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global power since 1946“

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ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to better understand endogenous specificities and peculiarities of the Brazilian foreign policy on the pursuit of international power. It is remarkable that the country does not afford the traditional means, namely military puissance and economic strength, at the expected level to claim being an international influential in the modern Western world. Such a fact poses myriad problems to several of the relevant approaches in International Relations, Economics and Globalization theories, be they classic or contemporary. Brazil can hence be seen as an anomalous case of emergent power, even different from the other BRIC countries, which conversely possess salient continuous growth, sophisticated military apparatuses, and even nuclear weapons.

Brazil has been trying throughout the entire republican history to channel its given natural richness, relevant population and territorial sizes into exerting more power and having active voice in international decision-making. Nonetheless, it was only after the World War II that the country initiated comprehensive political strategies to engage in a state-led modernization process, aiming at world noteworthiness. Thus this work draws upon Brazil and the contest for global power, comparing the milestones from 1946 to 1991 and from 1992 to 2010. The second period marks a turning point when the country actually reaches many of its goals. At last, the purpose is to trace and identify the sources of effectiveness and ineffectiveness of the policies established on the course of time.

In sum, the ultimate conclusion which I dedicate to conceive in this thesis is the gauging of eventual presence of elements from the Brazilian history that contribute to the knowledge of power-building. In other words, the questions herein posed are whether or not Brazil holds new sources of capabilities in international relations, and, if so, how they impact global order.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Diese Arbeit untersucht die endogenen Charakteristika und Besonderheiten brasilianischer Außenpolitik beim Streben nach internationaler Macht. Es ist bemerkenswert, dass der Staat nicht den traditionellen Weg, d.h. militärische Macht und ökonomische Stärke, verfolgt um einen Platz zu beanspruchen als international einflussreiche Größe in der modernen westlichen Welt. Diese Tatsache stellt viele der gängigen Ansätze der Internationalen Beziehungen, VWL und Globalisierungstheorien, egal ob klassisch oder zeitgenössisch, vor vielfältige Probleme. Brasilien kann folglich als Anomalie einer aufsteigenden Macht gesehen werden, die sich von anderen BRIC Staaten mit ihrem hohem Wirtschaftswachstum, fortgeschrittenen Militärapparaten und sogar Nuklearbewaffnung unterscheidet.

Brasilien versuchte während der gesamten Zeit als Republik die natürlichen Reichtümer (wie Bevölkerungsstärke und Landesgröße) zur Ausübung von Macht und Einfluss in internationalen Entscheidungen zu nutzen. Trotzdem gelang es dem Land erst nach dem 2. Weltkrieg politische Strategien zu entwickeln die zu einem staatlich gelenktem Modernisierungsprozess führten, welcher darauf gerichtet war die internationale Bedeutung Brasiliens zu erhöhen. Dem folgend wird die vorliegende Arbeit Brasiliens Wettbewerb um globale Macht nachzeichnen und die historisch signifikanten Perioden von 1946-1991 und 1992-2010 vergleichen. Die zweite Phase markiert dabei den Wendepunkt an dem das Land zum ersten Mal etliche die angestrebten Ziele erreicht. Die Arbeit wird Brasiliens gewählten politischen Strategien auf ihre Effektivität, bzw. Ineffektivität analysieren und durch die Zeit verfolgen.

Zusammenfassend ist diese Arbeit bemüht die historischen Elemente der Machtsteigerung Brasiliens zu untersuchen, um so einen akademischen Beitrag zur Erforschung der Frage der Machtgenerierung in den Internationalen Beziehungen zu leisten. In anderen Worten stellt diese Arbeit die Frage ob Brasilien neue Formen der Einflussmöglichkeit in ihren internationalen Beziehungen entfaltet und falls dies zutrifft, welchen Einfluss diese auf die bestehende Weltordnung nehmen.

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INTRODUCTION

Global governance has been mushrooming into one of the most common terms in current economic and political debates. Along with it comes the equally cliché term BRIC, which is composed of countries purportedly predestined to be among the major players of new international order, if not already. Brazil is among these select few. More than ever, large territory and population lead to greater economic and political clout, and thus, countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China have momentum to consolidate their ability to influence the international system. This chapter seeks to focus on the Brazilian development by analyzing how the state has interacted with other agents to make its voice heard internationally. However, to understand the current tools that Brazil has to continue in this direction, it is required to first look at its history as far back as post-World War II. Over the period studied between the 1940s and the 1980s, Brazil had, for the first time, begun a public national(istic) plan to develop itself into a powerhouse. The results and side effects of the policies of this time span will vigorously influence the current Brazilian project to become a global player. In sum, the questions to be answered in this chapter are the following: Has the state-directed economic development from the 1940s to the 1980s created new sources of power? How has this policy contributed to Brazil's role as an international actor?

This thesis seeks to better understand endogenous specificities and peculiarities of the Brazilian foreign policy on the pursuit of international power. It is remarkable that the country does not afford the traditional means, namely military puissance and economic strength, at the expected level to claim being an international influential in the modern Western world. Such a fact poses myriad problems to several of the relevant approaches in International Relations, Economics and Globalization theories, be they classic or contemporary. Brazil can hence be seen as an anomalous case of emergent power, even different from the other BRIC countries, which conversely possess salient continuous growth, sophisticated military apparatuses, and even nuclear weapons.

Brazil has been trying throughout the entire republican history to channel its given natural richness, relevant population and territorial sizes into exerting more power and having active voice in international decision-making. Nonetheless, it was only after the World War II that the country initiated comprehensive political strategies to engage in a state-led modernization process, aiming at world noteworthiness. Thus this work draws upon Brazil and the contest for global power, comparing the milestones from 1946 to 1991 and from 1992 to 2010. The second period marks a turning point when the country actually reaches many of its goals. At last, the purpose is to trace and identify the sources of effectiveness and ineffectiveness of the policies established on the course of time.

In sum, the ultimate conclusion which I dedicate to conceive in this thesis is the gauging of eventual presence of elements from the Brazilian history that contribute to the knowledge of power-building. In other words, the questions herein posed are whether or not Brazil holds new sources of capabilities in international relations, and, if so, how they impact global order.

Over the last two decades or so, a wave of optimism flooded Brazilian scholarship, public opinion and politics. Economic and political stabilities, strong economic growth, and honorific foreign titles, such as being a BRIC country, resulted in several pieces of research discussing how the Global South would overthrow the traditional powers in the near future. Many other works drew upon interconnectedness among these select few emergent countries. Often, works were conducted to assess the rise of China and the demise of the United States as we know it today. Nevertheless, very little research was conducted aiming to understand what “overthrow” means or what the path is that our “autonomy” pursuit has been taking and to think critically whether the current situation in Brazil is exactly the way it is being largely put by many scholars or if Brazil is not so much overcoming the status quo as one may think. It is then important to create new knowledge on Brazilian impact in the world and on the suitability of its choices toward being a powerhouse.

In order to do so, I will divide this work in three chapters, containing as follows: 1) Historical economic development from 1946 to the 1980s. The strategies and policies established in this period tell us much about Brazilian understanding on what should be pivotal for development and international recognition. This first chapter will explain the paths towards power backed on economics and steered by the hands of the state; 2) Multi and bilateral relations with Brazil during the Cold War Period. The second chapter will deal with a different front, namely direct international politics. Commercial, technical, cultural and political agreements have served many purposes, amongst which the escalation of power and autonomy that the Brazilian state believed have the right to have before a very unbalanced and unpleasant international decision-making; 3) Comparison with the post Cold War era. This last chapter will present the same layers of a state previously studied (economics, politics and international relations), but showing their fundamental operating and philosophical changes after 1991. It will be important to understand remarkable lurches and alterations on the pattern of effectiveness of Brazilian power politics. Therefore, the third chapter will pave the way for the conclusion of this thesis, which seeks to identify the contributions Brazil posed on the knowledge of power development beyond prediction of mainstream theories. Provided that each chapter will discuss different areas of knowledge, they will have their own specific methodology described in the respective introductory sections.

CHAPTER 1:

Economic development and state power – the Brazilian developmental state from the 1940s to the 1980s

1.1. Introduction

When one studies social sciences, analyzes current international conjunctures or simply reads newspapers, it is noticeable that the international system environment looks different from the one of some decades ago. If on the one hand this statement does not constitute itself in a valid argument because history is always an endless changing process, on the other hand, such changes are never entirely by accident. Many recent studies point to the fact that there is a shift of the center of power from the US, Europe and Japan towards former peripheral countries and mainly towards the BRICs¹. If seen separately, some countries possess classic attributes that explain, at least in part, their growing importance. No one must be a specialist to conclude that the Chinese economic development has taken it to a different stage of importance in the last two decades. Also the size and technology of its Armed Forces catch the eyes of any traditional international relations analyst; technological islands of excellence and nuclear weapons coupled with fast economic growth make the Indian case not so different from the one of China; and Russia is not a young player in this game either. Russia has played an important role since the 17th century under the imperial expansion of Tsar Peter, the Great and, across the ages, the only period it had its global prominence drastically diminished was right after the collapse of the USSR. More recently in its economic recovery linked to its oil resources and its remaining nuclear weapons arsenals, Russia has been put back in an impacting position; However, Brazil is a case apart. Obviously the aforementioned factors are not the only ones posing a shift; it has also to do with other internal factors, historical reasons and with specific internal phenomena occurring within these classic powerhouses. Nevertheless the economic and military aspects are present, at

¹ FLEMES, Daniel. **A visão brasileira da futura ordem global**. P.403-436

different levels, in the relative success of the BRICs, but not exactly in Brazil. Let me turn the attention to this.

To the eyes of traditional or even conservative thoughts, Brazil has an anomalous shape. In contrast to the other BRICs, Brazil possesses, for instance, only one 55-year-old aircraft carrier, which was bought from France after the latter country had transformed it into a floating museum. The state company responsible for developing weapon technology for the Brazilian Armed Forces and also for exporting armament had its apex during the 1970s and now it only produces small civil guns, counter to the country's aspirations. Furthermore, the last time that Brazil reached the current economic growth rates of the ones from India or China was between 1971 and 1974. Naturally these factors are not enough to once and for all determine success or failure of a country, they are just some indicators. Lacks of technology/innovation, sustained economic growth vigor, and of obsolete military equipments are not coherent in a country that is working towards being a powerhouse in the contemporary constellation of capitalism and the international order. At this point I pose the introductory questions: what are the sources of power that Brazil affords to claim to be voiced in the international forums at the same elite platoon as China or even the US²? What are the elements of Brazilian foreign policy to exert power rather than the classic ones? Are these elements really new? Are they effective considering Brazilian foreign interests? These questions are not meant to be responded now, but to orientate the debate throughout the whole text.

Concepts and Methods

Preliminarily I will sustain a double-layered argument in which a) I affirm that the traditional theories in International Relations, Realism and Liberalism, do not suffice to explain

² It can be argued that is not known if being at the same level as China and the US is the main goal of the Brazilian foreign policies. First of all, this is what it is meant by the concept BRIC: the countries that in the future will bypass the current powerhouses, in other words, will be as or more powerful than these classic centers; second of all, it is way less likely that one is able to prove, by analyzing Brazilian set of foreign policies since the post-World War II, that Brazil has been investing to be in a different position.

the form of power exerted from Brazil. According to the majority of authors of Realism and of its “neo” variations, power is a force from A over B or more actors that arouses a rush on the latter actor(s) to acquire more power. As Realists put it, power is the ability of one state to use material resources to get another state to do what it otherwise would not do.³ Although negative, this would be the inevitable essence of the system. According to the Liberals, power is seen the same way, but it is surmountable through the establishment of institutions and the learning from past negative experiences. As previously said, these are not new views and do not bring up any longer a fruitful range of new conclusions. Otherwise, the concept of power used in this work will be starkly inspired by the work of Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall et al.⁴ Their train of thought draws upon a much broader meaning of power. They offer an interesting set of tools to check real life policies and phenomena and how they can give momentum to the diverse forms of powers.

The authors explain that power can be categorized as follows: *Compulsory power* – direct control over others; *Institutional power* – indirect control over others through multilateral institutions; *Structural power* – political ability to create interests in actors and; *Productive power* – socially diffuse production of subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification. Barnett & Duvall et al. however will not be alleged herein to give a definitive account of power because, as a result of social relations, it is indisputably constantly changing. Notwithstanding, the intellectual framework they propose helps to open a way to realize the reductionism of the traditional Realism/Liberalism, which just account for compulsory and institutional power, as well as of new theories such as “soft power”, which mainly envisages structural power only. A better analysis of it concerning Brazil will be developed when I reach to my thesis that policies implemented in the country over the 1940s and the 1980s privileged an incomplete understanding of power and the two first forms damaged the development of the two last ones.

³ BARNETT, Michael & DUVALL, Raymond et al. **Power in global governance**. 2005. P.2

⁴ BARNETT, Michael & DUVALL, Raymond et al.. *op cit*.

b) In order to back the Brazilian search of power I will propose that many economic policies in fact have weakened the state rather than reinforcing it and consequently the capacities of the state of planning, acting and executing have been harmed for several times. The so-called Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policies have become the core path to finance the project of Brazil as a powerhouse. I will also pose that ISI and industrialization in Brazil constituted itself in an ambivalent fashion: during some periods it was seen as the means for higher political goals and during other periods it was seen as the end itself. Such an indefiniteness of priorities has led Brazil to a few setbacks. Argument “b” is centered inherently on domestic factors and the state-directed development. This layer will be interwoven with the argument “a” of state-directed acquisition of international power. This will require the interplay of different theories and points of view, but I will be intermittently referring to the “Neo-statist” theory proposed by Linda Weiss and John M. Hobson⁵. They suggest that just a strong state has the ability to plan, the mechanisms to execute, and power to sustain its goals. Furthermore Neo-statism affirms that strong state is not the one, which controls and intervenes or, in other words, rules over the society, but rather the one that rules through and from the society. In this logic, the always alleged minimal state of Britain during the early capitalist era was otherwise strong rather than weak as usually argued on the literature. Certainly several criticisms against Neo-statism’s assumptions fit, but the intellectual reflections it comes up with are indeed enriching for this chapter. Weiss & Hobson and Barnett and Duvall et al. are complementary and interconnect the discussions of my both layers of argument.

Organization of the Chapter

This chapter will be divided into five sections. First, I will present the historical background which will guide to the context that culminated in the actual happenings to be analyzed; Second, I will present brief considerations on modernity and modernization process in

⁵ WEISS, Linda & HOBSON, John M. **States and Economic Development**. 1995

Brazil, because these concepts will be present throughout the text it is important to understand their specificities for the country's reality; Third, I will show a short review of how the developmental strategies came to be and the role of the state; Fourth, the interplay between domestic development and its implications for Brazil's international participation will be analyzed in order to better comprehend the mutual impacts on the two faces of the state; Fifth, I will prepare a conclusion which aims to summarize responses to the two main proposed questions.

1.2. Background

It is usual for the Brazilian scholarship in economics to label the period from its independence (1822) until the end of the World War II as the "Brazilian economic formation" and, only after that, the studies of "Brazilian economy" start. This is the mainstream taught at the universities throughout the country, the interpretation being that before 1945 little or nothing had been made to construct an insulated Brazilian economy. The system and policies implemented by the government until then used to privilege the continuity of the former Portuguese colonization patterns such as monoculture (sugar cane or coffee, depending on the historical phase); plantation systems; exhaustive extraction of natural resources; black slavery; and an absolutist monarchy with a very strong military control over society. Dom Pedro I, who declared the independence from the Kingdom of Portugal, crowned himself as the emperor of Brazil and carried with him what he had learned of politics from the European system and, in turn, tried to reproduce and put in play what in Europe had been an early stage of the imperial era (and golden era for Portugal). Therefore, no medium or long term state plans had until then ever been issued to foster any kind of innovative development of the economy or of the politics. Despite of any Liberal analysis that can be made out of this situation, the argument here is that Brazil was, intentionally or not, intending to repeat early moments of a system which was collapsing throughout the whole "Western" world, the Absolutism. It is worth remembering that Europe had already gone through the Glorious and the French Revolutions that had given

momentum to industrialization, Republicanism and certain levels of liberalism. Such ideals had spurred a *modernization process* (this will be a pivotal discussion on specific section) in the Americas and resulted in the Republican US in 1776 and in the Haitian Revolution in 1804, among others.

Brazil did not assimilate those historical changes even with overwhelming internal contradictions and external pressures, it differently preferred to be like the Portugal from the 17th century. It is not being defended that Brazil should necessarily follow the steps of the others, otherwise it is being posed that the full set of changes all around Brazil had also reshaped reality and this fact makes it more difficult for a country to sustain an opposite-directed development. Countries that try this usually either incline to isolation, create new systems or succumb to *modernity*. Brazil was until mid-19th century an agro exporting economy. Coffee set the tone for the Brazilian economy's directions and was highly subsidized by the government. Such a situation sustained the Brazilian economy until the second half of the century when the industrialization in the US and Europe already produced surplus and need for new markets. Until 1912 the European and American economies sought the Latin American ones as import markets for their manufactures by noticing their domestic potential. The presented scenario launched a gradually increase of the Brazilian commercial deficit. To reinforce that, heavy investments in coffee over the years has led its production to be greater than the global demand, therefore its price decreased violently. Thus some coffee growers decided to invest in industries that seemed to be more profitable. Brazil had already 17 million inhabitants in 1890 and it was a fertile field for scaled production⁶. Brazil succumbed then to modernization. In 1888 slavery was abolished and in 1889 the Republic was proclaimed after a military coup d'état. Despite these major events, profound economic and political reforms did not occur as could be forecast or even expected. State kept its authoritative rule and the economy still depended mostly on coffee production.

Even without a unified national plan or strategy, a sparkle of industrialization naturally surged from the coffee elites during the World War I, when the world economy entered into

⁶ SANTOS Jr., José Aldoril dos Santos & MATTEI, Lauro. **ISI in Brazil and Argentina: a compared history analysis**. p.6

crisis and the imports of non-essential products (mainly from Europe, the Brazilian largest export market) such as coffee decreased drastically. A small portion of the so called “barons of coffee” then decided to invest their assets in industries. These coffee growers, inspired by the capitalist success coming from the North of the pre war, ignited a clumsy, specific and inefficient industrial sector. Once more, a portion of foreign success was intended to be reproduced in Brazil without however the same historical reasons which give momentum to the same success to happen abroad (this will be more widely discussed during the section on modernity).

President Getulio Vargas took the power after leading the Revolution of 1930, which overthrew the elected president Washington Luís and, with it, the “República Velha” (or Old Republic as the period from 1889 to 1930 is called) was brought to an end. Vargas instituted a new style alongside with profound shifts on the understanding of the role of the state. The “Estado Novo” (or New State as Vargas’ administration from 1937 to 1945 is called) created for the first time a national plan that enlarged the action and the responsibilities of the state with the society and the economy. Firstly, the state was reshaped to perform increasingly complex functions in the overall economy. Secondly, the government economic policy has become more ambitious, reaching high confidence in the destiny of a nation, which in its broadest sense constitutes what might be called “Nacional-Desenvolvimentismo” (or Developmentalist Nationalism). Externally, the crisis in coffee prices and the capitalist depression posed new challenges for policy makers and businesses; internally, the determination as a policy option to promote the growth of industries reflected the interests of the urban masses who demanded employment and higher income, the national bourgeoisie who demanded space for their business and of the military means to ensure that its required responsibility for security and defense would be guaranteed. The aim was to modernize, which then mingled mostly with the concept of industrialization.⁷ Vargas promulgated several laws protecting labors, fiscal incentives to some

⁷ SILVA, Heloísa C. M. da, **Deterioração dos termos de Intercâmbio, substituição de importações, industrialização e substituição de exportações: a política de comércio exterior brasileira de 1945 a 1979.**

segments of the industry and imports of supplies for it. Nevertheless, the possible new paths for the Brazilian politics and economy were still rooted in the capital that the elite of coffee growers held, but this secular reality would switch radically during and mainly after the World War II. Vargas' first cycle of administration lasted from 1930 and 1945 and he would govern again from 1951 to 1954. His management will be resumed and more profoundly taken during the section on the analysis of Brazilian industrialization.

