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## List of Abbreviations

### A

A.K.P *Justice and Development Party*

ANAP *Motherland Party*

### B

BBC *British Broadcasting Corporation*

### D

D.P *Democrat Party*

### E

EU *European Union*

### F

FSA *Free Syrian Army*

### I

I.M.F *International Monetary Fund*

IR *International Relations*

### M

*MIT* *National Intelligence Organization*

### N

NATO *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*

### P

PKK *Kurdistan Workers' Party*

### R

*RAND* *Research ANd Development*

RPP *Republican People's Party*

### S

SU *Soviet Union*

### T

TSK *The Turkish Armed Forces*

### U

U.N *United Nations*

UK *United Kingdom*

US *United States*

USA *United States of America*

## **Kurzfassung**

Das Ziel dieser Masterarbeit ist es die Veränderungen der türkischen strategischen Kultur und ihre Auswirkungen auf die türkische Außenpolitik zu analysieren und die auf einen Wechsel der Eliten im türkischen Staatsapparat zurückzuführen ist, aufzuzeigen. Die Dynamik der türkischen Gesellschaft erfuhr unter der AKP (Partei für Gerechtigkeit und Entwicklung) wesentliche Änderungen, welche auch Einfluss auf die türkische Außenpolitik nahmen. Einer neuen konservativen Elite gelang es die säkulare kemalistische Elite zu verdrängen und ihre eigene Agenda in der türkischen Außenpolitik umzusetzen. Die neue Elite bezog sich dabei auf ihr osmanisches Erbe und den Islam, welche für die säkulare Elite, die seit Beginn der türkischen Republik entgegengesetzte Werte darstellten. Unter der Führung von Präsident Recep Tayyip Erdogan verfolgte die Türkei eine aktive, aber vor allem auch aggressive Außenpolitik, indem sie zwar auch Soft-Power Instrumente gebrauchte, obwohl diese neue außenpolitische Orientierung zumal von westlichen Allianzen heftig kritisiert wurde. In dieser Arbeit wird die grundlegende Dynamik der türkischen Außenpolitik und der dramatische Wechsel der türkischen Außenpolitik unter der AKP erklärt.

**Schlüsselwörter:** Strategische Kultur, Türkische Außenpolitik, Elitewandel, Modernisierung, Narrativen

## **Abstract**

The aim of this master thesis is to illustrate the shift of Turkish strategic culture and its effects on Turkish foreign policy, which occurred due to elite change in the Turkish state apparatus. The dynamics of Turkish society underwent a significant change under A.K.P (Justice and Development Party) rule and naturally Turkish foreign policy too. New conservative elites managed to oust secular-Kemalist elites and started to implement their agenda in Turkish foreign policy. This new elite structure took its references points from both Ottoman heritage and Islam, both of which were completely opposing values for the secular elite cadre during the whole era of the Republic of Turkey. Under the leadership of Erdogan, Turkey followed an active and aggressive foreign policy particularly, by using soft-power instruments and even though, at some points, this new foreign policy orientation was harshly criticized by Turkey's Western alliance. In this work, I stress the fundamental dynamics of Turkish foreign policy and the dramatic alternation of Turkish foreign policy during the AKP term.

**Keywords:** Strategic Culture, Turkish Foreign Policy, Elite change, Modernization, Narratives.

## 1 Introduction

Research on Turkish Foreign Policy is a fascinating effort for foreign policy experts and scholars. There are numerous inter-connected variables such as geographical position, international balance of power, and different ethnic and sectarian groups. Furthermore, it should also be considered a secular state formation in a majoritarian Muslim population with Ottoman Imperial heritage. Indeed, it can be indicated that such a conflicting state of affairs and identity in a dynamic and transitional region certainly make difficult for any predictions and analysis about Turkish foreign policy. Particularly, under the leadership of A.K.P government (Justice and Development Party), it is observed that Turkey followed a different foreign policy approach and used a different discourse compared to the previous era of Turkish Republic. In this work, my aim is to figure out the reasons for this different foreign policy orientation under the term of A.K.P rule. Although, it is mentioned the International environment in this work, to limit my work, I focused on two conflicting elite formations. These are secular-nationalist elites, which emerged after the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire as a successor elite cadre of Ottoman elite structure that implemented a harsh authoritarian modernization and westernization process in Turkish society. The second elite cadre emerged at the end of the Cold War and is named as the conservative or neo-Ottomanists, elite cadre. The second elite cadre first came to power under Turgut Ozal and started to shift the main paradigm of Turkish foreign policy. It reached its peak of power and then ousted the secular elite cadre in the Turkish state apparatus with the A.K.P (Justice and Development Party) under the leadership of Erdogan.

In this work, my main argument is: Turkey fundamentally changed its core foundation in foreign policy, due to elite changes during A.K.P (Justice and Development Party) under the leadership of Erdogan. As a result of this change, Turkish strategic culture turned into offensive one from defensive one in foreign policy. However, in this work, the meaning of offensive strategic culture is more autonomous foreign policy approach and more involvement in regional conflicts rather than imperial, a colonial or irredentist meaning of aggression.

My research question is: “How can we compare the perception and reaction of these two conflicting elite cadres in Turkish foreign policy?”

To answer this question, It is categorized the differences of these two elite cadres in the sphere of Turkish foreign policy, under four headlines:

- 1- Creation of new Ideology (Kemalism) after the fragmentation of Ottoman Empire.
- 2- Sevres syndrome.
- 3- Idealization of West.
- 4- Perception about Turkey’s Geopolitical position.

These four points were applied to the five important foreign policy cases under conservative elite rules. These cases are:

- 1- Turkey- Brazil- Iran Nuclear Deal.
- 2- Turkish-Israeli Relations during A.K.P Era.
- 3- Turkey’s involvement in Syrian Conflict.
- 4- Turkey- Muslim Brotherhood Relations.
- 5- Turkey- Russia Jet Incident.

In this master thesis, methodologically, I will use the historical analysis of Turkish foreign policy chronologically, narrative analysis and finally case studies.

As structure of this thesis, firstly, I will argue the concept of strategic culture and constructivism theoretically, and in later sections I will discuss four points, emergence of conservative elites, power shifting in Turkish politics and finally, it will be mentioned the five cases, which conservative elites encountered and each case will be interpreted according to four points, which were underlined above.

Finally, I would like to point out obviously that throughout my master thesis, I try to avoid any bias or any normative assessments and try to keep my work objective and scientific.

## 2 Historical Development of Concept of Strategic Culture

The strategy might have many meanings, of which one is cultural. Culture or cultures consist of existing (but not eternal), socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of mind, and methods of operation that are more or less pay attention to a specific geographically rested security community that has had a unique historical experience.<sup>1</sup>In historical texts, it can be found numerous examples of relations between culture and its influence on power and security. The writings of Thucydides, Sun Tzu and Machiavelli describe, explain and compare the characteristics of (in pre-modern period's dynasties), systems and offer some prescriptions to solve problems.<sup>2</sup>For instance in Prince, Machiavelli directly compares two empires, Ottoman and France, and argues:

*“In our times example of these two diverse kind of government are the Turk and the king of France. The whole monarchy of Turks is governed by one lord, the others are the servants of him. Dividing his kingdom into Sanjaks(provinces), he sends different administrators to them, and he changes and varies them as he likes. But the king of France is placed in midst of an ancient multitude of lords, acknowledged in that state by their subjects and loved by them. They have their privileges and king cannot take them away without danger to himself. Thus whoever considers the others of these states will find difficulty in acquiring the state of the Turk, but should it be conquered, great ease in holding it. So inversely, you will find in some respects more ease in seizing the state of France, but great difficulty in holding it”.*<sup>3</sup>

In a more modern context, Carl von Clausewitz advanced and deepened the concepts of recognizing war and warfighting strategies as a test of moral and physical forces in security studies, in his famous classical work “On War” in 1831.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>C Gray, ‘Strategic Culture as Context: the first generation of theory strikes back’, Review of International Studies, vol. 25, 1999, p. 51.

<sup>2</sup>Jeffrey S. Lantis,” Strategic Culture and National Security Policy,” The International Studies Association Vol. 4, No. 3 (Autumn, 2002): 93, Accessed: 02/06/2014 08:20, URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3186465> .

<sup>3</sup> Nicolo Machiavelli, Prince, 2nd ed. trans. Harvey.C.Mansfield, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 17-18

<sup>4</sup>Carl von Clausewitz, On War [1831], ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret ( Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976)



His primary goal is much more than defeating an enemy in battle. He perceives the war as a continuation of politics, and his assumptions are mainly based on Napoleon's campaigns and French revolutionary warfare, while here, he focuses on mobilization and employment of conscripted mass formations, according to Clausewitz's theories.<sup>5</sup>

When we come to the 20<sup>th</sup> century, during the Second World War, specific attention was on how to deal with the axis power via cultural theorizing. In the United States, foreign morale analysis division of the Office of War Information employed innumerable anthropologists to study the national character of the Axis powers particularly Japan and Germany. All these attempts demonstrate that national character plays an essential role in public discourse during the Second World War era.<sup>6</sup>

These first waves of cultural theorists retreat at the end of the war due to nuclear revolution. The effects of nuclear weapons are so much destructive, and this destructiveness makes the cultural differences irrelevant. Nuclear Revolution renders the strategic behavior theories such as deterrence theory, which is inspired by assumptions (Homogeneous rational actors) and methodology (Rational choice) of economics. Security studies in the 1950s and 1960's were dominated by the rational actor theories of strategic behavior<sup>7</sup>. However, some significant events, for instance, when the Soviet Union (SU) could not achieve the balance nuclear parity, subsequently the American defeat in Vietnam War caused the undermining of many of these general theories of deterrence and coercion. For example, Colin Gray criticizes the attempts of American deterrence logic on all national components in the nuclear warfare competition, which resulted in miscalculation if the distinctiveness of each component is disregarded. Gray's critiques, which ignore the difference in local context, are highly shared by other security analysts and pave the way for alternative theories of strategic behavior. Thus, cultural theories manage to attract the attention in security studies again.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Michael Howard," Clausewitz Man of the Year,"New York Times, January28, 1991, p. A17

<sup>6</sup> Michael C. Desh, " Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies," International Security, Vol. 23:1( 1998):144-145

<sup>7</sup>Marc Trachtenberg, *History and Strategy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 12-15.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.,145-146

The cold war struggle, in the late 1970s between the USA and the Soviet Union, intensified.<sup>9</sup> The term of strategic culture has become a popular approach to analyzing actors' security and defense policies, particularly in the middle of 1970's. Russell Wrigley's 1973 classic, *The American Way of Warfare*, emphasizes the significance of cultural roots of strategic dispositions. ***In 1977, Jack Snyder, who brought the concept of political culture arguments into security studies, pioneered the work to characterize what exactly strategic culture is.***<sup>10</sup> In his work, Snyder interprets the Soviet's military strategy and draws a frame that strategic culture is a sum of ideas, preconditioned emotional responses and some habitual attitudes, which determine nuclear strategies between these two great rivals. Furthermore, according to Snyder, history plays a crucial role as a perceptual lens through which strategic issues are processed and, therefore, influence political choices. In his work, he came to the conclusion that the Soviet's military would use preemptive and aggressive force due to a feeling of insecurity and authoritarianism, which comes from history.<sup>11</sup> He also strongly points out that strategic culture is semi-permanent and new problems, and developments would not be objectively evaluated, because of perceptual lenses.

Snyder's work profoundly influenced other scholars such as Ken Booth's *Strategy and ethnocentrism*, which is focused on the ideational foundations of nuclear strategy and superpower relations and Colin Gray's *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*, which pays close attention to historical and anthropological roots. For example, Gray describes the strategic culture as "referring the modes of thought and action concerning force, which derives from a perception of national historical experience. More importantly, he accepts Snyder's argument that "strategic culture would have a semi-permanent effect on security policies of states." ***He believes that culture plays an essential role to understand the country's behavior and interpret its role in world politics.*** However, this kind of understanding was harshly criticized by other scholars; for instance, Booth considered the formation of military strategy highly ethnocentric while Yitzhak Klein argues that just a comprehensive, comparative study of the structure, influence and process of change in strategic culture of major powers in the modern era might be sufficient and beneficial for use in war and peace studies.

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid, 146

<sup>10</sup> Jeffrey S. Lantis, "Strategic Culture and National Security Policy," *The International Studies Association* Vol. 4, No. 3 (Autumn, 2002): 93, Accessed: 02/06/2014 08:20, URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3186465> .

<sup>11</sup> Jeffrey S. Lantis, "Strategic Culture and National Security Policy," *The International Studies Association* Vol. 4, No. 3 (Autumn, 2002): 94, Accessed: 02/06/2014 08:20, URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3186465> .

However, in the late of 1970's and 1980's most of the evaluation and predictions, made by culturalists, failed. For example, they underline the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States have different kinds of organizational culture. They interpreted the character of the Soviet Union as Clausewitzian and operationally oriented. Furthermore, some cultural specialists perceived the political culture of United States as weak and indecisive, because it does not have enough experience of prolonged war or subtle ability of statecraft.<sup>12</sup> Richard Pipes links the US strategic culture sarcastically to a marriage between a scientist and an accountant. In contrast, they considered the Soviet Union as a cohesive authoritarian state with a long tradition of warfare, and deep involvement in diplomacy and high politics.<sup>13</sup> Despite expectations, the democratic, commercial and non-Clausewitzian United States managed to win the cold war. And with Clausewitzian war machine, the Soviets lost in Afghanistan and finally the cold war as well.<sup>14</sup>

Although the failed prediction of culturalists about the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States and unexpected end of Cold War caused an increasing interest in cultural studies to explain the behaviors of states in world politics. Thus, in 1990's we can observe a revival of strategic culture again. For instance, as Peter Katzenstein stated:

*"It is hard to deny the fact that existing theories of international relations were woefully short in explaining an important revolution in world politics."*<sup>15</sup>

Joseph Lapid, in his famous work "The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory" strongly underlines the fact that culture and society at the end of 20<sup>th</sup> Century dramatically reappear in IR and social studies. ***He criticizes political realists' position that is the overestimation of the value of Waltzian approach, which views the competition among the states for power and security.***

This approach, according to Kenneth N. Waltz, the system is composed of a structure and interacting units. The structure is the system – with components that make it possible to think of the system as a whole. In international politics, states are the units, and their interactions shape the structure of the international political system. In this system, states and

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 146

<sup>13</sup> Richard Pipes. "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," Commentary, Vol. 64, No. 1 (July 1977), p. 21-34;

<sup>14</sup> Michael C. Desh, "Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies," International Security, Vol. 23:1 (1998):p.147.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, 148.

their interactions form the structure of the international political system.<sup>16</sup> According to that view, relations reflect varying degrees, restrictions imposed by the system's structure.<sup>17</sup> Waltz states that there are three main dimensions in his model: ordering principles, the character of units, and distributions of capabilities. An international system is not hierarchic and because of this, anarchy is the main ordering principle of the system presented by Waltz. The assumption of that model is that units survive. In order to achieve survive, states should take care of themselves. Therefore, self-help becomes the main principle of action in anarchic order.<sup>18</sup>

The second assumption of his model is the functional similarity of units. As a natural result of anarchy, due to anarchy requires coordination among a system of units, which caused the sameness of units.<sup>19</sup> It means that states are rather similar in their tasks, however, not their abilities to perform. In other words, differences are the capabilities of states, not their functions.<sup>20</sup>

According to neo- realist theory, once the structure of an international system is formed, this structure becomes a force, which the units cannot put under their control. This structure creates a limit and restricts the attitude of the units. In this respect, states must act under the necessities of a system, or they cannot exist<sup>21</sup> In other words, structure encourages some behaviors; however, the same structure also penalizes those who do not respond adequately to systematic encouragements.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid. p. 90.

<sup>17</sup> John Gerard Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis," in *Neorealism and its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p.134.

<sup>18</sup> Yücel Bozdaglıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: Neorealism and The Rational choice Explanations of International Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2003), p.-13.

<sup>19</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Political Structures: In Neorealism and its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p.87.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. p.91

<sup>21</sup> Yücel Bozdaglıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: Neorealism and The Rational choice Explanations of International Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2003), p.14.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. p.14.

Among the conservative intellectuals, there is harsh criticism toward a positivist approach. The most important question in the post-Cold War era was how much will this return to culture help us to understand post-cold war strategic behaviors of the states? To give a more satisfactory answer to this question, I will focus on ‘‘constructivism’’ in the next chapter.

### 3 Rise of Constructivism

Constructivism was first presented to international relations theory by Nicholas Onuf in 1989.<sup>23</sup> Constructivism challenges the neo-realism and neo-liberalism in the area of international relation studies. For constructivists, there could be other variables that might be more significant than anarchy and power for explaining the behavior of states.<sup>24</sup>

At the end of last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, we witness the rise of constructivism. After the Cold War, the international system dramatically changed. *Neorealism was not successful in predicting the end of the Cold War.*<sup>25</sup>

That was the reason for the return of culture in 1990’s. *The primary aim of the constructivist approach is to redefine the rationalist material-based explanations on epistemological and methodological grounds.* Constructivism disagrees with the ontological foundations of International Relations, which is based on positivist ontology and an empiricist epistemology and focused on the logic of the self-interested rational actor model.<sup>26</sup> *This constructivist model replaces the principle of rational action based on pre-given interests with the argument that human action, whether it is goal-oriented and interests-based, is constituted by ideas, norms and identities found at the international and domestic levels. As I already pointed out, many respected scholars, turned to the constructivist approach. This situation triggered the emergence of a new research agenda in IR theories. For them, the*

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<sup>23</sup>Enes Bayraklı, “ Turkish Foreign Policy in Transition: The Emergence of Kantian Culture in Turkish Foreign Policy (A holistic Constructivist Approach)” (PhD, diss., University of Vienna, May 2012), p.13.

<sup>24</sup>Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: Neorealism and The Rational choice Explanations of International Relations (New York: Routledge, 2003), p.15.

<sup>25</sup>Enes Bayraklı, “ Turkish Foreign Policy in Transition: The Emergence of Kantian Culture in Turkish Foreign Policy (A holistic Constructivist Approach)” (PhD, diss., University of Vienna, May 2012), p.13.

<sup>26</sup>Kadri Renda, “ Discursive change in Turkish strategic culture: changing narratives, roles and values” (PhD diss., King’s College, June 2013), p.20.

***“building blocks of international reality are ideational as well as material”***<sup>27</sup>. This trend in post-cold war era has an undeniable influence on strategic culture studies. The basic idea is to produce and reproduce the ways an individual interprets her/his self, her/his environment as well as her/his interaction with other individuals. It is in this context that ideational factors “constitute social situations and the meaning of material forces”<sup>28</sup>. Ideas initially form attitudes by defining them. The task of definition is performed by assigning images and meanings to pure facts and individual actions, and in this way turning them into social facts.<sup>29</sup> **The central concerns of constructivism are identity formation, history, tradition, and culture, which are closely related to the studies of strategic culture and international relations studies.** For instance, Alexander Wendt shows his constructivist point of view and argues that state identity and interests are socially constructed by knowledgeable practice and focused on how identity and interests are formed. Also, again for Alexander Wendt, Waltz’s definition of political structure rested on ordering principle (anarchy). According to Wendt, distribution of capabilities, alone, makes prediction little about states attitudes.<sup>30</sup> He argued that

*“It does not predict whether two states will be friends or foes, will recognize each other’s sovereignty, will have dynastic ties, will be revisionist or status quo powers....These factors, which are fundamentally inter-subjective, affect states’ security interest and thus the character of their interaction under anarchy”*.<sup>31</sup>

***Alexander Wendt claimed that structure is not only made of material capabilities, but social relations also play a significant role.*** Moreover, social structures consist of three

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<sup>27</sup> John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge (International Organization at Fifty Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics: The MIT Press, 1998), Accessed: on 22.09.2015, p:862-864  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2601360.pdf>

<sup>28</sup> Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Accessed on 22.09.2015, p:77-78  
<http://elibrary.kiu.ac.ug:8080/jspui/bitstream/1/141/1/Social%20theory%20of%20international%20politics.pdf>

<sup>29</sup> Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground, Constructivism in World Politics,” European Journal of International Relations (1997): 324-326

<sup>30</sup> Yücel Bozdağıoğlu, Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: Neorealism and The Rational choice Explanations of International Relations (New York: Routledge, 2003), p.17.

