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„Stateless Warfare in the Balkans:  
Young Bosnia and the Serbian Irredentism (1908-1914)“

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angestrebter akademischer Grad

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## 1. Introduction

Hundred years after 1914, the world remembers the fallen, raises awareness about its dire consequences but yet, is perplexed about how everything unravelled so swiftly. As the hundredth centenary of the Sarajevo shootings was marked, the role of Young Bosnia was questioned, yet again. The mass media, from France to Russia, filled pages and created hours of documentaries igniting the blame game. One could not wonder how it came about, as states have always resented revisionism, particularly when it comes to questioning true intentions in the eve of the global conflict. The academia concurs: the global system was flawed, and it could not bear excessive paranoia and mistrust that augmented security dilemmas leading to war. Nevertheless, hundred years later, when caginess still impacts policy-making, the origins of the World War I are being politicised. In the Balkans, the governments subsidise film industries, universities and other research centres, archives and libraries among others to make a case that a countries were on a right side of the history.

If we did not live in the interconnected world where news travel faster than light, would governments really care about the legacy of Young Bosnia and all others who shaped the world on the brink of war?

With all the aspects taken into account, while presenting a case from the Young Bosnian point of view, the aim of this report is to analyse the independence of the Young Bosnian insurgency calculus from the Serbian irredentist organisations, namely the *Unification or Death* or the *Black Hand* and the *Serbian National Defence*. The accent is not put on the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, as most pieces on this subject have rendered, but instead it focuses on the early days of the movement, so as to draw important conclusions from the calculus and demonstrate how Young Bosnia evolved into a movement capable of murdering the Archduke of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The scope of this report is the Young Bosnian insurgency calculus from the Annexation Crisis in 1908 to the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in 1914, with an emphasis on the period between 1911 and 1914, when Young Bosnia pivoted toward the irredentist organisations in Serbia. The motives of this report lie in the opening lines of this chapter; it aspires to create a niche in the subject, by providing a different point of view explained by theoretical frameworks of *insurgency calculus*, *transnational rebels* and *ethnic irredentism*.

Firstly, the report will pose a research question that represents a core of the report, to which a comprehensive conclusion will be provided in the latter chapters of the report.

Secondly, a chapter on methods will follow, aiming to familiarise the reader with the steps undertaken to complete this research. It demonstrates how the research was conducted and elaborates in detail methodological approach, hypotheses, motivation, design of the paper, data collection, and limitations of data, reliability and validity.

Thirdly, theoretical framework is presented. It consists of two theories, namely Brooker's insurgency calculus that explains the internal dynamics of Young Bosnia as well as Salehyan's transnational rebels theory (TNR theory) with ethnic irredentism that elucidate the external dynamics of Young Bosnia. Both theories complement one another, as they conceptualise *motivation*, *means* and *opportunities*, notions that this report finds paramount for the analysis of Young Bosnia. Furthermore to that, while insurgency calculus framework clarifies what it takes for one entity to spark a rebellion, TNR theory explores the opportunities abroad that the entity must use to strengthen its calculus and hurt the enemy.

Fourthly, with the state of the art chapter, this report sheds light on Young Bosnia itself. It presents the main ideas of authors who analysed Young Bosnia from different angles. To support it, the report summarizes the main historical events that impacted Young Bosnia over the years. Those events are relevant to this historical analysis, because they represent causality that shaped Young Bosnia.

Fifthly, the report is narrowed down to a discussion or the analysis chapter. It operationalises motivation, means and opportunities and analyses how the Young Bosnian calculus evolved and to what extent it changed in the course of co-operation with the Black Hand and National Defence irredentist organisations. In this chapter, the evidence is presented in support of the hypotheses of the report.

Lastly, this report concludes with the summary of the findings and the perspectives on the further research. This chapter will encompass a condensed answer to the research question.

## 2. Research Question

The main goal of this report is to provide a comprehensive answer to the following research question: *To what extent was the Young Bosnian insurgency calculus directly impacted by the Serbian irredentist networks from 1911 to 1914?*

## 3. Methods

### 3.1 Methodological approach

This paper applies a hypothetical-deductive approach, as it entails a deductive view of the relationship between theory and social research. In other words, this paper construes hypotheses based on the knowledge acquired from the literature reviewed. The literature review on the stateless warfare is elaborated in the *State of the Art* chapter. The hypotheses are operationalised in the *Analysis/Discussion* chapter and complemented with the empirical evidence so as to scrutinise them that helps in answering the research question more effectively. The process of data collection was guided by theoretical reflections and formation of hypotheses. The hypotheses of this paper reflect the acquired evidence collected from the review of primary and secondary data selected for this research.<sup>1</sup>

### 3.2 Hypotheses

1. This paper argues that although motivated by youth organisations and movements from abroad, Young Bosnia formed its insurgency calculus independently;
2. This paper advocates that the cost-benefit analysis to fight the Austro-Hungarian authorities self-sufficiently in Bosnia changed after the crackdown on student organisations had commenced, which prompted Young Bosnia to cooperate with the irredentist networks in Serbia that promoted aggressive ethnic irredentism on the premises of the *Great Serbia* platform;
3. This paper claims that irredentist attempts to replicate the know-hows from the guerrilla warfare in the Ottoman territories before 1912-1913 war to Young Bosnia was successful when it comes to

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<sup>1</sup> The Methods chapter is based on the methods framework of the project report, V Rakocevic, L Gashi, S Outzen, I Knudsen, *'Reconciliation in Algeria-The Collaboration between civil society and the state'*, Roskilde University, 2013, p.8-12

providing means and opportunities, but less successful in motivating Young Bosnia to fight for the same cause;

4. This paper also contends that Young Bosnia was simply an instrument of Serbian irredentist politics. It maintains that its political stances differed greatly from *Unification or Death* and/or *Serbian National Defence*, but the survival of the organisation and its calculus was contingent upon the external assistance in light of Austro-Hungarian counter-insurgency policy.

### 3.3 Motivation

At the hundredth anniversary of Sarajevo shootings in 1914, the debate on Young Bosnia was reignited by scholars who intended to rethink the already established norms and present a new take on the series of events that plunged the world into the global armed conflict. Similarly, for some of them Young Bosnia has been the starting point, not as an independent organisation or a movement, but as a carefully selected group of young people who were manipulated from the outside to assassinate the Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand. The mass media strictly probed whether Gavrilo Princip was a terrorist or freedom fighter, with a little regard to the historiography of the Balkans before 1914, however with an immense interest to apply contemporary concepts of *terrorism* and *irregular warfare* onto the actors from the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. In light of the polarised debate on who really started the World War I, this paper is motivated to provide a different perspective on the events in Bosnia, from the point of view of the Young Bosnians.<sup>2</sup>

The motivation of this paper is two-fold: firstly, it is motivated to give a voice to Young Bosnia as an independent actor with a political manifesto that was reflected in its organisational calculus and secondly, it is interested in showing how grass-root interests of Young Bosnia conflicted or complimented with the top-down approach of the external factors and shaped the regional politics. For that reason, the focus of this paper is not on the assassination in Sarajevo and internationalised conflict as such, but on the evolvement of Young Bosnia from the early stages to its end.

In many aspects, Young Bosnia is similar to any other subject with similar political goals and aspiration to counter a state. That is why the paper is motivated to explain the engagement of Young Bosnia helped by two relevant theoretical frameworks.

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<sup>2</sup> See *State of the Art chapter*



### 3.4 Design of the paper

The first chapter of this paper is *Introduction*. It defines the objective, focus and scope of the research. The focus of the paper is additionally elucidated through the research question: *To what extent was the Young Bosnian insurgency calculus directly impacted by the Serbian irredentist networks from 1911 to 1914?*

This is followed by the chapter on methods that presents the actual methodological guiding principles behind the conducted research and the written report. The chapter addresses the methodological approach, hypotheses, data collection, and limitations of the data, reliability and validity.

Then, the theoretical chapter makes clear on the grounds of which theory the research question was posed and why. The paper utilizes *Insurgency Calculus Framework* to explain the internal dynamics of Young Bosnia and conceptualises notions of motivation, means and opportunities that organisation embodies. In order to shed light on how and why rebels tend to seek the assistance abroad, *Theory on Transnational Rebels* is selected to describe the external dynamics. It is equally compliments the first theoretical framework, because it provides further input on how opportunities are exploited in insurgency planning. Similarly, it addresses the calculus of the factors that are providing the assistance to the rebels, focusing on what grounds they get connected to the rebels. On this note, the second part of the theoretical chapter outlines the theory and conceptualises *Ethnic Irredentism*. These concepts are indispensable for defining the Bosnian and Serbian settings and equally essential for understanding the events related to the research question.

Furthermore to that, two contextual chapters follow. The chapter on state of the art presents the research that has already been done relevant to Young Bosnia and the regional setting that impacts it. The chapter categorises literature on Young Bosnia according to the position in the overarching debate. It additionally answers how the scholarly works relate to the topic and expresses what the added value of the report is to the broad debate. The other contextual chapter provides a brief historical overview of the major events that are of utmost importance to understanding the setting. It concisely summarises the origins of the ethnic irredentism in Serbia and Bosnia, Austro-Hungarian and Serbian bilateral relations and two Balkan Wars of 1912-1913.

The discussion chapter is the core of this report, concentrating on the operationalization of the theories and its main concepts following the historical timeline of Young Bosnia and its relationship with the irredentist networks in Serbia, mainly *Unification or Death* and *Serbian National Defence*.

As for the conclusion chapter, the findings will be summed up as well as the hypotheses will be established as true or false, thereby answering the research question. Subsequently, a chapter on the perspectives on further research will be presented, in order to draw parallels to the themes elaborated in the Global Studies/Global History course.

### 3.5 Data Collection

This report mainly uses secondary data as its main source of data. The grounds for this, as well as its implications are explained in the limitations of the data within the methods chapter. The empirical data is gathered from various sources, which help the investigation of stateless warfare, insurgency calculus, transnational rebels, ethnic irredentism as well as more specifically, Young Bosnia in the context of the regional geopolitical rivalries. This report employs both quantitative and qualitative data, albeit most of the data is qualitative. As a result, a qualitative analysis is conducted. The sources from which the empirical evidence is gathered are mainly records on Young Bosnia, peer-reviewed articles, journals, newspaper articles as well as primary sources that include: diaries, interviews, personal narratives, correspondence, speeches, letters and poetry.

The primary sources on Young Bosnia were selected carefully during a six-month long research process in Austria, Bosnia and Serbia. Notwithstanding the limitations of the data (e.g. its scarcity), the research was concentrated the first-hand sources on Young Bosnia, for instance, the correspondence between Gavrilo Princip, Vladimir Gacinovic, Bogdan Zerajic among others, the original newspaper articles in *Vihor*, *Pijemont* and *Preporod* where Young Bosnians expressed their political views, the hand-written speeches delivered by the main protagonists, rules and regulations of the organisation as well as numerous original photographs preserved. The research also included the visits to the centennial anniversary exhibitions in the Museum of the History of Yugoslavia, held in the month of September 2014 in Belgrade, Serbia as well as the Kalemegdan Fortress exhibition *on Young Bosnia-A Personal Story* under the auspices of the city of Belgrade. Both events provided enough insight into the lives of the members of Young Bosnia. Generally, the first-hand sources consulted during the research represent a valuable testimony to the history of the pre-war Balkans. That is why this report benefited greatly from the evidence collected from the primary sources available for the researchers.

### 3.6 Limitations of the Data

The limitations of the data is primarily reflected on the scarcity of primary and secondary sources that focus on Young Bosnia as a case-study. The scholarship mainly discusses Young Bosnia in the context of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and his wife as a pretext to start the World War I. Similarly, the research has encountered pieces written from exclusively Serbian point of view. In that context, some data on Young Bosnia is found to be insufficient and limited to a time period just before the assassination. To follow up on that point, the research has shown that many first-hand accounts on Young Bosnia were destroyed during the World War I and 1941 German aerial campaign on Yugoslavia. The evidence that survived the conflicts is located in the Yugoslav National Archives in Belgrade and National Museums in Sarajevo and Belgrade, which is scrutinised in the analysis of this report. Furthermore, the language barrier was an inhibiting factor for this research when it comes to the records in German, primarily with respect to the secondary sources in German. When it comes to primary sources, usually speeches and newspaper articles in Bosnia under the Austro-Hungarian reign, this paper uses translated versions into Serbo-Croatian. This paper attempts to overcome these limitations by gathering as much empirical data from the primary and secondary sources by consulting electronic libraries, archives, exhibitions and galleries.

### 3.7 Reliability

This paper adheres to Bryman's arguments on reliability in social research methods underscoring that reliability of the data relates to its credibility. In other words, the point is to what extent the sources, from which the data is collected, are trusted.<sup>3</sup>

This report deems that reliability of the sources are satisfactory, considering that they are critically acclaimed in the academia as well as cited and interpreted by scholars, who have researched this topic. Logically, the secondary data used in this paper was subjected to academic scrutiny and is widely endorsed by the prominent scholars. The paper refrained from consulting any data that was not submitted to rigorous peer review. It correspondingly took into consideration the background of the authors, the reviews and the institutions that published the works. In order to ensure the maximum possible reliability, the selected sources were selected from the certified electronic libraries at the University of Vienna and Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia.

Given a specified reliability for the primary data, the Governments of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, under which auspices the archives and museums operate, guaranteed reliability for all

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<sup>3</sup> A Bryman, '*Social Research Methods, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition*', Oxford University Press, USA, p.28-35

the artefacts that were presented to researchers. Thus, this report finds its data to be proven reliable.

### 3.8 Validity

Validity of the data evaluates its applicability in the investigation. To be precise, it points out to whether the data can be used in the report to answer the research question, and to what degree it can do so. Hence, validity of the data is the assessment of how close did the gathered data come to what the researcher was looking for, in order to conduct the analysis and answer the posed research question.<sup>4</sup> The argument can be made that secondary data has a lower validity than primary data, as secondary data represents the interpretation of primary or other secondary data. Therefore, it is argued in the report that the emphasis on secondary data augmented the risk of lower validity. However, the empirical findings used in this paper are within the main focus of the research, as most of the data was collected from the peer-reviewed articles and highly esteemed books, which describe the concepts that operated in the discussion chapter. The data from the primary sources on Young Bosnia was judiciously studied endeavouring to extract the most valid evidence that would help answer the question more thoroughly. For example, in analysing the first hand correspondence between the members of Young Bosnia, the focus was on finding substantial and credible evidence that revealed the impact of Young Bosnia on the irredentist networks in Serbia and vice versa. In general, the combination of findings from the primary and secondary sources in case of Young Bosnia was sufficient to provide a comprehensive answer to the research question.

## 4. Theory

The theoretical chapter of this paper employs a bottom-up approach in understanding how Young Bosnia used the external factors to meet its organisation's goals. A bottom-up or grass-root

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<sup>4</sup> Bryman, p.28-35

approach demands that initially Young Bosnia as an organisation be examined, before proceeding to a discourse on the external factors. On that note, this chapter will entail two major theoretical frameworks: firstly *insurgency calculus* theory that elaborates the types of insurgency, the means and modes of insurgency, the structure and agency of motivations and secondly, a theory of transnational rebellion as a major bulk of the opportunities of insurgency with the theoretical outline of irredentism as an example.

#### 4.1 Insurgency calculus framework

This paper aims to adopt insurgency calculus theory because it is presented as an umbrella theory for the theoretical concepts like motives, means and opportunities. It was developed by Paul Brooker in *Modern Stateless Warfare* as a framework that assesses the capability of an organised armed group to spark an insurgency. Brooker provides a historical analysis of the modernisation of stateless warfare in the first part of his book, while the second part of the book introduces and develops this theory based on the forensic calculus in order to answer why/how insurgencies succeed or fail. This paper adopts his theory by following his guidelines on three important variables, but also complements it with Salehyan's theory of transnational rebellion, with an intention to create a comprehensive theoretical framework that explains Young Bosnian case.

Insurgency calculus theory emanates from a calculus of *usurpation* and a calculus of *intervention* that analysed and predicted the means to assume power, whether violently through military coups and revolutions or non-violently through elections, so as to rule authoritatively and indefinitely.<sup>5</sup> This framework has been appraised for its comprehensive approach to the study of various kinds of regimes. The scholarly works by Finer in *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, Crenshaw's *The Logics of Terrorism: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product of Strategic Choice* and Waterman's *Reasons and Reason: Collective Political Activity in Comparative Historical Perspective* all contribute to the question 'What does it take for an insurgency group to succeed?' Their lines of arguments relate to how organised rebels strive to achieve an end-state for a conflict, be it a fast victory or a long-drawn-out conflict or, inexorably a crushing defeat.<sup>6</sup> All of them argue that usurpation of power and intervention entail a calculated approach of groups' *motivation*, the *opportunities* presented to them and the *means* they possess to win.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, this paper is to

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<sup>5</sup>Brooker, p. 117-123

<sup>6</sup>Brooker, p. 118-119

<sup>7</sup>Brooker, p. 120

adhere to the framework that Brooker proposed in *Modern Stateless Warfare* to assess the probability of success/failure or none of those, provided that the frozen conflict ensues, using a 'net' aspect of assessment, meaning that *motivation*, *opportunity* and *means* are often deeply interlinked and in most cases, cannot secure victory for insurgents who disregard its miscellany. In addition to that, it is necessary to underpin that even a combination of such cannot guarantee success of the insurgency, without taking into an account who the insurgents fight against, be it a local state, an occupying power or other rebels.<sup>8</sup>

In addendum to motives, means and opportunity as set out by Brooker, this paper argues that external support is indispensable for assessing the success of insurgency.<sup>9</sup> In light of that, this paper will subsequently utilize a concept of *transnational rebels* within a broader *theory of transnational rebellion* endeavouring to embed the variable of external support into the insurgency calculus. This paper also advocates that both theoretical frameworks, as presented in Brooker's *Modern Stateless Warfare* and Salehyan's *Rebels without Borders*, complement one another and are thereby auspicious for the case-analysis of Young Bosnia and inexorably, as the research will show, its external patronage.

Table 4.1 Insurgency Calculus<sup>10</sup>

Motives	+	Means	+	Opportunity & External Support
<b>Strengths/Weaknesses</b>				
<b>1. Positive Motives</b> a) political goals b) unofficial, self-interest of band c) self-interest of social/ethnic group d) individual self-interest  <b>2. Minus Inhibiting Motives</b> a) moral inhibitions b) fear of failure -tactical -strategic -opportunity cost		<b>1. Modes</b> -Guerilla -Terrorist <b>2. Strategy</b> -Preparation -Pressure -Provocation -Propaganda <b>3. Capability</b> -Leadership -Personnel -Information -Equipment		<b>1. Shelters</b> <b>2. Weapons</b> <b>3. Political supp.</b> -Irredentism -Ideology <b>4. Geopolitical Rivalry</b> <b>(Neighbourhood Effects)</b>

<sup>8</sup> Brooker, p. 121

<sup>9</sup> Brooker, p.123; See also: M Crenshaw, 'The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice' in W Reich, 'Origins of Terrorism', Washington DC, 1990, p.16-22; I Salehyan, 'Rebels Without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics', Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2009, p. 18-55

<sup>10</sup> Brookers, p.125

## 4.2 The types of insurgency based on the political goals

This aim of this section is to introduce the types of insurgencies relevant to this debate. The very beginning of this section is to outline the question of the political goals that asks the question ‘*Why the insurgencies organise violence?*’ and ‘*Who do they fight against?*’

Prior to the analysis of the insurgency types, it is worth underlining the core idea of the political goals as defined by Clausewitz. His definition of the stateless warfare, as ‘*the pursuit of political goals by means of organised violence*<sup>11</sup>’, will be utilised as a backbone in the further analysis of the Bosnian scenario. On this note, while this definition is central to this paper, broader Clausewitz’s views on war will not be expounded, as they necessitate the analysis of the historical examples of the age when he was writing, which merely does not follow the rationale of this paper.

Insurgency is often a *small warfare* perpetrated against a local state and/or against a foreign state.<sup>12</sup> Insurgency against a local state entails fighting to transform the state where the organised violence takes place. The transformation of a state usually refers to the overthrow of the regime in power or the attack on state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity that premeditates secession.<sup>13</sup> On the other hand, organised violence against a foreign state means that insurgency is organised to fight occupational forces in order to expel them. Other scholars have not neglected other causes of organised violence, chiefly two or more insurgencies fighting against one another in the failing or failed states where the central authority is weak or simply does not exist. This scenario is often taken into account when analysing civil wars or similar armed struggles.<sup>14</sup>

The types of insurgencies fighting against a local state can herein be defined as *revolutionary* or *separatist* insurgencies.<sup>15</sup> A revolutionary insurgency aims to topple a regime, then to substitute it and finally, to form a new society. In most cases these insurgencies had political agendas in place to infiltrate and spread the ideas of revolution elsewhere. Many insurgencies inspired by a spectrum of ideologies, be it communism or Islamic fundamentalism, exhibited similar agendas. Separatist insurgencies tend to stick to the fight against a local state with goals to achieve autonomy or a full independence from the local state involved. This type of insurgencies is formed on basis of

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<sup>11</sup> C von Clausewitz, ‘*On War*’, Princeton University Press, 1976 (1832), p.75-78, 459-464

<sup>12</sup> D Martin Jones, M.L.R. Smith, ‘*Whose Hearts and Whose Minds? The Curious Case of Global Insurgency*’, Kings College, London, 2010, p.3-5

<sup>13</sup> Jones, Smith, p.7

<sup>14</sup> Jones, Smith, p.10, Salehyan, p. 44

<sup>15</sup> Brooker, p.34, See also: Laqueur, 2002, p.401

grievances that are caused by ill-treatment of minority population, violations of basic human rights, complete disregard of decentralisation of the state by the state apparatus and/or demands for an ethnic-state among others.<sup>16</sup>

The type of insurgency in an armed struggle vis-à-vis a foreign state is hereby labelled as an *expeller insurgency*. As Bell puts it the notion *expeller* is a connotation for an armed group combating a foreign power that is, '*invading, occupying or colonially ruling an insurgent's nation, religious community, local community or other traditionally or ideologically defined "home"*'.<sup>17</sup>

It is central to underscore that the abovementioned categories (types or definitions) are not rigid by themselves.<sup>18</sup> On the contrary, they overlap and therefore create hybrids that contain multiple characteristics of each. For instance, the expeller types of insurgencies are not dissimilar to numerous separatist insurgencies.<sup>19</sup> Separatist insurgencies like Kosovo Liberation Army or ETA vocally supported the independence/secessionist cause, but also labelled their flight as anti-colonial struggle against Yugoslav (Serbo-Montenegrin) and Spanish government forces, respectively. Contrary to this argument, Brooker argues that colonial 'usurpers' allowed no representation in legislative branches of government, whereas the separatists still attained representation of some sort. In light of this sub-debate, it is evident that insurgents tend to use these categories to their advantage, in order to harness public support for the cause and legitimise clandestine activities.<sup>20</sup>

Expeller and revolutionary types overlap when insurgents have to fight adversaries on two or more fronts, including a local and a foreign state.<sup>21</sup> This hybrid is encapsulated in the example of the Yugoslav Partisans that fought a civil war against the provisional government (the Monarchists) and Nazi occupying forces. Same with modern day Al-Qaeda/Talibans who fought to topple a legitimate government and with that, to expel Americans and other NATO allies from Afghanistan.

This section is essential for the study of Young Bosnia and its affiliates. The second part of this paper will bring about the insurgency type framework applied onto the activities of the insurgents in 1908-1914 Bosnia and Herzegovina. Hence, each of the established concepts will be tested against the spectrum of political goals of Young Bosnia and its wider network that span borders. This method will help conceptualise the exact insurgency type or its hybrid to which Young Bosnia belongs.

