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Using Herbert C. Kelman's Approach
"Interactive Problem Solving"

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Abbreviations

AE	Action Evaluation
CORE	Congress of Racial Equality
e.g.	exempli gratia (for example)
f. ex.	for example
ICR	Interactive Conflict Resolution
HIHK	Heidelberg Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies
HKI	Herbert C. Kelman Institute for Interactive Conflict Transformation
i.e.	id est (in other words)
IICP	Institute for Integrative Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding
IPS	Interactive Problem Solving
NGO	Non-governmental organization
PICAR	Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
SPSSI	Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues
UN	United Nations
US	United States of America

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Preface

I am a student of International Development Studies and have had a particular interest in Peace Studies research for a long time. While spending two years in Japan and one year in France as an exchange student, I had the opportunity to make many international acquaintances which helped me realize the importance of peace. Particularly in France I perceived that even peoples that had formerly been hated arch enemies for centuries were able to get along very well in a short amount of time after a conflict.

The French I met while staying there were always friendly to me. These experiences made me notice that I as an ordinary person can also contribute to peace and intercultural understanding. I participated in courses about Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Vienna and the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. These courses mainly dealt with conflict resolution, conflict management and peace building. This is why I decided to write my diploma thesis about a subject in this field of studies.

It is my personal wish that Peace Studies gain more importance and progress in order to discover further mechanisms to solve conflicts, find deficiencies of present conflict resolution techniques and make the world a more peaceful place. I do not presume that my thesis can change anything, but I want to contribute.

1. Introduction

Many different approaches on conflict resolution and/ or working on conflicts have been developed in Peace Research. For example, popular measures to solve international conflicts in a non-violent way are mediation, conflict transformation using Johan Galtung's *Transcend* approach, good offices¹, reconciliation, facilitation and fact-finding. *Interactive Problem Solving* is another one of them. Herbert C. Kelman developed this approach approximately 40 years ago. While being known in the US and even also practiced in conflict areas such as Israel and Palestine, Kelman and his approach are rather unknown in Europe. That is why I specifically want to address *Interactive Problem Solving* in this thesis. In the mainstream of Peace Studies in Europe, this approach has been mentioned in one of my courses; however it has not become prevalent even though Kelman is seen as one of the founders of conflict resolution in the United States (US). Since there is relatively few literature available about (not from) Herbert C. Kelman in Vienna, I want to write a state-of-the-art on *Interactive Problem Solving*. Kelman's method is promising as it is developed from a social-psychological background (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 24). Also, it is important for policy makers to understand that "peace is not made by governments alone" (Saunders 2000: 252). As Saunders (2000: 252) continues to explain: "Important as government is, ultimately peaceful relationships are built by people" (cf. Saunders 2000: 254).

The aim of this thesis is to give an overview of the method Kelman developed to deal with conflicts and to classify it within the broad variety of concepts dealing with conflicts – which I see as a small contribution to Peace Studies. Through analyzing methods of conflict resolution, I hope to gain further perceptions that are important for working on conflicts to contribute to sustainable peace. The main questions dealt with are:

- What is *Interactive Problem Solving*?
- What are the differences between this and other conflict solving approaches?
- What kind of challenges does *Interactive Problem Solving* face?

The method used in this thesis is based on literature. Kelman's approach will be characterized and analyzed. How has it been put into practice? What failed and why did it fail? To answer these questions Kelman's articles, which appeared over the years, are analyzed on how his

¹ Good offices are services provided by the United Nations (UN) to assist negotiations (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 64).

approach developed and what changes were introduced. Furthermore, not only Kelman's literature will be taken into account but also those of his colleagues and other peace researchers who either influenced Kelman or were influenced by him. These scholars are Ronald Fisher, Donna Hicks, Oliver Wolleh, and Cynthia Chataway worked with and on this approach. In addition to them, John Burton's writings, which had a strong influence on Kelman will also be analyzed.

Kelman has published a number of articles and books, i.e. in his original field of study Social Psychology, which plays an essential role in *Interactive Problem Solving* (IPS). IPS can be applied on an international level as well as on a communal level. However, in this thesis, I will only deal with workshops on an international or national level.

One major work of other authors on this subject is "The Social Psychology of Group Identity and Social Conflict"; an edited volume with articles by different scientists particularly of the psychology field. The book is dedicated to Kelman and Kelman's work while processes of social influence, national identity and nationalism as well as solving ethnical conflicts are put into the focus of this book. Additionally, literature of scholars, that are experts in mediation and other conflict solving approaches like Bercovitch and Druckman, is used. I also relied on articles published from German-speaking scholars such as Oliver Wolleh and Cordula Reimann.

2. Concepts of Dealing with Conflicts

This chapter will attempt to provide an accurate picture of different types of interventions in interstate and intrastate conflicts. To do so, different approaches of conflict resolution are introduced in detail. These classifications follow Bercovitch and Uyangoda.

2.1 Definition of Conflict

Conflict is a part of our daily life. For most of us, conflict occurs in our interpersonal and social relationships. Of course, conflicts are also found on the political level, but in most European countries they are discussed and decided by non-violent means. If a person is torn between two or more options, conflict can also be intrapersonal.

Many definitions of conflict exist. Here are some definitions that have important points: Peter Wallensteen defines conflict as "a social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources" (Wallensteen 2007: 16 [Original citation in italics]). Conflict has three components in this definition: incompatibility, action, and actors. Conflict analysis deals with the things that conflict parties are interested in, what they claim, the relationship between the positions of the parties and finally destructive actions of the parties (Wallensteen 2007: 24).

The Berghof Foundation defines conflict as a "clash between antithetical ideas or interests – within a person or involving two or more persons, [...] or states pursuing mutually incompatible goals." (Berghof Foundation 2012: 10). They find conflicts are normally complex and unique. In contrast to other definitions, the Berghof Foundation includes the intra-personal conflict (Berghof Foundation 2012: 10).

The Heidelberg Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies on the other hand developed its definition of a political conflict as "a positional difference regarding values relevant to a society – the conflict items – between at least two decisive and directly involved actors, which is being carried out using observable and interrelated conflict means that lie beyond established regulatory procedures and threaten a core state function or the order of international law, or hold out the prospect to do so." (HIK)

With regards to my subject in this thesis, I choose a broad definition of conflict. However, it shall be noted that there are almost as many definitions of conflict as there are scholars dealing with it.

In this thesis, I will refer to conflict as a situation where at least two parties have issues that seem to be contradictory or incompatible at the same point of time (cf. Berkel 2008; cf. Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 20; cf. Wallensteen 2007: 16). I also understand that conflicts are not negative per se.

2.2 Dealing with Conflicts

Dealing with conflicts dates back to the ancient times (Miall/ Ramsbotham/ Woodhouse 1999: 34). Nevertheless, peace research or more precisely – research on reasons why wars and conflicts erupt and how peace can be achieved has not received much attention until after World War II (Rothman/ Olson 2001: 290; Burgess/ Burgess 1997: 207). Many conflicts are so protracted, complicated and intertwined that they seem to be “intractable” (Lederach 2010: 14). Burton calls them “deep-rooted conflicts” (Burton 1987²). As even intrastate conflicts – that are increasing especially since the beginning of the 1990s - are considered as a threat to the security of the international community lately, the need and interest for peace research and methodologies has increased immensely over the last few decades (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 4, 87). Furthermore, the fact that disputed communities live side by side in intra-state conflicts requires more and different measures to reach sustainable solutions of those conflicts (Lederach 2010: 23).

The Charter of the United Nations obliges member states to settle their conflicts by peaceful means such as negotiation, mediation or judicial settlement in article 33 (UN 1945). The strategies to build peace in international politics involve peace-making, peace building, peace consolidation, reconciliation and mediation.

While peace-making sums up the actions taken to reach an agreement between the disputed parties peacefully, such as negotiation, mediation, reconciliation or arbitration, peace building refers to post-conflict actions that search out root causes and build a frame which helps to secure the peace (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 89).

It is crucial to note that peace consolidation already requires peace so that it can be consolidated (Lorenz 2005: 178).

Further distinctions between different approaches of dealing with conflicts shall be made at this point, since the terms are often confused and sometimes one term actually describes another approach (Reimann 2004: 2; Lund 2006: 7; Fisher / Keashly 1991: 33). Additionally,

² Burton, John W. (1987): *Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict. A Handbook*. Lanham, MD/ London: University Press of America.

meanings can shift, leading to a vague and at times wrong use (Stern/ Druckman 2000: 56). The terms subject to distinction are:

(a) Conflict management, (b) conflict resolution, (c) conflict transformation and (d) conflict prevention.

In order to provide a sound understanding of the differences, I will briefly introduce them.

2.2.1 Conflict Management

Conflict management is mainly characterized by the management or regulation of conflicts (Miall/ Ramsbotham/ Woodhouse 1999: 21) depending on the positive or negative approach.

The term can be understood in two ways. In its negative understanding conflict management means that conflicts are negative per se and that the conflict is controlled in order to contain its destructive impact and dynamics or to prevent an escalation (Goertz/ Regan 2006: 214). “Control” is the key word in this type of conflict approach. Contrary to this understanding, the positive approach does not consider conflicts as completely negative, but as an inevitable part of the democratic dialogue. In this sense, conflict management implies a positive and constructive approach to differences and divergences between the conflicting parties. However, solving the conflict is not on the agenda at all, but the containment and prevention of an escalation (Uyangoda 2005a: 11-12). This means that conflict management aims at reestablishing the order before the conflict broke out. Positions usually are seen not to be changeable and official leaders are the main actors in this approach (Reimann 2004: 9, 13).

Within the concept of conflict management, some scholars refer to this type of intervention as “conflict settlement” (Reimann 2004: 8).

Since the mid-1990s, conflict management became more integrative and complementary as regards to its approach towards conflict resolution (Reimann 2004: 5).

The following subchapters are a short introduction to strategies used in conflict management.

2.2.1.1 Mediation

Mediation is the most frequent method of third-party intervention (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 33). It is the term for

a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties’ own efforts, where the disputing parties or their representatives seek the assistance, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state or organization to change, affect or influence their perceptions or behavior, without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law (Bercovitch 1992: 7).

While mediation intends to support the process of finding an agreement between conflicting parties, and also to minimize the conflict between the parties (Greig 2006: 198), the final decision on the agreement is left to the conflict parties.

Mediation is most likely used when (a) conflicts are long and complex, (b) conflict parties cannot solve the conflict by themselves, (c) all parties want to prevent further escalation and costs, and (d) parties want to cooperate to end the conflict (Bercovitch 1997: 187). The advantages are that mediation is adaptive and responsive (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 34). However, the mediator does not interpret and analyze the conflict with the conflict parties (Fisher 2006: 112).

Furthermore, mediators can be either official or unofficial individuals - mediation of the latter is called “individual mediation” (Bercovitch/ Schneider 2006: 175). States choose a high level official as well as institutions and organizations, the most prominent of which is the United Nations (UN) (Bercovitch/ Schneider 2006: 175-176).

According to some studies, it appears that a mediator cannot influence the outcome and if there is an animosity, it would be wiser to apply pressure tactics (cf. Harris/ Carneval 1990, Carneval/ Henry 1989 cited in Stern/ Druckman 2000: 66).

There are also different types of mediation: facilitation, good offices, the use of ombudsmen, arbitration (Stern/ Druckman 2000: 44).

Mediation in the understanding of Assefa (1999) belongs to conflict resolution, conflict transformation and conflict prevention. This is because in this form of dealing with conflicts, the third party only assists the conflict parties in their common search for a solution. Conflict parties are able to participate in the process to a high degree.

2.2.1.2 Peacekeeping

Since 1956, peacekeeping forces have been sent to conflict regions that have achieved a cease-fire to prevent a new outbreak of violence and monitor the implementation of the conflict settlement. This kind of intervention is meant to be peaceful, preventive, complementary to the negotiations between conflict parties, impartial and consensual – only after conflicting states give their permission can peacekeeping missions enter the conflict regions.

In the last two decades, the UN has extended their competences in conflict situations. The peacekeeping missions we have seen since then are dispatched as humanitarian interventions. While the United Nations are the main player in this kind of conflict management, the UN get support by regional organizations and states that want to help (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 75).

Apart from the big area of UN peacekeeping, that includes a range from disarmament, monitoring to resettlement of refugees, the UN offer a well-used service of providing mediators, contact men, good offices and venue as well as organizer for meetings (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 7).

The content of peacekeeping missions has also changed over the years. Formerly, the mandate was limited to observe and ensure the cease-fire and be a neutral power. Nowadays, peace keepers monitor elections and assist the process of nation building. These additional tasks allow to associate peacekeeping to conflict resolution as well (Diehl/ Druckman/ Wall 2006: 89, 92). Nevertheless, three principles are preserved through the time: consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 77-78).

Bercovitch and Jackson (2009: 80-81) conclude that peacekeeping missions are – with one exception in Lebanon in 1978 – at least partially successful. For interstate conflicts, peacekeeping is a good method because the nation states do not lose their sovereignty and because it is a cost-effective intervention. Not only is violence successfully contained from within the state, it is also prevented from spreading to other regions and external forces are put off to intervene because of the presence of the peacekeeping forces. Peace negotiations following the peacekeeping interventions are facilitated and provide a face-saving solution.

The peacekeeping method has many weaknesses: (a) Root causes are not addressed; (b) as violence is limited, the urgent need to proceed in negotiations might disappear; (c) the UN lacks an efficient organizational system for peacekeeping; (d) in some cases serious problems developed through the non-coherent peacekeeping forces, add to difficulties between them and the national military; (e) the UN budget is insufficient; (f) critics blame the UN for being inconsistent for not providing the necessary resources and dispatching peacekeeping forces without a clear mandate; (g) the condition to be impartial sometimes hinders the UN to undertake appropriate actions; and (h) it is designed only for interstate conflicts (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 82-83).

One has to note that there is a paradigm shift from conflict management to conflict resolution (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 8).

2.2.2 Conflict Resolution

I prefer the definition of conflict resolution by Bercovitch and Jackson (2009: 1):

[C]onflict resolution [refers to] a range of formal or informal activities undertaken by parties to a conflict, or outsiders, designed to limit and reduce the level of violence in conflict, and to achieve some understanding on the key issues in conflict, a political agreement, or a jointly acceptable decision on future interactions and distribution of resources. [It] is about accepting a conflict, recognizing that there are ways out of it, and engaging in some tacit or explicit coordination, without which none of these goals can be achieved.

Thus, all activities that are done to achieve a curfew, agreement or solution can be counted to conflict resolution. Important characteristics are ending or at least stemming violence in a conflict as well as dealing or eliminating the root causes for a sustainable solution (see Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 1; Uyangoda 2005a: 9-10).

Kelman, Saunders, Azar, Burton and Doob were the first to bring the idea of conflict resolution into the field. Strictly speaking, Kelman's *Interactive Problem Solving* is a part of conflict transformation. Nevertheless, Kelman's approach is counted among conflict resolution (see below). I believe this may stem from the fact that Kelman uses conflict transformation as a method for conflict resolution while the search for new approaches in conflict resolution are on the agenda. *Interactive Problem Solving* targets at influence conflict parties positively, i.e. to transform the relationship, and contributes to the *solution* by adding new ideas. However, Kelman seems to be more and more prepared to change his approach in the direction of conflict transformation (Graf 2013b). Factors like no audiences³, privacy and no pressure of time make these tools successful (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 25).

In the concept of conflict resolution, it is important to recognize the fact of having a conflict that can be solved (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 1) in a way that is acceptable to all conflict parties and which is based on unmet human needs (Reimann 2004: 9).

Modern conflict resolution comprises both top-down and bottom-up approaches and has a focus on societies, not merely on states (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 10). This implies that more actors are included in the process.

As Conflict Resolution gained more importance over the decades, its research was enlarged to the different phases of conflict so that the research can be diversified with regard to its different phases. Before conflict f. ex. conflict prevention gained importance, as did peace building in the aftermath of ending the conflict by an agreement (Kriesberg 2006: 115).

³ No audiences are allowed to observe the workshops. These workshops are completely off the record.

According to Laue conflict resolution has these characteristics:

- All conflict parties accept the agreed solution voluntarily.
- The solution is legitimate and fair and satisfies all interests and needs of the conflict.
- No important values of a conflict party are ignored or left out.
- The solution will not be refused later, even if a conflict party is able to do it afterwards.
- All conflict parties benefit from the solution and the solution in itself is restorative and sustainable.

(Laue cited in Uyangoda 2005a: 10)

The following strategies are aimed to end violence and also to substitute former goals that seem incompatible with perspectives that allow a win-win situation for all conflict parties. This means that the goal is not to seek a solution that divides the conflict parties in winners and losers. Finally, the goal is to solve the roots of the conflict permanently and in such a way that offers all conflict parties a good solution (Uyangoda 2005a: 9-10). Negotiations are the usual tool in traditional forms of dealing with conflicts (Uyangoda 2005c: 49).

Negotiation and bargaining are both designated to end violence and to reach an agreement between conflict parties by joint decisions (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 20).

These approaches only involve the conflict parties. They do not use third parties to come to an agreement (Leung 2006: 9). These conflict resolution strategies are conducted voluntarily between government officials and diplomats or other leaders of conflicting groups by communication tools. The perception of how conflict parties view each other is essential in these approaches. Therefore, conflict parties try to influence the other sides' perceptions and view of the situation by demanding and threatening in a non-violent way as well as making concessions and promises etc. (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 20-21).

Elements that are essential in negotiation behavior are "two-party interaction, conflict, adaptive and sequential behavior, mutual cooperation, and joint determination of value distribution" (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 24).

2.2.2.1 Negotiation

Negotiation is the most popular form of conflict resolution (more than 90% of international conflicts after the Second World War). The aim of negotiation is to regulate the conflict in a way that escalation is reduced or at best prevented. The best outcome is an agreement that sets

an end to the conflict (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 19, 21). That is why negotiation can also be counted among conflict settlement (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 8).

It must be noted that official negotiations do not exclude informal meetings on the top level – joint dinners and lunches are often organized – or interactive forms of communication. However, the formal character on the official level must be clear. Diplomats and politicians must guard their interests and are responsible to get satisfactory results, e.g. binding agreements to present to their people (cf. Saunders 2000: 256).

International negotiation is usually applied to conflicts that are about material issues and are not so violent. Its advantages are that they offer a good and bargained outcome, efficiency through its voluntary character, fruitful interactions as the conflict's emotional and interpersonal dimensions are analyzed and have legitimate standards. Nevertheless, negotiation cannot be used in all conflict types (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 21).

While four types of negotiation are specified by Sawyer and Guetzkow (2006: 147) as

1. *(Secret) bilateral diplomacy*: Diplomacy through a country's embassy and its counterpart of the foreign country's foreign office;
2. *Parliamentary diplomacy*: Countries have memberships in a permanent body with regular meetings and a common goal, e.g. the UN;
3. *Conference diplomacy*: Diplomacy through ad hoc meetings for special issues, e.g. summit meetings;
4. *Consultative diplomacy*: Diplomacy in international organizations, e.g. in the NATO;

Carnevale/ Leung (2006: 64) have identified three main strategies in negotiation:

1. *Concessions*: A party renounces its wishes, demands less or also reduces its offers.
2. *Contending*: A party tries to dominate and achieve its goals or tries to not give in to the other party's dominant behavior.
3. *Problem solving*: Cooperative behavior that is intended to identify and arrange a mutual satisfactory solution by active listening and reveal one's preferences.

A successful negotiation is more likely when conflict parties are relatively equals in power and when the conflict is about tangible issues and not about psychological or cultural issues (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 22). If one conflict party has more power than the other, the

solution might be imposed by the more powerful party. Consequently the outcome might be not the best mutual solution, but one which is accepted by the weaker party (Assefa 1999).

Finally, the principled negotiation approach by Fisher and Ury (1981 cited in Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 30) is introduced. It is relevant due to the fact that it concentrates on merits and interests and attempts to disconnect persons from issues. Zartman and Berman (1982 cited in Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 30) support this approach as they propose to bring the parties' attention to the "reconfigured" conflict so that the conflict is certainly no longer seen as a zero-sum conflict, which in turn makes parties more free to find solutions that take into account the other parties' wishes as well. Thus, in principled negotiation a win-win solution is the goal (Ross 2001: 5). Zartman (2006: 108), an expert in international relations, especially negotiations and diplomacy, estimates that the probability of successful negotiations increases if there are entitled representatives of the parties, a time limit and the sense of possibility of an acceptable solution.

2.2.2.2 Bargaining

Stern and Druckman (2000: 67) point to the differentiation by Cross and Rosenthal (1999) having tested distributive bargaining (bargaining about group positions), integrative bargaining (identifying interests and searching for alternatives), problem-solving (identifying needs and joint problem solving) and control condition (no instructions on how to discuss). The result of comparing the participants' methods found that those who used problem-solving had "less hawkish" attitude than those who applied the integrative bargaining method. Those applying the integrative bargaining method were the most hawkish.

There is a range of legal methods for conflict resolution which shall be introduced briefly.

2.2.2.3 Adjudication

Adjudication by definition is delegating the solving of a conflict to a permanent judicial body or standing tribunal in favor of a binding solution. It is also called judicial settlement. The advantages of adjudication are (a) established courts are available with procedures, judges and jurisdiction; thus, decisions are reduced; (b) judges are generally well-experienced and devoted to impartiality; (c) costs are low as the international community pays international tribunals; (d) parties have a greater pressure to comply to the conflict settlement as the international tribunals have a high status (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 53).

Parties have the possibility to present their view on the conflict and their preferred solution, but it is the third party, which was chosen by the state, who finally decides the outcome (Assefa 1999).

2.2.2.4 Arbitration

Arbitration is a flexible measure for the settlement of interstate conflicts by judges chosen by the conflict states. The states in conflict accept the arbitration award which is binding. Arbitration has some elements of mediation, some of a judicial settlement and can be ranged in between bargaining and adjudication (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 33, 50; Assefa 1999).

Arbitration is characterized by a consent, which turns to obligation once the decision was made to use this method. There are a lot of decisions to be made by parties: When parties bargained to settle the conflict with the help of arbitration, they can decide to appoint either a commission of arbitrators or a foreign chief of state or government; or they can choose The Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration, which is an institution providing a list of possible arbitrators and a venue with the needed equipment. Or finally, they can agree on using the international claims tribunal offering services to both public and private disputing parties. These need to agree on the procedures, how the decision of the arbitrators will be taken (possibility of provisional measures and separate opinions), the venue and the payment, the law upon which the arbitrators shall make the award (international law, international custom, jurists' and expert's decisions and legal opinions, general principles of national and international legal systems or law recognized by "civilized nations"). The issues that are arbitrated most frequently are territorial issues. Recently however, arbitration is not so common in settling disputes. The numbers of arbitrations are decreasing (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 51-52).

What arbitration distinguishes from adjudication is that there is no fixed tribunal and judges have to be chosen, which is not necessary in adjudication (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 53). Conflict parties have a more active role in arbitration than in adjudication (Assefa 1999).

Legal methods can be advantageous for interstate conflicts where power distribution is asymmetric and they have the strengths of being trusted, rational, independent and legitimate as well as making dispositive decisions that are based on legal principles. Moreover, the time-consuming processes give time to enable negotiations and deescalate the conflict (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 57). On the other hand, powerful states may resist such legal methods even if legal institutions have the authority to decide on a solution. A legal dispute may leave out political questions and is not an appropriate instrument for all international conflicts. Also,

given the fact that legal systems only recognize states as legal entities and that international law is based on European law non-European or non-Western nations may not find it useful due to their different background. Bilder (1997 cited in Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 58) even questions the impartiality of the judges who are chosen. This is due to eventual underlying political factors or judgments of judges regarding matters that involve their home country. Finally, it is possible that the simple action of asking a nation-state to go to court escalates the conflict. In short, legal methods, while still flawed, can still be helpful in interstate disputes about territory, commerce and law (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 58).

2.2.2.5 Reconciliation

Reconciliation became more and more important in the last few decades of peace building as the number of intrastate conflicts increased, which means that conflict parties in most recent conflicts live close to each other or sometimes even “together” (Lederach 2010: 23). This fact requires reconciliation between the opponents as “they have to live together in their common postconflict environment” (Kelman 2008b: 16⁴) and as their relationship must change to “friendship and harmony” (Assefa 2001: 337).

John Paul Lederach coined the term “sustainable peace” promoting the transformation of confrontative relationships to peaceful relationships by reconciliation in order that these relationships are self-reinforcing and regenerate themselves for a sustainable peace (Lederach 2010: 75).

Reconciliation is also important due to the fact that political agreements often do not solve the conflict in a sustainable way. The violence may be ceased, certain rights and structures may be introduced; mistrust and the perception of the adversary as a non-human existence, though, are still in the minds of the members of conflicting parties (Chataway 2002: 167).

When dealing with root causes, the concept of “chosen traumas” by Vamik Volkan (2007a, 2007b) is worth mentioning: The term “traumas” refers to traumatic events that ancestors of a group have experienced, in most cases with a neighboring group. The word “chosen” is added to point to a phenomenon in which these traumas are unconsciously “[chosen]” to mythologize and psychologize the mental representation of the event” (Volkan/ Aykan 2007a) generations later. By passing it to subsequent generations, the chosen trauma becomes gradually a “marker” of the group (Volkan/ Aykan 2007a). The effect of transmitting the trauma to following generations is that the trauma changes its function. This means that the real events are not that relevant anymore. Instead of the truth, the group is interested in the

⁴ As Kelman’s articles sometimes include the same information or similar descriptions, I refrain from citing all articles mentioning the same point. In this case, I will only cite one of Kelman’s articles.

shared identity resulting from the “marker” (Volkan/ Aykan 2007b). The trauma does not necessarily need to be exposed over the whole time, but can be reanimated and then, easily be (mis)used psychologically, e.g. for political agendas. It may lead to “exaggerated entitlement ideology” (Volkan/ Aykan 2007a) which in turn creates the conviction of the group to be entitled to have or demand for something, meaning that the group can be mobilized (Volkan/ Aykan 2007a; Volkan/ Aykan 2007b).

