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„Is there such a thing as a ‘new’ British Empire?
The case of the Falkland Islands in the context of neoliberal imperialism“

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Is there such a thing as a ‘new’ British Empire? The case of the Falkland Islands in the context of neoliberal imperialism

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ABSTRACT

This study focuses on the changes of the UK’s socio-economic system in the late 1970s and early 1980s. By that time, Britain had lost most of its colonies, as well as its previously dominant imperial position. The country was faced with ongoing economic crisis, the resolution of which required immediate and effective measures. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher began neoliberal reforms after her election in 1979 and most historians and researchers focus primarily on British neoliberalism in the 1970s-80s, leading to a neglect of the concept of imperialism. In fact in this period Britain was no longer labelled as an Empire, but neither had it another name. In this paper, it is assumed that no empire relinquished its domination voluntarily and no system undergoes fundamental change in a short timeframe. It is proposed that Britain was an empire in a “new” form – the neoliberal empire. To address this issue, the case of the Falkland Islands was chosen and examined using the methodological framework of critical discourse analysis. Conceptualizing the very idea of neoliberal imperialism, features, which are important for discourse manifestation, were found and further used as a basis for analysis of discourse.

Detailed analyses of the historic background to the case, together with the analysis of primary materials – public speeches given by Thatcher in the House of Commons, interviews with Thatcher, recently declassified telegrams and reports of the Falkland Islands’ war period – provide an insight into the processes Britain experienced in that time. Though the scope of this study is limited, the attempt to present a fresh perspective on the place Britain occupied can be seen as a contribution to further research, especially that concerned with discourse manifestation.

ABSTRACT

Die vorliegende Forschung konzentriert sich auf die Veränderungen im sozial-wirtschaftlichen System des Vereinigten Königreichs in den späten 1970er und den frühen 1980er Jahren. Zu jener Zeit hatte das Vereinigte Königreich die meisten seiner Kolonien und seine frühere imperiale Machtposition verloren. Das Land befand sich in einer anhaltenden Finanzkrise, deren Beseitigung schnelle und effektive Maßnahmen erforderte. Die neugewählte Premierministerin Margaret Thatcher antwortete mit neoliberalen Reformen. Diese Tatsache erklärt, warum die meisten Historiker und Forscher sich vor allem mit dem britischen Neoliberalismus in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren befassen und dem Imperialismus nicht ausreichend Beachtung schenken. Tatsächlich wurde Großbritannien zu jener Zeit nicht mehr als ein Imperium bezeichnet, aber es hatte auch keine andere Etikettierung. In dieser Masterarbeit wird davon ausgegangen, dass kein Imperium seine dominante Position freiwillig aufgibt und dass kein System in kurzer Zeit fundamental verändert werden kann. Es wird vorgeschlagen, dass Großbritannien als ein Imperium in „neuer“ Form – ein neoliberales Imperium – gesehen werden kann. Um diese Hypothese zu diskutieren, wurde der Streit um die Falklandinseln gewählt und unter Anwendung der kritischen Diskursanalyse studiert. Aufbauend auf der Konzeptualisierung der Idee des neoliberalen Imperialismus wurden jene Charakteristika festgestellt, die für dessen diskursive Manifestation wichtig sind, und als Basis für die Diskursanalyse verwendet.

Die Detailanalyse des historischen Hintergrundes des Streites um die Falklandinseln und die Analyse von Quellenmaterialien – Reden Margaret Thatchers im britischen Unterhaus, Interviews, die sie gab, erst vor Kurzem freigegebene Telegramme und Berichte über den Krieg auf den Falklandinseln – geben einen Einblick in die Prozesse, die in jener Zeit in Großbritannien vor sich gingen. Trotz mancher Beschränkungen der vorliegenden Studie kann der Versuch, eine alternative Sicht auf den von Großbritannien eingenommene Position zu entwerfen, als Beitrag zu deren Erforschung, vor allem im Hinblick auf diskursive Phänomene, gesehen werden.

Introduction

The British Empire that once controlled around a quarter of the world territory is known as the largest empire that ever existed.¹ It grew up through centuries and was at the very peak of its imperial supremacy in the first decade of the 20th century², with an enormous number of colonies under British rule. However, after the Second World War (WWII), the world system changed for a number of reasons – in particular, the rise of power of the USA and the USSR, the evolution of the anti-colonial movement, and the economic problems many European countries faced after WWII. These factors shook the position of Britain as a powerful hegemon on the world map moving it into the background of the world system and forcing it to adapt to the new internationally accepted environment.

Nevertheless, things never change on short notice. Otherwise, it might take a lot of time for any country experiencing similar changes to find a new place and to adjust to a new socio-economic system. The transition from one form of a socio-economic system to another goes through the process of phasing out the elements of the old system and the introduction of the elements that will replace them.³ However, some of the elements of the old system can be incorporated into the new one either temporarily or permanently, the old system elements being more recognizable at that stage of the systemic change. This process thus is very interesting to observe since it can give us an idea of the way former hegemons adapt to the new environment.

In this research, it is assumed that no empire relinquishes its dominance voluntarily and gives up its old imperial behavior easily. As Cox, Dunne and Booth argue:

¹ Niall Fergusson, *Empire* (London: Penguin books, 2004), p.15

² In the 1920th.

³ We can predict the question one might ask: “Is this change always gradual?” In our opinion, the answer is “no”. The reason for that lies in contradictions that a particular system accumulates with time. If these contradictions are not solved in a timely manner, the system undergoes radical changes, such as revolutions, riots and revolts. But if these contradictions meet a timely and adequate response, then changes are less painful for the society, and its development is not associated with a significant loss.

“The fact that France [we can say Britain] did not achieve its hegemonic ambitions does not mean it had abandoned them”.⁴ Often, to preserve the elements of the old imperial system, empires consciously substitute old notions with new ones.

The starting point of this research is the point of time appearing in most of the studies of Britain – namely, the border between the two periods of British history: the peak domination period of the British Empire (beginning of the 20th century) and the fall of the British Empire (which most historians and researchers link to the independence of Hong-Kong⁵). This period in between is associated with the fading of the Empire, the loss of colonies and, though not official, resignation. Thus this period correlates with the abovementioned process of transition from one socio-economic system to another. It is no longer labelled as an Empire, but neither has it another name. The aim of this study is to fill in this gap and propose a concept which could be applied to the socio-economic formation of Britain during this transitional period; further, the analysis will be conducted in order to test whether the concept fits the reality.

It is proposed in this research that Britain was still an Empire, but in its ‘new’ form. It is possible to distinguish between what the British Empire is in the common understanding with what the British Empire represented at a very specific moment, and thereby to use the notion of the “New British Empire”⁶ that has been already introduced in the title of this study.

The case of the Falkland Islands was chosen as a case study for several reasons: the Falklands war happened exactly in this transitional period of British 20th century history, in between the two key events, which are the Second World War and the independ-

⁴ Michael Cox, Time Dunne, Ken Booth, Empires, system and states: great transformations in international politics, *Review of International Studies* 27:1-15 (2001), p.10

⁵ Hong-Kong gained independence in 1997. For the British Empire it was an event that many call “the end of Empire”. Please see, for instance, the article: The end of Empire will test our good faith, *The Independent* (3 January 1997), available under [<http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/leading-article-the-end-of-empire-will-test-our-good-faith-1281418.html>]

⁶ The notion of the «new imperialism» is usually used to mark imperialism of the 19th and the early 20th century. This notion has nothing to do with our understanding. In this research, the new imperialism correlates with concept of the neoliberal imperialism.

ence of Hong-Kong; the conflict originated from the old imperial dispute and reached its new momentum at the beginning of the second half of the 20th century; the escalation of the dispute led to the war in 1982, the time of the peak of the anti-colonial movement, and this war is often called the last imperial war, where the fact of the war and its consequences were directly related to the total abandonment of imperial patterns.

These distinctive features make the case of the Falkland Islands important for answering the given research question, and the case itself offers the opportunity to provide some alternative perspectives on the processes Britain was experiencing at that time.

Research problem, questions and structure.

The main research area of this master thesis is the position of Britain in the transitional period after the Second World War. The time frame is mainly the period 1979 – 1982. The historical background information will cover a wider period of time and the analysis of the case of Falkland Islands will be limited only to 1982.

The main research question this master thesis will address is the following: “Did the behavior of Britain in the case of the Falkland Islands’ war in 1982 characterize it as a neoliberal Empire?”

To answer this question it is necessary to provide some definitions and address other relevant issues, such as:

- What is neoliberal imperialism?
- How is neoliberal imperialism related to Britain and its politics?
- What is the essence of the Falkland Islands case and can we apply the concept of neoliberal imperialism to it?
- Was neoliberal imperialism anyhow represented in the discourse of the Falklands Islands case? If yes, how?

In regard to the last question, it is important to mention that the notion of discourse is understood, first of all, in a wider sense, being a communicative event, writing, conversation, and a set of texts in general, which may or may not cover a topic of interest. At the same time, a discourse can be understood as a micro-topic in a text. This study focuses mostly on discourse in a wider sense, whereas a narrower understanding is important for one specific part of the analysis.

The thesis has the following structure:

Firstly, theoretical concepts will be outlined which are central in this research – namely, imperialism and neoliberalism, and the very idea of neoliberal imperialism will be conceptualized. This will constitute the basis of the research.

Secondly, the methodology to be used will be briefly outlined and the reasons for choosing this particular method for the analysis of the Falkland Islands' case will be explained.

Thirdly, the practical part of the research will be conducted including the historical background of the Falkland Islands case and the discourse analyses of the materials chosen, with the conclusions to follow.

Chapter I. Theoretical framework

As has been mentioned, the main research question given above includes two important concepts: the concept of the neoliberal imperialism and the case of the Falkland Islands.

To begin with, the basis of the research, that is, the concept of neoliberal imperialism, will be investigated. This concept is not as researched and established as, for instance, the theories of neoliberalism or imperialism taken individually, nor has it many followers – rather, the opposite is true. However, it can help to understand the place Britain occupied after the Second World War. The rationale for using this theory can be found in the assumptions outlined in the introduction: Britain was experiencing a transforming socio-political system, the imperial component was slowly diminishing; at the same time, the process of neoliberalisation was starting in the late 1970s and early 1980s; thus, from imperialism and through the absorption of neoliberal ideas, Britain, it can be argued, came to neoliberal imperialism.

The concept of neoliberal imperialism consists of two components: neoliberalism and imperialism. Before merging them into neoliberal imperialism they will be discussed separately and their most important features will be outlined.

1. 1. Imperialism

The term ‘imperialism’ does not have one common definition because it is always linked to a particular period of time and particular imperial structure. The only thing that

seems a “constant” is the very nature of the word “empire”, the latter descending from the Latin “imperium”, which means power, authority.⁷

The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines imperialism as “the policy, practice, or advocacy of extending the power and dominion of a nation especially by direct territorial acquisitions or by gaining indirect control over the political or economic life of other areas; broadly: the extension or imposition of power, authority, or influence.”⁸ From this definition, the core idea of imperialism can be derived: the struggle for supremacy, its goal and result being the gain of power. In most cases empires of the 18th and 19th centuries realized the incentive of gaining power and achieving political and economic domination through the seizure of territories in wars.

The concept of imperialism in the 20th century is often associated with Lenin’s understanding. In his book *Imperialism*, Lenin calls imperialism the highest stage of capitalism⁹, and indicates the predominance of the economic component in imperialism. His definition is as follows: “Imperialism is capitalism at that stage of development at which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital is established; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun, in which the division of all territories of the globe among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed.”¹⁰ Imperialism in Lenin’s understanding aims at gaining economic power by means of three important tools: international monopolies, finance capital and division of territories.¹¹ The political component per se, outlined in the first definition, is not represented in Lenin’s, which makes it one-

⁷ Alejandro Colas, History of Empires and Conflicts, *Global Security and International Political Economy* 1, EOLOSS online Encyclopaedia (UNESCO), available under [<http://www.eolss.net/Sample-Chapters/C04/E1-68-06-00.pdf>]

⁸ This definition is from The Merriam Webster dictionary Online, available under [<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/imperialism>]

⁹ Vladimir Lenin, *Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1963), p.667-766, available under [<http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/>]

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Lenin himself distinguishes 5 features, but, in our opinion, these three are the bases in his definition.

sided. Nevertheless, Lenin, while arguing about the incorrectness of Kautsky's¹² definition of imperialism, marks one of the most important aspects – namely, that “politically, imperialism is, in general, a striving towards violence and reaction”.¹³

Other researchers further developed Lenin's emphasis on the economic, capitalist component of imperialism. For instance, a Marxist historian, Ellen Meiksins Wood, offers the concept of capitalist imperialism, its distinguishing feature being the unique capacity of capital to impose its hegemony without expanding its territorial political power. Capitalism, argues Wood, has created an economic form of domination that is autonomous and does not need to depend on the reach of geopolitical and military force which is the case in all other forms of empire.¹⁴ This assumption unites Wood's ideas with Lenin's. Further, Wood develops the idea of global capital that is served not by a global state but by a global system of multiple territorial states; and capitalist imperialism is not about an expanding political structure to match the scope of capital accumulation but rather about the complex relation between the economic reach of capital and the territorial states which organize and enforce its global hegemony.¹⁵ This understanding of imperialism can be easily used in relation to contemporary imperialism, that of the 21st century, since it indicates the issue of globalization and the very simple idea that “money is power”. However, to explain the British imperialism of the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the period of time this study focuses on, David Harvey's definition will be used.

Harvey suggests that imperialism is a contradictory fusion of “the politics of state and empire” and “the molecular process of capital accumulation in space and

¹² To justify his definition, Lenin heavily criticizes the definition of Marxist theoretician Karl Kautsky. To read more please see Lenin, Chapter VII.

¹³ Lenin, *Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism*, Chapter VII.

¹⁴ Ellen Meiksins Wood, *Logics of Power: A conversation with David Harvey*, *Historical materialism* 14:4 (2006), p.13

¹⁵ Ibid.

time”.¹⁶ Seemingly complex at first glance, this definition was meant to highlight two sides of imperialism: the political and the economic. The political component is the gain of power through “command of a territory” and ability to “mobilize resources” in order to achieve particular goals. The economic component is the gain of power through “command over and use of capital”.¹⁷ Ellen Wood in *Conversation with David Harvey* calls these two components: “a logic of territory” and “a logic of capital”.¹⁸ As Harvey underlined himself: “by territorial logic I mean the political, diplomatic and military strategies”, and “the capitalist logic focused on the ways in which economic power flows across and through space”.¹⁹ This definition is more balanced and especially applicable when a military action takes place, since no military action starts as a result of exclusively economic or political reasons, but as a result of a combination of the two.

In the case of the Falkland Islands’ dispute that led to the war in 1982, the logic of capital was less visible than the logic of territory, but it was obviously used as a starting point and reason for fighting for the islands, thus exercising the logic of territory.

To sum up, the understanding of imperialism shifts with time and depends on the approach and the case the researcher chooses. Accordingly, all of the above-mentioned definitions can be applied on a case to case basis. David Harvey’s definition takes into consideration both economics and politics and helps to understand and to explain the “new” form of imperialism in the period of transition and crisis – the period and conditions Britain faced in the 1970s-1980s (also being the key period for the case of the Falkland Islands).

¹⁶ David Harvey, *The New Imperialism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.26

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Wood, *A conversation with David Harvey*, pp.9 -33

¹⁹ David Harvey, *Spaces of Global Capitalism, towards a theory of uneven geographical development* (London: Verso, 2006), p.107. It is worth noting that Harvey firstly developed the idea of two logics of power in respect to capitalism, and only then this idea was adjusted to imperialism.

1. 2. Neoliberalism

The premise for reviewing the concept of neoliberalism in relation to Britain is the time-frame (late 1970s – early 1980s) of this paper. It is precisely since the 1970s that neoliberal ideas dominate political discourse.²⁰

The concept of neoliberalism has something in common with classical Adam Smithian liberalism, as it shares some historical roots and some basic vocabulary such as “freedom” and “liberty”²¹. Sometimes neoliberalism is even called economic liberalism²², and the definitions of liberty and freedom are linked to the economic sphere. On the one hand, it is true – indeed, neoliberalism focuses on the economy and aims at freedom in the economic sphere. On the other hand, neoliberalism is not just about the economy and the freedom in the economic sphere is quite limited because, as opposed to the central thesis of liberalism, a state ‘has not voluntarily given up its ability to control the economy for the good of society as whole’²³.