<sup>31</sup> Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States make of it: The social construction of Power Politics,” (International Organization 46: spring 1992): 391-425, p.396

major elements: *shared knowledge*, *material resources*, and *practices*, which are additionally interrelated with each other.<sup>32</sup>

Firstly, social structures are defined by sharing understanding, expectations or knowledge. These form the actors in a circumstance and the nature of their relationship, which is the essence of the relationship, either conflictual or cooperative.<sup>33</sup> According to neo-realist theory, states don't trust each other, and they describe their interest in self-help terms. However, as opposed to the main assumption of neo-realist theory, states trust each other in a security community to solve conflicts without war. States' consideration about each other then become a crucial element of structure from that perspective: ideas are social, in another word, what makes their ideas (structure) social.<sup>34</sup>

"*Material sources*" form the second crucial element of social structure. However, constructivists have differing meanings for the concept of material capabilities. Constructivists claim that material sources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded. People act toward objects, including other actors, due to the meaning of that objects for them. That is why states act differently toward friends than their enemies. For example, Iran's possible nuclear capability would be more threatening to the USA than to the United Kingdom, In other words, the US would be more worried about Iran's missiles, even though the UK is more capable of damaging the US than Iran, because of UK is friend and Iran is not.<sup>35</sup>

The third element of the social structure is "*practice*". According to Wendt's claim, social structure does not exist, in actors. It means not material capabilities but practices. Social structure exists only in the process.<sup>36</sup> Social practices produce and (re)-produce the intersubjective meanings, which form social structure and actors alike. For example, Ted Hopf argued:

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<sup>32</sup> Alexander Wendt, *Constructing International Politics*: (International Security20:Summer 1995),71-81, p.73.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid. p.73.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid. p.73.

<sup>35</sup> Yücel Bozdaglıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: Neorealism and The Rational choice Explanations of International Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2003), p.18.

<sup>36</sup> Alexander Wendt, *Constructing International Politics*: (International Security20:Summer 1995) p.74.

*“The US military intervention in Vietnam was consistent with a number of US identities: great power, Imperialist, enemy, ally, and so on. Others observing the United States not only inferred US identity from its action in Vietnam, but also reproduced the intersubjective web of meaning about what precisely constituted that identity. To the extent, for example, that a group of countries attributed an imperialist state was reproduced by the US military intervention. In this way, social practices not only reproduced actors through identity, but also reproduced an intersubjective structure through social practice.”*<sup>37</sup>

***According to the constructivist point of view, identities describe state interest. Thus, they have significant explanatory power in foreign policy analysis. States do not possess a portfolio of interests that they carry around independently of social context; instead, they describe their interest in the process of describing their circumstances.***<sup>38</sup> States sometimes may encounter extraordinary circumstances so that they have to constitute their meanings, and, therefore, their interest.<sup>39</sup> The non-existence or failure of roles renders defining situations and interests more complicated, and identity confusion may result.<sup>40</sup>

As the last feature of constructivist theory, I would like to point out Wendt de-emphasizes the corporate identities of states, because their roots are in domestic politics. He shows more interest in explaining how through systematic interaction, states constitute their social identities and how self- and collective interest are produced. Wendt, in his analysis, excludes the domestic roots of states identities. By doing so, Wendt aims to prove that state identities are endogenous, not exogenous to the system.<sup>41</sup>

Constructivism has a very strong and profound influence on International Relations studies, and there are many respected scholars who follow that approach. For example, as I

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<sup>37</sup> Ted Hopf, The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations:(International Security 23(Summer 1998): 171-200,p.178

<sup>38</sup>Alexander Wendt,”Anarchy is What States make of it: The social construction of Power Politics,(International Organization46:spring 1992):391 425, p.396

<sup>39</sup>Yücel Bozdaglıoğlu,Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity:Neorealism and The Rational choice Explanations of International Relations (NewYork:Routledge,2003), p.18.

<sup>40</sup>Alexander Wendt,”Anarchy is What States make of it: The social construction of Power Politics,(International Organization46:spring 1992):391 425, p.398

<sup>41</sup>Yücel Bozdaglıoğlu,Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity:Neorealism and The Rational choice Explanations of International Relations (NewYork:Routledge,2003), p.18.



already pointed out above, Ted Hopf, as one of the pioneer scholar of International Studies, underlined the fact that Constructivism promised to return the culture and domestic politics to international relations theory. And he stated that:

*“Constructivism provides a promising approach for uncovering those features of domestic society, culture and politics that should matter to state identity and state action in global politics. Any state identity in world politics is partly the product of social practices that constitute that identity at home.”<sup>42</sup>*

According to Valerie Hudson, constructivism has a comprehensive perspective on culture as an evolving system of shared views that govern perceptions, communications, and actions. And when the moment of action comes, culture provides the elements of grammar, which describes the circumstance and reveals the motives and set forth a strategy, which is expected to bring success. There are numerous research programs, which illustrate the connections between national security behavior and culture all over the world. For example, Elizabeth Kier, who gives the description on the importance of the organizational culture in the development of French military doctrine, Stephan Rosen's work on India which shows how the Military and organization culture is formed at the time of India. Also, the fascinating work of Alastair Johnston's work “Strategic Culture And Grand Strategy in Chinese History”, on Chinese strategic culture and the possibility of using military forces against external threats. For example, after a careful strategic analysis, Alastair Johnston fundamentally focused on Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) and came to the conclusion that China has a unique strategic ‘culture and that culture shows the main characteristic of realpolitik.<sup>43</sup>

Culture becomes a popular in the mainstream of international relation studies in post-cold war era. There is a rising consensus among scholars that culture can influence the grand strategy and attitudes of the states. Material things are out there, and it is easy to identify them when we see them. Ideas are intangible and not easily identifiable. Thus, it is hard to measure their impact on the attitude of states compared to the influence of material elements. Social constructivism tends to see state identity and state action as indivisible and structure (international system) and agency (states) as mutually constitutive. Rather than the pure

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<sup>42</sup> Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations," *InternationalSecurity* 23, No. 1 (1998), p. 914

<sup>43</sup> Jeffrey S. Lantis, "Strategic Culture and National Security Policy," *The International Studies Association* Vol. 4, No. 3 (Autumn, 2002): 93, Accessed: 02/06/2014 08:20, URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3186465> .p.87-88-97-98.

existence of anarchy in the international system or the uneven distribution of material capabilities, questions as to how state elites perceive the international system are anarchical, how they create their national identity; how they describe their national interests, construct (in-)securities by imagining their neighborhood as being fraught with problems or abundant with opportunities; Whether they consider their neighbors as threats or friends and how they accommodate international norms and values into their political culture forms the heart of social constructivist research in IR. That is the reason why I focused strategic culture concepts to enlighten the foreign policy of Turkey in my Master thesis. Nowadays, scholars, experts, and intellectuals have started to interpret events, and crises such as USA and China spy plane crisis, or conflict between Palestinians and Israelis conflict, the view of cultural and identity lenses.<sup>44</sup>

## 4 Theoretical Structure of Strategic Culture Concept

First of all, when we investigate the literature generally, we find out that all scholars explicitly or implicitly argue that different states have different dominant strategic preferences, that were constructed in the early term experiences of the state, and were affected to some degree by the philosophical, political, cultural, and cognitive features of the state and its elites' point of view. ***Other significant variables such as technology, polarity, or relative material capabilities that are based on ahistorical and objective assumptions are taken into account secondary attention.*** However, we shouldn't understand that strategic culture rejects the rationality, rather than rejecting rationality, it can be much more proper to use the Johnston's term, which is "limited rationality"<sup>45</sup> (where strategic culture simplifies reality) with process rationality (where historical choices, analogies, metaphors, events to guide

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<sup>44</sup>Michael C. Desh, "Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies," *International Security*, Vol. 23:1 (1998):p:148-150

<sup>45</sup> The concept of limited rationality is related with the concept of bounded rationality. Proposed by the US Nobel-laureate economist Herbert Simon (1916-2001) in his 1982 book 'Models Of Bounded Rationality And Other Topics In Economics.' Compare with perfect rationality. Concept that decision makers (irrespective of their level of intelligence) have to work under three unavoidable constraints: (1) only limited, often unreliable, information is available regarding possible alternatives and their consequences, (2) human mind has only limited capacity to evaluate and process the information that is available, and (3) only a limited amount of time is available to make a decision. Therefore even individuals who intend to make rational choices are bound to make satisficing (rather than maximizing or optimizing) choices in complex situations. <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/bounded-rationality.html> Accessed on: 23.09.2015 at 14.05.

election of choice)<sup>46</sup>. *Whereas, in game theory, strategy depends on the behavior of other players, to make the best choice, strategic culture does not entirely focus on or is wholly responsible for the decision of other players. The central pillar of a strategic culture approach is to challenge neo-realist frame, which is consist of ahistorical and non-cultural assumptions, for analyzing strategic choice.*<sup>47</sup>

According to a neo-realist frame, states are undifferentiated units and seek to maximize their utility, which is in this framework, means, power capabilities or resources. Thus, strategic choices will be optimizing ones, and are only constrained given variables such as geography or changeable assets such as capabilities.<sup>48</sup> However, scholars, who are proponents of a strategic culture approach, oppose that sort of assumption. *According to proponents of strategic culture approach, socialization of elites is the most significant variable, which should first be taken into account. The reason is that different strategic cultures cause the interpretation of similar events differently by elites.* The problem, which must be dealt with, by proponents of a strategic culture's approach is to explain similarities in strategic behavior across varied strategic cultures. From structuralists' approach, the main problem is to explain differences in strategic behavior when the structure is constant. This is why, there is not a priori reason for predictions about strategic choice derived from strategic culture as being different from predictions, which are derived from ahistorical structural approaches (any differences depend on the content of a strategic culture). There is no a priori reason for them to be the same either.<sup>49</sup>

From the theoretical bases of strategic culture, we can mention about three different strategic culture generations. Each of them illustrates distinct features. The first generations appeared to emerge in the early 1980s. As I pointed out above (in the historical development of strategic culture chapter), the primary focus of their research is to enlighten the Soviet-USA nuclear rivalry from the strategic culture point of view, which focuses on deeply rooted experience, political culture, and geography. *Jack Snyder's paper for RAND cooperation appeared as a first work on strategic culture studies. Jack Snyder, Colin Gray, and David*

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<sup>46</sup>Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," International Security" MIT press Vol.19, No.4(Spring,1995):p.34.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.34-35.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.35.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid,35-36.

*Jones are the chief representatives of this first generation.*<sup>50</sup> For instance, Jack Snyder describes strategic culture as:

*“Strategic Culture is “the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy.”*<sup>51</sup>

His definition more or less resembles the most specialized version of the political culture which was firstly used by Almond and Verba 1960. *Jack Snyder’s attempt was considered the only scientific challenge to game theories particularly deterrence model during the cold war era.*<sup>52</sup>

For instance, David Jones (another prominent representative of the first generation) uses three levels of inputs to analyze the state’s strategic culture. These are the macro-environmental, societal level and micro level. The macro- environmental level consists of geography, ethno-cultural characteristics and history, while societal level consists of social, economic, and political structures of society, and a micro level contains military institutions and characteristics of civil-military relations. According to Jones, strategic culture does not just restrict the strategic option; it has an impact on from grand strategy of states down to tactics of the states.<sup>53</sup>

*The second generation began to emerge in mid- the 1980s. Their main concept is the hidden agenda of leaders. In other words, there is a there is a vast difference between what leaders think or say they are doing and the actual hidden, deeper motives for what in fact they do.* Even though strategic culture is an instrumental tool to attain preferable outcomes, which is described as political hegemony in the realm of strategic decision making - as Bradly.S.Klein claims - that strategic culture is a product of historical experience. These experiences differ across the states, and we observe how different states follow different

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid, p.36.

<sup>51</sup> Jack L. Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options*, R-2154-AF (Santa Monica, Calif. Rand Corporation, 1977).p.8

<sup>52</sup> Kadri Renda, “ Discursive change in Turkish strategic culture: changing narratives, roles and values”(PhD diss., King’s College, June 2013),p.50-51.

<sup>53</sup> Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” *International Security*” MIT press Vol.19, No.4(Spring,1995):p.36.

strategic cultures. For example, *Klein argues, “rather than strategic culture, hegemonistic interests of elites, which shapes the strategic choice, restrict the strategic behavior of states”. Obviously, the main concern of the second generation scholars is to perceive the strategic culture as a tool of political hegemony in decision- making process*, and by doing so, questions the hegemony of militaristic thinking and security-oriented attitudes among the circles of the national security elite. Second generation researchers contend that the national security elite maintains their power in the policymaking process regarding national security issues by excluding other discourses from the realm of national security.<sup>54</sup>

Although strategic culture is instrumental, according to the second generation, it does not come out of the pockets of political and military elites. Klein implies that strategic culture is a product of historical experience. As I pointed out, these experiences differ across states and naturally, these states exhibit different strategic cultures. However, since there is an undeniable relation between strategic culture and behavior, and since the latter is the reflection of the interests of a hegemonistic group, strategic choice is constrained by these interests rather than by strategic culture.<sup>55</sup>

Two concepts are often used by the second generation: The declaratory strategy and operational strategy. The declaratory strategy provides legitimization for the authority of the elites and operational strategy that reflects the particular interest of elites. For instance, concerning American Nuclear Warfare, Klein states that real operational strategy emphasizes defense of American hegemony’s interests, while declaratory strategy is used instrumentally by political elites to fashion a culturally and linguistically acceptable justification for operational strategy, and to mislead and misinform the potential political challengers.<sup>56</sup>

In the 1990s, we witness the emergence of a third generation. As I previously underlined, in 1990’s, there was a scholar debate about culture, particularly after the failure of rational-materialist theories, to enlighten rapidly changing world politics. Johnston epitomized the third generation.

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<sup>54</sup> Bradley S. Klein, "Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence Politics," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (April 1988), p. 136.

<sup>55</sup> Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," *International Security* MIT press Vol.19, No.4(Spring,1995):p.36.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*39.

Johnston, as a chief representative of the third generation of strategic culture, believes can be defined:

*“Strategic Culture is an integrated system of symbols (i.e., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors, etc.) that acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting grand strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.”*<sup>57</sup>

As Johnston sees it, symbols, metaphors, language and all sorts of analogies are a part of the strategic culture. For him, culture assists policy-makers to settle their preferences in ranked order and prevent any day to day fluctuations.<sup>58</sup>

***The third generation tries to explain the strategic choice of states in those cases, where structural materialist notion of interests are not sufficient.*** However, the arguments made by the third generation invoke the notion of a rational actor that is “culturally shaped or enculturated”<sup>59</sup> However, Johnston’s serious challenges to the idea of rational-materialist models, for Johnston culture just limits the options.<sup>60</sup> His arguments about the role of cultural elements on state behavior are somehow centered on decision-making. In fact, Johnston pays more attention to the processes of preference ranking rather than the substance and content of the chosen policy.<sup>61</sup>

In their approach, the third generation is much more eclectic when explaining independent variables and pay close attention narrowly to dependent variables. For instance, these scholars consider the term independent variables use with for military culture, organizational culture, and military-politic culture. And Compare to the first generation, the

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<sup>57</sup>Ibid.,46.

<sup>58</sup>Kadri Renda, “ Discursive change in Turkish strategic culture: changing narratives, roles and values”(PhD diss. King’s College, June 2013),p.53.

<sup>59</sup>Stuart Poore (2003). What is the context? A reply to the Gray-Johnston debate on strategic culture. Review of International Studies, 29, pp 280. Accessed:17.06.2015 at 19.06 URL:  
<http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=149811&fileId=S0260210503002791>

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.45.

<sup>61</sup>Kadri Renda, “ Discursive change in Turkish strategic culture: changing narratives, roles and values”(PhD diss., King’s College, June 2013),p.53.

third generation is less deeply rooted in history, and more precisely focused on the product of recent practice and experience. Moreover, the third generation excludes behavior as an element.<sup>62</sup> *Alastair Johnston proposes a typology of strategic culture literature and argues for the evolution of research from descriptive studies to normative and positivist approaches.* According to Johnston, the first generation research suffers several empirical problems due to its definition of culture as an all-encompassing concept that is everywhere and everything. <sup>63</sup>Alastair Johnston also claims that the third-generation avoids the determinism of the first generation because the third generation cautiously separates the state behavior as an independent variable.

Therefore, from Johnston's point of view, how decision makers are influenced by strategic culture can be formalized as a frame and interaction. Strategic culture presents a limited, ranked set of grand strategic preferences and more importantly, this affects how members of these cultures learn from interaction with the security environment. Johnston believes that third generation has strengths and superior positions compared to the first two generations. There are two reasons for this belief. First, the definition, which isolates the strategic culture as an independent variable, and then he starts to measure its causal power with respect to state behavior, leaves out behavior from independent variables.<sup>64</sup> Thus, avoiding the tautological traps of the first generation. Secondly, scholars can manage to do competitive theory testing, and can create different arguments that can be compared to each other's. For example, Jeffrey.W.Legro applied a realist model to explain restriction in the war against institutionalism and bureaucratic organizational culture models against each other.<sup>65</sup> That is why, the third generation managed to deal with problems, which emerged and were experienced by the first generation, according to Johnston.

As theory part clearly point outs, history and geography play a significant role, which shapes the strategic culture and naturally state attitudes.

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<sup>62</sup> Ibid.42.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid,41-42-43

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.48-49-53.

<sup>65</sup> Jeffrey S. Lantis," Strategic Culture and National Security Policy," The International Studies Association Vol. 4, No. 3 (Autumn, 2002): 93, Accessed: 02.06.2014 08.20, URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3186465>. p.108.

## 5 The Brief History of Evolution of Turkish Strategic Culture: Ottoman Empire

The traumas of society during history are likely to have a huge influence on a country's identity formation and its foreign policy preferences in the long term. Thus, the Ottoman legacy has exerted a significant impact on the Turkish state's identity and its foreign policy culture.<sup>66</sup>

First of all, *Turkey has historically, showed a relatively consistent security culture of Realpolitik, which has been constructed over the centuries from a dominant offensive character into a defensive one.* Secondly, *since the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the process of westernization has had a dramatic influence on national security culture.* It has magnanimously motivated Turkey's Western-oriented policies and brought liberal and internationalist elements into foreign policy. Simultaneously, these factors caused an identity problem that is very complex in terms of Turkey's foreign and security policy attitudes.<sup>67</sup>

If we look at the Ottoman Empire historically, its security culture became defensive instead of offensive. Before the peace of Westphalia term, and Ottomans played a significant role in international affairs. *The Balance of power was an indispensable tool for its strategic behavior.* Historically, we clearly notice that Ottomans were engaged in a harsh power struggle with the Hapsburg dynasty, the aim of which was world supremacy.<sup>68</sup> In 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> century, the immense threat to Europe was the Ottoman Empire. All attempts among the European powers such as unification, alliance, coalition, or confederation were to secure need of protection and common defense. The Ottoman Empire was an important actor in European politics.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Enes Bayraklı, "Turkish Foreign Policy in Transition: The Emergence of Kantian Culture in Turkish Foreign Policy (A holistic Constructivist Approach)" (PhD, diss., University of Vienna, May 2012).