Volkan further distinguishes “hot” and “acute traumas”. The first term describes the situation in which traumatized persons and their descendants still deal with the trauma while trying to understand the events and grieve for victims. “Acute traumas” explain “a continuing state of confusion, unbearable grief, chaos, and increased criminality, as well as the traumatized group’s search for a leader(s) to act as a repairer or savior, and their effort to reestablish a new sense of large-group identity”, possibly leading to violence. However, acute traumas are not suited to become markers of the large group’s identity (Volkan/ Aykan 2007a).

Assefa (2001: 340) assigns the following characteristics to the concept of reconciliation in order:

Honesty and sincerity regarding the harm done to the other party, sincere regrets and apologies for one’s own actions that hurt the other party, efforts to overcome the conflict and negative feelings caused by the conflict, a promise not to repeat the harm and to compensate the damage done to the other party as much as possible and finally start a new, fruitful relationship.

Even though there is only little agreement about how to “do” reconciliation, there is a common consent that it is required nowadays (Assefa 1999).

2.2.3 Conflict Transformation

Conflict transformation, an alternative concept to conflict resolution, comes from the hypothesis that the dynamic of a conflict changes the conflict parties and their mutual relationships. This in turn also transforms the conflict itself. John Paul Lederach is one of the most famous researchers in this field.

Vayrynen (cited in Uyangoda 2005a: 13) analyzes four different ways of conflict transformation: (a) transformation of players who either change their policy or new players such as a new leader join the process; (b) transformation of subjects which become the new

focus in conflict management; (c) transformation of rules which influences the attitude of players and (d) transformation of the structure of the conflict.

Subsequently, Vayrynen finds four levels on which transformation is possible – in the positive and negative direction. An approach may aim at influencing players to change their views and demands, or aim at introducing new players that change the conflict by their involvement. Another strategy to transform the whole conflict is to change the issues of the conflict, f .ex. by changing the political agenda. Instead of focusing on the most popular issues, common views of the conflict parties are emphasized. Furthermore, changing the rules, which can be linked to the context transformation identified by Miall et al. (1999: 156), is a tactic to transform the conflict in order to assign more serious consequences on the attitudes of the conflicting parties. The most relevant measure, however, is to change the structure of the conflict as structure comprises actors, issues and relationship between actors. A fifth is added by Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999: 156): personal and group transformation.

Conflict transformation provides the option to include civil society in the process. Unfortunately, official authorities have often underestimated the important contributions the civil society can make. Ignoring this crucial segment of the society leads to the waste of valuable resources in support of the peace process. However, it must be noted that the assessment of the civil society's supportive activities proves difficult (Saunders 2000: 253). The conflict – according to the understanding of conflict transformation – was caused by inequality. Consequently, there is the need to build new or improved social and political structures to achieve a positive social change (Reimann 2004: 10-13).

2.2.4 Conflict Prevention

Aside from the mechanisms that deal with conflicts that already exist, the need for conflict prevention is recognized more and more.

Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* describes conflict prevention as actions aimed at preventing conflicts beforehand as well as preventing a conflict from escalation or containing an expansion of the conflict if it has already escalated (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 5). According to Lund (2006: 9) preventing conflicts from getting violent or getting too tense is the most important of all three pillars of conflict prevention in the *Agenda for Peace*.

Miall et al. (1999: 97) defined a distinction between light and deep conflict prevention. Light conflict prevention consists of diplomatic intervention, private mediation and long-term

missions. The primary goal is to prevent a violent, armed outbreak of latent conflicts. Therefore, underlying structural causes of the conflict are not dealt with implicitly; they are instead dealt with in deep conflict prevention. Analyzing and working on root causes are main tasks in deep conflict prevention. The effort of deep conflict prevention may address developing problems, problems concerning the political order or identity conflicts of communities (cf. Uyangoda 2005a: 16-17).


While there are obvious measures such as mediation, problem-solving workshops, peace commissions, indigenous strategies for conflict resolution and peace radio, economic assistance seems less obvious (Lund 2006: 9). However, economic support helps to improve the economic situation, which in turn benefits the population. At best it helps to provide economic equality and eliminates conflict potential.

Figure 1 demonstrates which strategies are used at which stage of conflict. Lund, from whom I adapted the figure, used two terms to describe the interventions. The words in big letters (preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peace enforcement (when a third party insists on a settlement), peace-keeping and peace building) are associated to activities of and within the UN. The other terms, on the contrary, are expressions usually used in the (academic) literature (Lund 2006: 10). The figure shows that in peacetime, “normal” diplomacy is applied. If a situation is seen to be unstable, preventive diplomacy is deployed. When the crisis erupts, crisis management is needed. If there is an outbreak of violence, tools of conflict management will be used to reach a cease-fire, which can be supported by peace-keeping. This will hopefully lead to the settlement of the conflict. The settlement of conflict is followed by post-conflict peace building. This includes conflict resolution measures and also conflict prevention, to ensure sustainable peace.

Contrary to the other approaches that were introduced above, conflict prevention is not reactive to a conflict, but proactive and is intended to foresee conflicts and take actions to hinder the conflict to break out (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 88). The concept of conflict prevention starts from the premise that an escalation of the conflict is not desired (Wallenstein 2007: 263).

This term describes a strong bond of a group that identifies with the traumas, fears, and images of heroes and/ or victims.

Figure 1: The Course of a Conflict and the Timing of Possible Strategies (adapted from Lund 2006: 11)



2.2.4.1 Early warning

Originally used in the context of natural catastrophes, early warning also exists in preventive diplomacy (Schmeidl 2000). Analysts try to “[predict] conflicts on the basis of identifying some structural conditions that are generally conducive to violence” (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 91). Hence, such structural factors must be understood, and detected as signs for a possible upcoming conflict. Key factors are “insecurity, inequality, private incentives, and hostile perceptions” (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 91) as well as structural and mobilizing (root) causes. If these factors are found, a warning has to be made public (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 91). Logically, the warning is more effective when it is known at an earlier stage of the (potential) conflict (Zartman 2005 cited in Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 91).

As preventive diplomacy is cost-intensive, officials are reluctant to support interventions, which is one of the principal factors of failing in prevent conflicts (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 91, 93). Other factors for the failure of the early warning system are the few staff who monitor the internal development of countries and their superiors not reacting to their warnings. In order to remedy this problem, Brecke (2006: 377-378) proposes a computerized system which collects information and enables us to understand erupting dangers beforehand. The method Brecke suggests is to create “harbinger templates” out of historical data. Historically, if some specific harbinger configurations (a combination of indicators such as the degree of inequality or satisfaction with the government) have occurred before the outbreak of violence, then this can be compared to the current situation facing the government. This would enable us to predict the probable violent development of a country more easily (Brecke 2006: 379). What is also important is to ensure that actions are actually taken after a warning. In reality, this does not always happen. It is a challenge to fill this warning-response gap and act proactively (Schmeidl 2000).

There are several indicators for changes in political and economic circumstances and the prevalence of destructive events are interpreted as signs for a significant change in a society. In addition to this information, early warning needs facts about the conflict history, such as the conflict parties’ characteristics, goals, and the hardship of groups in the society. An analysis and a contingency plan need to be handed to national governments and the UN (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 92-93).

Schmeidl criticizes that the analysis of the collected information is not sufficient. There is more of a focus on collecting information about the conflict than the analysis part. Furthermore, the analysis itself may not be enough to urge politicians to initiate measures. Schmeidl suggests adding possible scenarios and options to the report to make it more

convincing. If several trouble spots exist, they must be prioritized. Early warning is mostly seen unsuccessful due to the fact it is very difficult to prove its effectiveness: If it is effective, there will be no outbreak of the conflict, and thus no evidence that there would have been a conflict without the preventive measures (Schmeidl 2000).

Nevertheless, the interest is gradually increasing in early warning prognoses (Chataway 2002: 181).

2.2.4.2 Confidence-building

Decreasing uncertainty and disposing of misjudgments are the goals of confidence-building measures. The motive is to prevent violent escalations after events that could make it happen by building trust. If people trust each other in what concerns their motivation and future behavior, they will not react to triggers of conflicts violently (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 94).

For example, if there would be an assassination of a popular person and people claimed that the other conflict group must have done it, the trust into the other group could prevent violence. This trust makes it difficult for radical groups (mostly within the own party) to provoke war.

Politically, trust and confidence can be consolidated by pledging to comply with international code of conducts, by exchanging information and reassuring the other party about their doubts, by guaranteeing transparency of activities and by agreeing on not to use particular weapons or not to strike under a special condition (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 94).

Apart from the preventive aspect of confidence-building measures, they can lead to negotiation or other forms of conflict resolution given that trust is an essential condition for cooperation (Deutsch 1958 cited in Bierhoff 2000: 375).

2.2.4.3 Fact-finding

Fact-finding is a tool of the United Nations. The UN has the right to be informed about disputes. The UN Security Council can convoke a fact-finding mission in case the facts of a conflict are controversial or uncertain. This mission is done either by a special representative of the UN or a subcommittee. It can clear doubts about the fighting, happenings and process of the conflict. By solving ambiguities of the conflict and thus bringing objectivity into the conflict, the communication between the conflict parties can go more smoothly and encourage further dialogue. Aside from the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretary-General can also employ a fact-finding mission to discover clues which may lead to upcoming political and social unrest (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 64-66; UN 1991).

2.2.4.4 Preventive Diplomacy

Preventive diplomacy describes – as the name indicates – actions that help to “reduce the potential for violence” (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 89) by identifying hot spots that might escalate, by creating an alert system for the international community and by enhancing political efforts to prevent a violent escalation of the conflict.

Often preventive diplomacy uses coercive and persuasive measures. Sanctions, embargoes and preventive deployment of the military belong to its strategies. Strategies for preventive diplomacy need to be developed further (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 89-90) as preventive diplomacy faces several severe challenges:

The sovereignty of the state makes it difficult to influence national politics to establish preventive measures. Furthermore, it is critical to persevere during the preventive measures are implemented. The logistics to commit to a long-term effort are insufficient. Another problem of preventive diplomacy, as for conflict prevention generally, is that there is never an evidence of success as nobody can prove what would have happened without preventive measures. Countries also reject the new norm of “the responsibility to protect”. The biggest obstacle, however, is the willingness to be committed and to intervene (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 98-99).

Yet, on the other side, critics usually only see the cases of failure of conflict prevention. We have not seen a World War III and even in system collapses, some were settled rather peacefully like in Estonia, Macedonia and Ukraine (Lund 2006: 17).

In order to improve conflict prevention, Lund (2006: 23) argues that alarm signals must reach government officials and the UN Security Council directly which is only possible by giving local organizations, staff of embassies and missions more power to be heard.

2.3. Interactive Conflict Resolution

For Saunders (2000: 253) the term “Interactive Conflict Resolution” (ICR) summarizes the “processes of nonofficial dialogue, analysis, and more recently common citizen action that enable citizens to act systematically to change conflictual relationships.” These small group meetings with members of conflicting parties are aimed at discussing their problems, needs, relationships and perspectives in an unforced atmosphere in order to explore new ideas to solve the conflict. More than agenda issues, the goal is to get to know each other and the other’s needs, perspectives and fears as well as get closer to the perceived enemy. Some

include Track 2⁵ approaches of former officials or persons close to the political core to interactive resolution, although their focus is influencing the government, while other approaches also have the goal to change the relationships and create feelings of possibility to achieve a conflict resolution (Saunders 2000: 255-257).

Saunders (2000: 257) situates ICR between official and unofficial efforts, however including ordinary citizens (in whom he sees high potential with regard to their possible contribution to the peace process). He sees it as a chance for actors of civil society to take responsibility and make a difference by committing to the peace process. Moreover, it is clear that no “resolution” can be sustainable without the inclusion of the civil society (Saunders 2000: 290-292).

One major difference to other conflict resolution approaches is that the focus is on human relationships. Human relationships are to change in order to achieve positive results. Usually it is the change of institutions which is the target in other strategies (Hoffman 2011: 150). Furthermore, the conflict and the adversaries are seen in an empathic and intersubjective way. Root causes are analyzed in the process of resolving the conflict (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 9).

To make ICR more effective, Rouhana (2000: 295) argues that *Interactive Conflict Resolution* as a discipline needs (a) theory building and building methodologies for researching the relationship between micro and macro goals, and (b) empiric research on long-term results.

There are different levels on which *Interactive Conflict Resolution* workshops are held: On the intrapsychic level, feelings are in the center of the workshop. Bringing participants⁶ to realize their unconscious attitude in the conflict is a major part of the workshops on this level. Furthermore, the healing of trauma and forgiveness play an essential role in a workshop. These are seen as presupposed conditions for reconciliation.

Workshops dealing with the interpersonal level have a strong focus on the present, stereotypes and misperceptions. The workshops are designed for small groups; sensitivity training is applied and the improvements of communication skills are targets for this level.

⁵ See chapter 2.4 for the elaboration on Track Two diplomacy.

⁶ By saying “participants”, I usually mean persons participating or having participated in Kelman’s IPS workshop or any other ICR events. If I mean an explicit group of participants, I will specify it in the text. The same applies to the term “party” which will be used to describe a conflict party.

On the intergroup level, the dynamics of the conflict and needs of the conflict groups are central. By improving communication skills, increasing sensitivity and trust towards the other conflict group a solution or possibilities for solution are thought of mutually.

Some elements can be comprised in other levels of interactions as well. There is no strict line between them (Rouhana 2000: 298).

Other terms describing this approach are *Third Party Consultation* (Fisher 1997), process-promoting workshops, and facilitated dialogues (Miall/ Ramsbotham/ Woodhouse 1999: 50).

2.3.1 The Social-Psychological Approach to Conflict Resolution⁷

Bercovitch and Jackson state that the social-psychological approach in conflict resolution is the most auspicious (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 31). Apart from viewing the conflict from a past, present and future perspective, this approach is useful to clarify the nature of the conflict and its effectiveness as well as to explore options for an agreed-upon outcome. Viewing outcomes of bargaining as a result of interactions of persons, their roles⁸, the situation⁹ and interferences is what makes the social-psychological approach unique (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 24).

Two types of interactions can be observed: distributive and integrative interactions. Distributive interactions are dominated by competitive behavior and misperceptions; in short, they escalate the conflict. They can be particularly seen in zero-sum conflicts about a single issue. Contrary to this, integrative behavior frequently occurs in conflicts that are about several issues, but some interests can be shared. Integrative behavior includes the willingness for new options and open-minded and creative problem-solving. Obviously, the integrative approach is more successful (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 27).

Four factors that influence the interactions between negotiating groups are invoked: first, the parties' motivation and mutual attitudes; second, the power relations; third, the communication mode; fourth, social influence strategies (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 28).

Generally, conflict parties think that their own interests are opposed and incongruous with those of the adversary. The only possible results of the conflict are to win, compromise or lose. And if one's own group has to lose, then the other group should lose too (lose-lose situation). The Prisoner's Dilemma model of the game theory illustrates this well: Two

⁷ For Kelman's deliberations on the social-psychological approach, please see chapter 4, in particular 4.1.

⁸ The persons that are involved in the peace process represent their group or country. They, thus, underlie the influence of their reference group and cannot act as individuals but only as representatives (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 26).

⁹ Social and physical conditions are influencing the negotiation (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 26).

persons can either cooperate with one another or tell on him or her. Because they are interrogated separately, both do not know which decision the other will make and so the best choice seems to inform on the other person even if this is not the best outcome. Fear and mistrust that the other person could act against oneself is bigger than trying to cooperate. This lose-lose stalemate is where many conflicts end. Conflict resolution efforts include help for conflict parties so they can substitute their zero-sum perception (we win, they lose) with a non-zero sum perception (both win or both lose) and actually achieve a positive sum outcome (Miall/ Ramsbotham/ Woodhouse 1999: 5-8).

It is worth noting that psychological factors can be key factors to transform the conflict. They can explain root causes. Human beings tend to dehumanize the “enemy”, making a difference between “us” and “them” and working with certain images. Traumatic experiences complicate the situation and make it more difficult to build sane relationships between the conflict groups (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 97).

To conclude, the social-psychological approach of analyzing conflicts provides valuable insights and gives important clues to conflict resolution.

2.3.2 Barriers to Successful Outcomes

In the negotiation process, many obstacles can hinder the continual de-escalation of peace talks. Bercovitch and Jackson (2009: 28-29) summarized them:

- 1.) *Structural barriers*: Parties, issues, interests, linkages etc. can be structural barriers to successful negotiation if a party or issue is refused by one party.
- 2.) *Strategic barriers*: Uncertainty and distrust are strategic barriers which have to be overcome by trust-building.
- 3.) *Psychological barriers*: This kind of barrier is essential for it is a difficult task to overcome them. However, surmounting them is indispensable for advancing in the negotiation process. Psychological barriers include rigidity of behavior and interests, arrogance, the incapability to value long-term gains more than short-term concessions, misperceptions and a too strong self-identification with one's group which creates a clear line between “us” and “them”.
- 4.) *Institutional barriers*: Extremists make it difficult to proceed in negotiation talks since they are opposed to moderates' efforts to come to an agreement and thus try to sabotage. Being well organized and gaining public support for negotiations are important factors to make negotiation successful.

- 5.) *Cultural barriers*: Communication and decision-making are affected by the cultural background. Furthermore, conflicts increase the group cohesion which often leads to hostile perceptions and images of the adversary. Nevertheless, cultures also often provide indigenous methods of conflict resolution.

2.4 Multi-track Approach to Peace

This approach consists of different tracks which refer to activities of different actors on different levels.

Montville came up with the term “Track Two Diplomacy” (Davidson/ Montville 1981: 153). However, the method was already used in the 1960s by Burton¹⁰ (Jones 2008: 3). So, what is Track Two Diplomacy? Track Two Diplomacy describes unofficial and non-committing interactions of members of the conflict parties. So, diplomatic activities reaching from cultural exchanges to problem-solving workshops on Track Two, the unofficial track with influential but not official actors, are seen as a useful contribution to the overall peace process. The actors of the Track Two level are prominent and respected persons whose strengths lie not so much in their power but rather in their network. Track One (Diplomacy) implies the traditional, official political level where the actors are “highly visible” (Lederach 2010: 38) representatives of the government who can release official statements, negotiate and fix binding agreements. It is known that leaders of conflict groups cannot and will not act reasonable because they fear this would be interpreted as weakness and would put them at a disadvantage. This attitude often is the reason why conflicts break out (Davidson/ Montville 1981: 154-156; Lederach 2010: 41).

Louise Diamond and John McDonald introduced the multi-track theory with 9 different levels. Unofficial negotiations with official representatives or Track 2 events in which very important representatives of the conflict parties participate can also be described as Track 1.5. Due to the closeness of some participants to the official level, the track might be described as a track between the first and the second (Wils et al. 2006: 24; Mitchell 2013).

It must be noted that the understanding of a 3-track approach proved to prevail: Figure 2 illustrates the differences between Track I, II and III. Track 1 is the level of official negotiation which include good offices, fact-finding missions, facilitation, mediation, peace-

¹⁰ See Chapter 4.2.1 for the introduction of Burton and his approach of Track Two Diplomacy.

keeping and arbitration. Track 2¹¹ means the unofficial dialogue and conflict resolution to which facilitation, consultation, problem solving workshops and round table discussions are counted. Track 3 activities of the civil society implies activities like peace education, reconciliation processes, institution building, capacity building, grassroots training etc. (Wils et al. 2006: 24; Reimann 2004: 4-6). Track 3 leaders comprise competent actors and activists of local communities who have the knowledge of ordinary people's problems (Lederach 2010: 42-43).

Burton (1969: 19) stresses the importance of including the civil society level in conflict resolution as settlements imposed by governments do not always establish themselves at the local level.

	Track I	Track II	Track III
Actors	Official political or military leaders as mediators and/ or representatives of conflict parties	From private individuals, academics, professionals to international and local NGOs (conflict resolution)	From local grassroots organizations to local and international NGOs and governmental organizations (development, human rights, humanitarian assistance)
Strategies	Outcome-oriented: From official and coercive measures (sanctions, arbitration) to non-coercive measures (facilitation, negotiation, mediation, fact-finding missions and good offices)	Process-oriented: Unofficial and non-coercive measures (facilitation/ consultation through problem-solving workshops, round tables)	Process- and/ or structure-oriented: Capacity building, trauma work, grassroots training, development, human rights work

Figure 2: Track One, Two and Three and their actors and strategies (figure adapted of Reimann 2004: 6)

¹¹ Track Two often is a reaction to the apprehended failure of Track One, which means that if governments, international and regional organizations fail, the unofficial negotiation takes up and follows or runs aside of official negotiations (Uyangoda 2005b: 112; Lorenz 2005: 180).

Since the end of the 1980s, Track Two diplomacy efforts are increasing, and gradually the Track Two approach has been approved by Track One actors as a necessary complement to official diplomacy (Chataway 1998: 271-272). This was different before. The end of the Cold War, as well as budget constraints and a change in diplomacy style, however, enabled diplomats to be more open to unofficial contribution to peace making. Furthermore, organizations, institutions and think tanks spread and contributed to commitment of the civil society (Chataway 1998: 272). Nowadays, the importance of both official and unofficial conflict resolution endeavor is acknowledged, and the contribution of unofficial efforts to find creative solutions in order to de-escalate the conflict is also acknowledged (Chataway 2002: 166). Principally, the tracks tend to get more and more unofficial.

Pruitt (2000: 250) attributes success to Track Two Diplomacy if the third party understands the conflict well, if it is trusted and has access to the parties.

Calliess pointed out that it is essential to co-ordinate the efforts of the different peace-making, peace building and conflict prevention efforts. He stressed the importance to include all civil and social actors, groups, organizations and institutions in the responsibility of what he called “civil conflict management”. To be efficient, the communication and cooperation between players must be coordinated. Furthermore, civil conflict management is necessary in all phases of conflict: preventive measures and de-escalating measures, intervention such as mediation, conflict transforming, conflict solving measures and peace consolidation (Calliess 1997: 244-245).

Chataway (1998: 270) remarks that the terms “Interactive Conflict Resolution” and “Track Two Diplomacy” are often confused as often enough that the terms are used interchangeably. However, *Interactive Conflict Resolution* is a *part* of the Track Two Diplomacy. There is a variety of other activities which all form the Track Two Diplomacy. On Track Two, to which we also count Kelman’s *Interactive Problem Solving*, NGOs, churches, academics serving with good offices, conciliation and conflict resolution can be found. The central characteristic is that it is unofficial, meaning not taking place on the intergovernmental level.

Lorenz (2005: 179) points out that Track Two is aimed at building the bridge between the official level and bottom-up approaches. This unofficial level is named “public peace process” by Saunders (2000: 254).

Figure 3 gives an overview of the conceptual domain of the different approaches to peace.

Cynthia Chataway collected data on Track Two Diplomacy from the perspective of officials working on the Track One level. There was a broad disagreement on how officials see track two efforts. However, there is an acknowledgement that trust building is easier and dealing with emotional issues is almost only possible in Track Two methods. Due to the fact that more people are included which makes it possible to reach them using from Track One. Consequently, Track Two Diplomacy is seen as slightly contributing or at least not harming the official track and sensitive to barriers such as psychological barriers (Chataway 1998: 273, 277-279).




Figure 3: The conceptual domain of approaches to peace (Fisher 1997: 12)

Track Two Diplomacy is not without criticism; some doubt the “credibility and official legitimacy” (Jones 2008: 4). Nevertheless, the importance of Track Two diplomacy is evidenced by its contribution to change public opinion (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 9). Moreover, Track Two diplomacy increases the likelihood to achieve successful outcomes in negotiation, when the conflict is about values, identity and other psychological or cultural issues (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 23). Chataway also defends the importance of the Track

Two approach and encourages a “respectful dialogue between Track [One] and [Two in order] to overcome past resentments and to develop mechanisms by which the skills and insights of Track [Two] can be fed into Track [One]” (Chataway 1998: 269). Saunders (2000: 290) adds that Interactive Conflict Resolution can fill the gap of the decreasing power of national governments.

Jones, Ball, Milner and Taylor identified four contributive effects of Track Two Diplomacy to negotiations:

- In the Track Two framework, policy recommendations are developed “as a kind of reserve of intellectual capacity” (Jones 2008: 7),
- Ideas can be explored and tested,
- Communication can continue even if there is none on the official level,
- It can help to socialize participants (Ball et al. 2006 cited in Jones 2008: 7).

Conflict resolution needs to address the conflict issues in order to prepare changes to solve root causes, consolidate intraparty differences of opinion so that all members are ready to accept a solution, adapt the context in a way that parties stay motivated and expand the willingness of society and institutions to support the solution (Miall/ Ramsbotham/ Woodhouse 1999: 158).

Nevertheless, Track III strategies support the process of reconciliation and establishing social justice which is necessary to eliminate the conflict.

2.5 Differentiation of Conflict Handling Mechanisms

Peace researchers generally aim to introduce their findings into policy. They can do it by advising high-ranking policy-makers, by writing commissioned reports, by commenting in the media or by offering seminars. They can also launch their own projects or actually be advocates. Finally, they can act as a third party (Wallensteen 2011: 232-233). This is what Wallensteen describes as “academic diplomacy” (2011: 233), as academic knowledge is applied to achieve peace through diplomacy.

Wallensteen further differentiates between three main approaches in conflict analysis:

The first is a focus on conflict dynamics. This is the idea that an action causes a reaction which in turn evokes an action and so on. Establishing a dialogue is essential to change the dynamics of the conflict. The underlying incompatibility in conflicts is to be solved by creatively addressing the issues and actors. A transcend solution is when both conflict parties

achieve their goals. Galtung contributed to this approach. Game theory can be counted among this approach as well (Wallensteen 2007: 32-34).

Needs based conflict resolution is the second approach. Conflicts (either violent or not) are seen as “instrumental actions” (Wallensteen 2007: 37). This means that conflicts are caused by unfulfilled needs such as access to political, social and economic systems, as well as non-recognition by the state or the dominating group. This is why the economic situation is an important factor in the well-being of human beings (Wallensteen 2007: 36-42).

