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Meiner Großmutter

Einer großartigen Frau mit einzigartiger Willenstärke, Kenntnis und Güte,
die mich Vernunft lehrte und mein Leben für immer prägen wird.

“The world is full of international institutions. Disagreement about definitions, about how old or new the phenomenon, and about its exact impact cannot mask the reality of a growing number and role of international institutions.”

(Stein, 2008)

“(...) drug control efforts have rarely proceeded according to plan. To that effect there have been reversals and set-backs, surprising developments and unintended consequences. (...) But then, very little has been simple or smooth about developments in international affairs over the last century.”

(UNODC, 2009)

“Drug control is as much a matter of banning and illicit substances and reducing cocaine supply, as it is of reducing demand in consumer countries, and also of preventing coca cultivation through more ambitious alternative and rural development programs in the source countries.”

(International Crisis Group. 2008)

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AD	Alternative Development
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AUC	Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
CCPCJ	Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
CICAD	Organization of American States Drug Control Commission
CND	Commission on Narcotic Drugs
CPS	Co-finance and Partnership Section
EC	European Commission
ED	Executive Director
ENL	Ejército de Liberación Nacional
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FO	Field Office
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HQ	Headquarters
IEU	Independent Evaluation Unit
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
IO	International Organization
LACU	Latin America and the Caribbean Unit
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDCS	National Drug Control Strategy
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PM	Permanent Mission
SCOPE	Strategy for Coca and Opium Poppy Elimination
SLU	Sustainable Livelihoods Unit
UN	United Nations
UNDCP	United Nations Drug Control Programme
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGASS	United Nations General Assembly Special Session
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

Relevance of the Investigation

International organizations can be found in nearly every thematical and geographical area in our global system. That includes the long established Unites Nations as much as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), or the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). International relations research is gathering solid knowledge about international institutions: their role, qualities and functioning within in the continuously changing global system and about problems of international interdependence they are facing.

One problem of global outreach combated by the international community is illicit crop cultivation, the later trade and final consumption. Since single states are not able to resolve this problem on their own they are willing to cooperate within the framework of international organizations in order to secure the provision of security and welfare to their citizens. The mutual interest to eliminate illicit crop cultivation is combining a range of global actors, particularly states, within the context of alternative development programmes.

However, the actual qualifications, limitations, and performance of international organizations implementing alternative development projects and programmes in the 21st century have sparely been identified so far. Neither could a catalogue of key elements regarding the design and implementation of alternative development programmes and projects be found, nor of existing challenges limiting the work of international organizations. In order to gather solid knowledge and valuable data on these issues the current academic discussion on the role of international organizations, alternative development, and counter-drug measures will be illustrated and discussed before two UNODC alternative development projects in Colombia serving as a case study will be analyzed.

Research Objective, Questions and Hypothesis

The following research is based on stable research questions and further on pre-elaborated hypothesis which I hope will be validated and would be both explanatory and predictive.

Research Objective

The main objectives are the evaluation of qualifications and eligibility of international organizations as the main implementation agency of alternative development projects, as well as the identification of existing challenges and indispensable elements within the design and implementation of alternative development strategies and projects. For this purpose two UNODC alternative development projects in Colombia will be analysed in a case study.

Research Questions

- RQ1 What level of importance is and should be given to Alternative Development within current counter-drug strategies?
- RQ2 What special requirements have to be met during the implementation of Alternative Development strategies and projects? Are these elements successfully incorporated in the analyzed alternative development projects?
- RQ3 What abilities offers an International Organization such as UNODC as the implementing agency of alternative development projects compared to other actors within the global system?
- RQ4 What interests are pursued and actions taken by UNODC, the donors and the counterparts during the project cycle?

Hypothesis:

- H1 If national states face problems of international interdependence and are not able to resolve it on their own, then they are willing to cooperate within the framework of international organizations.
- H2 If national states intend to secure the provision of security and welfare to their citizens' within the framework of international organizations, then they act both according to their self-interest and in compliance with common objectives.

- H3 If alternative development projects are implemented in an unsound socio-economic environment, then the establishment of a well-designed socio-economic infrastructure in equal partnership with the project beneficiaries are essential for the projects' effectiveness and sustainability.
- H4 If strong emphasis is put on alternative development and broader development efforts in illicit crop cultivating countries, then endeavours in the fight against drugs undertaken by the international community can be effective.

Methodology

The present study is methodologically divided into three parts:

- I. Literature Research
- II. Document Research
- III. Expert Interviews

Ad III) Qualitative Interviews¹

The qualitative interview is because of the fact, that information can be gathered in "status nascendi", are unwrapped authentic, are intersubjectively comprehensible, and can be reproduced any time a popular method in the collection of data. The interview is a conversation situation that is established intentionally and purposefully by the people involved in order to gather information. The following table should demonstrate the different forms of interviews:

Dimensions of Differentiation	Forms and Denotation
1. Intention of the Interview	Investigative or Educational
2. Standardization	Standardized, Half- standardized, Or Non- standardized
3. Structure of Interview Partner(s)	Single Interview Group (Possibly Group Discussion)
4. Form of Communication	Verbal or Written
5. Stile of Communication (Interview conduction)	Hard, Soft, or Neutral
6. Nature of Questions	Closed or Open
7. Communication Media for Verbal Interviews	Face to face By Telephone

Figure 1: Forms of Interviews

A very important criterion for differentiation is also the intended direction of the information flow. It can be differentiated between the investigative interview and the educational

¹ The following description is, if not indicated otherwise, an adopted quotation from: Lamnek, Siegfried (1995). Qualitative Sozialforschung. Band2. Methoden und Techniken. Belz: Weinheim. P. 35-56.

interview. In the investigative interview the interviewed person is regarded as having recallable information that is of interest for the interviewer. In the educational interview the interviewed person is target of an informational or influential communication.

In the case of the present investigation qualitative expert interviews were conducted. The intention of the interviews is the gathering of information that is relevant for the answering of the research questions. The interviews were conducted in verbal form and face to face. The structure will be single interviews and the communication style was kept neutral. The interviews were based on half-standardized questionnaires consisting of open questions and it was recorded by a dictaphone. The interviews were of investigative nature and the information flow was directed one-sided from the interviewed person, the expert, to the interviewer. Though there are diverse forms of investigative interviews a precise differentiation has to be made: Informative, analytical and diagnostical interviews can be distinguished. In the present study informative interviews were conducted that aim at comprehending and capturing the knowledge and facts out of the expertise of the interviewed person in a descriptive manner. The interviewed person is regarded as an expert that can, because of their technical knowledge, provide information on special thematical areas that are of interest to the investigator. The form of half-standardised questionnaires was selected in order to both not constrain the answer's amplitude and depth and permit certain flexibility during the conduction while still guaranteeing the comparison of the individual answers or respectively the gathered information.

Planned Interview Partners:

- Arthur-Flatz, Claudia. External Relations Officer. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC.
- Hanke, Martina. Expert. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC.
- Jerneloey, Muki Daniel. External Relations Officer. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC.
- Mollinedo Claros, Julio. Second Secretary of the Bolivia Mission to the United Nation in Vienna.
- Montano Duran, Javier. Drug Control and Crime Prevention Officer. Latin America and the Caribbean Unit. UNODC.
- Philip De Andres, Amado. Drug Control and Crime Prevention Officer. Latin America and the Caribbean Unit. UNODC.
- Rios, Jorge Eduardo. Chief. Sustainable Livelihoods Unit. UNODC.

1. Theoretical Approach

Concerning the methodological international relations approach to my research subject I chose the traditional one as I wish to understand and describe the complexity of international cooperation and the various actors including their interests and positions involved in a humanistic way by reaching inside the field. I aspire to understand the role of the decision-makers and the institutions they act in, attempting to comprehend the both moral and political dilemmas in the undertaking to secure human health, welfare and security. The history and practice of diplomacy will also be of high interest in this regard.²

1.1 Liberal Belief: The Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number³

The emergence and establishment of liberal theories is in close connection with the rise of the modern liberal state in the 17th century and was regarded as a great potential for human progress by liberal philosophers such as John Locke. Modernity was associated with a higher level of welfare, free of authoritarian governments, and build a basis for the liberal belief in progress. In addition modernization constantly increases the scope and the need for cooperation⁴ and will strengthen long run cooperation based on mutual interests.⁵

I	A positive view of human nature
II	A conviction that international relations can be cooperative rather than conflictual
III	A belief in progress

Figure 2: Basic Liberal Assumptions I

According to liberal thinkers rational principles can be applied to international affairs. Although individuals place their own interest above others' and are let by competitive thinking, they share many interests and can engage in collaboration and cooperation which increases the individual benefits. Liberals belief that human reason can triumph over human

² See Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2007). Introduction to International Relations. Theories and approaches. Oxford University Press: Oxford, New York. P. 40sq.

³ „The greatest happiness principle“ is one of Jeremy Bentham's three principal characteristics of which constitutes the basis of his moral and political philosophy. Jeremy Bentham was an English philosopher and political radical. He is primarily known today for his moral philosophy which reflects what he calls at different times "the greatest happiness principle": what is morally obligatory is that which produces the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people. The modern liberal state invokes a political and economic system that will bring such happiness. In: <http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/b/bentham.htm>

⁴ Jackson/Sorensen. 2007. P.99 cit from Zacher, M.W./Matthew, R.A. (1995). Liberal International Theory. Common Threats, Divergent Strands. P119. in: Kegley, C.W.Jr. (1995). Controversies in International Relations. Realism and Neoliberal Challenge. St. Martin's Press: New York. 107-150.

⁵ Ibid. P. 98.

fear and the desire for power. Consequently conflict and war are evitable when people employ their reason and apply it to international affairs and cooperation across international boundaries.⁶

As mentioned before the belief in progress is one of the three main liberal assumptions but also a point of debate among liberals. Differentiations are discussed concerning the limits of progress, the beneficiaries⁷ of progress, or the area of progress. Progress is always for individuals as the core concern of liberals is the happiness of individual human beings.⁸




Figure 3: Basic Liberal Assumptions II⁹

Important early liberal thinkers that laid the base for today’s academic discussion are John Locke, Jeremy Bentham, and Immanuel Kant.

In the liberal view of world order liberty, freedom is core elements. Differentiation can be made between positive and negative liberty. Positive liberty is the liberty of taking one’s own decisions based on the existence of certain conditions, such as being healthy, the possession of economic resources, education, etc. Negative liberty implicates the guarantee of an individual sphere of autonomy, meaning the non-interference of state authority in any kind. Negative liberalism emphasizes a Liberalism of Restraints, including international institution-building and international laws. Of course Liberalism aims at sorting out problems via negotiation and cooperation and via dialogue rather than military or otherwise aggressive interference.¹⁰

After the end of the cold war there was a new upsurge of liberal thinking based on the defeat of communism and the victory of liberal democracies and Fukuyama’s concept of “the end of history”¹¹ in the academic world. However, the new threats to peace and security faced by the international community, the national state, and individuals in the 21st century as a result of

⁶ Ibid. P.97sqq.
⁷ Beneficiaries can be both geographical areas and single states or specific social classes within states or the global system.
⁸ See Jackson/Sorensen. 2007. P.99
⁹ Ibid. P.100
¹⁰ Ibid. P.123sqq.
¹¹ Fukuyama, F. (1989). The End of History?. National Interest. 16. And: Fukuyama, F. (1992). The End of History and the Last Man. Avon: New York.

the terrorist attacks in New York, London, Madrid, Mumbai and elsewhere, are a setback for liberal ideas and the sound optimism at the end of the previous century.¹²

1.2 Neoliberalism: The Debate between Liberalism and Realism continues

Neoliberalism, also known as post-war liberalism, is the renewed liberal approach that was developed in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s when the at that time present East-West rivalry and the experiences of two devastating world wars lent itself easily to the then established realist interpretation of the world. Realists trace their intellectual roots to Thucydides¹³ and see states as the primary actors in an anarchic world system where power is the central factor.¹⁴ However new international structures and relations in the fields of trade and investment, communication and travel provided the basis for a new attempt by liberals to formulate an alternative to realist thinking. In the 1950s a process of regional integration was getting under way in Western Europe and was referred to as a particularly intensive form of international integration by neoliberal scholars.¹⁵ Consequently there was a broad-scale effort to support and benefit from this integration and several international institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank¹⁶, the International Monetary Fund and the European Economic Community were established.¹⁷ Focus of their study was either, how certain functional activities across border offered mutually advantageous long-term cooperation, or how cooperation in one transactional area paved the way for the cooperation in an other¹⁸. The concept and definition of the analyzed international organization moved from: “a formal arrangement transcending national boundaries that provides for the establishment of institutional machinery to facilitate cooperation among members in the security, economic,

¹² See Jackson/Sorensen. 2007. P.99

¹³ Thucydides was is a greek historian in the 5th century B.C. and the author of the History of the Peloponnesian War. He developed high standards of evidence-gathering and analysis in terms of cause and effect and is also referred to as being the father of political realism. He constituted the relations between nations as being based on might rather than right and his interest in human nature in order to explain behaviour such as crisis and civil war. See Stammen, T./Riescher, G./ Hofmann, W. (1997). Hauptwerke der Politischen Theorie. Alfred Kröner Verlag: Stuttgart. P. 491sq.

¹⁴ Stein, A. Neoliberal Institutionalism. In:Reus-Smit, C./Snidal, D. (2008). The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. Oxford University Press: New York. P. 206

¹⁵ See Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2007). Introduction to International Relations. Theories and approaches. Oxford University Press: Oxford, New York. P. 42sq.

¹⁶ Originally established as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

¹⁷ See Stein. 2008. P. 202sq.

¹⁸ Relevant literature: Haas, E.B. (1958) The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957. Stanford University Press: Stanford.; Keohane, R.O./ Nye, J.S. (1975). International Interdependence and Integration. In: Greenstein, F./Polsby, N. (1975). Handbook of Political Science. International Politics. Reading. Addison-Wesley: Massachusetts. P.363-414.

social, or related fields”¹⁹, to a broadened one focusing on regimes in the 1980s: “principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area”²⁰.

In the following two decades four new streams of Neoliberalism managed to establish itself in international relations theory:

Sociological Liberalism	Cross-border flows, common values
Interdependence Liberalism	Transactions stimulate cooperation
Institutional Liberalism	International institutions, regimes
Republican Liberalism	Liberal democracies living in peace with each other

Figure 4: Neoliberalism: Progress and Cooperation²¹

The different streams of Neoliberalism all support and promote the idea of a peaceful and cooperative international system and stand as a challenge to the realist approach to international relations²² and focused on the cooperation and post World War II international arrangements and the expected change and improvement.²³

1.2.1 Sociological, Interdependence, and Republican Liberalism

Due to the limited research focus of the present study only institutional liberalism will be subject to an in-depth discussion in the following chapter. However the mentioned other three approaches will be very shortly presented below.

Sociological Liberalism:

During the 1950s and 1960s Europe and Japan developed mass-consumption societies with a higher level of trade, communication, cultural exchange and other cross-border relations. Karl Deutsch argued that such interconnecting activities helped create common values and identities among the people of Europe²⁴.

Interdependence Liberalism:

In the 1970s Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye developed Deutsch’s idea further into the interdependence liberalism approach and are among the main contributors to this line of

¹⁹ Stein. 2008. P. 203 cit from Plano, J.C./Olton, R. (1979). The International Relations Dictionary. New Issues: Kalamazoo. P.288.

²⁰ Ibid. P. 203 cit from Krasner, S.D. (1982). Structural causes and regime consequences. Regimes as intervening variables. International Organizations: 35. P.185.

²¹ Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2007). Introduction to International Relations. Theories and approaches. Oxford University Press: Oxford, New York. P. 44.

²² Ibid. P.44sq

²³ See Stein. 2008. P. 204

²⁴ See Jackson/Sorensen. 2007. P.43 cit from Deutsch, K.W. et al. (1957). Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Princeton University Press: Princeton.

thinking. They focused on the verified forms of connections, interactions and relations between societies besides the traditional political relations of governments. The situation in international relations is described as a high complex interdependence between powers and the absence of hierarchy among issues, such as the non dominant status of military security or military power.²⁵

Republican Liberalism:

The main idea is that liberal democracies enhance peace because they do not go to war against each other and has been strongly influenced by the rapid spread of democratization in the late 1980s, especially after the end of the Cold War when former Soviet satellite countries transformed into democracies. According to Michael Doyle this “democratic peace”²⁶ is based on three pillars: 1) Peaceful conflict solution between democratic states; 2) common values among democratic states; 3) a common moral foundation; 4) economic cooperation among democracies.²⁷

1.2.2 Institutional Liberalism -From a Jungle to a Zoo?

After the First World War former US President Woodrow Wilson had the vision about transforming international relations “from a jungle to a zoo”. This was to be achieved through the establishment of international organizations, in particular the League of Nations. According to early liberal idealists, traditional power politics is a chaotic ruthless “jungle”, whereas within the framework of an international organization, such as the League of Nations, have the ability to transform the jungle into a “zoo” by providing relatively restrained conditions based on international law.²⁸ At the first half of the 20th century the research focused on international organizations and the literature was largely descriptive and normative.²⁹

Contemporary institutional liberals pursue a less optimistic approach. They argue that international institutions enable an easier cooperation, but don't poses the ability to transform international relation effectively form the discussed “jungle” to a “zoo” because powerful states won't be easily constrained. However, a high level of institutionalization strongly supports the stabilization of international structures and negative effects caused by the revival

²⁵ Ibid. P.44, 97.

²⁶ Doyle, M.W. (1983). Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs. Pts 1 and 2. Philosophy and Public Affairs. 12/3: 205-235 and 12/4: 323-354.

²⁷ See Jackson/Sorensen. 2007. P.44, 97.

²⁸ Ibid. P. 34,108.

²⁹ See Stein. 2008. P. 202.

of multi-polarity in the global system. That's because institutions support the development of trust between states or other relevant actors due to the facilitation of transparency through the provision of information and the provision of a forum for negotiation. Governments are able to monitor others' compliance and to implement their own commitments.³⁰

In order to evaluate the role of international institutions in the promotion of and agreement to international cooperation institutional liberalist developed a behaviouralistic scientific approach. The extent of institutionalization among states and their role in the advancement of institutionalization is the focus of the analysis and can be measured according to its depth and scope³¹. One way of assessing the mentioned scope and depth of institutionalization is to look at a group of states where we assume a high level of institutionalization and then evaluate the ways in which institutional matter. Current research on international institutions pursues the following two aims: 1) the collection of data on existing regimes in various issue areas of international relations; 2) the study of specific theoretical questions³² that require further research.³³

1.2.3 Neoliberalism versus Neorealism³⁴

One way of assessing the qualities of the (neo) liberal theory and its developed approaches is to compare it with its main contender, the (neo) realist view.

In the 1970s neoliberal thinkers regarded their approach as the future dominant theory in the discipline. However a reformulation of realism³⁵ and the development of neorealist approaches re-established the balance.³⁶ While previous debates between realism and

³⁰ See Jackson/Sorensen.2007. P.108-111.

³¹ Depth can be measured through its 1) commonality (the degree to which expectations about appropriate behaviour and understanding about how to interpret action are shared by participants in the system.), 2) specificity (the degree to which these expectations are clearly specified in the form of rules.), and 3) autonomy (the extent to which the institution can alter its own rules rather than depending on outside agents, such as the national state.). Scope concerns the number of issue areas in which there are institutions. Jackson/Sorensen. 2007. P.108sq cit from Keohane, R.O. (1989). *International Institutions and State Power. Essays in International Relations Theory*. Westview Press: Boulder. P.4

³² Important questions: Under what conditions and through what mechanisms do international regimes come into existence? Do regimes persist even when the circumstances in which they came into existence change? What consequences of regimes for state behaviour and problem solving can we observe? What long-term effects do regimes have on national political systems and the structure of world politics? Jackson/Sorensen. 2007. P.109 cit from Levy et al. (1995). *The Study of International Relations*. *European Journal of International Relations*. 1/3. P. 268.

³³ See Jackson/Sorensen. 2007. P.109sq

³⁴ A deeper discussion on peace and war and the different positions and arguments of Neorealists and Neoliberals won't be presented due to the focus and limitation of the present study.

³⁵ Leading scholar was Kenneth Waltz: Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. McGraw-Hill: New York.

³⁶ See Jackson/Sorensen. 2007. P.44sq.

liberalism discussed the human nature³⁷ and its internal moral qualities and capabilities, present discussions focus on observable facts and measurable data in the external social and political world. As pointed out before neorealists account the global system as being anarchic. This anarchic structure is the reason for the new instabilities and insecurities that exist in the now multi-polar global system. Institutions don't play an important role in international politics because such institutions can only work in "low politics", areas of lesser importance, and not in "high politics" such as national security. According to Mearsheimer, institutions would only constitute a "false promise"³⁸. In addition institutions only reflect the power and interests of the member states and therefore have no chance to act independently. Moreover realists claim that institutions are only created by the powerful to serve the powerful and only exists as long as the purpose of its establishment is still valid. However, following example should prove the contrary: NATO, whose purpose was to contain Soviet power continued to function after the End of the Cold War and even expanded its membership and tasks.³⁹

As pointed out before for liberals history is potentially progressive with new and often better social or economic conditions coming up, while realists argue that conditions, such as increased international cooperation and relations in the 1970s, have existed for a long time⁴⁰ without being able to prevent two world wars. History is the same damn things over and over again, so Layne⁴¹. Even in international institutions, so the realist view, state act according to their self-interest and own decisions. In short, there is no escape from self-help and the security dilemma.⁴² However, liberalists respond to the realists' arguments and according to their new position they can be divided in two groups: weak liberals and strong liberals⁴³.

Weak liberals accept several realist claims including the view of the world system as being anarchic, whilst strong liberals claim that the present fundamental changes in the global system, world politics and the international society are in line with the liberal expectations. Robert Keohane is one of the most important scholars in the debate between neoliberals and

³⁷ „You have misunderstood politics because you misestimated human nature“, so Waltz. Jackson/Sorensen. 2007. P.115 cit from Waltz, K.N. (1959). *Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis*. Columbia University Press: New York. P.40.

³⁸ Stein. 2008. P. 206 cit from Mearsheimer, J.J.(1994).*The false promise of international institutions*. *International Security*:19. P.5-49.

³⁹ *Ibid*. P. 206

⁴⁰ Especially in the field of economic interdependence, as for example world exports in the 1960s or 1970s were below the level at the end of the 19th century.

⁴¹ Jackson/Sorensen. 2007. P.116 cit from Layne, C. (1994). *Kant or Cant. The Myth of the Democratic Peace*. *International Security*. 19/2. P.5-49

⁴² *Ibid*. P.115sq.

⁴³ Weak and strong indicates different degrees of disagreement with realism and not the solidity of the arguments.

neorealists. In his analysis on international institutions he applied a clearly realist starting point, assuming that states are the major actors in our anarchic international system where the power for states is of great importance. However, international institutions possess the ability to facilitate cooperation and make it less likely that states mistrust or cheat on each other.⁴⁴ Even if international institutions are a self-interested creation of states, they can be constructed easily if there is little conflict of interest. In addition states experience collaboration problems in which their autonomous self-interest behaviour results in poorer or even deficient outcomes. Additionally states may also create institutions in order to reduce the transaction or governance cost resulting from autonomous decision-making or action.⁴⁵ Realists on the other side claim that Keohane overlooked the one crucial point: relative gains⁴⁶, which means that states have distributional concerns and have to worry about the relatively higher or greater benefits for their cooperation partners and consequently are a source of inhibitions for closer cooperation. Therefore cooperation would be more difficult to achieve and sustain because states would give up potential gains if the cooperation that brought them these gains meant that others gained even more⁴⁷. Keohane dealt with these neorealist arguments by stating that the conditions for cooperation between states defines its qualification. The single most important condition is the existence of common interests between states⁴⁸. If states pursue a common interest or objective they won't be worrying about relative gains as they won't be able to reach their goal at all on their own. Of course in the case of absence of such common interests states will act competitive, sceptically or even fearful and institutions won't be a big help.⁴⁹ Of course states differ in power and this power is used in to structure the choices for others in the construction of institutions and is reflected in their bargaining power to obtain certain outcomes. However, this doesn't reduce the importance of institutions and voluntaristic agreements. And the fact of their foundation in order to improve outcomes for member states provides no assurance that they actually accomplish their objective. The participating actors simply have different endowments, possibilities and bargaining powers that determine outcomes.⁵⁰ Keohane also points out, that

⁴⁴ See Jackson/Sorensen. 2007. P.117sq.

⁴⁵ See Stein. 2008. P. 208sq

⁴⁶ Gains are benefits that accrue to participants that cooperate.

⁴⁷ Stein. 2008. P. 210 cit from Grieco, J.M.(1988). Anarchy and the limits of cooperation. A realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism. *International Organization*: 42. P.485-507

⁴⁸ Jackson/Sorensen. 2007. P.118 cit from Keohane. 1989. P.3; Keohane. 1993. P.277. In: Baldwin. 1993. P.269-301.

⁴⁹ Ibid. P.117sq.

⁵⁰ Stein. 2008. P.210sq.

“realists and institutionalists agree that without a basis either of hegemonic dominance or common interests, international institutions cannot long survive.”⁵¹

This neoliberal position enables the understanding of successful cooperation in an anarchic global system, but it is also leading liberalism away from its genuine origin. Still, despite these new institutional assumptions and approach emphasize self-interest, draw on microeconomics and agree to the global system as being anarchic as realists do, they were labelled neoliberalism and neoinstitutional liberalism because of its emphasis on cooperation and institutions⁵².

The faction of strong neoliberals⁵³ argue that history isn't “the same damn things over and over again” as realists state, because today's close economic interdependences concerning production, consumption, financial flows, and so on, make it almost impossible for states to opt out⁵⁴ of the system and the resulting cooperation. Strong liberals don't deny the anarchy of our world system, but in their view it is by far more complex than recognized by neorealists and they question the conclusion neorealists draw from its existence. Of course there is no single world government or such thing, but there are significant elements of legitimate and effective authority in international politics even though the existence of anarchy. Neoliberals also state, that anarchy doesn't necessarily produce the insecurity pointed out by neorealists. Despite anarchy genuine progress is possible and currently taking place in many regions in the world and in several areas states have managed to change and establish new governance structures within the “not so raw any more anarchy”.⁵⁵ Summing up both the neorealist and neoliberal approaches finally agree on the existence of anarchy. The key element of debate has shifted to its meaning and implications and the extent to which development if institutions such as the United Nations can transcend the basic structural characteristics of the existing anarchy in the global system.⁵⁶

When it comes to studying this change, neoliberals seem to provide the better tools than neorealists. Unfortunately neoliberals are short of instruments and arguments when it come to explain lack of progress or retrogress, such as it is happening in the third world where a

⁵¹ Dougherty, J./Pfaltzgraff, R. (2001). *Contending Theories of International Relations. A Comprehensive Survey*. Longman: New York. P.68. cit from Keohane. 1993. In: Baldwin. 1993. P. 294-295.

⁵² Stein. 2008. P. 205.

⁵³ Strong Liberals include J. Burton, K. Deutsch, M. W. Doyle, R. Rosecrance, J. N. Rosenau, B. M. Russett and M. Zürn.

⁵⁴ See Jackson/Sorensen. 2007. P.119 cit form Holm, H.-H./Sorensen, G. (1995). *Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War*. Westview Press: Boulder.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* P.118-123.

⁵⁶ See Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff. 2001. P.68

number of very poor countries have failed to develop successfully or even experience state collapse.⁵⁷

1.3 Present Focus of Research

As a result of the end of the Cold War certain traditional liberal research issues gained new relevance, such as the securing of democratic peace. Karl Deutsch's security community also requires further development in order to apply to the present threats and circumstances. Further focus of research is the gathering of solid knowledge about international institutions: newer institutions such as the OSCE and WTO that play a central role in the present global system. Or older established institutions such as NATO or the UN, that need to change and changed significantly since their foundation after the Second World War due to the constantly new challenged and problems they have to face.⁵⁸ The circumstances under which international institutions were established mostly change substantially, so can the distribution of power and the constellation of interest. Facing new political, social or economic problems member states can extend the scope of and reform existing institutions or even create new ones.⁵⁹ Important is also the fact, that institutions have become more and more intrusive and constraining over time. Today states more or less expect and generally tolerate such strong involvement in their internal affairs⁶⁰.

At present great attention is given to the assessment of the impact, or effectiveness, of international institutions⁶¹. Scholars have also focused on state compliance with international institutions. Surprisingly states mostly comply with the agreements they make, at times even without enforcement mechanisms. This can be explained the following way: the compliance results "from the fact that most treaties require states to make only modest departures from what they would have done in the absence of an agreement⁶². That is one of the reasons why it remains difficult to assess to impact of institutions.⁶³

Without doubt and as indicated earlier the new threats to international security above all resulting from the terrorist attacks in New York, London, Madrid, Mumbai and elsewhere,

⁵⁷ See Jackson/Sorensen, 2007. P.123.

⁵⁸ Ibid. 123sq.

⁵⁹ See Stein. 2008. P. 215sq.

⁶⁰ Ibid. P. 216 cit from Stein, A.A. (2001). Constrained Sovereignty. The growth of international intrusiveness. P.261-281. In: Rosecrance, R./Lanham, (2001). The new great power coalition. Toward a World Concert of Nations. Rowman and Littlefield: Md.

⁶¹ Mostly by economists assessing the impact of regional or global trade arrangements, or of the effectiveness of international environmental regimes.

⁶² Stein. 2008. P. 212 cit from Downs, G.W./ Rocke, D.M./Barsoom, P.N. (1996). Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation? *International Organization*:50. P.380.

⁶³ Ibid. P. 212sq.

embody a great challenge to liberal international relations theory. Greater security at international borders, the demand for more police and intelligence and control and less openness in general interferes with the liberal ideas. However, such developments can also strengthen or establish new international cooperation and collaboration in order to pursue their common interests concerning the provision of security to their citizens.⁶⁴ Moreover the neorealist-neoliberal debate has moved away from the sharp delineation that existed during the utopian-realist era to an effort towards synthesis, which will hopefully provide a basis for further progress in international relations theory.⁶⁵

1.4 Research Focus on International Organizations

1.4.1 The Concept of IOs

The term “international organization” was recognized in the political vocabulary long after organizations that would be labelled as international organizations today were founded at the end of the 19th century. Not until the founding of the League of Nations after the First World War was the term international organization widely known as only a mix of different terms such as international public union or commission existed before. It took about 30 years till the term was finally established in the political thesaurus.⁶⁶

An international organization is a certain class of an international institution. An other central class would be an international regime. Two important differentiations can be made between the two: First, regimes always focus on a single thematical problem, such as human rights, while international organizations can focus on one area or can also act in various over-lapping fields. Second, international organizational possess the ability to be an independent actor while international regimes possess no such quality.⁶⁷

International Organizations can be described and regarded in three different ways: as an instrument, an arena, or an actor⁶⁸. As an instrument of national diplomacy the core objective of member states is the realization of self-interests and the exercise of power. International organization as an arena provides the forum or stage for intergovernmental negotiations. This includes informational exchange, issue setting or the expression of demands. According to the image of international organizations as an instrument or arena doesn't include the possibility

⁶⁴ See Jackson/Sorensen. 2007. 123-126.

⁶⁵ See Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff. 2001. P.69.

⁶⁶ See Rittberger, V./Zangl, B. (2005). Internationale Organisationen. Politik und Geschichte. 3. Ed. Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften: Wiesbaden. P.21sq.

⁶⁷ Ibid. P.25

⁶⁸ Ibid. P.23 cit from Rittberger, V./Mogler, M./Zangl, B. (1997). Vereinte Nationen und Weltordnung. Zivilisierung der Internationalen Politik? Leske+Budrich: Opladen.

of overcoming the anarchy in the global system. As pointed out before an international organization possess the ability to be an independent actor in the global system. Without doubt IOs are a collective of states acting within a certain frame. However, there is something very specific about this decision-making or corporate action when sovereign states act according to formalized rules and procedures within and through international organizations: it is the fact that without this certain organization and its organs the action or decision wouldn't have taken place/ been taken.⁶⁹

Important for the classification of international organizations is the facilitated and established political linkage, which can be identified with the following five criteria: membership, mandate, function within the development process of politics⁷⁰, decision-making power, and decision-making scope.⁷¹

1.4.2 Core Actors, Interests and Exercise of Influence in IOs

The elaboration of politics in international organizations is regulated by their normative frameworks and after all determined by the various interests, resources and influences of actors involved in the decision-making process. According to Rittberger five classes of actors can be distinguished: 1) representatives of governments or member states, 2) administrative staff⁷², 3) parliamentary assemblies, 4) organized interests and public opinion, 5) experts with politics-consulting functions.




Figure 5: The political System of International Organizations (Input)⁷³

1.4.3 Motivations and Characteristics of Decision Makers

Basically there are two types of motivation: “in-order-to” motives and “because-of” motives⁷⁴. The first are conscious and articulable, as the decision-makers are taking this

⁶⁹ Ibid. P. 23sqq
⁷⁰ Focus of work or role within this process.
⁷¹ Ibid. P. 28-32.
⁷² In particular high ranked leading positions.
⁷³ Ibid. P.116

particular decision in-order-to accomplish a specific objective (with a certain outcome) of the state they serve. The second are unconscious or semiconscious motives or even impulses arising out of previous life experiences or moral values or interests of the particular decision-maker. According to the classic model of decision-making, policymakers make a calculation in two basic dimensions: utility and probability. Assuming that they are rational, they aim at maximizing the resulting utility. Of course decision-makers act according to clear preferences, which result from the rules of the organizational system, shared organizational experience, information available and biographies of individuals⁷⁵. However, decision-making theory does not necessarily assume the rationality of decision-makers. Modern theorists of governmental decision-making assume purposeful behaviour and explicit motivation. The decision-making process combines rational elements, value considerations in which the rational can mix up with the nonrational, the irrational or the suprarational. Last three results from the psychic condition of the policymaker and emerge from stress or anxiety⁷⁶. The scholars Braybrooke and Lindblom point out that every solution addressed by policymakers must be limited by several factors such as the individual's problem-solving capacities, the amount of information available, the cost of analysis and of course the practical inseparability of fact and value⁷⁷. According to the minimum standards of acceptability by Herbert Simon people just keep rejecting unsatisfactory solutions until they find one that they can agree is sufficient to enable them to act in a satisfactory way. Furthermore it is evident that foreign policy decision-making, especially in crisis situations and matters of national security, is influenced by domestic politics and political forces. In particular realists such as Kenneth Waltz endorse this statement. It has been made clear that the dichotomy between assumptions of rationality and irrationality in the behaviour of individuals, groups and governments is one of the most persistent dimensions in the field of international relations theory. In particular in non-western societies and states today's decision-making theory is very little developed and lacks of sufficient theoretical approaches in connection with the international relations dimension.⁷⁸

⁷⁴ Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff. 2001. P. 559 cit from Snyder, R.C. et al. (1963). *Foreign Policy Decision-Making*. Free Press: New York P.144.

⁷⁵ Ibid. cit from Snyder. 2002. P.176.

⁷⁶ Ibid. P. 561 cit from Singer, D. (1963). *Inter-Nation Influence. A Formal Model*. *American Political Science Review*: LXII. P.428-430.

⁷⁷ Ibid. P. 561 cit from Braybrooke, D./ Lindblom, C.E. (1963). *A Strategy of Decision*. Free Press: New York. P.40

⁷⁸ Ibid. P. 559-562, 598sq.

2. Illicit Crops in Latin America

“A decade after the UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on the world drug problem⁷⁹, illicit drugs, drug trafficking and related crime continues to threaten peace and stability around the globe. (...). After ten years of intense efforts to curb cocaine in the three Andean source countries⁸⁰ and to reduce the amount trafficked to, and consumed in, the U.S. and Europe, but more recently also increasingly in former transit countries (...), results are meagre at best.”⁸¹

This chapter is dedicated to take a closer and critical look at the drug problem arising from and in Latin America and assess if the results are truly meagre at best.

2.1 Scope of Cultivation, Trafficking and Consumption

2.1.1 Cultivation

Over the last years there had been a constant up and down in the regions different cultivation centres, but the overall situation has been quite stable. So was a decrease in coca cultivation in Bolivia and Peru accompanied by an increase in Colombia⁸², and then vice versa in the following year⁸³. Of course long term trends are by far more meaningful than short term fluctuations and single dat. However, some facts should be additionally presented in this subchapter in order to show a more concrete picture.

According to UNODC, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, some encouraging reduction of cocaine can be recognized at the global level in the year 2008. The coca cultivation in Colombia, which is of interest to the present research, increased about 18%, while the trends in other production countries are mixed. Taken into account that data can never be complete enough to give a precise statements or even a forecast it can be pointed out that the total coca production did in fact decrease. Despite small increases in Bolivia (6%) and Peru (4%) the total coca cultivation declined (8%) in the year 2008 due to the high decrease in Colombia (18%). Despite this significant decrease Colombia remains the leading coca

⁷⁹ The UNGASS on the world drug problem and the decided action plan will be discussed in chapter 4.2.1.

⁸⁰ Bolivia, Colombia and Peru.

⁸¹ International Crisis Group (2008a). Latin American Drugs I. Losing the Fight. Latin America Report No.25: Brussels, Bogota. P.1.

⁸² There is also coca cultivation in marginal amounts in Ecuador, Venezuela and Brazil.

⁸³ UNODC (2007). Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region. A survey of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. P.III.

cultivator in the world (81,000 ha). The total area under coca cultivation fell to 167,600 ha which is the average level between 2002 and 2008 and most importantly below the high 1990s levels. Also the cocaine production decrease by 15% down to around 845 mt.⁸⁴




Figure 6: Coca Cultivation in Latin America 1994-2008⁸⁵

However, according to the White House’s drug office (ONDCP) around 198,500 ha of coca crops could be detected in 2005 and 177,800 ha to 254,800 ha in 2006. This variation is due to methodologies. UNODC uses commercial satellite imagery, with frequent view and continuous recording but comparatively low resolution, over all of Colombia, fifteen coca-growing regions in Peru and Bolivia’s Yungas and Chapare regions, combined with high resolution airplane photo and video imagery and field verification. The U.S. uses higher resolution satellites, its own sampling and extrapolations, but its methodology has been criticised for not including statistically more rigorous accuracy assessment and terrain and atmosphere correction.⁸⁶

As was pointed out in an Crisis Group Report in 2008 several years of efforts to reduce coca crops in the Andean region have had little success⁸⁷, but according to UNODC the overall situation is stable, yet fragile and there has been some substantial decrease in the last two years. Needs to be questions if this is the beginning of a positive and promising trend or only a fluctuation in a dreadful odyssey. However, progress is possible as shown in the Golden Triangle⁸⁸ of South East Asia that was far and wide known for its vast opium cultivation and became almost opium free in the last two decades.⁸⁹

⁸⁴ UNODC (2009). World Drug Report. United Nations Publication: New York. P.9sq, 63sq.

⁸⁵ Ibid. P.11

⁸⁶ International Crisis Group. 2008a. P.2 cit from Crisis Group interviews, coca survey expert and Government Accountability Office (GAO) officials, Bogota and Washington DC, 19 October 2007 and 14 January 2008.

⁸⁷ Ibid. P.31

⁸⁸ Myanmar (Burma), Laos, Vietnam and Thailand.

⁸⁹ See UNODC. 2007. P.III.

2.1.2 Drug Trafficking and Cocaine Seizure

In 2007 the global seizure of cocaine base, salts and crack cocaine fell slightly compared to the year before but halts the strong upward trend of the last years⁹⁰. Central America and the Caribbean remain the two major transit areas: cocaine trafficked to North America usually originates in Colombia and reaches the US through Mexico.⁹¹ Unfortunately no reliable data on how much cocaine enters Mexico from South America and gets trafficked to the U.S. is available. But a 90% of the cocaine entering the United States is estimated to come through Mexico. Europe is after the United States the second largest cocaine consumer market globally.⁹² In the 2007 and 2008 declines of cocaine trafficking into the United States and Europe could be detected. But unfortunately drug trafficking through Western Africa had been increasing since in the last decade while the seizure is still at a very low percentage compared to the likely cocaine trafficking flows affecting the continent.⁹³ Very weak governance and enforcement structures build the basis of the ongoing boom of drug trafficking⁹⁴. Both UNODC and Crisis Group agree that it needs to be realized that transnational trafficking organizations and cocaine retailers across the globe have not been controlled successfully. Better coordination between the U.S., European and Latin American approaches and actions in the fight against drugs is urgently required as transnational trafficking organizations adapt rapidly and continue making extreme profits in this destructive business.⁹⁵

2.1.3 Consumption

Unfortunately but as a matter of consequence drug problem effects all regions in the world. Either as cultivation area, consuming society or trafficking route. Concerning the case of Latin America it can be illustrated as below:

⁹⁰ The immense financial scope of drug trafficking can be illustrated with the seizure of 80 million US\$ worth of dollars, Euros and gold in one single operation based on DEA intelligence made by the Colombian police in 2007. See International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.6 according to Crisis Group interviews, DEA officials: Washington D.C. 9 January 2008.

