



universität
wien

MASTERARBEIT / MASTER'S THESIS

Titel der Masterarbeit / Title of the Master's Thesis

„Populist policy discourses and their effects on
democracy in Japan: Hashimoto Tōru and the Kimigayo
Ordinance policy discourse“

verfasst von / submitted by

Andreas Eder, BA

angestrebter akademischer Grad / in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts (MA)

Wien, 2015 / Vienna 2015

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt /
degree programme code as it appears on
the student record sheet:

A 066 843

Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt /
degree programme as it appears on
the student record sheet:

Masterstudium Japanologie

Betreut von / Supervisor:

Univ.-Prof. Mag. Dr. Wolfram Manzenreiter

Populist policy discourses and their effects on democracy in Japan

Hashimoto Tōru and the Kimigayo Ordinance policy
discourse

Andreas Eder,

Vienna 2015

Acknowledgements

Thank you! Thank you to all who went the path to the completion of this thesis with me. First of all, I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to Univ.-Prof. Mag. Dr. Wolfram Manzenreiter, who gave me a lot of freedom in conceptualizing this thesis and let me work in peace, only to be pushing me at the right moments. Without his guidance, problems would have remained seemingly too big to resolve and the thesis could have never been completed to my satisfaction.

Furthermore, I want to extend great thanks and love to Valerie who helped me with patience, emotional and practical support. Your ability to bring structure to my knotted thoughts was crucial for writing all this. Without my parents love and support my studies also would not have been possible: For this I am forever thankful. For being a great intellectual encouragement and for his continuous emotional and practical support I also want to thank my brother Thomas. Last but not least I want to thank all the people who have been contributing to the completion of this thesis in various ways, especially: Elias Kaneko, Tsuyoshi Kawahara, all the people at the Japanese Study department and all those showing compassion for cancelled get-togethers or evenings spent whining about slow progress.

Thank you!

Table of content

Acknowledgements	5
Figures	8
Tables	8
1. Introduction: Hashimoto Tōru – A populist rebel on the rise?	9
1.1. Hashimoto’s political career	13
1.2. Conceptualizing the Kimigayo Ordinance: A policy issue and its setting	17
2. The Theory: Populism, a concept difficult to pin down	21
2.1. A brief history of populism research: From typologies to finding an inherent core	21
2.2. Populism as a movement, a method of achieving power or an ideology	23
2.3. Populism as discourse practice	26
2.4. Local populism and the language of populism in Japan	32
3. The Method: Towards the study of populist narratives	34
3.1. Qualitative Discourse Analysis of a policy discourse	34
3.2. Quantitative policy discourse analysis: The Narrative Policy Framework	35
3.2.1. The Narrative Policy Framework	36
3.2.2. Codebook and codesheet	37
3.3. The sample: Policy narratives for and against the Kimigayo Ordinance	43
4. The Kimigayo Ordinance discourse: A populist policy discourse?	47
4.1. The antagonistic rupture in Japan’s society	47
4.2. The demands of the Kimigayo Ordinance discourse	54
4.2.1. The pro-ordinance discourse I: Conservative demands	55
4.2.2. The pro-ordinance discourse II: Neo-liberal demands	58
4.2.3. First conclusions: The anti-ordinance discourse, the extension of equivalential chains and the Kimigayo Ordinance	61
4.3. The People (<i>fumin</i>): Empty signifiers and the creation of popular identities in the Kimigayo Ordinance discourse	63
5. Narrative structures in the pro-ordinance and anti-ordinance policy discourse	68
5.1. Intercoalitional differences in narrative structure, narrativity and effectiveness in persuasion	68
5.1.1. Characters	69
5.1.2. There is only one truth: Evidence in the policy discourses	77
5.1.3. Plots: Into a bleak future	78
5.1.4. Narrative strategies: Constructing a moralistic and wide policy reality	83
5.2. Intracoalitional cohesion and its relation to effectiveness in persuasion	87

5.3. Conclusions on narrative structure and strategies	91
6. The Kimigayo policy narratives and the shaping of democracy.....	93
6.1. Concepts of democracy and how democracy can be effected	93
6.2. Democratic policy beliefs and solutions in the pro-ordinance and anti-ordinance policy discourse	96
6.2.1. Policy beliefs.....	97
6.2.2. Solutions and intracoalitional comparisons	100
6.3. Conclusions: The Kimigayo Ordinance policy discourse and its effects on democracy	103
7. Concluding remarks: Populist policy discourses, populist narratives and their meaning for democracy	106
References.....	110
Primary sources	117
APPENDIX A – Codesheet	120
APPENDIX B – Codebook	122
APPENDIX C – Intercoder reliability.....	126
APPENDIX D – Abstract (English)	127
APPENDIX E – Abstract (German).....	127
APPENDIX F – Academic CV.....	128

Figures

Figure 1. Scale for democratic policy beliefs.....	43
Figure 2. Number of Policy Narratives (divided by policy stance).	44
Figure 3. Document categories of pro- and anti-ordinance policy narratives	45
Figure 4. Distribution of analyzed texts in the years 2011-2015	46
Figure 5. Formula for calculating democratic policy beliefs of narratives	99

Tables

Table 1. Codesheet: Measurement of victim characters (villain characters accordingly)	39
Table 2. Codesheet: Measurement of story types	39
Table 3. Codesheet: Measurement of policy solutions	40
Table 4. Codesheet: Measurement of science/evidence	40
Table 5. Codesheet: Measurement of causal mechanisms.....	41
Table 6. Codesheet: Measurement of scope of conflict	41
Table 7. Empty signifiers used in texts	64
Table 8. Range of use of characters between advocacy coalitions and Hashimoto specifically.....	70
Table 9. Attempts of casting individuals or groups as heroes.....	74
Table 10. Usage of evidence in the advocacy coalition's narratives and by Hashimoto specifically	78
Table 11. Stories of change found in narratives by both coalitions and Hashimoto specifically	79
Table 12. Stories of power found in narratives by both coalitions and Hashimoto specifically	81
Table 13. Causal mechanisms as used by the two coalitions and Hashimoto specifically.....	84
Table 14. Scope of conflict as deployed by advocacy coalitions and Hashimoto specifically	86
Table 15. Intracoalitional comparison of narrative elements and strategies	88
Table 16. Range and means of character usage (pro-ordinance coalition)	89
Table 17. Means of character usage in Hashimoto's narratives according to publication medium	89
Table 18. Intracoalitional comparison of narrative strategies	91
Table 19. Different victim characterizations by the advocacy coalitions and Hashimoto specifically..	97
Table 20. Different villain characterizations by the advocacy coalitions and Hashimoto specifically ..	98
Table 21. Intercoalitional comparison in underlying democratic policy beliefs	100
Table 22. Intercoalitional comparison of democratic policy solutions	102
Table 23. Intracoalitional comparison of democratic policy beliefs and democratic solutions.....	103

1. Introduction: Hashimoto Tōru – A populist rebel on the rise?

Political scientist Benjamin Arditi so vividly describes populism as the drunken, awkward dinner guest nobody really knows how to deal with (Arditi 2005:90). It seemed in 2011, when I first stumbled upon then-mayor of Osaka Hashimoto Tōru, that the dinner party called Japanese politics was still not sure how to deal with the disturbance caused by such a drunken guest. From being a popular TV-personality, Hashimoto had risen to become the most popular politician of Japan in 2012 (Weathers 2014). As populism has always been a core interest of mine, I decided to take a closer look at what such a dinner guest might mean for the dinner party.

Attacking city employees in front of TV cameras (Weathers 2014:82-83), speaking about the necessity to “eradicate” [sic!] unfit teachers (text_62), or directly calling teachers refusing to stand for the national anthem “idiots” (*bakayarō*) (text_22), Hashimoto conducted numerous actions that did not fit together with classical imaginaries of local politicians in Japan as competent but uncharismatic former bureaucrats (Reed 1981:143). His policy decisions were not falling behind in controversy. For example, he cut the budget of many public institutions to the bone and inquired into whether public employees have tattoos and if so, asked them to resign. The policy at the core of this thesis caused similar uproar by trying to tighten control on teachers, in order to make them stand for and sing the Japanese national anthem – the Kimigayo – at school ceremonies with it (Weathers 2014:82-83, 88-89). The fact that amidst all these disputes, or because of them, Hashimoto managed to become the most popular politician in Japan for quite some time (Weathers 2014:77), brought up many questions about the nature of Japanese politics and politics in general. The questions researched in this thesis are: Why is it that Hashimoto is so successful and why is he able to persuade so many to see in him an alternative to existing forces in Japanese politics? And what does this mean for Japanese politics and democracy?

As the depiction that Hashimoto is a populist is common in Japanese research on him (Yoshida 2011; Matsutani 2011, 2012; Tadano 2012; Takayose 2011; Zenkyō et al. 2012)¹, I started to look into the possibility of using the concept of populism as a tool for analysis. I came to the conclusion that political theorist Ernesto Laclau (1935-2014), offers the best approach to doing so. He suggests that it is the creation of a popular identity, “the people”, which makes populism so effective. Populism must therefore be seen as a tool for analyzing how such a popular identity is constructed in a discourse by deploying a mode of articulation leading to the incorporation of various demands in a so-called “equivalential chain”. This chain is not built by finding the smallest common denominator among the demands, but by adding a “negative” component, which unites them through the fact that they are all

¹ More often than not, the term populism is connected with adjectives like “neo-liberal” (*shin jiyūshugi*), “right-wing” (*uyoku*), or “neo-conservatism” (*shin hoshushugi*), and in analyzing Hashimoto’s policies these attributions rather than populism are used as analytical tools (e.g. Tanaka 2012).

not answered by a common “other”. Through an inversion of the relationship, the popular identity is later not perceived as constructed, but as a real-existing group and the chain of demands is seen as the expression of this group’s reality (Laclau 2007:93). In other words, those feeling affiliated to the popular identity do not see their identity stemming from a process deciding what demands they want to pose and against whom, but feel that the demands of the chain represent a natural reality.

The drunken dinner guest is, therefore, “drunk” in the sense that he creates unity in a previously heterogeneous group against a common antagonistic “other”. The “sober” dinner guests, in turn, are seen as having lost the ability to create such a popular identity and hence, see the drunken dinner guest’s perspective as unusual. It is important to note that we can only speak of populism in a discourse – in the case of the example, the discussion happening between the dinner guests –, and not term the dinner guest as being *a* populist. While someone, or a group must trigger such a discursive fixation through a populist political practice, he or she does not become a populist, as not every discourse partaken by that person or group must be shaped in such a way.²

But how to examine such an identity construction and its meaning for democracy?

As examining the whole dinner discussion – all of politics in Japan, is clearly too much to handle, the area of analysis must be confined somehow. Therefore I argue that political discourse as a whole consists of numerous policy³ discourses, in which issues of certain sub-systems⁴ (McBeth et al. 2014:239) are negotiated. By explaining the need for a certain policy (demand) – e.g. the regulation of teachers’ conduct towards national symbols – the policy is set into a societal context and society itself is shaped by creating policy realities.⁵ During this process, questions like the following and respective answers, are negotiated: Why is a certain policy necessary, why does the problem occur and how can it be fixed? If we posit that, in a society, political actors try to answer to or unite the demands brought forward by smaller or larger groups of people, we can see that policies are the field in which those demands get negotiated. This creation of meaning of a policy and the process of embedding it in society represents a policy discourse.⁶

² The reasons why this distinction is important will be laid out in more detail later. For now though, this is explained by simply wanting to avoid a moralization against *a* politician (e.g. Mouffe 2005).

³ Policy describes – in separation to polity and politics – the content side of the three dimensional word “politics”, while “polity” describes the structural aspects of politics, like things written in the constitution, “politics” describes the conflictual process of interacting actors with different preferences, goals and ideas (Schubert/Bandelow 2009:4-5). The content side of politics aims to influence citizens directly, by implementing a certain law for instance, or symbolically making a statement (Schubert/Bandelow 2009:4). Public policy is seen as including all decisions a government – national or local – or an equivalent authority makes (Weible 2014:4). Additionally, though, any actor arguing for or against a certain law or something similar is seen as making a policy proposal (Schubert/Bandelow 2009:4) and therefore partaking in a policy discourse.

⁴ Regulating teachers’ conduct in schools would be part of the sub-system of public education for instance.

⁵ Policy reality is defined in this thesis as the discursively shaped reality around a given policy. In this reality, it is constructed which actors are relevant and what problems have to be seen in connection to the policy.

⁶ The understanding of discourse in this thesis builds heavily on the insights by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, who see discourse as not merely a linguistic practice, but finding its material representation in “real life” – by

Further, each policy discourse possibly contributes to the aforementioned identity construction, but to a different extent. Following Laclau, who stated that discourses can have different degrees of populism (Laclau 2007:154), I claim to have found a policy discourse of a highly populist nature – the policy discourse around the “Ordinance obligating the standing for and singing of the Kimigayo national anthem” (referred to as “Kimigayo Ordinance” from now on).⁷ By enacting this ordinance on 3 June 2011 in the Osaka prefectural assembly, Osaka prefecture became the first to explicitly regulate the obligatory singing of the national anthem (Kimigayo) while standing respectfully in front of the national flag (Hinomaru) for teachers at public school events (Kazuo/Masanori 2011:#1). The main part will show how this policy discourse constructs a popular identity around the empty signifier “the people”, which explains observations of a “neo-conservative” support-base of Hashimoto (Matsutani 2012). The fact that Hashimoto references “the people” (*kokumin*, *ippan no hito* or most prominently *fumin*) in the discourse at hand, was a necessary precondition that made it possible to choose the discourse for the analysis with populism to begin with (Stavrakakis 2005:231).

For understanding the reasons for the concrete mixed-method⁸ approach applied in this thesis, two citations found in populism theory are essential. First, “if populism is a mode of representation compatible with liberal-democratic politics, the latter is not left untouched” (Arditi 2005:78). The effects of populism on democracy, therefore, are the main reason for studying populism in the first place. Second, the formation of “the people” alone does not tell us all there is about these effects. As populism expert Francisco Panizza has stated, “the ultimate impact of the [political] leader’s appeal depends on the particular story that he/she relates or embodies [...]” (Panizza 2005:20). In other words, in addition to the populist mode of articulation, the concrete story told around an issue also contributes to or possibly minimizes the effect a political leader has. A rather new framework in the political science sub-field of public policy research will help bridge the study of populism, stories told and the effects on democracy: the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF).

Observing a growing consumerism and marketing appetite in post-industrial societies in recent decades, as well as an increasing reach⁹ of narratives through modern communication technology

“practices directly connected to the discursive logic that formulates them” (Stavrakakis 2005:232). Each discourse is further seen as “providing (subject) positions with which social agents can identify” and discourse theory as the investigation into the way “in which social practices articulate and contest the discourses that constitute social reality” (Howarth/Stavrakakis 2000:3).

⁷ The ordinance is named in different terms: Kimigayo kiritsu seishō gimuzuke jōrei 君が代起立斉唱義務付け条例 大阪府の施設における国旗の掲揚に関する条例 or 大阪府の施設における国旗の掲揚及び教職員による国歌の斉唱に関する条 or for short Kokki kokka ni kansuru jōrei 国旗・国歌に関する条例 or Kimigayo kiritsu jōrei 君が代起立条例.

⁸ “Mixed-method” is defined here in the sense that materials collected for the understanding of a phenomenon are analyzed using both qualitative and quantitative methods of data analysis (Kuckartz 2014:30-32).

⁹ Hashimoto’s success is often attributed to him being media-savvy, as exemplified by his successful presence on the social network Twitter with 1.3 million followers, compared to PM Abe’s 479 thousand. The reach of his narratives can, therefore, surely be seen as extensive. See the twitter-accounts @t_ishin (https://twitter.com/t_ishin) and @AbeShinzo (<https://twitter.com/AbeShinzo>) (numbers as of 04.05.2015).

(McBeth et al. 2014:225), Narrative Policy Framework scholars have described the rising importance of narratives (stories).¹⁰ Rather than focusing on *what* stories are told and how issues are portrayed (framing) (see Chong/Druckmann 2007), they focus on *how* these stories are told from a structuralist perspective (narration). In other words, narratives are seen as consisting of generalizable elements, like characters, plots, causalities and so forth, different as their content may be.

On a coalitional level, splitting the analyzed texts into two groups (advocacy coalitions), those in favor of a policy and those against it, the differences in quantitative use are further seen as having effects on policy success and persuasiveness (Shanahan et al. 2013:453-454). By analyzing the content of texts making up the two discourses empirically, through a codebook developed inside the NPF, necessary structures of a populist discourse articulation can be observed and differentiated from narrative characteristics not inherently stemming from the populist logic. Combined with insights on the importance of “narrativity”¹¹, which has shown that more extensive usage of narrative elements and strategies makes the narratives more memorable (see Jones 2014a), and which elements and strategies previous NPF research has found to be exceptionally effective in persuasion, this allows a deeper and more nuanced analysis of the policy discourse.

A conceptualization of narratives following the NPF will furthermore prove to be very helpful in quantitatively analyzing the shaping of democracy through the policy discourse. Applying the concept of policy beliefs allows, through calculating the specific use of narrative elements (characters, plots, etc.), a quantitatively measured portrayal of underlying constructions of democracy inside the discourses (Shanahan et al. 2013:460). To do so, I will analyze to what extent majorities and minorities are either portrayed as powerful or powerless villains, victims or heroes by the two advocacy coalitions. Combined with the proposed democratic policy solutions, the shaping of democracy and the effectiveness of the attempt to do so will be looked at. Scholars like political scientist Yoshida Tōru have emphasized the characteristic of populism as being a kind of “story-telling-politics” (*monogatari no seiji*) (Yoshida 2011:55, 59). Therefore, we can hypothesize to find different narrativity in the texts analyzed. Insights already developed inside NPF research will help to put results of the analysis of the discourse in perspective.

After this introductory chapter has familiarized the reader with Hashimoto Tōru and the Kimigayo Ordinance in more detail, I will discuss populism theory and argue for the relevance of Ernesto Laclau’s approach. Then the mixed-method approach of this thesis will be explained in more detail prior to the main analysis. The main part is split into three chapters: The first shows how a policy discourse can be qualitatively analyzed for a discursive formation of a popular identity and attributed

¹⁰ The trend of “idolization” (*aidoruka*) of politics observed in Japanese politics can be seen in the same light (Ōtake 2012:120, 125-129).

¹¹ Various research has found narrative messaging to be more memorable, and therefore, it is hypothesized that stronger usage of narrative elements corresponds with more “effectiveness” in persuasion (e.g. Jones 2014a).

as populist. In the second chapter of the main part the quantitative analysis will further help distinguish what narrative characteristics can be explained by the (found) populist mode of articulation and which are independent of a possible populist nature contributing to “effective” story-telling. In the last chapter of the main part, measured insights on the policy discourse as well as theoretical consideration about the relationship between populism and democracy will lead to the conclusion on how the Kimigayo Ordinance policy discourse contributes to the shaping of Japan’s democracy.

1.1. Hashimoto’s political career

To start with, the story of how a lawyer from Osaka became the most popular politician in Japan needs to be told. Raised in a single-mother household with six siblings and bullied in high school, Hashimoto early on overcame obstacles and in the end made it into Waseda University. He then passed the bar examination on the second try in 1996. Only ten months later, he had his own law firm and was quickly discovered as being fit for television. By 2001 he was a well-liked TV-personality, attracting attention with provocative statements and a charismatic personality. This, in connection with his appearance and background, brought him lots of popularity and made him a recruiting target for the LDP and local business leaders to run for the 2008 gubernatorial election (Weathers 2014:81). Finding Osaka in a state of crisis, falling behind in nation-wide comparisons on rates of employment and public security, gave Hashimoto a good chance of winning. Finding a target to blame in Osaka’s civil servants and combining it with an anti-Tokyo sentiment – something said to be very effective in Osaka (Komatsu 2012:26) – made his campaign a winning combination and brought him his first political post (Komatsu 2012:31).

During his campaign and also thereafter, Hashimoto frequently reminded and emphasized to prospective voters his status as a political outsider.¹² Often drawing conclusions from his experiences gathered outside of politics as a lawyer (e.g. text_13), or on occasion mentioning accounts from his family life, like being scolded by his mother for how he talks (Weathers 2009:87-88), Hashimoto built this image as an “outsider” and *futsū no hito* (“regular guy”). Japanese media picked up some “folksy” tales of Hashimoto’s upbringing and his own family life (Weathers 2014:81) and surely contributed to this image. A controversy around an *Asahi Shunkan* article in 2012 about Hashimoto’s possible *buraku*-ancestry brought his biography to the forefront again and Hashimoto was left with sympathy while the Tokyoite *Asahi Shunkan* was widely scrutinized for acting in a discriminatory way (Johnston 2015b:#9-#10).

¹² A political outsider is someone who gains political prominence not through or in association with an established, competitive party, but as a political independent or in association with new or newly competitive parties. It is important to note, that marginality of a party can serve in the same way as qualifying as an outsider and not fact but perception of status is key in qualifying as a political outsider. Mavericks, meaning politicians active in an established party, but going against its traditional structure or values can also have an outsider-status (Barr 2009:33).

In January of 2008, Hashimoto became, with only 38 years of age, Japan's youngest governor (Weathers 2014:82) and arguably one of "the most famous local executives of the last couple of years" (Trifu 2013:26). Upon starting his career as governor, he quickly cultivated his image as a harsh and strict reformer, disposing of those who supposedly stand in the way of positive change. His term as governor was branded by struggles against the governor of Hyogo prefecture about the Itami airport, against the prefectural assembly about relocating prefectural buildings, and the local administration about working conditions (Trifu 2013:26). Through all his political career Hashimoto deployed a neo-liberal agenda, trying to slim government expenses and enforcing competition, for instance among public schools, and aiming at the restriction of labor union rights (see Weathers 2014).¹³ Combining such cost-cutting, neo-liberal strategies with conservative darling policies¹⁴, like the Kimigayo Ordinance (see Babb 2012), and short-term support for the development of nuclear weapons (Shen 2014:56), seemingly made a winning combination. Approval ratings showed a widely satisfied and rising sentiment with Hashimoto's governance all through his term. A survey by Matsutani Mitsuru among 772 prospective voters in Osaka prefecture for instance showed constant approval among those strongly supporting Hashimoto from the start of his term to 2011 (Matsutani 2012:105).¹⁵

In 2010, approaching the 2011 double election, with both the post of governor and mayor of Osaka to fill, Hashimoto decided to form the Ōsaka ishin no kai (One Osaka)¹⁶ based mainly on his signature policy, the Osaka metropolitan restructuring plan (Ōsaka-to kōsō). This plan called for the abolition of Osaka prefecture and Osaka city and unifying the 24 ward, together with Sakai city into an Osaka metropolitan area consisting of only five to seven larger wards. This would elevate Osaka to the same rank as Tokyo and would bring, according to advocates of the plan, more cost-efficiency, economic recovery and stronger local authority and according to the, in this case, united opposition a decrease in quality in government services (Weathers 2014:84-85). The plan was further embedded in a call for stronger decentralization and the strengthening of local governments' authority. A statement

¹³ Hashimoto on one occasion tried to implement an ordinance in 2012 expelling all union activities from school buildings, which was in the end deemed unconstitutional and lead to the city paying compensation to unions (Johnston 2014b:#1).

¹⁴ Publicity stunts like his shouting match with anti-Korean group Zaitokukai leader Makoto Sakurai, are something Hashimoto tries to utilize in order to show strong leadership and bravery (Johnston 2014d), but can maybe also be seen as efforts to distance himself from the extreme right and not to seem too conservative. Matsutani has also shown that conservative, maybe even nationalistic, sentiments are to be found among Hashimoto's voters (Matsutani 2012:107).

¹⁵ This is supported from another survey in front of the 2011 double election, which found that more than 70 percent of the Osaka residents surveyed were at least somewhat satisfied with Hashimoto's term as governor (Zenkyō et al. 2012:1053).

¹⁶ The reluctance to define oneself as political party, as is reflected in the usage of *kai* ("group", "meeting", "assembly") not *tō* ("party") in the party's name, might also be seen in connection to the construction of an outsider image. The choice of *ishin* ("restoration"), furthermore is clearly referencing the Meiji-Restoration (Kawata/Papp 2013:246). Takayose also cites an interview with Hashimoto in which he compares himself to the "patriots" who overturned the Tokugawa-*bakufu*, also explaining holes in his agenda by stating that they also did not have it all figured out for the new government they wanted to form (Takayose 2011:124).

cited by Weathers also shows one motivation for Hashimoto for this, when he says, “we can’t entrust things to Diet politicians... Isn’t it only the people of Osaka Prefecture who can get this country moving?” (Weathers 2014:84). To further establish One Osaka as a regional power Hashimoto decided to run for the mayoral post and party comrade Matsui Ichirō ran for the post of governor, which they both won with 59 percent and 55 percent respectively (Mori 2012:105-109).¹⁷

As with Koizumi Junichirō – who is often described as the populist predecessor of Hashimoto –, it is proposed that sharing neo-conservative (neo-liberal and conservative) views or tendencies made it possible to get votes from older, more conservative voters, as well as younger, urban, goal-oriented voters of the middle-class (Matsutani 2011:138). What became apparent though in the voter analysis by Zenkyō, Ishibashi and Sakamoto was that in the 2011 double-election both Hashimoto’s and his party colleague Matsui Ichirō’s popularity sank with a rise in voters’ age (Zenkyō et al. 2012:1026). This became also evident in the 2015 referendum on his Osaka metropolitan plan (Ōsaka-to kōsō), in which support by young voters was quite strong, but failed in large part because of the resistance by voters over seventy (N.N. 2015b).

That Osaka, having a “tradition” of electing TV-personalities – the comedians Yokoyama Nokku and Nishikawa Kyōshi had also been elected for the national diet respectively, and the former also as governor in 1995 (Mori 2012:104) –, had elected a TV-personality as governor again, might not be exceptional in itself. The fact though that Hashimoto, partly successfully, took to the national stage with his own party and the “Hashimoto-Boom” stretching beyond the limits of the Osaka region (Mori 2012:105), makes him an exceptional case. As everybody interested in Japanese politics is surely aware of, the life span of national opposition parties in Japan is mostly short and tumultuous. Hashimoto’s record on that matter does not differ here. Together with problems in furthering the realization of his pet project and his very controversial remarks about the Kono statement and the comfort women issue, which drew harsh criticism (Johnston 2012), Hashimoto’s seemingly invincible facade appeared to crumble for the first time.

With his 2012 formation of the Japan Restoration Party (Nippon ishin no kai) together with then-governor of Tokyo Ishihara Shintarō, a grand figure of the Japanese right-wing (e.g. Babb 2012), Hashimoto became a participant in the carousel that is Japan’s ever-changing national party landscape. After the landmark election win of the Democratic Party of Japan (Minshūtō) in 2009, the LDP’s almost uninterrupted rule in post-war Japan was ended and made it look vulnerable for a brief moment in history. On the other hand, a governing record of the DPJ, which was deemed by many as not sufficient, left them both stumbling towards the general election in 2012. In this climate of two flagging giants,

¹⁷ Hashimoto’s fight against his “arch-enemy” from his time as governor, former Osaka mayor Hiramatsu Kunio, himself a previous TV anchor, also brought 60.92 percent of all voters to the urns, which showed a rise in participation of nearly twenty percent compared to the previous mayoral election (Mori 2012:105-109).

many new actors, such as Hashimoto Tōru, stepped in (Pekkanen et al. 2013:3). Political scientist Yoshida Tōru also saw a situation that left room for new parties in the 2012 election. While the DPJ in the 2012 lower house (*shūgiin*) election was struggling to find consistent positions on debated topics and the LDP (Jimintō), gunning to reach power again, focusing on mainly criticizing the DPJ. The ‘twisted parliament’ (*nejire kokkai*) since the upper house election of 2010 – meaning that both the upper and lower house are controlled by different parties – benefited this climate of dissatisfaction (Yoshida 2013:53-55). Matsutani also sees Hashimoto in the tradition of the “reforming governors boom” (*shinkaku būmu*) of the 1970s and the 1990s rise of the reform faction (*kaikakuha*) against the background of a weakening of the traditional parties (Matsutani 2011:134).¹⁸

An unsuccessful campaign in 2014 brought the split between Hashimoto and Ishihara and the end of the Nippon ishin no kai. Hashimoto then decided to form the Ishin no tō (Japan Innovation Party), which did surprisingly well at the Lower House elections in December 2014 (Johnston 2014a:#5), together with Yui no tō – a former part of the Minna no tō (Johnston 2014c). Ishin no tō also made efforts to cooperate with the DPJ, in order to be able to counter the ruling coalition’s forces. In light of Hashimoto’s history of union bashing and the DPJ’s strong ties to Rengo, Japan’s largest nation-wide trade union, this alliance was an unlikely one, and could be predicted to be unstable at best (Johnston 2014a). In March 2014 Hashimoto stepped down as mayor of Osaka, in an effort to strengthen his mandate in a new election and rebuild some confidence in his legislation. He won the election, but was punished by voters with a record low voter turnout of 23.6 percent – partly also due to all other parties except the Japanese Communist Party deciding not to partake in the election with their own candidates (Pohl 2014:41).

Before the May-referendum in 2015 on his Osaka merger plan, Hashimoto seemingly went all-in and declared he would step down if his plan got voted down in the referendum (Johnston 2015a). And so it came. Despite the loss being closer than expected – only 10,000 votes –, Hashimoto kept word and announced his resignation from politics (Johnston 2015c). Since then he has continued to contribute to the aforementioned carrousel of Japanese party politics and split his Osaka fraction from the Ishin no tō (Johnston 2015e). Various rumors considering Hashimoto’s future have been circulating since this announcement.¹⁹ In any way, a complete retirement from politics is not believed by most.

In all this turbulences, Hashimoto introduced a number of policies, almost all controversial to some extent. Nonetheless, among all these policies Weathers considers Hashimoto’s neo-conservative education reforms, which the Kimigayo Ordinance is part of, as his riskiest. Reasons are that their pace and neo-liberal focus would be likely to harm children from low-income households (Weathers 2014:89). In Japanese research as well, his education reforms have been given a serious amount of

¹⁸ This is exactly the climate in which many scholars see populism thriving in (e.g. Mouffe 2005).

¹⁹ One of those rumours being that he will join the Abe government as advisor or minister (Johnston 2015d)

attention (see for instance Niwa 2012, Komatsu 2012, Ichikawa 2012). Here the relationship of education and democracy (Ichikawa 2012, Tanaka et al. (eds.) 2012) and a neo-liberal attack on civil servants and teachers (e.g. Ichikawa 2012) have been viewed as the most important aspect. The Kimigayo Ordinance can be said to take a central role in these analyses (e.g. Niwa 2012). In the following chapter the Kimigayo Ordinance and its background will be explained.

1.2. Conceptualizing the Kimigayo Ordinance: A policy issue and its setting

The Kimigayo Ordinance made Osaka the first prefecture to explicitly regulate the obligatory singing of the national anthem (Kimigayo) while standing respectfully in front of the national flag (Hinomaru) for teachers at public school events (Kazuo/Masanori 2011:#1) and was enacted during the “peak of Japanese populism” in 2011 (Matsutani 2012:103). In May of 2011, after the recent unified local elections had brought Hashimoto a majority in the prefectural assembly, the plan for the introduction of the Kimigayo Ordinance arrived very suddenly, according to education scholar Niwa Tōru (2012:166).

Supposedly enraged by 38 teachers refusing to stand and sing the national anthem in the same year, Hashimoto pushed the plan through the assembly and after a discussion time of fifteen minutes, the ordinance got enacted on 3 June 2011, without consent by any other party in the assembly (Niwa 2012:166-167). Hashimoto claimed to make three policy issues the key topics of the looming 2011 double-election: The Shokuin kihon jōrei (“Basic Employee Ordinance”), the Osaka metropolitan restructuring plan, and the Kyōiku kihon jōrei (“Basic Education Ordinance”), which the Kimigayo Ordinance was mostly seen as a foundation to. In reaction to much criticism against the Kimigayo Ordinance Hashimoto challenged them to just beat him in the election if they dislike the ordinance (text_16). A confrontation he later saw as won, since he got reelected in the election. Critics of Hashimoto’s other policies consider the heavy focus on the Osaka metropolitan restructuring plan, to have overshadowed other issues completely in the fight for the mayoral post and the post of governor, though (Mori 2012:106).

After the Second World War, the Hinomaru and the Kimigayo were banned by the US-occupational forces as symbols of war-time imperialism and aggression. A series of steps, though, led to the continuation and revival of the two symbols (Cripps 1996:81).²⁰ From the 1950s on, the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) declared it *nozomashii* (“desirable”) that the Hinomaru be hung and the Kimigayo sung at school ceremonies and national holidays (Cripps 1996:82). After the return of Okinawa to Japan in 1972, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei (PM 1972-1974) was the first to utter the wish to give legal basis to the Hinomaru and Kimigayo

²⁰ Critics often cite the fact that Germany and Italy had chosen new flags and anthems after the Second World War (Cripps 1996:81).

(Nishimura 1988:155).²¹ A few years later, this found manifestation in a revision of the guidelines of the Ministry of Education, which referred to them as national anthem and flag for the first time (Cripps 1996:83). Little by little a fixation of these two symbols was prepared. Under Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro (PM 1982-1987) and his “Ad hoc council on education” (*rinji kyōiku shingikai*), pressure increased on opponents and the Ministry of Education changed the wording from “desirable” to “must be done” in its 1989 guideline revision (Cripps 1996:83). Lastly, in 1999 the Hinomaru and Kimigayo were legally set as national anthem and flag (Nishimura 1988:155).

During these phases the Japanese government was faced with different levels of resistance. From the late 1960s the local boards of education (*kyōiku iinkai*), which had due to the autonomy of the education administration in post-war government structure some freedom of choice, stood on the opposite side of the Ministry of Education and were reluctant to encourage the singing of the Kimigayo (Nishimura 1988:153). Left leaning teachers’ unions and left parties also quite heavily battled coercion towards national symbols. In the mid-1980s the question of how to position the unions towards the Hinomaru and Kimigayo became a big confrontational issue between the government and teachers’ unions (Cripps 1996:81) and unions themselves. Waning support for left-wing parties problematizing the issue and a split inside Japan’s biggest labor union, the Nikkyōso, in 1995²², left the ministry and conservative forces thinking it had won the dispute (Aspinall 2000:8).

Conflicts nonetheless prevailed, as teachers, mostly those belonging to labor unions close to the communist party, continued to obstruct orders to sing the national anthem. The first punishments for teachers who did not conform to the ministry’s wishes were executed in Koichi prefecture in 1991 (Cripps 1996:83). Media attention rose high in 1998, during the so-called “Tokorozawa incident”, when students of the Tokorozawa High School boycotted the entrance ceremony, because their principal tried to strictly enforce the still somewhat controversial guidelines of the ministry (Aspinall/Cave 2001:78).²³ The opening of legal cases against reluctant teachers since 2003 (e.g. Young 2009), especially under the rigid rule of the former governor of Tokyo Ishihara Shintarō, again brought attention to the matter and left Japan with numerous legal decisions and an ongoing back-and-forth. In 2011, the Supreme Court deemed laws ordering teachers to stand and sing the national anthem constitutional. The fact that they stated something like this would also indirectly restricting freedom

²¹ The Olympic Games held in Tōkyō in 1964 are seen as contributing to the “cleansing” of Japan’s national symbols (see Tagsold 2002).

²² In this split the more radical teachers’ formed Zenkyō and the remaining Nikkyōso, the much bigger faction, gave up resistance against the government’s efforts and made no reference to the issue in its charter (Aspinall 2000:8).

²³ The new principal had been sent to achieve compliance in a school known for its ethos of “freedom, autonomy and independence” and ended up with a lot of media attention, somewhat sympathetic with the students’ fight for freedom (Aspinall/Cave 2001:78)

of thought and freedom of conscience (Asahi Shinbun 4.6.2011:38), again, gave also room for critics of such laws.²⁴

In political science terms, what the Kimigayo Ordinance can be seen as, as an analytical topic, is a policy. To explain the approach taken in this thesis, how policies are conceptualized and studied is important. Simply put, public policy includes all decisions a government – national or local – or an equivalent authority makes. The research of such decisions, called policy process research, therefore can be defined as the “study of the interactions over time between public policy and its surrounding actors, events, and contexts, as well as the policy or policies’ outcomes” (Weible 2014:4-5). Each policy is part of a policy-subsystem (a setting). Such subsystems are populated by different actors (e.g. elected officials, interest groups, experts, judicial actors, the media), who partake in coalitions in order to control a policy issue and are either dominated by one coalition or contested by many (McBeth et al. 2014:238-239). Defining the context in such a way as a policy subsystem enables us to systematically introduce the issue and the actors partaking in the discourse.

The policy sub-system of the Kimigayo Ordinance mainly shows conflict in three areas. Firstly, administrative division of power in the education system between politics and a somewhat autonomous education system formed after the Second World War. The point of conflict here is, whether politics or schools themselves or local boards of education should dictate the course of education. Secondly, administrative division of power between national government institutions and local entities is important. In this area it is questioned whether the Ministry of Education or local authorities, like governors and mayors, should decide on educational reforms. Lastly, ideological questions of individual freedom, Japan’s war-time past and so on, are also still embattled (Weathers 2014:87-89). The following paragraphs will introduce these conflictive areas briefly.

Hashimoto saw one reason for the introduction of the Kimigayo Ordinance in the state of crisis of Osaka’s education system. A nation-wide comparison had shown Osaka’s average test scores to be quite low (Komatsu 2012:31). He had made it his goal to reform the local board of education system early on, as he saw an ineffective system, autonomous from local politics, as one cause for economic trouble in Osaka (Weathers 2014:87-88). In line with this, the Ōsaka ishin no kai explained the necessity of its move to pass the Kimigayo Ordinance with the following goals. Firstly, to foster a cosmopolitan way of thinking (*kokusai kankaku*) and raise awareness for the national flag, and secondly, to stricter enforce working regulations for teachers (Ōsaka ishin no kai 2011). The latter, in other words, meant strengthening authority and “bettering” management inside the education system by strengthening one’s own power. The first claim answered ideological questions by stating that former reservations

²⁴ In 2015 the Tokyo district court also decided to compensate teachers punished for not singing the national anthem (N.N. 2015a).

to the national anthem and flag's imperial past were not relevant anymore and also hindering global exchange between nations.