The third approach has a focus on rational calculations such as positions and interests. This correlates with the concept of conflict management. Zartman, Fisher and Ury are the main theorists in this line of conflict analysis (Wallensteen 2007: 42).

Apart from the conflict handling mechanisms above, more general mechanisms can be identified. Seven options are declared by Wallensteen (2007: 50-54) in case of an incompatibility:

1. *Change of priorities*: The dynamics of a conflict altered by a change in goals, leadership or environment.
2. *Division of resources*: While maintaining their goals, each conflict party changes in a way in which each party gets a share of the resources.
3. *Agreement on getting at least one demand fulfilled and in turn giving up on another demand*: Each conflict party achieves one goal but also loses one.
4. *Sharing control*: Both parties divide the power and govern together.
5. *Externalizing control*: Conflict parties decide that a third party will assume control instead of themselves.
6. *Delegation of the decision to legal procedures*: A conflict solving procedure such as arbitration is applied. Conflict parties leave the responsibility to a third party actor.
7. *Postponement of decisions*: For example, asking a commission to investigate can buy time. Some issues become less important and time helps with deescalating the situation. However, the open questions should be definitely dealt with later.

Assefa (2001: 337) distinguishes between conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict prevention by sorting the amount of participation that all conflict parties exhibit in the search for a solution. Figure 3 shows a clear differentiation of the concepts dealing with conflict. In the figure, force is at the left end meaning it has the lowest mutual participation for conflict resolution. Together with adjudication, arbitration, negotiation and mediation

these forms of conflict suppression, conflict management and conflict resolution are reactive actions to conflicts. The proactive way of dealing with conflicts, namely conflict prevention, is situated at the right end. Reconciliation, negotiation and mediation can also be applied proactively. Some of the mechanisms point at several overall categories. Depending on the context of the action, the interventions either only control the conflict (i.e. conflict management), solve it (if all underlying causes of the conflict are resolved then it is counted towards conflict resolution) or be preventive. For example, this means that mediation (which Assefa associates with conflict resolution) is not a preventive intervention per se. Nevertheless, if mediation is applied before an outbreak of violence, it can be counted among conflict prevention and transformation. Another important point in the figure is that the likelihood of obtaining a mutually satisfactory and sustainable solution increases steadily with the degree of participation while the knowledge and skills of the mechanisms applied decrease at the same time. The tools for conflict prevention are less known and compared to the tools and institutions of conflict management few concepts have been put into practice in conflict resolution and conflict prevention (Assefa 1999).




Figure 4: Spectrum of Dealing with Conflicts according to Assefa (figure made by Assefa 1999)

2.6 Conclusion

There are a variety of interventions in case of war and conflict. As described above, there are different approaches with sometimes overlapping methods. Boutros-Ghali, one of the former UN secretary-generals, issued an Agenda for Peace in 1992 that promotes a strategy which combines the different approaches of response to the more holistic and broad understanding of peace (Boutros-Ghali 1992). While these days new approaches are developed and traditional approaches are adapted to, there is always a trend towards a combination of methods to embrace the wider definition of modern peace understanding.

Many strategies can be assigned to multiple approaches. Mediation i.e. can be applied as a tool for conflict management, conflict resolution or even conflict prevention.

New actors were and are emerging over the years and joining the UN and governmental officials in diplomacy. In the meanwhile, NGOs, civil society and financial institutions¹² play a role in the peace process that is not to be underestimated (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 11-13).

A conflict can be seen as solved, when an outcome has been reached, when conflict behavior is cast off and when an agreement regulates the balance of values and resources in an acceptable way (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 20).

Some measures can be applied at the same time and others may succeed in a chronological order.

It is arguable f. ex. that conflict management resulting in an agreement and thus ending the conflict is the first step. Conflict settlement can be followed by conflict resolution, which is sure to satisfy the needs and sense of justice of the conflict parties. Then, in the best case, reconciliation follows to ensure self-generating relationships of the former conflict parties for a sustainable peace (Kelman 2008b: 19).

¹² Financial institutions finance development projects and have strategies for development projects assuming that development is linked to security and can thus contribute to peace. The citation of Kofi Annan (2005) underlines this assumption: “[W]e will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights. Unless all these causes are advanced, none will succeed.”

3. Herbert C. Kelman

This chapter introduces Kelman's background and career so that his work and philosophy can be better understood.

3.1. His Career

Herbert C. Kelman was born into a Jewish family on March 18, 1927 in Vienna, Austria. When the Nazis came to power, his family fled to Antwerp, Belgium, where he continued to attend elementary school. In 1940 the family finally immigrated to the United States where he was granted US citizenship (Kelman 2012a: 1).

As a student, he participated in civil rights and anti-war protests and faced arrests and fines during his activism. Immediately after the Second World War, Kelman became involved with the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) applying the non-violence approach of Gandhi which had a major influence on him with regard to his understanding of social change and social movements. He also learned to appreciate multi-method and multi-level approach to conflict resolution. After his secondary education in New York, Kelman started to study English and psychology at Brooklyn College in New York in 1943. At this time he already knew he wanted to write, so he chose English as his major. An advice from a participant of a CORE conference brought him to psychology, which – he was told – apart from sociology was one of the most important fields concerning peace and social change (Kelman 2010b: 365; Kelman 2012b: 362).

During his studies, from 1946 to 1947, Kelman also went to a Seminary College of Jewish Studies to study Judaica and pre-theological studies. After graduating from Brooklyn College with a bachelor's degree in 1947, he pursued his Masters (1949) and Ph.D. (1951) at Yale University, majoring in social psychology and personality with a minor in learning. In 1953, he married his wife Rose. Since the early 1950s, he has been active in peace processes as a practitioner and scholar. For instance, he was almost arrested for refusing military service during the Korean War, but was eventually accepted as a conscientious objector (Kelman 2010b: 365).

Academically, Kelman was research assistant in the Psychology Department at Yale University where he did research on child training and personality from a cross-cultural perspective and on attitude change. He was a post-doctoral research fellow at the John

Hopkins Hospital and University between 1951 and 1954 (Kelman 2012a: 2). He helped founding an organization called Research Exchange on the Prevention of War. The aim of this organization was to promote and facilitate war and peace research, probably the first peace research organization (Kelman 2010b: 367; 2012b: 363). In 1955, he transferred to the Center for Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences in Stanford for one year and continued to be a research psychologist for the next two years. In 1957, he started his career at Harvard University as a lecturer on Social Psychology where he only stayed for five years. In the same year, the bulletin of the Research Exchange on the Prevention of War was replaced by *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, which is now in its 56th year. Kelman then went on to the University of Michigan where he continued to work as a research psychologist for the following seven years at the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution (Kelman 2012a). Little by little, the Research Exchange on the Prevention of War became disorganized and its members continued their work in the newly set up SPSSI (Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues) Committee on International Relations, another interdisciplinary group formed at the Center of the University of Michigan. Both institutions were a part of the peace research movement in the 1950s and 60s (Kelman 2012b: 365) and Kelman one of its founders (Eagly, Baron/ Hamilton (2004: xvii).

During his time in Michigan, Kelman spent several months as a fellow at other universities as well. He researched and taught at different universities and centers in the US, Italy, Cairo, Jerusalem, Vienna and Istanbul. Kelman is or has been a member of the editorial or advisory board or the consulting editor of two dozens of academic journals. In addition, he is and has been advisor to many committees, research centers and institutions like the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, the American Psychological Association, the American Psychological Society, the International Studies Association, the Peace Science Society International, the International Association of Conflict Management and the International Association of Applied Psychology.

He is still a faculty associate of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and member of the Faculty at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, and was director of the Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution. Being a member of many psychology or peace research associations, he is Richard Clarke Cabot Professor of Social Ethics Emeritus at Harvard University.

Due to his life-time commitment, Kelman has been awarded 28 awards and prizes to date. Apart from two socio-psychological prizes by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (1956, 1967) and the Kurt Lewin Memorial Award by the Society for the

Psychological Study of Social Issues (1973), he was awarded the Austrian Medal of Honor for Science and Art, First Class (1998) (Kelman 2012a; Chataway 2004: 213).

3.2 His Research

While Kelman's research was dedicated especially to attitude change, social psychology and personality research, as well as group work and public opinion, he also turned his interest to peace and conflict research explicitly in the early 1950s. Kelman is seen as one of the actors of the US-American peace movement and one of the intellectual founders of conflict resolution. He still is a main actor in this field today (Burgess/ Burgess 1997: 163).

Beside his social research he also researched human behavior and perceptions. Beginning in 1958, he also published papers dealing with human behavior in the context of international politics from a social-psychological perspective. So he concentrated his work on the contributions of social psychology to the study of war and peace and international educational and cultural exchanges in the 1950s and 60s. In the 1960s and 70s, his work was on nationalism, national identity and the relationship of individuals to the national system; in the 1970s and 80s on violence and international crimes. He consequently published the books *International Behavior - A Social-Psychological Analysis*¹³ and *Crimes of Obedience - Toward a Social Psychology of Authority and Responsibility*¹⁴ (Kelman 2012b: 366; Kelman 1965; Kelman/ Hamilton 1989).

Kelman's main focus was on social change and the role of language in national politics. The list of his publications comprises more than 30 pages, which proves his continuous work. In principal, he wrote articles for journals or contributed to edited volumes, but as pointed out, he also published own books.

In 1972, he wrote his first article on his conflict solving approach, which he later named *Interactive Problem Solving* (Kelman 2012a). Furthermore, he began to get interested in the Middle East conflict when the war erupted in 1967. This is why he set a focus on the Israeli-Palestinian relationship and the conflict resolution in this context. His first workshop on the Middle East conflict, together with Stephen Cohen, took place as a one-time workshop in

¹³ Kelman, Herbert C. (ed., 1965): *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

¹⁴ Kelman, Herbert C./ Hamilton, V.L. (1989): *Crimes of Obedience: Toward a Social Psychology of Authority and Responsibility*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

1971 (Kelman 2012b: 368). Despite some setbacks, Kelman as “strategic [optimist]”¹⁵ and “bearer of the sense of possibility” (Kelman 2010b: 384) continued to devote much of his work efforts to this special conflict. As he is especially committed to the peace process in Israel and Palestine, he co-chaired a joint working group on this issue and has been co-chair to another as well. His efforts did not halt merely in his research, but he founded a Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution (PICAR) at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard, a program designed to conduct research on IPS and the Middle East conflict between 1993 and 2003 (Kelman 2012b: 369). The 1993 Oslo Accord, the first agreement between Israel and Palestine acknowledging both parties as official parties, was seen as a major achievement of Kelman’s workshop and Track Two diplomacy (cf. Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 9; Wallensteen 2011: 261). Saunders (2000: 254) confirms that “countless interactions over two decades deserved a significant share of the credit” to the 1993 approach of Israel’s Prime Minister Rabin and PLO Chairman Arafat since “many of the chief negotiators [on both sides] of the 1993 agreement” (Miall/ Ramsbotham/ Woodhouse 1999: 50) were former participants of Kelman’s IPS workshops.

Kelman researches and uses his theories in practice, which helps him to further improve his concept. He and his colleagues, being scholars and practitioners alike, describe themselves as “scholar-practitioner[s]” (Kelman 2012b: 369; Kelman 2000).

His work is so highly recognized in the US that it seems incomprehensible that he is not as well known in Europe as in the States. As I have already mentioned in the introduction, Kelman is not so famous in European peace research. Some may know him, but few are studying his approach. The reason behind this is quite simple, though. Humanistic psychology and system theory are the mainstream in peace research in the US. Thus, it is only natural that (social) psychology is playing a key role in analyzing politics and conflicts in the US and according to this has been the core of peace research from the beginning. Within European peace research on the other hand, Marxist, structuralist and post-structuralist approaches prevail. In Europe, where structuralism is important, the fact that Kelman ranges between two fields of studies, and thus is not positioned clearly in a field of study, may also have contributed to the disregarding attitude. The Herbert C. Kelman Institute for Interactive Conflict Transformation (HKI) situated in Vienna tries to contribute to his (re)discovery.

¹⁵ According to Kelman, strategic optimism is „a strategy designed to seek out and actively pursue all possible openings to peace, which can help to counteract the pervasive pessimism that dominates deep-rooted conflicts and the negative self-fulfilling prophecies that it engenders” (Kelman 2010b: 384).

4. Interactive Problem Solving

Interactive Problem Solving (IPS) is a social-psychological approach of conflict resolution. IPS is not part of the concept of “negotiation” (Kelman 2012b: 368). It belongs to the unofficial third party intervention and is taking place on the Track Two diplomacy level¹⁶, not on the official Track One. This strategy mainly uses workshops, both one-time and continued, to bring unofficial, influential persons of conflicting parties together to envisage mutual acknowledgement and in order to seek creative solutions for the conflict. IPS can be applied to international conflicts as well as to inter-communal conflicts. Until now, we have seen workshops in Cyprus, Sri Lanka, Bosnia, Columbia, Northern Ireland, Canadian and American Native communities, in the Israeli-Palestinian and US-Cuban conflicts (among others Kelman 2000: 274; Kelman 2010a: 389-390; Hicks/ Weisberg 2005: 151).

This chapter starts with an introduction to social-psychological premises in the IPS approach. Before continuing with the IPS approach itself, three scholars are introduced: John W. Burton, Leonard W. Doob and Edward Azar were the pioneers in problem-solving approaches and strongly influenced Kelman in developing his method.

4.1 Social-Psychological Premises

Kelman’s background as a social psychologist manifests itself in his peace research, too. His IPS approach results from several premises of Social Psychology. He understands ...

1. conflict as an intersocietal process;
2. conflict resolution as a transformation of relationship;
3. diplomacy as a mix of official and unofficial processes;
4. that intragroup conflicts have an impact on intergroup conflicts;
5. the world as a global society;
6. Social Psychology as an interdisciplinary field;
7. that multiple methods must be used;
8. that Social Psychology has a cross-cultural, international character;
9. the importance of applied research and practice;
10. the importance of social issues in Social Psychology;
11. that there is an ethical dimension in Social Psychology.

(Kelman 2002: 178-182; Kelman 2004: 261-263).

¹⁶ See chapter 2.4 for a description of Track Two Diplomacy.

Furthermore, he researched on social influence and also incorporated these ideas in his conflict resolving approaches. He determines three types of social influence: *compliance, identification and internalization*: Compliance describes the behavior of accepting an outside influence to get an advantageous response. Identification, on the other hand, refers to accepting it for the sake of the actual, favored relationship to the other. Finally, internalization implies the acceptance of changes in order to maintain the own value system (Kelman 2008b: 20).

Kelman is convinced that the social psychological approach fits well with conflict resolution with regard to its activities on the micro level, which are to have impacts in the macro level:

“Social psychology [...] is particularly well suited to exploring the relationship between individual change and social change. Changes at these two levels can best be conceived as linked to each other in a continuous, circular fashion. Structural changes, by way of various processes of social interaction, produce changes at the level of individuals, which [...] produce new changes at the system level, and so on.” (Kelman 2004: 260)

It is not in medical terms as diagnosis and therapy that (social) psychology is important in conflict resolution, but in terms of determining escalating factors, perpetuations of conflict by psychological actions. (Social) psychology is significant and useful to understand individual and collective behavior as well as to tell where to begin from a social-psychological perspective in order to enable conflict resolution (Kelman cited in Wählich 2009: 10; Kelman 2012b: 363). Sawyer and Guetzkow (2006: 120) corroborate the relevance of social psychology in conflict behavior as psychological factors can influence conflict parties' behavior and thus the future of the conflict.

4.2 John W. Burton, Leonard Doob, Edward Azar

Before analyzing Kelman's *Interactive Problem Solving*, one has to deal with Leonard Doob and Edward Azar, but especially with John W. Burton. Kelman draws much on Burton's *Controlled Communication*.

Social conflicts after the Cold War often are “deep-rooted” (Burton 1987) or “protracted” (Azar/ Moon 1986: 394) due to ethnic, racial or linguistic identity conflicts (Hoffman 2011: 148). According to Hoffman, the approaches attempt to connect two aspects of conflict,

namely the subjective perception of the conflict and the political, economic and social relationship of power in an objective way (Hoffman 2011: 148).

The focus on needs and structural causes for a conflict were new and characterized by Burton, Azar and others (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 10).

4.2.1 John W. Burton

John Burton, an Australian scholar, founded a Center for the Analysis of Conflict in London in the 1960s. During his time at the Center he developed his pioneering approach of *Controlled Communication*. He wanted to offer a place for dealing with root causes and not merely with the settlement of a conflict (Kelman 2000: 274). His premise is that a conflict can only be solved, if human needs are fulfilled (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 9). Accordingly, Burton's understanding of conflict, that he calls "deep-rooted conflicts", is that there are human needs that are not negotiable behind the conflict (Fisher 1997: 5-6).

At first sight, Burton seems to derive this approach from Maslow's so called hierarchy of needs. Maslow argues that human beings have at least five kinds of basic needs: physiological needs to live (food, water, sleep etc.), safety needs (health, social stability, employment etc.), love needs (family, friends etc.), "esteem" needs (confidence, respect etc.) and self-actualization (morality, creativity etc.). Moreover, Maslow states that human beings want to achieve or maintain a state of conditions that allows them to enjoy basic needs as well as other intellectual needs. It is logical that physiological needs are the most important, followed by safety needs, further followed by love needs and self-actualization. So, there are several needs chains. If the most basic needs are not satisfied, the other needs cannot be fulfilled either (Maslow 1943: 370, 393; Burgess/ Burgess 1997: 207).

However, Burton disagrees with Maslow's understanding of the needs chain. According to him, there is no hierarchical order of different needs (Marker 2003). What is further interesting is that according to Maslow any danger or possible direct or indirect danger to basic human needs is seen to be a "psychological threat" (Maslow 1943: 395). This means that human needs comprise physical as well as non-physical needs (Marker 2003).

Although this motivation theory seems to be identical with the behavior theory, Maslow is strictly against this perception. He argues that motivation is only one of many drivers for behavior (Maslow 1943: 370).

What is a new perspective on conflict is that human needs cannot be denied (Marker 2003; Hoffman 2011: 150). In other words, "it recognizes the existence of negotiable and nonnegotiable issues" (Marker 2003). According to human needs theorists, social and political

conflicts come mainly from the fact that people want to fulfill their unsatisfied needs (Marker 2003).

However, Sandole (2013) argues that Burton preferred the sociologist Paul Sites' understanding of human needs to Maslow's hierarchical order of human needs. Sites posits that the eight basic needs (consistency in response, stimulation, security, recognition, distributive justice, rationality and the appearance of rationality, meaning and control) were equally important as the other needs and need fulfillment. Burton identified more with this understanding but adds another that he named "role defense". It describes the action to defend one's situation when all needs are already fulfilled.

Burton was also influenced by systems theory and game theory, from which he derived the irrational behavior in face to competition (Miall/ Ramsbotham/ Woodhouse 1999: 46).

While Burton and Doob were the first to apply problem-solving workshops to improve communication skills and to analyze the relationship between conflict parties for conflict solving, they might have been influenced by Walton (1969)¹⁷, who used it for the interpersonal level of conflicts, and Blake et al. (1964)¹⁸ concentrating on the intergroup level (Fisher 2006: 109-110).

Reflecting the development of his workshop, Kelman points to the meeting with Burton in 1966. At that time, Kelman was invited to participate in Burton's exercise dealing with the conflict in Cyprus. Consequently, Kelman gained first-hand insight into this unofficial, confidential meeting where high-level representatives of conflicting parties got a chance to meet under a third party's lead (Kelman 2000: 274).

The following part briefly introduces Burton's *Controlled Communication* approach.

4.2.1.1 Controlled Communication

Controlled Communication has elements of conciliation and mediation, and is thus completely free of enforcement and animates participants to analyze the conflict and adjust themselves in the process to resolve the conflict (Burton 1969: ix-xi). The underlying hypothesis is that communication is one of the causes for the conflict and consequently it is through (improved) communication that the conflict can be solved by the conflict parties themselves (Burton 1969: 49, 55).

¹⁷ Walton, R.E. (1969): *Interpersonal Peacemaking. Confrontations and Third Party Consultation*. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.

¹⁸ Blake, R.R./ Shepard, H.A./ Mouton, J.S. (1964): *Managing Intergroup Conflict in Industry*. Houston, Tex.: Gulf.

Burton assumes that conflict parties have a variety of components, i.e. the ability to choose from, e.g. different perceptions and goals, different methods to reach them, and the evaluation of goals, how to achieve them and the costs of conflict. This suggests that conflicts are seen subjectively, and that by changing attitudes the relationship can be changed as well. According to this, perceptions, motives and objectives are exchanged in an academic setting to help conflict parties to get a better understanding of the conflict and possibilities to find sustainable solutions (Burton 1969: ix-xi).

In December 1965, a pilot study conducted in London gave a first impression of how a workshop can work and made the scholars realize that they should contain themselves instead of intervening too much. That is how the term “*Controlled Communication*” was invented (Burton 1969: 4-7).

The one-week long workshop in Cyprus in 1966, one of the two workshops that was the basis for Burton’s *Controlled Communication* approach, involved two Greek Cypriots, two Turkish Cypriots and six social scientists who explored new options for the conflict after having analyzed it in its roots and process. Kelman participated as well. The workshop was done in a period of no official communication between the conflict parties. The parties were motivated to take part in the workshop by the academic setting, a project to analyze conflict situations, and by the indication that participants may contribute to conflict resolution in their conflict through the improved communication (Kelman 1972: 170-172; Kelman 2006: 80).

The workshop had three phases: The first phase served as an introduction where participants could demonstrate their views of the conflict. The staff only asked for details but stayed rather in a passive role. In the second phase, the social scientists took an active part and introduced various conflict models. After a discussion of the general development of conflicts, the discussion proceeded to discuss the Turkish-Cypriot conflict. The conflict parties were asked to try the models of conflict on the actual conflict. The staff made propositions and explained the models. Approaches were further considered and discussed in the third phase with examples by the third party. The social scientists intervened when a “solution” was found by one party while this “solution” was not acceptable to the other conflict party. They signaled why this possibility was not a solution to all (Kelman 2006: 80).

The fact that the participants were chosen by their community leaders was special, although they came as private persons. However, their proximity to the decision-makers was a considerable benefit. Shortly after the workshop the negotiations restarted. The extent to which the workshop could contribute to this progress is not clear, but it is for sure that it has had a positive impact on it: The information and ideas of the workshop were transferred to the

decision-makers, communication was freer, and important views have been exchanged, and new insights were gained (Kelman 1972: 170-172; Kelman 2006: 80).

Controlled communication, being a stage prior to negotiation between the parties, being exploratory of relationships, and aiming to reveal underlying causes of conflict, can effectively be conducted at lower decision-making levels – provided [...] that there is communication with decision-makers as and when required (Burton 1969: 42).

Burton concluded that conflict settlement does not always guarantee its solution. Instead, long-term measures are needed in order to establish peace (Burton 1969: 11). The third party should be non-judging and neutral but explain conflicts, how they are caused and evolve (Burton 1969: 61).

Before the actual workshop, it proved to be useful to conduct a preparative meeting of scholars to discuss propositions for the upcoming workshop (Burton 1969: 65).

Burton's intention in conducting the workshops was academic, notwithstanding with a certain hope to contribute to the peace process by making participants communicate with each other (Chataway 2002: 167).

Furthermore, he prefers solutions that integrate the parties' needs in a simple compromise (Burton 1969: 11).

Another term that was coined by Burton is "conflict prevention": Additionally to effects on humans, the conditions that produce the conflict and the structural changes needed for conflict resolution, Burton and Dukes (1990: 2 cited in Miall/ Ramsbotham/ Woodhouse 1999: 48) suggest to attribute the enhancement of conditions favorable to cooperative relationships to the conflict resolution efforts.

While it is obvious that Burton nowadays counts to human needs theorists, earlier publications prove that Burton first had a functionalist approach until the beginning of the 1960s. After getting influenced by systemic theory in the mid-1960s, he shifted his focus to social psychology, pluralism, interdependency and third parties approaches around 1970. He added the human needs approach around 1980 and finally analyzed international conflicts and their causes more intensively in his book of 1984 (Hoffman 2011: 149).

Kelman remarks that Burton, who in his eyes is a "highly innovative IR scholar", has a focus on "perceptual processes and human needs" (Kelman 2012b: 367), which can be ascribed to his first degree in psychology (Kelman 2012b: 367). It is clear that Kelman derived many components of Burton's problem-solving workshops for his *Interactive Problem Solving* workshops. The "no-fault" principle, dealing with own perceptions about the other parties and needs, the third party's role to clarify and summarize contributions of

participants, considering new options, the transfer from the micro level to the macro level and the workshop structure with three phases (presentation of view on conflict, analysis of the conflict with the help of the third party, consideration of possible solutions) are only a few elements, that Kelman borrowed from Burton (Kelman 1972: 171-172). Differences between Burton and Kelman can be seen in the phases of the workshop, interpretations of the third party (even if merely hypothetical), purpose – Burton wanted to reach a solution which was then transferred to political leaders while Kelman has not the ambition to actually *find* a solution (Rouhana 2000: 301). Kelman rather intends to give participants a sense of possibility and a set of tools that contribute to advances in negotiations. At best, they can find a solution, but it is more the good atmosphere that is important to him.

Controlled Communication was renamed “Analytical Problem-Solving Facilitated Conflict Resolution” when the factor “needs” explicitly turned into the main focus (Burton 1990 cited in Sandole 2013).

Mitchell (1973) reacted to Yalem’s¹⁹ criticism of Burton’s *Controlled Communication* defending the approach as a method preparatory for official negotiations contributing inputs into the process. He shares the same opinion as Yalem concerning the limitations that the confidentiality of the workshops brings with themselves. However, Mitchell also sees the positive side. If there was no meeting organized by Burton, there would have been no effort for improving the relationship at all (Mitchell 1973: 123-125). Being aware of multiple peace efforts, essential changes of behavior (more cooperation, less threat) were found after the exercises. Mitchell underlines that he was assured that the inputs from *Controlled Communication* played a role in this change (Mitchell 1973: 126).

