

DISSERTATION

„US Foreign Policy Conduct in Iran:
Action, Reaction, and Counter-Reaction“

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Abstract:

The following dissertation and analysis represents a comprehensive investigation into the bilateral relationship between the US and Iran since 1953. The hypothesis focuses on the question: “Is US foreign policy preventing Iran from reaching its democratic potential?”

Using neo-colonial methods or indirect intervention, the United States altered the political development of Iran. Neo-colonial policies, as used by the US, and their long-term impact on Iran, are analysed carefully. The Volksgeist of the Iranian nation today has strong feelings regarding these events. I have defined the tripartite flow of this relationship as the Action, Reaction, and Counter-Reaction periods. The investigation begins with the post-World War II period, leading to the early 1950’s in Iran. The Action Period from 1953 - 1979 then becomes the first primary focus of the investigation, as I examine realities concerning the violent removal by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), of legally elected, popular Iranian Prime Minister Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq in 1953.

Mosaddeq’s violent removal, strongly supported by the US in August 1953, began a wide range of on-going political developments and negative emotions between the people of Iran, its governments after Mosaddeq, and successive US administrations. The US supported Iranian regime that replaced Mosaddeq, led by Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, was never accepted by Iran’s majority. As part of my larger investigation, I will examine whether or not the Iranian people could have chosen or been aware of other responses to the US removal of Mosaddeq, instead of the violent, negative emotions displayed against the US following his removal.

The Action Period analysis reveals the unpopularity of the Shah’s rule, led to Iran’s later support for regional and global terrorism, especially against the US, Israel, and their interests, with Iran being ruled by successive, fanatical Islamic regimes, governing poorly overall and disrespecting democratic development. My main conclusion for the Action period is US removal of Mosaddeq from power was a major foreign policy mistake by the United States, creating very negative, long-term consequences for Iran and the US. For Iran, the nation witnessed and still experiences continuation of ineffectual and poorly governing fanatical Islamic regimes, preventing Iran from reaching its much larger (democratic) potential.

The Reaction Period of Iran-US relations, 1979-2001, concludes Iran’s regime and its citizens, starting in 1979 and continuing for over two decades, would not have been able to realize other responses towards US administrations after 1979. The combined efforts of continued US hostility towards Iran after 1979, with greatly increasing hostility towards the US by Iran’s post 1979 fanatical Islamic regimes, offered no possibility for compromise. Among

the strongest examples of increasing hostility towards the US by Iranians, was their anger at the US decision to support Iraq militarily when Saddam Hussein attacked Iran, leading to the wasteful and murderous eight year war between Iran and Iraq. This caused the Iranian public to rally behind anti-American Khomeini, who drove the country into an oligarchy of extremist clergy, and away from democracy.

The Counter-Reaction period of Iran-US relations, 2001 to the present, analyses how and why US policy under the US administration of George W. Bush, was very aggressive towards Iran. Following 9/11, Mr. Bush and his administration referred to Iran as a member of an “axis-of-evil”, meaning the Counter-Reaction period now has a new level of US hostility towards Iran, which I also show continues under current US President Obama. I conclude by analysing why specific special interests inside the US find it convenient and believable Iran should be considered one of the greatest threats to US security beginning after 1979, continuing to the present and lasting well into the future. Neo-colonialism, as the primary, post-WWII policy choice by successive US administrations, has prevented Iran from achieving its potential political development.

Zusammenfassung:

Die vorliegende Dissertation und Analyse ist eine umfassende Untersuchung der bilateralen Beziehung zwischen den USA und dem Iran seit dem Jahr 1953. Die darin erörterte Hypothese konzentriert sich auf die Frage: "Hindert die US-amerikanische Außenpolitik den Iran daran, sein demokratisches Potential auszuschöpfen?".

Durch neokoloniale Methoden und indirekte Interventionen haben die Vereinigten Staaten die politische Entwicklung des Iran verändert. Die neokoloniale Politik, wie sie von den USA eingesetzt wird, und deren langfristigen Auswirkungen auf den Iran werden einer sorgfältigen Analyse unterzogen. Der Volksgeist der iranischen Nation verbindet heute starke Gefühle mit diesen Zeitereignissen. Die Entwicklung dieser dreiteiligen Beziehung unterteile ich in Aktion, Reaktion und Gegenreaktion. Die vorliegende Untersuchung beginnt mit einer Schilderung der Zeit nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg bis in die frühen 50er Jahre des 20. Jh. im Iran. Die Aktions-Periode zwischen 1953 und 1979 bildet hierbei den ersten Schwerpunkt. Ich schildere in diesem Teil die tatsächlichen Ereignisse der gewaltsamen Amtsenthebung des rechtmäßig gewählten und beliebten iranischen Premierministers Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq im Jahre 1953 durch die US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Mit Mosaddeqs gewaltsamer Amtsenthebung, die nachhaltig von den USA im August 1953 unterstützt wurde, wurden weit reichende und anhaltende politische Entwicklungen in Gang gesetzt und negative Emotionen zwischen dem iranischen Volk, seinen Regierungen nach Mosaddeq und den sukzessiven US-Regierungen geweckt. Das von den USA gestützte iranische Regime, welches Mosaddeq unter Führung von Schah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi ersetzte, wurde von der Mehrheit der Iraner niemals anerkannt. In einem umfassenderen Untersuchungsrahmen ermittelte ich dann, ob das iranische Volk anders auf die US-amerikanische Amtsenthebung Mosaddeqs hätte reagieren können - oder ob es sich anderer Reaktionsmöglichkeiten hätte bewusst sein können - als mit den gewaltsamen, negativen Emotionen, die sich nach der Amtsenthebung gegen die USA entluden.

Eine Analyse der Aktions-Periode zeigt, dass die Unbeliebtheit der Schah-Herrschaft zur späteren Unterstützung von regionalem und globalem Terrorismus durch den Iran führte, insbesondere gegen die USA, Israel und deren Interessen. In dieser Zeit wurde der Iran von sukzessiven, fanatischen islamischen Regimen mehr schlecht als recht geführt, die jegliche demokratische Entwicklung gering schätzten. Meine wichtigste Schlussfolgerung für die Aktions-Periode ist, dass die Amtsenthebung Mosaddeqs durch die USA ein großer außenpolitischer Fehler der Vereinigten Staaten war, mit sehr negativen, langfristigen Konsequenzen für den Iran und die USA. Was den Iran betrifft, wurde die Nation Zeuge

einer Reihe von ineffektiven und schlecht regierenden fanatischen, islamischen Regimen, die bis heute weiterherrschen und den Iran daran hindert, sein viel größeres (demokratisches) Potential zu entfalten.

Ab 1979 zeigte die Reaktions-Periode der iranisch-amerikanischen Beziehungen, die sich von 1979 bis 2001 erstreckte, dass die iranischen Regimes und die Bürger Irans über mehr als zwei Jahrzehnte keine andere Reaktion auf die US-Regierungen nach 1979 aufbringen konnten. Aufgrund der anhaltenden Feindseligkeiten der USA gegen den Iran nach 1979 und der zunehmenden Feindseligkeit des fanatischen, islamischen Regimes im Iran gegen die USA nach 1979 boten sich keinerlei Kompromissmöglichkeiten. Zu den eindringlichsten Beispielen zunehmender Feindseligkeit der Iraner gegenüber den USA gehört die zornige Reaktion auf die Entscheidung der US-Amerikaner, den Irak militärisch zu unterstützen, als Saddam Hussein einen Angriff gegen den Iran startete. In der Folge kam es zu einem verheerenden und mörderischen acht Jahre andauernden Krieg zwischen dem Iran und dem Irak. Dies bewegte die iranische Bevölkerung dazu, sich hinter den anti-amerikanischen Khomeini zu stellen, der das Land in eine Oligarchie extremistischer Geistlicher verwandelte und weg von der Demokratie führte.

Anhand der Gegenreaktions-Periode der iranisch-amerikanischen Beziehungen, die 2001 begann und bis heute fortwährt, zeige ich auf, wie und warum sich die US-Politik unter der Regierung George W. Bushs sehr aggressiv gegenüber dem Iran verhielt. Nach 9/11 sprachen Mr. Bush und seine Regierungsmitglieder vom Iran als Land auf der "Achse des Bösen." Dies bedeutet, dass in der Gegenreaktions-Periode eine neue Stufe der US-Feindseligkeit gegen den Iran erreicht wurde. Ich belege zudem, dass diese unter dem derzeitigen US-Präsidenten Obama weiterhin besteht. Abschließend erkläre ich, warum spezifische Sonderinteressen innerhalb der USA es für zweckmäßig und glaubwürdig halten, den Iran als eine der größten Bedrohungen der US-Sicherheit nach 1979 zu betrachten, die bis in die Gegenwart reicht und noch weit in die Zukunft reichen wird. Der Neokolonialismus als erste Wahl der Nachkriegspolitik der sukzessiven US-Regierungen hat den Iran daran gehindert, sein politisches Entwicklungspotential auszuschöpfen.

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INTRODUCTION: UNITED STATES - IRAN RELATIONS, 1953 TO THE PRESENT / ACTION, REACTION, AND COUNTER-REACTION

This dissertation analyses US–Iranian relations in an on-going tripartite flow of three specific periods (Action-Reaction-Counter-Reaction). Beginning with the Action Period, from 1953 to 1979, the US government removes Iran’s popular and only democratically elected leader, Mohammad Mosaddeq. This loss of freedom and democracy for Iranians led to rising anti-US feelings, leading to violent revolution against the American supported Shah of Iran in 1979. These anti-US feelings in Iran led to more terrorism directed against the US and the West at present.

My hypothesis is the following: The decision by the US government in 1953 to actively influence removal of Mohammad Mosaddeq as Iran’s only democratically elected Prime Minister, set in motion Iran’s continuing inability to reach its democratic potential. The resulting disillusionment by Iranians after 1953 led to permanent political hostility between Iran and the United States, and increasing terrorism in the Middle East and worldwide. The primary question I will answer for my hypothesis is this: “Is US foreign policy preventing Iran from reaching its democratic potential?”

To fully address my hypothesis and answer the hypothesis question, I will primarily analyze the post-World War II diplomatic, political, and military, relationship between Iran and the United States from the early 1950’s to the present. In reality, analysis and coverage technically begins after WWII, but the primary analysis begins with the year 1953. Therefore, the full extent and coverage of this dissertation concerns a time-line of over six decades. This relationship as discovered, assessed, and analyzed carefully through my research, finds Iran-US relations to consistently be volatile, destructive, controversial, and exhaustive for both nations. Therefore, my analysis overall is careful, systematic, proportional, and as objective as possible.

All analysis, conclusions, assumptions, and forecasts regarding this difficult relationship represent my best attempt to analyze, interpret, and understand, allowing the public to achieve the following result: they can reach a more informed conclusion regarding the nature of on-going relations between Iran and the United States. This intended result would bring about the following. Participants, observers, analysts, the media, academic community, and ultimately policy makers would more objectively represent what the global public demands from this relationship overall.

Unfortunately, the relationship between Iran and the US has been perceived too often as violent and incapable of improvement. It is my heartfelt intention as an Iranian born citizen, this dissertation and contribution to public discourse concerning Iran's relationship with the United States, offer observers and participants at all levels, new opportunities to make better choices and more informed public and private decisions impacting Iranian and American attempts to better understand each other. I wholeheartedly disagree with those who have previously stated, very loudly and publicly, we have reached the end of history (**Fukuyama, 1989**).

The effort I have made through this comprehensive work, in helping to bridge the gap between the US and Iran, hoping to make achievement of democracy in Iran a real possibility, will also make US foreign policy decision-making more responsible and ethical as well. Ultimately, this dissertation clarifies important trends in the overall relationship between Iran and the US, primarily regarding the degree and methods of US influence and involvement impacting many areas of Iranian policy-making for over six decades. This is the first major study of its kind to specifically assess cause and effect regarding Iran's larger relationship with the United States.

INTRODUCTION: Action Period 1953-1979

As mentioned I have defined US-Iranian relations by three key eras of the relationship: Action, Reaction, and Counter-reaction. These three eras all begin with the post-world War II period, primarily with the year 1953 and continue to the present time. The Action period concerns the first of the three phases and the period 1953-1979. During this period, which began with a well-known and popular Prime Minister in Iran, Mohammad Mosaddeq, he was suddenly removed in a military overthrow by extremist elements of the Iranian military and populace, strongly supported and influenced by the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) of the United States. This violent act led to a pattern of affairs in and around Iran for the next quarter century, until 1979.

The result of this primarily US orchestrated military overthrow of this popular Iranian leader, which Mosaddeq was, represented a major policy change coming from the newly installed US supported regime headed by Mohammad-Reza Shah. Most Iranians correctly perceived the Shah to be closely supported and overwhelmingly influenced by the United States, while also believing then actually witnessing as well both Iran's domestic and foreign policy undergoing major change in direction during this Action period of Iranian-US relations.

The evidence presented in this paper will clearly show that during the Action period, 1953-79, the Shah was officially supported by the US. Also very importantly, I will show the Shah's image globally, very poor before and after his overthrow in 1979, certainly is not getting worse. The realities of Iranian religious fundamentalists who overthrew the Shah have become more and more apparent to the world since the Shah was overthrown.

In other words, those religious fundamentalists who overthrew the Shah and whose rule continues to the present, have created a series of regimes, policies and realities since 1979, greatly weakening much of the Iranian economy overall. Living standards for most Iranians became much lower than they were before. These post-1979 regimes have been at least as repressive as the Shah's, and more so in many ways. In other words, the former Shah of Iran is perceived in a less negative light as the post-1979 period is now over thirty years old. More and more Iranians feel post-1979 Iranian Islamic regimes have been very poor at governing, and has led to poor quality of life for many Iranians, in many respects being worse than during the reign of the Shah.

From the perspective of IR Theory and related thinking, I will analyze these overlapping issues during the Action period, primarily through the context of neo-colonial theory or neo-colonial thought and analysis, originally known as neo-colonialism. For the conclusions I offer throughout my dissertation, I must stress this theory has no relationship with Dependency theory, because Dependency theory states Third World nations today, formerly dominated and controlled by previous European imperial powers, are still dependent upon former European rulers (**Knutsen, 1997**). This includes the implication that some Third World nations wish to remain dependent on former colonial masters. While true in some cases, especially regarding former colonial controlled nations in Africa, in fact this is absolutely not the case with Iran.

Neo-colonialism believes major powers maintain their control over weaker, poorer nations, areas, and peoples through indirect means. Iran, as I show throughout this dissertation, has wanted complete independence from the US in all areas since 1953, including political and military. As my analysis indicates throughout, the violent response against Washington's policies towards Iran by successive Iranian regimes after removal of the Shah strongly supports an important part of my overall analysis. During the Action period, an image clearly emerges of Iran's negative relationship with the US since removal of Mosaddeq in 1953. Mosaddeq's removal and Iran's subsequent experience convinced most Iranians that political and economic control of their nation by Washington through heavily influencing the Shah (1953-

79) or any such US supported Iranian dictator, was and is completely unacceptable. Important sourcing I use throughout strongly supports this conclusion.

Further evidence of neo-colonialism serving as the most realistic theory by which I analyze the Iran-US relationship, comes from understanding the origins of the theory and its clear relationship to IR modeling. The term became more and more common throughout post-WWII Africa, as the decolonization process after WWII became a reality, driven by increasingly energetic attempts by independence movements throughout Africa to make decolonization an unquestioned fact. Former European colonial nations were leaving Africa after the war, allowing independence movements throughout the African continent, more freedom to express their frustrations and claims against crimes committed by the former European colonial masters. The end result was neo-colonialism, as an accepted term for analyzing and justifying African interpretations of European colonial policy, past and recent.

After achieving independence, many African leaders and supporters were insisting neo-colonialism was not only theory, but practice as well. They believed neo-colonial theory was strongly practiced by now former European colonial powers, using more indirect forms of political, economic, and military influence and pressure against their former African colonies. The single most prominent exponent of this theory was Kwame Nkrumah, the first leader of Ghana as an independent African nation in 1957.

In 1965, he wrote the first and most influential book expounding neo-colonialism as the latest form of imperialism. Called, "Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism", the book was very popular with post-independence movements throughout Africa and much of the Third World as well. The essence of neo-imperialism according to Nkrumah, is that former colonial powers were and are able to achieve continuing dominance and control of their former African colonial subjects, through indirect use of economic and military superiority. This greater European power relative to Africa was always the case for centuries before and after decolonization, therefore, Europe still possessed great ambition to reclaim their African holdings.

Fueled by the Cold War as well, in fact Kwame Nkrumah's greatest fears and concerns regarding neo-colonialism becoming reality, were in fact occurring. The methods and means by which neo-colonial policy in Europe would regain control and reclaim great influence in Africa, would be through use of newly created secret services like the CIA in the United States, MI6 in Great Britain, SIS in France, the former KGB in the former Soviet Union, and others. Economic and political pressure would be used as well by Europe and the US

in Africa and throughout the Third World. In short, the fears of Kwame Nkrumah came true. The same fears came true regarding Iran's relationship with the West as well.

Regarding Iran, most Iranians have concluded the events of 1953 permanently require Iran to be independent of heavy US influence or any powerful foreign influence over Iran's leaders. Stephen Kinzer of The New York Times, one of the many credible and influential sources I use throughout, has written the most comprehensive book and investigation to date regarding events and secret plotting by US and anti-Mosaddeq elements in Iran (**Kinzer, 2003**). Kinzer carefully supports the notion of a direct link regarding removal of Iran's most popular and popularly elected leader in its history (1953), Mohammad Mosaddeq, to decisions and actions ordered from Washington, D.C., carried out inside Iran during that controversial time. As my analysis during the Action period also indicates and is well supported by Kinzer and others, the removal of Mosaddeq was and still is the greatest national political tragedy for Iranians in modern times.

As Kinzer carefully highlights through direct discussion with numerous Iranians of all backgrounds, not just politicians and people with political influence, a majority of Iranians clearly believe removal of Mosaddeq in 1953 was an incomparable tragedy. It prevented their nation from reaching full or partial political, economic, and overall potential set forward by Mosaddeq when he was in power. To the present time, Kinzer offers evidence many Iranians still feel this way despite great failures brought about by radical anti-US Islamist regimes ruling Iran since Iranians violently removed the US supported dictator, the Shah of Iran in 1979 (**Kinzer, 2003**).

Surprisingly, there are still people who doubt the common claim by most Iranians, scholars, and observers the US was primarily behind controversial, secret events of August 1953 leading to Mosaddeq's removal, and destruction of Iranian democracy. Such people only need to realize that Kermit Roosevelt himself, a grandson of former US president Theodore Roosevelt; US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director of Middle Eastern operations in the early 1950's, and most importantly, leader of the Mosaddeq removal planning and organization, wrote his own book proudly stating his primary responsibility for these events (**Kinzer, 2003**). In fact until his death in 2000, he publicly defended actions regarding his key role in directing, planning, and organizing momentous events leading to removal of Mosaddeq. He was fully aware as well before, during, and after he directed CIA operations of 1953 in Iran, Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq was the only democratically elected leader in post-WWII Iranian history until that time. This is still the case today.

In my view, it will always be doubtful whether Kermit Roosevelt's highly controversial actions in 1953 on behalf of the Eisenhower administration and CIA of the United States, will ever be accepted as beneficial by most Iranians regarding their nation's continuing attempts to realize its full potential. This is why it is important to emphasize neo-colonialism as the primary, theoretical international relations instrument through which I support conclusions overall regarding US-Iran relations since the end of WWII. This is because US domination of Iran's domestic political and economic realities after removing Mosaddeq, until the Shah's removal in 1979, fit the dominant characteristics of neo-colonial theory and reality. Specifically, it allows one to see why the US was able to impose such direct influence over Iranian domestic interests.

For example, the role of foreign multinational corporations operating inside a poor nation like Iran is significant to the credibility of neo-colonial theory. Iran from the time of Mosaddeq in the early 1950's to the present is a powerful example of this. During the Action period, the key role of the Anglo-Iranian oil company (AIOC) in Iran is quite significant, representing the key economic interest around which both domestic and foreign intrigue in Iran evolve. More specifically, the AIOC is the main reason major outside powers like Britain and especially the United States wish to assume the most influence political, economic, and military events in Iran. Therefore, neo-colonialism strongly addresses the issues, concerns, and above all, conclusions I reach throughout this massive project.

Stated simply regarding the Action period, neo-colonialism in theory and practice, as I apply it to US interests regarding Iran and the AIOC, allows me to further successfully argue and fully support my larger conclusions overall. In its simplest form during the Action period, the US clearly wished to have major control over the AIOC, Iran's major economic asset, thus giving Washington direct access to resources in Iran and major influence over Iranian affairs. Such access would allow the US most importantly direct and powerful influence over Iranian resources and related economic decision-making. For the record, I wish to state carefully and clearly there are prominent and influential economists, for example having served in positions of great influence during previous US administrations and with multilateral institutions, who do not agree with the way the US was or is still able to use its great economic power in neo-colonial ways to achieve intended results without consent of those in other nations directly affected (**Stiglitz, 2002**). These concerns continue to grow.

This kind of powerful influence by the US over a poorer nation, in this case Iran, is clearly different than direct physical control over a nation. Direct physical control of a nation is clearly identified through imperialism, and its overall meaning in developing international

relations theory (**Galtung, 1987**). That is not the case regarding US-Iran relations from the end of WWII to the present. Neo-colonialism as theory and practice, best addresses the numerous attempts and eventual realization by Washington in achieving its preferred policies towards Iran throughout the Action period. Here are the reasons.

Balance-of-power-theory, created by Hans Morgenthau in the 1950's, elegantly offered the concept of nations as being deterred from doing certain things to other states if no single nation has too much dominance over others. If one such state becomes too powerful, threatening the perceived security of all other states, the latter will converge to stop the newly dominant state (**Morgenthau, 1978**). This has for the most part, not been the case regarding the global system and United States foreign policy throughout the Middle East, Southern and Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America, since the end of World War II.

Great global influence and dominance by Washington after WWII ended, was immediately used to spread US influence and power throughout Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Most of that influence was spread indirectly through use of non-direct or neo-colonial means by Washington. The best examples of this were Washington's use of the CIA and US based multinational corporations throughout Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Such policy continues by the US then and now regarding its difficult relationship with Iran.

The neo-colonial model as a component of IR theory, is best suited to allow one to witness and analyze how indirect methods of control over Iran employed by the United States, actually operate at that time or currently. This means precisely neo-colonialism allows this analysis to establish direct and credible evidence regarding Washington's use of the CIA and related secret, indirect components of US diplomacy, influence, and overall conduct in international relations, for establishing dominant influence over Iran during the Action period. Finally, the neo-colonial model appears to derive more and more credibility because of Washington's highly dysfunctional relationship with Iran.

INTRODUCTION: Reaction Period 1979-2001

The second section of this dissertation covers the reaction period of US-Iranian relations, from 1979-2001. This receives careful examination concerning how the new post-Shah, post 1979 Iranian regimes went from being very popular inside Iran and somewhat so outside as well, to seeing much of their global and internal support weaken and unravel as the 1980's progressed. By the time of the 1990's, Iran's regimes have steadily lost a great part of their popularity internally overall, and become less popular globally as well. Not that they were

ever popular globally, but were at least more accepted worldwide immediately after the 1979 revolution.

This reality since 1979 inside Iran, while noticed by many globally as well, never seemed to convince western observers perhaps the Shah's rule should be seen in a less critical light than previously. No matter how unpopular the post 1979 Iranian regimes were inside and outside Iran, most western observers never questioned that perhaps the Shah was not as incompetent overall than over thirty years of post-Shah rule has become. Were western observers to do this, perhaps a more balanced view of history concerning US-Iranian relations could take place, as well as judging the Shah in a more realistic light. This is not to say the Shah should now be perceived favorably.

I simply mean the Shah's negative image can now be viewed more objectively after thirty years of post-Shah Iranian rule. Let me emphasize however, this is not the major concern of the Reaction Period, nor even a major concern of this dissertation. It is simply an observation I support with economic evidence that needs to be part of the growing literature regarding the Shah's assessment in history. The realities of the Reaction period in Iran, as I show, require observers to reassess the Shah in light of history.

As this dissertation progressed through the Reaction Period, I felt an obligation to address the Shah's rule in light of poor performance by post-Shah Islamic regimes in Iran to the present time. The Reaction period passage of time allowed history to evolve and regenerate, creating reinterpretations. However, this has not happened regarding the Shah's continuing terrible image as US supported dictator and tyrant. This dissertation therefore attempts to offer more balanced views of the Shah's rule in the larger context of US-Iranian relations during the Reaction period. It is important to restate as well, any new or altered interpretation for the Shah resulting from Reaction period analysis, is far from being the primary goal of this work. It is nevertheless, unavoidable in the context of this dissertation.

Much of the attempted objectivity I offer in assessing the Reaction period attempts to realize more balanced views of US policy towards Iran during this time. This includes analysis of what motivates Washington as well as how US policy choices affected Iranian policy and policy makers overall. The Reaction period assesses how Iran's pre and post-1979 Islamic leaders were highly influenced by US policy, to an extent preventing Iran's pre and post-'79 leadership from achieving better results inside Iran and for Iran's region. I assess and analyze how post-'79 Iranian leaders chose more or less realistic alternatives from their perspective, which is very important for this analysis overall. The degree to which realistic choices existed in the minds of post-'79 leaders, to a large extent determined the degree of

freedom Iran's revolutionary leaders had in achieving post-1979 economic, political, and social improvement for their people overall.

Another aspect of neo-colonialism I analyze concerns how Reaction period analysis should be viewed in terms of what Iran's post-'79 revolutionary leaders originally intended for Iran regardless of US policy. The Reaction period assesses actual intentions regarding Iran's post-'79 leadership, which will help identify Iran's intended post-1979 path. Understanding this as opposed to what they actually did is assessed here with neo-colonial implications. As we will see, Washington's neo-colonialist ambitions in the Reaction period setting were forceful, leading to dramatic changes in priority and direction by post-'79 Islamist regimes in Iran. Reaction period analysis clearly indicates Iran's post-'79 leaders never believed they could carry out the kind of policy direction they preferred because of US inspired neo-colonial activity.

I will support with evidence US policy choices towards Iran during the Reaction-period, as being completely neo-colonial in nature and achieving neo-colonial outcomes in Iran. For example, the US military supported Iran's enemy Iraq during the horrific Iran-Iraq war during the 1980's. At no time did the US directly intervene militarily against Iran, therefore this kind of indirect US influence against Iran clearly is neo-colonial in nature, as it still had decisive effect on Iranian affairs. This US decision to support Iraq for much of the war with Iran, clearly kept the war going much longer than expected. This, led to many more Iranian deaths than would have occurred without US military assistance to Iraq. Much of the evidence I use clearly shows Iran's economy and social structures greatly weakening throughout the long, horrific ordeal of war with neighboring Iraq. Clearly, US policy towards Iraq was having serious and negative neo-colonial or indirect implications for all Iranians inside their nation during the brutal conflict.

In another context, neo-colonialism is the primary tool the US clearly chooses since the end of WWII, when wishing to influence other nations and interests. Besides direct military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan over much of this decade, and direct US military intervention in places like Korea, Vietnam, Kuwait 1991, or Somalia briefly in the early 1990's, Panama very briefly in 1989, or the equally brief US occupation of Grenada, a Caribbean island in 1983, there is little direct evidence the US prefers imperial forms of rule when dealing with the rest-of-the-world. Therefore, my primary use of neo-colonialism as the major tool for conducting analysis during the Reaction period, finds further credibility in this study. The lack of a serious post-WWII record regarding direct US imperial occupation finds further evidence in my next observation regarding the Reaction period.

Neo-colonial US policy and behavior during this time is perhaps most clearly indicated when analyzing the US decision to economically embargo Iran in 1993. Such a decision, though clearly aggressive in nature against Iran, was justified by the US on defensive grounds. The US reasoning behind the embargo is Iran's aggressive support of terrorism in regional and perhaps larger contexts. The main point here regarding the Reaction period is Iran's direct use of terrorism in the Middle East has never impacted the US living standard, US government policies, or way of life in the US at all. Therefore, Iran's support of regional terrorism, while worrisome, has no impact on US political decision making. Iran cannot be accused of practicing neo-colonial policies against the US.

However, the US decision of 1993 to strengthen the economic embargo upon Iran's economy and nation, in place since the revolution in 1979, certainly had to impact Iran's living standards and way of life. The vast majority of Iranians most certainly saw their living standards fall since the embargo began. Clearly, the embargo against Iran has neo-colonial implications regarding US policy towards Iran during the Reaction period. Noam Chomsky is not influential with the overall dissertation, however, regarding Reaction Period conclusions and analysis I make concerning neo-colonial assessments of US policy towards Iran.

Neo-colonialism therefore, is extremely credible and powerful in assessing the US motivated economic embargo of Iran. It has achieved major impact through indirectly altering Iran's political, economic, and military decision-making in important ways. Perhaps Iran's living standard during the Reaction period, following imposition of the US embargo, fell even more than caused by the eight year war between Iran and Iraq. I must also stress here as well, Washington maintaining a long-term economic embargo against Iran during the Reaction period, should certainly be assumed from the point of view of logic, which was and is my purpose throughout Reaction period analysis, to have lowered Iran's living standards after 1993. After all, the announced purpose of the embargo by the then Clinton administration of the US, was to pressure Iran's regime into abandoning support for terrorist groups and realizing nuclear weapons capability. Clearly, the purpose of the embargo would be to create resistance and frustration by Iran's population against their own regime. This is clearly impossible if the purpose of an embargo is to improve economic living standards for Iran or any nation.

I am completely comfortable making this assumption regarding US intentions concerning application of the embargo against Iran's economy. It is extremely difficult to argue, much less support, that a major economic embargo against one nation would not negatively effect living standards overall. The neo-colonial implications for US policy towards Iran after

1979 therefore, remain highly credible. The US ability to continue heavily influencing political, economic, social, and military events inside Iran after 1979, through indirect neo-colonial methods, should be considered forceful and impacting.

It will become evident throughout assessment of the Reaction period, US policy follows known definitions and interpretations of neo-colonialism. All US administrations and authorities will most likely continue denying Washington's policy priorities have neo-colonialist priorities concerning Iran. I am confident however, supporting evidence I offer throughout the Reaction period clearly indicates Washington used a wide variety of economic, political, and military tools to achieve outcomes completely within neo-colonial boundaries, assumptions, and recognized definitions.

Finally, the post-1979 Reaction period requires assessment of whether or not political, economic, military and other behavior would have been similar if the Shah of Iran continued in power following 1979. The findings here can be surprising, but it is worth knowing where evidence leads in this and other contexts analyzed from 1979 to 2001. The Reaction period will require reinterpretation, especially by western interpreters because of new sourcing, evidence, and knowledge coming to light. Howard Zinn has commented on this subject and others regarding US foreign policy.

He believes the Shah in power after 1979 would have been very different policy wise compared to the Islamist leaders like Ayatollah Khomeini, who followed the Shah instead. This is mainly because Zinn believes the US would have wanted the Shah to move in a specific direction. Such a reinterpretation requires objectivity regarding the Reaction period, which I have tried to bring about. I sincerely hope western viewers of Iran-US relations will agree with my conclusions regarding the 1979-2001 period.

Regarding the current state of US-Iran relations, I believe Reaction-period reinterpretation is crucial, not least because further negative implications regarding the Tehran-Washington relationship can result if no acceptance of new evidence since 1979 occurs. As we know, dangerous assumptions can be followed by very dangerous circumstances, such as the current crisis in US-Iran relations. Trying to assess new evidence offering new interpretations is crucial in assessing why Iranian-US relations have never become more stable, despite numerous changes in political leadership in both nations since 1979.

Dr. Gary Sick, member of the Carter administration's National Security Council staff in the US, and senior White House advisor for Iran to President Carter from 1977-81, is one of the more thoughtful and objective US observers concerning then and later predicted future trends in US-Iran relations. His outstanding book, *All Fall Down*, written shortly after he left

the White House under President Carter, is still in my assessment one of the very best and most objective US analysis and interpretation concerning what happened in Iran in 1979 and afterwards. His analysis of the events leading to the fall of the Shah and beginning of the Reaction period are very penetrating. He is an important source in allowing one to see how US decision-making worked during the Carter administration. Though not used extensively as a source in the Reaction period, his thinking on the subject of events in 1979 leading to the fall of the Shah and beginning of post-Shah realities, has influenced me greatly.