1.3. Considerations on the Brazilian economic process of modernization

Modernity and the process that originates from it, the modernization, are challenging topics for any research work. Their sense is broad and takes many forms and interpretations. Therefore the intention is not to exhaust the theme, nor to provide a comprehensive *state of art*. Instead, the intention is to isolate a few focal points which might help understand the path taken by Brazil toward its economic development and state power construction.

As already mentioned, the US and Britain had been supporting the Brazilian political and economic restructuring since the early 1900s due to a new phase of capitalism they had entered into. However since the immediate post-war, the North American interests in supporting economic development initiatives in Brazil, including industrial development, demonstrated during the 1930s and the years of armed conflict, changed completely. The priorities of that country were clearly centered in Europe and later in Asia, and in 1946 the US position that the financing needs of Latin America and the external resources would depend on the ability of Latin American governments to create favorable conditions for foreign investment was already public⁸. It is noteworthy that Brazil was the only Latin American country to fight in the World Wars I and II with material resources and troops. The Brazilian state expected then to receive economic or political compensations in the aftermath of the success of the Allies. Such compensations never

p.40; WIRTH, J.D. **The Politics of Brazilian Development, 1930-1954**. p. 23; FONSECA, Pedro D. **Vargas: o capitalismo em Construção**. p. 312.

⁸ SILVA, Heloísa C. M. da, **Deterioração dos termos de Intercâmbio, substituição de importações, industrialização e substituição de exportações: a política de comércio exterior brasileira de 1945 a 1979**. p.42

came to be after either war, and this fact aroused more than dissatisfaction in the government, the economic elites and in intellectuals. Opinion makers of that time ventured in studies that usually converged to the single perception that Brazil was being explored and increasingly dependent of the system it helped create. At this point a strong sentiment of anti-colonization, unfair distribution of international power, and international division of labor took over public opinion strongly than ever before.

As Himadeep Muppidi puts it, “It is not enough for some to define others as objects. It is also necessary for those who are objectified thus to reproduce, to live up to, their presumed ‘responsibilities’ as objects of a colonial global order”⁹. The general feeling was that the US could choose when and how Brazil would develop; it would be limited and constrained according to the sovereign American exercise of power. Technology and capital for this development used to have three geographical sources: US, Britain and Germany. After the World War II, these pillars had been reduced to one, the US. Furthermore, Brazil had not reacted against the American neglect after the World War I and performed the same outlay level and political support to the US for the World War II. The Brazilian support to the Allies that could be interpreted as a matter of good will towards the West during the first version of the war, now was interpreted as an obligation for the Second War. Elaine Scarry so states:

Our behavior toward objects at the exceptional moment when they hurt us must be seen within the context of our normal relations with them...the chair routinely relieves the problems of weight. Should the object prove insufficiently mimetic of awareness, insufficiently capable of accommodating the problem of weight..., the object will be discarded or set aside. (Scarry, 1985: 295-96)

In this context the Brazilian government found itself pushed, but also motivated, to define an aggressive plan of industrialization, development, modernization and search for safe levels of independence. So began the largest state-directed long-term developmental plan ever made until then. Brazil was not alone. Along with it, many other Latin American and Asian countries also felt disadvantaged. The technological superiority of Americans and Europeans;

⁹ MUPPIDI, Himadeep. In: BARNETT, Michael & DUVALL, Raymond et al. *op cit.* p.282

their advancement phase in the industrial revolution; and the huge productivity capacities were used to make the so called “Third World Countries” no match to compete in international market or even to have power enough of defining their own fate. The observed reaction for this was the appearance of nationalistic policies and the public defense of inward economic development through vigorous state control. In South Korea, the influential economist Ha-Joon Chang summed up the logics behind it by saying that all major developed countries – including the United Kingdom – used interventionist economic policies to promote industrialization and protected national companies until they had reached a level of development in which they were able to compete in the global market, after which those countries adopted free market discourses directed at other countries in order to obtain two objectives: to open their markets to local products and to prevent them from adopting the same development strategies which led to the developed nations' industrialization.¹⁰

Thereby the foundations of the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) were historically and theoretically placed. Apart from simple industrial growth, “Import substitution refers to a set of ideas about why mass poverty has prevailed and continues to prevail in many countries while other countries have grown rich, and about a general approach to the elimination of that poverty.”¹¹ In other words, ISI attempts to respond and in turn solve the problem of why some countries develop and others do not. Herein I turn to the initial point of the section, modernity. Import Substitution represents the bulwark of poor countries in the modern theory in play from the post war until the 1980s. The theorists of these policies aim at finding paradigmatic strategies to take their countries out of the backwardness. Modernity inaugurates such a dichotomy in which the world is divided into two groups: the modern and the backward; also called, the well-succeeded and the failed; or as well as the advanced and the traditional; or still, the developed and the underdeveloped. The countries that did join the

¹⁰ CHANG, Ha-Joon. **Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective**. 2003

¹¹ BRUTON, Henry J. **A Reconsideration of Import Substitution**. P.904

capitalist bloc during the Cold War had made their “choice” and saw a unique route of success to follow the historical steps taken by the banners of capitalism, the US and Britain.

Neo-mercantilism in comparison

According to the ideas expressed by Chang, I have the strong tendency to interpret that the developing countries such as Brazil and South Korea in fact planned to resemble, during the 1940s and 1950s, the Britain from the 17th and 18th centuries, when this latter integrated the mercantilist Europe. It is a historical common knowledge that Britain began and strongly boosted industrialization during this era (First Industrial Revolution). Nevertheless, it would not correct to consider that suddenly Britain has simply decided to be different and that this is necessarily translated into industrialization. A given moment and constellation promoted it. I will not go into minor details about them but what interests us is the fact that in a period of some 200 years about 76 wars, rebellions, and civil wars broke out in Europe. Bullionism, and rapid accumulation of metals and wealth were matters of survival because they were the means to finance wars. There is nothing new in this statement and the classic theories of International Relations translate accurately this environment. States are the primary force of modern world and they struggle in a daily basis to keep their existence. In sum, politics is the end and the economy is the means; both are parts of the engine of a zero-sum game in which the accumulation of wealth is the strategy of winning resources to the detriment of others' losses. In this scenario the industrialization performs a dynamo that increases the productivity that in turn will promote surplus to export and diminish the imports, culminating in accumulation of capital and fast manufacture of weapons. Thus if all the ends and goals are political-based, the state should be the one coordinating and encouraging this process. Thereat, it is possible to observe that the states in their initial phase of industrialization in Europe used to have a very centralized government in charge.

All the aforementioned is necessary in order to present three points of comparison between the historical reasons that have linked industrialization in European Mercantilism and in

Brazilian “neo-Mercantilism”. First, unlike in Britain, Brazil was recreating inward policies of industrialization and accumulation of capital as an end in itself. Early capitalist development in Britain or even in France and Switzerland cannot be seen as end in itself as it is not consciously associated with improvement of educational system, social well-being and justice, like the contemporary development literature claim to be¹². In other words, neo-Mercantilism inverts the values of Mercantilism by putting economy on the top. One may argue that it would be simply an adaptation and not a problem. Indeed the inversion of values is not a shortcoming *per se*, otherwise the industrial boom in Britain was naturally conceived, not necessarily intentional and mostly a consequence of broader political concerns. On the other hand should Brazil promote the same success, then the state must have the ability to put together most of the constellation of factors and foundations that once were a historical given. Thus the development will happen artificially conceived, intentional, and as a choice, provided that the state must account to do so. The state runs the risks of the chosen anachronistic policies.

Second, Britain was moved to industrialization because of their high incidence of war and in turn the threat to the existence of the state, specifically. Therefore industrialization was a demand and one cannot consider it as inevitable at other conditions. Weiss and Hobson remark that “China was a case in which powerful commerce and rich revenues did not lead on capitalism, industrialization or ‘development’ because economy is not enough to explain development in Western model.(...)The absence of warfare was the essence of the lack of will to industrialize in China.”¹³ This means that capitalism and development are neither necessary nor an inevitable process like the modern theory from the 19th and 20th centuries makes us believe. Russia is another example that demonstrates that an international powerhouse simply did not choose to industrialize until the 19th century. In this last case, no foreign power was really threatening the integrity of the Russian territory and as a conclusion its government joined industrialization only

¹² For example: PAULA, Silvana de & DYMSKI, Gary A. et al. **Reimagining Growth: towards a renewal of Development Theory**. 2005

¹³ WEISS, Linda & HOBSON, John M. *Op cit.* p.60-61; 87

way later. Both cases show that Mercantilism and rush to develop was a European phenomenon and not universalistic. The point here is to show that Brazil also did not hold a background of warfare that could be able to rush elites, government, and other agents in necessitated industrialization. Economy alone was ballasting development and this economic rationality insulated from politics in a misinterpretation of developmental science that came up the post-1945, as Weiss and Hobson argue. I would add to this that development theory on the post-war is inevitably attached to the contemporary modern theory and is, as such, problematic.

Third, Britain and a few more countries benefited from the pioneer factor. The inventors of the industrialization had the clear advantage of not having competitors throughout the whole world and so consumer markets were easily available when they advanced to the export-promoted phase. Britain no longer depended on imports due to its industries and could also meet the international demand for manufactured goods. It was clearly not the case of the world during the 1950s (or even decades before). As a conclusion, the reproduction of early British industrial success was problematic and brought about several risks and dangers to the contemporary state. However I will not argue on the success or failures of the ISI policies, a vast literature on it was already produced and beating a dead horse is not the purpose. What I propose though is to analyze the consequences of a development plan inserted in the just debated philosophy for the state and its power capacities. Before this, I will look more closely at the development plan in action.

1.4. Brazilian state-directed development

One of the almost unanimous invariables in classic scholarship on economics is that development is good. For obvious reasons, Liberal literature takes development as an end and, as such, it is always valuable. The question for this section is then whether development could ever be harmful. Such a question opens up scope for many books therefore I do not intend to give a definitive and comprehensive answer and even less construct or deconstruct entire economic

theories. By using previous established studies, I will render problematic on the effectiveness of Brazilian development strategy according to its presumptions. As a logical assumption that might be part of an eventual answer, I argue that the rational economic development is a choice of priorities and as such opts to develop in some daily life layers to the detriment of others, ergo it ought to change on the course of history whom its outcomes will benefit.

“The economic development can no longer be natural...in other words, the deliberate purpose of guiding facts to the fulfillment of the fundamental design of economic development.”¹⁴ This sentence is from a 1952 ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, or CEPAL in Spanish) convention which focused on the development of Latin American states. Under this spirit, states throughout the whole subcontinent triggered inwardly-driven policies that would allow them to import less and accumulate capital in order to lessen international dependence. In Brazil, exchange rates were devaluated, tariffs to import consumer goods were raised whereas production goods were lowered. BNDE (National Economic Development Bank, acronym in Portuguese) was founded to invest in industries; incite foreign capital; to create centralized and authoritative federal government; and the project “Brazil, the Powerhouse” was officially issued. Weiss and Hobson, while discussing late developers, cited the well-renowned author “Alexander Gerscehkron in his book ‘Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective’ (1962) who argued that late developers such as Russia and Germany in the 19th century required strong state intervention in order to catch up with the early developers...”¹⁵ the greater the degree of backwardness, the greater the degree of state intervention.”¹⁵ Brazil established almost 55 years of dictatorial governments during the implementation of the ISI policies. In this sense, large plans of a nationalistic character that generate economic profits also help keep authoritative governments in power, once they pleased the elites, many created jobs and appealed to the ideation of the nation. It created a

¹⁴ BIANCHI, Ana Maria. **Reimagining growth – Towards a Renewal of Development Theory**. P.34 (citing document of CEPAL, 1952: 2)

¹⁵ WEISS, Linda & HOBSON, John M. *Op cit*. p.93

virtuous cycle in which ISI and government feed one another and where stability may be confused with prosperity.

Many authors highlight that the rate of imports really decreased after the reforms, but the capital was mainly foreigner so, in the end of the day, the imports did not decrease in fact, but changed their nature (from importing goods to importing capital). Furthermore until the 1990s no substantial investments had been made in technology and innovation, consequently the knowledge to develop the economy and the industry had also to be imported.¹⁶ This represents already the opposite of the prerogative of capital accumulation and industrialization observed in Britain. Despite the described contradictions so far, one may not disregard the rewards that 30 years of economic growth fostered. After President Getulio Vargas left office in 1951, Juscelino Kubitschek went on with the modernization process. In 1956 he decreed the “Plano de Metas” (Plan of Targets) which established for the first time an annual growth goal for the industry; regulated the relations between private, foreign and state owned capitals; increased the state’s share of direct investments in base industry (steel, mining and petrochemicals) as well as in infrastructure (telecommunications, transport and energy). As a result, in fact consumer goods imports were widely reduced and were replaced by domestic production.¹⁷ The great slogan of Kubitschek administration was “50 years in 5” alluding to the intention to make Brazil develop in 5 years what would, without the “Plano de Metas”, take it 50 years.

Earlier I cited the well-known Gerschekron’s quote concerning latecomers and state intervention, here his conclusion gives a framework to explain the moment in Brazilian economy because the state indeed increased its intervention. Nevertheless the explanation offered by Alice Amsden seems to be more accurate when it comes to this specific case, as she phrases it, “the later a country industrializes in chronological history, the greater the probability that its major

¹⁶ LIMA, Saulo de Castro. **Da substituição de importações ao Brasil potência**. 2011; SUZIGAN, Wilson. **Estado e industrialização no Brasil**. 1988; SILVA, Heloisa Conceição Machado da. **Deterioração dos termos de intercâmbio, substituição de importações, industrialização e substituição de exportações: a política de comércio exterior brasileira de 1945 a 1979**. 2003

¹⁷ SUZIGAN, Wilson. *Op Cit*. 1988

manufacturing firms will be foreign-owned.”¹⁸ This is due to that “The distance from the world technological frontier and the degree of government intervention, therefore, do not necessarily move in unison in a latecomer. Instead, as the distance from the frontier rises, what probably does increase is the role of the foreign firm.”¹⁹ “Plano de Metas” did not promote the expected overall growth. Instead there has been an enormous expansion of certain sectors and specific industrial branches such as carmakers. Volkswagen and General Motors founded their plants in Brazil over these years after the federal government has constructed hundreds kilometers of highways connecting important cities. Alice Amsden goes further in explaining that “economic development is a process of moving from a set of assets based on primary products, exploited by unskilled labor, to a set of assets based on knowledge, exploited by skilled labor.”²⁰ During Vargas administration the traditional sectors of agriculture and cattle raising (that constituted some 90% of Brazilian GDP until that moment) were rapidly jeopardized by sudden incentives cuts and by becoming less overriding for public policies for the first time in centuries. Masses of peasants lost their jobs in the countryside and there was neither time nor investments enough to professionalize them in industrial work. As a result, unskilled labor and no technological innovation generated a non-expected gap. However the basic industry created in this time laid the foundations for the rapid growth observed in the late 1960s.

Between 1963 and 1967, though, the economy went into recession. The deterioration of the balance of payments, the falling profits, high inflation rate, and labor masses striking for better work conditions led Brazil to an economic setback. According to Saulo de Castro Lima paraphrasing Paul Singer, “The notable expansion of our (Brazilian) exports in the last ten years, is not a result of our technological superiority” as occurred in Japan and Germany, “but the abundance of our natural resources and low cost of our manpower.”²¹ Thus the populist alliance in power since 1961 did not enjoy social support and in 1964 a military coup empowered the

¹⁸ AMSDEN, Alice. **The rise of the rest**. 2001. P.286

¹⁹ Ibidem

²⁰ Idem. P.2

²¹ LIMA, Saulo Castro de. *Op cit*. P.36

most dictatorial government in the Republican history of Brazil. After three years of profound and modernizing reforms, Brazil adopted an ambivalent figure by keeping a liberal discourse towards economy and controlling basically every single aspect of social life and the society through politics. In 1967, President Costa e Silva proposed the “Programa Estratégico de Desenvolvimento” (Strategic Program for Development) which aimed to reduce inflation rates, maintain jobs at cost of severe salary policies, attraction of foreign capital, and establish heavy state investments in basic industry. Under this program the country returned to growth and the dictatorial government became positively popular, Saulo Lima explains "...all confidence in the great destiny of Brazil in the early 1970s is represented in the II PND, which would be the way to complete the condition of the country as a powerhouse," taking up the idea of nation as a project to be built, which ridgepole will now have finally completed its paving"(LESSA, 1988, p.53)."²²

During the dictatorship the motto “Brasil Potência” (Brazil, the Powerhouse) became a common place. Many other economic plans came year after year and the pattern has been consolidated, the economic power mingled with state power in the international system and development became an end in itself. Nationalist and vainglorious discourses set the tone to overcome grievances, intermittent recessions, political discontents, and outrageous inflation rates that reached 40% per annum in the 1970s and 330% in the 1980s, on average. By the 1970s, the economic developmental plans changed and began holding the promotion of exports as a principle for two main reasons: first, the multinational companies that opened plants in Brazil and produced manufactures at low cost had the interest to export and the government did not have policies to enable it²³; second, Brazil had the immense need to attract external resources to continue financing its policies. However after eight aggressive modernizing plans, the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 and the oil crisis in 1979, the situation of the Brazilian economy deteriorated. External financing was scarce; debt of the balance of payments entered into a

²² Saulo de Castro. *Op cit.* 2011. P.39

²³ SILVA, Heloisa Conceição Machado da. *Op cit.* 2003

vicious cycle for over a decade; and the country could not afford importing so much technology and oil to its industrial yard anymore.

The industrialization policy adopted gave priority to the new export sectors, limiting the replacement of some imports of intermediate goods industries, without extending it to vital sectors, such as equipment incorporating advanced technology [...] started, since 1964, a new cycle of our economic history - the export of industrial products - which promises to repeat the previous ones, bringing prosperity to certain areas and groups, whose ephemeral character follows the ups and downs of the capitalist world economy, which he is hopelessly tied. (SINGER, 1977, p.94)

Despite the efforts, the development was incomplete and super dimensioned in some sectors. Brazil never overcame these imperfections as South Korea and Taiwan did in the same time span. In the 1980s the dictatorship fell and the external moratorium dominated the national politics and the economy. The artificial plans for development encountered self-built and natural barriers along the way. ISI rendered profits to the economy as whole, indisputable, because the economic condition in which Brazil had been immersed from the 1822 until 1945 as a non-attitude taker was changed forever at the core of its society and politics. On the other hand, the dream to become a powerhouse in a bit more than 40 years is still to be analyzed in order to understand if the means reached the end.