Hashimoto is seen by many as one of the most vocal proponents arguing that local education boards should not only reflect the will of local mayors or governors but that they should actually be led by them (Nakata 2012:61). The reform of administrative competences in the education system has already followed through different phases. Since a report by the Central Council for Education (Chūō kyōiku shingikai) of the MEXT in 1998 called for the reevaluation of the division of competences between different sub-national entities (e.g. between prefectural and municipal local boards of education) and national government institutions and inside local entities, municipalities were given more responsibilities and rights. For instance, the right of paying and hiring middle-school teachers themselves (Nakata 2012b:59). All in all, most efforts aimed at slimming the national government expenditures. But the fostering competition among municipalities for successful reforms, later employable on a national level, is also seen as a motivation (Nakata 2012b:58-60). During this phase competences were mainly concentrated within schools, meaning that head masters were given more authority in decisions concerning their school. A second report in 2005 then saw a lack of administrative quality control and called for a flexible handling of shared competences between local leaders (mayors, governors) and the local education boards, while still considering the characteristic of political autonomy of the education system.

A shift of competences towards local leaders has been criticized by many as an attack on the autonomy of the post-war education system, and the Kimigayo Ordinance is seen by many as exemplifying such dangers (Nakata 2012b:60-61). As the local boards of education system has been criticized repeatedly for being ineffective, not preventing for instances serious cases of bullying (N.N. 2014), this trend will continue. Another complaint about the local board of education system has been that its members have not been elected democratically and it is therefore not representing the people's will. This leads some to argue for a direct election of local board of education council members and some, probably most, to call for strengthening local leaders' powers (Nakata 2012b:67). The two currently discussed reform packages would either see final responsibility for the local education administration shifted to local government heads or keep it with the boards, but make it possible for local government leaders to choose the people carrying out the day-to-day administrative work (N.N. 2014). Clearly, the trend is moving towards decentralization and strengthening of local authorities. Actors arguing for and against such a development also inhabit the policy sub-system under analysis in this thesis. What will become obvious in the analysis though, is that opponents of the ordinance strongly focus on historical and ideological aspects of Japan's national anthem and flag.

2. The Theory: Populism, a concept difficult to pin down

The Japanese media's focus on the question, whether Hashimoto *is* a populist or not, exemplifies a problem inherent in the use of the concept of populism. Articles both terming Hashimoto as such (Asahi Shinbun, 30 November 2011, 7, evening paper) and denying this, by differentiating Hashimoto from populists like Koizumi Junichirō and Kawamura Takashi (Asahi Shinbun, 1 December 2012, 17, morning paper), are prevalent in the left-leaning *Asahi Shinbun*. In an article from 2012, the *Yomiuri Shinbun* also leaves the question open, whether Hashimoto is to be seen as a charismatic leader or a theatrical populist (*Yomiuri Shinbun*, 9 June 2012, 1, *chōkan*). What I will conclude in this chapter, though, is that rather than asking whether Hashimoto *is* a populist, which more often than not leads to unsatisfactory answers, we should ask whether his discourses are following a populist mode of articulation.

The often ascribed vagueness of populism has led many to disregard it as a fruitful concept. This, in part, stems from the incoherent and sometimes wildly inappropriate use of the word by journalists, politicians and others, who simply use it to discredit a political opponent or a policy not to the personal liking.²⁵ This has led some scholars to call populism one of the “most used and abused terms inside and outside of academia” (Mudde/Rovira Kaltwasser 2013:1). A rigorous definition of populism seeing it as a tool in analyzing a discourse, following Ernesto Laclau (2005, 2007), will nonetheless, show the benefit of the utilization of populism, as it can bring to light, how populism can construct the very people it claims to represent. Before laying out this approach, a brief history of populism research and discussion of competing definitions of populism will make evident why Laclau's approach is favored in this thesis.

2.1. A brief history of populism research: From typologies to finding an inherent core

A brief history of populism research will exemplify the problems of concept formation and will show how populism research today got to where it is. The first phenomena explained by the concept of populism are mostly seen in the closing years of the nineteenth century with the emergence of the so-called “Populist Party” in the US and the Narodniki in Russia (Mudde/Rovira Kaltwasser 2013:3). These self-ascribed “populist”²⁶ movements – as different as even those two have been – were followed by numerous phenomena being termed with the same name all over the globe in the years thereafter and scholars trying to make sense of them.

²⁵ To give a few examples: Western, as well as Japanese, journalists and commentators depict Hashimoto in great variation, as being either a populist, as seen in the German newspapers *Zeit* or *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (Lill 2012, N.N. 2012b), a nationalist (Ghelli 2012), a “charismatic outsider”, in the British *Guardian* (N.N. 2012a), or a “non-politician” (Banyan 2012). No matter the terminological differences though, all found him to be different – a political “other” inside the “otherness” that is Japan, so to speak (see the before and also Köhler 2012).

²⁶ *Narod* meaning something similar to the German concept of *Volk* (“people”) in Russian (Taggart 2000:48)

The Great Depression of the 1930s brought up a number of populist leaders in Latin America, such as Juan Perón (1895-1974), who utilized a reference to “the people” instead of claiming to represent the lower class, in order to form multi-class coalitions. In the European context, populism only reared its head at the end of the last century, while in North America different manifestations took hold between the 1930s and the 1970s (Mudde/Rovira Kaltwasser 2013:3-4). While South-East Asia and East-Asia saw some of their politicians being analyzed with populism starting around the 1990s (see Mizuno/Phongpichit 2009), populism really only entered Japan’s political discourse with Koizumi Junichirō (PM 2001-2006) and the emergence with European right-wing populism.²⁷ The description of arguably very different phenomena as populist, from contexts ranging from Latin America to East Asia, showed the problem that political scientist and philosopher Giovanni Sartori had described as conceptual travelling. This means that concepts get applied to an excessive amount of cases, which, in turn, leads to a distortion of the used concept (Sartori 1970:1034-1036). This brought up the desire of many scholars to define populism as a consistent concept.

Historically, Edward A. Shils was the first to offer a description of populism as a consistent and global phenomenon in the 1950s, which he mainly saw as characterized by an opposition sentiment towards political establishments (Taggart 2000:12). Countering this in 1969, Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner doubted the consistency of populist phenomena in general and emphasized the contextuality of different phenomena all described as populist. From Gellner and Ionescu’s approach of populism defined as a contextual phenomenon, though, a shift occurred to a denial of a universal essence of populism and the building of “taxonomies of different populisms” (Taggart 2000:7). Especially Margaret Canovan – the starting point of every current populism theory – favored a typology of manifestations, for instance a categorization into agrarian and political populism. This approach, based on radial categorization of phenomena, stemming from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1889-1951) idea of family resemblance, sees a phenomenon as conceptualized on the basis of various defining attributes, which not all cases need to share. This building of sub-groups which do not share all characteristics but “live” under the same roof can lead, though, to conceptual stretching, which means that concepts get broadened too much. Instead of a generalizable definition, this leads to a distortion of the meaningful content of a concept (Sartori 1970:1034-1036; 1051).²⁸

This typology-building is, therefore, often criticized for lacking a clear conceptual core and explicit analytical usage of the term populism. By simply looking “at alleged cases of populism in an attempt to extract a set of positive definitional characteristics that could provide a distinctive group of attributes to characterize the phenomenon” (Panizza 2005:2-3), two problems would become evident.

²⁷ European right-wing populism also being the main influence on the “image” of populism in Japanese society according to acclaimed political scientist Ōtake Hideo (Ōtake 2012:110-112).

²⁸ The development of typologies of populism also features in Japanese scholarship (see Ōtake 2012).

One, for the process of allegation some assumptions need to preexist the analysis. Secondly, the previously mentioned problem of conceptual stretching is looming large over this approach, as small similarities become sufficient in order to fit into a typology, too many cases become part of a phenomenon. Similarly, so-called historicist approaches to populism are, for instance, criticized by Francisco Panizza since, as populism would get linked to a “certain historical period, social formation, historical process or set of historical circumstances”, the lack of an analytical core and a failing justification of “self-imposed narrow geographical and temporal limits, which exclude earlier and later cases of populism” would be highly problematic (Panizza 2005:3). Out of these early approaches conceptualizations using a classical categorization for concept formulation have developed. According to these approaches, a concept should be defined through sufficient characteristics shared by all “family members”. It aims at finding the lowest common denominator (Mudde/Rovira Kaltwasser 2013:7). These approaches will be discussed from here on out.

2.2. Populism as a movement, a method of achieving power or an ideology

Against the still existing reservations by some scholars (e.g. Priester 2011), recent works have tried to define a universal populism, which should, regardless of context, enable to differentiate populism from other political phenomena (Priester 2011:190). It is observable that it is “possible to identify an analytical core around which there is a significant degree of academic consensus” (Panizza 2005:1). This consensus concerning an inherent core in populism is emphasized by most recent populism theories. Said core, as the common ground in most conceptualizations, is the consistent allusion to a confrontation between “the people” and “the establishment”. Everything that should be defined as a manifestation of populism criticizes the existence of powerful minorities, which in one way or another are obstructing the will of “the people” (Mudde/Rovira Kaltwasser 2013:8; Stavrakakis 2005:230). How this core is further defined though is split into various streams of research, which will be laid out in the following pages.

The first stream of populism research focuses on the issue of *who* a certain political movement, party or individual is able to mobilize as a support base. Seeing the core of populism in a specific “movement character” stems largely from the work of Martin Lipset. He proposed to analyze populism in Latin America in a similar way as fascism in Europe, as a particular political movement.²⁹ The difference is, that the latter relied on the middle-class and the former on the lower classes

²⁹ This surely contributed to the image of populism as being something like fascism. This can also be observed in the Japanese case. In the case of Hashimoto, a term was even coined out of his name and the word “fascism”: *hashizumu* (Weathers 2014:83). Closeness to fascism has also been attributed to former Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō (Ōtake 2012:110). Ōtake criticizes this and concludes that a more positive bottom-up conceptualization of populism stemming from the U.S.-experience would be more in line with Japanese populism, as Japanese would also share with U.S. Americans a “naive” [sic!] trust in democratic institutions combined with a skepticism towards acting politicians (Ōtake 2009:207-208).

(Mudde/Rovira Kaltwasser 2013:5). In other words, this stream of research sees the core of populism as it being supported by a group of people stemming from a specific social base (Laclau 2007:117). Empirical research, though, showed that supporters of individuals, groups or movements described as populist have a multi-class structure.³⁰ That this multi-class structure could be the core of populism found a lot of criticism, since every mass party would only achieve their size by being multi-class structured (Mudde/Rovira Kaltwasser 2013:5). Furthermore, focusing on organizational differences would make a distinction between populist phenomena possible, but not distinguish populists from non-populists, as Robert Barr criticized (Barr 2009:42). Many, like Ernesto Laclau, therefore concluded that since the social base for political movements all equally termed populist were so different, the specificity of populism surely had to lie outside of its constituency (Laclau 2011:145).

One answer to this conclusion of a rejection of a constitutive social base as core was to view populism rather “as a multi-class movement organized around a charismatic leader” (Mudde/Rovira Kaltwasser 2013:5). This second stream of populism theory, hence, sees populism as a strictly political phenomenon (Priester 2011:192), not reliant on a specific social base but rather a political project of building and maintaining power (Weyland 2001:12). Political scientist Robert Barr emphasizes, though, that populism should not be merely seen as rhetoric or style³¹, but rather a strategy of a “mass movement led by an outsider or maverick seeking to gain or maintain power by using anti-establishment appeals and plebiscitarian linkages” (Barr 2009:38). Therefore the constituency is formed by a leader, who focuses on appealing to voters through an anti-establishment sentiment, whoever that establishment consists of, *and* a special form of linkage. Plebiscitarianism, as an “extreme” variant of electoral linkages, vests a single individual with the task of representing “the people”. The leader provides options the electorate can decide upon and builds an emphasis on accountability through an extremely vertical form of linkage (Barr 2009:36).³² In other words, the social constituency of populism is seen as developing out of the construction of the “us-versus-them” dichotomization, depending on the context (Barr 2009:39-40).

The focus of this stream of research lying on a leader figure, was criticized, for narrowing the analysis to the supply-side of populism. This led to the third stream of populism research, for which Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser offer the core texts. They conceive populism as an ideology. As their approach would assume that “the formation, propagation, and transformation of the populist

³⁰ As research by Matsutani suggests this, is also the case for Hashimoto who finds his strongest support base among wealthier people, but an almost equally strong support in lower-income households (Matsutani 2012:105-106).

³¹ Arditi also criticizes an understanding of populism as a mere style of political rhetoric or as a mode of persuasion. The usage of everyday expressions, tropes, themes, and images in order to mobilize a large group can rather be seen as a general characteristic of modern politics, with the attacking of elites also being a democratic characteristic of those trying to achieve success (Arditi 2005:79).

³² The opposite would be participatory linkages (Barr 2009:36).

ideology depends on skillful political entrepreneurs and social groups, who have emotional and rational motives for adhering to the populist ideology” (Mudde/Rovira Kaltwasser 2013:10), they would not underestimate the role of the circumstances that make it possible for a certain method of gaining power to succeed.

Their proposal for conceptualizing populism in such a way relies on the method of classical categorization explained above, trying to find a “minimal definition”. Populism, according to their most recent definition, is

[...] a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people. This means that populism is in essence a form of moral politics, as the distinction between “the elite” and “the people” is first and foremost moral (i.e. pure vs. corrupt), not situational (e.g. position of power), socio-cultural (e.g. ethnicity, religion), or socio-economic (e.g. class). Moreover, both categories are to a certain extent “empty signifiers” (Laclau 1977), as it is the populists who construct the exact meanings of “the elite” and “the people”. (Mudde/Rovira Kaltwasser 2013:8-9)

Initially, authors like Karin Priester criticized this approach maintaining that populism could not be defined as a substantial ideology or procedural strategy. It is instead considered to be more in line with a “way of thought” or “mentality”. Priester differentiates here that dissimilar to ideology, which she defines as reflexive self-interpretation, mentality has a fluid, strongly affect-laden content, not causally related to practice (Priester 2011:190-191). Nonetheless, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser introduce all important core concepts of which populism consists: “the people”, “the elite”, and “the general will”³³ plus the two direct opposites to populism, namely elitism and pluralism (Mudde/Rovira Kaltwasser 2013:9).

The above-mentioned most recent definition of the term reacted to the initial criticism. Populism was now more precisely defined as a “thin-centered” ideology, building on the work of Michael Freeden. He differentiated full ideologies, which themselves would have to give sufficient answers on a broad variety of issues perceived in a society, and “thin-centered” ideologies. The latter are such that can easily be attached to other ideologies, such as liberalism or socialism (Freeden 1998:750). Populism therefore becomes a “neighbor ideology” to others like neo-liberalism or

³³ Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser develop “the general will” as a *volonté générale*, a concept dating back to Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). Rousseau differentiated between a *volonté générale* (“general will”), a *volonté de tous* (“will of all”) and a *volonté particulière* (“particular will”). While the will of all is nothing more than the sum of all the egoistic particular wills, the general will is a hypothetical will aimed at the common good of the society. This goes together with a distinction between good citizens (*citoyen*) interested in the common good and self-interested people (*bourgeois*) (Schmidt 2010:85). Hashimoto makes a quite similar case for how a natural political will constitutes itself in a society (text_10).

socialism and is shared for “rational” reasons by a certain group of people. At this point, Ernesto Laclau’s critique interferes. As he argues, if a group is chosen as the smallest unit of analysis, populism would become an ideology shared or a type of mobilization of an already existing group. It would be the expression of a social reality (Laclau 2007:72-73). In his belief, though, populism should be understood as constituting the social agent itself, not being a mere expression of the latter (Laclau 2005:32-33).

Laclau further argues against a clear distinction between rhetoric and ideology. Since through rhetoric operation itself subjects were constituted, rhetoric would be “the anatomy of the ideological world” rather than something to distinguish it from. This would mean that only through rhetoric, ideology can be built and transported in the first place and in this way would make a distinction meaningless. Laclau also speaks against a clear separation of ideology and movement, as this would follow a separation of ideas *of* and actions *by* people, argued against in his discourse theory. In the discourse theory developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in *Hegemony and socialist strategy: Towards a radical democratic politics* (1985), discursive meaning is defined as not only finding its expression in linguistic elements but also in materialized actions (Laclau 2007:12-13).

2.3. Populism as discourse practice

What makes famous political theorist Ernesto Laclau’s post-structural approach to populism the “weapon of choice” in this thesis, are the great insights it offers into the formation of collective political identities. Counter to approaching a certain group as given and rationally adhering to a populist ideology, he proposes that populism should be thought of as the very way that constitutes the unity of a given group. Therefore, demands formulated in a society should be chosen as the smallest unit of analysis (Laclau 2007:72-74). Following this, populism is seen as a discursive practice, a mode or logic of articulation of such demands. Such logic is understood as constituting the social agent itself, not being a mere expression of the latter (Laclau 2005:32-33). In this approach it is accepted to some extent that there is no common essence to be found in all cases described as populist. Rather it is proposed to focus on a “*symptomal* reading of discursive structure [...] and then proceed to explore the modalities of discourse with which populism can be associated” (Stavrakakis 2005:230). Explaining this, Laclau develops an intricate argument building on insights from psychoanalysis by scholars like Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), Jacques Lacan (1901-1981), or Gustave Le Bon (1841-1931), and political theory, especially Antonio Gramsci’s (1891-1937) theory of hegemony (see Laclau 2007).³⁴ As the

³⁴ Hegemony following Gramsci does not mean the dominance by a certain group, but a certain kind of political power, which is achieved through consent on a moral, cultural or ethical level. Nonetheless, the state is defined as a combination of hegemony “shielded” with coercion (Opratko 2014:36-37).

scope of this thesis circumvents the detailed description of the arguments made, only crucial points must suffice.

To start an insight into Laclau's argument, the choice of his "smallest unit of analysis" needs to be further explained. From the postulation that no actor's will in a given society is congruent with the workings of that society as a whole, demands³⁵ and their logic of articulation become important. Laclau's definition of the subject becomes important for understanding this. As he states,

Individuals are not coherent totalities but merely referential identities which have to be split up into a series of localised subject positions. And the articulation between these positions is a social and not an individual affair. (Laclau 2005:35)

In other words, through reference to an "other", the "self" gets constructed in the first place.

Through the fact that demands are always brought forward by subjects vis-à-vis a higher entity, which is expected to solve the demand, a "natural" split develops. In any complex system, every demand cannot be solved in a particularistic way, which means in separation from other demands arising in a society. Because of this, unanswered demands can be connected through their shared characteristic of not being solved by the system they are all directed at. This leads to the possibility of a so-called equivalential relation between the demands (Laclau 2007:73-74).

In order for an equivalential relation to occur between demands, the logic behind the articulation of the demands must change. A logic of difference, which presupposes that there is no social division and that any legitimate demand can be satisfied in a non-antagonistic, administrative way, must turn into a logic of equivalence. If, for instance, both the wish for a new road and the wish for a better school bus are not met by a government entity, these demands unite in their negativity against the entity not fulfilling them. All those demands that were not satisfied – as different as they might be – can then be connected through equivalential chains, following a logic of equivalence (Laclau 2005:37). In regards to terminology, Laclau distinguishes here between "democratic demands"³⁶ – such accommodated differentially within the existing hegemony – and popular demands, those unsatisfied in the current hegemony (Laclau 2007:82).

If through such a logic of equivalence a popular subject gets formed, heterogeneous demands get homogenized to some extent. It is important to note, though, that heterogeneity is never revoked

³⁵ Laclau distinguishes the two meanings of demands: request and claim. He defines demands in the sense of claims, which is seen as being a more active formulation, as it would lay a claim on somebody to do something (Laclau 2005:35).

³⁶ Laclau has been criticized for terming these demands "democratic", but has explained it in the following way. "Democratic" adds the notion of a possible non-fulfilment of a demand against a given status quo. This makes it possible in the first place to build equivalential chains. If such a demand were called "specific", it "would immediately evoke the idea of full positivity, [a demand] closed in itself" (Laclau 2007:127). In other words, calling a demand "democratic" simply emphasizes the possible negative component a demand gets from its status of not being answered by a given status quo.

completely. As heterogeneous demands get homogenized but still remain particular to some extent, this leaves room for friction (Laclau 2007:152-153). Laclau explains further that this is crucial for understanding representation in a democracy. Representation is only possible if a particular demand, still being particular for the individual subject, also functions as a signifier for a larger equivalential chain (Laclau 2005:39). Only then, representation can occur.

In order to understand how such a popular subject can develop, a few things need to be explained. An ever present antagonistic frontier in a society is essential for a populist mode of articulation. This is, again, best shown by an argument already touched upon before:

A demand is always addressed to somebody. So from the very beginning we are confronted with a dichotomic division between unfulfilled social demands, on the one hand, and an unresponsive power, on the other. [...] since the fullness of the community is merely the imaginary reverse of a situation lived as deficient *being*, those who are responsible for this [unsatisfactory situation] cannot be a legitimate part of the community; the chasm between them is irreversible. (Laclau 2007:86)

This potentially antagonistic characterization of society is fundamental in the analysis of Laclau and Mouffe. Based on insights from theories on identity construction, – especially Jacques Lacan (1901-1981) and Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) – a necessary “constitutive other” for the construction of the “self” is crucial for this argument (Mouffe 2014:25-26). Also, Antonio Gramsci’s emphasis on the connection between the state and civil society, making it possible for universality and particularity (of interests) to exist simultaneously, is important, as otherwise each demand would either be universal (shared by all) or particular (only wished for by few).³⁷ This makes it possible to abolish the strict separation of state and civil society and to see discursive constructions as temporal, in the sense that they are not forever fixed, and the role of contingency in hegemonic fixations becomes apparent (Laclau 2007:107). Simply put, a certain particular understanding of the world and society can become universal by a discursive fixation through a hegemonic project but be developed out of the linking of numerous particular demands.³⁸ Laclau further illustrates this point along the lines of his theory of populism by introducing the two concepts of “empty signifiers” and “floating signifiers”.

In the formation of popular subjects, “empty signifiers” are immensely important:

The construction of a popular subjectivity is possible only on the basis of discursively producing *tendentially* empty signifiers. The so-called “poverty” of the populist symbols is

³⁷ Gramsci’s insights are different to understandings of society and the role of the state by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), who saw the state as the highest form of universality and civil society as the realm of particularity (of demands), and Karl Marx (1818-1883) who represented the opposite view (Laclau 2007:107).

³⁸ This does not entail, though, that this fixation is made in a top-down process by a state elite, only looking at its own interests (Marx), or developing out of the state being the natural universal representation of “its” people (Hegel). Rather such a fixation can develop through a shift in society that made the temporal fixation in a connected society-state field possible.

the condition of their political efficacy – as their function is to bring to equivalential homogeneity a highly heterogeneous reality, they can only do so on the basis of reducing to a minimum their particularistic content. (Laclau 2005:40)

These signifiers are potentially empty, as they have to be understood as rather playing an *ontological* role in discursively constructing or representing social division and can be filled with different *ontic* contents (Laclau 2007:87-88). The antagonistic empty signifiers “the people” and “power” are in other words seen as emptying, since they on the one hand extend the reach of the signified (what they describe), but on the other hand, because of this wider reach, they need to reduce their connection to the particular contents (Laclau 2005:40). Put differently, as they reach to describe a bigger group of people, they cannot be defined in a very stringent way, as this would rather lead to the exclusion of many people. The reason these empty signifiers are important is that

Equivalential relations would not go beyond a vague feeling of solidarity if they did not crystallize in a certain discursive identity which no longer represents democratic demands as equivalent, but the equivalential link as such. (Laclau 2007:93)

German political scientist Karin Priester³⁹ is critical about Laclau’s empty signifiers, as they would imply a completely arbitrary possibility of partnerships for populists. As she argues, this array of partnerships is in fact limited by the basic populist postulate as anti-elitist (Priester 2011:194). If understood in the way intended though, each anti-hegemonic project – trying to alter a hegemonic fixation of society – can incorporate parts of “the elite”, as this is also an empty signifier. The crucial point is that simply an antagonistic “other” must *remain*, whose shape nonetheless can change.

One of the most important signifiers is “the people”.⁴⁰ As Greek political scientist Yannis Stavrakakis states, “if populism exists, it can only refer to all discourses in which ‘the people’ functions as a *point de capiton*⁴¹, discourses that include ‘the people’ in the set of their master signifiers” (Stavrakakis 2005:233-234). It needs to be emphasized yet again that “the people” of populist politics are not the poor, rather all those feeling excluded from public life, whose unsatisfied demands get bound together in an equivalential chain and named through an “empty signifier” (Panizza 2005:16). Also,

³⁹ Priester is a very passionate critic of Laclau and Mouffe’s work and devoted a whole book to this critique, calling their work a “mystification of politics” (see Priester 2014).

⁴⁰ The notion of “the people” clearly stems from a basic understanding of the concept of democracy. As political theorist Amy Gutman states, aspects of democracy as a social idea are always charged with intricate implications and expectations, for example concerning who is allowed to be part of the sovereign people (*demos*), or who is allowed to rule and so forth (Gutman 2012:521).

⁴¹ Stavrakakis refers here to Jacques Lacan’s explanation of how a *point de capiton* (“quilting point”) is necessary for binding various signified together with one signifier. Former heterogeneous signified get substituted with such a quilting point to broader signify something, in this case the group populism claims to represent – “the people”.

[...] discourses grounded in this articulatory logic can start from any place in the socio-institutional structure: clientelistic political organizations, established political parties, trade unions, the army, revolutionary moments, and so on. “Populism” does not define the actual politics of these organizations, but is a way of articulating their themes – whatever those may be. (Laclau 2005:44)

The “power” signifier does not function on account of its own materiality but rather as “the bearer of the negation of the popular pole (through the frustration of the latter’s demands)” (Laclau 2005:40). The two cannot in general exist without the other, as should be clear by now.

The effect this naming of “the people” has is to be understood in the following way: Differentiating between the “signifier” and the “signified”, the signifier (the term “the people”) firstly becomes a nodal point (*point de capiton*) which plays the role of connecting previously democratic subjects into an equivalential relation. Only a signifier like “the people” can play this connecting role. It does so by becoming, through an inversion, the basis for what it signifies – a heterogeneous group of people. Similarly, the link between the demands was originally ancillary to the particularistic contents of the demands, but starts to react over them and, “through an inversion of the relationship starts behaving as their ground” (Laclau 2007:93, 103-105). That is to say, the signified (a group of people) perceived as real existing only are produced through the process of naming, represented in the signifier (“the people”). Or, as Panizza states, “the naming retroactively constitutes the meaning” (Panizza 2005:5). Put simply, the argument “because it’s what ‘the people’ want”, becomes real in a sense, as “the people” through naming them become an “existing” group.

“The people” as a popular identity has the following characteristic:

A popular identity becomes increasingly full from an *extensional* point of view, for it represents an ever-larger chain of demands, but it becomes intensionally poorer, for it has to dispossess itself of particularistic contents in order to embrace social demands which are quite heterogeneous (Laclau 2007:96).

Laclau further explains that through an inseparable process of signifying and affect, popular subjects feel as being part of a mythical fullness. In other words, the particular (a certain group) claims to be the whole (*populus*) (Laclau 2007:111-115). As described above, the side negating the demands cannot be part of the whole, as it is the particular that gets elevated to the whole through this process. It should be emphasized, though, that as “it is impossible to erase the traces of the particular from the universal, identification always fails to produce full identities. Rather it generates a dialectic of aspiration, disappointment, and grievances” (Panizza 2005:28). This also contributes to the unstable nature of populism, as this mythical fullness can never be fully achieved and dissatisfaction with it can arise quickly.

Lastly, Laclau's insights into how popular subjectivities can be bound together through the above-described process in a way that can change the hegemonic status quo, shall be explained. For this, so-called "floating signifiers" are crucial. Empty signifiers are constructions of a popular identity, which are formed against an antagonistic frontier perceived as stable. Floating signifiers on the other hand try to "apprehend the logic of the displacements of that frontier". For as only if a clear inside/outside frontier would be present, the frontier would be immobile. As should be clear from the argument above, this is not an option in a society in which new demands possibly constantly shape and reshape popular identities (Laclau 2007:133, 153).

In his last conclusions, Laclau equates populism with "the political" itself, since the shaping of popular identities is "the political act par excellence". He further states that, in a way, every political act is thus populist, but emphasizes the possibility of varying degrees. The latter depend on the extension of the equivalential chain, its maximum "length" in a "rupturist discourse"⁴² in which society is divided into two camps (Laclau 2007:154). As Laclau modestly states,

if this approach is correct, we could say that a movement is not populist because in its politics or ideology it presents actual *contents* identifiable as populist, but because it shows a particular *logic of articulation* of those contents – whatever those contents are (Laclau 2005:33).

Ernesto Laclau's theory of populism did find introduction into Japanese scholarship through Yoshida Tōru's work (2011) just recently.⁴³ While Yoshida explains and discusses how populism as a mode of articulation has the ability to transcend class-borders and build larger coalitions (Yoshida 2011:100), he does not apply Laclau's conceptualization for an analysis. Also, while some scholars see a reference to the "general will" (*min'i*) as characteristic of Hashimoto (e.g. Nakata 2012a:8), or have observed that "Hashimoto uses the 'popular will' as a pretext for forcefully pressing forward and creating a political reality" (Mori 2012:104), how "the people" are constructed has been overlooked in analysis so far.

As this is the case in all Japanese research on populism, this thesis offers the first attempt to utilize Laclau's theory for an analysis of Japanese politics. Such an approach could also solve a malaise in Japanese populism research: an unclear distinction between populism and other ideologies in the analysis of effects on democracy and the actions of those seen as populist.⁴⁴ Therefore, the approach

⁴² A "rupturist" discourse simply means a discourse characterized by a depiction of society with a dichotomist split.

⁴³ Apart from a discussion of Laclau's theory in his 2011 book (see Yoshida 2011), this becomes also evident in an interview Yoshida gave the Asahi Shinbun in 2012. He described populism as something "like a self-healing mechanism", which would appear due to unrepresented, unsatisfied masses and defined it as an inherent transitory part of democracy (Takahashi 2012). Here, a clear reference to Laclau's equivalential articulation and floating signifiers, which are changing societal hegemonies, is evident.

⁴⁴ Yoshida, for instance, defines a foundation of business ideas as one core characteristic of populism (Yoshida 2011:55). A similar problem is to be found in Matsutani Mitsuru's criteria for case selection and analyzing the effects on democracy more focused on neo-liberalism (see Matsutani 2011, 2012).

aimed at seems all the more promising. As this thesis deals with populism in Japan, a closer look at Japanese scholarship is nonetheless important, especially in regards to terminology and signifiers that need to be looked for.

2.4. Local populism and the language of populism in Japan

As Kawata and Papp state, political language must always be embedded in the cultural context in which it occurs, taking into account its “cultural” dimension (Kawata/Papp 2013:249-250). This chapter will prepare the analysis in understanding the “lingo” of populism (originally translated as *taishūgeigō* but nowadays as *poppyurizumu*) in Japan. It will introduce the reader in the “technical language” of Japanese populism.⁴⁵ I will acquaint some parts of the language by citing Ōtake Hideo, who was the first to dive into the concept of populism in Japanese academia (Ōtake 2012 [12003]). He defines populism as follows:

Populism (*poppyurizumu*) is a theatrical political style, which simultaneously tries to perform the role of a hero, who challenges a fight against enemies (*teki*) who oppose the “ordinary people” (*futsū no hitobito*), which he/she is a part of. At the same time the leader emphasizes standing with the “ordinary people” in a society split into two camps: the ordinary people vs. the elite, the good guys vs. the evil guys, and friend vs. enemy. It is a political method not organizing a social movement but providing political directions through mass media (Ōtake 2012:118-119).

He describes the immorality of the opponent as stemming from *tokken* (“privileges”) or *kitokukenekei* (“vested interests”) gotten through impure or unfair methods (Ōtake 2012:113). The core of populism is seen in the fight between the *kenryokusha* (“powerful”) and the *futsū no hito* (“powerless”), which are situated in a dichotomized society (Ōtake 2012:113-114). “The people” can therefore be signified by signifiers like *futsū no hito* or *seken no jōshiki* (“common sense”) (Matsutani 2011:135).

Yoshida Tōru, currently the most prominent populism scholar, also emphasizes characteristics of populism as being a kind of story-telling politics (*monogatari no seiji*) and politics of the construction of enemies (*tekizukuri no seiji*) (Yoshida 2011:55). Similar to Ōtake, Yoshida emphasizes the morally induced dichotomization of society developed by populists (Yoshida 2011:59), but relies on a definition of populism as a method or style for gaining power. Ōtake, for instance, emphasizes the importance of the fact that populists would directly appeal to the masses by seeking approval for policies through a televised orchestration of their politics (Ōtake 2012:111-115, 119). While “the general will” is referenced in an emphasis on acting on behalf or accordingly to the *min’i* (“general will”) (e.g. Nakata 2012a:8), a certain political style is deemed the crucial part for success. As stated before, this thesis takes another approach.

⁴⁵ Meaning nothing more than populism occurring in Japan, or inside of Japan’s democratic political system.

A characteristic of populism in Japan makes another signifier important: The *fumin* (“residents of a prefecture”). In recent years, a lot of scholars have dealt with the strengthening of locally confined political forces, like Hashimoto’s Ōsaka ishin no kai, since the 1990s (e.g. Matsutani 2011, 2012; Trifu 2013). In this line of research, many local politicians are seen as populist, and as part of a larger trend, termed *jichitai popyurizumu* (“local populism”) (Matsutani 2011, Sakakibara et al. (eds.) 2012).⁴⁶ Political scientist Matsutani Mitsuru’s (2011, 2012) and Yoshida Tōru’s (2011, 2013) accounts are certainly the most comprehensive works on this recent development. In an interview with the Asahi Shinbun, Yoshida describes the new trend of local populism in Japan as follows:

Today, Japan's populists tend to be restricted to those in charge of local governments. Directly elected by voters, prefectural governors and municipal mayors can exercise presidential-style executive powers, and they continuously remind the public of ongoing conflict between central and local governments. Whatever leadership they exert is readily visible. If former Prime ministers Nakasone and Koizumi were top-down populists, we can say a new breed of bottom-up populists has now emerged among local government leaders. (Takahashi 2012)

Besides Hashimoto, former governor of Tokyo and controversial political figure Ishihara Shintarō and mayor of Nagoya Nakamura Takashi are seen as recent representatives of this trend. The practicality of the signifier *fumin*, compared to its long English translation, might benefit this local populism and we will see what role it plays in the Kimigayo Ordinance policy discourse.

⁴⁶ To name a few examples, Ishihara Shintarō, the former comedians Yukio Aoshima and Nock Yokoyama, former Miyazaki governor Hideo Higashikokubara (Ōtake 2009:205), or Tanaka Yasuo (mayor of Nagano 2000-2006) are all brought into connection with populism (see Trifu 2013).

3. The Method: Towards the study of populist narratives

After looking at why populism should best be viewed as a tool for Discourse Analysis (Stavrakakis 2005:229-230), how exactly this tool is used will be explained.

3.1. Qualitative Discourse Analysis of a policy discourse

In the development of the method used in this thesis, insights into recent trends in Discourse Analysis (Poblete 2015, Stavrakakis/Howarth 2000) and one recent trend in the study of public policies, the Narrative Policy Framework (Jones/McBeth 2010, Shanahan et al. 2013), have played an foundational role. Out of these inputs I developed a mixed method approach, confining the analyzed political discourse to one policy area (sub-system). As the NPF posits that inside one policy sub-system the “effectiveness” of narratives can be studied (McBeth et al. 2014:237), this offers a necessary qualitative criterion for sample selection, which is often deemed as missing in Discourse Analysis (Poblete 2015:213-214).

Compatibility of the qualitative Discourse Analysis and the quantitative analysis is given, as both the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) and research in which populism has been utilized as a tool for Discourse Analysis emphasize the benefit of comparative strategies and use texts of some sort (interviews, speeches, newspaper editorials and so forth) (Poblete 2015:208-209; McBeth et al. 2014:237-246). Informed by the NPF, discourses will be separated in a pro-ordinance discourse and an anti-ordinance discourse, as contributed to by the respective advocacy coalitions (McBeth et al. 2014:239), and those texts will be compared. These so-called advocacy coalitions are seen as developing and communicating policy narratives in a strategic way to achieve a desired policy goal (McBeth et al. 2014:237). While the framework underlying the quantitative approach gave qualitative insights on how to select a sample of texts for analysis, qualitative Discourse Analysis will be carried out first to prove that demands get articulated following a populist mode of articulation. These insights will be highly important later for the exploration of the quantitative results.

The qualitative part of the analysis follows one of the three main perspectives in the study of populism through Discourse Analysis. In a poststructuralist tradition, based on the theories of Laclau (Poblete 2015:202)⁴⁷, such a line of study should be “understood within a hermeneutic context in which the researcher must carry out second-order interpretations of the actions and social practices

⁴⁷ The second approach similarly understands populism as discourse, but in a postmodern sense. It views “discourse [as] a set of ideas or latent frameworks of meaning, unintentionally manifested by individuals through speech, writing or some other type of symbolic action”. In this line of research a hermeneutic way of accessing discourse is employed but within a positivist research. The third approach to populism understands discourse as “explicit linguistic allocation, clearly stated in the content of a text”. This approach is based on content analysis and in a purely positivistic and quantitative way encodes phrases and/or words manifested in texts, so that analysts can classify them according to their populist intensity (Poblete 2015:202)

under consideration” (Howarth 2005 cit. by Poblete 2015:202). In other words, by systematically applying concepts formed in the discourse theory of Laclau, I try to understand the texts analyzed, in which actors describe how they perceive reality (first-order observations) (Poblete 2015:209). This can, for instance, be observed in Yannis Stavrakakis’ Discourse, in which he strives to identify a populist nature in a policy discourse (Stavrakakis 2005:229).⁴⁸ Following his approach, the discourse will be analyzed on whether an equivalential, antagonistic discursive logic is to be made out and a reference to “the people” is functioning as a master signifier. In other words, whether a reference to “the people” can be seen as central in the discourse (Stavrakakis 2005:235-237).