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<sup>16</sup> Brooker, p. 36-41; Gventer, Jones, Smith, '*Deconstructing Counterinsurgency: COIN Discourse and the Evaluation Strategy*', Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Cambridge, 2013, p. 2-10

<sup>17</sup> Bell, p.287

<sup>18</sup> Brooker, p. 49,132,133

<sup>19</sup> Brooker, p. 202-205; Gventer, Jones, Smith, p.17,

<sup>20</sup> Gventer, Jones, Smith, p.22

<sup>21</sup> Brooker, p.36,37; S Wexler, C Pischedda, M Smith, '*Do Foreign Occupations Cause Suicide Attacks?*', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 58 (4), p. 625-631



### 4.3 Insurgency means

The introductory lines of this paper commenced an overarching debate on what constitutes guerrilla and terrorist mode of an insurgency. This section is to follow up on this debate with the overview of preparation, pressure, provocation and propaganda strategies. Likewise, this question of concern in this chapter is '*How insurgents achieve their goals*'?

Preparation strategy is narrowly associated to the Maoist model of insurgency elaborated in the previous section. In this sense, this strategy presupposes establishing a semi-state that would grow stronger in time and as a result overthrow the regime in power.<sup>22</sup> Mao's focus was on a rural bases of the semi-state from which a regular army would wage a war against the government forces. The imperative was to sustain a large-scale battles and to incrementally take over control. Unlike strategies of urban combat that will subsequently be presented, the preparation strategy that Mao wrote about carries greater degree of risk, because of its predictability and reliance on the foreign assistance.<sup>23</sup> According to Laqueur, this type of insurgency strategy was ubiquitous throughout history, but for insurgents who opted for merely this strategy were easily defeated by the counter-insurgency by the government.<sup>24</sup> Yugoslav Partisans were, however, successful in guerrilla warfare while holding control over rural and often mountainous inaccessible areas, also in mobile warfare supplemented by a regular army and lastly, in using the regular army to create swathes of liberated territory.<sup>25</sup> Nonetheless, their efforts were hand in hand with Soviet advances and a substantial military assistance received from the Allies. To this day, as Townshend argues, this strategy raises controversy in insurgents' circles for the technological progress at governments' disposal and an increasing urbanisation of the periphery. Due to its focus on a large-scale warfare, in most cases it was detrimental to the success of any insurgency.<sup>26</sup>

In order to evade predictability, insurgencies were more willing to pressure politically through military hurt. The elementary rationale of such insurgency strategy is to exhaust the adversary through protracted warfare, which in turn would turn the public opinion against the counter-insurgency efforts. In absence of a decisive victory as an end-state, Giap advocates that democracies will be resolute to pressure governments to back down.<sup>27</sup> However, not only have democracies been war-weary, autocratic states were also susceptible to an indirect pressure. Revolutionary and war-torn Russia succumbed to the popular pressure in the midst of the World War I, whereas similar

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<sup>22</sup> Brooker, p.70-72

<sup>23</sup> Brooker, p.75; Wexler, Pischedda, Smith, p.627

<sup>24</sup> Laqueur, 2002, p.210

<sup>25</sup> Brooker, p.64; C Townshend, '*Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction*', Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 30

<sup>26</sup> Townshend, p.33-35

<sup>27</sup> Giap, p.17

circumstances struck Germany. Giap also adds that the ability to mentally hurt society while physically harming the soldiers can make this strategy effective without opting for the terrorist mode, which includes indiscriminate civilian targeting.<sup>28</sup> Additionally, economic costs of war can gradually trigger public discontent and unrest. In *Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars*, Mack argues that secessionist and expeller types of insurgencies were particularly successful in, '*the progressive attrition of their opponents' political capability to wage war*'.<sup>29</sup> In the nutshell, notwithstanding the military might the adversary might have, by targeting political will of an adversary, insurgents are more likely to claim victory. He also adds that occupying or colonising state has less incentive to keep fighting protracted and bloody wars, than the state experiencing surging secessionist or revolutionary armed groups facing the cost-benefit predicaments. In most cases, colonizing powers confronted with the expeller type of insurgencies faced more costs to rule rebellious provinces, than those states that faced revolutionary and secessionist insurgencies hindering its territorial integrity and sovereignty, while threatening the very existence of that state.<sup>30</sup>

In contrast to the preparation and pressure strategies, insurgents tend to opt for provocation and propaganda strategies to supplement their insurgency goals. They are often attributed to the terrorist mode of an insurgency, rather than to the guerrilla mode, since they follow the pattern of *hit and run* urban tactics.<sup>31</sup> The accent is on being everywhere and nowhere, in order to deceive an adversary more efficaciously. Two attributes are intrinsic for the terrorist mode of an insurgency: firstly, the targets shift from men in uniforms to civilians, be it indiscriminately or deliberately<sup>32</sup> and secondly, the insurgents cannot be ultimately successful if they rely on solely provocation and propaganda.<sup>33</sup>

While pressure and preparation are profoundly military strategies, propaganda and provocation are not; they go beyond the use of military force, as they range from winning *hearts and minds* of the population by providing social services in absence of government to 'propaganda by deed' that involved systematic kidnapping of individuals, hijacking of airlines and so on.<sup>34</sup> As Wright points out, a carefully drafted combination of provocation and propaganda strategies have become burdensome due to internationalisation of media coverage, public interest in their clandestine activities, but also more successful counter-insurgency programs.<sup>35</sup> For instance, forced

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<sup>28</sup> Giap, p.22

<sup>29</sup> A Mack, '*Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict*', World Politics, 27/2, p.177

<sup>30</sup> Mack, p.199-201

<sup>31</sup> Brooker, p.79; Townshend, p.44;

<sup>32</sup> DEFINE IT HERE!

<sup>33</sup> Brooker, p.80; Townshend, p.45

<sup>34</sup> Wright, p.73-77

<sup>35</sup> Wright, p.81

proselytization, strict religious laws applied and constant harassment of the civilians diminish success of insurgency and it turns civilians against the rebels, which allows the state apparatus to eradicate terrorist cells more effectively. In this sense, when misused or overused, these strategies exacerbate rebels' chances of success.<sup>36</sup>

With respect to rigidity, the strategies are analogous to the types, as insurgents opt for each interchangeably, depending on a number of factors: the nature of conflict, political goals, security environment, motivation, opportunity and means.<sup>37</sup> All of them will be taken into account when analysing the Young Bosnia and their affiliates. The next section will formulate the motivation, which will help us understand the complexity of the issue at hand.

#### 4.4 Net assessment of motivation: Positive and Inhibiting Motives

A net assessment of motives of stateless warfare generated an impressive number of scholarly works that, to this day, has remained essential for this field. The scholarship has attempted to explain the rebels' motive by linking it to the motives of the conventional forces. The American military scholarship, in particular, differentiated between intrinsic and extrinsic forms of motivation.<sup>38</sup> Unlike the intrinsic forms that relate to those motivations that personnel attains as generic, cultural, or social legacies, the extrinsic forms of motivation are derived from the military by socialisation, training and other forms of conditioning.<sup>39</sup> Although this comparative approach is useful to understand the organised conventional forces, it does not automatically translate onto unconventional "rebel" forces that are indoctrinated in a different way. The evident difference is in the nature of war and strategies that the organised conventional forces and rebels adhere to.<sup>40</sup>

This paper's argument is in line with a critique that Henriksen and Vinci provide, when conceptualising motivations. They point out that some scholars have failed to take into account the polymorphous or multidimensional character of war that overtly brings about a spectrum of *changing* motivations.<sup>41</sup> They are particularly critical of the overly simplified causes of stateless warfare, like *greed or grievance*. Furthermore to that, they add that concepts are meaningless,

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<sup>36</sup> Wright, p.88

<sup>37</sup> Brooker, p.75,76

<sup>38</sup> E Marks, 'Terrorism in Context: From Tactical to Strategic', Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol.17, No.4, 2006, p.46

<sup>39</sup> Marks, p.47

<sup>40</sup> Marks, p. 53

<sup>41</sup> R Henriksen, A Vinci, 'Combat Motivation in Non-State Armed Groups', Terrorism and Political Violence, Routledge, London, 2008, p. 88

should the context of time and place are not projected. Similarly, this paper adopts their view that intrinsic and extrinsic forms of motivations change rapidly when it comes to a non-state combatant.<sup>42</sup>

In their discourse on combat motivation in non-state armed groups, Henriksen and Vinci establish two important dimensions for understanding motivations for an armed struggle, hence, the context (structure) and the motivation (agency) dimension.<sup>43</sup>

As complex as this topic is, Henriksen and Vinci argue that it is possible to analyse the context (structure) by assessing the attitudes of non-state fighters towards an asymmetric warfare. Hence, they differentiate between insurgency, terrorism and warlordism, aiming not to make finalized academic definitions, but to understand the context within which the fighter will be motivated. As for motivations (agency) dimension, it refers to the individual motivations of the fighter irrespective of a context. Furthermore to that, agency begets reasonable and senseless motivations. Reasonable motivations, as explained by Henriksen and Vinci, are based on social and normative views and are intertwined with a decision-making by a respective fighter. For example, fighting for a communitarian, existential or economic objectives can be a reasonable motivation. On the other hand, senseless motivations engender irrational decisions, for instance, made by coercion or psychopathic intent.<sup>44</sup>

Brooker's net assessment of motivation implies the calculus of positive and inhibiting motives. Positive motives encompass the sum of collective motives and individual motives or selective incentives. He underlines that collective motives emanate from the political goals of an organisation or grievances.<sup>45</sup> On the other hand, Brooker considers selective incentives to be as important for the net assessment of motivation, because they relate to the motives that are attributed to the individuals who are fighting for the revolutionary cause. Those motives vary from the financial and other material benefits that can be gained to the secular or religious immortality including a cult of personality.<sup>46</sup>

Inhibiting motives contrast collective motives and selective incentives, because they are essentially based on 'fear of failure' or 'moral inhibitions'.<sup>47</sup> This report utilises Brooker's net assessment of motivation frameworks, for its multi-faceted approach and broad categories. It is line with the Henriksen and Vinci's arguments, as it adopts the agency and structure into its net assessment and is

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<sup>42</sup> Henriksen, Vinci, p. 89

<sup>43</sup> Henriksen, Vinci, p. 92, 93

<sup>44</sup> Henriksen, Vinci, p. 94-96; Marks, p.57

<sup>45</sup> Brookers, p.126,128,129

<sup>46</sup> Brookers, p.136

<sup>47</sup> Brookers, p.132

flexible to assess the changes in the net assessment. The aim of the net assessment is to determine whether positive motives outweigh inhibiting motives, or vice versa.<sup>48</sup>

This paper finds motivations inexorable for understanding how much external factors contribute to the success of the insurgency. In order to conceptualize the external factors as part of opportunities for an effective *petit guerre*, it is necessary to demonstrate the interplay of other embedded variables: motivations (positive and inhibiting motives) and the means of the rebel group and their external patrons. For that reason, the chapters that follows will examine precisely the same: how much did external assistance contribute to the success or failure of Young Bosnia and its networks by affecting its insurgency calculus? The external assistance will be summarised by a theory of transnational rebellion, whereas the theory will be exemplified in the case of *Irredentism*.

#### 4.5 A Theory of Transnational Rebellion: an Opportunity for Rebels without Borders

This section aims to deliver an understanding of the main theoretical concepts with relevance to the case, in order to illustrate the dynamics of Young Bosnia and its patrons in the context of the pre-World War I Balkans. It also aims to outline the discussion on the external factors, so to determine how they are exercised. Firstly, this section will break down a theory of transnational rebellion, identify its main concepts, so as to draw the main arguments that can explain the case of Young Bosnia more meaningfully.

The theory of transnational rebellion, as formulated by Idean Salehyan in *Rebels without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics*, underpins the rationale of this paper that advocates a comprehensive approach to the study of the stateless warfare and the rebellious subjects that wage it against a state. In other words, although the main focus of this paper is on the external factors that contribute to the success or failure of the rebels, it advocates the imperative to provide a net assessment of other variables, namely motivations and means, with relation to the external factors.<sup>49</sup>

He defines transnational rebels as, '*armed opposition groups whose operations are not necessarily confined to the geographic territory of the nation-state(s) that they challenge...They gather funding*

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<sup>48</sup> Brookers, p.137; Henriksen, Vinci, p.105

<sup>49</sup> Salehyan, p.11-60; See also: Anderson, Benedict, '*Long-Distance Nationalism*', Verso Press, London, 1998, p. 40-60; I Arreguin-Toft, '*How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict*', International Security 26, p.96-122; N Chazan, '*Irredentism and International Politics*', Boulder, 1991, p.20-35; M Zacher, '*The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force*', International Organization 55, p. 220-241

*and resources among the diaspora, recruit fighter abroad and secure bases in neighbouring countries from which to attack the home state”.*<sup>50</sup>

The theory of transnational rebellion argues, *‘that rebellion will be more likely to occur when conditions in neighbouring countries allow rebels to take up extraterritorial bases’.*<sup>51</sup> With that, Salehyan indicates that as a consequence, *‘International borders and safe havens in neighbouring countries allow rebels the opportunity to mobilise their supporters and sustain their forces while being less susceptible to government repression.’*<sup>52</sup> This theory is specifically applicable to the cases of the rebel groups that cannot profit from domestic opportunities due to a repressive government and so choose to seek support across borders in order to boost their bargaining power vis-à-vis the state. For that matter, the theory strives to provide a framework that will explain both the calculus of the rebels and of the patron-state, as for why it is essential for rebels to seek support abroad; for what reason rebels opt for the specific patron and how they do it; why the patrons decide to assist the rebels and etc.<sup>53</sup> On that note, the second major postulate of this theory relates to the likelihood of the inter-state conflict. Salehyan argues that transnational rebellion is a significant cause of conflict between states.<sup>54</sup>

In his work on translational insurgency, Salehyan expands on the insurgency calculus or, as he puts it *insurgency equation*, by adding that every individual fighting must deem that there is realistic chance of meeting organisational goals, or they would give up on fighting in the very first place.<sup>55</sup> The cost-benefit analysis is needed in such cases, as the cost of oppression is an intrinsic variable in elucidating the success of an insurgency. On the other hand, geography plays an important opportunity that rebels want to use in their advantage.<sup>56</sup> Mountainous and inaccessible terrain is often a hindrance to successful counter-insurgency efforts, from where rebels tend to operate. In terms of political opportunities in conflict, it is noteworthy to come back to the rebels’ political goals that designate type of an insurgency. Be it revolutionary, expeller or separatist type, its nature is enrooted in the local political environment.<sup>57</sup>

With respect to the discourse on the opportunities, it is important to summarize that if the rebels cannot challenge the state directly by matching the means of the state, they will attempt to dodge

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<sup>50</sup> Salehyan, p.15

<sup>51</sup> Salehyan, p.29,166

<sup>52</sup> Salehyan, p.30

<sup>53</sup> Brooker, p.157, Salehyan, p.22

<sup>54</sup> Salehyan, p.19-22, p.160-168

<sup>55</sup> Salehyan, p.36

<sup>56</sup> Salehyan, p.37

<sup>57</sup> Salehyan, p.39

the state power and seek the opportunities abroad.<sup>58</sup> Hence, by mobilizing and training forces abroad they can successfully evade the state security forces as well as fundraise and recruit new fighters. However, as Salehyan argues, the external support comes with strings attached, as the external patron often pursues agendas that aim to diminish the power of the neighbouring state. In other words, by seeking support abroad, the rebels become a *hostage* of the friction between two neighbouring states.<sup>59</sup> Consequently, by embracing support from the external patron(s), rebels groups tend to lose some of their organisational autonomy they attained. In this sense, this theory is broken down into two important concepts: *neighbourhood effects* and *the internationalisation of civil conflict*.<sup>60</sup>

Salehyan bases his views on civil war literature that sought to establish a connection between a regional environment and a probability of stateless warfare. *Neighbourhood effects* are viewed as the politico-military, socio-economic and cultural factors that shape the regional politics of the states involved. He writes that the conflict is all but likely if the regional politics is dominated by the *weak states*, or *rival states* that present an obstacle for the regional co-operation.<sup>61</sup>

So-called *weak* states are described as entities that do not have an effective control over its territory, or namely, the full exercise of sovereignty. They lack resources, personnel and infrastructure to be able to police their territory commendably.<sup>62</sup> As a sheer consequence, rebel groups use porous borders to effectively smuggle fighters, weapons and goods, which in turn, helps them to prolong fighting and furthermore internationalise conflict.<sup>63</sup> As the matter of fact, this scenario does not necessarily require a host state to grant support for the rebels, but as it is often a case, weak states are unwilling to allocate resources to fight rebels due to domestic problems they face. If conditions deteriorate, transnational rebels can plunge the region into chaos that may bring about the internationalisation of conflict.<sup>64</sup>

Conversely, a state that undermines a rival state and seeks to establish control over rebel groups that wage asymmetric warfare across the border, is interested in prolongation of the conflict until it completely exhausts the means, motivations and opportunities of the rival state.<sup>65</sup> More importantly, the state shares no interests in open confrontation or a total war and therefore chooses

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<sup>58</sup> Brooker, p.161; Salehyan, p.44;

<sup>59</sup> Salehyan, p.51-55; Zacher, p.140-198; Toft, p. 104-112

<sup>60</sup> Salehyan, p.50-55

<sup>61</sup> Salehyan, p. 40-47

<sup>62</sup> Salehyan, p.41

<sup>63</sup> Salehyan, p.43

<sup>64</sup> Salehyan, p.46; Toft, p.99

<sup>65</sup> Salehyan, p.49, Brookers, p. 162

to empower rebel groups.<sup>66</sup> The relationship between rival states is of particular importance for development of the Bosnian case, noting the power entanglements prior to July crisis of 1914. Particularly central for this case is *ethnic irredentism*, a logical derivative of the transnational rebel theory, “legitimising” neighbouring state to support rebel groups of an ethnic kin within the rival state aiming to annex “historical motherland”.<sup>67</sup> The foreign policy instrument as such will be elaborated in detail in the last section of the theoretical chapter.

The aim of TNR theory is also to demonstrate that transnational rebels precipitate the *internationalisation of civil conflict*. TNR theory advocates that not only are they the cause of the enmity between the states, but due to international rivalries, transnational rebels are also a consequence.<sup>68</sup> As it has been previously explained, rebel groups exert substantial bargaining power, only if the sponsoring state delegates such power to them, as it is the case of the international rivalries. In case of weak or failed states, transnational rebels benefit from the inherent instabilities home and abroad.<sup>69</sup>

Contrary to some monolithic scholarly works disregarding issues arising from asymmetric stateless warfare, TNR theory is multi-dimensional: it examines conflict on a micro level of analysis-the background, dynamics and consequences of *client-patron relationships*<sup>70</sup>, while not ruling out a macro level of analysis-the internationalisation of civil conflict.<sup>71</sup> Client-patron relationship between host states and rebel groups can offer sanctuaries for the rebels, which can provoke a target state to retaliate ensuing conflict that spans borders. With that, target states violate borders and sovereignty of neighbouring states in pursuit of transnational rebels.<sup>72</sup> This is starkly relevant to the case of Young Bosnia and its military affiliates in Serbia, taking into account what ensued in the aftermath of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and his wife on June 28<sup>th</sup> 1914.

#### 4.6 Irredentism

The objective of this section is to build up on TNR theory by illustrating how the patron state that provides assistance to rebels benefits from the armed rebellion in the neighbouring rival state. This section will also aim to demonstrate how the patron state justifies the external support to the rebels though the pursuit of irredentism that is consequently contingent on the secessionist movements in

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<sup>66</sup> Salehyan, p.165-169; Zacher, p.238

<sup>67</sup> Salehyan, p.170; G White, ‘*Irredentism*’, Frostburg State University, Frostburg, MD, 2009, p.590

<sup>68</sup> Salehyan, p.40,166

<sup>69</sup> Toft, p.102

<sup>70</sup> Salehyan, p.165

<sup>71</sup> Salehyan, p.48,164-165; Toft, p.105-107;

<sup>72</sup> Chazan, p.25



the targeting rival state. For further reference, an addendum to the TNR theory with regards to *Irredentism* and *Secessionism* will be limited to *Ethnic Irredentism*, the most common type of irredentism throughout history, for its relevance to the case of Young Bosnia.<sup>73</sup>

On that note, this section is to: 1) define *ethnic irredentism* 2) link it to the TNR theory 3) explore the relationship with secessionism 4) establish a final theoretical framework for the analysis of Ethnic Irredentism in the Balkans.

White in his textbook analysis *On Irredentism* sets out that the term is derived from Italian *terra irredenta*, which stands for *unredeemed land*.<sup>74</sup> In his etymological overview of the term, he outlines the Italian struggle for unification prior to 1861. At that time, the newly-formed Italian kingdom strived to *redeem* Italy by adding territories that hitherto belonged to Austria-Hungary, France and Greece. More importantly, those irredentist claims were legitimised by incorporating foreign territories that were inhabited by ethnic Italians.<sup>75</sup> Due to the fact that programs and agendas of an irredentist entity were mostly based on protecting the ethnic kin across the sovereign borders of a neighbouring state, the scholarship generally defines ethnic irredentism as, '*a desire to have a state annex any territories of neighbouring states on historical grounds or because such territories contain inhabitants of similar cultural/historical characteristics as the people within the potential annexing state*'.<sup>76</sup>

With respect to the generally accepted definition of irredentism, Neuberger in *Irredentism and Politics in Africa* argues that a successful irredentist campaign demands a parent state aiming to *redeem* ethnic kin into the existing structure.<sup>77</sup> He also adds that irredentae are a sheer consequence of historical precedents, namely, the territories have been claimed in hopes to restore a pre-colonial

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<sup>73</sup> White, p.590-598; See also: G Gokcek, '*Irredentism versus Secessionism: The Potential for International Conflict*', Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 2011, p.276-296; S Saideman, R W Ayres, '*Determining the Causes of Irredentism: Logit Analysis of Minorities at Risk Data from the 1980s and 1990s*', University of Indianapolis, 2000, p.1-19; D Carment, P James, '*Internal Constraints and Interstate Ethnic Conflict: Toward a Crisis-Based Assessment of Irredentism*', The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.39, No.1, 1995, p.82-109; M Kornprobst, '*Dejustification and Dispute Settlement: Irredentism in European Politics*', European Journal of International Relations, 2007, p.461-487; T Priestly, '*Linguistic Propaganda Against Perceived Irredentism*', International Journal of Applied Linguistics, Vol.9, No.1, 1999, p.38-75; P Trumbore, '*Victims or Aggressors? Ethno-Political Rebellion and Use of Force in Militarized Interstate Disputes*', International Studies Quarterly, no.47, 2003, p.183-201; V Roudometof, '*The Social Origins of Balkan Politics: Nationalism, Underdevelopment and the Nation-State in Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria, 1880-1920*', Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol.11, No.3, 2000, p.144-163; J Nagle, '*Does Having a Kin State Lessen the Likelihood Of Minorities Engaging in Secessionist Mobilization?: An Analysis of the Moderating Influence of Kin States*', Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 2013, p.287-309

<sup>74</sup> White, p. 592-593

<sup>75</sup> White, p.593

<sup>76</sup> White, p.590

<sup>77</sup> B Neuberger, '*Irredentism and politics in Africa*', in N Chazan, '*Irredentism and International Politics*', Boulder Lynne Rienner Publishers, p.97-109

empire, then by former colonizers to retain authority over past subjects and lastly, pursuant to physiogeography. These examples are important to pinpoint some other motives of irredentist networks besides ethnic. For that reason it is vital for this paper to present irredentism as complex as it is elaborated in the literature on causes of the conflict spill-over.<sup>78</sup>

TNR theory relates to Irredentism on multiple levels. Irredentism is certainly an evidence why rebels are motivated to fight in the very first place. It is a logical derivative of TNR theory, because it is a motive for rebels to seek external support as well as an instrument of foreign patrons used to change the status quo.<sup>79</sup> To illustrate this point, TNR theory has to be revisited. Namely, the concepts like bad *neighbourhood effects* and *internationalisation of civil conflict* can be instigated by irredentist networks. Any alteration to the status quo, propelled by visions of ethnically pure and redeemed states, tend to cause the conflict that vary from *petit guerre* to full-scale interstate conflict.<sup>80</sup> Deteriorating conditions in the region, additionally fuelled by irredentist agendas and transnational rebels following them, engender ethnic security dilemma. This is particularly symptomatic of the multi-ethnic societies, where the state leadership's impartiality is in doubt.<sup>81</sup>

For Saideman and Ayres in *Determining the Causes of Irredentism*, ethnic groups tend to become insecure competing for the control of the state or to secede from the state or to join the neighbouring state where their ethnic group is in control.<sup>82</sup> Security dilemma, a pillar of the realist school of thought, translates onto this scenario: the more privileged one ethnic group is over others, the less secure the underprivileged will feel, which subsequently can propel them to find a patron abroad with irredentist claims. In the nutshell, poor governance leads to disenchantment and mistrust that can ultimately turn obedient citizens into insurgents and rebels with secessionist and/or irredentist objectives.<sup>83</sup>

Gokcek defines secessionism in *Irredentism versus Secessionism: The Potential for International Conflict* as, '*a decision by an ethnic minority to secede or rather break free from the sovereign authority of the country where the group resides, in order to be able to govern that territory where it is concentrated*'.<sup>84</sup> In contrast to that, he views irredentism, '*as a political effort to unite religiously or ethnically related segments of a particular population that have been integrated into several*

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<sup>78</sup> Nagle, p.287-289; Trumbore, p.183-187

<sup>79</sup> Salehyan, p.41; Brookers, p. 125

<sup>80</sup> Salehyan, p.50; Gokcek, p. 278-280

<sup>81</sup> Gokcek, p. 283; Kornprobst, p.469; Nagle, p.290-295

<sup>82</sup> Saideman, Ayres, p.1-3

<sup>83</sup> Saideman, Ayres, p.10

<sup>84</sup> Gokcek, p.279

*different states*’,<sup>85</sup> of which ethnic groups are dispersed geographically into two or more countries adjacent to one another. As importantly, while secessionism is mainly a bottom-up or grass-root initiative, irredentism is usually contingent on governments or military as a top-down phenomenon. Another conceptual difference regards the outcome of these phenomena; secessionism is to *create* a new political entity by breaking apart, whereas irredentism strives to *enlarge* an existing state. Both of these phenomena, however, challenge the sovereignty of the foregoing states and with that, alter the status quo of regional and international politics. This rationale also brings about the calculus of retaliation. Gokcek argues that an attack of the state sovereignty is likely to provoke an inter-state war, provided that benefits outweigh the costs. This argument goes back to the insurgency calculus that, in many respects, translates into the calculus of the states fighting secessionist insurgency, which may work under the auspices of the irredentist networks.<sup>86</sup> Gokcek exemplifies this thesis with India-Pakistan clashes over Kashmir and argues that the benefits of this conflict offset the costs back in 1947 and 1965.

