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## **Is Japanese Colonization Unique: A Prelude of East Asian Regionalism**

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## **Abstract:**

During the last decades, the issue of regional cooperation has gradually emerged as a dominant feature around the world. The European Union (EU) is, especially, a prominent leading group in terms of the promotion of regional cooperation. On the contrary, the East Asian region is lagging far behind the EU in terms of regional integration. However, while the theme of East Asia regionalism and integration is under intensive discussion, it should not be disregarded that Japan in the 20<sup>th</sup> century did try to create a form of regionalism in East Asia, in spite of the fact that measure and purpose at that time were quite different and might be seen controversial nowadays. Japan was once the dominant force in East Asian regionalism. In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, Japan emerged as the supreme power in East Asia and as a challenger to the European-centered colonial order.

The imperialism and colonialism conducted by Japan not only politically symbolized the changing of the balance of power in Asia, but also economically formed its own pattern of development as a model for East Asian regions. Accordingly, in the period of post-colonization and afterwards, when discussing the East Asian economic growth miracle (Four little Tigers and so on) or the feasibility of further East Asian integration, Japan's colonial legacy and its influences should be seriously taken into account. Therefore, it is fruitful to probe Japanese colonialism and Japan's approach to regional integration to excavate the singularity of Japanese colonization.

This paper would like to focus on the uniqueness of Japanese colonization and will analyze it not only from the resultant side of Japan's colonization, but also from the strategic side, in order to further emphasize how Japan stood out as a singular colonial power among all the other Western colonizing powers. From the very first colonial experiences derived from Taiwan and Korea to the building of Manchukuo and further expansion to Southeast Asia, Japanese colonization performed in a way not just getting involved in fulfillments of economic interests or extractions but also sublimating its intention to an ideal of promoting the Pan-Asianism concept.

In order to clarify the hypotheses that, first, Japanese expansion and colonialism were unique in being the first attempt at Asian integration after a Sino-centered tributary system; and second, Japan's uniqueness was presented both in terms of economic achievements in its colonies and its ambitious strategies toward its own empire building, this paper is aimed at sorting out the factors that formed the singularity of Japanese colonization and its overall colonial impacts left in the East Asian region for further development or integration. I will consider and discuss Japan's Asia or Japanese colonization from basically three perspectives: first, economic development and social change, with concentration on the case of colonial Taiwan. Secondly, the Japanese ambitious vision of East Asian regionalism will be discussed. To consider the relationship between war, nationalism, and anti-colonialism, emphases will be put on building the Manchu State and the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Japan's attempt for further political integration will also be taken into account. The last part tries to analyze Japanese control over Asia from a broader point of view by concentrating on regional dynamics and regional ties to the world. In other words, the third part will be the evaluation of Japanese colonial influences on East Asia's further regional integration.

## **Abstract**

In den letzten Jahrzehnten wurde die Thematik von regionaler Kooperation zu einem bedeutenden Faktor auf der ganzen Welt. Die Europäische Union (EU) steht prominent an der Spitze bei der Förderung von regionaler Kooperation. Auf der anderen Seite hinkt die Region Ostasien in Bezug auf regionale Integration hinterher. Während das Thema eines ostasiatischen Regionalismus und Integration intensiv diskutiert wird, sollte man nicht vergessen, dass Japan im 20. Jahrhundert versucht hatte, eine Form von Regionalismus in Ostasien zu schaffen, trotz der Tatsache, dass die damaligen Mittel und Ziele sehr unterschiedlich waren und in der Gegenwart kontrovers erscheinen. Japan war einmal der dominante Akteur im Rahmen des ostasiatischen Regionalismus. Im frühen 20. Jahrhundert war Japan die führende Macht in Ostasien und forderte die europäisch-zentrierte koloniale Ordnung heraus.

Der japanische Imperialismus und Kolonialismus symbolisierten nicht nur eine Änderung der Kräfteverhältnisse in Asien, sondern formte eigene ökonomische Muster der Entwicklung, die als Model für die Regionen Ostasiens dienten. Daher muss man in der Diskussion des Wirtschaftswachstums in Ostasien (Vier kleinen Tiger etc.) in der postkolonialen Phase und danach, und in der Frage der stärkeren Integration Ostasiens, das koloniale Erbe Japans und dessen Einflüsse berücksichtigen. Es erweist sich als fruchtbar den japanischen Kolonialismus und Japans Zugang zu regionaler Integration zu untersuchen und die Besonderheit von Japans Kolonisation zum Vorschein zu bringen.

Diese Arbeit legt den Focus auf die Einzigartigkeit der japanischen Kolonisation und will nicht nur die Folgen analysieren, sondern auch dessen strategische Seite beleuchten, um deutlich zu machen wie sich Japan dabei von den anderen westlichen Kolonialmächten unterschieden hat. Ausgehend von den ersten Erfahrungen bei der Kolonisierung von Taiwan und Korea bis zur Gründung von Manchukuo und der weiteren Expansion nach Südostasien, konzentrierte sich die japanische Kolonisation nicht nur auf wirtschaftliche Interessen oder Ausbeutung, sondern festigte auch seine Absicht, ein Pan-Asiatisches Konzept zu fördern.

Die Arbeitshypothesen sind: erstens, dass die japanische Expansion und Kolonisation in dem Sinne einzigartig waren, dass sie den ersten Versuch einer asiatischen Integration nach dem sino-zentrierten Tributsystem darstellen; zweitens Japans Einzigartigkeit zeigt sich sowohl in den wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungen innerhalb seiner Kolonien als auch in seinen ambitionierten imperialen Strategien. Diese Arbeit versucht die Faktoren fest zu machen, die die Einzigartigkeit der japanischen Kolonisation ausmachten und welche Einflüsse diese auf die Entwicklung der ostasiatischen Integration hatten. Ich möchte Japans Asien oder die japanische Kolonisation von drei Seiten her betrachten und diskutieren: erstens, die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und sozialer Wandel, mit dem Schwerpunkt auf dem Beispiel des kolonialen Taiwans. Zweitens wird die ambitionierte japanische Version eines ostasiatischen Regionalismus diskutiert. Um die Beziehungen zwischen Krieg, Nationalismus, und Anti-Kolonialismus zu untersuchen, wird der Schwerpunkt auf den Aufbau des Manchu Staates und der „East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere“ gelegt. Seine darüber hinausgehenden Versuche einer politischen Integration werden ebenso berücksichtigt. Der letzte Teil versucht Japans Kontrolle über Asien von einem breiteren Gesichtspunkt aus zu untersuchen mit einer Konzentration auf regionaler Dynamik und regionaler Verbindungen zur

globalen Ebene. Mit anderen Worten, der dritte Teil wird eine Evaluation der japanischen kolonialen Einflüsse auf Ostasiens regionale Integration darstellen. Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, dass die japanische Kolonisation in Hinsicht auf Entwicklung, Modernisierung und regionaler Integration eine Besondere war; allerdings bedeutet dies nicht eine Zustimmung oder Rechtfertigung der Methoden der Kolonisierung.

## **I. Introduction**

### **1.1 Purpose of this study**

During the last decades, the issue of regional cooperation has gradually emerged as a dominant feature around the world. The European Union (EU) is, especially, a prominent leading group in terms of the promotion of regional cooperation.<sup>1</sup> On the contrary, the East Asian region<sup>2</sup> is lagging far behind the EU in terms of regional integration. However, while the theme of East Asian regionalism and integration is under intensive discussion, it should not be disregarded that Japan in the 20<sup>th</sup> century did try to create a form of regionalism in East Asia, in spite of the fact that measure and purpose at that time were quite different and might be seen controversial nowadays. Namely, Japan was once the dominant force in East Asian regionalism, while building its own empire during the late 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, as it tried to chart regional dynamics within a global framework and context.<sup>3</sup>

In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, Japan emerged as the supreme power in East Asia and as a challenger to the European-centered colonial order. By seizing the Ryukyus, integrating Hokkaido into its empire, colonizing Taiwan and Korea, winning the Russo-Japanese War, establishing the puppet state of Manchukuo between 1872 and 1932, and eventually

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<sup>1</sup> Makio Miyagawa, Relevance of EU Model for the East Asian Regional Integration, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, accessed 20<sup>th</sup> April, 2010, from [http://www.nira.or.jp/past/newse/paper/japan-eu/pdf/miyagawa.pdf]

<sup>2</sup> The term Asia or East Asia throughout the paper is basically used as equivalent for Northeast, East, and Southeast Asia.

<sup>3</sup> Mark Selden, East Asia Regionalism and its Enemies in Three Epochs: Political Economy and Geopolitics, 16<sup>th</sup> to 21<sup>st</sup> centuries, in: The Asia Pacific Journal 9-4-09 (2009)

subjugating large parts of China and Asia, Japan gradually became the only nation of Asia, Africa or even Latin America to join the competitions of colonial powers.<sup>4</sup>

The imperialism and colonialism conducted by Japan not only politically symbolized the changing of the balance of power in Asia<sup>5</sup>, but also economically formed its own pattern of development as a model for East Asian regions.<sup>6</sup> Accordingly, in the period of post-colonization and afterwards, when discussing the East Asian economic growth miracle (Four little Tigers and so on)<sup>7</sup> or the feasibility of further East Asian integration, Japan's colonial legacy and its influences should be seriously taken into account.

Therefore, it is fruitful to probe Japanese colonialism and Japan's approach to regional integration in order to excavate the singularity of Japanese colonization.<sup>8</sup>

This paper would like to focus on the uniqueness of Japanese colonization and will analyze it not only from the resultant side of Japan's colonization, but also from the strategic side, in order to further emphasize how Japan stood out as a singular colonial power among all the other Western colonizing powers. From the very first colonial experiences derived from Taiwan and Korea to the building of Manchukuo and further

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<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> Basically the dominant power switched decisively away from a Sino-centric and China-centered to a Japan-led hegemony.

<sup>6</sup> Bruce Cumings, *Colonial Formations and Deformations*, in: *Decolonization: Perspectives from Now and Then*, ed. Prasenjit Duara (London 2004), 278-297

<sup>7</sup> Four Little Dragons: Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea. These countries have experienced rapid economic growth since the 1960s.

<sup>8</sup> Especially when Japan's Prime Minister recently apologized to South Korea for its past colonial rule in the hope of building future-oriented bilateral relations, Japanese colonization becomes once again attention-getting. In the mean time, Japanese selective apology shows its different strategies and intentions toward its regional relations with countries in Asia.

expansion to Southeast Asia, Japanese colonization performed in a way not just getting involved in fulfillments of economic interests or extractions but also sublimating its intention to an ideal of promoting the Pan-Asianism concept.

## **1.2 Historical Background**

In global history, Portugal and Spain were the first dominant colonial powers. Their territories and exploration extended to the Americas, East Asia, the Middle East, India, and the coasts of Africa. After the loss of their New World colonies, Spanish and Portuguese colonial powers faded away and their hegemonic positions were replaced by Britain, France and the Netherlands.<sup>9</sup> Later, in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, with the progress of industrialization, the pace of colonization rapidly precipitated and colonialism entered a new chapter, the era of New Imperialism. During this period, colonization was no longer favored just by the European countries. The rising power in Asia, Japan, followed the 'European expansion' methods to extend their influence and control over their neighbors. After Japan was transformed by the reformation, Japan changed from a weak, feudal and agrarian country (Tokugawa period) into a modern industrial power that was capable of resisting foreign domination, both economically and militarily.<sup>10</sup> What's more, witnessing

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<sup>9</sup> P. O'Brien and L. Prados De La Escosura, The Costs and Benefits of European Imperialism from the Conquest of Cueta 1415 to the Treaty of Lusaka, 1974, in: Special Issue of *Revista Historia Economica* 16 (1998), 29-89

<sup>10</sup> Mark R. Peattie, Introduction, in: *The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895-1945*, eds. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, N.J., 1984), 3-52



the fall of the Chinese Ch'ing<sup>11</sup> Empire and being afraid of gradually becoming a dependency or perhaps even a colony of the Western powers, the rising Japan turned to maximize its relative advantages by seeking territories close to the homeland.<sup>12</sup> Thereafter, Japan quickly moved from being concerned with national survival to national confidence beyond its own shoreline, asserting its presence in Asia and creating its own empire.<sup>13</sup> As Mark R. Peattie points out, "By 1895, one thing was certain: Japan had acquired a colonial territory and had thus joined the ranks of the colonial - the civilized - powers; the new territory, once the government decided to keep it, became a source of common pride, a symbol of the nation's equality with the West and of its participation in the great work of modern civilization."<sup>14</sup> As a late-comer to colonialism, Japan did not possess any proper literature on colonial affairs, any policy to guide their efforts in new overseas territories or even any administrators trained in the government.<sup>15</sup> How to operate this colonial task was dependent largely on historical experiences or by learning lessons from other Western powers. Therefore, Taiwan, as Japan's first colony, was perceived as a "laboratory"<sup>16</sup> and "colonization university"<sup>17</sup> for Japan's experiments in

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<sup>11</sup> Chinese: 清朝, the last ruling dynasty of China. Here I use the Wade-Giles system, which is a romanization system for the Mandarin language.

<sup>12</sup> Li Xing, East Asia Regional Integration: From Japan-led "Flying-geese" to China-centered "Bamboo Capitalism", in: CCIS Research Series 3(2007)

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 7

<sup>14</sup> Mark R. Peattie, Japanese attitudes toward colonialism, 1895-1945, in: The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895-1945, eds. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, N.J., 1984), 80-127

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 83

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 85

<sup>17</sup> T.S. Ching, *Becoming Japanese: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 2001), 17

colonial rule. Furthermore, Manchukuo was a product of the swelling Japanese colonialism and of the changing relationship between imperialism and nationalism.<sup>18</sup> A key feature of Japanese colonization, according to Hyman Kublin, is to borrow the rich experiences from other Western nations but make further distinct contributions themselves. Consequently, the Japanese created a colonial system that was peculiarly Japanese.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, the regional dimensions of the Japanese empire also had its own characteristics. Taiwan, Korea and Manchukuo, to name just the three most important one, were well-populated and had inhabitants ethnically alike and who shared a common cultural heritage with its Japanese rulers.<sup>20</sup> This cultural affinity with its colonies made Japan special among the colonial powers and deeply shaped Japanese attitudes toward colonial governance.<sup>21</sup>

### **1.3 Framework of Analysis**

In order to clarify the hypotheses that, first, Japanese expansion and colonialism were unique in being the first attempt at Asian integration after a Sino-centered tributary system; and second, Japan's uniqueness was presented both in terms of economic achievements in its colonies and its ambitious strategies toward its own empire building,

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<sup>18</sup> Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity, Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* (Lanham 2004), 245

<sup>19</sup> Hyman Kublin, *The Evolution of Japanese Colonialism*, in: *Comparative Studies in History and Society* (1959), 68

<sup>20</sup> Mark R. Peattie (1984), Introduction, in: *The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895-1945*, 3-52

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 7

this paper is aimed at sorting out the factors that formed the singularity of Japanese colonization and its overall colonial impacts left in the East Asian region for further development or integration. I will consider and discuss Japan's Asia or Japanese colonization from basically three perspectives: first, economic development and social change, with concentration on the case of colonial Taiwan. Secondly, the Japanese ambitious vision of East Asian regionalism will be discussed. To consider the relationship between war, nationalism, and anti-colonialism, emphases will be put on building the Manchu State and the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Japan's attempt for further political integration will also be taken into account. The last part tries to analyze Japanese control over Asia from a broader point of view by concentrating on regional dynamics and regional ties to the world. In other words, the third part will be the evaluation of Japanese colonial influences on East Asia's further regional integration.

In the third part, this thesis will be mainly divided into two fragments in order to answer the research question and see whether Japanese colonization is unique. The first focus will be put on discussing a unique model of development related to Japanese colonization; and the second one will concentrate on exploring Japan's model of regionalism and to which degree it is an obstacle or a positive impulse for further regional integration of East Asia. Concerning the first part, it will first look at the relationship between colonization and development by examining both modernization

and dependency theories. Then, it will illustrate how Japan was a unique colonial power by contributing to Taiwan's economic development and form a so-called East Asian development model. Furthermore, the second part will demonstrate how Japan's strong desire to build a new order in Asia and the rising pan-Asianism formed negative recollections. Finally, this paper will conclude by evaluating the overall impacts of Japanese colonization in terms of realizing regionalism in Asia.

## **II. Economic development and social change aspects---**

### **Taiwan under Japanese rule: the economic effects and social changes of Japanese colonization; the transition from pre-modern to early modern economy and society**

First of all, Japan's Asia from the perspective of the economic development was comparatively striking. There is no denying that like the Western colonial powers, Japan actively opened up the colonies for natural resources and human resources to provoke Japan's industrialization. However, at the same time, Japan's colonialism was far more than either the Chinese tributary-trade order or the Western colonial order elsewhere in Asia. Instead, Japan fostered colonial agricultural and industrial development, notably in Taiwan and Korea.<sup>22 23</sup> In other words, although it goes without saying that the colonial development was conducted to serve the Japanese Empire instead of the rest of the

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<sup>22</sup> Although Korea was also once colonized by Japan and might have similar experiences, Taiwan was taken as the "colonization university" for Japan's first experiment in colonial rule and this paper, therefore, mainly focuses on discussions in the case of Taiwan in this part.

<sup>23</sup> Mark Selden, *East Asia Regionalism and its Enemies in Three Epochs: Political Economy and Geopolitics, 16<sup>th</sup> to 21<sup>st</sup> centuries*

region, there are many arguments state that colonialism did have certain positive effect on the later development of such as Taiwan and South Korea, and certain changes effected from Japanese colonialism were without doubt historic.<sup>24</sup> Whereas former colonies of European Great Powers in Africa, the Middle and Latin America are still among the countries of the so called third world, the former colonies of the Japanese empire were among the first to develop their economies successfully and rise above third world status. At least, it is convincing to claim Japanese imperialism had laid an infrastructural foundation for these countries' later industrialization. Most importantly, distinct from other colonial powers, Japan colonized its neighboring countries in order to establish a close and inseparable regional economic integration. In colonies like Taiwan and Korea, Japan emphasized both military control and development under strong state supports. Japan was also among the few imperial powers to locate modern light and heavy industries in its colonies, such as steel, chemicals, smelters, railways, roads, shipyards, textile factories, rice mills, hydroelectric facilities, oil refineries, and some heavy industries. It was during the colonial period that East and Southeast Asia gradually established their preliminary industrial relations.<sup>25</sup> Shortly, the developmental influence on Japan's colonies, and the degree of economic integration with the metropolis, were far

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<sup>24</sup> Bruce Cumings, *Colonial Formations and Deformations*, 278-297

<sup>25</sup> Li Xing, *East Asia Regional Integration: From Japan-led "Flying-geese" to China-centered "Bamboo Capitalism"*, 4-5

greater than in the case of the American or even the European colonies.<sup>26</sup>

The case of colonial Taiwan would be the best example to be probed into. Taiwan, one of the Four Little Tigers<sup>27</sup>, has experienced rapid economic growth since the 1960s. Before this, from 1895 to 1945, Taiwan was occupied by Japan and was used as a base to support the development of Japan's industry. As a colony and dependent economy for fifty years, how could Taiwan have undergone such dramatic growth not long after retrocession? Did Taiwan's economic miracle growth after World War II have its roots in the Japanese colonial era? The main objective of this part is to examine the uniqueness of Japanese colonization in terms of the economic development and social change it brought to Taiwan from 1895 to 1945; in addition, key issues regarding which factors shaped the singularity of Japanese colonization will also be addressed here.

In terms of global history, Japanese colonization was noted for successfully expanding the economies of its colonies, namely Taiwan and Korea, and making positive economic contributions to them. What Japan did in Taiwan, during that period of time, was actually better and more efficient when compared to that achieved by other Western colonial powers in different parts of Asia, such as the Dutch in Indonesia or the British in India. A squeezing economic policy adopted by Western colonial powers only made the native people poorer and, rather than raising the standard of production, it was the

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<sup>26</sup> Mark Selden, *East Asia Regionalism and its Enemies in Three Epochs: Political Economy and Geopolitics, 16<sup>th</sup> to 21<sup>st</sup> centuries*.

<sup>27</sup> Four Little Dragons: Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea.

cost of living that was raised.<sup>28</sup> As table 1 indicates, the GDP growth rate in Taiwan during the Japanese colonial period, especially 1913-1950, was higher than that in Burma under British control (1886-1940s) and in Indonesia under Dutch rule (1800-1949).<sup>29,30</sup> Even today, as Samuel Ho indicates, “many less developed countries have not been able to sustain a growth rate comparable to that achieved by colonial Taiwan.”<sup>31</sup> Japan contributed to the economy of Taiwan for fifty years, mainly in improving its primitive farming industry and leading the way to a modern society. However, as Chih-yung Weng claims, in essence, Japan’s colonial policy was no different to that of any other colonial power. Its aims were to exploit the colony for the benefit of the home country.<sup>32</sup> What makes Japanese colonization unique is the method applied by Japan in ruling Taiwan.