While Stavrakakis works comparatively in a historic sense (Stavrakakis 2005:235), I would argue that a focus on advocacy coalitions fighting out one policy issue has the benefit of elucidating the impact of populism on democracy. One reason is that it takes into account the “competition” a populist discourse is facing. While other researchers have controlled cases for structural and historical similarities in their comparative analysis (e.g. Groppo 2013, Stavrakakis 2005), I argue that the setting of a policy issue provides even tighter constraints – with its laws, historical background, and so forth – for comments by participants in the policy discourse. Therefore, a focus on comparing differences of narratives inside a particular policy discourse, is deemed fruitful for analyzing different degrees of populism. As Poblete notes, scholarly work in Discourse Analysis often is criticized for not explaining why certain texts are representational for a discourse (Poblete 2015:213). Using a composition of various actors in both the pro-ordinance discourse and the anti-ordinance discourse is therefore seen as achieving a satisfactory level of representativeness. By including not only Hashimoto, but other “friends-and-foes”, the variety of discourse contributions should add to the representativeness of the study.

3.2. Quantitative policy discourse analysis: The Narrative Policy Framework

After qualitatively analyzing the discourses for a possibly populist nature, the following quantitative part of this thesis will help to distinguish other interesting characteristics of the discourse from its populist nature. Insights from the Narrative Policy Framework will also help evaluate the “effectiveness” of certain narrative characteristics. This will furthermore lay the groundwork for analyzing the shaping of democracy, as it occurs in the pro- and anti-ordinance discourses. All this will be done using a codesheet and codebook explained in the following chapter. Studying populism and political discourse with an empirical component is called for by many scholars (Horwath/Stavrakakis 2000; Mudde/Rovira Kaltwasser 2013) and can certainly be described as a trend in political Discourse Analysis (see Poblete 2015). The development of a codebook inside the NPF, which is extensively informed by populism, as

⁴⁸ While he does not term it a policy discourse, it is clear that the discourse he analyzes is focused on one particular law (regulating whether a person’s faith is included on Greek identity cards).

well as democracy theory, makes the systematic evaluation of the relationship between populism and democracy through this case study possible.

3.2.1. The Narrative Policy Framework

Simply put, the NPF “[a]s a framework, [...] asserts [...], that policy narratives matter in policy change and outcomes” (Shanahan et al. 2011:555). The NPF aims not at a judgment as to which narratives are right or wrong. It states that the variation of policy narratives can be studied systematically and that these variations might help explain policy outcomes, processes and designs (Jones et al. 2014:4). Differing from the view that narratives in the policy process are some form of manipulation harmful to democracy, NPF scholars take them as “a way in which we understand ourselves (as individuals and as communities) and others”, and therefore as a legitimate unit of analysis (McBeth et al. 2010:392). They conceive narratives in the following way:

Narratives have a dual function that both reflects and shapes who we are. Representing both the communicative and transformative nature of narrative, storytellers spin their tales as both fundamental expressions of individual and group identities and expressions of value. (Shanahan et al. 2014:69)

The NPF proposes a structuralist understanding for these narratives and focuses on a systematic empirical analysis of such narratives (McBeth et al. 2010:392-393). The reason for this stems from confrontations happening in the study of policies.

Asserting the importance of narratives in the policy process, the developers of the NPF targeted the bridging of positivism and post-positivism in policy research (Jones/McBeth 2010:332-334). Benefiting from the function of positivism to limit bias and promote objectivity (Jones/McBeth 2010:332) while at the same time critique concerning positivism in public policy research should be included was the main goal for the development of this approach. Critique brought forward against positivistic policy research is exemplified here by Deborah Stone, who argued that traditional “policy analysis, rooted in market models and instrumental reason, fails to accurately capture the subjective nature of political reality” (Stone 2012:378). More so, policy realities are constructions, which bring some elements of society into connection as relevant with regard to a certain policy and leave others out (Shanahan et al. 2013:453).

In general, inquiries in public policy research that see policy discourses in a constructivist fashion, can be regarded as a relatively new trend.⁴⁹ In the end, they combine both claims: on the one hand, public policy making is contextualized through narratives and social construction (a post-positivist claim), and on the other hand, they follow the claim that legitimacy is grounded in falsifiability (a

⁴⁹ The field being largely dominated by positivist approaches focused on finding policy recommendations replicable in a variety of contexts (Schubert/Bandelow 2009:13-14).

positivist assertion) (Shanahan et al. 2013:453). In other words, while they “accept that there is an objective world out there, [...] [they] also more fundamentally accept that when it comes to public policy, what the world *means* [sic!] varies tremendously” (Jones et al. 2014:4).

3.2.2. Codebook and codesheet

Building on theoretical considerations from both populism and democracy theory, a codesheet (APPENDIX A) and a codebook (APPENDIX B) have been developed inside the Narrative Policy Framework. Adaptions to codesheets already developed in previous NPF research have been kept to a minimum, in order to make the insights drawn in such research usable for this thesis as well.⁵⁰ Comparing the narrative structure of populist narratives against the structures found in other research surely contributes to a better understanding of the phenomenon. Only characters and solutions have been coded different to preexisting NPF research, in order to allow the measurement of effects on democracy. Each text has been evaluated against the codesheet and the results of the codesheet have been transferred into an SPSS database.⁵¹ The codebook consists of narrative elements and strategies, which lay the foundation for the measurement of policy beliefs.

3.2.2.1. Narrative elements

Through the structuralist approach narratives are conceptualized as having generalizable characteristics, which are separated in form and content (McBeth et al. 2014:228). The form, which is the structure of the narrative, consists of four core narrative elements: the setting, characters, a plot and the moral of the story (solution) (McBeth et al. 2014:228). The setting, as explained above (Chapter 1.2., p.17), is merely the context in which the discussion happens – with its legal and constitutional parameters and so forth – and therefore is not measured in the narratives. As “policy reality blueprints come to life through characters” (Shanahan et al. 2013:468)⁵², the empirically measured narrative

⁵⁰ The main influence for this thesis has been the codebook used in a paper by Elizabeth A. Shanahan, Michael D. Jones, Mark K. McBeth, and Ross R. Lane in an analysis of a policy discourse concerning the installation of wind turbines (see Shanahan et al. 2013).

⁵¹ As this project is carried out only by one author, questions of intercoder reliability (Shanahan et al. 2013:465) could not be addressed. To achieve some sort of “intracoder” reliability, though, all texts were coded twice, starting from blank code sheets. Differences in the results were then revised in a third step and by consultation of the codebook, weighed against the definitions of variables made. Existing NPF research has shown good internal consistency, with Cronbach alpha coefficients between around 0.8 and 0.95 (Shanahan et al. 2013) for all elements measured. In the current study Cronbach alpha coefficients for the variables were also found to be between 0.75 and 0.95. As measurement for characters as powerful or powerless showed the lowest score (0.782 for victims as powerless majorities) replicability of this variable is the most difficult and needs the most deliberation. All other narrative elements were coded the same above 80 percent (for all results see APPENDIX C – Intercoder reliability).

⁵² The measurement of characters is seen as highly important as for instance research on the individual level suggest, that hero characters are the main driver of narrative persuasion. In an experimental study, Michael Jones found that respondents tend to have positive affect for hero characters in policy narratives regardless of their priors (Jones 2010, 2014a).

elements are firstly the featured characters (heroes, villains, and victims) of the narrative. As every policy narrative must at least feature one character, the nature of characters must be defined.

First of all, characters do not have to be persons, but can be institutions, companies or society as a whole. Victims are entities harmed by a problem, policy or action (Shanahan et al. 2013:459). In connection to the other characters, victims mostly suffer at the hands of the villain and are generally saved by the hero (Shanahan et al. 2011:554). Villains are the individuals or groups causing a problem or hurting the victims (Shanahan et al. 2013:459). Also, they can be seen as someone hindering the hero. Lastly, the hero is portrayed as being able to fix a problem or at least trying to, and/or saving the victims (Shanahan et al. 2011:554). In the codesheet, characters have been analyzed in two ways: Firstly, the number of characters. In this case, each reference to a villain, for instance, counts separately. If, for example Hashimoto criticizes the media and then the *Asahi Shinbun*, as well as the *Mainichi Shinbun*, the number count for villains rises to three.

Secondly, as has become clear in the discussion of populism theory, the “content” of signifiers like “the people” and “the elite”, with their villains and victims are matters of context. In other words, *who* is subsumed in antagonistic groups or counted as belonging to the popular subject is secondary, primarily whether this happens or not is important. Therefore, rather than looking at who is portrayed as a villain, hero, victim – e.g. teachers – in what frequency by the two coalitions, as is common in the NPF (e.g. Kear/Wells 2014), it is important whether individuals or groups, minorities or majorities were cast as certain characters. As questions of democracy are mostly concerning issues of dividing power and making sure the *demos* (the sovereign of a nation) gets heard (Mudde/Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; Gutman 2012), it also becomes important whether a character is portrayed as belonging to a majority or minority, with either too much or too little influence. Hence, the component of relative power or status and association with either a majority or minority will be added. This means that someone qualifies as a villain if he/she is seen as having, relative to others, more power/status and someone qualifies as a victim if he/she has less than someone else. Again, the hero is someone who changes this constellation, and is only measured in number and whether a narrative feature at least one hero character. As Ōtake has described, in Japanese populism an overreach in privileges (*tokken*, *kitoku ken’eki*), obtained by impure or unfair methods (Ōtake 2012:113), can be seen as one such example of hinting at such a power surplus. In an NPF analysis, a character with such “*tokken*” would be a villain, in our definition. In the analysis in the main part the importance of this measurement for the effects the discourse has on democracy will become clear.

Table 1. Codesheet: Measurement of victim characters (villain characters accordingly)

CHARACTERS_VICTIMS. Do VICTIM(s) appear in the narrative?		
<input type="radio"/>	Yes, number: ____	<input type="radio"/> NO
<input type="radio"/>	powerless majority is victim	(1=Yes, 2=No)
<input type="radio"/>	powerful majority is victim	
<input type="radio"/>	majority is victim	
<input type="radio"/>	powerless minority is victim	
<input type="radio"/>	powerful minority is victim	
<input type="radio"/>	Individual or specific group is victim	

Besides characters, the plot (what happens if one side gets its way) and the solution or moral of the story are also measured (Shanahan et al. 2013:458). The plot types used in the NPF build on the works of political scientist Deborah Stone (2012) who differentiated the following categories: stories of decline, stymied progress stories, stories of rising and change-is-only-an-illusion-stories (Stone 2012:160-165). In addition to these stories of change, as I will call them, Stone developed plot types for stories of power, for instance, stories of helplessness and control, conspiracy stories and blame-the-victim stories (Stone 2012:166-168). Plot types have been coded accordingly in two categories.

Table 2. Codesheet: Measurement of story types

STORY_OF_CHANGE. Does the narrative feature stories of change?		
<input type="radio"/>	None	
<input type="radio"/>	Story of decline (bad on the rise)	Things are getting worse because bad things increase.
<input type="radio"/>	Story of decline (good slipping away)	Things are getting worse because good things decrease.
<input type="radio"/>	Stymied progress	Things were bad, got better for some reason, and now are getting worse again.
<input type="radio"/>	Stories of rising	Things are getting better.
<input type="radio"/>	change-is-only-an-illusion	Stories that doubt the belief by someone that things are getting better or worse.
STORY_OF_POWER. What stories of power does the narrative have?		
<input type="radio"/>	None	
<input type="radio"/>	helplessness and control	Things were always bad and there was nothing to be done about it, but now there is a chance to change that.
<input type="radio"/>	conspiracy	Stories that say that all along the control over an issue was in the hands of few, using the control only for their benefits.
<input type="radio"/>	blame-the-victim-stories	The control over a problem is seen with those who claim to suffer from it. These stories call for behavioral change in the victims. Such stories of power always assert that there is a choice for action and are often intertwined with stories of decline

While the plot is connecting the different characters, the solution presents a way forward (McBeth et al. 2014:228). Usually this means being either in favor of or against the implementation of a policy, or the regulation of teachers' conduct towards national symbols. In the case of this thesis, though, the solution concerns the way forward after a policy has already been implemented. A discussion of the implementation process, as well as general implications of how to resolve a debate around a

controversial policy, should reveal some indications as to what deficiencies in Japanese democracy are seen or how it should work. Possible solutions look as follows:

Table 3. Codesheet: Measurement of policy solutions

SOLUTION. What kind of policy solution does the narrative offer?	
<input type="radio"/>	None
<input type="radio"/>	Plebiscite: The narrative sees competing in elections as the way forward.
<input type="radio"/>	Participation: The narrative makes a call for participation in the political process.
<input type="radio"/>	Deliberation: Further discussion is needed to achieve general consensus.
<input type="radio"/>	Constitutionalism: The narrative speaks in favor of more respect for constitutional law or stricter enforcement of regulations in the constitution.

Lastly, evidence is measured as a narrative element. As NPF research posits: “Science has the power to legitimize a proposed policy solution and can also contradict competing policy solutions” (Shanahan et al. 2013:468). The strategic use of scientific evidence, like court decisions, expert results on environmental impact or similar things, is deemed relevant to persuasiveness and is therefore, also measured in the ensuing way:

Table 4. Codesheet: Measurement of science/evidence

EVIDENCE. For what purpose is science/evidence cited in the narrative?		
<input type="radio"/>	No science/evidence	
<input type="radio"/>	support their argument	Evidence is used in the process of bringing forward an argument.
<input type="radio"/>	refute an argument	Evidence is used in the process of attacking an argument.
<input type="radio"/>	matter-of-fact	Evidence is stated only to present the own opinion as matter of fact.

3.2.2.2. Narrative Strategies

Put simply, “narrative strategies are the tactical portrayal and use of narrative elements to expand, contain, or otherwise manipulate involvement in the policy arena” (Shanahan et al. 2013:458). What is called the “content side” of narratives does not in reality concern itself with the content of the narrative, but rather tries to examine how the elements are used in a strategic way (McBeth et al. 2014:229). Coalitions, either for or against the policy, are seen as deploying such narrative strategies to further their goals. The first of these narrative strategies are causal mechanisms.

Causal mechanisms ascribe responsibility and blame and can be thought of as explanations of why and how one or more particular factors (e.g. income disparities and lack of education) lead to another (e.g. social unrest) in public policy development. “Causal mechanisms are found in policy narratives to strategically connect events and narrative elements to create a policy reality of responsibilities and blame” (McBeth et al. 2014:241). The basic causal theories used in the NPF date back to Deborah Stone (2012). The main four types are: intentional, mechanical, unintended and inadvertent causes. Causal arguments in politics are either used to challenge or protect an existing set of rules, institutions and interests, or assign blame and responsibility for fixing a problem and compensating victims. Also, they can legitimize a certain actor as “fixer”, giving them more authority

or power, and create new political alliances among people who perceive themselves to be harmed by the problem (Stone 2012:227).

Table 5. Codesheet: Measurement of causal mechanisms

CAUSAL_MECHANISM. What kind of causal theory does the narrative have?		
O	none	
O	intentional	Causes directly asserting blame to individuals or groups, who are willingly causing a problem (e.g. oppression).
O	mechanical	"Events caused by things (or sometimes people) that have no will of their own but are designed, programmed, or trained by humans" (Stone 2012:208-213).
O	Inadvertent	Differentiates problems that are caused by someone's actions but were not anticipated, or aimed at, in such a way (e.g. carelessness).
O	accidental	Describes every causality perceived as decided by fate.

Another narrative strategy is termed scope of conflict. It describes how coalitions tend to either extend or contain the size of a policy issue (McBeth et al. 2014:241). This is implemented by distributing the costs and benefits of the proposed policy and of the one proposed by the opposing group. Costs are not meant as monetary expenditures, but disadvantages or demerits the own policy proposal or the opposition's policy proposal is seen as entailing. Again, certain assumptions follow. For instance, losing groups are expected to implement an expanding strategy, meaning they are tending to use policy narratives to expand the scope of conflict by diffusing the costs and concentrating the benefits of a policy they oppose. Conversely, winning coalitions are expected to implement a containment strategy, they concentrate costs on a small group and diffuse the benefits of a policy to a larger group in order to maintain the status quo or contain the scope of conflict (McBeth et al. 2014:241; Shanahan et al. 2013:459).

Table 6. Codesheet: Measurement of scope of conflict

SCOPE_OF_CONFLICT_1a. Costs of own policy:		
O	Not discussed	The costs one's own policy can have is not discussed.
O	Concentrated	One's own policy has negative effects on only a limited group.
O	Diffused	One's own policy has negative effects on a wide array of groups.
SCOPE_OF_CONFLICT_1b. Benefits of own policy:		
O	Not discussed	The benefits one's own policy can have is not discussed.
O	Concentrated	One's own policy has positive effects on only a limited group.
O	Diffused	One's own policy has positive effects on a wide array of groups.
SCOPE_OF_CONFLICT_1c. Costs of opposing policy:		
O	Not discussed	The costs the other coalition's policy can have is not discussed.
O	Concentrated	The other coalition's policy has negative effects on only a limited group.
O	Diffused	The other coalition's policy has negative effects on a wide array of groups.
SCOPE_OF_CONFLICT_1d. Benefits of opposing policy:		
O	Not discussed	The benefits the other coalition's policy can have is not discussed.
O	Concentrated	The other coalition's policy has positive effects only limited to a small group.
O	Diffused	The other coalition's policy has positive effects for a wide array of groups.

While the scope of conflict has been measured as shown above, for the analysis only the most effective strategies, “expansion” and “containment” as defined in the NPF, will be measured. Therefore, variables SCOPE_EXPAND and SCOPE_CONTAIN have been formed to measure if narratives either depict concentrated benefits and diffused costs for the opposition’s policy proposal or depict diffused benefits and concentrated costs for their own proposal (Shanahan et al. 2013:459).

One of the strengths of the NPF, furthermore, is the systematic way it allows to connect the structural side of the narratives to a content side. By doing this it enables the systematic measurement of how certain core policy beliefs are underlying the narratives. How this can help us understand the effects of discourses on democracy will be explained in the following chapter.

3.2.2.3. Policy Beliefs: Linking populism with democracy

Policy beliefs are seen as “a set of values and beliefs that orient a group and/or coalition” (Shanahan et al. 2013:459). They are, differently put, “akin to the moral compass embedded within the narrative” (Shanahan et al. 2013:458). The core policy beliefs, found in policy narratives, answer fundamental policy questions. Who should have the power to make policy decisions? Who (or what) is harmed by the policy status quo? On what basis should policies be decided (science, majority rule, etc.) (McBeth et al. 2010:393)? Originally developed in the Advocacy Coalition Framework, it is assumed that shared policy beliefs are what holds coalitions together (McBeth et al. 2014:241).

In NPF literature it is advised for the measurement of belief systems to draw upon “preexisting and robust deductive theories”. This should aim at circumventing issues of ad hoc theoretical constructs (Shanahan et al. 2011:540). The authors of the NPF also emphasize the choice of theory and its relation to the context it is applied to. By employing abstract or very general deductive approaches, the applicability of those theories to different policy contexts should be ensured (Shanahan et al. 2011:557). Arguably, democracy theories are abstract in the way that they discuss the conduct of individuals, minorities and majorities, not depending on the context. Therefore, the policy beliefs are seen as the perfect way of connecting populist narratives and their effects on democracy. The NPF aims at measuring this in a structured way. To do so, the NPF identifies both an operational measure of policy beliefs through narrative elements and a measure of the use or intensity of policy beliefs both within and between advocacy coalitions (McBeth et al. 2014:242-243).⁵³

⁵³ To give an example, Shanahan et al. (2013) measure for three policy beliefs: the nature-human relationship, the polis–market belief, and the conservation-business belief. The polis–market belief model or self-interests vs. public or common interests belief is calculated by using victims who are cast as individuals (e.g. ratepayer, voter) and those who are cast as groups or refer to cultural contexts (e.g. sacred grounds and the environment). The human–nature policy belief, emerging from the preservationist vs. conservationist literature, is calculated using human and wildlife/environment victims (Shanahan et al. 2013:465-466). In such a way, to examine democratic beliefs, transported in the narratives, narrative elements will be measured and compared as described in the following chapter.

A democratic policy belief will be calculated by looking at the number of narratives portraying powerful minorities as villains and a powerless majority as victim minus those narratives portraying powerless minorities or individuals or groups as victims in proportion to the whole corpus. This is calculated to achieve -1.00 to +1.00 scale results for both coalitions (Shanahan et al. 2013:465).




Figure 1. Scale for democratic policy beliefs

A strong positive result will indicate a shaping of democratic reality favoring a “populist” democracy and a negative result leaning towards a liberal democracy.⁵⁴ Looking at the solutions advocacy coalitions present will further deepen this argument. While in populist democracy an “anything-goes” plebiscitarian solution, based on only majoritarian rule would be expected, liberal democracy would call for reason or constitutional limits (Poblete 2015:206). Before starting the analysis, the composition of the sample will be explained.

3.3. The sample: Policy narratives for and against the Kimigayo Ordinance

The texts for the analysis of the policy discourse have been collected according to several criteria. First of all, they have to qualify as a policy narrative. In other words, they have to include a policy stance or a judgement on a policy-related behavior. So there has to be a preference or a proposed future form of conduct and there must be at least one character in the form of a hero, villain or victim (Shanahan et al. 2013:457-458). According to the policy stance found in a narrative, it will be assigned to one of the two advocacy coalitions. From here on, the advocacy coalition of which Hashimoto is a part, speaking in favor of the enactment of the Kimigayo Ordinance, will be referred to as the “pro-ordinance”-coalition and the coalition arguing against it will be termed “anti-ordinance”-coalition.

I reviewed public consumption documents for policy narratives, fitting the definition made above. These documents are defined as being accessible by the wider public without any privileges (e.g. private connections to a politician) or extensive monetary cost (Shanahan et al. 2013:457). All in all, the sample consists of 73 such public consumption texts. As can be seen in Figure 1, the number of Anti-Kimigayo Ordinance policy narratives is higher (41), compared to Pro-Kimigayo Ordinance policy narratives (32). Among these texts, some do not discuss the Kimigayo Ordinance as the main topic. Nonetheless, the ordinance functions as a symbol for a certain argument and is therefore used to construct realities on the one hand and reconstruct the policy reality of the ordinance itself. Some texts also do not mention the Kimigayo Ordinance explicitly, meaning the concrete name of the

⁵⁴ A discussion of democracy theory and definitions of the concepts of “liberal democracy” and “populist democracy” will follow in the main part.

ordinance, but they deal with the doings of Hashimoto Tōru concerning the handling of national symbols for teachers. Consequently, indirectly discussing the Kimigayo Ordinance in connection with Hashimoto’s policy decision also renders a text also usable for the purpose of this study.

In the data collection phase newspaper archives, various blogs, homepages and Twitter-accounts were searched for policy narratives. Newspaper archives used are those of the *Asahi Shinbun*, *Yomiuri Shinbun* and *Kyodo News*. The *Asahi Shinbun* archive (Asahi Kikuzo II) provides all letters to the editor (21) and one editorial on the matter, while the *Kyodo News* archive provides five editorials. Although the *Yomiuri Shinbun* archive offers articles and editorials on the issue, none of them is written in a narrative style – meaning that they either did not feature any victims, villains or heroes and/or had no particular stance towards the policy. Therefore, they had to be excluded from the sample.




Figure 2. Number of Policy Narratives (divided by policy stance).

The document types of the narratives can be categorized as seen in Figure 2. For the pro-ordinance-coalition Hashimoto’s Twitter account was the major contributor to the collection (19 narratives). Tweets by Hashimoto have been gathered from Twilog, a “twitter-archive”, where users can store their past tweets, display them in various forms and make them searchable with keywords.⁵⁵ As no labor union or politician arguing against the Kimigayo Ordinance uses this service, Twitter could not be used as a source for anti-ordinance policy narratives, as Twitter accounts cannot be accessed for free in full.

Also, notably, Hashimoto is – to my observation – the only politician tweeting in a narrative style. As one single tweet can hardly be treated as a narrative, series of tweets were merged. Because Hashimoto usually tweets a series of tweets in a steady three-minute interval, it is mostly very easy to distinguish where a narrative ends and a new one starts. Also, sentences like, “Well, let’s change the topic...” (text_15), mark the end or beginning of a narrative. The way in which the tweets are released leaves the impression that the tweets have been cut up from a pre-written longer text. Besides Hashimoto’s twitter-narratives, one press release by Hashimoto as governor of Osaka (text_10), as well as an editorial (text_3) and an interview (text_8) in the *Asahi Shinbun*, together with a transcript of a diet discussion (text_12), build the corpus of policy narratives contributed by Hashimoto.

⁵⁵ See for an explanation on Twilog: <http://twilog.org/page-about> (06.10.2015) and for Hashimoto’s stored Tweets: http://twilog.org/t_ishin (06.10.2015).

As Hashimoto's discourse contribution needs to also be compared from an intracoalitional perspective, not only texts by Hashimoto will be used on the pro-side. The inclusion of other politicians, as well as citizens, gives a broader image of the discourse. This tells us more about the coherence of a populist argument and the spread and reproduction of such a way of thinking. In this respect, "Hashimoto-chum" (Weathers 2014:88), Nakahara Tōru's blog (<http://ameblo.jp/nakahara-toru/>) has been the only good source for such narratives (8 narratives). Nakahara was one of the school principals, who had no prior professional background in education (*minkan kōchō*), put into post by Hashimoto, a measure heavily criticized by many (Weathers 2014:88). Merely one letter to the editor in favor of the policy could be found. A little surprising maybe, but that letter to the editor was also published in the *Asahi Shinbun* (text_4). Other than that, finding texts in favor of the policy written in a narrative style was very difficult.




Figure 3. Document categories of pro- and anti-ordinance policy narratives

In respect to anti-ordinance narratives, the *Asahi Shinbun* offered a large amount of letters to the editor from a diverse group of citizens (21). Also, politicians opposing the policy, such as Nonaka Hiromu (*1925)⁵⁶ were interviewed. Besides the editorials already described in the beginning, blog entries from the Nakama Labor Union⁵⁷ (10), a private blogger (1) and one policy narrative from the group Hinomaru-Kimigayo kyōsei hantai hottorain Ōsaka ("Osaka hotline against the coercive implementation of the Hinomaru and Kimigayo") offered the sources for anti-policy narratives.

Since the aim of the analysis is to uncover a populist mode of articulation through a comparison with texts that show a lesser or none such populist aspect, the date of release of the documents was deemed as not relevant for analysis. An analysis focusing on the content would be of course interesting, but in an analysis focused on structure, excluding a certain time period does not seem necessary.

⁵⁶ Nonaka served as chief cabinet secretary (*kanbō chōkan*) under Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō (PM 1998-2000) and was responsible for the drafting of the Act on the National Flag and Anthem (*Kokki oyobi kokka ni kansuru hōritsu*) in 1999 (text_64, Babb 2012:85).

⁵⁷ The Nakama Labor Union is a Osaka-bound teachers' union, which has been active since 1998 (see www.nakama-union.org/).

Figure 3 shows the distribution of the release dates of the analyzed texts, which shows that the vast majority of texts have been released in 2011. Nonetheless, later years also saw some discussion of the Kimigayo Ordinance in a narrative form.




Figure 4. Distribution of analyzed texts in the years 2011-2015

4. The Kimigayo Ordinance discourse: A populist policy discourse?

The question this chapter poses, is whether we can speak of a populist policy discourse in the case of the pro- or anti-Kimigayo Ordinance discourse. To do so, all three necessary structural dimensions of populism will be looked for. These are, the establishment of an internal frontier dividing society into two antagonistic camps, the combination of a plurality of demands in an equivalential chain and the construction of a popular identity, which becomes the basis for the chain (Laclau 2007:77). In searching for these three structural moments, the basic lines of thought and the policy realities constructed by both coalitions concerning the Kimigayo Ordinance will become clear. The opening chapters look for the first two structural moments, which Stavrakakis summarizes as the “equivalential, antagonistic discursive logic” (Stavrakakis 2005:235).

4.1. The antagonistic rupture in Japan's society

To start off this inquiry, a basic consideration that is foundational to this approach needs to be explained. A demand for or against a policy almost always comes attached with other implicit or explicit demands. Both advocacy coalitions connect a demand for or against the Kimigayo Ordinance with implicit demands for a certain society or with explicitly uttered wrongs they want to fix through the ordinance. Such a collection of demands can either be posited as a conflict in a split society or a mere collection of administrative issues solvable in an existing system, separate from each other. The way multiple demands are connected or not is important, as only an equivalential articulation of demands makes the emergence of “the people” possible (Laclau 2007:74). Such a chain gets built through an added “value”: a negative component. This negative component is achieved through a shared characteristic of not being answered by an antagonistic “other”. Therefore, the first step in this analysis is to look for a possible split in society, constructed by discourses in the advocacy coalition, which produce an antagonistic “other”.

First I will look at the pro-ordinance discourse, as the discourse where a populist nature is suspected. Here we suspect the “drunken dinner guest” to bring the disturbance. Hashimoto was initially criticized heavily for rushing the Kimigayo Ordinance through the local assembly (see Nakata 2012b). His justification of the steamroller voting (*kyōkō saiketsu*) of the Kimigayo Ordinance – without any consent by other parties – introduces us to the picture of society he posits the conflict in:

This is not a case of imposing any duties on the people of Osaka prefecture (*fumin*). This is merely an attack on the members of the diet, the Osaka municipal office and parts of teacher organizations who just enjoy their vested rights (*kitokuken*). This is a fierce power struggle (*kenryoku tōsō*). [...] The changing of power structures demands a huge battle. Because it means you're taking away someone's power. On the other hand, you must be careful about laying duties, or constraints on the people of Osaka prefecture, or how you're

using their taxes. This diet session was not about laying duties on the people of Osaka prefecture, or coercing them. Neither was it about how to use taxes. It was a battle for the change of power structures. (text_27, 00:09:39-23:55:01)

This tweet hints at the dichotomist picture of society between those with privileges (*kitokuken*) and those without (*fumin*), which Hashimoto and the pro-ordinance coalition construct the Kimigayo Ordinance as being situated in. Hashimoto continuously emphasizes how his decisions are deliberately and carefully not effecting regular citizens, but are only a power struggle against those with – either explicitly or implicitly stated – too much privileges or power.

Through statements like the above, Hashimoto emphasizes his awareness of the problems of the ones' effected by power. He creates a rift that homogenizes two spheres that are to be treated differently. Because of existing or lacking privileges, effecting the one becomes a more delicate issue than forcing the other to do something. Anyhow, we could not yet say at this point, if only the two groups exist, those who have power and those who do not. The following tweet, though, offers another insight in the constructed societal reality by Hashimoto:

I am on the side of power, but when I quit as governor, I am on the side of those afflicted by power. I hope Japan will continue to be a society where free speech does not get suppressed by power (text_32, 20:03:31).

Through stating his future transition *back* to the side of the powerless, after resigning from the world of politics, Hashimoto builds, on the one hand, a connection to the side of the powerless. On the other, he emphasizes that there is a clear dichotomization between having power and being afflicted by it. The state in Hashimoto's narrative therefore becomes the only area of power. This negation of power relations in civil society or even inside the state (power disparities between different institutions or different politicians) fits very well in the homogenized dichotomist picture that populism needs to construct discursively. Considerations on issues like Hashimoto having more influence on political authorities or society as a whole, compared to most citizens, even after he resigns, are neglected. This is also important, for as we will see later, Hashimoto argues for the implementation of the Kimigayo Ordinance merely out of considering the powerless and bringing power back to them. Such a statement therefore, allows him to represent such a claim more believably.

Simply stating, though, that there exist the powerful and the powerless alone, does not create an antagonistic "other". An antagonistic "other" is constructed through distancing the "other" completely from the "self" ("the people"), which means that it is unresponsive to any – as logic and natural as the wish might be – demand posited to it. In the pro-ordinance discourse this antagonistic rupture is produced by repeatedly speaking of "closed-off areas" (e.g. *seken no jōshiki kara hairi shiteiru ryōiki*), extraterritorial areas (*chigai hōken*) or areas outside of democratic control (*minshuteki tōsei no hanigai*), which are completely unresponsive to any demands posited to them. The fact that

not only a rift, for instance, in education is seen, but through comparison and connection of the various closed-off areas, the Kimigayo Ordinance policy discourse posits the ordinance in the center of an antagonistic rupture running through Japanese society as a whole.

In order to examine the rupture going through Japan's society, as depicted in the pro-ordinance discourse, I will start with the point of departure: Japan's education system. Deliberately shielded from political influence after the Second World War, Hashimoto now sees a different danger in the current education administration: "Under the local board of education system, today's schools are areas of extraterritoriality. They don't reflect the popular will at all. They are not under democratic control" (text_1, 19:32:28). Or:

Can teachers simply ignore something decided by the highest decision-making body in educational administration? If we allow such things, that's how schools become an area outside the democratic system, a lawless area. (text_8, 03:10:18)

This leads Hashimoto to the conclusion that without resolving the "closed-off areas issue" a dangerous situation is at hand. He tweets:

In the current local boards of education system, teachers are not being exposed to the ways of the world. Even if they are just persistent on their own views, their responsibility does not get questioned in any way. This is extremely dangerous. Education is not something with unlimited freedom. Especially since it has a tremendous effect on children, specific rules are of importance. (text_23, 08:36:48)

Through observations like this Hashimoto does not confine the conflict of the Kimigayo Ordinance to the limits of an existing system. Rather he explicitly develops an antagonistic "other" in the education system, as it would be completely unresponsive to any demands directed at it. The demand for the Kimigayo Ordinance can achieve a negative component through this, which later enables the building of an equivalential chain. Hashimoto further develops this view of society, when he explains that areas detached from the general public get corrupted. He attributes this status to schools under the current education system. He tweets the following:

Areas, which elevate their own sense of justice and values, without receiving any criticism from the public, are definitely detaching from society and corrupting. [...] Teachers refusing to stand are not subjected to criticism under the current local board of education system, and are not fulfilling their responsibility to explain themselves to their students. They don't face the public and are only pushing through their own values. (text_13, 17:05:34-17:08:07)

The people inhabiting such closed-off areas become an antagonistic other. As if they would be, homogeneously, detached from all the rest of society, they are portrayed as only pushing through their own goals. As part of the antagonistic "other", their demands cannot be legitimate, because they are

responsible for the state of deficient *being*, against which the camp of the “self” gets constructed (Laclau 2007:86). By further devaluating the “other”, by for instance stating that “teachers are childish beings isolated from common sense” (text_19, 03:53:59), the demands of the “other” are put outside the legitimate field and the chasm becomes irreversible (Laclau 2007:86). Following this logic, teachers’ demands are described as egoistic insistence on status guaranties (*mibun hōshō*). This of course negates the fact that teachers are certainly affected by other teachers, parents, principals and the rest of their social surroundings. Herein again a simplification of society can be observed which illustrates the antagonistic dichotomization of society. The following citation exemplifies very well how the demands of teachers are made impossible to inscribe in the same equivalential chain, and are therefore made into an antagonistic “other”:

Teachers taking advantage of their status guaranties (*mibun hōshō*) don’t think at all about the children. They are not sincerely pursuing what it is the parents want or what is important for the children. They are only going their own way. And nobody can say anything about this. These are the status guaranties of public servants (*kōmuin no mibun hōshō*). (text_18, 09:13:18)

This is in accordance with Hashimoto’s justification of the ordinance in the first place: “The Kimigayo Ordinance stands for straightening some teachers’ disobedience of work orders, who are taking advantage of their status guaranties (*mibun hōshō*) as public servants” (text_27, 00:00:32). Since teachers are detached from the majority, the demands they pose cannot be linked to demands by people of the perceived majority.

Hashimoto’s emphasis that teachers would be above any criticism strengthens his argument of detachment of the educational sector.

Moreover, the administration has legal forces towards normal people. The most extreme are taxes. If people are ordered something and they don’t listen, they get a fine. But members of this organization can’t be blamed? That is a joke! Is it ok if we get teachers that follow every decision by the local board of education! Even such stupid opinions come up. (text_19, 03:12:35)

The sentiment is further intensified by constructing an image of the antagonistic “other” resisting the “natural” and “logical”. By arguing what politics, as such, per definition should do, Hashimoto is trying to naturalize his accumulation of executive authority. As he is fighting for the realization of the public’s demands, his influence should not be constrained.

Our country is not North Korea. We protect the freedom of the press, hold elections properly and institutions limiting power also exist. Therefore, politics discusses with expert institutions of education the rough objectives and parliament decides on them together.

Even such a natural [sic!] role of politics is said to be wrong in Japan. Those who say it is wrong are those who are educating (*kyōikugenba no hitotachi*). (text_14, 07:10:49)

Starting from his depiction of educational administration as a corrupted closed-off area, Hashimoto draws similar conclusions about the political establishment. As Hashimoto states, “no matter who, local municipalities, the local parliaments, national politics, or whoever, every area or field not facing up to criticism and avoiding a dialogue in fact gets corrupted” (text_13, 17:16:08). This implicit ascription of various government institutions or politics as a whole as being detached gets explicitly uttered when Hashimoto describes diet members as the opposing force in a war against unnecessary status guarantees and privileges of politicians (text_27, 00:03:24). In this narrative he discusses both the Kimigayo Ordinance and the introduced Ordinance for the reduction of the number of diet members in the Osaka prefectural assembly (*Kyōgikai secchi jōrei*) as examples for the same struggle: A power struggle against those privileged few inhabiting closed-off areas detached from common knowledge. He excludes himself from this though to some extent, as he argues that politicians are vulnerable to criticism as they can be dropped in elections and he encourages voters to not vote for him if they do not like the Kimigayo Ordinance (e.g. text_6).

He extends the antagonistic rupture of closed-off areas in Japanese society to media outlets, lawyers and bar associations. Through this extension his depiction of power relations becomes a little bit more complicated. In a tweet he states that power is not only split between the state and citizens, but also between citizens. Again, though, the ones’ with power would be those inhabiting closed-off areas such as the media and organized lawyer groups (text_13, 17:31:21). Rather than seeing state power as the only source or place of unfair privileges, the media and bar associations are also depicted as areas only elevating their own beliefs through their power and being reluctant to hear or respond to criticism from the outside, from “the people”.

