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„The Philippines and the Mindanao conflict –
An Ethnographic study on a Conflict Induced Internal
Diaspora from Mindanao in Metro Manila “

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Laura Belting

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“Mahirap pag pumunta ka dito ng mag isa at walang kilala, kung ganun, ticket lang ng bangka ang meron ka!” (Interview, June 18, 2016)

(“It could be difficult, if you come alone. It’s only the boat ticket that you have then!”)

To all the respondents of this research.

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Abstract

The conflict in Mindanao is characterized by a high degree of fragmentation leading to different conflict lines, and therefore to the emergence of multiple sources of violence. Consequently, the civil society is very vulnerable to multidimensional threats. Families are repeatedly forced to flee from their homes, whereby a considerable number seeks shelter in evacuation camps. However, a significant part is suggested to leave the places of origin, in order to seek for more stability elsewhere in the Philippines, or abroad. Hence, respective migrants fall out of the monitoring schemes and statistics of international organizations.

However, it can be observed that since the official outbreak of the conflict, the emergence of Muslim communities all over the Philippines, and especially in Metro Manila, increased decisively. This dynamic indicates common patterns of settlement of Filipino Muslims native to Mindanao. Due to the religious dimension of the conflict, and the resulting marginalization of the Muslim population in the Philippines, it is assumed that ethnic migrant networks play outstanding roles for the migration from the conflict affected areas to other locations in the Philippines. In this regard, this thesis intends to investigate on the impact of such networks on the emergence of internal diasporas in terms of the push and pull factors, considerations of settlement, the organization in the new location and the maintenance of home ties. Therefore, an ethnographic field research was conducted in the Muslim community from the Salam Compound, Quezon City, Metro Manila.

Keywords: Diaspora; Ethnic Conflict; Ethnic Networks; Evacuation; Family Networks; Forced Displacement; Forced Migration; Internal Conflict; Internal Migration; Internally Displaced Person; Latent Conflict; Marginalization; Migrant Networks; Minority Conflict; Religious Conflict; Resource Conflict

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Abstrakt

Der Konflikt in Mindanao ist charakterisiert durch einen hohen Grad an Fragmentierung, und eine daraus resultierte ansteigende Anzahl verschiedener Gewaltakteure. Durch die mehrseitige Bedrohung ist die Zivilbevölkerung sehr gefährdet, und Familien sind wiederholt dazu gezwungen zu fliehen. Auch wenn der Großteil wiederholt Schutz in Evakuierungszentren sucht, muss beachtet werden, dass ein wesentlicher Teil sich dazu entscheidet, den eigenen Herkunftsort zu verlassen, um woanders nach mehr Stabilität zu suchen. Die Migranten verschwinden somit aus dem Blickwinkel der Internationalen Organisationen, und somit auch aus den Statistiken.

Dennoch kann beobachtet werden, dass seit dem offiziellen Ausbruch des Konfliktes in Mindanao die Anzahl von Muslimischen Gemeinden in anderen Teilen der Philippinen, und im Besonderen in Metro Manila, deutlich gestiegen ist. Diese Entwicklung weist darauf hin, dass die philippinischen Muslime aus Mindanao sich an verbreiteten Migrationsmustern orientieren. Im Anbetracht der religiösen Dimension des Konfliktes, und der dadurch entstandenen Ausgrenzung der Muslimischen Gesellschaft in den Philippinen, kann man also annehmen, dass ethnische Migrationsnetzwerke von entscheidender Bedeutung sind. Aus diesem Grund untersucht diese Arbeit den Einfluss solcher Migrationsnetzwerke im Bezug auf die „push und pull“ Faktoren vor der Migration, sowie auf die Wahl des Wohnortes, die Organisation und das Einleben vor Ort, und das Aufrechterhalten der Verbindungen in den Heimatort. Aus diesem Grund wurde eine ethnographische Feldrecherche vorgenommen, mit Einwohnern der Muslimischen Gemeinde des Salam Compounds, Quezon City, Metro Manila.

Keywords: Ausgrenzung; Binnenmigration; Diaspora; Ethnischer Konflikt; Ethnische Netzwerke; Evakuierung; Familien Netzwerke; Interner Konflikt; Interne Migration; Internally Displaced Person; Latenter Konflikt; Migrationsnetzwerke; Minderheitenkonflikt; Religiöser Konflikt; Ressourcen Konflikt; Vertreibung; Zwangsevakuierung; Zwangsmigration

Statutory Declaration

I hereby declare that the Master's Thesis presented for the grade is entitled:

The Philippines and the Mindanao conflict –

An Ethnographic study on a Conflict Induced Internal Diaspora from Mindanao in Metro Manila

I wrote it independently under the guardianship of the supervision by

Dr. Gunnar Stange (University of Vienna)

I hereby declare that this thesis has been written by myself without any external unauthorized help, that it has been neither presented to any institution for evaluation nor previously published in its entirety or in parts. Any parts, words or ideas of the thesis, however limited, and including tables, graphs, maps etc., which are quoted from or based on other sources, have been acknowledged as such without exception.

Vienna, February 14, 2018

Signature: 

List of Abbreviations

| | |
|--------|--|
| AFP | Armed Forces of the Philippines |
| AKUF | Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung (German Working Group for Research on the Causes of War) |
| ARMM | Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao |
| ASG | Abu Sayyaf Group |
| BBL | Bangsamoro Basic Law |
| BIFF | Bangsamoro Freedom Fighters |
| CAB | Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro |
| CIA | Central Intelligence Agency |
| FAB | Framework Agreement on Bangsamoro |
| HIK | Heidelberger Institut für Internationale Konfliktforschung (Heidelberger Institute for International Conflict Research) |
| IA | International Alert |
| ICG | International Crisis Group |
| ICGM | International Contact Group Mindanao |
| IDMC | Internal Displacement Monitoring Center |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Person |
| IOM | International Organization for Migration |
| IRM | International Return Migrant |
| IS | Islamic State |
| MILF | Moro Islamic Liberation Front |
| MIM | Mindanao Independence Movement |
| MNLF | Moro National Liberation Front |
| MOA-AD | Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain |
| NCR | National Capital Region |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organization |

| | |
|-------|--|
| NSO | National Statistics Office |
| OCHA | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| OFW | Overseas Filipino Worker |
| OIC | Organization of the Islamic Conference |
| PCI | Problem-Centered Interview |
| PhP | Philippine Peso |
| PNP | Philippine National Police |
| SAF | Special Action Force |
| SMAAC | Salam Mosque and Madrasah Advisory Council, Inc. |
| UAE | United Arab Emirates |
| UNCHR | United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees |
| US | United States of America |
| WFP | World Food Programme |

1 Introduction

Since the official outbreak over five decades ago, the Mindanao conflict has continuously been addressed in the scientific literature. The complex context of the conflict thereby offers a broad spectrum of aspects, which allowed scholars to approach it from numerous and multidimensional angles of different disciplines. Apart from the conflict causes and political developments, the impact on the civil society, and in particular the topic of internal displacement as a direct consequence of violence, have aroused a widely spread interest of different fields. Besides the economic issues, studies have put a focus on the social dimensions, such as the social development, psychological impacts and increasingly on gender studies, reflecting on the repeated and protracted forced dislocation of the society directly affected by the conflict. In this regard, the field of research of the Mindanao conflict is to a considerable extent shaped through the work of international organizations that are engaged in different projects in the region. Thereby, they maintain an outstanding access to information, that is otherwise barely reachable for outsiders.

The lasting confrontations in Mindanao not only constitute direct threats, that cause the immediate evacuation of the respective areas, but it is suggested that the resulting instability and lack of future perspectives moreover trigger migration movements, that according to the common theories account as being of voluntary nature. Apart from the migration to other countries, dynamics show that a considerable number of migrants resettles within the state borders of the Philippines. In this regard it is moreover to be taken into account, that the initial migration movements that are directly related to the conflict, were directed from the northern parts of the Philippines to the southernmost island Mindanao, which triggered the first direct confrontations between the resettlers and natives. In contrast to these visible large-scale movements, the resulting migration from the south to the north however remained rather unnoticed. Since the internal migration does not require any specific documentation, a significant part of it happens unregistered. Through the movements out of the conflict zone, the internal migrants are moreover excluded from the monitoring fields of international organizations, that continuously try to capture adequate statistics about internally displaced persons (IDPs). In this relation, the considerable emergence of Muslim communities, especially in the peri-urban and urban centers of the Philippines, are visible evidences for the migration from Filipino Muslims from the conflict affected areas towards other locations in the Philippines. Hence, this research intends to reach beyond the official internal displacement, and to investigate on the emergence of the internal Muslim diaspora in the Philippines, specifically on the sphere of migrant networks. In this context, Ph.D. Nimfa Ogena (2012: 1) states:

“Sociopolitical and cultural issues dominate the rich scholarship on Muslims globally and in the Philippines. Very rarely, however, do they examine the demographics particularly migration issues that confront this specific population group. Moreover, limited information is available on linkages between migration and social and religious networks of Muslims in Asia, which we often assume are crucial in facilitating migration as implied in the large volume of migration literature.”

In this regard, similar to the lack of official data, that was expected to be provided either through state or international institutions (inquiries to the National Statistics Office (NSO) of the Philippines, to the office of the International Organization of Migration (IOM) in Cotabato, as well as to the ARMM Department on Social Welfare and Development remained without reply), the topic showed moreover to receive only a comparatively low share of academic attention. In this context, the work of Akiko Watanabe (2008) was perceived as a milestone in the field. In her study: “Migration and mosques: The evolution and transformation of Muslim communities in Manila, the Philippines”, part of the working paper series of the Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies of the Ryukoku University, Watanabe suggests, that Metro Manila is the major destination of internal migrants from the conflict affected areas in Mindanao, and therefore gives a detailed outline of the emergence of Muslim communities in the capital region in relation to the influx of the Muslim migrants.

In addition, Ogena (2012) undertook a “Social Survey on Muslim Migrants in Metro Manila” as part of the Demographic Research and Development Foundation, Inc. of the Institute for Asian Muslim Studies at the Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan. The works reveal, that by the 1980s twenty-seven Muslim communities had emerged spread over the Philippines (Watanabe, 2008a: 1-2), of which thirteen are to be found in Metro Manila (Ogena, 2012: 3). Complementary to Watanabe’s outline, Ogena focuses on general living conditions of the internal migrants resident in Metro Manila. The study encompasses 100 male participants, of which half settled in Metro Manila directly, while the other fifty respondents initially worked abroad as Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) and moved to the Metro after their return. In this regard, Ogena underlines that in total only 5% of the population in the Philippines is Muslim, while Christians dominate the religious (and political) landscape. More than half of the Muslim population is thereby resident in parts of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), hence in the areas that are most affected by the conflict. Almost further 40% live in other parts of Mindanao, while only a margin of 2,7% is spread over the rest of the country. More than half of the Filipino Muslims outside of Mindanao are concentrated in Metro Manila (1,5%). These visible dynamics do not only indicate the existence of migrant networks, but they suggest moreover an outstanding role in the overall context of the internal migration. Furthermore,

taking the religious demographics into account in regard to the context of the conflict, the emerging Muslim communities are regarded as (ethnic) internal diaspora.

Since the lack of information constituted a significant obstacle for a more detailed research, a field trip became a reasonable approach. Metro Manila was perceived as being an adequate location, considering the previously presented data that identify the area as main destination for internal Muslim migrants from Mindanao. Hence, a field research was undertaken from May 5, 2016 until July 28, 2016, whereby a stay of two weeks in February 2016 allowed first general preparations. Based on the increased research on migrant networks, the specific point of interest was specifically set on the impact of migrant networks in terms of the decision-making process for the migration, the patterns of settlement, the organizational structures in the destinations, as well as in regard to the maintenance of the ties to the respective home areas. Even though the literature on migration foremost provides theories related to international migration, they are suggested to capture the dynamics of the specific case of the conflict triggered migration from the affected areas in Mindanao to Metro Manila adequately. In this regard, the religious dimension of the conflict was taken into account, which has evidently led to split among the Muslim minority and the Christian majority in the Philippines. Additionally to the resulting degree of ethnic and cultural segregation in the country, the comparatively low level of development in Mindanao in contrast to the urban environment in Metro Manila is suggested to cause considerable degree of alienation of the Filipino Muslims in the course of their migration and settlement in the National Capital Region (NCR).

Metro Manila consists of sixteen cities (see also Annex 2), whereby it was initially not identified where the Muslim communities are exactly located. Through the help of International Alert (IA), ties to the Muslim community in the Salam Compound in the barangay Cultiat, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, were established, which allowed a specification of the research questions regarding the location. In the context of the previously defined interest, the conducted research was based on the following research questions (see also Annex 1).

Principal research questions

- In how far do networks influence the settlement in Manila in general and in the Salam Compound in particular?
- What are the migration patterns leading to a settlement in the Salam Compound?
- How is the Filipino Muslim diaspora organized in terms of networks?

Minor research questions

- What are the initial push and pull factors for the internal migration?
- To which extent do the networks play a role for push and pull factors?
- How are the ties to the “homeland” maintained?

Apart from the previously introduced work of Watanabe (2008a), that already includes the Salam Compound in the context of the emergence of Muslim communities in Metro Manila, three further studies specifically deal with the residential area. Watanabe (2008b) published a further study: “Representing Muslimness: Strategic Essentialism in a land dispute in Metro Manila”. In this work, the author addresses a land dispute between the Muslim community and the Christian organization Iglesia ni Cristo in regard to its impacts on the solidarity among Muslims residents in Metro Manila. Furthermore, the studies of Taqueban (2011): “Salam: Of dislocation, marginality and flexibility”, and of Crisanto Regadio Jr. (2015): “Morospora: Formation of tribal leadership in Salam Compound at Barangay Culiati, Quezon City” were based on interviews conducted with residents of the Salam Compound, whereby the first one did not reveal the exact amount of interviewees, and the second one was based on a collaboration with eight residents. Even though both works superficially touch some aspects related to the research questions of this research, none specifically approached the sphere of migrant networks.

The beforehand presented time frame of this field trip allowed to conduct an ethnographic research, which revealed individual experiences related to the research questions, whereby emerging connection points highlighted common patterns of reality. Fifteen interviews with residents of the Salam Compound were conducted according to the structure of problem-centered interviews (PCI) (for the interview guideline see also Annex 1). The interviews were conducted from June 14, 2016 until July 17, 2016. Besides this main pillar of the research, additional unrecorded (spontaneous) interviews were conducted with one Muslim office holder from Mindanao resident in Metro Manila, two Christian migrants from Illigan and Surigao del Norte in Mindanao resident in Metro Manila. Moreover, conversations with members of different international organizations engaged in different projects related to the Mindanao conflict offered a further insight into the overall topic. The stays in Metro Manila allowed moreover the observation of the last days of the peace process under president Aquino III and the failure of the BBL (February 4, 2016), as well as the election period, Duterte’s electoral victory on May 9, 2016, his inauguration on June 30, 2016 and the first weeks of the new president in office until the last day of the stay.

In regard to the presentation and the discussion of the findings of this research, it is decisive to not only consider the recent political developments, but to capture the broad historic background of the Mindanao conflict. However, as indicated above, the long-lasting conflict in the region is characterized through its high complexity and fragmentation, whereby already single aspects fill entire studies from various scientific fields. Therefore, the extent of the following elaborations regarding the conflict context are based on the previously presented research questions, consequently certain aspects and dimensions of the conflict are approached only superficially or are not considered in this research. The target of the outline is to understand the conflict developments, which are suggested to be decisive in order to capture the dominating atmosphere and spirit of the interviews, and hence to put the gathered data of this research into the context in regard to the discussion of findings. Nevertheless, the Part I of this thesis shall give a general overview of the Mindanao conflict. Chapter 2.1 seeks to clarify what internal conflict are, and therefore gives a broad introduction into the topic by presenting general features and dynamics as well as approaches of conflict categorizations, whereby especially the Heidelberger approach as well as Johann Galtungs' conflict triangle (1969) provide theoretical explanations. On this basis and in relation to the case of Mindanao, the second section (Chapter 2.2) then elaborates more in detail upon the dimensions of ethnicity and resources, as well as on the emergence of markets of violence according to the work of Georg Elwert (1999), and underlines moreover the traces of interconnection among them.

In the third chapter, this first theoretical approach shall be followed by the outline of the actual case of the Mindanao conflict. The first section therefore encompasses a brief overview over the historical and recent context in relation to the different conflict dimensions. The next part then summarized the past peace attempts under the different administrations of the Philippines since the official outbreak of the conflict (Chapter 3.2). The last section (Chapter 3.3) takes a closer look at the last peace process under President Benigno Aquino III (2010-2016) and the circumstances leading to its failure. As a last point, the electoral victory of Rodrigo Roa Duterte on May 9, 2016 as the new president of the Philippines shall be addressed, therefore a brief insight into the career and resulting reputation of Duterte shall be given.

After the contextualization, Chapter 4 relates the conflict to the issue of migration, whereby the previous emphasis on political developments is complemented by an insight into the situation of the affected Muslim civil society, in particular related to internal displacement according to the definition of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) (Chapter 4.1). In order to highlight the extent of the impact, presented examples are complemented through available statistics provided by the World Bank, the World Food Program and the International Organization.