Before the Japanese occupation, the economy in Taiwan was still a traditional one, consisting mainly of an agricultural sector operated by Chinese immigrants. Sugar, rice, and tea were widely cultivated and exported and, at the time, opium, textiles and other consumer goods were imported. The central traits of development in pre-colonial Taiwan are described as a process of land settlements and the immigration of Chinese

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<sup>28</sup> Chih-yung Weng, Introduction, in: *Economic Development in Taiwan*, ed. Kowie Chang (Taiwan, 1968), 1-26

<sup>29</sup> Colonized areas by Western colonial powers in Asia or America confirmed more with the predictions of Frank’s dependency theory: development of underdevelopment. Within the metropolis-satellite structure, “the metropolis exploits the satellite, surplus is concentrated in the metropolis, and the satellite is cut off from potential investment funds, so its growth is slowed down and reduced to a state of dependence which creates a local ruling class with an interest in perpetuating underdevelopment.” Thus, what colonialism could be expected to bring about was backward-development. (Brewer 1980, pp.164)

<sup>30</sup> Although it’s hard to make fair comparison between different colonies, here I intend to show that Taiwan’s GDP growth rate under Japanese colonialism was comparatively impressive.

<sup>31</sup> Pao-san Ho, *Economic Development of Taiwan 1860-1970* (New Haven, 1978 ), 26

<sup>32</sup> C.Y. Weng, Introduction, in: *Economic Development in Taiwan*, 1-26

immigrants from China's provinces.<sup>33</sup> It is worth noting that Taiwan's peasant agriculture in the pre-colonial period was already able to produce a surplus of sugar and rice for exporting.<sup>34</sup> The existence of such a surplus in the pre-colonial period has historical meaning. It may have given an incentive for Japan to take over the island.<sup>35</sup> Another significant feature in the pre-colonial period was the complicated three-tier land tenure system. Under three-tier land tenure, which was composed of three land claimants: absentee landlords (*ta-tsu* 大租), *hsiao-tsu* (小租) and the tenants. The absentee landlord owned the largest share of land, left the farming to *hsiao-tsu*, and was the one responsible for paying taxes to the government; the second group *hsiao-tsu* further leased some land to the third group tenants and collected the rents; tenants were in fact the one who farmed the land.<sup>36</sup> To make this land tenure more complicated, the *ta-tsu* and *hsiao-tsu* often sold their rights of rent collection to other farmers with the result that the parties concerned had little knowledge of where true land ownership lay.<sup>37</sup> This tenure system had a disincentive effect and may have greatly impeded the scale of agricultural growth during the period before Japanese colonization.<sup>38</sup> For one thing, with private property limited recognized and protected, land ownership was not clearly defined and secured

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<sup>33</sup> P. S. Ho (1978), *Economic Development of Taiwan 1860-1970*, 7-24

<sup>34</sup> Yhi-min Ho, reviewed of *Economic Development of Taiwan 1860-1970*, by Samuel P.S. Ho, *Economic Development and Cultural Chang* 28 (3) (1980): 638

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 638

<sup>36</sup> P. S. Ho (1978), *Economic Development of Taiwan 1860-1970*

<sup>37</sup> Chang Han-Yu and Ramon H. Myers, Japanese Colonial Development Policy in Taiwan, 1895-1906: A case of Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship, in: *The Journal of Asian Studies* (22-4, 1963), 433-339, 441

<sup>38</sup> Yhi-min Ho, reviewed of *Economic Development of Taiwan 1860-1970*, 639



under the law; for the other, land taxes were not fixed. Therefore, cultivators, with fear that profits might be given away to upraised taxes, had no incentives to expand production for market or to accumulate profits and agricultural growth was accordingly inhibited.<sup>39</sup> This restraint of growth gave the space and opportunity for Japanese control to make magnificent improvements and progress. When the island was ceded to Japan in 1895, it marked a great change in the political and economic conditions in the country. Under Japanese colonialism, the economic role assigned to Taiwan was as an appendage to supply Japan with rice and sugar and to buy manufactured goods from Japan. During the period of colonial rule under Japan, agricultural production in Taiwan displayed a rapid advance: on the one hand through increasing uses of land<sup>40</sup> (refer to Table 2), labor, fertilizer and irrigation inputs; on the other hand, through the rise in productivity achieved by the assistance of better seeds, better techniques of cultivation, improved knowledge and an extension system.<sup>41</sup> Industry, consisting mostly of food processing establishments, was then divided into a large traditional sector and a modern enclave. The traditional sector was largely operated by the local natives. However, the modern enclave was dominated by the Japanese. The domination of this modern enclave was to ensure control of the economy and the transfer of profits or export surplus from Taiwan

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<sup>39</sup> Chang Han-Yu and Ramon H. Myers, *Japanese Colonial Development Policy in Taiwan, 1895-1906: A case of Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship*, 441

<sup>40</sup> Please refer to Table 2. It displays how the cultivated lands were greatly expanded.

<sup>41</sup> You-tsao Wang 1968, *Agricultural Development*, in: *Economic Development in Taiwan*, ed. Kowie Chang (Taiwan, 1968), 141-238

to Japan.<sup>42</sup>

The purpose of Japanese colonial policy was clear: that developing Taiwan was to support Japan in their conflict with the West. Japanese occupation had long abiding effects on Taiwan, including agricultural development, construction of transportation and communication, extending the railroads and other networks, building extensive sanitation systems, establishing revised public school systems for higher education and the start of many infrastructure programs. All of the above became fundamental keystones of economic development after the restoration of Taiwan. There is no single factor could appropriately explain a process as complex as economic development; many factors have contributed to Taiwan's postwar extraordinarily successful development.<sup>43</sup> However, as historical evidence shows, "the poorest and the least developed countries generally find it more difficult to grow rapidly"<sup>44</sup> Namely, initial conditions are essential for growth. From such viewpoint, in the case of postwar Taiwan, the initial conditions were relatively favorable. As a Japanese colony, in Ho's words, "Taiwan developed an effective administrative system, a fairly extensive infrastructure, an agricultural sector that was, after Japan, the most advanced in Asia, the beginning of an industrial sector, and some modern commercial and financial institutions."<sup>45</sup> There is no denying that the

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<sup>42</sup> P. S. Ho, *Colonialism and Development: Korea, Taiwan, and Kwantung*, in: *The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895-1945*, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, N.J., 1984), 368

<sup>43</sup> Samuel P. S. Ho, *Economics, Economic Bureaucracy, and Taiwan's Economic Development*, in: *Pacific Affairs* 60-2(1987), 226-247

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 231

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 231

vigorous growth in Taiwan since the 1960s is related to developments in the colonial period and it is hard to refute that postwar growth in Taiwan benefitted from the investments in human capital and material constructed during the period of colonization.<sup>46</sup> What Japanese colonialism achieved, in short, was to accelerate the process of transition in Taiwan from a pre-modern to an early modern society and economy. In other words, instead of keeping Taiwan in its backwardness, Japan was developing Taiwan's economy thus building a possible rival for its own economy in East Asia.

Although it is undeniable that the Japanese colonization of Taiwan was unique, since it laid a good foundation for Taiwan during the occupation period, what is noteworthy is how the Japanese colonization became unique. Most of the literatures involved are concerned about the dynamics of development and dependency but they have seldom reached the point of explaining what shaped the differences in Japanese colonization in Taiwan, compared to other colonizing nations. Therefore, in this part of my paper, firstly, the uniqueness of the enormous growth in Taiwan will be briefly considered and then some factors which played decisive roles will be scrutinized.

## **2.1 Growth under the colonial period**

Japanese colonization in Taiwan attracted attention mainly because it had achieved

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<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 226-247

remarkable growth in its colony, Taiwan, compared to other European colonial powers in their Asian colonies. Table 3 displays Taiwan's economic performance during the colonial period. In the form of selected economic indicators, this table presents a period of steady growth which, although not dramatic, was experienced in Taiwan during the period of Japanese control.<sup>47</sup> What is more, the growth rate for Taiwan during the colonial period was even higher than for Japan itself.<sup>48</sup> Figure 1 and Table 4 show this phenomenon. In Nakamura's estimate, due to the extraordinary success in developing small-scale traditional agriculture within a relatively short time, agricultural growth rates in Taiwan even exceeded those of early Meiji Japan.<sup>49</sup> To be more specific, not only did agricultural output in Taiwan grow rapidly over the entire colonial period but also the manufacturing sector expanded quickly (See Table 5).<sup>50</sup> Additionally, as output during this period increased in Taiwan, trade magnified at an even faster pace, especially exports which were dominated mostly by agricultural products and industrial raw materials (See Table 6). In addition, the population grew faster in Taiwan (1.3 percent) than in Japan (0.9 percent)<sup>51</sup>. As Christopher Howe observed, "of all the colonial areas, only Taiwan

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<sup>47</sup> P.S. Ho. (1978), *Economic Development of Taiwan 1860-1970*, 25-40

<sup>48</sup> James I. Nakamura, *Incentives, Productivity Gaps, and Agricultural Growth Rates in Prewar Japan, Taiwan, and Korea*, in: *Japan in Crisis*, eds. Bernard S. Silberman and Harry D. Harootunian (Princeton, N.J., 1974), 358

<sup>49</sup> Mark R. Peattie (1984), *Introduction*, in: *The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895-1945*, 3-52

<sup>50</sup> Toshiyuki Mizoguchi and Yuzo Yamamoto, *Capital Formation in Taiwan and Korea*, in: *The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895-1945*, eds. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, N.J., 1984), 399-419

<sup>51</sup> James I. Nakamura, *Incentives, Productivity Gaps, and Agricultural Growth Rates in Prewar Japan, Taiwan, and Korea*, in: *Japan in Crisis*, 358

achieved a per capita income near to that of Japan itself.”<sup>52</sup> Overall, in half a century under Japanese control, Taiwan proceeded through a major stage of agricultural development and was prepared to mature in a direction of an industrial and service economy.<sup>53</sup>

Before Taiwan was ceded to Japan, there were indeed some Western impacts, like trading connection with Dutch, Spanish, and French, and a reforming Chinese administration that produced important overall developments and made Taiwanese economy a complex history of international linkages.<sup>54</sup> Nevertheless, according to Christopher Howe, “Economic performance in the long term is the result of interaction between an economy’s internal characteristics and its external environment.”<sup>55</sup> Taiwanese economy before Japan’s occupation lacked an institutional and physical infrastructures for comprehensive growth and modernization.<sup>56</sup> The impacts from Western and mainland China only gave rise to levels of developments far below the potential. It was during the period of Japanese control that created the main components of the external environment of Taiwan’s development<sup>57</sup>, realized the potential of economic gains to the largest extent, and gradually changed Taiwan into an opener economy with significant

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<sup>52</sup> Christopher Howe, Taiwan in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century: Model or Victim? Development Problems in a Small Asian Economy, in: *The China Quarterly* 165 (2001), 37-60, 48

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 37-60

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 39

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 37

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 40

<sup>57</sup> Being an East Asian economic hub in Japan’s empire and serving as a base for military expansion to the south.

economic growth. With such unprecedented consequences, Japan's occupation in Taiwan is, without doubt, an example of successful transition of agricultural and economic modernization. No wonder Barclay asserted that, "Taiwan developed into one of the most successful colonial programs in the world."<sup>58</sup>

## **2.2 Factors that made Japanese colonization in Taiwan unique**

The question of what made Japanese colonization relatively singular and, to some extent, successful is a complex one. The reasoning needs to take into account many factors, whether innate or acquired. Samuel Ho puts emphasis on the role of the colonial government and the institutions, plus the policies adopted.<sup>59</sup> These elements did matter. However, there is other historical background or cultural factors that Ho Yhi-min claims should not be ignored.<sup>60</sup> Following on, factors that have had an impact on forming the unique Japanese colonization will be argued.

### **2.2.1 Historical background**

The historical background is vital because it formed Japanese attitudes toward colonization and then shaped its colonial policies. Facing the trend of colonialism and the rise of European colonial power in other Asian areas, Japan was concerned with its

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<sup>58</sup> George W. Barclay, *Colonial Development and Population in Taiwan* (Princeton, New Jersey, 1954), 7

<sup>59</sup> Pao-San Ho(1978), *Economic Development of Taiwan 1860-1970*

<sup>60</sup> Y.M. Ho (1980), reviewed of *Economic Development of Taiwan 1860-1970*, 637-644

own survival and independence, its own interests, and its power in Asia. Besides, its balance-of-payments difficulties were presented as its economic structure was transformed in the early 1900s. Japan believed it must become a great power to confront such challenges and, following the European logic, as a great power it needed to acquire colonies. In 1895, as a late-comer to colonialism, Japan gained Taiwan as its first colony. All European imperial powers viewed military glory and strength as important as economic profit. However, as Lewis H. Gann mentions, “no empire builders indulged in quite the same spirit of mystical self-exaltation as did the Japanese. No empire was quite as security-minded as Japan’s.”<sup>61</sup> After defeating China in the Sino-Japanese War, Japan’s victory signaled “the replacing of the old Chinese Empire by the new Japanese imperialism in East Asia”<sup>62</sup>. In order to be evenly matched in colonialism with the European powers, learning what the European powers had done was not sufficient. Japan had to build further its own methods in managing its colonies. The new Japan was emerging after more than two hundreds years of the Tokugawa period. For the first time, Japan was consolidated in an economic sense by a progressive system of railways, education and public health, etc. and was proud of its achievements and confident of its future.<sup>63</sup> Accordingly, Japanese colonialism was a matter of glory and reputation. The

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<sup>61</sup> Lewis H. Gann, *Western and Japanese Colonialism: Some Preliminary Comparisons*, in: *The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895-1945*, eds. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, N.J., 1984), 525

<sup>62</sup> T.S. Ching, *Becoming Japanese: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation*, 16

<sup>63</sup> L. H. Gann, *Western and Japanese Colonialism: Some Preliminary Comparisons*, in: *The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895-1945*, 502

colonial Taiwan, therefore, had two profound meanings. Firstly, it demonstrated that Japan had the equal capacity of Western imperialists and, secondly, it surpassed the Western colonial powers in bringing more welfare to its conquered area.<sup>64</sup> So, colonization was taken as a form of conspicuous consumption on the scale of a nation.<sup>65</sup> Additionally, in the era of new imperialism, Japan's colonization advocated the transmission of new methods of administration, new methods and technologies of production and new ways of thinking about its colony.<sup>66</sup> As mentioned before, Taiwan was to be developed in order to support Japan in the conflict with the West.<sup>67</sup> This kind of background and experience led the Japanese colonial operation to run extremely efficiently with strict policies on one hand and consequential economic development on the other.<sup>68</sup>

With such a reputation for maintaining its national pride and prestige, the Japanese attitude towards colonialism in Taiwan was rather active and constructive. For example, looking at the establishment of a system of colonial administration in Taiwan, Japan followed almost the same processes which were used to enhance modernization on the homeland. In terms of the economy, the Japanese tried to extend the Meiji experiences

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<sup>64</sup> T.S. Ching, *Becoming Japanese: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation*, 17

<sup>65</sup> L. H. Gann, *Western and Japanese Colonialism: Some Preliminary Comparisons*, in: *The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895-1945*, 502

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 497-525

<sup>67</sup> Han-yu Chang and Ramon H. Myers, *Japanese Colonial Development Policy in Taiwan, 1895-1945: A Case of Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship*, in: *Journal of Asian Studies* 22(4) (1963), 433-450

<sup>68</sup> James I. Nakamura, *Incentives, Productivity Gaps, and Agricultural Growth Rates in Prewar Japan, Taiwan, and Korea*, in: *Japan in Crisis*, 329-373



of promoting economic development in Japan to its colony, Taiwan. It could be asserted that it was this historical background that formed the unique development-orientated aspect of Japanese colonization. Exactly how development-orientated it was can be observed in policies adopted in Taiwan during this period.

### 2.2.2 Policies adopted

Before directly inspecting the colonial policies adopted in Taiwan, the administrators who were responsible for policy-making should be noted. The two main people were Kodama Gentaro, the governor general, and Goto Shimpei, the civil administrator. While Kodama formulated colonial policies that focused on military intentions, Goto took a broader view of colonial development, specifically, colonial progress that included both material improvement and cultural development. Goto strongly stood for 'biological politics'.<sup>69</sup>

This concept could be explained by the following paragraph from Goto's note:<sup>70</sup>

"Any scheme of colonial administration, given the present advances in science, should be based on principles of Biology. What are these principles? They are to promote science and develop agriculture, industry, sanitation, education, communications, and policy force. If these are satisfactorily accomplished, we will be able to persevere in the struggle for survival and win the struggle of the "survival of the fittest." Animals survive by overcoming heat and cold, and by enduring thirst and hunger. This is possible for them because they adapt to their environment. Thus depending upon time and place, we too should adopt suitable measures and try to overcome the various difficulties that confront us. In our administration of Taiwan we will then be assured of a future of brilliance and glory."

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<sup>69</sup> Chang and Myers, Japanese Colonial Development Policy in Taiwan, 1895-1945: A Case of Bureaucratic Entrepreneurshi., 433-450

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, 438

This idea of 'biological politics' was substantial because it consisted of a compromised position of policy-making, which formed a social and physical surrounding that was beneficial for changes. In Goto's opinion, such a suitable environment could only be made through a thorough and detailed understanding of the colony, Taiwan. Therefore, the acceptance of the Taiwanese people to any policies and changes in the local surroundings was a major concern. That is to say, policies were not only for the sake of the Japanese and should not be implemented by force. Local factors were taken into consideration as well.

Primarily, policies adopted in Taiwan during the Japanese colonial period could be distinct from the political, institutional and economic aspects. Concerned with political facets, using a police system to control social order was the chief measure. Only when the problem of social instability is solved can economic or institutional changes be effective. Combining the old *pao-chia*<sup>71</sup> system with a modern police system that maintained surveillance over and contact with people, the police force peered into almost every household and eliminated disturbance or suppressed uprisings. These active and potent police actions not only helped to quell social disorder but also guaranteed the

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<sup>71</sup> The *pao-chia* system originated from Ch'ing to efficiently control the social order of each local area. It's a system of collective neighborhood organization and members would mutually responsible for each other. A *pao-chia* consisting of many local families was a 'self-policing' organization responsible for political good behaviors. By applying this system, central government would be able to keep order of all levels of society under control without employing many officials.

execution and completion of many projects. In summary, the police system advocated by the Japanese colonial government, not only functioned as a police force concerned with law and order but also worked as minor officials executing the policies for collecting tax, registering households, maintaining engineering works, overseeing the sanitation system, water control and even promoting the use of new rice seeds.<sup>72</sup> Under this kind of rule, Taiwan was neatly arranged to become an “island of policemen.”<sup>73</sup> Whether this police system good for Taiwan’s transition into modernity is still debatable, but, such an all-around police system maintained the operation of Japanese colonial control in Taiwan and also shaped the uniqueness of Japanese colonization.

It seems that social stability and political policies alone could neither bring the colony of Taiwan towards the path of economic growth nor mark Japanese colonization in Taiwan as distinct from other colonial powers. After order was slowly restored, Japan put a new emphasis on how to improve and expand the market in Taiwan in order to achieve better integration with the homeland. Institutional changes were needed. Measures taken included land survey and tax reforms which clarified and legitimized property rights in order that the colonial government could collect more land tax and offer incentives for farmers to increase production for the market. Other measures were a unified system of weights and measures which integrated internal markets with Japan,

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<sup>72</sup> Chang and Myers, *Japanese Colonial Development Policy in Taiwan, 1895-1945: A Case of Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship*, 433-50

<sup>73</sup> Katsura, *Formosa: the early administration*, in: *Japan by the Japanese*, ed. Alfred Stead (New York, 1904), 582

the establishment of a central bank, construction of a transportation system, public health and education etc.<sup>74</sup> These measures mentioned above made it possible to construct a social and economic frame in Taiwan. This recasting work was essential for the Japanese colonial achievements of development and growth in Taiwan by releasing human energy, directing yielding work to the market, stimulating expansion of the economy and division of labor. In brief, the process of modernization was gradually introduced and carried out in Taiwan under Japanese rule.

