



universität
wien

MASTERARBEIT / MASTER'S THESIS

Titel der Masterarbeit / Title of the Master's Thesis

„Titel Governance and Democracy: The Balance of
Interests after the EU's Governance Turn“

verfasst von / submitted by

Magdalena Pichler BA BA

angestrebter akademischer Grad / in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts (MA)

Wien, 2016 / Vienna 2016

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt /
degree programme code as it appears on
the student record sheet:

A 066 824

Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt /
degree programme as it appears on
the student record sheet:

Masterstudium Politikwissenschaft

Betreut von / Supervisor:

Prof. Dr. Mag. Sylvia Kritzinger

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank:

Prof. Sylvia Kritzinger, for her exceptional supervision and her willingness to engage in long discussions over my thesis.

Anja Katharina Arend for the final proofreading of my thesis as well as for the proofreading of several papers and essays during and beyond my studies.

Isabella M. Hahn, for her readiness to help regarding the printing of my thesis.

Virginia Lui, Christina Del Giudice, and all the others who contributed to the proofreading and discussed my thesis with me.

My friends and my family, especially my mother, Margareta Pichler-Marschallinger, for their general support during my studies.

For my parents

Inhalt

1	First chapter	5
1.1	Introduction.....	5
2	Theoretical Embedding	7
2.1	Of Public and Private Actors.....	9
2.2	Mapping European Interests.....	14
3	Hypotheses.....	16
4	The Case	17
4.1	The Policy Field.....	17
5	Methodical Approach.....	20
5.1	Methods for measuring influence.....	20
5.2	Methodical approach of the thesis	22
5.2.1	The White Paper.....	22
5.2.2	The Communication “A sustainable future for transport — Towards an integrated, technology-led and user-friendly system” (COM(2009) 279 (final) of 17 June 2009).	24
5.2.3	Data Set	26
6	Operationalization.....	27
6.1	The actors	27
6.2	Classification of the actors	30
6.3	Extracted Points of the Communication	66
6.3.1	The 18 Measures	67
6.4	An annotation to sustainability.....	75
6.5	Frequencies	77
6.5.1	Mentioning	77
6.5.2	Evaluation.....	78
6.5.3	Other Actors	78
7	Analyzation.....	80
7.1	Comparison of the Variable.....	80
7.1.1	Measure 1: Internalisation of external costs in all modes and means of transport	80
7.1.2	Measure 2: Completing the internal market, especially concerning rail transport	85
7.1.3	Measure 3: Transport as integrated intermodal network	87
7.1.4	Measure 4: A shift to environmental friendly modes	90
7.1.5	Measure 5: Transport should be accessible to anyone.....	94
7.1.6	Measure 6: Technological innovation as a “major contributor to transport challenges”.	98

7.1.7	Measure 7: Expanding infrastructure projects and policy to neighbouring countries	100
7.1.8	Measure 8: “Enhanced cooperation in Urban Transport”	103
7.1.9	Measure 9: More investment in R&D (with special focus on sustainable technology)	105
7.1.10	Measure 10: Maintaining and improving working conditions	108
7.1.11	Measure 11: Shipping and Motorways of the sea, also in combination of rail transport, as alternative to land transport.....	111
7.1.12	Measure 12 Sustainability via efficiency	114
7.1.13	Measure 13: A common framework for the evaluation of infrastructure projects ...	117
7.1.14	Measure 14: Reducing transport problems by virtual accessibility	119
7.1.15	Measure 15: Technological shift towards lower/zero emission vehicles.....	121
7.1.16	Measure 16: Common European Standards	124
7.1.17	Measure 17: Internalisation charges for transport funding.....	126
7.1.18	Measure 18: The integration of airports and railways.....	129
8	Results	131
9	Conclusion	135
9.1	Back to theory	135
10	Limits and suggestions	137
11	Literature.....	138
11.1	Table of Figures	144
12	Appendix.....	145
12.1	Coding.....	145
12.2	List of the documents used for analysis.....	152
12.3	Abstracts.....	158
12.3.1	Abstract English	158
12.3.2	Zusammenfassung Deutsch.....	160

This thesis investigates whether a certain group of private actors is favored by/more influential on the EU Commission's transport policy after the EU's 'Governance Turn'.

1 First chapter

1.1 Introduction

At the turn of the millennium the concept of governance had in many respects replaced the idea of government¹. It was developed to cope with the latter's problems, for example within legitimization. Governance views private actors as important representatives of society and grants influence to them to ensure a more democratic process. It implies the inclusion of different societal actors², such as interest groups, which are involved in policy processes as well as a less hierarchical relationship between the actors. Problem-solving capacities are shifted to society. Private actors have an important role in concepts of governance, as they are seen as representatives of the society. Better access to public documents as well as inclusion in policy/decision-making processes shall be granted to them (cf. Peters, 2004). The European Union (henceforth referred to as EU) has embraced governance³ with its White paper⁴ on Governance in 2001. The White Paper on Governance aims to give different private actors a chance to participate and to enhance democracy in the European Union. It is, however, debated controversially by scholars as to whether it really did so.

Some scholars do indeed emphasize the importance of private actors or interest groups to fight the democratic deficit of the European Union. Wessels (2004, 199), for example, mentions the importance of interest groups linking the "authoritative institutions" and citizens, especially in case of the European Union.

However, "if public policy is systematically biased in favor of some interests while others are constantly losing, the democratic legitimacy of policy outcomes is greatly undermined (Dahl, 1989, 322ff., in: Klüver, 2013b, 1). Therefore, enhancing democracy by the increased inclusion of interest groups could only be achieved if groups representing different interests had equal chances; not only to be included in

¹ "Formal dimension of politics, defined by constitution, law and order" (Nohlen/Schultze (ed.), 2005, 324), which includes the idea that the state holds the monopoly of power (cf. Nohlen/Schultze, 2005, 324).

² Groups/Actors without a formal public mandate, which represent various interests of the society.

³ and with it instruments like open access (cf. Peter, 2004).

⁴ "European governance - A white paper" COM(2001) 428 final - Official Journal C 287 of 12.10.2001

a discussion, but to be heard of or, in other words, to influence the outcome. Scholars like Peters (2004, 63f.), argue though that instead of enhancing democracy and transparency, 'New Governance' may produce the opposite effects. He (2004, 60) states, that the EU-Commission selects a few interest groups with whom it shares sympathies and which are in its eyes representative of society. Critical Political Economy argues that Governance was favoring the economic interests (Hosli et al, 2004, 45f.). Following this argumentation, the White Paper on Governance would have brought less democracy to the European Union instead of more. Despite the salience of the topic, private actors have, in contrast to other realms of European integration, e.g. the European Party System or European Institutions, not received enough scholarly attention (cf. Wessels, 2004, 195, see also: Klüver, 2013b), especially concerning "the democratic question and empirical analyses" (Wessels, 2004, 195). Yet the balance of influence is crucial when considering democratic premises (cf. Wessels, 2004). If some interests are constantly prioritized, while others are always put aside, it has democratic implications (cf. Klüver, 2013b). Governance was enforced to strengthen democratization and legitimization as well as to fight asymmetries which favored business interests. If including governance in the EU was executed according to its aims, it should actually have formed more democracy and challenged asymmetries between (the representation of) different interests (Michalowitz, 2007, 58f). As a result, private interest included by the EU-Commission normatively 'should' be balanced and include economic, as well as public or labor interests. This has, despite various academic debates, not yet been empirically proven. The aim of this thesis is therefore to investigate whether or not this has been the case. The following research question is hence deduced:

What kind of interest is represented in the EU-Commission's legislative initiatives after the EU's 'Governance Turn'?

The research question will be approached in the context of transport policy: Michalowitz (2007, 104f.) suggests concentrating on one policy field to study lobbying. This MA-thesis will focus on transport policy, as a conflict between public and economic interest is inherent and Michalowitz (2007, 52) defines such differences as "empirical relevant". "(...) [T]ransport is one of the major industries in the European Community in terms of employment, contribution to the GDP and total

investment [...]” (Van Miert, 1991), therefore business interests are involved. On the other hand, the transport sector is the EU’s “second biggest greenhouse gas emitting sector after energy” (EU-Commission, 2014), producing a quarter of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions. According to the EU-Commission (2012), industry needs cheap, fast and safe transport. On the other hand, climate change calls for measures to reduce transport emissions.

In a summary this MA-thesis aims to determine which private actors took part in the processes of creating the White Paper ‘Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area - Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system’, and whose positions when it came to the policy were reflected, with the result of observing whether private actors representing, business, public, and labor interests had equal chances to shape policy or if the EU-Commission’s paper/policy approach was biased. Were diverse interests had included (more or less) equally into the EU-Commissions position, this could indicate that the governance approach made the EU more democratic. If not, it is an indication that the introduction of governance did not make the EU more democratic and was therefore not entirely successful, as balanced interests and influence is a prerequisite for democracy. This will be discussed further in chapter 2.

2 Theoretical Embedding

The post-Maastricht era has led to an increased engagement of companies in loose networks and to an advantage of multinational corporations. This imbalance has been discussed by EU institutions, for example in the White Paper on Governance in 2001 or in the Green Book on Transparency in 2005 (cf. Michalowitz, 2007, 58f.). The White Paper of Governance in 2001 and the OMC⁵ are seen as landmarks for a new relationship between the EU and private actors (cf. Greenwood, 2011, 32, cf. Kohler-Koch/Rittberger, 2006, 36), as well as a trigger point for scholarly discussion on (the new modes of) governance. Governance, which has been introduced due to a declining trust in the EU, its institutions and its acting capacities (cf. Peters, 2004, 56) as well as a decision deadlock in the EU-Commission (cf. Kohler-Koch/Rittberger, 2006), is seen as a chance to include various kinds of private actors

⁵ Open Method of Coordination

in decision-making. The White Paper on Governance was introduced with the objective to “create a pluralistic design of ‘checks and balances, where anyone [sic!] interest is challenged by another, and where interests are empowered through procedures to do so and to keep EU institutions accountable.” (Greenwood, 2011, 32). A major goal was thus to make the EU more democratic via the inclusion of different societal groups. This intention is communicated in the Commission’s White Paper on Governance 2001 (cf. Commission, 2001). To correspond to this governance, defined by a less hierarchical relationship between political institutions and private actors, the reduction of the public sector, fewer authority-based instruments and the inclusion of private actors at declining distrust in political institutions and democracy, has been used as a remedy for quite a long time (cf. Peters, 2002). Overall governance is viewed by the EU-Commission as way to make the EU more democratic (cf. EU-Commission, 2001). Academic debates on this issue are controversial. While some scholars think the output justifies the means of decision-making, others criticize the uncontrollability of governance (cf. Kohler-Koch/Rittberger, 2006)). In (some) democratic discourses scholars expect that interest groups enhance the democracy as well as the legitimacy in the European Union as both are regarded as a way of citizen participation (e.g. Hix, 1994, Cohen and Rogers, 1995, in: Arts/Verschuren, 1999). The European Union has adopted this position, as aforementioned. Other scholars, like Goetschy (2003 in Kohler-Koch/Rittberger, 2006), however, doubt that (New Modes of/Open) Governance, make the EU more democratic in terms of participation: even if groups which focus on the Common Good are included, the European people delegate, but do not participate themselves: they hand over, for example, environmental concerns to an environmental interest group (cf. Eising/Kohler-Koch, 2005 and Kohler-Koch/Rittberger 2006). This line of argument will not be adopted or elaborated further in this thesis, but it will, however, be assumed that a balanced inclusion of interest groups has the potential to enhance democracy. Some scholars such as Peters (2004, 62), argue though that the same mechanisms which should provide better inclusion of various interests and less asymmetry actually have a contrary effect and lead to even less democracy and transparency (cf. also to Peters, 2002, 16). Peters (2004, 60), states for example that the EU-Commission selects few interest groups with whom it sympathizes and which are in its eyes representative of society. Furthermore, it is not transparent as to how and to what extent private actors

are actually included in any given policy process, as important discussions are mainly held behind closed doors (cf. Peters, 2004, 60). While some scholars think the output justifies the means of decision-making, others criticize the uncontrollability of governance (cf. Kohler-Koch/Rittberger, 2006). As governance was introduced to the European Union increasingly more importance was given to “oft law”, open coordination and [...] other more informal mechanisms” (Héretier, 2002 in: Peters, 2004, 61).

It has not yet been empirically proven, though, if the introduction of (New) Governance in 2001 made the EU more democratic or not. What does more democratic mean, therefore? In this context, democratic means the inclusion of different societal interests. It would otherwise, favor certain interests instead of improving democracy in the European Union (cf. Peters, 2004, 61f.) and “if public policy is systematically biased in favor of some interests while others are constantly losing, the democratic legitimacy of policy outcomes is greatly undermined (Dahl, 1989, 322ff., in: Klüver, 2013b, 1). The question of inclusion of private by public actors, as well as the influence of private actors (seeing lobbying as two way process (cf. Michalowitz, 2004)), is thus a question of democracy.

2.1 Of Public and Private Actors

So far the European Union, in particular the EU-Commission, has been presented as rather active public actor that shapes the conditions for private ones. This view is for example presented by Michalowitz (2004, 92), who attributes quite an active role to the EU-Commission, seeing lobbying as a two-way process. She argues that public actors seek the private actors’ inclusion to create consensual decisions and to avoid transaction costs (cf. Michalowitz, 2007, 53). Peters (2004, 61) describes “the relationship between interest groups and the Brussels bureaucracy [...] as ‘clientela’”. The relation between the EU-Commission and the private actors is also seen as reciprocal relationship (cf. Klüver, 2013b). The exchange of goods between public and private actors (cf. Wessels, 2004) is also treated in literature, based on a reciprocal benefit of both sides. Traded goods can be either information (the EU-Commission is described as an understaffed actor so information is thus highly valued), public or economic support (cf. Klüver, 2013b). As a trade-off, the private actor can expect to gain influence over decisions, policies, etc. or to impede those

which he does not favor. In regard to avoiding transaction costs, it is important for the EU-Commission to know that major economic players will support a decision. Public support can be enhanced if a well-known NGO supports a decision instead of organizing a demonstration against it (cf. Klüver. 2013b). So, while institutions are able to set conditions how private actors can participate, the latter have a certain ability to influence policy, depending inter alia on their resources. According to Klüver (2013, 61) private actors'⁶ camps of interest groups (left and right of the EU-Commission's position) are successful if they can provide information, or citizen and economic support. In literature it is distinguished between the 'Brussels or European Route' and the 'National Route'. "The national route is characterized by activities of national interest groups aiming to influence European decisions, either directly at European Level or via their national governments" (Wessels, 2004, 197). The European or Brussels Route is characterized by "European-level interest articulation and intermediation" (Wessels, 2004, 197). The best way to use the Brussels Route is still the Commission (cf. Greenwood, 2011). This is one reason why this Master's thesis concentrates on the EU-Commission as public actor (of the European Union). Then, as Klüver (2013, 60) points out, the EU-Commission is still the only institution which has the right of a legislative initiative and highlights the importance of the EU-Commission in policy-making: "Policy-making in the EU [...] almost always starts with a EU-Commission proposal and it is more difficult for the other institutions to amend than to accept the proposal" (Klüver, 2013, 60). Klüver (2013, 61) assumes that interest groups aim to influence the EU-Commission in the policy formulation phase. Pluralists often consider the decision-making phase as (the/an) important (first) phase of power⁷ (cf. Klüver, 2013b). The pluralist concept considers effects of decision-making as observable and assumes that many players can be involved in a decision-making process (cf. Arts/Verschuren, 1999, 414).

On the other side of the coin are the private actors. Among them a differentiation between economic, labor and public interest is most commonly used in political science literature. Economic interest is profit-seeking, while public interest is oriented towards the common good, such as social or environmental interest. Labor interests

⁶Klüver (2013, 61) refers to camps of interest groups (left and right of the EU-Commission's position), which she defines as interest groups sharing the same lobbying goals on a specific issue.

⁷ The three phases of power source to Luke (1974), though he criticizes, according to Arts and Verschuren (1999, 414), the pluralist approach.

are described as being in-between private and public interest, as their interests usually concern only one societal group, but they are not solely profit oriented. (cf. Michalowitz, 2007, 51f.). Labor interests and public interest will most likely act in consistency with a regulated capitalism project (cf. Wessels, 2004). While interest representation is no longer solely undertaken by business groups or corporates, and public interest groups have meanwhile a share of one fifth (cf. Michalowitz, 2007, 59), they are still regarded as the most powerful ones (cf. Eising/Kohler-Koch, 2005; cf. Michalowitz, 2007). One reason mentioned is the higher conflict potential of particular economic interests (cf. Michalowitz, 2007), which is considered as “strong” in the sense of “powerful” interest, while public interest, like environmental or consumer protection, is described as a weak interest, because it is often less organized and assertive (cf. Michalowitz, 2004, 52; see also: Mancur Olsen). In contrast to Michalowitz, Kozák (2010, 60) argues (in reference to Greenwood, 2007 and Hix, 2005) that environmental interest groups, meanwhile, had a high level of organization. Environmental groups such as Greenpeace or the Environmental Bureau may receive EU funding, but even so, business interest organizations have substantially more financial support (cf. Kozák, 2010, 60).

Private interest is advocated by different actors such as groups, loose networks, lobbyists or law firms (cf. Michalowitz, 2007, 52). Concerning the groups, Beyers, Eising, and Mahoney (2008, 1106ff. in: Klüver, 2013b, 5), this thesis will name three factors which have to be present that an actor can be defined as interest group: 1) organization, 2) political interest, 3) private status. Factor one signifies a formal structure and excludes broad and spontaneous movements. Factor two, political interest, is defined by Klüver (2013b, 6) as follows: “Actors must pursue the objective to influence political decision-making and to shape policy outcomes”. Having a private status (factor three) implies the actor is not striving for public office nor funded by public means⁸, but seeks informal influence. It can be therefore, clearly differentiated from a political party (cf. Klüver, 2013b, 6f.). Further differences between associations which have memberships, and companies as corporate actors without members, can be distinguished (cf. Klüver, 2013b, 7). A company with enough resources is likely to use the three different kinds of Brussels lobbying

⁸ It has to be considered though, that some private actors, like environmental interest groups receive a certain amount of EU funding (cf. Kozák, 2010).

channels: Eurogroups, In-House Lobbyists, and Political Consultants. In-House Lobbyists represent the company interests in Brussels and also inside its Eurogroup. The latter is seen as representative for many actors and therefore favored by European institutions, as negotiating partner. A disadvantage of Eurogroups is a certain slowness due to the obligatory coordination of the members' positions. The more flexible political consultants are used for emergencies, such as when a new position has to be developed urgently (cf. Michalowitz, 2004, 71ff.).

Wessels (2004, 195ff.) offers another classification of private actors⁹. In comparison with parties acting on a European level, he divides parties and private interests in a similar way to how it is described above: The triangular cleavage labor-capital-environment, or in terms of political actors: unions-employers-environmental organizations, which correspond with the aforementioned distinction between private actors representing labor, business or public interests. He locates three alliances on the European party and interest group level: a labor, a bourgeois and a green alliance. Wessels (2004, 196ff.) adds political contestation to the debate and describes contestation as a necessary prerequisite for political representation. Dahl (1971:6, in: Wessels, 2004, 195) names both of them as dimensions characterizing democracy. So participation (as a prerequisite to contestation) is a crucial starting point. According to this argumentation, without participation no democracy is possible. Wessels (2004, 198) argues that "since meaningful participation demands interest group representation, it is safe to say that interest groups are particularly important at the European Level". Due to the ratio of MEPs to population, there was a linkage problem between citizens and their representatives (cf. Wessels, 2004, 199). Consequently, interest groups have an increased importance and are faced with an increased expectance regarding democracy on the European level. This hope is also expressed by the EU-Commission and in its White Paper on Governance (EU-Commission, 2001). However, as Wessels (2004, 199) puts it, "[l]inked with this is the question of equal opportunity for different interests [...]". This question is even more important considering that interest groups are seen as the main guarantee to ensure democracy in the European Union. It has democratic implications if some groups are generally winning, while others are always on the losing side, as Klüver (2013b) suggests. Or as Arts and Verschuren (1999, 412)

⁹ His focus lies on interest groups.

suggest in reference to Dahl (1961), Mills (1956) and Hunter (1953): “whether the making of decisions in all kinds of organizations is truly democratic in nature or is dominated by one or a few elites”. Yet it is scarcely known which groups tend to be the winning ones and why (cf. Klüver, 2013b). It is therefore crucial to study the influence of interest groups to learn about their democratic impact (cf. Klüver, 2013b, 3). Dür (2008, 1) adds:

“The normative implications are particularly significant at a time when governments and international organizations aim at increasing political participation of societal groups: does this participatory engineering lead to increased influence by specific societal interests?”

This is also true regarding the European Union, which offers as an institution with “multiple layers of government together with the high fragmentation of the European Institutions” (Klüver, 2013b, 1) a formidable environment for interest groups with many “access points to the decision-making process” (Klüver, 2013b, 1).

Nonetheless, few scholars have studied the empirical influence of interest groups yet (cf. Dür, 2008), which is why Klüver (2013b, 15) calls and aims for a “coherent theoretical model of interest groups’ influence on policy making in the European Union”. One of the major aims of interest groups is, according to Klüver (2013b, 1), to influence policy-making. Influence will be seen in this Master’s thesis as “the ability of an actor to shape a political decision in line with her preferences; in other words, ‘a causal relation’ between an actor between the preferences of an outcome and the outcome itself” (Nagel, 1975, 29, in: Dür, 2008, 2). An actor can achieve his/her goal by negative goal-achievement (preventing an outcome he/she did not approve of) or by positive goal-achievement (achieving a goal which is “opposite to his competitors in decision-making” (Arts/Verschuren, 1999, 413). Klüver (2013, 65) states that “interest groups successfully lobby decision-makers if the policy output converges with their policy preferences”. So a way of defining and measuring influence is via the outcome or via lobbying success, which can be “defined as the attainment of preference goals” (Barry, 1980b, 338 in: Klüver, 2013, 65).

Arts and Verschuren (1999, 412) further emphasize the importance of studying influence in correlation to power in theory building, public administration and politics. Within the pluralist tradition, influence, power and decision-making are viewed as interconnected (cf. Arts/Verschuren, 1999, 414). From this perspective, the study of influence is also the study of power. “(W)e may infer the political power of an actor

from his political influence, the former being a kind of generalization of the latter” (Kuypers, 1973, in: Arts and Verschuren, 1999, 412). Power may be defined “as general ability to influence and influence as the realization of a single effect” (Arts/Verschuren, 1999, 413). Arts and Verschuren (1999, 413) add that power does also include the possibility of achieving or preventing the outcome against the will of the other competitors in Weberian sense of power. “(T]he phenomena of influence and power are elementary aspects of political and social life and therefore among the main themes of current social sciences” (Arts/Verschuren, 1999, 411). Influence and power can be linked to democracy (cf. Arts/ Verschuren, 1999). Arts and Verschuren (1999, 412f.) suggest that knowledge of “the division of influence among the stakeholders” allows one to make assumptions of “the democratic premises”, which serves to amplify the necessity of analyzing the influence and inclusion of private actors in the policy process of the European Union.

To sum up political contestation, participation, and a division of power and influence among the different actors are essential for democracy. Participation is necessary for contestation (cf. Wessel, 2004). Concerning the European Union, the hopes of the EU-Commission and roles of the scholars regarding participation (and contestation) are imposed on interest groups and the inclusion of various societal interests. These measures are also included in the concept of governance, which had been explicitly introduced by the EU-Commission with the goal of enhancing democracy in the European Union via the increased inclusion of societal interest groups. In this thesis it is assumed, however, that the goal of enhanced democracy can only be achieved if the influence and inclusion of various interests, namely between labor, business, and environmental interests is balanced. Due to a lack of empirical research, regarding which groups (of interests/of society) are winning or losing and why (cf. Klüver, 2013b), this Master’s thesis seeks to contribute to an advance of knowledge about how balanced the inclusion and influence of societal interests to the European Union is, which shall give evidences if governance lives up to the promise of democracy and indications about the democratic conditions of the EU.

2.2 Mapping European Interests

According to Greenwood (2003, 74) “the EU agenda has been driven by a search for economic prosperity and global competitiveness”. Major EU projects, such as the

internal market, have been based on this paradigm. Of all national laws concerning business, approximately 80% stem from Brussels. The business agenda has dominated interest representations all over Europe and the member states' concentration on the EU (cf. Greenwood. 2003, 74). Although Greenwood (2003, 74f.) argues on the one hand that the EU multi-level structure prevents one certain interest from regularly dominating and that "market power does not automatically translate to political power", he states on the other hand that "in certain specific circumstances it is possible for the interests of one specialist constituency to prevail", and that "the importance of business interest associations [...] has been underemphasized in literature. He highlights the significance of conducting further research into this field (cf. Greenwood, 2003, 74f).

Bernhard Wessels (2004, 210), by mapping European private interests, locates three alliances on the European party and interest group level: a labor, a bourgeois and a green alliance, which he describes as triangular cleavage. European party members and interest representatives of each alliance work together. For example, a representative of an environmental organization and a party member of the Green. Politicians of the respective alliance are likely to listen to an interest representative of the same alliance (cf. Wessels, 2004, 211). According to Wessels (2004, 211) the triangular-cleavage has its roots in the left-right cleavage but is also connected to the integration dimension. Most commonly European Integration is viewed on a two-dimensional model where a left-right cleavage is brought together with national/supranational cleavage (see: Hix and Lord 1998; Hooghes and Marks 1999). Hooghes and Marks (1999) also identify, according Wessels (2004, 211), a neoliberal approach versus a project of regulated capitalism.