Hereafter, the focus is shifted to the phenomenon of internal migration (Chapter 4.2), which in the context is understood as a further symptom of the ongoing conflict in Mindanao. Hence, the internal migration is assumed to be induced by the continuing instability, as well as by protracted and repeated forced displacement. In this regard, the section seeks to provide a general understanding of internal migration, whereby the specific focus is set on migrant networks in regard to the research questions of this paper. Apart from the traditional approach of push and pull factors for the decision-making process, the focus is extended to the dimensions of “Family and Personal Networks” and “Migrant Agency Activities” according to James Fawcett (1989), and the further elaborations by Monica Boyd (1989) and Sonja Haug (2008) in regard to the role of the different actors in the immediate surrounding of the migrants. Along these lines, the personal networks, social networks, and migrant agencies are furthermore connected to the stage of settlement after the migration, as well as the incorporation of new migrants into such networks (Massey, 1990, Massey et al., 1993).

This passage shall then be succeeded by a general overview of the emergence of Muslim communities in Metro Manila (Chapter 5.1), whereby the Salam Compound as field of this research is addressed in particular (Chapter 5.2).

On the basis provided by the first part, Part II then focuses on the field research, the findings and the empirical analysis. Chapter 6 therefore reflects on the circumstances of the research by encompassing the procedure of accessing the field, and the data collection process, while Chapter 7 reveals the chosen approaches for the research design as well as for the eventual analysis of the data gathered through the field trip. Additionally to Part I, these chapters intent to provide a deeper understanding of the direct context of the conducted interviews, as well as of the angle of the researcher during the data collection as well as during the analysis.

The final section (Chapter 8) then focuses on the findings of the research and analysis. Chapter 8.1 gives therefore an initial overview of the interviews conducted with residents of the Salam Compound, Quezon City, Metro Manila, which were initially already introduced main pillar of this research. In the following, Chapter 8.2 presents the findings, which in regard to the research questions were divided into seven main discursive fields, whereby each is highly interconnected to the other: “Push and Pull Factors: Private Networks and Recruitment Agencies”, “The Settlement: Networks and Patterns”, “A Home away from Home”: About Religion and Identity in the Salam Compound”, “Jobs: Networks versus Discrimination”, “Remittances and Home Ties”, “Memories of the Homeland and Hopes for the Future”, “Evaluation of Conflict”. On the basis of the initial outline of the conflict context reaching from the historic background

to recent developments (Chapter 3-5), Chapter 9 then discusses the findings in relation to the presented research questions. To be taken into account is, that the principal as well as minor research questions are mutually interrelated, consequently the questions are not answered one by one, but the entire discussion sets the questions into the context of conflict triggered internal migration from Mindanao to Metro Manila, specifically to the Salam Compound. To this respect, the elaborations in Chapter 4.2, concerning specifically the role of migrant networks, provide the theoretical background for the discussion.

Part I

2 Internal Conflicts

This chapter elaborates theoretically the issue of internal conflicts, whereby the first part shall give an overview of categories and general features, whereas the second part approaches the conflict dimensions of ethnicity, resources and the emergence of markets of violence more in detail.

2.1 General Features

Most notably since the 1990s, the classic war scenario of two or more states fighting for territory and power diminished decisively. Herfried Münkler (2004: 179) elaborates, that due to the technological development interstate wars have become unreasonable, since its costs would exceed by far any possible yield. In this regard, he considers the development of nuclear weapons and the respective destructive power and the increased vulnerability of the modern industrial- and service societies. Yet no matter how promising such statement might sound, the decrease indeed gave not path to an era of peace. Just another form of war moved into the foreground; the intrastate war commonly referred to as internal (armed) conflict or civil war. The dynamics caused by the end of the cold war pushed the occurrence of such conflicts and the attention they received. In fact, already since 1945 internal conflicts have outnumbered interstate wars. According to the German Working Group for Research on the Causes of War (AKUF) 74% of the wars between 1945 and 2014 were fought within the border of a single state, whereby parts of sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the Middle East have accounted as the most affected regions. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of former Yugoslavia however brought the war zones right into the supposedly peaceful Europe, which attracted the public attention and raised the awareness of this “new” kind of war (Schreiber, 2015).

To actually understand and capture the dynamics of internal conflicts thereby turn out to be an extremely complex endeavor, since its roots, triggers, processes and number of involved parties vary decisively between individual cases. In the late 1990s, in his work “Societies in Civil War” Peter Waldmann (1999: 62) describes such conflicts as chaotic scenarios not following any rules in their developments, nor does he see a possibility to influence them from the outside: “Civil wars can culminate and at some moment loose momentum without it being possible to predict the moment when they are ready for peace. It is hardly possible to manipulate them from the outside.” Over the past decades the increased research of conflict and

peace studies has however shown that the seemingly anarchic and lawless structures of internal conflicts indeed follow certain patterns, which allow us to categorize different forms. The role of external actors thereby can be decisive for the dynamics, in a positive as well as in a negative sense.

The Department of Conflict Research of the University of Uppsala gives us the general definition of internal conflicts, or to stay with the respective terminology; State based armed conflict as a:

“[...] contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related death in one calendar year” (PCR UU, 2017).

Whereby, as already mentioned, the number of involved parties is not limited to two and varies between different individual conflict scenarios. But before opening up all the possible variables and manifold structures internal conflicts can take, it is essential to figure out what the general features are and how we can approach such events, and in particular the case of Mindanao.

Thereby already the amount of possible reasons shows to be numerous. However, it is difficult to distinguish them clearly from one another since they are commonly interrelated and quite flexible in regard to possible adjustments related to the conflict development. Nevertheless, to avoid losing track in the seemingly chaotic structures that Waldmann described in his work, the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIK) defines ten broad categories of possible reasons for inter- and intrastate conflicts, that shall be presented in the following table.

Table 1

| | |
|-----------------|---|
| System/Ideology | aspired change of the ideological, religious, socioeconomic or judicial orientation of the political system or changing the regime itself |
| National Power | power to govern a state |
| Autonomy | attaining or extending political self-rule of a population within a state or of a dependent territory without striving for independence |
| Secession | aspired separation of a part of a territory of a state aiming to establish a new state or to merge with another state |
| Decolonization | independence of a dependent territory |

| | |
|--------------------------|--|
| Subnational Predominance | attainment of the de-facto control by a government, a non-state organization or a population over a territory or a population |
| Resources | possession of natural resources or raw materials, or the profits gained thereof. |
| Territory | change of the course of an international border |
| International Power | aspired change in the power constellation in the international system or a regional system therein, especially by changing military capabilities or the political or economic influence of a state |
| Other | residual category |

(Source: Schwank et al., 2014)

The categorization shall for now just contribute to the general overview of the emergence and developments of conflicts. In regard to the topic of this paper, the points of system/ideology, autonomy, secession and resources play in particular an important role and will be elaborated on further in the following section (Chapter 2.2) and in the contextualization (Chapter 3.1).

The focus for now shall be put on how such tensions develop into an intrastate war. The Heidelberger approach considers the reasons listed in table 1 in the first place as political conflicts, that can but do not necessarily have to develop into an armed conflict. Such initial situation is termed as *incompatibility* (ibid.). Norbert Ropers underlines as well, that conflicts are not necessarily violent and destructive, but indeed crucial and necessary for social change. A society without conflicts therefore would be stagnated, thus dead (Schrader, 2012a). If a political conflict takes a violent course or not is highly dependent on the *conflict actors* and how they communicate or take actions (*conflict measures*) in regard to the respective contested objects (*conflict item*), that can be of “material or immaterial” nature. Conflict measures direct the progress of a conflict, if they lie within the “established procedures and regulations” that are accepted by all sides, they do not constitute a threat. Whereas actions crossing the line push the potential of an outbreak of an armed confrontation between the parties involved (Schwank et al., 2014).

In addition to this, the conflict triangle of Johan Galtung (1969), one of the founding fathers in the sector of peace and conflict research, is essential to understand conflict dynamics. The triangle consists of *behavior* on top, *attitude* in the left corner and *contradiction* in the right corner. The upper visible or observable part of the behavior is thereby separated from the lower, invisible part or underlying interest.

The term contradiction can be related to what is above termed as incompatibility as the base of a political conflict and related to the conflict items. The conflict measures can be compared to what Galtung describes as behavior, visible actions that determine directly the course a conflict takes and that have the potential to exacerbate and transform already ongoing conflicts. The attitude additionally refers to the mindset and conduct of a party and how they perceive (consciously or unconsciously) the own role, the roots of the conflict and how they evaluate the counterpart. Each part of the triangle is interconnected and only the interplay of all the parts causes a conflict (Schrader, 2012a).

The HIIK provided already a list of ten possible conflict reasons (conflict items), whereby the categories of system/ideology, autonomy, secession and resources were already selected as particularly important for the analysis of the case of the Mindanao conflict. However, in reality conflict scenarios barely, if ever, fall into one clear category as described in the text book. They might start as a mixed form right away or during the development different actors and shifting interest trigger new conflict lines. Nevertheless, Lutz Schrader (2012a) formulates five proxies that are based on Galtung's conflict triangle in order to analyse intrastate wars. His approach is fundamental to understand what forms of conflict are part of the situation, to identify if there is a dominant conflict line and how the categories influence each other. Following the conflict triangle, his five points of observation are the level of *behavior/actors*, the contradiction as the *factual level/interest*, the attitude or *level of relationships* and the *socio-structural* as well as *socio-cultural* environment. The involved actors or stakeholders and the respective behavior shapes the conflict reality crucially, thus it can for example assume the form of a civil war, guerilla warfare, markets of violence or terrorism. Each of these kinds shows different characteristics; A civil war is a systematic war between insurgencies/ rebels and the government of a state or organized political, ethnic or religious groups fight for control/power of the state. Guerilla warfare on the other hand is less organized and single attacks and confrontations of different, more or less independent units aim to weaken the state. In the case of markets of violence, the ongoing conflict itself allows the emergence of a shadow economy that creates financial incentives for so called war lords to keep the war ongoing. Terrorism at last does not show a clear military strategy, but rather a strategy of violence as communication or rather intimidation (ibid.).

The factual level as contradiction considers several material or immaterial aspects. Generally, it accounts as a fight for a scarce good, that can either be about territories or natural resources and the respective power and revenues distribution. Apart from such material goods a conflict can also arise from the dispute about the way of development and modernization or the demand for more autonomy of a minority. Even though the pure contradiction on the factual level might be based on recent developments or events, the level of relationship is commonly deeply rooted in the respective history. Tensions do not appear from one to the

other day, the background can indeed reach back over several centuries and long-lasting experiences of e.g. discrimination of a certain group can then cause a strongly internalized atmosphere of mutual rejection, fear, frustration and hate. The level of relationship between the involved parties sets thereby the conditions for either open and constructive talks or if those are undermined right from the start (behavior) (ibid.).

In this relation, the issue of identity clearly comes into play. The level of affiliation with for example an ethnic or religious group is decisive to distinguish oneself from the other, which facilitates the establishment of the concept of an enemy. This can be then easily (mis-) used by group leaders to keep fighters or even the entire affected society motivated and staunch. The own position and role in the conflict is hence consciously or unconsciously defined and justified. Conflicts in which the level of identity is in the foreground are therefore termed as ethnic, religious or ideological conflicts. Due to the possible instrumentalization of the political- and intellectual elite however, Schrader suggests a more accurate naming as ethno-political, religious-political and politic-ideological conflicts. Additionally, the socio-structural and socio-cultural level are highly interdependent. They shape the everyday life of societies, but in a case of conflicts they show the tendency that breaks emerge along these lines. This can then develop into conflicts between genders, generations, social classes, minorities and majorities or center and periphery or based on different cultures and different frames of references and general conceptions of history, man etc. (ibid., Schrader, 2012b). For a better overview and guideline for the following elaborations on the Mindanao conflict, the findings of Schrader are summarized in the following table.

Table 2

| Actors | Factual level | Relationship level | Structural level | Cultural level |
|--|---|--|---|---|
| governments, regular forces, insurgents/rebels, guerilla, warlords, terrorists, third parties, international organizations | goals and interest regarding, the control, possession and/or (re)distribution of scarce resources | expectations, feelings, prejudices, stereotypes, values and identities of the conflict parties | dividing lines between the conflict parties based on the social level | cultural environment and frame of reference of the conflict parties |

| | | | | |
|--|--|---|---|--|
| civil wars, partisan/guerilla warfare, markets of violence, terrorism, genocide | sovereignty, power, territory, status natural resources, access, rights, freedom | stability vs. instability, trust vs. mistrust, recognition vs. discrimination, appreciation vs. depreciation, affiliation vs. exclusion, tolerance vs. disciplining | male vs. female, old vs. young, “normal” vs. “different”, rich vs. poor, superiority vs. inferiority (social class), majority vs. minority, center vs. periphery, dominant vs. marginalized worldview/conception | understanding of nature, conception of history, the world and man, language and culture, religion, political conviction and values, conception of science |
|--|--|---|---|--|

(Source: Schrader, 2012b.)

If the involved parties do not manage to settle the contradiction peacefully, to stay with the terminology of Galtung for now, this does not mean that the conflict escalates right away to the full extend. Friedrich Glasl therefore established a model of nine stages of conflict escalation that reaches from the initial stage of “hardening” to the last one of “together in the abyss” (Jordan, 2000), even though Ropers underlines that this model was particularly designed for meso-social conflicts and shows some shortcomings towards other forms (Ropers, 1997: 24).

The HIIK ranks the level of conflict intensity based on the conflict measures taken, to switch back to the pursuant terminology. The scale reaches from value 1 to value 5. The first two levels, the *dispute* and the *non-violent crisis*, are thereby characterized as *low intensity* and are the only non-violent forms. The following level 3 is the *violent crisis* and reaches a *medium intensity*, whereas level 4 (*limited war*) and 5 (*war*) account as conflicts with a *high intensity* (Schwank et al., 2014).

2.2 The Dimensions of Ethnicity, Natural Resources and Markets of Violence

In the previous section the ten conflict items categorized by the HIIK were presented and the points of system/ideology, autonomy, secession and resources were already identified as important for the case of Mindanao. Each category thereby does not stand on its own, but they are highly interconnected and overlapping. In addition to that the elaborations of Schrader based on Galtung’s conflict triangle gave us five proxies for analyzing specifically internal conflicts. The purpose of this section is to offer additionally

a more nuanced insight of conflict dynamics in regard to the subsequent elaborations on the Mindanao conflict. Therefore, it seeks to explore the nature and interconnection of ethnicity and resources in conflicts as well as the emergence of markets of violence. Based on these dimensions the official goal of conflict can then be targeted at the autonomy of a marginalized group or secession of a specific territory.

2.2.1 The Dimension of Ethnicity

As we have seen, ethnicity is one outstanding dimension that falls under the broad spectrum of ideology and hence under the respective category of conflict items. Even though in most cases different ethnicities co-exist peacefully, observations show that it bears a considerable potential for the outbreak of internal conflicts. If so, a split erupts along ethnic differences that become visible for example through different skin colors, languages, cultures, traditions, religions and settlements (Schrader, 2012c). Those differences, or rather the subjective awareness and perception of them, however are not unalterable but highly depend on the situation. Peter Kreuzer (Kreuzer, 2002: 11-12) suggests that the ethnic cohesion and consequently emerging differences are to a crucial extent based on fictive and thereby changeable factors, which makes ethnicity a state of mind.

To understand why in some cases the issue of ethnicity leads to conflict the *constructivist* and *instrumentalist* approach shall briefly be presented. The constructivist angle assumes that ethnic identities are social constructs, whereby in a neutral scenario the interplay of the socio-structural and socio-cultural environment are crucial for individual as well as collective identities. The leading elite and the daily life within the group thereby shape and change the impact of each dimension, which becomes particularly relevant during the process of ethnicization. This means that the ethnic dimension is moved to the foreground and superimposes the other aspects, which makes the ethnicity the core of cohesion of the group (Schrader, 2012c). Along these lines, the instrumentalist approach focuses on the goals of ethnicization itself. Accordingly, the process does not occur naturally as a social dynamic, but the awareness of ethnic differences is consciously pushed by the political, religious or intellectual elite. This does not automatically imply the respective individual attachment to such issue, but the need to cover the actual self-interests that are commonly connected to economic incentives and/or power, which gives already a first idea of the role of resources and markets of violence. As previously mentioned, due to the political dimension or rather background of ethnic conflicts, Schrader suggests the more adequate term of ethno-political conflicts (ibid.).

However, the induced affiliation with one ethnic group facilitates the differentiation between friend and foe decisively and sets thereby the basis for the intended instigation of conflict on the level of the civil society.

In the course of intensification, the own survival seemingly depends on the demise of the other whereby experiences of conflict and violence in turn lead again to an increased affiliation as a community of fate (Kreuzer, 2002: 15). In relation to Galtung's conflict triangle and in the successive elaborations of Schrader, it was already elaborated, that the point of attitude and the level of relationship between conflict parties are not based on recent events, but deeply rooted in the respective history (Schrader, 2012a). Correspondingly, the factor of experiences determines if ethnic co-existence bears a conflict potential or not. If the situation is dominated by economic imbalances and a lack of social exchange, the underlying competition leads to an initial insinuated split. This does not mark automatically the official beginning of an ethnic conflict, as long as it is accounted as economic or social problem (Kreuzer, 2002: 14-15). In this relation Waldmann (1999: 64) recognizes in his work, that such internal conflicts do not derive from what he calls a "social vacuum" but:

" [...] even if in certain cases violent clashes between different confessional groups might have provoked astonishment and shock amongst the citizens of the states, it had been clear to them before that they were far from constituting a unified nation".