The literature on this subject has emphasised that irredentist claims are more likely to transform asymmetric stateless warfare into full-blown inter-state warfare as opposed to secessionist claims.<sup>87</sup> Woodwell maintains that anti-irredentist state defending its sovereignty and territorial integrity is more prone to wage intra-state warfare by escalating ethnic conflict into total war. He adds that, *‘the likelihood for war is higher between two states that share an ethnic group over a contiguous geographic territory, where in one country the group happens to be a dominant majority, and in the other, a disenfranchised minority’*.<sup>88</sup> This thesis is of particular importance for the Young Bosnians and their links to Serbian government and military echelons, having in mind the Bosnian Serbs’ sentiments under the Habsburg reign and their inclination towards the independent Serbian state.<sup>89</sup>

This paper also relies on Horowitz’s work in *Irredentas and Secessions: Adjacent phenomena, Neglected Connections*, where he advocates that secessionism and irredentism are inseparable in many cases.<sup>90</sup> He claims that rigidness cannot be applied to this case, arguing that dispersed minorities in the bordering states tend to have secessionist aspirations in the short run, while in the long run irredentism prevails. Furthermore to that, his secessionism-irredentism connection is conceptualised accordingly: Irredentism is often “sold” to an ethnic group by a patron state shaping

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<sup>85</sup> Gokcek, p.280

<sup>86</sup> Gokcek, p.282; Brookers, p. 127-136, 245-250

<sup>87</sup> Gokcek, p. 287; D Woodwell, *‘Unwelcome Neighbors: Shared Ethnicity and International Conflict During the Cold War’*, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.48, No.1, 2004, p.197–223

<sup>88</sup> Woodwell, p.211

<sup>89</sup> See *State of the Art/History Chapter*

<sup>90</sup> D Horowitz, *‘Irredentas and secessions: Adjacent phenomena, neglected connections’*, International Journal of Comparative Sociology Vol.33, No.1–2, 1992, p.120

its insurgency calculus (provided that the group is rebellious); consequently, secessionist aspirations are born and should they break free, they are easily incorporated by the final stage of irredentism.<sup>91</sup> Notwithstanding its applicability to numerous cases of irredentism throughout history, the evidence in the research by Saideman, Ayres, Horowitz and Gokcek shows that ethnic groups across borders must share the common aims and accordingly, identify with one another for irredentism to be effective. If that is not the case, the chances of success of irredentist networks will remain slim.<sup>92</sup>

An important point in line looks at the justification for irredentism. Kornprobst in *Dejustification and Dispute Settlement: Irredentism in European Politics* discusses two aspects of irredentist justification: legitimacy and vision. The legitimacy dimension entails, '*the irredentist nation has the right, given its history, the obligation to retrieve the disputed territory from the status quo power*'<sup>93</sup>, and while the visionary dimension indicates how the disputed territory will be reunited with her "motherland". Both of dimensions will be used to test whether the relationship between Young Bosnia and Serbia was based on irredentism. In this case, it will be particularly telling to come back to the very nature of nationalistic rhetoric that is opulent in notions like *obligation, right and historical injustice*.<sup>94</sup>

Although other theories like realism or rational choice theory also try to explain irredentism, their approach is strictly top-down, focusing on how elites benefit from the conflict transformation: for instance, how they escalate territorial disputes in order to conceal domestic problems for which they are accountable or how they use domestic sentiments to usurp power in a neighbouring state and so on.<sup>95</sup> Conversely, TNR theory explains how mutually beneficial the client-patron relationship is and thus is multi-faceted. Its main focus remains on the rebels who are operating transnationally and thereby impacting the patron state and vice versa.<sup>96</sup>

The concluding remarks of this chapter will start to narrow down irredentism to the Balkan scenario. It is indispensable to underpin a thread that will connect the theoretical chapter to the main discussion on external factors in the case of Young Bosnia. As a follow up to the introductory lines and established theoretical framework, for the analysis of an insurgency to be thorough and accurate, it must be reiterated that external factors cannot be examined without the account of other variables described in the previous sections. Similarly, the motives of the patron state embedded in irredentism cannot be fully grasped without the analysis of the roots of irredentist programs. For that matter, the analysis will revisit that irredentism is virtually non-existent without a

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<sup>91</sup> Horowitz, p.126-128

<sup>92</sup> Saideman, Ayres, p.5; Gokcek, p.285; Horowitz, p.122

<sup>93</sup> Kornprobst, p.470-476

<sup>94</sup> Kornprobst, p.479

<sup>95</sup> Carment, James, p.89

<sup>96</sup> Salehyan, p. 11-70, 165-169

nation state supporting it. Therefore, the analysis will pinpoint nationalistic programs that envisaged an ethnic group living in one state, irrespective of their residence and citizenship.

This theoretical chapter is useful in outlining “tools” that will be essential when analysing the relationship between Young Bosnia, Serbia and Austria-Hungary. Those tools are, as noted beforehand, insurgency calculus with motivations, means and opportunities, with the focus on external factors that encompass: sanctuaries, financial support, ideology (legitimacy and vision), neighbourhood effects and internationalisation of civil conflict.

## 5. State of the Art

The aim of this chapter is to lay out the scholarship on the Young Bosnians and its affiliates. The first part of this chapter will introduce the literature that has been critically acclaimed in the context of pre-World War I writings. The second part of the chapter will primarily focus on how the scholarly debate relates to this paper as much so as what the added value of this paper is to the debate.

Majority of pieces written about this period observe Young Bosnia as a factor in the broader debate that looks into the causes of the Great War. Baffled by the lack of agreement on the causes of the World War I, the scholars have, up to this day, debated the causes and consequences of the assassination of the Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophia. At the hundredth anniversary of the shootings in Sarajevo, historians cannot exactly pinpoint the origins of the war; they certainly disapprove the governments’ decision-making that led the world into the greatest catastrophe up-to-date and lament the loss of life, harmony and prosperity that was enjoyed up until 1914. In the period between two world wars, scholars insisted on analysing the causes of the Great War in order to draw important preventive and pre-emptive lessons that would dissuade warmongering and with that, to give credit to the Wilson’s idealism. They proved to be wrong immediately after the Nazi Germany had resurrected on the wings of Hitler’s perverted ideology.

### 5.1 Young Bosnia in the eyes of many

The scholarship on Young Bosnia available in public and electronic libraries in Vienna and the Balkans, where the research was conducted, is commonly embedded in the literature that scrutinises the origins of the World War I. In light of that, the introduction of this chapter sets the

tone of the *State of the Art* of this paper, acknowledging that majority of scholars debated whether or to what extent Young Bosnians represented the advent of war. To reiterate, the main aim of this paper is to look at developments from 1908 until 1914, with a subsequent analysis of the trials.

In order to understand the historical context that relates to the Young Bosnian narrative, this paper relies on the secondary data collected from the literature that precedes the inception of Young Bosnia and that follows its demise. The annotated bibliographies of those works are elaborated in the *History/Context* chapter.

Having in mind diverse viewpoints on Young Bosnia, this chapter will implement a specific categorisation of the relevant scholarship, so as to illustrate depth and intricacy of the arguments more effectively. Namely, according to the data collected, Young Bosnia is generally perceived in these terms: nationalist agitator *versus* fighter for social justice and liberator; marionette *versus* (semi) autonomous group; conspirators against the state, anti-monarchists *versus* visionaries, modernists, anti-colonialists, and revolutionaries. These relationships portray disagreements and points of contention that have echoed up to this day, insofar as they have been used in academic discourses and political manifestos in the Balkan contemporary history as well as the global history at the hundredth anniversary of the beginning of the World War I.

The first bone of contention in the debate is a perception of Young Bosnians as nationalistic agitators as opposed to freedom fighters. In the literature covered these constellations are the most prevalent, which is understandable considering the scholars' objectives, in this instance to identify the culprits for the war. On the other hand, while scholars agree that nationalism was a driving force for the events that followed, they disagree on its legitimacy. For example, Cristopher Clark in *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War* argues that The Habsburg Empire aimed to modernise Bosnia, alter the regressive Ottoman feudal mentality and turn it into industrious and prosperous province that would ultimately serve the legitimate interest of one of the oldest empires in Europe.<sup>97</sup> Furthermore, he is not ambivalent in claiming that Young Bosnians, inspired by the Serbian aggressive politics in the Balkans, availed themselves of the opportunity to incite ethnic and religious tensions in a multicultural Bosnia. David Mackenzie in his piece *Serbia as Piedmont and The Yugoslav Idea 1804-1914* indicates that causality ought to be a principal argument because it explains how the

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<sup>97</sup> C Clark, 'The Sleepwalkers How Europe Went To War in 1914', The Penguin Group, London, 2013, p.3-99,242-308, 367-391, 451-469, 555-562

upsurge of nationalism in the aftermath of the Bosnian annexation crisis in 1908 engendered Young Bosnia, an aggregation of groups and cells of revolutionary youth that spread from around 1904.<sup>98</sup>

Victor Roudometof in *Nationalism, Globalisation and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans* reminds that Young Bosnia resented the social injustice that crippled Bosnia under the Austro-Hungarian rule. He adds that the Bosnian Muslims profited the most from the secular policies that the Austro-Hungarian Empire introduced, which favoured former Bosnian-Ottoman feudal lords and Catholic Croatian intelligentsia over predominantly impoverished Serbian Orthodox peasantry and artisans.<sup>99</sup> The constitution of 1910 vindicated these claims, as it gave more privileges to the small portion of population, but stripped thousands of peasants of land and property. In light of the widespread resentfulness among Bosnian youth, Young Bosnians opted for more radical methods to alleviate social injustice.<sup>100</sup> Roudometof, in his book, contrasts the Clark's argument of Austro-Hungarian successes in Bosnia and provides a more balanced analysis of the organisation, claiming that the rift between Young Bosnia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire was not elicited from abroad, in this case from Serbia. In other words, Roudometof argues that social injustice, corruption, nepotism, and The Habsburg *divide and rule* strategy prompted Young Bosnians to seek external support.<sup>101</sup>

This argument advertently leads to the second point of disagreement that pertains to the independence of Young Bosnia.

The independence of action of Young Bosnia has also been debated by scholars across the academia. It has invariably witnessed many different viewpoints, because there has been no consensus among scholars over a direct connection between Young Bosnia and the Government of Serbia. The literature that has been written analyses the relationship between Young Bosnia and other clandestine organisations, namely *Narodna Odbrana (Serbian National Defence)* and *Ujedinjenje ili smrt (Unification or Death)*. Both organisations are viewed as an instrument of the irredentist programs inspired by the idea of the Great Serbia. Behschnitt and Mackenzie go in line and discuss the involvement of *Narodna Odbrana* as a recruiter of thousand volunteers who operated throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina as early as 1908.<sup>102</sup> They indicate that the organisation was run by the Serbian military leadership, citing Major Voja Tankosić as a focal point in charge of

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<sup>98</sup> D Mackenzie, 'Serbia as Piedmont and The Yugoslav Idea 1804-1914', East European Quarterly, 1994, p.153-182

<sup>99</sup> V Roudometof, 'Nationalism, Globalisation and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans', Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001, p.1-47, 101-131, 157-179, 203-240

<sup>100</sup> Roudometof, p. 160-164

<sup>101</sup> Roudometof, p. 169-171

<sup>102</sup> Mackenzie, p.173; W D Behschnitt, 'Nationalismus bei Serben und Kroaten 1830-1914', Oldenbourg, 1980, p.54-132, 201-231

recruitment, training and supervision of the recruited operatives. Even prominent Yugoslav authors like Dedijer or Jovanović who wrote about the pre-war period underline that organisations like Narodna Odbrana could not be disbanded by the Prime Minister Pašić himself for fear that he would lose public support and for the mere fact that he promoted the idea of Serbian leadership as “Piedmont among the South Slavs”.<sup>103</sup> With the aim of understanding the relationship between irredentist networks in Serbia and Young Bosnia, this paper finds various Belgrade embassy reports particularly telling. For instance, one of the most vital accounts written was Ambassador Whitehead’s *General Report on the Kingdom of Serbia for the Year 1906*<sup>104</sup>, where he alerts the British Foreign Office that every patriotic Serb who shares any interest in politics and public matters thinks that Serbian nation spans the nation’s borders and that all Serbs must be adamantly freed of foreign occupation and imperialism. He adds that, in the eyes of many in Serbia, dominions of the Habsburgs and Ottomans will cease to exist.<sup>105</sup> In the course of the research for this paper the official formerly confidential reports sent to the European capitals are taken into account as the primary sources that shed light on the events from 1905 until 1914.

Contrary to the arguments that view Young Bosnia as a clandestine terrorist organisation that was a Serbian-financed entity, prominent Yugoslav authors Krleža, Dedijer, Andrić, Crnjanski and Bazdulj defend the autonomy of Young Bosnia and point out its multifaceted character. First and foremost, although there were fractions within the group that supported Serbian monarchy and the great Serbian platform, the Yugoslav idea was still predominant among the Young Bosnian youth, namely Gavrilo Princip and Bogdan Žerajić.<sup>106</sup> As Dedijer and Krleža argue, Bosnian youth who gathered in Belgrade to plan a revolution advocated Serbo-Croatian unity within Yugoslavia. At that point, their priority was to create means for insurgency in Bosnia and that is why they sought the assistance from the irredentist guerrilla networks that had already invaded the Ottoman Macedonia prior to the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913.<sup>107</sup> There is substantial evidence to this point in the accounts by Drago Ljubibratić, Princip’s close friend and comrade. In one of the accounts on life in Belgrade, Ljubibratić describes in detail that conversations about current events, news from the youth movements, literature reviews and discussions led to the revolutionary ideas and plans. Ljubibratić’s accounts

<sup>103</sup> Mackenzie, p.174; Behschnitt, p.109

<sup>104</sup> J B Whitehead, ‘General Report on the Kingdom of Serbia for the Year 1906’ in D Stevenson, *British Documents on Foreign Affairs. Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print,...1848-1914*, vol.16, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia 1885-1914, p.200-235

<sup>105</sup> Whitehead, p.210-212

<sup>106</sup> M Krleža, *‘Jugoslovensko pitanje u Prvom svjetskom ratu’*, published in Gradac, 2010, p.38-47; I Andrić, *‘U Ulici Danila Ilica’*, published in Gradac, 2010, p.220-225; M Crnjanski, *‘Spomen Principu’*, published in Gradac, 2010, p.215-219; M Bazdulj, *‘Mlada Bosna’*, published in Gradac, 2010, p.5-8; V Dedijer, *‘Sarajevo 1914’*, Prosveta, 1978, p.212-520, 618-702, 829-832

<sup>107</sup> ibidem



about Princip's and Young Bosnian activism before the assassination in Sarajevo, particularly the interpretation of his friendship with Vladimir Gaćinović, will be duly analysed in the latter stages of this paper.<sup>108</sup> His testimony shows that Gaćinović was a member of Ujedinjenje i Smrt, in contrary to Princip, which ostensibly did not affect their friendship. Mainly for the friendship between the two, historians concur that Young Bosnians were ideologically tied to the clandestine circles of the irredentist networks in Serbia. For that reason, Clark and Mackenzie question the organisation's independence of action prior to the Sarajevo shootings.<sup>109</sup>

When it comes to the ideology of Young Bosnia, Dedijer provides the most engrossing analysis in the major piece *Sarajevo 1914*.<sup>110</sup> A prominent Yugoslav historian who was appointed to write Josip Broz Tito's biography as a commander of the partisan forces in the World War II, Dedijer was interested in the origins of the Yugoslav idea, from the Enlightenment of the Balkan peoples under the Ottomans up to the struggle of Young Bosnia against the Habsburgs. *Sarajevo 1914* or *The Road to Sarajevo* is rather balanced and poised historical narrative of Young Bosnia and its links across the Balkans, focusing on the primary sources and accounts of the members of Young Bosnia who survived the World War I.<sup>111</sup> That is why this paper adopts Dedijer's historical timeline that not only provides important first-hand accounts on Young Bosnia, but also emphasizes the contextual narrative of the major actors in the Balkan politics in the decade before the assassination in Sarajevo. Dedijer highlights that Young Bosnia did not base its activism on a single ideological platform, because its members' stances sometimes differed significantly. However, they would definitely label themselves as nationalists, fighting the occupation and then, Marxists, republicans, anarchists and etc.<sup>112</sup> Dedijer agrees that national liberation was undoubtedly a primary goal of the organisation, which did not envisage any cooperation with the Austro-Hungarian authorities in Bosnia. He writes that Young Bosnians were more or less against all institutions; they were atheists and devoted republicans. What is more, Dedijer adds that they adhered to the socialist and anarchist principles.<sup>113</sup> Most importantly, Dedijer opposes Clark's arguments that Young Bosnia was merely an instrument of Serbian irredentist politics. According to Dedijer, Young Bosnians and the members of *Ujedinjenje ili Smrt* led by Lieutenant Apis differed not only in the views how to organise the state after the Habsburgs, but also in the philosophy of life.<sup>114</sup> The generation of Young Bosnians, originating from the multi-cultural Bosnia, fought against chauvinism and hatred based on religious and ethnic

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<sup>108</sup> D Ljubibratic, 'Nepoznati dokumenat o sarajevskom atentatu', Borba, 1960, p.1-23

<sup>109</sup> Mackenzie, p.178; Clark, p.47-51, 367-375

<sup>110</sup> Dedijer, p.212-520, 618-702, 829-832

<sup>111</sup> Dedijer, p.604-608

<sup>112</sup> Dedijer, p.292

<sup>113</sup> Dedijer, p.298-301

<sup>114</sup> Dedijer, p.631

differences, argues Dedijer, which cannot be said for the highly militaristic *Ujedinjenje ili Smrt* that regarded Muslims and other minorities as traitors, having abandoned Orthodox Christianity under Ottoman pressure.<sup>115</sup>

This paper finds public outreach of particular importance for the analysis of the main events that preceded the assassination in Sarajevo. The cultural contribution of Young Bosnia was vast, thus this paper will duly analyse written pieces by Vladimir Gacinovic, Gavrilo Princip and Bogdan Zerajic among others published in the youth magazines *Zora*<sup>116</sup>, *Pijemont*<sup>117</sup>, *Slovenski Jug*<sup>118</sup>, *Vihor*<sup>119</sup>, *Preporod*,<sup>120</sup> *Bosanska Vila*<sup>121</sup> and *Zvono*.<sup>122</sup> These papers, published from Slovenia to Serbia, embodied the Yugoslav idea and propagated the anti-imperial and anti-colonial ideas directed against the Habsburg rule. Additionally, the above-mentioned publications serve as a primary source of evidence supporting the claims of this paper.

## 5.2 Summary

To sum up, all of the aforementioned literature on Young Bosnia represent a valuable source of information that was needed for this paper to be completed. The literature on Young Bosnia premised on the beginning of the World War I provided an extensive analysis of the cooperation between Young Bosnia and irredentist networks (*The Unification or Death* and *Serbian National Defence*) aiming to investigate to what extent Young Bosnia caused the eruption of the *Great War*. This premise well-suited the scope of this paper, concerning the external factors that shaped the activism and position of Young Bosnia. On the other hand, historiography on Young Bosnia as an organisation or movement, from its inception to its demise, served to identify internal dynamics and helped to determine motivation, means and opportunities from the Young Bosnian point of view. Both points of view, external and internal, are vital for this paper and are accordingly incorporated in the research question.

The added value of this paper is multifaceted. It concentrates on Young Bosnia within and outside the borders of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It views Young Bosnia as an active, dynamic force that

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<sup>115</sup> Mackenzie, p.181

<sup>116</sup> The herald of the progressive Serbian youth and the herald of the Serbo-Croatian nationalist-radical youth; Published in Vienna and Prague (1910-1912)

<sup>117</sup> The Serbian irredentist magazine, run by *Unification or Death*; Published in Belgrade (1911-1915)

<sup>118</sup> The magazine of the *Serbian National Defence*, Published in Belgrade (1908-1912)

<sup>119</sup> Magazine for nationalistic culture, Published in Zagreb in 1914

<sup>120</sup> The provincial herald of the Yugoslav progressive youth in Slovenian, Published in Ljubljana (1907-1912)

<sup>121</sup> The literature magazine, Published in Sarajevo (1885-1914)

<sup>122</sup> The herald of the Yugoslav socialists, Published in Sarajevo until 1914

influence and that is influenced. Furthermore, it combines two theories that have been prominent in the history of stateless warfare to explain Young Bosnian dynamics. The organisational calculus to commence rebellion or insurgency addresses the *grassroots* of Young Bosnia: its initial motives, means and opportunities that are derived from the political programme (internal dynamics) and political circumstances of the Habsburg Empire in Bosnia (external dynamics). With that in mind, the outcomes of such calculus predicate the ground for seeking international support and assistance from similar or like-minded subjects and consequently change the scope, from merely a national manifestation to a regional and international actor. In other words, this paper underscores the importance to observe Young Bosnia initially as an independent actor, whose calculus encouraged them to lose some autonomy to seemingly like-minded entities in pursuit of the overarching goal, namely, to start an insurgency against the colonial power and obtain independence.