The neoliberal project "attempts to insulate markets from political interference by combining European-wide market integration with minimal European regulation" (Hooghes and Marks, in: Wessels, 2004, 211). The project of regulated capitalism seeks more regulation, a deepened Union and inters alia an up-grade of the European Parliament. "' [...] a variety of market-enhancing and marketing-supporting legislation [...] [shall] create a social-democratic dimension of European governance.'" ((cf.) Hooghe and Marks, 2004, 211f.). Wessels (2004, 215) connects the triangular cleavage with the left-right dimension and the "net support for parliamentary order of the EU". He observes that "[...] unions, environmental groups

and consumer groups are located close to the project of regulated capitalism [...] they are left of center on the left-right dimension and strongly support a parliamentary order of the EU" (Wessels, 2004, 213). Interest groups which represent "industry, trade and commerce" (Wessels, 2004, 214) are likely to be in favor of the neoliberal project, right of the left/right scale, and to have few sympathies for an empowerment of the European Parliament. Actors associated with transport and professional organizations advocate the neoliberal project, but are found (slightly) to the left side of the center, while actors from agriculture, fishing and insurance and, interestingly, banking, are to be found between the neoliberal and the regulated capitalism projects (cf. Wessels, 2004, 213ff.). Summing up, according to Wessels, (2004, 214), a cleavage between producers' organizations and organizations concerned with public goods can be found not only in the case of parties but also of interest groups.

To return to the distinction between private actors representing business, labor and public interest, we can see that the first group is likely to lobby for a neoliberal project or act having this project in mind. Labor interests and public interests will most likely act in consistence with a regulated capitalism project.

3 Hypotheses

As mentioned above governance and the following inclusion of private actors is applied to enhance the accountability of the European Union's institutions as well as democracy in the European Union. In a first step it is controlled if, by the inclusion of private actors, the public actors are still the most powerful ones or if private actors have gained so much influence that they already overrule the public actors:

H1) Private actors have more influence than public actors on the EU-Commission's legislative initiatives.

If the inclusion of private actors in policy making actually enhances democracy, then they should be, as aforementioned, balanced. While some authors like Peters (2004, 60) state that certain interests are picked by the commission as representative for the society, other authors like Greenwood (2003, 74) question that a single interest dominates Brussels. To test if business interests are indeed the most powerful

private interests and if, as a consequence, interests' influence is imbalanced or if rather diverse private actors form a system of checks and balances (cf. Kohler-Koch in: Greenwood, 2011), the following hypothesis is used:

H2a): Private actors lobbying for business interests are more represented in the EU-Commission's legislative initiatives than private actors lobbying for labor or public interests.

Some groups' members consist of public actors, as well as of private actors. In some companies private actors as well as public actors hold shares and there are state-hold companies that have the structure of multinational companies and are listed on the stock exchange. To scrutinize whether business actors or public actors dominate, the following hypothesis is tested:

H2b): Groups, which have business actors as well as public actors as members are dominated by business interests, as well as (partially-) state hold companies.

4 The Case

4.1 The Policy Field

In order to examine the inclusion of private actors in the EU-Commission legislative initiatives and their influence on it, a specific case in context of a policy field has to be chosen. Michalowitz (2007, 104f.) suggests concentrating on one policy field to study lobbying. She defines a lobbyist or a representative of an interest group as someone who "acts with the interest to influence a political decision, which is made




Figure 1 Greenhouse gas emissions, analysis by source sector, EU-28, 1990 and 2013 (percentage of total) (Eurostat, 2015)

within political processes. This decision stands in context to a policy field [...]. It is not possible to assess the role of the lobbyists apart from this context“ (Michalowicz, 2007, 104f.). Therefore, it seems adequate to choose one policy field. Transport policy is not one of the most researched EU policy fields although it touches on crucial societal (public) interests such as environmental policy (cf. Brand/Wissen, 2011). Furthermore, a conflict between economic and public interests, which Michalowicz (2007, 52) calls as “empirical relevant at the European level”, is inherent in transport policy. As aforementioned, interests such as environmental or social interests, which can be defined as “common good”, are public interests, as only the energy sectors emits more greenhouse gases than the transport sector (cf. EU-Commission, 2014), producing a quarter of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions. Whilst emissions from other sectors in the EU have decreased, the transport sector’s greenhouse gases “have increased 36% since 1990” (EU-Commission, 2014). According the Commission (2011, 4f.), greenhouse gases have to be reduced by 60% “Commission analysis shows that while deeper cuts can be achieved in other sectors of the economy, a reduction of at least 60 % of GHGs by 2050 with respect to 1990 is required from the transport sector, which is a significant and still growing source of GHGs” (EU-Commission, 2011, 4f.).

These statistics show that environmental interests and thus public interests are crucially affected by the EU’s transport policy. At the same time, business interests are concerned. “[...] (T)ransport is one of the major industries in the European Community in terms of employment, contribution to the GDP and total investment, and it was - together with agriculture - the only sectoral policy explicitly defined in the Treaty of Rome” (Van Miert, 1991). The importance of transport for business was not only true in 1991, the year of Commissioner Van Miert’s speech, but is still a fact today: According to the Commission (2011, 6), 5% of the EU’s GDP derives from transport and 10 million people are employed by the transport industry. According to the EU-Commission (EU-Commission/Eurostat, 2012), it was crucial for both national and international trade, as well as for economic development, that goods could be transported safely, fast and economically. Furthermore, “[t]ransport is fundamental to our economy and society. Mobility is vital for the internal market and for the quality of life of citizens as they enjoy their freedom to travel. Transport enables economic growth and job creation [...]” (European EU-Commission, 2011,

4). Freight has grown exceptionally in the European Union, in comparison to passenger traffic. It is meanwhile negatively decoupled from the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which means that the freight transport has grown more than the GDP (cf. Aberle, 2005). A few more statistics highlight the growth of haulage: between 1970 and 2002 the tonne-kilometres (tkm) of freight have increased 99% from 74 billion to 1.737 billion tkm. In 2010 this increased to approximately 2.3 thousand billion tkm, though admittedly the EU's enlargement (2004 and 2007) must be taken into account. Road haulage had a market share of 76% in 2002 and has increased 186% since 1970 (in comparison to 2002) (cf. Aberle, 2005). In 2010 its share was 76.4%. In the new member states road haulage has increased with two-digits. On the other hand, rail transport has decreased continuously and parallel to the growth of road haulage, shipping has only increased slightly (cf. Aberl, 2005/2012).


Hence transportation grows with emissions due to transport and so the environment –and by extension public interest- is affected by (freight) transportation. The EU-Commission had already highlighted in 1991, during the preparations of the White Papers on Transport in 1996¹⁰, the importance of environmental measures in transport. On the other hand, business is interested in fast and cheap haulage and it is these business groups who oppose potentially expensive environmental protection, such as the internalization of external costs¹¹ (cf. Land Salzburg, 2011), which is quite a debated concept in European transport policy. Of course business in passenger transport is also affected. However, passenger transport, except aviation,

¹⁰ "A Strategy for Revitalising the Community's Railways," COM(96) 421, July 1996, "Air Traffic Management - Freeing Europe's Airspace", White Paper COM(96) 57, March 1996.

¹¹ In the concept of internalization of external costs the polluter, etc. (ergo external costs) shall bear the costs, by internalizing them. In this context is spoken of true-cost pricing. Environmental friendly, silent means of transport would become cheaper; noisy polluters more expensive.

has not increased as forcefully as freight transport. Passenger transport, except aviation, has, in contrast to freight transport, increased less than the GDP (cf. EU-Commission, 2009, 12; see Figure 2). In 2012 inland freight transport was about 2 100 billion tonne-kilometres (tkm). Road transport had a share of 75.1%, while rail and inland waterways had only shares of 18.2% (rail) and 6.7% (inland waterways) (cf. Eurostat, 2015).

Figure 4: Evolution of GDP, population and GHG emissions from transport as well as freight and passenger transport demand in the EU-27 since 1995 (1995 = 100)



Source: EU energy and transport in figures — Statistical pocketbook 2009.

Figure 2: Statistical pocketbook 2009, in: EU-Commission (2009, 12).

5 Methodical Approach

5.1 Methods for measuring influence

There are different methodical approaches to measure the influence of interest groups. Classical approaches analyzing influence and power are “position, reputation and decision-making methods” (Arts/Verschuren, 1999, 414).

Dür (2008, 1) distinguishes three approaches to study the influence of interest groups: ‘assessing the degree of preference attainment’, ‘process tracing’ and ‘assessing attributed influence’. The latter is a survey-based method, where a group has to assess the influence of itself or of another group. An observing expert might also be asked to estimate the group’s influence (cf. Dür, 2008, 9). Process-tracing is described as the most used methodical approach concerning influence. It tries to

uncover what causes the influence on the outcome (cf. Dür, 2008, 9). “[S]cholars scrutinize groups’ preferences, their influence attempts, their access to decision-makers, decision-makers’ responses to the influence attempts, the degree to which groups’ preferences are reflected in outcomes, and groups’ statements of (dis-)satisfaction with the outcome” (Dür, 2008, 4f.). A very prominent example of process tracing is Maria Green Cowles’ study of the influence of the ERT (European Roundtable of Industrialists) on the Single European Act (cf. Dür, 2008, 6).

‘Assessing the degree of preference attainment’ compares the political outcome with the policy preferences of the groups (cf. Dür, 2008, 11, cf. Klüver, 2009, 536). Dür (2008, 12) for example defined 19 aspects of EU position in the Doha Round on which business actors could have had an impact and compared them with the demands of the (private) actors (cf. Dür, 2008, 12). He “then took a coincidence between the demands voiced by business actors and the EU’s position across a large number of these aspects as indicating business influence.” (Dür, 2008, 12). Klüver (2009, 536) emphasizes that the approach allows one to “draw conclusions of the winners and loser of the decision-making process”. She highlights the objectivity of the approach. Dür (2008, 15) recommends combining the methodical approaches. Klüver (2009, 536) suggests combining quantitative text analysis with the ‘preference attainment approach’ to measure the policy preferences, as the former had shortcomings in measuring the policy preferences. In her article she compares the applicability of hand-coding, WORDFISH and WORDSCORES for measuring policy preferences of interest groups, in an online consultation of the EU-Commission regarding “the reduction from CO2 emission from cars” (Klüver, 2009, 540). She concentrated on the policy formulation phase and deduced “[t]he policy positions of the interest groups [...] from their submissions in an online consultation” (Klüver, 2009, 539). The interest groups’ opinions were required and reviewed concerning a draft before the definite policy proposal was made (Klüver, 2009, 539). Instead of reading the submissions by the interest groups, she scrutinizes press releases belonging to the proposal. She developed a classification scheme made out of 41 categories and categorized 20 as pro environmental-control and 20 as anti-environmental control. Statements which did not correspond to one of those were classified as ‘others’ (cf. Klüver, 2009, 540). She assessed the policy positions of the interest groups as well as of the Commission “on a single ‘pro-environmental control’ and ‘anti-environmental control’ policy dimension” (Klüver, 2009, 539). Groups

approving the EU-Commission's policy or wanting to go further were classified as 'pro-environmental', those criticizing the measures as too harsh, as 'anti-environmental'. The groups were divided into four classes: Traditional Automobile Industry groups, Alternative Industry groups, which promote the use of biofuels or

Table 1 Hand-coding classification scheme

Overall category	Environmental control	
	Pro	Anti
Reduction target	positive	negative
Appropriateness of measure	positive	negative
Inclusion of vans	positive	negative
Code of good practice on car advertising	positive	negative
Improved labelling to promote the purchase of fuel-efficient cars	positive	negative
Fiscal measures to promote the purchase of fuel-efficient cars	positive	negative
Penalties to enforce CO ₂ reductions	positive	negative
Efficiency Improvements of tyres	positive	negative
Efficiency Improvements of air conditioning	positive	negative
Greater use of alternative fuels or automotive technology	positive	negative
Long-term reduction strategy	positive	negative
Averaging	negative	positive
Pooling	negative	positive
Banking	negative	positive
Individual targets for small-scale manufacturers	negative	positive
Exceptions for special-purpose vehicles	negative	positive
Weight as a parameter for calculating reduction targets	negative	positive
Inclusion of CO ₂ reduction from cars in general Emissions Trading Regime	negative	positive
Monitoring	positive	negative
Crediting	negative	positive
Other	–	–

Figure 3, Klüver, 2009, 542

electric vehicles, environmental groups, and other groups (cf. Klüver, 2009, 539f.).

5.2 Methodical approach of the thesis

In this Master's thesis I will follow Klüver's approach described in the last paragraph, though I will use an alternate version. The

first step is the choice of the

papers to be compared.

5.2.1 The White Paper

The White Paper 'Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system' (March 2011) is the most recent white paper on transport, which outlines the direction of the EU's transport policy up until 2020 and partially even until 2050. So having the possibility to participate and to influence the White Paper is crucial for all actors. It was published in March 2011 and outlines the following key goals by 2050, which shall contribute to reduction of greenhouse gas emission by -60% emissions by 2050.

Apart from promoting climate goals, the White Paper aims to increase mobility in order to improve competition and to enhance prosperity. So the volume of transport shall not be cut, but a cut shall be made on the dependence on oil. Much hope is

placed on new ‘green’ technologies and efficiency. The (climate) goals shall be achieved by the following measures or (sub-) goals:

“Developing and deploying new and sustainable fuels and propulsion systems”

1) ‘Conventionally fueled’ cars shall be phased out in cities in 2050, in 2030 the share shall be only 30%. Also in 2030, major urban centers’ logistics shall be CO₂ free (cf. EU-Commission, 2011,9).

2) By 2050 the use of low-carbon fuel for airplanes shall have a share of 40%, while “EU CO₂ emissions from maritime bunker fuels” shall be cut down to 40% (EU-Commission, 2011, 9).

Under the headline **“Optimizing the performance of multimodal logistic chains, including by making greater use of more energy-efficient modes”** the following goals are listed:

3) Road freight over 300km shall be shifted to other modes of transport¹² (30% by 2030, 50% by 2050%). To achieve this goal, green and efficient road corridors and their accompanying infrastructure shall be built (cf. EU-Commission, 2011, 9).

4) Along with the latter and also by 2050 a European high-speed rail network shall be finished. Already in 2030 the sizes of the currently existing network shall be tripled. By 2050, the majority of passenger transport of medium-distance travel (300-800km) shall be carried out by rail. The general density of the rail network in Europe shall be kept the same (cf. EU-Commission, 2011, 9).

5) By 2030 a “fully functional and EU-wide multimodal TEN-T¹³ ‘core network’” shall be finished, “a high quality and capacity network by 2050 and a corresponding set of information services” (EU-Commission 2011, 9).

¹² Different means of transport are described subsequently as modes in the White Paper on Transport, being part of a multi-modal chain.

¹³ TEN-T (Trans-European Transport Network) stands for a Europe-wide transport network, connecting the whole continent. Moreover it symbolizes an EU transport policy, which want to remove any kind of trade and transport barriers, like bottlenecks of railway stations (cf. EU-Commission, 2016c).

6) By 2050 all core airports and core seaports of the network shall be connected to the rail network and, where possible, to inland water systems (cf. EU-Commission, 2011, 9).

The next points fall under the category **“Increasing the efficiency of transport and of infrastructure use with information systems and market-based incentives”**:

7) Deployment of modernized air traffic management infrastructure (SESAR12) in Europe by 2020 and completion of the European Common Aviation Area.

Deployment of equivalent land and waterborne transport management systems (ERTMS13, ITS14, SSN and LRIT15, RIS16). Deployment of the European Global Navigation Satellite System (Galileo) (EU-Commission 2011, 9).

8) A “framework for a European multimodal transport information, management and payment system” will be created by 2020. (EU-Commission, 2011, 10).

9) Concerning safety the EU wants to reach nearly zero fatalities by 2050 and be a world leader in safety and security. Casualties shall be halved by 2020 (cf. EU-Commission, 2011,10).

10) Move towards full application of “user pays” and “polluter pays” principles and private sector engagement to eliminate distortions, including harmful subsidies, generate revenues and ensure financing for future transport investments. (cf. EU-Commission, 2011, 10).

5.2.2 The Communication “A sustainable future for transport — Towards an integrated, technology-led and user-friendly system” (COM(2009) 279 (final) of 17 June 2009).

As several papers preceded the White Paper on Transport 2011 there are a few papers, which could have been chosen as a starting point for analysis. Among them for example, several Green Papers: “Towards a new culture for urban mobility [COM(2007)55]” and “TEN-T : A policy review – Towards a better integrated trans-European transport network at the service of the common transport policy” in 2009 have been published. In 2005 a “Green paper on a European programmer [sic!] for critical infrastructure protection was released. The latter deals mainly with the protection of infrastructure against terrorist attacks after the attacks in Madrid and

London. In 2008 a “Communication from the EU-Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 8 July 2008 “Strategy for the internalization of external costs”” COM(2008) 435 final was forwarded. Further papers had been: “Communication from the EU-Commission - Towards a rail network giving priority to freight [COM(2007)608]”, Communication from the EU-Commission - Freight Transport Logistics Action Plan [COM(2007)607], Communication from the EU-Commission on European Ports Policy [COM(2007)616], EU-Commission Communication: Strategic goals and recommendations for the EU’s maritime transport policy until 2018, COM (2009) 8 and the Communication from the EU-Commission - Greening Transport [COM(2008)433], which also treats the internalization of external costs and measures for a toll on trucks (cf. EU-Commission, 2013). Internalizing external costs means that external costs as pollution, noise or congestion should be reflected in the transport costs (cf. EU-Commission, 2008). In 2009 the Communication ‘A sustainable future for transport: Towards an integrated, technology-led and user-friendly system’ (COM(2009) 279 (final) of 17 June 2009) was issued. The latter will be used as initial position of the EU-Commission for the analysis in this thesis for the following reasons: the Communication asks stakeholders to participate in an online consultation to post opinions about this communication. It is explicitly mentioned in the preface, signed by Antonio Tajani, Vice-President of the European Commission and EU-Commissioner for Transport in 2009, that “[t]he responses to the consultation will help the EU-Commission in preparing, in 2010, a new White Paper that will outline the European transport policy for the next decade” (Tajani, 2009, 3). 266 responses of stakeholders were submitted. Furthermore, the communication can be seen as preliminary draft of the White Paper in 2011. It outlines the major points of the White Paper. Demands of the Green Papers mentioned above are integrated into the Communication as are demands of the Communication on the Internalization of external costs. The latter, as well as the Green Papers, scrutinize their issues in detail, whereas the Communication on the Future of Transport is more general and includes more points, as does the White Paper on Transport. Therefore, the two of them are more comparable. The communication can be seen as an outline of the White Paper. It has to be mentioned, though, that the consultation was prevailed and stakeholder conferences (EU-Commission, 2009), and the opinions given by stakeholders throughout the

consultation cannot be regarded as the sole influence, which can change the EU-Commission's stance. Klüver (2013b, 7ff.) points out that the outcome of a decision might be indirectly in favor of an interest group's position: external factors might change or other interest groups might be successful. She states that a causal link between the interest group's inclinations and the outcome is decisive regarding influence or luck of an interest group. Therefore the outcome of the research is to be considered under certain limitations.

5.2.3 Data Set

Measure X					
	Positively mentioned	Partially positively mentioned	Neutrally mentioned	Partially Negatively mentioned	Negatively mentioned
Group 1					
Group 2					

First the measures and main points of the Communication have to be assessed. After having evaluated these points, I will scrutinize the submitted papers and examine how the reaction was towards each point. I will remark on each measure if each groups comments 'positively' (=1), 'partially positively' (=2), 'neutrally' (=3), 'partially negatively' (=4) or 'negatively' (=5) on the EU-Commission's proposed measure and enter the numbers into a data set (SPSS). So if Group 1 is in favor of measure X, it will be evaluated as 1 (confer also to the code book in the annex). If only parts of it were mentioned positively, or the actors demanded some alterations, less strong actions or conditions, the evaluation is counted as 'partially positive=2'. For example, one business actor who is active in the aviation sector, wrote that he would agree to the measure "internalisation of external costs" but only if an international agreement was reached. In some cases, an actor declared a measure was not enough to solve a problem, like technological innovation to fight climate change. Depending on how strong the critic on measure was, it is counted as 'partially negative = 4' or as 'partially positive=2'. Answers are also counted as 'partially negative' if a measure was evaluated negatively by an actor but some

aspects were regarded as 'positive'. 'Partially positive' and 'Partially negative' indicate a change of the measure is preferred, though not an (entire) cut of the measure is necessary. If a measure was as a whole disapproved by an actor it was counted 'negative' (=5)". If a measure was mentioned but not assessed, it was counted as 'neutral' (=3)" Further, it is also scrutinized if an actor mentions another actor regarding the scrutinized measure was mentioned and if yes, 'positively (=1)', 'negatively (=3)' or 'neutrally (=2)'. If no other actors was mentioned it is counted as 4 (See also Chapter 'Coding' in the annex). As a result, it should be possible to define the policy positions of the interest groups and to compare them with the outcome – The White Paper on Transport 2011.

6 Operationalization

6.1 The actors

266 stakeholders have contributed to the consultation. The EU-Commission splits them into:

Aviation sector (n=12¹⁴), Cities and Regions (n=39), Economic Stakeholders (n=36), Energy Stakeholders (n=5), Environmental Organizations (n=11), Governments, National Administrations (n=27), Logistics (n=10), Non - motorized transport (n=3), Other Organizations (n=4), Private Citizens (n=26), Public Transport (n=13), Rail Transport (n=17), Research (n=10), Road Transport (n=31), Safety Organizations (n=3), Tourism (n=3), Waterborne Transport (n= 16);

To test my hypotheses 1 (following Klüver 2009) regroup the actors that participated in the consultation into: private actors representing business interests, private actors representing public interests, private actors representing labor interests, public actors, public-associated actors, business-public actors, citizens and other actors. Of course there is the possibility that no coherent structure of arguments can be found in each group and that the built groups are very heterogeneous. This could however serve as another explanation; it could explain for example why this group of actors could not position its interests strongly on a certain issue. 18 measures of the Commission's Communication "A sustainable future for transport: towards an

¹⁴ If an actor submitted more than one paper it was still counted as one

integrated, technology-led and user friendly system” in preparation of the White Paper on Transport 2011 were selected. Only papers which were submitted in English, German, French and Italian were taken into account.¹⁵ Submissions had, as mentioned above, been (re-)grouped into 8 categories:

- 1) Private for business = private actors lobbying for business interests
- 2) Private for public = private actors lobbying for public interests
- 3) Private for labor = private actors lobbying for labor interests
- 4) Public = Public actors as cities, regions, governments
- 5) Public associated: like Research Centers
- 6) Business-public actors: (partially) state-hold companies and formations in which public actors and business actors (and in some cases other actors) have a membership
- 7) Citizens: private citizens, who submitted their opinions
- 8) Others: other actors not fitting the other categories

All of the actors and their classification can be found in the table below As written above, Klüver (2009, 539f.) divided the actors into four classes: (Traditional Automobile Industry groups, Alternative Industry groups, which promote the use of biofuels or electric vehicles, environmental groups, and other groups). Considering my research question and hypothesis, in this thesis the actors are were reclassified into the following categories: private actors lobbying for business interests, private actors lobbying for public interests, private actors lobbying for labor Interest, public actors (elected bodies, such as city councils and governments and their authorities and associations, as well as regions), associated public actors (like research centers, as DLR), business-public (mainly enterprises, which are (partially) public/ in

¹⁵ Not included were: CCIM WG Sustainable Road Transport , Algemeen Vertegenwoordiger van de Vlaamse Regering bij de EU (2), Generalitat de Catalunya, Gobierno de Canaria, IPO (Dutch Provinces), Marszałek Województwa Pomorskiego, Tran Pyrenean Foundation, WATERWEGEN EN ZEEKANAAL, Transport en Logistiek Nederland (TLN), Adolfo Roquero, Elena Biriucheva, Francisco Javier, Perea Sardón; PKP (Polish Railways), IT Instituto da Mobilidade e dos Transportos Terrestres 2, NHR (Nationale Havenraad), Sveriges Riksdags, Stad Stockholm, Stockholm Region, Permanent Representation of Latvia.

the hand of public actors and operate on the market or in a platform where public actors and private business actors participate (and sometimes also others), e.g. ACARE¹⁶, where universities, enterprises, like BAE systems or Shell and public actors, like the European Commission, participate, private Citizens and Others (e.g. universities, consultation bureaus). As previously pointed out, Michalowitz (2007, 52) writes that private interest was articulated via groups, loose networks, lobbyists or law firms. Klüver (2013, 67) states that in having a private status the actor was not a striving for an office and/or is funded by public means. While the first criteria can be applied easily, it is a bit more difficult for the second, as, the Commission steered interest and worked as an incentive for the formation of groups or networks (cf. Greenwood, 2003). Then, some actors, like environmental organization, especially private actors lobbying for public interests, are likely to receive public funding. For this reason, (mainly) independent bodies which receive (some) public funding, will still be regarded as private actors in this thesis. Analyzing the actors has shown that several actors could not be divided clearly between public and private actors pursuing either private, business or public interest. For this reason I use extra categories: Associated public actors, for example the German Aerospace Center, which is “the national aeronautics and space research Centre of the Federal Republic of Germany [...] In addition to its own research, as Germany's space agency, DLR has been given responsibility by the federal government for the planning and implementation of the German space program” (DLR, 2015). DLR is not a directly elected body or an association of elected bodies, however the Federal Republic of Germany gave responsibility to the program. As a result, it qualifies as associated public actor. The Austrian Federal Railway on the other hand operates as a stock company and an internationally operating group, but is nonetheless 100% in state ownership. Another example is the case of Deutsche Post (German Mail Service): the Deutsche Post is operated by the kfv banking group, whilst the German Federal republic holds meanwhile, after the implication of privatization policies, only 21% of the shares (cf. DHDPL, 2015). Both qualify as examples for the category business-public. In the case of ÖBB it is a state-owned concern, in the case of Deutsche Post it is a corporate-owned concern, with private as well as public (state) shareholders. Actors classified under the category business-public involve different

¹⁶ The Advisory Council for Aviation Research and Innovation in Europe

kinds of actors e.g. in a platform where various stakeholders participate and business as well as public actors (and sometimes others) are involved such as ACARE, where universities, enterprises, like BAE systems or Shell and public actors, like the European Commission, participate. The European Commission also has the chairmanship. It might be possible that the ‘true’ change after the Governance Turn of the EU can be found in this groups or association where representatives of Shell discuss with delegates of the commission and researchers from universities, which is controlled in hypothesis H2b.