The initial but critical tensions are what Ropers describes as *latent conflict*. If such injustice is recognized as ethnical problem, conflict parties have to form first, which does not indicate that such developments and the later progress fit into the linear design of the ladder of escalation. Conflict parties might not switch from one to the next stage at the same time: "[...] there are often several escalatory phases co-existing in a single area of conflict" (Ropers, 1997: 22), which decisively adds to the complexity of analyzing internal conflicts as well as efforts for the settlement.

In sum, under the category of ideology, ethnicity can be used to infiltrate and dominate the individual and the group identity and thereby forms a strong sense of belonging and distinction respectively. As a precondition earlier experiences of inequality, social and cultural tensions have already lead to an underlying accumulation of frustration and frictions, which during the conflict is brought to the surface and becomes the driver of hostilities (Schrader, 2012c, Waldmann, 1999: 66). Ideology in general, and ethnicity in particular are consequently attractive conflict instruments for the stakeholders in power.

2.2.2 The Dimension of Resources

Economic motivation has already been identified as one outstanding underlying interest that gets covered by an ethnic conflict. As briefly mentioned before natural resources thereby play a decisive factor and

moreover constitute one of the biggest security risks for the outbreak of internal conflicts. The high risk thereby derives from each scenario, scarce resources as well as resource wealth (Richter, 2012).

In the first case, not the actual available amount is decisive, but rather the relative shortage that emerges through unequal distribution and access on one side and the increasing demand on the other. Contested resources thereby usually are land, woodland, or water. Even though it constitutes an internal problem, such situation is additionally augmented through the international commodity market and the encroaching of economic oligopolies as well as through unfavorable regulations on taxes and export. Yet only the interconnection with another dimension triggers a violent escalation, which leads us back to the instrumentalization of ethnicity. The competition about the contested resource can thus be based on ethnic differences and the power and access becomes the necessity of the own security (*securitization*).

Yet, most internal conflicts are not based on contested scarce resources and hence *grievance*, but on the contrary on resource wealth and the respectively emerging *greed*. Thereby striking is that particularly poor countries often show large deposits of natural resources. Such given economic opportunity however can reverse into the opposite if not handled considerably (Richter, 2012). It might lead to what is commonly referred to as the Dutch disease or resource curse. This phenomenon is caused by the complete economic focus on the given resource which might have been encouraged by an initial upward trend of the respective commodity market. The resulting neglect of the other economic sectors results in a fundamental imbalance of the budget and the general society. Such structures leave the entire economy highly vulnerable if the temporary boom eventually drops. Additionally, weak governance boosts the emergence of a patronage system and corruption on the level of the elite. The greed for possible revenues and windfalls thereby triggers the competition for the respective disposition. The access controlled by only a few powerful stakeholders leads consequently to the unequal redistribution of revenues (ibid., Frankel, 2012: 19-21). On the other side, resources that are easy to extract and transport can transform into a source of funding for non-state armed groups and on top of that again for parts of the elite (Richter, 2012). The ground around the economic field of natural resources is thereby closely connected to the so-called markets of violence.

2.2.3 The Dimension of Markets of Violence

In context, the power of the elite to instrumentalize issues such as ethnicity gives an opportunity to trigger the outbreak of a conflict officially for one reason, while the actual background stays well hidden from the broad masses, internal as well as external. As repeatedly mentioned, economic issues thereby constitute a dominant factor and moreover have a high potential to turn into an outstanding driver for the continuation of a violent conflict. The competition for land and the access to valuable natural resources connected the

control over the respective revenues plays thereby an outstanding role, and dynamics seemingly become unstoppable when related to the alleged insuperable hostilities between different ethnic groups. If during the intensification of such conflict lines the legal institutions fail to sustain security and stability, *self-help* becomes the only apparent alternative for securization. This approach includes the use of violence in order to achieve justice and to secure the own needs and to supposedly defend against the other. Such situations can be referred to as *violence open areas*, which constitutes the precondition for what Georg Elwert (1999: 87, 95-96) describes as *markets of violence*. In the context of violence open areas, Artur Bogner identifies the ineffectiveness or absence of legal institutions on the side of the state as a reason for an increased need of social networks on the level of the civil society in order to complement exactly this lack of security. The compensation of the own vulnerability hence becomes a further boost for the affiliation with one side and the resulting transformation from a we-group to collective actors of ethnic cohesion (Eckert, 2004: 13). In this respect and related to the previous elaborations on the role of ideology for non-state armed groups, Elwert underlines that the grand scale economic dimension of markets of violence is not related to the visible fighters in the foreground, but to the stakeholders of the elite behind. Such actors, just like “[...] generals, princes, militia chiefs and party leaders” can be collectively referred to as *warlords* (Elwert et al., 1999: 86-87). Those actors then have “[...] a number of basic options ranging from theft to trade” in order to gain revenues: “These markets of violence exhibit a self-stabilized structure and owe their reproduction to a profit-oriented economic system which combines violence and trade as means of access to commodities“ (ibid.: 85-87). Even though initial decisions and approaches might be related to emotions, the pure economic interest behind and the process of optimization however is solely based on rational calculations. In this respect, Elwert identifies a *strategic triangle* that constitutes of violence, trade and time. These three reference points are not only prevalent to the decision making regarding the economic aims but they consequently determine the course and the progress of the conflict (ibid.: 87-88).

In order to maximize the revenues, the instrumentalization of ethnicity as conflict item thereby can be accounted as already a first strategic step. As elaborated, the evoked emotions based on latent conflicts attract volunteer fighters who provide their service without any claims for a salary (ibid.: 89). Such reliable allegiance is not only cheap, but a crucial for the support during the ongoing conflict and hence for the achievement of the goals of the warlords (ibid.: 93). Depending on the leading actors involved and their respective interests, the connection point of ethnicity can potentially again be subdivided into specific smaller fractions (Kreuzer, 2002: 11-12). However, an active involvement in the conflict can also be a rational necessity rather than an emotional choice, in particular during the continuing intensification of the conflict. The traditional economic system breaks down and the dominating violence generates additionally an atmosphere of fear, which undermines a traditional source of income and thus livelihood in various ways. Hence, being part of an armed group becomes an alleged assurance in terms of a sustained livelihood,

protection and consequently survival, which can attract even neutral outsiders within the civil society (Elwert et al., 1999: 89-90, 94). Thus, the conflict situation itself boosts the need for affiliation with one side and often moreover the active involvement. Such increase is very favorable for warlords, since the actual goal becomes more and more invisible, while the passive as well as active support grows.

On such basis, they can use their resources in term of violence to push through they business plans within the sphere of illegalities, like for example the “collection of ransoms, protection money, road tolls”, kidnapping, marauding, drug and weapon trade, illegal mining activities and the redirection and misuse of donations (ibid.: 87-91). Along the clear lines between friend and foe, moreover the identification of business- and trading partners comes into play, which requires at least an apparent atmosphere of safety, even though contracts do not constitute a guarantee of non-aggressions (ibid.: 94) The illicit gained access to natural resources can boost the emerging shadow economy to the surface and connects it to the legal market (ibid.: 87-91). In regard to the increasing accumulation of revenues, after violence and trade, time as the last part of the strategic triangle of conflict is another outstanding factor. It creates important opportunities to strengthen troops that were weakened during the conflict, and gives moreover the chance to restructure and reorganize as well as to reevaluate approaches and contacts and to generally adjust in respect to the developments of the conflict. Time gaps are predominantly created through peace negotiations and pacts of ceasefire, whereby the actual motivation is again hidden behind an alleged purpose of establishing peace and order (ibid.: 92). In this regard Elwert does not only account the non-state actors as stakeholders for the endurance of conflict, but draws a line to the state level stating that: “One plays for time, allows the non-aggression to be bought and then calls it taxation, duty or financing the peace process” (ibid.) On the other side can time also be used as a measurement to “[...] weaken or simply unnerve” the counterpart as military strategy (ibid.: 93).

3 The Mindanao Conflict

This chapter gives a brief overview of the Mindanao Conflict by initially discussing the conflict roots and the political context, which is then followed by a more detailed outline of the recent political developments. The elaborations are thereby related to the previous theoretical outline.

3.1 Historical Background and Context

This section discusses the background of the Mindanao conflict, whereby the first part elaborates upon the historic context and the role of external actors, while the second part focusses on the internal sphere and developments in the conflict affected areas in relation to the overall context.

3.1.1 Conflict Roots

Since the 14th century had the territory of what was to become the Philippines been highly influenced by Islam brought through Arab traders. The contact had an impact on the religious as well as on the political life and shaped the emergence of different Muslim ethnicities and sultanates in the region. The well-established system however experienced an abrupt disruption with the arrival of the Spanish in the 16th century. The Spanish colonial rule marked the beginning of enforced conversion from Islam to Catholicism, whereby remaining Muslims who dared to defy were collectively defamed as *Moros* (Spanish word for Muslim). Only the southernmost island of the Philippines, Mindanao, proved constant resistance against the invader throughout the 300 years of power. The locals of Mindanao thereby do not only consist of Muslim tribes, but moreover of eighteen indigenous tribes, that are collectively referred to as *Lumad* (Brown, 2011: 2-3, 17, Adriano and Parks, 2013: XIII, 12, Tan, 2007: 226). The Muslim tribes that predominantly shaped the landscape of Mindanao till today are the *Maguindanao* ('people of the flooded plain') around the areas of North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat and the Maguindanao provinces, the *Maranao* ('people of the lake') from the area of Lanao ('lake'), *Tausug* ('people of the current' or 'brave people') from the Sulu islands, Tawi-Tawi, Palawan, Zamboanga and Sabah (Malaysia) and *Iranun/ Ilanon* that are also spread over Lanao del Sur as well as Maguindanao areas. Other Muslim tribes are the *Sama* and *Badjao*, that are prevalently known as "sea-gypsies", as well as the *Yakan*, *Molbog*, *Kolibugan*, *Sangil* and *Kalagan* (see also Annex 1.1).

Each tribe has an own language, whereby the languages of Maguindanao, Iranun and Maranao show similarities. In this context, traces of interconnection of the Maguindanao sultanate and the Iranun tribe can be moreover found in history. The Maranao are the largest Muslim ethnicity and are considered as the direct descendants of the 'royalty'. Supposedly most of the powerful and wealthy families derive from this ethnic group, that is moreover said to be the most traditional one. The name Tausug indeed reaches back to pre-Islam times, whereby the respective tribe adapted Islam and the respective system, which led eventually to the Sulu sultanate (CPRM, 2004).

In 1898 the US took over the colonial rule in the Philippines and signed a first peace treaty with Sultan Jamalul Kiram II of Sulu, which made the situation for Mindanao and its inhabitants initially seem promising. But the alleged settlement on the level of ethnic matters just shifted slowly but surely the controversy towards a new interest, Mindanao's wealth in natural resources (Adriano and Parks, 2013: 12, Brown, 2011: 4-7). Apart from the countries broad coastlines, maritime life and the diverse flora and fauna especially Mindanao shows vast fertile and arable lands as well as rich mineral deposits. The Philippines rank fifth in the world in terms of total mineral reserves, and in detail third in terms of gold reserves, fourth in terms of available copper, and fifth in terms of nickel deposits (PH-EITI, 2014: 41). Till then the lands

had been traditionally held communally between Muslim and Lumad tribes, and the exploitation was limited to agricultural cultivation for personal needs. But the US was very well aware of the still unrevealed treasures and started to occupy land, which caused already a first outbreak of armed fights between the colonial power and the sultanate. Eventually after three years of ongoing confrontations, the US eventually managed to force the persistent province under the control of the central government (Adriano and Parks, 2013: 12, Brown, 2011: 4-7). Suddenly the issue of religion was brought up again and a “Bureau for non-Christian” tribes was established, while the government already undertook first investments in land explorations in areas actually held by the Muslim and Lumad communities. Overtaking the land was essential for the US, since apart from the economic potential, the exploitations created new job opportunities for Christian Filipinos from the rest of the country, that faced an emerging crisis of unemployment (Brown, 2011: 4-7, Tan, 2007: 227).

The colonialization of the Philippines thus caused a first split of the population among those parts who became Catholic and those who remained Muslim, which drew an invisible line between Mindanao and the rest of the Philippines, yet without consequences. Triggered by the new revealed interest of the US, the influx of internal migrants to Mindanao caused then increasing visible tensions between the groups. The situation aggravated even more when the resettlement politics were again augmented after the Philippine’s independence in 1946. Due to the rapidly increasing (Catholic) population did available land in Mindanao become a highly disputed good in less than thirty years. In this regard, Christians could officially claim land that had been traditionally held by Muslims, but without documentation (Adriano and Parks, 2013: 12). The strong influx caused furthermore a significant shift in terms of religious representation in the province. By the year 2000 did the percentage of Muslims in Mindanao shrank from 90% to only 8% (Grabowski and Reese, 2006: 206, Tan, 2007: 225). The natives of Mindanao hence faced a multi-fronted repression through the dispossession of their own land and hence the loss of livelihoods due to the presence of Christian Filipinos that moreover became the local majority. Till today Muslims as well as Lumad have been pushed back to a few core regions, while the major part of Mindanao is inhabited by Christians. Moreover, the natives were denied access to the emerging market around land exploitations and natural resources. Triggered by the competition of scarce land on one side and the unequal, or rather absent access and the redistribution of revenues from available resources on the other side, the line between friend and foe was clearly set along the lines of main religious differences between Muslims and Christians. The ongoing discrimination and rising tensions lead to first confrontations and a raising demand for autonomy and self-determination for Muslim Mindanao (Brown, 2011: 9).

The accumulated frustration eventually found a first peak after several incidences in the late 1960s. After centuries of discriminations events suddenly started overturning. The *Corregidor Incident*, or *Jadibah*

massacre in 1968 thereby is a deceive trigger. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) held a secret military training related to the territorial claim over Sabah, Malaysia, which used to be part of the Sulu Sultanate before it was annexed by the British in the 19th century (Adriano and Parks, 2013: 13). Due to the ethnic relation (in particular to the tribe of Tausug), the Muslim participants of the training were suspected to be informants and were eventually killed by their Christian officers. The incident caused severe tensions with Malaysia and had furthermore far reaching consequences for the internal security. The then governor of Cotabato responded with the rather unremarkable Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM), whereas 92 young Muslim men from Sulu and Mindanao joined a training with the Royal Malaysian Special Forces. One of the participants, Nur Misuari, later on founded the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), an insurgency aiming at a separate Muslim state in Mindanao. He called for a “Moro ethnic nationalism” through which he managed to connect the Muslim population throughout all ethnic differences as Moros. The developments entailed violent outbreaks between the Muslim and Christian population in Mindanao, whereby the latter group was backed by the AFP while the MNLF received support from Libya and the Chief Minister of Sabah. The situation escalated to a large-scale war and spread over different provinces of Mindanao (Brown, 2011: 9, Tan, 2007: 229). In relation to the previous elaborations, state institutions did not only fail to sustain security, but they were actively involved in the destabilization of the situation and through the Jadibah massacre turned into the origin of threat. The overtaking spirit of self-help was thereby not only an internal movement but furthermore supported by external actors like Malaysia and Libya as well as several other Muslim countries. The high degree of professionalization pushed through the military training and equipment on one side as well as the active involvement of the AFP on the side of the Christians lead to a considerable degree of professionalization, which caused a violence open area with a considerable level of intensity.

Not until 1976 did the government under then President Ferdinand Marcos and the MNLF agree on participating in peace talks, which eventually took place in Tripoli under the observation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). To be taken into account thereby is the point of time as part of the strategic triangle after Elwert (1999: 92), since just before the MNLF lost its connections to Malaysia, which weakened the group decisively. On the other side, the government had to rethink the strategy, since the lasting operations of the AFP were a considerable cost factor and the president furthermore feared restrictions on the oil trade with Middle Eastern countries (Adriano and Parks, 2013: 13). The final ceasefire agreement from 1976 indeed contemplated the creation of an autonomous Muslim region in Mindanao, but it was clearly beneficial for the state, especially in terms of the highly contested land access and related resource revenues. However, the MNLF leadership still approved the deal and therefore suffered a severe loss of reputation and credibility within the own rows. The disappointment of the members led consequently to the breakaway of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1984. The splinter group was founded by

the previous MNLF Vice Chairman Hashim Salamat, who shifted emphasis on the religious aspect of the separatist movement. The MILF's objective was not a separate state for Muslims, but an Islamic state. This splintering triggered a division along ethnical lines into mainly Tausug under the MNLF and Maguindanao as well as Maranao under the MILF (Adriano and Parks, 2013: 13, Tan, 2007: 229-230, Brown, 2011: 11).

Indeed, the dynamic of more radical (and/or more criminal) splinter groups can also be observed during later peace negotiations. This led to the emergence of the so-called Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the late nineties under the previous MNLF member Abdurajal Abubakar Janjalani, who previously fought on the sides of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and helped to establish a smaller cell in the Philippines (Tan, 2007: 233). However, the main activities of the ASG can be identified to be of "anti-Christian" nature, which led to bombings of churches and public spaces of Christian dominated areas. Indeed, a report of International Alert draws connection from one of the founders to the national police of the central state, which leads to "[...] speculations, that the group was set up by the military to discredit the Moro cause", considering that the main involvement has been connected to kidnapping, arm smuggling and logging (Concepcion et al., 2003: 11). In 2011 the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) emerged as a breakaway from the MILF, followed by the Maute group, which reportedly has links to the Islamic State (IS) (Stanford University, 2015b, TRAC, 2017).