The closed-off areas become connected in the discourse at some point or another. This is necessary to create a societal rupture and not just partial ruptures in certain sub-systems. In the case of the media and defense attorneys⁵⁸, such a connection looks as follows:

Furthermore, at the moment, the editorial writers of the major newspaper companies, or whatever they call themselves are the number one at not facing up to criticism by the public. They are only speaking smugly without listening to anything. [...] Only their own remarks are the absolute truth. Not just the editorial writers, but also the deskman, who is writing the stupid headlines. [...] The editorial writers of the Asahi Shinbun and the Mainichi Shinbun, have absolute trust in criminal defense, so much, that they are answering nothing about the situation of the world of criminal defense, which elevates their own sense of

⁵⁸ The initial reason for including defence attorneys was the legal case involving defamation claims against Hashimoto made by a group of lawyers, as already described in the introduction.

justice and is detached from common sense. Without knowing the public. Well, it can't be helped. Just old men who don't know the general public, jabbering in their small conference rooms, without receiving any criticism from the public. (text_13, 17:24:52-17:28:23)

Through this connection, the image of a unified antagonistic "other" develops. Single instances, in this case the *Asahi Shinbun*, agreeing with a bar association opposing Hashimoto, are used to construct a homogenized opponent of the powerless. They all share responsibility for an unsatisfactory situation and are unresponsive to any change.

In the same narrative that connects the media and bar associations as antagonistic "others", he goes on to compare the local board of education system as even more flawed. He argues that the fact that there are no disciplinary measures in the local board of education system, as there are for lawyers, they would be even more "closed-off". This leads to the problematic situation in which a "power-check" (*kenryoku chekku*) for the public is impossible (text_13, 17:08:07). This shows in what manner Hashimoto extends the rift of one closed-off area to a whole societal rift. Simultaneously he constructs the local board of education system and its proponents – not differentiated in any detail – as a small group, not subject to public pressure and therefore not necessarily having too much power, but lacking accountability for its actions, which the public has to suffer from.

As the local board of education system is a national question, the rupture we are seeing is not confined to a local level. The extension of the antagonistic rupture to the national level can further be seen in the following series of tweets, in which Hashimoto postulates the same conditions, the same power struggle for Japan as a whole:

Something I deeply feel is that in Japan government structure is shaky. Not only national government policy, the administration of the country, but also the regions are not working to constitute the body of government structure. Japan's administrative structure is completely destroyed. [...] When the government structure is shaky, whoever becomes leader, he/she can't change the system. [...] *About the necessary restructuring of power structures though: You are taking power from one place and transfer it to another, so surely this turns into a terrible power struggle. Those who get power taken away from them are resisting it desperately* [emphasis added]. (text_22, 09:34:33-09:37:42)

To summarize, in the case of the pro-ordinance discourse we can observe a definitive antagonistic split of society. Through this split of society into powerful and powerless people, one characteristic or precondition for populism is fulfilled. While a logic of difference would "displace the political conflict in the confines of the system", a logic of equivalence "places the conflict in the center of the political arena and antagonistically divides social space" (Poblete 2015:209). The demand for the Kimigayo Ordinance, in other words, gets placed in the center of an antagonistic struggle happening in society. In other terms, the demand could have been uttered by describing it as a problem with a solution that,

separate from other demands can be fixed singularly in an administrative way by the institutional status quo. Rather than that, though, it is put in a constructed policy reality in which it becomes an exemplary conflict point of society as a whole.

To make this difference clearer, a look at the anti-ordinance discourse is helpful. In the case of the anti-ordinance discourse we can observe how the conflict is put in the confines of the system and formulated in a differential logic. Viewed from another angle, the difference between anti-establishment appeals and anti-incumbent appeals might help understand the difference. Differentiating the former from the latter is the fact that one sees responsibility for the common-man's problems in the ruling class, and the other in the specific person executing a certain role. So, anti-establishment appeals lie in the middle between anti-system appeals, which see the whole system as the root of all problems, and anti-incumbent appeals, which are directed at specific persons in charge and criticize a "power-elite" (Barr 2009:31-32). While we find such an anti-establishment appeal in the pro-ordinance discourse, the anti-ordinance discourse offers a different image. Whether it is criticized that Hashimoto is mistaken in believing that patriotism can be produced forcibly (text_70), or calling on other diet members to fight against the enactment of the ordinance (text_54), the conflict is confined to an opposition against one party. In most cases it is confined to just one man, Hashimoto. In other words, the conflict is seen as solvable within the confines of the status quo, by simply removing Hashimoto from office or blockading his actions.

Among few contributions of the Nakama Labor Union, we might find a depiction of a societal split, like the following:

In summation, encouraging human resources who have internalized the capacities to win in global competition and are filled with patriotism, as the government and corporations want them to [sic!], is defined as an educational goal. An emphasis on competition, which, beginning with teachers, but in effect, all the people of Osaka prefecture (*fumin*) are forced to promote. [...] Such an education can't be an education all the people of Osaka prefecture wish for! (text_73)

There is a depiction of an elite that pushes through its own goals. As the anti-ordinance demand is posed as a critique of an incumbent, it is not put in a societal conflict. While there might be a nationalistic elite, the struggle is not put in the context of a central societal struggle. Such a positioning could look like the following: "There is an evil nationalist group, which pushes through its ideology without listening to what the people want. Not enacting the ordinance is just one instance of this struggle against a society where freedoms get more and more limited." Instead, even when it is proposed that a mentality of submissive obedience is aimed at or contributed to by the enactment of the ordinance, the problem is attributed to the craving for power by Hashimoto (text_47). In other words, the demand stays limited to a single-issue basis.

It is important to understand that the construction of an antagonistic rupture in society alone is not enough to speak of populism. With “neoliberalism”⁵⁹, for instance, we can speak of a rupture in society between free enterprise and the free market on one side and an overly strong state on the other side. Many other world views or ideologies transport a dichotomist society. But yet the articulation of, for instance, a neoliberal ideology is not populist as long as a chain of equivalence and a popular subject are not formed. This example should highlight that the antagonistic rupture is just one precondition on the way to populism.

4.2. The demands of the Kimigayo Ordinance discourse

As Hashimoto’s pro-ordinance discourse offers an antagonistic rupture, we can examine in a next step, if and how an equivalential chain of demands gets built. For better understanding, I want to give a brief introductory example on how such a chain could look like. An example not related to the issue at hand would look like the following: Rather than emphasizing the importance of a new road (*demand A*), a politician stresses the incompetence of a government because of *reason A* to handle such a demand. In other words, unfulfilled *demand A* is a scandal, not (only) because it is hugely important to the world (*reason B*), but because *government C* is not able to fulfill demands like *demand A* because of *reason A*. All demands presented in such a way – as traceable to *reason A* – can get inscribed in a chain of equivalence. As Laclau has made clear, such demands must always retain some form of particularity, but in order to overcome strict heterogeneous separation they are formulated in a unified way, as stemming from the confrontation of the “self” with the antagonistic “other” (Laclau 2007:139). The following pages will illustrate how this works.

For the sake of clarity, different demands have been grouped under the title “conservative demands” and “neo-liberal demands” in the following chapters. The reason for this is an observation by Matsutani Mitsuru. He has noted that Hashimoto successfully merges support from older, more conservative voters, with that of younger, urban, goal-oriented voters of the middle-class. This leads him to conclude that following a proposed neo-conservative (neo-liberal and conservative) ideology achieves the merging of such a heterogeneous support base (Matsutani 2011:138). What this chapter will show, though, is that it is exactly the populist political logic, which through an equivalential articulation of demands achieves this unification of seemingly heterogeneous groups. As not much time should be spent with defining conservatism and neo-liberalism, these chapters’ headlines should be seen as points of illustration for the sake of structuring the argument, and the classification of the demands might not be a hundred percent precise. Emphasizing the importance of strict top-down relations, for instance, might be seen as conservative as well as neo-liberal characteristics. As in this

⁵⁹ The vagueness of this term is recognized here, but a favouring of a free market is surely a criteria every definition shares (e.g. Weathers 2014:79-80) and important for the example at hand.

case though, an emphasis on necessary top-down relations akin to those in any business runs counter to a classic conservative view of the state, such a demand is subsumed under neo-liberal demands.

4.2.1. The pro-ordinance discourse I: Conservative demands

As already mentioned in the introductory chapters, the Ōsaka ishin no kai and Hashimoto explained the initial need for the Kimigayo Ordinance twofold. Firstly, they posited the need to foster a cosmopolitan way of thinking (*kokusaikankaku*) through raising awareness for the national flag. Secondly, they underlined the need to stricter enforce working regulations for teachers (Ōsaka ishin no kai 2011). These two demands are the basic starting points for the two ensuing chapters. As they are themselves heterogeneous, the way they are inscribed in one equivalential chain will show how the basis for the “naming” of a neo-conservative “people” is built. Both must be united through a negative component, their status as not heard and responded to by an entity (the establishment). As seen before, this entity, as an antagonistic “other”, exists in those perceived as privileged in some way or another (teachers, public servants, the media, politicians, or lawyers). They can be seen as having certain privileges that shield them from critique, or decision-making power others do not have.

Let us look at the wish for a cosmopolitan way of thinking first.

On account of the Kimigayo-issue normally being viewed in connection with questions of nationalism⁶⁰, conservatism and Japan’s war-time past (e.g. Cripps 1996, Aspinall 2000, Aspinall/Cave 2001), we will start here. Hashimoto strikes a conservative tone in the policy discourse at hand. As Matsutani’s survey has shown, about half of Hashimoto’s supporters strongly agree with the view that patriotism is something that should be fostered (Matsutani 2012:105). Hashimoto’s understanding of a cosmopolitan way of thinking and patriotism are illustrated very well in the following narrative.

A series of tweets in which Hashimoto shares an experience he had during a trip to Indonesia, exemplifies very well how he poses a conservative argument for the singing of the Kimigayo. People supposedly told him they were thankful for Japan’s interference in the Second World War, as it ended the colonialization by the Netherlands. He exemplifies by this that Japan with all its flaws did something good in the war time period too and this should be taught to children. During this trip he also met an Indonesian principle who had no understanding for Japanese teachers who refused to sing their own national anthem. He then goes on to describe how they both sang their respective national anthem and cheered each other on (text_21). Hashimoto wants to exemplify with this story how the fostering of respect for one’s own national symbols, regardless of concerns about the history of those symbols,

⁶⁰ The relationship of nationalism and populism is seen in accordance with Yannis Stavrakakis, who explains that there is rather a relation of articulation and no essential or necessary fusion: “Although both discourses (populism and nationalism) share an equivalential logic, they are, firstly, articulated around different *points de capiton* (the nation and the people, respectively) and secondly, construct a very different enemy as their antagonistic ‘other’: in the case of nationalism the enemy to be opposed is usually another nation, while in the case of populism the enemy is of an internal nature” (Stavrakakis 2005:246).

is the basis for coming together with other nations. If someone like the teachers in Japan would refuse to sing their or other national anthems, such a transnational exchange would not be possible, Hashimoto claims. Hashimoto is thereby describing himself as a politician who would understand the importance of international exchange and respect for other nations (text_21). This is what Hashimoto understands as cosmopolitan way of thinking.

Up to now, such a demand for a cosmopolitan way of thinking could be seen as a differential, or as Laclau also calls them “democratic”, demand (Laclau 2007:82). As a wish for better contact between “nations”⁶¹ and mutual respect through singing each other’s anthems can be seen as one demand, particular and separated from others. This is to say that it would mean that a mere shift of focus in the current status quo of society or politics would suffice to resolve this demand. What follows this deliberation, though, exemplifies the inscription in an equivalential chain.

Hashimoto goes on to explain that the Kimigayo Ordinance should be seen as an example of responding to a prior lack of political interference resulting in too little enthusiasm for one’s country in Japan, which rendered Japan’s education system incapable of responding to the described needs (text_21, 00:27:19-01:09:24). Hashimoto alleges the following:

The faults about the Second World War will be reflected where necessary. But instances that should be evaluated positively will be genuinely viewed positive. For the next generation of Japanese children we must build a robust education system. Such a grand objective should be decided by politics. In the current local board of education system all decisions are left to the teachers. If the objectives of education are decided without politics, it is only natural that it gets corrupt. Teachers are education professionals, but they are no professionals in understanding the global conditions. All the young people in Asian countries have the strong will to carry their country on their shoulders. Now that is an education system. (text_21, 00:49:55-00:52:43)

Because young people would not hear good things about Japan’s past, he argues they would not have this will to carry their country he sees as evident among the young people of other Asian countries. The fact that teachers are allowed to not stand for the national anthem inside the education system therefore becomes harmful in two ways. First, it obstructs international friendship, as it would hinder good relations to neighboring nations. Second, as Hashimoto clearly references, it is symbolic for the closed-off nature of the education system, which is a problem itself. This problem of lacking political interference adds the negative component to the demand. Through this, the demand for a cosmopolitan way of thinking is to some extent emptied out, as it lost importance, but it takes on the

⁶¹ “Nations” in quotes should refer to the constructed nature of nations and the understanding of international contact and in accordance a cosmopolitan way of thinking, based on a concept of the world as a “world of nations”.

fight against the antagonistic “other”. Here we can see the double role an equivalential chain plays in breaking with an existing order and constituting a new one. As Laclau states:

The equivalential chain necessarily plays a double role: it makes the emergence of the particularism of the demands possible [constituting an order, *editor’s note*] but, at the same time, it subordinates them to itself as a necessary surface of inscription [breaking with an existing order, *editor’s note*]. (Laclau 2007:122)

Through establishing the demand directed at the education system as one that is actually directed at the antagonistic “other”, whose formation we have seen in the previous chapter, the demand gets “emptied” in so far as it is not only a demand for the fostering of patriotism and a cosmopolitan way of thinking. It becomes much more. It becomes a part in the necessary power struggle Hashimoto and his advocacy coalition see themselves fighting in. The education system is, we remember, portrayed as part of the antagonistic “other”, because it supposedly is unresponsive to such important things due to a lack in political interference. Public servants, in this case teachers, are able to fend off such interference on account of their status guaranties (*mibun hōshō*; e.g. text_19, 03:38:44).

In a different narrative, Hashimoto turns to another conservative demand to society: respect and manners. A particular demand in this sphere, that etiquette and respect in society need to be fostered and emphasized, is connected to the previous demand by giving up particularity and constructing an equivalential negativity through the same antagonistic frontier.

To stand and sing the Kimigayo is of course a matter of etiquette/courtesy. I’ve never been to a ceremony where people were singing while sitting in their seats. Does such a ceremony exist in this world? Going as far as making it into an ordinance should actually be unnecessary. Saying good morning when you get up or saying thank you when somebody does you a favor is just the same. (text_19, 03:06:09) [...] Teachers who repeatedly ignore a working order should be made to leave. Why are we tolerating this? Because they are completely taking advantage of their status guaranties (*mibun hoshō*). (text_19, 03:29:58)

Combined with another narrative, in which Hashimoto describes how he called a friend of his children, who wanted to directly go to the children’s room without greeting, into the living room and made him greet (text_15), he describes himself as a defender or promoter of courtesy. Thereby, he also inscribes those people who posit demands for more respect and decency in Japanese society in the equivalential chain against the antagonistic “other”. To the critics of stricter enforcing rules for teachers, Hashimoto paints the following picture:

If we let that slide, people can’t even greet. Even urinating wherever they want. Putting their elbows on the table while eating. All the rules of today’s world are not something followed by all humans instinctively. That’s why they must be taught. Even if that bullies children sometimes. [...] (text_15, 12.06.2015, 13:38:50).

It is because teachers are the ones who have to lead by example that if they are allowed to do as they please all of society supposedly collapses. This leads him, interestingly, to give up particularity of a later demand, which posits that it is important to enforce the Kimigayo Ordinance for academic success. Rather he states:

Children who say that because of their freedom of thought and conscience it is acceptable not to greet an older man won't get away with it. With teachers standing up and singing the Kimigayo it is basically the same. Because they are public servants. This has actually nothing to do with schools [sic!]. (text_15, 13:47:20)

Instead of arguing for such a demand by explaining why this fosters respect and why respect is important for a society, Hashimoto rather criticizes an unresponsive organization, members of which oppose regulations. In a similar way to the demand before, this demand does not become crucially important because of its own content but because an “other” is refusing to follow it.

So we can see how conservative demands for more patriotism, more courtesy and manners in society and the like are propagated as particular to some extent. It is portrayed as legitimate to demand the enactment of the Kimigayo Ordinance, because an increase in patriotism or improvement in manners are associated and posited as important for society and are taught or learned in the school setting. Moreover, the enactment is essential as it is aimed against an antagonistic “other”, which is reluctant to realize the demands. In other words, different to an articulation following a differential logic, which would confine its resolution to an existing order, they are formulated in an equivalential logic against an antagonistic “other”. The following chapter shows how further demands are inscribed in the equivalential chain of the Kimigayo Ordinance.

The political establishment and especially the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party are also constructed as part of the antagonistic camp. As Hashimoto states, they are all talk and no action:

The LDP is also sloppy. For insisting that what corrupted Japan was post-war education, the Nikkyōsō, or a number of other things they said, they haven't done much about it. Compared to how they say they are conservative or whatever, nothing much changes. The LDP were the ones who said the results of test scores should be made public in the first place. But even in their time as ruling party they didn't do so. (text_17, 19:57:57)

4.2.2. The pro-ordinance discourse II: Neo-liberal demands

The second stream of demands is subsumed under the label “neo-liberal” as it portrays the state and especially schools and the education system as something to be run like a business and excludes other viewpoints. In response to the main arguments of the anti-ordinance coalition that the Kimigayo and the Hinomaru are symbols of an imperialist past, Hashimoto mostly answers something like the following. He portrays the ordinance as rather being a question of good “management”:

Some teachers complain about the connection [of the ordinance] with school management and intensifying control, right? Idiots (*bakayarō*)! Because this is an organization it is only natural that there is management. If you don't like management, quit being a public servant and turn to a self-employed profession! Tax payers are not paying taxes in order to provide for public servants who behave like they are self-employed. In all of Japan, in every organization, everywhere, there is management. (text_22, 10:05:38)

What does Hashimoto mean when he speaks of “management”? In an essay he posted on the official homepage of Osaka prefecture he lays out in detail how he thinks education should be approached and the role of the Kimigayo Ordinance in this approach.

In the text called “What is it that parents demand from schools?” (*Hogosha ga gakkō ni motomeru koto wa nani ka*), Hashimoto explains the demand for his ordinance. He explains how times have changed and schools have to turn from being a collection of individual businesses (every teacher doing his own thing) into a system of experts well-managed by rules. While after the Second World War and especially during the period of economic prosperity it was alright to entrust one teacher with judging how to best teach children, this has changed now. A stagnating economy, a diversification of opinions and especially intensified competition with neighboring countries have made it extremely important to switch to a more business-like structure (*kigyōsoshiki*) of the entire education system, subsuming the previously independent individual businesses (text_10). The demand for a business approach to education is combined with an appraisal of businesses' ability to adapt to changing times in a series of tweets:

In today's society, people's perception of various matters is changing, so the mission of politics is to understand and guide these changes. The world is changing drastically and if we can't answer to these changes, we will fall behind. Businesses are also desperately responding to these changes. The education administration too is certainly at a tipping point. It can't be that solely education is not changing at all. (text_1, 19:00:23)

In the same narrative he positions this demand against the antagonistic “other”, when he sees education administration as performed in a state of extraterritoriality and thereby standing in the way of adapting to modern times (text_1, 19:32:28). The Kimigayo Ordinance is therefore seen as an example of how to ensure the proper running of a business organization:

[...] if directives, which are the nerve system of an organization, do not work, organizational management does not hold true. A typical example for this is the so-called “Kimigayo Ordinance”. This ordinance is prone to being perceived as an issue of ideology and belief, but I think this is not the core of this issue. The local boards of education should decide whether teachers stand and sing the national anthem. The core of this issue rather is why something decided by the prefectural board of education, which is the highest decision-

making body, cannot be followed through at the actual spot of education. Members of an organization abiding to rules of that organization is something natural. (text_10)

Together with the fact that teachers would be able to act against the natural order of businesses, because they rely or want to keep their privileges/status guaranties (text_1, 19:24:47), it connects the issue to those who feel they do not have the freedom to disobey orders in their working life. This can be observed in a citizen's letter to the editor arguing in favor of the ordinance. In it the author shows no compassion for teachers, since there would be no choice to disobey work orders in the private sector, in which he is employed in (text_4).

What the above citation also shows is that in relation to the previous demands we can observe how the conservative nature of the demand is emptied out to build room for connecting others. His phrasing when he states that the "core of the issue" would not be an ideological one is also a good example for this. On the one hand, room for conservative demands in the "periphery" of the issue is left. On the other, a shift is made through the already mentioned power struggle and the antagonistic "other" to different demands.

In another issue we can observe how Hashimoto inscribes a generational conflict in the equivalential chain. He sees a generational gap between those who support his claim and those who still see Japan's national symbols related to their wartime past. He states that reservations older generations have are not to be seen as universal and that younger generations would simply not share the same views on history. This is also evident in Hashimoto's criticism of Nonaka Hiromu, who offered an anti-ordinance statement in the *Asahi Shinbun* (text_64). He states that

[...] Mr. Nonaka Hiromu has a perception of history based on his own experience of war time and he is one-sidedly convinced that all people in today's society see it in the same way. He does not grasp the changing times concerning the Kimigayo. [...] In Mr. Nonaka's times the demerit of being made to stand for the anthem was probably big. But, in these times, the demerit of not standing is bigger. (text_23, 08:21:11, 08:30:06)

Hashimoto in this way extends the equivalential chain to all those demanding better representation of younger generations that might not feel represented by the struggles of the old left, labor unions and the like. They see these actors as part of the traditional politics they learned to loath. While conservative demands like the enforcement of Japanese national symbols are traditional battlegrounds for the right wing in Japan (see Babb 2012), discursively, a younger generation might be inscribed in the link through emptying out those issues to some extent. Therefore, the part of the younger generation agreeing with this view can later become part of the popular subject that claims to be the whole.

Lastly, Hashimoto extends the equivalential chain to the national level. He connects various issues, like the wish for keeping citizens safe from nuclear disasters and the demand for economic

growth with an unresponsive national establishment. This can, for instance, look like the following case: In a series of tweets Hashimoto criticizes an analysis by the *Asahi Shinbun*, in which greater control and restriction of the “atom village” (*genshiryoku mura*)⁶² is demanded. Hashimoto sees this as hypocritical, since the newspaper would denounce his actions in restricting the power of the “education village” (*kyōiku mura*), which would suffer from the same malaise. Two of the tweets, directed at the *Asahi Shinbun*, embody the way he extends the equivalential chain through this comparison:

Well, why is the Kimigayo Ordinance necessary? You know, right? Because it's the same logic as your [the *Asahi Shinbun*] own inquiry into nuclear power and TEPCO. [...] There is only one logic. You want to challenge closed-off villages with strong, external authority. With the nuclear accident the *Asahi Shinbun* has made the closed-off nature of the “nuclear power village” their target. The absolute value system in a tight space. Before one knows it, this [value system, *editor's note*] has detached itself from common sense (*yo no jōshiki*). A nuclear accident happened and raising the problem of the “nuclear power village” now is too late. [...] With education it's the same. Whether you feel that there is something wrong with schools or not. I feel that if we don't reform the school system now, that would cause Japan to fall into a state of decline. (text_16, 09:20:23-10:20:48)

Through warning of impending decline, and equating the education administration with the administrative system in place for nuclear reactors, Hashimoto allows those that demand nuclear safety and those that worry about Japan's economic standing to become part of the popular subject behind the Kimigayo Ordinance.

4.2.3. First conclusions: The anti-ordinance discourse, the extension of equivalential chains and the Kimigayo Ordinance

To draw a first conclusion, through the extension of the equivalential chain to a variety of demands on a local as well as a national level, we can see that the popular identity develops in the following way:

The popular identity becomes increasingly full from an extensional point of view, for it represents an ever-longer chain of demands, but it becomes intensionally poorer, for it has to dispossess itself of particularistic contents in order to embrace social demands which are quite heterogeneous. (Laclau 2007:96)

In other words, as the chain of demands around the Kimigayo Ordinance extends, the particular demands lose content. As there is not much time to debate, for instance, how forcing people to sing

⁶² The “atom village” is a derogatory term for describing the tightly connected community of legislators, regulators and manufacturers involved in the promotion of nuclear power. These relations are seen as a source for too lenient controls and regulations.

the national anthem leads to patriotism and if so, how this correlates with a cosmopolitan way of thinking, these particular demands are lacking internal quality. In the general analysis of Hashimoto, the following insight brings some clarity:

While individual demands get reinforced through their equivalential inscription, the chain as a whole develops a logic of its own which can lead to a sacrifice or betrayal of the aims of its individual links. (Laclau 2007:139)

This can be shown by the fact that in the whole “dinner discussion” Hashimoto is sometimes not seen as a true conservative, because he cut funding for cultural programs of traditional Japanese arts, like *bunraku* (Japanese puppet theater) (Weathers 2014:87). As the equivalential chain brings together heterogeneous demands, one of the demands posed by conservatives might be betrayed to satisfy other demands – in this case neo-liberal state spending cuts. This emphasizes the instability of populist forms of articulation, as every chain is subject to intricate balancing of various heterogeneous demands.

As I have mentioned, the degree of populism rises through the extension of the equivalential chains’ “length” (Laclau 2007:154). Looking at the length of the equivalential chain of the pro-ordinance policy discourse we can come to the conclusion that it is highly populist for two reasons. First, it extends its reach not only to ideological questions about patriotism and the nation but also to foundational questions of the state and how government institutions should be run. Second, it does not stay confined to the local level.

The focus on a policy discourse can further show us the following: Inside a policy discourse the policy discussed is the one demand that is taking centrality and becoming representational for the whole chain. The ordinance as a symbolic act becomes “a performative operation constituting the chain as such” (Laclau 2007:97). In other words, the discourse created around the enactment of the ordinance does not reflect a “conceptual operation of finding an abstract common feature underlying all social grievances” (Laclau 2007:97) but binds them together in the formulation of the demand for the ordinance. The discursive construction of the policy reality is where an equivalential chain can get built.

In order to illustrate why the articulation of the pro-ordinance discourse follows an equivalential logic, and how this is a distinct way of articulating a number of different demands, a quick comparison with the anti-ordinance discourse is provided. As the previous chapter has shown, no antagonistic rupture is depicted in the anti-ordinance policy discourse. Hence, an equivalential chain inscribing various demands cannot be built. This shall be demonstrated by an example. First, though, as a reminder, a logic of difference has to be seen as a “continuous articulation of more and more elements (political demands, ideological principles, and so on) entering into a relation of combination” (Stavrakakis 2005:234). In a narrative published by the Nakama Labor Union of the anti-ordinance coalition, we can observe such a logic of difference. They demand not to intimidate teachers (1), to

make students aware of the imperialist past of Japan's national symbols (2) and not to introduce an education system that teaches only obedience (3) (text_66). They further state that, "such an education is not what the people of Osaka prefecture want! It is clear that this is only something based on the specific views of education the Ōsaka ishin no kai (= the Hashimoto-clique)" (text_66). Rather than inscribing demands in a counter-hegemonic chain, they suggest unity against one incumbent, something characteristic in the logic of difference (Stavrakakis 2005:234). Through this the possibility of constructing a social identity gets lost and only a possibility of speaking for an existing social group, those sharing the views, is given.

Now we have observed two necessary conditions in the discourse by Hashimoto. Can we, however, speak of populism? Not yet. To return to the comparison with neoliberalism, we say for the sake of the argument, that there is a neo-liberal discursive logic. In such a logic we could also find the two conditions described so far. Various demands could give up a certain particularity to be inscribed in an equivalential chain against the state. The difference, though, lies in the process of naming. While a (neo-)liberal rupture presents the state as antagonist, it contrasts it with individuals acting out of self-interest. This can also be identity building, but the effects on group consciousness remain limited. In the case of populism, though, a homogenizing group identity gets produced, named and ascribed in the process.

4.3. The People (*fumin*): Empty signifiers and the creation of popular identities in the Kimigayo Ordinance discourse

Finally, as Panizza has stated, the inclusion of a phenomenon into populism is justified by the respective actors' construction of "the people" as a political actor (Panizza 2005:3-4). As Stavrakakis has stated, we can only describe a discourse as being populist if the political actor "the people" has the role of a master signifier in the discourse. In other words, the signifier "the people" has to play a central role in the discourse (Stavrakakis 2005:234-237). "The people" has to play the central role of bringing together under its name (the signifier), groups previously termed (the signified) separately (e.g. conservatives and neo-liberals). This is deemed important as populism only arises

[...] if political mobilization has reached a higher level: the unification of these various demands – whose equivalence, up to that point, had not gone beyond a feeling of vague solidarity – into a stable system of signification. (Laclau 2007:74)

As Laclau has made clear, the process of naming⁶³ leads to an inversion of the relationship between the equivalential link and the demands. While the "link was originally ancillary to the demands, it now

⁶³ This "naming", is seen as a radical one, which means that it must constitute a social agent, which is not an expression of a previously given unity of a group (Laclau 2007:118). Anti-descriptivist understanding of naming:

reacts over them and, through an inversion of the relationship, starts behaving as their ground” (Laclau 2007:93). In other words, while the equivalential articulation itself only produced a certain group (*plebs*) through a discursive process, the signifier “the people” becomes the basis for one demand becoming representational for all. This leads to the conclusion that “‘the people’ is not something of the nature of an ideological expression, but a real relation between social agents. It is, in other terms, one way of constituting the unity of the group” (Laclau 2007:73). In this case, we can see how the Kimigayo Ordinance becomes a demand that reaches centrality of the chain constructed through the signifier “the people” and discursively becomes the basis for it.

First, the presence of an empty signifier that both expresses and constitutes an equivalential chain has to be observed (Laclau 2007:129). In order to look for the presence of an empty signifier which plays this role, a variable has been added to the codebook used in the next chapter. We can see in Table 7 that Hashimoto in the majority of his discourse contributions refers to either a signifier related to “the people” or “the popular will”. In the other pro-ordinance contributions we can also find a signifier referencing “the people” but no reference to “the popular will”. As previously noted, a reference to “the people” is quite common in politics in general. Accordingly, we find reference in the anti-ordinance coalition’s discourse, too. The difference of these references will be made clear in the following pages.

Table 7. Empty signifiers used in texts

Empty signifiers	Advocacy coalitions		
	Hashimoto n = 23 (% of n)	Pro-ordinance n = 9 (%)	Anti-ordinance coalition n = 41 (%)
The people	18 (78.26)	5 (55.55)	11 (26.83)
The elite	0 (0)	1 (11.11)	0 (0)
Popular will	14 (60.87)	0 (0)	2 (4.88)

Before explaining the role of popular identities, one problem will be discussed. The great variety in signifiers used to refer to “the people” raises the question if they can all be subsumed under the same roof. For this, I have found no reference in existing research so far. Nonetheless, as they all play the role of homogenizing a previously not unified group, they can be seen as playing the same role. Therefore, whether a reference to *ippan fumin* (“ordinary people of Osaka prefecture”, e.g. text_7, text_8), *fumin* (“people of Osaka prefecture”, e.g. text_9, text_10), *kokumin* (“people”, e.g. text_9, text_28), *kokuminippan* (“ordinary people of the nation”, e.g. text_19), *futsū no hito* (“ordinary

there is no fixed relationship between the signifier (the name) and the signified (the thing named) (Laclau 2007:103).

people”, e.g. text_15), *seken* (“the public”, e.g. text_18), or *shimin* (“citizens”, text_28) is made, they all contribute to the unification of a “people” opposite to the antagonistic “other”.⁶⁴

In the case of “the popular will”, we similarly observe a variety of terminology: most prominently *min’i* (“popular will”, e.g. text_1, text_3, text_7), *shakai jōshiki* or *seken no jōshiki* (e.g. text_28, text_13), *futsū no kankaku* (“common sense”, e.g. text_14, text_19), *kokumin kankaku* (“the people’s sentiment”, e.g. text_1), *fumin no kankaku* (“the people of Osaka prefecture’s sentiment”, e.g. text_7). The popular will has been measured separately, in order to show that different to Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser’s claim (Mudde/Rovira Kaltwasser 2013:8-9), the general will is not propagated in an ideological fashion, but also plays the role of unifying and homogenizing a group.

The antagonistic “other” almost never gets signified directly. While Hashimoto never speaks of an “elite”, Nakahara Tōru, principal of Izumi High School, once mentions the ideology of an existing elite in response to media criticism about his pro-ordinance stance, when he states: “We learned once again that parts of the media emphasize the ideology of the elite (*jōsōbu*) and compile the content of their reports accordingly” (text_29). Besides this direct mention of an elite, though, “power” (*kenryoku*), “public servants” (*kōmuin*), “established parties” and “the media” take on the job to construct and connect an antagonistically opposing force to “the people”. That these constructions do not describe specifically confined groups but are open and fluid shows the “emptiness” these signifiers similarly share. The “media”-signifier for instance is sometimes kept broad to describe all of the media, but mostly only mentions the *Asahi Shinbun* and sometimes is used to reflect an anti-intellectualism targeted at scholars and their “empty theories” (*kijō no kūron*) (text_23, 08:28:06). This has to be seen as part of populism’s inherent vagueness, which is not a weakness but enables populism to construct popular identities in the first place.

In conclusion, we can assert the presence of signifiers needed for the emergence of a popular subject. In a next step, the signifier “the people” must both constitute the equivalential chain and become the expression of it. How the Kimigayo Ordinance, as a central demand for the equivalential chain, constitutes the signifier “the people” is easily explained. The antagonistic rupture makes it possible to add value to the demands proposed, the negative component of not being answered by an entity detached from “the people”. Therefore, in the process of building the equivalential chain, “the people” get inscribed with this content. The content, though, is not a positive one, as it is not directly stated what “the people” want. Rather, the content is achieved through the negativity of “the people” not getting what they want. See the following citation:

⁶⁴ One important distinction has been made, though, whereas *nōzeisha* (“taxpayers”) has been counted as reference to “the people”, *hogosha* (“parents”) has been dismissed of that role. While the signifier *hogosha* also clearly plays a homogenizing role, it is in quality to be treated a little differently, as not everybody, unless he/she has a child, can be included in this group. The signifier *hogosha* therefore lacks the possibility of representing as a part the whole.

The goal of this ordinance is, to shift the focus at schools from an individual approach to a system approach with the power of politics. There lies a gap between the current focus in schools and the focus that most people of Osaka prefecture (*fumin*) and parents want. To fix this, we enacted the ordinance. (text_10)

Through this operation, the signifier “the people” gets filled with content, with all demands discursively inscribed in the chain.

In a next step, while the building of the chain has constituted the popular subject in the first place, the signifier becomes the basis for the chain of demands. “The people” implicitly become the originator of the demands. This happens through Hashimoto’s description of the ordinance as being an expression of the popular will (text_7, 13:37:44).

[...] Following work orders is natural. Furthermore, a working order in a public organization is an order that contains the popular will (*min’i*). Acting against such an order deliberately is not just simply resistance to that organization, but a defiance of the popular will. (text_19, 03:26:08)

At the same time, the signifier expresses the equivalential chain, for as in the end of the discursive production of a popular subject, being part of “the people” becomes the meaning of being *for* the equivalential chain.

By naming the chain, the plurality of links becomes a singularity through the condensation around a popular identity (Laclau 2007:94-95). This happens in the following discursive operation. The meaning of the Kimigayo Ordinance as a policy debate is not constructed as a specific demand. As Hashimoto says, the ordinance is not punishing the teachers’ refusal to stand and sing the anthem, but is punishing the defiance of work orders, which *are* the will of “the people”. Therefore, he explains, not the defiance of work orders is punished but the defiance of the will of the people (text_7, 09:00:13-13:42:27). The Kimigayo Ordinance as an equivalential chain is elevated to more than just a series of demands. It crystallizes in it the will of the people, which has to be followed even more (text_7, text_8). This does not describe the Kimigayo Ordinance policy discourse as something *constructing* the people, or telling them what is good for them, but as an *embodiment* of what people, as an *a priori* existing group, wanted all along.

This final point of the discussion should have proven that, in fact, we can speak of populism in the Kimigayo Ordinance policy discourse as constructed by the pro-ordinance coalition. To better exemplify the difference to the anti-ordinance coalition, the usage of the signifier “the people” will be discussed. The big difference is that the naming is not a radical one. It does not construct unity through building an equivalential chain. To begin with, Hashimoto’s usage of the word “the people” is mostly seen very critical (e.g. text_34, text_36), as can be seen in the following statement found in a letter to the editor from the *Asahi Shinbun*:

The governor might say, “If you don’t stand up you’re defying the people of Osaka prefecture (*fumin*)”, but at the least I can say, I am not part of the people who take not standing as a defiance. (text_38)

Or in the case of an editorial of the *Kyōdō Tsūshin*, wherein the author criticizes Hashimoto’s view that simply because he won the election he would embody the popular will completely (text_50).

The rare instances in which the signifiers are not used critically, make apparent the different usage and role of the signifier “the people”. In one such instance, a worried citizens states “I believe the people of Osaka prefecture did not elect you all [the diet members] to enact such ordinances” (text_39). While the author of this letter to the editor in the *Asahi Shinbun* references a people, which would not wish for enacting ordinances like the Kimigayo Ordinance, she stays confined to one demand, the permission of actions based on different convictions concerning the Japanese national anthem and flag (text_39). Through this, the signifier is restricted to a fixed relationship to the signified. In other words, she implies a fixed group, probably a majority, of the citizens of Osaka as sharing her conviction. In opposition to the pro-ordinance discourse, we can see that there is no construction of a popular subject going on, as no demands are connected and no popular subject is embodying such demands. To state Laclau,

In order to have “the people” of populism, we need something more: we need a *plebs* who claims to be the only legitimate *populous* – that is, a partiality which wants to function as the totality of the community. (Laclau 2007:81)

When the Nakama Labor Union on the other hand speaks of the responsibility Hashimoto and the Osaka Restoration Party have in explaining themselves to the people of Osaka prefecture (text_41), they refer to the fullness of the term. The missing connection of equivalential demands, hinders the elevation of a part (*plebs*) to embody the full, though. Similar to these two examples, references to “the people” in the anti-ordinance discourse are always either referring to the full, like in the second example, or referencing a part, which they perceive as the whole. Since there is no construction of a popular subject, however, this reference to a partiality, i.e. those sharing the same opinion, does not have the power to create subjectivity and expand the group of people agreeing to their policy proposal. If the specific opinion in question is not shared by someone, it is all too easily dismissed and ignored.