⁹¹ See UNODC. 2009. P.70.

⁹² International Crisis Group. 2008a. P.23-29.

⁹³ See UNODC. 2009. P.71-74.

⁹⁴ See National Drug Control Strategy. 2008. P.34

⁹⁵ See International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.1,9.




Figure 7: Drug Cultivation-Trafficking-Consumption

The number of drug users⁹⁶ at a global level has remained basically stable within the last four years at around 4, 7 to 5, 0% of the world's population. Cocaine users increased in the last two years up to 16 to 21 million people, about 0, 37% percent of the world's population. The cocaine market is forecast to stabilize in the medium term as production levels and consumption continues to ever decline, such it is the case in the North America, or flatten such it is the case in Western Europe⁹⁷. According to recent surveys in Western Europe, North America and Oceania, cocaine markets are calculated in total shrinking or at least stabilized at a high level⁹⁸, however "there are no data to suggest a significant fall in drug use"⁹⁹. The largest market remains North America¹⁰⁰, followed by West and Central Europe and South America. After declines in youth drug use throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, drug use in the United States had rebounded and has finally been decreasing again in the last years in North America, especially the United States¹⁰¹. Europe markets, following strong increases in recent years¹⁰², appear to be stabilizing in recent times, whereas cocaine use still appears to be increasing in South America¹⁰³. However, the consumption level remains dangerously high and new markets can always emerge as it is initiating along the trafficking routes through Central America and Western Africa¹⁰⁴. Some African countries, notably in Western and Southern Africa, already show rising levels of cocaine use, although data are sparse and no predictions can be made yet.¹⁰⁵

⁹⁶ The term drug users refers to the drug consuming population aged 15 to 64.

⁹⁷ UNODC. 2008. P.30-34.

⁹⁸ International Crisis Group. 2008a. P.31.

⁹⁹ EU drugs strategy 2005-2012. P.4 at: <http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/html.cfm/index6790EN.html>

¹⁰⁰ See also International Crisis Group (2008b). Latin American Drugs II. Improving Policy and Reducing Harm. Latin America Report No.26: Brussels, Bogota. P.2

¹⁰¹ See National Drug Control Strategy. 2008 Annual Report. Office of National Drug Control Policy: Washington D.C. P. 1 at: <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/>

¹⁰² See also European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction- EMCDDA at: <http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/html.cfm/index190EN.html>

¹⁰³ See also: International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.1

¹⁰⁴ See also: UNODC (2007). Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa. The Threat to Stability and Development.

¹⁰⁵ UNODC. 2009. P.9, 15, 80 sq.

2.2 Drug Caused Problems

Illegal drugs and crime are inexorably linked to each other as most countries prohibit the cultivation, manufacturing, possession, use, purchase, sale, distribution, import or export of drugs and the laundering of the proceeds. Consequently the quantity of people committing drug related crime is significant. The most commonly associated criminal activities are a) acquisitive crimes motivated by drug use, such as burglary and robbery, used to pay for drugs; b) trade linked to drug use, such as street sex work; c) crimes committed under the influence of drugs, a result of the effects of drugs on the mind; and d) crimes related to drug markets, for example territory wars.¹⁰⁶

It is easy to realize that the established international drug control system produced unintended consequences such as the creation of a highly lucrative black market for drugs and the violence and corruption it generates. Of course there have been demands for the abolition of the system, and legalized and tax substances like cannabis or cocaine in order to stop the often extreme violence that comes along. That means the core problem is not the costs or effectiveness of the system, but the resulting violence and corruption. Abandoning the counter- drug system would also require undoing the UN Conventions¹⁰⁷ dealing with the drug problem by global consensus. But on very few issues in international relations have been that much positive consensus as on drug control. However illegal substances such as cocaine are kept illegal for the purpose of protection citizens from the dangerous and adverse effects of drug use and addiction. It's a fact that more people die from the use of legal substances such as tobacco than of illegal ones every year. But not because they are more harmful, rather because they are almost universally available. Consequently if currently illegal substances would be accessible their popularity would rise and so the victims of their destruction. Moreover treatment and the capacity to collect taxes are very limited in the developing world where people are already very vulnerable to addictive legal substances such as alcohol and tobacco. Therefore the international community needs both to control drugs and to reduce the violence and crime linked to it. However, drug control efforts have rarely proceeded according to plan. To that effect there have been reversals and set-backs and surprising developments. But then, very little has been simple or smooth about developments in international affairs over the last century.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ See Hughes, R./ Lart, R./ Higate, P. (2006). *Drugs. Policy and Politics*. Open University Press: Maidenhead. P. 75sq

¹⁰⁷ The UN Conventions dealing with the drug problem will be further discussed in chapter 4.1.2.

¹⁰⁸ See UNODC. 2009. P.18sq, 163sqq. Also see: Jelsma. 2002. P.23.

As partly brought up before illicit drug business, especially drug trafficking, often leads to 1) the undermining of institutions and democracy; 2) the fuelling of armed and civic conflict; 3) the weakening of local governance and development; and the obstruction of international cooperation. Especially in Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela and Haiti courts and police are infiltrated, officials are corrupted at all levels of government, and even elections are tainted at times. Mexico has a long history of corruption and criminal infiltration and in particular police forces have been vulnerable, but also military and members of federal government. In many cases politicians have turned a blind eye to trafficking in order to avoid or limit drug trafficking caused violence¹⁰⁹. Strongly in big cities of Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina so called wars between criminal groups to control drug distribution are raising street violence to extreme levels and constitute a very serious threat to public security.

2.3 Counter Drug Strategies

Counter-drug strategies have been recognized by observers and even privately by many policy-makers and police chiefs as being ineffective so far.¹¹⁰

2.3.1 U.S., EU and Colombian Strategies

In the past decade, both great efforts and resources have been invested in the global fight against drugs. These efforts include crop eradication, interdiction, institutional strengthening and law enforcement, domestic demand reduction harm reduction programmes and alternative development¹¹¹. But they have proved ineffective and overall demand and supply levels have not changed for the better¹¹².

The United States can account around 35 years of “war on drugs” based on former U.S. President Richard Nixon’s declaration back in 1971. The global drug trade has been viewed as a serious threat, having the capacity to “destabilize democratic and friendly governments, undermining U.S. foreign policy objectives, and generate violence and human suffering

¹⁰⁹ International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.36 according to Crisis Group Interview, Political analyst. Mexico City. 26 November 2007.

¹¹⁰ Ibid. P.35

¹¹¹ Ibid. P.I,1.

¹¹² For a more detailed illustration of the present scope of coca cultivation and cocaine consumption see subchapter 2.1.1 and 2.1.3.

(...)”¹¹³. Its priority has been given to supply reduction measures with a strong component of law enforcement against traffickers on one side and to coca crop eradication on the other¹¹⁴.

Washington has always been focusing on the first three stages of drug supply: cultivation, processing and transit, and combating drug trafficking has been a primary foreign policy objective since the mid 1990s and about 50% of all U.S. foreign assistance has been invested in this field. Since 2002 the National Drug Control Strategy has set three priorities within the fight against drugs: 1) stopping drugs before use, through prevention measures and the enhancement of a cultural shift away from drug use, focusing on youth; 2) intervening and healing America’s drug users, including treatment for drug users and addicts; and 3) disruption of the market for illegal drugs in order to reduce the supply.¹¹⁵

With reference to the focus of the present study, eradication of illicit crops has been encouraged through cash investments, alternative crops and, only most recently, community infrastructure projects. But the bigger part of eradication has been realized through areal spraying, and the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) continue to argue that “crop control is the most cost-effective means of cutting supply”.¹¹⁶

State Department assistance in the field strengthening judicial and financial institutions, including transparency and efficiency, usually focuses on units in Colombia that are directly dedicated to combating drugs and have no broader development approach as USAID programmes.¹¹⁷ That way, leaders and facilitator involved in drug trafficking, money laundering or other illicit groups, but will most probably not commit to a sustainable change in the Colombian drug scene and the resulting problems.

The National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) has been emphasizing the importance of balanced demand and supply reduction interventions at home and abroad, but up until now this has only been rhetoric, as policy responses and resources still focus largely on law enforcement, interdiction and incarceration of users and traffickers, but a public health

¹¹³ National Drug Control Strategy. 2008. P.34

¹¹⁴ See International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.2 according to Crisis Group Interview. Government Accountability Office (GAO) officials: Washington DC. 14 January 2008.

¹¹⁵ See National Drug Control Strategy. 2008. P.1-5

¹¹⁶ But see: International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.4 according to Rubin, B./Sherman, J. (2008). Counter-Narcotics to Stabilize Afghanistan. The False Promise of Crop Eradication. P.5 At: www.cic.nyu.edu/afghanistan/docs/counternarcoticsfinal.pdf. In Afghanistan the U.S. supports poppy eradication in order to deprive the Taliban insurgency of funding, but eradication raises the price of opium and consequently ensures equally high income through drug business and encourages farmers to move to other illicit crop cultivation areas.

¹¹⁷ Ibid. P.6 according to Crisis Group Interview. U.S. official: Cartagena. 19 November 2007.

approach to demand reduction is still missing. For the year 2009 the federal drug control spending is divided into a) 3,830,9\$ million for interdiction; b) 3,763,3\$ million for domestic law enforcement; c) 3,402,8\$ million for treatment; d) 1,609,8\$ million for international; and e) only 1,507,1\$ million for prevention.¹¹⁸ Concerning U.S. spending and focus on fighting drugs within “Plan Colombia” virtually security through military and law enforcement is the key element¹¹⁹.

Plan Colombia was launched ten year ago in 1999 as a joint effort between the Colombian government and the United States to fight the global drug problem through fighting trafficking, the promotion of economic growth, social development, and the strengthening of democratic institutions. A significant amount of resources and efforts is allocated into security in order to persecute drug traffickers and terrorist organizations and to prevent the illegal drug flow into the U.S. for which organizations such as FARC, ELN and former AUC groups¹²⁰ are made responsible for. Complementary efforts such as eradication, interdiction, extradition and persecution have also played a vital role, so do social programs that provide opportunities to displaced people and those affected by the conflict.¹²¹ According to the National Drug Control Strategy’s Annual Report 2008 eradication, interdiction, and organizational reform have facilitated progress in alternative development. Judicial reform, and the establishment of democratic institutions since the launch of Plan Colombia¹²².

But regarding the distribution of financial resources and activities having taken and taking place it is clear that Plan Colombia is focusing on security and is leaving social and economic development behind¹²³. AD investments have been small and merely serve to justify “voluntary eradication”, where farmers have to eliminate all coca in return for financial compensation in order to avoid aerial spraying. The limited success of such undertakings is evident, despite the good intentions, as it leaves the rural population which no choice but to cooperate and does not provide the necessary settings for sustainable coca eliminating unless infrastructural improvement are ensured before the crop substitution.¹²⁴

¹¹⁸ See National Drug Control Strategy. 2008. P.5. Also see International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.7. These figures do not include the enormous U.S. spending on military and law enforcement within Plan Colombia.

¹¹⁹ Also see Heinz, W. S. (2002). The Potential of Alternative Development in Conflict management. Paper prepared for the International Conference on the Role of Alternative Development in Drug Control and Development Cooperation: Feldafing. P. 11.

¹²⁰ The involvement of these organizations will be discussed in chapter 5.1

¹²¹ See Embassy of Colombia. Plan Colombia at: http://colombiaemb.org/index.php?id=82&option=com_content&task=view

¹²² National Drug Control Strategy. 2008. P. 51 sq.

¹²³ See Center for International Policy. Erasing the Lines. Trends in U.S. military programs with Latin America at: <http://www.ciponline.org/facts/0512eras.pdf>

¹²⁴ See Jelsma. 2002. P. 21.

As a response to Plan Colombia, which Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa characterized as militaristic and violent, he announced the launch of a plan of peace, justice, and development called Plan Ecuador in 2007, and offered assistance to Colombians in Ecuador displaced by the armed conflict. Further, following a tense exchange at the UN International Court of Justice, where Ecuadorian Foreign Affairs Minister María Fernanda Espinosa accused Colombia of violating an agreement not to fumigate illicit crops in areas close to their shared border, Colombian President Álvaro Uribe announced that the Colombian government would compensate Ecuadorians who could prove that their crops were damaged by fumigation.¹²⁵ The Ecuadorian experience demonstrates one example of strong criticism against aerial spraying and the request for peaceful development measures.

Unfortunately this war against drugs production is also a war against peasant communities involved on growing cannabis, coca or opium. Because every war has its motivation, its excuse and if you want to fight your “enemies”, you have to justify yourself and criminalize the people you fight against. That means, if you want to spend billions in military operations you need to prove that your target group can be held responsible for certain damage done to society and that it is their choice to do so.¹²⁶ Well, this can be critiqued in various ways as it does not include the peasant communities’ perspective and does not support development. The issue of illicit crop cultivation is rooted in social and economic problems that need solutions people benefit, not suffer from.

The United States is also and especially closely cooperating with the Mexican government. The Merida Initiative¹²⁷ is a multiyear security cooperation program and a regional effort designed to support and strengthen U.S., Mexican and Central American enforcement capacities. The Mexican government itself, especially the government of President Felipe Calderon, has employed forces from seven government agencies, spending 2, 5\$ billion to improve security and reduce drug-related violence in 2007 and is implementing anti-corruption initiatives and institutional reforms¹²⁸.

It is worth mentioning the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy sounds like a most positive and compact concept to counter the drug problem and refers to the success made so far for

¹²⁵ See UNODC. Quarterly Report. April-June 2007. P. 1 sq.

¹²⁶ See Oomen, J. (2002). The Fight for Development. An Overview of three Evaluations of Alternative Development in the Andean Region. Paper submitted at the International Conference on The Role of Alternative Development in Drug Control and Development Cooperation.

¹²⁷ For more information see: U.S. Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. Merida Initiative at: <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/merida/>

¹²⁸ See National Drug Control Strategy. 2008. P.46sq.

instance dramatically as “ (...) hundreds of thousands of people are spared from addiction and lives are saved”¹²⁹ which from a scientific view sounds quite dramatic and less analytical.

However, even if counter-drug policies could not efficiently reduce drug consumption and supply, U.S. policy makers believe that Plan Colombia has helped to stabilize the country, to strengthen the state and to improve public security¹³⁰. The at present lowest homicide rates in 30 years, lowest unemployment and poverty rates in a decade, and constant economic growth illustrate the importance of counter-drug and development efforts and leave them unquestionable¹³¹.

Around 15 years ago the European Union and Latin America pointed out the importance of and strengthened the cooperation and coordination on drugs and trafficking between the them based on the High-Level Specialised Dialogue on Drugs between the EU and the Community of Andean Nations¹³² in 1995 and the Ministerial Meeting of the Rio Group¹³³ and the EU in 1996. However, coordination and cooperation is still unsatisfying within the EU member states. “European policy at home and abroad resembles less a mosaic in which a number of initiatives form a coherent picture than a patchwork of many, often divergent programs”¹³⁴. Currently the EU is working to streamline the member state’s different approaches to deal with illegal drugs.¹³⁵ It is hard to analysis or discuss European counter-drug policies since it is an area, which until recently did not really exist. Formally this is actually true. No EU policy on drugs does exist as there simply is no legal basis existing for policy development in this area because the subsidiarity principle is applied and there are no competencies given to supranational authorities. However the evolution of the beginning of a European policy perspective on drugs has already started and although no formal EU policy exists, the EU can take international action with a combination of political initiatives, like action plans, as well as assisting through development programmes.¹³⁶ There is a corporate EU Drugs Strategy for

¹²⁹ National Drug Control Strategy. 2008. P.2.

¹³⁰ See International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.3

¹³¹ Embassy of Colombia. Plan Colombia.

¹³² Community of the Andean Nations-CAN: members are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. Venezuela announced its withdrawal in April 2006.

¹³³ Rio Group: An international Organization of Latin American and some Caribbean countries created in 1986 as an alternative body to the Organization of American States (OAS). Members are Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.

¹³⁴ International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.8

¹³⁵ Ibid. P.8. See also: Crisis Group Interviews, European Council and Commission officials: Brussels. 21 September, 3 October, 9 November 2007.

¹³⁶ See Hughes, R./ Lart, R./ Higate, P. (2006). Drugs. Policy and Politics. Open University Press: Maidenhead. P. 113sq, 121sq.

2005-2012 serving as a basis for the EU action plan on drugs for 2005- 2008, and 2009-2012. The eight years strategy is based on the respective UN conventions¹³⁷ and aims at adding value to the various national strategies of EU member states. It acknowledges the EU's responsibility for the global drug problem and calls for a balanced approach combining demand and supply reduction and including consultation with a broad group of partners such as scientific centres, NGOs or civil society. The Union's strategy in the field of international cooperation focuses on improvement of cooperation between its member states and between them and the Commission and on the promotion of a balance approach in international institutions. Also pointed out in a coordinated and more visible appearance of the EU on world stage, especially in international organizations.¹³⁸ The Unions drugs action plan identifies five priorities, and seems quite detailed and output oriented when presenting concrete objectives, actions, timetables, responsibilities, indicators and assessment tools. The five priorities are set on 1) improving coordination, cooperation and raising public awareness at both European and national level; 2) reducing demand for drugs, i.e. prevention, treatment and harm reduction; 3) reducing the supply for drugs through more effective law enforcement at EU level and better use of Europol and other EU structures, such as multidisciplinary law enforcement operations or establishment of regional security platforms; 4) improving international cooperation, including the promotion and implementation of alternative development ,and strengthening of cooperation within the EU and European Neighbourhood Policy countries; and 5) improving understanding of the problem through research, gathering of data of drug-related crime and supply market.¹³⁹

As illustrated above the EU is currently very much focusing on the improvement of coordination and cooperation between EU member states and within the EU itself is of higher importance than cooperation efforts with the U.S. or other countries¹⁴⁰. Attention is given to the development and establishment of a common approach to what has become a common problem. This is a good step, but it is uncertain how far this ongoing process will go. Cooperation on supply reduction and border control has become more complex but also more pressing.¹⁴¹ The current status quo of the Union's common policy is simply not enough when facing the great extent of the global drug problem.

¹³⁷ Relevant UN Conventions will be presented in subchapter 4.1.

¹³⁸ See EU drugs strategy 2005-2012. P. 2-17.

¹³⁹ See EU drugs Action Plan for 2009-2012 at: <http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/html.cfm/index66221EN.html>

¹⁴⁰ See International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.9

¹⁴¹ See Hughes, R./ Lart, R./ Higate, P. (2006). *Drugs. Policy and Politics*. Open University Press: Maidenhead. P. 122sq.

The current Counter-drug policy in Colombia is strongly linked to President Uribe's Democratic Security Policy (DSP) and to the bilateral undertaking "Plan Colombia", whose priorities had been addressed previously. Besides the "Dirección Nacional de Estupefacientes"¹⁴² plays an important role in Colombian drug control as it coordinates and partly executes the central governments drug control efforts.¹⁴³ Unfortunately and likely not to effectively support the overall development of the country and the provision of basic goods and alternative income for the rural population, around 10, 7\$ billion were invested by the Colombian and U.S. government from 1999 to 2005 mainly for coca crops eradication through aerial spraying or manual means, the modernization of the security forces and the strengthening of institutions¹⁴⁴. While only 863\$ million were provided to USAID 2000-2007 for alternative development and democracy programmes¹⁴⁵.

The involvement of NGOs in the governments' counter-drug efforts, in the assessment of the drug problem, the identification of solutions, and the implementation of policies and programmes is strongly encouraged by the UN General Assembly. It is highly recognized that NGOs play a key role in raising awareness, prevention, treatment, rehabilitation and social re-integration activities. According to the report of "Beyond 2008"¹⁴⁶, a global forum on the 1998-2008 of the UNGASS on illicit drugs, 37% of the partaking NGOs reported having been consulted or involved at some point in the preparation of a national drug strategy. Significantly fewer were involved in the monitoring or evaluation arrangements. Those who were provided epidemiological data and completed monitoring questionnaires, were represented in the monitoring group, or were invited to comment and respond to the monitoring report. As the actual situation at national and sub-national level almost in every case varies significantly local drug control strategies are developed at city, state, country or

¹⁴² Dirección Nacional de Estupefacientes- National Directorate for Narcotic Drugs- is part of the Colombian Ministry of Interior and Justice.

¹⁴³ Its Plan Estratégico 2008-2010 focuses on a) strengthening of institutions; b) supply reduction through fighting money laundering, strengthening of international cooperation, analysis of cultivation, trafficking and eradication, and the improvement of information systems; and c) on demand reduction through public information. See Ministerio del Interior y de Justicia. Dirección de Estupefacientes. Planes at: <http://www.dne.gov.co/?idcategoria=650>

¹⁴⁴ See International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.16 according to Departamento Nacional de Planeación (2006). Balance Plan Colombia 1999-2005. P. 11 at: www.dnp.gov.co/archivos/documentos/GCRP_Otros/BALANCE%20PLAN%20COLOMBIA%20%20septiembre%202006.pdf

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. P.16 according to Center for International Policy. Colombia Program. US Aid to Colombia since 1997. at: <http://ciponline.org/colombia/aidtable.htm>

¹⁴⁶ For more information see: Vienna NGO Committee on Narcotic Drugs. Beyond 2008. at: http://www.vngoc.org/details.php?id_cat=8&id_cnt=27

regional levels. NGO often can contribute to this elaboration with certain assets that the central state might not possess as they gain first hand information and witness the impact of implemented strategies at the very first. According to the partaking NGOs in the “Beyond 2008” summit certain strengths and weaknesses of the drug strategies in place in their country can be identified. There was considerably praise for the identification of specific target groups, the assessment of the drug problem, the clear statement of policy objectives, and for the consultation process during the preparation of the strategy. Less satisfaction was showed regarding clear allocation of responsibilities, and the adaption for changing needs. Significant insufficiencies were indicated concerning the allocation of resources needed to implement the strategy, the coordination between key partners, the involvement of identified target groups, and the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. NGOs also pointed out, that there is still an over-focus on dug supply reduction while demand reduction would still not be given the required attention and resources.¹⁴⁷

A lot has been done so far. Numerous strategies, programmes and initiatives have been developed and implemented. However, both the U.S. and the European approach including Plan Colombia and the EU Drugs Strategy could not find the right mix of supply and demand reduction measures to fight and control the world drug problem effectively and the aspired objectives could not be realized. Concerning the EU it needs to be realized that as long as cooperation within the EU member states in still work in progress no solid and powerful cooperation between a second party such as Latin America can be successful.

It has been made clear that a long term reduction of the world’s supply of coca depends not only on effective law enforcement, but also on eradicating poverty that makes farmers vulnerable to the temptation of growing lucrative illicit crops¹⁴⁸ or even forces them to do so as it is only possibility of income in order to provide the basic goods for their families. Such poverty reduction need to be planned an implemented in sustainable ways and will be discussed in the following chapter in the form of alternative development.

It is required to deal with this serious problem with mutual actions. As reaffirmed during the 63rd session of the 3rd committee of the UN General Assembly, “countering the world drug

¹⁴⁷ See Commission on Narcotic Drugs. 51st session. 10-14 March 2008. Beyond 2008-Contribution of Non-Governmental Organizations to the Implementation of the Political Declaration and Action Plans adopted by the 20th special Session of the General Assembly. at: <http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND-Session51/CND-UNGASS-CRPs/ECN72008CRP12.pdf>. P.3-8, 16sq.
¹⁴⁸ UNODC. 2007. P.III

problem is a common and shared responsibility (...) requires an integrated and balanced approach and must be carried out (...) with full respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of States (...) and for all human rights and fundamental freedoms (...)¹⁴⁹. Interventions can only be successful if they are based on the recognition that North and South have a shared responsibility and may obtain shared benefits.¹⁵⁰

Unfortunately “policy coordination between the U.S., Europe and Latin America is severely hampered by the marked differences on both how best to address the world’s overall drug problem and how to reduce cocaine supply, as well as by unrelated political disputes”¹⁵¹ as their perception of the problem differs largely between drugs as a law enforcement issue (US) and as a public health issue (EU).¹⁵² Tri-continental cooperation is required between North America, South America and Europe, but as pointed out in a crisis group report, Latin American countries are not much part of the debate about how counter-drug policy might be reformed and also turn a blind eye to the grave impact of increasing domestic use at home¹⁵³. This needs to be changed in order to enable progress and sustainable achievement.¹⁵⁴

As occurring by far too often in politics, national interests and priorities hinder the elaboration and realization of corporate initiatives. Shared experiences focusing on problems occurred or in attendance should be exchanged at a global level. According to the International Crisis Group, the United Nations should “conduct a rigorous and transparent evaluation, with civil society participation”¹⁵⁵ in order to present and discuss the progress or regress made so far since the UNGASS¹⁵⁶ on the world drug problem in 1998. Besides the UN would be able to serve as a forum and should focus on the promotion of the “establishment of new policy consensus (...) and strengthening cooperation and policy coordination between the U.S., Europe and Latin America source (...)”¹⁵⁷. A strong involvement of international organizations and international cooperation is also pointed out in the EU drugs strategy 2005-2012: “The global nature of the drugs problem calls for regional, international and multilateral

¹⁴⁹ UN General Assembly. 63rd Session. 3rd Committee. Agenda Item 98. International drug control. at: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N08/591/67/PDF/N0859167.pdf?OpenElement>. P. 3.

¹⁵⁰ Oomen. 2002. P. 3.

¹⁵¹ International Crisis Group. 2008b. P. 1.

¹⁵² Ibid. P. 40.

¹⁵³ International Crisis Group. 2008a. P. 2.

¹⁵⁴ Also see: National Drug Control Strategy. 2008. P. 56 sq

¹⁵⁵ International Crisis Group. 2008b. P. IV.

¹⁵⁶ The United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the world drug problem in 1998 will be further discussed in subchapter 4.2.1.

¹⁵⁷ International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.IV.

approaches. (...) cooperation needs to be intensified, both bilaterally (between the Union and third countries) and within international organisations and fora”¹⁵⁸.

It needs to be kept in mind that counter-drug strategies, especially fighting trafficking should not be at the expense of the strengthening of state institutions and democracy, nor of the enhancement of human rights. That is because strong democracies can achieve more lasting results than weak and corrupt state systems and can build on the trust of their citizens.¹⁵⁹

2.3.2 International Relations Theory meets Reality

It is a fact that most of the time states cooperate with each other for mutual advantage. They carry on diplomatic relations and exchange knowledge and collaborate in order to make a strategic contribution to international freedom and progress and to deal with various common problems, such as the cultivation of and trafficking in illegal drugs. In that regard they commit themselves to international treaties and interact in accordance with norms of reciprocity.¹⁶⁰

This can be explained the following way: the compliance results “from the fact that most treaties require states to make only modest departures from what they would have done in the absence of an agreement”¹⁶¹.

International relations have domestic roots and domestic consequences. That is why domestic politics, problems or requirements are of high importance to international institutions. There are often domestic requisites to joining or certain effects on internal arrangements¹⁶². Becoming a member of an international institution has the effect both of locking in domestic changes and of making credible a domestic commitment to a particular policy path¹⁶³ such as the commitment to counter-drug strategies. In addition international institutions, especially if

¹⁵⁸ EU drugs strategy. 2005-2012. P.16

¹⁵⁹ See International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.37.

¹⁶⁰ See Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2007). Introduction to International Relations. Theories and approaches. Oxford University Press: Oxford, New York. P. 26.

¹⁶¹ Stein. 2008. P. 212 cit from Downs, G.W./ Rocke, D.M./Barsoom, P.N. (1996). Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation? *International Organization*:50. P.380.

¹⁶² Ibid. P. 214 cit from Skalnès, L.S. (1998). From the outside in, from the inside out. NATO expansion and international relations theory. *Security Studies*: 7. P. 44-87. ; Kelley, J. (2004). International actors on the domestic scene. Membership conditionality and socialization by international institutions. *International Organization*: 58. P. 425-457.

¹⁶³ Stein. 2008. P. 215 cit from Pevehouse, J.C. (2002). With a little help from my friends? Regional organizations and the consolidation of democracy. *American Journal of Political Science*: 46. P.611-626.

they are part of the UN family, may provide a degree of legitimacy¹⁶⁴ and make difficult domestic changes more palatable by providing political cover¹⁶⁵.

Despite the traditionally realist view of our global system and the position taken by the United States government¹⁶⁶ the importance of cooperation and co-working is pointed out in the annual report of the National Drug Control Strategy that “the old divisions between drug-producing, transit, and consuming nations have broken down in today’s globalized world”.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁴ Ibid. P. 215 cit from Franck, T.M. (1988). Legitimacy in the international system. *American Journal of International Law*: 82. P.705-759.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid. P. 215 cit from Vreeland, J.R. (2003). Why do governments and the IMF enter into agreements? Statistically selected cases. *International Political Science Review*: 24. P.321-343.

¹⁶⁶ Especially during the George W. Bush administration under which the discussed National Drug Control Strategy Report was elaborated.

¹⁶⁷ National Drug Control Strategy. 2008. P.56

3. Alternative Development

As discussed earlier in chapter 2 drug control is not only about banning illicit substances and reducing cocaine demand and supply, but also and more importantly about offering sustainable ways in preventing coca cultivation through more ambitious alternative and rural development programs in the source countries.

Definition of Alternative Development:

“(...) defining alternative development as a process to prevent and eliminate the illicit cultivation of plants containing narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances through specifically designed rural development measures in the context of sustained national economic growth and sustainable development efforts (...) within the framework of a comprehensive and permanent solution to the problem of illicit drugs.”¹⁶⁸

3.1 A Very Short History of AD

Back in the 1970s the first alternative development projects were crop substituting ones, searching for more profitable licit crops, but unfortunately had very little success. By the mid 1980s the concept was broadened to integral rural development, focusing on alternative income and local infrastructure, health, and education improvements. “Shared responsibility” between the north and the south was also a term of central importance the required strengthened efforts in demand reduction, money laundering and synthetic drug production. ¹⁶⁹ CICAD ¹⁷⁰ argued for multi-sectoral programmes and underlined the importance of the trust of the population and the need for complementary education programmes. Correspondingly early AD ¹⁷¹ programmes included the identification of subsidizing crops, technical assistance to process and market those crops, preservation of the environment, the development of infrastructure in coca growing regions, community development and employment programmes.¹⁷² The 1990s showed the failure of AD efforts in the last decades as both consumption and production figures had risen dramatically. These

¹⁶⁸ United Nations General Assembly (1998). 20th Special Session. 8-10 June 1998. World Drug Problem.

¹⁶⁹ See Jelsma. 2002. P. 14 sq.

¹⁷⁰ CICAD- the Organization of American States Drug Control Commission

¹⁷¹ AD= Alternative Development

¹⁷² See Thoumi, F. E.(2002). The Profitability of Illicit Crops and Alternative Development in Latin America. Paper presented at the International Conference on the Role of Alternative Development in Drug Control and Development Cooperation. 7-12 January 2002. P. 7 sq.

trends resulted in a polarization between supporter of a re-assessment of existing anti-drug policies and of re-affirmation of the agreed policies and its principles. It was then when today's AD concept had been developed, that underlined the importance of a participatory approach. The local population should be incorporated in the decision-making process in order to assure the identification and consideration of specific needs. In addition the overall AD efforts should be linked to broader sustainable development goals.¹⁷³ Francisco Thoumi¹⁷⁴ points out, that in the late 1990s many analysts agreed that AD programmes did not and do not contribute to lower drug production but they are necessary to appease coca farmers and are politically useful¹⁷⁵. Farmers might not have stopped cultivating illicit drops, but they might have diversified their portfolio in order to minimize the risk.

3.2 UNGASS Action Plan on Alternative Development

The necessity of “shared responsibility” had been pointed out continuously previous to and during the United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on the World Drug Problem in 1998. Producer and consumer countries should co-work in a balance approach and independent evaluation was needed. The main outcome and consequences for the AD field were 1) the “Strategy for Coca and Opium Poppy Elimination¹⁷⁶” (SCOPE), and 2) the “Action Plan on International Cooperation on Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and on Alternative Development¹⁷⁷”. Originally SCOPE called for a balanced approach between law enforcement, alternative development and demand reduction, and aimed at eliminating the worldwide cultivation of coca bush and opium poppy within 10 years. The Action Plan had been elaborated on the basis of drafts from Colombia, the United States and the European Union. Meaning that, in respect to the present study, all important stakeholders on both the supply and demand side were involved in the elaboration. Besides as some coca growers do not completely abandon production voluntarily even if AD projects are successful they have to see the risk associated with illicit cultivation. Therefore law enforcement needs to be an

¹⁷³ See Jelsma. 2002. P.15.

¹⁷⁴ Francisco E. Thoumi is professor at the Latin American and Caribbean Centre at Florida International University.

¹⁷⁵ Thoumi. 2002. P.8 cit from Joel, C. (1999). Tamano y efecto macroeconomico de la industria de la coca/cocaine en la economia boliviana. In: Gamarra, E./Thoumi, F. eds. (1999). Drogas ilicitas en Bolivia. UNDP: La Paz. And: Lee, R. III/ Clawson, P. (1993). Crop Substitution in the Andes. Office of National Drug Policy Control.

¹⁷⁶ Strategy for Coca and Opium Poppy Elimination- SCOPE- at:

http://www.ungasson drugs.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=124&Itemid=78

¹⁷⁷ Action Plan on International Cooperation on Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and on Alternative Development at: <http://www.unodc.org/documents/alternative-development/UNGASSActionPlanAD.pdf>

involved element.¹⁷⁸ Unfortunately the dates set during UNGASS 1998 regarding successful illicit crop elimination already passed by and the aimed goals clearly could not be met.

In addition the official statement of UNGASS on drugs does not make any special reference to local people's empowerment in the context of AD. "(...) development efforts in countries taking action against drugs, recognizing the particular socio-cultural characteristics of the target communities and groups (...)"¹⁷⁹. It rather points away from empowerment by defining local people as target groups, and the state remains responsible for national drug crop reduction programmes and plans.¹⁸⁰

About a decade has passed by since UNGASS in 1998 and the concept of AD has been adjusted within evident limitations as old and new challenges have to be met and certain elements had to become part of AD strategies. During the 51st session of the CND, ten years after UNGASS 1998, the international community assessed the progress made so far and discussed possible future steps¹⁸¹. Central documents and discussed issues will be discussed later on in this chapter.

3.3 Assumptions, Elements and Challenges

3.3.1 Basic Assumptions about Illicit Crop Cultivation and AD

Originally Alternative Development has been formulated under several assumptions¹⁸²:

- a. Farmers grow illicit crops because they are poor and have no alternative,
- b. Farmers would forgo the illicit drug profits if they had a an other licit crop,
- c. Illicit crop growers are often victims of extreme poverty and inequality,
- d. Many have been displaced by economic crisis.

However these assumptions might only be valid for some farmers and don't explain why illicit crops are grown in certain countries at a certain time and in others not. For example is Colombia by far richer than Peru, Bolivia or Ecuador and nevertheless is the biggest cultivator and cocaine producer. Fact is that some large coca farmers are relatively rich¹⁸³ and

¹⁷⁸ See Jelsma. 2002. 17 sqq.

¹⁷⁹ See UNGASS 1998. Action Plan on International Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and on Alternative Development. A/RES/S-20/4. General Assembly Special Session on Drugs: New York at: <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/20sp/a20spr04.htm>

¹⁸⁰ Gebert/Rerkasem. 2002. P. 3.

¹⁸¹ See UNGASS Action Plan on International Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and on Alternative Development. At: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/alternative-development/ungas-action-plan-on-eradication-and-alternative-development.html>

¹⁸² Thoumi, F. 2002. P.1 according to: Thoumi, F. (1997). Drogas Illicitas en Colombia. Su impacto economico, politico y social. Direccion Nacional de Estupefacientes y PNUD- Editorial Planeta: Bogota

¹⁸³ Ibid. P.1 cit from Uribe, S. (1997). Los cultivso ilicitos en Colombia. Evaluacion. Extension, tecnicas y tecnologias para la produccion y rendimientos y magnitud de la industria. In: Thoumi. 1997.

most people behind the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of cocaine are well educated and would have employment alternatives in the legal economy¹⁸⁴. Of course poverty and inequality contribute to the growth of illicit crops but they are not the only or main determining factor. So was Colombia in the 1980s the only country in Latin America and the Caribbean that could avoid the external debt crisis faced by the region but nonetheless it was in Colombia where the big international trafficking organizations developed. According to this poverty and illicit behaviour are not necessarily linked one-to-one.¹⁸⁵

So why are illicit crops cultivated and why not? The availability of natural resources determines whether a country can produce agriculture products like coffee, rice or wheat and almost every country cultivates the respective products that are within their possibilities. In contrast to these common or legal products numerous more country could grow illicit crops but don't do so. From a purely economic perspective, the limited cultivation of illicit crops is quiet remarkable since it produces uncommonly high profits. According to standard economics and international trade theory models, any production process requires a set of factors of production. Such factors would be various types of capital and labour, natural resources and technology and their relative abundance determine what products can or should be produced.¹⁸⁶

In order to explain the spatial distributions of coca cultivation it is necessary to focus on the differences between illicit and licit products and their organizational environment: Isolation, underdevelopment and poverty, lack of markets, possible ethnic unrest, and absence of basic infrastructure are the reality of illicit crop growing areas¹⁸⁷ and almost a precondition to it. In addition there are certain tasks required by the people involved in the illicit cultivation that is not required in the licit one such as undetected growing of illicit crops, successful trading and smuggling of illicit products, developing of drug manufacturing systems or laundering of illegal obtained funds. These tasks require special illegal skills and the development of illegal business organizations which is almost impossible in most countries where the social, political and economic system is controlled and secured by the central state. What is of central importance in the comparison of licit and illicit crop production and business is that profitability and the availability of natural resources are necessary elements for both but not necessarily sufficient in the case of illicit crops. That way the existence of massive illicit crop

¹⁸⁴ Ibid. P.1 cit from Hernandez, M. (1997). Comportamientos y busquedas alrededor del narcotrafico. In: Thoumi. 1997.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid. P.1 sqq.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid. P.3 sqq.

¹⁸⁷ UNGASS Action Plan on International Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and on Alternative Development. At: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/alternative-development/ungas-action-plan-on-eradication-and-alternative-development.html>

cultivation is only manageable in countries where the central state has no control over its territory or countries with open civic conflict.¹⁸⁸ Drugs are produced in areas where political framework conditions are not met, the state has very weak or no control, as it is the case in areas inhabited by ethnic minorities in Pakistan and Southeast Asia or in Colombia, where guerrilla groups developed their activities in those parts of the country where state presence was and is lacking.¹⁸⁹

3.3.2 Core Elements of AD

As the combination of violence, corruption, patronage systems and poor economic conditions often result in dependence of rural population on illicit crop cultivation¹⁹⁰, a number of requirements need to be met in order to limit cultivation and to secure effective production and marketing of AD products:

1. Local/ Regional focused Strategies,
2. Participatory Approach and Trust between Beneficiaries and Implementing Agencies,
3. Rural and Community Development,
4. Agro-Industrial Development and Product Marketing,
5. Strengthening the State,
6. Environmental Protection,
7. Harm Reduction Approach,
8. Monitoring and Evaluation

Ad 1) Local/ Regional focused Strategies

As there is no clear correlation between poverty, inequality, economic crisis, corruption and development the development of sustainable and wide-ranging alternative development strategies faces big difficulties. Any anti-drug policy should be based on the understanding of the institutions and social structure of the respective country where it is applied¹⁹¹ and has to be as diverse as the communities they are assisting.

Ad 2) Participatory Approach and Trust between Beneficiaries and Implementing Agencies

As pointed out before AD is about creating the economic and social conditions under which farmers or rural population can attain an acceptable standard of living- a standard acceptable

¹⁸⁸ Ibid. P. 6.

¹⁸⁹ Heinz, W. S. (2002). The Potential of Alternative Development in Conflict management. Paper prepared for the International Conference on the Role of Alternative Development in Drug Control and Development Cooperation: Feldafing. P. 5, 11.

¹⁹⁰ See International Crisis Group. 2008b. P. 39.

