



universität
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MASTERARBEIT

Titel der Masterarbeit

South-South Migration: the Case of Chinese Migrants in
Lesotho

Verfasserin

Sarah Hanisch

angestrebter akademischer Grad

Master of Arts (MA)

Wien, 2012

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt:

A 067 805

Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt:

Individuelles Masterstudium: Global Studies
– a European Perspective

Betreuerin / Betreuer:

Univ.-Prof. Mag. Dr. Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik



universität
wien

MASTERARBEIT / MASTER THESIS

Titel der Masterarbeit /Title of the master thesis

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank everybody who encouraged and supported me during the process of writing my master thesis. I would like to specially thank Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrizk and Zhu Jia Ming for their help and encouragement, and Grace Matokoloho Khuto, Puleng Mabathoana, Khetsi Mokane, Solomon Maleke, Khetsi Mokone, Malehloa Molato, Martin Mayer, Mantsoaki Moorosi, Makali Nathane, Matete Nena, Lineo Palime, and Tsepiso Thabane for helping me collect data and information on Chinese migrants in Lesotho.

Abstract (English)

Despite the fact that Chinese migration to Lesotho is not an entirely new phenomenon, we still know little about these migrants and their economic activities in general, and their influence on the reproduction or altering of Lesotho's employment and business opportunities in particular. To allow for a better assessment of this process, I conducted a survey among 86 Chinese migrants in seven towns in Lesotho in November 2011 and February 2012. My analysis of the economic activities of Chinese migrants shows that Chinese migrants in Lesotho, by establishing mainly small retail shops and supermarkets, appear to give in to structural constraints (low demand and high entrance barriers into the large-scale wholesale and retail sector) and are thereby reproducing existing business opportunities. However, by being economically rather successful and employing mainly Basotho, they are at least partially altering existing employment opportunities. Yet, at the same time, they are also outcompeting Basotho businesses by engaging in different business practices (different setups of the businesses and sourcing strategies). I conclude that for the local population, this has negative as well as positive implications: on the negative side it leads to an exposure of Basotho to the (fierce) competition from Chinese migrants. On the positive side, Basotho are responding to the fierce competition by adapting several aspects of Chinese business practices, thus at least partially increasing the Basotho's overall economic competitiveness.

Abstract (German)

Obwohl chinesische Migranten in Lesotho kein neues Phänomen sind, wissen wir allgemein relativ wenig über sie und ihre wirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten sowie ihren Einfluss auf die lokalen Beschäftigung- und Geschäftsmöglichkeiten. Um die Datenlage zu verbessern, habe ich eine Umfrage mit 86 chinesischen Migranten in sieben Städten in Lesotho im November 2011 und Februar 2012 durchgeführt. Meine Analyse der wirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten der chinesischen Migranten zeigt, dass diese eher die bestehenden lokalen Geschäftschancen reproduzieren, da sie hauptsächlich kleine Geschäfte betreiben und den strukturellen Randbedingungen wie der schwachen Nachfrage nach größeren Geschäften und hohen Markteintrittsbarrieren nachgeben. Dennoch kann man auch beobachten, dass die chinesischen Migranten teilweise bestehende Wirtschaftsfelder verändern. Dies zeigt sich zum einen darin, dass sie sich sehr erfolgreich im Wettbewerb mit bestehenden Geschäften durchsetzen. Zum anderen zeigt sich dies an den neuen Geschäftspraktiken, die sie in Lesotho einführen. Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, dass dies sowohl positive wie auch negative Auswirkungen auf die lokale Bevölkerung hat: Negativ ist, dass es durch die wirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten der chinesischen Migranten zu einem verschärften Wettbewerbsdruck auf die Basuto kommt. Positiv ist jedoch, dass es so scheint, als ob die Basuto sich erfolgreich an Geschäftspraktiken der Chinesen anpassen und sich damit zumindest teilweise die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der Basuto erhöht.

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1. Introduction

Having lived and studied in China for two years, and having made many good Chinese friends, both in China and abroad, I was always puzzled by the fact that many Chinese are willing to give up secured jobs and businesses in China, to venture out into the world, and to take up jobs or to open up small shops, restaurants or other types of businesses which meet local demand. I was particularly fascinated by the seemingly large numbers of Chinese that decided to go to Africa. While I had occasionally met some Chinese who were directly or indirectly involved with Africa during my time in China, and had read books and articles about Chinese in Africa, it was not until 2011—the year of my exchange semester at the University of Stellenbosch (South Africa) and travels through Lesotho, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and South Africa—that I was really able to witness the growing presence of Chinese businesses in Africa. Out of all the African countries I have been to, Lesotho struck me as an extreme case: on walks through the urban areas or on minibus rides through the remote areas of Lesotho, I came across small Chinese-owned shops or supermarkets with names like “Friendly Supermarket” or “Happy Fashion Store”. In fact, small-scale business ventures of Chinese migrants have become a common feature of Lesotho’s urban and rural settings. While it is generally accepted that Chinese migrants “are changing the social and economic landscape of many African countries” (Alden and Large, 2010:34), there is still relatively little known about how exactly these migrants reproduce and alter businesses and employment opportunities in African countries in general, and in Lesotho in particular. Holding that the topic is important and fascinating, I decided to write my master thesis about the economic activities of Chinese migrants in Lesotho. In this introductory chapter I provide a detailed description of the background of my thesis, its problem statement, aim and objectives, its research questions, methodology, scope and limitations, as well as an outline of the remainder of the thesis.

1.1 Background

For centuries, Chinese people have voluntarily or involuntarily decided to leave their country to seek their fortunes elsewhere (Wang, 1993; Hamilton, 1999). Although some have returned to their homeland, many remained in the new countries, often forming large Chinese communities. These communities were established and maintained by Chinese networks, i.e. “an invisible empire that knows no borders” (Callahan, 2003:482). The local communities in turn are part of a larger “fluid and flexible global network” (Liu, 2006:150). Historically speaking Chinese migration followed four different migration patterns: (i) the trade pattern¹, which is characterized by “merchants and artisans and, their colleagues and members of their extended families, going abroad and eventually setting up businesses

¹ In Mandarin: 华商 huashang.

(Poston et al., 1994:631); (ii) the coolie pattern², involved short term “contract laborers who returned to China after their contract came to an end” (Poston et al., 1994:632); (iii) the sojourner pattern³, which “included all types of migrants, and was strongly comprised of well-educated professionals” (Poston et al., 1994:632); and (iv) the migration of persons of Chinese decent who were migrating from “one foreign country to another foreign country” (Poston et al., 1994:632).

While many of the early Chinese migrants had the image of “small shopkeepers and clannish ethnic minorities” (McKeown, 2009:317), they are now increasingly considered as “astronauts” (McKeown, 2009:317), who are “in constant movement around the globe, seeking out property, education, citizenship, and market opportunities in myriad nations, feeling comfortable anywhere as long as it is near an airport” (McKeown, 2009:317). Traditionally, Chinese migrant communities could be found in South East Asia, North America and Europe (Wang, 1993; Hamilton, 1999; Callahan, 2003; Liu, 2006; Cheung, 2005; Ahlstrom et al., 2010). However, by the end of the 20th Century, Chinese migrant communities “have become both much larger and ethnically more diverse than in the past, while areas—or even whole continents such as Africa—that previously had only few Chinese quite suddenly became home to vibrant Chinese communities” (Pieke, 2004:5).

The origins of the first Chinese to arrive to Africa can be traced back to the 17th century (Park, 2009:2). While Chinese migration to Africa displays characteristics of all four migration patterns, the two most pattern were the trade and coolie migration pattern. For example, Park (2009:2) points out that there have always been some Chinese who arrived as traders to open up small shops. Nevertheless, the majority of the early Chinese migrants followed the coolie migration pattern: they came as part and parcel of government projects. e.g. as indentured labor under the British Colonial regime, as technical specialists under Mao, and recently as skilled labor for various development projects under the Sino-African cooperation theme (Park, 2009:2f.).

In the 21st century, Chinese migration to African countries has undergone significant changes both in terms of quantity and purpose of migration. Government project workers no longer account for the single, most dominant source of migrants (Mung, 2009:97). They are increasingly replaced by individuals, families and other networks who migrate to African countries to engage in a broad range of economic activities (Park, 2009:5; Mung, 2009:95). These activities range from small-scale farming, petty trade, and small-scale businesses to large scale direct investment (Broadman, 2007; Song, 2011). As a result, Chinese migrants have become a highly visible part of people’s everyday’s life in countries like Angola (Center

² In Mandarin: 华工 huagong.

³ In Mandarin: 华侨 huaqiao.

for Chinese Studies, 2008; McNamee et al., 2012), Cape Verde (Haugen and Carlin, 2005; Carlin, 2009), Ghana (Center for Chinese Studies, 2009; Giese and Thiel, 2012), Lesotho (The Economist, 2010; Park, 2009; Tanga, 2009; McNamee et al., 2012), Namibia (Dobler, 2009), Nigeria (Center for Chinese Studies, 2008), South Africa (Park, 2009), Sudan (Center for Chinese Studies, 2008), Zambia (Center for Chinese Studies, 2008), and Zimbabwe (Center for Chinese Studies, 2008; Brautigam, 2009; Park, 2009).

With a few exceptions (see e.g. Haugen and Carlin, 2006; Park 2009; Park, 2010; McNamee et al., 2012), most research on Chinese migrants in Africa has concentrated on the economically and geopolitically “important” countries like Angola, Ghana, South Africa and Zambia. In addition, research has tended to focus on the study of single cities. This in turn makes intra- and interstate comparisons difficult and limits—to a certain extent—the explanatory power regarding the impact of Chinese economic activities on business and employment opportunities in the respective countries. More importantly, small African countries like Lesotho have attracted little attention. Yet, as already indicated above, it is exactly in countries like Lesotho that Chinese migrants and their businesses have expanded even into the most remote and rural areas. Considering the country’s size, its small population, its strong dependency on one industry sector (i.e. textile and garment industry), its reliance on remittances, and its considerably large Chinese population - estimates ranging from 5,000 (Park, 2009:4) to 10,000 (unofficial estimates) - , Lesotho provides an excellent case to study the impact of Chinese migrants’ economic activities on business and employment opportunities across a broader range of cities.

1.2 Problem statement

Since 2002, Lesotho has experienced a continuous influx of Chinese migrants who set up small wholesale or retail businesses or seek short-term employment in one of the Chinese-run businesses (Park, 2009; SAMP, 2010; The Economist, 2010; McNamee, 2012). These developments have not gone unnoticed among Basotho⁴, and many worry that the presence of Chinese migrants will have negative consequences for the country and its people (IRIN, 2008:2; The Lesotho Times, 2011:1). Basotho, who are engaged in the small-scale wholesale and retail sector, view Chinese migrants as biggest source of competition and as an immediate danger for their business prospects (Tanga, 2009:113; SAMP, 2010:67). Basotho employees likewise complain about the growing numbers of Chinese working in “China shops”, and the huge status and wage differences between Basotho and Chinese employees (Tanga, 2009:113). The perception that Chinese sell low quality and expired goods is equally wide held (Maama, 2012a:1). However, Chinese migrants in Lesotho frequently disagree with

⁴ Although the name of the country is Lesotho, its people are called Basotho (Mosotho is the singular). The language is Sesotho.

this assessment. They feel that they are doing Basotho people a favor, not only by selling “cheap and beautiful”⁵ products, but also by employing Basotho (Tanga, 2009:114). Many of these migrants complain about the hostility of local people and about a lack of safety (IRIN, 2008:2; McNamee et al., 2012:34). Since several Chinese migrants have been killed during robberies or have been victims of other assaults⁶ (Maama, 2010:1; Maama, 2012a:1; Maama, 2012c:1), these claims are not totally ill-founded.

The perceptions of Basotho and Chinese in Lesotho are in line with findings from the above mentioned studies on Chinese migrants in African countries. In these studies, Chinese migrants are assessed as a phenomenon which has a negative, at best neutral influence on the country’s business and employment opportunities (Alden and Large, 2011:34). Underlying these assessments are at least four implicit assumptions. The first assumption is that there are “simply” too many Chinese migrants in these countries and that the countries cannot absorb them without harming the local population (Mohan, 2009:6). Building on the fact that more and more Chinese are opening businesses and are bringing their own Chinese employees, the second assumption asserts that Chinese migrants are providing few business and employment opportunities for locals (Haugen and Carling, 2005:650; Mohan, 2009:16 Giese and Thiel, 2012:5). Turning to Chinese products, the third assumption is that Chinese migrants are flooding African markets with cheap, low quality products, and are harming or even destroying business opportunities for locals (McNamee et al., 2012:24; Mohan, 2009:16f.). Finally, the fourth and probably most important assumption is that Chinese migrants are flexible and feel no obligations towards any particular country (apart from China), thus are at any time ready to relocate to the country where they can gain most (Haugen and Carling, 2005:447).

While these assumptions tell us something about the perceived reality, it remains questionable whether the directly or indirectly implied casual relation between “Chinese migrants” and the perceived deterioration of the business or employment opportunities in Lesotho and other African countries can indeed be established. Thus far, we have little reliable data on which basis we could draw meaningful conclusions about the influence of Chinese migrants in African countries, and especially in Lesotho. On the one hand, local ministries have only partially monitored the influx and economic activities of Chinese migrants. On the other hand, existing academic research has likewise made little attempts to

⁵ Cheap and good products: 价廉物美 *jialian wumei*.

⁶ This includes also police violence against Chinese migrants. On 19 March 2012, a Chinese migrant filed a complaint with the High Court of Lesotho claiming that he had been “arrested by the police with respect to a charge [...], detained in custody and tortured with suffocation, beatings and other ‘atrocities’ during which he fainted several times and in which case he would be revived by being splashed with water all over his body.” (High Court of Lesotho, 2012a:2).

systematically collect data on the demographics, migration patterns, lives in the host community and economic activities of Chinese migrants.

Related to the problem of lacking data on Chinese migrants in Lesotho is the broader problem of lacking attempts to connect the phenomenon of Chinese migrants in Africa to existing migration theories or concepts. The reasons for this are twofold: first, Sino-African relations are a relatively young research field, and it is only since 2006, the year of the China-Africa Summit⁷, that we can speak of a notable academic interest in this topic. The early works were pioneered mostly by economists like Broadman (2007), and development scholars such as Kaplinsky et al. (2007), which focused mainly on macro-level developments (i.e. Chinese FDI and aid), but did not specifically focus on micro-level developments (i.e. Chinese migration). As a result, Chinese migration tended to be treated as a natural, albeit worrisome, side product of growing flows of Chinese aid, foreign direct investment and trade (Goldstein et al., 2006; Tull, 2006; Broadman, 2007; Kaplinsky et al., 2007; Asche and Schüller, 2008), which required no further theorizing or embedding into existing migration concepts such as migration systems, migration configurations and migrant economy. Second, Chinese migration to Africa does not (yet) have an established place on the migration research agenda. Research on migration still tends to focus on explaining South-North migration, and its implications for the welfare states of the North (Castles and Miller, 2009:50). Likewise the focus of literature on Chinese migration is largely on Chinese migration to America (i.e. Voss, 2005; Wickberg, 2007), Australia (i.e. Sun, 2005; Bagnall, 2011) and Europe (i.e. Pieke et al., 2004; Pieke, 2004a; Pieke, 2004b; Nyíri, 2005; Wu and Sheehan, 2011). Interestingly, despite the growing importance of South-South migration (Ratha and Shaw, 2007:5), Chinese migration to Africa is rarely considered within this context. For example, among Ratha and Shaw's "Top 20 Migration Corridors" (2007:8), the most important cases of South-South migration were migration between (i) Bangladesh-India, (ii) Afghanistan-Iran and (iii) Pakistan-India (Ratha and Shaw, 2007:8).

Given the paucity of reliable data on Chinese migrants' demographics, migration patterns, migrants' lives in the host community, and economic activities in Lesotho, as well as the lacking connection between Chinese migration to Lesotho and existing migration concepts, we currently still lack both the data and theoretical foundation on which it would be possible to draw meaningful conclusions about the relationship between Chinese migrants' economic activities and the reproduction and altering of business and employment opportunities in Lesotho.

⁷ The China-Africa summit marked for many Western observers a symbolic turning point in China's engagement in Africa: for the "first" time China showed the rest of the world that it was willing to be a major player in Africa.

1.3 Aim and objectives

Considering that the stream of Chinese migrants to Lesotho is likely to continue, it is important to provide a more comprehensive explanation of direction, dynamics and impact of Chinese migration to Lesotho. From my point of view, such an explanation has to be built on actual data gathered from both, Chinese migrants and local ministries in Lesotho, as well as on an adequate theoretical foundation. The objectives of this thesis were therefore:

1. To collect and analyze data on Chinese migrants' demographic characteristics, migration patterns, their image of Lesotho as well as their economic activities.
2. To demonstrate how Chinese migration to Lesotho is the result of a complex interplay of actor-level and structural factors.
3. To explore how the Chinese migrant economy in Lesotho reproduces and alters business and employment opportunities in Lesotho.

1.4 Research questions

To achieve the above outlined aims and objectives, I developed a set of main and sub-research questions (see below). These questions are grounded in interdisciplinary migration approaches, and built on three specific concepts from migration studies: migration systems, migration configuration and migrant economy⁸ (for more details see Chapter 2).

1. *Direction of migration: the role of migration systems for facilitating Chinese migration to Lesotho.*
 - 1.1 Which historical links exist between China and Lesotho that facilitated the creation of the Sino-Basotho migration system?
 - 1.2 How did the Sino-Basotho migration system develop over time?
2. *Intra-migration system dynamics: the role of migration configurations for sustaining Chinese migration to Lesotho.*
 - 2.1 What do the demographic characteristics of Chinese migrants in Lesotho tell us about the Chinese migration configuration?
 - 2.2 What do migration patterns of Chinese migrants in Lesotho tell us about the Chinese migration configuration?
 - 2.3 What do the problem solving strategies of Chinese migrants in Lesotho tell us about the Chinese migration configuration?
3. *Impact of migration: the role of the Chinese migrant economy for reproducing and altering employment and business opportunities in Lesotho.*
 - 3.1. How do the economic activities of Chinese migrants in Lesotho reproduce employment opportunities in Lesotho?

⁸ I also employ insights from the New Chinese Migration Order (Pieke, 2007:83), which is closely connected to the three concepts of migration system, migration configuration and migrant economy.

3.2. How do the economic activities of Chinese migrants in Lesotho reproduce business opportunities in Lesotho?

3.3. How do the economic activities of Chinese migrants in Lesotho alter employment opportunities in Lesotho?

3.4. How do the economic activities of Chinese migrants in Lesotho alter business opportunities in Lesotho?

1.5 Methodology

To answer the above outlined research questions, I used both primary and secondary data. I collected primary data during two research trips to Lesotho in November 2011 and February 2012. During these, I conducted a survey among 86 Chinese migrants in seven towns, interviewed eight stakeholders from local ministries in Lesotho, and had the opportunity to access data from Bureau of Statistics (BoS), the Ministry of Labor (MoL), the Ministry of Trade, Industry, Cooperatives and Marketing (MTICM), and the One Stop Business Facilitating Center (OSBFC). For the survey I developed a questionnaire (see attachments A1-A2). The survey was in Mandarin (Chinese), and I tested it in advance in Stellenbosch and Cape Town, South Africa. By conducting the survey and the interviews with Chinese migrants in Mandarin the possibilities for misunderstandings were significantly reduced. By using the native language of migrants communication barriers were lower and the readiness of the migrants to participate in the survey increased. Since the survey contained confidential information, such as the participant's income, the survey was kept anonymous. For the qualitative interviews I developed interview guidelines. I conducted both the survey and the interviews myself.

Building on assumptions and findings of earlier studies (Haugen and Carlin, 2006; Dobler, 2009; Mohan, 2009; Park, 2009; Park 2010), two sets of questionnaires were developed. The first set (Category 1) was given to all those migrants who considered themselves as the boss⁹ of a business, or at least did not consider themselves as "simply" working there¹⁰. The second set (Category 2) was given to all those migrants who considered themselves as working in the businesses (see footnote 10), or those who directly affirmed that they were personnel or staff¹¹. The first two sections of the two questionnaires contained similar questions about demographics characteristics, migration patterns, image of Lesotho and problem solving strategies. However, they differed slightly in the questions about economic activities. For example, Category 1 included questions about the number of businesses owned, the wage level of Basotho, and income of the business owner. Category 2 included questions about migrants' living costs, and the location of their boss.

⁹ Boss: 老板 laoban.

¹⁰ Working(there): 打工 dagong.

¹¹ I am an employee: 我是职工 wo shi zhigong.

While Category 2 at least theoretically implies that the respective migrants were “employed”, Category 1 does not necessarily imply that migrants were self-employed. After all, migrants from Category 1 can be employed or self-employed. Although this complicates a clear distinction between “employed” and “self-employed” migrants, the two categories were chosen in this way because the “practical” ownership structure of many businesses is often fuzzy: close family members of a shopkeeper might neither neatly fit categories like “employed” or “self-employed”. Also, a shop might not officially be owned by a certain person, but practically be run on own or partly own account. Considering this, the distinction between Category 1 and Category 2 was an attempt to take into account the complexity of the businesses and social positions of participants rather than solely their positions *de jure*.

Two things are important to note here. First of all, my approach to gather information on Chinese migrants in Lesotho differs from earlier research in that I decided to employ a standardized questionnaire instead of in-depth interviews¹². This allowed me to have a higher degree of comparability of answers as well as to have a greater number of participants¹³. Since I conducted the survey myself, there was still room for participants to share their personal views and experiences, i.e. to gather information about issues which were too complex to be included in the standardized questionnaire. Moreover, this method allowed me to cover a larger number of towns. Second, the final number of participants in the survey was 86. This is considerably more than the 22 interviews McNamee et al. (2012) conducted. However, with the number of Chinese migrants in Lesotho estimated to be around 5,000 to 10,000 people, my survey is not representative of Chinese migrants in Lesotho (i.e. only approximately one and two percent coverage). Nevertheless, it is still possible to deduce indications about broader trends and phenomena of Chinese migrants in Lesotho, which future research can further specify.

The guidelines for the interviews with the stakeholder from local ministries were divided into six thematic parts: (i) profile of Chinese in Lesotho, (ii) migration patterns of Chinese in Lesotho, (iii) relation of Chinese with their host community, (iv) impact of the Chinese on local economy, (v) impact of Chinese migrants on employment opportunities, and (vi) regulatory response to the activities of Chinese in Lesotho. The interviews were conducted in English and in one case in German. Depending on the professional background of the interviewee, priorities for the interview were set and key questions were sent out in advance in order to collect more detailed information on certain topics. In this thesis, parts of the

¹² For example, Park (2010) and McNamee et al. (2012) used in-depth interviews as the primary method to collect information.

¹³ Park and her research team conducted “thirty in-depth interviews, fourteen shorter interviews, and several key informant interviews in Johannesburg, as well as selected places in Free State and Lesotho throughout a period of three years” (Park, 2010:461).

interviews are used to indicate if and how Chinese migrants' economic activities reproduce or alter businesses and employment opportunities in Lesotho.

To provide a better theoretical foundation for understanding the relationship between the economic activities of Chinese migrants and the reproduction and altering of business and employment opportunities, I developed a five stage model of migration, which combines both actor-level and structural elements (see Section 2.3). In doing so, it tries to capture some of the key dynamics of migration in general and Chinese migration to Lesotho in particular. The model builds on four key concepts from interdisciplinary migration studies: migration system, migration configuration, migrant economy and new Chinese migration order. I chose these concepts because migration systems are useful for describing the context in which migration takes places and develops. Since migration systems tend to focus on larger structures and process, the concept of migration configuration was employed to supplement the broad insights derived from migration systems (Pieke, 2004:20). To provide a theoretical background for dealing with a central phenomenon of migration and the prime concern of my thesis, i.e. the dynamics and influence of migrants' economic activities, I included the concept of migrant economy, i.e. the sum of all economic activities of migrants and migrant networks in a particular migration system (Author's own definition). By including migration configurations and migrant economy, it is possible to highlight intra-migration system differences and ways in which Chinese migrants' economic activities reproduced or altered business and employment opportunities in Lesotho. Together with the model, they provide a theoretical foundation in turn will be important for understanding the context of Chinese migrants' economic activities (see Section 2.3).

1.6 Scope & limitations

The survey was limited to seven cities in Lesotho (Butha Buthe, Mafeteng, Maputsoe, Maseru, Mokhotlong, Roma and Teyateyaneng). A total of 86 questionnaires was collected in Lesotho during November 2011 and February 2012. Additional data on Chinese migrants in Lesotho was obtained during personal visits to different ministries (see 1.5), as well as from qualitative interviews with representatives of the Delegation of the European Union, Deutsche Gesellschaft für International Zusammenarbeit¹⁴ (GIZ), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MoL, MTICM, and the Lesotho Business Development Project in Lesotho. The Chinese Embassy and the Chinese Ministry of Trade and Commerce (MOFCOM) in Lesotho were inquired, but refused to give interviews or to answer questions in written form. Although the local ministries in Lesotho were well aware of the growing presence of Chinese migrants and businesses, it was difficult to obtain specific data on Chinese and their activities in Lesotho.

¹⁴ GIZ, formerly Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), is the German development agency. Since there is no official translation of their name (according to their website) I only provide the German name.

For example, the Bureau of Statistics conducts a quarterly survey on employment, wages and profits in the manufacturing sector¹⁵, but does not conduct a similar survey for the wholesale and retail sector. A similar situation is found for the registration of new enterprises. While there are clear procedures, records are only available for selected years, thus long-term changes in type and number of Chinese businesses cannot be easily deduced. Finally, there is no coherent database on the numbers and nationality of foreigners in Lesotho. The applications are stored only manually in an archive and it was not possible to get reliable numbers from the Ministry of Home Affairs.

1.7 Outline

The remainder of my thesis is structured as followed: in the second chapter, I will outline the key concepts and assumptions, which together constitute the basis for my five stage model of migration as well as the theoretical foundation for the subsequent chapters. In the third chapter, I will apply this model to Chinese migration to Lesotho and highlight how a configuration of historical links between China, Taiwan and Lesotho paved the way for the development of the Sino-Basotho migration system and defined key structural dynamics within this particular migration system. I then move on to describe two migration configurations (i.e. non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migration configuration) within the Sino-Basotho migration system in the fourth chapter. This description is based on the findings of my survey among Chinese migrants in Lesotho. The fifth chapter looks at the economic activities of Chinese migrants in Lesotho and how they reproduce or alter existing business and employment opportunities. The sixth and final chapter provides a detailed summary and discussion of the main findings.

2. Theoretical considerations: implications for analyzing Chinese migration to Lesotho

Migration is a complex process and phenomenon that is difficult to mold into a single static framework or model. Believing that it is nonetheless useful to capture some of the aspects and dynamics of migration in an abstract, more generalized manner, I chose to design a five stage model to describe the development and dynamics of migration. The model combines structural (i.e. migration system and configuration) and actor aspects (i.e. migrants and migrant networks), and focuses primarily on economic aspects. I start by providing a brief overview of the four key concepts (i.e. migration system, migration configuration, migrant economy and the new Chinese migration order) that form an important part of the five stage model. This is followed by a summary of the basic assumptions about the relationship between actors and structures in general, and migrants and structures in particular. Finally, I

¹⁵ Unfortunately, the survey does not make a distinction between foreign owned operated and local enterprises. This in turn makes it difficult to estimate the aggregated effect of Chinese enterprises in Lesotho.

outline the five-stage model of migration, which will guide my analysis of the Sino-Basotho migration system (see Chapter 3). It should be noted that my aim is not to develop a general theory of migration. Rather, my aim is to outline analytical tools, which define a set of key concepts and mechanisms that can be applied to the study of particular migration systems, and allow for better understanding of key dynamics of migration (especially in the economic realm) by combining structural and individual factors.

2.1 Key concepts

In the last twenty years migration studies have moved away from strictly employing economic and historical-structural approaches to increasingly employing interdisciplinary approaches. This development is reflected in a growing number of papers that merge different theoretical approaches to arrive at a more holistic explanation for particular migration flows (Castles & Miller, 2009:27)¹⁶. But this development is also reflected in a whole array of concepts designed to supplement existing theories. These concepts include, for example, migration systems (Fawcett, 1989; Kritiz et.al 1992, Bakewell & Haas, 2011), migration networks (Massey, 1987; Boyd, 1989), transnationalism (Glick et al., 1994; Portes, 1999; Faist, 2000), and immigrant entrepreneurship (Light et al., 1989; Portes et al., 2002). Despite their specific nature, these new approaches and concepts are united by the desire to overcome the classical division between those researchers that focus on the “determinants, processes and patterns of migration” (Castles & Miller, 2009:20), and those that focus “on ways in which migrants become incorporated into the receiving societies” (Castles & Miller, 2009:20). Instead of a single-level (i.e. macro, meso or micro level) analysis, the interdisciplinary analysis tries to provide an integrated, multi-level analysis of migratory movements and phenomena.