6.2 Classification of the actors

Sector s	Private Business Interest	Priv ate Publ ic Inter est	Private Labor Interest	Public Actor s	Asso ciate d Publi c Actor s	Busine ss- public	Priv ate Citi zen s	Othe r Acto rs
Aviatio n	Airbus en	Aviat ion Envir onm ent Fede ratio n (AEF)	FNAM (Fédérat ion National e de l'Aviatio n Marcha nde)	The Strate gic Aviatio n Specia l Interes t Group (SASI G) of the Local Gover nment	DLR (Natio nal aeron autics and space resea rch centr e of the Feder al Repu blic of	ACARE (Adisory Council for Aviation Resear ch and Innovati on in Europe)		

				Associ ation	Germ any)			
Aviatio n	Association of European Airlines (AEA)	ECF (Eur opea n Cycli st Fede ratio n)						
Aviatio n	European Low Fares Airline Association (ELFAA)							
Aviatio n	European Regions Airlines Association (era)							
Aviatio n	Flughafen München							
Aviatio n	The Boing Company							
Cities and Region s		Lond on Trav el Watc h		Associ ation of Nether lands Munici palitie s	Natio nal Susta inable Trave l Office	Comité pour la Transal pine		

					Ireland			
Cities and Regions				The Northern Way		The Mersey Partnership		
Cities and Regions				Baden Württemberg				
Cities and Regions				CEMR (Council of European Municipalities and Regions)				
Cities and Regions				Conseil Général du Nord				
Cities and Regions				Deutscher Städte- und Gemeindebund				

Cities and Regions				Deutscher Städte tag				
Cities and Regions				East of England				
Cities and Regions				ENFS (European Forum of Northern Sweden				
Cities and Regions				European Metropolitan Transport Authorities				
Cities and Regions				GMIT A (Greater Manchester Area Integr				

				ated Trans port authori ty)				
Cities and Region s				Kent				
Cities and Region s				Lanca shire Count y Counc il				
Cities and Region s				Land Berlin				
Cities and Region s				Local Gover nment Associ ation (LGA)				
Cities and Region s				METR EX (The networ k of Europ ean Metro				

				politan Regio ns and Areas)				
Cities and Region s				NHS (Natio nal Health Servic e)				
Cities and Region s				North East Engla nd I&II				
Cities and Region s				Österr eichisc her Stäteb und				
Cities and Region s				Régio n Auver nge				
Cities and Region s				Régio n Bretag ne				
Cities and Region s				Régio n des Pays de la Loire				

Cities and Regions				Conse Régio nal Poitou - Chara ntes				
Cities and Regions				Régio n Prove nce- Alpes- Côte- d'Azur				
Cities and Regions				Scotla nd Europ e				
Cities and Regions				The Regio n of South Bohe mia				
Cities and Regions				Stadt Marktr edwitz				
Cities and Regions				Verbin dungs stelle der Bunde				

				slände r				
Econo mic Stakeh olders	Accenture- Vodafone	CEE Bank watch Netw ork	ACF- TRANS COM			pteg - The Voice of Urban Transpo rt		ITE (Euro pean Trans port Initiat ive)
Econo mic Stakeh olders	Alstom		DGB (Deutsc her Gewerk schafts bund)			Deutsch e Post		
Econo mic Stakeh olders	American Chamber of Commerce to the EU		AK (Austria n Federal Chambe r of Labour			entrepri ses publicq ues locales		
Econo mic Stakeh olders	Assemble des chambres françaises de commerce et d'Industrie		Vida (Austria n Labour Union)					
Econo mic	Bundesspart e Transport		The Institutio n of					

Stakeholders	und Verkehr		Engineering and Technology (IET)					
Economic Stakeholders	Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie		Transnet und (Verkehrsgewerkschaft) GBDA					
Economic Stakeholders	Business Europe		ETF (European Transport Workers Federation)					
Economic Stakeholders	CBI (Confederation of British Industry)							
Economic Stakeholders	cep							
Economic Stakeholders	Confcommercio							
Economic Stakeholders	DIHK (Deutscher							

Stakeholders	Industrie- und Handelskammertag)							
Economic Stakeholders	EAA (European Aluminium Association)							
Economic Stakeholders	EMS (European Modular System)							
Economic Stakeholders	TNT							
Economic Stakeholders	EUROCHA MBERS							
Economic Stakeholders	EuroCommerce							
Economic Stakeholders	FIEC (European Constructing Industry Federation)							
Economic Stakeholders	GDV (German Insurance Association)							

Economic Stakeholders	Italmondo Servizi ed Editoria 1-7							
Economic Stakeholders	Michelin							
Economic Stakeholders	Mobility for prosperity in Europe							
Economic Stakeholders	Pirelli&Co SpA							
Economic Stakeholders	SIKA (Svedish Institue for Transport and Communication Analysis)							
Economic Stakeholders	STRCA (Systèmes de transport a coussin d'air)							
Economic Stakeholders	WKO (Wirtschafts kammer Österreich)							

Energy	APPA Biocarburantes (Spanish Biofuels Association)							
Energy	Danish Energy Association							
Energy	EHA (European Hydrogen Association)							
Energy	Eurelectric							
Energy	Deutsches Verkehrsforum							
Energy	Clean Fuel Consulting							
Energy								
Environmental	SheccoTM			LEEZ EN (Low Emission and Environment Zones in Europe)		Klimabündnis Ö		
Environmental		Environmental		Natural				

		protection UK		England				
Environmental		Sustrans						
Environmental		T&E Transport and Environment						
Environmental		The Netherlands Society for Nature and Environment						
Governments/ National Administrations	RSSB (Rail Safety Standards Board. Marked by the EU as DFT			Autorités Françaises	ADEME Agence de l'Environnement et de la			

	Consultation s)				Maîtri se de l'Ener gie			
Gover ments/ Nation al Admini stration s				COSL A (Conv ention of Scottis h Local Author ities)	Sum mary of UK Publi c Cons ultatio n			
Gover ments/ Nation al Admini stration s				Danis h Gover nment				
Gover ments/ Nation al Admini stration s				Grand Duché du Luxem bourg				
Gover ments/ Nation al Admini				HIE (Highl ands and Island				

strations				s Enterprise)				
Governments/ National Administrations				Ministerium für Infrastruktur und Verkehr des Landes Brandenburg				
Governments/ National Administrations				Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications Sweden				
Governments/ National Administrations				Ministry of Transport of Hungary				

strations								
Governments/ National Administrations				Ministry of Transport of the Czech Republic				
Governments/ National Administrations				Ministry of Transport Slovenia				
Governments/ National Administrations				Norwegian Ministry of Transport and Communications				
Governments/ National Administrations				Österreichisches Bundesministerium				

strations				für Verkehr, Innovation und Technologie				
Governments/ National Administrations				Royal Dutch Transport Association				
Governments/ National Administrations				Royal Town Planning Institute				
Governments/ National Administrations				Scottish Government				
Governments/ National				Svedish Parliament				

Admini stration s								
Gover ments/ Nation al Admini stration s				United Kingd om				
Logistic s	Alliance for European Logistics							EIA - EIRA C (Euro pean Inter moda l Asso ciatio n/ Euro pean Inter moda l Rese arch Advis ory Coun cil)

Logistics	confetra (Confederazione Generale Italiana dei Trasporti e della Logistica)							Institute of Transport Planning and Logistics
Logistics	ECG (Association of European Vehicle Logistics)							Institute of Transport Studies University of Leeds
Logistics	GS1 Europe							Dryport Project
Logistics	Transport Gruppen							
Non motorised transport		ctc (UK's National Cyclists						

		Federatio n)						
Non motoris ed transpo rt		ECF (Eur opea n Cycli st Fede ratio n)						
Other Organi zations			UIT (Union interfed erale des transpor ts)		North west of Engla nd Healt h(NW HBO)			
Other Organi zations		Worl d Care free Netw ork						
Other Organi zations		FUS S e.V. (Fac hver band Fußv						

		erke hr Deut schl and)						
Private Citizens							Adrian Thomas	
Private Citizens							Ann J.	
Private Citizens							Ansi Meriläinen	
Private Citizens							Christopher Kaupat	
Private Citizens							Emil Hocvar	
Private Citizens							Fabio Ciuffini	
Private Citizens							Familie Svo	

							bod a	
Private Citizens							Gar anc e Ferr ant	
Private Citizens							Geo rg Infü hr	
Private Citizens							Hild e Eise l	
Private Citizens							Hub ert Lari dant	
Private Citizens							Jac k Bro wn	
Private Citizens							Jea n Tres tour	
Private Citizens							Jerr y Sch neid er	

Private Citizens							Juh ani Pek kola	
Private Citizens							Mar co Per oni	
Private Citizens							Matt hias Sch öner er	
Private Citizens							Mic hael Thal ham mer	
Private Citizens							Tom i Ran ta	
Private Citizens							Ulric h Sch neid er 1+2	
Private Citizens							Vuo kko Jarv a	

Private Citizens							Will y Win kel man s	
Private Citizens							Wolf Rüd iger Nick el	
Public Transport	EPTO (European Passenger Transport Operators)			Belgia n Feder al Public Servic e for Mobilit y and Trans port	Mers ey Trave l	Dortmu nder Stadtwe rke AG		Allian z pro Schie ne
Public Transport	National Express	Euro pean Pass enge r's Fede ratio n			Trans port Com mitte e	Tfl (Transp ort for London)		
Public Transport	UTP (L'Union des Transports					UITP (Interna tional		

	Publics et ferroviaires)					Associa tion of Pubic Transpo rt)		
Public Transp ort	Fédération Nationale des Traveaux P ubliques					VDV (Verban d Deutsch er Verkehr suntern ehmen)		
Public Transp ort	Ceep (European Centre of Employers and Enterprises providing Public Services)					Verkehr sverbun d Rhein- Neckar GmbH		
Rail Transp ort	House of Rail					CER (Comm unity of Europe an Railway s)		
Rail Transp ort	IARO (Internationa l Air Rail Association)					DHE (Delme nhorst Harpste		

						der Eisenba hn GmbH)		
Rail Transp ort	Rail Freight Group					EIM (Europe an Rail Infrastru cture Manage rs)		
Rail Transp ort	UNIFE (Union of the European Railway Industries)					Deutsch e Bahn		
Rail Transp ort	Network Rail					Eurosta r		
Rail Transp ort						Ferrovie dello Stato		
Rail Transp ort						Österrei chische Bundes bahn Holding Aktieng esellsch aft		

Rail Transp ort						Russian Railway s		
Rail Transp ort						VR (Finnish Railway s)		
Rail Transp ort						SNCF (Société National e de Chemin s et de Fer)		
Resear ch	LCP Consulting	ECT RI (Eur opea n Cent er of Tran sport Res earc h Instit ute)		SoNo Ra				Depa rteme nt of Land Econ omy Cam bridg e
Resear ch	Mouchel							Link Foru m
Resear ch	Navtechrada r							

Research	RUF International							
Road Transport	AEGPL 1+2 (European LPG Association)	Union interfédérales de transport)						ADAC (Allgemeiner Deutscher Automobilclub)
Road Transport	ACEA (European Automobile Manufacturers Association)	LSVA für Europa e.v (Alliance Heavy Vehicle Fee Europe)						EAC (European Automobile Club)
Road Transport	ANITA (Associazione nazionale delle imprese di autotrasport	VERT Association						EARPA (European Automotive

	o e logistica)							Rese arach Partn er Asso ciatio n)
Road Transp ort	ASECAP (Association Européene des Concession aires d'Autoroutes et d'Ouvrages à Péage)							Fede ration of Britis h Histo ric Vehic les
Road Transp ort	Better Place							The Royal Auto mobil e Club Foun datio n
Road Transp ort	DTL&SA (Danish Transport and Logistics Association and the							

	Swedish Association of Road Haulage Companies)							
Road Transport	DEKRA (Deutscher Kraftfahrzeugüberwachungsverein e.v.)							
Road Transport	ERF (European Road Union Federation)							
Road Transport	ETRma (EUROPEAN TYRE & RUBBER manufacturers' association)							
Road Transport	Eurolines							
Road Transport	European Express Association							
Road Transport	FNTR (Fédération Nationale des							

	Transports Routieres)							
Road Transp ort	FIA (Fédération Internationa le de l'automobile)							
Road Transp ort	FTA (Freight Transport Association)							
Road Transp ort	IRU (Internationa l Road Union)							
Road Transp ort	KAPSCH TrafficComA G							
Road Transp ort	LeaseEurop e							
Road Transp ort	NGV System Italia							
Road Transp ort	NGVA (Natural Vehicle and bio Gas Association)							
Road Transp ort	SCANIA							

Road Transp ort	UETR (Union européene des transporteur s routiers							
Road Transp ort	Volvo Group							
Safety		EPS CC (Eur opea n Roa d Safe ty Cou ncil)						The Dutc h Safet y Boar d
Safety		AIPS S (Itali an Asso ciati on of Roa d Safe ty Prof essi						

		onal s)						
Tourism	Drv (Deutscher Reise Verband)							fedop (Féd ératio n Euro péen ne D'Or ganis ation s de Pèleri nage s)
Tourism	ECTAA The European Travel Agents' and Tour Operators' Association							
Waterborne Transport	BIMCO (Baltic and International Maritime Council)				Port Autho rity of Puert o de Gijon			
Waterborne Transport	ECASBA (THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIT							Inlan d Wate

	Y ASSOCIATI ON OF SHIPBROK ERS AND AGENTS							rway s
Waterb orne Transp ort	ECSA (European Community Shipsowner s' Association)							S.Jäd erber g, N.An derss on
Waterb orne Transp ort	ESC (European Shippers' Council)							Secto ral social dialo gue com mitte e
Waterb orne Transp ort	INE (Inland Navigation Europe)							North ern Mariti me unive rsity proje ct
Waterb orne Transp ort	(ESPO European Seaports Association)							


Waterborne Transport	EBU (European Barge Union)							
Waterborne Transport	EFIP (European Federation of Inland Ports)							
Waterborne Transport	ERSTU (Europäische Fluss - See-Transport Union e.V.)							
Waterborne Transport	UIR (Unione Interportuari)							

After having categorized the actors into the classification scheme mentioned above, ¼ of each group of actors¹⁷ was randomized. (The full classification scheme can be found in the annex). So at the end 61 actors¹⁸ had been elected for analysis and their opinions upon the 18 measures scrutinized. Therefore the dataset counts 1098

¹⁷ Not even numbers were treated as follows: decimal places < 0.5 were rounded down, decimal places ≥ 0.5 were rounded up.


¹⁸ For a breakdown of the actors confer to the annex ('Coding').

cases. As one can see in the pie chart above (Actors 1) the private actors' lobbying for business actors had submitted most of the papers. In the data set they make up the largest group and have a share of 37.7% which is almost twice as much as the



second largest group, the public actors, which has 21.3%. Private citizens have a share of 9.8%, private actors lobbying for public interests 8.2%, business-public actors have a share of 8.2%, private actors lobbying for labor interest 3.3%, and public associated actors 3.3%.

As the group “public associated” had not so many actors, the groups “public actors” and “public associated actors” were transformed into the variable “publicsum” more significant and compact use, containing different kinds of public actors. After regrouping, public actors have a share of 24.6%.



6.3 Extracted Points of the Communication

As already described in the section *Methods*, I start my analysis by evaluating the (main) measures of the Communication of the EU-Commission “The future of transport”, published in 2009. The Communication calls for a transformation of the transport system to counter increased greenhouse gas emissions emitted by the transport sector, the anticipated oil scarcity and congestion especially in cities. The Communication mentions economic crises and the ageing population as counter-effective to the solution of these problems. In the foreword, the Communications is described as strategy document as well as consultation document (cf. Tajani, 2009). Antonio Tajani, Vice-President of the EU-Commission and EU-Commissioner for Transport in 2009, writes: “The responses to the consultation will help the EU-Commission in preparing, in 2010, a new White Paper that will outline the European transport policy for the next decade” (Commission/Communication, 2009, 3). As a

second step I will scrutinize how the stakeholders react towards each point/measure of the Communication. Afterwards, a comparison between the Communication on the future of transport and the White Paper on Transport 2011 will be made.

The papers, which were submitted in the online consultation, are screened by the points listed below. Klüver (2009) evaluated 41 points for her qualification scheme, after having read the press proposal accompanying the draft. Dür (2008, 12) defined 19 aspects of EU position in the Doha Round on which business actors could have had an impact and compared them with the demands of the (private) actors (cf. Dür, 2008, 12). I have chosen 18 points or measures of the Communication scrutinizing the communication “A Sustainable Future of Transport”, reading the White Paper on Transport, consulting some of the papers handed in by the stake holders and by taking part in a discussion after the publication of the White Paper on Transport in 2011 “Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system.” I have selected the points for the following reasons: I tried to integrate important points of the Communication on the Future of Transport. Similar as described by Dür (2008, 12), I chose points where I expected private actors to take interest in on the one hand, based on the reading and the discussion, and on the other hand by estimating that interests could be at stake. For example logistic firm offering road transport could expect loss in sales if the internalization of external costs came into force, as this would signify that their transport mode is becoming more expensive in relation to other means of transport.

6.3.1 The 18 Measures

1) Correct pricing: Internalization of external costs in all modes and means of transport

Internalization of external costs means that external costs such as noise, pollution and congestion are included “in the price paid by the user” (EUR-LEX, 2001). The variable refers to the sections 4.6. “Smart prices as traffic signals” (“Policy objectives for sustainable transport”) and 5.2. “Funding: finding the resources for sustainable transport” (“Policies for sustainable transport”). In 4.6., the Communication goes as far as stating: “In transport, like in any other sector, there cannot be economic efficiency unless the prices reflect all costs — internal and external — actually

caused by the users. [...] The transport system would particularly benefit from better price signals.” And further: “Transport operators and citizens are not always in a position to identify among several transport alternatives what is best for the economy and the environment, but with correct pricing of externalities for all modes and means of transport they would make the right choice just by opting for the cheaper solution” (EU-Commission, 2009, 19).

A stepwise introduction of the internalization of the external costs was presented to action by the Commission in 2008 (EU-Commission, 2009, 22).

2) Completing the internal market and further opening of the market/transport sector, especially in the rail sector.

The Communication mentions the importance of completing the internal market several times, especially in 5.4: “The legislative framework: further promoting market opening and fostering competition” (Policies for a sustainable transport), where it highlights the importance of completing the internal market state with strong competition rules. Transport companies should be released of administrative burdens. The Commission also stresses the priority of opening up the rail sector where the market opening has not progressed as much as in air and road transport. (cf. EU-Commission, 2009, 24).

3) Transport as an integrated intermodal network (system)

The subtitle of the Communication is “Towards an Integrated, Technology-led and user-friendly system”. The fact that the integrated system is stated in the subtitle demonstrates the importance of the concept for the Communication. An integrated network means that several parts of the transport system are connected to each other and achieve, via working together, a better or, to say it in the Communication’s wording, more efficient performance. The communication describes in 4.2. (A well-maintained and fully integrated network more integrated internal market):

“infrastructure, nodes, transport vehicles and equipment, ICT applications related to the infrastructure and on-board, network services, and operational and administrative procedure” as elements of transport as a network industry” (EU-Commission, 2009, 17). The combinations of the “relative strengths” of each mode and exploiting the networks’ capacity should lead to less congestion, fewer accidents, less pollution and fewer emissions ((cf.) EU-Commission, 2009, 17). The

Commission stresses the necessity of intermodal platforms and nodes, as well as the integration between countries.

Intermodality shall boost and improve the use of railways, inland waterways and transport by sea by combining at least two modes (cf. EU-Commission, 2005).

“Intermodal” does also mean that although the modes change, in freight transport, the containers are not handled (cf. Low Carbon Freight Dividend, 2015). Although no mode is abolished, intermodality is a prevention of a further decline of the aforementioned modes (cf. EU-Commission, 2005), which can indicate disadvantages for road freight, as by promoting rail, inland water and sea transport also together with road transport signifies a possible reduction of all-road transport. In the concept of an integrated and intermodal network, a modal shift is possible and explicitly mentioned in paragraph 46 of the Communication (see also next measure). In the submitted paper the terms “multimodal” and “co-modal” appear as well.

“Multimodal” indicates that more than one mode is involved in a passenger’s journey or in a freight transport. (cf. Low Carbon Freight Dividend, 2015) “Co-modal is a term first used by the EU in 2006 and refers to the intelligent use of two or more modes of transport on their own and in combination to get the biggest benefit from each of them so that the overall journey is the most sustainable that it can be” (Low Carbon Freight Dividend, 2015). This should lead to economic, societal gains and environmental gains. (cf. Low Carbon Freight Dividend, 2015).

In the examination of variable 3 I concentrate on the desired integration between modes rather than between countries. The Communication uses the terms “intermodal” and multimodal, however not “co-modal”. (See also paragraph 63).

4) Shifting transport to more environmental friendly modes (especially in urban transport)

A modal shift means a transfer from one mode of transport to another mode of transport. In this context it is used to express a transport-shift from an environmentally harmful mode to an environmentally friendlier mode, like from road to rail and inland water shipping and from individual transport to public transport. As mentioned above a modal shift is/can be part of an intermodal transport system (see above).

In paragraph 17, the Commission criticizes goal of “shifting transport to more efficient modes” is still not advanced enough and should be proceeded also with the help of short sea shipping” (Commission/Communication, 2009, 11). And in paragraph 46 it predicts that “the urbanisation trend [...] will make a ‘modal shift’ towards more environment friendly modes particularly important in the context of urban transport” (Commission/Communication, 2009, 17).

5) Transport should be accessible to all

The Communications lays an emphasis on accessibility (also) for sustainability reasons and due to an ageing society. Elderly people and people with disabilities should have good access to comfortable and safe (public) transport. Furthermore, it is important to include remote regions in the transport network (cf. EU-Commission, 2009, 16). Apart from including elderly people or people with disabilities, answers discussing the accessibility of remote regions or socially disadvantaged people were also included. Not included were answers regarding general access.

6) Technological innovation as a “major contributor to the solution transport challenges” (Comfort, Safety, Security and Environmental Problems). (EU-Commission, 2009, 18).

Technology and technological innovation can be seen as emphasis of the communication in general. In 4.2, paragraph 50 (“Keeping the EU at the forefront of transport services and technologies”) technological innovation is described as “major contributor to the solution of the transport challenges” (Communication, 2009, 18). Much hope is put in new technologies regarding comfortability, safety, security and environmental impacts (cf. Communication, 2009, 18). The evaluation of this variable is mainly focused on technical innovation for the solution of environmental problems.

7) Expanding infrastructure projects and policy to neighbouring countries

Paragraph 5.7. deals with ‘The external dimension: the need for Europe to speak with one voice’ in an European as well as global or international perspective. Measure 7 represents the goals to expand EU infrastructure projects and policies to neighboring countries for example developing the South East Europe Core Regional Network, which foreruns TEN-T, establishing the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) Action Plans or building up cooperation agreements and bilateral

partnerships. The Commission proposes that the ENP-states adopt the EU's transport policy in various intensities. Further an extension of TEN-T to ENP countries and Belarus is mentioned (cf. EU-Commission, 2009, 25).

When only the international/external dimension per se was mentioned by an actor, the measure was counted. However an approval was in this case counted as 'partially positive'.

8) Enhanced cooperation in urban transport

The Commission defines growing urbanisation as one of the major challenges of the next decades. Furthermore, according to the EU-Commission (2009, 25) "most transport starts and ends in cities". As a result the Commission suggests in paragraph 5.6. "Governance: effective and coordinated action" (EU Commission, 2009, 24), enhanced cooperation within urban transport to handle and coordinate urban traffic. Concrete elements of the coordination are: demonstration projects and exchanging best practices. It further suggests a framework that supports local authorities to implement actions (cf. Commission, 2009, 24). If, for example, only the best practice approaches were approved, but a common framework was opposed, the values 2 (= 'partially positive') or 4 (= 'partially negative') were given, depending on the intensity of the opposition.

9) More investment in R&D (research and development) with special focus on sustainable technology

The measure relates to section 4.4. "Keeping the EU at the forefront of transport services and technologies ", paragraph 51. R&D and investment in newer, sustainable mobility is not only promoted for reasons of ecological sustainability but is seen as a grant for competitiveness and growth in an ageing society. The variable refers also to paragraph 79, which proposes that investments in R&D should be focused sustainable mobility. Examples are the European Green Cars Initiative as well as joint technology initiatives (cf. Communication, 2009, 24). See also paragraph 77.

