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*“The end is in the beginning and yet you go on” –  
riverruns and End(ing)games in James Joyce’s  
Ulysses and Finnegans Wake*

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***“The end is in the beginning and yet you go on” – riverruns and End(ing)games in James Joyce’s Ulysses and Finnegans Wake***

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# 1. Introduction

...in a jiffey.” (FW 625.32-33)

As Beckett’s famous quote in the title suggests, the end paradoxically stands at the beginning of this study and forms just one of the many contradictions the beginning of this thesis, which was originally designed in a chiefly teleological way, but slowly assumed a more and more cyclical structure to the point of almost denying its own ending, implies. The imperative “Begin!” uttered towards the very beginning of *Sirens* (*Ulysses* 246.35) proves problematic in this context – how can an interpretation be conducted about a text that defies univocal interpretation? How can measureless and infinite time be measured and described? And finally, how can an ending that is not, in fact, formally existent, be analysed?

Several authors before and after Joyce’s *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* tried, and to some point also succeeded in capturing the ceaseless flow of time. Marcel Proust’s *A la recherche du temps perdu*, for instance, might not only create a subjective feeling among the reader that the novel will never actually end - it is also a formidable example of the writer’s attempt to discuss the highly complex issue of time both on a philosophical level and on the level of plot and to provide an appropriate form for the transient nature of human life and the merciless and relentless quality of time’s passing, without arresting its eternal flow. Indeed, as Charles Baudelaire suggests in his article “The Painter of Modern Life”, writers around the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> to the 20<sup>th</sup> century were seeking an expression for “the ephemeral, the fugitive, the contingent, the half of art whose other half is the eternal and the immutable” (13) with the help of novel and sometimes experimental techniques. In contrast to Joyce, for instance, Proust uses relatively straightforward grammar and lexis, although the general impetus of remembering events and objects from the past, which results in an associative web of thoughts that eventually triggers off much greater philosophical musings about life is to be found both in *La recherche* (cf. e.g. the famous “*madeleine*” episode, where the taste of a cookie leads to an instance of “involuntary memory” of Marcel’s childhood and he reconsiders his whole life as a result) and in *Ulysses*, although it has to be said that the amount abstract and metaphysical considerations is mostly limited to the character Stephen Dedalus.

Yet another similar attempt at capturing the free-flowing stream of thoughts as a way of expressing the unstoppable force of time, but also at placing a focus on easily overlooked everyday objects and events, which nevertheless suddenly become immensely important within the subjective realm of a character, is Virginia Woolf's novel *Mrs. Dalloway*, consisting almost entirely of stream of consciousness. The exclusive subjectivity of an individual character's point of view, which highlights thoughts that might be considered banal in different circumstances, and the celebration of everyday bagatelles is an important concept for both Woolf and Joyce.

However, the technique of stream of consciousness and instances of interior monologue not only serve as a presentation of a character's immediate thoughts, but also, on a narratological level, as an attempt at meticulously reproducing thoughts at the same moment they are conceived. Of course, in the realm of written words, this effect can merely be hinted at, as the real-life succession of thoughts is certainly much more rapid and overlaps occur very frequently than can ever be indicated in a necessarily linearly displayed text. The effect of stream of consciousness passages among the reader is generally a perceived lengthening of discourse time, and a slowing down (or even stoppage) of plot. While on that level, the narrative pace indeed comes to a standstill, so to speak, it accelerates at the same time as the reader enters the character's loosely connected and quickly shifting thoughts.

With both *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*, Joyce undertook attempts at capturing the never-ending flow of time, both by means of style and structure and by means of musings and philosophical considerations on the level of plot. In a way, both texts seem to be able to evade the necessity of an ending by constantly referring to the cyclical and / or timeless potential of the text itself and by stressing its possibility of re-"writing itself" in Roland Barthes's terms. In both *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*, the aforementioned tendencies can be observed, not only on a formal level regarding the famous last / first sentence of *Finnegans Wake*, but also on a metaphorical level of negating finality and striving to counteract the flux of time by applying the poetic device of stream of consciousness – the most impressive example, of course, being the last chapter of *Ulysses*. The Homeric parallels applied in *Ulysses*, as well as the polyphony

of past and present voices in *Finnegans Wake* can also be seen as a means of introducing a timeless aspect, which persists beyond the text.

The main focus of this thesis will be the distinction between cyclical and linear concepts of time and their respective representations in literature in connection with the idea that a teleological narrative structure suggests a linear development of plot towards an ending, while a cyclical one symbolises a rejection of closure and of a clear-cut definition of an ending. In some cases, however, both of these notions are transgressed and time assumes an infinite quality, as in *Penelope*, and to some degree, in the last chapter of *Finnegans Wake*.

The theoretical background of my thesis is shaped by Plato's and Aristotle's warring concepts of time as proposed in *Timaeus* and *Physics* respectively (2.1). The idea of infinite time can be approximated by Henri Bergson's notion of *pure duration*, which shall be discussed in 2.2.

The third chapter will consist of an in-depth analysis of four representative chapters from *Ulysses* (*Proteus*, *Hades*, *Aeolus* and *Penelope*) and two major themes from *Finnegans Wake* connected to the topic of endings (Shem and Shaun and ALP).

While several scholars have acknowledged and commented on the cyclical nature of *Finnegans Wake* and some have even investigated the topic of endings, non-endings and re-beginnings (cf. e.g. Kermode, Borg, Kumar), none of them have gone as far as to suggest that both *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*, in fact, succeed at questioning and also in a way abandoning the very concept of endings, while retaining a strong sense of structure at the same time. In addition, while the general structure and style of the works has been discussed in this context, an actual analysis of this aspect on the textual level itself and in connection with the characters' own thoughts on this topic has not been conducted yet to my knowledge, except in connection with the concept of memory and mostly limited to *Finnegans Wake* (cf. e.g. Fulton, Rickard, Fagan).

The (linearly) increasing length of the individual chapters of this thesis is defined by the growing complexity of the respective chapters and texts themselves.

## 2. Theoretical Background

### 2.1 Plato and Aristotle

The main difference between Plato's and Aristotle's approach of time is that Plato saw time as being created together with the heavens by God and as an approximated cyclical image of eternal time, which, as the term suggests, is necessarily anti-teleological and ever-moving,<sup>1</sup> while Aristotle introduced a teleological approach to time and saw it as a process rather than a cycle.<sup>2</sup>

In *Timaeus*, Plato gives an account of his idea of the creation of time:

Wherefore [the Father] made an image of eternity which is time, having an uniform motion according to number, parted into months and days and years, and also having greater divisions of past, present, and future. These all apply to becoming in time, and have no meaning in relation to the eternal nature, which ever is and never was or will be; for the unchangeable is never older or younger, and when we say that he 'was' or 'will be,' we are mistaken, for these words are applicable only to becoming, and not to true being; and equally wrong are we in saying that what has become IS become and that what becomes IS becoming, and that the non-existent IS non-existent [...] These are the forms of time which imitate eternity and move in a circle measured by number. (37c – 38b)

The most important idea in connection with Plato's understanding of time is that it was created by God, and therefore has a beginning, while at the same time being circular and never-ending. Plato describes time with vocabulary that signifies timelessness when he suggests that it "ever is and never was or will be". The cyclical nature of human time is derived from its similarity to eternal time, and as a further consequence to the Creator himself, who "moves in a circle turning within himself, which is the most intellectual of motions" (34a). Another very important aspect in this context is the "uniform motion" Plato mentions at the beginning of this quotation. Since time, according to Plato, imitates eternity (although it can never actually reach this endeavour since it is

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<sup>1</sup> Essentially, in accordance with Plato's other works, the relation between eternal and human time can be viewed as idea (eternal time) and its (necessarily imperfect) mimesis (human time), the main difference between them being that eternal time does not move at all, but "is", whereas human time, as an imperfect mimesis of this idea, follows a cyclical movement as an approximation of eternity. (cf. pp. 2 et seq.)

<sup>2</sup> In his work *Geschichtsbild und Romankonzeption. Drei Typen des Geschichtsverstehens im Reflex der Form des englischen historischen Romans*, Ewald Mengel discusses three kinds of views on history (teleological, circular and contingent) with regard to the English historical novel. Here, teleology (as proposed by Sir Walter Scott) is associated with a belief in progress and juxtaposed to the idea of circularity (exemplified in the works of Charles Dickens), which suggests an upward as well as a downward moment, between which a balance must be achieved. While this idea is not yet present with Plato and Aristotle, it certainly can be seen as a continuation of their respective theories.

merely an “image of the eternal nature” [38c]), its motion must necessarily reflect the perfect “everlasting motion” (36e) of eternity itself. However, Plato stresses the fact that the mentioned divisions derived from number such as “months and days and years”, but also, on a greater scale, the divisions of “past, present, and future” are not, in fact, related to eternal time, since they are derived from number and therefore divisible, as opposed to eternity, which is uncountable and indivisible by definition. This distinction eventually goes back to that of “becoming” and “true being” in time: Whereas divisions of time are only possible if time is conceived of as a process of becoming, the notion of being in time stresses the everlasting presence of eternity. Further implications of this theory are that eternal time does not necessarily have a clear-cut beginning, but that it has always existed, while time as conceived of by human beings was wilfully created by God.<sup>3</sup> This relation can be approximated metaphorically with the help of a distinction Plato makes slightly earlier in his argument, that between “the unchangeable and indivisible” (35a) and therefore divine, and “the divisible and corporeal”, although, of course, time is not in fact corporeal, but it certainly is divisible, as discussed above. Eternity is therefore presented as a static concept, while time, although imitating eternity, “move[s] in a circle measured by number” and is subject to constant circular motion. However, the stasis of eternity is not to be thought of as a singular point in time, but rather an all-encompassing, continuous presence.<sup>4</sup>

The idea of circles and cycles as perfect shapes and movements respectively due to their imitation of the divine order is palpable throughout *Timaeus* and constitutes one of the major arguments of Plato’s thinking, or, as Benjamin Jowett suggests in the introduction to *Timaeus*, “[t]here is no principle so apparent in the physics of the *Timaeus*, or in ancient physics generally, as that of continuity” (19). Plato also introduces the concept of “a cycle or perfect year at the completion of which ... [the planets] coincide” (39d). His argument is

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<sup>3</sup> Benjamin Jowett’s argument that Plato’s conception of the creation time is paradoxical, since it presupposes time to have existed already before its creation by God, can, I believe, be refuted due to the fact that Plato makes a clear distinction between eternal time on the one hand and created time on the other hand. It is precisely this distinction which resolves the paradox.

<sup>4</sup> Wolfgang von Leyden points out that Plato’s association of human time with number actually suggests that it can even be seen as “complementary to the statement that it is a likeness of eternity” and mentions “periodic repetition” as a characteristic of created time, thus stressing both its circularity and its successive moment. (cf. Wolfgang von Leyden, *Time, Number, and Eternity in Plato and Aristotle*. In: *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 54, Plato and Aristotle Number (Jan., 1964), pp. 35-52; pp. 39 et seq.)

driven by thoughts of a divine order reflected by cyclical concepts in the corporeal world. Hence, the cyclical becomes a representation and imitation of the divine, without the world ever developing or progressing in a linear sense, for if we follow Plato's line of argument, a God-created world must be perfect in the moment of creation already. Plato's view of time is therefore characterised by a strong sense of steady, unchangeable cyclical movement and a complete lack of teleology.

Contrary to Plato, Aristotle propagated a teleological approach to time in *Physics*, suggesting that "time wastes things away, and [...] all things grow old through time [...] [f]or time is by its nature the cause [...] of decay, since it is the number of change, and change removes what is" (IV.12.30).

Aristotle's argumentation starts out by a seemingly straightforward question, namely that of the nature of time. Unlike Plato, Aristotle does not make a distinction between eternal and human time, nor does he give an account of the creation of time. Instead, he is concerned with the question whether time "belong[s] to the class of things that exist or to that of things that do not exist" (IV.10.2). His first consideration is that "it either does not exist at all or barely, and in an obscure way. One part of it has been and is not, while the other is going to be and is not yet." (IV.10.3) This first definition, although naturally vague and tentative, alludes to one of the central concepts in Aristotle's discussion of time, the "now", which serves "as a statement of the difficulties about the attributes of time" (IV.10.17). Aristotle starts out by reflecting on the nature of the "now", i.e. whether "it always remain[s] one and the same" or if "it [is] always other and other" (IV.10.7). Firstly, he examines the implications of the "now" as being "always different", deducing that

if the 'now' which is not, but formerly was, must have ceased-to-be at some time, the 'nows' too cannot be simultaneous with one another, but the prior 'now' must always have ceased-to-be. [...] [O]ne 'now' cannot be next to another, any more than point to point. If then it did not cease-to-be in the next 'now' but in another, it would exist simultaneously with the innumerable 'nows' between the two – which is impossible. (IV.10.9-12)

Aristotle introduces the sense of a temporal "before" and "after", between which, it seems at this point of Aristotle's argumentation, there can be no seamless transgression; instead, the two "now"s, if perceived as different from each other, "cannot be simultaneous" or even "next to another". Aristotle claims that two

“now”s cannot occupy the same place at once, which is a common notion in Ancient Greek philosophy (Bakalis 142) when dealing with corporeal objects, but seems unusual if we bear in mind that he is dealing with highly abstract matters. Even if the “now” is seen as remaining “always the same” (IV.10.13), Aristotle argues that “the ‘now’ is a termination, and it is possible to cut off a determinate time” (IV.10.14). By suggesting a successive sequence of “now”s with clear-cut beginnings and endings (“the prior ‘now’ must always have ceased-to-be”), Aristotle rejects Plato’s cyclical notion of time already at this early stage of the argument. Apart from the obvious aspect that Aristotle is not concerned with the actual creation of time and the fact that he does not see time as revolving in a perfect circular manner but rather in a straightforward progressing line, the fact that he defines time as divisible and introduces the concept of “now”s as separate, distinguishable items in time, suggests a notion of time altogether different from Plato.

The next aspect Aristotle discusses in connection with the nature of time is whether it is “motion” or “change” which he concludes by the rather cryptic remark that “time is neither movement nor independent of movement” (IV.11.5). The phrasing of the sentence preceding this statement (“But as time is most usually supposed to be (3) motion and a kind of change, we must consider this view” [IV.10.24]) already suggests a certain degree of scepticism concerning the validity of this definition. As expected, Aristotle dismisses this idea on the grounds that “time is present equally everywhere and with all things” and therefore not subject to change (or, in fact, movement, for “[w]e need not distinguish at present between ‘movement’ and ‘change’” [IV.10.29]). Another reason he gives for his refusal of the common view of time as movement is that “change is always faster or slower, whereas time is not: for ‘fast’ and ‘slow’ are defined by time [...] but time is not defined by time, by being either a certain amount or a certain kind of it.” Aristotle therefore refutes the notion of time as movement by linking it to change and claiming that a movement in time cannot be the same as time itself. While this point appears logical and straightforward enough, it does not explain the passing of time, or indeed the common notions of past, present and future. However, at the beginning of the following section (IV.11), Aristotle acknowledges that “time [does not] exist without change” because we do not actively notice it changing, since we do not consider the

interval between two “now”s as time. Thus, “the soul seems to stay in one indivisible state, and when we perceive and distinguish [change] we say time has elapsed, evidently time is not independent of movement and change” (IV.11.5).

It follows from these considerations that the passing of time is only perceived by humans in an active and conscious act of acknowledgement. In that case, “we perceive movement and time together” (IV.11.7), which suggests that time must be “something that belongs to movement” (IV.11.9), since it cannot be movement proper for the reasons given above. Aristotle then reflects on the nature of that movement, suggesting that “all magnitude is continuous. Therefore movement goes with the magnitude. [...] Because the magnitude is continuous, the movement too must be continuous, and if the movement, then the time” (IV.11.10). While this assumption at first appears to be a reinforcement of Plato’s cyclical view of time, it becomes clear that the continuous movement Aristotle claims for time is not necessarily connected with circularity, but rather bears the concept of “‘before’ and ‘after’” as markers of motion, which is typical of a linear progression of time, rather than a circular one.

In accordance with Plato, Aristotle sees time as connected to number; however, he goes one step further than his predecessor by claiming time to be “a kind of number” (IV.11.22), since it can only be movement “in so far as it admits of enumeration” (IV.11.21). In the same context, he states that “[j]ust as motion is a perpetual succession, so also is time” (IV.11.22) and associates it with the “point; for the point also both connects and terminates the length – it is the beginning of one and the end of another. But when you take it in this way, using the one point as two, a pause is necessary, if the same point is to be the beginning and the end” (IV.11.38-40). The image of the pause is particularly important in this quote, since it denies the notion of a seamless transgression, but rather points to the consecutive aspect of events. Moreover, the mere suggestion that time can come to a standstill refutes the idea of ever-moving, uniform time as suggested in *Timaeus*. Aristotle elaborates further on this aspect by stating that time is not only “the measure of motion”, but also “of rest [...] – indirectly” (IV.12.34).

The main difference, however, between the two lines of argument is that Aristotle views time as oriented towards a certain goal (in the case of earthly life that goal equals decay and death), whereas according to Plato, time is everlasting and cyclical in nature. The following quotation sums up Aristotle's teleological view convincingly:

A thing, then, will be affected by time, just as we are accustomed to say that time wastes things away, and that all things grow old through time, and that there is oblivion owing to the lapse of time, but we do not say the same of getting to know or of becoming young or fair. For time is by its nature the cause rather of decay, since it is the number of change, and change removes what is. (IV.12.30-31)

The destructive power of time is depicted very vividly in this quotation through the accumulation of imagery with a strong sense of decomposition, such as "time wastes things away", "grow old through time", "the cause ... of decay", "change removes what is".

The interplay between cyclical and linear time will provide the main theoretical grid for my analysis of the primary texts, together with Henri Bergson's notions of "pure duration" and "simultaneity", which shall be discussed in the following chapter.

## 2.2 Henri Bergson

In the second chapter of his major work *Time and Free Will*, entitled "The Multiplicity of Conscious States; The Idea of Duration", Henri Bergson introduces the notions of "pure duration" and "simultaneity", which are strongly connected to his ideas of time and space presented in the same context. Bergson's main claim is that time can only be conceived of by an act of projection, or "symbolical representation" (87) by means of space, which serves as an auxiliary mediator between the events the human mind perceives through consciousness and their (necessarily simplified) representation in a manner communicable to other humans.

As an example of this theory, Bergson proposes an analysis of the concept of "number", which suggests that number is made out of "units [...] assumed to be identical when they are counted" (76), but at the same time he claims that these units "must be somehow distinct from one another, since otherwise they would merge into a single unit" (ibid.). There are two possibilities of counting those units: firstly, the distinct units can be placed "side by side in an ideal space"

(77), or “else we repeat fifty times in succession the image of a single one” (ibid.), creating a “series [which] lies in duration rather than in space” (ibid.). However, he argues, the second option implies the paradox that it would always be one and the same unit that is counted, thus completely leaving aside the above mentioned distinctness, or “multiplicity” (85), inherent therein. Thus, “we must retain the successive images and set them alongside each of the new units which we picture to ourselves: now, it is in space that such a juxtaposition takes place and not in pure duration” (ibid.). Bergson therefore argues that the counting of material objects (he uses sheep as his first example) is necessarily linked to the “intuition of space” (77), even though it is commonly (falsely, according to Bergson) associated with duration. He then goes on to state that any idea of number is necessarily interconnected with the idea of space, since

when we add to the present moment those which have preceded it, as is the case when we are adding up units, we are not dealing with these moments themselves, since they have vanished for ever, but with the lasting traces which they seem to have left *in space* on their passage through it. (79, my emphasis)

Bergson therefore emphasises the transient characteristic of time and juxtaposes it with the solidity and constant presence of space. Just like Aristotle, Bergson too uses the idea of an “interval of space” (83), which Aristotle calls “pause” (IV.12) in between a “mathematical point which is separated from the following point” (Bergson 83). However, contrary to Aristotle, Bergson uses this image as an example of the misrepresentation of number as a divisible unit, when in fact it is perceived as continual and indivisible by consciousness. Aristotle, on the other hand, views the pause as yet another exemplification of a linear progression of time, while Bergson holds that time and number are anything but linear (or cyclical, for that matter) and that this consecutive aspect is only realised in the moment of representation, because the multiplicity and the simultaneous perception inherent in consciousness cannot be expressed adequately.<sup>5</sup> Bergson’s notion of time can be described as infinite and teleological at the same time, since on the one hand he emphasises the never-ending flux of time (“a moment of time (...) cannot persist in order to be added to others” [87]) and stresses its “continuity” (83), while also drawing attention to

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<sup>5</sup> Except, as I will argue, by means of literature, especially that kind of literature which breaks with the common linguistic code and displays experimental tendencies in form and grammar, as Eco argues with regard to the open work.

the simultaneous perception of consecutive moments of time by consciousness, which presupposes a movement forwards, or at least in a given direction.