1.5. Brazilian development and state power – mutual impacts

The development programs issued by the Brazilian government are deliberate state-led attempts to take the country to be respected in the international environment after centuries of sentiment of full foreign dependence. In order to so accomplish, the state has to be strong enough so that the ideal factors for the success of the strategies can be established. The state must have conditions to penetrate the society and conduct coordinated changes in the macro sphere. In sum, it is imperative that the state is capable of executing its plans effectively. The figure of a strong state is usually seen in the classic literature as the one that imposes its will and interferes in a top-down fashion. Weber exemplifies well this understanding in his famous concept that says that the state has the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force. Realist

theorists make use of this concept to describe the prerogatives of a state as the driving force of history. Liberals also refer to this very often when they construct their dichotomy between interventionist and minimal state. Imposition and intervention are seen then as a choice of action of the state. They may or not use their right of coercion, but it is there inherently as a given. For the purpose of this analysis I will however not use the adjective strong meaning the choice for active violence, instead the difference between strong and weak lies in the effectiveness to coordinate the whole society towards a common objective or, in other words, to turn a national plan into socially legitimate and feasible. Strength and power are thus intimately related once power is seen herein as ability to execute something.

Power as ability to execute something is portrayed well by the work of Hobson and Weiss in their book *States and Economic Development*. Their work helps create an understanding of the role of the state that differs from the Weberian theory and is more suitable if one seeks to analyze developmental processes. “States compromised with internal negotiations with power groupings reinforce economic activity instead of the state that (forcibly) extracts material sources from its population...Despotic states generate instability and lack of governance with it.”²⁴ State power cannot be seen as a zero-sum game where the state would be a villain that usurps the society, likewise the two-level game theory proposed by Robert Putnam²⁵ suggests. Power and state strength should be seen as an interdependent relation between societal groups, once internal resistance is energy-consuming and, as such, a barrier. Weiss and Hobson suggest that a strong (also called infrastructural) state leans on three dimensions: *penetrative power* as being the state’s capacity to naturally legitimize its acts; *extractive power* as being the effectiveness of raising resources without resistance and; *negotiated power* in which societal and governmental interests are harmonized through negotiations. Contrarily to what Liberalism and Marxism affirm, state is not opposed to or even an enemy of the economy, but the first can positively foster the latter’s

²⁴ WEISS, Linda & HOBSON, John M. *Op Cit.* p.4

²⁵ Robert D. Putnam. **Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.** *In:* International Organization. 42(Summer 1988):427-460.

activity. “To a certain extent the history of capital accumulation is the history of state infrastructural power”²⁶

In a comparative view, Britain was a very strong state during its nascent-capitalism phase, despite of a whole literature that calls it “minimal state”. The presence of a Parliament inserted the economic elite in the daily state decisions. The collection of taxes and the expenditure of public money for national strategies were therefore easier because the power groups that were directly affected took part in the politics²⁷. Even if they could not control or veto the state’s decisions, they could negotiate and have information on how and what their resources would be used for. Thus interests tended to merge and the third dimension of negotiated power is present. “State and economy feed one another and the Liberal economic autonomy is a myth”²⁸...Economy is not autonomous nor self-constituting, it is always embedded in non-economic institutions.”²⁹ In Britain, mercantilism figured as a zero-sum game in international relations, but an absolute-gain game domestically, once capitalists and state profited together through commerce. Contrarily, “Estado Novo” and the dictatorship made Brazil a weak state, in this model. Not only had the state shut the Parliament down, but strong non-state-owned economic groups and political participations were prevented from emerging, so that the state’s despotic power could remain unchallenged. The centralizer governments picked and allowed specific sectors and capitalists to be present in economic and political life. In this sense, the penetrative power was compromised because government’s acts were just legitimized when they represented visible profits to people and elites, otherwise resistances would rise. Extractive power was contested because the society was not able to have full glance of the destination of the resources and; negotiated power was minimal since only few strategic groups had voice and policies were mostly made by imposition. The state was then not likely to reproduce alone the factors that created the British power two hundred years earlier. Having the will and plans to

²⁶ WEISS, Linda & HOBSON, John M. *Op Cit.* p.57

²⁷ WEISS, Linda & HOBSON, John M. *Op Cit.*

²⁸ WEISS, Linda & HOBSON, John M. *Op Cit.* p.58

²⁹ WEISS, Linda & HOBSON, John M. *Op Cit.* p.55

industrialize does not necessarily lead to industrialization, the state should be strong enough to foster it. A very clear sign of weakness of the Brazilian state is the gap between law and reality. There is in Brazil the figure of the laws which are not obeyed by population and, for being so widely disrespected, not even the authorities or police enforce such laws anymore. This is what is publicly called as “leis que não pegam” (literally: laws that do not stick). In this sense, it is not hard to show why the implementation of many development plan’s mechanisms failed. Weiss and Hobson argue that the government should govern through the society and not over it, so a collaborative power would emerge and these two entities of the governance cannot be considered as enemies.

The state capacity in the domestic sphere impacts the state power in the international sphere. As already explained, international rivalry led Britain to industrialize during Mercantilism. Weiss and Hobson put it:

Interstate rivalry, we argue, is important (central) to an understanding of the emergence of a political leadership committed to industrial transformation. In other words, it is quite likely that strong external pressure is necessary to stimulate a ‘will to develop’, but it will do so only if such an economic commitment is seen to complement the state’s own power objectives...It is important to note that challenges and pressures emanating from the international system are not infallible forces in the creation of a development commitment. It depends to a large degree on how those external pressures are perceived. (WEISS & HOBSON, 2005. p.184, 185, 187)

What is being argued is that domestic development is not only an internal demand. The will to catch up comes up from a perceived necessity to compete in international system and therefore state strength mingles with state power. Thus it is also important to check the impact of these 40 years of developmental policies on the international layer of state power, in order to complement the analysis done so far.

Just as Weiss and Hobson set tools for domestic state power, Barnett and Duvall et al. did the same for the international arena along with the same understanding of the word power already proposed on this section. Barnett and Duvall et al. understand power as being “the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to

determine their own circumstances and fate”³⁰ which connects with the earlier discussion of the state strength. The state plans of development and independence seek ultimately to determine their own circumstances and fate. Nevertheless power may not be constructed through the achievement of one of its forms only. It is not a simple social construction, as shown on the introduction. Through the search for power as the one in play during Mercantilism, Brazil primarily understood it as being a compulsory power form or in effect counter-compulsory power in reaction against a perceived foreign ruling. Cold War is another factor that brings *Realpolitik* and compulsory power in to evidence and masks the face of the other power forms. Brazil under the military government promoted the armament industry and placed national defense as the number one priority. Communism was also something that should be fought due to the American influence and, along with it, soldiers were always prepared for the imminence of war. As a conclusion, compulsory power became oversized.

The relenting of the Cold War brought up a new phase for the international power. During the 1970s neo-Liberals gained importance with the rise of international organizations and of a renovated and heated international economy. This way, compulsory power was not crowded out because economy also exerts “power over”, but the iteration of universal rules and resource flows through institutions embedded the institutional power on the compulsory power targeted by Brazil. They also consider non-state actors as power agents: “Multinational corporations can use their control over capital to shape the foreign economic policies of small states and global economic policies.”³¹ What more, international institutions are taken into account: “International organizations also exhibit compulsory power. The world Bank can shape the development policy of borrowing states.”³² In this matter, Brazil entered several international institution and has been undertaking efforts and international alliances to conquer a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. On the other hand, the structural and productive powers have always been neglected.

³⁰ BARNETT, Michael & DUVALL, Raymond et al.. *op cit.* p.3

³¹ *Idem.* p.14

³² *Ibid.*

“Structural power is structural constitution, that is, the production and reproduction of internally related positions and super- and subordination, or domination that actors occupy.”³³

The catch-up model proposed by the dependence theory and by CEPAL intellectuals perceived *per se* the reproduction of British and American success on the capitalist world. By taking their models as paths to be revisited, ideational structures of subordination are automatically replicated and the related positions of domination are maintained. The original models will always be more advanced according to the strategies they created on their own. Marxist (also at its “neo” versions) inputs may shed some light over this specific form of power. As Toledo puts it, modernization process under the aegis of industrialization is not more than a necessary geographic expansion of the capitalists of countries that have never been exploited. Accordingly, these countries would seize the economic system of underdeveloped nations with their oligopolistic groups and impede the exploited economies from having real insulated development. In other words, dependence is included in the discourse about the fundamental theories of inequality, applied to international relations between center and periphery, in the name of civilization legitimized and accepted by a voluntary serfdom of leaders from underdeveloped countries.³⁴ This view argues that the international structures exerts “power over” countries such as Brazil and limits their exercise of constructing its own “power to”. However it is important to take this standpoint with caution, because it does not consider that the underdeveloped countries have agency and that the fault is always of others. Still the point is to show that structure has power and it was neglected by ISI policies. Non-recognition of the national matter as a key to the development by the authorities resulted in what happened in Brazil, dependent industrialization or associated in transnational groups that assimilated the national economic sector and dominated the market.³⁵

³³ BARNETT, Michael & DUVALL, Raymond et al.. *op cit.* p.20

³⁴ MACHADO, Luiz Toledo. **A teoria da dependência na América Latina.** p.199-215.

³⁵ *Idem.* p.202

Concepts of what being modern means includes a country that is investing to become inserted in categories as, for instance, Western, stable, as developed as the European, or civilized. When the will to be aligned to this constellation of categories influences a development plan, then one may say that a productive power is being exercised. I have mentioned earlier that development, industrialization and modernization are neither inevitable nor innate, but they are results of rational choice (being it a means or an end). Thus the process of becoming stable, Westernized, organized and civilized can be understood as a choice of surrendering to the productive power these terms exercise. This power has the ability to dictate what is normal, possible and natural when one intends to participate in determined systems. Basically the literature deals with this power as a consequence of colonization. “This colonially imagined order can then be read as possessing at least two features: first, the structuring of the world into the governors and the governed, the subjects of politics and the objects of politics; and, second, the ways in which productive power empowers the subjects of governance but not the objects.”³⁶ Muppidi is stating in this excerpt that when countries like Brazil undergo these concepts as the unique via without problematizing them, it starts being an object of politics instead of being a subject. In this case, the look for compulsory power is counterproductive because it is already born constrained by productive power.

1.6. Conclusion

Between 1989 and 1992 Brazil experienced the complete exhaustion of ISI policies and, along with it, economic liberalization. The period comprising the decades of 1940 and 1980 represented a clear-cut mark for the country because, for the first time in history, Brazil rationally devoted efforts in order to develop a status of a great international player. It is undeniable that after over 40 years some impacts of these efforts would be visible. Throughout the whole article I showed arguments and evidences to respond if the state-directed economic development from

³⁶ MUPPIDI, Himadeep. *In*: BARNETT, Michael & DUVALL, Raymond et al. *op cit.* p.280

the 1940s to the 1980s created new sources of power, and how this policy contributed to Brazil as an international actor.

The discussions I presented intended to support the thesis that Brazil invested to overstretch its classic compulsory powers as the ones held by the mercantilist Britain and the modern US. Also institutional power was seen as complementary means of control after the détente of the Cold War. This amounts to say that the rational choice for the path of development in Brazil followed the classic forms of power which were oversized to the detriment of the others. Structural and productive powers are not less effective to constrain countries' ability to determine their fate. This casts no doubt because both powers have been conducting politics, knowledge and sense of reality of nations since the beginning of the modern era. Therefore, no new sources of power emerged, but contrarily the share of participation in power has heavily moved from the two subjective powers and concentrated on the material ones. One can claim that the abandonment of problematizing the subjugation from foreign subjective powers means no progress in the overall construction of power, once it is incomplete and it negatively compensates one another.

Finally, I would like to draw attention to the fact that it is only possible to comprehend complete construction of power when it is not seen as a negative meaning. This happens because power is depicted as a means for encroachment and zero-sum relations. Nevertheless power is an inalienable part of social life and is present in all political relations, meaning it is not always noxious. Conversely, development does not assume only a good value as also usually seen in classic thought. Rational development comprises choices and priorities and, as such, may be harmful for certain sectors while profitable to others. Ultimately the choices made may mislead to a direction not previously desired and end up in counterproductive results. In the case of Brazil, the search for power may have undermined the achievement of power. By the end of the 1980s the country held a much larger industrial yard, but its nature of indebtedness still reflected the one from the 1930s; technological and capital dependence were at similar levels as it was before

the war; exports of manufactured goods just happened at the expense of cheap manpower and abundant natural resources³⁷; industrial sector was able to grow while the protectionist policies were in force, national companies had no real competitiveness³⁸ to live up to without protection; and no innovation on the conduction of politics was observed. Having said that, it is still necessary to recognize that this period built up important material powers, which are very important because Brazil did not have them before and they will always be necessary factors.

CHAPTER 2:

The Brazilian state activity in international relations during the Cold War

2.1. Introduction

Brazil stands, therefore, in a complex diplomatic situation. It is too big to passively accept a blatantly unfair and undemocratic world order, but not large enough to influence on it directly and significantly. As a result, it sees the cooperation with countries in similar situation as being the only way to effectively respond to these challenges. (My own translation: MAIOR, 2003, p.41)

Economy is an imperative element for countries' endeavors into modern international system. Be it the means or the end in itself, as different theories see it, the importance of the economy is always present in the very nature of the state. Nevertheless, economy has a feedback relationship with interstate relations. Through international relationships, states secure (or fight for) resources, build alliances, establish technical cooperation, standardize rules, create systems of significance and agree upon trade norms that, among other outcomes, allow the economic wheel to keep spinning. As a loop, states reinvest part of the economic results to reinforce international relations capabilities of which diplomacy, weaponry and institutions are the most common representations. In this regard, the second chapter will conduct a debate on the Brazilian state activity in international relations and show that the elements of the developmental policies

³⁷ LIMA, Saulo Castro de. *Op cit.*

³⁸ SUZIGAN, Wilson. *Op cit.*

discussed in the first chapter are also present in foreign policy. Both layers have similar goals, turn the country into a major power; are attached and feedback each other; similarly look for tools inside compulsory and institutional powers logics to reach the goals; among others. Brazil is anew an institution and compulsory-power driven country without enough compulsory and institutional powers. I risk using an allegory of Brazil as being a Neanderthal man dressed up in an astronaut suit or, in other words, it wants to develop external characteristics rapidly without having internal ballast to support them.

In regards to this specific chapter, I will keep the same nature of discussion from the first chapter and propose as the main question: Did the Brazilian foreign policies during the Cold War successfully contribute to the filling of gaps that hindered the country from acquiring international power in the past? This unfolds into several other secondary questions, such as: Were the foreign policy strategies efficient to meet the country's goals? Did some innovative diplomatic approach emerge? What is the motivation that led the country to keep pursuing a status of global power in a bipolar world?

Concepts and Methods

The concepts presented in the last chapter will be kept in here as well. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall et al's proposition of four manifestations of power will back the discussion throughout the text, and so will Linda Weiss and John M. Hobson with their understanding of weak and strong state. Apart from the theories previously mentioned, this chapter will add new ones. In order to comprehend the differences between Brazil's behaviors on the course of the years during the Cold War, Gelson Fonseca Junior³⁹ coined the concepts "*autonomia pela distância*" (autonomy through distance) and "*autonomia pela participação*" (autonomy through participation). These ideas explain two phases when, in the first, Brazil allegedly prefer to abstain in multilateral environments, so it did not clash the Western bloc but also kept its autonomy in the bipolar

³⁹ FONSECA JR., Gelson. **A legitimidade e outras questões internacionais**. 1998

scenario; in the latter, Brazil decided to adopt a participatory attitude towards creating alternatives for balance of power, but still, without going up against the great powers. This theory is important because it gives an account of the different historical moments that the Cold War has been through and forced Brazil to adapt itself. Regardless the strategy the country has taken, Fonseca Jr. also agrees that there was a homogeneous pattern, namely inveterate search for autonomy and also **defense of a critical attitude towards the superpowers.**

In addition, there is a consensus in the Brazilian scholarship that labels Itamaraty's (another name for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) operational philosophy as *Universalist*. Since the late 19th century, Itamaraty have been working upon modern universal values that include self-determination of peoples, respect to international rules and laws, pursuance of universal human rights, preference for peace and no intervention, and democracy. This concept will be the logical homogeneous base of all the Brazilian discourses and policies during the 20th century. However, I will also show that the term *Selective Universalism* is yet more adequate to represent real policies implemented by Brazil. From time to time, some of those values are abandoned or simply “forgotten” in the name of pragmatic desired outcomes. It amounts to say that not all universal values carried the same importance depending on certain historical demands and what Brazil desired as a byproduct. All the aforementioned will be better explored along the text and shown during the application of a few brief case studies.

Organization of the Chapter

The first part will constitute of an overall historical background that will develop on the theories just mentioned above. Four short case studies will apply these theories and evince recurrent similarities in the Brazilian government's behavior and also in the outcomes reached with it. As a first case, I will present the Brazilian presence in the UN and the attempts to attain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council; second, I will work on the bilateral relations between Brazil and the US and the struggle against a possible full American dependence; third, I

will present the cooperation with Latin America to cope with traditional powers and their zones of influence; and, fourth, I will discuss the relations with Germany and the search of a way out of the American capital and technology. Such real-life events will demonstrate successes and failures on achieving goals and also point out recurrences that help better understand Brazilian general strategies in foreign policy. At last, I will conclude and amalgamate all the cases in order to identify some generalizations and show how they may contribute to answer the proposed research questions.

2.2. Historical background and the Itamaraty's approach

Brazilian foreign policy is roughly marked by continuity. The dominance for many years of a paradigm based on a set of beliefs characterized historically the trend towards convergence of the inner thoughts inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty). (My own translation: SARAIVA, 2010, p.45)

By the turn of the 20th century, Brazil had reached the approximate territorial shape it has nowadays. Itamaraty secured the annexation of new territories out of litigations against Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, France and The Netherlands under Baron of Rio Branco's leadership. Differently from what happened to the former Spanish colonies, Brazil did not break up in several states and it represented 45% of the South American land surface already before the World War I. The imperial and absolutist regime the country had until 1889 turned to major internal and external policies to keep the territorial unity and annex new ones. Upon successful execution of such policies in the course of over 20 years, Brazil afforded to become an indispensable source of natural resources, farm products and almost the owner of the American South Atlantic coast. Diplomats who served during this period of transition carried with them the practices from the imperial traditions coupled with the hope of emergence of a big and important modern country. In other words, the gigantic and successfully unified Brazilian state put it in a visible geopolitical position in the world and aroused the desire for autonomy and protagonism.

It is also very important to mention the fact that, from 1880 to 1930, about 1.5 million Italians; 1.1 million Portuguese; 600 thousand Spanish; 200 thousand Japanese; 200 thousand

Germans; 95 thousand Syrians and Lebanese; and 585 thousand more people from elsewhere immigrated into Brazil. These impressive figures placed Brazil among the most attractive destinations for immigration in the world. Only the US received more immigrants in the Americas, the promising continent. The republican Brazil counted with roughly 20% of its population formed by immigrants who very importantly served as cheap labor force after the abolition of the slavery. In this context, Brazil became the biggest coffee and rubber exporter in the world. It was not by accident then that the country got irrevocably connected to the rest of the world, either culturally, economically and politically. Itamaraty's interest for protagonism in the world is therefore explicable. Brazil was already way too bounded to world conjunctures by then⁴⁰ and it felt the necessity to be heard in the international system. Baron of Rio Branco, who was the most influential diplomatic thinker in the early 20th century, firmly believed in and propagated the idea that Brazil was destined for greatness. He commonly stated that Brazil should occupy a special political-strategic place in the international arena and pointed to the "similarities" between Brazil and the United States in terms of territory, ethnic base, cultural diversity, and for being surrounded by Hispanic countries.⁴¹

Although, not every desire, which is explicable, is at the same time justifiable. Did Brazil have, by that time, capabilities to make itself heard in the international community? What motivated Brazil's will to be amongst the greatest powers back then? A quick answer would be that the countries who perceive having potential power will develop the wish to make it come true. Benjamin O. Fordham⁴² affirms that there are two main theoretical perspectives on this issue. "Some international relations theory claims that potential power is itself a sufficient motivation for the adoption of major-power foreign policy. Other theorists suggest that some

⁴⁰ The first chapter gives more examples to support this fact.