Policies related to the economy came along with institutional changes. Taiwan's later rapid growth was founded on the momentous accomplishments of such policies, including the coordination between island shipping transportation, the overall coordination in the development of irrigation systems and the generation of electricity. In addition, there was the programming of crop fertilization and the employment of fertilizers plus the coordination in the joint production processes of agriculture and industry. Speaking of the development of an island economy, in order to develop maximum economic value, the ability to utilize all the resources on the island in the way of profitable production is fundamental. From this viewpoint and facing the fact that Taiwan is limited in natural resources, Japan as a colonizer had done well by connecting transportation links between the island and overseas shipping. The opening of

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<sup>74</sup> Chang and Myers, *Japanese Colonial Development Policy in Taiwan, 1895-1945: A Case of Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship*, 433-50

Kaohsiung and Keelung harbors helped to improve Taiwan's trading conditions within fifty years and, for Japan's own sake, it raised its control over Taiwan's trade. It goes without saying that once the trading level was greater, the control of Japan over Taiwan would be stronger and, therefore, the probability of Japan exploiting Taiwan became larger. Meanwhile, the fact that there was a huge amount of increase in foreign trade in the fifty years was good for Taiwan in some way or another.<sup>75</sup>

What Japan had done for its colony was better than other western colonizers in their colonies. In essence, the doctrine of Japanese colonization was to exploit a colony for the sake of the home country. Under the policy of colonial economy, only agriculture was underlined. What so peculiar during the period was that the rather primitive farming measures were replaced by relatively modern farming techniques. Consequently, agricultural production increased because of the introduction of a new irrigation system and, with a sufficient supply of electricity, industrial production was brought in. These achievements could be perceived as a sort of compensation for Japan's exploitation of Taiwan. Therefore, Taiwan's agriculture started to modernize during the period of Japanese colonization and this modernization process made the economic transition less challenging during the post-colonial period.

Government policies and programs, that developed and distributed new technology and modern inputs, contributed even more directly to the production of agriculture. The

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<sup>75</sup> C.Y. Weng (1968), Introduction, in: *Economic Development in Taiwan*, 1-26

increasing use of chemical fertilizers and new seeds helped to speed up agricultural production.<sup>76</sup> From the aspects of an irrigation system and the use of fertilizers, Japan did a huge amount for the development of Taiwan's agriculture. Yet the use of fertilizers was like a double-edged sword for Taiwan because it made Taiwan become more dependent on Japan for the supply of fertilizers, since the Japanese did not build any fertilizer factories in Taiwan.<sup>77</sup> Another important point related to the use of chemical fertilizers was the policy to barter rice for fertilizers. This policy, on one hand, benefited the farming population in Taiwan by assuring them of a good harvest. On the other hand, it also gave the Japanese colonizers a good political result and economic rewards. Politically, the barter system had secured Japanese control over Taiwan and, simultaneously, the prestige of Japanese colonization was raised because social security and stability usually resulted from regular and constant production in the agricultural sector. Economically, a steady flow of food into Japan was guaranteed in exchange for fertilizers without involving any negative influence on Japan's exchange of resources and food, such as a serious drain on foreign exchanges. Moreover, Taiwan became a definite market for Japan's chemical fertilizers.<sup>78</sup> Such well-prepared policies were like killing two birds with one stone and, to some extent, promised the uniqueness and economic success of Japanese colonization in Taiwan.

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<sup>76</sup> P.S. Ho(1984), Colonialism and Development: Korea, Taiwan, and Kwantung, in: The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895-1945, 347-398

<sup>77</sup> C.Y. Weng, Introduction, in: Economic Development in Taiwan, 1-26

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-26

Thanks to the development of irrigation and the application of fertilizers, despite being limited in natural resources and confined by the expansive development of agriculture, Taiwan was capable of increasing agricultural production. However, “the use of land is governed by the law of diminishing returns.”<sup>79</sup> By raising the economic efficiency of agricultural production and averting disruption, waste or duplication, in addition to the application of intensive cultivation, detailed planning for agricultural production was indispensable, especially in the manufacturing processes where all phases concerned must have been closely organized.<sup>80</sup> From this perspective, the last point about Japanese colonial policies was the joint production processes of agriculture and industry. In this respect, an exceptional achievement by the Japanese was manufacturing sugar from sugar-cane. In order to meet the rising demand and assure that the joint production process went smoothly, all of the investment, capital and infrastructure related to sugarcane development, as well as colonial government subsidies and protection, were introduced to Taiwan. Consequently, the sugar-refining business, without facing any competition in the world market, was strengthened and this contributed to the solid foundation for the development of Taiwan’s sugar industry.<sup>81</sup>

Therefore, rice and sugar during the period of the Japanese colonial occupation, were the two mainstays either in terms of development, dependency or exploitation.

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<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, 19

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, 19

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 20

The observed policies adopted by Japan, at first glance, might not be a special case, when compared with other European colonial powers. However, Japan was the one to implement those policies comprehensively and the one to be unusually development-oriented. Economically speaking, Japanese fulfillment in the above mentioned prospects was more successful than others in Asian colonized areas. However, it still has to be kept in mind that, ostensibly, the economy of Taiwan seemed to have moved at a tremendous pace as, at the same time, Taiwan's economy depended very heavily on Japan and was more integrated into the economic entity of Japan.<sup>82</sup>

### 2.2.3 Agriculture: The role of rice and sugar

Agricultural development was the decisive factor that made Japanese colonization praiseworthy. As mentioned before, rice and sugar were the two mainstays, not only for the time before Japanese colonization but also during the colonial period. Rice culture in Taiwan, under Japanese rule, had already prevailed and was enhanced further by the Japanese. However, the culture of sugar cane and the sugar refinement industry were considered to be one of the most dramatic achievements of Japanese colonization in Taiwan.<sup>83</sup> From Table 7 and 8, they show the magnificent efforts being put into the development of rice and sugar. In Mints's words, "while rice might have been important

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<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 21

<sup>83</sup> Andrew J. Grajdanzey, *Formosa Today: An Analysis of the Economic Development and Strategic Importance of Japan's Tropical Colony* (New York, 1942), 57



to the Taiwanese domestic economy; it was sugar that loomed large for the incoming Japanese capitalists.”<sup>84</sup> Hence, it would be better to understand the uniqueness of Japanese colonization in the context of the contradictory relationship between rice and sugar. Originally, it was not meant to upgrade welfare among the people in Taiwan to help them to step up production of rice. Instead, it was meant to solve the problem of Japan’s growing food shortages and to balance the use of cash in order to import rice from other countries. Likewise, the promotion of sugar production was taken as a scheme to neutralize great deficits of foreign exchange and to realize financial independence in Taiwan in order to lessen the Japanese financial burden.<sup>85</sup> As Yanaihara Tadao stated, “the development of Japanese imperialism in Taiwan centered on sugar production.”<sup>86</sup> It was the linkage between the rice and sugar sectors that gifted Taiwanese agriculture under Japanese control with its particular character, by “protecting stakes of the peasantry and forestalling plantation growth.”<sup>87</sup> An observation from Mintz<sup>88</sup>

“In the beginning period of colonial rule, a rice sector that was encumbered with backward administrative regulations had made it easier for Japanese to push conversion from rice to cane production, while guaranteeing a cheap supply of cane. Yet the fact was that cane-growing peasants could also switch back to rice production, and this was a source of constant anxiety to the sugar industry. The class structures of the rice and

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<sup>84</sup> Sidney W. Mintz, Foreword, in: *Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan: land tenure, development and dependency, 1895-1945*, ed. Chih-ming Ka (Boulder, Colorado, 1995), xiv-xix

<sup>85</sup> Chih-ming Ka, *Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan: land tenure, development and dependency, 1895-1945*, (Boulder, Colorado, 1995), 109-124

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, 7

<sup>87</sup> S.W. Mintz, Foreword, in: *Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan: land tenure, development and dependency, 1895-1945*, xviii

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, xix

sugar sectors were measurably different; as Japanese capital developed the sugar industry, its benefits redounded overwhelmingly to foreign investors. In contrast, benefits arising from the expansion of rice production were much more widely shared, since the managing classes in the rice sector were themselves Taiwanese, and could not wield a comparable degree of control over the peasantry. When the Japanese market for the high-quality rice produced in Taiwan grew stronger in the subsequent stage of the occupation, that burgeoning demand greatly benefited Taiwanese rice-growing peasants. But growing rice production and rice-producing income also posed a threat to the supply of cane and tended to force up its price to the mills. The Japanese colonial administration firmly supported moves that turned the terms of trade against the rice producers and sought to discourage increased high-quality rice production.”

The interesting conflicts between rice and sugar put Taiwanese rice producers in competition with, not just with mill-merchants and Japanese rice exporters, but also against Japanese sugar capitalists. Encountering the emulation of expanding rice production in Taiwan, which resulted in the difficulties of sugar capital to sustain its mechanism of surplus extraction, the colonial government failed to act properly and decisively. In other words, the policy to deal with such a dilemma was not as effective or as useful as expected. Therefore, this predicament contributed to what Samuel Ho calls the “balanced, broadly based development”<sup>89</sup> that forms Taiwan’s unique colonial experience.<sup>90</sup>

Despite the contradictory relationship between rice and sugar and the disagreement between local natives and the colonial power, it is hard to dispute the fact that agricultural output increased by a huge amount with almost the entire agricultural

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<sup>89</sup> P. S. Ho (1978), *Economic Development of Taiwan 1860-1970*

<sup>90</sup> C.M. Ka (1995), *Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan: land tenure, development and dependency, 1895-1945*, 5-6

population getting involved in this development process. In addition, the profits of development were also widely shared so much so that Taiwan, as a Japanese colony, escaped the worst aspects of dualistic growth.<sup>91</sup>

#### 2.2.4 Lack of a plantation system

Under the discussion of agricultural development during the colonial period, one crucial element should be recognized: the lack of a plantation system under Japanese rule. In the fifty years of control, Japan never introduced a plantation system to Taiwan. Consequently, it became possible for the natives to be included in agricultural growth and they received greater income advantages, just like other capitalists and entrepreneurs did. That is also the reason why Samuel Ho contends that the lack of introduction of a plantation system contributed to the more broadly based development pattern in Taiwan under Japanese rule.<sup>92</sup> It was the lack of a plantation system that Sidney Mintz finds Japanese colonialism had followed a developmental route so prominently at odds with European colonialism in the Americas.<sup>93</sup> Not having a plantation system and maintaining the small scale of peasant sugarcane farming are the most striking features that made Taiwanese case so different. On the eve of Japanese rule, one of the radical

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<sup>91</sup> P.S. Ho (1984), *Colonialism and Development: Korea, Taiwan, and Kwantung*, in: *The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895-1945*, 386

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, 347-398

<sup>93</sup> S.W. Mintz, *Foreword*, in: *Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan: land tenure, development and dependency, 1895-1945*, xvii

characteristics of Taiwanese agriculture was widespread small-scale farming. Although there was land-reform followed by colonial rule policies, the small-scale farmers roughly remained. The Japanese realized that keeping this small-scale land system in place and then gaining cane for mills on contract would be easier to implement and fit in with their own interests, rather than applying a plantation system and buying lands. Accordingly, an adequate system of contract cane farming was established. Evidence can be found from surveys undertaken in 1921, 1932 and 1939 that family farms (small-scale farms), which cultivated only one to five chia<sup>94</sup>, comprised almost half of the total number of peasant households. These kinds of figures clash with any picture of a plantation society.<sup>95</sup> But, since Japanese colonization based its colonial behavior primarily on Western colonial powers' modes, and plantation agriculture was one of the key elements for Western powers to control the economy of colonies, how come the Japanese never introduced such a plantation system to its colony, Taiwan? Some conceivable reasons may include the fact that export crops, like rice and sugarcane were already widely grown, so there was no need to set up a new institution to transfer resources from traditional subsistence crops to export cash crops; secondly, the Japanese colonists were content with the existing landlord-tenant system in Taiwan because it resembled the Japanese system; thirdly, since property rights were already firmly founded in Taiwan, the introduction of

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<sup>94</sup> 1 chia = 0.96992 hectare or 2.396 acres (approx.)

<sup>95</sup> Chih-ming Ka, *Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan: land tenure, development and dependency, 1895-1945*, 101-109

a plantation system, which required a radical redistribution of rural properties, might lead to destructive and counter-productive consequences; lastly, it may be quite convincing that the Japanese recognized the fact that developing an agricultural plantation system would have required immense supervision costs.<sup>96</sup> It would be easier for the Japanese to apply market incentives to induce more production.

All in all, during the colonial period, one pivotal view is that after being ceded to Japan for fifty years, Taiwan's traditional agricultural economy was not thoroughly damaged or destroyed. On the contrary, this traditional economy was preserved and restructured in such a way that labor and land converted into more productive methods and resources formerly left unused were now utilized.<sup>97</sup> This significant effect resulted from Japanese expectations that land and labor productivity in Taiwan could be prompted to rise. This kind of expectation was rather different from that of other Western colonial powers. Westerners either supposed that the colonies had a back-bending supply curve of effort or thought that the social benefits of raising productivity could not offset the social costs.<sup>98</sup> Without the introduction of a plantation system and with Japanese expectations, the main export commodities of sugar and rice cultivated by the traditional sector were increasingly connected with the rest of the

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<sup>96</sup> P.S. Ho (1984), *Colonialism and Development: Korea, Taiwan, and Kwantung*, in: *The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895-1945*, 385

<sup>97</sup> Chang and Myers, *Japanese Colonial Development Policy in Taiwan, 1895-1945: A Case of Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship*, 448

<sup>98</sup> James I. Nakamura, *Incentives, Productivity Gaps, and Agricultural Growth Rates in Prewar Japan, Taiwan, and Korea*, in: *Japan in Crisis*, 349

economy. Consequently, in Taiwan, the results of a sharp dualism of economy, a modern, export-oriented enclave and a large backward agricultural sector, was avoided.<sup>99</sup>

Compared to other colonial powers that in their plantation agricultures only a small portion of the population was directly influenced, Japanese colonization stood as an exceptional case for not applying plantation agriculture to its colony, Taiwan, and being willing to preserve a cultural particularity of the region.

#### 2.2.5 Industrial development

Taiwan was meant to be developed as a main supplier of rice and sugar under Japan's colonial policy. Thus, agriculture could be taken as being responsible for much of the economic growth and, furthermore, contributing largely to the export extension.<sup>100</sup>

Industrial development was never a priority for colonial policy, especially in the early period of Japan's occupation. Therefore, industrial growth was less impressive than agricultural growth. Before 1930, the industrial growth path mostly depended on the expansion of agriculture-related industries. Things changed since the 1930's, and manufacturing production began to increase at a comparatively high rate. Moreover, industrialization in the 1930's was transformed and based on energy, mineral resources

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<sup>99</sup> P. S. Ho (1978), *Economic Development of Taiwan 1860-1970*

<sup>100</sup> P.S. Ho (1984), *Colonialism and Development: Korea, Taiwan, and Kwantung*, in: *The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895-1945*, 347-398

and hydro-electric power.<sup>101</sup> With an increasing need for self-sufficiency within the empire, the colonial government decided to switch its focus in Taiwan to heavy industry, shifting resources from agriculture to other industries. Besides, due to the stimulative effects of World War I and in response to the decline in Western exports to Asia, Japan seized the chance to increase exports to other Asian countries and, accordingly, decline exports to its colony. All of these encouraged local manufacturing in Taiwan to prosper because of the shortage of manufactured goods.<sup>102</sup> Combined with the self-sufficiency policy and the effects of WWI, Table 5 displays the fact that the manufacturing sector in Taiwan expanded at quite a fast pace. Although the Japanese did not pay much attention to the industrialization process in Taiwan during the early period of their occupation, they gradually placed more industrial investment in the latter period of colonization, due to necessity. Hence, before Taiwan was returned to Chinese control, certain industries, such as electricity, cement and aluminum, already had solid foundations.<sup>103</sup> By the same token, the steady expansion of social overhead capital during the colonial period probably helped Taiwan, whether directly or indirectly, to accelerate the process of industrialization in the post-colonial era.<sup>104</sup>

#### 2.2.6 Active government

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<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, 367

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, 365

<sup>103</sup> C.Y. Weng, Introduction, in: *Economic Development in Taiwan*, 1-26

<sup>104</sup> Y.M. Ho (1980), reviewed of *Economic Development of Taiwan 1860-1970*, 639

Developments of agriculture, industry, transportation, communication, law and order, social infrastructure, public health, education, human resources and so on in Taiwan during the colonial period were based largely on policies adopted by the government and government involvement. Whether or not what the colonial government had done in a broader context was beneficial for Taiwan might be controversial because the government's objectives were to keep economic power and control over Taiwan and to develop Taiwan in a way that best served Japan's own interests. Therefore, under Japan's control, despite some well planned development programs, opportunities for the Taiwanese people to be educated were limited and discriminatory. An indigenous, entrepreneurial, capitalist class was never encouraged to emerge and industrial skilled labor and technicians were also restricted. In spite of some unequal development policies, due to Japanese own concerns and objectives, the Japanese colonial government, when compared to the pre-colonial Chinese government's passive attitude toward managing Taiwan or other colonial governments dealing with their colonies, actively participated in the development of Taiwan including offering services and investment at the very beginning of its control.

Records can be viewed from the figures provided by Samuel Ho. For instance, government expenditure absorbed 11 to 16 percent of Taiwan's total products and the total government expenditure as a share of total production was 12 to 18 percent. (Refer



to Table 9 for more details)

In contrast to other colonial powers that depended largely on native administrators, the Japanese colonial government trusted their own human capital and, therefore, brought great numbers of Japanese to manage its colonial tasks.<sup>105</sup> It is impressive that a colonial government put so much effort into the development programs and projects and paid an unusual amount of attention to details. In order to solve problems in their colony, colonial administrators in Taiwan would follow “a consistent pattern of study, planning enactment, further study, further planning, and revision”.<sup>106</sup> No wonder Hugh T. Patrick notes, “What distinguishes the Japanese is the assiduous detail and pragmatism of their effort.”<sup>107</sup> It is this careful, deliberate planning and supervision that guaranteed the effective implementation of development programs. Beyond all these efforts in programs or projects, colonial governments, like Japanese capitalists, reinvested a lion’s share of the surplus that was under their control. Although these investments were created to fulfill Japanese benefits, the huge amount of growth in infrastructure distributed these gains throughout the economy.<sup>108 109</sup> Briefly, government investment sped up the process of capital formation and helped the economy of its colony to grow.

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<sup>105</sup> P. S. Ho (1984), *Colonialism and Development: Korea, Taiwan, and Kwantung*, in: *The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895-1945*, 347-398

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, 386

<sup>107</sup> Hugh T. Patrick, *Comments on Development Policy of the Japanese Colonial Government in Taiwan*, in: *Government and Economic Development*, ed. Ranis Gustav (London, New Haven, 1971), 330

<sup>108</sup> L.H. Gann, *Western and Japanese Colonialism: Some Preliminary Comparisons*, in: *The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895-1945*, 523

<sup>109</sup> P. S. Ho (1984), *Colonialism and Development: Korea, Taiwan, and Kwantung*, in: *The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895-1945*, 385

In short, the active role of the Japanese colonial government was one of the components that made Japanese colonization unique and fruitful. Quoting from Samuel Ho's words, the idea of active government is best explained.

“Taiwan’s creditable economic performance and its success as a colony were to a great extent the achievements of the colonial government. It is not an exaggeration to say that economic growth in the colonial period was initiated and sustained through government efforts. Besides maintaining stability and order, intermediate goods so vital to development, the colonial government also introduced and carried through crucial economic programs designed to promote development. Through its fiscal instruments and preferential treatment of Japanese investors, the government also influenced income distribution and ensured that the export surplus generated by the economy remained in Japanese control.”<sup>110</sup>

It can be understood that, without such active government, Japanese colonization in Taiwan might not have had such a big difference from other colonial experiences and growth would never have been created as impressively as it was.

#### 2.2.7 Cultural factors

Colonial attitudes, policies and government all mattered when shaping Japanese colonization into a unique one. Last, but not least, combined with other factors, one determining point that made Japan unique among other colonial powers is cultural conformity. Ho Yhi-min indicates that “common cultural heritage in dietary habits

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<sup>110</sup> P.S. Ho (1978), *Economic Development of Taiwan 1860-1970*, 32

shared between the Japanese and Taiwanese may have contributed to the differences in the experience under colonialism between Taiwan and other less developed areas.”<sup>111</sup>

Taiwan, as Japan’s colony, not only shared a common cultural heritage in dietary habits but also had proximity of regional configuration, which meant lower transportation costs, better information and more instant communication between the home government and the colony. The cultural, ethnic affinities and geographic proximity contributed to Japan’s unique economic advantage over a Western colonial power developing its empire. In other words, these similarities helped the integration of rulers and ruled to a degree that could barely be achieved within the European colonial system.<sup>112</sup> Such better integration had crucial economic meaning. Rather than solely developing typical export-orientated enclaves, Japanese colonization differentiated itself from other Western colonial powers by establishing economic linkages to all sectors of the economies between colonial Japan and its colony Taiwan.<sup>113</sup> Besides, this resemblance could also be the reason to explain why Samuel Ho declares that the development experience in Taiwan did not conform in all respects to the triangular operation model and prevented the two economies, Japan and Taiwan, from becoming compartmentalized.<sup>114</sup> Sharing such affinities of culture and diet between Japan and Taiwan, the agricultural sector, which was both the export sector

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<sup>111</sup> Yhi-min Ho, reviewed of *Economic Development of Taiwan 1860-1970*, 643

<sup>112</sup> Mark R. Peattie, Introduction, in: *The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895-1945*, 3-52

<sup>113</sup> J. I. Nakamura (1974), Incentives, Productivity Gaps, and Agricultural Growth Rates in Prewar Japan, Taiwan, and Korea, in: *Japan in Crisis*, 350

<sup>114</sup> P.S. Ho (1984), Colonialism and Development: Korea, Taiwan, and Kwantung, in: *The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895-1945*, 384

and foundation of the economy in Taiwan, did not end up languishing. It can be further argued: with such ethnic and cultural similarities that made eventual integration possible, it gave the Japanese the motivation to be enthusiastic when investing in social infrastructure and human resources.<sup>115</sup>

For Japanese colonial power, the relationship between home country and colony was taken as, in Arendt's description, "an enlarged tribal consciousness"<sup>116</sup>, which might eventually lead to the colony being totally integrated into Japan. Therefore, cultural factors might have helped Japan to change its attitude to be more constructive and active towards the colony and further helped Japan to manage its colony, whether in development, exploitation or quelling resistance, in a way that is relatively efficient and distinct from other colonial powers.