4.2.2 Leonard W. Doob

Leonard W. Doob, William J. Foltz and Robert B. Stevens and their team from Yale University conducted the so-called Fermeda Workshop that was organized for six representatives of Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya. Understanding the dynamics of groups and organizations and a conscious behavior in a group of participants were the objectives of the workshop. It was hoped that some learning would be applied to improve cooperation and decrease the negative condition in daily life (Doob/ Foltz 1974: 238). In the two-week-long workshop²⁰, the participants were chosen by the persons responsible for the workshop.

¹⁹ Yalem, R. J. (1971): Controlled Communication and Conflict Resolution. In: Journal of Peace Research, VIII, 263-272.

²⁰ There were 2.5 days off in the middle of the workshop.

However, the governments of the three countries were well informed on the plans for the workshops. The third party was composed of the above named three Yale organizers and four American experts of sensitivity training using the T-group²¹ method. The structure of the workshop requires two so-called T-groups, each of which comprised three participants of each country, two experts and one or two organizers. In the first phase, the T-group procedures demand self-awareness-raising and the development of open communication; the conflict itself was completely omitted. The trainers do not intervene, except making interpretations and observations, but they do not form the process. However, they lead the sessions that are held with both T-groups in between the first days. In these sessions, the scientists explain leadership and strategy styles and make them clearer by simulation exercises. In the second phase, the participants are brought together in their “own” national group in order to write down the perceived concerns and grievances they have towards the other groups and the concerns and grievances the two other groups have in their eyes towards them. Following this, the lists are presented to each other. However, in the Fermeda Workshop this plan failed due to the inability of two parties to imagine the others’ perceptions. Instead of this step, the focus changed to brainstorming techniques and updates of each T-group about their activities. Then, both T-groups developed possible solutions, which were accepted by the members of each group. Nevertheless, the following joint quest for a solution accepted by all participants failed. The trust developed in the small-group work could not be transferred to the total group. Moreover, the differences within one group hindered an agreement on a solution that was already accepted by the members in one group. In some cases, it even escalated to an argument within one group because of blaming a participant for compromising too much and acting against national interests (Kelman 1972: 173-174).

Even if the Fermeda Workshop failed in achieving a supported proposal of all participants, Kelman (1972: 174) identifies several benefits of the workshop: a certain level of trust and open communication was achieved, even though it was only within the T-group; a new understanding of each other’s motives and problems as well as of the mutual perception was established; participants were more open to other settlements of the conflict. Additionally, interviews with 13 of 18 participants one year later strengthened the assumed positive effects. Most of former participants were still keeping in touch with each other. Nevertheless, participants did not transfer benefits of the participation to their communities.

²¹ T-group stands for “training group”. “Sensitivity training” and “encounter groups” refer to the same method. Problems are analyzed in small groups. Group members learn about their behavior by reflecting it in the group training. While interacting with others, group members are expected to learn how to be more conscious of their actions, how their actions impact others and make them more aware of the fact that they have choices (Kegan 1971: 454-455).

Doob and Foltz also organized a workshop for 56 Protestants and Catholics living in Belfast, Northern Ireland. The workshop was intended to improve the understanding of groups and organizations as well as the skills of participants in their individual behavior as being part of a group or organization that in turn should facilitate cooperation of grassroots leaders in the communities. Participants were chosen from the lower and lower-middle classes. The age ranged between 16 and 60; there were more men (60%) than women (40%); few participants were well known in Belfast, most belonged to a local organization (Doob/ Foltz 1974: 237-238).

Nine and a half months after the workshop, Doob and Foltz conducted interviews with former participants of the workshop described above. They found that all participants but one remembered details of the workshop. The self-perception and the perception of the other changed, own potentialities were recognized, important social contacts were made at the workshop, effectiveness of actions within organizations was increased – one of the goals of the workshop – and a sense of possibilities as well as “a high degree of trust among participants” (Doob/ Foltz 1974: 255) came up. A few participants came to question their activities and changed them or changed their role in an organization. This also applies to political behavior, where all changes went in the direction of a more moderate political view. For most of the participants it was a rather positive experience, even if some also noted that there were negative elements, such as that many participants felt that they have not been informed correctly about the structure of the workshop. It is also evident that all participants felt stress in the workshop, which usually occurs in workshops. After the workshop, most participants confirmed that the stress was important in the learning. It is also worth noting that the positive change only eventuated after a little time has passed after the workshop²² (Doob/ Foltz 1974: 243-252).

Burton's and Doob's approaches have a few things in common: First of all, the settings of the workshop are isolated, either by an academic setting or by taking place on a “neutral” ground. Secondly, the academic background of the initiators gave them (a) an academic sponsorship, (b) the legitimacy to act as a third party in the workshop, (c) the possibility to conduct the workshop on an unofficial level, furthermore concerned governments knew about the workshop and authorized them. Third, influential persons that have access to policy-makers were chosen to participate as private persons. Fourth, both approaches foster an informal and

²² The time elapsed until the positive changes were perceived range from two weeks to three months (Doob/ Foltz 1974: 248).

interpersonal atmosphere that is intended to facilitate presenting views and enhance “mutual trust, sense of shared values, and commitment to a common task, cutting across national or ethnic divisions” (Kelman 1972: 176). Fifth, the discussion format enables face-to-face communication. The third party does not follow a certain agenda in discussions, does not intervene in the subject, i.e. leading, proposing, or interpreting, due to the principle of the workshop: the conflict groups have to find a solution themselves. Sixth, third parties help in an analytical manner by providing tools and concepts that may be helpful for participants to deal with the conflict (Kelman 1972: 175-177). Seventh, the workshop of both Burton and Doob offer participants to break away from their reiterative environment and to get new impressions and insights that help them to understand the conflict not only from the own perspective but also from the other’s. Eighth, both workshops are designed to transfer the inputs and new ideas into the official negotiation level (Kelman 2006: 85).

Compared to *Controlled Communication*, Doob’s approach is quite different in the number and selection of participants, the duration of the workshop and also the method. Furthermore, Doob set his workshop in a physically different setting. (Kelman 2006: 85).

It is striking, however, that mutual perception and joint developing of possible solutions are key words in both approaches.

I assume that Kelman chose the better method in developing IPS on the basis of Burton’s and Doob’s concept. As the transfer of trust from the small group to the whole group did not work, the T-group method might cause more harm to the overall process if participants react to the unsuccessful discussion in the joint group by hardening their positions. I doubt that official persons that were chosen by a government to participate in a problem-solving workshop can truly act as “private persons”. In my eyes, it is doubtful that they can act independently.

The reason why Doob is still important to Kelman is because Kelman’s participation at a working conference of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research in 1970 shaped him much. The agenda of the working conference included detailed presentations and discussions on Burton’s *Controlled Communication* as well as on the Fermeda Workshop (Kelman 1972: 173). The similarities of the approaches, which are described above, influenced Kelman in his work on what he came to call IPS. Notably, Kelman maintained the core of the problem-solving workshops of Burton and Doob by undertaking his workshops to provide a place that is isolated from media, obligations of duties if a participant occupies an official position, and from further in-group pressures. Participants are asked to explore options, learn from each other regarding views, needs and motivations, and to change their

behavior according to their new learning, self-reflection and experiences as well as to be open to new ideas that may induce the problem-solving process. Aside from the micro level goal, the overall goal is to put new ideas in the policy-making level and spread a sense of possibility (Kelman 1972: 177).

4.2.3 Edward Azar

Edward Azar named conflicts that seem to be so complicated and have such deep roots that a solution simply appears to be impossible “protracted social conflicts”. The term describes intra-state or interstate “hostile interactions among individuals and groups” (Azar/ Moon 1986: 394) which were caused by conflicts in society, culture and ethnicity (Azar/ Moon 1986: 394). According to him, contrary to what is widely assumed, it is not the questions of economics or power that lead to conflicts, but the needs of people being denied (Fisher 1997: 5).

Azar draws attention to the role of state and the international context to protracted social conflicts. According to him, only by considering their impact, is it possible to understand them. (Rothman/ Olson 2001: 290).

Beside of the safety needs and the needs of social and cultural values of a community, the needs of participation in political, economic and social processes in a legal and legitimate way are especially relevant (Hoffman 2011: 148). If these basic needs are unfulfilled, it leads to inequality in a society and a “structural victimization” (Azar/ Moon 1986: 397), which in turn results in a violent outbreak of the conflict (Hoffman 2011: 148). The link between unfulfilled personal needs and the macro-level structure was only made when Burton worked also with Azar’s approach (Avruch/ Mitchell 2013a).

4.3 Beginning of *Interactive Problem Solving*

Kelman has in particular been influenced by John Burton and Leonard Doob, both of whom brought unofficial representatives of conflicting parties together and gave them a platform to communicate – without protocol and public. Sociologists experienced in group processes and conflicts were to lead the meetings. As the gatherings did not have a given structure, the perception and the behavior of the participants are supposed to change and therefore enable creative problem solving (Kelman 1972: 168).

In his first article on the workshop, Kelman (1972) analyzes the conflict solving approaches of John Burton and Leonard Doob. Both want representatives of conflict parties to have direct

communication, which was described as “problem-solving workshops”. Kelman compares the methods and tries to integrate both approaches²³.

Moreover, he presents the strengths and limits of these workshop-based approaches. By working with the methods of his two predecessors, he developed his own version of workshops: his *Interactive Problem Solving* workshops.

In the first two decades of IPS, the contributions of the workshops mainly fit to the qualities needed before official negotiations start, such as enabling a positive political atmosphere favorable to negotiations. Between 1990 and 1993, Kelman transformed his approach into a negotiation-assisting work. It is also in this time, that Kelman and Rouhana, his Arab counterpart, did their first continuing workshop for Israelis and Palestinians (Kelman 2010b: 377, 379-380).

Kelman learned from the peace work at CORE and derived many premises that he thought to be essential and useful in IPS:

[T]he importance of combining different methods and simultaneously working at different levels; [...] the relationship between the microprocess and the macroprocess of social change; [...] the importance of persistence [...]; the value of using methods of change that instantiate the future situation [...] (Kelman 2012b: 362).

Kelman assumes that “war and peace are in essence societal and intersocietal processes.” (Kelman 2012b: 363) As a result, he structured his approach in a way that perceptions of “the enemy” change. The underlying thought is that mutual respect and empathy change the relationship between the conflict parties, and thus the conflict itself. Conflicts can be transformed (Kelman cited in Wählich 2009: 12). Lederach (2010: 26) reinforces the thesis that the relationship is a crucial factor for conflict, and thus the relationship is also the starting point for finding a solution.

Actually, Kelman attempts to transform the relationship between conflict parties so that constructive discussion is possible and solutions can be found creatively. Transforming relationships is a main characteristic of conflict resolution (Kelman 2008b: 23).

In the 1980s, problem solving workshops became more and more significant (Kriesberg 2006: 114).

²³ See chapter 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 for a detailed comparison.

4.4 Kelman's *Interactive Problem Solving Workshops*

This concept has numerous elements. The content will be summarized – what is IPS – in categories.

The overall idea of IPS is to find new ideas and options on how to handle the conflict. The whole process is interactive and confidential and is to stimulate “active listening, joint thinking and the development of working trust” (Kelman 2012b: 368) – a key word in IPS. “Working trust” is not the emotional trust between human beings, but limited to the participants’ commitment to finding a solution and their motivation to do it by their own willingness and interest (Kelman 2000: 279). This is because separating the positive and the negative evaluation of an attitude object analytically can be more than useful at times (Kelman 2007: 292). The more one party seems to act “naturally” for its own good, the higher is the working trust (Kelman 2012b: 369).

Kelman sees IPS with its non-binding character as an accurate tool to change public opinion, political culture and national policy at the societal level (Kelman 2012b: 368). In group works “collective needs and fears, perceptions of self and other, national narratives and identities, and conflict norm” (Kelman 2012b: 368) are discussed, analyzed and transformed to enable the process of finding a new common ground. These changes are to be transferred into inputs for official policies and public debate and thus encourage the people to change their political culture (Kelman 2012b: 368). Kelman was the first to declare the transfer of inputs to the decision-making level one of the targets of the problem-solving approach (Fisher 2005: 5).

The following subchapters describe IPS as Kelman practices it. However, it must be noted that there is no “universal” IPS workshop that works every time, in every conflict and for all purposes (Rouhana 2000: 305).

4.4.1 Goals

Kelman’s workshops have two different goals: In a wider sense, these workshops are to influence the macro level from the micro level. More specifically, new ideas are to be developed together actively and participants should acquire insight into the situation, needs and fears of the other conflict party. Hereby, it is important to get to know mutual needs. In addition, private dialogue is promoted (Kelman 2010a: 389-391). In this way, the individuals participating in the workshop will be influenced in order to change their attitude. It is then up to them to communicate their modified, new attitude towards the other conflict party, as well as their impressions and new approaches in order to solve the conflict in their community.

This means that a change or at least an influence on politics depends on the commitment of the individuals (Kelman 2010a: 402-403). This is the political objective (Kelman 1992:76). Another goal of conflict workshops is to identify unfulfilled needs of conflict parties that are root causes of the conflict. Furthermore needs are easier to please than demands. This enables cooperation (Hicks/ Weisberg 2005: 169) and is therefore a fundamental part of IPS.

Psychological barriers add to the escalation of the conflict that arises out of different, apparently mutually incompatible interests, ideology, and tradition. The workshop intends to eliminate or lessen psychological barriers that translate into the ability to enhance suggestions for a solution (Davidson/ Montville 1981: 153). This is an educational objective because participants learn communication skills, insights into the other party's needs, humanize the other conflict party, etc. (Kelman 1992: 76).

In short, a change in the micro level, which also implies a change in the macro level, is the goal of IPS.

4.4.2 Fundamental Rules

Kelman (2010a: 398-400) lists seven basis rules for IPS:

1.) Privacy and confidentiality

Nobody is allowed to cite anything of the workshop with attribution to a participant outside the workshop. The workshops are closed to the public. No one besides the participants and the third party knows what is said and happening in the workshop. There are also no minutes. Rule 1 enables free talking and thinking in the workshop as their actions will have no consequences. By this way, innovative and creative thinking is possible and a new approach to the conflict can be discovered.

2.) Focus on each other (no other parties are involved or have to be paid attention to)

Listening to each other actively and learning to understand the other side is essential to the intended outcome of the workshop: the transfer of the micro level to the macro level.

3.) Analytic discussion

No accusation is allowed. It is important, however, to talk about emotions and the needs of the participants (and the groups they are representing). This should be conducted on a "no-fault" principle. Participants are asked to deal with the conflict as a shared problem that needs a joint process of searching a sustainable solution.

4.) Problem-solving mode

Participants are encouraged to be in a problem-solving mode, that is to be cooperative, thus productive, instead of being hostile or blaming the other party. Of course, the

parties are not talked into believing in another way of thinking of justice or fault etc. It is only about being productive in the joint work.

5.) No expectation of agreement

Although finding a mutually acceptable solution satisfying the needs of all conflicting parties is an overall goal in IPS, it is not the only aim. The success of IPS cannot be measured whether an agreement that has been reached or not. A better mutual understanding of the other parties and the conflict itself already serves the purpose of IPS.

6.) Equality of conflict parties

Even if equality, in reality, is not given due to asymmetric power and legitimization relations in the conflict, it is important to treat the parties in IPS as equals. Both sides shall have the right to be heard and to explain themselves.

7.) Facilitative role of third party

Third parties may help in the process of the agenda, like moving discussions in a constructive direction, summarizing or pointing to similarities. Nevertheless their only role is to assist in the process and not proposing ideas or possible solutions to the conflict parties. Neither do they take position or evaluate the proposals of parties.

After his first workshop, Kelman concluded that more than the neutrality of the facilitators, the ethnic balance of the third party team is important and that the effectiveness of the workshop is higher, when only two parties – despite of the many involved parties in the conflict - participate in the workshop (Kelman 2010b: 371).

4.4.3 Process of Conflict Solving

The process of the IPS workshops varies depending on whether it is a one-time or continued workshop. In case of one-time workshops, each conflict party gets four to five hours of separate units. The workshop with both conflict parties together then requires 2.5 days (Kelman 2005b: 5).

Before beginning the workshop with all participants, there are short pre-sessions with each conflict party separately. These meetings enable participants to voice their concerns and to get a feeling of how creative they can be in searching for a solution (Hicks/ Weisberg 2005: 160).

Constituents in the conflict solving process

There are four constituents in the conflict solving process. It is essential to keep steps in order; only going to the next step when the previous has been completed.

In the first phase, the problem of the conflicting parties is identified and analyzed. Hereby, needs and fears of participants are discussed and participants are sensitized on the dynamics of a conflict. In the second phase²⁴, participants are encouraged to jointly find creative ideas for a solution. Participants learn to explore options and to rephrase their concerns to make them more receptive. The main core in the third phase is influencing the other. Participants learn how to explore options, rephrase their objectives in order to make them more amenable to the other side. It is essential that trust replaces the (attempted and tempted) utilization of violence or threats. Trust, mutual assurance and the benefit of negotiations are supposed to attract participants.

The fourth and last phase is about creating a supportive political climate for official negotiations. Trust-building is an important factor for this step.

Finally, the feeling of the possibility to have negotiations and to have them in a constructive way also helps to animate an atmosphere that is open to negotiations (Kelman 2010a: 392-399). In this phase the participants also analyze the political and psychological barriers of each party's society that may prevent or hinder a successful introduction and implementation in the societies (Kelman 2005a: 642).

4.4.4 Concept

The concept of IPS is introduced first by separately dealing with the participants and then with the third party. Subsequently, the core of the concept is described.

Participants

In general, three to six participants of each conflict party and two to four members of the third party take part in a workshop. Typically, the representatives of the conflict groups are influential persons in their home society and politics, but they do not take up official roles, or at least are not decision makers. This includes persons that are famous and/ or accepted. In Kelman's Israeli-Palestinian problem-solving workshops, parliamentarians, members of political parties or political movements, journalists, academics who also write in journals and have media appearances, who advise political leaders, who have positions in politics and academics, former diplomats, officials and military officers participated. The proof that these people have been a good choice is evident now as many have become negotiators, ambassadors, cabinet ministers, parliamentarians or leaders in media and research (Kelman

²⁴ Hoffman (2011: 152) understands the first phase as Kelman (encouraging mutual understanding of mutual perceptions of the conflict). However, he parts the further phases into phase 2 (deeper understanding of conflict and learning to understand situations and actions that perpetuate or worsen the conflict) and phase 3 (creative thinking of mutually acceptable solutions).

2005b: 6). So, participants are “primarily [...] political influentials who are not currently in official positions“ (Kelman 2012b: 368), at least not in high positions as leaders of political parties may also qualify for taking part in the IPS workshop.

Another qualification for participation is the willingness to approach the conflict in a way that a negotiated solution may be a possible outcome, even if it is nonbinding and confidential. In addition, they have to accept that all conflict parties have the same rights in the workshop. No matter which party might be more powerful in reality, in the workshop they are equals. The facilitator has to be committed to empower the weaker party (Kelman 2005b: 6).

Third party

The third party which functions as a facilitator in IPS has an academic standing. It has only a facilitative character. It must not propose or intervene in the substantive content of the workshop. As a good facilitator, it has to be trusted by all participating groups. The credibility of the third party is essential to persuade parties to take part in the workshop. This is also why the academic setting at a neutral place is helpful. It is important to treat parties as equals; but empowering the weaker party is legal.

Kelman has proven his credibility by the intimacy that developed over the years and by his long-term commitment to contribute to the solution of conflicts, especially the Middle East conflict (Kelman 2005a: 642).

The third party is responsible for creating conditions that enable fruitful communication and an environment in which joint creative thinking for a possible solution can be made. Furthermore, the third party chooses and informs the participants, sets the ground rules and makes sure that they are complied with and helps to keep a constructive atmosphere and common thread. It may intervene in order to clarify issues, point to observations and even challenges, and refer to the content, but actually the third party is only allowed to intervene in the process. Again, I repeat: no substantive proposals are to be made by the third party (Kelman 2005a: 642).

If the facilitator is committed to de-escalate the conflict, participants will also be encouraged to commit to the process (Chataway 2002: 185).

Through his many years of commitment, Kelman identified four elements that are important for a successful third party: First of all, the ability of networking is essential as it enables inviting potential participants to the IPS efforts. These connections help to make the third

party a credible partner. Second, the third party should comprise at least two persons who are experts in at least one relevant subject (such as international politics, local knowledge or group processes), to enable being attentive and sensitive and not to overlook or miss anything. Ethnical balance is also important. Third, listening attentively and respectfully to what is said in the workshop is relevant. Fourth, the third party can assist the conflict parties in transferring the ideas of the workshop (Kelman 2010b: 375).

The characteristic of a third-party having a large knowledge of the conflict differs from Burton's and Fisher's approach where no special knowledge is desired because it would be easier not to have certain ready-made images of the conflict groups. Another difference between Kelman and Fisher is that Kelman does not care if the third-party is member of either of the conflict group while Fisher does care (Fisher 2006: 127).

Kelman (2010b: 383-384) reflects his personal qualities in one of his articles: He cites *humor* to be useful in relaxing the atmosphere and to develop personal relationships with the participants. He believes that his *persistent and continuous work* and the fact that he is "multipartial" (Kelman 2010b: 383) – instead of – impartial contributes to his credibility as a third party.

In *identity* issues, Kelman aims at developing a "negotiating identity" among the participants of his IPS efforts in conflicts between identity groups. Kelman stands for the possibility of integrating the identity of the other's group into the own, thus, transcending the identity without the zero-sum thinking. A condition to achieve a transcend identity is the confirmation of one's own national identity (Kelman 2010b: 384).

Summarizing the role of the third party, they contribute to clarification by requesting further details and sometimes observing the process theoretically. Further tasks include taking care of the atmosphere and norms as well as making remarks which can be discussed immediately afterwards (Kelman 2005b: 6). Additionally, participants can put their trust in the third party. As a matter of fact, participants usually do not trust each other (Kelman 2010a: 397).

Concept of IPS

No audience is accepted, no publicity is allowed, and there is no taping or recording. Moreover, it is prohibited to cite something of the IPS in referring to a participant in public. All this contributes to the confidentiality of IPS. IPS distinguishes itself in providing a unique place to interact with the counterpart in an open discussion. Participants deal with the conflict

analytically, so that they can assess how their actions as well as interactions with the other conflict parties fuel or perpetuate the conflict. Thereby participants learn that refraining from merely judging and blaming “the other” will ease the conflict (Kelman 2005a: 642).

The concept of IPS contains three key words: “problem“, “solution” and “interactive“.

The *problem* needs to be dealt with as a common issue of all conflicting parties. It is important to recognize that the problem lies in the relationship and that the *solution* addresses the root causes of the conflict in which needs of every conflict party have to be taken into account. The best method is an *interactive* joint thinking in the process. Direct interaction enables the participating individuals to communicate their differing perspectives to the others and by this they can learn that it is possible to influence the other by understanding the needs and fears of the other sides. Interaction promotes a sustainable solution as ideas for a solution are collected and assessed together (Kelman 2010a: 391-392). Actually, participants are asked to think aloud and to be creative in generating ideas and possibilities; and participants will do so, as they are assured that everything is confidential and that they are protected – no statement given or thought expressed during the workshop may be made public hinting at a certain person (Kelman 1999: 179; Kelman 2005b: 6-7).

IPS, however, faces two dilemmas: First, selecting participants is difficult. Ball et al. (2006 cited in Jones 2008) called it “autonomy dilemma”: Participants must be open enough to find and articulate new ideas, but are supposed to be influential in their community. If they are too close to the government, they may be constrained. On the other hand, they may be free to think in case that they are not in positions with much influence at the governmental level. This means, however, that their impact will be limited. This contradiction is solved by allowing unofficial influential representatives of the conflict parties to participate (Kelman 2010a: 403).

Second, an optimal degree of cohesiveness is necessary. If the cohesiveness is too strong, participants lose their credibility and influence in their party. If it is too low, no foundation of trust can be created and cooperation is made difficult (Kelman 2010a: 403).

Concerning the venue for the workshop, Kelman recommends an academic, sometimes a religious setting. Up to date, Kelman has chosen universities as a venue. The reason for this is that moderators and facilitators get a certain authority in this neutral frame.

What else is needed to conduct a workshop successfully? The third party needs good or very good contacts. Without the contacts, it is extremely difficult to animate potential participants to take part in the workshop (see Kelman 2010b: 370).

Transfer

According to Chataway (2002: 177), there are three ways of transferring the learnt from the micro level (workshop) to the macro level (official decision-making level and civil society): First, a broad transfer by communicating it in a one-way communications medium. Second, a specific transfer is possible by informing certain active, energetic individuals about the learnt. Third, a solicited communication if directly asked for advice by decision makers.

The transfer of new ideas to decision makers and civil society can be made more likely by disseminating clear and consistent information through many different media, especially to key players, and keeping it in the public (Chataway 2002: 179, 184). According to Chataway (2002: 180), “[h]euristic processing is relatively automatic and rapid, with little effort” (2002: 180) and needs multiple, credible resources and similarities to the own ideology to be accepted. It also can pave the way for new ideas by making them familiar. On the contrary to heuristic process, systematic processing is a detailed, careful long-term effort for real cognitive changes. It has the better success rate. Additionally, third parties can exert soft powers like expert power and informational power to reinforce the long-lasting outcome through systematic processing (Chataway 2002: 180-181).

Fisher (1997: 202) has drawn up a schematic model of possible transfers in the most important target groups and interactions (see figure 5):

Starting from the black point in the middle of the figure, which represents an Interactive Conflict Resolution activity, ideas produced and insights gained from the activity can be transferred from the participants, marked as unofficial diplomats here, to public-political constituencies, directly to the leadership of the party or to diplomats who are responsible for the official negotiations. It can snowball as the input can follow other channels that the participants do not have such as a transfer from the public-political constituencies to the leadership or the official delegation of diplomats in negotiation. This applies to both conflict party A and B.