Bergson differentiates between two kinds of multiplicity: “that of material objects, to which the conception of number is immediately applicable; and [that of] states of consciousness, which cannot be regarded as numerical without the help of some symbolical representation, in which a necessary element is *space*” (87). Again, the main focus lies on “symbolical representation” in space, which is the only way that states of consciousness become communicable, according to Bergson. He then gives his definition of space: “space is what enables us to distinguish a number of identical and simultaneous sensations from one another; it is thus a principle of differentiation other than that of qualitative differentiation, and consequently it is a reality with no quality” (95). The important aspect in this quotation is that of “identical and simultaneous sensations”, which cannot be represented simultaneously (as they are perceived by consciousness), but must be laid out in space in order for the mind to be able to grasp it.<sup>6</sup> It is of particular importance as well that Bergson calls the perceived sensations “identical”, whereas the mind describes them as different, thus reuniting both the idea of motion (if the sensations are seen as successive and distinct from each other in retrospect) and continuity through repetition (it is the same sensation over and over again). Bergson makes it very clear that “states of consciousness, even when successive, permeate one another” (98), blurring the boundaries of the individual states on the one hand and denying the notion a clear-cut end of one state and the beginning of another, and on the other hand again fusing the opposing ideas of teleology and cyclicity in the single image of multiplicity. The only event that makes states of consciousness appear external to one another is when they are “spread out in time, regarded as [an unbounded and] homogenous medium” (99). Due to the fact, however, that externality is a typical feature of space, Bergson concludes that “time [...] is nothing but the ghost of space haunting the reflective consciousness” (ibid.) and considers time, insofar as it is seen as a homogenous medium, reducible to space. From these theories Bergson then deduces the concept of “pure duration”,

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<sup>6</sup> Again, I would argue that a certain amount of simultaneity is expressible in literature, and even more so in performances of literature.

the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states. For this purpose, it need not be entirely absorbed in the passing sensation or idea; [...] Nor need it forget its former states: it is enough that, in recalling these states, it does not set them alongside its actual state as one point alongside another, but forms both the past and the present states into an organic whole. (100)

Once again, the emphasis lies on the “organic whole” made up not of successive, but of simultaneous perceptions, which are not set “alongside” one another and are therefore not distinguishable from one another, but instead subsumed and absorbed into one singular sensation. Bergson compares this sensation to “recall[ing] the notes of a tune, melting [...] into one another. [...] [E]ven if these notes succeed one another, yet we perceive them in one another” (ibid.). The image of musical notes and motifs overlaying one another is particularly important, as Bergson seems to suggest that in order to understand pure duration and simultaneity, it is necessary for the mind to conceive of another medium than that of language and science, namely music.<sup>7</sup> Again, Bergson mentions the “abstract thought” (101), which “project[s] time into space, [...] and succession thus takes the form of a continuous line or a chain, the parts of which touch without penetrating one another” (ibid.). This act of setting the simultaneously perceived events side by side, Bergson argues, necessarily introduces the idea of a three-dimensional space, since in order to be able to “perceive a line as a line, it is necessary to take up a position outside it, to take account of the void which surrounds it, and consequently to think a space of three dimensions” (103). It follows that space according to Bergson is merely a helpful tool for projecting and symbolically representing events perceived by consciousness, like pure duration or simultaneity, which the mind cannot conceive of otherwise and, perhaps more importantly, which the human being cannot communicate<sup>8</sup> in any other way than by applying a linear description of three-dimensional events, for “as soon as we try to measure [pure duration], we unwittingly replace it by space” (106).

Similarly to Plato, who views cyclical human time as an imperfect representation of eternal time, Bergson introduces the idea of space as an auxiliary (though faulty) medium for representing pure duration. Both Plato and Bergson are aware of the fact that they are working with ultimately flawed

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<sup>7</sup> This argument becomes especially important with regard to *Sirens*.

<sup>8</sup> Bergson stresses the importance of social communication towards the end of this chapter.

representations of the actual concept, which are nevertheless necessary for reasons of social communicability and pragmatic considerations connected with it. While in Plato's line of argument, human time can only be but a reflection of eternity, since it can never reach the same amount of perfection as a concept devised by God, Bergson dismisses the spatial notion of time as a conceptual error related to the limits of the intellect, which can, according to him, be corrected.

Both Bergson's idea of pure duration and that of the permeability of states of consciousness display a certain degree of continuity, "without precise outlines, without any tendency to externalize themselves in relation to one another, without any affiliation with number" (104), therefore denying clear-cut divisions and boundaries and proposing an in(de)terminable state of multiplicity instead.<sup>9</sup>

As a further logical consequence following from his arguments, Bergson dismisses the notion of public time, suggesting that time cannot in fact be measured, since it cannot be regarded as a "quantity" (107), even though it "has every appearance of a homogenous medium" (ibid.) and the "moments of duration seem to be external to one another" (ibid.) – however, the crucial point he is making here, as on various other occasions, is that it merely "appears" and "seem[s]" so, just as "the time which our clocks divide into equal portions [...] must be a measurable and therefore homogenous magnitude" (ibid.), but "[i]s nothing of the sort (ibid.). Instead of measuring time, we are actually "counting simultaneities" (108) according to Bergson. Summarising his former arguments, Bergson once again stresses his major point:

within our ego, there is succession without mutual externality; outside the ego, in pure space, mutual externality without succession [...] no succession, since succession exists solely for a conscious spectator who keeps the past in mind and sets the two oscillations or their symbols side by side in an auxiliary space. (108-109)

Again, the notion of "auxiliary space" as a means of symbolical representation of the events perceived by consciousness is highly important, as well as that of a "conscious spectator", without whom mutual externality would not be possible, for the ego perceives the successive moments in time as homogenous and interpenetrating before this mediation, rather than mutually exclusive. Note that even these two concepts do not exclude each other, since "a kind of exchange

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<sup>9</sup> The aspect of multiplicity will be further discussed in relation with Shem and Shaun in 3.3.

takes place" (109), for by way of habit and social code, the ego is used to dividing and measuring time according to oscillations of the clock, an influence not negligible in this context.<sup>10</sup>

In the next section, Bergson deals with motion in connection with duration, his main argument being that motion, i.e. "successive positions of the moving body [...] in space" (110-111), can only be perceived as homogenous *and* divisible at the same time, because consciousness is able to create a "mental synthesis" (ibid.) by "keep[ing] the successive positions in mind and synthesiz[ing] them" (ibid.), instead of considering them separate. Therefore, consciousness also views motion not as "an *object* but [as] a *progress*" (ibid.), which is an important aspect, especially in connection with the teleological aspect inherent therein. Again, as when dealing with the perceived indivisibility and immediateness of states of consciousness, Bergson uses the image of "a unity resembling that of a phrase in a melody" (ibid.) in this context, stressing its interconnectedness and inseparability, for without singular notes formed into a logical sequence, a tune could not be called a tune, and neither could singular notes be called a melody. Bergson concludes this section by pointing out that

it is of the very essence of duration and motion, as they appear to our consciousness to be something that is *unceasingly being done*; thus algebra can represent the results gained at a certain moment of duration and the positions occupied by a certain moving body in space, but not duration and motion themselves. (119, my emphases)

Just like before, Bergson stresses the aspect of "progress" in this quotation when he defines duration and motion as something "unceasingly being done". Another very important argument he makes here is that neither duration nor motion can be adequately represented, since even space cannot serve as an auxiliary means of representation any more except for the "results gained at a certain moment" – a purpose which is diametrically opposed to his concept of duration and motion.

Interestingly enough, Bergson claims the same incapacity for adequate representation for the medium of language at a later point in this chapter, namely when he is dealing with the "fundamental self" (129) and conscious states. Here he suggests that human emotions are "confused, ever changing, and inexpressible, because language cannot get hold of [them] without arresting

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<sup>10</sup> I will not go into detail on this aspect, since it is not of great relevance to my argument.

[their] mobility or fit it into its common-place forms without making it into public property” (ibid.).<sup>11</sup> In the following chapters of my thesis, I shall argue that a certain usage of language, like that in literature, and more specifically literature which applies a certain amount of experimental or unusual grammar and / or lexis, or in other words heavily violates the common linguistic code can in fact be seen as an attempt at arriving at pure duration and motion, even if it can only ever be seen as a symbolical representation.

This aspect will be further developed and discussed in the following chapters, in connection with my main focus, the distinction and interplay between cyclical and teleological representations of time. In this context, I will regard concepts of pure duration and simultaneity discussed in this chapter as ways in which linear time can be transgressed and as specimens of the impossibility to measure time except by approximated, yet inaccurate means of public time and examine their representation in the chosen literary texts.

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<sup>11</sup> The same argument is found with Georg Simmel, who claims that “[l]ife [...] is always in latent opposition to form” (12).

### 3. James Joyce

#### 3.1 *Ulysses*

James Joyce's *Ulysses* presents the reader with a wholly novel concept and experience of time, challenging common notions of public time by showing up the arbitrariness of individual time perception in contrast to the socially defined clock-time. Not only are the events in *Ulysses* taking place in one single day, June 16<sup>th</sup>, 1904, thus creating a gap between the discourse time and the narrative time,<sup>12</sup> but also the whole journey of the *Odyssey*, lasting for numerous years, is laid out in this single day. Occasionally, the novel seeks to counteract this discrepancy by undertaking an attempt at capturing the free-flowing flux of individual time perception by means of interior monologue. In these sections, the reader is presented with a "form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states" (Bergson 100), thus striving to achieve a state that can be described by Henri Bergson's notion of "pure duration".

While both *Proteus* and *Penelope* feature large amounts of stream of consciousness, other chapters, such as *Lotus Eaters*, display shorter or fewer passages of personal thought, as Leopold Bloom is mostly shown in interaction with other characters. His discourse is mediated by a 3<sup>rd</sup> person narrator, who interrupts Bloom's thoughts by describing events taking place in the outside world: "So warm. His right hand once more slowly went over again: choice of blend, made of the finest Ceylon brands" (68.35-69.1). This technique demonstrates a discrepancy between the inner and the outer world, just as the whole text is constantly caught in a struggle between private and public time. However, several chapters include instances of onomatopoeia, which can be seen as a very condensed, instantaneous representation of a single moment where discourse time and narrative time overlap and therefore serves as a representation of simultaneity.

A genuine sense of simultaneity is achieved in the chapter attributed to the art of music, *Sirens*. In this polyphonic fugue, multiple voices overlap at the

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<sup>12</sup> For the concept of discourse and narrative time cf. Gerard Genette: *Narrative Discourse. An Essay in Method*. Ithaca, NY et al.: Cornell UP, 1990.

same time. The voices are “no longer successive, but simultaneous” (Bergson 101); the “notes of a tune”, which Joyce symbolically represents through language, “succeed one another, yet we perceive them in one another” (Bergson 100). The individual motifs laid out at the beginning of the chapter develop in the course of the section. They are varied, lengthened, shortened, and build a dynamic whole that can almost be heard, creating an effect that is similar to a musical work. The motif of “Bronze by gold”, for instance, is taken up several times in the course of the chapter, always slightly differing from one usage to the next: “Bronze by gold heard the hoofirons, steelyringing.” (245.1), “Bronzelydia by Minagold. / By bronze, by gold, in oceangreen of shadow. Bloom. Old Bloom.” (246.20-21), “They threw young heads back, bronze gigglegold” (249.19). The second instance is particularly interesting, since there, the motif of “Bronze by gold” is already permeated by the one that is introduced as “Blew. Blue bloom is on the” at the beginning of the chapter (245.6). Indeed, Graham Allen argues that *Ulysses* itself can be described as a “polyphonic novel”, since

we find not an objective, authorial voice presenting the relations and dialogues between characters but a world in which all characters, and even the narrator him- or herself, are possessed of their own discursive consciousnesses. The polyphonic novel presents a world in which no individual discourse can stand objectively above any other discourse; all discourses are interpretations of the world, responses to and calls to other discourses. (23)

Once again, the focus of this argument lies on the individuality of various discourses, which are nevertheless strongly interlinked. Much as the discourses seem to differ, they still overlap at all times and cannot exist without each other, just as the individual themes of a fugue are meaningless on their own.<sup>13</sup> It seems that Joyce has managed to create an effect of simultaneity by “borrowing” from the artistic sphere of music, thus letting the art of language and of music fulfil a “mutual penetration” (Bergson 101). Perhaps this section can therefore be read as a claim that it is possible to express in music what cannot be expressed by words.

A chapter that is diametrically opposed to *Sirens* in terms of time perception is *Oxen of the Sun*. In this section, the history of English literature is told in a linear, chronological fashion, thus presenting a direct antithesis to the

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<sup>13</sup> A similar idea is taken up in *Finnegans Wake* with the topic of the warring twin brothers Shem and Shaun (cf. Chapter 3.2).

simultaneity achieved earlier on. In this chapter, like in the whole of *Ulysses* considering the Homeric parallel, the past is brought into the present, and even pervades it on a semantic level (since the characters of the present are entangled in the story of the past). Still, the chapter does not present an instance of “pure duration”, since the individual stages are more or less clearly marked through a change in style, thus ordering the discourse and stressing its “successive” (Bergson 101) nature.

*Eumaeus* displays a wholly different approach to time, similar in effect to that of the interior monologue. In this chapter, time has slowed down completely; the words virtually “go to sleep” (Beckett 27), and the weariness of Stephen and Bloom is perceivable through the lethargic pace of language. The sentences are elongated, as is the subjective time perception of both the characters and the reader:

His [Stephen's] mind was not exactly what you would call wandering but a bit unsteady and on his expressed desire for some beverage to drink Mr Bloom, in view of the hour it was and there being no pumps of Vatry water available for their ablutions, let alone drinking purposes, hit upon an expedient by suggesting, off the reel, the propriety of the cabman's shelter as it was called, hardly a stonethrow away near Butt Bridge where they might hit upon some drinkables in the shape of a milk and soda or a mineral. (*Ulysses* 571.11-18).

In *Eumaeus*, form and content combine to form an effective union, which, albeit successfully creating a strong bond with the reader, does not make the reading experience any more pleasurable for that same reason, in so far as it slows down the reading process and evokes a certain amount of weariness amongst the reader him- or herself. It is once again Samuel Beckett – although at this point referring to *Finnegans Wake* – who sums this thought up convincingly: “Here form *is* content, content *is* form. [...] His writing is not *about* something, *it is that something itself*” (27). Just like Odysseus is forced to overcome many strenuous challenges before finally returning to Penelope, the reader seems to be forced to overcome this rather tiresome chapter. This serves as a means of identification with the original mythical figure on an abstract level, as clearly, in this section, the subjective perception of elongated time is not limited to the characters alone, but also involves the reader due to its unbreakable link between form and content.

The catechist, impersonal style of *Ithaca* finally presents a first step towards timelessness that is finally achieved in *Penelope*, but is not yet complete at this

point. The chapter is still assigned an hour of the day (2 a.m. in the Gilbert schema) and a certain degree of plot movement is palpable. Although the questions evoke answers that clearly prolong the narrative time, the section seems at the same time to be completely void and bereft of time. Instead of a linear discourse, the chapter is broken up into numerous small pieces, thus once again emphasising the succession of events rather than their simultaneity. This chapter in a way prepares Molly's interior monologue in *Penelope* by hinting at the timeless nature of the imminent free-flowing flux of thoughts that is about to break loose.

Although the topic of endings is a prominent feature throughout *Ulysses*, only the most striking examples and chapters can be analysed in this thesis for reasons of length. I have chosen the chapters *Proteus*, *Hades*, *Aeolus* and *Penelope* in order to show the gradual development in the complexity of style and in the treatment of this issue.

### 3.1.1 *Proteus*

In *Proteus*, when Stephen Dedalus's thoughts are recorded in all their incoherence and impenetrability, the reader encounters an alleged incongruence between discourse time and narrative time for the first time in the text. It seems as if Joyce manages to slow down time in order to capture and savour every single thought within one moment. In the course of the text, there are only two full-length chapters featuring interior monologue, the aforementioned *Proteus* chapter, and *Penelope*. Both these instances of "telling from the inside" (Lewis 121) feature grammatical lapses and ellipses, which are typical of spontaneous, not thoroughly developed thoughts.<sup>14</sup> Although the interior monologue is not yet as radically developed as in *Penelope*, since the flow of thoughts is interrupted by other voices at times, and the narrator is still present at various points (e.g. "Stephen closed his eyes to hear his boots crush crackling wrack and shells." [37.10], to name just one), it does serve as a means of conveying Stephen's immediate, uncensored thoughts at the very moment they are conceived. Stephen's ideas are not connected in a linear fashion, leading logically from one argument to the next, but rather they seem to

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<sup>14</sup> This topic will be expanded on when dealing with the narrative structure of *Proteus*.

“melt [...] into one another”, just as Bergson suggests with regard to pure duration (100).

One of the chapter’s main themes is time and space, on a philosophical level with regard to Stephen’s musings about Aristotle and the chapter’s main art, philology,<sup>15</sup> but also on a subtler, underlying level with regard to structure.

On the story level, Stephen’s mind is very much focused on time, especially in connection with his own mortality and human mortality in general. One of the big discrepancies in this chapter lies in Stephens “[persistent resentment of] his existence as matter”<sup>16</sup> and his eventual acceptance of the fact that his life will, at some point, come to an end. On a philosophical level, his struggle can be seen as representative of the mind-body dichotomy, but also Stephen’s initial denial of corporeality can be interpreted as a denial of teleology (in the manifestation of bodily decay).

At the beginning of *Proteus*, Stephen is concerned with matters of the visible and the audible, but also with matters of time and space:

A very short space of time through very short times of space. Five, six: the *nacheinander*. Exactly: and that is the ineluctable modality of the audible. Open your eyes. No. Jesus! If I fell over a cliff that beetles o’er his base, fell through the *nebeneinander* ineluctably. I am getting on nicely in the dark. (37.11-15)

The notions of *nacheinander* and *nebeneinander* are commonly held to be references to Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s *Laokoön*,<sup>17</sup> suggesting that *nacheinander* (“one after another”) applies to time and *nebeneinander* (“side by side”) to space as a further consequence. However, although time is so readily associated with succession, Stephen does not accept the ineluctable *nacheinander* of time and therefore the transience of human life at first, but rather seeks refuge in the circular image of eternity on the one hand (“Am I walking towards eternity along Sandymount strand?” [37.18], “and ever shall be, world without end” [38.3]) and the teleological idea of original creation on the other hand (“Creation from nothing” [38.11], “Put me on to Edenville” [38.14-15]). Both of these notions are depicted in highly religious imagery and seem to allude to the religious education Stephen received in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*. Another religious motif that recurs throughout Joyce’s work is that

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<sup>15</sup> cf. Gilbert and Linati schemata.

<sup>16</sup> Jeri Johnson, Explanatory Notes to *Ulysses*, p. 784.

<sup>17</sup> cf. e.g. Jeri Johnson p. 784.

of Adam and Eve: “Spouse and helpmate of Adam Kadmon: Heva, naked Eve” (38.16). In Stephen’s eyes, Adam and Eve are not only a symbol of God’s creation, but also of the Fall. Both in *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*, this symbol is connotated both positively (in the sense of genealogical continuity) and negatively (due to the aspect of original sin). This discrepancy is invoked in the mentioning of “Adam Kadmon” and “Heva”, the prelapsarian names of Adam and Eve<sup>18</sup>, while hinting at their postlapsarian names in the same phrase. All of these elements are finally united in the phrase “from everlasting to everlasting Womb of sin” (38.18-19).