## 6. Context/History

The aim of this chapter is to outline major events of great relevance to the rise of Young Bosnia. It provides contextual background on the roots of the Serbian ethnic irredentism with *Načertanije* in the focus, then it covers the decisions of the Congress of Berlin and a subsequent Austro-Hungarian occupation, followed by the May Coup of 1903 in Serbia and the Annexation Crisis of 1908 and lastly, the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and its aftermath. This chapter presents the accounts on the Serbian irredentist networks in the Ottoman territories, in order to contextualise their activism prior to cooperation with the Young Bosnians.

### 6.1 Načertanije and Serbian Irredentism

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*"A plan must be constructed which does not limit Serbia to her present borders, but endeavours to absorb all the Serbian people around her." – Ilija Garašanin, Načertanije<sup>123</sup>*

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Ilija Garašanin, the Serbian interior minister under the rule of Prince Alexander Karadjordjevic, formulated a platform on Serbian foreign and security policy in 1844. The secret document named *Načertanije* promulgated guidelines that every generation ought to follow for the common interests of the Serbs wherever they lived. Christopher Clark compares it to the Magna Carta of Serb nationalism, reminding that Garašanin's *Načertanije* was based on the František Zach's work on the reunification of the South Slavs into one state. Garašanin built up on the Zach's ideas and substituted South Slavs with Serbs.<sup>124</sup> He advocated that the main goal of every statesman should be the unification of all Serbs in one national entity, proclaiming that '*Where a Serb dwells, that is Serbia*'.<sup>125</sup> Such views were not welcomed by the powers in the region, given that the Ottoman Empire ruled over Bosnia, Sandžak and parts of the Balkans that were regarded as 'Old Serbia' in Belgrade.

The region of 'Old Serbia' that included modern-day FYR of Macedonia and Kosovo, represented a cradle for the Serbs reminiscing about the vast Serbian medieval Empire and grieving over its demise after the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. On the other side, Austro-Hungarian Empire grew stronger and kept in check the Obrenovich Dynasty that decided to bandwagon the Habsburgs.<sup>126</sup>

Garašanin evoked the Serbian historical right to its homeland, arguing that legitimacy to rule the medieval lands was not jeopardized under the Ottoman occupation. In justifying his irredentist manifesto and rebuffing the critique, Garašanin argued that everyone is wrong claiming that the ideas presented in the 'draft' are something new, failing to acknowledge that it was founded in very ancient times and rooted in the vibrant and progressive Serbian medieval state.<sup>127</sup> As Clark remarked, Garašanin wanted to equate Serbian medieval polity under Tsar Dušan the Great with the

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<sup>123</sup> Quoted in B Trensényi, M Kopecek, '*National Romanticism: Formation of National Movements, Volume Two (Discourses of Collective Identity in Central and Southeast Europe)*', Central European University Press, 2007, p.242

<sup>124</sup> Clark, p.21-28; Trensényi, Kopecek, p.241-251

<sup>125</sup> Clark, p.22

<sup>126</sup> Clark, p.23

<sup>127</sup> Trensényi, Kopecek, p.242

modern idea of nation-state. Those inconsistencies seemed unimportant to the Serbian nationalists at the turn of the century.<sup>128</sup>

Načertanije was among the first documents that envisaged a dominion of Great Serbia. It was an ambitious project that promoted aggressive and rather intolerant nationalism, given its envisagement of the peoples who did not identify as Serbs, but dwelled in the region for hundreds of years. On that note, it failed to take into account complex ethnic realities of the Balkans, which would prove hitherto troublesome. Načertanije was a blue-print for the formation of the Yugoslav state after the World War I under Serbian Karadjordjevic Sovereigns.<sup>129</sup>

## 6.2 The Congress of Berlin 1878: The Habsburg Occupation of Bosna and Herzegovina

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*“My peoples are far away from one another, and that is good. When plague strikes in France, you get sick straight away, but I send Hungarians to Italy, and Italians to Hungary. Each of them observes own neighbour: they do not understand anything and hate each other from the bottom of their souls. Thanks to the common mistrust, the order is maintained and their hatred for one another ensures long-term peace.”- Emperor Franz I to the French Ambassador at his court<sup>130</sup>*

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Bosnia and Herzegovina was the western-most province of the weakened Ottoman Empire by the Congress of Berlin in 1878. The Ottoman Turks maintained the feudal system in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which favoured the well-off *begovi* or feudal lords who possessed property and answered directly to the Ottoman Porta. The agrarian reform was not passed in the Ottoman Bosnia, triggering popular unrests from impoverished *raja*- the peasants and some artisans who worked under the auspices of the feudal lords.<sup>131</sup> Bosnia and Herzegovina at that time witnessed national awakening of the peoples, who looked up to the Revolutions of 1848, the socialist uprisings in the Russian Empire and most importantly, the writings of Vuk Karadzic, the founder of the modern Serbian language. Vuk Karadzic travelled all around the Balkans, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, collected traditional folklore and subsequently wrote one of the most riveting ethnographic reports.

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<sup>128</sup> Clark, p.23-24

<sup>129</sup> Clark, p.31

<sup>130</sup> Quoted in Dedijer, p.181, Translated from Serbo-Croatian to English by author

<sup>131</sup> Roudometof, ...Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans..., p.32-47

He noted that some 5 million people speak the same language and understand one another, but belong to three different religious groups that had created problems.<sup>132</sup>

Aiming to respond to the disparate political reality in the aftermath of the Russian campaign against the Ottomans that resulted with the Treaty of San Stefano in 1877, the foreign powers led by Germany, Austria-Hungary, England and Russia gathered in Berlin. Fearing the South Slavic awakening in the Balkans and Serbo-Montenegrin influence that resonated with the Bosnian peasants, major powers agreed to bestow the mandate upon the Habsburg Monarchy over Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnian Vilayet was officially part of the Ottoman Empire, but administered by Austria-Hungary. The occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was not an easy task for the Austro-Hungarians, as they were confronted with revolts from Muslim and Orthodox population. The Habsburgs lost 5198 servicemen, out of which 178 officers died in combat.<sup>133</sup> The revolt was sparked by the feudal lords to avoid the risk of losing the feudal property to agrarian reforms. By the turn of the century, Austria-Hungary succeeded in maintaining order, introducing some administrative and social reforms and seemingly silencing the pan-Slavic nationalism. All in all, Bosnia and Herzegovina was the model colony for the Austro-Hungarians, facilitating the penetration of the Austro-Hungarian capital into the Balkans. New authorities also began with the economic reforms and investment in railways and road infrastructure.<sup>134</sup> As Dedijer argues, the economic reforms passed revitalised the economic output, but dangerously enlarged gaps between the wealthy intelligentsia and poor peasantry. Almost half of the population was comprised of the underprivileged serfdom. He also underlines that it was not in the interest of Austria-Hungary to pass the agrarian reform and to abolish serfdom, because in its core it was still a conservative empire that supported the ruling minority at the expense of poor peasants.<sup>135</sup>

During the administration of Benjamin Von Kalay, the urban parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina were favoured over rural. Around 88 percent of the population was illiterate, majority of which lived in isolated Bosnian rural areas. His strategy of *Divide et impera* alienated the Serb Orthodox and some Croat Roman Catholic peasantry from the authorities and the rich Muslim feudal lords. For instance, Jesuit order was sponsored at the expense of the Franciscans, whereas Serbian Orthodox Church was stripped of the opportunity to run its religious schools, the privilege it enjoyed under the Ottomans.<sup>136</sup>

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<sup>132</sup> ibidem

<sup>133</sup> J Schindler, 'Defeating Balkan Insurgency: The Austro-Hungarian Army in Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1878-82', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 2004, p.528-552

<sup>134</sup> Schindler, p.532

<sup>135</sup> Dedijer, p.104

<sup>136</sup> Dedijer, p.107; Roudomentof, p.158

Although educated Croats and Serbs voiced their discontent and appealed for better conditions for the South Slavs within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, their demands fell on deaf ears in Vienna. With that, facing enormous pressure from the Austro-Hungarian conservative rule, the revolts of the Bosnian population were easily quelled by occupational authorities.<sup>137</sup>

John Schindler in *Defeating Insurgency in Bosnia* argues that the mandate to administer Bosnia and Herzegovina was wrongly worded and implemented in the first place.<sup>138</sup> The unwieldy agreement not to assign Bosnia to either Austrian or Hungarian part of the Empire, but to administer Bosnia as a *corpus separatum* diminished chances for a more effective control over the occupied territories. Instead, Bosnia was subjected to the joint Ministry of Finances, where Vienna and Budapest had a direct jurisdiction. Schindler agrees with Dedijer that Bosnia was treated as a quasi-colonial possession, intended to keep Serbian and Montenegrin armed forces in check.<sup>139</sup>

### 6.3 May Coup of 1903, Karadjordjevic Dynasty and the Annexation Crisis

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*“We will struggle until we are victorious, but if we are defeated, we will be defeated knowing that we gave our greatest effort, and that we have the respect not only of all Serbs but also of the whole Slavic race”- Ljuba Davidović, leader of the Independent Radicals, delivering a speech in Belgrade when the Annexation was announced<sup>140</sup>*

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Serbian independence was fully recognised in 1878 by the delegates of the Berlin Congress. Ever since the popular rebellions in the first decade of the 1800s, Serbia has been ruled by the fractions of two dynasties Karadjordjevs and Obrenovics. The leaders of both dynasties fought in the rebellion against the Ottomans, so the legitimacy to rule Serbia was disputed between the descendants of Djordje Petrović Karadjordje and Milos Obrenović. The animosity between two royal families culminated in 1903, when the incumbent monarch King Alexander Obrenović and his wife Queen Draga Mašin were brutally murdered by the officers-conspirators on the premises of the Royal House in Belgrade.<sup>141</sup> Although it was never proven that Karadjordjevs conspired against the last Obrenović monarch, it was widely believed that conspirators supported Peter Karadjordjevic, who

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<sup>137</sup> Roudomentof, p.159-147

<sup>138</sup> Schindler, p.549

<sup>139</sup> Schindler, p.550-551

<sup>140</sup> Quoted in Clark, p.35

<sup>141</sup> Clark, p.3-13

was crowned the next king of Serbia in 1904. The so-called May Coup echoed as an act of barbarism across the European capitals. Austria-Hungary staunchly criticised the coup, urging the authorities to locate and arrest the conspirators. It also feared that Karadjordjevic would not be loyal to Vienna, which would ultimately be proven true.<sup>142</sup>

In order to ensure the Austrian support, Prince Michael Obrenovic of Serbia signed a secret treaty with Austria-Hungary that enabled Vienna to monopolise Serbian economy and have a say in the foreign and security policy of the Serbian Kingdom.<sup>143</sup> Peter I Karadjordjevic decided to annul the treaty and subsequently sought financial and military support from France and Russia. The Dual Monarchy implemented harsh measures to punish Serbia, which resulted in the Customs War or The Pig War that lasted from 1906 until 1908. Serbian economy was dependant on the import of pigs into Austria-Hungary until the Customs War. The blockade of the Serbian imports was seemingly disastrous for the impoverished Serbia, but France and Russia aided the Serbian government with numerous loans and military assistance, fearing that Austria-Hungary could retaliate militarily. From that moment until the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, the bilateral relations between two neighbouring states were strained, on the brink of a full-blown escalation.<sup>144</sup>

The Annexation Crisis of 1908 put the fragile regional stability in peril. Austria-Hungary opted not to prolong the mandate to administer the Ottoman province of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but decided to annex it as an integral part of the Empire.<sup>145</sup> The Serbian public opinion was outraged and demanded that Serbia take action against the annexation. Serbia turned to Russia for support, but Nicholas II the Emperor of Russia could not afford to wage war against the Austro-Hungarians, following the disastrous defeat in the Russo-Japanese War and a temporary détente with Vienna.<sup>146</sup> When Serbia learnt about the Russian decision, the leaders in Belgrade understood that the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was irreversible. Nonetheless, Serbian nationalists perceived the Annexation Crisis as an opportunity to stir up unrest and popular discontent and with that, to challenge the government.<sup>147</sup> The ambivalent position of the government that deplored the Annexation but wanting to avoid the costly war against the Austro-Hungarians did not resonate with the population, predominantly in the rural areas of Serbia. From that point on, the clandestine military-financed

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<sup>142</sup> Clark, p.13-15

<sup>143</sup> ibidem

<sup>144</sup> Roudomentof, p.171; R Hamilton, H Herwig, *'The Origins of World War I'*, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.92

<sup>145</sup> Hamilton, Herwig, p.100

<sup>146</sup> Hamilton, Herwig, p.102-105

<sup>147</sup> Hamilton, Herwig, p.107



groups would soar and strengthen, which would only widen the gaps between civilian and military leadership in Serbia.<sup>148</sup>

Mackenzie in *The “Black Hand” on Trial: Salonica 1917* writes that *Narodna Odbrana* (*The Serbian National Defence*) spurred all motivated Serbs to join the fight against the Habsburgs, which was a sheer consequence of the Annexation Crisis.<sup>149</sup> *The Serbian National Defence* operated in the Ottoman Macedonia and Kosovo as well, prompting the Ottoman authorities to threaten the Serbian government given that the clandestine organisation waged a guerrilla warfare against the Ottoman garrisons.<sup>150</sup> The Annexation Crisis of 1908 caused a domino effect in the formation of extremely antagonistic, irredentist secret organisations that culminated with *Ujedinjenje ili Smrt!* (*Unification or Death!*). *Unification or Death* or infamously known as “The Black Hand” was established by several high-ranked officers in the Serbian army to fight for the irredentist objectives in the Ottoman and Habsburg territories. In addition to that, Unification or Death vehemently opposed the Pašić-led government, which was criticised for inaction, incompetence and lack of support for the Bosnian and Ottoman Serbs.<sup>151</sup>

The Annexation Crisis took Pašić and other Serbian statesmen by surprise. In balancing the regional powers, namely the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy, Pašić shared the vision of unification with the clandestine organisations, but disagreed on the methods that would turn such a vision into reality. In some instances, he supported the work of The Serbian National Defence, arguing that they promote Serbian values and serve as cultural ambassadors to the territories where Serbs dwell.<sup>152</sup> In the tumultuous years before the Sarajevo assassination, the discrepancies between the civilian and military leadership in Serbia were so obvious insomuch that Pašić struggled to keep the defiant officers in check.<sup>153</sup>

## 6.4 The Balkan Wars (1912-1913)

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*“Serbia feels that she has, so to speak, attained her majority and [...] can pursue a national policy of her own. The kingdom’s political elites are currently passing*

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<sup>148</sup> Hamilton, Herwig, p.110-112

<sup>149</sup> D Mackenzie, ‘*The “Black Hand” on Trial: Salonica 1917*’, East European Monographs, 1995, p.5-43

<sup>150</sup> Mackenzie, p.78-81; Clark, p.42-47

<sup>151</sup> Mackenzie, p.12-20

<sup>152</sup> Mackenzie, p.22

<sup>153</sup> ibidem; Clark, p.46

Two Balkan Wars were waged in the aftermath of the Italian invasion on Libya that significantly weakened the Ottomans. Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece formed a secret coalition with an aim to expel the Ottoman Empire from the Balkan Peninsula. Up to then, the Ottomans had controlled the areas that were of strategic importance for all Balkan states. The coordinated attacks against the Ottoman positions in Thrace, Albania and Macedonia triggered the First Balkan War that lasted from October 1912 to May 1913. The Balkan Coalition swiftly undermined the Ottoman forces in the Balkans, thereby capturing territories from Sanjak of Novi Pazar, Kosovo, Albania and the Ottoman Macedonia. As a result, the Ottomans were reduced to a couple of enclaves in Albania and the European outskirts of Constantinople. Serbia, the informal leader of the coalition, conquered around 39,000 square kilometres and incorporated around two million people. The Serbian forces fought the Ottoman and local Albanian forces in the mountainous regions of Albania and subsequently prevailed, which ensured the access to the Adriatic Sea.<sup>155</sup> That was crucial for the geopolitical power projection of the resurgent Serbian state. In addition to that, Serbia bordered Montenegro, a long-term ally. However, Serbian forces were not allowed to occupy parts of the Albanian coast, because of the Habsburg objections that would force the Serbs to unwillingly cede the coastal provinces to a newly-formed Albanian state. The Albanian state, which was an Austro-Hungarian project from the very beginning, was the major point of contention in the Austro-Serbian bilateral relations.<sup>156</sup>

The occupation of Macedonia did not go according to plan. The Serbian forces and newly-formed authorities loyal to Serbia were encountered with the strong opposition from the Bulgarian regular and guerrilla forces that viewed Macedonia as an integral part of Great Bulgaria.<sup>157</sup> Serbian and Bulgarian irredentist programmes clashed in Macedonia, thereby provoking an open conflict in the summer of 1913. Greece, Montenegro and Romania and even the Ottoman Empire sided with Serbia and attacked Bulgarian territories. The Second Balkan War lasted only for two months, which was

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<sup>154</sup> Quoted in Clark, p.43 from Crackanthorpe to Grey, Belgrade, 7 September 1913, p.74-76

<sup>155</sup> I Despot, *‘The Balkan Wars in the Eyes of the Warring Parties: Perceptions and Interpretations’*, Library of Congress, 2012, p.121

<sup>156</sup> Despot, p.165-169; Clark, p.45-46; Roudomentof, p.216

<sup>157</sup> *ibidem*

enough for Serbia to uphold its dominion over Macedonia, whereas Greece took away Eastern Thrace and the Ottoman Empire regained control over Edirne.<sup>158</sup>

The conflict drew international attention, when the seemingly weakened Ottomans committed atrocities deep inside the Bulgarian territories. Russia warned the Ottomans of the potential naval campaign against Constantinople, which alarmed England to de-escalate the conflict and force the warring parties to negotiate the settlement in good faith. The Treaty of Bucharest ended the Second Balkan War, with tens of thousands of casualties and great material devastation.<sup>159</sup>

Clark writes that the Balkan Wars, particularly in Macedonia, were shaped by insurgence of the partisan bands called *comitatiji* and *četniki* that fought under the patronage of various irredentist networks from Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece.<sup>160</sup> These bands that predominantly fought guerrilla warfare were opportune for the regular forces, as they had been initially responsible for collecting intelligence, attacking military garrisons and crucial infrastructure by employing *hit and run* tactics. All of that contributed to a decisive victory of the armed forces in the course of the Balkan Wars. Serbian case is particularly telling, as there is substantial evidence showing that Serbian guerrilla bands had been smuggled to the Ottoman territories, in order to attack its strongholds and win hearts and minds of the Slavic population in the areas. Most of these free-lance fighters were contracted by The Serbian National Defence and other like-minded irredentist organisations.<sup>161</sup> There is no doubt that Serbian military financially backed the campaigns of the Serbian National Defence. MacKenzie adds that Major Bogdan Radenković, Major Vojislav Tankosić and Major Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis were in charge of the guerrilla units in Macedonia, which motivated them *'to form a club with revolutionary aims like those of the Burschenschaften and Carbonari'*.<sup>162</sup> This group would ultimately become known as Ujedinjenje ili Smrt or The Black Hand.

Another important point with regards to the Serbian conquest of Macedonia and Kosovo was the administration that ran the provinces. Clark argues that irredentist networks in Macedonia shared power with the military leadership. In light of that, the correspondence between the British Consuls in Macedonia and the British Minister in Belgrade demonstrates that the Serbian administration in Macedonia and Kosovo was not tolerant to the Muslim population that had not fled with the Ottomans.<sup>163</sup> In fact, the Craig to Crackanthorpe correspondence presents the findings of *'systematic intimidation, arbitrary detentions, beatings, rapes, village-burnings and massacres by the Serbs in*

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<sup>158</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>159</sup> Despot, p.158-163

<sup>160</sup> Clark, p.46-47

<sup>161</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>162</sup> Mackenzie, Salonica, p.68

<sup>163</sup> Clark, p.47

*the annexed areas.*<sup>164</sup> It is contested how much Pašić knew about the committed atrocities, but it is certain that he initially silently supported the Serbian cause in Kosovo and Macedonia. The criticisms coming from Constantinople, Britain and Austria-Hungary did not make Pašić stop the ill-treatment of Muslims, but inspired by the successful military campaign, he did not object Major Tankosić appointment as a chief of the General Staff's intelligence that controlled the agents of The Serbian National Defence across the Habsburg Bosnia.<sup>165</sup>

To sum up, the acquired experience in Macedonia shaped the irredentist networks for their campaigns in Bosnia. Major Tankosić is merely one of the leaders who facilitated the whole process.<sup>166</sup> This is particularly important for the analysis of the Bosnian case. To reiterate, this paper argues that irredentist networks strived to replicate its know-hows on Bosnia by working closely with Young Bosnia. The backbone of this report, *Analysis* chapter, will analyse to what extent the know-hows were implemented, and thereby how Young Bosnia was impacted.

## 7. Analysis/Discussion

This chapter presents an analysis of Young Bosnia, its internal and external dynamics, henceforth the organisation's insurgency calculus, then its opportunities abroad, given the links with the established Serbian irredentist networks, and the changes in the Young Bosnian calculus that resulted from such cooperation. The chapter will proceed with the formation of Young Bosnia, analysing how independent Young Bosnia was in terms of the revolutionary goals that comprise insurgency calculus. In this instance, Brooker's insurgency calculus theoretical framework will be revisited with the purpose of analysing the initial means, motivation and opportunities of Young Bosnia to organise a rebellion. The second part of this chapter will address the Young Bosnian international pivot, primarily analysing what exactly prompted Young Bosnians to rally for support abroad. The focus of this analysis will be the Young Bosnian activism in Serbia, discussing who assisted them and how the assistance came about. For this part of the analysis, Salehyan's theory on transnational rebels will shed light on how Young Bosnians benefited from international support. The third part of this chapter will provide an analysis of the Serbian irredentist organisations' calculus, in order to examine to what extent they impacted Young Bosnia. Lastly, the chapter will provide an answer to the research question and elaborate whether the research hypotheses hold true.<sup>167</sup>

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<sup>164</sup> Quoted in Clark, p.42

<sup>165</sup> Mackenzie, p.69

<sup>166</sup> Mackenzie, p.72

<sup>167</sup> See: Methods chapter, Research question

## 7.1 Young Bosnia and the Prospect of an Insurgency in Bosnia and Herzegovina

To understand the origins of Young Bosnia, one must be aware of the socio-political conditions in the annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Habsburg occupation of the Ottoman province or vilayet Bosnia commenced in 1878 after the Congress of Berlin and climaxed in 1908 when Austria-Hungary annexed the province provoking outrage throughout Serbia. Although Serbia protested, it could not change or renegotiate annexation, as it would provoke an armed conflict that Serbia could not withstand.<sup>168</sup>

Not only was Young Bosnia a reflection of the Bosnian reality, but also it was a manifestation of spontaneous revolutionary fever across the Austro-Hungarian Empire, particularly among the Slavic peoples in the Empire. In addition to that, as the research findings indicate, Young Bosnia was inspired by the 19<sup>th</sup> century revolutions for independence in Italy and the populist and socialist movements in the 19<sup>th</sup> century Russia. For instance, many historians point out that the name Mlada Bosna or Young Bosnia was derived from the revolutionary movement in Italy called La Giovine Italia which translates as Young Italia.<sup>169</sup> Young Italia was led by a charismatic revolutionary Giuseppe Mazzini, whose views on oppression, national liberation and unification stimulated the rise of youth movements in Bosnia and Croatia.