⁴¹ SARAIVA, Miriam Gomes. **A diplomacia brasileira e as visões sobre a inserção externa do Brasil: institucionalistas pragmáticos x autonomistas**. 2010, p.45

⁴² FORDHAM, O. Benjamin. **Who wants to be a major power? Explaining the expansion of foreign policy ambition**. 2011

triggering condition is required, such as increasing international threat or expanding international economic interests.”⁴³

The claim that capabilities drive intentions are mostly based on Realism and, subsequently, to the compulsory facet of power. In this case, countries want to exercise their ability to mobilize material resources in order to develop bargaining power. At the same time, the will of power through societal triggering is related to both compulsory and institutional facets. It is still compulsory because the goals of the two claims do not differ (imposition power) and can also be related to military threat; however it is institutional as well by virtue of the institutions, such as companies and elites, which induce to the interest in expansionism. First, I should remember that, from the beginning of the 20th century until the outbreak of the World War I, Brazil suffered no military threat from any foreign armed forces and, hitherto, it constitutes no driving force for mobilization of resources towards compulsory power. Second, there was no economic elite interested in global markets because the industrialization development was still in its very puerile phase.

One may argue that the coffee growers may have pushed for international power, which is partially true. For over a century Brazilian government acted in the international market aiming to raise the worldwide coffee price to please the dominant agrarian elite. However, this has to do more with mechanisms of supply and demand than to international power. The biggest example of this is President Getulio Vargas’ decision to burn up huge amounts of coffee grains with a view to decreasing offer of the product and consequently increasing of the prices. In addition, foodstuffs have always limited selling capacity because it is bounded to the vital necessities people have, in opposition of several industrial products. Nobody can eat or drink unlimited quantities thus international power growth does not guarantee that agrarian elites will be able to sell more. Therefore, the second theory has little explanatory strength for Brazil of the early 20th century. Fordham argues and cites other authors who side with him:

⁴³ FORDHAM, O. Benjamin. *Op. Cit.*, p.587

Focusing on European powers in the years before World War I, Choucri & North (1975) contend that the very things that gave these states material power also led them to expand their interests. Economic growth led to greater international activity by each state's citizens as they sought markets and resources. Population growth created 'lateral pressure' for territorial expansion. Choucri & North's argument is more historically specific than realist claims about human nature, but it points to the same relationship between expanding material capabilities and a more ambitious foreign policy. (FORDHAM, 2011, p.588)

This exemplifies how the European powers before the World War I had a totally different reality from that of Brazil. No economic or industrial growth led Brazil to adopt a great power foreign policy as in Europe, but rather the natural resources that the country had in hands, mainly after the annexation of several lands, did so; they indeed looked for market expansionism in the form of colonies acquisition and this mostly explains the outbreak of the warfare; Exactly opposed to what was seen in Europe, Brazilian population did not create lateral pressure, once its huge territory was (and still is) simply little populated. As a conclusion, it seems adequate to say that the Brazilian specific motivation to be a great power has primarily originated from the belief that it could so be. We are left to examine whether Brazil had material resources at disposal to become a classic *Realpolitik* power.

No country can build up a strong compulsory power without growing its political and military participation in the world, and a solid economy to support such expenditures. Here I come across again the feedback-loop international relations-economic development. This is not, however, a mere academic ambivalence; Itamaraty is historically divided into two main train of thoughts: on one side, stand the *Autonomists* or *Nationalists*, who defend that the country should be less dependent on other countries, be less dependent on international regimes, build more independent political presence and activity in the world, among others; on the other side, stand the *Pragmatic Institutionalists*, who defend that the country should cooperate with others and be involved in whatever institutions that can be of help to achieving targeted ends. This latter group concerns more about liberalization policies without losing grasp of the project "Brazil as a great power", it just understands that international trade, institutions and economy are indelible pillars

to be in international force, even before politics. Despite it could seem, both groups are not perennially conflicting. Depending on the government in office and international relations scenario, both groups actually worked together in several occasions. One of these situations was the World War II when, after two years of declared neutrality, there was a consensus about the Brazil's entry into the war. Autonomists saw the need for fighting against the Germans, who sank several Brazilian merchant vessels in national waters; On the other hand, coffee was a superfluous product and the exports to the biggest market, Europe, had dramatically dropped. Commercial incomes were then drastically reduced due to product stranding and Pragmatics saw it as unacceptable. What more, Germany established a naval blockade to Brazil, which was considered a violation of international laws.

There is another issue upon which both groups agree: universalism. In the aftermath of the War, liberal ideals came into vogue a means to prevent new conflicts of that magnitude and to promote self-determination of peoples, according to oppressed countries' desires and the Wilsonian discourse. Even though the peripheral countries came to realize some years later that the 14 points of Wilson had nothing to do with their interests, but with the Europeans', they still nonetheless embraced the idea of self-determination as a real survival necessity. This concept was starkly intensified after the decade of 1930, when the centralizing government run by Getúlio Vargas inaugurated the developmental state in Brazil. At this point, liberal ideas in international relations were meaningful and used to please the nascent industrial and urban elite. Universalism then attended to the interests of both groups in Itamaraty, Nationalists and Institutionalists, by pursuing five core objectives⁴⁴:

- a) International persecution of the elements considered essential to the execution of the economic development project already under implementation, whether they are investments, markets, technologies, energy sources or loans;

⁴⁴ Topics summarized by LESSA, Antonio Carlos. **A diplomacia universalista do Brasil: a construção do sistema contemporâneo de relações bilaterais**. 1998, p.30

- b) establishment of international forums where states could create together mechanisms that allow democratic access to inputs for development;
- c) diversification of international contacts, eliminating the "curse of the special relationship" with the US, which represented the narrowing of decision-making capacities and limited autonomy provided by international alignments;
- d) effective integration in the international economic flows;
- e) construction of an international presence, which should be non-aligned and increasingly divorced from the ideological constraints of each historical moment, without however refusing the scope of the western civilization;

Universalism to Brazil corresponds to the idea of being open to maintain relations with all countries, regardless of geographic location, type of regime or economic option. It means freedom of action in relation to the hegemonic power of the moment and can be linked to the behavior of global player⁴⁵. These views nurture both groups because they defend political autonomy at the same time that they envisage developmental pragmatism. Finally, universalism accounts for the "least common denominator" between the two diplomatic strands and therefore becomes appellant in Brazilian politics. Having said that, it is important to remark that Brazil always selected, according to historical opportunity, the bilateral relations that would be more fruitful for the achievement of these five objectives. Selective Universalism is a noticeable feature used by Brazilian diplomacy to operationalize the ever-changing internal yearnings in a productive fashion. Professor Antônio Lessa explains that:

From as early as back in the empire times, one adds on the universalism a variable of selectivity that is implemented through the selection of priority relations with certain countries and regions, through bargaining in several movements. Sometimes trumps are offered up in the form of renewal of dialogue and approach of political positions, some other times, opportunities for large joint projects and mutual market penetration; hoping always to have access to inputs for development project implementation in return. (My own translation: LESSA, 1998, p.31)

⁴⁵ SARAIVA. *Op. Cit.*, p.45

At this historical moment, I agree with a mixture of the two main sources of motivation to acquire global power proposed by Fordham. Elite, institutional and economic pragmatisms are inserted as Brazil modernizes, industrializes and purposely looks more like Europe. World War II was a milestone in this process. Most of the imperial system had collapsed in Europe and this continent no longer represented a strong competitor as it used to be in the international system. Brazil then gained momentum and saw a power gap in the world. As a result and reaffirming what I have stated in the first chapter, the massive developmental projects and more violent investees toward global power acquisition have come into being mainly after 1946.

Thinkers from the Global North usually are unable to see that there is more going on in the world than just the clash between the two superpowers during the Cold War. Countries, communities, societies and institutions throughout the world have also activities and projects outside the bipolar logics. Brazil reinforced efforts to create its own global identity and to be apart from the dichotomy East-West, whilst not confronting any side. Despite this, Brazil experienced an apparent incoherent duality on its ideas for foreign policies. On one side, there was a focus to establish independent policies and non-aligned coalitions; on the other side, this focus was seen through biased Realism and Marxism ideals borrowed by both blocs. From the 1940's to the 1960's all attentions were turned to the modernizing capacity of the state to generate self-help power, which is a main premise inside the Realism theory adopted by policy-makers in the US; From the 1970's to the 1980's, Dependence Theory, based on Marxist core-periphery beliefs, influenced Brazil's policy and law-makers with a set of principles, which had already been adopted by the USSR. In other words, Brazil intended to get rid of the shackles of the Cold War through a mimesis of its main ideas. Structural and productive powers from the system were steering the way Brazil developed compulsory and institutional powers. It is inconclusive then to affirm that the eventual increase of material power could result in effective power, once the ability to realize the first was limited by cognitive constraints of the latter.

Aiming at better understanding how Brazil put in play its strategies, I will now present a series of real-life actions. Brazil pragmatically selected certain countries, regions and topics from which it could most benefit and created certain diplomatic axes of interest. The next section will deal with the most important axes for Brazil during the Cold War, namely the United Nations, the United States, third world countries, and Germany.

2.3. Case studies

2.3.1. United Nations and multilateral relations

...thus, one managed to proclaim, in one single legal instrument, the sovereign equality of all UN member states and submit them to the custody of five of them. And, most extraordinarily, one managed that such an instrument had been signed by both custodians and detainees. (My own translation: MAIOR, 2003, p.29)

Brazil traditionally defended the League of Nations and, later, the United Nations to be the only legitimate forum for international common decisions by virtue of its universal values. After the end of both world wars, Brazil was always one of the most enthusiastic and active in the multilateral relations. Both groups in Itamaraty found comfort for their claims on the idea of a democratic sharing of global management. The view that the UN occupies, or should occupy, a central position in the international decision-making process is the result of the view that this institution is the only one accessible to almost all sovereign states and able to provide with both democratic and international order based on international law⁴⁶. Also, the fact that the country had sided with the allies in both wars made it believe it would have a guaranteed prominent position in these institutions. Shortly after the founding of the UN system, Brazil pleaded a permanent seat on the Security Council by believing it would be seen at the same level of the winners of the war. Such a candidacy has been repeated on the course of the decades.

There is an international understanding that Brazil takes on an Idealist position (in terms of radical Liberalism) when it comes to the United Nations. This emerges since the beginning of

⁴⁶ HERZ, Monica. **O Brasil e a reforma da ONU**. 1999, p.94

the 20th century, when, during the Second Hague Conference of 1907, Itamaraty's discourse advocated the relevance of the norms of the international law and the negotiated conflict resolution. In that context, the "Hague paradigms" were created and the tradition of defending an ideal of an international society, which is based on universal principles and systematic support to the role of reason and mediation in international conflict resolution, established roots⁴⁷ (but they suffered a big setback during the Cold War period). The Brazilian representative, Rui Barbosa, is still praised even today for being one of the firmest, compelling and exquisite diplomats at the convention. I however do not agree on the image of Brazil as being an idealist in Kantian level because it starkly defends the independent state activity. I prefer to pose a more accurate argument that lies on the fact that the country sees the Idealist discourse as a means to dilute the power in the international system, once, by inserting the important actors under equal and clear rules, it would be easier to scrutinize their compulsory power. This strategy has been adopted ever since and constituted of an attempt to use institutional power to overrule third countries' compulsory power.

Lessa (1998) highlights that this entails, therefore, that the international operations of Brazil have been characterized, since the end of World War II, by the gradual building of universalism, a process that reached its heyday in the seventies, resulting, historically, in the accumulation of some prestige capital and in the establishment of a minimum margin of extra freedom to maneuver, which in turn could be used during critical moments. Coupled with a good deal of skill and ability to articulate the interests manifested in relations between two nations, the instrumentalization of universalism works to strengthen international gains. Such a strategy sought to diminish the inertia provoked by the exercise of third countries' compulsory and institutional powers.

Another complementary approach was simultaneously implemented. As previously mentioned, Brazil has been postulating a permanent seat on the Security Council since the very

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*

beginning, having as argument against its marginalization the fact that, regardless of socio-economic reality and the relatively low position of Brazil in the hierarchy of states, it proposes that the cultural and ethnic diversity, the presence of characteristics of a developing country and others of a first world country, the tradition of a coherent foreign policy and sophisticated diplomacy, the peaceful nature of the country's international relations, favor a more intense participation in international decision-making process⁴⁸. Consequently, Brazil has actively participated in peace operations. The principles with which have traditionally been dealt (agreement of the parties, impartiality, and minimum use of force) have also been supported by the Brazilian government during Cold War. Brazilian military took part in operations in the Middle East, Central America, the Balkans and Africa⁴⁹.

During the Cold War, mainly at its most bustling phase until the 1960s, there was little or no room at all for universal values. The tense relations between the US and the USSR drew upon specific ideological and material topics and no concession could be offered from one side to the other. Brazilian military activism was not remarkable enough to cope with Soviet and American mobilizations; and universal values were squeezed between capitalism and communism walls. Brazil had no material power enough to be a necessary key in this scenario, nor had it a third-via ideology that could be strong enough to suppress the ones in play; ultimately, it was seen as a marginal actor in multilateral relations, because it did not even contributed to one of the two blocs on its power balance, neither it offered a coherent way out to the peripheral countries to form new groupings detached from the Cold War imprisonment.

Aware of its situation, Brazil adopted what Fonseca Jr. (1998) described as the politics of autonomy through distance. The country was devoid of alternatives to compete with the blocs' subjective powers, had not received political or economic compensations for being an allied during the war, and also, despite all economic modernizing efforts, afforded no material resources to engage in independent endeavors. Therefore the Brazilian position in the multilateral

⁴⁸ ABDENUR, Roberto. **A política externa brasileira e o "Sentimento de Exclusão"**. 1994

⁴⁹ HERZ, Monica. *Op. Cit.*, p.95

relations was of being autonomous by not taking part of the Cold War standoff. The posture of attitude-taker towards constructing active power earnestly observed from late 1940s until 1950s, which coincided with the phase when Brazil decided to accept hermetic alignment with the US, got severely dampened. Thus, the so-called independent foreign policy activity from the 1960s until President's Geisel office in 1979 was characterized by, among other things, the maintenance of a distance in relation to the actions of Western Block, the defense of a critical attitude towards the superpowers and the support of the ideas of a new international economic order^{50,51}. This same period may be called as well as the period of negative foreign policy, due to its denial and inability of individual action. It is no surprise, then, that Brazil has not demonstrated diplomatic clout so that it could impact the *status quo* in a way to promote the desired reform in the Security Council.

As of 1980, acute economic crises shook Brazilian capacity to develop. Two oil shocks resulted in the drying up of foreign investment flows in Brazil and a process of deindustrialization began. Public accounts have suffered such strangulation that Brazil came to default on its foreign debt. Thus, distance in multilateral decisions no longer figured in the comfort zone of Brazilian diplomacy because being absent was no longer a lucrative option. The country redisplayed its political positions to implement a more aggressive and active participation that helped on the overcoming of the crisis or, labeled in other words, the autonomy through participation. After 1983, Itamaraty never more voted "no" during polls at the UN; and the diplomats were absent in no more than 3% of the plenary sessions⁵². What's more, new groupings and coalitions were formed through a more intensive South-South cooperation. It was very important to build an active engagement to promote redistribution of international wealth and decrease of vulnerability in times of crisis. This concern with a specific definition of

⁵⁰ LESSA, Antonio Carlos; COUTO, Leandro Freitas; FARIAS, Rogério de Souza. **Distanciamento versus Engajamento: alguns aportes conceituais para a análise da inserção do multilateralismo Brasileiro (1945-1990)**. 2010. p.336

⁵¹ FONSECA JR., Gelson. **A legitimidade e outras questões internacionais**. 1998

⁵² LESSA, Antonio Carlos; COUTO, Leandro Freitas; FARIAS, Rogério de Souza. *Op. Cit.*, 2010, p.342

economic justice in the international system shaped Brazilian world image as being universalist and reformist. It is noteworthy, in this sense, the Brazilian position to overthrow external constraints against domestic policies aimed at development, mainly linked to a developmental mindset and political debate of economic issues⁵³.

Brazil of the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s experienced a disturbing mosaic of “tri-duality”. a) Externally, the country struggled to keep a bi-faceted position by disagreeing with the system without confronting it; b) internally, the government, likewise other developmental states by that time, established a confusing authoritarian-conservative progressive administration. The regime in office consisted of a centralizing military junta, nonetheless, economic development conducted the base of foreign and domestic policies; c) Brazil was a Capitalist third world country inspired by Structuralist-Marxist ideas of center and periphery, Economicism, and international division of labor, for instance. Chapter 1 already explained how CEPAL concepts flooded Latin American countries’ intellectuality and steered political views towards left-wing actions. The “leftist” Brazil won the sympathy of many poor countries, in opposition to the past few decades when neutrality had been set the tone. In this scenario, the Group of 77⁵⁴ gained strength and attracted the interest of over 50 other nations, including the Communist China as an observer member in 1981.

It is clear that Marxism came into being in order to respond to economic-faceted deficit that the foreign policies had. Political articulation at the multilateral level alone was no longer able to cope with the historical moment. The so-called détente period, started after 1970, revealed that there was more diversity of events in “real life” around the world than just *Realpolitik*. For the first time, Liberals and Realists in their “neo” versions⁵⁵ shared the same idea that international

⁵³ My translation for: *Idem*, p.350

⁵⁴ “The Group of 77 is the largest intergovernmental organization of developing countries in the United Nations, which provides the means for the countries of the South to articulate and promote their collective economic interests and enhance their joint negotiating capacity on all major international economic issues within the United Nations system, and promote South-South cooperation for development.” Definition extracted from <http://www.g77.org>

⁵⁵ Neo-Realists such as Kenneth Waltz and Neo-Institutionalists such as Joseph Nye

flows and transnationalization processes should be valued. In this process, rich countries⁵⁶ found comfort to their economic demands on the Neo-Liberalism (Neo-Institutionalism); on the other hand, third world countries found support to their economic demands on the Neo-Marxism. However, the three aforementioned theoretical approaches deal with substantial material resources. Under any of these theories' interpretations, economic and political realities would be a given and the states would simply react to them, as if history was *a priori* only. Rational and Structural interpretations see little agency of the international system of states in the constructing of demands, but, instead, relevant agency in dealing with them. This is obviously not the case. Accordingly, material powers are not definitive ways through which political decisions are taken, by virtue of their incompleteness.