What's more, when speaking of cultural factor, there is one more point should be emphasized to stress the singularity of Japanese colonialism: the Japanese language was introduced as the official language to Taiwan. During the final period of Japanese rule in Taiwan, the colonial government devoted its full efforts into the movement of Japanization<sup>117</sup> to japanize Taiwanese society. As part of the movement, local people were strongly encouraged to wear Japanese clothes, live in Japanese-style houses, speak Japanese language and even advocate the adoption of Japanese names. Accordingly,

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<sup>115</sup> Y.M. Ho (1980), reviewed of *Economic Development of Taiwan 1860-1970*, 637-644

<sup>116</sup> Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (London, 1958), 223-224

<sup>117</sup> This movement of Japanization is known as Kominka Movement, which is 皇民化運動 in Chinese.

nobody was allowed to speak Chinese in public or publish in Chinese. This fully attempt of assimilation is something no European power had ever tried to achieve in any of its colonies.

#### 2.2.8 Japanese legacy

After fifty years of occupation, Japanese colonial power was not only particular in its historical conditions and attitudes toward Taiwan or the methods with which it managed Taiwan, but also the legacy it left for its colony. After fifty years of Japanese control, there was no such decolonization process, which was common in the European experience, to end the colonial relationship between Japan and Taiwan. Without such a decolonization process, Japan did not need to face prolonged negotiations with its colonies to avow the colonial problems. This, in turn, helped Japan to hasten its economic recovery.<sup>118</sup> Yet in Taiwan, mainland China replaced Japan to take over Taiwan. However, as there were gaps between Taiwan and mainland China due to economic development in Taiwan under Japanese rule plus there was corruption amongst mainland governors in the post-colonial period, the Japanese colonial legacy proved to be more resilient.<sup>119</sup> People in Taiwan tended to re-establish and re-conceive their colonial relationship with Japan.<sup>120</sup> This kind of legacy and perceptions from colonized people

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<sup>118</sup> T.S. Ching , *Becoming Japanese: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation*,15-50

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, 20-36

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, 20

are somehow beyond expectations and, therefore, gave Japanese colonization another exceptional mark.

### **2.3 Consequences**

To sum up, the successful Japanese experience in Taiwan was related to the following points

- the existence of an authoritarian foreign government in efficacious political control;
- tenacious commitment to economic development;
- previous experience derived from the Meiji era of successful economic growth;
- the former presences of low productivity and the increase incentive levels in Taiwan;
- the supply of incentives by establishing capitalist economic organizations and institutions of land tax reform;
- the geographic closeness of Taiwan to Japan;
- the integration of the colonial economy into the Japanese empire;
- Taiwan's increasing demand for rice and sugar;
- the employment of imported, trained specialists for development work;
- efforts in developing traditional agriculture, which involved most of the

population in the development process;

- the existence of reasonably efficient administrators from Japan.<sup>121</sup>

All the factors mentioned above might not be comprehensive but they are decisive ones. Consequently, these factors must be taken into consideration when attempting to understand the uniqueness of Japanese colonization that has brought constant growth to the Taiwanese economy and explains why Japanese colonization was positively appraised in this case. It is no exaggeration to state that without these factors, Japan, as a latecomer to colonialism, would not be able to distinguish itself from other colonial powers and Japanese colonization would not catch as many attentions and stand out above the rest. In the case of colonial Taiwan, Japanese colonialism presented itself not only as colonizers but also modernizers, not only as imperialists but also capitalists.<sup>122</sup>

### **III. Japanese ambitious vision of East Asian regionalism---**

#### **Japanese Utopian Vision of Colonialism: from the Establishment of Manchukuo to the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere--- new East Asia Order and the rising of Pan-Asianism**

Besides emphasizing the noticeable experiences in Taiwan, this part of my paper will analyze the uniqueness of Japanese colonization as an approach to the construction of a regional order and a regional identity in East Asia. It explores the ideology of

Pan-Asianism as a predecessor to contemporary Asian regionalism, which served as the

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<sup>121</sup> J. I. Nakamura (1974), Incentives, Productivity Gaps, and Agricultural Growth Rates in Prewar Japan, Taiwan, and Korea, in: Japan in Crisis, 369

<sup>122</sup> Bruce Cumings, Colonial Formations and Deformations, in: Decolonization, eds. Prasenjit Duara (London, 2004) 278-298, 281

basis for efforts at regional integration in East Asia, but also as a tool for legitimizing Japanese colonial rule. Manchukuo, which was established under the Japanese dominion, will firstly be discussed. The culminating spread of Pan-Asianism will further be stated with the example of Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

### **3.1 Manchukuo**

With the quite contented and thriving experiences and economic integrations within its colonies, Taiwan and Korea, plus Japan's ambitions of empire building and its own strengthened military forces, Japan found the necessity to expand its colonial territory further to the northeast Asia: Manchuria. Right after the invasion, Japan established the independent government and state, Manchukuo. Notwithstanding, it's noteworthy that however imperialistic the purposes of its builders, Manchukuo was not exactly developed as a colony, rather, it was built as a nation-state. This so called puppet state, Manchukuo, was actually a product of the post- World War I period, when imperialism changed increasingly into illegitimate and economic and political competition among nations was expressed through the forms of nationalism.<sup>123</sup> Therefore, the case of Manchukuo reflects the complicated and persistent relationship existing between imperialism, nationalism and modernity.<sup>124</sup> In Duara's words, "Manchukuo appears as a place of paradoxes, where it becomes difficult to disentangle imperialism from nationalism,

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<sup>123</sup> Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* (Lanham, 2004)

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*



modernity from tradition, frontier from heartland, and ideals of transcendence from ideologies of boundedness.”<sup>125</sup> Furthermore, according to Yamamuro, one more interesting viewpoint from the American magazines as *Fortune* claimed that “Manchukuo was an immense laboratory created by the Japanese army. The Japanese army would use the experiments carried out in Manchuria, it argued, in constructing a Japanese system for full national mobilization and a militarized state.”<sup>126</sup> The link between Manchukuo and Japan is best depicted here. Besides, what made Manchuria under Japanese control special is that, different from Taiwan or Korea, Manchuria’s industrialization under Japanese manipulation was principally based on the exploitation of natural resources.

Therefore, when speaking of the uniqueness of Japanese colonization, beyond its striking economic integration in Taiwan and Korea, Japanese singular intention in building Manchukuo should not be ignored.

Getting Manchuria area under Japan’s control is important in the following respects: military conquest and national security concern; economic integration; and also the utopian idea of settlement. And each of them was closely related to both Japan’s own survival/independence and the building of Japanese regional order. First of all, from the military and security perspective, Manchuria was considered as Japan’s lifeline because Manchuria shared a border with colonial Korea, and it was, therefore, taken as the front

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<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.* 1

<sup>126</sup> Shin’ichi Yamamuro, *Manchuria under Japanese Dominion* (Philadelphia 2006), 237

line in defenses against the Soviet Union and China. Namely, if Japan was expelled from Manchuria area, then Japanese control over its old colony, Korea, would be put seriously in danger; accordingly the whole Japanese empire might be gradually facing the jeopardy of decline. From the broader point of view concerning regional order, Manchukuo was the first acquisition of the Japanese wartime empire, and it further remained the centerpiece of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Secondly, in terms of economy, elaborate plans were undertaken to make Manchuria an extension of the Japanese economy.<sup>127</sup> Regarding Japan's independence, Manchuria represented a strategic economic connection to solve the problem of Japan's poverty of resources. In other words, with Manchuria in control, Japan would not be subjected to economic blackmail.<sup>128</sup> In short, it was the richness of natural resources which singularized Manchuria from other Japanese colonies and gave Japan the incentives to exploit and even use these bounteous natural resources, in turn, for the industrialization in Manchuria. By the same token, in order to get out of the economic depression of rising foreign trade barriers, an export market that could be integrated with Japan's colonial empire of Taiwan, Korea and so on was needed.<sup>129</sup> Manchuria was exactly the place which fit all the economic purposes; thus, the 'yen bloc' was established and promoted

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<sup>127</sup> Louise Young, *Imagined Empire: The Cultural Construction of Manchukuo*, in: *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945*, eds. Duus and Chou (Princeton, N.Y. 1996) 72

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, 77

<sup>129</sup> Takafusa Nakamura, *The Yen Bloc, 1931-1941*, in: *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945*, eds. Duus and Chou (Princeton, N.Y. 1996) 173

in Manchuria as a very beginning step of regional economic integration. Last but not least, the settlement plan which sent a million Japanese to settle their families in the Manchurian hinterland was designed to serve the purpose of nursing a new generation of “continental Japanese who would secure a more thorough domination of colonial society.”<sup>130</sup> This settlement was more than noteworthy because the utopian idea of building a state under kingly way based on harmony, peace and prosperity among different ethnicities was at the same time promoted and stressed. This utopian ideology held some beliefs and symbolic meanings for Japanese as Young described, “Buying a Manchukuo fantasy offered escape from a domestic society that held little to hope for and much to fear.”<sup>131</sup> Behind the realistic and imperial concerns, the Japanese dominion in Manchuria did contain ideal plans for regional integration.

The importance of Manchukuo in the context of Japan’s empire building lies in that this Manchuria State not only evolved out of the trajectory of Japanese colonialism, it also represented an origin, the first step in the realization of the autarkic sphere, which included the yen bloc, new strategies of mobilization and development, and a pan-Asianist alliance.<sup>132</sup> Only through the concept of pan-Asianism can Manchukuo be conceived of not simply as a colony, but as the core of an anti-western alliance of East

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<sup>130</sup> Young, *Imagined Empire: The Cultural Construction of Manchukuo*, 72

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, 95

<sup>132</sup> Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* 246

Asian states, thus settling the conceptual basis for a developmental and strong state.<sup>133</sup> In short, whether it was constructed as corporatist governmentality or the development of the yen block, Manchukuo was largely considered unique and singular from the colonial night watchman state or previous patterns of economic relationships between metro-pole and colony directed by colonial power.<sup>134</sup>

### 3.1.1 Pan-Asianism

The singularity and importance of Japanese colonization on Manchuria in the period of 1930s were the rising and then spreading of pan-Asian sentiment. The ideology of pan-Asianism was developed in the discursive space between national identities and possibilities for transnational cooperation. In Saaler's words, "In all its historical manifestations, pan-Asianism emphasized the need for Asian unity, mostly *vis-à-vis* the encroachment of Western colonialism and imperialism, but also emphasizing indigenous traditions."<sup>135</sup>

Although the pan-Asianism is not new in Japan's history<sup>136</sup>, it existed at the early period only as a vague romantic and idealistic feeling of solidarity, which could not be applied to the sphere of real politics.<sup>137</sup> However, with the growing consciousness of

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<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.* 246

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.* 77

<sup>135</sup> Sven Saaler, Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History, in: Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History, eds. Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann (London 2007) 2

<sup>136</sup> This pan-Asianism was once already mentioned and discussed since the period of Meiji Japan.

<sup>137</sup> Saaler, Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History, 1-18

Japanese national strength and the rise of Japan as a leading regional power, this pan-Asianism provided the possibility to mobilize Asian peoples through a collective regional identity established from cohesive cultural factors like geography, language, race and religion. What's more, it was this pan-Asianist conception that distinguished Manchukuo from Japanese older colonies: Taiwan and Korea and it was also this pan-Asianism further built and expanded Japanese empire and idea of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. While a drastic attempt of cultural assimilation implemented in Taiwan and Korea, policy adopted in Manchuria was stressed under the pan-Asianist planning such as racial harmony, brotherly bonds, and the creation of a common East Asian culture.<sup>138</sup> To be put in a broader global context, it can be said that Japanese establishment of Manchukuo was under the historical background of keen global competition, which had led to the mobilization of resources and identity. This time, as Duara depicted, "the Self that was the object of integration was not merely wider than the nation, it had already been or was in the process of becoming shaped by regimes of national authenticity for all parties concerned—Japanese, Chinese and Korean."<sup>139</sup> Indeed, Manchukuo signals fundamental changes in the nature of the Japanese empire. For Japan, managing Manchukuo meant not only military conquest and economic development, but also as the utopian promise of planned Japanese emigration as above

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<sup>138</sup> Peter Duus, Introduction, in: *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945*, eds. Duus and Chou (Princeton, N.Y. 1996) 11-47

<sup>139</sup> Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* 247

mentioned.<sup>140</sup> In other words, despite the fact that the reality of life in Manchukuo diverged sharply from appearances, there were still many young Japanese bureaucrats holding the belief to take Manchukuo as a Pan-Asian polity and as a place of ‘harmony among the five ethnicities and the paradise of the kingly way’ guided by classical Confucian political principle and trying to pursue the ideals of Manchukuo. The establishment of Manchukuo, ideally, seems to be able to provide the outlines of a more broadly applicable political model for Japanese rule in East Asia when national independence, international cooperation, and Japanese imperial hegemony could be reconciled. To be more specific, when speaking of Japanese predominant building of Manchukuo, while imperialism was unavoidably preserved in this hegemony, it nevertheless dictated relations between center and periphery different from those of the older colonies. The new and singular program applied in Manchukuo involved more alliance, autonomy, investment, development, identity, and competitiveness. No wonder Duara claimed that “In many ways, Manchukuo prefigured the phenomenon of a junior partner or a client state dominated by hegemonic states such as the United States and the Soviet Union in the postwar period.”<sup>141</sup>

In short, it is believed that this pan-Asianism ideology played an important role in shaping the political economy in East Asia for both Japanese colonial period and

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<sup>140</sup> Louise Young, *Imagined Empire: The Cultural Construction of Manchukuo*, eds. Duus and Chou (Princeton, N.Y. 1996) 71-96

<sup>141</sup> Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, 78

post-war period. On one side, it served as a foundation for early efforts at regional integration in the East Asian region; however, on the other side, as a cover for expansionism and as a method for legitimizing Japanese colonial control and hegemony.<sup>142</sup> Therefore, although this early pan-Asianism, directed by Japanese colonization, gave the basis for the possibility of East Asian integration, it equally left some negative legacies that might pose a major barrier for further regional integration in contemporary East Asia.<sup>143</sup>

### **3.2 The Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere**

After gaining Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria under control, Japanese empire building was gradually moving from self-defense toward self-definition. The spreading pan-Asianism, combined with a strong sense of self-righteousness prevailed in Japan, led more and more members of the Japanese political elites to consider Japan's ideals and values superior to those of the rest of the world and further to force these values and ideals on other Asian countries.<sup>144</sup> Before the idea of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was promoted and constructed, by the mid-1930s, a group of cosmopolitan supporters of expansionism figured out a scientific explanation of Japan's continental policy that would

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<sup>142</sup> Sven Saaler, *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History* (London 2007)

<sup>143</sup> J. Victor Koschmann, *Asianism's Ambivalent Legacy*, in: *Network Power*, eds. Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi (Ithaca, New York 1997) 83-110

<sup>144</sup> Fumitaka Furuoka, *Japan and the 'Flying Geese' Pattern of East Asian Integration*, in: *Austrian Association of East Asian Studies* 4 (1)(2005)

both serve Japan's need and make sense to outsiders. The resulting formation was the notion of a New Order in East Asia, which attempted to combine pan-Asianist rhetoric with the idea of national self-determination.<sup>145</sup> This New Order in East Asia proposed the building of a new regional political order, based on mutual cooperation and aid among the independent states of Japan, China, and Manchukuo.<sup>146</sup> As Tamamoto once commented, "In the early 20th century, as Japan began to feel more secure and confident with its modernization successes, it awarded itself the right to civilize the rest of Asia... . And if it took force to impose upon Asia what was good, such was the burden of Japan's civilized mission."<sup>147</sup>

However, the story of Japanese empire construction did not end here. The setting up of New Order in East Asia could not satisfy Japan's ambition. In 1940, Japanese Foreign Minister Arita Hachiro typified a new vision of ideology, "In order to realize the establishment of world peace, it seems to be the most natural step that peoples who are closely related to one another geographically, racially, and economically should first form a sphere of their own for coexistence and co-prosperity and establish peace and order within that sphere, and at the same time secure a relationship of common existence and prosperity with other spheres....The countries of East Asia and the regions of the South Seas are geographically close, historically, racially, and economically very closely related to

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<sup>145</sup> Duus, Introduction, in: *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945*, 21

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>147</sup> Masaru Tamamoto, Japan's Uncertain Role, in: *World Policy Journal* 8(4) (1991): 579-597, 582



each other. They are destined to cooperate and minister to one another's needs for their common well-being and prosperity, and to promote peace and progress in their regions.

The uniting of all these regions in a single sphere on the basis of common existence and assuring thereby the stability of that sphere is, I think, a natural conclusion.”<sup>148</sup>

Accordingly, the idea of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was encouraged and the Pan-Asian notions of an “Asian community” had expanded beyond East Asia to the European colonies in Southeast Asia by adding a third element to the Pan-Asian vision.

Nevertheless, this new element, composed of the people of Southeast and South Asia, concerning religions, languages, and ethnicities, was quite different from the Sinitic culture that linked the Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans; thus, the Co-Prosperity Sphere redefined the “Asian community” as a region, where people had a common interest.<sup>149</sup> In this context, it assumed that all the people of Asia, including the Japanese, shared the common experience of confrontation with the West, and that all Asians had a common interest in expelling western domination and influence from the region.<sup>150</sup> From stressing

the older pan-Asianism of racial harmony, brotherly bonds, and the creation of a common East Asian culture in the establishment of Manchukuo and New Order in East Asia to setting the commonalities of geography and economy side by side with common race and common culture in the development of Southern regions and the Greater East

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<sup>148</sup> Duus, Introduction/Japan's Wartime Empire: Problems and Issues, 22

<sup>149</sup> Peter Duus, The Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere: Dream and Reality, in: Journal of Northeast Asian History 5 (2008): 143-154

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*

Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Japanese colonialism moved forward to proclaim Japan as the 'liberator' as well as the 'brother' of the local populations.<sup>151</sup>

### 3.2.1 Integration concept behind the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

Japanese colonialism and empire building, starting from its first colonial regions of Taiwan and Korea, to Manchukuo, North China, to the construction of the New Order in East Asia, to the 'move south' strategy, to the peak of establishing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, no matter how lofty or how ideal objective Japan had, the indisputable fact was that Japan's project and ambitions were formed and implemented forcibly through the use of military force and unavoidably brought these regions under arduous wartime ; that Japan promoted its own ideals aggressively and imposed those on other Asian countries; and that Japan's powerful expansionist and militarist policies and its excessive anti-Western sentiment and nationalism could be instrumental to fuel the country's expansionist policy.<sup>152</sup> As a result, Tamamoto also declares that the proclamation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was simply a justification for Japanese military expansion guided under the pretence of liberalizing Asia from the Western imperialism.<sup>153</sup>

From an opposite perspective, as Fumitaka Furuoka indicated, however disastrous

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<sup>151</sup> Duus, Introduction/Japan's Wartime Empire: Problems and Issues, 11-47

<sup>152</sup> Li Xing, East Asia Regional Integration: From Japan-led "Flying-geese" to China-centered "Bamboo Capitalism", 5

<sup>153</sup> Masaru Tamamoto, Japan's Uncertain Role, 582

the result brought by Japanese domination, there is no denying that Japan's expansionist policy in the periods before and during the Second World War was the first attempt at Asian integration.<sup>154</sup> As Pempel observes, “The only significant collective challenge to Western leadership in Asia, and the only real bid for Asian integration, came with Japan's unsuccessful military attempt during the 1930s to form the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.”<sup>155</sup> Therefore, this ideology of building the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, when concerning East Asian regional order and regional identity, was more or less put under survey related to regional integration.