3.1.2 Rido

Especially the splintering from the MNLF into the MILF shows that dependent on the situation, the collective Moro identity had worked against the state but was never fully reached on the micro level. The incidences in the 1980ies caused a significant backshift from the collective identity towards the own ethnic tribes, families as well as clan memberships (Kreuzer, 2005: I). In this context, the increased occurrence of rido became a conflict line on the community level additional to the intrastate war on the subnational base, which created a "multidimensional system of violence" (ibid.). In fact, till today rido are accounted as the major source of violence and hence the main reason for internal displacement in the region (Kreuzer, 2005: I-III, 16, 23, International Alert, 2014: 2, Lara and Champain, 2009: 10). The role of local sway and power thereby is the decisive factor, since it comes with the control over land and the respective access to natural resources. Local powerful families instrumentalize violence whenever they see their power at risk. The dimension of violence however is not limited to the assassination of the counterpart. In fact, local elites hold private armies that nowadays reach numbers of several thousand soldiers and moreover are legal institution of police or military infiltrated with clan members. In addition, clans and members of the Moro

insurgencies are often connected if not related by blood. Hence even relatively small-scale arguments can indeed develop into a large-scale outbreak of violence (Co et al., 2013: 67, cf. International Alert, 2014: 2, 28, Kreuzer, 2005: II-III). In this regard Kreuzer (2011: I-III) suggests that this dynamic is rooted in the “pre Islamic social order” of the *Datu system* (monarchical leader) and the related violence as mechanisms of social control, whereby the recent level and extend of violence shows a significant increase. It reveals that Muslim elites in Mindanao that eventually managed to “[...] capture a place for themselves in the national system of patronage” after centuries of discrimination and decades of violence. They persistently hold onto their power and try to expand it whenever possible. In this respect, the rivalry about land and resources is one visible level, but moreover to be taken into consideration are the emerging markets of violence. The clans as local strongmen or warlords in Mindanao are involved in the illegal trade with drugs and weapons, in the informal land market, unlicensed mining activities and informal credit provisions and moreover in kidnappings for ransom. The field is thereby not exclusively dominated by Muslim clans, but the Mindanao and the Philippines in general show such dynamics on the sides of the Christian population (International Alert, 2014: 1-3, Gutierrez, 2013:120, Lara and Champain, 2009: 15). In this context, International Alert concludes: “In tandem with the central state, the powerful Muslim and Christian clans and the leaders of the [Moro insurgencies] must share part of the blame for the lingering violence [...]” (Lara and Champain, 2009: 13).

3.2 Overview: Past Peace Processes

The structures of internal conflicts are complex by nature, and the interconnectedness of the different dimensions adds decisively to that. As the example of the Mindanao conflict shows, the high fragmentation of real life scenarios requires a highly inclusive approach when it comes to peace efforts, which accounts for the roots, dimensions, involved actors as well as the civil society. As already elaborated in the theoretical part, warlords and the emergence of markets of violence are thereby a crucial hurdle since peace negotiations can be a strategic step to create time. In the case of Mindanao, moreover, the phenomenon of rido constitutes an additional outstanding obstacle and in this regard the interconnectedness of insurgency groups, clans and politics, which not only leads to a well-established system of patronage, but also to a system of mutual cover. In fact, it seems that the local elites as well as the state profit from the ongoing conflict that they are supposed to settle, while the affected civil society remains excluded of the peace process. One can assume that the powerful stakeholders of the conflict do not only go together in the abyss, but in fact they are the ones to keep each other alive as long as everyone takes a share in profiting from the orchestrated struggle. Indeed, the following outline of the different efforts to settle the conflict in Mindanao after the Tripoli agreement thereby constitute repeating examples of the failure of peace processes and a

back and forth shifting without a permanent stabilization of the situation. The actual efforts are thereby the only observable part, while the underlying interests of each side remains hidden and can only be speculated about. Thereby the public presentation of events can in fact be unreliable, depending on clans and politicians in power and their ability to let their goals “[...] disappear behind the violence of civil war”. This refers to the possibility to legitimize and lobby for the own businesses while defaming competitors officially as rebels (Kreuzer, 2005: III), which hampers the observation and thus the analysis and evaluation of peace attempts crucially.

After the peace agreement between the Marcos regime and the MNLF, which led to the breakaway of the MILF and caused rising tensions, the talks to the government were basically put on ice until the dictator was forced into exile after the People Power Revolution in 1986. What followed was a new constitution that limited the presidential term to a non-extendible period of six years (Choi, 2001: 489-491). This tight timeframe in turn led to a considerable time pressure for the following administrations and their peace efforts, since there was no guarantee that the next procedures would be continued in the same manner after the end of a term.

Corazon Aquino, the widow of Marcos former opponent, became the first president after the dictator. She assured Misuari her willingness to collaborate with the MNLF, even though both Moro groups had agreed on joint peace talks. Aquino nevertheless kept up an exclusive approach and thereby underestimated completely the concurrent gained importance of the MILF. With a continuing ignorance, the government enforced an own idea of an Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), which was strongly rejected by the MNLF as well as by the MILF (Brown, 2011:13, Tan, 2007: 231). The president nominated representatives from the civil society as a Regional Consultative Committee that was responsible for drafting the legislation for the ARMM, excluding both of the Moro insurgencies. The region was to be established after a referendum in 1989, that allowed 13 provinces and nine cities within to either vote for or against the inclusion in the autonomous region. In fact, most of the leading politicians in the respective areas were Christians and thus only four provinces and none of the cities voted in favor of becoming a part of the ARMM in 1990 (Concepcion et al., 2003: 11). The newly established body was then severely criticized for barely taking any impact on the improvement on the general situation of the impoverished society and hence was rather seen as a new “[...] layer of bureaucracy, providing positions, privilege and opportunities for graft to Moro politicians” (ibid.). The situation further on tensed up when the Aquino administration failed to tackle the issue of land access and the distribution of wealth through the so called Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Package. The supposedly original purpose was to redistribute land from the rich to the poor population but the actual effect was indeed highly beneficial for commercial companies and multinationals (Brown, 2011: 20).

The rather unsuccessful and unsatisfying process of Aquino was eventually taken over by the next government under Fidel Ramos. Ramos agreed on a territory and power expansion of the previously established ARMM, but he also excluded the MILF from the negotiations. Moreover, he was severely criticized by Christian politicians from Mindanao who feared restrictions and losses within their own power. Nevertheless, the government and the MNLF signed the Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement in 1996, which made Misuari the new governor of the revised ARMM (Brown, 2011:14, Bell and Utley, 2015: 2). His performance however is described as incompetent and highly corrupt. International Alert thereby elaborates that the administration indeed “[...] created conditions for the persistence of rebellion-related violence” (Lara and Champain, 2009: 11). A crucial factor thereby was the lack of effective command over the local institutions to maintain security, such as the police and armed forces, which undermined a monopoly of violence on the community level (cf. *ibid.*). Anyways, Ramos’ approach is less seen as peace attempt but rather as effort for “short-term economic goals”, since the decline of violence allowed him to “[...] undertake fiscal and economic reforms aimed at controlling growth in expenditures and a refocusing of resources towards economic priorities [...]” (*ibid.*). The outcome of the revised ARMM additionally did still not correspond with the initial claims of the MNLF, which again led to a high degree of discontent among members. A big number consequently defected to the MILF (Brown, 2011: 14, Tan, 2007: 232). During the increasing disappointment in Mindanao, the ASG emerged and crucially shaped the landscape with a more radical and criminal form of rebellion (Tan, 2007: 233). The remaining MNLF eventually denounced its own founder and deposed him, yet did Misuari stay in office until 2001 (Brown, 2011: 14, Tan, 2007: 232). For four more years the ARMM stayed under the control of the MNLF, then under Parouk Hussin who previously served as the chief foreign aide. The power then was shifted to powerful family dynasties that were related to the MNLF or MILF. The developments significantly shaped the political landscape and opened up a new stage for *rido*, which amongst others has led to an increase of violence every election year (Unso, 2013, Lara and Champain, 2009: 15).

Ramos’ unpopular successor Joseph Estrada did not feel committed to the previously signed peace agreement. In April 2000, he started an “all-out-war” and caused thereby one of the peaks of violence in Mindanao (Adriano and Parks, 2013: 14). Under his command, the MILF camps were attacked even though they housed a significant number of civilian buildings, which were equally perceived as “[...] military targets and subjected to indiscriminate bombardment” (Concepcion et al., 2003: 13-14). In response, the MILF declared officially a *jihad* (holy war) against the central state. Indeed, due to earlier incidences and a major kidnapping undertaken by the ASG, the major part of the Filipino Christians supported Estrada’s drastic approach while the affected civil society in Mindanao stood against it in isolation (*ibid.*: 14). The trigger for the outbreak of the war is thereby related to different factors, whereby one is connected to the

presence of natural resources in the territory that was held by the MILF and the need to clear respective lands:

“The seven camps acknowledged by the government represented an area of 451,700 hectares of potential agricultural land, and included the oil and natural gas deposits of the Liguasan Marsh. In August 2000, a month after the fall of Camp Abubakar, Agrarian Reform Secretary Horacio Morales told reporters in Davao City that the government was considering development of Moro lands, including those ravaged by the war, into cash crop plantations through joint ventures with foreign companies” (Concepcion et al., 2003: 14).

Even though the president received support in this regard, he was removed from office in 2001 before the end of his term due to the rejection of his overall political practices and the high degree of corruption. The next administration under Gloria Macapagal Arroyo took over (Adriano and Parks, 2013: 14, Brown, 2011: 15-17).

The newly elected president turned against the precursor and restarted talks under the spirit of an “all-out-peace” approach, this time exclusively with the MILF. However, after the incidences of ‘terror attacks’ on September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington, the president assured her support for the international war on terrorism according to the design of then US president George W. Bush Jr., which led to the increase of military presence and influence of US in the Philippines as well as to the official definition of the MILF and the ASG as ‘terrorist organization’. In addition, the Philippine military received more funds and training from the previous colonial power (Concepcion et al., 2003: 15). After several actions undertaken by the US military aimed at the newly listed terror groups of the Philippines, peace negotiations between the government of the Philippines and the MILF eventually broke down completely in 2003. The official reason therefore were alleged links between the MILF to Al-Qaeda (ibid., Adriano and Parks, 2013: 14). It took until 2008 that a new agreement was drafted, the so-called Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). For the first time, the issue of land disputes was included. The agreement adjudicated more autonomy to the MILF including the division of management and revenues of the highly contested resources. However, Christian politicians in Mindanao again feared restrictions and petitioned successfully at the Supreme Court in Manila pillorying such autonomy as being unconstitutional (cf. Brown, 2011: 15-17, Adriano and Parks, 2013: 15). Indeed, at the same time also Muslim clans were involved in the failure of the MOA-AD, since it constituted a risk to their control over territory (Lara and Champain, 2009: 17-18). Hence not only the disappointment directed at the central state caused another massive violent outbreak, but the lingering violence can be identified as a tool for the local elite in order to maintain the power and control.

3.3 Recent Developments

This chapter puts emphasis on the recent political developments in the Philippines. The first part discusses the last peace process under Benigno Aquino III, and the failure of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) in 2016, and the second part focusses on the following election period in regard to the eventually newly elected president, Rodrigo Roa Duterte.

3.3.1 The Peace Process under President Benigno Aquino III

When Benigno Aquino III took office in 2010, he announced a final peace deal as being on his prioritized agenda. Yet were the disillusioning experiences from the past and the high level of distrust a crucial obstacle to restart peace talks. It took another two years and 32 rounds of negotiations until the so-called framework agreement on *Bangsamoro* (FAB) (Bangsamoro = Moro nation (Cagoco-Guiam, 2013: 15)) was signed between the Philippine government and the MILF, whereas the MNLF remained excluded. Malaysia and the established International Contact Group Mindanao (ICGM) served as mediators to facilitate the communication between the hardened fronts. In 2014 the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) followed, wherein the parties agreed on a revision of the ARMM aiming at a more autonomous political body called Bangsamoro under the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) (ICG, 2012: 2-4, cf. Heyadrian, 2015: 4). Different political bodies were established to enhance the process and MILF agreed for the first time on forming a political party. The newly formed United Bangsamoro Justice Party was to take part in the elections for a Bangsamoro government (Herbolzheimer, 2015: 2-6, cf. Fisas, 2015: 164-166). Both sides showed a comparatively high level of willingness for a change and the initial situation seemed promising and gave new hope to finally stabilize the situation in the conflict torn areas. However, also this peace process was eventually disrupted by major incidences that undermined its success.

In the first place, the course of the restarted peace talks caused discontent within the rows of the MILF and eventually led to another breakaway of the BIFF and the Maute group (Stanford University, 2015b, TRAC, 2017). The emergence of these further splinter groups led to a higher fragmentation of the conflict and sources of violence and thereby added decisively to the complexity, considering that the commitments amongst official negotiation partners did no account for other separatist groups that act beyond their control (Dalangin-Fernandez, 2016). These dynamics in fact caused a national security crisis in 2013 when Misuari and supporters from the side of the MNLF attacked Zamboanga City trying to enforce an own independence. The ASG as well as the BIFF responded with additional attacks which turned the area into a war zone and led to “[...] one of the largest military operations in Mindanao since Estradas ‘all-out war’” (Heyadrian, 2015: 5). The developments caused a rising distrust among the official negotiation partners and were a significant hurdle for the peace process.

The final setback however is attributed to the so-called Mamasapano tragedy that took place on January 25, 2015. So far, the exact circumstances have not been clarified, but what is known is that in the one-day encounter 44 members of the elite Special Action Force (SAF) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) were killed by members of the MILF while persecuting two suspected terrorists wanted by the US (Operation Exodus). Around eighteen MILF and five BIFF members lost their lives besides an unclarified number of civilians. It has not been confirmed if fighters of the BIFF had also been coordinated under the MILF and in how far the US was directly involved.¹ However, consequently a number of legislators withdrew for the peace process (Heyadrian, 2015: 5-6, N.N., 2015). While all parties accused each other of violating the ceasefire, clashes went on until December 2015 and stopped only weeks before the BBL was to be filed to the Congress (Mallari, 2015, Fernandez, 2015). Additionally, the peace agreement itself became a target of critique and was declared as being unconstitutional. In this respect, already in 2012, the International Crisis Group (ICG) stated that the Aquino government was aware of a required change of the constitution in order to achieve the final peace deal, whereas the administration had ensured that the agreed-on provisions were no obstacle to the process (Fisas, 2015: 166, ICG, 2012: 13). The reopened discussions and all-over delays led to a considerable time pressure of finalizing the BBL before the end of Aquino's term. Only three weeks were left for amendments on the final draft excluding further approval and measures of implementation (Yap, 2016, Porcalla 2016). The BBL was eventually given up even before the final session of the Congress, a presumption that was to become true on February 4, 2016, which led again to increasing tensions and armed confrontations in the ARMM (Hegina, 2016, Santos 2016, Porcalla, 2016).

3.3.2 The New President: Rodrigo Roa Duterte

Facing the upcoming elections chief negotiator Miriam Coronel - Ferrer declared the CAB as a binding document that would assure a continuation of the peace process under the new government. However almost all of the presidential candidates remained hesitant (Clapano, 2016a, Maitem et al., 2016, Clapano, 2016b, Calica, 2016, Dizon, 2016, Sabillo, 2016, Santos 2016). This did not account for the populist candidate Duterte, who visited the MILF Camp Darapanan (Maguindanao) as the first presidential candidate ever at the end of February 2016. He met the group under MILF's first Vice Chair Ghazali Jaafar, who already then called him the "next president" in front of his comrades. Duterte assured them, that if he

¹ Since 2000 a military corps of 500-600 men is based on the island of Jolo as part of the Joint Special Operation Task Force – Philippines (JSOTF – P). The external actor did not only overtake consulting task, but has been reportedly actively involved in several incidences (Lum and Dolven, 2014: 14).

became the president, he would push the BBL through the congress and create path for federalism (Cabrera, 2016, CNN Ph, 2016).

