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“Taking Sides?
A Comparison of Theorizing and Modelling
Public Opinion on European Integration.”

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1. Introduction

The European Union (henceforth EU) has changed dramatically and perhaps early advocates of European unification like Jean Monnet, Paul-Henri Spaak or Robert Schumann would hardly recognize the European integration process today. Since the Paris treaty from 1952, which founded the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and later on the Treaty of Rome which laid the foundations for the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), the European unification project increased not only with regard to the number of participating countries but also with respect to its focus on the range of competences. Some European citizens perceive the competences of the EU as too excessive, often fuelled by articles and editorials of the yellow press. Such 'stories' range from rather recent news, like the accusation that the EU wants to forbid the use of the word 'bankrupt' because it is too harmful to those in debt [1], to one of the rather classical unfounded allegations that the EU even regulates the curvature of cucumbers, which effectively has been abolished in 2009 by the European Commission. Sometimes the discussions about new EU regulations are rather emotional such as the case of the dropped regulation on unmarked olive oil jugs on restaurant tables[2], which was intended to foster consumer protection, or the ban of energy-wasting light bulbs which should not only protect the environment but also save energy[3]. Those recurring public debates and the respective reactions of political actors like the European Commission or the European Parliament are first indications that public concerns and public opinion matters in EU politics.

Regardless of how powerful, all-encompassing and overarching some European citizens perceive the power of Brussels, the EU only has sovereignty over those policies that the respective member states have transferred to the supranational level (see Art.2 TEU ff.). This process is impressive because, since the Treaty of Rome, the member states shifted more and more competencies to the supranational level. From the beginning of the European integration process with the creation of the ECSC, unifying Europe implied shifting competencies from the national to the supranational level, albeit with different ends. The initial impetus for pooling sovereignty regarding the two

[1] http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/politics/5447677/EU-wants-to-ban-the-word-bankrupt.html

[2] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/10076201/EU-drops-olive-oil-jug-ban-after-public-outcry.html

[3] http://ec.europa.eu/energy/lumen/professional/legislation/index_en.htm

resources coal and steel was to prevent war between European countries. However, the ECSC has been the result of considerable power struggles about the future role of Germany and control over the important resources coal and steal. Especially France tried to have a say about the coal industry in the Ruhr territory, and even opted for a permanent separation of the Ruhr from Germany. On the American and British side, the idea of a full recovery of the German state and economy especially in the context of the beginning cold war dominated. After the adoption of the Truman doctrine and the beginning containment policy, the USA initiated the so-called Marshall plan or European Recovery Program (ERP) which offered resources to countries of Western Europe. At least since the inclusion of Germany within the ERP, France recognized that control of the resources coal and steal may only be exerted via a western European customs union (cf. Milward 1992, 1984).

There have been a lot of different plans regarding how to shape the future Europe in the aftermath of the second World War and it has not been clear which of these ideas will succeed. The basic vision prevailed, if the European countries cooperated on trade they are less likely to go to war with each other. The formation of ECSC thus reflects to some extent the further development of the European integration process because there has never been a full-blown plan of how to design European unification. Rather, it has often been the case that specific developments consisted of ad-hoc solutions to pressing problems like the opting-out of the UK from the third stage of the economic and monetary union (EMU) and thus not introducing the Euro and taking part in the Eurozone. Another example might be the institutional struggle after the adoption of the Treaty of Rome, i.e. the interplay between European Commission, European Council of Ministers, the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament. Not only did those institutions have to figure out how to interact to form a set of interdependent institutions but also how to transform the Treaty of Rome into workable policies (Fligstein/Stone Sweet 2001). The missing *finalité* of the European integration process is not necessarily a weakness but could also be rather a strength of the European unification process although this aspect has not always been clear. As Rittberger et. al. 2014 argue, extreme Eurofederalists still see flexible or differentiated integration[4] as a threat to the European unification project. However, as the same authors present, flexible or differentiated integration did happen only since the 1990s[5] with the prominent example of Denmark and the UK opting out of the third

[4]There have been numerous names and conceptualization for a not unified or homogeneous European integration process (eg. Stubb 1996).
[5]With the exception of the UK rebate negotiated in 1984 at the Fontainebleau European Council.

stage of EMU or the internal and external differentiated integration with regard to the Schengen border regime (cf. Rittberger et al. 2014; Leuffen et al. 2012). Thus the European integration process changed according to changing demands and an altering context. The changing character of the EU is also reflected in many other scholarly discussions, e.g. the shift from a 'permissive consensus' to a 'constraining dissensus' in public opinion research (Hooghe/Marks 2009; Down/Wilson 2008; Hooghe/Marks 2005; Lindberg/Scheingold 1970; Franklin et al. 1994a,b), which implies that the development from the European Communities to the EU and the accompanying transfer of more and more national sovereignty to the supranational level ('deepening') and an increasing number of member states ('widening'), today constituting the EU28, also brought an ever higher relevance and significance of the EU for the day-to-day politics of European citizens (cf. Pollack 2000; Börzel 2005). A changing momentum of the European integration process is also reflected in the concepts of 'negative' and 'positive integration' (Scharpf 1996). The former signifies the removal of trade barriers to create a common market and the latter refers to the explicit regulation of specific aspects of life, e.g. social policy. As Fritz Scharpf argues, negative integration has been pushed forward relatively easy "behind the back of political processes by the Commission and the Court" (Scharpf 1996, 19), i.e. negative integration is predominantly integration through law (e.g. Scharpf 2009). The decision making process looks totally different in the case of positive integration, in this case the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament (EP) have to act together and, furthermore, the national representatives can be held accountable in their national political systems. Thus said, positive integration requires also political legitimation and as described above, in times of a 'constraining dissensus' citizens no longer accept every political decision from the supranational level and question the voting behaviour of their political representatives in the respective European institutions (cf. Diez Medrano 2012; Kaina/Karolewski 2013). That leads to a third strand of discussion - the politicization of the European integration process (de Wilde 2007; Papadopoulos/Magnette 2010; de Wilde 2011, 2012a,b), whereas Hooghe and Marks 2009 identify the politicization of European integration as the main process which led from a 'permissive consensus' to a 'constraining dissensus'. Analytically, the process of politicization manifests itself along the concepts polity, politics, and policy, i.e. political institutions as well as the decision-making process and even single issues can be politicized (de Wilde 2011, 2012a,b). For example, the ideological composition of the European Commission became more and more important (Egeberg 2006a,b; Wille 2012), the bureaucracy of the Commission became more politicized (Bauer/Ege 2012) as well as negotiations in the Council of Ministers (Häge 2013; Häge/Naurin 2013; Häge 2011), and in the

case of issues e.g. how to reallocate the EU bugdet (de Wilde 2012b). However, the term 'politicization' is used not only with regard to institutions, processes and issues but also to more abstract concepts like 'European identity' (Checkel/Katzenstein 2009; Hooghe/Marks 2008c) or 'European integration' as such (Hooghe/Marks 2009).

What these 'storylines' of scholarly discussion – 'negative' versus 'positive' integration, the shift from a 'permissive consensus' to a 'constraining dissensus', differentiated or flexible integration, and the phenomena of 'politicization' – have in common is the illustration that the character of the EU has changed considerably and that these changes influence the public opinion formation of the European citizenry towards the European integration project. EU issues and EU politics increased in their importance for the daily live of European citizens and simultaneously they perceive that they have little say on the decision-making processes at the supranational level (White 2010b,a). As already mentioned above, the EU does not have the ultimate power over every tiny political decision and there are still policies which will be entirely decided at the national level, but however diverse or flexible European integration is, each of the EU member states (MS) has shifted national sovereignty to the supranational level. Politicization implies that the 'permissive consensus', with the tacit trust of citizens in their national political, elites vanished and European integration by stealth ended. Consequently, the politicization of the European unification process implies that there are divergent opinions with regard to EU institutions, processes, and issues both between national political elites and European citizens (de Wilde 2011). Political decisions of the EU have increased in salience and European citizens are concerned with those decisions and sometimes heavily in opposition. Further, cases of corruption at the supranational level are only the icing on the cake, like the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999 or the allegation of abuse of annual funds for travel and personal assistants by some members of the European parliament (MEP). It is to some extent ironical, that the EU tried to give itself a constitution in order to face increased politicization and the ever-increasing complexity of decision-making at the supranational level with a basic and common set and that this Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) faced massive opposition in many MS. This process began in 2001 with the Laeken declaration and continued with the appointment of the European Convention led by former French president Valèry Giscard d'Estaing. In 2004 a 'Draft treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe' has been put to vote by the member states either within their respective parliaments or by conducting a national referenda after the representatives of the then 25 member states have signed the draft constitution. Before the first referenda were held in Spain, France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, the

draft constitution passed a vote in the European parliament. However, although the referenda in Spain and Luxembourg approved the constitutional treaty, the process came to a halt after the rejection in France and the Netherlands.

What the failure of the European Constitution and the critique on the Lisbon treaty and also the referenda on the Maastricht treaty reflect is that the 'winter of discontent' of public opinion has not yet transformed into a 'glorious summer' and that public opinion does matter for the course of European integration. The importance of public opinion may be seen as a slowly evolving process like the transformation of the 'permissive consensus' into a 'constraining dissensus' but public opinion also matters punctually as dozens of referenda have shown (Hobolt et al. 2008; Hobolt 2009). The importance of public opinion does not stop at 'institutionalized' possibilities for European citizens to raise their voice, like EP elections or domestic referendas about European issues, but also has the power to stop certain proposals like the ban of unmarked olive oil jugs mentioned above or the fate of the regulation of plant reproductive material, stopped by the EP (Commission 2013) after a massive public outcry. Thus, support of a citizenry for a political system is of crucial importance. The people, as the sovereign of a political community have to support the political system, otherwise it will loose its legitimacy and be abolished. Scholars have been theorizing political support, its necessities, and the consequences if absent for decades (see e.g. Lipset 1959, 1960; Almond/Verba 1963; Easton 1965b; Almond 1989). It is of crucial importance to know how a specific citizenry thinks about its political system. The analysis of public opinion should not stop with a descriptive presentation. Although it is interesting how attitudes towards a political system look and how they are distributed, of more importance is what factors determine those attitudes. These factors can be individual characteristics like age, education, sex, etc., also called demographic factors. However, determinants of public opinion are also variables like the performance of the economy, the individual cost-benefit analysis, regional and/or national identities or attitudes like xenophobia. If we are able to explain what factors influence public opinion, we can, for example, ask after the differing characteristics of a group supporting a political system compared to a group opposing this political system. Furthermore, we can also answer questions about the weight of different factors, i.e. how important are specific variables in determining public opinion. Such analysis of public attitudes are not only important from a political science point of view, but also for political actors in political systems. The relationship between a citizenry and the respective political system is in constant flux. Therefore, as argued by David Easton 1965b, if the norms, values, and principles of a citizenry deviate from the political system, the political system may be

in danger of breaking down. Regarding the conception of Easton, in the first stage, individuals will withdraw their cognitive support and if the gap between the individual and the political system increases the individual will even withdraw its affective support. As said above, to know the determinants of public opinion towards a political system helps political decision-makers to adapt to the respective characteristics of a political system according to the needs and demands of its citizenry.

There exists a vast literature on research about the predictors of individual attitudes towards the European unification project. The range of 'suspicious' determinants ranges from post-material values (Inglehart 1970a,b), cognitive mobilisation (Janssen 1991; Gabel 1998b,d), education (Hakhverdian et al. 2013), support for governing parties (Franklin et al. 1994c; Ray 2003a), satisfaction with democracy (Anderson 1998), political elites (Ray 2003b; Steenbergen et al. 2007) or the media (de Vreese 2007; Maier/Rittberger 2008). However, two theoretical strands remain the most prominent: economic utilitarian approaches and cultural/identity-related explanations. Both theoretical approaches come in a large variety of flavours. Many of the early analyses of public opinion towards European integration focussed on economic utilitarian considerations which assumes that individual attitudes towards a political system or political actors are determined by the economic costs and benefits an individual acquires from the specific political system or decisions made by political actors. Economic utilitarian explanations differ according to whom is the receiver of economic costs or benefits, the individual (egocentric economic voting) or a specific group of individuals or a community (sociotropic economic voting), if the individual takes into account the past (sanctioning model) or appraises performances to come (selection model), if an explanation uses objective or subjective measurements for economic performance. Accordingly, political scientists used many different operationalisations of economic performance like occupation, income, education (Gabel 1995, 1998a,b; Anderson/Reichert 1996), inflation, unemployment, GDP (Eichenberg/Dalton 1993), EU trade balance, Intra-EU-trade (Gabel 1998b; Anderson/Reichert 1996) and many others (see table 1: Models of Euroscepticism in chapter 2).

Scholars concentrating on cultural factors assume that, although economic factors are crucial, identity-related influences are of much more importance. Different studies explained variation in public support with influences like, exclusive national identity (Hooghe/Marks 2005; Christin/Trechsel 2002), intensity and type of identity and level of national attachment (Carey 2002), perceived group threat and/or symbolic threat (McLaren 2002, 2006, 2007, for a similar argument see Llamazares/Gramacho 2007;

Weßels 2007; Diez Medrano 2003 and de Vries/Van Kersbergen 2007) and fear of immigration (de Vreese/Boomgarden 2005). Summarizing the empirical results of these studies suggests that research on public opinion toward European integration witnessed a 'cultural turn'. Whereas the early studies employing identity/cultural factors were interested in the relative explanatory power between identity- and economic-related approaches (e.g. McLaren 2002; Hooghe/Marks 2005; Brinegar/Jolly 2005), later studies concentrated on the interplay of these theoretical concepts. However, the results of these studies are contradictory. Whereas de Vreese et. al. (2008) conclude that 'hard' economic factors are mediated through 'soft' identity-related influences, Garry and Tilley (2009) argue that the causal mechanism works in the other direction, i.e. identity/cultural factors are mediated through economic influences.

There exists only a handful of studies analysing a larger time frame, which also focus only on economic considerations and not taking into account individual feelings of cultural or national attachments (Eichenberg/Dalton 1993, 2007; Gabel 1995). Studies comparing both major theoretical strands focussed only on specific time points and not longer periods (McLaren 2006; Hooghe/Marks 2005). Thus, the first research gap this thesis will close is the missing comparison of these two rivalling theories in a longer time frame, specifically between 1976 and 2005. The limits of this period are due to data restrictions, because data for household income is only available between 1976 and 2002 and data for national attachment is only available from 1992 to 2005. The comparison of economic utilitarian considerations and cultural/identity-related approaches asks after the relative explanatory power[6] of each approach and if the relative explanatory power of one of these rivalling theories increases or decreases over time. If the respective relative explanatory power of these two theoretical approaches changes over time it is also important to ask if these changes follow a specific pattern as often argued (McLaren 2002, 2006, 2007; Hooghe/Marks 2005; Brinegar/Jolly 2005), namely that especially after the Treaty of Maastricht cultural/identity-related theories are 'better' in explaining individual attitudes towards European integration compared to economic utilitarian approaches. This addresses a second research gap, a missing comprehensive test if a 'cultural turn' in public opinion research has really happened?

Further, individuals form their attitudes towards a political system like the EU not in isolation but according to a specific 'state' of this political system. As already mentioned above, the EU witnessed considerable changes since the creation of the ECSC

[6] I will be more detailed as to why I speak of *relative* explanatory power in chapter 2.

with the often highlighted milestone of the Maastricht treaty. There have been several attempts to categorize the European integration process into different time periods although they have only rarely also been included in the analysis (Çíftçí 2005b; Fligstein 2008; Sundlisæter Skinner 2012; Gillingham 2003). The most often employed categorization is the differentiation into a pre- and post-Maastricht period (Hooghe/Marks 2009; Down/Wilson 2008; Hooghe/Marks 2005; Lindberg/Scheingold 1970; Franklin et al. 1994a,b) with the change from a 'permissive consensus' to a 'constraining dissensus' and the evolution of a 'post-Maastricht blues' (Eichenberg/Dalton 2007) with regard to public opinion towards the European unification project. This thesis will go a step further and combine the literature on changing characteristics of the European integration process (Çíftçí 2005b; Fligstein 2008; Sundlisæter Skinner 2012; Gillingham 2003) and studies of public opinion towards the European unification project. I will differentiate between four different periods of European integration (I will go into more detail and present the considerations leading to this categorization in chapter 2.4), namely:

- The period of non-politicization (until the Single European Act (SEA) 1986)
- The period of 'new hope' (from 1986 until the Maasticht treaty 1992)
- The period of the 'post-Maastricht blues (from 1992 until the 'physical' introduction of the Euro 2002)
- The period of an 'ever closer union' (from 2002 to 2005)

In the period of non-politicization, the European integration process has been largely seen as a peace-fostering project, although it became immediately a pawn in the hands of the powerful in the Cold war (Milward 1984, 1992; Gillingham 2003), and the unification process was largely an elite-driven project. The major political events in this period were the collapse of the Bretton-Woods-system, the two oil crises and the resulting bad economic environment. The period of 'new hope' was driven by the 'relance' of the European integration process due to Jacques Delor's fostering of the internal market project. The main important event in that period was the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent fall of the Berlin wall leading to the reunification of Germany. The period of the 'post-Maastricht blues' was characterized by a growing politicization and increased salience of the European integration process. Further, all countries joining the EU in the enlargement rounds of 2004 and 2007 passed on their applications. The change from the EU-15 to a EU-27 raised the question of how to reform

the decision-making processes and voting procedures in order to remain able to make decisions. Finally, the period of an 'ever closer union' witnessed especially two developments, the 'physical' introduction of the common currency (at least in the Eurozone) and the Eastern enlargement in 2004 (Maier/Rittberger 2008).

These four periods build the background for the comparison of the relative explanatory power of economic voting theory and approaches using individual feelings of cultural and national attachments. The main reason for this way of proceeding is the assumption that individuals form their attitudes not in isolation but with reference to specific characteristics of the European integration process. The research design of this thesis is a theory-testing one, i.e. it focusses on the comparison of two rivalling theories and their respective relative explanatory power and the changes thereof in the time frame 1976 - 2005. There are obviously obstacles to such a research project which I will address fully in the respective chapters.

Based on the above argumentation, the first research question reads as follows:

R1: How does the relative explanatory power of economic voting and cultural/identity-related theories change over time, conditional on the changing 'nature' of the European integration process?

Essentially R1 covers a two-dimensional analytical problem, firstly, it asks after the relationship between the respective relative explanatory power of these two rivalling theories, and secondly, do different characteristics of the European integration process really matter for the relationship of the relative explanatory power of economic utilitarian considerations and individual cultural or national attachments. Closely connected to the main research question is the second one. Since recent studies indicate the presence of a 'cultural turn' in explaining individual attitudes toward European integration as mentioned above, it asks:

R2: Do cultural/identity-related approaches yield a substantively higher impact on explaining attitudes towards the European unification process compared to economic voting, which indicates an assumed 'cultural turn'?

Finally, as discussed above, recent studies claim that either economic voting theory or cultural/identity-related approaches are only indirect indicators. Because the findings in this literature are contradictory I formulate my third research question as:

R3: Are the causal effects of cultural and economic factors independent of each other or is the explanatory power of one approach conditional on the other, i.e. the impact of individual cultural and national attachments depends on economic factors or vice versa?

The structure of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 presents and compares different theoretical approaches employed in previous research of public opinion towards the European integration process. I will focus mainly on the two 'traditional' theoretical approaches, the effects of European integration on economic costs and benefits for European citizens and the consequences of individual cultural or national attachments. Although, economic-voting theory and cultural/identity-approaches are the most important for the following analysis, I will also present other theoretical concepts explaining attitudes towards the European unification project. In the analytical part, I will mainly compare economic-voting and cultural/identity approaches while controlling for other explanatory factors. I will also present how theorizing public opinion towards the EU evolved and how the scholarly discussion led to the so-called 'cultural turn' in studying attitudes towards the EU.

The next section deals with the differentiation of the historical development of the European unification process into four different periods – the period of non-politicization, the period of 'new hope', the period of 'post-Maastricht blues', and the period of an ever closer union – marked by the SEA in 1986, the Maastricht treaty in 1992, and the physical introduction of the Euro. There I will identify and discuss in length the internal as well as external events and developments, which characterize these four periods and justify on empirical grounds the differentiation thereof. Additionally, I will present the hypotheses, which guide the following analysis, thereby presenting the assumed relationship between cultural/identity approaches and egocentric economic-voting theory in the respective period. After discussing part of the existing literature, especially those studies which explicitly assume different periods of the historical development of the European integration process, I will, in the following paragraphs, present the segmentation of the European unification project useful for the following analysis. Deviating in defining different periods from the studies presented above suggests not that I do not agree with the differentiations of these authors nor that I think their studies are biased - however my view is quite the opposite. These studies have different foci of analysis and so have I. My research is heavily based on Eurobarometer data, therefore I have to take into account data limitations. Generally, I am able to analyse the period from 1976 to 2005. Because I have to cope with the given

data availability and focus on the period from 1976 to 2005 it makes no sense to start with the Treaty of Rome or also take into account the Lisbon treaty. Surely, in defining the segmentation of the historical development of the European integration process I will also consider events before 1976 because former events and political decisions are necessary to understand the status quo of the European unification project in 1976. Partly due to the given time frame, I will focus on specific groups of MS, namely the EU9, EU12, and the EU15. Since this thesis captures the change of relative explanatory power of important predictors of attitudes towards the European integration process, it makes no sense to analyse, for example the EU25, because there is only data available for 1 year.

Chapter 3.1 presents the variables employed in the different models and the descriptive statistics thereof. Firstly, I will discuss different measures of support of the European integration process made available by Eurobarometer surveys and compare them to each other. Secondly, I will present the explaining factors and their relationship to different theoretical approaches compared in the analysis. Furthermore, we have to deal with the topic 'data availability' and the restriction imposed therefore on the analysis.

The employed methodology and the operationalisation of the compared theories are the main topic of the subsequent chapter. The respective models will be calculated using multilevel ordinal logistic regression with random intercepts only at the country level, due to the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, the membership-question, and the hierarchical nature of the dataset. For each year I will calculate a separate model in order to assess the relative explanatory power of different theories. The development of the explanatory power of the different theories will be compared to each other. Consequently, I speak of relative explanatory power. In addition, I will present the operationalisation of the various theories and also discuss the pros and cons of the chosen operationalisation. Furthermore, I will discuss the shortcomings of heavily relying on Eurobarometer data and possible improvements to the analysis.

The subsequent two chapters concentrate on the analysis of comparing theoretical approaches towards the European integration process. The former chapter deals with the results of comparing cultural/identity approaches and egocentric economic voting-theory over time as well as over contexts. I will present and discuss the results on the aggregate level as well as on the country-level and also compare the results and discuss the differences between them.

Measurement error is an important topic, especially regarding surveys in political science. Therefore, I will devote a chapter to enhance the reliability of the previous analysis by using multiple survey items in order to capture the underlying latent attitudes towards the European unification process. I will analyse the signal-to-noise ratio for the dependent variable, support for European integration.

The following section summarizes the main results of the preceding analytical chapters. Furthermore, I will contrast the empirical findings with the main arguments of previous studies, especially research assuming a 'cultural turn' in public opinion towards the European unification process. However, I will also critically examine the empirical results and their possible shortcomings as well as their novel character.

The last chapter consists of the conclusions and discusses the possible consequences of the empirical results for the future development of the European integration process. Furthermore, I will discuss the implications of the findings for the current state of research of public opinion towards the European unification project. Finally, I will present some suggestions for further research resulting from the empirical results.

2. Theorizing and modelling public opinion on European integration

Research on the relationship and interdependence between individual attitudes and support for a political system has a long tradition in political science. Early advocates of this strand of research are Almond&Verba with their 'political culture'-approach (Almond/Verba 1963), David Easton with his 'political system'-approach (Easton 1965a,b) and Seymour Martin Lipset with his 'political support'-approach (Lipset 1959, 1960). Whereas Almond&Verba were interested in the congruence between a specific political culture and the structure of a political system, David Easton developed his theory at a very abstract level in order to apply it to all possible configurations of political systems and Seymour Martin Lipset concentrated exclusively on democracies. What these early studies have in common is their question concerning the stability and general legitimacy of a political system as a function of individual attitudes towards this political system. Furthermore, individual attitudes are not given a priori, instead they are the results of a multitude of influences, like former events (like wars, cases of corruption, etc.), or of specific individual values (e.g. a secularized

state, a strict immigration policy, etc.) or of a change in the principle orientation of a political system (e.g. the change of the EU from an overwhelmingly economic project to a more political one commonly marked by the implementation of the Maastricht treaty in 1992). Furthermore, individual opinions are shaped by the influence mass media and/or opinion leaders like political party leaders exert.

Students of the European Community and later the European Union followed these strands of research and applied, refined and further developed the analytical strategies and concepts used for these classical studies. As I will present in the following chapters, theories regarding individual public opinion towards European integration focused at various levels of the political system and took into consideration a wide variation of different explaining factors. Nevertheless, all these new theoretical approaches borrowed more or less from the 'classic' theories of political support. Thus, although I am able to provide only a rough summary of the relevant approaches trying to explain support or opposition to the European unification process I will try to present a comprehensive picture and will start with a short summary of three classical approaches of political support. The concepts used in these theories serve as a building block for the understanding of the subsequently discussed theories of public opinion.

As already mentioned, theories of public opinion towards European integration take into account lots of different factors explaining political support or opposition. In order to systematize the existing literature I grouped them or categorized them according to the level of a political system at which they predominantly focus. Thus, I distinguish between the individual level, between an intermediary level consisting predominantly of political parties and interest groups, and the national level.

One often overlooked dimension, explaining political support or opposition to European integration, is the context in which the European unification process is embedded, i.e. the external environment in which European integration takes place, e.g. the consequences of the two oil crises in the 1970s or the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the EU has also changed its nature over time, indicated not only by the changing name of the unification project but also by institutional changes and other internal developments. I will thus explicitly distinguish between internal and external factors of change in the 'nature' or character of European integration. Sometimes this distinction is impossible, like in the case of the German reunification, but the purpose of emphasizing the context of public opinion towards the EU should be clear, indi-

viduals form their opinions not in a vacuum but are embedded in specific contexts (Fligstein 2008; Çiftçí 2005a; Diez Medrano 2003)

2.1. Theories of public opinion on European integration

In this section I will review the most important models concerning public opinion on European integration[7]. Due to the fact that many of these models build on economic voting theory, I will first review different approaches building on the theory of the economic vote. Subsequently, I will present identity-based approaches explaining citizens' attitudes toward the European unification process. Furthermore, the various models are categorized due to effects at the individual and at the national level.

2.1.1. The economic vote reviewed

The underlying reasoning concerning the theory of economic voting is, that individuals judge their incumbent government or political institutions according to their economic performance. The empirical connection between economic performance and the respective influence on individual vote decisions has puzzled researchers for more than 50 years (Lazarsfeld et al. 1968). The theoretical connection between the management of the economy and individual voting behaviour has evolved to a nearly social scientific law. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the theory of economic voting—developed in the context of the American political system—has been employed in other contexts too, like European Studies (Tilley et al. 2008). In order to follow the theoretical underpinnings of economic voting, applied to public opinion towards the European unification project, I will shortly review the existing economic voting literature.

The economic voting approach rests on the assumption that voters are rational cost-benefit analysing actors. Anthony Downs (1957) conceptualized voters as utility-maximizing political 'consumers', who base their vote choices on the comparison of expected utility functions for each of the competing parties. However, from the beginning of economic voting research until today one puzzling question is, how exactly do economic conditions enter individual utility functions?

The main conflict-lines regarding how the economy affects individual vote choices are

[7] In the appendix I present a table summarizing the main characteristics of the different models.

retrospective versus prospective and egocentric versus socio-tropic economic voting and how the individual evaluates the economy, i.e. individual perceptions versus objective measures of the economy (for an overview see e.g. Anderson 2007; Hibbs 2006). I will address each of them shortly in the following.

2.1.2. Sanctioning versus Selecting

Proponents of the so-called 'sanctioning'-model argue that voters gather information of past economic performances and political actors in order to punish the incumbent government for bad economic conditions or to reward them for good economic performance (see e.g. Fiorina 1978, 1981). The underlying theoretical consideration can be depicted as a principal-agent relationship, where the principal–the voters–sanctions the agent–the incumbent government.

> "Voters, according to this model, are confronted with a moral hazard problem when deciding on voting for the incumbent versus opposition parties. They argue that if voters do not sanction economic performance, they risk signalling to incumbents that poor economic performance would be tolerated and, hence, invite rent seeking on the part of self-interested political candidates" (Duch/Stevenson 2008, 11).

In the sanctioning-model of the economic vote, citizens hold their incumbent politicians accountable for their past economic decisions.

The selection-model of economic voting—also called the competence-model—deviates from a simple reward-punishment perspective. Advocates of the selection-model argue that rational voters do not only judge past economic conditions, but also use their available information to select the most competent candidate for the future (see e.g. Kramer 1971; Duch/Stevenson 2005, 2008). Consequently, rational individuals maximize their utility by selecting the most—in economic terms—competent politician.

A further puzzling question concerning both models points to the mechanisms of how individuals differentiate between economic fluctuations caused by political decisions or by exogenous shocks, i.e. how do individuals evaluate past economic information to choose a specific candidate? One way of handling this so-called 'signal-extraction'-problem is to include context, "[...] because the relative magnitudes of exogenous and

politically relevant competency signals vary systematically across different economic and political contexts" (Duch/Stevenson 2008, 14) [8].

Taking context into consideration affects the relationship between voters and governmental actors in two ways: First, context determines the capacity of politicians to influence macroeconomic conditions, e.g. the openness of a national economy to external markets. Second, context also affects the capacity of individual voters to effectively make incumbent politicians accountable for economic conditions. Or the other way round from the perspective of a political actor, context enables or prevents an incumbent politician to shift responsibility for poor economic policies, e.g. due to the existence of coalition governments or multiple levels of decision-making. Both ways of contextual influence have been explored cross-nationally as well as over time in previous research (see e.g. Bingham Powell/Whitten 1993; Rudolph 2003; Duch/Stevenson 2008). Thus, the strength of the causal relationship between economic performance and voter behaviour is dependent on the institutional context, because the institutional context influences the ability of voters to identify the political actor responsible for specific economic policy and hold that actor accountable (Anderson 2007). Regardless of the institutional context, the scholarly discussion also differentiates between various targets for which costs and benefits will be calculated, the individual itself or a specific community, e.g. a country.

2.1.3. Egocentric versus Sociotropic economic voting

Originally, the rational voter was conceptualized as a self-interested, utility-maximizing individual (Downs 1957). Most of the early research has been built on this assumption and has explored the aggregate connections between the economy and individual vote choices (see e.g. Tufte 1975, 1978; Kramer 1971). Consequently, research turning to the micro-level has been proceeding on this assumption, too (see e.g. Fiorina 1978, 1981). Although, research results gathered using aggregate national data show consistent results regarding the connection of economic conditions and politics, turning to the micro-level and cross-sectional analysis–as already mentioned above–research on the economic vote shows high variability in the relationship be-

[8] However, although much research showed cross-national variation in models of the economic vote, neither the theoretical nor the empirical implications are fully explored. As Christopher J. Anderson points out, the question of economic voting research changed from: "How can we best identify a relationship we know exists?" to "How can we best make sense of a relationship we know to be unstable?"(Anderson 2007, 275).

tween economics and politics-the so-called 'instability-dilemma' (Nannestad/Paldam 1994). Kinder and Kiewiet (1981) were the first who challenged the conception of the rationally self-interested, utility maximizer and argued instead that voters judge national economic conditions in order to evaluate the incumbent government. In comparing egocentric and socio-tropic models of the economic vote, the authors draw the conclusion that socio-tropic economic voting has a more profound impact on economic voting than egocentric variables like income or the financial situation of the household [9] (for an overview see Lewis-Beck 1988).

2.1.4. Individual perceptions vs. objective measures of the economy

Researchers frequently disagree about the employment of objective measures of the economy and individual perceptions thereof. As Anderson points out, this differentiation rests on two streams of debate about individual-level constraints and economic voting: The first, informational and cognitive limits and, the second, the impact of values and ideology on how the individual perceives and evaluates the economy (Anderson 2007, 278).

The assumption that individuals lack the sufficient knowledge or the cognitive ability to process information, in order to evaluate economic conditions as well as political objects or processes, is very common in the literature on public opinion (see among other Lupia/McCubbins 1998; Anderson 1998; Popkin 1994; Zaller 1992; Janssen 1991). Also often employed is the assumption that individuals use informational short-cuts or cues—especially political elites—to evaluate political objects or processes (c.f. Lupia/McCubbins 1998; Anderson 1998; Zaller 1992).

The translation of 'objective' economic measures into voters evaluations of the incumbent government requires several steps (see Anderson 2007, 279ff., see also Anderson/O'Connor 2000):

- Voters have to perceive or judge accurately objective economic conditions.
- These perceptions have to be translated into evaluations of the economy.

[9] Kinder and Kiewiet talk about socio-tropic information and not about motivation, i.e. socio-tropic economic voting does not imply that voters are inherently altruistic.

- The evaluation of the economy needs to result in a vote choice for or against the incumbent government.

- A vote choice for or against the incumbent government can only be made if the voter is able to make the government responsible for the past economic performance.

Consequently, even if only one step fails the whole chain breaks down. Nevertheless, there is a further problem and this points to the above mentioned second strand of research. Individuals are eager to uphold a consistent system of beliefs, i.e. the newly found evaluation of economic conditions needs to fit to their previously held beliefs. Therefore, individuals are likely to take cues, e.g. from the representatives of the respective party they support. This is simply the case, because even if individuals really have the cognitive ability to handle information on the economy, they simply have biases and values which may in turn result in misperceptions about the actual economic conditions (Anderson 2007). Furthermore, most citizens learn about the national economy through the lenses of the mass media. As mass media tend to report mainly about negative economic conditions, this circumstance considerably influences voters' economic perceptions (see e.g. Hetherington 1996).

After having summarized broadly the main variations of models of the economic vote, I will now turn to the application of economic voting concerning attitudes towards European integration.

2.2. Effects at the individual level

We can categorize different theoretical approaches according to the object of their focus, i.e. at which level in a political system their main source of support or opposition to the European integration process is situated. I will differentiate between the individual level, an intermediate level, and the national level thereby ignoring the supranational level (cf. Brack 2013). Table 1 serves as a first overview for the relevant literature and the differences between important studies as well as the various operationalisations.

	Eichenberg/Dalton's National Performance Model (1993)	**Gabel/Palmer's Economic Voting Model (1995)**	**Gabel's Policy Appraisal Model (1998)**	**Anderson's National Proxies Model (1998)**	**Anderson/Reichert`s Direct-Indirect Benefits Model (1996)**	**McLarens's Cultural Threat Model (2002)**	**Hooghe/Marks' Exclusive National Identity Model (2004)**
Dependent variable	Membership net support	Membership + unification	Membership	Membership	Membership	Index: Membership + importance	Index: Membership + speed + direction
Egocentric Economic Voting		Occupation, Income, Education	Occcupation, Income, Education	Evaluation of personal economy, Democracy satisfaction, Education, Income	Dummy for Farmer/Fishermen, Income, Education	Income, Education, Occupation	Education, Personal economic prospects
Sociotropic Economic Voting	Inflation, Unemployment, GDP index, Intra-EC-export, EC budget returns	Evaluation of national economy, National benefit, EC trade balance, EC trade %, EC parliament election	EU-trade-balance, Intra-EU-trade	Evaluation of national economy	Intra-EC-trade , EC-budget-return	Budget-balance, Intra-EC-trade	National economic prospects
Interaction terms			Relative human capital (professional & executive), CAP subsidies				Professional/Manager*GNI, Manual Worker*GNI, Fiscal transfer
Community and identity							
Cultural threat						Attitudes towards minority groups, Resource-based group threat	
Identity						Exclusive National Identity	Exclusive National Identity, National attachment
Political cues							
Ideology/values				Postmaterialism	Postmaterialism		Multiculturalism
Party/elite cues				Party attachment, Government support			
Other factors	East-West-Conflict, U.K. referendum, Danish SEA, Irish SEA, EC 1979 election	WWII deaths, Border resident	Border resident	Interest in EC politics	Length of membership, Age, Gender	Socioeconomic controls	Type of capitalism
Country dummies		Denmark, UK, Italy, Portugal, Spain					
Method	TSCS (ARMA, 1973-1988)	TSCS (1973-1989)	OLS	OLS (EB 34.0)	Cross-sectional analysis 1982, 1986, and 1990	OLS	Multilevel-Analysis (individual, party, country level)
R^2	0.52 – 0.72	0.16	0.09 – 0.16	0.08 – 0.20	0.02 – 0.10	0.14 – 0.21	68833 (-2 x log likelihood)

Table 1: Models of Euroscepticism

2.2.1. The national performance model

Richard C. Eichenberg and Russell J. Dalton focus on the determinants of public support towards the European unification process at the aggregate national level (Eichenberg/Dalton 1993 using 'net support'[10] as the dependent variable. The authors differentiate between national and international as well as between economic and political factors influencing national-level variation in public support. Employing a pooled time-series-cross-sectional and autoregressive moving average (ARMA) model with generalized least squares they analyse the time-period 1973-1988 for up to 9 countries (the original 6 member states plus UK, Ireland and Denmark). Eichenberg and Dalton assume that individuals evaluate the European integration project according to the recent performance of the respective national economy, i.e. they build their analysis on retrospective socio-tropic economic voting. As national economic factors Eichenberg and Dalton use objective macroeconomic measures like inflation, unemployment and a real GDP index and as international economic factors, a measure of intra-EU-exports and EU-budget-returns. Therefore, the authors assume that individuals evaluate European integration not only in terms of recent national economic performance but also in terms of a cost-benefit analysis of being a member of the European Union. The analysis shows that inflation was negatively and intra-EU-trade was positively related to national aggregate support of the European integration process, furthermore EU-budget returns have no impact on aggregate public opinion towards the EU.

2.2.2. The (extended) policy appraisal model

One underlying assumption of Eichenberg and Dalton's analysis concerns the way in which individuals connect national economic conditions and their support for or hostility against the European unification project, i.e how the economy enters individual utility functions. The authors assume that individuals evaluate the EU according to general national economic conditions. This assumption is challenged by the work of Matthew J. Gabel and Harvey Palmer (Gabel/Palmer 1995; Gabel 1998b). Generally agreeing with the assumptions of economic voting, Gabel and Palmer pro-

[10] Net support is calculated by subtracting the percentage of all individuals answering the membership question with 'bad thing' from the percentage of all individuals answering with 'good thing'. This operationalisation ignores all individuals answering this question with 'neither/nor'. Furthermore, as Gabel rightly argues, "[...] a nation with 15 percent of its respondents choosing 'good thing' and 5 percent choosing 'bad thing' will have the same score as a nation with 55 percent if its respondents choosing 'good thing' and 45 percent choosing 'bad thing"' (see footnote 1 in Gabel/Palmer 1995).

ceed on the hypothesis that individuals do not make the EU solely responsible for the national economic performance. Rather, individuals judge supranational institutions like the EU according to the policies the EU enacts. Gabel and Palmer assume two important venues, through which the EU affects national economies, first, the customs union by eliminating tariffs and protectionist regulation and, second, by institutional links between the member states fostering continued interaction and communication and therefore peace and stability (see Gabel/Palmer 1995, 5). Consequently, the authors present two hypotheses according to these two venues of influence: the so-called'mercantilist-hypothesis' and the 'security-hypothesis'. The first one argues, that the higher the relative importance of intra-EU trade in relation to total nation trade, the higher is the support for the unification project, whereas the second assumes, that the higher a nation's death toll in the Second World War the higher the support for the EU. Clearly, both hypotheses measure an individual's socio-tropic evaluation of the impact of the European integration process. Nevertheless, the authors also employ egocentric economic voting hypotheses. The 'human capital'-hypothesis argues that EU policies affect individuals differently, namely according to their ability to benefit from market liberalization policies. Therefore, the higher one's human capital—measured with occupation and education—the more likely an individual supports the unification project promoting market liberalizing policies. Finally, the 'capitalist-hypothesis' posits that individuals with higher incomes are more supportive because they prefer less inflation, less public sector spending and open markets. The authors show, by comparing their assumptions with the model developed by Eichenberg and Dalton, that individual perceptions of the overall national benefits from the European integration process are more influential that retrospective individual perceptions of national economic conditions. In their second model—the 'policy appraisal' model—the authors replace the measure of EU national benefit with objective measures of national benefits, namely with EU trade balance per capita and a ratio of a nation's intra-EU-trade to its total trade. The empirical results of the 'policy appraisal'-model show that—compared to the first model—the coefficients of the four above presented hypotheses rise in strength and precision. These results imply that, first, individuals differentiate between personal and national benefits from the European unification process and, second, that individual perceptions of potential benefits from EU policies are a superior measure than individual perceptions of the performance of the respective national economy.