<sup>67</sup> Ali. L. Karaosmanoglu, "The Evolution of The National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey," *Journal of International Affairs* (Fall 2000):200.

<sup>68</sup> Ali. L. Karaosmanoglu, "The Evolution of The National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey," *Journal of International Affairs* (Fall 2000):p.201.

<sup>69</sup> Halil İnalcık, "Osmanlılar: Fütühat, İmparatorluk, Avrupa ile İlişkiler (Ottomans: Conquests, Empire and Relations with Europe). (Istanbul: Timaş yayınları, 2010), p.216.



**Figure 1: Territorial position of Ottoman Empire in 17th century**



Source 1: Available at: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/434996/Ottoman-Empire>. (Accessed on 24.02.2015, at 19.06)

For example, in 1525, when King Francis 1 of France demanded Ottoman assistance against Vienna, Ottomans availed themselves of this golden opportunity to increase their pressure on Central Europe and to open a front against the Hapsburgs in the Mediterranean as well. Ottoman support for France and the Protestants in a matter of trade, and encouragement of the English, the Dutch, and the other anti-Hapsburg parties- including the Moors and Jews of Spain- heavily influenced its foreign and security policy. The newly emerging monarchies of France, England, the Low Countries and the Protestant princes of Germany all benefited from the Ottoman realpolitik, which provided an element of balance and a sort of protective shield against the dominance of the Hapsburg emperor and the Pope in Europe.<sup>70</sup>

*The supremacy of Ottoman Empire, in another word, “offensive realpolitik” continued until the 17<sup>th</sup> century. Its aim was to maximize territory, population and wealth. After the treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, the balance of power between European Powers and Ottoman Empire started to shift. As a result, the strategic character of Ottoman Empire*

<sup>70</sup> Halil İnalcık, “The Meaning of Legacy: The Ottoman Case,” in L. Carl Brown, ed., *Imperial Legacy: Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1996) , p.21.

*took on a defensive character.*<sup>71</sup>When European powers had a clear dominance, the conquest of the Ottoman Empire required greater cooperation between European powers. This situation was the birth of the “**Orient problem-Eastern Question.**”<sup>72</sup>At this point, it is worth to mention briefly about the Russian- Ottoman relation, which shapes Ottoman foreign policy. Since the 17<sup>th</sup> century, Russia’s expansionist policies have triggered hostility between Russian-Ottomans. Major defeats at Russian hands forced Ottomans to confront with the realities of its declining power. Furthermore, it was Tsar Nicholas, who described Ottoman Empire, as the “**sick man of Europe** „when he proposed to British Empire, in 1853 that the Ottoman Empire be fragmented. The last of thirteen Russo-Turkish wars, over four centuries, was a clear indicator of hostility and distrust between Turks and Russians.<sup>73</sup>This hostile environment between Russian and Ottoman had an enormous effect on Ottoman’s strategic culture in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century and even nowadays Turkey as a successor state of Ottoman Empire.

***Figure 2: The cartoon which depicts Ottoman Empire in the 18th and 19th centuries***



Source 2: <http://crowleyhistory12.weebly.com/breakup-of-the-ottoman-empire-and-the-french-and-english-mandates.htm>. c

In the 19th century, the power status of the Ottoman Empire declined, and it became a secondary power and was highly dependent on the Western powers to survive against

<sup>71</sup>Ali.L.Karaosmanoglu , "The Evoulution of The National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey," Journal of International Affairs (Fall 2000):p.201.

<sup>72</sup> Halil İnalcık," Osmanlılar: Fütühat, İmparatorluk, Avrupa le ilişkiler(Ottomans: Conquests, Empire and Relationswith Europe).(Istanbul:Timas yayınları, 2010), p.216.

Western military imperialism, particularly against the Austrian and Russian Empires.<sup>74</sup>

International politics was dominated by European power: These states were France, Prussia, Austria, Russia and Britain. The preservation of peace and the survival of small states, rested essentially on the “**preservation of a balance of power between European powers.**” Fundamentally, states as political preferences are in favor of negotiations with each other rather than fighting and eliminating of an essential actor; moreover, no actor had enough strength to conquer all the others.<sup>75</sup>

To survive, Ottoman Empire underwent an institutional and legal transformation in its imperial structures due to the reform process initiated in the early 19th century, which started with the Reorganization (*Tanzimat*) in 1839 and continued with the promulgation of the Imperial Edict of Reforms (*Islahat*) in 1856 and the adoption of the first ever constitution in 1876.<sup>76</sup> However, *it must be particularly pointed out that the modernization process of the Ottoman Empire was not triggered by the aspirations of an economically self-confident bourgeoisie claiming a formal legal framework for their property rights and demanding political participation.*<sup>77</sup> Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, the Ottoman Empire dealt with social turmoil owing to the spread of nationalism among different ethnic and religious communities (*millet*) in the empire.<sup>78</sup> Because of spreading nationalism, these modernization movements guided neither by the interest of a rising bourgeoisie class nor by the spirit of enlightened absolutism were trying to safeguard the integrity of the Empire’s territory in the world. Ottoman Empire’s external relations even though domestic political affairs increasingly dominated and shaped by European powers.<sup>79</sup> This long fragmentation process of Ottoman Empire and modernization constituted the four significant aspects of Turkish

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<sup>74</sup>Roderic H. Davidson, “Ottoman Diplomacy and Its Legacy,” in L. Carl Brown ed., *Imperial Legacy : The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East* (Newyork: Colombia University Press, 1996) p.176.

<sup>75</sup>William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000: The Ottoman And Turkish States And The International System* (London: Franks Cass, 2003), p.3.

<sup>76</sup>William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000: The Ottoman And Turkish States And The International System* (London: Franks Cass, 2003), p.14.

<sup>77</sup> Dietrich Jung and Wolfango Piccoli, *Turkey at the Crossroads: Reform and Decline, Modernization in the Ottoman Empire* (London & Newyork: Zed Books, 2001), p.31.

<sup>78</sup>Kadri Renda, “ Discursive change in Turkish strategic culture: changing narratives, roles and values” (PhD diss., King’s College, June 2013), p.118.

<sup>79</sup> Dietrich Jung and Wolfango Piccoli, *Turkey at the Crossroads: Reform and Decline, Modernization in the Ottoman Empire* (London & Newyork: Zed Books, 2001), p.31

strategic culture in Turkish foreign policy during the Republican Era. (I refer the Republican era until the Turgut Ozal term, after he came to power, and gradually, we observe the dominance of new elite cadre “Conservative elites” and their new foreign policy approaches.)

These are:

- 1- *Creation of new Ideology (Kemalism) after fragmentation of Ottoman Empire.*
- 2- *Sevres syndrome.*
- 3- *Idealization of West.*
- 4- *Perception about Turkey’s Geopolitical position.*

In the next chapter, I will continue with Kemalism and its influence on Turkish foreign policy.

## **6 Characteristics of Secular Elites**

### **6.1 Impact of Kemalism on Turkish Foreign Policy**

Many scholars, who have been researched and examined Turkey, directly focused on the history of Turkish modernization. For example, Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Feroz Ahmad’s *The making of Modern Turkey*, Erik Jan Zürcher’s *Turkey: A Modern History*, Serif Mardin’s *Religion, Society and Modernity in Turkey*, are just some of the examples in this field of study.<sup>80</sup> Kemalism was an outcome of Turkish modernization process. Discussion of Turkish modernization exceed the limit of that master thesis, however, I will mention Kemalism’s impact on Turkish strategic culture.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (Founding Father of Turkey) did not control Turkish foreign policy in his lifetime, but he had drawn an ideological framework, which is used as guidance for Turkish decision makers after his death. Kemalism, named after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and the Kemalist principles are the main engines of the Turkish revolutionary movements and represent the fundamental ideological character of the Turkey. The Kemalist ideology (Six principles: Nationalism, Secularism, Statism, Populism, Republicanism and Revolutionism)

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<sup>80</sup> Dietrich Jung and Wolfgang Piccoli, *Turkey at the Crossroads: Reform and Decline, Modernization in the Ottoman Empire* (London&Newyork: Zed Books,2001), p 11.

was unveiled in 1931 at the Congress of the Republican People's Party (RPP), These principles were incorporated in the Constitution in 1937. Kemalism is a top-down process and was led and implemented by bureaucratic-authoritarian political elites along with military officers. This elite cadre was heavily influenced by 19th-century European style of educational settings.<sup>81</sup> ***Of these principles, three of them are the most essential; Republicanism, Nationalism and secularism, which associate with abolishment of Ottoman dynasty, the Caliphate and the rejection of Ummet Ideology.***<sup>82</sup>

As we see clearly, the main ideology of Turkish state apparatus, after Atatürk, completely changed. Turkey's founding father believed that Ottoman Empire could not adapt to the new environment and this resistance to change was the primary reason for the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire. Westernization in the form of modernization was the only cure for the founding fathers of the Republic of Turkey. At that point, Turkish scholar Mustafa Aydın argued:

*‘‘The Turkish Republic was born out of the Ottoman Empire but bore little resemblance to its forerunner. The new Turkey was not an empire, but a relatively small nation-state; Not autocracy or theocracy, but a parliamentary democracy; Not a state founded on expansionist principles, but a nation dedicated to maintaining the existing status quo; Not a multinational, multiracial, and multi-religious state, but an almost "homogenous" society. Her aims were not to create and expand an empire, but to build and perpetuate a strong, stable nation within the boundaries of her homeland. Those were not ephemeral happenings at that critical time of history, but the facts created by the deliberate choices of the leaders of the new Republic.’’<sup>83</sup>*

Between 1920 and 1938 Atatürk started a profound modernization movement of the society and that is the reason why a peaceful foreign policy was required to accomplish his domestic political reforms inside Turkey. If we look at the notations, are presented by Kemalist ideology, for example, republicanism means popular sovereignty, freedom and equality before the law. These sorts of notations ultimately oppose the notions of empire, such

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<sup>81</sup>Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: Atatürk and the Institutionalization of Turkey's Western Identity(New York: Routledge, 2003), p.50.

<sup>82</sup>Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: Atatürk and the Institutionalization of Turkey's Western Identity(New York: Routledge, 2003), p.46.

<sup>83</sup>Aydın, Mustafa (2004); Turkish Foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis, SAM (Center for Strategic Research) Papers, December 2004, Ankara, p 15

as revisionism and imperialism. Naturally, Turkey accepted the international status quo. As Atatürk stated in “Nutuk”:

*“(...) I mean to work within our national boundaries for the real happiness and welfare of the nation and the country.”*<sup>84</sup>

The inclusion of Kemalist principles in Turkish foreign policy represents total disengagement with its Ottoman past. For instance, during the Ottoman period, three ideological tools were important. These are Imperial-Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, and Pan-Turanism. Three principles: Republicanism, Secularism and Nationalism replaced these three principles.<sup>85</sup> Concerning the secularism, it was the necessary step for modernization of society politically, socially and culturally. In terms of foreign policy aspects, it was a differentiation between democracy and theocracy. A theocratic Islamic state must see the Christian powers, according to Islamic belief, as infidels, and there is a never-ending conflict between them. Nevertheless, by selecting the idea of secular, democratic system of government, it abolishes the idea of an Islamic-protector nation and by doing so, establishes peaceful relations with Christian nations. Another important outcome of secularism on foreign policy is a rejection of the idea of Pan-Islamism. As, a new state, Turkey, as the successor state of Ottoman Empire, would not aim at world-conquering or Islamic-protecting anymore. Such claims would endanger the existence of the state.<sup>86</sup> Additionally, the desired result of alternation of the basis of state legitimacy was the exclusion of Islam from social and political life and replacement of it with symbols of a newly defined Turkish nation. The only way to achieve all that was cutting ties, related to Ottoman history. According to Kemalist-nationalist elite discourse, Islam became an all-purpose bogey symbolizing everything that reform, progress, and civilization were not. Thus, the only way to save the country is to follow Western civilization, which is, of course, more rational and capable of modernity.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>84</sup>Aydin, Mustafa; Turkish foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis, SAM (Center for Strategic Research) (Papers, December 2004,) Ankara, p 32

<sup>85</sup>Aydin, Mustafa; Turkish foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis, SAM (Center for Strategic Research) (Papers, December 2004,) Ankara, p 31.

<sup>86</sup>Aydin, Mustafa; Turkish foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis, SAM (Center for Strategic Research) (Papers, December 2004,) Ankara, p 33.

<sup>87</sup>Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: Atatürk and the Institutionalization of Turkey's Western Identity(NewYork: Roudledge,2003), p.46-47.

We see a similar approach not just in Kemalist elite's discourse, but in Atatürk's personal evaluations as well. For example, According to Atatürk, Islam and civilization are two conflicting terms. As Atatürk stated:

*“The Turks were a great nation even before they have accepted Islam. However, after they had accepted this religion, it loosened their national ties and numbed their national feelings. That was a natural outcome because the purpose of Islam as laid out by Mohammed was an Ummet policy.”*<sup>88</sup>

Again, from Atatürk's perspective, Caliphate symbolized Turkey's attachment to the past and Islam, but at the same time it is one of the most significant obstacles to progress and reaching the standard of Western civilization. Atatürk argued:

*“The Caliphate had never enjoyed universal jurisdiction over the Muslim world, as had the papacy over the Catholic world. The office was an Arab institution adopted by a former Turkish Sultan, whom millions of Muslims had never acknowledged as their spiritual ruler. The new Turkey was not irreligious but needed a religion stripped of artificiality, which implied nothing contrary to reason or hostile to progress”*<sup>89</sup>

Another principle, Nationalism was a movement, which influenced the Ottoman Empire's Christian subjects and eventually caused the fragmentation of the Empire. For Turks, this concept took shape, when Entente power started to make inroads in Anatolia, It was generally agreed that to achieve independence, a common goal and public awareness were needed, which is based on a nation's historical consciousness. That is why it is crucial to implement a European model of nationalism against the supremacy of European imperialism.<sup>90</sup> Atatürk believed that it is a waste of resources to follow unobtainable goals such as İttihat ve Terakki's (Committee of Union and Progress) irredentist<sup>91</sup> foreign policies.

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<sup>88</sup>Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: Atatürk and the Institutionalization of Turkey's Western Identity(NewYork: Roudledge,2003), p.47.

<sup>89</sup>Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: Atatürk and the Institutionalization of Turkey's Western Identity(NewYork: Roudledge,2003), p.-47.

<sup>90</sup>Aydın, Mustafa; Turkish foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis, SAM (Center for Strategic Research) (Papers, December 2004,) Ankara, p 34.

<sup>91</sup>**Irredentism:**(Usually initial capital letter) A member of an Italian association that became prominent in 1878 advocating the redemption, or the incorporation into Italy, a certain neighbouring regions (Italian irredenta) having a primarily Italian population. A member of a party in any country advocating the acquisition of some region included in another country by reason of cultural, historical, ethnic, racial, or other ties.<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/irredentism>.

In the another word, Kemalist nationalist discourse followed an authoritarian approach to homogenize the different ethnic groups, however, in the foreign policy, aimed to follow status-quo. **For Turkey, there are two meanings of Status Quo, one of them is continuity of current territorial integrity, and the other is sustaining the current international balance of power.**<sup>92</sup>

There are some significant reasons why Turkey followed the status-quo or had to follow status-quo after the establishment of the Turkish Republic in foreign policy. These reasons can be summed up under two points **(continuity of current territorial integrity)**:

1) After the Turkish independence wars, there was not enough material capacity to focus on outside of national territory. Furthermore, it was a construction period and there were numerous factors to be taken into account, for example, to consolidate the new political regime, state apparatus, suppress the Kurdish rebellious movement, regime introduce new social and political reforms to society and aimed to eliminate ex-Ottoman elite structures. Due to these reasons, rather than focus on surrounding regions, the main objective is to sustain new political regimes and territorial integrity.<sup>93</sup>

2) After the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire, especially after the devastating pan-Turkism policy of “İttihat ve Terakki” (Committee of Union and Progress), Kemalist elites avoided any expansionist foreign policies. After the Treaty of Lausanne, new Turkish elites (as a successor state of Ottoman Empire), believed that they had reached the most of the borderline of “Misaki- Milli.”<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>92</sup>Baskın Oran(Ed.), Türk Dış Politikası1919-1980 (Turkish Foreign Policy1919-1980):Türk Dış Politikasının Teori ve Pratigi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), p.46.

<sup>93</sup> Baskın Oran(Ed.), Türk Dış Politikası1919-1980 (Turkish Foreign Policy1919-1980):Türk Dış Politikasının Teori ve Pratigi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), p.47.

<sup>94</sup>Baskın Oran(Ed.), Türk Dış Politikası1919-1980 (Turkish Foreign Policy1919-1980):Türk Dış Politikasının Teori ve Pratigi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), p.47.



**Figure 3: The border of Turkey of Misak-I Milli vs. “National Pact” & the current territory of Turkey**



Source 3: [http://bilgi-bilgi.com/misak\\_i\\_mill](http://bilgi-bilgi.com/misak_i_mill) (Accessed on 10.09.2015)

The second explanation for Turkey to follow the “Status-Quo” means to *sustain the international balance of power*. Turkey tried to balance West and its opposite power structure or tried to put Western powers against each other due to its geo-politic position. For example, between 1923-1939, 1939-1945, and 1960-1980 Turkey managed to manipulate the Soviet Union as balancing power and use it as a balancing power against the West. After the USA had emerged as a global player, Turkey tried to play a balance of power game, the USA against European powers. However, Turkey could not achieve to balance the USA. Because after the Second World War, Europe was quite weak. Between 1960-1980, Turkey, could not decide to take part in the European community, particularly after 12 September 1980 (Civilian government toppled by Military) and human rights violations pushed Turkey away from Europe. Additionally, It should be also underlined: **“When Turkey managed a balance between global players, it could follow more autonomous foreign policy, when it could not do this, its foreign policy autonomy also decreased.”**<sup>95</sup>

Although Turkish foreign policy underwent various alternations during the 20<sup>th</sup> century, all Turkish governments, which come to power, implemented this indisputable

<sup>95</sup>Baskın Oran(Ed.), Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1980(Turkish Foreign Policy 1919-1980):Türk Dış Politikasının Teori ve Pratiği (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), p.49.

dogma (Kemalism) into their foreign policy agenda, and were cautious not to violate or compromise the main Kemalist principles.<sup>96</sup>

There are many counter-reactions to Kemalism from Kurds and conservatives. I will discuss the counter-reactions after I complete to introduce rest of these four points. But, before I continue to the next part, as a summary of this chapter, it can be mentioned some core points and conclusions. These are:

- ❖ Kemalism represents complete dis-attachment from Ottoman imperial heritage and Islam.
- ❖ Kemalism aims following Status-Quo, which means is continuity of current territorial integrity and sustaining the current international balance of power.
- ❖ Kemalism is against any irredentist foreign policy approach. (However, it should be taken into account exceptional cases, such as annexation of Hatay province in 1939, and Cyprus operation in 1974.

In the next chapter, I will point out another important concept, which is named “Sevres Syndrome.” Sevres Syndrome is a psychological phenomenon, which influence on Turkish decision-makers (Secular elite cadre).

## 6.2 Sevres Syndrome


The Treaty of Sevres (*See figure 4*) was designed to achieve the fragmentation of Ottoman Empire among the European powers after the First World War. ***This fear was inherited by new elites and naturally, the successor State of Ottoman Empire, Turkey.***<sup>97</sup> Due to its enormous influence on Turkish foreign policy, scholars and foreign policy experts, pay special attention to Sevres Treaty. Although Turkey was never colonized by Western powers, the Sèvres Treaty represented the ultimate destruction that brought an end to more than six hundred years old Ottoman Empire. ***For new Turkish elite cadre, it was a constant reminder of Western supremacy to economically exploit and politically control Ottoman lands in 18<sup>th</sup>, 19<sup>th</sup> and the first two decades of 20<sup>th</sup> century.***<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>96</sup>Aydin, Mustafa; Turkish foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis, SAM (Center for Strategic Research) (Papers, December 2004,) Ankara, p 30.