INTRODUCTION: The Counter-Reaction Period 2001 – 2010

This brings the reader to the third and final phase of this dissertation: the Counter-Reaction period of 2001 to the present. Specifically, this means the period beginning with the US presidency of George W. Bush, and its policy orientation or framework towards Iran in the context of post-9/11 realities. Gradually but firmly, the Bush policy becomes more aggressive towards Iran, and continuing to do so until the end of his administration in 2009. Though the Bush administration was willing to talk with Iran late during the Bush administration's tenure, and indirect contact was made, the aggressive stance towards Iran overall by the last Bush administration, did not change in any significant way.

The Counter-Reaction period is marked by heightened tensions between the US and Iran. Curiously enough however, this Counter-Reaction period also offers more predictability overall in the US-Iran relationship as well. This predictability, while often ignored by some, serves an important purpose. In my assessment, for the first time since post-WWII US-Iran relations, global observers not just western think growing predictability, characterized by increased US and Iranian hostility towards each other, makes Middle Eastern issues more predictable. Is this positive for regional and global security? The Counter-Reaction analysis indirectly acknowledges that some believe this is occurring. From a policy perspective, my intention from analysis of the Counter-Reaction period is to increase public debate creating greater, more objective possibilities for Iran-US relations in finding improvement. In any serious analysis, this objective is always one of the important goals.

My analysis of the Counter-Reaction period is also intended to create a more objective reality in which to perceive US-Iran relations. It does not however, assume a more peaceful region or globe as a result, primarily because of ongoing US-Iranian hostility over Iraq and the on-going US military presence and conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. These long-term implications take on new meaning with the current US administration of Barack Obama, having succeeded the second Bush administration in January of 2009.

This third and final Counter-Reaction period, 2001 to the present, is the third and final period in this analysis of US-Iranian relations. It is also marked by very emotionally charged elements in this overall relationship. In other words, the now completed US presidency of George W. Bush, coming to power in January 2001, marks the beginning of the third or Counter-Reaction period in Iran-US relations, and is defined as the most important determinant regarding current US-Iranian relations. It has set the stage for the overall assessment and analysis of US-Iran relations. Even the results of the first eighteen months of the Obama administration in the US, can only be assessed and measured against what the Bush administration actively pursued for eight years previously.

The US presidency of George W. Bush, and its administration's policies towards Iran since January 2001, as the evidence will show, represented very aggressive policy towards Iran. In a comparative context, there perhaps were more aggressive US policies towards Iran, such as the Action period with its tremendous neo-colonial US influence directly affecting Iranian policy outcomes. None however, has been consistently applied towards an unfriendly regime of the US, in this case Iran, as that of this now previous US administration. As such, the Counter-reaction period concerns US-Iran relations since early 2001, even before 9/11 occurred in September of that year. After 9/11 did occur, this dissertation will show how Bush administration policies became yet even more aggressive in the overall relationship between the US and Iran.

During this Counter-Reaction analysis as well, with the benefit of time elapsing since 9/11, it is becoming easier to identify the degree of total impact this catastrophic event had on overall relations between Washington and Tehran. The events of 9/11 and their cause, from the US point of view, are explored carefully. Since this event, US policies towards Iran in a post-9/11 setting during the Bush administration have been partly justified by Washington's belief Tehran sponsors global terrorism. This included belief by some in the Bush administration Tehran had links with Al-Qaeda when 9/11 occurred. The evidence presented by the Bush administration since 9/11 shows this not to be the case. In the Counter-reaction analysis, this is a serious weakness by the then Bush administration. Bush administration policies towards Iran after 9/11, nevertheless became much more intensive in terms of short and long-term impact on Iranian decision-making.

Examining the Bush administration's responsibility towards evidence used in making decisions is important in determining overall legitimacy of US policy towards Iran during Counter-reaction analysis. This period also seeks to understand if Tehran had other policy

choices to follow after 9/11. Or, as has been implied, did US pressure after 9/11 offer Tehran little room to follow a less confrontational course with the US?

Whether or not the Counter-reaction period is the most confrontational between Tehran and Washington, going back to the end of WWII, is debatable at best.

As the Counter-Reaction analysis does imply however, the current state of relations between the two are at their lowest point since the period following the Iranian revolution in 1979, when 52 American diplomats were taken hostage by post-Shah Iranian student revolutionaries. The US then had to conduct diplomacy with Iran through the Swiss embassy and intermediaries. To understand the Counter-Reaction period as completely as possible requires a thorough investigation of Bush administrations intentions, outcomes, and realities. This is what has been achieved as an objective view of the long-term Iran-US relationship presents itself in current form. The Counter-reaction analysis allows one to fully comprehend the largest realities that have come to influence US-Iran relationships throughout post-war history.

The election of current Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005, perceived as highly confrontational by the US, is analyzed as part of the larger Counter-Reaction context of post-9/11 realities. Therefore, part of Counter-reaction assessment responsibilities treats carefully and selectively the on-going impact of Iranian President Achmadinejad's election and policies on Iran-US relations, since he took office. Understanding the current Iranian president, is an important part of the larger forces that make-up Iranian-US relations overall. Also, an assessment from Iran itself will help answer important questions regarding Iran under their current confrontational president. Such evidence is either ignored in the West or not taken seriously, but Counter-Reaction analysis does take Iranian assessments of their president seriously as well.

Ever since President Bush referred to Iran as a member of an "Axis of Evil", which included Iraq and North Korea, he attempted to isolate Iran economically and politically on the world stage. No doubt in Tehran this has not been appreciated by any regime in power since the highly controversial Bush speech in 2002. Most important, this reality must be addressed in terms of overall US policy aggressiveness towards Iran. This includes Counter-Reaction analysis of US President Obama's US policy towards Iran as well. Counter-Reaction also argues logically, it does not matter whether one likes the US or Iran in this confrontation. What matters is one of the two countries in this relationship, the US, clearly has carried out policies which can be perceived as aggressively preventing Iran from carrying out its larger ambitions. Some actually perceive US policies towards Iran as representing colonial

aggression against Iran from an Iranian perspective. Counter-Reaction analysis strongly supports the notion of continued neo-colonial influence by the US towards Iran.

Many Iranians have clearly suffered as a result of original US led sanctions strengthened further by the Bush administration. This again, as with initial sanctions during the previous Reaction period, requires acknowledgement concerning the fact the sanctions are an influential cause of Iranian underdevelopment goals, and increasing nationalism against the US. This fact will determine a key part of the Counter-Reaction conclusion regarding whether or not the US is the primary cause of tensions in the overall US-Iran relationship. As during the Reaction period however, Counter-Reaction logic would also assume stricter sanctions coming from the Bush White House after 2001, must have been intended to weaken Iranian living standards. Counter-Reaction analysis assumes this as a safe assumption as well.

Since Counter-Reaction assessment assumes Washington's stronger sanctions are the chief cause of falling living standards for the Iranian people, then US policy makers are confronted with an important ethical obligation. They must admit that US policy in the sanctions context overall, is probably influencing Iran's leadership, at least since post-9/11 and currently, into more confrontational policies with not only the US, but their own region as well. This reality might be difficult for some observers to accept, but is fully within the probability of truth.

What appears to be confrontational policy by Iran is in fact a less aggressive but more assertive defensive tactic, since the Bush administration strengthened economic sanctions on Iran after 9/11, as well as the current Obama administration. Counter-Reaction assumes Iranian pride will increase and lower political risk in Iran for Iranian politicians. In Counter-Reaction analysis, Iran's leaders may not believe they have a choice regarding their current "confrontation" with the US. If they perceived another choice, they would have chosen the path of least resistance with Washington.

In the end, I use varying kinds of evidence regarding causes for Iranian policy. One piece of evidence however, is abundantly clear by the end of Counter-Reaction. In their overall relationship, only the US has had the on-going ability to influence Iranian regimes to take certain policy actions, as Iran's leaders are clearly aware of this and respond accordingly. At the same time, Iran's leaders have always had limited ability to influence US policy overall, including in neighboring Iraq. Counter-Reaction argues in a neo-colonial context, Iran's leaders may well believe going along with US demands on suspending or restricting nuclear weapons building to a certain point, will reduce aggressive US policy overall. Counter-

Reaction fully assumes this to be predictable Iranian behavior in response to aggressive US policy.

At the same time, Counter-Reaction fully recognizes this may also weaken the Iranian political leadership domestically. Therefore, neo-colonialism as a context finds Iranian resistance to US demands will probably only continue, not by choice as much as by political necessity. Survival, at this point, seems the priority for the current regime in Tehran led by President Achmadinejad. Predictability regarding the current regime in Tehran, is assumed to be less and less credible within neo-colonial boundaries, and increased indirect actions by Washington, especially since the previous Bush administration and now the Obama administration as well, have tightened the sanctions regime against Iran.

The evidence presented in the Counter-Reaction context supports the view the US leadership has an ethical obligation to alter its policies if they are pushing Iran's current, desperate regime into more dangerous responses regarding regional and even global security. Washington's policy during Counter-Reaction periods is also problematic when looking at consistency regarding US views of the so-called "Axis-of-Evil". Here I speak of US policy towards each of the three countries US President Bush named in his "Axis of Evil" speech in January 2002: Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Counter-Reaction analysis asserts the world knows President Bush stated none of the three countries in this axis can be allowed to have nuclear weapons, yet North Korea appears to have already built one (**Alterman & Green, 2004**).

The Bush doctrine seemed to mean at least earlier in the Counter-Reaction period, the US would have no choice but to militarily strike any of these three countries, should they produce a nuclear device. Only Iraq and Afghanistan, however, have been directly attacked by the US during the Counter-Reaction period, with Iraq having been found to have no weapons of mass destruction, while North Korea appears to have already built a nuclear device (**Alterman & Green, 2004**). Regarding the Bush doctrine, it would appear North Korea should have been directly attacked by the US military, not Iraq.

Counter-Reaction assessment in this context sees neo-colonialist tendencies regarding US foreign policy as becoming even stronger, since the US clearly chose not to strike North Korea after they appeared to have developed their first nuclear device by October 2003 (**Alterman & Green, 2004**). The Bush doctrine lost its original credibility as a form of direct military attack in the imperial IR tradition, once North Korea produced its first nuclear device (**Alterman & Green, 2004**). Failure to bring about direct US military activity to address this violation of the Bush doctrine, indicates neo-colonial thinking in Washington is increasing in

momentum. As a result, Counter-Reaction thinking also assumes further loss of credibility regarding future US military assertions to use direct force against other nations. I conclude current and long-term US credibility has been seriously weakened by lack of direct military enforcement with North Korea, regarding the Bush doctrine. Further support for my assertion comes from Iran's behavior regarding its nuclear weapons program.

Perhaps what appears to be Iran's stubbornness or refusal to stop nuclear weapons development is in reality something else: Iran's awareness that US President George W. Bush did not order major, direct military strikes against North Korea's nuclear facilities after the Bush administration stated North Korea had realized completion of at least one nuclear weapon. As a result, Counter-Reaction analysis asserts governments globally and observers in general may have trouble believing current or future US accusations regarding Iran's or any nation's secret nuclear ambitions.

Counter-Reaction also assumes but cannot conclusively prove the following concerns as well. Since no evidence was ever found in Iraq following strong accusations by the previous US administration weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were in Iraq, Iranian leaders may believe more strongly the US lost credibility globally when making such accusations overall. Counter-Reaction analysis asserts yet further lost US credibility with many governments over false claims regarding Iraqi WMD by the previous US administration. When combined with US failure to directly enforce the Bush doctrine over North Korea, Counter-Reaction analysis makes assumptions regarding future US behavior, seeing foreign policy making in general regarding future assumptions, based on previous behavior.

For example, Tehran's current and future regimes may think the world community won't believe the US anymore, therefore Tehran would continue supporting terrorism and pushing ahead with its nuclear weapons program, believing that US foreign policy has been discredited and proven false in accusing sovereign states like Iraq of actually pursuing and acquiring WMD.

Therefore, evidence as presented in all Counter-Reaction analysis, is primarily focused on understanding where and why US neo-colonial policies will take both Iranian and US policy making overall, and whether or not influential US domestic interests like the pro-Israel lobby, will ever be interested in influencing US foreign policy in a different direction. Counter-Reaction analysis makes assumptions based on previous and current patterns of policy making behavior by both Tehran and Washington. It must be emphasized, Counter-Reaction analysis makes reasoned assumptions regarding future behavior based on existing policy patterns.

In the end, three periods discussed here, Action, Reaction, and Counter-Reaction, cover most of the post-WWII period to the present time. Quite a lengthy time frame is involved. Such an examination serves another important purpose as well. I analyze whether or not US influence bilaterally with any one country, like Iran, could have been redirected or changed by Washington. If so, the US could have achieved a better overall bilateral relationship with that specific country or countries. In other words, I also examine if this or any US administration since the end of WWII, wanted to change direction policy wise regarding Iran, or for that matter towards any nation, but concluded it could not.

This is important because the stability of any nation's relationship with the US, in this case Iran, is at stake. The evidence leads me to conclude Washington's policies, in this case towards Iran, cannot change direction quickly, or at all. Once certain kinds of specific interests in the US make clear their priorities, US foreign policy follows that path. Former US President George W. Bush and his administration, or any US administration since WWII for that matter, do not appear to have actually succeeded in bringing about needed policy change regarding Iran.

The overall US policy course towards Iran pursued since the end of WWII, was incapable of change once begun. This reality casts a dark shadow over US-Iran relations overall, since what appears to be near direct US hostility towards Iran is now just over three decades old, since the violent anti-US revolution in Iran of 1979. To a large extent, a degree of momentum has built up regarding overall US policy direction since the Shah of Iran was removed from power in 1979. It is also quite realistic to state US hostility towards Iran is now fifty-seven years old, since the US overthrew the popular Mosaddeq regime in 1953.

Non-acceptance by the US of all post-1979 Iranian regimes led to a degree of long-term trends in US policy towards Iran over three decades. This kind of policy momentum has made it very difficult for new US administrations to seriously consider dramatic change in US policy overall, as if a permanent Cold War mentality exists in US relations with many nations (**Chomsky, 1987**), not least with Iran. Unfortunately towards Iran, US policy has appeared noticeably inflexible to more and more observers. There are in this context, perhaps too many powerful domestic interests in the US as referred to a moment ago. These special interests require no or little change take place regarding policy towards Iran. Washington's very entrenched and strong relationship with Israel has reached a point where it may in fact be difficult to change anything regarding overall US policy positions towards Iran.

Simply put, some observers of US foreign policy have referred to this long-term trend as representing a degree of momentum throughout three decades of US foreign policy towards Iran. This means policy directions have existed far too long in US foreign policy to simply be reversed or changed. Washington's foreign policy towards Iran may well have brought about a life of its own over the last thirty years. This is not least because outside many observers are viewing US-Iranian relations only from outside the US, so they cannot appreciate internal dynamics of US foreign policy and their long-term implications.

As I will discuss at the end of this dissertation, US-Iran relations are deeply affected by the overall depth of the US-Israel relationship. The US-Israel relationship in turn, influences many parts of the US relationship with the Middle East overall. The end result is an ongoing pattern of US neo-colonial foreign policies and intentions towards Iran, not able to change course or direction.

US-IRAN RELATIONS: THE ACTION PERIOD 1953 to 1979

The US-Iranian relationship during the action period is primarily defined to a significant extent by US perceptions during the Cold War. This means the Cold War between the US and Soviet Union beginning right after World War II. By the time the action period in US-Iran relations begins in 1953, US-Soviet hostility has reached the point where US foreign policy is clearly hostile to nearly any nation having any degree of relations with the Soviet Union. Mohammad Moseddeq in reality is not pro-Soviet, but for a variety of reasons US policy makers in certain US administrations never comprehend this crucial point. As we will see, this will be the most important policy mistake US policy makers make during the entire history of the post-WWII US-Iran relationship. Such historical assessment is crucial to establishing why the US chose to use neo-colonial methods to achieve its political and economic interests in Iran.

It is important to understand that domestic opposition in Iran to Iranian strongman Mohammad-Reza Shah in the period after WWII formed around three main groups. Establishing who this opposition was will help us understand the larger dynamics in Iran at this time. It will also become obvious the Soviet Union never had strong influence in Iran at this time, or any time since the end of WWII. It was always perceived by the US to be stronger than it was. These dynamics are crucial to understanding the post-WWII relationship between Iran and the US. It is also important to remember both Britain and Russia nearly physically took complete control over Iran, almost completely without resistance, in August 1941. This was because during WWII, with the terrible pressures London and Moscow faced in trying to

survive Hitler's aggression against both their nations, they acted to divide Iran into Soviet and British spheres of influence (**Jenkins, 2001**).

The reason for this action was to guarantee British and US military support to southern Soviet armies fighting Hitler's German invading armies in the Soviet Union. From the viewpoint of Iranian citizens however, this joint British-Soviet takeover of their country was most likely not appreciated. No doubt this contributed to eventual post-war suspicions by Iranians regarding any kind of foreign involvement in their affairs. The fact of the matter is both Britain and Russia had long been interested in obtaining direct and indirect influence over Iran, since the 19th century.

At this point, it is important to define these long-term interests in Iran. In the case of Russia, their interest existed even before the 19th century. However, at the beginning of the 20th century, around 1900, many policy makers in Britain considered Russia's intentions towards Iran to be unstoppable regarding many areas of commercial or business related activities. In other words, around 1900 British policy makers saw Russian policy towards Iran as slow, deliberate, and very conservative, or completely imperial geographically. According to London, if unchecked by Britain or anyone, this would eventually lead to a complete financial and physical Russian takeover of Iran, leaving Britain completely out (**Porter, 1984**).

In all of southern Asia at the turn of the 20th century, over one hundred years ago, Britain only had long-term confidence against Russia when defending itself directly over Tibet and India (**Porter, 1984**). This is an important point often forgotten when assessing Iran in a post-WWII context. Most post-WWII perceptions of British policies in Iran are in the context of the Cold War, when Britain certainly seemed to be very assertive towards the former Soviet Union. This was because London wished to protect and improve British interests in Iran, especially access to oil. Before oil was discovered in Iran in 1907, however, competition over Iran concerned important commercial advantage, but not to the degree that Iranian possession of oil represented after WWII.

A proper historical perspective really needs to be established here regarding the true nature of Russian-British competition regarding Iran. It would seem British fears of an eventual, complete imperial Russian take-over of Iran early in the 20th century were exaggerated and not realistic. This is similar to later US misperceptions regarding Soviet intentions towards Iran after WWII and during the Cold War. The historical record shows Britain, and especially later the US to be deeply misinformed when assessing Iranian reaction to foreign influence. Poor decision making by the US later in the Action period is partly based on the

assumption the Iranian nation is more resentful of directly, imperial foreign aggression as opposed to neo-colonial intentions. This turns out to be a disastrous assumption by the US.

At the turn of the 20th century, British-Russian rivalry over Iran led to the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907. Spheres of influence were created by this treaty for the benefit of both nations in Iran. Iran itself received a neutral sphere under its direct control (**Morgenthau, 1978**). Though this was not popular with Iran itself, it is quite different than complete imperial control over another nation. The basic point here is Russia at no time wished for a complete physical, imperial take-over of Iran, whether a century ago or half a century ago. This is consistent with my application of neo-colonialism as the best tool in which to assess US-Iran relations. Had the US understood Russian and later Soviet intentions towards Iran, it is likely US-Iran relations would be quite different today.

Historically, it is important as well to state the above-mentioned treaty specifically referred to compensations for the parties involved. In this Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907, the compensations were specifically for Britain, Iran, and Russia. This meant each of the three parties “has the right, without having full title to the territory concerned, to operate within its sphere of influence without competition or opposition from another nation” (**Morgenthau, 1978, p. 186**). Had the US understood the larger meaning of the 1907 Treaty as well during the Cold War, in which Russia clearly respects other party interests in Iran, then US paranoia regarding Soviet intentions towards Iran and Mosaddeq in particular, would have been much less intense, with likely more favorable outcomes for neo-colonial US policy in Iran. More specifically, perhaps the crisis in US-Iran relations would not be there today, or at least greatly minimized.

In other words, Russian and then Soviet commercial transactions and influence with Iran may well have been more stabilizing than destabilizing for regional stability, then or now. Obviously, the US did not see it this way, which may have been an error. Perhaps to ease Cold War tensions, the US should have agreed to some kind of limited but purposeful Soviet interest in Iran. This would have allowed Iranians to see and witness their neo-colonial experience under the US supported Shah in a more realistic light, very possibly leading to a much less violent end to the Shah’s rule overall and continuing US influence in Iran to the present.

Moving forward one-half century, what appears to be growing post-WWII British assertiveness against the Soviet Union is in reality, realization by Britain of its even greater dependence on Iran and its oil. Therefore, following WWII, London feels it has no choice but to challenge the Soviets directly over Iran. This means London seeks to defend its commer-

cial interests already in Iran, not however to seek physical confrontation with Moscow over Iran. Most importantly for Britain after WWII is its strongest ally and friend globally, the United States, also the world's most powerful country, claims important interests in Iran as well.

Clearly for Iran, this kind of direct imperial action by outside powers, in this case by the former Soviet Union and Britain, seems to convincingly represent IR theory from the imperialist model. Imperialism in this case was directly experienced first-hand by the people of Iran, who certainly would remember this when experiencing the dominance of neo-colonial US influence in the future. This is important to state because Iran's people never reacted violently against direct Soviet or British rule, though they did not like it. Comparatively, by the time neo-colonial indirect US influenced rule by the Shah was over in 1979, Iranians reacted violently against over a quarter century of neo-colonial influence by the US heavily influencing the Shah. Therefore and importantly for Action period analysis, it must be emphasized Iranians have strong historical memories in which to assess their nation's leadership by easy comparison with recent history.

By the time the Shah replaces Mosaddeq in power during 1953, Iranians are keenly aware and highly sensitive as to which of their leaders are truly representing Iran's best interests. Mosaddeq, during his roughly two years in power, whatever his faults, was highly popular and respected by his nation. Therefore, Action period analysis asserts Iranians would always naturally compare any and all post-Mosaddeq leaders with Mosaddeq himself. This is a key assumption when assessing the full implications of the Action period, 1953-1979. Washington here as well, was completely unaware Iranians would compare all future leaders against their admiration and respect for Mosaddeq.

Continuing historical analysis also identifies the following. Some of the interests later supported by the US in Iran are or were those originally supported by London. This complicates later US decisions after WWII regarding how to apply neo-colonial priorities and dealing with the Soviets in Iran. However, I wish to stress British policy in Iran overall towards Russia first, the Soviet Union later, seems less confrontational than later US policy against the Soviets in Iran. This is a crucial distinction and observation, allowing for understanding why later US inspired but unilaterally enforced neo-colonial methods fail for Washington in Iran.

Again, we can identify failure by later US administrations after WWII to have learned important lessons from Britain's direct experience with Russia in Iran. Earlier around 1900,

the US had no interests in Iran, meaning Britain then acted alone against Russia. British assertiveness, but not direct confrontation against the Soviet Union in Iran after WWII, must be seen to be realistic in this historic context. Stated differently, the British had more historic experience dealing with Russia in Iran than the US. Many, many errors by US policy regarding Iran can be directly connected to this failure to learn from Britain's historical experience with both Iran and Russia in that region.

Continuing now as mentioned earlier with the issue of Iranian group opposition to Iran's immediate post-WWII strongman, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, there was the communist Tudeh party, growing quickly in popularity. This was primarily so with students at universities and employees and working people around the country. Though there were ties to Moscow, the group was not controlled by the Soviets and acted independently. The second group, opposing from the right side of the political spectrum were religious groups and factions that did not agree with growing secular proposals and policies for Iran. This includes as well dislike of foreign influence throughout the country, which had usually been unpopular. Third, in the middle of the left and right anti-Shah factions were a combination of liberal anti-royalist, and nationalist factions united under the leadership of Mohammad Mosaddeq (**Daniel, 2001**). He would eventually lead Iran right before the very beginning of the Action period under discussion here, from 1953-1979.

These three factions in no way can be said to have been permanent friends, but their dislike of the Shah grew from the end of the 1940's to 1951 when, Mosaddeq became Prime Minister. The main issue allowing Mosaddeq to become Prime Minister was the growing controversy surrounding the presence of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and its enormous oil profits. Nearly all these profits went to Britain, not Iran the host country for the oil. The AIOC was originally called the Anglo-Persian Oil Company when Britain's Winston Churchill, in 1914 convinced the British admiralty to switch from coal to oil use on all British warships built from that time. A controlling interest by Britain was purchased in 1914 of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which eventually became the AIOC (**Massie, 1991**). It would seem from this point forward, the importance of the AIOC to Britain, its military and overall economic and global influence, would be difficult to overestimate.

With Mosaddeq as leader of the anti-Shah groups, they wanted to nationalize or take over the AIOC completely, putting it under Iranian control. The opportunity to do so however never arrived until pro-Shah elements proposed a revision of the previous agreement between Iran and the just mentioned oil company in question, the AIOC. This proposed revision was perceived by the opposition to the Shah, as an attempt to give even more control to Britain

and the AIOC directly over Iranian affairs. Mosaddeq opposition to the Shah greatly increased as well as that of most Iranians against the presence of the AIOC. Iranian anger against the AIOC and Britain must also be understood in the larger context of historical foreign interference and domination of Iran by Britain and Russia (**Daniel, 2001**).

Emotions surrounding AIOC issues can be seen in the following tables regarding who received the most profits from AIOC operations. The following information allows one to see why Britain was perceived to be getting far more than Iran through AIOC operations as of 1950. The most important line is the “Total” column in table “(b) Stakeholder Shares of AIOC Profits, 1950”...there one can easily see the dominance of British holdings, which is the source of Iranian anger against Britain. Britain has 53,902 total AIOC shares to 16,032 shares for Iran. Other totals are secondary in importance:

In panel (b) AIOC profits for 1950 are allocated between 3 groups of stakeholders – the Iranian and the British governments and other stockholders. The following basis has been used: *£84,466 is the profit for the year before tax taken from AIOC, Annual Report and Accounts 1950, p.6, and split using the following rules:

1. Splits of profits between Iranian and Non-Iranian activities are allocated pro-rata from Panel (b) estimates, so that an estimated 80% of the profit and other figures are attributed to Iranian activities.
2. Total Iranian royalties as disclosed in the notes to the accounts, Annual Report and Accounts 1950. As these were charged to the accounts as a cost of production (Bamberg, p.325) they need to be added back to the profit available for distribution to the above stakeholders, so the amount of £16,032 is made in the final column to reconcile disclosed accounting profit.
3. Remaining equity dividends attributable to Iran divided 51:49, British Government AIOC Stockholders. Reserve appropriations, retained profit and minority interests are in the same proportions.
4. The effects of discounted pricing to the benefit of the British Admiralty / reduced Iranian royalties are not factored in the following calculations.

(b) Stakeholder shares of AIOC Profits, 1950


	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000
				Estimated	Estimated	
				Iranian	non-Iranian	
	Iranian	British	Other	share of	share of	Total per
	Govern-	Govern-	AIOC	profit	profit	accounts
	ment	ment	stockolders	(80.15%)	(19.85%)	
Royalties	16,032			16,032		16,032
Ordinary dividend		2,464	2,368	4,832	1,208	6,040
Preference dividend			857	857	214	1,071
Reserve						
Appropriations		10,608	10,192	20,800	5,200	26,000
Retained profit		-3	-3	-6	-2	-8
Minorities and subsidiaries		268	258	526	131	657
UK taxation: profits		9,368		9,368	2,342	11,710
UK taxation: dividend income tax		31,197		31,197	7,799	38,996
Total	16,032	53,902	13,671	83,605	16,893	100,498
% Share	19.18%	64.47%	16.35%	100.00%		16,032
<i>Accounting profit</i>						84,466*

Source:

AIOC Annual Report and Accounts, 1950

The next table, Figure 2a, shows the falling share price for AIOC from 1947 to 1951, helping bring about the crisis between the Shah and Mosaddeq. This crisis led to Mosaddeq becoming Iranian Prime Minister in 1951.

Figure 2a



Source: AIOC Annual reports and accounts, 1950

Next, the above table indicates stabilization of the AIOC Share Price Index from its low of March 1951. This stabilization corresponds roughly with Mosaddeq becoming Prime Minister, immediately after the dispute with the Shah regarding ownership rights over the AIOC. The graph indicates Mosaddeq as Prime Minister has a positive overall impact on AIOC's economic impact in Iran.



Source: AIOC Annual reports and accounts, 1950

After seeing these graphs, it would appear Iranian anger regarding British refusal to fairly share AIOC profits was justified. It does seem Britain's policies towards the AIOC led directly to their greatest fear: Mosaddeq becoming Prime Minister, thus increasing anti-British and anti-Western feeling, exactly what London wanted to prevent overall. In the end, the dispute between Iran and Britain over the AIOC must be perceived in the broader context of great power competition in Iran's region historically. Iranians certainly were not surprised Britain or any foreign power would try and manipulate political and economic events there. At the same time, Britain and its government could not or should not have been surprised Iranian opposition to British control or dominance over Iranian economic affairs would create the degree of Iranian anger towards Britain it did.

Britain's government seemed surprised by Iran's degree of opposition to British manipulation and control of AIOC activities. This represents another example of the failure that comes to any imperial regime, in this case Britain, when failing to learn the lessons of imperial history. Trying to directly influence the economic activities of other nations will always lead to strong and violent backlash against the controlling nation. Iran's reaction against British economic control of the AIOC should not be surprising overall. London's policies towards Mosaddeq and Iran after WWII were very similar to neo-colonial policies Washington used when removing Mosaddeq and afterwards. Washington especially seems to have not learned from previous British neo-colonial attempts to manipulate Iranian affairs.

Mosaddeq was able to come to power because of Iranian anger against the Shah and foreign intrigue over the AIOC. Mosaddeq in response, had the opportunity to support legislation outlawing the AIOC, which would effectively take from Britain its largest economic interest outside Britain, giving Iran full ownership over the AIOC's control and production. Mosaddeq's supporters then successfully brought about passage of legislation nationalizing the AIOC, shortly after which Mosaddeq became Prime Minister in April 1951 (**Daniel, 2001**). As Prime Minister, this allowed him to put anti-AIOC legislation into reality, which he did and remained in power as Prime Minister for just over two years, until August 1953.

During this time he managed to greatly anger Britain and the United States regarding the AIOC. Britain was furious at Mosaddeq, and the new US Eisenhower administration of 1953 saw Mosaddeq as a potential close friend and ally of the Soviet Union. Thus, both London and Washington were very upset with Mosaddeq policies, as he was perceived to be very anti-American and anti-British. We may conclude Mosaddeq's successful attempt to nationalize the AIOC in 1951, represented defeat for Britain's style of neo-colonial influence making

from the end of WWII. Throughout the Cold War, only the Truman administration in the US and in particular President Truman himself preceding Eisenhower's presidency, learned lessons appropriate to Britain's failure to credibly assert neo-colonial policies in Iran.

President Truman deserves much praise here, which I am pleased to offer as Mr. Truman refused to give in to anti-Soviet hysteria growing in Washington since 1949 and the fall of China to communism. Truman, until the Eisenhower administration replaced him two years later, believed the US should continue supporting Mosaddeq, believing he would be Washington's best hope for keeping Iran from major Soviet influence (**Kinzer, 2003**). The fact that Truman remains the only US president to have supported an elected nationalist leader in Iran since the end of WWII is in my view, testament to the man's wisdom. I believe Truman's wisdom has been missing by all successive US administrations regarding policies towards Iran.

Except when Truman was in the White House, US policy including a few but not most in Britain, saw Mosaddeq as dangerously friendly to Soviet Russia. The evidence supporting Mosaddeq as friendly to Russia or pro-communist is weak or nonexistent. I have found none. Nevertheless, the Eisenhower administration starting in 1953 and Britain under a second Churchill administration beginning in 1951, are overly influenced by fear of Soviet Russia and Soviet communism. In early 1953, neither nation, especially the US, understood larger dynamics of what was happening inside Iran politically and economically. This was a very unfortunate development regarding future potential for Iran and its region.

Churchill, Britain , and Iran:

British policymakers after WWII, especially Winston Churchill after coming back to power in 1951, should have understood Soviet and Russian behavior towards Iran in a less paranoid fashion. By the end of WWII, British and Russian/Soviet secret services have been competing and fighting each other in and over Iran for nearly a century, since the middle of the 19th century. Churchill of all people had great experience directly and indirectly regarding how the original imperial game was played. The "great game", as commonly referred to when discussing British-Soviet rivalry in the Middle East and southern Asia, from a British perspective, involved mainly indirect forms of British influence to create greater opportunities for British interests. In some ways, Britain's indirect use of influence during the 19th century certainly resembled neo-colonial indirect influence today.