Sustainable technologies in the context of the Communication can be described as technologies that produce fewer or zero emissions, have a good life cycle-evaluation and can "even, if widely used, essentially solve [...] environmental problems"

(Chalmers University of Technology/Göteborg University, 2002, 3f.). For different interpretations of sustainability see also annotation on sustainability (Measure 12).

10) Maintaining and improving working conditions

In the paragraphs 41, 53, 54 and also 82 the concern of maintaining and improving working conditions in an ever-intensified liberalization of transport workers is discussed. A race to the bottom concerning working and social conditions should be avoided. Instead the Commission highlights the necessity of improving or maintaining working conditions (cf. Communication, 2009, 19). In paragraph 82 the Commission appends the necessity of “a uniform protection of workers conditions” (cf. Communication, 2009, 24), in paragraph 41 the importance of health and safety in working conditions is emphasized (cf. Communication, 2009, 16).

11) Shipping and Motorways of the sea, also in combination of rail transport, as alternative to land transport.

Variable 11 can actually be seen as ‘sub-variable’ of the variables 3 (integrated intermodal network) and 4 (modal shift). Especially inland water shipping is regarded as a very environmentally friendly mode, whereas short sea shipping is assessed as a very efficient mode (cf. Communication, 2009, 11). The maritime sector is highlighted as an alternative to land transport, and synergies between rail and waterborne transport are viewed (cf. Communication, 2009, 21) as potential. Motorways of the sea are part of TEN-T¹⁹. The Commission proposed their “development as a “real competitive alternative to land transport ²⁰”” already in the White Paper 2001 (EU Commission, 2015).

12) Sustainability via efficiency

The measure „sustainability via efficiency” is an “odd variable” and is not an actually a suggested measure by the Commission. However, it is implied in the Communication that with a more efficient transport system, more fuel efficiency and

¹⁹ Provided “the full implementation of the European maritime space without barriers and the maritime transport strategy for 2018 [...]” (Communication, 2009, 21, paragraph 68).

²⁰ Land transport is in this case understood mainly as road transport, as synergies of shipping and rail are emphasized in contrast to land transport and because 75.1% of land freight is transported on the road (cf. Eurostat, 2015).

more efficient technology, more sustainability can be achieved. Confer to: 6.3: 'An annotation to sustainability'.

13) A common framework for the evaluation of infrastructure projects.

Infrastructure planning is seen as a relevant factor in fighting environmental problems (and also to make an intermodal network reality) New infrastructure projects should be appraised according to common methodologies which vary across modes and countries, taking socio-economic benefits as well as externalities and the total effect on the network into account. The variable takes into account evaluations which deal with common rules or measures regarding the appraisal or (pre-) planning of infrastructures (cf. EU-Communication, 2009).

Variable 13 relates mainly to paragraph 65, which stresses the necessity of [...]“ common methodologies and similar assumptions [...] should be adopted in the appraisals of infrastructure projects across modes and, possibly, countries”, based on the know-how gained while applying EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) and SEA (Strategic Environmental Assessment). Further the Commission stresses the need of “common data and indicators”, especially concerning traffic and congestion, as they helped to choose “[...] projects on the basis of comparable cost–benefit ratios and [to take] all relevant elements into account: socioeconomic impacts, contribution to cohesion and effects on the overall transport network solutions [...] (EU-Commission, 2009, 20). Moreover the Commission emphasizes in paragraph 47 that while planning new infrastructure externalities and effects on the whole network should be taken into consideration. The maximization of socio-economic benefits should be a priority (cf. EU-Commission, 2009, 17).

14) Reducing transport problems by virtual accessibility

'Virtual accessibility' shall help to avoid transport. By using teleworking, e-health or e-government, more ways become evitable (cf. Communication, 2009, 19).

15) Technological shift towards lower and zero emission vehicles

is one of the measures in which the paradigm of 'technology as a major solution' is inherent and can be found in section 5.3. 'Technology: how to accelerate the transition to a low-carbon society and lead towards global innovation'.

Due to a growing population and a 'global car ownership', the Commission calls "a technological shift towards lower and zero-emission vehicles and for the development of alternative solutions for sustainable transport" (EU-Commission, 2009, 23). The EU should become the global leader of sustainable mobility (cf. EU-Commission, 2009, 23).

According to the EU Commission (2016) 12% of all EU-CO₂ emissions are emitted by cars. All road transport together is responsible for one fifth of all EU CO₂ emissions (cf. EU Commission, 2016b). The term "Zero Emission Vehicle" (ZEV) goes back to a regulation of the State California in 1990 (cf. California Environmental Protection Agency, 2004). At first ZEV-standards were only met only by electric vehicles, which emitted 90% less emission than gasoline vehicles. (cf. Vogel et al., 2005, 5). Since a modification of the regulation in 2003, hybrid electric vehicles can also, under certain circumstances, meet ZEV criteria (cf. California Environmental Protection Agency, 2004).

Lower emission vehicles (LEV): a vehicle can be defined as lower emission vehicle when its emissions are lower than the average standards. New cars, which were registered in the EU not allowed to exceed emissions of 130g CO₂/km (cf. EU Commission, 2016). For 2021 the target for new cars is 95gCO₂/km. As extremely low emission would encompass vehicles below 50g CO₂/km (cf. EU Commission, 2016).

This measure will be evaluated regarding vehicles on wheels.

Measure 16) Common European Standards (in technology, security, safety)

This variable evaluates a general attitude towards common European standards rather than the specific attitudes towards any specific standards. The common standards mentioned deal with the environment, safety, security, and technologies. It is regarding the last three that the variable is controlled. If for example one standard is not included or not approved but the others are, the variable is counted as 'partially positive =2'. The security dimension had not existed in the White Paper on transport 2001 and has only been introduced since the terror attacks of 9/11 (cf. EU-Commission, 2009, 10). Security (countermeasures against terrorism, piracy), as well as safety (e.g. fighting road fatalities) is presented as increasingly important, due also to an aging society (cf. EU-Commission, 2009, 16). Standards shall

therefore be kept in a more liberalized market (cf. EU-Commission, 2009, 26). Regarding technology “[t]he most important policy instrument will probably be standard setting” (EU-Commission, 2009, 23).

Measure 17) Internalization charges for transport funding

Internalization charges are revenues generated by pricing the use of transport infrastructure according to its (negative) externalities, such as noise or pollution. As the Commission expects public funding to decrease, “the transport sector has to become increasingly self-financing in relation to infrastructure” (EU-Commission, 2009, 23), and for this reason congestion charges are suggested. Furthermore it is expected that with a market penetration of vehicles combustion engines driven by alternative energies, revenues from oil derivatives will decrease and internalization charges are additionally necessary in this case (cf. Communication, 2009, 22).

Measure 18) The integration of Airports and Railways

Measure 18 is [mainly] a sub-variable of variable 3. The integration of airports and (high-speed-) rail is seen as part of a functioning intermodal transport network. It can also contribute to a modal shift (variable 4) especially in passenger transport (cf. Communication, 2009, 17).

6.4 An annotation to sustainability

The Communication on the Future of Transport as well as the White Paper on Transport 2011 frequently uses the terms sustainable or sustainability. The nature of sustainability is fiercely discussed by scholars as the means of achievement and the different approaches to obtain climate goals and how to fight climate change. In fact, papers could be written solely on these debates. This would clearly go beyond the scope of this thesis, however I would like to give a short overview over main ideas of sustainability, in order to categorize the White Paper on Transport in the context of environmental theory. It is not easy to give a definition on sustainability because the term itself and what is needed for a sustainability or sustainable development is contested. The most commonly used definition of sustainable development is the one given by the Brundtland Report (cf. IISD, 2016):

"Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts: the concept of needs, in particular the essential needs of the world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs." (Brundtland Report in: IISD, 2016).

One string of the debate assumes that ecology, economy and the social world interact with each other and that sustainability is achieved via three dimensions of sustainability (economic, social, and environmental) (cf. IUCN, 2006). Preferable every part should be sustainable. Scientists agree that the EU's policy on climate change and sustainability and the transport goals regarding the environment can be, generally, classified under this definition. The European Commission's definition of sustainable development also refers to the Brundtland Reports's definition. Since 2001 an EU Sustainable Development Strategy exists, a review has been adopted in 2009 (cf. European Commission, 2015b). The IUCN however does scratch on another theme, which is not on the EU's agenda: rethinking growth and prosperity and accepting certain limits of growth. It is also acknowledged that economic growth is causing environmental devastation (cf. ICUN, 2012) whereas, as written above, "the EU agenda has been driven by a search for economic prosperity and global competitiveness" (Greenwood, 2003, 74). Many instruments propagated by the EU operate within the logic of the market, e.g. technical efficiency or emission-trading (ETS). This is criticized by scientists promoting other stances of the sustainability debate which are more critical concerning the economies influence on environmental degradation. Clive Spash (2013) states that the assumed linkage between economy, ecology, and society underestimates the pervasion of the ecology and society by the economy and propagates Social Ecological Economics as "an integrating interdisciplinarity [sic!] heterodox economic approach" (Spash, 2011,1). Spash (2013) and other scientists such as Armin Dieter (2013) call for an end of the kind of economic growth we are used to or for degrowth. The necessity of a trend reversal is when it comes to transport also supported by natural scientists like climatologist Helga Kromp-Kolb based on current climate data. Kromp-Kolb (2013) argues that without saving energy and a reduction in the volume of transport crucial climate


goals like the 2°C goal are unapproachable and criticizes approaches, which rely too much technical inventions and efficiency. The demand of cutting the volume of transport is also voiced by some of the actors in their comments on the Communication; however this interest is not represented in the White Paper.

6.5 Frequencies

6.5.1 Mentioning


After extracting the points of the communication, it was evaluated in a first step how many times a measure had been mentioned by one of the actors. In 45.3% of the cases a measure had been mentioned by an actor.

In 54.7% of the cases a measure had not been mentioned or could not have been identified clearly enough.



6.5.2 Evaluation


498 cases were valid and 600 missing. If a measure was mentioned by an actor, it was in 50.6% of the cases mentioned “positively (=1)”, in 29.7% “partially positive =2”, 8.2% of the answers were “partially negative = 4”, 7.6% “negative =5”, and 3.8% neutral (=3).



6.5.3 Other Actors

Further, it was also scrutinized if an actor mentioned another actor regarding the scrutinized measure. If another actors was mentioned it was assessed if it was ‘positively (=1)’, ‘negatively (=3)’ or ‘neutrally (2)’, (No=4). As written above as “other actor” counted any other actor than the actors itself or the EU/the Commission in general. Mostly other actors were addressed in a rather general way for example as “member states” or as a (business) sector, sometimes specific member states or

associations/groups were mentioned by their name. In the latter case, however, usually only 'positively' or 'neutrally'. In 6.4% another actor was mentioned 'positively', in 47.3% 'neutrally' and in 12.5% 'negatively', in 33.8% no other actors were mentioned in connection with the respective measure.



An interesting observation was that the different transport modes (rail, road, aviation, shipping, and also public transport) mostly criticized each other or described the advantage of their mode in comparison to another mode. For example road transport actors tended to criticize especially the train sector and also vice versa. Actors from waterborne transport also liked to criticize road transport. This is not surprising though as the Communication suggests e.g. a modal shift to environmentally friendlier modes (especially in urban transport) and an internalization of external costs. In both cases road transport (and also aviation) would have to expect higher costs as they produce more unwanted costs like CO₂ and other greenhouse gases

and loss of share of the modal split. As highlighted above the share of road transport is, especially in the case of freight transport, exceptionally high. While road transport actors highlight road users already paid taxes (e.g. fuel taxes) and the aviation sectors actors declare that they already functioned without state subsidies in contrast to rail, rail transport actors argue that aviation benefits from tax-free kerosene and road transport as well as aviation did not pay for the actual costs they cause.

7 Analyzation


7.1 Comparison of the Variable

7.1.1 Measure 1: Internalisation of external costs in all modes and means of transport

How was it evaluated?

Business actors evaluated the measure mostly 'partially positively' (31.3%²¹), 'positively' (25%) or 'negatively' (25%). Some did evaluate it 'partially negatively' (6.3%) or 'neutrally' (12.5%). Private actors for public interest assessed it 100% 'positively' and labor actors were either 'positive' (50%) or 'partially positive' (50%) about the measure. The preferred evaluation of the public actors was 'positive' (50%), a considerable amount was 'partially positive' (33.3%) or while 8.3% (each) had a 'partially negative' or 'neutral' attitude towards the measure. Business-public actors evaluated it positively (75%) or partially negatively (25%). Citizens evaluated it positively (50%) or neutrally (50%); while other actors were against it (100% negative), their answering rate was however not very high.

²¹ The percentage refers always to those actors who have actually evaluated the measure.



Is it mentioned in the White Paper?

Measure I is mentioned again in the White Paper of Transport 2011, but it has however undergone certain changes. While in the Communication the internalization of external costs appears as an important paradigm, majorly important for transport funding and also for inducing a modal shift, it is not equally important in the White Paper on Transport.

While the Commission states in the Communication (EU-Commission, 2009, 19) that “there cannot be economic efficiency unless the prices reflect all costs — internal and external — actually caused by the users [...]”, it urges for economic incentives that let users choose the most environmentally friendly mode and therefore states:

“[t]ransport operators and citizens are not always in a position to identify among several transport alternatives what is best for the economy and the environment, but with correct pricing of externalities for all modes and means of transport they would make the right choice just by opting for the cheaper solution” (EU-Commission, 2009,19).

In the White Paper it is written:

“Transport charges and taxes [...] should underpin transport’s role in promoting European competitiveness, while the *overall burden* for the sector should reflect the total costs of transport in terms of infrastructure and external costs” (EU-Commission, 2011, 15).

Therefore, according to the Communication, transport operators and citizens should be incentivized to use the most environmentally friendly modes and every mode and mean of transport should pay the price for its own externalities: in the White Paper (2011, 15) an “overall burden” for the sector is mentioned. Revenues should be earmarked “development of an integrated and efficient transport system”, however internalization of external costs has lost importance for general funding (see also measure 17). It is argued in this thesis that, although it is described in the White Paper 2011 (p.15) as likely that transport users have to pay more in the future, choosing more environmentally friendly means through the internalization of external costs is no longer given as a prominent solution, but as a way ensuring a level playing field for all modes²².

As considerable difference can be seen in that although the internalization of external costs should proceed for “all modes of transport applying common principles”, the “specificity of each mode” needs to be taken into account. So, what does that mean? Different transport modes have different externalities to internalize. The internalization of external costs should be mandatory for road and rail transport (to be introduced in 2016- 2020) and include “noise, local pollution and congestion on top of the mandatory recovery of wear and tear costs” (EU-Commission, 2011, 29). “Local pollution and noise in ports and airports, as well as for air pollution at sea” should be internalized in maritime and air transport examined for inland waterway transport in the EU (EU-Commission, 2011, 29). In the long run users charges for all passenger cars shall be implemented, so that as a minimum “the maintenance cost of infrastructure, congestion, air and noise pollution” are reflected (EU-Commission, 2011, 15). While the Communication is leaning towards including heavy goods vehicles (cf. EU-Commission, 2011, 22), the White Paper wants to “examine the gradual phasing in of a mandatory harmonized internalization system for commercial vehicles on the entire inter-urban network” (White Paper, 2011, 15).

²² This is however also mentioned in the Communication.

Concerning greenhouse gases, CO₂ will be included into the internalization for external costs for road vehicles but only if it is not included in fuel taxes. Pricing measures to tackle CO₂ emissions are energy taxation and emission trading systems. Land transport's use of fuel is currently taxed, whereas electricity use is included in ETS as is aviation (cf. EU-Commission, 2011) (since 2012). A decision for maritime transport shall be reached in IMO.

Considering the change of measure, I suggest that the evaluation "partially positive" and "partially negative" apply the most.

Were certain interests favored over others?

In particular, business actors from the aviation sector of waterborne transport have urged that the internalization of external costs should be applied globally, as otherwise there would be market disadvantages for Europe. The White Paper does highlight the importance of international organizations for agreement in general much more than the Communication. Internalizing climate change costs in the maritime sectors has moved to the IMO level. As we see in table one, internalization of external costs was most popular within the group private actors lobbying for public interests as well as, for business-public and public actors. The most frequent answer of business actors was 'partially positive', which also included answers of actors who were principally in favor of the measure but wanted to have it applied at an international level, while there was a considerable amount of positive answers from business actors: they had a share of 80% of all 'negative' evaluations regarding the measure.

Regarding this measure, it can be said that there have been developments in favor of business actors as views have moved towards 'partially positive' and 'partially negative'. The measure is still in the White Paper, but it is less ambitious than in the Communication - although the most frequent answer of all actors was clearly 'positive' 46.6%. Climate change costs for the maritime sector have all moved to IMO level. As mentioned in the Communication (EU-Commission, 2009, 22) aviation will be included in ETS. Kilometer charges or fuel taxes will not be considered for internalization. (cf. EU-Commission, 2011).


Business actors' expected and observed counts differed most within 'positive' (expected 7.4, observed 4), 'partially positive' (exp.:3.9, obs. 5) and 'negative' (exp.: 2, obs.: 4) evaluations. It could be argued that there was hardly a difference between

the observed (1) and the expected count (1.2) within 'partially negative'. However, a development of the variable towards 'partially negative' can be interpreted as success for business actors, with their relatively high share of 'negative' statements, because the general evaluation of the measure was rather positive and the measure moved nonetheless in the direction of the business actors. Private actors for public and business-public actors were disadvantaged as both of them had a very positive attitude towards the measure and both had higher observed counts within 'positive' than expected (Private for public: exp.:1.9, obs. 4; business-public: ex.: 1.9, obs.: 3) public actors would have been expected to have higher 'negative' counts (exp.: 1.5, observed 0). Although 'partially positive' applies to their interests, they have a higher share of 'positive' evaluations and the trend towards more negative evaluations does not favor public interests. Therefore, business interests were favored over other private interests and over public actors. Business-public and business actors had dissimilar evaluations.

7.1.2 Measure 2: Completing the internal market, especially concerning rail transport

How was it evaluated?

In general the measure was mentioned by 41% of the actors and generally evaluated 'positively' (52 %). As can be seen in the bar chart, the measure was evaluated 'positively' (91.7%) and 'partially positively' (8.3%) by the business actors. In contrast to this 'positive' evaluation, 100% of labor actors evaluated it 'negatively'. It was evaluated 'partially negatively' (100%) by the private actors lobbying for public interest and had a mixed evaluation by the public actors: The most mentioned classification was 'partially positive' (50%), but 16.7% were 'positive' and there was also a considerable amount of '(partially) negative' evaluations (16.7% 'partially negative' and 16.7% 'negative'). The group 'business public' assessed it 33.3% 'positively', 33.3% 'partially positively', 33.3% 'partially negatively'. The citizens' assessment was neutral (100%).



Is the measure mentioned in the White Paper?

Yes, the completion of the internal market or a Single European Transport Area is mentioned in the White Paper. It includes also a Single European Sky and a Single European Railway Area and a 'Blue Belt' around Europe to facilitate market integration concerning shipping et cetera is mentioned and promoted in the White Paper. Removing national obstacles (technical, legal and administrative) is a declared goal. (cf. Commission, 2011, 11.). As a result, it is argued that the actor's 'positive' evaluation is applied best in the White Paper.


Were certain private interests favored over others?

In the case of Measure 2 the decision to carry on with completing the internal market (in the transport area) especially in the rail sectors was in favor of private actors lobbying for business interests as they had a clearly positive attitude towards the measure and are responsible for 84.6% of the 'positive' evaluations. The decision was against the preferences of the private actors lobbying for public and labor interests in particular. A correlation between the groups is indicated, as business actors had a lower expected count in all evaluations but 'positive', where they had an expected count of 6.2 and an observed count of 11. Private actors for public interests had higher expected counts in all but 'partially negative' evaluations (exp.: 0.1, obs.: 1), and the same is true for labor actors regarding 'negative' evaluations (exp. 0.2, obs.: 2). This thesis also argues that business actors were more influential than public actors who would have favored 'partially positive' (exp.: 1.2, obs.: 3) over 'positive' (exp.:3.1 obs.1), as they were more satisfied with the measure in general in contrast to the public actors that also had 'negative' and 'partially negative' mentionings. Furthermore, their interests were more influential than those of the labor actors and of the private interests for public. Business-public actors' evaluations differ from those of the business actors' as well as of those of the public actors. They would have been expected to have 1.6 'positive' evaluations, but had 1, and they would have been expected also to have slightly more 'neutral' evaluations (ex. 0.1, obs.: 0) and also more 'negative' evaluations (exp. 0.4, obs. 1) and less 'partially positive' (exp.: 0.6, obs.:1) and 'partially negative' (exp. 0.4, obs.:1) evaluations.

7.1.3 Measure 3: Transport as integrated intermodal network

How was it evaluated?

The variable “Transport as integrated intermodal network” was mentioned relatively frequently by 68.9% of the actors. The most frequent evaluation of the business actors was ‘partially positive’ (61.1%); they otherwise evaluated it as ‘positive’ (38.9%). Of the private actors’ lobbying for public interest answers, 50% were ‘positive’, while 50% were ‘negative’. The labor actors had the same results. It was assessed ‘positively’ by 53.8% of the public actors, ‘partially positively’ by 30.8%, ‘neutrally’ and ‘partially negatively’ by 7.7% each. It was evaluated 100% ‘positively’ by the group business-public. The citizens could not really agree on a position as 50% assessed it positively and 50% negatively. The case was similar with regard to the other actors where 50% assessed the measure ‘negatively’ and 50% ‘partially positively’.



Is the measure mentioned in the White Paper?

Yes, the measure is mentioned in the White Paper. In contrast to the Communication there is more often spoken of an integration of a “core- network²³”. Furthermore, it is notable that in contrast to the Communication the terms “co-modal” and “co-modality” are used in the White Paper. In contrast to the Communication the term “multimodal” is more often used instead of intermodal, e.g. regarding multimodal platforms (cf. EU-Commission, 2011, 6) or “the core network must ensure efficient multi-modal links between the EU capitals and other main cities, ports, airports and key land border crossing, as well as other main economic centres (Commission, 2011, 14). However also the term “intermodal” is still used in the White Paper on Transport.

Again, the new term or approach is the core network. Additionally, the travel distances are divided now into urban, intermediate and long-distance travel. The Commission sees the possibility of EU-wide application of its measures and modal integration in the medium distances as there were constraints because of subsidiarity or international agreements regarding the other distances (cf. EU-Commission, 2011). Further the Commission does not expect cleaner fuels and new efficient vehicles to save enough emissions on their own, but “a consolidation of larger volumes” (EU-Commission, 2011, 6) is needed for long distances. Therefore more buses, rail and air transport and coaches are needed for passenger transport as well as multimodal-solutions, using especially rail and waterborne modes for long distance freight transport. (cf. EU-Commission, 2001, 6).

Interestingly enough, buses and coaches are explicitly mentioned as it was lobbied by the Volvo Group (cf. Volvo Group, 2009). Even more interesting is that greater use of air transport is demanded. Air transport is from an environmental perspective neither an environmental friendly nor a sustainable mode of transport. It was however noticeable that business actors from the air sectors, as Airbus, declared aviation as sustainable mode (e.g. no land cutting, eco-efficient) and questioned the impact of aviation on climate change (cf. Airbus S.A.S., 2009). It is also new that freight transport below a distance of 300km should remain on heavy goods vehicles and not be part of an intermodal network or be shifted to other modes. For long

²³ Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung des Landes Berlin (2009) points out that there had been several options for the intermodal network. According Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung des Landes Berlin (2009, 3) focusing on a core network had been option 3.

distances efficient co-modality is demanded in the White Paper (cf. EU-Commission, 2011, 7).

Were certain private interests favored more than others?

Measure 3 is still mentioned in the White Paper; however, it has undergone some changes. Therefore, the evaluation 'partially positive' applies most. This was the most favored evaluation of the business actors and therefore I argue that their evaluation counted most. One reason is that as mentioned above 61.1% business actors evaluated the measure as 'partially positive' – most of them preferred the term co-modal instead of intermodal, which is one reason why their evaluation was weighted as 'partially positive'. Likewise, certain new points reflect demands issued by business actors, such as transferring decisions to international organizations, not abolishing trucks, regarding aviation as a sustainable and essential mode, and acknowledging the importance of taxis and coaches (cf. EU-Commission, 2011, 6). In a further step the suggested action/amendments by the actors should be quantified/evaluated. Of all 'partially positive' evaluations, 61.1%²⁴ were from business actors, 5.6% from private actors for public interests, as well as for labor interests 22.2% of public actors and 2.4% of other actors. Business actors were expected to have more counts than observed in the classifications 'positive' (exp.: 8.6, obs. 7), 'neutral' (exp.: 0.4, obs.: 0) or 'partially positive' (exp.: 0.4, obs.: 0) and 'negative' (exp.: 0.9, obs.: 0), and fewer counts than observed in the classification 'partially positive' (exp.: 7.7, obs.: 11). Public actors had fewer expected counts than observed concerning 'positive' (exp.: 6.2, obs.: 7), 'neutral' (exp.: 0.3, obs.: 1) and 'partially negative' (exp.: 0.3, obs.: 1), and higher expected counts than observed concerning 'partially positive' (5.6, 4) and 'negative' (exp.: 0.6, obs.: 0). As there was no or only marginal differences between the counts and the expected count within labor and private actors lobbying for public interests, this thesis suggests that in relation to the numbers (or the lack of correlation between actors and classification regarding the latter), there is not much indication that they had been disadvantaged much in relation to the business actors. A comparison of the content of the suggestions for changes of the measure would probably show a clearer contrast. This thesis argues that business actors were favored over public actors, as public


²⁴ However most actors who submitted papers were business actors.

actors would have favored firstly 'positive' more clearly over 'partially positive' and the difference between expected counts and observed counts suggest a correlation. Business-public actors interests would have been also clearly in favor of 'positive' (exp.:1.4/obs.:3; partially positive: ex.: 1.3/ obs.:0), therefore business-public actors were also disfavored in comparison to business actors and are more congruent with the public actors in this case.