When looking back at the East Asian history, regarding regionalism, Japan was not the only and the first dominant force at play in East Asia. Instead, it was the China-center tributary system spanning the 16<sup>th</sup> century to the early 19<sup>th</sup> century that provided a framework for East Asia to link to a wider regional and even global economy.<sup>156</sup> This Chinese tribute-system had for a long period offered a vision of Asian unity based on the core position of East Asian culture China had. Notwithstanding, Japan's empire-building was the first major sign of the emergence of a broad new ideology of Asianism<sup>157</sup>, which gave an impetus to regional integration. Since the concept of the Greater East Asia

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<sup>154</sup> Fumitaka Furuoka, Japan and the ‘Flying Geese’ Pattern of East Asian Integration

<sup>155</sup> T.J. Pempel, Gulliver in Lilliput: Japan and Asian Economic Regionalism, in: *World Policy Journal* 13 (4)(1996/1997): 13-26, 13

<sup>156</sup> Mark Selden, East Asia Regionalism and its Enemies in Three Epochs: Political Economy and Geopolitics, 16<sup>th</sup> to 21<sup>st</sup> centuries

<sup>157</sup> Li Narangoa and Robert Cribb, Japan and the Transformation of National Identities in Asia in the Imperial Era, in: *Imperial Japan and National Identities in Asia, 1895-1945*, eds Li Narangoa and Robert Cribb (London 2003)1-22, 16

Co-Prosperity Sphere was the culmination of the Asianism discourse, thus, there is a necessity to take the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in the context of regional integration into consideration.

### 3.2.2 Flying Geese Pattern

When speaking of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, it provided the platform to comprehend the ‘Flying Geese’ implication and the role of Japan in the political economy of regional order and regional integration. Besides, it is said that the flying geese paradigm was part of Japan’s propaganda during World War II by lending the intellectual legitimacy that was needed to create the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and was incorporated into arguments about the contemporary Asianism.<sup>158</sup>

Hence, when analyzing the historical pattern and characteristics of East Asian integration or discussing about the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, it is essential to take a look at this Flying Geese model. According to Li Xing, the terminology of ‘flying-geese’ has special implications that the notion actually implies a symbol of an order based on leadership and collective action within a nation-state.<sup>159</sup> This concept of flying-geese pattern of regional economic integration was brought up in the 1930s by a Japanese economist, Kaname Akamatsu. In theory, this flying geese model was set up in a

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<sup>158</sup> Shigehisa Kasahara, The Flying Geese Paradigm: a Critical Study of its Application to East Asian Regional Development, in: MPRA Paper No. 21881(2010)

<sup>159</sup> Li Xing, East Asia Regional Integration: From Japan-led “Flying-geese” to China-centered “Bamboo Capitalism”, 5

multi-tier hierarchical relationship and it believed that industrialization and development could be promoted and spread from developed countries to the less developed countries through their economic integration.<sup>160</sup> Following this model, Japan was taken as the center leading nation, and a group of nations in East Asia flying together along with Japan. Those nations would be further divided into two groups, based on the different stages of economic development. In other words, Japan, being the leading goose, led the second-tier geese (less developed countries) which, in their turn, are followed by the third-tier geese (least developed countries). This model or strategy advocated by Japan, as Pempel points out, “the message to the rest of Asia was quite simple: follow Japan’s example, stay in line, do not try to get too close, and eventually you too will fly into this kind of successful economy... The implicit arrogance of a permanent place at the front of the avian Asian advance seems never to have been challenged.”<sup>161</sup> Therefore, it can be seen that the structure of Akamatsu’s model could be put into the context of the world system theory<sup>162</sup>; it described the regional division of labor as consisting of Japan as the centre, a semi-periphery, which implied the two formal colonies of Korea and Taiwan, and the immense suppliers of raw material and markets of the rest of Asia as the

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<sup>160</sup> Fumitaka Furuoka, Japan and the ‘Flying Geese’ Pattern of East Asian Integration, 2

<sup>161</sup> Pempel, Gulliver in Lilliput: Japan and Asian Economic Regionalism, 16

<sup>162</sup> “The World System School (Wallerstein, 1982, 2004) maintains that there are global divisions within the capitalist world system: the core, or First World, has an economy based upon the importation of raw materials and exportation of finished goods; the periphery, or Third World, in turn provides the raw materials and a market for the finished goods made from them; in between it is the semi-periphery, or Second World whose economy is a mixture of resource extraction and manufacturing.”

periphery.<sup>163</sup>

Japan's first attempt at East Asian integration and to be a leader of Asian countries stayed side by side with the concept of pan-Asianism and the formation of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Under the name of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the Japanese Government started its brutally expansionist policy and the result of which was the creation of the 'first gaggle of flying geese.'<sup>164</sup> In this first gaggle, Japan was using military power to force its leadership on other East Asian countries. The first-tier goose, Japan, on one hand, restrained the peoples of Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria, those regarded as second-tier geese in the model, and drove them to accept Japan's leadership as well as Japan's own socio-cultural norms, worldviews, ideals and values; on the other hand, Japan, at the same time, exploited natural and human resources in those places.<sup>165</sup> The third-tier geese, the Asian countries, which were occupied by Japan before the end of Second World War, were also under a similar type of suppressive relationship with Japan. The dream of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere in the framework of the flying geese integration idea, combined with the hostile attitude toward Western countries, was broken when Japan was defeated in the Second World War. By the same token, it signified the end of flight of the first flying-geese gaggle and unsuccessful try of regional integration. This first Japan-led

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<sup>163</sup> Li Xing, East Asia Regional Integration: From Japan-led "Flying-geese" to China-centered "Bamboo Capitalism", 6

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*, 3

<sup>165</sup> Furuoka, Japan and the 'Flying Geese' Pattern of East Asian Integration, 3

endeavor to integrate the East Asian regions under the name of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere widened the gap between the vision and the reality of the wartime empire, which turned out to leave relatively negative legacy persisting even in the postwar historical memory of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.<sup>166</sup> Correspondingly, this 'legacies of the past' gradually evolved as heavy burdens for regional approaches in East Asia and made the history of pan-Asianism therefore ambiguous, which continue to bear a main barrier for regional integration even in contemporary East Asia.<sup>167</sup>

#### **IV. Regional dynamics and regional ties to the world: A prelude of East Asian regionalism?**

Being a collection of islands on the edges of the continent, occupying a position in Pacific Asia similar to that of Britain in Europe, lacking of resources that stimulated itself to the expansionism, plus having relatively homogenous ethnics and preserving the military feudalism of the Samurai in its society, Japan used all these factors and advantages to distinguish itself and develop its own unique colonial empire in East Asia, in order to response to western imperialism.<sup>168</sup> The uniqueness of Japan's colonialism presented not only in terms of economic development, as in colonial Taiwan I mentioned above, but also from the perspective of establishing the modern state in Manchuria, disseminating the concept of Asianism, and forming the Greater East Asia

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<sup>166</sup> Duus, Introduction/Japan's Wartime Empire: Problems and Issues, 39

<sup>167</sup> Sven Saaler, Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History, 1

<sup>168</sup> Barbara Bush, Imperialism and Modernity, in: Imperialism and Postcolonialism, ed. Barbara Bush (Harlow 2006) 77-114, 112

Co-prosperity Sphere. Step by step, Japanese colonialism seems to move toward the direction of integrating the whole East Asia and presenting it as the strong power in the world stage, as some scholars already indicated that it was the very first attempt at Asian integration. No wonder that Japanese colonial studies is said to be the origin of Japanese international relations. Regionalism, in Peter Katzenstein's words, "offers a stepping-stone for international cooperation between unsatisfactory national approaches on the one hand and unworkable universal schemes on the other."<sup>169</sup> As it is receiving increasing attention in the studies of international relations in East Asia and a shared comprehension of the region's present, past and future is the basis of regional integration and cooperation, then Japan's first attempt at Asian integration played a pivotal role for future further integration. What lessons could be drawn from those previous experiences Japanese colonial empire offered? Is Japanese colonialism in Asia representing a prelude for East Asian regionalism and regional integration?

In this chapter, the development model set up by Japan, which not only represented the uniqueness of Japanese colonization, but also played a vital role in Asian economic integration, would be firstly discussed by referring to the case of Taiwan, as mentioned before. Second of all, whether Japan's try for regional integration under its empire-building is good or bad for the contemporary East Asian integration will be put under discussion. Namely, the positive and negative legacies left by Japan on the process

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<sup>169</sup> Saaler, *Pan-Asianism in modern Japanese History*, 1



of East Asian integration will be emphasized.

#### **4.1 Model of development related to Japanese colonization**

During the 1930s and 1940s, Japanese officials and planners sketched plans for integrating and developing the other economies of East Asia with the Japan-led metropolitan economy; moreover, government agencies, semi-government corporations, and private firms all got involved into the capital investments to finance the development of Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, and north China.<sup>170</sup> The question is: did these wartime changes have any impact on the postwar economic development of the countries of East Asia? In a way to respond, an East Asian model of development has been identified and stressed by the scholar Bruce Cumings. By stating so, Cumings followed the trail of the experience of Japanese modernization and, importantly, Japan's extension to the colonies in Korea and Taiwan.<sup>171</sup> Before examining this development model, the relationship between colonization and development should be considered, particularly in applying it to the case of Taiwan under Japanese colonization in order to clarify this relationship more clearly.

##### **4.1.1 Development/modernization or dependency?**

Colonization has long been chronicled in global history. In order to justify the behavior

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<sup>170</sup> Hideo Kobayashi, The Postwar Economic Legacy of Japan's Wartime Empire, in: The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945, eds. Duus and Chou (Princeton, N.Y. 1996) 324-334

<sup>171</sup> Bruce Cumings, Colonial Formations and Deformations, in: Decolonization, eds. Duara Prasenji (London 2004) 278-298

of occupation and the domination of colonial rule, colonizers sought to present colonialism in the best interests, both pragmatic and moral, of both colonizers and colonized<sup>172</sup>. From the early period that centred on the spread of Christianity, to the mercantilist phase of colonialism that allowed the civilising quality of commerce and even to the new colonialism (with the rise of industrial capitalism) that justified colonial rule in the form of ideologies of progress, colonization is closely related to the process of development and progress.<sup>173</sup>

Consequently, modern colonial doctrine increasingly characterized ideas of development/modernization as the logical process of colonial rule and its responsibilities. According to Henry Bernstein, the developmental works involved the formation of law and order within a modern administrative structure with the establishment of infrastructure and communications to speed both the implementation of law and order and the growth of markets, trade and economy, even including new disciplines and new values.<sup>174</sup>

By contrast, as a result of maintaining different opinions and as a criticism of the doctrine of development/modernization, views on dependency were voiced. Consequently, this dependency issue has been at the centre of international development

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<sup>172</sup> Henry Bernstein, *Colonialism, Capitalism, Development*, in: *Poverty and development into the twenty-first century*, ed. T. Allen (Oxford, 2000), 265

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*, 241-270

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*, 267

debate.<sup>175</sup> The dependency argument focused on the underdevelopment or economic distortion of so-called periphery countries, which offer resources to core nations to aid their future development. As a result, the core nations are enriched at the expense of the poor, periphery countries. Beyond that, the inability of the periphery country to flourish in technological innovation and the incapacity to transfer technological knowledge are also responsible for the underdevelopment of the periphery with respect to the core nations.<sup>176</sup> Besides, scholars like Andre Gunder Frank and Samir Amin, following the dependency theory, further elaborated on the interpretation of the uneven growth of periphery countries, namely, the ‘development of underdevelopment’.<sup>177</sup> For Amin, even though a capitalistic economy might be transited, the transition to capitalism in the periphery country follows a different route to that in the core country.<sup>178</sup> The structural features of such ‘development of underdevelopment’ include: (1) inequality of productivity between varied sectors, (2) the disarticulated economy<sup>179</sup>, and (3) domination from the outside which causes dependence.<sup>180</sup>

In short, the development/modernization view emphasizes the learning process derived from better developed countries so that backward countries can achieve

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<sup>175</sup> Chih-ming Ka, *Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan: land tenure, development, and dependency, 1895-1945* (Boulder, Colorado, 1995)

<sup>176</sup> Matías Vernengo, *Technology, Finance and Dependency: Latin American Radical Political Economy in Retrospect*, *Review of Radical Political Economics* 38(4) (2006): 551-568

<sup>177</sup> A.G. Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (New York, 1969)

<sup>178</sup> S. Amin, *Accumulation on a World Scale* (New York, 1974)

<sup>179</sup> A distorted form of economic growth typical of many less developed countries. Economic sectors in such economy are juxtaposed with different levels of development and productivity, which might have a bad effect on economic development and social well-being.

<sup>180</sup> C. H. Ka, *Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan: land tenure, development, and dependency, 1895-1945*, 8

development. It understands that what causes development or underdevelopment is determined by internal conditions within economies. However, the dependency theory focuses on external constraining factors and regards development and underdevelopment as relational.<sup>181</sup>

#### 4.1.2 Study a specific case: Taiwan as a case to be applied

Notwithstanding, if the case of Taiwan under Japanese colonization is once again taken into consideration, to make the theory clearer, it is necessary to note that the 1920s should be taken as the watershed. Prior to 1925, the domination policy emphasized the expansion of the sugar industry and this led to economic disarticulation and the uneven development of production among various sectors. This suggests that the economy prior to 1925 was in agreement with Samir Amin's model of peripheral capitalism. By comparison, Samir Amin's explanation fails to capture the post-1925 situation. Production and export of rice dramatically increased after 1925 because of the rising demand for rice in Japan. Consequently, in spite of restrictive government policies such as discouraging rice production, the living standards of rice producers rose with the rise in productivity. Therefore, cane farmers either changed to planting rice or requested higher prices for their cane in order to gain an income that was comparable to the rice farmers and so the supply of cheap sugarcane was weakened. This situation caused the

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<sup>181</sup> Anthony Brewer, *Marxist Theories of Imperialism: a critical survey* (London, 1980), 48

colonial surplus extraction of sugar capital to become less feasible. In short, with rice exports thriving, development gradually evened out.<sup>182</sup>

Therefore, development/modernization and dependency theories are both indispensable for discussing the Japanese colonization of Taiwan. However, it is hard to judge which viewpoint is more correct than the other. All that could be drawn is that the dependency theory is thought to depict the phenomena better when referring to the earlier period of Japanese colonization and the development/modernization theory highlights the situation in the later period of occupation.<sup>183</sup>

By different emphases on either dependency or development, Ka Chih-ming's summary is helpful in understanding studies about Japanese colonization in Taiwan. In Ka's classification, the pioneering and radical Japanese scholars, especially Yanaihara Tadao<sup>184</sup> and Tu Chao-yen<sup>185</sup>, focus on the phenomena of dualism and dependency. Yanaihara, reflecting on Lenin's approach to imperialism, maintained that it was the penetration of Japanese monopoly capital that weakened the indigenous mode.<sup>186</sup> "The concentration of Taiwan's sugar production in the hands of Japanese capital and the destruction of indigenous sugar mills provide support for this dependency

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<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.*, 5

<sup>183</sup> C. H. Ka, Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan: land tenure, development, and dependency, 1895-1945, 182

<sup>184</sup> Tadao Yanaihara, Taiwan under Japanese Imperialism [Teikokushugi ka no Taiwan] (Tokyo, 1988)

<sup>185</sup> Chao-yen Tu, Taiwan under Japanese Imperialism [*Fih-pen ti-kuo-chu-I sha ti tai-wan*], Trans. Ming-chun Lee (Taipei, 1993)

<sup>186</sup> C. H. Ka, Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan: land tenure, development, and dependency, 1895-1945, 2

perspective.”<sup>187</sup> On the contrary, many western writers, such as Ramon Myers, Mark Peattie, Samuel Ho, etc., belong to the group that emphasize “the success of Japanese colonial rule in fostering development, not underdevelopment, to illustrate the uniqueness of Japanese colonialism”<sup>188</sup> and take Japanese colonial as an anomaly.

That being the case, in the study of Japanese colonization in Taiwan, Japanese scholars, like Yanaihara Tadao and Tu Chao-yen, had paradoxical viewpoints that, while they admitted the occurrence of agricultural revolution, they did not believe that this revolution had favorable advantages for the native people. They believed that policies that originated from metropolitan Japan were designed to promote only Japanese interests and, in such conditions, the colonized people had no voice and could not share the fruits of economic growth.<sup>189</sup> They consolidated the ideas of exploitative mechanisms and socio-economic unevenness that was set in the colonial structure.<sup>190</sup> This viewpoint confirmed Tu Chao-yen’s emphasis on dependence and malformed features of the Taiwanese economy under Japanese rule.<sup>191</sup> Tu implies that the economic development in Taiwan before 1895 was normal. However, since Japan took control of Taiwan, the country’s economy had become increasingly dependent on the Japanese home market. Moreover, local businessmen with their own capital funds never found an

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<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.*, 2

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid.*, 2

<sup>189</sup> Ramon H. Myers 1984, Post World War II Japanese Historiography of Japan’s Formal Colonial Empire, in: The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895-1945, eds. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, N.J., 1984), 455-477

<sup>190</sup> C.M. Ka, Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan: land tenure, development, and dependency, 1895-1945, 181

<sup>191</sup> C.Y. Tu, Taiwan under Japanese Imperialism

equal opportunity to compete with the Japanese capitalist class because the colonial government controlled the whole domestic market in Taiwan.<sup>192</sup> Although Tu did not refute the creditable record of Japanese entrepreneurial bureaucrats who had opened up Taiwan's economy to foreign trade and modern technology, he firmly criticised the great power of the Japanese monopoly-capitalists that limited Taiwanese entrepreneurs to develop on an equal footing.<sup>193</sup>

To analyze this from a different angle, from the development/modernization point of view, the positive effects brought about by Japanese colonization are emphasized. Scholars in support of such an argument, for example, Myers, Chang and Samuel Ho, believe that a lot of significant work was achieved by the Japanese during the colonial period and emphasize the role of colonial state to foster economic growth. Among others, Samuel Ho, to a great extent, assumes that it was a turning point for development in Taiwan when the country was ceded to Japan. Thus, the following discussion will be largely based on his arguments. Becoming a Japanese colony and the transition from a neglected Chinese province effectively changed Taiwan into an open economy and, subsequently, made economic development more accessible. In addition, with a huge amount of human and material capital pouring into Taiwan, there was also a substantial influx of advanced technology and a better utilization of indigenous labor and land

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<sup>192</sup> R. H. Myers, Post World War II Japanese Historiography of Japan's Formal Colonial Empire, in: *The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895-1945*, 466

<sup>193</sup> R. H. Myers, Post World War II Japanese Historiography of Japan's Formal Colonial Empire, in: *The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895-1945*, 467

resources. The production capacity was highly and strikingly enhanced.<sup>194</sup> But, most importantly, the colonial government had different objectives and preferences than the previous Chinese government and was involved vigorously in developing the island.<sup>195</sup>

“It was the agent, the entrepreneur, that mobilized the resources and made development possible.”<sup>196</sup> Furthermore, Samuel Ho contests that although colonialism had its intangible costs and pride, the wages, per capita consumption, health and education of the average Taiwanese person improved predominantly during the colonial period. In conclusion of his analysis of Taiwan’s development under Japanese colonization, Samuel Ho even manifests that

“It is doubtful that Taiwan could have done as well economically had it remained a province of China without access to Japan’s material resources, administrative and technical know-how, and entrepreneurship.”<sup>197</sup> As a result, Ho believes that if Japan had suddenly decided to withdraw from Taiwan, both growth and the economy would have been retarded and suffered from dislocation.<sup>198</sup>

Even though in favor of the developmental viewpoint, Ho eclectically argues that the economic development of Taiwan can be analyzed by a well-known model of colonial development. This is the triangular mode of operation, which emphasizes any

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<sup>194</sup> P.S. Ho (1978), *Economic Development of Taiwan 1860-1970*, 25-40

<sup>195</sup> Pao-san Ho, *Development Policy of the Japanese Colonial Government in Taiwan*, in: *Government and Economic Development*, ed. Ranis Gustav (London, New Haven, 1971), 287-328

<sup>196</sup> P.S. Ho (1978), *Economic Development of Taiwan 1860-1970*, 25-26

<sup>197</sup> *Ibid.*, 101

<sup>198</sup> *Ibid.*, 91-102



unequal growth and development relationships between the primary sector, the non-agricultural sector and the foreign trade sector.<sup>199</sup> (Also refer to Figure 2) This model describes a close economic relationship between the colony and the colonising country. Although the colony profits from an open economy, its external relations are actually confined to the colonising country. Based on the European colonial experiences in Asia and Africa, this model helps to determine some of the major differences and similarities between economic development under Japanese colonialism and under European colonialism.<sup>200</sup> Samuel Ho states that in many aspects, the Japanese colonies developed in the way suggested by the model. For instance, Taiwan was closely tied to Japan and obviously formed the bilateralism of colonization. On one hand, Taiwan simply supplied primary products to Japan and served as a market for Japanese manufacturing. On the other hand, the triangular flow of resources was established by Japan in order to bring about an export surplus.<sup>201</sup> However, Ho declares that the development experience of Taiwan under Japanese colonization did not prove all aspects predicted by the model and it is a peculiar part of Japanese colonization. More importantly, economic development was not restricted in the Japanese-dominated enclave whilst the subsistence sector weakened. The reason is because in Taiwan the export sector included both the extractive, energy-intensive industries and peasant agriculture.