Figure 5: Model for possible transfers in the most important target groups and interactions (Fisher 1997: 202)

4.4.5 Relevance

Kelman delineates IPS from negotiation, which can only be done by officials, as he does not intend to substitute official negotiations (Kelman 2005a: 642). Thus, he views IPS only as a complementary peace-making measure (Kelman 2000: 282). Workshops can fulfill the function of a forum for testing ideas and working out a mutually tolerable language (Chataway 2002: 172).

Kelman assesses three positive impacts of IPS:

1. IPS workshops contributed to create leading groups with experiences in communication with the other party and willing to commit to constructive approach.
2. Substantive inputs were fed in the political and social discussions.
3. IPS workshops helped to improve the political atmosphere so that negotiations were welcomed (Kelman 2010a: 406).

Kelman disassociates himself from the understanding of international conflicts as being only based on misunderstanding and misperception. He assumes that communication is

helpful insofar that it helps clarify facts. He underlined that the main purpose of the problem-solving workshops is not to have the final solution and resolve the conflict but that valuable inputs are made, a sense of possibility is created, and communication skills of participants are improved through the workshops (Kelman 1972: 169). Furthermore, IPS is only useful then conflict parties want to change the situation and commit to the workshop. If official leaders are able to enter official negotiations, there is no need to offer IPS (Kelman 1992: 90).

Conflict phases

Kelman differentiates the relevance of his workshops for the conflict parties depending on the status of the negotiation:

Via the IPS approach, the first reconciliation talks, which usually take place after the negotiations have been concluded, are brought forward *before* the start of the negotiation in order to attract conflict parties more easily to negotiations (Kelman 2010a: 410). It is in this pre-negotiation phase that IPS seems to be most useful as it offers a non-binding, private and confidential framework (Kelman 2005a: 644).

While creating a good political and social climate is especially important before official negotiations, the purpose of having the IPS running parallel to the negotiations on Track One is to raise new or other issues and to preserve the feeling of possibility. Another contribution is that IPS tries to reframe options for ending the conflict in a more advantageous way. IPS is also useful in case negotiations break down, as IPS tries to create and transfer (working) trust and a feeling of possibility and hope. After the negotiations or even after an agreement has been reached, IPS supports the peace process by backing the implementation of the agreement and solutions (Kelman 2005a: 644; Kelman 2010a: 394-395).

Due to its open (structured) and nonbinding character, Kelman argues that the workshops contribute in a unique and special way to the overall process (Kelman 2010a: 394). The workshops help participants to learn more about the members of the conflicting parties, their needs and fears, their perspective, priorities and constraints (Kelman 2005b: 5).

Furthermore, the workshops are relevant as they help communicate with the other side and prepare for productive negotiation. It should be added that IPS gives substantial inputs in the debate of the involved societies and politics, as well as the contribution to a positive political climate for negotiations, especially during diplomatic stalemates.

On the personal level, Kelman states the importance of the sensitization of participants to dynamics of conflicts. New ideas proposed in the workshop can increase the probability that

formal negotiations obtain maximum effectiveness if workshops were held in the pre-negotiation phase.

Shifting away from threats and the utilization of violence and moving toward trust and a sense of possibility are other results of the workshops (Kelman 2010a: 391; 394; Kelman 2010b: 377).

IPS' functions

Rouhana differentiates functions of ICR that I find worth presenting. First, ICR workshops serve as a perfect framework for defining, whether and how ideas can be realized and what kind of agreement might be realistic and possible. Participants can try it out in a workshop and can introduce new insights to their policy makers. The acceptance and reception of ideas can be reported to other participants in a subsequent workshop. What is more, ideas can be adapted and drawn up.

Second, participants can present new insights and ideas more easily to the official level of their conflict party by taking part in seminars, writing articles, doing speeches, and so forth. By getting involved themselves, convincing others of these new insights and ideas becomes easier and more authentic. The participants are credible as they have first-hand information and can strengthen the will to adopt the ideas by pointing to the fact that they are based on mutual needs.

Third, it is possible that only by having an ICR workshop, a positive attitude towards problem-solving can be achieved. Kelman would say that a feeling of possibility of dialogue can emerge.

Fourth, dynamics of the conflict can be changed by ICR, not only by the feeling of possibility, but actually to gain more supporters for the dialogue and negotiation.

Fifth, by deepening their cooperation in continuing workshops, participants get a sense and understanding for the position of the other party in the conflict.

Sixth, besides the network that develops through workshops on an ongoing basis, mutual familiarity with the other party's participants is advanced. Knowledge about political issues, the conflict party's society, political system and culture – f. ex. understanding and preventing the use of taboo words or other linguistic sensitivities – is helpful during the negotiation process.

Seventh, seen that the workshop aims at power equality of the conflict groups, it must be noticed that in reality usually one party is more powerful. The power asymmetry, thus, can prevent to accept idea, made under the condition of benefiting all parties, due to the wish to

maintain the stronger position. In spite of this reality gap, ideas of the workshop are important. They can influence the coming process just because they have been mentioned earlier. These ideas can be of use later, for instance if power relations have changed (Rouhana 2000: 313-318).

Trust

Trust is one of the goals of IPS and is very important for good relationships, and thus for peace. Usually, there is deep mutual distrust between conflict parties. In mutual distrust, parties think that the enemy aims to harm their needs and their lives, and thus do not want to make concessions for fear of being betrayed or disadvantaged (Kelman 2005a: 640-641). “[Each party] is unwilling to risk acting [openly, truthfully and generously] on the assumption that the enemy *shares* that interest [of making peace]” (Kelman 2005a: 641 [emphasis put by author]). However, here lies the dilemma in building trust between adversaries in a conflict: In order to start a peace process, a certain amount of mutual trust is needed. Yet, the conflicting parties cannot trust each other before the peace process has started (Kelman 2005a: 639-640).

Exchanging information about own needs and fears is the basis of IPS workshops. But only if conflict parties start to trust each other, they are willing to expose this necessary information (Bierhoff 2000: 375).

Kelman (2005a: 644-649) summarized in one of his articles²⁵ how trust can be built between opposing parties. Actually, he derived five concepts of how to tackle the dilemma in IPS from workshops conducted with Israelis and Palestinians. Due to the fact that Kelman thinks these concepts can also be helpful in trust building in a larger scale, they shall be introduced here.

The first concept is the *process of successive approximations of commitment and reassurance towards peace*. A gradually growing mutual trust and an increase of new ideas can be expected in IPS. The more assurance conflict parties can provide the deeper the commitment of the conflict parties to the peace process.

The second concept is the *third party as a repository of trust*. This is especially important in the beginning of the process when trust has not yet been established between the conflict parties. The third party has to function as a trustful facilitator to assuage fears that the workshop might be a trap, or that the participation might be used against them, or that they

²⁵ This article has been a keynote address at the Biennial Conference of the International Academy for Intercultural Research 2005 at Kent State University, Ohio.

will be subject to violence perpetrated by the other group. Through continuous commitment towards a successful outcome of a workshop, third parties can increase their credibility and gain the conflict parties' trust.

The third concept is what Kelman calls *working trust*²⁶. The hypothesis underlying this concept is that if the other conflict party is seriously interested in a solution, then it can be better trusted because it will certainly seek a solution, as it wants the conflict to end as well. It is not likely that the two parties will betray each other when both parties are seriously interested in solving the conflict. It is not to say that other parties' quest for peace is what the conflicting parties want, too. "Working trust" is most likely established when participants see that the others' efforts coincide with their interest.

Kelman prefers this "working trust" over interpersonal trust, which is more based on good will. Entering a peace process is only possible if both conflicting parties definitely want peace and the end of the conflict. They need to act on behalf of their own interest (Kelman 2005a: 641). But it is also possible that working trust can grow into personal trust (Kelman 2008b: 25).

The fourth concept is the *uneasy coalition*. The mutual understanding that the relationship between the conflict parties is not an easy one prevents high expectations and therefore disappointments, but can result in distrust. In this difficult relationship, participants have to be "sufficiently cohesive so that the members can interact productively [...], but not so cohesive that they lose credibility and political effectiveness in their own communities" (Kelman 2005a: 648).

Finally, the fifth concept is *mutual reassurance*, with the essential elements of responsiveness and reciprocity. It can best be achieved by acknowledgments by other parties. Mutual reassurance helps to move on in the workshop.

Furthermore, it is relevant to make aware of the de-escalatory language that parties learn to use and that parties evolve a joint picture of a preferable solution (Kelman 2005a: 649) that is helpful in improving the relationships and reaching an agreement (Chataway 2002: 177).

²⁶ See also chapter 4.4, where I explained what "working trust" means.

Reconciliation

Kelman also dealt with the concept of reconciliation later onwards. According to him, a sustainable peace necessitates mutual trust and mutual acceptance (Kelman 2008b: 16, 19). Both features are developed under the instruction of the facilitator.

While Kelman sees reconciliation as the product of successful conflict resolution, he does not see reconciliation only as the outcome but also as a process (Kelman 2008b: 17). In the process of negotiation or in a diplomatic stalemate, reconciliation is not a prerequisite for official negotiations to proceed or to successfully conclude. However, it is essential that reconciliatory moves are made. Subsequently, the mode of the negotiations should comply with the reconciliatory requirements (Kelman 2008b: 17).

Kelman assumed that reconciliation was a part of conflict resolution. Today, he separates reconciliation from conflict resolution, and also from *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, although he acknowledges the fact that they are connected to each other. He states that conflict resolution is intended to achieve a sustainable agreement, whereas he considers reconciliation as a process of learning of how the involved societies can coexist after the conflict. Therefore it is important to detach the “negation of the other as a central component of one’s own identity” (Kelman 2008b: 24) and to remove or decrease “negative elements in each group’s self-identity” (Kelman 2008b: 24-25). This means that the other needs to be acknowledged and it must be understood that the other is as legitimate as oneself. There is no need, though, to agree with everything what the other party says and claims. What is important is that the other is accepted as such and that the conflict parties see each other as partners in finding a mutually satisfying solution. Negative elements in identities like being victim or victimizer tend to be used as accusations and are thus not productive. If the manners with which these “roles” are dealt with are altered, the relationship can be improved. If successful, it is even possible to establish a transcendent identity (Kelman 2008b: 18, 24).

On the other side, conflict settlement, resolution and reconciliation can be seen as successive: the settlement with an agreement at first ideally followed by a resolution and then, maybe by reconciliation.

Moreover, Kelman draws an analogy between these three processes of peacemaking and those of social influence: The first process of social influence is *compliance* which describes the approach to and acceptance of the other in order to make them react in an advantageous way. The other’s party control or power is crucial in this process of social influence. If applied to international relations, conflict settlement may be understood to operate at the level

of interests. This is because individuals are asked to comply with rules to ensure individual and group interests.

The second process is called *identification*: By accepting the influence of the other, the favored relationship is maintained. In this case the attractiveness of the other induces the acceptance. This process centers on relationship. Individuals identify with shared roles. This matches conflict resolution, which operates at the level of relationship. Finally, the third is *internalization* in which the influence of the other is accepted due to its credibility in order to protect the actual value system. Identities are the key level. Individuals internalize values of identity. This is the level on which reconciliation operates (Kelman 2008b: 19-22). This is insofar interesting as new attitudes are or can be adapted because they match the own value system better. Kelman does not want to change identities completely. He is sure that the core of the identity must remain (Kelman 2008b: 25). Parties must also understand and trust the other party that they are no threat to their identity – this threat is part of the negation of the other and persists because of existential fear (Kelman 2008b: 26).

Finally, Kelman defined five conditions for reconciliation: mutual acknowledgement of the other's nationhood and humanity, a common moral basis for peace, confrontation with history, symbolic and material acknowledgement of responsibility for the harm done, and the establishment of patterns and institutional mechanisms of cooperation (Kelman 2008b: 27-30).

Success of the workshop

The success of the workshop, and thus the contribution of the workshop to the overall peace-making effort, is not limited to the transfer of the new attitudes, reformulated goals and new insights into the conflict or to the influence they might have on society and decision makers. Given that participants can have a glance on a possible future and the experience that they can influence the peace-making process is also considered as success (Kelman 2000: 276). Kelman underlines, over and over again, that the sense of possibility is important, so that the efforts come to turn out as "positive self-fulfilling prophecies" (Kelman cited in Wählich 2009: 4).

The term "self-fulfilling prophecies" needs explanation. Originally, this term was coined by Merton who described the situation when social predictions gain momentum. Actually, Merton derived it from the Thomas theorem, which states that "if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (Thomas theorem cited in Bierhoff 2000: 223). This

means that just by expecting things to happen, they turn real because of changed behavior that results in the expected situation (Jussim 1990 cited in Bierhoff 2000: 223).

If participants get to know persons of the conflicting party, if they understand that they can actually talk to each other and have something to talk about, if they get insights into the other side's perceptions, if participants realize changes that have happened, realize that changes are possible and they can influence or even precipitate the changes (f. ex. by a certain manner of communication); and if they realize the importance of symbolic actions and develop a greater understanding of actions that are significant for the other group, we can note successful outcomes (in the attitudes of the participants; Kelman 1991: 152). However, since participants prepare themselves mentally, a regression of behavior and communication style was often noted. Therefore, positive outcomes should be repeated and pointed to in order to bring it to their minds (Chataway 2002: 179).

4.5 Other efforts of IPS

IPS does not only comprise the above broadly described workshops, but also other efforts exist such as joint working groups. Kelman and Rouhana organized a Joint Working Group on Israeli-Palestinian Relations. Highly respected and influential in their community, the participants focused on the complicated issues in the Israel-Palestine conflict in 15 plenary meetings and some group meetings between 1994 and 1999. The goal was to make ideas compatible with the envisioned future of both conflict parties. The basic concept of joint thinking is analyzing the core of the conflict, exploring options and making them easy to accept by the political leaders and civil society. The needs approach is also applied like in the workshops. However, this method is completely different from the workshops in view of the fact that the purpose was to *produce* visible results. The participants developed and improved four concept papers from which three were made public. They were published in English, Hebrew and Arabic and distributed in large quantities (Kelman 2010b: 381). Except some personal changes, the commitment of the participants to find solutions over five years is impressing and in my eyes, testifies to the quality of the working atmosphere in this difficult task.

Starting in 2000, Kelman and Shibley Telhami organized another joint working group. The goal was to find new ways to increase the sense of possibility to meet negotiators of the other group and to rediscover the belief in a satisfactory solution to both parties as well as how to make the possible solution popular with peoples. A result of the joint working group,

gathering four times from 2004 to 2006, was that the framework of the future agreement is more relevant than the actual agreement itself. The produced common statement in 2006 was not published as it was decided that the public is not yet prepared to know about a possible final solution (Kelman 2010b: 382).

Other joint working group meetings took place in 2009 dealing with the challenge of how trust can be rebuilt between the conflicting parties and in 2010 discussing the involvement of the United States in order to proceed in the peace process (Kelman 2010b: 382-383).

There was another type of meeting that was organized by Kelman in 1989 at the wish of two participants: a public, unofficial symposium between high-level Israelis and PLO members (Chataway 2002: 176).

Joint public statements by participants of IPS workshops are usually difficult to achieve (Kelman 1999 cited in Chataway 2002: 174-175), but can be highly successful in drawing attention to new ideas (Chataway 2002: 180).

5. Interactive Problem Solving and its Development

This chapter is about scholars and practitioners dealing with Kelman's IPS approach. Each of the chosen scholars has had an impact on the practice of IPS. Finding weaknesses of the approach, they suggested and improved the *Interactive Problem Solving Approach*.

Generally, the micro objectives are the same as defined by Kelman. The change of mutual perception of the relationship between conflict groups is one of the micro goals. Goals can be psychological (forgiving), interpersonal (changes in attitudes and relationship), political (mutual learning of needs) and educational (learning useful skills for conflict resolution). The macro goals usually include the change of the dynamics of the conflict by the input of new ideas, but in many cases goals are not identified in the design of workshops (Rouhana 2000: 300).

5.1 Donna Hicks

Donna Hicks is a psychologist like Kelman and an associate at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, and teaches conflict resolution. She was taught by Kelman and deals intensively – and also quite critically - with Kelman's conflict solving approach trying to improve and extend the method.

Hicks and Weisberg, also a founding member of PICAR, have applied IPS during the civil war (1983-2009) between the separatist Hindu Tamil and the government in Sri Lanka with Harvard's program PICAR. They led three sets of workshops each lasting between three and four days. The first was conducted in 1993 with expatriate Sri Lankans (Tamils, Sinhalese and Muslims) living in the United States. The participants explained their needs. Even if there was positive feedback (like the proposal that this type of conflict resolution should also be done with high officials), there was also a hardening of positions and fears of Tamils of not being acknowledged by the majority population. Three years later, another meeting with Tamil and Sinhalese from Sri Lanka and the US focusing on joint action was organized. The result was the accord to ask for the support of international donors to solve the conflict. The third party, encouraged by participants, tried to organize a meeting of high-level persons – both attempts failed. One failed due to the wish of the Sri Lankan government to have an official mediator in negotiations, the other due to the intensified violence in war and the ban of travelling of NGO members to meet with the Tamil militarist organization, the leader on the side of Tamils in the civil war. In 1999, a meeting between leading Sinhalese clerics, scholars and political advisers of both parties followed. The opportunities and obstacles to an agreement were

discussed and analyzed and one subject was found to be substantial and that it must be introduced in top negotiations in the Sri Lankan parties People's Alliance and United National Party (Hicks/ Weisberg 2005: 154-156).

Through their experience in Sri Lanka, Hicks and Weisberg realized that IPS needs to address more than basic human needs. I summarize their suggestions in chapter 6.1.

Two components that are coherent to Kelman's concept are trust and the "no-fault" principle. Hicks and Weisberg (2005: 163) emphasize the need to prevent destructive behavior and to establish trust. Distrust can lead to a vicious cycle: distrust prevents fruitful negotiation and interactions, suspicion can result in dehumanizing the other conflict group and in unwillingness to find solutions; this may lead to an escalation of the conflict, which itself makes it more difficult to bring parties back to negotiation.

Victims telling the perpetrators about their suffering can induce the humanization of the enemy which again can lead the perpetrators to realize the dignity all peoples have and the need to end the conflict (Hicks/ Weisberg 2005: 165, 166). Therefore, humanization and trust between the parties are essential components of productive IPS workshops as well as of a successful process to find solutions.

5.2 Oliver Wolleh

Oliver Wolleh is working at the Berghof Conflict Research and has published several articles on IPS. Wolleh has the same understanding of IPS as Kelman. The Berghof Conflict Research developed this concept in a systemic direction and identified three core areas which have to be paid attention to in the future: the activities of IPS have to be conceptualized thoroughly, the long-term involvement of the most concerned participants and the extent to which there is a relation to powers that influence the conflict in a positive or negative way (Wils et al. 2006: 23).

The Berghof Conflict Research deals especially with systemic conflict transformation. Oliver Wolleh does research on systemic therapy and observed similarities between the concept of IPS and systemic therapy:

- Both see a conflict as a "system" that is maintained by communication and the behavior of the actors.
- Both recognize the role of the actors and their perceptions in making the conflict.
- Both see the environment and the conflict connected by mutual effect.
- Both concepts are based on the no-fault principle.

- Both attribute the ability to change to participants. This is why a learning process and self-reflection are part of both approaches.
- Both recognize that the third-party becomes a part of the “system” as soon as they work with participants (Wolfe 2011: 230).

5.3 Ronald J. Fisher

Ronald J. Fisher is another former student of Kelman and a professor of psychology at the University of Saskatchewan. He has published several books on social psychology and conflict resolution. Fisher named the method he applies *Third Party Consultation*. This pattern comprises the main characteristics of IPS. However, in his method, he also includes identity and especially the role of the third party. Fisher (2005: 1) sees his approach, as well as similar approaches, as part of the overall term of *Interactive Conflict Resolution*.

Fisher, Keashly and Grant (1993 cited in Chataway 2002: 167) tested mediation and “process consultation” and found that mediation only leads to an agreement on tangible issues while process consultation also induced better attitudes and behavior. Fisher and Keashly (1991) propose a *Contingency Model* of third-party intervention. The underlying rationale is that objective and subjective elements exist in a conflict and that both have to be dealt with in order to solve the conflict. Possible interventions are

- *Conciliation*: The third-party serves as an informal communication channel in order to find out core issues, de-escalate the situation and motivate direct negotiations.
- *Mediation*: The third-party facilitates to reach an agreement between conflict parties. The third party has a more active role as it can suggest and persuade conflict parties.
- *Power Mediation*: This kind of mediation permits the third party to use coercive measures such as threat or rewards.
- *Arbitration*: A binding judicial settlement is provided by a third-party.
- *Consultation*: Consultation is another term for problem-solving facilitated by a skilled third party.
- *Peacekeeping*: The third party dispatches military forces to sustain a cease-fire. Humanitarian activities may be included.

(Fisher/ Keashly 1991: 33).

Which interventions fit the conflict best at a certain point of time are chosen by the degree of escalation (Fisher/ Keashly 1991: 34-35).

5.4 Cynthia Chataway

Cynthia Chataway worked at York University as a professor of psychology. She researched on conflict resolution and rights of indigenous peoples. She did some work on Kelman and the relationship between Track One and Track Two diplomacy (see Chataway 1998, 2002 and 2004 and chapter 2.4 and 6.1). She passed away in June 2006 due to cancer (York University 05.12.2006). It would have been interesting to see more of her work as she concentrated on improving Kelman's *Interactive Problem Solving* approach.

Chataway indeed had some points of criticism on IPS workshops (see chapter 6.1). However, she agrees with the confidential frame of the workshops as this “may the only way to bring influential people together, and may be necessary to create working relationships, communicate accurate information, and generate ideas for moving toward formal negotiations” (Chataway 2002: 166) in an intense protracted conflict in a phase without official negotiations. Moreover, she attributes “an important contribution” (Chataway 2002: 167) of the IPS workshops to alter attitudes in a hostile relationship. The understanding of the other party as an inhomogeneous group gained in the workshop is also valuable since participants may even identify with some opinions of the other side and thus learn that there are members of the adversary group with whom they can talk (Chataway 2002: 171).

What is new in Chataway's IPS is that she wanted to include the third party as a channel to the macro level. In Kelman's approach, the whole success of the workshops depends on the participants, the change of their attitude, communication skills, empathy, and finally their actions to transfer the trained skills and ideas to decision-makers and high-level officials. Additionally to the participants, Chataway wants also the facilitators as agents of transfer. In a certain way this is a “back-to-the-roots approach” by giving scholars the possibility to research dynamics of an actual conflict. She sees high potential in including the third party because of their experience; they discern key issues, understand conflict behavior of the main conflict parties and factors or important points for a possible solution. The transfer of skills and knowledge can be enlarged by applying it, so that they master them and have the chance to find practicable suggestions (Chataway 2002: 168-173). Chataway (2002: 175) finds that articles²⁷ published by Kelman about Arafat played a large role in increasing the acceptance of the PLO as a negotiation partner by the Israelis, which is an example of how facilitators can contribute to the transfer of new attitudes and ideas.

Actions in the public by the facilitator make it easier for participants to evaluate when they can take actions as well (Chataway 2002: 179).

²⁷ Articles like the one of Kelman in 1982 “Talk with Arafat”.

Whereas participants are vulnerable in a way that they can be delegitimized in their society (because of perceived weakness against the adversary group or being too nice to them), facilitators must not endanger their credibility and never infringe the private setting. Even a perceived betrayal might be fatal. To ensure the best collaboration between participants and third party for the transfer, Chataway suggests (a) the continued assistance of the third party to participants to take notice of their attitude changes²⁸ and to disseminate the new understanding of the conflict and ideas, (b) the transfer by the participant is more likely to be successful in his or her society and the transfer by the facilitator is more likely to draw attention on an intersocietal and international level, and (c) as in (b) participants have access and are sensitive to influential players in their society while facilitators are on the larger scale (Chataway 2002: 177-178).

5.5 Herbert C. Kelman Institute for Interactive Conflict Transformation

Founded in 2005 as the Institute for Integrative Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding (IICP), the non-profit NGO situated in Vienna, Austria, was renamed in Herbert C. Kelman Institute for Interactive Conflict Transformation (HKI) in December 2011. Wilfried Graf and Gudrun Kramer founded it as a non-profit society with the aim of promoting peace through conflict prevention, peace mediation and historical reconciliation. The activities of HKI include assistance in peace mediation, integrative conflict intervention and consultation, development aid which is sensitive to conflicts, capacity building and training, participative research in action, conflict analysis and development of methods. HKI is further committed to civil conflict transformation and peace building both on the international as well as on the inter-societal level²⁹.

Between 2006 and 2010 the institute collaborated with the Institute for Sociology of Law and Criminology in Vienna. Since 2012, HKI collaborates with the Center for Peace Research and Peace Education of the Alpen Adria University of Klagenfurt.

HKI was active in conflict in Sri Lanka (2002-2010) and still is in Carinthia³⁰ (since 2006) and in the Middle East conflict (since 2005) by conducting dialogue projects. Capacity

²⁸ A behavioral change is difficult to perceive by the concerned person him- or herself (Petty/ Priester/ Wegener 1994 cited in Chataway 2002: 178-179). Therefore, it is important to bring it to his or her attention.

²⁹ See HKI website b.

³⁰ Carinthia is a region in Austria on the border to Slovenia (and Italy). The conflict in Carinthia is about place name and traffic signs: The Slovene-speaking minority wants to have them bilingual, in German and Slovenian, whereas large parts of the Austrian population is against the Slovenian labeling (see Fledner, Josef/ Sturm, Marjan (2007): *Kärnten neu denken. Zwei Kontrahenten im Dialog* [Think Carinthia in a new Way. Two Antagonists in a Dialogue]. Klagenfurt/ Celovec: Drava and Johannes Heyn Publisher and Peritsch, Wolfgang/ Graf, Wilfried/ Kramer, Gudrun (eds., 2012): *Kärnten liegt am Meer. Konfliktgeschichte/n über Trauma, Macht*

building and training are conducted in Central Asia, Columbia, Eastern European and Western Balkan countries. The HKI uses social psychological, sociological and cultural science approaches in its conflict analysis and applies integrative, dialogue-based methods³¹.