¹⁹¹ See Thoumi. 2002. P. 6 sq.

for them- without having to cultivate illicit crops. But these households should have choices and control during the substitution and development process and should be part of the decision-making processes that determine their future lives. They should be empowered. Unfortunately empowerment is a very slippery concept and not easy to apply in concrete and efficient measures. However, a crucial aspect of it is the implicit idea of disempowering those who already have power to exercise adequate choices in their lives. This can and should happen at different levels, starting from the individual, a group, the community, up to institutions. Participation can also happen in a passive way by simply complying with certain activities and strategies. But participation should be active, including the marginalized and most vulnerable, and determine the activities of a project, the planning and evaluation, and the respective policy frameworks. Both the failures and successes of AD so far demonstrate the need for participation and empowerment in the beneficiaries' community. As empowerment is about people, they need to have direct and effective say about their socio-economic development, about the goals and timeframes of AD. But these components have already been fixed by governments and donors on higher political levels, so that people are left with very little choice. Even if schedules and activities are decided or agreed by leaders of local institutions it doesn't mean that they represent a majority of the AD beneficiaries. Consequently the room for community participation and empowerment is very limited.¹⁹² "Traditional cultivators need to be given the time to decide for themselves if they want to reduce cultivation (...) and what constitutes an acceptable quality of living"¹⁹³.

According to the final report of a global thematic evaluation of AD carried out by the UN in 2005, "AD policies had been more efficient when all major stakeholders, including governments, donors, non-governmental organizations and beneficiaries had been involved in their formulation and when those policies allowed for decentralised decision-making, empowering local communities and were flexible enough to adapt to local contexts"¹⁹⁴. Especially a broad participation of the local population, being peasant federations, producers' associations, or social organizations need to be part of the design and implementation of projects.¹⁹⁵ However, unfortunately, "despite all rhetoric such programmes arrive usually top-

¹⁹² See Gebert, R./Rerkasem, K. (2002). Community Empowerment in Alternative Development. Prerequisite for Success or Mutually Exclusive Concepts? Paper for the International Conference on The Role of Alternative Development in Drug Control and Development Cooperation. 7-12 January 2002: Berlin, Chiang Mai. P. 1-6.

¹⁹³ Ibid. P. 7.

¹⁹⁴ UN Economic and Social Council (2008). The World Drug Problem. Fifth Report of the Executive Director. Action Plan on International Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit Crops and on Alternative Development. at: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V07/892/21/PDF/V0789221.pdf?OpenElement>. P. 10 sq. according to United Nations. 2005. P. 11.

¹⁹⁵ Oomen. 2002. P. 2.

down in an ambiguous context of sticks and carrots (meaning eradication, interdiction, penalisation of consumers, ect.)”¹⁹⁶.

According to an interview hold with USAID officials by the Crisis Group¹⁹⁷ effective alternative development and rural development requires the full cooperation of peasant families. Critics argue that alternative development has suffered form eradication operations rather than acting as a complement in the same overalls strategy, that project’s objectives have been short-sighted and isolated from overall development efforts, and that local organizations have not been considered as a partner.¹⁹⁸ Unfortunately aerial spraying does most likely result in resistance. It is no secret that aerial spraying has also eradicated legal crops near coca growing areas and resulted in farmers abandoning their land, and repeatedly migrating to coca growing regions.¹⁹⁹ It is easy to see the negative side of aerial spraying, the often negative consequences for the rural population²⁰⁰, and the problem of the balloon effect. Forced eradication can be an effective tool deployment in regions controlled by FARC and paramilitary groups when it comes to short term limitation of coca cultivation and consequently of available financial resources, but it is simply contra productive to the building of trust and the necessary cooperation between citizens and government entities or third actors. The caused threats or even violent image of foreign development aid that can evolve from forced eradication with law enforcement and military involvement needs to be prevented as they cause nothing but fierce resistance from beneficiaries and do only hinder possible change.

The United Nations Drug Control Programme already warned in the late 1990s that “the relationship of trust that must exist in any development process between the stimulating agents and the beneficiaries (...) requires that, in the field, AD and prohibition are separate although the general link between them is recognized”²⁰¹.

Besides or maybe because the problematic of aerial spraying and its negative consequences to trust in government agencies, cooperation with civil society and NGOs in AD programmes is

¹⁹⁶ Heinz. 2002. P. 16.

¹⁹⁷ See Crisis Group interview. Washington DC. 8 February 2008.

¹⁹⁸ Oomen. 2002. P. 3.

¹⁹⁹ See International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.17sq; International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.17 according to Consultoria para los derechos humanos (CODHES). Accion Urgente por Desplazamiento Masivo a Cause de Fumigaciones de Cultivos de Uso Ilicito at: www.codhes.org.

²⁰⁰ Also see: Jelsma, M. (2002). Alternative Development and Drug Control. A Critical Assessment. Paper presented at the International Conference on the Role of Alternative Development in Drug Control and Development Cooperation. 7-12 Januray 2002: Feldafing.

²⁰¹ Ibid. P. 19 cit from UNDCP (2000). Alternative Development in the Andean Area. The UNDCP Experience. United Nations: New York.

a key element for the of building of a strong partnership and trust²⁰². NGOs can provide unique inputs to the elaboration of AD strategies and their implementation as they face reality at the grass roots level and witness first hand the impact of national strategies, laws and policies.²⁰³ It is necessary not to mix repression with development as development is hardly possible when imposed upon people.²⁰⁴

Ad 3) Rural and Community Development

Of course it is possible to motivate people to eradicate their coca cultivation via negative incentives such as law enforcement or the military. This would be the good old “carrot and stick” approach. But this is neither empowering, nor does it require or help build up community institutions. But community development is one of the most important components and requirements for AD and development in general. Beneficiaries must have shared, positive visions and goals of what they want to achieve in their communities. They need to be given more space to decide how they want to organize and represent themselves. NGOs and activist academics that are at the forefront are often very qualified to assist local people and their communities to open a dialogue with their government and policy-makers and bring the community to a larger region and the nation²⁰⁵. Target groups not only need to have greater voice within AD projects, but also in the larger socio-political and economic context.²⁰⁶ To support and assure these essentials, a structured assessment of local needs, the application of a tested theoretical model, and clear objectives and beneficiaries are required.²⁰⁷ This issue will be further discussed in point 7, local/ regional focused strategies.

Institutions and mechanisms to support community-based drug control need to be create or strengthened as weak institutional capacities, infrastructure and coordination between public and private sector are considered both as cause and consequence of illicit cultivation.²⁰⁸

²⁰² See UN General Assembly. 63rd Session. 3rd Committee. Agenda Item 98. International drug control. P. 5.

²⁰³ See Commission on Narcotic Drugs. 51st session. 10-14 March 2008. Beyond 2008-Contribution of Non-Governmental Organizations to the Implementation of the Political Declaration and Action Plans adopted by the 20th special Session of the General Assembly. P. 17.

²⁰⁴ Oomen. 2002. P. 2.

²⁰⁵ Also see: Heinz. 2002. P. 17.

²⁰⁶ See Gebert/ Rerkasem. 2002. P. 10 sqq.

²⁰⁷ See Commission on Narcotic Drugs. 51st session. 10-14 March 2008. Beyond 2008-Contribution of Non-Governmental Organizations to the Implementation of the Political Declaration and Action Plans adopted by the 20th special Session of the General Assembly. P. 10.

²⁰⁸ See Heinz. 2002. P.9 according to GTZ- Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (1998). Drugs and Development in Asia: Eschborn. P. 61,65.

Taking a look at the lessons learned and experiences in the past one has to admit that the negative lessons unfortunately outweigh the positive as AD efforts have largely been accompanied by the threat of enforcement, the so-called carrot and stick approach, which is largely demeaning and manipulative. Obviously it did not result in the building of social capital or a strengthened society.²⁰⁹

Concerning the economic dimension of alternative development it needs to be considered that coca growing regions are usually very far from established markets and any larger city, and they have to face high transportation costs. This is especially a problem in Colombia where very little infrastructure is available. In addition many products require special handling, refrigeration or likewise. Unluckily rural development and the provision of infrastructure not only assist and benefit legal AD production but also illicit production at the same time.²¹⁰

Ad 4) Agro-Industrial Development and Product Marketing

The existence and further development of communal organizations are central to agro-industrial development, but unfortunately very less developed in Colombia. “Products in Colombia must build such organizations virtually from scratch”²¹¹.

According to Mr. Jorge Rios, Chief of the Sustainable Livelihoods Unit, UNODC, and the alternative development world has progressed. Slowly, but has. The marketing component is of highest importance of the assurance of sustainability and effectiveness. Otherwise some person here at UNODC headquarters in Vienna who designs projects will say: “Ok, let’s do an AD project in Colombia. Let’s have the farmers in San Jose grow Egyptian tomatoes instead of coca. Let’s give money for that.” so Mr. Jorge Rios. Consequently the basics: market driven products and possibilities in the field became very significant.²¹²

Unfortunately, from a marketing point of view coca poppy is by far more attractive than any other licit product. This makes a substitution especially difficult. In that respect CICAD pointed out that “if alternative development programmes were to succeed, it was necessary to study the markets for their products”²¹³. Consequently it is essential to promote productive activities that are market-oriented, but take into account those products that are known to the

²⁰⁹ See Gebert/ Rerkasem. 2002. P. 12 sq.

²¹⁰ See Thoumi. 2002. P. 9 sqq.

²¹¹ Ibid. P.11 cit from Lee/Clawson. 1993. P. 9.

²¹² See interview with Mr. Jorge Eduardo Rios, SLU, VIC, 28 August 2008.

²¹³ UN Economic and Social Council. 2008. P. 21.

local population and relate to their culture and experience. Simultaneously the capacity of the local, regional and national market should be strengthened before export-oriented initiatives can be considered²¹⁴. That also means, that crops should be promoted that are consumed in the local and regional markets.²¹⁵ Later on, states not effected by illicit drug crop cultivation and the private sector should provide better access to markets for AD products²¹⁶ and perhaps microcredit for illicit crop growers attempting to switch to legal crops can be provided as part of alternative development programmes²¹⁷.

Ad 5) Strengthening the State

Colombia faces the most obstacles in AD than other countries in the Andean region for a number of reasons. Illicit crops grow often extremely far from existing markets and there is very little infrastructure for transportation. In addition many coca cultivation regions are under guerrilla or paramilitary control. Consequently the strengthening of the central state in Colombia has to be a core element in any AD strategy designed for Colombia.

Ad 6) Environmental Protection

Illicit crop cultivation and drug production have many negative effects on the environment, such as overexploitation of forest resources and the pouring of waste products into rivers. Therefore AD projects should include environmental restoration components and need to incorporate environmental sustainability and protection into their projects aiming at developing economic and social infrastructure.²¹⁸

Ad 7) Harm Reduction Approach

Through harm reduction measures AD can be de-linked from the most repressive parts of drug control on the supply side. Most importantly it needs to be realized, that illicit crop

²¹⁴ An example from the past: there is a special grain, Quinoa, in Bolivia, which is a small Indian weed, that is sold in Bolivia and Peru in the high lands and very rich in proteins. The Americans company Kellogg's wanted to use this grain for its products and went to Bolivia and agreed to work with a local company. However, the Bolivians tried and tried, but just couldn't produce enough for Kellogg's since had ensured to deliver amounts that they were not able to cultivate and harvest only in order to get to project. In the end neither quantity nor quality could be delivered because in order to meet to demand, the Bolivian company started not to care if there were little sticks or other things in-between. Of course Kellogg's was looking for quality control as they have strict sanitary regulations and in the end Kellogg is growing the requested grain in California and Colorado, US.

²¹⁵ Oomen. 2002. P. 2.

²¹⁶ UN Economic and Social Council. 2008. P. 30.

²¹⁷ UNODC. Open-end intergovernmental expert working group on international cooperation on the eradication of illicit drug crops and on alternative development. P. 3.

²¹⁸ See UN Economic and Social Council. 2008. P. 17 sq. according to United Nations (2005). Alternative Development. A Global Thematic Evaluation. Final Synthesis Report. New York. P. 7. Also see: UNODC. Open-end intergovernmental expert working group on international cooperation on the eradication of illicit drug crops and on alternative development. P. 4.

cultivation will continue to stay as long as demand exists. The goal of eradication and counter-drug strategies should not be the quantitative elimination of coca cultivation, but the reduction of harm associated with it. New spaces of dialogue with the involved communities have to be opened in order to elaborate ways of gradual reduction of illicit cultivation accompanied with activities that reduce the harm of monodependence or of problems related to local abuse. The environmental dimension and the damages done by illicit cultivation should also be taken into consideration -harm reduction can also be applied there. Moreover there are currently various ideas of linking harm reduction on the demand and the supply side. Accordingly raw materials from indigenous communities could supply the heroin maintenance programmes in Europe, further it could be differentiated between specific substances and their possible harm, allowing coca products to be exported to international markets.²¹⁹

According to Mr. Julio Mollinedo Claros, Second Secretary of the Bolivia Mission to the United Nation in Vienna, the use of the coca plant for the production of legal products, and for the use of drugs in drug substitution programmes in consumer countries is a very good idea. Unfortunately, the coca leave is illegal and banned based on the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs²²⁰ from 1961. The convention is binding for all countries and its content is neither questioned nor discussed at the moment. Consequently, until the coca leave is made legal the import or export of the coca leave is prohibited on a global level any such undertakings are unfeasible.²²¹

Ad 8) Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring of the project is an indispensable element of effective project implementation as it enables the detection of intended and unintended consequences of project activities.²²²

The evaluation of any kind of project is a central key to the success of future activities and need to be incorporated into every alternative development project. An assessment of the success or failure of AD projects should normally be based on data collected among their main target group: coca growing farmers. The increase, stabilization or decrease of life standards, taking into account that an increase is the main reason for initiating the collaboration, should be identified.²²³

²¹⁹ See. Jelsma. 2002. P. 22- 25.

²²⁰ Available online: http://www.incb.org/incb/convention_1961.html.

²²¹ See interview with Mr. Mollinedo Claros, Julio. Second Secretary of the Bolivia Mission to the United Nation in Vienna. VIC: 30 September 2009.

²²² See Heinz. 2002. P. 15.

²²³ See Oomen. 2002.

According to an analysis presented at the 51st session of the CND 23 of 105 reporting states (2006-2007), compared to 17 states (1998-2000), indicated having systems to monitor and evaluate the qualitative and quantitative impact of programmes for AD and the eradication of illicit crops. The central reasons for not having such systems are the lack of technical expertise and of financial resources, so the reporting states. Concerning the assessment of AD programmes it has been recommended²²⁴ to use socio-economic parameters. Human development indicators, including education, health, employment, the environment, institution-building and governmental capacity, have to be part of national and internationally agreed action plans in order to get a picture of the actual development progress made so far.²²⁵

According to the discussed literature all this special requirements have been identified already about a decade ago. But due to various obstacles and problems in the design and implementation process of alternative development programmes and strategies present AD projects have not performed especially well on these criteria. The aspired change takes time as it is the case in most development efforts.

3.3.3 Core Challenges and Problems

The following chapter will present the most important challenges and problems to an efficient and sustainable implementation of AD in the Andean region with special focus on Colombia.

There are a great number of obstacles that need to be overcome.²²⁶

1. Identification of Adequate Licit Crops
2. Sustainment of Licit Cultivation
3. Lack of Trust in Government or Project Partner
4. Complex Conflicts
5. Lack of Security for All Actors Involved
6. Financial Constrains

Ad 1) Identification of Adequate Licit Crops

It is difficult to identify licit crops or rural activities that would generate the same income level as illicit crops. In addition illegal crops have a secure market without great fluctuations

²²⁴ UN Economic and Social Council. 2008. P. 20 according to Official Records of the Economic and Social Council. 2006. Chap. II. Para. 16; United Nations. 2005. P. 17; and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2005. P. 11 sq.

²²⁵ See UN Economic and Social Council. 2008. P. 19 sq., 31.

²²⁶ See Heinz. 2002. P. 6,7, 17 sqq.; Commission on Narcotic Drugs. 51st session. 10-14 March 2008. Beyond 2008-Contribution of Non-Governmental Organizations to the Implementation of the Political Declaration and Action Plans adopted by the 20th special Session of the General Assembly. P.10; Thoumi. 2002. P.7-11, and UN Economic and Social Council. 2008. P. 14 sq. Quotations regarding individual statements and information is provided in detail in the course of the following listing.

and almost no competition. Moreover AD programmes require investments in regions where businesses would normally not invest and farmers do not have the necessary economic skills. For instance are farmers not used to care about sophisticated packing or handling or strict quality control techniques.²²⁷

Ad 2) Sustainment of Licit Cultivation

Even if eradication and crop substitution are successful, illegal coca prices just go up and generate new cultivations elsewhere which is known as balloon effect. And even if a suitable and profitable licit crop is found traffickers can increase the crop price since coca costs account for less than one percent of the cocaine street price in the U.S. In addition crop substitution is very vulnerable to a reversal due to the short nature of the coca crop.²²⁸

Besides, law enforcement efforts possess the ability to weaken trafficking structures and have impact on cultivation patterns and price developments within a region. However, they cause only temporary disruptions in the illicit economy and cultivation displacements due to high flexibility of the illicit drug market.²²⁹

Ad 3) Lack of Trust in Government or Project Partner

Coca farmers do not trust the government or strangers and often need to be talked into planting and to them alien crop. In addition illicit crop substitution is often executed through law enforcement, which is often associated with repressive measures. One alternative would be to target drug-law enforcement more clearly at improving governance, including the rule of law, human rights, transparency and accountability or the control of organized crime. Otherwise, and currently happening, the fight against drugs can be used to move against political opponents or delay political reforms and cause the limitation of human rights^{230, 231}. The ideal situation would be to “ensure that law enforcement activities in illicit crop cultivation areas contribute to the building of trust between the local communities and the authorities (...) law enforcement should be considered a supportive factor in the context of overall socio-economic development”²³².

²²⁷ See Thoumi. 2002. P.7-11

²²⁸ Ibid. P.7-11

²²⁹ See Jelsma. 2002. P.14.

²³⁰ Also see: Human Rights Watch at: <http://www.hrw.org>

²³¹ See Heinz. 2002. P. 9 sq. according to GTZ. 1998. P. 48, 61-65.

²³² UNODC. Open-end intergovernmental expert working group on international cooperation on the eradication of illicit drug crops and on alternative development. P. 5.

However this is only an idea which is currently far away from reality since aerial spraying can cause serious negative side effects as illustrated in the following example: On 2 August 2001, two interesting news items appeared in the same edition of the daily “El Espectador”²³³: U.S. ambassador Annie Patterson warned that fumigation of coca plants should not be stopped because this might lead many in Congress to demand the termination of the U.S. aid package, while in the same edition the German embassy is reported to have drawn attention of the Colombian government to the fact that GTZ two projects had suffered again from fumigation, which constitutes a serious risk for the continuation of the projects²³⁴.

Ad 4) Complex Conflicts

In an alternative development context four general types of conflict can be distinguished.

1. Conflict around AD programmes as a consequence of differences of opinion on implementation, on certain program activities, on state repression, or on distribution of program benefits, etc. This probably the main area for conflict management. Differences in the assessment of project progress, or distribution of benefits can be emerge and need to be solved expeditiously in order not to threaten the overall project success or its continuation.
2. Selective violence by social movements in the context of social vindication. Here the obvious link can be made to protests of coca peasants, e.g. in Colombia or Bolivia, which try to negotiate policies that differ from government programs.
3. Violence in the context of organized crime and crime. Drug prevention programmes can help to lower crime rates. It is estimated that about 90% of violent deaths in Colombia are non-political cases. Among different potential target groups, work with youth and different sectors of women is promising.
4. Armed conflict with objective to bring down the government and/or to control territory. Here focus should be given to the strengthening of local organization of communities through capacity building, improved infrastructure, and productive activities. The role of technical cooperation is to 1) provide direct support for state institutions, NGOs and communities active in this environment, and 2) support internally displaced people and victims of violence, as well as re-integration of members of violent groups (guerrilla, etc.).²³⁵

²³³ El Espectador at: <http://www.elespectador.com/>

²³⁴ Heinz. 2002. P. 13 according to El Espectador. 02.08.2001 at: <http://www.elespectador.com/noticias>.

²³⁵ Ibid. P. 6 sq., 17 sqq.; P. 19 according to Anderson, M. B. (1999). Do not harm. How Aid can support Peace- or War. Boulder: Co.

Ad 5) Lack of Security for All Actors Involved

Currently there is a definite lack of security available for people involved with alternative development. Especially rural population and NGO staff is victims to threats made against them from drug trafficking and organized crime groups.²³⁶ Even members of involved government authorities and international organizations staff that are under the supervision of special security mechanisms²³⁷ are subject to security risks and sometimes even harm. The risk for unprotected individuals is consequently relatively high and sometimes limits their possibilities and the intensity of their engagement.

Ad 6) Financial Constrains

In the mentioned analysis presented at the 51st session of the CND 31% of the respondents cited financial constraints as being the greatest obstacle to the implementation of alternative development programmes. In the cited analysis 32 states indicated financial constraints as a difficulty, but only 10 reported having negotiated financial assistance for AD and eradication programmes with international financial institutions or regional development banks. And only 5 cited receiving actual support. According to the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission of the Organization of American States (CICAD²³⁸) various factors, including the unreliability of funding sources, had affected the implementation and sustainability of AD programmes in the region. In addition the lack of coordination of AD policies in the region was another common problem.²³⁹

Apparently the distribution and provision of financial resources for the substitution and eradication of illicit crops regarding its scope on an international level has been focusing on law enforcement, interdiction, especially in the case of Colombia with extremely high financial assistance coming from the U.S. through Plan Colombia. However, financial shortfalls are not the central problem or reason for inefficiency and the continuation of past and present problems faced in the implementation of AD.

Considering all these challenges to AD, coca cultivation is just the easier thing. Consequently it requires very strong and sharp efforts and strategies to achieve and secure sustainable

²³⁶ Commission on Narcotic Drugs. 51st session. 10-14 March 2008. Beyond 2008-Contribution of Non-Governmental Organizations to the Implementation of the Political Declaration and Action Plans adopted by the 20th special Session of the General Assembly. P. 10.

²³⁷ For more information see: UN Department of Safety and Security at: <https://dss.un.org/dssweb/>

²³⁸ Inter- American Drug Abuse Control Commission- CICAD at: <http://www.cicad.oas.org/>

²³⁹ UN Economic and Social Council. 2008. P. 14 sqq.

development and efficient substitution of coca crops. Of course this can not be the duty of the cultivation country or even the local government alone, but rather the responsibility of the global community. Not because of our moral responsibility, but because of the great dimension of this undertaking and anything but a corporate approach to coca cultivation and the illicit businesses connected to it would result in pure failure as history has repeatedly proven.

3.4 Present AD Strategies in International Cooperation

3.4.1 Present AD Strategies of Core Actors

As illustrated in chapter 2.4 the United States have always been focusing on counter-drug-supply strategies, focusing on the eradication of coca crops and strong law enforcement components. Its alternative development efforts have been of mediocre importance. However, AD programmes financed by the U.S. Agency for International development (USAID²⁴⁰) include community infrastructure, education and health and voluntary agreements to not grow coca and eradicate existing fields. USAID programme in Colombia builds on the three pillars: economic growth, agriculture and trade and runs a budget of about 80,000,000 USD per year. USAID's alternative development program focus on the provision of licit income and employment opportunities for farmers engaged in illicit crop cultivation and the provision of assistance for the development of social and productive infrastructure as a means for improving access to markets and services. The programme includes the following major assistance areas²⁴¹:

- Develop and Expand Economic and Social Alternatives (about 55% of budget): Agricultural and non-agricultural economic alternatives that provide legal income and employment alternatives are provided through technical assistance. Non-agricultural activities will include support to small and medium-sized private enterprises to generate employment and to help them become more competitive, thus increasing their capacity to create licit employment.
- Expand and Improve Rural Economic and Social Infrastructure: Technical and financial support is provided to build or rehabilitate infrastructure such as local rural roads and associated bridges, school facilities, rural health clinics, and potable water systems in remote regions of the country to generate new jobs and improve access to basic services.

²⁴⁰ USAID at: <http://www.usaid.gov/>

²⁴¹ The following assistance areas are listed according to the size of budget in decreasing order.

- Improve Sustainable Management of Natural Resources and Environment: Sustainable production through agro-forestry systems is provided through technical assistance and training. Activities are implemented in or near national parks to improve the overall management of the Colombian park system to better protect its resources and improve visitor services, and also continues to work with indigenous communities in protecting the environment and indigenous cultures.
- Support Democratic Local Government and Decentralization: The local governance program provides technical assistance to enhance the capacity of municipalities to deliver services and to strengthen their fiscal conditions by increasing their revenues through the updating of cadastres and municipal tax codes.
- Strengthen National and Local Economic Institutions: The overall objective is the promotion of a strengthened Government of Colombia's National Alternative Development Plan in the areas of planning, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating.²⁴²

Further it seems that the U.S. has somehow realized the importance of AD and former U.S. President George W. Bush signed a law as part of an omnibus appropriations bill, that provides a near 50% increase in alternative development funding for Colombia beyond the administration's request, with a commensurate reduction in military aid funds and also very important a number of additional conditions for the use of aerial spraying²⁴³. At the same time it was argued that Colombia's own budget for rural poverty reduction are too low, especially in areas with coca cultivation²⁴⁴.

The European Union is currently focusing on alternative development in cooperation with third countries, strengthening communities and income generating programmes in the Andean drug source countries Bolivia, Peru and Colombia. According to the current EU Drugs Action Plan the financial support for the implementation of AD projects and programmes should be increased and should be included into the broader development agenda of EU member states. Further should third countries be encouraged to integrate AD in their development policies,

²⁴² See USAID Alternative Development Programme for Colombia at: <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/lac/pdf/co514-008.pdf>

²⁴³ See International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.4 according to Foreign Operations and Related Programs FY 2008. Congressional Research Service Report for the Congress. At: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34023.pdf.

²⁴⁴ Ibid. P. 4 according to World Bank (2005). Beyond the City. The Rural Contribution to Development. At: <http://web.worldbank.org>

and new initiatives, including legal support and sustainable livelihoods, should be formulated in order to reduce poverty, conflict and vulnerability.²⁴⁵

However, according to interviews made by crisis group with European Council and Commission officials this is “important but in the final analysis not much more than a drop in the ocean”²⁴⁶. Unlike the United States the EC²⁴⁷ and EU member states do not support and execute forces eradication of coca cultivation but focus on the identification of secure alternative income for farmers and the development of social and economic infrastructure through alternative development^{248, 249}.

The European Commission Colombia Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 is focusing at the following priorities: a) economic and social development and poverty alleviation, b) alternative development, c) support for the reform of the judicial system, d) support for the promotion of human rights, and e) humanitarian aid for victims of the internal conflict. The current strategy aims to combat drugs via alternative development programmes, programmes for peace and greater political dialogue. It points out, that development is also conditional on economic and commercial development. Consequently the EU strategy will support the process of reactivating the Colombian economy and integrating it into the world economy. Measures to promote competitiveness in the rural environment and projects in the fields of alternative development, and technology transfer will be applied in this undertaking. Integral Local Development, building institutional capacity, support for basic infrastructure, culture of legality and social and human development to encourage job creation at local level and alternative development in areas where illicit crops are cultivated is one of the core elements. According to the strategy, alternative development measures will be promoted to become an important component of the peace and economic development initiatives. Of course they need to be accompanied by the provision of outlets for products emanating from alternative development areas where production projects are set up to combat illicit crops. In addition the environmental impact needs to be taking into account as anti-drug measures could have, particularly in cases where deforestation and pesticides are used, long-lasting negative side

²⁴⁵ See EU drugs action plan 2009-2012. P.15

²⁴⁶ International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.9 according to Crisis Group interview. European Council and Commission officials: Brussels. 21 September and 3 October 2007.

²⁴⁷ EC- European Commission

²⁴⁸ Crisis Group Interview. European Commission official: Brussels. 3 October 2007. Besides: For 2007-2013 the EC allocated 160€million for Colombia, consisting of 70% for the promotion of peace and stability, including alternative development and a third peace laboratory, and 30% for human rights, justice, and productivity, competitiveness and trade initiatives.

²⁴⁹ See International Crisis Group. 2008b. P.9-12.

effects. To the effect environment concerns have formed an integral part of the alternative development projects.²⁵⁰

As pointed out in the mentioned analysis presented in the 5th report of the Executive Director during the 51st session of the CND, an increased proportion of states compared to the first reporting period for 1998-2000 indicated that their AD programmes supported participatory approaches, incorporated the gender dimension and environmental considerations, gave consideration to the poorest and most vulnerable and included measures to reduce illicit drug demand.²⁵¹ This is positive notice, but unfortunately such rates tend to fluctuate and can not be taken as indicators for the meeting of programme objectives and the aspired change in society.

According to the thematic debate of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs at its 49th session, UNODC's strategy should follow "an integrated approach that required a mixture of comprehensive activities including sustainable development efforts, demand reduction, interdiction and law enforcement measures, in compliance with human rights obligations"²⁵². As already indicated before the UN and its drug control programme²⁵³ has been criticized in the scholastic discussion for its support of law enforcement and interdiction as certain illicit crop substitution or eradication concept regard such measures as being repressive and unsustainable. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime's strategy, programme and its work in the field of alternative development will be examined closer in chapter 4.

3.4.2 International Cooperation

Despite the title of the present study "Multilateral Cooperation in Alternative Development" the following subchapter will present and discuss cooperation on a global level in general as knowledge about existing cooperation forms enables comparison and understanding of the greater context, and provides a basis for further considerations.

²⁵⁰ See European Commission. Colombia Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013. at: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/colombia/csp/07_13_en.pdf

²⁵¹ UN Economic and Social Council. 2008. P. 16.

²⁵² Ibid. P. 11 sq. according to Official Records of the Economic and Social Council (2006). Supplement No. 8 (E/2006/28). Chap. II. Para18 at:

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V06/526/23/PDF/V0652623.pdf?OpenElement>

²⁵³ UNDCP is part of UNODC.

During the 51st session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs²⁵⁴ an analysis based on reports questionnaires provided by UN member states on international cooperation on the eradication of illicit drug crops and on alternative development was presented. 105 responses were submitted by member states from all world regions. 42% of respondents stated that they had national plans or programmes including alternative development to reduce and eliminate illicit crop cultivation. Compared with the first reporting period 1998-2000 that represented an increase of 13%²⁵⁵. Concerning international cooperation efforts in AD 21 states reported to having provided assistance to in AD to other states on a bilateral, regional or multilateral basis during the years 2006 and 2007. UNODC has been the central UN organization providing multilateral AD assistance²⁵⁶. In recent year so called emerging national donors such as Bolivia, Colombia and Peru have substantially increased their national budget allocations for AD programmes. Besides financial assistance for AD programmes several states cooperate and assist through the sharing of information or other cooperation agreements.²⁵⁷

Regarding Colombia, it is recognized both at the regional and the global level that the country's problems are of international importance. The Colombian agenda coincides with the international agenda that there is great need to address the critical human rights situation, environmental ravages, violent human displacement, and the global drugs problem. In the Latin American region neighbouring countries have increasingly voiced concerns about the cross-border effects of these issues, and the consequences of the Colombian drug problem. For instance has Venezuela become the main corridor for illegal trafficking, as well as a destination for injured guerrillas and paramilitaries requiring hospital treatment. The Venezuelan government has however refused to contribute to interdiction efforts. Brazil, and to a lesser degree Peru have experienced problems relating to the drug trade and local guerrilla activity, and Ecuador has also recently been accused of allowing the supply of arms, munitions and explosives to the guerrillas and paramilitaries.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁴ 51st Commission on Narcotic Drugs at: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/commissions/CND/session/51.html>

²⁵⁵ The remaining 58% reported not having such programmes or plans, however some of these states indicated that the question was not applicable because there is no illicit crop cultivation or no significant one on their territory. Other states indicated that small areas with illicit cultivation were addressed through regular law enforcement.

²⁵⁶ States including Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America have provided assistance in Asia and Latin America.

²⁵⁷ See UN Economic and Social Council. 2008. P. 8 sq., 13 sq.

²⁵⁸ See Conciliation Resources (2004). The Role of the International Community in Colombia at: <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/colombia/role-international-community.php>

In general, the coca crop cultivating countries in the region, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, should develop regional cooperation mechanisms that include the exchange of experience in the areas of alternative development and eradication, the sharing of intelligence on trafficking flows and the undertaking of joint operations²⁵⁹.

The former Colombian government defined an “international cooperation strategy of Colombia”, is giving priority to six thematic areas for action: (1) forestry; (2) reincorporation into civilian life; (3) consolidation of the social rule of law and human rights; (4) productive and alternative development; (5) regional programmes for development and peace; (6) forced displacement and humanitarian aid.²⁶⁰

As discussed before the United States cooperation with the Colombian government through Plan Colombia generated a strong reaction from the rest of the international community because of the weight of US military aid to Colombia, the Andean Region and the Caribbean. However, in 2008 the United States elaborated a proposal for consideration in the UNGASS review where it pointed out that significant progress has been made so far, but more importantly discussed important limitations and challenges. According to the United States the full implementation of the UNGASS Action Plan has been delayed because of 1) lack of political will and adequate national drug control legislation, 2) insufficient security and governance, 3) the enormous damaging effects of illicit drug production on the environment, 4) increased aggressive efforts by drug trafficking organizations to maintain the illicit sector, 5) continued global consumption, and 6) the lack of a coordinated approach to AD, including local government and the civil society. To that effect the provision of security and support in good governance to promote AD and the elimination of illicit drug crops is of central importance. In addition the development of a resource mobilization plan for eradication and AD is proposed.²⁶¹

The EU still refuses to contribute to the military budget and instead is directing its support to the defence of human rights and international humanitarian law, and initiatives aimed at

²⁵⁹ UN Economic and Social Council. 2008. 29.

²⁶⁰ See European Commission. Colombia Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013. at: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/colombia/csp/07_13_en.pdf. P. 19.

²⁶¹ See UNODC. Open-ended intergovernmental expert working group on international cooperation on the eradication of illicit crops and on alternative development. U.S. Proposal for Consideration in the UNGASS Review. 2-4 July 2008, Vienna. At: http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND_UNGASS_EWG/CND_UNGASS_EWG_2-4July08/UNODC_CND2008WG3_CRP2E.pdf

supporting the internally displaced and alternative development. Despite these evident differences in national strategies and objectives, the continuation of multilateral initiatives to fight the drugs problem is essential.²⁶² The differences between the European and U.S. American approach is also illustrated in a paper prepared by the EC, FAO, GTZ and UNODC for the CND 51st session. There it is pointed out that eradication should not be undertaken until households have viable and sustainable livelihoods. Further development assistance should not be conditional on reductions in illicit drug crop cultivation.²⁶³

Considered realistically such recommendations and guidelines are not realized in the field the way they are formulated by any development agency. One could say paper doesn't blush, and in the end such guiding principles meet reality with all its challenges and limitations and have to do the best out of it. However, the current U.S. strategy²⁶⁴ is inter alia because of its strong military and law enforcement involvement and measures such as "voluntary eradication" the most distant to these ideas.

In the context of international development organizations and other forms of cooperation, donor states are urged to increase efforts to harmonize and manage international development assistance to the state cultivation illicit crops in order to support their effectiveness. Simultaneously and following the concept of shared responsibility, consumer states should support drug abuse prevention, treatment and rehabilitation and incorporate those strategies into AD programmes. Affected states on the other side together with international organizations should put more efforts into the sharing of AD results with the broader development community. In that sense best practise and lessons learned can be identified and shared, and failures evaluated and hopefully integrated into new initiatives.²⁶⁵

According to a paper prepared by the EC, the FAO, GTZ and UNODC for the CND 51st session development organizations need to consider how their programmes can address the cause of illicit crop cultivation given the clear overlap between the drug and development

262 See Conciliation Resources. 2004 at: <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/colombia/role-international-community.php>

263 See Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Complementary drug-related data and expertise to support the global assessment by Member States of the implementation of the declarations and measures adopted by the General Assembly at its twentieth special session. P. 7.

264 Excluding USAID.

265 See UN Economic and Social Council. 2008. P. 30 sq.

agendas. Such efforts are referred to as “mainstreaming counter narcotics into development programmes” and “undertaking development in a drugs environment.”²⁶⁶

Without fail a significant role is and should be played by developing countries with ample experience in the design of alternative development strategies and the implementation of AD. Their task is to promote best practise and lessons learned in that area and try to apply them in accordance with the respective national particularities.²⁶⁷ Besides all relevant institutions should share and disseminate their experience with AD and support the involvement of both local communities and academic and research institutions in that process²⁶⁸. In addition governments and relevant international and regional organizations should integrate AD into their broader development programmes in order to enhance long-term strategies for legitimate livelihoods²⁶⁹.

3.5 The Role of IOs according to Neo-Institutionalism

According to Neoinstitutional Liberalism international institutions and international organizations such as the United Nations are gaining more and more importance in international politics because of the increasing complexity and interdependences in various political areas and issues. That is because international institutions can facilitate cooperation between national states in compliance with their common interests in situations and fields of conflict where individual interests are neither identical nor exclusive. International organizations are to ensure the individual compliance of states to decided actions or other forms of agreements. Available instruments are monitoring and enforcing measures for instance. Therefore international cooperation in accordance with mutual interests is often only possible within the framework of international institutions, so neoinstitutional theorists²⁷⁰. As international institutions permit the realization of individual states interests they are established or maintained by national states²⁷¹ and do not depend on a specific state in a

²⁶⁶ Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Complementary drug-related data and expertise to support the global assessment by Member States of the implementation of the declarations and measures adopted by the General Assembly at its twentieth special session. P. 7.

²⁶⁷ UN General Assembly. 63rd Session. 3rd Committee. Agenda Item 98. International drug control. P.5sq.

²⁶⁸ UNODC. Open-end intergovernmental expert working group on international cooperation on the eradication of illicit drug crops and on alternative development. P. 6.

²⁶⁹ Ibid. P. 5.

²⁷⁰ See Rittberger/Zangl. 2003. P. 41 according to Keohane, R. (1989). Neoliberal Institutionalism. A Perspective on World Politics. In: Keohane, R. (1989). International Institutions and State Power. Essays in International Relations Theory. Westview Press: Boulder CO. P. 1-20.

²⁷¹ Ibid. P. 41 according to Keohane, R. (1984). After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton University Press: Princeton. P. 80.

hegemony position. Cooperation is consequently possible without hegemony. Thus the establishment and continuation of an IO is not a question of supply (of a hegemon), but of demand. Such demand is constituted by any problematic constellation of interests. Considering that, transnational problems and the resulting action taken by states can be improved or can result in better outcomes when mutual interests are formulated on agreed on through international organizations. However, the type of interest constellation is central for the likelihood of cooperation. Simplified: the more mutual interests prevail existing controversies the more international cooperation is likely to be agreed on.²⁷²

²⁷² Ibid. P. 40-43.

3.6 Conclusions

3.6.1 Balancing Accounts

Alternative development is “at best a more human way to not solve a problem²⁷³” as no significant measurable change has happened in the Latin American region or at the global level at large. Neither through eradication nor through AD or other efforts²⁷⁴. Well that is true when we it comes to quantitative eradication and when we define the solving of a problem as getting rid of it within a short period of time. But yes, AD has measurably contributed to positive social change at the local level. In addition one or two decades in development terms are truly not much. More realistic time frames allowing for gradual reduction over a period of several years and greater compatibility with local rural development plans will be essential for future initiatives.

Unfortunately there is no clear connection between changes at national level and the respective policy interventions and consequently it is quite unsure if the intensification of current strategies would result in bigger outcomes to the global drug situation.²⁷⁵ In that sense AD should not focus primary on quantitative eradication of illicit crops, but should leave room for the beneficiaries to decide for themselves when they are willing and able to substitute in order to assure an acceptable and improved quality of life.²⁷⁶

A significant role is and should be played by developing countries with ample experience in the design of alternative development strategies and the implementation of AD. Their task is to promote best practise and lessons learned in that area and try to apply them in accordance with the respective national particularities.²⁷⁷ Besides all relevant institutions should share and disseminate their experience with AD and support the involvement of both local communities and academic and research institutions in that process²⁷⁸.

As pointed out in the final report²⁷⁹ of a global thematic evaluation of alternative development carried out by the United Nations in 2005, various forms of AD had been developed, ranging form an emphasis on security to poverty alleviation and development. It underlines that “AD

²⁷³ Jelsma. 2002. P.23.

²⁷⁴ Of course there were structural de-, and increases of coca cultivation, that are influenced by price trends, trafficking routes and geopolitical developments.