5. Narrative structures in the pro-ordinance and anti-ordinance policy discourse

As described above, this chapter has two goals. Firstly, narratives comprising a populist discourse are to be analyzed against those of a non-populist discourse. Through this quantitative measurement of “general” characteristics found in policy narratives, the characteristics of the discourse of the pro-ordinance coalition can be shown to be of a populist nature. Also, those characteristics that are not inherently populist, can be separated from populism as their explaining variable. The embedding of a populist discourse in a “neutral” analytical environment, thereby, leads to greater objectivity and allows to better systematically distinguish what characteristics are to be brought in connection with populism and which are not.

Secondly, through insights drawn from the NPF, the significance or effects populist, as well as, “non-populist” characteristics have on effective story-telling and on the shaping of democracy can be understood. Furthermore, because “a specific narrative’s influence is not wholesale; countervailing stories arise to reflect different experiences, articulate different beliefs, and challenge narrative orthodoxies” (Shanahan et al. 2014:69), the comparative aspect will further allow to judge the relative narrative effectiveness (= high narrativity + effective strategic use of elements) both coalitions achieve in the embattled policy arena. The combination of the qualitative analysis in chapter 4, which proved the pro-ordinance discourse to be populist and the results from chapter 5 will form the foundation for chapter 6, in which conclusions will be drawn on which discourse is more likely to achieve hegemonic status and what that means for democracy.

5.1. Intercoalitional differences in narrative structure, narrativity and effectiveness in persuasion

In this chapter, I will first discuss the differences between the two advocacy coalitions’ narrative forms and strategies. The narrative form consists of generalizable narrative elements, which the NPF posits as being comparable across different contexts. These are: characters, evidence and plots (McBeth et al. 2014:228). Furthermore, I will focus on two narrative strategies: causal mechanisms and scope of conflict. While the first will give insight into how the moralization of problems in the policy reality is occurring (causal mechanisms), the latter will show to what extent the range of the issue is extended or contained (scope of conflict) (McBeth et al. 2014:241). While results of Hashimoto’s texts are also presented here, quantitative comparisons for statistical significance will be made between the two coalitions alone. As Hashimoto is the main contributor to the pro-ordinance coalition results showing significance can be extended to Hashimoto.

The NPF posits that different advocacy coalitions deploy different usage of narrative elements (Shanahan et al. 2013:469). In the case of the comparison of a populist and a non-populist coalition, we would assume, accordingly, different usage of those elements. As the following analysis shows, this holds true in most cases.

5.1.1. Characters

The focus in populism research on populism as being the “politics of the construction of enemies” (*tekizukuri no seiji*) (Yoshida 2011:55), or a style constructing “good guys” and “evil guys”, and the populist standing with the oppressed “good guys” (Ōtake 2012:118-119), quickly makes obvious the important role characters play. The NPF also sees characters as the essential part of narratives, and has made them one of the necessary criteria for qualifying a text as a narrative. Therefore, the texts of the sample have been analyzed for character usage. The following pages will analyze the differences in numbers of occurring characters in both coalitions and discuss what the quantitative measurement can tell us about the narrativity and degrees of effective story-telling found in the texts.

A first look at the means and range of characters used in the narratives (see Table 8) makes it obvious that the distribution of character usage is quite similar. Both coalitions use villains most; victims second and heroes are the character type least used. An independent-samples t-test was conducted to check for significant differences in character usage by the two coalitions and significant differences for villains and heroes could be observed (see Table 8). The villain usage of the pro-ordinance coalition ($M=3.67$, $SD=2.56$) and the anti-ordinance coalition [$M=2.22$, $SD=0.99$; $t(73)=3.006$, $p=0.005$] showed statistically significant differences. The magnitude of the differences in the means was moderate ($\eta^2=0.113$, guidelines for interpretation see Pallant 2005:208). Heroes are generally the least used character type, but the stronger hero usage of the pro-ordinance coalition ($M=1.03$, $SD=0.82$) is also statistically significant compared to the anti-ordinance coalition [$M=0.2$, $SD=0.6$; $t(73)=5.019$, $p=0.00$]. The magnitude of the differences in the means was even large ($\eta^2=0.262$) in this case. We can see first evidence that the two coalitions in fact rely on different usage of narrative elements. So, while the pro-ordinance coalition sticks out in villain usage ($M=3.67$ and $M=2.22$ respectively), the anti-ordinance coalition uses slightly more victim characters on average ($M=2.05$ and $M=1.75$ respectively), but not to a statistically significant extent.

Table 8. Range of use of characters between advocacy coalitions and Hashimoto specifically

Characters	Advocacy coalitions								
	Pro-ordinance coalition n = 32			Hashimoto n = 23			Anti-ordinance coalition n = 41		
	Min.	Max.	Mean	Min.	Max.	Mean	Min.	Max.	Mean
Victims	1	3	1.75	1	3	1.83	0	6	2.05
Villains	1	12	3.67*	2	12	4.39	1	5	2.22*
Heroes	0	3	1.03*	0	3	1.22	0	3	0.2*
	Victims pro-ordinance coalition and anti-ordinance coalition <i>t-statistic</i> = -1.277, <i>ns</i> Villains pro-ordinance coalition and anti-ordinance coalition <i>t-statistic</i> = 3.005, $p < 0.05$, equal variances not assumed Heroes pro-ordinance coalition and anti-ordinance coalition <i>t-statistic</i> = 5.019 $p < 0.001$								

Populism theory can inform and, in turn, be informed by these results. Firstly, the specific use of villains and victims and resulting significant differences can be explained by populism and the construction of antagonisms. Secondly, the usage of hero characters brings additional insights into the role of the leader in populism, as it tells us whether the central role of the leader is a necessity in populism or not and we are just looking at an effective narrative usage of a hero character. I will start with victims and villains.

5.1.1.1. Different usage of victim and villain characters

In the case of the pro-ordinance discourse, it is interesting to see that every single narrative features at least one victim *and* one villain. In connection with previous insights drawn from populism theory, we can understand this as necessary for the building of an antagonistic frontier in society. The fact that victims are, in numbers, less often featured than villains, is also to be explained by the populist discursive logic on which the narratives are based. An ever-increasing number of villains, presented in an antagonistic way (see above), extends the rupture in society and leads to a higher degree of populism (Laclau 2007:154). The adding of villain characters, therefore, gives the possibility of extending the equivalential chain by inscribing additional demands new villain characters are not willing to fulfill. For a populist mode of articulation, constantly extending the number of villains can be seen as important. In terms of villain usage, therefore, rising degrees of populism (a more extensive antagonistic “other”), correlates with higher narrativity (usage of more villain characters), which can make the narrative more memorable and form negative affective assessments of more oppositional groups.

As explained before, the number of villains contributes positively to the populist “fullness” of the discourse. The narrative by Hashimoto with the highest count of villain characters of all narratives (12 in total) exemplifies this very well. He manages to connect all villain characters starting from teachers and public servants to the media as a whole and specific outlets, political commentators and theoreticians, the political establishment, the “nuclear power village” (*genshiryoku-mura*) and the

world of lawyers (text_13, 16:35:30-18:16:05), all in one narrative. This can only make sense if they are discursively brought into connection through their ascription to the closed-off antagonistic “other”. A qualitative study of how villain or victim characters are brought into connection can give insights, overlooked by the NPF so far, as to how effective villain “adding” could function. A logic of difference, only combining different villains, not connected in an equivalential relation, might come across as collateral damage while an equivalential relation offers a sensible and well-rounded picture. This is exemplified very well in one tweet by Hashimoto:

People from the Asahi Shinbun or the Mainichi Shinbun writing the editorials, they just can't give answers. While they insist on their justice, in the world of lawyers they are absolutely not aware of the situation that seems irrational from common knowledge. They are ignorant of the ways of the world. Well, it can't be helped. Just old men, ignorant of the ways of the world, sitting in their small conference rooms, gabbing on without receiving any criticism from the public. (text_13, 17:18:23)

Here, Hashimoto brings together his critics as villain characters. Additionally, these villain characters are bound together by describing their maliciousness as rooted in the same problem, the fact that they are not exposed to public criticism.

The fact that the anti-ordinance coalition only uses 2.21 villain characters on average shows that it is underperforming in narrativity, as less such characters are used than by the pro-ordinance coalition. This reflects the previously ascribed anti-incumbent focus of the coalition. As Hashimoto and his party, the Ōsaka ishin no kai, have been counted separately, we can observe that the ascription of villain characters by the anti-ordinance coalition is almost completely confined to anti-incumbent appeals (e.g. text_53 or text_54). This is also evident in the fact that some narratives add Nakahara to the villain characters (e.g. text_51). As these narratives exclusively see him as a “soldier” of Hashimoto, though, this is in fact also part of the anti-incumbent appeals. Only on some occasions, the range of villains gets extended to a more general notion of politicians who interfere in education (text_52). Nonaka Hiromu, in a rare exception, adds four extra villain characters: The Japanese in general, who would follow too easily, populists like Hashimoto, Koizumi, the previous DPJ government, and arrogant rulers as a general problem (text_64). In general, though, a focus on Hashimoto cannot be negated. This is exemplified by the narrative of Hiramatsu Kunio, predecessor of Hashimoto as mayor of Osaka that does not feature any victims, and only focuses on Hashimoto as the villain (text_61).

Let us turn to victim characters.

As we have also seen, compared to villain characters, the pro-ordinance coalition uses few victim characters ($M=1.75$ for the coalition as a whole and $M=1.83$ for Hashimoto). In light of the discourse's populist nature, this can be viewed as a necessary condition. Describing almost exclusively “the people” as victims, is necessary for constructing a homogenized partiality being harmed by the antagonistic

“other”. Using different victim characters might stand in the way of people feeling part of “the people”.⁶⁵ As, for example, if more occupational groups were described as victims, the probability of someone holding personal grudges and therefore not responding to a unifying popular identity, would rise. The development of victims in the pro-ordinance coalition’s narratives deviates to some extent from the conclusions drawn in NPF research. While the NPF has found victims to mostly be those suffering in the story of decline (Shanahan et al. 2013:468), the pro-ordinance discourse additionally portrays the majority of victims as those suffering from the antagonistic rupture in society. As we will see later, this sometimes corresponds with stories of decline (about 28 percent for the pro-ordinance discourse as a whole), but what qualifies “the people” as victims is mostly not their direct suffering from bad economic developments. Rather the detachment from decision-making and the absent possibility of getting their wishes heard, defines them as victims. In this regard, populism might show its “drunkenness”, as the story-telling deviates from “normal” political story-telling as explained by Deborah Stone (Stone 2012). Rather than describing the harm to the victim as stemming from future developments the opposition’s policy proposal – i.e. not regulating the teachers conduct towards national symbols – will bring, the harm stems from an existing condition in society.

Another interesting aspect of the pro-ordinance coalition’s victim character usage is the fact that both Hashimoto and Nakahara describe themselves as victims alongside “the people”. In this narrative construction we might find one reason for the affective identification with a leader by his/her electorate. The story-teller gets hurt in the same story in which “the people” are also harmed. Hashimoto and Nakahara are not necessarily harmed by the same problem, but the correlation of being simultaneously harmed could suffice for building a relationship. Through this narrative operation both “the people” and Hashimoto or Nakahara are put on the same level and share the fact that they get hurt by an antagonistic villain.

This portrayal of Hashimoto or Nakahara as victims might (most commonly) include being wrongfully scolded by the *Asahi Shinbun* (e.g. text_7, text_13, text_24), or simply being misunderstood (e.g. text_14). Another strategy of self-victimization is sometimes deployed by Hashimoto, when he points out how he supposedly suffers as a boss having to employ people (public servants) who fight him in a “fight to the death” struggle during elections and continue to do so afterwards as well (text_26). In line with Hashimoto’s above-mentioned statement that he is only temporarily on the side of the powerful (text_32, 20:03:31), the self-victimization also describes him as an outsider, because he supposedly still suffers from those with too much power. This operation surely creates an affective sympathy for Hashimoto.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Arditi has also made that observation, writing that “the ‘Us’ has to stay vague, as to be able to encompass as many dissatisfied as possible” (Arditi 2005:82).

⁶⁶ NPF-“co-founder” Michael D. Jones has found that narratives influence respondents’ affective assessment of groups used as either heroes or villains in the narrative treatments (Jones 2014b:3). It would further be

With a mean of 2.05 in victim usage, the anti-ordinance coalition uses slightly more victim characters on average than the pro-ordinance coalition. As losing coalitions are expected to try to extend the policy issue (Shanahan et al. 2013:460), describing and naming more victims can be seen in this light. Compared to the pro-ordinance coalition, which depicts mainly “the people”, the majority of society and Hashimoto or Nakahara as victim, the anti-ordinance coalition depicts victim characters in much larger variation. Most common, of course, is the depiction of teachers in this context, as can be seen in the following example:

Having their own thoughts crushed to death, I can't wipe away concerns that this will only lead to the spread of reservations to pretending to obey but secretly betraying one's own beliefs. (text_63)

Victims do range, though, from teachers who do not sing (e.g. text_62, text_63, text_71), to teachers in general – as pressure in schools is supposedly on the rise (e.g. text_71, text_53) –, to various groups like children, unions, public servants (e.g. text_75, text_51, text_53) or minorities (text_55). Implicit victimization of the majority, as the problem makes everything worse, also occur (e.g. text_50). This is exemplified in one letter to the editor, in which the author sees the danger of an extension of the coercion towards national symbols from teachers to parents and students. Also, he perceives a rise of nationalism, which is aided by Hashimoto's actions, as dangerous to society as a whole (text_55). Additionally, some narratives bring into the discourse victim characters that do not get mentioned on other occasions. For instance, former chief cabinet secretary (*kanbō chōkan*) Nonaka Hiromu views Hashimoto's action as a betrayal of the Act on National Flag and Anthem (Kokki oyobi kokka ni kansuru hōritsu, 1999) he helped draft (text_64). We might speak of greater narrativity in the case of the anti-ordinance coalition's victim usage, but as the mean shows no statistically significant difference to the pro-ordinance coalition's usage, this has to be seen as negligible. Also, greater variation might lead to a negative effect as intracoalitional cohesion has also shown to be effective in story-telling (This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.2.2.). As we can only find one instance where a punished teacher describes himself as a victim (text_60), the creation of affect with punished teachers as victim characters can be seen as low.

Therefore, the anti-ordinance coalition's slight advantage in victim narrativity doubtfully translates into more effectiveness of the narratives, as the difference is also statistically insignificant. While emphasizing different groups hurt by the problem is probably meant to extend the reach of the problem, the discourse stays confined to one issue. All victims are hurt or could suffer from constraining freedom of speech, conscience and religion. If people do not share the main premise,

interesting to see, if such a construction has an effect on the level of “narrator trust” – i.e. how recipients feel about the originator of the story – because the former has been shown to matter in narrative persuasiveness (Jones/McBeth 2010). This could be an interesting starting point for future NPF-research.

though, that the Kimigayo Ordinance is in fact a constraint of freedom of speech, conscience, or religion, then the lacking supply of additional problems leads to less empathy with the victim characters. Here we can see, how the pro-ordinance coalition's equivalential chain of demands opens up the possibility to sympathize with victims, mostly "the people", from various angles. Such angles can be as different as the fear of a decline of etiquette or respect in society, or a decline in competitiveness on the global market.

5.1.1.2. Different use of hero characters

The analysis of hero characters through the NPF can help better understand the role of "the leader" in a discourse and in populism. While the leader figure is central in many definitions of populism (see Barr 2009, Mudde/Rovira Kaltwasser 2013), Ernesto Laclau sees its discursive role in creating affective investment as one singularity which becomes representative of the whole – the leader as simultaneously being part and representative of the whole. This follows the same logic as the definition of equivalential chains, which in their entirety get represented by one particular demand that reaches centrality (Laclau 2007:99-100). Before going into more detail on this, I want to take a first look at the quantitative data.

As we have seen, the pro-ordinance coalition and especially Hashimoto, significantly outperform the anti-ordinance coalition in hero usage. While the means show a generally low usage ($M=1.03$ and $M=1.22$ against $M=0.2$ for the anti-ordinance coalition, see Table 8), I have proven above that the two coalitions differ in their hero usage in statistically significant ways (see Table 8). Table 9 further shows how most narratives of the pro-ordinance discourse feature at least one hero character (75 and 82.61 percent respectively for the pro-ordinance coalition and 11.9 for the anti-ordinance coalition). This difference is also of a highly significant nature and shows a strong relationship (Cramer's $V>0.6$).

Table 9. Attempts of casting individuals or groups as heroes

Characters	Advocacy coalitions		
	Pro-ordinance coalition n = 32 (%)	Hashimoto n = 23 (%)	Anti-ordinance coalition n = 41 (%)
Narratives with at least one Hero character	24 (75)*	19 (82.61)	5 (11.9)*
Chi-squared (d.f. = 1) = 27.042, $p < 0.001$; Cramer's $V = 0.637$, $p < 0.001$			

The most common hero character in the pro-ordinance discourse is "the self". Hashimoto, as well as Nakahara, depict almost exclusively themselves as the hero character (e.g. text_8 and text_9). As they are both in active positions directly working and making decisions in the area they see a problem in, this might not be that surprising. Nonetheless, it helps to understand how a populist discourse can

become more effective in persuading people through the hero character. Let us look at some examples:

Hashimoto is for instance representing himself as a hero character when he presents himself as the trigger for a “shift from a geocentric to a heliocentric world view in the world of lawyers’ value system”, which makes them less of a “closed-off” area from “the people” (text_13, 16:35:30-18:16:05). Because he made lawyers face up to public criticism, more justice was supposedly brought to Japanese society. Therefore, his sometimes inappropriate words, which led him to being sued, led him to the heroic act of bringing public influence to one “closed-off” area. On a more general note, Hashimoto’s whole political activity is portrayed as heroic as it is an attempt to solve the problematic situation of “the people”.

Mr. Tsuboi or the Asahi Shinbun pick out the Kimigayo Ordinance in which they are interested in, and sum that all up as “fighting”, by saying that this is a steamrolling by the Osaka Restoration Party. How about that? Of course we are fighting, and that is necessary in politics. Especially, regarding the redistribution of power: situations where we step in against vested interests are where we fight! (text_26, 00:22:17)

Hashimoto’s actions are also described as somewhat heroic, because he could be held accountable by the public very easily if he did something wrong:

Public administration is a huge bundle of administrative tasks. I am not only responsible for the reduction of parliamentarians and question of standing and singing the Kimigayo. Also, in a situation where the balance in politics is missing, there is something like elections, where I, unlike any other worker in Japan, would lose my social position due to punishment I can get in an election. (text_26, 00:20:21)

As mentioned before, the role of the political leader is seen differently in populism theory. Robert Barr, for instance, depicts the importance of a populist leader to be an outsider and states that this “depends strictly on location, not rhetoric or strategy” (Barr 2009:34).⁶⁷ Interestingly, though, he also states that the relative success of the anti-establishment appeal ultimately depends “on the ability of the political actor (or party) to convince [sic!] potential supporters that he indeed stands in opposition to, and is not part of, the entrenched power structure” (Barr 2009:32). In other words, for a populist story to be

⁶⁷ Besides the discursive construction of Hashimoto, such an outsider image surely must find some anchorage in real life. Therefore, a brief look into this should be made. In fact, one can see that on a national level, the Japan Restoration Party had the second highest percentage of first-time candidates (76,2%) at the 2012 general election – only slightly behind Your Party (Smith 2013:102). Concerning the background of these first-time candidates, a lot of candidates are coming from a business profession (Smith 2013:107), which fits the party’s self-ascription as outsiders. In a second recruitment round Osaka ishin no kai officials especially targeted academics and other professionals. Additionally, out of the selected candidates almost half were not coming from the district they were aiming to represent (Smith 2013:114). In other words, they were geographic outsiders, too. With the LDP still relying heavily on legacies for selecting candidates at the 2012 election (Smith 2013:120), the Japan Restoration Party’s approach can be seen as displaying outsider status.

persuasive, a concrete location must be given and the readers must be convinced of this location being accurate. As Barr also includes “mavericks” – defined as “inner-establishment” forces that start to act against it in possibly playing the role of an outsider (Barr 2009:30) – though, the importance of discursive constructions of the role of “the self” can be seen as more significant. Of course, actions must, to some extent, correlate to the discursively constructed image, but if it is possible to turn from a member of the establishment into a “maverick”, discursive constructions can potentially outweigh an “inopportune” location. Therefore, discursive construction has to be seen as the primarily important factor.

Still, it is not clear whether centrality of the leader figure in a populist discourse is an inherent and necessary characteristic. We can see it as a necessity for a politician who is partaking in a policy discourse, in describing the policy proposal he/she is in favor of (see also (Stone 2012:207). Describing his/her action as problem solving, therefore, turns the respective politician into a hero character. Hence, a populist policy discourse logically brings forward the leader as a hero character in a specific way. Firstly, he can only be part of “the people”, as there are only two choices in a dichotomist society. The populist nature in the pro-ordinance discourse allows a leader to only be posited with the people and against the antagonistic “other” in that policy discourse. Secondly, this leads to the affective investment in the leader as an identification figure central to the discourse.

If we, therefore, measure quantitatively the number of hero characters with the codesheet of the NPF, we can make a judgment about how convincing the narratives are. For as Yannis Stavrakakis has concluded, “it might be necessary to distinguish populism not only in terms of its discursive structure but also in terms of its intensity, the nature of the investment leaders and followers exhibit in their identifications” (Stavrakakis 2004:264). Since, for instance, Michael D. Jones has found that people especially tend to be persuaded through the vehicle of the hero character against their ideological priors (Jones 2014b:22), a continuous supply of hero characters possibly leads to bigger investment of the followers. As Jones states,

narratives are found to influence respondent affective assessment of groups used as either heroes or villains in the narrative treatments. In turn, these same affective assessments are found to drive the respondents’ reactions to arguments and assumptions within the narrative [...] as well as preferences for policy solutions championed in the narrative. (Jones 2014b:3)

In other words, narrative descriptions of Hashimoto as the hero character create a positive affective assessment of him. This, in turn, leads to positive assessments of his proposals. The supply of hero characters (higher narrativity) therefore possibly leads to higher investment, something outside the populist structure, but benefitting its persuasiveness. If this supply of hero characters is concentrated mostly on only one character, which is the case for the pro-ordinance discourse (almost exclusively

Hashimoto), the positive affective assessment of him/her/it is seen as rising, because, following the logic of NPF research, higher narrativity has positive effects on memorability and persuasiveness.

The, statistically significant, rarer usage of hero characters by the anti-ordinance coalition, on the other hand, is quite interesting. Even if heroes included not only those who fix a problem but also those who point it out, the texts of the anti-ordinance coalition would not feature more. This shows the difficult life of teachers refusing to stand and sing the national anthem at school ceremonies, as their act of disobedience is not even depicted as a necessary or brave act by those supporting their claim. This contributes to an anti-incumbent nature of their discourse participation, which is only focused on criticizing Hashimoto. Given the long continuation of the conflict, it is arguably a sign of defeat that opponents of the ordinance cannot portray teachers in a more positive light. While there is certainly compassion regarding the uneasiness the ordinance brings to all teachers (e.g. text_71), only four narratives by labor union activists (text_42, text_44, text_59, text_60) and just one letter to the editor in the *Asahi Shinbun* (text_57) featured resisting teachers as hero characters. The character usage of an anti-incumbent appeal can be concluded to correlate with less degrees of narrativity and, therefore, leads to less persuasiveness.

We can summarize that narratives of the pro-ordinance discourse can be seen as effective in respect to character usage. The relation of villains and victims can be viewed as effective for the building of antagonisms, and an extensive use of villains extends the antagonistic rupture in society. Furthermore, the usage of hero characters and the positioning of Hashimoto as hero standing with the victims is affect-building and combined with Hashimoto's location to the political establishment, possibly impassions supporters. Also, in respect to narrativity, the pro-ordinance coalition outperforms its opponents in almost every aspect and in the case of victims does not fall behind far.

5.1.2. There is only one truth: Evidence in the policy discourses

Scientific evidence is often seen as the one characteristic which should decide policy issues. Constitutional lawyers might agree with this also in the case of the Kimigayo Ordinance. We can see, though, that in the construction of the policy reality both advocacy coalitions pursue, evidence plays a very little role. As Shanahan et al. emphasize: "Science has the power to legitimize a proposed policy solution and can also contradict competing policy solutions" (Shanahan et al. 2013:468). Between the two coalitions, it is evident that science is used in a statistically significant different way (medium relationship; Cramer's V between 0.2 and 0.6). In the case of the populist pro-ordinance discourse it is mostly used to contribute to the naturalization of the popular subject and the demands it constitutes and expresses. This happens by mostly referencing evidence in accordance with one's own view, to present this view as a matter-of-fact (see Table 10).

The only "evidence", as a somewhat objective input formed outside both coalitions, featured in the narratives, was the Supreme Court decision of 2011, which deemed laws ordering teachers to stand

and sing the national anthem constitutional (e.g. text_18). Since this statement further declared, though, that laws like this would have aspects indirectly restricting freedom of thought and freedom of conscience it was also usable by the anti-coalition (e.g. text_61). From an empirical point of view, the fact that less than half of the narratives in both coalitions even mention the decision, is in congruence with NPF research that showed that evidence is not that important in the construction of policy realities (e.g. Shanahan et al. 2008). Given the charged nature of the issue in post-war history, it is little surprising that legal arguments are not at the center of the discussion.

Table 10. Usage of evidence in the advocacy coalition's narratives and by Hashimoto specifically

Evidence*	Advocacy coalitions		
	Pro-ordinance coalition n = 32 (%)	Hashimoto n = 23 (%)	Anti-ordinance coalition n = 41 (%)
None	17 (53.12)	13 (56.52)	29 (70.73)
Support of argument	5 (15.63)	4 (17.39)	10 (24.39)
Refute an argument	2 (6.25)	2 (8.7)	1 (2.44)
Matter-of-fact	8 (25)	4 (17.39)	1 (2.44)
Chi-squared (d.f.=3) = 9.611, p < 0.05; Cramer's V = 0.363, p < 0.05			

As previously mentioned, one interesting point is that the pro-ordinance coalition much more often stated the Supreme Court Decision as a matter-of-fact point. Rather than discussing pros and cons, it is proclaimed “the Supreme Court said so!”. This can be seen as part of the naturalization of the argument. As Hashimoto and also the rest of the coalition emphasize that what they ask for from teachers is only natural (*atarimae*), a conclusion that the Supreme Court ruling reflects this natural state and common sense, without the need to discuss it, is fitting. We can conclude that while evidence plays a subordinate role in the discourse, the pro-ordinance coalition shows higher levels of narrativity and a fitting usage effective for the construction of a popular subject.

5.1.3. Plots: Into a bleak future

As Deborah Stone wrote: “In politics, narrative stories are the principal means for defining and contesting policy problems” (Stone 2012:158). In other words, the story types are crucial for the construction of policy realities and persuading people. The NPF also sees plots as serving “to link characters to settings, assign the roles of the characters, and, most importantly, assign blame through some assertion of causation” (Shanahan et al. 2011:540). Furthermore, story plots are also something that “reflect[s] the style or architectural artistry” of the narratives (Shanahan et al. 2013:468). So, in the stories we should be able to make assertions about what kind of narrative style we are dealing with and what that means. Especially, in regards to populism we can deal with the following insight Paul Taggart has stated:

What is perhaps more important is that populism tends to emerge when there is a strong sense of crisis and populists use that sense to inject an urgency and an importance to their message. (Taggart 2004:275)

How this creation of urgency is transported in narrative characteristics can be seen in this chapter. Additionally, as we are dealing with a politician in power, it is interesting to see how this sense of crisis is brought together with stories of success and is met with anti-incumbent criticism once more.

Again, both coalitions use different stories at a significantly different rate (medium relationship). Among the plot types used by both coalitions, stories of decline are the most common ones. As has been observed, this is common in so-called “wicked” policy areas, in which both coalitions try to make out a fight for a specific way of life (Shanahan et al. 2013:468). In such “wicked” policy arenas, conflicts are value based, difficult to define, and resist resolution. They “are populated with narratives that tell a loser’s tale” (McBeth et al. 2010:393-394). While the anti-ordinance coalition almost exclusively features stories of decline (the two decline types combined make out 64.42 percent), in the case of the pro-ordinance coalition, the range is more diverse. Decline stories still are the most used type (31.26 percent for the coalition and 34.78 percent for Hashimoto) other story types, such as stories of rising (18.75 and 17.39 percent respectively) and stymied progress (9.38 and 13.04 percent respectively) are also prevalent. See the complete results in the Table 11.

Table 11. Stories of change found in narratives by both coalitions and Hashimoto specifically

Stories of change*	Advocacy coalitions		
	Pro-ordinance coalition n = 32 (%)	Hashimoto n = 23 (%)	Anti-ordinance coalition n = 41 (%)
None	12 (37.5)	7 (30.43)	12 (29.27)
Stories of decline (bad on the rise)	7 (21.88)	5 (21.74)	24 (58.54)
Stories of decline (good slipping away)	3 (9.38)	3 (13.04)	2 (4.88)
Stymied progress	3 (9.38)	3 (13.04)	3 (7.32)
Stories of rising	6 (18.75)	4 (17.39)	0 (0)
Change-is-only-an-illusion	1 (3.13)	1 (4.35)	0 (0)
	Chi-squared (d.f.=5) = 15.651, p < 0.01; Cramer’s V = 0.463, p < 0.01		

Stories of change are the only case in which the anti-ordinance coalition shows higher levels of narrativity than its rivaling coalition. A closer look at the, almost exclusively featured, stories of decline reveals that there are mainly two types of such stories. Only some of these stories paint a bigger picture of society. Two such cases are found in letters to the editor. In one the author asks: “furthermore should we not see this as an omen of an unfree time when heterogeneous ideas are excluded?” (text_36). This implicit forecasting of worse things to come is also evident in the following quote: “With totalitarian tendencies such thoughts are spreading, I am afraid” (text_40). Such stories are surely

trying to create a sense of urgency with the reader and put the issue of the Kimigayo Ordinance in a societal perspective. Different to this, though, most stories remain focused on Hashimoto and assume that worse things are to be expected of him. Especially, Hashimoto's statement that he would like to fire teachers who repeatedly defy the Kimigayo Ordinance arose such suspicions (e.g. text_34).

Hashimoto and the pro-ordinance coalition, in turn, manage to combine different declining aspects in the Kimigayo Ordinance policy discourse. An example for a story of decline with something good slipping away told by Hashimoto is featured with statements like: "I believe, that especially if we do not reform the educational administration now, that because of this, Japan will fall in a state of decline" (text_16, 10:20:48). Thus, urgency is emphasized by forecasting Japan's decline if action is not taken immediately. Stories of rising are also featured in some narratives. In one such narrative Nakahara emphasizes that his motivation to become active in Japan's education system was always driven by a feeling that a balanced, factually proven deliverance of history to students is missing. As he later goes on to explain, from the beginning of his career in education, he developed and executed many programs to contribute to a solution of this problem (text_11). Therefore he portrays himself as part of a positive trend, together with the necessary policy, which will solve this problem.

Further examples for stories of rising can be found in Hashimoto's success story of how he brought some "reality" to the world of criminal attorneys. In 2007, Hashimoto called for disciplinary measures against lawyers involved as defense attorneys in a murder case on national television. He criticized the attorneys harshly for trying to cheat the justice system for an overtly mild punishment for their client. The accused lawyers saw their reputation damaged and sued (N.N. 2009). In the end, Hashimoto won and incorporated his success into the Kimigayo Ordinance policy reality in the following way:

For the fight against state power, attorneys are given various rights. But depending on the case, they must answer to criticism from the public. [...] In the world of attorneys, until now they have the approach that criminal attorneys themselves are justice. There is no need to confront criticism. [...] Hence, the attorney group, which lost the case against me [sic!], now clearly states that "It is disappointing that attorney groups must get used to getting bashed by the public. (text_13, 16:55:46-16:58:38)

Hashimoto, in other words, managed to achieve a triumph against the closed-off areas he depicts as the antagonistic "other". The fact that he admits some wrongdoing in speaking impolite (text_13), can also be seen as a positive narrative tool to some extent, for as Panizza states, "people can also identify themselves with failure or flaws in a populist leader" (Panizza 2005:26) This is also evidenced in Hashimoto's dramatized "bragging" with the reduction of diet members he pushed through in Osaka:

If this had happened in different times, it would have been a bloody fight with an exchange of cannons and gun fires. Sugarcoating it won't bring us any further. The Ōsaka ishin no kai

pledged in their nationwide local election campaign as follows: The reduction of diet members can only be achieved with the power of the will of the people. That's why it came to a huge battle, which led to this first blockade of the assembly hall in the Osaka prefectural assembly's history. (text_27, 00:07:21)

The stories of change leave us with a mixed picture. While we can say that the anti-ordinance coalition for the first time shows a higher level of narrativity, the pro-ordinance coalition does not fall behind very much (narratives that do not feature stories of change are 29.27 percent for the former and 37.5 percent for the latter; with Hashimoto faring better than his coalition at 30.43 percent). As the pro-ordinance coalition is the one that has already enacted the ordinance, a mere focus on stories of decline would be surprising.

A story of power, different to stories of change, “links *helplessness* and *control* as the two sides of power relationships” (Stone 2012:165). According to Deborah Stone, such stories are especially gripping as they debate basic questions of how much individuals can influence their own lives (Stone 2012:166). Simply put, the stories ask whether individuals or groups are helplessly bound to the mercy of others or if they can control their own lives. It is no wonder that we can observe that so-called stories of power are very characteristic of the pro-ordinance coalition's narratives (see Table 12) and are used in statistically significant different ways (strong relationship; Cramer's $V > 0.6$). Especially, Hashimoto's insistence on fighting for the return of power to “the people” has to be conceived of as stories of helplessness and control. As the anti-ordinance coalition, by contrast, almost completely refrains from telling such stories, the pro-ordinance coalition once more pulls ahead in narrativity and effectiveness.

Table 12. Stories of power found in narratives by both coalitions and Hashimoto specifically

Stories of power*	Advocacy coalitions		
	Pro-ordinance coalition n = 32 (%)	Hashimoto n = 23 (%)	Anti-ordinance coalition n = 41 (%)
None	13 (40.63)	8 (34.8)	38 (92.68)
Helplessness and control	11 (34.38)	11 (47.8)	0 (0)
Conspiracy	1 (3.13)	0 (0)	3 (7.32)
Blame-the-victim-stories	7 (21.88)	4 (17.4)	0 (0)
Chi-squared (d.f.=5) = 30.611, $p < 0.001$; Cramer's $V = 0.648$, $p < 0.001$			

The blame-the-victim-stories, which are the second most common of the pro-ordinance coalition mainly focus on teachers' possibilities to find a new job. As a reminder, such stories place the control over a problem with the people who claim to suffer from it. These stories call for behavioral change in the victims. Such stories of power always assert that there is a choice of action (Stone 2012:166-168). This disqualifies the teachers' demands as illegitimate, as the state would simply require a certain action from them, to which they are of course bound to oblige. If they object, they can quit and work

at a private school or at any other private firm that would have them and would be more to their ideological liking. An example by Hashimoto looks like this:

[...] I tell you, there are many teachers who despise the governor and the people at the local board of education as political enemies, who have different principles than they do. For a normal voter, this is ok of course. But inside a system we will not allow this. As part of the system, it is only natural that you follow the decision of the local board of education. If you have the belief that you can't stand and sing the Kimigayo, then you should quit as a public servant and follow that belief. You should quit and express yourself as you wish. If you quit as public servant, your freedom of expression will be protected to the maximum extent. (text_17, 19:47:58-19:50:25)

Nakahara Tōru also delivers such an argument in response to a comment by a Christian student, who criticizes the Kimigayo as praise to the emperor and argues that because of his faith he could not participate in such an act (text_2). A very similar argument can also be found in the letter to the editor published in the *Asahi Shinbun* speaking in favor of the ordinance (text_4). A different example is Hashimoto's statement that teachers would have better options to express themselves ideologically, but supposedly evade actually talking to students about the issue out of cowardice and instead rely on childish acts like not standing for the national anthem:

As teachers who can face students and explain their own historical views under specific rules, they don't need to go on strike by not standing for the national anthem. The excuse that teachers who don't teach Japanese classes or social studies have no opportunities to talk to students about such issues has its limits. They just need to create such opportunities by themselves. (text_23, 08:25:04)

The reasoning behind these blame-the-victim-stories can, on the one hand, be attributed to a market style portrayal of the state, which is seen as best run as any other business. This is implying that a business is always run the same, of course. From a populism theory perspective, though, this fits into the portrayal of a societal rupture in which the conflict is placed. As the teachers are on the powerful side, which is the side leaving the demands inscribed in the equivalential chain unsatisfied, they cannot place demands themselves.⁶⁸ In summation, while the anti-ordinance coalition has stronger narrativity in their narratives when it comes to them using more stories of change, the mix of stories of change by the pro-ordinance coalition and their strong deployment of stories of power is seen as making their stories more effective.

⁶⁸ Populism theory might well give an insight into the effectiveness of stories of power, which should be looked into further in future NPF research.

5.1.4. Narrative strategies: Constructing a moralistic and wide policy reality

In this section I will look at narrative strategies as the tactical portrayal of narrative elements (Shanahan et al. 2013:458). On a meso-level, coalitions, either for or against the policy, are seen as deploying narrative strategies to further their respective goals. The first of these narrative strategies are causal mechanisms. Causal mechanisms ascribe responsibility and blame and describe how a problem arose (who is at fault and for what reason). Causal mechanisms are therefore “found in policy narratives to strategically connect events and narrative elements to create a policy reality of responsibilities and blame” (McBeth et al. 2014:241). As we will see, these mechanisms can contribute to putting a conflict into the center of a divided society, or can be more of an anti-incumbent, moralizing nature.