From these considerations it follows that the refuge Stephen seeks in both the teleological (creation) and the cyclic concepts (eternity) of religious discourse cannot be granted to him, since for Stephen, these concepts are tainted with the idea of original sin from the very moment they come into being.

Another cycle present throughout *Proteus* is that of life and death. Similarly to the aforementioned example of Adam and Eve, rather than being introduced individually, these two elements are always presented in relation to each other. On a narratological level, the symbols of life and death succeed each other very quickly, which results in one single image of life and death together, stressing their inseparability:

Mrs. Florence Mac Cabe, relict of the late Patk MacCabe, deeply lamented, of Bride Street. [...] Creation from nothing. What has she in the bag? A misbirth with a trailing navelcord, hushed in ruddy wool. The cords of all link back, strandentwining cable of all flesh. [...] Aleph, alpha: nought, nought, one. (38.8-14)

Indeed the opposed images of life on the one hand (“Creation”, “misbirth”, “navelcord”) and death and decay (“relict”, “late”, “lamented”, “misbirth”) on the other hand fulfil an act of “strandentwining” in this passage. The strongest effect in this respect is achieved by the word “misbirth”, which combines birth and death in a single mental image. Another noteworthy element in this passage is Joyce’s use of “nothing” and “nought”. While in the first case, it belongs to a phrase describing the act of creation as seen in a religious context, in the second case it forms part of a line of thought that can again be interpreted as a teleological transgression from “Aleph, alpha” (the beginning) to the end (the first letter of “one” can be read as Omega, but also as a representation of

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<sup>18</sup> cf. Jeri Johnson, p. 785.

“zero”, i.e. “nothing”). Thus, “nought” can be read as a symbol of the abovementioned act of creation from nothing on the one hand, if the phrase is read as “[from] nought [to] one”, but also as a symbol of the ultimate end (“[from] alpha [to] nought”) in accordance with the reading of “one” as Omega or as zero. Interestingly enough, the doubling of “nought” introduces once more an idea of circularity, since the same word represents the end and the beginning (creation). The seemingly paradoxical mergence of opposites is present throughout Joyce’s work and especially prominent in *Finnegans Wake*, where the motif of Alpha and Omega is also used and transfigured on various occasions. In the case of *Proteus*, this paradox can be resolved by the consideration that although human time is seen as teleological in Christianity, it is still part of the grand scheme of eternal time, which is believed to be everlasting and cyclical in nature, just as Plato suggests in *Timaeus*.<sup>19</sup>

Although there are various other occasions in *Proteus* where the opposing aspects of eternity and mortality are discussed or hinted at (e.g. “Houses of decay” [40.4], “*Schluss*. He laps” [41.31] – here, the Fall equals the end (of innocence), “Weak wasting hand on mine” [44.9]), it is only towards the actual ending of the chapter that they become more prominent again and form a more or less comprehensible train of thought:

His shadow lay over the rocks as he bent, ending. Why not endless till the farthest star? Darkly they are there behind this light, darkness shining in the brightness, delta of Cassiopeia, worlds. Me sits there with his augur’s rod of ash, in borrowed sandals, by day beside a livid sea, unbeheld, in violet night walking beneath a reign of uncouth stars. I throw this ended shadow from me, manshape ineluctable, call it back. Endless, would it be mine, form of my form? Who watches me here? Who ever anywhere will read these written words? (48.3-9)

At this point in *Proteus*, the atmosphere has become even gloomier than in the initial passages of the chapter and Stephen’s thoughts are ruled by darkness (“Darkly”, “darkness”, “night”), which, as a symbol of uncertainty and possible danger, is set in opposition to the “light” and “brightness” of eternity. Once again, the distinction between the “ending” body and the “endless” soul is picked up. Stephen regrets that his body cannot be “endless till the farthest star” and denies his own corporeality and mortality. As a result, he “throw[s] this

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<sup>19</sup> To complicate matters even further, “alpha, nought, nought: one” could be read as an acronym of “anno” (domini), which would reinforce the idea of the birth of Christ as the ultimate beginning. Moreover, Christ himself is often referred to as “Alpha and Omega” in Christian theology.

ended shadow from [him]", but finally has to accept that "manshape" is "ineluctable" and "call [...] back" his shadow.<sup>20</sup> Finally having acknowledged that he cannot escape his body, which is subject to decay and death, he calls on his soul ("form of my form"), which indeed was seen as eternal and therefore endless in classic philosophy.<sup>21</sup> Stephen therefore finally accepts the finiteness and teleology of human time, but only in connection with a hope for the everlasting quality of his soul. The following consideration in Stephen's interior monologue, although seemingly unconnected with the preceding one, is actually a continuation of it: Stephen is wondering who will read the "scribbled words" (48.2) he wrote earlier on, reinforcing his hope that his soul will survive him and that he will be remembered. As an artist, Stephen naturally believes in the power of art to make its creator immortal. However, contrary to usual notions of this concept, Stephen's belief serves as a means of reassurance and is of an almost obsessive nature in this chapter, as well as in *Portrait*.

The last two sentences of the passage ("Who watches me here? Who ever anywhere will read these written words?"), just as the whole section, can also be interpreted on the level of metafictionality and self-reference, as Udaya Kumar suggests:

The monologue commences by 'Why not endless...'. It is triggered off by the 'ending' introduced by the narrative. It appears as if Stephen is reading the very written words of the narrative. This could be related to 'read these written words' at the end of the passage. (68)

Although I generally agree with Kumar on this point, I am not fully convinced of his use of the term "narrative", since the inner monologue forms part of the narrative as a whole in my opinion, even though it might not be part of the narrative voice in *Proteus*. Kumar then claims that the opposition of "corporeal being" as "finite" and the soul, or "interiority" as endless "reproduces the distinction between the narration that depicts the external states and events and the monologue that presents an interior discourse" (ibid.) and thus suggests that Stephen functions as a mediator between the level of narration and of interior monologue, which appear to be strictly separated in this approach at this point. Kumar's final remark on this passage is that "[t]he repetition of the

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<sup>20</sup> Of course, the meaning of this passage could also be interpreted as Stephen casting a shadow in the sunlight, which would once again stress the aspect of transiency.

<sup>21</sup> The most probable source for this discussion is Aristotle's *De Anima*, which Stephen alludes to on several occasions in *Proteus*.

‘ending’/‘endless’ opposition seems to highlight [the equivocation about the discursive status of ‘ending’] and destabilize the sharp distinction between narration and monologue” (69). While this argument is certainly valid, I would argue that especially in *Proteus*, the narrative voice is not easily distinguishable from the interior monologue to start with, since the whole of the chapter is narrated in a very subjective and character-oriented way. Besides, Stephen does not have to “read [...] the very words of the narrative” in order to see his shadow and start reflecting on its finiteness. Yet another way of interpreting the sentence “His shadow lay over the rocks as he bent, ending” is considering the somewhat unexpected addition “ending” as a prelude to the resulting interior monologue, or possibly as free indirect speech rather than straightforward, linear narration, which would place the sentence closer to the realm of unmediated thought and resolve the resulting discrepancy of discourse. Moreover, the question “Who ever anywhere will read these written words?” seems like a typical playful ambiguity Joyce uses on several occasions throughout his work rather than a conscious act of discursive mediation.

It is noteworthy that Stephen is reflecting on the nature of endings and teleology in this passage in the interior monologue itself, which is also located towards the ending of the actual chapter in the text. While at the beginning of *Proteus*, Stephen dismisses thoughts of finiteness, and his somewhat escapist focus lies on eternity and creation as the ultimate beginning, here he finally starts accepting his corporeality, and as a result, his own mortality. There is an accumulation of references to the constant passing of time, both in a cyclical and in a teleological way, on the last two pages of the chapter as Stephen’s thoughts progress in that direction:

Under the upswelling tide he saw the writhing weeds lift languidly and sway reluctant arms, hising up their petticoats, in whispering water swaying and upturning coy silver fonds. Day by day: night by night: lifted, flooded and let fall. Lord, they are weary: and, whispered to, they sigh. (49.19)

Just like the “tide” is a never-ending cycle that never comes to a standstill, the weeds, which are personified in this passage, cannot escape the repetitive action of being “lifted, flooded and let fall”, which they are bound to carry out “day by day” and “night by night”, “reluctant[ly]”, without ever being able to stop. It seems as if cyclical repetition has gained a negative connotation for Stephen at this point of the text, as he perceives it as compulsive and inescapable. It is

particularly important to note that, just like at the beginning of *Proteus*, neither the concept of circularity nor that of teleology is able to offer solace to Stephen, since he views both of them as oppressively inexorable.

Again, this account is followed by symbols of decay and death and finally a passage that once more reunites symbols of life and death: “A corpse rising saltwhite from the undertow” (49.28-29), “Bag of corpse gas sopping in foul brine” (49.31), “Dead breaths I living breathe, tread dead dust, devour a ruinous offal from all dead.” (49.33-34), “the stench of his green grave, his leprous nosehole snoring to the sun” (49.35). The notion of “[d]ead breaths I living breathe” is a perfect exemplification of the aforementioned mergence of opposites into a single image.

The very last paragraphs of *Proteus* are characterised by Stephen’s thoughts about the aspect of ending in yet another sense of the word, namely the end of the day (“To evening lands. Evening will find itself.” [50.6], “Yes, evening will find itself in me, without me. All days make their end” [50.7-8]). It seems curious that Stephen should be musing about evening at 11 a.m. (cf. Gilbert schema). One of the possible motivations for this might be the establishing of a sense of connection with the following chapters, despite its alleged disjointedness, most of all with *Penelope*.<sup>22</sup> In this context, it is also interesting to note that the very last paragraph of *Proteus*, albeit showing Stephen’s perspective, is told by the narrator and does not form part of the interior monologue, which might suggest a further adaptation to the relatively linear narrative style of the following chapter: “He turned his face over a shoulder, rere regardant. Moving through the air high spars of a threemaster, her sails brailed up on the crosstrees, homing, upstream, silently moving, a silent ship” (50.22-24).

Another noteworthy aspect present in this quotation is the mentioning of “silent”, since Stephen associates the audible with time by linking it to the *nacheinander* (Johnson 784). The ship can also be read as a metaphor of Stephen himself, who watches it (alluding to the visible, or *nebeneinander*), but is at the same time himself “homing, upstream” and “silently moving”, for he does not utter a single word in *Proteus*, but merely wanders (or “moves”) along Sandymount strand. In this case, the audible becomes silent and signifies a denial of time on Stephen’s side, subtly suggesting that he has not genuinely

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<sup>22</sup> I shall discuss the connection between *Proteus* and *Penelope* in 3.1.4 *Penelope*.

accepted the implications of his corporeality completely. This claim can also be supported with regard to the narrative structure and style in *Proteus*.

The most striking stylistic feature of this chapter is certainly the interior monologue, which is mostly characterised by accumulations of nouns and adjectives rather than verbs and full sentences, which function as a representation of a rapid succession of images with which the character is trying to cope: "Signatures of all things I am here to read, seaspawn and seawrack, the nearing tide, that rusty boot. Snotgreen, bluesilver, rust: coloured signs" (37.1-2). Interior monologue appears to be a very apt technique for conveying the Modernist experience of time in all its rapidity and accelerated pace. Joyce's use of interior monologue, especially at this stage of the novel, has various implications. Firstly, due to the mere fact that a very limited, subjective point of view is offered rather than an objective account of events, there is a special emphasis on the individual experience of one single character, while the others are completely excluded and the reader only learns what the other characters were doing at that point in retrospect, or not at all. Secondly, not only does the chapter give a mere snapshot account of a single character's thoughts, but these thoughts are fragmented and disconnected themselves, both semantically and, on the level of representation, grammatically. While purely logical, straightforwardly thought-through examinations about art, which are typical of Stephen's character in *Portrait*, could be associated with teleology, Stephen's thoughts in *Proteus* (and indeed in most of *Ulysses*), being only loosely connected by a merely associative nexus, do not fulfil this criterion. Moreover, the very technique of interior monologue itself provides an additional aspect of conceptual openness due to the fact that Stephen's thoughts have not suddenly stopped simply because the chapter is at an end and the reader stops "read[ing] these written words" as the narrative focus zooms out of the interior perspective (nor, for that matter, have they just begun at the point that the reader enters the scene); instead, they are an ongoing process lasting throughout the character's life. Even though that life will eventually end at some point, the character's thoughts themselves are certainly not concluded at the discussed point in the text.

Although the story level suggests an acknowledgement of mortality and the teleology of time on Stephen's side, Joyce manages to undermine this

seemingly straightforward claim, as well as the belief in a single, definitive interpretation with the help of association and structure. Similar tendencies can be observed with regard to *Penelope*, with which the present chapter has more in common than meets the eye at first.

### 3.1.2 *Hades*

As the whole chapter takes place on the way to and at Glasnevin cemetery, where the characters attend Patrick Dignam's funeral, it is not surprising that Bloom's thoughts are mainly circling around the topic of life and death. Similarly to Stephen in *Proteus*, although on a much more bodily and down-to-earth level and with an altogether different line of argument and outcome, Bloom also considers the two to be an inseparable unity rather than two separate elements. Bloom's first reflection on death is triggered off by Simon Dedalus's mentioning of his son Stephen:

Noisy selfwilled man. Full of his son. He is right. Something to hand on. If only little Rudy had lived. See him grow up. Hear his voice in the house. Walking beside Molly in an Eton suit. My son. Me in his eyes. [...] Must have been that morning in Raymond terrace she was at the window, watching the two dogs at it by the wall of the cease to do evil. She had that cream gown on with the rip she never stitched. Give us a touch, Poldy. God, I'm dying for it. How life begins. (86.9-17)

At this point, Bloom is thinking about the death of his son Rudy and the more general theme of paternal legacy ("Something to hand on", "Me in his eyes"), which was denied to him due to the untimely death of his son in infancy.<sup>23</sup> Immediately after lamenting his son's death and wishing that he was still alive, his thoughts turn to Rudy's conception, thus once again suggesting a reunification of the opposing concepts of life and death. Moreover, Bloom's thoughts about Molly, as well as the very last sentence of this particular train of thoughts ("How life begins") do not merely constitute an act of impropriety in terms of respect for Dignam, considering that the interior monologue is taking place at the graveyard, but they are also set in juxtaposition to the actual location itself and its implications of death and decay. It is also noteworthy that Bloom's train of thoughts is presented in an anti-chronological order, thus completely reversing the teleological passing of time.

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<sup>23</sup> Father and son relationships, albeit being an integral part of *Ulysses*, unfortunately cannot be discussed at greater length in this thesis.

Throughout the chapter, Bloom's thoughts are dominated by set phrases in connection with death and funerals (e.g. "Aged 88 after a long and tedious illness. [...] On whose soul Sweet Jesus have mercy." [88.19-20]). Since Bloom's profession is that of an advertising agent, it is not surprising that these rather impersonal statements, sounding as if they come straight out of a newspaper, are present in his thoughts amidst more personal and emotional ones (as represented in the previous quote). Most of his considerations are triggered off by his immediate environment, and some result from the interaction with other characters, such as the following one:

- As decent a little man as ever wore a hat, Mr Dedalus said. He went very suddenly.
- Breakdown, Martin Cunningham said. Heart. [...] He had a sudden death, poor fellow, he said.
- The best death, Mr Bloom said. Their wide open eyes looked at him.
- No suffering, he said. A moment and all is over. Like dying in sleep. No-one spoke.
- Dead side of the street this. [...] Foundation stone for Parnell. Breakdown. Heart. (92.14-28)

In this passage, Bloom's thoughts are prompted by Martin Cunningham's explanation of Dignam's death ("Breakdown. [...] Heart"). Although Bloom's thoughts take a turn from the initial consideration towards the actual spatial environment, they revolve in a cyclical fashion and end on the same note as the initial impulse given by Cunningham ("Breakdown. Heart"). The actual cause of death is also of particular importance with regard to teleology and endings, since the described "[b]reakdown" puts a very unexpected and sudden end to a human life, thus reaching the envisioned goal of its teleological drive not by constant, controlled progress, but rather in a single, random moment. The notion of "breakdown" serves as an exemplification of the relentless power of teleology on the one hand, but also of its arbitrariness and the fact that Dignam's death is not necessarily part of a grander scheme, which would perhaps render it meaningful, but rather a mere act of coincidence, which nobody can predict or prevent. The general circular tendency of the interior monologues in *Ulysses*, and especially those delivered by Bloom, has already been discussed by Udaya Kumar in connection with *Lestrygonians*:

'Provost's house. The reverend Dr Salmon : tinned salmon. Well tinned in there. Wouldn't live in it if they paid me.' [*Ulysses* 157.11-12] The 'Provost's House' leads to an evocation of his name. This further leads to 'tinned salmon', but the 'tinned' leads back to a consideration of the

house again. In this passage, the topic of discourse seems to be moving in a circle. (50)

I would argue that in this case, the circularity of Bloom's thoughts stands in (conscious or subconscious) juxtaposition with the rather bleak and destructively teleological overall tone of *Hades*, with which Bloom is trying to cope.<sup>24</sup>

The constant repetition of motifs (the opposition of life as the ultimate beginning and death as the ultimate end) is not only present on the story level in Bloom's thoughts, but also on the discourse level via the excessive use of "deadly" verbal nuances" (Johnson 803), or rather nuisances in some cases ("Priests dead against it", "He gazed gravely at the ground" etc.), which suggest a somewhat obsessive circularity. This idea also corresponds to the Homeric parallel, where Odysseus meets "Sisyphus heaving his stone [and] Tityus, a character who, like Prometheus, is condemned to an eternity of having his liver plucked at by vultures" (Johnson 802) in Hades. Both Homeric characters are mentioned in the Linati scheme, while Gilbert only gives the equivalent of "Sisyphus: Cunningham". Thus, the circularity first introduced as a reassuring counterpart to the negatively connotated teleological implications of the graveyard turns into a compulsive repetition of sorts. It is not so much the dead which Bloom pities, but the living, especially the bereaved (like himself), since they are the ones who have to cope with the consequences of their beloved one's death over and over again, while death, according to Bloom, means "[n]o suffering" for the deceased – "[a] moment and all is over". Although this statement seems somewhat egotistical and inappropriate at first glance, it becomes understandable in view of Bloom's father's suicide and Rudy's premature death. On a similar note, Bloom considers it "[m]ore sensible to spend money on some charity for the living" (108.35) instead of using it for the upkeep of graves or for organising funerals.

The last pages of *Hades* are characterised by Bloom's musings on the topic of memory and its counterpart, forgetting: "Begin to be forgotten. Out of sight, out of mind" (107.15). As a solution for the latter aspect, he briefly considers the

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<sup>24</sup> Interestingly enough, the example chosen by Kumar, albeit stemming from an altogether different context, also features a merging of life and death in the single image of the salmon, which is first referred to as "Reverend Salmon", but consecutively proclaimed "tinned", i.e. dead. For an exploration of the metaphor of the salmon as a way of establishing continuity and circularity, cf. Vicki Mahaffey's lecture "*Finn Again: Huck Finn, Finn MacCool & the Salmon; The Irish-American Odyssey of Finnegans Wake*", delivered at the James Joyce Summer School in Dublin, July 2010.

use of a gramophone, which would enable the living to remember their deceased relatives and friends: “Besides how could you remember everybody? Eyes, walk, voice. Well, the voice, yes: gramophone. [...] Remind you of the voice like the photograph reminds you of the face” (109.28-32). It is interesting to note the medial shift inherent in this aspect, which is not only taking place from the visible (“photograph”) to the audible (“gramophone”), thus maybe subtly alluding to *Proteus*, but also from the static medium of photography to one that is more apt at capturing not simply one single moment in time, but a series of moments, or a longer time span in general. Moreover, the gramophone allows for a sense of simultaneity if more than one voice is involved.<sup>25</sup> Interestingly enough, the only one of the three aspects mentioned (“[e]yes, walk, voice”) Bloom does not remark on further is how to remember the walk of a specific person. While Joyce could probably have been aware and even familiar with new approaches to photography and painting directed at depicting movement, such as the works of Eadweard Muybridge (whom he must have acknowledged at least for his strikingly pun-like name), or Marcel Duchamp’s œuvre (and *Nude descending a staircase*<sup>26</sup> in particular), Bloom is apparently not aware of this technique, or at least does not think of it in that particular moment. In the second case, this might be explained due to the fact that the painting did not exist in 1904, but this fact does not explain Bloom’s ignorance towards Muybridge, whose creative period dates back as far as the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Therefore, this non-mentioning can be read as a social marker of his less intellectual background in contrast to Stephen Dedalus, but also of his general aversion towards metaphysical and scientific matters (represented by Stephen) in favour of empiricism and his association with the bodily sphere rather than with overly abstract theoretical problems throughout the text.