²⁷⁵ Ibid. P. 14

²⁷⁶ See Gebert/ Rerkasem. 2002. P. 14.

²⁷⁷ UN General Assembly. 63rd Session. 3rd Committee. Agenda Item 98. International drug control. P.5sq.

²⁷⁸ UNODC. Open-end intergovernmental expert working group on international cooperation on the eradication of illicit drug crops and on alternative development. P. 6.

²⁷⁹ United Nations (2005). Alternative Development. A Global Thematic Evaluation. Final Synthesis Report. New York.

policies had been more efficient when all major stakeholders, including governments, donors, non-governmental organizations and beneficiaries had been involved in their formulation and when those policies allowed for decentralised decision-making, empowering local communities and were flexible enough to adapt to local contexts”²⁸⁰. These elements have already been discussed above, are supported by the international community, but lack in efficient implementation.

However, larger parts of illicit crop growing farmers do not receive AD assistance and remain isolated from wider economic and social development programmes. It will be important to build the adequate setting in which this efforts take place as international cooperation and the participation of civil society and the private sector are required to be part of it. This is extremely difficult to ensure as AD programmes or better say investments in AD are made because of illicit crop cultivation causing damage to other parts of society of global extent and not because of traditional development intentions.

Anyhow, alternative development supports and even more important initiates development in rural areas where investment would not be made under normal circumstances because of the poor economic conditions and no change in life would ever happen to the local population. Even if alternative development programmes and initiatives did not manage to have to desire strong impact on the coca cultivation it has been making achievements so far. But it is also clear that in these rural regions where AD is implemented due to the scope of the coca cultivation very few or non development efforts had been made before, and that governments and the international community are only taking action because of the global drug problem.²⁸¹ “It is only a shame that peasants could not be helped unless they grow illegal crops”²⁸².

3.6.2 Integrating AD into Wider Development Efforts

As pointed out before alternative development is currently implemented largely in the context of individual rural development projects in isolated areas which do not provide adequate opportunities for AD to have an impact on drug control on a larger scale.²⁸³ It was indicated by various sources that alternative development is more effective and more sustainable as part of a wider development scheme whose goal is to improve the livelihood of marginal rural

²⁸⁰ UN Economic and Social Council (2008). The World Drug Problem. Fifth Report of the Executive Director. Action Plan on International Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit Crops and on Alternative Development. at: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V07/892/21/PDF/V0789221.pdf?OpenElement>. P. 10 sq. according to United Nations. 2005. P. 11.

²⁸¹ See Thoumi. 2002. P. 11-21.

²⁸² Ibid. P.21.

²⁸³ UNODC. Open-end intergovernmental expert working group on international cooperation on the eradication of illicit drug crops and on alternative development. P. 4.

populations²⁸⁴. It is important to recognize that alternative development for the most part is agriculture development. At the same time the international community needs to understand that drug control agencies don't have the sufficient money, resources and ability to develop these areas where the crops grow. In addition most development agencies and programmes are not represented in coca growing areas.²⁸⁵

However, in the Andean region there is only few experience of integrating drugs as a cross cutting issue within national and regional development programmes and AD is still project oriented and has very limited outreach as only about 23% of farmers of illicit crops in the Andean region are currently reached²⁸⁶. In that concern Colombia has seen growing involvement of line ministries and provincial governments in development planning in areas affected by illicit crop cultivation.²⁸⁷ At large both national governments and multilateral development agencies, such as UNODC in the hereafter case study, should include counter narcotics issues into wider rural development initiatives and approaches in order to enhance long-term strategies for legitimate livelihoods²⁸⁸.

Hopefully strong support focused on traditional development elements will provide fruitful assistance to the overall strengthening of existing social and economic structures and also the governments' capacities to enforce counter-drug laws and combat drug related crime. Also, the replacement of illicit coca cultivation will sooner or later happen when economic and social standards have been developed and provide the necessary environment for a legal economy.

²⁸⁴ UN Economic and Social Council. 2008. P. 11 according to United Nations. 2005. P. vii.

²⁸⁵ See interview with Mr. Jorge Eduardo Rios, SLU, VIC, 28 August 2008.

²⁸⁶ See also: Commission on Narcotic Drugs. 51st Session (2008). Complementary drug-related data and expertise to support the global assessment by Member States of the implementation of the declarations and measures adopted by the General Assembly at its twentieth special session. Report by the European Commission, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the German Society for Technical Cooperation and The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. P. 3. At: <http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND-Session51/CND-UNGASS-CRPs/ECN72008CRP11.pdf>. Only about 20% of households cultivating coca in the Andean countries have received direct assistance from AD projects. Unfortunately these communities are often neglected by the mainstream rural development effort despite their pro-poor mandates.

²⁸⁷ Ibid. P. 4 sq.

²⁸⁸ See UNODC. Open-end intergovernmental expert working group on international cooperation on the eradication of illicit drug crops and on alternative development. P. 5.

4. Case Study on Two UNODC Projects in Colombia

4.1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

International Organizations such as UNODC vary in their membership and size. Some are regional and some global, some narrowly focused and others quite broad.²⁸⁹ Their range of services and functions are based on their mandates decided upon by their member states. These mandates facilitate the organization to take action, but also limits their range of possibilities regarding its engagements and interventions.

The following subchapters will present inter alia UNODC's mandates and relevant conventions that build the organization's foundation for their work at headquarters and in the field. Subsequent its work and role in alternative development will be illustrated before the organizations performance and relevance will be discussed.

4.1.1 Mandates and Conventions²⁹⁰

The UN established its Drug Control Program (UNDCP) in 1990 focusing on demand reduction and alternative development²⁹¹. Because of required changes in leadership, management style and internal culture²⁹² the programme was combined with the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division in the UN Office at Vienna in 1997 and formed the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, which was finally renamed as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2002²⁹³. The same year UNODC's current Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa came into office. UNODC is the only UN agency to have two completely separate governing boards, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) and the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ). The organization also must take account of decisions taken by the International Narcotics Control Board, which monitors the implementation of the United Nations drug control conventions.²⁹⁴ The organization's work is guided by a broad range of international legally binding instruments and a set of United Nations standards and norms on crime prevention and criminal justice:

²⁸⁹ See Stein. 2008. P. 213, 216.

²⁹⁰ The following information is, if not indicated otherwise, an adopted quotation from: UNODC Menu of Services. Technical assistance provided by UNODC. In: <http://www.unodc.org/documents/about-unodc/Menu-of-Services-EN-July08.pdf>

²⁹¹ Jelsma. 2002. P. 15.

²⁹² Ibid. 25.

²⁹³ See UNODC at: <http://www.unvienna.org/unov/en/unodc.html>.

²⁹⁴ Government Office of Sweden (2008). Swedish Assessment of multilateral organizations. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. At: www.sweden.gov.se/mfa

- UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)²⁹⁵
- UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC)²⁹⁶
- International Legal Framework against Terrorism²⁹⁷
- United Nations Standards and Norms in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
- International Legal Framework on Drug Control²⁹⁸

There are three major international drug control treaties which are mutually supportive and complementary. These international conventions provide not only that states should make efforts towards the eradication of illicit cultivated drug crops, but also recognize that no such effort would be truly effective and sustainable without measures to provide alternative, legitimate livelihoods for the populations affected²⁹⁹. An important purpose of the first two treaties is to codify internationally applicable control measures in order to ensure the availability of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances for medical and scientific purposes, and to prevent their diversion into illicit channels. They also include general provisions on illicit trafficking and drug abuse.

- *Convention Against the Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988)*³⁰⁰

This Convention provides comprehensive measures against drug trafficking, including provisions against money laundering and the diversion of precursor chemicals. It provides for international cooperation through, for example, extradition of drug traffickers, controlled deliveries and transfer of proceedings.

- *Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971)*³⁰¹

The Convention establishes an international control system for psychotropic substances. It responded to the diversification and expansion of the spectrum of drugs of abuse and introduced controls over a number of synthetic drugs according to their abuse potential on the one hand and their therapeutic value on the other.

²⁹⁵ Full version available under: http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf

²⁹⁶ Full version available under: <http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf>

²⁹⁷ UN Security Council Resolution on counter-terrorism 1373 (2001). In: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf?OpenElement>

²⁹⁸ UNODC treaties: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/index.html>

²⁹⁹ UNODC. Open-ended intergovernmental expert working group on international cooperation on the eradication of illicit drug crops and on alternative development. Discussion note by the International Narcotics Control Board. 18 June 2008. P. 3. At:

http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND_UNGASS_EWG/CND_UNGASS_EWG_2-4July08/UNODC_CND2008WG3_CRP1E.pdf

³⁰⁰ UN Convention against the Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988. In: http://www.incb.org/pdf/e/conv/1988_convention_en.pdf

³⁰¹ UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971. In: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1971_en.pdf

- *Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961)*³⁰²

This Convention aims at combating drug abuse by coordinated international action. There are two forms of intervention and control that work together. First, it seeks to limit the possession, use, trade, distribution, import, export, manufacture and production of drugs exclusively to medical and scientific purposes. Second, it combats drug trafficking through international cooperation to deter and discourage drug traffickers.

Within a period of 15 years for opium and 25 years for coca, all illicit cultivation should have been stopped by 1979 and 1989 respectively.³⁰³ Obviously these targets could not be met.

4.1.2 Organizational Structure and Financial Resources




Figure 8: UNODC Organizational Chart³⁰⁴

The organization is financed by voluntary contributions of governments, grouped into “major donors” and “emerging national donors”, UN Agencies, Inter-Governmental Organizations, International Financial Institutions and to a very small part private donors, including private sector entities and foundations. These contributions comprise two types: GP-general purpose funds and SP-Special purpose funds. First finance UNODC’s executive direction and

³⁰² UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961. In: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1961_en.pdf

³⁰³ Jelsma. 2002. P. 17.

³⁰⁴ UNODC Organizational Chart. In: <http://www.unodc.org/images/about-unodc/UNODC%20Organizational%20Chart%2029%20October%202008.jpg>

management, while second finance the organization's technical cooperation and other substantive activities at headquarters. Since 2006 the annual level of voluntary funding has more than doubled and amounted 258, 8 million US\$ in 2008. Around 95% (245, 5 million US\$) were special purpose funds, while only 5% (13, 3 million US\$) were defined as general purpose funds. Around 74% of the funding is invested in drug programmes, and 26% in the crime fund.³⁰⁵

4.1.3 Services and Work in Alternative Development

Overall technical assistance is provided in three areas: Rule of Law, Trend Analysis and Forensics, and Health and Development. Alternative Development constitutes one of three subareas in the field of Health and Development and services are supplied in the fields of Alternatives to Illicit Crop Cultivation, and Sustainable Livelihoods. The most significant services in respect to the present research are:³⁰⁶

- Technical assistance in agricultural and rural development (as well as off-farm employment) for sustainable livelihood opportunities in illicit crop cultivation areas.
- Development of marketing strategies for products from alternative development programmes.

As most major organizations or institutions work in compliance with medium or long term strategies international organizations elaborate such as they are essential for achieving shared objectives of their member states and maximizing available resources. In the case of UNODC it supports the organization in assisting their member states to control drugs, prevent crime and terrorism, and building security and justice for all. The UNODC Medium Term Strategy for 2008-2011³⁰⁷ strategy sets out tangible goals within three main themes: 1) Rule of Law; 2) Policy and Trend Analysis; and 3) Human Security: Prevention, Treatment and Reintegration, and Alternative Development. AD is one of 14 result areas and subordinated to the third theme human security and consists of the following 3 results: 3.4.1. Enhanced capacity of Member States, upon request, to design and implement sustainable alternative development

³⁰⁵ See UNODC Resources. At: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/donors/index.html>.

³⁰⁶ In order to promote and execute these services or rather alternatives to illicit crop cultivation UNODC disposes of a variety of tools. Inter alia: Report on Emerging Gender Strategies for Alternative Development, Regional Seminar on Alternative Development: Information Networking and Sharing Good Practices on Gender and Development; A Manual on Monitoring and Evaluation for Alternative Development Projects; Alternative Development in the Andean Region- The UNODC Experience 2007; Alternative Development: Sharing Good Practices, Facing Common Problems; and Report on Guidelines for Best Practices on Gender Mainstreaming in Alternative Development.

³⁰⁷ UNODC Medium Term Strategy 2008-2011. In: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V07/806/72/PDF/V0780672.pdf?OpenElement>

programmes, including, where appropriate, preventive alternative development programmes, within their broader development context, aimed at preventing, reducing and eliminating the illicit cultivation of opium poppy, coca bush and cannabis. 3.4.2. Raising awareness of and mainstreaming the issue of alternative development, including, where appropriate, preventive alternative development programmes, among international organizations, international financial institutions and development networks. 3.4.3. Increased partnerships between UNODC and relevant civil society entities and the private sector that promote Member States' capacity for collaborative activities in alternative development, including, where appropriate, preventive alternative development.³⁰⁸

Over the past 25 years, UNODC has been the central UN organization providing multilateral AD assistance³⁰⁹. The *Sustainable Livelihoods Unit's (SLU)* role is to provide technical advice and training, best practice and guidelines, project quality control, the organization of expert groups and the establishment of collaboration with other development agencies. In this venture SLU pursues the following objectives:

- Offering sustainable alternatives to illicit cultivation, including community initiatives and value-added gains;
- Expanding and sustaining alternative development achievements through increased international involvement and support;
- Promoting innovative approaches and sharing best practices;
- Pursuing an integrated approach to drug and crime prevention;
- Mainstreaming drug issues into development programmes.

In the past the Sustainable Livelihoods Unit has implemented more than 120 technical cooperation projects³¹⁰. Positive development and results are the increased capacity of countries to elaborate national crop elimination or alternative development plans. In addition the scope of the illicit crop cultivation in Southeast Asia and in some countries in Latin America has been reduced. More detailed, around 160, 00 ha of land for agricultural livestock production was developed, UNODC worked with around 220 farmers' organizations and assisted in the creation of 35 commercially viable businesses in Bolivia, Peru and Colombia. UNODC also assisted in the reduction of farmers' dependence on opium poppy in around 350

³⁰⁸ Result area 3.4 Alternative Development. In: UNODC Medium Term Strategy for 2008-2011. In: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/unodc-strategy.html>. P.9.

³⁰⁹ UN Economic and Social Council. 2008. P. 13.

³¹⁰ Between 1979-2004. Further an investment of US\$ 318 million had been made in alternative development between 1988-2004.

villages in Laos and Myanmar by improving food security, irrigation, clean water supplies, roads, health and education services.³¹¹

However, as illustrated in chapter 3.3 many factors hinder the sustainable elimination of illicit crop cultivation and the development of stable social and economic infrastructure. According to UNODC the speed of eradication and the provision of alternative development are not congruent and therefore insufficient. Further is the illicit cultivation often displaced and not efficiently eradicated and the existence of armed conflict and instability in illicit cultivation areas complicates a third party intervention and the implementation of alternative development projects massively.³¹²

4.1.4 Alternative Development “in the Field”

UNODC has 25 offices covering over 150 countries around the world through its network of field, project and liaison offices³¹³. UNODC claims to “work directly with governments and non-governmental organizations” as its “field staff aims at developing and implementing drug control and crime prevention programmes tailored to countries’ particular needs”³¹⁴. As pointed out in subchapter 3.3.2, country focused strategies are one of the core elements in alternative development. Thus any AD strategy should be based on the understanding of the institutions and social structure of the respective country where it is applied³¹⁵ and has to be as diverse as the communities they are assisting. Taking this aspect into account is a valuable aspiration which successful implementation is highly challenging.

Alternative development is the principal method for member states and UNODC to address illicit crop cultivation and currently, UNODC supports six countries³¹⁶ with AD. In the field, meaning the respective country of project implementation, UNODC seeks to work in partnership with the affected countries, other UN agencies, NGOs and the private sector. The focus is on helping small farmers with licit income generation activities to reduce their dependency on income from coca cultivation. Further activities are undertaken to support the health and education sector, to build basic infrastructure, and to support community development. Attention is also given to the economic and ecological dimension as environmental protection and the improvement of markets for AD products are indispensable

311 UNODC. Division for Operations. Units Information at: www.unodc.org

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ Afghanistan, Baltic States, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, East Asia and Pacific, Egypt, Eastern Africa, India, Iran, Lao PDR, Mexico, Myanmar, New York, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Russia, Senegal, South Africa, South Eastern Europe, Thailand, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam.

³¹⁴ UNODC. Field Offices at: <http://www.unvienna.org/unov/en/unodc.html>

³¹⁵ See Thoumi. 2002. P. 6 sq.

³¹⁶ Afghanistan, Bolivia, Colombia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Peru.

elements in successful AD initiatives. Besides the Global Partnership on Alternative Development project was launched on 2007. Its objective is the strengthening of capacities of relevant line ministries and key national and international development actors in order to mainstream alternative development efforts into broader development plans and programmes.³¹⁷

According to the above information provided by UNODC the whole package for successful AD seems to be there. As elaborated in chapter 3 on AD and later pointed out the concluding subchapter 3.6 alternative development is more effective and more sustainable as part of a wider development scheme whose goal is to improve the livelihood of marginal rural populations. According to the previously discussed literature should both national governments and multilateral development agencies include counter narcotics issues into wider rural development initiatives and approaches in order to enhance long-term strategies for legitimate livelihoods. Many important elements seem to be considered in UNODC's overall programme on AD. Of course it is important to analyze and realize the necessities and elaborate the right concepts and initiatives. However, in the end effective implementation and final results in form of social change are what matters to the beneficiaries. Later on in this chapter two AD projects implemented by UNODC will be analyzed closer in order to assess the organizations competences and qualification in more detail.

4.1.5 Cooperation and Role within the UN-System

In the past UNODC has been the central UN organization providing multilateral AD assistance³¹⁸. However, one organizations efforts are often not enough to support sustainable change and mutual efforts are needed. In that regard system-wide coherence within the UN system is needed to support national priorities through working together, leveraging more effectively its respective capacities and expertise³¹⁹. Thus UNODC's work should be carried out in close cooperation with other relevant United Nations organizations and programmes,

³¹⁷ See UNODC. Alternative Development. Work in the Field. At: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/alternative-development/Work-in-the-field.html>; and UNODC. Global Partnership on Alternative Development. At: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/alternative-development/GlobalpartnershiponAlternativeDevelopment.html>

³¹⁸ States including Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America have provided assistance in Asia and Latin America.

³¹⁹ UN. Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization. General Assembly Official Records. 63rd Session. Supplement No.1. P. 16. 2008. At: [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/63/1\(SUPP\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/63/1(SUPP))

such as WHO, UNDP or the Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS, in order to improve the organization's overall performance³²⁰.

Besides, important working arrangements between UNDP and UNODC are in place as the UN Development Programme (UNDP) has the leadership role within the UN system for the coordination and funding of technical assistance programmes and projects to support and supplement the national efforts of partner countries to accelerate their economic and social development. The purpose of these arrangements is to set a framework for cooperation between the two organizations in the areas of administration of field personnel, field office administration and the financial and administrative support to projects. In that regard the representative of a UNODC field office, such as the field office in Colombia, has responsibility for all UNODC drug and crime control activities in the designated country and exercises management control over UNODC representation, policy, programme and projects, finances, staff and office administration. However, as mentioned above there are certain financial and administrative arrangements between UNDP and UNODC. So does the formal responsibility for committing and verifying expenditure against funds allotted or authorized for UNODC field office executed activities lie with UNDP. There are also some services provided by UNDP to UNODC field activities: the UNDP office is responsible for providing the necessary services related to the administration of the field office, UNODC field office executed projects are serviced by UNDP in accordance with UNDP procedures for the administrative budget, etc. Further the UNDP Administrator and the UNODC Executive Director consult each other periodically on the overall effectiveness of the working arrangements and discuss the quality of services provided by UNDP to the UNODC field office.³²¹

Moreover the "Delivering as One" Initiative was launched in 2007 upon request of governments since the UN will be unable to deliver on its promises and maintain its legitimate position at the heard of the multilateral system without far-reaching reforms. Until now five One Country Programmes as pilots were established in order to overcome the fragmentation and deliver as one through a stronger commitment to working together.³²² Such one UN programme is not yet in place in Colombia, but will hopefully be established in more

³²⁰ See UN General Assembly. 63rd Session. 3rd Committee. Agenda Item 98. International drug control. P.8.

³²¹ See Working Arrangements Between the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). P. 2-8, 11.

³²² See UN. Delivering as One. Report of the Secretary-General's High -Level Panel. 2006. New York. P. 1 sq., 12. At: <http://www.un.org/events/panel/resources/pdfs/HLP-SWC-FinalReport.pdf>

countries worldwide in order to make programme and project implementation easier and more efficient. In addition the respective counterparts, the public and private sector, and civil society will have one single person to talk to. This will most likely facilitate easier cooperation and collaboration.

4.1.6 Evaluation and Monitoring

Evaluation and monitoring mechanisms not only measure how well or bad an organization and its programmes and projects are doing, but more importantly support them to improve their performance and be more effective. The Independent Evaluation Unit is responsible for the planning, coordination, and execution of evaluations of UNODC programmes and projects. The Unit provides substantive guidance and support for all evaluation activities, independent accountability for resources entrusted to UNODC, and also advice to senior management on evaluation issues. Programme evaluations and other major evaluations aim to assess the overall impact and provide feedback and information to management through recommendations, lessons learned and best practices. Evaluation follows two main purposes: firstly, evaluation should assess the effectiveness of a project or programme in order to detect shortcomings or mistakes and to finally enable learning and improvement; secondly, it is a matter of accountability as evaluations demonstrate to donors and other stakeholders how resources are allocated and have been used and can provide them with evidence of success.³²³

In 2008 the Independent Evaluation Unit carried out a thematic evaluation of alternative development initiatives by UNODC. It noted that AD programmes needed to consider how projects could best be linked to national drugs and economic development policies and that such programmes should be part of national development programmes³²⁴. Further the report found that there was little evidence that eradication reduces illicit cultivation in sustainable ways. The main reasons are the flexibility or the need of cultivators to move to other areas, the evolvement of production technologies and the little or not existent decrease in total production. Moreover, it pointed out that reductions in illicit crop production were not the only indicator to measure success and that development indicators must be the basis to assess the impact and sustainability of AD initiatives.³²⁵ In that regard it should be pointed out that

³²³ See UNODC and evaluations at: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/index.html>.

³²⁴ See UN Economic and Social Council. 2008. P. 11 according to United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2005). Thematic Evaluation of United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Alternative Development Initiatives. P. 33. At: <http://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/2005-alternativedevelopment.pdf>

³²⁵ Ibid. P. 12 according to United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2005). Thematic Evaluation of United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Alternative Development Initiatives. P. X.

in the present discourse on sustainable alternative development several fractions argue that the level of illicit crop cultivation is not a reliable factor at all when it comes to assessing 1) the improvement of the quality of lives for the rural population in supply countries, 2) the decrease of drug related violence in trafficking countries, and 3) the negative consequences of drugs in consumer countries.³²⁶

The findings and requests issued by the Independent Evaluation Unit correspond with findings of the discussed literature in chapter 3 on alternative development. It is necessary that theory meets practise and that these requirements are considered in the project implementation in the field.

4.1.7 External Assessment and Critics

According to an assessment undertaken by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs UNODC's internal effectiveness is assessed as simply not good. The report indicates that one of the major causes is bound up with its forms of governance. As pointed out at the beginning of this chapter UNODC is the only UN agency to have two separate governing board, which are each unwieldy and ineffective as policy-making bodies since they mainly engage in normative work and political negotiations when they meet. The report also highlights that another deficiency stems from the mix of UNODC funding as almost 90% of its budget consists of voluntary funds and only 10% comes from the regular UN budget. Consequently this presents challenges to the leadership of the organization³²⁷. The funding of UNODC is therefore deficient in both predictability and stability. Unfortunately the rapid growth of the organization's budget in recent years has taken place while the resource level for administrative functions within, e.g. budget, human resource and evaluation, has remained unchanged and the support function then appears to be underfunded. The new UNODC mid-term strategy³²⁸, introduced in 2008, for the first time includes an integrated, results-oriented work plan containing both objectives and quantitative, monitorable performance indicators. The report finds that under the leadership of ED Costa UNODC has been successively revitalized, integrated and made more effective. In contrast the organization's external effectiveness of project implementation is assessed as relatively good and UNODC'S substantive activities must be regarded as very professional. However, much of the good work done is not part of countries' poverty reduction strategies or plans but takes place on a more

³²⁶ This was discussed earlier in chapter 3.

³²⁷ This has in some degree been addressed in subchapter 4.1.2.

³²⁸ The strategy is referred to in subchapter 4.1.3.

ad hoc basis, often in the form of projects. The new strategy has the potential to contribute to improvements, so the report.³²⁹ “To sum up, the process of change in UNODC is moving in the right direction at the same time as much still remains to be done to establish an organizational culture in which operational objectives are monitored and evaluated systematically.³³⁰” Some of these deficiencies and ongoing improvements in the organization’s internal and external effectiveness will be discussed relating to UNODC’s project implementation in Colombia subsequently.

Critic on UNDCP’s/UNODC’s could be found in the academic discussion on alternative development. It is argued, that UNDCP/UNODC would “lack of self-criticism, and over-optimistic view on AD projects’ capacity to establish a relationship of confidence with peasant federations (...) may be best classified as wishful thinking. But there is not doubt that it sees AD as a complementary element of forced eradication. (...) Beneficiaries of AD projects are still considered as potential guerrilleros or criminal elements that need to be re-integrated in society.³³¹

According to Mr. Javier Montano Duran, Drug Control and Crime Prevention Officer in the Latin America and the Caribbean Unit of UNODC’ Division of Operations, generally, there are certain things that “can go wrong” within the implementation of a project. But every UNODC project over 500,000 USD is required to have an external evaluation, and those evaluations are publicized documents. These external evaluations illustrate problems and critic. However, this information is available but not advertised in the international community. UNODC reports generally show the present situation based on data. As data is never good or bad or right or wrong, it simply shows increase or decrease of certain social problems. For instance, in 2008 an increase of coca cultivation in Colombia was recorded, which of course was a big shock. Certainly the efforts of the Colombian government and illicit crop cultivation data is reported on the base of facts, and the language does not change depending on de- or increase, so Mr. Montano. In addition, reports concerning the managerial performance are elaborated. Further projects implemented by UNODC are audited by the OIOS, Office on Internal Oversight Services of the United Nations. This audit by the OIOS is responsible for the investigation of possible mismanagement or violations of the UN rules. Besides the independent evaluation unit (IEU) is responsible for evaluations on the outcome of the projects. Therefore it becomes evident: UNODC can follow all rules without having the

³²⁹ See Government Office of Sweden. 2008. 1 sqq.

³³⁰ Ibid. P. 3.

³³¹ Oomen. 2002. P. 3.

desired impact, which will be reflected in the evaluation. On the other side there can be projects with excellent results, but certain UN rules or procedures were not respected, which would be highlighted and traced in the OIOS report. In case of defences, certain action would follow and sometimes sanctions are decided.³³²

Mr. Montano also pointed out, that the questioned “relationship of trust” is certainly established in Colombia as most of the alternative development projects implemented in Colombia are the response of requests from the ground and in collaboration with the beneficiaries. In alternative development, different types of intervention are possible, but it is essential, that they are owned by the local community as failure would be a very possible consequence if the peasant does not see the value of the project or activity and will not comply, or will start growing coca again. Consequently there are consultation meetings between UNODC and the target population in Colombia in order to get them engaged, and have their inputs for new project proposals, which are very comprehensive.³³³

Also, one has to keep in mind that official UN documents and publications are generally written in very diplomatic language and obviously point out global problems, needs and challenges, but not the own organizations boundedness or ignorance. However, this critic has its justification as evidence of failure is easily found across the field.

4.2 Analysis of Two Projects

4.2.1 Project Environment in Colombia

Colombia was one of the three countries that emerged from the collapse of Gran Colombia in 1930 (the others are Ecuador and Venezuela). A four-decade long conflict between government forces and anti-government insurgent groups, principally the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (funded by the drug trade)³³⁴, escalated during the 1990s. Since the insurgents lack the military or popular support necessary to overthrow the government Colombia is an electoral democracy that faces severe human rights violations, armed conflict and increased organized crime for decades and no solution to the armed conflict is likely in the near future³³⁵. Fortunately violence has been decreasing in the last years, but insurgents continue attacks against civilians and large areas of the countryside are

³³² See interview with Montano Duran, Javier. Drug Control and Crime Prevention Officer. Latin America and the Caribbean Unit. UNODC. VIC: 23 September 2009.

³³³ Ibid.

³³⁴ Also see: National Drug Control Strategy. 2008. P. 34.

³³⁵ See Heinz. 2002. P. 10.

under guerrilla influence or are contested by security forces.³³⁶ Peace negotiations have been taking place with interruptions between the government and the leadership of guerrilla and paramilitary groups. The negotiations focused on:³³⁷

- The acknowledgement of fundamental human rights and international humanitarian law standards;
- The rejection of new abductions and the release of those abducted;
- An agreement on a political dialogue and an armistice;
- On the transformations of the Guerrilla into a political party in the medium-term; and
- An agreement on the basic contours of the necessary modifications of the Colombian society and politics after the end of the conflict.

Despite the international community's, especially the United State's, praise for Colombia's commitment to fighting production and trafficking of drugs in the past decade, including record aerial and manual eradication levels, impressive cocaine seizure numbers, interception of imported precursor chemicals, destruction of processing laboratories and action against drug traffickers and armed groups³³⁸, Colombia remains the world's largest cocaine producer. Progress in Colombia has been made concerning the level of eradication. The Colombian government also continues to seize great amounts of its own cocaine, to intercept imports of precursor chemicals, to destroy drug labs and to face the corrupting power of the drug trade on the government.³³⁹

It is estimated that between 67,000 to 100,000 families are involved in the cultivation of coca³⁴⁰. In 2006 the largest areas were in the following departments in the south and east of Colombia: Narinio (20% of the national total), Tumaco (9%), Meta and Guaviare (26%), Putumayo and Caquetá (22%). Most departments where coca crops have been cultivated for a long time can show decreases while in other regions with minor cultivations increases can be detected. In addition farmers broadly began to reduce their average cultivation area in order to prevent spraying and detection after vast eradication undertakings with U.S support and aerial spraying in the recent years. Unfortunately coca cultivating farmers have become more

³³⁶ See CIA. The World Factbook. Colombia. In: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/countrytemplate_co.html

³³⁷ If not indicated otherwise: Heinz. 2002. P. 12.

³³⁸ International Crisis Group. 2008a. P.3 cit from UNODC. 2007. P.III.

³³⁹ UNODC. 2007. P.III.

³⁴⁰ According to an interview carried out by the Crisis Group in Bogota in 2007 some Colombian authorities believe as many as 100,000 families are involved while UNODC talked about 67,000 in their Colombian Coca Cultivation Survey 2007.

sophisticated in the recent years and could maintain their production levels while the average plot seize has been reduced by more than a half.³⁴¹

Unfortunately the country's traffickers have significantly evolved since the 1980s and today's trafficking organizations are much smaller than the major Medellín and Cali drug cartels in the 1990s but there are some 140 of them and the countries traffickers have significantly evolved since the 1980s. The dismembering of the large cartels led to a rise of individual groups and the rise of a new generation of low-profile trafficking organizations which are difficult to trace.³⁴² Important actors are the insurgent Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and paramilitary successor organizations³⁴³, which continue to control much of the primary drug resources such as crops, processing facilities and regional trafficking routes, which they seek to safeguard against other illegal organizations. Of course FARC's involvement varies from region to region, but it is present in about half of the countries 1,098 municipalities, including 128 with illicit crops³⁴⁴ and is dictating the terms for coca cultivation, and processing. Some of its fronts even control the smuggling of chemical precursors and the pure cocaine and consequently have established links to international organized crime³⁴⁵.³⁴⁶ The smaller National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla group has repeatedly denied drugs involvement, but the contrary has become increasingly apparent³⁴⁷. In fact it can be proved that FARC, to a lesser degree the ELN and also the successors of the former paramilitary AUC finance a large part of their effort with drug trafficking and strive to control drug corridors and also the local population in respective areas.³⁴⁸ In that regard the eradication of illicit crops is has become vital in cutting off sources of finance from the guerrillas and paramilitaries. This can be achieved through initiatives that combine crop eradication with alternative development.³⁴⁹ However, simple eradication without the sufficient provision of legitimate livelihoods can lead to a deterioration of the quality of life of the beneficiaries and has no chance to be sustainable. In addition the

³⁴¹ International Crisis Group. 2008a. P. 4, 9.

³⁴² Ibid. P. 6 sqq.

³⁴³ AUC: The Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia) had ceased to function when more than 31,000 former paramilitaries had demobilized in 2006. However simultaneously emerging criminal groups arose, whose members include some former paramilitaries.

³⁴⁴ Ibid. P.8 cit from UNODC. 2007. P. 69.

³⁴⁵ Ibid. P.9 cit from Ministerio de Defensa Nacional (2008). Tendencias y Resultados 2007. P. 12.

³⁴⁶ Ibid. P.1, 6-9.

³⁴⁷ See Embassy of Colombia. Plan Colombia; Also see: International Crisis Group. 2008a. P.9 cit from International Crisis Group (2007). Crisis Group Latin America Briefing no.16. Colombia. Moving forward with the ELN? P. 7 sq.

³⁴⁸ See International Crisis Group. 2008b. P. 37.

³⁴⁹ See Conciliation Resources. 2004. at: <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/colombia/role-international-community.php>

guerrilla war has become a regional problem as neighbour governments are forced to guard their boundaries more actively since border trespassing and use of neighbouring countries as retreats for guerrilla groups and drug trade.³⁵⁰

Unfortunately the mentioned possibility of a deterioration of the humanitarian situation of peasants after the eradication of illicit crops is likely to occur as adequate social and economic structures are difficult to assure even if their provision is a central objective.

Consequently focus of alternative development should be given to the strengthening of local organization of communities through capacity building, improved infrastructure, and productive activities. The role of technical cooperation is to 1) provide direct support for state institutions, NGOs and communities active in this environment, and 2) support internally displaced people and victims of violence, as well as re-integration of members of violent groups (guerrilla, etc.).³⁵¹

4.2.2 UNODC Programme in Colombia

Overall UNODC is supporting the Government's efforts to assist farmers, who gave up coca cultivation, through AD in order to ensure sustainable legal income. Currently there are four major AD initiatives under implementation. 1) "Products of Peace": in collaboration with the Colombian Government UNODC supports farmers' associations engaged in AD products. A larger part is organic products, which have good opportunities in being profitable and competitive in domestic and international markets. 2) "Forest Management": in coordination with the Social Action Plan of the Presidency of Colombia UNODC is implementing forest management, agro-forestry and food security activities. 3) "Forest Warden Families Programme": UNODC is monitoring the achievements of the programme with respect to voluntary eradication, forest recovery and socio-economic development. Its main objective is the incorporation of farmer families into a process of voluntary eradication of illicit crops and the recovering of forest in ecologically and socially vulnerable areas. 4) Initiative with departmental government: in line with the national and departmental strategies on AD in order to strengthen the productive capacities of at least 200 families and community enterprises.³⁵²

³⁵⁰ See Heinz. 2002. P. 11.

³⁵¹ Ibid. P. 19 according to Anderson, M. B. (1999). Do not harm. How Aid can support Peace- or War. Boulder: Co.

³⁵² See UNODC. Alternative Development. Colombia. At: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/alternative-development/Colombiaprogramme.html>

Certainly official information and planned initiatives (especially planned by headquarters) mostly seem feasible and show great efforts. However, reality often looks differently. That's what we have learned throughout previous experiences in development. Therefore two AD projects implemented by UNODC in Colombia will be illustrated and analysed in the following subchapters.

4.2.3 The Two Projects

1. Project COL/J36 "Alternative Development in Antioquia Department"³⁵³

The project was launched in January 2007 and will be completed in December 2010 if no additional project revision will be submitted for approval at headquarters. It is one of 5 currently³⁵⁴ ongoing projects implemented in the thematic area "Sustainable Livelihoods". The project is executed by UNODC with the Government of Antioquia as its counterpart. The total proposed budget amounts US\$ 3,667,931. US\$ 3,543,591 have been pledged by donor countries; US\$ 2,707,144 have been collected as of 23 September 2009. Donor countries are: Austria, Colombia, France, Italy, and Switzerland.³⁵⁵

Project Environment in Antioquia: From 2000-2005 the area of land employed for illicit crop cultivation in the department of Antioquia rapidly increased by 152%. Traditionally the municipalities of Anorí and Bricenio in the Antioquia department are coffee and cacao producers. However, agricultural production has not succeeded in achieving a higher development level, nor has added value created by the industrialization process. As such, the market for their products has not become more commercialized by external intermediaries. In some cases, due to the low prices of AD products or the problems in marketing, some farmers have been forced to cultivate illicit crops. It is evident that the interest in the commercialization of AD products, within national and international markets, has only been recently developed. Fortunately, and different from other countries in the region, Colombia can rely on a develop domestic market and with the possibilities of introducing marketing concepts such as "solidarity markets". COL/J36 is the first development project to receive financial contribution from a departmental government. In addition the departmental government has provided technical assistance, alongside the Secretary of Agriculture, IDEA, and advisors from UNODC, in the conceptual formulation of the project. The project will

³⁵³ If not indicated differently, see: UNODC. Project Document. COLJ36 Alternative Development in Antioquia Department. At: UNODC Programme and Financial Information Management System.

³⁵⁴ As of 23 Spetember 2009.

³⁵⁵ Drugs and Crime Programmes-Technical Cooperation. Priority Funding Requirements. Project Number COLJ36. At: UNODC Programme and Financial Information management System.

attempt persuade farmers, currently involved in illicit crop cultivation, to grow alternative and economically viable crops such as cocoa and coffee. The project does not only have the direct support from the private sector for the commercialization of coffee and cocoa, but also has the backing of the National Federation of Coffee Growers (La Federación Nacional de Cafeteros).

Main Objectives: In terms of strategy, the current AD project will enhance the capacity of the local government of Antioquia to design and implement a sound sustainable AD programme, aimed at preventing, reducing and eliminating the illicit cultivation of coca crops. The project's main objectives are 1) the strengthen social ties, productive capacities, and enterprises of at least 200 families in the communities of Anorí and Bricenio. 2) to promote a change towards agro-forestry production of coffee and cocoa as a mechanism to substitute illicit crop cultivation in accordance with the Departmental Strategy for Alternative Development promoted by the Government of Antioquia.

2. Project COL/J31 “Strengthening alternative development productive projects within the framework of integrated rural programmes in Colombia”³⁵⁶

The project was launched in January 2007 and was meant to be completed in December 2008. However, some project segments related to marketing and agro-industrial strengthening will still be ongoing during the years 2009 and 2010³⁵⁷. The project is implemented in the thematic area “Sustainable Livelihoods”, and has a nationwide coverage. It is executed by UNODC with the Programa Presidencial contra Cultivos Ilícitos as its counterpart. For the first time ever, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) co-funded a UNODC project. These funds have been used to strengthen the commercialization component, thus helping farmers promote their AD products in national and international markets.

The total proposed budget amounted US\$ 9,810,100. US\$ 9,225,025 have been pledged by donor countries, while US\$ 8,039,863 have been collected as of 23 September 2009. Donor countries are: Colombia, Italy, USAID and Inter-American Development Bank.³⁵⁸

Project Environment and Justification: Economic support and incentives are necessary to give farmers a sense of ownership in the Colombian government's zero-coca and environmental

³⁵⁶ If not indicated differently, see: UNODC. Project Document. COLJ31 Strengthening alternative development productive projects within the framework of integrated rural programmes in Colombia. At: UNODC Programme and Financial Information Management System.

³⁵⁷ UNODC. Drugs Programme. Technical Cooperation. Annual Project Progress Report. Project COLJ31. 01012008-31122008. P. 4. At: ProFi- Programme and Financial Information Management System.

³⁵⁸ Ibid.

protection policies and also increase the chances for sustainable economic and social success of AD initiatives. For several years, UNODC has worked on the identification and promotion of legal and commercially viable alternatives to replace farmers' dependence on coca crops. With exception of the region of Tumaco (Narinio), the project worked in 7 geographical areas with about 20,000 Forest Warden families (Guardabosques) that have decided to invest the finds received from the government in productive and commercially viable activities. About 70% of the recipients of funds under the Forest Warden Families are women.

Main Objectives: Referring to the UNODC Strategy 2008-2011, the project falls under the result area of alternative development, aiming at increasing partnerships between UNODC and relevant civil society entities and the private sector. The objective of the project is to offer alternatives for an appropriate use of natural resources and establishment of productive projects aiming at an immediate positive impact on social and economic conditions of the beneficiary population.