Therefore, I remain surprised and disappointed that a person of Churchill's experience outside Britain would fail to understand the dangers of trying to forcefully remove a man of

Mosaddeq's popularity from power in Iran. In other words, Churchill understood well before the Cold War Russia had certain but limited interests in Iran. He had perhaps more experience in this area than any other British politician. Therefore, it is highly surprising in my consideration Churchill apparently did not realize more specifically priorities regarding Soviet post-WWII intentions and interests in Iran and its region. In other words, Churchill, unlike before the Cold War, once it begins refuses to acknowledge legitimate security and other limited interests for the Soviets and historic Russian interests in Iran and its region. To help appreciate this sobering fact regarding Churchill, it is wise to listen to the record of former Soviet high ranking personnel during the Cold War, in this case the former Soviet secret service during the Cold War, the KGB.

Following collapse of communism in the Soviet Union, important realities regarding Cold War Soviet priorities in Iran and the Middle East were made public by former Soviet intelligence personnel. Most likely, none of what was revealed could have surprised Churchill were he still alive. It is important to mention them very briefly here. Most importantly for Moscow during the Cold War, Middle Eastern policy was primarily dominated by Soviet interest in controlling or manipulating the Kurdish independence movement in Iraq. The reason here, being the Kurdish people's closeness to the oil fields of Mosul, in northern Iraq (**Sudoplatov & Sudoplatov, 1994**).

If Moscow heavily influences the Kurds, this gives them more influence regarding Iraqi politics and the oil there, not events in Iran. At best, only indirectly can Moscow influence events in Iran at this time or any time for that matter. At the height of the Cold War in the 1950's, Moscow's influence in the Middle East is primarily with the Kurds though they don't control the Kurds. The best Moscow can hope for at that time is an independent Kurdistan, weakening British and American interests in the region. In fact, not until overthrow of Iraq's regime in the 1960's, did the Soviets gain larger influence in the region. At that point, Iraq and Syria became the main allies of the Soviets, with the Kurds were once again left to themselves as they had been often. In this context, the Kurds were then and always had been treated cruelly and terribly by both east and west (**Sudoplatov & Sudoplatov, 1994**).

Interestingly as well, even here during the height of the Cold War, the Soviets in reality practice their own version of neo-colonial policy and practice. The policy just described by former high ranking Soviets would not, for example, have very strong impact on Iran and its domestic situation at this time or any time. No doubt Moscow's Kurdish strategy, a form of neo-colonialism only Moscow could use at that time, because they had little or no economic influence in or around Iran then, would be considered threatening from British or US per-

spectives. It certainly was not however, nor ever was the great imperial threat the Soviet Union was perceived to represent against Iran by London and Washington during the Cold War. I must emphasize, it really would be difficult to believe this was not already understood by Churchill at that time.

Furthermore, Churchill as British leader during the 1950's, would have realized Soviet leader Stalin had withdrawn Soviet forces from northern Iran in 1946, shortly after WWII. This was primarily based on bilateral understandings between Tehran and Moscow. The US did offer political support for Iran's right to insist on Soviet removal of its troops from northern Iran in 1946. In no way, however did US President Truman at this time threaten Stalin and Moscow with US nuclear weapons if Soviet troops were not removed (**Bundy, 1988**). There seems to be a general but very important misunderstanding regarding this point that must be cleared up before we move forward.

Some have stated over the years, President Truman threatened using the US nuclear monopoly over Soviet Russia to get Stalin to remove Soviet forces from northern Iran. As McGeorge Bundy, former national security advisor to US President Kennedy has stated, President Truman never, ever made such a nuclear threat against Stalin over the presence of Soviet troops in northern Iran. According to Bundy as well, President Truman never even mentioned any kind of direct or indirect nuclear threat in his memoirs, though Mr. Truman did discuss the Iran situation overall with Stalin (**Bundy, 1988**).

The larger truth regarding Soviet troops in northern Iran in early 1946 includes the following fact as well. The US and Britain in the UN Security Council had heavily criticized Soviet behavior in Iran after WWII, and demanded Soviet withdrawal of their military forces by the beginning of March 1946. At first the Soviets refused US and British demands. After a few months however, with Britain and the US maintaining their official position, the Soviets compromised directly with Iran over key issues facing both nations. Soviet troops were then withdrawn (**Barck, Jr. & Blake, 1974**).

Surely, if Truman had made the threat it would have been recorded in official history in several sources, public and private. Again, in 1951 Churchill would have known of Soviet willingness without a US nuclear threat, to pull its military forces out of northern Iran in 1946. Churchill should easily have understood as well the larger implications for Britain in removing Mosaddeq. I must repeat admiration for US President Truman, who resisted Churchill's strong requests to have the US remove Mosaddeq during Truman's final two years in office. Sadly, post-WWII British and US worries concerning Soviet intentions in Iran

as the 1950's begin, appear based on irrational fears and non-appreciation regarding their previous and long experience using neo-colonial policy throughout the former British empire.

Stated differently, the British and Churchill during the early 1950's, did not appreciate the larger negative repercussions for British interests when even indirect use of neo-colonial policy is used to remove a popular and respected leader like Mosaddeq. This is very important for Action period analysis as well, because Churchill as we will see, strongly supported and influenced US President Eisenhower's decision to actively seek removal of Mosaddeq. In a strange twist of fate and irony, the two men who primarily planned and carried out the highly successful and universally famous D-Day invasion in June of 1944, defeating mighty and powerful Hitler, nine years later manage to destabilize and weaken Iran and its strategic region, directly threatening US and British long-term credibility and interests.

Another possibility is perhaps Churchill wanted Eisenhower to use indirect methods of neo-colonial power, in this case using the CIA, which would not be noticed or disliked as much as direct application of US or British military power on D-Day, June 6, 1944. I have found no direct or indirect evidence Churchill believed or used this analogy with Eisenhower. What is known and supportable is strong and highly confident support from Churchill was clearly intended to help convince Eisenhower that US, British, and western interests would be strengthened through actively removing Mosaddeq as legally elected Prime Minister of Iran (**Kinzer, 2003**).

A separate point is important to mention here as well. Though seemingly unrelated to current analysis, it offers larger perspective regarding Churchill's overall perceptions of oil, energy, Iran and the Middle East during the Cold War. By the early 1950's, British policy makers like Churchill would surely have known of the following historic proposal crucial for British and global interests. Specifically, this proposal was made by Chaim Weizman, scientist and eventual first president of Israel. Seriously proposed by Weizman to Britain during WWII itself, this proposal called for establishment by Britain itself somewhere in West Africa, of a laboratory to establish advanced, alternative products regarding alternative energy. Weizman's view was that Britain was the most logical country to do this. This would have the intended impact of making the world less dependent or even totally independent of oil production in the Middle East (**Weizman, 1949**).

For Weizman, this would make it much easier for nations like Britain to support broader peace initiatives throughout the Middle East. Broader and more ethical peace initiatives, based on the world being free of oil dependency in Iran's region, would be good for Israel, Palestinians and reducing domestic and foreign tensions in Iran over control of the

AIOC. This would surely be in the long-term interests of nations like Britain, the US, Soviet Union and the world, greatly reducing incentives by anyone to use neo-colonial or even imperial methods to achieve secretly inspired policy goals for the nation. This initiative by Weizman, presents yet further evidence policy makers like Churchill should not have had the fear and paranoia they displayed when dealing with Iran, Mosaddeq, and the AIOC in the early 1950's. Losing the AIOC and its oil to Iranian direct control should not have caused panic in London.

Overthrow of Mohammad Mosaddeq 1953: Operation Ajax

To analyze the most important aspect of the Action period and neo-colonial policies, there are three key issues most important to focus on. The first issue concerns how and why the US and Britain chose to overthrow Mosaddeq in 1953? Second, after the Shah comes back to power supported by the CIA, why is his form of rule and oppression not questioned by the US especially, but also not by Britain? Third, why do US administrations after 1953, but especially in the 1970's, continue supporting the Shah knowing he is more and more unpopular inside Iran?

Regarding the first issue, in August 1953 the United States primarily but also Britain, carry out neo-colonial policies and actions against Mosaddeq and Iran, resulting in the removal of Mosaddeq from power. The result is the return of Mohammad Reza Shah, to power in Iran for the second time in his life. The CIA spent a great deal of money to secretly influence certain senior Iranian military officers loyal to the Shah. The CIA also paid Iranian individuals to protest in the streets against Mosaddeq (**Kinzer, 2003**). The lesson here for the Shah however, after the removal of Mosaddeq, was to never again allow significant opposition to his rule. Also, although the British role in removing Mosaddeq was limited compared to larger US neo-colonial plotting, it deserves mention.

Playing a less direct role does not mean loss of importance. It is doubtful the CIA could have overthrown Mosaddeq without Britain's previous long-term influence in Iran, giving the CIA and Washington advice and knowledge regarding Iranian politicians they could trust and manipulate. For example, Britain's secret service was always willing to overthrow Mosaddeq because the AIOC represented Britain's symbol as a global economic power and empire. In other words, Britain's MI6 secret service was more aware of true anti-British feelings in Iran than the CIA was, meaning MI6 would never show reluctance to move against Mosaddeq if the order was given. This kind of loyalty by MI6 might also be referred to as fanatical. This is an important point because even the CIA had certain officers who were

against removing Mosaddeq, but apparently MI6 showed literally no misgivings (**Curtis, 2003**). Therefore, I conclude Mosaddeq was always in danger, should he not cooperate with Britain concerning outstanding issues over AIOC ownership rights in Iran.

The context of what sounds like MI6 and British arrogance, might be understood better by realizing the following. After Mosaddeq formally nationalized AIOC operations in May 1951, in which he authorized the Iranian Majlis(parliament) to approve taking over AIOC operations from Britain, he nevertheless offered to compensate London. In spite of his offer, London demanded a completely new concession, or compensation covering all profits AIOC would have made far into the future (**Kinzer, 2003**).

Iranian academic scholar, Homa Katouzian, stated Britain's response to Mosaddeq's nationalization, essentially required Iran to simply give up the larger realities of the nationalization, or compensate AIOC for its investment costs. If Mosaddeq and the Majlis agreed to this, it would mean compensating AIOC and Britain for all investment costs from the 1951 nationalization, including covering total cost of oil AIOC could produce forty years beyond that date (**Curtis, 2003**). Separately but important, another Iranian academic, Fakhreddin Azimi, believes MI6 and Britain preferred replacing Mosaddeq with Sayyid Zia instead of the Shah, who was Washington's choice. Zia had little or no popular support, just like the Shah eventually. Azimi believed Zia, if actually put in power by Britain and the US, would have generated immediate and powerful domestic dislike and resistance against him (**Curtis, 2003**). The point here is the very limited choice of Iranian politicians thought loyal to both London and Washington, would most likely have evolved like the Shah after 1953: growing unpopularity throughout Iran, leading to eventual violence and violent removal from office.

It would seem apparent then Mosaddeq, after announcing nationalization 1951, faced permanent even near unanimous opposition in London, but not so much in Washington yet. At the very same time, and until the Eisenhower administration in 1953, the CIA does have personnel who do not agree or trust Britain and MI6's motivations regarding Mosaddeq and Iran (**Dorrill, 2000**).

Larger context of Operation Ajax:

For Washington, the Shah was the only Iranian politician trusted to defend British and US interests throughout Iran and the region as well. To appreciate this context, prominent US policy makers like former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who dealt directly with the Shah often, referred to the Shah “a leader whom eight [US] Presidents of both [political] parties proclaimed – rightly- a friend of our country [US] and a pillar of stability in a turbulent and vital region” (**Kissinger, 1979, p. 1258**). Kissinger’s observation reflects the strong relationship eight US presidents directly enjoyed with the Shah in a post-WWII context. This kind of relationship would not be possible if eight successive US administrations did not perceive the Shah within this context. The words of Kissinger help one appreciate complete psychological dependence by the US on the Shah following WWII: “America and its allies shamed themselves by their later behavior towards him, abandoning a friend not only politically...but also humanly, when he was adrift without a refuge...History is written by the victors; in this case they have been cruel” (**Kissinger, 1982, p. 667**).

Kissinger also strongly believes false interpretations have been used when discussing the Shah and his US relationship. For a friendship to last as long as it did, Kissinger indicates more than just personal friendships had to be involved. In his words: “America’s friendship with Iran reflected not individual proclivities but geopolitical realities. Iran’s intrinsic importance, transcended the personalities of both countries’ leaders” (**Kissinger, 1982, p. 667**).

Instead of interpreting Kissinger and the US position on the Shah as being wrong overall, it is more realistic to assume the US was incapable of another view towards the Shah. Therefore, because of Cold War pressures and realities, I accept the US position towards Shah Pahlavi as realistic from a US perspective. I also accept the following view regarding Mosaddeq: Iranian culture conditioned a majority of Iranian citizens to feel strong dislike for the Shah for the same reasons US Cold War culture conditioned a majority of US policymakers to feel the Shah was their main political friend in Iran.

When the Shah is put back in power by Operation Ajax in August 1953, most Iranians deeply resent him as they are keenly aware he is the only “trusted” politician in US and British eyes. The Shah in the minds of Iranians, is a tool or puppet in the hands of the US especially, but also of Britain. It would seem therefore, the answer to the first issue discussed in this section is easily viewed this way: the CIA primarily, but also Britain used money to influence key military and civilian anti-Shah individuals, to move against Mosaddeq (**Dorril, 2000**). Mosaddeq was considered hostile or against US and British AIOC oil company interests. If not removed, growing Soviet influence in Iran or even worse, a pro-Soviet communist

take-over could occur. For the British in reality, the main concern was losing AIOC, their oil company, to extremists, nationalists, and possibly communists in Iran as well.

Now, regarding the second key issue to be addressed for this section, posed earlier: Why was the Shah of Iran considered to be so important to the US especially, and eventually acceptable to Britain as well? According to the evidence, this should not have been the case. Instead, being less paranoid about Mosaddeq or any other Iranian politician except the Shah, would have been perfectly logical because the world at that time already had an oil glut even though Iranian oil production had been shut down (**Fisher, 1979**).

There was simply no need for Britain or the US to fear increased oil prices globally, since there was already a large oil glut on world markets. Action period analysis assumes this oil glut was known to London and Washington during the crisis over Mosaddeq. Action period analysis cannot logically explain or even assume under any conditions, how or why British and US decision-makers would have been unaware of such an overwhelming public reality. Addressing this second key issue then means understanding the following points analyzed as part of the Action period.

Since the Shah was determined to never again allow opposition to his rule after removal of Mosaddeq, the US especially understood this because of Cold War anti-communist hysteria. The US understood this because of the Shah's bitter lesson learned after Mosaddeq legally became Prime Minister in April 1951. Washington and London would naturally prefer the Shah to stay in power permanently after 1953, because of his previous record of at least trying to prevent serious opposition. He was also the only post-WWII politician in Iran with publicly confirmed pro-US attitudes as well (**Dorril, 2000**). From 1941, when the British put him in power, until 1951 when Mosaddeq gained power, the Shah never formally wished to allow or agree to political opposition. For Washington especially during the height of the Cold War, despite knowing his repressive limitations, it seemed the only way to maintain US influence and interests in Iran after Mosaddeq, was complete support for the Shah (**Kinzer, 2003**).

For the Shah and the US then, never again would Mosaddeq-like rule be allowed while the Shah was in power. The Shah, with the CIA's help and support in many areas, became repressive enough to stay in power until 1979, followed by his overthrow. The US never had to directly attack Iran in an imperial, military way to achieve its desired result. It used neo-colonial foreign policy methods, especially the CIA, to achieve the desired result. It should be mentioned as well the CIA, especially in the early decades of the Cold War, held a firm and powerful universal commitment to stopping the spread of Soviet inspired com-

munism anywhere, which the CIA believed influenced or controlled all other forms of communism globally. This specific belief system was primarily motivated by CIA ideological commitment to preventing nuclear war between the US and then Soviet Union, as its most important objective (**Gup, 2000**).

In short order, following the Shah's coming to power for a second time, the following outcomes occurred. Constitutional rule was greatly limited, and in 1957 the Shah created two political parties, a People's Party and a Nation's Party, which were completely loyal to him and made up of his strongest supporters. This effectively ended serious public anti-Shah political debate. He also created the SAVAK secret police organization, which became deeply feared and resented throughout Iran as the Action period progressed. (**Batra, 2007**).

One might think by the late 1950's or early 1960's, after a decade of increasingly harsh dictatorial rule by the Shah, ethical concerns would have been raised in US government circles. Or at least by the early 1960's, concerns about US policy choices in supporting the Shah unconditionally, would and should have appeared in major US media institutions like newspapers and television reporting government policy. Sadly, this was not the case. A very few articles and limited coverage occurred, but nothing approaching coverage directed towards Vietnam, US civil rights, and the Cold War overall (**Zinn, 1980**).

During the early 1960's, the most influential newspaper then and now in the US regarding coverage of US national and international politics, The Washington Post, still had not officially criticized CIA actions in Iran over Operation Ajax. By the early 1960's, the CIA had also removed the popular and legally elected regime of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, only one year after Mosaddeq was removed. In 1960, the CIA was also trying to remove then popular Fidel Castro as leader of Cuba as well (Castro became a dictator by the very early 1960's). The Washington Post as late as 1962, was still defending CIA activities in areas of the Third World as part of the larger anti-communist US policies globally (**Graham, 1997**).

Action period analysis also considers implications during 1960, when US President Eisenhower agreed to CIA plans for removing Castro from power in Cuba, justifying these actions on successful CIA activity to remove just-mentioned legally elected leaders from Guatemala and Iran. Operations in Guatemala during 1954 and Iran the year before, considered to be CIA "successes" from Eisenhower's perspective, are not acceptable for Action period analysis. This is because US use of neo-colonial action in removing unfriendly regimes world-wide, had then and still has the overall ability and influence to change conditions in foreign nations as much as imperial or direct aggression. For Eisenhower and all US

administrations, except for the Carter administration of 1977-1981, “success” appears based on removal of any leader or leaders against US interests (**Reeves, 1993**), whether or not the outcome benefits the population of the nation directly effected; nor whether or not the CIA’s supported politician is or is not in favor of democracy for their nation.

In 1963, during the US Kennedy presidency, we see further evidence of US indifference to events in Iran during the Shah’s increasingly repressive rule. In June of that year 10,000 Muslims, barefoot, were rioting in the streets of Tehran. The source of their anger was arrest of then popular Ayatollah, Rouhallah Khomeini (**Reeves, 1993**). This was sixteen years before the Shah was overthrown by Khomeini in 1979. Had the US paid attention to the Shah’s problems in 1963, the sequence of events in Iran against the Shah some fifteen years later leading to his downfall, might not have occurred. The US would have been able to keep its friend in Tehran, as Henry Kissinger referred to the Shah.

A later example of similar blind support for the Shah occurred during events of September 8, 1978, when anti-Shah demonstrators were killed by military soldiers. Less than a year later, the Shah was forced to leave Iran. The US president at that time, Jimmy Carter, nevertheless immediately announced US continuing support for the Shah as an important ally of the US (**Zinn, 1984**). The Shah was the only dictator the Carter administration chose to continue supporting against the wishes of that nation. In the case of the Shah, US President Carter, a man openly committed to promoting global human rights as part of his foreign policy, found himself continuing the same paranoid responses to threats against the Shah.

Neo-colonial patterns of US influence gathering around the world during the cold war appeared to gain more credibility with successive US presidents. One might think Jimmy Carter, with his strong concern for human rights, might walk away from the Shah, or at least scold him somewhat for specific violations of human rights. Not so. Mr. Carter could and did scold other global dictators and their regimes, though scolding the Shah never seemed to be a serious or even considered option.

Deeper Understanding of forces leading to the overthrow of Mosaddeq:

Once one realizes the Shah after 1953, was yet more determined to never allow such a situation as existed between 1951 and 1953, then the reaction against him in 1979 becomes understandable. The following should also be acknowledged as well. While the Shah turned out to be a repressive dictator, it was also true Mosaddeq behaved irresponsibly at times regarding negotiations over the AIOC (**Fisher, 1979**). Despite achieving great, popular, success as Prime Minister in Iran, Mosaddeq also behaved in a stubborn, counter-productive manner

as well. During the two years Mosaddeq was Prime Minister, he had certain excellent opportunities to compromise with Britain over ownership of the AIOC. He always refused however, any and all compromises with Britain and the US, even though US President Truman supported Mosaddeq as legitimate leader of Iran (**Fisher, 1979**).

Larger issues surrounding CIA activity against Mosaddeq in 1953 are the Cold War between the US and Soviet Union *remaining* at very intensive levels. This is significant because Stalin had just died, but US policy does not pursue change with Moscow or assume a change from the Soviet side. Washington's fear of a Soviet take-over or at least attempted take-over of Iran was immense, but should have reduced after Stalin dies, and the well respected Eisenhower is in office. Perhaps this was the biggest mistake the Eisenhower team made. We should remember as well, the US under President Truman had already reacted strongly to possible Soviet threats against Iran after WWII, though Truman did not use a nuclear threat against the Soviets (**Bundy, 1988**). In response Soviet leader and dictator, Stalin reacted by removing Soviet forces from northern Iran.

I must stress Truman may well have believed Stalin's pullback of Soviet forces from Iran by early March 1946 was permanent. That did nothing, however, to lessen US fear of *long-term* Soviet intentions. Also assumed by Truman, but not Eisenhower, was that future Soviet leaders would not question US defense of Iran, no matter who the US president was. After Eisenhower became president, he was surrounded by extremely hostile anti-communist and anti-Soviet advisors, primarily US Secretary of State John Fuster Dulles and Vice-president Nixon (**Kinzer, 2003**). This effectively guaranteed major changes for the US following the Truman administration. This means further yet greater appreciation of US paranoia regarding Soviet intentions becomes obvious, when assessing Eisenhower after becoming president. This comes in large part from Eisenhower's advisors judging only a short time earlier in late 1949 the Soviets tested their first atomic bomb. Also at this same time, the world's most populous nation, China, fell to communist rule.

After hearing the fearsome message regarding possible Soviet take-over of Iran if Mosaddeq stays in office, Eisenhower decides to support the joint CIA-British action against Mosaddeq. The assumption here was any new Soviet leadership after Stalin would still carry out similar policies regarding global expansion of Soviet communism, including the permanent take-over of Iran. Remember as well, though Truman does not share the same fears of Eisenhower regarding Mosaddeq, both presidents were primarily committed Cold Warriors against the Soviets. Eisenhower's much stronger paranoia regarding Mosaddeq, seeming to

be the opposite of Truman's, is in reality not much different. Truman was as anti-Soviet overall as Eisenhower, with Iran being the only difference between the two.

There was never any question the Soviets had expansionist tendencies in the 1950's. When combined with previously identified realities regarding the first Soviet atom bomb test in late 1949, the communist take-over of China within a month, and the Korean War stalemate of June 1953, the US debate over Iran during the Cold War is comprehensible. Communist China had just pushed US military forces back to the original geographic line in Korea where the war began in 1950. These events certainly would have convinced any US or British leaders, communist expansion everywhere globally was a very serious threat. When one combines this with the fact most US leaders and policymakers did not know China and Russia were bitter historic enemies, preventing their actual cooperation, it is yet easier to comprehend Washington's paranoid phobias regarding post-WWII Soviet expansion.

Mosaddeq never requested any Soviet assistance, which can only mean one thing. Mosaddeq was completely independent of the Soviet Union and/or Soviet influence. He did not even welcome enough Soviet support to protect him from what he believed would certainly be US and British attempts to oust him. His decision to not request any Soviet assistance at any time may also indicate his conclusion he could withstand a US-British move against him. If so, this is another key point concerning proper understanding of Mosaddeq. His confidence was based on the amount of popular support he enjoyed during his two years as Prime Minister. At the time of his removal in August 1953, his popularity had been decreasing since earlier in the year. Yet he still seems to have never considered inviting and asking for Soviet influence directly or indirectly.

It would seem we are forced to conclude Mosaddeq was never under influence or obligation to welcome any kind or degree of Soviet influence. This is a key finding and conclusion, which influences the overall conclusion of this dissertation.

Other US concerns affecting Iran and US during the Cold War:

Rising Arab and non-Arab Moslem nationalist anti-western feelings against US and former British and European colonialism in Iran and the Middle East, were then and are very strong today. From the US perspective, the new Eisenhower administration was becoming equally worried about Arab and non-Arab Moslem nationalism against Western interests. Therefore, Eisenhower's administration decided to start backing non-democratic regimes throughout the Middle East that supported US interests, primarily US oil companies. The result was Arab and non-Arab nationalism growing stronger against both the West and US.

Perhaps this was Eisenhower's and successive US administrations' greatest mistake in Cold War politics. Unlike Truman, who seemed to trust local popular regimes in the region like Mosaddeq's, Eisenhower never gave such regimes a chance.

A good example of Eisenhower meaning well but perhaps mistakenly increasing Soviet and especially nationalistic Arab and non-Arab feelings towards the US, would be the following. After collective enforcement discussions by the US with the Soviet Union in the late 1940's, the US position with Eisenhower starting in the 1950's, was complete exclusion of the Soviets from any mutually agreed to participation in Middle Eastern disputes. Specifically, it is interesting to note during the Suez crisis of 1956, Eisenhower completely rejected a Soviet proposal to work with the US in enforcing a UN demand for removal of forces attacking Egypt in the Suez Crisis. Eisenhower even used the word "unthinkable" to refer to the Soviet proposal (**Claude, Jr., 1962, p. 189**).

It is obvious here Eisenhower believed US interests in Iran and the larger region would also be protected as part of the overall US goal of keeping Moscow out of the region entirely. This is possibly one of the most powerful examples regarding irrational US paranoia of Moscow during the Cold War. The US position in this case was only a Soviet presence in the Middle East threatened US interests in the region, thus including Iran. Therefore, for Eisenhower and this team the solution is simple: keep the Soviets out and problems for the US are then manageable. There is apparently complete unawareness by Eisenhower's entire team the just-mentioned nationalistic feelings by Arabs/non-Arabs throughout the Middle East, are rapidly increasing and demanding a larger Soviet voice to help them against former western colonial oppressors.

This growing frustration is primarily an Arab/non-Arab, Middle Eastern response to US policies in the overall region. In other words, populations of Middle Eastern Arab and non-Arab regions, including Iran, are primarily blaming the US for much of the troubles region-wide. Therefore, welcoming a Soviet presence to counter US influence was perceived as positive by Middle Eastern peoples. By refusing the Soviet proposal, Eisenhower made Middle Eastern suspicions even stronger regarding US intentions. Equally interesting during the Cold War, the United Nations itself had decided, with full US support, to keep out "continents of all the great powers from the emergency forces sent to the Middle East in 1956 and the Congo in 1960" (**Claude, Jr., 1962, p. 189**). In this case, we may conclude the US was not interested in having any participation by the Soviets in the two crisis mentioned here, Suez and Congo 1960 (**Claude, Jr., 1962**), or for that matter any crisis. The US was even

willing to keep Britain, France, and China, the three other UN Security Council members, out of Suez and Congo, to prevent direct Soviet participation here.

Exclusion of the Soviets in Suez 1956, and Congo 1960, again heavily favored by the Eisenhower team, seems to further indicate US intolerance to Soviet participation through any institution (in this case the UN), or through individual Soviet or other international proposals. In short, the evidence seems persuasive, even conclusive, Cold War policies by the US Eisenhower administration see success in the region of Iran and the Middle East as keeping the Soviets out. All other concerns seem insignificant by comparison. The degree to which anti-US and anti-western feelings in Iran had risen, may also be seen in the following fact. During the Shah's reign in Iran, foreign owned firms completely outperformed domestic and minority owned firms. Presumably, this must include the AIOC and foreign firms doing business with AIOC in Iran. Despite this, Iranian dislike of foreign influence overall in Iran did not change (**Bergsten, Horst, Moran, 1978**).

Backlash against Eisenhower/US policies:

Most of this dissertation concerns the Action period being currently described, and with good reason. To appreciate Iran's behavior today and since 1979, especially its dislike of US policies since the 1979 revolution, it is vital to appreciate the specifics of US policy choices made when and after the Shah was put back in power in 1953. This further analysis of Eisenhower and his policies does exactly this. Terrorism, included much of what is happening today, cannot be understood unless Eisenhower's policies receive a full analysis.

A broader view of Eisenhower's team, in this case his administration's support of US oil company policies, always seemed to witness his administration's strong support for untrusted and unpopular post-WWII regimes and dictators in the Middle East (**Chomsky, 2002**). By doing this, Eisenhower and his team were now actively working against the wishes of the vast majority of citizens there. The US thus saw both the Soviet Union and Arab/non-Arab Moslem nationalism as serious threats to US interests. Unfortunately however, by unknowingly working against the wishes of the vast majority of Middle Eastern peoples, including Iran, the US was inviting a serious backlash against its interests. This eventually happened in 1979, as events then would completely work against US interests.

To truly appreciate the backlash, or the revolution against US policy in Iran coming in 1979, consider that one of the American hostages taken captive in November that year by enraged Iranian students later stated the following. He and all US diplomats had no idea at the time should the Shah be allowed to travel to the US for cancer treatment in 1979 (after

leaving Iran in January of that year), this would repeat events of 1953. In 1953, the Shah was put back in power by the US after fleeing Iran for his life because he was unpopular. For Iranians, the situation in 1979 was unacceptable, so they took over the US embassy to prevent the US from doing what it did in 1953: using it to secretly coordinate through the CIA the Shah's return to Iran if this is what the US wished.

The key point here by former US hostage Charles Scott, is the US embassy, by being closed down permanently in late 1979, would prevent the CIA from having resources in Iran to carry out in continuing US neo-colonial ways, a repeat of events in 1953 and the removal of Mosaddeq (**Houghton, 2001**). As evidence mounts throughout this dissertation, it becomes difficult to underestimate the tragic importance to Iranians of what 1953 meant to them then *and now*.

We therefore come to see how the US war against global communism in the 1950's, 60's and 70's during the Action period, can resemble the US war on terrorism today. In both periods, the US supports any regime that supports US policies, whether or not such policies are popular with nations living under US supported and financed dictators. It is important to draw this analogy at this time between US anti-communist policies during the Cold War and US anti-terrorist policies today.

Implications for and from the Action period:

Thus far, I conclude if Washington conducted its cold war policies differently, terrorism today would be less extreme in many areas. Of course we can never know for sure, but such considerations should figure prominently here. If most Iranians believe the way Mosaddeq was overthrown led to religious extremism, what are the full implications for future Iran-US relations? This relates directly to the third key issue mentioned at the beginning of the Action period: Why do US administrations after 1953, but especially in the 1970's, continue supporting the Shah, knowing he is more unpopular and vulnerable inside Iran? This is a very powerful issue and question.

Action period analysis addresses this first by saying the Shah was well-intentioned at least in terms of wanting to turn Iran into a modern state such as Germany or Japan. Many observers, writers, historians, etc. have not given the Shah his due credit here. His forceful attempts to push Iran in this direction, however, met more and more resistance inside Iran as well as increased his dependence on US support. Closeness of the US to the Shah proved to be fatal, and can also be understood by realizing all communication with him from 1953 until 1979 would be through the CIA's chief of station in Tehran, not the American ambassador.

The CIA's presence in Iran became truly immense, with some observers stating overthrow of Mosaddeq was the CIA's greatest achievement throughout the Cold War (**Weiner, 2007**). These observers did not mention removal of Mosaddeq as perhaps the most effective example of neo-colonial US influencing of a foreign nation until that time as well. Action period analysis also does not make that claim, however if that claim was ever made (I can find no evidence of this), it would be difficult to disagree with in a comparative context at that time.

Progressing forward through the Shah's time in power to the 1960's, we observe his awareness concerning the new Kennedy administration of the US in 1961, wishing to see more progressive and reform oriented political leaders by the Shah. Because of the amount of support coming from Washington and the Shah's growing dependence on this, he did react in a limited way on the reform side at this time. He forced the head of SAVAK, the feared secret police, into exile and pushed through land reforms in 1962 (**Daniel, 2001**). Overall however, these reforms did not meet the expectations of most Iranians. By mid-1960's to revolution in 1979, and end of the Action period, politics in Iran is totally dominated by the Shah.

Therefore, evidence thus far supports the following. Except for the Kennedy administration, the Shah, under no conditions, can undertake serious reform of any kind if he wishes to continue receiving US aid and support. Justifying continued neo-colonial policy, the US finds it convenient to continue increasing support for the Shah, requiring nothing in return. Washington wants no serious reform making in return for its aid, knowing the Shah will always commit his energy and focus to promoting US interests in Iran and the region. This is how the Shah guarantees his survival by promoting US priorities, of which serious reform is not. We must still however, carefully look at the rest of the Action period to assess whether current evidence is still credible regarding US refusal to support any other "leader" for Iran.