Matthew Gabel further developed the 'policy appraisal'-model to the so called 'Extended Policy Appraisal Model'. This extension deviates from the former conceptions that it proceeds from the assumption that individuals generally lack sufficient knowl-

edge to evaluate their personal welfare gains or losses deriving from European integration. Matthew Gabel argues that citizens use informational cues from informed elites, interest groups and the media to form attitudes that reflect their self interest (Gabel 1998b, 12). According to the policy-appraisal model individuals use these informational short-cuts to evaluate supranational policies—especially market liberalizing economic policies—in relation to their individual socio-economic status. Therefore, citizens are more supportive of European integration, if they perceive that specific policies increase their personal welfare. The classical economic voting models employed to explain public opinion towards European integration assume that only the consequences of the European integration process on the general economic environment and individual perceptions of the economy matter, whereas the 'policy-appraisal'-model proceeds on the assumption that general economic conditions do not influence individual judgements of the European unification process. Rather, individuals take into account policies stemming from the supranational level and their implications for economic development and accordingly form attitudes towards the EU (Gabel 1998b).

Furthermore, proceeding on the model of political support developed by David Easton (Easton 1965a,b) Gabel differentiates between a utilitarian and affective dimension of individual support of European integration. The utilitarian dimension captures citizens' appraisals of the costs and benefits of European policies like opening the labour market, higher capital mobility and liberalizing trade operationalised as described above. The affective dimension comprises emotional or psychological attachment to the European unification project. An individual takes both dimensions into account, but these two dimensions are indirectly related, i.e. the higher one's influence of the utilitarian dimension the lower is the impact of the affective dimension on forming attitudes towards the EU. Matthew Gabel shows that most citizens hold low levels of affective attachments and these are stable over time, while the vast majority of the European public evaluates the integration process according to the utilitarian dimension which may vary over time (Gabel 1998b, 110).

2.2.3. The direct-indirect benefits model

Christopher J. Anderson and Michael Shawn Reichert differentiate between direct and indirect benefits an individual and the national economy potentially gain deriving from European integration. Direct benefits are payments a MS receives directly from the supranational level and indirect benefits are those generated from, e.g. increased

trade activities within the EU or the removal of trade barriers. At the individual level indirect benefits refer to higher opportunities of individuals with high educational levels and high incomes to exploit the chances offered by an integrated European market. Some individuals also receive direct benefits, because they are beneficiaries of subsidies paid by the EU, most notably farmers and fishermen. At the level of member states, net-receiver states directly benefit from European integration, whereas member states with a higher share on intra-EU-trade benefit indirectly from EU-membership.

Methodologically, Anderson and Reichert pool their data only cross-sectional for three different time points: 1982, 1986, and 1990. They follow such a strategy, because otherwise "[...] scholars implicitly assume that national and personal economic benefits have consistent, i.e., time-*invariant*, effects on citizen support for integration. In other words, they assume that economic benefits affect citizens attitudes similarly at different points in time, that is, regardless of whether the survey was conducted in 1975 or 1995"(Anderson/Reichert 1996, 236). Furthermore, the authors argue that the European integration process itself changed its substance over time, e.g. in the 1980s European integration was mostly considered as negative integration aimed at abolishing trade barriers and restraints on the free movement of capital, labour, goods and services. Whereas after the Maastricht treaty in 1992 the EU became a more political role and hence positive integration increased.

Anderson and Reichert are concerned only with a utilitarian dimension of support, thereby measuring immediate costs and benefits from a country's membership using the membership-question as dependent variable. In order to measure direct individual benefits the authors include a dummy variable whether the respondent is a farmer or fishermen, whereas to measure indirect individual benefits measures of income, education and post-materialism are included into the model. To take into account cross-national differences according to direct and indirect benefits at the member-state-level measures for the amount of intra-EU-trade as percentage of total trade and budget return as a percentage of GDP are employed as well as the length of membership. The empirical results stem from three identical OLS regressions for the years 1982, 1986, and 1992 on pooled data for all EU member-states. Furthermore, the authors split the data into a sample comprising the original six member-states and a sample for the later member-states and re-estimate the model. In the pooled model the results show equally strong and significant individual-level variables as well as national-level variables. The results of the splitted model show a somehow contrary picture. Only

indirect individual-level variables and the direct national-level measure are significant for older and newer member-states and over time. As the authors conclude:

> "This findings casts doubt on the often-assumed, but seldom-tested, assumption that relationships remain constant over time, and provides systematic evidence for the claim that the effects of different factors on support for EU membership must be considered in the context of a changing EU and changing economic and political environments" (Anderson/Reichert 1996, 245).

It is exactly this hunch expressed by Anderson and Reichert, which this PhD-thesis analysis in the empirical section, that changes in the relative explanatory power of different theoretical approaches explaining public opinion towards the European integration process need to be analysed in the context of changing characteristics of the European integration process.

2.2.4. The cultural-threat model

Drawing on findings of cognitive social psychology and especially group conflict theory Laura McLaren is able to move from an individualistic self interest and utility maximizing perspective to a group-level perspective and simultaneously incorporate factors tapping identity. McLaren conceptualizes opinion formation through perceived threats. According to her argument individuals construct their attitudes toward European integration on the basis of perceived group threat and/or symbolic threat (McLaren 2002, 2006, 2007, for a similar argument see Llamazares/Gramacho 2007; Weßels 2007; Diez Medrano 2003 and de Vries/Van Kersbergen 2007). Employing realistic group conflict theory McLaren argues that individuals construct opinions toward other groups, like minorities, on the basis of the perceived losses the own group suffers from the competition between these in- and out-groups. Group conflict theory draws on the assumption that different groups of individuals contend about limited resources and if a group perceives that another group receives benefits at the costs of one's own group, this will be perceived as a threat to the own existence (McLaren 2006). Therefore, persons, who are hostile against other groups do not build their anxiety at the individual level but on the in-group level, i.e. it is a dynamic phenomenon between whole groups. In the language of economic voting theory, individuals rather act in a socio-tropic way than forming attitudes based on egocentric considerations.

The second strand of the argument draws on the 'symbolic-politics'-approach, which

claims that individual opinions are products of their socialization or instinctual reactions. The assumption is, that European citizens developed on average strong attachments to the nation state and that they approve the sovereignty of the nation-state, i.e. they support their respective national political system and the ongoing process of European integration challenges these attachments to the nation state (McLaren 2002). An approach which expands group conflict theory is realistic group conflict theory, which claims that a threat must not exist—the mere perception of such a threat suffices. One argument supporting this assumption is that individuals do not evaluate every government policy or every proposal, but rather draw their conclusions by evaluating effects of societal developments on the socio-tropic level, i.e. what are the effects for the society or a specific group of society (McLaren 2006)). Lauren McLaren employs two Eurobarometer surveys to measure group conflict theory, first with a battery of questions tapping attitudes towards minority groups and, second using two questions tapping resource-based group threat. In order to measure symbolic threat the author employs, again, two batteries of Eurobarometer questions, whereas the first battery measures perceptions of threat by other cultures and the second measures symbolic threat resulting from the European unification project, like the loss of national identity or national culture.

As a measure for support for or opposition to European integration McLaren creates an additive index with the membership-question and a further question asking after future support for the EU[11]. Furthermore, Lauren McLaren includes occupation, income and education as measures of egocentric economic voting and budget balance and intra-EU-trade as measures for socio-tropic economic voting to compare these effects to the two indexes for group threat and symbolic threat. The model also includes socio-economic control variables for age, gender, cognitive mobilization, and self left-right-placement. The author comes to the conclusion, that resource-based group threat and symbolic threat are significant predictors of support for the European integration process and that these predictors explain a larger portion of the variability of support than utilitarian variables.

[11]Question wording: "In five years' time, would you like the European Union to play a more important, a less important or the same role in your daily life?".

2.2.5. The national-identity model

The national-identity model uses a similar strand of argument like the 'cultural threat' model, especially concerning the evolution or development of symbolic threat. Identity evolves through a socialization process and is only hardly changeable in adulthood. Some elements of an individual identity may be even formed during a much longer period, because individuals show intense group loyalty over generations and those affiliations are emotionally loaded and extremely powerful and may be stronger than rational considerations in being decisive in forming attitudes towards political objects (Hooghe/Marks 2004). There exists a considerable scholarly debate about how to conceptualize and how to measure identity concepts. From the perspective of democratic theory, scholars argue that a European identity is a prerequisite for a European demos and hence for a legitimate European democracy. From the perspective of identity formation we can distinguish between two main strands of scholarly discussion. First, the pessimistic point of view, which claims that an evolution of a European identity seems impossible due to the lack of a common European culture, language and history (Obradovic 1996). Second, the more optimistic perspective argues that identity is the product of a social construction process and hence a slow moving but ever changing development (Kaltenthaler/Anderson 2001).

Sylvia Kritzinger proceeds on the above mentioned assumptions and differentiates between a short term interest and utilitarian perspective (Kritzinger 2005) and a slowly developing form of national identity thereby focussing on the first one. Drawing on Easton's theory of support she argues that, "[...] utilitarian orientations already have to be developed in order to understand their impact on the affective dimension of identity" (Kritzinger 2005, 55). Analysing the preferences of citizens on which level (European or national) different policies shall be decided she comes to the conclusion that a utilitarian identity feeling has already evolved.

Sean Carey analyses three different conceptualizations of national identity (c.f. Carey 2002, 390):

- Intensity and type of identity towards the nation
- Level of attachment to the nation in relation to other geographic and governmental entities

- Identity in terms of perceived cultural threat

Carey's results show that a strong national attachment does not necessarily imply negative support for the EU. Nevertheless, national identity exerts substantial influence on support for the European integration project. Thereby Carey states that the effects of national identity are as important as utilitarian explanations, e.g. income or education (Carey 2002).

Lisbeth Hooghe and Gary Marks (2004; 2005) explicitly focus their research on the comparison of the influence of economic variables and variables regarding national identity. Although individuals can identify themselves with several groups or communities at the same time Hooghe and Marks use identity as taken to mean 'national identity' and therefore focus on the national level (c.f. Hooghe/Marks 2004, 2005 for a similar argument regarding central and eastern Europe see Vetik et al. 2006). To solve this problem the authors use a distinction between inclusive and exclusive national identity, whereas the latter one relates to expected higher Euroscepticism. Further, Carey 2002 proceeds on the assumptions that although national identities are heavily determined before adolescence, they still under steady pressure or are permanently (re-)constructed through socialization and the political environment. This argument again constitutes one point of departure for one of the intention of this PhD thesis, namely that the comparison of the relative explanatory power of different theories needs to include the changing characteristics of the specific political object, in our case the European integration process.

The authors construe three variables on the basis of three Eurobarometer questions in order to tap national identity.

- Exclusive National Identity[12]
- Multiculturalism[13]
- National Attachment[14]

[12]Based on: In the near future, do you see yourself as (1)[nationality] only, (2)[nationality] and European, (3) European and [nationality], or (4) European only? This dichotomous variable takes the value 1 if the respondent answered with (1) and 0 otherwise.

[13]Thinking about the enlargement of the European Union to include new countries, do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with the following statement...'With more member countries Europe will be culturally richer' (1) tend to disagree, (2) don't know, (3) tend to agree

[14]People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country,

The operationalisation of the first variable and the procedure of direct comparison bears some problems: First, directly comparing the 'national identity' and 'economic' coefficients leads to what Gary King 1986calls 'race of the variables', i.e. if variables do not share a common unit of measurement we are not able to meaningfully compare their coefficients, thus we need to find other strategies or ways to overcome this problem, one possible avenue is the comparison of relative explanatory power instead of raw coefficients. Second, the concept exclusive national identity and support for the European integration project seem to be endogenous to each other, i.e. they are measuring a somewhat identical concept. So it does not wonder that it is the strongest predictor, although one can not compare coefficients with different measures. However, for the time period under investigation in the following analysis there exists no better identity-related measure. Notwithstanding, we should keep the above arguments in mind when interpreting the empirical results.

2.3. Effects at the national level

This section covers models or effects situated at the national level. Such a categorization is not always easy to accomplish, because approaches/models explaining attitudes towards the European unification process often measure effects at the individual as well as effects at the national level. The 'National Proxies'-model is such a case with variables measuring effects at the individual and the national level. Proceeding on the assumption of three different proxies located at the national level I decided to subsume this model under the national-level-category.

2.3.1. The national-proxies model

Following Janssen (1991) Christopher J. Anderson (1998) argues that citizens are fairly uninformed about the process of European integration as well as about European institutions.

> "The fact that Europe's citizens are not particularly well-informed about the EU and are thus unlikely to conform to the strict definition of self-interested utility maximizers vis-á-vis the EU also is evident in citizens' responses to a myriad of other questions that gauge

or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you fell to [your country]? (1) very attached, (2) fairly attached, (3) not very attached, (4) not at all attached, (5) don't know

their knowledge about things, such as the president of the commission, the Maastricht treaty, and elections to the European Parliament" (Anderson 1998, 573).

Furthermore, this lack of information does not differ systematically across different member states (Anderson 1998, 574). That fact taken for granted, how do EU-citizens form their attitudes toward European integration? Anderson argues that individuals use 'proxies' as a means to evaluate objects about which they have only limited knowledge or information. Accordingly, he proposes three such 'proxies':

- system support (level of satisfaction of the national democracy)[15]
- government support (dummy variable indicating the inclination to vote for a governing party)
- establishment party support (dummy variable indicating the inclination to vote for an establishment party)

Each of these three 'proxies' captures another part of European integration or of the European Union in general. According to this perspective the EU can be seen as (1) a set of institutions, (2) a sequence of events or decisions the domestic government is involved in or (3) as a subject of political contestation at the domestic level (c.f. Anderson 1998, 576ff.). Individuals therefore construct their opinion toward European integration on the basis of one or a combination of these 'proxies'.

Christopher J. Anderson includes retrospective egocentric and sociotropic economic voting variables in order to control for the possibility that the variables for system and government support effectively measure economic conditions. The model also includes socio-economic control variables, these are: interest in European politics, post-materialism, education and income. Methodologically, Anderson employs data from a single Eurobarometer (Eurobarometer 34.0 Fall 1990) and estimates an OLS model for each EU country. In order to being able to differentiate between economic effects and effects of the three hypothesized 'proxies' Christopher J. Anderson starts with estimating models for each country with only the personal and national economic evaluation variables and the control variables and, in a second step, estimates models for each country only with the 'proxy'-variables and the control variables. Finally, a

[15] Question wording: "On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (your country)?

comprehensive model including all variables allows for the comparison of economic and political effects in the different member-states.

The empirical results of the last model show much weaker and less significant effects for the economic variables than the model in the first step. Furthermore, regarding the political hypotheses, only system support provides strong and significant coefficients in nearly all countries (except Portugal) and to a lesser extent the 'establishment party support-proxy'. As Anderson further concludes, "the findings show that purely economic models, that is, models that do not control for attitudes about domestic politics, are likely to overestimate direct economic effects, given that they work through government and system support. The results help resolve the incongruence of a coexistence of strong economic effects and widespread ignorance about the integration process by pointing to an alternative individual-level model of attitude formation"(Anderson 1998, 592).

2.4. Four periods of the historical development of European integration

The relationship between a citizenry and a political system is in constant flux. This implies that also the determinants of public attitudes change if the EU itself changes, i.e. different factors became different weights according to changes of the political system. What is not straightforward is how to conceptualize 'changes' in the 'nature' of the European unification process. I use the term 'changes' if the institutional set-up and institutional rules alter as well as the objectives and aims of the EU. Following Çíftçí (2005b) I take treaties as significant events, because they are culminations of past experiences and simultaneously shall prepare the EU for future developments. 'Past experiences' refer to internal as well as external past events or circumstances. For example, the adoption of the Single European Act refers to Europe's waning competitiveness especially vis-Ãă-vis the United States and Japan (see e.g. Keohane/Hoffmann 1991; Eichengreen 2007; Dedman 2010) as well as to the experiences concerning the 'Luxembourg compromise' (see e.g. Moravcsik 1991; James 2012).

2.4.1. Discriminating periods in EU's historical development

At least two studies[16] explicitly consider the character of the European integration process as the context within public opinion towards the EU is shaped. Sabri Çiftçí argues, " [...] that integration may be described as a process having various stages and developing at different speeds. [...] Integration, as a political object, can be thought of as a process starting with minimal agreement about non-controversial economic issues and progressing incrementally to economic and political unification. As such, if one is to examine support for integration, either at the individual or at the aggregate level, the depth of integration is important"(Çiftçí 2005b, 475). Çiftçí analyses aggregate data on attitudes towards the EU and differentiates three different periods of the European integration process. The author exclusively focusses on treaties as marking the end respectively the beginning of a different period thereby discriminating between three various periods which represent different characters of the European integration process. Çiftçí sees the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 and the Maastricht treaty of 1992 as the two cornerstones marking three episodes of the integration project, whereby the first one lasts from 1971 to 1985, the second one from 1986 to 1991, and the last one from 1992 to 1999. Furthermore, the author tests for structural breaks in the analysed time series data on public opinion and corroborates – at least at the aggregate level – the recognition of different periods of the European integration process by the European public.

The second study explicitly discriminating different periods of the European unification project has been done by Neil Fligstein (2008). The author employs field theory and focusses therefore on social interaction. He understands the term 'field' "[...] as an arena of social interaction where organized individuals or groups such as interest groups, states, firms, and non-governmental organizations routinely interact under a set of shared understandings about the nature of the goals of the field, the rules governing social interaction who has the power and why, and how actors make sense of one another's actions"(Fligstein 2008, 8). This definition of an abstract concept has to be filled with empirical content, nevertheless, it touches the changes and relationships, especially between institutional set-up of the European unification process and social interactions between various actors. Using this definition and focussing thereby on

[16]There is at least a third one by Marianne Sundlisæter Skinner taking into account three periods in the development of Norwegian euroscepticism, however, the focus of the analysis lies on the so-called VCR-model and periodisation of historical development plays only a secondary role (Sundlisæter Skinner 2012).

social fields, the author distinguishes four significant events which changed the quantity as well as the quality of social fields over the course of the European integration process considerably. The first event is the Treaty of Rome, which laid the foundations for the European common market and provided the first rules for social interaction, predominantly economic activities.

> "The decision to produce an open-ended organization continuously to promote agreements meant that as firms took advantage of the possibility of producing new economic fields, there was a natural political field in which to discuss their problems. This field could then be used to produce new agreements to govern the continued international opening of markets" (Fligstein 2008, 7).

The creation of clearly defined rules for social interactions in a complex environment is impossible, because legislative bodies cannot foresee any possible situation and make rules accordingly, furthermore actors may change rules by applying them, which is also unpredictable. This problem of the necessary vagueness of rule making is a topic to which the principal-agent-theory explicitly points (for a political science application see e.g. Kiewiet/McCubbins 1991; Epstein/O'Halloran 1999, for a general overview see e.g. Mueller 2003; Hillman 2009). This problematic situation of social interaction without clearly defined rules, leads to the second event, which is actually a series of events, which have a common nature: the struggle between defining rules and social interaction. Because rules of interaction cannot define any possible social interaction the various actors have to figure out how to conceptualize rules and make them work more effectively. Fligstein provides the example of the European Court of Justice, who had to decide how EU law could be integrated into or combined with national law and how to interpret the Treaty of Rome. Furthermore, the relationship of the European Commission and the member states (MS) has been and is until today a continuous tug-of-war between transferring competencies to the supranational level and preserving national sovereignty. However, the European Commission had also to figure out how the decision-making process should be designed, especially the intergovernmental part, i.e. how is it possible that a certain number of MS can reach an agreement in order to enhance the European integration process.

The second event is rather the summary of different processes which led to the institutionalization of the Treaty of Rome (Fligstein/Stone Sweet 2001; Fligstein 2008). Essentially, this second event is about individuals figuring out how to transform the rules laid down in the Treaty of Rome into a set of interdependent organizations, the European Commission, the European Council of Ministers, the European Parliament

and the European Court of Justice, which produces policies efficiently but also representatives from transnational companies or interest organizations have had to figure out how to pursue their interests efficiently at the European level. This second event is the linkage between construction of European institutions, increased economic activity, the capacity of the Brussels complex of institutions to produce legislation and the practice of the EU legal system (32 Fligstein/Stone Sweet 2001).

Fligstein locates the third event in the early part of the 1980s with the agreement of the MS governments to relaunch the EU. The 1970s have been a decade of slowdown of the European unification process, which scholars often term as 'Europessimism' or 'Eurosclerosis' (see e.g. Moravcsik 1991). Çíftçí assumes that this slowdown was due to especially three circumstances: the inability of the EU to handle the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system, to respond effectively to the two oil-crisis, and to cope with the resulting bad economic performance of nearly each member states's national economy(see Çíftçí 2005b, 475). The EU's *relance* was mainly due to Jacques Delor's fostering of the internal market project implying further economic liberalization and cooperation (see e.g. Ludlow 2006). Furthermore, with respect to the experience of the EU's incapacity to act and the upcoming enlargement round the member states felt the need for reforms for enhanced economic activities as well as to push forward the European integration process.

> "These events and what generated them are still the subject of scholarly dispute, but everyone agrees that the Single European Act and the Treaty on European Union laid the groundwork that provided actors in governments, political parties, social movements, and the private economy to continue and intensify their creation of Europe-wide social fields" (Fligstein 2008, 8).

The last event identified by Neil Fligstein is the end of the Cold War and the German reunification. The bipolar world of the Cold War vanished almost over night because of the break-down of the USSR thereby transforming the security issues that have dominated Europe for forty years. This transformation enhanced the readiness of national governments to increase European cooperation and to intensify economic growth and individualism. Furthermore, German reunification has been seen ambivalently, especially from the French side. Not only did France fear the already huge economic power of Germany and especially their leading role in monetary policy in the EU, but also the possible rearmament of an unified Germany. The compromise between France and Germany can be seen as a trade-off between German's acceptance of the French proposal of a new currency regime with fixed exchange rates essentially leading to the

European Monetary Union, thereby abolishing the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), in order to reunify Germany.

Although Fligstein does not exclusively focus on treaties as significant events dividing historically the European integration process into distinguishable periods, he also considers the SEA of 1986 and the Maastricht treaty of 1992 as cornerstones of the European unification project and the Treaty of Rome as the starting shot of the common market project. Additionally, although we can distinguish them only analytically, Fligstein takes into account internal as well as external events by discriminating between different periods of the integration process. Surely, the example of German reunification has been a struggle especially between two MS, Germany and France, but the end of the Cold War with the breakdown of the Soviet Union was the triggering event for the following changes.

Furthermore, Fligstein stresses the analytical value of thinking about different periods of the European integration process by summarizing his approach, because "(t)hese historical events provide the backdrop for thinking about the process of building European fields. The Treaty of Rome, the creation of the Brussels-Luxembourg-Strasbourg complex, and the relaunched EU of the 1980s reflected the process by which European society was being built. The end of the Cold War pushed governments away from worrying about security concerns and caused them to focus on issues of social justice and employment and ways to grow their economies"(Fligstein 2008, 8).

These few considerations presented above touch in essence the two points which are the stone(s) of contention for the analysis at hand. The main two research questions guiding this work ask after the relative explanatory power of various theoretical approaches explaining public opinion towards the European unification process over time and the internal as well as external developments of the EU and their influence on different determinants of individual attitudes towards the EU. How are these two points related to each other? The basic assumption leading the analysis at hand is that the relative explanatory power of different theoretical approaches changes due to the changing 'nature' of the European integration process. This includes not only the institutional changes of the EU but also the internal as well as external developments.

2.4.2. Dynamics triggered by European integration

Neil Fligstein argues that the historical development of the European unification project has led to three critical dynamics, which have also been described by other scholars dealing with public opinion towards the European integration process (see e.g. Anderson/Reichert 1996; Gabel 1998b; Hooghe/Marks 2005, 2008a), but have never been classified and described as coherently as Neil Fligstein did. These different dynamics have not been set in motion at the same time, but are consequences of the changing character of the European unification project. Furthermore, these dynamics analytically combine individual characteristics with the institutional development of the EU. In the following paragraphs I will discuss these three dynamics as presented by Fligstein and relate them to the literature on public opinion towards the European integration project as well as to the research questions of the analysis at hand.

The first dynamic is a response to the ongoing process of economic liberalization and therefore started with the adoption of the Treaty of Rome and intensified ever since. The creation of a common market provides opportunity structures for a specific set of actors, because the European unification process has concentrated on economics and business most of its historical development. The set of actors which benefits the most of economic liberalization include individuals such as managers, professionals, and white-collar workers or in other words the well-educated, the affluent and rich individuals and more generally the young people, i.e. in general the more flexible individuals. Furthermore, also government officials benefited from this dynamic because the intensified economic cooperation led to the need of closer political cooperation between different MS as well as between the MS and the supranational level. Although, also most of the middle class benefited from European integration, because the Single Market increased economic growth and trade and therefore created jobs in the national economies. Additionally, the European unification process created opportunities alongside mere monetary benefits like an increased variety of services and goods and the (relieved) possibility of studying abroad but also income-related advantages like lowered prices for goods and services, lower fees for banking transactions as well as cheaper vacations because of intensified competition to name only a few.

However, the process of European integration produced not only winners. Many people see the European unification project as lowering or reducing their opportunity structures. The characteristics of individuals, which see the process of the Europeanization/globalization of national economies as a disadvantage, are e.g. low-

skilled people, because they are least likely to find well-paid jobs and have problems to adapt to changing demands of domestic labour markets. Additionally, various sectors changed dramatically due to European integration, e.g. the telecommunication sector, which has been, firstly, privatized, and secondly, been subject of dramatic technological changes. As a consequence many jobs disappeared in these sectors and people previously employed in such sectors are less likely to see the European integration process positive. Further examples are the postal sector or the sector of air traffic, generally those sector are mostly affected, which have been previously state-owned and where state-subsidies have vanished because of EU's competition policy.

Especially, scholars employing economic-voting approaches to explain attitudes towards the EU stress the above described two dynamics. Economic-voting theory emphasizes the individual's rational account of cost-benefit-analysis, i.e. emphasize utilitarian self-interest. Therefore, the behaviour of an individual is determined by rational expectations, in our case, costs and benefits derived from European integration. Advocates of egocentric economic-voting focus on individual characteristics to explain public opinion towards the EU on the individual level, whereas scholars employing socio-tropic economic-voting focus on the aggregate level and how the domestic or supranational economy performs. This theoretical approach assumes that individuals act according to how European policies affect the national or supranational economy and the costs and benefits deriving from them. Beside cultural/identity-approaches, economic-voting is one of the most important theories employed by scholars of public opinion to explain attitudes towards the European unification process. Therefore, by definition, it also plays a prominent part in a comparison of different theoretical approaches coping with public opinion towards the EU. Part of this analysis is to show how the relative explanatory power of economic-voting theory, especially egocentric economic voting, changes over time and how different periods of the integration process influence this relative explanatory power.

The third and last dynamic is essentially a result of the previous two one. According to the ever more intense cooperation of the MS, economically as well as politically, and the ongoing development of enhancing supranational authority through shifting decision-making power from the national to the supranational level also the previously presented dynamics intensified. The special character of the third dynamic is the evolution of a new conflict line or cleavage within domestic political systems. Scholars of public opinion towards the EU often call this dynamic the growing politicization of the European integration process, especially since the adoption of the Maastricht treaty

in 1992 (see e.g. Franklin et al. 1994a; Eichenberg/Dalton 2007; Hooghe/Marks 2005, 2008a; Kriesi et al. 2008a,b, 2006, 2012). This third dynamic consists of several dimensions or is, at least, the most complex dimension of the here presented. The growing politicization of the European integration process resulted not only in the intensification of the two above described dynamics but led to the creation of a new cleavage in domestic political arenas. National political parties try to capture this new issue partly even trying to integrate this issue into the classic left-right-dimension of political competition. Scholars of political contestation and political spaces offer a broad range of concepts regarding how to conceptualize political spaces by including the new conflict line 'European integration'. The breakdown of the 'permissive consensus' and the since then ever growing politicization and increasing salience of European integration (c.f. for the individual level Imig 2004, for the national party level Steenbergen/Scott 2004) are two sides of the same coin.

I also consider the 'physical' introduction of the Euro as a critical event, thereby following Fligstein (2008), because the introduction of the common currency constitutes an event no individual in the Eurozone has been able to ignore (Delors 2013). However, this period presents a mixed nature because of the Eastern enlargement in 2004 and 2007, which eurosceptic, right-wing parties used to fuel fear of immigration. One might argue, by taking into account a fourth period beginning with 2002, I have also to define a fourth dynamic according to the trias presented by Fligstein. However, the dynamics identified by Fligstein do not coincide with the periods he defined. Surely, there is an interdependence between the segmentation of the historical development and the trias of dynamics. Although I am convinced that the physical introduction considerably influenced individual attitudes towards the European integration process by abolishing a symbol of national identification, namely the domestic currency, and fuelling eurosceptic attitudes by the subsequent two Eastern enlargement rounds, I do not assume that these events triggered a dynamic with a quality justifying an own dynamic. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the events from 2002, 2004, and 2007 have intensified the third dynamic. Although we speak all too often only about the negative consequences of the third dynamic, i.e. intensified euroscepticism, electoral strengthening of eurosceptic political parties, etc., the third dynamic also implies positive consequences.

> "There have been moments when a more transnational debate over issues has occurred and European governments have been pushed to act collectively in order to respond to their publics. The main conduit for these politics is the media which offers extensive coverage of EU politics and events in member states. But this kind of politics that unites citizens

> across member states, what could be called a horizontal or more descriptively, European politics, remains the least developed" (Fligstein 2008, 12).

The scholarly literature dealing with public opinion towards the EU rarely recognized the influence of the institutional development of the European unification process as well as the position of the EU within international relations. However, the institutional configuration has been recognized implicitly, e.g. employing theories of economic voting to explain the on average more positive attitudes towards the EU of well-educated, high income individuals. This approach argues that due to the economically liberalizing character of the EU the better-off are more positive towards the European unification process (see e.g. Gabel 1998b,a). This line of argument implicitly takes into consideration the institutional set-up of the EU. Furthermore, some scholars differentiate between a pre- and post-Maastricht period thereby assuming that the adoption of the Maastricht treaty did change the character of the EU from a more economic to a more political one (see e.g. Eichenberg/Dalton 2007; Hooghe/Marks 2008a). The same line of argument applies to those studies, which see identity-related factors more important in explaining public opinion towards the EU in the post-Maastricht period than rational cost-benefit considerations (e.g. Hooghe/Marks 2004, 2008a; McLaren 2007, 2002; Sundlisæter Skinner 2012; Serricchio et al. 2013).

In the following paragraphs I will identify four different periods and correspondingly four different qualities of relationship between the European public and the EU. I will use two treaties and and a single event—the introduction of the common currency—to mark the end, respectively, the beginning of different periods. Furthermore the respective hypotheses regarding the relative explanatory power of economic and identity/cultural theories will be presented.

2.4.3. The period of non-politicization

At a very general level we can divide the development of the EU over the past six decades into three periods (see e.g. Çíftçí 2005b): However, the first period consists of two phases, whereas from the beginning until approximately the end of the 1960s the EU was largely seen as a project fostering and ensuring peace. The predecessor of the European Union, the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) has been founded in 1951 and served predominantly to prevent war in Europe. After two devastating world wars six European nations–Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg

and the Netherlands–decided to regulate important strategic resources. The years thereafter until 1985 were largely characterized by pessimism and stalemate (for a different view especially regarding the 1970s see e.g. Moravcsik 1998, 312ff.). Scholars of the European integration attribute this slowdown in efforts towards further integration to three circumstances. Namely the failure of the EU to cope with (1) the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, (2) the two oil crises, and (3) the resulting bad economic performance in the EU. The resulting economic stagnation in Europe led to fears by the European elite, political as well as economic, to become the only third most important economic area after the USA and Japan (see e.g. Baun 1995; Keohane/Hoffmann 1991). The aim of the subsequent so-called 1992-project was increased economic efficiency and growth through removal of national barriers to the movement of goods, services, labour and capital.

Furthermore, although the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been a hotly debated topic since the 1950s, especially for France leading under de Gaulle to the 'empty chair'-crisis in 1965-66, however, a vigorously public debate has been fought in the early 1980s. This debate about the CAP, leading to Germany's first veto in EU history by invoking the Luxembourg Compromise by the Kohl-government (c.f. Moravcsik 1998, 331ff.), might have influenced the public opinion towards the European unification project (c.f. Çíftçí 2005b, 476). Furthermore, the struggle about CAP reform also has paved the way for the British rebate on the UK's contribution to the EU budget. Britain was the largest per capita net contributor, but received only a small share of the agricultural subsidies which amounted at that time to 70% of the whole EU budget (see e.g. Moravcsik 1991, 32).

The justification for summarizing these two phases into one period lies in the only weakly politicized nature of the European unification project in the European public at these years—at least compared to the period after the implementation of the Maastricht treaty. This circumstance is often called as 'permissive consensus' (see Lindberg/Scheingold 1970), or Moravcsik speaks of periods 'Europessimism' and 'Eurosclerosis' which indicates that not only politicians lost faith in the EU but also some academics got more and more pessimistic (Moravcsik 1991).

Following Pieter de Wilde, as already addressed in the introduction, 'politicization' can be defined as "[...] an increase in polarization of opinions, interests or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards the process of policy formulation

within the European Union" (de Wilde 2007, 20), non-politicization implies the absence of opinion polarization and therefore low to none salience in the public discourse.

Considering the low-politicized nature of the European integration process I hypothesize that neither economic nor cultural/identity approaches explain public support towards the EU. Of course, there have been beneficiaries of the European unification project in this period, but this group has been relatively small and consisted of managers, business owners, professionals, generally the affluent. Those who did not benefit did not have disadvantages of the European integration process. European politics in this period did focus predominantly on decisions regarding the so-called 'negative integration' (see Scharpf 1996), i.e. decisions have been directed at removing barriers to trade and economic competition.

> "The main beneficiary of supranational European law has been negative integration. Its basic rules were already contained in the 'primary law' of the Treaties of Rome. From this foundation, liberalization could be extended, without much political attention, through interventions of the European Commission against infringements of Treaty obligations, and through the decisions and preliminary rulings of the European Court of Justice. By contrast, positive integration depends upon the agreement of national governments in the Council of Ministers; it is does subject to all of the impediments facing European intergovernmental policy-making" (Scharpf 1996, 15).

Furthermore, the salience of the European integration process was very low to non-existent in the national public discourses, mainly because European politics in the period of non-politicization did not affect the life of the people. Therefore I hypothesize the following relationship between cultural/identity and economic-voting approaches in the period of non-politicization:

H1: During the period of non-politicization the relative explanatory power of egocentric economic voting is at the lowest level compared to the three following periods.

2.4.4. The period of 'new hope'

These periods of stalemate changed with the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986, respectively with the appointment of Jacques Delors as president of the commission in 1985. The EU's *relance* was mainly due to Jacques Delor's fostering of the internal market project implying further economic liberalization and cooperation (see e.g. Ludlow 2006). Furthermore, with respect to the experience of the EU's incapacity to act and

the upcoming enlargement round the member states felt the need for reforms. The path from the single market programme to the economic and monetary union was cherished by most of the member state governments as well as by a majority of the European public.

The project of a common internal market implied the creation of a new European currency in order to abolish monetary advantages for specific member states, especially for Germany, who became the de-facto benchmark for the other currencies participating in the exchange-rate mechanism (ERM) and to achieve monetary stability necessary for the EMU (European Monetary Union).

> "The creation of a European currency, mirroring European integration generally, has been very much an elite-driven, top-down, politically insulated phenomenon. The 'permissive consensus' [...] that had prevailed in the European Community throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s was in evidence throughout the negotiations on EMU that ended at the Maastricht summit of December 1991. However, after the Treaty on European Union, or Maastricht Treaty, had been signed, a new era of mass public-elite relations about European matters began" (Heisenberg 2006, 234).

In order to understand the massive changes introduced with the Maastricht treaty and, thereby, leading to a politicization of the European Union we have to summarize the key events and their consequences. As already mentioned, because of his long tradition of not devaluating his currency, Germany became the de-facto benchmark of the ERM, which has allowed for an adjustable peg (+/- 2.25 % of the central peg). This system has induced economic disadvantages for other member states participating in the ERM. Especially France was eager to change this system and proposed several changes to the ERM, because

> "[...] whenever the German mark (Deutsche Mark or DM) appreciated [...] because of sudden international currency inflows seeking a safe haven, the French central bank [...] had to intervene with scarce reserves in order to prevent the franc from falling below its DM floor. [...] Moreover, German exporters did not have to bear the trade disadvantages of an appreciating currency" (Heisenberg 2006, 236).

The major external event paving the way to the adoption of the Maastricht treaty has been the break-down of the Soviet Union and the subsequent fall of the Berlin wall. This chain of events prepared the (re-)unification of Germany, which especially France was afraid of.

Linking external and internal events, France was in favor of monetary coordination at

the European level because of the dominance of the German Bundesbank. The key event for the French proposal of a new currency regime with fixed exchange rates was the so-called 'Black Monday' in October 1987. This date denotes an hitherto unprecedented fall in the US stock market which led to large investments in the DM. Consequently, the DM appreciated and the other members of the ERM, without economic downturns or 'bad' policies, had to stabilize their currencies, because they dropped under their respective bottom fluctuation margin against the DM.

The years to come were characterized by technocratic policy making. Jacques Delors established the so-called Delors-committee, which formulated the institutional configuration (three stage process) of the EMU resulting in the Delors-report released in April 1989. Essentially, there were two opposing groups of member states trying to reach different outcomes regarding the process to EMU, whereas there existed essentially two groups, the first one consisting of France, Italy, Spain, Belgium and the Commission wanting the fastest way to EMU with a strict timetable, whereas the second group consisting of Germany, Britain, the Netherlands, and Denmark demanded a more flexible road to EMU (Heisenberg 2006). The compromise consisted of France accepting strict convergence criteria and Germany agreeing on the creation of a European central bank at the beginning of stage three. Consequently, the member states had to find a compromise regarding the convergence criteria, which later were institutionalized in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).

It were essentially those two features which rose domestic opposition against the EMU and that fuelled euroscepticism and gave rise to eurosceptic political parties, respectively let established political parties, mostly parties at the fringes of the political spectrum, instrumentalise the emerging political issue of euroscepticism (see e.g. Hooghe et al. 2004). The lowering of public trust towards the European unification project was largely due to the loss of domestic dominance over monetary policy and restrictive policies resulting from meeting the convergence criteria, although the supranational level was also often blamed wrongfully for domestic austerity measures.

After the German unification and the 1:1 exchange rate of DM and 'Ostmark' the ERM was under severe strain, because the German Bundesbank refused to lower their interest rates despite a beginning economic downturn.