4.2.4 Stakeholder Interests and Decision-Making Processes

UNODC is cooperating with a wide range of actors, which all have different interests and act according to different procedures. As for donors the individual requirements and standards of often depend on their economic and political importance. Consequently most of the smaller countries are very easy to work with. For instance conduct some countries their correspondence in their official language, such as France, Belgium and Luxemburg³⁵⁹. Of course bigger donors dispose of bigger financial resources and consequently are able to play a bigger part. Such donors would be able to influence the future direction and focus of projects supported by them.³⁶⁰

The government of France is financially assisting the alternative development project COLJ36 implemented by UNODC in Colombia. French authorities did not get involved in the elaboration of project document COLJ36. Nevertheless there is contact to a certain extent between the UNODC Field Office in Colombia and the local French Embassy. France is a very stable financial supporter and is likely to fund project COLJ36 next year again. As for France a certain "French ownership" or "French branding" is important. For instance a senior

³⁵⁹ Luxemburg for instance in corresponding in German, the treaties are sent in French and answered by UNODC in English.

³⁶⁰ See Interview with Hanke, Martina. Expert. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC. VIC: 07 August 2008.

project officer with French nationality, reports in French language, etc. Compared to other donors it is noticeable, that French is one of the bigger ones and also more demanding.³⁶¹

Austria is funding project COLJ36 in Colombia but did not get involved in the elaboration of project document COLJ36. However, there is contact and exchange of information between the UNODC Field Office in Colombia and the local French Embassy. Austria is seldom changing its focus areas and therefore a consistent donor for project COLJ36 and other projects supported by Austria. Decisions are taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its development policies, which is oriented regionally. Alternative development is of high importance within its cooperation with and financial support for UNODC.³⁶²

The government of Switzerland, concretely the Ministry of Health, is a small donor, but has very exact ideas and rules of procedures. Switzerland wanted to support a project implemented in Colombia and had special criteria to its contributions.³⁶³

The Italian government, precisely the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Environment, is financially supporting project COLJ31 and COLJ36, and will contribute an additional US\$ 1Mio to COLJ31 and COLJ36. The funds come from a special purpose fund for Latin America. The political interests behind this investment are not clear, but it is likely that the Italian background of UNODC's permanent field representative in Colombia; Aldo Lale-Demoz, and his well established relationship with the embassy in Colombia is one reason. UNODC is both communicating with the Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Vienna and Ministries, which dispose of earmarked funds of certain development areas. That way UNODC sometimes gets information or negotiates with the Ministries in Rom without the Permanent Missions' involvement. Even trips to certain donor countries are undertaken or the responsible Ministry personal is invited to Vienna, for example to the "Major Donor Meeting", which takes place twice a year in order to strengthen existing cooperation.³⁶⁴

While Italy is increasing its financial contributions to COLJ36 and COLJ31 Switzerland will decrease its donations and has not yet decided where to focus on. However, Switzerland is

³⁶¹ See interview with Arthur-Flatz, Claudia. External Relations Officer. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC. VIC: 22 August 2008

³⁶² Ibid.

³⁶³ See Interview with Hanke, Martina. Expert. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC. VIC: 07 August 2008

³⁶⁴ Ibid.

only supporting projects with human rights elements such as Criminal Justice Programmes while at the same time not giving assistance to Law Enforcement Projects. Besides, some countries, such as Germany prefer to support a certain component of a project due to special administrative procedures, which is of course additional work for UNODC.³⁶⁵

Without any doubt, political events and government configuration influence the decision-making of stakeholders. Also it depends on the respective political goals and programmes. A repetitive change of government and leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can result in a change of thematic or geographic priorities concerning the development policies.³⁶⁶ Nonetheless, most donors have certain thematic and geographical areas they are supporting. So far, Colombia has not been of big strategic interest to Italy and Switzerland. Financial contributions had been small so far. But with a pledge of US\$ 1 Mio. it seems that a partnership with Colombia has become more important to the Italian government. Switzerland usually focuses on Criminal Justice programmes in the East. Italy on the other hand, had been given support to all kinds of geographical and thematical areas and is likely to focus on specific areas in the near future. Still, Italy has certain thematical preferences depending on geographical zones. For instance, alternative development in Latin America or Judicial Reform in Afghanistan.³⁶⁷ Of course donor priorities change and new areas come up while others diminish. Further: if a project is not within a donor's target area, then it is almost impossible to get funded. Consequently UNODC has to adjust its projects to the donors' wishes, and projects are elaborated, that are donor driven rather than country driven. Of course this is not always the case. However, the risk exists, that UNODC may focus on something not effective in order to capture some funding. After all it is difficult to engage donors. Concerning alternative development, UNODC seeks to design projects in regions of interest to its member states and donors in order to secure funding.³⁶⁸

The money invested by the United States of America in the Colombian project COLJ31 is given by USAID and funded locally in Bogota. USAID is financing projects independent from the US State Department in case projects fit its local objectives. Alternative development in Colombia is an important area for the USAID, which corresponds to its very

³⁶⁵ Ibid.

³⁶⁶ See interview with Arthur-Flatz, Claudia. External Relations Officer. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC. VIC: 22 August 2008

³⁶⁷ See Interview with Hanke, Martina. Expert. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC. VIC: 07 August 2008

³⁶⁸ See interview with Jerneloev, Muki Daniel. External Relations Officer. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC. VIC: 12 August 2008

high contributions (up to US\$ millions) to UNODC alternative development projects, such as COLJ31 and COLJ36, each year.³⁶⁹

Of course donors are bound to their pledges through financial agreements and almost entirely comply with. As for projects COLJ31 and COLJ36 there had been no problems. In general, only few times money had to be returned. For instance, when money was not spent because the project had never started. However, sometimes this money is contributed to other projects or programmes in addition to the considered financial assistance. The responsible UNODC personnel needs to be familiar with the donors interests, funding preferences and financial capacity including earmarked funds, in order to get these additional funds. Unfortunately UNODC does not dispose of special personnel assigned to research the mentioned interests or activities due to lack of resources. Yet Mrs. Martina Hanke, Expert in UNODC's Co-finance and Partnership Section, undertakes a few trips to the Ministries of donor countries in order to strengthen existing and build new partnerships, meet various Ministry personal, present UNODC, as it is compared to other UN organizations rather small, and to introduce new hard-, and soft pipeline projects.³⁷⁰

The allocation of funds is widely decided by the respective Ministry. Only in some cases representatives, e.g. ambassadors, have the decision-making competences to decide upon the assurance of financial assistance. In the Colombian case there is a very close contact between UNODC and the donor countries which sometimes makes the decision-making process less complicated as local needs are recognized by both parties. The existence of various partners within the financial donator community allows more cooperation possibilities but increases the complexity and uncertainty of the whole structure.³⁷¹

Although UNODC field office in Colombia is in touch with the local embassies of Austria and France, decision about agreements, funding or other types of cooperation are taken centrally in Vienna and Paris. As for the representative of the PMs in Vienna it is extensive work to get decisions outside the determined agenda approved by the government.³⁷²

³⁶⁹ Ibid.

³⁷⁰ See Interview with Hanke, Martina. Expert. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC. VIC: 07 August 2008

³⁷¹ Ibid.

³⁷² See interview with Arthur-Flatz, Claudia. External Relations Officer. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC. VIC: 22 August 2008

Usually, the embassy in the project country is not allowed to sign agreements with the field representative³⁷³ and donor countries demand feedback to the Permanent Mission as they need to submit agreements and treaties centrally. Agencies such as USAID or Canadian SIDA have authority locally and their own local budget, which has been decided upon local priorities and the assessment of potential funding vehicles, etc. Further there is an important element that has changed in the decision-making process and the cooperation with donors since UNODC is extending its donor base. Before most assistance came directly from governments through the Vienna Permanent Missions. Now a number of funding sources are local because the field office representatives are mobilizing funding while keeping in touch with headquarters in Vienna. Additionally UNODC headquarters has to authorize the signature of agreements. Quite frequently questions about clauses in the agreement, format, or discrepancies in the agreements, such as inappropriate references to national law or auditing, etc. come up, which UNODC can not accept since it works under the UN rules and regulations. Consequently it is still important, that the approval and clearance process goes through headquarters in order to make sure that the agreement is in accordance with the required regulations.³⁷⁴

Concerning the projects' effectiveness, immediate and stable results can not be identified, accept after a couple of years. Further there are a couple of reasons why objectives can not be achieved. For instance external factors, politics, natural disaster, etc. Therefore, if a donor decides not to financially assist a project any more it means that the donor has no funds for this particular thematic or geographic area. However, it wouldn't mean, that the assistance is not needed any more. This is quite a problem for the people on the ground and the responsible UNODC field office. Such scenario took place about six years ago when donors shifted their funding from the Latin American region to Afghanistan and the surrounding region for political reasons. There was not doubt Latin America still needed assistance, but the donors invested financial resources in an other region.³⁷⁵

There are also certain demands expressed by donors regarding the supply with information such as project documents and revisions, time schedules, work plans and financial data. Financial statements, annual, and semi-annual reports are sent automatically each year.

³⁷³ For instance the Swiss development cooperation has the competence to do so.

³⁷⁴ See interview with Jernelojev, Muki Daniel. External Relations Officer. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC. VIC: 12 August 2008

³⁷⁵ Ibid.

Sometimes special information about project activities sponsored by single donors is inquired. However, there had been no particularly extensive demands been expressed in the course of COLJ31 and COLJ36.³⁷⁶

As for France, few special demands are expressed within a very well organized organizational structure. Austria, in comparison, is more extensive to work with. Sometimes UNODC's contact person to the Austrian Permanent Mission for funding obtains few decision-making competences, such as an intern, and change on a regular basis. That way UNODC's contact person to the PMs is very inconsistent and knowledge management within the Austrian Permanent Mission is sometime rather poor. Unfortunately, this scares situation is already a long-term condition, so Ms. Arthur-Flatz, UNODC External Relations Officer. This results in additional administrative work for UNODC since project and donor information, as well as working procedures need to the communication reiteratively.³⁷⁷

4.2.5 Intermediate Conflicts

Conflicts between stakeholders implementing an alternative development project or programmes can arise as a consequence of differences of opinion on implementation, on certain program activities, on state repression, or on distribution of program benefits, etc. In addition differences in the assessment of the project progress or the distribution of benefits can emerge and need to be solved expeditiously in order not to threaten the overall project success or its continuation.³⁷⁸

As USAID, co-financing alternative development project COLJ31, works and decided at a local level, the US Permanent Mission in Vienna does not know what USAID's plans in Colombia are. It even occurs that the mission is surprised to see new contributions from USAID, because they don't know about this undertaking. USAID's headquarters is in Washington, but its priorities are set locally and it has own regional or country offices with individual country programmes, targets, and priorities. Of course, there is obviously coordination between USAID and the US State Department of "somehow" going out as one. Consequently this had been a huge political controversy when about two years ago former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice suggested, that development assistance should possibly

³⁷⁶ See Interview with Hanke, Martina. Expert. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC. VIC: 07 August 2008

³⁷⁷ See interview with Arthur-Flatz, Claudia. External Relations Officer. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC. VIC: 22 August 2008

³⁷⁸ Heinz. 2002. 17 sq.

follow political goals. This caused uproar within the development community, because the development community urges, that development should be for its own sake, not to realize political aims and decisions should be taken based on the situation of the people on the ground. However, there is often a coincidence of assistance between USAID and the US State Department, because they are in the same sphere of interests. As for Colombia, the country is important to the United States for a number of reasons and therefore supported by many US institutions.³⁷⁹

Also, the involvement of other donors or their financial contributions can sometimes be of interest to a donor. Mostly contributors want to be informed about the money already pledged or allocated and by whom it is done so. This is not necessarily about “who” is involved, but about “will there be enough money to start the project”.³⁸⁰ Of course donors coordinate their funding with other donors, although, UNODC is not always informed about ongoing discussions between them. Sometimes one of the smaller countries wants to co-finance a project with one of the politically more important countries. This cooperation and financial contributions can be issued due to development efforts in a certain area or due to political reasons³⁸¹. Most of the political constellations and cooperation are an outcome of the commissions, as the GRULAC block for Latin America, and its resolutions. These blocks discuss priorities and try either to fund themselves, or to act as a pressure group toward the group with financial power. Overall donors and member states rather agree to work together than to actually coordinate their actions.³⁸²

As for Colombia UNODC and the counterparts in the government have the same goals. Of course the government of Colombia, that is financing its alternative development projects to a great part, wishes not to be told by other donors what to do in their own country. However, if

³⁷⁹ See interview with Jerneloev, Muki Daniel. External Relations Officer. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC. VIC: 12 August 2008

³⁸⁰ See Interview with Hanke, Martina. Expert. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC. VIC: 07 August 2008

³⁸¹ For instance did Japan and the US cooperate on a project in Myanmar: The US had political problems with Myanmar as 8 people were in US courts for crimes and it had to cut the funding. But the US had the political objective to change the drug situation. Hence it agreed with Japan to financially support a project in the region, Thailand, when Japan would fund the project that the US could no longer support in Myanmar. So basically the donors agreed, that they would split was they fund, because there were political problems. That means that the donors are not trying to do their own political thing no matter what, but are trying to make sure, that project and assistance works.

³⁸² See interview with Jerneloev, Muki Daniel. External Relations Officer. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC. VIC: 12 August 2008

common objectives exist, support and cooperation between the project counterparts can most of the time be relied on.³⁸³

4.2.6 Analysis of the Project Documents

This chapter will illustrate and examine both the elaboration of the analyzed project documents, and the incorporation and consideration of essential components or approaches³⁸⁴.

As illustrated and discussed in chapter 3.3, certain factors and challenges need to be considered during the elaboration of projects or programmes and must be integrated in the official document in order to facilitate and enhance results-oriented implementation of strategies, programmes, and projects. Consequently the incorporation of specific elements depending on respective objectives of individual alternative development projects and programmes into their design is required to permit sustainable results and valuable assistance for the beneficiaries in the field.

- According to the discussed literature, alternative development projects and programmes has to meet the country's or region's needs and take into account its environment. With regard to Project COLJ36 and OCLJ31 any development strategy must also take the continuation of the war as a starting point for any short to middle term perspective.³⁸⁵ In addition, as pointed out above, any anti-drug policy should be based on the understanding of the institutions and social structure of the respective country where it is applied³⁸⁶.

Since the departmental government in Colombia has provided technical assistance in the conceptual formulation of project COLJ36 alongside the Secretary of Agriculture, IDEA, and advisors from UNODC the involvement of local stakeholders can be verified. Complementary the projects follow national policies on crop substitution promoted by the Presidency Programme of Accion Social: Illicit Programme Against Crops. Further the planned promotion of a change towards agro-forestry production of coffee and cocoa as a mechanism to substitute illicit crop cultivation, which is part of the project's main objective, is in accordance with the Departmental Strategy for Alternative Development promoted by the

³⁸³ Ibid.

³⁸⁴ In case no further quotations are made the following information is based on project documents COLJ36 and COLJ31.

³⁸⁵ Heinz. 2002. P. 19 according to Collier, P. (2000). Policy for Post-conflict Societies. Reducing the Risk of Renewed Conflict.

³⁸⁶ See Thoumi. 2002. P. 6 sq.

Government of Antioquia itself. In addition a local office is operating in Medellin in order to support the local cooperation and project implementation.

- However, not only cooperation with local authorities and institutions in the planning and later implementation of the project is central, but also the participation of the project target groups. That way later project goals can meet the beneficiaries' interests and requirements. Therefore it is necessary to shift power and responsibilities from the implementing agency to the beneficiaries.³⁸⁷ Especially a broad participation of the local population, e.g. peasant federations, producers' associations, or social organizations, need to be part of the design and implementation of projects.³⁸⁸ The beneficiaries should have choices and control during the substitution and development process and should be part of the decision-making processes that determine their future lives. In addition a relationship of trust should exist in any development process between the stimulating agents and the beneficiaries³⁸⁹.

It is indicated in project document COLJ36 that in terms of the UNODC Mid-term Strategy 2008-2011 COLJ36 will enhance the capacity of the local government of Antioquia to design and implement a sound sustainable AD programme, aimed at preventing, reducing and eliminating the illicit cultivation of coca crops. This implies that power and responsibilities are shifted from the implementing agency UNODC to the local government. In addition the government of Antioquia is the project counterpart, which also demonstrates the strong involvement of local authorities. The National Federation of Coffee Growers, UMATA's³⁹⁰, Direction of Agriculture of the Government of Antioquia, and Direction of Political of the Government of Antioquia have also been playing an important role, so the document.

As indicated in project document COLJ31, UNODC worked in 7 geographical areas with about 20,000 Forest Warden families (Guardabosques) that have decided to invest the funds received from the government in productive and commercially viable activities. This decision made by the project beneficiaries themselves assures their support for later project activities

³⁸⁷ See Gebert, R./Rerkasem, K. (2002). Community Empowerment in Alternative Development. Prerequisite for Success or Mutually Exclusive Concepts? Paper for the International Conference on The Role of Alternative Development in Drug Control and Development Cooperation. 7-12 January 2002: Berlin, Chiang Mai. P. 1-6.

³⁸⁸ Oomen. 2002. P. 2.

³⁸⁹ See Jelsma. 2002. P. 19 cit from UNDCP (2000). Alternative Development in the Andean Area. The UNDCP Experience. United Nations: New York.

³⁹⁰ UMATA- Unidad Municipal de Asistencia Técnica Agropecuaria.

regarding the development of forest management with active participation of community councils and communities.

- The history of alternative development efforts in the past three decades has shown that illicit crop substitution can not be successful without concurrent development of the rural and community infrastructure. Consequently institutions and mechanisms to support community-based drug control need to be create or strengthened since weak institutional capacities, infrastructure and coordination between the public and private sector are considered both as cause and consequence of illicit cultivation.³⁹¹

This is especially a problem in Colombia where in some regions very poor infrastructure exists.³⁹² Measures should be taken to support the stabilization of the social and political environment, e.g. strengthening social-, political institutions. Moreover the central state in Colombia has to be a core element in any AD strategy designed for Colombia.

Project COLJ36's main objectives include the strengthening of social ties, productive capacities, and enterprises of the beneficiaries. The specific objectives include the raise of both the capacity of self-management and of socio-economic development of the beneficiary families and producer associations, and also the technical capacity of the local organizations in the planning and regulation of forest and natural resources. However, no new construction of infra-structure is envisaged, since transformation of products will take place either at existing locations or will be contracted by the project. The first of two project objectives is the consolidation of the two processes of community organization and enterprise management of at least 200 families in the municipalities of Bricenio and Anorí in the Department of Antioquia. In doing so 200 families that are currently involved in illicit crop cultivation are involved in the project and requested to sign an agreement. Further will base organizations that lead organizational processes oriented towards activities of legal crop production be consolidated, and the establishment of community associations for the production and marketing of honey will be fostered. As a result the organizational and entrepreneurial capacities of production organizations, but also the capacities of local institutions, will be strengthened in the municipalities of Bricenio and Anorí. Besides, project COLJ31 has incorporated mechanisms to strengthen social, environmental and institutional networks.

³⁹¹ See Heinz. 2002. P.9 according to GTZ- Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (1998).
Drugs and Development in Asia: Eschborn. P. 61,65.

³⁹² See Thoumi. 2002. P. 9 sqq.

- In order to ensure the profitability and successful marketing of alternative development products agro-industrial development and product marketing mechanisms need to be part of the programme. Further the existence and further development of communal organizations are central to agro-industrial development. Unfortunately, such organizations are very poorly developed in Colombia, and “producers must build such organizations virtually from scratch”³⁹³ As regards the marketing matter it is essential to promote productive activities that are market-oriented, but take into account those products that are known to the local population and relate to their culture and experience. Simultaneously the capacity of the local, regional and national market should be strengthened before export-oriented initiatives can be considered.³⁹⁴

The Government of Colombia started an initiative to market AD products under the label “Products for Peace” which has increased the involvement of the private sector and could serve as a good example to be adopted in other countries.³⁹⁵ States not affected by illicit drug crop cultivation and the private sector can and should provide better access to markets for AD products³⁹⁶.

Project COLJ36’s main objective includes the promotion of a change towards agro-forestry production of coffee and cocoa as a mechanism to substitute illicit crop cultivation. One of the project’s specific objectives is the improvement of the efficiency of production systems (based on agro-forestry) and the production chain of timber yielding and non-timber yielding products. Within the project implementation supportive facilities for the handling of these production systems are developed. In addition the traditional system of agro-forestry production, extraction and use of alimentary resources are planned to be optimized. Additionally food security activities are promoted. In specific production systems adjustments with emphasis on the production of coffee and cocoa should be established based on agro-forestry. These are to complete the rural income for the families and enable the environmental sustainability of relevant production units. (300 hectares of cocoa and 100 hectares of coffee are to be established.) As a result the beneficiaries will have the capacity for sustainable production and enterprise management. Further will the organizational and entrepreneurial

³⁹³ Thoumi. 2002. P.11 cit from Lee/Clawson. 1993. P. 9.

³⁹⁴ Oomen. 2002. P. 2.

³⁹⁵ UN Economic and Social Council. 2008. P. 21.

³⁹⁶ Ibid. P. 30.

capacities of production organizations be strengthened in the municipalities of Bricenio and Anorí. Concerning the marketing component of project COLJ36 AD products are marketed in fair trade markets and supermarket chains in Colombia.

Project COLJ36 does not only have the direct support from the private sector for the commercialization of coffee and cocoa, but also has the backing of the National Federation of Coffee Growers (La Federación Nacional de Cafeteros). For that reason the National Federation of Coffee Growers, UMATAs, Direction of Agriculture of the Government of Antioquia and Direction of Political of the Government of Antioquia are central actors.

As indicated in project document COLJ31, UNODC has worked on the identification and promotion of legal and commercially viable alternatives to replace farmers' dependence on coca crops for several years. The project's main objective is to offer alternatives for an appropriate use of natural resources and the establishment of productive projects aiming at an immediate positive impact on social and economic conditions for the beneficiary population. The project promoted traditional alternatives, such as cocoa and coffee, as well as relatively new legal livelihoods, such as agro-forestry, ecotourism and fisheries. National markets for these products are mostly assured, considering the helpful and socially responsible engagement of major national supermarket chains in Colombia, as well as national federations and foundations that help farm enterprises to place their products in both national and export markets. The project supports the establishment of agreements with productive organizations for forestry and agro-forestry production and planning, focusing on environmental protection. Further it seeks to improve the marketing chain for forestry and agro-forestry products in the national market, food security through traditional production systems and the introduction of new agro-forestry practices, and capacities for fishery, ecotourism and the production of handicrafts with local natural resources. In addition COLJ31 seeks to contribute to the competitive ability of micro, small, and medium-sized rural producers and to implement a sustainable marketing model for various agro-industrial producers involved in AD.

- The environmental dimension also needs to be considered. In this regard AD efforts should include environmental restoration components, and incorporate environmental

sustainability and protection into their project activities aiming at developing economic and social infrastructure.³⁹⁷

Project COLJ36 incorporates production systems that are to offer rural income for families and enable environmental sustainability of relevant production units. Further they are to develop licit production activities, which emphasise not only on the quality of production, but also environmental conservation.

Project COLJ31 has incorporated mechanisms to strengthen environmental networks and seeks operational synergies with local and departmental entities involved in the promotion of environmental protection initiatives. Focusing on environmental protection the project support the establishment of agreements with productive organizations for forestry and agro-forestry production and planning.

- The application of a Harm Reduction Approach is rather new and needs to be promoted on an international level. Harm reduction can also be functional in the environmental dimension and the damages done by illicit cultivation. Moreover there are currently various ideas of linking harm reduction on the demand and the supply side. E.g. raw materials from source countries could supply the heroin maintenance programmes in Europe, or risk-free coca products could be allowed to be exported to international markets.³⁹⁸

However, such approach is not incorporated in any of the analyzed project.

- As repeatedly illustrated and discussed earlier in the present study monitoring and evaluations mechanisms need to be established in order to detect intended and unintended consequences of project activities³⁹⁹, and an evaluation of the success or failure of AD projects is essential for the initial conditions and chance of success of later initiatives. The assessment should normally be based on data collected among their main target group: coca growing farmers. The increase, stabilization or decrease of life standards, having in

³⁹⁷ Ibid. P. 17 sq. according to United Nations (2005). Alternative Development. A Global Thematic Evaluation. Final Synthesis Report. New York. P. 7. Also see: UNODC. Open-end intergovernmental expert working group on international cooperation on the eradication of illicit drug crops and on alternative development. P. 4.

³⁹⁸ See. Jelsma. 2002. P. 22- 25.

³⁹⁹ See Heinz. 2002. P. 15.

mind, that an increase is the main reason for initiating the collaboration, should be identified.⁴⁰⁰

The new UNODC mid-term strategy⁴⁰¹, introduced in 2008, for the first time includes an integrated, results-oriented work plan containing both objectives and quantitative, monitorable performance indicators. Both project document COLJ36 and COLJ31 incorporate monitoring and evaluation components through the establishment of a system facilitating the monitoring, tracking, and evaluation of the projects. Project COLJ31 also includes an assessment with quantitative indicators, which should be obtained through verification of the production, productiveness, profitability and generation of income, marketing volumes, and product processing. The project document also indicated to monitor the impact of AD in terms of its acceptance by the communities and the improvement in terms of governance, participation local democracy and achievement of peace conditions.

These monitoring and evaluation mechanisms seem very well designed and also strongly considering the beneficiaries dimension and not only quantitative coca reduction data. Unfortunately, actual data on the mentioned activities are not available yet and their realization can not be evaluated or judged so for.

- Provision of Security for all Actors involved is also of extreme importance. Especially rural population and NGO staff, but also members of government authorities and international organizations are victims to threats made against them from drug trafficking and organized crime groups.⁴⁰²

No specific security measures could be found in project documents COLJ36 and COLJ31. However, as pointed out in chapter 3.3 UNODC staff is under the supervision of special security mechanisms implemented by the UN Department of Safety and Security⁴⁰³.

- Further it is of high importance to ensure sustainable financial support for the planned AD initiative or project.

⁴⁰⁰ See Oomen. 2002.

⁴⁰¹ The strategy is referred to in subchapter 4.1.3.

⁴⁰² See Commission on Narcotic Drugs. 51st session. 10-14 March 2008. Beyond 2008-Contribution of Non-Governmental Organizations to the Implementation of the Political Declaration and Action Plans adopted by the 20th special Session of the General Assembly. P.10; and Heinz. 2002. P. 20 sq.

⁴⁰³ For more information see: UN Department of Safety and Security at: <https://dss.un.org/dssweb/>

An assessment report by the Swedish government highlights that deficiency stems from the mix of UNODC funding as almost 90% of its budget consists of voluntary funds and only 10% come from the regular UN budget. Consequently this presents challenges to the leadership of the organization. The funding of UNODC is therefore deficient in both predictability and stability.⁴⁰⁴

Financial contributions to project COLJ36 have been overall stable since the start of its implementation. The biggest donor country is the government of Colombia itself, which has become an important emerging national donor in the UNODC programme portfolio. Austria and Switzerland have been constant donors too, while Italy and France only pledged and allocated funds once in 2008.

As regards project COLJ31 the Colombian government has also been the major donor and has consistently allocated financial contributions. Italy has been a significant donor, while the United States/USAID only contributed with a smaller amount. However, the project's overall financial situation has been stable and sufficient because of the active donor role of the beneficiary country.

- Within international development organizations, such as UNODC, donor states should increase efforts to harmonize and manage international development assistance in order to support the effectiveness. Simultaneously, following the concept of shared responsibility, consumer states should support drug abuse prevention, treatment and rehabilitation and incorporate those strategies into AD programmes.⁴⁰⁵

Project COLJ36 and COLJ31 do not include such initiatives. However, UNODC's programme portfolio in has projects or initiatives in this area.

- Last but not least, international and regional organizations should integrate AD into their broader development programmes in order to enhance long-term strategies for legitimate livelihoods⁴⁰⁶.

⁴⁰⁴ See Government Office of Sweden. 2008. 1.

⁴⁰⁵ See UN Economic and Social Council. 2008. P. 30 sq.

⁴⁰⁶ See UNODC. Open-end intergovernmental expert working group on international cooperation on the eradication of illicit drug crops and on alternative development. P. 5.

According to the assessment report by the Swedish government much of the good work done is not part of countries' poverty reduction strategies but takes place on a more ad hoc basis, often in the form of projects. The new UNODC strategy has the potential to contribute to improvements, so the report.⁴⁰⁷ However, a lot needs to be changed regarding the overall counter-drug strategies and the linkage to development aim.

4.2.7 Analysis of Project Elaboration, Implementation and Progress

This chapter will analyze and illustrate the elaboration of the project documents and the hitherto project performance based on expert interviews, as well as reports and project progress reviews submitted to UNODC Headquarters by the Field Office in Colombia.

PROJECT ELABORATION

As pointed out above it has become evident that the core stakeholders in and beneficiaries of the project need to be not only considered but also included in the elaboration of a project, programme or initiative. That way special needs and requirements can be met in adequate ways. In addition common goals and shared responsibilities build the basis for possible mutual efforts, belief in project success, and trust between all actors concerned.

COLJ36 is the first development project to receive financial assistance from a departmental government. As pointed out before, the departmental government has provided technical assistance, alongside the Secretary of Agriculture, IDEA, and advisors from UNODC, in the conceptual formulation of the project.

During the elaboration of the project documents or project reviews some donors involve themselves in order to ensure the realization of certain objectives or goals. Donors can indicate whether they would financially support certain project components or single activities, make suggestions, or propose new elements or thematical directions. The government of Italy suggested to collaborate with UNODC on a portfolio overview of projects supported by Italy, but did not have the necessary temporal resources yet. However, as regards the Colombian portfolio it is likely that such undertaking will take place in Colombia between UNODC Field Representative Aldo Lale-Demoz and the local Italian Embassy. That way more detailed and up to date information can be presented within the

⁴⁰⁷ See Government Office of Sweden. 2008. 3.

context of an already well-established partnership. Consequently a well-designed and functioning coordination between UNODC headquarters and its field offices, as well as corporate identity and functioning in front of member states and donors is essential in order to anticipate uncertainty or misunderstandings. Within the elaborating of project documents or ideas it is required to formally get the approval by headquarters, and many member states demand a formal letter sent by headquarters. Nevertheless, the Field Office in Colombia, as other FOs, is elaborating agreements or project ideas in partnership with the local embassies, which makes it difficult for headquarters to exactly know what is happening in the field. Formally, the competencies are divided between HQ and FOs, but some overlap with can have both positive and negative effects.⁴⁰⁸

UNODC is encouraging such a participatory approach of project development by all means because funding and transparency can be secured. Moreover, donors are able to deliver the envisioned assistance while giving attention to all stakeholders, the beneficiaries and the project environment and make sure that all are well represented. The ongoing discussion during the elaboration includes all counterparts, and take into account the actual situation and needs on the ground. Certain donors, such as Australia or the US, mostly only financially assist if they had been participating in the design of a project. Of course the political situation in a donor country or in the field is influencing the stakeholders' decision to support strategies or activities. As a result they might change their opinion only in order to not support a certain political party, the government, or foreign actors, such as UNODC. That is way national politics matter a lot⁴⁰⁹.⁴¹⁰

Besides, some project documents are elaborated in partnership with the Permanent Missions to the United Nations in Vienna. In that case, concept notes are sent to the PMs in order to obtain their feedback, including the aspects they would finance and which not. Thereafter UNODC's thematical units can start elaborating a project document in accordance with the donor's priorities. That way funding of a project can a secured. Especially because UNODC's mandate is concern of various government authorities such as the Ministry of Environment,

⁴⁰⁸ See Interview with Hanke, Martina. Expert. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC. VIC: 07 August 2008.

⁴⁰⁹ For instance corruption: It is easy to criticize the corrupt politicians that are in power. However, when the own political party get into power it gets harder to actively support those elements.

⁴¹⁰ See interview with Jerneloev, Muki Daniel. External Relations Officer. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC. VIC: 12 August 2008.

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Health, or National Development Agencies such as USAID.⁴¹¹

FIELD OFFICE WORK AND MANAGERIAL CHALLENGES

Field offices need to have sufficient capacity and transparency in order to secure checks and balances. Of course this requires the separating of responsibilities concerning the provision of oversight, which is costly since additional staff, project managers, project administrators are employed⁴¹². In particular field office personal has additional work when special requirements are issued by donors. So has USAID very strict reporting requirements which demand monthly project progress reports and quarterly financial reports. Consequently a strong field office administration is key. Efficient administration of files is required to make sure that background information and how the project is proceeding is administrated and can be presented easily to donors on a regular basis. There is also a review meeting, where the implementing agency within the government and donors meet with UNODC and synergies can be built and strengthened. According to Ms. Muki Daniel Jerneloev, External Relations Officer UNODC, the Colombia field office led by Mr. Aldo Lale-Demoz, has been performing well in such endeavours. The Colombian Field Office has a high percentage of national staff, which is working in the field with the beneficiaries. As a result there is a lot of activity generated, which requires to be discussed and reported. All this needs to be shared with the donors to create a cycle of accountability and transparency and show the effectiveness.⁴¹³

In addition UNODC is required to work in cooperation with a diverse set of stakeholders in order to endorse the efficiency of its programmes and projects. Especially in the field UNODC is trying to cooperate with as many other agencies and NGOs, especially NGOs and the civil society, as possible and not only within the UN system. The incorporation of local knowledge about the actual situation and needs is highly important. In addition UNODC has to work on a global level because of the “balloon effect”, meaning the movement of illicit

⁴¹¹ See Interview with Hanke, Martina. Expert. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC. VIC: 07 August 2008.

⁴¹² This creates indirect costs, such as the mentioned administrative costs, office costs, the rent, infrastructure, etc., which have to be recovered through the project support costs (PSC), which is then issued back as part of the budget of the field office. PSC is a fixed percentage of 13 percent. Unless a field office has very large portfolio with quite a lot of PSC returned to the office not enough money is generated financial support needs to come from Headquarters.

⁴¹³ See interview with Jerneloev, Muki Daniel. External Relations Officer. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC. VIC: 12 August 2008.

crop cultivation to other areas within very short time, as organized crime will always be well funded and able to “export” such illicit cultivation. Of course UNODC is not able to be represented in every country since there are only about three offices in every region. However, NGOs are working locally and can play a central role because of their profound knowledge about the field. That’s why UNODC needs the support of NGOs, but also local political powers, and religious leaders (depending on the country) to help the organization meet common goals. Basically, UNODC works with NGOs for specific events and disposes of a field network as the field is normally already working with NGOs, except field offices, which cover a large number of countries. Also, more information on NGOs, which work on the right level and the right areas of UNODC’s mandate, is needed. Of course it can be problematic to contract local agencies or NGOs since UNODC has to protect its reputation and needs to be liable to its member states, but has to be accountable for its official partners. However, the UN can be co-implementing projects with an NGO⁴¹⁴s. Two things are important in this regard: First, expertise of partners needs to be secured and capacities need to be built and shared with other countries if possible. Second, partner NGOs should be administrated in a public registry to ensure their accountability. Also, certain standards of credibility have to be met. To sum up: new partnerships, capacities and a roster of partner NGOs need to be developed. Further UNODC is cooperating with other UN organizations and agencies, and trying to take advantage of existing networks, not necessarily linked to alternative development, but to important stakeholders in the field in general.⁴¹⁵

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND PROGRESS

In the first two years of implementation, 2007 and 2008, project COLJ36 “Alternative Development in Antioquia Department” had been a key partner for local authorities in Antioquia and to a smaller extent in Cordoba, and had proven the advantages of UNODC intervention in the regions. During 2007-2008 a total of 750 peasant families and about 1780 hectares of cocoa, coffee, sugar cane, rubber, and apiculture had been supported by the project^{416 417}.

⁴¹⁴ For instance, in the fight against corruption in West Africa UNODC has a very strong partnership with Transparency International. Both are raising funds and then together implementing projects with the respective government.

⁴¹⁵ See interview with Philip De Andres, Amado. Drug Control and Crime Prevention Officer. Latin America and the Caribbean Unit. UNODC. VIC: 29 August 2008.

⁴¹⁶ Cocoa: 455 families- 1370ha; coffee: 160 families- 160 ha; sugar cane: 50 families- 150 ha; rubber: 35 families- 100ha; and apiculture: 50 families- 1000 beehives.

⁴¹⁷ See UNODC Drugs Programme Technical Cooperation. Annual Project Progress Report. Project COLJ36. 01012007-31122007; and UNODC Drugs Programme Technical Cooperation. Annual Project Progress Report. Project COLJ36. 01012008-31122008. At: ProFi- Programme and Financial Information Management System.

In respect to the social and organizational component of the project, meetings, workshops and discussions took place in each municipality in order to attract families to join the project by registering and signing agreements to eradicate illicit crops. The reached families (750) committed to abandon coca crops in the municipalities of Anori, Bricenio, Taraza, Ituango and Valdivia, and were benefited with training programmes including development of technical and managerial capacities. Further the project promoted the grouping of beneficiary families to strengthen existing organizations and created new ones. In this context, a coffee storage and marketing centre was opened in Bricenio and is properly operating. Another example is the establishment of ASOMUCAN (Municipal Association of Cocoa Growers of Anori). In addition the project organized technical workshops for the organizations, established a commercialization fund for cocoa and coffee, advised on the creating of a brand, and undertook actions to market chocolate and cocoa derivatives. Workshops cover a wide range of themes, e.g. clean production, leadership, and business management.⁴¹⁸

The agro-forestry component supported low scale agriculture, and beneficiary families received seeds for cropping corn, beans and vegetables apart from traditional cocoa and coffee. For the needs of the population, the project was requested to reinforce activities related to food security to reach 700 families.⁴¹⁹

Within the commercial and marketing component advances had been made to standardize production and achieve high quality of products. In the case of cocoa marketing funds were created, and seven cacao products now count with bar codes, which permit their distribution through the main supermarket chains in Colombia (Exito, Carrefour, Casino, and Cafam). The cacao products include milk chocolate bars, caramel-chocolate bars, and chocolate-coffee beans. During 2008, approximately 150,000 chocolate bars were produced, out of 10 tons of cacao by the beneficiary families. Previous to this the local government of Antioquia and UNODC had given around 800 million pesos to families in Anorí to cultivate around 150 hectares with cacao based on a contract⁴²⁰. For coffee, the project established a joint venture with the Colombian Coffee Federation to produce special quality coffee. Since March 2007 “La Vega” Forest Warden Coffee had been sold throughout Colombia in Juan Valdez coffee shops and an additional Juan Valdez coffee store was to open in Popayán selling coffee

⁴¹⁸ Ibid.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid.

⁴²⁰ UNODC. Quarterly Report. July-September 2007. Country Office Colombia. P. 3.

products produced by Forest Warden Families of La Vega⁴²¹. The Colombian Coffee Federation has participated in the project through the assignment of two coffee specialists who are collaboration full time with the project in the region Bricenio.⁴²²

In the context of monitoring and evaluation the project put in place a Monitoring and Evaluation System, that serves as a tool for decision making and coordination with the monitoring Programme of the Government of Antioquia, and Acción Social. The System collects information on the families involved and their productive and social characteristics. This has been accomplished together with an other alternative development project implemented by UNODC (COLJ86), and with the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme, with which it had developed synergies for the provision and analysis of data, maps, and satellite information on the target areas. Complimentary a monitoring group from the Secretary of Agriculture undertook periodic missions to the field to verify project advances and recommend adjustments as needed.⁴²³

A major difficulty faced was and is the presence of outlaw groups in the area of project implementation, which has made difficult the full achievements of results. However, the joint work with local authorities has permitted to work in all planned project areas, and to involve an important number of families.⁴²⁴

In the context of project COLJ31, following “development of productive forestry” had been delivered so far: 61,598 hectares are under forest management plans for productive activities, administered by Community Councils in Colombia’s Pacific Region, and benefiting 577 Afro- Colombian families directly. Through constant training on several topics, the beneficiaries are now aware of the economic and environmental advantages of sustainable use of natural resources based on management plans instead of disorganized exploitation. In addition, 100 hectares of forest have been planted with native and exotic species with excellent market perspectives, so the project progress report. Given the long term perspective of this particular activity, the project has made significant changes in the expectations of the families, who find in the licit economy real alternatives for a better and more sustainable

⁴²¹ See UNODC. Quarterly Report. April-June 2007. Country Office Colombia. P. 5.

⁴²² UNODC Drugs Programme Technical Cooperation. Annual Project Progress Report. Project COLJ36. 01012007-31122007; and UNODC Drugs Programme Technical Cooperation. Annual Project Progress Report. Project COLJ36. 01012008-31122008.