It is important to understand when and why neoliberalism gained popularity. The 1970s were characterized by a major economic recession of many countries, Britain being among them. Prior to that, the politico-economic discourse was dominated by the Keynesian idea of a welfare state. The objectives of the welfare state included the support of living standards, the reduction of inequality, the avoidance of the costs explosion and determination of behavior that may cause ‘moral hazard and adverse selection’.²⁴ Moreover, the welfare state was supposed to minimize administrative costs and the abuse

²⁰ Lori Hartmann-Mahmud, Neoliberalism: A Useful Tool for Teaching Critical Topics in Political Science, *Political Science & Politics* 42:4 (2009), p.745

²¹ Dag Einar Thorsen, Amund Lie. *What is Neoliberalism?* University of Oslo. Department of Political Science, (2007), p. 2

²² David Kotz, Globalization and Neoliberalism, *Rethinking Marxism* 12:2 (2002), p. 64

²³ Thorsen, Lie, *What is Neoliberalism?* p. 10

²⁴ Maria Cristina Marcuzzo, *Whose Welfare State? Beveridge versus Keynes*, p.191 in Roger Backhouse, *Welfare Economics and the Welfare State in Britain, 1880-1945* (Cambridge University Press, 2010)

of power.²⁵ However, it has been pointed out that the policy of the Keynesian welfare state in Britain just led to stagnation.²⁶ As such, the idea of Keynes was rejected, the concept of neoliberalism came to substitute it, and Britain, with a newly elected (in 1979) Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, was one of the first to implement neoliberalism.

In some ways, neoliberalism is a return because, according to Dumenil and Levy, neoliberalism is about restoration of the power and income of capitalist classes, the idea that has been neglected during the period of Keynesianism after the Second World War.²⁷

To understand the notion of neoliberalism, the definition of David Harvey will be used - the one he proposed in his recent work *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* :

“Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. The state has to guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of money. It must also set up those military, defence, police, and legal structures and functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture. State interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum because, according to the theory, the state cannot possibly possess enough information to second-guess market

²⁵ Ibid. To read more on comparison of the welfare state and neoliberalism, please see Ingo Schmidt, There were alternatives: Lessons from efforts to advance beyond Keynesian and neoliberal economic policies in the 1970s, *The Journal of Labour and Society* 14 (2011), pp. 473-498

²⁶ For more about economic crisis of the 1970s in Britain please read, The economic situation: Annual review: chapter I. The British economy in 1970, *National Institute Economic Review* 55:4 (1971), pp.4-21

²⁷ Gerard Dumenil, Dominique Levy, 'Imperialism in the Neoliberal Era: Argentina's Reprieve and Crisis', *Review of Radical Political economics* 38:3 (2006), p.388

signals (prices) and because powerful interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own benefit.”²⁸

Harvey’s definition highlights the two important features of neoliberalism: the existence of a free market, a free individual and free trade, and the existence of a state that has to guarantee and ensure these freedoms. A state has a right to intervene in the economy to keep neoliberal reforms alive, and even despite the remark “the state intervention must be kept at minimum” it becomes obvious that a state in such politico-economic system might understand the notion of “minimum” in a preferable way.

Although Harvey’s definition is in line with those of most neoliberalism theoreticians in terms of focusing, first and foremost, on market forces and economic features and trying to represent neoliberalism as an apolitical phenomenon, Harvey still maintains the importance of the state - thus, a political constituent makes its way to the surface.

By and large, neoliberalism should not be seen as an economic phenomenon only. On the contrary it should be recognized as a theory and practice, which influences politics as well as economics.

1. 3. Neoliberal imperialism

Having, on the one hand, imperialism, with its struggle for supremacy and the gain of power through economy and politics, which, as Lenin stated, leads to violence and action; and, on the other hand, neoliberalism, where economic incentives obviously prevail over political ones and where the role of a state is (ideally!) limited to the creation of an institutional framework favorable for achieving economic freedoms, the way these two concepts fold into one another or merge will be now outlined.

²⁸ David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.2

A theory is generally supposed to possess some universality in the sense that it should represent a formula applicable to a variety of practices. However, the concept or phenomenon of neoliberal imperialism is very much linked to particular examples. That could be due to the fact that this concept is not very well developed and represents a very peculiar mixture of two overdeveloped concepts. Nevertheless, it is informative to outline some general characteristics.

Jan Nederveen Pieterse applies the concept of a neoliberal empire to the United States. For him, neoliberal imperialism primarily tries to reconcile business as a purely economic project with business that earns money through war (politics) or – as he puts it – to “merge the America whose business is business with the America whose business is war, in a time when business is not doing well”²⁹. Moreover, Pieterse says that neoliberal imperialism involves vast military spending.³⁰ Thus, a neoliberal empire lives a quiet life when the economy is doing well, and exercises power in a most brutal way such as a war when there is a reason. The reason can be economic, then the war is only a tool to stabilize the economy; and the reason can be political, but the state will anyway find an economic or any other explanation for the action it takes.

David Harvey, while writing about neoliberal imperialism and describing the case of Iraq in US policy, expresses a similar idea with the example: “The coup de grace was to be the takeover of Middle-East oil, not so much in the interest of the oil industry, but as an instrument of economic and geopolitical power”.³¹ Again, the control of the economy is needed to achieve political hegemony (Pieterse’s argument “business is war”), where economic discourse is just a cover for making politics.

Jan Pieterse, apart from the definition of neoliberal imperialism, distinguishes

²⁹ Jan Nederveen Pieterse, *Neoliberal Empire, Theory, Culture & Society* 21:3 (SAGE, London, 2004), p.123

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ David Harvey, *The New imperialism* (Oxford: oxford university press, 2003), p.19; Idem. Robert Brenner, What Is, and What Is Not, Imperialism? *Historical materialism* 14:4 (2006), p.103

nine characteristics of a neoliberal empire, the most important being the following: 1) state intervention in favour of corporations; 2) a free market ideology concealing corporate redistribution; 3) a conservative ideology of authoritarian moralism; 4) threat inflation, massive defence contracts, militarism; 5) defunding social government.³² Although he distinguishes these characteristics in relation to the U.S., they also appear quite universal for the concept of neoliberal imperialism as such.

A major finding was the fact that the mixed concept of neoliberal imperialism was not applied to Britain by researchers, but to the US. In relation to Britain, either imperialism or neoliberalism was used. Considering that researchers exemplified US cases of the 1990s – early 2000s, not surprisingly Britain was out of their interest, since Britain was then no longer an Empire. Nevertheless, in the period of the late 1970s- early 1980s, Britain can be recognized as a neoliberal empire, and therefore the above-mentioned characteristics can be applied to Britain as well.

Coming back to Pieterse's characteristics, the last three of them form the basis of the system of a neoliberal empire, and can be seen both as prerequisites for neoliberal imperialism and as consequences of the transformation of the socio-economic system into neoliberal imperialism. The reduced "social" directionality, inflation and conservative ideology can be readily applied to Britain of 1979 – 1982 when neoliberal ideas were becoming more and more powerful. These characteristics 'made' the image of Britain in this period, they were the essential part of the cause-effect basis of neoliberal imperialism in Britain.

The first two, besides being very important for an understanding of neoliberal imperialism, reflect a crucial behavioristic pattern: a neoliberal empire uses covers or 'false fronts' to justify itself. These covers are needed to hide the obvious contradictions.

³² Pieterse, *Neoliberal Empire*, p.123

For instance, the statement “free market ideology conceals corporate redistribution” has the false idea that can be expressed through a conditional sentence: if the market ideology is free how it can conceal redistribution? Precisely such antonymous constructions have to be covered.

The leitmotif of a cover or ‘false front’ is one of the main (if not the main) characteristics of neoliberal imperialism. In almost every policy, neoliberal empire uses this false reasoning to explain its actions. Pieterse notes that the neoliberal empire lacks transparency³³, has deception and operates “in the shadows and behind closed doors”.³⁴ Harvey, for instance, talks about the concentration of wealth by means of force and fraud.³⁵ Such notions as deception and fraud influence the creation of a certain image of the neoliberal empire.

The essence of these covers is the fact that the different media sources, as well as mainstream literature, while arguing about interventionist actions of a neoliberal empire, present them as a “force for good”, fight for democracy, human rights, a free market and peace, thus legitimising the use of force.³⁶ Rhetoric, words and slogans, as per Bourdieu, impose visions and division to actualize and transform symbolic power³⁷ into legitimated official politics. To justify the action, especially military action, the neoliberal empire uses contradistinctive concepts, like ‘democracy’ against ‘dictatorship’, or simple ‘evil’ against ‘good.’³⁸ When military action is not the case, a neoliberal empire uses the same notions to justify the prevailing power of specific interest groups.

³³ Pieterse, *Neoliberal Empire*, p.126

³⁴ Ibid, p.135 from Robert Kaplan, Supremacy by Stealth: Ten Rules for Managing the World, *The Atlantic Monthly* (2003), p.70

³⁵ Ellein Meiksins Wood, Logics of Power: A conversation with Davis Harvey, p.22

³⁶ Niels Hahn, Neoliberal Imperialism and Pan-African resistance, *Journal of World-Systems research* 8:2 (2008), p.160

³⁷ Ibid, p.155; According to Bourdieu, symbolic power is that invisible power which can be exercised only with the complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even that they themselves exercise it.

³⁸ Neils Hahn, p.160

Hence, the neoliberal empire can hide the real motives through the use of appropriate diplomatic constructions. Even in case some other actors of the political arena understand the motivation, it is quite a challenge for them to prove their position. Moreover, apart from diplomacy and the use of language, an empire has always strongly relied on allies and 'friends', whom the neoliberal empire can hide as well.

In general, empire remains, but the form is changed. A neoliberal empire places an emphasis on the implementation of neoliberal policies, which concern economics internally first of all -as most people mistakenly think being the only focus of the neoliberal empire - while the imperialist element is overshadowed (but does not disappear!) At the same time the neoliberal component has softened the expressivity of the imperial language, which has opened new possibilities for those who have power. This specificity of the use of a language prompted the selection of discourse analysis, which will be discussed in the following chapters.

Choosing the case of the Falkland Islands in relation to the concept of neoliberal imperialism, this study will examine whether the transitional period of British history affected the dispute, which goes back to the 16th century. The Falkland Islands war of 1982 more than anything falls under the period we correlate with the establishment of the neoliberal empire in Britain. Moreover, it is primarily in crisis situations that particular behavioristic patterns are manifested. As we have found out, these behavioristic patterns could be manifested through the actions the state takes and through the language the state uses in relation to these actions. We will try to find whether the concept of neoliberal imperialism was represented in the discourse and in the context of the Falkland Islands case and, if so, in which way; this will provide an answer to the main question of our research.

Chapter II. Methodology

The methodology used for this research was chosen to fulfil several criteria: 1) the complexity of the theoretical framework requires a complex methodological tool in order to answer the main question of the research; 2) the method should be applicable to the social sciences; 3) the method should help to analyse the political sphere in the period of transition; 4) the method should be applicable and adaptable to the specific case; 5) the method should help to reveal latent structures (since the framework of neoliberal imperialism consists of implicit elements).

Building on these requirements discourse analysis will be used as a method for this research. This method will allow an analysis of discourses relevant for the topic of this study and will help to answer the main research question, ‘Did the case of the Falkland Islands in the 1980s represent Britain as a neoliberal Empire?’ The discourse analysis will include analysis of Margaret Thatcher’s speeches and documents such as telegrams and reports, which remained secret for a long time and have been recently made available to the public.

From many existing perspectives of discourse analysis, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) has been chosen. This is not only problem-oriented, but also an interdisciplinary approach³⁹, which, unlike discourse analysis, works with the context as well as linguistics.⁴⁰ It attempts to ask further questions in order to reveal and critique interconnections between cause and effect of different things.⁴¹ Moreover, as Ruth Wodak states, CDA is “fundamentally concerned with analyzing opaque as well as transparent structur-

³⁹ Ruth Wodak, Michael Meyer, *Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis*, 2nd edition (SAGE, 2009), p. 2

⁴⁰ Marianne Jørgensen, Louise Phillips, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method* (SAGE publications, 2002), p. 62

⁴¹ Norman Fairclough, Critical and descriptive goals in discourse analysis, *Journal of Pragmatics* 9 (1985), p. 747

al relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language”⁴². This serves the aim of the research.

For this question, the concepts of power, domination, ideology, and history⁴³ are crucial. These terms are deeply embedded in the nature of the concept chosen - that is, neoliberal imperialism. CDA, when working with the abovementioned concepts, points out several elements, which are important for further analysis: “language serves to legitimize relations of organized power”⁴⁴, “every discourse is historically produced and interpreted and situated in time and space”, “dominance structures are legitimated by ideologies of powerful groups”, finally, “a complex approach makes it possible to analyse pressure from above and possibilities of resistance to unequal power relations”⁴⁵. In the given case, the complex analysis of the discourses specific to the definite time and space, with special attention given to the question of power, is especially important as it can help to understand if Britain in 1979-1982 represented an empire of a special type.

In order to use CDA as a method for our research, it is necessary to pick one particular approach, which will be that of Ruth Wodak, the Discourse-Historical Approach. This approach is appropriate for this study first of all because it places great emphasis on the analysis of context, through which the discourse can be understood and without which it is not possible to address the main question of this research. Secondly, this approach is good for the analysis of political topics and it attempts to “integrate a large quantity of available knowledge about the historical sources and the background of the social and political fields”⁴⁶. Hence, this study will analyse the chosen discourses

⁴² Ruth Wodak, What CDA is about - a summary of its history, important concepts and its development in Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse analysis* (SAGE publications, London, 2001), p. 2

⁴³ Ibid., pp. 9-11

⁴⁴ *Qualitative Research Practise: Concise paperback edition*, edited by Clieve Seale, Giampietro Gobo, Jaber F. Gubruim, David Silverman (SAGE publications, London, 2007), p.187

⁴⁵ Wodak, What CDA is about - a summary of its history, important concepts and its development, p.3

⁴⁶ Ruth Wodak, The discourse-historical approach in Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse analysis* (SAGE publications, London, 2001), p. 2

mentioned above as well as providing an outline and analysis of the historical background of the Falkland Islands case.

2. 1. The discourse-historical approach of Ruth Wodak.

For Ruth Wodak the starting point of research in CDA is the assertion that research “must be multitheoretical and multimethodological, critical and self-reflective”.⁴⁷ To use CDA for a study in the political sphere, one should not only use the ‘meta-data’, but also compare it to the historical facts in order to detect the disfiguring of facts and realities.⁴⁸

The discourse-historical approach (DHA), along with other approaches to CDA, perceives both written and spoken language as a form of social practice, and discourse is a “particular domain of social practice”.⁴⁹ Moreover, for Wodak, discourse is a “complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts, which manifest themselves within and across the social fields of action as thematically interrelated semiotic, oral or written tokens, very often as texts, that belong to specific semiotic types, that is genres.”⁵⁰ In a simplified way a discourse is the macro-topic.⁵¹ However, a discourse can be perceived as a specific micro-topic, which is emphasized in a text.

Between discourses and different types of settings (social, situational, institutional), there is interconnection and mutual influence.⁵² Here, such an assumption will help to see whether the historical facts and other contextual information of the Falkland Islands

⁴⁷ Ruth Wodak, *The discourse historical approach* (2001), p.64

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, p.70

⁴⁹ Norman Fairclough, *Critical discourse analysis: the critical study of language* (Longman Publishing, New York, 1995), p.14, *idem*. Wodak and Meyer (2001) p. 66

⁵⁰ Ruth Wodak, *The Discourse-historical approach* in Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse analysis* (SAGE publications, London, 2001), p.66

⁵¹ *Ibid*.

⁵² *Ibid*.

case are reflected in the chosen discourses and texts, and how discourses influenced processes and actions in case of the Falklands.