Continuing, we see from 1965 to 1977 there was only one prime minister in Iran, completely loyal and dominated by the Shah. The Shah created one mass political party intended to absorb smaller independent parties under its influence, allowing him to completely rule Iran uncontested anywhere. It is also interesting to note in 1964, the Shah controversially allowed US military personnel in his nation to have diplomatic immunity from prosecution in Iran for any crimes committed. Action period analysis concludes strongly here, such action was clearly intended to fully protect all human US assets in Iran from facing legal action. At the same time, the increasingly harsh nature of his repressive regime, prevented outward protest by Iranians against favored treatment of US military personnel on Iranian soil.

Clearly however, the Shah was creating further protection for all US assets in Iran, the primary source of his support, allowing him to ignore growing internal demands for major

reform in many areas. In 1964, one of Iran's major religious leaders, Rouhollah Khomeini, was the only major figure to speak openly against the Shah being under heavy influence by the US. This clearly indicates the degree of repression his regime had already created. Most Iranians were against giving American personnel such immunity, but were afraid to speak openly. Perhaps not surprisingly, Rouhollah Khomeini eventually led the revolution against the Shah in 1978-79 (**Daniel, 2001**).

The behavior of the Shah after 1953 until his removal in 1979 at the end of the Action period, indicates consistently growing paranoia. The fear he displayed concerning his attempt to maintain total power in Iran, while promoting his unrealistic version of Iran's future at the same time, contributed heavily to his growing unpopularity. There can be no doubt he was very heavily influenced by steadily increasing US support, with that influence growing as he purchased more and more weapons from the US, especially in the 1970's, thus feeding his growing sense of dependence on the US. This also made US administrations more loyal and committed to his survival as well. From an Action period analysis standpoint, continuing and growing direct US support for the Shah, creating growing US commitment to the Shah's survival as well, combine to make it more and more difficult for both Tehran and Washington to understand greatly growing tension and resistance throughout Iran to the Pahlavi regime.

Being heavily influenced by the US must be defined more carefully at this point. Influence by the US with the Shah simply means a very powerful kind of developing momentum between successive US administrations and the regime in Tehran. Based on the evidence, it means the Shah deliberately purchases more and more military equipment throughout the Action period, while always aware the US expects closer and closer political support and military protection for all US interests inside *and* outside of Iran regionally. For US foreign policy towards Iran during the Action period, this degree of increasing dependency by the Shah and Washington on each other, is one of the powerful side effects of neo-colonial influence, Washington style. By this I mean Action period analysis discovers Washington's overall influence with foreign regimes during the Cold War, in this case Iran, takes neo-colonialism to new and greater levels regarding US ability to influence events and outcomes advantageously.

Neo-colonial policy US style offers the following observation as part of a larger Action period analysis. Neo-colonialism Washington's way creates patterns of mutually reinforcing support for both Washington and its increasing desire to keep the Shah in power. This pattern repeats itself with other US neo-colonial initiatives during the Cold War, including

US support for unpopular dictatorships in the Philippines, Guatemala, South Africa, and Panama.

To emphasize this neo-colonial pattern further with Iran as the example, from 1972-76, the Shah purchased over \$10 billion dollars worth of the most sophisticated US weaponry available, made possible by huge increases in oil profits after 1973. These came from the huge OPEC Arab oil price increases of 1973, of which Iran was a very influential member (**Daniel, 2001**). Stated differently, the US economy especially was benefitting from very high oil prices, receiving huge amounts of Iran's vast oil profits through direct Iranian purchase of major US weapons systems after 1973. Action period analysis concludes quite realistically, it would be nearly impossible for any US administration to move against the Shah's repressive policies inside Iran when his regime is so clearly and forcefully defending US interests there, *and* greatly helping the US economy as well.

Therefore, Action period analysis in addressing the third all-important issue overall, which was why the US supported the Shah with growing momentum during the Action period, seems well supported by evidence. Taking all evidence presented, it appears first the Shah then the US as the Action period moves forward, unknowingly but eventually accepted fears of losing each other, especially during the 1970's. At the same time, Action period analysis cannot conclude the Shah nor any US administration could, would, or should have seriously risked jeopardizing such close arrangements.

The Shah's Economic Record:

At this point in assessing the Action period, it would be beneficial for the dissertation to present some of the successes in the Shah's overall economic record as compared to post-Shah regimes from 1979 to the present. In other words, during the Cold War, US administrations from Eisenhower to Ford, through much of the Shah's rule, were impressed overall with some of the Shah's economic policies. This was because from the US perspective, this would be perceived as helping prevent the spread of communism in Iran itself. Therefore, during much of the height of the Cold War, the US could take some perceived comfort regarding its relationship with the Shah. No matter how the Shah's image suffered internally and globally from a repressive human rights record, his economic policies had some benefit for the nation at different times.

For example, the so-called "White Revolution" of 1963, appears to have been somewhat successful, while his overall economic record was mixed during his first ten years until 1963. Mixed however was still better than much of what post-79, regimes accomplished. In

the Shah's case, the "White Revolution" appeared successful enough that even some of his critics were impressed. For example the Muslim clergy, which strongly condemned the Shah's 1963 program when it was first announced, even comparing it to the work of the devil, eventually came to accept it as a positive program. Furthermore, great oil profit increases of the 1970's, lead to incredible growth rates of 35% in 1974, and 42% in 1975. Most groups in Iranian society came to believe the White Revolution was the long-awaited economic answer to unlocking Iran's tremendous economic potential overall (**Lacquer, 1979**). Quite simply, by the early 1970's, the Shah was at the very height of his powers, and his political opponents and opposition seemed permanently weakened and disorganized. Action period analysis believes Iran overall was perceived by many, especially outside Iran, to be achieving great progress. However, this economic achievement did come to an end, hurting the Shah and his overall support.

The source of the collapse of the White Revolution began with major corruption concerning handling of oil revenues, with much of the corruption within the Shah's regime itself. By late 1975, the overall economic boom started to lose its positive purpose and overall control and influence. Then in 1976, it became clear Iran was overspending its oil profits far too much. Some of the most important goals of his regime regarding giant oil profits, which emphasized having a huge welfare system, in the end were too large to afford. In October of 1976, the Shah stated such programs could not be afforded. He also said, "We have not demanded self-sacrifice from people; rather we have covered them in cotton wool. Things will now change. Everyone should work harder, and be prepared for sacrifices" (**Lacquer, p. 3, 1979**).

The White Revolution overall was a success for the Shah's basic economic development goals. From 1963 to 1974, there was continued success for this program, which found support among most elements of Iranian society. Action period analysis also concludes analysis of the Shah's legacy overall should increase with further consideration of the White Revolution's intentions and effects. In other words, Action period analysis in assessing the Shah overall, finds this economic period to have enough support for its overall legacy to be ignored. I believe too many analysts were worried about the Shah's record in other areas to emphasize the White Revolution's positives and potential. This needs to be corrected and readdressed as part of larger Iran-US relations since WWII.

Further evidence below also seems to support better economic performance overall during the Shah's era, beyond the White Revolution itself. The following graphs and tables indicate improving overall economic performance during the Shah's era compared to post-

Shah regimes from Khomeini to the present with Ahmadinejad. In fact the comparative realities are in favor of the Shah. In the table shown below, one can easily see Iran's GDP per capita (income per year) was one of the highest of OECD countries in 1975, one of the peak years of the White Revolution. The Shah's GDP percentage of 13.2% that year was clearly one of the highest overall. It should be stressed from this table that only South America, South Korea, and Turkey had higher GDP per capita ratios than Iran.


This Action period assessment does not conclude such economic performance is well balanced across all sectors, because it is most certainly is not, otherwise the Shah would have required less severe methods of repression. This is, however, comparatively better economic performance for the Shah overall and his White Revolution, then post-'79 regimes experience. Though the White Revolution peaked in 1975, the OECD percentages presented show the Shah's economic performance overall, supported by influential and widely quoted financial global institutions. In fact, direct comparison with OECD estimates of post-'79 GDP per capita estimates, indicate the Shah's economic performance looks better with the passage of time.

GDP per capita (FX) of selected countries as a % of GDP per capita (FX) of the OECD countries					
	1965	1975	1985	1995	2007
OECD area	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Iran	9	13.2	7.7	5.9	7.2
Egypt	5	4.1	5.7	5.4	6.1
Turkey	--	16.6	14.8	15	17
Middle East and North Africa	7.5	8.4	7.3	5.8	6.3
Brazil	14.3	19.2	17.41	15.2	14.2
Argentina	53.9	47.1	32.1	30.3	31.4
Mexico	28.5	27.6	26.3	20.6	22
Latin America and Caribbean	21.3	21.1	17.7	15.5	15.4
China	0.9	1	1.5	2.8	6.1
India	1.8	1.5	1.4	1.6	2.3
South Korea	11.9	16.5	22.9	38.6	48.9
East Asia and Pacific	1.3	1.4	1.9	3.1	5.5
Russia	--	--	--	6.8	9.6

Source: World Bank - World Development Indicators. Regions only include those countries considered "developing" by the World Bank – that is, below a particular income level.

Next, in Figure 5, we see Real Per Capita GDP growth and inflation in Iran are much more stable under the Shah then after.

Figure 5. Real Per Capita GDP Growth and Inflation in Iran



Sources: Central Bank of Iran Website; Khavarinejad, *The Estimation of Gross Domestic Product of Iran*; Bharier, *Economic development in Iran*.

This is a consistent graph record, supporting my belief the Shah’s economic record was stronger for Iran and many Iranians then post-Shah regimes. While certainly far from perfect or even of realizing well balanced economic improvement for Iran across all sectors, full implications of graphs and tables just used support Action period conclusions concerning the Shah being underestimated in economic terms by observers overall.

Why the Shah fell:

By the early 1960’s, the Shah is in near-complete political, economic, and military control of Iran, as evidenced by the Iranian population not showing outward signs of revolution or even street protests. The main reason for this appearance of success is the Shah’s powerful use of ruthless tactics creating fear in the minds of potential protestors throughout Iran. The Shah was able to achieve this degree of fear by creating and using his secret police

force, the SAVAK, as already mentioned. After 1953, though the Shah might have been partly unaware, the SAVAK created much fear and terror until the anti-Shah, violent anti-American revolution of 1979, appeared in retrospect to be a natural response. Interestingly enough, the SAVAK was created with the help and advice of CIA and at the end, unfortunately for the US, resulted in turning SAVAK into the main cause of anti-US sentiments within Iran.

Therefore, a first key reason regarding why the Shah fall, concerned the methods of SAVAK in torturing and overall repression, which without question were strongly disliked by the vast majority of Iranians. These tactics were also used against critics of the Shah inside and outside Iran, and all who supported greater human rights for Iran. Action period analysis concludes this image of the Shah creating and using ruthless secret police for decades, clearly haunted Iran's ruler for the rest of his unpopular regime. In the end, the Action period came to a violent end for the Shah because of specific, observable policies followed by his regime after Mosaddeq's removal in 1953, continuing until 1979, and the violent revolution directed against the Shah's unpopular regime.

A second important and highly visible reason leading to destruction of the Shah's image overall, is by the 1960's he is convinced he has complete control of the country, thus choosing to greatly advance image building of his country abroad by hosting incredibly large and ostentatious ceremonies in 1967 and 1971. Each of these extremely costly and overly ostentatious and dramatic events, centered upon the greatness of his monarchy and Iran's glorious Persian past. These two coronation ceremonies were so lavish and expensive, held in the midst of great poverty, Iranians come to hate the Shah with great passion. These two coronations are paid for with huge sums from the government treasury while Iranian poverty for many continues to grow. After this, the Shah is perceived as even more insensitive to the needs of average people on a daily basis. Needless to say, the Shia clergy in Iran capitalized on this by constantly reiterating these realities and therefore increasing anti-Shah awareness. However, it must be stated that the clergy were primarily frustrated and feared the Shah because of his glorification of pre-Islamic Iran, which included changing the national calendar from being Islamic to pre-Islamic, starting 2500 years ago when Cyrus the Great ascended to the throne and established the first world empire. The Shah fueled the Mullah's anger further when he changed his name from "Mohammed" to the ancient pre-Islamic Persian name "Aryamehr". He also made sure to include Zoroastrian (ancient religion of Iran) elements and proverbs in the national anthem of Iran. Therefore, one can conclude the Mullahs in Iran hat-

ed the Shah mainly because of his clear anti-Islamic tendencies, which really started to surface in the 1970's.

A third key reason for the Shah's fall is by the 1970's, the Shah becomes extremely close to the US as he fully supports the Nixon doctrine, which states the US after leaving Vietnam will depend on close allies like the Shah, to defend regional and global interests for Washington (**Daniel, 2001**). The Shah was pleased to work closely with all US administrations, and be a key or even most important US ally in the region. For most Iranians, this ever closer symbol between the US and their nation was the key source of growing resentment towards the Shah, especially throughout the 1970's.

Supporting this argument is that by 1976, the Shah had approximately "...3,000 tanks, 890 attack helicopters, over 200 advanced fighter aircraft, the largest fleet of hovercraft in any country, 9,000 anti-tank missiles, and much more equipment either on hand or on order" (**Daniel, 2001**). Clearly, the Shah was spending vast amounts of oil revenues and government money overall, turning Iran into a regional and global military power after 1973. Unfortunately, this increases the Shah's unpopularity, making him yet more dependent on US aid and weapons sales overall.

A fourth key reason is the Shah and his feared secret police are harassing the most popular religious figure in Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, throughout the 1970s especially. This gives Khomeini more support among Iranians themselves outside the Iranian power structure. Eventually, the Shah agrees to the idea of supporting the move of Khomeini from exile in neighboring Iraq to Paris, thinking the greater distance will protect the Shah from Khomeini's powerful anti-Shah rhetoric. Instead the opposite occurs. The world media has a much easier time transmitting and covering Khomeini from Paris, where communication technology is much better than Baghdad's. For the Shah, this is one of his greatest miscalculations, allowing his greatest religious critic and opponent to dramatically increase anti-Shah feelings in Iran.

Fifth, during the 1970's, especially the latter half, with a falling worldwide economy and more repression overall, religious extremism growing, it is easy to understand why attempts were made against the life of the Shah, increasing his isolation. Other Iranian politicians close to the Shah were actually murdered. As the 1970's wear on, there were increases in terrorist activities, a violent strike at the University of Tehran, retaliation by SAVAK, then retaliation by students and anti-Shah personnel (**Fisher, 1979**). The violence reaches what appears to be never-ending retaliation.

Sixth, by the time the Carter administration comes to power in the US in January 1977, the Shah's overall relationship with the US was closer than ever. Iran's dependence on US aid, trade, and support was nearly matched by US dependence on the Shah for security in the Gulf concerning US, European, and other oil supplies. The degree of mutual dependence between the US and Iran is difficult to exaggerate by the time of the Carter administration.

Finally, in late 1977, President Carter visited Iran and gave a televised, public tribute and official toast to the Shah. Seen and heard by many throughout Iran, Carter referred to the Shah and his nation as an "island of stability..."; the Shah as representing "enlightened leadership", which was "a tribute to the respect, admiration, and love" Iranian citizens had for the Shah (**Daniel, 2001, p. 166**). This proved too much for the Iranian people to swallow. Little more than a week after Carter's televised praising of the dictator Iran, thousands of demonstrators rioted in Qom. From then to the end of the Action period, in 1979, when the Shah left, he faced consistently larger and ever-growing violent demonstrations against his rule. They only grew in size during the last years of his time in power, when finally, the ruler of Iran had no choice but to leave his nation in January 1979.

CONCLUSION: The Action Period:

When the Shah was finally overthrown in January 1979, the US was able to do little to help him. His overall lack of sensitivity towards his own people, represent much of the reasoning and conclusion as to why he was eventually overthrown. To appreciate how unpopular the Shah was by end of the Action period, we must analyze in greater detail why Iranian students decided to attack the US Embassy and take US diplomats hostage in November 1979, some ten months after the Shah had already left his country. The assault by Iranian students on the US Embassy compound is a near- unprecedented event in modern international diplomatic history. It became known as the Iranian hostage crisis.

This dramatic and traumatic event, November 4, 1979, took place only a few weeks after then US President Carter announced he would allow the Shah to enter the US for medical treatment. Carter made his announcement on October 22, 1979. This was some two weeks before Iranian students actually took over the embassy. For Iranian students and citizens overall, Carter's announcement reminded them of August 1953, when the US embassy was able to get directly involved in the coup against Mosaddeq. This direct involvement by the CIA in 1953, acting through the US Embassy, in the eyes of anti-Shah Iranians allowed Washington and the CIA to finally remove Mosaddeq, because original coup momentum against Mosaddeq had already ended. In other words this late US embassy involvement

against Mosaddeq was, in the minds of many Iranians, the decisive moment in Mosaddeq's fall.

Literally all Iranians young and old were aware of this in 1979, even though much of Iran's young population were born after 1953. Such was the trauma for most Iranians after what happened to Mosaddeq over a quarter century earlier. After US President Carter's announcement allowing the Shah into the US for cancer treatment, the Iranian revolution turned increasingly violent, as the motivating force for such violence was hatred and distrust of US intentions after the Shah left ten months earlier in January, 1979. Iran's students were determined to prevent the US embassy and its professional personnel from playing a major or even minor role in protecting the Shah, or allowing pro-Shah political elements to come back to power (**Houghton, 2001**).

The Iranian students, in occupying the US embassy in November 1979, may have prevented repetition of similar events leading to the CIA coup d'état of 1953. We can never be certain, but we can know with complete certainty student actions against the embassy were supported by many in Iran, thus offering forceful recognition of Iranian certainty the US embassy was the key symbol for why, how, and how long the Shah was able to stay in power against majority Iranian opinion. This example, more than any other concerning Iranian conviction the US embassy was key to carrying out US neo-colonial activities during the Shah's rule, portrays the sense of suspicion regarding US intentions throughout Iran. Iranians fully believed Washington would try again, as in mid-August 1953, to bring back the Shah yet again. The Action period analysis supports this categorically: Iranians of all age groups in 1979 were keenly aware and had absolutely no doubts as to what actually occurred in 1953.

Action period analysis also concludes the Carter administration at no time seemed to conclude these strong memories by Iranians would lead to violence, as they were caught completely by surprise when the US embassy was taken. Another event as well, angering Iranians and greatly increasing fears of another US repeat of 1953, concerned the then secret meeting of November 1, 1979 in Algiers, Algeria between President Carter's national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, with the first post-Shah, more moderate Prime Minister, Mehdi Bazargan and his foreign minister, Ibrahim Yazdi (**Brzezinski, 1985**). Public disclosure of the secret meeting in Algiers further increased an already chaotic and violent situation throughout Iran.

Between these two events however, it was clearly admission of the Shah to the US for medical treatment that angered Iranians the most. This allowed the Iranian revolution to take on new momentum after November 4, 1979. Therefore, removal of the Shah in January that

year did not bring about the end of anti-US feeling, only a temporary waiting period. Most Iranians were anticipating a response from the US, which happened when Carter allowed him into the US for medical treatment. At this point the anti-Shah revolution takes on a completely anti-American character, and brings about the end of the Action period.

We can conclude the Action period in Iran-US relations was one in which the Shah's rule became more and more repressive, justified by the Shah in the name of progress and development for his country. He really believed he could remake and rebuild Iran into a modern state, with a flourishing economy, competitive industry, and a secular society. How seriously he justified this to allow him to repress his own people we may never know. I conclude he was moving the country in this direction at the time he was overthrown. The need to repress his people in a post-Mosaddeq environment was directly related to his growing efforts to make the country into his own image. Put differently, the Shah concluded his own security was directly related to showing his people greater and greater efforts to "modernize" Iran. He seemed to think his people would unquestioningly accept his ideas for a "greater Iran", as partly an ancient Persian concept reflecting Persia's earlier glory. In reality, the opposite occurred. The problem was he always had the stamp of US approval upon him as he was re-installed with CIA money and help. It must be understood that no matter how much of an effective leader he was, he couldn't change this fact, which always remained a cause of suspicion towards him by his people.

In the end, removal of Mosaddeq and re-installment of the Shah is based on US and British priorities of that time. Important for the conclusion is US preoccupation, even paranoia concerning Soviet communist control of Iran, which was not shared in a specific way by Britain. The nature of Britain's opposition to the US is highly significant for my Action period conclusion. Though stated earlier, it helps us appreciate the truly US centered and enforced results of 1953 and throughout the Action period. In other words, the Shah after 1953 and the Action period are completely US driven and oriented, with outcomes most likely very different had more British directed events occurred in 1953 until 1979.

We must remember, Britain was mainly concerned about its AIOC interests in Iran, not Soviet influence. From Mosaddeq's becoming Prime Minister in 1951, high level British officials did not share US fears of growing Soviet influence in Iran for uniquely important reasons impacting our interpretation of the US war on terror today. It also impacts our view why Iran continues to support global terrorism. Specifically, Peter Ramsbotham, then secretary of the British Cabinet's special Persia Committee in the early 1950's, and clearly an in-

fluent British government member, stated the following about that time: “Mosaddeq was a Moslem, and in 1951 he would not have turned to the Russians” (Yergin, 1991, p. 457).

This important quote though not definitive regarding British feeling overall, is influential. It does require one to truly wonder how different Iran and its regimes might be today if Mr. Ramsbotham’s advice and assumptions were more widely understood then. While anti-Soviet fears regarding Iran by certain members of the British cabinet, and Eisenhower administration in particular, were credible and rational based on then global realities, we are nevertheless forced to consider why Eisenhower’s team especially, seemed unaware of historic and long-term Soviet and Muslim animosity.

What if Eisenhower and his advisors had simply been aware of this and of an incredibly simple and well-known fact: Mosaddeq and many other Muslims in Iran and throughout the Muslim world, were highly committed to their faith and would never allow, tolerate, or even consider direct or even indirect Soviet influence to grow and/or threaten Iran’s independent status. Is it too much to ask or wonder why the President of the United States, the most powerful official in the world then and now, never knew this basic fact of life regarding Mosaddeq and adherence to Islam in general?

The US it is hoped, learned an important lesson since the violent end of the Action Period. Unconditionally supporting hated dictators leads to great distaste for the US government and its policies. This in turn leads to increasing terrorism, of which Iran after 1979 is perhaps the best example. The US and the world might not be facing a global war on terror against nations like Iran that support terror, or against active, well organized and well funded groups like Al-Qaeda. The outcome in 1979 was very tragic for everyone involved, with Washington losing its influence in Iran and being an ally in any way, and Iran becoming a regional and global supporter of terrorism. This was the worst possible outcome for the US, Iran, and the world.

At the same time, post-1979 lessons for the US have been learned with the Philippines in 1986. Having had unpopular right-wing dictatorships supported by the US for many years, these two nations witnessed more peaceful revolutions not nearly as violent as the anti-US Iranian revolution. The most likely reason for success in the Philippines and South Korea was the US not intervening, unlike in Iran, in these two post-Shah revolutions. This created less long-term anger as well against the US by respective populations in the Philippines and South Korea nations. Perhaps these two examples are truly indicative of the US learning the most important lessons from the Action period in US-Iran relations. The US should never again support unconditionally, unpopular and hated dictators. Instead, Washington should support

pro-democratic regimes and forces in all nations. The US should never again support one individual at the expense of many. This obvious lesson is as simple and all-powerful as the golden rule itself.

I wish to close this section by assessing a crucial policy point, though it is not part of the larger scope of this investigation. There was clearly a major intelligence failure by the US during the Carter administration regarding how fragile the Shah's leadership was, including discussion as to why this weakness with US perceptions happened. However, I conclude the debate over US intelligence failures with the Iranian revolution, as conducted, was misguided and missed the central point. The larger question should have been why the US did not listen to Israel.

As very close allies politically, and the closest ally the US has in the entire Middle East, this question has not yet been answered. I do not have a definitive answer either. Nevertheless, it is important to mention because Israel was trying to share important information with Washington about the Shah at that time. Washington chose not to listen and the results were disastrous. Why would the US not listen? It appears the eventual truth must still wait. When the answer comes, a much better understanding of US intelligence weakness with the Shah will occur, as well as more recently why US forces in Iraq never found WMD anywhere, yet this was the major reason for invading Iraq. Until that moment, the following quote relating to Israel's secret service and abilities at the time of the Shah's downfall, help illustrate my just-mentioned concern (the tragic US failure to listen to Israelis about the Shah, or Iraqi WMD). In a major historical assessment in 1980, regarding Israel's primary secret service, the Mossad, the following statement was made:

“Today, the Israeli intelligence community sits supreme in the Middle East. Its voice is ignored at peril. Months before the Shah fell, for instance, the Israelis were warning the Americans of the nature of the revolution they were ushering in by not more forcefully supporting Pahlavi.

The State Department [US] - believing it was listening to the special pleading of a Jewish state that feared militant Islam -chose to disregard them. Moreover, the Israelis were able to warn the Saudis, through an intermediary, of an imminent attack upon the Holy Mosque at Mecca - only to be ignored. Never before have the Israelis been in a better position to influence the region in which they seek their precarious existence” (Steven, 1980, pp. xxvii-xxviii).

These many examples offered throughout this now completed Action period analysis, will help us explore the Reaction Period of US-Iran relations from late 1979 to 2001.

THE REACTION PERIOD: IRAN-US RELATIONS 1979-2001

As Reaction Period analysis now begins, the hypothesis continues its strong application, as the period 1979 to 2001 witnesses increasing tensions between the US and Iran. The hypothesis is confirmed by new forms of US pressure against Tehran, because of the strong anti-US nature of the 1979 revolution in Iran. New US pressure includes supporting Iraq's war against Iran starting in 1980, US economic sanctions applied against Iran, US military support for ships carrying oil from Iraq, and US pressure to increasingly isolate Iran globally. All of these new US forms of pressure represent increasing neo-colonial pressure directed by Washington against Iran, continuing to prevent Iran from focusing on its larger democratic potential. The hypothesis sees increasing momentum in the Reaction Period.

It is interesting to note the Reaction Period of Iran-US relations, from 1979 to 2001, occurs during very difficult times internationally, though the internal realities of Iran seem to have their own momentum. The year of the hostage crisis in Iran, 1979, sees the US lose its political, military and economic influence there. This leads to fears by US policy makers the US position throughout the entire Middle East might be completely undermined. This kind of fear from a Reaction period perspective, can also be perceived as typical over-reaction by Washington regarding local or regional setbacks, which in the end do not weaken the US position at all.

Understanding why the US seems to misread, overreact, or under-react too many perceived threats, is a key concern of the Reaction period and primary case in point for this study. It offers analysis and lessons overall that need to be taken seriously. As the Reaction Period begins and moves into the early, middle 1980's, importantly the US attempts to make important changes to the CIA's ability to predict internal political developments more accurately (**Woodward, 1987**). These recommended changes last until beginning of the 1989 administration of George H. W. Bush. The most logical reason for halting CIA reform from a Reaction period perspective, appears as lack of political will with the new Bush administration in Washington, beginning in 1989.

This first Bush administration, that of George H. W. Bush, 1989-1992, a former CIA director in 1975-76, and passionate defender of traditional Cold War CIA analysis, was not inclined to believe or accept the notion of faulty CIA interpretations regarding Iran's revolution or incorrectly predicting trends in Iran's region. Reaction period assessment strongly assumes this is easy to conclude, based on the fact the Bush family made their entire wealth and political careers through US based oil investments directly connected to the post-WWII

Washington power structure. This means the Bush family had strong post-WWII military-industrial complex connections, including strong direct and indirect relationships with the CIA, Wall Street, and powerful politicians in Washington committed to protecting the narrow interests of both Washington's and Wall Street's elite (**Phillips, 2004**). This should not come as a surprise to most.

Whether with Iran or any country, the CIA's self-evaluation during the early 1980's under the Reagan administration, 1981-1989, concludes there were many weaknesses that must be addressed. The main motivation for this study was based on belief US failure to predict fall of the Shah was a disaster that must never happen again, with any other nation or situation. Many, many weaknesses in intelligence gathering by the CIA in Iran were assessed and changed at this time (**Woodward, 1987**). Many changes were implemented. In short, the CIA intelligence failure with Iran was considered an incomparable disaster. So much so that US interests throughout Iran's region and globally most likely could not be defended or dealt with properly unless drastic changes in US intelligence collection were made. As the Reaction Period begins then, understanding CIA capabilities after 1979 will help us interpret later US actions during the 1980's, the first decade of the Reaction period.

As we already know, long-term policy momentum of the US in Iran by supporting the unpopular Shah, led to collapse of the US position there. There was some weakening in the US position region-wide as well, but no domino affect where countries fall one by one to Iran's new Islamic fundamentalism. This is significant because yet again, as with the fall of Vietnam to communism three decades earlier, US interests were not severely weakened beyond the borders of Iran/Vietnam, though highly anti-US regimes came to power there. Many analysts in the US predicted Vietnamese and Iranian repercussions, with complete collapse of US interests in these respective regions and perhaps beyond. This never happened, and is significant for larger Reaction period analysis overall.

Though Iran has influence outside its borders, its 1979 revolution did not produce a domino affect taking over entire countries in its region. Some might argue the revolution in Iran spread beyond its borders into Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union, leading to the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan in December 1979. However, a closer look at Iran's 1979 anti-US revolution leads to conclusions that actually promoted long-term US interests worldwide. This is because the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan created momentum leading to the break-up and collapse of the now former Soviet Union.

From a Reaction-period analysis, as anti-Soviet Afghan forces created reaction inside the former Soviet Union against that war, growing dissatisfaction by Russians against their

repressive Soviet system overall grew intensively. No doubt this contributed to growing belief in Eastern Europe throughout 1989 (following Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in February of year), Gorbachev and Soviet leaders would not militarily intervene. Also, after Iran's revolution in 1979, a greater build-up of anti-communist/anti-Russian sentiment throughout Eastern Europe occurred throughout the 1980's. This helped lead to the dramatic results of 1989: the collapse of communism.

In short, Afghan defeat of Soviet armies and Iran's post-revolution anti-Soviet attitude, both directed against the former Soviet Union, increased East European determination to challenge Moscow's authority during the 1980's. In other words, Reaction period analysis concludes 1979 was a crucial year, because violent revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had significant impact increasing Muslim hatred for direct and indirect Soviet rule against Muslim peoples inside and south of the former Soviet Union. When Moscow decided to leave Afghanistan in February 1989, Reaction period analysis concludes these events confirmed East European belief Soviet leaders would not challenge anti-communist authority throughout East Europe as well.

Therefore, as the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall came and went, it is wise to consider Soviet defeat in Afghanistan as helping lead to fall of Soviet communism in Eastern Europe. In reality, this proved beneficial to US interests overall as well. Collapse of the Shah, while hurting neo-colonial US interests in Iran, appears to have contributed to collapse of Soviet communism as well. Reaction period analysis concludes fall of the Shah was beneficial overall to US interests. Many who thought losing the Shah was a complete loss for US interests, should review this perception, while also reconsidering why the US offered unconditional support for the Shah.

Why did so many others for that matter, consider the 1979 revolution in Iran to be against US interests? It is simply not possible to conclude survival of the Shah after 1979 would help US interests regionally or globally. Therefore, when examining the US position regarding Iran after 1979, it is important to remember these larger realities. One should consider the following: Is it possible Soviet military intervention in Eastern Europe to prevent the fall of communism in 1989, would have occurred if there was no Iranian revolution to remove the Shah in 1979? The more negative answer for Washington in this scenario might well be yes.

Though we can't know with certainty, Reaction period analysis concludes had the Shah stayed in power after 1979, events in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union ten years later might well have been different. In other words, violent collapse of communism in East-

ern Europe and/or the Soviet Union might have been the result. Certainly, violent collapse of communism could not have been an outcome beneficial for US interests, with the possibility of first use of nuclear weapons against US interests resulting from terrified Soviet leaders backed into a corner. Could this have led to nuclear war between the US and former Soviet Union, or in some capacity, instead of the non-violent outcome the world actually experienced in 1989?

We should assume at the least increased likelihood of regional and perhaps global violence and possibly nuclear war between the US and Soviet Union, had the Shah stayed in power after 1979. This is because a heavily US armed anti-Soviet Shah on the Soviet border in 1989 would have made it much more difficult for the Soviets to peacefully let go of Eastern Europe. In other words, Moscow understood Washington had lost a key ally in Iran and the US did not directly intervene militarily, therefore, Moscow found it easier in 1989 to let go of key allies in Eastern Europe without intervening militarily. Simply stated, because the US lost Iran in 1979, Moscow thought there was less direct US pressure on their southern border. Also, it is important to realize events in Iran after 1979 during the Reaction Period, are important to determining not just long-term realities from a political, analytical, and historical perspective, but also helps one understand why US policy never seems to find support among a majority of Iranians for long periods during the Reaction period.