Dedijer argues that Young Bosnians were primarily nationalists, who did not strive to form a centralised organisation, with a written programme and membership terms. As they were primarily a clandestine youth movement operating under the regime that banned student organisations and literary societies, they feared the Austro-Hungarian reprisals in case they found out any concrete written evidence on illegal cells in Bosnia.<sup>170</sup> The term *Young Bosnia* was mentioned for the first time by Petar Kočić in 1907, a famous Bosnian satirist, who ridiculed the Austro-Hungarian authorities in Bosnia and depicted deplorable socio-economic conditions in rural Bosnia.<sup>171</sup> In discussing its loose framework, some Balkan historians write about its figurative meaning for the contemporary Balkan history, dominated by Yugoslavia over time. They see it as the state of mind of the disenfranchised population under the Habsburg occupation, as the heralds of national awakening, revolution and ultimately, freedom.<sup>172</sup> This paper distances from the allegory that Young Bosnia has produced

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<sup>168</sup> Clark, p.38-41

<sup>169</sup> Dedijer, p. 296

<sup>170</sup> Dedijer, p. 301

<sup>171</sup> P Kocic, '*Jazavac pred sudom*', Zavod za udzbenike i nastavna sredstva, Podgorica, 1999, p.20-40

<sup>172</sup> See: Lj Jurkovic, '*Nacionalni problem u Habsburskoj Monarhiji i nasa jugoslovenska nacionalna omladina*', Pregled, 1964, p. 45-62; J Skerlic, '*Neoslavizam i jugoslovenstvo*', Zora, 1919, p.8

hitherto, and it conversely observes Young Bosnia as an entity with political goals that was embodied into a socio-political movement.

Young Bosnian calculus for an insurgency is evident in the works of Vladimir Gacinovic, a Young Bosnian from the older generation, who designated that Young Bosnia should be an umbrella movement under which the student organisations could develop. According to the writings of Dedijer, MacKenzie and Ujevic, Young Bosnia had maintained such an arrangement until the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914.<sup>173</sup> Gacinovic was indisputably the ideological father of the movement, since he was among the first students to write about the means, motives and opportunities of Young Bosnia. From 1907 to 1910, Bosnian youth had to leave the homeland in pursuit of education abroad. Most students departed Bosnia for Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana, Vienna, Zurich, Lausanne and Paris. Bosnian Serbs who aspired to study abroad were financially supported by *Prosvjeta*, a cultural institution that fundraised in Serbia.<sup>174</sup>

Bosnian youth had to 'fight on two fronts': firstly, they were not allowed to form and register student groups under the Austro-Hungarian regime, particularly after the annexation, secondly, Bosnia was underdeveloped, still a feudal society, where the conservative norms prevailed.<sup>175</sup> In this sense, when reading about the changes that occurred across Europe, they were led by a revolutionary vigour that their illiterate parents could not comprehend. As a result, they opted to leave their homes in the countryside in order to get the best possible education, knowing that networking with many like-minded peers would be forthcoming.<sup>176</sup>

## The Analysis of Motives

Motives are the most important variable when discussing the calculus of an insurgency. As Brooker argues, motives may be a sufficient incentive to spark an organised rebellion, regardless of means and opportunities.<sup>177</sup> This sub-chapter will apply a net assessment of Young Bosnian motivation to start an insurgency. It will be limited to the period from the annexation in 1908 to the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in 1914.

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<sup>173</sup> Dedijer, p.296-315; Mackenzie, p. 66-76; T Ujevic, '*Vladimir Gacinovic*', Jugoslavenska njiva, 1921, p.3-5

<sup>174</sup> Clark, p.34

<sup>175</sup> Dedijer, p. 259

<sup>176</sup> Dedijer, p. 261

<sup>177</sup> Brooker, p. 125-127

The net assessment of motivation is a calculus of Positive Motives minus Inhibiting Motives.<sup>178</sup> To reiterate, positive motives represent a sum of Collective or Organisational motives and Individuals' motives or Selective Incentives. The aim of the net assessment is to determine whether positive motives outweigh inhibiting motives, or vice versa. In other words, this assessment demonstrates whether motives to fight an insurgency are strong enough to eliminate 'fear of failure'.<sup>179</sup> Moreover, Brooker emphasises that the overall insurgency calculus depends on assessment of means and opportunities, respectively. However, he underscores that if motivation net assessment is in favour of strong positive motives, means and opportunities may not be impact the overall calculus.<sup>180</sup>

The groups aiming to fight an expeller or revolutionary insurgency put emphasis on collective motives, namely political goals or grievances. In case of Young Bosnia, the political goals are evident: the cessation of the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and other lands where South Slavs live, the reprisals against the administration that harassed the population and liberty and national awakening of the South Slavs.<sup>181</sup> Vladimir Gacinovic, in response to the sluggish Bosnian politicians who did not object to the Austro-Hungarian annexation, writes:

*'Back there [in Bosnia] living is based on slavery, the entire society is a slave...We, the youth of Bosnia, must start creating a new history...We must wage a war against pessimism, languor, dispiritedness, we, the heralds of new generations and new people...'*<sup>182</sup>

Gavrilo Princip, discussing the differences between the older generation of politicians and Young Bosnians wrote:

*'Our older generation was conservative for the most part, but the people, as a whole, yearned for national liberation...The older generation had different views on how liberation should be won...They wanted to win freedom from Austria legally, whereas we did not believe in that kind of freedom.'*<sup>183</sup>

These excerpts illustrate that Young Bosnians did not only identify the Austro-Hungarian colonialism as the main problem, but also the narrow-minded people who feared to take action. That was not merely a demonstration of discontent toward the Monarchy, but a reflection of generational gaps that shaped a reality of Bosnia at the turn of the century.<sup>184</sup>

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<sup>178</sup> Brooker, p.127-128

<sup>179</sup> Brooker, p.130-136

<sup>180</sup> Brooker, p.137-139

<sup>181</sup> Clark, p.20-28

<sup>182</sup> V Gacinovic, *'Smrt jednog heroja'*, Narodna bibiloteka Srbije, 2014, p.4-5; translated from Serbo-Croatian to English by author

<sup>183</sup> Zora, 1912 in P Palavestra, *'Kriticka svest Mlade Bosne'*, Zivot, 1964, p. 103; translated from Serbo-Croatian to English by author

<sup>184</sup> Dedijer, p. 460

Young Bosnia was comprised of individuals who aspired to be poets and novelists. They looked up to the influential European writers at that time, who were also revolutionaries, namely Mazzini, Bakunin and Trotsky. Dedijer even argues that some contemporaries of Young Bosnia perceived it as a cultural reformist association, rather than a revolutionary group. This explains the choice of words in the abstracts, given the poetic style of writing. In light of that, it is important to identify unofficial motives that relate to the self-interest of a particular social class or specific interests of an ethnic/sectarian, tribal or any other group.<sup>185</sup>

In engaging with the secondary sources on Young Bosnia, this paper deduces that Young Bosnia envisaged a multi-cultural society, where differences among disparate ethnic and religious groups would disappear. Young Bosnia gathered youth from different religious and ethnic backgrounds, with Serbs, Croats and Muslims working together.<sup>186</sup> They vehemently opposed the Austro-Hungarian strategy to stir up ethnic tensions in Bosnia, perceiving it as a successful tool of ruling the multi-cultural society in Bosnia. Looking at the articles by Gacinovic and Zerajic, it is absolutely clear that Young Bosnians were motivated to find common grounds with the Slovenian, Croatian and Serbian youth who attended universities in the Empire.<sup>187</sup> On that note, Young Bosnians committed to collaborating with other student-revolutionary organisations in Croatia and Slovenia on the grounds of revolution, atheism and republicanism envisioning social justice, cultural awakening, multi-culturalism and anti-clericalism in a federal Yugoslav state. Gacinovic's visions are illustrated in the following abstract:

*'Deep social changes entail spiritual awakening. Our society...has been convulsed in all its parts... Solidarity and mutual help is gone and our society has become more complex, comprised of individuals who do not care about anything but themselves...'*<sup>188</sup>

In this abstract, Gacinovic summarized trends in the pre-World War I Bosnia of the population that had not been fighting for any cause. However, after having been acquainted with the European revolutionary literature he adds that, *'...in silence of the sickening nights, I was toppled old regimes, upset old Gods and...went about to revive new empires and resurrect old dreams...it's high time we spread the word in the Serbian land, that have been miserable and desperate up to now. And if there is strength, deep convictions and great faith...I have faith in great awakening of the nation'*.<sup>189</sup>

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<sup>185</sup> Brookers, p. 131

<sup>186</sup> See Palavestra, p.118-132; Dedijer, p.258-267; P Slijepcevic, *'Omladina i sarajevski atentat'*, Nova Evropa, 1925, p. 10

<sup>187</sup> ibidem

<sup>188</sup> Gacinovic, p.7; Translated from Serbo-Croatian to English by author

<sup>189</sup> Gacinovic, p.8; Translated from Serbo-Croatian to English by author



Young Bosnians were predominantly adolescents from rural Bosnia, whose families could barely afford to fund their education. That is why Young Bosnia was a voice of underprivileged, relatively poor young people, who blamed Austro-Hungarians and Ottomans for the years of occupation and economic exploitation that impoverished the peasants.<sup>190</sup> The collective motive of a deprived social class is ubiquitous in the primary and secondary sources on Young Bosnia. For instance, as Gacinovic was travelling extensively, he was got acquainted with Leo Trotsky, who introduced him to Marxism and hence, impacted the views of Young Bosnia on economic exploitation of imperial and colonial powers in Europe. This is particularly evident in the correspondence between Gacinovic and Trotsky, where Gacinovic summarised the traits of an ideal revolutionary:

*'A Serbian revolutionary, wanting to win, must be an artist and conspirator, must be talented for fighting and dying, be a martyr and a conspirator, a man of Western manners and a brigand, who will roar and lead a fight for the underprivileged and ill-treated'*<sup>191</sup>

To sum up, Young Bosnia was a revolutionary movement led by student organisations in Bosnia that was motivated to liberate Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Austro-Hungarian reign. Its collective motives reflected a balance of political goals and more specific interests of youth movement they stood for. Their scope was not merely limited to Bosnia, given that student mobility enabled them to exchange know-hows with other student organisations throughout Austria-Hungary.<sup>192</sup> Except for nationalism, they were inspired by anarchism, socialism, Marxism and republicanism. That shows that Young Bosnians were not only interested in a revolution to topple the Austro-Hungarians in Bosnia, but perceived themselves as a credible political factor that can provide an alternative to the decadent Balkan polities.<sup>193</sup> As an association of student organisations coming from the rural and underdeveloped areas of Bosnia, they were sympathetic to the peasant cause and resented the Austro-Hungarian authorities for upholding feudalism. They deplored the crackdown on the student organisations in Bosnia and the marginalisation of students who openly criticised the authorities. Inspired by Italian, Russian and German revolutionary literature, they were motivated to start a comprehensive revolution, expelling the Austro-Hungarians, but simultaneously fighting cultural 'literate' revolution that would engender more just, educated, open-minded and prosperous society.<sup>194</sup>

<sup>190</sup> V Dedijer, *'Sarajevo; Portrait de l'assassin'*, Preuves, Paris, 1964, p.44

<sup>191</sup> Gacinovic's article in *Kievyan Thought*, published in November 1916, quoted in Dedijer, p.289

<sup>192</sup> L Albertini, *The Origins of War of 1914*, Oxford, 1953, p.78

<sup>193</sup> Albertini, p.81

<sup>194</sup> Albertini, p.82; Palavestra, p.122; Dedijer, p.167

According to the evidence on Young Bosnia up until 1914, selective incentives shaped a net assessment of motivation to some extent. The research findings did not demonstrate that material incentives like *'greed for material pay-offs'* encouraged Young Bosnia to take action.<sup>195</sup> Moreover, in analysing its evolution from a student association to a group with means for insurgency, Young Bosnia showed no interest in material benefits. Primarily due to the collective motives they stood for, Young Bosnians felt bitter about the senior Bosnian politicians who were easily bribed by the authorities to defend the Austro-Hungarian mandate.<sup>196</sup> Therefore, this paper argues that Young Bosnia, in its first calculus upon inception, was not motivated to base its activism on money, property or other goods. Consequently, Young Bosnians cannot be considered as criminals or bandits, because they did not live 'off', but 'for' insurgency. Hence, Young Bosnians were motivated by moral incentives, rather than material incentives.<sup>197</sup>

Brooker writes about religious or secular immortality as an individual motive or a selective incentive. He argues that religious or/and secular immortality shapes the net assessment of motivation, provided that a group stands for religious or secular dogmas, which glorify sacrifice.<sup>198</sup> According to the accounts of Princip and Gaciovic, Young Bosnians sought secular immortality more willingly than religious glory. Principally, Young Bosnians were atheists and anti-clericals, who perceived religious dogmas of the conservative Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires as an obstacle to progress. Most of it was a reaction to the clerical politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the Austro-Hungarians, but also a follow up on the literature on socialism and republicanism that envisaged secularism as the only viable opportunity to limit ecclesiastical interference in the policies of a state and vice versa.<sup>199</sup> In the following abstract from the trial in aftermath of the Sarajevo shootings, one of the conspirators Grabez converses with the court president:

*'President- Are you faithful, or are you an atheist?*

*Accused- I have faith.*

*President- Your father is a priest. How was your upbringing?*

*Accused- I was brought up in spirit of the Holy Testament.*

*President- How did his inputs shape you?*

*Accused- As a child I obeyed his word, but I was affected by other things when I got acquainted with youth.*

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<sup>195</sup> V Lebedev, *'Vlada Gaciovic i ruski revolucionari'*, Pregled, 1934, p.56-72

<sup>196</sup> Lebedev, p.45

<sup>197</sup> Lebedev, p.66

<sup>198</sup> Brookers, p.135

<sup>199</sup> Dedijer, p.345

*President- Do youth have faith?*

*Accused- Yes, plenty of nationalist faith.'*<sup>200</sup>

The research has shown that the selective incentive of secular immortality is prevalent in the Young Bosnians' testimonies. Having in mind the political platform they used to spread the vision of revolution, they were successful in defending the secular Bosnia as the only guarantee for a tolerant multi-cultural society. What is more, this report finds the perception of religion and immortality as a key evidence to the net assessment of their motivation. Sacrifice is a crucial motive for this analysis. Young Bosnians were led by the premise that insurgency must entail sacrifice, if it is to ensure success.<sup>201</sup> The secondary sources that analysed Young Bosnia emphasise the historical precedents of sacrifice that Young Bosnians revered. Dedijer concurs that the Battle of Kosovo of 1389, where the outnumbered Serbian forces confronted the Ottomans to protect Christendom and the medieval Serbian state, reverberated in the Young Bosnian circles. According to the myth, which was retold from a generation to a generation under the Ottoman yoke, Serbian medieval princes marched with their armies, prepared to give away their lives for the religious immortality and the *Heavenly Empire*.<sup>202</sup>

Young Bosnians deemed that they have a mandate to vindicate the sacrifice that they ancestors made. For them, the circumstances had not changed: the population was still subjected to a foreign dominion without any rights to self-determination. They did not differ the Ottomans from the Austro-Hungarians, because neither of the Empires had not acknowledged the legitimate interests of the impoverished peasants. In light of that was the prolonged occupation of Bosnia that resulted in the annexation in 1908.<sup>203</sup>

This report argues that due to the affinity to the revolutionary literature, Young Bosnians had an incentive to start an insurgency and be encapsulated in the revolutionary writings. For them, immortality could be achieved only if they were given enough credit for the revolutionary endeavours.<sup>204</sup> This goes hand in hand with the means of insurgency, in line with Brooker's arguments that insurgency calculus is not comprehensive in absence of the net assessment of

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<sup>200</sup> V Bogicevic, '*Sarajevski atentat. Stenogram glavne rasprave protiv Gavrila Principa i drugova*', Sarajevo, 1954, p.1-32; Obtained in the Yugoslav Archives in Belgrade on September 15, 2014

<sup>201</sup> Dedijer, p.412-413

<sup>202</sup> Dedijer, p. 434

<sup>203</sup> W Vuchinich, '*Serbia between East and West: The Events of 1903-1906*', Stanford, 1954, p.63-68

<sup>204</sup> Vuchinich, p.77

motivation, means and opportunities. In other words, all three complement one another and cannot shape the calculus on its own.<sup>205</sup>

With respect to secular immortality, the report emphasises the case of Bogdan Zerajic. Zerajic planned to assassinate Emperor Franz Joseph upon his arrival in Mostar in 1910, but subsequently aborted his mission. That did not dissuade him from planning to assassinate Governor of Bosnia Marian Varesanin the same year. His attempt to assassinate the Governor in the Parliament in Sarajevo was unsuccessful, which prompted him to commit suicide.<sup>206</sup> It is deemed that his act was the first testing of the Young Bosnian calculus, and albeit ineffective, Zerajic set an example for the rest of the Bosnian youth that comprised Young Bosnia. Zerajic's attempted assassination profiled the initial calculus of Young Bosnia analysed in first part of this chapter. Most importantly, it altered the face of Young Bosnia, from the movement that consisted of small student organisations to the clandestine entity with a calculus to start an insurgency. Even though his attempt on Governor's life did not yield results, it set an example for the rest of the Bosnian youth to develop an organisation and strengthen its calculus. This is an important case of how Zerajic's suicide warranted immortality, first among the members of Young Bosnia and later among other revolutionaries in Slovenia and Croatia.<sup>207</sup>

Throughout the existence of Young Bosnia, a cult of personality was created to glorify the lives of the fallen. The analysis of the primary sources, primarily the poems that were written by the members of Young Bosnia, demonstrates that Zerajic's secular immortality was generally upheld.<sup>208</sup> It is evident from the text that his premature death saddened his comrades, but similarly inspired them to commit to continuing his work.<sup>209</sup> His tomb became a meeting spot for the students, who praised his work, commended him and swore to follow his path. One of them was Gavrilo Princip, who often visited his grave site and took an oath to avenge his death. In the morning of June 28, 1914, Princip paid the last visit to the Zerajic's grave and went on to kill Franz Ferdinand and his wife.<sup>210</sup>

The evidence is stark, particularly summarised in the words of Gavrilo Princip, who remarked: '*Our [Young Bosnian] shadows will be walking through Vienna, strolling down the court, frightening lords*'<sup>211</sup> This quote illustrates their vision of immortality, or 'setting an example' for the future generations of revolutionaries, who will be inspired by the Young Bosnian case. Zerajic's allegedly

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<sup>205</sup> Brookers, p.137

<sup>206</sup> Dedijer, p.399-409

<sup>207</sup> ibidem

<sup>208</sup> V Bogicevic, '*Mlada Bosna, pisma i prilozci*, Svjetlost, Sarajevo, 1954, p.15

<sup>209</sup> Bogicevic, p.18

<sup>210</sup> Bogicevic, p.22

<sup>211</sup> Gacinovic, p.6

last words, '*my revenge I bequeath upon Serbdom*'<sup>212</sup>, mobilised Young Bosnians to create Zeraĳic's cult of sacrifice that is elaborated in Gacinovic's piece *Death of a Hero*.

In his article, Gacinovic compares Zeraĳic to Felice Orsini, an Italian revolutionary who attempted to assassinate Napoleon III. Zeraĳic's martyrdom is not an example for the South Slavs, writes Gacinovic, but for all occupied and enslaved.<sup>213</sup> In the course of the trial for the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, Gacinovic was quoted to Princip because the prosecutor acknowledged that *Death of a Hero* inspired Princip and his comrades. Princip loudly exclaimed: '*Long live, Zeraĳic!*'<sup>214</sup>

Succinctly put, the prospect of secular immortality provided substantial incentive for Young Bosnians, more than material incentives. The research findings do not indicate that Young Bosnians were motivated by material incentives, but by collective motives that encompassed broad political goals and unofficial motives that pertain to the social group, in this case, to the students. The Young Bosnian individuals' selective incentives mainly related to secular immortality, as it is embodied in the above-mentioned findings.<sup>215</sup>

The third aspect to the net assessment makes up inhibiting motives that contrast positive motives or a sum of collective motives and individuals' selective incentives. It is essential to explain all relevant inhibiting motives, namely moral inhibitions and 'fear of failure', because net assessment determines to what extent positive motives or inhibiting motives dominate the calculus.<sup>216</sup>

In *Modern Stateless Warfare*, Brooker elaborates that moral inhibitions relate to the illegality of action.<sup>217</sup> This is particularly important when we have in mind the clandestine character of the Young Bosnian movement. As it was elaborated in the *History/Context* chapter, Austro-Hungarian Empire began the crackdown on student organisations fearing a widespread popular dissent in aftermath of the annexation in 1908. By 1910 the Austro-Hungarian authorities in Bosnia had prepared a draft of the constitution that formally incorporated Bosnia and Herzegovina into the legal system of the Empire.<sup>218</sup> According to MacKenzie, the proclamation of a new constitution for Bosnia was a turning point for Young Bosnians, who regarded it as a threat to their existence.<sup>219</sup> However, the research findings draw attention to the prevalence of 'fear of failure' more than 'fear of illegality'. This is

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<sup>212</sup> Gacinovic, p.9

<sup>213</sup> Gacinovic, p.3

<sup>214</sup> Gacinovic, p.12

<sup>215</sup> See: Gacinovic, p.1-17; Bogicevic, p.3-23

<sup>216</sup> Brookers, p.136

<sup>217</sup> Brookers, p.128

<sup>218</sup> Mackenzie, p.27

<sup>219</sup> Mackenzie, p.31-34

mainly attributed to the fact that Young Bosnians rejected the Austro-Hungarian legitimacy to occupy and annex Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Such fear transpired in the writings of the most active members of Young Bosnia: Vladimir Gacinovic and Danilo Ilic. Both Gacinovic and Ilic doubted the inevitability to accept the individual terror as the only mean to meet the requirements for a revolution. The research has shown that some disagreement amongst the members resulted from different philosophical and ideological standpoints.<sup>220</sup> For instance, Gacinovic led a more liberal current in Young Bosnia, given that he was more exposed to modern liberal thinking when residing in Switzerland and France. He advocated that targeted assassinations should remain a priority for Young Bosnia, as he perceived them to be the most effective method of instigating a popular revolt.<sup>221</sup> On the other hand, he acknowledged that targeted assassinations must be supplemented by comprehensive means, or to be precise- propaganda and provocation. On the contrary, Gavrilo Princip championed a more hawkish approach to confronting Habsburgs. Like many others in the movement, he strongly opposed negotiations with the Bosnian political elites and Austro-Hungarians. He did not only conspire to assassinate Archduke Ferdinand, but any Austro-Hungarian in admonition to the occupation under which they lived in Bosnia. Apart from Franz Ferdinand, Young Bosnians targeted Emperor Franz Joseph, his ministers Bilinsky and Berthold as well as Governor of Bosnia Oskar Potiorek.<sup>222</sup> Both of them, however, showed no restraint in terms of illegality of action in the initial calculus of Young Bosnia.