Among other characteristics of DHA we need to stress that the theory and the methodology within DHA are eclectic.⁵³ Moreover, the approach is abductive (derives a reason for an observed event⁵⁴) and requires constant movement between theory and empirical data.⁵⁵ That is why the CDA shall make a choice at each point of the research, and theoretically explain why certain interpretations of events are more valid than others.⁵⁶

Therefore, the analysis based on DHA includes four steps:

- 1) establishment of specific contents or topics of a specific discourse;
- 2) investigation of discursive strategies;
- 3) examination of linguistic means (as types);
- 4) examination of specific, context-related linguistic realizations (as tokens).⁵⁷

Under discursive strategies DHA implies a “more or less accurate and intentional plan of practices which aims to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic aim.”⁵⁸ DHA uses 5 discursive strategies, and the following table (table 1) summarizes main objectives and devices for each strategy:

Strategy	Objectives	Devices
Referential/nomination	Construction of in-groups and out-groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Membership categorization • Biological, naturalizing and depersonalizing metaphors and metonymies • Synecdoche (pars pro toto,

⁵³ Ibid. p.69

⁵⁴ ‘Abductive reasoning typically begins with an incomplete set of observations and proceeds to the likeliest possible explanation for the set. Abductive reasoning yields the kind of daily decision-making that does its best with the information at hand, which often is incomplete.’ To read more see, Paul Thagard and Cameron Shelley, *Abductive reasoning: Logic, visual thinking, and coherence*, (Waterloo, Ontario: Philosophy Department, University of Waterloo, 1997), available under [<http://cogsci.uwaterloo.ca/Articles/Pages/%7FABductive.html>]

⁵⁵ Wodak and Meyer (2001), p.70

⁵⁶ Ruth Wodak, and Rudolf de Cillia, *Politics and Language: Overview* in Keith Brown, (Editor-in-Chief) *Encyclopedia of Language & Linguistics 9*, 2nd edition (Oxford, Elsevier 2006), p.65

⁵⁷ Reisigl Martin, and Wodak Ruth, *Discourse and Racism: European Perspectives*, *Annual Review of Anthropology* 28 (1999), p. 188

⁵⁸ Wodak and Meyer (2001), p.73

		totum pro pars)
Predication	Labeling social actors more or less positively or negatively, deprecatorily or appreciatively	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits • Implicit or explicit predication
Argumentation	Justification of positive or negative attributes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Topoi used to justify political inclusion, discrimination or preferential treatment
Perspectivation, framing, or discourse representation	Expressing involvement. Positioning speaker's point of views	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reporting, description, narration or quotation of (discriminatory) events and utterances
Intensification, mitigation	Modifying the epistemic status of a proposition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of (discriminatory) utterances

Table 1.⁵⁹

Unfortunately, Wodak does not state whether these 5 strategies can be applied to all kinds of discourse, and thus there is no prescription of how to do it. However, in respect to our research topic, we will simply apply these strategies to the chosen texts as they are, or simply reject the use of some. This study will mainly focus on argumentation strategy.

Another important point, to which, in Wodak's analysis, significant importance is allocated, is the use of topoi, which are part of argumentation strategy. As Wodak writes, topoi are content-related warrants or 'conclusion rules' which connect the argument(-s) with the conclusion, the claim, and thus justify the transition from the argument to the conclusion.⁶⁰ In one of Wodak's recent books, we can find the list of the most common topoi that are "used when negotiating specific agenda in meetings, or trying to convince audience of one's interests, visions or positions"⁶¹. The list includes:

1. Topos of Burdening
2. Topos of Reality
3. Topos of Numbers
4. Topos of History
5. Topos of Authority
6. Topos of Threat
7. Topos of Definition
8. Topos of Justice

⁵⁹ Wodak, Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* (2001), p.73

⁶⁰ Wodak, Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* (2001), p.74

⁶¹ Ruth Wodak, *The Discourse of Politics in Action* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p.44

9. Topos of Urgency⁶²

Again, the limitation that is found in DHA concerns the absence of practical rules of how the topoi should be defined in the specific case, and the question of whether topoi should be defined after the analysis of concrete content itself or whether they should be generalized prior to the analysis. However, it can be assumed that topoi should be more or less universalistic in order to be “conclusion rules”, and hence, we can apply the above-mentioned list to our case.

The final point, perhaps the most important, is the application of a triangulatory approach that consists of four levels:

- the immediate, language or text internal co-text;
- the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses;
- the extralinguistic social/sociological variables and institutional frames of a specific ‘context of situation’ (middle range theories);
- the broader sociopolitical and historical contexts, which the discursive practices are imbedded in and related to (‘grand’ theories).⁶³

The triangulatory approach is needed to ensure validity.⁶⁴ In our analysis these levels will be reversed. The grand theories’ level was already partly explained in the first chapter.

2.2. Adaptation of DHA for Falklands case

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Gilbert Weiss and Ruth Wodak, *Critical Discourse Analysis. Theory and Interdisciplinarity* (Palgrave Macmillan, London 2003), p.23; idem. Wodak, The Discourse – historic approach p.67; idem. Ruth Wodak and Rudolf de Cillia, *Politics and Language: Overview* in Keith Brown, (Editor-in-Chief) *Encyclopedia of Language & Linguistics* 9, 2nd edition (Oxford, Elsevier 2006), p.711

⁶⁴ Wodak and Meyer, *Methods for Critical Discourse analysis* (2009), p.31

In order to use this complex approach to answer the question, ‘Did the case of the Falkland Islands in the 1980s represent Britain as a neoliberal Empire?’ we need to clarify some moments.

The CDA assumption that ‘language gains power by the use powerful people make of it’⁶⁵ is a sensible one. In CDA, it is common that an analyst takes the side of an oppressed group and critically analyses the language use of the powerful group⁶⁶, since through different linguistic forms the researcher in CDA can distinguish if expressions and manipulations of power took place.⁶⁷ For instance, the category of genre is closely linked to the occasion of power use⁶⁸, and thus can give the researcher an important starting point for analysis. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that power is expressed not only grammatically in text, but also by a person’s control of a social situation.⁶⁹

In the case study, there is no oppressed group as such, since neither Britain nor Argentina can be called ‘oppressed’. Usually the aim for picking a side of an oppressed group is to proceed with a “prognostic critique”,⁷⁰ which is used to transform and improve communication, but, for this research, this type of critique is simply out of interest. Nevertheless, in order to realize a prerequisite of CDA to be critical, we need to take a side opposite to the group that has the power (Britain). Hence, we place ourselves in opposition to Britain but not on the side of Argentina.

Besides, some of the simplifications of the method to be used have been mentioned above. For now we will use the given list of topoi and discursive strategies as outlined above.

⁶⁵ Weiss & Wodak 2003, p.15; idem. Wodak & de Cillia 2006, p.717

⁶⁶ Marianne Jørgensen, Louise Phillips, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method* (SAGE publications, 2002), p. 64

⁶⁷ Wodak, What CDA is about in Wodak and Meyer (2001), p.11

⁶⁸ Ibid. p. 11

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Wodak, The Discourse-Historical Approach in Wodak and Meyer (2001), p.65

Since Wodak does not insist on a particular order of the research, but rather on methodological eclecticism, it is useful to summarize key points of her method and present the simple sequence of steps to be used. They will include: 1) presentation of historical background information; 2) determination of topics of discourses and discourses themselves; 3) determination of texts, genres and fields of actions; 4) analysis of chosen tokens from linguistic perspective; 5) application of linguistic analysis to the context. However, the order will not be followed fully and some conversions will be allowed.

To make a linguistic analysis, the list of categories of ideological discourse analysis will be used as presented in the article of Teun A. van Dijk “Politics, Ideology and Discourse”⁷¹.

An important point for our analysis is data gathering. Researchers of CDA do not consider data gathering as a phase of analysis, but still they pay a lot of attention to the data gathering.⁷² As we outlined in the very beginning of this chapter, Margaret Thatcher’s speeches, recently declassified telegrams and reports have been chosen for the analysis.

Margaret Thatcher was a leading ideologist of her time; she was not only a representative of the Conservative Party, but also the main power executer and the main actor. Her policies, decisions and actions strongly influenced the life of the British in 1979-1980s, and thus, influenced political discourse in general, and the discourse around the Falkland Islands’ case in particular. That is why the analysis of speeches, delivered by her, is of a great importance. The analysis of formerly classified documents might give us a more objective and comprehensive picture, and will be a worthwhile addition to the crea-

⁷¹ Teun A van Dijk, Politics, Ideology and Discourse, *Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, Section Language and Politics* – ed. Ruth Wodak, second version (2004), available under: [http://www.discourses.org/UnpublishedArticles/Politics,%20ideology%20and%20discourse%20(ELL).htm]

⁷² Wodak and Meyer (2009), p.27

tion of the whole analysis. The texts were chosen, first of all, due to the relevance to our case, and, second of all, due to the time they were published.

2. 3. Limitations

Despite all of the efforts to remain critical and objective, CDA is a qualitative method, and thus fully relies on the personal interpretation of the researcher. The personality of the researcher, his knowledge of the context, abilities to fully apply the method to a specific case, and also personal preferences in the selection of material give subjectivity to the analysis.

Moreover, DHA is an eclectic and complex method for analysis that cannot be fully applied to our case. The requirement of DHA for constant mediation between theories and empirical data, between the social and the text creates the gap between these dimensions, and as a result leaves some gaps in the analysis. Unclear moments of the method, such as absence of explanation of how to gather topoi from the discourse and if new discourse strategies should be investigated in accordance to a specific case, also represent a limitation for this study.

The choice of texts for the analysis constitutes another limitation. Usually DHA includes a very detailed study of each chosen text/token, which for our research is not applicable because of the length of the chosen materials. The number of chosen texts will be reduced in order to proceed with the analysis, and some generalization will be allowed.

Finally, our case is per se bilingual as it concerns the dispute between Britain and Argentina. However, only English sources will be analysed.

Chapter III. Analysis

For the CDA, the context in which the text was produced is very important. In our case the context can be divided into two parts. The first part is the general context of Britain in transition from the 1970s to 1982, the way in which Britain came to neoliberal imperialism and the way this framework was represented in the life of the state. To make the picture of this changing environment a bit more complete we will briefly summarize the developments of the British Empire immediately after World War II. The second part is the historical background of the Falkland Islands case, and the way in which the case experienced change because of neoliberal imperialism.

3. 1. The general context

Like many other countries directly after WWII, Britain had vast economic problems caused by the war. To recover the economy, Britain had to go for a US loan of \$4.33 billion (in 2012, this would equate to around \$56 billion),⁷³ which did not help and was spent in only two years instead of 5 planned initially⁷⁴, in addition it caused dependence on the US. In the political sphere, the period after WWII is characterized by the sequential change of power between the two rival main parties: the Labour Party and the Conservative Party. In general, the Labour Party favoured the welfare state with nationalization, publicly funded social services (medical, education, etc.), support of trade unions. The Conservative Party, by contrast, favoured private capital, denationalization and

⁷³ Judith Brown, Roger Louis, *The Oxford History of the British Empire: volume IV: The twentieth century* (Oxford University Press, 1998), p.27

⁷⁴ Corelli Barnett, *The Wasting of Britain's Marshall aid* (BBC History, 2011), available under [http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/marshall_01.shtml]

preservation of the empire.⁷⁵ In the period 1945-1951, while the Labour Party was in power, the economic situation did not change much: neither the big US loan helped, nor the following Marshall Aid.⁷⁶ Moreover, in 1947 India became independent⁷⁷, and as it seems, this fact initiated the further loss of colonies, the main symbol of imperial dominance. In addition, the US pursued anti-colonial policies after WWII. The next two decades were more promising in terms of the stabilization of the UK economy. In the Quarterly Bulletin of 2010 the following information can be found: “between 1945 and 2007, an average rate of growth of the UK economy was at about $2^{3/40}$ % per annum”⁷⁸, and further “fluctuations in the 1950s and 1960s were generally mild and annual growth was positive”.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, the Empire was fast losing its position on the world stage: in 1956 the Suez Crisis struck⁸⁰, and by 1965 only five million people outside Britain remained under British rule, compared to a previous seven hundred million.⁸¹ Although the Quarterly Bulletin shows the positive economic trend in a long run, the losses of colonies could not but affect the economy in a short run, since, in the past, colonies were the main source of economic stability for Britain because of cheap resources and monopolist position of Britain.

Despite the short period of economic stability of the 1950s - 1960s, by 1970 Britain again appeared in a difficult economic situation. The crisis of the 1970s was char-

⁷⁵ For background information, please read David Childs, *Britain since 1945: A political history* (Taylor & Francis, 2006)

⁷⁶ Cornelli Barnett, BBC History, available under [\[http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/marshall_01.shtml\]](http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/marshall_01.shtml)

⁷⁷ David Childs, *Britain since 1945: A political history* (Taylor & Francis, 2006), p. 25

⁷⁸ Sally Hills, Ryland Thomas, Nicholas Dimsdale, The UK recession in context – what do three centuries of data tell us?, *Quarterly Bulletin 4* (The bank of England 2010), available under [\[http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/qb100403.pdf\]](http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/qb100403.pdf)

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ The 1956 Suez Crisis in Rose McDermott, *Risk-taking in International politics* (The University of Michigan, 1998), pp.135-164

⁸¹ Judith Brown, p.330

acterized high inflation, which in July 1975 reached the level of 26%⁸² (by comparison, in the 1960s, it was about 1%⁸³). Unemployment was at the highest level since WWII: roughly three million (around 11 %) unemployed people.⁸⁴ The balance of payments deficit also was shocking: in 1971 there was a surplus of £261 million; in 1973 there already was a deficit of £2383 million, and in 1974 it reached £3600 million.⁸⁵

Between 1970 and 1979, Britain had 3 general elections: for the first 4 years, the Conservatives were in power, then 1974 - 1979 the Labour Party, both without any visible success of fighting the crisis, and further the Conservatives replaced the Labour Party once again.⁸⁶ This time the things were different, as would be seen a couple of years later. Margaret Thatcher headed the Conservative government of 1979.⁸⁷ This government is primarily associated with the construction of a neoliberal empire in Britain, by this author's understanding.

It is often the case that, in a crisis situation, radical change takes place. Thatcher became Prime Minister in a very peculiar moment of British history: the economy, as we outlined above, was radically hurt, and the imperial position of Britain was not the same. Britain already had lost India, Malaysia, Singapore, Bahrain, Maldives, Sudan, nearly all the colonies in Africa, Malta, Cyprus, Jamaica, Barbados, and many more.⁸⁸ These losses caused irreparable damage not only to the British economy, but also British prestige. The state of affairs necessitated change.

⁸² The data is from essay by Steward Morris, *Is it accurate to describe the 1970s as a decade of crisis? If so – what were the causes?*, The social Structure of modern Britain, available under

[<http://www.stewartmorris.com/essays/14Ingham2.pdf>]

⁸³ The data is from Worldwide inflation data, available under [inflation.eu]

⁸⁴ Doods Klaus, The 1982 Falklands Islands War and a critical geopolitical eye: Steve Bell and the If... cartoons, *Political geography* 15: 6/7 (1996), University of London, Elsevier Science Ltd, p.577

⁸⁵ The data from The Steward Morris, available under

[<http://www.stewartmorris.com/essays/14Ingham2.pdf>]

⁸⁶ David Childs, *Britain since 1945: A political history* (Taylor & Francis, 2006), pp. 139-183

⁸⁷ David Harvey, *A Brief history of Neoliberalism* (Oxford University press, 2005), p.1

⁸⁸ UK and colonies, *UK Border Agency*, available under

[<http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/nationalityinstructions/nisec2gensec/ukandcolonies?view=Binary>]

The radical change can be seen in two recognizable trends of the conservatives' politics: first, the replacement of the Keynesian welfare state with neoliberal ideas, second, the return to old imperial values.⁸⁹ As a matter of fact, there is a close interconnection between these two trends, since the neoliberal reforms in the end were the method to return to the old values, to restore the power of rich classes or, as Dumenil & Levy wrote, the "power of capitalist classes".⁹⁰ Moreover, one of the main distinctive features of an empire was the power of rich classes. Thatcher herself once said, in an interview for the Sunday Times: "Economics are the method; the object is to change the heart and soul".⁹¹

The neoliberal reforms covered different areas of the British economy. To fight the crisis Thatcher introduced monetarism and strict budgetary control.⁹² Both were needed to control inflation, which can be achieved only through the control of the money supply, and this in turn requires the reduction of government deficit. Step by step: taxes were raised, government spending cut, interest rates increased, as a result inflation was reduced.⁹³ However, the externality of such deflation policies was higher unemployment.⁹⁴ Such policies, first of all, hurt workers, thus the policies were in line with the goal – to restore the power of the rich. Alan Budd, an economic adviser to Thatcher, in this respect said that 'the 1980s policies ... were a cover to bash the workers'.⁹⁵

The next important feature of neoliberal reforms was denationalization. In pursuing this goal, the number of state enterprises was significantly reduced, in some sectors

⁸⁹ Stuart Hall, The Neoliberal Revolution, Thatcher, Blair, Cameron – the long march of neoliberalism continues, *Soundings* 48 (2011), pp.16-19

⁹⁰ Dumenil, Levy, p.388

⁹¹ Butt Ronald, Mrs Thatcher: the first two years, *Sunday Times*, 3 May 1981
[<http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104475>] (accessed 2 June 2012)

⁹² David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.68

⁹³ Teivan Pettinger, *UK economy under Mrs Thatcher 1979-1984*, available under
[<http://econ.economicshelp.org/2007/03/uk-economy-under-mrs-thatcher-1979-1984.html>]

⁹⁴ Harvey, *Neoliberalism*, p.68

⁹⁵ Ibid.

state enterprises were eliminated totally.⁹⁶ The reduction policy also affected the maintenance costs of public enterprises and companies, which were reduced from the early 1980s. For instance, in 1983-1984 such costs were at the level of £6.1 billion, in 1984-1985 they were reduced to £5.6 billion.⁹⁷ As a result, the investment share of nationalized industries to the British economy dropped to 25 % in the early 1980s, instead of 50% in 1970s.⁹⁸