Were the US able to achieve long-term support for its policies among Iranians during the Reaction Period, many and perhaps most current problems in US-Iran relations would not be occurring with the kind of intensity we currently see. Or, they could be much less risky than they currently are. To assume this however, requires further careful examination of post-revolutionary, Reaction Period events in Iran. Such an examination must objectively analyze why US and Iranian leaders (mainly Iranian) during the 1980's, did not seem to consider overall improvement of relations with each other. There were short-term and indirect attempts to communicate, but these attempts in no way appeared to seriously improve negative relations overall.

During the 1980's, primarily Iran and its leaders did not want direct discussions with the US, because of intense distrust of US motives. Therefore, the 1980's appropriately represent that part of the Reaction Period in US-Iran relations, in which Iran, its leaders and population are angrily "reacting" against perceived long-term intentions of the US. Iranian memories of the Shah and his perceived neglect will not die or fade easily as will see.

Reaction Period: Its Global Impact

While knowing Iran's overall domestic situation after 1979 is mainly an on-going direct and indirect reaction against the Shah and related US support, we should analyze post-1979 events in Iran and throughout the 1980's in the larger context of global change. For example, there is more instability regionally and globally, not least because of Tehran's long-term support and sponsoring of its regional and global terrorist group, Hezbollah (**Byman, 2003**). In terms of on-going Cold War politics, it is important to remember the US had just established diplomatic relations with China at the end of 1978, which was part of a larger global Cold War between the Soviet Union and the US. In this case, the US under the Carter administration was trying to increase Cold War influence and pressure against the Soviet Union by formally making China a "friend". However, US policy during the Cold War, like so many other times, assumed all nations globally had the same priorities against the Soviet Union. As so often happened, this was not the case.

When the US and China formally recognize one another in 1978, Washington's assumption is still further global anti-Soviet pressure be directed mainly against Moscow. Countries like Iran, from the US point of view during the Cold War, were always assumed stable enough to support US long-term anti-Soviet policies. The result for Iran and Washington regarding US anti-Soviet communist policy overall, the violent 1979 revolution, is completely unexpected but totally consistent with these kinds of failures with US Cold War policy overall. Reaction period analysis states that as a political and diplomatic assumption, the 1979 US failure in Iran may be logical, since as we just stated US anti-communist failures had already happened elsewhere, such as Vietnam.

We know this because anti-Soviet policies by the US throughout the Cold War assume fighting Soviet communism or influence globally would be the priority of all peoples, not just their governments. As Washington found out the hard way with Iran in 1979, this is simply not the case. Containing and/or defeating Soviet power globally, while welcomed by many, was never the main priority for people in countries like Iran and others, where US supported anti-communist regimes fell because local populations did not see Soviet influence as a major threat.

In Iran then after WWII, and after 1979, achieving direct democratic government was and is the priority for most Iranians, but not unfortunately Iranian politicians. For Iranian citizens foreign influence, not just Soviet or British, but US or any other was unwelcome, as long as foreign influence did not support long-awaited democratic wishes and aspirations. As we analyze the 1980's, this decade tells us much regarding anger, disappointment, and grow-

ing disillusionment for non-political Iranians, most of the population, in never experiencing their own democracy. Events inside Iran importantly tell us much as well concerning how nationalistic Iranians become following downfall of the Shah, with Reaction period analysis concluding growing nationalism moved Iran away from original post-'79 goals. Understanding why Iranians became more and more nationalistic after 1979, whether or not they were aware, is important to assessing whether post-'79 Iran could have ever achieved original post-Shah democratic goals.

Despite growing global instability in political, military, and economic affairs, events in Iran seem almost completely divorced from events outside Iran. Iranian citizens were directly witnessing and feeling the new energy created following removal of the Shah. Globally, not even dramatic increases in global oil prices, inflation, and global tensions will cause events in Iran to change course. Such is the intensity of post-Shah feelings throughout Iran during the entire 1980's.

Events in Iran during the 1980's

The primary issue for this analysis regarding the Reaction Period is emergence and coming to power of supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Khomeini becomes supreme leader in Iran as well, after the revolution, by consolidating power using a variety of strategies and beliefs regarding where Iran should go following the Shah. The Ayatollah Khomeini arrived in Iran from Paris during early February, 1979, one month after the Shah left. Khomeini was greeted as a great liberator by the Iranian people, and perceived by most in Iran to be the current savior of the country. During his exile in Paris, he was able to get more public attention for his cause as well, which most likely contributed greatly to his final triumphant and very popular return to Iran.

One of the Shah's pre-1979 revolution mistakes was to pressure Saddam Hussein into forcing Ayatollah Khomeini out of Iraq, thinking this would make Khomeini less influential in neighboring Iran. Just the opposite happened. The world's media attention had very little presence in Iraq because Saddam Hussein was in power. The Shah, by forcing Khomeini out of Baghdad, unknowingly allowed the Iranian people to hear much greater anti-Shah pronouncements from Khomeini overall (**Daniel, 2001**). Since the world's media could easily accommodate Paris as a media-friendly and safe location, covering Khomeini's exile from there was always perceived as very newsworthy. While in Baghdad, the media's natural motivation to cover him as well could never be realized because of Saddam's tyrannical rule.

This is a very important point when assessing how and why Khomeini became so popular in exile.

Once Khomeini is back in Iran, he is easily the most influential leader there. Until his death ten years later in 1989, his authority overall will never be seriously threatened by anyone or any group. His revolutionary guard was there to intimidate any opposition. Leaders like Bani Sadr had to flee for fighting to keep Iran democratic and secular rather than Velayate Faghi, i.e., theocratic rule. Beginning with his arrival in 1979, Khomeini immediately begins trying to create governments that reflect his will and authority. Over time he will create many differing kinds of coalitions, ministries, and governments, all of which are ultimately under his rule. Although it takes about three years from the time the 1979 revolution is complete, his eventual authority is established. Nevertheless, to appreciate his full support overall, I must repeat what I said a moment ago: from the time of his arrival in Iran in February 1979, his authority is never seriously questioned.

It is very interesting to realize Khomeini, during his exile in Paris, primarily had around him advisors who were Islamic, but non-clerical. This was consistent with the belief of many in opposition to the Shah overall, non-clerical forces would eventually come to power in Iran after the post-1979 revolutionary dust had settled. This belief was based on assumption that clerics, if they achieved power, would be incompetent, with demand for non-clerical rule naturally being the result. This did not happen, and is a very important point in this analysis (**Keddie, 2003**). Clerics did come to power after 1979 with Khomeini, and with Khomeini as supreme leader, they unexpectedly ruled with complete authority. They also managed to keep that authority for most of the 1980's. This was perhaps the biggest surprise to the vast majority of non-clerical Khomeini followers throughout the entire post-Shah decade.

Following Khomeini's return to Iran from Paris, he offered support for presidential candidate, Abolhassan Bani Sadr, a complete non-cleric, during the first post-Shah presidential elections (**Keddie, 2003**). Many inside and outside Iran naturally saw this as evidence clerical rule would not come to rule post-Shah Iran. Khomeini also appointed Mehdi Bazargan, another non-cleric as Prime Minister in the same, first post-Shah government, which seemed further evidence direct rule by Khomeini and clerics after 1979 would not occur.

Khomeini even seemed to go out of his way to keep away from public awareness in Iran an important personal document he had written. During 1978 and 1979 (before, during, and after the Shah left), he withheld his original writings or treatise, called *Islamic Government* or *Velayat-e faqih*, which called for great powers in a post-Shah regime going to a *faqih* or supreme leader. Instead, Khomeini and his followers were spreading more traditional or

liberal views, primarily those of his Paris team and supporters there (**Keddie, 2003**). Combined, the two appointments of Bani Sadr and Mehdi Bazargin, and what appeared to be elimination of Khomeini's writings from public view, seemed further proof Khomeini and the clergy had no intention of ruling directly after 1979.

As we will see, there was always disagreement from certain groups, though these differences did not become open challenging of his rule. This kind of popular appeal for Khomeini or anyone is very rarely witnessed. Therefore, inside Iran during the 1980's, events are occurring, which at no time seriously threaten Khomeini's political survival directly. Knowing this should help western viewers in particular appreciate just how dominant and unchallenged Khomeini was throughout his decade in power.

Reaction period analysis states all other events regarding politics, economics, military, and social affairs etc. in Iran, while very important and highly emotional, are operating under the widely held perception of Khomeini as unquestioned, unchallenged and supreme leader of all post-revolutionary 1979 Iran. There are only a few examples of post-revolutionary leaders of any nation having so much unquestioned authority at any time in history.

Iran – Iraq War (September 1980 – September 1988):

The single most influential, important, and devastating issue for Iran, its people, and its all-powerful leader after 1979 is the Iran-Iraq war beginning in 1980. Lasting for eight years, this war impacted Iran and its people, politics, economy, religious, and social affairs far more than any other single issue. Though many issues impacted Iran in the 1980's, the war itself had such an overwhelming impact on Iranian society, all other domestic issues can only be understood within the larger context of the eight year war itself.

The most horrifying and terrifying reality of this incredibly bloody and brutal war concerned the following result: Iran ended up practicing the use of massive attacks by waves of Iranian teenagers, irregular forces and others to fight the Iraqis. The term "human wave assaults" were often used to describe Iran's military strategy. In reality, nearly a million teenagers, irregulars, and others were killed, wounded, or taken captive on both sides of the conflict (**Woodward, 1987**). For Iran itself, the use of human wave attacks indicated how desperate the nation was in the post-1979 revolutionary climate. Again, this reality was and is in major contrast to the US and Reagan administration claims at that time, post-revolutionary Iran was a major threat to the entire region, even globe.

The human, economic, military and social devastation created by the war permanently prevented post-1979 Iran from achieving any of its long held goals considered crucial to lift-

ing Iran out of economic difficulty. The Iran-Iraq war therefore, represents yet another long-term weakening of Iran's important sectors needed to reestablish the nation as a vital and functioning member of the global community. To make matters worse, Iranians knew and understood the war was started by their long-time neighboring enemy Iraq, being heavily supported by the United States.

Since this reality was well understood by Iranians, this added further anti-US and anti-western sentiment to their already deeply held resentment of Washington's previous policies towards their nation. Therefore, the Iran-Iraq war would create even more long-term anti-US and anti-western policies by Tehran. These would have long-term negative consequences for Iranian development, regional stability outside Iran, and most importantly, Iran's ability to see US policies in the region and worldwide in a more objective manner. Reaction period analysis believes global opinion was never aware of the extent to which the Iran-Iraq war severely limited policy choices by Iran's leaders during the 1980's. Especially nations like the US, where public opinion was still highly unaware of the degree to which US support for the Shah had greatly weakened Iran's development potential, leading to the kind of anti-Washington nationalism working directly against Iranian democratic decision making.

It is important to emphasize that Khomeini coming to power is not what hurt US interests in the region during the 1980's. What hurts US interests is the US decision to fully support Saddam Hussein and Iraq in the terrible eight year war against Iran. Though the US will later come to slightly support Iran as well late in the war against Iraq, the overall preference for the US is Saddam. Reaction period analysis states this is what creates even greater need by Tehran to actively work against US interests region wide. At no time, however, does this statement mean the US would have been better off regionally and globally if the Shah had stayed in power. Reaction period analysis believes removal of the Shah had to happen. Whatever anti-American regimes came to Iran after 1979, were moving overall with larger Muslim forces of the region in rejecting foreign rule overall, whether in the former Soviet Union or under US directed rule from the Shah.

When the eight year war began in September 1980, the Carter administration was pre-occupied with Iran's holding of the 52 US embassy employees taken the previous November. When Iraq begins the actual war against Iran, senior officials of the US administration seem to reflexively assume Iraq and Saddam are the "good guys" and Iran with Khomeini in charge are the "bad guys". Such black and white thinking by some of Carter's most senior advisors is, in my view, a continuing example of narrow mindedness by US strategists overall regarding the region. Certainly, the vast majority of Iraqis, Iranians, and people throughout the re-

gion considered Saddam at least as threatening as Khomeini. For this reason as well, it was most likely quite easy for Khomeini to motivate so many young Iranians to willingly offer their lives in the tragic Iranian “human wave assaults”, justified to defend Iran against Iraq’s equally brutal attacks led by Saddam’s regime, which Reaction period analysis believes was considered by many region-wide more brutal than Khomeini’s.

There is a good example to actually see how narrow US assumptions were in assuming Iran was automatically the “bad guy”, during the very beginning of Iraqi-Iranian hostilities in that first month of conflict, September 1980, when Carter’s most influential advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, made the following statement: “...Apparently the Iraqis were planning to stage an attack on Iranian facilities along the Gulf from the territory of some of the Arabian Gulf states, and the Saudis feared a retaliatory Iranian response, directed at their oil fields” (**Brzezinski, 1985, p. 452**). The assumption here by Carter’s national security advisor is the US should automatically defend Saudi Arabia, a US “ally” against Iranian aggression. The larger point missed by Brzezinski was that US supported regimes in both Iraq and Saudi Arabia were more unpopular with their own peoples than Khomeini’s regime. Reaction period analysis concludes this kind of over-reaction by Washington in favor of any US supported “ally” in general, creates long-term anti-US sentiment throughout that region.

Reaction Period analysis concludes the current negativity in Iran-US relations as well, has much of its negative momentum coming from continuing Iranian perceptions and further distrust of US support of Iraq during the eight year Iran-Iraq war. It would be very difficult, even impossible to overstate or exaggerate how mistrusted the US became in Iranian eyes. This was especially so after ruling clerics in charge of Iran with Khomeini, witnessed Washington openly and directly support Iraq against Iran some months after the war began. Washington’s direct support began after January 1981. This is however, *after the beginning of hostilities*, in September 1980.

This US decision to support Iraq’s view on the war early on, must have convinced most Iranians Washington could never be trusted as a long-term friend. Equally important, great power indifference by primarily the US but also the former Soviet Union to mass slaughter being conducted by both Iran and Iraq against each other’s armies and peoples, highly contributed to continuing Iranian distrust (**Randall, 1999**). Being as objective as possible who could blame them.

Objectivity also requires me to state then US President Jimmy Carter, at the *very moment* Iraq invaded Iran, September 22, 1980, was himself very much *against* Iraq’s aggression, immediately wanting a ceasefire. Once war began, he pushed for a ceasefire, and shortly

after was out of office by January 20 (**Carter, 1982**). I must state this because Iranians accused Carter and the US directly of openly supporting Iraq's invasion, when in reality the new Reagan administration of January 1981 would begin the open support for Iraq. Anti-US feelings of Iranians at that time prevented a more objective view of Carter and his policies.

No doubt Carter faced great pressure throughout the hostage crisis, as more and more of the US public demanded forceful action from their president. Years after leaving office, Carter stated that during the hostage crisis, he could have ordered a major F-15 military airstrike from a US aircraft carrier, which he believed would have killed around 15,000 Iranian civilians and destroyed Iran as a functioning nation economically and politically (**King, 2006**). He chose not to he stated, because he believed Khomeini and his team could respond rationally to Carter's restraint, which is what actually happened. Reaction Period analysis concludes Carter was correct in not using direct US military action to resolve the hostage crisis one way or the other, and that Carter has been unfairly criticized for not using overwhelming US military power against Iran overall at that time.

I conclude Carter's military restraint throughout the crisis led to peaceful return of the fifty two US hostages held in Iran and analyzed earlier. This is significant for Reaction Period analysis because it does indicate Khomeini and his supporters willingly and rationally responded to US demands without US military action. This example of military restraint by a US president is evidence Khomeini and the Iranian students holding US diplomats hostage, were much more concerned with larger realities and implications for themselves, their nation and region than given credit for.

Carter's restraint showed that even Khomeini, shortly after coming to power and with overwhelming support for using violence against US interests in Iran, was already capable of choosing moderation in his policies towards Washington. Remembering this will help us appreciate why later more confrontational US policies against Iran can be perceived as pushing Khomeini and later Islamic leaders in Iran towards more aggressive forms of policy against US interests directly and more regional interests supporting the US. I believe Mr. Carter set an example regarding how not to escalate existing tensions . His patience and decision not to militarily attack Iran, was a key factor to the survival of the US hostages, and their release which happened January 20th 1981 12:00 noon Washington time, the moment Reagan took office.

Reaction Period analysis concludes the most important criticism that should be directed against Carter would be his decision not to inform his Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, of the then impending secret rescue mission of US hostages in Iran authorized by President

Carter, with key planning and support from his then national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and the Pentagon. Mr. Vance, upon finding out of the secret plan, considered Carter's action an insult and unethical lack of trust in the US Secretary of State's office by the President. Vance immediately chose to resign over principle, and his criticism of the proposed military helicopter rescue mission proved to be accurate as well (because the mission failed in the Iranian desert). Carter chose instead to rely on Assistant Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, during planning of the operation (**Halberstam, 2001**). Christopher eventually became US Secretary of State during Clinton's first term in office, 1993-1997.

Separately, Reaction Period analysis must also assess during this time US attempts to isolate Iran from the international community, as if Iran was not already isolated enough. This US policy however, does not represent the same kind of pressure or threat against Khomeini direct US military action as just described would. In this context, although Washington-Soviet relations were highly strained during the first half of the 1980's, Soviet-Iranian relations however, never improved much despite strong US hostility. China started and continued to sell missiles to Iran during the 1980's, but this as well did not really create a new feeling of global acceptance for Iran.

At the same time, Washington policy makers in all US administrations during the eight year war, with the possible exception of President Carter himself, seemed not aware of the degree to which Arab nationalism outside Iran prevented Shiite Muslims throughout much of the Arab world from supporting Shiite Iran (**Barash, 1991**). In other words, because Khomeini and Iran are not Arab, nationalism throughout the Arab world would always prevent them from obtaining Arab support, even though Khomeini and his supporters are Shiites, like many Arabs. Had US policymakers understood this from the beginning, perhaps there would have been much less paranoia regarding how Washington should deal with Iran then and today.

All of this was certainly noticed by Iran's leaders and its people, which likely helped convince Iranians and especially Khomeini the US was committed to destroying Iran's revolution, from within and outside Iran. Whether or not the US had the ability to isolate Iran internationally and threaten its revolution is another issue. My point is Iranians must certainly have believed the US could do this. Further evidence of perceived US intentions to isolate and destroy the Iranian revolution as being a realistic possibility, can be noticed with increasing tensions inside Iran because of the Iran-Iraq war. These stresses would most likely have destroyed other post-revolutionary regimes politically, because there were less perceived external threats to the post-revolutionary country than Iran faced.

We can assume therefore Khomeini must have greatly perceived and felt actual foreign pressure against his Iranian revolution following 1979. A very strong example is in 1981, very early in the revolution when extremist religious Islamic clerics in control of Iran, intensely hated the president of Iran, Abolhasan Bani Sadr, mentioned earlier. Though Khomeini backed Bani Sadr as first legally elected post-Shah president, who in fact did win the first presidential election in post-Shah Iran, his political relationship with all-powerful clerical leaders in Iran was very poor. Stated more exactly, by January 1981, both Bani Sadr as president and fanatical clerical rulers in power, hated each other. The consequences for Iran were already terrible enough, as Iran resorted to using more and more teenage youngsters to do the fighting in what were called “human wave” assaults against Iraqi military forces. As terrible as this outcome was however, for Iran’s young people and citizens overall, the Islamic regime still never collapsed. Both Bani Sadr and the clerics or mullahs, despite their hatred for each other, were still focusing on the larger picture, which was to prevent the Iranian revolution from collapsing and losing everything they had fought for.

Bani Sadr, was reported to have stated the ruling Islamic Republican Party of Iran “was a greater calamity for the country than the war with Iraq” (**Karsh, 2002, p. 71**). Accordingly, extremist advisors to Khomeini also took the view of Bani Sadr before he became president: “it is preferable to lose half of Iran than for Bani Sadr to become ruler” (**Karsh, 2002, p. 71**). It is worth repeating what was stated a moment ago, but using a different context. The following would seem to be a safe assumption at the very least for this analysis: Iran’s post-revolutionary regime could only survive this kind of mutual hatred among its most important political factions, if there were greater distrust of motives concerning outside countries believed working against the goals of their revolution. The outside country considered most threatening to revolutionary Iran and its interests was clearly the United States, and no other nation.

The Iran-Contra Affair

Proceeding with my analysis of the 1980’s, an event that occurred, no doubt in connection with the Iran-Iraq war became known in the US, Iran, and around the world as the Iran-Contra affair. Contra was a word for US, CIA backed rebels in Nicaragua, using profits made from secretly and illegally selling US weapons to Iran. At that time during the 1980’s, the US government was legally forbidden by its own laws from selling weapons to Iran and/or legally supporting anti-Marxist rebels in Nicaragua. For US-Iranian relations, the im-

pact was to convince both the citizens of the US and Iran their governments had been lying to them.

Starting in 1986, the Iran-Contra affair had the effect of showing the world both Tehran and Washington were secretly trying to communicate with each other for specific reasons. The US and President Ronald Reagan in particular, wanted to communicate with Iran's leadership to help free US hostages taken captive in Lebanon. Iran's leaders on the other hand, wanted access to spare parts for US military equipment in Iran from time of the Shah. The Iran-Contra affair was perceived as highly unethical as well, by both Iranian and US populations. Reaction period analysis concludes it was highly unethical as well, since both Washington and Tehran stated publicly many times they would never recognize or communicate with each other. The public discovery they were occurred in the middle 1980's, represented by great shock to US and Iranian populations.

President Reagan during the 1980's, promised US citizens there would be no negotiating with terrorist regimes and Iran especially. The repercussions for violating his promise were powerful. During the US presidential election of 1988, Michael Dukakis, the eventual US Democratic presidential candidate in 1988, was partly motivated to run for president because of his perception of unethical behavior by the Reagan administration during Iran-Contra (**Kenney & Turner, 1988**). Though Dukakis eventually lost that election to then Vice-President, George H. W. Bush, he was able to convince large areas of the US population that the Reagan-Bush administration of the 1980's was highly unethical for directly violating its promise not to negotiate with the Khomeini regime.

The importance of the public discovery of secretly intended Iran-Contra dealings can best be realized by the following. Then President Reagan's chief of the White House political staff stated in 1988, public concern in the US over the Iran-Contra scandal, very nearly led to collapse of the Reagan presidency (**Regan, 1988**). There were intense official public investigations in the US during 1987 into the Reagan administration's secret dealings with Iran's leadership. In May of 1986, a US group of men, led by President Reagan's national security advisor at that time, had actually secretly flown to Tehran to meet with leaders of the Iranian regime. News of the secret dealings occurred when one of the most senior Iranian clerics, Ayatollah Montazeri, discreetly allowed disclosure of the secret US contacts with Iran to a newspaper in Beirut, Lebanon (**Regan, 1988**).

A point about the timing regarding Iran-US secret dealings is important as well. It should be pointed out even before senior Reagan administration officials went to Iran in 1986, the US actually began sending missiles made in the United States to Iran in 1985. In

other words, serious communication and discussion was already taking place after President Reagan indicated his support for secret dealings with Iran in August 1985. Reagan was agreeing to secretly send US weapons to Iran to bring about release of US hostages held by Iranian controlled groups in Lebanon, mainly Hezbollah, to be sent home to their families. The first shipment of US missiles went to Iran after Reagan gave the just-mentioned go-ahead. On September 15, only one month later, a second bunch of US made missiles arrived in Iran. Only hours after this second shipment arrived, US hostage Benjamin Weir was released in Lebanon (**Parsi, 2007**).

To appreciate how damaging these revelations of secret US-Iranian contacts were to President Reagan, one needs to realize the following. Mr. Reagan became US president in 1980 by severely criticizing then US President Carter for failing to get released the fifty-two US embassy hostages held by Iran since November 1979. On the day Mr. Carter left the US presidency and Mr. Reagan became president in 1981, Ayatollah Khomeini and Iran released the then fifty-two US embassy hostages held captive for over one year. I analyzed this issue earlier. Clearly, Reagan was under tremendous pressure to get the US hostages out of Lebanon, because of his criticism of Carter. President Reagan was irresponsible in criticizing then US President Carter for failing to obtain peaceful release of all 52 US hostages held in Tehran after the Shah fell. Reaction period analysis concludes US president Reagan's willingness to break his and his administration's commitment to never negotiating with regimes that capture hostages, greatly increased the probability of further taking of US hostages outside the US.

Release by Iran of the US hostages at that time made Reagan look very powerful to the US public. Knowing this however, allows one to realize the pressure President Reagan must have felt when he himself failed to get released US hostages taken by Iranian captors in Lebanon during the early 1980's, after Reagan became US president. I already mentioned Reagan and the US, officially recognized US laws at the time, legally preventing US administrations from negotiating with any terrorist state. Reagan's private emotions were clearly stressed to the point where violating US laws to release US captives in Lebanon seemed realistic to him. However, reaction period analysis concludes this was highly irresponsible by Reagan, no matter how much pressure he was under. Because he defeated former US president Carter during the 1980 election based on such criticism, and pledge to never negotiate with Iran over release of any hostages, he had no other option but to keep his promise.

It must also be addressed that Reagan's own administration, prevented the official White House monitoring group from its responsibility in overseeing any US administration's secret activities. This "policing" mechanism or official government watchdog monitors White

House secret plans to make sure they are legally followed. Reagan and his team here must be criticized for this. Had they not weakened or prevented this monitoring group from doing its job, Reagan would have been prevented from carrying out his secret contacts with Iran that clearly violated his public promise to never negotiate with terrorist regimes like Iran (**Clifford, 1991**). The taking of US or any hostages is clearly an extremely emotional issue for all US presidents and all leaders of nations. For the US in this case, this represented the single most serious setback for the Reagan administration during its entire time in power, 1981 to 1989. Nevertheless, I firmly hold President Reagan accountable for this serious breach of trust with the US and with official US law and his own stated policy such as the Boland Amendments in 1984.

For Khomeini's regime, their motivation to secretly talk to the US in violation of its pledge to its people, concerned survival of the regime and country in the desperate war against Iraq. This was because the Shah had purchased large amounts of US military aid until the very late 1970's, and after the Shah was forced out of Iran, the US cut off Iranian access to these spare military parts. By 1986, Iran desperately needed these extra technical US military supplies in their terrible conflict with Iraq. Only by cooperating with the US can they get access to such supplies, otherwise, the Iranian military will not be able to use any of them. I conclude here as well Khomeini also deserves much criticism, because of his public pledges and responsibilities as first post-Shah leader. Reaction period analysis concludes however, Khomeini is partly justified, unlike Reagan, because Iran was under terrible military and economic pressure threatening Iran's very collapse as a society. When facing such extreme circumstances, it is not surprising when any leader chooses to break original promises to survive as a nation. Reagan can make no such claim because the US during his presidency faced no such pressures against his nation.

Looking back both the people of Iran and the US, after finding out the truth regarding secret US-Iranian negotiations, had less trust in both President Reagan and Ayatollah Khomeini. Any lessening of public support for the leadership of both the US and Iran, could only force both leaderships to change policies and regain as much support as possible from their peoples. Nevertheless, even though Khomeini and Reagan did regain some original public support from before Iran-Contra, their respective public standing in both Iran and the United States was never as strong again. This led to certain major policy changes for the rest of the 1980's in both nations, with major ethical implications regarding their policies as well. Such was the legacy for both leaders and countries concerning the implications of the Iran-Iraq war

and Iran-Contra. Both Washington and Tehran learned difficult lessons from the Iran-Contra affair.

Reaction period analysis concludes the most important lesson learned by Tehran was never to trust any US administration again, concerning overall US intentions towards Iran. Though the Reagan administration was secretly agreeing to Iran's demands for release of US hostages, for Tehran the fact Reagan so easily violated his own public pledges and government's own laws, while in no way fighting for his nation's very survival, unlike Iran at that time, would be cause for concern by any foreign regime dealing with the US in those circumstances. If the US were involved in a world war like WWII, I would conclude differently.

For the administration of President Reagan and all US administrations afterward, the most important lesson learned was that Washington must never again break its public pledge and public laws, which clearly state no US president can directly or indirectly negotiate with any state that has taken US citizens hostage.

Change in Iran's policy:

Regarding the impact of Iran's domestic policy on its foreign policy, the Iran-Contra affair brought about a major change in how to fight the war against Iraq. Since Khomeini was weakened politically by Iran-Contra, because he was perceived by Iranians as having secretly cooperated with "The Great Satan", referring to the US, he now took a more aggressive path in the war. His decision and that of Iran's government, was to start threatening oil ships or tankers carrying oil from Iraq through the Gulf separating Iraq from Iran. This would create a direct military challenge to the United States, possibly even provoking war. Khomeini however, understood this tactic would help him win more respect from Iranians by showing he was not afraid of the United States.

Obviously, Khomeini realized such a new policy would also bring about criticism from the global community and risk further alienation for Iran. Khomeini and his regime as the 1980's wore on, were rapidly becoming less and less popular globally, therefore, his regime's decision to threaten oil shipping from Iraq through the Strait of Hormuz, surely reflects growing insecurity as Iran's main political leader. Therefore, the combined affects of the very negative impact of the Iran-Iraq war overall, followed by the Iran-Contra affair have a dramatic impact on domestic perceptions by Iranians inside Iran. This increasingly negative impact by Iranians will drive Iran's leadership into yet more confrontational attitudes with the US, and the world for that matter.

This is partly because Iranian citizens have a strong image of US policy toward their nation as one of being completely aggressive. Of course, their image of US policy towards their nation has always been perceived as aggressive since the time of Mosaddeq's overthrow in 1953. Therefore, it is important to realize throughout the decade of the 1980's, first decade of the Reaction Period, anything Washington does regarding Iran is perceived as openly hostile. This includes the just-mentioned Iran-Contra affair as well, which in reality was not really an anti-Iranian policy by Washington as much as a domestically inspired US action.

Stated differently, it is almost impossible to exaggerate the degree of anti-US feeling the Iranian population has. When combined with the degree of Khomeini and clerical propaganda used to continue Iran's aggressive foreign policy during the 1980's, and memories of the Shah's US puppet status in Iranian eyes, these two perceptions for Iranians generate tremendous distrust of Washington. Even though Iranians know Khomeini forced Bani Sadr (the previously analyzed first post-Shah president) out together with his dreams of democracy and secular governance, Iranians still rally around Khomeini in defiance of US actions. This distrust towards the US is that strong, and because Khomeini continues his stance against the US, people accept him and feel their views are strongly represented through him.

This example regarding major Iranian distrust of the US is important to this analysis. It clearly indicates no matter what policy Tehran or Washington pursue towards each other in the 1980's, Iranian domestic distrust of Washington overall had reached a point of never trusting Washington's long-term intentions. This level of distrust by Iranian domestic opinion towards the US could easily have led to pro-longed war between both nations, even after public disapproval of secret dealings with the US was already known. Such intense dislike by the US could have led Iran to war with other members of the international community as well. Reaction period analysis concludes that this did not happen is one of the major "successes" of Iran's overall domestic and foreign policy under Khomeini during the 1980's.

At the same time, Khomeini and his supporters managed to anger many members of the global community several times. The decision during the middle 1980's to threaten oil shipping taking oil from Iraq to western nations was Iran's most provocative yet. It led to a US decision to threaten immediate military retaliation upon Iran itself should oil shipments be threatened, interrupted, or directly attacked. Reaction period analysis concludes despite these threats by the US, it should have been apparent to all outside observers Iranian domestic opinion was still very nationalistic and growing. This meant support for Khomeini and his regime was getting stronger because of Iranian dislike of foreign threats. At the same time, it should have been realized by outside observers as well, Iranian support for Khomeini and his

regime was becoming more conditional also. In other words, the longer and more intense the Iran-Iraq war became, all domestic groups in Iran would remain nationalistic but increasingly divided. Many of these groups were demanding more and more from Khomeini and his political allies, in return for their continued strong nationalistic support. This is very different from concluding greater demands from Khomeini were leading to more support for foreign interests regarding Iran.

At the same time, by continually threatening Iran with military strikes, Washington was actually preventing larger democratic reforms as well by Khomeini and his supporters, not just economic. After Iran-Contra had been exposed, Iranian leaders led by Khomeini and US leaders led by President Reagan, are primarily concerned with protecting their own domestic interests. Reaction period analysis concludes the United States, clearly the more influential of the two nations, should have been more open to the idea of allowing domestic Iranian factionalism to take its natural course. This way, Khomeini would have felt less direct support for threatening western oil shipping, forcing him to democratize Iran more. This would have been in everyone's interest, for both the US and Iran. President Reagan and his US administration should have been much more selective and careful in how they chose to pressure Iran.