This paper contends the notion that moral inhibitions of Young Bosnia, primarily with respect to illegality of action, constrained Young Bosnians in pursuit of their revolutionary goals. In spite of the increased pressure on the student organisations in Bosnia from 1910, Young Bosnia augmented its clandestine activism. The evidence of the Young Bosnian activism is reflected in a number of attempted assassinations Young Bosnia partook thereof.<sup>223</sup>

In regards to 'fear of failure', Young Bosnia exhibited tactical inhibiting motives that affected the initial insurgency calculus. Tactical inhibiting motives primarily relate to the fear of casualties. The recruitment patterns show that Young Bosnia, notwithstanding its reputation in Bosnia, was a relatively small organisation that could not be compared to the *Unification or Death, Serbian National Defence* in Serbia, or even to a like-minded association of students in Slovenia- *Preporod*.<sup>224</sup> Although it has been previously argued in this report that Young Bosnians believed in an ultimate

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<sup>220</sup> L Trotsky, *'Ispovest Vladimira Gacinovica-Sarajevski atentat'*, Svetlost, Beograd, 1922, p.66

<sup>221</sup> Trotsky, p.69

<sup>222</sup> J Cvijic, *The Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serb Problem*, London, 1909, p.17

<sup>223</sup> Cvijic, p.22

<sup>224</sup> Dedijer, p.457-460

sacrifice for the goals of the movement, early tactical errors would not have contributed to meeting such goals. Fearing the Austro-Hungarian reprisals, Young Bosnians were not in a position to overtly oppose the Austro-Hungarian authorities in Bosnia.<sup>225</sup> Particularly elucidating is the case of Muhamed Mehmedbasic, a Bosnian Muslim who conspired against Governor Potiorek. Hence, Vladimir Gacninovic authorised Memedbasic to travel to Bosnia and liquidate Potiorek. However, on his way to Bosnia, he noticed that police were searching for something, which forced him to abort the conspiracy.

*“Upon arrival in Dubrovnik, I noticed that Austrian gendarmes were extensively looking for someone. Fearing that I had been uncovered, I tossed a dagger and a container with poison”<sup>226</sup>*

Further Medhedbasic’s accounts are also telling. According to the reports that were collected after the war, Mehmedbasic found a gun and headed off to Sarajevo to complete the mission.<sup>227</sup> When he arrived in Sarajevo, he met up with Danilo Ilic, a prominent Young Bosnian, who persuaded Mehmedbasic to call off the assassination on Potiorek. Instead, they were told that Franz Ferdinand had scheduled his visit to Sarajevo, so the assassination on Potiorek alone would not have been opportune.<sup>228</sup> This is of particular importance for the further analysis of the inhibiting motives, because of the opportunity costs that Young Bosnians were willing to take. Instead of focusing on Potiorek, Medmedbasic and Ilic opted to change the course of action. With that, the opportunity cost is evident, as they designated Franz Ferdinand to be of greater importance at the expense of assassinating the Governor of Bosnia. In this instance the inhibiting motives prevailed over the positive motives.

The evidence shows that upon finding about the assassination of Ferdinand, Gacinovic was fearful of the reprisals that would ensue. He expressed his views to Bastajic: *‘...we can experience a great tragedy with this event: Serbia is not ready for war and Austria will probably trigger it and we shall be found guilty, we, Young Bosnians, the revolutionary youth...’*<sup>229</sup> With this in mind, it is clear that some Young Bosnians were sceptical of the Young Bosnian calculus, mainly when it comes to the assassination of Ferdinand. This evidence points out to the case of opportunity cost: Ferdinand was assassinated, but what ensued was a sheer repercussion of the assassination, which was not planned by Princip and his comrades. According to his testimony during the trials, he never expected the

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<sup>225</sup> Didijer, p.461

<sup>226</sup> Dedijer, p.462

<sup>227</sup> Dedijer, p.463

<sup>228</sup> Dedijer, p.465

<sup>229</sup> Bogicevic, *‘...pisma i prilozi’*, p.33; Translated from Serbo-Croatian to English by author

trials to happen, because he planned to commit suicide after he had killed Ferdinand. He also admitted that victims were necessary for the cause they were fighting for.<sup>230</sup>

As for strategic inhibiting motives with which Brooker exemplifies ‘wasted sacrifice’<sup>231</sup>, the research has shown that Young Bosnia had not displayed any strategic inhibitions. In this instance, collective motives and secular immortality, in particular, are more inherent in the Young Bosnian calculus. The numerous pieces on Young Bosnian ‘sacrificing for the sake of liberty’ are indicative of the overarching theme in the calculus- providing incentives for others to join or setting an example, in order to win freedom. In their eyes, Young Bosnia was a continuation of a struggle that began with the martyrs of Kosovo, continued with the Serbian Revolt of 1804 with Karadjordje and resulted in the independence of Serbia and Montenegro in 1878.<sup>232</sup> Therefore, this paper concludes that positive motives that incorporate collective motives and selective incentives prevail over inhibiting motives, and therefore dominate the net assessment. On that note, this paper identifies that a strong historical awareness about the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian colonialism and imperialism in the Balkans in a specific Bosnian setting with a revolutionary fervour coming from Europe endowed Young Bosnians with substantial incentives to shape its revolutionary calculus.<sup>233</sup>

## The Analysis of Means

No insurgency can be sparked without the appropriate rational analysis of available means. The Brooker’s theoretical framework in *Modern Stateless Warfare* breaks down means into the method and capability of insurgency.<sup>234</sup> This part of the analytical chapter will revisit the methods that Young Bosnia opted for and explain the reasons behind the choice, namely the mode of operation, the operational format and the strategy used. Additionally, parallels will be drawn from the net assessment of motivation, given that capability is contingent on the motives of the movement. To be concise, this part is central to the analysis, because it builds up on motivation assessment by explaining the capability of Young Bosnia and sheds light on why Young Bosnia pivoted towards Serbia.

This report argues that Young Bosnia had limited means for insurgency prior to the Zerjaic’s attack on Varesanin in 1910. Vladimir Gacinovic, who was regarded as the initial leader and the ideological

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<sup>230</sup> Bogicevic, ‘...stenogram...’, p. 7

<sup>231</sup> Brookers, p.130

<sup>232</sup> Clark, p.34; Mackenzie, p.76

<sup>233</sup> Mackenzie, p.91

<sup>234</sup> Brookers, p. 142-151



father of the movement, aimed to replicate the revolutionary cells from the 19<sup>th</sup> century Russia.<sup>235</sup> To reiterate, he was principally inspired by *The People's Will* or *The People's Freedom*, which operated in the Russian Empire in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. He praised their left-wing programme that urged the absolutist regime in Russia enact social and economic reforms, introduce universal suffrage, ensure freedom of speech, assembly and refrain from jailing journalists.<sup>236</sup> This coincides with the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and also with a popular revolt that swept across the formerly western-most Ottoman territory. Gacinovic notes that the absolutist regimes in Russia share the same values with the Austria-Hungary, thus Bosnia was in dire need of the like-minded movement.<sup>237</sup> This is important to keep in mind, because the organisation of Young Bosnia as a movement would remain intact until its demise in 1914. Likewise, the principal organisation required the scrutiny of the available means. Due to the crackdown on student organisations in Austro-Hungarian Empire and tense relations between Serbian and Austro-Hungarian governments, Gacinovic recognised that the movement must be clandestine. Thus, he went on to form small student organisations called *kruzhok* similar to the hierarchy of *The People's Will*. According to Slijepcevic's findings, he established five *kruzhoks* in Sarajevo, two in Vienna and a one in Zagreb and Pakratz. All of these outputs presented channels through which the revolutionary youth could network and operate.<sup>238</sup>

One of the striking similarities the two movements was the resort to the terrorist mode. Vladimir Gacinovic wrote extensively about the authoritarian rule of Tsar Alexander II of Russia. In his writings, Gacinovic criticises absolutism and imperialism in foreign politics and suggests that there are no viable solutions but to commit to targeted assassinations of the Austro-Hungarian leaders.<sup>239</sup> However, as it has been restated throughout this report, Gacinovic failed to acknowledge that the assassination of Tsar Alexander II resulted in a more aggressive, even reactionary politics of his successor Alexander III. In this sense, having failed to use appropriate means and apt opportunities, *The People's Will* perished under the iron-fist rule of Alexander III. There is evidence that Gacinovic was in contact with some Russian dissidents at that time, including Leo Trotsky and Mark Natanson. Natanson and Bukunin shared interest in the South-Slavic national awakening, supporting the emancipation of peasantry through revolution. For instance, Trotsky dedicated a prologue to *The Kievan Thought* to Gacinovic, which was published in 1914. In this prologue, Trotsky describes him as

<sup>235</sup> P Palavestra, '*Knjizevnost Mlade Bosne*', Svjetlost, Sarajevo, p.650-652

<sup>236</sup> Palavestra, p. 655

<sup>237</sup> Palavestra, p. 671; Dedijer, p.292

<sup>238</sup> Dedijer, p.294

<sup>239</sup> Gacinovic's article in *Zora*, published in January 1911, obtained in The Archives of Yugoslavia in Belgrade on September 15, 2014

a tall, strong, but also a pensive young man, who could be easily recognized in the crowd.<sup>240</sup> He also adds that Gacinovic was a curious man, who desired to embrace new perspectives, then again able to defend his revolutionary views. Trotsky writes that though Gacinovic was only 23 years of age, he had his own goal and notes that he is a good friend of Gavrilo Princip.<sup>241</sup>

The support base for Young Bosnia was almost exclusively students, who attended high schools in Bosnia and Serbia, and then went on to study in Vienna, Zagreb, Belgrade, Lausanne and Paris.<sup>242</sup> Thus, the prospects for insurgency were very slim, having in mind the membership, which amounted up to a hundred students.

It is argued in the Young Bosnian sources that it was unfeasible to spark a rebellion in Bosnia in a guerrilla mode. First of all, Young Bosnians did not target military strongholds in Bosnia, which according to Schmid is a primary indicator of a guerrilla-led warfare. Second to that, Young Bosnia did not adhere to the Maoist-model which entailed strengthening its own military capability, eventually building up an armed forces and creating liberated sectors that would rival the sitting government or in other words, resorting to semi-state warfare. Thirdly, Young Bosnia focused on deliberate assassinations on civilian and military leaders in an urban zone, which in most cases is not apt for guerrilla mode of insurgency. For all afore-mentioned aspects of stateless warfare, Young Bosnia employed terrorist mode, rather than guerrilla, because of a deliberate intention to attack political and administrative leaders in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.<sup>243</sup>

In order to understand the Young Bosnian rationale, one must revisit the motivation assessment. To reiterate, this report argues that Young Bosnia was mainly inspired by the historical practises of regicide. The assassination of Sultan Murat in the Battle of Kosovo by the Serbian soldier Milos Obilic had won the hearts and minds of the Bosnian youth who despised the Austro-Hungarian imperialism. It is also important to take into account a more recent example to Young Bosnians, and that is Giuseppe Mazzini, who called upon the Italians living in the Austro-Hungarian Empire to take up arms and resort to the assassinations of the political leaders.<sup>244</sup>

Young Bosnians aimed to seek legitimacy from the renowned romanticists who glorified freedom and deplored the absolutism of the Old Royal Houses in Europe. They were inspired by the heroic acts of Lord Byron who was fighting alongside the Greek revolutionaries in a struggle against the

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<sup>240</sup> Trotsky's article in the *Kievyan Thought* published in November 1914, obtained in The Archives of Yugoslavia in Belgrade on September 15, 2014

<sup>241</sup> ibidem

<sup>242</sup> Dedijer, p. 301

<sup>243</sup> Bogicevic, '...stenogrami...', p.34

<sup>244</sup> Dedijer, p.170

Ottomans.<sup>245</sup> They particularly identified with Schiller's William Tell, who assassinated Gessler, an Austro-Hungarian representative in Switzerland.<sup>246</sup> To Young Bosnians, particularly Gacinovic and Princip, the legitimacy was derived from natural law and embedded a moral duty for an assassin. This goes in line with Brooker's theoretical framework to which this report adheres to, which explicates that motives, means and opportunities complement one another. This is to say, Brooker's calculus for insurgency theoretical framework is applicable to Young Bosnia, as it methodically explains how the means of the movement depend on the net assessment of motivation and other way around.<sup>247</sup>

The sporadic attacks on senior political and administrative leaders in Bosnia were viewed as deliberate, terrorist and barbaric acts that intended to derail Bosnian progress under the auspices of the Dual Monarchy. According to the authorities in Sarajevo, Zerajic was encouraged and instructed by the Serbian irredentist networks that operated clandestinely across Bosnia, in order to destabilise the Empire and instigate popular insurgency.<sup>248</sup> To reaffirm, Zerajic's act was a turning point for many Young Bosnians, who were determined to complete Zerajic's mission. This is to say that from late 1910, Young Bosnia putatively embraced terrorist mode as the most efficacious method to hurt the Austro-Hungarians.

Since Austro-Hungarians began to eradicate revolutionary cells across the Empire, quelling the popular protests in Zagreb and Dubrovnik in 1910/1911, many revolutionary kruzahoks were disbanded, while their leaders were jailed. That resulted in a more aggressive Young Bosnian outreach, given the plans to murder Cuvaj, the Governor of Croatia.<sup>249</sup> Young Bosnian activist Janko Jukic shot and badly wounded the governor in Zagreb. Another assassination attempt proved that Young Bosnia opted *for hit and run* tactics in a gangster-like operational format. Pursuant to Laquer's study of the stateless warfare, gangster-like operational formats are susceptible to the groups that employ terrorist mode, which operate in urban zones. Unlike bandit-like operational format, groups that organise into gangster-like formats tend to live separately, avoiding to form a community that would be easy to track down.<sup>250</sup> For that reason, Young Bosnians often moved from a place to a place around the region. Being students enabled them to travel easily around the region. The role of kruzahoks was two-fold: it was easier for Young Bosnians to capitalise on the students' resentment in

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<sup>245</sup> Dedijer, p.181

<sup>246</sup> Dedijer, p.182-184

<sup>247</sup> Brookers, p.280-284

<sup>248</sup> Austrian reaction to Zerajic's assassination attempt, official document, Sarajevo 1911; Obtained from the Archives of Yugoslavia in Belgrade on September 15, 2014

<sup>249</sup> V Bogicevic, '*Atentat Bogdana Zerajica 1910. godine*', Godisnjak Istorijskog Drustva Bosne i Hercegovine, 1954, p.66

<sup>250</sup> Laquer, p.131

different centres of the Empire compared to a single unit in Bosnia, and with that to recruit more followers, but also it provided enough leeway for them to deceive the authorities.<sup>251</sup> In case of periodical clampdowns, they would disperse around the region, escaping to the independent states of Montenegro and Serbia, where Austro-Hungarian authorities had no jurisdiction. Henceforth, it is essential to note that the lack of appropriate means in the Austria-Hungary, chiefly due to the robust counter-insurgency efforts, forced Young Bosnians and their affiliates to seek a shelter abroad.<sup>252</sup> The second part of the analysis will shed light on this issue in aspiration to examine to what extent Young Bosnia was changed in aftermath of the “exile” in Serbia and Montenegro.

The case of Muhamed Mehmedbasic proves this point, as he successfully escaped to the Kingdom of Montenegro, immediately after Princip had shot Franz Ferdinand. He wrote a letter to the Montenegrin authorities noting:

*‘...I have crossed the Montenegrin border today for the following reasons: as it is known what occurred in Sarajevo, I was part of the six-member group with a task to assassinate Ferdinand. I successfully escaped from Sarajevo and after six days of travelling, I crossed into Montenegro and saved my life...I could not do anything differently, as the Austrian police were looking for me. I implore the Royal Authorities in Montenegro to authorise my stay in the Montenegrin interior, as I have contacts in the Ministry of War, namely Filip Mihojevic...’<sup>253</sup>*

The operational format of Young Bosnia was emblematic of an organisation that operated in the urban zones of the Empire, but gained support from the rural areas, where most of the underprivileged peasants lived. This is of no surprise, taking into account that the series of the rebellions in aftermath of the Treaty of Berlin were instigated in the rural hinterlands of Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are Austro-Hungarian records that urge the civilian and military leadership to keep an eye on the rebellious peasants and their lords.<sup>254</sup> For instance, the records on Gavrilo Princip obtained from the Archives of Yugoslavia in Belgrade demonstrate that Princip was smuggled to Bosnia and Herzegovina by a local peasant, who was an operative of the Serbian National Defence.<sup>255</sup> The last part of this chapter will elaborate on the foreign influence in Bosnia, shedding light on the impact of the Serbian irredentist networks on Young Bosnia.

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<sup>251</sup> Dedijer, p.511-520

<sup>252</sup> Dedijer, p.523

<sup>253</sup> Dedijer, p.536; on Mehmedbasic’s exile in Montenegro see: M Popovic, *‘Boravak atentatora Muhameda Mehmedbasica u Crnoj Gori nakon atentata’*, Istorijski zapisi, Cetinje, 1947, p.11-43; Translated from Serbo-Croatian to English by author

<sup>254</sup> Dedijer, p.537

<sup>255</sup> Trial Transcripts obtained in the Archives of Yugoslavia published in M Albert, *‘Un drame historique: L’attentat de Sarajevo. Documents inedits et Texte Integral des Stenogrammes du Proces’*, Paris, Payot, 1930, p. 630-690

With respect to the Young Bosnian strategy, this paper concludes that propaganda was widely used to win the hearts and minds of the population, using the resources that were available to them at that time: newspapers and magazines. To reiterate, out of four strategies that Brooker focuses on as an important mean for insurgency, propaganda and provocation were commonly used by Young Bosnia. Conversely, preparation and pressure strategies are commonly attributed to guerrilla mode of warfare, given its *'focus on upon preparing for a shift to semistate warfare...establishing large rural base areas in which the guerrillas could create a regular army that was capable of defeating the state's forces on the battlefield...'*<sup>256</sup>

Consequently, Young Bosnia was not capable of employing such strategies, due to the clandestine nature of the movement, its scope of action, motivation calculus, limited personnel, which was caused by the relative strength of the Austro-Hungarian forces. Having in mind Young Bosnian historical awareness, they renounced strategies of the Bosnian rebels who were defeated by the Austro-Hungarian forces upon the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1878-1882). Bosnian rebels aimed to hurt the Austro-Hungarian forces by pressuring them politically through military hurt, and by preparing an insurgency to liberate swathes of territory from the occupying forces.

On the contrary, Young Bosnia emphasised propaganda with some provocation at the latter days of the movement. Up until Zerajic's assassination in 1910, propaganda was solely used to raise awareness about the imperativeness to expel Austro-Hungarians from Bosnia.<sup>257</sup> According to Dedijer, it was in the early stages of the movement, when Young Bosnia was a vocal critique of the Austro-Hungarian authorities in Bosnia, but with less ambition to provoke.<sup>258</sup> Following the early writings of Gacinovic, it is conspicuous that revolutionary writing was a priority, with no indications that Zerajic would take up arms. Subsequently, in Zerajic's letter to Gacinovic on January 12, 1910, Zerajic condemns the ambivalence of the Serbian and Russian authorities after the annexation and suggests that he must be strong for the final act, which according to a Gacinovic's interpretation, was an evidence that he was prepared to sacrifice his life for the revolution in Bosnia.<sup>259</sup>

When analysing Young Bosnia, it is equally important to note that all members committed to writing poems and romantic narratives. With that, articles in the prominent student magazines of that time commensurate with such affinity. For instance, Young Bosnians were appointed to write opinion pieces that resonated with the students from other parts of the Empire, mainly Slovenia and Croatia. As they were recognised to be the strongest voice against the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

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<sup>256</sup> Brookers, p. 24; Laquer, p.45-72

<sup>257</sup> Dedijer, p.399-409

<sup>258</sup> Dedijer, p.411

<sup>259</sup> Gacinovic, p.16

they were favoured by the Serbian irredentist magazines, out of which Pijemont was the most prominent.<sup>260</sup>

On the other hand, Young Bosnians collaborated with the Slovenian youth, having established *Preporod* as the main Slovenian student magazine. In an introduction to the inauguration of the magazine, Gacinovic wrote, '*An Ideological laboratory gave birth to Zora and Preporod. The Slovenians are formidable organisers; their suffering toughened their characters...With their sobering and pragmatic approach, they were irreplaceable for us idealists, dreamers...*'<sup>261</sup> As Dedijer argues, *Preporod* was the first organised group that fought for the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in Slovenia.<sup>262</sup>

The strategy of Young Bosnia is illustrated in the November edition of *Zora* in 1911, where Gacinovic dedicated an essay to a deceased Zerajic. In the essay titled *To Those Who Are on the Way*, he criticizes the Bosnian elites as well as the Bosnian youth who had not done much to oppose the Austro-Hungarian reprisals. He broadly puts that youth must take charge and create new history. He concludes his essay with Zerajic's words, '*Youth must be ready for sacrifices. Tell them!*'<sup>263</sup>

To sum up, up until Zerajic's assassination, Young Bosnia mainly employed propaganda strategy in the magazines *Zora*, *Preporod* and *Pijedmont*. In aftermath of the assassination in late 1910, Young Bosnia augmented its propaganda efforts and complimented them with provocation strategy. The Young Bosnian provocation strategy was an effort to deliberately eliminate senior officials of the Empire. Hence, the assassinations on Governor Cuvaj and Archduke Ferdinand followed. The combination of these strategies was selected, due to the successful counter-insurgency effort by the Austro-Hungarian police which precluded Young Bosnians to recruit more followers, train its members for guerrilla warfare, and fundraise in order to start a full-fledged revolution. In addition to that, Young Bosnia was a movement that embodied small Russian-style *kruzhoks* that were dispersed around the urban centres of the Empire instead of the rural bases, from which guerrilla warfare is usually waged. That was due to the fact that Young Bosnians were students at the urban university centres in Zagreb, Ljubljana, Vienna, Lausanne and Freiburg.

This report argues that the propaganda strategy of Young Bosnia was additionally shaped by its net assessment of motivation, given that collective political motives and individual secular immortality dominate. This is particularly evident in their disappointment with the ambivalent position of the

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<sup>260</sup> Dedijer, p.389

<sup>261</sup> Dedijer, p.433; Translated from Serbo-Croatian to Serbian by author

<sup>262</sup> Dedijer, p.435

<sup>263</sup> Gacinovic's article in *Zora* published in January 1911, obtained in the Archives of Yugoslavia on September 16, 2014

Bosnian and Serbian politicians in aftermath of the Annexation Crisis, the Austro-Hungarian crackdown on student organisations, as well as the co-operation with like-minded movements in the Empire and successive assassinations of Zerajic, Jukic and Princip. The assassinations are a result of propaganda and provocation strategies of the Young Bosnian calculus, aiming to hurt the Empire and legitimise the calculus among the South Slavic population and with that, to ensure the secular immortality of its initiators. Having been aware of the scarce means for a successful insurgency after Zerajic's attempt, Young Bosnians would pivot towards Serbia, given the links to the irredentist networks and the Serbian victories in the Balkan Wars in 1912 and 1913. The second part of the analytical chapter will shed light on that pivot and explain whether Young Bosnian calculus was changed in its aftermath.

## 7.2 Opportunity Calculus: Young Bosnia and Serbian Irredentism

The previous sub-chapters analysed Young Bosnia revisiting Brooker's insurgency calculus theoretical framework. Accordingly, a net assessment of motivation and means of Young Bosnia was covered, having conceptualised *collective motives*, *selective incentives*, *inhibiting motives* as well as *mode*, *operational format*, *strategies* and *capabilities* of Young Bosnia. The same approach will be applied to the Young Bosnian opportunities abroad. To revisit the arguments made in the theoretical chapter of this report, the assessment of opportunities is central to any insurgency calculus and is contingent on the assessments of means and motivations. Similarly, this sub-chapter will introduce the external factors and scrutinize their impact on the Young Bosnian calculus for an insurgency in Bosnia under the Habsburg rule. It will begin by analysing the roots of the Young Bosnian pivot to Serbia, in aftermath of the Annexation Crisis of 1908. Then, this sub-chapter will proceed to the analysis of the irredentist opportunities for Young Bosnia in the Kingdom of Serbia, specifically the relationship with *Unification or Death!* and *The Serbian National Defence*. This will be observed in the context of the victories in the Balkan Wars and an increasing polarisation between military and civilian leaderships in Serbia. The latter part of this sub-chapter will focus on the assassinations planning, by examining the postures of the Young Bosnian cells in Serbia and the afore-mentioned irredentist networks. Lastly, this sub-chapter will summarise the findings and provide concluding remarks on the extent of changes to the insurgency calculus of Young Bosnia. Furthermore to that, Salehyan's Transnational Rebels Theory as well as Ethnic Irredentism will be operationalised in the analysis of the Young Bosnian opportunities in Serbia.