Believing that this approach provides a fruitful avenue to study Chinese migration in Lesotho, I selected four concepts from interdisciplinary migration literature, i.e. migration systems, migration configuration, migrant economy and the new Chinese migration order. Despite some criticism¹⁷, migration system offers a good starting point for understanding migration contexts and the development of specific migration flows. It has the advantage of providing a contextual, historically informed framework for studying particular flows of migrants, information, goods and ideas (Boyd, 1989:642; De Haas, 2010:1593). Since migration systems tend to focus on larger structures and process, migration configuration is a good concept to supplement the broad insights derived from migration systems (Pieke, 2004:20).

¹⁶ Examples include the merging of network approaches and systems approaches (Fawcett, 1989; Massey, 1994), and the inclusion of social and cultural capital (Massey, 1987; Faist, 2000; Haug, 2000).

¹⁷ Like other interdisciplinary approaches, migration system approaches have been criticized for being mainly “heuristic tools” (Haug, 2000:45). This criticism is not completely ill-founded. The majority still lack well-worked out hypotheses about the causal relationship between its elements (Faist, 2000).

By focusing on particular local places, intra-migration-system differences can be identified. This in turn is important because the country-level perspective frequently overlooks regional and spatial differences, and thus suggests that all inhabitants of a particular country have an equal share in the construction and maintenance of a particular migration system. To provide a theoretical background for dealing with a central phenomenon of migration and prime concern of my thesis, i.e. the dynamics and influence of migrants' economic activities, I chose to include the concept of migrant economy. A common theme emerging from the first three concepts is that migratory flows and phenomena are strongly influenced by the particular context in which they developed. Therefore I included a brief review of changes of in Chinese migration during the last two decades, which Pieke (2007:83) termed the "new Chinese migration order". This concept highlights a set of characteristics, which are not necessarily unique to Chinese migration, but are nevertheless important for understanding the development of the Sino-Basotho migration system.

2.1.1 Migration systems

The concept of migration system has its origin in Mabogunje's (1970) seminal-work on rural-urban migration in Africa, which in turn draws on insights from general social theory (Bakewell, 2011:7). His theoretical considerations were extended to international migration, by amongst others, Portes and Brocz (1989), Fawcett (1989) and Kritz et al. (1992). Together, they built the foundation for our current understanding of migration systems. Following this theory, a migration system is defined as "two or more countries linked together by flows of people, goods and information" (Castles and Miller, 2009:28). Unlike earlier Push-Pull-Factor models, migration systems theory provides a system-level explanation of migratory movements and phenomena by emphasizing the importance of the migration system as providing the context of actual movements, and influencing migrants' decisions to move or to stay (Faist, 2000:51).

Migration systems are broadly speaking "a product of past historical development" (Portes and Brocz, 1989:626). Since these developments are reflected in "linkages between countries other than people, such as trade and security alliances, colonial ties, and flows of goods, services, information and ideas" (Portes and Walton, 1981 cited in Faist, 2000:51) that often predate actual migration flows (Faist, 2000:51), historical links form the antecedent condition of migration systems. The internal structure of migration system is constituted by both structural and individual elements (Castles and Miller, 2009:28). Structural elements comprise the political, economic, social and demographic context of the involved countries, and linkages between them (Kritz et al., 1992). Individual elements refer to individual and collective actors, i.e. individual migrants, groups of migrants, and networks (Castles and Miller, 2009:28). Migrants are—broadly speaking—people who "transfer themselves and their

labor from one place to another” (Pieke et al., 2004:18). Networks are “sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin” (Massey et al., 1993:448). Within a migration system, migration networks fulfill two important functions: they “lower the costs and risks of movement” (Massey et al., 1993:448), and they “increase the expected net returns to migration” (Massey et al., 1993:448).

The interaction of structures and actors in general, and the interaction of feedback mechanisms in particular, explain why migration systems are not static, but highly dynamic. Feedback mechanisms can be divided into (i) contextual and (ii) endogenous feedback mechanisms (De Haas, 2010:4). Endogenous feedback mechanisms refer to those mechanisms which stem from “the migration process itself” (De Haas, 2010:4), and include “intermediate, self-sustaining structures largely created or reinforced by migration processes themselves” (De Haas, 2010:4). Contextual feedback mechanisms are defined as those mechanisms which “affect changes in the migration pattern” (De Haas, 2010:5) by transforming “the broader social, cultural and economic contexts in sending and receiving communities and societies” (De Haas, 2010:4). Feedbacks can be either positive or negative (Mabogunje, 1970:12). In this context, positive means migration facilitating, and negative migration-undermining feedback mechanisms (Mabogunje, 1970:12). Examples of feedback mechanisms include the transfer of remittances, ideas, development of networks, migrant industry, but also mass migration and changes in the structure of country of origin or destination (De Haas, 2010:1952). In addition, transnational and global processes influence the dynamics and development of a particular migration system because (i) “immigration like other international processes does not so much take place between compartmentalized national units as within an overarching system” (Portes and Brocz, 1989:626), and (ii) “nation-states play an important, but not exclusive role within this system which includes the activities of multiplicity of private actors” (Portes and Brocz, 1989:626).

2.1.2 Migration configuration

Migration configuration is a particular useful, yet relatively new concept. It was first introduced by Pieke et al. (2004:19f.) and denotes “connections between the total sum of social institutions and practices in areas of origin, transit and destination that produce and sustain a particular flow of migrants” (Pieke et al., 2004:19). Like transnational spaces or fields, which “consist of combinations of social and symbolic ties and their contents, positions in networks and organizations, and networks of organizations that cut across the borders of at least two national states” (Pieke et al., 2004:19), migration configuration constitute “a field of interaction that is much more than just people living and moving between locations” (Pieke et al., 2004:19). Similar to migration systems, a migration configuration is assumed to be

embedded into a particular environment, and should therefore be “understood as an aspect of other institutions and communities, businesses and employment strategies, migration flows and discourses of exclusion and inclusion” (Pieke et al., 2004:19).

However, a migration configuration in itself does not constitute a migration system, since it focuses on connections between particular local places (i.e. cities, villages) that are embedded into larger structures (i.e. migration systems). Although a migration configuration includes interactions in country of origin, transit and destination (i.e. includes transnational aspects), it is not just a special kind of transnational space or field. Transnational formations are “located in between the life-world of personal interactions, on the one hand, and the functional systems of differentiated spheres, such as the economy, polity, law, science and religion” (Faist, 2010:1673). Migration configuration on the other hand looks at connections between particular areas of origin and destination, and is primarily concerned with explaining the sustaining and creation of particular migration flows. Transnational interactions may constitute one, but not the only, part of these connections.

2.1.3 Migrant economy

The migrant economy is a “regime of accumulation” (Létourneau, 1994:63), which is directly or indirectly linked to the “internationalized process of capital reproduction” (Létourneau, 1994:63). In this thesis, the migrant economy is defined as the sum of all economic activities of migrants and migrant networks in a particular migration system. The concept of migrant economy differs from the previous two concepts in that it is not a concept which is associated with a particular theory or theoretical approach. Alternative concepts to tackle this central phenomenon are “immigrant or ethnic economy” (Light, 1974; Waldinger, 1986; Light et al., 1989; Model, 1997; Light et al, 1999), “ethnic niches” (Zhou, 1992; Waldinger, 1996; Logan and Alba, 1999) and “immigrant entrepreneurship” (Light et al, 1989; Zhou, 2004). However, I would argue that the term “migrant economy” is better suited for grasping the complexities of the sum of migrants’ economy activities. Immigrant economy frequently limits its analysis to the destination country and somewhat neglects the connection between countries of origin, transit and destination. Ethnic economy likewise tends to focus mainly on ethnic or cultural aspects (Waldinger, 2004:51). Immigrant entrepreneurship may provide important insights of why particular groups of migrants are more successful in creating a migrant economy. However, it somewhat neglects the role of structural constraints and opportunities.

On a practical level, the migrant economy includes the creation of migrant businesses (Light et al, 1989:3), of self-employment, and employment opportunities for co-ethnics (Light et al, 1989:3), as well as the creation of demand and supply for particular ethnic goods. Moreover, the migrant economy can supplement “the earnings opportunities available in the general labor market” (Light et al, 1989:3). According to Logan et al. (2003:347), four economic

sectors can be identified within the migrant economy in the country of immigration: (i) employment niche, (ii) enclave economy, (iii) entrepreneurial niche, and (iv) non-ethnic sectors. The migrant economy, like the national economy, is about supply and demand, and the creation of employment and business opportunities. What distinguishes the migrant economy from the national economy is that processes of reproduction of migrant capital are frequently not confined to a particular geographic location because they are parts of migrants' larger risk-diversification strategies (Létourneau, 1994:64). This means that the focus of analysis shifts from the "economic relationships among nations" (Létourneau, 1994:63) to economic relationships among particular migrants and networks.

The migrant economy in general, and migrants and their networks in particular play an important role for overcoming economic saturation and similar situations of structural constraints at both the country of origin and destination (Light et al., 1989:3). For example, Light et al. (1989:3) point out that migrants may overcome economic saturation at country of destination by shifting "capital from the non-immigrant entrepreneurs to immigrant-receiving locality", and by the "use of capital to create employment and business opportunities for the migrants" (Light et al., 1989:3). This means that migrants and migrant networks, through the migrant economy, may not only reproduce the local structures, but also modify and transform them. The modification of the economy of the host country has in turn important ramifications for the host community.

While the migrant economy offers migrants a number of opportunities, it can at the same time curtail migrants' individual scope of action (Light et al, 1989:2). When occupying particular niches of the economy of the country of origin or destination, migrant businesses may have difficulties to compete with already existing businesses over scarce resources (Waldinger, 1996 cited in Logan and Alba, 2003:345). Also, migrant economies tend to enforce a dual-labor-market, particularly in developed countries (Haug, 2000:24), i.e. one sector for highly paid locals and one for low-paid migrants. This in turn means that the situation of migrants, regardless of having employment, may not improve dramatically. Another important aspect of the migrant economy stems from the double embeddedness of the economic, but also political and social actions (Baker and Faulkner, 2009). Double embeddedness "denotes the two-sided nature of communities, markets, and organizations—where economic, political, and social actions are embedded in social structure and culture" (Baker and Faulkner, 2009: 1536). Depending on the interplay of structural and cultural embeddedness in a particular country, four macro states of double embeddedness can be identified: (i) "a society united by social networks and by common values" (Baker and Faulkner, 2009:1538); (ii) "a multicultural society united by social networks" (Baker and Faulkner, 2009:1539); (iii) "society with fragmented networks but united by common values"

(Baker and Faulkner, 2009:1539) and (iv) “a society divided by networks and by values” (Baker and Faulkner, 2009:1540). This means that the migrant economy is not only shaped by market dynamics, but also by complex interactions between migrants, actors from their host community and their country of origin (Baker and Faulkner, 2009). Therefore, the overall effect of the creation of a migrant economy will vary across different migration systems and configurations as well as across time (i.e. from one generation of migrants to the next), and might not depend entirely on the conditions of the host economy.

2.1.4 New Chinese migration order

The new Chinese migration order (Pieke, 2007) is closely related to the previous three concepts, and directly linked to my analysis of Chinese migration to Lesotho. The new Chinese migration order refers to systematic changes in “types, origins and destination of Chinese migration” (Pieke, 2007:85) from the 1990s on. It stems from China’s accelerated economic growth and integration into the capitalist world market (Pieke, 2007:84). According to Pieke, (2006:85), the new Chinese migration order is characterized by a high degree of (i) commercialization of emigration, (ii) involvement of the local governments, and (iii) the rise and diversification of education and professional migration. I would add a high degree of transnational connectedness as a fourth characteristic to the list.

The commercialization of emigration manifests itself in the development of a migration industry that legally or illegally offers migration related services (Pieke, 2007:86). Unlike earlier generations of Chinese migrants, potential migrants no longer have to rely on established overseas ties with family and kin. This means that outward migration has become an option for a much broader range of people (Pieke, 2007:86). Yet, with growing demand for these services, outward migration “has increasingly become a scarce commodity for sale in the market-place” (Pieke, 2007:85). In light of the growing competition, the migration industry has increased prices. At the same time it diversified its portfolio of possible migration destinations. Unfortunately, this increased competition also led to an increase in illegal activities of both migrants and migrant industry (Pieke et al., 2004:94f.; Pieke, 2007:84;). These illegal activities range from acquiring false documents and buying visas, to forced human trafficking (Pieke et al., 2004:94).

Since the benefits from the economic reforms in China were unevenly distributed (Goodman, 2004:17) a number of local governments started to directly or indirectly support or facilitate migration (Pieke, 2007:85; Chen and Jian, 2009:3ff.). Local government initiatives have to be seen against the larger political incentive structure of China. From the beginning of the economic reforms, economic development became an important directive for local party leaders. Moreover, it became the benchmark for evaluating the success of local party leaders, and thus having a direct impact on career chances (Chen, 2005:422). Where the outlook for

local economic development was bleak, local party leaders pursued the policy of development through migration (Pieke et al., 2004:58f.). Examples for this include the initiative of local party leaders from Sichuan to encourage inner Chinese migration (Mobrand, 2011), as well as the activities of local party leaders from the Northern Part of Fujian who encouraged migration to Europe (Pieke et al., 2004). Furthermore, efforts by local governments were directly or indirectly supported by the gradual relaxation of emigration and internal migration laws by the central government (Biao, 2003; Pieke, 2007; and Liu, 2009).

The rise and diversification of education and professional migration is most visible in the large amounts of Chinese students that enroll for “postgraduate degrees at a top-level research university, undergraduate degrees, high school diplomas or short-term certificate courses in English or other vocational skills” (Pieke, 2007:86). This type of migration is largely, but not exclusively, concentrated in Western countries. During my stay in South Africa, I encountered several Chinese migrants who had come to South Africa to send their children to a local high school or university. Also many showed an interest in going to local language schools to learn English. Migration of Chinese professionals is on the one hand a “by-product of educational migration” (Pieke, 2007:86), but on the other a reflection of a growing demand of globalized companies for highly skilled Chinese managers working in China and abroad (Pieke, 2007:86). These companies include Western multinationals, but also large state-owned and private Chinese companies. In the developing countries, this type of migration is mainly linked to China’s development projects. These development projects are frequently full set projects¹⁸ which rely on Chinese managers for the development, execution and supervision of these projects (MOFCOM, 2011:1). But it also linked to large private Chinese companies, like Huawei and ZTE, which seek to enter the markets of developing countries (Broadman, 2007:304).

Chinese migrants have long been characterized as a particularly successful type of global migrants (Light, 1974; Liu, 1998; Mckeown, 2000; Khanna, 2001; Pieke et al, 2006; Liu-Farrer, 2011). Large parts of their success have been attributed to their transnational connectedness which was reflected in their family and kin networks that engage in flexible, transnational business (Mckeown, 2000:319; Nyiri, 2005:660). Personally, I would argue that the nature of Chinese transnational connectedness has changed. The falling costs of communication and new communication technologies such as instant messengers (e.g. Skype, QQ and MSN Messenger) and social networks (e.g. Xiaonei¹⁹) have made it possible for Chinese migrants to establish and maintain contact with large numbers of people. This means that information

¹⁸ Full-set or complete project: 全套项目 quantaoxiangmu.

¹⁹ Similar to Facebook or the German Studi VZ: 校内 (xiaonei).

about particular migration destination, particular goods and services can be obtained faster and at much lower costs. Contacts with friends, including former class mates and colleagues, can be easily maintained. Furthermore, successful migrants who wish to return to China, but keep their overseas business by assigning a Chinese manager, can do so more easily because modern communication technology enables them to receive daily updates on the situation and maintain a stronger degree of control. As a result, Chinese migrants' transnational connectedness has become broader and more flexible.

2.2 Basic assumptions

From a meta-perspective, the majority of theories or approaches within social sciences use 'actors', i.e. natural and legal persons, and 'structures', i.e. economic, political, and social contexts, as their key concepts for analyzing and understanding society and societal phenomena. This also applies to migration studies and the above outlined concepts: all include actors (i.e. migrants and migrant networks) and structures (i.e. the economic, political and social context) to analyze and understand migratory flows and phenomena. Problems arise when trying to specify the relationship between actors and structures²⁰. On the extreme ends, we find those theories claiming that migrants exclusively determine migration²¹, and those claiming that structural imperatives determine migration²². Although the four above stated concepts are situated at neither end of these two extremes, it is still useful to provide a more detailed account of my general assumptions about the relationship between actors and structures, and how this relates to the four concepts.

2.2.1 Relationship between actors and structures

The relationship between actors and structures is assumed to be defined by processes of mutual interaction and influence within a particular social system. These processes are (i) the reproduction and transformation of structures through the (inter-)action of actors, and (ii) the distribution of resources and opportunities through the (inter-)action of structures. I start by outlining the assumptions of these processes within one country. I assume that the system boundaries coincide with the national boundaries. In reality this rarely happens because countries are seldom closed systems. But for the moment, this assumption helps to reduce the complexity and thereby one can get a better understanding of the basic processes between actors and structures.


²⁰ Within social sciences, the agent-structure debate has long tried to settle opposing views over the relationship between agents and structures (Wight, 2006:62). This debate is rooted in two opposing views about society: one which claims that "society is people" (Dave, 1979 cited in Wight, 2006:62), and one which claims that "society is the circumstances within which people are formed" (Dave, 1979 cited in Wight, 2006:62).

²¹ Micro-explanations make migration solely depended on individual choice (Massey et al.,1993:434f.).

²² Macro explanations make migration solely depended on structural determinants (Massey et al., 1993:433f.)

The processes in this fictitious country are assumed to be constituted by a particular configuration of actors' and structures' meta-variables which vary across time and space. These meta-variables are 'structural constraints' and 'structural opportunities' for structures, and the meta-variables for actors are the 'three types of agency' (Wight, 2006:212), as well as 'material and non-material resources'. Structural constraints are those configurations which curtail the scope of action of individual actors or a group of actors. Structural opportunities are those configurations which provide possibilities to enlarge the scope of action of individual actors or a group of actors. The three types of agencies are: Agency 1, Agency 2 and Agency 3 (Wight, 2006:212). Agency 1 is actors' "freedom of subjectivity" (Wight, 2006:212) which makes actors "a subject capable of reflecting upon, and constantly renegotiating, the forces of construction" (Wight, 2006:210). Agency 2 describes how actors, through the use of Agency 1, become part of some elements of the socio-cultural system into which the agent is born and develops (Wight, 2006:212). Agency 3 refers to the "positioned-practice places: structural properties that endure irrespective of the agents that occupy them" (Wight, 2006:213). Material resources refer to tangible assets such as money, land and real-estate. Non-material resources are non-tangible assets such as cultural and social capital as well as ideas, information and rights. Building on these assumptions, Figure 1 provides a detailed overview of the basic processes and meta-variables.

Figure 1 Basic relationship between actors and structures



Source: Author's own depiction.


Structural constraints and opportunities are the result of a particular configuration of the economic, political and social context at a given time t , which in turn is reproduced or altered through actors' actions. Structural opportunities and constraints distribute and curtail actors' resources and opportunities. This influences the extent to which actors are able to realize

their potential scope of action at a given time t . Actors' potential scope of action is produced by the Agency 1, 2, 3 and material and non-material resources of individual actors. The extent to which actors are able to realize these actions depends on two factors. First, differences in Agency 1, 2 and 3, the resources at the disposal of actors, as well as the actions of one or a group of actors which—intentionally or unintentionally—influence the scope of action of other actors, both within the same and a different system, explain inequalities between different actors. Second, structures distribute and curtail the possibilities available to actors (Wight, 2006:176).

2.2.2 Relationship between migrants and structures

In addition to the above elaborated basic assumptions about the relationship between actors and structures, I propose the following assumptions about the specific relationship between migrants, other actors and structures in both country of origin (Country A) and destination (Country B). These assumptions are based on insights from the four key concepts in my thesis (i.e. the migration system, migration configuration, migrant economy and the new Chinese migration order).

Figure 2 Relationship between migrants and structures



Source: Author's own depiction.

From Figure 2 we can deduce the following assumptions about the relationship between migrants, other actors and structures in both country of origin (Country A) and destination (Country B). First, migration is a societal phenomenon, which involves actors, structures and takes place both within²³ and between different states, i.e. different social systems. This means that at a given time t , structural and actor-level factors of Country A produce migrants

²³ In this thesis the focus will be on migration between states. But this does not mean that migration within states is not important.

and non-migrants. Migrants are those actors whose potential scope of action would permit them to move from Country A to Country B (and back). Non-migrants are those actors which have less potential to migrate. Second, scope of action of potential migrants will be influenced by other potential migrants as well as non-migrants. Third, in Country B the interaction of Actors B and Structure B at time t —i.e. reproduction and transformation of the structure, and distribution of resources and opportunities—produces Structural constraints B and opportunities B. Fourth, the interactions of migrants and non-migrants from Country A reproduce or alter Structural constraints and opportunities in Country A. Finally, the interactions of actors from Country B reproduce and alter structural constraints and opportunities in Country B, which has a direct or indirect impact on Actors A.

While Figure 2 does not suggest a static relationship between migrants and structures, insights from migration system and migration configuration can enhance our understanding of the dynamics of this relationship. Migration system and migration configuration both show that migration varies across time and space (Kritz and Zlotnik, 1992 cited in Jennissen, 2007:415). This is not only reflected in terms of quantity, i.e. numbers of migrants, but also reflected in terms of quality of migration flows, i.e. different degrees of maturity of migration processes. Since migration is the result of a particular configuration of migrants, actors and structures in Country A and Country B, the relationship between migrants and structures is assumed to vary across time and space.

The establishment of migration systems or configuration can be traced back to historical links between the countries. Depending on the time horizon²⁴, the new Chinese migration order is assumed to be a particular important aspect in shaping historical links for Chinese migration after 1990. Since migration systems or configuration are not created at once but develop over time, it is assumed that not every configuration of a particular relationship between migrants and structures qualifies as a migration system or configuration. It is furthermore assumed that recognizable feedback mechanisms are good indicators for the existence of a fully-developed migration system. These feedback mechanisms increasingly shape the relationship between migrants and structures and determine if flows of migrants, information, ideas and goods will continue between Country A and Country B. Despite the fact that these feedback mechanisms develop a self-sustaining dynamic, they are still assumed to be the result of interactions of migrants and other actors. It should be noted that with advancing maturity of these mechanisms, it becomes increasingly difficult to reverse the dynamics. The migrant economy is assumed to be an important (positive) feedback mechanism because it directly or indirectly influences flows of migrants, information, ideas and goods.

²⁴ The new Chinese migration order applies primarily to all Chinese migration after 1990.


2.3 Five-stage-model of migration

Building on the earlier works of Mabogunje (1970), Fawcett (1989) and Kritz et al. (1992) and De Haas (2010), as well as the above outlined key concepts and assumptions about the relationship between migrants and structures, I developed a five stage model of migration. With this model I am mainly trying to grasp the key dynamics of migration, i.e. pioneer migration, rise and fall of migration systems, and the development of self-sustaining structures (i.e. feedback mechanisms). Like similar models, it is based on a simplified picture of reality and presents an ideal type thereof. The model should therefore primarily be seen as a heuristic tool which helps simplifying and organizing the analysis of a particular migration (here: Chinese migration to Lesotho). In particular, it does not make any direct statements about causal relations between the key concepts.

2.3.1 Stage 1: initiating pioneer migration

The first stage (t_1) describes the beginning of migration process, i.e. the production of potential migrants and non-migrants (see Figure 3). The emphasis is here on potential, since from an outside perspective many people could potentially qualify as migrants, but only a few pioneers decide to migrate. It is therefore important to stress that in t_1 these potential migrants have two choices: to migrate or to stay. If they have opted for the first option, these Actors A' become pioneer migrants. Pioneer migrants²⁵ tend to be few in numbers and “relatively well-off, risk-prone and entrepreneurial community members” (De Haas, 2010:20), and typically come from a limited number of places from Country A (De Haas, 2010:20).

Figure 3 Stage 1: initiating pioneer migration



Source: Author's own depiction.

Their decision about the destination of migration is influenced by their Agencies 1, 2 and 3, material and non-material resources as well as the structural opportunities and constraints in country of origin and destination. Theoretically, pioneer migrants could potentially go to


²⁵ Of course, people who have to leave their country involuntarily (i.e. refugees) might also be pioneer migrants. They might not fit neatly the description of “relatively well-off, risk-prone and entrepreneurial community members” (De Haas, 2010:20). However, since Chinese migrants to Lesotho are not refugees in a classical sense, I focused on the ‘entrepreneurial type’ of pioneer migrants.

any country. In reality, their choice is likely to be limited to countries with which historical links exist (here between Country A and Country B). In my view, historical links should not be defined according to historic periods (i.e. colonialism), but seen as a result of the sum of all past interaction and connectedness between the involved social systems (i.e. countries). This interaction can take place in the economic, political, social or cultural realm. For the sake of analytical clarity, I focus on pioneer migration to one country (i.e. Country B). But in reality the range of destination at point t_1 is likely to include more than one country.

2.3.2 Stage 2: developing contextual and endogenous feedback mechanisms

Once the first pioneers (Actors A') have migrated from Country A to Country B, they find themselves in situation t_2 , i.e. stage 2 (see Figure 4). Structure B in Country B defines the scope of action of Actors A' and Actors B. Unlike subsequent stages (i.e. Stage 3-5), the availability of resources and opportunities of Actors A' is almost exclusively influenced by Actors B, i.e. the local population. In this setting Actors A' and B interact and are thereby reproducing and/or altering the Structure B at t_2 . Simultaneously, Actors A' are sending information, goods and resources back to Country A. These interactions set in motion the development of two important feedback mechanisms. The first feedback mechanism is contextual, and refers to the reproduction or altering of the structure B. If the interaction of Actors A' and B would reproduce Structure B, future migrants would face the same structural opportunities and constraints as their predecessors. However, also if they alter the Structure B they may ease or complicate further migration. This means that—depending on the context of Country A in t_2 —this contextual feedback mechanism can be positive or negative.

Figure 4 Stage 2: developing contextual and endogenous feedback mechanisms



Source: Author's own depiction.

The second feedback mechanism is endogenous, and refers to the role of pioneer migrants in creating awareness about the opportunities for migrating to Country B (De Haas, 2010:1594). In t_2 , this is likely to be limited to providing information, goods and other resources to their

family and nucleolus kinship. At the same time, other members of the community, who have decided to migrate, might decide to migrate to Country B because of herd-behavior, i.e. because of thinking “if those people go there, then there must be something”. This can be an important step towards the development of a particular migration configuration, i.e. migration between one place in Country A and Country B. The nature and the interplay of endogenous and contextual feedback mechanism will determine whether migration in t_2 reaches the critical ‘herd-effect-threshold’ (De Haas, 2010:20), thus leading to large scale migration. If it fails to reach a critical threshold levels of migration are likely to remain low.

2.3.3 Stage 3: building the structures for the migration system

In t_3 , the interplay of endogenous and contextual feedback mechanisms from t_2 has resulted in the passing of the critical threshold and the lowering of risks and costs of migration (see Figure 5). This paved the way for more migration, particularly from pioneer migrant areas that have established a migration configuration. In t_3 , some of Actors A' and Actors A'' decide to form different kinds of networks²⁶ which make further migration easier. These migration networks are characterized by (i) the ability to “mobilize the necessary resources (or capitals) to facilitate migration” (De Hass, 2010:17), and (ii) the willingness of members “to help prospective migrants because of moral obligations, altruism, self-interest or a combination thereof.” (De Haas, 2010:17). The success of these networks rests on the number of participants and connections that can be activated (Granovetter, 1973). Intra-migrant community relations play an important role for the success of these networks, because “boundaries between groups are highly fluid, shifting over time” (Park, 2010:464). This applies particularly to the relations between pioneer migrants and newcomers: pioneer migrants have often some resentment against the new migrants²⁷, because they might take away business opportunities, but they might also be an obstacle to a successful integration of pioneer or first generation migrants.


In contrast to situation t_2 , new migrants (Actors A''') can now decide to either migrate individually or to join the newly established migration networks. This development is made possible because Actors A' and A'' did not only sent back information, goods and resources as in t_2 , but also formed networks. Once Actors A', A'' and A''' have migrated to Country B, their scope of action is influenced by the same factors as outlined in t_2 . The main difference between t_2 and t_3 is that the numbers of potential actors has increased and thus processes of interaction and mutual influence become more complex. In t_3 , the contextual feedback

²⁶ It should be noted that other networks, i.e. links and connections with other people, may have existed before. But, the formation of networks which exclusively serve the facilitation of migration between Country A and B is likely to occur only after pioneer migrants have arrived in Country B.

²⁷ For example, in South Africa, “Chinese South Africans, Taiwanese and more settled Chinese from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) seem to have formed some strong feelings about the newest migrants from Fujian province” (Park, 2010:464).

mechanisms are essentially the same as in t_2 . Yet, due to the increased numbers of actors, the influence, i.e. strength, of these feedbacks can be expected to be larger.

Figure 5 Stage 3: building the structures for the migration system



Source: Author's own depiction.