<sup>97</sup>Ali.L.Karaosmanoglu , "The Evolution of The National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey," Journal of International Affairs (Fall 2000):p.202.

**Figure 4: Sharing of Anatolia after the Treaty of Sevres**



Source 4: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty\\_of\\_S%C3%A8vres#mediaviewer/File:TreatyOfSevres\\_\(corrected\).PNG](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_S%C3%A8vres#mediaviewer/File:TreatyOfSevres_(corrected).PNG) (Accessed on 03.03.2015, at 20.24)

Sevres syndrome creates a huge distrust against Western countries and Turkey's surrounding neighborhood. This distrust triggers a belief of foreign plots against Turkey's territorial integrity. At this point, as Malik Mufti summarized well the Turkish fear behind the Sevres treaty:

*"Fear of Russian expansionism southwards, and frustration at the disappointing consequences of the Turkish expansionism northwards; concern about Armenian territorial ambitions in eastern Anatolia, and Greek territorial ambitions in western Anatolia; dismay at the Arabs for joining the anti-Turkish coalition during World War I; and for Syria's unsuccessful claim to the province of Hatay as well as Iraq's successful claim to Mosul; and suspicion that the western powers might at any point be ready to sacrifice Turkish interests in pursuit of their own strategic objectives",<sup>99</sup>*

Sevres Syndrome has a long-lasting impact on Turkish state behavior and even on the Turkish society. To clarify its impact, I will give examples of discourses of some important

<sup>98</sup> Kadri Renda, "Discursive change in Turkish strategic culture: changing narratives, roles and values"(PhD diss., King's College, June 2013)

<sup>99</sup>Kadri Renda, " Discursive change in Turkish strategic culture: changing narratives, roles and values"(PhD diss., King's College, June 2013),p122.

politicians and army officers. For instance, Süleyman Demirel, ex-former president, who gave a speech at the opening session of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1994:

*“What is attempted to be achieved [by foreign countries]? Make no mistake [...] Turkey is an object of partition schemes. Both internal and external events indicate the revival of the Sèvres [Treaty]. Nobody can claim otherwise (Demirel01/09/1994).”<sup>100</sup>*

Secondly, Sevres syndrome also generates distrust and fear against ethnic minorities (Particularly Kurds) and opposition groups, (Conservatives) which is a conviction that these groups cooperate with a foreign power or powers and pose a threat the Turkish territorial integrity or Turkey's political regime. The reason for this distrust rests on history. During the fragmentation process of Ottoman Empire, most of the ethnic groups (Which are the member of Millet system) declared their independence, founded their nation states and were confirmed by Western powers.<sup>101</sup> For example, General Fevzi Türkeri, (He was an effective figure of 28 February process<sup>102</sup>) a former chief of military intelligence stated:

"Political Islam is working closely with Iran and some other Islamic countries to pull Turkey into an endless darkness."

Or in the domestic political crises of Merve Kavakci, whom was (Fazilet) a deputy from Istanbul in the 'Islamic Virtue Party', wore a headscarf in parliament, (First time a women deputy wore a headscarf in Parliament) as a reaction to her act, ex-former Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit said in May 1999:

"Even though Turkey does not meddle in Iranian affairs, Iran is continually trying to export its regime to Turkey.”<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>100</sup>Kadri Renda, "Discursive change in Turkish strategic culture: changing narratives, roles and values"(PhD diss., King's College, June 2013),p125.

<sup>101</sup>Kadri Renda, "Discursive change in Turkish strategic culture: changing narratives, roles and values"(PhD diss., King's College, June 2013),p122.

<sup>102</sup>The 1997 military memorandum (, "28 February"; "Post-modern coup") in Turkey refers to the decisions issued by the Turkish military leadership on a National Security Council meeting on 28 February 1997. This memorandum initiated the process that precipitated the resignation of Islamist prime minister Necmettin Erbakan of the Welfare Party, and the end of his coalition government.[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1997\\_Turkish\\_military\\_memorandum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1997_Turkish_military_memorandum) (Accessed on 14.11.2015 at 2015)

<sup>103</sup>[http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives\\_roll/2003\\_07-09/jung\\_sevres/jung\\_sevres.html](http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_07-09/jung_sevres/jung_sevres.html) (Accessed on 14.11.2015 at 17.05)

As I pointed out above, Sevres Syndrome also has an impact on Turkish Society. According to a Survey conducted in 2006, 72 percent of Turks believe that some countries would like to fragment Turkey. This belief also is shared by Turkish intellectuals as well. As Guida underlined; we can interpret that result as an impact of Sevres Syndrome on Turkish society.<sup>104</sup>

*Additionally, the Sevres Syndrome promoted the term that foreign and security policy should be isolated from the daily political discussions to preserve Turkey's interests and its territorial integrity. This type of foreign policy legitimizes the idea that in order not to jeopardize national security, democracy can be restricted.*<sup>105</sup> ***This culture is “characterized by a deep sense of suspicion and unwillingness to cooperate with other actors.”***<sup>106</sup> ***Obviously, Sèvres Syndrome has evolved into “a paradigm to sustain the political power and control of military and bureaucratic elites over the social and economic resources of the state.”***<sup>107</sup> At the same time, it is an illusion, which is often used to explain world events and to justify various Turkish national failures.<sup>108</sup>

After conservative elite cadre came to power, even though, this phenomenon, which is called Sevres Syndrome, weakened, however, we can still observe this phenomenon in some high military officers even in under conservative ruling era. For instance, ex-former Chief of the General Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt give a speech in Washington in February 2007 shows how Sevres Syndrome still has an enormous influence on Turkish decision makers:

*“Nobody can or will ever dare to divide Turkey. We’ll do whatever it takes to stop them. Is there such a country [which plans to divide Turkey]? No. There are dreamers. There are collaborators. They were dreaming in the past too. We’ll not allow anyone to divide Turkey.”* (Büyükanıt 14/02/2007).<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> Guida, Michelangelo (2008); The Sevres Syndrome and “Komplo” Theories in the islamist and secular press, p. 38.

<sup>105</sup> Kirişçi, Kemal (2006); Turkey's foreign policy in turbulent times, p.33.

<sup>106</sup> Kirişçi, Kemal (2006); Turkey's foreign policy in turbulent times, p. 35

<sup>107</sup> Kadri Renda, “ Discursive change in Turkish strategic culture: changing narratives, roles and values”(PhD diss., King's College, June 2013),p201.

<sup>108</sup> Guida, Michelangelo (2008); The Sevres Syndrome and “Komplo” Theories in the islamist and secular press, p.49.

Before continue, as a summary of this chapter, it can be mentioned some significant points:

- ❖ As a result, the fear of losing territory became one of the most significant elements in Turkish strategic culture, which is known as Sevres syndrome.
- ❖ Any democratic demands from ethnic minorities or opposition group were considered under international conspiracy to divide Turkey or as a threat to Turkish political regime.
- ❖ It provides a psychological legitimacy for high officers of Turkish military to intervene domestic political affairs of Turkey (Perceive themselves as protectors of Turkish secular regime and Turkish territorial integrity) and most determiner force in Turkish state apparatus, which design Turkish foreign policy agenda.
- ❖ It indicates a lack of self-confident and introverts policy, unwilling to cooperate with regional and global actors (Highly suspicious toward them) or lack of any willing to shape regional developments or involvement of any conflict.

In the next chapter, I will underline the third crucial factor in Turkish strategic culture, known as, ‘Idealization of Westernization’.

### **6.3 Idealization of West**

As I already underlined, there has been a direct linkage between Turkish modernization and development of Turkish identity since the beginning of the 19th century. For centuries, historically, Turks played a significant role in European politics, but not culturally or institutionally.<sup>110</sup> For example, The Ottoman Empire was not placed in the Westphalian system until the Treaty of Paris was signed in 1856. According to that treaty, the empire was accepted and recognized as one of the participants in the public law and concert of Europe.<sup>111</sup> A centuries-long westernization process had an enormous impact on Turkish state identity institutionally, politically and socially. Due to that constructed state identity,

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<sup>109</sup>Kadri Renda, " Discursive change in Turkish strategic culture: changing narratives, roles and values"(PhD diss., King's College, June 2013),p201.

<sup>110</sup>Kadri Renda, " Discursive change in Turkish strategic culture: changing narratives, roles and values"(PhD diss., King's College, June 2013),p138.

<sup>111</sup>William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000:The Ottoman And Turkish States And The International System*(London: Franks Cass,2003),p.27.

there is always seek for a need of confirmation from the West by aligning Turkish security and foreign policy orientation with its western partners.<sup>112</sup> Such a fast Westernization of Turkish society by secular elites precipitated an identity crisis in Turkish society. For instance, Samuel Huntington classifies Turkey as a “torn country”<sup>113</sup> and argued:

*“The most obvious and prototypical torn country is Turkey. The late twentieth-century leaders of Turkey have followed in the Atatürk tradition and defined Turkey as a modern, secular, Western nation state. **They allied Turkey with the West in NATO and in the Gulf War; they applied for membership in the European Community.** At the same time, however, elements in Turkish society have supported an Islamic revival and have argued that Turkey is basically a Middle Eastern Muslim society. In addition, while the elite of Turkey has defined Turkey as a Western society, the elite of the West refuses to accept Turkey as such.”*<sup>114</sup>

After the Second World War, we witness the highly Westernization of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey became a member of the United Nations in 1945 and in 1947 the US President Harry S. Truman officially declared that the United States would support the economic development and military modernization of Greece and Turkey and thereby thwart the spread of communism in the surrounding regions. Turkey joined the Council of Europe in 1949, and it was then accepted into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization along with Greece in 1952 as a result of its participation in the Korean War.<sup>115</sup> When we look at the foreign policy after the Second World War, we clearly remark that In spite of Atatürk’s indifferent and non-interventionist policy towards the Middle East, Turkey followed a foreign policy approach like a spearhead of the West during the 1950s. Turkey joined the Baghdad Pact in 1955 alongside Britain, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan. Then Turkey politically supported Britain and France during the Suez Crisis of 1956 and defended the French position in Algeria.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>112</sup> Kadri Renda, “ Discursive change in Turkish strategic culture: changing narratives, roles and values”(PhD diss., King’s College, June 2013),p138.

<sup>113</sup> The concept of Torn country: These countries’ leaders typically wish to pursue a bandwagoning strategy and to make their countries members of the West, but the history, culture and traditions of their countries are non-Western. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1993-06-01/clash-civilizations> (Accessed on 14.11.2015 at 20.12)

<sup>114</sup><https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1993-06-01/clash-civilizations> (Accessed on 14.11.2015 at 20.12)

<sup>115</sup>Kadri Renda, “ Discursive change in Turkish strategic culture: changing narratives, roles and values”(PhD diss., King’s College, June 2013),p129.

Notably, Turkey's stance in Algeria and Suez Crisis created a negative image for Turkey in the Arab World. From that cases, it can be obviously stated that even though one party political regime ended, in Foreign Policy of Turkey guided by Westernization. At that point, as one of the foreign policy scholar Oral Sender commented:

*“This fundamental inclination that emerged as establishing close ties with the West cannot be defined as a limited and temporary policy preference aimed at thwarting of a threats against Turkey's security and territorial integrity; but one that shows a surprising continuity”*<sup>117</sup>

In sander's view, Turkey's foreign policy orientation cannot be only explained by short or medium term political or military interest, but derives from state identity. Its westernness is expressed not only via the adaptation of ideas and manners from the Western world but also by western institutions. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is one of the great examples of that.<sup>118</sup> After the end of the Second World War, the top priority of Turkish foreign policy was aiming to receive US assistance (Truman Doctrine 1947<sup>119</sup>) and membership of NATO. Subsequently, Turkey started to seek membership in the European Economic Community, and later on the European Union. Turkey attempted to convince its Western partners with actions like sending troops to fight in the Korean War and cooperated with the USA and Great Britain in forming a regional security organization in the Middle East. All attempts of Turkey were aiming at showing its Western partners that Turkey is a reliable partner. Throughout the cold war, Turkey was labeled as “ junior partner” of the United States against a war of communism and the Soviet Union and by doing so, Turkish intellectuals of statecraft consider themselves to be placed in the West.<sup>120</sup> In that frame, in the

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<sup>116</sup>Kadri Renda, “ Discursive change in Turkish strategic culture: changing narratives, roles and values”(PhD diss. King's College, June 2013),p131.

<sup>117</sup>Yücel Bozdağıoğlu, Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: Ataturk and the Institutionalization of Turkey's Western Identity(NewYork: Roudledge,2003), p.57.

<sup>118</sup>Eylem Yilmaz and Pinar Bilgin, “ Constructing Turkey's "Western" Identity during the Cold War: Discourses of the Intellectuals of Statecraft,” International Journal,Vol. 61, No. 1, Turkey: Myths and Realities(Winter, 2005/2006):p.39.

<sup>119</sup>With the Truman Doctrine, President Harry S. Truman established that the United States would provide political, military and economic assistance to all democratic nations under threat from external or internal authoritarian forces. The Truman Doctrine effectively reoriented U.S. foreign policy, away from its usual stance of withdrawal from regional conflicts not directly involving the United States, to one of possible intervention in far away conflicts. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/truman-doctrine> (Accessed on 16.11.2015)

<sup>120</sup>Eylem Yilmaz and Pinar Bilgin, “ Constructing Turkey's "Western" Identity during the Cold War: Discourses of the Intellectuals of Statecraft,” International Journal, Vol. 61, No. 1, Turkey: Myths and Realities(Winter, 2005/2006):p.41.



era of cold war, Turkey's intellectuals shared two crucial and interconnected points. First, as Turkey's intellectuals manifest themselves as Western, therefore, as participants of an organization, such as NATO, was not just seen as a military organization, but as a cultural representation. Thus, participation in Western institutions provides the discursive (re)production of Turkey's Western identity. Secondly, by doing so, Turkey can demarcate itself from the non-Western states, such as Eastern bloc countries, which were non-western, traditional, underdeveloped and non- democratic states, and identify itself instead with modern, Western and democratic states.<sup>121</sup>For example, if we look at the Turkish membership of NATO in much more detail, geo-political reasons for that membership are: Russian demands the revision of the Montreux Convention in its favor, which assures the free passage of Soviet warships through the straits and their closure to non-Black Sea states, the establishment of Soviet bases at the straits and the retrocession to Russia of the eastern provinces of Kars and Ardahan.<sup>122</sup>We can easily come to the assumption that these political demands of Stalin forced Turkey to seek protection from the USA. However, actual reasons is more profound as Turkish Scholar Ali Karaosmanoglu stated:

*“Beyond the Soviet threat after the Second World War, Turkey's decisiveness in joining NATO derived mostly from a profound belief in Western values and the virtues of Western political systems. NATO membership solidified Ankara's Western orientation by establishing a long-lasting institutional and functional link with the West.”*<sup>123</sup>

As we see, the actual motivation for joining NATO was deeper than simply geopolitical reasons. If we look at the Treaty of Washington (1949), it is clear that signatory states present themselves as the protectors of freedom, common heritage, and the principle of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. NATO manifests itself from the cultural context and differentiates itself from non-Western (Eastern) countries.<sup>124</sup>Turkey's political

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<sup>121</sup>Eylem Yilmaz and Pinar Bilgin, "Constructing Turkey's "Western" Identity during the Cold War: Discourses of the Intellectuals of Statecraft," *International Journal*, Vol. 61, No. 1, Turkey: Myths and Realities(Winter, 2005/2006):p.44.

<sup>122</sup>William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000: Turkey and the Cold War: The Engagement Phase, 1945-63*(London: Franks Cass, 2003), p111-112.

<sup>123</sup>Eylem Yilmaz and Pinar Bilgin, "Constructing Turkey's "Western" Identity during the Cold War: Discourses of the Intellectuals of Statecraft," *International Journal*, Vol. 61, No. 1, Turkey: Myths and Realities(Winter, 2005/2006):44-45.

elites considered membership of NATO not just as a membership in a collective defense organization but as a means of political identification.<sup>125</sup>

As an outcome of Westernization process of Turkey's foreign policy, Turkey, in 1950's, was alienated from the surrounding region. After a decade, Turkey had to reconsider its foreign policy position in the region. There were many significant developments inside and outside of Turkey between mid-1960's and 1970's. For instance, In 1960's-1970's Cold War period, although Turkey's dependency on the West, politically, militarily or economically continued, loosening tensions between blocks, increased the important role of secondary states (Third World states, Group of 77) in world politics. Turkey's threat perception from the Soviet Union declined, and Cold War tension shifted away from Europe to other regions of the world such as the Middle East, Africa and East Asia.<sup>126</sup> In this period, we observe the emergence of public and elite support for the Arabs and Palestinians in the 1970s, effects of the oil shocks in the early 1970s and the rise of anti-Westernism at the public level. At that point, as William Hale argued:

*“The shift in Turkish foreign policy in the mid-1960s was marked by a determined attempt to rebuild bridges with the Arab world. The most immediate reason for this was the aim of winning the Arab states away from their previous support for Makarios and, more broadly, to try to convince them that Turkey had abandoned the obviously futile approaches of the Baghdad Pact. The pact was now severely criticized in Turkey for its alienation of Arab nationalism and for allegedly subordinating Turkey's national interest to those of the Western alliance”*<sup>127</sup>

Additionally, American reaction toward Cyprus intervention and ‘‘opium crisis’’<sup>128</sup>, between the US and Turkey, caused a serious deterioration in relations between USA and

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<sup>124</sup>Eylem Yilmaz and Pinar Bilgin, "Constructing Turkey's "Western" Identity during the Cold War: Discourses of the Intellectuals of Statecraft," *International Journal*, Vol. 61, No. 1, Turkey: Myths and Realities(Winter, 2005/2006):p.45.

<sup>125</sup>Eylem Yilmaz and Pinar Bilgin, "Constructing Turkey's "Western" Identity during the Cold War: Discourses of the Intellectuals of Statecraft," *International Journal*, Vol. 61, No. 1, Turkey: Myths and Realities(Winter, 2005/2006):p.53.

<sup>126</sup>William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000: Turkey and the Cold War: Turkey and the Cold War Global Shifts and Regional Conflicts*(London: Franks Cass,2003),p146.

<sup>127</sup> William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000: Turkey and the Cold War: The Engagement Phase,1945-63*(London: Franks Cass,2003),p169.

Turkey.<sup>129</sup> However, I should underscore that *during the inter-coup period, (1960-1980), Turkey altered some foreign policy preferences but not the foreign policy foundation that bases on the principle of identification and alliance with the West.*

In 1980's, Turkey faced a new era of the Cold World, particularly when it's the relation with superpowers, entered a new area of re-engagement in the Western alliance. At the end of the 1970's, the tension between global powers increased dramatically due to new global developments, such as the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, which triggered the tension between superpowers and re-established the significant role of Turkey in Western alliance and at the same time Turkey's attachment to West.<sup>130</sup> In this period, threat-centered security oriented approach emerged as a dominant approach in Turkey's security agenda. The fundamental problem of this approach was not only a prioritized military dimension but the other dimensions were subsequently played down or even disregarded. Even non-military dimensions were considered and approached from a 'national security' perspective.<sup>131</sup>

As I underlined in the chapter of Kemalism, in the early years of the Turkish Republic, the Westernization of Turkey and by doing so, being part of Western civilization (Muasır medeniyet) was the main goal of secular elites includes Ataturk, (Founding Father of Turkey) as well, in spite of huge skepticism, as we seen in Sevres Syndrome chapter. For example, these statements of Ataturk sum up the secular vision about the West very well:

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<sup>128</sup>Turkey sold opium freely; United States government asked to stop. United States threatened trade cut if Turkey doesn't halt production; smuggling was common and American funds set up narcotics bureaus to slow trade; growers must sell on black market to make profit, commercial value too low; poppy growing Turkish tradition and control difficult; Turks resented American pressure. [http://discoverlibrary.vanderbilt.edu/primo\\_library/libweb/action/dlDisplay.do?vid=Vanderbilt\\_University&docId=tvnews452394&fromSitemap=1&afterPDS=true](http://discoverlibrary.vanderbilt.edu/primo_library/libweb/action/dlDisplay.do?vid=Vanderbilt_University&docId=tvnews452394&fromSitemap=1&afterPDS=true) (Accessed on 16.11.2015 at 12.24)

<sup>129</sup>Mustafa Aydın, Turkish Foreign Policy Framework and Analysis: Conjuctural Determinants and Changing Patterns, Foreign Policy Setting at September 12, 1980 SAM (Center for Strategic Research) (Papers, December 2004,) Ankara, p 83.