In a way, Bloom’s thoughts can be read as a somewhat more pragmatic addition to Stephen’s belief in the eternal quality of art and its power of

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<sup>25</sup> Of course, both the appearance and the actual usage of a gramophone record represent a cyclical appearance and movement respectively. However, the fact that the record has two sides, which have to be turned in order for the music to keep playing, suggests an aspect of pause rather than a seamless transgression.

<sup>26</sup> Marcel Duchamp: *Nu descendant un escalier no. 2*. 1912. (current location: Philadelphia Museum of Art). This painting not only captures one single moment in time (that of the descent), but also unites several movements within that one moment into a single image, as the various stages of the movement overlap. Thus, they not only create a sense of teleological movement in a particular direction, but also the simultaneity of the movement itself, creating a sense of continuity and infinity at the same time, since the movement never changes and its length (and eventual goal) is only determined by the materialistic parameters of the canvas.

preserving the memory of a human being expressed in *Proteus*. While Stephen's solution is (or rather: must be) a chiefly abstract and intellectual one, Bloom displays a more down-to-earth approach to this matter. Rather than seeking artistic transfiguration, he is interested in a direct mimetic representation of the voice and the person, respectively.

Bloom's very last thoughts at the graveyard blur the line between life and death even further, although he means to leave the place behind once and for all and get "[b]ack to the world again" (110.23). Apparently, this attempt is bound to fail due to the cyclical interconnection between life and death alluded to throughout *Hades*, and, on a grander scale, in all of *Ulysses*:

Enough of this place. Brings you a bit nearer every time. [...] Poor papa too. [...] I will appear to you after death. You will see my ghost after death. My ghost will haunt you after death. There is another world after death named hell. I do not like that other world she wrote. No more do I. Plenty to see and hear and feel yet. Feel live warm beings near you. Let them sleep in their maggoty beds. They are not going to get me this innings. Warm beds: warm fullblooded life. (110.23)

This passage articulates Bloom's fears of his own mortality that he naturally experiences in a particularly strong manner at the cemetery. Although he is determined to leave the place and its implications of death and decay behind, he does acknowledge that it "[b]rings you a bit nearer every time". His mentioning of "ghost"s also draws a connection between the life of the bereaved and the dead, suggesting that he is not able to mentally draw a line between his own and the "other world". Bloom wants to experience and feel everything he possibly can in the "lease of life" (105.14) he has left, as he believes there is still "[p]lenty to see and hear and feel". This train of thoughts ends on a particularly positive reaffirmation of life ("Warm beds: warm fullblooded life") that is juxtaposed with the "maggoty beds" of the dead.

Just like in *Proteus*, the concept of cyclicity is seen as ambivalent. While Bloom, not unlike Stephen, applies thoughts of circularity as a kind of coping strategy for the grim overall atmosphere of death and finality in *Hades*, it is never free from the connotation of enduring and suffering in a Sisyphus-like way. Only in the conceptual merging of death and new life, as exemplified in the following thought, as well as in Bloom's initial thoughts about Rudy's conception and birth, a positive re-evaluation of the cyclical concept is carried out: "The Botanic Gardens are just over there. It's the blood sinking in the earth gives new

life" (104.26-27). In this respect, "[b]oth ends meet" (104.16) indeed in Bloom's mind, where "[i]n the midst of death we are in life" (104.15).

### 3.1.2 *Aeolus*

In *Aeolus*, the reader is presented with a concept of time altogether different from the preceding chapters. Several different voices are laid out through the medium of the newspaper, creating a sense of simultaneity, the "intersection of time and space" (Bergson 100). Indeed newspapers were seen as "the present in its totality" or as "simultaneous poetry" at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Kern 70). However, while the newspaper might provide various parts of information at once, the very act of reading it is not simultaneous any more, since the individual articles cannot be read at the same time. Time in this chapter appears very condensed, the newspaper displays an almost imagist conciseness, and different voices seem to be cut off without having had the chance to develop further. Like many Modernist texts, *Aeolus* (and, indeed, *Ulysses* itself) presents a very fragmented and snapshot-like view of events. The newspaper cuttings are semantically very much connected to and serve as a mirror image of a given present moment through language; they are not timeless, but rather serve as a demonstration of the ephemeral nature of the present. As soon as new events happen in the outer world, newspapers become out of date, thus this chapter can also be read as challenging the possibility of representing reality through language. In fact, simultaneity in a broader sense can also be discovered in the whole of *Ulysses* itself, since form and content are inseparably interlinked.

The style of *Aeolus* appears to be modelled on newspapers, since bold, upper-case headlines dominate its form. However, its textual body is not that of a newspaper article, but rather it presents the reader with a relatively straightforward narrative (as far as any part of *Ulysses* can be considered "straightforward"). The realm of the newspaper, exemplified in the aforementioned use of headlines, but also in the frequent allusions to the actual machinery behind the press, provides the general setting for the narrative, and is also reflected upon in the actual narrative itself.

The chapter starts out with an account of the fast-paced "HEART OF THE HIBERNIAN METROPOLIS" (112.1):

Before Nelson's pillar trams slowed, shunted, changed trolley started for Blackrock, Kingstown and Dalkey, Clonskea, [...] Harold's Cross. [...] Right and left parallel clanging ringing a double-decker and a singledeck moved from their railheads, swerved to the down line, glided parallel. (112.2-10)

The focus of this initial passage lies on the urbanisation of Dublin, which was certainly also a characterising topic of newspapers from that time, exemplified by the accumulative mentioning of public transportation ("trams", "trolley", "double-decker", "singledeck", "railheads", "glided parallel"). Another element present here is that of the increase in velocity brought about by modernised and industrialised life, as expressed by the quick succession of verbs ("slowed, shunted, changed [...] started", "swerved") and the somewhat impressionist onomatopoeic description of the busses' movement as "clanging" and "ringing".

Similarly, the printing machinery is described as an ever-moving force, without ever coming to a halt, or a standstill. The frequent use of onomatopoeia, such as "Thumping, thumping." (114.10-11), "Thumping, thump." (114.20) and "Silt" (117) in the midst of otherwise perfectly grammatical sentences strengthens the sense of inescapability and omnipresence of a strong forward drive in this context. This issue is openly discussed towards the beginning of *Aeolus*: "Machines. Smash a man to atoms if they got him caught. Rule the world today. [Dignam's] machineries are pegging away too. Like these, got out of hand: fermenting. Working away, tearing away. And that old grey rat tearing to get in" (114.21-24). The parallelisation of machines with human life, and in this case death, reintroduces the ever-present discussion of the unavoidability of death and the inexorable teleological drive of life. However, once again, this drive is seen in connection with "fermenting", i.e. re-cycling, which blurs the boundaries between life and death once more and links them even more closely. In a way, the constant repetition, reiteration and transformation of this topic on various levels and occasions in the text presents yet another exploration of cyclicity on a metapoetic level.

The aforementioned topic of industrialisation and machinery is taken up at various points in the chapter, always in connection with their unstoppable and never-ending, merciless movement. While this aspect is merely alluded to in most of the passages, the following quote contains a direct examination of it:

The machines clanked in threefour time. Thump, thump, thump. Now if he got paralysed there and no one knew how to stop them they'd clank

on and on the same, print it over and over and up and back.  
Monkeydoodle the whole thing. Want a cool head. (115.9-12)

Interestingly enough, the rhythm of the printing press is first compared to the metre of a musical piece (“in threefour time”). As the most common type of dance in three-four time would be a waltz, this mentioning could further implicate a circular movement. In any case, the deliberate association with the realm of music presents a somewhat playful and light-hearted transformation of the negatively connotated notion of the relentless movement exemplified by the printing press. However, Bloom’s thoughts do revert to that aspect soon enough, when he is considering the possibility of the editor Myles Crawford becoming “paralysed”. This time, the impossibility of the machinery coming to a standstill is addressed directly (“they’d clank on and on the same, print it over and over and up and back”) and juxtaposed to the imagined paralysis of the human editor. It is of particular importance that in this case, the machine’s movement is not only never-ending and compulsively circular in nature, but also highly repetitive (“on and on the same”) and unproductive as far as its outcome is concerned. In effect, its result amounts to a testimonial of the highly destructive power of the inescapable, ceaseless drive of the press machinery and, as a further consequence, of industrialisation itself, which does not allow the human being to stop or take a break, but forces and chases him on incessantly. Contrary to previous allusions to cyclicity and teleology, for the first time the reader is presented with a sort of circular teleology that, albeit being aimed at a certain goal by definition (the actual release of the next issue), manages to lose this goal at the same time, thus turning into meaningless repetition rather than a straightforward progression towards an ending.<sup>27</sup> In fact, the movement of the machine develops into a certain kind of paralysis with regard to its result, while at the same time symbolising infinite movement, since it does not produce a coherent, teleologically oriented newspaper article, but a large amount of randomly generated “Monkeydoodle” of questionable content and textual affiliation instead.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Dieter Fuchs alerted me to the idea that the printing press itself resembles both a teleological and a cyclical movement, as the paper keeps rolling on in the same direction, but also from a bigger roll of paper itself. Moreover, the barrel of the printing press also revolves in a circular fashion.

<sup>28</sup> Perhaps this mentioning can also be read as an allusion to the Infinite Monkey Theorem, which suggests that a monkey randomly hitting keys of a typewriter for an infinite amount of time will “almost certainly” generate a given text (the suggested example is Shakespeare’s Complete Works). While the chance of a monkey actually producing a coherent text in this way is very small, it does not equal zero. In

On many more occasions, there is talk about “the obedient reels feeding in huge webs of paper” (116.7-8). Again, the characteristic sound of clanking is mentioned: “Clank it. Clank it.” (116.8). This time, the afterlife of the newspaper is also considered, introducing once again its connection to the cycle of life and death mentioned in the beginning: “Miles of it unreeled. What becomes of it after? O, wrap up meat, parcels: various uses, thousand and one things” (116.8-10). In this case, an interesting transformation of this aspect occurs in the act of the recycling of the newspaper for “various uses”. By that act, the outdated (i.e. “dead”) newspaper is offered a “new lease of life” (105.14) in another function. Of course, this passage also alludes to Bloom’s own secondary use of the newspaper in *Calypso* (“He took up a page from the pile of cut sheets [at the butchers]” [57.12], “He tore away half the prize story sharply and wiped himself with it” [67.22]). Even at this very bodily level of the text, there is a clear distinction between the “kidney ooz[ing] bloodgouts on the willowpatterned dish” (57.3), which is described in very lively and vivid terms albeit technically being dead meat, and also paralleled with Bloom’s erotic fantasy about the “nextdoor girl” (57.4) and Bloom’s act of defecation, probably of that very same kidney, significantly enough taking place at the very end of the chapter. Again, a sense of (re)cyclicity is achieved through the mediating device of the newspaper, while at the same time a certain amount of finality is hinted at by the fact that even the kidney’s secondary use as food has eventually come to an end (although, to complicate the matter even further, it could theoretically also be used as dung).

The telling headline “ORTHOGRAPHICAL” (117.1) features a self-reflexive account of the act of typesetting, highlighting its mistakes: “Want to be sure of his spelling. Proof fever. [...] It is amusing to view the unpar one ar alleled embarra two ars is it? double ss ment of a harassed pedlar while gauging au the symmetry of a peeled pear under a cemetery wall” (117.1-6). While these mistakes are mostly “amusing”, they also create a sort of disturbance in the flow of information and especially in that of reading. While these errors can probably be said to originate from human blunders, as the passage continues, the

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the context of *Aeolus*, this reference to “Monkeydoodle” might imply that even though the machine is simply “doodling” on and inserting random letters, it might actually generate a coherent text, which would mean that although the generation of the text lacks an intention and a teleological drive, the eventual outcome is satisfactory.

faultiness of the actual machinery becomes apparent and the interjections become more intrusive: “Sllt. The nethermost deck of the first machine jogged forward its flyboard with sllt the first batch of quirefold papers. Sllt. Almost human the way it sllt to call attention. Doing its level best to speak. That door too sllt creaking, asking to be shut. Everything speaks in its own way. Sllt” (117.10-14). Although on the story level, Bloom is reflecting on the actual sound of the machines and their “[a]lmost human” quality of attempting to attract attention, on the discourse level it must be considered that from a formal point of view, the genre of the text is supposed to be a newspaper article. Therefore, the mistakes not only disrupt the flow of the text, but also its very function – that of presenting information in a linear fashion.

A possible explanation for this apparent reluctance towards machines could be that Bloom himself does not approve of the significant acceleration of the pace of human life caused by industrialisation. On another occasion, “[a] heavy tram honking its gong” (71.28), as yet another symbol of the aforementioned rapid change, prevents Bloom from watching a woman across the street with silk stockings enter a car, which might have given him the opportunity to have a closer look at them in greater detail. This missed opportunity triggers off the following thoughts: “Lost it. Curse your noisy pugnose. Feels locked out of it. Paradise and the peri. Always happening like that. The very moment. [...] The tram passed. They drove off towards the Loop Line bridge, her rich gloved hand on the steel grip. Flicker, flicker: the laceflare of her hat in the sun: flicker, flick” (71.29-37). It is not only the tram which is pictured in a negative light in this passage, but also the car, which is responsible for the woman eventually driving away. Bloom is therefore bereft of the opportunity to obey his desires and bodily drives by the very embodiments of the unrelenting force of industrialisation (of which the printing press is yet another specimen) and openly dismisses them as “pugnose”.

On yet another level, the numerous mistakes and interruptions of the textual flow in the aforementioned passage of *Aeolus* can be read as a disruption of a straightforward teleology of the text, which also seems to be one of the major aims of *Ulysses* itself. The straightforward style of a newspaper is literally blown away by the “hot air” (Johnson 809) of its rhetoric in *Aeolus*, as the Homeric parallel might suggest, as well as in the whole of *Ulysses* itself, with the effect of

an “unsettling of narrative expectations” (Johnson xxxiv). David Hayman was the first to introduce the idea of an Arranger present in the text, who seems to be especially active in this chapter. He characterises this entity as follows: “the arranger should be seen as something between a persona and a function, somewhere between the narrator and the implied author” (122). As much as this concept seems tempting, since it apparently resolves the problematic relationship between author and narrator, which has been discussed on numerous occasions with regard to literature for centuries, it simplifies, or even overlooks the strikingly high level of self-reflexivity and metafictional comments in *Ulysses*, which do not only relate to an instance present *in* the text, but also comprise the whole of the reader’s and author’s reality lying *outside* the text (cf. Stephen’s “Who anywhere will read these written words?” [48.9], to name just one). Rather than making a clear distinction between the role of the author and the narrator, *Ulysses* is a formidable example of a text that blurs and consciously plays with binary boundaries on a large number of occasions and indeed, intentional ambiguity (on the level of words, as well as that of grammar and concept) seems like one of the basic principles around which the novel is built. Moreover, Hayman’s narratological approach completely disregards the role of the reader, who, in terms of reader response criticism, would in fact be regarded as the real arranger of the text.<sup>29</sup> Just as Hayman’s arranger “flips through the score before tapping his baton to ‘Begin’” (Johnson xxxiii) in *Sirens*, so does the reader flip through the book, deciding where he/she wants to start and stop reading, whether he/she desires to skip a few pages, or if he/she wants to start reading at the first chapter, in the middle of the book or even on the last page. Moreover, the reader is the only instance able to arrive at simultaneity through his/her reading. While the author can conceive simultaneity and try to make it apparent, it only materialises through the mediation of the reader. In the context of *Aeolus*, the role of the reader and more specifically, of the supposed audience of the *Freeman’s Journal*, is of particular importance, since newspapers would be made obsolete without their readers and the reading public in general. Although the general style of *Aeolus*, and the abovementioned mechanical disruptions of the text in particular, can certainly be described as “a subversive textual force always drawing attention back to

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<sup>29</sup> Cf. e.g. the works of Wolfgang Iser, Hans-Robert Jauss or C.S. Lewis in particular.

*Ulysses* as a field in which meanings are produced, countered, remade, and undone” (ibid.), they might as well assume this function without the mediating instance of an arranger.

In any case, the numerous disruptions of the continuous textual flow caused by human mistakes on the one hand, because they cannot keep up with mercilessly fast pace of the machinery, but also by the sheer relentless never-ceasing drive of the printing press itself, present a noteworthy disturbance in the context of teleology as well. It seems that the meaningless, circular repetition of the printing press stands in the way of teleology, which relies on that very same machinery for its actual purpose, the distribution of relevant information.<sup>30</sup>

### 3.1.4 *Penelope*

All the chapters of *Ulysses* are defined by their respective unique art and style, which creates a strong correspondence between form and content. However, it is not until *Penelope* that “pure duration” in the sense of Henri Bergson is achieved. Not only are the past, the present and even the future united on a conceptual level (no hour of the day is assigned to this chapter, its symbol is eternity; the interior monologue takes place in the moment between a day ends and a new one dawns), but also on a semantic level, since Molly Bloom thinks about past lovers, her husband Leopold Bloom as a representation of both the present and the past and finally about Stephen Dedalus, which suggests an association with the future and, in a wider sense, with genealogy. In this section, time has virtually become unbound (as has Molly): her thoughts are “melting [...] into each other”, her “ego” indeed “lets itself live” and Joyce makes “the past and the present states into an organic whole” (Bergson 100) through the immediate representation of Molly’s unfiltered, spontaneous flow of thoughts. Contrary to the depiction of Stephen’s ideas in *Proteus*, this chapter lays bare its lack of structure and punctuation:

Yes because he never did a thing like that before as ask to get his breakfast in bed with a couple of eggs since the City Arms hotel when he used to be pretending to be laid up with a sick voice doin his highness to make himself interesting to that old faggot Mrs Riordan [...]. (*Ulysses* 690.1-4)

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<sup>30</sup> The faulty typeset in these passages might also ironically allude to the actual printing process of *Ulysses* itself, whose circumstances were described as “exceptional” by Sylvia Beach in the preamble of its first edition, asking “the reader’s indulgence for [unavoidable] typographical errors”.

There are barely any signs of punctuation that might hinder the stream, which becomes more ecstatic with every page.<sup>31</sup>

The overall structure of *Penelope* can certainly be described as cyclical (the same topics are taken up over and over again; it starts with an affirmation and ends with one: “Yes” (690.1 / 732.22), the first and the last man Molly mentions is Leopold Bloom), therefore it creates a sense of an “organic whole” even within itself. Yet, at the same time, there is a strong sense of finality and teleology toward the actual ending of the chapter. However, contrary to its common notion, in this case it does not lead towards a final ending point, but rather back to the beginning (not only towards the first word of *Penelope*, but also towards the very first word of *Ulysses*, as *Penelope* ends with the letter “s” [“Yes” (732.22)] and *Ulysses* starts with it [“Stately” (1.1)]<sup>32</sup>).