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<sup>199</sup> Pao-San Ho (1984), *Colonialism and Development: Korea, Taiwan, and Kwantung*, in: *The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895-1945*, 381

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.*, 381

<sup>201</sup> *Ibid.*, 382

The role of agriculture was significant, as agriculture was both the export sector and the mainstay of the economy during the colonial period. Hence, when rice was promoted by the Japanese, agricultural development in Taiwan was magnified to the subsistence sector and, simultaneously, nearly the whole agricultural population in Taiwan was involved in the development process.<sup>202</sup> More than anything else, “the development of peasant agriculture improved the economic conditions for the Taiwanese and prevented the two economies from becoming as strictly compartmentalized as the model predicted.”<sup>203</sup>

All in all, the developmental point of view emphasized the colonial government’s building strategies and programs that led to the economic development of Taiwan under Japanese rule.

Coming back to the dependency theory, it put more emphasis on the negative effects brought about by colonization, especially the dependency economy, which by and large would lead to a stagnated economy and underdevelopment. Nevertheless, this theory was challenged by the exceptional economic growth in Taiwan, for both the colonial period and post-colonial period. Barrett and Whyte state Taiwan as a case, challenging two predictions from the dependency theory: “that foreign economic penetration leads to slow economic growth and also to heightened inequality.”<sup>204</sup> After fifty years of a dependency economy under Japanese rule, Japanese colonization in

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<sup>202</sup> *Ibid.*, 385

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.*, 385

<sup>204</sup> Richard E. Barrett and Martin King Whyte, *Dependency Theory and Taiwan: Analysis of a deviant case*, in: *The American Journal of Sociology* 87(5) (1982): 1064-1089

Taiwan did not result in an absence of growth or even underdevelopment.<sup>205</sup> Therefore, in order to solve difficulties when dealing with cases like Taiwan, the term 'dependent development' emerged in the dependency theory. Gereffi illustrates this as, "Dependency theory modified to use the term dependent development to indicate that structural dependency on foreign capital and external markets constrains and distorts, but is not incompatible with, capitalist economic development."<sup>206</sup> Accordingly, rapid economic development would not be entirely confined, even in a state of dependency.

Looking at the modernization/development or dependency points of view, neither of them denied the uniqueness of Japanese colonization and, manifestly, the development in Taiwan under Japanese occupation did occur and prevail. Now, an interesting question can be raised: Was it because of Japanese colonization that Taiwan has succeeded where other Less-Developed-Countries have failed so far? Did Japan found a so-called development model that changed the economic scenario of East Asian countries, chiefly Taiwan and Korea? Will this model be a stepping stone for economic integration to further help East Asian regional integration?

#### 4.1.3 Japan paved the way for regional integration: building up a development model

(with intention or without intention)

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<sup>205</sup> *Ibid.*, 1064-1089

<sup>206</sup> Gary Gereffi, Rethinking Development Theory: Insights from East Asia and Latin America, in: Sociological Forum 4(4) (1989), 505-533

The East Asian development model<sup>207</sup> consists of “a bureaucratic state combining Confucian statecraft traditions with the European-style civil service, high levels of mass education, state direction of the economic, total surveillance, involvement in the regional political economy, and an ideology of national essence.”<sup>208</sup> Bruce Cumings further gave a term ‘the bureaucratic-authoritarian industrializing regime’<sup>209</sup> to specify this model. In short, the role of state is very essential in this development model.

Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, with manifest different traditional polities, with distinct cultures, societies and peoples, although in different temporal sequences, ended up to have resembling economic structures and have adopted quite similar political models and roles for the state<sup>210</sup>, which include “relative state autonomy, central coordination, bureaucratic short- and long-range planning, high flexibility in moving in and out of industrial sectors, private concentration in big conglomerates, exclusion of labor, exploitation of women, low expenditures on social welfare, militarization and authoritarian repression.”<sup>211</sup> This similar pattern and model followed by prewar Japan and contemporary South Korea and Taiwan should not be taken as granted or as a coincidence. Instead, the influences of Japanese colonization are strongly related and

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<sup>207</sup> Whether there is a general recognized East Asia development model or not is not the main concern here; it wouldn't be discussed in this respect in the chapter.

<sup>208</sup> Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern*, 250

<sup>209</sup> Bruce Cumings, *Colonial Formations and Deformations*, 294

<sup>210</sup> “When one is compared to another the differences will also be salient, but when all three are compared to the rest of the world the similarities are remarkable.”

<sup>211</sup> Bruce Cumings, *The Origins and Development of Northeast Asian political economy: industrial sectors, product cycles, and political consequences*, in: *International Organization* 38(1984): 1-40, 38

could be seen as the historical origin of this development model. Basing on Cumings' analysis, the model of East Asian political economy could be found in Japan and its colonies by the mid-1930s and then successively in post-war Japan, Taiwan and South Korea.

In the colonial period, especially in Taiwan, a highly disciplined, articulated, and penetrating colonial bureaucracy substituted both for the traditional regimes and for indigenous groups and classes; the colonial state replaced an old weak state to direct the development.<sup>212</sup> This experience goes a long way toward explaining the post 1945 succeeding marked centralization of both Taiwan and South Korea, and has provided a model for state-led development in all two. Therefore, the state-directed development model was rooted in the period of Japanese colonization.

What's more, as Cumings also argued, instead of considering it as an individual country phenomenon, the industrial development in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan is a regional phenomenon that a tripartite hierarchy of core, semi-periphery, and periphery was created in the first part of the 20th century and then slowly recreated after World War II.<sup>213</sup> Tracing back to the colonial period, Japanese intention to put East Asian integration under its control had predicted the relationships between Japan and its colonies, Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria in the theory of world system. Under Japanese

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<sup>212</sup> *Ibid.*, 11

<sup>213</sup> *Ibid.*, 38

control, both Taiwan and Korea had played the role and taken the characteristics of semi-periphery. In this system, Taiwan's geographic proximity to South China and Southeast Asia made it a natural location for processing certain raw materials taken from these areas, and then for producing some manufactured goods to export to there.<sup>214</sup> Apparently, Taiwan became as a base for Japan to implement its southward policy in the rest of Asia. As for Korea, the developing periphery was Manchuria, where Korea sent soldiers, merchants, bureaucrats and workers to occupy a middle position between Japanese overlords and Chinese peasants; while Korean rice was imported to Japan, millet was shipped from Manchuria to feed Korean peasants in a classic core-semiperiphery-periphery relationship.<sup>215</sup>

Under such kind of operations, not only the form of state-centered development but also the industrial developments, East Asian economies were more or less closer connected, interdependent and somehow followed the specific pattern conducted by Japan. In shaping the effects of economic forces on distinct societies, cultures and peoples in Asia, Japanese influences were tremendous and cannot be ignored.

Although the comparatively successful development experiences in colonial Taiwan and Korea offered better explanation and samples of East Asian development model, many of the neomercantile state features<sup>216</sup> that persist even today in the model was

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<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*, 13

<sup>215</sup> *Ibid.*, 13

<sup>216</sup> The neomercantile features include: "its virtuosity in moving through the product cycle, from old to

acquired in the 1930s<sup>217</sup>, combined with the lesson of Manchukuo. Scholars like Li Narangoa and Robert Cribb asserted that “the idea of Japan as a model for modernity was especially important in Japan’s construction of a platform for establishing Manchukuo after 1931 and in creating a new political order elsewhere in northern China thereafter.”<sup>218</sup> Therefore, as Duara declared, “several features of this model outside Japan derive principally from the period of strategic autarky in which Manchukuo and its pattern of industrial development, corporatist organization, surveillance, and mobilization played a central role. Indeed, postwar state-builders in South Korea were deeply shaped by their experiences in Manchukuo. The particular cultural deployment of the East Asian modern-enabling exaltation of the state, commitment of the bureaucracy, appeals to discipline and self-sacrifice, and moral suasion, among other developments---is a significant precondition of the East Asian model.”<sup>219</sup>

The importance of Japanese forming and accelerating of such East Asian development model is influential. Since 1960s, the economic miracles of East Asian countries, namely, the industrialization, rapid economic development, substantial growth in per capita income and the formation of a vibrant multi-directional East Asian regional

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new industries; the extraordinary role for the bureaucracy and key agencies like MITI, exercising "administrative guidance" throughout the economy; the peculiar vehicles for credit, which account for much of the mobility in and out of industries; the role of large conglomerates; the systematic exclusion of labor from most important decision making; and the high rates of exploitation of poorly paid female labor.”

<sup>217</sup> Bruce Cumings, *The Origins and Development of Northeast Asian political economy: industrial sectors, product cycles, and political consequences*, 14

<sup>218</sup> Li Narangoa and Robert Cribb, *Japan and the Transformation of National Identities in Asia in the Imperial Era*, 8

<sup>219</sup> Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, 250

economy have caught a lot of attentions around the world. Such Asian economic success is almost uniformly believed to have been largely dependent on exports.<sup>220</sup> This kind of exported-oriented development linked with the hyper-growth of Pacific Asia expanded the notion of “a new development orthodoxy.”<sup>221</sup> Further clarification can be proven by T.J. Pempel, “Asian successes, combined with geopolitical proximity and a host of common traits related to political and economic organization and to social structures have led contemporary theorists to group the nations of East Asia under umbrella terms such as ‘the developmental state.’”<sup>222</sup> From this viewpoint of the developmental state, Japanese colonial management in Asian regions had lasting impacts on forming the model of development. Early postwar developmental and social change strategies throughout East Asia focused on state-directed investment and accumulation, social change strategies that concentrated on land reform, and measures that blocked takeover by international capital while creating firm foundations for the domestic economy, all these representatives cannot be understood apart from Japan and the era of Japanese colonialism.<sup>223</sup>

As East Asia has come to be regarded as one of the three major regions in the world, East Asian integration, regionalism and regional co-operation become the central

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<sup>220</sup> T.J. Pempel, *Transpacific Torii: Japan and the Emerging Asian Regionalism*, in: *Network Power*, eds. Katzenstein and Shiraishi (Ithaca, New York 1997) 47-82, 76

<sup>221</sup> Stephan Haggard, *The Newly Industrializing Countries in the International System*, in: *World Politics* 38(1986), 344

<sup>222</sup> T.J. Pempel, *Transpacific Torii: Japan and the Emerging Asian Regionalism*, 76

<sup>223</sup> Mark Selden, *East Asia Regionalism and its Enemies in Three Epochs: Political Economy and Geopolitics, 16<sup>th</sup> to 21<sup>st</sup> centuries*



issues to be intensified. Before expanding regional co-operation into a political domain, economic sphere and integration play a precursory role for the arrival of deeper and broader regional integration. With no exception, Japanese first attempt and experience in East Asian integration derived from colonialism showed exactly the rule and pattern. Besides, since the economic integration is the very starting point for feasible or even successful regional cooperation and integration, the East Asian model of development predominated by Japan using its own modernization experiences as referral to lead the rest of 'geese' in Asian countries, illustrated the chance for economic integration to move further forward and can be considered as the catalyst to set up the historical pattern of East Asian regional integration development. In such respect, Japanese colonialism is unique in a way more positively to prepare East Asia for integration.

#### **4.2 Legacies left by Japan**

Facing the predatory European and US imperialism, how to react to the modernity brought by them explained the collapse of the Chinese empire and the rise of Japanese imperialism.<sup>224</sup> The period when Japan started to build its own empire over Asia was the point for political domains in Asia to change. There is no denying that the rise of Japan as a colonizer or as a 'defender' against western colonial power did give a lesson and establish a paragon for East Asian countries to contemplate, for example, a question like

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<sup>224</sup> Barbara Bush, *Imperialism and Modernity*, 100

‘Why did China decline into chaos in response to Western imperial penetration and Japan become an imperial power in its own right.’ It could be said that Japanese models, actions, and ideas influenced many societies, peoples and countries in Asia during the colonial period. However, whether these impacts were positive or negative is still under debate. In Li Narangoa and Robert Cribb’s observations, “in some cases, Japan’s achievements inspired admiration: Japan’s early success in industrializing and its spectacular victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 inspired many Asians; in other cases, especially among peoples who had been ruled by other powers, Chinese or Western, Japan’s presence offered an opportunity to change the balance of power in favor of the subject people, and these people sought to persuade the Japanese into granting them support; in still other cases, however, the brutality of Japanese authorities in the occupied territories turned sentiment against Japan and stimulated identities which were fundamentally hostile to Japan’s war aims.”<sup>225</sup> Accordingly, Japan’s expansion into Asia and the colonial control under the goal of empire building shaped the national identities of its neighbors both positively, presenting a model to be followed, and also negatively, offering an example to be avoided.<sup>226</sup>

Aside from the national identities impacts, the Japanese colonialism symbolized the conceivable plan for regional order and integration. Before Japanese colonization, East

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<sup>225</sup> Li Narangoa and Robert Cribb, *Japan and the Transformation of National Identities in Asia in the Imperial Era*, 2-3

<sup>226</sup> *Ibid.*, 4

Asia was somehow in the state of chaos or under anarchy due to the western colonial carve-up. Even after the end of Japanese colonialism following the defeat of Japan in World War II, because of the cold-war period, Asia (East Asia) was continually fragmented by ideological cleavages. The possibility to speak of regional integration or the likelihood to put regional order in arrangement was insignificantly small and weak. Hence, it is no exaggeration to state that Japan's attempt to consolidate and form a single 'co-prosperity sphere' during the colonial period was the noticeable and symbolic representation for Asian regional integration. Cumings affirmed that Japanese unilateral colonialism until 1945 suggests that a hegemonic system is essential and even necessary for the functioning of regional political economy.<sup>227</sup>

However, a great power driven either by economic requisite or by imperial ambition to swell its influences beyond its own borders, has always two expansion techniques to choose from: by using armed force to impose its will or selecting the methods of peaceful penetration to apply. In the case of Japan, in the pursuit of what she believed to be its own interests in Asia, Japan frequently decided to turn to the use of armed force.<sup>228</sup> It's exactly this resort to armed force which made Japanese colonization and its empire building over the whole of Asia the negative recollection and terrible wartime memory which, to a certain extent, hinders the East Asian regional order or integration

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<sup>227</sup> Cumings, *The Origins and Development of Northeast Asian political economy: industrial sectors, product cycles, and political consequences*, 38

<sup>228</sup> Jack Shepherd, *Japan's Southward Advance---Economic and Political*, in: *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 215(1941):44-53, 44

to move forward. Up until today it has made regional cooperation and integration based on a shared perception of the region's present, past and future impossible.

This negative recollection of Japanese colonialism has lasting effects on the political economy of Asia. In spite of the impacts on modernity, national identities, development model and so on, Japanese colonialism could not excuse itself from producing exploitation, repressive domination and the reproduction of dissimilarities between ruler and ruled in the colonies. The negative recollections Japan brought to Asian countries and the following non-constructive influences exerted on these countries is like the Achilles' heel for a smooth and successful East Asian cooperation and advanced integration.

#### **4.3 Japanese colonialism and the distinguishing features of Asian integration**

##### **nowadays**

In the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, because of the growing competitive pressure from globalization, economic and political integration, regional cooperation and enlargement have become distinctive features of international political and economic scenes. While the European Union is considered to be fully integrated, Asia still lags behind, particularly with respect to political integration. Despite the fact that political integration in Asia remains quite limited, recent economic integration initiatives through bilateral or

multi-lateral free trade agreements illustrate that governments in Asia have gradually recognized the mutual benefits gained from economic integration and interdependence. However, integration in Asia is still largely driven by market incentives. As Axel Berkofsky observed, “economic integration is perceived as beneficial when it yields economic benefits for all parties involved, whereas the benefits of political integration in Asia are not yet fully acknowledged.”<sup>229</sup> It seems that social or economic integration in Asia has not had a spillover effect<sup>230</sup> to the political arena<sup>231</sup>, as neo-functionalist theory would predict. Thus, the overall outcomes of Asian integration are not very remarkable in comparison. Since the European Union is a prominent leading group in regional integration, the EU model has been commonly used as a counterpart or benchmark to study regionalism or regional integration in Asia. In comparison to the European Union, Asian governments are in favor of the so-called ‘network- style’ of integration in the promotion of regional cooperation, which emphasizes the importance of making use of interpersonal and informal relations instead of taking democratic structures including legally codified-binding and institutional regulations as precondition to pursue ‘Asian-style integration’.<sup>232</sup> The network style of integration in Asian countries, in other

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<sup>229</sup> Axel Berkofsky, Comparing EU and Asian Integration Processes--- the EU a Role for Asia? In: EPC Issue Papers 23(2005):1-22, 7

<sup>230</sup> Spillover effect is one of the hypotheses of the neo-functionalist theory and it means that “based on high rates of mutual transactions; the greater the policy scope and the higher the level of the initial commitment are to collective decision-making, the greater the propensity is for task expansion.”

<sup>231</sup> Dong-ching Day and Alvin Yuan-ming Yao, EU Model and Cross-Strait Integration, In: Regional Integration, State-building and Conflict Settlement in Europe and Asia Conference Presenting paper (2004), 1-22

<sup>232</sup> Axel Berkofsky, Comparing EU and Asian Integration Processes--- the EU a Role for Asia?, 9

words, is the integration without institutionalization. The lack of institutionalization is clearly displayed in the operation of ASEAN or even ASEAN+3<sup>233</sup>, which are two of the influential associations to coordinate foreign and economic policies among Asian nations. Unlike the way the European Union is organized and run, ASEAN and ASEAN+3 act on the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of their member states. This non-interference principle is indeed the key principle formulated in the ASEAN Charter and it has played a significant role in limiting influences from the association on member states' policy making. Although a lack in EU-style of institutionalized integration might not necessarily be a shortcoming for Asian countries, because it makes the processes of integration more flexible and maintains its non-binding legal status, the key principle of non-interference in internal affairs could actually still be considered to remain an obstacle for further economic and political integration in Asia.

So, why is there an Asian style of integration distinct from EU style? What were the reasons that made Asian countries to advocate non-interference principle, bilateralism and bilateral alliances? Why are Asian nations, at least for the foreseeable future, not willing to integrate further economically and politically, in spite of encouragements from the wider aspirations to develop an Asian identity and the pressure from outside?

When speaking of regional integration among Asian countries, the importance of

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<sup>233</sup> ASEAN stands for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and ASEAN+3 is ASEAN member states plus Japan, China and South Korea.

issues like divergences, difficulties and even disputes existing among Asian countries, without doubt, are considerable and should not be neglected. Nevertheless, the unwillingness or reluctance of Asian countries to endeavor to institutionalize their relations has something to do with a shared feeling of distrust that regional bureaucratic structures will finally become unconnected or even autonomous from their state sponsors.<sup>234</sup> The fears of losing their own sovereignties and the strong desires to defend their state rights could be credibly traced back to the influences of Japanese colonialism and legacies left by Japan's great empire building.

Before the paper moves on to more discussion of the uniqueness of Japanese colonization in terms of lasting influences on Asian integration, one opinion from Axel Berkofsky is worth mentioning: "A number of authors argue that it is the nature of British, French, Dutch and US colonialism in Southeast Asia which still hinders Asian economic and political integration. Southeast Asian nations, Peter Katzenstein wrote in the mid-1990s, are heirs to colonial powers and have inherited the colonial tradition of the 'rule by law' rather than the West European tradition of the 'rule of law.' The relation between state and society is governed by social rather than legal norms. Following this argument, colonialism has indeed kept former colonies to establish democratic structures (after the era of colonialism in Southeast Asia) as the precondition for meaningful and

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<sup>234</sup> Axel Berkofsky, *Comparing EU and Asian Integration Processes--- the EU a Role for Asia?*, 7

codified Asian regional integration.”<sup>235</sup> There is no intention here to controvert or disagree with this statement, however, in my opinion, no other colonial powers reveled in their legacies and impacts on Asian integration in an extent so comprehensive, convincing and noteworthy as Japanese colonialism did.