<sup>130</sup> William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000: Turkey and the Cold War: Turkey and the Cold War Global Shifts and Regional Conflicts (London: Franks Cass, 2003),p163.

<sup>131</sup>Kadri Renda, "Discursive change in Turkish strategic culture: changing narratives, roles and values"(PhD diss., King's College, June 2013),p134.

*‘ The West always been prejudiced against the Turks... but we Turks have always consistently moved towards west. In order to be a civilized nation, there is no alternative’<sup>132</sup>*

However, as you have seen in this chapter, during the Cold-War era, Turkey’s Westernization goal associated itself with the US. However, particularly in 1990’s, for Turkey’s elite cadre, now the primary motivation turn into membership of the European Union, which is the desired outcome of whole Turkish modernization process. Again, I should stress that the content of Turkey-European Union relations or Europeanization of Turkish politics exceeds the limit of this work, however, due to its significance and relation to the theme of (Idealization of Westernization), I should also mention the role of European Union briefly.

Historically, Turkey started to establish an official tie with European Economic Community (EEC) with the signing of the Ankara Association Agreement in 1963. In 1987, Turkey applied for membership in the European Community (EC). This application was rejected for the reason that ‘Turkey was not ready to take on the obligations of membership’. Instead of full-membership, Turkey was offered the formation of a customs union, and Turkey entered in the Customs Union in 1996.<sup>133</sup> This rejection was perceived as discrimination toward Turkey. As a response to this policy, Turkey threatens to cut its application process with EU. Due to the high risk of an alienation of Turkey from Europe, Europe reconsidered its decision toward Turkey, and EU granted Turkey candidate status in its Helsinki Summit in 1999. Helsinki decision of European Union can be seen as a milestone in the Turkish politics, which paved the way for a huge political and economic reform process.<sup>134</sup> For example, P.M Bülent Ecevit stated In Helsinki on Turkey’s candidacy to the EU (December 11, 1999):

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<sup>132</sup>Enes Bayraklı, " Turkish Foreign Policy in Transition:The Emergence of Kantian Culture in Turkish Foreign Policy (A holistic Constructivist Approach)" (PhD, diss., University of Vienna, May 2012),p.139.

<sup>133</sup><http://avrupa.info.tr/eu-trade-and-economy/customs-union.html> Accessed on 20.11.2015 at 18.57.)

<sup>134</sup> Enes Bayraklı, " Turkish Foreign Policy in Transition:The Emergence of Kantian Culture in Turkish Foreign Policy (A holistic Constructivist Approach)" (PhD, diss., University of Vienna, May 2012),p.139.

*‘‘ These important strides that we were able to achieve in a short span of time not only reflect the harmony and the determination that prevails in our government, but also the propensity and the quest of the Turkish people to **change and modernization**. ’’*<sup>135</sup>

I would like to demonstrate the Bülent Ecevit’s discourse, which links the membership of European Union with modernization. In 2001, The European Council ‘‘adopts the EU-Turkey Accession Partnership’’ on 8 March, providing a road map for Turkey’s EU accession process. On 19 March, the Turkish Government adopts the NPAA, the ‘‘National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis’’ (acquis means EU law). In 2004, on 17 December, the European Council decided to open membership talks with Turkey.<sup>136</sup> These developments indicate some important points for Turkey. First of all, declaration of the European integration as the final goal and complementing of reforms increased the legitimacy of domestic reform rhetoric in the political sphere. For example, Turkey forced to pay more attention to issues such as the rule of law, human rights and respect for the protection of minorities. Furthermore, such a political reforms provided the limitation of the historical role of Kemalist elite cadre which consists of a bureaucratic-military elite structure and keeping their position via securitization of certain social and political issues. Turkey to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria, Turkey had to be forced to face its chronic problems particularly, military elite dominance over civilian rule was one of the major problems of Turkish democracy.<sup>137</sup> For instance, between 1987 and 2004, Turkish constitution was amended 8 times, (To change the 1982 Constitution, written by military rule) and if we compare these figure with nine harmonizing packages, which were approved by Turkish Parliament between 2002-2004, we obviously figure out that membership negotiations between Turkey and the European Union consolidated the Turkish democracy and motivated political elites to alter ex-Turkish political structure.<sup>138</sup> Finally, Europe was perceived by state elite as a civilization to whom Turkey belonged. Relationship with the European Union or any membership chance were considered in this aspect.

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<sup>135</sup> [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/statement-of-prime-minister-bulent-ecevit-in-helsinki-on-turkey\\_s-candidacy-to-the-eu\\_br\\_december-11\\_-1999-.en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/statement-of-prime-minister-bulent-ecevit-in-helsinki-on-turkey_s-candidacy-to-the-eu_br_december-11_-1999-.en.mfa) (Accessed on 26.11.2015 at 18.50)

<sup>136</sup> <http://avrupa.info.tr/en/eu-and-turkey/history.html> (Accessed on 21.11.2015 at 15.58)

<sup>137</sup> ARAS, Bülent; POLAT, Rabia K; “From Conflict to Cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey’s Relations with Syria and Iran” , Security Dialogue, Vol. 39, No.5, October 2008, pp.497-498.

<sup>138</sup> 361Özbudun, Ergun (2007); Democratization Reforms in Turkey: 1993-2004, Turkish Studies, Volume 8, Issue 2, June 2007, p. 180.

If we sum up core points in this chapter:

- 1- There is an idealization of West in Turkish foreign policy. Rather than strategic interests, Turkey approaches the issue through identity, as a result of Turkish modernization.
- 2- Membership of NATO and Europe are the two main pillars of Westernization of Turkish foreign policy.
- 3- Due to conjectural enforcement (1960-1970), Turkey had to reconsider its stance in foreign policy. However, relations with the Middle Eastern countries were not taken into account as an alternative to Turkey's relations with the West.
- 4- Although Western civilization idealized in Kemalist discourse, at the same time, due to losing the privileged position of Turkish politics, and Sevres Syndrome, there is a huge skepticism against the West.

In the next chapter, I will continue with geo-political position of Turkey and analyze how elites perceive geopolitics of Turkey.

## 6.4 Geo-Political Position of Turkey

Geopolitical characters are one of the most fundamental variables that Turkish decision makers have to take into account. Geopolitics gives specific attention to geography, policy makers' decisions regarding both foreign and domestic policy level base on geographical position.<sup>139</sup> According to Sloan and Gray, one of the goals of geopolitics is to point out that political predominance is a question not just of possessing power in the sense of human and material resources, but of the geopolitical context within, which that power is exercised.<sup>140</sup> A policy maker, when considering his country's geopolitical perspective, estimates and judges the opportunities and weaknesses that country has. Then he might design a foreign policy orientation, which is regulated according to the *geopolitical code*<sup>141</sup> of a

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<sup>139</sup>Hüseyin Bağcı, "Changing Geopolitics and Turkish Foreign Policy," *Understanding Geopolitics* (June 2009):4.

<sup>140</sup>Geoffrey Sloan and Colin S. Gray, "Why geopolitics?: Geopolitics Geography and Strategy (London & New York : Frank Cass, 1999), P.1-2.

<sup>141</sup>Geopolitical code is a term which is used by Colin Flint, "The manner in which a country orientates itself toward the World is called geopolitical code. For further information: (Colin Flint, *Introduction to Geopolitics*, London&Newyork, Routledge,2006)

country has.<sup>142</sup> Turkey played a crucial role regionally and internationally in the pre-Cold War, the cold war and post-cold war periods, due to its significant geopolitical position. Its territory is located in both Asia and Europe, and its influence extends south-eastern Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean, Transcaucasia, the southern regions of the former Soviet Union periphery, and the northern parts of the Middle East. The most strategic asset, Turkey possess, is the Straits of Dardanelles and Bosphorus.<sup>143</sup>

It is clear that Turkey is a major crossroads of air, land and sea routes of modern times; it lies between the industrially advanced lands of Europe and the petroleum-rich Middle East. Additionally, Turkey is the source for most of the water irrigating countries as far as the Persian Gulf. During the cold war period, Turkey played a significant role, as it was a very sensitive part of the Mediterranean, where both superpowers tried to expand their spheres of influence and to counter-balance each other.<sup>144</sup>

**Figure 5: Map of Turkey**



Source 5: Available at: <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/00summer/Turkey1.gif> (Accessed on 16.03.2015 at 17.52)

<sup>142</sup>Hüseyin Bağcı, "Changing Geopolitics and Turkish Foreign Policy," *Understanding Geopolitics* (June 2009):4

<sup>143</sup>William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000: The Ottoman And Turkish States And The International System* (London: Franks Cass, 2003), p.7.

<sup>144</sup>Mustafa Aydın, *Turkish Foreign Policy Framework and Analysis: Structural Determinants And Operational System-Geographical Realities* (Ankara Center for Strategic Research "SAM", 2004), p.24.

Turkey has a unique geographical position, in which the interests of several great powers intersect with each other. This rare geographical location also gives its foreign policy-makers a degree of flexibility not open to states which are likely to be dominated by a single great power. (Mexico and the USA case is an obvious example). This obvious advantage is that Turkey can extract some “strategic rent” from its allies.<sup>145</sup>

Geopolitics can have numerous interpretations and is a complicated area of study. We can consider economic, military, cultural, educational, diplomatic relations as coming under the umbrella of geopolitics code. Thanks to her geostrategic position, modern Turkey plays a more significant role than its territorial size, population, and economic capability would indicate.<sup>146</sup>

After such a brief introduction to Turkey’s geopolitical position, I would like to discuss discourses. Because discourses are the reflection of perception and that is why discourses play an essential roles. As Leslie Hepple underscores about geopolitic discourse:

*“....are not free-floating, innocent contributions to an ‘objective’ knowledge, but are rooted in what [Michael Foucault] calls ‘power/knowledge’, serving the interests of particular groups in society and helping to sustain and legitimate certain perspectives and interpretations”*<sup>147</sup>

The concept of geopolitics was introduced first time in Turkey in the second World in the some newspaper articles and firstly studied in military schools and turned into a concept, which legitimized the dominance of military elites over civilian political elites in domestic and foreign policy sphere. Every aspect of domestic and foreign policy such as society, agriculture, economy and administration started to be considered under the notion of geopolitics by Turkish military elites.

As Hepple argued:

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<sup>145</sup>William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000:The Ottoman And Turkish States And The International System(London: Franks Cass,2003),p.7-8.

<sup>146</sup>Mustafa Aydın, Turkish Foreign Policy Framework and Analysis: Structural Determinants And Operational System-Geograraphical Realities(Ankara: Center for Strategic Research”SAM”,2004),p.23.

<sup>147</sup>Bilgin, Pinar. "Only Strong States Can Survive in Turkey's Geography"1: The Uses of “geopolitical Truths” in Turkey." Political Geography 26 (2007): 752. Accessed November 23, 2015. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.04.003



*‘allows the military a legitimate and commanding place in all aspects of the political and economic life of the state, all in the name of the security of the state organism from both internal and external threat’*<sup>148</sup>

For example, General (Ret.) Suat ilhan<sup>149</sup> statements leave no rooms for civilian politicians also reflect the idea of militarist-secular elites:

*‘Politicians no longer have a monopoly on foreign policy issues’ and that ‘geostrategic issues are of interest not only to the Military but also scientists’*<sup>150</sup>

As we understand above, the concept of geopolitics are generally used by military elites and as a tool, which provide legitimacy and dominance over civilian rules in Turkish context.

Secondly, if we research the discourses of civilians during the Republican era, it can be clearly discerned that they find excuses about the redundant role of Army in politics or legitimize it by using discourses such as Turkey locates in the sensitive era, exceptional geography... and ironically confirm the position of the military elites in Turkish politics. For example, ex-P.M- Bulent Ecevit stated:

*‘Turkey is located at the most sensitive geopolitical location in the world....this is why the Turkish Armed Forces play a crucial role.’*

As an example, Ambassador (Ret.) Sükrü Elekdag as a response to criticism against involvement of army into foreign affairs of Turkey in 1997:

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<sup>148</sup>Bilgin, Pinar. "Only Strong States Can Survive in Turkey's Geography"1: The Uses of "geopolitical Truths" in Turkey." *Political Geography* 26 (2007): 742-745. Accessed November 23, 2015. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.04.003

<sup>149</sup>Suat Ilhan is not an ordinary retired general. He is a prolific author who has published some twenty formal studies on geopolitics including his 1989 book *Jeopolitik Duyarlilik* (Geopolitical Sensitivity) which has gone through several prints. During 1967-1969 he set up and taught the first geopolitics course at the Military Academy. His lecture notes, which were later compiled into a book, have been used as teaching material at military institutions. Resource: Bilgin, Pinar. "Only Strong States Can Survive in Turkey's Geography"1: The Uses of "geopolitical Truths" in Turkey." *Political Geography* 26 (2007): 741. Accessed November 23, 2015. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.04.003

<sup>150</sup>Bilgin, Pinar. "Only Strong States Can Survive in Turkey's Geography"1: The Uses of "geopolitical Truths" in Turkey." *Political Geography* 26 (2007): 743-745. Accessed November 23, 2015. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.04.003

*‘Due to its geopolitical and geostrategic characteristics, external security issues play a major role in shaping Turkey’s foreign policy. This requires the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of the Chief of Staff to work in tandem with each other.’<sup>151</sup>*

If we look at the content of discourses of secular elites about geopolitics, we observe that there are two components in the discourses. These are:

- 1- Fear of abandonment and fear of loss of territory.
- 2- Geographical determinism

Fear of abandonment or fear of loss of territory, as I remarked in the previous chapter, related to Sevres Syndrome. I will not explain the Sevres syndrome again here, but, it can be stated that Sevres Syndrome illustrated itself with minimal participation in international affairs especially in the early years of Republic. After the Cold War period, the discourse of fear of abandonment and fear of loss of territory intensified, particularly, due to the insurgency of Kurdish movements. For example, if we research the narratives, which were used by the high military officers, we better comprehend the fact.<sup>152</sup> For instance: General Nahit Senoglu (then Commander of the Military Academy) gave a speech to the military students at the beginning of the academic year:

*‘You will see that Turkey has the most internal and external enemies of any country in the world. You will learn about the dirty aspirations of those who hide behind values such as democracy and human rights and who want to take revenge on the republic of Atatürk.’<sup>153</sup>*

General (Ret.) Dogan Bayazit (former Secretary General of the National Security Council, 1992–1995) put emphasis on Kurdish movements and discussed:

*‘For centuries, external forces, which find a self-sufficient and powerful Turkey, in this region with enormous geopolitical advantages, as threatening to their interests have adopted the covert policy of the ‘creation of a Kurdish state’ within Turkey. Indications are such that*

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<sup>151</sup>Bilgin, Pinar. "Only Strong States Can Survive in Turkey’s Geography"1: The Uses of "geopolitical Truths" in Turkey." *Political Geography* 26 (2007): 751. Accessed November 23, 2015. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.04.003

<sup>152</sup>BILGIN, PINAR. "Turkey’s Changing Security Discourses: The Challenge of Globalisation." *European Journal of Political Research* 44 (2005): 183-184

<sup>153</sup>BILGIN, PINAR. "Turkey’s Changing Security Discourses: The Challenge of Globalisation." *European Journal of Political Research* 44 (2005): 184

*this policy is currently being forced upon the future of the country. Whenever this country has an opportunity to prosper, an ethnic or religious problem makes its appearance''*<sup>154</sup>

Narratives of high military officials show us that fear of abandonment or fear of loss of territory, which linked to Sevres Syndrome, are significant factors in the content of geopolitical discourse of secular elites.

The second important content is ‘‘Geographical determinism. ’According to that perception, Turkey locates in a very sensitive era and has to deal with threats. Because of that Turkey has to take special precautions. Such a discourses shape not just Turkey’s foreign policy, but general political mechanism as well. For instance, Bülent Ecevit (Ex-Prime Minister), made a statement:

‘‘‘Turkey’s special geographical conditions require a special type of democracy’’ (Quoted in Aydınli - Waxman 2001)<sup>155</sup>

It can be conceived explicitly that geographical determinism used as an excuse to explain Turkish democratic standards and merely imply Turkish surrounding region does not allow a more democratic system in Turkey.

In the next chapters, I will focus on conservative elites approach and narratives to compare these two distinguish elite cadre.

As a result of this chapter, we have some core points about the perception of secular elite cadre:

-Turkey has a significant location, which provides an immense advantage in international politics.

-Geopolitics is used a discourse particularly by military elites to securitize politics, and civilian politicians confirm the narratives of military elites and role of the army in politics.

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<sup>154</sup>BILGIN, PINAR. "Turkey's Changing Security Discourses: The Challenge of Globalisation." European Journal of Political Research 44 (2005): 185

<sup>155</sup>BILGIN, PINAR. "Turkey's Changing Security Discourses: The Challenge of Globalisation." European Journal of Political Research 44 (2005): 186.

-There are two different contents in geopolitical discourse: 1- Fear of abandonment and fear of loss of territory, which is related to Sevres Syndrome and the other one is geographical determinism that is used as an excuse for impediments in Turkish democracy.

## 7 Emergence of Conservative Elites

On 12 September 1980, political anarchy and economic collapse caused the third coup d'état since 1960, in which four force commanders of the armed forces, headed by the Chief of General Staff, General Kenan Evren overthrew the Demirel government, banned and suppressed political activities both of left or right and declared a new constitution in November 1982, which was restrictive and introduced his presidency for the next 7 years.<sup>156</sup> Throughout the 1980's Turkey experienced different political regimes. The 1980's began with a multi-party democracy, followed by terrorism, political chaos and economic disaster and caused September 12 coup d'état. Subsequently, a three- year transition period under military rule followed and finally again multi-party parliament under the leadership of Özal.<sup>157</sup> *After the coup d'état of 12 September 1980 period, Turkey underwent some fundamental changes in every field such as political, economic, social strata, cultural patterns, religious expression and naturally foreign policy*<sup>158</sup>. From a foreign policy aspect, we can easily call this period "activism" in foreign policy that was initiated by Prime Minister (1983-1989) and subsequently President (1989-1993), Turgut Özal. *He combined his foreign policy approach with domestic policies of liberalization and moderate Islamization with an active export strategy, particularly concerning Middle Eastern countries.*<sup>159</sup> Turgut Özal created a period of stable single party government, which Turkey had lacked since the late 1960's.<sup>160</sup>

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<sup>156</sup>William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000: Turkey and the Cold War: Turkey and the Cold War Global Shifts and Regional Conflicts (London: Franks Cass, 2003), p163-164.

<sup>157</sup>Mustafa Aydın, Turkish Foreign Policy Framework and Analysis: Turkish Foreign Policy At The End Of The Cold War Roots And Dynamics, SAM (Center for Strategic Research) (Papers, December 2004,) Ankara, p 86.

<sup>158</sup>Mustafa Aydın, Turkish Foreign Policy Framework and Analysis: Turkish Foreign Policy At The End Of The Cold War Roots And Dynamics, SAM (Center for Strategic Research) (Papers, December 2004,) Ankara, p 85.