In rationalist position (which, in International Relations theory, include the Realism as well as Institutional Liberalism), ideas are not important as a causal mechanism in view that interests and preferences are given and the actors acting rationally anticipate the result of their actions. Here, ideas are just hooks that provide intellectual rationales and/or policies for the spread and legitimization of interest⁵⁷. Contrarily, in reflexivist position, beliefs and ideas play a central role in cognitive and intersubjective conception of the process by which identities and interests are endogenous to the interaction, as opposed to the rationalist-behaviorist stance, which sees them as being exogenous. Non-material powers seek, therefore, to cope with not only the strategies developed by actors to achieve particular interest, but as preferences and identities that are constructed and molded⁵⁸. Thus, throughout the whole process of policy-making during Cold War, Brazil failed with all its attempts to reach its main goal at the UN, which was a permanent seat on the Security Council, because it could not appear relevant enough at the bipolar scenario in order to call the attention of the powerhouses. European and North-

⁵⁶ Even rich second world states such as USSR implemented, in 1985, the Glasnost and Perestroika programmes that were somehow inspired in Liberal ideas.

⁵⁷ GOLDSTEIN, Judith & KEOHANE Robert O (eds). **Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change**. 1993

⁵⁸ SILVA, Alexandra de Melo e. **Ideias e política externa: a atuação brasileira na Liga das Nações e na ONU**. 1998, p.144

American intellectualities (Liberalism, Realism and Marxism) still exerted enormous productive and structural powers on Brazilian decision-makers and academia and steered its choices towards non-innovative paths. Cognitive capabilities in the multilevel environment were still tremendously trapped by ideas that could not be put in play by a country like Brazil due to the lack of tools, namely: Realism without normative and military strengths; Liberalism without economic autonomy; Marxism without being able to reject the fundamentals of the Capitalist system. As a conclusion, the state was not in position to realize its objectives.

2.3.2. Relations between Brazil and the United States

... One can talk about a unipolar world, given the enormous quantitative and technological superiority of the United States, able to cope with any potential enemy or probable alliance of opponents. (...) Our foreign operations converged in practice for a wide political and economic rapprochement with the United States and to certain vagueness about the international role of Brazil. (My own translation: MAIOR, 2006, p.42; 50)

I already cited and even talked about Brazil and US relations several times throughout this work outside this section. This is due to the fact that it is impossible to discuss global power, international relations strategies and development without pervading the US. Every notion of foreign affairs in the Americas has, at some point, to touch on the superpower. It is therefore needless to say why this country was selected to compose the chapter, and as needles is to mention that any policy maker or intellectual in Brazil ever agreed that keeping relations with the US is indispensable, even if to oppose it. On the other hand, the history of this relationship is so complicated and vast that I do not intend to cover even the most important events. I will otherwise outline trains of thoughts, the logics, which generally guided over time this bilateral arrangement to show how Brazil pursued its overall objectives by using strategies linked to the US.

Since the proclamation of the republic in 1889, US was used as a modern model for Brazil. Third president of the republic, Prudente de Moraes, once let clear publicly the hope of the government was to “develop and prosper and match, in South America, its model in North

America”.⁵⁹ However, policies of distancing and rapprochement with the US alternated along the centuries and decades, but, simplistically speaking, Brazil used to be closer when it comes to ideologies, regimes, and cognitive issues in general; conversely, it has distanced when it comes to resources, wealth, geopolitical influence, and material power in general. I am not advocating though that Brazil has no important economic partnership with the US, on the contrary, economic systems in both countries are quite similar and Brazil dedicated four decades of import substitution policies aiming at making its economy look more and more alike the American one. This is so because economic system is also a cognitive entity founded in principles, ideologies and psychologically influenced. That is the reason why, adoption of socialism or communism never became a serious option in Brazil, even under left-wing administrations.

In this roster of affinities and animosities, US always expected to have Brazil by its side over critical and decisive moments and this was the case of the World Wars I and II. No other country in Latin America ever had resources, financial capacity or the American trust to join actively global endeavors such as the World Wars. US therefore has bet in all its chips in Brazil to help avoid the spread of the war to the continent and even to battle in Europe. Despite all efforts, Brazil remained neutral in the war because the Nazi Germany had several bilateral commercial agreements with Brazil and President Getúlio Vargas was personally in tune with the regime of the axis because of the similarities they shared when it comes to authoritarianism, interest in military technological progress, and capitalist development. In 1942, for no clear known reasons, Germany began sinking Brazilian commercial vessels in the Southern Atlantic and then public opinion pressed the government to assume a position and take an energetic decision. As of that same year Brazil joined the allies by declaring war to Germany. Very intensive joint military trainings were run with the US army so that Brazil was capable of sending its expeditionary force (FEB in Portuguese acronym) to fight in Europe. Brazilian navy was also a significant figure on the western African coast to stop the spread out of the war in that region

⁵⁹ Ângela Castro Gomes, Dulce Chaves Pandolifi, Verena Alberti (Org.). **A República no Brasil**. 2002, p, 44

and to patrol the south Atlantic. The air force struck Italian forces and FEB won some clashes against the axis, remarkably the Monte Castelo battle.

By the end of the war, Brazil felt as being one of the big winners and expected for some rewarding, for its share. However, the Marshall plan implemented by the US only benefited the reconstruction of Europe. The recovery of European economy was seen as *conditio sine qua non* for American economic sustainability itself. Furthermore, no territorial portion was annexed to Brazil, no special treatment was given at the UN or in other important international forums. In sum, this was the situation of both countries' relations at the beginning of the Cold War: a strong disillusionment experienced by Brazil and a big indifference on the part of the Americans. The development and exercising of Brazilian material power never competed with or convinced the Americans of this first country's global importance. Just to give an idea, out of articles and books written between 1940s and 1960s on relations between the US and Latin America, Brazil is just cited a tenth of the times Cuba is cited, and it represents only 5% out of the overall citation of countries in Latin America; even in the sections dedicated to American help to dismantle communist governments in Latin America, Brazil is not often cited⁶⁰. There is a total gap of interest and comprehension on what Brazil is to the continent. The other way around is not the same, Brazilian scholarship mainly devoted heavy studies on the US⁶¹. It literally seemed that the US "existed" to Brazil, but Brazil did not "exist" to the US, evidencing an asymmetry in the bilateral relations.

One may briefly explain the why of this situation by seeing that, for the US, there were no major actors beyond the dynamics of the Cold War; no issue that would not be sensitive to the bipolar balance was to be placed front line on the American priorities list. The scarce moments when the US proactively contacted the Brazilian government coincided with the fear of communist spread in the region. President Lyndon Johnson offered support to overthrow the

⁶⁰ ROLIM, Tácito T. L. **Brasil e Estados Unidos no contexto da "Guerra Fria" e seus subprodutos: era atômica e dos misses, corrida armamentista e espacial, 1945-1960**. 2012, p.31

⁶¹ *Idem*, p33

leftist government of João Goulart in 1964 in favor of an authoritarian, but Capitalist, military junta. And that is what happened. In gratitude, in 1965, Brazil sent troops to the Dominican Republic as part of an Inter-American Peace Force⁶². Even with a traditional discourse of freedom and democracy, US preferred to nourish an anti-communist regime to the detriment of such values. With the military empowered, Brazil embraced in definitive the Realist school that oriented US policies since the aftermath of World War II and, hence, mutual relations once more flourished. Nonetheless, the ups and downs proceeded. US President Jimmy Carter visited Brazil in 1977, in order to criticize the human rights abuses that the centralizing government either allowed to happen and/or promoted itself, and also to inquire about the program of transfer of nuclear technology from West Germany. US had become Liberal-oriented and this fact disappointed Realist government in Brazil. What is more, Carter was perceived to be interfering in domestic sovereign business in Brazil and mutual relations again cooled down. Politicians in Brazil had had the feeling that the US had abandoned what they helped to create after the coup d'état.

Coincidentally or not, that was the time when Marxism reemerged in Latin America and also in Brazil. Former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva claimed during his first presidential election candidacy in the 1980s that Brazil was a Capitalist country without capital. He was not wrong, the aforementioned fact represented big source of “dependence”⁶³: endemic and systemic ideology without systemic division of wealth and world responsibility that the five countries with veto power in the UN assumed. Hence, a perception of failed modernity hovered in the air of Brasília; academic studies throughout the country leaned on research questions such as why Brazil did not go so successful like the United States did? In order to respond to that a very simplistic but accepted answer rose: Brazil was a colony of exploitation and not a colony of settlement like Britain did to the US, so the first was created to provide wealth to the colonizer

⁶² WOODWARD, Joel Anthony. **As relações entre o Brasil e os Estados Unidos: caminhos para uma parceria estratégica**. 2011, p.19

⁶³ Term used to designate lack of autonomy and power according to (neo) Marxist premises.

while the second was created to develop. This argument misled to some syllogism-mistaken conclusions that defended that if Britain had colonized Brazil too everything would be better; or that the predatory extraction of raw materials, gems and precious metals from the 15th to the 18th centuries had sealed the fate of Brazil's failure. As if the next three centuries would not be enough to recover from colonization. I want to point out with it that part of the scholarship and common sense in Brazil still credited Mercantilism and Bullionism as being deterministic factors and indispensable phases for modern success. In this sense, even the Marxism assimilated in Brazil, after the emergence of Dependence Theory, had a bitter taste of conservative modernization theory on the bottom of the tongue. Even upon inflicting severe critiques to the American conduction of world politics, US and UK still were the ultimate model that Brazil sought to follow, yet if sometimes unconsciously.

Looking at the actual events that characterized the bilateral relations during the Cold War, it is very hard to sustain the thesis that Brazil had control over the situation or was able to use the US strategically to accomplish its projects of power. The cognitive constraints that the American system ideals posed over Brazil impeded material power to suffice as being a real tool towards global or even continental leadership. As a conclusion, it will take Brazil most likely several decades to compete with US by using alone institutional and compulsory powers, once these two features are way too developed in this latter country and their overcoming will depend on shifts in cognitive limitations (created by structural and productive powers from the system) of the Brazilian worldview.

2.3.3. Relations between Brazil and Latin America

As a matter of scale, one should accomplish being a regional power before becoming a global power. Borders shape territory and therefore define one of the tripods that sustain the modern state. Dealing with neighboring countries is then vital for every and each non-insular state. To the views of a classic statesman, all countries wish they were an island, but it indeed is

not the case and, instead, South or Latin America are neuralgic points to Brazilian aspirations. On the other hand, one deceives oneself if one thinks Brazil historically aimed at Latin America ever since it launched its powerhouse project. This is not true due to mostly two reasons.

First, universalism call for equal treatment of states and sense of neighboring and collectivity as defended by Brazil in international forums since 1907, however, the selective universalism posed by Itamaraty understood that relations with Latin American countries were important but not as urgent as the ones with the US, for instance. Even after the disillusionment with the “big brother from the North” as of the 1960s for not receiving special war winner status, Brazil established more agreements and bilateral relations with Middle Eastern countries than with Latin American ones. The only significant progress in relating with Latin America occurred through growth in exports of Brazilian manufactured goods, thanks to the success of imports substitution model. Why was it so? A short answer would be that the poor Latin American countries used to make the most of their efforts to confront the orthodox system that caused them so many political and economic losses. Both autonomists and institutionalists in Itamaraty had otherwise a reformist posture when it came to challenging the *status quo*. Brazil was not interested in the breakdown of existing international rules, replacing them by the extremely unorthodox arrangements proposed by most developing countries. There was otherwise much more “incremental” and objective approach from Itamaraty than the proposals claiming for radical changes. Brazil looked for reform in the structures and not of the structures; it had the desire to improve the pre-established world order in its favor, but not to put it down to build another. Brazilian diplomatic leaders, in this environment, no longer believed that the country had enough strength to act like a moderator among developing countries because Brazil lacked ideological confidence on the block. Both sides had different aims. Nonetheless, the desire to avoid isolation caused the Brazilian government to stay constrained to not seriously and explicitly outsource its detachment from the radical initiatives of the non-aligned world⁶⁴. In other words,

⁶⁴ LESSA, Antonio Carlos; COUTO, Leandro Freitas; FARIAS, Rogério de Souza. *Op. Cit.*, p.353-354

Brazil was not having success in coping with American subjugation, hence, losing grip also with Latin America would most likely lead to regional seclusion.

In 1973, the situation deepened. The transformation in the country's preferences on groupings and alliances was clear. Especially in matters of economic security, Brazil was already determined to identify less with developing countries. An incident at the UN General Assembly pretty much contributed to Brazilian estrangement of Latin American states. The "automatic majority" of the non-aligned movement voted against Brazil and in favor of Argentina on the topic of prior consultation on the use of shared water resources⁶⁵. Nonetheless, Itamaraty did not go cap in hand because it understood that the Latin American states had weak proposals, which would not help them achieve their ultimate goals on international fairness. The pragmatic institutionalists' policy of non-confrontation was more of a priority than the regional cohesion; coupled with the autonomists' fear of counterproductive isolation resulted in a faltering double: not voting in favor of the neighbors and not voting against them.

Second, the concept of Latin America carries not so much meaning to Brazil as may suggest the American and European literature. This term never pushed for any sense of priority to compromise in foreign affairs. Such a term was coined during the Pan-American plan launched by the United States to compete, in Americas, against the European trade.

As early as the 1890s, the term 'Latin America' can be found in official US documents referring to reciprocal trade treaties with the countries south of the Río Grande, including Brazil. In his instructions to the US delegates to the second Pan-American Conference in Mexico City in 1901, President Roosevelt expressed the desire of the United States to be the friend of all the Latin American republics. (BETHELL, 2010, p.475)

The entirety of the non-Anglo-Saxon American portion was generalized and put inside one category simply in order to differentiate policies directed to the North and politics directed to the South. No other aspects such as culture, language, identities or worldview were taken into consideration in the making of the region categories. In sum, Latin America did not emerge as a natural cohesive feeling of unity, but as unilateral political simplification. Another excerpt written

⁶⁵ *Idem*, p.352

by the renowned British Brazilianist professor, Leslie Michael Bethell, reinforces the arbitrary nature of the term.

The emergence of the United States as a global power during and after the Second World War led to a demand for more expertise for military and political strategic planning. During the war a so-called Ethnogeographic Board was created. (...) The Board began by dividing up the world into continents, with one important exception: instead of the western hemisphere or the Americas or North and South America, there was to be the United States and Latin America. (BETHELL, 2010, p.478)

After the War, the strength of this construct influenced the academia both in the US and Europe, which took Latin America for granted and started publishing hundreds of books yearly on the subject; other governments began to use the label even in multilateral environment. In 1948, UN established the CEPAL as the first international organization to assist a subcontinent, Latin America. It was only in the period from the 1960s to the 1980s that some leading Brazilian intellectuals, mostly on the Left, began to self-identify with Latin America. This was not merely a question of ideological affinity and solidarity with their colleagues in Spanish America during the Cold War. It was often a directly consequence of years spent in exile in Uruguay, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela, as well as in various European countries and the United States⁶⁶ during the Brazilian military dictatorship. By virtue of historical moment, Brazil also accepted the idea of Latin America for many occasions as it is shown by the establishment of several regional agreements with the 20 republics to the South of Rio Grande. It never fought it off, actually. Otherwise, it simply did not have the natural perception that this portion of the continent shared similar goals. Ultimately, Latin America were more meaningful, during the Cold War, to the US and Europe than it was to Brazil.

Accordingly, instead of implementing the “Latin Americanism”, Brazil developed the “South Americanism”. From 1960 to 1980, several agreements were signed with the intention towards integration, for instance the Latin American and the Caribbean Economic System established in 1979; the First Montevideo Treaty that created the Latin American Free Trade

⁶⁶ BETHELL, Leslie. **Brazil and „Latin America“**. 2010, p.482

Association in 1960; or the Second Montevideo Treaty that founded the Latin American Integration Association in 1980. However, none of those instruments caused to create binding goals or sentiment of cohesiveness; they were not able to carry meaning for the involved countries and the implementation of their premises is still stuck in rudimentary plans up to now. Differently, functioning agreements and arrangements proposed by Brazil in South America were mushrooming and already covered almost all the countries in the region. It seemed that Brazil had less comprehensive objectives than trying to convert the whole of Latin America into a homogeneous group. Thus, in 1969, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay signed in Brasilia, the Treaty of the Plata Basin, to promote the harmonious development and physical integration of the Plata Basin and its areas of influence. In 1978, also in Brasilia, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname and Venezuela signed the Amazon Cooperation Treaty, by which they undertook to make joint efforts and actions to promote the harmonious development of their respective Amazonian territories.⁶⁷

Again, bordering countries are key-points for any modern state and, therefore, even if they do not share exact social, linguistic, cultural and historical commonalities, one will dedicate efforts to relate with them. In the case of Brazil, almost all South American republics are neighboring countries. Furthermore, Brazil already knew that its strength was compelling enough to exert influence in South American. No other country or even eventual alliances of them could compete against Brazilian relevance in the region. It is clear that Itamaraty posed hard Realist approach by coming up with foreign policies on South America.

...taken together, the agreements covered virtually the entire South America In a sense, it can be said, therefore, that by promoting the completion of the international instruments on Amazon, Brazil was anticipating another form of continental regionalism, the south-Americanism (...) With the initiative of the Free Trade Area of South America and especially with the completion of the First South American Summit, Brazil launch ostensibly formal bases on the continent of a new regional movement, presumably commensurate with the its ability to effectively influence in the area. (My translation: MAIOR, 2006, p.56)

⁶⁷ Transcriptions of the Articles I of both the *Treaty of the Plata Basin* and *Amazon Cooperation Treaty* cited by MAIOR, Luiz A. P. Souto. **Brazil and American regionalism in a changing world order**. 2006, p.52

Contrarily to what had been the case in the multilateral environment (i.e. UN), Brazilian material power (mainly the compulsory) in South America was indeed strong enough to establish a regional power. The matter whether or not this leadership would be sustainable, due to its nature of incompleteness (for not having other stances of power), is disputable. Notwithstanding, Brazilian project of power projection took South American relations as its most successful example. This outcome was just possible, according to Itamaraty's view, because Brazil had distanced Caribbean, Central America and Mexico who were under direct American zone influence. This way, Brazilian interests would not frontally crash against the Pan-American project. As a result, borderline conflicts with Brazil were solved; no direct confront with the Western leaders took place; and a solid base of international support pro Brazil was formed.

It is important to mention, though, that some South American countries had with Brazil a similar relation that Brazil had with the US, in other words, they took for granted that Brazil was the regional leader and this could not change, but always searched for ways to counterbalance this fact. Argentina is a classic example because it had had historical issues against Brazil and was even involved in warfare in the 18th and 19th centuries. It was, then, hard to accept Brazilian material superiority as a fact. The lack of institutions on the regional arrangements resulted in many trade issues with no legal parameters to solve them; political divergences took place in the multilateral level (Argentina opposed Brazilian candidacy for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council); Bolivia had growing resentment against Brazil by perceiving an imperial expansion on the continent; and other minor claims. At this point, thus, Brazil in the 1980s already enjoyed the fact of being a consolidated regional power, but also underwent the conflicts of so being.

It is normal that a country with the territorial, demographic and economic sizes achieved by Brazil aspires to have, on the international stage, a more striking position than the one which it always had. Along the same idea, it is even more natural, by its relative weight, for it to be perceived as a *primus inter pares* in South America. Ultimately, such a position is not objectively contested, although, as already noted above, this is often a source of concern to the neighbors. In

such circumstances, public ostensible pursuance of leadership position in South America will always be counterproductive, while discreetly seeking to exercise it by simple natural relevance will not necessarily be a problem. It is, therefore, important to have a very clear the notion of what a Brazilian plan for regional leadership could be and, more importantly, what should or not be a public and open greed⁶⁸. As a conclusion, this is a reason why the development of structural and productive powers are more likely to complete the material powers effect in the long run should Brazil seek having a sustainable prominence in the continent.