While the most striking embodiment of cyclicity is found on a structural and conceptual level (also with regard to the Homeric parallel), quite a few references to this topic can be found on the story level as well. Ironically enough, one of the first thoughts Molly has right at the beginning of the chapter is that of “the end of the world” (690.8), but just like Bloom in *Hades*, she dismisses the bleak consequences of this thought and juxtaposes it with an affirmation of life by suggesting to “let us have a bit of fun first” (ibid.). Similarly to Bloom in *Hades*, Molly’s interior monologue is characterised by thoughts of the cycle of life and death, the transience of human life and the mark a human being (and especially a woman) can leave on the world. In this context, she considers the use of perfume as a means of preserving a person’s memory, which adds an olfactory medium to the ones mentioned in *Hades* (audible: gramophone, visual: photograph):

weeks and weeks I kept the handkerchief under my pillow for the smell of him there was no decent perfume to be got in that Gibraltar only that cheap peau despagne that faded and left a stink on you more than anything else I wanted to give him a memento he gave me that clumsy Claddagh ring for luck that I gave Gardner going to South Africa where those Boers killed him with their war and fever (713.4-8)

The symbolical exchange of a “memento” seems to be the most fervent wish uttered by Molly. In this case, this exchange is translated into that of a

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<sup>31</sup> Hans – Walter Gabler argues that the full stops constitute a structural Möbius strip. (*Penelope, the last Chapter of Ulysses* 47).

<sup>32</sup> This idea was also mentioned by Fritz Senn in his lecture entitled “Alphabetic Dispersion in *Ulysses*” delivered at the James Joyce Summer School in Dublin, July 2010.

handkerchief bearing the smell of her lover; however, her own transfer of smell is somewhat ridiculed when it becomes “a stink” of “cheap peau despagne”.<sup>33</sup> An aspect that is probably even more problematic than the perfume’s unpleasant smell in this context is the “fad[ing]” of the perfume, which would imply that the memory would not last very long. As the exchange of smell does not seem to render an altogether satisfactory result, Molly’s lover gives her a “clumsy Claddagh ring for luck” as a symbol of consistency and solidity, which is contrasted with the short-lived shelf life of scent. In an ironic reversal, the very same ring that was once intended as a sign of durability (and circularity, both due to its form and its general meaning) is connected to death, violence and eventual destruction when Molly’s lover is killed by “those Boers [...] with their war and fever”. While it also seems quite surprising that Molly would give a token of her first lover’s affection to another one, it also asserts a certain sense of continuity, which is eventually broken up by Gardner’s death.

In this context, Molly also reminisces about the topic of past lovers in general before concluding that “I suppose theyre all dead and rotten long ago” (716.1-2), thus metaphorically burying them along with her memories. From this point onwards, the only male figures of sexual interest she mentions are Bloom, Boylan (as representatives of the present) and Stephen (as a symbol of the future). Thus, while the whole chapter is made up of a recount of her past and while this fact does not change at this point, she now concentrates on the present and the future at the same time.<sup>34</sup>

Still focussing on the topic of the teleological drive of human life, Molly also juxtaposes her own (relative) youth to the aged appearance of other women: “ugly as she was near 80 or 100 her face a mass of wrinkles with all her religion domineering” (710.7-8), “I can’t help it if Im young still can I” (727.1), which, in a way, might be read as a sort of denial of the destructive aging process which she herself will one day undertake. On a similar note, Molly thinks about her daughter Milly, who symbolises genealogy and therefore a continuation of Molly’s own life through her maternal legacy on the one hand. On the other hand however, Milly is also perceived as a competitor in terms of beauty and

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<sup>33</sup> Molly is apparently not aware of the fact that Roger & Gallet’s “Peau d’Espagne” was a highly esteemed and probably everything but “cheap” perfume and even won the Grand Prix in France in 1889. (Cf. e.g. Havelock Ellis)

<sup>34</sup> She does briefly think about Rudy, but only in connection with Bloom (728).

youthfulness by Molly, who laconically comments on the vanity (both in the sense of conceit and of *vanitas*) of her daughter's bodily charms: "wanting to put her hair up at 15 my powder too only ruin her skin on her shes time enough for that all her life after of course shes restless knowing shes pretty with her lips so read a pity they wont stay that way I was too" (718.10-12). In this quote, both aspects (that of Molly as a caring mother and as a woman jealous of the other one's attractiveness) coincide, as Molly fears that Milly will grow up too soon and that the powder Milly uses to imitate her mother might harm or "ruin her skin", claiming that she has "time enough for that" once she is older. At the same time, Molly constantly compares herself to her daughter ("I was too", "I was just like that myself" [718.23-24]) and almost maliciously states that it is a "pity they wont stay that way". Again, the image of ruined skin as a sign of decay is juxtaposed to the "red lips", which will, however, also be subject to the process of aging eventually. By stating that there is "time enough for that", Molly also seems to attempt to deny the teleology of human time by negating its passing and trying to stop Milly from growing older, at least on the level of appearance.

While Milly qualifies as a carrier of Molly and Leopold Bloom's genetic material and therefore as a metaphorical continuation of their own lives,<sup>35</sup> Rudy's premature death symbolises a failed genealogy. Milly, as a representative of the female sex, is therefore associated with continuity and cyclicity, while Rudy's death symbolises the eventual ending point of the merciless force of teleology. The female and male principle are associated with circularity and teleology respectively throughout *Ulysses*. Just like Bloom in *Hades*, Molly mourns Rudy's death in *Penelope*, but at the same time believes it would have been better to save the freshly knitted jacket in which he was buried for a (living) child in need: "I oughnt to have buried him in that little woolly jacket I knitted crying as I was but give it to some poor child" (728.12-13). This particular passage also inverts the Homeric parallel in an ironic way, since in the *Odyssey*, Penelope is knitting a burial robe for her father in law, Laertes (Johnson 971), which she keeps unravelling in order not to be pursued by her suitors, thus buying time and at the same time seemingly hindering its flow by

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<sup>35</sup> This topic is elaborated on in *Finnegans Wake* in the context of ALP and her daughter Issy, especially in Book IV.

never actually finishing the cloth,<sup>36</sup> while here, Molly does complete the action of knitting, but in a way wishes she could undo it. However, while Penelope is the weaver of her own text(ure) (or, indeed, the mysterious arranger figure?), who can control, speed up and slow down the pace of time (or in this case of the narrative), Molly cannot undo the force of human teleology as easily in her own life due to her being “human, all too human” (*Letters* 1:160, *Selected Letters* p.287).

Similarly to the other discussed chapters, *Penelope* is characterised not only by gloomy thoughts about the end of life, but also by more positive ones about its beginning, especially in connection with Molly’s strong sense of motherhood and womanhood. This aspect is not just limited to her children, but also seen on a wider scale, with Molly playing the part of a pre- and posthuman<sup>37</sup> mother of humanity in general. Like Bloom, she also remembers Rudy’s conception immediately before thinking of the aforementioned burial jacket: “it wasn’t my fault we came together when I was watching the two dogs up in her behind in the middle of the naked street” (728.10-11). A strong sense of cyclicity in the context of life and death is palpable throughout Molly’s words, especially in the aforementioned passage, or when she muses about “Fanny M Coy [...] skinny thing with a turn in her eye trying to sing my songs shed want to be born all over again” (723.23-24) or claims that “[men are] all mad to get in there where they come out of” (711.21-22), which strongly connects the aspect of birth to that of conception and reproduction, stressing the never-ending process of both metaphorically and physically re-entering the womb (and thereby even possibly creating yet another human being).

Although Molly’s thoughts feature a large amount of cyclical imagery, *Penelope*, in fact, manages to transgress the concepts of both cyclicity and teleology altogether and turn it into a discourse of abundance and, as a further result, of infinity.<sup>38</sup> Molly’s discourse of abundance is structurally perceivable through the excessive repetition of certain words and phrases, such as “yes” and “O”, while on the conceptual level, similarly to *Proteus*, Molly’s thoughts

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<sup>36</sup> Ruben Borg addresses this issue by calling Penelope “the agent of an impossible economy in which buying time and wasting time are accomplished as a single gesture” (15).

<sup>37</sup> cf. Joyce’s letter to Harriet Shaw Weaver: “I have rejected the usual interpretation of [*Penelope*] as a human apparition. [...] In conception and technique I tried to depict the earth which is prehuman and presumably posthuman.” (*Letters* 1:180, *Selected Letters*, p. 289)

<sup>38</sup> Ruben Borg makes a stringent and strongly convincing case of the inability to measure time by common, necessarily limiting standards in *Penelope* and *Finnegans Wake*.

continue even though the reader stops reading. Molly herself reflects on the never-ending quality of thoughts in *Penelope*: “it fills up your whole day and life always something to think about every moment” (709.29-30). Moreover, the fact that Molly is depicted as a character very much focussed on the body in general and more specifically on the female body, while at the same time representing the rather vaguely defined abstract concept of “the earth” suggests that her identity is not - and probably need not be - defined in terms of strictly drawn boundaries in the realm of *Ulysses*.<sup>39</sup> Similarly, Molly combines the contrary epithets “prehuman” and “posthuman” within herself, which leads to the question whether she is subject to the teleology of human life at all or whether she actually becomes immortal (Molly Bloom as a character definitely became immortal through the mediating instance of literature). This discrepancy, as well as the general realm of unboundedness, is playfully alluded to by Molly herself, when she juxtaposes the regularity of Mina Purefoys’s regular birth giving intervals (“filling her up with a child or twins once a year as regular as the clock” 694.16) to her own uncontrollable emotional outbreaks:

I was in fits of laughing with the giggles I couldn’t stop about all my hairpins falling on after another with the mass of hair I had you’re always in great humour she said yes because it grigged her because she knew what it meant because I used to tell her a good bit of what went on between us not all but just enough to make her month water (695.12-15)

The implications of laughter as a means of expressing repressed subconscious desires and its link to sexuality has been explored and often highlighted by Sigmund Freud and Hélène Cixous with opposing arguments and altogether different imagery, but essentially similar results.<sup>40</sup> Apart from Molly’s laughter, which is perceived by her environment in a negative way along with her open handling of sexuality (“it grigged her because she knew what it meant”), her hair is yet another image that stresses a very bodily focus and depicts Molly as “der [sic!] Fleisch, der stets bejaht” (*Letters* 1:170, *Selected Letters*, p. 285). It is freed from its metaphorical imprisonment by Molly’s unusually strong laughter and her (apparently abundant) “mass of hair”. The hairpin can be read as a symbol of a cultural code which not only represses female sexuality (which is

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<sup>39</sup> In *Finnegans Wake*, the transfiguration of human characters into dead objects is not uncommon, but in *Ulysses* this is the only instance.

<sup>40</sup> cf. Sigmund Freud: “Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewussten.” Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 1981, Hélène Cixous: “The Laugh of The Medusa” trans. Keith Cohen and Paula Cohen, *Signs* 1, no. 4 (1976): 875-93.

frequently associated with loose hair), but also censors the transgression of social norms (in this case, inappropriately powerful or unarticulated laughter). The addition “she knew what it meant” also suggests a strong link between Molly’s laughter and her sexuality. The term “month water”, albeit most probably being a misspelling, or indeed a Freudian slip (corrected to “mouth water” in Hans Walter Gabler’s edition), might provide an interesting connection to the female cycle, which is referenced on several occasions in *Penelope*: “God knows theres always something wrong with us 5 days every 3 or 4 weeks” (709.20), “Have we too much blood up in us or what O patience above its pouring out of me like the sea”<sup>41</sup> (719.29-30), “I don’t want to ruin the clean sheets the clean linen I wore brought it on too damn it damn it” (719.31-32). The female cycle is naturally associated with the body, especially with fertility and the possibility of procreation, but also with the idea of not being pregnant and therefore not being able to pass on one’s genetic material (“he didn’t make me pregnant as big as he is” [719.31]). An associative connection between menstruation and reproduction takes place in Molly’s thoughts as well, when she considers the importance of “a stain on the bed to know youre a virgin for them all that’s troubling them theyre such fools too you could be a widow or divorced 20 times over a daub of red ink would do or blackberry juice no that’s too purply” (719.33-36). Interestingly enough, Hélène Cixous also uses the imagery of overflowing and of the sea in her article “The Laugh of the Medusa”, where she examines possibilities of *écriture féminine* and its possible liberating effect on women: “I, too, overflow. [...] Time and again I, too, have felt so full of luminous torrents that I could burst [...] I said to myself: You are mad! What’s the meaning of these waves, these floods, these outbursts?” (876). Cixous also directly connects laughter to an act of liberation through transgression: “Our glances, our smiles, are spent; laughs exude from all our mouths; our blood flows and we extend ourselves without ever reaching an end; we never hold back our thoughts, our signs, our writing” (878). While Cixous is certainly more radical in her theory of *écriture féminine* than Joyce with regard to *Penelope*,<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Katherine Mullin informs us about the fact that this was an actual scientific belief around the turn of the century in her article “Menstruation in Ulysses”. JJQ, Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (Spring-Summer 2009), pp. 497-508.

<sup>42</sup> In fact, Joyce was also heavily criticised by later feminist criticism for allegedly reproducing gender stereotypes in his portrayal of Molly Bloom. Derek Attridge gives a concise and insightful summary of Sandra Gilbert’s and Susan Gubar’s main points of criticism (*Joyce Effects* 106-111).

two similarities are particularly noteworthy: Firstly, Cixous not only associates *écriture féminine* with the body, but claims that the body forms an integral part of *écriture féminine*, and indeed that it could not come into being without the body. Secondly, Cixous stresses the endlessness of womanhood (“we extend ourselves without ever reaching an end”, “body without end, without appendage, without principal “parts.” [punct. sic!] [889]), just like Joyce seems to be hinting at it in *Penelope*. Similarly to Joyce, Cixous also manages to combine a theory focussed on “real-life”, bodily aspects of womanhood with the very abstract notion of womanhood in general. Contrary to Joyce, however, she sees these two things as synonymous and does not distinguish between women as human beings and limitless womanhood as a concept beyond humanity, but claims that both aspects are inherent in every single woman and can be set free with the correct technique of writing.

Social and gender norms are, however, not the only ones Molly transgresses in *Penelope*. The literally overflowing style of the chapter, as well as the technique of interior monologue also suggest a novel treatment of time. Molly’s thoughts are meticulously (dis)arranged into an associative web of thoughts and connections in which discourse time and narrated time are strongly interwoven. In this respect, the stream of consciousness technique can not only be seen as the closest representation in language of “pure duration”, but also of “simultaneity”, as the thoughts and associations are not connected in a teleological, linear fashion, but rather happen all at once and frequent, fluid overlaps occur. The general discourse of excess and transgression also finds an equivalent in the chapter’s treatment of time itself, as Molly complains about her watch being broken: “I never know the time even that watch he gave me never seems to go properly” (699.15-16). This passage manages to summarise the highly complex philosophical issue of an almost inexpressible abundance of time by trivialising it and alluding to it in a rather laconic way. The playful translation of highly abstract matters into banal everyday situations, which are nevertheless incredibly apt at displaying the problem in a nutshell, seems to be one of the defining techniques of *Ulysses*.<sup>43</sup> Another detail featured in this particular quotation is that it is Bloom who gave her the watch in the first place, an act which can be read as a means of trying to control Molly and to artificially

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<sup>43</sup> cf. e.g. the aforementioned secondary use of newspaper by Bloom in *Calypso*.

impose an order into the generally abundant and ever-moving nature of her whole being. Just as the hairpins eventually fall out of Molly's hair, she also manages to overcome the boundaries of time in *Penelope*, since the symbolic instrument of time measuring appears to be itself faulty. This passage of course also immediately evokes Bergson's notion that clock time is not an accurate way of measuring time, but an artificial, constructed human invention which originally served a pragmatic purpose, such as the invention of Greenwich Mean Time in 1880, whose major function was the creation of nationwide timetables for trains:

[The effect of] the standardisation of the Greenwich meridian and the synchronisation of clocks around the world in order to serve the needs of modern transport and communication systems (the railway, the telegraph) was to make the passage of time and distance suddenly seem to change in a very obvious and public way. Alongside this regulated *universality* of temporal and spatial measurement, however, both the physical and psychological sciences were paradoxically beginning to reveal its arbitrariness, and the *relativity* of temporal experience. (Parsons 109 paraphrasing Kern 1983)

In this case, however, the watch does not only represent an artificial social convention that Bloom imposes on his wife, but also a (failed) attempt at controlling the exuberant nature of her being. In a similar way, Molly also complains about the aforementioned ring she received from her past lover, which she has to "keep turning and turning to get it over the knuckle" (701.4-5). The frequent, ever-present interjection "O" might also be a typographical representation of a wedding ring<sup>44</sup> and Molly's inability to escape from her marriage with Bloom, even though she manages to transgress certain cultural boundaries and her desire is given a voice in this chapter. Molly's boundless nature is also characterised by never-ending motion and restlessness: "every day I get up theres some new thing on sweet God sweet God well when Im stretched out dead in my grave I suppose Ill have some peace" (719.10-12). In this case, the cyclical ("every day"), but also the infinite movement attributed to Molly assumes a certain compulsive and Sisyphus-like quality, just like in all of the other discussed chapters.

At the very last page of *Penelope*, the narrative pace accelerates and becomes more ecstatic as the interjection "Yes" becomes more frequent and disrupts the textual flow more strongly than before and even renders sentences ungrammatical (e.g. "or shall I wear a red yes" [732.17], "and then he asked me

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<sup>44</sup> cf. also Joyce's use of symbols and sigla, which is very common in *Finnegans Wake*.

would I yes to say yes" [732.20]), which is not the case in prior interjections (e.g. "he said you have no proof it was her proof O yes her aunt was very fond of oysters [691.36-692.1]). The grammar of this section is generally more blurred and the sentences are less comprehensible than before, which either suggests a strong sense of agitation or of sleepiness.<sup>45</sup> In either case, this last section points towards a strong sense of finality and displays teleological tendencies, which are, however, not resolved, but redirected towards the beginning by means of circularity. Another aspect that contributes to the idea of *Penelope* as reuniting teleology and circularity is the fact that the chapter ends in the future tense, while Molly is actually thinking about things long past and concluded (Bloom's marriage proposal), therefore reinforcing this dichotomy on a grammatical level.<sup>46</sup>

Moreover, while the first and the last "yes" form a possible structural circle, there does not seem to be any linear progress connected to this word, other than its accumulation at the ending of the chapter, which, however, does not necessarily mean that the interior monologue has come to a standstill at this point.

Another interesting aspect of this very last word is that by connecting the final and the first letter of the book, *Penelope* also assumes the role of a mediator between female and male discourse. This idea is further supported by the conceptual, stylistic and even lexical connections between *Penelope* and *Proteus*. Firstly, and probably most trivially, both chapters feature an excessive amount of interior monologue.<sup>47</sup> In the grander scheme of things, *Proteus* and *Penelope* are also the last chapters of their respective part of *Ulysses* (I and III,

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<sup>45</sup> There has been much debate, which I cannot possibly outline at this point, concerning both the nature of the interjections in this particular section and the general idea of what is actually physically happening. The two major "solutions" seem to be that Molly is either sexually excited at this point and possibly even reaches a climax expressed through the final "Yes", or that she is gradually going back to sleep. Diametrically opposed as these two solutions might be, they both support the sense that a strong teleological moment is palpable throughout these last words.

<sup>46</sup> It is interesting to note that in German, „Ich will“ is the common reply to both marriage proposals and at the legal marriage ceremonies, constituting a speech act of major importance. Even though this is not the case in English, Joyce could have been aware of that meaning, which also fits the context of marriage present in this section. Recent Genetic research has shown that the phrase in question was originally intended to read "I would" and was only changed by Joyce shortly before publication, which attributes great weight and importance to the phrase. Moreover, the phrase "I will" rings strangely ungrammatical as a reply to the original question posed by Bloom ("would I yes to say yes"), as it changes the mode from conditional to a much more affirmative instance of future tense, which would be highly unusual for a native speaker, even in oral communication. Luca Crispi presented this discovery in his talk entitled "The courtship of Leopold and Molly Bloom" at the IV James Joyce Birthday Conference in Rome, February 2011.