The quantitative data shows no statistically significant difference between both coalitions. They both focus on some form of intentionality, by describing someone as causing a problem on purpose. In the case of Hashimoto, this looks as follows:

Principles can't manage teachers! [...] Teachers taking advantage of their status guaranties don't think at all about the children. They are not sincerely pursuing what it is the parents want or what is important for the children. They are only going their own way. And nobody can say anything about this. This is the status guaranty of public servants. [...] A group of teachers is ridiculing the principals and the local board of education! (text_18, 09:07:42-09:20:43)

In other words, egoistic maliciousness by the teachers is seen as the reason preventing the education from functioning correctly. As this is often connected with teachers simply capitalizing on their special social status to defy rules they do not like – something ordinary people cannot (text_17, 19:55:29) – the construction of the antagonistic rupture can be seen witnessed here. Hashimoto, in general, excels in the description of intentionality, with an overall figure of 65.22 percent. Still, the pro-ordinance coalition as a whole also surpasses the anti-ordinance coalition by about ten percent (see Table 13). The difference in this intentionality, again, is rooted in the way it qualitatively works on a societal scale. While Hashimoto's alleges that an antagonistic group intentionally acts harmful to the many by taking advantage of a flawed condition of society, the anti-ordinance coalition rather moralizes against one concrete incumbent, or those supporting him in his quest for power accumulation.

This can be seen, for instance, in Nonaka Hiromu's narrative, in which he describes Hashimoto's construction of enemies as a mere strategy to gain popularity, which would create the problem of restricting freedom of conscience and thought (text_64). The Nakama Labor Union similarly portrays Hashimoto's fight for the ordinance as a merely deceitful act, whereas he is supposedly trying to maximize voter support by using public servants as scape goats (text_59). The use of intentionality by the anti-ordinance coalition can also be witnessed in the attribution of the Ōsaka ishin no kai's

enactment of the ordinance to belonging to an ideologically charged battle against labor unions, by an editorial writer of Kyodo News. This intentional maliciousness, again, is seen as causing the problem of restricting personal freedom (text_75).

Mechanical causes, which “include events caused by things (or sometimes people) that have no will of their own but are designed, programmed, or trained by humans” (Stone 2012:208-210), are also used by the pro-ordinance coalition to quite some extent. This is used mainly in attacking the structure of the education administration, which would lead to problems without intent (e.g. text_8, text_10). Inadvertent causality, which describes a causality in which problems are caused by someone’s actions but were not anticipated or aimed at in such a way (Stone 2012:208-213), are only used in one anti-ordinance narrative. In this letter to the editor, the author utters the opinion, that while Hashimoto’s aim for more patriotism would be a good thing, the ordinance would have the effect of not educating children to being self-responsible human beings (text_35).

Table 13. Causal mechanisms as used by the two coalitions and Hashimoto specifically

Causal mechanisms	Advocacy coalitions		
	Pro-ordinance coalition n = 32 (%)	Hashimoto n = 23 (%)	Anti-ordinance coalition n = 41 (%)
None	9 (28.13)	3 (13.04)	21 (51.22)
Intentional	18 (56.25)	15 (65.22)	18 (43.90)
Mechanical	5 (15.63)	5 (21.74)	1 (2.44)
Inadvertence	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (2.44)
Accidental	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Chi-squared (d.f.=3) = 7.741, <i>ns</i>			

Research conducted inside the NPF has brought some insights into the effectiveness of certain causal mechanism strategies. For instance, when Elizabeth Shanahan and others tested the influence of intentional mechanisms and inadvertent mechanisms on narrative persuasiveness in an experimental study, they found that intentional mechanisms are more persuasive. They did so by finding significant differences in the persuasion of groups of people against their prior stance on a specific issue, who were presented with narratives featuring either intentional or inadvertent mechanisms (Shanahan et al. 2014:79). As there has been research showing that one winning coalition relied on using inadvertent causal mechanisms (Shanahan et al. 2013), they concluded that the short term effects of intentional mechanisms were stronger, but nothing could be said about long-term effectiveness in persuasion (Shanahan et al. 2014:82).

When we transfer these insights to the study of populism and the effectiveness of the discourse, we can understand a couple of things. Firstly, what is often called the moralizing nature of populism (Mudde/Kaltwasser 2013:8) is certainly connected to the intentionality that is attributed to those described as causing a problem in the narrative. Describing intentionality is a necessary condition for

an antagonistic rupture. A problem cannot be situated in such a divided society if the problem is caused by inadvertence or accidentally. In this case, there would not really be anybody to blame and the problem could be fixed following a logic of difference, merely putting similar problems side by side. Inadvertent mechanisms could even turn the ignorant villain into the hero once an understanding of the mistake has occurred (Shanahan et al.: 2014:83). Also, the possible short-term effectiveness of intentional causal mechanisms could also be reflected in the instability of populism and often short-term success. This is often explained by the tendency of populism to be leader-centric (Taggart 2004:276), but from a discursive perspective, this insight could shed new light on the issue.

Shanahan et al. explained their research results with the fact that the public might grow weary of stories of intentionality over a long period of time (Shanahan et al. 2014:82). For “small” ordinances, which only get media attention for a short time period, we can speculate, though, that intentionality could be the most effective causal mechanism strategy. Combined with the extensive antagonistic rupture the pro-ordinance discourse is creating, the intentional causal mechanism can be seen as more diversified and might therefore not make the readership weary quite as fast as the demonizing of one politician. Therefore, the anti-ordinance coalition’s focus on demonizing Hashimoto is to be considered less effective. This is especially true, if a frustration with “old” politicians is a winning attribute of the new force they are attacking. Demonizing the newcomer with intentional causal mechanisms will probably not work as easily.

The second narrative strategy measured in this thesis is the so-called scope of conflict, which concerns itself with the distribution of costs (negative effects) and benefits (positive effects) ascribed to one’s own policy proposal and the opponent’s proposal. It describes how coalitions tend to either extend or contain the size of a policy issue by extending or containing costs and benefits to smaller or larger groups depending on whether they are talking about their own policy proposal or the proposal by the opposing coalition (McBeth et al. 2014:241). Once more, certain assumptions follow. For instance, losing groups are expected to implement an expanding strategy, meaning that they tend to use policy narratives to expand the scope of conflict by diffusing the costs and concentrating the benefits of the policy they oppose. Conversely, winning coalitions are expected to implement a containment strategy (McBeth et al. 2014:241; Shanahan et al. 2013:459). Expansion of a policy story is achieved by depicting concentrated benefits and diffused costs for the proposal of the opposition in order to draw in more participants and expand the scope of conflict. Containment, on the other hand, tells a policy story “depicting diffused benefits and concentrated costs [for one’s own proposal] that is intended to dissuade new participants and maintain the status quo” (Shanahan et al. 2013:459).

An example for the diffusion of cost of the opposing coalition’s policy by the anti-ordinance coalition looks like this:

This is not just the problem of some teachers who are not standing. It is easy to imagine that if the governor is emphasizing the importance of the method of a focus on more control, by saying “it is important in terms of organizational control” and is introducing this method in schools, the majority of teachers, which is standing, will also feel intimidated and suffocated. And what will the children think who learn from the teachers working in such a tense atmosphere? The doubts are endless. (Kyōdō Tsūshin 25.05.2011, Text 25)

While we can observe that both coalitions show no statistically significant difference in expanding the issue, the pro-ordinance coalition contains the issue more at a statistically significant level (medium relation as Cramer’s V is between 0.2 and 0.6; see Table 14). As NPF research has shown that the strongest narrative strategy is to diffuse the costs and concentrate the benefits of the opposing policy proposal in combination with discussing the preferred policy alternative with concentrated costs and diffused benefits (Shanahan et al. 2011), the pro-ordinance coalition, once more, is more effective. In both respects, the anti-ordinance coalition fails in strategically telling a story both emphasizing the good of the own proposal and the bad of the opposing one. Generally, it becomes obvious quite fast that the anti-ordinance coalition holds freedom of thought, speech and so forth as important values, but fails to offer explanations what benefits these values have on a greater scale.

Table 14. Scope of conflict as deployed by advocacy coalitions and Hashimoto specifically

Scope of conflict*	Advocacy coalitions		
	Pro-ordinance coalition n = 32 (%)	Hashimoto n = 23 (%)	Anti-ordinance coalition n = 41 (%)
For opposite policy			
Expansion: Concentrates benefits and diffuses costs	10 (31.25)	8 (34.78)	9 (21.43)
Does not use	22 (68.75)	15 (65.22)	33 (78.57)
	Chi-squared (d.f.=1) = 0.396, ns		
For own policy			
Containment: Diffuses benefits and concentrates costs	11 (34.38)	8 (34.78)	4 (9.52)
Does not use	21 (65.63)	15 (65.22)	38 (90.48)
	Chi-squared (d.f.=1) = 5.25, p < 0.05; Cramer’s V = 0.302, p < 0.05		

Given the surplus in resources and reach Hashimoto is enjoying as well as the weakness of the political left and the majoritarian support for the singing of the national anthem (N.N. 2013)⁶⁹, we can expect the pro-ordinance coalition to be and to conceive themselves as the winning coalition. Therefore, we would assume the pro-ordinance coalition to constrain the issue. Empirical findings suggest the opposite picture. The pro-ordinance coalition and Hashimoto, more than the anti-ordinance coalition,

⁶⁹ An opinion poll by the Asahi Shinbun in 2013 showed that only 13 percent of people opposed the statement that the Kimigayo should be sung by all attending a school ceremony (N.N. 2013).

try to widen the issue by diffusing the benefits of their own policy and the costs of the opposing one. The anti-ordinance coalition almost refrains completely from discussing the costs of their own policy and also does not diffuse the benefits to the same extent their opponents do. This shows, again, that strategically the pro-ordinance discourse can be seen as more effective.

The reason for this is, we can again argue, that a populist mode of articulation needs a discursive formulation of antagonism and, therefore, expansion of the problem becomes necessary. Counter to the insights of the NPF that coalitions either portray themselves as winning and accordingly try to contain an issue, or portray themselves as losing and expand the issue (Shanahan et al. 2013:460), populism seems to do both – the latter, interestingly, with the same intensity as the losing coalition. On the one hand, the opposing policy proposal is attacked and the issue expanded and on the other hand, the own proposal is judged in a containing way as not being harmful to many people. This combination looks highly effective and should be tested in more detail. As the goal in policy discussion “is to portray your side in the broad public interest and the other side as narrow special interests” (Shanahan et al. 2011:544), higher narrativity in this respect achieves this more effectively. To summarize, the pro-ordinance coalition stands out in the usage of narrative elements (high narrativity) and seems to be using their narrative elements more effectively (strategic use).

5.2. Intracoalitional cohesion and its relation to effectiveness in persuasion

After comparing the differences between the two coalitions, internal differences in the coalitions will move into the center of our attention. This is especially important, as NPF research has shown that intracoalitional cohesiveness – no statistically significant difference – is important for the success of policy narratives of a coalition (Shanahan et al. 2013:472). Therefore texts of both coalitions have been grouped into two sub-groups: the “dominant narrative authors” and the others.

In the case of the pro-ordinance coalition, Hashimoto is clearly the dominant narrative author (n=23) and will be compared against Nakahara’s narratives and the letter to the editor with a pro-ordinance stance (termed “other”-group, n=9). On the anti-ordinance side, the Nakama Labor Union is seen as the dominant narrative author as it publishes the most texts under a coherent organization’s name. As the “Osaka hotline against the coercive implementation of the Hinomaru and Kimigayo” is also part of Japan’s organized labor, the text will be added to the Nakama Labor Unions group (henceforth NLU+, n=11). The second group features all editorials, letters to the editor and opinion pieces published on TV or in the paper. Additionally, former Osaka mayor Hiramatsu’s statement at a press conference will be ascribed to this group (Media+, n=30). As samples are becoming even smaller, again, no significant differences could be observed. Nonetheless, interesting insights can be extracted from the findings at hand. The ensuing table presents the results.

Table 15. Intracoalitional comparison of narrative elements and strategies

	Advocacy coalitions			
	Pro-ordinance coalition n = 32 (%)		Anti-ordinance coalition n = 41 (%)	
	Hashimoto n = 23 (%)	Other n = 9 (%)	NLU+ n = 11 (%)	Media+ n = 30 (%)
Characters*				
Victims	1.83	1.56	2.63*	1.83*
Villains	4.39*	1.78*	2.55	2.10
Heroes	1.22*	0.56*	0.63	0.03
	Victims <i>t-statistic</i> = 0.956, <i>ns</i> Villains <i>t-statistic</i> = 2.887, $p < 0.01$, eta squared = 0.105 Heroes <i>t-statistic</i> = 2.165, $p < 0.05$ eta squared = 0.062		Victims <i>t-statistic</i> = 2.039, $p < 0.05$ eta squared = 0.0553 Villains <i>t-statistic</i> = 1.290, <i>ns</i> Heroes <i>t-statistic</i> = 1.936, <i>ns</i>	
Stories of change				
None	7 (30.43)	6 (66.66)	4 (36.36)	8 (26.66)
Stories of decline (bad on the rise)	5 (21.74)	1 (11.11)	7 (63.63)	17 (56.66)
Stories of decline (good slipping away)	3 (13.04)	0 (0)	0 (0)	2 (6.66)
Stymied progress	3 (13.04)	0 (0)	0 (0)	3 (10.00)
Stories of rising	4 (17.39)	2 (22.22)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Change-is-only-an- illusion	1 (4.35)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
	Chi-squared (d.f.=5) = 5.3, <i>ns</i>		Chi-squared (d.f.=5) = 2.159, <i>ns</i>	
Stories of power*				
None	8 (34.8)	5 (55.56)	8 (72.72)	29 (96.66)
Helplessness and control	11 (47.8)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Conspiracy	0 (0)	1 (11.11)	3 (27.27)	1 (3.33)
Blame-the-victim- stories	4 (17.4)	3 (33.33)	0 (0)	0 (0)
	Chi-squared (d.f.=3) = 8.299, $p < 0.05$; Cramer's V = 0.509, $p < 0.05$		Chi-squared (d.f.=3) = 5.239, $p < 0.05$; Cramer's V = 0.357, $p < 0.05$	
Evidence				
None	13 (56.52)	4 (4.44)	7 (63.63)	20 (66.66)
Support of argument	4 (17.39)	1 (1.11)	4 (36.36)	8 (26.66)
Refute an argument	2 (8.7)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (3.33)
Matter-of-fact	4 (17.39)	4 (4.44)	0 (0)	1 (3.33)
	Chi-squared (d.f.=3) = 3.017, <i>ns</i>		Chi-squared (d.f.=3) = 1.003, <i>ns</i>	

Both coalitions, in part, show cohesive use of characters. While the pro-ordinance coalition uses victim characters cohesively, the anti-ordinance coalition uses both villain and hero characters cohesively. Where the pro-ordinance coalition's sub-groups largely differ, is in villain usage ([M=4.39, SD=2.61] for Hashimoto and [M=1.78, SD=1.09] for the "other"-group), which, as has been described, can be seen

as a positive factor for narrativity. Therefore, a lack of cohesiveness will not be seen as a negative factor. Since the Media+ group of the anti-ordinance coalition almost completely refrains from using hero characters, cohesiveness in this respect is also not counted as a positive factor.

If we look at the character usage of the pro-ordinance coalition's sub-groups (see Table 16), it becomes abundantly clear that Hashimoto for the most part is responsible for bringing the discourse of the pro-ordinance coalition to life through his narration of the policy issue. Especially, for villains and heroes, the role of Hashimoto in adding narrativity to the discourse and making it more persuasive is obvious ($[M=4.39, SD=2.61]$ and $[M=1.78, SD=1.09]$ respectively for villains and $[M=1.22, SD=0.85]$ and $[M=0.56, SD=0.53]$ respectively for hero characters). In other words, Hashimoto is critical in extending the societal rupture. Where the "other"-group's villain usage ranges between one and four, Hashimoto starts at two and manages to mention as many as twelve in one narrative (see Table 16). We can conclude that an important cohesiveness is given at most points, and where it is not, Hashimoto certainly plays a bigger role in creating a persuasive policy discourse through higher narrativity. As Hashimoto is, by far, the author with the biggest reach of narratives, some lack of cohesiveness might not weigh as heavy as for the pro-ordinance coalition.

Table 16. Range and means of character usage (pro-ordinance coalition)

Characters	Pro-ordinance coalition					
	Hashimoto n = 23			Other n = 9		
	Min.	Max.	Mean	Min.	Max.	Mean
Victims	1	3	1.83	1	2	1.56
Villains	2	12	4.39	1	4	1.78
Heroes	0	3	1.22	0	1	0.56

An additional interesting insight can be found by reviewing Hashimoto's text specifically, an "intra-Hashimoto" perspective, so to speak. One can observe that the twitter-narratives are much more populated with characters than "official" publications (texts published in newspapers or on official government homepages) (Table 17). Especially when it comes to villains, Hashimoto seems to hold back in portraying a variety of groups as villains in official publications, a restraint not found in his twitter activities.

Table 17. Means of character usage in Hashimoto's narratives according to publication medium

	Twitter (n=19)	"Official" Publications (n=4)
Victims	1.89	1.50
Villains*	4.89	2.00
Heroes	1.32	0.75
Victims <i>t</i> -statistic = 0.919, <i>ns</i> ; Villains <i>t</i> -statistic = 2.185, $p < 0.05$; Heroes <i>t</i> -statistic = 1.223, <i>ns</i>		

As other research has shown (e.g. Bruhn 2013), references to the split of society between the corrupt elite and the pure people differ according to the audience and medium, for instance between campaign speeches for firing up supporters and official platform publications (Bruhn 2013:91-92). Hashimoto's Twitter activities can be seen, therefore, as a tool for firing up supporters. For further research, this insight could be used to weigh results and samples.

Concerning stories of change, both coalitions, again, show cohesiveness in which type they use most (stories of decline for the anti-ordinance coalition and both stories of decline and stories of rising for the pro-ordinance coalition). Both groups of the pro-ordinance coalition focus on stories of decline and stories of rising simultaneously, and also balance creating a sense of urgency for the issue and portraying "the self" as a hero solving the problem of "the people". This cohesiveness in story-telling and victim and hero usage can be seen as central for an effective populist narrative coalition. For stories of power both coalitions show lacking cohesiveness. While the NLU+ group stands alone in their telling of conspiracy stories, the Media+ group completely refrains from telling stories of power. Lack of cohesiveness is critical in this point, as the pro-ordinance coalition covers the field extensively. While the pro-ordinance coalition also lacks cohesiveness in this story, their win in narrativity might make up for it.

Concerning narrative strategies both coalitions show coherent strategies concerning the scope of conflict and differences in their deployment of causal mechanisms. As for the anti-ordinance coalition, paradoxically to their stronger character usage, the NLU+-group fails to successfully expand the scope of the conflict in large part – as does the Media+ group, from which more restraint in "firing up supporters" is to be expected, though. The NLU+ group's description of intentional causal mechanisms (63.63) is undermined by the fact that the Media+ group does not mention many causal mechanisms (60 percent do not feature any causal mechanisms). This can be seen as lacking intensity in the anti-incumbent fight that sees Hashimoto as villain in most cases, but does not explain his conduct with any specific motives. To conclude, it can be said that cohesiveness in both coalitions is quite similar. The points of divergence, though, speak in favor of the pro-ordinance coalition, as points of divergence of the anti-ordinance coalition have been analyzed to lead to worse effects on the effectiveness of the respective discourse as a whole

Table 18. Intracoalitional comparison of narrative strategies

	Advocacy coalitions			
	Pro-ordinance coalition n = 32 (%)		Anti-ordinance coalition n = 41 (%)	
	Hashimoto n = 23 (%)	Other n = 9 (%)	NLU+ n = 11 (%)	Media+ n = 30 (%)
Causal mechanisms*				
None	3 (13.04)	6 (66.67)	3 (27.27)	18 (60.00)
Intentional	15 (65.22)	3 (33.33)	7 (63.63)	11 (36.66)
Mechanical	5 (21.74)	0 (0)	1 (9.09)	0 (0)
Inadvertence	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (3.33)
Accidental	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
	Chi-squared (d.f.=3) = 9.739, $p < 0.01$; Cramer's V = 0.552, $p < 0.01$		Chi-squared (d.f.=3) = 6.111, <i>ns</i>	
Scope of conflict				
Expansion	8 (34.78)	2 (22.22)	1 (9.09)	8 (26.66)
Does not use	15 (65.22)	7 (77.77)	10 (90.91)	22 (73.33)
	Chi-squared (d.f.=1) = 0.07, <i>ns</i>		Chi-squared (d.f.=1) = 1.451, <i>ns</i>	
Containment	8 (34.78)	3 (33.33)	1 (9.09)	4 (13.33)
Does not use	15 (65.22)	6 (66.66)	10 (90.91)	26 (86.66)
	Chi-squared (d.f.=1) = 0, <i>ns</i>		Chi-squared (d.f.=1) = 0.135, <i>ns</i>	

5.3. Conclusions on narrative structure and strategies

Before discussing the effects on democracy a populist pro-ordinance discourse can have, I want to summarize the insights about the narrative structure and strategies of both coalitions. This will provide, in short, important conclusions about narrativity, as higher degrees of narrativity make the narratives more memorable (see Jones 2014a).

Concerning narrativity, the pro-ordinance coalition outperforms the anti-ordinance coalition in most respects. In character usage, the anti-ordinance coalition only shows a slightly higher rate in victim usage, which is outweighed by the pro-ordinance coalition using about twice as many hero or villain characters. Despite the non-decisive role evidence plays in persuasion in a policy discourse, we can detect a “bonus” in persuasiveness in respect to narrativity, as the pro-ordinance coalition simply uses the narrative element of evidence more. When it comes to plots, the picture is somewhat mixed. While the anti-ordinance coalition uses more stories of change and almost exclusively stories of decline, the pro-ordinance coalition outperforms its opponent at stories of power at large.⁷⁰ As the pro-ordinance coalition still uses stories of change to quite some extent, narrativity is also deemed higher for the plot use of the pro-ordinance coalition. Concerning narrative strategies, the pro-ordinance

⁷⁰ Whether stories of change or stories of power persuade people more effectively could be an interesting topic of further NPF research.

coalition lies ahead in the deployment of causal mechanisms and also in simultaneously expanding and containing the scope of conflict of the issue.

In addition to higher levels of narrativity, stronger focus on intentional mechanisms by the pro-ordinance-coalition can be seen as more effective in persuading people, at least in the short run. Moreover, the fact that they excel in expanding the problem with the counter proposal and contain problems with their own proposal to a larger extent than their rival coalition, speaks in favor of the pro-ordinance coalition being more effective. Furthermore, more cohesion, or cohesion in important cases observed in the pro-ordinance coalition, contribute to an evaluation of the pro-ordinance discourse as more effective.

The meso-level approach of this thesis shows the importance of comparing a populist discourse against its “direct opponent”. As comparable numbers of what is to be considered as, for instance, high character usage, are missing, we can only say something about the effectiveness of a populist discourse in a specific sub-system. If we could detect high levels of narrativity in the anti-ordinance coalition, the power of the pro-ordinance discourse could be more limited, despite its populist nature. The comparative general lack in narrativity of the anti-ordinance narratives leaves the pro-ordinance narratives showing higher persuasiveness.

Additionally to a comparison of which of the two coalitions’ discourses is more likely to persuade people, we can theorize on whether populism necessarily correlates with effective narration. Populism necessarily correlates with some effective narrative characteristics, like victim and villain characters, as well as stories of power and some sort of stories of change. These factors necessarily have to be observable for a populist mode of articulation to occur. Also, as a populist articulation gets “better” the more villains are added, high narrativity in character usage is to be expected. In general, the structural moment of an antagonistic rupture is one main source for narration, as this has to be constructed through dramatization and creating a sense of urgency. As has been discussed above, in a policy discourse “the self” being a hero character becomes a necessity and herein lies one important factor for the effectiveness of narratives leading to a populist discourse. So, if we can attribute, qualitatively, the structural moments of a populist articulation, then there is a strong possibility that we can find high levels of narrativity and effective story-telling.

6. The Kimigayo policy narratives and the shaping of democracy

As Benjamin Arditi has stated, “if populism is a mode of representation compatible with liberal-democratic politics, the latter is not left untouched” (Arditi 2005:78). Therefore, we need to find out how it changes its “host” democracy. The benefit of the mixed-method approach in this thesis will show itself in this chapter, as it shows the effects the concrete Kimigayo Ordinance policy discourse has on democracy and, on a more general note, what effects populism can have on democracy. The empirical part of this chapter, again, helps to distinguish between effects of the Kimigayo Ordinance discourse on Japan’s democracy caused by the populist nature of the pro-ordinance discourse and additional characteristics found in both discourses.

In order to understand how a populist discourse can change or effect democracy, the conflicting nature in the word “democracy” itself must be discussed. To do so, we have to introduce different understandings of democracy, as democracy is something disharmonious, since “in politics, as in personal life, autonomy requires choice among conflicting and incommensurable values” (Gutman 2012:529) and populism is one way to organize those choices. As described in Chapter 3.2.2.3., these considerations about different concepts of democracy have been important for the development of the codebook.

6.1. Concepts of democracy and how democracy can be effected

“Democracy is important!” Most people would agree and support this sentence. What people understand concretely when hearing “democracy” and how they would like it to function in detail, though, differs to a great extent. The fact that “the people” (*demos*) are supposed to be the sovereign, the one making the decisions, is the starting point for some of these differences. As political theorist Amy Gutman has noted, aspects of democracy as a social idea are always charged with intricate implications and expectations, for example on who is allowed to be part of the sovereign people (*demos*), or who is allowed to rule (Gutman 2012:521). The question of who is part of the sovereign people was termed the “boundary problem” by famous political scientist and democracy scholar Robert Dahl (1915-2014). It poses the question of how to define who “the people” are, who are meant to act as a sovereign (Rovira Kaltwasser 2014:472-473). Chantal Mouffe explains this exclusionist/inclusionist characteristic as a necessary part of the “the logic of democracy” and calls it one of the paradoxes of democracy (Mouffe 2013:55). While this question has been negotiated along the lines of gender, class, nationality and ethnicity, for the thesis at hand another question is more relevant. From asking who is allowed to participate in the making of decisions, another question arises: What questions can be decided and against whose resistance?

Most modern day usages of the word democracy implicitly refer to liberal democracy (or constitutional democracy). Much like in most current understandings of representative democracy this

entails the priority of institutional mediations over charisma, the presence of checks and balances to limit the discretionary power of political leaders, the wide spread practice of reaching agreements through negotiations among political elites, and so on. (Arditi 2005:91)

The liberal democracy tradition is highly alert to the fact that majority rule in itself is not sufficient for a political system to be called democratic. A cruel majority regime like Nazi Germany also had, arguably, majoritarian support. But without protection of the individual or minority groups, a society cannot be called democratic (Plattner 2010:84). Therefore, liberal democratic theory stresses the importance of the protection of individual liberties against the state and against majority groups.

Contrasted to this, populist democracy sees “the people ruling themselves as free and equal beings, rather than being ruled by an external power or by a self-selected minority among themselves”, as key. Constraints on the will of the majority are sometimes deemed necessary, but as these constraints sometimes conflict with actual popular will, they are often seen as undemocratic. Therefore, a claim for better representation and influence of the majority can be attributed to this line of thought. While Gutman concludes that the differences in both schemes are more in theory than in practice (Gutman 2012:523-524), they can be seen as two poles democracy can be shifted towards.

More generally speaking, these problems are concerned with how much a majority can find influence on society through the state in comparison to minorities, or how much minorities should remain protected from majorities and their influence on the state. In this struggle, populism is on the side of majority rule, as the discursive elevation of the particular to the whole is hostile against pluralism and the protection of minorities. The popular identity also leads to the “primacy of the political, which means that any other institutional center of power, including the judiciary, is believed to be secondary” (Mudde/Rovira Kaltwasser 2013:17). As I have shown the populist nature of the discourse by the pro-ordinance coalition, it is no surprise that quantitative data will give evidence for a shift towards populist democracy through this discourse. Nonetheless, a quantitative inquiry can prove this from an additional perspective and combined with the analysis of proposed solutions in the narratives, give answers to further questions that might not come up with a mere focus on qualitatively assessing a populist mode of articulation. For instance, a question whether participation or direct democratic mechanisms should be emphasized in the political process.

Besides shaping dissatisfactions with a claim of lacking influence of majorities or lacking protection of minorities by the state, the question of how to best form decisions remains. This concerns questions of representation, participation, deliberation and constitutional protection. The deliberative model, developed by scholars like Jürgen Habermas and Ulrich Beck, and the radical democracy approach, developed in large part by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (Laclau/Mouffe 2012), are crucial for such considerations. Deliberative models, on the one hand, see democracy as valuing

“popular rule as means of encouraging public deliberation on issues that are best understood through open, deliberative processes” and negate “the political” as a conflictive area with irreconcilable differences. Individuals are thought of as having preexisting interests and wishes, from which they collectively shape their own politics through persuasive, free argument. Ongoing accountability, meaning that educated voters freely and in an informed way judge performance and actions of elected officials, is seen as the key to deliberative democracy, not direct political participation (Gutman 2012:524-527).

Opposed to this stands radical democracy, which criticizes the combination of a liberal tradition (rule of law, respect of individual liberty, etc.) and a democratic tradition (equality, popular sovereignty, etc.) in liberal democracy as mistakenly seen as a universal good, which should rather be seen as a problematic, grown relationship. The inherent tension between the liberal and the democratic tradition is portrayed as the main cause for the emergence of populism, because real-existing conflicts⁷¹ in society are supposedly suppressed by an alleged consensus (see Mouffe 2005). This approach dates back to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s book *Hegemony and socialist strategy: Towards a radical democratic politics* (1985).⁷² The reason for this lies in the fact that such consent is always formed in a historically contingent set of power relations. Radical democracy, therefore, criticizes quite heavily a deliberative conceptualization of democratic competition as it fails to take into account passions, affects, and power struggles and negates the political (Mouffe 2014:79-80).

From these theoretical considerations on how people can discuss and make decisions, two alternatives more related to practice have been formed. Widespread dissatisfaction with representative democracy has led to calls for either participatory democracy or plebiscitarian linkages, something Robert Barr attributes to populism (Barr 2009:35-36). Participatory democrats see the future of a well-functioning society in an extended participation of citizens in the political process. While among advocates of deliberative democracy, a free and fair discussion in society suffices to empower the voter, participatory democrats see participation itself as a way of empowering citizens to become knowledgeable in political affairs and reach life satisfaction (Gutman 2012:525-526). To this participatory approach Barr contrasts plebiscitarian linkages as an extreme form of electoral linkage. The big difference is that “[w]hereas initiatives (and participatory linkages more generally) grant citizens substantial control over the process, plebiscites offer them a ‘take it or leave it’ choice” (Barr

⁷¹ See Laclau’s explanations on antagonisms Chapter 4.1.

⁷² Radical democracy should be seen as an emancipatory political project critical of, as the authors describe it, neo-liberal hegemony. Being heavily influenced by Italian communist Antonio Gramsci’s (1891-1937) theory of hegemony, Mouffe and Laclau stress the necessity of constructing a new hegemonic project, in order to articulate fragmented demands of different minority groups. As a hegemonic status quo with its fixation of meaning in society enjoys a power surplus on a materialistic and ideological level, equivalential chains need to be built and collective identities formed in order to change that status quo (Laclau/Mouffe 2012:100-105).

2009:35). This has a highly legitimizing function and is usually seen as having a strong connection between a specific leader and his/her electorate (Barr 2009:36).

To understand how democracy can be effected by a discourse, one final thought is important. Robert Dahl has differentiated between the term “democracy” as an ideal form of government, fully responsive to all its citizens, which can never be reached completely, and the real existing political form, the “polyarchy”. The latter, in contrast, fulfills some standards but falls short in comparison to the ideal concept of democracy. The polyarchy would always keep the citizens unsatisfied with the level of democratic quality reached (Dahl 2006:xvii). As Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser state: “From this perspective, democracy alludes not only to a particular type of political system, but also to a dynamic and open-ended process that always remains incomplete” (Mudde/Rovira Kaltwasser 2013:12). Therefore, while this thesis will not measure empirically the quality of Japan’s democracy, as Dahl and his students prefer, it is proposed that discourses shape the dissatisfaction of people with their polyarchy. In other words, this dissatisfaction is not based, at least not exclusively, on measurable factors but also in narration. Hence, we can observe how the discourses shape assessments of the polyarchy and, as the construction of meaning in a discourse relates to real-life practices (Stavrakakis 2005:232, Howarth/Stavrakakis 2000:3), how this can influence democratic life in Japan.

6.2. Democratic policy beliefs and solutions in the pro-ordinance and anti-ordinance policy discourse

Ernesto Laclau stated that “any emerging ‘people’, whatever its character, is going to present two faces: one of rupture with an existing order, the other introducing ‘ordering’ where there is basic dislocation” (Laclau 2007:122). When it comes to the assessment of the Japanese polyarchy we can see this happening in the pro-ordinance discourse. On the one hand, there is critique of the establishment and political system, because it is viewed as in disarray for various reasons, like the previously discussed lack of political influence on education.⁷³ On the other hand, the introduction of ordering by proposals like giving power back to “the people” through accumulating power around Hashimoto, or the demand to directly vote for the position of prime minister of Japan (text_20, 23:47:44), can be observed. Measurement of narrative elements will in the following help to assess the constructions of the condition of the polyarchy, through a systematic and structural approach. This will lead to a well-grounded assessment of what the Kimigayo Ordinance policy discourse means for Japan’s democracy.

⁷³ For a general assessment of Hashimoto see for instance Weathers 2014.

6.2.1. Policy beliefs

Based on the insight from the NPF that “an analysis of characters (heroes, villains, victims) in a political narrative reveals the political values rooted in the problem definition” (McBeth et al. 2005:415), an analysis of the depiction of victim and villain characters will show us the underlying democratic values of the coalitions. These policy beliefs as “a set of values and beliefs that orient a group and/or coalition” (Shanahan et al. 2013:459) answer fundamental policy questions, like: Who should have the power to make policy decisions? Who (or what) is harmed by the policy status quo? On what basis should policies be decided (science, majority rule, etc.) (McBeth et al. 2010:393)? In regards to democratic policy beliefs, the questions the narratives of both coalitions answer, are: Who should get more decision power? How should policy issues, in general, be resolved in a democracy?

To answer the first question, as explained before, the characters referred to in the narrative have been conceptualized in accordance with their affiliation to either a majority or a minority, either powerful or powerless. Furthermore, the victim or villain can be the majority without being referenced to having too much or too little power, or a certain group or individual not clearly portrayed as belonging to the powerful or powerless (for a detailed variable description see APPENDIX – B). Based on the character usage, as observed in the respective narratives of both coalitions, democratic policy beliefs will be calculated, showing if there really is significant difference in the construction of democracy of the two discourses. I will analyze this further by looking at the democratic policy solutions both advocacy coalitions present. Before presenting the results of the democratic policy beliefs, I want to give examples for the coding of victim and villain characters as powerful or powerless majorities or minorities, which lead to the following results (see Table 19 and Table 20).

Table 19. Different victim characterizations by the advocacy coalitions and Hashimoto specifically

Characters	Advocacy coalitions		
	Pro-ordinance coalition n = 32 (%) ⁷⁴	Hashimoto n = 23 (%)	Anti-ordinance coalition n = 41 (%)
Victim is powerless majority*	22 (68.75)	21 (91.30)	13 (31.71)
	Chi-squared (d.f.=1) = 8.453, p < 0.005; Cramer's V = 0.368, p < 0.005		
Victim is powerful majority	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
	-		
Victim is majority	9 (28.13)	4 (17.39)	17 (41.46)
	Chi-squared (d.f.=1) = 0.873, ns		
Victim is powerless minority*	6 (18.75)	3 (13.04)	26 (63.41)
	Chi-squared (d.f.=1) = 8.968, p < 0.005; Cramer's V = 0.379, p < 0.005		
Victim is powerful minority	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
	-		
Victim is individual or group	13 (40.63)	9 (39.13)	11 (26.83)
	Chi-squared (d.f.=1) = 0.988, ns		

⁷⁴ One narrative can feature victims portrayed with different characteristics.

Unsurprisingly, statistically significant results with medium strong relationships are shown when it comes to powerless majorities and powerless minorities depicted as victims. An example for a powerless minority found in a narrative by the Nakama Labor Union would sound like the following:

The Osaka City Basic employee ordinance (Ōsaka-shi shokuin kihon jōrei) is, even compared to the prefectural one, an example for emphasizing heavy punishment and a “power harassment ordinance” that is infused with the awful thought to remodel someone’s thought by force. (text_60)

From this statement it can be concluded, that there certainly is a power imbalance between two groups. Further, the one being harmed is described as a minority, a certain occupational group (civil servants), which is vulnerable to the powerful (text_60). For the depiction of a powerless majority, I will not give an example, as we have heard a lot about this depiction of “the people” as a powerless majority already.

When it comes to villain characters, no difference could be found. While the anti-ordinance coalition sometimes criticizes the fact that a majority would have too much power in forcing rules on minorities (e.g. text_54, text_61), they are, in the previously described anti-incumbent fashion, focused on depicting Hashimoto and the Ōsaka ishin no kai as either a powerful minority group or as malicious individuals (see Table 20).

Table 20. Different villain characterizations by the advocacy coalitions and Hashimoto specifically

Characters	Advocacy coalitions		
	Pro-ordinance coalition n = 32 (%) ⁷⁵	Hashimoto n = 23 (%)	Anti-ordinance coalition n = 41 (%)
Villain is powerless majority	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
	-		
Villain is powerful majority	0 (0)	0 (0)	6 (14.63)
	Chi-squared (d.f.=1) = 3.347, <i>ns</i>		
Villain is majority	0 (0)	0 (0)	2 (4.88)
	Chi-squared (d.f.=1) = 0, <i>ns</i>		
Villain is powerless minority	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
	-		
Villain is powerful minority	23 (71.88)	20 (86.96)	20 (48.78)
	Chi-squared (d.f.=1) = 3.063, <i>ns</i>		
Villain is individual or group	25 (78.13)	18 (78.26)	32 (78.05)
	Chi-squared (d.f.=1) = 0, <i>ns</i>		

An example for a villain group with no power reference would be Nakahara Tōru’s attack on teachers that says:

Such a way of thinking, even if they want to impress with not standing or singing at a ceremony, is not helpful for the education of students in any way. It becomes a fight among

⁷⁵ One narrative can feature victims portrayed with different characteristics.

grown-ups concerning ideology, which has nothing to do with education any more.