Reaction period analysis concludes the quicker Iran democratizes the better off the world is, whether during the second half of the 1980's, today or anytime. The policy of the US against Iran during the 1980's had the opposite result, thus moving Iran, its leadership and population more firmly into reaction thinking against the US and much of the world. By calling the 1980's then the first decade of the Reaction Period, with Iran and its overall perception against the US, is highly accurate and observable. This is an important conclusion regarding current and future US policy towards Iran as well. I conclude Iranian public distrust of Washington is still strong because of Washington's policies during the 1980's.

Similarities exist today between US pressure on Iran and Iran's willingness or ability to negotiate and democratize from within. Though that question will be answered in the final chapter, it is somewhat chilling to think today's policy by the US towards Iran shows many of the same tactics used by US President Reagan during the 1980's against Iran. If the evidence shows this is the case, this would certainly be another disappointment for US policy in failing yet again to appreciate the internal dynamics of Iran's domestic situation. It should not surprise anyone nearly all of Iran's actions are intended reactions against Washington, starting in the 1980's.

The Iranian leaders led by Khomeini, were resistant though willing to negotiate with the US during the 1980's, as long as Iran-Contra remained secret. Though they were not thrilled about this, they were willing to do what was best for their nation. Even Khomeini agreed to end the Iran-Iraq war in September 1988 to save his revolution, though he tried to resist this as strongly as he could. The point here is that Khomeini, though a fanatic could also be a realist. Could it be he was more realistic than US leaders during the 1980's? A historical verdict still waits, but it does seem clear as a Reaction period conclusion, despite Khomeini's radicalism and extremism against the US, it was still him and not US pressure, that finally agreed to end direct participation in the Iran-Iraq war in September 1988. Khomeini even admitted how difficult it was for him to accept this UN sponsored peace agreement.

Since the US was militarily supporting both Iraq and then at times Iran as well during this eight year war from 1980-1988, signing the UN agreement would have favored the US position overall. This was because the US was in the middle of an election year. Ending the Iran-Iraq war was perceived by the US public, as being a positive thing for then Vice President George Bush, who was running for the US presidency during the 1988 elections. It would only later be revealed to the US public and world, the extent to which then Vice President, George H. W. Bush (Reagan's Vice President 1980-1988), secretly led major US arming and support of Saddam Hussein and Iraq throughout the 1980's (**Phillips, 2004**).

This allowed the Iran-Iraq war to reach its truly murderous proportions, and eventually Iraq's military aggression and takeover of Kuwait in 1991, creating another major crisis for Iran and the US: yet another US war, this time over Kuwait against the very same Saddam and Iraq in 1991, the US had just armed and considered a friend against Iran (**Phillips, 2004**). Reaction period analysis concludes the role of the US in arming Iraq against Iran is a key reason as well for continuing Iranian distrust of US policies. I also conclude US President Reagan and then Vice President Bush deserve great condemnation on ethical grounds for deliberately arming Saddam and Iraq throughout the Iran-Iraq war. I conclude there is no question they knew Saddam was a monster who had and would continue indiscriminately killing against his own people and Iran's as well. Arming Saddam lead to at least one million deaths overall during this time.

Therefore, it was very difficult for Khomeini to accept the UN resolution ending the terrible war, knowing it helped promote US interests. Khomeini in this context can be seen as a more pragmatic and conciliatory figure than many have given him credit for. His decision

to accept the globally supported UN resolution was quite likely more pragmatic than the US position was at that time in the region.

End of the Khomeini era:

Reaction period analysis concludes again, the level of US influence in Iran from the end of WWII, created a momentum of growing distrust of Washington's intentions regarding Iran overall. The Reaction period, though generating its own degree of short and long-term momentum inside and outside Iran, already has a great degree of momentum coming from the pre-1979 period as well.

The US was never able to identify the level and duration of Iran's resentments at any time during the post-war period. This fact clearly exposes US policy towards Iran as being at the very least, insensitive, and at worst imperially intended through neo-colonial methods. Since this analysis concludes US policy was neo-colonial towards Iran, one has no choice but to conclude such policy by any nation, in this case directed by the US, always leads to unintended consequences or reaction, or as others call *blowback* against US interests (**Johnson, 2000**). These unintended consequences usually have far-reaching outcomes, negatively affecting the neo-colonial country, in this case the US, but much more so Iran, the country being influenced.

Since the US repeated similar mistakes in Iran as in other neo-colonial examples from post-WWII history, what happened during the 1980's Reaction Period regarding Iranian domestic politics, most likely happened in other nations as well. It appears US policymakers regarding Iran, from Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, through President George W. Bush, have not learned the lessons of history regarding previous US attempts to use neo-colonial influence in a post WWII setting. Reaction period analysis does conclude there were some observers early on, following Khomeini's return to Tehran leading to the 1980's and Iran's powerful *reaction* against the US and foreign influence, who correctly predicted Khomeini's true intentions. Such observers outside Iran, correctly assumed and stated publicly Khomeini and the clerics who replaced the Shah would take Iran down the road to exporting their brand of revolution throughout the Middle East (**Afary & Anderson, 2005**). In this context, such a prediction was very accurate. Those who predicted this carefully believed the following.

From the very beginning of Khomeini's return to Iran from Paris, exporting Khomeini's ideological brand of religious extremism called Islamic fundamentalism or Shiite fundamentalism, would always be Iran's *reaction* or priority, starting with the 1980's (**Afary & Anderson, 2005**). These observers did not use the term Reaction period to describe Islamic

fundamentalism at that time, but certainly implied that some kind of strong reaction by Khomeini and Iran would occur. This is what actually happened. This is not to be confused with policymakers in several nations, especially the US, who officially were concerned about Iran and Khomeini “exporting” their revolution. This concern occurred only after Khomeini began actually supporting regional terror and other groups in the Middle East, like Hezbollah.

As always, important lessons need to be learned so as not to repeat them again. For example, Washington, when pressing Middle Eastern allies to be as tough against Iran after 1979 as the US would wish, in this case during Reaction period of the 1980’s, naively assumed all regional allies would understand the US position towards Khomeini’s Iran. This unsurprisingly, was not the case. The US ambassador to Turkey at that time tried to get Turkish leaders directly involved in supporting all forms of US pressure against Iran, Khomeini, and the clerics. Predictably, Turkey had its own interests to consider. In this case, Turkey received large oil shipments from Iran, making Turkish authorities less willing to support the US attitude of direct confrontation with Iran’s post-Shah clerical leaders (**Spain, 1984**). The Turkish economy and national security seemed to obviously have much to lose from a direct confrontation with neighboring Iran.

This should not come as a surprise to anyone, though it surprised Washington. In this context, US understanding of the region’s relations to Iran, as with other regions, seems to lack deeper focus. We see what appears to be naive US policy towards Iran. In my view, this kind of naive perception by the US has consistently shown itself throughout post-war US foreign policy. I don’t think this statement would or should surprise any observer. One of the larger external tragedy’s of the Reaction Period during the 1980’s, was that Washington, by choosing to react strongly against Iran, brought about an increased militarization of the region. In other words, Iran felt it had to buy more and more weapons from nations like China, Brazil, and Russia. These nations were only too happy to sell them as well. Countries like Iran felt they had to sell more and more weapons as well to help their weakening economy (**Sampson, 1989**).

Finally, from a historical perspective, perhaps one of the few bright spots for Iran’s sense of pride during the Reaction Period was this. The age of Khomeini’s Islamic fundamentalism and all its contradictions, which created the Reaction Period, did achieve a small “victory” of some kind. The post-Shah Iranian economy under Khomeini was so anti-US, that US made products of all kinds became impossible to buy legally. An underground economy rose to make such products available (**Barnet & Cavanagh, 1994**).

For Khomeini and his supporters, during the early, middle 1980's especially, such a "victory" was a very small one, if any. Islamic fundamentalism, the Khomeini and Iranian way during the Reaction Period, produced no long-term victories for Iran's economic, political, and social development. The final judgment of history still awaits Khomeini and what he did. For myself, I believe it is already possible to conclude what he and his movement represented deserves to be condemned both domestically in Iran and outside. Khomeini and his allies did not seriously try and give Iranians what were promised to them when the Shah was removed. I do not make this judgment influenced by official US government criticisms of Iran during the 1980's (**US Department of State Documents, 1985**). I also emphasize however, foreign pressures directed against Iran for many decades before 1979, made it highly likely Khomeini-like extremist movements would capture and control post-revolutionary developments throughout Iran.

Following the Khomeini period after his death in June of 1989, there were two primary eras dominating the reaction period. From 1989 to 1997, President Hashemi Rafsanjani was allied with Supreme Leader (also called Faqih), Khamenei, during which time there were attempts to improve the overall situation and relations outside the country. Not included in this new governing era however, were attempts to allow greater personal freedom and related improvement overall. These were in fact limited attempts to change society for the better, as not much energy if any was devoted to greatly changing society. While this seemed to be a limited move in the right direction, the larger and greater attempts at modernization of Iranian society would occur after spring of 1997 with the election of reformist Mohammad Khatami.

The more accurate way to describe this first part of the post-Khomeini era of the Reaction Period, lasting until about spring of 1997, is that some small amount of economic liberalization and improvement in external relations was realized. Very little improvement regarding increasing of personal freedom and controls on expression overall were achieved (**Daniel, 2001**). This is a period of limited modernization inside and outside Iran. In analyzing the post-Khomeini era, we must also realize in some ways it is a rejection of part or even much of what Khomeini stood for.

By the time of the second Bush administration in 2001, we can also see that making Iran the "enemy" is popular with domestic forces inside the US. In other words, every US president after Khomeini finds it politically convenient to identify Iran as an enemy of the US. This reality makes Iran-US relations even more problematic, supporting the notion that US policy and influence is driving the overall relationship. In this sense, Iran is on the defen-

sive in all areas of the relationship with Washington. As we reach closer to current periods with Iran-US relations, the evidence seems to support this. The momentum regarding on-going US hostility towards Iran seems to grow. No better example of this concerns the Clinton administration of 1993-2001, replacing the first Bush administration.

By the time of Bill Clinton's US administration in January 1993, presidential politics in the US as well as at Congressional and Senate levels, clearly continues to use Iran as an example of hostile countries against the US. Even though candidate Clinton in 1992, tells American voters he will make domestic policy his priority, once he becomes president, internal dynamics of US politics makes it convenient for Clinton to continue such hostility towards Iran. Areas of US policy during Clinton's time, like economic sanctions against Iran, become more and more popular with certain kinds of American voters. Clinton is well aware of this. What makes US policy towards Iran seemingly unchangeable is the following fact: Clinton, of all modern US presidents, was perhaps the most domestically motivated. In other words, his priorities from the beginning of his term in 1993 were to focus on internal US issues, like health care reform.

Despite spending the first year and one-half of his presidency focusing on complicated, time-consuming domestic issues, Clinton foreign policy continued to treat Iran in almost unbroken or unchanged ways. The only thing he did change was anti-Iran intensity, because of the dominant role of economic sanctions Clinton imposed against Iran, which included the Iran Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. Its predecessor being Executive Order 12959 of May 6, 1995, which prohibited American commerce or investment in Iran. The main reasons for imposing these sanctions were to pressure Iran against continuing its nuclear program, and support for terrorist organizations such as Hizbollah and Hamas. Therefore, this on-going pattern of US hostility towards Iran clearly appears to have its own momentum. This is even more remarkable when we realize during Clinton's second term, 1997-2001, he was almost completely consumed by obsessive US media focus with a sex scandal involving Clinton and a White House female intern. Though Clinton seemed to be greatly weakened, even paralyzed as US president during his second term, yet the intensity and consistency of US policy towards Iran showed little or no slowing in momentum.

This is an amazing piece of consistency in US policy continuing right up until today. In the case of the Reaction Period, this means up until 2001 and the election of the George W. Bush administration. There are few other nations considered an on-going enemy of the US for such a long period. Only the former Soviet Union comes to mind, and even here this consistent hostility ended or greatly modified with the collapse of communism in 1989. Thus

Iran and probably North Korea and Cuba are the only two nations to be considered nearly permanent enemies of the US, at least until the present time, 2010.

Specific issues in post-Khomeini Iran-US relations:

The main issues and problems facing Iran during the post-Khomeini years were economic, caused by aftershock of the incredibly destructive and ruinous war with Iraq. The war itself destroyed numerous ports, oil facilities, devalued and weakened the currency, and greatly increased poverty. Very negative results existed in areas like unemployment, inflation, growing debt and dependence on foreign oil, and poor agricultural production (**Daniel, 2001**). In 1989, following Khomeini's death, newly elected President, Hashemi Rafsanjani, was perceived as more pragmatic than Khomeini, and proceeded to attempt new initiatives.

Increasing foreign trade, creating and promoting two new five year plans, promoting new free trade zones, and encouraging foreign investment received attention from Rafsanjani during these first post-Khomeini years. Rafsanjani also received support from Supreme Leader (faqih) Khameni in areas like reconstruction, the support of new enterprises, and creation of some kind of limited but effective market economy. This support for the new president also concerned his effort to obtain a new loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). To achieve this, Rafsanjani tried to create a new liberalization package overall, requiring smaller government subsidies and reducing Iran's multiple exchange rates. Devaluing or weakening the currency and increasing exports (both tied together), plus privatizing many nationalized industries and companies were priorities as well in trying to get the IMF loan (**Keddie, 2006**).

Despite serious attempts to achieve these goals, with this first five year plan (1988-1993) stressing privatization, the results were eventually disappointing. Internal fighting, factional bickering, and strong animosity in many sectors derailed the potential of many of these well-intended projects. For example, the privatization program which in the end privatized about a thousand public enterprises began in 1993 but stopped a year later. The large number of scandals and overall corruption made the privatization program impossible to continue. Different ideas and laws were passed to make it easier but nothing worked. As imports flooded Iran and their debt situation grew, privatization looked worse and worse. Then US President Clinton imposes a full embargo on Iran in May of 1995. The combined effect of these negative results made it impossible to achieve most of the originally realistic goals set out by President Rafsanjani (**Keddie, 2006**).

These reforms did manage to start moving Iran away from its main focus on agricultural production to a larger focus on exports, requiring industrial growth. The final results were mixed as much of the revenue went into real estate and apartment buildings instead of directly back into industry. At the same time, the country's great dependence on foreign oil was not changed during this overall limited reform effort. Though post-'79 Iranian rulers had told Iranians that dependence on foreign powers like the US for oil would end, giving Iran and its people more independence, this effort never really got off the ground. After the '79 revolution, most foreign oil companies were forced to leave, leaving Iran to produce its entire capacity. Iran's domestic oil production was never able to keep up with growing demand, and Iran had more debts to pay off as well. Oil revenue did not come strongly enough to meet both needs. Foreign companies were asked to come back in as a result (**Keddie, 2006**).

Early in the Clinton administration, the attempt to impose a set of limited sanctions on Iran, in addition to the ones already long in place since 1979, did not last long. Limited but powerful US financial and trade connections still existed, the most sensitive being US oil companies legally willing to work with Iran. However, growing pressure from the US Congress against such a move, influenced by very strong pro-Israel feelings in the US overall, led to a full trade embargo against Iran by April 1995.

It is difficult to know if President Clinton truly believed the sanctions should be applied, or whether their political popularity with pro-Israel supporters in the US was more attractive. As confusing as Clinton's true motivation for the sanctions was, even more confusing was the US Congress passing the Iran-Libya sanctions Act in 1996, threatening any nation outside the US with large penalties should they invest in any energy projects in Iran. The European Union refused to follow this US lead and continued trading/investing with Iran. Overall, this unusual act by the US did have the larger effect of greatly reducing foreign investment in Iran, which was its purpose. Some foreign companies managed to get into Iran but not many. Again, the hostility displayed by not only US presidents against Iran, but also the Congress is quite unusual in the history of US foreign policy (**Keddie, 2006**).

At this time overall, very modest improvements in Iran's foreign policy occurred. During Saddam Hussein's occupation of Kuwait in 1990-91 and the war itself, Iran improved its overall image worldwide, especially with the Arabs. This is because Iran stayed primarily neutral in this conflict. The world and the Middle East blamed Iraq and Saddam for the conflict, thus Iran became less isolated. The greatly increased military presence of the US after the Kuwait conflict, was not liked by Iranian leaders but tolerated because there was nothing they could do. The temporary jump in oil prices caused by the Kuwaiti conflict also helped

Iran's economy. Economic progress in certain areas was occurring, but ultimately not enough to dramatically change things overall. While economic progress could be claimed in some areas because of higher oil prices, there was no increase in political freedoms at all. This was most likely the biggest disappointment regarding Iran's overall ambitions under President Rafsanjani.

Finally, during Rafsanjani's first term as elected president, many political people who were to the left on the political spectrum began changing their politics after losing power starting in 1992. The collapse of communism and command economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union had a dramatic effect on them. Their traditional support for state-centered economic control and direction, including strict ideology in the overall production process, was greatly weakened because of their shock regarding communism's failure. At this point, these Iranians started talking more openly about having more democracy instead of less, as well as more rights for individuals overall and greater distrust of central government control in Iran itself (**Keddie, 2006**). Reaction period analysis concludes Iranian public opinion was highly influenced by the collapse of Soviet communism because market economies in the west, not least that of the US looked more attractive.

Towards the end of Rafsanjani's first term in office, disillusioned Iranians started taking a more positive view of Western ways overall, as President Rafsanjani barely won reelection to a second presidential term in 1993. He faced far more difficulties from all sides during his second term, not least those caused by rapidly falling oil prices, increasing foreign debt and inflation, and collapsing currency (rial). In 1992, riots resulted as living standards caused many working people to protest.

One of the few bright spots for Rafsanjani during both of his terms as president, was his ability at first to improve relations with Europe and the Arabs overall. Unfortunately he was unable to do this with the US, whose hostility towards Iran showed no change in direction, even though Khomeini had already died in 1989. The Clinton presidency in the US refused to change their policy towards Tehran, because of what Washington called Iran's, "...hostility to the then-active Arab-Israeli peace process, Iranian support for 'international terrorism', and its pursuit of nuclear energy, which the United States thought was aimed at development of a nuclear bomb" (**Keddie, 2006, p. 267**). These criticisms of Iranian policy by Washington are nearly identical to US concerns regarding Iran today. Reaction period analysis concludes Washington then and now has a very difficult time changing policy direction once begun. In this case, the Clinton presidency simply treated Iran as a continuing enemy because it was good politics domestically for his administration.

Reaction period: Presidency of Mohammad Khatami 1997 – 2005

During the presidency of Mohammad Khatami, beginning in 1997, much was expected from this perceived “reformer”. Both inside and outside Iran, expectations were he would be very different from his predecessors. This proved correct in certain areas and incorrect in others. To be sure, there were attempts at reform and support, but only to a certain extent. Nevertheless, the expectations inside and outside Iran, were large.

One of the first things he did after being elected was to agree to the ending of the death warrant and death threats issues against well known writer Salmon Rushdie. This had the effect of impressing many in the west, especially Britain, since that is where Rushdie lived at the time. In response, investment from Europe overall began to grow. Nevertheless, economic performance under Khatami did not meet the high expectations set for him. Overall, he was very slow to come forward with a new agenda for dealing with the serious economic problems facing his country. During the first two years of his leadership, economic growth was down to about 1 percent; investment in industry declined by 40 percent; unemployment was actually around 20 percent, while the currency kept falling catastrophically. It reached a low point of about 8,000 to the dollar (**Daniel, 2001**).

Paying off foreign debt was equally difficult for the new reformist president, and great dependence on foreign oil was a reality. The primary form of good economic news occurred in the form of major increases in the price of oil near the end of 1999. At the same time Khatami apparently, like those before him, did not have clear cut views on what to do regarding crucial economic issues like debt and deficit spending, ending subsidies, or raising taxes. It appears the Khatami economic team came to realize that to meet the job needs of large numbers of young people entering the workforce, economic growth would actually have to be over 600%, larger than it actually was. It would seem that the Khatami team in their hearts did not believe that their efforts, no matter how well-intentioned, would achieve such results (**Daniel, 2001**).

In foreign policy, Khatami continued to pursue and follow the policies of his predecessor, Rafsanjani, especially in the region. There were serious attempts by Iran to improve relations with Arab nations and between them, as well as among and between non-Arab Islamic nations. This is certainly a positive thing for Khatami to do since Iran is a non-Arab Islamic nation with historically strong ties throughout the region. In fact historically, at one time Iran was the most powerful and influential nation throughout the region.

In essence, Khatami's new foreign policy meant that Iran, at least rhetorically, was interested in reducing tensions throughout the region. Nevertheless, no matter how hard Khatami and his team tried to create at least even the impression of foreign policy change, the reality more often than not, seemed to indicate otherwise. For example, tensions with neighboring Iraq continued, and perhaps became even stronger. Iraq, run by the tyrannical Sunni Muslim dictator, Saddam Hussein, never liked Eastern neighbor, Shiite led Iran. Saddam always needed to maintain external tensions with neighbors to focus Iraqis on other issues instead of him as their tyrant. At the same time, Khatami, no matter how well intentioned, had to deal with the Sunni led Taliban in eastern neighbor Afghanistan. The very violent and angry Taliban had just emerged triumphant after six years of Afghan civil war following the Soviet withdrawal.

These newly governing and hostile Sunni Afghan Taliban were in no mood to patch up relations with Shiite regimes overall. Khatami and his group seemed to sense fairly early such realities in the region, and started offering more realistic rhetoric to at least match the ongoing Islamic tensions ever present in the region. Some of the most powerful statements and policies by Khatami regarding maintaining the status quo concerned his criticism of PLO leader Arafat for participating with the US and Israel in the Oslo peace process. Importantly as well, Khatami never offered any indication that Iran would stop supporting groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, or Islamic jihad (**Daniel, 2001**).

Regarding Iran's relations with western nations, it was a priority for Khatami to remove the Western and especially US impression that Iran was not a responsible nation, and was therefore worthy of international recognition. He stated Iran was a victim of terrorism, especially from neighboring Iraq, not a sponsor. Most nations considered Iran since 1979 to be a major sponsor of global terrorism. Khatami referred to neighboring violent attacks from groups in Iraq against Iranians as terrorism directed against Iran overall. He stated his view and policy that groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad, which Iran would continue to support during his presidency, were in fact liberation groups, not terrorists. This is because they were supporting groups fighting against Israel, which Khatami believed was treating non-Israelis in Israel very harshly.

He did manage to improve Iran's relations with West European nations, which is probably his most impressive foreign policy achievement. This is because the US during the entire Clinton administration (1993-2001), continued its aggressive policy of economic sanctions against Iran and continued threatening any nation, especially European, with economic penalties if they expanded trade with Iran. Sadly, Khatami was never able to change the US

image of him, which means his improvement with Europe is all the more impressive. It may be as well Khatami never really intended to improve relations with the US overall, since he sensed his own population and political rivals were strongly against it. He continued attacking Israel very forcefully, which Khatami certainly knew would make it very difficult for his image to improve in the US.

Just over two years after becoming elected, any consideration of Iranian improvement with the US was finished. Besides improving relations with Western Europe, he defended his leadership image stating Iran was taking much stronger action against illegal drug trafficking internationally, and was more sensitive to Iranian young people having greater problems with drugs as well. Another powerful example of how strong anti-US feelings were in Iran, even under Khatami, he eagerly participated in the 20th anniversary celebrations concerning the 1979 student takeover of the US Embassy and taking of 52 US diplomats hostage (**Daniel, 2001**).

During the 2000 parliamentary elections, somewhat surprisingly to many observers, Khatami and the reformists did surprisingly well. I have mentioned Khatami's economic reforms after 1997 were not that successful, at least in terms of the expectations set out by his team. Nevertheless, successful reformist victories in much of Iran during the parliamentary elections of 2000 must be perceived as nothing but continuing overall support for Khatami overall. This is very impressive when one realizes the amount of anti-reform influence in Iran working openly against him, has been very powerful since he first took office three years earlier. When judging Khatami overall, analysts, observers etc., must be highly careful (**Daniel, 2001**). Reaction period analysis concludes a final verdict on Khatami's rule is not yet complete.

Without question, the US economic embargo had a very negative impact on Iran's economic growth, nevertheless, Khatami's group still won in 2000. This is spectacular when one realizes most Iranians did not believe economic performance under Khatami had reached its potential. Most Iranians likely concluded Khatami's performance during his first term, though disappointing, was vastly superior to preceding rule of Rafsanjani and more conservative elements. This is significant for this overall analysis. It means that Khatami and his reformist group were clearly perceived as more competent and preferable than any of the conservative groups, each of whom had strong anti-Shah credentials. However, after experiencing a decade of Khomeini's growing irrationality, Iranians became highly disillusioned with the overall performance of anything related to conservative rule. This is why understanding Khatami's image is important regarding my overall assessment. In other words Khatami,

rightly in my view, was perceived by most Iranians as perhaps the only truly rational national politician in Iran.

When the populace of Iran saw the candidates for public office in both 1997 and 2000, it is clear they concluded Khatami was the most qualified. This observation becomes very supportable when looking at the election in 2000. Simply put, even after three years of disappointing results from the Khatami group, which most Iranians thought were in fact disappointing, by 2000 no one else came close to offering an image or perception of truly competent governing ability. Khatami and his group of advisors remains a unique force in assessing post-Shah Iranian politics. After over thirty years now of post-Shah rule, the image of Khatami though slightly reduced, remains ahead of previous and current post-Shah leadership.

By the time Khatami's two-term administration ended in August 2005, he had indeed achieved important accomplishments. In foreign policy, when he first came to power, Iran had one official friend, Syria. When he left office eight years later Iran had friendly relations throughout the Middle East, India, China, Russia, Venezuela, and overall improvement with Europe as a whole. These were very important foreign policy accomplishments that began the process of lifting Iran out of its isolation, occurring since the 1979 revolution. The only major foreign policy setback began late in Khatami's term, when Iran's secret program for uranium enrichment started causing international controversy. What Khatami actually knew about this is unclear, however, this negative occurrence did not overshadow his quite impressive foreign policy accomplishments overall (**Keddie, 2006**).

In the economic area, Khatami also achieved certain results, which though impressive, cannot be called tremendous. His most successful achievement concerned those aspects of his economic policies which directly raised the overall average salary per Iranian beyond what the average salary was during the final years of the Shah's reign. This is truly impressive when one realizes what Khatami was up against concerning resistance to his policies overall. His economic accomplishment is not great because global oil prices increased in second half of 2000, following parliamentary elections discussed earlier. These oil price increases were certainly the key reason for overall increases in wages, which helped the very poorest in Iran. Most Iranians believed Khatami's economic policies helped them. Khatami had nothing to do with global oil prices increasing, but managed to turn them into economic advantage for most (**Keddie, 2006**).

Where he deserves criticism economically, is in his failure to carry through on promises to make privatization and attraction of foreign direct investment work for all Iranians.

This did not happen. The privatization program was a failure, as corruption destroyed the long-term goals of this program overall, while foreign investment in the end ended up benefiting only the wealthiest. Khatami deserves harsh criticism for this since much of his promises to lift the poor were based on foreign direct investment creating long-term benefits throughout the economy. Reaction period analysis concludes he was not serious about foreign direct investment helping the poor and very poorest. In the end, it was good luck and good fortune that global oil prices rose, allowing him to divert some of this to assisting the poorest and others.

Regarding improvement in social and political freedoms, here Khatami was far less successful, even an outright failure. Khatami was always unable to control those lawless elements and the conservative opposition from routinely taking the law into their own hands, as many killings of journalists and those fighting for Iran's greater freedoms disappeared or often appeared as mutilated corpses (**Keddie, 2006**).

Other areas of success however for Khatami, include greater liberalization of dress codes and non-enforcement of rigidly imposed norms of behavior dating back to Khomeini. Khatami also allowed and tolerated greater public discussions regarding a variety of issues. Though anti-Khatami forces tried to eliminate this more open discussion, here the reformist minded president was able to create larger areas of public discussion on a variety of issues important to the public. By the time he left office in August 2005, clear achievement in these areas had occurred.

Of benefit overall to Iran's image and reformist intentions during Khatami's rule, was the completely unexpected awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to female human rights attorney, Shirin Ebadi in 2003. No one expected this. Obviously, Khatami did not expect this either. However, some may assume, correctly perhaps that Khatami's ability to generate more openness since 1997 made it possible for Ebadi to more effectively conduct her human rights work. She was very effective at representing families of prominent political victims murdered by the regime before 1997, as well as helping abused children. She even managed to get through the Majlis a bill that became law allowing children to stay with their mothers if the fathers proved violent. She was also the first Iranian and Muslim woman to receive the prestigious award as well. Some even saw the award as a slap at US policies towards Iran and the Middle East overall, as well as global support for Iran's overall democracy movement (**Keddie, 2006**).

These were impressive accomplishments by Shirin Ebadi, not only helping deserving people, but also having the effect of improving political freedom overall. Her courage, even

before the award was announced, allowed others to take greater risks as well. After the award was announced, her courage saw greater recognition for her efforts and others like her. It must be emphasized that though Khatami's era was probably perceived as making Shirin Ebadi's accomplishments possible, this may not in fact be correct. The larger truth may well be that she would have accomplished this anyway. Khatami in his own mind no doubt claimed some credit for this as well.


Conclusion to Reaction period:

In the end when assessing the Reaction Period, first from 1979 to 1989, we certainly witness a very emotional reaction against anything related to the Shah's rule. For a few years following Khomeini's coming to power after the Shah fled, things seemed promising and optimistic for most Iranians. By the end of Khomeini's time in power, most Iranians were disillusioned with him. For this reason it is important to remind readers what I stated earlier in this dissertation: despite the many negatives regarding the overall rule of the Shah, at least economically he seems to have given most Iranians better opportunities than much or most of Iran's post-1979 revolutionary/ideological leadership.

This significant point becomes all the more important when we realize we are over thirty years since the Shah's fall. It is simply quite surprising to realize that only during the short period after global oil prices increased in 2000 during Khatami's rule, did most Iranians feel their living standards improved. During the Shah's rule by contrast, living standards were generally higher economically, which I stated earlier is significant when assessing the post-Shah Islamic regimes running Iran.

A further key indicator for understanding how much stronger the Shah's economic performance was can be seen by the amount of foreign debt the Shah had to deal with. The graph below clearly shows that both short-term debt and external debt under the Shah was much, much less of a problem than Iran's overall debt problems after the Shah. We may also assume that Iran's economic record under the Shah concerning debt would be a good model for any economy in the world today considering how much government debt exists presently.

Figure 11. Foreign Debt



Sources: Central Bank of Iran Website; World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2007*.

Of course, this dissertation also assessed the impact of the Shah's lack of political freedoms, which were certainly painful for most Iranians as well. However, as we have already seen with Khomeini, Rafsanjani, and even Khatami, it would seem political and press freedoms were very limited also. Therefore, on balance, it would be difficult to state post-Shah leadership in Iran offered Iranians greater living standards overall for most, compared to the Shah. In assessing the impact of the Shah's rule over time, it becomes important to analyze post-Shah leadership as objectively as possible. In this sense, Khomeini, Rafsanjani, Khatami and their followers certainly felt they were bettering themselves and their nation. The emotional reaction to the new regimes after 1979 certainly created a kind of momentum. This excitement in the post-Shah context was certainly confident that whatever happened after the Shah would be better. That was often not the case however.

For Iranians, even though they are reacting against US policies after 1979, Iran also realizes US actions against them continue long after the Shah has chosen to leave. Therefore, Iran's reaction against the US during this Reaction period, in many ways seems to Iranians to be mainly against continuing US aggressiveness. Reaction by Iran against the US does repre-

sent some kind of emotional victory at least, so Iranians come to feel post-Shah Iran can feel a sense of justice and pride in their relationship with Washington. However, an overall sense of increased justice by Iranians in their nation did not occur.

THE COUNTER-REACTION PERIOD: 2001-2010

To fully appreciate the Counter-Reaction period in US-Iran relations, we need to realize US policy under President George W. Bush, was committed like previous presidents in responding to what it believed was aggressive Iranian policy since the fall of the Shah in 1979. Therefore, Counter-Reaction, from the US point of view, concerns expanding already aggressive US policies towards Iran, regarding overall momentum of US-Iran relations. The Counter-Reaction period officially begins from the moment George W. Bush becomes US president in January 2001. From that moment, US policy becomes more and more aggressive towards Iran regardless of the regime in power in Tehran.