With the establishment of migration networks, 'network effects' (De Haas, 2010:22) become an important endogenous feedback mechanism. According to Massey et al. (1933:448), these network effects can be divided into three categories: (i) lower the costs of movement, (ii) lower the risks of movement, and (iii) increase the expected net returns to migration". However, it should be kept in mind that the establishment of networks alone does not mean that they do automatically have these effects. The extent to which these positive (i.e. amplifying) effects can be realized is determined by the internal organization of these networks and the resources they can mobilize (Haug, 2000:75; Johnston, 2006). Therefore the interplay of contextual and endogenous feedback mechanisms in t_3 , resulting from the interaction of networks, Actors A' , A'' , A''' and B, decides whether migration will develop into a quasi self-sustaining process or not.

2.3.4 Stage 4: fostering the dynamics within the migration system

In t_4 , migration has become a quasi self-sustaining process that is characterized by flows of migrants/returnees, goods, resources, information, and investments between Country A and Country B (see Figure 6). The stage t_4 differs from the previous stages both in terms of quantity of migrants and quality of the connectedness between Country A and B. More importantly, t_4 marks the successful establishment of a migration system and particular migration configurations within this system. Migration flows are sustained by both individually migrating and returning actors as well as those who migrate and return via networks. The overall costs and risks of migrating are once more significantly lowered as

compared to t_3 , thus contributing to the self-sustaining dynamics. In t_4 , contextual and endogenous feedback mechanisms are both more advanced and complex. Because of the growing interconnectedness of Country A and Country B, changes in structure of one country are likely to directly or indirectly affect changes in the structure of the other country. This means that it is becoming increasingly difficult to predict how a specific interaction of Actors A', A'', A''' and B reproduces or alters the structure of Country A and B.

Figure 6 Stage 4: fostering the dynamics within the migration system



Source: Author's own depiction.

Endogenous feedback mechanisms have likewise become more advanced and complex. They now refer primarily to “intermediate, self-sustaining structures largely created or reinforced by migration processes themselves” (De Haas, 2010:4). These structures include the ‘migration industry’ and the ‘migrant economy’ (De Haas, 2010:4). Both the migration industry and migrant economy tend to rely, at least in part, on transnational links. The migration industry is created by both networks and individually migrating actors who offer to provide services to potential new migrants. Examples are support in finding housing, work, and so on. The migrant economy refers to the economy created by migrants in Country B, and potentially also in Country A as a result of remittances. This includes the opening up of businesses, the providing of employment opportunities, and the filling of niches in the economy of Country B. By creating demand for specific goods and migrants, the migrant economy provides additional opportunities for potential migrants (Johnston, 2006; Kitching et al., 2009).


Because of these feedback mechanisms, the motivation of migration is not “strongly correlated to wage differentials or employment rates, because whatever effects these variables have in promoting or inhibiting migration are progressively overshadowed by the

falling costs and risks of movement stemming from the growth of migrant networks over time.” (Massey et al., 1993:450). While it is important to note that absolute wage differentials may become less important once a migration system is established, it does not mean that wage differentials become completely redundant just because the risks and the cost for migration are low. Consequently, the overall opportunities for potential migrants, which include wages, still need to be taken into account to determine if migration will continue. Moreover, falling economic costs for migration does not mean that the social and cultural risks of migration are eliminated. In fact, in some contexts²⁸, migrants might suddenly be the target for xenophobia, making their life in their host country more difficult and more risky.

2.3.5 Stage 5: decline of migration system

Time t_5 describes the decline of the existing migration system (see Figure 7). This decline is commonly a long and slow process which is initiated when the system has passed the saturation point, i.e. it is no longer attractive to migrate to Country B because opportunities are becoming more and more marginal.

Figure 7 Stage 5: decline of migration system



Source: Author's own depiction.

There are a number of scenarios and reasons for this process to start. In the first scenario, migration declines because of “exogenous changes in the macro-level factors” (De Haas, 2010:5). These changes increase the costs and risks of migration and thus explain the slowing down of migratory movements between Country A and Country B. Under the second scenario, the decline of migration system can be attributed to negative contextual feedback

²⁸ Examples include attacks on migrants in South Africa (Mail & Guardian, 2010; Mail & Guardian, 2012) and the hostile atmosphere against Chinese migrants in Hungary (Nyíri, 2005:661).

mechanisms. These can develop if a group of actors (commonly part of the Actors B, but possibly also Actors A', A'', and A''') successfully affects changes in the structure of Country B or even A which lead to an unfavorable distribution of opportunities and resources for new migrants. In the third scenario the decline of migration systems can be explained through a different kind of negative contextual feedback mechanisms. These are the result of two developments. First, at a certain point even marginal costs of new migrants outweigh the benefits (De Haas, 2010:18). As a result, actors already established in Country B are less willing or able to "provide migration assistance" (De Haas, 2010:18). Second, with increased numbers of migrants, competition for opportunities increases and may eventually make Country B less attractive.

3. Sino-Basotho migration system: explaining the context of Chinese migration to Lesotho

3.1 Defining historical links between China and Lesotho

Historical links, i.e. past interactions between China and Lesotho, constitute the antecedent condition of the Sino-Basotho migration system and form an important aspect for understanding why this particular migrations system was created (see Chapter 2). The following sections will provide a detailed analysis of these past interactions. The timeline of my analysis will be from 1966 till 1996. I chose 1966 as a starting point because this is the year of Lesotho's official independence. I chose 1996 because pioneer migration from China to Lesotho gained momentum only after 1996. Therefore, developments before 1996 seem to provide important indications for the historical links between China and Lesotho. Events after 1996 will be discussed in Chapter 3.2. My analysis starts with an outline of the historical context in which these interactions developed and took place. Believing that internal developments within China and Lesotho, as well as external developments, are important for explaining historical links between China and Lesotho, I included them in my analysis of the historical context. I continue with an account of how and why Taiwanese migrants, a group of non-state actors, played an important role for the creation of historical links between China and Lesotho, and for the Sino-Basotho migration system. The sum of these aspects then constitutes the historical links between China and Lesotho.

3.1.1 Historical context of interactions

Lesotho, formerly Basutoland under the direct mandate of the British, completed its first general elections in 1965. Three parties, the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), the Basutoland National Party (BNP) and the Marematlou Party (MTP), participated. The outcome of the elections assigned a marginal victory to the BNP (Makao, 2010:62). One year later, Lesotho gained official independence. After independence, Lesotho became a constitutional monarchy, with the BNP's leader Chief Leabua Jonathan as its first prime

minister (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho, 2009:1). Although the other parties, in particularly the BCP, had won a considerable number of votes in the 1965 election, the BNP denied them largely the right to participate in government and was therefore effectively governing alone (Makao, 2010:62).

Even though Lesotho was now formally recognized as a new member of the international state system, its interactions with China as well as other countries were complicated by a number of factors. Despite independence, Lesotho maintained the image of a “homeland of South Africa” (Rosenberg, 2007:462). This can be partly attributed to Lesotho’s strong economic ‘dependence’ on South Africa. At the time of its independence, Lesotho was (and till today continues to be) a small, land-locked country that did not possess any significant natural resources²⁹. Agriculture was an important factor for the creation of employment opportunities and economic growth (World Bank, 1965:5). But already at the end of the 1960s, it became clear that soil erosion and population growth would damage the agricultural sector (World Bank, 1965:5; Rosenberg, 2007:461). With only “twelve establishments, three in the public sector and most of the rest printing shops or missions with total turnover of less than 1 million Rand and employing just 500 people” (World Bank, 1971:68), the industrial and manufacturing base of Lesotho was relatively weak. Furthermore, “South African companies and individuals dominated insurance, foreign trade, domestic wholesale and retail businesses (Ferguson, 1990:38). As a result, employment opportunities within Lesotho were scarce, and substantial parts of Lesotho’s population had to migrate to South Africa to find employment in mines and on farms (Seidman, 2009:582). For instance, between 1967 and 1973, 35,000 new jobs for Basotho were created in South Africa (World Bank, 1971:18). In the same period, only 2,000 were created in Lesotho (World Bank, 1971:18).

In the early post-independence years, the BNP pursued a cooperative policy towards the South African Apartheid regime (Taylor, 1997:84). This may stem from the fact that maintaining good economic and political relations with South Africa was essential for the economic development of Lesotho. But it may also stem from the fact that the BNP—even before independence—had gained substantial support from South African government and that after independence many of the “important government posts were given to white South Africans” (Ferguson, 1990:107; Taylor, 1997:84). The strong influence of South Africa was also reflected in the BNP’s decision in 1966 to establish diplomatic relations with the

²⁹ While economic development is not necessarily conditioned on the presence of natural resources, for a small-land-locked country like Lesotho, it is nevertheless a strong impediment.

Republic of China³⁰ (Taiwan) and not with the People's Republic of China (Taylor, 1997:84). With the Cold War at its peak, South Africa, similar to many other Western countries, was taking a strong stance towards the communist regimes and supported the non-communist Taiwan (Taylor, 1997:84). It was therefore—at least indirectly—implied that Lesotho, like other frontier states³¹ (e.g. Botswana and Swaziland), would choose to support Taiwan rather than China, too.

Apart from the Cold War, the geopolitical competition between China and Taiwan for winning allies in supporting their respective claims as the “sole representative of China” was in full swing. Since China was primarily occupied with the Cultural Revolution at the time of Lesotho's independence, a chance for Taiwan to win another ally on the African continent presented itself. Up to 1966, China had been more successful than Taiwan in gaining support from African countries (Brautigam, 2009:34). For example, by 1966, China had managed to establish diplomatic relations with almost 20 African countries. Between 1964 and 1971, China “started aid programs in thirteen additional African countries” (Brautigam, 2009:34). Realizing this, Taiwan was stepping up its interactions with African countries in general and Lesotho in particular.

The first official state-to-state interaction between Lesotho and Taiwan took place at Lesotho's independence ceremony on October 4, 1966 in Maseru. Taiwan's Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs (UNSC, 1966:8) congratulated Lesotho and expressed his country's willingness to cooperate with Lesotho (UNSC, 1966:8). Only two months later, Chief Jonathan visited Taiwan (as well as Japan and South Korea), and found that these countries “were interested in Lesotho” (Andor et al., 1999:113). One year after the establishment of diplomatic relations with Taiwan, Chief Jonathan paid another visit to Taiwan “for a six-day study of agricultural development projects” (Tseng, 2008:167). In 1967, the first basic agreement between the two countries was signed (Andor et al., 1999:114; Tseng, 2008:167). A special technical cooperation scheme and a friendship treaty followed in 1968 and 1969 (Andor et al., 1999:116).

Despite the revived engagement of Taiwan with African as well as non-African countries, it could not influence the 1971 UN General Assembly voting on the “Representation of Republic of China to the UN” in its favor. The vote showed that many countries were not satisfied with the status quo (i.e. total exclusion of China from UN institutions). 22 African countries voted for China (Pickels and Wood, 1989:5f.). In contrast, only 16 African countries (Lesotho

³⁰ The Republic of China (Taiwan) was at that point the legitimate representative of China (including mainland China) in the United Nations. Many countries had therefore established diplomatic relations with the Republic of China. But many newly independent African countries established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. These included, for example, Egypt (1956), Ghana (1960), Mali (1960), Uganda (1962), and Zambia (1964).

³¹ Namibia, then South-West-Africa, was a South African colony and was not considered an independent state.

included) voted for Taiwan. Taiwan rewarded Lesotho's loyalty with the signing of a mutual visa fees waiver deal in 1974 (Andor et al., 1999:128), and a technical co-operation agreement on August 2, 1977 (Andor et al, 1999:133). Since Lesotho maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan, China limited itself to "periodically quoting Chief Jonathan in its official press—a sign of approval from Beijing" (Taylor, 1997:85), and being critical about the unequal relationship between South Africa and Lesotho, which was perceived as "the big bullying the small"³² (Taylor, 1997:85)

The 1970 general elections in Lesotho, in which the opposition party BCP achieved a landslide victory, likewise showed that Basotho were dissatisfied with the status-quo (i.e. the rule of the BNP). This dissatisfaction stemmed from two facts: first, the BNP "had done very little to improve the lot of the people" (Embassy of the People's Republic of China to the Kingdom of Lesotho, 2009:1); second, the BNP's uncritical cooperation with the South African Apartheid regime was generally resented among Basotho (Ferguson, 1990:106). Unfortunately, the BNP refused to accept the defeat. After violent clashes, Chief Jonathan unilaterally annulled the elections, declared a state of emergency and suspended politics for five years (Andor et al., 1999:117). This implicated that the BNP, from 1971 till 1976, was primarily concerned with securing its one party rule.³³ During this time, Lesotho's economic situation worsened. In 1971, GDP growth was -9.8% (World Bank Databank, 2012) and GNI per capita increased by only 144 USD from 1971 to 1975 (World Bank Databank, 2012). In addition, South Africa's growing interference in Lesotho (including armed raids) created even stronger resentment among Basotho, threatened the sovereign rights of Lesotho and the BNP's one-party rule (Ferguson, 1990:108). In light of these constraints, the BNP granted selected BCP members political participation rights (Ferguson, 1990:107) and changed its stance toward South Africa. After successfully portraying Lesotho as the little country fighting the big and unjust country (Taylor, 1997:85), the BNP achieved that substantial flows of international aid were channeled towards Lesotho (Ferguson, 1990:8). Yet, these flows had only limited effects for facilitating economic development and poverty reduction (Murray, 1981:18; Ferguson, 1990:8).

Between 1975 and 1980, the rapid growth of migrant workers' remittances, increases in Customs Union³⁴ payments, diamond production and inflow of external assistance helped to

³² The big refers to South Africa, and the small refers to Lesotho.

³³ Chief Jonathan justified these measures by claiming that he "agreed with many other African leaders that democracy was not suitable to deal with Africa's problems" (Andor et al, 1999:118). The state of emergency, the suspension of politics for five years and the expulsion of the King were just three of many measures taken to secure the power of the BNP.

³⁴ Refers to the South African Customs Union (SACU). Basutoland (under the directorate of British High Commission) became a member of SACU in 1910 (World Bank, 1987:2). In 1976, a new revenue sharing formula was introduced, which had the potential to stabilize revenues for smaller countries such as Lesotho (World Bank, 1987:2).

partially improve Lesotho's economic situation (World Bank, 1987:8). However, only little improvements were made in terms of attracting foreign investment and developing an indigenous business sector (Tangri, 1993:258). This was not so much attributed to a lack of institutional support³⁵, but to the fact that the BNP continued to back "foreign commerce in the 1970s and 1980s" (Tangri, 1993:228). Therefore, the economy of Lesotho remained under the influence of foreign investors (mainly South Africans, but also some Taiwanese traders) and continued to provide limited business and employment opportunities for Basotho. Consequently, the migration to South Africa continued (SAMP, 2010:11).

Since the BNP pursued a less cooperative policy towards South Africa, relations with South Africa worsened from the mid-1970s onwards. South African troops repeatedly launched "military raids into Lesotho" (Taylor, 1997:86). Starting with an "economic blockade against Lesotho"³⁶ initiated by the South African government (Taylor, 1997:86), and the invasion of Maseru by South African troops (Taylor, 1997:86; Andor et al, 1999:143) the situation escalated in 1986. These developments finally culminated in a bloodless military coup by Justin Lekhanya (Taylor, 1997:87). The military coup ended Chief Jonathan's rule. His successor, Lekhanya, pursued a more cooperative policy towards South Africa. The supremacy of the South African army, the willingness of the South African government to launch military raids into Lesotho, as well as Lesotho's economic dependency on South African investment and South Africa's economy explain Lekhanya's policy change (Taylor, 1997:87). Especially, the economic aspect should not be underestimated. In the 1980s, Lesotho's economic growth stagnated (World Bank, 1987:2). Since Lesotho's "domestic formal sector provided only a limited number of jobs, currently employing 13 percent of the domestic workforce" (World Bank, 1987:35) and economic growth stagnated, Lesotho remained highly dependent on South Africa for creating employment and business opportunities for Basotho both within and outside of Lesotho.

Towards the end of the 1980s, two important alternatives for creating employment opportunities and economic growth opened up. The first alternative was the Highlands Water Scheme, Lesotho's "brightest investment opportunity" (World Bank, 1987:vi) which—again—was mainly financed by South Africa. While the Scheme was expected to contribute to the country's export as well as government revenue, the prospects for providing significant employment opportunities were not so bright (Akokpari, 2011:81). The second alternative was the introduction of large-scale manufacturing by Taiwanese investors from

³⁵ Between 1967 and 1975, the BNP had set up a number of institutions which all aimed at attracting investment and developing an indigenous industry sector. These institutions included the Lesotho National Development Corporation (LNDC), the Basotho Traders Association (BTA), the Basotho Enterprise Development Corporation (BEDCO), and the Lesotho Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI) (Tangri, 1993:228f).

³⁶ This blockade was the result of Chief Jonathan's refusal to hand over ANC members who had fled to Lesotho (Taylor, 2010:86).

the textile and garment industry. Taiwanese investors were relocating their productions from South Africa³⁷ to Lesotho to circumvent growing international sanctions placed on South Africa, to benefit from Lesotho's access to preferential trade agreements and from Lesotho's low wage levels (Lall, 2007:1004).

Despite the growing economic relations with Taiwan, Lesotho established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in 1983³⁸ (Taylor, 1997:87). After the establishment of diplomatic relations more state-to-state interactions took place. This was reflected in the signing of an agreement on economic and technical cooperation in 1983 (Taylor, 1997:86), as well as in emergency relief provided by the Chinese government in form of 75,000 USD aid to buy food during the 1984 drought (Taylor, 1997:87). Likewise, the number of official state visits between China to Lesotho increased. From the Chinese side, this included visits by the Minister of Metallurgical Industry Li Dongye in 1983, by the Vice Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Lu Xuejian in 1988, and by the Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in July 1989 (Peoples' Daily, 2001:3). Visits from Lesotho to China included the 1983 "friendly visit" of Chief Jonathan to, amongst others, study the "socialist modernization" in Shanghai (Taylor, 1997:86), the visit of King Moshoeshoe II in the hope to gain support against South Africa's interference in Lesotho's affairs in 1985, and the visit of Queen Mamohato in 1987. However, during the 1980s, China's engagement in Lesotho remained of a rather symbolic nature and did not translate into any meaningful trade or economic cooperation (Taylor, 1997:87f.). This, in conjunction with Taiwan's "cheque book diplomacy" (Taylor, 2010:88), explains why, in 1990, Lesotho's military rulers once again severed diplomatic relations with China. In fact, it was only in 1994 when military rule ended, and the BCP had won the second democratic elections of Lesotho's post-independence, that diplomatic relations with Taiwan were severed for good (Taylor, 1997:89).

Compared with other African countries, which in 1996 had established strong and diverse historical links with China, the historical links between China and Lesotho appear to have had

³⁷ From the mid-1970s, Taiwan's "strong economic performance led to demand for higher wages and better benefits, undercutting the low wage levels that have been part of the basis for the Taiwanese economic miracle" (Pickels and Wood, 1989:10). Faced with rising wage levels, many Taiwanese businesses from the "low technology, low productivity industries" (Pickels and Wood, 1989:11) moved their operations offshore. While investments were initially concentrated in Asia, Taiwanese investors from the textile and garment industry shifted parts of their operations to the South African periphery, i.e. the homelands (Pickels and Woods, 1989:3; Hart, 2002:3) in the mid-1980s. The decision to move operations to South Africa was a result of a mix of an attractive incentive package offered by the Homelands and rising wage levels in Taiwan, which were threatening to undercut the competitive edge of Taiwanese textile and garment industries (Pickels and Wood, 1989:11; Hart, 2002:3). Moreover, both countries, albeit for different reasons, found themselves increasingly isolated and thus found a mutual interest in extending political and economic cooperation (Hart, 2002:2).

³⁸ Surprisingly, the signing of the agreement to establish diplomatic relations took place in Maputo, Mozambique on April 30, 1983, and was announced only during a subsequent visit of Chief Jonathan to Beijing in 1983 (Taylor, 2008:85).

a relative low profile³⁹. Clearly, Lesotho violated the “One-China-Policy” by maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan from 1966 to 1982 and from 1990 to 1994, and, thus, complicated official state-to-state interaction between China and Lesotho. But the fact that a country’s government did officially recognize Taiwan alone did not keep China from establishing historical links with a particular country. For example, China was long supporting the ANC in South Africa, even before they were officially elected in 1994 (Ash, 1986:585). Of course, Lesotho did not have classical liberation movements (as for example South Africa). However, Lesotho had a party (the BCP) which had won elections and was systematically denied any participation in governing the country. Still, neither Taiwan, nor China, nor in fact any other country, tried to effectively pressure Chief Jonathan. Generally speaking, it seems that China’s relative low engagement in Lesotho till 2001⁴⁰ stemmed from the fact that Lesotho held little “strategic value” for China (Taylor, 1997:85).

3.1.2 The special role of Taiwanese migrants

As the previous section highlighted, Taiwan’s relationship with Lesotho has been, historically speaking, much closer and deeper than China’s relationship with Lesotho. Therefore it is not surprising that the first “Chinese-looking” non-state-actors who arrived in Lesotho were from Taiwan and not from Mainland China. Using Mung’s (2008:95) categorization of Chinese migrants, these non-state-actors can be divided into (i) temporary migrants, i.e. Taiwanese aid workers who arrived as early as 1967 to conduct agricultural training, and (ii) entrepreneurial migrants, who were constituted of small-scale traders and investors from the textile and garment industry. I argue that it was particularly the latter group, i.e. entrepreneurial migrants, which played a crucial role for defining initial interactions between China and Lesotho as well as the subsequent creation of a Sino-Basotho migration system.

Although several sources (i.e. Politzer, 2008:1; McNamee et al., 2012:33; Park, 2010:465; Akokpari, 2011:92) confirm that Taiwanese migrants arrived in the 1970s, no information on the background or motives of these migrants is provided. Therefore, it can be only speculated about how pioneer migration to Lesotho started. One plausible explanation would be that they, or some of their relatives or friends, came to Lesotho under one of the government-initiated development cooperation projects (e.g. the technical cooperation scheme signed in

³⁹For example, the relations between China and Zambia were much stronger (Brautigam, 2009:40).

⁴⁰ Only two out of the 14 Economic and Technical Cooperation agreements between China and Lesotho up to 2006 were implemented or agreed upon before 2001 (Economic and Commercial Counselor’s Office, 2004:1). Only after 2002 did the cooperation between China and Lesotho gain momentum. The latest examples of this cooperation are the two Agreements of Economic and Technical Cooperation signed in December 2011. These Agreements encompass a “grant of 50 million Renminbi and an interest-free loan of 50 million Renminbi” (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho, 2011:1), and “both the grant and the loan will be used for the implementation of mutually agreed projects”. (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho, 2011:1). Therefore it seems safe to state that China’s engagement in Lesotho was of low profile until 2001.

1968) and decided to stay. Since they were mainly engaging in small-scale trade activities, they fit to some extent De Haas's (2010:20) description of "relatively well-off, risk-prone and entrepreneurial community members". Well off, because—after all—the opening of a small business in Lesotho required at least the financial resources for an air plane fare, the rent for a shop, as well as the purchase of goods to sell.

It seems that migration from Taiwan to Lesotho was the result of a combination of structural opportunities and constraints in Taiwan and Lesotho. In Taiwan, structural opportunities stemmed mainly from the rapid economic development, which increased actors' material and non-material resources. Theoretically this created ample structural opportunities within Taiwan. But, since the economic boom was accompanied by "unprecedented growth in income and asset inflation, [...] increasing environmental pollution and social stress" (Yu, 2006:556), structural constraints were imposed on actors' potential to employ their resources fruitfully. Taken together, it seems that growing numbers of Taiwanese decided to seek their fortunes outside the country. Apart from migrating to developed countries⁴¹, small numbers of Taiwanese appear to have decided to migrate to developing countries, including Lesotho⁴². The reasons for coming to Lesotho might stem from the structural opportunities which Lesotho's nascent private and industrial sector offered. Yet, given the structural constraints of Lesotho (i.e. the poor economic situation, the low income and the low demand) the numbers of Taiwanese migrants was rather relatively small.

Through their actions Taiwanese migrants were essentially reproducing the foreign control in trade sector of Lesotho⁴³. Yet, neither the ruling party nor the newly established organizations appeared to have been effectively limiting the engagement of foreigners in these business sectors (see 3.1.1). Since the signing of the mutual visa fee waiver in 1974 further lowered the costs of migration to Lesotho, more migrants from Taiwan arrived in Lesotho. As a result, they had become a "formidable economic community"⁴⁴ by the end of the 1980s (Akokpari, 2011:92). Considering that the newly established textile and garment factories had a reputation for exploiting workers (Tangri, 1993:230), and Taiwanese traders had a reputation for taking away employment and businesses opportunities from Basotho (Moeshoeshoe, 2010:2), it was not surprising that the presence of Taiwanese created negative feelings among Lesotho. The first national outcry about the presence of the

⁴¹ It seems that during this time Taiwanese migration focused mainly on developed countries. The migration of Taiwanese students to the United States is a case in point: in 1980 there were approximately 75,353 Taiwanese in the United States (Lin, 2010:1).

⁴² Unfortunately, no comprehensive data on outward migration from Taiwan to developing countries during the 1970s is available. It is therefore difficult to assess the attractiveness of Lesotho in comparison to other developing countries.

⁴³ Clearly, during the early stage Taiwanese migrants' involvement did not match the scale of the South Africans' involvement.

⁴⁴ For example, Fisseha (1991:ix) states that Chinese businesses accounted "for roughly 60-80 of small-scale enterprises" in 1990.

Taiwanese, wrongly termed the presence of the “Chinese” (Tangri, 1993:221), came already in 1987 (Moeshoeshoe, 2010:2). In 1991, the situation escalated when a Basotho was killed by one of the security guards of a Taiwanese-owned shop (Tangri, 1993:221). Angry Basotho attacked Taiwanese shops, and many Taiwanese fled to South Africa (Tangri, 1993:221). With this, at least temporarily, the inflow of new Taiwanese traders was stopped.

While Taiwanese traders played a special role in creating and maintaining a structure conducive for further trade-related migration from China and Taiwan, Taiwanese investors from the textile and garment industry played a special role for bringing migrants from China to Lesotho. As mentioned earlier, Taiwanese investors started to expand their operations in Lesotho from the mid-1980s. Although they provided many jobs to Basotho, they tended to recruit non-Basotho for managerial positions (Tangri, 1993:230; Lall, 2007:1007). The majority of the managers came from Taiwan, but they also recruited personnel from China (Lall, 2007:1007). Unfortunately, the recruiting process of mainlanders is not well-documented. In my opinion, mainlanders are likely to have been employed because they had the comparative advantage of being similarly qualified, but at presumably much lower labor costs, an important requisite for competitiveness of these companies (Hart, 2003:198). Connections between Chinese migrants on the one hand and Taiwanese textile and garment factory owners on the other hand, are likely to have been established through formal migrant brokers, informal kinship networks, Overseas Chinese Associations and Conventions (Liu, 1998:587), and direct recruitment from Taiwanese textile and garment industries⁴⁵ in Fujian, China (Hart, 2003:198).

3.2 Establishment of the Sino-Basotho migration system

The previous section demonstrated how past interaction and connectedness between Lesotho, Taiwan, and China led to the production of a particular set of historical links. These historical links in turn will be important for the subsequent description of the development of the Sino-Basotho migration system. Building on the assumptions and arguments made in Chapter 2, I will provide an account of the evolution of the Sino-Basotho-migration system.

⁴⁵ Due to rising production costs in Taiwan, Taiwanese textile and garment producers had shifted parts of their labor intensive production to Fujian and Zhejiang Province in China at the beginning of the 1980s (Hart, 2009:198). The reasons why Taiwanese investors initially chose Fujian and Zhejiang are twofold: first of all, both Provinces are fairly close to Taiwan. Second, many Taiwanese came originally from these two Provinces and had still some relatives living there.

3.2.1 Stage 1: initiating pioneer migration to Lesotho

Chinese pioneer migration⁴⁶ to Lesotho was broadly speaking the result of (i) renewed production of Chinese migrants, and (ii) creation of employment opportunities in Lesotho's textile and garment industry and Chinese government projects. When talking about the renewed production of Chinese migrants, it is important to distinguish between inner-Chinese migration and outward Chinese migration. Both inner- and outward Chinese migration had been systematically curtailed⁴⁷ by the Chinese authorities until 1978 (Liu, 2009:314). Yet, the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s marked first and foremost the production of migrants destined to migrate within China⁴⁸. At that time, outward migration, although not impossible, was still reserved for a small group of people who had either good connections with the Communist Party or overseas Chinese (Liu, 2009:316). Nevertheless, by the 1990s China's rapid economic development and further easing of emigration restrictions made the structural opportunities created in other countries more accessible to potential migrants. Figure 8 on illustrate this point.

Figure 8 Overview net migration China 1985-2005

Year	1975-1980	1985-1990	1990-1995	1995-2000	2000-2005
Net migration	- 428,000	-236,000 ⁴⁹	-824,000	- 677,000	-2,298,000

Source: <http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Excel-Data/migration.htm> (Accessed: 12-07-2012).