> "The fact that economic differentials could no longer be corrected by means of realignments meant that German unification essentially undermined the EMS just as it was set to become a measure of economic convergence" (Heisenberg 2006, 242ff.).

H2: In the era of the *relance* the relative explanatory power of egocentric economic voting approach increases throughout this period.

2.4.5. The period of the 'post-Maastricht blues'

The pressure on the EMS has been further intensified through the speculations at the currency markets on the French franc and the English pound. The currency speculation followed the referendas on the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark, Ireland and France. However, the public of the latter two countries approved the Maastricht Treaty, whereas the citizenry of Denmark voted preponderantly 'No'. Only an amendment to the Maastricht Treaty,the so-called Edinburgh agreement, including an opting-out possibility for Denmark regarding entering the third stage of EMU[17], led to a second referenda on the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 whereas the Danish people accepted the Maastricht Treaty. The Danish 'No' is considered to mark the end of the so-called 'permissive consensus', albeit only as an symbolic event. However, since the Maastricht Treaty eurosceptic parties are on the rise all over Europe.

Although European integration has been already an contested issue in national political arenas in the mid of the 1980s, the end of the 'permissive consensus' became noticeable during the ratification process of the Maastricht treaty. A further argument in the scholarly discussion, as already mentioned in the introduction, is the changing emphasis of 'negative' and 'positive integration', whereas the former one predominated in the pre-Maastricht periods and implied the removal of tangible barriers to trade and the latter implied the purposive creation of supranational policies in order to adopt laws using the community method. Thus, through a stronger emphasis of 'positive integration' in ever more salient policy areas the European integration process also became more and more visible in everyday life and public discourses (e.g. Franklin et al. 1994a). This fact became especially remarkable in the course of the French and Danish referenda necessary for ratifying the Maastricht treaty. Since then because of the growing politicization and increasing salience of European integration (c.f. for the individual level Imig 2004, for the national party level Steenbergen/Scott 2004), the European unification process became an additional dimension in national political spaces (regarding conceptual discussions see e.g. Marks/Steenbergen 2002; Steenbergen/Marks 2004; Hooghe et al. 2004).

[17]The Edinburgh agreement consisted of four sections regarding citizenship, EMU, defence policy (membership in the Western European Union) and Justice and Home Affairs (see e.g. Svensson 2002).

Regarding the relationship between member states, after the Franco-German deal of exchanging EMU with German reunification, the tensions between France and Germany have not relaxed. Germany had to bear the generous offers it had made toward their East-german counterparts. The German Bundesbank has changed its role, from a hard currency exporter to a deliverer of high interest rates thereby attracting investment especially from the US. Therefore, other MS had to pay for it, because they "[...] were obliged to keep their currencies pegged to the soaring mark by raising their own interest rates. [...] It was only a question of time before the other member states began to resent paying for German reunification with their own unemployment"(Gilbert 2003, 228). Therefore, the EMU was one of the most important topics in the 1990s. Concerning European enlargement, the Northern Enlargement in 1995 posed no problem, because the new MS were economically potent and had only relatively small populations, but the CEEC's knocked at the EU's door. In the mid-1990s all countries joining the EU in 2004 and 2007 passed on their applications. Consequently, the EU had to think about reforming decision-making processes to remain able to act in an EU-25 or EU-27.

Especially eurosceptic right-wing parties aroused fear of massive immigration due to Eastern enlargement and of loss of sovereignty because of shifting more power to the supranational level. However, politicization does not imply only negative consequences, politicization indicates that political competition reaches a stadium of normality and points to the fact that Europe is a polity-in-the-making and no sense- and meaningless political construction (Checkel/Katzenstein 2009).

Considering the above mentioned developments I hypothesize:

H3: The relative explanatory power of cultural/identity approaches is higher compared to the relative explanatory power of egocentric economic voting.

2.4.6. The period of an 'ever closer union'

These three periods—the period of depolitization and 'eurosclerosis' from the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community until the Single European Act and 1986, the period of growing trust and increasing expectations towards the European unification project but also an still existing 'permissive consenus' between 1986 and the adoption of the Maastricht treaty in 1992 and the period after Maastricht with an

increased politicized nature of the EU and intensified eurosceptical publics all over europe—are the same as those identified by Çíftçí (Çíftçí 2005b).

However, I want to add a fourth period beginning with 2002 and the publicly visible introduction of the Euro. Although, the Euro has been introduced already in 1999, marking the entering into force of the third stage of the EMU, most of the European public either did not know it or did not recognize it, because they were not confronted with the Euro in their day-to-day businesses. Between 1999 and 2001 the Euro served as an exchange rate unit to which the national currencies of EMU-participating member states[18] were fixed. The introduction of Euro notes and coins and the step-wise abolition of the national currencies of the 12 participating member states (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland , Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain) can be seen as a further loss of national sovereignty or at least as a loss of a national symbol. However, the loss of national sovereignty over monetary policy became effective as early as in 1999 with the single monetary policy under the responsibility of the European Central Bank (ECB) already established in 1998. Nevertheless, I assume the loss of the national currency and the introduction of a new currency as an essential point in time, because the introduction of the Euro was almost immediately felt by each individual in the participating countries.

National currencies serve as a national symbol a citizenry can identify with. "Indeed, political elites have regularly used money to construct specific political identities and social boundaries. Accordingly, money has not only served economic functions but has also operated as a symbol of place, locality and power"(Kaelberer 2004, 2). However, national currencies also need some level of collective support, because money cannot function properly if nobody trusts its value or simply denies to accept it. Thus, money has not only a symbolic function but also needs collective support to fulfil this task. Introducing the Euro, consequently, implied abandoning the before existing national currency thereby loosing a national symbol. Furthermore, supporting the replacement of a national currency with the Euro implies the willingness to strengthen the European integration project. As Banducci/Karp & Loedel put it, "[...] understanding the dynamic interplay of public support (or lack thereof) for the Euro is critical for evaluating the future viability of European integration and the increasing movement toward supranational governance"(2003, 686).

[18] In 1999 and 2000 11 member states have participated in the EMU, in 2001 Greece also entered the final stage of the EMU and adopted the Euro.

Previous research on political support of the common currency takes different determinants into account in order to explain variation in attitudes towards the Euro. Similar to research of public opinion toward the EU early studies of support for the common currency concentrated on economic factors. Manfred Gärtner (1997), for example, found evidence that individuals from countries with loose fiscal or monetary policy, i.e. individuals from countries which experienced high inflation and/or accumulated debts are more likely to support the common currency. Furthermore, also the length of membership in the EMS determines attitudes toward the Euro. Matthew Gabel (2000) focuses on the distributional costs of the common currency and the related convergence criteria for different groups of citizens, i.e. he differentiates between occupational sectors, e.g. between the public sector and the industry sector or between groups dependent on welfare benefits and therefore influenced by austerity measures. Furthermore, Gabel, like Gärtner, found a positive relationship between public debt and support for the Euro. However, recent analysis also employed identity/cultural-related explanations. Kaltenthaler & Anderson (2001) find empirical support that national identity, national economic performance and support for the EU are important determinants of support for the Euro.

Banducci et. al. (2003) employ a similar strategy as the analysis at hand, they focus on the changing dynamic of support for the Euro in the post-Maastricht period. Thereby, the authors differentiate between "[...] the exchange rate turmoil of 1992-1993, the expansion of the EU to 15 Member states in 1995, ongoing referendums in Denmark (1992, 1993 and again in 2000), treaty revisions (Amsterdam), renewed negotiations on the conditions of EMU (the Stability and Growth Pact of 1997), the launch of the Euro (1999) and Britain's on-again, off-again relationship with the EU and the Euro project" (Banducci et al. 2003, 689ff.). Again, the results corroborate some of the findings of previous studies. There is a strong relationship between national economic conditions and support for the common currency, explicitly a weak national currency fuels support for the Euro. Furthermore, those mostly affected by austerity measures because of meeting the convergence criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact are more likely to not support the Euro project. In a follow-up study, the same authors (Banducci et al. 2009) also concentrated on identity/cultural-related factors, thereby focusing on the period after the physical introduction of the Euro. The empirical results, again, indicate that economic concerns structure support for the common currency. Perceived inflation and positive assessments of the national economy determine attitudes toward the Euro. An interesting finding suggests that economic considerations are important inside the Eurozone, whereas identity plays a more important role outside.

A second important event in the period of an 'ever closer union' has been the first round of Eastern enlargement in 2004, which has been the biggest enlargement in the history of the European integration process in terms of number of people and territorial expansion. The accession of 10 new countries to the EU led to a total population of roughly 450 million. The negotiation process began in 1998 with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia, furthermore the EU began accession negotiations with Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, and Slovakia in 1999. At its December 2002 summit in Copenhagen the EU concluded accession talks with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The accession treaty was signed with these ten states on April 16, 2003.

However, some 'old' MS feared disadvantages for their domestic labour markets because of a possible massive immigration from the 'new' MS, because the first enlargement round brought approximately 75 million additional individuals into the EU, whereas the GDP decreased to around 92 % of the level of the 'old' MS, furthermore, the income levels of the CEEC's ranged between one-third and 40 % (Worldbank vs. Eurostat estimates) of those in the EU.

> "Given the magnitude of income and wage differentials and the strong degree of integration involved by the accession, there are mounting concerns among the present EU members that Eastern Enlargement may have a number of undesirable effects on labour markets and income distribution. In particular, a deterioration of living standards of the unskilled workers, associated with job displacement and wage losses triggered by the inflow of low-cost labour and the de-localisation of plants from the West to the East is feared"(Boeri/Bruecker 2001, 49).

Consequently, the 'old' MS insisted on a transition period to be implemented into the Accession Treaty. The transition period has been designed according to the so-called '2+3+2'-model, i.e. the MS of the EU15 could restrict the free movement of labour[19]. to their domestic labour market for the 8 new MS (there has been no transition period for Cyprus and Malta) for the first time only for a period of two years. The extension of the transition period of another 3 years was possible after a report published by the European commission and a last extension for further 2 years has been only possible in the case of considerable disadvantages for the respective domestic labour market[20].

[19]The transition period rules refer not only to the free movement of workers, but also to rules regarding the acquisition of land and secondary residences, value added tax (VAT) and excise matters, as well as in the area of environment.

[20]Two remarks are worth mentioning: First, transition periods are no novel instrument, they have also

Especially eurosceptic parties drew a picture of massive immigration of low-cost labour from the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), thereby fuelling sentiments against the Enlargement process in general.

Besides the feeling of some individuals that the EU robbed their national currency and therefore a national identification symbol, because "(d)issatisfaction with the euro was a standing incentive to political elites on the extreme Left and Right to instrumentalize it for populist Euro-sceptic politics."(Dyson 2008, 5), the relationship between MS and the Euro were tensed in the early 2000s. Economically, the Euro Area faced a low rate of economic growth, declining labour productivity and high long-term unemployment as well as a decreasing rate of growth of real disposable incomes, but, simultaneously, rising corporate profits as a share of GDP (see Dyson 2008).

Additionally, 'perceived' inflation played in the hands of eurosceptic parties, the European citizens saw the changeover to the Euro as hidden price increases. The 'Teuro' discussion in Germany and Austria is only one sign of consumer inflation perceptions.

However, the years between 1999 and 2005 were characterized by favourable economic factors, "[...] sustained high rates of global growth bolstered by rising US consumption and corresponding indebtedness; a continuing flow of technological changes that generated new products, product improvements, and production efficiency gains; and the new entry of India and China into the global economy, with a huge expansion in the supply of cheap labour and subsequent downward pressure on prices. In short, the ECB, like other central banks, could deliver historically low real interest rates and conduct overall an accommodating monetary policy for growth and employment"(Dyson 2008, 13).

Individuals who are capable of taking their advantage out of these favourable economic conditions have available the respective human capital to profit from economic liberalization in general. Individuals lacking this human capital are not only not able to profit from intensified international economic competition but are also disadvantaged by the high supply of cheap labour especially from India and China because they are more likely to lose their jobs. Additionally, those people are often reluctant to welfare provisions, which have been subject to austerity measures in most MS, not

been applied in the case of Greece, Spain, and Portugal. Second, each country of the EU-15 have used the transition period in different ways and to a different extent.

least because of the Stability and Growth pact, which came under crisis in November 2003.

With the above presented developments in mind I hypothesize:

H4: In the period of an 'ever closer union' the relative explanatory power of the cultural/identity-related approach is at its highest level compared to the preceding three periods.

These are the four periods of European integration between 1976 and 2005 which I assume are influential in the shaping of individual attitudes towards the EU and offer a specific context and specific characteristics of the European unification process necessary to take into account when analyzing the relative explanatory power of different theoretical approaches of public opinion towards the EU. This thesis is, to my knowledge, which explicitly uses the political and economic background of the European integration as well as its characteristics to analyze individual attitudes towards the European unification project.

After presenting my theoretical considerations regarding public support of the European integration process and the formulation of my expectations regarding the following empirical analysis, I will now turn to data- and method-related concerns.

3. Data and Methods

Generally, political scientists want to explore how one or more variables or factors, the independent variables, influence a specific phenomena or outcome, the dependent variable. Each independent variable should have a theory-driven causal influence on the specific outcome. Whenever we can theoretically plausibly assume a relevant influence of several independent variables on a dependent variable we face a multivariate analysis problem. In order to deal with the complex interrelationships among several variables we need some kind of mathematical model. The choice of the appropriate right statistical model depends on the characteristics of the dependent variable and technical characteristics of the independent variables, sampling processes, etc. For example, comparative research often employs time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data which often poses the problem of autoregression, i.e. the dependent variable is not independent from its own values of former periods, e.g. the gross-domestic prod-

uct. Furthermore, TSCS data also allows for correlated error terms within the sections, e.g. nations, i.e. because of the idiosyncrasies of specific nations. Consequently, cases from the same nation are not independent and more clustered than cases from another country, which leads to biased standard errors and an overestimation of the precision of the model used. However, the first topic to consider in choosing the appropriate model is the characteristic of the dependent variable.

Variables in survey-data are often nominal or categorical variables, because the standardization of the questionnaire requires a limited number of categories for the answers. The Eurobarometer data is no exception and often-used dependent variables, like the membership-question, are categorical or ordinal. In the following analysis I will assume that the membership-question is an ordinal variable with three categories – good, neither/nor and bad, because the categories of this variable can clearly be ranked, but respondents may not see the differences between the categories as the same. In order to take into account the ordinal nature of the dependent variable a model for ordinal outcomes is the proper choice – the ordered logit model. The choice between the ordered logit and the ordered probit model is essentially a matter of taste, although the logit model has been easier to compute and may therefore have historical advantages.

Ordered response models are more general versions of binary response models suited for models employing dependent ordinal variables with more than two categories. The categories of an ordinal variable can be ranked from low to high, but the distances between the various categories are not the same.

In the following I will present the dependent variable as well as the independent ones and will then discuss the appropriate methods to analyse the data at hand.

3.1. The dependent variable

We will now turn to the dataset used for the following analysis. Basically, I have extended the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trendfile (Schmitt/Scholz 2005) with the Standard Eurobarometer surveys from 2003 up to 2007 and pooled all these datasets. The trend questions of the final dataset are the same as in the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trendfile until a specific trend question has not been abandoned, i.e. I have not added new trend questions even if they would have met the necessary requirements as estab-

lished by the team of the Mannheim Trendfile. I will firstly present the independent variables because I will embed the discussion about the dependent variable – the membership question – into a broader context about measuring public opinion towards the European integration process and the dimensionality of a European integration dimension. Let us turn to the main dependent variable of the following analysis - the membership question - with the following wording:

"Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the European Union (Community, common market) is a ...?"

1. good thing

2. neither good nor bad

3. a bad thing

Again I have recoded this variable so that higher values indicate a more positive evaluation of ones country's membership. Before dealing with the analysis regarding the number of dimensions of European integration lets have a look at some descriptives. Figure 1 shows the changes over time of the percentage of respondents answering the membership question with one of the valid possibilities between 1973 and 2007. The text-boxes indicate the number of member states and since I focus my analysis on the EU-15 I did not indicate the first Eastern enlargement in 2004.

Figure 1 shows the responses to the membership-question between 1973 and 2007, the vertical dashed lines indicate a change in the composition of MS. In 1981 Greece joined the EU, in 1986 Portugal and Spain became members and in 1995, the Northern or EFTA enlargement, Austria,Sweden and Finland entered the club of EU member states. We can see the percentage of individuals perceiving the membership of their country as a 'good thing' has been relatively high in the 1970ies but decreases. This trend changed during the 1980ies and those figures rose to an all-time high in 1991 with 76.15% of the respondents thinking their membership is a 'good thing'. Then support declined again until a low in our time-frame of 51.80% in 1996. Afterwards the figures gently increased and reached approximately the level of 1984 in 2007. The literature explains the decline between 1991 and 1996 largely with the adoption of the Maastricht treaty in 1992 and the associated change from a period of 'permissive consensus' to a period of 'constraining dissensus' or the phase of the 'Post-Maastricht



Figure 1: Support for the European integration process measured with the membership-question.

blues' (Hooghe/Marks 2009; Down/Wilson 2008; Eichenberg/Dalton 2007; Franklin et al. 1994a,b,c).

The following figure provides the same measures as the previous one but for each individual country. Figure 2 shows that there is considerable cross-national variation between the three groups of membership-responses. In the vast majority of member states (Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands) the percentage of individuals holding the opinion that their country's membership is a bad thing never exceeds those percentage of individuals thinking EU membership is a good thing. However, in Austria, Denmark, Sweden, and the UK there are several time points where the share of 'bad'-responses outnumbers the share of 'good'-responses. The highest negative difference between the percentage of 'good'-responses and the percentage of 'bad'-responses showed the UK in 1980 with -22.3 percentage points. Furthermore, this figure shows the amount of difference between traditionally 'europhil' countries and traditionally 'eurosceptic'

countries. The countries were net-support exceeded the 80 percent threshold are Ireland, the Netherlands, Italy, and Luxembourg.

If we compare 2 to figure 1, we also see that although Greece joined as a rather sceptical country the attitudes towards the European integration process steeply increased during the 1980s and 1990s. Both countries of the Southern enlargement, Portugal and Spain, entered the EU with rather promising figures above 50% of their citizens perceiving the membership as a 'good thing'. What is also remarkable is, that from the original six founding MS, the course of positive attitudes remains rather stable and does not follow the aggregate figures, this is especially the case in Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands and to some extent in Belgium. Furthermore, in Belgium and Luxembourg it is even not possible to detect a difference between the pre- and post-Maastricht period.



Figure 2: Support of the European integration process across EU countries

In Belgium the positive attitudes do change, but on average they are slowly declining between 1973 and 2007 and in Luxembourg they seem to remain stable at a high level of approximately 75%. Also Denmark, one of the 'opting-out'-countries regarding the

EMU, displays interesting figures of positive attitudes since they are steadily increasing except at the time of the Maastricht treaty and after the referenda those figures are rising again. Also Ireland, a rather 'europhil' country, figure 2 shows no such mood change as expressed in a 'post-Maastricht'-blues, the positive attitudes are steadily increasing in the 1980s and at a lower rate in the 1990s.



Figure 3: Support of the European integration process across different groups

Figure 3 shows the percentage of 'good'-responses for each country according to their entry into the EU and the average percentage of EU citizens thinking the membership of their country is a good thing[21]. These graphs show that the original six member states (Belgium, West-Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) are on average more 'europhil' than the later joining countries, except Ireland and Greece after the late 1980s. What is also interesting to note is that after the entry of the on average more eurosceptic EFTA countries, also the percentage of 'good'-responses of old member states dropped, especially in Italy, West-Germany, and France. Nevertheless, what again becomes clear is that there exist considerable variation in each country

[21]Note that the graph for Germany since 1991 also includes East-Germany.

in public opinion regarding EU membership. Furthermore, as the lower right graph of figure 3 shows the percentage of 'good'-responses in Austria, Finland and Sweden never reached the EU-wide average percentage of citizens feeling that one's country EU membership is a good thing, only the UK also joins this club of 'eurosceptics' (see figure 2).



Figure 4: Support of the European integration process across different enlargements

The last graph visually presenting the 'good'-responses of the membership-question shows the average percentage of country-groups according to their entry into the EU. For the reasons of graphical readability I did not treat Greece as a 'joining-group' on their own and therefore Greece is part of the Southern-Enlargement group. Consequently, the graph for the Southern-Enlargement group between 1980 and 1986 shows only the 'good'-responses for Greece. This graph clearly shows what I mentioned already above, that the original six member states are on average the most 'europhil'-countries joined since 1996 by the three Southern-enlargement countries. Furthermore, the EFTA-enlargement countries are on average the most eurosceptic ones. Comparing the development of positive attitudes of the founding member states, the countries of the first enlargement and the Southern-enlargement reveals that although they started

with quite different levels of positive attitudes they converged to some extent after the adoption of the Maastricht treaty in 1992.

3.2. The independent variables

Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent as well as the independent variables. However, one has to treat these information with caution because it is only a rough overview of the dataset, i.e. those figures comprise the whole time-series-cross-sectional dataset. In the following I will present the wording of each question and the respective recoding strategy.

The left-right self-placement has been measured with the question: "In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place your views on this scale?" whereas the respondent could place herself on a scale between 0 indicating left and 10 indicating right. The variable left-right extremism is the squared left-right self-placement and puts more emphasis on the either left or right extremism. I included this variables because Hooghe, Marks and Wilson claim a non-linear relationship between support for European integration and left-right placement of political parties (Hooghe et al. 2002, 2004). The main assumption states, that the more extreme a party's position on the left/right dimension the more hostile this party is against European integration. Furthermore, the more centrist a partisan actor is the more supportive he will be.

> "European integration is primarily a market-liberal project mitigated by some measure of regulated capitalism. The Euroskepticism of extreme parties arises, therefore, not only from their opposition to the EU's policies, but also because they reject the ideology of the EU's construction"(Hooghe et al. 2004, 125).

The authors assume that actors on the extreme left defeat European integration because of its market-liberal character and political parties on the extreme right because of the feared losses of national sovereignty and for cultural reasons.

The variable 'exclusive national identity' rests on the question: "In the near future, do you see yourself as?"[22]

[22] I will suppress the codes for 'not know'. 'not applicable' because, first, I do not distinguish between these two possibilities and, second, I have largely deleted all missing values from the dataset, i.e. each case is a full subset of the dataset.

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Membership	2.465	0.735	1	3	632981
Left-Right Self Placement	5.305	2.065	1	10	613692
Left-Right Extremism	32.41	23.21	1	100	613692
Opinion Leader Index	2.472	0.928	1	4	597493
Dummy: Female/Male	-	-	0	1	632981
Age of Respondent	46.22	16.68	15	99	617409
Exclusive National Attachment	-	-	0	1	175635
Income Quartile	2.560	1.064	1	4	466411
Education Quantile	1.790	0.831	1	3	580771

Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the independent and dependent variable(s).

1. (Nationality) only

2. (Nationality) and European

3. European and (Nationality)

4. European only

In a further step I have recoded the variable to take on the value 1 if the respondent answered '(Nationality) only' and 0 otherwise. I included this variable into the model to take into account the theoretical arguments put forward in the 'national identity'-model (Hooghe/Marks 2004) and the 'cultural threat'-model (McLaren 2002, 2006, 2007).

The next independent variable, the 'opinion leader index' is a combination of two survey questions asking after the frequency of individual political discussions and the individual eagerness to politically persuade friends or family members, the wording of the former questions is: "When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?"

1. frequently

2. occasionally

3. never

The wording of the latter question is: "When you (yourself) hold a strong opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives or fellow workers to share your views? Does this happen...?"

1. often

2. from time to time

3. rarely

4. never

The term 'opinion leader' stems from the study "The People's Choice" conducted by

Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet (1968) and measures the political engagement of individuals and how important they are in acting as a 'transmission belt' for and politically influencing other individuals. Further, this measure captures the concept of 'cognitive mobilization' as developed by Ronald Inglehart (1970a). 'Cognitive mobilization' implies that those who are better educated and discuss about politics more often are on average more supportive of the European integration process (eg. Inglehart 1970a; Janssen 1991). I choose the same method for constructing the 'opinion leader index' as used in the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trendfile, but recoded the index such that higher values indicate a politically more engaged individual. Table 3 shows the coding scheme for the 'opinion leader index:

OLI	**Persuade**			
Poldisc	often	from time to time	rarely	never
frequently	4	4	3	3
occasionally	3	3	2	2
never	2	2	1	1

Table 3: Construction of the 'opinion leader index'.

The dummy variable 'female' just indicates the sex of an individual and amounts to 1 if the individual is female and 0 if it is a male. Equally simple, the variable 'age' indicates how old an individual has been and ranges from 15 to 99. The remaining independent variables are dummy variables indicating the level of income, the level of education and the respective occupation of the respondent. Since prior to the physical introduction of the common currency income has been measured with different currencies and each member state has had a different economic level I have normalized this variable by recoding this variable into four income quartiles, thus i.e. the dummy 'low-medium income' indicates individuals with a household income amounting to the second-lowest quartile (cf. Gabel 1998a,b,d). Lastly. I applied a similar approach to the educational level of the individuals by collapsing the 10 possible answers into three categories whereas a I ignored the possibility that an individual is still studying. The respective question wording is: "How old where you when you finished your full-time education?" with the possible answers:

1. up to 14 years

2. 15 years

3. 16 years
4. 17 years
5. 18 years
6. 19 years
7. 20 years
8. 21 years
9. 22 years and older
10. still studying

There is a lively discussion in the literature about how to measure education and the above measurement is far away from being perfect. We do not know if an individual has been just lazy and therefore slowly in attaining a bachelor whereas another individual also finished her studies at an age of 22 years and older but also received a master. Thus, we are measuring also a lot of noise and this measure is not very reliable and valid and therefore biased but it is the only available and thus we have to use it, nevertheless with caution (about measuring education see e.g. Schneider (2009)).

4. The Eurobarometer and its critics

The first Eurobarometer survey has been conducted between April and May 1974 and have been published in July 1974 (from 1970 until 1973 surveys have been conducted called European Community Studies). Since then the European Commission uses the various Eurobarometer surveys to gather information about the public opinion in the respective member states. Jaques-Renè Rabier has born the idea as early as the beginning of 1960 to gather information about the public opinion towards the European integration process and about political challenges. The ultimate decision to launch the Eurobarometer survey has been a report by Wilhemus Schujit in 1972 about deficits in the EU's information politics (c.f. Nissen 2012). The Eurobarometer surveys have not

always been used only to collect information about levels of knowledge and opinions but also to predict possible reactions to future decisions (Pausch 2008, 540).

Today, there exists an armada of different Eurobarometer surveys, namely the 'classic' Standard Eurobarometer, the Special Eurobarometer, the Flash Eurobarometer, and the Qualitative Eurobarometer. Aside of these still conducted surveys two Eurobarometer series vanished, one has been the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, which has been conducted from 1990 to 1997, and the second one, has been the Applicant and Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, which is essentially the successor of the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer and has been conducted until 2004. The latter one has been more similar to the Standard Eurobarometer since it also included selected trend questions and topical modules.

Since this study exclusively relies on the Standard Eurobarometer I will not deal with the other survey series. However, there exist three cumulative datasets: the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File, the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer Trend File 1990-1997, and the 'Public Understanding of Science in Europe 1989-2005 Eurobarometer Trend File'. The analysis at hand only deals with the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File. The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File 1970-2002 (ZA3521) is the product of a project realized under the guidance of Hermann Schmitt at the 'Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung (MZES)' (Schmitt/Scholz 2005). This dataset consists of all Standard-Eurobarometers between 1970 and 2002, i.e. from the European Communities Study 1970 up to the Eurobarometer 57.2 from 2002. Thus, the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File comprises 86 waves, 145 variables, and more than 1 million cases. The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File defines a trend variable as a question which has been asked at least 5 times with identical wording and stemming from the Standard Eurobarometer surveys (Schmitt/Scholz 2005).

The Standard Eurobarometer are conducted on behalf of the European Commission twice a year. The respondents answer the questions during a face-to-face interview and the sample size amounts to roughly 1.000 respondents per member state (with roughly 500 respondents in Malta, Cyprus, and Luxembourg). The Standard Eurobarometer comprises questions regarding diverse topics but also include trend questions. Further, the amount of questions increased from roughly 20 questions in the first European Community Studies to more than 80 in the EB75 (Nissen 2012). Consequently, also the reports of the European Commission with regard to the results of the Standard Eurobarometer became more and more lengthy. The first reports comprised to roughly

40 pages, whereas the report to the EB75 has 469 pages, and the all-time high refers to report of the EB69 with 1.415 pages.

The increasing amount of data and tightly connected also the increasing amount of secondary analysis of Standard Eurobarometer datasets evoked many critics. Those criticism aims at different characteristics of the Standard Eurobarometer surveys, which can be summarized in three categories:

- contextual characteristics
- application and analysis of the Standard Eurobarometer
- methodological deficiencies

I will mainly concentrate on methodological criticism since this part is the most relevant for the study at hand. The first category comprises mostly the critic that a political actors like the European Commission is the contracting entity and defines the type and amount and the wording of the questions as well as the publishing of the results and thus can control the information going public(Nissen 2012; Pausch 2008). Simultaneously, the European Commission uses those results to legitimate their own activity and as an instrument to counteract the often posited democratic deficit of the European Union (eg. Føllesdal/Hix 2006; Kohler-Koch/Rittberger 2007; Scharpf 1999). Criticism also argues that the purpose of the Standard Eurobarometer changed since its implementation. Sylke Nissen (Nissen 2012, 2014) argues that in the beginning the European Commission used the surveys as an instrument to observe the public opinion within the member states and to advice political decisions whereas today the author suspects that the Commission uses them as an intervening instrument, i.e. rather to create public opinion (cf. Pausch 2008, 2009).

The second strand of criticism focuses on the interpretation of the data and the Commission's strategy of informing the public via results of the Eurobarometer surveys. Much of the criticism is motivated by the methodological idiosyncrasies of the Standard Eurobarometer and thus I will deal with those topics more thoroughly in the following paragraphs. As already mentioned, the European Commission publishes twice a year reports on the results of the Eurobarometer surveys, whereas these analysis are mostly just descriptive summaries of the results, i.e. frequency counts and percentage calculations cross-tabulated with socio-demographic characteristics, from a longitudinal perspective as well as from a cross-sectional. Authors like Sylke Nissen

2012; 2014 or Markus Pausch 2008; 2009 especially doubt the validity of time-series data because, first of all, the Standard Eurobarometer has no panel design and, secondly, the sample selection procedure differs, and, thirdly, sometimes the wording of questions changed. Further, Sylke Nissen argues, that "(d)ivergent cultural standards and developmental levels that have an effect within the European Union and can influence the interview partners' response behaviour are not taken into account [...]" (Nissen 2014, forthcoming). These are roughly the critical arguments with regard to the contextual characteristics and the analysis and application of the gathered data by the European Commission. I will now turn to the methodological issues and discuss the possible consequences for the analysis at hand.

We cannot discuss methodological problems with regard to survey design per se, i.e. without taking into account the respective research design. The study at hand predominantly employs a time-series cross-sectional design and will assess the explanatory power of two rivalling theories regarding public opinion towards the European integration process. If we want to compare the explanatory impact of (egocentric) economic voting and identity-related theoretical approaches the datasets have to have specific characteristics. Sylke Nissen 2012; 2014 points to the fact that sample selection did differ across time and countries until 1989. So form instance Eurobarometer surveys rested on quota samples in Germany, France, Italy, Great Britain, Ireland, and Belgium. In other countries the polling institutes used random sampling to select their respondents and sometimes mixed methods have been used (cf. Böltken/Gehring 1984). Although, it would be desirable to compare surveys with a unified strategy of selecting samples the important question is: Do these different sampling procedures yield a substantive bias or error to compromise the pooled dataset? There is an ongoing discussion especially between the merits and drawbacks between quota sampling and random (probability) sampling (eg. Böltken/Gehring 1984; Reuband 1998). The most prominent argument with respect to quota sampling is that it is a non- random selection technique and thus common (frequentist) statistical formulae must not be used, e.g. the calculation of confidence intervals (eg. Reuband 1998). Since the (frequentist) interpretation of probability rests on the law of large numbers (cf. DeGroot/Schervish 2012) and thus the probability equals the relative frequency if the experiment, i.e. drawing a sample, may be, at least in theory, repeated infinite times a quota sample does not fulfil the necessary (frequentist) requirements (eg. Moser 1952; Biemer/Lyberg 2003). However, there exist a few studies which empirically assess the consequences of choosing either sampling strategy (Böltken/Gehring 1984; Reuband 1998). Surprisingly, they find no substantive differences, except that socially active in-

dividuals are more likely to be selected using quota sampling than random sampling (Reuband 1998).

With regard to the longitudinal or time-series perspective one strand of criticism refers to the fact that the Standard Eurobarometer is no panel survey, i.e. in each wave of the Eurobarometer opinion pollsters draw a new sample of respondents. Notwithstanding, the reports of the European Commission and political scientists alike use the data to describe and analyse changes in public opinion over time (Nissen 2012, 2014). Generally, we can distinguish three different research designs with regard to longitudinal surveys or studies (eg. Kumar 2010; Menard 2008; Frees 2004):

- Trend Study
- Cohort Study
- Panel Study

In a trend study the researchers repeatedly draws a sample from the same population and asks the same set of questions although the sample is not the same and will be drawn anew in each wave. The cohort study employs the same logic as the trend study, i.e. although the population remains the same the sample differs, but focuses explicitly on cohort effects. Contrastingly, panel studies repeatedly ask the same group of individuals over time and thus is perfectly suited to assess intra-individual effects. That said, having no panel design is no a priori a shortcoming of the Standard Eurobarometer data until one does not want to analyse intra-individual changes over time, e.g. the causal relationship between individual party identification and issue orientation (Milazzo et al. 2012). If for example, a report shows the share of individuals perceiving the membership of their country as a 'good thing' there is, methodologically, no need for a panel design. However, for reasons of completeness, there are more severe problems with regard to analyse time trends. The Eurobarometer survey redefined the population twice. Until 1993 the sampling population in a specific country comprised all individuals residing and being member of that country. After 1993 the population consisted all individuals living in a specific country and being a member of any member state of the European Union (Nissen 2012, 2014). Further, the population of the European Union also changed in the course of the European enlargement advancing from the original founding member states of the ECSC to the EU28. Whereas the former problem might have consequences in specific research contexts, we can avoid the latter by excluding the analysis to a specific sub-group or by including breaks in the

time series. Although not exclusively related to longitudinal studies effects of changed question wordings, suggestive questions, and question ordering may bias the reliability of the Standard Eurobarometer (Nissen 2012, 2014; Pausch 2008, 2009; Höpner/Jurczyk 2012). It remains to the judgement of the researcher to call into question the reliability of changed question wording and really to decide as the case arises. With regard to suggestive questions and question ordering effects we have ex post no possibility to assess the amount of bias[23], again it remains to the critical judgement of the researcher and the research question and research design of the secondary analysis.

In the following I will shortly summarize the properties of the binary response model in order to present the idiosyncrasies of ordered response models, because Ordered response models are more general versions of binary response models suited for models employing dependent ordinal variables with more than two categories. The categories of an ordinal variable can be ranked from low to high, but the distances between the various categories are not the same.

4.1. The binary response model

Dichotomous or binary dependent variables can take two values, typically 0 (in case an event did not occur) or 1 (in case an event did occur). Binary response models allow to explore how each independent variable affects the probability of the outcome P(y=1|x). Because the dependent variable can either take the value 0 or the value 1 the estimation of such a model with linear regression is not appropriate and poses several problems:

The most obvious problem is that linear modelling provides estimated coefficients which can be either greater than 1 or less than 0. Therefore, we have to find a solution to constrain the predictions to the range 0 to 1 (for other possibilities to derive the binary response model see Long/Freese 2006, 132ff.). There are several candidates available, the two most popular are the logistic function and the cumulative normal function, whereas the former is used in the logistic regression model and the latter in the probit regression model.

The logistic function forces the regression line to range from 0 to 1, i.e. the logistic

[23] However, we know that question ordering may bias results up to two-digit percentages (cf. McFarland 1981; Zaller 1992; Zaller/Feldmann 1992)

functions becomes 0 at $-\infty$ and 1 at $+\infty$ (see figure 5). The turning point of the logistic function is at 0.5. Further, as we can see in figure 5, a one-unit-change on the x-axis causes a different change on the y-axis depending where the change on the logistic functions occurs. At the ends of the logistic function a one-unit-change produces only a minor change on the y-axis, whereas in the middle of the function the change on the y-axis is largest.

I follow the latent-variable interpretation, which I think is intuitively more understandable due to its link to the linear regression model. This approach assumes an underlying continuous unobservable latent dependent variable y^*. The latent-variable interpretation furthermore allows to see the logistic regression as a 'random utility model' (see e.g. Kennedy 2003, 261). The 'random utility model' implies that the choice of an individual depends on an underlying preference function or utility function, i.e. the individual has a level of utility associated with choosing a specific outcome of the dependent variable. If this level of utility exceeds a specific threshold this individual is more likely to choose $y = 1$[24]. Regarding individual attitudes towards the European integration process we can interpret the utility function as individual characteristics and preferences toward the EU. For example, operationalising support for the European unification process with the benefit-question[25] the latent variable interpretation allows to model individual attitudes as a function of individual characteristics like age, sex, cultural/identity preferences, etc. In this example the model estimates the conditional probabilities of thinking that the own country has benefited from EU-membership.

Furthermore, the 'random utility model' allows for the interpretation of the error term in the latent function as unmeasured characteristics of an individual. Therefore, we can interpret the independent variables as the non-stochastic part of the utility function and the error term as the stochastic part. Consequently, two individuals with the same utilities may have different probabilities because of the value of the error term (c.f. Kennedy 2003, 261). Suppose individuals have a high probability of having the attitude that the own country has benefited from EU-membership due to their measured characteristics and all this individuals share the same characteristics. These individuals may have very different unmeasured characteristics, which are captured by the error term of the latent function. Accordingly, low error terms will not change the

[24]The logistic regression model takes $y = 0$ as the reference category, if one wishes to model the probabilities for an event not to occur the dependent variable has to be recoded.

[25]The question wording: "Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (our country) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?", whereas the respondents can answer with 'benefited' (=1) and 'not benefited' (=0).



Figure 5: Logistic curve



Figure 6: Logistic density function

utility function and these individuals will see EU-membership as positive, only a large error term may decrease the utility function below the threshold and the individual has a negative attitude toward EU-membership.