When Bush first took office, the Khatami regime was still perceived by some in Europe and the West as the best hope for moderating Iranian behavior both inside and outside Iran. Whatever one concludes about this debate, there is little question from Counter-Reaction perspectives, the Bush presidency increased overall tensions in the relationship. This is because the US increased the degree and severity of accusations against Iran as being a strong supporter of regional and global terrorism, and trying to fully achieve nuclear weapons capability at the same time. The invasion of Iraq in 2003, represented the single most direct increase in US pressure against Iran during the Bush presidency, as George W. Bush became the first US president to accuse Tehran of supporting A-Qaeda. This went beyond previous US administrations and their criticism of Iran for supporting regional and global terrorism directly through Hezbollah, Iran's long-time ally in Lebanon and elsewhere (**Byman, 2003**).

President Bush, in his second official address to Congress and the nation five months after 9/11, referred to Iran as being part of an "Axis of evil", including the nations of Iraq and North Korea. These words were very strong and were not appreciated in Iran, many parts of the world, and perhaps even in many parts of the US. For many people, the new Bush policy or Bush doctrine caused many to feel uncomfortable with US policy overall. Clearly however, the Bush doctrine is Counter-Reactionary because it assumes Iran has been the "aggressor" since the 1979 revolution against the Shah. The new Bush doctrine assumes Iran has always been an aggressor, especially against US interests in the Middle East region. This allows the

White House under Bush to pursue policies of all kinds, covert and overt. The Bush team's position on Iran allows it to ignore US and global public opinion for the most part as well (**Alterman & Green, 2004**). This is important to understanding the Bush doctrine.

Once Bush tells the world it believes Iraq is part of the "axis-of-evil", then all policies of whatever kind seem to be justified, regardless of what domestic or global opinion believes. This implies the Bush team from the beginning knew public opinion globally and inside the US would not support such a harsh view of Iran and its leadership. Taking this view as the baseline or beginning of Counter-Reaction analysis of the Bush doctrine and Iran, we may easily conclude this now previous US administration and its influential Vice President, Richard Cheney, always wanted a policy of confrontation with Iran (**Suskind, 2004**). In the end, this confrontational policy was not effective in achieving its overall goals, which were to get Iran to give up its pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Therefore, to reach an early conclusion regarding the Bush policy and Counter-Reaction, it would seem the intended outcome was not achieved. Iran always continued pursuing its nuclear weapons program despite aggressive policies coming from Bush and Cheney. Some might even conclude Bush and Cheney's aggressiveness are the primary reasons Iran seems more and more determined to build nuclear weapons. This argument states that aggressiveness by Bush/Cheney, starting in 2001, convinced Iranian leaders once and for all, including the perceived moderate Khatami, that US hegemony in the region was always the primary US goal. By concluding this, Khatami and all Iranian leaders who come afterwards have no choice but to pursue an independent Iranian nuclear capability. This would be the only way Iran could achieve its own true independence.

Around the world, public opinion in several nations, seem to hold this view. From this perspective, Bush/Cheney policies have achieved the exact opposite of what they were supposed to. Instead of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, Bush/Cheney angered enough people inside and outside Iran into believing Tehran should pursue nuclear weapons further and further. This would drive public opinion globally and inside Iran closer to supporting success in getting nuclear weapons.

Though I strongly criticize the former Bush administration regarding its overall policies towards Iran, people need to realize Iran was determined to pursue building of nuclear weapons as far back as the 1970's, when the Shah was still in power (**Hersh, 2001**). Hypocritically, then US leaders did not criticize the Shah and Iran at all for building infrastructure seriously required to achieve nuclear weapons development, though they clearly were aware the Shah had a growing lack of support. This should have been a warning to then US admin-

istrations, the Shah's regime could not be counted upon to remain in power loyal only to the US. I conclude Washington then should have been as forceful against the Shah's nuclear program as it has been since the Shah's removal from power. Counter-Reaction analysis concludes current and future US administrations need to reconsider when and how to support and criticize regimes regarding nuclear weapons proliferation.

Perhaps the best example of US inconsistency in this regard concerns Pakistan. The US willingly allowed this so-called ally to pursue nuclear weapons capability starting in the 1980's, which ended when Islamabad successfully tested its first nuclear weapons in 1998. The US administrations of the 1980's and 90's did nothing to prevent this, yet Pakistan today is much more unstable than Iran, while contributing to greater and greater instability in southern Asia overall. Simply stated, Pakistan from a Counter-Reaction assessment, is much more threatening to the US and world in most areas of nuclear proliferation, than Iran was or is currently. Counter-Reaction analysis concludes Washington's hypocritical policy towards Pakistan and nuclear proliferation highly contributes to Iran's determination to pursue nuclear weapons. This is partly because Iran's post-'79 regimes and currently, know their nation faces less likelihood of physical break-up as a nation than does Pakistan (**Shirley, 1995**). Counter-Reaction analysis strongly believes a collapsing Pakistan with nuclear weapons stored at different internal locations, is a much greater problem for US and global nuclear non-proliferation/anti-terror policy, than Iran's potential and actual threats are in these areas. Failure to criticize Pakistan openly and bring about tougher US policy responses towards Pakistan, in the areas just discussed, is one of the reasons I strongly criticize the previous US administration of George W. Bush. Washington's policy towards Pakistan, of looking the other way, benefited Iran and its nuclear weapons program.

9/11, The Bush Doctrine and US policy towards Iran

It is important to remember the Bush Doctrine was announced after 9/11 took place, though it would appear Bush/Cheney had already determined their Iran policy from the moment their administration began. Evidence also supports the notion the Bush administration was determined to invade Iraq whether or not 9/11 occurred (**Suskind, 2004**). During President Bush's very first cabinet meeting after taking office, removal of Saddam Hussein from power was a key topic of discussion (**Suskind, 2004**). This is significant because it supports my view stated shortly before that Iran itself would require significant policy attention from Bush/Cheney, because Bush included both Iraq and Iran in the "Axis-of-Evil" speech in January 2002. If 9/11 had never happened, I can easily believe much of what the world saw with

the Bush doctrine following 9/11 would have occurred anyway. Without question, Counter-Action analysis concludes 9/11 made it easier for Bush to sell the invasion of Iraq, including statements about Iran cooperating with Al-Qaeda and global terrorism. The Bush accusations against Iran for supporting Al-Qaeda before the Iraqi invasion were never proven. Nevertheless, it is also quite possible the Bush administration would have invaded Iraq without 9/11, as part of larger Bush Doctrine efforts against Iran as well.

The fact Iran was accused by the US before Bush/Cheney of wanting to illegally achieve WMD was something the Bush people always knew and believed as well. I wish to stress whether or not an invasion of Iraq occurred, the stated objectives of the Bush Doctrine regarding Iran leave little doubt as to what Bush/Cheney were already intending. We must also remember that within six weeks of 9/11, the US had started putting soldiers in Afghanistan. Therefore, the mindset of Bush/Cheney was to now elevate Afghanistan/Iraq to greater importance than Iran. For Iran however, the Bush/Cheney pressure on both Afghanistan and Iraq meant Iran not only faced direct military pressure against it, but also faced continued, powerful US economic sanctions. The western media rarely if ever offered the Iranian perspective regarding this situation. Obviously however, the leadership in Tehran must have keenly felt the US was now pressuring Iran in significant ways: sanctions and military pressure.

Surely Iranian leaders had to feel on the defensive regarding US policy after 9/11. Once the US actually invaded Iraq with over one hundred thousand soldiers in April 2003, many Iranians may well have thought Bush/Cheney would attack Iran next. This would be the third country in that region invaded by the US in less than two years. Surely, the view from Tehran must have been defensive in nature. It is important to stress this aspect of Iran's perception of Washington. It would be difficult for analysts to believe Iran would feel it was the aggressor when Washington clearly has overwhelming economic and military power deployed directly and indirectly against it. An important question then must be asked. Why do so many in the US policy making establishment see Iran as the aggressor in the overall US relationship with Iran? The answer for now clearly is US concern over Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons. But most importantly, we are forced to comprehend whether US policy is actually logical in this case.

If Iran succeeds in developing a nuclear weapon, why should Washington under any president consider this a threat to the US? It is not wise or practical to assume Iran would wish to anger the US and provoke a major US military strike against Iran from a nuclear armed US. Therefore, what is Iran doing and why does the US not see Iran's logic? Because

it appears the US believes Iran can sell or secretly deliver directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons to terror related groups that could then secretly threaten the US directly or indirectly. While this fear may be legitimate, we still are confronted with the fact Washington did nothing while its “ally” Pakistan, mentioned earlier, appears to have helped Iran and North Korea on their path towards achieving nuclear weapons (**Hersh, 2001**).

Pakistan’s chief nuclear scientist, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, known by many in that nation as the father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb since he began directing that program from the late 1970’s, made at least one confirmed secret visit to Iran in early 2001, before 9/11. Though US intelligence had him under surveillance, they concluded he brought no materials with him, but did bring his memory of important nuclear knowledge (**Hersh, 2001**). The important point here is the US again seemed to do nothing while observing their ally Pakistan, allow its chief nuclear scientist to visit North Korea and Iran. If Dr. Khan had been an Iranian scientist, it may well be the US or more likely the Israelis might have killed him to prevent nuclear knowledge going to Tehran. Therefore, Counter-Reaction analysis concludes US nuclear non-proliferation and anti-terror policy is very inconsistent, which I conclude is a greater threat itself than Iran’s long-term attempts to obtain a nuclear weapons.

Fear of Iran spreading or selling nuclear weapons and/or related materials is credible if the US leadership always assumes worst intentions regarding Iran. However, as was just mentioned with Dr. Khan, if the US would focus more on reducing Iran’s contact with potential or actual sources of nuclear materials, this I believe would be the more realistic option for the US. Since the US has and is behaving with a Counter-Reaction mentality, meaning the US is “countering” what it believes is Iran’s illegal and aggressive behavior in pursuing weapons of mass destruction, US leaders must truly believe Tehran intends to attack its interests directly, or indirectly help certain terror groups achieve this. While certainly a possibility, I conclude in the larger context of US Counter-Reaction outcomes, the best solution in this area would be for the US to work very closely with Russia to prevent Iran’s accessing enough material and knowledge to achieve full production of a nuclear weapon.

The US is moving in this direction at present with improved relations with Russia under the current Obama administration. The US relationship with Russia during the 1990’s, also attempted to convince Russia to discontinue working with Iran on its nuclear program, however, Russia’s grossly underpaid nuclear scientists and poorly motivated nuclear monitoring group did little in this area. Instead, the need for cash and economic aid in Russia was so great then Russian foreign policy was not seriously interested in working against Iran. Stated differently, during the 1990’s, long-term unpaid Russian scientists and nuclear monitors were

comfortable in assuming Iran would achieve its goal of acquiring nuclear weapons capability, therefore, Russia should work with Iran, not against it (**Hersh, 2001**). Counter-Reaction analysis concludes if the US currently can truly convince Russia to actively resist Tehran's attempt to build nuclear weapons, this will achieve more for US nuclear non-proliferation policy than most other options. Motivating Russian scientists into non-cooperation with Iran, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iraq would be the most significant achievement for the US against Tehran.

I wish to emphasize I do not believe Iran's current leadership is respectable, pragmatic, or even rational. I am stating that if a nation like Iran is going to such effort to pursue nuclear weapons capability, against the wishes of much of the global community, then one should conclude Tehran believes possession of nuclear capability will help Iran survive. Not only survive but offer more protection for itself against other nuclear powers. Counter-Reaction period analysis concludes this is surely what Iran's leaders are pursuing. It simply is not feasible or even rational to think or assume Iran's leadership, no matter how extreme, would risk complete destruction of their nation just to try and detonate one nuclear weapon. If Iranian leaders are going to such great efforts to currently play hide and seek with the US and global community, it would seem more rational for US policymakers or anyone to assume Iran's current leadership is mainly interested in achieving nuclear weapons capability so outside powers cannot threaten Iran like before.

From Iran's perspective, should they actually develop and test a nuclear device, this would allow Iran's leaders greater confidence in feeling less intimidated by foreign powers. After all, isn't this why nations like the US, Russia, France, Britain, and China developed nuclear weapons? Of course it is. No nation wishes to be threatened by nuclear blackmail from another power. This is perhaps the most consistent lesson of political history in any era. Therefore, to assess the effectiveness of US Counter-Reaction policies towards Iran, beginning with the US presidency of George W. Bush, there is no choice but to assess whether the US should actually feel threatened by Iran. Counter-Reaction simply means a nation's leaders feel the need to counter what it perceives, in this case Iran's decision to have a nuclear weapon.

Just because the Bush administration chooses to believe Iran would use such weapons against other nations does not mean US policy has sound logic behind it. By this standard, the US could choose to say that Brazil, Argentina, or Japan, all with potential nuclear weapons capability, should have complete economic sanctions imposed against them, with the threat of massive US military attack as well. Of course, this is a ridiculous argument but makes the

larger point. While there is a valid point against comparing them to Iran, it does not change the fact those three nations, unlike Iran, could choose to actually build nuclear weapons in much shorter time than Tehran. Based on the logic of US Counter-Reaction since 2001, the US should now threaten any nation that has the ability to construct weapons of mass destruction, even though they have never chosen to begin actual development. This would mean the US should now be threatening Brazil, Argentina, and Japan. It is difficult to believe the US would find any significant support for such a move.

Counter-Reaction analysis believes the logic used by the US since 2001 to justify Counter-Reaction policies against Iran is flawed, unsupportable, and may actually increase the threat of terrorism against the US. (As I said before, more time is still needed however, before I conclude the Bush Doctrine was a complete failure). Another example to support my arguments against the Bush Doctrine concerns North Korea. When US President Bush announced the “Axis of Evil” speech in January 2002, he mentioned North Korea as one of three rogue nations that should never be allowed to have nuclear weapons. The clear implication behind that speech was US military power if need be, be used to prevent any of the three “Axis” nations, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea from achieving actual nuclear weapons capability. As of this writing, it does appear North Korea has already achieved creation of at least one nuclear weapon, with the International Crisis Group estimating North Korea had and has the potential to build over 200 nuclear weapons by this year, 2010, warning time is running out for a peaceful outcome to the nuclear crisis in Korea (**Alterman & Green, 2004**). The Bush administration since taking office in January 2001, clearly tolerated this event without using US military power to stop it. Primary examples concerning how dangerous Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech were and still are concern the following:

“In December 2002 [eleven months after the speech] the North Koreans shocked most of the world by ordering the three IAEA inspectors to leave the country, shutting down cameras monitoring the nuclear complex in Yongbyon and removing the IAEA seals in their nuclear facilities. The following month, Pyongyang announced it had withdrawn from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), restarted its small research reactor, and began removing spent nuclear fuel rods for likely reprocessing into weapons-grade plutonium. In October 2003, it announced that it had finished reprocessing spent fuel rods into plutonium and now possesses ‘nuclear deterrence’ – another way of saying it has the bomb. No independent confirmation was available” (**Alterman & Green, 2004, pp. 314-315**).

Based on these just-mentioned developments, it would seem North Korea has the atomic bomb. Based on the evidence quoted above, Counter-Reaction analysis fully accepts

this fact, because of the above and other powerful forms of evidence. Subsequent statements and actions by the North Koreans leave no doubt about this as well. This chilling realization also sheds further light on overall inconsistencies regarding stated objectives of the Bush doctrine. By violating the doctrine's threat that US military power would be used to prevent North Korea, Iran, and Iraq from testing a nuclear weapon, it does seem the Bush doctrine has lost credibility since announced in January 2002. Counter-Reaction analysis thus concludes the speech itself had a completely opposite affect from Bush administration intentions.

Even before Bush's speech, he had already begun undermining extremely important negotiations occurring from the previous Clinton administration, which were in the process of bringing North Korea more directly as a functioning participant into the regime of international relations (**Alterman & Green, 2004**). In other words, President Bush himself was already determined to undermine the more successful outcomes the previous Clinton administration had achieved with North Korea, though Bush no doubt did not see it this way. For example, when former South Korean president Kim Dae Jung (Nobel Laureate) came to the White House shortly after Bush took office in 2001, the new US president shocked all of South Korea and its president at the same time by publicly criticizing the 1994 Agreed Framework, which both nations until then were strongly supporting. This effective framework agreement had frozen the North's advanced plutonium-processing, which was then larger than the combined amounts of India, Israel, and Pakistan, with the North receiving economic aid in return for keeping their pledge (**Alterman & Green, 2004**).

No less an authority than US General Wesley Clark, at that time stated his belief once the Bush administration took office in 2001 and immediately began weakening the Agreed Framework, continuing too and through the "Axis of Evil Speech" a year later, North Korea decided the US would never tolerate the North Korean regime. Clark believes final confirmation of the US threat to North Korea occurred when Bush ordered the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, only two months after Bush's speech. North Korea's regime, perhaps understandably, now felt there was no going back. According to General Clark, speaking after Mr. Bush ordered the Iraqi invasion in late March:

"The red line's already been crossed in North Korea, to be honest. That red line was crossed while we were engaged with Iraq. And North Koreans have told us, and I don't have any information that would contradict this, that they've begun reprocessing the plutonium and that it's mostly completed in the reprocessing. This was what we tried to prevent starting in 1994, and we had it frozen for several years. But if they've moved it, if its reprocessed, if its out in the system, then what it means is that even a preemptive strike on their facility won't neces-

sarily get the nuclear material, and you have to live with the consequences of that” (**Alterman & Green, 2004, pp. 315-316**).

Incredibly, it does appear the above quote was already the reality for North Korea the very moment Mr. Bush was saying instead the same thing about Iraq, before ordering the invasion. Counter-Reaction analysis strongly believes the Bush administration knew these larger truths but tried to hide them from the public. Counter-Reaction analysis notes that in mid-2003, after the Iraq war began, former Clinton administration defense secretary, William Perry, a close follower of Korean developments, concluded then as well: “The nuclear program now under way in North Korea poses an imminent danger of nuclear weapons being detonated in American cities” (**Alterman & Green, 2004, p. 316**). Finally, a US official is quoted as saying Bush administration toleration of a nuclear North Korea, after the Bush doctrine stated it would not, sends the same message to Iran the invasion of Iraq sent to North Korea: “Get your nuclear weapons quickly, before the Americans do to you what they’ve done to Iraq, because North Korea shows once you get the weapons, you’re immune [from US attack]” (**Alterman & Green, 2004, p. 316**).

This reality requires this analysis to assess Iran’s possible response to US failure in preventing North Korea from achieving its own nuclear weapons capability. Certainly, Iran’s determination to achieve its own nuclear weapons capability was reinforced by Bush administration’s failure to enforce the Bush doctrine with direct military action against North Korea. How much that failure influenced Iran is not yet known. For current US policymakers, it should be assumed failure of the Bush doctrine to prevent North Korea in this area did increase the motivation of Iran to realize its nuclear ambitions. However, the larger truth as well is that Iran has been misleading, lying, and deceiving the world for over thirty years, going back to the Shah, regarding its nuclear program. This is well before North Korea achieved its realization of completed nuclear weapons development.

Nevertheless, but confidently after seeing evidence, I continue to conclude as stated earlier in this section, the largest threat still facing the Bush doctrine and US nuclear non-proliferation policy overall, concerns successive failure of US administrations in preventing Washington’s “ally” Pakistan, from supporting the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea. Counter-Reaction analysis concludes Pakistan, at least as much as Bush doctrine threats and most likely more so, made it possible for Iran and North Korea to reach their current level of nuclear weapons achievement or near achievement Iran currently has. Some analysts believe Pakistan supplied or wanted to provide at least ten years worth of advanced nuclear weapons knowledge, research, and technical support to Iran and North Korea, including but

not limited to warhead-design specifics, greatly advanced technology, and weapons-testing data. Anything the global market in this area would and could allow for Pakistan, no matter the negative impact on global nuclear security, was pursued (**Alterman & Green, 2004**).

Counter-Reaction analysis concludes as well, the global community outside the US believes the situation with Pakistan is more threatening to US security than either Iran or North Korea, and far more threatening than with Iraq since the Bush administration took office. I conclude as well the Bush administration never recognized, or perhaps never wished to recognize, China's crucial diplomatic and overall vital role in trying to work with and contain North Korea at the same time. This was yet another serious error by the Bush administration, which has greatly increased tensions with North Korea *and Iran*. Counter-Reaction analysis concludes China's very positive role with the on-going North Korean crisis, indicates Beijing's growing maturity and confidence regarding its increasing role in international affairs (**Medeiros & Fravel, 2003**).

Regarding continuing tensions with Iran, I conclude the US should actively seek to have China directly involved diplomatically in overall US anti-proliferation efforts regarding Tehran. It would be a serious miscalculation by current and future US administrations to insist China, like the former Soviet Union and now Russia, be prevented from having major diplomatic influence throughout the southwest Asia region. Allowing China great diplomatic influence convinces Beijing the US recognizes China's growing legitimate interests in southwest Asia. Should Washington refuse to do this, an unappreciated Beijing will be yet more motivated to increase its highly effective though destabilizing missile sales to Iran, and anyone else willing and able to purchase. The latter outcome is surely not in the US interest concerning making Iran less threatening to its neighbors, larger region, the US itself, and US interests worldwide (**Medeiros & Fravel, 2003**).

Iran's pursuit Of Nuclear Weapons and the US response:

For over two decades Iran has attempted to pursue nuclear weapons capability against the wishes of the United States primarily, leaving out US support for the Shah's original nuclear construction efforts. (It must be stressed the Shah began Iran's nuclear weapons program because he envisioned and wanted a nuclear-armed Iran. He could never imagine his program falling into the hands of the enemies of his father and himself, the Ayatollahs (**Melman, Y., & Javedanfar, 2007**)). Over time however, more of the international community has come together to condemn Iran as well in this regard. What is important for this disserta-

tion and overall analysis is to realize Iran's determination to achieve nuclear weapons occurs in a more complex setting than US administrations have been willing to see.

The US position under the Bush doctrine refers to Iran as being an outlaw nation, which must be confronted by global powers. Such coordination by major global players it is assumed will deter and prevent Iran from achieving nuclear weapons. While this so-called US "logic" may sound persuasive to some, especially US viewers, an objective look at the larger issues surrounding Iran's determination quickly shows Iran is motivated by far different issues than US administrations seem capable or willing to admit.

Because of history, most Iranians share certain memories of historic domination of their nation by Russia, Britain, and then the US (from the end of WWII until 1979). Though Iran is split internally between those who rule the nation as a dictatorship and those who want democracy, no one should doubt the collective memory of foreign domination by these same Iranians overall. Therefore, understanding Iran's motivation to achieve nuclear weapons is easier to perceive in a more rational light when we include the fact Iran is surrounded by nuclear powers. Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and Israel all are major nuclear powers while some having historically hostile relations with Iran. When I include the US in this category with other nuclear powers just mentioned, it becomes obvious Iran has tremendous fears of encirclement by each of these nations. This one fact would seem to be obvious to objective observers, yet it seems to go unnoticed with US administrations, especially the most recent.

The news media in the US and west in general, is filled with stories, seemingly month after month in which Iran is accused of violating the rules of United Nations Weapons Inspections. As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran like all such signatories is expected to comply with all such UN resolutions regarding nuclear weapons inspections. Iran has not done this for several years, and is accused of being non-compliant with the will of the international community. This has been the primary US accusation leveled against successive Iranian regimes, going back two decades, including the previous more moderate Iranian regime of Mohammad Khatami.

A closer look at US attempts to isolate Iran however, finds the following. First, Russia and China have been inconsistent regarding cooperation with harsh US sanctions against Tehran. Moscow and Beijing want closer trade relations with Iran. Cooperation with Washington in this regard would undermine and weaken Russia and China's overall economy and regional economic development. Brazil and India as well, as larger less developed nations refuse to cooperate with Washington's economic sanctions policy against Iran (**Zakaria, 2009**). This is important to understand, since the Bush Doctrine had called for isolating Iran by the global

community. Instead, it seems US policy regarding Iran is isolating itself, and grows more so with time. Currently, the Obama administration has convinced Russia to support larger economic sanctions against Iran, but whether this achieves its intended result remains to be seen.

Also, the US basically has three options to pursue with Iran if it really wants to prevent Tehran from achieving nuclear weapons capability. The United States can attack Iran militarily and destroy much or most of Iran's physical, technical, and scientific infrastructure regarding nuclear weapons in this regard. Such a major military strike by Washington would most certainly delay Iran's achieving nuclear weapons, pleasing US policy makers. However, the result would be tremendous anger inside and outside Iran, and throughout the region uniting all forces in the Middle East and Islamic communities against the US (**Zakaria, 2009**). There would be a great weakening throughout the region at large and perhaps globally, regarding support for Washington's objectives anywhere. The US war against terror would most likely be overwhelmed as huge numbers of new recruits would join terrorist groups wanting to strike the US. Iran's economy would be destroyed as well in such a strike, leaving regional economic growth worse off than before.

In short, the US would stand to lose very much by choosing a military strike. This option is not supported by the global community at all and finds serious weaknesses in the outcome after such an attack. Again, this part of US policy seems to be more and more isolated regarding global reaction towards Iran. Another option for the US regarding Iran is diplomacy. This means having the US talk and trade with Iran, which ultimately leads to full diplomatic recognition for Tehran and its regime. If this were US policy, which it isn't, it might be easier for the US to find global support. A third option for the US is containing Iran militarily by continuing and strengthening the already strong economic sanctions regime (**Zakaria, 2009**). Newer, more specific sanctions, such as those announced by US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, would target the leadership of Iran more specifically. It remains to be seen if these are effective in weakening the current hold on leadership that exists in Tehran. I have serious doubts however, they will be effective.

A further option would be that the US can choose to do nothing regarding Iran, and remove all forms of economic, political, and military pressure directed against the regime. This would mean full acceptance by the US Iran will achieve its own nuclear weapons capability. This may well be the most realistic policy by the US, since Iran's leadership, whatever else they may be, are clearly not suicidal (**Zakaria, 2009**). This means Iran's regimes, current and otherwise, no matter how unlikeable, should not be feared as irrational. The US has directly supported far more dangerous regimes and dictatorships throughout the world. Saddam

Hussein is the best example of this, as Washington eagerly supported and encouraged him shortly after he attacked Iran in 1980. In its simplest form then, the US and world would likely greatly benefit by having the White House restore normal relations with Tehran. The world will most likely be a more stable place if Iran is allowed to have such weapons. It is clear Iran's regimes do not intend to use them for what should be very obvious reasons: self-preservation. They would probably only use them if first attacked by nuclear weapons directly by other nations having them.

Counter-React analysis strongly concludes should Iran use any weapons of mass destruction against Israel, Israel's overwhelming nuclear superiority would completely destroy Iran as a functioning country. Surely Iran's leaders appreciate and understand this. The same result applies to any Iranian nuclear attack against any of Iran's surrounding major nuclear powers. Should Iran become irrational enough to do this, and there is no evidence this would happen, Russia, China, India, or even Pakistan could easily overwhelm Iran's still limited deterrent. Again, as with Israel, why would Iran choose to carry out such suicidal policies. I am confident they would not even consider attacking first more powerful nuclear armed countries, if not attacked first themselves.

Finally, I have already mentioned the use of nuclear weapons by Iran against any US interest would bring about an overwhelming nuclear response from US leaders, completely devastating Iran and its infrastructure. It should be obvious Iran's leaders, while perhaps unlikeable and not obeying international law, are not suicidal. Again, they want to have nuclear weapons to survive and be able to prevent or deter any nuclear power from ever threatening Iran directly or indirectly. History also shows when outside nations attack unpopular regimes, then those regimes suddenly become not only popular, but very popular. This would be the worst of all outcomes for the US, since the current regime in Iran is not popular either with its own citizens or the world at large.

When Germany attacked Russia in 1941, Stalin went from being hated to very popular. When Saddam Hussein attacked Iran in 1980, Iran's fanatical leadership under Khomeini, which had been falling in popularity, went from being not very popular to very popular. When Bin Laden attacked the US on 9/11, then US president George W. Bush went from not being very popular to very popular overnight (**Zakaria, 2009**). Therefore, any military strike by the US against Iran at this time or anytime would have the same effect. The very regime in Tehran Washington wants to isolate would become very popular. Further evidence for this comes from one of the current Iranian dissidents, Ali Akbar Mousavi Khoeni, who stated

recently, “If there were an attack, all of us would have to come out the next day and support the government. It would be the worst scenario for the opposition” (**Zakaria, 2009, p. 32**).

In the end, everything the US wishes to pursue regarding goals in Iran, would be lost should a military solution be pursued to “resolve” the problem of Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons capability. Furthermore, I want to stress that people need to realize just how often the US committed some kind of direct or indirect aggression against Iran over the years. These aggressive US acts certainly must have left a major psychological scar on the minds of Iranians and much of their population, who well remember on-going US activity, which threatened Iran directly and indirectly. Some of these memories we have discussed at length, like the CIA overthrow of Mosaddeq, US support for Iraq against Iran in the 1980’s war between both nations, US imposed economics sanctions beginning in the mid-1990’s, the US invasion of Iraq, and repeated threats of direct military action against Iran by the Bush administration.

Other powerful memories for the Iranians include the US freezing of Iranian financial assets in the US, following Iran’s taking of 52 US hostages from the US embassy in November of 1979 (**Kinzer 2003**). Also for Iranians, the painful memory of the accidental though shocking shooting down of an Iranian civilian airliner in 1988 (killing all on board, 290 civilians) by the US military vessel U.S.S. Vincennes. No punishment for the ship’s commanding US officer was ever given (**Kinzer, 2003**). Regarding this last example, I don’t have to exaggerate how Iranians reacted to this glaring lack of justice by the US.

Ever since the Shah fell in 1979 however, the CIA has continued to support enemies of all Iran’s post-1979 regimes since then. Many of these Iranian opposition groups strongly supported by the CIA are very active and even violent, and will resort to any means to take power in Iran (**Mohaddessin, 2004**). Certainly Iranians of all kinds know this, and the general population as well is highly aware the US has over 150,000 soldiers on both eastern and western borders with Iran. The on-going US occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan is continually known to Iran’s regime as yet another form of long-term US pressure against it, not just short term. Some US analysts have tried to compare Iran with Algeria, believing Iran’s problems would become Algeria’s as well (**Shirley, 1995**). This is unrealistic and might be similar to black and white US interpretations of the Middle East in general. Such comparisons often miss the mark, and often bring about greater confusion than clarity.

Therefore, in the end, if we are to objectively assess US Counter-Reaction policy towards Iran since 2001, we must conclude Iranian leaders have good reason to be suspicious of both short and long-term US motives and policies towards their nation. This would include

assessing Hezbollah, the global terrorist group Iran has supported for over two decades, as primarily a defensive response to on-going US pressure against Iran. Though there is no doubt Hezbollah is an active terrorist group globally because of overwhelming evidence against it (**Byman, 2003**), Counter-Reaction analysis concludes Hezbollah's activities are seen by Iranians as primarily defensive overall, as the group has also been witnessed to support social and economic causes as well (**Byman, 2003**). I do not agree with Hezbollah's methods and tactics because they deliberately choose to murder innocent people. Objectively speaking however, Hezbollah is popular in certain regions of the Middle East and worldwide.

Conclusion to the Counter-Reaction period:

As we move beyond the Bush doctrine and Bush presidency into the current administration of US President Barack Obama, we must recognize that US Counter-Reaction policy continues under Obama, with some changes as well. These changes seem to recognize the weaknesses inherent in the Bush doctrine. For example, President Obama moved the US away from missile defense policy in Europe, which was supported by Russia. This in turn led to Russia agreeing to at least reconsider its policy on sanctions against Iran. In other words, Russia was now willing to consider sanctions against Iran, which is what the US wanted (**Economist, September, 2009**). This would certainly get the attention of Iran's current leadership.

At the same time, the new US president has aggressively moved to try and isolate Iran's current president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who seems to be self-destructing following Iranian elections in June 2009. Widely condemned as being stolen by Ahmadinejad, these elections have had the effect of isolating Iran's regime even further, both internally and globally (**Economist, August, 2009**). No doubt if the Bush administration were still in power, Ahmadinejad would still be isolated and self-destructing, but the world might have a less favorable view of US condemnation of Ahmadinejad if Bush were still in power. That is because the Bush/Cheney administration was perhaps the most unpopular US administration ever outside the United States. Therefore, we must see the June 2009 elections in Iran, and the deep suspicion of Iran's regime as partly the result of President Obama condemning Ahmadinejad in the eyes of the world. Mr. Obama's credibility worldwide is obviously higher than Mr. Bush's ever was, so Tehran's current regime would obviously feel this. In other words, US Counter-Reaction policy under Obama overall, has much more credibility globally than under Bush. This allows US Counter-Reaction policy towards Iran to have much more credibility since Obama became president January 20, 2009.