This still begs the question of why Chinese migration to Lesotho started in the 1990s. After all, China had been developing rapidly and Lesotho remained to be one of the least-developed

⁴⁶ It is difficult to find exact dates about the arrival of the first Chinese migrants in Lesotho. This is mainly due to the fact that the sources do not make an explicit distinction between Taiwanese and Chinese migrants and paucity of information on activities of Chinese or Taiwanese in the 1990s. Generally, the literature mentions two distinct events, which help for a crude estimation. The first is the arrival of the first Taiwanese migrants in 1970 (Politzer, 2008:1; McNamee et al., 2012:33; Park, 2010:465). The second event is the successful establishment of a 'Chinese' economic community in the 1980s (Akopari, 2011:92; Moeshoesoe, 2010:2). Taken into consideration that the recent study of McNamee et al. (2012) found that some Chinese migrants had been in Lesotho for 19 years, and that the events reported for the 1980s are most likely to refer to Taiwanese, it seems safe to assume that Chinese migration to Lesotho did not start before the 1990s.

⁴⁷ For instance, between 1965 and 1970 only 12,073 migrants left China (UN Migration Database, 2012). While this is not to say that no migration took place, it seems that there were drastic increases only after the initiation of the reform. Between 1949 and 1978, "China only approved about 7,000 annual exits abroad for private affairs". (Liu 2009:315). In contrast, between 1979 and 1985 "50,000 individual applications to exit for private affairs were approved annually" (Liu, 2009:316). Also up to 1978, migrants were potentially regarded as traitors and were only under special circumstances granted to leave the country (Louie, 2000:667).

⁴⁸ Inner-Chinese migration resulted from the initiation of economic reforms. At the early stages, China's economic reforms were based on the re-opening of China's borders for foreign trade and investment, and the introduction of household responsibility system in agriculture (Ahlstrom et al. 2010:342). The former targeted coastal regions (i.e. Zhuhai, Xiamen, Shenzhen, and Shantou in 1980, and 14 coastal cities in 1984), and the latter reintroduced market-incentives to the agricultural production (Ahlstrom et al. 2010:342).

⁴⁹ Since these numbers represent the net migration rate, the lower number for the period 1985-1990 stems mainly from the fact that many Oversea Chinese were returning to China to benefit from the new possibilities in China.

countries, and was itself a source of outward migration (Seidman, 2009:582). The answer lies in the structural opportunities that had been created in Lesotho's garment and textile industry and in Chinese government projects. Since the 1980s, more and more Taiwanese-owned textile and garment factories had been opening up in Lesotho (Tangri, 1993:230; Lall, 2007:1004). Due to a perceived lack of skilled Basotho, a lack of trust in local people, as well as cultural differences, Taiwanese factory owners were appointing mostly non-Basotho for higher management positions (Lall, 2007:1007). As already mentioned above, they were also employing people from Mainland China, mostly from Fujian Province (Lall, 2007:1007). Interestingly, today's Chinese migrants in Lesotho seem to come largely from Fujian Province⁵⁰, particularly Fuqing City (see Chapter 4).

Apart from employment opportunities in the Taiwanese textile and garment industry in Lesotho, additional temporary employment opportunities for Chinese migrants were created by the Chinese government projects. In 1996, the governments of China and Lesotho signed an agreement on the construction of Lesotho's first National Convention Center. Like many Chinese government projects, this project was a "full-set project"⁵¹, and included not only the planning and construction, but also the importing of materials and labor from China. Usually, government project workers were returning to China with the completion of the projects. But some workers have remained in Lesotho to set up small businesses (see 3.2.2). Despite working in different industry sectors, Chinese pioneer migrants (i.e. workers for textile industry and workers for government projects) presumably share some common characteristics: (i) the duration of their stay was fixed and, at least theoretically, known in advance; (ii) salaries were paid in China and they only had a small monthly allowance to finance their expenditures in Lesotho; (iii) accommodation and food was usually provided by the employer, such that living costs were low; (iv) travel from and to Lesotho was paid by the employer; (v) they were living in confined compounds and had little exposure to locals apart from work; (vi) they were not allowed, or at least not encouraged, to bring their family; and (vii) for those who stayed for longer periods in Lesotho frequently additional non-financial incentives⁵² were granted. However, since these positions were either time-wise (i.e. government projects) or number-wise (i.e. management positions in textile and garment factories) limited, they did not initiate mass migration to Lesotho.

⁵⁰ Fujian Province is "China's second most important overseas province, overseas Chinese originated from Fujian amounted to over ten million." (Kinglun, 2011:168).

⁵¹ Full-set project: 全套项目 *quantao xiangmu*.

⁵² For example, during my fieldwork in Lesotho in February 2012, I had the chance to talk to managers from the Taiwanese textile and garment factories. They told me that the company was paying for tickets to go home and visit families, for the laundry, and was organizing a private shuttle to work every day.

3.2.2 Stage 2: developing contextual and endogenous feedback mechanisms

With the arrival of the first Chinese pioneers in Lesotho in the 1990s, initial contact and interactions among Chinese and Basotho took place. These interactions were first and foremost defined by the larger structures of Lesotho (i.e. political, economic and social context which created a set of structural opportunities and constraints). The political context was marked by occasional instability which was caused by the attempted overthrow of King Letsie III in 1996, and the post-elections violence in 1998 (Matlosa and Pule, 2010:64). Yet, unlike Taiwanese migrants in the 1980s, Chinese migrants did not experience significant clashes with Basotho. This is not to say that mutual suspicion and hostilities had ceded. Rather it is to say that no unusual degree of conflict emerged. Also, Lesotho's new President Bethuel Pakalitha Mosisili took a very cooperative approach towards China (Redvers, 2012:2), which resulted in a number of state-level interactions. These included, for example, the sending of medical teams in 1997, the construction of the Botha Bothe Industrial Park in 2002, and the forgiving of some parts of Lesotho's debt (MOFCOM, 2006:1).

The economic context was marked by positive macro-economic developments⁵³. However, despite these positive macro-economic developments, "poverty had not declined and a large segment of the population appeared not to have shared the benefits of economic growth" (IMF, 2004:8). Moreover, the social context was marked by a gradual shift in the employment patterns of Basotho. Up to the beginning of the 1990s, large parts of the male labor force had been working in South African mines. However, vacant positions in the mines were increasingly awarded to South Africans (SAMP, 2010:12). Thus, the number of male Basotho being able to work in the mines was declining (IMF, 2004:5). Simultaneously, larger parts of Lesotho's female labor force were seeking employment in one of the newly established Taiwanese textile or garment factories (Rosenberg, 2007:465). Not only the textile and garment industry, but also the small-scale wholesale and retail sector offered alternative employment opportunities (SAMP, 2010:69f.). Since the wages in these two sectors were significantly lower than the wages in the South African mines, many families had a smaller disposable income (SAMP, 2010:69). Moreover, the small-scale wholesale and retail sector had been experiencing an influx of individual traders from Taiwan during the 1980s and from Chinese during the 1990s and 2000s. These traders, building on networks and actions of early pioneer migrants from Taiwan, appear to have been highly successful in establishing themselves and out-competing locals (Tangri, 1993:223). Thus, they were curtailing business opportunities of Basotho.

Assuming that the Chinese migrants working in the textile and garment factories or in the Chinese government projects were on hierarchical and functionally higher levels than their

⁵³ Between 1996 and 2001, Lesotho's economy was growing on average 3.55% per year. GNI per capita had increased from 1,070 USD in 1990 to 1,310 USD in 2002 (World Bank Databank, 2012).

Basotho counterparts, it is difficult to imagine the two sides establishing profound friendships outside the working place. Language and cultural differences might have been a further obstacle in overcoming differences. In other words, the early interactions between Chinese migrants and Basotho were probably confined to the workplace. Despite this limited interactions, and despite a—in comparison to China—relatively challenging economic and political environment, like coolie migrants in South Africa, a small number of workers from the Chinese government projects stayed in Lesotho to open up small businesses. In Maseru I met a Chinese shop owner who had first come to Lesotho under the framework of the 1996 government project. After the project was finished in 1999, he decided to stay and now runs a successful Computer shop in a big shopping mall in Maseru. This shop owner is not an exception. Unfortunately, we lack official data about the exact numbers of people.

Interactions between Chinese migrants, Taiwanese migrants and Basotho set in motion a contextual feedback mechanism. This contextual feedback mechanism was reproducing Lesotho's structure in the sense that the dominant role of foreign non-state actors in the textile and garment industry, and to a lesser extent, in the small-scale industry sector was fostered. The occasional protests of Basotho were an attempt to alter this structure⁵⁴. Since Lesotho's top leadership was not responding to the demand of its population, these attempts failed. Therefore, the structural opportunities for Chinese migrants remained intact. Endogenous feedback mechanisms which were creating awareness about the opportunities for migrating to Lesotho are likely to have been initiated by Chinese pioneer migrants, particularly by those who opened up small shops. As a result of the interplay of these two feedback mechanisms⁵⁵ a critical 'herd-effect-threshold' (De Haas, 2010:20) was passed and migration from China to Lesotho gained momentum.

3.2.3 Stage 3: building the structures for the Sino-Basotho migration system

With migration from China reaching a critical threshold by the end of the 1990s, more and more Chinese migrants came to Lesotho to open up small businesses. The overall more positive environment was clearly one factor. Yet, this factor alone does not provide a satisfying explanation. After all, Chinese migrants had been in Lesotho for some time, and political and economic conditions, albeit not staying completely the same, did not improve dramatically. I would argue that the explanation for this development is linked to changes in China's structural constraints and in the full development of endogenous and contextual

⁵⁴ For example anti-Chinese protests were reported in 2008 (Wilson, 2008).

⁵⁵ While there are some rumors that the Chinese migration to Africa is part of a larger government strategy, Mohan (2009:5) argued that "many of the migrants in Africa are there independently of any state direction" (Mohan, 2009:5). Moreover, in her study on Chinese small-and medium enterprises in Africa, Gu (2009) found that many are not aware of the central government's strategies. However, one could argue that the relaxation of "state policy towards emigration" (Mohan, 2009:5) is itself an indirect measure to encourage outward migration. To my knowledge, in the context of Lesotho, there are no particular indications that migrants have come under some state direction.

feedback mechanisms. Changes in China's structural constraints were related to the reform of China's emigration law and regulation. While the process of easing restrictions on emigration had already been initiated in 1986, major changes came only after 2001 (Liu, 2009:319). Previously, outward migration from China had been complicated by the fact that the obtaining of passports entailed complicated procedures. For example, till 1994 people needed to have the "approval from their work unit and producing household registration documents, an invitation letter from overseas, and a financial guarantee for the duration of the visit." (Liu, 2009:319). From 2000, the possession of a foreign exchange deposit replaced the approval of their work units (Liu, 2009:318). The 2001 Exit- and Entry Reform also introduced the "passport on demand" policy (Liu, 2009:319). This gave potential migrants from "193 large- and medium-sized cities" the possibility to get a passport "merely by presenting their ID and the household registration documents" (Liu, 2009:319). In other words, structural constraints in China limiting broad-based migration to Lesotho as well as potentially other countries⁵⁶ were altered.

While structural constraints in China were altered, and structural opportunities in Lesotho's small-scale wholesale and retail sector remained, a number of laws complicated the setting up of small businesses in Lesotho. There were around 200 types of trading licenses and any person that wished to do business in Lesotho had to apply and obtain the appropriate one (US State Department, Bureau of Economic Affairs, 2012). However, many of these early migrants were not fluent in English, and even local business owners claimed that they were not aware of all the relevant regulation and policies (MTICM, 2008:114). Therefore, Chinese migrants often applied, intentionally or unintentionally, for the wrong license (MTICM, 2009:6). Moreover, since major segments of the small-scale business sector were reserved for Basotho, the scope of possible business ventures was essentially restricted to two options: opening up of supermarkets or wholesale businesses. For these early migrants supermarkets often did not constitute a viable option because the Trading Enterprise Regulation 1999 and the Enterprise Act 1999 stipulated that foreigners are only allowed to operate supermarkets with a shop floor size of at least 1000m². This stipulation meant that initial start-up costs, particularly the rent, were significantly higher. Things were complicated by the fact that the majority of the large-scale supermarkets in the urban centers of Lesotho was and remains in the hands of well-known, long-established South African retail chains such as Shoprite, Pick 'n' Pay and Checkers. Therefore, the initial entrance barrier into this business sector was simply too high for early Chinese migrants. Establishing a wholesale business was a more viable option for Chinese migrants because the law did not stipulate the size of the business in terms

⁵⁶ That is not to say that Chinese migration before this time was nonexistent. My point is that migration became available to more people because the bureaucratic barriers were significantly lower and due to increases in the disposable income, more people could afford to migrate.

of square meters. Nonetheless, the operation of wholesale businesses restricted the scope of potential customers to licensed traders (i.e. not private consumers). Since demand was generally not too strong and the number of potential, legal costumers was relatively small, Chinese migrants were often found to sell to private costumers, too (MTICM, 2009:6f.).

In the light of these complications, it seems that Chinese migrants were increasingly relying on family and kinship networks as a way to secure access to information, goods and people. For instance, Chinese shops needed cheap and reliable workers, but also goods from China. From accounts of Chinese migration to Europe (Pieke et al., 2004), we know that Chinese migrants frequently established transnational networks for securing the supply of goods and workers from China. This is not to say that transnational networks connecting China and Lesotho evolved only towards the end of the 1990s. My point is that the integration in and therefore the importance of these networks in the activities of Chinese migrants in Lesotho gained momentum only towards the end of the 1990s. Since the migrants had not unlimited start-up capital, they brought family members to help them set up the business and keep labor costs low. The frequently cited example of the Chen family, who has now allegedly 172 family members in Lesotho, is a good example (The Economist, 2010:1). Since these interactions are never one-way exchanges, information about the possibilities to migrate to Lesotho were spread among the involved families and their communities. This brought new members into the transnational networks.

Activities of transnational networks and individual migrants in turn further developed the contextual and endogenous feedback mechanisms. On the one hand, they were fostering the presence of Chinese migrants in the small-scale industry sector and were thereby reproducing the dominant role of foreign non-state actors. On the other hand, by informing friends, family and others about the opportunities in Lesotho, they fostered endogenous feedback mechanisms. A crude indicator for the effectiveness of these feedback mechanisms in stimulating further migration from China are the number of work permit applications. Already in 2000, 1,146 out of 2,743 total applications for work permits were filed by Chinese (Akokpari, 2011:92). Out of these, 923 permits were for the manufacturing sector, and 627 for the wholesale and retail trade sector (Akokpari, 2011:98). The differences in the numbers of applicants between the manufacturing and the wholesale and retail sector can be explained by the fact that Lesotho had just become part of the US Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2000. AGOA offered the textiles and garments produced in Lesotho preferential access to the US market. Since the US had imposed high tariffs on textiles produced in Taiwan or China, Taiwanese textile and garment producers in Lesotho were expanding their production and were) additional managers for their expanded operations (Lall, 2007:999. Again, it should be noted that this type of employment-based migration was just one factor

that explains why Chinese migration to Lesotho gained momentum from the late 1990s, early 2000s onwards. Another factor which might have played a role is China's "Going-Out-/Going-Global-Strategy"⁵⁷ (Brautigam, 2009:74).

3.2.4 Stage 4: fostering the dynamics within the Sino-Basotho migration system

According to one interviewee, Chinese migration to Lesotho had become highly visible by the year 2002. This is in line with McNamee's (2012) recent survey among Chinese migrants in Lesotho, which found that 85% of the interviewed migrants had stayed in Lesotho between 0-9 years and only 15% had been in Lesotho for 10-19 years. In other words, it seems plausible that the Sino-Basotho migration system was fully established shortly after 2002. When talking about the Sino-Basotho migration system it should be noted that this system is characterized by a strong migration configuration. McNamee's (2012) as well as my own survey both reveal Fujian Province in general and Fuqing City as the main sending areas of Chinese migrants. This in turn has created special dynamics with the migration system.

For a start, flows of migrants/returnees, goods, resources, information and investments between China and Lesotho are mainly sustained by networks and individuals from Fuqing. Member of these networks are therefore likely to benefit proportionally more from potential network effects, e.g. by decreases in the overall costs and risks of migrating to Lesotho due to better information provided by other Fuqingnese migrants. This in turn makes it more difficult for migrants from other parts of China to establish themselves in Lesotho, and to get to know about the possibility to go there in the first place. Since Fujian Province and Fuqing City can look back on a long history of migration to South-East-Asia, America and Europe (Pieke et al. 2004), Fujianese and Fuqingnese migrants have a comparative advantage in terms of migration industry and creating a migrant economy⁵⁸. The Fujianese migration industry, i.e. brokers and networks, has developed highly sophisticated ways of legally or illegally helping migrants to obtain the necessary documents and information for almost any possible migration destination (Pieke et al., 2004:96ff.). It seems that illegal practices are also common for the Sino-Basotho migration system. In July 2011, 26 Chinese migrants⁵⁹, who arrived at the Airport in Maseru, were detained because they did not possess the right papers (*The Lesotho Times*, 2012:1). All of them had proper visas, which had been issued at the embassy of Lesotho in Beijing, but did not have the required return tickets. More strikingly,

⁵⁷ The strategy was formulated in 2001 and has since then become closely associated with the growing presence of Chinese businesses across the world. While this strategy is clearly important, it seems that in the context of Africa, the majority of the smaller players (i.e. Chinese migrants and small-scale business owners) are not particularly aware of this strategy. For example, one interviewee of Gu's study (2009) said: "we have learned about central government policies about China-Africa from the media, television news or newspapers. We do not know the policies or exactly how they operate in reality" (Gu, 2009:18).

⁵⁸ For example, in my survey Fuqingnese migrants had more businesses than non-Fuqingnese migrants.

⁵⁹ Please note that the sources did not reveal the particular origin of the Chinese nationals, i.e. which Province they came from.

these migrants arrived on a chartered plane from Mozambique. Investigations into the case revealed that a syndicate of four Mosotho senior government officials and two Chinese nationals based in Lesotho, as well as members of the embassy of Lesotho in China, were involved in systematically organizing illegal migration from China to Lesotho (The Lesotho Times, 2012:1).

Access to these services is often costly. For example, the Lesotho Times reported in April, 2012 that a Chinese national, found to illegally organize migration to Lesotho, received “58,000 Maloti⁶⁰ (around 6,900 USD) for every Chinese national he delivered to Lesotho” (The Lesotho Times, 2012:1). This sum is considerably lower than the 10,000 to 20,000 USD migrants had to pay in 1999 to get to Eastern Europe (Pieke et al. 2004:97). Nonetheless, it still surpasses the annual income of many potential migrants. Therefore, Fujianese, but also migrants from other parts of China, often have to rely on family members and official or semi-official money lenders. Many Fujianese enjoy an advantage over migrants from other parts of China, particularly the more Western Provinces, because their families have frequently managed to establish transnational networks of businesses that allow them to pay these sums. Even for potential migrants that cannot rely on family access to credit, acquiring these sums is often not a big obstacle. Banks or individuals, whose families have acquired wealth through migration, often readily lend to new migrants. In some Chinese counties and prefectures the local governments encourage and support migration, because they view it as a way to develop the Home County or Prefecture (Pieke et al., 2004). This applies particularly to counties and prefectures that traditionally did not have any overseas connections and whose economic situation deteriorated after the reform era. Mingxi County is a case in point (Pieke et al., 2004:58f.).

In terms of creating a migrant economy in Lesotho, Chinese migrants in general, and Fujianese and Fuqingnese in particular appear to be engaged in different types of economic activities. The most visible economic activities include the involvement in the textile and garment industry, small-scale manufacturing (for example, Chinese migrants are running a sandstone factory in Berea District), and operating of small-retail shops, supermarkets and other wholesale business in urban and rural areas. This is also reflected in the statistics of the Lesotho’s OSBFC in Maseru. Their statistics show that the number of applications for work permits increased from 546 in 2008 to 897 in 2011 (OSBFC, 2012). Out of these, 80% are from Chinese and only 15% from South Africans (OSBFC, 2012). The majority of the applications was for supervisors in the textile and garment industry, followed by managers for import and exports, ware house, workshop, dispatch, shipping, packing, and sales (OSBFC, 2012). These activities are catering both the special demand of Chinese as well as the broader

⁶⁰ Maloti is the official currency of Lesotho.

local demand. Frequently, Chinese migrants are entering deals with Basotho to use their business licenses, especially for the business sectors that are reserved for Basotho (MTICM, 20009:14). Furthermore, Chinese migrants destined to work for other Chinese migrants in Lesotho are supplied through the migration industry. Unfortunately, in rare cases this also includes the provision of forced labor, particularly prostitution. In January 2012, three Chinese women were freed after they had been forced to work as prostitutes in a local hotel (Lesotho Times, 2012:1). The women had been brought to Lesotho on the pretext that they would work for some respectable company and were then forced to sell their services for M 1,500 (around 180 USD) (Lesotho Times, 2012:1).

Looking at the described dynamics, we note that the Sino-Basotho migration system is not only shaped by the Chinese, but also by the interactions between Chinese and Basotho. So far, I have described some extreme forms of interaction such as the cooperation in illegal human trafficking and illegal licensing. But interactions between Chinese and Basotho include a whole array of other forms, for example: interactions between Chinese migrants and local authorities, Chinese migrants and the local communities, and Chinese employers and Basotho employees. Some of these more common interactions will be described in more detail in the next chapter.

4. Non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migration configuration: highlighting intra-Sino-Basotho migration system similarities and differences

Despite the fact that Chinese migration to Lesotho is not a new, albeit important, phenomenon, only few systematic studies on Chinese migrants in Lesotho have been conducted (see e.g. Park, 2009, Park, 2010; McNamee et al., 2012). Moreover, to my knowledge no studies on particular migration configurations within the Sino-Basotho-migration-system exist. As a result, we know relatively little about Chinese migrants and intra-migration system migration configurations. Identifying this knowledge gap, I decided to conduct a survey among Chinese migrants in Lesotho (i) to find out more about Chinese migrants' demographic characteristics, their migration pattern, their image of Lesotho, and their problem solving strategies; and (ii) to discover intra-Sino-Basotho migration system differences and similarities. Building on findings from my survey, this chapter provides a detailed account of the profile of migrants from two migration configurations within the Sino-Basotho migration system: the Fuqingnese and the non-Fuqingnese migration configurations. Note that—when using a conservative definition of migration configurations—it might be questioned to what extent the non-Fuqingnese migration configuration qualifies as a full-fledged migration configuration, since it is composed of Chinese migrants originating from several different of cities. However, since the amount of questionnaires from migrants from specific cities other than Fuqing is not sufficient to derive statistical relevant results, I

decided to apply the concept of migration configuration also to the non-Fuqingnese case. This allows me to derive differences between the specific migration configuration of Fuqingnese migrants, and a meta-configuration which might be interpreted as the average of all other migration configurations, i.e. the non-Fuqing migration configuration. I start with a few introductory remarks about the survey, and continue with my definition of the two migration configurations within the Sino-Basotho migration system. This is followed by a detailed description of the profile of migrants from these two migration configurations. Finally, I discuss intra-migration system similarities and differences.

4.1. Survey sample: introductory remarks

Before analyzing migrants from the two particular migration configurations, it is useful to briefly describe some aspects of my survey. I conducted the survey myself in seven towns in Lesotho during two research trips in November 2011 and February 2012. I identified potential participants for the survey by going to Chinese shops and supermarkets in the central areas of the seven towns, informing the Chinese migrants inside these shops about my survey and asking them whether they would be willing to participate. In some cases, they referred me to another person in the shop or to a neighboring shop, and this information was used to increase the number of participants. In total 86 Chinese migrants took part in the survey.


With the exception of Roma, Lesotho's university town in Maseru District, the survey was carried out in central areas of larger towns of Lesotho's administrative districts: Butha Buthe (capital of Butha Buthe District), Mafeteng (capital of Mafeteng District), Maseru (capital of Lesotho and Maseru District), Maputsoe (second largest town in Leribe District), Mokhotlong (capital of Mokhotlong District), and Teyateyaneng (capital of Berea District). These towns are located in three different livelihood zones⁶¹: Maseru, Mafeteng and Roma are located in the Southern Lowlands, Butha-Buthe, Maputsoe and Teyateyaneng in the Northern Lowlands, and Mokhotlong in the Mountain Zone. Together, these three zones comprise 80% of Lesotho's population. Moreover, all towns, except for Mokhotlong, are close to the South African border and can therefore be assumed to have comparably good access to the South African market.

Figure 9 shows that the three places with the highest number of migrants participating in the survey were in descending order: Maseru, Maputsoe, and Mafeteng. Variations in the number of migrants participating are partly explainable by structural differences between the "developed" Southern and Northern Lowlands, and the remote mountain areas, i.e. by different absolute numbers of Chinese migrants living and working in the respective cities.

⁶¹ Lesotho's livelihood zones are „six geographical regions, differentiated according to factors such as population density, agricultural productivity, primary economic activities and sources of cash in the area, average levels of income, access to markets and infrastructure" (MTICM, 2008:76f.).

However, these variations are also a reflection of other constraints: in some towns, a smaller percentage of Chinese migrants was willing to participate in the survey. This applied especially to Teyateyaneng. There, some local migrants, who disapproved the survey, appeared to have a fast communication network which informed and “warned” other migrants about my presence and therefore made it more difficult for me to win participants. Furthermore, due to practical constraints at several stages of the research trip (i.e. little time until next bus connection, accommodation in a different city, and similar), the relative coverage of some towns was lower than that of other towns. Therefore, variations across the different towns cannot be assumed to be in all cases a direct reflection of a stronger or weaker presence of Chinese migrants.

Figure 9 Distribution of migrants across the seven towns Lesotho



As mentioned in Chapter 1, I used two sets of questionnaires⁶². In the subsequent analysis of my results, I will use the terms “Category 1 migrant” and “Category 2 migrant” to indicate the type of questionnaire. The survey sample consisted of 54 Category 1 migrants, and 32 Category 2 migrants. The higher rate of collected Category 1 questionnaires can be partly attributed to the fact that potential migrants for Category 2 questionnaires were frequently more cautious and often not sure if they were allowed to participate in such a survey. For example, in one instance a Chinese employee first called her boss in China to find out if she was allowed to participate.

4.2. Non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants: defining migration configurations within the Sino-Basotho migration system

In Section 2.1.2 I pointed out that migration configuration, by focusing on connections between particular areas of origin and destination, is a useful concept for highlighting intra-migration system differences. My study showed that migrants were mainly divided along two lines: non- Fujianese and Fujianese, and non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants. In the

⁶² The first set (Category 1) was given to all those migrants who considered themselves as the boss of a business, or at least did not consider themselves as “simply” working there. The second set (Category 2) was given to all those migrants who considered themselves as working in the businesses, or those who directly affirmed that they were personnel or staff.

survey, non-Fujianese migrants constituted 22% and Fujianese migrants 68%. Non-Fuqingnese migrants on the other hand comprised 45% and Fuqingnese migrants 55% of the survey. Taking into consideration (i) the small share of non-Fujianese migrants, (ii) the low intra-Fujianese diversity (i.e. 70% of the Fujianese migrants were from Fuqing), and (iii) the tendency of migration configurations to be manifested in connections between particular local places that are embedded into larger structures (i.e. migration systems), I decided to divided the survey sample into non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants. Fuqingnese migrants were defined as all migrants whose place of origin is Fuqing⁶³ and non-Fuqingnese migrants in turn comprised all migrants whose place of origin is not Fuqing.

The Fuqingnese migration configuration was constituted of Fuqingnese migrants. Since migrants in this configuration are from the same place of origin, they face a similar set of structural opportunities and constraints. This means that intra-migration configuration variances are mainly deriving from actor-level differences, i.e. differences in material and non-material resources, and personal attributes of migrants. The non-Fuqingnese migration configuration was constituted of non-Fuqingnese migrants from various Chinese towns (see Section 4.3). Unlike the Fuqingnese migration configuration, the non-Fuqingnese migration configuration has higher intra-migration configuration variances because migrants from this configuration can be considered to face, depending on the place of origin, different structural opportunities and constraints. In other words, intra-migration configuration variations of Fuqingnese migrants are a result of both actor-level and structural differences.

Generally speaking, differences in structural opportunities and constraints at the places of origin are important for explaining the “why so many out of so few places” phenomenon (Faist, 2000:43), because the structural setting directly or indirectly determines the percentage of people who are able to migrate to a particular place. In the context of my survey, the fact that participants were already in Lesotho shows that they had successfully overcome structural constraints. The overcoming of structural constraints is closely linked to actor-level characteristics (demographic characteristics, migration patterns, image of Lesotho, problem solving strategies). By comparing Fuqingnese and non-Fuqingnese migrants’ actor-level characteristics, I am able to identify similarities and differences between the two migration configurations, and to highlight intra-Sino-Basotho-migration system variations. Both of these results are important for better understanding the nature of Chinese migration to Lesotho.

⁶³ Fuqing is a coastal city in Fujian Province which has traditionally good overseas links and a long tradition of outward migration.