Privatization as an important step towards a free market economy followed after denationalization. Usually privatization took the form first of the restructuring of the state companies, and second, of their sale to private owners.⁹⁹ Harvey wrote: “British Aerospace, British Telecom, British Airways, steel, electricity and gas, oil, coal, water, bus services, railways, and a host of smaller enterprises were sold off in a massive wave of privatization.”¹⁰⁰ Around fifty large companies were privatized by 1990, which according to the *Economist* is over two-thirds of the industrial assets owned by the state in 1979.¹⁰¹ These sales increased revenues in the budget. In figures the sale of public assets raised roughly £27 billion in 1979-1988.¹⁰²

The rationale behind privatization was to encourage greater efficiency, individual initiative and innovation, as well as to extend the scope of personal and corporate responsibility.¹⁰³ There was also another side of a coin. It is obvious that privatization like monetarism ensured that rich get richer. The explanation is simple: it is hard to imagine that a worker would buy a company such as British Telecom. Moreover, it was noticed

⁹⁶ Nickolay Kredins N.E, Economic reforms of Thatcher's government, *Financial management* 4 (2001) [Николай Крединс, Экономические реформы правительства Тэтчер, Финансовый менеджмент 4 (2001)]

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Graham Thomas, Government and the Economy today (Manchester University Press, 1992), p. 100

¹⁰⁰ Harvey, Neoliberalism, p.60

¹⁰¹ To the victor these spoils (Margaret Thatcher's years of power), The Thatcher's Record, *The Economist* (24 November 1990)

¹⁰² Thomas, p.100

¹⁰³ Harvey, Neoliberalism, p.60

that only profitable enterprises were sold into private hands. That means a private owner collects large profits even after tax. In addition, privatization and speculative gains on the property released went hand in hand.¹⁰⁴

Privatization also affected the sphere of housing. The extensive sales of public-ly-owned housing caused the growth of homeowners' number within a decade. The working-class could realize (we do not say realized!) the traditional dream of being an individual owner, while the upper class did become individual owners and "saw their asset values rise".¹⁰⁵

In the sub-chapter about Neoliberal Imperialism, the importance of the characteristics of neoliberal empire were outlined, such as: defunding social government. The Conservative government of 1979 realized this feature by confronting the power of trade unions, which Thatcher called "the enemy within".¹⁰⁶ Thatcher wanted to significantly limit trade union power, to tie them more closely to individual firms and to break trade union involvement in politics.¹⁰⁷ After several Employment and Trade Unions' Acts, political strikes and mass picketing were banned, and strikes could be organized only against an employer.¹⁰⁸ In the *Economist's* article, one can read about an outcome of this reform: "The labour market started to taste freedom: part-time, temporary and badly paid jobs, often done by women, replaced well-paid, secure ones."¹⁰⁹ The major consequences were as follows: the position of employers was strengthened, while the position of employees was weakened; the position of employees was weakened to the point that they feared to demand higher salaries as it could cause the loss of their job; the number of strikes was

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Harvey, *Neoliberalism*, p.60-61

¹⁰⁶ Margaret Thatcher, *Speech to 1922 Committee ("the enemy within")* (19 July 1984), available under [<http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/105563>]

¹⁰⁷ Petr Hlina, *Thatcherism and its long-term consequences* (Prague, 1998), p.22

¹⁰⁸ The Employment Act 1980, The Employment Act 1982, The Trade Union Act 1984, all available under [<http://www.legislation.gov.uk>]

¹⁰⁹ To the victor these spoils (Margaret Thatcher's years of power), The Thatcher's Record, *The Economist* (24 November 1990)

reduced and at the same time productivity increased, and as a result the employers received higher profits.¹¹⁰

Privatization, denationalization, monetarism and the fight with trade unions all led to the achievement of the main goal of neoliberal empire: the restoration of the power of the rich. In all these reforms, the major characteristics of neoliberal empire, presented in the previous chapter, can be found: a conservative ideology, defunding social government, free market ideology that conceals corporate redistribution, the threat of inflation, and, of course, state intervention in favour of corporations.

Yet, even more important is that while implementing neoliberal reforms, Thatcher's Conservative government used false reasoning, one of the main characteristics of neoliberal imperialism, all the way along: presenting the fight with trade unions as a fight for efficiency, nationalization and privatization as a key to "property owning democracy"¹¹¹, monetarism as the only way to reduce inflation. Although reforms indeed improved the economy in some way, they changed the socio-economic formation of Britain, taking the country away from a socially-oriented welfare state to the new form of empire, the neoliberal empire. The real political goal, thereby, was properly hidden behind different economic explanations.

Last but not least was the attempt to rescue an 'archaic' British nationalism¹¹², which manifested itself in the strongest possible way during the Falklands war. This consisted of a strong nationalist discourse: return to the flag, family values, national character, imperial glory and the "spirit of Palmerstonian gunboat diplomacy"¹¹³ – the usual imperial values. Thus, coinciding the British nationalism with neoliberal ideas, the Con-

¹¹⁰ Hlina, pp.25-26

¹¹¹ Stuart Hall, p.17

¹¹² Ibid, p.18

¹¹³ Ibid.

servatives were “marching towards the future clad in the armour of the past”¹¹⁴, what we call neoliberal imperialism or just new imperialism.

Due to the fact the Falklands war was an outstanding event in the politics of Thatcher and her government, it is time to review the context of the Falkland Islands’ dispute.

3. 2. The context of the Falkland Islands

The Falkland Islands are technically disputed between Argentina and the UK. They were discovered in the 16th century and, since then, both Argentina (being a successor of Spain) and Britain claim this territory on the basis of discovery, first settlement, geographical location and self-determination of people.¹¹⁵ The very core of the dispute lies in the old imperial struggle for the spheres of interest between the two well-known empires: the Spanish and the British ones. The presence of an empire in every spot on the Earth was probably the main incentive for the two empires to fight over this territory in the past. With time comes change, and in the 1970s the fight over the sovereignty of the islands was more about the question of prestige and honor, and only then about economy and strategic position. Nevertheless, the last major change of the status of the

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ This research does not aim at the discussion of claims and the topic of rightfulness, neither it aims to find a solution. For the general information about claims made by the UK and Argentina in this dispute please read John House, Political geography of contemporary events: Unfinished business in the South Atlantic, *Political Geography Quarterly* 2:3 (July 1983); Julius Geobel, *The Struggle for the Falkland Islands* (New York: Yale University Press, 1927); Houchang Esfandiari Chehabi, Self-determination, Territorial integrity, and the Falkland Islands, *Political Science Quarterly* 100:2 (1985); Hermann Weber, *Falkland Islands or Malvinas?* (Frankfurt on Main, 1977)

Falklands was made in 1833, when Britain wrested the islands from Argentina by force, and, since then, the Falkland Islands officially belong to Britain.

Geographically, the Falklands, or Islas Malvinas as they called in Spanish, are much closer to Argentina, and located some 300 miles (450 kilometers) from Argentina's coast¹¹⁶, in comparison there are 8000 miles (about 9143 kilometers) between the coasts of the UK and the Falkland Islands. According to Lyubomir Ivanov: "They constitute a group of islands in the South Atlantic Ocean, facing the Strait of Magellan to the west, South Georgia to the east, and the Antarctic Peninsula area to the south".¹¹⁷ There are only two main islands, East and West Falkland, and more than 700 smaller ones.¹¹⁸ With the total area of 12,713 square kilometers it is larger than area of Cyprus, Lebanon or Jamaica, but the resident population is only about 3000 (Census 2006).¹¹⁹ The islands have a status of a self-governing overseas territory, where the UK provides them assistance in spheres of defense and foreign affairs.¹²⁰

The economic situation of the islands in the 1970s represented a clear cut case of a usual imperial presence in any colony: drain of the capital and "de-industrialization".¹²¹ From the two economic reports of 1976 and 1982 drafted by Lord Shackleton, the following picture looms: during the period 1976-1982 the prices on a primary resource¹²² of the islands that is wool had fallen by 20 percent, energy costs on the contrary had risen by the same 20 percent; decline in GDP (1976-1982) had reached

¹¹⁶ Lord Shackleton, The Falkland Islands and their History. The geography of the Falkland Islands, *The geographical journal* 149 (1983)

¹¹⁷ Lyubomir Ivanov, The Future of the Falkland Islands and its People, on the map (2003). Available under:

[http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Future_of_the_Falkland_Islands_and_Its_People/On_the_Map]

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Graham Pascoe, Peter Pepper, *Getting it right: The real history of the Falklands/Malvinas. A reply to the Argentine seminar of 3 December 2007*, (2008), p.2

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Maria Misra, Colonial Officers and gentlemen: the British Empire and the globalization of "tradition", *Journal of Global History* 3(2008),p.137

¹²² To read more about the economy of the islands please see: Richard Johnson, The islands resources, *The geographical journal* 149:1 (1983), pp.4-7

the point of 25 percent.¹²³ These figures reveal about the obvious economic stagnation of the islands. However, by virtue of the Shackleton's report it turns out that the islands were profitable for Britain. For instance, the profits from ship ranching and wool production have been remitted to the UK by the monopolistic Falkland Islands Company, a holder of half of the farms on the islands.¹²⁴ In this regard, Richard Johnson who made the economic survey together with Lord Shackleton wrote: "the UK Exchequer has benefited from the economic activity of the Falkland Islands in excess of the aid that has been given to the Islands by a factor of 2:1 – at least that was the figure up until the time of the survey in 1976". As a matter of fact, together with money from the Falkland Islands "drained" people. In the period 1972-1980 the net loss of population was about 15 percent. In addition, the proportion of elderly people in the capital Stanley was rising.¹²⁵

The monopoly of the Falkland Island Company, the high outmigration level and the extensive outflow of capital - all these factors are symptoms of classical colonial exploitation, in our case it was the exploitation by an imperial state whose imperial status was diminishing.

Moving further from the topic of economy to politics, we may state that the history of the dispute over the Falkland Islands in the second half of the 20th century (till 1982) has several times engaged the attention of the international community, firstly when the UK submitted its application against the Argentine Republic to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in May 1955.¹²⁶ Notwithstanding that Argentina never gave

¹²³ Data is taken from Stephen Palmer, *Chapter 12: 1976 & 1982 The Falkland Islands Economic Reports. The Shackleton Reports*, (University of Portsmouth, 2004), pp.116-129, available under: [http://www.newportminster.org/media/thesis/1976_and_1982_the_shackleton_reports.pdf]; idem. John House, Political Geography of contemporary events: Unfinished business in the South Atlantic, *Political geography Quarterly* 2:3 (1983), p.243

¹²⁴ Newsweek, 3 May 1982, 68

¹²⁵ John House, Political Geography of contemporary events: Unfinished business in the South Atlantic, *Political geography Quarterly* 2:3 (1983), p.243

¹²⁶ Antarctica cases (United Kingdom v. Argentina; United Kingdom v. Chile), orders of March 16th, 1956: Removal from the list, available at [http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/26/9065.pdf]

up on the Falklands, calling them “Nuestra tierra”¹²⁷ [Spanish for: ‘our land’] and teaching Argentine children that the islands were illegally seized by Britain in 1833¹²⁸, it didn’t submit its application¹²⁹, making a resolution of the case through the ICJ impossible. Therefore, in 1956 the ICJ decided to remove the case.¹³⁰ Secondly, two UN resolutions were passed: the first one in 1960 - Resolution 1514 of the United Nations, being a “declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples,”¹³¹ mentioned “the self-determination of all peoples”¹³²; the second one in 1965 – the resolution 2065 “Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)” invited “the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to proceed without delay with the negotiations recommended by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples”.¹³³ These two resolutions encouraged Argentina and the United Kingdom to find a solution of the dispute over the Falkland Islands. As an outcome a small step was made: in 1968 the two claimants signed a Memorandum of Understanding, and in the 1970s they agreed on fuel supply.¹³⁴ Thirdly, when in 1980 Nicholas Ridley, a Conservative party politician and Minister of State who was responsible for the Falkland Islands’ case in that time, proposed a leaseback solution. This solution implied that the sovereignty of the Falklands formally would be transferred to Argentina for 50 years, but at the same time the actual British government would rule during the abovementioned period. One year later, in 1981, as if deliberately undermining

¹²⁷ Beck, Cooperative confrontation in the Falkland Islands dispute, *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 24 (1982), pp.37-58.

¹²⁸ Roberto Laver, The Falklands/Malvinas case: Breaking the Deadlock in the Anglo-Argentine Sovereignty dispute (the Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001), p.19

¹²⁹ John House, p.236

¹³⁰ Antarctica case (United Kingdom v. Argentina), order of March 16th, 1956 : I.C.J. Reports 1956, p. 12 available at [<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/26/2157.pdf>]

¹³¹ David Killingray and David Taylor, The United Kingdom Overseas Territories, past, present and future (London: Institute of Commonwealth Studies) pp.65-86

¹³² General Assembly Resolution 1514.

¹³³ Declaration on the Granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, available at [<http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/declaration.shtml>]

¹³⁴ Stephen Royle, Postcolonial culture on Dependent islands, *Space and Culture* 13:2 (2008)

the already rather shaky position of Britain on the islands, the British Nationality Act removed full British citizenship from the Kelpers [name of population of the Falklands]. To be eligible for British citizenship, the islanders had to have a parent or grandparent who was a British citizen.¹³⁵ Lastly, on April 2 1982 Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands, and Britain sent the navy to protect its overseas territory.

There is a double paradox that can be observed: the first is that Britain was considering the possibility of the islands' return to Argentina and then responded with war; the second paradox is that Britain was about to give up on islands that were per se profitable. Of course, the three political moves and their outcomes (the application to the ICJ, the two UN resolutions and, finally, the leaseback proposal) might indicate that Britain in the period between 1955 and 1982 experienced major transformations of the existing imperial system that usually aims at strong territorial domination, but in no way the voluntary renunciation of its own territory, especially when that territory is profitable. If Britain would let Argentina to take the islands, it would seem to represent a transformation of the old imperial politico-economic system, the transformation of a vast empire to a small country. Yet, Britain responded: it did not give up on the islands. The Falklands war questions the idea of the UK's total denial of territorial domination. Moreover, the war raises the question of whether Britain had ever given up on the islands.

The outlined general context and the context of the Falkland Islands' case gave us necessary factual information of what was happening in the period when neoliberal imperialism emerged. However, the neoliberal empire gives a great deal of attention to the specific use of language and rhetoric, to the analysis of which we are approaching. The revealed paradoxes and explicit manifestation of neoliberal imperialism in reality will help us to analyse and correlate the texts with facts, and further to proceed with conclu-

¹³⁵ Ibid.

sions and to answer the main research question.

3. 3. Critical Discourse Analysis

Before proceeding with the actual analysis, it is important to briefly summarize why the Falkland Islands' case was chosen for the analysis.

Britain was going through the process of change, trying to replace familiar imperialist behavior with softer neoliberal imperialism, where the imperialist component is hidden behind neoliberal rhetoric. However, in a crisis situation, the imperialist component tends to become more pronounced. Since the dispute over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands escalated into a war, the Falklands' war thereby represented the crisis situation.

Britain was in economic crisis, most colonies had gained independence, and besides, they gained independence in most cases peacefully, without resistance from the British side (the Suez Crisis excepted). The wave of new neoliberal reforms deliberately emphasized its apolitical character through actions and through the use of language (free market, free economy and so on). At the same time, the dispute over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands between Argentina and Britain, existing since 16th century, was on a backstage of political agenda. Britain was even considering giving up the Falklands, when suddenly Thatcher started to introduce a nationalist discourse in the moment when the danger of invasion became pronounced and in a very short period made it clear to everyone that Britain will fight for these islands. Such behavior was very different from the steps Britain had taken in the 1950s and the 1960s. Such behavior says more in favour of Harvey's 'territorial logic of power', carrying the imperialist component. This observation became the starting point to apply the concept of neoliberal imperialism to this particular behavior of Britain in the case of the Falklands. All in all, not only the time of the Falk-

lands war defined our choice, but more the radical change in Britain's behavior in this particular case.

3.3.1. Results of preliminary reading

For preliminary reading, approximately 60 text examples produced between January 1982 and July 1982 were chosen. We were interested in this time frame, primarily, because the Falklands' war started in April 1982. Among these texts were 2 groups: 1) speeches that Margaret Thatcher made in the House of Commons, several speeches in the form of public statements, some letters on the topic of resignation (H. Atkins, R. Luce and Lord Carrington resigned) addressed to her colleagues, interviews with Thatcher both for radio and TV media; 2) among documents marked "confidential" and "secret" were mostly telegrams and letters. However, we found it useful to include some reports and an interview with US Secretary of State Haig who played the role of mediator in the conflict – these documents are from Margaret Thatcher's personal files and from public and private archives in Britain and the United States. All these documents were chosen due to the relevance to the case of the Falkland Islands.