First of all, as mentioned above, during the Japanese colonial period, the modernity or developmental model was introduced and made applicable to Asia, nationalism was boosted to become a powerful force in Asia, and pan-Asianism was promoted as the main ideology to shape Asia’s own identities against the Western powers. From the very first trials and experiments in Taiwan and Korea, through its ambitious attempts to create the new State of Manchukuo on Asian mainland, to its concise but dramatic invasion into Southeast Asia in order to fulfill the dream of ‘the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere’, Japan unscrupulously utilized all its strengths to expand its power all over Asia and set up its own empire. Even though Japan did make a first attempt to set up regional Asian order, this attempt inevitably gave Asian countries an association of regional integration with conflicting historical experiences. Under the cover and ideal concept of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, scenes of Japan’s brutality and repression with armed force are still vivid in the minds of many Asian countries. Consequently, negative impressions from Japanese colonialism could be seen as the main cause of the distrust among Asian countries, which then became one of the impediments for further

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<sup>235</sup> *Ibid.*, 17



regional integration: the uncertainty of losing their sovereignties and being subordinate to some other strong central power exist whenever the wartime and colonial period memories are recalled. Before China's catching up, Japan was the only economic power that could take the role as a regional leader but was distrusted by its neighbor countries because of its militarism.<sup>236</sup> Based on the 'theory of hegemonic stability'<sup>237</sup>, "regional leadership is similar to regional public good; thus, the undersupply of public goods may be the root cause for limited achievements in regional institutional cooperation."<sup>238</sup> Besides, in association with the characteristics of preferring bilateral relations, alliance, cooperation and agreement in Asian-style integration, Japanese colonial rule proved somehow to be in charge. The incapability of Japan to pacify the endemic conflicts or to create effective regional bonds during the colonial period induced Japan to prioritize its own military security and put bilateral relations with other colonies in primacy even under such imperial operation of a 'world system'.<sup>239</sup> The bilateral relations were emphasized and prioritized during the Japanese colonial period and continued to persist for a long time.

Secondly, another decisive influence from Japanese colonialism on further

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<sup>236</sup> Tsai-Lung Hong, East Asian Economic Integration and Taiwan's FTA Strategies, in: Taiwan Institute of Economic Research paper 2-56(2008):1-23

<sup>237</sup> Theory of Hegemonic Stability is the international relations theory, indicating that the international system or order is more likely to remain under control and stable when a single nation-state is the dominant world power.

<sup>238</sup> Tsai-Lung Hong, East Asian Economic Integration and Taiwan's FTA Strategies, 4

<sup>239</sup> Mark Selden, East Asia Regionalism and its Enemies in Three Epochs: Political Economy and Geopolitics, 16<sup>th</sup> to 21<sup>st</sup> centuries, 24

integration lies in the complicated relationship between Japan and China. If the assumptions are accepted that the region's biggest economies Japan and the rising China are the two main players and engines for the game of Asian integration and that both countries are able and willing to take the roles, regardless of the disputes that whether a country like China without democratic political structures should be assigned a leadership role for the integration process, it further implies that stable Japanese-Chinese relations, with reconciliation and collaboration between the two countries will be the key point for further economic and political integration in Asia. There is no doubt that the tensions between China and Japan in international politics are far more complex to perceive and factors like economic competition, rivalry and interdependence matter a lot as well when the relations between Japan and China are concerned. Nevertheless, one crucial point should be intensively regarded: the inability for both countries to overcome the legacies of war, reminiscences of rude manners, conflicts, and invasions left by Japanese hegemony during Japan's empire period. Namely, it was this historical element of Japanese colonialism staying in the way to block the propitiation between China and Japan, which further situated advanced Asian integration in a predicament.

In short, with the early signs of integration and regional cooperation, the phenomenon of regionalism is well recognized to play a vital role in the changing

international relations of East Asia in recent decades.<sup>240</sup> With the growing attention received by integration and regionalism, the significance of Japanese colonial effects and legacies appears to be increasing. Dealing with the issue of integration in Asia, therefore, makes one question whether there is a need to reconcile and build the trust before constructing regional political cooperation for further integration. In such respect, Japanese colonialism again presents its unique dimension of lasting impacts. Whether positive or negative, these effects are valid till nowadays and, as it's believed, they will continue to exist in every aspect concerning Asian affairs in the future.

## V. Conclusion

“As the only non-Western imperium of recent times, the Japanese colonial empire stands as an anomaly of modern history. It was assembled at the apogee of the new imperialism by a nation which was assiduously striving to emulate Western organizational models... Yet the historical and geographic circumstances of the overseas Japanese empire set it apart from its European counterparts and gave it a character and purpose scarcely duplicated elsewhere.”<sup>241</sup> Both congenital environment and acquired conditions were favorable for Japan to develop its own unique empire. In Ching's words, “the historical timing of Japanese imperialism and the regional nature of its colonizing activity are

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<sup>240</sup> Sven Saaler, *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History*

<sup>241</sup> Mark R. Peattie (1984), *op.cit.*, pp.6

therefore the temporal and spatial coordinates that influenced and informed the unique formation and configuration of the Japanese empire.”<sup>242</sup> Japan seized the opportunity to fulfill its target and form its unique colonialism. From the beginning strategy in order to solve problems of food shortage, over-population, the growing resources dependency, and to the need for total mobilization, Japan expanded its empire from Taiwan, Korea to Manchuria, Northern China, and even to the Southeast Asia in 1930s and 1940s.

Through the processes of learning by doing, Japan had its own perception of ideal Asian order, which was integrated under Japanese leadership. Japan’s ruling principles were accentuated from the practical economic development and constructive foundation to conceptual ideological beliefs and conversion. Japanese colonialism in Taiwan and Korea provided the plentiful experiences for economic growth, gave the rational explanation for East Asian miracle and further put the distinct model of development in Asia up for the followers to refer. The establishment of Manchukuo under Japan’s guidance clarified the relationship between the “globally circulatory notion of culture and civilization, transnational identities, and nationalist ideology in the 20<sup>th</sup> century,”<sup>243</sup> and signified the intention of Japanese political integration under the name of Pan-Asianism. The promotion of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere presented the trend of further spreading Pan-Asianism ideology and the vision for sketching the blueprint of regional

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<sup>242</sup> T.S. Ching, *op.cit.*, pp. 20-21

<sup>243</sup> Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity, Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern*, 245

integration.

In some respects, in terms of global history, Japanese colonization seems to have been different from the Western experiences. First of all, Japanese colonization, which was short of expansive capital, operated against the typology of colonialism from Hobson to Lenin. This typology considered imperialism and colonialism as a specific stage of capitalism that expressed the political superstructure of dominating monopolies and finance capital.<sup>244</sup> With its own historical background, attitudes, objectives and sharing a similar culture and regional location with its colonies, Japanese colonization, although basing on some Western colonial experiences, was “an imperialism without capital”<sup>245</sup>. In spite of causing a more or less dependent economy in colonies, for instance in Taiwan, without a plantation system and with active government involvement, strong and effective policies and deliberate planning of projects, the consequences that resulted from Japanese colonization were relatively impressive. It is recorded that Taiwan underwent, if not dramatic, at least steady, economic growth during the fifty years of Japanese occupation. This growth, compared to other colonies ruled by other colonial powers, was imposing and it is this growth that further formed the uniqueness of Japanese colonization as Japan planned the development of its colonies more effectively and comprehensively than other colonial powers did in their colonies.

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<sup>244</sup> T.S.Ching, *op.cit.*, pp.21

<sup>245</sup> Tadao Yanaihara (1988), *op.cit.*

Economic development is a process of accumulation, which means that today's achievements should be built on past accomplishments. Understandably, Gann maintains "The *Wirtschaftswunder*"<sup>246</sup> experienced by Taiwan after World War II had its roots in the Japanese colonial era"<sup>247</sup>. To zooming in the case of Taiwan, according to Lee and Chen, the distinct phases of agricultural development in Taiwan can be divided into six phases<sup>248</sup>, in that the initial agricultural development and success of agricultural transformation were both under Japanese colonial rule.<sup>249</sup> Although industrial development was not as spectacular as the agricultural one under Japanese administration, agricultural growth alone played its role in ushering in advanced development. Based on the thoughts of the Marxist and classical schools, the agricultural sector supports industrialization by transferring farming surpluses to other sectors, rather than reinvesting in agriculture. The implication is that the larger the agricultural surplus, the better the chance of industrialization and growth. In the article by Penelope Francks<sup>250</sup>, it is claimed that Taiwan was the representative in the East Asian region and became industrialized on the basis of significant agricultural sectors. Therefore, if agricultural

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<sup>246</sup> *Wirtschaftswunder* means economic miracle.

<sup>247</sup> Lewis H. Gann, *op.cit.*, pp.523

<sup>248</sup> Six phases: "1913-23 the initial period of agricultural development under Japanese colonial rule; 1923-37 success in agricultural transformation; 1937-46 downward trend of agricultural output, the effect of war and typhoon damage; 1946-51 rapid recovery of Taiwan agriculture after WWII; 1951-60 further development; 1960-70 the sustained agricultural growth."

<sup>249</sup> Teng-hui Lee and Yuen-eh Chen, "Agricultural Growth in Taiwan, 1911-1972," in *Agricultural Growth in Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and the Philippines*, eds. Yujiro Hayami, Vernon W. Ruttan, and Herman M. Southworth (Honolulu: the East-West Center, The University Press of Hawaii, 1979), pp. 59-89

<sup>250</sup> Penelope Francks, "Japan and an East Asian Model of Agriculture's Role in Industrialization," *Japan Forum* 12(1) (2000): pp.43-52

sectors played such an essential role in Taiwan's industrialization and economic development, then it might be rationalized that successful agricultural transformation and development under Japanese colonization was the key factor that established the foundations for Taiwan's high growth rate and rapid industrialization between the 1960s and the 1990s.

From the colonial point of view, or from the perspective of colonial contribution and development, Japanese colonization was quite a unique case and its colonial record was reasonably successful. While they made good use of resources, grabbed every possible exploitation opportunity to meet their own benefits and even set up the esteemed ideal to conquer the whole Asia, the Japanese did not fail to endow its colonies with the potential to progress further progress.

However, even though there might be some "historical and philosophical differences in the methods of colonization, the fundamental structure of the relation between colonizer and colonized remains quite similar."<sup>251</sup> Plus, it is undeniable that most forms of colonialism share one similarity: an external power to rule a native people with some kind of force.<sup>252</sup> As Yamamuro also confirmed, "No matter how lofty the ideals proposed, a colony could only be treated as the object of exploitation according to the

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<sup>251</sup> T.S. Ching, *op.cit.*, pp.19

<sup>252</sup> *Ibid.*, pp15-50

operative laws of a colony.”<sup>253</sup> Even though Japanese colonialism more or less did contribute to the development of its colonies, Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria, from the natives’ viewpoint, the intentions and aims of Japanese colonization at the end turned out to be no such different from other Western colonial powers: everything was served for Japan’s own benefits and interests. The intangible costs included being humiliated as second class citizens, or possessing no real political and personal freedom and also losing the appropriate opportunity to form their own society.<sup>254</sup> Therefore, from this perspective, Japanese colonial record seemed not to stand out above other western colonial powers. Notwithstanding, this paper intended to address the uniqueness of Japanese intangible imperial effects on strengthening the concept of nationalism, encouraging and also undermining the making of national identity, consciousness of state sovereignty and the singularity originating from both Japanese negative recollections and positive legacies which lasted for longer time to change the scenario of present and future regionalism in Asia. Ironically speaking, from one side, Japanese domination during the colonial period was the first attempt to realize Asian integration, put Asian countries under one orderly system, set up a development model as referral for modernization, and awaken many Asian countries to a sense of sovereignty and authenticity; from the other side, it was due to this early attempt that put the nowadays

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<sup>253</sup> Shin’ichi Yamamuro, *Manchuria under Japanese Dominion*, 237

<sup>254</sup> P.S. Ho (1984), *op.cit.*, pp. 386



Asian advanced integration in the position less feasible and problematic. Not only due to the feeling of distrust or losing state supremacy once again among nations, but also because of the vigorous roles played by Japan and China in regional integration/cooperation in Asia.<sup>255</sup> More smoothly contemporary Asian integration could be anticipated when Japan and China work together and coordinate. With the strong economic force, Japan is able and expected to take the leading role of pushing the processes of integration. And China, the rising power now, is also expected to be in charge of leading regional integration in Asia. However, on one side, concerning the colonial negative recollections, which also had great influence on self-criticism in Japanese domestic politics<sup>256</sup>, and being satisfied with the comparatively stable bilateral relations with the U.S., Japan is less willing to again actively get involved into leading Asia, and avoids re-awakening the images of Japanese colonization fearing a rise in spirits against Japan. On the other side, as aforementioned because of the complicated relationship between China and Japan, there is no easy way for China to be completely open-minded to rehabilitate and work together with Japan without holding any grudge against Japan. In sum, Japanese colonization is unique as catalysis to step up the formation and construction of regional integration in Asia, and simultaneously as a

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<sup>255</sup> There is no doubt that Asian integration, including East Asia and Southeast Asia, depends on efforts from every related nations and there are also many leading nations should be taken into consideration. Whether regional integration in Asia can further be advanced or not relies mainly on China and Japan's key involvements.

<sup>256</sup> Sven Saaler, *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History*, 1-18

hamper to slow down the integration process.

Nonetheless, Japanese colonization taught an irreplaceable lesson. From the contemporary perspective, the concept of Asian integration and pan-Asianist means a lot for a case like Taiwan. As part and parcel of a pan-Asianist concept of the Japanese, East Asian integration might today offer an opportunity for Taiwan not to be marginalized in Asia<sup>257</sup> and provide an alternative to relax the Cross-Strait tensions between China and Taiwan. Following the belief in regional integration encouraged by Japan during the colonial period, the further successful and institutionalized integration in East Asia present a framework or mechanism for Taiwan and China to move forward beyond economic integration, which helps to avoid a vicious circle between Taiwan's identity issue and China's intimidation, to manage stalemate, to maintain the peace and stabilize the status-quo around Taiwan and China and the whole region as well.<sup>258</sup> With the platform offered by integration, common interests and ideology are taken as the first priority, war could be prevented, Cross-Strait tensions could be relaxed and then the peaceful order could be expected.

History does not repeat itself, yet it might offer insight into possible options. This is exactly the role played by Japanese colonization over the long time-span in the past,

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<sup>257</sup> As mentioned before, regionalism and integration in East Asia are in favor of bilateralism, either in terms of political or economics aspects, like FTA. Since Taiwan's national status is not clearly defined and still under debate, with China's rising as a strong power and its continual denying acknowledging Taiwan's existence and sovereignty, Taiwan might face the reality to be marginalized in the regional affairs.

<sup>258</sup> Dong-ching Day and Alvin Yuan-ming Yao, *EU Model and Cross-Strait Integration*, 22

present and future. Japan's colonialism influenced many Asian regions and more than half a century later it still marked the landscape of Asian politics and popular culture, as well as economic and military policies. Objectively speaking, Japanese colonization is singular and hard to duplicate and its great impact on East Asian history of development and the Asian integration are self-evident. If a hegemonic system is necessary for the functioning of regional political economy, the unilateral colonialism conducted by Japan in Asia until 1945 was a good example for deliberation and introspection. Japanese domination in the forms of colonialism is undoubtedly controversial. Nevertheless, from the perspective of well-planned economic development and social changes to the growing ambitions of expanding pan-Asian regionalism, to the even broader view of regional dynamics and regional ties to the world in the global context, no other colonial powers could be so thorough and complex in building empire; and no other colonial powers had so lasting, wide-range influences and legacies as Japanese colonialism on contemporary international relations and the international political economy in the region. There is no denying that every colonial power had its own distinct features, but, concerning developing the economy, spreading the idea of modernization and nationalism, building regionalism, promoting integration and so on, Japanese colonization presented its own uniqueness in an all-round and full scale manner and gave it a character and purpose scarcely duplicated elsewhere.

## Appendix

Table 1 GDP Per Capita Growth Rates in 16 East Asia, 1820-1998

	<b>1820-70</b>	<b>1870-1913</b>	<b>1913-50</b>	<b>1950-73</b>	<b>1973-98</b>
Bangladesh				-0.36	1.99
Burma			-1.47	2.03	1.97
China	-0.25	0.10	-0.62	2.86	5.39
Hong Kong				5.19	4.27
India <sup>a</sup>	0.00	0.54	-0.22	1.40	2.91
Indonesia	0.13	0.75	-0.20	2.57	2.90
Japan	0.19	1.48	0.89	8.05	2.34
Malaysia			1.50	2.18	4.16
Nepal				0.99	1.69
Pakistan				1.73	2.87
Philippines			0.01	2.66	0.59
Singapore			1.50	4.40	5.47
South Korea <sup>b</sup>			-0.40	5.84	5.99
Sri Lanka			0.33	1.93	3.29
Taiwan			0.61	6.65	5.31
Thailand		0.39	-0.06	3.67	4.91
<b>16 East Asia</b>	<b>-0.10</b>	<b>0.49</b>	<b>-0.08</b>	<b>3.83</b>	<b>3.30</b>

GDP Growth Rates in 16 East Asia, 1820-1998


	<b>1820-70</b>	<b>1870-1913</b>	<b>1913-50</b>	<b>1950-73</b>	<b>1973-98</b>
Bangladesh				1.66	4.24
Burma			-0.25	3.84	3.96
China	-0.37	0.56	-0.02	5.02	6.84
Hong Kong				8.13	6.21
India <sup>a</sup>	0.38	0.97	0.23	3.54	5.07
Indonesia	1.10	2.04	1.05	4.61	4.96
Japan	0.41	2.44	2.21	9.29	2.97
Malaysia			3.54	4.88	6.61
Nepal				2.51	4.27
Pakistan				4.37	5.55
Philippines			2.23	5.79	3.08
Singapore			4.71	7.93	7.45
South Korea <sup>b</sup>			0.30	8.13	7.31
Sri Lanka			1.55	4.46	4.77
Taiwan		1.95	2.87	9.81	6.77
Thailand		1.35	2.23	6.87	6.59
<b>16 East Asia</b>	<b>0.03</b>	<b>1.04</b>	<b>0.84</b>	<b>6.00</b>	<b>5.09</b>

Source: Maddison (2001), Table A3-d. and Table A3-e., pp. 216-217

Table 2 Cultivated Land Areas 1901-1965

Year	Total	Paddy Land	Dry Land	Percentage of Cultivated Land to Total Area a/		Percentage of Cultivated Land		Year	Total	Paddy Land	Dry Land	Percentage of Cultivated Land to Total Area a/		Percentage of Cultivated Land	
				ha	%	Paddy Land	Dry Land					ha	%	Paddy Land	Dry Land
1901	375,909	206,753	169,156		10.5	55.0	45.0	1933	820,047	436,934	383,113		22.8	53.3	46.7
1902	437,465	245,388	192,077		12.2	56.1	43.9	1934	825,726	448,990	376,736		23.0	54.4	45.6
1903	534,157	278,190	255,967		14.9	52.1	47.9	1935	831,003	478,689	352,314		23.1	57.6	42.4
1904	625,299	303,196	322,103		17.4	48.5	51.5	1936	846,021	517,771	328,250		23.5	61.2	38.8
1905	624,501	304,908	319,593		17.4	48.8	51.2	1937	856,689	528,061	328,628		23.8	61.6	38.4
1906	633,647	309,615	324,032		17.6	48.9	51.1	1938	857,789	526,818	330,971		23.9	61.4	38.6
1907	654,233	318,658	335,575		18.2	48.7	51.3	1939	859,550	530,100	329,450		23.9	61.7	38.3
1908	650,238	322,800	327,438		18.1	49.6	50.4	1940	860,439	529,610	330,829		23.9	61.6	38.4
1909	661,949	327,620	334,329		18.4	49.5	50.5	AVG	838,201	482,193	356,029		23.3	57.5	42.5
1910	674,100	332,372	341,728		18.7	49.3	50.7	1941	859,446	527,981	331,465		23.9	61.4	38.6
AVG.	587,150	294,950	292,200		16.3	50.2	49.8	1942	854,462	524,533	329,929		23.8	61.4	38.6
1911	687,187	334,928	352,259		19.1	48.7	51.3	1943	846,986	519,861	327,125		23.6	61.4	38.6
1912	689,886	335,955	353,931		19.2	48.7	51.3	1944	808,165	501,414	306,751		22.5	62.0	38.0
1913	691,032	337,610	353,422		19.2	48.9	51.1	1945	816,017	504,709	311,308		22.7	61.9	38.1
1914	693,173	339,593	353,580		19.3	49.0	51.0	1946	831,951	507,636	324,315		23.1	61.0	39.0
1915	700,080	343,087	356,993		19.5	49.0	51.0	1947	833,952	516,378	317,574		23.2	61.9	38.1
1916	716,205	347,879	368,326		19.9	48.6	51.4	1948	863,157	526,384	336,773		24.0	61.0	39.0
1917	720,637	320,528	400,109		20.0	44.5	55.5	1949	864,864	528,097	336,767		24.0	61.1	38.9
1918	732,255	341,479	390,776		20.4	46.6	53.4	1950	870,633	530,236	340,397		24.2	60.9	39.1
1919	737,923	345,101	392,822		20.5	46.8	53.2	AVG	844,963	518,723	326,240		23.5	61.4	38.6
1920	749,419	367,177	382,242		20.8	49.0	51.0	1951	873,871	533,804	340,067		24.3	61.1	38.9
AVG	711,780	341,334	370,446		19.8	48.0	52.0	1952	876,100	533,643	342,457		24.4	60.9	39.1
1921	752,805	364,148	388,657		20.9	48.4	51.6	1953	872,738	533,316	339,422		24.3	61.1	38.9
1922	750,540	365,002	385,538		20.9	48.6	51.4	1954	874,097	532,565	341,532		24.3	60.9	39.1
1923	752,076	365,434	386,642		20.9	48.6	51.4	1955	873,002	532,688	340,314		24.3	61.0	39.0
1924	761,800	368,642	393,158		21.2	48.4	51.6	1956	875,791	533,113	342,678		24.4	60.9	39.1
1925	775,468	373,629	401,839		21.6	48.2	51.8	1957	873,263	533,144	340,119		24.3	61.1	38.9
1926	790,044	382,093	407,951		22.0	48.4	51.6	1958	883,466	533,674	349,792		24.6	60.4	39.6
1927	797,151	387,144	410,007		22.0	48.6	51.4	1959	877,740	528,762	348,979		24.4	60.2	39.8
1928	806,754	391,714	415,040		22.4	48.6	51.4	1960	869,223	525,580	343,643		24.2	60.5	39.5
1929	805,043	393,817	411,226		22.4	48.9	51.1	AVG	874,929	532,029	342,900		24.3	60.8	39.2
1930	812,116	396,670	415,446		22.6	48.8	51.2	1961	871,759	528,149	343,610		24.2	60.6	39.4
AVG	780,380	378,830	401,550		21.7	48.5	51.5	1962	871,858	530,354	341,504		24.2	60.8	39.2
1931	810,277	398,709	411,568		22.5	49.2	50.8	1963	872,208	528,709	343,499		24.3	60.6	39.4
1932	814,471	426,246	388,225		22.6	52.3	47.7	1964	882,239	531,790	350,449		24.5	60.3	39.7
								1965	889,563	536,772	352,791		24.7	60.3	39.7

Note: a/ Total land area of Taiwan 1901 to 1934 was estimated at 3,597,355 hectares, and from 1934 to 1965 at 3,596,121 hectares.