4.3 Non-Fuqingnese migration configuration: a profile of non-Fuqingnese migrants


The non-Fuqingnese migration configuration consisted of migrants from Chongqing (n=2), Danshan (n=5), Fuzhou (n=14), Guangzhou (n=1), Jiangyi (n=1), Shanghai (n=1), Tianjin (n=1), Wuhan (n=1), Yuqi (n=1), Zhenjiang (n=1), five undisclosed⁶⁴ cities in Fujian Province, and one undisclosed city in Jiangsu and Hubei Province. Non-Fuqingnese migrants have established connections between their place of origin and all seven towns of Lesotho. However, the strength of these connections, as reflected in their presence in particular towns, differs. The towns with the highest number of non-Fuqingnese migrants taking part in the survey were in descending order: Maseru (n=18), Maputsoe (n=7), Mafeteng (n=7). In Butha Buthe and Mokhotlong, one non-Fuqingnese migrant participated, each. In absolute terms, non-Fuqingnese migrants constituted 58% of all migrants in Maseru, half of those in Teyateyaneng and Mafeteng, 40% of those in Maputsoe, only a quarter of all migrants in Butha-Buthe and Mokhotlong. This in turn indicates that non-Fuqingnese migrants have established stronger connections than Fuqingnese migrants between their place of origin and Maseru, Teyateyaneng and Mafeteng, respectively weaker connections to the other cities.

4.3.1 Selected demographic characteristics

Out of 39 non-Fuqingnese migrants, 23 were Category 1 migrants and 16 were Category 2 migrants. With 18 male and 21 female migrants, the non-Fuqingnese sample, unlike the total sample, had a slightly higher female rate. In the survey, the age of non-Fuqingnese migrants ranged from 20 years to 62 years (see Figure 10). Nearly two thirds (n=23) of surveyed non-Fuqingnese migrants were between 20 and 39 years old. Further analysis showed important differences in the mean age of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants: whereas the former had a mean age of 37, the latter had a mean age of 31 years. Differences in the mean age of male and female non-Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants were marginal. In other words, it seems that non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants are on average older than non-Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants.


⁶⁴ These migrants only disclosed their Province, but not their city of origin.

Figure 10 Age of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants



Looking at the marital status of the non-Fuqingnese migrants (Figure 11), it can be noted that 74% of Category 1 migrants (n=17) and 56% of Category 2 migrants (n=9) were married. The different proportions of married and single migrants can be traced to gender and age differences: three out of four married male non-Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants were older than 40, and three out of five married female non-Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants were older than 35 (i.e. beyond age still considered acceptable to be single). The large proportion of singles among non-Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants derived likewise from age and gender differences. Many single non-Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants had not yet reached the “typical age” for marriage (i.e. 67% of them were between 20 and 25 years old). Moreover, since more than 83% of them were males at an average age of 30, it is possible that they had not yet accumulated enough wealth for being in the social position to marry.

Figure 11 Marital status of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants



For the previous occupational status of non-Fuqingnese migrants it could be noted that 56% had been a “businessperson”. Moreover, a great overlap between the Categories and migrants’ previous occupational status was found: 87% of the non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=20) had previously been “businesspersons or merchants”⁶⁵; and 81% of non-Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants (n=15) had previously been “staff”⁶⁶(Figure 12).

⁶⁵ Businessperson or merchant: 商人 shangren.

⁶⁶ Staff: 职工 zhigong.

Figure 12 Previous occupational status of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants





Figure 13 shows that there were significant differences between the present occupational status of non-Fuqingnese migrants and belonging to a certain category and having a particular present occupational status (see Figure 13). For Category 2 non-Fuqingnese migrants the answers to both questions were relatively consistent: 81% stated that they were presently “staff” (n=13), and only one migrant stated that he was presently a “businessperson or merchant”. Yet, only 43% of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=8) stated that they were presently “businesspersons or merchants”, and 34% (n=6) stated that they were presently “staff”. This puzzle will be further discussed in Section 4.5.

Figure 13 Present occupational status of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants



When moving away from simply comparing changes in the absolute numbers and separately analyzing particular occupational statuses, it can be noted that 62% of the non-Fuqingnese migrants (n=24) did not experience any change between their previous and present occupational status. This was most evident among non-Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants. Here, 81% (n=13) had previously been and continued to be “staff”. Among non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants the number of those who did not experience any changes was smaller. Only ten migrants did not experience any changes. Out of these ten, eight were and continued

to be “businesspersons or merchants”. Among the total survey sample, the share of Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants who had previously been and continued to be “businesspersons or merchants” was only 35%.

4.3.2 Migration patterns

To better understand the migration pattern of non-Fuqingnese migrants, they were asked about their motivations to come to Lesotho, the people that accompanied them, earlier outward migration experiences, the duration of their stay in Lesotho and their future plans. The motivations of non-Fuqingnese migrants highly matched those of their respective categories (see Figure 14): 74% of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=17) had come to Lesotho “to start a business”, and 50% of non-Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants (n=8) had come to Lesotho “to seek employment”. Only three non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants indicated that they had come to Lesotho to “seek employment”.

Figure 14 Motivation of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants to come to Lesotho

Motivation	Category 1	Category 2	Total
Accompany family members	0	1	1
Start a business	20	1	21
Seek employment	3	8	11

While there were larger differences between motivations of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants, only small differences existed when it came to the purpose of making money (see Figure 15⁶⁷). Out of 36 non-Fuqingnese migrants, 50% (n=18) said that the main purpose of making money was to “support the family” and 25% (n=9) said that it was to “support oneself”. Interestingly, only one person stated that he wanted to “buy a house”. These findings back up the view that Chinese migration is highly a family decision which serves to secure the wealth and prosperity of the family.

Figure 15 Selected purpose of making money of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants

Purpose	Category 1	Category 2	Total
Support oneself	6	3	9
Support family	11	7	18
Buy a house	1	0	1

Looking at the people who accompanied non-Fuqingnese migrants, we find further support for the claim that their decision to migrate to Lesotho is mainly part of a larger family risk-diversification strategy. As Figure 16 shows, 76% of the non-Fuqingnese migrants (n= 28) came together with some part of their family and only 13% came alone (n=9). Moreover, 88%

⁶⁷ The total number is here 28 (instead of 37).


(n=15) of the married non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants and 88% (n=8) of the married Category 2 migrants had brought some part of their family. Out of the nine migrants who had come alone, two thirds were from Category 2 (n=6). Among the six non-Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants, five were single and younger than 30, and four claimed to have come to Lesotho to seek employment.

Figure 16 Persons that accompanied non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants

Person	Category 1	Category 2	Total
Alone	3	6	9
Husband/wife	12	7	19
Husband/wife + Child	1	3	4
Husband/wife + parents	3	1	4
Parents	0	0	0
Others	0	1	1

When it came to previous outward migration experiences of non-Fuqingnese migrants, surprisingly 82% of non-Fuqingnese migrants (n=32) did not have any outward migration experience (see Figure 17). Only a small group of seven non-Fuqingnese migrants (five from Category 1 and two from Category 2), stated that they had been to another country before coming to Lesotho. The majority had stayed in their previous migration destination for three years and only one person had stayed for more than nine years. Among all non-Fuqingnese migrants with previous migration experience, male migrants (n=4) had a slightly higher share than their female counterparts (n=3).


Figure 17 Previous migration experience of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants



Turning to the duration of the stay in Lesotho, almost 60% of non-Fuqingnese migrants (n=23) had been in Lesotho for at least five years. For example, out of 36 non-Fuqingnese

migrants⁶⁸, 31% (n=11) had been in Lesotho for more than nine years and 25% between five to seven years (n=9). A clear difference in the duration of the stay existed between non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants: 50% of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=18) had been in Lesotho for more than five years (see Figure 18). For non-Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants the reverse applied: 62% (n=13)⁶⁹ had been in Lesotho for less than five years. Only two non-Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants had been in Lesotho for more than nine years.

Figure 18 Duration of the stay in Lesotho of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants




Regarding the answers of non-Fuqingnese migrants to the question of how long they were intending to stay in Lesotho, it could be observed that 41% of non-Fuqingnese migrants (n=16) indicated that they were intending to stay in Lesotho between one to five years. Moreover, 26% of all non-Fuqingnese migrants “did not know” how long they would stay. Only one migrant indicated to intend to leave Lesotho after more than nine years (see Figure 19). Leaving those aside who said they would not know, it could be noted that Category 1 migrants had a slightly higher share among those migrants who were indenting to stay in Lesotho for more than three years. Likewise, Category 2 migrants had a higher share among those who were intending to stay in Lesotho for less than three years.

⁶⁸ The first version of the survey did not include this question. Therefore total number of respondents is 36.


⁶⁹ The question was not included in the first round therefore three Category 2 migrants were not asked this question.

Figure 19 Intended duration of the stay in Lesotho of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants



While the answers of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants diverged with regard to the duration of their past and future stay, their answers to the question of where they intend to go afterwards were very similar: 90% of all non-Fuqingnese migrants (n=35) wanted to go to “China”, and only 2% (n=2) intended to go to America or Oceania, each (Figure 20). Tellingly all of the non-Fuqingnese migrants (five Category 1 migrants and two Category 2 migrants) who had previous outward migration experience wanted to go back to China. Furthermore, none of migrants who had migration experiences with other African countries (n=2) wanted to migrate to another African country.

Figure 20 Next migration destination of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants




4.3.3 Image of Lesotho

An important aspect for understanding Chinese interactions with the local population (see Chapter 5) is to try to capture some aspects of the image that Chinese migrants about Lesotho, and the relations with Basotho and the local Chinese. In the first question in this regard migrants were asked about their image of Lesotho before they came to the country (see Figure 21). The majorities of both, non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants, had


an “average impression” of Lesotho. Furthermore, it could be noted that non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants tended to have a slightly better impression of Lesotho than Category 2 migrants. However, in both cases migrants with a “non-average” impression constituted the minority.

Figure 21 Impression of Lesotho (before) of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants



When comparing the present impressions of non-Fuqingnese migrants to their impression prior to migration, a slight shift from a positive to a negative impression can be observed. While Category 1 migrants still tended to have a more positive impression of Lesotho than their Category 2 counterparts, those with a bad or not so good impression increased among both Categories (see Figure 22).


Figure 22 Impression of Lesotho (after) of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants



One possible explanation for these changes can be found when analyzing the impressions of non-Fuqingnese migrants of the attitude of Basotho towards Chinese (see Figure 23). Here, Category 1 migrants assessed the attitude of Basotho towards Chinese more positive than their Category 2 migrants, too. But unlike earlier, non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants had almost equal share among those who thought that Basotho displayed a “bad” or


a “not so good” attitude towards Chinese. Interestingly, non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants constituted 60% of those who stated that Basotho had a “bad attitude” and non-Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants constituted 67% of those who said Basotho had a “not so good attitude” towards Chinese. In other words, Category 2 migrants were grading the attitude slightly better than their Category 1 counterparts. A point worth noting here is that the share of migrants felt that Basotho had an “average attitude” towards Chinese was significantly lower than the 64% who had an “average impression” of Lesotho before migration and the 54% who had an “average impression” afterwards.

Figure 23 Impression of the attitude of Basotho towards Chinese of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants




Although non-Fuqingnese migrants tended to have a rather negative impression of Basotho’s attitude towards Chinese, the opposite was found for the relations with Basotho (see Figure 24). Non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants who thought relations with Basotho were “average” represented the largest group (n=20). But those who thought that relations were “good” or “very good” represented the second largest group (n=19). Only a small minority thought relations were “bad”. Again, Category 1 migrants had a higher share among those who gave a positive assessment.

Figure 24 Relations with Basotho of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants



In stark contrast to the answers about the relations with Basotho, the answers of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants revealed an overall positive assessment of the relations with the local Chinese (see Figure 25). The majorities of both groups thought that relations were good. Only a small group of Category 1 and Category 2 migrants stated that relations were “average”. More importantly not a single participant thought relations were bad. This somewhat questions the extent to which non-Fuqingnese migrants are less integrated into the local Chinese community (discussed later).

Figure 25 Relations with local Chinese of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants



4.3.4 Problem solving strategies

To find out more about the problem solving strategies of non-Fuqingnese migrants, the survey asked migrants about their advance preparations, and the people that would help them in times of difficulties. Starting with the preparations of non-Fuqingnese migrants (see Figure 26), the survey showed that 39% “did not prepare” (n=15). They were followed by 28% of migrants who “asked their friends for advice” (n=11). Interestingly, “learning English” and “looking at experiences of others online” were not important preparation strategies among non-Fuqingnese migrants.

Figure 26 Preparation of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants

Preparation	Category 1	Category 2	Total
Ask friends for advice	8	3	11
Learn English	3	2	5
Did not prepare	9	7	16
Look at experiences of others online	1	0	1

The next important aspect of non-Fuqingnese migrants’ problem solving strategies could be derived from their answers to the questions of who would help them when they had problems (see Figure 27).

Figure 27 Sources of help for non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants

Source of help	Category 1	Category 2	Total
Family	9	6	15
Colleagues	2	2	4
Local Chinese	6	7	13
Basotho	0	0	0
Myself	0	2	2

In the survey, the family (n=13), local Chinese (n=11) and colleagues (n=4) were the three most common sources of help. Not a single non-Fuqingnese migrant indicated that he or she would turn to “Basotho”. For 60% of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=9) the “family” was the most important source of help. Among them, all migrants had brought some part of their family. This in turn could indicate that they were part of a family business. For non-Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants, local Chinese were the most important source. Here, 83% (n=7) had been previously and were presently “staff”. Interestingly, only two had come alone and more than half had brought their husband or wife.

4.4 Fuqingnese migration configuration: a profile of Fuqingnese migrants

Having described the profile of non-Fuqingnese migrants, I now continue with the description of the Fuqingnese migrants and the Fuqingnese migration configuration. The Fuqingnese migration configuration included 47 Fuqingnese migrants who had established connections between Fuqing and all surveyed towns in Lesotho. However, the strength of these connections, as reflected in their presence in particular towns, differs. The largest groups of Fuqingnese migrants were found in Maseru (n=13), Maputsoe (n=11) and Mafeteng (n=7). Moreover, compared to the non-Fuqingnese migration configuration, the connections between Fuqing and the surveyed towns were stronger in six out of seven towns. The sample of Fuqingnese migrants included 31 Category 1 and 16 Category 2 migrants. With 19 female and 28 male migrants, males had a higher share among Fuqingnese migrants.

4.4.1 Selected demographic characteristics

The demographic characteristics of Fuqingnese migrants covered by my survey include age, marital status, place of origin, as well as the previous and present occupational status. The age of Fuqingnese migrants ranged from 19 years to 48 years and 82% of them were between 19 and 39 years old. As earlier, difference in the mean age of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants can be observed (see Figure 28). Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants had a mean age of 36 years, whereas Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants had a mean age of only 30 years. Moreover, the share of migrants older than 40 years was lower. This means that Fuqingnese migrants confirmed the trend that Category 1 migrants are on average older than Category 2 migrants.

Figure 28 Age of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants





Figure 29 shows that 85% of Category 1 migrants (n=28) and 60% of Category 2 migrants (n=10) were married. These shares were slightly higher than the shares of married non-Fuqingnese migrants. Again, Category 2 migrants formed the largest group among single Fuqingnese migrants (n=5). The fact that the mean age of single Fuqingnese Category 2


migrants was 21 years may explain their marital status. The large proportions of married Fuqingnese migrants can be likewise traced to age.

Figure 29 Marital status of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants



An analysis of the previous occupation status of Fuqingnese migrants revealed that more than half of them had been previously a “businessperson or merchant” (see Figure 30), and less than 40% said they had been “staff”. As earlier, an overlap between the Categories and migrants’ previous occupational status existed: 78% of Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=24) had previously been a “businessperson or merchant”; 81% Fuqingnese Category 2 (n=13) migrants had previously been “staff” (see Figure 30).


Figure 30 Previous occupational status of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants



When asked about their present occupational status, 48% of Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants stated that they were “staff” (n=23), and only 17% (n=8) stated that they were at present a “businessperson or merchant” (see Figure 31). Compared to the 34% of non-Fuqingnese migrants who considered their present occupational status as that of a “businessperson or merchant”, the share of Fuqingnese migrants with a present occupational status of “businesspersons or merchants” was lower. When individually analyzing changes for each occupational status, I discovered that only 18 out of 47 Fuqingnese migrants did not experience any changes between their previous and their present occupational status (i.e.

staff-staff or businessperson-businessperson). Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants had an equal share among those 18 migrants who did not experience any changes. This differed from findings for non-Fuqingnese migrants where Category 2 migrants constituted 67% of all non-Fuqingnese migrants that did not experience any changes in their occupational status. Moreover, 30% of Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=10) changed from “businessperson” to “staff”.

Figure 31 Present occupational status of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants



4.4.2 Migration patterns

Like non-Fuqingnese migrants, Fuqingnese migrants were asked about their motivations to come to Lesotho, the people that accompanied them, earlier outward migration experiences, the duration of their stay in Lesotho and their future plans. Again, the motivations of Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants highly matched the motivations of a “businessperson or merchant”: 90% (n=28) had come to Lesotho “to start a business” (see Figure 32). Only three Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants indicated that they had come to Lesotho to “seek employment”. A similar trend applied to Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants: 47% (n=8) had come to Lesotho to “seek employment”.

Figure 32 Motivation to migrate to Lesotho of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants

Motivation	Category 1	Category 2	Total
Accompany family members	1	1	2
Start a business	27	3	30
Seek employment	3	8	11

Despite differences in the motivations to migrate to Lesotho of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants, no larger differences were observed when it came to the purpose of making money: 44% of all Fuqingnese migrants (n=21) wanted to “support the family” and 19% wanted to “support oneself” (see Figure 33). The shares of Fuqingnese migrants who

wanted to support themselves or their families were each 6% lower than that of non-Fuqingnese migrants. This shows that Fuqingnese migration is also part of a larger risk-diversification strategy that serves to secure the wealth and prosperity of the family (Haugen and Carling, 2006:643).

Figure 33 Selected purpose of making money in Lesotho of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants

Purpose	Category 1	Category 2	Total
Support oneself	8	1	9
Support family	17	4	21
Buy a house	1	1	2


The answers of Fuqingnese migrants to who accompanied them to Lesotho further support the claim that their decision to migrate to Lesotho is part of a larger family risk-diversification strategy. The majorities of Category 1 and Category 2 migrants brought some part of their family. In contrast to the 23% of non-Fuqingnese migrants who came alone, only 9% of Fuqingnese migrants came alone (Figure 34). Moreover, all the Fuqingnese migrants who came alone were male, but only one of them was single.

Figure 34 Persons that accompanied Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants

Person	Category 1	Category 2	Total
Alone	2	2	4
Husband/wife	18	8	26
Husband/wife + Child	7	0	7
Husband/wife + parents	1	1	2
Parents	1	1	2
Others	0	3	3


The survey revealed that Fuqingnese migrants had even less outward migration experience than non-Fuqingnese migrants. Here, 87% of all Fuqingnese migrants (n=41) had not gone to any other country before (see Figure 35). From the 17% of Fuqingnese migrants (n=6) with previous outward migration experience, 83% were Category 1 migrants (n=5) and only 17% Category 2 migrants (n=1). The previous migration destination of Fuqingnese migrants were in descending order: Asia (n=3), Europe (n=1), America (n=1) and Africa (n=1). Half of them had stayed there for less than one year. All Fuqingnese migrants with previous migration experience were male.

Figure 35 Previous migration experience of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants



Among the surveyed Fuqingnese migrants⁷⁰ (see Figure 36), 52% had been in Lesotho for at least five years. In contrast, only one Fuqingnese migrant stated that he had been in the country for less than one year. Again, a clear difference in the duration of the stay between Category 1 and Category 2 migrants could be identified: 58% of Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants⁷¹ (n=14) had been in Lesotho for more than five years, and 67% Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants⁷² (n=6) had been in Lesotho for less than five years. Only 11% Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants had been in Lesotho for more than nine years. In contrast those who had been in Lesotho for more than nine years comprised 25% of the Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants. However, in relation to the total sample of all migrants (i.e. Fuqingnese and non-Fuqingnese migrants) who had been in Lesotho for more than nine years (n=17), Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants constituted only 36%.

Figure 36 Duration of the stay in Lesotho of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants




⁷⁰ The first survey did not include that question therefore total number of respondents is 36.

⁷¹ For this question the number of surveyed Category 1 migrants was 24.

⁷² The question was not included in the first round therefore three Category 2 migrants were not asked this question. The number of persons not asked this question was 7 migrants.


Looking at the answers of Fuqingnese migrants about how long they were intending to stay in Lesotho, it could be observed that 25% (n=12) intended to leave Lesotho between “one to three years” and 21% (n=10) “did not know”. Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants displayed important differences (see Figure 37). 44% of Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=21) wanted to stay in Lesotho for additional one to five years, and 31% wanted to stay for more than five additional years (n=15). Furthermore, 50% of Category 2 migrants (n=8) wanted to stay in Lesotho for additional one to five years, and 25% (n=4) wanted to stay for more than five additional years.

Figure 37 Intended duration of the stay of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants



As earlier, no larger differences existed when it came to the next migration destination. Here, 76% of all Fuqingnese migrants (n=36) stated that they intend to go back to “China”. Among the small minority of 11 migrants who stated that they were intending to go to some other country, Category 1 migrants constituted the largest group (n=8) (see Figure 38). Moreover, only one migrant wanted to migrate to another African country and the majority of migrants (n=5) with previous migration experience wanted to go back to China.


Figure 38 Next migration destination of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants



4.4.3 Image of Lesotho


To understand Chinese interactions with the local population (see Chapter 5) participants were asked about their impressions of Lesotho, and the relations with Basotho and the local Chinese. Starting with Fuqingnese migrants' impression of Lesotho before coming to the country, it could be noted that 70% of Fuqingnese Category 1 and 44% of Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants had an "average" impression of Lesotho (see Figure 39). Moreover, 29% of Fuqingnese Category 1 and 50% of Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants had either a "bad" or a "not so good" impression. Only a minority of 4% had had a "good" impression of Lesotho. In other words, Fuqingnese migrants tended to have a rather negative impression of Lesotho beforehand. Therefore, they differ from non-Fuqingnese migrants who tended to have a rather average impression of Lesotho.

Figure 39 Impression of Lesotho (before) of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants




A comparison of Fuqingnese migrants' impressions of Lesotho before and after migrating revealed decreases in the number of migrants with a "not so good" impression and increases in the number of migrants with a "good" impression. The numbers for Fuqingnese migrants with either a "bad" or a "very good" impression did not change. Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants tended to have a more positive impression than Category 2 migrants (see Figure 40).

Figure 40 Impression of Lesotho (after) of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants




Similar to non-Fuqingnese migrants, the share of Fuqingnese migrants who felt that Basotho had a “bad attitude” or a “not so good attitude” towards Chinese was 46%. Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants constituted only 33% of those who thought Basotho had a “bad attitude” towards Chinese (i.e. 27% less than non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants). Again, Category 2 migrants tended to have a more negative impression of the attitude of Basotho towards Chinese (see Figure 41). Moreover, Fuqingnese migrants who thought that Basotho displayed an “average attitude” were only 31%. Again, this was significantly lower than the 53% who had an “average impression” of Lesotho before (see Figure 39) and the 48% who had an “average impression” afterwards (see Figure 40).

Figure 41 Impression of the attitude of Basotho towards Chinese of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants




As Figure 42 shows, that both Category 1 and Category 2 migrants gave a rather positive assessment of their relation with Basotho. Category 1 and Category 2 migrants who thought relations with Basotho were “average” represented the largest group (n=28). But those who thought that relations were “good” or “very good” represented the second largest group (n=16). Only a small minority though relations were “bad” (n=1).

Figure 42 Relations with Basotho of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants



The assessment of the relations with local Chinese confirmed the trend that the relations with local Chinese are better than those with Basotho (see Figure 43). The majorities of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 had “good”, “very good” or “excellent” relations with local Chinese. Only one Category 2 migrant thought relations with local Chinese were “bad”. This in turn confirms that Fuqingnese migrants are rather well integrated into the local Chinese community.

Figure 43 Relations with local Chinese of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants



4.4.4 Problem solving strategies

Figure 44 summarizes the advance preparations of Fuqingnese migrants. Fuqingnese migrants who “asked their friends for advice” formed the largest group (n=20). They were followed by migrants who “did no prepare” (n=10). Among Fuqingnese migrants, more Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants “asked their friends for advice”, and relatively more Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants “did not prepare”. As earlier, “learning English” and “looking at experiences of others online” were not important preparation strategies.

Figure 44 Preparation of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants

Preparation	Category 1	Category 2	Total
Ask friends for advice	14	6	20
Learn English	6	0	6
Did not prepare	6	4	10
Look at experiences of others online	0	2	2

For 45% of Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=14) and 60% of Category 2 migrants (n=6), “local Chinese” were the most important source of help (see Figure 45). Among them, 85% were presently “staff” (n=12). In contrast, those Fuqingnese migrants who turned to their “family” or their “colleagues” comprised only 27% of the Fuqingnese migrants. For the 13% of Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants who turned to their “family” all had brought some parts of their family. Again, not a single migrant indicated that he or she would turn to “Basotho”.

Figure 45 Sources of help for Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrant

Source of help	Category 1	Category 2	Total
Family	4	3	7
Colleagues	5	1	6
Local Chinese	14	6	20
Basotho	0	0	0
Myself	2	1	3

4.5 Discussion of intra-Sino-Basotho migration system similarities and differences

Having described the profile of migrants from the non-Fuqingnese and the Fuqingnese migration configuration, I will now discuss some intra-Sino-Basotho-migration system similarities and differences characteristics, as well as some puzzles emerging from my findings for the two migration configurations. I start with a discussion of some common characteristics of the two migration configurations, i.e. qualitative differences between Category 1 and Category 2 participants, migration as a risk-diversification strategy, and limited support for the African dream thesis. I then continue with an analysis of some important intra-migration system differences i.e. higher share of singles among non-Fuqingnese migrants, and differences in the problem solving strategies. Finally, I discuss three puzzling findings from the survey among migrants from both groups, i.e. the divergence between belonging to a Category (i.e. considering oneself as being a “boss”) and present occupational status, the negative assessment of Basotho’s attitude towards Chinese, but positive assessment of relations with Basotho, and low propensity of migrants to have previous outward migration experience and to engage in further migration.

Qualitative differences between Category 1 and Category 2 participants manifested themselves first and foremost in differences in the knowledge about the business operations. Personal conversation with the migrants revealed that Category 1 migrants appeared to be more familiar with the respective businesses than Category 2 migrants. Qualitative differences were also reflected in the motivations of Category 1 and Category 2 participants: whereas the majority of Category 1 migrants had come to Lesotho to open up a business, the majority of Category 2 migrants had come to seek employment. Finally, qualitative differences were also reflected in the tendency of Category 1 migrants to adopt a medium timeframe for their stay in Lesotho (i.e. three to five additional years) and in the tendency of Category 2 participants to adopt a short timeframe (i.e. one to three years). These qualitative differences indicate a high involvement of Category 1 migrants and a low involvement of Category 2 migrants. This seems plausible if one assumes that starting a business (the main motivation of the majority of Category 1 migrants) requires more time and resources than the seeking of employment (Category 2 migrants’ main motivation). This in turn set Category 1 migrants, regardless of their present occupational status, apart from Category 2 migrants.

The description of the migration patterns of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants indicated that for the majority migration is part of a larger family risk-diversification strategy that serves to secure the wealth and prosperity of the family. This indication was supported by migrants' answers about their purpose of making money in Lesotho: 45% of all migrants stated that the main purpose for making money was to "support the family". Moreover, 76% of all migrants had brought some part of their family to Lesotho. At first sight, the 20% who wanted to "support themselves", seems to undermine the family risk-diversification strategy argument. But, when taking into account that even among these 20%, 83% had brought some parts of their family; it seems less plausible to assume that their decision was not directly or indirectly linked to larger family risk-diversification strategies.

Earlier studies on Chinese migration to Africa were pointing out that the motivation of Chinese migrants to migrate to African countries is related to the desire to make enough money in Africa to be able to buy a house in China or simply to make easy money (McNamee, 2012:14). Park (2009) argued that many Chinese migrants are dreaming about returning "home to build a three-level home or monument' to their success overseas" (Park, 2009:469). However, in the survey migrants did not neatly confirm this "African dream". After all, only few migrants stated that their main purpose was to buy a house. Against this backdrop, it seems safe to assume that migrants' motivations to come to Lesotho were complex and presumably more likely to be related to larger family risk diversification strategies.

Coming to the differences between non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants, the first important difference is the higher share of singles among non-Fuqingnese migrants (i.e. 23% compared to 15%). As argued earlier the large proportion of singles derived in both cases from their occupational status (i.e. staff), age (younger than 30) and gender (i.e. mostly males). Despite these similarities, a clear difference between single non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants existed. Out of seven Fuqingnese migrants who were single, only one person had come alone. In contrast, more than half of non-Fuqingnese migrants had come alone.