<sup>159</sup>Dietrich Jung and Wolfango Piccoli, Turkey at the Crossroads: Encircled by enemies? Turkey's Foreign Policy and Its Middle Eastern Neighbours (London&Newyork: Zed Books, 2001), p 141.

<sup>160</sup>William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000: Turkey and the Cold War: Turkey and the Cold War Global Shifts and Regional Conflicts (London: Franks Cass, 2003), p164.

As already outlined, one of the priorities of Özal's programme was economic liberalization, which followed the policy of Ronald Reagan and Margeret Thatcher. Indeed, Özal was relatively successful in restoring economic growth and achieving greater external balance. Özal believed that the second half of 1970's illustrated the failure of not only the communist system but also, the Keynesian economic system and the welfare state.<sup>161</sup> *In the 1980's Özal's activism had an apparent aim and pursued a rapprochement policy with the Arab and Islamic world. For example, if we search the trades figures of Turkey in the 1980's, between 1980-1985, Turkey's exports to the Middle East increased fivefold with 64 percent of Turkey's total exports going to surrounding countries.* As another example, Turkey's exports to Iran rose from the US \$12million in 1979 to US\$1billion in 1985.<sup>162</sup> However, until 1983, under the military regime, Turkey clashed with fundamental Western values, which had been part of its identity since the beginning the Republic. However, the human rights violations were huge problem for Turkish political system and Turkish foreign policy.<sup>163</sup> In other words, frequency of military regimes in Turkish political history and the general tendency of suppression and violation of ideas and freedoms, even under civilian government, was always a significant obstacle for Turkish foreign policy in its relations with West. Turkish human rights records caused a lack of sympathy for Turkey in Western public opinion in this period.<sup>164</sup>

In conclusion, the political system of a country is not, naturally, restricted to 'politics' alone. We have to take into account policies, cultural affinities and ideological tendencies. In the early 1980's Turkey made a move toward Europe via implementation of liberal economic policies under Özal's leadership. Turkey's contribution to Western security interest was rewarded with foreign assistance during its economic transition. Subsequently; *Turkey started to implement an economic programme on 24 January 1980 and introduced other austerity programmes, which were of course supported by the IMF and World Bank.* Turkey attracted the vast amount of currency inflow into the country and the aim to borrow

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<sup>161</sup>William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000: Turkey and the Cold War: Turkey and the Cold War Global Shifts and Regional Conflicts* (London: Franks Cass, 2003), p164-165.

<sup>162</sup>Dietrich Jung and Wolfango Piccoli, *Turkey at the Crossroads: Encircled by enemies? Turkey's Foreign Policy and Its Middle Eastern Neighbours* (London&Newyork: Zed Books, 2001), p 141.

<sup>163</sup>Mustafa Aydın, *Turkish Foreign Policy Framework and Analysis: Turkish Foreign Policy At The End Of The Cold War Roots And Dynamics*, SAM (Center for Strategic Research) (Papers, December 2004,) Ankara, p 86.

<sup>164</sup>Ibid, p:88.

such a huge amount was persuading foreigners to invest in Turkey and diversify Turkey's exports. We can summarize the 1980's as an integration of the economy into the world economy and the 1990's as becoming a part of the global economy.<sup>165</sup> In other words, the Turkish Republic now oriented toward the West, and during the term of Özal that process reached a peak point particularly concerning Turkish- American relations.<sup>166</sup>

Another crucial point, I would like to underline, is the social engineering of Turkish society during the military regime. **The military regime in Turkey repressed the liberal and left-wing intellectuals and created an orthodox Islam as an antidote to extremism and to hinder political polarization.**<sup>167</sup> More importantly, this sort of social engineering paved the way for victory after two decades for Erdogan and his political party, AKP(Justice and Development Party).After following an active foreign policy, especially in the Middle Eastern Security complex, led to intertwining and de-territorializing of Kurdish nationalism, political Islam and Turkey had to deal with into inter-state disputes as well.<sup>168</sup> *In the Özal period, it can be obviously stated that Conservative elites achieved an undeniable victory, and Kemalist (secular elites) seriously were challenged. The emergence of Özal changed the state apparatus and society and prepared the way for a proper political environment of political Islam as well.* Turkish policy makers (particularly conservative elites) started to use the Ottoman legacy in order to solve the domestic tensions, which derive from cultural diversity and aimed to expand of influence sphere toward surrounding regions. **This Ottoman legacy was used to arouse a collective cultural memory by forming nostalgic narratives of Turkey's shared past.**<sup>169</sup>

## 7.1 Turkish Foreign Policy at the End of Cold-War

The end of the Cold-War and the collapse of Soviet Union during 1989-1991 changed Turkey's position in international politics profoundly. The main reason for Turkey's

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<sup>165</sup>Ibid,p:94-95.

<sup>166</sup>Dietrich Jung and Wolfango Piccoli, Turkey at the Crossroads: Encircled by enemies?Turkey's Foreign Policy and Its Middle Eastern Neighbours (London&Newyork:Zed Books,2001), p 148.

<sup>167</sup>Ibid,p:95.

<sup>168</sup>Dietrich Jung and Wolfango Piccoli, Turkey at the Crossroads: Encircled by enemies?Turkey's Foreign Policy and Its Middle Eastern Neighbours (London&Newyork:Zed Books,2001), p 149.

<sup>169</sup> Yılmaz Colak," Ottomanism vs Kemalism: Collective Memory And Cultural Pluralism in 1990's Turkey(London: Roudledge, July 2006),p587.

attachment to the Western alliance came to an end.<sup>170</sup> *Throughout the Cold War period, the role of Turkey was quite straightforward. Turkey played a clear cut role as a part of NATO's collective defense mechanism to hold and secures its 'Southern Flank' against the Soviet threat. In this way, Turkey hindered Soviet access to the Middle East and Mediterranean and assisted the implementation of a NATO containment strategy.*<sup>171</sup> However, after the Cold War, Turkey was affected by dramatic changes in world politics. *Turkey's position moved from a distant outpost of NATO on the European periphery to the center of the uncertain environment that has a significant impact on the Post-Cold War international politics.* Turkey was surrounded by 13 of 16 threat generating regions.<sup>172</sup> As Mustafa Aydın, foreign policy specialist argued:

*"At the end of Cold War, Turkey suddenly moved into a posture, intended to have an effect across a vast region extending (From East Europe to Western China). This change in Turkey's stance and mentality was not accidental, but due to wider changes experienced within and around Turkey during the 1980s."*<sup>173</sup>

*After the Soviet Union was constitutionally dissolved, small successor states suddenly appeared in the Black Sea region, Central Asia, and Transcaucasia. Compared to the past, when Turkey surrounded on three sides by a single and more powerful state, Turkey now faced, after fragmentation of Soviet Union, with smaller neighbors that were weaker than itself both militarily and economically.*<sup>174</sup> After the end of the Cold War, Turkey's foreign policy, which lasted for 45 years, had to be reconsidered by a new approach. Firstly, the emergence of new independent states and attempts to democratize politics in Russia created new opportunities and global cooperation. Still, a lack of mechanisms for preventing regional conflicts and instabilities within new-born states and tensions between

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<sup>170</sup>William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000: Turkish Foreign Policy After The Cold War: strategic Options and The Domestic Environment* (London: Franks Cass, 2003), p191.

<sup>171</sup> Sadi Ergüvenç, "Turkey At The Threshold Of The 21<sup>st</sup> Century Global Encounters And/VS Regional Alternatives: Turkey's strategic Importance in Military Dimension A regional Balance Holder (Ankara, International Relation Foundation, 1998), p61.

<sup>172</sup>Mustafa Aydın, *Turkish Foreign Policy Framework and Analysis: Turkish Foreign Policy At The End Of The Cold War Roots And Dynamics*, SAM (Center for Strategic Research) (Papers, December 2004,) Ankara, p 86.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid, p:85

<sup>174</sup>William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000: Turkish Foreign Policy After The Cold War: strategic Options and The Domestic Environment* (London: Franks Cass, 2003), p191.

them threatened fatal risks of interstate clashes and civil wars in the center of Euro-Asia geography where Turkey is located.<sup>175</sup> At that point, to underline the difference and importance of a new international environment, as Sükrü Sina Gürel (Ex-Foreign Minister of Turkey) pointed out:

*“A somewhat natural extension of the end of the Cold War has been the diminishing importance of the old east-west division of International system, which has been replaced by a new line dividing north and south. In such an emerging division, where the bipolarity of the Cold War era has disappeared, it seems inevitable that regional concerns would play a more important role in determining the course of international relations in the foreseeable future.”*<sup>176</sup>

*Another crucial point, which I would like to emphasize, is that even though the Soviet threat does not play a significant role anymore, Turkey, as a foreign policy approach, prefers strengthening its ties with Western allies.* As we have seen, NATO provides an ideological and institutional bridge between Turkey and the West. Turkey would also like to keep other non-military ties with the West such as the European Union. *Turkey continued its commitment to Western values, as well as economic and political liberalism. This sort of foreign policy orientation apparently indicated that there was a continuity of Turkish foreign policy preference in both Cold War and post-Cold War terms as well.* This preference means being a part of Western Civilization.<sup>177</sup>

## 7.2 Neo-Ottomanism in Turkish Foreign Policy

Turkey's foreign policy agenda were expanded in the Post-Cold War period. There was a need for a new foreign policy agenda. *Neo-Ottomanism was a rewriting of Turkish history, according to shared Ottoman past in a globalizing context. The creation of a Neo-Ottomanist narrative was not limited just to the foreign policy sphere, but it is also an attempt to implement a social engineering project in Turkish society to construct a new*

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<sup>175</sup>Mustafa Aydın, Turkish Foreign Policy Framework and Analysis: Turkish Foreign Policy At The End Of The Cold War Roots And Dynamics, SAM (Center for Strategic Research) (Papers, December 2004,) Ankara, p 109.

<sup>176</sup>Mustafa Aydın, Turkish Foreign Policy Framework and Analysis: Turkish Foreign Policy At The End Of The Cold War Roots And Dynamics, SAM (Center for Strategic Research) (Papers, December 2004,) Ankara, p 110.

<sup>177</sup>William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000: Turkish Foreign Policy After The Cold War: strategic Options and The Domestic Environment (London: Franks Cass, 2003), p191-192.



*reality. The neo-ottomanist narrative consists of two main features. The first one is a rearticulating of Turkish nationalism via increased political and cultural tolerance for diversity, as used in Ottoman past to overcome domestic tensions.* The other one is an affecting tool in foreign policy, which provides a moral motivation and legitimation in surrounding regions, and the elimination of economic borders among Balkan, Caucasian, and Middle-Eastern states, while still respecting the political boundaries of the countries in the ex-Ottoman space.<sup>178</sup>

Furthermore, Özal and the conservative elites' pay particular attention to uniqueness discourse i.e. "exceptionalism narrative", which refers to the countries geographical positions, history, culture and beliefs and were often used for motivation purposes in foreign policy. For example, in one speech Özal (1992) argued:

*"Our country is located between developed Western countries and Islamic countries that have rich oil resources. Our location has advantages and certain difficulties. Like a bridge that connects two people, we must connect these two cultures differing in their main orientations and at the same time we should not cause any conflict within us. In other words, we should synthesize West's science and technology and Middle East's belief and value system and present it for the use of humanity. Turkey that can construct a bridge in this regard will do great service for regional and world peace",*<sup>179</sup>

**If we look more deeply at the core features of Neo-Ottomanism, we notice that it is not an anti-Western ideology. However, it is a counter-hegemonic movement,** which challenges the universality of Western values, particularly Kemalism. It is in a favor of political and economic globalization, to put it another way, Neo-Ottomanism is a proponent of liberal democracy and free market economy, but it combines these two main values with a distinct localized common identity.<sup>180</sup> On that point, Yanik had an interesting contribution, and approached the theme from a different perspective and stated:

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<sup>178</sup>Yılmaz Colak, "Ottomanism vs Kemalism: Collective Memory And Cultural Pluralism in 1990's Turkey (London: Roudledge, July 2006), p588.

<sup>179</sup>Lerna K. Yanık, "Constructing Turkish "exceptionalism": Discourses of liminality and hybridity in post-Cold War Turkish foreign policy" Department of Political Science (2011): 5.

<sup>180</sup>Ibid, p:588

*“Though neither Turkey nor its precursor Ottoman Empire was ever colonized, both entities historically have had an uneasy relationship with the “West” and displayed the reflexes of a post-colonial country. Liminal representations grounded in hybrid constructions of geography and history not only paves the way for “exceptionalism.” Such representations also turn exceptionalism into a strategy of resistance and paradoxically, a claim of superiority against the West”* <sup>181</sup>

To sum up, at the end of 1980's and 1990's, Turkey had to deal with new identities in the domestic environment and the surrounding regions, such as Kurdish, Islamic and Balkan identities. Within this heterogeneous frame (multiculturalism of Turkey's population), some conservative elites in politics and academia, reinterpreted and reimagined the Ottoman past, especially its cultural pluralism to overcome the present political reality that Turkey faces and offers a model for a multifaceted identity and political unity.<sup>182</sup> ***Neo-Ottomanism posed two fundamental challenges to secular elites – and secular state apparatus. The first one is an imperial vision concerning Turkish foreign policy approach and national homogeneity. The second one emphasizes cultural diversity and cultural pluralism that is a legacy of the Ottoman Empire in Turkish society.*** However, in the 1990s, liberal conservative elites, who were represented by Özal, could not manage to find sufficient support from the Turkish ruling class and intellectuals, due to a theoretical deficiency, concerning challenging the official ideology of Kemalism by paying attention to Islam as a primary resource of Turkish identity.<sup>183</sup>

As a result of the 1990s, Turkey faced conflicts in its neighborhood and domestic politics. Coalition governments could not formulate and implement well-founded foreign policy because they could not stay in power in the long term, which is necessary for political stability. So; military and civilian bureaucratic elites were in the driving seat and shaped Turkish foreign policy. For example, in this period, Turkey had to deal with Kurdish separatist movements, which became the most important priority in the political agenda and led to a state of emergency in The South-east part of Turkey. During this period, so many serious human rights violations occurred. In light of these developments, to handle domestic

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<sup>181</sup> Lerna K. Yanık, "Constructing Turkish "exceptionalism": Discourses of liminality and hybridity in post-Cold War Turkish foreign policy" Department of Political Science (2011): 4.

<sup>182</sup>Yılmaz Colak," Ottomanism vs Kemalism: Collective Memory And Cultural Pluralism in 1990's Turkey(London: Roudledge, July 2006),p589.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid, p:598-599

and international conflicts, Turkey created narratives, which tried to justify using coercive military instruments rather than soft power. In the 1990's, **Turkey approached foreign policy from a realist perspective**, using military power as the main option, to safeguard the national security and preserve the status quo.<sup>184</sup>

This sort of foreign policy uses a narrative, which precludes Turkey's geographical neighborhood particularly in the Middle East and its past. As such: Turkey should find an alliance from out of its region to overcome any threats, which result from its geography. In the 1990's, Turkey was faced with the highly dynamic international environment. **This dynamic international environment was interpreted by Kemalist elites as a revitalization of the Sevres syndrome and was perceived as a direct threat to the political regime and their existence.**<sup>185</sup>

In 1992, Özal's unexpected death led to domination by military and bureaucratic secular elites and the imposition of their narratives in domestic and international affairs. As outlined above, these state narratives are not sufficient to give necessary response to a changing environment in the surrounding region of Turkey. After Ozal, Turkey entered a period of political crisis. The successors of Ozal, as centre-right leaders of Turkish politics, were weak and lacked political experience and determination. After Süleyman Demirel became president, there were no potential leaders in the center-right, who had the vision of Ozal or political skills of Süleyman Demirel. With such a leadership gap in the center-right, Islamists or (conservative elites) benefited from the domestic political environment. Specifically, after Islamists won municipalities in cities such as in Istanbul and Ankara in 1994, this process accelerated. At the end of 1990's, we had a domestic political environment, which was shaped by the voting preferences of Islamists.<sup>186</sup>

Islamists had their first victory in the 1995 election; Welfare party achieved to take part in the coalition government in 1996. However, in 1997, the military indirectly intervened in the government and domestic political environment in Turkey.<sup>187</sup> At a meeting of the MGK

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<sup>184</sup>Kadri Renda, " Discursive change in Turkish strategic culture: changing narratives, roles and values"(PhD diss., King's College, June 2013),p146-147.

<sup>185</sup>Kadri Renda, " Discursive change in Turkish strategic culture: changing narratives, roles and values"(PhD diss., King's College, June 2013),p148-149

<sup>186</sup>Hasan Kösebalan, " Torn Identities and Foreign Policy: The Case of Turkey and Japan"Insight Turkey Vol. 10 / No.1(2008) :15

<sup>187</sup> Ibid, p:15

(National Security Council) on 28 February 1997, Top Commanders issued an 18-point declaration, asking the government to take measures to stop the growing Islamist activities all over Turkey.<sup>188</sup> In the following five years, Turkey was intensively confronted with violations of fundamental human rights in the name of protecting secular Turkey. This process is known as the 28-February period in Turkish politics. Examples include a headscarf ban on university campuses. The military then removed the Refah-led government from power later that year. Refah was banned. During this unstable time in Turkish politics, a new group emerged from RP and established AKP (Justice and Development Party). Interestingly, the party identified itself with conservative-liberal values and perceived itself as a continuation of D.P. (Democrat Party) and ANAP. (Motherland Party). Rather than a party of Islamism, which was still identified with the Milli-Gorus movement<sup>189</sup> and Necmettin Erbakan<sup>190</sup>. The ultimate aim of AKP, as pointed out above, is to fill the center-right gap, after Turgut Ozal.<sup>191</sup>

In this chapter we arrive some significant points:

- 1-Conservative elites emerged and the first time strongly challenged the Kemalist elite cadre.
- 2-After the end of the Cold War, core perception, at the elite level, of Turkey's geography changed. Newly arouse conservative elites brought new concepts and consideration, not just as the result of changing the international and regional dynamics, but also to gain domestic support and advantage against Kemalist elite cadre.
- 3-The new elites cooperate with status-quo power, they did not follow revisionist foreign policy even though they strengthened the ties with the surrounding region.

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<sup>188</sup><http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/tu-military-coup-1997.htm> (Accessed on 07.06.2015 at 16.16)

<sup>189</sup>Milli Gorus movement is one of "the leading Turkish diaspora organizations in Europe and also described as the largest Islamic organization operating in the West. Founded in 1969. <http://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1268/vielhaber.pdf> (Accessed on 26.11.2015 at 20.09.)

<sup>190</sup> The ideology and political agenda of the Milli Görüş are rooted in the ideas of Necmettin Erbakan (1926-2011), a leading Turkish Islamist intellectual who was also one of the most influential Turkish politicians in the second half of the 20th century. Erbakan's political vision was radically anti-secular and anti-Western, and throughout his career, he called for the overthrow of Turkey's secular Kemalist regime. <http://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1268/vielhaber.pdf> (Accessed on 26.11.2015 at 20.09.)

<sup>191</sup>Hasan Kösebalan, " Torn Identities and Foreign Policy: The Case of Turkey and Japan" Insight Turkey Vol. 10 / No.1(2008) :p.15

4-Neo- Ottomanism presented as a cure of Turkish domestic problem and as a new motive in Turkish foreign policy.

This period ended unsuccessfully due to following reasons:

- 1-The conservative elite cadre were suppressed through military and judiciary.
- 2-There was a leadership gap in the centre-right politics after Ozal's death.
- 3-The cadres in Turkish state apparatus (in Foreign Ministry, security forces, were not ready to fulfill the new foreign policy orientations) were designed according to the Cold War concept. For instance, there were not enough number of diplomats who could speak Arabic.