Duterte managed to establish an image of himself as an ordinary fellowman unlike the usual politician. He likes to present himself as an outsider against the establishment and political elite, even though over generations several members of his family have been involved into politics. What puts him into a unique position however are his personal origins from Mindanao and further on family ties to Muslims. This distinguished him distinctively not only from his current opponents, but from previous presidential candidates as well. Before running for the presidential office, Duterte had been the mayor of Davao for over twenty years. Thus, throughout the time the ARMM and conflict torn areas were his direct neighbor. His time in office was thereby characterized by controversial issues including amongst others the so-called Davao death squads, a group committing extrajudicial killings of suspected criminals, especially those related to drugs. Duterte has often been linked to such activities but there was allegedly never enough evidence for a persecution. Besides that, he mandated one of the strictest legislations of the entire country within his sphere of power. This reached from a public smoking and alcohol ban over early closing time for bars to video control in the streets, what supposedly made Davao the safest place in the Philippines. His official approach and the unclarified links or rather command over the death squads have strengthened the image of Duterte as “The Punisher”, also nicknamed as “Duterte Harry” and during the election time symbolized as a clenched fist with “DU30” written on it (see also Annex 1.2) (Mogato and Lema, 2016, Aljazeera, 2016, Paddock, 2016, Cabrera, 2016, Peel, 2017). As a comparison, Benigno Aquino III has commonly been referred to as “Noynoy”, “Abnoy” (as indirectness to abnormal) or “Minion” related to alleged similarities to the respective comic figure (see also Annex 1.3). Duterte used this stance to present himself as the one to tackle not only the issue of the Mindanao conflict, but also the multiple other internal and external problems of the Philippines based on his success in Davao. His approach was thereby highly acknowledged by the MILF leadership (Aljazeera, 2016). His direct offensive language and intimidations thereby became his signature to appear as a fearless leader without self-interest. In this manner, he told the MILF that if he would fail to convince the congress of passing the BBL: “I will separate. I will lead a movement or be a follower in that movement to separate from the entire Republic of the Philippines. We’re being made a fool” (CNN Ph, 2016).

Dutertes visit in Darapanan was not the last one in the ARMM during his election campaign, and he successfully continued to find connections to the Moro community as well as to the Lumad of Mindanao. His established reputation based on his origins and past therefore were a clear booster he knew how to use. He stated amongst others that with him “[...] one foot of the Moro [was] already in *Malacañang*”

(presidential residency in Manila) (Cabrera, 2016), which in return brought him the deep appreciation of the MILF, that officially described him as “a true son of Mindanao” (ibid., Basman and Rood, 2016).

Duterte approached the MILF and furthermore the MNLF, Misuari and leaders from Lumad communities stating that a successful peace agenda needs to be inclusive towards all groups willingly to establish peace. Thereby he drew a clear line between the Moro insurgencies and what he describes as uncontrollable terrorist groups and criminals. He further on officially acknowledged the historical injustice and the still ongoing unfair wealth distribution undertaken by the Philippine state. Additional to such accusations of the administration and the turn towards the rights of Muslim and Lumad against the Christian majority was further boosted through verbal attacks against the Christian church and priests (Mellejor, 2016, Gutierrez, 2016, Cabrera, 2016, CNN Ph, 2016). Duterte thereby managed to touch the sensitive spot of the ethnic issue and the respective historical injustice, while avoiding the topic of clans and the shadow economy as one outstanding obstacle to sustainable peace.

Soon after the elections on May 9, 2016 it was clear that Duterte was leading the polls. From an above-average election turnout of 81.6 %, Duterte received over 38% of the votes. His support-base was widely spread over the entire Philippines and especially in the ARMM he had a considerable lead (Basman and Rood, 2016, Aljazeera, 2016, Paddock, 2016, Arguillas, 2016). On June 30, 2016, he was inaugurated as the new President of the Philippines. Besides a priest, also an Imam and a Lumad representative were part of the ceremony for the first time in history. During his speech, he addressed the topic of Mindanao stating that his “[...] administration is committed to implement all signed peace agreements in step with constitutional and legal reforms” (Duterte, 2016). For the first time, the president does not stay in the Malacañang palace, but Duterte commutes between his appointments in Manila and his permanent settlement in Davao. Those circumstances cause a shift in the perception of traditional power structures of the superior center and the minor periphery, which becomes particularly important for the support within the provincial provinces of the Philippines. Symbolically the province rules the center. However, Duterte’s first month in office was mainly characterized by a controversial harsh approach against drug crimes all over the Philippines. The first thirty days of his administration already claimed over 300 victims, which caused severe internal as well as external criticism. In regard to the Mindanao conflict he set a unilateral ceasefire agreement, but no agenda considering on when he plans to restart the process (GMA, 2016).

4 Conflict and Migration

On the basis of the previous elaborations, this chapter discusses migrant movements triggered by the conflict. In this regard, the first part focusses on the internal displacement related to the situation in Mindanao, whereby the second part puts emphasis on internal migration as consequence of the internal conflict and repeated internal displacement.

4.1 Internal Displacement

As previously identified, likewise the reasons of conflict, the sources of violence in Mindanao are multilateral and interrelated and indeed have turned into the driver and justification for the continuance. The ongoing conflict has severe consequences for the civil society and led to more than 120,000 deaths till 2015 and forced an even higher number into internal displacement, especially in the peak times of violence. Older generations of the conflict torn areas do not even remember how often they already had to evacuate (Herbolzheimer, 2015: 1, Bück, 2012: 106-108). In this context, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement define that

“[...] internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human – made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border” (UNCHR, 2013: 2).²

Internal displacement is triggered by a direct threat that forces the affected civil society to immediately leave their homes and belongings behind. The definition however does not imply a special legal status like for refugees (that cross the state border) and consequently there are no legal obligations for the state to provide special assistance or protection, which commonly leads to a high level of involvement of international organizations (Mooney, 2005: 10-14).

In relation to the Mindanao conflict, the World Bank and the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) count only for the times of Estrada’s “all-out war” as well as during the outbreak of violence after the failure of the MOA-AD each time nearly a million internal displaced persons (IDPs) in the affected areas of

² The conflict torn areas in Mindanao experience additionally cases of severe floods and landslides, which by 2015 caused the displacement of an estimated 119,427 persons (Bell, 2011: 5, UNCHR, 2015: 15).

Mindanao, whereby a study covering Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Lanao del Norte, North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City revealed that 30% of the cases faced protracted displacement that endured over a year (Bell, 2011: 2). The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimated in 2015 a number of approximately 58,742 IDPs or counted as 11,384 families only in Maguindanao and North Cotabato provinces (IOM, 2015). The official numbers and statistics however have to be handled carefully, since not all individuals seek shelter in official evacuation camps. A considerable amount stays unregistered and settles with family or friends resident to safer areas or informal displacement sites (Coletta, 2010: 4). Apart from the voluntary decision to do so, evacuation camps can simply be too far and/or the access hindered through ongoing battles along the way (UNCHR, 2015: 6). In the Philippines IDPs are commonly referred to as *bakwit*, which is assumed to derive from the word “evacuate”, which gets transformed due to the local pronunciation (ACFJ, 2017). Maguindanao accounts as the most affected area of violence and faces consequently the highest numbers of displacement, which led to even more sordid levels of poverty in the region (see also Annex 1.4) (Bell, 2011: 6-7).

As outlined, forced displacement implies the immediate escape, which does not allow IDPs to plan the evacuation to any extent nor to take (a considerable part of) their belongings. The chaotic scenarios can moreover pull families apart, which causes severe risks for the most vulnerable, especially women and children. Isolation and the risk to face dispossession or destruction of lands, and their home and the loss of crops and cattle as well as personal assets leaves IDPS consequently under considerable stress during the dislocation (Lakhani, 2013: 4, Mooney, 2005: 15). Some IDPs in Mindanao reportedly try to stay close to their farms and continue their work in order to secure their livelihood for after the return, even though they expose themselves to the high risk of the ongoing violence. This is especially the case in repeated experiences of displacement and loss. They either settle down in informal evacuation sites close by or return to the official evacuation camps at night while staying in their farms during the day (UNCHR, 2015: 13). This is furthermore triggered through inefficient relief assistance by the government as well as mistargeted projects of international organizations (Coletta, 2010: 3).

Being forced to leave home and life behind, IDPs find themselves commonly in overcrowded evacuation camps. The life inside such camps is characterized by the general fears, food insecurities and moreover worrying levels of hygienic standards. Poor sanitation and the lack of clean water in combination with scarce or absent medical treatment in a hot and humid environment commonly lead to the outbreak of epidemics such as cholera or tuberculosis, which have severe consequences especially for older generations or young children and already sick individuals (Bell, 2011: 4, Mooney, 2005: 17). Hence, IDP camps hold sad records of diseases, malnutrition and casualties (IRIN, 2009).

Women and children constitute the major part of IDPs and as already mentioned belong to the most vulnerable group. The risks for children are multidimensional. In the first place, displacement implies a severe disruption of the overall development and comes furthermore with a poor access to education. Thereby additionally the factors of protracted as well as repeated displacement augment the impact even beyond the evacuation for the future life (Mooney, 2005: 15-17, Bell, 2011: 4). In 2013 the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) revealed in their Humanitarian Action Plan for Mindanao that the ongoing displacement disrupted minimum 60% of the classes for children in the ARMM, which in turn meant 18 months out of 30 months were without schooling. The repeated disruptions cause that a lot of children are “over-age” for their level of schooling. In 2013, 42,076 children at the age of 13 or older were still in primary school. Additionally, a significant number never returned back to school, which led to a drop out of 86 % of the children in Lanao del Sur (OCHA, 2013: 34). The survey of the World Bank and WFP mentioned above reveals moreover that in the respective areas: “[...] one in four head of households had no formal education or did not complete primary education”, which undermines opportunities over generations (Bell, 2011: 4, 9). The severe disruptions in education and the augmented lack of future perspective in the conflict torn areas reportedly cause that becoming a member of armed groups has become indeed an attractive opportunity for the young generation (OCHA, 2013: 34).

The precarious financial situation of IDPs forces them frequently to sell the last pieces of their personal belongings that were not lost or destroyed during the conflict or even parts of their food aid. The items however are often sold decisively under price (Lakhani, 2013: 9). Another side effect of long-lasting internal conflicts and repeated internal displacement is the lack of legal documentation, that might either have been destroyed, lost, confiscated or in regard to children born during the conflict, simply never issued (ibid.).

Furthermore, especially girls and young women face the risk of human trafficking and forced prostitution within and outside of the Philippines, whereby traffickers are not only external actors but also relatives who use their victims as financial ‘resources’ (Cagoco-Guiam, 2013: iii, 7-8).

Apart from the physiological impact moreover psychological problems and resulting identity issues are a common consequence for the affected individuals (ibid.: 6), which Erin Mooney (2005: 17) relates to:

“[...] massive loss not only of commodities such as the home, income, land or other forms of property, but also of less tangible symbolic goods, such as cultural heritage, friendship and a sense of belonging to a particular place. [...] impoverishment, social isolation, exclusion from health, welfare and education provision, the breakdown of social relationships and support structures and the undermining of authority structures and social roles.”

In this regard, it is suggested that displacement affects men and women differently. Rufa Cagoco-Guam (2013: ii) thereby points out, that in many cases men “[...] disappear from the public sphere” already before to join the fight as rebels, as members of the clans or on the side of government forces, which puts the women under pressure to assume additionally the role of their men while remaining the nurturing part of the family. Even though women thereby access possibilities that was previously limited to men, Cagoco-Guam does not identify such developments as empowerment but in the overall context rather as additional burden.

The severe situations in the evacuation camps and the psychological impact of displacement triggers a wide spread longing to return home among IDPs to continue their normal lives (UNCHR, 2015: 7). However as already indicated, also if the threat is over, people are not able to return back to the life that they had left before. According to the investigations of the World Bank and WFP, IDPs that return to their original home remain almost as vulnerable as during the displacement (Bell, 2011: 3). In the case of internal conflicts, the civil society is still exposed to the risk of a renewed outbreak of violence. Furthermore, they face problems due to the underdevelopment or destruction of infrastructure, which undermines continuously the access to health services as well as education (ibid.: 4, 9). Additionally, after the displacement many returnees face losses of assets through dispossessions or destruction of their previous held land and possessions, which is again augmented by the high degree of lacking documentation of ownership (ibid.: 3-4, 10-13, Mooney, 2005: 17)³. In this respect, it is hard to determine the actual end of displacement, since according to the official definition the return has to “[...] occur voluntarily and in ‘safety and dignity’”, which implies the protection of discrimination and the equal access to public services as well as assistance in recovering and compensations for destroyed or dispossessed property as a result of displacement (Mooney, 2005: 22).

4.2 Internal Migration and Migrant Networks

The situation in Mindanao is not only determined by occurring clashes as direct threats, but the ongoing conflict and the resulting instability undermines the economic and social development decisively, which leads to a lack of job opportunities, a low level of income, and has moreover severe consequences for the sectors of health and education. As previously outlined, the most affected areas are Central- and West-Mindanao, whereby in particular the ARMM accounts as one of the poorest provinces of the Philippines (Bück, 2012: 100-103). Underlining the impact of the conflict in an expressive manner, Maike Grabowski

³ During the survey of the World Bank and WFP, a considerable number of land owners answered the question about the official documentation with a simple: “[The] clan knows” (Bell, 2011: 10).

and Niklas Reese (2006) point out that the ARMM has the lowest income per capita and life expectancy, but the highest concentration of arms compared to the rest of the country (208).

As presented in the precedent chapters, the lasting conflict, continuously failing peace attempts and repeated experiences of displacement leave the affected civil society in desperate and hopeless situations. Like outlined in the previous section, the return home after displacement does in many cases not constitute a solution nor an option. Consequently, already since the early 1970s, apart from migration directed abroad, increased internal migration movements from the conflict affected areas directed towards different locations in the Philippines can be observed, mostly to peri-urban or urban centers. In particular, the cities of Cotabato, Davao City and Zamboanga in Mindanao were popular destinations, whereby a significant part of the internal migrants moved further up over the Visayas and Luzon (Cagoco-Guiam, 2013: 1, Coletta, 2010: 4). The National Capital Region (NCR) in Luzon has thereby become the major destination as final settlement or gateway for going abroad, whereas the ARMM has continuously been experiencing a negative net-migration (see also Annex 1.5) (Ogena, 2012: 2). In total 5% of the population in the Philippines is Muslim, whereby 56.5% live within the ARMM and 39.3% in other parts of Mindanao. In 2012, 2.7% of the Muslim population were spread over the Philippines, whereby 1.5% stayed in Manila (Ogena, 2012: 2). However, since internal migration does not require specific legal obligations, the movements usually stay unregistered, which leads to a considerable lack of statistics.

Bearing in mind that the internal displacement caused by the direct threat of conflict accounts as forced migration, the eventual triggered decision to migrate is regarded as being of voluntary nature. Thereby the general definition of IDPs as well as the blurry outline of when internal displacement ends creates space for discussions if migration indirectly caused by conflict can indeed be evaluated as a free decision. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) formulates a *voluntary to forced migration continuum*, which considers a slowly evolving crisis and the increase of instability as a trigger to consider the voluntary migration elsewhere, whereby the forced migration or displacement falls on the peak of the crisis and the immediate need to seek shelter (Bilak et al., 2016: 52-53). In this respect, the continuum leaves space to suggest an approach from “forced to voluntary migration”, which sets in after the (repeated) experiences of displacement and the longing to break out of stagnated instability, and to hence voluntarily decide to seek for a better life elsewhere. This step is not necessarily a separate approach, but more a complementary step towards migration movements triggered by long lasting conflicts.

However, even though if triggered by conflict like in the case of Mindanao, instability, extreme poverty and economic problems, are not included into the forced or political spectrum, but related to economic migration under the voluntary dimension (Mooney, 2005: 13, Lucas, 1997: 755). Commonly related to migration abroad, the decision process of such voluntary migration is traditionally put under the pattern of

push factors deriving from the sending country, and pull factors towards the receiving country. The outlined living conditions of the conflict affected civil society in Mindanao offers thereby numerous examples, which could be structured under push and pull factors, that eventually leave a voluntary resettlement within the own state borders as one possible pro-active approach to escape the stagnated conflict situation and the instability in the home areas. The push-pull theory has in recent migration studies been under increased critique, due to its limitations regarding the one-directed angle. Nevertheless, if extended to the specific needs, the general structure constitutes a practical tool, that has the potential to encompass multidimensional factors of the decision-making process of migration (Haug, 2000: 15), be it of international or internal nature. In this context, migration studies offer a broad spectrum of approaches and theories in order to investigate on (international) migrant movements. These reach from classic theories reflecting economic factors and the labor market on the macro level, over neoclassical approaches of human capital and the new economics of labor migration on and further extensions to for example the concept of place-utility on the micro level, to meso-level approaches of transnational migration, migration systems and migrant networks (Haug, 2000). Migrant networks thereby have long been identified as outstanding facilitators for further migration, and hence are regarded as being essential for the decision-making process and furthermore for shaping migration patterns. Even though the presented concepts are predominantly shaped and used for international migration, the aspect of migrant networks shall in this study be related to the internal migration from the rural conflict affected areas in Mindanao to the urban center Manila. In the overall context of the Mindanao conflict, this adjustment is suggested to capture the principles of migrant networks adequately due to the considerable degree of alienation of the Muslim migrants from Mindanao in the Christian dominated environment., whereby the sphere of illegal migration is excluded within the topic of internal movements.