Differences in the problem solving strategies manifested themselves in the different preparation strategies of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants. Whereas 43% of Fuqingnese migrants "asked their friends for advice", only 28% of non-Fuqingnese migrants did the same. In fact, 38% of non-Fuqingnese migrants "did not prepare". They are significantly more than the 21% of Fuqingnese migrants who "did not prepare". The relatively high share of those who "did not prepare" among non-Fuqingnese migrants is inevitably linked to their current occupational status: 67% of them were "staff", out of which 73% had come with some parts of their family. In other words, they are likely to have been a part of some collective or family business and in some kind of employment. This in turn

means that, when they decided to migrate to Lesotho, it is likely that their partners or family had already a clear idea of what they wanted to do, or some parts of the businesses had already been established. Therefore, they probably had a much clearer idea about their salary and other necessities, and with this knowledge, they did not need to indulge in any major preparations. This in turn could indicate that they were part of some transnational network. Likewise, the high share of Fuqingnese migrants whose preparation strategy consisted of “asking friends for advice” could—at least theoretically—indicate that they had contact with persons involved in transnational activities with Lesotho and/or other countries. Of course, not every friend is automatically engaged in transnational activities. But ultimately, it seems rather likely that the friends which were asked would have to have some knowledge about and/or experience in Lesotho, in order to be considered useful as a preparation strategy.

Finally, differences in the problem strategies also expressed themselves in the persons non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants would turn to for help. For instance, for 33% of non-Fuqingnese migrants and only for 15% of Fuqingnese migrants, the “family” was the most important source of help. In contrast, 43% of Fuqingnese migrants and only 28% of non-Fuqingnese migrants would turn to “local Chinese”. This could indicate three things: first, connections between Fuqingnese migrants and the local Chinese community are stronger. Second, because Fuqingnese migrants have a stronger presence in Lesotho, non-Fuqingnese migrants find it more difficult to integrate into the local Fuqingnese dominated Chinese communities. Third, local networks within the Fuqingnese migration configuration are more advanced than those of non-Fuqingnese migration configuration.

After describing the similarities and differences of the two migrant groups, I move on to a discussion of the three puzzles. The first puzzle was the divergence between belonging to a category (i.e. considering oneself being or not being a “boss”) and present occupational status: only 25% of Category 1 migrants were presently “businesspersons or merchants”. This puzzle could relate to complex ownership and management structures of these businesses (mainly family businesses), which allow for flexible definitions of “boss” and “owner”, in both directions. But it could also relate to the fact that the Mandarin word for businessperson or merchant⁷³, does not automatically imply ownership of the business or self-employment. Depending on the context, a businessperson can be an owner and/or a manager of a particular business. Likewise, the Mandarin word for staff⁷⁴, denotes all people of the businesses, ranging from the cleaning lady to the store manager. But unlike the businessperson, staff implies that persons are in some form of employment. This could mean that the large share of “staff” simply reflects the fact that migrants were in some form of

⁷³ Businessperson: 商人 shangren.

⁷⁴ Staff: 职工 zhigong.

employment, presumably also at the managerial level. Considering that many of these businesses were probably family businesses with complex ownership structures, it could be that Category 1 migrants said they were “staff” because they were less involved in the decision making processes associated with the status of a businessperson or merchant.

The second puzzle stems from the negative assessment of Basotho’s attitude towards Chinese on the one hand, and the positive assessment of relations with Basotho, on the other hand. This puzzle could relate to the fact that migrants had witnessed changes over time in the attitude of Basotho towards Chinese. During personal conversations, many migrants said that they had observed negative changes in the attitude of Basotho during the last years. For example, one migrant said that when they first came to Lesotho, Basotho had a very friendly attitude towards Chinese, sometimes even greeting them in Mandarin. Yet, with more and more Chinese coming to the country, resentments among Basotho seem to have grown and nowadays it was said to happen that Basotho will insult them in Sesotho. Furthermore, the rather positive assessment of relations with Basotho could also derive from positive encounters in their daily interaction with their Basotho employees, co-workers and costumers, as compared to possibly more negative interactions with Basotho outside of their working environment.

Two interesting cases can further help to illustrate the situation. The first case was a robbery of a Chinese-owned supermarket in Pitseng, Leribe on January 19, 2012 (The Lesotho Times, 2012a:1). After two men had successfully robbed the supermarket they were “were apprehended by some villagers on the same day” and beaten severely before they were handed over to the police (The Lesotho Times, 2012a:1). A similar incident had occurred already in 2010 when a Chinese-owned supermarket in Maseru was robbed. Again, the local people “managed to catch the two robbers and beat them thoroughly” (The Lesotho Times, 2012b:2). The fact that the local police officer “advised villagers not to take the law into their own hands and instead report the crimes to the police” (The Lesotho Times, 2012b:2), indicates that these were not isolated incidents. These two cases furthermore show that, while Chinese businesses are frequently the target of robberies or other assaults, the majority of the local population does not support these. In other words, although many Basotho might display a negative attitude towards Chinese, they are not indifferent to what happens to the Chinese and oftentimes are even willing to help them⁷⁵.

The third puzzle was the low propensity of migrants to have previous outward migration experience and/or to engage in further migration. This was demonstrated by the high proportion of migrants who had never migrated to any other country before Lesotho, and the high proportion of migrants who were intending to return to China and not to further migrate

⁷⁵ But it could also be that Basotho are generally against theft. For example a friend told me that in Kenya it does not matter who people rob, if they are caught they are beaten by the masses.

to other countries. Only few migrants with previous outward migration experience wanted to continue to another country. Tellingly, all migrants with previous migration experience in Africa wanted to go back to China. Since only one of them was older than 40, it seems that this was not related to age. These findings in turn question to what extent Chinese migrants use Lesotho as a springboard for future business ventures in other countries in general, and African countries in particular. For example, Mung (2008:92) states that “migrants intending to go to the western countries [...] wait in Africa or Eastern European countries seeking a passage to Western Europe or the Latin American countries, with a view to getting to the United States or Canada eventually”. Yet for Chinese migrants in Lesotho, it seems that this is often not the case and that the propensity to engage in further migration is not directly linked to previous migration experience, but is more likely to be linked to age and personal considerations (i.e. larger family risk-diversification strategies).

5. Chinese migrant economy in Lesotho: explaining the reproduction and altering of business and employment opportunities in Lesotho

The Chinese migrant economy in Lesotho comprises mainly the economic activities of Chinese migrants in the textile and garment sector, the small-scale manufacturing sector, and the wholesale and retail sector. In my survey I focused on Chinese migrants from the wholesale and retail sector. The reasons for this are twofold: first, Chinese migrants' economic activities in the retail and wholesale sector are the most visible aspect of the Chinese migrant economy in Lesotho (MTICM, 2008; Park, 2009; SAMP, 2010; McNamee, 2012). Second, since the wholesale and retail sector is vital for creating employment and business opportunities for Basotho, it is important to explore how the presence of Chinese migrants affects these opportunities for the local population. The remainder of this chapter is structured as followed: I start by outlining the context in which these economic activities take place. This is followed by a detailed description of the economic activities of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants. Building on this I indicate how the activities of Chinese migrants reproduce and transform employment and businesses opportunities in Lesotho.

5.1 The context: Lesotho's micro- and small-scale business sector

To better understand the setting in which the surveyed Chinese migrants are operating, it is useful to analyze some of the recent structural constraints and opportunities as well as specific constraints emanating from the Chinese migrant economy in Lesotho. The general constraints and opportunities stem mainly from the overall political and economic context. Regarding the political context, it can be observed that Lesotho has not experienced any major outbreaks of violence since 1998, and it seems that a higher degree of political stability has developed ever since. The peaceful transition after this year's elections is a case in point (Jordan, 2012:2). Since then, there were no signs that the government or administration was

actively changing its policy towards Chinese. Thus, the structural opportunities which existed at the time of the creation of the Sino-Basotho migration system were not subject to any significant negative inference by political actors.

The 2008 global financial crisis affected Lesotho in general (OECD, 2011:3), and the Chinese migrant economy in particular. The crisis was felt primarily among Chinese migrants from the textile and garment industry, because this industry is more vulnerable to changes in the global demand (especially the USA⁷⁶). The declining demand imposed—at least temporarily—constraints on the production and profits of Lesotho's textile and garment industry. Responding to these (temporal) constraints, the textile and garment industry retrenched “more than 19,000 workers” (MoL, 2009:9). As a result, the overall national unemployment rate increased to over 40% in 2010 (OECD, 2011:17). This was 17% more than in 2008 (MoL, 2009:7). Increases in unemployment, combined with a “15% reduction in employment in the South African mines⁷⁷ from 2007 to 2009” (MoL, 2009:27), meant that the overall economic position of many Basotho worsened. This also had ramifications for the economic activities of Chinese migrants in the wholesale and retail sector. My personal conversations with non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants revealed that business had been bad for the last three years because Basotho were buying fewer goods, which resulted in fewer profits on part of the Chinese migrants.

When moving away from the macro-economic context, a number of sector specific characteristics can be identified. The wholesale and retail sector is embedded in Lesotho's private sector in general and the service sector in particular. Lesotho's private sector comprises around “100,000 SMEs, most of them informal” (MTICM, 2008:13). Among the more formal SMES, the majority were “retailers, followed by businesses in the service sector, and much smaller numbers in the industry and agro-processing sectors.” (MTICM, 2008:6). The formal and the informal small-scale enterprise sector provided roughly 200,000⁷⁸ persons with employment in 2008 (MTICM, 2008:13). In 2008, Lesotho's service sector was estimated to contribute at least 85% to Lesotho's private sector (MTICM, 2008:13). According to the Central Bank of Lesotho, “the greater part of the services sector is controlled or managed by the private individuals and organizations” (Lesotho Central Bank, 2009:2). Despite these impressive numbers it should be kept in mind that the “majority of SMEs are survivalists, and have limited potential for growth” (MTICM, 2008:6). Ironically, it is the survivalist nature of the retail and wholesale sector that provides the most important

⁷⁶ The textile industry is mainly producing for the US market because of African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA).

⁷⁷ Mine workers accounted for 95% of all licensed Basotho migrant workers in South-Africa in 2009 (Ministry of Labor and Employment, 2009:27).

⁷⁸ In comparison to 1991, the number of small-scale enterprises decreased by 2,968, but 38,719 more persons found employment in this sector (Amstader and Eriksen, 1994:7).

structural opportunities for Chinese migrants as well as other foreigners operating in this sector.

Apart from Lesotho's general structural constraints and opportunities, Chinese migrant economy in Lesotho forms an important aspect of the context of Chinese migrants' economic activities. The presence of many Chinese, often from the same hometown, allows Chinese migrants to build on existing intra-Chinese economy infrastructure such as formal and informal networks of suppliers and mutual support and advice (see 4.3.4). This makes the economic activities of those migrants who have access to these networks presumably easier. However, with more and more Chinese arriving to Lesotho, the "one Chinese is a dragon, three Chinese are bugs"⁷⁹ (Haugen and Carling, 2006:651) phenomenon can be observed. This phenomenon not only increases inner-Chinese migrant economy competition, but also increases the likelihood of monopoly building. For example, certain segments of the Chinese migrant economy are believed to be in the hands of a few powerful families (Personal Interview, Maseru, February 2012). As a result, entrance barriers into Lesotho's wholesale and retail market are higher and the exit barriers lower.

5.2 Economic activities: a profile of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants


My description of the economic activities of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants is based on findings from the third section of my survey questionnaire. Unlike the first two sections, which contained almost identical questions for Category 1 and Category 2 migrants, the third section asked Category 1 and Category 2 migrants different questions. For example, Category 1 included questions about the salary paid to Basotho and the sources of the goods the shops were selling. Category 2, on the other hand, included questions about the living costs and where the boss of the interviewee is currently staying. Although both categories provided important insights, I will primarily discuss the answers of Category 1 migrants to indicate how Chinese migrants' economic activities reproduce or alter business opportunities (see Section 5.4). The answers of both categories are used to indicate how Chinese migrants' economic activities reproduce and alter employment opportunities in Lesotho (see Section 5.5). Since my analysis (see Chapter 4) showed significant differences between non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants, I will also apply this distinction to my subsequent analysis. However, unlike earlier (i.e. in the section about migration configuration), this distinction is not a reflection of two separate migrant economies, but rather a reflection of two different types of actors, who have different material and non-material resources and different economic strategies. The distinction will make it possible to highlight potential differences between the economic activities of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants.

⁷⁹ This saying describes in a metaphorical way the fact that individual profit margins will decrease with rising numbers of Chinese in one place.

5.2.1 Nature and scope

To identify the nature and scope of the economic activities of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants, my survey asked participants about the type of businesses, and the number of years they had been running the particular business, respectively working in it. In addition, Category 1 migrants were asked about the number of businesses they owned, and Category 2 migrants about where their boss was located. Starting with the type of business, the majority of both, non-Fuqingnese (n=18) and Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=20), stated that they were running⁸⁰ a small-retail shop (see Figure 46). Likewise, the majority of non-Fuqingnese (n=16) and Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants (n=15) was working in small-retail shops. Differences between non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants existed for wholesale businesses and supermarkets. In the survey, wholesale businesses were exclusively run by Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants. Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants constituted 78% of all Category 1 migrants running a supermarket. Interestingly, Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants were only slightly more often working in supermarkets than non-Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants. Since I selected the shops randomly, i.e. I did not systematically exclude or include certain types of businesses, it seems safe to conclude that the fact that 71% of all surveyed migrants (n=30) were either running or working in small retail shops indicates that this type of business could be the most popular type of businesses in the central-urban areas. Likewise, the finding that 18% of all surveyed migrants were running a supermarket could indicate that a small group of migrants prefers this type of business in the central-urban areas.

Figure 46 Type of business by non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants




Having outlined the most common types of business, it is insightful to look at the number of businesses Category 1 migrants owned (see Figure 47). Around 50% of Category 1 migrants (n=27) stated that they owned only one business, 35% indicated that they owned two (n=19),

⁸⁰ This does not necessarily mean that they owned the shop, but they were still in a higher hierarchal and responsibility level than Category 2 migrants.

9% said that they had three (n=5), and only one migrant said she had more than five businesses. Again, differences between non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants existed. For example, 65% of the non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=15), but only 39% of Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=12), owned only one business. Moreover, 58% of Fuqingnese (n=13), but only 30% of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=6) owned at least two businesses. For non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants the number of businesses seemed to be related to the duration of their stay in Lesotho: 86% of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants who had more than one businesses had been in Lesotho for more than five years. This did not apply to Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants: here, only 33% (n=6) of Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants owning more than one business had been in the country for more than five years.

Figure 47 Number of businesses owned by non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants




Looking at the time non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants have been running their businesses, larger differences persisted (see Figure 48). 35% of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants had been operating their business between five to seven years (n=8) and 22% (n=5) for more than nine years. Among Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants, 29% (n=9) had been running the business for one to three years, 26% (n=8) for three to five years and only 13% had been running the business for more than nine years (n=4). The tendency of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants to have been in a particular business for a longer time than Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants applied also partially to non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants. For instance, only 38% of Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants (n=6) had been working between five to nine years for a particular business.

What is interesting is that the number of years Category 1 migrants have been running the business is rarely exactly the same as the number of years they claimed to have spent in Lesotho. This observation was especially striking for Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants who had been running a particular business for five to seven years (n=8). Here, 50% had been in


the country for more than seven years. Likewise, 75% of Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=6), who had been running the business for one to three years (n=9), had been in Lesotho for more than three years. The contrast among Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants who had been running the business for three to five years (n=8) was even greater. Here, only 25% (n=2) had been in Lesotho for only three to five years. Interestingly, for Category 2 migrants no larger divergences between the number of years stayed in Lesotho and the number of years worked in a particular business were found. This in turn could indicate that Category 1 migrants, unlike Category 2 migrants, engage in different economic activities over the course of their stay and require more time to set up a business.

Figure 48 Number of years of operating the business by non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants



Finally, the survey showed that 55% of Category 2 migrants (n=12) stated that their boss was in China (see Figure 49). The rest stated their boss was in Lesotho (45%, n=8). Out of those stating that their boss was in China, two thirds were non-Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants (67%, n=8) and only one third Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants (33%, n=3). The respective differences between non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants whose boss was in Lesotho were smaller. Interestingly, all five Category 2 migrants, who named Maseru, Maputsoe or Mafeteng as the present location of their boss, were in the same city as their boss. This points towards two important aspects: first, it seems that the bosses of the surveyed non-Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants follow a similar pattern as Chinese migrants in Cape Verde, who return to China and “let Chinese employees and relatives run these businesses” (Haugen and Carling, 2006:456). Second, it seems that the bosses of Category 2 migrants tend to have one or more businesses in the same town rather than at different locations in Lesotho.


Figure 49 Location of the boss of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants (n=22)



5.3.2 Working and employment patterns

Having outlined the scope and nature of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants' economic activities, in this section I will look at the working and employment patterns of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants. Regarding the working patterns, the survey asked participants about their weekly and daily working times. Interestingly, both, non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants had similar working patterns. Beginning with the weekly working days of Category 1 and Category 2 migrants, the following was observed: 97% of Category 2 migrants (n=17) and 78% of Category 1 migrants (n=33) were working six to seven days a week. In contrast, 18% of Category 1 migrants (n=10), but only one Category 2 migrant worked five days a week. Moreover, Category 1 and Category 2 migrants who worked seven days a week constituted 35% of the total sample. 50% of Category 1 migrants (n=27) worked between six to eight hours per day and 40% between eight to ten hours (n=22) (see Figure 50). For Category 2 migrants the shares differed: here 28% of Category 2 migrants (n=9) worked between six to eight hours per day, 47% between eight to ten hours (n=15) and 22% for more than ten hours per day (n=7). It is worth noting here that a "normal" working week in Lesotho consists of six days, which in turn means that the 35% of migrants who worked seven days a week were not only having a longer working week than the average Chinese, but also than the average Mosotho in Lesotho. However, considering that small businesses in China have long businesses hours and are often open seven days a week (personal experience of the author who lived for several years in different towns in China), it seems that it is not the 35% who work 7 days a week, but rather the 65% who work six days a week or less that actually deviate from the Chinese norm.

Figure 50 Daily working hours per day Category 1 and Category 2 migrants



Regarding the employment patterns, participants were asked about the number of employees, both Basotho and Chinese, in a particular business (see Figure 51). In terms of the total number of employees, 74% of Category 1 migrants (n=40) and 65% of Category 2 migrants (n=21) stated that there are more than four employees in their business. Out of these, 58% of the Category 1 (n=23) and 74% of Category 2 migrants (n=17) were working with more than six people. Among all surveyed migrants only four stated that they were the only person working in that particular business. Moreover, 85% of the Fuqingnese migrants (n=40), but only 58% of the non-Fuqingnese migrants (n=23) were employing or working with at least four people. In contrast, 41% of the non-Fuqingnese migrants (n=16), but only 15% of the Fuqingnese migrants (n=7) were employing or working with equal or less than three people. In other words, it seems that Fuqingnese migrants provided on average more employment opportunities than non-Fuqingnese migrants.


Figure 51 Number of persons working in the business non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants

Persons	Fuqingnese Category 1	Fuqingnese Category 2	Non-Fuqingnese Category 1	Non-Fuqingnese Category 2
0	0	0	0	4
1-2	3	1	6	1
2-3	2	1	1	4
4-5	11	4	6	2
6-7	6	4	2	3
>6	5	2	0	1
>7	5	3	5	4

The tendency to employ more than four persons continued for the number of Basotho employed in the businesses (see Figure 52). However, as expected, the differences between those working with more than four and those working with less than four persons were smaller (the number of employed Basotho cannot be higher than the number of total employees). Earlier 74% (n=63) had stated that they were working with more than four

persons, now only 51% (n=44) stated that that they were working with more than four Basotho. Almost 50% of the Category 2 migrants (n=15), but less than 40% of the Category 1 migrants (n=20), were working with less than four Basotho. Since differences between non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants were smaller⁸¹, it seems that non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants did not differ significantly when it comes to providing employment opportunities for Basotho.

Figure 52 Number of Basotho working in the business Category 1 and Category 2 migrants




While the previous paragraph confirmed the tendency to have more than four persons working in a particular business, the reverse was found for the answers of migrants about the number of Chinese working in a particular business (see Figure 53). 48%⁸² (n=33) stated that no other Chinese was working with them. Only two participants (both were Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants) stated that there were between six and seven Chinese employees in their business. Interestingly, 49% of the non-Fuqingnese (n=7), but only 39% of the Fuqingnese migrants (n=5), stated that no other Chinese was working in that particular business. These differences might be attributed to the fact that Fuqingnese were on average working with more persons. But it could also indicate that Fuqingnese migrants are more likely to employ a higher percentage of Chinese, which could be related to the size of the business. However, one can also speculate if the stronger developed migration configuration of the Fuqingnese (see Chapter 4) contributed to this difference.

⁸¹ Here, 20 out of 39 non-Fuqingnese (51%) and 29 out of 47 Fuqingnese migrants (62%) were working with more than four people. 17 out of 39 non-Fuqingnese migrants (44%) and 16 out of 47 Fuqingnese migrants (34%) were working with less than four people.

⁸² This question was not included in the first round. Therefore the total number is 69.


Figure 53 Number of Chinese working in the business Category 1 and Category 2 migrants



5.3.3 Wage and income structure

The wage structure of the businesses non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants were running was quite similar (see Figure 54). 88% of Category 1 migrants (n=32) paid a salary of 1,000 to 1,500 Maloti (120-180 USD) to their Basotho employees. Still, 22% of the non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=5) and 32% of Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=10) paid their Basotho employees a salary of 1,500 to 2,000 Maloti (180-240 USD). Only two non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants stated that they would pay between 2,000 to 2,500 Maloti (240-300 USD).


Figure 54 Wages paid to Basotho by non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 in Maloti



A different wage structure was found for Chinese Category 2 migrants (see Figure 55): only 16% Category 2 migrants (n=5) said that they were having a monthly salary of less than 2,000 Maloti. Likewise, 84% of the Category 2 migrants (n=27) stated that they had a monthly salary above 2,500 Maloti. This in turn indicates that Chinese employees tend to have higher salaries than their Basotho counterparts and that Chinese migrants are on average more expensive. Moreover, considering that the minimum wage for an Basotho employee in a wholesale and retail shop was 1,170 in 2008 (Lesotho Statistical Yearbook,

2010:66), the survey found that 60% of the Category 1 migrants were paying their Basotho employees at least the minimum wage and almost 40% were paying them more than the minimum wage. This in turn confirms Haugen and Carling's (2009) and Giese and Thiele's (2012) findings that some Chinese pay their local employees above the minimum wage, and questions, at least partially, the image of the low paying Chinese businesses.


Figure 55 Monthly salary non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 2 in Maloti



Looking at the monthly income of Category 1 migrants, it can be noted that 24% (n=13) earned between 1,000 to 3,000 Maloti (120-360 USD), and 41% (n=22) earned between 3,000 to 6,000 Maloti (360-724 USD) (see Figure 56). Only a small minority of four Category 1 migrants was earning more than 12,000 Maloti (1448 USD) per month. While it is difficult to assess if the surveyed migrants were indicating their profit or the disposable income, the large number of migrants stating to have less than 6,000 Maloti (360 USD) was surprising. Especially when considering that these businesses tend to employ on average 4 Basotho and 2 Chinese which alone would amount to approximately 9,000 Maloti (1020 USD) per month in labor costs⁸³. A possible explanation could be that these migrants were not the owner, but the manager of the business. This seems plausible, when considering the high share of Category 1 migrants who stated to be presently "staff". Common wisdom to the contrary, the monthly income of Category 1 migrants did not automatically increase with the number of businesses. In fact, among the 16 Category 1 migrants who earned more than 6,000 Maloti (360 USD) per month, only one migrant had three businesses and only one more than five. Out of the remaining 14, eight had two businesses (six Fuqingnese and two non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants) and five had only one business. Here, non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants had a slightly higher share.

⁸³ Theoretically, the low income could also be an indication of the low profits. However, considering the relatively large number of employees per business, this seems less plausible.

Figure 56 Monthly income of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants in Maloti



Having outlined income and wage structure, it is insightful to look at respective assessments of Category 1 and Category 2 migrants (see Figure 57). Non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants arrived at different assessments of the local wage level: 50% non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=12) stated that the wage level was lower than the wage level in China. 45% of Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=14) thought levels were the same and still 29% thought they were higher than in China (n=9). Category 2 migrants' assessment of their salary in turn did not show major differences between non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants. 14 Category 2 migrants thought their salary was the same as in China. They were followed by 13 Category 2 migrants who thought their salary was higher than in China. Only five Category 2 migrants stated that their salary was lower than in China.

Figure 57 Assessment of own salary levels by non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants





Figure 58 gives an overview of Category 1 migrants' assessment of their own income. Here, 37% of the Category 1 migrants (n=20) thought their income was higher, and 35% thought it was approximately the same (n=19). Only one participant thought it was twice as high as his income in China. The share of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants who

thought that their income was higher than in China was roughly equal. Differences between non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants prevailed when it came to the shares of those who thought income levels were the same or lower. Among Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants 42% thought the income level was the same and only 10% thought they were lower. Among non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants on the other hand, those who thought the income level was the same and those who thought they were lower constituted each 26%. The more positive assessment of Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants could stem from the fact that Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants had a higher share among Category 1 migrants with an income higher than 6,000 Maloti per month, i.e. the self-assessment of the migrants is consistent with their absolute incomes.

Two things are worth noticing here. First, recalling that 45% Fuqingnese and 21% non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants thought the local wage level was the same, and that 52% non-Fuqingnese and only 16% of Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants thought local wage levels were lower, it is surprising that there is no direct relationship between the assessment of the wage level and Category 1 migrants' assessment of their own income. For instance, out of 20 Category 1 migrants who thought incomes were higher than in China, only three thought the local wage level was lower. Likewise, five out of nine Category 1 migrants, who thought the income levels were lower than in China, stated that the local wage level was lower than in China. On the one hand, this could indicate that migrants were simply not sure about the current wage level. On the other hand, it could indicate that the success of Category 1 migrants is not a direct result of low wages.


Figure 58 Assessment of income levels by non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants



Finally, the answers of Category 2 migrants showed that their living costs were relatively low (see Figure 59). Only few migrants stated that their living costs were more than 1,500 Maloti (180 USD). For the majority, especially for Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants, living costs tended to be below 1,000 Maloti (120 USD). This means that migrants tend to spend less than

half of their salary on living costs. Moreover, assuming that the employer of these migrants often provide them with accommodation and food, it seems plausible that living costs of Category 2 migrants are relatively low, in some cases even below 500 Maloti (60 USD).


Figure 59 Monthly living costs of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants in Maloti



5.3.4 Sourcing strategies


The business success of Chinese migrants is frequently related to their (transnational) sourcing strategies (Haugen and Carling, 2006:643). Believing that this would also be important for Chinese migrants in Lesotho, I asked Category 1 migrants about their supply channels. The share of those who were sourcing nothing from China was higher among Non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (see Figure 60). In terms of the share of goods made in China, only five Category 1 migrants said that all of their goods were produced in China. 30% of the Category 1 migrants said that 80% of all their goods were produced in China (n=16), and 20% said that less than 20% of their goods were produced in China (n=11). Out of the 20%, 81% were from Fuqing (n=9). This could indicate that among Fuqingnese businesses the share of local goods sold in these businesses is much higher than often alleged. These results contrast the common view that China is the key sourcing country for Chinese migrants (McNamee et al., 2012:25).

Figure 60 Share of goods bought or ordered in China by non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants



A fuzzy picture existed when it came to the importance of local Chinese wholesalers for sourcing goods: 28 Category 1 migrants indicated that they were sourcing more than 60% of their goods from local Chinese wholesalers, and 22 Category 1 migrants indicated that they were sourcing less than 60% from local Chinese wholesalers (see Figure 61). With a few exceptions, no larger differences between non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants were found. It seems that the decision to source from local Chinese wholesalers was directly not related to a particular migration configuration. Interestingly, the decision was also not related to differences in the relations with local Chinese. Among both groups (i.e. non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants) the majority had good, very good or even excellent relations with local Chinese. For instance, out of the 22 who were sourcing less than 60% from local Chinese wholesalers, 16 had good, very good or excellent relations with local Chinese. In other words, the decision to source from local Chinese was not related to better relations with them, for neither category.


Figure 61 Share of goods bought or ordered at local Chinese wholesalers by non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants



To find out about potential connections with South Africa, Category 1 migrants were asked about the share of goods they sourced from South Africa as well as the share of goods they sourced from Chinese wholesalers in South Africa (see Figure 62). 72% of⁸⁴ Category 1 migrants (n=34) were sourcing less than 60% from South Africa. In fact out of these, the vast majority (88%) were sourcing less than 20% from South Africa (n=30). The number for those who were sourcing less than 60% from Chinese wholesalers in South Africa was even higher: 37 out of 47 were sourcing less than 20% from Chinese wholesalers in South Africa. Only six Category 1 migrants were sourcing between 60% and 80% from Chinese wholesalers in South Africa. These six participants were all located closely to the South African border, which could explain their decision to source from South Africa.