⁴²³ Ibid.

⁴²⁴ Ibid.

future. Skilled and non-skilled workers are involved in various stages of the cultivation, permitting to involve different population in the project.⁴²⁵

In the area “organizational strengthening” project COLJ31 has promoted and advised on the establishment of 40 associations and the legalization of another 35, through which productive activities related to the cropping and commercialization of the following products have been achieved: cocoa, coconut, coffee, palm oil, rubber, wood, rural tourism, handicrafts, and fishing. Serious security risks in the project regions (illegal armed groups) clearly affect families, who in some cases are reluctant or very slow or establish social bounds, thus delaying solidarity and team work. Sales of AD products by the beneficiaries continued to increase, reaching US\$ 3, and 5 million during the period 2007-2008.⁴²⁶

Within the element “agricultural diversification and food security” 3,100 hectares of cocoa, coffee and rubber have been planted, distributed in the project target municipalities. Productive forestry activities have been interspersed with crops such as coffee, cocoa, green banana, or plantain. An interesting innovation in 2008 was the testing of “young boding” for rubber. An important number of rubber plantations are run by internally displaced populations and demobilized persons, and contributing to the development of social structures for peace and security in Colombia, so the report.⁴²⁷

As to the “gulf wardens” activities related to fishery, ecotourism and production of handicrafts using local natural resources were held. In the case of fishing, 111 families grouped under three community organizations in the Uraba Gulf region achieved sustainable licit income generation as a result of technical improvements for commercial fishery, construction of storage and refrigeration centres and local marketing outlets. In eco-tourism, 116 families participated in training on hospitality disciplines, such as business management, customer services and maintenance of infrastructure. The families are currently grouped under three community organizations. In addition negotiations started with national and international tour operators to reach customers beyond the natural regional market.⁴²⁸

⁴²⁵ UNODC Drugs Programme. Technical Cooperation. Annual Project Progress Report. Project COLJ31. 01012007-31122007; and UNODC Drugs Programme. Technical Cooperation. Annual Project Progress Report. Project COLJ31. 01012008-31122008. At: ProFi- Programme and Financial Information Management System.

⁴²⁶ Ibid.

⁴²⁷ Ibid.

⁴²⁸ Ibid.

In the area “marketing and agro-industrial strengthening” eleven organizations were selected on the basis of rigorous technical, social, organizational and potential productivity criteria to benefit from future project-supported marketing promotions to reach national and international markets. Technical committees were established to monitor product quality, management, productivity, transformation and a wide range of assessments required to win and maintain future sales contracts. According to the specific characteristics of the organizations, the project produced manuals on security norms for production areas, critical production points, best manufacture practices, and environmental management plans. Further, workshops were undertaken to design good strategies to market AD products. Also, project personnel and experts from the government counterpart “Acción Social” participated at a SCAA fair in Minneapolis, USA, on coffee products and services.⁴²⁹ In addition government officials, particularly from Acción Social, but also representatives of local Embassies and international development entities (USAID, Italy, Israel, Germany, Mexico) and the private sector regularly visit and monitor the project and participate in the inauguration of major works, such as eco-tourism lodges, or wood processing and transformation centres.⁴³⁰

Unfortunately, problems related with public order and uncertain weather conditions affected the schedule of the activities. However, proper organization and reprogramming of the activities permitted to achieve results as planned. In most of the cases the beneficiary families and the number of productive subprojects were superior to the number initially planned.⁴³¹ Concerning the continuation of project COLJ31, which originally was to be completed by December 2008, the project parties agreed to precede working solely on activities related to marketing and agro-industrial strengthening for 2009 and 2010.⁴³²

4.3 Multilateral Cooperation in AD- UNODC’s Assets

UNODC is not the only institution implementing alternative development projects. Especially the European Union has become a leading actor in development aid. As a high number of UNODC member states are also members of the European Union, and their financial resources for development aid are limited, it has become harder to engage donors. In addition states are implementing development project on bilateral basis. However, the UN disposes of a number of competences and long-time expertise, especially in alternative development and

⁴²⁹ Ibid.

⁴³⁰ Ibid.

⁴³¹ Ibid.

⁴³² Ibid.

work in the field, which others lack of. For instance is the UN able to recruit expert and project officers worldwide, while bilateral cooperation only comprises national public service personal. In addition less “colonial aftertaste” is connected with the UN contrary to bilateral assistance by former colonial powers.⁴³³

EuropeAID, the EU’s office for international development, is implementing alternative development projects in Colombia, as for example the „Peace laboratories“ mentioned in chapter 3.4.1. Unfortunately activities are undertaken without consultations between UNODC and the EU what results in overlapping efforts, which can also have different objectives, and lack cooperation. Sometimes UNODC gets sub-contracted by EuropeAID and is implementing projects on behalf of the European Union. The establishment of a stable strategic partnership is a central goal of course. In addition alternative development programmes are implemented by other UN organizations, such as the World Food Programme, World Bank, UNDP, UNODC, or UNIFEM. Due to the overlap of mandates UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon is strongly supporting the „One UN“ initiative. This new initiative can have positive impact on administrative costs, programme coordination and efficiency. Unfortunately, reform processes are always complex, and take their time, and no UN organization wants to release employees or loose on importance.⁴³⁴

In the Andean region plenty of alternative development programmes or projects are implemented in cooperation with the United States, the European Union and the United Nations. The development and strengthening of national or local industries is a central element in these endeavours. According to Mr. Julio Mollinedo Claros, Second Secretary of the Bolivia Mission to the United Nation in Vienna, AD projects and programmes implemented in the context of bilateral cooperation often reflects asymmetrical relationships, giving the donor country a dominant position, where individual local requirements are not met. The UN, however, can act as a neutral player within the international system and has the capacities to facilitate and support “responsabilidad compartida”, shared responsibility on a global level. One of the positive implications of the UN is that it is a very experienced and proficient organization, so Mr. Mollinedo, which is important since the beneficiaries of

⁴³³ See interview with Arthur-Flatz, Claudia. External Relations Officer. Co-financing and Partnership Section. UNODC. VIC: 22 August 2008.

⁴³⁴ Ibid.

alternative development projects need to be trained and supported in order to understand professional cultivation and market requirements, including marketing.⁴³⁵

Moreover, the international community is of high importance when facing problems of translateral outreach. Therefore international institutions such as UNODC need to be strengthened and maintained. Of course individual interests of member states and national politics can often be interacting or result in conflicts. For example many countries concerned with an AD project have different opinions and precede different goals. Consequently, consensus is often not possible to be reached and common positions take their time to be identified and formulated. In addition countries usually have different ideas about the future of coca cultivation or coca substitution. For example forced and voluntary eradication and the use of aerial spraying are a highly controversial issue.⁴³⁶

Overall UN Endeavours For Efficient Programme Implementation

The UN has been putting strong efforts on strengthening its partnerships with regional organizations and on working more closely from the highest political level on down to the field. There is clear political recognition that regionalism as a component of multilateralism is necessary and more feasible. In addition civil society engagement with the work of the UN has increased and become more results-oriented. In that regard it has also become a well-established practice for the General Assembly to conduct interactive hearings with representatives on NGOs, civil society and the private sector during all major UN conferences. Moreover the business community is an increasingly important partner in achieving UN goals, particularly those to sustainable development. In the past the UN has taken concrete steps to increase its relationship with the business sector. For instance had the “Partnership Assessment Tool” and the “Business Guide to Partnership with NGOs and the United Nations: Report 2007/2008 been elaborated and released recently.⁴³⁷

According to the above illustrated statements of the report of the UN Secretary-General, important elements for efficient programme implementation have been strengthened and are highly supported. At least on the paper.

⁴³⁵ See interview with Mr. Mollinedo Claros, Julio. Second Secretary of the Bolivia Mission to the United Nation in Vienna. VIC: 30 September 2009.

⁴³⁶ Ibid.

⁴³⁷ See UN. Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization 2008. P. 25-28.

5. Concluding Remarks

5.1 IR Theory meets Alternative Development

As discussed in the theoretical section and confirmed by the presented case study new threats to international security and human welfare maintain and strengthen international cooperation within international organizations since states pursue common interests concerning the provision of security to their citizens and are not able to realize them on their own. Besides international institutions possess the ability to facilitate cooperation and make it less likely that states mistrust or cheat on each other. Further they are to ensure individual compliance of states to decide actions or other forms of agreements. Available instruments are monitoring or enforcing measures. In addition IOs permit the realization of states' interests while not depending on a specific state in a hegemony position.

The most important factor for the establishment and maintenance of international organizations is the demand for a resolution of problematic constellations of interests. Considering that, transnational problems, such as the negative consequences of drug cultivation, trade and consumption, and action taken by states result in better outcomes within the framework of international organizations. However, as pointed out in chapter 3.4, the type of interest constellation is central for the likelihood of cooperation. In the field of alternative development mutual interests are prevailing existing controversies by far since mostly all stakeholders pursue the same objectives and are highly depending on each other. So does the coca cultivating population depend on technical and financial assistance, and expertise provided by the government, public institutions and donor countries, while at the same time donors and the local government depend on the participation and liability of the coca cultivating population in their efforts to substitute illicit crops.

In IR theory Robert Keohane argues that common interests between states are the most important condition for cooperation since actors worry less about relative gains if they are not able to reach their objectives alone. That way states still act according to their self-interest while being engaged in joint actions and realizing mutual goals.

As for alternative development almost all member states of international organizations face problems originating either from drug cultivation, trafficking or consumption and are dedicated to eliminate the source, coca cultivation, through crop substitution and the establishment of socio-economic infrastructure, including marketing mechanisms. Thereby the theoretical mutual advantages are evident: Overall development, security, and provision of basic goods for former coca cultivating areas, more security for drug trafficking countries, and fewer problems connected to addiction and dealing in consumer countries, especially North America and Europe.

In order to realize these common objectives diplomatic relations and communication are strengthened, knowledge and expertise exchanged, and technical and financial cooperation established. States and stakeholders also commit themselves to international treaties and interact in accordance with UN rules and procedures. Besides international organizations, especially within the UN family, are providing a degree of legitimacy and difficult changes “in the field” are often accepted and supported easier.

Based on these findings, hypothesis 1 and 2 can be verified since national states are both willing to cooperate within the framework of international organization if they face problems of international interdependence and are not able to resolve it on their own, and also act according to their self-interests and in compliance with common objectives if they intend to secure the provision of security and welfare to their citizens’ within the framework of international organizations.

5.2 The Past and Future of Alternative Development

Unfortunately alternative development has only been of limited importance within global counter-drug strategies and programmes. As being stated before a long term reduction of the world’s supply of coca depends not on effective law enforcement, but also on the eradication of poverty, which makes rural population vulnerable to the temptation of growing lucrative illicit crops or even forces them to do so as it is the only possibility of income. However, AD investments in the course of Plan Colombia have been small and merely serve to justify “voluntary eradication”, where farmers have to eliminate all coca in return for financial compensation in order to avoid aerial spraying. The limited success of such undertakings is evident as the necessary settings for sustainable coca eliminating are not provided unless

infrastructural improvement is ensured. Consequently the issue of illicit crop cultivation is rooted in social and economic poverty, which need solutions people benefit from, not suffer.

However, AD has measurably contributed to positive social change at the local level. Unfortunately, large parts of the coca cultivating population don't receive alternative development assistance and remain isolated from wider economic and social development initiatives. For the future it will be essential to establish adequate setting in which this efforts take place since the participation of public and private actors, and the civil society is necessary. In addition developing countries with experience in the design of alternative development programmes or strategies should play a significant role. Their task is to promote best practise and lessons learned in that area and try to apply them in accordance with the respective national particularities.

Overall, UNODC alternative development programme in Colombia, in particular the two analyzed projects COLJ31 and COLJ36 seem to be very comprehensive and well-designed. Six out of seven elements, identified and discussed in chapter 3.3, are very well incorporated in the projects' objectives, activities and also seem to be implemented properly so far. As for element seven, the harm reduction approach, no activities are and can be included due to the illegal status of any coca crop cultivation in Colombia at present.

I. Local/ Regional focused Strategies
II. Participatory Approach and Trust between Beneficiaries and Implementing Agencies
III. Rural and Community Development
IV. Agro-Industrial Development and Product Marketing
V. Strengthening the State
VI. Environmental Protection
VII. Harm Reduction Approach
VIII. Monitoring and Evaluation

Figure 9: Core Elements in Alternative Development

Especially the partnership and collaboration between UNODC and the Colombian government, but also the projects' beneficiaries seem to be very well established and strong. The reason might be Colombia's political openness to foreign actors, such as the United States (Plan Colombia), or the United Nations. Unlike in Bolivia or Peru, coca cultivation in Colombia is not part of the country's traditional agriculture, but was only started in the 1970s for economic reasons. In addition Colombian guerrilla and paramilitary groups finance themselves with illicit crop cultivation and trade, for which reason the government of

Colombia is particularly interested in the efficient and sustainable eradication of coca cultivation and also willing to work closely with the international community.

Due to its long-term experience with alternative development and rather neutral role in the international system, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime is a convenient partner of the Colombian government and public authorities. Of course UNODC can not be present and implement AD projects throughout all Colombia since some regions are not under control of the central government. However, UNODC is able to work with population in areas, where development organizations usually do not have access to and citizens are left aside. Sadly, people living in such marginal areas are not of interest to the central government or the international community until they are cultivating illicit crops.

Unfortunately, due to the limited scope of the present study, it was not possible to assess the beneficiaries' attitude and opinion about their experience with alternative development projects implemented by UNODC, and possible future endeavours and strategies at a local level. Surely more interests, problems concerning the implementation process and the sustainability of alternative development projects could have been identified. A perspective away from government interests and global drug caused problems would have offered different thoughts and inspiration.

Again, hypothesis 3 and 4 can be validated since the establishment of a well-designed socio-economic infrastructure in equal partnership with the project beneficiaries are essential for the projects' effectiveness and sustainability if alternative development projects are implemented in an unsound socio-economic environment. Also, endeavours in the fight against drugs undertaken by the international community can only be effective if strong emphasis is put on alternative development and broader development efforts in illicit crop cultivating countries.

Last but not least the "harm reduction approach" should be brought to attention once again. As explained before, the goal of coca eradication and counter-drug strategies should not be the quantitative elimination of coca cultivation, but the reduction of harm associated with it. New spaces of dialogue with the involved communities have to be opened in order to elaborate ways of gradual reduction of illicit cultivation accompanied with activities that reduce the harm of monodependence or of problems related to local abuse. According to Mr. Julio Mollinedo Claros, Second Secretary of the Bolivia Mission to the United Nation in

Vienna, the use of the coca plant for the production of legal products, and for the use of drugs in drug substitution programmes in consumer countries is a very good idea. Unfortunately, the coca leave is illegal and banned based on the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs from 1961, whose content is neither questioned nor discussed at the moment. Consequently, the commercialization of the coca leave is prohibited on a global level any such undertakings are unfeasible at present.

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6.4 Figures

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- Figure 5: The political System of International Organizations (Input)
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7. Annex

7.1 Questionnaires

CPS QUESTIONNAIRE

GENERAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING FUNDING AND DONORS

Q1 Do donors usually focus on specific target areas (thematically and geographically)?

AQ1a Do donors usually support a certain project continuously?

AQ1b Does donor X have such specific target zones? If yes, for what reasons?

AQ1c Does donor X have any “restricted areas”, where he would not contribute financially to? (e.g. no crime projects)

AQ1d How difficult is it to engage donors in new areas?

Q2 Who is responsible for the selection of funding areas and the specific projects?

AQ2a Who is involved in the decision-making process?

Q3 Do donors coordinate their funding with other donors?

AQ3a Is there any special collaboration between certain donors?

Q4 Are donors legally bound to their pledges?

AQ4a Do donors usually comply with their pledges?

AQ4b What would be reasons not to comply with?

Q5 What kind of information about the project is requested by the donors before the assurance of pledges?

AQ5a Do donors request information about donor trends and other donors funding focus?

AQ5b With what kind of information are donors provided automatically and on a regular basis?

AQ5c How often do donors demand individual information? (report on activities funded by donor,...)

AQ5d How can the impact and sustainability of the donors’ financial contribution be made visible to them?

AQ5e De donors request information about the project counterparts and partners? If yes, how does this influence their decision-making?

SPECIAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING COLJ36 AND COLJ31

Q6 Did donor x participate in the elaboration of/ comment on the project idea, project document, budget, or At other points of the project cycle, before sent to approval?

Q7 As COLJ36 is a large project, had donor X any concern concerning its efficiency, impact, or transparency?

AQ7a Did donor X request any information about the project's former activities, achievements or impact?

AQ7b What were X's concerns, if any?

AQ7c Can donors fund particular project components? Is there/had there been interest in such funding?

Q8 To what extent is donor X's embassy in Colombia involved in the funding negotiations?

AQ8a Does the local embassy collaborate with the Permanent Mission in Vienna? Do they have extra funds?

Q9 Will donor X continue funding project COLJ36/COLJ31 in the year 2009?

AQ9a What would be an important criteria for the assurance of new pledges?

Q10 To what extent do national (in donor country X) events influence the funding focus?

AQ10a To what extent do social problems influence the funding focus?

AQ10b To what extent does the political leadership influence the focus?

Q11 To what extent does Colombia's political situation influence the donors' funding focus/decision-making?

Q12 To what extent do economic interests influence the donors' funding focus/decision-making?

Q13 Is alternative development an important thematic area in donor X's funding portfolio?
For what reason?

SPECIAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING COLJ31

Q14 Is IDB only a financial partner for component 5?

Q15 How is USAID involved in COLJ31?

AQ15a In the project document its involvement is described as technical and financial support.

Please indicate any specific information about its involvement, if available.

COLLABORATION BETWEEN CPS AND DONORS

Q16 How is the working atmosphere between CPS and the donors/Permanent Missions?

AQ16a Are there any special requirements to take into account?

AQ16b Did any kind of cooperation problems occur so far?

AQ16c Did any kind of conflicts of interest occur so far?

SLU QUESTIONNAIRE

GENERAL QUESTIONS ON ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT (IN COLOMBIA)

AD aims at securing: food, environmental protection, public security/legal sector, and the strengthening new industries, such as fishery, ecotourism or handicrafts through the development of productive infrastructure, the creation of employment opportunities, and strengthening of national institutions responsible for AD.

Q1 On which of the above mentioned elements does UNODC focus on?

AQ1a Which is the most developed? Which is the most successful? Which needs to be strengthened?

AQ1b Should UNODC focus on one specific element in order to gain particular expertise and to strengthen its position vis-à-vis other institutions implementing AD projects?

Q2 How does UNODC fight against drug trafficking networks, which is important for the success of AD projects as it is essential for the pacification of the area?

AQ2a Does project COLJ66 (LA to West Africa) support AD?

AQ2b Is there such component in any AD project) Future plans?

The “model” of AD should be adapted to the respective local context in order to identify the individual needs, and possible solutions. Projects and activities should be developed according to the beneficiaries’ needs.

Q3 Are the project documents co-elaborated with local authorities?

AQ3a How are local requirements identified and integrated?

Q4 At what stage of development is UNODC’s AD programme currently?

AQ4a Since when does UNODC implement AD projects in Colombia?

AQ4b Are the AD projects successful so far?

AQ4c Is there any kind of evaluation of the whole UNODC AD programme in Colombia?

What are the indicators of such study?

Q5 Whar relevance does UNODC have in the field of AD in

- the UN system (UNDP, World Bank,..)
- the global system (EC, NGOs, national authorities,..)

REFERRING TO THE NEW STUDY “AD EN EL AREA ANDINA”

- Q6 What is UNODC’s integrated approach in Colombia?
- Q7 Why has coca not been cultivated in Venezuela or Brazil?
- Q8 Will there be an English version of the study?
- Q9 What’s UNODC’s general philosophy on AD?

COLJ31

The project seeks to increase the production and productivity, social cohesion, food security, health, education and environmental protection.

Q10 Which actors were responsible for the design/elaboration of the project?

AQ10a What responsibilities and competences do

- UNODC HQ, UNODC COCOL, Donors, and Project Partners have?

AQ10b What are their main interests or special demands?

Q11 What role does USAID play in its provision of technical and financial assistance?

COLJ36

Q12 Which actors were responsible for the design/elaboration of the project?

AQ12a What responsibilities and competences do

- UNODC HQ, UNODC COCOL, Donors, and Project Partners have?

AQ12b What are their main interests or special demands?

COLJ36 has been the first project to receive financial contributions from a departmental government. The department of Antioquia and the Secretary of Agriculture, IDEA, assisted in the conceptual formulation of the project.

Q13 How and to what extent were these actors involved?

QUESTIONNAIRE MR. AMADO PHILIP DE ANDRES

- Q1 Do you think UNODC should focus on a special element of Alternative development in order to successfully position itself within the international community?
- AQ1a Would AD be more efficient if the different AD implementing agencies would focus on different elements and areas?
- Q2 What role can local authorities play in collaboration with UNODC?
- Q3 What role can NGOs play in alternative development, and in collaboration with UNODC?
- AQ3a Are local NGOs often project partner?
- Q4 What advantage do NGOs have?
- AQ4a What does UNODC lack that NGOs have? (structure, connections,..)
- Q5 Are there any possible problems concerning such collaboration? (The UN/UNODC needs to protect its reputation and liability to the member states,...)
- AQ5a Do member states support a strong partnership with NGOs?
- Q6 Is there any UN unit or agency, that is responsible for the collaboration with NGOs?

QUESTIONNAIRE MR. JAVIER MONTANO DURAN

- Q1 One criticism I found in publications on alternative development is, that official UN and UNODC publication would lack of self-criticism and are over-optimistic. Is this the case? If yes, why?
- Q2 A second criticism is about the capacity to establish a relationship of confidence with the beneficiaries. It states, that “such relationship is wishful thinking”.
How would you describe the present relationship between farmers and UNODC in Colombia?
- AQ2a Has the relationship changed and moved forward in the last years?
- AQ2b Are the beneficiaries now a real partner in the decision-making process and the design of a project?
- Q3 Are project evaluations available to the public?
- AQ3a Are project evaluation sent out to project donors and Permanent Missions, or do they have to request them?
- AQ3b Are they somehow available to them?
- Q4 Is failure during the project implementation also described in such evaluations or reports?
- AQ4 Is there management failure that led to inefficiency described?
- Q5 What is UNODC’s official position concerning voluntary eradication and forces eradication?
- Q6 Are there any project or future project plans where coca is still cultivated, while the basis for legal income is created?

QUESTIONNAIRE MOLLINEDO CLAROS

Q1 What are the main intentions and interests of countries in the Andean region of implementing alternative development projects within the framework of an international organization?

AQ1a What are the benefits and disadvantages of such cooperation?

Q2 Do you think the UN is a neutral player within the international system?

AQ2a What are the risks and difficulties in connection with the UN and its member states?

AQ2b Is the complexity of the UN a serious disadvantage?

Q3 What do you think are the donor countries' motivations of investing in alternative development projects in the Andean region?

Q4 Is the harm reduction approach of using the coca leave for the production of non-drug products a realistic and efficient alternative?

AQ4a Could it be a possible approach in the future?

Q5 How can new international cooperation in alternative development be established in order to pursue common interests of the international community?

AQ5a How can problems of international concern be dealt with the best possible way?

Q6 Given the current situation, is there any new requirement for future alternative development projects?

7.2 Transcript of Interviews

Interview with Mrs. Martina Hanke, CPS, VIC, 07 August 2008

- H: Also wie gesagt, ich kann nur zu den Gebern etwas sagen, mit denen ich arbeite. Wir haben eine ganze Reihe von Gebern. Die haben natürlich unterschiedliche Interessen und unterschiedliche Vorgehensweisen, unterschiedliche Prozesse. Es ist ganz unterschiedlich, wie wir mit denen arbeiten. Aber ich kann nur über die sprechen, die ich betreue, das sind Italien und die Schweiz.
- N: Hängen die speziellen Ansprüche, die die Geber stellen, von der Größe, oder der wirtschaftlichen bzw. politische Bedeutung ab, oder kann man sagen, dass Land X von sich aus einfach mehr involviert ist, auch wenn es jetzt nicht den größten Eta hat, oder am meisten betroffen ist von diesem Problem. Oder kann man behaupten, dass Länder mit großer Bedeutung, die auch große Beiträge leisten, mehr Ansprüche stellen, und dass kleiner Geber unkomplizierter sind?
- H: Ja, wahrscheinlich kann man das so sagen. Aber die Schweiz beispielweise hat einen kleinen finanziellen Betrag, aber die haben ganz genaue Vorstellungen, was sie wollen. Die haben sich auch speziell Kolumbien ausgesucht und hatten auch ganz spezielle Kriterien im Sinn. Also ganz generell kann man das nicht sagen. Die Großen haben natürlich konkretere Vorstellungen und können durch ihr Finanzvolumen alleine schon ganz andere Ideen einbringen, sich einbringen. Die können sagen: "Wir hätten gerne, dass das Programm, das sie finanzieren in Richtung X geht und so weiter. Wobei Italien zum Beispiel, da kriegen wir jetzt auch noch ne Million für COLJ31 und COLJ36, eine halbe Million pro Projekt. Das kommt jetzt aus einem Sondertopf mit Mitteln aus Lateinamerika. Ich weiß zwar nicht, welche politischen Interessen dahinter stecken, aber ich bin mir sicher, dass dieser Pledge etwas damit zu tun hat, dass Aldo, der Italiener ist, mit dem Italienischen Botschafter Vorort gesprochen hat. Welche politischen Interessen Italien damit verfolgt weiß ich nicht genau.
- N: Unterstützen Italien und die Schweiz kontinuierlich bestimmte thematic areas, oder sich auf spezielle geographische Regionen beziehen?
- H: In der Regel kann man das so sagen. Die Geber haben ihre Regionen, in denen sie sich engagieren, über uns, UNODC. Man muss auch immer bedenken, dass die Geber auch immer ihre Bilateralen Programme haben, und dann haben sie Geld für Multilaterale Programme- das ist dann auch oft unterschiedlich. Das Geld was über uns als

multilaterale Organisation geht, da kann man in der Regel schon so grob festmachen, für welche Regionen und Gebiete sich die Geber besonders interessieren.

N: Ist Kolumbien da ein großer Eta für die Schweiz und Italien?

H: Für die Schweiz nicht und für Italien bisher auch nicht. Aber mit der einen Million, die da jetzt kommt, dann schon.

N: Für welche Regionen haben sich die Schweiz und , früher, Italien dann fokussiert?

H: Die Schweiz zunehmend im Osten für Crime Programme. Die machen jetzt auch viele Criminal Justice Programme und sind dabei sich mit ihren Geldern zu spezialisieren? Italien hat traditionell mit der Gießkanne die ganze Welt bedient und sind dabei sich auch mehr zu fokussieren. Wobei Afghanistan wichtig ist für Italien, Afrika, Nordafrika, Asien eigentlich überhaupt nicht. Süd-Ost Europa natürlich, als Nachbarn und Lateinamerika.

N: Es sind auch manchmal ausständig die Funds/Pledges von Italien?

H: Ja, das ist ein Ministerium. Wir bekommen von Italien Geld aus dem Außenministerium. Und dann eben einen Pledge vom Umweltministerium, und das ist ein bisschen schwierig.

N: Verhandeln Sie, oder UNODC, direkt mit den Ministerien, oder läuft das alles über die Botschaft, dass der jeweilige Repräsentant mit seinem Ministerium Kontakt aufnimmt, oder gibt es da auch direkte Korrespondenz zwischen Ihnen bzw. UNODC und dem jeweiligen Ministerium?

H: Es gibt auch direkte Korrespondenz. Also der formale Weg ist immer über die Permanent Mission hier in Wien. Formell würde es so ausschauen: Wir, UNODC, schreiben einen Brief, in dem wir um Unterstützung bzw. Geld bitten. Dann schicken wir das an den Botschafter hier in Wien, der dann alles zum Ministerium weiterleitet. Oder umgekehrt: Ein Ministerium hat Gelder, die sie gerne in bestimmte Projekte investieren möchten. Dann schreiben sie an ihren Botschafter hier und der leitet das dann zu uns weiter. Es ist aus so, dass wir sehr gute Kontakte haben mit dem Ministerium selber und speziell mit einer Frau, die hab ich auch regelmäßig am Telefon. Wir sprechen viel und direkt und sie hilft mir auch, wenn sie sagt: „Ah, ich habe gehört, Kolumbien könnte Geld brauchen. Da könnte man mal einen Vorschlag machen“. Also sie informiert mich dann auch, ohne dass die Botschaft hier involviert ist. Oder wir waren auch mal da, in Rom. Und eigentlich war gedacht, dass wir jedes Jahr hinfahren, oder sie kommen her. Und die Dame war auch heuer hier, bei Major Donor Meeting. Also da besteht ein sehr enger und reger Kontakt, aber der formale

- Weg geht über die Botschaft hier. Je nachdem, wie engagiert sie sind in den Botschaften und wie viel Zeit sie haben, involvieren sie sich selber, oder nicht.
- N: Im Fall Schweiz und Italien, ist die Permanent Mission gleichzustellen mit der Botschaft?
- H: Beide haben eine zusätzlich Permanent Mission, für die Beziehungen mit den Internationalen Organisationen.
- N: Dieses Major Donor Meeting ist jährlich?
- H: Zweimal im Jahr.
- N: Bestehen die Botschaften darauf, dass ihre Ansprechpartner die Landessprache, also in Ihrem Fall Italienisch und Deutsch, sprechen?
- H: Nein. Franzosen, Belgier und auch Luxemburg schreiben uns manchmal in Französisch, und erwarten, dass man sie versteht. Aber wir antworten natürlich auf Englisch. Oder meine Kommunikation mit Luxemburg beispielsweise ist Deutsch. Email, die wir austauschen sind auf Deutsch, die Agreements, die sie schicken sind Französisch und unsere Replay letter sind Englisch. Italien ist alles Englisch.
- N: Demnach gibt es keine besonderen Ansprüche.
- H: Nein, nein, nein.
- N: Bezüglich der Projekte: COL J36: Italien wird das in Zukunft ziemlich groß mitfinanzieren und auch die Schweiz.
- H: Zu der Schweiz kann ich noch nichts sagen. Es ist ein kleiner betrag, der heuer noch einmal reduziert wird. Und ich weiß nicht genau, wir haben noch gar nicht angefangen darüber zu sprechen, was sie eigentlich wollen.
- N: Geht es hierbei um Themen oder Regionen. Wo sie sagen, auf dem Gebiet, für dieses Land geben wir keine Gelder? Nicht nur aufgrund der Priorität, sondern auch aus politischen Gründen, dass gesagt wird: "Hier sind wir nicht tätig." Italien und die Schweiz gelten ja als neutral, gibt es da auch bestimmte Motive?
- H: Ja sicher. Also die Schweiz, zum Beispiel, die finanzieren nur Projekte, die einen Human- Rights Aspekt haben. Die finanzieren zum Beispiel diese ganze Criminal Justice Reform, weil sie eben diesen Menschenrechtsgedanken haben. Und das gleiche gilt auch für den roten Bereich: Also die Schweiz würde nicht ein Law Enforcement Projekt finanzieren. Andere Projekte, die einen humanitären Hintergrund haben, wie HIV/AIDS, werden auch von der Schweiz finanziert und sind typisch. Für Italien kann man das glaub ich so nicht so ausschließen. Die haben aber bestimmte thematische Bereiche, die sie sich auch aussuchen pro Region. Also zum Beispiel in Latein

Amerika ist es Alternative Development. In Afghanistan ist es Judicial Reform, Prison Reform. Für den Balkan ist es die Grenzsicherung. So haben sie für jede geographische Region ihre Schwerpunkte.

N: Inwiefern kommt es vor, oder ist es ein Problem, wenn ein Projekt eine Komponente beinhaltet, die ein Thema anspricht, welches eines der Geberländer nicht finanzieren möchte? Gibt es da Möglichkeiten noch etwas zu ändern? Oder suchen sich die Geberländer dann eher ein anderes Projekt?

H: Deutschland, zum Beispiel, suchen sich immer, wenn möglich, eine geschlossene Komponente in einem Projekt aus, weil die aufgrund von eigenen finanzadministrativen Gründen nachweisen müssen, wo ihr Geld genau hingehet. Die haben ganz unterschiedliche Vorgaben, d. h. die können jetzt nicht Geld in einen großen Topf schmeißen, und dann wird das irgendwann einmal ausgegeben.

N: Ist das administrative aufwendigen, wenn eine bestimmte Komponente gefördert wird?

H: Das kommt darauf an. Manchmal ist es kompliziert und dann müssen sie, wenn sie das Geld gerne hätte für die Aktivitäten, die Deutschland bereit wäre, zu finanzieren, noch etwas Ausarbeiten. Aber zum Beispiel ein Projekt in Guinea Bissau, das hatte verschiedene Objectives, verschiedene Targets, und da haben die Deutschen gesagt, wir würden gerne Objective 2 und Target 6 finanzieren. Das hat dann im Projektdokument auch angeführt werden müssen. Und das war relative einfach, weil es eine geschlossene Komponente war. Die Italiener machen das nicht und die Schweizer auch nicht.

N: Wer trifft die Entscheidung, ob ein Projekt finanziert wird? Ist das der Repräsentativ hier, oder das zuständige Ministerium? Wenn UNODC, beispielsweise, ein Projekt, das einen hohen Shortfall hat an eine PM heranträgt, ist da immer Rücksprache notwendig?

H: Es ist in der Regel das Ministerium. Es gibt einige Donor, die haben eine spezielles Decision making, da entscheidet der Repräsentativ Vorort. Beispielsweise, man muss auch unterschiedlichen Ministerien Geld und die arbeiten wieder unterschiedlich. Das Geld, was wir aus der Schweiz, aus dem Außenministerium bekommen, wird in Bern entschieden, so war das Kolumbien Geld auch in Bern entschieden. Aber die Schweiz hat auch eine Entwicklungshilfeorganisation, die Teil des Außenministeriums ist, aber ein sehr unabhängiger Teil. Und diese Entwicklungshilfeorganisation hat ihre Vertreter in verschiedenen Ländern oder als Teil der Botschaft und die können selber entscheiden.

N: Ist es nicht einfacher, wenn Entscheidungen Vorort getroffen werden können, weil der Kontakt verlässlicher ist und Entscheidungen schneller getroffen werden können, da weniger bürokratischer Aufwand bzw. Umweg damit verbunden ist? Denn, wenn ich weiß, dies Person hat Interesse daran, ich kann die Interessen leichter kennen.

H: Also das kann ich mir vorstellen und die Frage besser beantworten, wenn ich Kolumbien als Beispiel hernehme: Es gibt ja auch Gebervertreter Vorort. Ich könnte mir vorstellen, dass dort ein engeren Kontakt ist, da beide am selber ort sind. Da ist auch die Entwicklung von gemeinsamen Projekten möglich. Und hier machen wir alles über die PM und die Ministerien.

N: Werden Projektideen mit den PMs zusammen entwickelt?

H: Das gibt es auch, dass wir Concept notes schicken, wo drinsteht, was wir gerne machen würden und von den Gebern feedback kommt. Was sie finanzieren bzw. nicht finanzieren würden. Dann können die Leute hier die Konzepte ausarbeiten. Und das macht auch Sinn, denn wenn man weiß: Aha, für dieses Projekt kann ich Geber so und so gewinnen, wenn ich diesen Schwerpunkt legen.“ Dann macht es mehr Sinn, dieses Projekt zu entwickeln, wenn ich weiß, dieses Geld kommt dann. Und wenn man ein Projekt entwickelt, ohne, dass man je mit einem Geber gesprochen hat, dann kommt nie einer und finanziert es. Da ist es dann schade um die investierte Zeit, und die Projekte.

N: Ich bin auch schon auf Projekte gestoßen, die seit langen in Soft Pipeline sind, es vergeht Zeit und das Projekt muss dann erst recht überarbeitet werden, um Geber zu finden.

Finden Sie, es macht es kompliziert, dass es so viele Stellen von allein einem Geber gibt? Wie PM, Botschaft, Ministerien, Vertretung im Projektland,... So bestehen zwar mehr Kooperationsmöglichkeiten, aber auf der anderen Seite können an unterschiedlichen Stellen unterschiedliche Abkommen getroffen werden. Da können auch unterschiedliche Abkommen oder Verträge unterschrieben worden sein und keiner hat mehr gewusst, was jetzt korrekt bzw. gültig ist.

H: Ja, das Fund raising ist kompliziert. Vor allen Dingen, weil das Mandat von UNODC zwischen viele Stühle fällt. Nicht so wie bei UNDP, die haben als Donor Entwicklungshilfeministerien/-abteilungen als Partner. Italien ist da noch relativ einfach: da gibt es das Außenministerium, das alle Gelder verwaltet, die in internationale Angelegenheiten investiert werden, und das Umweltministerium, das uns Kopfzerbrechen bereite . Aber in Deutschland haben wir das Außenministerium

als unseren Counterpart, dann haben wir das Entwicklungshilfeministerium, das Gesundheitsministerium, das Justizministerium, und das Kriminalamt, das ist Teil des Innerministeriums. Und von denen bekommen wir alle Geld. Das ist alleine schon das Spektrum in Deutschland. Und die muss ich alle im Auge behalten; das ist meine Funktion hier: dass ich die alle kenne, dass ich weiß, was sie für Interessen haben. Das ist mein Job hier, die Interessen zu kenne und dann auch schon richtig heranzutreten.

Das ist nur das, was sich hier abspielt. Und dann gibt's natürlich noch Vorort. Aldo, in Kolumbien, hat natürlich auch seine Kontakte. Er spricht dort mit der Botschaft und die leitet das dann an uns weiter, oder auch nicht. Das ist ein komplexes System.

N: Das Mandat von UNODC ist sehr komplex, da es sich nicht auf ein Gebiet beschränkt, wie andere UN Organisationen und somit diversere Counterparts hat. UNODC reicht von Umwelt und Gesundheit, bis hin zu Justiz und Kriminalität.

Inwiefern sind Donor trends oder die Aktivitäten anderer Donor interessant und wichtig für andere Geber. Inwiefern ist Zusammenarbeit gewünscht? Ist den Gebern egal, wer neben ihnen noch ein Projekt finanziert?

H: Es gibt Geber, die wissen wollen, wie viel Geld schon im Topf ist, wer finanziert, wie viel noch fehlt, ob es schon Zusagen gibt von anderen Partnern? Zum Beispiel bekommen wir jetzt deutsches Geld für ne Konferenz, und nur wenn bestätigt wird, dass noch andere mit Sicherheit mitfinanzieren, dann bekommen wir auch das deutsche Geld.

N: Das heißt es geht mehr um die Sicherheit, dass das Geld sicher implementiert wird.

H: Aber dass ein Land aus politischen Gründen ein Projekt nicht mitfinanziert, weil jemand Geber ist, der ihn nicht passt, kommt eher nicht vor. Es ist eher so, dass sich bestimmt Geberkonstellationen immer wieder finden, weil sie gemeinsame Interessen haben, regional zum Beispiel.

N: Inwiefern sind die Donors an ihre Pledges gebunden?

H: Pledges sind Dokumente internationalen Rechts.

N: Wie kann man Geber, von denen noch Geld ausständig ist mahnen?

H: Es ist in den Agreements festgelegt, wann gezahlt wird. Also das ist festgelegt und so weit ich weiß, gab es nur einen Fall, dass ein Geber, nachdem er gepledged hat, Geld zurückgezogen hat. Manchmal müssen wir Geld zurückgeben, denn die Pledges haben eine bestimmte Laufzeit. Und wenn wir nicht schaffen, das Geld auszugeben, dann fragen wir an, ob wir es umwidmen oder verlängern dürfen. In der Regel erlauben das die Geberländer, manchmal nicht. Jetzt mussten wir leider gerade Geld zurück geben.