In the next chapter, I will focus on Erdogan's era and compare the perception of conservative elite cadre through to examine the significant foreign policy cases and profoundly looking at the discourses. My main frame consists of four core points, which was mentioned in the previous chapters. These are:

- 1- Creation of new Ideology (Kemalism) after fragmentation of Ottoman Empire.
- 2- Sevres syndrome.
- 3- Idealization of West.
- 3- Perception about Turkey's Geopolitical position.

## **8 Erdogan's Era in Turkey**

The November 2002 elections brought a significant victory for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and A.K.P, which acquired almost 363 of 555 parliamentary seats with 34.2 percent of the vote. This was the new political era in the history of the Republic of Turkey.<sup>192</sup>There were two core reasons for this change. The first one is, as pointed out in a previous part that voters did not consider A.K.P. as an Islamist party, although party elites derive from Erbakan's Welfare's party, and even though there was a huge suspicion about a hidden agenda from secular courts, media, and civilian groups. Moreover, the A.K.P elites introduced themselves as a conservative party with a liberal economic agenda and used a

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<sup>192</sup>Soner Cagaptay, "The November 2002 Elections and Turkey's New Political Era " Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (December 2002) : p.42

moderate-non-confrontational rhetoric during the election campaign. This election victory was a golden opportunity for AKP cadre, who started their political adventure in Islamist opposition and now for the first time, came to form a single majoritarian government.<sup>193</sup> The second crucial factor is A.K.P was able to channel frustration of voters, which was formed during the Implementation of I.M.F (International Monetary Fund) reforms by (Kemal Dervis<sup>194</sup>)<sup>195</sup>. By doing so, A.K.P. managed to attract many moderate urban voters, who were tired of economically disastrous and corrupt governments of the 1990's and wanted to punish old political establishment.<sup>196</sup>

*At this point, I would like to clarify that political stability is one of the most crucial determinants that we should take into account to analyze the success of A.K.P.* If we look at the Turkish political system after the 1950's, we obviously notice that Turkey, due to a lack of a compromised culture in Turkish politics, always did very well under majority government, which brought economic growth and prosperity, in the 1950s, late 1960s, and 1980s. In my opinion, that was the key driver of the success of the A.K.P government. The main promises of A.K.P were to achieve economic recovery, growth, and political stability.<sup>197</sup> Erdogan represents a dramatic shift in the main essence of Turkish Republic. Erdogan as a political figure is quite different compared to other political leaders in Turkish political history before his era and is the most influential political leader since Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. There are positive and negative aspects of the A.K.P, however, researching these aspects are not the primary aim of this master thesis and exceed the scope of this work.

Before proceeding to the next chapter, I would like to compare to conservative elites Ozal and Erdogan concisely.

As pointed out in previous chapters, concerning Turkey's foreign policy, there are some interesting common points between Özal and Erdoğan. *Compared to Ozal, Erdogan*

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<sup>193</sup> Ibid, p:47.

<sup>194</sup> Kemal Derviş is vice president and director of Global Economy and Development. Formerly head of the United Nations Development Programme and Minister of Economic Affairs of Turkey, he focuses on global economics, emerging markets, development and international institutions.  
<http://www.brookings.edu/experts/dervisk?view=bio> (Accessed on 27.11.2015 at 13.18)

<sup>195</sup> Soner Cagaptay, " The November 2002 Elections and Turkey's New Political Era " Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (December 2002) : p.42

<sup>196</sup> Ibid, p:42-43.

<sup>197</sup> Ibid, p:43.

*was more successful in eliminating veto players from secular elites.* For example, both of them had to confront the military and bureaucratic elites. *Özal, as president, overruled this presidential power to appoint the chief of staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, which was described by the media at the time as a “civilian coup.”* *Ozal had unsuccessfully attempted to reduce the military’s role in Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT).* *However, Erdogan managed to eliminate secular opposition in state apparatus.* *Additionally, both of the presidents wanted a formal shift from a parliamentary to a presidential system. Because they believe that this sort of political system will protect Turkey from political crises, which were caused due to coalition governments in Turkish politics in the 1970s and 1990s, and create an effective decision-making system.* Additionally, both of the politicians want to restore Turkey’s relations in its neighborhood. Ozal tried to alter the fundamental dynamics between Greece and Turkey.<sup>198</sup> Ozal did not have an enough power to accomplish his vision, but Erdogan, after a long challenge to secular elites, managed to dominate Turkish politics and eliminate any opposition to the state apparatus.

In the next chapter, I will reveal how Erdogan achieved to oust the Secular elite.


## **8.1 Power Shifting In Turkish Politic**

The democratic elections are the most significant tool how Erdogan captured and consolidated his power. If we look at the national election results profoundly, it can be expounded obviously the power shifting in Turkish politics.

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<sup>198</sup><http://www.fpri.org/geopoliticus/2014/09/turkeys-shifting-strategic-culture-part-i> ( Accessed on 19.06.2015 at 17.50)

**Table 1: National Election Results of AKP (2002-2015)**



Source 6: <http://electionresources.org/tr/> (Accessed on 28.11.2015 at 14.11). Note that there are totally 550 members in the Turkish parliament and are elected for four years term.

First of all, as we see in the chart, for example, in 2002 national election, A.K.P was represented by 363 deputies with 34,3%, however, in 2007 and in 2011 election, although A.K.P reached higher percentage, represented less or in another Word in 2002 election overrepresented, due to the threshold electoral system<sup>199</sup>(10 percent) in Turkey. The chart shows us that under A.K.P, Turkey between 2002 and 2015 was ruled by a single party and A.K.P guaranteed to rule until 2019. Furthermore, I should underscore that Abdullah Gül, whom was the founding member of A.K.P elected as 11th president of Turkey in 2007 and served until 2014 and on 28 August 2014, Recep Tayyip Erdogan became first directly elected president of Turkey and his tenure of Office will be ended in 2019.

If we examine the power and duties of Turkish president according to article 104 of Turkish Constitution:

<sup>199</sup>The concept derives from the fact that all electoral systems impose some kind of threshold that a party must exceed in order to gain representation. [https://www.tcd.ie/Political\\_Science/staff/michael\\_gallagher/EISystems/Docts/effthresh.php](https://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/EISystems/Docts/effthresh.php) (Accessed on 28.11.2015 at 14.53)



***‘1-Those related to legislation:***

- ✓ *To return laws to the Turkish Grand National Assembly to be reconsidered,*
- ✓ *To submit to referendum, if he/she deems necessary, legislation regarding amendments to the Constitution,*
- ✓ *To appeal to the Constitutional Court for an annulment in part or entirety of certain provisions of laws having the force of law, and the Rules of Procedure of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on the grounds that they are unconstitutional in form or in content.*

***2- ) Those related to the executive function:***

- ✓ *To appoint the members and Chairman of the State Supervisory Council,*
- ✓ *To instruct the State Supervisory Council to carry out enquiries, investigations and inspections,*
- ✓ *To appoint the members of the Higher Education Council, and*
- ✓ *To appoint rectors of universities,*
- ✓ *To decide on the use of the Turkish Armed Forces,*
- ✓ *To appoint the Chief of General Staff,*
- ✓ *To call the National Security Council to meet,*
- ✓ *To preside over the National Security Council,*
- ✓ *To proclaim martial law or state of emergency, and to issue decrees having the force of law, in accordance with the decisions of the Council of Ministers convened under his/her chairmanship,*
- ✓ *To sign decrees*

***3- ) Those related to the judiciary:***

- ✓ *To appoint the members of the Constitutional Court.*
- ✓ *One-fourth of the members of the Council of State.*
- ✓ *The Chief Public Prosecutor and the Deputy Chief Public Prosecutor of the High Court of Appeals.*
- ✓ *The members of the Military High Court of Appeals.*
- ✓ *The members of the Supreme Military Administrative Court and the members of the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors.’’<sup>200</sup>*

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<sup>200</sup> <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/presidency/power/> (Accessed on 28.11.2015 at 15.27)

As a result, it can be argued that Turkey ruled under A.K.P since 2002 and A.K.P guaranteed to rule Turkey until 2019 and particularly after 2007, the presidency was under the control of conservative elites, which indicates that conservative elite cadre gained uncontested victory over secular elite cadre and controlled whole state apparatus. After such an indication, before I continue with the next chapter, I would like to illustrate some crucial challenges and its results between secular elite cadre and conservative elite cadre in briefly.

- ✓ When his party got 363 seats Turkish parliament in November 2002 election, he was unable to become prime minister because he was banned from holding political Office due to reading a political poem.<sup>201</sup>(BBC News). After the 58th Government was founded with Abdullah Gül as Prime Minister, and elections were repeated in the province of Siirt, Erdoğan was elected as an MP and the 59th Government was founded with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as the Prime Minister.<sup>202</sup>(Yenisafak).
- ✓ The “e-memorandum,” posted on the military’s website around midnight on April 27, 2007, was the first episode in a chain of events that plunged Turkey into political turmoil and forced early elections. In the statement, the army threatened to step in to protect Turkey’s secular system, hours later Parliament held an inconclusive, first-round vote to elect a new president, with the Islamist-rooted Abdullah Gül standing as the sole candidate.<sup>203</sup>(Hürriyet Daily News).The Republic Protests (Turkish: Cumhuriyet Mitingleri) were a series of peaceful mass rallies that took place in Turkey in 2007 in support of a strict principle of state secularism. The protesters are concerned that the ruling party's candidate (Abdullah Gül) for the post remains loyal to his Islamic roots.<sup>204</sup>(BBC News). His candidacy, however, was blocked by secular parties and the military. Later, A.K.P called for a snap election and AKP won an obvious victory in the general elections, and Abdullah Gül became the 11th president of Turkey.<sup>205</sup>

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<sup>201</sup><http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2270642.stm> (Accessed on 28.11.2015 at 17.27)

<sup>202</sup><http://www.yenisafak.com/en/news/turkey-general-election-history-2334171> (Accessed on 28.11.2015 at 17.33)

<sup>203</sup><http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/e-memo-was-not-coup-says-former-top-soldier.aspx?pageID=238&nID=34294&NewsCatID=338> (Accessed on 28.11.2015 at 19.01)

<sup>204</sup><http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6604643.stm> (Accessed on 28.11.2015 at 18.36)

<sup>205</sup>

- ✓ In 2008, Supreme Court of Appeals Chief Prosecutor Abdurrahman Yalçinkaya requested the closure of the AKP and a ban on 71 of its high-level officials from engaging in politics for five years, including President Gül [a former AKP member] and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan<sup>206</sup>. ((Hürriyet Daily News).The court's ruling formally launches the case against the AKP, which won 46,6 percent of the votes in 2007 general election. The 11 judges voted by six to five for closure. Under the court's rules, at least seven votes in favour were needed for a dissolution ruling. The court instead opted to strip the party of state funding - a verdict that implied the AKP has been guilty of anti-secularism but not sufficiently to justify closure.<sup>207</sup>(Guardian)
- ✓ Ergenekon and Balyoz trials, which changed the dynamic of civilian-military relations in the favour of civilian and restricted the role of the army in politics, however, suspects of both of the cases released and found not guilty.
- ✓ On May 27, 2013: A group activists from Taksim Solidarity, a civil group that had voiced criticism of the renovation plans all along, gathered in Gezi Park in Istanbul after bulldozers came to the area to cut down the trees in the park, however, after police intervention protest turned into a national wide anti-government protest, during the protests, government was harshly criticized due to disproportionate usage of power of security forces on civilian. However, government achieved to cease the protests.<sup>208</sup>(Hürriyet Daily News)

As a result, it can be obviously stated that A.K.P dominated Turkish politics more than a decade, and conservative elites have an opportunity to influence whole state apparatus such as legislative, executive branches, bureaucracy, and judiciary and finally have the power to shape foreign policy priorities.

In the next chapter, five significant foreign policy incidents during the era of A.K.P will be selected, and the reaction of conservative elites will be interpreted according to four criteria, which are mentioned in the previous chapters. These four criteria are:

- 1- Ideology (Kemalism) 2- Sevres syndrome.3- Idealization of West.

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<http://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdullah-Gul> (Accessed on 28.11.2015 at 18.54)

<sup>206</sup> <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ruling-party-to-face-closure-trial.aspx?pageID=438&n=ruling-party-to-face-closure-trial-2008-04-01> (Accessed on 28.11.2015 at 17.49)

<sup>207</sup> <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/30/turkey.nato1> (Accessed on 28.11.2015 at 17.46)

<sup>208</sup> <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/timeline-of-gezi-park-protests-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=48321&NewsCatID=341> (Accessed on 28.11.2015)

#### 4-Perception about Turkey's Geopolitical position.

## 9 Significant Foreign Policy Cases during A.K.P Era:

In this chapter, 5 cases were selected during the A.K.P. These cases are:

- 1- Turkey- Brazil- Iran Nuclear Deal.
- 2- Turkish-Israeli Relations during A.K.P Era.
- 3- Turkey's involvement in Syrian Conflict.
- 4- Turkey- Muslim Brotherhood Relations.
- 5- Turkey- Russia Jet Incident.

In this part, these five foreign policy developments are selected, because these cases are excellent examples, which illustrates the differences between secular and conservative elites' reactions, and prove my main argument: *'There is a shift in Turkish foreign policy, because of change of Turkish strategic culture. These change occurred due to change of elite cadre in Turkish state apparatus.'*

### 9.1 Case 1: Turkey- Brazil- Iran nuclear Deal

Turkey' played an active role with Brazil to find a solution to the dispute between Iran and the Western World over the Iranian nuclear enrichment programme in 2010. "Turkey and Brazil, both non-permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, offered to mediate to find a resolution to the impasse at a time when world powers are in talks to impose a fourth round of U.N. sanctions on Iran. (Reuter)"<sup>209</sup>Turkey along with Brazil appeared as important regional actors looking for a deal, which would bring an end to sanctions on Iran.<sup>210</sup>Turkey and Brazil's common strategy can be viewed as a desire for expanding their global influence, especially in the Middle East, via active diplomacy. To achieve that Iranian Nuclear conflict with West offer a great opportunity for Turkey.<sup>211</sup>According to the agreement, Iran accepted

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<sup>209</sup><http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/16/us-iran-nuclear-deal-idUSTRE64F29P20100516#paCuci9jYs8FiPWj.97> (Accessed on 30.11.2015 at 17.32)

<sup>210</sup>ÖNİŞ, ZİYA. "Multiple Faces of the "New" Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique." *Insight Turkey* 13 13 (2011): 52. [http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insight-turkey\\_vol\\_13\\_no\\_1\\_2011\\_onis.pdf](http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insight-turkey_vol_13_no_1_2011_onis.pdf)

to send 1,200 kg of 3, 5% enriched uranium to Turkey in exchange for 20% enriched uranium from Western countries. But, the Vienna Group, the EU, and the Obama Administration responded to this proposal negatively due to high skepticism toward Iran.

**Figure 6: Iran Nuclear Deal**



Source 7: <http://edition.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/05/21/turkey.brazil.world.stage/> (Accessed on 04.12.2015 at 01.25)

As a result, United Nations Security Council s approved the fourth sanctions package on Iran. Turkey could not stop the sanctions on Iran at the United Nations Security Council in June 2010.<sup>212</sup> Although Turkey could not achieve the goal of its diplomatic attempt, this attempt indicates some crucial points, which represent the disengagement from the traditional line of the Turkish foreign policy.

- This act with Brazil aimed to take a diplomatic initiative in a highly significant international conflict and perceived as an act against leading the diplomatic mission of U.S and other Western institutions. (Sustaining the current international balance of power principle of Kemalism-Idealization of West).
- This act can also be interpreted as a cooperation of none-Western developing countries against the developed countries, which have privileges on nuclear technology. (Idealization of West) This act illustrates (overcoming of Sevres Syndrome), which is a lack of self-confident and introverts policy, unwilling to cooperate with regional and

<sup>211</sup>Gurzel, Aylin. "Turkey's Role in Defusing the Iranian Nuclear Issue." 2012, 147. Accessed November30,2015.

[http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Aylin\\_Gurzel/publication/268575140\\_Turkeys\\_Role\\_in\\_Defusing\\_the\\_Iranian\\_Nuclear\\_Issue/links/5470637f0cf216f8cfa9ef26.pdf](http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Aylin_Gurzel/publication/268575140_Turkeys_Role_in_Defusing_the_Iranian_Nuclear_Issue/links/5470637f0cf216f8cfa9ef26.pdf).

<sup>212</sup>ÖNİŞ, ZİYA. "Multiple Faces of the "New" Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique." Insight Turkey 13 13 (2011): 52. [http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insight-turkey\\_vol\\_13\\_no\\_1\\_2011\\_onis.pdf](http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insight-turkey_vol_13_no_1_2011_onis.pdf)

global actors (Highly suspicious toward them) or lack of any willing to shape regional developments or involvement in any conflict.

- This act also shows a distinctive feature of Turkish geopolitics discourse, which portray Iran as a historical, regional rival and one of the primary enemy of Turkish secular political regime. However, after the Arab Spring spread over to Syria in 2011, regional competition between these two countries intensified and the both of the countries returned the historical positions.

## 9.2 Case 2: Turkish-Israeli Relations during A.K.P Era

First of all, it must be underscored that Turkey recognised Israel in 1948 as a first Muslim nation and Turkey is the only Muslim country, which has formal and friendly relations with the Jewish state for many decades.<sup>213</sup> If we scrutinize profoundly the relationship between Turkey and Israel, particularly after the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference and the 1993 Oslo Accords, the Full diplomatic relations were founded by Turkey in 1992, which removed obstacles and restriction on Turkey's ability to advance its ties with Israel and grounded the strategic partnership in the whole era of the 1990s and early 2000s.<sup>214</sup> For Turkey, it can be mentioned two main factors to establish deep ties with Israel. Firstly, The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) was the most influential institution in Turkish politics during the 1990s and was the principal actor to shape the Turkish foreign policy and desired to improve relations between Turkey and Israel.<sup>215</sup> For Turkish military elite, it was significant to illustrate domestically to Islamist government of that time (Under the premiership of Necmettin Erbakan) and International public that Turkey is a secular and pro-Western country, and that was the reason why relationship with Israel has a symbolic value.<sup>216</sup> The second main reason was pragmatism. For example, for Turkey, the good relations with Israel

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<sup>213</sup>Volfová, Gabriela Özel. "Changes in Turkish-Israeli Relations:." 2014, 83. Accessed December 7, 2015. <http://static.cejiss.org/data/uploaded/1400105687309543/Article 05.pdf>.

<sup>214</sup>Cohen, Matthew S, and Charles D Freilich. "Breakdown and Possible Restart: Turkish-Israeli Relations under the AKP." 8 (2014): 40. Accessed December 7, 2015. <http://www.israelcfr.com/documents/8-1/8-1-5-MatthewSCohen-CharlesDFreilich.pdf>.

<sup>215</sup>Cohen, Matthew S, and Charles D Freilich. "Breakdown and Possible Restart: Turkish-Israeli Relations under the AKP." 8 (2014): 40. Accessed December 7, 2015. <http://www.israelcfr.com/documents/8-1/8-1-5-MatthewSCohen-CharlesDFreilich.pdf>.

<sup>216</sup>Volfová, Gabriela Özel. "Changes in Turkish-Israeli Relations:." 2014, 83-84. Accessed December 7, 2015. <http://static.cejiss.org/data/uploaded/1400105687309543/Article 05.pdf>

provided the support of the Jewish lobby in the United States against the Armenian lobby, which attempted to push the US Congress to adopt a law on the recognition of the Armenian genocide. And most importantly, Turkish military paid attention to military cooperation with Israel to contribute its modernization.<sup>217</sup> However, after A.K.P came to power, Turkey's relations with Israel underwent a sharp retrogression diplomatically and militarily, nevertheless it was not affected economically.<sup>218</sup> During the AKP term, the role of the Turkish military in politics decreased due to the enthusiasm of implementing European Union reforms through legislative changes.<sup>219</sup> Decreasing role of Turkish army is not the only reason for shifting the relationship between Israel and Turkey. There are other important dynamics as well such as changing perception toward the Middle East, AKP's Islamic orientation or increase the role of Turkish public opinion in politics. However, to discuss all these aspects is not the aim of this work. Below I show the significant events between Turkey and Israel during the AKP era.