7.1.4 Measure 4: A shift to environmental friendly modes

How was it evaluated?

This measure was mentioned by 67.2% of the actors. Bearing in mind that the measures were in general evaluated (in absolute numbers) rather positively, the "shift to environmentally friendly modes" has a relatively high number of negative evaluations (29.3%), however the most popular evaluation was still 'positive' (46.3%). Business actors evaluated the measure rather more negatively than positively: while 22.2% evaluated it 'positively' and 16.7% 'partially positively', 16.7% assessed it 'partially negatively' and 44.4% 'negatively'. In contrast to that all answers from private actors lobbying for public interests were 'positive' (100%). Private actors lobbying for labor interests assessed the measure 'neutrally' (100%). Public actors assessed it rather more 'positively' than 'negatively' with 66.7% 'positive' and 16.7% 'partially positive' evaluations in comparison to 16.7% 'negative' evaluations. The measure was not popular (but also not often mentioned) by private citizens with 50% 'partially negative' and 50% 'negative evaluation' and by other actors, with 100% 'negative' evaluations, while it was popular with 'business-public actors' (100% 'positive' evaluations).



Is the measure mentioned in the White Paper?

Yes, the measure is mentioned in the White Paper on Transport. In contrast to the Communication, as already mentioned in the section to variable 3, that 'multimodality' has become more important than intermodality and there is no modal shift planned for freight transport below a distance of 300 km. Clean urban transport and commuting also in urban context freight transport is not planned to be shifted to environmental friendlier modes, but vehicles in general (also for passenger transport) and in particular trucks should become cleaner (cf. EU-Commission, 2011, 8). In the context of passenger transport, a higher share of collective transport is still envisaged, however clean vehicles and alternative fuels system are promoted stronger. (cf. EU-Commission, 2011).

In this thesis it is argued that using the term of co-modality can indicate a tendency to move away from the modal shift paradigm. And indeed modal shift in freight transport has been abandoned for short distances below 300km. It is however still promoted for distances above 300km, especially medium distances (and perhaps in

a clearer way than in the Communication) (cf. EU-Commission, 2011, 9).

Passengers travelling medium distances shall do this mainly by rail by 2050 (cf. EU-Commission, 2011). No mention is made of shifting long distance passenger transport to more environmentally friendly modes (not including aviation as such), however vehicles should be accompanied by rail, busses, coaches and transport. It is (considering environmental arguments) remarkable that aviation is mentioned as means of transport that shall help to cut emission and solve congestion problems (cf. EU-Commission, 2011, 6). Buses and coaches are promoted more than in the Communication.

Were certain interests favored over others?

Scrutinizing the measure “modal shift”, it is noticeable that the paradigm issued by several actors, especially business actors, that every mode has its place and strength, has become part of the White Paper of Transport. It can be seen as part of the concept of co-modality. With freight transport on the road remaining below 300km and half of the volume of the intermedium transport means that each mode has its share. The same can be said for passenger transport that has been moved to rail for medium distances, but apparently no explicit shift is envisaged for long-distance travel, but a multimodal airport/train connection (cf. Commission, 2011, 15). For short distances, collective modes should increase the share, but include means such as buses and coaches and promote cleaner vehicles for individual transport. Coming back to the data it is clear the “business actors”, (and also other actors and citizens) did not want a modal shift. On the other hand, public actors, business-public actors and especially private actors lobbying for public interests were much in favor of the measure. Under these circumstances the changes can be seen as compromises, because the modal shift for freight transport under 300km was abandoned, as well as other concessions granted to various (business) sectors. Nonetheless, the modal shift remains partially in the White Paper especially in intermedium distance, where half of the volume shall be transported by rail and waterborne transport by 2050 (cf. EU-Commission, 2011). If the variable was shown in a spatial diagram, it could be said it moved in the direction of business actors, other actors and citizens, however it was not entirely abandoned. I suggest the evaluation ‘partially negative’ applies most, as a considerable part of the measure changed and for some distances a modal shift was given up completely.

A comparison of the expected and observed count demonstrates a correlation between the groups and the evaluations²⁵. Business actors were expected to have higher expected counts than observed counts within 'positive' evaluations (expected counts: 8.3, observed counts 4) and within 'neutral' (exp.:0, observed 0.4) and have higher observed counts than expected counts within 'partially positive' (exp.: 2.2, obs.:4), 'partially negative' (exp.: 1.8, obs.: 3) and 'negative' (exp. 5.6, obs.8). Private actors lobbying for public interests had 1.9 expected in contrast to 4 observed counts within 'positive' and lower observed counts than expected counts in every other section, most remarkable within 'negative' (exp.: 1.2, obs.: 0). Labor actors had the highest differences between 'neutral' (exp.: 0, obs.:1) and 'positive': (exp.: 0.5, obs.:0). Public actors had higher expected counts than observed counts in all classifications but 'positive' (exp.: 5.6, obs.:8). The highest differences concerning the lower expected counts were within 'negative' (exp.:3.5, obs.: 2) and 'partially negative' (exp.: 1.2, obs.:0). Business-public actors had higher observed counts (3) than expected (1.4) within the 'positive' evaluations and higher expected than observed counts in all other sections, most prominently within 'negative' (exp. 0.9, obs.: 0). I will not go into detail regarding the citizens and other actors as they are less relevant to my hypotheses. The comparison backs the thesis' argument that business actors tended towards the negative evaluations, while public actors, business-public actors and private actors lobbying for public interests tended towards positive, all the while taking into account the high approval of the measure and the considerable change despite of that.


I argue that regarding this measure business actors' interests were more influential or favored than those of public actors, business-public and private actors lobbying for public. Similarities between business-public actors and business actors were not given therefore H2b cannot be confirmed. Business actors were favored more than public actors, therefore private actors had, on the one hand, been more influential than public actors. On the other hand, labor and private actors for public interests had not been more influential (rather less) than public actors. This leads to the suggestion that, first a simple differentiation between private and public actors is not enough and secondly a simple inclusion of more private actors does not lead to a balance of power between a private interests or more democracy.

²⁵ Apart from citizens and other actors regarding 'neutral'.

7.1.5 Measure 5: Transport should be accessible to anyone

How was it evaluated?

This measure was evaluated by 36.1% of the actors. 25% of business actors assessed it 'positively' and 75% 'partially positively'. Noteworthy is the lack of interest of the business actors in comparison to other variables. Only 4 out of 23 mentioned the measure. 100% of the private actors lobbying for public interests evaluated it 'positively'; equally the private actors for labor. 50% of the public actors assessed it 'positively' and 50% 'partially positively'. 66.7% of the business-public actors assessed it 'positively', 33.3% mentioned it 'neutrally', 100% of the citizens assessed it 'positively', and the 'other actors' evaluated it 'positively' (50%) or 'partially positively' (50%). There was no 'negative' or 'partially negative' evaluation.



Is the measure mentioned in the White Paper?


Yes, partially. However, its role was more important in the Communication, where dealing with an ageing society was presented as one of the major transport challenges (cf. EU-Communication, 2009, 13) and accessibility as brought in context with sustainability (cf. EU-Communication, 2009, 16), ergo public transport needs also be comfortable and accessible for the growing ageing publication. The accessibility of remote regions is also regarded as highly important (cf. EU-Communication, 2009, 16). In the White Paper the ageing population is no longer “the great challenge it had been before” and “accessibility for everyone” is not given the same importance as in the Communication. It is mentioned that “the quality of transport for elderly people, Passengers with Reduced Mobility and for disabled passengers, including better accessibility of infrastructure” should be improved (White Paper on Transport, 2011, 23). Further it is more linked to service than to sustainability: “The quality, accessibility and reliability of transport services will gain increasing importance in the coming years, inter alia due to the ageing of the population and the need to promote public transport.” (White Paper on Transport, 2011, 12). Remote regions are not mentioned in the White paper, geographical accessibility is only mentioned in the following sentence: “Overall, transport infrastructure investments have a positive impact on economic growth, create wealth and jobs, and enhance trade, geographical accessibility and the mobility of people.” The importance of access to the market is mentioned several times however. The newly planned multimodal core network shall link main cities, ports, airports and land crossing, though there is no mention of the regions outside of the core network (cf. Commission, 2011, 14).

Were certain interests favored over others?

Different groups of actors had been relatively united in a ‘positive’ or ‘partially positive’ evaluation, as there was no ‘negative’ or ‘partially negative’ evaluation. Some actors mentioned that too much emphasis was laid on the ageing population, however this was not directly measured in the variable. It cannot be deduced from the data why the accessibility to remote regions does not appear in the White Paper. One could, however, conclude that the lack of interest from the side of the business actors could have led to a less importance of “accessibility” in the White Paper of Transport. Concerning service and sustainability, it is remarkable that the White

Paper places a higher emphasis on the market-based instruments, whereas the Communication is focused comparatively more on sustainability and environment. A quantitative text analysis might be useful to evaluate the changes in the texts' wordings. This thesis argues that 'partially negative' would apply best to the results, but as there were no 'partially negative' evaluations, it is suggested that those who had 'partially positive' evaluations were more influential. Business actors (ex.: 2.4, obs.: 1), public actors (exp. 4.7, obs.: 4), and other actors (exp. 1.2, obs.:1) had higher expected counts within the 'positive' evaluations, whereas private actors for public (exp.: 1.2, obs.: 2), private actors for labor (exp. 1.2., obs.:2), business-public (exp.: 1.8, obs.:2) and citizens (exp.: 0.6, obs.: 1) had lower expected counts than observed counts. It was the other way round with 'partially positive': business actors: exp.: 1.5/ obs.:3, private actors for public and labor: exp.: 0.7, obs.:0, public actors: exp.: 2.9, obs.: 4, business-public actors: exp.: 1.1/obs.: 0, citizens: exp.: 0.4/obs.:1 and others: exp: 0.7/ obs.:1. Within neutral the highest difference was within business-public actors: exp.:0.1/ obs.:1. These numbers indicate a correlation between the actors' groups and the evaluation of measure 5 and also indicate that business actors, public actors and other actors had a tendency towards 'partially positive', whereas the other had a tendency towards „positive“. It is suggested therefore in this thesis that the former were more influential, as the measures' importance has decreased in the White Paper. As I have mentioned above the measure had a low evaluation rate within the business actors, which leads to my thesis that their low evaluation rate has also contributed to the decreased importance of the measure. To verify my thesis, I have calculated a crosstab with 'summed actors' and whether or not the measure was generally mentioned. As the chart shows business actors had a much higher share of 'not answered', they had an expected count of 8.3 and an observed count of 4 of 'yes', while they had an expected count 14.7 and observed count of 19 of 'no'. In contrast to that public actors had an expected count of 5.4 and observed count of 8 of 'yes', while they had an expected count of 9.6 and an observed count of 7 of 'no'. There was also a distinction between the expected counts and the observed counts of more than 0.2 within labor actors ('yes': exp.: 0.7, observed 2; 'no': exp. 1.3, obs.: 0), business-

public ('yes': exp.: 1.8, observed 3, 'no': exp.: 3.2 observed: 2) and citizens ('yes': expected: 2.2, observed: 1, 'no': expected: 3.8, observed: 5).




As aforementioned, business actors, public actors and other actors had a tendency towards 'partially positive'. As public actors had a higher evaluation rate than expected, while it was the other way round with business actors, this thesis suggests a decrease of the importance was not in favor of the public actors. As a result, it is argued that they had less influence on the measure than the business actors. So while regarding private actors business interests were favored over public and labor interests (as they were both in favor of 'positive', but labor had a higher correlation to the amount of evaluations) business actors were also favored over public actors, while public actors had more influence than private actors for labor or public interests. Business-public actors' evaluations or their amount of evaluations had no similarities to business actors, the trend was rather towards public actors.

7.1.6 Measure 6: Technological innovation as a “major contributor to transport challenges”.

How was it evaluated?

The measure was mentioned relatively frequently by 68.9% of the actors. It was mentioned ‘positively’ (45%) or ‘partially positively’ (55%) by the business actors. Private actors lobbying for public interests assessed it rather ‘negatively’ than ‘positively’: 33.3% evaluated it ‘negatively’, 33.3% ‘partially negatively’, while 33.3% evaluated it ‘positively’. 100% of the labor actors valued it ‘positively’. 44.4% of the public actors evaluated it ‘positively’, 33.3% ‘partially positive’ and 11.1% evaluated it ‘negatively’ and 11.1% ‘partially negatively’. Business-public had 100% ‘positive’ evaluations, the citizens assessed ‘positively’ (60%), ‘partially positively’ (20%) or ‘negatively’ (20%) and other actors assessed it ‘positively’ (100%).



Was the measure mentioned in the White Paper?

Technological innovation mentioned in the White Paper can be still regarded as a major contributor to transport challenges, although the phrase is not cited in the White Paper. It is however made clear that a single technological solution cannot enable the move away from a transport system based on oil. “It requires a new concept of mobility, supported by a cluster of new technologies as well as more sustainable behavior” (EU-Commission, 2011, 12). It is, however, still seen as very important as technological innovation is seen as guarantee to a quick transition to a sustainable transport system. According to the Commission (2011, 12) technological innovation is promising regarding: “vehicles’ efficiency [...]; cleaner energy use through new fuels and propulsion systems; better use of network and safer and more secure operations through information and communication systems” (EU-Commission, 2011, 12). Innovation is furthermore seen as essential for a Single European Transport Market (cf. White Paper on Transport, 2011, 10). A regulatory framework, including standardization and interoperability is viewed as important for European businesses on European and world-level (cf. EU-Commission, 2011, 13). Concerning innovation, the deployment of innovative vehicles, higher importance is given to a system approach and the introduction of smart technologies (or in the case of smart technologies a new), importance. Innovation is more goal-orientated and in a bundle with research and deployment. The latter has become increasingly important (cf. EU-Commission, 2011).

Were certain interests favored over others?

Measure 6 has also undergone some changes in the details, while the principal goal remains. This could indicate that business interest had the most influence on the measure, as the most frequent answer of business actors was ‘partially positive’ and I argue that ‘partially positive’ applies to the changes best. Business actors had a share of 73.3% of all ‘partially positive’ evaluations, while a majority of actors (52.4%) evaluated the measure ‘positively’. Business actors had a lower expected count (7.1) regarding ‘partially positive’ than observed (11) and higher expected counts within ‘positive’ (exp.: 10.5/obs.: 9), ‘partially negative’ (exp.: 1/obs.: 0) and ‘negative’ (exp.: 1.4, obs.: 0). Private actors lobbying for public interests were expected to have higher counts regarding ‘positive’ (exp.: 1.6/ obs.: 1) and ‘partially positive’ (exp.: 1.1/obs.: 0), while it was the other way round within ‘partially negative’


(exp.: 0.1/obs.: 1) and 'negative' (exp.: 0.2, obs.:1), which demonstrates a relative negative attitude towards the importance of technological innovation as solution for transport challenges. This is not surprising, as private actors lobbying for public interests often campaign for environmental interests and climatologists as Helga Kromp-Kolb (2013) question the sufficiency of technological measures/innovation in the fight against climate change. It has to be said however, that the acknowledgement that a single technical solution cannot solve all problems (cf. EU-Commission, 2011, 12) is an argument employed by groups of actors such as private interests lobbying for public interests. However, the bundle of measures to embed technical solutions is still orientated to systemic technological solutions. And, considering the importance of technology and technological innovation, it is argued that the interests of private actors lobbying for public interests have not been influential regarding this measure. Public actors would have preferred 'positive', however the gaps within the positive evaluations between the expected counts and the observed count have not been extremely high ('positive': exp.: 4.7, obs. 4, 'partially positive': exp.: 3.2, obs.: 3), business-public actors had a clearer tendency towards 'positive' (exp.: 3/obs.: 1.6) in contrary to 'partially positive' (exp.: 1.1/obs.: 0). To sum up, I suggest that business actors were most influential regarding the measure. While public actors were, due to their relatively low gap between expected and observed cases and their generally positive attitude, not largely disfavored, business-public actors were more disfavored as they would have clearly voted for 'positive'. Labor actors have opted for 'positive' as well. Least influential have been public actors lobbying for public interests as they tended to towards the negative evaluations which are clearly not reflected in the White Paper. Business-public actors differed in their stance from public actors and from business actors.

7.1.7 Measure 7: Expanding infrastructure projects and policy to neighbouring countries

How was it evaluated?

The measure was mentioned by 32.8% of the actors. Three groups did not mention it at all: labor actors, citizens and other actors. The biggest share of the business

actors was the possibility 'partially positive' (45.5%), followed by 'positive' (27.3%), 'partially negative' (18.2%), and 'neutral' (9.1%). Private actors lobbying for public assessed the measure 'positively'. 50% of the public actors mentioned it 'positively', 33.3% 'partially positively' and 16.7 'neutrally'. 100% of the groups business-public evaluated it 'positively' private actors lobbying for public assessed the measure 'positively'.



Is the measure mentioned in the White Paper?

Yes, it is: it is planned to expand the EU's transport and infrastructure policy as well as a coordination framework to the "immediate neighbours" (EU-Commission, 2011, 16).

In distinction to the White Paper there is hearsay of extending the policy to „immediate“ neighbors, whereas in the Communication it is spoken more generally of the integration of "neighbouring countries" (cf. EU-Commission, 2009). Plans to

expand TEN-T to eastern European ENP²⁶ countries and Belarus are not mentioned, neither is explicitly creating a south-eastern core network to prepare TEN-T in this region (cf. Communication, 2009, 25). (The letter is, however, mentioned in general in connection with transport policy in the Western Balkans (cf. European Economic and Social Committee, 2010, 1).

To summarize, expanding TENT-T is not explicitly mentioned and a distinction between immediate neighbors and others is made. In general, in the chapter “External dimension” the “more” international dimension including promoting European Internal Market rules through international organization seems to have become more important and a Mediterranean Maritime Strategy is newly introduced (cf. Commission, 2011, 30).

Were certain interests favored over others?

In general, the “more” international dimension was more often commented in the Commission by business actors, which is reflected by the highest share of ‘partially positive’ evaluations (ex.: 3.9/obs.: 5), and ‘less positive’ evaluations (exp.: 5/obs.: 3). This dimension of the external dimension is more prominent in the White Paper, while only a few lines are dropped about the neighboring countries. ENP is not explicitly mentioned, neither is TEN-T. Therefore, one could see a tendency in the direction of the most favored tendency/characteristic of the business actors.

Furthermore, there were also some ‘partially negative’ evaluations (exp.: 1.1, obs.: 2) of the business actors, which could also indicate that if parts of the variable are omitted, it was in their interest. Business actors were the only ones with ‘partially negative’ evaluations. ‘Neutral evaluations’ did not have a high correlation with the groups. Private actors for public interests and business – public actors had been 100% pro, so it can be assumed that it is less of their interest if some parts change. Of these two groups the expected counts and the observed count regarding the ‘positive’ evaluations had been as such: positive: private for public actors: exp.: 0.5/obs.:1; business public: exp.: 0.9/obs.: 2. A short annotation: This thesis suggests that a reason of the high approval of the group “business-public” is that in this group very among other (partially) state hold rail companies, who were generally rather in favor of expansion of T-ENT, where the priority of an European high-speed

²⁶ European Neighborhood Policy

rail network is emphasized. As a consequence, they would benefit of the expansion of TEN-T. The expected counts of the pro evaluations of the public actors were relatively congruent with the observed counts ('positive': exp.: 2.7, obs.: 3, 'partially positive': exp.: 2.1/observed: 2. The highest difference was within "partially negative" /exp.: 0.6, obs.: 0). Evaluating these numbers, this thesis suggests that there is a tendency towards business interests in this measure. To confirm this thesis, it would be advisable to compare changes/parts, which were suggested by the business and the public actors. I argue that private actors lobbying for public interests and business public actors would have been more in favor of a complete acceptance of the variable, so they were slightly disfavored. Admittedly, correlations were less indicated by the data than in other measures.


7.1.8 Measure 8: "Enhanced cooperation in Urban Transport"

How was it evaluated?

The measure "enhanced cooperation in urban transport" was mentioned by 39.3% of the actors. 37.5% of the business actors mentioned it 'positively', 50% 'partially positively' and 12.5% 'neutrally'. Of the private actors lobbying for public interests who mentioned it, 50% evaluated it 'positively' and 50% 'partially positively'. None of the labor actors mentioned it. Of the public actors 36.4% evaluated it 'positively', 27.3% 'partially positively', 27.3% 'partially negatively', and 9.1% 'negatively'. 100% of the group business-public assessed it 'positively'. None of the private citizens mentioned it, 50% of the other actors mentioned it 'positively' and 50% 'partially negatively'.

There was a relatively high interest²⁷ shown by the public actors. Although more than 60% evaluated the measure as 'partially positive' or 'positive', more than 30% evaluated it 'partially negatively' or 'negatively'. An explanation is that some public actors were worried about the subsidiarity principle.

²⁷ 11 of 15



Is the measure mentioned in the White Paper?

Yes, it is (confer to 2.3 Urban Mobility Plans, EU-Commission, 2011, 26f.). It is more detailed and more concrete than in the Communication. This thesis argues that the measure had been a success for the Commission’s (or the Communication’s) position as a change apart from becoming more detailed is not apparent. There will be enhanced European cooperation on the Urban level e.g. through establishing “procedures and financial support mechanisms at European level for preparing Urban Mobility Audits, as well as Urban Mobility Plans, and set up a European Urban Mobility Scoreboard based on common targets (Commission, 2011, 26).” Further it will be scrutinized if a mandatory approach is possible for “cities of a certain size” (Commission, 2011, 26). Compliance should be linked to funding, framework is planned for urban road user charging, and another one for applying the Urban Mobility plans in cities is scrutinized (Commission, 2011, 27). Further best practice exchange for urban freight and a strategy planning for urban logistics without

emissions by 2030 is planned (Commission, 2011, 27). The various actions for an enhanced cooperation are still scarcely legally binding.

Were certain (private) interests favored over others?

Assuming that “enhanced cooperation in urban transport” was transferred ‘positively’ to the White Paper, it is assumed that actors who did evaluate it ‘positively’ are most satisfied. In this case that would be business-public actors, which did evaluate it 100% ‘positively’ (however in total numbers only one of them did mention it). 50% of the private actors lobbying for public interests did evaluate it ‘positively’ as well as 50% of the other actors, though they had also 50% ‘negative’ evaluations. I suggest that as business-public and private actors for public interests approved mostly of Measure 8 (100% ‘positive’ and ‘partially positive’ evaluations), their interest was favored most, and followed by the business actors who had 87.5% ‘positive’ or ‘partially positive’ evaluations. Public actors were expected to have higher observed counts of the pro evaluations (‘positive’: exp.: 4.6, obs.: 4; ‘partially positive’: exp. 3.7, obs.: 3) and lower observed counts within ‘partially negative’ (exp.: 1.8, obs.: 3), while it was the other way round with business actors (‘positive’: exp.: 3.3/obs.:3, ‘partially positive’: exp.:2.7, obs.:4, ‘partially negative’: exp.: 1.3, 0), so it can be argued that business actors had more influence than public actors, and private actors in general had, in this measure, more influence than public actors. Business-public actors’ evaluations were more similar to business actors’ evaluations than to public actors’ evaluations.


7.1.9 Measure 9: More investment in R&D (with special focus on sustainable technology)²⁸

How was the measure evaluated?

The measure “More investment in R&D (with special focus on sustainable technology)” was mentioned by 44.3% of the actors. 50% of the business actors evaluated the measure as ‘positive’ and the other 50% as ‘partially positive’. The results were the same within the private actors lobbying for public interest. 100% of

²⁸ Also evaluations only: treating “more investment in R&D” were taken into account.

the private actors lobbying for labor interest, the business-public actors, the citizens and the other actors were in favor of the measure. The public actors were out of all of the groups the most divided in their evaluation and the only ones with a 'negative' evaluation (12.5%). However, they did also evaluate it overall rather positively with 50% 'positive' and 37.5% 'partially positive' evaluations.



Is the measure mentioned in the White Paper?

The answer is a bit ambiguous. The short form “R&D” itself is not exactly mentioned, but rather the terms “research” and/or “development”²⁹. Research shall now tackle the combined “cycle of research, innovation and deployment.” Transport research and innovation policy now has the role to “increasingly support in a coherent way the development and deployment of the key technologies needed to develop the EU transport system into a modern, efficient and user-friendly system (Commission,

²⁹ However I also scrutinized the submitted papers for either of these terms.

2011, 12)". Therefore the measure has become more goal-orientated. The importance of the deployment of the newly researched technologies has increased. Regulatory framework is regarded as important, and smart technologies and "vehicle propulsion technologies and alternative fuels Green Car Initiative, Clean Sky)" are considered as main fields of research. The latter can be - under certain circumstances – counted as sustainable technologies, however neither sustainable technologies or nor sustainability are explicitly mentioned; instead "smart" technologies are introduced and efficiency has become even more important. The goal seems to be rather sustainability than efficiency now. (See: evaluation measure 12).

Were certain (private) interests favored over others?