It is worth noting that we used the approach of Alfred Schutz who distinguishes three forms of relevance: 1) thematic – the key question 'what is the problem to be studied?'; 2) interpretational relevance – the key question 'which elements of our knowledge are relevant for the interpretation of the problem subject to study?' 3) motivational – the key question 'to what extent should the problem be investigated?'¹³⁶

The first form is the easiest to recognise, since it simply requires correlation of the text with the main question of the research. The second form of relevance made us choose the DHA as a method for this research, and the importance of this method was

¹³⁶ This approach is presented in Ruth Wodak, *The Discourse of Politics in Action* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p.52

already outlined. The problem for a researcher occurs mainly on the level of motivational relevance; it is difficult to judge how far the research should go in order to be satisfied with the findings, as well as what number of materials for the analysis will provide a sufficiently strong basis to make conclusions.

As a result, eighteen texts from the first group and twenty-four from the second were selected to be used in the analysis (the list is presented in the Appendix in two tables). The texts of the first group cover the entire period of the war. The texts of the second group are mainly related to the first month of the war (21 March – 22 April). The decision to limit the texts of this group to only one month period was made due to the fact that, during this month, the influence of external actors is more visible, while we were looking for their opinions and their involvement. Moreover, before the analysis, we assumed that implicit language constructions could be more evident in the period of, so to speak, “heating of the atmosphere” before the war (21 March – 2 April). This assumption relies on a psychological aspect of human behavior that holds that people become more negligent in a period of time pressure and crisis.

We would like to note that the texts of the second group are documents, the majority of which were declassified in 2012. The research of these documents is important in order to provide an alternative perspective to our analysis, and, even more, they ensure the importance of the study itself.

3.3.2 Topics, fields of action, genres, texts

The preliminary or pilot reading under the framework of the DHA allows an identification of important content topics within the particular discourse. Wodak distin-

guishes topics as one of the dimensions constituting textual meanings and structures.¹³⁷

The major topic of this analysis is the Falklands' war; the other topics either lead to the main one or constitute its specific feature. Of course, in the chosen material, the topic of the Falklands' war is not the only topic covered, but we intentionally exclude others from the analysis. In each case, the more specific topics were distinguished: Argentine invasion, the future of the islands, the consequences of the war for both parties, Thatcher's position, and consensus on the war strategy inside the British parliament.

The content topics are inextricably linked to discourses, texts and fields of actions of discourses. Wodak makes a distinction between 'text' and 'discourse'. In general a discourse is the macro-topic,¹³⁸ while the text is a 'specific and unique realization of a discourse.'¹³⁹ In addition, the text is always tied to a genre, and discourses are realized in both genres and texts.¹⁴⁰ Norman Fairclough says that a genre is the "conventionalized, more or less schematically fixed use of language associated with a particular activity."¹⁴¹ Last, but not least, come the "fields of action". They are "segments of the respective societal reality, which contribute to constituting and shaping the frame of discourse."¹⁴²

First of all, we start with the fields of action. Our first group of texts represents three main fields of action in the political sphere: formation of public attitudes, opinions and will; inter-party formation of attitudes, opinions and will; political executive and administration. And the second group of texts is mainly related to fields of: political executive and administration, and political control.¹⁴³ The fields of action presented determine not only the 'frames', but also the goals of the discourse representation.

¹³⁷ Wodak, *The Discourse of Politics in Action*, p.38

¹³⁸ Ibid., p.38

¹³⁹ Ibid, p.39

¹⁴⁰ Wodak, Meyer, p.66

¹⁴¹ Norman Fairclough, *critical discourse analysis: the critical study of language* (Longman Publishing, New York, 1995), p14

¹⁴² Martin Reisigl, Ruth Wodak, *Discourse and Discrimination. Rhetorics of racism and anti-Semitism* (London: Routledge, 2001)

¹⁴³ Wodak gives two similar tables with the fields of action both in Wodak & Meyer , p. 68, and in Wodak, *The Discourse of Politics in Action* ,p.41.

Each field covers a different number of genres. Very often the same genre is represented in various fields of action. The genres of our texts were already outlined above, but we need to give some details since the genres imply the use of language in a different way.

The major part of the first group includes speeches Thatcher made in the House of Commons. Although we worked with the written text, usually a speech is written to be presented orally. The specialty of the speeches for the House of Commons is that they also include comments and questions made by the members of parliament, but these comments and questions are made under the authoritative supervision of a speaker, in our case of Margaret Thatcher. These speeches are not spontaneous, they are prepared in advance, and in most cases, they are prepared not directly by Thatcher, but by the respective speechwriter. As Wodak and Meyer state “it is very rare that a text is the work of any one person”.¹⁴⁴ This factor should be considered in the analysis, because it influences the direct relation between the speaker and her speech. The Prime Minister, in general, could control much of the parliamentary debates and this is very visible in the speeches. For instance, Thatcher often dismissed questions or answered them in a way that there is no definite answer given. This way she made her position pronounced, and the opponent’s position neglected. Like in this example (MT 2 – speech at the House of Commons [HC], 3.04.1982):

Mr. Eric Ogden: *Will the right hon. Lady say what happened to HMS “Endurance”?*

The Prime Minister: *HMS “Endurance” is in the area. It is not for me to say precisely where, and the hon. Gentleman would not wish me to do so.*

Sometimes Thatcher even insists on her position. Like in MT 6 (Speech at the HC, 6.04.1982):

¹⁴⁴ Wodak&Meyer, *Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis* (2009), p.10

There are two points that need to be made. I told the House on Saturday that even if the action had been taken – [Hon. Members: “Oh”.] Will the House let me answer the question in my own way, giving information that I am certain is accurate, as I try to do and try to check these matters? As I told...

A different picture comes with the genre of interview. Chosen interviews were often made in the same day almost without a break in between. In such cases we saw the way Thatcher answered similar questions addressed to her by different interviewers and the way she articulated her position without a necessarily pre-written material. It was the case while during the first interview she was still “touching the ground”, trying to find the right way of answering a question, and then in the second interview she answered the similar question with greater certainty.

In the MT 4 (interview with ITN, 5.04.1982 at 17:30) the interviewer asked Thatcher the question about the new Foreign Secretary (Lord Carrington had resigned this position on 5 April 1982 after Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands).

Interviewer: *But this is an hour of crisis. Is it wise to have a new Foreign Secretary with no immediate experience?*

Mrs. Thatcher: *That of course, I also put to Lord Carrington but in the end, you know, he felt so strongly about the point of honour and after all it is rather a wonderful thing in politics to have people who feel strongly about honour and who resign...*

While in MT 5 (radio interview with IRN, 5.04.1982, followed the previous interview) Thatcher already had answered with more confidence:

Interviewer: *Prime Minister, can you tell me first of all about new Foreign Secretary?*

Mrs. Thatcher: *Yes, I have appointed Francis Pym, he was leader of the House, before that he was Secretary of State for Defence, and in [Edward Heath] Ted's government he was part of*

the time Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. So he's quite a lot of experience and he's known internationally.

It is clear that the success of the interview depends on the appropriateness of the questions addressed (right question in a right moment). Unlike the speeches, in an interview Thatcher could not simply dismiss the question. As a result, interviews gave us more information that includes Thatcher's personal opinion, as she answered, first of all, on behalf of herself, not the party.

The genre of the telegram, that comprises a large number of the second group of texts, is one of the most controlled spaces for information transmission. First of all, it requires a sender to present the essence of transmitted information in a short way, thus requiring selectivity and summation of information in the form of theses. Second of all, it almost excludes free narrative style and implies the general use of official language. However, because the analysed telegrams were classified as secret or confidential, the core information is not hidden or at least properly hidden. Moreover, if the information was included in the telegram, in most cases that means the information was requested by the receiver in a previous telegram. Thus, we can construct the possible answers that were addressed and grasp the meaning of information. For example in SD 3(25.03.1982, from Carrington to UK Embassy in Buenos Aires), the very last sentence is as follows: *We are meanwhile considering the defence implications*. Such answer most probably means that the sender was asked to prepare for a defence. This knowledge, for instance, could give us the information about when Britain was aware about the invasion and the moment it decided to use force.

Finally, in the second group of texts, two reports were included. In fact, the report drafted for Alexander Haig, the Secretary of State in Washington D.C. and the mediator in the conflict, still has blank paragraphs and even pages marked "page denied".

These secret reports reflect those moments about which Britain chose to remain silent, such as the issue of oil in the Falklands' basin. In the SD 22 (2.04.1982, Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] background analysis, and confidential summary from the Director of Latin American Affairs at the National Security Council) it is stated: "The growing economic potential of the islands area heightened diplomatic tensions in the mid-1970s. In 1974 a geological survey determined that the Falklands could be the center of a vast pool of oil – perhaps nine times the size of North Sea fields". In addition, in another report (SD 19, 2.04.1982, CIA Director William Casey sent a quick intelligence assessment on Falkland affairs to Haig) the position of the U.S. became pronounced; and also under the section "UK Options" Haig sets out a possible British plan of action, which in fact was used. Such alternative opinion helped us to judge the speeches of Thatcher.

3.3.3. Discourses

After we set up fields of action, genres, topics and texts, it is time to outline discourses which appear in the chosen materials. From all materials, we determined four main discourses (here, micro-topics): nationalistic discourse, war discourse, sovereignty discourse, diplomacy discourse.

The 'nationalistic' discourse is based on old imperial values and directly related to the British nation. Thatcher as a representative of government more than other actors used nationalistic discourse, sometimes imposing her wording or representing her words as words and opinions of other actors. Talking about wishes of people of the Falklands (Kelpers) she said: *"There is no reason to believe that they would prefer any alternative to the resumption of the administration which they enjoyed before Argentina committed aggression"* (MT 7, Speech at the HC, 14.04.1982), - which made a reader think that Kelpers themselves wanted to

stay under the British rule. The reason for their wish Thatcher expressed in the next passage: *“We have a long and proud history of recognizing the right of others to determine their own destiny. Indeed, in this respect we have an experience unrivalled by any other nation in the world”*, highlighting the superiority of the British nation. For ‘nationalistic’ discourse, the use of certain words and collocations of superiority is typical, like “proud history”, “our basic principles”, “superlative ships”, “excellent equipment”, “the most highly trained professional group of men”, “the most honourable and brave members”, “her majesty’s service”, “best traditions of the Royal Marines”. Moreover, most adjectives in these collocations are in superlative form. The use of adjectives and nouns that express belonging to British nation is also typical for this discourse: “people of British stock”, “way of life is British”, “alliance is to the Crown”.

The ‘war’ discourse is the easiest to determine. This discourse covers not only the Falklands war, but also the pre-war warnings and preparations by both sides. Under this discourse, actors discussed sub-topics of invasion, confrontation, the use of military means, defence, strategies and so forth. First of all, the ‘war’ discourse includes reporting about the course of action with phrases such as: “the first phase of the operation to repossess”, “British troops landed”, “forces of South Georgia formally surrendered”, “no casualties have been notified”. In this discourse the dichotomy “we” – “they” is especially important to mention. Thatcher deliberately emphasized that Argentina is “aggressor”, “invader” and a “dictatorship”, and Britain is “aggrieved”, “victim” and “democracy”. The difference between democracy and a dictatorship is also highlighted by the difference in the attitude: thus, a dictatorship is ready “to sacrifice 40000 lives”, and democracy “thinks about each one”. Often with the modal verb “must”, Thatcher insists how Argentina must behave (“must withdraw”) in order to close the conflict, and explains it with the verb “want” (“we want peace”). This dichotomy influences the formation of desired image and further makes it easier to justify the rightness of British action.

The ‘diplomacy’ discourse can be recognized as a continuation of ‘war’ discourse or as one of its sub-topics. However, since it was very pronounced in all materials we decided to highlight it separately. There are two nouns “diplomacy” and “negotiations”, which form this discourse. In the context of this discourse, the willingness of Britain to use diplomatic means was emphasized. This way, ‘diplomacy’ became the major feature to explain and justify the use of military means, like in this example: *“I support the dispatch of the task force. I support it because I believe that it can have strong diplomatic results”* (MT 16, Thatcher’s interview to BBC, 2.06.1982). We can distinguish three stages of the ‘diplomacy’ discourse: negotiations before invasion, negotiations after invasion, and the end of negotiations on the grounds of failure to reach the agreement. Each stage has specific characteristics. The first stage includes various idioms, metaphors and phrases – propositions, which explain the generation of diplomatic strategy: “we should be clear on this facts”, “we have no wish to build up this issue unnecessarily”, “to ensure that any further irresponsible and provocative actions of this nature are avoided”, “the rudeness of this communication provides, as I had hoped, useful material for leaking to others, if the chips are down”, “the ball is now in Britain’s court”.

The ‘diplomacy’ discourse on this stage gave us, actually, the basis to ask the question: did Britain know about the invasion in advance? If it did, then the use of constructions in the second stage (“there was no good reason on 3 March to think that an invasion was being planned”) is not appropriate and it means Britain behaved as a neo-liberal empire. The second stage of ‘diplomacy’ discourse involved a major reference to the UN Security Council (“in accordance with resolution 502 of the UNSC”), and to mediator Haig (“we remain in close touch with Mr. Haig”). Finally, the third stage can be summed up with a sentence Thatcher uttered on 29 April. “We have done everything that we can to encourage Mr. Haig’s attempts to find a solution by diplomatic means”. Last but not least, for the ‘diplomacy’ discourse, in general, the constant iteration of two

collocations “peaceful solution” and “diplomatic effort” is typical.

‘Sovereignty’ discourse is in most cases used as a way to explain why certain actions took place and why Argentina and Britain have no basis to fight over the territory of the Falkland Islands. It covers mainly the sphere of law with nouns: “right”, “agreement”, “dispute”, “proposal”, “regime”, “negotiations”, “measures”, “documentation”, “recognition”, “claim”, “possessions”. In this discourse, we often found the use of idioms. For instance, in the telegram Williams (Britain's ambassador to Argentina from 1980 to 1982) sent to FCO (British Foreign & Commonwealth Office) (SD 5): “making too much fuss”, “to build a golden bridge”, “to have knocked away his end” – which Williams uses in a loose interpretation of Costa Mendez’s (Argentine diplomat and Minister of External Affairs during the Falklands war) message about the sovereignty issue. British representatives tried to show that Argentine steps over sovereignty did not correspond to law. Linguistically it was expressed with adjectives: “disproportionate”, “provocative”, “adequate”, “illegal”. In addition, a verb in the form of negation (would not accept, could not be, should not condone) is used to highlight the incorrectness of Argentine behavior. It is worth noting that ‘sovereignty’ discourse was pronounced by Haig in his interview (SD 21, interview with Time Magazine, off the record briefing, 22.04.1982), where he in a way supported the British way of labeling of Argentine behavior, saying “the peace was broken by illegal action”, and at the same time justifies the American position, saying “the United States did not have the luxury of staying aloof”.

The distinction of these discourses and the linkage of them to the context of the case study characterize British behavior as neoliberal imperial. ‘Nationalistic’ discourse that serves the goal of revitalizing old imperial values frames Britain as an empire mainly internally, whereas externally it, in a way, reminds outsiders of British importance. ‘Diplomacy’ discourse highlights the neoliberal form of a state, which means that Britain

used soft power accepted in a modern society as a most appropriate approach. ‘Sovereignty’ discourse implies that Britain behaved according to the law, thus could not be called an empire, which might be concerned only to benefit economically or politically (again highlighting the neoliberal component). Without the context, diplomacy and sovereignty discourses would have nothing to do with imperial behavior. However, in the context of Falkland Islands’ case, both discourses are used to justify ‘war’ discourse. As a result, Britain aims at imperialist military action, but pronounces its position in a neoliberal way.

3.3.4. Interdiscursivity and intertextuality

Establishment of interdiscursivity and intertextuality is an important step, according to Wodak. She recommends establishing both after respective discourses and genres are outlined.¹⁴⁵ For this analysis, this step helps to further apply necessary generalization, since most of the materials we used, especially speeches, are too big to be analysed “clause by clause”¹⁴⁶, as Wodak suggests.

In general, intertextuality is the interconnection of “texts to other texts, both in the past and in the present”¹⁴⁷. The interconnection can be drawn in several ways: “through continued reference to a topic or to its main actors; through reference to the same events as the other texts; or through the reappearance of a text’s main arguments in another text.”¹⁴⁸ Moreover, when the same argument appears in different texts, we can talk about recontextualization, which implies the dismantling of the argument from the

¹⁴⁵ Wodak & Meyer, p.93

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, p.93

¹⁴⁷ Wodak, *The Discourse of Politics in Action*, p.39

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

context and then incorporation of it in another context.¹⁴⁹ Recontextualization often takes place when the same argument has to be used under different genres and in different situations.

The interdiscursivity should be mainly understood through the interlinkage of topic-oriented discourses. For instance: discourse of social exclusion often refers to the topics of education and employment.¹⁵⁰

The texts chosen for the analysis, first of all, are interlinked by the reference to the main topic, the Falklands war. Regardless of the discourses to which these materials correspond, all of them in one way or another cover the dispute of the Falkland Islands.