(text_29)

As he does not mention status guaranties of public servants or teachers, or something similar, he does not depict them as powerful in comparison to other groups. Different to this we can see a description of a powerful minority as villain in Hiromatsu Kunio's narrative, who acted as mayor of Osaka before Hashimoto. During their overlapping terms as governor and mayor, there was a lot of friction between the two politicians and Hiromatsu had the following to say about the Kimigayo Ordinance:

Without a doubt, the people of Ishin no kai... why, why are they suddenly... as the first... with the reduction of parliamentarians it's the same. I can't understand why they addressed the national anthem and there was definitely no necessity for enacting an ordinance. I rather wonder if it has something to do with showing that they can do it, because they can push it through with their majority. Actually the diet is there to further discuss matters but, well, now it seems like with a majority you can do whatever you want. This is a characteristic way of acting for a person who asserts numbers make you strong. Because of this, yes, I have a certain sense of crisis in some way. (text_61)

Building on these measurements, democratic policy beliefs have been calculated. The formula for the calculation looks as follows:

$$\frac{\left(\begin{array}{c} \text{powerful min. OR individual} \\ = \\ \text{villain} \\ \text{AND} \\ \text{powerless maj.} \\ = \\ \text{victim} \end{array} \right) - \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{powerless min.} \\ = \\ \text{victim} \\ \text{AND} \\ \text{powerful maj. OR min. OR individual OR maj.} \\ = \\ \text{villain} \end{array} \right)}{\text{Total number of narratives}}$$

Figure 5. Formula for calculating democratic policy beliefs of narratives

A strong positive result will indicate a shaping of democratic reality favoring a "populist" democracy and a negative result indicates a leaning towards a liberal democratic conception, which sees minorities in danger of being suppressed by a majority. The "populist democracy"-belief must include a powerless majority as victim *and* somebody obstructing it. These villains can either be an individual, a specific group or a powerful minority group. Both of these types are possible, as a powerless majority can also be obstructed by an incompetent villain, who does not necessarily have more power. The majority still can remain powerless, though, as they might not be able to resolve their suffering themselves, but rely on the help of the hero. Therefore, either a powerful minority or an individual or a specific group must be a villain harming or standing in the way of the powerless majority.

For the “liberal democracy”-belief, a powerless minority must necessarily be described as the victim character. Additionally, a villain character *must* be depicted. This villain character can take on any form, except a powerless majority. A policy belief for each narrative has been calculated (1 if a character usage fitting a populist democracy belief is present, -1 if a liberal democracy belief is present and 0 if both or neither occurs) and an independent-samples t-test was conducted to check for significant differences in the mean policy beliefs of both coalitions (see Table 21).

Table 21. Intercoalitional comparison in underlying democratic policy beliefs

Policy beliefs	Advocacy coalitions	
	Pro-ordinance coalition Mean (n, SD)	Anti-ordinance coalition Mean (n, SD)
Democratic policy beliefs*	+ 0.50 (32; 0.672)	- 0.24 (41; 0.699)
<i>t</i> -statistic = 4.587, <i>p</i> < 0.001, eta squared = 0.229		

Results show that there is a significant difference in the democratic policy beliefs underlying the narratives of both coalitions. While the pro-ordinance coalition shows a relatively strong positive value ($M=+0.5$, $SD=0.672$), the anti-ordinance coalition shows a negative value [$M=-0.24$, $SD=0.699$; $t(71)=4.587$, $p=0$], showing the call for better protection of minority groups. The magnitude of the differences in the means was strong (eta squared=0.229). Before discussing what these results mean for the shaping of the assessment of the polyarchy, a look at presented policy solutions will further deepen the understanding of the relationship of democracy and the discourses at hand.

6.2.2. Solutions and intracoalitional comparisons

To answer the question of how policy issues, in general, should be resolved in a democracy, I turn to the analysis of democratic solutions. In NPF research, the solution as a narrative element presents a way forward (McBeth et al. 2014:228). In a policy context, a solution is something proposed to solve a specified problem (Shanahan et al. 2013:459). Usually, this means to be either in favor of or against the implementation of a policy. The benefit of analyzing a policy that has already been enacted, though, is that solutions presented in the discourses concern themselves with the “problem” of how it was possible that the ordinance was enacted. Or, for the pro-ordinance discourse, why it was important to enact it and its critique is wrong. A discussion of the implementation process, as well as general implications of how to resolve a debate around a controversial policy reveals further indications about what deficiencies in Japanese democracy are seen or how democracy would be better. Lastly, showing greater narrativity in presenting solutions has been found to be a characteristic of winning coalitions (Shanahan et al. 2013:476) and therefore, the role of the presented democratic solutions should not be underestimated.

The four possible democratic solutions that were looked for in the discourses were plebiscites, participation, constitutionalism and finding consensus. The clear distinction between these four categories is not always easy, but during the coding process decisions depending on which solution seemed to be the most emphasized were made. A plebiscite solution would be an appeal to voters to bring greater accountability to politicians and see elections as an opportunity to judge the performance of politicians and their policies. While such a solution would exclude direct participation in the political process, a participation solution calls on people to regularly participate in the process. Constitutionalism is defined as a call to more strictly interpret the constitution and hold it as the highest goal to protect the rights of individuals and minorities. This certainly acts as a factor contributing to a liberal democracy ideal. Influenced by some understanding of deliberative democracy, a consensus solution is a plea for a deliberation between people that negates the political and conceives the possibility of rational consensus as possible. Other than plebiscite or participatory solutions, seeing such a consensus as feasible negates the condition of the political as an embattled sphere of irreconcilable differences.

An example for a plebiscite solution would be Hashimoto's repeated call to simply see the 2011 double-election as a chance to evaluate his enactment of the Kimigayo Ordinance (e.g. text_27, 10:35:22). Another example would be the case, in which Hashimoto, in a moment of reflection, admits that there are people who doubt his approach and he further states that the possibility exists that he is not right. This insight leads him to emphasize the importance of plebiscitarian linkages, as he states:

But, especially because we don't know if it is correct, shouldn't it be entrusted to the decision of politics? Since, if politics gets it wrong they can be taken responsible through elections, which are the judgement by the will of the people. If the balance of things is on the verge of falling into crisis, you need to understand the will of the people and make a bold step to move the core and restore that balance again. I am convinced that this is the role of politics and our responsibility as politicians that has been entrusted by the people (*fumin*). (text_10)

The following table (Table 22) shows the results of the intercoalitional comparison. It shows that both coalitions use democratic solutions in statistically significant ways (strong relationship as Cramer's $V > 0.6$). While both coalitions use solutions to almost the same extent (narrativity almost the same), the pro-ordinance coalition relies on plebiscite solutions and the anti-ordinance coalition is split between participation, finding consensus and constitutionalism.

Table 22. Intercoalitional comparison of democratic policy solutions

Democratic solutions*	Advocacy coalitions	
	Pro-ordinance coalition n = 32 (%)	Anti-ordinance coalition n = 41 (%)
None	14 (43.75)	19 (46.34)
Plebiscite	16 (50.00)	0 (0)
Participation	0 (0)	12 (29.27)
Consensus (Deliberation)	2 (6.25)	6 (14.63)
Constitutionalism	0 (0)	4 (9.76)
Chi-squared (d.f.=5) = 34.167, p < 0.001; Cramer's V = 0.684, p < 0.001		

Hashimoto even shows a strong “anti-participatory” attitude, as can be seen in the following statement.

Teachers don't play the role of checking whether the power of the times is plunging into militarism. This power check is done by the media or the parliament, and also it gets checked in elections. (text_1, 19:22:25, Text 43)

As the NPF assumes that shared policy beliefs are what holds coalitions together (McBeth et al. 2014:241), intracoalitional coherence will also briefly be looked at. Table 23 shows that, when it comes to policy beliefs, the sub-groups of the pro-ordinance coalition differ at a statistically significant level. While Hashimoto shows a very strong tendency towards populist democracy policy beliefs, the “other”-group is contrastingly even leaning towards liberal democratic constructions of democratic realities. As for the anti-ordinance coalition, we see no statistically significant differences in their policy beliefs although, surprisingly, the intensity of their construction of liberal democratic realities is only slightly higher than the one of the “other”-group of the pro-ordinance coalition. Concerning solutions, though, the picture is reverse. While the pro-ordinance coalition is coherent in its call for plebiscites, the sub-groups of the anti-ordinance coalition differ greatly, with the NLU+ group relying on participation as the way forward and the Media+ group being more focused on consensus building and constitutionalism.

Table 23. Intracoalitional comparison of democratic policy beliefs and democratic solutions

	Advocacy coalitions			
	Pro-ordinance coalition n = 32 (%)		Anti-ordinance coalition n = 41 (%)	
	Hashimoto Mean (n; SD) (%)	Other Mean (n; SD) (%)	NLU+ Mean (n; SD) (%)	Media+ Mean (n; SD) (%)
Policy beliefs*				
	+ 0.78 (23; 0.422)	- 0.22 (9; 0.667)	- 0.27 (11; 0.786)	- 0.23 (30; 0.679)
	<i>t</i> -statistic = 5.122, <i>p</i> < 0.001, eta squared = 0.27		<i>t</i> -statistic = -0.158, <i>ns</i>	
Solutions*				
None	10 (31.25)	4 (44.44)	1 (9.09)	18 (60.00)
Plebiscite	13 (40.63)	3 (33.33)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Participation	0 (0)	0 (0)	10 (90.91)	1 (3.33)
Consensus	0 (0)	2 (22.22)	0 (0)	7 (23.33)
Constitutionalism	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	4 (13.33)
	Chi-squared (d.f.=2) = 5.830, <i>ns</i>		Chi-squared (d.f.=4) = 31.543, <i>p</i> < 0.001; Cramer's V = 0.877, <i>p</i> < 0.001	

6.3. Conclusions: The Kimigayo Ordinance policy discourse and its effects on democracy

In conclusion, we can therefore say that the pro-ordinance coalition, as expected, constructs the reality of the polyarchy as deficient for the powerless majority. The popular subject that gets constructed in the discourse, accordingly, is constructed as seeing the polyarchy deficient in this respect. The “real-life” exemplification of discursive meaning as practice is evident in one citizen’s letter to the editor, which prioritizes the right of the majority to force the singing of the national anthem on teachers (text_4).

Furthermore, as Hashimoto answers the question of who the sovereign of the nation is, by elevating the constructed popular identity to be the whole, those not included (the left, unions, civil servants and so forth) are losing democratic legitimacy in a polyarchy deficient for the partial (“the people”) claiming to be or feeling like they are the majority (the whole). As Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser have put it:

Ironically, by advocating an opening up of political life to non-elites, populism’s majoritarian, anti-elite thrust can easily promote a shrinkage of “the political” and cause a contraction of the effective democratic space. (Mudde/Rovira Kaltwasser 2013:22)

In a similar fashion, Hashimoto’s claim to open up closed-off areas to democratic control takes away democratic legitimacy from others. Thereby, the possibilities for contesting the actions of a

democratically elected power are reduced and “counter-balancing powers” weakened (Mudde/Rovira Kaltwasser 2013:20).

A positive attribute, sometimes ascribed to populism, is the inclusion of previously excluded groups (the poor) (Mudde/Rovira Kaltwasser 2013:21). This is not seen in the populist discourse at hand. As the bridging function of populism only lies only in bringing together conservative and business-oriented “neo-liberal” voters, a positive effect on opening up democratic space cannot be attributed. In other words, there is no inclusionist, positive effect on democracy in the populist policy discourse as the pro-ordinance coalition deploys it.

The anti-ordinance coalition, in turn, depicts the current state of the polyarchy as dangerous for minority groups under the reign of Hashimoto. The anti-ordinance coalition is coherent in its democratic policy beliefs but not when it comes to democratic solutions. While labor unions focus on calling for participation, this gets undermined by the Media+ group’s reluctance to call for the same thing. Rather a consensus oriented, deliberative model of democracy⁷⁶ is mixed with a call for constitutional protection of minority rights. For the effectiveness in persuasion this incoherence is surely negative, as the discourse of the pro-ordinance coalition, in turn, shows cohesiveness in calling for plebiscitarian solutions. While narrativity in the usage of solutions is the same, the pro-ordinance excels in depicting villain characters as powerful minorities and also in attacking individuals or specific groups. A lack of coherence in the discourse of the pro-ordinance coalition concerning democratic policy beliefs was observable, but as with narrative elements, Hashimoto’s more extensive reach can be seen as outweighing this problem.

The exclusive focus on plebiscite solutions found in the discourse of the pro-ordinance coalition shows effectiveness in narration. Hashimoto can be seen as constructing the polyarchy in a dangerous way. While the positive effects this can have are increasing “democratic accountability by making issues and policies part of the political realm” (Mudde/Rovira Kaltwasser 2013:21), these “anything-goes” plebiscitarian solutions (Poblete 2015:206) sometimes overshadow what voters really give a mandate for. As Mori has mentioned approaching the 2011 double-election nothing much got discussed besides the Osaka restructuring plan (Mori 2012:106). To see an election win as a positive reinforcement for all actions a politician takes is, therefore, a misconception.

Also, Hashimoto’s construction of the Kimigayo Ordinance as not his will but the will of “the people” leads to an exclusion of people from active participation in the political process, as a mode of telling people what they want arises. As Arditi mentioned, “from his [the leader’s] point of view [this] might leave room to retreat to, since they not themselves decide what to do (Arditi 2005:82-83), but

⁷⁶ “Pop-philosopher” Azuma Hiroki has pointed to the fact that deliberative democracy has found prominence in Japan with the Democratic Party of Japan’s first government’s emphasis on the constant need for “deliberation” (Azuma 2014:49).

leaves an electorate not really insisting on accountability but absorbing certain ideologies into their subject or group identity. Such a vertical link between populist leader and voters can turn into a relationship of servitude of “the people” and “servitude, voluntary or otherwise, turns citizenship into an empty shell and distributive justice into an instrument of domination” (Arditi 2005:97).

Such a discursive construction of the polyarchy and a popular subject as we observe in the discourse of the pro-ordinance coalition might, therefore, lead to what Arditì sees as the negative effects of populism on democracy:

The populist disregard for institutional checks and balances can encourage rule by decree and all sorts of authoritarian behavior while maintaining a democratic façade. In addition, the Manichean distinction between good common people and corrupt elites can become an excuse for using strong-arm tactics against political adversaries, and the continual invocation of the unity of the people can be used as means to dispel pluralism and toleration. (Arditi 2005: 95)

While we can summarize, that in accordance with Ōtake Hideo, democracy will not be destroyed by politicians like Koizumi or Hashimoto and their populist discourses (Ōtake 2009:206), considerable negative effects of such discourses have to be reflected and avoided.

7. Concluding remarks: Populist policy discourses, populist narratives and their meaning for democracy

Basically, we can conclude the following: the Kimigayo Ordinance policy discourse is a populist one, as it is inhabited by the narratively more effective populist discourse of the pro-ordinance coalition. This final chapter will summarize why this is considered to be the case, why this is important and what that means for Japan's democracy. Further, I want to discuss how this thesis can contribute to research within the Narrative Policy Framework and to populism theory.

Understanding whether a discourse is populist is important because on account of the populist mode of articulation the pro-ordinance discourse is able to deploy a more persuasive narrative of the Kimigayo Ordinance than the anti-ordinance coalition. This is in large part due to the populist logic found in its discourse construction. Thereby, we can understand the effectiveness of populism from a new perspective: its effective narration. When Hashimoto sees a general problem in Japanese society in areas "closed-off" from the public, we observe a discursive construction of a policy reality, which posits the issue in the center of a dichotomist society. Through this, Hashimoto opens up the possibility of constructing a popular subject, in which various demands around the Kimigayo Ordinance are inscribed. Through focusing more on the antagonistic "other", Hashimoto manages to bring heterogeneous groups of conservative and neo-liberal voters together. While arguments for particular demands, for instance the need for more patriotism, remain poor in content, it is exactly this characteristic that makes it possible to connect a variety of seemingly heterogeneous demands. As Hashimoto is simply stepping in, in order to make "the people" heard, the fact that demands like instilling more respect of the nation in individuals is simultaneously claimed and negated by saying the Kimigayo Ordinance has only to do with the importance to stay economically competitive.

In the quest for understanding Hashimoto's success we can state that this ability to balance heterogeneous groups is clearly one factor for his popularity among large groups of Japanese society. An election won by Hashimoto should not be explained by a "right-wing-turn" or a stronger diffusion of neo-liberal ways of thinking in Japanese society, rather the bridging of these two camps should be seen as the winning factor. Compared to a differential logic, Hashimoto's equivalential formulation of demands is more effective because it leaves open the disliking of a partiality of the demands. We can see this, for instance, if someone shows an indifference or disliking towards conservative views on national pride, but can agree to Hashimoto's argument that the Kimigayo Ordinance would contribute to economic development or would improve the education of someone's child. Since this logic of equivalence empties out those demands that might not be liked by everyone, they can still find belonging with the popular subject, as they might agree to other demands inscribed in the equivalential chain and in turn believe their subject position to be reflected in the popular subject.

Hashimoto's comfort women statement (Johnston 2012) has proven that if one side of demands gets emphasized too strongly, the balance can collapse and those only tolerating particular demands can get pushed away. If the balance is found, though, this logic can be highly effective in bringing people together and be a good foundation for effectively narrating a discourse.

As the additional perspective on the discourse through the content analysis following the Narrative Policy Framework has shown, the populist discourse of the pro-ordinance coalition is effective in persuasion only in part because of the populist discursive logic. While many measured narrative elements and strategies can be explained by populism (e.g. using a lot of villain characters, using stories of power or intentional causal mechanisms), the analysis has shown that not every factor can be explained by populism. The hero character is not an inherent characteristic of a populist mode of articulation. While it necessarily develops as standing with "the people" in a populist narrative, if there is a hero character, a populist policy discourse without a hero character would also be imaginable. If Hashimoto did not emphasize his achievements while in office or his legal battle against the defense attorney group, the discourse would still be a populist one. If an active politician is among the authors of texts analyzed, though, it would be highly unlikely that there is no hero character, as every politician's goal is to portray himself or herself as having achieved something positive. We can understand from this that a centrality of the leader is not a specificity of populism but might just be a characteristic of modern politics. It is important for populism theory to distinguish effective factors inherently lying in populism and those that do not in order to more rigorously define the core of populism. Also, if such a rigorous distinction is made, differences between populist discourses can be understood, as surely not every populist discourse is equally successful in persuasion.

Previously conducted Narrative Policy Framework research has also aided in understanding from a comparative perspective that both coalitions, as expected, use narrative elements and strategies differently. This thesis, therefore, is an addition to the existing corpus of research, proving that the framework can be applied to different contexts outside the United States. It was helpful in understanding what narrative elements and different levels of narrativity contribute to persuasiveness in argument and, for instance, showed why the anti-incumbent focus of the anti-ordinance coalition might not be very persuasive, as it results in low levels of narrativity. As it is a relatively new framework, additional research is needed to further expand the range of usable insights it offers and to further prove, for instance, the higher levels in persuasiveness for intentional mechanisms as opposed to inadvertent, mechanical or accidental causal description. The specific impact of stories of power is also something worth looking at, especially in times of rising populist discourses.

In general, the anti-ordinance coalition has proven not to be a strong adversary for Hashimoto and his fellow campaigners. The main problem with the discourse of the anti-ordinance coalition is that it does not expand the issue. Whether in character usage, scope of conflict or the stories told,

topics always stay confined to one issue. Also narrativity was consistently lower than that of the pro-ordinance coalition almost throughout all categories of narrative elements and strategies. The fact that the pro-ordinance coalition outperforms the anti-ordinance coalition in terms of describing intentional causal mechanisms is especially astonishing. As Hashimoto was the main force behind the enactment of the ordinance it is surprising that his actions were not portrayed as deliberately evil and the pro-ordinance coalition used more intentional causalities.

Focusing on policy discourses and the construction of policy realities in the respective discourses has also helped to understand populism better. In a populist policy discourse the policy itself becomes the point of centrality an equivalential chain needs for its representation. In the following, various populist policy discourses can be bound together and reach high levels of persuasion at the whole dinner table. As a survey conducted by Zenkyō Masahiro et al. (2012:1029) showed that among Hashimoto's voters in the 2011 double election his policies were by far the main reason to vote for him⁷⁷, we can see the necessity of the effective construction of policy realities reflected. As all the policies enacted by him up to that point could not have shown positive effects on economic, educational or any other measurable parameter by the time that survey was conducted, policy realities must play a big role.

As historically Hashimoto's fight can be seen in close relation to the slogan previously propagated by Koizumi and the DPJ government alike, "Bringing control from the bureaucrats to the government" (*kanryōshudō kara seijishudō he*) (Nakata 2012b:57-58), we can understand that Hashimoto is not the first to construct such an antagonism.⁷⁸ This contributes to populism theory that also while in office, politicians can deploy a populist discourse, as other "establishment" forces remain to attack. Against research arguing for the opposite (e.g. Priester 2014, Barr 2009) it has been shown that the construction of "the people" does not necessarily end when a politician or group is in power. Additionally, as a local politician, Hashimoto has the possibility of attacking national institutions and build an extensive antagonistic "other", against which the popular subject can be positioned. Combined with structural factors of Japan's political system, this might be one explanation for the continuous success of local populism in Japan. This, of course, needs more research, but as a starting point this thesis might play its role.

By measuring narrative elements and strategies, effects on democracy could also be quantitatively measured. It is doubtful whether, as Robert Barr claimed, a plebiscitarian linkage is the only option for populism in constructing democratic solutions. The possibility of calling on "the people" to participate in the political process is not excluded by constructing a populist policy discourse. What

⁷⁷ Interestingly his opponent Hiramatsu's voters found character to be the main reason for voting for him (among Hashimoto's voters only 15.7 percent answered with character) (Zenkyō et al. 2012:1029).

⁷⁸ Matsutani also found that among Hashimoto supporters mistrust against public servants was even slightly higher than mistrust of politicians (Matsutani 2012:108).

can be observed, though, is that out of the confrontation of the powerless many with the powerful few necessarily arises a construction of the polyarchy as being deficient for the many. This, again, must not be a negative thing, but in the case of the Kimigayo Ordinance it shows, how this can lead to a dangerous ignoring of minority rights. Teachers, labor unions and journalists are arguably not the ones wielding the most power in Japan's society and a populist construction of such an antagonistic "other" does in fact seem to lead to a society all too easily ignoring minority rights.

The thesis at hand hopefully has contributed to understanding the drunken dinner guest's charm and taking a more "sober" look at him and others like him.

References

Arditi, Benjamin

2005 "Populism as an internal periphery of democratic politics", Francisco Panizza (ed.): *Populism and the mirror of democracy*. London and New York: Verso, 72-98.

Aspinall, Robert W.

2000 "Tokorozawa High School and the ceremony and the controversy surrounding the enforcement of respect for the national flag and anthem", *NIASnytt* 3, 8-12.

Aspinall, Robert W. and Peter Cave

2001 "Lowering the flag: Democracy, authority and rights at Tokorozawa High School", *Social Science Japan Journal* 4/1, 77-93.

Azuma, Hiroki

2014 *General will 2.0: Rousseau, Freud, Google*. New York: Vertical.

Babb, James

2012 "The Seirankai and the fate of its members: The rise and fall of the new right politicians in Japan", *Japan Forum* 24/1, 75-96.

Banyan

2012 "Fighting monsters: Political outsiders are challenging Asia's traditional elites", *Economist* 27 September 2012 (<http://www.economist.com/node/21563719>) (23.04.2015).

Barr, Robert R.

2009 "Populists, outsiders and anti-establishment politics", *Party Politics* 15/1, 29-48.

Bruhn, Kathleen

2013 "'To hell with your corrupt institutions!': AMLO and populism in Mexico", Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (eds.): *Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or corrective for democracy?*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 88-112.

Chong, Dennis and James N. Druckman

2007 "Framing theory", *Annual Review of Political Science* 10/1, 103-126.

Cripps, Denise

1996 "Flags and fanfares: The Hinomaru flag and Kimigayo anthem", Roger Goodman and Ian Neary (eds.): *Case studies on human rights in Japan*. Sandgate: Japan Library, 76-108.

Dahl, Robert A.

2006 *A preface to democratic theory*. Chicago and London: The Chicago University Press [¹1956].

Freedon, Michael

1998 "Is nationalism a distinct ideology?", *Political Studies* 46/4, 748-765.

Ghelli, Fabio

2012 "Japan wird nationalistisch" [Japan turns nationalist], *Zeit Online* 15 December 2012 (<http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2012-12/japan-parlamentswahl>) (23.04.2015).

Groppa, Alejandro José

2013 *The two princes Juan D. Perón and Getulio Vargas: A comparative analysis*. Villa María: Edivum.

Gutmann, Amy

2012 "Democracy", Robert E. Goodin et al. (eds.): *A companion to contemporary political philosophy*. Malden and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 521-532.

Howarth, David R. and Yannis Stavrakakis

2000 "Introducing discourse theory and political analysis", David R. Howarth and Yannis Stavrakakis (eds.): *Discourse theory and political analysis: Identities, hegemonies and social change*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1-23.

Ichikawa, Sumiko

2012 "Kyōiku to jichitaiminshushugi" [Education and local democracy], Urata Ichirō and Shirafuji Hiroyuki (eds.): *Hashimoto popyurizumu to minshushugi* [Hashimoto-style populism and democracy]. Tokyo: Jichitaikenkyūsha, 67-80.

Johnston, Eric

- 2015a "Hashimoto vows to quit if Osaka merger plan fails", *Japan Times* 17 January 2015 (<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/01/07/national/politics-diplomacy/hashimoto-vows-to-quit-if-osaka-merger-plan-fails/#.VT4kwiHtmko>) (27.04.2015).
- 2015b "Of birds and bugs: journalism in Tokyo and Osaka", *Japan Times* 14 March 2015 (<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/03/14/national/birds-bugs-journalism-tokyo-osaka/#.VT4gtyHtmko>) (27.04.2015).
- 2015c "Hashimoto announces exit from politics after Osaka rejects merger plan in referendum", *Japan Times* 17 May 2015 (<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/05/17/national/politics-diplomacy/osaka-referendum-rejects-merger-plan-possibly-ending-hashimotos-political-career/#.VfGCthHtmko>) (10.09.2015).
- 2015d "Will he, won't he? Osaka Mayor Hashimoto keeps public guessing about future role in politics", *Japan Times* 9 September 2015 (<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/09/national/politics-diplomacy/will-wont-osaka-mayor-hashimoto-keeps-public-guessing-future-role-politics/#.VfGDvhHtmko>) (10.09.2015).
- 2015e "Hashimoto's new national party likely to closely resemble Ishin no tō", *Japan Times* 7 September 2015 (<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/07/national/politics-diplomacy/hashimotos-new-national-party-likely-closely-resemble-ishin-no/#.VfGEyxHtmko>) (10.09.2015).
- 2014a "Ishin-DPJ tieup, Kepco's greed to play key roles in April polls", *Japan Times* 14 December 2015 (<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/12/21/national/politics-diplomacy/ishin-dpj-tieup-kepcos-greed-play-key-roles-april-polls/#.VT4lkyHtmko>) (27.04.2015).
- 2014b "Court rejects Osaka mayor's bid to ban unions from using school buildings", *Japan Times* 26 November 2014 (<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/11/26/national/crime-legal/court-rejects-osaka-mayors-bid-ban-unions-using-school-buildings/#.VT4rXShtmkko>) (27.04.2015).
- 2014c "Osaka mayor prepares to tackle anti-Korean group Zaitokukai", *Japan Times* 1 October 2014 (<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/10/01/national/osaka-mayor-prepares-tackle-anti-korean-group-zaitokukai/#.VT4tQiHtmko>) (27.04.2015).
- 2014d "Nippon ishin, Yui no tō take second shot at dethroning LDP: Parties taking wiser approach to merger after 'third force' implosion", *Japan Times* August 24th 2014 (<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/08/24/national/politics-diplomacy/nippon-ishin-yui-no-to-take-second-shot-at-dethroning-ldp/#.VT4t8iHtmko>) (27.04.2015).
- 2012 "No evidence sex slaves were taken by military: Hashimoto", *Japan Times* 23 August 2012 (<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/08/23/national/no-evidence-sex-slaves-were-taken-by-military-hashimoto/#.VfF8ixHtmko>) (10.09.2015).

Jones, Michael D.

- 2010 *Heroes and villains: Cultural narratives, mass opinions, and climate change*. PhD. diss., University of Oklahoma. (<http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=mjones>) (06.06.2015).
- 2014a "Communicating climate change: Are stories better than 'just the facts'?", *Policy Studies Journal* 42/4, 644-673.
- 2014b "Cultural characters and climate change: How heroes shape our perception of climate science", *Social Science Quarterly* 95/1, 1-39.

Jones, Michael D. and Mark K. McBeth

- 2010 "A Narrative Policy Framework: Clear enough to be wrong?", *Policy Studies Journal* 38/2, 329-353.

Kawata, Junichi and Melinda Papp

- 2013 "The meta-language of politics, culture and integrity in Japan", *Human Affairs* 23, 246-254.

Kazuo, Ikejiri and Masanori Sako

- 2011 "Toru Hashimoto: Out of the question for teachers to refuse work order", *Asahi Shinbun* 16 August 2011 (<http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/opinion/AJ2011081610815>) (18.03.2013).
- Kear, Andrew R. and Dominic D. Wells
- 2014 "Coalitions are people: Policy narratives and the defeat of Ohio Senate Bill 5", Michael D. Jones et al. (eds.): *The science of stories: Applications of the Narrative Policy Framework in public policy analysis*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 157-184.
- Köhler, Nicholas
- 2012 "Toru Hashimoto, the brash, young mayor of Osaka, is Japan's most popular politician: Osaka's mayor is young, media savvy, opposes nuclear power, and is firing up voters", *MacLeans* 24 May 2012 (<http://www.macleans.ca/news/world/toru-hashimoto-the-brash-young-mayor-of-osaka-is-japans-most-popular-politician/>) (23.04.2015).
- Komatsu, Hiroshi
- 2012 "Kenpō ga motomeru minshushugi no arikata" [The current state of democracy as demanded by the constitution], Urata Ichirō and Shirafuji Hiroyuki (eds.): *Hashimoto popyurizumu to minshushugi* [Hashimoto-style populism and democracy]. Tokyo: Jichitaikenkyūsha, 23-42.
- Kuckartz, Udo
- 2014 *Mixed Methods: Methodologie, Forschungsdesigns und Analyseverfahren* [Mixed methods: Methodology, research design and analytical methods]. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
- Laclau, Ernesto
- 2011 *Politics and ideology in Marxist theory: Capitalism, fascism and populism*. London and New York: Verso Books [¹1977].
- 2007 *On populist reason*. London and New York: Verso [¹2005].
- 2005 "Populism: What's in a name?", Francisco Panizza (ed.): *Populism and the mirror of democracy*. London and New York: Verso, 32-49.
- Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe
- 2012 *Hegemonie und radikale Demokratie: Zur Dekonstruktion des Marxismus* [Hegemony and socialist strategy: Towards a radical democratic politics]. Wien: Passagen Verlag [¹1985].
- Lill, Felix
- 2012 "Ein Populist gegen Japans Establishment: Direkt, aggressiv, widersprüchlich – und ziemlich unjapanisch" [A populist against Japan's establishment: Direct, aggressive, contradictory – and very atypical for a Japanese], *ZeitOnline* 12 November 2012 (<http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2012-11/JAPAN-Toru-Hashimoto>) (23.04.2015).
- Matsutani, Mitsuru
- 2012 "Dare ga Hashimoto wo shijishiteiru no ka" [Who supports Hashimoto?], *Sekai* 832, 102-112.
- 2011 "Popyurizumu no taitō to sono gensen" [The appearance of populism and its origin], *Sekai* 815, 132-141.
- McBeth, Mark K. et al.
- 2014 "The narrative policy framework", Paul A. Sabatier und Christopher M. Weible (eds.): *Theories of the policy process*. Boulder: Westview Press, 225-266.
- 2010 "Buffalo tales: Interest group policy stories in Greater Yellowstone", *Policy Sciences* 43/4, 391-409.
- 2005 "The science of storytelling: Measuring policy beliefs in Greater Yellowstone", *Society and Natural Resources* 18/5, 413-429.
- Mizuno, Kosuke and Pasuk Phongpaichit
- 2009 "Introduction", Mizuno Kosuke and Pasuk Phongpaichit (eds.): *Populim in Asia*. Kyoto: Kyoto University Press, 1-17.
- Mori, Hiroyuki
- 2012 "Ōsaka-to kōsō to 'kokkakaizō'" [The Osaka metropolitan plan and the restructuring of the state], Sakakibara Hidenori (ed.): *Jichitai popyurizumu wo tou: Ōsaka ishin kaikaku, Kawamura-ryū genzei no nagekakerumono* [Questioning the populism of local governments: What can be understood from the reforms of the Osaka Restoration Party and Kawamura's tax reduction measurements]. Tokyo: Jichitaikenkyūsha, 103-130.

Mouffe, Chantal

2014 *Agonistik: Die Welt politisch denken [Agonistics: Thinking the world politically]*. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag.

2013 *Das demokratische Paradox [The democratic paradox]*. Wien: Turia + Kant [¹2000].

2005 "The 'end of politics' and the challenge of right-wing populism", Francisco Panizza (ed.): *Populism and the mirror of democracy*. London and New York: Verso, 50-71.

Mudde, Cas and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser

2013 "Populism and (liberal) democracy: A framework for analysis", Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (eds.): *Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or corrective for democracy?*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-26.

Nakata, Yasuhiko

2012a "Hajimeni: Ōsaka no kaikaku wa warewareni nani wo kangaesaseyou toshiteiru noka" [Introduction: What Osakan reforms should make us think about], Nakata Yasuhiko et al. (eds.): *Ōsaka kyōiku kaikaku ga tou: Kyōiku to minshushugi* [Inquiring the education reforms in Osaka: Education and democracy]. Kyoto: Kamogawa Shuppan, 2-9.

2012b "Shinjiyūshugika deno 'chiikishuken' kyōikukaikaku towa: Kihonseikaku to mondaiten" [What do 'regional sovereignty' educational reforms mean under neo-conservatism: Basic characteristics and problems], Nakata Yasuhiko et al. (eds.): *Ōsaka kyōiku kaikaku ga tou: Kyōiku to minshushugi* [Inquiring the education reforms in Osaka: Education and democracy]. Kyoto: Kamogawa Shuppan, 56-69.

Nishimura, Hidetoshi

1988 "Flag and anthem, symbols of distress", *Japan Quarterly* 35/2, 152-156.

Niwa, Tōru

2012 "Ōsaka niokeru 'Kokkakirituseishō kyōsei jōrei' to 'Kyōiku kihon jōreian' no hōteki kentō" [A discussion of Osaka's 'Ordinance for the compulsory standing for and singing of the national anthem' and the 'Basic education ordinance plan' from a legal perspective], Sakakibara Hidenori (ed.): *Jichitai popyurizumu o tou: Ōsaka ishin kaikaku, Kawamura-ryū genzei no nagekakerumono* [Questioning the populism of local governments: What can be understood from the reforms of the Osaka Restoration Party and Kawamura's tax reduction measurements]. Tokyo: Jichitaikenkyūsha, 163-196.

N.N.

2015a "Teachers awarded compensation for being forced to sing national anthem", *Japan Today* 27 May 2015 (<http://www.japantoday.com/smartphone/view/national/teachers-awarded-compensation-for-being-forced-to-sing-national-anthem>) (12.2.2015).

2015b "20, 30dai wa 6 wari sansei tokōsō Asahi ABC deguchichōsa" [60 percent approval among people in their 20s and 30s, Osaka metropolis plan, found out in an Asahi and ABC exit poll], *Asahi Shinbun* 17 May 2015 (<http://www.asahi.com/sp/articles/ASH5J7X87H5JPTIL01M.html>) (21.09.2015).

2014 "Keep power in boards of education", *Japan Times* 13 January 2014 (<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/01/13/editorials/keep-power-in-boards-of-education/#.VfaHoRHtmko>) (14.09.2015).

2013 "Jimin, abenomikusu tanomi 'hyōka' hoka no seisaku wo attō: Asahi shinbunsha yūsō seronchōsa" [An assessment of the LDP's relying on Abenomics: Overpowering other policies. A postal public opinion poll by the Asahi newspaper company], *Asahi Shinbun* 26 June 2013, *chōkan*, 19.

2012a "Charismatic outsider Toru Hashimoto tipped as future leader of Japan", *Guardian* 17 July 2012 (<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/17/toru-hashimoto-tipped-future-japan-leader>) (23.04.2015).

2012b "Populisten in Japan fusionieren: Ehemaliger Gouverneur von Tokio führt 'Wiedergeburt'" [Populists in Japan merge: Former governor of Tokyo leads "rebirth"], *Frankfurter Allgemeine* 18 November 2012 (<http://www.faz.net/frankfurter-allgemeine-zeitung/populisten-in-japan-fusionieren-11964598.html>) (23.04.2015).