This should also help embattled Iranian presidential candidate, Mirhossein Mousavi, who most likely won the June 2009 presidential election against Ahmadinejad, stay in the public eye and put yet greater pressure on Ahmadinejad's regime (**Economist, July, 2009**). As demonstrations grew in Iran, this additionally had the effect as well of making other Arab regimes in the region uncomfortable. They, like the Iranian regime, feel very uncomfortable when large demonstrations occur against their own corrupt and murderous regimes. Nearly all Arab regimes were and are uncomfortable when Iran's people go into the streets anytime, even though Iran and Arab nations have traditionally been enemies. Simply stated, demonstrations against Arab governments in Arab capitals are the greatest fear Arab regimes have. Anytime an Iranian leader of whatever belief falls, Arab governments become very nervous (**Economist, July, 2009**).

In the end, no matter what US President Obama does and no matter what his popularity is, he is most likely to be far more popular than Bush/Cheney was globally. For our analysis of Counter-Reaction, this is significant because US Counter-Reaction policies will continue against Iran as if Iran is the true or primary enemy of the US. For that matter the US seems to always pursue similar kinds of policies against nations considered threats to the US (**Lake, 1994**). Whether Bush, Obama, or whoever is US president, this seems to be a constant for US foreign policy. As we have seen, this assumption is false, even very false. It may well be that Iran, its region and the world, are better off if Iran has its own nuclear weapons. No person can rationally argue that Iran wishes to attack other nations or arm other groups with nuclear weapons and not be held accountable. If Iran did this, or any of its regimes, the response from the US, or other nuclear powers would be immediate and overwhelming. In short, Iran would be destroyed by a massive nuclear response from other nations if Iran used even one nuclear weapon against another nation. There is little doubt this would be the result and Iran is well aware of it.

In the end, when assessing US Counter-Reaction Strategy since 2001 and the creation of the Bush doctrine, it does seem difficult to find areas of positive results for US policy. If we enlarge the US Counter-Reaction policies against Iran and include Obama administration efforts as being more effective, we still must assume the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan under the Bush doctrine, and Obama's confrontational but more accepted policies, are still intended to frighten Iran. Overall, the Bush doctrine did not achieve its stated objectives, as the main goal was to reduce the threat of terrorism against the US following 9/11. I conclude this has not happened. Major terrorist attacks against key US allies, Britain, Spain, and Italy in retaliation for supporting the war in Iraq, should not be taken as reducing terrorist

threats against the US. These represent major increases in the amount of terrorism overall worldwide, especially against US allies, which certainly cannot be considered as increasing US security overall.

Counter-Reaction analysis concludes trying to enforce the Bush doctrine has led instead to greater and greater degrees of global terrorism or attempted terrorism against the US, its NATO allies, and worldwide against softer US and NATO assets. Counter-Reaction analysis concludes populations in Europe, the US, and around the world are tiring of the one dimensional form of aggressive US anti-terror policy. This certainly does not strengthen US anti-terror policy making and is not healthy for maintaining democratic public support in NATO for reflexively continuing Bush doctrine policies in many areas. Though current US president Obama and his team is modifying the Bush doctrine in several key areas, including withdrawing the vast majority of US combat forces in Iraq by 2011, he continues to pursue overall US anti-terror policy in uniquely US terms. It is difficult for me to conclude the Obama team will succeed in establishing long-term trends in US anti-terror policy globally, that significantly finds a majority of the global public supporting Washington's intentions.

An example of this concerns the current situation in Iraq. Basic items for everyday living like electricity still do not exist for many Iraqis, and one can only wonder how long such a situation will continue before nations like Iran can further increase their influence in neighboring Iraq. This is certainly not what US policy towards Iran had in mind, but it seems to be happening at this very moment. In general, while support for the US among the Iranian populace has increased over the years, continued or increased US enforcement of economic sanctions against Iran's population makes it difficult for many there. I conclude this will not reduce Iran's support or motivation to use terror regionally and globally against US interests. While I conclude individual Iranian citizens show growing dislike of their now illegal regime and may throw them out someday, partly because of growing impatience with economic sanctions, I cannot conclude the impact of economic sanctions on Iran's people will reduce terrorism. To be fair to the Bush doctrine overall, I conclude Obama and his team must complete their mission and be assessed before the Bush era can be judged for history.

In its simplest form, the Bush doctrine has had the effect of making far greater numbers of people in Iran and its region angry at the US, most likely increasing the terrorist threat against the US overall. Though not what the Bush doctrine wanted, such a result means Counter-Reaction policy by the US towards Iran, as practiced since 9/11 especially, is in serious need of reexamination. This includes continuing assumptions by the Obama administration that Iran is the primary threat to US interests in the region, not Pakistan. On the other

hand, because of Mr. Obama's background and historic record of commitment to human and civil rights in the US, especially in the Chicago area where he grew up (**Obama, 2004**), I conclude President Obama's policies towards Africa will be much more realistic. If only the Obama administration could do the same towards Iran, how different I believe Iran-US relations could become.

Counter-Reaction analysis strongly concludes Washington is wasting its energy and time by trying to prevent what seems unpreventable at this point for Iran. Iran will achieve nuclear weapons capability. Instead, the US should focus proliferation prevention policies on states that have not yet decided if they should build nuclear weapons capabilities (**Schulte, 2010**). Regarding continued US policy against Iran, Counter-Reaction analysis is in full agreement with those who call for specific levels of containment by the US against Iran now and in the future, whether or not Iran has nuclear weapons.

The US should already assume Iran will get them, and should create containment policies that meet specific levels of Iranian threats whether regionally, against the US directly, and globally. I am in total agreement with those who believe the US should only use nuclear weapons against a nuclear armed Iran if Iran uses such weapons first, either against a neighboring nation, regionally, or directly against the US (**Posen, Ruben, Lindsey, Takeyh, 2010**). At the same time, there are those who say the US should use nuclear weapons against an Iran that threatens or destabilizes its region through non-nuclear, conventional, or overall indirect means (**Lindsay & Takeyh, 2010**).

Throughout the Counter-Reaction period from 2001 to the present, the hypothesis clearly continues its momentum. First, the new US President, George W. Bush, enters the White House with increasing determination to pressure Iran even more as one of three nations considered an "Axis-of-Evil": Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Even before 9/11, the new Bush administration was determined to increase US neo-colonial forms of influence against Iran and its pursuit of nuclear weapons capability. After 9/11, US neo-colonial pressure against Iran became even more assertive, as tougher economic sanctions were applied, and President George W. Bush threatened direct US military action against Iran as well, not just Iraq and North Korea, to prevent Iran from moving forward with its nuclear weapons program. This threatened use of US military action against Iran was a uniquely strong form of neo-colonial US influence against Iran because of Washington's invasion of Iraq in 2003. With US military forces now deployed on Iran's border, the Bush administration believed it had greatly increased the amount of neo-colonial influence against Iran as much as possible, without directly attacking or invading Iran.

CONCLUSION FOR ENTIRE DISSERTATION:

An appropriate conclusion for this entire dissertation begins with the following. Most of the coverage, analysis, and information have been directed towards the first period I analyzed, the Action Period. This is appropriate because the events of post-WWII to 1979 shaped the larger pattern of Iran-US relations to the present. The Action Period is a very significant time in US foreign policy as well, because the US decision to remove Mosaddeq, the most popular Iranian Prime Minister in history, set in motion a series of events and occurrences that managed to push the vast majority of Iran's population against the United States for many decades. The significance of this cannot be underestimated. Once the Shah fell in 1979, Iran's politics became dominated by the most extreme elements of the clergy. The Ayatollah Khomeini, upon returning to Iran from Paris and exile, immediately turned the post-Shah political environment into the most extreme form of religious governing anywhere in the world.

For the US, the harsh reaction by Iranians against the Shah and US leadership should have been a very strong warning to all future US administrations concerning how to deal with Iran or any country for that matter. The fact is, hatred for the Shah was so intense, religious extremism and long-term support for regional and global terrorism by Iran, was and still is a likely result. From 1979 to the present, US policy overall towards Iran has been met with harsh resistance, first by the entire population, and now by successive Iranian regimes, all of whom were legally elected except the current one. Under the current Iranian regime of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, we see the Iranian population moving away from it and moving closer to endorsing and supporting larger US policy and other non-Iranian initiatives towards Iran. While this sounds like good news for the US, the larger point is that strong opposition to the US was how all post-1979 regimes came to power in Iran. Therefore, the mess that Washington finds itself in is its own fault in many ways.

The US really needs to learn an important lesson about supporting dictators like the Shah through neo-colonial means: no matter how loyal dictators are to the US, the population of the dictator's country itself will end up hating the US. This will make it nearly impossible for succeeding regimes in that nation to be favorable towards US policy overall. Perhaps the most important lesson learned here for the US as mentioned earlier, is the Shah's record on economic development. While better than succeeding, extremist, religious Islamist regimes from 1979 to the present, it still does not find most Iranians and outside observers of Iranian

issues, seeing his overall record on economic performance as superior then the combined record of post-1979 Islamic fundamentalist leadership in Iran.

This is perhaps the greatest tragedy concerning the very negative reaction by both Iranians and outside world to the Shah's harsh human rights record. The Shah deserves much criticism, which he has certainly received, but his overall record in economic areas mentioned are truly better than post-'79 developments. This comparative record may never be understood by the US, Iranians, and Iran analysts in the west, which would be a true tragedy. If the US wishes to continue using neo-colonial methods against Iran, like putting the Shah in power, then current and future US administrations should expect similar kinds of negative results. Fairly or not, the reason for this seems to always occur when unpopular dictators like the Shah are removed. From that point forward, all regimes that replace the original dictatorship are perceived by the populace as better or more deserving of popularity than the original dictator.

While unfair to the historical record of the Shah or any dictator, the most important lesson in retrospect is the US should never support dictators of any kind. Wherever the US has done this globally, as with Iran, the results always have negative results for Washington's policies and the local population directly impacted by neo-colonial activities. How the CIA operated in Iran in 1953, and in many similar situations worldwide, are very strong examples. Local populations see foreign imposed dictators as the most negative moment in their history. Many regime problems following removal of foreign dictators, no matter how poorly governed and corrupt, are usually blamed on the original foreign imposed dictator, setting a negative trend in local minds for all that follows. That is the key lesson regarding the history of political relations and interaction between the United States and Iran, since the end of WWII.

In the current context of Iran-US relations, if this or following US administrations truly learn important lessons from over six decades of very negative, unstable relations and continuing between Tehran and Washington, then the following are most important for future conduct and outcomes. The most important would be that US sponsored dual containment against Iran and its neighbor Iraq in southwest Asia, in the context of preventing nuclear proliferation overall and reducing global terrorism, has not come close to achieving its intended result. Dual containment in southwest Asia can mean many things to many people, which is why I am only using the term in a specific way in this conclusion. I agree with those who conclude the US fixation with Iraq and Iran or fixation on nations anywhere, set negative trends overall regarding use of dual containment in any military context (**Gause III, 1994**).

Dual containment, emphasized by military enforcement, must be abandoned by this and future US administrations.

Equally important lessons to learn are much less visible, but very effective US successes in certain areas of its tortured relationship with Iran. Unfortunately, these receive much less public visibility through the media. Specifically, before the previous US administration of George W. Bush, the following positive developments were occurring in overall US relations with Iran, as relations with Iran and the US were improving in the final years of the Clinton administration. In 1998, legally elected Iranian President Khatami complimented the civilization of the United States including remarks meaning the hostage crisis had been too “excessive”, “a pity”, and was a “tragedy”. The Clinton administration responded by no longer calling Iran a ‘rogue’ and ‘pariah’ nation. It said the 1953 coup was a “setback” for Iran, and for the first time admitted that the United States “orchestrated the overthrow of Iran’s popular prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq” (**Cummings, Abrahamian, Ma’oz, 2004, p. 95**). It relaxed economic sanctions imposed since 1979, so “Iranian pistachios, caviar, and rugs were again permitted into the United States; and American wheat, medicines, and spare parts were allowed to be exported to Iran...”[former senior US] policy makers, such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft, and Richard Murphy, spoke out in favor of ending ‘dual containment’ – a policy that had been imposed against Iran as well as Iraq” (**Cummings, Abrahamian, Ma’oz, 2004, p. 96**).

After September 11, Tehran condemned the “terrorist Taliban” (though Bush wrongly stated Iran helped Al Qaeda in his “Axis of Evil” speech five months later); allowed mourning for the US throughout Iran, and British foreign minister Jack Straw went to Tehran for a “historic visit”, thanking Iran for help in Afghanistan mentioning Iran as a partner with Britain in the war against terrorism. President George W. Bush’s first Secretary of State, Colin Powell (the only senior Bush administration official popular outside the US), met Iran’s foreign minister and publicly stated Iran would be officially welcomed to work with other nations fighting terrorism. Iranian leaders responded by saying they would like to have normal relations with the US (**Cummings, Abrahamian, Ma’oz, 2004**).

When the US moved into Afghanistan, Tehran offered to rescue fallen US pilots, allow humanitarian aid through its shipping channels, and strongly pressured anti-Taliban Northern Alliance forces Tehran supported to work with US forces. Amazingly, at Geneva, Tehran’s leadership was crucial in creating an agreement allowing Hamid Karzai, Washington’s man in Afghanistan, to be nominated as president for the Afghan nation (**Cummings, Abrahamian, Ma’oz 2004**). Diplomats of the United States stated before Congress, Iran was

“extremely helpful in getting Karzai in as the president....” (**Cummings, Abrahamian, Ma’oz, 2004, p. 96**). Clearly there was positive momentum building in the Iran-US relationship during this time.

In the context of this pattern of overall US improvement in Iran-US relations before the Bush administration took office in 2001, there seems little doubt Bush administration policies, especially labeling Iran as a member of an “Axis of Evil” during the axis speech of January 2002, completely shocked Iran’s leadership, not to mention the rest-of-the-world. As former Iranian president Khatami was president when Bush took office, and knowing how Khatami and Iran were positively and eagerly responding to the US before Bush became president, Bush administration policies against Iran seem all the more misdirected, irresponsible, and dangerous in terms of creating long-term tensions. In the axis speech, Bush said Iran was “repressed by an unelected few”, though Khatami and all post-’79 Islamic regime leaders were legally elected, including current Iranian President Ahmadinejad in his first election as president, though not after the June 2009 elections. These results have been recognized inside and outside Iran (**Cummings, Abrahamian, Ma’oz, 2004**).

President Bush also said in the axis speech Iran was a “major exporter” of terrorism, which was always true even when the previous Clinton administration managed to improve relations with Iran before Bush took office. Bush continued in the speech to say invading Afghanistan was the beginning of the battle against global terror, leaving no doubt Iran itself could well be next on the Bush schedule (**Cummings, Abrahamian, Ma’oz, 2004**).

Bush spoke of preemptive attack against threats from the future: “The [US]....will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons” (**Cummings, Abrahamian, Ma’oz, 2004, p. 96**). When we combine Bush’s deliberate use of powerful terms from Christian history and his comparisons to WWII (**Cummings, Abrahamian, Ma’oz 2004**), one can easily conclude Iran’s then elected leadership might seriously wonder if they would remain in power long after the speech, or even be alive. Imagine Iran’s leadership right after the speech trying to comprehend what happened in so short a time since the highly controversial US election of George W. Bush as President of the United States in early 2000.

As Bush and his team were consistently establishing a degree of rising hostility against Iran’s regime since he came to office, the timing of the axis speech should be perceived as especially threatening to Iran’s then elected leaders. The most powerful example of this would be the Bush decision to give the axis speech shortly after publicly revealing for the first time why and how the Bush doctrine would be enforced. The document revealing this,

called *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, strongly called for using preemptive military strikes against any nations considered potential threats to the US. This meant the US for the first time in its history, believed and strongly promoted preemptive military action and preemptive war, clearly in violation of existing international law and Washington's own previous policies (**Cummings, Abrahamian, Ma'oz 2004**).

With regard to the Bush doctrine, well known influential US historian Arthur Schlesinger noted: 'During the long years of the cold war, preventive war was unmentionable. Its advocates were regarded as loonies' ” (**Cummings, Abrahamian, Ma'oz 2004, pp. 96-97**).

Though the above analysis of the Bush doctrine does not represent perfect evidence, I must stress there is no such thing as perfect evidence when analyzing the conduct of international relations and world politics. Having stated this, I am confident the observations I have used here convincingly establish a pattern of poorly conceived policies by the Bush administration, beginning in January 2001. These policies are the primary reasons for greatly increasing US-Iran tensions overall, and I conclude have not increased the overall safety of US citizens inside and especially outside the US. In 2009, the murderous shooting spree in Austin, TX and a foiled suicide bombing on a US airliner landing in Detroit; the first by a highly disturbed US citizen, incredibly also a psychiatrist; the second by a well-born, affluent African citizen entering the US, leave little or no doubt in my conclusion that US citizens everywhere, will never return to the sense of security they had before September 11, 2001 and the January 2001 White House arrival of the previous Bush administration.

Though Iran has never been implicated in these just-mentioned acts of terror on US soil, no doubt US public opinion has already been highly influenced by Bush's axis speech against Iran, not to mention Iraq and North Korea. Public opinion in the US, in my assessment, has a difficult time changing negative stereotypes against foreign nations or religions, once a negative image has been created. Bush doctrine policies against Iran, have clearly increased anti-Muslim and anti-Arab feelings throughout the United States, and appears to be the case in more areas of Europe as well. I conclude there is no possibility for improving US-Iran relations in such a climate of tension, generated by Bush doctrine threats against Iran's previous elected leadership, or with Tehran's current highly unpopular leadership. A weakening Iranian economy for many years because of US sanctions has weakened Iran's regional neighbors economically as well. Surely, this can only represent negative implications for overall US security in Iran's region, globally, and in the US.

Following this conclusion, the hypothesis has shown consistently strong and growing credibility throughout the three periods analyzed: Action, Reaction, and Counter-Reaction. It

is clear that US neo-colonial pressure towards Iran, motivated by Iranian responses to US actions against Iran, beginning with Washington's support for the removal of Mosaddeq, has consistently increased in pressure and scope since 1953. Some will always debate who is to blame for the overall state of tension previously and currently existing between Washington and Tehran, but it is much more difficult to refute my primary hypothesis: the continuing, increasing, neo-colonial pressure applied against Iran by Washington since the early 1950's, is the main reason for Iran's continuing failure to achieve or even seriously attempt to achieve its true democratic potential.

This potential requires the absence of foreign indirect pressure of the neo-colonial kind as practiced by the US for nearly six decades now and continuing. The hypothesis has rigorously supported the analysis, arguments, and conclusions offered throughout this dissertation, as evidenced by the increasing, systematic use of neo-colonial methods and forms of pressure against Tehran's regimes by successive US administrations going back to Eisenhower and continuing to the present. A clear pattern of escalating US neo-colonial pressure against Iran was always applied throughout the three periods assessed, regardless of motive, with the intended purpose of preventing and permanently retarding Iran's ability to conceive its actual democratic potential, much less to actually realize it.

Final conclusions concerning US-Iran relations

In its simplest form, US global anti-communist policy was completely focused on only preventing the spread of Soviet influence anywhere and everywhere worldwide. Therefore, US policy towards Iran during the Action period had to be overwhelmingly influenced by US perceptions of Soviet influence and perceived expansionist policies. To its credit the Truman administration in the US, from 1945-53, tried to convince its chief ally Britain to share the oil profits of its Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) on a 50-50 basis with Iran. Truman believed this would prevent the Iranian people from becoming very angry at British and AIOC domination of Iran's economy and politics. We should recall as well, Action period analysis complemented Truman for also having the wisdom to see Mosaddeq as an ally, and not an enemy. Should Britain not share its profits believed Truman, then perhaps Soviet communism might grow in popularity among Iran's people as an angry response to British policy and the AIOC's perceived arrogance throughout Iran.

As history has shown, Truman was right and all succeeding US administrations were misdirected overall, including the current Obama administration, regarding US treatment and overall policies towards Iran. Such shortsighted policy cost the British dearly in Iran: it great-

ly increased the speed with which London lost its global empire. It is worth emphasizing the Truman administration's policies towards post-war Iran, are the only time in post WWII, Cold War, and current history, a US administration did not see Soviet expansion or Islamic fundamentalism as the primary threat to US interests coming from one country, in this case Iran.

The coming to power of the Eisenhower administration in January 1953 changed US global anti-communist policy into a completely rigid and non-compromising policy against the Soviet Union, which did not change for the remainder of the Cold War. This kind of fundamentalism in US policy towards Iran and the Muslim world overall, has continued since the collapse of communism, not least because the entire US military industrial complex is motivated to act against one perceived ideological enemy. In this case, Iran's continuing brand of aggressive and violent global terrorist responses to US intimidation, are seen by Washington as the primary source of global anti-US Islamic fundamentalism overall. The final verdict on Bush doctrine and Obama administration policies towards Iran still awaits a final verdict of history. I have offered mine.

Further confirmation of the crucial importance of US and CIA directed events in the summer of 1953, leading to neo-colonial removal of Iran's most popular prime minister in its history, Mohammad Mosaddeq, concerns US willingness to openly and officially apologize for what it had previously done. In May 2000, during the last year of US President Clinton's term in office, his Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, offered an official US apology for the events of 1953, in which the CIA and Eisenhower administration removed Dr. Mohammed Mosaddeq from power in Iran. As I have stated so carefully, this set in motion the ongoing negative Iranian reaction to the US since 1953, continuing to this day. Here are the exact words of the official US apology to Iran on May 17, 2000, made in Washington, D.C.:

"In 1953, the United States played a significant role in orchestrating the overthrow of Iran's popular prime minister, Mohammed Mosaddeq. The Eisenhower administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons, but the coup was clearly a setback for Iran's political development. And it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs. Moreover, during the next quarter-century, the United States and the West gave sustained backing to the Shah's regime.

Although it did much to develop the country economically, the Shah's government also brutally repressed political dissent. As President Clinton has said, the United States must bear its fair share of responsibility for the problems that have arisen in U.S.-Iranian relations. Even in more recent years, aspects of U.S. policy towards Iraq during its conflict with Iran appear

now to have been regrettably shortsighted, especially in light of our subsequent experience with Saddam Hussein” (Baer, 2008, pp.238-239).

These words, from a recent US Secretary of State and authorized by then US President Bill Clinton, clearly imply the US is coming to recognize events of 1953 against Mosaddeq and Iran were very negative in outlook and result. The apology seems to state the Eisenhower or succeeding US administrations should have been more aware of long-term negative consequences for Iran, the region, and US-Iranian relations overall in carrying out the CIA action against Mosaddeq and his popular regime. While some may disagree with this interpretation, there is little doubt this official US apology towards Iran in 2000, indicates growing US awareness of just how damaging the 1953 coup was to Iranian, regional and Middle Eastern security, and US long-term interests in the region continuing to the present. Also as a result, though Iran is not an Arab nation, perhaps now or the near future can also be the time for US and Arab worlds to realize their larger goals are actually very similar and mutually supportive (Lewis, 1995). In the end, this can only have a positive influence on Iran, its development, and on-going relations with the United States of America.

Obviously we cannot go back and change history, but we can learn from it. The US has much to learn from this tragic case. At the same time, it is doubtful whether the US has actually learned its lessons regarding sensitivities of the Muslim world regarding overall western domination and aggression. Syria is a case in point where the US, though always considering the Syrian regime a terror sponsoring undemocratic regime throughout the Cold War and continuing, has never tried to work with the regime as well. This includes the entire post-WWII period under long-time powerful dictator Hafez L. Asad (Seale, 1988), or following his death with his son, a London trained medical doctor optometrist currently in power.

The US continues to support unpopular dictators around the world, especially in Africa and the Arab world, though perhaps not as many worldwide as in earlier decades of the Cold War. It is interesting to note during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and early 1991 US-Iraq war that followed, most Muslims throughout the Muslim world were quietly supporting Saddam Hussein against the US (Huntington, 1996). Could much of this anger be from events in 1953 and Muslim dislike for the US removing Mosaddeq? Most likely not however, because Arabs historically consider Iran to be their enemy. However, the official apology to Iran offered in 2000 by the Clinton administration, may reflect growing US belief the events of 1953 made it more difficult for the US to establish long-term positive relations with most or all Arab states, all being in Iran’s region. If this is part of the motivation behind the official

US apology towards Iran, then US thinking towards the Middle Eastern region overall is showing signs of maturity.

Importantly, the US should assume Arab anger against the US would exist currently anyway, whether or not events of 1953 actually occurred. It should also be assumed a majority of Muslims throughout the entire Muslim world were against the US sponsored CIA action against Mosaddeq. As shocking as the earlier-mentioned observation is regarding majority Muslim support for Saddam during his 1991 war against Washington and other western nations, the fact this happened should be a major continuing cause of concern for US policy makers especially. In January 1991, once the US under President George H. W. Bush began war on Iraq, the Arab and Muslim world was, “...seething with resentment against the U.S., barely able to contain its glee at the prospect of an Arab leader [Saddam] bold enough to defy the greatest power on earth” (**Huntington, 1996, p. 248**).

It is difficult to exaggerate the amount of anti-US feeling throughout the Muslim world, beginning with 1953 and increasing to the very present time. Further evidence of this comes again from the US-Iraqi war over Kuwait in 1991. Fully seventy-five percent of India’s Muslims, with a population of 100 million, were against the US in that war, blaming the US for that war with Iraq (**Huntington, 1996**). At the same time, nearly one hundred percent of Indonesia’s 171 million Muslims were almost entirely against US military action in that war (**Huntington, 1996**). For the Muslim world then, the US military attack on Iraq in 1991 regarding control of Kuwait, was perceived by some as a conflict between civilizations (**Huntington, 1996**), with US civilization losing a popularity contest with the Muslim world.

These are staggering, even overwhelming percentages regarding near universal Muslim distrust and dislike of how the US uses its power, including threats to use that power against Muslims and the Muslim world. If one were to consider a US attack in the near future directly on Iran and its attempt to build nuclear weapons, that would be the fourth direct US military attack on a Muslim nation since the US attacked Iraqi forces in Kuwait and Iraq in 1991. Imagine that: the US directly attacking and occupying four Muslim nations in the last two decades. Certainly, this would be considered overwhelming US aggression against Muslims overall.

If we leave out Kuwait in 1991, and only consider a near-future US attack on Iran, then the US will have directly invaded and occupied three Muslim nations in less than ten years, beginning with the US attack on Afghanistan in 2001. However one views the use of US military force overall, when it comes to the US attacking and occupying numerous Muslim nations, one has no choice but to assume some kind of major retaliation by combined

Muslim outrage against the US, is a strong likelihood. One wonders if US policymakers are truly aware of the negative implications for the US throughout the entire Muslim and globally as well.

In the end, we are left to pick up the wreckage of on-going US-Iranian relations, wondering when this terrible confrontation will end. Even though the US apologized to Iran in 2000 regarding events in 1953, current Iranian policy continues to act as if the US apology meant nothing (**Tyler, 2009**). These are painful facts and realities that US and Iranian leaders must deal with. These realities will not go away soon. In the end it would seem the US holds the answer to changing the on-going negative dynamics of Iran-US relations. The domestic politics of the US hold tremendous influence leading to outcomes for US policy overall that can be helpful to a large number of nations and interests. Or, this same force can be very hurtful leading to US policies that harm a vast majority of people, while helping only a few. In this context I refer primarily here to US domestic support for Israel, which is extremely influential at creating US foreign policy outcomes.

Perhaps the most serious study ever done regarding the negative influence of the pro-Israel lobby in the US on US foreign policy was recently published. Its conclusions certainly deserve special mention here. Of particular interest for this conclusion regarding how the US primarily holds the cards to changing and achieving much better Iran-US relations, the following statements from the official study conclusion should be quoted directly:

“...we traced the lobby’s impact on U.S. Middle East policy and argued that its influence has been unintentionally harmful to the United States and Israel alike. Washington’s reflexive support for Israel has fueled anti-Americanism throughout the Arab and Islamic world and undermined the U.S. image in many other countries as well. The lobby has made it difficult for U.S. leaders to pressure Israel, thereby prolonging the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This situation gives Islamic terrorists a powerful recruiting tool and contributes to the growth of Islamic radicalism. Turning a blind eye to Israel’s nuclear programs and human rights abuses has made the United States look hypocritical when it criticizes other countries on these grounds, and it has undermined American efforts to encourage political reform throughout the Arab and Islamic world.

The lobby’s influence helped lead the United States into a disastrous war in Iraq and has hamstrung efforts to deal with Syria and Iran. It also encouraged the United States to back Israel’s ill-conceived assault on Lebanon, a campaign that strengthened Hezbollah, drove Syria and Iran closer together and further tarnished America’s global image. The lobby bears considerable, though not complete, responsibility for each of these developments, and none

of them was good for the United States. The bottom line is hard to escape: although America's problems in the Middle East [and Iran] would not disappear if the lobby were less influential, U.S. leaders would find it easier to explore alternative approaches and be more likely to adopt policies more in line with American interests...The U.S. invasion of Iraq – which Israel and the lobby both encouraged – turned out to be a major boon for Iran, the country many Israelis [and the U.S.] fear most" (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007, pp. 335-336).

There does appear to be strong support for the idea that key to changing the very negative momentum of Iran-US relations lies primarily with the US. This is so because of a variety of reasons addressed throughout this dissertation. Understanding how Washington and its federal government actually works, though difficult, is in everyone's interest to know (Smith, 1988). Iran would certainly benefit by doing this, leading to more and more influence with Washington. This is what Israel has done to great benefit. These powerful political forces in the United States are very influential, and will continue to have powerful effect on overall US foreign policy outcomes. This is so especially in the Middle East, and primarily so with regard to our main concern throughout this dissertation: the state of Iran-US relations, throughout the Cold War and to the present.

History clearly shows as well that nothing remains the same, and change is always ever present. We must actively work towards creating the kind of change that works for the larger good and not just specific interests with powerful but narrow goals. These narrow goals or interests end up weakening the larger good, and ultimately, it will weaken those who continue pursuing very narrow interests. This will then lead to loss of the one thing narrow interests consider most important: influence.

Therefore, powerful, special interests must and eventually will reconsider their current positions and views regarding US policy in the Middle Eastern region. Failure to do so may well lead to the one outcome these interests fear most: a nuclear armed Iran, willing to use its nuclear weapons against more powerful nations. Though I clearly don't fear a nuclear armed Iran as an outcome if it occurs, I do think and believe special interests always sow the seeds of their downfall and eventual loss of influence. This is because they don't face the realities most others seem to perceive, be aware of, and fear.

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Curriculum Vitae



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PROFILE:

A Senior advisor and project coordinator for multi-national corporations entering the Middle Eastern market in the fields of Transportation, and Energy.

Writer for online media organizations in the field of international political news, member of “Journalist Club Vienna”.

Enrolled in the Phd program of political science at the University of Vienna, institute of government.

SOME ACHIEVEMENTS::

- Along with Dr.Nasser Mansouri (chief Siemens project coordinator in Iran) welcomed the Austrian trade delegation headed by ex-President Dr. Thomas Klestil, January 2004 in Tehran.
- Interview for Slovak news channel TA3
<http://www.youtube.com/watch#!videos=s64TXNKh4iQ&v=by-9QYAW9eA>

EDUCATION:

1982-1984 Elementary, Vienna Public school

1984-1986 Elementary, Tehran International School

1986-1994	American International School in Vienna, U.S.Diploma with I.B.certificates
1994-1995	John Cabot University, Rome Italy
1996-1999	Webster University, Vienna, BA in International Relations
1999-2000	Webster University, London, MA in International Relations
2006-	Phd program in Political Science at the University of Vienna,

WORK EXPERIENCE:

1995-1999	NAMA Ex-Import Gesmbh, Korngasse 7/2 1050 Wien Part-time Assistant to General Manager From 1997 export manager
1999-2000	KASKADE Consulting, 66 Onslow gdns, UK, London SW7 3QB Assisted the Senior Partner in recruiting for major software companies in the UK.
2001-2002	OZALPRINT Co. Delfan Alley 9, Tehran, Iran Conducted purchase negotiations with suppliers in Europe on be- half of the company.
2005-2007	Instructor of International Relations and Philosophy at the International University of Vienna, (www.iuvienna.edu)
2008-	Freelance Journalist, active member of “Journalist Club Vienna”

PERSONAL DETAILS:

Born in Tehran, 01.02.1976
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