Source: Rural Economics Division JCRR (1966), pp.11


Table 3 Selected Indicators of Economic Development during the Colonial Period

		<i>Net domestic product in 1937 prices (1937 = 100)</i>	<i>GNE in 1934-36 prices (1937 = 100)</i>	<i>Index of agricultural production (1935-37 = 100)</i>	<i>Industrial production</i>		<i>Public RR freight distance (million MT·km)</i>	<i>Export volume index (1925 = 100)</i>	<i>Import volume index (1925 = 100)</i>
	<i>Population (millions)</i>				<i>General- index (1937 = 100)</i>	<i>Sugar production (1000 MT)</i>			
1905	3.04	a	30	39	a	50	26	21	31
1910	3.29	37 <sup>b</sup>	43	42	24 <sup>c</sup>	204	88	39	49
1915	3.48	36	45	48	30	208	143	49	54
1920	3.66	40	71	48	30	223	220	44	68
1925	3.99	62	74	68	51	480	386	100	100
1930	4.59	79	90	79	70	810	507	122	136
1935	5.21	102	112	98	88	965	639	180	179
1940	5.87	93	99 <sup>d</sup>	93	123	1,133	904	196	172

Source: Samuel Ho (1978), Table 3.1, pp. 27

a: not available b: 1911 c:1912 d: 1938

Figure 1 GNE and GDE indicators for Japan, Korea, and Taiwan (1903-1937)



Source: Mizuguchi and Yamamoto (1984), Figure 1, pp. 401

Table 4 Growth Rate of Real GNE, GDP and GDE Indicator (percent)

<i>Estimator</i>	<i>GNE</i>	<i>GDE Indicator</i>		<i>GDP</i>
	<i>Japan Ohkawa</i>	<i>Korea Mizoguchi</i>	<i>Taiwan Mizoguchi</i>	<i>Taiwan Lee</i>
1903-1938	3.24		3.21	
1911-1938	3.36	3.57	3.80	
1903-1912	2.27		2.73	
1908-1917	3.09		3.16	
1913-1922	5.21	8.74	6.67	2.03
1918-1927	1.50	2.73	5.09	5.91
1923-1932	2.35	0.70	3.55	5.93
1928-1937	4.70	2.98	1.21	4.07

Source: Mizoguchi and Yamamoto (1984), Table 1, pp.413

Table 5 Growth Rate of Production Indices (percent)

<i>Estimator</i>	<i>Agricultural or Primary Industry</i>				
	<i>Japan Ohkawa</i>	<i>Taiwan Ishikawa</i>	<i>Taiwan Lee</i>	<i>Korea Ishikawa</i>	<i>Korea Suh</i>
1903-12	0.9	1.5			
1908-17	2.7	2.0			
1913-22	0.4	1.8	0.3	2.4	1.6
1918-27	-0.0	4.4	6.0	-0.9	0.7
1923-32	1.2	4.2	5.0	1.4	2.9
1928-37	0.7	3.5	3.4	3.7	1.6
1911-38	0.6	3.4		1.9	
<i>Estimator</i>	<i>Manufacturing or Secondary Industry</i>				
	<i>Japan Ohkawa</i>	<i>Taiwan Shinohara</i>	<i>Taiwan Lee</i>	<i>Korea Mizoguchi</i>	<i>Korea Suh</i>
1913-22	5.4	4.2	2.3	6.1	10.6
1918-27	3.1	6.9	2.8	6.2	9.1
1923-32	7.1	7.0	5.3	4.4	6.5
1928-37	2.8	4.6	6.6	12.2	10.9
1914-38	5.6	5.3		6.7	

Source: Mizoguchi and Yamamoto (1984), Table 3, pp.414

Table 6 Taiwan's Foreign Trade (1897-1945)

Period	Total	With Japan	With Other Countries
1. Total amount (in hundred million old Taiwan currency)			
1897—1913	9.96	5.54	4.42
1914—1920	16.18	11.93	4.25
1921—1931	42.69	33.46	9.23
1932—1945	93.97	79.78	13.99
2. Average amount per year (in hundred million old Taiwan currency)			
1897—1913	0.64	0.38	0.26
1914—1920	2.31	1.70	0.61
1921—1931	3.88	3.04	0.84
1932—1945	6.70	5.70	1.00
3. Percentage to the total			
1897—1913	100.00	59.67	40.33
1914—1920	100.00	73.73	26.27
1921—1931	100.00	38.38	21.62
1932—1945	100.00	85.08	14.92
4. Comparison of the average amount per year of the last period to that of the first period (times)			
1932—1945	10.47	15.00	3.85
1897—1913			

Source: Taiwan's Foreign Trade, 1964, edited by Bureau of Accounting and Statistics,

Taiwan Provincial Government; Weng (1968), Table 1-1, pp.13



Table 7 Rice, 1901-1965

Year	Area	Yield <sup>a/</sup>	Production <sup>a/</sup>	Year	Area	Yield <sup>a/</sup>	Production <sup>a/</sup>
	ha	kg	MT		ha	kg	MT
1901	353,360	1,239	437,977	1934	666,979	1,947	1,298,412
1902	344,989	1,168	403,061	1935	678,629	1,920	1,303,164
1903	394,868	1,330	525,316	1936	681,548	2,004	1,365,484
1904	435,134	1,366	594,266	1937	657,672	1,988	1,304,438
1905	447,432	1,390	621,978	1938	625,385	2,217	1,387,950
1906	458,591	1,236	566,940	1939	626,118	2,067	1,293,932
1907	471,647	1,367	644,592	1940	638,609	1,749	1,116,933
1908	478,953	1,389	665,232	AVG	654,847	1,926	1,261,187
1909	478,955	1,381	661,421	1941	646,914	1,834	1,186,670
1910	456,276	1,311	598,211	1942	616,515	1,884	1,161,498
AVG	432,021	1,324	571,899	1943	610,038	1,831	1,116,715
1911	478,780	1,340	641,516	1944	600,696	1,765	1,060,476
1912	481,204	1,201	578,087	1945	510,818	1,145	584,973
1913	494,313	1,482	732,331	1946	564,016	1,585	894,021
1914	499,679	1,317	658,322	1947	677,557	1,474	999,012
1915	491,089	1,392	683,511	1948	717,744	1,489	1,068,421
1916	471,677	1,408	664,167	1949	747,675	1,624	1,214,523
1917	466,184	1,481	690,545	1950	770,262	1,845	1,421,486
1918	483,344	1,369	661,744	AVG	646,224	1,657	1,070,780
1919	497,211	1,415	703,320	1951	789,075	1,882	1,484,792
1920	500,169	1,383	691,764	1952	785,729	1,998	1,570,115
AVG	486,365	1,379	670,531	1953	778,384	2,109	1,641,557
1921	495,426	1,435	710,899	1954	776,660	2,183	1,695,107
1922	511,241	1,521	777,831	1955	750,739	2,151	1,614,953
1923	507,829	1,369	695,155	1956	783,629	2,284	1,789,829
1924	531,450	1,633	868,090	1957	783,267	2,348	1,839,009
1925	550,835	1,671	920,452	1958	778,189	2,434	1,894,127
1926	567,172	1,565	887,739	1959	776,050	2,392	1,856,316
1927	585,011	1,685	985,524	1960	766,409	2,495	1,912,018
1928	584,918	1,660	970,715	AVG	776,813	2,227	1,729,782
1929	567,952	1,630	925,824	1961	782,510	2,577	2,016,276
1930	614,390	1,714	1,052,931	1962	794,228	2,660	2,112,874
AVG	551,622	1,594	879,516	1963	749,220	2,815	2,109,037
1931	633,726	1,686	1,068,549	1964	764,935	2,937	2,246,639
1932	664,325	1,924	1,278,459	1965	772,918	3,038	2,348,041
1933	675,476	1,768	1,194,549				

Note: <sup>a/</sup> Yield and Production are quoted in terms of brown rice.

Source: Rural Economics Division JCRR (1966), pp.23


Table 8 Sugarcane 1902-1965

Year	Area <u>a/</u>	Cane Yield	Cane Production	Sugar <u>b/</u> Production <u>c/</u>	Year	Area <u>a/</u>	Cane Yield	Cane Production	Sugar <u>b/</u> Production <u>c/</u>
	ha	kg	MT	MT		ha	kg	MT	MT
1902	25,380	29,953	760,215	ND	1934	88,421	60,283	5,330,281	647,043
1903	16,029	25,572	409,895	30,408	1935	117,969	68,546	8,086,356	965,652
1904	20,945	30,794	644,985	45,501	1936	124,469	63,584	7,914,234	901,679
1905	24,281	28,564	693,567	49,580	1937	120,808	70,883	8,563,125	1,007,352
1906	34,101	29,739	1,014,124	76,433	1938	130,169	69,607	9,060,660	990,160
1907	29,467	28,174	830,189	63,877	1939	162,394	79,039	12,835,395	1,418,731
1908	27,842	30,577	851,317	65,521	1940	169,048	59,019	9,977,080	1,132,768
1909	37,860	33,589	1,271,683	122,328	AVG	119,740	68,206	8,166,994	948,344
1910	61,505	35,134	2,160,898	204,241	1941	157,194	53,389	8,392,385	814,630
AVG	30,823	31,134	959,653	82,236	1942	156,444	65,516	10,249,650	1,101,752
1911	87,368	32,382	2,829,153	270,339	1943	156,497	64,489	10,092,283	1,041,450
1912	76,866	24,659	1,895,416	175,587	1944	149,456	56,658	8,467,834	892,290
1913	66,665	13,775	918,311	71,490	1945	107,676	38,628	4,159,279	327,200
1914	75,496	21,002	1,585,570	150,768	1946	36,205	27,801	1,006,526	87,692
1915	86,250	27,366	2,360,284	208,468	1947	29,905	26,618	796,012	31,310
1916	113,760	30,249	3,441,131	321,082	1948	85,158	36,557	3,113,062	268,111
1917	127,484	39,949	5,092,870	458,094	1949	122,392	50,606	6,193,818	646,825
1918	146,784	27,868	4,090,521	344,123	1950	121,940	48,064	5,860,958	626,298
1919	116,788	28,931	3,378,803	291,814	AVG	112,287	51,949	5,833,181	583,756
1920	105,116	25,015	2,629,504	223,210	1951	79,249	45,237	3,584,997	410,521
AVG	100,258	28,149	2,822,156	251,498	1952	97,971	49,003	4,800,883	545,286
1921	116,282	25,481	2,962,994	252,734	1953	113,230	74,136	8,394,348	911,300
1922	137,760	29,411	4,051,703	352,655	1954	95,679	65,950	6,310,090	722,573
1923	113,112	35,179	3,979,118	355,392	1955	77,941	78,121	6,088,871	755,111
1924	119,526	39,123	4,676,213	452,210	1956	90,901	69,782	6,343,348	795,149
1925	126,450	41,945	5,303,900	479,540	1957	98,231	72,110	7,083,395	866,040
1926	120,224	42,970	5,166,068	499,926	1958	101,454	74,142	7,521,985	929,239
1927	96,691	46,047	4,452,289	411,140	1959	99,219	81,571	8,093,447	970,793
1928	104,987	55,292	5,804,956	580,117	1960	95,543	70,505	6,736,236	797,856
1929	116,435	63,341	7,375,167	789,329	AVG	94,942	68,418	6,495,760	770,387
1930	106,106	65,699	6,971,015	810,484	1961	100,180	79,082	7,922,383	947,785
AVG	115,757	43,836	5,074,342	498,353	1962	93,496	65,697	6,142,408	723,747
1931	96,113	68,324	6,566,802	797,279	1963	94,100	69,145	6,506,590	764,378
1932	106,217	75,782	8,049,285	989,050	1964	95,028	70,999	6,746,961	795,101
1933	81,793	64,635	5,286,720	633,724	1965	110,694	85,730	9,489,770	1,024,899

Note: a/ Includes land used for production of seed canes

b/ Includes white and brown sugar.

c/ The figures of sugar production have converted into raw value since 1951



Source: Rural Economics Division JCRR (1966), pp.47


Table 9 Functional Distribution of Total Expenditures of the Government-General,  
Selected Years (Percentage of total)

	1900	1905	1910	1915	1920	1925	1930	1935	1939
Total expenditures (million yen)	14.8	10.7	26.6	21.2	51.5	41.8	63.4	65.1	116.5
Percentage distribution:	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Current expenditures	47.6	75.7	73.9	81.5	64.9	74.5	65.7	74.4	72.5
General	27.9	43.0	32.5	33.2	38.7	43.3	32.8	32.3	38.8
Development	17.0	17.8	23.5	19.9	16.1	17.9	20.3	18.7	20.1
Transfer payments	0.7	0.9	0.4	*	*	*	*	11.8	4.7
Interest on public debt	2.0	14.0	16.8	23.7	5.4	9.5	8.8	9.2	4.3
Unallocable expenditure	*	*	0.7	4.7	4.7	3.8	3.8	2.4	4.6
Capital expenditures	52.4	24.3	26.1	18.5	35.1	25.5	34.3	25.6	27.5
Fixed capital formation	52.4	25.2	26.5	19.4	34.1	20.5	26.9	24.4	24.4
Transfer to capital account of domestic sectors	—	—	—	—	2.9	5.9	6.0	2.4	4.0
Direct loans and advances	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.3	—	—
Purchase less sales of property	*	-0.9	-0.4	-0.9	-1.9	-0.9	-0.9	-1.2	-0.9

\*Less than 0.05%.

Samuel Ho (1978), Table 3.3, pp.34

Figure 2 Triangular Mode of Operation



Source: Samuel Ho (1984), Figure 1, pp.381

M: manufactured imports J: primary exports

C: manufactured goods and commercial services

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## **Curriculum Vitae**

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#### **Education**

Oct.2008~July2010	<b>Erasmus Mundus Master Program, U.K. and Austria</b> Double Master Degree—Major: Global Studies; Received Erasmus Mundus Full Scholarship
Oct.2009~July2010	<b>University of Vienna (Universitaet Wien), Austria</b> Master of Arts—Major: Global Studies
Oct.2008~Sep.2009	<b>London School of Economics and Political Science, U.K.</b> Master of Science—Major: Global Studies * Cumulative Grades: Merit
Sep.2002~June2008	<b>National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C.</b> Bachelor—Major: Political Science, International Relations Division Minor: Economics * Cumulative GPA: 3.9/4.0 Rank: Top 10 Percent
Sep.2005~June2006	<b>Ruprecht Karl University of Heidelberg, Germany</b> * As an Exchange student; Received the exchange student program scholarship

#### **Honors & Awards**

2008~2010	<b>Erasmus Mundus Master Scholarship holder</b>
2005~2006	<b>Scholarship for Exchange student from Germany</b> <b>Baden-Wuerttemberg Government</b>
2005	<b>Elite Scholarship for Exchange Student from Ministry of</b> <b>Education, R.O.C</b>

2003	Yen Kan-Lin Track and Field <b>Scholarship</b>
May2008	Competitor, 2008 Intercollegiate Sports Meet * Fifth place, 1600m relay * Silver, 400m relay
May2007	Competitor, 2007 Intercollegiate Sports Meet * Silver, 1600m relay * Silver, 400m relay * Fifth place, Individual 100m
May2005	Competitor, 2005 Intercollegiate Sports Meet * Gold, 1600m relay * Silver, 400m relay * Fourth place, Individual 100m * Fifth place, Individual 200m
May2004	Competitor, 2004 Intercollegiate Sports Meet * Silver, 1600m relay * Bronze, 400m relay

### **Work Experience**

June ~August 2010	As an <b>Intern</b> in Section of SEAP (South Asia, East Asia, and the Pacific), IPB (Integrated Programme and oversight Branch) of <b>UNODC</b> (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), Vienna, Austria
Aug.2007~July2008	As a <b>research assistant</b> in the Department of Social Medicine, NTU (dealing with some social science, medical ethics, Humanities issues about policy making)
July2005	As a <b>scrutineer</b> for the political party primary election
Dec.2004	<b>Volunteer</b> as an assistant to foreign competitors in the 2004 <b>ING International Marathon</b>
Nov.2004	<b>Volunteer</b> to serve in the <b>FIFA</b> (Futsal world championship) soccer championship in Taipei
July2004	<b>Volunteer</b> to work under political <b>election campaign</b> team to get the practical experience

### **Extracurricular Activities**

Student Society	
Sep.2006~June2007	<b>Captain of NTU Track and Field Varsity Team</b>
Sep.2004~June2005	<b>Vice Captain of NTU Track and Field Varsity Team</b>
Sep.2003~June2004	<b>General Affairs Officer of NTU Track and Field Varsity Team;</b>

**Headman** of the NTU Regional Students' Association (Tainan)  
 Sep.2002~June2004 Taking part in the Debate club, Chinese music club, and the NTU kind kid club

#### Activities outside school

Dec.2008 Attending Winter School of Erasmus Mundus Global Studies Program in Poland  
 July2009 Attending Summer School of Erasmus Mundus Global Studies Program in Austria  
 2005 Tertiary institutions of democracy Training Camp; Interchange Training Program with Shanghai Fudan University  
 2004 Tertiary institutions of international affairs Training Camp; Peace Forum International Conference;  
 Training camp for youths to care about public affairs  
 2003 Diplomatic Training camp

#### **Formal Accreditation**

June 2010 Certificate of German: B2  
 2009 Certificate of Spanish: Beginner level  
 July2008 IELTS 7  
 Oct.2007 TOEFL 103  
 2006 Certificate of German: Mittel Stufe  
 2004 Passed G-TELP Level 2  
 2003 Passed G-TELP Level 3  
 2002 Passed Advanced Level, General English Proficiency Test,  
 2001 Distinction, 2001 International Sciences Evaluation, English Division;  
 Passed Intermediate Level, General English Proficiency Test;  
 Passed Advanced Level, National Online English Proficiency Examination

#### **Skills & Abilities**

Languages: Native speaker of **Mandarin and Taiwanese**;  
 Fluent in **English**, and **German (Mittel-stufe; B2)**  
 Beginner level in **Japanese and Spanish**;  
 Others: Team work, fast-learner, patient, enterprising spirit, flexibility;  
 Microsoft Word; Excel; playing piano; dancing; Track and Field

### **Overseas Experience**

One year exchange program in Germany;

Two years of full-time studying abroad (in London and Vienna);

Language courses: 20 hrs per week intensive German course for two semesters in Heidelberg; one trimester German course in Vienna.

Have been to Hawaii, Holland and Denmark with Taiwan National Under-19 Football Team to attend national friendly match

Have been to Europe (Germany, France, Italy, Czech, Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, Belgium, Luxemburg, Austria, Poland, Spain, Portugal), Egypt, U.S.A., Hawaii, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Korea, Thailand, Hong Kong, China, Cambodia and so on to expand my overseas knowledge.