- 2009 "Hashimoto-chiji to Yomiuri terebi teiso, meiyokison de hikarishijikenbengodan" [Governor Hashimoto and Yomiuri television get sued for defamation by defense lawyers in Hikari City incident], *Japan Today* 27 November 2009 (<http://www.47news.jp/CN/200911/CN2009112701000302.html>) (22.09.2015).
- Noda, Yu
- 2012 "Ōsaka-to kōsō to jichi: Ōsakashimin no ikōchōsa no bunseki kara" [The Osaka metropolis plan and local autonomy: Seen from an analysis of a survey of the residents of Osaka city], *Chiiki seisaku gaku jōnanu* [Aichi University Journal of Regional Policy Studies], 1/1, 61-82.
- Ōsaka ishin no kai
- 2011 "Ōsaka ishin no kai fugikai hōkoku [The One Osaka party's local parliament report]", *Ishin times* May 2011 (http://osaka-ishin.jp/pdf/times/h23_vol01.pdf) (21.06.2015).
- Opratto, Benjamin
- 2014 *Hegemonie* [Hegemony]. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot.
- Ōtake, Hideo
- 2012 *Nihonkei popyurizumu: Seiji heno kitai to genmetsu* [Japanese-style populism: Expectations and disillusionment towards politics]. Tokyo: Chūōkōronshinsha [¹2003].
- 2009 "Neoliberal populism in Japanese politics: A study of Prime Minister Koizumi in comparison with President Reagan", Kosuke Mizuno and Pasuk Phongpaichit (eds.): *Populism in Asia*. Kyoto: Kyoto University Press, 202-216.
- Pallant, Julie
- 2005 *SPSS survival manual: A step by step guide to data analysis using SPSS for Windows (Version 12)*. Crows Nest: Allen and Unwin.
- Panizza, Francisco
- 2005 "Introduction: Populism and the mirror of democracy", Francisco Panizza (ed.): *Populism and the mirror of democracy*. London and New York: Verso, 1-31.
- Pekkanen, Robert et al.
- 2013 "Introduction", Robert Pekkanen et al. (eds.): *Japan decides 2012: The Japanese general election*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 3-7.
- Plattner, Marc F.
- 2010 "Populism, pluralism, and liberal democracy", *Journal of Democracy* 21/1, 81-92.
- Poblete, Mario E.
- 2015 "How to assess populist discourse through three current approaches", *Journal of Political Ideologies* 20/2, 201-208.
- Pohl, Manfred
- 2014 "Innenpolitik Japans 2013/2014" [Domestic politics in Japan 2013/2014], David Chiavacci and Iris Wiczorek (eds.): *Japan 2014: Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* [Japan 2014: Politics, economy and society]. München: iudicum, 25-43.
- Priester, Karin
- 2014 *Mystik und Politik: Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe und die radikale Demokratie* [Mysticism and politics: Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe and radical democracy]. Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann.
- 2011 "Definitionen und Typologien des Populismus" [Definitions and typologies of populism], *Soziale Welt* 62, 185-198.
- Reed, Steven R.
- 1981 "Gubernatorial Elections in Japan", John C. Campbell (ed.): *Parties, Candidates and Voters in Japan*. Ann Arbor: The Center for Japanese Studies.
- Sartori, Giovanni
- 1970 "Concept misinformation in comparative politics", *The American Political Science Review* 64/4, 1033-1053.
- Schubert, Klaus and Nils C. Bandelow

- 2009 "Politikfeldanalyse: Dimensionen und Fragestellungen" [Policy analysis: Dimensions and questions], Klaus Schubert and Nils C. Bandelow (eds.): *Lehrbuch der Politikfeldanalyse 2.0* [Textbook on policy analysis 2.0]. München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 1-22.
- Schmidt, Manfred G.
- 2010 *Demokratietheorien: Eine Einführung* [Democracy theories: An introduction]. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Shanahan, Elizabeth A. et al.
- 2014 "The blame game: Narrative persuasiveness of the intentional causal mechanism", Michael D. Jones et al. (eds.): *The science of stories: Applications of the Narrative Policy Framework in public policy analysis*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 69-88.
- 2013 "An angel on the wind: How heroic policy narratives shape policy realities", *Policy Studies Journal* 41/3, 453-483.
- 2011 "Policy narratives and policy processes", *Policy Studies Journal* 39/3, 535-561.
- 2008 "Conduit or contributor? The role of media in policy change theory", *Policy Sciences* 41/2, 115-138.
- Shen, Simon Xu Hui
- 2014 "Local governments in Japan and roles played in Sino-Japanese relations", *East Asia* 31, 49-65.
- Smith, Daniel M.
- 2013 "Candidate recruitment for the 2012 election: New parties, new methods... Same old pool of candidates?", Robert Pekkanen et al. (eds.): *Japan decides 2012: The Japanese general election*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 101-121.
- Stavrakakis, Yannis
- 2005 "Religion and populism in contemporary Greece", Francisco Panizza (ed.): *Populism and the mirror of democracy*. London and New York: Verso, 224-249.
- 2004 "Antinomies of formalism: Laclau's theory of populism and the lessons from religious populism in Greece", *Journal of Political Ideologies* 9/3, 257-267.
- Tadano, Masahito
- 2012 "Popyurizumu to min'i" [Populism and popular will], Tanaka Takahiko et al. (eds.): *Ōsaka kyōiku kaikaku ga tou: Kyōiku to minshushugi* [Inquiring the education reforms in Osaka: Education and democracy]. Kyoto: Kamogawa Shuppan, 41-55.
- Taggart, Paul
- 2004 "Populism and representative politics in contemporary Europe", *Journal of Political Ideologies* 9/3, 269-288.
- 2000 *Populism*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Tagsold, Christian
- 2002 *Die Inszenierung der kulturellen Identität in Japan: Das Beispiel der Olympischen Spiele Tokyo 1964* [The staging of cultural identity in Japan: The example of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics]. München: iudicum.
- Takahashi, Junko
- 2012 "Interview: Toru Yoshida – Let's hear it for populist politics", *Asahi Shinbun* 13 December 2012 (<http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/opinion/AJ201212130077>) (07.07.2015).
- Takayose, Shōzō
- 2011 "Ōsaka-to kōsō to Hashimoto popyurizumu" [The Osaka metropolitan plan and Hashimoto-style populism], *Sekai* 813, 124-130.
- Trifu, Ioan
- 2013 "Prefectural governors and populism in Japan (1990s-2010s)", *Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia* 26, 64-85.
- Weathers, Charles
- 2014 "Reformer or destroyer? Hashimoto Tōru and populist neoliberal politics in Japan", *Social Science Japan Journal* 17/1, 77-96.
- Weyland, Kurt

2001 “Clarifying a contested concept: Populism in the study of Latin American politics”, *Comparative Politics* 34/1, 1-22.

Yoshida, Tōru

2013 “Min’i no arika” [The location of the people’s will], *Sekai* 839, 53-59.

2011 *Populism wo kangaeru: Minshushugi heno sainyaumon* [Considerations about populism: A reintroduction to democracy]. Tokyo: NHK Shuppan.

Young, Isaac

2009 “Shut up and sing: Japanese teachers in an era of conservative educational reform”, *Cornell International Law Journal* 42, 157-192.

Zenkyō, Masahiro et al.

2012 “Ōsaka daburu-senkyo no bunseki: Yūkensha no sentaku to Ōsaka ishin no kai shijikiban no kaimei” [An analysis of Osaka double election in 2011: Examining voter choice and support bases for Osaka ishin no kai], *Kansaidaigaku hōgakuronshū* [Kansai University’s Law Review] 62/3, 1019-1116.

Primary sources

Text ID	Author	Source	Date published
1	Hashimoto Tōru	Twitter @t_ishin, 19:00:23-19:50:12, http://twilog.org/t_ishin (last accessed 13.12.2015)	02-Jun-2011
2	Nakahara Tōru	http://ameblo.jp/nakahara-toru/entry-10908922298.html (13.12.2015)	31-May-2011
3	Hashimoto Tōru	Editorial, Asahi Shinbun – Kikuzo II Visual (DB), <i>chōkan</i> , p.12	28-Jun-2011
4	Citizen	Letter to the editor, Asahi Shinbun – Kikuzo II Visual, <i>chōkan</i> , p.16	09-Jun-2011
6 ⁷⁹	Hashimoto Tōru	Twitter @t_ishin, 14:18:17-15:04:00, http://twilog.org/t_ishin (13.12.2015)	10-Aug-2011
7	Hashimoto Tōru	Twitter @t_ishin, 09:00:13-13:42:27, http://twilog.org/t_ishin (13.12.2015)	21-Sep-2011
8	Hashimoto Tōru	Interview, Asahi Shinbun – Kikuzo II Visual (DB), <i>chōkan</i> , p.12	19-May-2011
9	Nakahara Tōru	http://ameblo.jp/nakahara-toru/entry-10898019162.html (13.12.2015)	21-May-2011
10	Hashimoto Tōru	http://www.pref.osaka.lg.jp/koho/chiji/230609_kyouiku.html (13.12.2015)	09-Jun-2011
11	Nakahara Tōru	http://ameblo.jp/nakahara-toru/entry-11191251489.html (13.12.2015)	13-Mar-2012
12	Hashimoto Tōru	http://osaka-ishin.jp/pdf/qa/qa_201202_okita.pdf#zoom=75 (13.12.2015)	05-Mar-2012
13	Hashimoto Tōru	Twitter @t_ishin, 16:35:30-17:16:08, http://twilog.org/t_ishin (13.12.2015)	16-Jul-2011
14	Hashimoto Tōru	Twitter @t_ishin, 06:48:13-07:17:30, http://twilog.org/t_ishin (13.12.2015)	01-Jul-2011
15	Hashimoto Tōru	Twitter @t_ishin, 13:35:02-14:01:04, http://twilog.org/t_ishin (13.12.2015)	06-Dec-2011
16	Hashimoto Tōru	Twitter @t_ishin, 08:51:03-10:37:36, http://twilog.org/t_ishin (13.12.2015)	26-May-2011
17	Hashimoto Tōru	Twitter @t_ishin, 19:42:06-20:22:56, http://twilog.org/t_ishin (13.12.2015)	20-May-2011
18	Hashimoto Tōru	Twitter @t_ishin, 09:07:42-09:29:11, http://twilog.org/t_ishin (13.12.2015)	13-Jun-2015
19	Hashimoto Tōru	Twitter @t_ishin, 03:03:44-16:03:40, http://twilog.org/t_ishin (13.12.2015)	19-May-2011
20	Hashimoto Tōru	Twitter @t_ishin, 23:23:32-00:03:59, http://twilog.org/t_ishin (13.12.2015)	08-Jun-2011
21	Hashimoto Tōru	Twitter @t_ishin, 00:27:19-01:09:24, http://twilog.org/t_ishin (13.12.2015)	19-Jun-2011
22	Hashimoto Tōru	Twitter @t_ishin, 09:34:33-10:49:12, http://twilog.org/t_ishin (13.12.2015)	04-Jun-2011
23	Hashimoto Tōru	Twitter @t_ishin, 08:14:42-08:46:43, http://twilog.org/t_ishin (13.12.2015)	29-Jun-2011
24	Nakahara Tōru	http://ameblo.jp/nakahara-toru/entry-10912998868.html (13.12.2015)	04-Jun-2011
25	Nakahara Tōru	http://ameblo.jp/nakahara-toru/entry-11625007136.html (13.12.2015)	30-Sep-2013
26	Hashimoto Tōru	Twitter @t_ishin, 23:51:41-00:57:24, http://twilog.org/t_ishin (13.12.2015)	23-Jun-2011

⁷⁹ Data set 5 was deleted during the data analysis phase, since I concluded that it did not qualify as a narrative.

27	Hashimoto Tōru	Twitter @t_ishin, 23:55:01-00:09:39, http://twilog.org/t_ishin (13.12.2015)	06-Jun-2011
28	Hashimoto Tōru	Twitter @t_ishin, 08:45:26-09:54:03, http://twilog.org/t_ishin (13.12.2015)	31-Oct-2011
29	Nakahara Tōru	http://ameblo.jp/nakahara-toru/entry-11248551587.html (13.12.2015)	12-May-2012
30	Nakahara Tōru	http://ameblo.jp/nakahara-toru/entry-10904908169.html (13.12.2015)	27-May-2011
31	Nakahara Tōru	http://ameblo.jp/nakahara-toru/entry-11192795624.html (13.12.2015)	13-Mar-2012
32	Hashimoto Tōru	Twitter @t_ishin, 20:03:31-20:59:38, http://twilog.org/t_ishin (13.12.2015)	17-Jun-2011
33	Hashimoto Tōru	Twitter @t_ishin, 17:20:38-18:16:05, http://twilog.org/t_ishin (13.12.2015)	16-Jul-2011
34	Staff Writer (Asahi)	Editorial, Asahi Shinbun – Kikuzo II Visual (DB), <i>chōkan</i> , p.1	04-Jun-2011
35	Citizen	Letter to the editor, Asahi Shinbun – Kikuzo II Visual, <i>chōkan</i> , p.12	18-May-2011
36	Citizen	Letter to the editor, Asahi Shinbun – Kikuzo II Visual, <i>chōkan</i> , p.12	31-May-2011
37	Citizen	Letter to the editor, Asahi Shinbun – Kikuzo II Visual, <i>chōkan</i> , p.12	17-Jan-2013
38	Citizen	Letter to the editor, Asahi Shinbun – Kikuzo II Visual, <i>chōkan</i> , p.8	22-May-2011
39	Citizen	Letter to the editor, Asahi Shinbun – Kikuzo II Visual, <i>chōkan</i> , p.8	29-May-2011
40	Citizen	Letter to the editor, Asahi Shinbun – Kikuzo II Visual, <i>chōkan</i> , p.14	20-May-2011
41	Nakama Labor Union	http://nakama-kyoin.jugem.jp/ Headline: “今日、組合から提出しました” (13.12.2015)	26-May-2011
42	Nakama Labor Union	http://nakama-kyoin.jugem.jp/ Headline: “出されていない「職務命令」に違反?!” (13.12.2015)	02-Jul-2014
43	Citizen	Letter to the editor, Asahi Shinbun – Kikuzo II Visual, <i>chōkan</i> , p.8	29-May-2011
44	Hinomaru - Kimigayo kyōsei hantai hottorain Ōsaka	http://www.labornetjp.org/news/2011/1306201609283staff01/view (13.12.2015)	23-May-2011
45	Citizen	Letter to the editor, Asahi Shinbun – Kikuzo II Visual, <i>chōkan</i> , p.10	06-Jun-2011
46	Citizen	Letter to the editor, Asahi Shinbun – Kikuzo II Visual, <i>chōkan</i> , p.12	05-Apr-2011
47	Citizen	http://akiharahaduki.blog31.fc2.com/blog-entry-732.html (13.12.2015)	24-Jan-2012
48	Citizen	Letter to the editor, Asahi Shinbun – Kikuzo II Visual, <i>chōkan</i> , p.14	28-Apr-2012
49	Nakama Labor Union	http://nakama-kyoin.jugem.jp/ Headline: “君が代起立条例は違憲!” (13.12.2015)	19-May-2011
50	Staff Writer (Kyōdō)	Editorial; https://mofa.kyodonews.jp/ (DB) Headline: “政治は教育に紹介するな”	01-Sep-2011
51	Citizen	Letter to the editor, Asahi Shinbun – Kikuzo II Visual, <i>chōkan</i> , p.14	25-Sep-2013
52	Citizen	Letter to the editor, Asahi Shinbun – Kikuzo II Visual, <i>chōkan</i> , p.10	23-May-2011
53	Nakama Labor Union	http://nakama-kyoin.jugem.jp/ (13.12.2015) Headline: “なかまユニオンに入って、権利と教育を闘いとうろう!”	19-May-2011
54	Citizen	Letter to the editor, Asahi Shinbun – Kikuzo II Visual, <i>chōkan</i> , p.8	29-May-2011
55	Citizen	Letter to the editor, Asahi Shinbun – Kikuzo II Visual, <i>chōkan</i> , p.12	25-May-2011
56	Citizen	Letter to the editor, Asahi Shinbun – Kikuzo II Visual, <i>chōkan</i> , p.14	09-Jun-2011
57	Citizen	Letter to the editor, Asahi Shinbun – Kikuzo II Visual, <i>chōkan</i> , p.14	01-Jun-2011
58	Citizen	Letter to the editor, Asahi Shinbun – Kikuzo II Visual, <i>chōkan</i> , p.10	01-Jun-2011
59	Nakama Labor Union	http://nakama-kyoin.jugem.jp/ (13.12.2015) Headline: “君が代起立条例を受け、府教委が「職務命令発出→処分」を決定”	20-Jun-2011
60	Nakama Labor Union	http://nakama-kyoin.jugem.jp/ (13.12.2015) Headline: “同僚のみなさん、見守って下さってありがとうございます”	30-Mar-2015

61	Osaka mayor Hiramatsu	http://www.city.osaka.lg.jp/seisakukikakushitsu/page/0000156158.html (13.12.2015)	03-Jun-2011
62	Staff Writer (Kyōdō)	Editorial; https://mofa.kyodonews.jp/ (DB) Headline: “繰り返さぬため歴史学ぼう”	16-Mar-2012
63	Staff Writer (Kyōdō)	Editorial; https://mofa.kyodonews.jp/ (DB) Headline: “‘規律’に潜む懸念拭えず”	03-Jun-2011
64	Nonaka Hiromu	Editorial, Asahi Shinbun – Kikuzo II Visual, <i>chōkan</i> , p.15	28-Jun-2011
65	Citizen	Letter to the editor, Asahi Shinbun – Kikuzo II Visual, <i>chōkan</i> , p.14	11-Jun-2011
66	Nakama Labor Union	http://nakama-kyoin.jugem.jp/ Headline: “橋下知事、ええかげんにして!” (13.12.2015)	31-Aug-2011
67	Citizen	Letter to the editor, Asahi Shinbun – Kikuzo II Visual, <i>chōkan</i> , p.11	30-May-2011
68	Nakama Labor Union	http://nakama-kyoin.jugem.jp/ Headline: “君が代起立’大阪府条例撤回!” (13.12.2015)	08-Aug-2011
69	Nakama Labor Union	http://nakama-kyoin.jugem.jp/ (13.12.2015) Headline: “国歌’君が代’の指導についての, 大阪市教育委員会の公式回答”	07-Mar-2011
71 ⁸⁰	Staff Writer (Kyōdō)	Editorial; https://mofa.kyodonews.jp/ (DB) Headline: “力づくは理解できぬ”	25-May-2011
72	Citizen	Letter to the editor, Asahi Shinbun – Kikuzo II Visual, <i>chōkan</i> , p.14	21-Apr-2012
73	Nakama Labor Union	http://nakama-kyoin.jugem.jp/ Headline: “教育と学校をつぶす’教育基本条例案’反対!” (13.12.2015)	31-Aug-2011
74	Hōdō Station	Transcript of TV programme; http://getnews.jp/archives/175604 (13.12.2015)	13-Mar-2012
75	Staff Writer (Kyōdō)	Editorial; https://mofa.kyodonews.jp/ (DB) Headline: “内心の自由尊重を” (13.12.2015)	27-Apr-2012

⁸⁰ Number 70 was also deleted during the analysis process.

APPENDIX A – Codesheet

0) General Information		
a) Document number		
b) Date of publication		
c) Date document retrieved		
d) Title of document		
e) Document author		
f) Document category	1=Press release, 2=Editorial; 3=Interviews; 4=Blog entry; 5=Letter to the editor; 6=Twitter; 9=Missing	
g) Stance towards policy	O 1) Pro	O 2) Anti
1) Core Narrative Elements		
a) CHARACTERS. Do VICTIM(s) appear in the narrative?		
O	Yes, number: ____	O NO
O	powerless majority is victim	
O	powerful majority is victim	
O	majority is victim	
O	powerless minority is victim	
O	powerful minority is victim	
O	Individual or specific group is victim	
b) CHARACTERS. Do VILLAIN(s) appear in the narrative?		
O	Yes, number: ____	O NO
O	powerless majority is villain	
O	powerful majority is villain	
O	majority is villain	
O	powerless minority is villain	
O	powerful minority is villain	
O	Individual or specific group is villain	
c) CHARACTERS. Do HERO(es) appear in the narrative?		
O	Yes, number: ____	O NO
O	Individual or specific group is hero	
d) PLOT. Does the narrative feature stories of change?		
O	None	
O	Story of decline (bad on the rise)	
O	Story of decline (good slipping away)	
O	Stymied progress	
O	Stories of rising	
O	change-is-only-an-illusion	
e) PLOT. What stories of power does the narrative have?		
O	None	
O	helplessness and control	
O	conspiracy	
O	blame-the-victim-stories	
f) SOLUTION. What kind of policy solution does the narrative offer?		
O	None	

<input type="radio"/>	Plebiscite: Competing in elections	
<input type="radio"/>	Participation: Participating in process	
<input type="radio"/>	Deliberation: Return to reason	
<input type="radio"/>	Constitutionalism: Restriction of similar decisions	
<input type="radio"/>	other:	
g) EVIDENCE. For what purpose is science/evidence cited in the narrative?		
<input type="radio"/>	No science/evidence	
<input type="radio"/>	support their argument,	
<input type="radio"/>	refute an argument	
<input type="radio"/>	matter-of-fact	
2) Narrative Strategies		
a) CAUSAL MECHANISM. What kind of causal theory/theories does the narrative have?		
<input type="radio"/>	None	
<input type="radio"/>	intentional	
<input type="radio"/>	mechanical	
<input type="radio"/>	inadvertence	
<input type="radio"/>	accidental	
b) SCOPE OF CONFLICT. How are the costs of the own policy distributed?		
<input type="radio"/>	Not discussed	
<input type="radio"/>	Concentrated	
<input type="radio"/>	Diffused	
c) SCOPE OF CONFLICT. How are the benefits of the own policy distributed?		
<input type="radio"/>	Not discussed	
<input type="radio"/>	Concentrated	
<input type="radio"/>	Diffused	
d) SCOPE OF CONFLICT. How are the costs of the opposing policy distributed?		
<input type="radio"/>	Not discussed	
<input type="radio"/>	Concentrated	
<input type="radio"/>	Diffused	
e) SCOPE OF CONFLICT. How are the benefits of the opposing policy distributed?:		
<input type="radio"/>	Not discussed	
<input type="radio"/>	Concentrated	
<input type="radio"/>	Diffused	

APPENDIX B – Codebook

Variable name	Criteria
VICTIM_Number	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Somebody qualifies as a victim if he/she suffers a) directly from the policy b) indirectly from a negative trend the policy contributes to c) or the acts of a villain. • Victims can either be a) an individual b) a group (teacher, taxpayer, children, an imagined majority, ...) or c) society as a whole. • Mentions of umbrella terms (e.g. civil servants) and concrete entities (e.g. a teacher) count separately.
VICTIM_PowerlessMajority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The victim character must be a majoritarian group being harmed by the policy or a consequence of it. • The victim character must be depicted as suffering through a power imbalance. • Power is understood as having more or less influence or resources, either seen relative to others in regards to the policy issue at hand OR in society as a whole. • A state of “powerlessness” might also be given, if the group/individual is himself/herself/itself not able to change its disadvantageous situation.
VICTIM_PowerfulMajority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The victim character must be a majoritarian group being harmed by the policy or a consequence of it. • Unlikely, but the case if a majority group is depicted as having more power than the group it is harmed by, but for instance forgets that it has the power. • Power is understood as having more or less influence or resources, either seen relative to others in regards to the policy issue at hand OR in society as a whole.
VICTIM_Majority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The victim character must be a majoritarian group being harmed by the policy or a consequence of it. • NO reference to a power imbalance (e.g. something is seen as having negative effects on society but the root of this trend is not a powerful minority) • Power is understood as having more or less influence or resources, either seen relative to others in regards to the policy issue at hand OR in society as a whole.
VICTIM_PowerlessMinority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The victim character must be a minority group being harmed by the policy or a consequence of it. • The victim character must be depicted as suffering through a power imbalance. • Power is understood as having more or less influence or resources, either seen relative to others in regards to the policy issue at hand OR in society as a whole. • A state of “powerlessness” might also be given, if the group/individual is himself/herself/itself not able to change its disadvantageous situation.
VICTIM_PowerfulMinority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The victim character must be a minority group being harmed by the policy or a consequence of it. • Unlikely, but for instance if a group of power holders is depicted as suffering from a majority and forgets to use its power. • Power is understood as having more or less influence or resources, either seen relative to others in regards to the policy issue at hand OR in society as a whole.

VICTIM_Individual_GROUP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The victim character must be an individual or specific group being harmed by the policy or a consequence of it. • NO reference to a power imbalance (e.g. something is seen as having negative effects on an individual or society but the root of this trend is not a powerful minority or majority) • Power is understood as having more or less influence or resources, either seen relative to others in regards to the policy issue at hand OR in society as a whole.
VILLAIN_Number	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Somebody qualifies as a villain if he/she is responsible a) directly for the problem b) indirectly for the negative trends the problem contributes to c) or the obstruction of the hero's actions. • Villains can either be a) an individual b) a group (the Japan Restoration Party, Journalists ...). • Mentions of umbrella terms (e.g. media) and concrete entities (e.g. <i>Asahi Shinbun</i>) count separately.
VILLAIN_PowerlessMajority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The villain character must be a majoritarian group being responsible for problems in connection with the policy or in society. • Unlikely, but the case if a majority group is depicted as having less power than the group it is harming, but this group forgets that it has more power. • Power is understood as having more or less influence or resources, either seen relative to others in regards to the policy issue at hand OR in society as a whole. • A state of "powerlessness" might also be given, if the group/individual is himself/herself/itself not able to change its disadvantageous situation.
VILLAIN_PowerfulMajority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The villain character must be a majoritarian group being responsible for problems in connection with the policy or in society. • The villain character must be depicted as benefiting from a power imbalance. • Power is understood as having more or less influence or resources, either seen relative to others in regards to the policy issue at hand OR in society as a whole.
VILLAIN_Majority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The villain character must be a majoritarian group being responsible for problems in connection with the policy or in society. • NO reference to a power imbalance (e.g. a majority is seen as having negative effects on something but the victim of this does not have less power) • Power is understood as having more or less influence or resources, either seen relative to others in regards to the policy issue at hand OR in society as a whole.
VILLAIN_PowerlessMinority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The villain character must be a minority group being responsible for problems in connection with the policy or in society. • The villain character must be depicted as being harmed from a power imbalance. Unlikely, but a situation where a, in reality, powerful majority is not using its power. • Power is understood as having more or less influence or resources, either seen relative to others in regards to the policy issue at hand OR in society as a whole. • A state of "powerlessness" might also be given, if the group/individual is himself/herself/itself not able to change its disadvantageous situation.

VILLAIN_PowerfulMinority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The villain character must be a minority being responsible for problems in connection with the policy or in society. • The villain character must be depicted as benefiting from a power imbalance. • Power is understood as having more or less influence or resources, either seen relative to others in regards to the policy issue at hand OR in society as a whole.
VILLAIN_Individual_GROUP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The villain character must be an individual or a specific group being responsible for problems in connection with the policy or in society. • NO reference to a power imbalance (e.g. an individual is seen as having negative effects on something or someone but the victim of this does not have less or more power) • Power is understood as having more or less influence or resources, either seen relative to others in regards to the policy issue at hand OR in society as a whole.
HERO_Number	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Somebody qualifies as a hero if he/she is responsible for a) directly solving a problem in connection with the policy or b) countering a negative trend the problem is causing to or c) countering a villain's actions or d) fighting alongside victims. • Heroes can either be a) individuals or b) a group (the Japan Restoration Party, Journalists ...). • Mentions of umbrella terms (e.g. media) and concrete entities (e.g. <i>Asahi Shinbun</i>) count separately.
HERO_Featured	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This variable is fulfilled if at least one hero is featured (description see above).
STORY_Change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None: No future trend is to be made out • Story of decline (bad on the rise): Something conceived as negative is getting more. • Story of decline (good slipping away): The quantity of something conceived as good is declining. • Stymied progress: From a bad situation things were getting better, but now are either stopping to get better or getting worse again. • Stories of rising: Things are getting better. • change-is-only-an-illusion: Things only seemed to get better, but in reality are not.
STORY_Power	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None: None of the previously power story types previously used in the NPF exists. • Helplessness and control: Things were always bad and there was nothing to be done about it, but now there is a chance to change that. • Conspiracy: Stories that say that all along the control over an issue was in the hands of few, using the control only for their benefits. • Blame-the-victim-stories: The control over a problem is seen with those who claim to suffer from it. These stories call for behavioral change in the victims. Such stories of power always assert that there is a choice for action and are often intertwined with stories of decline
SOLUTION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None: No solution is offered for solving the problem of the policy or a negative trend portrayed. • Plebiscite: The narrative sees competing in elections as the way forward. • Participation: The narrative makes a call for participation in the political process.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deliberation: Further discussion is needed to achieve general consensus. • Constitutionalism: The narrative speaks in favor of more respect for constitutional law or stricter enforcement of regulations in the constitution.
EVIDENCE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None: No judicial or other scientific evaluation of the policy issue is offered. • Support argument: A piece of judicial or other scientific evaluation is discussed in order to support a layed out argument. • Refute argument: A piece of judicial or other scientific evaluation is discussed in order to refute an argument made by the oppositional advocacy coalition. • Matter-of-fact: A piece of judicial or other scientific evaluation is only mentioned to present one's opinion as fact.
EMPTY_SIGNIFIER_THEPEOPLE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This characteristic is found if potentially empty signifiers describing groups of people are found in the narrative. e.g. <i>fumin</i>, <i>kokumin</i>, <i>hogosha</i>, <i>futsūnohito</i>, <i>ippannohito</i>, ...
EMPTY_SIGNIFIER_THEELITE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This characteristic is found if homogenizing signifiers for an immoral evil are found in the narrative. .
EMPTY_SIGNIFIER_GENERALWILL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This characteristic is found if potentially empty signifiers describing a homogenized way of thinking are found in the narrative. e.g. <i>fumin no kankaku</i>, <i>min'i</i>, ...
CAUSAL_MECHANISMS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None: No causality is offered linking a villain to a problem. • Intentional: Causes directly asserting blame to individuals or groups, who are willingly causing a problem (e.g. oppression). • Mechanical: "Events caused by things (or sometimes people) that have no will of their own but are designed, programmed, or trained by humans" (Stone 2012:208-213). • Inadvertence: Differentiates problems that are caused by someone's actions but were not anticipated, or aimed at, in such a way (e.g. carelessness). • Accidental: Everything perceived as left to fate.
SCOPE_CostsOwn	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The narrative must mention concrete costs or negative aspects caused by the introduction of the proposed policy. • Implied costs resulting from a discussion of benefits of the opposing policy are not counted.
SCOPE_BenefitsOwn	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The narrative must directly discuss benefits or positive aspects caused by the introduction of the proposed policy. • Implied benefits resulting from a discussion of costs stemming from the opposing policy proposal are not counted.
SCOPE_CostsOpp	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The narrative must mention concrete costs or negative aspects caused by the introduction of opposition camp's proposed policy. • Implied costs resulting from a discussion of benefits of the own policy proposal are not counted.
SCOPE_BenefitsOpp	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The narrative must directly mention benefits or positive aspects caused by the introduction of the opposition camp's proposed policy. • Implied benefits resulting from a discussion of costs of the own policy are not counted.

APPENDIX C – Intercoder reliability

Variable	Agreement (in %)	Disagreement (in %)
VICTIM_Number	95.5 %	4.5 %
VICTIM_PowerlessMajority	78.2 %	21.8 %
VICTIM_PowerfulMajority	100 %	0 %
VICTIM_Majority	80.3 %	19.7 %
VICTIM_PowerlessMinority	84.1 %	15.9 %
VICTIM_PowerfulMinority	100 %	0 %
VICTIM_Individual_GROUP	80.3 %	19.7 %
VILLAIN_Number	94.1 %	5.9 %
VILLAIN_PowerlessMajority	100 %	0 %
VILLAIN_PowerfulMajority	100 %	0 %
VILLAIN_Majority	84.1 %	15.9 %
VILLAIN_PowerlessMinority	100 %	0 %
VILLAIN_PowerfulMinority	80.3 %	19.7 %
VILLAIN_Individual_GROUP	84.1 %	15.9 %
HERO_Number	94.6 %	5.4 %
HERO_Featured	84.1 %	15.9 %
STORY_Change	94.4 %	5.6 %
STORY_Power	92 %	8 %
SOLUTION	85 %	15 %
EVIDENCE	90.3 %	9.7 %
CAUSAL_MECHANISMS	94.9 %	5.1 %
SCOPE_CostsOwn	82 %	18 %
SCOPE_BenefitsOwn	93 %	7 %
SCOPE_CostsOpp	85.7 %	14.3 %
SCOPE_BenefitsOpp	89.3 %	10.7 %

APPENDIX D – Abstract (English)

Former governor and mayor of Osaka Hashimoto Tōru certainly is one of the most interesting figures in Japanese politics in recent years. For analyzing his success and impact, the populist discourse formation by Hashimoto in the so-called Kimigayo Ordinance (Kimigayo jōrei) policy discourse is uncovered through a mixed-method approach. This approach utilizes Ernesto Laclau's definition of populism as a specific mode of articulation of demands, which is used as a tool for a qualitative approach in Discourse Analysis, and a quantitative content analysis based on insights from the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF). While the qualitative Discourse Analysis helps explain the creation of a popular subject "the people" resulting in the possibility of a large support-base, the analysis of narrative structure and strategies helps understand how a persuasive narration develops out of the populist nature. As this is only true in part, though, the comparison of narratives between two advocacy coalitions further helps to understand which narrative characteristics make the discourses of the coalitions effective or ineffective in persuasion. As a result, it is shown that the Anti-Kimigayo Ordinance coalition deploys a "weaker" narrative discourse and is likely to lose in the battle for persuading people. Lastly, through measuring narrative structure, underlying democratic policy beliefs can be measured and it is proven how the discourse heavily shaped by Hashimoto leads to a construction of democracy less considerate of minority rights.

APPENDIX E – Abstract (German)


Hashimoto Tōru, ehemaliger Gouverneur und Bürgermeister von Osaka, ist gewiss eine der schillerndsten Figuren der japanischen Politik der letzten Jahre. Eine populistische Diskurskonstruktion von Hashimoto wird in dieser Arbeit durch Verwendung eines Mixed-Methods-Ansatzes im Diskurs rund um den so genannten Kimigayo Erlass (Kimigayo jōrei) herausgearbeitet. Die verwendete Populismusdefinition nach Ernesto Laclau versteht unter Populismus einen bestimmten Modus der Artikulation von Forderungen (*demands*) in einem Diskurs. Diese Konzeption wird als Werkzeug zur qualitativen Diskursanalyse verwendet, die dabei hilft die diskursive Konstruktion einer kollektiven Subjektposition „das Volk“ im untersuchten Diskurs zu verstehen. Durch die Schaffung dieser Subjektposition können zuvor heterogene Gruppen vereint werden. Danach folgt eine quantitative Inhaltsanalyse basierend auf Einblicken des Narrative Policy Frameworks (NPF), die es ermöglicht Unterschiede in Strukturen von Narrativen und verwendeten Narrationsstrategien zwischen Koalitionen in diesem Politikfeld zu vergleichen. Aus dieser folgt, dass die größere Überzeugungskraft der Narration der so genannten „Pro-Kimigayo Erlass“ Koalition rund um Hashimoto zu großen Teilen aus einem populistischen, diskursiven Modus der Artikulation resultiert. Letzten Endes wird empirisch durch die Analyse gemessener narrativer Charakteristika gezeigt, wie durch den Diskurs, die Relevanz des Schutzes von Minderheitenrechten in Japans Demokratie reduziert wird.


APPENDIX F – Academic CV

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Andreas Eder

 5, Klanggasse, Vienna, 1020, Austria

 0043 699 12 54 27 23

 andreas.eder.m@gmail.com

Date of birth 21.11.1987 | Nationality Austria

RESEARCH INTERESTS

- Current Japanese politics
- Political theory and the history of ideas
- Nationalism and national identity in Japan
- Migration and development

WORK EXPERIENCE

- | | |
|-------------------|---|
| 10/2012 – 07/2015 | <p>Tutor at Department of Japanese Studies, University of Vienna</p> <p>Department of East Asian Studies
University of Vienna
AAKH Campus, Spitalgasse 2 - Hof 2
1090 Wien</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Front desk at Library for East Asian Studies, University of Vienna |
| 10/2013 – 10/2014 | <p>Student Assistant at Department of Japanese Studies, University of Vienna</p> <p>Department of East Asian Studies
University of Vienna
AAKH Campus, Spitalgasse 2 - Hof 2
1090 Wien</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Administrative support for the study programme director of the Institute for East Asian Studies (Dr. Ingrid Getreuer-Kargl, Ao. Univ.-Prof.) ▪ Course preparations for courses conducted by Dr. Ingrid Getreuer-Kargl, Ao. Univ.-Prof. |
| 11/2010 – 06/2011 | <p>Internship at Department for Japanese Studies, University of Vienna</p> <p>Department of East Asian Studies
University of Vienna
AAKH Campus, Spitalgasse 2 - Hof 2
1090 Wien</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organizing and documenting of the Japanese Department's collection of Japanese objects • Maintenance of the database recording the objects |

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

- since 03/2013 Studies (graduate) in **International Development**, University of Vienna
- since 10/2012 Studies (graduate) in **Japanese Studies**, University of Vienna
- 27.03.2012 Received the academic title **Bachelor of Arts** (with honours) in Japanese studies, Department of East Asian Studies, University of Vienna
- 09/2011 – 07/2012 One-year JASSO Scholarship at the **Yokohama City University**
- 10/2008 – 06/2012 Studies (undergraduate) in **Japanese Studies** and **Social and cultural anthropology**, University of Vienna
- 08/2009 Language School GenkiJACS (Fukuoka, Japan)
- 10/2008 – 02/2011 Studies (undergraduate) in **Economics**, University of Vienna

ACADEMIC COMMITMENTS

- 27.08.2015 Lecture at Japanologentag 2015 (Munich): "Local politics in the Aso area. Local identity, political participation and local democracy"
- since 09/2014 Board member of AAJ (Akademischer Arbeitskreis Japan)
- 09.07.2014 Lecture at International Workshop at University of Vienna: Methods and Fields of Research in European Japanese Studies: Bilateral Workshop for Students in Cooperation with the Nicolaus Copernicus University (Toruń/Poland)
- 24.05.2014 Lecture at 4th Student symposium at the Japanese Department of the FU Berlin
topic: "Hashimoto Tōru: Right-wing populist policies and their meaning for Japans' democracy"
- 07.04.2014 Lecture at Student's International Japanese Studies Workshop Poznań/Żerków
topic: "Hashimoto Tōru: Right-wing populist policies and their meaning for Japans' democracy"

LANGUAGES

Mother tongue(s) German

Other language(s)	UNDERSTANDING		SPEAKING		WRITING
	Listening	Reading	Spoken interaction	Spoken production	
English	Very good	Very good	Very good	Very good	Very good
	-				
Japanese	N2	N2	N2	N2	N2
	Japanese Language Proficiency Test (JLPT)				