Even though the developments in Mindanao leave the civil society in precarious situations, outside of Mindanao the conflict context is commonly reduced to a rather narrow viewpoint of recent incidences, violent clashes and the issue of ethnicity. The historic background as well as the broad contextualization are according to Philipp Bück (2012: 102-105) a “Blackbox” for the rest of the country. Consequently, events are easily judged as unreasonable Moro terrorism, which leads to a generalized stereotype thinking towards people from Mindanao and a high degree of discrimination towards the Muslim population. The dynamics show that the ethnic issues, that underlie the conflict in Mindanao as presented earlier, constitute a further obstacle “socially as well as politically” in the context of the internal migration of Filipino Muslims. The stereotyping undermines empathy, tolerance and support and leads to a high degree of marginalization and isolation of the resettlers within their own state borders (Lakhani 2013: 9-13). Anna Kanas et al. (2015: 88, 92) define the ongoing split and the resulting avoidance of contact between Christian

and Muslims in Manila as a further level of latent conflict deriving from the ongoing war in Mindanao. The emergence of Muslim communities all over the Philippines and specifically in Manila can thereby be seen as symptom for the internal split that divides the population along the religious lines and furthermore between majority and minority. The Muslim neighborhoods consequently show that the considerations of settlement of Filipino Muslim migrants are based upon ties deriving from their home communities and hence are suggested to be a first sign of migrant networks. Even though they have not crossed official state borders, the Filipino Muslim migrants from Mindanao in Metro Manila can be understood as diaspora, which are suggested to at least partly fulfill the attributions according to the elaborations of William Safran (1991: 83-84):

“1) they, or their ancestors, have been dispersed from a specific original ‘center’ to two or more ‘peripheral,’ or foreign, regions; 2) they retain a collective memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland – its physical location, history, and achievements; 3) they believe that they are not – and perhaps cannot be – fully accepted by their host society and therefore feel partly alienated and insulated from it; 4) they regard their ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their descendants would (or should) eventually return – when conditions are appropriate; 5) they believe that they should collectively, be committed to the maintenance or restoration of their original homeland and to its safety and prosperity, and 6) they continue to relate, personally or vicariously, to that homeland in one way or another, and their ethnocommunal consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by the existence of such a relationship.”

4.2.1 The Dimension of Family Networks

As mentioned above, migrant networks are seen as outstanding factors for migration starting from the pure decision process over the execution to the eventual settlement, whereby sending areas are connected to specific receiving locations through former and new migrants. Sonja Haug (2008: 588) points out that: “Being embedded in social networks thus has a significant influence on migration decisions”, which takes a direct impact if other push or pull factors based on for example economic factors lead to migration. In this context, James Fawcett (1989: 673) puts emphasis on the role of family structures. He includes the category of “Family and Personal Networks” among three further linkages (“State-to-State relations; Mass Culture Connections; [...] and Migrant Agency Activities”), that he perceives respectively as essential. These four categories are put into relation with three different kinds of linkages, namely “Tangible Linkages, Regulatory Linkages; and Relational Linkages”, whereby his elaborations on “Family and Personal Networks” as a framework shall be presented in the following table 3.

Table 3

| | Family and Personal Networks |
|---------------------|--|
| Tangible Linkages | (monetary) remittance flows correspondence from migrants (gifts, written communications from receiving country to sending country and vice versa, personal conversations of content reflects on spread information about destination) |
| Regulatory Linkages | family obligations (family-/ chain migration) ethnic/ friendship obligations (priorities for sponsorship of new immigrants by former immigrants, hiring preference) community solidarity |
| Relational Linkages | relative social status of migrants and nonmigrants (out-migrants and returned migrants versus potential migrants; microlevel disparities/ role models become a motivating force for migration, while failed migration can diminish flow/redirect to alternative locations) |

(Source: Fawcett, 1989: 674 - 678)

Along these lines, Monica Boyd (1989: 639-643) states in the same volume of the International Migration Review (23/3) that personal networks of migrants “[...] are conduits of information and social and financial assistance”, and have become “central ingredients of system approaches involving both macro and micro variables”. In this regard, the author also identifies families and households as one important part of personal networks. More distinctively than Fawcett, Boyd (1989: 643) elaborates that families act in the first place as “socializing agents” that “[...] transmit cultural values and norms which influence who migrates and why”, and moreover “[...] transmit norms about the meaning of migration and the maintenance of familial based obligations over time and space”. Consequently, migration is taken out of the individual sphere:

“[...] studying networks, particularly those linked to family and households, permits understanding migration as a social product – not as the sole result of individual decisions made by individual actors, not as the sole result of economic or political parameters, but rather as an outcome of all these factors in interaction” (Boyd, 1989: 642).

In this relation, Haug (2008: 588 – 589) states that “[...] the family is an important determinant of migration. This becomes especially evident when considering the influence on migration motives of the individual’s

role in the family, the socialization within the family, and the social networks provided by the family.” In this regard, Haug (2008: 589) draws up on the *encouraging hypothesis*, “Family members may encourage members of their family to migrate for work, [...]”, which becomes a push factor for migration. Hence the migration of single members of a family has to be seen as a mutual strategy to improve the living situation of all members (Boyd, 1989: 651). This phenomenon has furthermore been described as “livelihood strategy” or “family strategy”, whereby the initial financial costs of the migration are regarded as a mutual investment, that eventually are to be (extendedly) paid back via remittances as part of an “intertemporal agreement” (Lucas, 1997: 730).

According to Boyd (1989: 651) “existence of social networks across space” are mostly visible through the previously discussed monetary remittances to the migrant sending areas, which can either be transferred directly to the family, to schools to cover the fees for children’s education, or in form of investments in land or business. Even though the internal flow of remittances from urban to rural areas has not received as much attention as the financial inflow from abroad, Deshingkar and Grimm (2005: 41) suggest that the amount of internal remittances is significant.

This approach offers an explanation to the observation, that often only young, and single persons move, while the rest of the family stays behind (ibid.). However, not all families are able to undertake such investment in the first place, whereby the lack of perspective in the sending area and hence the need of such “strategy” allows informal money lenders to exploit the vulnerable situations, whereby remittances are first of all used to pay back the debt (Lakhani, 2013: 9, Bell, 2011: 5). On the other side, Haug (2008: 589) identifies moreover, that also “[intra]-familial conflicts within the community” as a negative input (*conflict hypothesis*) can also serve as a push factor for migration.

4.2.2 The Dimension of Social Networks

In addition to the family as one dimension of networks, private contacts to former migrants in one destination are a pull factor through available information and already existing social relations (*information hypothesis*) (ibid.). As a pre-condition, a first generation of “pioneer migrants” faces the initial struggle and costs of migration without the support of networks, and thereby provides important resources to following generations of migrants (ibid.: 591). Douglas Massey et al. (1993: 448) describe established migrant networks as a web of interpersonal ties connecting migrants, former migrants (including pioneer migrants) and non-migrants in the places of origin and destination through ties of kinship, friendship and ethnic/community bonds. However, apart from the directly shared information of former migrants to potential future migrants, also indirect messages have to be taken into account as potential push and pull factors. In

this regard for example, beyond the financial asset, remittances “[...] send back important messages about comparative opportunities and standards of living” (Boyd, 1989: 651). Moreover so-called ‘social remittances’ have an impact on the sending areas, including new ideas and norms as well as a rise of awareness of other (better) opportunities and lifestyles, which can lead to a cultural change triggered through migration or indeed to a ‘culture of migration’ (Massey et al., 1993). However, Michael Pohjola (1991: 437) points out, that the (direct and indirect) information flow within migrant networks can be incomplete or wrong, which in turn constitutes a considerable limitation for the considerations of settlement for future migrants.

After the initial information flow, existing migrant networks in receiving areas are suggested to facilitate the resettlement of new migrants by “[...] [diminishing] the psychic costs of relocating” and moreover “[...] [by lowering] the financial costs of resettling (by the common practice of initial accommodation with friends or relatives), or [by speeding] the process of job search” (Lucas, 1997: 743), which can again serve as an additional incentive, hence pull factor. In this regard Massey (1990: 8) points out:

“Expanding networks cause the costs of movement to fall and the probability of migration to rise; these trends feed off one another, and over time migration spreads outward to encompass all segments of society. This feedback occurs because the networks are created by the act of migration itself.”

The network expands and modifies with each arrival. In this regard, Boyd (1989: 651-652) points out, that “[...] network resources change with length of residency”, that apart from extended networks can lead to family reunions, which consequently leads to a decrease of remittances.

As a further aspect of migrant networks, the emergence of ethnic enclaves has to be mentioned; “[...] [which] generally [...] refers to small enterprises that are owned by (self-employed) members of an ethnic community. Here, the labor force is drawn extensively from the same ethnic community using kin, friendship and ethnic ties” (Boyd, 1989: 653). Ethnic enclaves can be outstanding and unique opportunities for the members of an ethnic community, since the affiliation and not the qualification is the important measurement. Hence instead of facing considerable limitation on the open labor market, ethnic businesses might provide comparatively higher salaries and moreover the possibility to acquire new skills. However, such enclaves on the other side can potentially have negative implications for the vulnerable migrants, such as low salaries and long working hours (ibid.: 654). Moreover, the continuous influx of migrants as part of a network can reinforce an ethnic segmentation in the labor market due to the lasting arrival of cheap labor force, whereby due to the lack of opportunities migrants are again vulnerable for exploitation (Lievens, 1999).

4.2.3 The Dimension of Migrant Agencies

As implied above, individuals outside and inside of a migrant network and an ethnic community can financially benefit from the need of support. As already mentioned, this can lead from informal money lenders to potential exploitations within ethnic enclaves or the labor market. On a further level, the informal migrant networks can lead to a commercialization of the “migration industry”, which amongst others includes travel agents, labor recruiters and brokers (Castles, 2004). As previously presented, also Fawcett (1989) already includes Migrant Agency Activities in his elaborations, which is presented in table 4.

Table 4

| | Migrant Agency Activities |
|---------------------|--|
| Tangible Linkages | job recruitment and promotional materials officially channeled remittances subsidies for recruiting purposes (e.g. paid passages for immigrants) (agencies in destination countries: assist migrants on arrival, facilitate their adaption) |
| Regulatory Linkages | rules and regulations governing migration process contracts with migrant workers (preference for gender, length of contract, worker welfare provisions) |
| Relational Linkages | complementary of agency activities in sending country and receiving country (extend of collaboration/complementation, e.g. housing for migrant workers) |

(Source: Fawcett, 1989: 674 - 678)

In this context, also the previously mentioned informal money lenders have to be considered as migrant agents. Hence, migrant agencies settle in the economic niches of the initially informally formed personal networks and complement the information flow as well as practical support. Thus, they provide thereby further pull and push factors, whereby they financially benefit from each new migrant.

5 The Muslim Diaspora in Metro Manila

Based on the previous elaborations on the emergence of migrant networks in relation to the internal migration from the conflict affected areas in Mindanao to Metro Manila, this chapter discusses the

emergence of Muslim communities in Metro Manila. The first part provides a general overview in relation to the overall political context, whereas the second part particularly focusses on the emergence of the Salam Compound in Quezon City, Metro Manila as the specific location of this field research.

5.1 Overview: The Emergence of Muslim Communities in Metro Manila

As presented above, due to the internal migration triggered by the conflict in Mindanao, already by the late 1980s twenty-seven Muslim communities had emerged over the Visayas and Luzon, whereby in particular Metro Manila had become a main destination (Watanabe, 2008a: 1-2). In fact, internal Muslim migration from Mindanao towards Manila started already before the official outbreak of the conflict. As early as in 1903, the US as leading colonial power established a scholarship program called *pensionado*, which was granted to children of “notable Muslims” (sultans or datus) which allowed them to receive higher education in Manila or the United States. The intention behind the generous offer was however connected to the already rising interest of the US in Mindanao’s vast lands and resources. The western styled education was supposed to transform the respective children eventually into well-disposed mediators between the foreign power and the local communities. Consequently in 1918 thirty-four Muslim students from Mindanao were studying at the University of the Philippines, the Philippine Normal University and the Manila High School (ibid.: 6).

To be observed is that in the same time frame the total number of Muslims in Manila increased significantly from 95 to 14.215 (of which 12,981 were men), which led to a Muslim share of 5% of the population in Metro Manila. Watanabe (2008a:7) suggests that the respective Muslim Filipinos at that time were most likely involved into commerce like Muslim of foreign descent resident in Metro Manila, such as “[...] Turks, Arabs, Persians, Indians and Indonesians.” Amongst others the Society of Indian Muslims came into being, of which the secretary later married a woman from the Sulu region. Their legal bound formed new family ties and strengthened the connection of international powerful Muslim families. The Society of Muslim Indians was eventually transformed and renamed to Muslim Association of the Philippines. The association started collecting money from its members and purchased a first piece of land in the Echague Street in Quiapo, where a small prayer room, as well as a dormitory for visitors were built. However, due to the political developments during the Second World War, the number of Muslims resident in Manila shrank decisively, but the established ties remained (ibid.: 7-8).

In the aftermaths of the war, the need to reconstruct Manila attracted Filipinos from rural areas to come to the Metro and among them again Muslim men from Mindanao. Apart from construction workers some of

the Muslim migrants got again engaged into commerce, in particular for “[...] antiques, pearls, precious metals and cloth” and in this context the wholesale market Divisoria became a common destination. The renewed influx, even though often only of seasonal nature, can thereby be read as a first symptom of the increasing Christian migration to Mindanao and the caused shortage of available land for the natives (ibid.: 8).

The first migration movements from Mindanao to Metro Manila hence do not necessarily refer to pioneer migrants as outlined in chapter 4.2.2, but the context of government scholarships and temporary migration for commerce built thereby the basis for migration. In the course of rising tensions, another scholarship program was eventually established. The program was officially formulated in order to ‘civilize’ Muslims as well as Lumad in accord with the Christian society, even though the latter group barely took a share. In 1958 109 Muslim students studied in Manila, a number which rose to 3559 in 1972, whereby again a significant part thereby stayed in the Metro even after the graduation. The already residing Muslims from Mindanao were in turn a decisive facilitator of movement and settlement when the influx of families escaping from the emerging war in the south reached new records (ibid: 9-11). Apart from private ties, Watanabe (2008a: 2-3) underlines the importance of mosques for the Muslim society, not only for the religious practice but moreover as a connection point and for the exchange of information. In this context, the author concludes that if a certain amount of Muslims move to one location “[...] they decide to build a mosque” which in turn will attract further Muslims to settle in that area.

And indeed, already by 1964 the Muslim Association of the Philippines managed to build a first mosque in *barangay* (smallest local administrative government, often referred to as village) San Miguel, which became known under the name Islamic Center (ibid: 10). The legal procedure thereby turned out to bear several obstacles since it requires the approval of the Securities and Exchange Commission, of the Office on Muslim Affairs as well as a building permit from the respective *barangay* and the city or municipality. This might be one reason that by 2002 only thirty-two mosques were officially registered while around 80 facilities remained unregistered. Apart from buildings, also other places such as rooms or corners can potentially be officially registered as mosques, as long as they have ‘[...] enough space for *salat* (five prayers a day) and a *mihrab* (arched niche) [that] must be located as a representation of the *qibla* (the direction of *salat*)’. Furthermore, it requires the presence of an *imam* (religious leader) and of more than five *jama’a* (attendants and regular prayers) and more than fourty *jama’a* on every Friday noon *salat* (ibid: 4).

The initial setting of the Islamic Center were the renovated facilities of a Chinese school, whereby further donations of resident as well as outside Muslims and a significant gift of 2.5 million pesos (“at that time 1USD = 6.8 [Philippine Peso (PhP)]”) from the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Manila allowed a

considerable rebuilding. The new mosque was renamed to Manila Grand Mosque. Even though accommodation was initially planned to be only for visitors, the entire facility was eventually developed in order to provide housing for the increasing number of people fleeing from the conflict in Mindanao. By 1980 the Center was promoted to the status of a barangay, which by 1982 was home to fifty thousand people. However, the structure could not keep up with the lasting inflow of migrants from the south and the Center consequently deteriorated to a slum. This in turn made a lot of residents move to other localities in Manila, which led to the emergence of further Muslim communities in the Metro. Amongst others the Salam Compound in the barangay Culiati in Quezon City was established, which is in particular field of research for this study and to be taken a more detailed look at in the following section. In her work Ogena (2012: 3) identifies moreover twelve other barangays in Manila that harbor Muslim communities in the areas of Quiapo, San Miguel, 649 in Port Area (BASECO), Holy Spirit, North Fairview, Patayas, Taguig and Maharlika.

Apart from communities emerging through the initiatives of the Muslim community, the first community in Maharlika was indeed developed through the Minister of Human Settlement Imelda Marcos in 1973, wife of then President Marcos. The so-called Maharlika Village in Taguig became one of the more sophisticated areas, which besides well-constructed houses and all necessary Islamic facilities comprised student dormitories, meeting halls, sport facilities and a cemetery. Moreover, the inhabitants were distributed randomly over the area to prevent the emergence of “ethnic accumulation”. However already then Muslim intellectuals identified the project as mean of propaganda to please the international community, particularly the Middle Eastern countries in the context of the ongoing violence in the south. It turned out that the village was indeed rather beneficial for the respective administrators that accounted as Marcos cronies. The acquisition of the houses in Maharlika Village bared financial requirements that were significantly higher than most of the impoverished Muslims families could invest. Hence the residents consisted of better-off families. With the end of the Marcos regime, the new administration of Aquino stopped amongst others the financial support for the village, which had considerable consequences of the living standards. More and more families settled in and around the village. After peace agreement in 1996 president Ramos granted the MNLF leadership amnesty and provided them with houses in the Maharlika Village, which was strongly rejected by its inhabitants, who were afraid of those ‘people prone to violence’ they had previously escaped from. Furthermore, a significant influx of more families was caused by a major outbreak of fire in the Islamic Center, which augmented the ongoing degradation of the settlement into another slum (Watanabe, 2008a: 18-19). More settlers stayed around the village and till today Taguig is known for its considerable share of Muslim residents.