Second of all, we can distinguish the constant reference to the same actors: in general, Britain and Argentina, and in particular – foreign ministers, prime ministers, presidents, ambassadors and other official figures of the political stage that were involved in the dispute. Among these actors, several gained special attention. Thus, in the speeches, Thatcher frequently referred to Alexander Haig (MT 7, MT 8, MT 9, MT 10, MT 13), mentioning his important role in the conflict: “Haig, whose skills and perseverance I pay warm tribute”, “good offices of Mr. Haig”, finally “most powerful and the most suitable mediator available”. However, Haig himself articulated his position as (SD 21, interview with *Time Magazine*, off the record briefing, 22.04.1982): “We are not mediators. All we are doing is offering good offices to help...” The general reference to the UN Security Council was found almost in all speeches, as well as in some texts of the second group (SD 13, SD 16, SD 18, SD 19, SD 20, SD 21). The way of development of the argumentation with the reference to the UNSC will be discussed further. The other actors who gained a lot of space in the texts of both groups were Costa Mendez (Argentine Foreign Ministry) and Leopoldo Galtieri (the dictator of the Argentine military junta). It is the

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid, p.40

case that in the majority of texts where reference to Galtieri was raised, he is characterized through the dichotomy “us - them” and described negatively, often even without a reference to his name: “his [Reagan, who called Galtieri] pleas fell on deaf ears [Galtieri]”, “this dictator”, “country, some of whose people say that they will withdraw only if they succeed”, “Fascist dictator”, “Galtieri snubbed President Reagan”.

Thirdly, there are repeated references to the same arguments. For instance, in SD 1 (telegram from Carrington to governor of Port Stanley, 21.03.1982), Carrington, while providing the British strategy in the case of Illegal Landing of Argentine group in South Georgia before the war stated: “*If Argentine Party appear ready to behave correctly and to seek appropriate authorization, we will wish to consider the position.*” In SD 3 (telegram, Carrington to UK Embassy in Buenos Aires, 25.03.1982), a similar argument follows: “*Argentine men cannot remain illegally on British territory. We have given the Argentine government all possible latitude for finding low-key exit.*” In the second case, the argument is more defined, but the meaning is the same. We can equate underlined collocations: ‘cannot remain illegally’ = ‘appropriate authorization’, and ‘wish to consider the position’ = ‘all possible latitude for low-key exit’. The repetition of this argument is attributed to the discourse of sovereignty, and aims at articulation of the legality of British action and its fair behavior.

The same aim is manifested in the use of another argument. Lord Carrington said in SD 3 (telegram from Carrington to the UK Embassy in Buenos Aires, 25.03.1982): “*this situation has in no way been of our seeking. We had no wish to escalate it.*” And in SD 10 (Carrington’s message to Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez, 30.03.1982), Carrington repeated the same argument: “*the potentially dangerous position has in no way been of our seeking*”. The reiteration of same argument in this case helps to create an image of ‘victim – victimizer’, which was also used by Thatcher in her speeches to justify British behavior. Carrington’s argument was reshaped by Thatcher thus: “it was not Brit-

ain that broke the peace” (MT 7, speech at the HC, 14.04.1982), “We did not break the peace”(MT 9, speech at the HC, 26.04.1982), “the crisis was not of our making” (MT 16, TV interview for BBC, 2.06.1982), and more precisely “It was the Argentine invasion which started the crisis”(MT 10, speech at the HC, 29.04.1982), “Argentina began the crisis” (MT 13, Radio Interview for BBC radio, 19.05.1982). Moving from one text to another, this argument, first uttered by Carrington in March and in the context of Argentine illegal landing (not the war yet), was not only incorporated into another discourse but occupied one of the most important provisions in Thatcher’s argumentation.

Among the other arguments that are valuable for the establishment of intertextuality, we can distinguish several: an argument that can be summed up as it was an “unprovoked aggression” and “we have a right to do something about it” (MT 2, speech at the HC, 3.04.1982) was repeated many times, having appeared for the first time in the very first speech after invasion on 3 April (MT 2); the most common argument in the second group of texts bears a strong resemblance with the previous argument, but it was established in the telegrams of the period prior to the war and sounds as follows “we cannot allow Argentina to continue behaving ‘inappropriate’ and ignorant to our requests” as well as “the dangerous situation may have a risk of military confrontation and “far reaching consequences”; finally under nationalistic discourse an argument “these people are British and we should protect them” moves from one text to another, in some case acquiring the form such as “*they are still British and to go back there and to regain them*” (MT 5, Thatcher’s radio interview with IRN, 5.04.1982) or “*our mission is to give the people what they want – the right to live under British rule and to owe allegiance to the British Crown*” (MT 6, speech at the HC, 6.04.1982), and more “*through diplomatic, economic and, if necessary through military means, we shall persevere until freedom and democracy are restored to the people of the Falkland Islands*” (MT 7, speech at the HC, 14.04.1982). The last example gains particular importance in relation to the concept of neoliberal imperialism since it uses a lexical con-

struction similar to ‘fight for freedom’ :“military means to preserve freedom and democracy”.

There is a tight interdiscursive connection between chosen materials, especially the interconnection is obvious between the discourse of war, diplomacy and sovereignty. The dialogue about sovereignty always implies the use of diplomatic means, and in the worst cases leads to war, and this is exactly our case. The discourse of war is connected to the discourse of diplomacy as they constitute two sides of the one coin, where diplomacy being a soft power takes the attributes of no less fierce fighting than a real war with the use of arms. The discourse of diplomacy at the same time may touch upon the topic of sovereignty and war. Moreover, diplomacy discourse may reveal a flawed diplomatic strategy that led to war. The nationalistic discourse is the only one that appears more detached from the others, since it does not always raise the topics of war, diplomacy or sovereignty. However, in our case it relates to other discourses in a way that the topic of war includes nationalistic arguments like “these people are British and we have to protect them” or claims to sovereignty such as “the Falkland Islands are once more under the Government desired by their inhabitants. God Save the Queen”.

Such interdiscursive and intertextual interconnections helped us to make a coherent and cohesive analysis of the last point: the strategy of argumentation.

3.3.5. Argumentation

The analysis of the strategy of argumentation is an important step of our analysis. It helps to reveal whether argumentation is used to cover real or false reasons for an action. It is not only the content that matters, but also the way in which the argument is structured, the sequence of words in a sentence, the use of figurative expressions and so

on. Here we also pay close attention to the use of topoi and fallacies which are used in order to justify the action and to present the out-group as a “scapegoat”. Both topoi and fallacies will be described in the analysis. Our findings will be confronted with other facts that were found in other texts, and with the facts and social context and historical knowledge.

In two previous sections we mentioned the importance of the “us - them” dichotomy, manifested in a positive representation of Britain and negative one of Argentina¹⁵¹. Wodak states that positive self- and negative other-presentation requires justification and legitimation¹⁵², and the strategy of argumentation performs these functions.

Since we will not analyse each text “clause by clause”, the importance of interdiscursive and intertextual analysis becomes evident. Intertextual and interdiscursive connection of texts helped us to summarize the most important arguments that were used. We distinguished four main trends in argumentation: 1) the vagueness of the issue of time (when did Britain find out about the invasion being planned?) 2) war and diplomacy: what comes first? (Was Britain willing to resolve the problem by diplomatic means?) 3) the nationalistic discourse and the use of a ‘democracy’ argument 4) the reason to fight presented in the discourse of justification: (why did Britain have a right to fight?)

1. The first point concerns the question of timing. We assumed that Britain knew about the invasion in advance and it was British strategy not to prevent it. The question we addressed: ‘Did Britain know about the invasion in advance?’ A positive answer would mean that their intention had to be covered with false constructions.

In the official speech on 3 April (MT2), right after invasion, Thatcher reported

¹⁵¹ In chapter 2 we presented a table of discursive strategies suggested by Wodak.. The first two were: the strategy of nomination and predication. They are the ones that serve the goals of construction of the in- and out-groups and labelling these groups positively and negatively. However, we decided not to write about them separately but to include these characteristics as a part of argumentation strategy, since the use of positive and negative constructions is important to build the argument.

¹⁵² Martin Reisigl, Ruth Wodak, Discourse and Racism: European Perspectives, *Annual Review of Anthropology* 28 (1999), pp. 187-190

that, on 19 March *“the deterioration which cumulated in yesterday’s Argentine invasion began”*, however only after 22 March, *“we recognised the potentially serious nature of the situation”*. To justify herself, Thatcher used fallacy of hasty generalization (generalization without any evidence) when she said: *“there was no good reason on 3 March to think that an invasion was being planned”*. The adjective ‘good’ in this case counter-factually presupposes that there was a reason, but it was not good or good enough. Moreover, since she refers to this date, it means she possessed certain information about the invasion on 3 March. According to Wodak, presupposed content is usually accepted without much critical attention.¹⁵³ This way, Thatcher could say what is needed in order to manufacture consent on the issue. The general use of presupposition (either implicatures or insinuations) is quite common for Thatcher in the cases when the meaning has to be hidden.

Another explanation why there was no preventive action taken is expressed by the topos of history in the following passage (MT 2, speech at the HC, 3.04.1982): *“There have been several occasions in the past when the invasion has been threatened. The only way of being certain to prevent an invasion would have been to keep a very large fleet close to the Falklands, when we are some 8,000 miles away from base. No Government has ever been able to do that, and the cost would be enormous”*. The justification goes this way: ‘as history showed there was no real action, thus we did not need to act’. To make the argument more convincing, reference to quantities is used: ‘a very large fleet’, ‘8000 miles away’, ‘cost would be enormous’. The same convincing purpose pursues the adverb of frequency ‘ever’.

The similar argument with the use of fallacy of generalization and the vague quantifier ‘many’ was implemented to justify the action in MT 4 (Thatcher’s TV interview with ITN, 5.04.1982): *“We’ve had similar times from many Argentinian regimes, many times in the last year, many many times, and I suppose you could say we ought somehow to have known this*

¹⁵³ Wodak, *The Discourse of Politics in Action*, p.49

one was different. There is not much in going back and seeing whether we could have perceived this was different from all". There is no evidence presented, the speaker appeals to emotions and beliefs (verb 'to suppose'). The constructed hypothetical assumption with the verb 'could' is used to speculate about real possibilities (we could, but why would we do that?).

The question of preventive actions was addressed to Thatcher by one of members of Parliament (MP) on 6 April with reference to "unimpeachable sources" such as *The Daily Telegraph* and *The Times*. Thatcher answered "*even if we had known at the time of 19 March... we could not have got ships of the Fleet there in time*", "*the first time we had precise information was on Wednesday*", and referred to the sentence from *The Times* that "*there were ships but did not know their intent*" (MT6, speech at the HC, 6.04.1982). In this case Thatcher's justification is based on mix of several topoi: the topos of reality ('as reality shows we got information on Wednesday, the action could not have been performed earlier'), the topos of threat and number ('on 19 of March the threat was not identified or we had no evidence, thus no action was taken'). The first and third sentences challenged the second one by the phrases "there were ships" and "we could not have got in time", which means they had information before they took action.

Moreover, in the same speech another MP commented that the Government had had no warning of any attack or threat to the Falkland Islands (FI) until about a fortnight earlier. Thatcher used pathetic fallacy to answer (appealing to her prejudiced opinion): "*I do not believe that there was a precise threat*".

Now if we look at the first speech dating back to 26 February 1982 (MT1), we find confirmation that, already at that moment, the House of Commons was concerned about possible invasion and asked whether Britain was going to protect the islands. However, Thatcher dismissed the question: "*We have put the position to the people of the FI*

and we have said that their future is wholly a matter for their decision. In the meantime, we shall do our level best to meet the decisions of the Falkland islanders". Instead of giving the answer to the question, she used presupposed information about the issue of sovereignty which for Britain can only be changed by self-determination of the islanders. With such an answer she implicitly confirmed that the time to raise the issue of invasion has not come yet. The second group of texts also provided evidence: *"the Americans have reports (sources not given) that the invasion has been under preparation for three months."* (SD 23, call by UK Ambassador in Washington Henderson to FCO, 2.04.1982)

The linguistic analysis leads to the following conclusion: the rhetoric is false and hides the real meaning of the argument. To reach this goal, the speaker, first, structured the argument in a certain way, and second, justified the argument with fallacious constructions instead of concrete evidence. In addition, if we confront the information we grasp from the linguistic analysis with contextual information, we find the following: the first submarine reached the Falkland Islands on 19 April, 17 days after invasion. Hence, if the navy had been sent as soon as the issue was first time raised by the House of Commons (not to mention American reports), the invasions could have been prevented.

2. The next point of argumentation was summed up with the name "diplomacy or war: what comes first".

The question that was asked here is 'was Britain willing to solve the issue by diplomatic means?' Our findings show that the use of military force was the main objective for Britain, whereas diplomacy was used to create a façade of internationally acceptable behavior. To present argumentation in a systematic way, we divided all arguments into five groups: the problem shall be solved, our action is legitimate, diplomacy is not going to work, diplomacy should not exclude military, we will resolve the issue by force. Each group challenges the following and contrasts the previous. They will be presented indi-

vidually.

The first argument distinctively articulates the fact that the force is approaching. The clause with this information was found in MT 2, MT 4, MT 5, MT 8. For instance, in MT2 (speech at the HC, 3.04.1982) it sounds as: *“The Government has now decided that a large task force will sail as soon as preparations are complete”*. Here the argument is quite neutral, it just gives an idea that the government has considered the issue and the decision was made in favour of the task force. The similar argument in MT 4 (Thatcher’s TV interview with ITN, 5.04.1982) presented the information in a different way: *“what matters is we recover those islands. What matters is that fleet is on its way”*. The first sentence is based on topos of burdening - ‘we are burdened by the problem of recovery, we need to solve it’. From the one side, this observation shows that the FI were a burden to Britain, and from the other, suggests that Britain had an obligation to the islands. The pronoun ‘those’ highlights that the burden is distant, and stresses detachment. The second sentence is based on the topos of threat - ‘the threat was identified, and as a result the fleet was sent’. Most probably, Thatcher wanted to highlight the seriousness of the issue if she had built her argument on this topos. The same topos is also used in MT 5 (Thatcher’s radio interview with IRN, 5.04.1982): *“what we have to do dispatching a very large fleet”*. However, even more convincing in this sentence is the collocation ‘very large fleet’, because it claims to be seen as a statistic. Finally, another clause in MT 5 is a culmination of this argument: *“Sending the biggest fleet that’s ever been mounted in peace time.”* The adjective in superlative form ‘biggest’, which alone enhances the meaning, is complimented by the adverb ‘ever’ to emphasize the adjective. This hyperbolic construction is supplemented by the collocation ‘in peace time’, which is antonymic to the noun ‘fleet’. As a result neither of these clauses presumes that the diplomatic solution of the problem is expected.

The second argument is used to show that Britain was attentive to the opinion of

the international community and the UN. It challenges the first argument of the use of force. For instance in MT 2 (speech at the HC, 3.04.1982): “*NATO council called both sides to refrain from force and continue diplomacy*” and “*we don’t want to be accused of sabre rattling and war mongering*”. This argument is very demonstrative. The position of Britain is very clear: it did not want to be accused, but that did not mean the war was not the goal. The metaphor ‘sabre rattling and war mongering’ (reference to old-fashioned wars) is a figurative expression of an idea of groundless accusation. The continuation of this argument sounds like “*We urge meeting at the UN SC*”. Such argumentation was needed for two reasons: to justify Britain’s actions in the eyes of the world community and to enlist its support, and at the same time to make a clear division between the British position (although the real intention of Britain was to go ahead with a war and the use of force) and that of Argentina. It is easier to blame the opponent, when you have an image of being a law-abiding actor.

In other speeches, Thatcher referred to the UN SC: “*Our immediate goal in recent days has been to secure the withdrawal of all Argentine forces in accordance with resolution 502 of the UN SC*”, “*First of all, we seek a peaceful solution by diplomatic effort. This, too, is in accordance with the SC resolution*”. (MT 7, speech at the HC, 14.04.1982) The collocation ‘in recent days’ suggests that there were other periods of time when the immediate goal was different. The iteration of the phrase ‘in accordance with the resolution’ is a topos of authority, where the meaning should be read as ‘since the UN SC is an authority, our action is legitimate’. The persuasive collocation ‘first of all’ indicates the process, and implies the existence of other steps. In fact, Thatcher did not introduce any other options, thus left the sequence opened. Similar argumentation is used in MT 10 (speech at the HC, 29.04.1982): “*We have been involved in constant activity at the UN... discussed all possible ways in which the UN could play a constructive role in assisting Mr Haig’s mission*”. The reference to the UN (topos of authority) is supplemented here by the adjective ‘constant’ and collocation

‘all possible ways’, which reflect the creation of positive self-representation. In the end, this argument is intended to imply that Britain tried its best to solve the issue by diplomatic means.