- In 2007, President Shimon Peres was invited to the Turkish parliament. This visit has a historical importance because first time an Israeli president addressed the parliament of a Muslim-majority nation.<sup>220</sup>
- Erdogan stormed out of the January 2009 World Economic Forum in Davos after criticizing Israeli President Shimon Peres for Israeli operation Cast Lead in Gaza.<sup>221</sup> (Guardian).
- Mavi Marmara incident occurred on May 31, 2010, Israel Navy troops boarded half a dozen ships that made up a flotilla headed from Turkey for the Gaza Strip. The six-vessel convoy had the intent of breaking through a comprehensive blockade Israel had

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<sup>217</sup> Volfová, Gabriela Özel. "Changes in Turkish-Israeli Relations:." 2014, 85. Accessed December 7, 2015. <http://static.cejiss.org/data/uploaded/1400105687309543/Article 05.pdf>

<sup>218</sup> Volfová, Gabriela Özel. "Changes in Turkish-Israeli Relations:." 2014, 93. Accessed December 7, 2015. <http://static.cejiss.org/data/uploaded/1400105687309543/Article 05.pdf>

<sup>219</sup> Volfová, Gabriela Özel. "Changes in Turkish-Israeli Relations:." 2014, 86. Accessed December 7, 2015. <http://static.cejiss.org/data/uploaded/1400105687309543/Article 05.pdf>

<sup>220</sup> Cohen, Matthew S, and Charles D Freilich. "Breakdown and Possible Restart: Turkish-Israeli Relations under the AKP." 8 (2014): 41. Accessed December 7, 2015. <http://www.israelcfr.com/documents/8-1/8-1-5-MatthewSCohen-CharlesDFreilich.pdf>.

<sup>221</sup> <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/30/turkish-prime-minister-gaza-davos> (Accessed on 15.12.2015 at 08.53)



placed on the coastal territory. Several Turkish citizens, travelling in a convoy of ships with humanitarian aid to Gaza, were killed by Israeli soldiers.<sup>222</sup>(Haaretz)

- Turkey suspended joint military exercises and Israeli diplomats had to leave Turkey in 2011.<sup>223</sup>(Washington post)
- On 22 March 2014, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu phoned Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan to apologise for the lost of Turkish citizens in the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident, which was initiated by Obama. After a month, on 21 April 2014, the first round of rapprochement talks began between Israel and Turkey, focusing on compensation for families of nine Turks killed in the flotilla.<sup>224</sup>

As a result, it can be arrived vast differences regard to the Israel-Turkey relationship in the era of A.K.P.(conservative elites) compare to secular elites. These are:

- (Change of geopolitical perception). As It was underlined above, geopolitical discourses were determined by Military, however during the era of A.K.P power and role of army decreased dramatically and that circumstance directly affected the essence of the relation between Israel and Turkey.
- Moreover, relationship with Israel had a symbolic value, which illustrates the Turkey's secular characteristic and willingness of the being part of Western civilization. However, after A.K.P came to power, new Turkish elites did not attach importance such a symbolism. (Influence of Kemalism).

### 9.3 Case 3: Turkey's involvement in Syrian Conflict

In 2011, largely peaceful protests in Syria, which demands political and economic reforms,- turned into full-scale civil war and became one of the significant issues on the international relations of today and Turkey involved this conflict actively. In the 1990s,

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<sup>222</sup><http://www.haaretz.com/misc/tags/Gaza%20flotilla-1.476996> (Accessed on 15.12.2015 at 09.03)

<sup>223</sup>[https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/turkey-expels-israeli-ambassador-over-flotilla-incident/2011/09/02/gIQABl6bwJ\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/turkey-expels-israeli-ambassador-over-flotilla-incident/2011/09/02/gIQABl6bwJ_story.html) (Accessed on 15.12.2015 at 09.14)

<sup>224</sup> Volfová, Gabriela Özel. "Changes in Turkish-Israeli Relations:." 2014, 88. Accessed December 7, 2015. [http://static.cejiss.org/data/uploaded/1400105687309543/Article\\_05.pdf](http://static.cejiss.org/data/uploaded/1400105687309543/Article_05.pdf)



Turkey and Syria had a serious conflict over Syria's support for the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) activities against the Turkish state. Furthermore, control of the Euphrates' water distribution and Syria's historic rejection of Turkey's annexation of Iskenderun/Hatay cause the main reasons for ongoing tension between Turkey and Syria.<sup>225</sup> However, between the 2002- 2011 (The period after conservative elites in Turkey came to power), the relation between Turkey and Syria improved. Turkey under new elite cadre implemented zero problems with neighbour doctrine. For example, in September 2009, Turkey's foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu and his Syrian counterpart Walid al-Mouallim signed an agreement that put an end visa requirements between Turkey and Syria. This agreement also allows free trade and provide that people and goods could pass freely over the same borders. Syria's president, Hafez's son Bashar al-Assad and Recep Tayyip Erdogan established close ties with each other.<sup>226</sup> But after Arab spring brought out and spread over the Syria, relation between Turkey and Syria deteriorated again, even became worse. Erdoğan demanded from Assad to implement deep-rooted political reforms rather than using brutal state force against the protesters and advised him to share power with the Muslim Brothers. After the uprising, Turkey started to assist FSA (Free Syrian Army) and other oppositions in Syria. To cover the Turkey's interest in Syria is not the primary aim of this work and exceed the content of this work. But below, I will point out Turkey's main interest lines in Syrian conflict:

- ✓ Syrian crisis deepened the conflict between Iran and Turkey in the region. Turkey (as well as Qatar and Saudi Arabia) is supporting Sunni rebel groups in the fight against a coalition of Iranian-supported Shi'ite forces in Syria.<sup>227</sup>
- ✓ Kurdish separatism is one of the most serious security priority of Turkey, after the uprising in Syria, Kurdish groups' activities at Nord Syria is still Turkey's primary concern. That stance of Turkey is criticized by its alliance because Turkey gives higher priority to Kurdish separatist movements than Islamic State activities.<sup>228</sup>

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<sup>225</sup>Hinnebusch, Raymond. "Back to Enmity Turkey-Syria Relations Since the Syrian Uprising." *Orient*, 2015, 14. Accessed January 5, 2016. [https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/10023/6068/1/Turkey\\_Syria\\_Relations\\_Orient\\_I\\_2015\\_Hinnebusch\\_1\\_.pdf](https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/10023/6068/1/Turkey_Syria_Relations_Orient_I_2015_Hinnebusch_1_.pdf).

<sup>226</sup>Phillips, Christopher. "Turkey and Syria." 34. Accessed January 5, 2016. <http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/publications/reports/pdf/sr007/syria.pdf>

<sup>227</sup>Cagaptay, Soner, and Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. "Syrian Crisis Leading Towards Open Turkey-Iran Conflict." May 26, 2013. Accessed January 7, 2016. <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/syrian-crisis-leading-towards-open-turkey-iran-conflict>.

<sup>228</sup><https://www.rt.com/op-edge/327446-turkey-kurds-oil-isis/> Accessed on 07.01.2016 at 03.33

- ✓ An enormous number of Syrian refugees flows to Turkey, and this situation poses a significant security threat to Turkey. Turkey hosts now the world's largest community of Syrians displaced by the ongoing conflict in their country. According to United Nations figures, Turkey's Syrian refugee population was more than 1, 7 million as of mid-March 2015,<sup>229</sup> according to unofficial estimates, Turkey currently hosts around 2 million Syrian refugees. There are totally 25 camps in 10 cities with a total capacity of 330,000, housing, and approximately 272,000 refugees live in camps the others live in cities. Many non-camp refugees live in overcrowded housing arrangements under improper circumstances in the whole Turkey. The increasing demand for housing in some of these cities triggered a social tension between refugees and local populations.<sup>230</sup>
- ✓ Pipeline politic is an important reason for Turkey's involvement in the Syrian conflict. For example, below, the map figures out the potential pipeline line between Turkey and Qatar. The map also explains the pipeline competition between Iran and Turkey.

**Figure 7: Qatar-Turkey Pipeline**



Source 8: <http://www.mintpressnews.com/tag/migrant/> (accessed on 07.01.2016)

Consequently, Turkey's involvement in Syrian conflict illustrate us:

<sup>229</sup>Icduygu, Ahmet. "Syrian Refugees in Turkey The Long Road Ahead." 2015, 1. Accessed January 10, 2016. <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/syrian-refugees-turkey-long-road-ahead>

<sup>230</sup>Kanat, KılıçBügra, and Kadirustun. "Turkey's Syrian Refugees Toward Integration." 2015, 9-21. Accessed January 10, 2016. [http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20150428153844\\_turkey's-syrian-refugees-pdf.pdf](http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20150428153844_turkey's-syrian-refugees-pdf.pdf).

- Turkey overcame the Sevres Syndrome, which indicates a lack of self-confident and introverts policy, unwilling to cooperate with regional and global actors (Highly suspicious toward them) or lack of any willing to shape regional developments or involvement in any conflict. Secondly, Turkey with the involvement of Syrian conflict violates two distinguish Kemalist principle in Turkish foreign policy: Following Status-Quo, which means is continuity of current territorial integrity and sustaining the current international balance of power and following against any irredentist foreign policy approach.

#### 9.4 Case 4: Turkey- Muslim Brotherhood Relations

Historically, there are strong ties between branches of political Islam in Turkey and Egypt. For example, after the end of the one-party rule, and the beginning of the Democratic Party's era, the Brotherhood started collaborating with Necmettin Erbakan, who was the founder of the Milli Görüş movement, which was the similar political organization of Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey. Although theoretically, A.K.P mainly focused on and introduced the Sufi interpretation of Islam, which was primary, rested on Shamsuddin al-Tabrizi and Jalaluddin Rumi, the political Islamists in Turkey were profoundly influenced by Hassan al-Banna, who founded the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and the teachings of 20th-century Islamic theorist Sayyid Qutb's writings.<sup>231</sup> As an example, Al-Helbawy, who is the member of Muslim Brotherhood and the spokesman for the Muslim Brotherhood in the West, stated:

*'We always had ties with the Islamic movement or the political party with the nationalistic and Islamic background in Turkey since its inception, even before the formation of the AKP. We had ties with the Islamic movement since the inception of the national order party formed by Erbakan',*<sup>232</sup>

Turkey's new ruling cadre has a deep connection with Muslim Brotherhood organization in the all over the World such as in Syria, Tunisia, and Europe and particularly in Egypt.

<sup>231</sup><http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/alarabiya-studies/2013/10/14/Turkey-s-relationship-with-the-Muslim-Brotherhood.html> Accessed on 13.01.2016 at 21.46.

<sup>232</sup>Merley, Steven G. "Turkey, the Global Muslim Brotherhood, and the Gaza Flotilla." 2011, 31. Accessed January 13, 2016. [http://jcpa.org/text/Turkey\\_Muslim\\_Brotherhood.pdf](http://jcpa.org/text/Turkey_Muslim_Brotherhood.pdf).

For instance, after Egyptian president was ousted by the army, Erdogan declared an open support to Brotherhood. If we look at the one of Erdogan's speech in press conference:

*'I have consistently said at international platforms that I do not accept Sisi as the president. Today, I am also saying the same thing. To me, the president of Egypt is not Sisi, it is still Morsi''*<sup>233</sup>

Or as another example, Erdogan welcomed exiled Muslim Brotherhood members and stated:

*'Seven top figures from the Muslim Brotherhood who are being forced to leave Qatar could come to Turkey if there are no complications preventing their entry.'*<sup>234</sup>

As it is seen, there is a huge level of cooperation between Turkish conservative elite cadre and Muslim Brotherhood movement, and such a close collaboration in foreign policy is the one of the clearest indication of the difference between secular and conservative elite cadres of the Turkish state. This collaboration violates core of the Kemalist principles in Turkish foreign policy:

- Kemalism aims following Status-Quo, which means is continuity of current territorial integrity and sustaining the current international balance of power.
- Kemalism is against any irredentist foreign policy approach.
- Kemalism represents complete dis-attachment from Ottoman imperial heritage and Islam.

Because first of all, Muslim Brotherhood aims to change political regimes in their home countries such as in Egypt and Syrian example, which could easily influence the International status-quo and by supporting Muslim Brotherhood, secondly, by supporting Brotherhood Turkey involved and became the part of internal political conflicts of Arab countries. Thirdly, Muslim Brotherhood gave religious references and as a partner of Turkey, this circumstance violates the founding secular principle of Turkey and Turkish foreign policy. As a critique of this foreign policy preference, Turkey's close relations with Muslim

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<sup>233</sup> <http://www.turkiyenewspaper.com/Politics/7613-president-erdogan-president-of-egypt-is-morsi--not-sisi.aspx> Accessed on 13.01.2016 at 23.20

<sup>234</sup> <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-to-welcome-seven-top-muslim-brotherhood-members-erdogan-.aspx?NewsCatID=510&nID=71770&pageID=238> Accessed on 14.01.2016 at 02.22

Brotherhood, the Palestinian Hamas, and its assistance to Sunni-linked jihadist groups operating in Syria, damage Turkey's profile in the region.<sup>235</sup>

## 9.5 Case 5: Turkey- Russia Jet Incident

As it is reported in all media resources, Turkish fighter jets shot down a Russian-made warplane near the Syrian border on 24 November 2015 after repeatedly warning it over airspace violations (Haaretz).<sup>236</sup> Turkey claimed that Russian jets violated Turkish airspace and was bombing Turkmen civilian villages, Russia refused the claims and stated that Russia did not violate the Turkish airspace and was targeting IS. After this event, high officials of both sides made harsh statements against each other. For example, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov pointed out:

“Wednesday that Turkey's downing of a Russian warplane "looks like a planned provocation," but that Russia is not going to war with Turkey. The incident will make Russia reconsider its relationship with Turkey.”<sup>237</sup>

As the highest authority of Russian state, Vladimir Putin also used harsh statements:

*“Our military is doing heroic work against terrorism... But the loss today is a stab in the back, carried out by the accomplices of terrorists. I can't describe it in any other way.”*<sup>238</sup>

And his another statement, Putin was directly criticizing Turkish new elite cadre and stated: *“We observe [...] that the current Turkish leadership over a significant number of years has been pursuing a deliberate policy of supporting the Islamisation of their country. There's a process of Islamization that would make Atatürk turn in his grave.”*<sup>239</sup>

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<sup>235</sup> Volfová, Gabriela Özel. "Changes in Turkish-Israeli Relations:." 2014, 90. <http://static.cejiss.org/data/uploaded/1400105687309543/Article 05.pdf> Accessed on 14.01.2016 at 02.24

<sup>236</sup> <http://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/1.687968> Accessed on 14.01.2016 at 03.25

<sup>237</sup> <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/russia-war-turkey-planned-provocation-151125134605630.html> Accessed on 14.01.2016. at 19.03.

<sup>238</sup> <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/24/turkey-shoots-down-jet-near-border-with-syria> Accessed on 14.01.2016 at 19.37

<sup>239</sup> <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/627557/Vladimir-Putin-Turkey-Russia-relations-jet-Syria-gas-prices> Accessed on 14.01.2016 at 22.30

Furthermore, Russia imposed several economic sanction packages over Turkey, such as restricting visa-free travel agreement, ban on import of agricultural products and a ban on the sale of touristic packages even cancellation of the packages.<sup>240</sup>

After this incident occurred, Turkey immediately called NATO and requested to discuss shooting down of a Russian fighter jet along the Syrian border.<sup>241</sup> The response of conservative elites to this serious international crisis can be interpreted by following way:

- Compare the first four foreign policy cases, when the conservative elite cadre encounters with a serious high political crisis, which the beyond the power of Turkey, Turkey demanded urgent was meeting from NATO, which was a similar reaction of secular elites during the Cold War period. In this cases, it can be claimed that in any high political issue, which affects Turkey's core interest or survival, Turkey rather than cooperating with regional actors, prefer cooperating with West. It brings us a point of Idealization of West.(Particularly, the Membership of NATO and Europe are the two main pillars of Westernization of Turkish foreign policy.)

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<sup>240</sup><http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/russian-sanctions-on-turkey-to-have-limited-effect-ebrd-----aspx?pageID=238&nID=92184&NewsCatID=344> Accessed on 14.01.2016 at 22.47

<sup>241</sup><http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3331823/NATO-calls-extraordinary-meeting-Turkey-downs-Russian-jet.html> Accessed on 15.01.2016 at 01.00

## 10 Conclusion

Turkey shows quite different foreign policy behavior under the ruling of Justice and Development Party, compared to the whole era of Turkish Republic. There are domestic and international developments, which affect Turkey's foreign policy preferences. Although the end of Cold War and changing international balance of power are significant factors that determine Turkey's foreign policy attitudes, in this master thesis, I mainly focused on domestic changes in other words elite change. Elite change in Turkish state apparatus is as significant as the change of international environment, because foreign policy decisions are taken by elites and each elite cadre has their own value system and perception. In this thesis, it is pointed out that Turkey consists of two different elite cadres: secular and conservative elite cadre. The first elite cadre's value systems and perceptions were constructed in the early term experiences of the state affairs and were influenced the huge degree of modernization philosophically, politically and culturally. The second elite cadre emerged as a counter reaction to the first elite cadre. The second elite cadre has a completely different value system and perceptions, which is based on the Ottoman heritage and Islam. In this work, it is categorized the differences of these two elite cadres in the sphere of Turkish foreign policy, under four points:

- 1- Creation of new Ideology (Kemalism) after the fragmentation of Ottoman Empire.
- 2- Sevres syndrome.
- 3- Idealization of West.
- 4- Perception about Turkey's Geopolitical position.

These four points, which illustrate the features of secular elite cadre's perception, were applied to the five important foreign policy cases under conservative elite rules. These cases are:

- 1- Turkey- Brazil- Iran Nuclear Deal.
- 2- Turkish-Israeli Relations during A.K.P Era.
- 3- Turkey's involvement in Syrian Conflict.
- 4- Turkey- Muslim Brotherhood Relations.
- 5- Turkey- Russia Jet Incident.

These five cases were selected, because firstly, these cases occurred, when conservative elite cadre consolidated its power in Turkish state apparatus, which means, A.K.P implemented their political preferences without any effective influence of secular elite cadre, and secondly, these

cases are great examples to compare the reaction of these two elite cadres. The result confirms my main argument except the last case (Turkey- Russia Jet Incident):

” Turkey fundamentally changed its core foundation in foreign policy, due to elite changes during A.K.P (Justice and Development Party) under the leadership of Erdogan and Turkey’s strategic culture turned from defensive one to offensive one.”

Although in the fifth case, (Turkey- Russia Jet Incident) conservative elite showed a similar reaction to secular elites (Under the criteria of Idealization of West) by showing that Turkey is a member of NATO and intrinsically the part of Western defense system, however, this reaction could also arouse from pragmatism, due to power asymmetry between Russia and Turkey rather than internalization of Western alliance’s value system and both of the interpretation should be taken into account.

Finally, 21st century under the guidance of conservative elites, offer a high opportunity to Turkey but at the same time, such a high level of involvement in the regional conflicts is highly risky and precipitates the loneliness of Turkey in the region, which was named by conservative elites, as “Precious Loneliness”.

I would like to finish my master thesis a quote from Henry Kissinger:

“It is not a matter of what is true that counts, but a matter of what is perceived to be true.”



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