Considering the changes of the variable/measure, it is suggested that the evaluations, which had been 'partially positive' or 'partially negative', were those of whose interests were advocated most. These were the private actors for business interests, private actors for public interests and public actors. To attain an indication of a possible correlation I compared the counts with the expected counts:

Concerning the 'positive' evaluations the observed count was lower than the expected count within the business actors (expected: 6.3, observed: 5), the private actors for public (expected: 1.3, observed: 1), and the public actors (expected 5, observed 4). The observed count was higher than the expected count within the labor actor (expected 0.6, observed 1), business-public (expected 1.3, observed: 2), citizens (expected: 1.3, observed: 2) and others (expected 1.3, observed 2).

Regarding 'partially positive', the differences between expected and the observed counts were highest within the labor actors (expected: 0.3, observed: 1) and within business actors (expected: 3.3, observed: 5). Concerning 'partially negative', the observed counts differed most from the expected counts within the business actors (expected: 0.4, observed: 0) and the public actors (expected 0.3, observed: 1). The differences between the counts and the expected counts indicate a correlation between the actors' groups and the evaluation of a measure. Furthermore, these dates indicate that there had been a higher tendency towards 'partially positive' within business actors (exp. 3.3, obs. 5) and also within public actors (exp.: 2.7, obs.: 3), as well as private actors for public interests (exp. 0.7/obs.1).

Considering the differences between expected and observed count, this thesis argues that business actors' and public actors' interests were favored mostly and most influential regarding this measure, assuming that 'partially positive' and 'partially negative' mostly reflect the outcome in the White Paper. Business actors tended more towards 'partially negative', while public actors also tended to 'partially negative'.

I therefore argue that among private actors, business interests were more favored by and had more influence on the White Paper regarding this measure, followed by private actors for public interests. The interests of labor actors were taken least into account together with those of business–public actors, citizens and other actors, because their evaluations were overall positive (all but labor: expected count: 1.3, obs. 2, labor: exp.: 0.6/obs.: 1). The same can be said about citizens and other actors. It is suggested that public and business actors have a relatively equal influence.


Note on the content: Deployment was mentioned mostly by the business actors, they were also very much in favor of efficiency, this would also indicate an influence of the business actors. Further research or the statistical evaluation of the alternative suggestions and/the alternative wordings/use of terms would be recommendable.

7.1.10 Measure 10: Maintaining and improving working conditions

How was it evaluated?

The measure 'Maintaining and improving working conditions' was mentioned by 27.9% of the actors and was therefore one of the measures with less evaluation on behalf of the actors. 22.2% of the business actors evaluated the measure as 'positive', 44.4% as 'partially positive', 11.1% as 'neutral' and 22.2% as 'partially negative' – the only negative reaction came from business actors. Compared to other variables there was a relatively low interest in the measure, and three groups did not mention the measure at all. The private actors lobbying for labor interest had unsurprisingly the highest amount of evaluations (100% within their group) and 100% evaluated it 'partially positively'. In contrast to other measures the public actors had a relatively low interest in this one. 60% evaluated it 'positively' and 40%

‘partially positive’. Last but not least, 100% of the business-public actors evaluated the measure ‘positively’.



Is the measure mentioned in the White Paper?

What is addressed is the quality of work in different sectors, with for example, minimum quality standards in the European Aviation Sector. Further sectoral dialogues are encouraged, working conditions will be addressed and “the EU approach to jobs and working conditions across transport modes” evaluated (White Paper on Transport, 2011, 20). “A higher degree of convergence and enforcement of social, safety, security and environmental rules, minimum service standards and users’ rights” (Commission, 2011, 10) is demanded. The avoidance of a race to the bottom is not addressed. As working conditions will only be addressed and working and social conditions are transferred to sectoral committees or councils, the procedure to an enforcement of the conditions does not seem to be very likely, I evaluate the measure as mentioned but attenuated in comparison to the (goals of the) Communication.

Were certain interests favored over others?

As

the commitment to maintain and to improve working conditions has decreased, the evaluations 'partially negative' and 'partially positive' are classified as most influential. Here however a flaw in the method becomes apparent – labor actors evaluated the measure 100% as 'partially positive', however they were in favor of strengthening the measure, therefore it can be said despite their proximity to 'partially positive', the interests of labor actors were not favored in comparison to other groups. This leaves the business actors with 66.6% of 'partially positive' or 'partially negative' evaluations. The groups business-public (100%) and public actors (60%) would have agreed most with the measure – a weakening of the measure can therefore not be seen as favorable to them.

Comparing expected and observed counts results in the following: Business actors had the highest divergence in the 'positive' evaluations where the expected count was higher (3.2) than the observed count (2), in the 'partially negative' evaluations, where the expected count (1.1), was lower than the observed count (2) and in the 'neutral' mentions, where the count was 1 and the expected (0.5). The 'partially positive' evaluations (count = 4) were closer to the expected count (4.2). The labor actors had the highest discrepancy in the 'positive' evaluations: expected: 0.7, observed count 0 and in the 'partially positive' evaluations: expected: 0.9, counted: 2. The expected count within the public actors was lower (1.8) than the observed (3) count within the 'positive evaluations', and higher within 'partially positive': expected: 2.4, observed: 2.

Comparing the counts indicates a tendency to a correlation between the groups of the actors and the evaluation of measure 10. Furthermore, it unravels the argument that business actors were in favor a trend towards 'partially negative' (higher counts than expected count), but were less in favor of the 'positive' evaluation (lower counts than expected counts) - if labor actors are not considered as favored for the reasons mentioned above), public actors and business-public actors opinions were comparatively disfavored as their expected count was lower in the 'positive' evaluations and higher in the 'partially negative' and 'partially positive' evaluations. Business actors had also a slightly higher expected count regarding 'partially positive', but the discrepancy was clearer regarding 'partially negative' and 'positive'.

All in all it can be argued that were in favor of a tendency towards changing or weakening the measure and therefore the most influential group of actors.

Another interpretation could be that the measure was (also) weakened because of a relatively low interest of the actors.

7.1.11 Measure 11: Shipping and Motorways of the sea, also in combination of rail transport, as alternative to land transport.

How was the measure evaluated?

The measure “Shipping and Motorways of the sea, also in combination of rail transport, as alternative to land transport” was mentioned by 24.6% and was one of the measures with less evaluation on behalf of the actors. They assessed it as it follows: business actors: 28.6% ‘positive’, 28.6% ‘partially positive’, 28.6% ‘partially negative’, and 14.3% ‘negative’. Private actors for public interests, public actors, and business-public were a 100% ‘positive’. Business-public actors evaluated the measure 50% ‘positively’ and 50% ‘partially positively’. Other actors evaluated it positively (100%). None of the labor actors or citizens mentioned it.



Is the measure mentioned in the White Paper?

Shipping should help to avoid “unnecessary transport traffic crossing Europe”. Seaports are the key to this development, which can be seen as alternatives to roads. However, it is argued in the Communication that shipping (short sea, general shipping and inland water shipping) shall help to absorb an increasing volume of transport and is not viewed as general competition to land transport (cf. EU-Commission, 2009). The question would be if a general higher share is still envisaged. The synergies with rail transport are not explicitly mentioned. Motorways of the sea are viewed as a part of the multimodal core network (cf. EU-Commission, 2011). I argue that the characteristic value ‘partially positive’ is the most fitting, as the measure is still in the White Paper, but that the underlying paradigm (moving away from modal shift) has changed.

Were certain interests favored over others?

As


100% of the other actors evaluated it as ‘partially positively’, the measure was in their interest. As 100% of the private actors for public interest, as well as public

actors and business-public actors were in favor of the measure, they were the least favored ones. The inclination of the public actors is also shown in comparison to the counts: expected: 2.8, observed: 5, while within 'partially positive' 1.3 were expected and none was observed. Business actors had quite a diverse reaction (with equal shares of 'positive', 'partially positive' and 'partially negative' evaluations, namely 28.6% and 14.3% 'negative' evaluations). This can be explained by a diversity of the sectors: waterborne transport is of course more in favor of the measure, as it gains with a higher modal share of shipping. Business actors' counts had been higher than expected concerning 'partially positive' (exp.: 1.4, obs.: 2), 'partially negative' (exp.: 0.9, obs.: 2) and 'negative' (exp.: 0.5, obs.: 1) and lower than expected concerning 'positive' evaluations (exp.: 4, obs.: 2).

These numbers show a tendency of the business actors away from a 'positive' evaluation towards the evaluation favoring change or a withdrawal of the variable; the tendency towards a change was however stronger.

To sum up, it is argued in this paper the measure was presented in the White Paper was a result of compromise between public actors, some of the business actors (waterborne transport, see below), business-public actors and private actors for public interests on the one side and a majority of the business actors (and other actors) on the other side.

The business actors remain the most divided group in their opinion. I argue this is because there are different things at stake for different sectors. For example, waterborne transport could gain from the measure, whereas road transport could lose profit. To examine this thesis, I calculated a crosstab with the EU's classification of the actors (see table below), which show that cities and regions, governments and administrations, environmental organizations and public transport were all 100% pro of the measure. Waterborne transport was 66.7% positive and 33.3% 'partially positive', [general] economic stakeholders were 50% partially positive and 50% 'partially negative, road transport was 50% 'partially positive' and 50% 'negative' and logistics were 100% 'partially negative'. Labor actors did not evaluate the measure. This shows that public actors, here including public transport and environmental organizations were "the losers" as they had to make a compromise with economic stakeholders, road transport, logistics, and (partially) also with waterborne transport.




7.1.12 Measure 12 Sustainability via efficiency

How was the measure evaluated?

As mentioned above the measure “sustainability via efficiency” is an “odd variable” and is not actually a suggested measure by the Commission, but more an underlying paradigm. However, it is implicated that with various efficiencies there are more efficient transport systems and more fuel efficient technologies. The concept is criticized regarding sustainability.

The measure “sustainability via efficiency” was mentioned by 54.1% of the actors. Business actors evaluated it ‘positively’ (93.8%) and ‘partially positively’ (6.3%). The reaction of the private actors lobbying for public interests was mixed the highest share had the evaluation ‘partially positive’ (50%), while ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ had a share of 25% each. The labour actors evaluated it ‘negatively’ (100%), the public actors (83.3%), as well as the business-public (100%) and the other actors (100%)

‘positively’. 16.7% of the public actors evaluated the measure ‘partially positively’. Private citizens evaluated it ‘negatively’ (100%). The variable had relatively high rate of ‘positive’ evaluations in comparison to other variables. While not many public actors had mentioned the measure, more than 2/3 of the business actors have commented on it.



Is it mentioned in the White Paper?

Yes, in the White Paper, the goal to reach sustainability and sustainable goals through efficiency is still inherent, therefore I suggest that ‘positive’ is the evaluation which reflects the outcome in the White Paper best. It is interesting to observe though, that the use of efficiency has increased regarding. This can be shown through a simple count of the words:

	Sustainable	Sustainability	Efficient	Efficiency
Communication A sustainable future for transport – Towards an integrated technology lead transport system	21	7	10	8
White Paper Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system	24	4	55 (plus 2 inefficiency)	18

As it can be seen in the table above the use of the words efficiency and efficient have exploded in the White Paper and made it even to the title, while the use of sustainable and sustainability did not diverge much.

Were certain (private) interests favored over others?

Concluding that 'positive' was the characteristic which reflects the outcome best, it was the preferred outcome of the following groups: Business actors (exp.: 12.6, obs.: 15), public actors (exp.: 4.7, obs.: 5), other actors (exp.: 2.4, obs.: 3) and business-public actors (exp.: 2.4, obs.: 3). Least favored were labor interests (exp.: 0.8, obs.: 0) and citizens interest (exp.: 0.8, obs.: 0) and private actors for public interests (ex.: 3.2, obs.: 1). In this case it is argued that within private interests, business interests rule over private actors for public interests and labor interests. Business-public actors, public actors and business interests had the same preferences. The variable was altogether evaluated very favorably, which could be the reason why efficiency has an even more prominent place in the White Paper of Transport. Comparing counts and expected count, a correlation between the actors' groups and the evaluation is given.

The demand of cutting the volume of transport is also voiced by some of the actors in their comments on the Communication, however this interest is not represented in the White Paper.


7.1.13 Measure 13: A common framework for the evaluation of infrastructure projects

How was it evaluated?

The measure “a common framework for the evaluation of infrastructure projects” was mentioned by 39.3% of the actors. Business actors were in favor of the measure (62.5% ‘positive’, 37.5% ‘partially positive’), as were private actors for labor interest (100% ‘positive’).

The most common evaluation within private actors for public was ‘partially positive’ (40%), however there were also ‘positive’ (20%) and relatively high ‘negative’ evaluations: ‘partially negative’: 20% and ‘negative’ (20%). Public actors’ most represented evaluation was ‘positive’ (42.9%), however they also had a relatively large number of ‘partially negative’ evaluations (28.6%), whereas ‘neutral’ and ‘partially positive’ had a share of 14.3% each. Business-public actors were in general

supportive of the measure with 50% 'positive' and a 50% 'partially positive' evaluation. Other actors and citizens didn't mention the measure.



Is the measure in the White Paper?

Land use planning is mentioned in the urban context. The variable has moved from a general appraisal through common indicators especially concerning environmental problems to an inclusion of ex-ante energy efficiency and climate change considerations in EU-funded infrastructure projects (cf. EU-Commission, 2011, 27). Ex-ante project evaluation criteria should be introduced to check if a project has EU-added value (cf. EU-Commission, 2011, 28). One of the criteria for the projects is, "integrated planning which takes environmental issues into account in early stages of the planning procedure" (EU-Commission, 2011, 29). The criteria of SEA and EIA are not mentioned. Further a PPP screening is introduced which shall make sure that no one requests EU funding if a PPP was possible (cf. EU-Commission, 2011, 29). There is a procedure for the evaluation of new infrastructure. This thesis argues

that the socio-economic parts seem to have overruled the environmental issues in the ex-ante planning, as they can be described as less binding. It is therefore argued, that the evaluation 'partially positive' was most reflected in the White Paper, as the measure appears, though with changes, as no inclusion of the SEA and EIA criteria a separation and the general PPP screening (cf. EU-Commission, 2011, 28).


Were some actors favored over others?

In the group of private actors for public 'partially positive' had the highest evaluation rate (40%, exp.: 1.5/obs.: 2), nearly as a high share as had the business actors with 37.5% (exp.: 2.3/obs.: 3). Business actors had higher expected counts within 'negative' evaluations (exp.: 1/ obs.:0) and lower within 'positive' evaluations (exp.: 4, obs.: 5), while private actors for public had lower observed counts regarding 'positive' (exp.: 2.5, obs.:1) and higher observed counts regarding the 'partially negative' (ex.: 0.6, obs.: 1 and 'negative' (exp.: 0.2, obs.: 1) evaluations. Only 14.3% of the public actors (exp.: 2, obs.: 1) had this evaluation and none of the labor actors (exp.: 0.6. , obs.: 0), however especially labor had relatively high shares of 'positive' evaluations (exp.: 1, obs.: 2). Business-public actors had also 14.3% 'partially positive' evaluations, though they would have been expected to have less (exp.: 0.6,obs.: 1). Assuming that 'partially positive' describes the transfer to the White Paper best, it is argued that the outcome was a compromise between the actors, as it cannot be distinguished clearly which one has dominated most, however it is suggested in this thesis that public actors were less influential than private actors in this case.

7.1.14 Measure 14: Reducing transport problems by virtual accessibility

The measure "reducing transport problems by virtual accessibility" was with 9.8% of the actor's the one with the least response. Public actors and private actors for business both evaluated the measure 'positively' (50% each) and 'partially positively' (50% each), however there is no correlation indicated towards 'positive' as the expected and observed counts in both cases the same. The difference between the expected (0.7) and the observed cases (1) was not very high. Business-public actors evaluated it 100% 'positively' (exp.: 0.2/obs.: 1) and would have been expected to

have higher counts concerning 'partially positive' (exp.: 0.3/obs.: 0) and 'negative' (exp.: 0.2/obs.: 01), other actors evaluated the measure 100% 'negatively' (exp.: 0.2/obs.: 1). The latter would have been expected to have higher counts regarding 'positive' (exp.: 0.5/obs.: 0) and 'partially positive' (exp.: 0.3, obs.: 0).



Was the measure mentioned in the White Paper?
No

Were (private) interests favored over others?


Concerning private actors, only business actors contributed to the evaluation. In general, the evaluation is not very significant, as less than 10% contributed to it. As mentioned above especially between business group and public actors and the measure is hardly any correlation given. It does seem inconvincible that other actors have, considering the evaluations rate, contributed to the cut of the measure. It seems to be more likely that the measure has been cut due to the lack of interest of the actors.

7.1.15 Measure 15: Technological shift towards lower/zero emission vehicles

How was the measure evaluated?

The variable “Technological shift towards lower/zero emission vehicles” was mentioned by 49.2% of the actors.

The most frequent evaluation of the business actors was ‘positive’ with 46.2%, there was, however, a considerable share of ‘partially negative’ evaluations (30.8%), 15.4% did evaluate ‘neutrally’ and 7.7% ‘partially positively’. Private actors for public evaluated it ‘partially positively’ (66.7%) and ‘partially negatively’ (33.3%). Private actors for labor did mention it partially positively (100%). Public actors did evaluate it ‘mostly positively’ (42.9%) or ‘partially positively’ (42.9%). 14.3% assessed it



‘neutrally’. Business-public actors evaluated ‘positively’ (100%), citizens ‘positively’ or ‘partially positively’ (50% each) and others ‘positively’ (100%).

Is the measure mentioned in the White Paper?

The shift towards low and zero emission vehicles was transformed into a general recommendation/call for the use of cleaner energy, alternative propulsion system and new technologies. The term ‘zero-emission’ is only used in urban context (cf. White Paper on Transport, 2011). In intermediate distances new technologies are described as “less mature” (Commission, 2011, 6) and not able to make cuts in emissions on their own, therefore a multimodal transport was needed (cf. Commission, 2011, 6). A shift is only pursued in the urban context, which is linked to the newly introduced grading of distances (see also modal shift/ intermodal integrated system) (cf. Commission, 2011). Technologies were best suited in the short distances. In the urban context the Commission (2011, 8) emphasized the need of “smaller, lighter and more specialised road passenger vehicles” (Commission, 2011, 8). Alternative propulsion systems are especially recommended for urban buses, delivery vans and taxis. For last mile freight transport, low emission urban trucks, which use electric, hydrogen and hybrid propulsion, are suggested. They could distribute greater amounts of freight, as they could be used also during normal curfews (cf. Commission, 2011, 8). Until 2030 the use of conventionally fuelled cars in urban transport should be reduced by 50. By 2050 cities should be basically free of them. In 2030 “CO₂-free city logistics in major urban centres” should be achieved (Commission, 2011, 9).

Were some (private) actors favored over others?

As the switch to zero emission or the phasing out of the vehicle relates mainly to passenger transport and to the urban context in the White Paper, it is suggested that the evaluation ‘partially negative’ applies most. Those who assessed the measure ‘partially negatively’ were business actors (80% of all ‘partially negative’ evaluations) and private actors lobbying for public interests (20% of the ‘partially negative’ evaluations). Both have differentiations between the expected counts (business actors: 2.2, private actors for public interests: 0.5) and the observed counts (business actors: 4, private actors for public interests: 1), which indicates a correlation between the group and the ‘partially negative’ evaluation. In contrast


there is practically no correlation indicated between the 'positive evaluations' and the business actors (observed: 6, expected: 6.1), but between private actors for public (observed: 0 expected 1.4). Here again a limit of the method becomes apparent, as, the argument of business actors and private actors for public had been quite different. In a next step, the issues/objections of the actors had to be compared and it had to be investigated whose arguments had been transferred better/more to the White Paper. Business actors would have been expected to have higher observed counts regarding 'partially positive' (exp.: 3.5, obs.: 1) and vice versa regarding 'neutral' (exp.: 1.3, obs.: 2). 'Partially negative' evaluations were 16.7% of all evaluations. If one includes the 'partially positive' evaluations as 'second characteristic of change' labour actors (exp.: 0.3, obs.: 1), private actors lobbying for public interests (exp.: 0.8, obs.: 2), citizens (exp.: 0.5., obs.: 1) and public actors (exp.: 1.9, obs.: 3) would be also satisfied with the outcome. However, even if one would include 'partially positive', both would together represent 43.4% of all evaluations, which is still a smaller share than the 'positive evaluations' (46.7 %), which would have been the favourite one of business-public actors (exp.: 1.4, obs.: 3) and was also rather popular within the public actors, the correlation is less clear in this case though (exp.: 3.3, obs.: 3). As mentioned above 46% of the business actors favoured 'positive', however without much correlation (exp.: 6.1, obs.: 6). Considering that not the evaluation with the highest percentage was applied, this could indicate that some actors' opinions although in a minority are more relevant than the majority of opinions. The actors with the partially negative opinions were: ACEA (European Automobile Manufacturers' Association), Chambres de Commerce, EAA (European Aluminium Association), ECTAA (The European Travel Agents' and Tour Operators' Association) and the Netherlands Society for Nature and Environment

As an example ACEA represents European producers of cars, busses, vans and trucks. According to the ACEA (2015) the automotive sectors produces 6.9% of the GDP of the European Union and employs 12.9 Million people.

7.1.16 Measure 16: Common European Standards

How was it evaluated?

The variable “Common European Standards” was mentioned relatively often, by 70.5% of the actors. Business actors evaluated it mostly ‘partially positively’ (55.6%), followed by ‘positively’ (38.9%) and ‘partially negatively’ (5.6%). Private actors for public evaluated it ‘positively’ (100%), as well as the private actors for labor interests. 45.5% of the public actors evaluated it ‘partially positively’, 45.5% ‘positively’ and 9.1% ‘partially negatively’. The majority of the business - public actors assed it ‘positively’ (75%), some actors also evaluated it ‘partially positively’ (25%) or negatively’ (16.7%), other actors described it as ‘positive’, ‘partially positive’, ‘partially negative’ or ‘negative’ (each 25%).



Is the measure mentioned in the White Paper?

Yes, it is. Standards, standardisations and standardising were mentioned in the White Paper 12 times in the context of technology, 8 times in the context of security and 7 times in the context of safety. In the Communication the terms were mentioned 12 times in the context of technology, one time in the context of security and one time in the context of safety. Safety and security received more attention than in the White Paper, the attention for technology remained the same, and the importance of standards of deployment in the context was relatively new. Because of the increase of the (quantitative) importance of safety and security, I argue that the evaluation 'partially positive' was most represented in the White Paper. However, for further research it might be useful to use different classifications for critique depending if more or less of measure was demanded or if it was criticised the measure was too strong or not strong enough.

Where some actors favoured over others?

Altogether 39.5% of the actors evaluated it 'partially positively'. 'Partially positive' had been a very popular evaluation of the public actors (45.5%; exp. counts: 4.3/obs. counts: 5) and of the business actors (55.6%, exp.: 7.1, obs.:10). Both of them had higher observed counts than expected within this category, the other groups had lower observed counts than expected (private actors for public: exp.: 1.6/obs.: 0, labour: exp.: 0.8/obs.: 0, business public/other: exp.: 1.6, obs.: 1). Within those who assessed the measure 'partially positively' were 58.8% business actors, 29.4% public actors and 5.9% of the business-public actors and 5.9% of the other actors. These numbers indicate a correlation between the respective group and the evaluation 'partially positive'. Assuming that there is a correlation and a causality between the evaluations of the Communication and the outcome (= White Paper 2011), this thesis suggests that these numbers could indicate an influence/a preference of interests of (first) business actors and (secondly) public actors and of less influence/preference of the positions of business-public actors, labour actors and private actors lobbying for public interest as they would have had a tendency towards 'positive' (business-public actors: exp.: 2/obs.: 3, labour actors exp.: 1/obs.: 2 and private actors for public (exp.: 2/obs.: 4), as they would have had more contra evaluations than expected ('negative': exp.: 0.1, obs. 1; 'partially negative': exp.: 0.3,


obs.: 1) and vice versa (positive: exp.: 2, obs.: 1; 'partially positive': exp.: 1.6, obs.: 1).

7.1.17 Measure 17: Internalisation charges for transport funding

How was it evaluated?

Measure 17 was mentioned by 52.5% of the actors. Business actors evaluated it 'partially positively' (42.9%), 'negatively' (28.6%), 'partially negatively' (21.4%), and 'neutrally' (7.1%). It was the only measure without 'positive' evaluations by the business actors. Private actors for public mentioned it 'positively' and 'partially positively' (each 50%), while private actors for labour assessed it 'positively' or 'neutrally' (each 50%). Public actors were rather in favour of the measure with 75% 'positive' evaluations. There were however also 25% 'partially negative' evaluations. Business-public actors were in favour of the measure with 66.7% 'positive' and

33.3% 'partially positive' evaluations, other actors were against the measure (100%), citizens did not mention it.



Was the measure mentioned in the White Paper?

Yes. Transport users are expected to pay more in the future than today (cf. EU-Commission, 2011, 15). All in all:

“Diversified sources of finance both from public and private sources are required. [...] Member States need to ensure that sufficient national funding is available in their budgetary planning, as well as sufficient project planning and implementation capacities. Other sources of funding to be considered include schemes for the internalisation of external costs and infrastructure use charges, which could create additional revenue streams making infrastructure investments more attractive to private capital.” (Commission, 2011, 14)

This paragraph shows that in contrast to the Communication, where public funding, was expected to get lower, in the White Paper the importance of public funding is emphasized and member states are called upon to provide sufficient funding. While internalization charges had been communicated as indispensable for transport

funding, charges are now treated among “other sources of funding” which need to be considered. Also considered are private sources. Private Public Partnerships should be supported by new financing instruments such as the EU Project Bonds Initiative (cf. Commission, 2011, 14f.). Therefore, this thesis argues that the evaluations ‘partially positive’ and ‘partially negative’ apply most to the measure as it has suffered from a loss of significance in comparison to the communication.