The third argument can be summed up as “we have to recover the FI”. Thatcher twice repeated this argument in the interview on 5 April 1982. The best example to present here is: *“Our objective is to recover the FI. We have to do what is necessary to that.... I wouldn’t talk in terms of war. A declaration of war is something different. We must recover the FI for Britain and for the people who live there who are of British stock. Let’s not say this is war, it is not _ a declaration of war is technically different... don’t stress technicalities, we know what we have to do and there are many different ways of achieving that objective. Let’s hope that it is not the worst one”* (MT 4, TV interview with IRN, 5.04.1982). The paragraph shows that Britain wanted the war, but could not “talk the war”. It is built on the topoi of burdening, definition and justice. The topoi of definition and justice are mixed here and are expressed as ‘people are of British stock, thus they have a right to be protected and we as their country should protect them’. The topos of definition is also used here to say ‘this is a declaration of war, thus we are not doing anything unacceptable’. Moreover, in the document there is a comma missing (the place indicated with “_”). The absence of this comma is crucial for understanding: either the negation ‘it is not’ refers to the previous statement “not a war” or to the following noun ‘a declaration’. The confusion is supported by the last sentence of this paragraph. It is hard to understand whether it is a declaration that is not the worst way, or the war. Nonetheless, acknowledging the message of the first argument of this group that the fleet is on the way, Thatcher’s utterance about the declaration is nothing but false rhetoric.

The fourth argument was used to convince the public that diplomacy did not work. This argument was found in many texts (MT 5, MT 7, MT 8, MT 9, MT 10, MT 12, MT 13, MT 15, MT 17). Among common characteristics of this argument is the ref-

erence to the numerical evidence (topos of numbers): “we’ve been negotiating diplomatically for three years, and previous governments for many years”(MT 5, radio interview with IRN, 5.04.1982), “we’ve been negotiating now for about 6 weeks” (MT 12, radio interview for IRN, 17.05.1982), “for over seven weeks, nearly eight weeks”(MT 15, TV interview for ITN, 2.06.1982). The statistical evidence gave Britain an excuse to start military operation. Apart from exact numbers, Thatcher uses the vague quantifier “many”, as in MT 5: “we’ve been trying for many many years.” The following paragraph, in our opinion, deserved special attention: *“No-one has been more active diplomatically than we have in the last three years. Those diplomatic moves have failed and so of course we went to the Security Council and did very well to get a straightforward condemnation by the SC of Argentina and a demand for withdrawal, no-one could have been more active diplomatically than we have – if failed, we shall go on diplomatically, but it’s difficult to see how it could succeed now when it failed before”*. In the paragraph several topoi are used: the topos of numbers (‘last three years’) as a starting point of an argument; the topos of authority (‘Security Council’) to confirm the lawful behaviour; and the other two topoi, the topos of reality (‘we made diplomatic moves, but it did not work out’) and the topos of history (‘as history taught we failed to achieve the goal diplomatically, thus we should not continue diplomacy ’), are used to conclude the argument. Such complex justification most probably was caused by the wish of Thatcher/Britain to reject diplomacy and to move towards the option of military force.

Another common characteristic for this argument is the accusation of Argentina of the failure of diplomacy. For example in MT 7 (speech at the HC, 14.04.1982), the accusation is reached by the pathetic fallacy (conviction of a specific social group): *“Of course, we too want a peaceful solution, but it was not Britain that broke the peace.”* The tension grows when Thatcher bases her argument on the argumentum ad hominem (verbal attack on the antagonist’s personality and character): *“Of course, we would all prefer, and will do everything possible to seek, a peaceful settlement, but, as the hon. Gentlemen will understand, that it is*

not easy, particularly when seeking a settlement with a country, some of whose people say that they will withdraw only if they succeed in obtaining sovereignty as the price of withdrawal.” The disdainful attitude is articulated by an intentional reference to Argentina (country as a person) as to ‘a country, some of whose people’. In this case the impersonal reference ‘a country’ is used to create generalization, but the context presumes reference to Argentina, which only highlights the disrespect. In MT 9, Thatcher expressed disbelief in the prospects of a resolution through diplomacy: *“It may not be possible to achieve an Argentine withdrawal by negotiations, but this is what we are seeking.”* The clause does not sound like a categorical assertion because of the modal verb ‘may’, which is also important to introduce another point after the conjunction ‘but’. Finally, in MT 12 (radio interview for IRN, 17.05.1982) Thatcher stopped hiding the real position of Britain: *“Oh, we’ve gone as far as we can, yes. If they want peace they can have it by withdrawing.”* The exclamation ‘oh’ is itself meaningful and here can be understood as ‘how much more diplomacy?’ The second sentence is counterfactual and confirms that the problem has only one solution, and compromise is not foreseen.

The fifth argument was meant to articulate the idea that the use of force is not excluded. This argument first appeared on 14 April (MT 7, speech at the HC) as follows: *“Diplomatic efforts are more likely to succeed if they are backed by military strength”*. This argument challenged the previous one, since here military strength had been presented as a complimentary to diplomacy, thus did not require the failure of diplomatic moves. In the same text, Thatcher refers to the UN charter and justifies legality: *“We shall remain ready to exercise our right to resort to force in self-defence under article 51 of the UN charter”*. Thatcher warned Argentina and the international community that the use of military force was justified. Thatcher justified the use of force by presenting Argentina as a “brute force” and Britain as adherent to the “rule of law”. The passage represents nationalistic discourse: *“Others are watching anxiously to see whether brute force or the rules of law will triumph... through diplomatic, economic, and, if necessary, through military means, we shall persevere until freedom and de-*

mocracy are restored to the people of the FI". As a matter of fact, the antonymous constructions ('brute force' vs. 'rules of law', 'democracy' and 'freedom'), on which Thatcher based this argument, worked not only for, but also against her. If one opposes brute force to democracy, then the use of military strength shall be excluded. However, we see that democracy can be reached by military means, and the use of force is a rule of law. The questions are: what is the difference between Argentine 'brute force' and British 'military means'? Does 'democracy' justify the use of military means? This argument is a clear example of argumentum ad baculum ('threatening with the stick' or trying to intimidate instead of using plausible arguments), where the premise of justification lies in the expectation of unidentified 'others'. The last example of this argument fully destroyed other arguments in favour of the British wish to solve the problem through diplomatic means: *"What incentive would there have been for the Argentine junta to give Mr. Haig's ideas more than the most cursory glance if Britain had not under-pinned its search for a diplomatic settlement with the dispatch of the task force?"* (MT 10, speech at the HC, 29.04.1982) There are several ideas in this argument. First, the role of mediator Haig is perceived as weak if not useless, and expressed by collocation 'cursory glance'. Second, the conditional modal verb 'would' says that diplomacy was never perceived as an effective strategy. Third is the idea that Argentina understood only military strength ('what incentive would there have been if not the dispatch of the task force').

If we sum up these five groups of arguments we can conclude that Britain behaved as a neoliberal Empire. Neither the involvement of Alexander Haig nor the involvement of the Security Council was perceived by Britain to be a real solution to the problem. At the same time, the task force should have been strengthening diplomacy (or to be the only mean?), and the use of military means helped to restore 'democracy' and 'freedom'.

3. The third point concerns the reasons to fight for the F.I. The question that we addressed is: “Why did Britain have a right to fight?” The three main arguments were established: Falkland Islanders want to be British/do not want to be Argentine, the dictator must be stopped, Argentina forced us to use military means. Even from the first sight these three arguments are not the kind of argumentation one expects, since all of them represent fallacious argumentation.

The argument “Falkland Islanders want to be British” was the first time uttered on 3 April, but again arose only in the speeches made in May (MT 12, MT 13, MT 14). The argument is a part of nationalistic discourse and appeals to emotions. In MT 2 (speech at the HC, 3.04.1982), the argument is a pathetic fallacy as it appeals to prejudice emotions and it sounds like: *“No civilian casualties. People were in tears. They do not want to be Argentine.”* The important thing here is that all three sentences did not represent the cause-effect sequence. The fact that people were in tears was not necessarily caused by their wish to stay under the British rule. However, it is easy to dismiss the absence of the cause-effect connection between these sentences. Thus, such argument helped to make a fallacious conclusion.

The argument in MT 13 (radio interview for BBC radio, 19.05.1982) is based on the presupposition: *“The liberty of the FI must be restored. Why should they lose that freedom and exchange it for dictatorship?”* The wish of Falklanders to stay with Britain is presupposed. The comparison of ‘freedom’ with a ‘dictatorship’ helped the listener to assume that the Falklanders will not stay with Argentina simply because Argentina is a “dictatorship”. The absence of any other evidence tells that the argument is the argumentum ad hominem (attack on personality).

The other kind of this argument comes from the assumption that people who experienced invasion would not favour the invader. For example: *“After their experience I*

doubt very much whether that would be the wish of the islanders. Indeed, I believe that they would recoil from it.” Or a more advanced example in MT 14 (speech at the HC, 20.05.1982): *“No, I don’t believe for one moment that after what people have experienced they would see Argentine government as playing any part in their future. They didn’t want it before, they would not even consider a very long lease of say 250 years. They said “no, we want to stay with our British way of life”. Now that they have experienced what it’s like to live with the Argentines on the islands, I think that their hostility to the Argentines would be even greater.”* The argument is very vague. The scale of what has happened in reality is expressed by the topos of threat in the phrase ‘after what people have experienced’. However, Thatcher did not tell what exactly people have experienced, and gave the listener an opportunity to imagine what that was. As it may seem, the Argentine invasion benefited British claims to sovereignty over the islands.

The next reason why Britain had a right to fight is the argument with the key message ‘stop dictator’ (MT 4, MT 8, MT 12, MT 13, MT 17). We decided to use here the extended paragraph from MT 12 (radio interview for IRN, 17.04.1982) as an example: *“If an aggressor succeeds in what he sets out to do, if he goes in by force to hold land and continues to hold that land, subjugate those people, then there will be many other people in the future who will be treated the same way in other territories across the world. Therefore he has to go and he won’t go by negotiations, he has to leave and we have to take military action to ensure that he does. We make him go. As I said in the very first speech the cost of making a dictator, an invader go now, is very much less than of having other invasions, other dictatorships taking territory and peoples by force and then finally having to deal with them. So, he has to go.”* Thatcher in this argument made a harsh generalization about any territory and any dictator, on the basis of which she concluded: “he has to go”. The conclusion does not come from the premise, but comes from the topos of threat. Explicitly, the threat that other people might be ‘treated the same way’ forced Britain to take military action. Britain, in this case, is perceived as a “fighter for freedom”. Moreover, without presenting any evidence, Thatcher stated that “he won’t go by negotiations”,

what is the argumentum ad baculum ('threatening with the stick'). This argument is a clear example of false reasoning that is very typical for neoliberal imperialism.

The third reason was repeatedly expressed in the speeches (several times in MT10, MT 13 and MT 17). This argument involved two steps: it created a negative image of Argentina, and allowed Britain to insist on military action. In MT 17 (Radio Interview for Central Office of Information, 2.06.1982), Thatcher twice appealed to this argument. The first time thus: *"Argentina has rejected proposal after proposal. One is bound to ask whether the junta has ever intended to seek a peaceful settlement or whether it has sought merely to confuse and prolong the negotiations while remaining in illegal possession of the islands. Its objective is procrastination and continuing occupation, leading eventually to sovereignty."* In this passage, the use of lexicalization should be mentioned, which is expressed through the blatantly negative wording: the structure 'proposal after proposal', the adjective 'illegal', the nouns 'junta', 'procrastination' and 'occupation'. The negative assessment of Argentina was supplemented by the usual discrepancy between the premise and the conclusion of the argument: 'it rejected proposals, thus it wanted to stay on the island as long as it was necessary to achieve sovereignty'. In practice the rejection of proposals does not mean that sovereignty can be achieved.

The second time this argument went as follows: *"Resolution 502 was not honoured by the Argentines. Because it was not honoured, we do not need to negotiate in any way with the UN or anyone else about British sovereignty of the islands."* The euphemism 'was not honoured' aimed at creation of a less negative opinion. This argument was uttered in the interview Thatcher gave to the Latin-American service of the BBC on 2 June 1982, what meant that the audience was foreign. As a result the negative opinion was mitigated and replaced with the characteristic of honour.

All in all, the three reasons that were found in the argumentation are not based

on the real evidence but on false ideas, which appeal to emotions and distract the attention of the listener in order to make the conclusion appear reasonable and rightful.

3. The fourth point is the nationalistic argumentation.

All the arguments of this group are fallacious. Lexically, the arguments are predominantly uttered in an elevated or lofty style. The sublime rhetorical tone of expression gives the impression of a fiction book. The particular stylistic tinge of some words can be recognized as a distinctive feature of this group. For example: ‘paramount’, ‘unequivocal wishes’, ‘profoundly’, ‘great depth of feeling’, ‘the heel of a junta’, ‘liberty’, ‘justice’, ‘adventurism’, ‘did not flinch’. In the end, such nationalistic argumentation made the speeches more emotional and convincing.

Although the arguments were found in many texts (MT 2, MT 6, MT 7, MT 12, MT 13, MT 14, MT 15, MT 17, MT 18), only those from the MT 11 (Speech at the Shuttleworth Agricultural College, 30.04.1982) are presented here. This speech was a hymn of nationalistic argumentation. The first example is: *“We are not so relatively powerful today. The great powers in the world today are the US, as far as might is concerned, and the Soviet Union. And yet both still look to us, and I believe will continue to look to us, because of this thing which we have always had in Britain. We stand for right and we are the nation who can be trusted and everyone recognizes that.”* Thatcher presupposed the idea that Britain is also a great power. She reached this goal by building the argument on the fact that there are two great powers today and both look to Britain. The last sentence represents a fallacy of hasty generalization since there is no evidence that Britain’s position ‘we stand for right’ meant that the country ‘can be trusted’. In fact, one might ask whether trust is built on one’s will to stand for right.

Another passage in MT11 is as follows: *“Now these things haven’t changed, though we might not have quite the might, though when the fleet sailed, as you said, it looked absolutely marvelous. And now did realize that we are still, still, the third largest naval power in the world. So these things,*

might, right and majesty, we still have the tremendous majesty, the oldest monarchy which obtains today. We still have the right, and we're not half bad when it comes to might either." The entire paragraph is very metaphoric. The lofty style is supported by the wording 'might, right and majesty', 'tremendous majesty', 'oldest monarchy'. The last sentence deserves special attention in this case. The information is presented in such a way that the reader is impelled to an idea that Britain is an Empire. The use of verbs in form of negation helps to achieve this. The multiple use of the adverb 'still' can be understood as: the emphasis on continuation of certain trend or the emphasis of the meaning "even more".

For our research, the following statement of Thatcher in MT11 is very interesting: *"That liberty, justice and duty are even more important than peace, that we have duty.... To pass them on to future generations and if possible try to enlarge the area of the world which enjoys it."* The nouns 'liberty' and 'peace' are used as antonyms in this paragraph. However, the usual antonym for 'peace' is 'war', and for 'liberty' is 'imprisonment'. As a result, 'war' and 'liberty' would become synonyms, as well as 'peace' and 'imprisonment'. It was indeed a very "imperial" manifestation to propose that liberty can be opposed to peace and equated with the war. The key message of passing on these notions "to future generations" in the enlarged "area of the world" sound even more 'imperial'.

Finally, the last paragraph says: *"It used to be said by a great American politician, Dean Acheson, that Britain had lost an Empire but had not yet found a role. I believe Britain has now found a role. It is in upholding international law and teaching the nations of the world how to live and I'm proud to be Prime Minister of a country that has the role in the world of which we are a part."* Thatcher clearly stated that Britain has a role as of the United Nations ('upholding international law') and a right to teach other countries 'how to live'. In the first sentence, the use of noun 'empire' refers to territorial possessions, since it is contrasted to 'a role'. But the following sentence claims that Britain did not lose an Empire in a meaning of power

and authority.

The overall analysis of argumentation showed that Thatcher was using false constructions in her speeches and interviews, which implied a dual understanding of real British intentions. Britain was convincing the world community and its own citizens that there was no other option but to answer the Argentine invasion with military means, that Argentina is the only one to be blamed, that Britain just wants to secure its people. To reach this goal diplomacy was loaded with false and unclear ideas and structures, while the real evidence was dismissed. Carefully hiding its only wish to preserve the islands through thick and thin, Britain behaved as a neoliberal empire.

Conclusion

The formation and reformation of any socio-political system is a complex and long-lasting process. Many attempts have been made throughout history to simplify this process and consider the transition towards a new socio-political system as an end of the old one. In reality, the transition can represent a distinct and pronounced period which is in fact a special socio-political formation with its own characteristics.

This study has proposed that Britain was at a stage of a new socio-political formation in the period of the late 1970s and the early 1980s - neoliberal imperialism.