In case of the logit model the link or latent function is the logistic function (see figure 5). Because the logit model is linear in the logit, Gujarati calls them "[...] inherently or intrinsically linear because with suitable transformations they can be made linear-in-the-parameter regression models" (Gujarati 2007, 576). Therefore, such models are also commonly known as *generalized linear models* (GLM). We can rewrite the logistic model as the so-called logit form of the model (see e.g. Kleinbaum/Klein 2010, 17).

$$logitPr(y = 1|x) = ln\left(\frac{Pr(y = 1|x)}{1 - Pr(y = 1|x)}\right) \tag{1}$$

or

$$ln\left(\frac{Pr(y = 1|x)}{1 - Pr(y = 1|x)}\right) = \alpha + \beta x_i \tag{2}$$

This equation is equivalent to the log of the odds, the logarithm taken from the probability how often an event occurs ($y = 1$) relative to how often it does not occur ($y = 0$). Further, the structural model can be written as

$$y_i^* = \alpha + \boldsymbol{\beta}\mathbf{x_i} + \varepsilon_i \tag{3}$$

For an single independent variable this equation simplifies to

$$y_i^* = \alpha + \beta x_i + \varepsilon_i \tag{4}$$

Combining this equation with the logit model leads to

$$f(y_i^*) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(\alpha+\beta x_i)}} \tag{5}$$

Although we can not observe y^* we have observations on the binary dependent variable y:

$$y_i = \begin{cases} 1 \text{ if } y_i^* > 0 \\ 0 \text{ if } y_i^* \leq 0 \end{cases}$$

Cases with positive values of y_i^* are observed as $y = 1$ and cases with negative or zero values of y_i^* are observed as $y = 0$. The logistic regression function describes the conditional probability of $Pr(y = 1|x)$. This leads to the equation of the binary logit model for the conditional probability (y=1|x):

$$Pr(y = 1|x) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(\alpha+\beta x)}} \tag{6}$$

However, coefficients of the logistic regression model are often not reported (because of the above mentioned problem, that the amount of change in y depends on the location on the logistic curve) but odds ratios instead. The odds is the relationship or the ratio between the probability that an event occurs and the probability that this event does not occur.

$$odds = \frac{Pr(y = 1|x)}{1 - Pr(y = 1|x)} \tag{7}$$

An odds of 1 corresponds with $Pr(y = 1) = 0.5$, which implies that $Pr(y = 0) = 0.5$, i.e. it is equally likely that an event occurs or not. An odds ratio of 3, consequently, describes $Pr(y = 1) = 0.75$ and $Pr(y = 0) = 0.25$, i.e. it is three times more likely, that an event will occur than not. Reporting the results using odds instead of raw (or the

log of the odds) coefficients also helps us better interpreting the intercept. Keeping all the xÂt's in the equation at 0, the intercept stands for the basic or baseline odds of an individual for an event occurring (see e.g. Kleinbaum/Klein 2010, 19).

We can also show the interpretation of odds if we transform the additive model into a multiplicative one by exponentiating the coefficients. Since

$$\frac{Pr(X)}{1 - Pr(X)} = e^{(\alpha + \sum \beta X_i)} \tag{8}$$

From algebraic theory we know that

$$e^{(a+b)} = e^a \cdot e^b \tag{9}$$

thus

$$e^{(\alpha + \sum \beta X_i)} = e^{\alpha} \cdot e^{(\sum \beta X_i)} \tag{10}$$

We can now directly interpret the coefficients provided by logistic regression. If an independent variable changes by one unit, the dependent variable changes by the log odds plus β or we simply multiply the odds by e^{β}. Since the model is multiplicative when presenting odds ratios a two unit change of an independent variable results in a $e^{\beta} \cdot e^{\beta}$ change in the dependent variable (see e.g. Rabe-Hesketh/Skrondal 2012b, 503ff.).

After presenting the basic binary logistic regression model I will now turn to the extension of this basic model for ordinal dependent variables. The defining characteristics of an ordinal variable are that the values can be ordered in a meaningful way, but the intervals between those values are not the same as for interval variables. Since the values may be ordered we are allowed to calculate rank statistics but, e.g., no arithmetic mean.

4.2. The ordered logit model

The most often employed dependent variable in models concerning attitudes toward the European integration process is the membership-question which exhibits three categories: good, neither/nor and bad. An individual changing from one category to the other has passed a threshold τ along the link function y^*. Category 1 versus 2 and 3 are separated by threshold τ_1, category 1 and 2 versus 3 in turn are separated by threshold τ_2. Regarding the interpretation of a logistic regression model as an utility model we can say that the overall utility stemming from the respective country's EU membership for a specific individual has to be higher than τ_2 to choose category 3 or higher than τ_1 in order to choose *at least* category 2. Formally we can express this circumstance as:

$$y_i = m \qquad \text{if} \qquad \tau_{m-1} \leq y_i^* < \tau_m \qquad \text{for m=1 to j} \tag{11}$$

The 'movement' along the underlying continuum (link function) as "[...] a function of predictor(s) can be modelled in a form of ordinal regression model, also referred to as a *proportional odds model* or *parallel regression model*" (Cohen et al. 2003, 523). The ordered logit model or ordinal logistic regression model assumes–given the values of the independent variables–that the odds are equal along the link function, or "[...] we assume that the predictors have the same impact on crossing all the thresholds" (Cohen et al. 2003, ebd.). In our example, this implies that the same amount of change in the odds has the same impact on moving an individual from the 'good thing'-category to the 'neither/nor'-category as moving from the 'neither/nor'-category to the 'bad'-category, i.e. the independent variables have the same impact over the thresholds. For the example of the membership-question these thresholds are defined as:

$$y_i = \begin{cases} 1 \Rightarrow \text{Bad thing} & \text{if } \tau_0 = -\infty \leq y_i^* < \tau_1 \\ 2 \Rightarrow \text{Neither/Nor} & \text{if } \tau_1 \leq y_i^* < \tau_2 \\ 3 \Rightarrow \text{Good thing} & \text{if } \tau_2 \leq y_i^* < \tau_3 = \infty \end{cases}$$

Consequently, calling p_{ij} the probability that individual i is in the category j, we have to compute three predicted probabilities for each individual: $\hat{p}_{iBad}$, $\hat{p}_{iNeither/Nor}$ and $\hat{p}_{iGood}$. As already mentioned, threshold τ_1 is between the categories 'Bad' and 'Nei-



Figure 7: Thresholds and density of the latent variable

ther/nor' and threshold τ_2 is between the categories 'Neither/Nor' and 'Good'. The intervals between different thresholds need not to be the same since we only model ordinality. With only one independent variable the ordered logit model estimates the following equations:

$$ln\left(\frac{\hat{p}_{iNeither/Nor} + \hat{p}_{iGood}}{\hat{p}_{iBad}}\right) = t_1 + \beta x_i \tag{12}$$

and

$$ln\left(\frac{\hat{p}_{iGood}}{\hat{p}_{iBad} + \hat{p}_{iNeither/Nor}}\right) = t_2 + \beta x_i \tag{13}$$

The thresholds t_1 and t_2 are the sample estimates of the population thresholds τ_1 and τ_2 (see Cohen et al. 2003, 523).

Figure 7 shows two different values for x_i. The grey shaded areas under the density curves express the probability of an individual to be in the category of 'Neither/nor' in our example.

The ordered logistic regression model depends on a demanding assumption, namely that the odds are equal across all possible categories, thus the name *proportional odds model*. Regarding our dependent variable this assumption implies that, e.g. individual economic benefit as an independent variable has the same impact on moving an individual from the category 'Bad' to the category 'Neither/Nor' as moving an indi-

vidual from the category 'Neither/Nor' to the category 'Good'. This assumption is also reflected in the equations for the two thresholds (see equation 12 and 13) since the regression coefficient β is the same for both thresholds.

There exist different possibilities to test for the 'proportional odds' or 'parallel regression' assumption. We can dichotomize the dependent variable while preserving the ordering of the categories and run separate binary regression models for each threshold or cutpoint. Regarding the membership-question we can put together either the 'Bad' and 'Neither/Nor' category versus the 'Good' category or the 'Bad' category versus the combined 'Neither/nor' and 'Good' category. This approach will lead to two regression coefficients for each independent variable and the corresponding odds ratios. If the odds ratios are roughly the same we can accept the 'proportional odds' assumption (Kleinbaum/Klein 2010, 480). A more appropriate approach is conducting a statistical test, however, such tests are not always available as 'canned' procedures in statistical software packages.

This so-called score test, which is a Lagrange-Multiplier test (see Cohen et al. 2003; Buse 1982), compares the fit of two models, one with a single slope across all categories and one where the slope might differ above and below the respective thresholds. The null hypothesis with this test assumes that the 'proportional odds' assumption holds. If an empirical model does not meet the 'proportional odds' assumption one can proceed with a nested-dichotomies approach (as mentioned above) or simple OLS (see Cohen et al. 2003, 524).

4.3. The hierarchical varying intercept ordered logistic model

International survey datasets often have a special structure stemming from the data-gathering strategy. The Eurobarometer survey is no exception, the data-collection strategy comprises two steps: First, 'choosing' the country sample consisting of the respective EU member states and some other countries of special interest, e.g. candidate countries. Second, identifying a subset of each population of the chosen countries, i.e. identifying a random sample using a specific method (I will present the Eurobarometer dataset in more detail in chapter 4). Thus, the individuals of each random sample are nested within their respective country. Although this be sound a little bit obvious or even strange it makes perfect sense regarding the statistical modelling of such data

structures. We can reasonably assume that a group of individuals may have more in common if they are from the same country than if they are residents of different member states, e.g. Eurobarometer surveys often describe the British public as the one with the highest share of Eurosceptics. There may be several factors influencing the relative 'uniqueness' of a country with regard to public attitudes towards the European integration process, e.g. the historical legacy of a country (c.f. e.g. Diez Medrano 2003). If we want to consider such a nested structure, i.e. individuals nested within countries, we have to use the appropriate statistical models.

Focusing the analysis only on one level of the nested structure of a datasets may lead to the two classical fallacies, the ecological fallacy or the atomistic fallacy. Both of these fallacies involves making causal inferences at a specific level by analysing data from another level, e.g. making causal inferences about individual characteristics by analysing country-level data leads to the ecological fallacy (Rabe-Hesketh/Skrondal 2012b; Gelman/Hill 2007; Hox 2010). Ignoring the multilevel structure of the data, but taking into account all respective levels and not statistically 'correcting' for the nesting of observations neglects the statistical necessity of the assumption of independence of observations and thus leads to biased estimates and more explicit to too small standard errors and thus we are too confident in our statistical results, i.e. the size of our confidence intervals and therefore overestimate the significance of our findings (Goldstein 1995; Kreft/DeLeeuw 1998; Snijders/Bosker 1999; Hox 2010; Raudenbush/Bryk 2002; Steenbergen/Jones 2002; Rabe-Hesketh/Skrondal 2012b; Gelman/Hill 2007; Green/Vavreck 2008). The hierarchical or multilevel structure may be conceptualized in very different ways. A simple example like the structure in this analysis may be a simple two-level model with individual European citizens nested within the EU member states. A more complex three-level model may involve the analysis of voting behaviour at European Parliament elections over time, i.e. eligible voters are nested within member states nested within the specific election years. As diverse as the variations of the structure of datasets as diverse are the labels for such models. As already mentioned they are called multilevel or hierarchical, but they are also approached as longitudinal models, general linear models, mixed models, or sometimes a combination of these (regarding some criticism of the different labels see Gelman/Hill 2007, 2ff.).

Further, if we acknowledge the multilevel structure of data coefficients may vary by groups or level-2 units (in our example the lowest level or level-1 units are individual European citizens and level-2 units are the respective member states, sometimes this notation is reversed, i.e. level-2 units represent the lowest level units). Allowing

coefficients to vary by groups offers two basic modelling strategies: varying intercept models and varying intercept and slopes models (also called fixed versus random effects models or random intercepts versus random slopes models). If you include only indicators or dummy-variables for groups this is called a varying-intercept model (but also one-way random effects model to make it more confusing), thus each group has its own intercept but the slopes are the same.

Essentially, we have three options to proceed with the analysis without ignoring the nested structure (Rabe-Hesketh/Skrondal 2012a; Gelman/Hill 2007), I will discuss them with the analytical problem at hand, i.e. the analysis of public opinions regarding the European unification project, thus we stick with the ordered logistic model due to the ordinal measurement metric of the dependent variable:

- Ordered logistic regression with country dummies: Choosing this alternative includes incorporating $J-1$ indicator variables to model the level-2 units, e.g. 14 country dummies with one reference country for the EU-15 member states. If we also want to model cross-level interaction effects we have also to include additionally $J-1$ multiplicative terms. The consequences are obvious, the vast amount of additional explanatory variables decreases the degrees of freedom of our model an further, we have to face the problem of collinearity between these indicator variables (Gelman/Hill 2007; Green/Vavreck 2008).

- Ordered logistic regression with robust (clustered) standard errors: Although this approach is an improvement compared to using indicator variables it does only 'correct' for the clustering effect and not modelling the different variance components explicitly. Especially in cases when the number of level-2 units is small compared to the number of level-1 units standard errors may also be to small and the null hypothesis falsely rejected (Cheah 2009; Primo et al. 2007).

- Multilevel ordered logistic regression: A standard tool available in all statistical programs as canned procedures at least for the basic modelling scenarios.

Since the model in this analysis includes no explanatory variables at the country-level and I am interested in taking into consideration the hierarchical structure of Eurobarometer data and capturing unexplained variance by the varying intercepts at the country-level I opt for the hierarchical varying intercept ordered logistic model.

[25] There is of course a third possibility, namely modelling a varying slopes model with constant intercept but this strategy is rather uncommon.

Thus, in a general form the model in our analysis is (cf. Rabe-Hesketh/Skrondal 2012b, 594ff.)

$$Pr(y_{ij}^{membership} > s|\mathbf{x_{ij}}, \zeta_j) = \boldsymbol{\beta}\mathbf{x_{ij}} + \zeta_j - \kappa_s \qquad \text{for individuals i=1...n} \tag{14}$$

alternatively we can rewrite the model with a latent response y_{ij}^*

$$y_{ij}^* = \boldsymbol{\beta}\mathbf{x_{ij}} + \zeta_j + \varepsilon_{ij} \tag{15}$$

where ε_{ij} follows a standard logistic distribution with variance $\pi^2/3$ and is independent across European citizens and EU member states as well as from the explaining variables $\mathbf{x_{ij}}$ (Rabe-Hesketh/Skrondal 2012b; Hedeker 2008). Further, we assume that the overall intercept $zeta_j$ is distributed normally with mean 0 and variance Ψ, $\zeta_j \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \Psi)$

The outcome variable, the political phenomenon we aim to explain, is $y_{ij}^{membership}$ the individual attitude towards the European integration process, whereas the individual European citizen i is nested in EU member states j. The common notation also includes $\boldsymbol{\beta}$, a vector of coefficients to estimate, and $\mathbf{x_{ij}}$, a matrix containing the data of our independent or explaining variables and ζ_j denotes the overall intercept. Denoting the variance of $VAR(\varepsilon_{ij})$ as Θ and the $VAR(u_j)$ as Ψ, we can calculate the proportion of the variance of the dependent variable attributable to the country-level, the intra-class correlation, as

$$\rho = \frac{VAR(u_j)}{VAR(y_{ij})} = \frac{\Psi}{\Psi + \Theta} \tag{16}$$

Because we can determine the proportion of variance at each level these models are also called variance-components models.

4.4. Presenting estimation results

As already mentioned in chapter 4.2 interpreting the coefficients of a logistic model is not as straightforward as in a OLS model because of the non-linearity of the model. If one is only interested in the direction and the significance the presentation of the raw coefficients suffices. Such a strategy ignores the strength of an effect, i.e. does an explanatory variable exert an effect of practical relevance despite its direction and significance (see e.g. Ziliak/McCloskey 2008). The marginal effects of changes in the independent variables are not constant along the logistic curve, thus the strength of the effect depends on the location along the curve. One possibility of presenting results, as shown in chapter 4.2, is the provision of odds ratios, i.e. exponentiated coefficients of a logistic model. However, there are more interesting ways to present effect sizes stemming from a non-linear model than the raw coefficients and odds ratios. Often it is of much more interest to present the difference in the probabilities of being in a specific response category due to a change of an independent variable. There exist several possibilities to present average probabilities or differences in probabilities (c.f. for discussion and application Bartels et al. 2011; Biggers 2011; Cameron/Trivedi 2009; Rabe-Hesketh/Skrondal 2012b; Hanmer 2009; Hanmer/Kalkan 2013).

Essentially, authors have three possibilities to present predicted probabilities or marginal effects of interest:

- Calculating the predicted probabilities for a special case, i.e. at specific values of the independent variables representing a specific group of cases.

- Calculating the predicted probabilities or marginal effects while holding the explanatory variables constant at their means or other meaningful values like the mode.

- Calculating the predicted probabilities or marginal effects for each case, i.e. using the observed values, and then taking the mean of the predicted probabilities for groups of interest.

The first approach may make perfect sense in specific situations but uses only part of the information available in the analysed dataset. The second approach is an often employed presentation strategy of authors using a limited dependent variable model (Hanmer/Kalkan 2013). The risk in using the second approach is that the case for

which probabilities are predicted may not even be in your dataset, e.g. holding a dummy variable for gender at its mean implies-necessarily-that the case does not exist in the dataset. Further, as Hanmer and Kalkan (2013) note, theories and the process of data-collection do not focus on the average case and thus we also should not making inferences based on the average case. "Since the research process does not start with a special concern for the average case, we should not conclude our empirical investigations by discussing results just for that case. Instead, we should conclude with results that allow us to make inferences about the population we have theorized about and collected data to represent"(Hanmer/Kalkan 2013, 265). Further, the effect sizes may differ considerably between the second and third approach and the results from the average case may not be generalizable to other contexts or the basic population. Thus, I opt for the third approach and will present marginal effects regarding the two most important explanatory variables in the following analysis the household income and whether a respondent has a exclusive national identity. For each model in the following analysis I will present tables with the raw coefficients and the odds ratios and graphs for the predicted probabilities.

4.5. Estimation and model fit

The binary logistic regression model as well as the ordered logistic regression model and the hierarchical ordered logistic regression model are estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation technique. Most often we want to calculate a specific probability, e.g. of having a given number of black balls in a urn (whereas there are only black and white balls in the urn). For this specific problem we can use the binomial formula and plug in the total amount of balls, the probability of grabbing a black ball, and the number of black balls we are interested in. As Gary King (1989) formulated this problem, we want to know $p(y|Model)$ or $p(Data|Model)$

The likelihood approach turns this strategy on its head. We observe specific data and want to estimate the parameter(s) which maximize the probability of observing the specific data. Thus, the likelihood approach searches for those parameter values given observed data which maximizes the likelihood of that observed dataset. Again, as Gary King puts it, we now search for $p(Model|Data)$. This is a so-called 'inverse probability problem', we aim at estimating the probability of a cause and not of an effect.

The likelihood approach is an estimation approach and thus not limited to binary or ordered logistic regression. If we want to use maximum likelihood we have to make distributional assumptions regarding the error term of our statistical model. In the case of the simple logistic and the ordered logistic regression model we assume that the error term follows a logistic distribution. Usually, a statistical model consists of more than one variable and more than one observation on relevant variables. Thus, if we use Z in matrix notation for the observed values of the relevant variables the likelihood function is:

$$L(\boldsymbol{\theta}; \boldsymbol{Z}) = f(\boldsymbol{Z}; \boldsymbol{\theta}) \tag{17}$$

$f()$ stands for the probability density function for the respective statistical model, in our case as already mentioned $f()$ refers to the logistic density function. In case of a multivariate model $f()$ is now the joint probability density function (see e.g. Greene 2012; Gould et al. 2010; Hardin/Hilbe 2012; Davidson/MacKinnon 2003). By estimating the parameters of a specific model we are interested in $\boldsymbol{\theta}$ which maximizes the probability of the data observed. As we know from simple probability theory, if two outcomes from a universe of events are independent we can calculate the probability of both events happening by multiplying their respective probabilities. Further, if we assume that all variables are identically distributed, we may calculate the likelihood by multiplying the likelihood of each observation in our sample. This assumption is commonly as independent and identically distributed random variables (i.i.d.). Thus, we can rewrite the likelihood function as:

$$L(\boldsymbol{\theta}; \boldsymbol{Z}) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} l(\boldsymbol{\theta}; \boldsymbol{z_i}) \tag{18}$$

It is much more convenient – because of statistical and of numerical/ computational reasons - not to maximize the likelihood function but to take the logarithm of the likelihood function and maximize the log likelihood (Gould et al. 2010; Davidson/MacKinnon 2003). Again, proceeding on the assumption of i.i.d. the log likelihood is:

$$lnL(\boldsymbol{\theta}; \boldsymbol{Z}) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} l(\boldsymbol{\theta}; \boldsymbol{z_i}) \tag{19}$$

Being more explicitly the general log likelihood function for a logistic regression model is:

$$lnL(\boldsymbol{\theta}; \boldsymbol{Z}) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left(y_i ln \left(\frac{1}{1+e^{-\theta}} \right) + (1-y_i) ln \left(1 - \frac{1}{1+e^{-\theta}} \right) \right) \tag{20}$$

We can use the log of the likelihood function because it is statistically more feasible to use sums instead of products and it would be computationally impossible to calculate the values for the likelihood function because they will become very small (Gould et al. 2010). In the case of the logistic regression each multiplier of the likelihood function represents the probability of the respective observation. The value of a probability is bounded between 0 and 1, thus multiplying a series of probabilities results in a very small number and may be not calculated by computers.

4.5.1. Maximizing the log-likelihood

From functional analysis we know that in order to calculate the parameters which maximize a specific function, i.e. to determine the maximum or minimum of a function we have to assess the value at which the first derivative of a function equals zero. However, we do not know if we have found a global or local minima or maxima by equating the first derivative to zero. If the likelihood function is twice differentiable, then we can calculate the second derivative. We put the extreme values found by equating the first derivative to zero into the second derivative, if the result is smaller than zero, i.e. is negative, we found a global maxima.

Regarding the previous example: We observe specific data like finding 3 black balls and 7 non-black balls in our sample of size $n = 10$. As already mentioned the likelihood-approach asks after the parameters which make observing this specific data-set most likely. The data-generating process of successfully drawing a black ball follows the binomial probability distribution, thus figure 8 shows the binomial probability distribution of getting 3 black balls in a sample of $n = 10$ draws for different values of p, i.e. for different probabilities of a successful trial which is also the likelihood function.

The data-set only contains information about the 10 draws and if the trial has been suc-



Figure 8: Binomial probability distribution for k=3 and n=10.
Notes: The graph shows the binomial probability distribution for drawing 10 balls from an urn with 3 successful trials for different values of p.

cessful, i.e. we draw a black ball, or not. We have no information about the probability p of a successful trial. Generally the binomial probability distribution is:

$$Pr(k|p,n) = \binom{n}{k} p^k (1-p)^{n-k} \qquad \text{for k=0 to n} \tag{21}$$

Consequently, if we know the number of trials and the outcome of each trial the search for the probability of a successful trial which makes the observed data most likely. Figure 8 shows that the probability p which maximizes the likelihood function is 0.3 and has the formula (see also Long 1997, 26ff.:

$$Pr(k=3|p,n=10) = \binom{10}{3} p^3 (1-p)^7 \tag{22}$$

To calculate the extreme values we have to set the first derivative equal to 0:

$$\frac{\partial L(p|k=3,n=10)}{\partial p} = 0 \tag{23}$$

The first derivative of the likelihood function is also called the gradient or score. As mentioned above, it is generally easier to maximize the log-likelihood function, thus the maximum likelihood estimate amounts to:

$$\frac{\partial \ln L(p|k=3, n=10)}{\partial p} = 0 \tag{24}$$

which leads to

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \ln L}{\partial p} &= \frac{k}{p} - \frac{n-k}{1-p} \\ &= \frac{3}{p} - \frac{7}{1-p} = 0 \end{aligned} \tag{25}$$

Solving that equation leads to the results of $p = 0.3$ as expected from figure 8. Again, as mentioned above, usually we have to check for a global maxima by assessing the second derivative also called the Hessian matrix, generally:

$$H(\theta) = \frac{\partial^2 \ln L(\theta)}{\partial \theta \partial \theta'} \tag{26}$$

Although, we solved the first and the second derivative algebraically, this solution is not always possible because more often there is no so-called closed form solution available. If there exists no closed-form solution the maximum likelihood estimate can only be obtained by employing iterative numerical methods (see e.g. Held 2008; Gould et al. 2010; Davidson/MacKinnon 2003). In a simplified way, iterative methods start with a guess for θ and compute $\ln L$, then calculate a direction vector (usually by computing the gradient or score vector) and compute a step width (usually by computing the Hessian matrix. A statistic package repeats those steps until a maximum is found. The first derivative indicates whether the log-likelihood function is upward or downward sloping[26] providing the direction in which the maximum is located. The second derivative indicates the rate at which the slope of the log-likelihood function is changing, i.e. this change becomes smaller and smaller the more the algorithm approaches

[26]For the simple bivariate case.

the maximum. However, this makes also clear that it may be very difficult to find the maxima if the log-likelihood function is very flat.

4.5.2. Goodness of fit

Measures of fit may be used as some yardstick of how two or more competing models perform, i.e. which model is optimal (for a thorough discussion of different measures see e.g. (Maddala 1992, 1983; Long 1997)). Since there exists no equivalent to the R^2 measure in the context of the maximum likelihood estimation approach several measures have been proposed which all have there weaknesses and thus, as Takeshi Amemiya (1981) proposes, one should use more than one measure and compare them. Measures of fit are constructed depending on how the R^2 is interpreted in the linear response model. However, regardless of the interpretation of R^2 in the linear response model the value of R^2 remains the same, whereas in the maximum likelihood context the value of the respective measures of fit vary. Long (1997, 103ff.) mentions three ways to interpret the coefficient of determination R^2:

- Percentage of explained variance.
- Ratio of the variances of $\hat{y}$ and y.
- Transformation of the likelihood ratio.

One example for an equivalent measure of the amount of explained variance is McFadden's pseudo R^2 or 'likelihood ratio index (McFadden 1974). This measure utilizes the ratio of the log-likelihood of the respective model $\ln L$ and the log-likelihood of the model without regressors $\ln L_0$.

$$R^2_{McF} = 1 - \frac{\ln \widehat{L}}{\ln \widehat{L_0}} \tag{27}$$

This measure is bound between 0 and 1, however, it is theoretically possible that this measure amounts to 0 (when all the slopes are 0) but can never become 1. Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985, 167ff.) proposed an adjusted R^2_{McF} by incorporating the number of parameters similar to the R^2_{adj} in the linear response model.

$$\bar{R}^2_{McF} = 1 - \frac{\ln \widehat{L} - K}{\ln \widehat{L_0}} \tag{28}$$

Thus, this measure of fit only increases if the log-likelihood of the fully-specified model increases by more than 1 for each additional parameter in the model. Another measure of fit not related to the R^2 measure has been proposed by Maddala (1992). This measure assesses the amount of correctly predicted outcomes and Maddala thus calls it R^2_{Count}.

$$R^2_{Count} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_j n_{jj} \tag{29}$$

This measure simply sets the number of correctly predicted outcomes in relation to the total number of cases, thus it ranges from 0 to 1, whereas j signifies the number of outcomes and n_{jj} the number of correctly predicted cases per outcome. $\sum_j n_{jj}$ summarizes the diagonal elements of a $j \times j$ classification table of observed outcomes and predicted outcomes. However, following the logic of a χ^2-statistic or Goodman and Kruskal's λ, we have to take into account the correctly predicted outcomes without any explaining variables, i.e. how many cases would have been predicted correctly just by guessing. With regard to binary and ordinal variables the mode is the best guess, i.e. the respective model is only useful if it provides more correctly predicted cases than just by guessing. Long (1997, 108) proposes to adjust for the largest row marginal (=mode):

$$R^2_{AdjCount} = \frac{\sum_j n_{jj} - max_r(n_{r+})}{N - max_r(n_{r+})} \tag{30}$$

The $R^2_{AdjCount}$ takes into account only the correctly predicted cases beyond the number of cases correctly specified by using the best estimation for guessing.

The following analysis will use these two measures for the goodness of fit to have a yardstick for the usefulness of the models. There exist several other measures like information measures (see e.g. (Long 1997; Maddala 1992)) and so on. However, since the aim of the following analysis is not proposing an challenging model of public opinion towards the European integration process but tracing the explanatory power

of the most prominent theoretical approaches over time these two measures suffice for the purpose at hand. The following section presents the data used for the analysis, the Standard-Eurobarometer, and reviews some criticism often evoked regarding this survey.

Now let us turn to the question about the perceived dimensionality of the European unification process.

5. Assessing the dimensionality of 'European integration'

The main question of the following analysis is what are the determinants of political support for the European unification process and if the explanatory power of different theoretical approaches changes over time. Thus, we have to be very carefully in how to operationalise political support. Thereby we have to take into account how individuals may perceive the concept of European integration. A very prominent approach is to conceptualize the European unification process as an issue space, i.e. the concept of European integration comprises a multitude of policy decisions and the individual potentially evaluates these decisions. The conceptualization of a political space and the assessment of congruence between specific policy decisions or proposals with the positions of an individual citizen goes back to the seminal work of Anthony Downs (1957). The first step in deriving a political space is to assess the number of dimensions a specific political space consists of. Exactly this question has a long history in spatial modelling in political science in general and also regarding European integration this topic has been and will be lively discussed (e.g. Proksch/Lo 2012; de Vries/Marks 2012; Benoit/Laver 2012; Bakker et al. 2012). As Benoit and Laver (2012) point out, there are essentially two ways how to assess the numbers of dimensions of a political space either determine the number of dimensions a priori or by deriving them inductively from the data using specific methods, e.g. like factor analysis. However, the construction of a political space does not take place without intentions, i.e. the concept of political space is only a mean for a specific task. Consequently, the complexity of a political space depends on the characteristics of the intended analysis. Further, we follow the principle of parsimony, i.e. ceteris paribus we prefer simpler representations over more complex ones.

The a priori approach determines the number of dimensions because of theoretical or analytical reasons, e.g. if one wants to analyse if individuals really distinguish between vertical and horizontal integration the analyst has to assume a two-dimensional European political space whereas one dimension captures the transfer of sovereignty to the supranational level and the other dimension political decisions regarding the enlargement of the European Union. The inductive approach derives the number of dimensions from a specific dataset at hand by using sophisticated statistical methods like principal components analysis. However, since such methods capture underlying latent dimensions the analyst has to have some intuition about the substantive meaning of one or more of these latent dimensions. When using the inductive approach we have also to take into account how the dataset has been generated, e.g. using a dataset stemming from an expert survey it seems more likely that we will derive a multidimensional political space because it is exactly the job of experts to think about specific concepts analytically, i.e. the systematic decomposition of that concept.

Aside from the availability, the membership question is the only variable tapping individual support of the European unification process available over the entire time span, I want to assess if survey respondents really think about European integration as a one-dimensional phenomenon or a multi-dimensional one, i.e. I will employ an inductive approach. The purpose of the following mini-analysis is to investigate if individuals take into account 'qualitatively' different idiosyncrasies of the European integration process in answering questionnaires. Hence, a 'dimension' can only refer to a set of characteristics which are clearly different from another possible set of characteristics of the European unification process and not to different types of intensity of attitudes. Thus, typologies using intensity as defining character are not capturing different dimensions of European integration. Hence, the differentiation between 'hard' and 'soft' euroscepticism (Taggart/Szczerbiak 2004; de Vreese et al. 2008) captures only one dimension, by differentiating between intensities of attitudes. To be clear, 'intensity' also plays a role within the concept developed by David Easton (1965a; 1965b) which many studies employ to analyse attitudes towards European integration. However, Easton divides political support into two modes of orientation toward political objects: specific and diffuse support. The former mode of support refers to specific political decisions or policies or more generally refers to the output of a political system and to the political authorities which made those decisions or output. The latter mode of political support—diffuse support—refers to the various political objects as a whole.

> "Except in the long run, diffuse support is independent of the effects of daily outputs. It

> consists of a reserve of support that enables a system to weather the many storms when outputs cannot be balanced off against inputs of demands"(Easton 1965b, 273).

As the above quote makes clear, there is not only a degree of 'intensity' within both orientations of support, i.e. more or less diffuse and/or more or less specific support, but also between them, because diffuse support is generally more durable than specific support.[27]

Boomgarden et. al. (2011) suggest a multidimensional conception of EU support, differentiating between 'negative affection', 'identity', 'performance', 'utilitarianism and idealism', and 'strengthening'. Again, I consider this approach as a multidimensional one because 'intensity' is not the main distinguishing characteristic. Finally, I will not only focus on the 'refusing' part of attitudes toward European integration, i.e. 'euroscepticism', but will take into consideration positive as well as negative opinions toward the EU. This decision is not only a matter of choice or a question of generality but rests on theoretical grounds which I will discuss in the following. Boomgarden et. al. (2011) also argue that "given the complex nature of the European integration project - it would be naive to speak about EU attitudes as a one-dimensional concept"(Boomgarden et al. 2011, 244). However, the complexity of the EU political system may be the reason that voters do not imagine the European integration process as a multidimensional political object while answering questionnaires. Generally, the complexity of a political system increases the costs for voters to gather political information and create well-based attitudes. As Janssen argued:

> "The issue of integration may be too difficult, too abstract or not interesting enough for the average citizen to form a well thought-out attitude"(Janssen 1991, 467).

Further, also Christopher J. Anderson (1998) assumes that the average citizen is not well informed but build up their opinion by using 'informational proxies', namely the domestic political context.

> "The relative lack of information about the integration project may result from its lack of relevance for people's lives and the uncertainty associated with the changing nature of a political and economic system still under construction. Moreover, the EU is a complex po-

[27] The point is, that 'intensity' is not the main characteristic to differentiate between specific and diffuse support. Thus, I would interpret the approach of David Easton as a two-dimensional conception of political support. Additionally, it should be mentioned that I use 'political support' and 'attitudes' as interchangeable terms. I also assume the approach developed by Seymour Martin Lipset (1959; 1960) as two-dimensional. Lipset differentiates between individual perceptions of the effectiveness and legitimacy of a political system.

litical phenomenon that often appears removed from domestic political reality"(Anderson 1998, 574).

However, the intention of this analysis is not to show what different types of proxies citizens may use but if citizens perceive the European integration process as one- or multidimensional. Given the relative low level of information an average voter has about the EU it is plausible to assume that citizens create symbolic attitudes toward the European integration project.

European voters live in a relatively 'information-unfriendly' environment. The average voter gets the largest amount through domestic media, mostly television and newspaper. Thereby, the mass media fulfils several functions[28], whereas for my argument two functions are important: the legitimation function and the accountability function. The former poses that European issues and policies are made 'visible' by the mass media because of missing direct communicative links between the European citizenry and the supranational level. The latter refers to the necessity of citizens to receive information about the EU via the mass media, because of little direct experience with European institutions and multilevel policies. Hence, the average voter has to rely solely on the mass media to gather information about the European integration process.

Thus, voters receive much of their available information about the EU via statements and interviews of domestic politicians (see e.g. Statham/Koopmans 2009; Koopmans 2007). The study conducted by Jason Statham and Ruud Koopmans (2009) confirms the hypothesis of an 'inverted u-shaped' positioning of political parties regarding the European integration process, e.g. left/right-centre parties are more in favour of European integration and parties on the fringes of the left-right dimension are more eurosceptic.

The scholarly literature offers several explanations for this 'inverted u-shaped' pattern of support of political parties regarding European integration. Small parties are better able to offer a single positions regarding European integration, whereas larger parties are more likely to have party members with different policy positions on European integration and, thus, have a larger intra-party dissent (see e.g. Gabel/Scheve 2007) regarding this topic (Steenbergen/Scott 2004). Further, larger parties are more likely to be positioned at the centre of the left/right dimension and are also more likely to be part of the government and therefore involved into the decision-making process at

[28] Koopmans 2007) speaks of four functions: legitimation function, responsiveness function, accountability function, and participation function.

the supranational level (the so-called 'political opportunity approach, see e.g. Kriesi et al. 1995), thus large left/right-centre parties are generally pro-European[29]. This in turn enables parties at the fringes of the left-right dimension to mobilize eurosceptic voters (Taggart 1998) and to float eurosceptic messages via the mass media.

Hanspeter Kriesi et. al. argue that European integration may even (but currently does not!) constitute a new cleavage which structures domestic political competition, i.e. European integration produces new disparities and new oppositions (for a similar argument see Hooghe/Marks 2009). Further the authors assume that this new cleavage produces 'winners' and 'losers'.

> "The 'losers' of globalization are people whose life chances were traditionally protected by national boundaries. They perceive the weakening of these boundaries as a threat to their social status and their social security. Their life chances and action spaces are being reduced. The 'winners', on the other hand, include people who benefit from the new opportunities resulting from globalization, and whose life chances are enhanced."(Kriesi et al. 2008a, 4ff.)

According to this argument, 'winners' and 'losers' are divided because of the impact of European integration on domestic political competition, i.e. the political (supra-national authority challenge), economic (market liberalization challenge), and cultural (immigration challenge) impact of the European unification project. Kriesi et. al. argue further, that the 'inverted-U' becomes asymmetrical because parties on the right make more effort to mobilize against Europe due to a fear of loss of national sovereignty than parties on the left due to economic liberalization. However, parties at the fringes of the left-right dimension have more incentives and are more capable to mobilize supporters against Europe than large mainstream parties, which tend to de-emphasize European integration as an issue, because it is easier to mobilize 'losers' than 'winners'.

However, I want to show whether citizens perceive the European integration process as one- or multidimensional by answering survey questionnaires. No doubt, voters may have different attitudes towards different aspects of the EU however defined. Thus, it is plausible that during the discussion about the accession of Turkey, opponents use arguments against Turkey's entry into the EU referring to horizontal integration or cultural arguments, e.g. Turkey as a Muslim nation (Azrout et al. 2011, 2013; Hobolt et al. 2011). However, I assume that this holds only because of contextual effects, i.e. the discussion about Turkey's accession framed the thinking of individuals and con-

[29] With the considerable exception of the British Conservative Party (see Statham/Koopmans 2009).

sequently the kinds of arguments used. As John Zaller (1992) argues in his 'RAS' model, survey respondents sample from accepted messages they previously received from elite-driven communication via the mass media. Therefore, if voters are answering survey questions about their attitudes toward the EU they perceive the European integration issue as 'black or white', i.e. they have pro- or anti-European integration attitudes, of course to a different degree. If this assumption is right, then we should be able to empirically prove that different questions regarding the European unification project highly correlate. Further, the more items we use to measure this underlying construct or this latent dimension to construct indices the higher should the correlation be.

5.1. Separating signal from noise

In essence, trying to detect one or more latent dimensions with substantive meaning implies separating signal from noise in the answers to Eurobarometer survey questions. As signal I define the latent construct or underlying dimension respondents have in mind concerning European integration. Noise in respondent's answers is a combination of measurement error and/or random answering. Measurement error occurs due to several reasons, e.g. vague question wording, vague response categories or categories the respondent feels uncomfortable with (Zaller 1992; Zaller/Feldmann 1992).

In order to reduce noise and increase the amount of signal I use multiple measures tapping the same latent construct or underlying dimension. First, multiple measures allow to estimate the relative amount of signal and noise. Second, constructing 'opinion scores', i.e. indexes from several measures which are assumed to capture the same underlying dimension, should lead to higher values of the correlation coefficient. The more items are used to construct an 'opinion score' the higher the correlation coefficient should be. 'Opinion scores' are constructed by averaging over two or more items and therefore reduces the variance of the measurement error (Ansolabehere et al. 2008). This method stems from psychometrics and has been used for decades to construct test scores, however, also political scientist have sometimes used this approach (see e.g. Ansolabehere et al. 2008). Clearly, there are other methodological approaches which are appropriate to analyse the problem at hand, e.g. structural models or factor analysis. However, Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficient is a simple

and highly intuitive statistical measure and also understandable for statistically not sophisticated readers.

Generally, answers to survey questions are assumed to be an additive term consisting of the true preference or attitude (signal) and measurement error (noise)[30]. Let OR_i denote the observed response on measure i, $i = 1, 2$. OR_i consists of two parts $OR_i = TA_i + \epsilon_i$; TA_i denotes the 'true attitude' (signal) and ϵ_i is the error term (noise) of the observed response with $E(\epsilon_i) = 0$ and $Var(\epsilon_i) = E(\epsilon_i^2) = \sigma_{\epsilon_i}^2$. Further, we have to assume that the error term is not correlated with the true attitude within the same item and across different items, formally: $E(TA_i\epsilon_j) = 0$ for $i = 1, 2$ and $j = 1, 2$ and $E(\epsilon_1\epsilon_2) = 0$. And, we denote the variances of the observed response and true response as $Var(OR_i) = \sigma_{OR_i}^2$ and $Var(TA_i) = \sigma_{TA_i}^2$ for $i = 1, 2$.