Were some actors favoured over others?


60% of the ‘partially negative’ evaluations were business actors (expected count: 2.2/observed count: 3) 40% public actors (exp.: 1.3, obs.: 2). 80% of the ‘negative evaluations’ were business actors (exp.: 2.2/obs.: 4) and 20% were other actors (exp.: 0.2/obs.: 1). All of them have lower expected counts than observed. The most favoured evaluation by the business actors was ‘partially positive’ with 42.9% and expected counts of 3.9 and observed counts of 6. In contrast to that, business actors would have been expected to have higher counts within ‘positive’ (exp.: 4.8/obs.: 0.). Public actors had a clear correlation between the ‘positive’ evaluation and their group (‘positive’: exp. 2.8, obs.: 6), whilst they did not evaluate the measure ‘partially positive’ (exp.: 2.3/obs.: 0) and had higher observed counts regarding ‘partially negative’ (exp.: 1.3/obs.: 2) and lower observed counts regarding ‘negative’ (exp.: 1.3/obs.: 0). Private actors for public had lower expected than observed counts regarding pro-evaluations (‘positive’: exp.: 1.4, obs.: 2; ‘partially positive’: exp.: 1.1, obs.: 2) and higher regarding contra-evaluations (both: exp.: 0.6/obs.: 0). Public–business actors had lower expected counts within ‘positive’ (exp.: 1 /obs.: 2) and higher expected counts within the contra evaluations (both: exp.: 0.5, obs.: 0). Their ‘neutral’ (exp.: 0.2 obs.: 0) and ‘partially positive’ (exp.: 0.8, obs.: 1) evaluations were relatively close to the expected count. In general, these numbers indicate correlations between the groups and the evaluations. Assuming that ‘partially negative’ and ‘partially positive’ are the evaluation, which is best reflected in the White Paper, this thesis argues that business actors have been most influential regarding this measure. First, they were the only group who could have driven the measure, which was quite favourably evaluated by all the other groups apart from ‘other actors’, towards the ‘negative’ evaluations. Public actors had some contra evaluations but three quarters of them evaluated the measure ‘positively’. However, their interests were better included in the White Paper than those of the other private

actors. (The tendency is also reflected by the comparison of the observed and expected counts.) The measure moved also in direction of the other actors, though with only 'negative' evaluations they are reflected less in 'partially negative' than business actors. Public-business actors, labour actors and private actors lobbying for public interests were less reflected in the outcome as they had been in favour of measure which has lost its significance. There was less similarity between business-public and business actors and comparatively more similarity between business-public and public actors.

7.1.18 Measure 18: The integration of airports and railways

How was the measure evaluated?

The measure was mentioned by 23% of the actors. Business actors evaluated it mostly 'partially positively' (66.7%) and 'positive' (33.3%), private actors lobbying for public interests assessed it 'partially negatively' (100%), public actors mostly 'positively' (75%), some of them mentioned it 'neutrally' (25%). Business-public actors evaluated it 'positively' (100%) and others 'partially positively'.



Was the measure mentioned in the White Paper?

Yes, it is mentioned in the White Paper as one of the “Ten Goals for a competitive and resource efficient transport system” (Commission, 2011, 9). All airports of the core network shall be integrated with rail by 2050. High-speed rail is preferred. A difference between the Communication and the White Paper is the referral to the core network. Nonetheless it is argued in this thesis that ‘positive’ reflects the approval of the measure in the ten major goals best. It is suggested that the core network as change/difference belongs rather to measure 3.

Were some actors favored over others?

Assuming that ‘positive’ is reflected best in the White Paper, this thesis suggests that public actor’ and business–public interests were most influential on this issue. A comparison of expected and observed counts shows a tendency of both towards ‘positive’ (public: exp.: 2/obs.: 3; business-public: exp.: 1/obs.: 2). They are followed by business actors and other actors that had a tendency towards ‘partially positive’

(business: exp.: 2.1 /obs.: 4; others: exp.: 0.4/obs.: 1), while private actors lobbying for public interests were not influential as they tended towards ‘negative’, (exp.: 0.1/obs.: 1). Business-public differed more from business interests than from public interests.

8 Results

First I will verify/falsify the hypotheses and answer the research questions. I will also point out limits of the research. After having embedded my results within the theory, I will suggest the next steps for research.

The following table shows whether the hypotheses were confirmed or not, as well as the most influential actors. As a reminder, the hypotheses were:

H1) Private actors have more influence than public actors on the EU-Commission’s legislative initiatives.

H2a): Private actors lobbying for business interests are more represented in the EU-Commission’s legislative initiatives than private actors lobbying for labor or public interests.

H2b): Groups which have business actors as well as public actors as members are dominated by business interests, as well as are (partially) state-hold companies.

Measures	Hypothesis 1	Hypothesis 2a	Hypothesis 2b	Most influential
1	Verified	Verified	Falsified	Business actors
2	Verified (regarding business)	Verified	Falsified	Business actors
3	Verified (business reg. business)	Verified	Falsified	Business actors
4	Verified (reg. business)	Verified	Falsified	Business actors

5	Verified (business yes others not)	Verified	Falsified	Business actors
6	Verified	Verified	Falsified	Business actors
7	More data needed	Verified	Falsified	Business actors or public actors
8	Verified. However also hybrids (business-public)	Falsified	Verified	Business-public and public actors
9	Falsified	Verified (business over public over labour)	Falsified	Business actors and public actors
10	Verified	Verified	Falsified	Business
11	Falsified	Falsified	Falsified	Compromise
12	Falsified	Verified	Verified	Business-public, business and public actors
13	Verified	Falsified	Verified	Compromise. Business-public, business, private actors for public interests
14	Falsified/no sufficient result	Falsified/no sufficient result	Falsified/not sufficient result	Falsified /no sufficient result
15	Verified	Falsified (business and private for public over labour)	Falsified	Business actors and private actors for public interests
16	Not (sufficiently) verified	Verified	Falsified	Business and public actors
17	Verified	Verified	Falsified	Business actors
18	Falsified	Verified	Falsified	Public actors, business-public actors

Hypothesis I was confirmed in 11 of 18 cases, which means in 11 cases private interests were more important than public interests, however mainly regarding to business interests. Public actors lobbying for business interests often had more influence over the White Paper than private actors lobbying for labor or public interests. In two cases public and business-public interests were together the most influential actors. Once the result was a compromise between business-public actors, business actors and private actors for public interests. Once the combination business interests and private interests for public interests was most influential and the coalition business, business-public and public actors. In two cases the data was not sufficient and there was a second compromise between various groups. The group of the business actors was the only group who was most influential without having a 'coalition of interests' with another group. The hypothesis, that private actors have more influence than public actors can be therefore confirmed – at least regarding the business actors. Private actors lobbying for labor interest have never been the most influential group, private actors lobbying for public interests have been most influential in a 'coalition of interests' twice. Then, public actors have often been the second most influential group.

H2a can also be verified. In 13 out of 18 cases, business interests have been more reflected in the White Paper than interests of the private actors' for labor and the private actors' for public and can be seen therefore as more influential, because lobbying success can be defined "if the policy output converges with their policy preferences" (Klüver, 2013, 65). An influence is seen in this thesis as "the ability of an actor to shape a political decision in line with her preferences [...]" (Nagel, 1975, 29, in: Dür, 2008, 2).

H2b can be falsified as business-public actors had similar/equal preferences in only three cases as business actors. On the contrary, business-public actors' interests were more congruent with public actor's interests. It has to be mentioned, however that random sample of the business-public actors was rather small therefore the falsification can only been made with limitation.

After having falsified/verified the hypothesis, it is time to reflect on the research question: What kind of interest is represented in the EU-Commission's legislative initiatives after the EU's "Governance Turn"?

As mentioned above and described in detail business interests were most represented in the White Paper “Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system”, followed by public interests (of public actors). The White Paper contains fewer opinions of private actors lobbying for public interests and of private actors lobbying for labor interests. Universities, research institutes or groups with mixed actors apart from business-public have been included in the group other actors. However, in this thesis not much attention was given to this group as their members had fewer common characteristics. Citizens interests were hardly included, however it has to be acknowledged that citizens had, as a group, often rather diverging stances. Furthermore, citizens often did not comment (clearly) on specific issues outlined in the Communication, but proposed new ideas or products, which is a reason why their evaluation rate regarding the measures was low. New ideas or other proposals had not been systematically evaluated in this thesis, though as far as observed there was the possibility that proposals were transmitted to the White Paper if they were in relation to measures mentioned in the Communication, as it was the case for “co-modality”. In this case proposals and demands from actors (in this case mostly business actors). Business actors and public actors (especially those public actors who operate on the national level) commented rather exactly on the points of the Communication and cover all the main ideas of the Communications. Proposals, which were not in relation to or against the goals of the White Paper were, as far as observed, not included. One example is the reduction of the volume of transport, which was (e.g.) demanded from some of the public actors (e.g. Land Berlin: Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung des Landes Berlin (2009)). However, curbing transport is explicitly rejected in the Communication, as well as in the White Paper (cf. Commission, 2011). New and (concerning the transport system) revolutionary approaches could be found among the citizens, they were not included in the White Paper, however.

Further it has to be mentioned that the Communication “A sustainable future for transport” was a relatively late step in the decision making process towards the White Paper, so it is possible that in earlier stages more “new” proposals were included, so it would be interesting to research who had access to the earlier stages of the process (and who had access to the stakeholder conferences).

As a next step, the different proposal of the various actors and their influence on the

outcome could be systematically evaluated. This could help to clarify in some cases, with similar preferences towards a measure (e.g. 'partially positive'), which one of two (or more) actors had been more influential. This problem was, for example, evident in measure 15, where private actors lobbying for public interest and business actors had similar preferences and were both regarded as most influential. However, they had different arguments, so systematic evaluation of the arguments could answer the question who had more influence. This could be also helpful in regard to the variable "other actors". Another possibility would be to give more values to the variable "evaluation", which might also be useful for the variable "mentioned" (i. e.: 'partially mentioned' or 'unclear').

9 Conclusion

9.1 Back to theory

As written in the first chapter, the concept of governance has arrived the European Union since the White Paper on Governance and the so called "Governance Turn" at the turn of the millennium. As it is described by Peters (2004, 59) governance transferred decisions to the society. Private actors are viewed as representatives of the society and therefore better access to public documents as well as inclusion in policy/decision-making processes shall be granted to them. With the public consultation to the Communication, which is easily accessible for everyone, the Commission includes private actors in the decision making process. Furthermore, so- called stakeholder conferences were held. All in all, in the decision-making process towards the White Paper of Transport 2011, instruments of governance were used. As it was outlined in the first chapter, governance is interweaved with the question of democracy. As written above one of the goals of establishing the white paper on governance of 2001 had been to "create a pluralistic design of 'checks and balances', where any one [sic!] interest is challenged by another, and where interests are empowered through procedures to do so, and to keep EU institutions accountable" (Greenwood, 2011, 32). It should also fight asymmetries and strengthen democracy and legitimization (Michalowitz, 2007, 58f). Some scholars like Wessels (2004, 199), for example, mention the importance of interest groups linking the "authoritative institutions" and citizens, especially in case of the European Union, while others like Peters (2004, 63f.), argue that instead of enhancing

democracy and transparency, the White Paper on Governance only facilitated the interests of businesses to exert their influence over the European Union. There was a certain agreement that, for enhancing democracy, a balance of interests (and therefore of the influence of private actors) was needed and if interests were biased and one group of interest was constantly winning, it had negative implications for democracy (cf. Dahl, 1989, 322ff., in: Klüver, 2013b, 1; cf. Klüver, 2013b, cf. Wessels, 2004). Upon examining the tested measures, it cannot be said that the interests of different actors were balanced. In nearly all of the cases private actors for business interests were more influential³⁰ than private actors for public interests and private actors for labor interests. If one only examines the numbers of the submitted papers, it is noticeable that nearly 40% of the comments were submitted by business actors and just over 20% by the public actors. If one just looks at the numbers, one could say that the majority ruled. It is however argued above that a balance of interests is necessary prerequisite for democracy. Therefore, this thesis argues that as business interests were far more represented than labor interests and private actors' lobbying for public interests', democracy is in this case not enhanced by the inclusion of societal actors as a result of the governance turn, but does favor business interests which do not completely represent society. Moreover, business actors proved to be more influential than public actors (H1), which were mostly elected bodies, and it has serious democratic implications if business interests had generally more influence than elected bodies.

As mentioned in chapter 2 ('The Case') transport policy is also salient due to its environmental implications. Without going into details it should be highlighted that two of the measures which were very pro-environmental (4: Modal shift, 1: Internalization of the external costs and 17: Internalization charges) had suffered (considerable) impact lost. In all three cases business actors were the most influential. Also the introduction of co-modality which, was enforced by business actors, was not in favor of environmental interests. This thesis thus argues that as a result environmental interests, which are inherently public interests, have suffered from the bias towards business actors.

³⁰ In this thesis it is sometimes written that an actors/interest influences or is influential, while in other cases it written that they were favored by the Commission, as it is assumed that lobbying is a two-way process (see also Michalowitz, 2004, 92).

To summarize, empirical research backed the arguments in this case that governance is not favorable for democracy as first, (private) interests were not balanced and secondly business actors were, at least partially, more influential than public actors. After the EU's governance turn business actors were most represented in the Commission's legislative proposal.

10 Limits and suggestions

Some difficulties in research have already been mentioned above. Another limit was the relatively small dataset (1098) cases. As there was a high percentage of cells with an expected count less than 5 and minimum expected counts, which were below 1 were included, Chi² was not used and therefore it cannot be exactly described how well the sample of one quarter describes all submitted papers.

Comparing measures of the Communication "A sustainable future for transport" to the White Paper "Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system" examined a small part of the policy formulation process. To gain more knowledge about the influence and the power of different kinds of actors more steps of the process needed to be examined. As a start, the correlations of the actors and their preferences as well as the hypotheses regarding the influence of the actors their reactions to the outcome (the White Paper) could be compared.

Next, it would be interesting to re-code the values of the variable "measure" into groups like pro-environmental measures, pro- European (standards) or pro-liberalization measures and determine the preference of the actors' groups towards the measures' groups', which could be examined with the suggestions how to map European interests by Hooghes and Marks (2004) and Wessels (2004), see 1.2.2.

11 Literature

Airbus S.A.S. (2009). Airbus contribution to EC consultation of June 17th 2009

ACEA (2015). Facts about the Automobile Industry, <http://www.acea.be/automobile-industry/facts-about-the-industry> (20.12.2015).

Arts, Bas/ Piet Verschuren (1999). Assessing Political Influence in Complex Decision-making: An Instrument Based on Triangulation, in: International Political Science Review (1999), Vol. 20, No. 4, 411–424.

Aberle, Gerd (2005). Zukünftige Entwicklung des Güterverkehrs: Sind Sättigungsgrenzen erkennbar?, Diskussionsbeiträge / Universität Freiburg i. Br., Institut für Verkehrswissenschaft und Regionalpolitik, No. 106.

Brand, Ulrich/Markus Wissen (2011). Die Regulation der ökologischen Krise, in: ÖZS, 36 2, S.12–34.

Business Europe (2015). Business Europe, 65q (20.3.2015).

California Environmental Protection Agency (2004). Factsheet. 2003 Zero Emission Vehicle Program Changes, <http://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/zevprog/factsheets/2003zevchanges.pdf> (12.12.2015)

Low Carbon Freight Dividend (2015). What is Multi-modal, Inter-modal and Co-modal Freight Transport?, <http://www.lcfd.co.uk/knowledge-bank/inter-modal-shift/what-is-multi-modal-inter-modal-and-co-modal-freight-transport/> (29.11.2015).

Chalmers University of Technology/Göteborg University (2002). Technology and Policy for Sustainable Development, report for the EU-Commission by the Centre for Environment and Sustainability at Chalmers University of Technology and the Göteborg University, 5 February 2002, <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/pubs/pdf/sustdev.pdf> (15.12.2015).

Dür, Andreas (2008). Measuring Interest Group Influence in the EU: A Note on Methodology: <https://sites.google.com/site/andduer/pubs> (24.03.2014). also in: European Union Politics, Vol. 9, Nr. 4,

DLR (2015). DLR at a glance, http://www.dlr.de/dlr/en/desktopdefault.aspx/tabid-10443/637_read-251/#/gallery/8570 (01.12.2015).

DPDHL (2015). Aktionärsstruktur, <http://www.dpdhl.com/de/investoren/aktie/aktionaersstruktur.html> (25.05.15)

Dieter Armin (2013). Die Umweltkrise aus der Sicht der Ökologischen Ökonomie. Wachstum und Wachstumskritik, im Rahmen der VO: Die ökologische Krise aus interdisziplinärer Perspektive - interuniversitäre Ringvorlesung, Uni Wien (u.a.), 29.11.2012.

Eisenstadt, S.N. (1959). Bureaucracy, Bureaucratization, and Debureaucratization, in: B. Guy Peters/ Jon Pierre (eds.) (2007). Institutionalism, Sage Library of Political Science, Vol. 3, Sage Publications, Los Angeles-London-Delhi-Singapore, pp. 343-367.

Eising, Rainer/Kohler-Koch, Beate (2005). Interessenpolitik im europäischen Mehrebenensystem, in: Eising, Rainer/Kohler-Koch, Beate (eds.) (2005). Interessenpolitik in Europa Regieren in Europa, Band 7, Nomos, Baden-Baden.

EU-Commission (1997), Communication: "Intermodal transport: intermodality of goods transport", <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:l24179> (15.10.2015)

EU-Commission (2001). European Governance – A White Paper, COM(2001) 428 final, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52001DC0428&qid=1413192795477&from=EN> (01.06.2014).

EU-Commission (2008). Internalisation of external transport costs, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/transport/transport_energy_environment/tr0007_en.htm (15.4.2015).

EU-Commission (2009). Communication A sustainable future for transport. Towards an integrated, technology-led and user-friendly system.

EU-Commission (2011) White Paper. Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0144&from=EN> (02.01.2015).

EU-Commission (2013). European Strategies. The Greening Transport Package, http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/strategies/2008_greening_transport_en.htm (04.04.2015).

EU-Commission (2014). Reducing Emissions from Transport, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/index_en.htm (10.10.2014).

Commission (2005), Intermodal transport: intermodality of goods transport, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:l24179> (10.11.2015).

EU-Commission (2015). Maritime. Motorways of the Sea, http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/maritime/motorways_sea/index_en.htm, (2.12.2015).

EU-Commission (2015b). Sustainable Development, <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eussd/> (4.3.2016).

EU-Commission (2016). Reducing CO2 emissions from passenger cars, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/vehicles/cars/index_en.htm (23.2.2016)

EU-Commission (2016b). Road transport: Reducing CO2 emissions from vehicles, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/vehicles/index_en.htm (23.2.2016)

EU Commission (2016c). Infrastructure - TEN-T - Connecting Europe. What do we want to achieve ?, http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/index_en.htm (19.03.2016).

EUR-LEX (2001). Internalisation of external transport costs, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:tr0007>, (29.11.2015).

Europa.eu (2014). Glossary. Green Paper, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/green_paper_en.htm (07.11.2014)

EU-Commission/Eurostat (2012). Statistik des Güterverkehrs,
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Freight_transport_statistics/de (11.10.2014)

EU-Commission/ Eurostat (2013). Glossary:Tonne-kilometre (tkm),
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Glossary:Tonne-kilometre_%28tkm%29 (12.10.2014).

European Economic and Social Committee (2010). OPINION of the European Economic and Social Committee on Transport policy in the Western Balkans,
<http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.rex-opinions.15764> (9.10.2015).

ESA (2015). What is EGNOS,
http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Navigation/The_present_-_EGNOS/What_is_EGNOS (14.06.2015).

Eurostat (2015). Energy, transport and environment indicators, 2015 edition, Eurostat statistical book,
<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3217494/7052812/KS-DK-15-001-EN-N.pdf/eb9dc93d-8abe-4049-a901-1c7958005f5b> (04.03.2016).

Greenwood, Justin (2003). Interest Representation in the European Union, 2nd edition, The European Union edition, Palgrave Macmillan.

Greenwood, Justin (2011). Interest Representation in the European Union, 3rd edition, The European Union Series, Palgrave Macmillan.

Hosli, Madeleine/ Andreas Nölke/ Jan Beyers (2004). Contending Political Economy on European Interest Group Activity, in: Andreas Warntjen/ Arndt Wonka (eds.) (2004). Governance in Europe. The Role of Interest Groups, Nomos, Baden-Baden. pp. 42–56.

IISD (2016). Topic. Sustainable Development, <http://www.iisd.org/topic/sustainable-development> (13.03.2016).

IUCN (2006). The Future of Sustainability. Re-thinking Environment and Development in the Twenty-first Century,
http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/iucn_future_of_sustainability.pdf (22.2.2016).

IUCN (2015). Theme on the Environment, Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment (TEM TI),
http://www.iucn.org/about/union/commissions/ceesp/what_we_do/wg/temti.cfm
(13.03.2016).

IRU (2015). History and Mission, https://www.iru.org/en_history_and_mission
(15.03.2015).

Klüver, Heike (2009). Measuring Interest Group Influence Using Quantitative Text Analysis, in: European Union Politics, Volume 10 (4), pp. 535–549.

Klüver, Heike (2013) Lobbying as a collective enterprise: winners and losers of policy formulation in the European Union, Journal of European Public Policy, 20:1, 59-76, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2012.699661.

Klüver, Heike (2013b). Lobbying in the European Union. Interest Groups, Lobbying Coalitions and Policy Change, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Kohler-Koch, Beate/ Berthold Rittberger (2006). Review Article: The ‘Governance Turn’ in EU Studies*, in: JCMS 2006 Volume 44 Annual Review, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford/Maldon, pp. 27–49.

Kozák, Andreas (2010). Europäische Klimapolitik im Kontext ökonomischer und ökologischer Interessensvertretung : die EU am Gängelband der Industrie oder ambitionierte Vorreiterin?, Hochschulschrift, Uni Wien.

Kromp-Kolb, Helga (2013). Sustainability Challenge 2013, LV der TU/WU/BOKU/UNI WIEN.

Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung des Landes Berlin (2009). Stellungnahme des Landes Berlin zur Mitteilung der Kommission: Eine nachhaltige Zukunft für den Verkehr.

Low Carbon Freight Dividend (2015). What is Multi-modal, Inter-modal and Co-modal Freight Transport?, <http://www.lcfd.co.uk/knowledge-bank/inter-modal-shift/what-is-multi-modal-inter-modal-and-co-modal-freight-transport/> (29.11.2015).

Michalowitz, Irina (2004). Lobbying as a Two-way Strategy: Interest Intermediation or Mutual Instrumentalisation?, in: Andreas Warntjen/ Arndt Wonka (eds.) (2004).

Governance in Europe. The Role of Interest Groups, Nomos, Baden-Baden, pp. 75-92.

Michalowitz, Irina (2007). Lobbying in der EU, Reihe Europa kompakt, UTB/facultas, wuv, Wien.

Nohlen, Dieter/ Rainer-Olaf Schultze (Hg.) (2005). Lexikon der Politikwissenschaft. Band 1A-M. Theorien, Methoden, Begriffe, 3 Auflage, Beck'sche Reihe, C.H. Beck, München.

Peters, B. Guy (2002). Governance. A Garbage Can Perspective, IHS Political Science Theories 84, Vienna.

Peters, B. Guy (2004). Interest Groups and European Governance: A Normative Perspective, in: Andreas Warntjen/ Arndt Wonka (eds.) (2004). Governance in Europe. The Role of Interest Groups, Nomos, Baden-Baden, pp. 56–64.

Spash, Clive L. (2011). Social Ecological Economics: Understanding the Past to See the Future, in: American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 70, No. 2 (April, 2011).

Spash, Clive L. (2013). Environmental Crisis and De-Growth from an Ecological Economics Perspective, im Rahmen der VO: Die ökologische Krise aus interdisziplinärer Perspektive - interuniversitäre Ringvorlesung, Uni Wien (u.a.), 21.11.2013.

Tajani (2009). Foreword, in: EU EU-Commission (2009), A sustainable future for transport. Towards an integrated, technology-led and user-friendly transport system.

Van Miert, Karel (1991). Speech at the pan-European traffic congress and fair – Eurotraffic 1991 –Aalborg-Hallen, Denmark, 17 OCTOBER 1991, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-91-107_en.htm (09.10.2014).

Vogel, David, Michael Toffel and Diahanna Post (2005). Environmental Federalism in the European Union and the United States, <http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/vogel/federalism.pdf> (17.12.2015).

Volvo Group (2009). PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON THE EU COMMISSION COMMUNICATION ON A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE FOR TRANSPORT: The Volvo Group view, Sep. 30, 2009.

Wessels, Bernhard (2004). Contestation potential of interest groups in the EU: emergence, structure, and political alliances, in: Gary Mark/Marco. R. Steenbergen (eds.) (2004), European Integration and Political Conflict, Themes in European Governance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, etc.

Wonka, Arndt/Andreas Warntjen (2004). The Making of Public Policies in the European Union: Linking Theories of Formal Decision-making and Informal Interest Intermediation, in: Andreas Warntjen/ Arndt Wonka (eds.) (2004). Governance in Europe. The Role of Interest Groups, Nomos, B.