## Serbian Irredentism and Young Bosnia after the Annexation Crisis

The Annexation crisis was a turning point for the Serbian irredentist networks. The Serbian National Defence was established during the Annexation crisis in 1908 to respond to the Serbian public opinion that demanded action in defence of the Serbian national interests in Bosnia.<sup>264</sup> Initially, the Serbian National Defence aimed to defend Serbia from the Austro-Hungarian attack, by provoking public unrests in the Empire, where South Slavs lived. Mackenzie and Dedijer write that the organisation's main purpose was to recruit volunteers into units and train them for combat, so that the annexation could be prevented.<sup>265</sup> This is of particular importance for the Young Bosnian case because, prior to the inception of the movement, there had been many Bosnian volunteers who illegally crossed the border to get enlisted into the Serbian National Defence. This is an evidence of the pre-existing channels that irredentist networks had built, knowing that the conflict between Serbia and Austria-Hungary was imminent. However, Serbian government eventually accepted the annexation terms, having faced mounting pressure even from the closest allies-France And Russia, which forced Serbian National Defence to abort preparations for the open conflict with the Austro-Hungarian Empire. As a result, the organisation was reformed and converted into a cultural institution. As an organisation that was tasked to fuel an insurgency in the Empire with a number of armed units, Serbian National Defence retained its clandestine channels that were subsequently used for collecting vital intelligence about the Austro-Hungarian military leadership in Bosnia.<sup>266</sup>

Contrary to Serbian National Defence, *Unification or Death's* inception was a result of a growing disappointment with the indecisive policy-making during and after the Annexation crisis. In Mackenzie's writings on Colonel Apis, he explains that Apis believed that Unification or Death pursued revolutionary goals, unlike National Defence that was downgraded to the cultural outreach organisation.<sup>267</sup>

In order to understand the position of Young Bosnia in the Serbian irredentist circles, this report draws attention to an increasing gap between civilian and military leadership in Serbia. In *Social Origins of Balkan Politics: Nationalism, Underdevelopment and the Nation-State in Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria, 1880-1920*, Roudometof studies three Balkan kingdoms that had won independence from the Ottomans in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and underlines that all of them confronted with discrepancies

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<sup>264</sup> Clark, p.35

<sup>265</sup> Dedijer, p.266; Mackenzie, p.345-356

<sup>266</sup> Clark, p.36

<sup>267</sup> D Mackenzie, '*Apis: The Congenial Conspirator*', Boulder, 1989, p. 26-41



between military and government.<sup>268</sup> In case of Serbia, he acknowledges, '*pursuit of irredentism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was detrimental to modernisation efforts*'.<sup>269</sup> He also argues that both government and military stood for the irredentist claims in the region, but on the other hand, they competed for legitimacy itself. Serbian militarism was on the rise at the turn of the century, having in mind that conspiracy to assassinate the last king of the Obrenovich dynasty was handled by the future members of the Black Hand. Roudometof also adds that not only did the civilian and military leaderships in Serbia compete for legitimacy to carry out irredentism in the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman territories, but military provided social services for the underprivileged in the rural areas of the kingdom.<sup>270</sup> With that in mind, it is clear why Apis wielded such power over the civilian leadership. Apart from Black Hand's infiltration in the state's apparatus, the successive prime ministers could not do much knowing that he was supported by the military, ministers and population.<sup>271</sup>

The research findings on the Black Hand are indispensable for understanding the Young Bosnian pivot to Serbia. Although the primary sources on Black Hand perished in the flames of two World Wars, secondary sources all agree on the irredentist claims: Unification or Death or the Black Hand advocated aggressive irredentism in the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman territories, namely in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Macedonia and Kosovo, based on the continuous legitimacy derived from the great medieval Serbian Empire, which was to be achieved through *stateless warfare* conducted by the like-minded groups, in order to topple so-called *occupying tyrants*.<sup>272</sup> This public outreach, although it was officially clandestine, was well-known in the Serbian politics. Dedijer writes that upon its establishment in 1911, it was decided that the organisation should rely on two documents.<sup>273</sup> One of them, the Statute reads: '*In aspiration to unify the Serbdom, the organisation is being founded which any Serb can be a member thereof with no regards to sex, religion, place of birth and anyone who truthfully stands up for this idea*'.<sup>274</sup>

The fourth article of the Statute adds that the aims of the organisation are to spark revolution in all areas where Serbs dwell, use all available means to fight the enemies of this idea, provide help to the like-minded organisations that fight for liberty and unification.<sup>275</sup>

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<sup>268</sup> Roudometof, p.146-155

<sup>269</sup> Roudometof, p.144

<sup>270</sup> Roudometof, p.156

<sup>271</sup> Roudometof, p.151; on Apis, see: Mackenzie, p.77-81

<sup>272</sup> Dedijer, 630-631

<sup>273</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>274</sup> *ibidem*; See also: Mackenzie, p.120; M Bogicevic, '*Bemerkungen zum Saloniki-Process 1917*', *Kriegsschuldfrage*, 1924, p.20-28; C Popovic, '*Apis i sarajevski atentat*', *Pregled*, 1953, p.2-14

<sup>275</sup> Mackenzie, p.121-123

According to Roudometof, Apis instructed Young Bosnia to assassinate Franz Ferdinand in order to prevent the reorganisation of the Habsburg Empire that was contemplating Trialism.<sup>276</sup>

While this report recognizes the close links between irredentist organisations in Serbia and Young Bosnia, it similarly challenges the notion that Young Bosnia was merely an instrument of the Serbian irredentist politics. On the contrary, this report argues that Young Bosnia used its opportunities abroad to strengthen its insurgency calculus as an independent actor.<sup>277</sup> The latter part of this chapter will analyse the relationship between Young Bosnia and irredentist networks in Serbia, more precisely, Unification or Death and Serbian National Defence.

This report argues that Young Bosnia supported aggressive irredentist program of the Black Hand and Serbian National Defence, because of the effectiveness they demonstrated in pursuit of the guerrilla warfare in Macedonia and Kosovo.<sup>278</sup> McCarthy claims that hundreds of conscripts were deployed to Macedonia, so as to incapacitate the Ottoman military presence in Macedonia and Kosovo and to win *hearts and minds* of the population.<sup>279</sup> Historians tend to agree that without the guerrilla activities in the Ottoman territories, the Balkan Wars of 1912 would not propel Serbian armed forces to defeat the Ottomans and incorporate Kosovo and parts of Macedonia and Albania. The research findings do indicate that Gavrilo Princip pledged to become an operative in Macedonia, but was rejected by Major Tankosic due to *'inexperience in handling the weapons'*.<sup>280</sup> In a diary of Princip's friend, there is some evidence that Princip resented the decision and Major Tankosic, which would prove crucial for the expectations he had from the Black Hand prior to the assassination of Franz Ferdinand.<sup>281</sup>

With respect to the theoretical framework that clarifies a pivot abroad as a substantial opportunity for an insurgency, TNR theory elucidates that rebels or insurgents tend to exploit the instabilities in the host country to take advantage of the opportunities.<sup>282</sup> In aftermath of the annexation crisis when the government of Serbia did nothing to respond to the Austro-Hungarian unilateral moves, Young Bosnia openly sided with the irredentist networks that promoted aggressive approach, because the Black Hand was the only irredentist organisation that was capable of providing them with weapons, training camps and strategic advice.<sup>283</sup> The Black Hand's aggressive stance and open

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<sup>276</sup> Roudometof, p.154

<sup>277</sup> Mackenzie, p.144; Dedijer, p.641

<sup>278</sup> J McCarthy, *'Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922'*, Princeton, 2966, p.162-166

<sup>279</sup> McCarthy, p.167

<sup>280</sup> Dedijer, p.601

<sup>281</sup> Ljubibratic's diary quoted in Dedijer, p. 604-606

<sup>282</sup> Salehyan, p.47

<sup>283</sup> Mackenzie, p.202

antagonism toward the civilian leadership in Serbia beckoned Gacinovic and Jukic to join the organisation in 1911.<sup>284</sup> It is of utmost importance to analyse the dates: Young Bosnia had been active since 1905, which is six years before the inception of the Black Hand. Thus, this paper argues that Gacinovic and Jukic had been admitted into the Black Hand as representatives of Young Bosnia that had already had an independent calculus. With their admission, Young Bosnia became a movement that spanned the borders of the Austro-Hungarian Empire comprising the members that can be classified as *rebels without borders*.

The second pillar of the theory regards the opportunity to claim bases in the host country. Young Bosnians had an *alibi*, as they were students who travelled extensively to Serbia for education purposes. On the other hand, as harsh measures implied crackdown on the clandestine student organisations in Bosnia, Young Bosnia turned to the independent Serbia, where Austro-Hungarians could not exercise authority, if it was not to risk an inter-state conflict. TNR theory also suggests that rebels take advantage of the porous borders, in order to uninterruptedly cross them.<sup>285</sup> In this case, Young Bosnians would not have succeeded in crossing the borders, if there had not been for the secret channels that were founded by the Serbian National Defence during the Annexation Crisis. The Austro-Hungarian authorities found a cable that had supports this argument. It reads that Jakov Milovic, a National Defence's operative, had smuggled Princip and his comrades to Bosnia a few days before the assassination took place.<sup>286</sup>

Neighbourhood effects are crucial for grasping the Young Bosnian pivot to Serbia. The tensions between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Kingdom of Serbia were sparked by the trade war in the early 1900s, continued with the Annexation Crisis and culminated after the Balkan Wars when Serbia occupied Albanian coast.<sup>287</sup> To Young Bosnia, tensions signified more pressure from the Austro-Hungarian authorities within the Empire, but equally provided them with more opportunities abroad, namely in Serbia. It is incontestable that both Young Bosnia and Black Hand's calculus was to liberate Bosnia and other South-Slavic lands and ultimately undermine Austria-Hungary. However, it is erroneous to claim that the calculus of Young Bosnia and Black Hand were identical.<sup>288</sup>

As previously argued, Princip and his generation of Young Bosnians envisaged a federal Yugoslav state that would not discriminate people for their sex, religion, ethnicity and roots.<sup>289</sup> On the other hand, Black Hand was an off-shoot of the Serbian military that was guided by a rigid military code

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<sup>284</sup> Dedijer, p.645

<sup>285</sup> Salehyan, p.52-55

<sup>286</sup> The cable quoted in Dedijer, p.622 and Mackenzie, p.229

<sup>287</sup> See *History* chapter

<sup>288</sup> D Mackenzie, Piedmont, p.153-182

<sup>289</sup> *ibidem*

that glorified Orthodox Christianity as a pillar of Serbdom, often citing the struggle for freedom against the Muslim Ottomans and Catholic Austro-Hungarians. With respect to religion, in its irredentist newspapers *Pijemont*, Black Hand also staunchly criticised the atheists that were undermining the values of the Serbdom by promoting godlessness and other unorthodox values.<sup>290</sup> Having been raised in the multi-ethnic society as Bosnia had always been, Young Bosnians rejected the program of the Black Hand that envisaged a state for the Serbs, by the Serbs and to the Serbs. To support this argument, Dedijer notes that during the trials, *Pijemont* conveyed a statement that Princip had killed Franz Ferdinand to ‘*restore the Great Serbian Empire*’.<sup>291</sup> Additionally, systematic maltreatment of the Muslim population in the occupied Macedonia did not resonate well in the Young Bosnian *kruzhoks*.<sup>292</sup>

In terms of the means of the calculus, for Young Bosnians political assassinations had a deep philosophical connotation to it, particularly when it comes to suicides and the provision of secular immortality.<sup>293</sup> Conversely, the Black Hand criticised the strategic fallacies of political assassinations, because it reduced chances of a successful completion of an insurgency. Furthermore to that, as the Black Hand was led by the senior military personnel, political assassinations had to be complimented with other strategies, specifically pressure and preparation.<sup>294</sup> To support this point, this report analyses *Pijemont* editions from the autumn of 1911. In labelling the instigators of political assassinations as criminals, *Pijemont* also adds:

*‘Firstly, the political assassin is always an immature, young boy, who has not even reached the half of the life expectancy; a fanatic..., inspired by vision... with a limited judgement...prone to be seduced by books, ideas and comrades... The aspiration to be celebrated and an urge to become a martyr, taking responsibility for everything in order to protect his comrades... is an indicator of a troubled state of mind’*<sup>295</sup>

The ideological standpoints of the Black Hand and Young Bosnia reflected on the respective calculus of both organisations. As Mackenzie notes, Colonel Apis did not hesitate to criticise Young Bosnian resorts to the anarchistic and socialist thinking, given that he believed in a power sharing between

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<sup>290</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>291</sup> *Pijemont* article published in August 1914 paraphrased in Dedijer, p.655

<sup>292</sup> Dedijer, p.656

<sup>293</sup> See Gacinovic, 1-17

<sup>294</sup> Mackenzie, Apis, p.233

<sup>295</sup> *Pijemont* article published in September 1911 as part of the *Pijemont* collection obtained from the Archives of Yugoslavia in Belgrade on September 16, 2014

monarchy and military.<sup>296</sup> In light of that, he urged Young Bosnians to stay on a revolutionary course, fearing that socialist and anarchical programmes that Young Bosnia propagated could exacerbate the relationship between the Serbian irredentist organisations and Young Bosnia.<sup>297</sup>

Neighbourhood effects from the Annexation Crisis to the assassination of Franz Ferdinand indicate that Young Bosnia was allowed to operate freely within the Kingdom of Serbia. To reiterate, due to animosity between the government and military, it was fairly easy for Young Bosnians to solidify its position in the clandestine networks in Serbia. Nevertheless, both military and civilian leadership worked in concert in pursuit of the ethnic irredentism.<sup>298</sup> This mainly manifested in the former Ottoman territories acquired after the Balkan Wars, where *commitatiji* or the recruited volunteers spearheaded the provinces alongside armed forces. Apis's promotion to the Chief of the General Staff's intelligence division that was overseeing the irredentist networks across the Austro-Hungarian Empire was particularly significant for Young Bosnia. Hence, Young Bosnians had more incentives to use the momentum built up after the successive victories in the Ottoman Macedonia.<sup>299</sup>

This report contends Clark's thesis in *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914* that observes Young Bosnia as a movement that was merely recruited to assassinate Franz Ferdinand.<sup>300</sup> This is an over-simplified argument that overlooks the autonomy that Young Bosnia had enjoyed among the student networks across the Habsburg Empire, long before the irredentism had its peak in Serbia. Instead, this report advocates that Young Bosnia was led by its calculus in its co-operation with the Black Hand, having defended its values and programme in spite of the mounting pressure from the Black Hand to fight for the revival of the Serbian Medieval Empire. Succinctly put, having witnessed a successful liberation of the Ottoman territories, faced enormous pressure from the Austro-Hungarians that threatened its existence and two unsuccessful assassination attempts, Young Bosnia pivoted to the Black Hand for the weapon acquisition, trainings and strategic counselling. While they lost some autonomy with dependence on the provision of means and opportunities, Young Bosnian net assessment of motivation remained unchanged.<sup>301</sup>

An anti-Austrian sentiment bonded Young Bosnians with the irredentist groups in Belgrade. In planning the assassination, Princip, Grabez and Cabrinovic were in touch with a Black Hand officer

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<sup>296</sup> Mackenzie, Apis, p.235-237

<sup>297</sup> ibidem

<sup>298</sup> D Batakovic, 'Nikola Pasic, les radicaux et la "Main Noire"', *Balkanica*, 2006, p.155-170, see also: S Jovanovic, 'Nicholas Pasic: After Ten Years', *Slavonic and East European Review*, 1937, p.290-322

<sup>299</sup> Mackenzie, Piedmont, p.155

<sup>300</sup> Clark, p.47-56

<sup>301</sup> Dedijer, p.634-640

Milan Ciganovic who *'provided the young men with Browning pistols and boxes of ammunition...'*<sup>302</sup> Young Bosnians also asked for the flasks with cyanide, if the mission was to fail. This proves that they would rather take their own life, which corresponds to their stances on secular immortality, which Pijemont attacked frequently.<sup>303</sup>

The scarcity of sources that describe the co-operation between the Black Hand and Young Bosnia in Belgrade several months before the assassination was an inhibiting factor for the research. However, a diary of one of the Princip's close friends in Belgrade illustrates that Major Tankosic had instructed Ciganovic to train Princip and his comrades how to shoot properly. That took place in the Topcider Woods in Belgrade, as accounts in the diary suggest.<sup>304</sup>

A week before the shots were fired at Franz Ferdinand and his wife, Young Bosnians used the secret irredentist channels to smuggle the weapons and cross the border. The accounts of the conspirators are of utmost importance as an evidence of an independent calculus of Young Bosnia. According to the intelligence sources found after the war that Dedijer uses to justify his claims, Apis feared that the assassination would provoke the Habsburg Monarchy to retaliate against Serbia, which would furthermore have a negative impact on the Serbs in Austria-Hungary. Therefore, he instructed his operatives to force Princip and other Young Bosnians to abort the assassination plans. Although he allegedly had never accessed the Black Hand, Princip resented Tankosic and demanded not to see him during his stay in Belgrade. Dedijer writes that Princip staunchly criticised Tankosic's hard-line and tactless approach. This sheds more light to a degree of disagreement between the leaderships in both organisations. Although Princip did not want to let his personal grievances overshadow the opportunities for Young Bosnia, he insisted that Grabez and Cabrinovic negotiate with Tankosic.<sup>305</sup>

There are accounts indicating that Young Bosnians debated whether it was the suitable moment to assassinate Franz Ferdinand. In his letter to Trotsky, Gacinovic wrote that the last time he got a letter from Princip, he elaborated that *'some comrades were against the assassination and tried to persuade the more hawkish group to disband action, but it was all in vain...'*<sup>306</sup>

Gacnovic's letter to Trotsky suggests that Young Bosnians assessed its calculus after they were trained to use weapons in Belgrade.<sup>307</sup> The opportunities that they exploited in Serbia were tested against the net assessment of motivation, as in this case was most probably the 'fear of failure',

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<sup>302</sup> ibidem

<sup>303</sup> ibidem

<sup>304</sup> Ljubibratic's diary quoted in Dedijer, p. 604-606

<sup>305</sup> Dedijer, 644; Mackenzie, Apis, p.266-268

<sup>306</sup> Gacinovic's letter to Trotsky, sent in aftermath of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand quoted in Dedijer, p.

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<sup>307</sup> ibidem

which constitutes the inhibiting motives. Brooker's insurgency calculus framework explains that *means, motives and opportunities* serve as checks and balances, which suggests that no variable can be assumed without the assessment of others.<sup>308</sup>

In analysing the transcripts from the trials after the June assassination in Sarajevo, days before the assassinations are instrumental for assessing the independence of the Young Bosnian calculus. In his response to the indictment, Princip responded that it was his intention to assassinate Franz Ferdinand for whom he shares no remorse. Dr. Papenheim's testimony revealed that, *'he [Princip] read a lot in Sarajevo [before the assassination]. He had dreams about assassinating senior politicians and wrestling with policemen and gendarme...He was overcome by an idea of political assassination...He perceived assassination as a mean to muster an organisation that can instigate a full-blown revolution...'*<sup>309</sup>

These accounts demonstrate that after the "exile" in Serbia, Young Bosnia retained the same calculus as it had formed in the *kruzhoks* across the Habsburg Empire prior to 1911. This is primarily discernible in the perception of political assassinations, contrary to the stances of the Black Hand and other irredentist organisations in Serbia. Furthermore, he was a quintessential political assassin, according to the critique of political assassinations published by the Black Hand in *Pijemont*. He was a passionate young man, who was overcome by the ideals of political assassinations, the cult of personality and the eternal glory. He was also the one who took all responsibility for assassination, to save his comrades from the imminent death.

The interrogation of the Young Bosnians tried for the assassination of Archduke and his wife reveal the calculus and enables the researcher to assess its independence. On the unification of all South-Slavs in a single state, Princip remarks, *'The political unification of all Yugoslavs had always hovered over me and that was my leading idea. For that to happen, Yugoslavs would need to expel Austrians, because all misfortunes that Yugoslavs lived through were a result of Austria...This was a core idea of the youth and was a consequence of a disappointment with the Austrian reprisals...'*<sup>310</sup>

Princip and other Young Bosnians who were tried for the assassinations repeated that they did nothing wrong, because they killed a tyrant who maltreated their own kind. They insisted on a natural right to take up arms and take a life away, irrespective of the illegality of action.<sup>311</sup> In light of that, it is imperative to emphasise that Young Bosnian calculus, primarily with respect to the anarchical and socialist views on revolution, had not been impacted by the external factors, in this

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<sup>308</sup> Brookers, p.125-127

<sup>309</sup> Dedijer, p.677

<sup>310</sup> Bogicevic, p.56, Translated from Serbo-Croatian to English by author

<sup>311</sup> Palavestra, p.12

case the Serbian irredentists. This is evident in the same discourse that Young Bosnians used before 1911 and during the trials.

Young Bosnians did not hide that Serbia was entitled to the role of Piedmont, as the only independent state in the region. However, most of them repudiated the visions of the Great Serbian Empire, which would have Serbia annex Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia and put them under its yoke.<sup>312</sup> In revisiting the theoretical framework on irredentism that was elaborated in the previous chapters<sup>313</sup>, it is evident that Young Bosnians did not fight for the cause that was promulgated from Belgrade. Contrary to the Black Hand's ethnic irredentist programme, Young Bosnia stood for the liberation of the Yugoslavs in the Austro-Hungarian Empire which would produce a state with its peoples on an equal footing.