This being said, the proximity to South Africa did not appear to be a key aspect for the majority of the Category 1 participants, possibly because their type of businesses (i.e. small retail shop) did not require specific goods from South Africa. Moreover, the fact that 28 Category 1 participants were sourcing from local Chinese wholesalers, but only 11 from China and six from Chinese wholesalers in South Africa, questions the extent to which these migrants are directly using transnational sourcing strategies. This in turn could indicate that they are more integrated in Lesotho's economy and the Chinese migrant economy than initially thought. Moreover, it could indicate for Chinese migrants in Lesotho, like migrants in other parts in Africa, local Chinese networks are crucial (Song, 20011).

Figure 62 Share of goods bought or ordered at local Chinese wholesalers in South Africa by non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants



5.4 Reproducing and altering business opportunities in Lesotho

The survey as well as personal interviews, which I conducted with key figures from different ministries in Lesotho, showed that the economic activities of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants impacted business opportunities in Lesotho in a number of ways. At first sight,

⁸⁴ The first round of the survey did not include this question. Therefore the total number is 47.

Chinese migrants' economic activities in Lesotho's wholesale and retail sector appear to fit the description of an "entrepreneurial niche" (Logan et al., 2003:349) because Chinese migrants predominate as "owners and self-employed, but without relying particularly on co-ethnic workers" (Logan et al., 2003:349). However, the term "entrepreneurial niche" is misleading because, first of all, Basotho still own considerable numbers of the wholesale and retail businesses. Second, the economic activities of Chinese migrants did not create a whole new sub-sector, but were built into existing structures. The fact that Chinese migrants are mainly engaging in the same type of businesses as Basotho (i.e. small retail shops) underlines this point. The prevalence of small wholesale and retail shops appears to be a reflection of the structural constraints in Lesotho, i.e. a weak demand and, at the same time, a strong presence of established South African retailers in the large-scale retail and wholesale sector. The weak demand stems from decreases in the disposable income of Basotho, as well as decreases in employment opportunities for Basotho in South Africa. Taken together this translates into a low and infrequent customer base, which tends to buy mainly necessities, and thus makes it more difficult to run a business profitably, which explains the many survivalist businesses in Lesotho.

The presence of established South African retailers means that entrance barriers into this large-scale retail and wholesale sector are comparatively higher because these already established retailers have more capital, better supply chains and more leverage. When taking into account that opening up a business in Lesotho entails a number of risks, it seems logical that Chinese migrants would keep investment to a minimum and concentrate on small shops. But not only general structural constraints, but also inner-Chinese migrant economy constraints influence the economic activities of Chinese migrants. For instance, Chinese migrants' decision to focus on small-scale businesses appears to be also influenced by the fact that the "Chinese niche" is dominated by a few powerful actors (i.e. long-established Chinese families), which create strong entrance barriers for newcomers. The fact that 27 out of 54 Category 1 migrants had only one business could further support this claim. By establishing mainly small retail shops and supermarkets, the economic activities of the surveyed Chinese migrants appear to give in to these structural constraints. Thereby, they are reproducing the existing business opportunity structure in the small-scale wholesale and retail business sector (MTICM, 2008).

Through the establishment of small businesses in almost all of the major towns and villages of Lesotho ⁸⁵ (MTICM, 2008; MTICM, 2009; Park, 2009; SAMP, 2010; McNamee, 2012), Chinese migrants have created a (perceived) strong presence. The strong presence indicates

⁸⁵ For example, on my way to Roma, a small town which hosts the only University in Lesotho, I saw many Chinese shops. In fact, a Chinese shop sometimes constituted the only shop in small villages.

that Chinese migrants are not only reproducing, but also altering the business opportunities in Lesotho. To understand how Chinese migrants alter business opportunities, it is useful to look at some of the strategies they developed to deal with the above mentioned structural constraints. For instance, because of the overall weak demand and the presence of well established South African retailers and the few large-scale Chinese supermarkets, many Chinese migrants appear to have chosen to shift their operations to various locations in Lesotho rather than competing in terms of business size. Moreover, given the constraints of Chinese migrant economy, Chinese migrants seem to have directly or indirectly chosen the location of their business based on the logic that “one Chinese is a dragon, three Chinese are bugs” (Haugen and Carling, 2006:651), i.e. the more Chinese shops there are in one location, the more difficult it becomes for existing and new businesses to remain profitable. Since the number of potential towns was limited, they decided to expand into the rural areas. In 2010 for instance, among 167 Chinese applications for work permits in the wholesale and retail sector, 70 were for small villages (unpublished data from Ministry of Labor, 2012). But, in order to succeed in these parts of Lesotho, they had to rely on local support and existing businesses infrastructures. To achieve this, Chinese migrants appear to have struck deals with existing local shop owners, who are said to rent out their shops and business licenses to Chinese in exchange for a fixed monthly “rent”. This kind of practice appears to have been rather successful, since the number of Chinese migrants who moved into remote areas has risen. As a side effect of this practice and cooperation, selected Basotho gained more resources, but this left existing local businesses exposed to the (fierce) competition from Chinese migrants. For example, in already in 1999 a woman from Mokhotlong was successfully suing a Mosotho and his Chinese business partner for “illegally” operating a supermarket and a gas station in Mokhotlong (High Court of Lesotho, 1999). The case revealed that the shop was officially owned by the Mosotho, but practically run by the Chinese, who did not hold the appropriate licenses to be engaged in this kind of activity (High Court of Lesotho, 1999). The women had been suing these two mainly because she felt that she had been put in a disadvantageous position: she was adhering to the law and legally operating a gas station and a supermarket, but could not compete with the prices and practices from the “Mosotho-Chinese” shop (High Court of Lesotho, 1999). But the fact that a similar story was told to me indicates that this practice still continues. When I was in Mokhotlong in November 2011, I talked to a Mosotho shop owner who told me that ever since the Chinese had arrived, it has become more and more difficult to do business because she could not compete with the low prices of the Chinese. Moreover, unlike the Chinese who she said had preferential deals with big South African wholesalers, she did not have access to such deals. Furthermore, the high gas prices meant that she had to sell her goods at a higher

price than the Chinese because otherwise she could not keep her business⁸⁶. In other words, it seems that the cooperation practices of Chinese migrants both within and outside of Lesotho are altering existing businesses opportunities in the sense that they are providing more resources to some Basotho and, at the same time, are increasing the pressure on “non-cooperative” Basotho shops.

Another interesting aspect of Chinese migrants’ economic activities is their influence on local business practices, which in turn also alters business opportunities. Chinese business practices differ in two aspects from those of their Basotho counterparts: i.e. the setup of the business and the sourcing strategies. In terms of setup, my visits to Chinese businesses showed that their design is very similar to that of shops or supermarkets in China: they make maximum use of whatever space they have, put up bright signs which announce discounts, play loud music to attract customers, and sell a broad range of products. My survey highlighted that Chinese migrants are frequently sourcing from a number of different locations, but mostly from local Chinese wholesalers. Moreover, several interview partners indicated that the Chinese tend to “buy in bulk”, i.e. to pool together orders, and have therefore (partially) better deals with both Chinese and South African wholesalers, which in turn allows them to sell at lower prices. Since more and more Basotho are appearing to copy these two business practices from Chinese migrants, business practices in Lesotho’s small-scale wholesale and retail sector are gradually changing and thus altering businesses opportunities.

Finally, although Chinese migrants do not dominate Lesotho’s wholesale and retail sector in absolute terms, they appear to be a dominant group among successful micro- and small-scale wholesale and retail businesses (i.e. unlike Basotho, they are mainly not survivalists). There are many possible explanations for this. However, as the result of my survey showed, one important aspect is certainly the fact that Chinese migrants, as well as other foreigners, have often previous experience in running small scale business, presumably in a competitive environment, and have better access to a (global) network of suppliers. Because of this comparative advantage, they are in the position to outcompete survivalist Basotho businesses (SAMP, 2010:67f.).

Another factor which weakens the position of Basotho is HIV/AIDS. With 31% Lesotho has one of the highest infection rates and the endemic disease is changing the social and therefore also the economic context (Makoa, 2004:72). Since approximately 25,000 people have died from HIV/AIDS since 1986 (Makoa, 2004:72), the number of single-headed households with little income has increased dramatically (SAMP, 2010:26). But, with the number of single-headed households increasing, it becomes also more difficult for Mosotho to take up

⁸⁶ Due to its geographic location (i.e. in the mountains relatively far away from the South African border and other towns) Mokhotlong might be a bit of a special case.

employment outside their hometowns (SAMP, 2010:25), because they do not have someone who can take care of their children. Considering that the majority of jobs these persons could take up provide only a wage which allows them to satisfy their most basic needs, but not to build up savings which would allow them to open up a small business, it seems that the number of Basotho-owned small businesses is not likely to increase in the future. This in turn could mean that over time an increasing percentage of small wholesale and retail shops will be in the hands of Chinese, and the already smaller business opportunities for Basotho will further decrease. However, since Basotho are also adapting to the altering of the business opportunities by the Chinese, it remains to be seen to what extent Chinese migrants will come to exclusively dominate the small wholesale and retail sector.

5.5 Reproducing and altering employment opportunities in Lesotho

The three most important sources for providing employment opportunities in Lesotho, apart from agriculture, are the public sector, the textile and garment sector, and the service sector (especially the wholesale and retail sector). The public sector is mainly reserved for Basotho with higher education and qualifications. This makes the garment and textile sector, and the wholesale and retail sector the most important sources for providing employment opportunities for less qualified Basotho and businesses opportunities for qualified Basotho (hence, the reserved business). Although the garment and textile sector is an important employer, it is mainly employing female Basotho (Gibbs, 2005:99) and it is restricted to a few urban centers in Lesotho (i.e. mainly to Maseru and Maputsoe) (BoS, 2012). This means that Basotho in the rural and mountainous areas of Lesotho are either relying on agriculture or the small-scale service sector (particularly, the wholesale and retail sector) for employment opportunities and income.

Since there is no centralized unit⁸⁷ which records all enterprises, it is difficult to get reliable statistics about the employment created by this particular sector. Believing that is nevertheless useful to have some data, I visited the MTICM in February 2012, which kindly provided me access to their electronic database of the Registrar of Companies, the district business licensing as well as an unpublished survey among foreign owned businesses. The below presented numbers are the result of my analysis of these databases as well officially published reports. My analysis of the MTICM's 2010 Registrar of Companies showed that in 2010 there were 2,518 registered companies which employed 66,737 Basotho and 3,501 expats (including Chinese)⁸⁸ (MTICM, 2010a). The MTICM's database on the distinct licensing

⁸⁷ For example, the Bureau of Statistics records only employment for the manufacturing sector. The Ministry of Trade, Industry, Cooperatives and Marketing has the "Registrar of Companies, and handles a trading or manufacturing licenses" (MTICM, 2008:99). The One Stop Business Facilitating Center deals with work permits and businesses licensees, but has not yet established an electronic register.

⁸⁸ For example, the Bureau of Statistics records only employment for the manufacturing sector. The Ministry of Trade, Industry, Cooperatives and Marketing has the "Registrar of Companies, and handles

showed that in April 2010 there were 4,161 businesses in the nine districts. Out of these 4,161 businesses, 3,591 were wholesalers, supermarkets, general dealers, household articles, and footwear and textiles businesses (MTICM, 2010b). However, considering that another survey conducted by the MTICM showed that only “ten percent of surveyed businesses said they were registered with the Registrar of Companies” (MTICM, 2008:99), and that the number of small-scale businesses is believed to be around 100,000⁸⁹ (MTICM, 2008:13), it seems that the actual number of businesses is likely to be much higher than the 4,000 enterprises in the MTICM’s database.

While it was already difficult for me to obtain annual data on the number of enterprises and the number of people employed there, it was even more difficult to obtain reliable data on the absolute number of Chinese enterprises and the number of Basotho and Chinese employed there. The few sources to which I gained access to allow only for a very crude estimation of the absolute number of Chinese enterprises in Lesotho, and the number of people employ there. These sources include the data on the number of applications for work permits as recorded by the OSBFC and the MoL, the 2010 Register of Companies and a survey conducted among primarily Chinese businesses by the MTICM in 2009. Unfortunately in all cases the data was not available for different time periods, so that they are at most a snapshot of a particular situation, which nevertheless makes it possible to deduce some general trends (see Figure 63).

Figure 63 Overview data on Chinese enterprises and employment opportunities in the service sector

Source	Chinese businesses	Basotho employees	Chinese employees	Ratio
MoL (2010)	449	4,986	745	11.1 : 1.7
MTICM Registrar of Companies (2010)	313	1,749	561	5.6 : 1.8
MTICM Survey (2009)	289	1,274	555	4.4 : 1.9
Own Survey (2012)	86	67% more than 4 Basotho	81% less than 3 Chinese	--

Source: Author’s own depiction.

Starting with the work permits, from 2008 to January 2012 the OSBFC issued a total of 3,300 out of which 1,528 were first time applications and 1,768 renewals (OSBFC, 2012). Moreover, 80% of these applications came from Chinese nationals (OSBFC, 2012). This means between 2008 and January 2012 around 1,222 Chinese were first time applicants and around 1,414

a trading or manufacturing licenses” (MTICM, 2008:99). The One Stop Business Facilitating Center deals with work permits and businesses licensees, but has not yet established an electronic register.

⁸⁹ This number should be treated with caution since it includes basically any kind of economic activity that people (including brewing beer). Therefore, one should not assume that there are in fact 100,000 shops or businesses.

Chinese renewed their license. According to the OFBC, the majority of them worked as supervisors (cutting line, weaving, ring spinning, and quality controller), followed by managers (import and exports, ware house, workshop, dispatch, shipping, packing, purchases, sales). The database on work permits of the MoL recorded a total of 524 applications by Chinese nationals in 2010 (MoL, 2012). Out 449 applications for businesses in the service sector, 427 applications were for wholesale and retail businesses. In terms of type of business, 178 were supermarkets and 50 wholesalers (MoL, 2012). At the time of the application these 427 businesses were intending to employ 2,533 male and 2,453 female Basotho, and 493 male and 252 female Chinese (MoL, 2012). This means that these businesses were on average intending to employ 11 Basotho and 2 Chinese. A slightly lower number was found in the 2010 Register of Companies. Here, approximately 313 Chinese companies were employing 1,749 Basotho and 561 Chinese (MTICM, 2010a). This translates into an average of six Basotho and two Chinese per enterprise. This means that, compared to the Ministry of Labor's database, only half as many Basotho, but the same number of Chinese were employed as officially intended. Finally, the MITC survey from 2009 found that in 414 foreign enterprises there were 1,662 Basotho and 662 expats (MTICM, 2009). Among these 414 enterprises, 289 were owned by Chinese, which employed 555 Chinese and 1,274 Basotho (MTICM, 2009). This would mean that on average Chinese enterprises were employing only 4 Basotho and 2 Chinese. In the same survey, there were 54 Indian/Pakistani businesses which employed 59 foreigners and 187 Basotho (MTICM, 2009). This means that they were on average employing 3 Basotho and 1 foreigner. My survey among 86 Chinese migrants in Lesotho showed that 52 out of 86 surveyed Chinese migrants (67%) were employing more than four Basotho, which is consistent to the range of employed Basotho in the different public statistics. Likewise 30 out of 37 surveyed Chinese migrants stated that less than three Chinese were employed in a particular business.

Given the qualitatively different sources the numbers are derived from (i.e. intended versus actual employment, only registered shops versus shops visited during surveys), as well as the above stated uncertainties, the different sources as well as my survey are in relatively good agreement, (except of the comparatively high number of average employed Basotho per shop in the database of the MoL which however recorded the intended employment). All sources confirm my results that Chinese businesses create on average more employment opportunities for Basotho than for Chinese. Considering that many non-Chinese owned shops tend to employ fewer persons, it seems that Chinese are at least partially altering existing employment opportunities because they provide more employment to Basotho. Apart from the fact that the businesses of Chinese migrants have presumably more financial resources than Basotho, which allow them to employ more people and have a bigger business, there are

potentially three additional reasons which could explain why Chinese employ (more) Basotho. First of all, as demonstrated above, the labor costs of Chinese employees are in average higher than of Basotho. Second, businesses that employ expats have to at least theoretically employ Basotho. Third, since many Chinese are not able to communicate fluently in Sesotho, it could also be that they need Basotho to have someone who is able to communicate fluently with the costumers. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that the majority of the Basotho working in Chinese shops is doing “menial work”, i.e. cleaning, working in the storage room, or guarding the shop. Only few of them fulfill managerial tasks. This means that despite the creation of employment opportunities, there are presumably limited skills development opportunities.

In fact, during my interviews, this was a reoccurring theme: “yes the Chinese create jobs for Basotho, but they do not provide them with any meaningful new skills”. It seems that policymakers had been hoping that the presence of Chinese shops would create spillover effects which would in the long run boost the indigenous wholesale and retail sector. However, with more and more Chinese entering the country and fewer Basotho operating shops in the wholesale and retail sector, the potential for spillover effects appears to be diminishing. While this is obviously a sensitive topic, it is still worth asking to what extent this behavior is a reflection of a divergence from already existing pattern before the Chinese arrived, i.e. whether the presumably little skill transfer is a reproduction or a deviation from aspects of existing employment opportunities for Basotho. To provide an answer to this question it is useful to consider if and how Chinese shops differ from other foreign-owned shops. In my opinion, there is not so much difference between the skills transferred to Basotho in an Indian or Pakistani shop as compared to a Chinese shop: in both cases the decisions are taken by the foreigner, and Basotho are rarely in “managerial positions”. Moreover, considering that the majority of Basotho-owned micro- and small-scale enterprises appears to be survivalists with limited potential of providing employment opportunities and/or skills development, it seems that the potential for skills development of an employee in this sector are, independent of the nationality of the owner, limited. In other words, I suppose that in this aspect, Chinese migrants are rather reproducing the existing skills development patterns than deviating from them.

Finally, the relationship between Chinese migrants’ economic activities and employment opportunities has to be seen in the wider context of the general structure of employment opportunities for Basotho. Large parts of employment opportunities for Basotho are created in Lesotho’s textile and garment industry sector. Here, both wages and skills transfers are lower than in the wholesale and retail sector. For example, in 2009, the minimum wage of an untrained person in the textile and garment industry was 763 Maloti (MoL, 2009:20). On the

other hand, in the wholesale and retail sector it was 1,107 Maloti. In addition, it is well documented that employees in the textile and garment factories are assigned to low-skill and labor-intensive jobs (Rosenberg, 2007:466). This means that in these sectors there is also virtually no skills transfer. Likewise, for Basotho working in the South African mines or on the farms, there are also limited skills development opportunities. In other words, there are in general limited skills development opportunities for unskilled Basotho. Therefore it seems less surprising that many of the Chinese wholesale and retail shops are providing limited skills development opportunities for Basotho, too. With this comparison I neither intend to defend the presumably little skill development possibilities for Basotho in shops run by Chinese, nor do I want to state that these possibilities could or should not be increased. However, if Chinese migrants rather reproduce existing skill transfer patterns, it might be questioned to what extent it is legitimate to hold this fact against them.

6. Conclusion & Discussion

In my thesis I analyzed Chinese migration to Lesotho—an interesting, yet relatively unexplored, example of South-South migration. More specifically, I was asking how economic activities of Chinese migrants in Lesotho reproduce and alter businesses and employment opportunities in Lesotho. Since this question cannot be answered in a void, I employed insights from four key concepts from migration studies (i.e. migration system, migration configuration, migrant economy and the new Chinese migration order), and developed a five stage model of migration, which combined actor-level and structural factors (see Chapter 2). The model was mainly seen as a heuristic device, which provides a theoretical foundation for understanding some of the key dynamics underlying migration in general and Chinese migration to Lesotho in particular.

Building on these considerations, I then set out to analyze historical links between China and Lesotho and to provide an explanation for the formation of the Sino-Basotho migration system (see Chapter 3). My analysis showed that past and present interactions between Chinese, Taiwanese and Basotho actors as well as the structures of China, Taiwan and Lesotho created sets of structural opportunities and constraints which varied across time and space (i.e. China, Taiwan, and Lesotho). A surprising feature of the historical links as well as the Sino-Basotho migration system was that Taiwanese and Chinese non-state actors appeared to have played and still play a far more important role than state actors for facilitating migration. Given the historical circumstances (Lesotho maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan from 1966 to 1983 and from 1990 to 1994), the room for maneuvering of Chinese state actors in Lesotho was severely limited throughout the first 30 years after Lesotho's independence. But even after the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with Lesotho in 1983, Chinese state actors kept their interactions with Lesotho to a rather

symbolic level. The first signs of a scaling-up of interactions between Chinese and Basotho state actors could only be observed in 1996, 13 years after the first establishment of diplomatic relations with Lesotho.

In fact, my account of the development of the Sino-Basotho migration system demonstrated that Taiwanese non-state actors, who were the first “Chinese looking” to arrive in Lesotho in 1970, were essentially paving the way for migration from China to Lesotho by creating both employment and, to a lesser extent, business opportunities for Chinese migrants. These employment opportunities were generated by Taiwanese non-state actors who started to shift their textile and garment factories from South Africa to Lesotho in the mid-1980s. Moreover, by the time the first Chinese government project workers arrived in Lesotho in 1996, Taiwanese migrants had already established successful micro- and small-sale wholesale and retail businesses. Interestingly, the economic activities of Chinese pioneer migrants and subsequent migrants concentrate in the same business sector. In this thesis I proposed that this development can be explained with the development of endogenous and contextual feedback mechanisms, as well as the transnational networks and a migration industry.

After the outline of the broader context of Chinese migration to Lesotho (i.e. the Sino-Basotho migration system), I presented two specific migration configurations within the Sino-Basotho migration system: the Fuqingnese and non-Fuqingnese migration configuration (see Chapter 4). My analysis of the answers of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants revealed several similarities in terms of demographic characteristics, of which the most important were (i) Category 2 migrants tended to be younger than Category 1 migrants; and (ii) the majority of Category 1 migrants had been previously businesspersons, and likewise the majority of Category 2 migrants had been staff. Regarding similarities in the migration pattern of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants, my survey showed: (i) Category 1 migrants came to Lesotho because they wanted to start a business, and Category 2 migrants came to Lesotho to seek employment; (ii) for the majority of the surveyed migrants’ the main purpose of making money was to support the family; (iii) only few migrants had come alone to Lesotho and most participants had brought some part of their family; (iv) only few migrants had previous outward migration experience; (v) almost all migrants indicated that they would return to China again; and (vi) on average Category 1 migrants have stayed in Lesotho for a longer time than Category 2 migrants, and they were also planning to return later to China (Category 1: in 3-5 years; Category 2: in 1-3 years). Finally, with a few exceptions, migrants’ impression of Lesotho, before and after migrating, tended to be slightly negative. Surprisingly, although they tended to assess the attitude of Basotho towards Chinese negatively, they describe their personal relations with Basotho rather positively.

Apart from these similarities, I pointed out two important intra-Sino-Basotho migration system differences: (i) a higher share of males among single non-Fuqingnese migrants, and (ii) differences in the problem solving strategies (i.e. Fuqingnese migrants tended to ask their friends for advice and turn to local Chinese in Lesotho for help, and non-Fuqingnese migrants relied on their family both for preparation and for help;). Based on the answers to several of my questions regarding the migration pattern, I argued that although Fuqingnese and non-Fuqingnese migrants have different preparation strategies, most migrants from both migration configurations had direct or indirect contact with transnational networks engaged in organizing migration to Lesotho (for employment or businesses purposes). On the other hand, the high share of Category 2 migrants whose boss was in China shows that some Chinese migrants are more actively engaging in transnational activities. Regarding the strength of these networks, I indicated that it would be misleading to conclude that non-Fuqingnese migrants had better developed networks just because they tend to not prepare their migration. In fact, I concluded the fact that Fuqingnese migrants could more often rely on friends for advice was an indicator for potentially stronger and more developed links between Lesotho and Fuqing.

In Chapter 5, I continued with a description of the Chinese migrant economy in Lesotho and the implications of Chinese migrants' economic activities for reproducing and altering business and employment structures in Lesotho. The economic activities were analyzed along three lines: nature and scope, working and employment patterns, and sourcing strategies. Regarding the nature and scope I noted that the majority of Chinese migrants was operating small retail shops. In terms of the working and employment patterns, my findings suggest that (i) a typical working week of Chinese migrants consisted of six days, and (ii) that Category 1 migrants worked on average 6-8 hours per day, whereas Category 2 migrants worked 8-10 hours per day; (iii) that a typical Chinese business in Lesotho employed more than four people, out of which the majority was Basotho and only few are Chinese; (iv) that the wage of Basotho employees of Chinese businesses was approximately 1,000 Maloti lower than the wage of their Chinese Category 2 counterparts; (v) that the income of Category 1 migrants was at least 1,000 Maloti higher than that of Category 2 migrants; and (vi) that most Category 1 migrants considered the local wage level as being either lower or the same as in China. Finally, in terms of the sourcing strategies I showed that the survey had a high share of (i) migrants who did not buy or order goods directly in China; (ii) migrants who did buy or order their goods from local Chinese wholesalers; and (iii) migrants who did not buy or order their goods at local Chinese wholesalers in South Africa.

While the economic activities of the members of the two migration configurations had a high degree of similarity, I could still identify important differences between the economic

activities of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants. These differences manifested themselves in the tendency of (i) Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants to have more businesses than non-Fuqingnese migrants; (ii) Fuqingnese migrants to have operated a particular business for fewer years than their non-Fuqingnese counterparts; and (iii) Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants to have lower wages than non-Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants. This confirmed that non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants also differ in important aspects of their economic activities. However, I concluded that unlike my earlier results about the differences of the two migration configurations, this distinction is not a reflection of two separate migrant economies, but rather a reflection of two different types of actors, who have different resources and strategies.

Building on these findings as well as the description of these economic activities context (i.e. the small-scale wholesale and retail sector of Lesotho), I argued that Chinese migrants in Lesotho, by establishing mainly small retail shops and supermarkets, appear to give in to structural constraints (i.e. low demand and high entrance barriers into the large-scale wholesale and retail sector) and are thereby rather reproducing than altering the existing business opportunity structure in the micro-and small-scale business sector. However, considering that Chinese migrants have managed to establish a strong presence, and that they have different business practices than their Basotho counterparts (i.e. different the setup of the business and the sourcing strategies), they are also altering the business opportunities in Lesotho. I showed that there are both negative and positive aspects in the altering of business opportunities in Lesotho. The negative aspects were the exposure of Basotho to the (fierce) competition from Chinese migrants, and the cooperation between local shop owners with Chinese migrants, through which 'cooperative' Basotho gained more resources, but left existing local businesses exposed to more competition. The positive aspects were that Basotho are responding to the fierce competition by adapting several aspects of Chinese business practices (i.e. sourcing strategies and setup of the business) to be able to at least partially compete with the Chinese.

My account of the relationship between the economic activities of Chinese migrants and employment opportunities in Lesotho demonstrated that Chinese migrants are at least partially altering existing employment opportunities because Chinese migrants provide more employment opportunities to Basotho. But, as I pointed out, the creation of employment opportunities did not translate into significant skills development and transfer opportunities for Basotho. From the perspective of the interviewed policymakers this was perceived as a huge problem, because they had hoped that Basotho could obtain important managerial skills from the Chinese migrants and thus be able to start their own businesses. While I do not intend to defend the presumably little skill development possibilities for Basotho in shops

run by Chinese, I nevertheless argued that Chinese migrants are not altering but rather reproducing existing skill transfer patterns and concluded that it might therefore be questioned to what extent it is legitimate to hold this fact specifically against them.

When relating my findings to earlier research on Chinese migrants in general and Chinese migrants in Lesotho in particular, a number of factors are worth noting. First of all, I demonstrated that the presence of foreigners in Lesotho's wholesale and retail sector is not a new phenomenon and could in fact be traced back to the early independence years. This somewhat contradicts the widely held picture of an exclusive Chinese presence and the recentness of 'Chinese invasion'. Second, common wisdom to the contrary, the case of Chinese migration to Lesotho suggests that Chinese state actors played a far less important and rather indirect role in facilitating migration to Lesotho than commonly thought. From conversations with Chinese migrants, I gathered that many of them do not have any contact with the local embassy, and their sometimes bitter complaints that nobody cares what happens to them further underline this. Nevertheless, considering that China's 'relaxed' emigration policy has facilitated large-scale legal and illegal migration, and that policy makers are clearly aware of this, one cannot help but suspect that this is at least a sign of indirect state-involvement. When I was in Lusaka (Zambia) in December 2012, I had the opportunity to interview the Charge d' Affairs for Political Activities of the Chinese embassy, and when asked about China's emigration management he told me that "China has never controlled [emigration]"⁹⁰. While this statement confirms the relaxed policy stance, the resoluteness of it indicates that Chinese migration policy is a sensitive topic. It seems that Chinese authorities could potentially and do indeed control emigration (particularly of political dissidents). The current situation can be better understood when taking into consideration that if Chinese policy makers would in any way admit that they in one or the other way encourage or even facilitate migration to selected countries, the image of their engagement in Africa would become even worse than it already is⁹¹.

Third, my findings in Chapter 4 are in line with what is generally known about Chinese migrants: i.e. the role of migration as a risk-diversification strategy. Those setting up businesses abroad are in average older than those coming to work in the shop of a relative or fellow countryman, i.e. sojourners or trade migrants (Poston et al., 1994:632f). Since migration is part of a larger-family risk diversification strategy, Chinese migrants prefer to bring some parts of their family. Chinese people are treated with suspicion by local people

⁹⁰ China has never controlled: 中国从来不控制 zhonguo conglai bu kongzhi.