The work of the HKI concentrates on intragroup and intergroup dialogue. Participants are made aware of “political and social power relations (on a social structural level), ideological and cultural assumptions and attitudes (on a cultural meaning level) as well as of biographical life stories (on an individual level).”³²

The HKI followed Johan Galtung’s *Transcend* approach and adapted Kelman’s approach who is the honorary president of the HKI. IPS was developed and is continually improved by the HKI. Subsequently, it differs from the original although it is largely based on it. The approach of the HKI was supplemented by Morin’s idea of the non-predictability and non-controllability of the future. As a consequence, there is no particular solution that has to be reached. Instead the goal is to find a creative solution in an interactive process. The method is based on a meta framework. It recognizes pluralist approaches, integrates the systemic approach, active listening and understanding as well as an interactive search for solutions (Graf 2013a).

Graf and Kramer developed the method called *Nine Perspectives*. The following description of the *Nine Perspectives* is based on Schönbauer (2012: 155- 182) and material of the HKI. The *Nine Perspectives* consist of three phases with three perspectives each. The first phase deals with the present, the second for the past and the third for the future. However, it is not relevant to maintain the chronology but to deal with each perspective. The first perspective deals with the different players in the conflict and their subjective view of their experiences. Players are connected to their goals and their strategy/ attitude. The second perspective deals with the needs, feelings, wishes and fears of conflict parties. Again, perceptions, and this time also emotions, are connected to the goals questioning their influence on the definition and legitimation of the goals, thus relating goals to the underlying assumptions of a conflict party. In the following perspective, the third, the question is to find out which incompatibilities prevent a solution of the conflict. The focus is on the type of conflict (is it a conflict on resources, political or economic goals, cultural identity?) and to find the main contradiction of the parties. This is how the present is dealt with.

und Identität [Carinthia is located at the Seaside. History/ Histories of Conflict about Trauma, Power and Identity]. Klagenfurt: Drava/Heyn.

³¹ See HKI website c.

³² See HKI website a.

The second phase goes deeper into the conflict by analyzing the past. Consequently, perspective four is about needs and their historical development. It is essential to deal with the social behavior, which usually intends to achieve the goals, and with de-escalating and escalating events in the past to learn more about iterative conflict behavior and trauma of the past. It is helpful to think about alternative reactions to events and to analyze the basic human needs of the conflict parties. Are certain needs more important than others? What might happen if there is no change in the conflict (behavior)? These considerations help to understand schemes of the conflict. Perspective five clarifies power relations in the conflict by bringing out social conflict lines. This step is useful to understand general social and historical conflict lines and contradictions (like gender or racial issues, stigmatism, nationalism etc.) between the conflict parties, and if they are aware of them. Further central questions are: What kind of power relations do exist and is there an asymmetry? Which basic needs are refused or violated? Cultural meanings, symbols, collective assumptions, values and actions of the conflict parties are at the core of the sixth perspective. How are they related to the goals? Do they serve as legitimization of goals and actions? What ideology do the conflict parties have and which factors escalated the conflict? Furthermore, social myths and chosen traumas³³ are analyzed in order to find out which are legitimating and escalating the conflict. These cultural assumptions are analyzed and put into categories: are they conscious, unconscious or preconscious? The sixth perspective is the last one of the second phase.

The last three perspectives are oriented towards the future. Analyzing the relationship of mutual basic needs is in the center of perspective 7. Which assumptions must be revised so that others can satisfy their needs? The objective of this perspective is to transform assumptions and emotions. Hereby it is essential to distinguish between real basic needs and needs that are illegitimate and egoistic. Furthermore, social interests and cultural values must be separated, too. If two legitimate interests are opposed to each other, only the means of achieving them are illegitimate. After sorting out the illegitimate goals, they must be reformulated into legitimate ones. The contradiction of the new legitimate goals is the basis for perspective 8. In this perspective, an attempt is being made to combine and integrate own interests and goals with the basic needs of the other conflict party and to find possible solutions. Creative suggestions are needed. The 9th perspective deals with an action plan for transformed attitude. How can the conflict parties contribute to the implication of a solution? This should be noted in concrete steps and a time frame should be designed. However, this last perspective might be utopic.

³³ "Chosen traumas" is a term used by Volkan

The HKI works with this method and offers services such as interactive conflict intervention and counseling, peace mediation, conflict sensitive development cooperation and commits to training³⁴. The Institute wants to address deeper social-psychological, cultural and social-structural patterns which have a negative impact on the relationship between conflicting parties.

The HKI works with upcoming leaders, who will be influential in five to seven years in a long term view (Graf 2013b).

5.6 Other Scholars Dealing with the Problem-Solving Approach

I introduced scholar-practitioners in the previous subchapters. However, there are a few others that should be noted as well.

Several times I cited Nadim Rouhana. He is a Palestinian scholar researching and working in the field of conflict resolution. Rouhana and Kelman cooperated in various articles (such as 1994³⁵, 1999³⁶) and organized the Joint Working Group on Israeli-Palestinian Relations (1994–2000) together (Kelman 2012a). Like Kelman, he has many leading positions and memberships in different institutions.

Christopher Mitchell, whom I referred to, started his career in conflict analysis and conflict resolution under the leadership of John Burton in the 1960s. He continued his commitment and published several books which count to the fundamental work in conflict resolution.

Rothman studied international relations has much experience in conflict resolution. Though his approach is not on the Track Two level, it is interesting how he developed the problem-solving approach.

Rothman focused on the matter of identity in conflict resolution. He and Olson (2001) propose the ARIA method for conflicts with identity at its core. Nevertheless, they do not try to substitute other conflict resolution methods but to add the identity issue to them with the ARIA approach. They argue that ignoring the role of identity can do harm in conflicts. They also point to Burton, who found that conflicts in which identity plays an essential role, worsen if handled with power politics, and Kelman recognizing that polarization is induced between conflict parties if bargaining is held without involving identity issues (Rothman/ Olson 2001: 291). Rothman/ Olson suggest applying the ARIA model of conflict engagement since the

³⁴ See HKI website c.

³⁵ Kelman, Herbert C./ Rouhana, N.N. (1994): Promoting Joint Thinking in International Conflicts: An Israeli-Palestinian Continuing Workshop. In: *Journal of Social Issues*, 50/1, 157–178.

³⁶ Kelman, H.C./ Rouhana, N.N. (1999): Introduction to Joint Working Group on Israeli-Palestinian Relations. Document: General Principles for the final Israeli-Palestinian agreement. *The Middle East Journal*, 53(1), 170–175.

identity issue has become a central part of many conflicts in addition to IPS. The ARIA model is useful in overcoming barriers of identity in a conflict. In four phases, *Antagonism* and the *Resonance* of basic values and needs are made visible, which makes the *Invention* of creative ideas and their implementation (*Action*) possible (Rothman/ Olson 2001: 297). The ARIA method was developed under the assumption that other conflict solving mechanisms work only after identity issues were dealt with (Rothman/ Olson 2001: 298-299).

In her analysis of Burton's problem-solving workshop, Reimann (2004: 19) relates it to Jürgen Habermas' *Ideal Speech Situation* which I find very interesting. She points to the equality of all participants which is essential in both Burton's and Habermas' approaches. Another connection that Reimann made was to Horkheimer's understanding of knowledge "as a social force to generate social change" (Reimann 2004: 19).

In contrast to Kelman's workshops on intergroup level, Tamra d'Estree and Babbitt (1998) put personal experiences and feelings in the center of their workshop (Rouhana 2000: 299).


5.7 Conclusion

I introduced IPS of Kelman and its developments by other scholar-practitioners. It is clear that they have all the same core in their concepts. They are taking place on Track Two level, involve representatives of conflict parties and a neutral third-party, have an interactive, problem-solving approach, want to influence the official decision-making process by introducing inputs of the workshops, and by teaching communication skills and sensitivity to mutual needs.

The "first generation" model of problem-solving workshops in the 1960s and 1970s was gradually developed and improved. Most scholars adapted Kelman's IPS and added further elements. The core elements such as the informal and analytical character, the relatively unstructured agenda, the effort to increase mutual understanding and to try and find a mutually acceptable solution remained. Nowadays, we can find a variety of problem-solving approaches with divergent objectives and methods (Mitchell 2013).

Generally, problem-solving workshops have the same objectives as presented in figure 6.

Figure 6: Transfer of Micro Goals to the Macro Level (see Kelman 2010b; Chataway 2002; Rouhana 2000)



6. Criticism on *Interactive Problem Solving*

This chapter summarizes the various criticisms on the IPS approach and which ones can be affirmed or denied.

6.1 Criticism on *Interactive Problem Solving*

Repeated criticism is that IPS and other ICR efforts lack theories and methodologies for empirical evidence and do not have sufficient training in mechanisms of interventions (Rouhana 2000: 295). The Berghof Conflict Research also notices disadvantages and weaknesses in IPS. On one hand, there is the “difficulty to guarantee the transfer of the workshop’s results in real politics” (Wils et al. 2006: 23). On the other hand, it is not clear “how measures for dialogue that target the perceptions and the attitudes of individuals can contribute to the necessary transformation of structures and institutions” (Wils et al. 2006: 23, 27). Chataway (2004) describes the criticism which was made on the IPS approach in her article “*Assessing the Social Psychological Support for Kelman’s Interactive Problem Solving Workshops*”. A couple of the common criticisms is that IPS would be atheoretical, or that IPS is not evaluated enough on its effectiveness. Chataway’s rejection to these reproaches and will be introduced in the following chapter (Chataway 2004: 213).

One major problem is that the transfer depends on participants. Another problem concerning the transfer is that it only goes to the official policymaking level. Civil society (i.e. the public) is ignored as a player (Tan 2005 cited in Jones 2008: 7). If civil society is included, IPS will have a greater and a broader impact. Within the HKI, the involvement of civil society has been a feature of the peace process for some time, but civil society still needs to be much more involved apart from confidence-building measures.

Another problem that might come from the IPS workshops is that third parties tend to transfer the context of the workshop to real life conflict and the relationship between the conflict parties. If the workshop was successful in establishing trust between participants, it might be that third parties see this as if the conflict parties in general had built trust. Many start from the premise that if only the relationship between conflict groups can be improved or a common way of solving problems can be found (in contrast to each cultural way of solving problems), the whole conflict can be solved. This is an overestimate of the dynamics in the workshop – which is also true for the expected influence of participants given that only a handful persons participate (Rouhana 2000: 325). The main challenge, however, is the transfer of ideas and inputs to the policy-making level. In addition, an active civil society

should be built or strengthened. The role of groups in civil society supporting the peace process, or even stimulating it is large; they can take over main tasks in changing the society (Saunders 2000: 292).

Although Rouhana (2000: 304) admits that there are no empirical evidence of the obtained goals, and if transfers of the workshops worked insofar that changes in conflict behavior were perceived, he would favor the judgment of the practitioner and the participants as long as the goals are worthy of in the workshops. Nevertheless Rouhana stresses the necessity of a conflict theory that not only involves the goals of IPS but also specifies the interdependence of outcomes with regard to the conflict dynamics (Rouhana 2000: 304).

The Berghof Conflict Research evaluated positively and negatively the structure of IPS, i.e. the small group work. The possibility of creating sub systems could be an advantage; the disadvantage is that it is not suitable to macropolitical design (Wils et al. 2006: 23).

Furthermore, critics doubt that IPS can be applied to international conflicts. Hoffman, a critical conflict resolution theorist, refers to the fact that in reality there is hardly a line between so called “conflict solution” and “conflict settlement”. While in theory there is a significant difference between both terms and outcomes, it is difficult to identify the outcome in practice. This is especially true for protracted conflicts (Hoffman 2011: 155-156; Miall/ Ramsbotham/ Woodhouse 1999: 58). In addition, there are doubts that IPS is useful in “hot conflicts” and asymmetrical conflicts (Hoffman 2011: 156-157). On the other hand, IPS concentrates on non-material asymmetry, because this is essential for conflict resolution (Hoffman 2011: 157).

Moreover, critical theorists like Cox and Fetherston argue that the problem-solving approach is too short-sighted because of its inability to dismantle existing frameworks. By accepting the institutions within the given framework and then concentrating on how to solve the conflict by fitting the social order into this framework, an iteration of conflicts might occur. Critical theory presupposes that conflicts arise from existing conditions and the framework must therefore be analyzed and changed if necessary (Miall/ Ramsbotham/ Woodhouse 1999: 59).

Another criticism is that the human needs theory proposed by IPS ignores cultural differences when dealing with conflicts. The universality of basic human needs is questioned (Miall/ Ramsbotham/ Woodhouse 1999: 62). This leads us to the relabeling of basic human needs as human rights. Basic human needs are not seen only as needs anymore. They are encompassed by the human rights discussion. (Avruch/ Mitchell 2013). I agree that cultural

values and differences are important and therefore have to play a vital part in the conflict resolution process. I argue, however, that this is actually done in IPS. Even if there is no specific category on the agenda to discuss cultural issues, participants disclose their needs, fears and views of the conflict. If participants do this, consciously or not, they inherently include cultural values and interpretations which can be discussed afterwards. By dealing with the needs of participants (independent of the fact if they are seen as universal or not) and analyzing the root causes, they will try to solve any structural problems that may arise. Therefore, the argument of the critical theorists is not justified. What is more, Kelman does not assume that there is a hierarchy of needs, or that they are universal in all cases. Instead, he posits that some needs are shared across cultures (Kelman 1990 cited in Avruch/ Mitchell 2013).

On a very basic level, one may argue whether or not basic human needs are universal. It should also be added that Burton does not pay much attention to the role of culture as a cause of conflict nor to the value of culture in conflict resolution (Avruch/ Black 1990 cited in Hoffman 2011: 156). Many conflicts do not only consist of needs, but also interests. According to Marker (2003), methods restricted to the satisfaction of unmet needs cannot solve conflicts. Even if needs would be fulfilled, contradictory interests can preserve the conflict.

Aside from organizational difficulties such as the identification of conflict parties, the content of the conflict, the choice of legitimate representatives of relevant conflict parties and their interpreters (if needed), the definition of goals and the choice of the agenda for IPS is a hard task (Hoffman 2011: 157).

There is also a dilemma between letting participants discuss freely about an important content and sticking to the agenda in order to deal with all relevant issues (Hoffman 2011: 157). As a matter of fact, it is essential to understand that there will be no effects and positive changes just because conflict parties are put together in a neutral, peaceful setting. On the contrary, it can even worsen the situation if the agenda and rules in a workshop are not taken care of (Rouhana 2000: 319).

One danger also lies in the fact that participants of the workshop may be despised for their commitment. New perceptions or “friendly interpretation” of a hated enemy can be repulsed and the participant may be accused of treachery. This is a reason why Mitchell thought it wise to conduct such workshops in deep-rooted conflicts when the tension between the parties is

lower and when they are prepared to solve the conflict together (Mitchell 1973: 126; cf. Pruitt 2000: 253).

There is another point I want to make. It is underlined that third parties should be impartial. This is one of the rules in ICR. However, at first sight because Kelman is a Jewish American, it would seem he does not fit this characteristic to the context of Israeli-Palestinian IPS workshops. In the end, he does not want to just solve the conflict in favor of the Israelis but simply solve the conflict (Kelman 1999: 177-178). This may be because he is attached to the region because of his roots. However, Kelman proved his sincere interest in helping to solve the conflict. In earlier workshops, he worked together with Rouhana, a Palestinian, to ensure a balance in the third party. Furthermore, the principle of IPS is to find a mutually satisfying solution. As a result, I think we can say that Kelman fulfills the criteria of being an impartial party.

The learning of IPS is also a critical point. Kelman himself admitted that after the achievement of the Oslo agreement in the Israel-Palestine conflict, the skills learned in the workshop “were dramatically *unlearned*” (Kelman 2010b: 382) after the peace process failed in Camp David and the Second Intifada started (cf. Kelman 2007: 287). It is therefore not guaranteed that the positive impact of the workshop is sustained. It is a hard task to change attitudes (Chataway 2004: 215).

It is also often argued that the stereotypes are not necessarily overcome by people who do not fulfill said stereotypes. This is due to the fact that human beings usually accept exceptions because of the understanding of heterogeneous groups (Bierhoff 2000: 289, 299). What is possible, however, is to ask for opinions about stigmatization which can lead to correct stereotypes. Additionally, thinking about ideas of fairness and equality should promote the rejection of stereotypes (Bierhoff 2000: 297).

Furthermore, Hicks and Weisberg (2005: 157) identify three elements in the IPS approach that need further attention or improvement: First, the workshop is not designed to solve conflicts within a conflict party - think of the fact that it is rare that one conflict party is completely congruent –during the workshop or take into account the actions of regional players. Secondly, the IPS approach will not solve the problem of traumas that conflict parties may have suffered; neither does it directly address a feeling of injustice that results from feeling harmed. These security needs such as the need to have their suffering as well as

injuries recognized and the need of security with acknowledgement have to be kept in mind. Third, facilitators have to be aware of the danger that lies in solely dealing with unfulfilled needs. Participants may harden their positions if the focus is on needs but responsibility is not addressed in the workshop.

According to Hicks and Weisberg (2005: 158), progress is necessary on all three levels of conflicts: on intraparty, interparty and international level. Of course, the interparty level is at the core of IPS, the intraparty level is addressed indirectly in the pre-session of the workshop, but not necessarily sufficiently. Even so, the international level is completely left out (Hicks/ Weisberg 2005: 159).

As Hicks and Weisberg (2005: 159) are aware, the question is whether or not introducing the international level is worth to complicating the whole IPS process. Yet, it is possible that international actors that are trusted can influence the attitude of a conflict party positively, for example by participating in IPS as members of the third party (Hicks/ Weisberg 2005: 160-161). Concerning the intraparty level, they suggest longer pre-workshop sessions structured like the general IPS workshop, but instead of issuing the interparty conflict, dealing with intraparty conflict to have a consensus on the conflict within the party. This was the underlying idea of the third workshop in Sri Lanka which was successful. However, Hicks and Weisberg (2005: 160) also point to the danger that this national consensus could also lead to a hardening of position.

One condition for reconciliation and healing to take place is the acknowledgment of harm that has been done to victims (Hicks/ Weisberg 2005: 152). Tamra Pearson d'Estrée backs this assumption. She pointed to the fact that symbolic gestures or acknowledgements changed the mood and increased the creativity of the workshop many times (cf. Kelman 2005a: 648). As a result of a sincere acknowledgement of the suffering of Palestinians and taking some responsibility by an Israeli in a workshop a Palestinian accommodated a disputed issue (Chataway 2002: 171). Accepting responsibility may address the trauma of a conflict group in a way that helps to open the way to a constructive discussion and therefore taking up responsibility should be part of the discussion (Hicks/ Weisberg 2005: 155).

While it is common to talk about traumatic events in IPS, there is still no plan how it could make an important part of IPS (Hicks/ Weisberg 2005: 165). So, why have traumas not been addressed specifically in IPS until now?

Practitioners feared that it may harm the joint constructive discussion and finding a solution by ending up in blaming each other or that it would change the analytical approach into a psychological therapy (Hicks/ Weisberg 2005: 164).

Traumas are intractable. Volkan stressed that traumas that are not treated stay until they are treated, and that they are also given to coming generations (cf. Hicks/ Weisberg 2005: 163). Given the importance of treating traumas for a sustainable peace, it is advisable to integrate this issue in the workshop as well. Hicks and Weisberg propose integrating this dimension in the beginning of the workshop before dealing with the needs of the participants. It would help to introduce a human dimension to IPS and to get a more complex (and realistic) view of the experiences and perceptions of the conflicting parties (Hicks/ Weisberg 2005: 166). However, a new problem arises or intensifies if traumas are addressed and participants say that they are victims. The other conflict parties in most cases will not take responsibilities as every party sees itself as having a legitimate and justified right to attack and defend itself. Since every party thinks it is acting legitimately and cannot “delink’ [its] experiences of suffering from those of the other” (Hicks/ Weisberg 2005: 167), a stalemate of expecting the other side to move develops. It is therefore necessary that parties reflect themselves and their actions³⁷ to enable taking responsibility. According Hicks and Weisberg this is best done firstly in the separate pre-workshop meetings by asking what the party did to escalate the conflict and what the party can contribute to an end, and secondly after the needs analysis in the joint workshop (Hicks/ Weisberg 2005: 168-170).

6.2 Kelman’s Defensio

Kelman also dealt with negative criticism on IPS. In an article published in 2008, he addressed the issues raised by critics and reviewers: the effectiveness of IPS and the measurement of the effectiveness. He writes about the difficulties that arise from the evaluation of the changes in political attitude, which is one goal of IPS. He introduces two models of evaluation: the “links-in-the-chain” model and the experimental model. The latter cannot be easily applied to problem-solving approaches as creating a control group is very difficult. Due to the dual-purpose workshop, it is even more complicated to find out if and how the macro level was affected. Kelman also points to ethical and methodological barriers: He does not want to betray the confidential character of the workshop nor offend participants in their privacy. An encouraging atmosphere and fruitful conduction of the workshops are more important than research data. Nevertheless, it is possible to conduct simulations and controlled experiments (Kelman 2008a: 39-41, 51).

³⁷ It happens that participants of one conflict party might have to take responsibility for and acknowledge something that “only” some of their groups they are representing did in injustice. Furthermore, the asymmetry in most conflicts makes it impossible that both or all conflict parties have the same “amount” of responsibility (Hicks/ Weisberg 2005: 168-169).

The “links in the chain” evaluation method tests and indicates how participants change in the process of the workshop. Kelman (2008: 44-51) identified nine steps with accurate criteria of evaluation:

1. *Nature of participants*: Do participants have the capacity to learn and change and do they have connections to leaders of the decision-making process? This can be checked by the observation of the participant and referring to the list of all participants of previous workshops.
2. *Commitment to the Process*: Do participants commit to the process and participate actively? Discourse analysis can serve as a basis for this evaluation.
3. *Modification of interaction over time*: “The logic of workshops postulates an increase over time in analytical, non-adversarial discourse, and a commensurate decline in polemical, historical, and legalistic argumentation and in the emphasis on blame and defense.” (Kelman 2008b: 46). Discourse analysis can provide information on a change in this regard.
4. *Attitudinal change*: Whether a change of attitude has been achieved or not is the most direct proof for the micro level goal. This can be examined by conducting interviews with participants.
5. *Change of the Participant’s Political Behavior*: The experience of the workshop is expected to influence not only the participant’s behavior but also his behavior in politics. An analysis of his pronouncements and activities indicates whether the participant altered his policy.
6. *Transfer of Participants’ Political Behavior to Others*: Do participants transfer what they learned in the workshop through political actions, writing or organizing events? This step can also be verified in interviews and observation of their activities.
7. *Influence on the Political Atmosphere*: Inputs of the workshop are transferred to the political level and then disseminate to the public. The impact can be analyzed by data on public opinion, media and speeches of politicians.
8. *Influence on Decision-Makers*: If political or religious leaders adopt ideas gained in the workshop can be assessed by their behavior and their decisions.
9. *Nature of the Agreement*: If ideas of the workshop are adopted, they can be part of the agreement. In addition to the analysis of the agreement, the relationship between the parties has to be assessed as well.

It can be said that the choice of participants for Kelman’s Israel-Palestine workshop was quite good. They included parliamentarians, political leaders and activists (of parties, research

institutions as well as movements), academic advisers to politicians, people in the press, former officials and finally military officers. Some were later in positions of official representatives like negotiators, ambassadors, ministers or parliamentarians or were influential in the media (Kelman 2005b: 6). This is a positive development. It means that skills which were trained in the workshops such as non-violent communication and a changed perception of the adversary, sometimes the contact between former participants continued and a certain degree of trust was introduced directly to the official level.

IPS tries to involve (unofficial) representatives of key factions. Consequently, the intraparty dimension is not completely left out, even if it might not be enough to unite them (Hicks/ Weisberg 2005: 158).

In an interview conducted in 2009, Kelman stated that “[he] never had the illusion that these deep-rooted conflicts can be solved easily and permanently.” (Kelman cited in Wählich 2009: 4). This is why he learned to continue working patiently, accepting retrogressions but also devoting a lot of time to the whole process (Kelman cited in Wählich 2009: 4). According to him, conflict resolution approaches should be integrated into early education. This idea is not new, there have been experimentations but it must be developed more. Another aspect that could improve the conflict resolution approach is that members of conflict parties themselves could overtake the facilitative role of third parties (Kelman cited in Wählich 2009: 11).

Some critics state that the values of Track Two oppose professional diplomacy and that the impact of Track Two through insights is low (Chataway 1998: 281). However, dealing with psychological barriers is one aspect of ICR, which makes it valuable as relationships are built much easier. Nevertheless, a diplomat, as interviewed by Chataway (1998: 278), restricts the impact of ICR on Track One negotiations:

[The] psychological level is not inserted into the formal level, just individuals who have been affected by their [ICR’s] work. [ICR makes] contributions of how to visibly listen to the angst of the other side, and share and empathize with their pain even while not necessarily agreeing with their explanation of the cause of this pain. [This] is a very good way of establishing human relations.

Even while the participant’s ability to transfer his or her changed values or the ability to show empathy is limited, I argue that it is clear that such a participant can have a positive impact on official negotiations. If the participant is open and listens to the other’s needs and wishes, he can later calm his colleagues down who might not be able to feel empathy and be able to listen actively while thinking creatively (Acland cited in Chataway 1998: 282).

Druckman (cited in Stern/ Druckman 2000: 48) found that secrecy indeed increases the flexibility in negotiation. The assumption that trust building measures like IPS workshops lead the way to fruitful negotiations is advocated by several scholars (see Chataway 2002: 167). Congruent to this assumption, workshops are seen to improve the relationship of the participants, not only establish but increase the sense of possibility for progressive negotiations and also lead to mutual understanding and acknowledgement of views (Chataway 2002: 167).