Watanabe (2008a: 2, 31) divides the Muslim communities in Manila into *primary* and *secondary* referring to the dynamics of the establishment. As general features, the author identifies that a lot of primary communities had received financial support from other Muslim states, like Egypt, Libya, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and were characterized by an ethnic diversification of Muslim tribes that had just accumulated in the new, Christian dominated environment. The first Muslim residents became then important connections for the following generation of internal migrants escaping from the conflict. The news about the emergence of Muslim settlement arrived in Mindanao either through visitors or even over the television, which attracted new migrants and led them directly to respective areas. The consequently occurring overcrowding of the Muslim settlements in the Metro led in turn to the emergence secondary communities. Such communities are supposedly smaller and usually less diverse in terms of ethnicity (ibid: 17-21). To be observed thereby is, that the ethnic origins of the person holding the initiative have a direct impact on the ethnic landscape of the such communities, which in Manila are mainly divided among Maranao, Maguindanao, Tausug and Iranun (ibid.: 13-14, Ogena, 2012: 13).

As mentioned beforehand, Manila became not only the destination for permanent settlers but also a location of transition for individuals that decided to work abroad. The Philippines have generally been promoting overseas work as part of the economic strategy in order to decrease the high numbers of unemployment inside the country and to receive the remittances sent by the respective Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs). Right from the start the Middle East thereby constituted a major destination, first for men as construction workers and further on also for women as domestic helpers. The high reputation of the Middle East as ‘birthplace of Islam’ attracts till today a lot of Filipino Muslims, that apart from a strategy of livelihood are motivated to learn more about Islam and hope for an opportunity for a pilgrimage to Mecca (*hajj*) (Watanabe, 2008a: 22).

In regard to male Muslim migrants that settled in Manila right away or that are accounted as international return migrants (IRM) (or in the Philippines termed as *balikbayan*; balik – returning, bayan – home) in the Metro, Ogena (2012: 3,11) detected several general circumstances of the respective living situations through a quantitative survey encompassing 100 participants. The survey reveals that in both cases migrants arrived at a very young age in the Metro, at 18.7 years or 20.7 years in the case of IRMs, whereby the main motivations were rooted in economic stability, opportunities and the escape from conflict. In all cases the migrants finished minimum elementary education, but comparatively high numbers even received high school education, vocational courses and college education, whereby IRMs generally had a bigger share in the sector of higher education (ibid.: 12). Over the twelve months previous to the survey an average of 22.5% of the migrants was unemployed, while 35% were self-employed. The usual profession was to be found in manual work activities with an income commonly below the national as well as regional average,

whereby still the role of remittances towards the home provinces played a significant role. The jobs were thereby mainly found through the network of Muslim migrants from Mindanao “[...] consisting of family, friends, relatives and job broker” (ibid.: 14-15). Similarly, also the residences inside the Muslim communities in Manila were found through such contacts. Generally, the contact to other Muslims took a high share, whereas the contact to non-Muslims was stated to be higher and more frequent in the home provinces than in the Metro (ibid.: 16-17). The ties to home were hold up through the modern technology, that allowed contact via calls or messages several times a week (ibid: 29). Around half of the participants stated that their faith became stronger living outside of Mindanao, and more than half followed Islamic rules and respective practices in their daily life, which encompassed most strikingly the practice of salat as well as the consumption of *halal food* (permissible food according to Islamic law) (ibid.: 12).

5.2 Salam Compound

The so-called Salam Compound (*salaam* is the Arabic word for peace) is part of the barangay Culiati located in Quezon City, Manila (see also Annex 1.6) (Taqueban, 2012: 3). The exact details of size and residents are unverified and differ among sources, whereby no official statistics were found. In her field research “Salam: Of dislocation, marginality and flexibility” Taqueban (2012: 3-4) states that the territory of the compound stretches over 4,9 hectares of land, whereby in the early 2000 it was home to almost 10,000 people, a similar number is used by Watanabe (2008a: 15), who states that in 2002 6,300 people were resident to the Salam Compound while a number of additional 3,000 inhabitants stayed there in transit to move elsewhere, mostly to work abroad. In a following text, the author augments the number to 15,000 (Watanabe, 2008b: 286). During the field trip for this research in 2016 the interviewees as well as the supporting international organization stated that the size of the compound used to be around 4 hectares but encompasses nowadays less than 3,5 hectares, while a number of around 20,000 people is resident to the place, of which a considerable number stays temporary before leaving the country as OFWs.

The unclarified size thereby assumingly derives from an initial land dispute with the neighboring headquarters of Iglesia ni Cristo, a “Christian restorationist religious organization” (Watanabe, 2008a: 15). The piece of land, what was to become the Salam Compound, was purchased already in 1971 by the Libyan government through the Islamic Directorate of the Philippines, which was indeed established for this purpose. Libya thereby consciously avoided the official contact with the Muslim Organization of the Philippines, since other actors had been accused of misusing their influence and the organization. The intention was to construct an Islamic facility complex for Muslim residents in Manila. However, due to the consequences of martial law, the mosque and the *madrasa* (Arabic school, often related to the purpose to

teach about Islam) were only finished in 1979 through the support of the meanwhile established Office of Muslim Affairs (ibid.: 15-16). However, the outstanding tax payments from the years in between forced the Islamic Directorate to sell one parcel of the land. Even though the size shrank, Muslim settlers fleeing from the conflict in Mindanao or from the problematic Muslim district in Quiapo continued settling in Salam, which caused fears among the Directorate leadership that the Libyan government could perceive the developments as negative and would reject further financial support (Watanabe, 2008b: 290-291). They sold the lot to Iglesia ni Cristo in 1988, since the organization already hold land titles in the surrounding area. The deal comprised a sum of 23 million PhP (in 1988 worth 1,090,322.56 US Dollar), of which 1 million was initially transferred to relocate the inhabitants. The Islamic Directorate offered each household 3,000 PhP (142.22 US Dollar) for the relocation, which was a considerable amount and hence accepted by a large number of the residents. However, some refused or did not leave even though they received the money and additionally Muslims from other areas quickly settled in Salam to take advantage of the situation (ibid.: 291). The remaining Muslim families however were then to be removed through an ordered forced evacuation, which led to an outbreak of fights and a number of casualties on the side of the Muslims, apart from significant demolitions of the houses (Taqueban, 2012: 7). Eventually only seventeen families were left in the compound, of which fifteen were Tausug and two Maranao. Apart from the mosque and madrasa almost all buildings were destroyed (Watanabe, 2008b: 292). The tragic incidents were reported on television, which caused a further influx of Muslims from all over Manila and elsewhere to settle in Salam. Thereby the solidarity with the Muslim sisters and brothers and the respective support plus the need to protect the holy structures was said to be the motivation for the developments, whereby additionally rumors spread that the prices of acquirable land in the compound dropped dramatically (ibid.: 8, Watanabe, 2008a: 15-16).

The developments triggered severe tensions between Iglesia ni Cristo and a significant part of the Muslim society in Manila, whereby the ownership of the territory of the Salam Compound seemingly turned into a symbolic dispute of land and rights. Consequently first Muslim student movements emerged in the Metro, that due to the history quickly also spilled over to older generations of Muslims that had previously escaped from the conflict in Mindanao. The responsible actors that actually sold the lot to Iglesia ni Cristo were perceived as *kafirs* (unbelievers) and due to legal gaps the transaction was expected to be declared as void (Watanabe, 2008b: 293). The case was presented in front of the Islam World League in Saudi Arabia, that eventually confirmed the financial support to bring the case to court (Watanabe, 2008a: 15-16). Additionally, the leading actors on the Muslim side used the stereotypes of *juramentados* (“persons engaged in ritualized suicide”) in the public in order to spread fear and thereby to undermine bribery and mismanagement (Watanabe, 2008b: 294). However, the case took eight years before the land was eventually attributed to the Muslim community through the Supreme Court (ibid.: 302). In course for the

common cause, developments are suggested to have created ground for a greater Muslim cohesion beyond ethnic differences (Taqueban, 2012: 7).

According to the information given through the interviewees of this research as well as the involved international organization, a part of the territory was however lost. Nowadays the majestic and salient building of the headquarters of Iglesia ni Cristo and its broad surrounding and the small Salam Compound all over surrounded by a grey brick wall are separated through a small, unused piece of land in between. Supposedly this stripe is an unofficial buffer zone that officially still is part of the Muslim community, but according to rumors Iglesia ni Cristo illegally sold it to a Chinese businessman and received a considerable sum. However, since the legal dispute it has never been used. It was allegedly the Christian organization that afterwards constructed the wall around the Salam Compound in order to prevent the residents from trespassing. Indeed, the compound nowadays only has one entrance that is just wide enough for a car to pass, while the spots at the border that are not taken by the buildings are high walls that reach up to approximately three to four meters. The set-up in combination with the dense population and the general dominance of the color grey inside reminds of the general image of a ghetto, which even though there is one open exit is isolated from the surroundings of the area. In this regard Taqueban (2012: 3-4, 8) uses the illustration of “fenced in/ fenced out”, whereby she describes the general atmosphere within as an own universe of the Muslim community within the Christian dominated surroundings. In fact, Salam Compound used to be one of the rare green places in the Metro that offered broad open space for its residents. Nowadays the main street, the Lybia street, is the only one that is wide enough for a car. It reaches circa 500 meters inside the area and ends at a the only open square where the madrasa is located next to a small basketball court and a parking possibility for the numerous tricycles inside the area. Along the main street one can find basic concrete houses and small stores for daily supplies, as well as the typical Filipino *ukay ukay stores* (cheap thrift shops), *sari-sari* shops (kiosks) as well as some booths that sell or rent illegally copied DVDs and CDs (ibid.: 3). From the basketball court onwards numerous smaller streets spread in all directions and from which again even more narrow paths lead like veins through the compound, all surrounded by the buildings or the wall. The street names refer to the different provinces, municipalities and cities the inhabitants originate from, such as for example the Sulu Street, the Basilan Street or the Pikit Street (a municipality in Maguindanao). The respective names however are said to not indicate any ethnic accumulation in certain streets. The structure of the compound has repeatedly been described as a life trap in case of fire, since a fire truck could barely enter on the one hand, and on the other it would block the only possible exit for the inhabitants.

Apart from the first mosque that was built in 1979, four further mosques were established due to the efforts and funding of residents. None is very dominant in the appearance, they blend in the general surrounding.

According to information gathered through the interviews, as an unwritten law each of the mosques is for a specific ethnic tribe, while the primal and still principal one serves as a communal religious facility. These findings are confirmed through the research of Regadio (2015: 17). According to Watanabe (2008a: 15), Maranao, Maguindanao and Tausug are the main represented tribes inside the compound with approximately a share of each 30%, while Iranun, Yakan, Sama, *Balik Islam* (converts to Islam) as well as a small number of non-Muslim relatives in total account for 10%. The comparatively balanced representation thereby is attributed to the developments related to the territorial dispute with Iglesia ni Cristo.

By 1990 the Salam Mosque and Madrasah Advisory Council, Inc. (SMMAC) came into being, a governing organization for the Compound that holds a general chairperson, the Sultan, as well as an elder's council consisting of representative of all ethnicities resident to the compound. The tasks thereby reach from formal arrangements and ceremonies to the mediation of disputes either within the respective ethnic group or among different ethnic groups according to the principle of Sharia (ibid.: 17, Regadio, 2015: 20, 28). According to Taqueban (2012: 8) one of the residents stated in an interview that through the SMMAC respective issues were handled "[...] how things are done back home". Hence the native system of sultans and datus reached from Mindanao all over to the Metro, where it was still acknowledged by the Moro diaspora. In Salam Compound a royal descent might be entitled for the leadership of the respective tribe, however the Sultan accumulates the "over-all leadership" which even got acknowledged by the government under president Macapagal Arroyo (Regadio, 2015: 21-22). The developments thereby reflect the statement of Safran (1991: 94), that "[the] homeland myth plays a role in the political behavior of diasporas and is reflected both in voting and in interdiaspora relations."

Even though the Muslim community inside the Salam Compound experiences something like an own universe, which in the interviews of this study was commonly referred to as "little Mindanao" due to the broad representation of Mindanaoan Muslims, the compound faces severe problems with the outside reality. The ongoing conflict in Mindanao constitutes thereby one major reason and Muslim residents in Manila generally face the risk to be accused of hiding terrorists and of being therefore arrested or taken into custody, which causes frequent police raids inside the compound and other Muslim communities. In particular, Tausug are affected due to the same ethnic background of the members of the ASG (Watanabe, 2008a: 17, Taqueban, 2012: 12). On the other side, a considerable number of residents of the Salam Compound is involved in the shadow economy of weapons and drugs (Watanabe, 2008a: 17). According to the findings of Taqueban (2012: 12) community members identify the police raids either as 'drug busts' or as "'show of force' of the governments anti-terrorism campaign", considering that "[...] every time there are bombings in Mindanao, police raids would usually happen in Salam and other Muslim communities in

Metro Manila”. Regadio (2015: 8) reveals that such reputation reached outside of the wall to the mainly Christian neighbors, which resulted in the general avoidance of the area and its inhabitants. In this regard the author gives the example of taxi drivers who refused to give passengers a ride to the Salam Compound. Moreover, the increasing number of Muslim students in the Culiati Elementary School as well as the Culiati National High School led to a decrease of the non-Muslim students, since their parents preferred to send them to different schools.

However, Taqueban’s (2012: 20) outline of the Salam Compound characterized by an “[...] anxious atmosphere of survival” and the “[...] undercurrents of the hushed talks about the illegal drug trade, the harried walks of the vendors, and the ardent and anxious waiting of the recruits to be called abroad” has to be set into the context of the general economic and social development of the Philippines, since such features are not only related to Muslim communities but are in fact as well a reality for a lot of Christian Filipinos. By 2015 officially 21,6% of the entire population lived below the national poverty line (World Bank, 2017). Hence the descriptions of “half-finished houses” and “half-paved alleyways” or the compound as “[...] seemingly out of place and out of synch in the urban landscape [as] ultimately a symptom of oppression [and] a continuing project for marginality” (Taqueban, 2012: 21) has to be relativized. The business centers as well as the luxurious residential areas are centered in specific parts, while impoverished communities as well as illegal settlements are spread all over the Metro and other urban centers. The extreme difference between rich and poor is a general and crucial characteristic of Manila. Hence the superficial living conditions within the Salam Compound do not constitute a convincing argument for the oppression and marginalization specifically targeted against Muslims.

Part II

6 Reflections on the Fieldwork

The following chapter discusses the conditions of the field trip that set the basis for this empirical study. The first part thereby describes how the field was accessed in the first place, which is then followed by a detailed outline of the conditions in the field. The elaborations shall reveal the context and circumstances under which the data was collected, that is to be analyzed in Chapter 8.

6.1 Accessing the Field

In the course of this research, a field trip to the Metro Manila was undertaken from May 5, 2016 until July 28, 2016. A previous visit of two weeks in February 2016 served as an opportunity for an initial orientation on the spot and allowed first general preparations regarding the stay. This was important considering that the Metro consist of sixteen cities. Due to personal ties, I initially moved to Makati, which is commonly known as the business area and hence hub for expats and tourists. At a later point, I eventually moved to Quezon City, Metro Manilas capital, in order to be closer to the research site, and to avoid the immense traffic Manila is generally known (see also Annex 2.5). As an additional preparation before my second departure in May, I received private lessons in Filipino culture and Tagalog from a fellow “Oversea Filipino Student” from Manila in Vienna. Aside from the general literature research encompassing the Mindanao conflict, internal displacement, internal migration and migrant networks, the lack of official documentation of Muslim communities constituted a considerable obstacle for the preparatory research from abroad. Before my departure, I tried to contact responsible national government offices and national as well as international organization via E-Mail. Inquiries to the National Statistics Office (NSO) of the Philippines, to the office of the International Organization of Migration (IOM) in Cotabato as well as to the ARMM Department on Social Welfare and Development remained without reply. Hence the first time in Manila was mainly determined by establishing contacts to the field, whereby initially one impasse followed the other.

I entered the Philippines via a temporary tourist visa and not a specific research visa. Due to my first stay in February, I was granted an extended visa valid for a stay of 56 days (instead of the usual thirty days,

which are automatically granted at arrival), which I could then again extend via the local Immigration Office in Makati or through a so-called “visa-run”, which implies that one takes a flight abroad (mostly Hong Kong or Bali) that is cheaper than the actual visa extension fee, to get another thirty days of visa at arrival in the Philippines. The Embassy of the Philippines in Berlin recommended such approach, since the application for a research visa would have been “too complicated and a too long procedure”, according to the person consulting me (telephone conversation on March 4, 2016). I did not perceive the type of my visa as further significant since I was not to work with official institutions, whereby I later-on asked myself if an official research visa could have boosted the communication with offices in the Philippines, and hence would have led to more support.

However, four weeks after my arrival on June 6, 2016 I finally received the long hoped-for answer of International Alert (IA),⁴ an international Non-government organization (NGO) that was interested in my research and offered me support. Through a local contact, the organization connected me to the Muslim community in Salam Compound in the barangay Culiati in Quezon City, Metro Manila, where the interviews started on June 18, 2016 until July 17, 2016. Apart from the previous literature research, an increased research on the particular location was eventually carried out when the respective ties were established.