<sup>47</sup> Even more blatantly, they both start with the same letter.

respectively). Although many chapters feature interior monologue, these two chapters are the only ones labelled “Monologue (male)” and “Monologue (female)” respectively in the Gilbert schema. However, the interconnection between these two chapters is much more complex. Not only are the general topics of motherhood, life and death discussed in both chapters (even the symbol of the sea is present in that context in both cases), but it also seems that *Penelope* achieves in many ways what *Proteus* has or cannot. While Stephen is merely “walking towards eternity on Sandymount Strand”, *Penelope* is assigned a lying eight as the symbol of eternity as its hour in the Linati schema. On a stylistic level, *Penelope* presents a radicalisation concerning the use of interior monologue, which *Proteus* merely hints at. On the textual level, a sort of prefiguration seems to be taking place in *Proteus*: “Open your eyes now. I will” (38.1). This passage is particularly noteworthy with regard to the idea that Molly is going to sleep at the end of *Penelope*, which would make the passage from *Proteus* a direct counterpart to the ending of *Ulysses*. Another passage of *Proteus* also features phrases which are present in *Penelope* in the same excited manner: “O yes, but I prefer Q. Yes, but W is wonderful. O yes. W” (41.1). A major difference between *Proteus* and *Penelope*, however, lies in the characters themselves, which are diametrically opposed in terms of conception. While Stephen is associated with the rational principle and very abstract matters, Molly is the complete opposite, since the connotations of Molly’s character are that of body and flesh (the organ assigned to *Penelope* in the Gilbert schema; cf. also “Der Fleisch, der stets bejaht”). Stephen and Molly seem to represent the mind-body dichotomy, which Stephen is trying to resolve in *Proteus*, on the level of characters. In a way, *Penelope* seems to propose a solution for this dichotomy in Molly’s imagining of Stephen as a possible future lover:

first I thought he was a poet like Byron and not an ounce of it in his composition I thought he was quite different I wonder is he too young hes about wait [...] what age was he then at Dillons 5 or 6 about 88 I suppose hes 20 or more Im not too old for him if hes 23 or 24 I hope hes not that stuck up university student sort. (725.3-8)

This merging of opposites is also carried out on a larger scale, by the aforementioned stylistic, thematic and lexical overlaps between the two chapters. While *Penelope*, however, is ultimately chaotic and disordered, *Proteus* displays an associative, yet more or less ordered web of thoughts.

Although *Proteus* makes frequent use of stream of consciousness, this novel technique is constantly mediated by a more straightforward narrative voice. In comparison, *Proteus* is much less radical than *Penelope*, which might, once more, have to do with the fact that Stephen is associated with the rational, male principle and Molly with the irrational, body-focussed female one. This opposition also reminds us of Plato's distinction between eternal, i.e. God-created time and its human counterpart. While the eternal motion of time must necessarily be perfect and ordered, human time must always remain but an image of eternity, which also suggests that it is constantly in disorder. In this case, eternal time can be approximated by the notion of abstract thought in the case of *Proteus*, since the "intellect" was highly regarded in ancient Greek philosophy, while bodily matters were deemed less important and valued much less, as in the following quote once again taken from Plato's *Timaeus*:

When a man is always occupied with the cravings of desire and ambition, and is eagerly striving to satisfy them, all his thoughts must be mortal, and, as far as it is possible altogether to become such, he must be mortal every whit, because he has cherished his mortal part. But he who has been earnest in the love of knowledge and of true wisdom, and has exercised his intellect more than any other part of him, must have thoughts immortal and divine, if he attain truth, and in so far as human nature is capable of sharing in immortality, he must altogether be immortal. (35b)

This idea also corresponds to Stephen's own worldview, which associates women with irrationality and with original sin and characterises his relationship with his mother and with all other female characters in *Portrait* and *Ulysses*, which is somewhat problematic to say the least.

Essentially, Molly's overflow of life and its depiction in *Penelope* can also be read as an attempt at resolving the dichotomy between form and formlessness inherent in every artistic representation of life, which is "always in latent opposition to the form" (Simmel 12). Indeed Molly's slightly disjointed, though associatively still connected rant, which Jean-Michel Rabaté deems "closer to utter madness than to normal female psychology" (52) seems to present a "fully positive drive towards life which is actively repressing [form]" (Simmel 13), which strives "to absorb the form [which has been forced upon it] in its immediacy, to let its own power and fullness stream forth just as if it emanated from life's own source, until all cognition, values and forms are reduced to direct manifestations of life" (Simmel 12). I strongly object to Rabaté's idea of

*Penelope* as the portrait of a raving lunatic, but propose to see the chapter as a very strong and “direct manifestation of life” and a highly successful attempt at depicting life in its purest, distilled and de-stilled form instead.

Just like Homer’s Odysseus is constantly prevented from reaching Ithaca, returning home to Penelope and finally arriving at the projected teleological goal of his wandering, which also represents a circle, as his leaving point is the same one as his final destination, *Ulysses* seems to evade the limiting perspective of straightforward finality, but rather introduces “the sense of an unstoppable onward movement ignoring all conventional limits” instead, as Derek Attridge suggests (*Joyce Effects* 98). Both Penelope, the weaver, and *Ulysses* itself play an endinggame with the reader’s expectations throughout the text. Contrary to usual narrative development, where the moment of peripeteia takes place around the middle of the text, *Ulysses* does not reach it until its very last chapter, if indeed the climax within *Penelope* can be described that way at all. As peripeteia “depends on our confidence of the end” and “is a disconfirmation followed by a consonance” (Kermode 18), its lack in *Ulysses* results in a disconfirmation of reader expectations rather than consonance. This aspect also points towards the idea that there might still be more to come and that while *Penelope* is a turning point in the narrative in so far as it presents a woman’s perspective of the day’s events mostly carried out by male characters, it can only be conceived of in connection with its preceding chapters, which would also turn into its following chapters if we consider the case of “Yes” / “Stately”. If *Penelope* is indeed seen as the peripeteia of *Ulysses*, its continuation would be a rereading of *Ulysses* from the beginning with completely changed expectations. In this way, Molly can not only be seen as “prehuman” and “posthuman”, but also as a “post-text”, which becomes a “pre-text” at the same time. After all, the symbol of dawn also combines both the ending of one day and the start of another.

### 3.2 *Finnegans Wake*

In *Finnegans Wake*, the topic of beginnings and endings, but also their exemplification in the cycle of life and death is discussed at great length, and indeed the text’s form is defined by this very issue. These considerations are traceable on a greater scale, as far as conceptualisation and structure are

concerned, but also form an integral part of the frequent metapoetic discussions, and constitute a defining element of plot. Indeed, matters of form cannot be separated from the plot itself, which in turn is defined by the text's cyclical nature. At this point, it already becomes apparent that the *Book of Kells* (and in particular its symbolism of the two snakes intertwined without a clear beginning or ending respectively) is much more than just a frequent intertextual reference in the multilayered chiasmic c(ha)osmos that is *Finnegans Wake*.

### 3.2.1 Vic(i)o's Cycles vs. The *Wake's* Progress

It is a truth universally acknowledged that Giambattista Vico's *La Nuova Scienza* is one of the founding principles of structure, or rather 'anti-structure' present in *Finnegans Wake*. However, unlike the *Odyssey* for *Ulysses*, Vico's theories cannot be applied to *Finnegans Wake* in the same manner and to the same extent. While Samuel Beckett acknowledges the "soothing" quality, which is "like the contemplation of a carefully folded ham-sandwich" of a one-to-one application of Vico's theories to the *Wake*, he feels that

there is the temptation to treat every concept like 'a bass dropt neck fust in till a bung crate', and make a really tidy job of it. Unfortunately such an exactitude of application would imply distortion in one of two directions. Must we wring the neck of a certain system in order to stuff it into a contemporary pigeon-hole, or modify the dimensions of that pigeon-hole for the satisfaction of the analogymongers? (19)

In spite of his (justified) scepticism towards a careless application and forced projection of a theory onto a text, Beckett does explore certain connections between Vico's ideas expressed in *La Nuova Scienza* and Joyce's work and mentions two particularly important concepts: "[Vico's] division of the development of human society into three ages: Theocratic, Heroic, Human (civilized)" (20), which is connected to "[h]is exposition of the ineluctable circular progression of Society" (ibid.) and his "theory of the origins of poetry and language, the significance of myth, and the nature of barbaric civilization" (ibid.). Most importantly, Beckett calls Joyce's recurrence to these aspects "reverberations" and "reapplications", which, "however, [do not receive] the faintest explicit illustration [...] in *Work in Progress*" (ibid.). He sees Vico's "inevitability of cyclic evolution" (19) as "a Necessity that is not Fate, [...] a Liberty that is not Chance [...]. This force he called Divine Providence, with his tongue, one feels, very much in his cheek" (22).

Clearly, Vico's conception of time and history differs a great deal from Plato's recount of cyclical time as an image of eternity. While Vico introduces the concept of "Divine Providence" in the realm of human affairs, for Plato, everything of human origin is imperfect by default and can therefore not be subject to Divine Providence. The major difference between these concepts, apart from the fact that Vico applies his theories to history and not directly to time, is certainly that Vico's approach features a certain amount of inevitability and necessity which is exempt from Plato's definition of a circular movement of time as an approximation of eternity.

Both Margot Norris and Ruben Borg have pointed out that the cycles in *Finnegans Wake* are essentially different from Vico's concept as far as their inevitability is concerned:

This type of repetition does not appear to be merely predetermined like Vico's events, which repeat themselves because the logical progression of evolutionary change brings each cycle to a close in precisely the same condition as it began. Rather the repetition in *Finnegans Wake* appears to be compulsive, that is, produced by irrational rather than logical necessity, and therefore actively induced – the result of human impulse rather than time. (Norris 25-26)<sup>48</sup>

They also agree on the idea that Joyce's use of cycles essentially implies a lack of teleology and progressive movement:

[i]n Joyce's book, [...] what repeats does not punctuate progress. The periodic re-emergence of a given motif or the reworking of a particular event will function independently of that sense of historical inevitability, of rational consequence, that is the mark of well-constructed plots. (Borg 7)

Borg concludes that "compulsive repetition implies a paralysis of sorts: a staying of time [which] [appears to have been immobilized, emptied of content]" (ibid.). While both of these approaches, in their own way, must arrive at this conclusion by way of "logical necessity", they overlook an important factor concerning the structure as well as the plot of *Finnegans Wake*. While Vico's cycles must necessarily be linked to a certain idea of compulsiveness by definition, since they are part of the process of history, the cycles in *Finnegans Wake* in fact do not only present "a repetition of identical moments" (ibid.), but display a certain creative potential in their affinity to change and development. While certain themes and motifs are taken up over and over again in the course of the book,

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<sup>48</sup> Norris's somewhat problematic differentiation between time as a rational force and human impulse as an irrational factor in the development of the text is discussed in Borg (7-8) and, although unfortunate, need not be discussed at this point, since it does not alter her essential hypothesis.

they are never *actually* the same, albeit referring to the same ideas and re-enacting them, but always altered slightly or considerably from the versions offered before. Furthermore, the cycle of death and resurrection, probably the most prominent one to be found in *Finnegans Wake*, offers a positive counterbalance to the idea of death as the ultimate ending point of human life.

Moreover, while the whole book is undoubtedly constructed in a cyclical way (this fact is not only traceable in the famous last / first sentence of *Finnegans Wake* “A way a lone a last a loved along the / riverrun past Eve and Adam’s, from swerve of shore to bend of bay, brings us by a commodius vicus of recirculation back to Howth Castle and Environs” [628.16 / 3.1]), but also, as this study suggests, on the level of plot and even lexis), a certain teleological drive can be perceived throughout the text as well, which is particularly palpable towards the actual ending (or re-beginning) of the text. At several points in the text, the narrative pace quickens and / or slows down and the abovementioned cycles are not mere repetitions, but do show a certain kind of development in some cases. Moreover, most of the characters fulfil a metamorphosis and / or represent many personages (or objects) at the same time – this idea represents a strong sense of multiplicity, but certainly not a static one. Similarly to *Ulysses*, however, teleology is not aimed at the actual ending of the text, which is formally non-existent in this case, but back towards the beginning.

This chapter will consist of an analysis of two particular motifs in *Finnegans Wake*: the warring twin brothers Shem and Shaun on the one hand and Annalivia Plurabelle on the other hand, considering their respective treatment of (non-)endings and (re-)beginnings. In the context of Shem and Shaun, a particular focus will be placed on Giordano Bruno’s idea of *concordia discors*<sup>49</sup> and the treatment of the cycle of life and death as a representation of teleology and cyclicity in *The Oндt and the Gracehoper*, while ALP becomes especially important in this respect with regard to her daughter, Issy, and the concept of genealogy as a means of ensuring continuity. The analysis will take into account both the macro level of structure and plot and the micro level of lexis and grammar by means of close – reading.

For the sake of clarity, I shall use the terms “ending” and “beginning”, although they are necessarily problematic in the context of *Finnegans Wake*, in

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<sup>49</sup> Cf. Bruno’s work *Cantus Circaeus*.

order to indicate the ending and beginning of the actual material book rather than constantly evading and circumscribing this terminology. Even though the text itself uses certain tactics of transgressing these boundaries, they are present in the actual printed book and will be used when referring to certain passages in order to avoid confusion. It should have become clear at this point that in my line of argument, the “ending” of *Finnegans Wake* is a non-ending of sorts, and its “beginning” can only be described as a re-beginning. Moreover, although the book is undeniably circular in terms of conception, I believe the teleological drive towards the actual ending of the book is perceivable and the last sentence is split before “riverrun” for well-considered reasons.

### **3.2.2 “*Them boys is so contrary*” – The warring brothers Shem and Shaun**

The problematic relationship between the brothers Shem and Shaun, the sons of HCE and ALP, is one of the many leitmotifs present in *Finnegans Wake*. This relationship is mirrored in various sections of the book, most famously in the story of the *Mookse and the Gripes*, *The Ondt and the Gracehoper* and the geometry lesson presented in II.2. The idea of Shem and Shaun as warring brothers, or indeed two parts of a whole that have been separated, but are bound to be unified in the end, goes back to Giordano Bruno’s theory of *concordia discors*, which is best exemplified towards the end of *Finnegans Wake* in yet another mirroring of the brothers, this time through the characters Juva and Muta (which are in turn variations of the Mutt and Jute motif first encountered in I.1): “Muta: So that when we shall have acquired unification we shall pass on to diversity and when we shall have passed on to diversity we shall have acquired the instinct to combat and when we shall have acquired the instinct of combat we shall pass back to the spirit of appeasement” (FW 610,23-27). The aspect of “combat” and “appeasement” is staged and alluded to on various occasions throughout the book. As an example of a possible merging of the twin brothers’ diametrically opposed lifestyles and worldviews, I shall analyse the tale of *The Ondt and the Gracehoper*, where the aforementioned appeasement and reunification takes place both on the level of plot and on a more abstract level, with the help of Plato’s and Aristotle’s theories of time.

The implications of the unusual connection between the two brothers are manifold. For this study, I shall concentrate on two in particular. Firstly, the fact that Shem and Shaun are always seen in relation to each other (except in the

“Portrait of Shem the Penman” section from I.7) and often presented as almost indistinguishable from each other suggests that the text defies clear boundaries of individual identities and allows for a novel and creative questioning of the very concept and formal necessity of clear-cut divisions between characters. This idea is also expressed by the frequent metamorphoses of characters (especially HCE) into historical and fictional political figures (e.g. the Russian General), inanimate objects (the washerwomen turn into a tree and stone at the end of I.8), but also into each other (The Ondt and the Gracehoper switch roles; ALP is succeeded by her daughter Issy). The effortless changing to and fro between animate personas and inanimate objects, which almost all characters undergo, can further be interpreted as a blurring between the boundaries of life and death and a reinforcement of their strong interconnection, which is a major theme both in *Ulysses* (especially in *Hades*, as discussed above) and the *Wake*.

Secondly, the idea that two opposed principles can eventually be united and its exemplification on the textual level via oxymora and homophones containing conflicting and seemingly irreconcilable concepts can be read as an essential struggle within the complex universe that is *Finnegans Wake*: the struggle between its cyclical structure and never-ending nature and the need for a certain kind of form, which can only be materialistically produced and perceived in a linear fashion (cf. also Fagan 6). While this discrepancy was eventually resolved by pushing lexis (and, in a few cases, grammar) to its utmost possible limit, the book’s necessarily linear form cannot do its complex simultaneity full justice. In a way, *Finnegans Wake* is faced with the problem of three-dimensional space, which can only be described in a linear fashion, as discussed by Bergson (103), for it must obey the material rules of the concept “book” in order to be perceived as one, while at the same time aiming at a much higher purpose, in which text, sound and various other media are combined. Just as the phrase “royal highness” is transfigured into “aural eyeness” (623.18), comprising the organs of sight (“eye”), hearing (“aural”) and taste (“oral”), *Finnegans Wake* itself is a text which not only caters for all the senses, but also reaches out far beyond its textuality and is, in that respect, not

only a “kingly work in progress” (625.13-14), but also an infinite one as far as its anagnostic<sup>50</sup> re-reading is concerned.

### 3.2.2.1 *The Ondt and the Gracehoper*<sup>51</sup>

In the tale of the *Ondt and the Gracehoper*, the twins’ duality leading towards eventual unification is laid out with a little help from Joyce’s philosophical friends. The brothers are represented through the dual antagonists of Aesop’s fable *The Ant and The Grasshopper*, with a casting of Shaun as the frugal, hard-working ant, and Shem as the hedonistic, lazy grasshopper – a reference which seems surprisingly clear in the rather vague realm of intertextual allusions in the *Wake*. In this episode, there are three main opposed pairings, which appear absolutely irreconcilable at first, but are eventually merged and unified, just like Shem and Shaun.

The main opposition present in the *Ondt and the Gracehoper* – apart from the diametrically opposed conception of the characters as such – seems to be that between Plato’s cyclical and Aristotle’s linear concept of time. In *The Ondt and the Gracehoper*, this discrepancy is, once again, discussed in connection with another pairing closely connected to this topic: the cycle of life and death, which, in turn, is reflected in the characters and their respective lifestyle. The third juxtaposition present in this section is that of time and space as they are mirrored in the characters of the Ondt and the Gracehoper.

In *The Ondt and the Gracehoper*, Plato and Aristotle are not only alluded to (more or less) directly as “plate o’monkynous” (417.15) and “aristotaller” (417.16), but also their theories are integrated in the episode in a more abstract manner. For once, Aristotle’s notion of the point as both the end of one “now” and the beginning of another (“using the one point as two” [*Physics*, IV.11.39]) in connection with the “point[, which] both connects and terminates the length” (IV.11.38) seems particularly important with regard to Shem and Shaun and the notion of them being alter egos, or even, as some scholars have suggested, two parts of HCE. The best way the warring concepts of Plato and Aristotle can be analysed in this context is through the imagery of life and death used in this

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<sup>50</sup> This term is a coinage by Fritz Senn (*Inductive Scrutinies*). The general idea behind it is that an “ideal reader” in the case of *Finnegans Wake* is a re-reader, because it is not possible to recognise certain allusions and prefigurations the first time around.

<sup>51</sup> This chapter is based on my talk entitled “‘Heidegger, Heidegger was a boozy beggar.’ Philosophical Approaches to Time and Space in *The Ondt and the Gracehoper*” given at the XXII James Joyce Symposium in Prague, June 2010.

episode. There are numerous references both to life as a cycle and to death as a (teleo)logical consequence of the process of life, but also on some occasions, to both aspects at once.

The description of the Gracehoper begins with an account of his hedonist lifestyle, immediately followed by a reference to the “funny funereels with Besterfarther Zeuts, the Aged One, [...] albedinous and oldbuoyant, inscythe his elytrical wormcasket” (414.35 – 415.1). The allusion to “funerals” and “wormcasket”, by which most probably a coffin is meant, is an obvious reference to death, yet at the same time, the funeral is “fun”, as “reels” are apparently played on that occasion. This idea echoes the self-destructive life of abundant entertainment, food and drink which the gracehoper is leading and therefore introduces a close link between life and death<sup>52</sup>. “Zeuts” refers on the one hand to Zeus, the Alpha and Omega of the Greek Gods (this idea is also reflected in the initials A-ged O-ne, but also in a-lbedinous and o-ldbuoyant), but on the other hand to time (German: Zeit). The mentioning of a “scythe” signifies an overt allusion to Father Time on the one hand, thus reaffirming the circular quality of time, but also serves as a foreshadowing of death, which can be read as the ultimate and inevitable denial of a circular movement, thus combining the two motifs and theories in a single image. After that reference, however, motifs of continuity and circularity prevail over those of death, like, for instance, the symbol of the wheel in “The whool of the whaal in the wheel of the whorl” (415.8) – the alliteration can also be seen as a means of enhancing the sense of continuity on a stylistic level, as well as the repetition of “ra” in the phrase “to the ra, the ra, the ra, the ra” (415.11).<sup>53</sup> Another particularly important reference to both the circularity and finiteness of time can be found in the phrase “for O’Cronione lags acrumbling in his sands but his sunsunsuns still tumble on” (415.20). Not only does it resemble the lines of the popular song “John Brown’s body lies amouldering in the grave, but his soul goes marching on” (McHugh), suggesting yet another instance of death and resurrection, but it also probably alludes to the Greek Titan Kronos, who overthrew his father Uranus by

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<sup>52</sup> In Freudian terms, the Gracehoper implements both the death drive (*thanatos*) and the *eros* within himself, symbolising once again a reunification of opposed principles. (cf. Sigmund Freud: *Jenseits des Lustprinzips* (1920). In: *Studienausgabe*, Bd. III: *Psychologie des Unbewußten*. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer 1975, S. 213-272.)