Having researched the basic definitions which form the theories of imperialism and neoliberalism, as well as the development of Britain in the abovementioned period (late 1970s- early 1980s) of the 20th century, this paper distinguished features characteristics of both imperialism and neoliberalism. As a general rule, tensions and conflicts, preexisting within a country, were resolved by economic transformations, highlighting the existence of a neoliberal component. Conflicts arising outside a country (particularly in regard to countries with a lower level of development) were usually solved by force, and this is an explicit sign of an imperial component. Hence, neoliberal imperialism is a combination of imperialism and neoliberalism, and the predominance of either component characterizes ongoing external and internal politics. By investigating processes, which took place in Britain in 1970s-80s, features inherent in both neoliberal theory (economic reforms of Thatcher) and the theory of imperialism (the Falkland Islands' conflict) were noted.

The accession to power in 1979 of the Conservative government with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who were following the principles of neoliberalism, was a consistent result of historical and economic processes that took place in Britain in the preceding period following the end of WWII. The radical change of the position of Brit-

ain in this period forced it to look for an alternative way of development, which was found in neoliberalism. Nevertheless, since Britain was still closely tied to its imperial past, that past haunted it. After economic reforms, the situation in Britain changed: the rights of workers were damaged, but the power of the rich got stronger. Against this background, British nationalism and imperial ambitions got stronger.

The analysis of the Falkland Islands' case study showed the following: neither the geographical location of the islands, nor the state of their economy gave a reason to consider them vital to Britain. Of utmost importance to Britain in this conflict were imperial ambitions, which were used in order to show power and influence on the political arena.

The critical discourse analysis of documents, namely – Thatcher's public speeches at the House of Commons, interviews with Thatcher, and various telegrams and reports, most of which were declassified in 2012 – confirmed that:

- Britain had an opportunity to solve the conflict peacefully, but preferred force;
- The decision to use force was covered by false theses about “freedom” and “democracy”;
- The image of Argentina as an aggressor and Britain as a victim was propagated to legitimise the use of force;
- False rhetoric techniques were used to convince the public that peaceful resolution of the conflict was not possible.

Thus, the politics of Britain in 1979-82 was neoliberal by form, and imperialist by content. As an outcome, the answer to the main question of the research: “Did the behavior of Britain in the case of the Falkland Islands' war in 1982 characterize it as a neoliberal Empire?” is positive. According to the analysis of the case, the neoliberal component was realized by intentionally softened use of language, while the imperialist component was realized by the military action, which could have been prevented. Both analysis of the

context and the discourse representation of the Falkland Islands' case helped to conclude that Britain of the 1979-82 can be labeled as a neoliberal empire.

Further research might be concerned with the analysis of new materials to be declassified in the nearest future, analysis of Spanish sources and possible comparative study of the concept of neoliberal imperialism and its discourse manifestation.

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Appendix 1.

Table 1. List of topoi with description

Topos	Description
Topos of Burdening	if an institution is burdened by a specific problem, then one should act to diminish it.
Topos of Reality	tautologically infers that as reality is as it is particular action should be performed.
Topos of Number	if sufficient numerical/statistical evidence is given, a specific action should be performed
Topos of History	because history teaches that specific action have specific consequences, one should perform or omit a specific action in a specific situation
Topos of Authority	if one refers to somebody in a position of authority, then the action is legitimate
Topos of threat	if specific dangers or threats are identified, one should do something about it.
Topos of definition	a person or thing designated X should carry the qualities/traits/attributes consistent with the meaning of X
Topos of Justice	if persons/actions/situations are equal in specific respects, they should be treated/dealt with in the same way
Topos of Urgency	decisions or actions need to be drawn/found/done very quickly because of an external, important and unchangeable event beyond one's own reach and responsibility

Appendix 2. Sources for analysis

Table 2

#	Type of document	Theme/additional information	Link	Date
MT 1	MT Public statement: Speech at the House of Commons	Various topics covered, the case of the Falkland Islands mentioned only once	http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104881 Hansard HC [18/980-84]	25 February 1982
MT 2	MT Public statement: Speech at the House of Commons	The invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina	http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104910	3 April 1982
MT 3	MT letters	Letters to persons leaving the Government (Atkins, Carrington, Luce)	http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104911	5 April 1982
MT 4	MT TV Interview with ITN	The discussion of the invasion and the case in general. The interview began at 17.30	http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104913 Thatcher Archive: transcript	5 April 1982
MT 5	MT Radio Inter-	The discussion of the invasion	http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104913	5 April

	view with IRN	and the case in general. The interview followed the ITN interview	er.org/document/104914 Thatcher Archive: transcript	1982
MT 6	MT Public statement: Speech at the House of Commons	Falklands War and defence as one of the topics	http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104915	6 April 1982
MT 7	MT Public statement: Speech at the House of Commons	Falklands War, Defence as one of the topics	http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104918	14 April 1982
MT 8	MT Public statement: Speech at the House of Commons	Falklands War, Defence as one of the topics	http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104921	22 April 1982
MT 9	MT Public statement: Speech at the House of Commons	Falklands War and Defence as a main topic	http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104924	26 April 1982
MT 10	MT Public statement: Speech at the House of Commons	Falkland War – key topic	http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104928	29 April 1982
MT 11	MT Public statement: Speech at the Shuttleworth Agricultural College	Falklands War as one of the topics. Speech to Mid-Bedfordshire Conservatives	http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104929 Thatcher Archive: OUP transcript	30 April 1982
MT 12	MT Radio interview for IRN	Falklands War. The interview was held at 15.30, at 17.00 many local radio stations broadcast the interview in place of the news	http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104938 Thatcher Archive: COI transcript	17 May 1982
MT 13	MT Radio Interview for BBC Radio	Falkland Islands as one of the topics	http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104784	19 May 1982
MT 14	MT Public statement: Speech at the House of Commons	Falklands War – key topic	http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104943	20 May 1982
MT 15	MT TV Interview for ITN	Falklands War, 15.45 – 16.00	http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104952	2 June 1982
MT 16	MT TV Interview for BBC	Falklands War, 16.10 – 16.25	http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104789	2 June 1982
MT 17	MT Radio Interview for Central Office of Information	Falklands War. Recorded for later broadcast on the BBC Latin-American service	http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104953	2 June 1982
MT 18	MT Public statement: Speech at the House of Commons	Falkland Islands	http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104969	15 June 1982

* MT – Margaret Thatcher

Table 3

#	Type of the document	Theme	Link	Date
SD 1	Telegram to Port Stanley	Carrington advice to governor "Illegal Landing in South Georgia"	http://www.margarettatcher.org/document/118391	21 March 1982 Declassified in 2012
SD 2	Fearn minute for Ure	"Illegal Landing at South Georgia"	http://www.margarettatcher.org/document/118402	25 March 1982 Declassified in 2012
SD 3	Telegram to Flash Buenos Aires	FCO to UKE Buenos Aires/ "South Georgia"	http://www.margarettatcher.org/document/118400	25 March 1982 Declassified 2012
SD 4	Fearn minute to Ure	"South Georgia"/ Possible response to Argentine intransigence	http://www.margarettatcher.org/document/118404	26 March 1982 Declassified in 2012
SD 5	Telegram to Flash FCO	UKE Buenos Aires to FCO/ "South Georgia"/ UK Ambassador's talk with Argentine Foreign Ministers	http://www.margarettatcher.org/document/118407	28 March 1982 Declassified in 2012
SD 6	FCO minute to FCO South America Department	"South Georgia: Legal Action"/ possible legal action to ensure departure of Argentine party from South Georgia	http://www.margarettatcher.org/document/118543	28 March Declassified in 2012
SD 7	Telegram to Immediate FCO	UKE Washington to FCO /"South Georgia"/account of Henderson's conversation with Deputy Secretary Stoessel; suggestion of US inclination toward neutrality in dispute	http://www.margarettatcher.org/document/118409	29 March 1982 Declassified in 2012
SD 8	Telegram to Immediate FCO	UKE Buenos Aires to FCO ("South Georgia: Argentine Press Treatment"	http://www.margarettatcher.org/document/118408	29 March 1982 Declassified in 2012
SD 9	Telegram Immediate Washington	FCO to UKE Washington /"South Georgia"/ Carrington meeting with US Charge D'Affaires Streater	http://www.margarettatcher.org/document/118544	30 March 1982 Declassified in 2012
SD 10	Telegram to Immediate Buenos Aires	FCO to UKE Buenos Aires /"South Georgia"/Carrington message to Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez: "I would propose sending a senior official as my personal Emmissary to Buenos	http://www.margarettatcher.org/document/118545	30 March 1982 Declassified in 2012

		Aires"		
SD 11	Telegram to Immediate FCO	UKE Buenos Aires to FCO/Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez meeting with US Ambassador to Buenos Aires/"It appears that Costa Mendez's reaction was wholly negative"	http://www.margarett-hatcher.org/document/118546	30 March 1982 Declassified in 2012
SD 12	Telegram to Immediate FCO and to Immediate Buenos Aires	UKE Buenos Aires to FCO /"South Georgia: Argentine Press Treatment"/reporting on Falklands crisis in Argentine press	http://www.margarett-hatcher.org/document/118442	31 March 1982 Declassified in 2012
SD 13	Telegram to Flash UKMIS New York	FCO to UKMIS New York /"Falkland Islands"/Argentina invasion of Falklands appears likely; possible UN actions	http://www.margarett-hatcher.org/document/118431	31 March 1982 Declassified in 2012
SD 14	Telegram to Flash FCO	UKE Buenos Aires to FCO /"Falklands Crisis"/ UK Ambassador delivers message to Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez	http://www.margarett-hatcher.org/document/118518	31 March 1982 Declassified in 2012
SD 15	Telegram to Immediate FCO	UKMIS New York to FCO /"Falkland Islands: Security Council" /unwise to call Security Council unless there is an immediate threat of an Argentine invasion of Falklands	http://www.margarett-hatcher.org/document/118432	31 March 1982 Declassified in 2012
SD 16	Fearn minute to Ure	"Falkland Islands: UK Response to any Argentine Action"/possible diplomatic responses to Argentine invasion	http://www.margarett-hatcher.org/document/118522	1 April 1982 Declassified in 2012
SD 17	US Secretary Haig letter to Carrington	US efforts regarding Argentine landing on South Georgia/"we have a greater chance of influencing Argentine behaviour if we appear to them not to favour one side or the other"	http://www.margarett-hatcher.org/document/118550	1 April 1982 Declassified in 2012
SD 18	Telegram UKMIS New York to FCO	"Falkland Islands" /results of meeting of UN Security Council	http://www.margarett-hatcher.org/document/118435	1 April 1982 Declassified in 2012
SD 19	Memorandum	Casey memo for Haig /"Quick Intelligence Assessment on Falklands Affairs (April 2nd, 1982)"/Galtieri's "generally aggressive foreign policy"; Cuba, Soviets will be wary	http://www.margarett-hatcher.org/document/114334 CIA Records Search Tool (the "CREST database") at National Archives II in College Park	2 April 1982 Declassified in 2007
SD 20	FCO record of conversations	US Secretary of State Haig-Carrington /third call by Haig to Carrington	http://www.margarett-hatcher.org/document/118438	2 April 1982 Declassified in 2012
SD 21	Memcon: Interview of Time Magazine	Haig off the record briefing to Time (extract on Falklands) /"neither side	http://www.margarett-hatcher.org/document	22 April 1982

	with Haig	wants war"	<u>/114276</u> Thatcher digital archive (per US State Department)	Declassified in 2012
SD 22	Memorandum	CIA background analysis /"The Falklands Dispute - An Historical Perspective"/"only a minor irritant in bilateral relations ... until 1965"	http://www.margarett-hatcher.org/document/114289 CIA Records Search Tool (the "CREST database") at National Archives II in College Park	2 April 1982 Declassified in 2008
SD 23	FCO Minute	"US Help" /call by UK Ambassador to Washington Henderson to FCO; Henderson "confident that the US would strongly condemn the invasion if it took place"	http://www.margarett-hatcher.org/document/118440	2 April 1982 Declassified in 2012
SD 24	Telegram	UKE Buenos Aires to FCO /"Falklands Crisis"/"rude" communications by Argentina	http://www.margarett-hatcher.org/document/118441	1 April 1982 Declassified in 2012

* SD – the abbreviation from Secret document

CURRUCULUM VITAE

Personal information

First name / Surname	Irina Safronova
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E-mail	iren.safronova@gmail.com
Nationality	Russian
Date of birth	22. November 1987

Education and training

Dates	October 2010 till present day
Title of qualification awarded	Joint/Double degree - A Master of Arts in Global Studies (Erasmus Mundus Global Studies – A European Perspective).
Principal subjects/occupational skills covered	Theories of International Relations, Globalization and Regionalization, International Forecasts and Simulations, Foreign Aid, Communicating Science (Media, Public Diplomacy, Communication), Theories of Global History, Economic Science (Development economics, Welfare economics, The Networked Information Economy, Frontiers of Commodities), Cultural Studies, Research Methods
Name and type of organization providing education and training	Wroclaw University (Poland), Institute of International Studies; University of Vienna (Austria), Department of History
Level in national or international classification	Higher Education
Dates	September 2005 –August 2010
Title of qualification awarded	Specialist degree in Public Relations
Principal subjects/occupational skills covered	Principles and Practices of Public Relations, Communicating Science, Professional Writing, Methods of Social Research, Introductory Statistics, Economics, Political Theory and Methodology, Research Methods.
Name and type of organisation providing education and training	Voronezh State University (Russia), Journalism Department, major in Public Relations
Level in national or international classification	Higher Education

Work experience

Dates	August 2012 – present day
Occupation or position held	Project Assistant
Main activities and responsibilities	Administrative and logistical support; Organisation of meetings and missions, Communication with counterparts, experts and suppliers; drafting of budget forecast, contribution to Financial management (SAP knowledge), translations
Name and address of employer	ICMPD (International Centre for Migration Policy Development), (Vienna, Austria)
Dates	February 2009 – October 2010
Occupation or position held	Treasurer
Main activities and responsibilities	One of the founders of AEGEE-Voronezh, local antenna of AEGEE (European Students' Forum); Financial reporting; Preparation and presentation of financial statements; Promotion of AEGEE; Organisation of local and international events.

Name and address of employer	AEGEE-Voronezh (European Students' Forum) (Voronezh)
Dates	September – October 2009
Occupation or position held	Internship, Marketing and PR department
Main activities and responsibilities	Prepared materials for publication; Working with mass-media; Development of PR activities.
Name and address of employer	State Unitary Enterprise "Semeinie Fermi Belogoriya" ("Family farms of Belogoriya") (Belgorod)
Dates	July – August 2009
Occupation or position held	Internship, journalist
Main activities and responsibilities	Prepared materials for publication.
Name and address of employer	"Ekonomika i Zhizn – Chernozemie" newspaper ("Economy and Life – Black-Soil Region") (Voronezh)
Dates	March – May 2009
Occupation or position held	Internship, Marketing Department
Main activities and responsibilities	Conducted sociological research.
Name and address of employer	LLC "Investicionnaya palata" ("Investment house") (Voronezh)
Dates	August – September 2008
Occupation or position held	Internship, Research Department
Main activities and responsibilities	Conducted sociological research; Analysed results.
Name and address of employer	The Independent Noncommercial Organisation "The Institute of Political Analysis and Strategy" (Voronezh)
Personal skills and competences	
Mother tongue	Russian
Other languages	English – fluent German – basic (B1)
Self-assessment	
Social skills and competences	Intercultural skills, acquired through experience in international voluntary camps, active membership in AEGEE, studies in multi-cultural environment; Communication and interpersonal skills, acquired through work as journalist and as an advertising manager; Team working skills and flexibility, acquired through organisation of international events in the framework of AEGEE activities; Excellent written and oral communication skills gained from giving presentations and working as journalist.
Organisational skills and competences	Leadership (was responsible for a team of 40 people); Good experience in project and team management due to planning and organising events (AEGEE Summer University Moscow-Voronezh, the Open Day Meetings at the University of Voronezh, current work in ICMPD); Ability to manage and carry on negotiations; Good analytical and diagnostic skills, acquired through internship in sociological institute.
Computer skills and competences	Knowledge of Microsoft Office tools (Word, Excel, PowerPoint); Basic knowledge of graphic design (Adobe Illustrator, PhotoShop, CorelDraw); experienced Internet user.

Additional information

Participated in the following youth forums:

- NMUN (France, Lille, February 2012)
- Fifth International Forum for Public Communication (Moscow, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, April 2008);
- Fourth All-Russian Forum of Young PR Specialists "Sphera" (Moscow, Moscow State University, January 2008).
- Festival "Provintsiya: communication technologies of the third millennium" (Voronezh, October 2006);

Participate in more than 10 seminars and workshops about different aspects of Communication Science.

Completed a full-time course at EF International School of English (Malta, July 2008).

Participate in the students' communication club "Compromise" (Voronezh, Mart 2009).