The improved communication skills and the use of a certain language can contribute to de-escalation (Kelman 2006: 79; see also Chataway 2002: 175). However, Kelman (2006: 79) is fully aware that conflicts are not only built on misunderstandings but also misperceptions, both of which can be eliminated by better communication.

Concerning the small number of participants, one may criticize that only very few people may benefit by IPS. However, I have to point out that IPS works only under the condition of having a small group. Too many participants would prevent creative thinking and agreements since a group tends to be less cohesive if the group size is bigger. Furthermore, the group tends to have more “specialists”³⁸ by dividing labor rather than if few persons participate “fully” (Sawyer/ Guetzkow 2006: 149). Yet, Kelman (2006: 79) recognizes the fact that only a few participants learn to understand and change their attitude compared to whole communities or conflict groups.

As for the criticism in regards to the attempt at solving international or intergroup conflicts at an interpersonal level, it is simply not true. Some sensitivity training is applied, but this should only facilitate trust (not necessarily interpersonal trust, which is a welcome side-effect) which in turn should ensure an atmosphere of creative thinking (Kelman 2006: 79).

Even though immense energy and patience are needed to offer continued workshops, Kelman succeeded in doing it. Financing and time are usually a big problem also as time wears on and many scholar-practitioners have to eventually return to their job. They thus are available only for a limited time. Moreover, there are a lack of qualified people to conduct workshops. Another difficulty consists in the fact that different initiatives are not at all coordinated (Hoffman 2011: 158).

³⁸ If a group has many specialists, they will have different functions as experts, advisers, assistants, etc.

IPS is thought of being only a contribution to official negotiation by supplying new ideas and insights (Kelman 2006: 79). Kelman has no ambition to solve the conflict by IPS only. In addition, it is clear that if the official negotiations fail or if there is no dialogue, then it is not because IPS failed to improve the situation. Rather, it means that other efforts were not fruitful either (cf. Kelman 2000: 276; Kelman 2008a: 37).

6.3 Comparison to other Concepts of Dealing with Conflicts

Kelman described his activity as an “informal mediation by [a] scholar-practitioner” (Kelman 2002). But where are the limits between different conflict resolution approaches and where do they have similarities?

IPS can be demarcated from mediation in many regards: Mediation usually takes place on the track one level, thus on the official level and in international politics. Additionally, mediation ends when an agreement has been reached. IPS workshops tend to be open-ended. Another difference between IPS and mediation is that in IPS, third parties do not influence conflict parties directly while in traditional mediation, proposals are made by mediators (Kelman 2002: 168). The role of third parties in IPS is to facilitate between conflict parties and make their communication easier.

Other mechanisms of conflict resolution such as negotiation and bargaining or legal methods take place on Track One.

Chataway (2002: 183) sees an important differing characteristic in the privacy of the IPS setting. IPS is confidential and independent from official political wishes which makes it unique. Therefore, facilitators should pay attention not to be suspected of having relevant communication with the official level. Of course, this does not apply to the participant's contacts.

7. Evaluation of *Interactive Problem Solving*

The evaluation of conflict resolution efforts poses several problems and needs further development. The effectiveness, strength and weaknesses of the problem-solving approaches in general and of IPS specifically, are examined in the following subchapters.

The chapter will also contain proposals for improvements.

7.1 General Evaluation of Interactive Conflict Resolution Efforts

It is quite difficult to evaluate interventions that are aimed at easing, transforming or solving a conflict. It is particularly difficult to evaluate them from a social scientific perspective.

Causal inferences are tricky in the field of conflict resolution because

[...] although interventions always precede outcomes, they may not cause them. Events outside of the control of the intervening actors may lead a conflict to intensify despite a set of interventions that would otherwise have been effective or to diminish even though the deliberate interventions have had no effect. (Stern/ Druckman 2000: 51)

It is also difficult because evaluating means (a) comparing events with events that did not happen, which means it is hypothetical; (b) assessing the roles of exogenous events, as the outcomes may be affected by unforeseen happenings; (c) evaluating possible relationships of the optimal conditions to succeed the intervention; (d) accounting for indirect outcomes of interventions; (e) accounting for actor's perceptions, so there is the risk of misperception (in the case of misperception of actions, it would be wrong to determine an approach to have failed) and (f) the fact that there are multiple interventions, which makes it arduous to attribute an outcome to one cause (Stern/ Druckman 2000: 51-55).

The later the evaluation takes place, the more difficult it is to assess the effectiveness of an intervention. This applies also to problem-solving workshops (Stern/ Druckman 2000: 52-53). Accordingly, there is a time component, but there is also the problem of the many routes that might lead to the same result, or vice versa, single input, that may have several outcomes (Stern/ Druckman 2000: 54). This is relevant for one international conflict resolution effort, as well as for the total amount of contributions (Stern/ Druckman 2000: 55).

The problem-solving approach has been used in conflicts overall the world, in many different types of conflicts – although it never has been used to solve a conflict about the distribution of primarily material resources – and in conflicts of different degrees of violence (Hoffman 2011: 153-154). Even though this might seem that there is no “right moment” for applying the problem-solving method, there are moments when it is more beneficial than in others: This is

when official, direct contact between conflict parties is difficult (Hoffman 2011: 154; see also Kelman 2005a: 644). Violence ceased in all conflicts in which the problem-solving approach was used, but in most cases a solution that *solves* the conflict is remaining (Hoffman 2011: 154).

Variables in the evaluation of conflict resolution efforts are the different types of interventions in conflicts³⁹, the success or failure of these interventions, and other factors that may eventually influence the consequences of the interventions (Stern/ Druckman 2000: 42-43).

Stern and Druckman (2000) have described and defined the conceptual challenges of evaluating international resolution interventions. According to them, first of all, it is necessary to define what kind of interventions exists. However, this is difficult. A large majority of terms in international conflict resolution have a very broad meaning or sometimes the same term is used to describe different actions and notions that may look similar at first glance but vary immensely in implementation and aim (Stern/ Druckman 2000: 43).⁴⁰

In order to deal with the second variable, a definition of the term success is needed. There is not a common definition of on what grounds international resolution interventions can be seen as a success, though. Some consider “negative peace”, i.e. the absence of violence, as a success, while others only accept a “positive peace”, which in addition to the absence of violence is a sustainable peace including social justice, as a success (cf. Richmond 2002 cited in Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 9). Other analysts propose the measuring of specific improvements in the peace process in the direction of an agreement or lasting peace as the right instrument to define success. Still others include human well-being in the conflict region as a requirement to successful intervention. The point is that there are often divergent conclusions, as it depends on the point of view of the evaluator. Another problem is that some interventions have several objectives; sometimes the different goals even oppose each other (Stern/ Druckman 2000: 45). When evaluating conflict resolution efforts, one has to be clear about the targeted goals. The goal as defined by the mediator or practitioner has to be taken into account in order to do a proper and fair evaluation. That means that if the goal is to “end violence,” then achieving a truce constitutes a success even if the conflict is not solved, but merely put on ice. If the goal is to bring conflict parties together to negotiate, this effort is a success as soon as the parties are brought together, even if they do not reach an agreement.

³⁹ See chapter 2 for different types of interventions in conflicts.

⁴⁰ See also chapter 2.

Stern and Druckman (2000:46) propose to determine several criteria and to evaluate them separately.

The third component is to set reasonable expectations and find the right timing to evaluate conflict resolution efforts. It would be unjust to attribute “peace” to single interventions as some only claim to contribute to the resolution of the conflict or preventing violence. Also the timing for the evaluation of short-term and long-term results is crucial (Stern/ Druckman 2000: 46).

Finally, relevant characteristics and contingencies should be defined, so that the effects of the intervention are not confused with other (unplanned) events or conditions (Stern/ Druckman 2000: 47).

For the evaluation of the issues dealt with in ICR, Reimann makes valuable points by addressing the framework of problem-solving approaches: social order, actual situation, gender, universality and objectivity. How does the problem-solving approach deal with these issues? And if not, why are they left out? Does leaving aside these issues perpetuate a situation that constrains human needs and social equality? Regarding f. ex. the gender question, those participating on the international level of conflict management are still mainly men. This implies that scholar-practitioners have their mental image of values, which they use to assess their efforts (Reimann 2004: 16-18). However, these images and values often collide with real facts. Reimann argues that academic research accepted the gap between values and facts as inescapable. In contrast to this dichotomy, she proposes to introduce theories that do not split values and facts, feminist and critical theory as well as social constructivism (Reimann 2004: 19).

In addition, Fisher (2006: 127) pledges that there is a need to introduce a theory in ICR to outline the process and outcomes of ICR. This leads us to a method that was developed by Rothman⁴¹ to include goal setting and evaluation in the design of the project from the beginning. Not only are the inclusion of goals and evaluation special in this method, but also that it attributes possible changes to goals during an intervention. Rothman’s *Action Evaluation* draws attention to goals as a main target of evaluation. *Action Evaluation* (AE) conceives of the need to raise self-awareness, build a consensus regarding the goals, reflect actively and make choices to improve the outcome of conflict resolution activities. It aims at improving the effectiveness of evaluation and at making conflict resolution projects more

⁴¹ Rothman, Jay (1997): *Action Evaluation and Conflict Resolution Training. Theory, Method and Case Study*. In: *International Negotiation*, 2, 451-470.

valid and reliable. Furthermore, this method is comprehensive: it defines, monitors, redefines and assesses the outcome. Due to the fact that there are various actors in the conflict, the outcome is assessed differently. This can be prevented if the goals are fed into the design from the beginning. Stakeholders are asked to elaborate the questions:

- What are the goals?
- Why are these goals important – which values and beliefs underlie the wish for certain goals?
- How can these goals be obtained?

As a result, the participants of the project take a more active role (Ross 2001: 1, 3; Friedman/ Rothman 2002; Rothman 2003). They will be more committed to the process because they define the goals themselves (Ross 2001: 5). However, it must be noted that it is not an easy task to agree on goals (Ross 2001: 11, 13).

The process consists of three stages:

1. *Establishing a baseline*: This is done prior to a project. First, a consensus on the goals has to be reached within each group. The second step is to find goals based on the three questions what-why-how. This is done in a group of representatives of the different conflict groups. Finally, all participants of AE split up in action teams in order to formulate action plans.
2. *Formative Monitoring*: The strategies are implemented. Measures and goals are monitored and adjusted.
3. *Summative Evaluation*: The process is evaluated according to the determined goals and criteria for future steps are developed.

The why-question about core values in particular helps to initiate a healing process as common feelings and hopes are discovered (Rothman 2003).

The database with information about the participants of the project, the involved stakeholders, and the project level can be found on the Internet⁴². It is what makes the method unique in comparison to other *Action Research* methods. The analysis is published there, but face-to-face meetings take place for feedback as well. The advantage is that project participants can check for updates and observe the process. In addition, it offers them a platform to stay in contact and exchange information (Friedman/ Rothman 2002; Rothman 2003). Assisting participants with staying in contact with each other will help them to use

⁴² The website is www.aepro.org.

their newly-acquired knowledge and skills (Chataway 2004: 215) and will strengthen the network.

Approaches similar to AE are Patton's *Utilization-focused Evaluation*⁴³, Fetterman's *Empowerment Evaluation*⁴⁴, and the *Theory-driven Evaluation*⁴⁵ of Chen (Friedman/Rothman 2002).

I found several other evaluation tools that shall be introduced quickly.

Carol Weiss developed the theory-based evaluation method. It is based on theories of change. The advantages are the focus on the evaluation of key facts, that the results are related to other facts so that the understanding enlarges, and that it pushes the third party to define its goals more exactly (Lederach 2010:133-134).

Furthermore, Hocker and Wilmot suggest differentiating the goals as they change during the conflict transformation process. Prospective goals are the explicit goals before the process starts. On the other hand, we get a gradually clearer picture of goals as the process progresses: the transactive goals. Finally, justifying or explaining happenings after the event can be referred to as retrospective goals. All these three kinds of goals should be connected to content goals (goals needed and wanted) and relational goals (goals regarding the relationship). To summarize, this approach attempts to define clear goals, adapt them during the process, contextualize the methods, and evaluate with the persons related to the peace building effort (Hocker/ Wilmot cited in Lederach 2010: 134-135).

Regarding the qualities of a mediator, he should be impartial, credible, and have good facilitative skills. According to Lederach (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 10), a mediator, that has a certain degree of involvement in the conflict, may be more successful in helping communities to build trust.

To summarize, the evaluation of *Interactive Conflict Resolution* efforts is quite difficult. Besides other difficulties, it is difficult to make out clear causal relations.

ICR is especially useful when there is a stalemate in negotiations. Evaluation may be easier, if there is a clear definition of what kind of interventions are made, and what goals the stakeholders have – they should be reasonable.

⁴³ Patton, M. (1997): *Utilization-focused Evaluation*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

⁴⁴ Fetterman, D. (1994): *Empowerment Evaluation*. In: *Evaluation Practice*, 15/1, 1-15.

⁴⁵ Chen, H. (1990): *Theory-driven Evaluations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

7.2 Evaluation of *Interactive Problem Solving*

This subchapter gives an overview over problems to evaluate IPS and other problem-solving approaches.

Even if some positives outcomes in the micro-process were achieved, it is challenging to transfer these outcomes in the macro-process in order to get the full impact of IPS (Bercovitch/ Jackson 2009: 9). According to Rouhana (2000: 305), participants need to learn in the workshop and need to apply what they have learned after leaving the workshop to succeed in achieving the micro level goals.

Communication leads to joint efforts on conflict resolution due to the existence of mutual needs and interests that again will make participants aware of what can be gained from a better relationship (Saunders 2000: 257). But communicating with each other is not enough to change the perceptions. Parties often are too occupied with their own needs and constraints so that they do not see problems and different fractions within the other party. Therefore it is important that parties apperceive constraints of and differences within the other party (Kelman cited in Wählich 2009: 8; see also Chataway 2002: 175). The learning in IPS is essential for finding creative answers in the workshop and for achieving the micro level goals (Rouhana 2000: 305).

The interactive nature of the workshops intensifies the learning, but how can “learning” be evaluated? If participants leave the workshop with a more differentiated view of the other conflict party, with an understanding of the variety of positions within that conflict group and their needs, their limits in political acting and the recognition of these needs, which will humanize them, one can say that micro level goals are achieved (Rouhana 2000: 305-307). Another way to see the importance of Track Two approaches can be the degree of acceptance and support of regional governments and institutions in regard to these methods, suggests Jones (2008: 9).

It has been argued that it is more difficult to evaluate a project if a lot of time has passed since then (Stern/ Druckman 2000: 52-53). However, some outcomes manifest only later. This is also true for participants who sometimes need time after the workshop to realize its impact and accept changes.

The next question is if these achievements are transferred to the conflict party’s social and political environment. This is necessary to obtain the macro level goals, which is that the impact of the workshop participants change politics, social thinking in a way that the disputed

groups can assume or continue (peaceful) negotiations to settle the conflict. If the interactive context of the workshops produced creative new ideas for the solution they must be made available to official representatives and society.

In order to communicate new ideas and perceptions, it is vital that participants apply what they learned in the workshops. This can happen consciously or unconsciously (Rouhana 2000: 312). It is, thus, important to check if participants keep their new attitude and use their new knowledge. However, Rouhana (2000: 308) admits that there is a tendency not to borrow a new attitude and view in protracted conflicts and that “at least some unlearning [took place] outside the workshop and that some relearning is often needed” (Rouhana 2000: 308). Also, participants sometimes could not apply their learning of previous workshops to understand later happenings.

On the contrary, in a highly aggressive context, participants may not dare to make their new learning and ideas public. It is possible that they arrange and modify their impressions and ideas to the atmosphere in the society to make them easier to approve of (Rouhana 2000: 309-310).

As a consequence, the transfer from the micro level to the macro level faces many difficulties. Rouhana (2000: 303) notes that it belongs to the quality of a scholar-practitioner to be capable of showing how they intend to transfer the outcomes of the IPS workshops to the macro level. Therefore the scholar-practitioner should provide an IPS design that includes the transfer and the specific goals.

Finally, there are also participants, especially high-ranked ones, who use their gained knowledge and distribute their findings (Rouhana 2000: 309). What is more, academic research proved that changing the image and evidence for another image (new information) are essential for changing attitude (Ajzen/ Fishbein 1980 cited in Rouhana 2000: 312). IPS and other Track Two efforts therefore provide an important opportunity to initiate the change.

Furthermore, Sawyer and Guetzkow argue that as negotiation is going on and eventually an agreement reached, conflict parties may be more cooperative in future negotiations because they learn that it is possible to talk and even reach an agreement. Also, the fact that conflict parties organize and work together may have more positive outcomes than estimated. Not only do they cooperate to settle the conflict, it is also more than possible that they realize common values. Consequently, negotiations do have an impact on aims as well as on the approach to the conflict and thus also on the ending (Sawyer/ Guetzkow 2006: 146).

I think the same applies to ICR and other conflict solving efforts.

One of the biggest strength of ICR is that it can help to overcome impasses by presenting other perspectives and that it looks beyond the peace agreement and commits to change the crucial relationships to obtain solid and substantial peace (Stern/ Druckman 2000: 258).

Stern and Druckman hypothesize that ICR develops its strengths to the fullest, if (a) an issue cannot be addressed in official negotiations, (b) the core of the problem is the relationship, (c) there is no official exchange (Stern/ Druckman 2000: 258). Furthermore, ICR enables innovation (Sawyer and Guetzkow 2006: 141). Finding new ways and possibilities to solve the conflict are searched for. This means that there are other choices than the “traditional” approach where just one option of the many presented had to be chosen.

By checking if there is continued and/ or back-channeled communication after the workshop finishes or by analyzing if parties have understood the heterogeneity and actual needs of the other party, the effectiveness of IPS can be assessed. The goals need to be attainable. Another focal point is whether alumni of IPS workshops are in higher, more influential positions. This means that if they were chosen correctly and if they became a person with a broader view and understanding, and possibly the knowledge of how better to proceed in negotiations. Last, the transfer of the inputs (application at the decision-making level or at least a more moderate atmosphere, willingness to negotiate) must be checked.

A more detailed evaluation of the problem-solving workshops follows in the next subchapter.

7.2.1 Evaluation of Problem-Solving Workshops

In this subchapter an evaluation of IPS or ICR workshops is given.

Stern and Druckman (2000: 53) suggest that problem-solving workshops can be effective in the long-term when relationships are built upon trust between the politically influential participants that will later on take part in the formal negotiation process. In this case, indicators for the evaluation of the effectiveness of the workshops can be determined: improved and continued informal communication beyond the workshop, back-channel communication if workshop “alumni”⁴⁶ are involved in the official negotiation, or an increase in alumni as official negotiators just before an agreement or a step forward.

The outcomes of interactive problem-solving workshops need time to fully unfold, so practitioners would have the right to practitioners ask for a postponement of the evaluation of

⁴⁶ The term “alumni” is used for former participants of the IPS or ICR workshop.

their efforts. On the other hand, it would be legitimate to ask for a provisional evaluation (Stern and Druckman 2000: 58, 63).

When it comes to the evaluation, the strength of IPS workshops is also its weakness. It is difficult to connect the political process and political and social events after the workshop to participants' influence and attitude. Moreover, there are conceptual challenges to prove them empirically.

There are actually four methods on which IPS has been evaluated. The first method is experimental research. Second, a number of exploratory studies on attitude, behavior as well as simulations (which is the third method) were done to examine the learning and make use of what was learnt. Furthermore, collective judgment and evaluation has taken place as well (Chataway 2004: 213-214).

Experimental research methods could provide evidence for such connections, could analyze different interventional actions, also of the third-party. On the downside, these methods face obstacles: It is disputable if using participants in quest for evaluation methods is ethically justifiable. On the practical side, it is difficult to conduct control groups in this case. The condition for the control group such as choosing the participants randomly cannot be fulfilled. Other interventions intended to analyze the participant's change can influence them by this practice, e.g. by making them aware of critical points. Moreover, participants will not like to be subject to experimental research (Rouhana 2000: 320).

Rouhana (2000: 320) suggests conducting control groups by letting students simulate the conflict or field experiments. However, I think it is impossible to imitate a conflict in a way that it allows realistic results. Even if real conflicts of the students are used, it is doubtful that their conflict can be compared to intractable, deep-rooted conflicts. In addition, intergroup conflicts are more complicated than interpersonal conflicts. Apart from that, the transfer from the individuals in the simulation on their social group would need evaluation as well. If conducted properly, the simulation would also have an impact on the intergroup conflict in real society which I think is rather unlikely, as it is only an exercise.

In regard to the macro level goals, there are several conceptual difficulties. For example, the expected influence of workshops on the conflict dynamics is neither obvious, nor clear how they relate exactly to the impact of workshops. Apart from that it is difficult to assess to what extent ICR workshops contributed to an achievement in official diplomacy (Rouhana 2000: 310). Another problem that results from Interactive Conflict Resolution is that the goals of ICR often are idealistic, sometimes utopic as they deal with root causes, human needs and its approach is to have a mutual satisfactory solution. This is the best case scenario. However,

it is not surprising that in real politics, the ICR approach often is too comprehensive. A problem emerges if ICR goals are confused with official goals (Rouhana 2000: 310).

Even if the transfer is “mostly unmeasurable” (Rouhana 2000: 323), interviews as well as discourse analysis can indicate whether there learning took place in the workshop. Both participant and scholar-practitioners tend to overestimate the impact of the workshop (Rouhana 2000: 323-324).

There is another trap that arises from the difficulty to evaluate the effects of problem-solving workshops: Not evaluating the impacts properly or making unhelpful interventions are often excused, as people tend to think that little action is better than no action, which is not the case though (Rouhana 2000: 323).

However, Rouhana (2000: 321) presents how experimental studies can be done to analyze the effectiveness of different actions in workshop settings. For this method, interventions are designed for different activities of the workshops such as “(1) facilitating the presentation of the political needs of each party; (2) sensitivity training; (3) examination of issues of forgiveness; and (4) training in principled negotiation” (Rouhana 2000: 321). After thinking of possible goals like broader understanding of the conflict or changes in seeing the other party, the interventions can be evaluated in their effectiveness to achieve a special goal. This is an important contribution to how effectiveness of interventions of the third-party can be valuable.

As Rouhana (2000: 320) suggested, “soft measures” that are not, or only to a small extent, conspicuous, are useful in my opinion. These quasi-experimental research methods would include observing and recording the interaction of participants and their attitude. Participants’ writing and speeches may give hints about their learning. Interviews are also a useful tool, though only for interventions that the participant is conscious of (Rouhana 2000: 322).

The impartiality of the third party often is said to be essential to peace-inducing processes. However, Kelman, a Jew, was in a Zionist youth group in Vienna as well as in Antwerp. Later, he joined a Zionist group in the US. At the age of 18, he published his two first articles in Hebrew (Kelman 2010b: 363). Being primarily committed to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, his “impartiality” can be questioned due this background. However, Kelman never agreed on suppressing the Palestinians. Even as an 11-year old, he acknowledged the right of the Palestinians to live where they live, as the diary of his sister reveals (Kelman 2010b: 363).

In his first two articles, he dealt with the positive and negative sides of nationalism⁴⁷ and already argued that cooperation is an ultimate condition to ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Kelman 2010b: 363-364). Moreover, his Jewish origin may induce one to suspect Kelman of taking the Israeli side in the Middle East IPS workshops. Nonetheless, Kelman is trusted by both sides. The reasons for this lie in the fact that Kelman is indeed interested in solving the conflict, and thus, not neutral in the conflict, but he commits to this process by treating both parties equally to achieve a mutually satisfying outcome. Additionally, his third party team is ethnically balanced. Third party members have Jewish and Arab background (Kelman 2010b: 370).

Stern and Druckman (2000: 63) propose to evaluate whether certain long-term goals of ICR workshops are possible, e.g. whether improved communication skills and trust contribute to agreements or if “alumni” of the workshops end up in important positions by using several indicators like contact years after the workshop, if the participants got higher positions, and if the conflicting parties adjusted their policies towards each other.

For this diploma thesis, it was not possible to get first-hand information. The participants’ names are not available and this is why I cannot conduct an evaluation of IPS using these indicators myself. According to Kelman, however, several alumni of the Israel-Palestine workshop now occupy higher positions compared to the time when they participated in the workshop. This and the fact that several of them continue to commit themselves to the joint work over the years (Chataway 2004: 173, 213) is proof enough that some members from both parties are still involved in the peace process on the second track.

Though the transfer of new ideas was limited in the case of IPS in the Middle East before the official process started, there is evidence that participants published articles in newspapers – even in the other party’s newspaper; that participants kept in touch with the members of the adversary group participating in IPS workshops; some invited each other to conferences or talks in their institutes (Kelman et al. 1998 cited in Chataway 2002: 173). The transfer to the macro level can even be direct when former participants were promoted as it happened on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian participants in 1992 (Chataway 2002: 173). Furthermore, Kelman explains that mediation only fails in his eyes if there has been no progress of

⁴⁷ According to Kelman (2010b: 363), positive aspects of nationalism comprise the pride of persons and the strength out of nationalism to fight oppression. Negative aspects include a sense of superiority and scorn for other peoples.

participants or if the development of participants has been negative (Kelman cited in Wählisch 2009: 7). So

Saunders (2000: 290-292) summarizes the benefits of ICR after 30 years of practice: It is a systematic, widely applicable approach in which civilians can take action and take part in the peace process. The more official negotiation are constrained or even ceased, the more can ICR contribute to the improvement of the relationship and atmosphere that is favorable to negotiation. Furthermore, participants learn in the workshop and they can apply this new knowledge and skills. This might involve that they feel more responsible and can adjust their position in the conflict. The more they are exposed in the conflict, the more they will commit to make changes that lead to conflict resolution. Nevertheless, most of the theories of conflict do not include civil society in the resolution process. In ICR, individuals are able to intervene in the conflict. Moreover, Saunders expects governments to pledge themselves to a multi-level peace process, which would underline the support for ICR (cf. Saunders 2000: 264).

The workshops are an important contribution to conflict resolution because they offer a place for conflicting parties (Lederach 2010: 34). Direct and personal experiences are the best method to build a positive attitude towards something or somebody (Bierhoff 2000: 288).