<sup>53</sup> Of course this particular image can also be read as a reference to the Wheel of Fortune, which bears an upward as well as a downward movement and can influence an individual’s life both positively and negatively (cf. also Mengel).

castrating him and throwing his testicles into the sea, which eventually resulted in the birth of Venus, or “Mrs Mereschame” (214.14), as she is called in *Finnegans Wake*. The castration of Uranus symbolises a violent disruption of the continuum of genealogy, as it renders further procreation impossible. Moreover, the act of patricide and the violent overthrowing of the father figure is certainly a major theme within the realm of *Finnegans Wake* in connection with Shem and Shaun, for instance in the episode *How Buckley Shot the Russian General* (II.3), where the Russian General’s (i.e. HCE’s) death is interpreted as an act of the twins’ supplanting and dethroning him.

Kronos’s “sunsunsun” Zeus (also called Zeus Cronion, to complicate the matter even further) eventually overthrew Kronos himself, although Kronos was careful enough to swallow all of his other children immediately after birth, not counting on Zeus being secretly raised by his mother in order to seek vengeance on him. In a way, this act can be seen along the lines of continuity in so far as it repeats the deed of Zeus’s own father and therefore connects the two generations. What this allusion further displays is a very strong theme of generational succession and, once again, the necessary interconnection between life and death, but also at the same time an interlinkage of the two concepts of time discussed in the beginning, depending on the way the reader chooses to place their focus (either on “acrumbling” or decaying, or on the more positive, future-related idea of the son “still tumble[ing] on”, which might also be read as “the sun still shining on”).

The concepts proposed by Plato and Aristotle, although seeming diametrically opposed at first, reach a sense of reconciliation within the realm of the ambiguous potential that probably only *Finnegans Wake* is able to – or dares to – convey. The concepts stand on their own, while permeating each other at the same time, just as Shem and Shaun, although they are individually developed characters, can only be conceived of in relation to each other. A particularly noteworthy biographical detail in this context is the dependence of Aristotle on Plato as his disciple, which provides yet another parallel to Shem and Shaun, as well as Plato’s hostility towards art, which is resembled in the figure of the Ondt.

This brings us – not by a “commodius vicus of recirculation” (1.2), but rather by an Aristotelean sense of teleology – to the actual characters of the Ondt and the Gracehoper and their connection to time and space.

The Gracehoper lives in a “summery [...] cottage, which was cald fourmillierly Tingsomingenting” (414.34), while the Ondt’s space is “cold antitopically Nixnixundnix (415.29)”. At first glance, this passage suggests an opposition between nothing (“Nixnixundnix”) and something (“Tingsomingenting”). However, typically for *Finnegans Wake*, “en ting som ingen ting” also means “a thing like no thing, a mere nothing” in Danish, and therefore encompasses duality within just one element of the opposition.

Another antagonism present on the level of characters is that between their respective associations with the notions of hot (“caldo”) and cold (“cold”) and, as a result, with summer and winter. This distinction in terms of seasons is a reflection of the characters’ general lifestyle on a smaller scale: that of the Gracehoper as a hedonist, with a special emphasis on “head”, for he is said to have “schelling in kopfers” (416.4) or “leivnitz in his hair” (416.29) and is generally more concerned with meta- and physical matters than with securing his existence, and that of the Ondt as a frugal and character whose life evolves around thrift and labour as a means of ensuring a secure future, even in adverse circumstances. The Gracehoper lives in the “now” of summer as opposed to the Ondt, who is already preparing for the wintertime. In contrast to the Gracehoper, the Ondt is not depicted as having any major intellectual thoughts, except in connection with food (“plate o’monkynous and a confucion of minthe (for he was a conformed aceticist and aristotaller” [417.15-16])).

As already mentioned, the conflict between the two characters is also perceivable along the lines of time and space. While the Ondt is introduced as a “weltall fellow, raumybult” (416.3), referring to the German words “all” and “Raum”, whose general occupation seems to be the “making [of] spaces in his psyche” (416.5-6), the Gracehoper first enters the scene in (one might state almost excessive) motion: “The Gracehoper was always jiggig ajog, hoppy on akkant of his Joycity” (414.22). He is further associated with “swallow[ing] lustres” (416.21), “devour[ing] fourty flights of styearchases” (416.22) “chew[ing] up all the mensas and seccles” (416.22-23) and “voracious[ing] [timeplaces] most glutinously” (416.24) throughout the episode. It is important to note that

the Gracehoper is not only associated with time and motion, but that these notions always seem to bear an aspect of almost violent excess and decadence, whereas the Ondt symbolises frugality and a controlled lifestyle, being described as “sair sair sullemn and chairmanlooking” (416.4-5) or “mothst sacred” (416.7), but also, in terms of motion, as a very static character who – interestingly enough, although being associated with space – does not move a great deal. Most of the time he is described as “making [...] spaces” (416.5), “pray[ing]” (415.34) or “smolking a spatial brunt of Hosana cigals” (417.12-13), while the Gracehoper “jigg[s]” or “jingle[s] through a jungle of love and debts and jangle[s] through a jumble of life” (416.9). This time, the antagonism is not as easily resolved as the philosophical one, as it is not until the end of the fable that a reversal of roles takes place. While in the first section it was the Gracehoper “always making ungraceful overtures to Fluh and Luse and Bienie and Vespatilla to play pupa-pupa and policy-pulicy” (414.24-26), now it is the Ondt who is a “baskerboy on the Libido, with Floh biting his leg thigh and Luse lugging his luff leg and Bieni bussing him under his bonnet and Vespatilla blowing cosy fond tutties up the allabroad length of the large of his smalls.” (417.17-20). Apart from demonstrating very convincingly once again Joyce’s use of ambiguity (or in this case rather his use of thinly veiled explicit suggestion), this passage dealing with the reversal of roles shows once again the interchangeability of the characters and their very strong interconnection.

In *The Ondt and the Gracehoper*, Joyce not only sets up binary oppositions and deconstructs them at the same time, but in fact also deconstructs the binary opposition of “binary opposition vs. merging of opposites” itself by already including an ambiguous meaning in just one of the two factors. In the end, the “mouschical unsummables” (417.9) become “musical ensembles”, the “Doublends” are “J[o]ined” (20.16) and the brothers are merged into a metaphorical chronotopos, or “timeplace” (416.24) in Joycean terms. Rather than reinforcing the binary of the “either-or”, Joyce presents the reader with a more progressive alternative of the “either-and”. In the case of Shem and Shaun, the same is always at once itself and the other, while the other, once itself, is not only the same as the same, but also different at the same time.

### 3.3 “*End here*” (?) – ALP (dis)continued

Annalivia Plurabelle (frequently abbreviated and referred to as ALP throughout the text), is not only a major character in *Finnegans Wake* as HCE’s wife, but also represents the river Liffey and therefore symbolises the idea of never-ending flow.

Similarly to Molly Bloom’s interior monologue in *Ulysses*, ALP’s soliloquy towards the end (or re-beginning) of *Finnegans Wake* seems to be overflowing in terms of narrative characteristics and style. In a way, this soliloquy can be read as a (more or less) final act of accumulation of the major themes present in *Finnegans Wake*. Her frequent references to death and rebirth, as well as her eventual mergence into the ocean (but also the seamless act of succession by her daughter Issy) at the end of the text, as well as her general reluctance towards death as her own personal ending suggest a strong wish for infinity on her side. ALP’s reluctance towards dying is expressed through direct lamentations (“O bitter ending!” [627.34-35]) and pleas for “Onetwo moremens [moments] more” (628.6) on the one hand, but also in the context of memory and ALP’s fear of being “forgodden” (625.18).

In terms of textual structure, ALP’s soliloquy follows ALP’s Letter to “dear dirty Dublin”. It is characterised by short sentences and a relatively straightforward style (at least compared to other chapters). In that respect, but also in many other ways, it reminisces the first chapter mostly devoted to ALP, who is being talked and gossiped about by the two washerwomen in I.8<sup>54</sup>. At the end of Book IV, ALP recounts the entire content of the previous chapters, but also at the same time hints at certain new aspects which can only be fully grasped through an anagnostic re-reading of the text. ALP is addressing both HCE and her father, the tailor encountered in II.3, differentiating between the pronoun “you” in connection with her husband HCE, and therefore speaking directly to him, and the pronoun “he”, which she mostly uses when talking about her father, who is assumed to be a symbol of the ocean, until she gradually “get[s] mixed” (*FW* 626.36) with the sea and so do the pronouns.

ALP’s soliloquy, not unlike Molly Bloom’s interior monologue in *Ulysses*, comprises the most prominent characters, events and motifs of the whole book,

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<sup>54</sup> See Terence Killeen’s interpretation of this episode as yet another mirroring of the motif of the warring brothers (“Life, Death and the Washerwomen”).

recounting and re-evaluating them from ALP's perspective. However, the link between ALP's soliloquy and Molly's monologue is much closer than might be expected at first. Not only are both told by women and situated at the very end of the respective text, as well as taking place between the ending of one day and the beginning of the next (in ALP's case, the rising of the new day also symbolises the beginning of a new era), but there are quite a few more or less direct intertextual references to *Ulysses* in ALP's soliloquy (e.g. "Not a sound" [619.21], "Blooming" [620.2], "lotus" [620.3]). Moreover, both of these discourses display a similar amount of unboundedness and defy formal and linguistic conventions and limitations up to a certain degree. In a way, ALP's soliloquy can therefore be read as a continuation of Molly's monologue, which is essentially circular with regard to form and structure and merely hints at the possibility of eternity, while ALP's soliloquy is genuinely infinite in terms of form. Even more striking than these similarities, however, is the fact that both *Penelope* and ALP's soliloquy serve as nodes and mediators between female and male discourse, or as Finn Fordham puts it: "indeed, the feminine river "brings us back" to the masculine earth of Howth" (471). Although Joyce certainly went more than just a few steps further in this context in *Finnegans Wake*, both (non-)endings share a similar concern: an appeal to the reader to re-evaluate and perhaps even re-read (this is certainly the case in *Finnegans Wake*) the whole text in the light of its last, "feminine" chapter.<sup>55</sup>

The monologue starts out with the words "Soft morning, city! Lsp! I am leafy speafing" (619. 20). Already at this early stage of the passage, the re-reader of the *Wake*, in contrast to the first-time reader, can detect that the phrase "Soft morning" does not only refer to a particularly wet morning in order to give a setting for the soliloquy, but can also be read as "soft mourning", thus evoking the image of the mourner's monologue towards the very beginning of the book (I.1). However, the phrase "soft morning" is also taken up twice within the scope of the soliloquy itself ("Sft! It is the softest morning that ever I can ever remember me." [621.8], "So soft this morning, ours." [628.8]). In both cases, the phrase is connected to the realm of memory and ALP's plea not to be forgotten

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<sup>55</sup> Interestingly enough, Genetic research has shown that Joyce himself revised quite a few aspects and sections of the first book, and the very beginning of *Finnegans Wake* in particular, only after having completed Book IV (cf. Fordham 469-479).

and can therefore be read as a reminder of ALP's presence, but also of the beginning of the soliloquy once its end is reached.

Similarly to their omnipresence in *The Ondt and the Gracehoper*, death and resurrection, but also "Death's Brother, Sleep" (*Illiad* 16, 660-82 / *Aen.* 6, 278) and its counterpart, being awake, become especially prominent in Book IV. Although technically speaking, it is ALP who has not had a chance to speak for herself yet, and can therefore be said to have "slept so long" (619.25-26) herself, she seems preoccupied with waking HCE instead: "Rise up, man of the hooths, you have slept so long! Or is it only so mesleems? [...] Rise up now and aruse! Norvena's over" (619.25-29). Of course, if "mesleems" is read as "me sleeps", a clear boundary concerning the sleeper's identity cannot be drawn. The idea that ALP herself could also have been sleeping is further supported by ALP's statement: "so has he as bored me to slump [McHugh: sleep]. But am good and rested" (619.32-33).<sup>56</sup> ALP's boredom can on the hand be a related to the fact that "[i]t is all so often and still the same to me" (625.16-17), but on the other hand, the mentioning of "bore" might simply refer to a tidal bore (this interpretation, in turn, would be supported by the fact that Dublin is spelt backwards a few lines afterwards, implying that an actual tidal bore might be taking place ("nill, Budd!" [620.3])).

Another previously presented motif taken up in ALP's soliloquy is that of the washerwomen encountered in I.8 washing HCE's clothes in the river Liffey: "Here is your shirt, the day one, come back. The stock, your collar. Also your double brogues" (619.34-35). While this passage can be read as ALP simply handing HCE various articles of clothing, the phrase "the day one, come back" can also be interpreted as a foreshadowing of the text's "come back" to "day [or page] one" of *Finnegans Wake* itself. ALP's and HCE's personal life is, however, also paralleled with certain historical political events within and beyond the realm of the *Wake*. There are, for instance, numerous references to the episode "How Buckley shot the Russian General" from II.3 (e.g. "buckly shuit Rosensharonals" [620.4], "Bugley Captain" [622.25]), but also to the problematic relationship between Ireland and Britain (e.g. "Proudpurse Alby with

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<sup>56</sup> If "Norvena" is understood to mean "Nirvana", as McHugh suggests, the concept of remembering and forgetting is touched upon as well, since in a state of Nirvana, the person is supposed to be elevated beyond their earthly life and therefore does not participate in the act of memory.

his pooraroon Eireen” [620.5-6]). In the latter case, McHugh also suggests a possible intertextual allusion to the character Irena from Henrik Ibsen’s play *When We Dead Awaken*, which would connect the history of Ireland (and history in general) to the concept of death and resurrection, but also to petrification.<sup>57</sup> In a way, it can therefore also be read as a reference to Vico’s theory of historical cycles, with the addition of the element of paralysis (petrification) discussed above. Moreover, the possible mentioning of Ibsen conjures up his play *The Masterbuilder* (*Bygmester Solness*), which is also referenced directly in ALP’s soliloquy (“Amid the soleness. Tilltop, bigmaster! Scale the summit. You’re not so giddy any more. All your graundplotting and the little it brought!” [624.10-13]) and, subsequently, “Bygmester Finnegan” (4.18), which provides yet another link from the last chapter of the book to the first one.<sup>58</sup>

Yet another motif prominent throughout the text ALP discusses in her soliloquy is that of the warring brothers Shem and Shaun:

Them boys is so contrary. [...] Heel trouble and heal travel. Galliver and Gellover. Unless they changes by mistake. I seen the likes in the twinngling of an aye. Som. So oft. Sim. Time after time. The sehm ashnuh. Two bredder as doffered as nors in soun. When one of him sighs or one of him cries ‘tis you all over. No peace at all. Maybe it’s those two old crony aunts held them out to the water front. (620.13-19)

Indeed, as we have seen, the boys seem to be quite “contrary” and “as doffered as nors in soun [North and South]”, but not irreconcilable, as Bruno’s theory, but also the tale of the *Ondt and the Gracehoper* show. Their sameness and difference are expressed at this point by ALP’s use of homophones and assonances, which represent different wor(l)ds, but nevertheless suggest a strong link between the two brothers (“Heel / heal”; “Galliver / Gellover”; “Som / Sim”). The actual names of the mingling, “twinngling” brothers are also present in this section in connection with yet another important theme in *Finnegans Wake*, “The sehm ashnuh” (“the same anew”). Their interlinked and inseparable identities also become apparent in the somewhat unclear and ambiguous pronoun “you” in the phrase “When one of him sighs or one of him cries ‘tis you all over”. While this sentence could theoretically also refer to HCE, whom ALP

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<sup>57</sup> The motif of petrification could, in turn, symbolise a playful reference to the washerwomen, one of whom turns into a stone at the end of I.8.

<sup>58</sup> Another motif from the first Book which is taken up during ALP’s hike with HCE is that of the hunting party, where HCE meets the king (622.23 – 622.31). Finn Fordham has analysed various parallels between the two chapters from a genetic point of view with striking results in the abovementioned work.

generally addresses as “you” in the soliloquy, it seems at this point that she might also be addressing one or both of her sons. Again, the sons’ actions are paralleled grammatically and also create assonance (“sighs / cries”). While in *The Ondt and the Gracehoper*, a possible reunification of the twins is hinted at, ALP clearly dismisses this thought (“No peace at all”), thus de-romanticising their relationship and stating that, at least from her point of view, a “spirit of appeasement” (610.27) seems unlikely. However, this sentence is also reminiscent of Molly’s thoughts about not being able to come to a standstill (“every day I get up theres some new thing on sweet God sweet God well when Im stretched out dead in my grave I suppose Ill have some peace” [U 719.10-12]). Even though ALP is not “stretched out dead in [her] grave”, this topic is certainly prominent within the last pages of *Finnegans Wake*. ALP’s mentioning of “old crony aunts” can also be understood as a reminder of the merciless progression of time, or its master, “O’Cronione” (415.20).<sup>59</sup>

As an impersonation of the river Liffey, ALP certainly represents a strong idea of teleology, since she will at some point unite with the ocean. However, while this eventual act of giving herself up cannot be a complete and final ending of her own identity, since by merging with the sea, she would not “die” in the literal sense of the word, but only become intermingled with other waters, she has ambivalent, or indeed “mixed” (626.36) feelings about the consequences of this act and fears it. In a way, the surprisingly clear and short sentences in that form the last 9 pages of *Finnegans Wake* can be read as a grammatical representation of her unwillingness to end her course and give up her reign (“And let her rain now if she likes” [627.11-12]) and the wish to prolong the moment of “fforvell” (626.33), maybe with the hope of avoiding it altogether. At the same time, however, the soliloquy is characterised by a somewhat fatalist calmness on ALP’s side and the feeling that she has, in fact, already put up with her fate (“*Let her rain now*” [my emphasis]).

Already at an early stage of the soliloquy, ALP starts thinking about this topic: “I’ll wait. And I’ll wait. And then if all goes. What will be is. Is is” (620.31). This passage bears a prefiguration of later events, namely the reign of ALP’s daughter Issy and the dawning of a new era through a generational shift. Again, this new era is not something that is completely distinct from ALP’s own time,

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<sup>59</sup> Of course, this allusion also reverts back to *The Ondt and the Gracehoper*.

but rather ALP and Issy are part of the same river and follow the same course. This idea is expressed by the seemingly paradoxical simultaneity of present and future (“What will be is”), but also by a direct mentioning of Issy (“Is is”). Of course, the mentioning of Isis, the goddess of the dead, reintroduces both the aspect of death and of resurrection, as she managed to bring her husband Osiris back to life. As the text progresses, references to endings, fears of being forgotten and hopes of being remembered become more frequent.<sup>60</sup>

Similarly to Molly Bloom, ALP briefly considers the medium of smell as a means of being remembered: “And you won’t urbjunk to me parafume, oiled of kolloney, with a spot of marashy. Sm! It’s Alpine Smile from Yesthers late Yesthers. I’m in everywince nasturtls. Even in Houlth’s nose.” (624.24-26). Although ALP’s Eau de Cologne (“oiled of kolloney”) is certainly not as elaborate a “parafume” as Molly’s “Peau d’espagne”, her smell of “urb[an] junk” (to which HCE, however, “won’t object”) is certainly much stronger than Molly’s, and therefore fulfils its purpose of a memento much better, as ALP claims to be in everyone’s nostrils, which probably makes them “wince” as a result.