The squared correlation coefficient of two observed responses OR_1 and OR_2 is biased toward zero:

$$\rho_{OR_1OR_2}^2 = \rho_{TA_1TA_2}^2 \cdot \frac{\sigma_{TA_1}^2\sigma_{TA_2}^2}{(\sigma_{TA_1}^2 + \sigma_{\epsilon_1}^2)(\sigma_{TA_2}^2 + \sigma_{\epsilon_2}^2)} < \rho_{TA_1TA_2}^2 \tag{31}$$

The signal-to-noise ratio depends on the variance in TR's relative to the variance in ϵ's, i.e. the amount of bias. Consequently we underestimate true correlations because of measurement errors. As mentioned above, I will construct the 'opinion scores' by averaging[31] over several items. Further, we can not only estimate an latent construct, but also analyse the stability of such an underlying dimension over time. Consider $k1, ..., K$ different questions to construct an 'opinion score' and suppose we have 2 time points with the same items:

$$\overline{OR_1} = \frac{1}{K}\sum_{k=1}^{K} OR_{1k} \text{ and } \overline{OR_2} = \frac{1}{K}\sum_{k=1}^{K} OR_{2k} \tag{32}$$

Further, let the average variances of the measurement error at the two time points be:

$$\overline{\sigma_{\epsilon_1}}^2 = \frac{1}{K}\sum_{k=1}^{K} \sigma_{\epsilon_{1k}}^2 \text{ and } \overline{\sigma_{\epsilon_2}}^2 = \frac{1}{K}\sum_{k=1}^{K} \sigma_{\epsilon_{2k}}^2 \tag{33}$$

[30]The following discussion owes much to Ansolabehere et. al. (Ansolabehere et al. 2008).
[31]It is also possible to use, e.g. factor scores, however I consider averaging over items more intuitive.

The relative amount of measurement error decreases with the number of available items as the following shows:

$$\sigma^2_{\overline{OR_1}} = \sigma^2_{TA_1} + \frac{\overline{\sigma_{\epsilon_1}}^2}{K} \tag{34}$$

$$\sigma^2_{\overline{OR_2}} = \sigma^2_{TA_2} + \frac{\overline{\sigma_{\epsilon_2}}^2}{K} \tag{35}$$

$$\rho^2_{\overline{OR_1},\overline{OR_2}} = \rho^2_{TA_1,TA_2} \cdot \frac{\sigma^2_{TA_1}\sigma^2_{TA_2}}{[\sigma^2_{TA_1} + (\frac{\overline{\sigma_{\epsilon_1}}^2}{K})][\sigma^2_{TA_2} + (\frac{\overline{\sigma_{\epsilon_2}}^2}{K})]} \tag{36}$$

$$Cov(\overline{OR_1}, \overline{OR_2}) = Cov(TA_1, TA_2) \tag{37}$$

The larger K becomes the smaller becomes $\frac{\overline{\sigma_{\epsilon_1}}^2}{K}$ and $\frac{\overline{\sigma_{\epsilon_2}}^2}{K}$ and $\rho^2_{\overline{OR_1},\overline{OR_2}}$ gets closer to $\rho^2_{TA_1,TA_2}$. Thus, the larger K becomes the relative amount of measurement error reduces roughly to $\frac{1}{K}$, whereas reducing measurement error means getting closer to the possible latent construct. However, as Ansolabehere et. al. note, "[...] the reduction in measurement error does not necessarily occur uniformly. Adding more variables to a scale will tend to make for a better measure, but it is possible to make a scale worse by adding a variable that has an extremely high amount of measurement error. Improvement in the measures depends on the quality of measures as well as their number."(Ansolabehere et al. 2008, 218ff.).

From the above we can derive a simple assumption: If individuals perceive the European integration process as one-dimensional than different questions tapping EU attitudes should highly correlate because they refer all to the same latent underlying dimension. The logic of this assumption as well as the formally presented considerations above are straightforward: Assume you want to measure a specific concept and only have one measurement instrument. Apart from face validity we are not able to determine if this measurement instrument is a reliable, valid and unbiased one. However, if we are able to use different measurement instruments, in our case different survey questions, and the derived measurements highly correlate we may be confident that all this measurements come close to an underlying 'true' value or concept.

5.2. A short look at the data

In order to analyse the dimensionality of EU attitudes I use several questions from the Standard Eurobarometer (henceforth: EB) and different time-points at which those questions are available. The standard EB was established in 1973. The survey is conducted twice yearly and there are approximately 1000 respondents per country. Several questions in the standard EB are frequently asked and, thus, measure trends in attitudes. However, there is a trade-off between the number of questions and number of time points, i.e. if you want to use more items for the construction of an 'opinion score' it is highly likely that you have only one or two time-points to analyse and vice versa. The best compromise is to use 5 items and 7 time-points. Those 5 items are the following questions:

- Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY'S) membership of the European Union is ... ?
  - A good thing
  - A bad thing
  - Neither good nor bad
- In General, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe? Are you ...?
  - For - very much
  - For - to some extent
  - Against - to some extent
  - Against - very much
- Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union ?
  - Benefited
  - Not benefited

- If you were told tomorrow that the European Union had been scrapped, would you be very sorry about it, indifferent or very relieved?
  - Very sorry
  - Indifferent
  - Very relieved
- In your opinion, how is the European Union, the European Unification advancing nowadays ? Please look at these people (SHOW CARD) No1 is standing still, No7 is running as fast as possible. Choose the one which best corresponds with your opinion of the European Union, European Unification.
  - 1 Standstill – 7 Runs as fast as possible

These questions have been asked together in one EB survey at 7 different time-points, respectively 1986, 1987, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, and, 1995. In the following I will analyse the possibility of constructing 'opinion scores' and assess their stability over time.

5.3. Deriving opinion scores

Constructing 'opinion scores' is straightforward. First, I correlate all 5 measures to gather the variance-covariance matrix of those 5 single items. In a second step I construct 'opinion scores' consisting of two items and correlate all two-items scores, whereas I correlate only those scores which are mutually exclusive regarding the items used for their construction, i.e. for example, I do not correlate the scores 'membership - benefit' and 'membership - regret' because both scores consist of the membership question[32]. There are 10 possibilities to construct two-items scores out of 5 measures. From the 36 overall possibilities to correlate two-item scores only 13 variants remain after excluding scores consisting of similar items. Third, I construct three-items measures and again correlate them with each other following the same logic as outlined above.

Figure 9 and figure 10 show the mean of the several correlations and the respective confidence intervals. We find a consistent pattern at all time-points, respectively that

[32]I do not correlate scores comprised of the same item to avoid overestimation of the correlations.



Figure 9: Comparing 'opinion scores' from 1986 to 1992

Notes: The first graph in each panel shows the single-item measure, the second one the two-items measure and the third one the mean correlation of the 'opinion score' constructed with three items.

single item measures have the lowest mean correlation compared to either two-items measures or three-items measures. Further, also meeting the assumptions hypothesized in section 2, the more items are used to construct 'opinion scores' the higher the mean value of the correlation coefficient.

The first results of the empirical investigation suggest that respondents indeed perceive European integration as one-dimensional. However, we have to test the statistical relationships between the different 'opinion scores', i.e. if the differences between them are statistically significant. I verify the differences between the different measures using a two-sample mean-comparison test. There are three measures, the single-item, two-items, and three-items measure, hence, we have to analyse three hypotheses:

- The difference between the single-item and the two-items measure.



Figure 10: Comparing 'opinion scores' from 1993 to 1995

Notes: The first graph in each panel shows the single-item measure, the second one the two-items measure and the third one the mean correlation of the 'opinion score' constructed with three items.

- The difference between the two-items and the three-items measure.
- The difference between the single-item and the three-items measure.

Due to multiple tests we have to apply a so-called Bonferroni correction to the used α-level. This methods divides the chosen α by the number of repeated tests. Generally we use $\alpha = 0.05$, thus the corrected α is $\alpha_{corr} = 0.05/3 = 0.0167$. This correction is necessary because of the repetition of several tests and the otherwise resulting underestimation of statistical results.

Table 4 shows if the respective difference is statistically significant or not. OS_1 denotes the single-item 'opinion score', OS_2 the two-items measure, and OS_3 the 'opinion score' consisting of three items, thus, e.g. the column $OS_1 - OS_3$ shows the results of the t-tests between the single-item measure and the three-items 'opinion score'.

Table 4: T-tests with Bonferroni-correction.

	$OS_1 - OS_2$	$OS_2 - OS_3$	$OS_1 - OS_3$
1986	!	!	✓
1987	✓	!	✓
1990	✓	!	✓
1992	✓	!	✓
1993	✓	!	✓
1994	✓	!	✓
1995	✓	!	✓

Notes: The exclamation mark signifies non-significant differences and ticked cells significant ones.

Looking at table 4 immediately reveals a pattern[33]. within the results of the t-tests, respectively that the differences between two-items and three-items measures are insignificant throughout all time-points. This finding already has been perceptible by looking at figure 9 and figure 10, because of the overlapping confidence intervals.

However, these results are certainly not satisfactory regarding our expectations, that 'opinion scores' with an additional item should have a significant higher correlation. Notwithstanding, we can test a somewhat weaker hypothesis, explicitly that single-item measures show a lower mean correlation than multi-items 'opinion scores'. For that purpose we can employ so-called 'orthogonal comparison', explicitly a one-to-composite comparison t-test (see Gamst et al. 2008, 113). In essence, a one-to-composite t-test means, that we do not test the mean difference of two items but between an item and a composite index[34]. For our purposes this composite index consists of an unweighed average from the two-items and three-items measures, because we want to test whether multi-item 'opinion scores' reveal higher mean correlation values than single-item measures.

Comparing the mean correlation values of OS_1 and OS_{23} using a t-test shows that the mean differences between single- and multi-item 'opinion scores' are significant at the 99 % confidence-level for all time-points[35]. Figure 11 shows the box-plots of the single-item versus the composite index of the two- and three-items measures. It is

[33]For the year 1986 also the t-test for $OS_1 - OS_2$ is insignificant although the p-value of the t-test amounts to 0.0183, which is very close to the 'significance threshold' of $\alpha = 0.0167$.

[34]Actually, I employed one-to-composite t-tests throughout this paper, however, because the focus of this paper lies on 'opinion scores', it is the first time building an index out of two 'opinion scores'.

[35]Detailed results are available from the author upon request.



Figure 11: Comparing single vs. composite measures 1986-1995.
Notes: The first graph for each year shows the single-item measure, the second one the composite measure.

clearly visible that multi-items 'opinion scores' have higher median correlations than single-item measures.

On average, i.e. over all time-points, multi-items 'opinion scores' have a mean correlation of 0.612 (with a standard deviation of 0.037) and single-item measures a mean of 0.468 (with a standard deviation of 0.041), which is roughly a one-third higher value of the mean correlation coefficient for multi-item 'opinion scores', thus suggesting that individuals indeed may perceive European integration as one-dimensional. Although the empirical results are not completely satisfactory because if individuals perceive the European unification process as one-dimensional the correlation between opinion scores should increase with each additional item we have got sound empirical evidence that using opinion scores considerably increases the validity of our measurement. Further, the empirical results strengthen our confidence that using only the

membership question produces less error in a one-dimensional space compared to a multi-dimensional one because of possibly neglecting one or more dimensions.

I will now turn to the main empirical analysis and begin with the presentation of the model and the empirical results for different groups of EC/ EU member states.

6. Attitudes towards the EU - The basic analysis

The analysis of political phenomena over a considerable time period always involves the risk that not all data is available for the entire time span. This is also true for the case of analysing individual attitudes towards European integration. Since the task of this analysis is assessing the relative importance of two rivalling theories, we need data to operationalise egocentric economic voting and identity-related group-threat theory. Unfortunately, data about the household-income is only available for the time period of 1976 until 2002 and data about the 'exclusive national identity' of the respondent is only available as of the year 1992. The analysis ends with the year 2005 mainly because there is no data for 'exclusive national identity' in the Standard Eurobarometer survey in the years 2006, 2008, and 2009. Consequently, I will first present the results from the models including a measure of household-income for the years 1976-2002 and then show the estimates of the models for the years 1992 to 2005 also including the measure for 'exclusive national identity'. Further, I will distinguish between three groups of countries, the EU-9 consisting of the six founding members France, (West-)Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, and Luxembourg which all signed the Treaty of Paris on 23 July 1952 and the countries of the Northern enlargement Great Britain, Ireland, and Denmark. The next group to be considered is the EU-12 with the additional member states of the two Southern or Mediterranean enlargements in 1981 and 1986: Greece, Portugal, and Spain. The last group and main focus of the following analysis is the EU-15 with the countries of the EFTA-enlargement in 1995: Austria, Sweden, and Finland. Since the analysis ends in 2005 I do not consider the EU-25 after the first Eastern enlargement and instead focus on the EU-15 and the EU-9 and EU-12, respectively. I will present for each group of the EU, i.e. the EU-9, the EU-12, and the EU-15, two different kind of graphs, the difference in average predicted probabilities in the following chapters and a series of graphs of average predicted probabilities for each level of household income for each individual year in the appendix. We can calculate aver-

age predicted probabilities while changing the quantity of interest, e.g. increasing the value of household income, and holding all other variables at their respective values, i.e. for each datum or individual in the dataset only one variable changes and all other independent variables keep their 'real' values. Thus, we predict *individual* probabilities for perceiving the EU membership as a 'good thing'. Finally, we can take the average of all individual predictions and get the average predicted probability $Pr(Good)$ for a specific value of the variable of interest, e.g. for the third quartile of household income. The graphs in the following sections show the differences of average predicted probabilities $Pr(Good)$ for the whole range of the independent variable household income, i.e. I have calculated the average predicted probability for the highest income quartile and the lowest income quartile and taken the difference of these two. Thus, these graphs show the effect of household income while this explanatory variable changes its whole range. Differences of average predicted probabilities may be interpreted in the same way as effect size or the strength of coefficients in linear regression models, i.e. "if I change the explanatory variable from the lowest to the highest income quartile this has the following impact on the average predicted probabilities".

As already mentioned I will differentiate in the following between three different groups of EU member states (although, they are certainly nested) and with a different set of explanatory variables, whereas I will show the preliminary results for each group only with the operationalisation of income, subsequently only with a measurement for identity, and finally the results for the full model including all independent variables.

6.1. Egocentric economic attitudes in the EU-9

As already mentioned I use multilevel ordered logistic regression with random intercepts to analyse individual attitudes towards the European unification project. There are several reasons for choosing such a modelling strategy. First, obviously, each individual is nested within a specific member state and in order not to overestimate the standard errors for our estimates I use a multilevel or hierarchical model. The justification for allowing for varying intercepts on the second level of the model results from the national idiosyncrasies of the respective member states. Since I want to focus on the explanatory power of two rivalling theories and due to data and modelling restrictions one cannot control for each possible influence, e.g. variations between member states of perceiving a 'democratic deficit' regarding the EU (see Diez Medrano 2003,

38). Since I only have data for the time period 1976-2005 I will show the first empirical results for the group of the EU-9. Further, in the beginning I will present findings of models which only include a measurement for household income and will only later present models which also include a measurement for 'exclusive national identity'. The reason is simple, because I can show how the effect for income changes if we also control for cultural/identity-related theoretical approaches and it is also possible to show if considerations of economic voting are mediated by cultural attitudes and/ or vice versa (cf. Garry/Tilley 2009; de Vreese et al. 2008). The tables with the regression results, presented as raw coefficients and as odds ratios, for each year can be found in the appendix as well as the figures of average predicted probabilities for each year. The dependent variable in all models presented in the following and in the appendix is the membership-question from the Standard Eurobarometer as described in chapter 3.1, whereas higher values indicate a more positive view of the European integration process.

Figure 27 to 33 (in the appendix) show the average predicted probabilities of perceiving the EU membership of one's country as a 'good thing' for each level of household income or for each quartile of the household income distribution. First of all we see that for each country and in each year between 1976 and 2002 the average predicted probability increases with income, i.e. the higher the household income the higher is the likelihood of perceiving the EU membership as positive. This first findings indicate that individuals do consider cost-benefit analysis regarding the European unification process and form their attitudes accordingly, i.e. individuals assess if they 'win' or 'loose' from European integration in terms of egocentric utilitarianism.

Furthermore, the estimates of the average predicted probabilities are highly significant yielding a very small confidence interval as shown in figure 27 to 33 (again presented in the appendix). However, not only the effect itself is highly significant but also each single change in the explanatory variable income, i.e. the effect of the second income quartile is statistically different from the effect of the, e.g. third income quartile on the average predicted probability. One can assess that fact by looking at the graphs and comparing the confidence intervals of each data point, if they do not overlap the difference of an effect is statistically significant[36].

[36]It would be statistically sound to use a t-test to examine if a difference of two means is significantly different as I have done in the chapter about measuring political support and assessing the dimensionality of 'European integration'. However, since this finding is not the focus of the analysis I refrain from presenting the respective t-tests.

Figure 12: Difference of Average Predicted Probabilities (over range of income) for $Pr(Good)$ 1976–2002 EU-9/EU-10.



Notes: The dashed lines show the difference of the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ if changing from the lowest to the highest income quartile and the light-grey area the corresponding confidence interval.

Also the size of the effect is considerable, while we can assess the effect strength only by face value, we see that within the group of the EU-9 and in the period from 1976 to 2002 the average effect of income increases the probability of perceiving the EU membership as a 'good thing' by approximately 15 percentage points. Figure 12 shows the difference in average predicted probabilities explicitly. I have calculated the differences by subtracting the average predicted probability at the fourth income quartile and subtracted the average predicted probability from the first quartile, thus figure 12 shows the maximum effect of household income on the probability of having a positive attitude towards European integration. The differences of average predicted probabilities changing from the highest to the lowest household-income quartile (see figure 12) are relatively stable over time with some fluctuations in the 1980ies and slightly increasing since the 1990ies. These first preliminary findings imply that at least for the EU-9 and since 1981 for the EU-10 the maximal effect of income on the average predicted probabilities remains fairly stable at approximately 15 percentage points, i.e. changing from the lowest to the highest household-income quartile increases the individual average probability of perceiving the EU membership as a 'good thing' by 0.15. However, as already mentioned I do not control for the influence of identity-based explanatory factors in these first models and thus only the effect of income is provided in the graphs in this section and the following sections.

I will now turn to the first empirical findings regarding the impact of income within the group of the EU-12.

6.2. Egocentric economic attitudes in the EU-12

Since the second Mediterranean enlargement in 1986 and the joining of Spain and Portugal the European Communities consisted of 12 member states. The so-called 'Club Med'-countries shared one experience, they have been autocratic regimes recently. In Portugal the Salazar-regime has been abandoned by a military coup d'état in 1974 during the carnation revolution. The first democratic presidential elections have been held in 1976. In Spain the autocratic regime ended with the death of Francisco Franco. The political successor King Juan Carlos initiated a democratization process which ended with democratic elections in 1977 and the constitution in 1978 which declared Spain as a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary government. The third Mediterranean country already joined in 1981, Greece, has also abandoned an autocratic regime only a few years ago. The military dictatorship under Georgios Papadopoulos ended in

1974 with democratic elections in the same year and Greece began EU accession negotiations in 1976. Thus, the enlargement resulting in the EU-12 is foremost a political integration, i.e. a process of fostering and upholding democratic norms and values in Europe.

Since I focus on the EU-12 in this chapter data for the effect of income is only available from 1986 to 2002. Again the statistical results are highly significant and have the expected sign, i.e. the higher the household income the higher the probability that an individual perceives the EU membership of her country as 'a good thing'. Further, the effect size is also considerably high, thereby increasing the average predicted probability $Pr(Good)$ by 0.1 to roughly 0.2.

The overall impact of income increases slightly between 1986 and 2002 thereby implying that the additional effect of income is steadily increasing. If we consider only the time period between 1986 and 2002 this steadily increasing effect is also evident regarding the EU-9 as shown in figure 12. However, although the impact of household income is on average increasing in the late 1980ies and 1990ies, we see a steady decline since 1999. Although we only focus on the effect of household income these first results may imply that egocentric economic voting becomes less important in the wake of the common currency - the Euro. Although not until 1 January 2002 the European citizens have had Euro-notes and -coins in physical form in their wallets, the Euro was launched on 1 January 1999. At the time of the Euro introduction 10 out of the former EU-12 member states step-by-step replaced their old currencies. Although, this is only a hunch at the current state of analysis, we should keep in mind that this maybe the first sign for the influence of identity-based explanations and their impact not only on attitudes towards the European integration process but also on the explanatory power of egocentric economic voting.

We find a similar pattern by looking at the years 1999-2002 in figure 12, whereas in 1999 from the former EU-9 member states, 7 out of 9 joined the monetary union (eith the exception of the UK and Denmark). Thus, also the second part of our preliminary findings regarding the EU-12 shows similar effects compared to the results of the EU9.

Figure 13: Difference of Average Predicted Probabilities (over range of income) for $Pr(Good)$ 1986–2002 EU-12.



Notes: The dashed lines show the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ if changing from the lowest to the highest income quartile and the light-grey area the corresponding confidence interval.

6.3. Egocentric economic attitudes in the EU-15

The European Communities became the European Union in 1993 after the Maastricht Treaty and in 1995 with the so-called Northern Enlargement or also called the EFTA-enlargement the number of EU member states increased to 15 and also included Austria, Sweden, and Finland. This round of enlargement is especially interesting with regard to economic voting theories because all three new member states had an higher GDP per capita than the EU-12 average, thus all three new member states are net contributors to the EU budget, however the largest net contributors in terms of GDP per capita are Germany, Italy, Denmark, and Finland (Commission 2012). However, all three countries of the EFTA enlargement have already had access to the internal market because of the European Economic Area (see e.g. Landaburu 2007).

As in the previous two sections I present the difference of the average predicted probabilities while changing from the highest income quartile to the lowest income quartile, i.e. a change in household income over the whole range of this explanatory variable. Again, if we take a look at the regression tables and yearly figures in the appendix, we see that all results are statistically significant at the 99% confidence level and have the expected sign.

Figure 14 shows the difference of average predicted probabilities for the EU-15 and the time period from 1995 to 2002. What is striking at the first glance is that the overall impact of household income is higher compared to the same time period and to the EU-9 and EU-12. Further, we see a similar pattern of the marginal effect size over time, i.e. the difference in average predicted probabilities increases between 1995 and roughly 2000 followed by a steadily decline. However, to be able to compare the three sets of findings, namely the results for egocentric economic voting for the EU-9, the EU-12, and the group of EU-15 I will present the respective graphs in the same figure in the next section.

6.4. Wrapping up - Interim results

Before turning to the impact and causal effects of identity-related approaches, I will shortly summarize the preliminary findings for egocentric economic voting. Regarding all three groups of EU member states, the EU-9, the EU-12, and the EU-15, and for each year the empirical results for our operationalisation of egocentric economic voting,

Figure 14: Difference of Average Predicted Probabilities (over range of income) for $Pr(Good)$ 1995–2002 EU-15.



Notes: The dashed lines show the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ if changing from the lowest to the highest income quartile and the light-grey area the corresponding confidence interval.

household income, are striking. They statistical estimates are highly significant at the 99% confidence level and have the expected sign, i.e. the accrual of income is positively related to favourable attitudes towards the European unification project. In the previous three sections we also found a similar pattern regarding the impact of egocentric economic voting on the individual assessment of the European integration process, namely an on average increasing empirical effect of income after 1986 with an subsequent decrease approximately in the years 1999 and 2000. Figure 15 shows the same graphs as presented in the preceding three sections but combines them into a single figure. Further, I have marked the years of an EU enlargement in order to denote the number of EU member states (as already mentioned I refrained from adding an extra line for the EU-10, rather the solid line representing the difference of average predicted probabilities $Pr(Good)$ for the EU-9 from 1976 to 1981 also represents the marginal effect for the EU-10 from 1981 to 2002, i.e. the statistical models behind figure 15 builds on the EU-9 member states in the first phase and on the EU-10 member states in the remaining periods).

At the first glance at figure 15 what is striking is, that after 1986 the over time effects of income for the three EU member state groups follow a similar pattern. Surely, that finding is not very surprising since the empirical results for the EU-12 also includes those for the EU-10, and the empirical findings for the EU-15 also contain those for the EU-12. However, the pattern in figure 15 is not necessarily given, i.e. it is no statistical or mathematical necessity. Each time when the set of countries is changed also the empirical results may change dramatically. However, not regarding the analysis at hand, further, the marginal effect of income is on average higher for each subsequent cohort of EU member states. Thus, changing from the lowest to the highest income quartile has the strongest effect on individual attitudes towards European integration for the EU-15, a medium effect size for the EU-12 and the 'lowest' impact for the EU-10.

However, I will delve more deeply into possible arguments for explaining these patterns when it comes to the combined effects of egocentric economic voting and 'exclusive national identity' embedded into the four periods of European integration hypothesized in chapter 2.4, the period of non-politicization, the period of 'new hope', the period of the 'post-Maastricht blues', and the period of an 'ever closer union'. For now I will turn to the first empirical results of statistical models only including the effect of 'exclusive national identity' on the individual attitudes toward the European unification process.

Figure 15: Difference of Average Predicted Probabilities (over range of income) for $Pr(Good)$ 1976–2002.



Notes: The solid line shows the differences of average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ for the EU-9 and EU-10, the dashed line the respective values for the EU-12 and the short-dashed line those for the EU-15. The light-grey area represents the corresponding confidence intervals.

6.5. The role of identity in the EU-9

Drawing on the theoretical arguments of Lauren McLaren individuals adopt their attitudes toward the European integration process on the basis of perceived group threat and/or symbolic threat (McLaren 2002, 2006, 2007, for a similar argument see Llamazares/Gramacho 2007; Weßels 2007; Diez Medrano 2003; de Vries/Van Kersbergen 2007). The specific group individuals may feel related to is their respective nation. Thus, a feeling of strong national identity may be an explanatory factor for attitudes toward European integration (see also Hooghe/Marks 2004, 2005; Vetik et al. 2006; Carey 2002). I have already mentioned some concerns regarding using 'exclusive national identity' as an independent variable explaining individual attitudes toward European integration in the theoretical part of this analysis. Explicitly, the problem of endogeneity and the overestimation of the effect size of this measurement because of the empirical closeness of these two variables, 'exclusive national identity' and the membership question (regarding meaningful common units of measurement see King 1986). Unfortunately, we have no other measure over time and even that operationalisation of identity-related factors is only available from 1992 until 2005.

What is striking if we look at figure 16 is that first, the result is negative and, second, that the marginal effect size is approximately doubled compared to the marginal effect of household income. The former finding corroborates our expectations about the causal influence of 'exclusive national identity', namely that switching from no 'exclusive national identity' to an individual with an 'exclusive national identity' decreases the probability of an individual to perceive the membership of one owns country as a 'good thing'. The latter finding can not directly be compared to the effect size of income because these two variables are measured with different units, doing so leads to what Gary King called the 'races of the variables' (1986). As King notes, "(o)nly when explanatory variables are on meaningfully common units of measurement is there a chance of comparison. If there is no common unit of measurement, there is no chance of meaningful comparison"(King 1986, 670). However, we can assess how the effect changes *relative to itself*, i.e. if the marginal effect of a variable increases or decreases and, further, how both of our variables of interest change over time. And, as Gary King argues further, "(m)ost often it is theoretically "good enough" to say that even after controlling for a set of variables (i.e., plausible rival hypotheses, possible confounding influences), the variable in which we are interested still seems to have an important influence on the dependent variable. This is precisely the empirical evidence for which we search to substantiate or refute our theoretical expectations. Usually, little political

understanding is gained by hypothesizing a winner in a race of the variables"(King 1986, 673ff.). That is exactly the strategy and aim of the following analysis, assessing if both operationalisations of two rival theoretical approaches still exert an important influence and how the importance of each theoretical approach changes over time and how it changes relative to its competitor.

However, let us now turn to figure 16 and the first empirical findings of 'exclusive national identity' in the context of the EU-10 and the period of 1992 to 2005 (see also the tables and figures for each year in the appendix).

Figure 16: Difference of Average Predicted Probabilities ('exclusive national identity' 0/1) for $Pr(Good)$ 1992–2005 EU-10.



Notes: The dashed line shows the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ for the EU-10 if changing from having no 'exclusive national identity' to having an 'exclusive national identity' and the light-grey area the corresponding confidence interval.

As already mentioned above, the graph in figure 16 shows negative values for the average predicted probabilities $Pr(Good)$, in fact it does so consistently for each year under investigation. If we take a look at the raw coefficients in the regression table sin the appendix we see that the empirical results for 'exclusive national identity' are statistically significant at the 99% confidence level and have show the expected direction, i.e. individuals with an 'exclusive national identity' have on average a lower probability of

perceiving the EU membership of their countries as a 'good thing'. Note also that we have no empirical results for the year 1994 because the membership question and the question after the individual identity have been asked only in one Eurobarometer wave in 1994. Further, after cleaning the dataset all observations containing both variables dropped out in the year 1994.

Again, since we can not directly compare the effects of income and 'exclusive national identity' we can only assess changes in the relative impact of these two variables. Further, it seems plausible that these two variables have different causal distances relative to the dependent variable, the membership question. With causal distance I mean that the concept of 'exclusive national identity' is causally much closer to how an individual perceives the EU membership of the respective country compared to the causal chain between income and attitudes toward European integration.

What can we infer from figure 16? First, by changing from no 'exclusive national identity' to an 'exclusive national identity' the probability of perceiving the EU membership as a 'good thing' decreases by roughly 30 percentage points or drops by 0.3. Further, it seems that the marginal effect size increases[37] albeit only on a very small scale. However, these are results of models only taking into account the impact of 'exclusive national identity' thereby, tentatively, neglecting the impact of egocentric economic voting.

Before interpreting the results let us turn to the empirical findings of the next group of EU member states, the EU-12.

6.6. The role of identity in the EU-12

Figure 17 shows the average predicted probabilities for the EU-12 and the period 1992 to 2005. It comes as no surprise that the empirical results are pretty similar to those presented in figure 16 since they comprise estimates for only two additional countries Portugal and Spain, which are EU member states since 6 years already in 1992, the starting point of the analysis at hand. However, again we get statistically significant estimates for the whole period and the effect is in the expected direction, changing to an 'exclusive national identity' decreases the $Pr(Good)$ by approximately 0.3.

[37] With 'increasing' I mean that the effect size increases although the value itself becomes more negative, i.e. mathematically the values decrease.

Figure 17: Difference of Average Predicted Probabilities ('exclusive national identity' 0/1) for $Pr(Good)$ 1992–2005 EU-12.



Notes: The dashed line shows the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ for the EU-12 if changing from having no 'exclusive national identity' to having an 'exclusive national identity' and the light-grey area the corresponding confidence interval.

Again, it seems that the marginal effect size increases a little bit over time, I will analyse that more precisely and in more depth when adding the context to the analysis. The presentation of the results for the EU-15 concludes the analysis of the sole impact of 'exclusive national identity'.

6.7. The role of identity in the EU-15

Logically, the empirical findings for the EU-15 comprise only the years 1995 to 2005. As for the other two groups of EU member states we obtain statistically significant results for each year in the time period of 1995 to 2005 and the sign of the estimates is in the expected direction. Except in the year 1995 the average predicted probability $Pr(Good)$ plummets by 0.3 while changing from a 'non-exclusive national identity' to an 'exclusive national identity'. The marginal effect size remains fairly stable at approximately -0.3 over the whole period[38].

As regarding the presentation of the empirical results of egocentric economic voting I will shortly wrap up the findings regarding the impact of 'exclusive national identity' on attitudes toward the European unification process and combine all three graphs in one single figure.

6.8. Wrapping up: Act II - Further interim results

Before turning to the combined causal effects of egocentric economic voting and identity-related approaches, I will again shortly summarize the preliminary findings. Regarding all three groups of EU member states, the EU-9, the EU-12, and the EU-15, and for each year the empirical results for our operationalisation of 'exclusive national identity' are statistically significant at the 99% confidence level and have the expected sign, i.e. 'exclusive national identity' is negatively related to favourable attitudes towards the European unification project. In the previous three sections we also found a similar pattern regarding the impact of 'exclusive national identity' on the individual assessment of the European integration process. Figure 19 shows the same graphs as presented in the preceding three sections but combines them into a single figure.

[38] Although it looks like the effect size is again increasing over time, this finding is highly influenced by the first observation in the year 1995 and may thus be biased. I will return to that issue in the following analysis.

Figure 18: Difference of Average Predicted Probabilities ('exclusive national identity' 0/1) for $Pr(Good)$ 1995–2005 EU-15.



Notes: The dashed line shows the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ for the EU-15 if changing from having no 'exclusive national identity' to having an 'exclusive national identity' and the light-grey area the corresponding confidence interval.

Figure 19: Difference of Average Predicted Probabilities (over 'exclusive national identity') for $Pr(Good)$ 1992–2005.



Notes: The solid line shows the differences of average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ for the EU-10, the dashed line the respective values for the EU-12 and the short-dashed line those for the EU-15. The light-grey area represents the corresponding confidence intervals.

Looking at figure 19 what is striking is, that the over time effects of 'exclusive national identity' for the three EU member state groups follow a similar pattern. As already mentioned above, this finding is not very surprising because the results are 'nested' in each other as the number of EU member states increases.

With presenting the causal effects of 'exclusive national identity' I have finished the analyses taking only one of the two rivalling explanations for attitudes toward European integration into account at the same time. The following sections are devoted to the empirical findings for the combined effects of egocentric economic voting and identity-related approaches.

6.9. The combined effect of egocentric economic attitudes and 'Exclusive National Identity' in the EU-10

I now turn to the presentation of the full models for the different groups of EU member states. The following investigation takes both theoretical approaches simultaneously into account and thus controls for the influence of each other. I will change the strategy of presentation in the following few sections, because of changing the perspective and showing the impact of egocentric economic voting conditional on 'exclusive national identity', i.e. each of the following figures shows the average predicted probabilities over time for a specific household income quartile and for two groups, individuals with no 'exclusive national identity' and individuals with an 'exclusive national identity'. However, this is only a first look at the empirical results of the combined effect of egocentric economic voting and 'exclusive national identity', I will return to the already used strategy to present the empirical results when also taking the 'nature' of the European integration process into account.

Figure 20 consists of four panels each showing the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ for a specific income quartile. Each panel also consists of two graphs, one for individuals with no 'exclusive national identity' (the dashed line) and the other representing the group with such an identity (the solid line). First of all, the empirical results again meet the expectations (see also the regression results presented in the tables in the appendix), i.e. the estimations are statistically significant at the 99% level and have the expected sign. We can also assess these facts by looking at figure 20 and

the panels from the lowest income quartile to the highest income quartile. Each graph shifts upwards as we switch from the upper left panel to the lower right panel. Let us first look only at the solid line, the upward shift across the different panels implies that switching from the lowest to the highest income quartile corresponds to an on average higher probability that an individual with an 'exclusive national identity' perceives the EU membership as a 'good thing'.

Figure 20: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 1992–2002 EU-10.



Notes: The dashed line shows the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ for individuals having no 'exclusive national identity' and the solid line for individuals having an 'exclusive national identity', the light-grey areas are the corresponding confidence interval.

We can also assess the statistical significance of the difference of average predicted probabilities between the two graphs in each panel as the confidence intervals (the light grey area) for each graph do not overlap.

The empirical results for the EU-10 and the period from 1992 to 2002 thus corroborate our expectations, both theoretical approaches contribute to the explanation of individual attitudes towards European integration and by taking into account both approaches our main variables of interest, income and 'exclusive national identity', show a considerable effect and the expected direction, i.e. individuals with an higher household

income perceive on average the EU membership more favourable compared to individuals with a lower household income as do individuals with no 'exclusive national identity' compared to individuals with an 'exclusive national identity'.

6.10. The combined effect of egocentric economic attitudes and 'Exclusive National Identity' in the EU-12

Examining the results for the same period as in the previous section but focusing on the EU-12 yields pretty similar results compared to the EU-10. The coefficients for household income and 'exclusive national identity' are once again statistically significant for each year and have the expected direction (see the respective regression tables in the appendix).

Figure 21 shows again four panels, one for each income quartile, and the marginal effects of household income conditional on 'exclusive national identity'.

As in the previous analysis, the higher the household income the more probable is an individual to perceive the EU membership as 'a good thing' and $Pr(Good)$ increases if we switch from the group with a strong national identity to the group with no 'exclusive national identity'. This finding supports the importance of these two theoretical approaches in explaining individual attitudes towards the European unification process. Before turning to the final analysis I will quickly present the empirical results for the EU-15.

6.11. The combined effect of egocentric economic attitudes and 'Exclusive National Identity' in the EU-15

The empirical results for the combined effect of egocentric economic voting and 'exclusive national identity' for the EU-15 are, as the previous presentations, are statistically significant at the 99% level and the coefficients our two independent variables of interest have the expected sign (see again the respective tables in the appendix).

Figure 21: Average Predicted Probabilities
for $Pr(Good)$ 1992–2002 EU-12.



Notes: The dashed line shows the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ for individuals having no 'exclusive national identity' and the solid line for individuals having an 'exclusive national identity', the light-grey areas are the corresponding confidence interval.

Obviously, we have to focus on the period of 1995 until 2002 for the EU-15 since the EFTA-enlargement took place in 1995.

Figure 22: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 1995–2002 EU-15.



Notes: The dashed line shows the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ for individuals having no 'exclusive national identity' and the solid line for individuals having an 'exclusive national identity', the light-grey areas are the corresponding confidence interval.

Again, the panels in figure 22 show the average predicted probabilities $Pr(Good)$ for each household income quartile. As the previous results also showed, the probability of having a positive attitude toward European integration increases with household income and decreases with the degree of individual national identity and this relationship still holds in the context of the EU-15.

At first glance the results for the EU-15 are striking because they clearly show that the relative importance of egocentric economic voting nearly steadily increases over the time period under investigation, namely 1995 to 2002. Further, also the relative explanatory strength of 'exclusive national identity' increases over time although this is only shown indirectly in figure 22. If we look at the differences in each panel between the graph for individuals without an 'exclusive national identity' and the line representing the average predicted probabilities $Pr(Good)$ we can visually assess the

increasing effect of 'exclusive national identity', e.g. in the upper left panel showing the empirical results for the lowest household income quartile the difference between the two lines in 1995 is approximately 0.2 whereas the difference in 2002 amounts to roughly 0.3. However, I will return to these empirical findings in more detail in a later chapter. For now I will wrap up the findings regarding the full or combined model, i.e. the models including household income, the operationalisation for egocentric economic voting, and 'exclusive national identity', the operationalisation for the impact of individual identity.

6.12. Wrapping up: Act III - Further interim results

As after the presentation of the empirical results for the models including only household income and the models including only 'exclusive national identity' I present a graph consisting of the empirical findings for all three groups of EU member-states. In the case of the combined models these groups are the EU-10, the EU-12, and the EU-15.

Figure 23 consists of four panels whereas each panel shows the empirical results for a specific household income quartile for the time period 1992 to 2002. Each panel also consists of two groups of lines, whereas the lower group represents the results for individuals with an 'exclusive national identity' and the upper group the results for individuals with no 'exclusive national identity'. Further, each group consists of three lines, whereas the solid line marks the empirical results for the EU-10, the dashed line the findings for the EU-12, and the short-dashed line those for the EU-15.

Again, the empirical results are very similar for each group of EU member states, which is - as already mentioned - not surprising on the one hand but also no mathematical necessity on the other hand. The estimators for the two variables of interest are statistically significant at the 99% confidence level and show the expected sign. Further, we see that egocentric economic voting as well as 'exclusive national identity' are both important in explaining individual attitudes toward European integration. This finding holds across different groups of EU member states as well as over time.