- N: Ist es dann so, dass dieses Geld dann zusätzlich im neuen Jahr gepledged wird, oder kommt es dann einfach zu einer Ersparnis um diesen Betrag? Falls 50,000 US\$ zurückgegeben werden und 200,000 US\$ im neuen Jahr investiert werden würden, ist es dann so, dass 250,000 US\$ zur Verfügung stehen, oder werden die 50,000 US\$ anderweitig investiert?
- H: Das ist unterschiedlich.
- N: Wie kann man die Geber dazu bewegen, das zurückgegebene Geld zusätzlich zu investieren? Was kann von Seiten CPS abgesehen von der Bereitstellung von Informationen getan werden, um die Geber positiv zu beeinflussen?
- H: Ja, da geht es darum, wie wir es machen, die Geber dazu zu bringen, in bestimmte Projekte zu investieren.
- N: Wie kann man bei Meetings höhere Unterstützungsbeträge erzielen? Was soll man nicht machen? Wie kann man Geber dazu bringen, mehr Mittel freizugeben?
- H: Man muss genau wissen, was die Interessen sind auf der anderen Seite und natürlich ist es auch wichtig zu wissen, was der finanzielle Spielraum ist. Italien beispielsweise: Wir bekommen einen Pledge mit der Bitte, eine Liste mit Projekten zu schicken, die wir gerne finanziert haben wollen. Dann geht meine Arbeit los, das schön zusammen zu stellen. Darauf sagen sie dann, das ja, das nein. So wissen wir bescheid. Andere Geber kommen einmal im Jahr und wir sollen ihnen vorschlagen, was wir mit dem Betrag machen wollen und dann beginnen wir zu verhandeln. Die andere Variante ist, Geber finanzieren Project by Project.
- Wenn man beispielsweise weiß, dass Deutschland Geld hat für Afghanistan, das am Ende des Jahres ausläuft. Und es ist natürlich von Land zu Land unterschiedlich, was die für finanzadministrative Regelungen haben. Und dann versuch ich in Gesprächen herauszufinden, was Interessen bestehen. Wollen sie Drug Law Enforcement, oder Grenzschutz,...? Das weiß man natürlich auch aus Recherchen, in welchen Bereichen die Geber früher gepledged haben. Es geht also darum richtig auszuloten, was deren Interessen sind, was UNODC braucht und dann den richtigen Vorschlag zu machen.
- N: Gibt es jemanden, der zuständig ist, zu recherchieren, was die jeweiligen außenpolitischen bzw. Entwicklungspolitischen Interessen und Aktivität eines Landes sind? Dabei auch die Aktivitäten oder Kooperationen mit anderen Organisationen oder bilateral zu identifizieren, um informiert in ein Gespräch hineinzugehen. So könnte man an jemanden herantreten: "Wir haben gehört, dass sie auf diesem Gebiet tätig sind, wollen Sie nicht in diesem Projekt involvieren?"

- H: Das wäre natürlich gut, wenn wir da Ressourcen hätten. Das ist aber nicht der Fall. Was ich machen, im Fall Deutschland, ich fahre mindestens einmal im Jahr hin und versuche möglichst viele Leute zu treffen. So im Außenministerium, im Entwicklungshilfeministerium,... Leute, die für Länder und Themen zuständig sind, in denen wir auch aktiv sind. Und auf diese Weise können wir UNODC erst mal ins Blickfeld rücken und Kooperationen aufbauen bzw. stärken. UNODC ist ja eine kleine relativ neue UN Organisation. Weiters kann man das Portfolio, Projekte in Pipeline vorstellen und herausfinden, was die jeweiligen Ministerien machen. Was sie nicht machen, ist Das ist so meine Art von Recherche praktisch.
- N: Inwiefern arbeitet CPS mit den Liaison Offices in New York und Brüssel zusammen? Kommt es vor, das die mit möglichen Partnern und Gebern an HQ herantreten?
- H: Ja, also das Brüssel Büro gehört zu uns und der Piero, der dort sitzt, der ist sehr aktiv. Er baut dort Kontakte auf und versucht für uns Geld zu bekommen bzw. Projekte vorzustellen. Wir haben aber hier auch einen, der sozusagen die Brücke ist, zwischen den Field Offices und der EU, da die EU regional bzw. pro Land Vertretungen hat und die dort Vorort über die Verteilung der Gelder entscheiden. So beispielsweise in Südafrika.
- N: Es ist bei UN oder Entwicklungsprojekten generell das Wichtigste, dass diese implementiert werden und auch nachhaltig die soziale Realität positiv verändern. Und Geld ist dabei am Anfang der zentrale Faktor, um überhaupt beginnen zu können. Sollte momentan, das UNODC noch eine relativ neue und weniger bekannte Organisation ist, nicht viel mehr in Fund Raising investieren?
- H: Natürlich, da könnte man mehr machen, aber wir haben dafür kein Budget. Das Geld für Projekte steigt ja massiv an. Das Problem, das wir haben, ist, dass unsere General Purpose Budget stagniert bzw. zurückgeht und davon unsere Gehälter und die Ausgaben für die Infrastruktur in HQ getätigt werden. So haben wir in unserer Abteilung kein Geld für Evaluation, Planning. Und es ist auch schwer, dafür Geld zu bekommen, da Geber aus guten Gründen bevorzugen, in Projekte zu investieren.
- H: Wichtig ist dabei, dass zwischen den Field Offices und HQ gut zusammengearbeitet wird und UNODC einheitlich gegenüber den Gebern auftritt, damit diese nicht mit unzähligen Anfragen überschwemmt werden. Die Koordination ist dabei ganz wichtig, damit nicht von allen Seiten gleichzeitig zum selben Thema gearbeitet wird und Unklarheiten entstehen.

- N: Würde es ausreichen, dass ein Project Proposal vom FO an den Geber gesendet wird? Oder muss alles über HQ laufen?
- H: Viele Geber wollen einen Brief, der zentral von UNODC HQ kommt.
- N: Trotzdem kommt es vor, dass im Projektland direkt mit Partnern und Botschaften neue Agreements ausgehandelt werden, da dort mehr Informationen aus erster hand zur Verfügung stehen.
- H: Das eine schließt sich ja mit dem anderen nicht aus. Natürlich wissen wir jetzt nicht ganz genau, wie sich das Projekt und die Arbeit im FO Kolumbien entwickelt. Da weiß Aldo natürlich am besten Bescheid, oder Javier. Diese Art von Initiative unterschützen wir natürlich sehr. Aber am Ende müssen alle Dokumente als offizielles UN Dokument über HQ laufen.
- N: Wie ist der Aufgabenbereich rechtlich geregelt?
- H: Ja, natürlich. Manchmal überlappt sich das dann. Manchmal ist es auch gut so und manchmal ist es kontraproduktiv. Grundsätzlich bauen die Leute Vorort sehr gute Kontakte zu den Botschaften auf und zu den Diplomaten. Oft ist es so, dass die dort Geld zusagen, aber nichts zu entscheiden haben. Die Kollegen Vorort denken dann, dass Geld kommt, muss aber nicht der Fall sein, da die Botschaften ja kein Budget für Entwicklungsprojekte haben, sondern die Ministerien im Heimatland.
- N: Was ist in dem Fall, dass die PM in einem Meeting sagt, dass sie auf Themengebiet X nicht tätig sind, Sie von meinem Ministerium aber dann eine Zusage gekommen. Dann ist das eigentlich eine klare Sache.
- H: Ja, also der Repräsentant unterschreibt nur auf Weisung der Ministerien. Und dann kommt es noch einmal darauf an, von welchem Ministerium das Geld kommt. Im Fall Deutschland: Wenn das Geld vom Außenministerium kommt, unterschreibt der Repräsentant hier in der PM und beim Entwicklungshilfeministerium unterschreiben wir direkt mit dem Ministerium.
- N: Bezüglich der Projekte in Kolumbien. Aus welchem Ministerium kommt aus Geld?
- H: Das Geld von Italien kommt aus dem Ministerium for Foreign Affairs. Und von der Schweiz aus dem Department for Public Health.
- N: Welche Art von Informationen verlangen die Donors? Das Projektdokument, die Projektidee,..?
- H: Ja, genau. Die Projektbeschreibung, Zeitplan, Activities, finanzielle Daten.
- N: Was gibt es für spezielle Ansprüche? Im Fall Schweden war es jetzt so, dass diese einen Report der Project und Non-Project Activities für 2007 wollten, die von

Schweden finanziert wurden, und dabei wiederum nicht die genaue Aktivität, sondern den Impact und Outcome, um darauf basierend ihre zukünftigen Gelder abzuwägen. Das ist natürlich für UNODC ein entsprechenden zeitlicher Aufwand.

Was kann von Gebern verlangt werden, bevor oder nachdem ein Projekt finanziert wird, was für UNODC ein großer Aufwand ist?

H: Schweden und Norwegen sind aufwendiger. Und jetzt gerade entscheiden sie sich, welche UN Agencies sie in den nächsten Jahren zu welchem Betrag fördern. Aber das ist schon die Ausnahme.

Automatisch gesendet werden die finazial statements einmal im Jahr. Von jedem Projekt an jeden Geber der daran beteiligt ist. Dann gibt's noch die annual reports, die in Profi erhältlich sind, und die dort für die Geber zugänglich sind. Was aber nicht so gut funktionier. Deshalb sehe ich das als Grundleistung, diese Reports auszusenden. Wenn die semi-annual Reports gut sind, dann schicken wir die auch.

N: Gibt es eine Auflistung, an welcher Stelle innerhalb des UN-Systems bezüglich Funding UNODC steht? Beispielsweise im Vergleich zu UNEP.

H: Hab ich noch nicht gesehen und ich wüsste auch nicht, wen Sie da jetzt fragen könnten.

N: Kommt es vor, dass Donors Projekte nicht weiter finanzieren möchten, das diese die vorgegebenen Ziele bzw. Objectives nicht erreicht haben oder ineffizient sind?

Kommt es vor, dass Donors sich aktiv einbringen, um die Realisierung der Ziele zu unterstützen, oder Vorschläge zu liefern, um neue Richtungen einzuschlagen?

H: Also das gibt es im Vorfeld bei Diskussionen, in denen es um das Projekt geht, indem beispielsweise gesagt wird, dass man bestimmte Activities nicht finanzieren will, da diese nicht effizient seien. Während das Projekt läuft habe ich aber bei meinen Ländern nicht erlebt, dass jemand inhaltlich Vorschläge gemacht hat. Die Italiener, die sagen jedes Jahr, sie wollen mit uns einen Portfolio Review machen, aber noch nie die Zeit fanden. Das heißt, sie wollten die Projekte, die sie finanzieren im Teil besprechen. Ich glaube, dass aber das das gar nicht hier passiert, weil die gar nicht nahe genug dran sind. Ich glaube eher, dass Aldo vielleicht Vorort in Kolumbien mit der Italienischen Botschaft die Projekte im Detail bespricht bzw. besprechen wird. Ich stelle mir vor, dass er so die Geber überzeugt, dass sie weiterhin die Projekte finanzieren sollen. Die Schweden versuchen ja gerade festzustellen, ob wir relevant sind, im Sinne von effektiv. D.h. es kommt schon vor, dass Geber sich aktiv einbringen, ist aber nicht immer der Fall.

N: Ok, das wären die vorläufigen Fragen. Hätten Sie vielleicht Zeit für ein weiteres Interview, nachdem ich weiterrecherchiert und die bisherigen Interviews transkribiert habe?

H: Wenn Sie noch konkrete Fragen haben, dann melden Sie sich einfach bei mir.

N: Vielen Dank, das werde ich machen.

Interview with Mrs. Muki Daniel Jerneloev, CPS, VIC, 12 August 2008

J: So, do donors usually focus on specific target areas, thematic or geographically?

N: Yes, specifically the US, as a donor in Colombia, the Colombian projects J31 and J36.

J: Ok, cause I have lots of donors. Ok, the US in Colombia. That's USAID money probably and they fund locally, when they want to, when it fits with their local objectives. But there is other money in J31 and J36. I thought there is some of the other donors. But the J31 and J36 have no money of any of my donors at all, because its not US state department money.

N: I thought you would be responsible for the US in general.

J: Yes, but USAID works and decides at a local level, and the US mission here doesn't know what USAID is up to. Because they are not informed, because there is a kind of wall and USAID keeps it that way. So sometimes the mission here would be surprised to see new contributions from USAID, because they don't know about that.

N: So USAID gets its instructions/ strategy from where?

J: USAID is independent. Its headquarters in Washington, but its priorities are set locally. They have their own regional or country offices with their own country programmes, targets, and priorities. And if you fit into their priorities, then they'll work with you. But it's not a given. There is obviously a coordination of somehow going out as one. But this has been a huge controversy politically because about two year ago Secretary of State Reece actually suggested that development assistance should possibly also follow political goals. And it caused an uproar, because the development community says that development is for its own sake, not to realize political aims. You know: Give more development assistance to your buddies. You should take your decisions based on the situation of the people on the ground. That's a huge problem. So USAID is independent and it has its own objectives. Of course there is often a coincidence of assistance, because they are in the same sphere of interests. You know, Colombia is important to the United States for a number of reasons. The drug trade. So they are looking for foreign policy goals there, but they are also looking for development assistance, and they are interrelated of course, you know, the coca cultivation.

But your questions are more general concerning funding and donors. Do donors usually focus on specific target areas?

Donors focus on their own thematic areas and their own geographic priorities. And if we fall into these, then we get funding. For instance, if we look at alternative

development, in Colombia, and we are doing it in a region, where they want to work in, then they give us funding. And do they support projects continuously? Sometimes they do, but its also not a given. It depends on what the target of the project was and if they need further assistance.

N: In general, does it also depend on how effective the project and its activities were. So donors would not only want the project progress report, but also solid achievements, in order to continue funding?

J: Well, when you talk about alternative development you don't see stable results, accept after a couple of years. And then there are a couple of reasons why things don't work, thinking of external factors, politics, natural disaster, ... And donors are not dumb, and have their own people on the ground. If donors don't support a project any more, it can be, that they don't fall into their priorities any more, so they wouldn't have finds for that, but it wouldn't mean, that the assistance is not needed any more. We had that, when Afghanistan blew up about six years ago, when donors shifted their funding from the Latin American region to Afghanistan and the surrounding region for political reasons. So this didn't mean at all that assistance dried up. They needed money for an other region.

N: Concerning the thematic areas. What, if you have a donor, and you know, that there would be resources available. Would it be possible to get them fund areas, where they usually don't fund, but there is a funding need/requirement? I'm thinking of pipeline projects.

J: You can always try. But it difficult unless you find an other funding source within the government. But you know, priorities change. So five years might pass by, and a new area is add, and you have projects there, then you get money. But if it's not in somebody's target area, then it's not going to get funded.

So there is always the problem that we have, so we would adjust the project to our donors wishes, in order to get the money. And that are projects, that are donor driven rather than country driven. It's not always that, but there is the risk, in order to capture some funding, some source, that's not traditional, you are picking up the very edge of the mandate somewhere, and may focus on something, that's not that effective. But it's better than not getting it done at all, I guess. Personal opinion and it's difficult to judge.

N: How is it difficult to engage donors?

J: Yes, that is difficult again. Find another source within the donor. The is interesting, because a couple of years ago, I found out, just be accident with Colombia, that as part of the global peace and security fund, they actually had a section that dealt with small arms and mines. And because of we mailed around, I got contacted, and followed up, and now we are even discussing a second grant for Colombia, S60, which is basically a small arms project. And it is interesting, because Canada supports that, even though they have not ratified the firearms protocol themselves. But they don't want anybody to talk about their own ratification of the protocol, but they are willing to put up foreign assistance to countries, that are recognized as having difficulties with firearms and illegal trafficking. So this is going to be the second grant UNODC is going to get from Canada. Which is quite interesting, because that was a completely new source.

N: However, the donor still he to decide on their own to fund in that particular area?

J: Well, they understood that that was in our areas and they asked and I immediately said "yes, there is a project", and they said, "really, there is a project?" So this was a lucky coincidence, but it is not always the case, that we have projects in their area, especially because Canada is more focused on Latin America, as it is their backyard. If it had been in Africa or somewhere else, it might not have gotten funded. So this project was in both their thematic and geographic area, and we were fortunate.

N: What would be very difficult or time consuming donor requests to get them fund projects? Like some kind of special reporting,...Would that be a lot of additional work for you?

J: Well, not for me, but in the field. USAID has very strict reporting requirements which require, I am not so sure, monthly, but at least quarterly financial and project progress reports. Financial reports are quarterly, progress reports monthly, I am not sure. I never see any of those, this is entirely done at the local level. And that is one of the important things about building up a strong field office administration . That you do not just have somebody overseeing the whole project management, but the administration of files, to make sure that that background information and what's happening in the project is administrated and can be presented easily to donors on a regular basis. And I don't know hoe often, I mean, there are various mechanisms. There used to be review meeting, where the implementing agency within the government and often we could invite the donor, the representative, to join these meetings. Instead of that now, there are meetings, which more or less replicate that. So there are meetings, to show and discuss the progress, which means that we can catch

problems early. You can also catch scents and replicate them elsewhere and build synergies. Sp this is really important. And when an office has a number of projects, they have to work together, so you can maximize that effect. And I think the Colombia office so been quite good in doing that. All offices in Latin America, that deal with Alternative development, they have quite a lot of national staff , that are working in the field. So there is a lot of activity generated, that is a lot to discuss and report and a lot to make sure is right. So it's quite important to have this project infrastructure. And then you have management at the field office, that capture that information and make sure it gets used. And then get it back to the donors to create a cycle of accountability and transparency and show the effectiveness.

N: So this extra work is left to the field office, which of course could create time problems.

J: Entirely to the field office. So, when I see a particularly wired agreement, I write to the Field Rep, and ask: "Did you read this, are you sure, you can comply?" And them say, yes, of course. But then they are the ones, that have to comply. They set a financial statement, they get financial cleared, they send the reports, you know. Sometimes they send them to us and I send the reports as a headquarters source. I'm not this was, but this was USAID funding for J31. But the US money that comes to Latin America has a to be reported differently and it comes through me. So the field office would send me the report and I send it to Washington to get the dispositive of funding. So there is different kinds of reports. And one of the confusing things that is happening right now with the proliferating of funding and funding sources is a bit difficult to keep track of reports and of course if we run faults, like the UN faulted a USAID ideas in Africa 2 years ago, then the funding was pulled. And it was on the pretext basically, well there were political and personal problems too, but whatever, but they actually caused, because we didn't have the reports, we weren't doing our reporting as required. So on a purely technical preach of the agreement, they could pull around one and half a million dollars. So that was a lesson.

N: So they were only bound to their pledge if you would fulfil the reporting requirements.

J: Yes, or this way: They had certain demand of discussion, but we had no leg to stand on, because we weren't fulfilling our side of the bargain.

N: And at this point, were the donor is pulling out money, who would be the responsible person to speak to them? The field rep or would this be happening here?

J: Initially it's the rep, but if the relations break down, then we get involved. Like it this cause the US mission got involved. You know, there was even a mission from PDB, they went down to try to understand the situation and to intermediate in a way, because the relation between the rep and the US was critical.

N: Where was that?

J: That was in Kenya. The relations were broken down, so that was unfortunate. But that's seldom and the most drastic thing that can occur, because we had funding pulled, although we never had to repay funding.

J: Do donors coordinate funding with other donors? Yes, quite regularly. We don't always know what's going on. But sometimes we hear about discussions or we can assume that they are there. And if we in CPS push that open and can say: "Hey, it's one of your buddies over there that's funding, why don't you just fund with them?" So Nordics support projects other Nordics are supporting. Sometimes one of the smaller countries want to be with one of the bigger countries. So was of the EU emerging national donors wanted to be up there with the UK or US funding something. You know, strategically important countries.

N: But how much do they cooperate? I mean, it's restricted to financial aid, so there is no real cooperation or collaborate between them, is there?

J: There can be. We are implementing the project, not them. But it can be, that when the project was being developed, we make sure donors like the project, and this can be one of the donor driven projects and the final product sometimes is that donors want to be part, because they want to see their objectives based on their analysis of the situation are in the project. And we make sure, that the field, that the counterparts are involved and are on the same wavelength. But it can be that the two partners say, I mean, I have an example here, the US and Australia are going to fund a computer based training (CBT) in East Timor shortly. And I heard about this, because it was communicated to by a guy out in the field, who had been discussing with both donors and both decided to do it in conjunction because neither had enough money to get the project start. You have the staff member, you have the activity,.. so the budget was going to be too high. And they figured if only one gives, it's quite realistic that there is money shortage. So they both decided that this is a priority. That an example of when two donors jointly decide to fund a project and get it started. Then you have an other situation, where you have Japan and the US in the Union of Myanmar. Where the US has political problems with Myanmar, but it had a political objective that it wanted something to happen. So

it agreed with Japan, and Japan agreed to pick up on the funding project that the US can no longer fund in Myanmar. I'm not sure what in return Japan got for that, but they had an agreement, the two donors agreed basically. I think in return the US would fund something in the region, in Thailand or X, that normally Japan funds. So basically the donors agreed, that they would split what they fund, because there were political problems. So you have various things and these are just a few things I know about. There are other projects where you have a number of donors that get together and decide who's gonna do what? Who's gonna be participating and who's gonna be in the first round? Ok, and they say: "Come on, let's go." Because all of this plays out of the commissions, and well, this kind of stuff, foreign politics and money, follows also the resolutions in the commissions. So you can more or less see through that, and I don't follow closely enough, cause I don't have time, which countries are gonna work together towards something and which are gonna be most amenable for them to say: "Ok, let's gear our funding priorities towards the same thing. So instead focusing on 10 projects, none of us can start, we are focusing on 3." And then if these 3 things are going to be supported, they will start and really move ahead. You find that at major donors meetings when you get support for the independent evaluation unit, for instance with got funding from the UK and a few others, or SPU's work, or some others, where they just basically say: "Ok, this is a thing for the change of the office. We have made this a stated priority and we want this to happen." An other example, where you have donors on board, INCB is ... the global Paris Pact, has a number of countries which have agreed because they have common ideas about opium in Afghanistan. So it's not that they coordinate, but they agreed that they gonna try and be at the table. And that means having money. So there is a certain amount of donor coordination, that's going on. And some of it is quite the general stuff, but then again this mirrors the commissions: you have the GRULAC block for Latin America, the WEOG West European and others group, the Africa group, or whatever. So you have political blocks, which also discuss priorities and then try either if they are in the position to fund themselves, like the WEOG group, then they fund, or if they are an other group, then they act as a pressure group toward the group with money. So, there you see a gross distinction between the G77 group and then major donors. And this division is very gross. But you see competing groups within member states, not just the donors, but the member states and who has what interest. And it's quite interesting, and I'm personally not that involved and I see from great distance a view of these trends

and I think it's a very interesting one. It plays out those in funding and in prioritization, what kind of mandates were ordered and followed by the missions.

N: Does it occur that a country doesn't want to fund one project together with a certain other country or actor?

J: I don't think that's happening. Because we don't have that many donors, that would not want to be sitting at one table, in that sense. If anything, it would be on thematic area. This has played out in earlier time when you played out much more dissent and opposition and polarization on harm reduction. Where UN simply said: "Oh no, US is not gonna fund that!" And it's not because the Netherlands or Australia is funding it. It's because of harm reduction. So this becomes the distinguishing feature in the project and not the other donors, it's the fact that it's a thematic area/subject that they don't support ideologically. So that plays out in a few other places too. You have a Law Enforcement project vs. demand reduction project. You see certain donors on one side and certain donors on the other. So these are general relations that one can make.

N: Are donors also actively involved in the elaboration of a project idea, document or revision of a project they are funding? So they could influence in which direction a project goes. How often is that?

J: It happens and it's quite regular. In particular in those projects that are funded by a single donor. I'm thinking of the US in Central Asia, where I see a lot of documents. Or the NATO countries, Russia countries that also fund a lot in Central Asia, where they are involved, because there are a lot of meetings happening at a local level. The embassy of the donor country would get involved. I can imagine that also in Latin America you can find that.

N: Is that something UNODC would encourage? Or would it also create problems because it's driven by one donor's interests?

J: We encourage it by all means. That's a way of securing funding and being transparent and open and ensuring, that the donor knows what they are funding. However, it can not stand as a bilateral discussion. It has to include the counterparts and take into account the actual situation and needs on the ground. And that's what I do find when I'm reading the documents from Central Asia: It's basically discussions between the Washington office, the embassy, our office and the counterparts. I only see the traffic that goes between us, but it always mentions what the counterparts say and they are in meetings all the time and going to generalists or whatever that. Because these are really important projects which are central to the Law Enforcement efforts in Drug

Control. On other projects I see, that there is some, but this is something more the DO would know about. But I know that there is a lot of dialogue that goes on all the time and we have certain donors, let's say Australia or the US, which will say in certain politics: "We will only fund things, in which we had been involved in developing." "They will only fund things in which they had been participating in. And if they are global, then it's a global thing between our offices here in Vienna. If it's at the field level, then it's something where the field offices are involved and the counterparts are directly involved and we encourage it. This is when you talk about a participatory approach of project development. You know, you really have to see and identify who the actors are, who are the targets, who are the beneficiaries, who are the actors involved to deliver the envisioned assistance and you have to make sure that they are all represented. You know, even people you don't agree with or people you don't think are really that important, because they might make themselves important. And there is a process in these countries as well, where you find the allegiance has shift. And I found that when I was in the Caribbean in the field. Even a political party in opposition they supported us very much. And there were certain political things that happened, and when the ruling coalition wanted to do some changes that were in line with the things we wanted, the opposition suddenly changed their opinion and they became against it, just because the ruling coalition wanted it. So you find depending who you are talking to, they can change their mind, or when they get into power they change their mind. So national politics matters a lot. Or take corruption: It's easy to criticize the corrupt politicians that are in power, and then when you get into power yourself, when it's your turn, it gets harder to bring in those elements.

J: So, next question: Are donors legally bound to their pledges? Yes. Do they usually comply? Yes. What would be a reason not to comply? What, with the pledge?

Well, if we don't comply with our part. You know, when we didn't do the reporting in Kenya with USAID. The only other situation is, when we had that political situation with Myanmar, but then the US mission basically phoned me and said, that they had problems with Myanmar, you know, 8 people were in US courts for crimes and that had to cut the funding. You know, "what would be the impact of this on your project, that we are funding?", that asked. And I quickly checked and said well, that funds have already been allocated so it would cause a problem, because we wouldn't be able to pay the money back, because we are already sending it, and it would create a shortfall for the project and that's a problem. So we said: "Fine, we compromise. We

only take back, what you haven't yet allocated. So you have a shortfall for the future, but are not taking away, what are you spending now. And that was kind of a nice negotiated thing. Well, it's important because this shortfall. The reality is, you got to take it. So what you do is you try to minimize the cost and then you try to find other alternatives and in this case they found Japan, that could fund something, that they could not. So you do find, that donors are committed to your same goals. So they are not trying to cheat us. Basically they are trying to make sure, that things work. And when they can't work for reasons beyond our control, then they try to work,... (phone) Actually this is a problem, because since the direct approval system, there has been an abolition of project ideas. And that creates a view problems for CPS because at the field level donors are getting project ideas from reps, that may or may not expedely the day. And they also change from donor to donor to satisfy their requirements or focuses of one donor or the other. But they don't have a legal status and then also in Headquarters we are not able to follow and create synergies, as we normally would and send it to our local counterparts here. So if the embassy in whatever country has gotten it from the rep as an idea, we would normally like to let the counterpart of that embassy let know here to say: "Hey, this is a priority. You might already have seen it. It's coming from your field office, but this is a priority that you should look at and it exists. It has some kind of status." And we can not do that any more. So it's harder. It's also harder for us to try and get to other donors.

N: Is the embassy in the project country allowed to sign agreements with the filed rep?

J: Well, not usually. It depends. Some of Martina's donors could in some cases, the swiss development or German cooperation, or whatever. But many donors have feedback. Ok, there is sides. There would be the donors that have feedback from their embassies, but their embassies submit centrally to apause money that is decided centrally. That's one group. And then you have the other group, like USAID or Canadian SIDA or Swedish SIDA to a point. Where they have authority locally, because they have their own budget, which has been decided from local priorities, local budgeting, local manpower, the assessment of potential funding vehicles, etc. Where they in a position to offer the negotiation of an agreement at a local level, because they have the money locally. So that's a completely different thing. It really varies on what funding source you are looking at.

N: Was it different before? Because you said, that it had been changed.

J: What has changed is that we are extending our donor base and we used to get most assistance from the governments directly. Which meant we came through the Vienna missions to capital. And now it's a different funding source. Not all of them, but a number of the funding sources are local. And that's why the reps in our field offices have to mobilize funding, but they also have to keep in touch with headquarters, because headquarters still has to authorize the signature of the agreement, having got clearance from finance and legal. Because there is often questions about clauses in the agreement, format,... Even though we have our own format approved by the controller, and he tells us to use it, we can't get member states to use that format all the time. So they have their own type of agreements. And there are deviation/discrepancies in those agreements, there are sometimes inappropriate references to national law or auditing, which we can't accept. And we have to work under the UN rules and regulations. And that is why it's still important that there is that process that goes through headquarters.

N: And I think it would also be difficult for the field office. I mean, if they had a new partner that assures funding. And then for some reason they don't get the money because they didn't fulfil some UN requirement. Could this also happen?

J: Well, you can't accept the agreement. We can't sign the agreement. And when it gets signed you just pray that no problems will come up, because when it does come to that point, maybe the donor would say: "Well, we are negating on this agreement." You asked about what could be a reason not to comply with it. Because if we don't fulfil our end of the bargain. But if our end of the bargain meant breaking UN rules and regulations, we can't fulfil it. So the way to get around that is to make sure that the agreement is something we can live with and that we don't break the rules. Because then we get knocked from the auditor's side. Why did we do this? The same thing is about ignoring PSC rates is the worst stuff to get the controller's approval. So there has to be some kind of paper record that there has to be a deviation.

N: What is PSC?

J: Project Support Costs. It also matters because when finance issues allocations and they calculate the Project Support costs based on expenditures and then you have different donors with different rates and then they haven't made provisions for that, then you actually end up with a tangled mess. In the financial side a well, it leads to other audit recommendations or observations of sloppiness.

So you need a field office that has sufficient capacity and the transparency to have the checks and balances. You can't have one person to certifying everything. You need to have the separating of responsibilities to provide the kind of oversight that you need.

N: Which is also costly.

J: Of course it's costly because it's also personal costs and most of the time that's not paid from the project. Because this kind of core administrated stuff is something which is responsibility of the office to provide. Additional stuff, project managers, project administrators who do the routine work they can be funded by the project. But others, the core programme, that's why there is a project support cost (PSC) to cover this indirect costs that you can't necessarily capture in a project document and costs. There direct and indirect costs: direct costs are the driver, the manager, administrator of a project, the travel or communications budget of those people that work for or are involved in the project. But then you have the office itself. And the office itself: the rent, infrastructure,.. there is a certain amount of indirect costs that has to be recovered through the project support costs, which is then issued back as part of the budget of the field office. And it needs charging up because this field offices are not self efficient. PSC is a fixed percentage and even though it varies and depending on the circumstances its fixed at 13 percent. Unless you have a very hard portfolio with quite a lot of PSC returned you don't actually generate enough money to pay for the office infrastructure and that's one of the big issues in the field offices.

I have been in operations so I'm the wrong person to ask short questions about that stuff, but I should leave you to talk to the colleagues in DO about that kind of things.

So, how often do donors demand individual project information?

Well, it's in the funding agreement and of course they have project progress reports that are supposed to be done regularly. But they can ask for ad hoc reports to be prepared as part of the agreement.

How can the impact and sustainability of the donor's financial contributions can be made visible to them? Well, part of the report. Take them on the missions. You know, go with them to project sites visits. Involve them in those activities they can be involved. Invite them to workshops opening.

N: Would UNODC have to invite them?

J: Sure.

N: And pay the travel costs?

J: No, local. These are local. If they want to come from somewhere else, then they can on their own costs. We even did that a long time ago in South East Asia, where we organized a field trip of the ambassadors from local missions. It was great because they really bought into it. And we were taking them somewhere else. A tour of four of the countries in South East Asia. And somebody went with them and then the reps were meeting them and stuff. And they paid their own costs. It was a trip of donors to go see the situation on the ground by their selves. It was quite useful.

Do donors request information about the project counter parts and partners?

Well yes, although in some cases they know themselves, because they are local.

N: Do donors and other counterparts get involved in the elaboration of the project document (activities,...)? I'm thinking concretely of the Colombian project funded by USAID.

J: If it's US money, they don't like it, that it's the US running the project. And of course you have, where is Christian from?, a German CTA maybe, who is running things. And actually the counterparts in the government want the same thing. They just don't like to be told to do it by the US. So you have common objectives, because you have to count on the cooperation with the counterparts. You can't do it if the counterparts don't agree. And it's necessary that the counterparts would agree that the UN would do it. But it happens to be US funding. And for the US, they get the same advantage because it's done and if they are funding. But it doesn't matter, that they give credit in this thing, that they give credit from us. Well, at the end of the day everybody's goals are met, which is important. And politically it was the better way to do it.

N: Is alternative development an important area for the US/ USAID? Or is it?

J: Yes it is, for USAID. For USAID alternative development is an important thing. They only fund from us or through us. And that can be sometimes millions a year. You know, it depends. They also fund projects in Peru. They just gave, I think it was, 3 million to Peru. Bolivia had a huge contribution, almost 7 million, but unfortunately when the policy changes, they shifted back, what hadn't been committed yet. So that created some difficulties because USAID funded. They had nothing against what we are doing, but politically they just couldn't be seen any longer giving money to the government, like with Myanmar. And we are trying to find other donors, but it has been quite difficult.

An interesting thing. The Peru rep told me recently, because he had some terribly funding shortfalls in some of his alternative development projects, that there is less

and less interest from the external donors. So he is more turning to Peru as a funding source, as it is Colombia. And he said: "There are several project that need money." And I said: "Why isn't the US still there? Aren't they interested?" And he said: "Oh yes, absolutely, they are really interested." But they had a bad experience with the implementation there locally. Cause that's where the insurgence are and that was really a problem for them. So they really, really support what we are doing The field office Peru then said: "Ok, so why don't you fund us to do it?" And in that case, what the Peru rep said, s that USAID is very involved in the implementation of its own projects. So, in other cases you could say: "Give the money to us, and we will implement it. In the USAID case, they can't just release the money and have somebody else do it, because they are actually involved in the development of the implementation. So as a result, in one of the neediest areas, where there is the most risk of insurgency and of problems with government control, the US has paradoxically decided to not to invest any further. Now, I'm over simplifying.

N: Thank you very much, that was extremely interesting and useful.

J: Not a problem, good luck of your thesis.

Interview with Mrs. Claudia Arthur-Flatz, CPS, VIC 22 August 2008

- N: Ich beziehe mich speziell auf das Projekt COL J36. Hat einer der Donors an der Ausarbeitung der Projekt Idee oder des Projektdokumentes mitgearbeitet?
- A: Das läuft jetzt schon seit vielen Jahren und da kann ich Ihnen nicht sagen, ob da ein Donor mitgearbeitet hat.
- N: Und wie steht es mit den Revisions?
- A: Nein, eher nicht, da gibt es keine Unterstützung.
- N: Gibt es seitens der Donor spezielle Anforderungen die gestellt werde. Im Generellen, nicht nur hinsichtlich des Projektes. D. h. neben den Project Progress Reports, oder dem Projektdokument, noch speziell etwas zusätzlich möchte oder wissen möchte. Beispielsweise wer noch beteiligt ist.
- A: Also wer noch beteiligt ist, das sehen die Donors in Profi, das ist ja ein transparentes System. Das interessiert natürlich viele schon. Wer beteiligt sich noch? Wer gibt wie viel Geld? Aber sonstige Informationen werden eigentlich nicht verlangt, nein.
- N: Das heißt es ist relativ unproblematisch. So soll eh sein.
Wissen Sie, ob die Botschaft in Kolumbien Vorort involviert ist, denn bei Italien ist das sehr stark der Fall? Dass beispielsweise agreements ausgemacht werden, oder finanzielle Leistungen zugesagt werden.
- A: Sprechen Sie noch immer das gleiche Projekt an?
- N: Ja genau, das in Kolumbien.
- A: Es gibt sicher Kontakte zwischen unserem field office und der österreichischen und französischen Botschaft. Aber in beiden Fällen wird beides über Paris und Wien abgewickelt.
- N: Wissen Sie wo Österreich und Frankreich im Jahr 2008 wieder mitfinanzieren werden?
- A: Ja, das eigentlich relativ stabile Partner, die machen eigentlich immer das, was sie im Jahr davor gemacht haben. Da ändert sich sehr wenig in den Fokibereichen.
- N: Sind diese Fokibereiche geographisch, oder thematisch ausgerichtet?
- A: Bei Österreich läuft das immer in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Außenministerium und der Entwicklungspolitik, die regional ausgerichtet ist. Für Österreich ist Alternative development ein großes Thema und gehört zu den Hauptförderungsgebieten bei UNODC. Frankreich macht das ähnlich, nur dass bei Frankreich wichtig ist, dass auch eine französische Ownership im Projekt ist. Dass es vielleicht einen Projektleiter gibt, oder dass ein Bericht in französischer Sprache publiziert wird. Das „Frankreich branding“ ist denen sozusagen sehr wichtig.

- N: Finden Sie, dass man in der Zusammenarbeit mit den beiden Ländern merkt, dass Frankreich ein größeres und sozusagen politisch und wirtschaftlich mächtigeres Land ist als Österreich?
- A: Ja, schon.
- N: Könnte man sagen, dass kleiner Staaten unproblematischer sind?
- A: Also problematischer kann ich nicht sagen. Frankreich ist beispielsweise sehr gut organisiert. Es ist eines meiner Länder, mit dem ich am liebsten zusammen arbeite, denn die sind sehr genau und sehr numerisch, und sehr berechenbar für uns. Die sind nicht so wankelmütig. Weil zum Beispiel Österreich, das ist ein bisschen schwieriger, die haben auch immer, muss ich sagen, eher jemanden in der Mission hier, die auf einem niedrigen Level sind. Also Praktikanten, die dauernd wechseln. Da ändern sich meine Ansprechpartner oft, so muss ich immer wieder alles erklären. Also das ist schon eher, wenn ich sagen darf, nicht so professionell wird das angegangen, und daher auch nicht so ernsthaft, wie das Frankreich macht, wo alles auf höherer Ebene angegangen wird (erster Sekretär, ...).
- N: Ist bei Österreich die Situation momentan so, dass das auf diese Weise angegangen wird?
- A: Nein, das war eigentlich schon immer so, dass nicht jemand von höherer Ebene als Ansprechpartner gilt, sondern es sind eigentlich immer die Praktikanten. Und da kommt oft immer wieder ein Kuddel-Muddel raus, weil die die Nummern verwechseln. Und das ist für mich natürlich ein größerer administrativer Aufwand, weil ich immer wieder alles erklären muss, weshalb etwas so gemacht wird, oder so ist. Währenddessen bei Frankreich, da habe ich drei-vier Jahre die gleiche Person. Und diese Person hat auch Entscheidungskompetenz. Die kann sagen: „So wird's gemacht, oder so nicht!“. Aber wenn ich mit einem Praktikanten zu tun habe, der kann mir überhaupt nichts sagen.
- N: Inwiefern beeinflussen politische Vorkommnisse die Entscheidung, welche Projekte oder thematische Bereiche unterstützt werden? Ich glaub vor drei Jahren, als die beiden Österreicher in Bolivien umgekommen sind, hat dann Österreich beschlossen, im nächsten Jahr ein Anti-Crime Projekt zu finanzieren? Oder wie könnte man sich das erklären?
- A: Das hängt immer mit politischen Programmen zusammen. Und da wir jetzt alle zwei Jahre eine neue Regierung haben, ist das auch wieder mühsam. Denn dann kommt immer eine Änderung des Programms und vielleicht des Außenministers, oder gar eine

anders zusammengesetzte Regierung, und dann können auch andere Bereiche oder Länder zu Prioritäten und schließlich finanziert werden. Zudem kommt, dass wenn immer neue Wahlen sind, dann ist alles auf Hold und Entscheidungen werden verzögert. Und das ist auch nicht so einfach.

N: Wissen Sie, weshalb Alternative Development für Österreich interessant ist?

A: Also ich glaube, das kann man so nicht sagen. Das ist einfach ein Säule von UNODC. Ich mein, was soll man denn sonst tun, wenn man die Drogen nicht mehr anbauen soll? Was soll denn der Bauer tun? Also ich denke, das ich wirklich eine der wichtigsten Säulen in unserer Arbeit, das Alternative Development weiterhin finanzieren und implementieren.

N: Ist die Zusammenarbeit mit den Gebern, jetzt nicht nur auf Sie bezogen, sondern auf das Konstrukt UNODC und die PMs eher reibungslos, oder schwierig?

A: Sehr reibungslos, sehr angenehm. Also wir verbinden das mit den Franzosen immer mit einem schönen Mittagessen. Das ist eigentlich immer sehr angenehm. Ich habe da noch nie Meinungsdiskrepanzen gehabt, was jetzt finanziert werden soll oder nicht. Alles immer im Einklang, Vielleicht liegt's auch an mir. Ich bin ein sehr geduldiger Mensch.