Although the entire soliloquy is essentially comprised of memories, ALP dismisses the past at one point (“Let besoms [bygones] be bosuns [bygones]” [621.1])<sup>61</sup> and focuses on the present moment, when she has to make way for her daughter, instead: “It’s Phoenix, dear. And the flame is, hear! Let’s our joornee saintomichael make it” (621.1-2). While Phoenix Park is a very important location both in the realm of Irish history and of *Finnegans Wake*, as HCE’s mysterious crime is said to have taken place there, in this context it can also be regarded as the actual bird “phoenix”, which is supposed to rise from its own ashes. However, McHugh suggests a reading of “Phoenix” as “finished”, thus again fusing both the end of the phoenix’s life with its resurrection (which only lies in its symbolical function at this point). ALP seems to be determined to

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<sup>60</sup> In his article “Forget! Remember! Forget” – Memory, Amnesia and the Cyclical Metamorphosis of Meaning in *Finnegans Wake*, Paul Fagan addresses this issue in great detail and claims that the process of making meaning in *Finnegans Wake* is inseparably linked to its circular structure and that the ideal reader can only be a re-reader: “Th[e] appeal to remember [ALP]—and the book’s content—leads the reader back to a generative, or re-generative, invocation of memory in the book’s closing and opening words, “the / riverrun”, which evoke the German ‘Erinnerung’ (“memory”). This memorializing river returns the re-reader “back to Howth Castle and Environs,” and to an inventory of textual events enumerated in the second paragraph which have not yet occurred, or have not yet re-occurred. In other words, the reader is cyclically returned to a forward-looking beginning which counterpoises the book’s final acts of remembrance.”

<sup>61</sup> Once again, this statement is strangely similar to Molly’s dismissal of her past lovers in *Ulysses*: “I suppose they’re all dead and rotten long ago” (*U* 716.1-2)

“make [her] jo[u]rne[y]”, as “the flame is” already there. At the same time, she is making a “hike” (621.7) with HCE, for which she apparently needs “light enough” (621.4-5), but not “our laddy’s lampern” (621.5). In that respect, the “flame” can also be read as the flame of a torch.<sup>62</sup> In a similar context, ALP also mentions “Eatster” (623.8) in connection with “newera’s day” (623.7). While Easter is a symbol of resurrection, or “arising” (623.26), New Year’s Day (or, indeed the day of a new era) stands for the beginning of something new rather than a resurrection of the old. However, the textual vicinity of these two phrases once again suggests a close link between two opposed principles, just as Annalivia Plurabelle will eventually be succeeded by Issy, but also, in a way, become Issy herself.

As mentioned before, in ALP’s considerations about her merging with the ocean and with Issy, these events are not easily identifiable as either positively or negatively connotated, but rather seem to be both at one and the same time. On the one hand, she is thinking about the ocean as “salvocean” (623.29), evoking the idea of salvation from “all these years within years in soffran [suffering]” (625.30), but at the same time, she claims that it is “still the same to [her]” (625.18) and complains about having “[I]apped so long” in “the still sama sitta [city; German: Sitte]” (625.27).

On the last pages of *Finnegans Wake*, ALP relives and revives her first encounter with HCE, which is once again connected to “adamant evar [Adam and Eve]” (626.3): “Sea, sea! Here, weire, reach, island, bridge. Where you meet I. The day. Remember! Why there that moment and us two only? I was but teen, a tiler’s dot” (626.7-9). This episode is also closely linked to her father, the tailor (“tiler”), who offered the Norwegian Captain (as yet another impersonation of HCE) her hand in marriage as a means of reconciliation (II.3). In combination with the mentioning of “Annamores leep” (626.1-2), which McHugh reads as an allusion to Edgar Allen Poe’s poem *Annabel Lee*, which tells the story of two very young, or even child-like characters, and a reference to “a youth in his florizel, a boy in innocence, peeling a twig, a child beside a weenywhite steed” (621.30), ALP’s soliloquy could be read as an act of purification and white-washing (in all possible meanings of the word) of sins committed throughout the text and a return to innocence. This idea is also

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<sup>62</sup> Symbols of darkness and light also serve as a metaphor for the symbolical dying of one generation and the dawning of a new era, just as the day succeeds the night.

supported by ALP's statement that "[a]ll men has done something. Be the time they've come to the weight of old fletch. We'll lave [French: wash] it" [621.32-33]. In accordance with the idea that the sins committed in and by the text (for the syntax and the general meaning of the text also seems to become much clearer and the towards the end of the text) are washed away by ALP's soliloquy, this part of the text would technically need to precede "The fall (bababadalgharaghtakamminarronkonnbronntonnerronntuonnthunntrovarrhounawnskawntoohohoordenenthurnuk!)" (3.15-17), since a state of innocence cannot follow after the fall, which is the embodiment of sin, but only exist beforehand. Clearly, this consideration creates yet another paradoxical situation with regard to the *Wake's* beginning and ending and confirms the idea that the *Wake's* ending is a beginning of sorts at the same time.

As the time to merge with the ocean approaches, references to reluctance towards this process on ALP's side become more frequent and she seems to become more aware of the fact that she will eventually have to give up her reign to her daughter:

But I read in Tobecontinued's tale that while blubles blows there'll still be sealskers [Danish: lovers]. There'll be others but non so for me. [...] I was a princeable girl. And you were the pantymammy's Vulking Corsergoth. The invision of Indelong. And, by Thorrer, you looked it! My lips went livid from the joy of fear. Like almost now.[...] Only, no, now it's me who's got to give. As duv herself div. Inn this linn. And can it be it's nnow fforvell? (626.18.33)

Although ALP still mentions "Tobecontinued's tale", which symbolises a clinging on to the idea that her tale is not going to end after all, she is aware that "there'll be other [lovers]", but not for her. When HCE is re-imagined at this point, he is seen as an invader of Ireland and a Corsair (or) Goth, being strongly connected with aggression and violence, rather than being described in naïvely romantic tones (such as "a child beside a weenywhite steed"). ALP's "joy of fear", which could be both related to HCE and to her imminent flowing into the sea ("almost now"), turns into "horror" (Thorrer) at the prospect of "fforvell". The doubling of the lenis consonants "nn", "ff" and "ll" also suggest an attempt at holding back the moment of parting at least for a few moments.

As time progresses, ALP's thoughts become more anxious and the "Thorrer" of having to let go is palpable throughout her words, especially after she feels that "you're changing, acoolsha, you're changing from me, I can feel. Or is it me

is? I'm getting mixed" (626.35-36). While "*a chuisle*" is mostly used as a term of endearment in Gaelic, which would mean that ALP is addressing HCE (as an embodiment of Finn McCool, he is also present in "cool"), but probably also her daughter Issy, its literal translation would be "dear pulse", which might suggest that ALP's pulse changes and becomes quicker (as does the general pace of the narrative, especially on the very last page). Again, she addresses her "changing[...] sonhusband [...] turning, I can feel you, for a daughterwife from the hills again" (627.1-2), before reverting to thoughts about being replaced by the "daughterwife" Issy:

And she is coming. Swimming in my hindmoist. Diveltaking on me tail. Just a whisk brisk sly spry spink spank sprint of a thing theresome saultering. Saltarella come to her own. I pity your oldself I was used to. Now a younger's there. Try not to part! Be happy, dear ones! May I be wrong! For she'll be sweet for you as I was sweet when I came down out of me mother. [...] First we feel, than we fall. And let her rain now if she likes. Gently or strongly as she likes. Anyway let her rain for my time is come. (627.3-13)

At this point, at Issy's actual "com[ing] down out of [her] mother", ALP's ambivalent feelings about handing down her reign to Issy become most apparent. On the one hand, she seems to pity that "a younger's there" instead of her and that "[her] time is come", but simultaneously, she assures her "dear ones" that Issy will be "as sweet for [them] as [ALP]" once was and wants to "let her rain now if she likes". Of course, the reference to "sweet" and "salt[y]" might also mean that ALP is slowly becoming salty, while Issy, who is usually associated with the name "Saltarella", is only at the beginning of her life as a river and therefore still sweet. At the same time, ALP's discourse not only turns from sweet to salty, but also becomes very bitter:

I done me best when I was let. [...] A hundred cares, a tithe of troubles and is there one who understands me? [...] All me life I have been lived among them but now they are becoming lothed to me. [...] How small it's all! [...] I thought you were all glittering with the noblest of carriage. You're only a bumpkin" (627.13-23).

Both these accusing statements (of which the above quoted passage is just the beginning) and the fin-negating structure of *Finnegans Wake* imply that ALP has, in fact, not put up with the idea of her own finiteness. In a way, ALP attempts to transgress the boundaries of her character by rejecting everything she has hitherto loved or cared for (HCE, the city of Dublin, her family). Instead

of Molly's rejoicing "Yes", the reader is faced with ALP's exasperated "no" ("no" [626.32] "No!" [627.26], "Niluna" [627.30]).

Towards the very end of the book, after a last lamentous outbreak ("I am passing out. O bitter ending!" [627. 34]), however, ALP seems to have put up with her fate, although a certain amount of bitterness is still perceivable in her words: "And it's old and old it's sad and old it's sad and weary I go back to you, my cold father, my cold mad father, my cold mad feary father, till the near sight of the mere size of him, the molyes and moyles of it, moananoaning, makes me seasilt saltsick and I rush, my only, into your arms" (627.36-628.4). It seems as if ALP has entirely lost the grammatical points of reference regarding HCE and her father respectively at this point, for it remains unclear which of the characters "my only" refers to. If the phrase is understood as representing her father, the ambivalence between her fear ("feary father") and her eagerness to finally return to him ("I rush, my only, into your arms") becomes even clearer than on the pages before. However, if "my only" in fact means HCE, ALP's reluctance to the moment of mergence is stressed and explained through the fact that "the [mere] sight of the mere size of him [...] makes [her] [seasick]". ALP's general state of uneasiness and anxiousness is also expressed in her plea to "[s]ave me from those therrble prongs! Two more. Onetwo moremens more" (628.5-6), before she seems to return into a calmer and more passive state:

Avelaval. My leaves have drifted from me. All. But one clings still. I'll bear it on me. To remind me of. LFF! So soft this morning, ours. Yes. Carry me along, taddy, like you done through the toy fair! [...] Whish! A gull. Gulls. Far calls. Coming, far! End here. Us then. Finn, again! Take. Bussoftlhee, mememormee! Till thousandsthee. Lps. The keys to. Given! A way a lone a last a loved a long the (628.6-17)

Once again, opposite meanings are reunited in "Avelaval" [Latin: Hail, Goodbye!], while "[m]y leaves have drifted from me. All. But one clings still" can be understood as yet another meta-reflexive reference to *Finnegans Wake* itself. Interestingly enough, ALP does not only re-course back to the beginning of the *Wake*, but also to the beginning of her own soliloquy at this point ("So soft morning, ours" / "Soft morning, city!" [619.20]). Eventually, ALP seems to accept her lot and utters a cautious, yet nevertheless affirmative "Yes". While ALP

claims that the “End” is “here”, it is in fact constantly delayed (“Finn, again”<sup>63</sup>, “Thousandsthee”), until it simply does not arrive, just according to ALP’s initial plan and her tactics of prolonging the time before parting in the hope of finally avoiding it altogether. Once again, she wakes HCE (“Take. Bussoftlhee [But softly]”), while she becomes wider (“[me, me, more me]”) and eventually grows into the ocean. Another noteworthy detail lies in the prominent motif “A/O”, which is given an elegant twist, as the first chapter devoted to ALP (I.8) starts with the letter “O” (196.1) and Book IV ends with a repetition of “A”s, suggesting that ALP’s origin (the typographical arrangement of page 196 suggests that O is the spring from which Annalivia Plurabelle develops into the river Liffey) is, in fact, her ending, and once again blurring the boundaries between those two principles.

The rest, indeed, is silence [Gaelic: whist], as “[t]he keys to [ALP’s] [Lips]” are “Given! A way”.

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<sup>63</sup> To the second-time reader, “Fin[n] again” might of course symbolise that the ending arrives for the second time.

#### 4. "Aloof is anoof" (FW623.19-20) – Conclusion / Ricorso

This thesis has examined the various ways in which the topic of endings and re-beginnings is negotiated in James Joyce's *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* by applying Plato's and Aristotle's theories on time as representatives of a cyclical and linear view of time respectively and by approximating the idea of measureless and infinite time via the use of Henri Bergson's notion of "pure duration" as expressed in *Time and Free Will*. These theories were incorporated into the study not only as a mere philosophical grid superimposed on the text, but also taken into consideration in combination with an in-depth literary analysis by means of close-reading.

In *Ulysses*, time does not flow equally fast in all parts of the text. As this thesis strives to prove, the narrative time is stretched considerably during some parts of the narrative, in particular at times when interior monologues are involved, thus allowing time to be slowed down metaphorically, presenting a coping strategy for the overflow of images with which a person in Modernist times might have been faced. Another instance where this effect is achieved is the chapter *Eumaeus*. On other occasions, time seems to be sped up (e.g. in *Oxen of the sun*, where the whole history of English literature is told in one chapter or on a more general level due to the fact that the events of the Odyssey are told in one day). Joyce convincingly shows that "time is relative to the system by which it is measured", thus "point[ing] to Einstein's theory that all temporal coordinates are relative to a specific reference system" (Kern 18). With regard to Henri Bergson's theories of pure duration and simultaneity, it can be seen that pure duration is achieved in *Penelope*, whereas a genuine approach at simultaneity can be found in *Sirens*. Both of these phenomena are often hinted at, however, they only cumulate once, in their respective chapters.

*Finnegans Wake*, on the other hand, presents the reader with a wholly different set of questions. The question in question, so to speak, is not only how time flows, but also why and where it flows (or, when thinking of Annalivia Plurabelle, who the flowing figure is in fact) and how its never-ending flux might be represented in a text that defies common boundaries by definition. One of the aims of this thesis was to show that in both *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*, the topic of endings, non-endings and re-beginnings is not only implicitly

touched upon on the level of structure and style, but also explicitly discussed on the level of plot. Therefore, after providing a general analysis of teleological and cyclical tendencies in *Finnegans Wake*, an analysis was conducted starting on the macro level, represented by the concept of the warring twin brothers Shem and Shaun, continuing on the micro-level of their representation in *The Ondt and the Gracehoper*, where Aristotelian and Platonic ideas could still be observed, and finally cumulating in the very last pages of the text, which simply defies common notions of linearity and cyclicity due to its sheer rejection of any (textual as well as theoretical) limits or boundaries.

Indeed, just as the process of reading can never actually be completed with *Finnegans Wake*, a literary analysis not only of Joyce's œuvre, but of several modernist texts, proves to be a never-ending *Work in Progress*, due to their complexity and all-encompassing nature, but also with regard to their abundance of possible meaning, which an analysis should not try to narrow down. Various other Modernist works would have lend themselves for an application of the presented theories, most of all Samuel Beckett's *Endgame*, but also T.S. Eliot's *The Waste Land*, or Virginia Woolf's *To the Lighthouse*, to name just a few. In order to incorporate all of these works, however, I would certainly need much more time and space, of which the Ondt and the Gracehoper seem to have so much, respectively. In order to prove that the end is really in the beginning, as Beckett suggests in his play *Endgame* (25), "I'll begin again

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## 7. APPENDIX

### Abstract

This thesis seeks to investigate the manifold ways in which endings in James Joyce's *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* are negotiated, and sometimes even seemingly evaded altogether.

My analysis is based on Plato's and Aristotle's concepts of time as a cyclical and teleological phenomenon, respectively. While Plato regarded human time as a (necessarily imperfect) reflection of eternal time, Aristotle coined the idea of time as a process, which leads towards a certain goal. In the case of human beings, this goal naturally equals death. However, in Joyce's works, a simple line between life and death cannot be drawn, as death is always connected to a new beginning – this effect is most famously achieved at the end / re-beginning of *Finnegans Wake*, where ALP is said to „die into a new beginning“, as Seamus Deane insightfully remarked in his Introduction to the Penguin Modern Classics edition. However, even during the bleakest hours of *Ulysses*, a certain amount of hope is communicated through the use of imagery representing circularity and infinity (for instance in *Proteus*).

Both the possibility of a certain kind of writing that manages to transgress time altogether and of writing which is necessarily connected to the very idea of time, without which, in fact, it could not even exist, are present in Joyce's texts and have been analysed in this thesis. Just as timelessness can only be expressed through the medium of time itself, or an absence thereof, a transgression of form and the defiance of limits prove to be inextricably linked to form itself. Even the most timeless and unbound characters are still thinking about common notions of public time (in the midst of her famous monologue, Molly Bloom remarks that her watch is broken) and still obey at least some of the rules regarding form, thus creating a conceptional paradox of sorts.

Rather than resolving this paradox, however, this thesis strives to embrace its chiasmic duality of the opposing principles inherent in both texts and affirm it with a climactic "Yes", as one of the many achievements of Joyce's texts is the idea that they not only do not need to justify their seemingly paradoxical fusion of opposites, but that both sides of the same coin are, in fact, equally legitimate, but can only be so in connection with their counterpart, respectively, just like the brothers Shem and Shaun.

## Zusammenfassung

Diese Arbeit setzt sich mit den vielfältigen Arten und Möglichkeiten auseinander, wie Enden in James Joyces Werken *Ulysses* und *Finnegans Wake* verhandelt werden, und in diesem Prozess bisweilen scheinbar vollständig umgangen werden können.

Meine Analyse stützt sich auf das theoretische Fundament der Zeitphilosophie von Plato und Aristoteles. Während Plato menschliche Zeit als (zwangsweise imperfektes) Abbild der (göttlichen) Unendlichkeit betrachtete, stand bei Aristoteles die Idee von Zeit als Prozess im Vordergrund, die stets auf ein Ziel gerichtet ist. Im Fall der menschlichen Zeit ist dieses Ziel natürlich gleichsam das Ende, also der Tod. In Joyces Werken verläuft die Linie zwischen Leben und Tod jedoch nicht so klar, da der Tod stets mit einem Wiederaufbruch und Neubeginn verbunden ist – das berühmteste Beispiel dieses Effekts wird am Ende / Neubeginn von *Finnegans Wake* erreicht, als ALP, mit den Worten von Seamus Deane, in einen Neubeginn stirbt („ALP dies into a new beginning“), wie er in der Einleitung zur *Penguin Popular Classics* – Edition treffend bemerkt. Allerdings gibt es auch während der freudlosesten und düstersten Zeiten in *Ulysses* Momente der Hoffnung, die stets mit einer Symbolik von Zirkularität und Unendlichkeit verbunden sind (so zum Beispiel in *Proteus*).

Sowohl die Möglichkeit eines Schreibens, das über die Zeit hinauszugehen scheint, und eines Schreibens, das notgedrungen sehr stark an die Zeit an sich gebunden ist – ohne die sie, in Wahrheit, nicht existieren könnte! – sind in Joyces Werken präsent und wurden in dieser Arbeit analysiert. Sowie Zeitlosigkeit nur im Zusammenhang mit Zeit selbst (oder deren Fehlen) ausgedrückt werden kann, ist auch die Überschreitung von formellen Grenzen nur über diese Grenzen kommunizierbar. Selbst die zeitlosesten Charaktere in Joyce's Werken beschäftigen sich mit allgemein gebräuchlichen Auffassungen von sozial definierter Zeit (mitten in ihrem berühmten Monolog bemerkt Molly Bloom, dass ihre Uhr kaputt ist) und gehorchen zumindest bis zu einem gewissen Grad den formalen Vorgaben eines Textes, was zu einer Art Paradoxon führt. Anstatt dieses resultierende Paradoxon auflösen zu wollen, möchte diese Arbeit dessen chiasmische Dualität mit einem klimaktischen „Ja“ bereitwillig annehmen, wie es auch eine der Errungenschaften des Textes ist, solche Dualitäten nicht rechtfertigen zu müssen und stattdessen einen produktiven Umgang damit zu ermöglichen.

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