Although these findings are important and relevant on their own, the main question of the analysis at hand is those if the relative explanatory power of these theoretical approaches, egocentric economic voting and identity-related theories, varies if the

Figure 23: Average Predicted Probabilities
for $Pr(Good)$ 1995–2002 EU-10, EU-12, & EU-15.



Notes: The solid line shows the differences of average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ for the EU-10, the dashed line the respective values for the EU-12 and the short-dashed line those for the EU-15. The light-grey area represents the corresponding confidence intervals.

context of the European unification project changes? Recall that I use four different periods in the history of European integration, the period of non-politicization, the period of 'new hope', the period of the 'post-Maastricht blues', and the period of an 'ever closer union' in order to capture changes in the 'nature' of the European integration process.

7. Attitudes towards the EU - Adding context

I will now turn to the main research question if, how, and why the explanatory power of economic voting and identity-related theoretical approaches may change with regard to an altering 'nature' of the European integration process.

Figure 24 shows the main empirical results of the analysis regarding the relative explanatory power of egocentric economic voting and 'exclusive national identity'. The presentation strategy is the same as in the sections regarding the models with either only household income or 'exclusive national identity', i.e. the graphs show the differences in average predicted probabilities when changing over the whole range of each variable of interest. In the case of household income this implies a change from the lowest income quartile to the highest income quartile and in the case of 'exclusive national identity' this means changing from having no strong national identity to feeling closely attached to ones nationality.

The average predicted probabilities calculated from hierarchical ordinal logistic regression models with only random intercepts at the country level are graphed over time. This implies that the number of EU member states changes after each enlargement round. As shown in figure 24 the empirical results stem from the EU-9 between 1976 and 1980, then Greece joins and the estimates are calculated on the basis of the EU-10. From 1986 to 2002 figure 24 presents the results for the EU-12 and from 2002 onwards the graph shows the results for the EU-15. The vertical dashed lines mark the beginning and the end of different periods of European integration history. Since the logic behind figure 24 is to ensure comparability of the empirical results within each period it presents the empirical results for the EU-12 in the period of the 'post-Maastricht blues' from 1992 to 2002 although the EFTA-enlargement in 1995 resulted in the EU-15.

The first period lasts from 1976-1986 and is called the period of non-politicization and ends with the Single European Act. The period of 'new hope' lasts until 1992 which is the year of the Maastricht treaty. The third period called 'post-Maastricht blues' endures until 2002 which marks the physical introduction of the Euro and the fourth period ends in 2005 because of data availability and is called the period of an 'ever closer union'. Obviously, categorizing an historical development into different periods does not imply that these periods really end and begin in a single point in time, rather that specific events mark some turning point like the Maastricht treaty, which is often interpreted as the politicization of the European integration process. To take this circumstance into account and to prove the robustness of my empirical findings I will shift the periods by $\pm$ 1 year and compare the results to our main findings in 24 (and see also the respective tables in the appendix).

In addition to the visualization of the differences in average predicted probabilities I have added a linear fit for each period and for each of the two variables of interest. This trend line helps to uncover the average development of the marginal effect of each variable within each period and thus the change in the relative explanatory power of these two theoretical explanations regarding individual attitude towards European integration. The dependent variable is as always the membership question and I have calculated the average predicted probability for the outcome 'a good thing' $Pr(Good)$ as in the previous sections.

Let us have a quick look at figure 25 and 26 which show the results of shifting the periods by $\pm$ 1 year. Shifting the periods by -1 year (see figure 26) does not change anything and with 'no change' I mean that the linear fit lines for each period and each variable of interest keep the sign of their slopes, i.e. on average is the development of the relative explanatory power of each theoretical approach the same as in the original analysis presented in figure 24. Please note that in figure 26 the empirical results in the period of 'new hope' are the estimations for the EU-10. Further, in both graphs (figure 25 and 26) I cannot present estimations for the year 1991 and 2003 in the period of the 'post-Maastricht blues" since data for both theoretical approaches is only available from 1992 to 2002. However, taking a look at figure 25 reveals that by shifting the periods by +1 year the slope of the linear fit for the differences in average predicted probabilities for household income changes its sign in the second period, i.e. the relative explanatory power of egocentric economic voting decreases if we shift the period of 'new hope' to 1987 to 1993. Although the change of the slope is very small the inverted sign of the slope implies that hypothesis 2 is falsified. I will turn to that

circumstance in the following. By and large the robustness check reveals that at least in the remaining three periods, we can rely on the empirical results of the full model with regard to the classification of the history of the European integration process into four different periods.

In the following I will review and discuss the empirical results according to the different periods and assess if the findings corroborate or falsify the hypotheses formulated in chapter 2.4.

7.1. The period of non-politicization

The period of non-politicization did not have a very good start at all, because it have had to cope with a series of economic problems from the immediate past. The 'golden age' of Western European economic growth with rates of approximately 4% per years was over. The most important external event before the period of non-politicization has been the first oil-crisis in 1973 preceded by the collapse of the Bretton-Woods-System and the related abandoning of fixed exchange rates. The reason for mentioning both events is, that after the USA left the Bretton-Woods-Systems and quitting the gold-exchange standard the US dollar depreciated. Further, oil producers have been paid in dollars, thus the real profit per barrel crude oil also decreased. After the start of the Yom-Kippur war, Egypt and Syria attacking Israel, the USA decided to support Israel after the Soviet Union send armament supply to Egypt and Syria. Consequently, the OPEC announced an oil embargo to punish the US and reduced the amount of exported oil (Venn 2002). Thus, not only the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods-System but also the first oil crisis fuelled inflation in Western European countries. This crisis resulted in a "[...] massive oil price increase from $2 per barrel mid-1973 to $10 in 1974 and $12 in 1975. The effect was worldwide economic recession, unemployment and inflation"(Dedman 2010, 109). With such economic turmoil and pressure on the respective currencies the member states showed no willingness to experiment with preparing European monetary union and the related transfer of national sovereignty to the supranational level. However, insecurity about the economic future has been only one part of the story of not responding as a community of states. The Werner-plan-the first attempt to install EMU has been discarded-has been discarded because of the oil crisis. As Martin J. Dedman notes, "(a)nother failure of EEC states to act together, with a community response, was during the 1973 oil crisis itself. The EEC did nothing to help defend Holland, a member state, when subjected to an Arab oil em-

Figure 24: Difference of Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 1976–2005.



Notes: The graph shows the differences of average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ for the EU-10, the EU-12 and EU-15 respectively. The solid line represents the linear fit in the respective period for the ease of interpretation. The light-grey area represents the corresponding confidence intervals.

Figure 25: Difference of Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 1976–2005.



Notes: The graph shows the differences of average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ for the EU-10, the EU-12 and EU-15 respectively. The solid line represents the linear fit in the respective period for the ease of interpretation. The light-grey area represents the corresponding confidence intervals.

Figure 26: Difference of Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 1976–2005.



Notes: The graph shows the differences of average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ for the EU-10, the EU-12 and EU-15 respectively. The solid line represents the linear fit in the respective period for the ease of interpretation. The light-grey area represents the corresponding confidence intervals.

bargo (because it was considered pro-Israeli). Instead EEC members, notably France and Britain,moved quickly to make bilateral deals for oil with Arab states in the Gulf, in order to safeguard their own national oil supplies. [...] The EEC looked like a community where economic integration and co-operation worked well in the commercially buoyant 1950s and 1960s but as soon as economic conditions got rough in the 1970s it was every member for itself"(Dedman 2010, 112).

Regarding internal developments in the time before the period of 'non-politicization, there are two events worth mentioning. An important internal development has been the removal of tariffs between the six founding member states until 1969, albeit it took until 1992 also to remove non-tariff barriers between EU member states. However, the removal of tariffs fuelled and restructured economic competition between and within member states. The impact of foreign competition most heavily affected France. The share of imports doubled from 8% in 1959 to 16% in 1969. "Thus, the 1960s were the heyday of extensive growth, driven by the creation of the EEC and EFTA and supported by policies that sustained investment in the face of pressure on profits" (Eichengreen 2007, 204).

A second important internal event, although of political nature, has been the so-called empty chair crisis and the related Luxembourg compromise. The empty-chair crisis resulted from conflicting opinions about the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and budgetary issues, like strengthening the competences of the European Parliament. For the analysis at hand it is not important if the French reaction has been due to pressures by domestic interest groups (Moravcsik 2000a,b) or issues regarding the development of the European integration process, i.e. national sovereignty vs. federalisation. What is important is that agricultural policy was an high-priority issue for the French government and after the Commissions presentation of common cereal prices and the envisaged development of the CAP, Charles de Gaulle left no doubt that the Commission had exceeded their mandate(Palayret 2006; Jo 2007). This led first to a suspension of the diplomatic relations between April and June 1965 and later on to the empty chair crisis, i.e. France-at a time when it should chair the Council-withdraw their permanent representatives and attended no further meetings of the Council thereby boycotting decision-making and paralysing work on the further development of the European unification process (Palayret 2006, 52ff.). Substantially, the empty chair crisis and the following Luxembourg compromise made clear that in essence this has been a battle over majority voting in the Council which should be automatically introduced on 1 January 1966 (Dedman 2010, 102). As Eichengreen argues, "(t)aking

decisions by majority vote in the Council, as foreseen in the Treaty of Rome, promised to streamline decision making but created the danger that other members states would band together to override French wishes" (Eichengreen 2007, 185).

And certainly, one key event has been the first enlargement and the joining of the UK, Denmark, and Ireland in 1973. After loosing a referendum dealing with domestic constitutional issues in 1969 French president Charles de Gaulle resigned and thereby paved the way for the British accession. Charles de Gaulle has been a fierce opponent of the UK as a member of the EEC and prevented an accession in 1967. Initially, negotiations opened with four potential member states, the three from the first enlargement UK, Denmark, and Ireland and the fourth one, Norway in 1970. Three of these four countries - Denmark, Ireland, and Norway - held referenda regarding their accession to the EEC, whereas the referendum in Norway ended with a rejection and the other two with the acception of joining the EEC (Dedman 2010). However, the first enlargement was not only seen as a positive development. As David Handley noted, "(i)n the process of two and a half years of negotiations and referenda, and in the three following years, Europe's confidence in itself, its self-image, must have suffered a jolting blow. First, one country refused to join the 'club'. Europe was turned down flat, was jilted so to speak. Second, another country, after two years of trial, almost left. It questioned seriously the usefulness, and even the rightness of it all. Even at the end of the 1970s, there is lingering doubt about Britain's continued membership" (Handley 1981, 360).

There have been a lot of problems to cope with in the period of non-politicization. However, it took only a few years until the second oil crisis happened in 1979. Albeit not so severe as the first oil crisis, the member states still have had to deal with the economic consequences from the first one. As Barry Eichengreen argues, "(t)he explosion of inflation meant that when Europe was disturbed by the second increase in oil prices in 1979, it was more difficult to response again with monetary stimulus" (Eichengreen 2007, 277). Thus, although after the then-member states decided at the Hague Summit in 1969 that European integration should be fostered the economic turbulences led to a slowdown of the unification process often named as an time of 'Europessimism' and 'Eurosclerosis' (see eg. Moravcsik 1991). This slowdown of European economic growth and competitiveness, especially when compared to the economic performance of the United States, Japan, and the four East Asian 'tiger' economies Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong resulted in united efforts of the EEC member states to advance European integration. The fear to lag behind the newly industrialised countries

of the Pacific Rim as well as the US and Japan led to the Single European Act in 1986 (Dedman 2010). Thus, there have been two bundles or dimensions of problems the EEC had to cope with, first, the acceleration of economic integration, especially so-called negative integration (Scharpf 1996), i.e. the removal of obstacles like non-tariff barriers to trade, and secondly, improving the efficiency of the decision-making process. The latter became more important since 1981 and the joining of Greece and would become even more relevant because of the upcoming Iberian enlargement in 1986. At the Council meeting in Milan in 1985 there have been essentially two proposals, "[...] a White Paper, specified some three hundred measures that would eliminate most of the barriers that still impeded the free flow of goods, services, capital, and labour in the Community. The other, the Dooge Committee's report, specified several changes that would improve the efficiency of decision-making in the Community, render it less vulnerable to the veto of individual member states, and expand the role of the European Parliament" (Cameron 1992, 23). The Council agreed upon considering both proposals and subsequently treaty amendments had been drafted which have been on the agenda of the European Council in Fontainebleau in 1984 and the Intergovernmental Conference in December 1985, which paved the way for the Single European Act (SEA). Scholars of European integration commonly identify three circumstances which led to the SEA. First, a turn in the strategy towards European integration of the French government under Francois Mitterand because of the failed traditional intervention in the domestic economy (see eg. Eichengreen 2007, 287ff.). Second, the UK complained about the CAP since it joined the EEC and the British government under Margaret Thatcher forcefully demanded a rebate on the British contribution to the EEC budget and threatened to leave the EEC and/ or block any discussion about reforms otherwise (eg. Fligstein/Mara-Drita 1996). The rebate has been granted at the European Council meeting in Fontainebleau in 1984. The third circumstance with a catalysing effect was the appointment of Jacques Delors as the president of the European Commission in 1984 and his explicit commitment to fostering European integration especially paving the way for a monetary union (eg. Fligstein/Mara-Drita 1996; Eichengreen 2007; Gueldry 2001).

Albeit the main problems in the period of 'non-politicization' have been of economic nature there has been at least one important political development and that was the joining of Greece in 1981 and Portugal and Spain in 1986. All three countries have had autocratic political systems in their recent past and have installed liberal democracies only recently. Further, all three countries showed a level of economic development lower than the EEC average. Thus, the so-called Iberian enlargement has been political

event with extraordinary political symbolic power. With accepting the applications of Greece, Portugal and Spain after 6-8 years long negotiations the EEC showed a strong commitment to the values of liberal and democratic societies.

However, although the EEC faced a series of crisis in the 'dark ages' of the late 1970ies and early 1980ies (Caporaso/Keeler 1995) these struggles did not 'trickle down' to the general public. "There appears to have been a fairly broad band of positively orientated 'permissive consensus' concerning support for the political community as represented by the ideal of European unification and for the Community as a set of European institutions. Saliency of European integration and of these same institutions was relatively low" (Handley 1981, 339). The term 'permissive consensus' has been used the first time with regard to the European integration process by Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold (1970). Since then many scholars have used this term to describe a low salience of the European unification process for the general public and thus the non-politicization of political decisions regarding European integration, which have been mostly technical regulations and did not impact the life of the individual citizen (eg. Eichenberg/Dalton 1993, 2007; Down/Wilson 2008; Hooghe/Marks 2005; Moravcsik 1991; Inglehart 1970b; Heisenberg 2006). Analysing the period from 1973 to 1988 (not exactly congruent with the period of non-politicization) Eichenberg and Dalton conclude, "(w)e know citizens blame national politicians when economic times are bad, but it remained to be shown that they also blame the politicians and bureaucrats in Brussels" (1993, 530). And indeed, there is empirical evidence, although at the level of experts and the academia, which corroborates this hunch. Claudia Schrag has analysed the dominant discourses in the period of non-politicization resulting from the economic pressures of the collapse of the Bretton-Wood system and the two oil crises which have been dominated by terms like 'legitimation crisis of the capitalist welfare state', 'ungovernability', and 'overloaded government' (Schrag 2013). Thus, at least the scholarly debate rather blames the nation state for the economic crisis in the 1970s and 1980s. Consequently, following this argumentation, Alan Milward spoke of the rescue of the nation state by the process of European integration (Milward 1992; Rasmussen 2010).

On the other side, there are numerous studies which show that economic considerations impact public opinion toward the European unification process and thus support of the supranational political system. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) found that the level of intra-European exports influence public opinion, as well as GDP growth, inflation, and unemployment at the national and the regional level (Gabel/Whitten 1997).

Generally, a number of analysis supports the influence of economic voting on attitudes toward European integration in the period of non-politicization from egocentric economic voting to socio-tropic economic voting either operationalised with subjective or objective measurements of economic performance (eg. Anderson/Reichert 1996; Gabel 1998c; Gabel/Palmer 1995; Gabel/Whitten 1997; Eichenberg/Dalton 2007). It is not surprising that economic considerations shape attitudes regarding European integration, as Eichenberg and Dalton formulate it, "[...] if the EC has promised anything, it has promised the enhancement of member states' national economic welfare" (Eichenberg/Dalton 1993, 510).

These two strands of argument may seem contradictory at first sight, where although it is a time of general apathy against the unification process, the European societies still take into account economic performance (although Carrubba (2001), focussing on electoral connection in EU politics, has resolved this contradiction by drawing on James Stimson's 'policy-mood'-approach (Stimson 1991)). Also Eichenberg and Dalton have been aware of this possible contradiction: "In short, the EC has a major impact on economic welfare, and this fact should be recognized by the European public. On the other hand, one might also predict the absence of a relationship by evoking the public's limited knowledge of EC affairs and the continuing dominance of national politics and policy-making in the everyday political experiences of Europeans" (Eichenberg/Dalton 1993, 512). Since this analysis focusses on the relative explanatory power over time, this relaxes to some extent. As hypothesized in chapter 2, I expect that, 'due to the depoliticized nature of the integration process until 1986, economic voting has lower explanatory power compared to the following periods, i.e. the theory of economic voting has the lowest relative explanatory power in the period of non-politicization'. This implies that European citizens are not interested in how policies will be decided or how regulations look, but still value the impact of European integration. Namely economic performance, or more generally European integration in the period of non-politicization, has had a high degree of 'output legitimacy' (Scharpf 1999, 2007; Schmidt 2013). Thus, the individual has not already developed some degree of 'affective support' (Easton 1965a,b) but evaluates the effectiveness (Lipset 1959). Further, the European integration process has not yet been an issue of political contestation, ie. political parties have not positioned themselves regarding the unification process (Kriesi et al. 2008b, 2012).

Figure 24 shows, as already mentioned, the differences between the average predicted probabilities while switching from the lowest income quartile to the highest income

quartile. If we compare the marginal impact of household income from the period of non-politicization to the period of 'new hope' and the period of the 'post-Maastricht blues' we see that there is no substantive difference in the average level of the respective period. Although the slope linear fit is negative, the graph shows that there is much variation in the period of 1980 to 1986. However, the difference to the subsequent periods is not large enough to corroborate hypothesis 1, thus our expectations are falsified by the empirical results.

The findings rather resemble the empirical results of those studies arguing that (egocentric) economic voting really has an impact on individual attitudes toward European integration regardless of the level of politicization. The empirical findings, combined with the already existing knowledge about the period of non-politicization, suggest the assumption that European citizens perceived European integration in a functional way, i.e. it is a 'fair-weather phenomenon', attitudes are positive if economic performance is good and negative when the economy is suffering (Eichenberg/Dalton 1993).

After analysing the relative explanatory power of egocentric economic voting in the period of non-politicization and thereby falsifying the first hypothesis I will now turn to the period of 'new hope'.

7.2. The period of 'new hope'

The period of 'new hope' starts with the SEA which resulted in more supranational sovereignty and the possibility of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council with regard to selected policies. The change to QMV has been a necessary step to avoid a gridlock in decision-making once the EEC comprises 12 member states. Economically, the most important development of the SEA has been the intention to complete the single market by 1992, the so-called single market programme or 'Europe 1992'. Compared to later treaties (especially the Maastricht treaty and the Lisbon treaty), the SEA has been rather uncontroversial, albeit there have been national referenda in Denmark and Ireland both coming down in favour of the SEA. Europe's *relance* was mainly due to Jacques Delor stressing the internal market project implying further economic liberalization and cooperation (eg. Ludlow 2006). The period of 'new hope' is characterised by the entrepreneurship of Jacques Delor and the implementation of the single market programme, of which the SEA was only one part and the Maastricht treaty should become the second part (Fligstein/Mara-Drita 1996). One central component of the

single market programme has been that monetary union (EMU) is already included in the SEA (James 2012). The first attempt with a system of pegged but adjustable exchange rates after the collapse of the Bretton-Woods-system, failed shortly after its implementation, the so-called 'snake' (James 2012; Eichengreen 2007; Overturf 1997). In 1979 the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) was introduced as part of the European monetary system (ESM). The ERM essentially constitutes a corridor of which the upper and lower limit are defined as +/- 2.25% of the ECU, whereas the ECU represents a weighted average of the participating currencies.

In 1989 Jacques Delors presented the later called 'Delors-report', the result of considerations of the committee for the study of economic and monetary union chaired by Jacques Delors and installed after the European Council in Hanover in 1988 (Commission of the European Communities 1989). This report proposed a three-stage development of the EMU:

Stage I: Free use of the ECU (European currency unit), increased cooperation between central banks and free capital movement beginning with July 1990.

Stage II: Installing the European Monetary Institute (EMI, as a precursor to the European Central Bank), increased coordination of monetary policies.

Stage III: A single monetary policy under the European System of Central Banks with a single currency by January 1997.

However, there have been essentially two camps with divergent views of monetary union, the proponents of a rather 'soft' currency with France ahead and the 'hard' currency proponents most notably Germany. The French franc had already been devalued because of payment crisis in 1981, 1982, and 1983, but was more severely devalued "[...] against the German deutschmark, now the undisputed strong currency of the system. This meant that the Bundesbank set the tone for monetary policy throughout Europe. [...] In the absence of capital controls, other European central banks were forced to follow the Bundesbank's lead to prevent their exchange rates from depreciating excessively" (Eichengreen 2007, 348). Thus, France fiercely supported Jacques Delors' monetary unification initiative. However, an external event occurred which not only facilitated a compromise between France and Germany but also shaped the future of the EC and more specifically of the European Union - the collapse of the Soviet Union and the downfall of communism.

The end of the cold war dramatically changed the face of Europe. All Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC's) joining the EU in the years 2004 and 2007 had written their letter of application in the 1990s. However, Germany almost immediately strived for reunification with East Germany. The EC was also confronted with the CEEC's applying for accession. "The reality is that there was no alternative to responding to the political hope which had arisen in the East. It would have been at the same time politically unthinkable, morally impossible to defend, as well as an economic nonsense to search for a solution other than the obvious one, provided certain precautions were taken"(Landaburu 2007, 10). And the obvious thing has been EC enlargement.

German unification also accelerated the development toward a monetary union. "In March 1990, Kohl announced his government's unwavering support for the goal of economic and monetary union, and one month later, he and Mitterrand called for the convening of an intergovernmental conference on political union to run parallel to formal discussions over EMU, which would chart a course toward a stronger, more democratic Community and a common foreign and security policy"[][34]Anderson1999. As already mentioned in chapter 2, France was in favour of monetary coordination because of the dominance of the German Bundesbank and their hard-currency policy. The compromise consisted of France accepting strict convergence (subsequently institutionalized in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)) criteria and Germany agreeing on the creation of a European central bank at the beginning of stage III. "As a quid pro quo [...], the French backed the German desire for a powerful central bank which would be free from political interference. The Germans also gained their wish that there should be tough rules governing entry into EMU, involving strict criteria on budget deficits, interest rates and inflation"(Watts 2008, 41).

The period of 'new hope' is mainly characterized through upcoming enthusiasm for the European unification process and the fostering of advancement of the internal market project. As Martin J Dedman concludes, "(t)he EC's '1992' programme gained momentum through the 1980s, the downfall of communism in 1989 reflected a growing confidence in the EC, viewed as the stable centre of Europe, while all around was in disarray" (Dedman 2010, 117). Therefore, the relative explanatory power of economic approaches should rise throughout this period as formulated in hypothesis 2. The graph in figure 24 shows the empirical results for the EU-12 and the period of 'new hope'. At this point a word of caution is necessary. Figure 25 and 26 show the empirical results of the robustness check with regard to the periodization of the Eu-

ropean integration process. Especially, figure 25 shows that when shifting the periods by +1 year the slope of the linear fit becomes negative, whereas with the original periodization and when shifting the periods by -1 year the slope of the linear fit of the difference in average predicted probabilities remains positive. Since I have hypothesized that the relative explanatory power of egocentric economic voting will increase in the period of 'new hope' this circumstance poses a dilemma. Further, the basis for the robustness check in terms of the number of member states is different because by shifting the periods by -1 year, the period then lasts from 1985 to 1991, therefore I can only take into account the EU-10 (Spain and Portugal join the EC in 1986), whereas the other two graphs show the empirical results for the EU-12. What is important is the fact that the marginal effect of egocentric economic voting remains highly important in the period of 'new hope' and switching from the lowest income quartile to the highest income quartile increases the $Pr(Good)$ by roughly 12 percentage points. Regarding hypothesis 2, I could neither corroborate or falsify this assumption because of the ambiguous empirical results. This is a somewhat unsatisfactory judgement but I can not come to a conclusion with such a weak empirical basis. Further,whether if the slope of the linear fit is positive or negative, the absolute value of the slope is pretty small. Again, the important finding is that the impact of egocentric economic voting remains at a consistent high level compared to the other periods.

I will now turn to the period of the 'post-Maastricht blues', which is the most interesting period in this analysis because, for the time frame from 1992 to 2002, we have data available for both theoretical approaches under consideration and can thus simultaneously assess the relative explanatory power of both.

7.3. The period of the 'post-Maastricht blues'

'Europe 1992' has been an overwhelming success, 260 out of 279 measures proposed in the White Paper on the Single Market (Commission of the European Communities 1985) have been passed by the Council of Ministers. The Maastricht treaty introduced the European Union with the three pillars, the first, supranational pillar, comprising the three European Communities, the second pillar consisting of the common foreign and security policy and the last pillar, similar to the second pillar an intergovernmental one holding police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The Maastricht treaty also extended supranational sovereignty to areas such as environment, justice and home affairs and foreign and security policies. However, there has also been some

disappointment. "But exaggerated claims of the single market's success and a severe economic downturn soured the public mood in the early 1990s. The Maastricht Treaty, which launched the new European Union, fanned popular unease about the pace of European integration. Responding to a near-fatal backlash against the treaty's scope and content, a chastened political establishment struggled to make the EU more open and accountable and responsive to citizen concerns" (Dinan 2004, 8).

There have been two external events which may have shaped public opinion towards the EU, one is economic in nature and was the currency crises in 1992, especially the speculation against the Sterling with the result that the UK left the ERM. The second one was political in nature and comprises of the inability of the EU to effectively solve the civil wars on the soil of former Yugoslavia which were resolved with NATO forces under the leadership of the USA (Berend 2009; O'Brennan 2006).

The main and most important component of the Maastricht treaty has been the roadmap to EMU. Treaty provisions also enhanced the power of the European parliament through extending the use of the co-decision procedure and implementing the Committee of the Regions and Local Authorities. "The treaty's provisions for monetary union were the most far-reaching and eye-catching. They called for a common monetary policy, with a single central bank and a single currency, by 1999 at the latest for Member States capable of meeting the convergence criteria. Economic circumstances in the 1990s did not seem propitious for the launch of monetary union, and public opinion was equivocal" (Dinan 2007, 1132) However, generally scholars see the Maastricht treaty as the cornerstone of the development from a 'permissive consensus' to a 'constraining dissensus' (eg. Hooghe/Marks 2009; Down/Wilson 2008; Franklin et al. 1994a,b; McLaren 2004). The move from the EEC to the EU also marks a transition to a greater political union, thereby increasing the salience of the supranational level (eg. Steenbergen/Scott 2004) and increasing the impact of EU politics on individual life. Further, the EU is still prepared for the upcoming eastern enlargement. The Maastricht treaty also defined the so-called Copenhagen criteria, i.e. the conditions a country have to meet in order to join the EU, which also implied an demanding process of adjusting to the EU (Berend 2009; O'Brennan 2006).

There has been an additional novum with the Maastricht treaty, as Denmark held a referendum regarding the ratification of the Maastricht treaty and became the first country ever to reject a European treaty in a national referendum (the treaty has been ratified in a second referenda). There have also been referenda in Ireland and France,

where the last is commonly named the 'petit oui' because of the small margin in favour of ratifying the Maastricht treaty. After the 'permissive consensus' and an elite-driven integration process, the referenda in Denmark revealed the possibility of the public to stop or slow-down the European integration process. With the Maastricht treaty also two terms entered the wider discussion about the European unification process: euroscepticism and 'democratic deficit'. Although the first term has been used in British media since the 1980s (Harmsen 2004) euroscepticism on a mass level became apparent only after the Maastricht treaty. The 1990s have also been the decade witnessing the rise of eurosceptic parties and the introduction of European integration as an issue for political competition in domestic campaigns (eg. Kriesi et al. 2008a; Kriesi 2007; Harmsen 2004; Hooghe/Marks 2008a; Hooghe et al. 2002). As Hooghe and Marks (2002) and Taggart (1998) have shown, eurosceptic parties are predominantly at the fringes of the political spectrum, i.e. they are either extreme left or extreme right parties. Radical right parties blame European integration as eroding national sovereignty and weakening the power of the nation state, whereas radical left parties oppose the European unification project because of its liberal economic characteristics (Hooghe et al. 2002; Kopecký/Mudde 2002).

Regardless of whether European integration has become a new cleavage in national political competition (van der Eijk/Franklin 2004), it adds a further dimension to national political spaces (regarding conceptual discussions see e.g. Marks/Steenbergen 2002; Steenbergen/Marks 2004; Hooghe et al. 2004) transforming the political space and thus party positioning (Kriesi 2008; Kriesi et al. 2008a, 2006). Generally, the salience of European integration has increased and supranational politics affect individual day-to-day life (Kriesi 2007; de Vries 2007). These developments gave rise to new assumptions about individual attitudes toward European integration. The dominant theoretical approach in explaining public opinion with regard to the EU has been economic voting, since the European unification process has been of predominantly economic nature (Gabel 1998c; Gabel/Palmer 1995; Gabel/Whitten 1997; Gabel 1998a,d; Eichenberg/Dalton 1993, 2007). With the deepening of European integration because of the Maastricht treaty and the widening of the EU due to the forthcoming Eastern enlargement (the Northern or EFTA enlargement did not raise noteworthy opposition because all three new member states have been relatively wealthy states and became net contributors to the EU budget), fears of loosing one's national identity arose - simultaneously fuelled by eurosceptic right-wing parties. Thus, scholars turned to theoretical approaches focussing on identity and identity-related concepts to explain individual attitudes toward European integration (McLaren 2002, 2006, 2007;

Llamazares/Gramacho 2007; Weßels 2007; Diez Medrano 2003; de Vries/Van Kersbergen 2007; Hooghe/Marks 2004, 2005; Carey 2002; Risse 2010).

The Maastricht treaty introduced the concept of an European citizenship and allows individuals to vote at local and European elections at the place where they are living. Further, the roadmap to EMU has been defined and thus with 1999, the Euro has been officially introduced as a unit of account, simultaneously creating the euro area and shifting monetary policy to the European Central Bank (ECB). All these developments may be perceived as a potential threat to individual national identity. Some national politicians may have had such an outcome already in mind, as Duncan Watts wrote: "The most important agreement was to fix a definite date for the achievement of economic and monetary union (EMU), 1999 at the latest, or 1997 if seven members met the necessary criteria. The French government, backed by the Germans, was determined to set an irreversible date for the introduction of a single currency. Leaders in both countries understood that shifts in public attitudes could lead to a questioning of the idea, especially as the German people realised that their familiar D-Mark could disappear" (Watts 2008, 41). Further, as already mentioned, the Maastricht treaty provided for the shift of national sovereignty to the supranational level and for an extension of QMV in the Council under the first pillar. Both developments may affect individual identity constructions, the former one through the undermining of national sovereignty (for a different view see eg. Milward 1992; Hooghe/Marks 1999; Moravcsik 1993, 1994; Hooghe/Marks 2008b) and the latter one because of diminishing veto power and thus potential overruling in the Council of Ministers of the individual member states.

Regarding the empirical analysis at hand, the period of the 'post-Maastricht blues' is of exceptional importance because the Standard Eurobarometer surveys have collected data not only on egocentric utilitarianism but also regarding the primary level of reference for the individual identity construction, i.e. if an individual has a national or European identity (Hooghe/Marks 2004, 2005).

Remember that I hypothesized for the period of the 'post-Maastricht blues' because of the above mentioned developments: H3: After the Maastricht treaty and the growing politicization of the integration process as well as the intensified vertical integration and the (individually perceived) associated loss of national sovereignty as well as fuelled fear of immigration cultural/identity approaches should rise faster in their explanatory power relative to economic voting concepts. Furthermore, the respective relative explanatory power should be higher than in previous periods.

Figure 24 shows the differences of average predicted probabilities for the period of the 'post-Maastricht blues' between 1992 and 2002. In the case of egocentric utilitarianism, the graphs show the difference in average predicted probabilities if shifting from the lowest income quartile to the highest income quartile and in the case of 'exclusive national identity' these differences are calculated when this dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. The empirical results for both operationalisations are statistically significant and in the expected direction, i.e. income has a positive effect on $Pr(Good)$ and 'exclusive national identity exerts a negative effect. Further, both theoretical approaches have a considerable effect on the dependent variable. If we take a look at the two straight lines representing the linear fit for each set of empirical results, we can assess that the relative explanatory power of egocentric economic voting increases nearly throughout the period of the 'post-Maastricht blues'. Also the empirical findings regarding 'exclusive national identity' suggest that this approach also becomes more important over time although the results show more variation over time compared to egocentric utilitarianism. A further important result of the empirical analysis of the period of the 'post-Maastricht blues' refers to the level of the marginal effect of egocentric economic voting. As depicted in figure 24, I have calculated the models for the period of 'new hope' and the period of the 'post-Maastricht blues' for the same set of EU member states, namely the EU-12. Thus, the empirical results for these two periods are directly comparable. As we can see, the level of the marginal effects for egocentric economic voting does not change considerably after including the measurement for 'exclusive national identity' (the intersection of these two periods). This finding contradicts claims that either measure is mediated by the other, i.e. economic voting is mediated by identity-related factors (de Vreese et al. 2008) or vice versa (Garry/Tilley 2009). If soft factors as 'exclusive national identity' are really mediated through hard factors like egocentric economic voting as argued by Vreese et. al. (2008), the graph should show a considerable drop in the marginal effect of egocentric utilitarianism since the inclusion of 'exclusive national identity'. The empirical results do not corroborate such an assumption as is shown in the level of the marginal effect of egocentric economic voting when changing from the period of 'new hope' to the period of the 'post-Maastricht blues' and thereby adding 'exclusive national identity' to the model.

However, the empirical results do not corroborate hypothesis 3 since I expected to find a comparatively higher relative explanatory power of 'exclusive national identity' in the period of the 'post-Maastricht blues' as a number of recent studies claim. Nevertheless, the empirical findings are highly interesting because they underscore the

importance of both theoretical approaches to explain public support of the European integration process and thus question studies claiming the explanatory superiority of soft factors like 'exclusive national identity' (Hooghe/Marks 2004, 2005). Furthermore they argue that 'exclusive national identity' has a fairly small effect on individual considerations about the benefit of EU membership (McLaren 2004, 2007) but, on the other side, reinforces claims about the explanatory equivalence of egocentric utilitarianism and identity-related approaches (Luedtke 2005).

I will now turn to my last period of the European integration under investigation in this study, the period of an 'ever closer union' which captures the development of the EU from the physical introduction of the Euro in 12 countries of the EU-15 until 2005, the limit forced by data availability of the Standard Eurobarometer surveys.

7.4. The period of an 'ever closer union'

Although this period is very short compared to the previous three, it comprises two remarkable events drastically changing the European integration process. The first one is the physical introduction of the Euro thereby abolishing an important national symbol of identification—the respective national currency in the Eurozone countries (with a transition period of six months). In January 2002 Euro notes and coins have been introduced in the EU-15 with the exception of Britain, Sweden and Denmark. And the second event has been the first Eastern enlargement in 2004 with the accession of the first group of CEEC's after the breakdown of communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Another external event has been the pre-emptive war of the USA against Iraq in 2003 because of alleged indications of weapons of mass destruction. After the September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington DC the leaders of the EU member states and the EU itself predominantly supported US policies regarding terrorism, eg. actions against the Talibans in Afghanistan. The Iraq war divided Europe into two groups: the group of not supporting the pre-emptive war of the US (e.g. Germany, France) and the supporting group (e.g. Poland). As Anand Menon argues, "(u)nprecedented bitterness characterized the disagreements between the member states spawned by their divergent reactions to events in the Gulf. For the first quarter of 2003 it appeared to some observers as if the prospects the Union implementing successful foreigner security policies had receded dramatically"(Menon 2004, 647ff.). I expect that this development, which triggered massive demonstrations in European cities leads to a higher explanatory power of identity related explana-

tions, although I believe that the other two events are more important in shaping the relationship between the relative explanatory power of the two theoretical approaches under consideration.

Previous studies have explored the determinants of public support for the Euro and find, resembling the results of this analysis with regard to hard and soft factors explaining individual attitudes toward European integration, that economic as well as identity-related factors contribute to explaining support for the common currency. Previous research found that high inflation in the domestic context (Gärtner 1997), the relative burden of the convergence criteria (Gabel 2000) have an impact on attitudes toward the Euro. Researchers also investigated the combined effect of rational cost/benefit calculations and identity on public support for the common currency, thereby finding evidence that both theoretical approaches matter (Kaltenthaler/Anderson 2001; Banducci et al. 2003, 2009). The empirical results of Banducci et. al. (2009) suggest that economic factors play a more decisive role inside the Eurozone, whereas identity is a more important explanatory factor outside.

The first Eastern enlargement in 2004 has been an historical event in the development of the EU. The German unification represents the first accession of a country from the former communist bloc, and in 2004 the reunion of Europe continued. Although norms and values have played an important role in the decision-making process toward enlargement, as Schimmelfennig concludes: "In the institutional environment of the EU, the supporters of enlargement were able to justify their preferences on the grounds of the Community's traditional pan-European orientation and its liberal constitutive values and norms and to shame "brakemen" into acquiescing in enlargement" (Schimmelfennig 2001, 76ff.) the EU-15 had some serious consideration about the democratic transition and economic performance and thus introduced with the Maastricht treaty the already mentioned Copenhagen criteria. The negotiation process, with regard to the accession, began in 1998 with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Cyprus, furthermore the EU began accession negotiations with Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, and Slovakia in 1999. At its December 2002 summit in Copenhagen, the EU concluded accession talks with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

Some member states of the EU-15 also expressed fears about the massive inflow of labour force of these countries because of large wage differentials (Boeri/Bruecker 2001). Thus, a transition period was implemented in order to allow member states the

restriction of the free movement of labour with regard to the respective labour markets (see also the remarks in chapter 2). These two events were just what predominantly populist eurosceptic parties had waited for. They stressed the robbery of the national currency in the Eurozone countries by the European elite in Brussels and fuelled fears of immigration resulting from the first Eastern enlargement, they drew a picture of considerable immigration of low-cost labour from the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) and new security threats because of the opening of borders, thereby fuelling sentiments against the Enlargement process in general.

Considering the developments presented above I hypothesized: After 2002 the relative explanatory power of 'exclusive national identity' increases because of the mainly identity-related developments in the period of an 'ever closer union' (common currency,Eastern enlargement,) and the increasing subjective insecurity felt by a growing share of the European public due to Eastern enlargement in 2004 and a (perceived) ongoing loss of national sovereignty.