N: Welche Vorteile bezüglich der Effizienz und der Realisierung der Interessen bringt es für die Geberländer, dass das Alternative Development Projekt von UNODC implementiert wird und dass die das nicht bilateral machen. So wie USAID, hat auch eigenständige Projekte.

A: Ja, das ist eben eines unserer großen Probleme. Da immer mehr unserer Mitgliedsstaaten in der EU sind, bestehen bereits große Zahlungen an die EU. Die EU macht Entwicklungsprojekte und dann müssen die Staaten auch noch an die UN zahlen. Und einige wollten das bilateral machen. Und Vorteile, wenn es die UN macht: Ich denke mir, das weder USAID, noch die EU, die Expertise, die wir einkaufen können haben. Denn die UN kann global Leute anwerben. Während bilateral, sind das halt immer die fünf gleichen Maxeln aus irgendeinem Außenministerium, die das halt machen. Aber ich glaube, die UN hat einfach die viel bessere Expertise und auch viel mehr Erfahrung im Feld. Weiters kommt dazu, dass, nehmen wir als Beispiel Peru: Wenn wir jetzt sagen, es waren die Spanier dort. Das hat dann gleich wieder etwas von dem Kolonialen Touch und die UN ist neutraler.

N: Wahrscheinlich auch mit wenigern Anforderungen verbunden, da die UN Entwicklung und nicht, beispielsweise, wirtschaftliches Wachstum als Ziel hat. Bei bilateraler

- Kooperation zwischen zwei Staaten kann das dann oft im Gegenleistungen verbunden sein. Und der Koloniale Nebengeschmack fällt weg.
- N: Kam es schon einmal vor, dass Frankreich oder Österreich aus einem Projekt ausgestiegen sind? Oder dass sie gepledged haben, oder von Seiten UNODC Teile des agreements nicht eingehalten wurden? Oder, dass das Projekt ineffizient war und sich die Länder für das nächste Jahr ein neues suchen wollten?
- A: Das ist eigentlich nicht der Fall. Das war vielleicht mit Frankreich einmal der Fall. Da haben sie drei Jahre ein Projekt unterstützt und das ist dann einfach nicht mehr auf der Liste gewesen, aber das war nicht Alternative Development. Allerdings war das nicht ineffizient, da war dann einfach weniger Geld da und man hat sich auf die Schwerpunkte konzentrieren müssen. Aber den Fall, den sie da ansprechen, den hat es noch nie gegeben.
- N: Wie würden Sie vorgehen, wenn sie ein Projekt finanzieren wollen, das nicht unbedingt den Schwerpunkten des Geberlandes entspricht, aber es wichtig wäre, das dieses Projekt zusätzliche Geber findet, um mit der Implementierung zu beginnen?
- A: Ja, das kommt immer wieder vor. Das ist halt dann Überzeugungsarbeit. Es gibt beispielsweise Projekte, wo Straßenkinder in eine Art betreutes Wohnen kommen und dort auch Bildung bekommen. Und das ist immer schwach finanziert, aber da finde ich dann doch immer wieder Geldgeber, wenn es diesen sozialen Aspekt hat, besonders mit Kindern. Aber da muss man halt dann bitten und betteln und auch wirklich überzeugend sein.
- N: Ist es für den Repräsentanten bürokratisch auch aufwendiger, etwas außerhalb seiner Agenda durchzusetzen?
- A: Sicherlich. Meine jeweiligen Counterparts in den PM verstehen das schon eher. Wo es dann schwieriger ist, ist in den Ministerien. Weil die sehen dann nur die Zahlen und da ist es dann schwierig diese Brücke zu schlagen.
- N: Inwiefern koordinieren die Donors ihr Funding mit anderen Geberländern?
- A: Die Skandinavischen Länder koordinieren sich immer. Und die EU Mitgliedsstaaten schauen, dass sie immer in eine Richtung gehen.
- N: Welche thematischen Gebiete von EuropeAID überschneiden sich mit denen von UNODC? In den Gebieten, wo EuropeAID eigenständig Projekte entwickelt und auch implementiert und Experten in das jeweilige Land schicken.
- A: Ja, das ist wieder so ein Beispiel, wo die EU eine Feldmission, oder ein Feldbüro eröffnet und oft duplizieren sich dann die Aufgaben mit unseren. Das ist dann nicht

- der Idealfall. Aber manchmal werden wir dann von EuropeAID subkontraktiert, um dann die Idee von EuropeAID Vorort auszuführen. Also diese beiden Fälle gibt es: Entweder wie sind beide dort und machen beide etwas ähnliches. Oder EuropeAID ist dort, hat das Geld und sagt: „UNODC macht das hier für uns.“
- N: Das heißt, es wäre für uns besser, etwas eigenständig durchzuführen, aber es ist dennoch gut, weil so die finanziellen Mittel bereit stehen, um Projekte durchzuführen.
- A: Ja, EuropeAID hat nicht diese Personalstärke im Feld. Darum tun die uns unter Vertrag nehmen.
- N: Wie denken sie, dass sich das in Zukunft entwickeln wird? Kann das in Zukunft eine stärkere Partnerschaft werden?
- A: Es ist das Ziel, dass man eine strategische Partnerschaft mit EuropeAID entwickelt. Besonders mit dem Regionalziel Ostafrika. Das ist gerade im Entstehen, aber das ist ein sehr langer und schwieriger politischer Prozess.
- N: Es ist ja auch nicht Sinn der Sache, dass es dann zehn Unterschiedliche Akteure gibt in einem Land, die alle das Selbe machen und schon fast konkurrenzartig interagieren.
- A: Ja, Alternative Development wird ja von vielen UN Organisationen ausgeführt: World Food Programme, World Bank, UNDP, UNODC, UNIFEM, die machen irgendein AD speziell mit Frauen. Also das ist bereits Tatsache, dass bereits die Mandate der verschiedenen UN Organisationen in einander verschmelzen. Und darum sagt ja jetzt der UN Generalsekretär Ban Ki Moon: „One UN.“
- N: Dieser Mechanismus wird aber bei UNODC noch nicht so realisiert. UNAIDS, oder UNHABITAT habe ich als Projektpartner gesehen, aber ansonsten noch ganz wenig, obwohl es sicherlich einfacher und effizienter wäre.
- A: Allerdings hat das auch Auswirkungen auf den Personalaufwand. Betriebswirtschaftlich positiv, dass vielleicht weniger Leute das gleiche Projektvolumen betreuen können. Aber keine UN Organisation hat Lust, seine eigenen Leute „wegzurationalisieren“. Vor allem auch, weil keine Organisation Terrain aufgeben und seine Leute abziehen möchte.
- N: Naja, ich denke es können ja, beispielsweise UNODC und UNAIDS in Brasil, noch immer getrennt sein, aber sie können ja im selben Gebäudekomplex sein und koordiniert arbeiten.
- A: Ja, dieser Prozess ist aber sehr langwierig und schwierig. Keine Reform geht ohne Köpfe rollen, oder?

N: Inwiefern kann UNODC Interessenskonflikt zwischen den unterschiedlichen Akteuren bei der Projektausführung verhindern, oder dazu beitragen, sie zu überwinden? Beispielsweise zwischen den Geberländern.

A: Also bei meinen beiden Geberländern in Kolumbien, Österreich und Frankreich, ist das eigentlich noch nie passiert. Da habe ich keine Erfahrungswerte.

Ein weiteres Problem bezüglich der Geberländer ist auch, dass zwar die Gelder für die Projekte ansteigen, aber die Gelder für unsere Infrastruktur zurückgehen. So haben manche Mitglieder, die normalerweise stabil zum GP beitragen und somit die Infrastruktur (Office costs, personal costs,...) finanzieren, im heurigen Jahr kein GP überwiesen.

N: Würde man dann die Geber zum Kaffee einladen, um das Problem zu besprechen.

A: Zum Kaffe einladen wäre vielleicht nicht adäquat. Aber man kann einen Brief schreiben, und eine Delegation hierher einladen und dieses heurige nicht überwiesene des GP (general purpose) Geldes zu besprechen, um das vielleicht heuer unter dem Jahr noch zu bekommen.

N: Das entscheidet aber auch nicht der Repräsentant, so dass es sich denkt: „Heuer behalten wir uns das Geld und investieren es in etwas anderes.“

A: Nein, aber er ist hier die höchste Instanz, die unsere Interessen im Mitgliedstaat vertritt. Und wenn ich an jemanden vorbei gehe, und mich selber sozusagen auf „Goldsuche“ begeben, das ist ganz delikant. Ich war lange im Außenministerium. Das ist einfach Protokollarisch nicht richtig.

N: Und wie schaut das aus, was ist der Grund, dass das GP heuer von Österreich nicht bezahlt wurde?

A: Ja, das kommt wahrscheinlich dann später im Jahr. Da war gerade kein Geld da. Da muss man sich halt darauf verlassen, dass die das bis Jahresende erledigen. Wenn es dann bis Ende des Jahres noch nicht gezahlt ist, dann muss halt Costa, oder auf D2 Ebene, eine Einladung schreiben und eine Delegation einladen.

N: Zahlen eigentlich alle Mitgliedsstaaten GP?

A: Nein, Großbritannien zahlt beispielsweise kein GP. Manche zahlen im einen Jahr schon, im anderen Jahr dann wieder nicht.

N: Naja, aber wenn meine Gelder begrenzt sind, dann würde ich auch eher in Projekte investieren, und so direkt der Zielgruppe helfen.

A. Das ist falsch, denn sie können keine Projekte laufen haben, wenn hier die Infrastruktur nicht bezahlt ist. Wenn wir hier unseren Strom nicht zahlen können, unsere Gehälter, die Reinigung, die Renovierung des Gebäudes, dann können wir auch keine Projekte mehr haben. Denn das ist der Herzschlag. Das ist eben der falsche Gedanke: „Ich investiere lieber in ein Projekt. “Dann gibt’s nur noch Projektpersonal. Und Projektpersonal, vor allem im Feld, die haben ein ganz anderes Personalprofil, als Leute, die hier sitzen.

N: Danke vielmals für das Interview.

A: Ja, kein Problem. Viel Glück.

Interview with Mr. Jorge Eduardo Rios, SLU, VIC, 28 August 2008

N: Is alternative development a question of development or anti- crime? And is it in UNODC's mandate?

R: I deal with that question all the time, because alternative development is drug control. But it is development. The same thing that UNDP does in the cost areas of Peru. So the question I always get, including the donors is: If it's a development issue, why is, that UNODC is involved in alternative development?

N: I see it more as fighting drugs and the whole drug cycle and here the drug cultivation. And that's the most important point, because if there are no drugs, people don't consume them and there is no trafficking. And this is just made more efficient through development. Development is the basement to make it really happen, to make it sustainable and efficient. Because in the document it's not about making them grow coffee instead for just one year. Because later, if they don't make good money, they'll grow coca again. Or because it's the environment that makes them to. So to my point, the development of social and economic infrastructure is just the insurance to make it sustainable. It's not very difficult to say: "Look people, that's illegal. We support you financially and you go grow something else." That could be done easily, but an economy should be established, that will increase and flourish the social background in order to make people want to be in the legal sector and secure education for their children and not to live in a dangerous or violent environment. Cause of course you are always a target for whoever you are sending your drugs if you want to get out of it. An other argument not to make it a development issue is that you would need good expertise to organized crime or drug syndicate. You have to know what they are doing and what are there goals in order to be preventive there and this is central to make it work. And I think UNDP doesn't have the experts that know about the organized crime that's behind the drug cultivation.

R: I think you got there a very interesting point. And that is, that approach has to be comprehensive. The reason that UNDP doesn't do Alternative Development in the jungle of Peru and only do it in the cost of Peru, is that they don't wanna get involved in organized crime, they don't wanna get involved in the guerrilla or in terrorism. You know, I think it is important that we understand, that alternative development for the most part in these areas is agriculture development. You not gonna grape a coca farmer and make him a physician. So, we recognize it's development. We recognize that we are not a development agency. But we also recognize, that we have a very

important role to play in so far as having the international community understand that drug control agencies don't have the sufficient money, resources and ability to develop a lot of these areas where the crops grow. One is because UNDP doesn't go there. And UNDP has so much money and so much big programmes, that if we all worked together, we could labage only. The World Bank doesn't go in these areas. So for the most part we are left to us and the Peruvian government, and this small government entities to be responsible for this. So I think we have to come to understand that we have a very important role to play. So do the member states. And our role is to ensure that the broader development community, all the financial institutions, understand that they need to look at Alternative Development not only as a drug issue, but as a development issue. And at the same time you also need to have governments, you have to fight corruption, you need to have demand reduction programmes. And it is within that framework, where UNODC really moves forward the issue with AD. Alternative development in Afghanistan in a classic example of the biggest Problem in the world. All the donors are there, we are there. But we have the smallest programme in all Afghanistan. Why? Because all this donors understand that this is a development issue. I hope you see the point. It's not only development, but development is critical. And there is a thing we are doing with Cesar, did you meet Cesar?

N: Well, I only worked with him for three weeks, because he was on mission, when I arrived and then he left for Canada.

R: We are working on the issue of security in development and development in security. UNODC tells the banks, the donors, the development people that unless you start developing these areas there will be no security. For the people there lack of water, lack of food.

N: Do you think that there is some kind of competition going on between World Bank, UNDP, or UNDC in that area?

R: There is no competition. What there is, is a lack of understanding on the part of the developing agencies. And to understand, that this is development. Just because you are eliminating coca or marijuana and putting in coffee, it's almost the same as to change banana field into a nut field. With the exception that you don't have organized crime. Of course there are differences and that's were the problem arises now. UNODC is best placed to serve as a catalyst. For example to go to the World Bank and say: "World Bank, can you discuss with Bolivia the poverty reduction paper/ strategy." You know, between the government and the World Bank. "Discuss the role of coca on

the economy.” That’s the role we play. And then World Bank says: “Bolivia has to tell us, that they want to prioritize that.” But they should understand, that coca is such a big part of the economy, that unless you don’t address development in general and not just development where there is no coca, the problem is never gonna get better. That’s where the reluctance lies. And our role is, well there is two things: One we have been seen as an easy way out to give money to do development. You know, “Let’s give the UN money to do development.” And what has happened is that the lack of focus on the broader development has basically caused what you see today. The balloon effect. You eradicate in San Jose, it will show up in Tujuan. You eradicate in Tujuan, it will show up in an other region.

N: As Peru had been the biggest coca cultivator in the region. It decreased, but Colombia increased dramatically.

I have one question though. Why isn’t there any coca cultivation in Venezuela or Brazil? Because it’s not that farmers are all wealthy there. An why did Colombia start to cultivate coca only in the late 1980s, and not earlier?

R: Because there really is very little amount of traditional coca. Jet they are the biggest coca producers. The question that you asked is interesting. I have been asking the Americans. If the border of Columbia has so much coca, why has the border of Ecuador none? In some parts a river is the border between Colombia and Ecuador. And in some parts the river is only a few meters, so you could swim or take a little boat. There is no reason why the coca should stop at the river.

N: But I’m sure there are people interested in cultivating in this areas.

R: Of course there are. They have many small fields in Ecuador. And the Americans say it’s isolated.

The other question people ask is: Why isn’t there coca production in Africa? They have the same climate basically. I mean you can find high tropical valleys where you can grow that stuff. So why haven’t the traffickers moved to Rwanda or elsewhere? There is a lot of discussion on this.

N: Lately there has a lot of drug trafficking been going through West Africa. So as the traffickers and the crime networks are already established in the area, it could be cultivated there.

R: Could be.

The government of Venezuela has ask us to help them do a survey on the coca cultivation there. I flew with the Venezuelans over the mountains there and have great pictures of coca cultivation. But the amount we don't know.

What else do you want to know?

N: First of all to identify the specific needs and characteristics of alternative development projects? So what would have any organization have to keep in mind to make the project efficient and sustainable? And also in reference to Colombia.

R: Well, Colombia is a special case. They have so much money. It's a special case. Have you read the documents that we wrote for the CND on AD? You should read these, and the report from the extra group meeting that we had last month here in Vienna on AD for the UNGASS. I think it's important that you get these documents. Cause there you will understand how do member states view UNODC's role in alternative development. You will find them on the web page of the CND. Then you go to the conference room papers. There is one on AD that we wrote with the EC, FPO and the Germans. It's based on 4 huge meeting we had. I think that will give you an idea of how the member states see it, and it will give you an idea also on where is it, where we can play a role? Because now the member state see, that it is development and they try to get the bans involved. So they are asking us to help them show the drug programmes to the banks under the issue of poverty, food security,...

And I think one of the reasons why they do wanna work with us is that in the end we have about 20 years of experience in the illicit crop growing areas. And we have a certain level, you know, we have the blue fag, that helps also to be seen neutral.

So, if you are not gonna find the documents today, just give me a call, I think they are critical. If you need any more help you can write me or call, seriously.

N: One more question concerning the Colombian projects. Where any of the donors or of the project partners involved in the elaboration of the project document? Because that's how you can focus on the specific local needs. Because many projects are designed in Vienna.

R: I know what you mean. I would bet, knowing Aldo and the way he works, that these projects include many elements.

N: Do you know if there is such thing as a requirement to include beneficiaries in the elaboration?

R: Sure, it's a basic guideline that we use at least. I mean, the alternative development world has progressed. Slowly, but has. We now understand, that we have to come up

with products that are market driven. Because otherwise some person here in Vienna, that designs the project will say: "Ok, let's do an AD project in Colombia. Let's have the farmers in San Jose grow Egyptian tomatoes instead of coca. Let's give money for that." And this kind of development is top down, and doesn't work. And now we think: "What does the market want?" Theresa wants blue tomatoes. And then you have to go see, if they are able to do that in Colombia. So we moved into the elements: market driven products and possibilities in the field. So you also have to ask them, what their interest in growing is. So what you wanna grow? Sometimes they suggest something, but it's not possible, because it needs to be sustainable and has a market. And then you have the donors, that have, let's say, half a million dollars and want to do a certain thing with it. That's the opposite side. So you take the money, go to Colombia and say: "Theresa, grow tomatoes because I have the money."

N: Do you think the AD projects implemented by UNODC are more efficient than projects by the Colombian government on its own, USAID, or any other single acting organization, such as a small NGO? Because they have some qualities, that UNODC doesn't have, so I think it's good that they are all there.

R: Sure, sure.

N: So what does UNODC lack? Because the project organization might be more complicated thinking of all the bureaucracy.

R: I think we also moved forward and had to recognize that we have to recognize the expertise of other institutions. We have the money and we go out doing some projects. But we had to learn that you just can't go out and train the (former) coca growing farmers on soil analysis. Well, you can do it, but let's find a NGO, a group, or whoever, that we can contract to do it. That's the better way to do it. That's the better way to do it. There is a lot of this, but there is also a lot a jealousies and competition, because money for AD is limited. In the past it wasn't. There was so much money. And now it's limited. I think UNODC recognizes the importance of working with others: Civil society and private enterprise/ the market.

N: Is it difficult to get the private sector engaged?

R: It depends on how you get it engaged.

N: Because drugs and crime is not the most popular sector to support. Usually you give money, or cooperate when it concerns children, education and related fields.

R: Well, we have to move forward and need to get the private sector seriously engaged. Not only in building schools, but also in helping open markets. Buying products and

ensuring fair prices for the products. I mean, there is different phases of social responsibility and corporate responsibility in private business. Because you have businesses where they only want to make money and you have businesses where there is some money that they want to donate. Probably to do something nice for the community. So there is different ways how business looks at that as well, and they are hard to engage. It takes a long time. And you are also dealing with the providers, that farmers, who are not always the most responsible.

N: Well, because they are not used to be in an economy that builds on treaties.

R: There is a good example from the past. There is a special grain, Quinoa, in Bolivia, it's a small Indian weed, that they sell in Bolivia and Peru in the high lands. And very rich in proteins. And the Americans, Kellogg's, was looking to buy this grain. So they went to Bolivia, because they knew that this grain was originally from this area and they wanted to start sourcing it from Bolivia for some of their products, such as Muesli,... The Bolivians tried and tried, but they just couldn't produce enough for Kellogg's. Because they made a mistake. They had said: "Sure, we can sell you 40 tonnes a week." Just in order to get to project. And then they signed the project and the first delivery showed up, but the second delivery never showed up because the farmers could not assure the quantity or quality. Because in order to meet to demand, they started not to care, if there were little sticks in it or other things. But Kellogg's was looking for quality control, because of course they have to because of all the sanitary regulations. So in the end they grow it all in California and in Colorado. It's tough. Economies of scale.

N: But this problem is again a development issue. It the development of their economy to meet the requirements of the global market.

R: It's an development issue. I mean, we say, that not all illicit crops are due to poverty. That's true. There are a lot of wealthy people that are growing coca. But there is also the other side. There a lot of poor farmers, that have no alternative. They want to be legal, but they don't have the right conditions, they don't have the roads, they don't have the market, they don't have the technical assistance, they don't have the irrigation. So it's defiantly tough.

In case you have any other question, just contact me.

N: I will, thank you very much.

Interview with Mr. Amado Philip De Andres, LACU, VIC, 29 August 2008

N: Do you think, that within the international community in the field of alternative development, UNODC should focus on some kind of element of alternative development in order to position itself? Because UNODC sees, because of its mandate, AD more from the drug reduction side, and not just as an development issue. So, for example UNDP is also doing AD in Peru, but only in the cost area and not in the jungle, where it is more dangerous. Would it be a realistic and efficient alternative that the different AD implementing agencies focus on different areas?

It's also that UNODC is a very small organization with limited financial possibilities.

A: You mean to create a niche for us. Well, we have to work in the field with all the actors concerned. And you are right that the situations are very different. But we have to be clear, AD and drugs were hand in hand in the 1980s. Now its drugs and crime and alternative development, which means that, in the Andean region, UNODC can position itself depending on what kind of development they want to generate as an alternative to the coca cultivation. You see the case for example with the opium poppy in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan. It's basically on the flat lands, where UNODC has a niche. But, what we know is, that if we do alternative development ... new opportunities will arrive for criminal organizations to grow coca or other illicit crops. So in the end, we have to try cooperate with as many other agencies and NGOs, especially NGOs and the civil society, as possible and not only within the UN system. We have to work on a global level, because of the "balloon effect". Because if we do AD only in a certain region, the cultivation will just move within a very short time and organized crime will always be well funded to be able to export that. For example, today it's almost impossible to trace coca cultivated in Venezuela and exported from Venezuela through West Africa to the European Union. So, more has to be done in the link between fighting drugs and fighting crime because it is one criminal axe.

N: What role could NGOs play in this combat? What advantage do they have? What does UNODC lack and they have? Concerning structure,....

A: The problem that we have is that we can not be everywhere. We can not have a representation or even a project office in every country. Because we only have about to or three offices in every region. But the NGOs are there. They know the field, they know also how population links, so that they are really grass root actors. So we need NGOs. But we also need the political power and even the religious leaders, depending on the country (Africa, parts of Asia), to help us send the message of where we want to

go. Alternative development does not become an excuse to say: “Well, we need something alternative, or we will cultivate that and have then money.” So UNODC has to position itself also with NGOs and also with networks of UN agencies. UNDP, for example, has a very good network in specific countries. Not in AD, but we can use the network to be able to link with the society and to reach out to do AD through them. It’s the only way.

N: Couldn’t it also be problematic to contract a local agency or NGO? Because UNODC or the UN in general has a certain reputation and liability to the member states, and if there is an official partner, UNODC has to account for it in the case something happened, in the case they are inefficient or corrupt. It could be that they just don’t really know how to do it. And the UN wouldn’t really know what happened, because it wasn’t their staff.

A: Yes, there are three things: One is, we have to ensure expertise, but how do we do that? We have a NGO and we have AD expertise and we link them for those regions which are clean. And we can build capacities. The second pillar is that, NGO should be in a roster, a public registry, because otherwise they are not accountable to anybody. Especially local, very local NGOs. We have to collaborate with NGO that are credible. Certain standards of credibility have to be met. So we have to develop the partnerships and roster of NGOs we have already worked to build a certain capacity, that was mentioned in the first pillar, and even share this capacity with other countries if possible.

N: Is there any UN unit or agency, that is responsible for the collaboration with NGOs? Or is this something, that is part an organized within UNODC?

A: Basically we work with NGOs for specific events. But we have the field network, cause the field is normally already working with NGOs, except field offices which cover a large number of countries. And we need to get more information on NGOs. But not only on NGOs, on NGOs which work on the right level and the right areas of UNODC’s mandate. You can have a very good NGO working on anti-human trafficking. And we can develop alternative mandates of NGOs if they are good.

N: Do you think member states do support a strong partnership with NGOs? Or do they only want the UN to be in the field implementing projects financed by them? Could this be an issue?

A: No, it’s not an issue. I think, sometimes we have many possibilities. The UN can also be co-implementing even with an NGO. In the fight against corruption in West Africa

we have a very strong partnership with Transparency International. There we are both getting funds and then together we implement a project with the government. So it's three actors involved: the government, a NGO and a UN organization. I think it's possible, even if there is a little problem, which is that donors and member states see that NGOs are not accountable to anybody. They are not accountable to the government or anybody.

N: Which can also be an advantage, because you are not bound to what a certain political party wants or whatever.

A: Yea, of course it's good vis a vis the goal, but it's not so good vis a vis accountability and credibility. So, by working with the UN there is a certain additional value to them, by implementing specific tasks for which they are good. And we don't have the capacities because we don't have the manpower. That's why NGOs are very, very good many times.

N: That's all. Thank you very much.

Interview with Mr. Javier Montano Duran, VIC, 23 September 2009

N: I would like to ask you about certain critics I found in publications for conferences on alternative development. First, that official publications would lack of self-criticism and would be over-optimistic. Is it really the case and why?

M: Generally I think there are things that go wrong sometimes in the project. But every UNODC project over 500,000 USD is required to have an external evaluation, and those evaluations are also publicized documents. The external evaluations illustrate problems and critic, but this information is not advertised in the international community. However, it is available to them. Reports generally show the present situation based on data. Data is never good or bad or right or wrong. It is simply as it is. Consequently you see increase or decrease of certain social problems, which is a step forward or a step back. So in 2008 there had been an increase of coca cultivation in Colombia, which was a big shock. And this year the Colombian government increased its eradication programme. Certainly it's the efforts of the Colombian government that is reported on the base of facts, and the language does not change depending on de- or increase.

N: Are the evaluations send out to the Permanent Missions and project donors automatically, or do they have to request them?

M: They are publicized documents and, e.g., the donors and PMs⁴³⁸ have access to the documents online.

N: Is there also failure in the project implementation described? Or some kind of management failure that led to inefficiency?

M: There are some reports. For example, the projects in UNODC are audited by the OIOS of the United Nations. On the other side the independent evaluation unit does evaluations on the outcome of the project. The audit (OIOS) is an audit branch to see if there has been mismanagement or the violation of the UN rules, while implementing a project. Which are different things. One can follow all the rules without having the desired impact, which will be reflected in the evaluation. There could also a project with excellent results, but the certain UN rules or procedures were not respected, and this would be highlighted in the OIOS report. Certain action would follow and sometimes sanctions are decided, if abnormalities are reported (being it from the human resources factor or from misuse of property,..).

⁴³⁸ PM- Permanent Mission

- N: Are these documents available for the permanent missions?
- M: I think the recommendations is also available for the PMs and for donor countries.
- N: The next issue I'd like to discuss is the capacity to establish a relationship of confidence with the peasant federations, the target groups/ farmers. I found a critic that referred to it as "wishful thinking". How would you describe the present relationship between farmers and UNODC in Colombia? Do you think the relation has changed and moved up to being a real partner in the decision-making process and the design of a project? Also compared to 5 to 10 years ago.
- M: I think such relationship and collaboration is certainly established. Most of the alternative development projects implemented in Colombia are the response of requests from the ground.
- N: But is this requested by the Colombian government or by the communities? Because the government might have different plans about its territory or the coca cultivation than the individual farmers.
- M: There are different in the work of UNODC. If we talk about the AD⁴³⁹ programmes, we can have a model type of intervention, but this intervention needs to be owned by the community. Otherwise it would fail, as the peasant might not see the value of the project or activity and will not comply, eradicate the coca cultivation or will start growing coca afterwards. Consequently there are consultation meetings with the target population in order to get them engaged, and have their inputs for new project proposals. And today's proposals are very comprehensive. Before there used to be only crop substitution, while now the whole economic chain is taken into account in order to secure the commercialization of the products. So now it's a central factor to ensure an alternative source of income.
- N: Do you think in UNODC in Colombia is already providing that?
- M: Yes, I think certainly it is. There the "products for peace", strategic alliances with supermarkets (Carrefour,..).
- N: One more question. What is UNODC's official statement or attitude concerning voluntary eradication? Because of course this type of eradication is not really forced, but you are not really giving people an option as aerial spraying would be the consequence of neglected cooperation. This is something that is very criticized as it is not really building trust.

⁴³⁹ AD- Alternative Development

M: I can not commend on behalf of UNODC on that aspect. So you can only quote me as Javier Montano, but not as official UN staff. My comments will only be from my personal point of view.

In Colombia the coca crop is by law an illegal crop. There the government has a authority to go and eliminate all coca cultivation by using various instruments. If the law is broken, the government has the power to intervene. So it is because of the sovereignty of the state, as they decided to interdict coca corps. However, Colombia has three different types of eradication: 1) aerial spraying, 2) manual eradication, and 3) voluntary eradication. From these three different types the last one is the most effective and sustainable one. As the peasants are entering an elimination process where alternatives for income generation are provided. And this is where UNODC is working. UNODC only works in voluntary eradication, where peasants eliminate their own crop and start cultivation new one(s).

Of course aerial spraying is the most controversial method and often accused of being dangerous to human health. There are also other parameters I am not aware of.

N: Is there no project where the coca crop is still planted, while the base for legal income is created.

M: No, because coca cultivation is illegal in Colombia. There are different programmes of course, but UNODC get not involved in rural development. There certain rural regions, that are focus of migration are developed in order to avoid new coca cultivation.

N: Thank you very much for your time.

M: No problem, anytime again.

Interview with Mr. Julio Mollinedo Claros, Second Secretary of the Bolivia
Mission to the United Nation in Vienna, 30 September 2009

N: What is the motivation of Bolivia, or any other country in the region, of implementing an alternative development project within the framework of an international organization, such as UNODC? What are the benefits and disadvantages or limitations that result from such cooperation?

M: In the case of Bolivia there are a lot of programmes or projects implemented in cooperation with the United States, the European Union and the United Nations. So we try to cultivate licit products, such as coffee or bananas, but there is no market to sell them. Consequently without the development of the national or local industry is central to the substitution of illicit crops.

Definitely all programmes run by the United States did not work, because they had a very dominant position in, where individual requirements were not met. This is a central disadvantage.

In addition we need sustainable programmes in the country. And additionally the target area needs to be developed at the same time.

N: Do you think that the UN is a neutral player within the international system?

M: Yes, and it is very important to have the support of the other member states. This is “responsabilidad compartida”. There need to be a mutual efforts.

N: What problems can appear because of the high complexity of the UN and the actors involved?

M: The positive implication of the UN is that it is a very experienced and proficient organization. And the beneficiaries of alternative development project need to be trained and supported in order to understand professional cultivation and market requirements, including marketing.

N: What do you think are the donor countries interest in investing in alternative development projects?

M: Recently, donor countries have been investing in demand reduction projects to a great part. They realize the social problem connected to illicit cultivation as the final consumption is largely happening in Europe and the United States, and Canada. Alternative development projects are now less supported by developed countries, and new resources are needed.

- N: What do you think about the harm reduction approach to use the coca plant for the production of legal products? And also the use of drugs in drug substitution programmes in consumer countries. Do you think this could be a possible alternative?
- M: This is a very good idea. But, unfortunately, the coca leave is illegal and banned based on the Convention from 1961. And this is binding for all countries and I think they try not to discuss this matter at the moment. Because of the convention the import or export of the coca leave is illegal. Consequently until the coca leave is made legal, such undertaking is very difficult or even impossible.
- N: How can new international cooperation in alternative development be established or strengthened in order to pursue common interests of the international community? How do you think problems of international concern can be dealt with in the best possible way?
- M: The international community is of high importance when facing such problems, and international institutions need to be maintained. But individual interests and politics can often be a problem. Of example, in a big AD programme the different countries may have different opinions and sometimes no consensus can be found. Consensus is often not possible, but common positions can be found, but it takes a lot of time. Concerning possible ways of non-drug products of coca leaves many states seem not to understand the difference between coca crop and cocaine, and strictly disapprove any commercialization of the coca leave. Which would be illegal anyway. Usually countries have different ideas about the future of coca cultivation or coca substitution. For example forced and voluntary eradication and the use of aerial spraying is very controversial.
- N: Is there any new and central requirement or element for future alternative development projects?
- M: For the future for alternative development projects it is important to find new financial resources for cooperation, where the beneficiary country can decide upon what it needs. This will be very important.
- N: How could non-drug coca products be marketed?
- M: This is very complicated and not possible right now. The barrier is the convention from 1961.
- N: Thank you very much.

CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

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E-mail theresa_neumeister@hotmail.com
Nationality Austria
Date of birth 25-06-1984

WORK EXPERIENCE, INTERNSHIPS

- Date Since November 2009
- Name of employer Global 2000. Environmental Protection NGO. Vienna, Austria.
Internship within the "Umweltkulturpraktikum" programme. www.global2000.at.
- Occupation or field of activity Task area: video-, online-, and photo journalism as well as the planning and organization of charity events.

- Date February - March 2009
- Name of employer UNODC- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; Vienna, Austria;
Internship in the Latin America and the Caribbean Unit (LACU), Technical Cooperation Section I, Division for Operations; Supervisor: Javier Montano
- Occupation or field of activity Duties: Preparation of presentations and reports on the UNODC programme in the region. Conduction of an analysis on donor and cost-sharing trends.
Assistance in the elaboration of country briefing notes, the annual section work plan, a meeting document for UNODC's Executive Director, and a national programme to support a UN Congress.

- Date March – September 2008
- Name of employer UNODC- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; Vienna, Austria;
Internship in the Latin America and the Caribbean Unit (LACU), Technical Cooperation Section I, Division for Operations; Supervisor: Javier Montano
- Occupation or field of activity Duties: Conduction of a secondary research on stakeholders in Central America in the field of human security. Preparation and updating of the overview of the regional project portfolio and the unit's annual programme presentation.
Assistance in the elaboration of project proposals and strategic documents, fact sheets on the drug and crime situation in various countries, the Regional Programme for Central America and the Caribbean, a presentation used at a Ministerial Meeting, and terms of reference for consultants.

- Date July 2007
- Name of employer Municipality of Wels, Upper Austria; Michael Ortner- www.wels.at
- Occupation or field of activity One month internship at the Department of Public Relations and Information.
Duties: Conduction of interviews and elaboration of articles for the monthly "Welscher Amtsblatt". Retouching of pictures and assistance in the preparation of the page layout and design. Elaboration of press releases and assistance in press conferences.

- Date March 2005- March 2006
- Name of employer AFA- United Nations Youth and Student Organization of Austria, Vienna, Austria
Michael Pfeifer - President; www.afa.at; "STOP Child Trafficking Campaign"
- Occupation or position held Duties: Assist in the strategic planning of the campaign (identification and contact with counterparts, elaboration of activity proposals and timeframe).
Assist in the preparation and holding of panel discussions on Child Trafficking and the conduction of a public awareness campaign, including organizing charity concerts or information desks at major concerts.

- Date July – August 2004
- Name of employer Diocese Barreiras, Bahia, Brasil; diocesebarreiras@uol.com.br
- Occupation or position held Development assistance; Internship within the project "cata vento". The project aims at providing children of socially disadvantaged families between the age 7 to 14 basic education and alimentation in a save environment.
Duties: Assist in the supervision of the children and the lessons carried out by volunteer teachers. Support and encourage the children with their homework and exercises. Help in the preparation of the daily meals. Assist in the local church office occasionally. Accompany the bishop on his journeys within the diocese Barreiras and at confirmations.

EDUCATION

- Date October 2003 - December 2006: Bachelor's degree
- Educational institution University of Vienna
- Major subject of study Communication Science and Journalism
 - Fields of practice Public Relations; Journalism
 - Elective module International Journalism

- Date Since October 2004: Diplomstudium
- Educational institution University of Vienna
- Major subject of study Political Science
- Minor subjects of study International Development, Spanish

- Date October 2002- June 2003
- Educational institution University of Salzburg
- Major subject of study Communication Science and Journalism

- Date June 2002
- Educational institution General qualification for university entrance at the Bundesrealgymnasium Wallererstrasse, Wels, Austria

- Date August 2000- July 2001
- Educational institution Academic year abroad; Colegio Universitario Central; Mendoza; Argentina

ADDITIONAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING

- Date November 24th 2009
 - Educational institution One day seminar on Project Management, Bildungsforum Wien.
Theoretical briefing on project structure, project environment analysis, financial and time schedule, project evaluation and controlling; elaboration of two project concepts through teamwork.

- Date May 29th- 30th 2009
 - Educational institution International Conference on International Criminal Law: Accomplishments, Challenges, and Newest Developments, Vienna, Austria.
Participation in the Workshop: International Criminal Procedure - Witness Protection.

- Date Since March 2009
 - Educational institution Governance Roundtable: Spin-off study group from the 7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government held in Vienna in June 2007.
Current publication project on: development organizations achieving the MDGs through good governance. Contact: Ho-Seung Lee: H.Lee@iaea.org

- Date 09.- 15. April 2007
 - Educational institution Study trip to Belgrade, Srebrenica and Sarajevo
Organized by the United Nations Youth and Student Organization of Austria

- Date 24. February 2006
 - Educational institution Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP); www.oaip.at
Workshop: Staaten auf den Weg bringen- Get states on their way

- Date 07.- 11. August 2005
 - Educational institution Vienna International Model United Nation (VIMUN); www.vimun.at
UN-Simulation; United Nations Headquarters, Vienna, Austria

- Date July 2005
 - Educational institution Language Studies International, New York, USA
3 weeks intensive English language course; TOEFL-Certificate; nyc@lsi.edu

- Date 18- - 20. February 2005
 - Educational institution London International Model United Nation (LIMUN); www.limun.org.uk
UN-Simulation; London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and London School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS)

- Date November 2004 – June 2005
 - Educational institution International Center for European Studies- CIFE; www.cife.org
Certified One – Year Training Programme on the European Union.
Examination of the economic, judicial, political, historic, and cultural dimension of the EU. As well as the Union's enlargement, regional cooperation, and Austrian Foreign Politics.

- Date 8.- 14. November 2004
- Educational institution Study trip to Brussels, The Hague and Paris. (International Court of Justice, International Criminal Court, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, European Commission. European Parliament, and UNICEF.) Organized by the Department of Political Science, University of Vienna

- Date 4. –10. June 2004
- Educational institution 21. International Summer School. "The Renaissance of Europe". Participation in the Workshop: The Media between War and Peace. Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution; www.aspr.ac.at

- Date 1. – 18. April 2004
- Educational institution Study trip to the UN Headquarters, New York, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C. Organized by the Department of Political Science, University of Vienna.

- Date July- August 2002
- Educational institution International Lions Youth Environmental Camp in Greater China: Hong Kong, China and Taiwan. Theme: Public Environmental Policies and Politics

PERSONAL SKILLS AND COMPETENCES

MOTHER TONGUE German

OTHER LANGUAGES:

English: fluently written and spoken
 Spanish: fluently written and spoken
 French: intermediate knowledge
 Portuguese: intermediate knowledge
 Latin: school leaving examination level

SOCIAL SKILLS AND COMPETENCES

Living and working in a multicultural surrounding and fields of activity, where teamwork and communication are important elements.

TECHNICAL SKILLS AND COMPETENCES

EDP- and Software skills: Windows 2000/ XP, MS Office, Internet research.

DRIVING LICENCE

B (passenger car)

Spare time activities

Collecting old books, Volleyball, Salsa dancing, travelling.

Reverences available upon request.

ABSTRACT

One problem of global outreach combated by the international community is illicit crop cultivation, the later trade and final consumption. Since single states are not able to resolve this problem on their own they are willing to cooperate within the framework of international organizations in order to secure the provision of security and welfare to their citizens. The mutual interest to eliminate illicit crop cultivation is combining a range of global actors within the context of alternative development. Thereby the establishment of a well-designed socio-economic infrastructure in equal partnership with the project beneficiaries is essential for the projects' effectiveness and sustainability. Moreover, endeavours in the fight against coca cultivation can only be effective if strong emphasis is put on alternative development and broader development efforts.