2.3.4. Relations between Brazil and Germany

In contrast to the previous cases, Brazil never saw the relations with Germany as an end in itself. Brazil wanted to be a solid leader in South America; also a highlighted player in the UN; overcome dependence from the US; but now it is different, there was never a sense of real direct competition or to develop any skill “over” Germany. Brazil simply always had Germany as a strategic partner (as an escape from US – UK dynamics in the Western world) to balance technological gaps, have a hotspot in Europe, construct an important market for exports, and having access to inputs for development.

As of the turn of the 20th century, over 200 thousand Germans immigrated into Brazil (already mentioned in the introduction) and they, and their descendents, became leaders in manufactured goods production already by the 1930s. Getúlio Vargas strategically used it to enhance diversification of the bilateral relations. Vargas supported the exports and imports to and from Germany and harnessed the cultural identity that both countries naturally developed. In 1938, Germany replaced the US as the major exporter to Brazil. “Much of the machinery, fuels, and technical expertise for Brazilian industrialization came from Germany, and Brazilian raw materials, in turn, helped to keep the latter's factories running.”⁶⁹ In the outbreak of the World

⁶⁸ MAIOR. Luiz A. P. Souto, *Op. Cit.*, p.57

⁶⁹ HILTON. Stanley E. **Brazil's International Economic Strategy, 1945-1960: Revival of the German Option.** 1986, p.288

War II, Germany economy had suffered severe damages because of the allies bombarding; also, British blockade on the Atlantic entailed a dramatic decrease in the potential of bilateral commerce; ultimately, in 1942, Vargas declared war against Germany because this country could not be any longer of so much help for Brazilian aspirations. Brazil has faced again the necessity of relying commercially and technologically on the US. Nonetheless, seven years after the War, (West) Germany already figured as the second largest foreign investor in Brazil and this latter was the first option destination for German enterprises. This striking rapid recovery has not happened by accident. Germany knew it needed an alternative path to enter in Latin America's market without competing with the US, and Brazil knew Germany was keen to provide support in a fashion it would never be possible to expect from the US or UK, as illustrated below.

The dramatic highlight of German-Brazilian cooperation during the period was a 1975 agreement that, in the words of Brazilian President Ernesto Geisel, "marked the threshold of a new era for the Brazilian economy," because it called for the transfer of complete nuclear technology, a step that the United States had been un-willing to take. Contemplating the country's future autonomy in the sector, the head of Brazil's state atomic agency proclaimed that the transfer would occur "in a form and to a degree without precedent in the history of relations between countries of different levels of development." (HILTON, 1986, p.287)

Transfer of technology was a key issue to Brazil because it is not possible to develop an industry without capacity to install machinery, for instance. The government wanted to refrain from importing manufactures and, instead, import capital goods and skilled labor. Presidential candidate Brigadier Eduardo Gomes once declared that without creating "an industrial civilization," Brazil would be relegated permanently to an inferior position in the hierarchy of nations. Indeed, an agrarian country was "a synonym for a colonial people, a subjugated people, a provincial people and an economically manacled people..."⁷⁰ Knowing this, Brazil made the best of its efforts to join the Paris Reparation Conference in 1946 aiming at being considered for material compensations after being so faithful to the Allies. Upon failure of all attempts, Brazil

⁷⁰ *Idem*, p.289 citing Brazilian personalities' speeches

did not participate on the division. US claimed that the nationalized German companies and the assets seized in Brazilian territory would already be enough to cover expenditures during the War.

Reflecting general expectations, Dutra (President 1946-51), a month after his inauguration, wrote personally to Truman about such assistance, and then in March he had Itamaraty formally request a loan of 1 billion dollars. To Rio de Janeiro's rapid disgruntlement, Washington granted it only 46 million dollars that year, despite Dutra's personal bid and a round of talks that spring between his minister of transportation and American authorities. When Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder visited Brazil in July 1947, his hosts were unimpressed with his argument that Brazil should eschew nationalistic measures and allow private foreign capital an open door; instead, the Brazilian finance minister handed Snyder a request for a short-term loan of 300 million dollars for essential imports and 1.5 billion dollars for "development and defense." The result of Brazil's campaign was 50 million dollars in aid that year and nothing in 1948. (HILTON, 1986, p.291)

The desperation generated by the American neglect opened up a race to find other partners to bail out Brazil from its "enslavement"⁷¹. Brazilian politicians noticed the difference between American and German markets in the prewar scenario. While Americans were interested in light consumer goods and extraction, in other words, fast profitable business, German companies, for instance Krupp and Siemens, heavily invested in equipments and development of the metallurgical industry in Brazil⁷². This previous positive experience heightened the opinion that one should restore, as soon as possible, relations with them. However the American occupation would not make it an easy task. First investee was to attract "naturally" German technicians' attention to immigrate to Brazil. Argentina had successfully done it and secured know-how in certain underdeveloped areas in South America, such as engineering.

Trade activities were resumed in mid-1947 with little amounts of coffee exported to West Germany. In return, machines were sent to Brazil because Europe was still in scarcity of convertible currency by then. That was all Brazil needed. Surprisingly, the US never imposed serious restrictions to this mutual commerce, on the contrary, some policies encouraged trade between the two countries after the 1950s. In 1960, the balance of trade was not just recovered, but had reached unprecedented amounts of exchange. Economic analysts explained such

⁷¹ Common term used to describe Brazilian situation in newspapers and academic papers produced in Brazil

⁷² *Idem*, p.297

significant figures through the complementarity of interests between these two countries. On the one side, Brazil was eager for non-American development aid and it was found in Germany; on the other side, German firms wanted to transfer their activities to a more safe and geopolitical stable continent in order to have breath to grow over longer periods, once Europe had been a bloody theater of warfare. Also, Germans lacked abundant raw materials to guarantee the recovery and functioning of their industry. Lastly, Brazil offered no signs, after 1964, of risk to undergo the communist threat. Although it was under a controversial regime, Brazil had an indisputable market economy in frank growth. As a conclusion, Brazil was well succeeded in his policies pro Germany during the Cold War, large extent of its economic development occurred thanks to this partnership. Brazil built up two nuclear plants, submarines and other military ships, train tracks, base industry capital goods and others covering a broad spectrum of Brazilian interests.

2.4. Conclusion

In this chapter I have shown some ambivalences in which Brazil has leaned on the course of the decades. At the same time that there are recurrent patterns of views and actions, the country ventures into multiple layers of political decisions in an attempt to develop new profitable paths for itself without derailing from the established *status quo*. When one splits one's strengths aiming at simultaneously fortifying different fronts, one might get weak in all of them. Thus, implementing Marxist dependence theories in a capitalist market did not culminated in effective results when it comes to the relations with the US, for instance. Brazil's selective universalism also played a role on the promotion of material development to the detriment of construction of an autonomous thinking and self-understanding. That is why, foreign affairs did not offer a very different contribution from the one offered by the economic policies discussed in Chapter 1. Both policies were coherent and basically continuous, despite the nature of the

government, be it leftist, rightist, democratic or authoritarian. Brazil invested its efforts in material powers only, disregarding subjective limitations.

This chapter also presented four short case studies that simply intended to exemplify the standardization of actions Brazil performed over 45 years. The first case pointed to the fact that the major Brazilian expectation in multilateral relations was never met: a war-winner position at the UN with a subsequent permanent seat on the Security Council. The country did not manage to grow at a level which could make a point of being recognized as a destabilizing country in the Cold War constellation. Regardless almost five decades of development, no capacity to realize a big project in global scale, coping with the powerhouses, could be forged. This shows how Brazilian material and institutional relevance was still proportionally underrated throughout the whole process.

In the second case the analysis is basically an extension of the one made on the UN. Brazil had limitations to grow and to exert international influence according to irresistible cognitive and material borderlines imposed by the US.

Third one is undoubtedly the most successful case. Brazil, by its weight, is a natural leader in South America. However, Brazilian experience at creating subjective power may result in distaste from the other countries in relation to any announced plan to be a regional power. Discourses claiming Brazil being imperialist and expansionist are not rare amongst scholars and opinion-makers in very poor countries such as Bolivia, Uruguay and Paraguay. I also showed that the concept of Latin America is problematic and does not arouse the compromise for unity or integration in Brazil.

Fourth is also a successful case. The specificity of Brazil – Germany relations is that both see in one another a means to achieve individual ends. Relations with the UN, US and South America are intended to provide outcomes such as leadership and power. Differently, Brazil searched in Germany a means able to disembody ultimately into development waters, which is in turn a supportive factor to future international projection.

CHAPTER 3:

The shift into the post Cold War world – quest for power in a new international setting

3.1. Introduction

In the first two chapters, I have attempted to show that Brazil mostly sought, during the Cold War period, to develop material powers that could give it a more prominent place in the international system. Up to the period mentioned, Brazil grasped, through historical experiences such as the two World Wars and the nuclear age, that the traditional powers always relied upon a strong industrialization (the means) to support their military apparatuses and their material capacities to sustain international influence (the ends). Countries unhappy with their relative positions in the world concluded from the Cold War that industrialization and hard power were the successful tools that would lead the path toward modernity, among these believers was Brazil. That is to say that the policies in favor of autonomy and development were based on classical precepts of liberalism, which served as guidebook to the means, and the realism, which guided their ends. More specifically, while trying to dodge the exogenous domination in order to earn its own space in the world, Brazil used to see the international power as being a zero-sum game by defending redistribution rather than the expansion of tools for governance⁷³, especially the institutional ones as in the case of the UN Security Council. On the other hand, Brazil was aware, however, of its inability to promote such “reslicing” of the international power cake and, to solve this problem, it ventured into myriad bilateral agreements based on third Worldism⁷⁴ in an attempt to create coalitions of power while struggling for establishing universal international laws, which could keep scrutiny over the great powers. It is in this context that the term selective universalism, as mentioned in the previous chapter, is inserted. Universalism is related to the liberal standards that allow the possibility of relationship with any other state, regardless of their

⁷³ BURGESS, Sean W. **Strategies and tactics for global change: democratic Brazil in comparative perspective**. 2012, p.353

⁷⁴ BURGESS, Sean W. **Consensual hegemony: theorizing Brazilian foreign policy after the Cold War**. 2008, p.75

political regime or economic system; Selective represents, in turn, the realist precepts once the country picked the relationships that contributed the most to achieving its redistributive goals.

Large portion of these selective universalist policies were focused on showing the world that Brazil was neither fully aligned to the West because that would bring very serious risks of foreign submission; nor was it aligned to the East, as this would bring strong implications for its capitalist economic development projects and; it was also not a participant in the movement of the non-aligned, as this would cause uncomfortable with both blocs at the same time. Overall, Brazil struggled to manage, through an independent view, the East-West divide without losing its credibility with both superpowers⁷⁵, as this loss would result in costs which Brazil was not willing to pay. So the battle for a more privileged international position dedicated itself to fighting in several different and, even incoherent, fronts such as: distributive paradigm allied with integrative discourses; autonomous positioning without insulating itself from the structure in vogue; use of liberal policies without having the inputs that a country needs to reach a modern liberal development (proprietary technology, capital, etc.); realist goals without possessing coercive capabilities; Marxist arguments arising from the Dependency Theory, in the 1970s, without thereby wanting to challenge the capitalist system; non-alignment position, but without being part of the non-aligned movement and; diplomatic approximation with the Third World with ideological distance from it. The diffuse mixture of political means and ends also encountered institutional support on the Foreign Ministry through its divide between Pragmatic Institutionalists and Autonomists, which led Itamaraty to become, again, oscillating between Realism and Liberalism.

The foreign policy seesaw here observed suffered however abruptly change when the Cold War ended. With the end of East-West dichotomy, the world witnessed a surge of diversity on the agenda of the traditional actors, the states, and also the diversity of the number of actors that influenced the new system. Much of dichotomies seen in the precedent years are now, from

⁷⁵ PECEQUILO, Cristina S. **A política externa do Brasil no século XXI: Os eixos combinados de cooperação horizontal e vertical**. 2008, p.138

the 1990s, useless and meaningless. It is hence latent the need to recast the foreign policies, bearing in mind such a change of reality and, more than that, there was the challenge of rethinking the cultural approach of Itamaraty. After nearly five decades of repetitive patterns of behavior, the Brazilian diplomatic corps carried and transmitted to its members interpretations of the world according to the values and ideas that have been institutionalized and accepted as appropriate throughout the process of forming a political culture⁷⁶. It is salutary to note in this regard that the Brazilian domestic reality changed very little if considering only the impact from the fragmentation of the Soviet Union⁷⁷. The internal Brazilian posture would thus still remain ambiguous and its foreign policy would have typical characteristics from that of semi-peripheral and middle-power countries of the Cold War. This kind of foreign policy is known by producing multiple strategies on international insertion that also routinely contradict each other, depending on the country's diverse vulnerabilities in different conjunctures⁷⁸. Yet in the domestic arena, some political groups were still affected by a mental state from the past by insisting in the same political models and in the same old economic formulations that led the socialist countries to bankruptcy. This is a characteristic that affected several other political movements in the region, dominated by the same regressive conceptions of economic organization⁷⁹. Thus, Brazil needed to reposition its inner reality, which was virtually unchanged, within an outer world, which was almost completely changed. According to Fonseca Junior, the irrationality of the bipolar conflict served as the basis for the classic reactive rational view that was present in the Brazilian autonomist project⁸⁰. Such rationality should now readapt itself.

With the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the neoliberal consecration, the challenge for countries without material power is exactly to redesign the arguments of reason,

⁷⁶ VIEIRA, Marco Antonio M. de C. **Ideias e instituições: Uma reflexão sobre política externa brasileira do início da década de 90**. 2001, p.247

⁷⁷ ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de. **O Brasil e as relações internacionais no pós Guerra Fria**. 2009, p.9

⁷⁸ VIEIRA, Marco Antonio M. de C. *Op. Cit.*, p.253

⁷⁹ ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de. *Op. Cit.*, p.12

⁸⁰ FONSECA JÚNIOR, Gelson. **A legitimidade e outras questões internacionais**. 1998, p.347

redo the speech⁸¹. Furthermore, the peripheral countries are no longer key pieces to be manipulated by the superpowers in the service of bipolar divide. Thus, many countries fail to be interesting as a destination for financial-economic aid, political treats and other features as they are no longer needed for the balance of power between the two blocs⁸². There was no time to experience the new international moment before taking any decision, Brazil had to rearrange its policies and actions. In this regard, which would be then the new sources of power and opportunities that Brazil should seize in the post Cold War period? What is the role of Brazil in this new global setting? What should be overhauled to improve the efficiency of achieving the secular Brazilian goal to acquire international prominence? These are the key questions that this third chapter will discuss and try to answer. In short, a comparative study will be herein developed, concerning the changes on behavioral pattern in Brazilian foreign policies during and after the Cold War, based on intellectual concepts and precepts already presented in the previous chapters.

In this chapter, Sean W. Burges will contribute relevantly to the arguments I will be posing. His thoughts are very important tools to understand how non-material powers represent indispensable matter for contemporary global governance and international politics. Hence Burges adds invaluable intellectual substratum to the base of this work; he also provides even more substance to Barnett and Duvall et al. At last, this chapter is the amalgamation and comparison between the two focal eras, Cold War and post Cold War, thus its conclusions are also the conclusion of the entire thesis. I will therefore not write a specific conclusion for this chapter, but I will instead integrate it with the overall final remarks in a separate section after this chapter. This way, the chapter will be divided into two items. First, “new clothing for some old ideas” will present how Brazil rearranged its foreign policy to adapt to the new era at the same time that many old cognitive tethers were yet at stake; Second, “new strategies for a new era” will

⁸¹ FONSECA JÚNIOR, Gelson. *Ibidem*

⁸² ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de. *Op. Cit.*, p.9

show the novelties or what concretely Brazil presented as innovative in the search of power in the post Cold War.

3.2. New clothing for some old ideas

Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) had been showing several signs of weakness since the 1970s. Throughout the 1980s this process has aggravated and shown its depletion to generate new economic resources. Hyperinflation, moratorium and economic stagnation convinced Brazilian political and entrepreneurial elites that the neo-mercantilist approach, which earlier protected the domestic business sector's interests, was now playing against them. The 1990s definitely made ISI become a moribund due to the prevalence of neoliberalism, acceleration of globalization, and formation of regional trade blocs that left no comfortable environment for economic isolationism. Notwithstanding this rupture, the surge of strong and independent elites was a byproduct from the more than 40 years of industrialization process, permeated by ISI policies, and thus it is undeniable that these latter contributed to the overall generation of wealth in Brazil. The creatures would now however bury their self-destroying creator in order to defend their survival. It is important to highlight the relevance of this fact. During the Cold War, especially the dictatorship period, Brazil had already a strong elite that was attached to and even dependent on the state through the protectionism this latter promoted; after the democratization, the state lost its political centralizing capacity and the economic elites grew as an autonomous entity.

According to Marcos Aurelio Guedes de Oliveira, this new class initiated, through political pressure, some of the Brazilian foreign policies that would be the flagship of the Fernando Collor de Mello's presidency (1990 – 1992). The author defended that

These new classes have found ways to feed their interests through actions and ideas that indicate the formation of a counter-hegemonic project for Brazil. For them the main issue and the first step to overcome backwardness is to reduce the country's comparative disadvantages when compared to other developed regions of the global capitalist system. (OLIVEIRA, 2010, p.125)

The tactics to try once more to overcome the backwardness included two main pillars, following the new classes' view. First, Brazil should open its economy to the globalized economy and improve bilateral diplomatic and trade relations with the major powers (US and Europe). Advocates of this thought understood that only these rich regions could provide the inputs necessary to development and reestablishment of growth. The criticism here is that Brazil invested too much of its efforts in the past trying to secure agreements with not so prominent countries (i.e. in the Middle East, Central America, Africa and Asia) in an attempt to diversify its major partners, but the economic return from these accords would never replace neither surpass the profits that the European or North American markets are able to offer⁸³. In the same vein, policy makers in Itamaraty, who nothing or little had to do with the entrepreneurial elites, also agreed on their side upon the necessity to develop privileged relations with the last superpower standing. They had a common view that Brazil was seen internationally as a peripheral country, regardless of four decades fighting off this status, and hence an alignment with the US would be the fastest and safest via toward insertion in the new world order⁸⁴.

Second, examples of integration processes from the North showed how established powers can help cement their regional prominence and contribute to globalization by forming free trade areas⁸⁵. The US started negotiations in 1988 with Canada and Mexico to create the North American Free Trade Agreement that entered into force in 1994. The technological and productive American supremacy became even more evident when the balance of trade within the group proved to be hugely more lucrative to the US than to Mexico, despite of seasonal oscillations. In addition, 1992 was a historic year for the European continent because it was by then that the Treaty of the European Union was signed, constituting the second largest economy in the world. Brazil also felt inspired to harness its unchallenged superiority in South America⁸⁶ and, beyond working on several projects that envisage south Americanization process as

⁸³ OLIVEIRA, Marcos Aurelio Guedes de. **Sources of Brazil's Counter-Hegemony**. 2010, p.138

⁸⁴ PECEQUILLO, Cristina S. *Op. Cit.*, p.137

⁸⁵ ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de. *Op. Cit.*, p.11

⁸⁶ BURGESS, Sean W. *Op. Cit.*, 2008, p.75

mentioned in the last chapter, institutionalized its evident hegemony by proposing also the creation of what would ultimately be a free trade area, the Mercosur. On the course of time, Mercosur proved in fact to be commercially beneficial mostly to Brazil. In sum, with the advent of neoliberalization, elites and government would tackle Brazilian vulnerabilities and shortcomings; whereas with Mercosur, the country's strengths would be highlighted and promoted. As a conclusion, the exhaustion of the from-West-inspired ISI represented, by no means, abandonment of imported Western models of development, quite the contrary, what could be observed was a period of full subjugation to American economic thinking⁸⁷, mainly under Collor presidency; and to European-style institutions, aiming to solidify regional hegemony.