The Serbian ethnic irredentism propagated by the irredentist organisations the Black Hand and Serbian National Defence envisaged the annexation of territories where the Serbs live. In the statute of the Black Hand, ethnic irredentism necessitated internal revolution within the Austro-Hungarian Empire sparked by the nationalist groups across the Empire after which they would expel the Austro-Hungarians, secede and be incorporated in the Kingdom of Serbia.<sup>314</sup> This goes back to the Horowitz's thesis expounded in the theoretical framework of this report that suggests that ethnic irredentism is often combined with secessionism. Also, ethnic irredentism in this case embodies vision and legitimacy.<sup>315</sup> As the statute reads, Serbia was *obliged* to redeem the territories of the Austro-Hungarian Empire due to the *historical injustice* made during the Congress of Berlin when Bosnia was mandated to Austria-Hungary and *legitimacy* derived from the medieval Serbian Empire that controlled Bosnia, parts of Dalmatia and Slavonia.<sup>316</sup>

TNR theory argues that rebels without borders cause the internationalisation of a regional conflict.<sup>317</sup> The aim of this report is not to examine whether Young Bosnia caused the World War I, as numerous scholarly pieces have already been written on how the World War started. However, in a tense regional setting, this report defends that Young Bosnia exploited the animosity between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, by rallying for its cause in both public and clandestine circles in Serbia.<sup>318</sup> Due to increasing pressure on the student organisations across the Empire in light of the emergency laws passed, Young Bosnia pivoted toward the irredentist organisations in Serbia. During

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<sup>312</sup> Mackenzie, Piedmont, p.162

<sup>313</sup> See *Theory* chapter

<sup>314</sup> Mackenzie, Apis, p.188; See also: Mackenzie, Piedmont, p.34-36

<sup>315</sup> Kornprobst, p.476; Horowitz, p.118

<sup>316</sup> See *History* chapter

<sup>317</sup> Salehyan, p.53

<sup>318</sup> Mackenzie, Piedmont, p. 180-182



the trials in the summer of 1914 in Sarajevo, Princip stated that Young Bosnians were aware of the heightened tensions between the Habsburgs and Serbians and claimed that the European war was needed to break down the Austro-Hungarian Empire.<sup>319</sup> This is to say that pivot abroad that Young Bosnia exploited to strengthen its calculus was an opportunity to hurt Austria-Hungary, which escalated in the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia and soon enough, into the world-wide conflict. In this sense, TNR theory helps to understand the Bosnian scenario: due to the international rivalries that had been forged before Young Bosnia was founded, not only did Young Bosnia precipitate the conflict between Serbia and the Habsburgs, but also its origins were a sheer consequence of the geopolitical rivalries and power politics in aftermath of the Congress of Berlin in 1878.<sup>320</sup>

## 8. Summary

At the hundredth anniversary of the beginning of the World War I, Young Bosnia is in the spotlight of a changed, yet at times, regressive world. For the patterns of the power politics still define the world we live in nowadays. That may be the reason why the world rushed in to celebrate the anniversary of the most tragic period in the human history hitherto, in order to avoid the public criticism with respect to the lessons not learnt. For historians, the times we live in are critical: politicians will always blame them for not doing enough to determine who actually pushed the world into the conflict, even a century later. Walking down the streets of Belgrade, Sarajevo, Vienna, Berlin, Paris, London and St. Petersburg, one could not miss the lines of book stores with the new publications conspicuously aligned to draw readers' attention. All those news editions, irrespective of the authors and the countries they were published in, discuss the origins of the World War I and present a recycled take on the events that caused the frozen peace to crumble before the eyes of the Emperors, Kings, Ministers and Generals of that era. A point of contention is the Balkans, where the actors are all but similar: Serbia with its ambition and vigour in light of the Balkan Wars, Bosnia with its revolutionary youth embodied in Young Bosnia, Austria-Hungary with its repressive regime and multi-cultural Empire, but who is to blame? The public campaign to mark the anniversary did not

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<sup>319</sup> Bogicevic, p.190

<sup>320</sup> Mackenzie, Piedmont, p.153-155; Dedijer, p.830

convey where we got in wrong all these years, but simply resorted to the ‘blame game’- something that we have already seen, which is far from being a novelty.

Abreast of the trends in the historiography of that period and its implications nowadays, this report aimed to present a balanced case-study of Young Bosnia, whose impact on the events that ensued had been largely misconstrued. It aimed to analyse a timeline of the Young Bosnian rise, from the equivalent of a student club to an independent, rather influential movement that spanned borders. It contended a rather prevalent argument that it was an instrument of the Serbian irredentist ambitions, usually judged from the events that superseded Young Bosnia, namely a centralised Yugoslavia with the Serbian dynasty of Karadjordjevic on top, then Tito’s federal socialist Yugoslavia and the Balkan civil wars that reinvigorated the chauvinistic nationalism in the Balkans. To support the claim, the report took advantage of two theoretical frameworks, i.e. Brooker’s *insurgency calculus* framework and Salehyan’s *transnational rebels or rebels without borders* theory, because they did not employ a top-down approach to explain Young Bosnia, but rather emphasising its grass-roots.<sup>321</sup> Thus, the accent of this report is on Young Bosnia, its internal dynamics represented in its initial calculus, and the external dynamics encapsulated in its co-operation, but not co-optation in Serbia.

The first part of the analytical chapter operationalises the concepts of *motivation* and *means* to start an insurgency under the auspices of the calculus framework presented in the theoretical chapter of the report. With that in mind, it assesses whether Young Bosnia was capable of “owning” a calculus on its own, which would contrast the argument of dependence on the Black Hand (Unification or Death) and the Serbian National Defence.

Consequently, the first hypothesis- *although motivated by youth organisations and movements from abroad, Young Bosnia formed its insurgency calculus independently*- holds true.

This paper concludes that Young Bosnia was not isolated from the external factors, having been mostly represented by students who used their mobility within the Empire and Europe to be exposed to the revolutionary trends at the turn of the century, specifically to the ideas of *Young Italy*, *People’s Will* in Russia and a number of notable German student clubs. However, it is argued that Young Bosnia is a unique case, contingent upon the conditions in pre-1914 Bosnia. They are single-handedly a movement that reflected the gaps of the Bosnian setting, given the centuries of occupation, impoverished population, failed multiculturalism and most notably, repressive policies of the occupying powers, the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary. They are also a product of the myth of Kosovo that had shaped the identity of the Serbs for centuries. On the other hand, this

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<sup>321</sup> Brookers, p. 125-127; Salehyan, p.11-50

report defends that they are a sheer consequence of the imperialist power politics that shaped the pre-war global politics.

In order to assess the independence of its calculus from the Serbian irredentist networks, the report proceeds to analyse the net assessment of motivations and means based on the research findings and theoretical framework as a guideline. It is concluded that Young Bosnian motivation assessment accentuates collective motives and individual selective incentives at the expense of inhibiting motives. On that note, it is proven that Young Bosnia was collectively motivated by an idea of revolution in Bosnia, liberation and an ultimate demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. To support the point, the report analyses the stances of the notable members of Young Bosnia, among them Gacinovic, Zerajic, Princip and Mehmedbasic. They are vocal about the deteriorating conditions in Bosnia, criticise the Austro-Hungarian occupation and the Serbian idleness to react after the Annexation crisis and urge all youth movements to unite, expel and destroy the Austro-Hungarian Empire. As for secular immortality, it is prominent that Young Bosnians were inspired by the *act of heroism* of the Serbian army in Kosovo and many other revolutionaries, who fell but warranted immortality in the history of the world. As an evidence, the report focuses on what immortality meant to Zerajic, Princip and Gacinovic analysing their literary contributions. As a result, it is established that Zerajic's death was a turning point of Young Bosnians, as they resorted to more aggressive means to start an insurgency.

Although 'fear of failure' was not absent, it did not dissuade Young Bosnians in pursuit of collective and individual goals, because of the belief that any heroic act against Austro-Hungarians will inspire new generations of youth to be engaged.

The second hypothesis, *the cost-benefit analysis to fight the Austro-Hungarian authorities self-sufficiently in Bosnia changed after the crackdown on student organisations had commenced, which prompted Young Bosnia to cooperate with the irredentist networks in Serbia that promoted aggressive ethnic irredentism on the premises of the Great Serbia platform*, refers to Young Bosnia in aftermath of the Zerajic's suicide in 1910.

It is advocated that propaganda strategy was not sufficient for the Young Bosnian aspirations in Bosnia, therefore they employed political assassinations as an example of provocation strategy and terrorist mode. The report concludes that fearing the Austro-Hungarian emergency laws in Bosnia and a wide-spread clampdown on the student organisations across the Empire, Young Bosnia intensively utilised the clandestine irredentist channels in Bosnia to co-operate with the Black Hand and Serbian National Defence. Their calculus was two-fold: to avoid a demise in Bosnia and to acquire new means and opportunities abroad, mainly weapons, trainings and strategic counselling.

TNR theory explains that when the means, motives or opportunities are exhausted, rebels tend to seek the external support. This is evident in the transcripts from the trials, correspondence between Gacinovic and Princip and the Austro-Hungarian intelligence records.

The third hypothesis, *the irredentist attempts to replicate the know-hows from the guerrilla warfare in the Ottoman territories before 1912-1913 war to Young Bosnia was successful when it comes to providing means and opportunities, but less successful in motivating Young Bosnia to continue fighting for the same cause*, unequivocally refers to a degree of independence of the Young Bosnian calculus after its Serbian pivot.

While establishing that Gacinovic and Jukic joined the Black Hand and Serbian National Defence after the successful campaigns in the Ottoman Macedonia, it did not alter the net assessment of motivation in the Young Bosnian calculus. The evidence suggests that the Black Hand did not tolerate Young Bosnian socialist and anarchic views as well as the philosophical meaning of political assassinations in their calculus. On the other hand, Young Bosnia depreciated the Black Hand's vision of the Serbian dominion over the Habsburg lands. Conversely, due to the multi-cultural Bosnian setting and their atheist affiliation, Young Bosnians envisaged a federal Yugoslav state that would embody tolerance, common values and progress, unlike Bosnia under the Austro-Hungarians. Most importantly, it is argued that had there been no co-operation between Black Hand and Young Bosnia, it would have been costly for both organisations, as Young Bosnia would have hardly acquired weapons, combat skills and strategic counselling elsewhere, whereas the Black Hand would have lost the primacy within the irredentist circles in the region.

The fourth hypothesis, *this paper also contends that Young Bosnia was simply an instrument of Serbian irredentist politics. It maintains that its political stances differed greatly from the Black Hand and/or Serbian National Defence, but the survival of the organisation and its calculus was contingent upon the external assistance in light of Austro-Hungarian counter-insurgency policy*.

The fourth hypothesis summarizes why Young Bosnians sought the external assistance from the Black Hand and National Defence in the first place. Both theoretical frameworks used in this report- Brooker's insurgency calculus and Salehyan's TNR theory- draw the same conclusion: if the existence of a rebel movement is under serious threat (limited means/motives/opportunities and/or counter-insurgency), it is likely that rebels will accept the external assistance (sanctuaries, weapons, training, counselling etc.). Correspondingly, all of the above are legitimised by ethnic irredentism, provided that rebels and irredentists base their co-operation on ethnicity and nationalism. To summarize, in aftermath of the crackdown on student protests in 1910/1911, Young Bosnia intensified its co-operation with the Serbian Black Hand and National Defence, so as to avoid the Austro-Hungarian

crackdown and to guarantee substantial means and opportunities in pursuit of political assassinations in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

From all of the aforementioned hypotheses and with regards to the research question- *To what extent was the Young Bosnian insurgency calculus directly impacted by the Serbian irredentist networks from 1911 to 1914?* - this report concludes that Young Bosnia co-operated with the Black Hand and National Defence, but was not co-opted. Taking into account the nature of Young Bosnian calculus, where collective motives and selective incentives dominated, this report establishes that irredentist networks in Serbia provided Young Bosnians with some means and opportunities, but did not impact the core of the calculus, namely motivation. In light of that, this report argues that from 1911 to 1914, the relationship between Young Bosnia and Black Hand/Serbian National Defence was mutually beneficial and culminated with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophia on June 18, 1914 in Sarajevo.

## 9. Perspectives on Further Research

Young Bosnia followed the wave of revolutionary movements across the southern peripheries of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. They represented a movement that aspired to act regionally, yet reverberate globally. It was among the first anti-colonial movements of the twentieth century that had paved the way for all of the movements that fought to undermine colonial regimes and expel them from the territory they called 'home'.

It is clear that Young Bosnia was a factor in a globalised pre-World War I world. In *La Belle Epoque* (1871-1914) when the crises were looming, Young Bosnians were all but a secluded phenomenon. They were part of the globalised trends to challenge *status quo* powers that derived legitimacy from the longevity of their absolutism. The challenge reflected on the programmes that envisaged liberty, social justice, human rights and accountability in contrast with the system of governance that favoured the centre over the colonial periphery, neglected nationalist awakenings and was governed by ethnic politics to divide and rule.<sup>322</sup>

Having in mind often neglected interconnectedness in the period of *La Belle Epoque*, it would be useful to focus on the similarities between revolutionary groups that appreciated and employed political assassinations and regicides across the pre-1914 colonies. The comparative analysis would

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<sup>322</sup> Dedijer, p.829

concentrate on multi-cultural Empires of that period, analyse their grievances and compare how political assassinations dominated their calculus and as importantly, to what extent political assassinations were interrelated to the concepts of *sacrifice* and a *cult of personality*. This report proposes the case studies of the Russian, Indian and Irish revolutionary movements, in particular People's Will in Russia, Sepoy Mutineers in British India and IRA during the War for Independence in Ireland.

Although Young Bosnia had never come in touch with Irish or Indian movements, like-mindedness is indicative of the global anti-imperialist and anti-colonial trends that shook up the world order causing the global powers to plunge into the open conflict with tens of millions of casualties.

## 10. Abstract

### *Abstract English*

At the hundredth anniversary of the beginning of the World War I, Young Bosnia is in the spotlight of a changed, yet at times, regressive world. For the patterns of the power politics still define the world we live in nowadays. Walking down the streets of Belgrade, Sarajevo, Vienna, Berlin, Paris, London and St. Petersburg, one could not miss the lines of book stores with new publications conspicuously aligned to draw readers' attention that, irrespective of the authors and the countries they were published in, discuss the origins of the World War I and present a recycled take on the events that caused the frozen peace to crumble. The public campaign to mark the anniversary did not convey where we got it wrong all these years, but simply resorted to the 'blame game' - something that we have already seen, which is far from being a novelty.

Abreast of the trends in the historiography of that period and its implications nowadays, this report aims to present a balanced case-study of Young Bosnia, whose impact on the events that ensued had been largely misconstrued. It aims to analyse a timeline of the Young Bosnian rise, from the equivalent of a student club to an independent, rather influential movement that spanned borders. It contended a rather prevalent argument that it was an instrument of the Serbian irredentist ambitions, usually judged from the events that superseded Young Bosnia.

The motivation of this paper is two-fold: firstly, it is motivated to give a voice to Young Bosnia as an independent actor with a political manifesto that was reflected in its organisational calculus and secondly, it is interested in showing how grass-root interests of Young Bosnia conflicted or

complimented with the top-down approach of the external factors and shaped the regional politics. For that reason, the focus of this paper is not on the assassination in Sarajevo and internationalised conflict as such, but on the evolvement of Young Bosnia from the early stages to its end.

#### *Abstract German*

Zum 100. Jahrestag des Beginns des Ersten Weltkriegs ist das „Junge Bosnien“ im Scheinwerferlicht einer veränderten, und bei Zeiten, regressiven Welt. Denn die Muster der Machtpolitik definieren noch immer die Welt in der wir leben. In den Straßen von Belgrad, Sarajevo, Wien, Berlin, Paris, London und St. Petersburg kann man die vielen Buchläden mit den neuen Publikationen nicht übersehen, die so drapiert sind, um die Aufmerksamkeit der Besucher zu erwecken. Unabhängig vom Autor und den Ländern in welchen sie publiziert wurden, diskutieren sie die Ursachen des Ersten Weltkriegs und recyceln die Sicht auf die Tatsachen, die dafür verantwortlich waren, dass der unsichere Friede zusammenbrach. Die öffentliche Kampagne anlässlich des Jahrestages vermittelte nicht, was wir falsch verstanden haben in all den Jahren, sondern bediente sich einfach des Bildes vom „Sündenbock“ – etwas was schon oft geschah und weit davon entfernt ist, eine Novität zu sein.

Entgegen der Trends in der Geschichtswissenschaft dieser Periode und ihre gegenwärtige Implikationen, zielt diese Arbeit darauf ab, eine ausgeglichene Fallstudie zum „Jungen Bosnien“ zu präsentieren, deren Einfluss auf die nachfolgenden Gegebenheiten Großteils miss-konstruiert worden ist. Sie versucht die Zeitachse zu analysieren, der Aufstieg des „Jungen Bosnien“ von einem Studentenklub zu einer unabhängigen, recht einflussreichen Bewegung, die grenzüberschreitend wirkte. Sie stellt das vorherrschende Argument in Frage, dass sie ein Instrument der Serbischen Ambitionen war, ein Urteil das gewöhnlich auf Basis von Ereignissen fußt, die sich vor der Zeit des „Jungen Bosnien“ ereigneten.

Die Motivation für diese Arbeit ist zweierlei: erstens, der Organisation „Junges Bosnien“ eine Stimme als unabhängiger Akteur zu geben, mit einem politischen Manifest, das in seinem organisatorischen Kalkül reflektiert wurde, und zweitens ist es interessant wie die „grass-root“ Bewegung des „Jungen Bosnien“ entweder in einem Konflikt mit, oder komplementär zu den externen Faktoren stand, und die regionale Politik formte. Aus diesem Grund ist der Fokus dieser Arbeit nicht auf die Ermordung des österreichischen Thronfolgers in Sarajevo gelegt, und die Internationalisierung des Konflikts selbst, sondern auf die Entwicklung des „Jungen Bosnien“ von seinen Anfängen bis zum Ende.

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## PERSONAL INFORMATION

Vladimir Rakočević

## WORK EXPERIENCE

01/03/2010–01/07/2012

## Youth National Delegate

European Environment and Health Youth Coalition, Bonn (Germany)  
eehyc.org

- Coordinating WHOEEHYC policies with Ministries of Health and Environment of Montenegro;
- Contributing to the formulation and implementation of the policies regarding the climate change, improvement of water supplies in Montenegro and enhancement of the children's environment;
- Writing reports to the government's focal points from the youth and high-political meetings abroad;
- Attended European Ministerial Conference on Environment and Health in Parma 2010 representing Montenegro;
- Drafted a youth declaration that was endorsed and incorporated into the official Parma declaration;
- Represented Montenegro at the European Youth Meeting for Sustainable Development in Estonia with the primary focus on the urban development;
- Took part at EEHTF Conference in Bled, Slovenia organized by the World Health Organization Europe;
- Took part at the UNEP Tunza Youth Conference in Nairobi, Kenya in February 2013

07/01/2011–05/05/2011

## Administrative Assistant

National Museum of American History, Washington DC (United States)

- Administrative work
- Communication with donors and alumni
- Running museum tours

30/01/2012–29/07/2012

## Intern

United Nations Development Programme-Montenegro Gender Office, Podgorica (Montenegro)

- Based on the full understanding on Gender Programme Activities, producing stories, cases, briefings, articles and other writings in English and Serbian languages (both at the native level) for the website, e-news, outreach materials, briefing for media, etc., under the framework provided by Gender Programme IPA 2010;
- Drafting/editing and distributing the news to inside/outside the UNDP through various outreach channels;
- Translation of written materials between English and Serbian languages;
- Deploying various social media instruments to disseminate the UNDP Gender Programme's core messages to Governmental, NGO and International and Civil Society stakeholders;
- Working closely with Communications Office, Learning Managers and Knowledge Managers Network (UNDP Team works) and utilize their video conference facility;
- Conducting research;
- Assisting in the preparation of various documentation and reports;
- Assisting in the organization of conferences, forums or other collaborative events;

01/02/2012–Present

## Junior Consultant

Atlantic Council of Montenegro, Podgorica (Montenegro)

- Promoting Montenegrin bid to NATO

- Raising awareness about NATO integrations
- Communicating with the Atlantic Treaty Organisation/Youth Atlantic Treaty Organisation, a parent umbrella organisation in Brussels
- Contributing to the *Security* magazine published by the Atlantic Council of Montenegro
- Organizing To Be Secure (2BS) Forum, a leading security forum in the region

01/09/2012–15/12/2012

### Junior Researcher

Youth Atlantic Treaty Association/ Danish Atlantic Council, Copenhagen (Denmark)  
<http://www.ata-sec.org/publications/atlantic-voices?start=10>

- Researching on transformation of civil society in the Western Balkans and its implications on the Euro-Atlantic integration process of the region

03/06/2012–07/06/2012

### Contact Point Officer for Dr. Liam Fox, Former Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom

To Be Secure Forum, Budva (Montenegro)

- Public Relations
- Plenary work
- Bilateral meetings
- Drafting speeches

27/05/2014–03/06/2014

### Contact Point Officer for Ret. General John Allen, Former ISAF Commander

To Be Secure Forum, Budva (Montenegro)

- Public Events
- Conference Sessions
- General's Schedule

17/11/2014–24/11/2014

### Administrative Assistant

NATO Parliamentary Assembly (Annual Session), The Hague (Netherlands)

- Working with the delegations during plenary sessions
- Administration
- Protocol

## EDUCATION AND TRAINING

01/09/2009–11/11/2012

### Bachelor's Degree in Political Science and International Relations

University of Donja Gorica, Podgorica (Montenegro)  
 udgedu.me/hs

Political Theory, Political Philosophy, Sociology, History of civilizations, History of Europe, Comparative politics, Modern Political Ideologies, Anthropology, Rhetoric, EU law, International Law, Diplomatic and Consular law, Diplomatic History, International Security Challenges, Intro to Geopolitics, Diplomatic Practice, Diplomatic Negotiation, International Organisations

10/08/2010–05/05/2011

### Certificate from the US State Department (study abroad programme)

American University, Washington DC (United States)

Analysis of the US Foreign Policy, European Foreign and Security Policy, Contemporary Islam and International Relations, World Politics and Human Rights, Foundations of Public Diplomacy, Advanced Spanish

01/09/2012–15/11/2014

### Master's Degree

Erasmus Mundus Global Studies Programme, Vienna (Austria)

#### First Year: Roskilde University, Denmark

-Global Political Economy and Global Civil Society; EU Public Diplomacy

Dissertation topic: EU and The Rift Between the State and Civil Society in Contemporary Algeria: A Prospect of Cooperation?

#### Second year: Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia/University of Vienna, Austria

Project topic: Humanitarian Intervention and Peacekeeping: Reaching an End-State of the MONUSCO in the Congo

-Advanced International Security; Humanitarian Intervention and Peacekeeping; Global History; Globalisation, Stateless warfare and insurgency

Master's Thesis Topic: Stateless warfare in the Balkans: Young Bosnia and the Serbian Irredentism (1908-1914)

02/02/2013–05/02/2013

### Acknowledgement

Atlantic Treaty Organisation's General Assembly, Rome (Italy)

-Voting for YATA Board

-Attending official sessions

08/02/2013–15/02/2013

### Certificate

United Nations Environmental Programme, Nairobi (Kenya)

-Took part in UNEP TUNZA Conference on Environment and Health representing EEHYC

10/07/2013–13/07/2013

### Certificate

Model NATO Youth Summit, Brussels (Belgium)

-Represented Canada in NATO-Russia Council as part of YATA Delegation

## PERSONAL SKILLS

### Other language(s)

	UNDERSTANDING		SPEAKING		WRITING
	Listening	Reading	Spoken interaction	Spoken production	
English	C2	C2	C2	C2	C2
	transcripts and certificates				
Russian	C1	C1	C1	C1	C1
	school certificates				
Spanish	C1	C1	C1	C1	C1
Greek	A1	A1	A1	A1	A1
Croatian	C2	C2	C2	C2	C2
Bosnian	C2	C2	C2	C2	C2
French	A2	A2	A2	A2	A2

Levels: A1 and A2: Basic user - B1 and B2: Independent user - C1 and C2: Proficient user  
Common European Framework of Reference for Languages

### Communication skills

Active Listening, Networking, Team Work, Assuming Leadership, Clarity and Concision, Open-mindedness, Respect, Confidence, Responsibility

## Organisational / managerial skills

Ability to react quickly and to adjust to changing circumstances; Attention to detail; Ability to prepare and present reports in a comprehensive, user-friendly format; Ability to work persistently and under pressure, with discipline and high degree of self-motivation; Proactive- demonstrating assertiveness; Ability to adapt to an international environment and different cultures; Team-worker and able to work under minimum supervision

## Computer skills

- MS Word, Excel, Access, Power Point, Adobe Photoshop
- 75wpm typing, Technologically literate
- Web 2.0 and new media marketing skills

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

## Publications

- "Is the Mission Truly Accomplished?"-Atlantic Treaty Association's publication on reconciliation in the Balkans (Atlantic Voices Nov. 2013)[http://issuu.com/atlantic\\_treaty\\_association/docs/vol.\\_3\\_\\_no.\\_11\\_\\_november\\_2013\\_](http://issuu.com/atlantic_treaty_association/docs/vol._3__no._11__november_2013_)
- European Environment and Health Youth Coalition Good Practice Document on Advancing Youth Participation in European Environment and Health Process
- "The Rift Between the State and Civil Society in Algeria"-Roskilde University Master's project