11.1 Table of Figures

Figure 1: Eurostat (2015). Greenhouse gas emissions, analysis by source sector, EU-28, 1990 and 2013 (percentage of total), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Greenhouse_gas_emissions_analysis_by_source_sector_EU-28_1990_and_2013_%28percentage_of_total%29_new.png (06.02.2016).

Figure 2: EU-Commission (2009). Statistical Pocketbook 2009, in: Communication A sustainable future for transport. Towards an integrated, technology-led and user-friendly system, p.12.

Figure 3: Klüver, Heike (2009). Measuring Interest Group Influence Using Quantitative Text Analysis, in: European Union Politics, Volume 10 (4), pp. 535–549.

12 Appendix

12.1 Coding

8 variables were used in SPSS:

Variable I has the name: "Measure" and the Label "Suggested Actions". It is nominal and numeric. They values describe the analyzed measures of the communication.

The values are listed below:

- 1 = Internalization of external costs
- 2 = Completing the internal market, especially rail
- 3 = Transport as an integrated intermodal network
- 4 = Shift to environmentally friendly modes
- 5 = Accessibility for everyone
- 6 = Technological innovation as "a major contributor to transport challenges"
- 7 = Expanding infrastructure projects and policies to neighbouring countries
- 8 = Enhanced cooperation in urban transport
- 9 = More investment in R&D with special focus on sustainable technology
- 10 = Common working conditions
- 11 = Shipping and Motorways of the Sea, also in combination with rail transport, as alternative to road transport
- 12 = Sustainability via efficiency
- 13 = A common framework for the evaluation of infrastructure projects
- 14 = Reducing transport problems by virtual accessibility
- 15 = Technological shift towards lower/zero emission vehicles
- 16 = Common European Standards,
- 17 = Internalization charges as transport funding,
- 18 = The integration of Airports and Railways

The detailed description can be found in chapter 6.

Variable 2 has the name “Actor Type” and the label “Actor’s group” describes the group of the actors. The values that define the actors’ groups are described in chapter 6. The variable is numeric and nominal.

List of the actors’ groups’:

1 = private for business

2 = private for public

3 = private for labour

4 = public

5 = public associated

6 = business-public

7 = citizens

8 = others

Variable 3 has the name “Actor” and is a string variable. Its value is: “Name of each actor”. It was created to have a detailed entry for every actor who was evaluated.

List of the evaluated actors including the actors’ group (see variable 2):

Business (=1)

ACEA

AEA

Airbus

ANITA

Better Place

Business Europe

BV Deutsche Industrie

CBI

Chambres de Commerce

DIHK

EAA

EBU

ECG

ECSA

ECTAA

ETRma

IRU

Kapsch

Mouchel

Rail Freight Group

Shecco

UNIFE

VolvoGroup

Private actors for public interests (=2)

BI Lebenswertes Wipptal/ Bürgerinitiative „STOP BBT“

BvF

ECF

T&E

The Netherlands Society for Nature and Environment

Private actors for labour interests (=3)

DGB

Transet&GBDA

Public Actors (=4)

Belgian Federal Public Service for Mobility and Transport

COSLA

Deutscher Städte und Gemeinde Bund

LGA

Ministry of Transport Slovenia

Norwegian Ministry of Transport and Communications

Conseil Régional Poitou-Charentes

Royal Dutch Transport Association

SASIG

Scottish Government

Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung des Landes Berlin

The Region of South Bohemia

Stadt Marktredwitz

Public Associated (=5)

UK Consultation

NWHBO

Business-Public (=6)

Eurostar

ÖBB-Holding AG

Russian Railways

The Mersey Partnership

Citizens (=7)

Georg Inführ

Vuokko Jarva

Anssi Meriläinen

Jerry Schneider

Michael Thalhammer

Willy Winkelmanns

Others (=8)

ADAC

Federation of British Historic Vehicles

Fedop

Jäderberg/Andersson

Northern Maritime University Project

Variable 4's name is "Mentioned", its label is: "has the actor mentioned the measure". The variable is nominal (dichotomous) and numeric. It has two values: 1=yes, 2=no. It was created to evaluate if an actor has mentioned a certain measure.

1= the actor who submitted the paper mentioned the measure. Also answers which used the exact wordings of the Communications suggested by the Commission, but in some cases also indirectly mentioned measures. An answer was also counted as mentioned if not the whole measure was mentioned by the actor e.g. Measure 2: "Completing the internal market, especially rail": was also assessed as mentioned if an actor only wrote about the completion of the internal market but not mentioned "especially rail

2= a measure had not been mentioned or could not have been identified clearly enough.

Variable 5 with the name "evaluation" and the label: "If the answer is yes, how was it evaluated" is an ordinal, numeric variable, which classifies the attitude of the actors concerning a measure from 1 (=positive) to 5 (=negative). If an actor did not mention the measure, it was counted as missing (=99). Numeric

Values:

1 = positive: the actor who submitted the paper was in favor of the measure

2 = partially positive: the actor who submitted the paper was partially in favor of the measure, meaning he/she mentioned and/or approved parts of the measure or he was in favor of the measure but complained (strongly) that the measure was not sufficient or he/she would prefer a less strong implementation of the measure as outlined in the Communication or would accept the measure if certain conditions were fulfilled

3 = neutral: the actor who submitted the paper mentioned it, but did not evaluate it

4 = partially negative: the actor who submitted the paper did reject the measure overall, but some parts of the measure were acceptable or the actor would accept the measure if it was adapted a lot

5 = negative: the actor who submitted the paper did reject the measure

99 = missing: the measure was not mentioned

The name of variable 6 is "Other Actors", its label is: "If the measure was mentioned, was another actor mentioned and how? ". It is nominal and numeric. An actor who did not mention the variable is counted as a missing value (= 99)

Values:

1 = yes, positive: one or more actors were mentioned favorably regarding a specific measure

2 = yes, neutral: one or more actor was mentioned neutrally, or more actors were mentioned and there was no trend if more actors were mentioned positively or negatively (regarding a specific measure).

3 = yes, negative: one or more actors were mentioned unfavorably regarding a specific measure

4 = no: no other actor was mentioned

99 = missing

As written above as “other actor” counted any other actor than the actors itself or the EU/the Commission in general.

Variable 7 was created as a means to compare the actors’ classification with the EU’s classification of the actor. Its name is “Euclasssector”, its Label: “So did the EU classify them?” It is numeric and nominal. Its values are:

- 1 = aviation sector
- 2 = cities and regions
- 3 = economic stakeholders
- 4 = energy stakeholders
- 5 = environmental organisations³¹
- 6 = governments and administrations
- 7 = logistics
- 8 = non-motorised transport
- 9 = other organisations
- 10 = private citizens
- 11 = public transport
- 12 = rail transport
- 13 = research
- 14 = road transport
- 15 = safety organisations
- 16 = tourism
- 17 = waterborne transport

Variable 10 has the Name: “ActorType1”, and the Label: “summed actors”. It is numeric and nominal and was created to regroup actors for having fewer groups. It has 7 values, which are:

Values:

³¹ As the European Commission used British English the original version was maintained in this case.

1 = private for business: private actors lobbying for business interests /business actors

2 = private for public: private actors lobbying for public interests

3 = private for labour: private actors lobbying for labour interests

4 = public sum: public actors

5 = business public: business- public actors

6 = citizens: private citizens

7=others: other actors

Variable 12 has the name 'compact measures', its label is: Only 4. The variable is numeric and nominal

Values:

1 = More Europe

2 = Technological solutions

3 = Integrated inter-modal network

4 = pro-environment

Variable 12 could be used in further research. The idea was to regroup the measures to a bundle of measures which summarize certain (contested) issues (see chapter 10).

12.2 List of the documents used for analysis

ACEA (2009). Commission's Communication COM(2009) 279/4, June 2009. A sustainable future for transport: Towards an integrated, technology-led and user friendly system ACEA comments on the seven policy fields identified for possible intervention, September 2009.

ADAC (2009). Stellungnahme des ADAC zur Mitteilung der EU-Kommission „Eine nachhaltige Zukunft für den Verkehr: Wege zu einem integrierten, technologieorientierten und nutzerfreundlichen System“ [KOM (2009) 279/4], München, 30.09.2009.

Airbus S.A.S. (2009). Airbus contribution to EC consultation of June 17th 2009, September 2009.

AEA/Association of European Airlines (2009). Position Paper. 2050 – The Future of Transport, September 29, 2009.

ANITA/Associazione Nazionale Imprese Automobilistici (2009). Communication on the future of transportation -COM (2009)279 Def. -White Paper 2010-2020. The contribute to the consultation, Roma, 29.09.2009.

Assemblée des Chambres Françaises de Commerce et d'Industrie – Représentation auprès de l'Union européenne (2009). Consultation Sur L'avenir de la Politique Europeene des Transports, September 2009.

BI Lebenswertes Wipptal/Bürgerinitiative „STOP BBT“ (2009). Stellungnahme zu “A sustainable future for transport: Towards an integrated, technology-led and user friendly system” über die künftige Politik im Bereich des transeuropäischen Verkehrsnetzes, Steinach, Wiesen/Pfitsch, Sterzing, 30.09.2009.

Better Place (2009). Better Place's Contribution to the European Commission's Consultation on the Future of European Transport Policy, September 2009.

Beckers, Joachim (2009). Potential for Improvement in Air Traffic Noise Abatement in Europe, May 2009. (Was taken for analysis regarding BVFs submission).

Belgian Federal Public Service for Mobility and Transport (2009). Public consultation on the FUTURE OF TRANSPORT, 06.10.2009.

BUSINESS EUROPE (2009). BUSINESS EUROPE Comments. Future of Transport Policy Executive Summary, 31.03. 2009.

Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie. Infrastruktur, Verkehr und Telekommunikation (2009). Stellungnahme. Mitteilung der EU-Kommission: Eine nachhaltige Zukunft für den Verkehr, 29. 09. 2009.

BVF (2009). Stellungnahme der Bundesvereinigung gegen Fluglärm zum Grünbuch der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaft TEN-V: Überprüfung der Politik ein besser integriertes transeuropäisches Verkehrsnetz im Dienst der gemeinsamen Verkehrspolitik, 30.4 2009.

CBI. The Voice of Business (2009). CBI consultation response: European Commission Communication: A Sustainable Future for Transport: Towards an integrated, technology-led and user friendly system, 30. 09. 2009.

Conseil Régional Poitou-Charentes (2009). Contribution de la Région Poitou Charantes au débat de l'avenir

COSLA Brussels Office (2009). COSLA key messages on EU Transport Policy for the new EU term, June 2009.

Deutscher Industrie und Handelskammertag (2009). Zum Thema: Mitteilung der Kommission "Eine nachhaltige Zukunft für den Verkehr" (KOM(2009) 279/4), Brüssel, 30. September, 2009.

Departement for Transport UK (2009). "A Sustainable Future for Transport – Towards an Integrated, technology-led and user-friendly system". Summary of UK Public Consultation

DGB Bundesvorstand/ Bereich Struktur und Regionalpolitik (2009). position. Stellungnahme des DGB zur Mitteilung der EU Kommission Eine nachhaltige Zukunft für den Verkehr: Wege zu einem integrierten, technologieorientierten und nutzerfreundlichen System (2009) 279, September 2009.

ECF (2009). A sustainable future for transport European Cyclists' Federation (ECF) Paper for DG Transport, 03.12. 2009.

european aluminium association (2009). EAA answer to public consultation on the Communication on a Sustainable Future for Transport.

european barge union (2009). EBU Statement on the Communication from the Commission: "A Sustainable Future for Transport: Towards an Integrated Technology-Led and User Friendly System".

ECG (2009). ECG Position on the Commission Communication "A sustainable future for transport: Towards an integrated, technology-led and user friendly system".

European Community Shipsowners' Association (2009). The Future of Transport. Commission Communication on a sustainable future for transport "Towards an integrated, technology-led and used friendly system", 29. September, 2009.

Eurostar (2009). Communication from the Commission: A sustainable future for transport: Towards an integrated, technology-led and user friendly system. A response from Eurostar, September, 2009.

ETRma (2009). EC Communication "A sustainable future for transport: Towards an integrated, technology-led and user friendly system". European tyre manufacturers' contribution, Brussels, 30th September 2009.

Fedop (2009). Contribution de la FEDOP pour le futur du transport en groupe des personnes à mobilité réduite, handicapées ou dépendantes en Europe, Paris, 26.09.2009.

Inführ, Georg (2009). Letter without a title.

IRU (n.y.). IRU White Paper on the Future of Commercial Road Transport in the EU.

Jarva, Vuokko (1999). Transport consumers' long-term mobility — a Gender Perspective on mobility and transport policy, in: Traffic, Needs, Roads: Perspectives

on the Past, Present and Future of Roads in Finland and the Baltic Area, Finnish Road Administration, Helsinki, 1999.

Jäderberg S., N. Andersson (2009). Can the influence on environment be reduced together with lower handling costs in the transportation chain?

Kapsch TrafficCom (2009). Position Paper by Kapsch TrafficCom regarding the communication of the European Commission on "A sustainable future for transport: Towards an integrated, technology-led and user friendly system" COM (2009) 279, Vienna, September, 2009.

Local Government Association (LGA) (2009). LGA response to EC A sustainable future for transport: Towards an integrated, technology-led and user friendly system, London, September, 2009.

Meriläinen, Anssi (2009), ITS, GPS, Automatic control – technology because of technology?, 28.09.2009.

Ministry of Transport Slovenia (2009). Sustainable-oriented future for transport: orientation towards a technology advanced and user-friendly transport system.

Mouchel (2009). A sustainable future for transport: Towards an integrated, technology-led and user friendly system COM(2009) 279 Final.

North West of England Public Health Community (2009). Position Paper Response to Consultation on the European Commission Communication on a Sustainable Future for Transport: Towards and Integrated, Technology led and User Friendly System, September 2009.

Northern Maritime University (2009). Enhancing the innovation capacity of the European transport industry, Edinburgh, 22.09.2009.

Norwegian Ministry of Transport and Communication (2009). The Future of Transport - Norwegian comment, 30.09.2009.

ÖBB-Holding AG (2009). A sustainable future for transport: Towards an integrated, technology-led and user friendly system Position paper of the Austrian Federal Railways (ÖBB), Vienna, September, 2009.

Rail Freight Group (2009). A sustainable future for transport: Towards an integrated, technology-led and user friendly system. Response from Rail Freight Group, September 2009.

Royal Dutch Transport Association (2009). KNV views on the EC Communication "The future of European Transport, a sustainable future for transport; towards an integrated, technology-led and user friendly system".

Russian Railways (2009). Keeping Europe on Track. Transnational Dimensions of EU Transport Policy, 24.09.2009.

SASIG (2009). SASIG RESPONSE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION STRATEGY CONSULTATION, 30.09.2009.

Scottish Government (2009). COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION: A Sustainable Future for Transport: Towards an integrated, technology-led and user friendly system COM(2009) 279 final. Response from The Scottish Government.

Schneider, Jerry (2009). Text without a title.

Seelbinder, Birgit (2009). Stellungnahme zur Mitteilung der Kommission KOM(2009) 279/4 „Nachhaltige Zukunft für den Verkehr“, Marktredwitz, 21. 07. 2009.

Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung des Landes Berlin (2009). Stellungnahme des Landes Berlin zur Mitteilung der Kommission: Eine nachhaltige Zukunft für den Verkehr, Berlin, 23.9.2009.

SheccoTM (2009). shecco reply to Commission consultation on “Sustainable future for transport: towards an integrated, technology led and user-friendly system”, Brussels, September, 2009.

The Netherlands Society for Nature and Environment (2009). Response to consultation: A sustainable future of transport.

Thalhammer, Michael (n.y.). TubeWay solar. Development study of the pressure-difference travel solution, Forum for Ecofriendly Mobility, Austria.

T&E (2009). A Sustainable Future for Transport Response to the European Commission Consultation, September, 2009.

The European Travel Agents' and Tour Operators' Association (2009). Response to the Consultation "A sustainable future for transport: Towards an integrated, technology-led and user friendly system",

The Mersey Partnership/ The Liverpool City Region Transport Partnership (2009). CONSULTATION RESPONSE FORM Commission Document 279/4- A Sustainable Future for Transport: Towards an integrated, technology-led and user friendly system.

The Region of South Bohemia – Permanent Office in Brussels (2009). Position of The Region of South Bohemia regarding the Communication of the European Commission „A sustainable future for transport: Towards an integrated, technology-led and user friendly system“, 30.09.2009.

TRANSNET/Verkehrsgewerkschaft GDBA (2009). Stellungnahme der Gewerkschaft TRANSNET und der Verkehrsgewerkschaft GDBA zur Mitteilung der Kommission „Eine nachhaltige Zukunft für den Verkehr: Wege zu einem integrierten, technologieorientierten und nutzerfreundlichen System“ (KOM(2009) 279/4), Frankfurt/Main und Berlin, 30. 09. 2009

UNIFE. The European Rail Industry (2009). A sustainable future for transport: Towards an integrated, technology-led and user-friendly system. UNIFE contribution, September, 2009.

Volvo Group (2009). Public Consultation on the European Commission Communication on a Sustainable Future for Transport: The Volvo Group view, 30. September, 2009.

Winkelmans, Willy (o.Y.). Letter without a title and 'Sustainable mobility: a dream or a necessity?'.

The comments listed above as well as all comments of all actors classified in this thesis as well as the Guidance Document from the Communication can be found here:

http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/strategies/consultations/2009_09_30_future_of_transport_en.htm (14.03.2016). The consultation period was from 17/06/2009 - 30/09/2009.

12.3 Abstracts

12.3.1 Abstract English

At the turn of the millennium the concept of governance had in many respects replaced the idea of government. It was developed to cope with the latter's problems, for example within legitimization. Governance views private actors as important representatives of society and grants influence to them to ensure a more democratic process. It implies the inclusion of different societal actors, such as interest groups, which are involved in policy processes as well as a less hierarchical relationship between the actors (cf. Peters, 2004). The European Union has embraced governance with its White Paper on Governance in 2001 (European governance - A white paper" (COM(2001) 428 final - Official Journal C 287 of 12.10.2001), which is seen as a landmark for a new relationship between the EU and private actors (cf. Greenwood, 2011, 32, cf. Kohler-Koch/Rittberger, 2006, 36), as well as a trigger point for scholarly discussion on (the new modes of) governance. The White Paper on Governance aims to give different private actors a chance to participate and to enhance democracy in the European Union. It is, however, debated controversially by scholars as to whether it really did so. Some scholars do indeed emphasize the importance of private actors or interest groups to fight the democratic deficit of the European Union, others like Peters (2004, 63f.), argue that instead of enhancing democracy and transparency, 'New Governance' may produce the opposite effects. In this thesis, it is assumed that governance and the inclusion of private actors can only lead to more democracy if actors representing different interests had equal chances; not only to be included in a discussion, but to be heard of or, in other words, to influence the outcome. This has, despite various academic debates, not yet been empirically proven. The aim of this thesis is therefore to investigate whether or not this has been the case. The research will be approached in the context of transport policy. In a summary this MA-thesis aims to determine which private actors took part in the processes of creating the White Paper 'Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area - Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system' and whose positions when it came to the policy were reflected, with the result of observing whether private actors representing public, labor or business interests had equal chances to shape policy. Furthermore it is evaluated if public actors or private actors' opinions are reflected better in the White Paper and if public or business actors rule in mixed groups of public and

business actors as well as (partially) statehold companies. In order to investigate these questions, comments from various actors, submitted in an online consultation of the Communication 'A sustainable future for transport: Towards an integrated, technology-led and user-friendly system' (COM(2009) 279 (final) of 17 June 2009), a forerunner of the White Paper, were analyzed. The actors are classified into 8 groups and their evaluations (positive, partially positive, neutral, partially negative or negative) on 18 extracted measures of the Communication were scrutinized. After entering the actors' positions in the statistic program SPSS and calculating the groups' positions, it was investigated whether the 18 measures appear in the White Paper, if and how they have changed in comparison to the Communication. Upon this testing the following results are observed: business actors are the most influential private actors, therefore private actors' influence after the White Paper on Governance is in this case not balanced. As a result the promotion of democracy can be questioned. Moreover the research shows that private actors have more influence on some issues than public actors. In mixed groups of public and business actors and (partially) statehold companies, the positions are however closer to those of the public actors than to those of private actors lobbying for business.

12.3.2 Zusammenfassung Deutsch

Um die Jahrtausendwende hatte das Konzept der Governance bereits in vielen Aspekten jenes der Regierung ersetzt. Ersteres wurde entwickelt, um Probleme des Letzteren zu bekämpfen, etwa bezüglich der Legitimierung. In dem Konzept von Governance werden private Akteure als wichtige Repräsentanten der Gesellschaft verstanden und ihnen wird, um einen demokratischen Prozess sicherzustellen, mehr Einfluss zugesprochen. Governance impliziert die Inklusion verschiedener gesellschaftlicher Akteure, etwa Interessensgruppen, welche in die Policy-Prozesse einbezogen werden, genauso wie weniger hierarchische Beziehungen zwischen den Akteuren (vgl. Peters, 2004). Die Europäische Union hat dem Governance-Ansatz insbesondere mit ihrem Weißbuch 'Europäisches Regieren' 2001 (KOM(2001) 428 endgültig), das als Meilenstein für die Beziehungen zwischen EU und privaten Akteuren (vgl. Greenwood, 2011, 32, vgl. Kohler-Koch/Rittberger, 2006, 36), sowie als Auslöser von wissenschaftlichen Debatten über (New Modes der) Governance, gesehen wird, angenommen. Das Weißbuch 'Europäisches Regieren' strebt danach verschiedenen privaten Akteuren die Möglichkeit der Partizipation zu geben und die Demokratie in der Europäischen Union zu steigern. Es wird jedoch wissenschaftlich kontrovers diskutiert, ob das Weißbuch diese Ansprüche tatsächlich erfüllt. Während einige Wissenschaftler betonen, dass private Akteure bzw. Interessensgruppen eine wichtige Rolle im Kampf gegen das Demokratiedefizit spielen, argumentieren andere, etwa Peters (2004, 63f.), dass New Governance anstatt Demokratie und Transparenz zu fördern möglicherweise das Gegenteil bewirkt. In dieser Arbeit wird argumentiert, dass Governance und die Inklusion privater Akteure nur zu mehr Demokratie führen können, wenn Repräsentanten verschiedener Interessen gleiche/gleichwertige Chancen haben – nicht nur in die Diskussion einbezogen zu werden, sondern auch gehört zu werden oder, in anderen Worten, das Ergebnis zu beeinflussen. Da dazu wenig empirische Daten vorliegen, ist es das Ziel dieser Arbeit, im Rahmen der Transportpolitik, zu untersuchen, wie ob die Repräsentation verschiedener privater Akteure ausgeglichen war. Um es kurz zusammenzufassen, in dieser Arbeit wird untersucht, welche privaten Akteure im Prozess am Weißbuch Verkehr 2011 ('Fahrplan zu einem einheitlichen europäischen Verkehrsraum – Hin zu einem wettbewerbsorientierten und ressourcenschonenden Verkehrssystem') mitgewirkt haben und welche Positionen in der Policy berücksichtigt wurden. Das geschieht um zu beobachten ob private Akteure, die öffentliche Interessen,

Wirtschafts- oder ArbeitnehmerInneninteressen vertreten die gleichen Chancen hatten, die Policy mitzugestalten. Weiters wird evaluiert, ob eher die Meinungen von öffentlichen oder von privaten Akteuren im Weißbuch aufscheinen und ob öffentliche oder Wirtschaftsakteure bzw. Interessen sich in Gruppen, in welchen beide teilnehmen oder in Unternehmen, die (teilweise) im Staatsbesitz sind, eher durchsetzen. Um diese Fragen zu beantworten werden Kommentare diverser Akteure, welche in einer Onlinekonsultation zu der Mitteilung ‚Eine nachhaltige Zukunft für den Verkehr: Wege zu einem integrierten, technologieorientierten und nutzerfreundlichen System‘ [KOM(2009) 279 (endg.) vom 17. Juni 2009], einem ‚Vorläufer‘ des ‚Weißbuchs Verkehrs‘, abgegeben wurden, analysiert. Die Akteure werden in acht Gruppen klassifiziert und ihre Evaluierungen (positiv, teilweise positiv, neutral, teilweise negativ, negativ) bezüglich 18 Maßnahmen der Mitteilung untersucht. Nach der Eingabe der die Positionen der Akteure in das Statistikprogramm SPSS und dem Ausrechnen der Positionen der Gruppen, wird untersucht, ob die 18 Maßnahmen im ‚Weißbuch Verkehr‘ aufscheinen und ob und wie sie sich im Vergleich zur Mitteilung verändert haben. Nach diesen Tests werden folgende Ergebnisse beobachtet: Wirtschaftsakteure sind die einflussreichsten privaten Akteure, daher kann der Einfluss privater Akteure nach dem ‚Weißbuch Europäisches Regieren‘ in diesem Falle nicht als ausgeglichen betrachtet werden, weshalb man eine vermehrte Demokratisierung im Zuge des Weißbuches Verkehr anzweifeln darf. Des Weiteren zeigt die Untersuchung, dass private Akteure in einigen Fällen mehr Einfluss haben, als öffentliche Akteure. Die Positionen von Gruppen, welche aus öffentlichen und Wirtschaftsakteuren bestehen oder von Unternehmen, welche (teilweise) im Staatsbesitz sind, gleichen eher jenen der öffentlichen Akteure, als jener der Wirtschaftsakteure.