At this point, two concepts that will guide Brazilian foreign policy throughout the 1990s and the 2000s are present and it is indispensable to discuss them more in depth: hegemony and institutions. I surely do not have the intention give a final definition of what these terms mean and/or represent; nor will I give full theoretical account on them. I will instead simply discuss specifically their role on the construction of the argument I want to construct.

3.3. Institutions

I tried to make clear my point in the previous chapters that great power status is not simply achieved through the collection of several material factors and it is rather hard even to identify which elements a country must have to be recognized as one. As I also showed earlier, states that possess these material capabilities are not always considered or remembered by foreigners as powers, partly because some of these states have no ultimate interest to be seen as such. Norway, Australia and Canada are good examples of material resources owners that never implemented large scale projects of power (for several specific different reasons). The key-word in play here is then recognition⁸⁸. A country must wish being a great power and should be recognized by its peers as so being. The constructivist theories shed adequate light in this matter.

⁸⁷ CERVO, Luiz Amado. **Brazil's Rise on the International Scene: Brazil and the World**. 2010, p.7

⁸⁸ HURRELL, Andrew. **Paths to Power: Foreign Policy Strategies of Intermediate States**. 2000, p.2

Evoking Constructivism, Andrew Hurrell explains two relevant points concerning the acquisition of power and its relation to institutions. First of all, the author affirms that:

The proliferation of international institutions is commonly associated with globalization and with increased levels of transnational exchange and communication. Institutions are needed to deal with the ever more complex dilemmas of collective action that emerge in a globalized world. (HURRELL, 2000, p.3)

That amounts to say that, in a world with multiple agendas, individual countries are not able to tackle all the problems they need to solve. At the same time as institutions represent the contemporary way to advance the globalization process, globalization itself requires the countries to be inserted in institutions, should they intend to have the necessary operating range to act in such a process. Participation in the main multilateral institutions is therefore the first and indelible step that a country must take toward international recognition. Knowing this, Sean W. Bruges highlights that:

while there are definite ups and downs in Brazil's adherence to the dictates of the power centers guiding the international system, the abiding reality that has continued strongly since the end of the Cold War is one of adhering to the core precepts of (the) global (...) dominant liberal economic and political ideology that underpins global governance institutions. (BURGES, 2010, p.352)

Institutions consist thus of an invariable in middle powers' foreign policy because it is too costly not to join the main debates on global political and economic issues. Moreover, the multilateral forums are the only stages where weaker states can somehow make a difference on the major powers' agenda, provided that institutions' bylaws always guarantee to their members the democratic right of, at least, being heard. In other words, a minimal level of power is secured for some of the states, which otherwise would not have it.

This brings us to the second point. Although the institutional liberals understand that institutions are founded to solve common multi-bordered problems, this is not the only purpose for what they are used by countries⁸⁹. They are also used as tools to exert power over others, as introduced in the first chapter, institutional power is also a form of material power, which reflects

⁸⁹ HURRELL, Andrew. *Op. Cit.*, p.3

de facto hierarchies and structures in the system. Both weaker and stronger states take institutions as a means to pursue interests. Less relevant states may harness the opportunity to contribute in the making of the certain internal rules that in turn draws some limits to the legitimate action of bigger powers. On the other hand, institutions standardize and perpetuate structures and make them harder to be altered and such structures very often favor major powers, especially in sensitive economic and military aspects. Hurrell even comes to claim that “indeed sovereignty may be increasingly defined not by the power to insulate one's state from external influences but by the power to participate effectively in international institutions of all kinds.”⁹⁰ In this same matter, middle powers may, paradoxically, climb up to influential positions in the institutions’ organizational charts, and therefore impact on less sensitive international decisions, but remaining under the subjugation of the great powers in more sensitive issues. Burges explains that “the dominant state creates an order based ideologically on a broad measure of consent, functioning according to general principles that in fact ensure the continuing supremacy of the leading state or states but at the same time offer some measure of prospect of satisfaction to the less powerful.”⁹¹ Chris Alden and Marco Antonio Vieira reinforce this proposition when they suggest that:

Middle powers—at least the ‘classic’ ones that academics have theorized about such as Canada, Australia, Scandinavia and the Netherlands—have used their status to attain key positions within the decision-making hierarchies of important international institutions such as the IMF’s Board of Governors and influential bureaucratic appointments within the UN. They justify their positions within these institutions not on the basis of economic or military importance on the global stage but through their activism in the name of international norms and/or their position as an intermediary for those states excluded from the ranks of power. But, in a substantive way, they are wedded to the ideological paradigm of neoliberalism that infuses the outlook and programming of these institutions and, through the systemic bias inherent in selection, owe their very position within the institutional hierarchy to a tacit acceptance of structural inequalities in the international system. (ALDEN, Chris & VIEIRA, Marco Antonio, 2005, p.1079)

⁹⁰ HURRELL, Andrew. *Op. Cit.*, p.4

⁹¹ BURGES, Sean W. *Op. Cit.*, 2008, p.71

In this excerpt, the authors state that middle powers may administrate high-level international issues, as long they do not touch the core values of the hegemon they accepted when they entered the institution. Ultimately, the development of certain members' material powers is again constrained by hegemonic structural and productive powers. Concerning this topic, I turn now to the discussion of the second concept of this section.

3.4. Hegemony

This term very easily induces us to think of polarity (uni and bi), of that state who is able to implement a certain kind of comprehensive predominance, i.e. *Pax Romana*, *Pax Britannica* and *Pax Americana*, through the application of authoritarianism and coercion. However, compulsory power is not the only one present at the establishment of hegemony. Sean Burges, drawing upon Antonio Gramsci, considers that “hegemony gains its strength through consent, not the latent threat of imposition.”⁹² He also sees that Brazil is an interesting case to study hegemonies because of its attempts to settle its regional preponderance in South America, quietly obtaining acquiescence of the other regional states, knowing that Brazil has little coercion capabilities. So here there are two coexisting factors that may look contradictory to conservative international relations analysts. On the first extremity, Brazil indisputably has supremacy in South America⁹³; on the other extremity, this is so without possessing hard power to claim hegemony. “The reality in Brazilian foreign policy is that power was rarely directly applied or explicitly visible; influence was instead sought by disseminating ideas or by attempting to create situations where it became implicitly too costly for other countries to deviate extensively from the Brazilian position.”⁹⁴

Itamaraty's approach was thus characterized by formulating a structure of ideas applied in South America and multilateral forums that left little or no space for public contradiction. For instance, Brazilian defense of values on human rights and the environment at international

⁹² BURGES, Sean W. *Op. Cit.*, 2008, p.65

⁹³ SERFATY, Simon. **Moving into a Post-Western World**. 2011, p.13

⁹⁴ BURGES, Sean W. *Op. Cit.*, 2008, p.66

organizations are not directly challenged by any country since the 1980s for being common expected modern values. One may say that Brazil has now the hegemony on environmental issues, not just because of its natural richness, but the country is legitimately accepted as host and organizer of the main conferences, events and forums on the topic, such as ECO 92 and Rio+20. In this latter event, Brazil took the lead of the process and drafted itself the final document that would be submitted to the plenary, containing eventual suggestions on how to tackle climate change. Another example of Brazilian hegemonic project is the ways Brazil designed the spread and development of neoliberalism to South America. Many countries of the region also adopted ISI policies during the Cold War and were willing to enter the new neoliberal era, but they had not enough economic foundations to do it. This way, Brazil's leadership to conduct regional integration, development and to speed up commerce was in fact accepted and welcome. The country became recognized as legitimate South American spokesman to the developed world and the other way around⁹⁵. Loosely, Brazil was vigorously spreading its own structural and productive powers and this fact is worth mentioning because represents a newness in its foreign policy. For the first time, the country was coupling material powers strategies with aggressive non-material powers strategies (values, ideas, righteousness and how-to-develop knowledge)

There is however a contradiction here. Brazilian hegemonic project was actually suffering influence from what I call meta-hegemony. As Oliveira puts it, in Brazil "there was a move towards the new US hegemonic project (...) believing this would help to alleviate high debt and economic recession by incorporating the national economy into a stronger system."⁹⁶ Sean Bruges complements by stating that "Although there are two main visions of how the hegemonic order is provided in mainstream international relations theory, in both instances the final goal is protection and advancement of the economic interests of the dominant state."⁹⁷ Although Brazil was propagating its values and ideas in the South to execute its regional hegemonic project, they

⁹⁵ BURGESS, Sean W. *Op. Cit.*, 2012, p.358

⁹⁶ OLIVEIRA, Marcos Aurelio Guedes de. *Op. Cit.*, p.131

⁹⁷ BURGESS, Sean W. *Op. Cit.*, 2008, p.69

were perfectly inserted within the already-existing hegemonic structure erected by the US and Europe. That is the reason why I argued that Brazil was constructing the so-called regional meta-hegemony, there was the occurrence of a hegemony being created inside another more comprehensive one. I would like to call attention for the fact that hegemony and hegemon might be represented by different actors. Hegemon is the country who establishes the hegemony, but hegemony does not necessarily need a hegemon to be put into action. In the Brazilian case, the hegemonic projects in South America, namely Mercosur and later CASA/UNASUL, also intended to cope with American hegemonic projects, namely NAFTA and FTAA, in a counter-hegemonic fashion. Nonetheless, Brazil was not at any point disrupting the American/Western precepts; it was rather only counterbalancing eventual material losses. In sum, the hegemonic Brazilian project was situated inside the umbrella of the American/Western existing ideas and Brazil was even helping spill them over.

“The intrinsic nature and importance of hegemony as a structure with an ‘ownership’ that may embrace a range of countries that agree on a particular vision for the system.”⁹⁸ Hegemony is in this broader sense an ownership of ideas, as mentioned by Burges. Keohane⁹⁹ and Strange¹⁰⁰ also add to this interpretation when they emphasize that the dominant country may develop the ability to integrate its long-term interests to the very base of the international structure so that the other countries, even when they attempt to develop higher levels of autonomy, end up maintaining and defending these dominant country’s hegemonic interests should they still are intent to exist under the Western scope. At last, Brazil’s efforts on global counter-hegemony are mostly concentrated in restraining foreign material and institutional dominances, not ideological and systemic ones. The trend to give preference to developing physical capacities to the detriment of subjective ones is observed ever since in Brazilian foreign policy and this pretty much explains what is meant by the title of this section 2.

⁹⁸ BURGESS, Sean W. *Op. Cit.*, 2008, p.70

⁹⁹ KEOHANE, Robert. **After hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy**. 1984

¹⁰⁰ STRANGE, Susan. **States and markets**. 1994

3.5. New strategies for a new era

Despite the prevalence of traditional preferences, one should admit that Brazil conquered a more prominent position in the 1990s and the 2000s as it had never had before. It is not by chance that such a rise happened, something has changed. I already quickly mentioned some reasons for this: strengthening of subjective powers on the regional and hemispheric scales and the use of an assertive South-South soft power. It is not implicated however that Brazil simply came up with these changes from nothing. Most of the values and ideas defended by Brazil in international forums in the end of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st are actually the same it had been propagated since the early 20th century, namely international laws, democratic governance, universalism, redistribution of power and righteousness. Conversely, great part of Brazilian success in the post Cold War lies on what space these conventional ideas have in the new international agenda. During the Cold War, topics that provided little or no contribution to the bipolar balance of power (i.e. environment, human rights, education, democratic governance, etc) were left behind, regarded as non-priority or even as dangerous to the systemic harmony. Coincidentally, such ideas were exactly the ones upon which Brazil had been basing its foreign policy discourses. Thus, no great effect could be expected.

Simon Serfaty gives a clarifying account for the post Cold War agenda. He states that, over a few years of unchallenged American supremacy, “in a unipolar world, allies are known (and sought) for their willingness, and adversaries are recognized (and defeated) for their capabilities; there is little need for diplomacy, and consensus is asserted rather than negotiated.”¹⁰¹ Therefore, high politics do not have to be reinforced and enforced constantly, it enters into a phase of relaxation, and this fact opens a gap for countries that do not possess hard power capabilities to introduce their alternative discourses. In other words, *Realpolitik* does not obfuscate other issues with the same intensity as it formerly did. Another important factor, as

¹⁰¹ SERFATY, Simon. *Op. Cit.*, p.19

Joseph Nye points out¹⁰² is that the use of coercion, apart from being no longer so much needed, is too costly. US has changed its nature by imposing hegemony through benevolence, economic structure and influencing institutions, not through direct confrontation. Accordingly, the 1990s experienced a boom of multilateral discussions and policies not directly related to international security and the like. Amongst the most remarkable topics were the aforementioned Brazilian values, and hence Brazil gained respect from international society for having taken the lead in some relevant issues at the moment, and for having previous know-how on various ascendant priority topics. This resulted in a big new array of opportunities to middle-power states like Brazil. In addition, countries with diplomatic abilities to form groupings and coalitions, and with wide participation in different institutions excel in this non-dichotomic environment. It is so because states can rearrange their strategic partnership worldwide according to their specific interests, not worrying about the two superpowers' oversight for bipolar balance.

Throughout the late 1990s and the whole 2000s, Brazil purposely changed its partners in a way that allowed it to better play the game according to the new rules. While, during the Cold War, the United States and Europe were the major Brazilian trade partners, in 2008, Mercosur, Latina America and Asia took over as the largest partners. For instance, commerce with China grew tenfold in seven years. In 2010, China ranks as the first Brazil's trade partner¹⁰³. The surge of the G20, UNASUL, BRICS and Cairns Group brought about the instruments that many "under-voiced" countries did not have during the Cold War to acquire weight in the international structure. Even without the military capability that Russia has, or without the same economic strength that China possesses, Brazil enjoys the same prestige of those countries inside the multilateral institutions.¹⁰⁴

In order to manage to have such parity in the international relations lately, here one can list six special tactics that either were developed by Brazil or it has learned how to use in a very

¹⁰² NYE, Joseph. **Bound to Lead. The changing nature of American power.** 1990

¹⁰³ CERVO, Luiz Amado. *Op. Cit.*, p.13

¹⁰⁴ SERFATY, Simon. *Op. Cit.*, p.13

proper fashion¹⁰⁵. Other authors present alternative tactics, but I will focus here on the more visible and recurrent ones: a) Avoid mindless opposition – Brazil opposed several times the mainstream Western positions and even brought lawsuits against major powers in organizations such as WTO, however such events occurred when specific cases led to specific losses, namely subsidies and the like. It was never observed any relevant campaign initiated by Brazil to contradict systemic positions without a direct infringement of specific institutional regulations or international laws. Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, for instance, is a kind of regime regarded by Brazilian policy makers as mindless opposition against the structure, because it seeks to contradict the major powers on whatever matters are discussed, indicating pure ideology.

b) Collectivize – as discussed in the section dedicated to hegemony, Brazil is making use of productive and structural powers more than it ever did. Part of the project of hegemony is executed by convincing that one's interests are also a collective interest of that specific group of partners (like G20 or BRICS). This way, when the rich countries oppose Brazilian position on a table of negotiation, Brazil can claim it cannot abandon such a proposal because this proposal reflects the wish of myriad nations. In sum, interests are standardized, legitimized and shared by countries;

c) Consensus creation – this tactic is linked to the previous one. Instead of reaching consensus by amalgamating divergent opinions, Itamaraty strives to explain how its position is beneficial to all, with patience and heavy negotiations. Weaker countries such as Paraguay, Uruguay and African nations buy the ideas because they understand Brazil is in a better position to negotiate with the US and the EU, thus their losses can be smaller if they use Brazil a catalyst¹⁰⁶. On the other hand, gains are reciprocal once, even diplomatically well-prepared, Brazil still sees itself as being weak to negotiate alone on certain issues.

d) Technocratic-speak – Few diplomatic corps in the world go to negotiations with such a comprehensive knowledge of the causes, laws and regulations that surround the case in play as

¹⁰⁵ Tactics are further explained in: BURGESS, Sean W. *Op. Cit.*, 2012

¹⁰⁶ *Idem*, p.358

the Brazilian diplomats. Proposals and documents presented by Brazil in international forums are hermetically in accordance with norms that regulate it. Also, the topics are backed by deep professional jargons in all spheres touching them, namely legal, economic, political, and philosophical fields. As Teivo Teivaninen and Sean Burges put it, “In itself this gives Brazil quite bit of influence and power because it is one of a limited number of countries that can attack a question with the at times exclusionary language of econometric modeling and economic theory.”¹⁰⁷ Or yet “nowhere has the Brazilian mastery of technocratic language been more evident than at the WTO, with Celso Amorim perhaps being one of a handful of people in the world who fully understands the Doha round talks. The ability to stymie the US/EU Cancún deal in large part came down to Itamaraty’s ability to attack the technocratic merit of the proposal, not the morality of the proposition on the table.”¹⁰⁸

e) Build new organizations – The most traditional struggle Brazil fights in multilateral institutions has been the conquest of a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. Such claim is not new, it has been reiterated several times on the course of the post World War II, including nowadays. The Security Council is an ambience Brazil knows that its interests will never be priority or, most of the times, not even considered. It is therefore crucial to build new institutions where Brazil has the capacity to influence the statutes, operations and agenda. In other words, the “country has worked to shift global governance structures to suit its own ambitions and thus shift benefits to itself.”¹⁰⁹

f) Propagate new thinking – This strategy began being applied from Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s presidency (1995 – 2002) onwards. During Collor’s term, American neoliberalism and the Consensus of Washington were simply and intensively replicated; there was almost no room for Brazilian new ideas on development and international relations. Conversely, Cardoso was a former theorist of dependency theories in the 1970s and he inevitably brought intellectual input

¹⁰⁷ *Idem*, p.359 and TEIVANINEN, Teivo & WALLERSTEIN, Immanuel. **Enter economism, exit politics: Experts, economic policy and the damage to democracy**. 2002

¹⁰⁸ BURGESS, Sean W. *Op. Cit.*, 2012, p.359

¹⁰⁹ *Idem*, p.361

with him to politics. Brazilian hegemonic project exemplified by Mercosur and developmental groupings, as the case of G20, reversed the fact because proprietary thinking began being propagated. Differently from what may seem, no rupture happened, neoliberal policies were still vigorous in the economy after 1994, but Foreign Ministry assumed a posture to criticize more often the structures and to foment formation of coalitions whose interests were more detached from the core of the structure. At this later period of the 1990s, strategies that would lead to development and accepted since the Cold War had some of their inconsistencies pointed out. That is, some productive and structural powers, from which Brazil had been suffering for decades, were identified.

Lula's foreign policy crew also asked a series of rather provocative questions, chief of which was why did Southern countries have to use Northern intermediaries for their bilateral exchange? Why should we expect improvements in South-South trade and interaction if most exchanges involved trans-shipment through a Northern port or airport? In response to these questions they floated the idea of a new international economic geography. (BURGES, 2012, p.364)

Cardoso and Lula (2003 – 2010) aroused the respect of the other so-called Third World countries by proposing non-mindless, sensible, efficient, clear and resourceful methods to develop in a more autonomous fashion. Under the examples and actions from Brazil, the South has been getting more confident to tackle its historical imagined inferiority.