Kelman admits that third parties can contribute to the transfer of new insights or ideas by publishing articles or making them public in another way. Actually, Kelman even thinks that his articles helped him to establish him as a credible expert on the conflict issues (Kelman 2010b: 377, 379).

Saunders (2000: 255) advocates continued process in ICR workshops, although he admits that even one-time meetings can have a positive effect.

7.3 Suggestions

Many scholars have urged that the unofficial Track Two methods be more measurable. It was often argued that further assessment was needed in this domain (Rouhana 2000: 310; Rothman 2003; Chataway 2004: 213). I see this as a crucial point. If it is easier to measure the effect of IPS, the positive outcomes that actually could be seen can be made “visible” to critics, to those who only believe in statistics and “hard facts”. Empathy and improved communication skills, for example, are rarely acknowledged as progress by “hard-fact-loving” politicians and scholars.

At the same time, it is helpful to define goals according to the stage of negotiations and the dynamics of the conflict. No conflict is linear so goals of the workshops must as well be adapted to the actual situation. Thus, goals in the pre-negotiation phase should be the working out of peaceful solutions, stabilization and support for the finding of an agreement in the negotiation phase, and finally support in the post-negotiation phase for the sustainment of the obtained peace (Rouhana 2000: 311).

As another means of assuring the transfer of new attitudes and ideas to the macro level, I suggest the implementation of round-table talks and conferences that participants of the workshop organize or take part in. This would give the influential participants a platform to transmit their gains from the workshops to others, not only to policy makers they have contact to. This idea came to me as I was reading Chataway's article stating that officials found these forms of Track Two diplomacy "particularly informative" (Chataway 1998: 274). Although these academic forms are public and not facilitated, thus not part of ICR according to Chataway, they are a welcomed space to discuss and think about new ideas and exchange information (1998: 274). I think by participating in such events that should be organized regularly, participants can share their new ideas and defend new approaches or solutions. Of course, they do not need to reveal that they were participating in IPS, but it would give them a chance to transfer thoughts. Additionally, Goertz and Regan (2006: 220) stated that

[t]he act of participating in a negotiating or mediating forum appears to convey at minimum an acknowledgement that tradeoffs are possible, maybe even desirable. The short-term attempts at finding the appropriate mix of tradeoffs may not bear fruit, but the more, and the more regularly, conflicting parties come to the table, the greater the likelihood that [...] medium-term results [can be seen].

This reinforces my idea of the usefulness of conducting extra events.

The debate on third parties was shaped by the discussion of the third party's partiality. However, Rouhana (2000: 327) recognizes an important aspect which remained unnoticed or at least unused until now. Third parties could take their part in ensuring the transfer of the learning in workshops by presenting the outcomes and ideas to the policy-makers of both parties or to other key persons. This implies that the participants do not fear that their involvement may become public and that participants can act and think creatively even if the ideas are to be advertised. Of course, this commitment requires the approval of the representatives of the conflicting parties who are/ were in the workshop. I can imagine that participants can agree at the end of the workshop which ideas can be given to others and

which stay in the discreet context of the workshop. The same applies to information which might be published to the public. To open the insights and ideas to public space, a channel to the Track Three level should be created as well. Civil society is completely ignored by IPS. However, the opinion of a majority of citizens is not ignored, at least in democratic states. Changing the attitude of ordinary citizens and convincing them to be open to or even active in the peace process will change the dynamics of the conflict. It can have a positive impact on the official negotiation. This also implies that civil society needs to be included in the whole process. I am aware of the fact that there usually are a lot of activities at a grass-roots level. Nevertheless, I think that inputs from Track Two levels can inspire and further stimulate activities on Track Three as well. Hoffman (2011: 158) claims that third-parties should neither compete in their efforts nor should different third-party involvement be deemed as incompatible to another A multi-level peace process, i.e. the integration and combination of various peace processes to reinforce themselves must be the target. As Calliess (1997: 245) who researched civil conflict management points out, it is important to have different approaches and efforts in dealing with conflicts. They can reinforce processes and ensure the achievement of a sustainable solution. This applies not only to civil conflict management which Calliess divides into research, early warning, training and intervention, but I think to all efforts in official and non-official diplomacy. What is essential is that all interventions are able to support the peace process.

As for Montville (cited in Rouhana 2000: 303), he demands the integration of more psychological analysis in IPS. I would say that he meant elements of reconciliation, which I also feel are missing in present IPS. Reconciling efforts should be part of the program. I suggest integrating more reconciliation efforts in IPS, especially in the first phase, when parties learn about the perspectives, needs and fears of the other conflict group. The approach of participants may be supported by reconciliatory components. I believe that such tools help to consolidate the perception of the other conflict group. The difficulty lies in the extent to which reconciliation should play a role. As mentioned earlier, it also poses problems if the participants are too sympathetic with the other group and it can offend players in their own communities. However, I think it is useful to teach the participants more tools of reconciliation so that they can apply them at a time when the conflict is not so intense.

According to Lederach (2010: 28-29) four concepts must be considered: (1) truth (acknowledgment of loss and pain); (2) mercy (acceptance of the past and moving forward

toward the future); (3) justice (rights and social restructuring); and (4) peace (well-being and security).

Fisher (2013) suggests further adjusting the focus of problem-solving workshops. On one hand, he suggests that it may be better to deal with factions within a conflict group before bringing conflict parties together. On the other hand, in case of a conflict that involves two states, such as the instance of Turkey and Greece in Cyprus, he suggests including those states in the workshop.

Subsequently, the workshop deals with a central issue of the conflict. This new idea has already been applied in the conflict of Darfur/ Sudan and in Cyprus. Although this shift of focus can also enrich the results of a workshop, there are also dangers. Working on intragroup factions might give the impression that the third party is no longer impartial and stop a party from participating in the intergroup workshop. The other possible negative impact is that the primary conflict parties might feel overlooked and fear a “solution” will be created without their input (Fisher 2013).

It was proven that skills learned in the workshop can be forgotten or obscured (Kelman 2007: 287; Rouhana 2000: 308). Therefore, I also strongly argue that the continuation of the contacts between participants of Track Two Diplomacy as well as the contact between the facilitator and the participants must be maintained to increase the effect of this approach. A deeper relationship and larger mutual trust may help what has been learned is applied. Saunders (2000: 260) recommends holding several workshops over a few months – with an open end – to give participants the time to let the relationship to each other change. Change needs time.

I agree with this. Better relationships can be developed if a workshop takes place several times. As learning and a certain degree of trust usually already exist, it is easier to proceed. Furthermore, Doob and Foltz (1974: 248) found that participants needed time after the workshops to realize and fully understand their experiences.

Women have been largely excluded in IPS. I assume that it is difficult to involve them but female participants usually enrich the process due to their honesty and willingness to share their feelings and experiences (Chataway 2004: 217).

It is essential to understand that a goal of IPS is to address needs and interests of all conflict parties. The strategy is to work together on a *common* problem of all parties involved in the

conflict. The process is more a “search and discovery process” (Hopmann 2006: 196), where “the cognitive chance is more important than a change of negotiating positions” (Hopmann 2006: 196).

According to Reimann (2004) more has to be done to define detailed frameworks for the problem-solving approach. What is with social order, the status quo, gender, universality and objectivity?

To make IPS and more generally ICR efforts more measurable, the workshops can be designed together with the participants, as it is done in *Action Evaluation*.

8. Conclusion

The field of Peace Studies is large and complex. Terms are mixed up or different terms are used to describe the same phenomenon. This is why I introduced and attempted to classify various approaches on dealing with conflicts. Conflicts are about incompatibilities but it is not always the case that the issues are incompatible.

Peace-making includes all actions taken to reach an agreement between the disputing parties peacefully, such as negotiation, mediation, reconciliation or arbitration. Peace building, on the other hand, refers to actions that analyze root causes and lead to a sustainable peace after the conflict is officially over.

I provided an overview of the actions that can be taken in a conflict. I first described conflict management, which – as its name makes clear – manages or regulates the destructive consequences of conflicts. In general, the aim is to control the situation and to prevent an escalation of the conflict. Other scholars refer to this concept as “conflict settlement”.

While many tools and interventions can be classified with more than one concept, I place mediation and peacekeeping within conflict management. Mediation, one of the most-used methods of third party intervention, is a method where a third party assists conflict parties to come to an agreement peacefully. The third party does not impose an agreement on the conflict parties. Facilitation, good offices, ombudsmen and arbitration can be also counted under mediation.

Peacekeeping is a totally different type of intervention. Peacekeeping forces of the UN are sent to the conflict region after violence has been ended by a ceasefire and if conflict parties have requested it. Peacekeeping is impartial and means the non-use of violence, the prevention of a violent outbreak, and is complementary to the peace process.

Conflict resolution includes all actions on the official, governmental level, as well as on the unofficial level that are aimed at containing violence and solving the conflict through sustainable solutions that are a win-win situation for conflict parties. Conflict is understood as being solvable and in order to do that, root causes are analyzed to prevent a reemergence of the conflict. There are top-down and bottom-up interventions in conflict resolution. Negotiation is the most frequently used method. Negotiation and bargaining are designed for conflict parties without a third party assisting the process. Traditionally, a win-lose situation was common. In newer approaches, cooperative behavior is sought for problem solving. This enables a win-win situation.

The main legal methods of solving conflicts are adjudication (or judicial settlement, which means a judicial body or tribunal takes responsibility for finding a solution) and arbitration

(which leaves more decisions to conflict parties, but the solution found by chosen judges is binding).

Reconciliation is a relatively new and important approach. Since most recent conflicts are between groups that live in the same environment, the need for a fundamental reconciliation has increased. The aim is to establish sound relationships between former conflict parties to enable them to live peacefully together. Reconciliatory measures try to heal traumas, ask for the acknowledgement for the harm caused and sincere regrets.

Conflict transformation is based on the assumption that a change in the dynamics of the conflict also changes the relationships of the parties. Structural inequality is seen as a root cause to conflict and therefore, the goal is to change the structures that underlie the conflict. This concept also enables the inclusion of civil society in the peace building process.

Conflict prevention is a huge concept. It is designed to prevent a conflict beforehand and refers also to prevention of an acute escalation of a conflict. Early warning serves the detection of signs of an escalation in order to intervene accurately to prevent it from escalating. Preventive measures have the flaw to be underestimated and not sufficiently recognized as they are costly and cannot prove their effectiveness (if it was successful, there is no violent outbreak as a proof that the prediction was correct).

Confidence-building measures support the peace consolidation by decreasing uncertainty and clarifying misperceptions of the other conflict group and establishing trust between them.

Fact-finding missions and preventive diplomacy with sanctions, embargoes and the deployment of military also belong to conflict prevention.

Interactive Conflict Resolution sums up activities on the unofficial level to deal with the conflict in a constructive way. They involve small group meetings as well as civil society activities. Many of them deal not (only) with how to solve the conflict, but commit to eliminate false perceptions between the conflict groups and find common grounds, needs and wishes. What makes this approach so unique is its focus on human relationships. Social-psychological findings enrich ICR. Dealing with psychological factors is a key element of ICR. The humanization of the enemy, understanding mutual needs and dealing with traumas are essential to proceed in the approach of the conflict parties.

I demonstrated the distinction of official negotiation and activities of the governments or local leaderships as Track One activities, the unofficial activities with influential persons as Track Two, and grassroots activities of the civil society as Track Three. I join the opinion of Calliess that there is a need to co-ordinate activities and make them more effective.

Furthermore, a multi-level peace process should be established and recognized by the official leaders.

After this classification of dealing with conflicts, I only add one further analysis: Wallensteen identified three approaches in conflict analysis: a focus on conflict dynamics, needs, and rational interests.

A focus was put on *Interactive Conflict Resolution* using Kelman's social-psychological approach *Interactive Problem Solving*. Kelman's *Interactive Problem Solving* is one type of Track Two efforts to contribute to official negotiations. It seeks to gather influential persons of the conflicting communities in a confidential setting to get to know the other party's perspectives and views on the conflict, their needs, fears and wishes, and realize common needs. Mutual acknowledgement makes it possible to work together with the help of a third party that leads the participants in an analytic discussion. The third party has a facilitative role. Parties are treated as equals in the workshop and are asked to participate in a cooperative manner. Although the main goal is often said to be to find creative solutions, this is only one of the overall objectives. Changing mutual perceptions, establishing working trust and finally feeding the ideas and perceptions into the decision-making level are as important as the search for a mutually satisfactory solution. IPS mainly works with the frame of a workshop, but joint working groups were organized as well. In a single case an unofficial symposium was organized by Kelman and Telhami, and in another case results from a working group were made public. Participants should be aware that an official agreement cannot be expected as a direct outcome of the workshop even if the whole work is done to contribute at its best to a peaceful and mutually acceptable solution. Kelman recognizes the advantage of applying different methods at multiple levels. He further tries to influence the macro level by changing perceptions on the micro level.

Prior to negotiations, IPS can help to create an atmosphere favorable to dialogue, establishing a sense of possibility and enough trust in the willingness of the conflict parties to negotiate. Workshops conducted parallel to official negotiations can enrich them by raising issues and preserving the feeling of possibility. IPS workshops can continue after an official agreement has been reached in order to support the implementation of agreed issues. Rouhana (2000: 313-318) has found further functions of ICR efforts that are that (a) they can be a laboratory to test ideas; (b) participants can contribute to make the insights and ideas of ICR acceptable in a society; (c) ICR helps to create a feeling of possibility which is not to be underestimated in a psychological way; (d) more supporters can be gained through changing

the dynamics; (e) the understanding of the other party is broadened; (f) a network is created and the familiarity with other participants is deepened; and (g) ideas of the workshop can be useful when power relations change.

Kelman sees reconciliation as a process of learning of how the involved societies can coexist after the conflict, which means that one's identity should not need that of the other conflict party to define itself. Negative images need to be eliminated.

However, it was found that there exist various approaches within ICR as well. Burton, Doob and Azar who were the pioneers of the problem-solving approach were introduced. Burton based the resolution of conflicts on the question of whether basic human needs are fulfilled or not, and the belief that communication is one of the conflict causes. The improvement of communication skills and the analysis of the relationship are targets in the confidential workshop, which also aimed at influencing the decision-making level. The interaction of the participants is on the non-fault principle, as it is in Kelman's IPS. Doob applied the t-group method for his workshop and Azar pointed to the role of states and the overall context in protracted social conflicts where participation and access to political, social and economic structures are especially important.

Doob, Burton and Kelman's methods share several characteristics. However, Ronald Fisher is maybe the most famous scholar in *Interactive Conflict Resolution* with his approach *Third Party Consultation*.

Hicks and Weisberg gave important inputs to improve IPS. Chataway also contributed also in a fruitful way to IPS by suggesting broadening the transfer channel to the macro level by letting third parties taking a role in this, too.

The Berghof Conflict Research, with Wils, Wolleh and Reimann, developed the concept in a systemic direction. The Herbert C. Kelman Institute for Interactive Conflict Transformation is another important German-speaking institute dealing with Kelman's approach. The NGO developed it into a concept named *Nine Perspectives*.

Rouhana and Mitchell, both working on ICR, published important articles with interesting ideas. Rothman proposes *Action Evaluation* to ensure a better evaluation of ICR and the ARIA method to conflicts based on identity. New discussion tries to move Interactive Conflict Resolution in the direction of Interactive Conflict Transformation where the interactive framework and the interaction are seen as central.

Differences between various conflict solving approaches were clarified as much as possible as there are many overlapping parts.

I highlighted the disadvantages and challenges that ICR and IPS in particular face.

The biggest challenges of IPS and ICR in a more general way lie in the transfer of the learning in the workshops (how to guarantee a transfer?) and in the degree of a contribution of IPS (what is related to and changed by IPS?). IPS and ICR lack a theory with empirical evidence. Criticism is also raised on the basic human needs approach which is questioned because of its claim to be universal and on the fact that the given framework (political, economic and social structures) is not questioned at all. Other problems are that the learning of the workshop often is unlearned outside of the workshops and that a change in the view of the other conflict party is not necessarily related to a change of stereotypes. The lack of reconciliatory measures in IPS is another claim of critics.

Several methods of evaluation show how evaluation of ICR and IPS can be done more easily. IPS is successful in the sense that it contributed to the resumption of official talks and the end of violence in all conflicts in which the problem-solving approach was used, but in most cases a solution that *solves* the conflict remains elusive, according to Hoffman. Success is always defined differently. In Kelman's approach, the goal is a transfer of ideas and a sense of possibility. I think there has been evidence for this to be called a success. Moreover, many of the participants commit to a years-long participation in workshops which is also very promising. In addition, some of the alumni of Kelman's Israel-Palestine workshop are now in higher positions than before, which is encouraging.

I suggested making IPS more measurable, integrating more reconciliatory measures, opening the process to civil society as well, creating channels of influence (Wallensteen 2007: 38) such as political access and establishing a multi-level approach to peace. I am aware of the difficulties of including women in ICR projects. However, it is important to keep in mind and try to encourage the participation of women.

Furthermore, round-table talks and conferences can contribute to spreading ideas to civil society – which I see as an important actor that should be included in the process – as well as a more active role of the third party as another channel for transfer. Participants should stay in contact.

Avruch and Mitchell (2013) attest that the problem-solving approach will maintain its importance in the search for conflict resolution and are confident that it will gain more recognition in the future. They predict that informal activities to support the official process will diversify more in the future.

This thesis is a state-of-the-art of *Interactive Conflict Resolution* and *Interactive Problem Solving* in particular. I think the thesis contributed to a state-of-the-art as I also used German-speaking scholars and integrated their views on ICR and IPS.

I compared different concepts dealing with conflict and presented IPS and the developments by other scholars. Criticism about IPS was listed and evaluated. Furthermore, I suggested how IPS can be further improved. Even if IPS faces challenges, I think it is a promising and valuable approach to conflict resolution.

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Abstract (English)

The field of Peace and Conflict Studies is large and complex. Often, terms used to describe the same phenomenon are confused or multiple terms are used to describe the same phenomenon. This is why I introduced and attempted to classify various approaches onto dealing with conflicts. The focus is put on Herbert C. Kelman's approach *Interactive Problem Solving (IPS)*, a method that belongs to *Interactive Conflict Resolution*. Since there is relatively little literature available about (not from) Kelman (who is known as one of the founders of conflict resolution in the United States) in Vienna, this thesis provides a state-of-the-art in *Interactive Problem Solving* – with findings of German-speaking scholars in addition to US-based scholars. The method used is based on literature research.

The aim of the thesis is to illustrate the differences between the conflict solving approaches and point out the challenges that IPS faces.

In the first part, I differentiate peace-making from peace building measures. I introduce conflict management with mediation and peacekeeping. Then, I continue with conflict resolution methods such as negotiation, bargaining, legal methods of solving conflicts and reconciliation. Next, the concepts of conflict transformation and conflict prevention are presented. The latter includes measures from early warning to confidence-building, to fact-finding and preventive diplomacy. I further elaborate the concept of *Interactive Conflict Resolution* with a special focus on the social-psychological approach. The Multi-track approach is also illustrated.

The main part of the thesis consists of the introduction of Kelman and the pioneers of the problem-solving approach and their approaches: John Burton, Leonard Doob and Edward Azar. All of them influenced Kelman largely.

IPS, a Track Two effort, is mainly conducted in the form of a confidential workshop with the help of a facilitating third party. IPS is non-binding, based on the non-fault's principle and explores human needs, perceptions and fears. The workshop aims at changing mutual perceptions and finding a mutually satisfactory, creative solution. The overall objectives are feeding inputs in the decision-making process and thus contributing to the peace process.

An overview of scholars dealing with Kelman's approach is then presented. This is followed by several criticisms on IPS and ICR in the third part of the thesis. The analysis indicates that most criticism is found on the vague transfer of ideas gained in the workshop to the macro level and on the lack of empirically reliable data.

Finally, ICR and IPS are evaluated. Additional evaluation techniques are presented to answer the criticism on the lack of good evaluations. Furthermore, suggestions to improve and develop IPS are made.

The thesis concludes that *Interactive Conflict Resolution* and *Interactive Problem Solving* are valuable and promising. Although challenges still exist, they contribute in an important way to the peace process.

Abstract (German)

In der Friedens- und Konfliktforschung wurden viele verschiedene Ansätze zur Lösung und/oder Bearbeitung von Konflikten entwickelt. Das Fachgebiet ist groß und komplex. Oftmals werden Bezeichnungen vertauscht oder es gibt mehrere, die das gleiche Phänomen beschreiben. Aus diesem Grund wird im ersten Teil der Diplomarbeit eine ausführlichere Einordnung von verschiedenen Konfliktlösungsmechanismen vorgestellt. Im Mittelpunkt der Diplomarbeit steht der Konfliktlösungsansatz „*Interactive Problem Solving*“ (IPS) von Herbert C. Kelman als ein Beispiel für Interaktive Konfliktlösung. Da bisher nur relativ wenig Literatur *über* Kelman (der als einer der Gründer der Konfliktlösung in den USA gilt) in Wien erhältlich ist, ist ein *state of the art* von *Interactive Problem Solving* das Ziel der Diplomarbeit. Dies soll durch Literaturrecherche mit Einbindung von deutschsprachigen Wissenschaftlern geschehen.

Das Ziel dieser Arbeit liegt darin, Unterschiede zwischen Konfliktlösungsansätzen aufzuzeigen, IPS zu analysieren und seine Schwachpunkte darzustellen.

Da Kelman zu den weniger bekannten Friedensforschern in der deutschsprachigen Friedensforschung gehört und seine Methode im Mainstream zwar Erwähnung findet, aber sich nicht sehr durchgesetzt hat, soll hiermit diese Lücke gefüllt werden.

Im ersten Teil der Arbeit werden friedensschaffende Maßnahmen wie *Peacemaking* und *Peacebuilding* differenziert. Des Weiteren werden Methoden des Konfliktmanagements wie Mediation und *Peacekeeping* vorgestellt. Es folgen die Konfliktlösungsmethoden wie Verhandlungen, *Bargaining*, juristische Verfahren zur Konfliktlösung sowie das Versöhnungsprinzip. Anschließend werden die Konzepte Konflikttransformation und Konfliktprävention vorgestellt. Letzteres beinhaltet Maßnahmen von Frühwarnung über *Confidencebuilding*, *Fact-finding* zu Präventiver Diplomatie. Dann setze ich mich mit dem Konzept der Interaktiven Konfliktlösung mit einem besonderen Fokus auf den sozialpsychologischen Zugang auseinander. Ebenso wird der Multi-Track-Ansatz vorgestellt. Der Hauptteil der Arbeit besteht aus der Vorstellung von Herbert C. Kelman und den anderen Pionieren des Problemlösungsansatz sowie ihren unterschiedlichen Zugangsweisen: John Burton, Leonard Doob und Edward Azar. Sie alle beeinflussten Kelman erheblich.

IPS wird hauptsächlich als von der Öffentlichkeit abgeschlossener Workshop auf der inoffiziellen *Track Two*-Ebene durchgeführt. Eine außenstehende Partei fördert den Austausch der Konfliktparteien. IPS ist unverbindlich, beruht auf dem Nichtansuldigungsprinzip und untersucht Bedürfnisse, Wahrnehmungen und Ängste der Konfliktgruppen. Das Ziel des IPS Workshops liegt darin, die gegenseitigen (feindlichen)

Wahrnehmungen zu verändern und eine für alle Konfliktparteien zufriedenstellende, kreative Lösung zu finden. Außerdem sollen die Inputs aus den Workshops auf den politischen Entscheidungsprozess einwirken und somit den Friedensprozess unterstützen.

Es folgt eine Übersicht über Forscher, die mit Kelmans Ansatz arbeiten. Daraufhin werden im dritten Teil der Arbeit kritische Stimmen zu IPS und zur Interaktiven Konfliktlösung analysiert. Die Hauptkritik besteht an der unsicheren Übertragung von Ideen und Lösungsmöglichkeiten aus dem Workshop auf das Makrolevel der Politik und an dem Fehlen von verlässlichen empirischen Daten zu IPS und zur Interaktiven Konfliktlösung.

Schließlich werden IPS und die Interaktive Konfliktlösung evaluiert. Entsprechend der Kritik, dass gute Evaluierungen fehlen, werden zusätzliche Evaluationsmethoden vorgestellt. Darüber hinaus werden Vorschläge zur Verbesserung und Weiterentwicklung von IPS aufgezeigt.

Die Diplomarbeit schließt mit dem Ergebnis, dass Interaktive Konfliktlösung und *Interactive Problem Solving* wertvolle Methoden sind, die Ideen zu Lösungsmöglichkeiten in Konflikten beisteuern. Obwohl noch Schwachpunkte bestehen, tragen sie auf wichtige Weise zum Friedensprozess bei.

Curriculum Vitae

Personal Information

Name: **Winkler, Aiko Elena**
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Education

10/2006 – present **International Development Studies at University of Vienna, Vienna/Austria**
Major subject: International Development
Minor subjects: Political Sciences, French, Roman Linguistics, Peace and Conflict Studies

10/2006 – 07/2010 **Bachelor of Arts in Japanese Studies at University of Vienna, Vienna/Austria**

10/2008 – 7/2009: Student Exchange Year at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Tokyo/ Japan

08/2005 – 07/2006 **One-year Stay as Au Pair in Versailles/France**

06/2005 **Abitur at Gymnasium Blaubeuren, Blaubeuren/Germany**

03/2002 – 02/2003: Student Exchange with AFS/ Attending to Niigata Prefectural Niigata High School, Niigata/Japan

Fall 1999: 1-Week Student Exchange Program, Nantes/France

Activities

10/2010 – 02/2011 **Tutor and Assistant for Japanese Studies, University of Vienna, Vienna/ Austria**

07/2010 **Participation in the 27th International Summer Academy at the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution**
Subject: “War in Offside Position – ‘Forgotten Wars’ between Shades and Light or the Duel in the Dawn on Economy, Media and Politics”

04/2009 – 06/2009 **Internship at the Headquarters of AFS Japan, Tokyo/Japan**