Figure 24 shows the differences in predicted average probabilities for the impact of 'exclusive national identity' for the period of an 'ever closer union'. As in the previous three periods, the estimations for 'exclusive national attachment' are in the expected direction and statistically significant (see also the respective tables in the appendix). Further, as the graph in figure 24 shows, this independent variable has also an considerable marginal effect on the $Pr(Good)$. Unfortunately, as mentioned a few times, no data is available to simultaneously test for the influence of egocentric utilitarianism. Nevertheless, we can meaningfully interpret the empirical results. First of all, we see that the overall level of the marginal effects endures also in the period of an 'ever closer union'. This corroborates to some extend my fourth hypothesis because the marginal effect of 'exclusive national identity' remains at a high level throughout the period of an 'ever closer union'. However, to convincingly accept H4, the difference of the average level should have been significantly higher. Nevertheless, the empirical findings speak to the existing literature. Basically, they strengthen the assumption that a 'cultural turn' has happened in the post-Maastricht period more generally, and in the period of an 'ever closer union' more specifically. Thus, this finding does not imply that rational cost-benefit calculation do not matter any more but rather suggest that we have to take into consideration both theoretical approaches to be able to adequately describe the public support of the European integration process. The findings also support the results of Luedtke (2005), that identity-related considerations are not instrumentally used but have an influence on their own, i.e. they can

be seen as an affective dimension of public support of the EU, because "(i)f identity were instrumental, then identities would merely be proxies (indirect indicators) for calculated self-interest and/ or socio-economic status, and therefore would have no more explanatory power" (Luedtke 2005, 102) when removing egocentric economic considerations from the model. Applying the same logic, the empirical results speak against the claim by John Garry and James Tilley (2009), that identity is mediated by economic considerations, although they focus on macroeconomic factors. However, if identity is indeed mediated by economic factors, the marginal effect should increase after removing economic measures from the model and this is not the case if we look at figure 24, where the level of the marginal effects should otherwise become more negative for the whole period of an 'ever closer union.

8. Conclusion

The European unification project is astounding. After centuries of national rivalries and war, the European nation states agreed to unite. This great political experiment has lasted now for nearly sixty years and consists of 28 member states. In these six decades, the European unification project not only increased in scope but also in depth. From the foundation of the European Coal and Steal Community, intended as a community of six nation states to foster peace in Europe after the dramatic and catastrophic experiences of World War II, over the European Economic Communities, intensifying and strengthening economic competition and cooperation, to the introduction of the European Union advancing political collaboration the European unification project has gone a long and successful way. The process of European integration also changed with regard to the so-called horizontal integration and vertical integration. The former refers to the increasing number of member states, from 6 to 28, united within the EU thereby not only enlarging the territory of the EU but also its population. It would be too narrowly considered to look only at numbers, European enlargement also includes the reunion of Europe. After nearly 50 years of Cold war between the two superpowers and after the collapse of communism and the Soviet bloc, most of the CEEC joined the EU. The latter development, vertical integration, scholars describe the extending powers of the supranational level, i.e. the shift of former national sovereignty to the EU level. With regard to this process, treaties are the most important events because they mark the formal implementation of such power shifts. Thus it comes as no surprise that sentiments of the European public are often expressed in referenda

accompanying treaty ratification, although individual behaviour at referenda is also often influenced by domestic issues. Scholars often see the Maastricht treaty as the most important in the course of the European integration process. This treaty not only introduced the European citizenry, extended qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers to new policy areas, enhanced the power of the European parliament and much more, it also marked the transition from a predominantly economic integration process to a more political one. Consequently, the European integration process became more politicized and more salient in the day-to-day life of its citizenry - European integration now matters. The impact of the Maastricht treaty is often described as a change from 'permissive consensus' to 'constraining dissensus' thereby pointing to the increasing salience of EU politics and growing politicization of EU issues. European integration changed from an elite-driven project to a new conflicting issue in political contestation in domestic and supranational political arenas.

Although the process of politicization of European integration already started in the 1980s after Maastricht and the first rejection of a European treaty in the Danish referenda, European integration became a dimension of political contestation within the national political arenas, some even argue that European unification poses a new cleavage - a new conflict line. Regardless of whether European integration became the quality of transforming the national political spaces, it changed political competition within the member states, where political parties now position themselves with regard to European integration.

The European unification process is an unprecedented political construct with regard to the density of cooperation between member states and the impact on the life of its citizenry. There have been ardently conducted debates between political leaders as well as scholars as to whether the EU is and/ or should be a confederation or a federal system. As the lowest common multiple and on a more abstract level, the EU is a political system which needs the political support of its citizenry. Thus, with the changes presented above, also the impact of the European unification process on the individual citizen has also changed dramatically. Increasing politicization implies that ever more EU issues became part of the world of the European people. This development also meant altering political allegiance of the European citizenry to the EU and changing attitudes towards the European unification project. A recent scholarly discussion about research of public opinion assumes a 'cultural turn' in explaining attitudes. Hence, public opinion towards European integration once driven by predominantly economic factors, is now also determined by cultural/identity-related characteristics.

The research project at hand is the first attempt to analyse the changing relationship of egocentric utilitarianism and identity-related theoretical approaches over the course of nearly 30 years of European integration, embedded within the context and the changing character of the European unification process as outlined above. Previous studies also focussed on the temporal development of theoretical approaches but either looked only at a few time points or focussed only on a single theory or simply interpreted the strength of regression coefficients.

Regarding the main research question: Has a 'cultural turn' in the determinants of public opinion on European integration really happened? Recent scholarly discussions strengthened the assumption that such a shift happened at least after the Maastricht treaty. The results of this analysis clearly say 'yes' - identity-related explanations are important. However, the results also leave us with a 'but'. Unfortunately, we lack data on cultural/identity-related factors for the period of non-politicization and the period of 'new hope' and data on income for the period of the 'post-Maastricht blues'. Thus, I have not been able to comprehensively compare the relative explanatory power of egocentric economic voting and 'exclusive national identity'. The periodization of the history of European unification provides us with quasi-experimental settings which are similar to including and removing specific variables from a model. This is especially important when asking if one theoretical approach is mediated by another, e.g. is the impact of identity larger if economic performance is low? Theoretically, if this is the case, including identity-related variables should suppress the relative explanatory power of egocentric utilitarianism and vice versa.

I have stressed the characteristic of the Standard Eurobarometer surveys and the possible drawbacks with regard of the non-panel character and the changing sample selection strategies. We have to keep that in mind and be very carefully in interpreting the empirical results. My research design addresses some of these problems, especially the fact that I have calculated not a pooled time-series cross-section model but one model for each year of the time period under investigation. Methodologically, the analysis relies on multilevel ordered logistic regression technique with random intercepts only at the country level. The choice for this method is driven by three facts, first, the measurement metric of the dependent variable is ordinal, thus, results are biased if I do not take that into account. Secondly, the data collecting process of the Standard Eurobarometer surveys is a hierarchical one, i.e. European citizens are nested within European member states. Ignoring this structure leads to biased standard errors of our statistical estimations and thus we overestimate the precision of our results. Third,

striving for random intercepts only is based on technical as well as substantive reasoning, different member states have varying average levels of political support of the European unification process and different historical legacies.

After I have analysed and found empirical support for the validity of using only one question as dependent variable as measure for support of the European integration, I have turned to the empirical analysis of egocentric utilitarianism and 'exclusive national identity' with regard to different groups of member states and different periods of European integration. The centrepiece of the former analysis is the combination of all these parts into a comprehensive picture. I will shortly review the empirical results for each period and then relate the empirical findings to the three leading research questions of my analysis.

The period of non-politicization has clearly been dominated by the 'permissive consensus' implying that citizens of the EEC preferred to their national governments for economic downturns and recession instead of directing blame to the European level. In the period of non-politicization, European integration predominantly meant technical regulations and the removal of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade. Thus, the relative explanatory power of egocentric economic voting declines within that period and further shows comparatively high variation. The volatility is relatively high in the first half of the 1980s which may reflect the economic insecurities and fears of European citizens.

Jacques Delors and the *relance* of European integration characterize the period of 'new hope'. The Single European Act marks the beginning of this period and brought a massive impetus to the European unification process. This period witnessed the process to the Single market and the end of the Cold war. Both events changed the nature and the meaning of the European integration process. The empirical findings are ambivalent as discussed with a view to the results of the robustness checks. What is important to take along from this analysis is that the overall level of the marginal effects of egocentric utilitarianism remains fairly stable within the period of 'new hope'.

Data availability changes when turning to the period of the 'post-Maastricht blues'. The Maastricht-treaty in 1992 had important symbolic value in the scholarly discussion of the 'cultural turn' in research on public opinion towards European integration, because it is often assumed as the transition from a 'permissive consensus' to a 'constraining dissensus'. The Maastricht-treaty has also had an impact on the attitudes of the European public as is clearly shown in the three referenda initiated to ratify the

Treaty on the European Union in Ireland, France, and Denmark, whereby in France the treaty has been verified by only a slim margin of 51.05%-the *petit qui* - and the Danish people even rejected the Maastricht treaty. For the period of the 'post-Maastricht blues', we have data available for egocentric economic voting and cultural/identity related approaches, where the former is operationalised with household income and the latter with 'exclusive national identity'. The results for this period are remarkable in several ways. First, the relative explanatory power for both approaches increased in this period within the EU12. Second, both exert an important influence in explaining attitudes toward European integration as indicated by their respective marginal effects. Third, neither approach is mediated by the other since there is no significant shift in the overall level of marginal effect, neither at the beginning of the period of the 'post-Maastricht blues' with regard to egocentric utilitarianism nor at the end of the period concerning 'exclusive national identity'.

However, why does the relative explanatory power of both approaches increase? The growing politicization and increasing salience of EU issues, especially after the adoption of the Maastricht treaty, affected the European citizenry not only regarding their cultural values and norms but also in economic terms. Furthermore, the growing importance of a specific theory does not imply that previous theoretical approaches loose their explanatory power. This pattern also corroborates the argument of Liesbeth Hooghe and Gary Marks, that both—cultural/identity-related approaches, as well as economic-voting theory—are necessary to give a reasonable picture of the structure of individual as well as aggregated attitudes towards the European integration project without loosing causally decisive information. Nevertheless, economic concerns continue to be of main importance and drive public opinion towards the European unification process. Following the 'cultural turn'-thesis the cultural/identity-based explanations are on the rise in the period of the 'post-Maastricht blues'. This development indicates that a growing share of the European public perceive or evaluate the European unification project as a threat to their cultural values and norms and their national identity. Parts of the European citizenry see the shifting of an increasing portion of national sovereignty to the supranational level as a danger to their way of life and as a danger to their respective in-group, especially the respective national citizenry.

The Maastricht treaty was not only the starting point for the EU (formerly the European Community) but also the beginning of the three-stages process of the European Monetary Union, although from the MS at the time only Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Spain participated in the first

stage. The participation in the EMU process implied massive restrictions for national sovereignty. Most significantly, the participating countries had to follow the convergence or Maastricht criteria, which implies that the national political decision-maker lost discretion in economic and social policy. Consequently, all participating countries had to introduce cost-containing policies within their social systems to a greater or lesser extent. Affected citizens perceived this development as a redistribution caused by European integration from the lower classes to the affluent individuals, which on average took away most of the advantages of the European unification process. These concerns have been additionally fuelled by eurosceptic parties, especially in countries with a generous welfare state, blaming the supranational level for those austerity measures.

The physical introduction of the Euro and the first Eastern enlargement characterize the last period which I have called the period of an 'ever closer union'. Both events are assumed to strengthen identity-related explanations. The introduction of Euro coins and notes also implied the abolition of former national currencies in participating Eurozone members. Thus, individuals lost one important symbol of national identification, that they were familiar with, their national currency. The first Eastern enlargement also gave rise to fears related to group-threat and identity. Populist eurosceptic parties used this development to create fear because of assumed massive immigration into labour markets and security threats because of open borders. As already mentioned, we lack data for the operationalisation of egocentric economic voting and have only data for 'exclusive national identity'. The main finding of the analysis for this period is that the overall level of the marginal effect of 'exclusive national identity' did not change and remained fairly stable over the period of an 'ever closer union'. Regarding the scholarly discussion about a 'cultural turn' in researching public opinion towards European integration, the results of the analysis of the period of an 'ever closer union' cast some doubt on the results of previous research. Although, we can not directly compare cultural/identity related approaches with economic-voting theory, the results give some indications suggesting that the 'cultural turn' has been only limited. The lack of data on income equals removing control variables for household income from the model. As discussed above, some scholars argue that 'soft' predictors such as feelings of identity and attitudes towards immigrants, i.e. cultural/identity factors, are mediated through 'hard' predictors of economic-voting theories. However, the results indicate that cultural/identity factors are not mediated through economic-voting factors, because the relative explanatory power has had to increase further by removing egocentric economic-voting control variables.

The present study clearly answered the question concerning the relative explanatory power of the two rivalling theoretical approaches under investigation. Egocentric as well as identity-related considerations are important to adequately draw a picture of public opinion towards European integration. If one ignores either of these two explanations, the resulting analysis neglects important causal relationships. Calling to mind the overall picture, although both approaches have a different overall level of marginal effect the changes within the explanatory power of each approach are fairly limited.

With regard to the second research question: Has a 'cultural turn' happened? Recalling again the empirical results, especially those for the period of the 'post-Maastricht blues', I would not speak of a 'cultural turn' but rather of a rise of cultural/identity-related explanations. The reason is simple, the impact of egocentric utilitarianism did not vanish. We have to take into account both approaches and can not rely only on identity-related theoretical explanations because that would miss an important part of the 'real' phenomenon. Public opinion in the time after the Maastricht treaty, an era of constraining dissensus', in the period of the 'post-Maastricht blues' and 'ever closer union', is shaped by rational cost-benefit calculations as well as identity-related considerations.

Turning to my last research question: Are either of these two theoretical approaches mediated by the other, i.e. is one of these explanations only an indirect factor? The answer is clearly 'no' as already discussed above. The transitions between the period of 'new hope' and the period of the 'post-Maastricht blues', as well as the transition from the latter to the period of an 'ever closer union' in conjunction with the lack of data, resemble quasi-experimental situations. Since no theoretical approach showed a substantive shift in the overall level of marginal effect, we can negate the last research question.

Thus, the present analysis constitutes an important contribution to the scholarly literature analysing public opinion towards the EU in general and the relationship between rational cost-benefit calculations and identity-related explanations more specifically.

The results also show that historical context is an essential, albeit often neglected, factor. If we ask after the driving factors of public opinion towards the European unification process, we have to take into account the 'nature' of the EU at specific points in time. Changes in the characteristics of the European integration process pose a new environment in which the European citizenry has to live and with which it has

to cope with. Furthermore, the analysis shows that the European citizenry responds to changes of European integration and reacts to new opportunities and/or obstacles.

The results of the analysis also suggest that EU-elites and policy-makers should carefully design future developments of the European integration process. However, the European citizenry seems—at least in the aggregate—sensible to changes and will judge them accordingly, this raises optimism that European policy makers can build consensus for further integration. It is vital that European, as well as domestic, politicians understand what drives support for the European unification process. They can not hope for a returning 'permissive consensus' anymore. European integration has become an issue of political contestation at the domestic as well as the supranational level.

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A. Appendix - Figures and Tables

A.1. Hierarchical Models - EU9 - Only with Income - Tables

Table 5: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-9: 1976-1978.

	1976		1977		1978	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.404***	1.498***	0.353***	1.423***	0.334***	1.396***
	(0.037)		(0.039)		(0.039)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.024***	0.976***	−0.022***	0.978***	−0.019***	0.982***
	(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.165***	1.179***	0.130***	1.139***	0.082***	1.086***
	(0.021)		(0.023)		(0.024)	
Age of Respondent	0.004***	1.004***	−0.000	1.000	0.001	1.001
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.108***	0.897***	−0.147***	0.863***	−0.181***	0.835***
	(0.040)		(0.042)		(0.043)	
Income	0.186***	1.204***	0.140***	1.150***	0.180***	1.197***
	(0.025)		(0.025)		(0.025)	
Education	0.330***	1.391***	0.286***	1.332***	0.271***	1.311***
	(0.031)		(0.033)		(0.034)	
cut1	1.193***	3.297***	0.425***	1.530***	0.205	1.228
cut2	2.611***	13.606***	1.792***	6.000***	1.674***	5.336***
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.561***	1.752***	0.645***	1.905***	0.655***	1.926***
	(0.016)		(0.017)		(0.018)	
Observations	11350		10933		10465	

Table 6: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-9: 1979-1981.

	1979		1980		1981	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.438***	1.550***	0.387***	1.473***	0.257***	1.293***
	(0.042)		(0.041)		(0.049)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.024***	0.976***	−0.025***	0.975***	−0.006	0.994
	(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.168***	1.183***	0.081***	1.085***	0.036	1.037
	(0.023)		(0.022)		(0.030)	
Age of Respondent	0.002*	1.003*	0.000	1.000	0.005***	1.005***
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.002)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.114***	0.892***	−0.125***	0.882***	−0.135**	0.874**
	(0.043)		(0.041)		(0.055)	
Income	0.230***	1.258***	0.160***	1.173***	0.089***	1.093***
	(0.024)		(0.023)		(0.031)	
Education	0.228***	1.257***	0.337***	1.400***	0.276***	1.318***
	(0.033)		(0.030)		(0.041)	
cut1	0.388**	1.473**	0.409**	1.506**	0.116	1.122
cut2	1.884***	6.579***	1.859***	6.419***	1.694***	5.443***
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.688***	1.989***	0.630***	1.877***	0.538***	1.713***
	(0.020)		(0.014)		(0.018)	
Observations	10830		10818		5902	

Table 7: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-9: 1982-1984.

	1982		1983		1984	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.305***	1.356***	0.434***	1.544***	0.249***	1.282***
	(0.037)		(0.038)		(0.045)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.015***	0.985***	−0.024***	0.976***	−0.010**	0.990**
	(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.004)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.037*	1.037*	0.025	1.025	0.108***	1.114***
	(0.021)		(0.021)		(0.025)	
Age of Respondent	0.005***	1.006***	0.003***	1.003***	0.006***	1.006***
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.058	0.943	−0.149***	0.862***	−0.179***	0.836***
	(0.039)		(0.039)		(0.046)	
Income	0.141***	1.151***	0.188***	1.207***	0.107***	1.113***
	(0.022)		(0.022)		(0.024)	
Education	0.341***	1.406***	0.262***	1.299***	0.350***	1.419***
	(0.028)		(0.029)		(0.034)	
cut1	0.516***	1.675***	0.616***	1.851***	0.196	1.216
cut2	2.086***	8.053***	2.191***	8.944***	1.866***	6.464***
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.515***	1.673***	0.437***	1.548***	0.639***	1.895***
	(0.014)		(0.011)		(0.020)	
Observations	11339		11728		8726	

Table 8: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-9: 1985-1987.

	1985		1986		1987	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.381***	1.463***	0.407***	1.502***	0.386***	1.470***
	(0.038)		(0.039)		(0.041)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.020***	0.980***	−0.021***	0.980***	−0.018***	0.982***
	(0.003)		(0.004)		(0.004)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.049**	1.051**	0.023	1.023	0.053**	1.054**
	(0.021)		(0.021)		(0.023)	
Age of Respondent	0.003**	1.003**	0.003***	1.003***	0.003**	1.003**
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.176***	0.838***	−0.152***	0.859***	−0.069	0.933
	(0.039)		(0.040)		(0.042)	
Income	0.143***	1.154***	0.061***	1.063***	0.165***	1.179***
	(0.020)		(0.020)		(0.021)	
Education	0.217***	1.242***	0.290***	1.336***	0.250***	1.284***
	(0.028)		(0.029)		(0.029)	
cut1	0.534***	1.706***	0.045	1.046	0.321**	1.378**
cut2	1.977***	7.225***	1.575***	4.830***	1.776***	5.906***
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.491***	1.634***	0.625***	1.869***	0.512***	1.669***
	(0.012)		(0.018)		(0.014)	
Observations	12246		12072		11406	

Table 9: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-9: 1988-1990.

	1988		1989		1990	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.262***	1.300***	0.268***	1.307***	0.322***	1.380***
	(0.039)		(0.028)		(0.046)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.010***	0.990***	−0.014***	0.986***	−0.018***	0.983***
	(0.003)		(0.002)		(0.004)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.121***	1.129***	0.080***	1.084***	0.133***	1.143***
	(0.022)		(0.017)		(0.025)	
Age of Respondent	0.002	1.002	0.003***	1.003***	0.004***	1.004***
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.122***	0.885***	−0.206***	0.814***	−0.118***	0.889***
	(0.041)		(0.031)		(0.046)	
Income	0.194***	1.215***	0.133***	1.143***	0.177***	1.194***
	(0.020)		(0.015)		(0.022)	
Education	0.248***	1.281***	0.292***	1.339***	0.300***	1.350***
	(0.028)		(0.020)		(0.030)	
cut1	0.128	1.136	−1.026***	0.358***	−0.326*	0.722*
cut2	1.637***	5.138***	0.441***	1.554***	1.032***	2.806***
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.608***	1.838***	0.495***	1.640***	0.429***	1.536***
	(0.018)		(0.011)		(0.016)	
Observations	11590		22255		10251	

Table 10: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-9: 1991-1993.

	1991		1992		1993	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.259***	1.296***	0.295***	1.344***	0.308***	1.360***
	(0.033)		(0.031)		(0.039)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.015***	0.985***	−0.022***	0.978***	−0.022***	0.978***
	(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.004)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.154***	1.167***	0.155***	1.167***	0.159***	1.172***
	(0.019)		(0.018)		(0.022)	
Age of Respondent	0.003***	1.003***	0.003***	1.003***	0.001	1.001
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.159***	0.853***	−0.179***	0.836***	−0.188***	0.829***
	(0.035)		(0.032)		(0.039)	
Income	0.142***	1.152***	0.124***	1.132***	0.125***	1.133***
	(0.017)		(0.016)		(0.018)	
Education	0.306***	1.358***	0.289***	1.335***	0.298***	1.347***
	(0.023)		(0.021)		(0.025)	
cut1	−0.019	0.981	−0.003	0.997	−0.197	0.821
cut2	1.350***	3.857***	1.343***	3.831***	1.242***	3.464***
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.537***	1.710***	0.313***	1.367***	0.540***	1.716***
	(0.017)		(0.011)		(0.021)	
Observations	18923		19525		12811	

Table 11: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-9: 1994-1996.

	1994		1995		1996	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.287***	1.333***	0.210***	1.234***	0.200***	1.221***
	(0.072)		(0.053)		(0.026)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.022***	0.978***	−0.016***	0.984***	−0.016***	0.984***
	(0.007)		(0.005)		(0.002)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.132***	1.142***	0.087***	1.091***	0.164***	1.178***
	(0.042)		(0.029)		(0.015)	
Age of Respondent	0.001	1.001	−0.002	0.998	−0.002*	0.998*
	(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.175**	0.839**	−0.159***	0.853***	−0.124***	0.884***
	(0.074)		(0.053)		(0.027)	
Income	0.114***	1.121***	0.154***	1.166***	0.118***	1.125***
	(0.036)		(0.025)		(0.013)	
Education	0.231***	1.260***	0.248***	1.281***	0.262***	1.299***
	(0.049)		(0.033)		(0.017)	
cut1	−0.140	0.869	−0.410**	0.664**	−0.205**	0.815**
cut2	1.309***	3.703***	1.106***	3.022***	1.315***	3.725***
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.446***	1.561***	0.418***	1.519***	0.349***	1.418***
	(0.035)		(0.021)		(0.007)	
Observations	3163		6255		23806	

Table 12: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-9: 1997-1999.

	1997		1998		1999	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.266***	1.304***	0.195***	1.215***	0.295***	1.343***
	(0.027)		(0.039)		(0.056)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.022***	0.978***	−0.017***	0.983***	−0.024***	0.976***
	(0.002)		(0.004)		(0.005)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.099***	1.104***	0.162***	1.176***	0.117***	1.124***
	(0.015)		(0.022)		(0.034)	
Age of Respondent	−0.000	1.000	0.001	1.001	0.001	1.001
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.002)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.172***	0.842***	−0.078**	0.925**	−0.089	0.915
	(0.027)		(0.039)		(0.058)	
Income	0.136***	1.145***	0.122***	1.129***	0.173***	1.189***
	(0.013)		(0.019)		(0.028)	
Education	0.291***	1.338***	0.325***	1.385***	0.360***	1.434***
	(0.017)		(0.025)		(0.037)	
cut1	−0.058	0.943	−0.236	0.790	−0.058	0.943
cut2	1.475***	4.372***	1.408***	4.090***	1.579***	4.849***
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.481***	1.618***	0.554***	1.740***	0.508***	1.662***
	(0.011)		(0.021)		(0.033)	
Observations	23576		11747		5377	

Table 13: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-9: 2000-2002.

	2000		2001		2002	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.160***	1.174***	0.234***	1.264***	0.257***	1.293***
	(0.041)		(0.041)		(0.057)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.018***	0.982***	−0.022***	0.978***	−0.024***	0.977***
	(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.005)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.158***	1.171***	0.194***	1.214***	0.165***	1.179***
	(0.023)		(0.023)		(0.033)	
Age of Respondent	−0.001	0.999	−0.001	0.999	0.004**	1.004**
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.002)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.085**	0.919**	−0.074*	0.929*	−0.189***	0.828***
	(0.041)		(0.040)		(0.059)	
Income	0.168***	1.183***	0.195***	1.215***	0.110***	1.116***
	(0.020)		(0.020)		(0.028)	
Education	0.200***	1.222***	0.150***	1.161***	0.395***	1.484***
	(0.026)		(0.026)		(0.039)	
cut1	−0.511***	0.600***	−0.442***	0.642***	−0.410*	0.664*
cut2	1.014***	2.757***	1.232***	3.429***	1.361***	3.900***
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.578***	1.782***	0.583***	1.792***	0.556***	1.744***
	(0.022)		(0.035)		(0.032)	
Observations	10437		10625		5237	

A.2. Hierarchical Models - EU9 - Only with Income - Figures

Figure 27: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 1976–1979.



Notes: The dashed lines show the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ and the light-grey area the corresponding confidence interval.

Figure 28: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 1980–1983.



Notes: The dashed lines show the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ and the light-grey area the corresponding confidence interval.

Figure 29: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 1984–1987.



Notes: The dashed lines show the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ and the light-grey area the corresponding confidence interval.

Figure 30: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 1988–1991.



Notes: The dashed lines show the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ and the light-grey area the corresponding confidence interval.

Figure 31: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 1992–1995.



Notes: The dashed lines show the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ and the light-grey area the corresponding confidence interval.

Figure 32: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 1996–1999.



Notes: The dashed lines show the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ and the light-grey area the corresponding confidence interval.

Figure 33: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 2000–2002.



Notes: The dashed lines show the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ and the light-grey area the corresponding confidence interval.

A.3. Hierarchical Models - EU12 - Only with Income - Tables

Table 14: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-12: 1986-1988.

	1986		1987		1988	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.408***	1.504***	0.355***	1.427***	0.250***	1.284***
	(0.037)		(0.038)		(0.036)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.021***	0.979***	−0.017***	0.984***	−0.010***	0.990***
	(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.039*	1.040*	0.040*	1.040*	0.144***	1.155***
	(0.020)		(0.021)		(0.021)	
Age of Respondent	0.003**	1.003**	0.002	1.002	0.002**	1.002**
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.153***	0.858***	−0.104***	0.901***	−0.138***	0.871***
	(0.038)		(0.039)		(0.038)	
Income	0.106***	1.112***	0.130***	1.139***	0.171***	1.187***
	(0.019)		(0.020)		(0.019)	
Education	0.239***	1.269***	0.276***	1.318***	0.301***	1.351***
	(0.028)		(0.027)		(0.026)	
cut1	−0.111	0.895	−0.062	0.939	0.085	1.088
cut2	1.430***	4.180***	1.419***	4.134***	1.637***	5.139***
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.329***	1.390***	0.564***	1.758***	0.500***	1.648***
	(0.009)		(0.014)		(0.013)	
Observations	13965		13453		13568	

Table 15: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-12: 1989-1991.

	1989		1990		1991	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.246***	1.279***	0.308***	1.361***	0.268***	1.308***
	(0.026)		(0.042)		(0.031)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.014***	0.987***	−0.018***	0.982***	−0.016***	0.984***
	(0.002)		(0.004)		(0.003)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.082***	1.086***	0.131***	1.140***	0.121***	1.128***
	(0.016)		(0.023)		(0.018)	
Age of Respondent	0.003***	1.003***	0.004***	1.004***	0.003***	1.003***
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.203***	0.817***	−0.121***	0.886***	−0.165***	0.848***
	(0.029)		(0.042)		(0.033)	
Income	0.134***	1.143***	0.151***	1.163***	0.151***	1.163***
	(0.014)		(0.020)		(0.016)	
Education	0.255***	1.290***	0.271***	1.311***	0.300***	1.350***
	(0.019)		(0.028)		(0.022)	
cut1	−0.678***	0.508***	−0.595***	0.552***	−0.376***	0.686***
cut2	0.816***	2.261***	0.794***	2.211***	1.020***	2.773***
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.525***	1.691***	0.424***	1.528***	0.387***	1.472***
	(0.011)		(0.015)		(0.011)	
Observations	25819		12165		21819	

Table 16: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-12: 1992-1994.

	1992		1993		1994	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.282***	1.325***	0.301***	1.351***	0.230***	1.258***
	(0.029)		(0.035)		(0.066)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.022***	0.978***	−0.022***	0.978***	−0.016***	0.984***
	(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.006)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.143***	1.154***	0.134***	1.144***	0.120***	1.128***
	(0.016)		(0.019)		(0.039)	
Age of Respondent	0.001	1.001	0.001	1.001	−0.001	0.999
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.002)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.166***	0.847***	−0.202***	0.817***	−0.220***	0.802***
	(0.029)		(0.035)		(0.069)	
Income	0.123***	1.131***	0.118***	1.125***	0.098***	1.103***
	(0.014)		(0.017)		(0.034)	
Education	0.289***	1.335***	0.276***	1.318***	0.210***	1.233***
	(0.019)		(0.023)		(0.045)	
cut1	−0.408***	0.665***	−0.352***	0.703***	−0.478*	0.620*
cut2	0.981***	2.667***	1.096***	2.992***	0.988***	2.686***
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.514***	1.671***	0.537***	1.711***	0.439***	1.551***
	(0.016)		(0.021)		(0.034)	
Observations	22719		15015		3625	

Table 17: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-12: 1995-1997.

	1995		1996		1997	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.191***	1.211***	0.194***	1.214***	0.248***	1.281***
	(0.048)		(0.024)		(0.025)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.015***	0.985***	−0.015***	0.985***	−0.021***	0.980***
	(0.004)		(0.002)		(0.002)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.077***	1.080***	0.148***	1.160***	0.105***	1.110***
	(0.026)		(0.014)		(0.014)	
Age of Respondent	−0.003*	0.997*	−0.003***	0.997***	−0.002*	0.998*
	(0.002)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.142***	0.867***	−0.147***	0.863***	−0.155***	0.856***
	(0.048)		(0.025)		(0.025)	
Income	0.133***	1.142***	0.112***	1.118***	0.132***	1.141***
	(0.023)		(0.012)		(0.012)	
Education	0.230***	1.259***	0.274***	1.315***	0.258***	1.295***
	(0.031)		(0.016)		(0.016)	
cut1	−0.651***	0.522***	−0.111	0.895	−0.405***	0.667***
cut2	0.885***	2.424***	1.457***	4.292***	1.174***	3.236***
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.413***	1.511***	0.294***	1.342***	0.417***	1.517***
	(0.021)		(0.006)		(0.009)	
Observations	7261		27861		27471	

Table 18: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-12: 1998-2000.

	1998		1999		2000	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.195***	1.216***	0.293***	1.341***	0.191***	1.211***
	(0.036)		(0.053)		(0.038)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.017***	0.983***	−0.024***	0.976***	−0.020***	0.981***
	(0.003)		(0.005)		(0.003)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.162***	1.176***	0.117***	1.124***	0.172***	1.188***
	(0.020)		(0.031)		(0.021)	
Age of Respondent	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	−0.001	0.999
	(0.001)		(0.002)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.109***	0.896***	−0.093*	0.911*	−0.124***	0.884***
	(0.036)		(0.054)		(0.038)	
Income	0.118***	1.125***	0.192***	1.212***	0.166***	1.181***
	(0.017)		(0.026)		(0.019)	
Education	0.322***	1.379***	0.345***	1.412***	0.264***	1.302***
	(0.024)		(0.036)		(0.025)	
cut1	−0.347**	0.707**	−0.122	0.885	−0.366**	0.693**
cut2	1.321***	3.746***	1.569***	4.800***	1.206***	3.340***
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.568***	1.764***	0.527***	1.693***	0.502***	1.653***
	(0.020)		(0.028)		(0.018)	
Observations	13612		6209		12127	

Table 19: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-12: 2001-2002.

	2001		2002	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.257***	1.293***	0.264***	1.303***
	(0.038)		(0.052)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.023***	0.977***	−0.024***	0.976***
	(0.003)		(0.005)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.206***	1.229***	0.156***	1.169***
	(0.021)		(0.031)	
Age of Respondent	−0.001	0.999	0.003	1.003
	(0.001)		(0.002)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.093**	0.912**	−0.198***	0.821***
	(0.038)		(0.055)	
Income	0.168***	1.183***	0.125***	1.133***
	(0.018)		(0.026)	
Education	0.164***	1.178***	0.387***	1.473***
	(0.024)		(0.037)	
cut1	−0.372***	0.689***	−0.449**	0.639**
cut2	1.343***	3.829***	1.332***	3.788***
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.529***	1.698***	0.540***	1.716***
	(0.030)		(0.030)	
Observations	12255		6064	

A.4. Hierarchical Models - EU12 - Only with Income - Figures

Figure 34: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 1986–1989.



Notes: The dashed lines show the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ and the light-grey area the corresponding confidence interval.

Figure 35: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 1990–1993.



Notes: The dashed lines show the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ and the light-grey area the corresponding confidence interval.

Figure 36: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 1994–1997.



Notes: The dashed lines show the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ and the light-grey area the corresponding confidence interval.

Figure 37: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 1998–2001.



Notes: The dashed lines show the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ and the light-grey area the corresponding confidence interval.

Figure 38: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 2002.



Notes: The dashed line shows the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ and the light-grey area the corresponding confidence interval.

A.5. Hierarchical Models - EU15 - Only with Income - Tables

Table 20: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-15: 1995-1997.

	1995		1996		1997	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.184***	1.202***	0.149***	1.161***	0.211***	1.235***
	(0.044)		(0.021)		(0.022)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.012***	0.988***	−0.009***	0.991***	−0.015***	0.985***
	(0.004)		(0.002)		(0.002)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.078***	1.081***	0.146***	1.157***	0.114***	1.120***
	(0.024)		(0.012)		(0.012)	
Age of Respondent	−0.001	0.999	−0.002***	0.998***	−0.001	0.999
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.165***	0.848***	−0.185***	0.831***	−0.178***	0.837***
	(0.042)		(0.021)		(0.021)	
Income	0.167***	1.182***	0.160***	1.174***	0.158***	1.171***
	(0.020)		(0.010)		(0.010)	
Education	0.243***	1.275***	0.236***	1.267***	0.268***	1.307***
	(0.027)		(0.014)		(0.014)	
cut1	−0.348**	0.706**	−0.187**	0.830**	0.202**	1.224**
cut2	1.108***	3.027***	1.336***	3.803***	1.715***	5.557***
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.456***	1.578***	0.501***	1.650***	0.396***	1.486***
	(0.019)		(0.010)		(0.007)	
Observations	9188		35563		35179	

Table 21: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-15: 1998-2000.

	1998		1999		2000	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.171***	1.186***	0.249***	1.283***	0.178***	1.195***
	(0.032)		(0.046)		(0.033)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.012***	0.988***	−0.017***	0.983***	−0.017***	0.983***
	(0.003)		(0.004)		(0.003)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.168***	1.183***	0.189***	1.208***	0.143***	1.154***
	(0.018)		(0.027)		(0.019)	
Age of Respondent	0.002**	1.002**	0.001	1.001	−0.001	0.999
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.133***	0.875***	−0.142***	0.867***	−0.172***	0.842***
	(0.031)		(0.046)		(0.033)	
Income	0.218***	1.244***	0.213***	1.237***	0.225***	1.252***
	(0.015)		(0.023)		(0.016)	
Education	0.301***	1.351***	0.292***	1.338***	0.203***	1.225***
	(0.020)		(0.030)		(0.021)	
cut1	0.296**	1.344**	0.279	1.322	−0.157	0.854
cut2	1.867***	6.466***	1.885***	6.589***	1.362***	3.903***
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.564***	1.757***	0.702***	2.017***	0.464***	1.591***
	(0.017)		(0.038)		(0.013)	
Observations	17422		7999		15620	

Table 22: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-15: 2001-2002.

	2001		2002	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.227***	1.255***	0.206***	1.229***
	(0.033)		(0.044)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.018***	0.982***	−0.016***	0.984***
	(0.003)		(0.004)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.209***	1.233***	0.136***	1.146***
	(0.019)		(0.026)	
Age of Respondent	−0.002*	0.998*	0.003*	1.003*
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.161***	0.851***	−0.217***	0.805***
	(0.032)		(0.047)	
Income	0.185***	1.203***	0.159***	1.173***
	(0.016)		(0.023)	
Education	0.198***	1.218***	0.365***	1.440***
	(0.021)		(0.031)	
cut1	−0.255**	0.775**	−0.472***	0.624***
cut2	1.392***	4.023***	1.283***	3.607***
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.528***	1.695***	0.531***	1.701***
	(0.019)		(0.023)	
Observations	15857		7923	

A.6. Hierarchical Models - EU15 - Only with Income - Figures

Figure 39: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 1995–1998.



Notes: The dashed lines show the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ and the light-grey area the corresponding confidence interval.

Figure 40: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 1999–2002.



Notes: The dashed lines show the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ and the light-grey area the corresponding confidence interval.

A.7. Hierarchical Models - EU9 - The role of ‘exclusive national identity’ - Tables

Table 23: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-9: 1992-1995.

	1992		1993		1995	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.275***	1.316***	0.399***	1.490***	0.188***	1.207***
	(0.059)		(0.058)		(0.054)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.019***	0.981***	−0.031***	0.969***	−0.013***	0.987***
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.005)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.002	1.002	0.068**	1.070**	0.051*	1.053*
	(0.033)		(0.032)		(0.029)	
Age of Respondent	0.000	1.000	0.001	1.001	−0.000	1.000
	(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.091	0.913	−0.097*	0.908*	−0.161***	0.851***
	(0.059)		(0.056)		(0.053)	
Exclusive National Attachment	−1.413***	0.243***	−1.389***	0.249***	−1.049***	0.350***
	(0.061)		(0.059)		(0.054)	
Education	0.172***	1.188***	0.213***	1.238***	0.194***	1.215***
	(0.038)		(0.035)		(0.033)	
cut1	−2.138***	0.118***	−1.003***	0.367***	−1.474***	0.229***
cut2	−0.724***	0.485***	0.521**	1.683**	0.102	1.108
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.516***	1.676***	0.443***	1.557***	0.624***	1.867***
	(0.031)		(0.027)		(0.035)	
Observations	6439		6329		6255	

Table 24: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-9: 1996-1998.

	1996		1997		1998	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.255***	1.290***	0.176***	1.192***	0.193***	1.213***
	(0.052)		(0.053)		(0.040)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.020***	0.980***	−0.014***	0.987***	−0.016***	0.985***
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.004)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.115***	1.121***	0.015	1.015	0.101***	1.106***
	(0.030)		(0.031)		(0.023)	
Age of Respondent	−0.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	0.001	1.001
	(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.135**	0.874**	−0.069	0.933	−0.068*	0.935*
	(0.054)		(0.055)		(0.040)	
Exclusive National Attachment	−1.221***	0.295***	−1.297***	0.273***	−1.274***	0.280***
	(0.056)		(0.057)		(0.041)	
Education	0.195***	1.215***	0.173***	1.189***	0.241***	1.272***
	(0.035)		(0.035)		(0.025)	
cut1	−1.449***	0.235***	−1.624***	0.197***	−1.549***	0.212***
cut2	0.153	1.166	0.072	1.074	0.201	1.223
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.427***	1.532***	0.592***	1.808***	0.595***	1.813***
	(0.019)		(0.028)		(0.023)	
Observations	6035		5846		11747	

Table 25: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-9: 1999-2001.