Let me turn the attention to the more recent years. After President Collor suffered an impeachment, neoliberalization process still went on with President Itamar Franco's (1992 – 1994) "Real Plan". Idealized by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, then finance Minister, the new currency, Real, represented a milestone in economic policy because it used wide openness of Brazilian market to imports as a strategy to tackle the historical high levels of inflation that had ravaged domestic market for over three decades. The deluge of imports experienced in 1994 and 1995 yielded some nefarious outcomes, but also some good ones¹¹⁰. On the one hand, opposition against Cardoso used the bankruptcy of many national companies and foreign indebtedness as

¹¹⁰ CERVO, Luiz Amado. *Op. Cit.*, p.7

the main criticisms against the president's policies. On the other hand, Brazil integrated an interdependent economic system and, from that moment on, several countries began to depend on Brazilian consumer market as never before. Late 1990s marked a period when it was impossible to imagine multilateral trade negotiations without the participation of Brazil; it became fundamental part of the world order in many areas (also environment, and nuclear proliferation)¹¹¹. This led momentum to Itamaraty to start an aggressive coalition's policy, to establish new alliances with rich countries¹¹² in order to increase commerce capacity. More than rise of self-confidence, Brazil built up mechanisms to deal with the *status quo* and to become an influential. Cardoso's approach served as base to Presidents Lula and Dilma Rousseff (2011 – current), who both succeeded him.

Lula did not leave behind the relations with the industrialized countries, as many political scientists affirmed about his left-wing tendency during the presidential campaign. He followed coherently and added on the steps made by Cardoso. Coupled with the centennial unwritten alliance with the US and Europe, Lula adopted in 2003 certain set of policies that are referred by Vigevani and Capaluni to as “autonomy through diversification”¹¹³, and by Alden and Vieira as “trialateralism”¹¹⁴. This consists of a dual-pronged foreign policy in which there is no preference of region to relate with, instead, conventional and privileged relations levels with the core countries are kept in function while new agreements with weaker countries are also established. To recall, from the Cold War until the end of the 1990s there were clear periods of approximation and distancing from the First World or Third World interchangeably, depending on historical necessities evidenced by the choice between autonomy through distance and through participation. Numerous high-profile visits were made to Africa, South-East Asia and China with a frequency never seen before. With this Lula sought to overcome the always-present

¹¹¹ HURRELL, Andrew. *Op. Cit.*, p.8

¹¹² DAUVERGNE, Peter & FARIAS, Déborah B. L. **The rise of Brazil as a global development power**. 2012, p.907

¹¹³ VIGEVANI, Tullo & CEPALUNI, Gabriel. **Lula's foreign policy and the quest for autonomy through diversification**. 2007

¹¹⁴ VIEIRA, Marco Antonio M. de C. *Op. Cit.*

material deficits and acquire a more comprehensive institutional presence in global governance aiming to reinforce norms and universalistic discourses. Lula's humanitarian help to impoverished areas, financial support for projects in places with scarce infrastructure, and defense of the participation and respect of weak nations in the international decisions led Brazil to be the founder of some sort of Wilsonianism of the South. With the acquiescence to act from the weak countries, Brazil erected important partnerships with other regional hegemonies, such as Russia, China, India and South Africa and this fact created a stable environment (without strong opposition) to quickly develop new levels of power.

Brazil, this way, adopted the Western values, which were always lucrative to the rich countries, but inverted the logic by changing who would be the main receivers of the profits. In other words, instead of defending the globalization of democracy, traditional American flagship, Brazil defended the democratization of globalization¹¹⁵. Once more, it is Brazil looking for an unparalleled space inside the Western primordial ideas. This represents an establishment of new hegemon that works well in various regions of the world, because it has been embraced by countries in the same structural position as Brazil, and gives tools to compete more significantly against Western productive and structural powers. Some say that the BRICS countries initiated a new post Western era. Notwithstanding the success of countries such as China, India, Brazil and Russia to suppress the unipolarity from the early 1990s, to assert that the traditional major powers were already overcome is a big mistake. These latter powers were always good as "players" in a game whose rules they created themselves, especially UK and US, and their zones of control in the aftermath of the World War II, namely Germany and Japan. However, it seems that some other countries learned how to play this very same game even by creating a few new rules. It is still nonetheless impossible to keep up the today's world without the participation of the conventional rulers. This fact casts no doubt. Conversely, there are two (contradictory)

¹¹⁵ CERVO, Luiz Amado. *Op. Cit.*, p.9

factors that tell us more about the repositioning of the rising influentials like Brazil without ruling out the old ones.

First, in order to conclude that the world is entering a post-Western era, it would be necessary to overcome and replace the core premises of the era in play, but it is not being intended to be done. As Serfaty correctly remembers, the rise of the US in the 20th century was not due to its own rise, but due to the collapse of whole Europe; in the 21st century, he stresses, “the post-Western world, should it be confirmed, need not be about the decline of Western powers, including the United States, but about the ascendancy of everyone else.”¹¹⁶ As a result, this configures as first time in modern history when the return to a uni or bipolar system is very unlikely to happen, whereas the broke out of a war among the main powers is also unimaginable. Against the forecast of (neo) realists, this fragmented world is not less stable than the bipolar and it is so, in great part, because the material interests may be conflicting, but the subjective worldview is not so much¹¹⁷.

Second, Itamaraty has what specialists call “memory resilience”, meaning that there is a collection of knowledge built in time and kind of a culture of appropriateness that tells the diplomats which knowledge to apply in certain situations. Simplifying, in times of trouble, Brazilian foreign policy recalls conservative measures to reach solutions, and these conservative measures are Western related. Markus Kröger¹¹⁸ shows how Brazil has hugely accelerated its in-progress neo-mercantilist and third-worldist policies after the 2008 financial crisis, suggesting that policy innovation is still not well-developed and intellectual influence from the West is starkly present as a vicious circle. Also, one may not disregard the elites as preponderant parts of this process by virtue of their independent capacity to influence government. For this class, economic protectionism is fundamental to the maintenance of competitiveness. Accordingly, regional

¹¹⁶ SERFATY, Simon. *Op. Cit.*, p.7-8

¹¹⁷ Following the analogy of the game and its rules I used before, the board on which the players play are different from the near past, but the game itself is still the same (how to survive in modern capitalism of sovereign states) and so are most of the rules.

¹¹⁸ KRÖGER, Markus. **Neo-mercantilist capitalism and post-2008 cleavages in economic decision-making power in Brazil**. 2012

integration processes are remarkably steady or being crowded out in the last decade in favor of conservative national(istic) control of flows. As Kröger highlights:

Brazil has been building a neo-mercantilist development approach involving 'noninstitutional restrictions on imports using exchange rates, regulation of financial flows, and active promotion of exports'¹¹⁹. The neo-mercantilist strategy has benefited Brazil's best interconnected capitalists and politicians, and will foreseeably continue to do so as Brazilian clout advances in the international political economy. (KRÖGER, 2012, p.887)

By observing the EU's inability to solve its internal problems or the US' struggle to sustain its own financial market, rich countries seem to show that their hegemonic premises installed on the structure no longer work all the time even for their own domestic realities. This is the first time in modern era also when the rich states are all together involved at once in serious economic and political crises for reasons other than war. Brazil does not wish to have the same fate, thus it rescued conservative models of success from the very basics of modern capitalism, namely international coalitions of power and a strong/big state. As examples for that, the three largest federal banks, Banco do Brasil, Caixa Econômica Federal, and Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES), are also the main agents through which businesses and public authorities fund their development projects. Be it for infrastructure, purchase of machinery, or simply floating capital, those public autarchies are the most important sources of credit. In addition, the Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (PAC, Program for Growth Acceleration) refers back to general developmental strategies adopted by the military regime in the Cold War by allocating efforts to exploitation and development of economic peripheries such as the Amazon. PAC has an initial investment budget of over 503 billion reais and makes the state the main agent of growth.

Finally, it is between extremes where Brazil alternates nowadays in the pursuit of power. It has not been choosing between relations with rich and poor, but instead a triateralism; and not choosing between generating new values or taking for granted old ones, but otherwise the

¹¹⁹ KRÖGER, Markus. *Op. Cit.*, p.887 *apud* HAJ, Abu-El. **From interdependence to neo-mercantilism: Brazilian capitalism in the age of globalization.** In: Latin American Perspectives, nº 34, vol. 5, 2007, p 109

construction of its own identity and space inside a non-owned structure. Brazil has learned along decades to play with the rules and how to be assertive and more successful using them. Above all, Brazil has learned to diversify its actions and thoughts, building a more complex foreign policy and assimilating strategies for non-material powers development. Now, after the 2008 crisis, the country showed it has a unique expertise in resuming economic development from scratch after depressions, as observed over the entire 20th century, expertise which the spoiled rich countries do not possess.

4. CONCLUSION

Since the very beginning of this work I stated very clearly the purpose I was seeking to achieve. I dedicated full attention to the knowledge of state power-building, in concept and in practice. Brazil is noticeably one of the most active countries in the pursuit of global political participation and, as such, represents a highly valuable case study to understand this matter. The whole of the modern society holds in mind some four or five states when it comes to exemplify who the global powers are. Historical examples are easily recognizable, sharable, accepted and are unanimously always the same ones, namely at least the United States, United Kingdom, France, and maybe Germany and Japan. It is no wonder that the concepts and roadmaps toward power are ultimately inspired and even intellectually bound to these few successful states. Thus, should a country other than these benchmark countries wish to join the select group, how can this country make its own path? What are the choices that separate the unsuccessful from the successful? And more importantly, if Brazil still sees itself as being unsuccessful in the contest for power, how could it act with views to be on the opposite side? These questions all ramify from the ones proposed in the introductory section, which would guide this entire research. The next three chapters provided evidences and ideas to respond such questions on the Brazilian case in different aspects of the spectrum of the state's action.

Chapter 1 demonstrated how the Brazil's economic basis, since its formation as a country, had not been insulated from the European realities and worldviews. I reinforced several times that the policies in play could be translated as artificial attempts to reproduce natural European historical processes as power idiosyncrasies. The same paths that led to power and wealthy were tried to be traversed again, aiming to end up in the Promised Land, the developed world. Not just did the state believe this route would be the only safe one toward success, but intellectuals, elites and public opinion were caught enclosed in the same unison thinking. European models definitely had its role on the construction of right and wrong of conducting politics in Brazil. As examples for this, Chapter 1 showed that Brazil established a European absolutist monarchy already after its collapse in Europe; mercantilist policies after 200 years liberalism had taken over the core Western economies; and centralizing governments that kept in their hands the wheels of the society in a monopolistic economy. In sum, Brazil was an ever-resurrection of Europe's past.

Chapter 2 presented this very same environment, reflected on the politics and international relations during the Cold War. This period is marked by a succession of authoritarian and, eventually, totalitarian regimes in which the school of thought in international relations is the militarism and *Realpolitik* practiced by the two then superpowers. It is possible to gauge from the short case studies I provided, that Brazil tries somehow to be a political Frankenstein: pro-West, non-anti-East and neutral at the same time. For this reason, policies intermittently changed to accommodate crises in the international scenario, but one recurrence stood: the reproduction of Western Realist models of security and development. Bilateral and multilateral agreements seen in this phase sought to collect attributes and conditions to exercise politics through its physical and material fashion. Technology transfer, institutional participation, military alliances and others of the like attempted to create an environment where Brazil was close enough from the West to still orbit it, but far enough from it for not to be swallowed. In other words, Brazil invested to generate resources to compete with the superpowers, but by

copying their means of action. It was never an option to propose and develop an alternative model for and from itself.

Chapter 3 compared the same political and economic levels from the Chapters 1 and 2, but outlining their transformations with the advent of the end of the Cold War. The first phase of this new era created crisis of significance of action, because 45 years of right and wrong in politics had abruptly shifted. Historically, it is normal to observe that, during critical moments, macro politics tend to refer back to conservative actions, for they look safer and more often tested. Therefore, President Fernando Collor de Melo again began resorting to ideas originated from the very basis of American neoliberalism. Notwithstanding, post-Cold War era brought along myriad opportunities to unleash an autonomous development project. In this period, traditional elements that sustained the core countries on the very top of the international pyramid started being perceived as not as efficient to the peripheral countries as they had always been to the core countries. The lack of a bulkhead power in global scale ended with the ideological dichotomy that limited countries' individual actions. This way, many new international organizations, alliances, regional and interest groups erected outside the direct control of the traditional powers. After 2008, the situation worsened to the so-called rich countries. That their success could not be hermetically reproduced by other poor countries, it was already known. However, from this moment onwards, their models of power sustainability became no longer sufficient to keep their own strength, and this is the novelty. Application and reapplication of austerity measures, Keynesian intervention, market protection, migratory hardening and others took no efficient results to make them emerge from the grave economic and political crises to which they are submitted.

Following 450 years of European and almost 100 years of American imitation, Brazil and some other influentials decided not to be successful like them in material powers, but otherwise in ideas. In other words, Brazil began proposing some new models of development, which were embraced as a legitimate model for other poor countries, mainly in Latin America

and Africa. The surge of a Brazilian ideological influence is the utmost newness of Brazilian contest for global power. Whether or not this model will be successful is still to be seen, but its first goal to establish Brazil as a visible figure at the global stage already takes effect. Never in modern history had Southern-originated ideas been taken so seriously by the traditional powerhouses. Another doubt to be solved with time is whether the new rising powers so are due to their accurate non-material strategies, the decline of old the hegemonies or yet due to a symbiosis of these two dynamics. The only certainty so far is that Brazil has crowned itself as a new power, not necessarily by any revolutionary new model, but by ably convincing the others that there it might actually be one. Ultimately, it is valuable to recall that Brazil still has similar portion of the global GDP from that of the 1970s, the same relative military power, and the same commercial participation in the world trade. So, I could conclude that material means have not defined Brazil germinal success, but the production of ideas of power indeed has. I have shown that power can manifest itself in many fashions. Material and hard powers are merely a few of them. Subjective forces are capable of posing unperceived influence and intellectual subjugation because they can dictate what is good and bad and what is appropriate and inappropriate as well as standards of success (not always rationally intended).

Over the last two decades or so, a wave of optimism flooded Brazilian scholarship, public opinion and politics. Economic and political stabilities, strong economic growth, and honorific foreign titles, such as being a BRIC country, resulted in several pieces of research discussing how the Global South would overthrow the traditional powers in the near future. Many other works drew upon interconnectedness among these select few emergent countries. Often, works were conducted to assess the rise of China and the demise of the United States as we know it today. Nevertheless, very little research was conducted aiming to understand what “overthrow” means or what the path is that our “autonomy” pursuit has been taking and to think critically whether the current situation in Brazil is exactly the way it is being largely put by many scholars or if Brazil is not so much overcoming the status quo as one may think. In sum, it is

important for Brazil to create new knowledge on its current impact in the world and on the effectiveness of its choices toward being a powerhouse. This master's thesis has addressed the clear need for work in this area. Nonetheless, further research is still to be done to understand the meaning of efficiency of the new power strategies in the building of power from Brazil and the Global South.

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Curriculum Vitae

Career Summary

2013–Current PROJECT ASSISTANT, International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Vienna

- Manage all phases of an international project (budget preparation, research, implementation, evaluation)
- Monitor project development and the making of reports
- Develop projects funded by the Brazilian Government and the European Commission
- Observe QMS processes
- Use of SAP applications

2012 INTERNATIONAL PROJECT MANAGEMENT INTERN, UN Office, Vienna

- Utilise exceptional interpersonal skills to develop and maintain positive relationships with embassies, associations, international organisations and government agencies
- Evaluate political processes in relation to economic, social, cultural and legal issues in various countries and regions and assess subsequent reform proposals of international treaties
- Employ excellent organisational abilities to manage conferences and subsequent plenary sessions for UN members, essential to developing and deciding on resolutions
- Prepare follow-up reports on projects approved at the plenary and utilise adept time-management skills to ensure reports are completed within specified timeframes
- Utilise multi-language abilities to develop and maintain international relationships at a diplomatic and political level
- Implement astute negotiation capabilities and exceptional leadership skills both in the workplace and when dealing with external government relations

KEY ACHIEVEMENTS

- Developed comprehensive evaluation and follow-up reports, resulting in draft resolutions accepted by the UN General Assembly in New York as well as new proposals on drug and transnational crime controls by member states

2011–2012 INTERNATIONAL PROJECT MANAGEMENT TRAINEE, European Economic & Social Committee, Brussels

- Monitored public policies and utilised excellent problem solving skills to develop innovative strategies in the field of Sustainable Development
- Established contracts with new stakeholders and developed regional partnerships with the intention of creating a comprehensive and diverse opinion document
- Evaluated projects proposed by European Civil Society Organisations regarding their suitability to be forwarded to the European Commission and/or European Parliament
- Organised events attended by diplomatic personnel and Civil Society Organisations – NGOs, universities and unions – to discuss and negotiate proposals for new sustainable development targets
- Implemented innovative proposal suggestions – while working in close relation and cooperation with stakeholders – to be included in the committee's opinions, and forwarded to the European Parliament

KEY ACHIEVEMENTS

- Organised events had a major impact on the common European position, which was proposed to the Rio+20 UN conference
- Utilised strong communication and interpersonal skills which lead to an increase of new partnerships and stakeholders

Career Summary Continued

2009–2010 DEPUTY MANAGER, Caixa Econômica Federal, Brazil

- Conducted excellent negotiation skills – commercial rates and reciprocity – with relation to terms of credit loans
- Implemented adept leadership skills and effective communication abilities to train and supervise new employees and trainees
- Undertook new challenges and responsibilities particularly with relation to financial targets of the corporate sector, including profit margins

KEY ACHIEVEMENTS

- Utilised time-management skills to ensure targets of the sector were always met
- Implemented adept communication and interpersonal skills to develop prospective new markets, including some outside the expected area of operation

2007–2010 BANK OFFICER, Caixa Econômica Federal, Brazil

- Evaluated investment projects and utilised decision making abilities with regards to the allocation of federal funds
- Responsible for reporting and monitoring the implementation of projects that were already receiving funding
- Utilised excellent communication and interpersonal skills to develop positive external client relationships and gain new

- projects as well as expand the customer base
- Managed sales of commercial banking portfolios – such as insurance – and researched and implemented new strategies for meeting targets in the corporate sector

KEY ACHIEVEMENTS

- Established a corporate sector in a new agency, and in one year, branch was ranked first among 49 other agencies
- Monthly targets were consecutively met for over a year and as a result of consistently high performance reviews, was promoted to a more challenging position, Deputy Manager.

Education and Qualifications

| | |
|----------------|---|
| MGS | Master of Global Studies (University of Vienna and University of Leipzig) |
| Course | Organizational Analysis (Stanford University) |
| BIntRel | Bachelor of International Relations (São Paulo State University, Brazil) |
| AssDeg | Business Administration Certificate (Memorial College, Brazil) |

Publications

- Santos, E. F. (2008) The European Union Policy and Integration Post-Maastricht: The Case of Eastern Europe
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Key I.T. Skills

| | |
|-------------------------|--------------|
| ▪ MS Office | ▪ MS Excel |
| ▪ MS Access | ▪ MS Windows |
| ▪ Internet Applications | ▪ MS Word |

Personal Details

Languages: Portuguese (Native), English (Fluent), Spanish (Fluent), German (Advanced), French (Advanced)