⁹¹ That is not to say that everybody thinks that Chinese engagement in Africa is negative, but the majority of the articles as well as the local policymakers appear to have a critical if not negative image of the Chinese engagement in Africa.

(particularly in African countries), but through continuous interactions they manage to establish relatively good relations with some parts of the local community.

Fourth, I found only limited support for the “transnational Chinese” and “African dream” theses. To shortly recapture, the transnational Chinese thesis claims that Chinese migrants are flexible and constantly on the move in the pursuit of even better business and employment opportunities (McKeown, 2009:317). The African dream thesis on the other hand, holds that Chinese migrants in Africa want to make fast and easy money to be able to buy a house in their home city (Park, 2009:469). Moreover, the African dream thesis directly or indirectly implies that Chinese migrants in Africa are “an exceptional case”. In my survey, only few migrants had previous outward migration experience, and similarly only few wanted to continue to migrate to another country. Tellingly, all migrants with previous migration experience in Africa wanted to go back to China. The fact that many Chinese migrants did not have previous migration experience could mean that Chinese migrants can rely on both personal and professional (transnational) networks (i.e. migration industry) to organize their migration to Lesotho. Through the commercialization of migration (Pieke, 2006:85), Lesotho might have become an attractive and relative easy reachable migration destination. But the fact that many Chinese migrants stated that they want to and will return to China indicates that at least they were not as mobile as the image of the flexible transnational Chinese suggests. The reasons for this could relate to the fact that they either had already made enough money and therefore did not need to engage in further migration, or that their (negative) experiences in Lesotho made them reconsider the benefits of further migration. In my opinion, the low propensity to engage in further migration on the African continent relates to changes in the local and macro-economic environment. From personal conversation with Chinese migrants in Lesotho, I gathered that many feel that their environment is becoming more and more uncertain and that the risks and costs for staying in Lesotho or even moving to another African country are simply too high. Moreover, the 2008 global economic crisis has meant that the already small income of many Basotho has become even smaller. Consequently, the number of potential costumers decreased, making it more and more difficult for Chinese migrants to remain profitable. China, on the other hand, has managed to retain high economic growth and the increases in demand are less severe, therefore making China itself a more and more attractive business destination.

Coming to the African dream thesis, it could be noted that only three out of 86 migrants explicitly stated that their main purpose of making money in Lesotho was to buy a house. In fact, the majority of the surveyed migrants stated that they wanted to support the family. Of course, supporting the family may include buying a house, which no doubt has a high symbolic value in China. But still, I would argue that the reasons for Chinese to come to Africa

or Lesotho are more complex than the simple desire to “build a three-level home or monument to their success overseas” (Park, 2009:469). This brings me to the second claim of the African dream thesis, i.e. that Chinese migration to Africa is an exceptional case because Chinese migrants come to the remotest areas of Africa to make money. Speaking for Lesotho, I can say that many people, both from other African countries as well as from India and Pakistan, view Lesotho as a relatively attractive destination for opening up small shops. For example, apart from Chinese owned or run shops, there are also many shops owned and run by Indians, South Africans, Pakistani and Bangladeshi. Second, the motivation of most people (including Basotho, Indians and other foreigners) who operate or work in a business in Lesotho can be considered to do this primarily to make money. Together, it seems questionable to what extent the stated exceptionality of Chinese can be deduced from their motives or business operations.

Fifth, my findings for the economic activities of Chinese migrants in Lesotho in Chapter 5 somewhat deviate from findings for the economic activities of Chinese migrants in other parts of the world. This is particularly evident when it came to the sourcing strategies of Chinese migrants. Here, the local Chinese wholesaler in Lesotho had a far more prominent role than wholesalers in China. It might also be attributed to the fact that Lesotho is a land-locked country with no access to the sea, and that it is too costly for individual shops to order goods from China. Moreover, the shops did not concentrate in China Towns or other designated areas (as for example in South Africa). It would be interesting to see to which extent this pattern is also prevalent in other African countries. Finally, Chapter 5 showed that the economic activities of Chinese migrants are both reproducing and altering existing business and employment opportunities in Lesotho. It was interesting to see that Chinese migrants tended to employ more Basotho than Chinese. Even more importantly, the success of Chinese migrants in the remote areas of Lesotho appeared to be stemming from successful cooperation with some Basotho. In fact, it seemed that Chinese migrants’ success was strongly relying on support from Basotho and official institutions. Nevertheless, it is still too early to judge to what extent the economic activities of Chinese migrants in Lesotho will benefit or harm Basotho.

Despite providing some interesting insights into Chinese migration to Lesotho, my thesis had a number of limitations which future research could address. First of all, due to practical concerns I concentrated my survey mainly on the central areas of the urban towns in Lesotho. Since Chinese migrants are also in rural parts of Lesotho, future research could explore to what extent their economic activities differ from those in urban areas. Second, despite several attempts, I did not manage to interview many Basotho shop owners, particularly those which cooperated with Chinese. This was partly due to language barriers (i.e. many of them speak

only Sesotho), but also due to a lack of trust. Future research could try to incorporate extensive research on the motivations and opinions of Basotho. Third, although I asked Chinese migrants about their sourcing strategies, I did not have the time or resources to conduct follow up research on this particular aspect. Since local Chinese wholesalers appeared to be highly important for supplying goods to other Chinese shops, it would be interesting to explore this aspect further. Finally, while I indicated that the success of Chinese migrants in Lesotho is likely to be related to legal and illegal collaboration of Basotho non-state and state actors, I could not provide extensive evidence for this, and future research should confirm or reject this.

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Appendix 1: Category 1 questionnaire

个人信息									
性别 与年龄		<input type="checkbox"/> 男			<input type="checkbox"/> 女			_____ 岁	
当前职业		<input type="checkbox"/> 商人			<input type="checkbox"/> 职工			<input type="checkbox"/> 其他:_____	
以前职业		<input type="checkbox"/> 商人			<input type="checkbox"/> 职工			<input type="checkbox"/> 其他:_____	
出生地点		_____ 国			_____ 省			_____ 市	
婚姻状况		<input type="checkbox"/> 未婚		<input type="checkbox"/> 已婚		<input type="checkbox"/> 离婚		<input type="checkbox"/> 丧偶	
陪你去莱索托的主要家庭成员		<input type="checkbox"/> 只有我		<input type="checkbox"/> 父亲		<input type="checkbox"/> 母亲		<input type="checkbox"/> 妻子 <input type="checkbox"/> 丈夫 <input type="checkbox"/> 孩子 <input type="checkbox"/> 其他	
个人经验和看法									
来莱索托主要原因		<input type="checkbox"/> 创业		<input type="checkbox"/> 就业		<input type="checkbox"/> 上学		<input type="checkbox"/> 陪家人 <input type="checkbox"/> 其他:___	
来莱索托挣钱主要原因		<input type="checkbox"/> 支持自己		<input type="checkbox"/> 支持家人		<input type="checkbox"/> 结婚		<input type="checkbox"/> 买房 <input type="checkbox"/> 其他:___	
在莱索托居留或停留的时间		<input type="checkbox"/> 不到 1 年		<input type="checkbox"/> 1-3 年		<input type="checkbox"/> 3-5 年		<input type="checkbox"/> 5-7 年 <input type="checkbox"/> 7-9 年 <input type="checkbox"/> 9 年以上	
去莱索托之前,去过其它国家		<input type="checkbox"/> 不		<input type="checkbox"/> 欧洲		<input type="checkbox"/> 美洲		<input type="checkbox"/> 非洲 <input type="checkbox"/> 澳洲 <input type="checkbox"/> 亚洲	
在那边留或停留的时间		<input type="checkbox"/> 不到 1 年		<input type="checkbox"/> 1-3 年		<input type="checkbox"/> 3-5 年		<input type="checkbox"/> 5-7 年 <input type="checkbox"/> 7-9 年 <input type="checkbox"/> 9 年以上	
准备什么时候离开莱索托		<input type="checkbox"/> 不到 1 年		<input type="checkbox"/> 1-3 年		<input type="checkbox"/> 3-5 年		<input type="checkbox"/> 5-7 年 <input type="checkbox"/> 7-9 年 <input type="checkbox"/> 退休时	
离开莱索托之后准备去		<input type="checkbox"/> 中国		<input type="checkbox"/> 欧洲		<input type="checkbox"/> 美洲		<input type="checkbox"/> 非洲 <input type="checkbox"/> 澳洲 <input type="checkbox"/> 亚洲	
来莱索托之前,对莱索托有过的印象		<input type="checkbox"/> 不好		<input type="checkbox"/> 不太好		<input type="checkbox"/> 一般		<input type="checkbox"/> 好 <input type="checkbox"/> 很好 <input type="checkbox"/> 非常好	
来莱索托之前,您个人认为以下那个方面可能带来困难		<input type="checkbox"/> 文化		<input type="checkbox"/> 语言		<input type="checkbox"/> 安全		<input type="checkbox"/> 法律 <input type="checkbox"/> 生活费 <input type="checkbox"/> 其他:___	
来莱索托之后,对莱索托的印象		<input type="checkbox"/> 不好		<input type="checkbox"/> 不太好		<input type="checkbox"/> 一般		<input type="checkbox"/> 好 <input type="checkbox"/> 很好 <input type="checkbox"/> 非常好	
来莱索托之后,与莱索托人的关系		<input type="checkbox"/> 不好		<input type="checkbox"/> 不太好		<input type="checkbox"/> 一般		<input type="checkbox"/> 好 <input type="checkbox"/> 很好 <input type="checkbox"/> 非常好	
来莱索托之后,莱索托人对中国人的态度		<input type="checkbox"/> 不好		<input type="checkbox"/> 不太好		<input type="checkbox"/> 一般		<input type="checkbox"/> 好 <input type="checkbox"/> 很好 <input type="checkbox"/> 非常好	
来莱索托之后,与本地的中国人的关系		<input type="checkbox"/> 不好		<input type="checkbox"/> 不太好		<input type="checkbox"/> 一般		<input type="checkbox"/> 好 <input type="checkbox"/> 很好 <input type="checkbox"/> 非常好	
来莱索托之后,本地的中国人对你的态度		<input type="checkbox"/> 不好		<input type="checkbox"/> 不太好		<input type="checkbox"/> 一般		<input type="checkbox"/> 好 <input type="checkbox"/> 很好 <input type="checkbox"/> 非常好	
来莱索托之后,遇到困难		<input type="checkbox"/> 没有		<input type="checkbox"/> 不多		<input type="checkbox"/> 不太多		<input type="checkbox"/> 一般 <input type="checkbox"/> 多 <input type="checkbox"/> 很多	
来莱索托之前,做了什么准备		<input type="checkbox"/> 没准备 <input type="checkbox"/> 听取朋友的意见 <input type="checkbox"/> 学英文 <input type="checkbox"/> 其他 <input type="checkbox"/> 看关于莱索托的书 <input type="checkbox"/> 上网与看其他人的经验							
来莱索托之前,您个人认为以下那个方面可能带来困难		<input type="checkbox"/> 文化 <input type="checkbox"/> 语言		<input type="checkbox"/> 法律 <input type="checkbox"/> 安全		<input type="checkbox"/> 生活费 <input type="checkbox"/> 其他:___			

来莱索托之后,遇到的困难的原因	<input type="checkbox"/> 文化不同 <input type="checkbox"/> 沟通不顺利	<input type="checkbox"/> 不安全 <input type="checkbox"/> 法律很严格	<input type="checkbox"/> 生活费太高			
遇到困难时,谁会帮助你	<input type="checkbox"/> 我自己 <input type="checkbox"/> 家人	<input type="checkbox"/> 同事 <input type="checkbox"/> 本地的中国人	<input type="checkbox"/> 莱索托人			
关于业务						
业务性质	<input type="checkbox"/> 批发商	<input type="checkbox"/> 零售	<input type="checkbox"/> 超市	<input type="checkbox"/> 饭店	<input type="checkbox"/> 中医	<input type="checkbox"/> 其他: _
营业业务的长短	<input type="checkbox"/> 不到 1 年	<input type="checkbox"/> 1-3 年	<input type="checkbox"/> 3-5 年	<input type="checkbox"/> 5-7 年	<input type="checkbox"/> 7-9 年	<input type="checkbox"/> 9 年以上
职工人数	<input type="checkbox"/> 0 位	<input type="checkbox"/> 1-2 位	<input type="checkbox"/> 2-3 位	<input type="checkbox"/> 4-5 位	<input type="checkbox"/> 6-7 位	<input type="checkbox"/> 7 位以上
职工其中多少个是莱索托人	<input type="checkbox"/> 0 位	<input type="checkbox"/> 1-2 位	<input type="checkbox"/> 2-3 位	<input type="checkbox"/> 4-5 位	<input type="checkbox"/> 6-7 位	<input type="checkbox"/> 7 位以上
职工其中多少个是中国人	<input type="checkbox"/> 0 位	<input type="checkbox"/> 1-2 位	<input type="checkbox"/> 2-3 位	<input type="checkbox"/> 4-5 位	<input type="checkbox"/> 6-7 位	<input type="checkbox"/> 7 位以上
莱索托员工的专业技术水平	<input type="checkbox"/> 很低	<input type="checkbox"/> 低	<input type="checkbox"/> 一般	<input type="checkbox"/> 高	<input type="checkbox"/> 很高	<input type="checkbox"/> 非常高
莱索托员工的工作态度	<input type="checkbox"/> 不认真	<input type="checkbox"/> 有点认真	<input type="checkbox"/> 一般	<input type="checkbox"/> 认真	<input type="checkbox"/> 很认真	<input type="checkbox"/> 非常认真
每天平均工作时间	<input type="checkbox"/> 0-2 小时	<input type="checkbox"/> 2-4 小时	<input type="checkbox"/> 4-6 小时	<input type="checkbox"/> 6-8 小时	<input type="checkbox"/> 8-10 小时	<input type="checkbox"/> 10 小时以上
每周工作几天	<input type="checkbox"/> 2 天	<input type="checkbox"/> 3 天	<input type="checkbox"/> 4 天	<input type="checkbox"/> 5 天	<input type="checkbox"/> 6 天	<input type="checkbox"/> 7 天
职工平均的月收入(M)	<input type="checkbox"/> 1500-2500	<input type="checkbox"/> 2500-3500	<input type="checkbox"/> 3500-4500	<input type="checkbox"/> 4500-5500	<input type="checkbox"/> 5500-6500	<input type="checkbox"/> 6500 以上
莱索托职工平均月收入与比中国比较	<input type="checkbox"/> 低	<input type="checkbox"/> 一样	<input type="checkbox"/> 高	<input type="checkbox"/> 高一倍	<input type="checkbox"/> 高两倍	
总共拥有的业务	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 家	<input type="checkbox"/> 2 家	<input type="checkbox"/> 3 家	<input type="checkbox"/> 4 家	<input type="checkbox"/> 6 家	<input type="checkbox"/> 6 家以上
大概的月收入 (M)	<input type="checkbox"/> 1000-3000	<input type="checkbox"/> 3000-6000	<input type="checkbox"/> 6000-9000	<input type="checkbox"/> 9000-12000	<input type="checkbox"/> 12000-15000	<input type="checkbox"/> 15000 以上
你的月收入与中国比较	<input type="checkbox"/> 低	<input type="checkbox"/> 一样	<input type="checkbox"/> 高	<input type="checkbox"/> 高一倍	<input type="checkbox"/> 高两倍	
业务所需要的货物百分之多少是...						
...中国制造	<input type="checkbox"/> 100%	<input type="checkbox"/> 80%	<input type="checkbox"/> 60%	<input type="checkbox"/> 40%	<input type="checkbox"/> 20%以下	
...在中国买或定的	<input type="checkbox"/> 100%	<input type="checkbox"/> 80%	<input type="checkbox"/> 60%	<input type="checkbox"/> 40%	<input type="checkbox"/> 20%以下	
...在本地的中国批发商买或定的	<input type="checkbox"/> 100%	<input type="checkbox"/> 80%	<input type="checkbox"/> 60%	<input type="checkbox"/> 40%	<input type="checkbox"/> 20%以下	
...在南非买或定的	<input type="checkbox"/> 100%	<input type="checkbox"/> 80%	<input type="checkbox"/> 60%	<input type="checkbox"/> 40%	<input type="checkbox"/> 20%以下	
...在南非的中国批发商买或定的	<input type="checkbox"/> 100%	<input type="checkbox"/> 80%	<input type="checkbox"/> 60%	<input type="checkbox"/> 40%	<input type="checkbox"/> 20%以下	

Appendix 2: Category 2 questionnaire

个人信息									
性别 与 年龄	<input type="checkbox"/> 男			<input type="checkbox"/> 女			_____ 岁		
当前职业	<input type="checkbox"/> 商人			<input type="checkbox"/> 职工			<input type="checkbox"/> 其他:_____		
以前职业	<input type="checkbox"/> 商人			<input type="checkbox"/> 职工			<input type="checkbox"/> 其他:_____		
出生地点	_____ 国			_____ 省			_____ 市		
婚姻状况	<input type="checkbox"/> 未婚		<input type="checkbox"/> 已婚		<input type="checkbox"/> 离婚			<input type="checkbox"/> 丧偶	
陪你去莱索托的主要家庭成员	<input type="checkbox"/> 只有我	<input type="checkbox"/> 父亲	<input type="checkbox"/> 母亲	妻子		<input type="checkbox"/> 丈夫	<input type="checkbox"/> 孩子	其他:_____	
个人经验和看法									
来莱索托主要原因	<input type="checkbox"/> 创业		<input type="checkbox"/> 就业		<input type="checkbox"/> 上学		<input type="checkbox"/> 陪家人		<input type="checkbox"/> 其他:_____
来莱索托挣钱主要原因	<input type="checkbox"/> 支持自己		<input type="checkbox"/> 支持家人		<input type="checkbox"/> 结婚		<input type="checkbox"/> 买房		<input type="checkbox"/> 其他:_____
在莱索托居留或停留的时间	<input type="checkbox"/> 不到 1 年	<input type="checkbox"/> 1-3 年	<input type="checkbox"/> 3-5 年		<input type="checkbox"/> 5-7 年		<input type="checkbox"/> 7-9 年		<input type="checkbox"/> 9 年以上
去莱索托之前,去过其它国家	<input type="checkbox"/> 不	<input type="checkbox"/> 欧洲		<input type="checkbox"/> 美洲		<input type="checkbox"/> 非洲		<input type="checkbox"/> 澳洲	<input type="checkbox"/> 亚洲
在那边留或停留的时间	<input type="checkbox"/> 不到 1 年	<input type="checkbox"/> 1-3 年	<input type="checkbox"/> 3-5 年		<input type="checkbox"/> 5-7 年		<input type="checkbox"/> 7-9 年		<input type="checkbox"/> 9 年以上
准备什么时候离开莱索托	<input type="checkbox"/> 不到 1 年	<input type="checkbox"/> 1-3 年	<input type="checkbox"/> 3-5 年		<input type="checkbox"/> 5-7 年		<input type="checkbox"/> 7-9 年		<input type="checkbox"/> 退休时
离开莱索托之后准备去	<input type="checkbox"/> 中国	<input type="checkbox"/> 欧洲		<input type="checkbox"/> 美洲		<input type="checkbox"/> 非洲		<input type="checkbox"/> 澳洲	<input type="checkbox"/> 亚洲
来莱索托之前,对莱索托有过的印象	<input type="checkbox"/> 不好	<input type="checkbox"/> 不太好		<input type="checkbox"/> 一般		<input type="checkbox"/> 好		<input type="checkbox"/> 很好	<input type="checkbox"/> 非常好
来莱索托之前,您个人认为以下那个方面可能带来困难	<input type="checkbox"/> 文化		<input type="checkbox"/> 语言		<input type="checkbox"/> 安全		<input type="checkbox"/> 法律		<input type="checkbox"/> 生活费
来莱索托之后,对莱索托的印象	<input type="checkbox"/> 不好	<input type="checkbox"/> 不太好		<input type="checkbox"/> 一般		<input type="checkbox"/> 好		<input type="checkbox"/> 很好	<input type="checkbox"/> 非常好
来莱索托之后,与莱索托人的关系	<input type="checkbox"/> 不好	<input type="checkbox"/> 不太好		<input type="checkbox"/> 一般		<input type="checkbox"/> 好		<input type="checkbox"/> 很好	<input type="checkbox"/> 非常好
来莱索托之后,莱索托人对中国人的态度	<input type="checkbox"/> 不好	<input type="checkbox"/> 不太好		<input type="checkbox"/> 一般		<input type="checkbox"/> 好		<input type="checkbox"/> 很好	<input type="checkbox"/> 非常好
来莱索托之后,与本地的中国人的关系	<input type="checkbox"/> 不好	<input type="checkbox"/> 不太好		<input type="checkbox"/> 一般		<input type="checkbox"/> 好		<input type="checkbox"/> 很好	<input type="checkbox"/> 非常好
来莱索托之后,本地的中国人对你的态度	<input type="checkbox"/> 不好	<input type="checkbox"/> 不太好		<input type="checkbox"/> 一般		<input type="checkbox"/> 好		<input type="checkbox"/> 很好	<input type="checkbox"/> 非常好
来莱索托之后,遇到困难	<input type="checkbox"/> 没有	<input type="checkbox"/> 不多		<input type="checkbox"/> 不太多		<input type="checkbox"/> 一般		<input type="checkbox"/> 多	<input type="checkbox"/> 很多
来莱索托之前,做了什么准备	<input type="checkbox"/> 没准备 <input type="checkbox"/> 学英文 <input type="checkbox"/> 看关于莱索托的书 <input type="checkbox"/> 上网与看其他人的经验				<input type="checkbox"/> 听取朋友的意见 <input type="checkbox"/> 其他:_____				
来莱索托之前,您个人认为以下那个方面可能带来困难	<input type="checkbox"/> 文化 <input type="checkbox"/> 语言		<input type="checkbox"/> 法律 <input type="checkbox"/> 安全				<input type="checkbox"/> 生活费 <input type="checkbox"/> 其他:_____		

难						
来莱索托之后,遇到的困难的原因	<input type="checkbox"/> 文化不同 <input type="checkbox"/> 沟通不顺利	<input type="checkbox"/> 不安全 <input type="checkbox"/> 法律很严格	<input type="checkbox"/> 生活费太高 <input type="checkbox"/> 其他:_____			
遇到困难时,谁会帮助你	<input type="checkbox"/> 我自己 <input type="checkbox"/> 家人	<input type="checkbox"/> 同事 <input type="checkbox"/> 本地的中国人	<input type="checkbox"/> 莱索托人 <input type="checkbox"/> 其他:_____			
关于工作						
工作业务性质	<input type="checkbox"/> 批发商	<input type="checkbox"/> 零售	<input type="checkbox"/> 超市	<input type="checkbox"/> 饭店	<input type="checkbox"/> 中医	<input type="checkbox"/> 其他:_____
工作的长短	<input type="checkbox"/> 不到1年	<input type="checkbox"/> 1-3年	<input type="checkbox"/> 3-5年	<input type="checkbox"/> 5-7年	<input type="checkbox"/> 7-9年	<input type="checkbox"/> 9年以上
同事人数	<input type="checkbox"/> 0位	<input type="checkbox"/> 1-2位	<input type="checkbox"/> 2-3位	<input type="checkbox"/> 4-5位	<input type="checkbox"/> 6-7位	<input type="checkbox"/> 7位以上
同事中其中多少个是莱索托人	<input type="checkbox"/> 0位	<input type="checkbox"/> 1-2位	<input type="checkbox"/> 2-3位	<input type="checkbox"/> 4-5位	<input type="checkbox"/> 6-7位	<input type="checkbox"/> 7位以上
同事中其中多少个是中国人	<input type="checkbox"/> 0位	<input type="checkbox"/> 1-2位	<input type="checkbox"/> 2-3位	<input type="checkbox"/> 4-5位	<input type="checkbox"/> 6-7位	<input type="checkbox"/> 7位以上
你的老板在哪儿?	<input type="checkbox"/> 中国	<input type="checkbox"/> 莱索托 (请写城市) _____				
每天平均工作时间	<input type="checkbox"/> 0-2小时	<input type="checkbox"/> 2-4小时	<input type="checkbox"/> 4-6小时	<input type="checkbox"/> 6-8小时	<input type="checkbox"/> 8-10小时	<input type="checkbox"/> 10小时以上
每周工作几天	<input type="checkbox"/> 2天	<input type="checkbox"/> 3天	<input type="checkbox"/> 4天	<input type="checkbox"/> 5天	<input type="checkbox"/> 6天	<input type="checkbox"/> 7天
莱索托员工的专业技术水平	<input type="checkbox"/> 很低	<input type="checkbox"/> 低	<input type="checkbox"/> 一般	<input type="checkbox"/> 高	<input type="checkbox"/> 很高	<input type="checkbox"/> 非常高
莱索托员工的工作态度	<input type="checkbox"/> 不认真	<input type="checkbox"/> 有点认真	<input type="checkbox"/> 一般	<input type="checkbox"/> 认真	<input type="checkbox"/> 很认真	<input type="checkbox"/> 非常认真
平均的月收入(M)	<input type="checkbox"/> 1000-1500	<input type="checkbox"/> 1500-2000	<input type="checkbox"/> 2000-2500	<input type="checkbox"/> 2500-3000	<input type="checkbox"/> 3000-4500	<input type="checkbox"/> 4500以上
每月的生活费	<input type="checkbox"/> 0-500	<input type="checkbox"/> 500-1000	<input type="checkbox"/> 1000-1500	<input type="checkbox"/> 1500-2000	<input type="checkbox"/> 2000-2500	<input type="checkbox"/> 2500以上
这边的月收入比你在 中国时拿到的收入	<input type="checkbox"/> 低	<input type="checkbox"/> 一样	<input type="checkbox"/> 高	<input type="checkbox"/> 高一倍	<input type="checkbox"/> 高两倍	

Personal Information

Name: Sarah Hanisch
 Address: Molkereistr.1, Top 130/1, 1020 Vienna, Austria
 Phone: +43 120 891 003 77
 Mobile: +43 681 101 267 27 or +49 176 217 236 58
 E-Mail: sarah_hanisch@t-online.de

Educational Background

Postgraduate Studies

03/2012- 07/2012	Master studies in "Global Studies – A European Perspective"	Vienna, Austria
07/2011- 11/2011	Exchange semester at Stellenbosch University (integral part of the master studies program).	Stellenbosch, South Africa
10/2010- 10/2012	Master studies in "Global Studies – A European Perspective". Mobility track: Wroclaw, Stellenbosch and Vienna.	Wroclaw, Poland

Undergraduate Studies

09/2008- 01/2009	Studying Chinese (integral part of bachelor studies program). Sichuan University	Chengdu, China
10/2006- 03/2010	Bachelor studies in "Asian Studies and Management – Chinese". University of Applied Sciences (HTWG) <u>Degree:</u> Bachelor of Arts.	Konstanz, Germany
08/2005- 07/2006	Studying Chinese. University of Science and Technology (QUST)	Qingdao, China
09/1996- 07/2005	High School: Heinrich-Heine-Gymnasium <u>Degree:</u> Allgemeine Hochschulreife (similar to A-levels).	Ostfildern, Germany

Working Experience

02/2009- 08/2009	Internship at the "Sino-German Corporate Social Responsibility Project" of German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) in China.	Beijing, China
03/2008- 07/2008	Student Assistant to Prof. Rainer Bakker, HTWG Konstanz. Planning and coordination of a seminar in France.	Konstanz, Germany
09/2007- 07/2010	Several times Student Assistant at Festo AG & Co. KG: marketing research on mechanical components (09/2007); organizing and conducting intercultural training for staff of the international department (03-08/2008); developing a draft for a user manual and training material for a new SAP application (07/2010).	Esslingen, Germany
03/2007- 07/2008	Student Assistant to Prof. Peter Franklin, HTWG Konstanz. Doing research and administration.	Konstanz, Germany
01/2006- 02/2006	Internship at the Quality Management Department of Philips Electronics Co., Ltd.	Beijing, China
09/2005- 07/2006	Teaching German to Chinese students and preparing them for the German test (DAF) at the Qingdao University of Science and Technology (QUST).	Qingdao, China

Scholarships

- 10/2010-09/2012 Awarded a full Erasmus Mundus Scholarship from the Global Studies Consortium.
- 09/2008-07/2009 Awarded a full scholarship for a “Combined theoretical and practical semester in China” from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD).
- 03/2006 Elected Excellent Student of Qingdao University of Science and Technology in China.

Language Skills

German:	Mother tongue	English:	Excellent verbal & written command	Chinese:	Excellent verbal, advanced written command
Spanish/	Basic				
French:	command				

Extracurricular Activities

- 07/2011 Conference paper “*Towards a better understanding on how to align Corporate Social Responsibility with Chinese companies’ engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)*”, presented at China ICCSR Conference of University of Nottingham in Ningbo (China).
- 01/2010 Organizing a workshop for high school students from Gaienhofen (Germany) on “China and Democracy”.

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