	1999		2000		2001	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.319***	1.375***	0.149***	1.161***	0.264***	1.302***
	(0.057)		(0.042)		(0.062)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.024***	0.976***	−0.015***	0.985***	−0.021***	0.979***
	(0.005)		(0.004)		(0.006)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.067**	1.070**	0.121***	1.129***	0.153***	1.166***
	(0.034)		(0.024)		(0.034)	
Age of Respondent	0.001	1.001	0.000	1.000	−0.002	0.998
	(0.002)		(0.001)		(0.002)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.095	0.910	−0.051	0.951	−0.107*	0.898*
	(0.059)		(0.042)		(0.061)	
Exclusive National Attachment	−1.276***	0.279***	−1.308***	0.270***	−1.241***	0.289***
	(0.061)		(0.043)		(0.063)	
Education	0.305***	1.357***	0.179***	1.195***	0.130***	1.138***
	(0.037)		(0.026)		(0.039)	
cut1	−1.398***	0.247***	−1.451***	0.234***	−1.837***	0.159***
cut2	0.347	1.415	0.185	1.203	−0.079	0.924
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.544***	1.723***	0.412***	1.509***	0.467***	1.595***
	(0.030)		(0.017)		(0.030)	
Observations	5377		10437		5312	

Table 26: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-9: 2002 & 2003.

	2002		2003	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.302***	1.352***	0.232***	1.261***
	(0.037)		(0.035)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.027***	0.974***	−0.021***	0.980***
	(0.003)		(0.003)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.123***	1.131***	0.123***	1.131***
	(0.022)		(0.019)	
Age of Respondent	0.001	1.001	0.000	1.000
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.110***	0.896***	−0.104***	0.901***
	(0.038)		(0.035)	
Exclusive National Attachment	−1.241***	0.289***	−1.191***	0.304***
	(0.040)		(0.036)	
Education	0.247***	1.280***	0.225***	1.252***
	(0.027)		(0.022)	
cut1	−1.498***	0.224***	−1.266***	0.282***
cut2	0.369**	1.446**	0.417***	1.517***
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.471***	1.602***	0.376***	1.456***
	(0.021)		(0.014)	
Observations	12852		15005	

Table 27: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-9: 2004 & 2005.

	2004		2005	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.094**	1.099**	0.187***	1.206***
	(0.048)		(0.054)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.009**	0.991**	−0.016***	0.984***
	(0.004)		(0.005)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.080***	1.084***	0.081***	1.084***
	(0.027)		(0.026)	
Age of Respondent	0.002	1.002	0.001	1.001
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.164***	0.848***	−0.084*	0.920*
	(0.048)		(0.047)	
Exclusive National Attachment	−1.143***	0.319***	−1.224***	0.294***
	(0.050)		(0.048)	
Education	0.287***	1.332***	0.329***	1.389***
	(0.031)		(0.031)	
cut1	−1.603***	0.201***	−1.173***	0.310***
cut2	−0.003	0.997	0.433*	1.542*
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.432***	1.541***	0.409***	1.505***
	(0.021)		(0.025)	
Observations	7926		8093	

A.8. Hierarchical Models - EU9 - The role of 'exclusive national identity' - Figures

Figure 41: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 1992–1998.



Notes: The panels show the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$, the light-grey vertical bars show the corresponding confidence interval for individuals with no 'exclusive national identity' (=0) and with 'exclusive national identity' (=1).

Figure 42: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 1999–2005.



Notes: The panels show the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$, the light-grey vertical bars show the corresponding confidence interval for individuals with no 'exclusive national identity' (=0) and with 'exclusive national identity' (=1).

A.9. Hierarchical Models - EU12 - The role of ‘exclusive national identity’ - Tables

Table 28: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-12: 1992-1995.

	1992		1993		1995	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.273***	1.314***	0.315***	1.371***	0.173***	1.189***
	(0.055)		(0.053)		(0.049)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.019***	0.981***	−0.025***	0.975***	−0.013***	0.987***
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.004)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.011	1.011	0.080***	1.083***	0.048*	1.049*
	(0.030)		(0.029)		(0.027)	
Age of Respondent	−0.001	0.999	0.002	1.002	−0.001	0.999
	(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.107*	0.898*	−0.108**	0.898**	−0.134***	0.875***
	(0.055)		(0.051)		(0.049)	
Exclusive National Attachment	−1.371***	0.254***	−1.273***	0.280***	−0.999***	0.368***
	(0.056)		(0.053)		(0.052)	
Education	0.175***	1.192***	0.205***	1.227***	0.182***	1.199***
	(0.036)		(0.032)		(0.031)	
cut1	−2.172***	0.114***	−1.122***	0.326***	−1.514***	0.220***
cut2	−0.738***	0.478***	0.408**	1.504**	0.082	1.085
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.500***	1.649***	0.432***	1.540***	0.482***	1.620***
	(0.030)		(0.026)		(0.033)	
Observations	7453		7376		7261	

Table 29: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-12: 1996-1998.

	1996		1997		1998	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.267***	1.306***	0.147***	1.159***	0.193***	1.213***
	(0.048)		(0.049)		(0.037)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.021***	0.980***	−0.010**	0.990**	−0.016***	0.984***
	(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.003)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.132***	1.141***	0.032	1.032	0.099***	1.104***
	(0.028)		(0.028)		(0.021)	
Age of Respondent	−0.002	0.998	−0.001	0.999	0.001	1.001
	(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.136***	0.873***	−0.077	0.926	−0.099***	0.906***
	(0.050)		(0.051)		(0.037)	
Exclusive National Attachment	−1.166***	0.312***	−1.203***	0.300***	−1.247***	0.287***
	(0.052)		(0.052)		(0.039)	
Education	0.194***	1.214***	0.149***	1.161***	0.241***	1.272***
	(0.032)		(0.032)		(0.024)	
cut1	−1.324***	0.266***	−1.740***	0.176***	−1.611***	0.200***
cut2	0.303*	1.354*	−0.026	0.974	0.158	1.171
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.373***	1.453***	0.654***	1.924***	0.607***	1.834***
	(0.021)		(0.032)		(0.023)	
Observations	7083		6820		13612	

Table 30: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-12: 1999-2001.

	1999		2000		2001	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.319***	1.375***	0.195***	1.216***	0.291***	1.338***
	(0.054)		(0.039)		(0.058)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.024***	0.976***	−0.019***	0.981***	−0.024***	0.976***
	(0.005)		(0.003)		(0.005)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.075**	1.078**	0.113***	1.119***	0.154***	1.167***
	(0.031)		(0.022)		(0.032)	
Age of Respondent	0.001	1.001	−0.001	0.999	−0.002	0.998
	(0.002)		(0.001)		(0.002)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.098*	0.907*	−0.092**	0.912**	−0.148***	0.863***
	(0.055)		(0.039)		(0.056)	
Exclusive National Attachment	−1.226***	0.294***	−1.308***	0.270***	−1.187***	0.305***
	(0.057)		(0.040)		(0.059)	
Education	0.300***	1.350***	0.140***	1.150***	0.129***	1.138***
	(0.036)		(0.025)		(0.036)	
cut1	−1.408***	0.245***	−1.693***	0.184***	−1.876***	0.153***
cut2	0.380*	1.463*	−0.006	0.994	−0.098	0.907
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.538***	1.712***	0.468***	1.596***	0.521***	1.684***
	(0.026)		(0.019)		(0.037)	
Observations	6209		12127		6083	

Table 31: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-12: 2002 & 2003.

	2002		2003	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.276***	1.318***	0.242***	1.274***
	(0.035)		(0.032)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.023***	0.977***	−0.021***	0.979***
	(0.003)		(0.003)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.113***	1.119***	0.130***	1.139***
	(0.020)		(0.018)	
Age of Respondent	0.001	1.001	−0.001	0.999
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.118***	0.889***	−0.123***	0.884***
	(0.036)		(0.032)	
Exclusive National Attachment	−1.188***	0.305***	−1.160***	0.314***
	(0.037)		(0.033)	
Education	0.277***	1.319***	0.239***	1.270***
	(0.023)		(0.021)	
cut1	−1.529***	0.217***	−1.442***	0.237***
cut2	0.302**	1.353**	0.265**	1.304**
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.432***	1.540***	0.313***	1.367***
	(0.018)		(0.011)	
Observations	14957		17686	

Table 32: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-12: 2004 & 2005.

	2004		2005	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.170***	1.185***	0.184***	1.202***
	(0.044)		(0.043)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.015***	0.985***	−0.015***	0.985***
	(0.004)		(0.004)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.081***	1.084***	0.095***	1.100***
	(0.025)		(0.024)	
Age of Respondent	0.002*	1.002*	−0.000	1.000
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.165***	0.848***	−0.075*	0.928*
	(0.045)		(0.044)	
Exclusive National Attachment	−1.086***	0.338***	−1.205***	0.300***
	(0.046)		(0.045)	
Education	0.282***	1.325***	0.306***	1.358***
	(0.029)		(0.029)	
cut1	−1.340***	0.262***	−1.215***	0.297***
cut2	0.228	1.256	0.365**	1.441**
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.428***	1.534***	0.419***	1.520***
	(0.020)		(0.021)	
Observations	9313		9403	

A.10. Hierarchical Models - EU12 - The role of 'exclusive national identity' - Figures

Figure 43: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 1992–1998.



Notes: The panels show the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$, the light-grey vertical bars show the corresponding confidence interval for individuals with no 'exclusive national identity' (=0) and with 'exclusive national identity' (=1).

Figure 44: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 1999–2005.



Notes: The panels show the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$, the light-grey vertical bars show the corresponding confidence interval for individuals with no 'exclusive national identity' (=0) and with 'exclusive national identity' (=1).

A.11. Hierarchical Models - EU15 - The role of ‘exclusive national identity’ - Tables

Table 33: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-15: 1995-1997.

	1995		1996		1997	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.174***	1.190***	0.169***	1.184***	0.150***	1.161***
	(0.044)		(0.043)		(0.043)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.011***	0.989***	−0.010***	0.990***	−0.009**	0.991**
	(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.048**	1.049**	0.087***	1.091***	0.024	1.025
	(0.024)		(0.024)		(0.025)	
Age of Respondent	0.001	1.001	−0.002	0.998	−0.000	1.000
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.160***	0.852***	−0.205***	0.815***	−0.103**	0.903**
	(0.043)		(0.043)		(0.044)	
Exclusive National Attachment	−1.029***	0.357***	−1.226***	0.293***	−1.246***	0.288***
	(0.045)		(0.045)		(0.046)	
Education	0.210***	1.234***	0.190***	1.209***	0.178***	1.195***
	(0.027)		(0.028)		(0.028)	
cut1	−1.309***	0.270***	−1.051***	0.350***	−1.557***	0.211***
cut2	0.216	1.241	0.537***	1.710***	0.115	1.122
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.453***	1.574***	0.502***	1.652***	0.609***	1.839***
	(0.019)		(0.018)		(0.022)	
Observations	9188		9004		8749	

Table 34: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-15: 1998-2000.

	1998		1999		2000	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.143***	1.153***	0.256***	1.292***	0.166***	1.181***
	(0.032)		(0.047)		(0.034)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.009***	0.991***	−0.017***	0.983***	−0.015***	0.986***
	(0.003)		(0.004)		(0.003)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.086***	1.089***	0.117***	1.124***	0.101***	1.106***
	(0.018)		(0.027)		(0.019)	
Age of Respondent	0.002**	1.002**	0.001	1.001	−0.000	1.000
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.138***	0.872***	−0.161***	0.851***	−0.161***	0.851***
	(0.032)		(0.047)		(0.033)	
Exclusive National Attachment	−1.268***	0.281***	−1.210***	0.298***	−1.282***	0.278***
	(0.033)		(0.049)		(0.035)	
Education	0.250***	1.284***	0.276***	1.317***	0.194***	1.214***
	(0.021)		(0.030)		(0.021)	
cut1	−1.869***	0.154***	−0.857***	0.425***	−1.409***	0.244***
cut2	−0.187	0.830	0.850***	2.340***	0.217*	1.242*
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.379***	1.460***	0.487***	1.628***	0.503***	1.654***
	(0.011)		(0.020)		(0.016)	
Observations	17422		7999		15620	

Table 35: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-15: 2001-2003.

	2001		2002		2003	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.296***	1.344***	0.232***	1.261***	0.227***	1.255***
	(0.051)		(0.031)		(0.030)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.022***	0.979***	−0.018***	0.982***	−0.018***	0.982***
	(0.005)		(0.003)		(0.003)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.193***	1.213***	0.095***	1.099***	0.120***	1.128***
	(0.028)		(0.018)		(0.016)	
Age of Respondent	−0.001	0.999	0.002**	1.002**	−0.000	1.000
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.215***	0.806***	−0.175***	0.839***	−0.145***	0.865***
	(0.048)		(0.031)		(0.029)	
Exclusive National Attachment	−1.205***	0.300***	−1.221***	0.295***	−1.156***	0.315***
	(0.050)		(0.032)		(0.030)	
Education	0.207***	1.230***	0.275***	1.316***	0.213***	1.237***
	(0.031)		(0.020)		(0.019)	
cut1	−1.147***	0.318***	−1.139***	0.320***	−1.411***	0.244***
cut2	0.592***	1.807***	0.680***	1.975***	0.285***	1.330***
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.523***	1.687***	0.435***	1.545***	0.538***	1.712***
	(0.027)		(0.014)		(0.015)	
Observations	7933		18952		20364	

Table 36: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-15: 2004 & 2005.

	2004		2005	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.180***	1.198***	0.197***	1.217***
	(0.039)		(0.038)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.014***	0.986***	−0.014***	0.986***
	(0.004)		(0.003)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.085***	1.088***	0.085***	1.089***
	(0.022)		(0.022)	
Age of Respondent	0.002	1.002	0.000	1.000
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.234***	0.791***	−0.134***	0.875***
	(0.039)		(0.038)	
Exclusive National Attachment	−1.143***	0.319***	−1.205***	0.300***
	(0.041)		(0.039)	
Education	0.280***	1.323***	0.294***	1.342***
	(0.025)		(0.025)	
cut1	−1.255***	0.285***	−0.985***	0.374***
cut2	0.338**	1.402**	0.613***	1.845***
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.439***	1.550***	0.307***	1.359***
	(0.018)		(0.014)	
Observations	11618		11863	

A.12. Hierarchical Models - EU15 - The role of 'exclusive national identity' - Figures

Figure 45: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 1995–2000.



Notes: The panels show the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$, the light-grey vertical bars show the corresponding confidence interval for individuals with no 'exclusive national identity' (=0) and with 'exclusive national identity' (=1).

Figure 46: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 2001–2005.



Notes: The panels show the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$, the light-grey vertical bars show the corresponding confidence interval for individuals with no 'exclusive national identity' (=0) and with 'exclusive national identity' (=1).

A.13. Hierarchical Models - EU9 - The role of income and ‘exclusive national identity’ - Tables

Table 37: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-9: 1992-1995.

	1992		1993		1995	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.269***	1.308***	0.391***	1.479***	0.173***	1.188***
	(0.059)		(0.058)		(0.054)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.019***	0.982***	−0.031***	0.969***	−0.012**	0.988**
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.005)	
Opinion Leader Index	−0.009	0.991	0.061*	1.063*	0.034	1.035
	(0.033)		(0.031)		(0.029)	
Age of Respondent	0.002	1.002	0.002	1.002	0.001	1.001
	(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.083	0.920	−0.082	0.921	−0.144***	0.866***
	(0.059)		(0.056)		(0.054)	
Exclusive National Attachment	−1.397***	0.247***	−1.368***	0.255***	−1.037***	0.354***
	(0.061)		(0.058)		(0.055)	
Income	0.086***	1.090***	0.112***	1.119***	0.126***	1.134***
	(0.029)		(0.027)		(0.026)	
Education	0.152***	1.164***	0.178***	1.194***	0.162***	1.176***
	(0.038)		(0.036)		(0.034)	
cut1	−1.921***	0.147***	−0.725***	0.484***	−1.199***	0.302***
cut2	−0.505**	0.603**	0.802***	2.231***	0.381*	1.464*
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.523***	1.687***	0.458***	1.580***	0.650***	1.916***
	(0.031)		(0.027)		(0.036)	
Observations	6439		6329		6255	

Table 38: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-9: 1996-1998.

	1996		1997		1998	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.239***	1.270***	0.165***	1.180***	0.184***	1.202***
	(0.052)		(0.053)		(0.040)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.019***	0.981***	−0.013***	0.987***	−0.015***	0.985***
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.004)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.104***	1.109***	0.004	1.004	0.090***	1.094***
	(0.030)		(0.031)		(0.023)	
Age of Respondent	0.000	1.000	0.002	1.002	0.002*	1.002*
	(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.116**	0.890**	−0.056	0.946	−0.057	0.945
	(0.054)		(0.055)		(0.040)	
Exclusive National Attachment	−1.245***	0.288***	−1.284***	0.277***	−1.264***	0.282***
	(0.056)		(0.057)		(0.041)	
Income	0.085***	1.089***	0.111***	1.117***	0.084***	1.088***
	(0.026)		(0.026)		(0.019)	
Education	0.112***	1.119***	0.151***	1.164***	0.224***	1.251***
	(0.035)		(0.035)		(0.026)	
cut1	−1.418***	0.242***	−1.348***	0.260***	−1.345***	0.261***
cut2	0.185	1.203	0.351*	1.421*	0.408***	1.503***
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.479***	1.615***	0.595***	1.813***	0.593***	1.809***
	(0.021)		(0.028)		(0.023)	
Observations	6035		5846		11747	

Table 39: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-9: 1999-2000.

	1999		2000	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.293***	1.340***	0.152***	1.165***
	(0.057)		(0.042)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.023***	0.977***	−0.016***	0.984***
	(0.005)		(0.004)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.059*	1.061*	0.111***	1.117***
	(0.034)		(0.024)	
Age of Respondent	0.002	1.002	0.002	1.002
	(0.002)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.086	0.918	−0.034	0.966
	(0.059)		(0.042)	
Exclusive National Attachment	−1.264***	0.283***	−1.291***	0.275***
	(0.061)		(0.043)	
Income	0.131***	1.139***	0.131***	1.140***
	(0.029)		(0.020)	
Education	0.198***	1.219***	0.156***	1.169***
	(0.038)		(0.027)	
cut1	−1.467***	0.231***	−1.107***	0.331***
cut2	0.283	1.327	0.534***	1.705***
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.412***	1.510***	0.506***	1.659***
	(0.023)		(0.022)	
Observations	5377		10437	

Table 40: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-9: 2001-2002.

	2001		2002	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.258***	1.295***	0.265***	1.303***
	(0.063)		(0.058)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.021***	0.979***	−0.021***	0.979***
	(0.006)		(0.005)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.133***	1.142***	0.076**	1.079**
	(0.035)		(0.034)	
Age of Respondent	−0.000	1.000	0.006***	1.006***
	(0.002)		(0.002)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.093	0.911	−0.155**	0.856**
	(0.061)		(0.060)	
Exclusive National Attachment	−1.236***	0.291***	−1.252***	0.286***
	(0.063)		(0.063)	
Income	0.185***	1.204***	0.069**	1.072**
	(0.030)		(0.029)	
Education	0.089**	1.093**	0.291***	1.338***
	(0.039)		(0.040)	
cut1	−1.285***	0.277***	−1.355***	0.258***
cut2	0.486**	1.625**	0.537**	1.710**
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.444***	1.559***	0.559***	1.748***
	(0.026)		(0.033)	
Observations	5312		5237	

A.14. Hierarchical Models - EU9 - The role of income and 'exclusive national identity' - Figures

Figure 47: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 1992–1996.



Notes: The dashed lines show the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ and the light-grey area the corresponding confidence interval for individuals with no 'exclusive national identity' and the solid line with the darker-grey area for those with an 'exclusive national identity'.

Figure 48: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 1997–2000.



Notes: The dashed lines show the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ and the light-grey area the corresponding confidence interval for individuals with no 'exclusive national identity' and the solid line with the darker-grey area for those with an 'exclusive national identity'.

Figure 49: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 2001–2002.



Notes: The dashed lines show the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ and the light-grey area the corresponding confidence interval for individuals with no 'exclusive national identity' and the solid line with the darker-grey area for those with an 'exclusive national identity'.

A.15. Hierarchical Models - EU12 - The role of income and ‘exclusive national identity’ - Tables

Table 41: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-12: 1992-1995.

	1992		1993		1995	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.269***	1.309***	0.308***	1.360***	0.160***	1.174***
	(0.055)		(0.052)		(0.049)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.019***	0.981***	−0.024***	0.976***	−0.012***	0.988***
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.004)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.003	1.003	0.075***	1.078***	0.033	1.033
	(0.031)		(0.028)		(0.027)	
Age of Respondent	−0.000	1.000	0.003**	1.003**	0.000	1.000
	(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.100*	0.905*	−0.097*	0.907*	−0.120**	0.887**
	(0.055)		(0.051)		(0.049)	
Exclusive National Attachment	−1.357***	0.257***	−1.255***	0.285***	−0.984***	0.374***
	(0.057)		(0.053)		(0.050)	
Income	0.074***	1.077***	0.096***	1.101***	0.104***	1.110***
	(0.027)		(0.025)		(0.023)	
Education	0.158***	1.172***	0.177***	1.194***	0.149***	1.161***
	(0.036)		(0.033)		(0.032)	
cut1	−1.966***	0.140***	−0.873***	0.418***	−1.300***	0.273***
cut2	−0.532**	0.588**	0.660***	1.936***	0.299	1.349
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.503***	1.654***	0.443***	1.558***	0.486***	1.626***
	(0.030)		(0.026)		(0.027)	
Observations	7453		7376		7261	

Table 42: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-12: 1996-1998.

	1996		1997		1998	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.250***	1.284***	0.147***	1.159***	0.186***	1.204***
	(0.048)		(0.049)		(0.037)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.020***	0.981***	−0.011**	0.989**	−0.016***	0.985***
	(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.003)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.115***	1.122***	0.013	1.013	0.089***	1.094***
	(0.028)		(0.028)		(0.021)	
Age of Respondent	−0.001	0.999	0.001	1.001	0.002	1.002
	(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.122**	0.885**	−0.065	0.937	−0.091**	0.913**
	(0.050)		(0.051)		(0.037)	
Exclusive National Attachment	−1.188***	0.305***	−1.197***	0.302***	−1.235***	0.291***
	(0.052)		(0.053)		(0.039)	
Income	0.079***	1.082***	0.117***	1.124***	0.070***	1.072***
	(0.024)		(0.024)		(0.018)	
Education	0.122***	1.129***	0.133***	1.142***	0.223***	1.250***
	(0.033)		(0.033)		(0.024)	
cut1	−1.361***	0.256***	−1.292***	0.275***	−1.450***	0.235***
cut2	0.265	1.303	0.431**	1.540**	0.320**	1.376**
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.460***	1.584***	0.436***	1.547***	0.607***	1.835***
	(0.021)		(0.021)		(0.023)	
Observations	7083		6820		13612	

Table 43: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-12: 1999-2000.

	1999		2000	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.307***	1.359***	0.168***	1.183***
	(0.054)		(0.039)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.023***	0.977***	−0.017***	0.984***
	(0.005)		(0.003)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.057*	1.059*	0.110***	1.116***
	(0.032)		(0.022)	
Age of Respondent	0.002	1.002	0.001	1.001
	(0.002)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.093*	0.911*	−0.076*	0.927*
	(0.055)		(0.039)	
Exclusive National Attachment	−1.190***	0.304***	−1.301***	0.272***
	(0.058)		(0.041)	
Income	0.115***	1.122***	0.130***	1.139***
	(0.027)		(0.019)	
Education	0.275***	1.316***	0.127***	1.136***
	(0.036)		(0.025)	
cut1	−1.744***	0.175***	−1.228***	0.293***
cut2	0.048	1.049	0.460***	1.584***
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.536***	1.709***	0.528***	1.695***
	(0.026)		(0.020)	
Observations	6209		12127	

Table 44: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-12: 2001-2002.

	2001		2002	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.277***	1.319***	0.281***	1.325***
	(0.059)		(0.053)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.023***	0.977***	−0.024***	0.976***
	(0.005)		(0.005)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.133***	1.142***	0.059*	1.060*
	(0.034)		(0.032)	
Age of Respondent	0.001	1.001	0.004**	1.004**
	(0.002)		(0.002)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.134**	0.874**	−0.152***	0.859***
	(0.057)		(0.056)	
Exclusive National Attachment	−1.187***	0.305***	−1.234***	0.291***
	(0.060)		(0.059)	
Income	0.187***	1.206***	0.111***	1.118***
	(0.033)		(0.027)	
Education	0.102**	1.107**	0.203***	1.226***
	(0.040)		(0.037)	
cut1	−1.194***	0.303***	−1.390***	0.249***
cut2	0.597**	1.818**	0.504**	1.655**
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.435***	1.544***	0.534***	1.706***
	(0.026)		(0.030)	
Observations	6083		6064	

A.16. Hierarchical Models - EU12 - The role of income and 'exclusive national identity' - Figures

Figure 50: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 1992–1996.



Notes: The dashed lines show the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ and the light-grey area the corresponding confidence interval for individuals with no 'exclusive national identity'. The solid line with the darker-grey area indicates the predicted probabilities for different values of income for individuals with an 'exclusive national identity'.

Figure 51: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 1997–2000.



Notes: The dashed lines show the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ and the light-grey area the corresponding confidence interval for individuals with no 'exclusive national identity'. The solid line with the darker-grey area indicates the predicted probabilities for different values of income for individuals with an 'exclusive national identity'.

Figure 52: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 2001–2002.



Notes: The dashed lines show the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ and the light-grey area the corresponding confidence interval for individuals with no 'exclusive national identity'. The solid line with the darker-grey area indicates the predicted probabilities for different values of income for individuals with an 'exclusive national identity'.

A.17. Hierarchical Models - EU15 - The role of income and ‘exclusive national identity’ - Tables

Table 45: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-15: 1995-1997.

	1995		1996		1997	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.139***	1.149***	0.155***	1.168***	0.145***	1.156***
	(0.044)		(0.043)		(0.043)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.008**	0.992**	−0.009**	0.991**	−0.008**	0.992**
	(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.022	1.022	0.079***	1.082***	0.016	1.016
	(0.024)		(0.025)		(0.025)	
Age of Respondent	0.002	1.002	−0.001	0.999	0.001	1.001
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.148***	0.862***	−0.189***	0.828***	−0.089**	0.915**
	(0.043)		(0.043)		(0.044)	
Exclusive National Attachment	−1.052***	0.349***	−1.220***	0.295***	−1.215***	0.297***
	(0.044)		(0.046)		(0.046)	
Income	0.135***	1.144***	0.116***	1.123***	0.136***	1.146***
	(0.020)		(0.021)		(0.021)	
Education	0.152***	1.164***	0.140***	1.150***	0.157***	1.170***
	(0.027)		(0.028)		(0.028)	
cut1	−1.192***	0.304***	−0.815***	0.443***	−1.071***	0.343***
cut2	0.333**	1.395**	0.776***	2.173***	0.606***	1.834***
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.695***	2.004***	0.506***	1.658***	0.473***	1.605***
	(0.026)		(0.022)		(0.031)	
Observations	9188		9004		8749	

Table 46: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-15: 1998-2000.

	1998		1999		2000	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.136***	1.146***	0.241***	1.272***	0.156***	1.168***
	(0.032)		(0.047)		(0.034)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.008***	0.992***	−0.016***	0.984***	−0.014***	0.986***
	(0.003)		(0.004)		(0.003)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.076***	1.079***	0.098***	1.102***	0.073***	1.076***
	(0.018)		(0.028)		(0.019)	
Age of Respondent	0.004***	1.004***	0.002	1.002	0.000	1.000
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.119***	0.888***	−0.149***	0.861***	−0.142***	0.867***
	(0.032)		(0.047)		(0.034)	
Exclusive National Attachment	−1.243***	0.288***	−1.207***	0.299***	−1.251***	0.286***
	(0.033)		(0.050)		(0.035)	
Income	0.159***	1.172***	0.152***	1.164***	0.170***	1.186***
	(0.016)		(0.024)		(0.016)	
Education	0.215***	1.240***	0.216***	1.241***	0.106***	1.112***
	(0.021)		(0.031)		(0.021)	
cut1	−1.027***	0.358***	−1.108***	0.330***	−1.284***	0.277***
cut2	0.651***	1.917***	0.596***	1.814***	0.350***	1.420***
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.576***	1.778***	0.556***	1.744***	0.465***	1.591***
	(0.016)		(0.023)		(0.015)	
Observations	17422		7999		15620	

Table 47: Multilevel ordered logistic regression for the EU-15: 2001-2002.

	2001		2002	
	β / SE	OR	β / SE	OR
Left-Right Self Placement	0.275***	1.316***	0.210***	1.234***
	(0.050)		(0.045)	
Left-Right Extremism	−0.020***	0.980***	−0.015***	0.985***
	(0.005)		(0.004)	
Opinion Leader Index	0.164***	1.179***	0.041	1.042
	(0.028)		(0.027)	
Age of Respondent	−0.000	1.000	0.004***	1.004***
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
Dummy: Female/Male	−0.200***	0.819***	−0.184***	0.832***
	(0.048)		(0.048)	
Exclusive National Attachment	−1.185***	0.306***	−1.246***	0.288***
	(0.050)		(0.050)	
Income	0.190***	1.209***	0.128***	1.136***
	(0.024)		(0.023)	
Education	0.118***	1.125***	0.195***	1.215***
	(0.031)		(0.031)	
cut1	−1.021***	0.360***	−1.506***	0.222***
cut2	0.728***	2.071***	0.367**	1.444**
RI[$\sqrt{\psi_k}$]	0.454***	1.575***	0.536***	1.709***
	(0.020)		(0.024)	
Observations	7933		7923	

A.18. Hierarchical Models - EU15 - The role of income and 'exclusive national identity' - Figures

Figure 53: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 1995–1998.



Notes: The dashed lines show the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ and the light-grey area the corresponding confidence interval for individuals with no 'exclusive national identity'. The solid line with the darker-grey area indicates the predicted probabilities for different values of income for individuals with an 'exclusive national identity'.

Figure 54: Average Predicted Probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ 1999–2002.



Notes: The dashed lines show the average predicted probabilities for $Pr(Good)$ and the light-grey area the corresponding confidence interval for individuals with no 'exclusive national identity'. The solid line with the darker-grey area indicates the predicted probabilities for different values of income for individuals with an 'exclusive national identity'.

B. Abstract (Deutsch)

Individuelle Einstellungen zum Europäischen Integrationsprojekt sind trotz intensiver Forschungsarbeit Gegenstand wissenschaftlicher Debatten von VertreterInnen unterschiedlicher theoretischer Erklärungsansätze. Die bisherige Forschung hat eine Vielzahl von Bestimmungsgründen identifiziert, welche die Varianz öffentlicher Meinung bezüglich der Europäischen Union erklären können. Die zwei wichtigsten Gruppen von Theorien der öffentlichen Meinung sind kulturelle bzw. identitätsbezogene Ansätze und Theorien des ökonomischen Wählens. Diese Dissertation vergleicht diese beiden Theoriefamilien und analysiert deren relative Erklärungskraft vor dem Kontext von vier unterschiedlichen historischen Phasen des Europäischen Integrationsprozesses. Die Forschungsfrage und die theoriegeleiteten Hypothesen werden mithilfe der Umfragedatensätze des Standard-Eurobarometer für den Zeitraum von 1976 bis 2005 empirisch überprüft. Für jedes Jahr wird ein eigenes ordinales logistisches Mehrebenenmodell mit variierenden Konstanten auf der Länderebene geschätzt. Ziel dieser Dissertation ist der systematische Vergleich der relativen Erklärungskraft der beiden angesprochenen Theorien über einen Zeitraum von 30 Jahren und einem sich wandelnden Kontext Europäischer Integration. Bisherige Forschungsarbeiten haben ebenfalls den zeitlichen Verlauf des Europäischen Vereinigungsprozesses analysiert, dabei jedoch nur auf einzelne Zeitpunkte fokussiert oder begnügten sich mit einem simplen Vergleich der Höhe der Regressionskoeffizienten. Die wichtigsten Ergebnisse dieser Dissertation sind (1) die relative Erklärungskraft der jeweiligen Theorie ist abhängig vom 'Charakter' des Europäischen Integrationsprozesses und (2) weder die kulturell-/identitäts-bezogene noch die egoistische Variante der Theorie des ökonomischen Wählens stellen eine vermittelnde oder moderierende Variable dar, d.h. jeder der untersuchten theoretischen Ansätze hat seinen eigenen direkten kausalen Effekt.

C. Abstract (Englisch)

Individual attitudes towards the European unification process are a well-studied political phenomenon. Previous research has uncovered a multitude of factors predicting public opinion toward the European Union. This sophisticated research has led to several theories explaining public opinion on the European unification project, whereby the most important explanations relate to identity-related factors and to economic-based determinants. This PhD-thesis compares the two dominant theoretical approaches of cultural/identity-related explanations and economic voting theory. Additionally, this thesis assumes that the relative explanatory power of each of these two theories depends on contextual factors. Consequently, the process of European integration will be divided into four different phases, which constitute different contextual landscapes. To test the leading hypothesis and to answer the research questions I will analyse Eurobarometer data from 1976 to 2005, furthermore I will use multilevel ordinal logistic regression with varying intercepts at the country-level to estimate the relative explanatory power of the examined theoretical approaches. The research project at hand is the first attempt to analyse the changing relationship of egocentric utilitarianism and identity-related theoretical approaches over the course of nearly 30 years of European integration embedded within the context and the changing character of the European unification process as outlined above. Previous studies also focussed on the temporal development of theoretical approaches but either looked only at a few time points or focussed only on a single theory or simply interpreted the strength of regression coefficients. The main findings suggest that (1) the explanatory power of theoretical approaches depends on the context in which European integration is embedded, and, (2) that neither cultural/identity-related approaches nor egocentric economic explanations are mediated through each other but have their own explanatory power, i.e. they have their own direct causal effect.

D. Curriculum Vitae - Peter Grand

(see next page)

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Education

since 2007 **University of Vienna**, *Vienna*, PhD.
Political Science

2007–2010 **Institute for Advanced Studies**, *Vienna*, PhD-program.
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2003–2007 **University of Vienna**, *Vienna*, Master.
Political Science

Additional training

11.-18. February 2012 **Maximum Likelihood and Limited Dependent Variables**, *Vienna*.
ECPR Winter School, Instructor: B. Dan Wood (Texas A&M University)

13.-24. June 2011 **EITM 2011, Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models**, *St. Louis*.
Summer Institute, Washington University

06.-08. May 2009 **Multi-Level Modeling**, *Vienna*, Department of Methods in the Social Sciences.
Instructor: Cristiano Vezzoni (University of Milan)

Present Positions

since 2009 **Lecturer**, *University of Vienna*, Vienna.
Introductory quantitative methods

since 2010 **Lecturer**, *University of Vienna*, Vienna.
Introduction: The political system of Austria and the EU

Past Positions

2010-2013 **Researcher**, *Project "Preference Formation and Electoral Behaviour in the European Political Space"*, IHS/Wien.
Project leader: Guido Tiemann, funded by the Austrian Science Foundation FWF

2011 - 2012 **Adjunct Faculty: Lecturer**, *Webster University*, Vienna.
Research Methods and Approaches in Political Science

Languages

German **fluent**

English **fluent**

Master Thesis

Title *Aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik in Österreich 1998-2005 vor dem Kontext der Europäischen Beschäftigungsstrategie*(Active Labour Market Policies in Austria 1998-2005 and the relationship to the European Employment Strategy)

Supervisor Prof. Dr. Emmerich Tálos

Awards

2014 **EUP Article 14(4)**, *EUP Sage Award for the best article 2013.*

2013 **EUP Article 14(4)**, *Paul Lazarsfeld Award IHS for the best article 2013.*

2007 **Master thesis**, *Award for the promotion of young scholars from the Austrian Political Science Association.*

2007 **Master thesis**, *Special Award from the Chamber of Labour–Lower Austria.*

Membership

-Austrian Political Science Association (ÖGPW)

-European Political Science Association (EPSA)

-American Political Science Association (APSA)

-Mid-West American Political Science Association (MPSA)

Publications

-Grand Peter/Guido Tiemann, Projection Effects And Specification Bias in Spatial Models of EP Elections, in: European Union Politics (EUP), 14(4), 2013, 497–521.

-Grand Peter, Wann sind "umfassende" Reformen auch ausreichend? Die janusköpfige Entwicklung der österreichischen aktiven Arbeitsmarktpolitik 1998-2007, in: Austrian Journal for Political Science (ÖZP), 38(2), 2009, 213–230.

Conference Presentations

-"Policy Representational Biases in the European Political Space.", presented at the Elections, Public Opinion and Parties (EPOP) Conference, 07th–09th September 2012, Oxford

-"Indistinguishable or too far away? The Causes of Voter Turnout.", presented at the 2nd Annual Meeting of the European Political Science Association, 21th–23th June 2012, Berlin

-"Alienation or Indifference? Determinants of Voter Abstention at the National and European Level Compared.", presented at the 2012 Annual Meeting of the Mid-West American Political Science Association, 12th–15th April 2012, Chicago

-"One or Several? How individuals (may) perceive the dimensionality of European integration.", presented at the 2011 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1st—4th September 2011, Seattle

-"Projection Effects in European Election Studies", presented at the 6th ECPR General Conference 2011, 25th—27th August 2011, Reykjavik

-"The Cultural Turn in EU Public Opinion! Has it really happened?", presented at the 3-Länder-Tagung, 13th—14th January 2011, Basel

-"Taking Sides? A Comparison of Theorizing and Modeling Public Opinion on European Integration.", presented at the Fifth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, 23th—26th June 2010, Porto

-"Determinanten sozialstaatlicher Entwicklung in westlichen Industrienationen", presented at the ADA Workshop "Welfare States & Social Protection", 25th Nov. 2009, Vienna

-"The Austrian Pension System and Low Income Pensioners in Austria", presented at the 2nd conference on "Working Together for an Inclusive Society", 11th Sept. 2009, Athens

Other Publications

-"Voters frequently misjudge the positions of parties in European Parliament elections on the basis of non-political factors", Article EUROPP – European Politics and Policy Blog, London School of Economics, 2014

-"Low turnout in European Parliament elections is driven by the perception that the process is not rewarding enough for voters.", Article EUROPP – European Politics and Policy Blog, London School of Economics, 2012

-Comment on the panel-discussion "Zur Lage der Politik in Österreich" (The State of Politics in Austria) at the event: "40 Jahre Österreichische Gesellschaft für Politikwissenschaft (ÖGPW) 1970-2010, 2010

-(with Marcel Fink) "Austria. In-work poverty and labour market segmentation", Report for the European Commission, Peer Review in Social Protection and Social Inclusion and Assessment in Social Inclusion, 2010

-(with Marcel Fink) "Austria. Impact of the Economic and Financial Crisis on Poverty and Social Exclusion", Report for the European Commission, Peer Review in Social Protection and Social Inclusion and Assessment in Social Inclusion, 2009

-(with Marcel Fink) "Austria. Assessment of Responses to the 'Questionnaire to the Member States on Homelessness and Housing Exclusion'", Report for the European Commission, Peer Review in Social Protection and Social Inclusion and Assessment in Social Inclusion, 2009

-(with Marcel Fink) "Austria. Minimum Income Schemes. A Study of National Policies", Report for the European Commission, Peer Review in Social Protection and Social Inclusion and Assessment in Social Inclusion, 2009

Refereeing

-Austrian Journal for Political Science (ÖZP)

-European Union Politics (EUP)