6.1.1 Initial Obstacles (Ethnicity, Gender, Language)

As previously mentioned, the lack of official documentation about the Muslim communities in Manila constituted a considerable obstacle for the preparatory research from abroad. Consequently, I arrived in Metro Manila in the beginning of May 2016 without any detailed information on the Muslim communities. Hence as a first step I needed to expand my own network and knowledge in order to find participants for my interviews. Even though my sampling was formulated quite broad, basically any Muslim migrant from Mindanao resident in Metro Manila could have functioned as an interviewee, I anticipated obstacles in entering the field. In particular, I feared that the language barrier could hinder my research, even though English as well as Tagalog (besides Filipino) account as the principal languages in the Philippines. Nevertheless, approximately further 180 languages are “living languages” distributed over the different

⁴ International Alert is a London-based non-governmental organization (NGO), which has been credited “[...] for making conflict prevention and resolution issues an important sphere of action among governments, IGOs [Inter-Governmental Organizations] and NGOs, through its numerous publications and its advocacy work” (Sørby et al. (2016).

islands and regions of the country (Simons and Fenning, 2017). Especially in the NCR and other (peri-) urban centers English is widely spread, however especially in more remote areas the command becomes more scarce and even though most people understand Tagalog, I was informed that not everyone is able to speak it. Considering the situation in the conflict affected areas of Mindanao and the respective different local languages, I was not sure if my future interviewees would be able to speak English and my knowledge of Tagalog would not be sufficient to conduct an interview. My few words were rather supposed to break the initial spell and to find a connection to the locals. Thus, I additionally had to look for an interpreter who could accompany me during the interviews, without drying up my financial resources.

As a further problem, I perceived my being as a young, white, unmarried female researcher as a crucial hurdle. As Carol Warren and Jennifer Hackney (2000: 5) point out:

“For the stranger confronting the other, the field-worker’s initial reception by the host society reflects the cultural contextualization of the field worker’s characteristics, including marital status, age, physical appearance, presence of number of children, social class, and ethnic, racial, or national difference as well as gender.”

My personal context as a white, young woman and what people would read into it based on my outer appearance, was to meet with a context that bore a high potential of obstacles and difficulties. I was to work with a Muslim community, that was moreover characterized and shaped by the background of the still ongoing conflict in Mindanao and the thereby triggered experiences of internal migration to Manila. In this regard Norman (2009: 74) includes both, “post-conflict situations” (even though the situation of the Mindanao conflict at that point could be described as being “on-hold”), as well as “humanitarian situations resulting from conflict, such as flows of refugees or [IDPs]” in her interpretation of conflict zones. Hence, I was in particular worried about my stance towards the male participants. My fear thereby did not derive from any possible risk of confrontations or even harassment (Warren and Hackney, 2000: 4), but from the simple fact of being allowed the access to the field and eventually to be taken seriously by my respondents. I feared that I could be put either in an inferior position towards male participants, or that interviewees could just use the opportunity to take a look at me, the stranger, and not for sharing their experiences with me. Furthermore, taking into account the conflict and migration context, I was worried that (some) interviewees (male as well as female) might be willing but not yet ready to talk about their traumatizing past (and present) experiences.

Nevertheless, I initially tried to enter the field directly on my own. I followed the suggestion of a local documentary filmmaker (of Christian descent), whom I met through private contacts in Quezon City. Hence, I went to markets in Divisoria and the connected mall 168 in Metro Manila's Chinatown in Manila City, as well as to the shopping mall Greenhills in San Juan (see also Annex 2.5 and 2.7). These locations are well known as retail places for fake brands ranging from fashion to technology, where by some smaller booths offer tourist souvenirs and jewelry made out of locally harvested pearls. In contrast to other shopping malls, a considerable part of the vendors in these areas are Muslim, which is mainly visible through women wearing their *hijab* (head scarf).⁵ According to the given information, the main part of the Muslim vendors were Maranao, Tausug and Maguindanao situated in specific market enclaves. In this regard, Maranao were supposedly known for selling illegally copied CDs or DVDs and Tausug to be involved into the commerce with pearls. According to Watanabe (2008a: 28-29), it were the Maranao who started the business in the area and dominate it till today. However, first attempts to involve individuals in conversations to get an own insight remained without significant results. Thereby I perceived my outer appearance rather than the language as the outstanding obstacle I could not change. Thus, I decided to at least dye my hair darker to blend in more, at least from the distance.⁶ Moreover, I dressed in rather long covering and loose clothes despite the comparatively hot and humid weather in the Philippines. I avoided wearing short and tight clothes to not put any attention on my physical appearance, according to the statement of Warren and Hackney (2000: 23): "Different dress and hairstyles may be adopted to fit into the culture's gender roles [...]." Albeit, when approaching some of the vendors (female and male), I felt that I either had an intimidating effect, since some vendors would politely pretend not to hear me, or a too distracting effect, since others started taking pictures of me, the "cana", or tried to sell me their goods.⁷ Moreover, I realized that asking someone if she or he was from Mindanao was often responded with caution and hesitation, whereas questions directed at the exact place of origin and hence ethnicity felt like a taboo. I realized that due to the overall context, such questions could indeed be perceived as

⁵ According to the elaborations of Watanabe (2008a: 28-29) Muslim vendors have to be part of "The Greenhills Muslim Business Club" (initially "Maranao Trader's Club") and already in 1989 a praying facility was established inside the mall in San Juan.

⁶ The first contact suggested me already in our first private conversation on May 13, 2016 in Quezon City, Manila to dye my hair since I was "too blonde" (thereby apparently everything that is brighter than black accounts as blonde).

⁷ In the Philippines, white foreigners are commonly referred to as "americana/-o" or "cana/-o" despite of the actual origin. The terms rather serve as well-established idioms, likewise the name "Joe", which serves as a collective name for white men. The reasons therefore are suggested to lie in the colonial ties and the actual dominant presence of Americans that resulted from it. Usually foreigners are moreover charged a "white price" when buying something, which is considerably higher than the price for the locals.

almost a threat, since actual “americanos” of the US military are part of operations related to the Mindanao conflict. This includes raids against Muslim terrorists also within Metro Manila. In this relation Warren and Hackney (2000: 18) reflect in their work on gender issues in research:

“Gender and globalization set the context for the attribution of spying to social scientists in non-Western settings. [...] Both in the world of macropolitics – where CIA agents have become covert instruments of U.S. policies – and in the micropolitics of organizationz – where an arm of local government may be seeking information – one place to which the field worker may be assigned is that of a spy. And gender is one of several features of the field-worker and of her or his task that elaborate the role of a spy. Depending on the social and political context, a female stranger can be invisible (field-worker as file clerk) or hypervisible (field-worker as Mata Hari).”

Thus, just after a few attempts I dropped such direct approach and decided to stay superficial in the conversations to at least gather some new general information, and to train my communication skills particularly with the Filipino Muslims.

The next potential research site was the Muslim district in Quiapo in Manila City, which is moreover the most visible one through the popular Golden Mosque (see also Annex 2.7). Different sides had warned me previously that the area was considered as unsafe, such concerns were exclusively voiced out by Filipino Christians who did not have any previous contact to Muslims nor have stayed in any location of Mindanao.⁸ However, my access stayed limited right from the start and it seemed not possible without a local contact to gain a deeper insight than to visit the mosque as a tourist. These first impasses did not stay the last. I visited respective areas several times and tried to get more information about other communities, which led me further to the areas of Taguig and Parañaque (see also Annex 2.5). However, it felt impossible to gain access to the communities or to individuals as an outsider, and moreover also these areas were generally considered as unsafe. Since I could not change my central European descent or gender, I realized that I did not only need an interpreter, but more importantly a local, preferably male, contact person. Like Julie Norman (2009: 78) describes in relation to her field work in Jerusalem and the West Bank, to gain access takes time and more importantly contacts. Therefore, Norman volunteered for several months for different NGOs before entering the field directly. Due to my set time frame and the available financial resources, a longer stay was however not possible. Hence, I decided to again to contact

⁸ “Quiapo is crazy! There everything can happen, everything is possible!”- Statement during a private conversation with a Filipino Christian on May 20, 2016 in Makati, Metro Manila.

various national offices, organizations as well as international organizations. After perceived hundreds of mails, calls and several seemingly promising conversations, I found myself after almost four weeks with practically nothing.

6.1.2 An International Organization as Gateway to the Field

After four weeks without any results and a lack of future perspective, I started considering to give up on my chosen research and to move my attention to the experiences of Christian migrants from Mindanao, since I had met two students from Illigan (bordering to the ARMM) and Surigao del Norte on the other side of Mindanao (see also Annex 2.1), that had moved to Metro Manila for their studies. In private conversations, respective contacts shared their experiences, which encompassed complaints about the common stereotyping towards all people from Mindanao, including Christians. In this regard, they mentioned the exaggerated depiction of Mindanao's low level of development, which in their perception came along with an alleged superiority of "Manileñas/ -os" (people from Metro Manila).⁹ Thus feeling alien inside the own country, the contacts initially stayed among other Christian migrants from Mindanao, and avoided contact to others until their Tagalog skills reached a level that allowed them to blend fully into the urban society.¹⁰

However, just then it were eventually private ties that set a last and decisive snowball rolling, in fact digitally via France and Canada back to the Philippines. It took until June 6, 2016 that I eventually received an invitation of the Filipino office of IA, which was interested in my research and offered me help to establish contacts to a local Muslim community. Hence, I took all the new information from my new Christian Mindanaoan friends as additional sources and refocused on the original plan. Only four days later I visited the headquarters of the organization and got introduced to a direct contact person of the Muslim community from the Salam Compound in the barangay Culiati, in Quezon City. When arriving at the office, I was welcomed by some of the members of the organization that were having lunch at a table full of book and paper piles, while still typing on their laptops. The recent failure of the BBL added decisively to their anyways immense workload. While briefly introducing themselves, I recognized some names as the authors of several papers I had read during my research. I presented my research questions

⁹ Respective students were amongst others asked, if they used to ride on Carabaos (native water buffalo commonly used as a working animal for farming) to schools.

¹⁰ Although Tagalog was taught in school in both cases the lessons received were described as being of rather theoretical nature, which resulted in a very low or even complete absence command of the language. Likewise, the knowledge of English used to be very limited.

as well as my interview guideline (see Chapter 7.2) and handed over a hard copy. Being new to the world of research, I wanted to take my chance to talk to the big fishes. However, there was no time for a consultation and without any feedback, I was asked when I could start conducting the interviews. The time schedule for the interviews was limited to the weekends, since the respective contact person, a middle-aged Muslim man from Maguindanao resident in the Salam Compound, was the new intern of the organization and hence not available during the week. Nevertheless, he offered me to meet up in the early morning on June 14, 2016, to plan out the field trip to the compound and moreover he suggested on being previously interviewed as well (he fortunately had a profound command of English). The other interviews were to be scheduled on the weekends of June 18 and 19, July 2 and 3, July 16 and 17 as well as July 23 and 24, 2016. A number of fifteen to twenty interviews was aimed at, and based on the set terms of the organization my contact person was the one to find the interviewees previous to each day scheduled. As expected and experienced before, my outer appearance would have been an obstade in finding contacts in the Salam Compound, particularly considering that I was allegedly the first white woman to enter the area, not even a member of IA had entered the compound before. Hence, to prevent my literal hypervisibility as termed by Warren and Hackney (2000: 18) from undermining the success of the study and moreover to prevent any possible risk, the respective contact as gatekeeper was the one to prepare the field.

The access to the community of the Salam Compound happened to be more than I was initially looking for, since my previously defined sampling encompassed generally Muslim migrants from Mindanao resident in Metro Manila. This sampling was then refined to Muslim migrants from Mindanao resident in the Salam Compound in Quezon City, Metro Manila. Thus, it turned into a complete, plus the most convenient sampling at the same time (Flick, 2009: 123). Nevertheless, I was initially concerned that such convenience and the quite comfortable position I was put into could have a negative effect. I feared that through such outsourcing of tasks, certain responsibilities could be moved to the background. The short time I could spend in the office of IA, and the conversations I could observe gave me the impression, that the long lasting high level of access to the field was so well-established, that most steps related to research approaches were already automated. Since I initially stayed in the background, I had to make sure that my contact person in the field also followed each of these steps, in particular in relation to the codes of ethics. Obviously as the executing researcher, the interview situation itself would be under my responsibility, but previous to that the gatekeeper had to ensure an informed consent of all interviewees on my behalf;

“[...] [Codes] of ethnics require that research should be based on informed consent (i.e. the study's participants have agreed to partake on the basis of information given to them by the researchers). They also require that the research should avoid harming the participants, including not invading their privacy and not deceiving them about the research's aims” (Flick, 2009: 37).

As another factor, according to the gatekeeper, even though most of the inhabitants of the compound were practicing and “good Muslims”, there were still the “negative parts” connected to the illegal drug and weapon trade.¹¹ Just a few days before the compound had again been part of a related police raid (on June 7, 2016). Consequently, he was to accompany and guide me through the compound based on security issues. In this regard, I was not allowed to spend more time than necessary in the compound. Likewise, my movement inside was limited to the respective locations of the interviews. I was only asked to bring an interpreter, since not all residents spoke English and due to the personal ties, the local contact was to be prevented from taking an active part during the interviews. Another member of the organization offered me to serve as a translator for the first day, even though he eventually helped me out two full weekends. Afterwards one of my Christian Mindanaoan contacts with private family ties to Muslims assisted me. However, before we could take action, the gatekeeper had to obtain additionally a written consent of the SMAAC and the sultan of the compound, that I was allowed to enter and to conduct my interviews (see also Chapter 5.2). The procedure was not officially required, but we intended thereby to show the necessary respect to the community and the established leadership. The consent was officially filed through the organization and it got eventually approved after some days. In this regard, I was moreover assured that the visible collaboration would not set my contact person at risk and would not cause any negative consequences for him or his family as residents of the compound.

My first impression of the compound was initially determined by numerous online articles, that immediately popped up about drug crimes, suspected Moro terrorists and related frequent police raids. In this relation, Julie Mertus (2009: 165) describes an “own risk assessment”, and indeed such information had an initial intimidating effect. But in general, I was not worried about my field trip. I trusted the gatekeeper, and I was sure that neither side would have consciously exposed me to any risk. Furthermore, the more profound research led me eventually to the initially introduced works of Watanabe (2008a, 2008b), Taqeban (2011), Regadio (2015) and Omega (2012). Apart from serving as

¹¹ Statements of the contact person during a private conversation on June 10, 2016 in the headquarters of the international organization in Manila.

main sources about the emergence of Muslim communities in Metro Manila, and in particular the establishment of the Salam Compound, the studies moreover encouraged me since evidently interviews had already been carried out inside the compound, yet I was supposedly the first international scholar to do research in this residential area.

The organization did not set any requirements for the collaboration, just at a later point I was informed that the project of a member overlapped with my topic. Hence, I was asked to share my gathered information. However, my interviews stopped after July 17, 2016 after fourteen interviews. The reason therefore lied in arising internal tensions, which I suggest to have appeared due to the immense stress and pressure all the employees were exposed to. A bit disappointed of not being able to reach my initial set aim of fifteen to twenty interviews, I left the field still being more than grateful for the opportunity and the insight I was given through the organization and especially due to the strong support of the gatekeeper and the employee, who sacrificed the personal free time to support me. As a last action, I held a presentation of my interim main findings on July 20, 2016 and showed my gratitude to the entire team by serving their favorite German potato salad.

6.2 Data Collection Process

As previously mentioned, the interviews in the Salam Compound in Quezon City, Metro Manila, started on June 18, 2016 until July 17, 2016. In total, a number of fourteen interviews was conducted with the Muslim residents and one interview with the respective contact person according to the previously prepared interview guideline (Chapter 7.2). In the meantime, of my overall stay, I additionally collected unrecorded (spontaneous) interviews with one Muslim office holder from Mindanao resident in Metro Manila, two Christian migrants from Illigan and Surigao del Norte in Mindanao resident in Manila as well as several conversations with members of other international organizations engaged in different projects related to the Mindanao conflict. Aside from the continuous efforts to find access to the field, the stay in Manila allowed me moreover to observe the last days of the peace process under president Aquino III and the failure of the BBL as well as the election period, Duterte's electoral victory on May 9, 2016, his inauguration on July 30, 2016 and the first weeks of the new president in office.

6.2.1 Relationship to the Gatekeeper

The gatekeeper was himself born and raised in Maguindanao, and had personal experiences of the armed conflict and forced displacement throughout his childhood. Through personal ties, he eventually moved directly to the Salam Compound in Quezon City, where apart from working as a tricycle driver he has been highly engaged in community activities related to keep the second generation of Muslim migrants connected to the religion, and since the last peace process also in mobilization events for peace-rallies. In this context, IA took eventually notice of him and hired him as an intern only some weeks before my arrival. These developments were reportedly the first of such kind. Hence, the success of my field trip was paved by a lucky coincidence.

Right from the beginning, the relationship between the contact person and me was friendly but yet respectful distant. I highly welcomed such atmosphere, since at no point I feared that my counterpart interpreted our collaboration to any extend beyond the professional sphere (Warren and Hackney, 2000: 27). He invited me to his family house and introduced me to his wife and children, and proudly showed me their peacefully sleeping newborn, which I perceived as a further evidence of our friendly connection. The family of five lived in a room of approximately fifteen square meters in the first floor of a three-story house. The house was a basic concrete house without windows or proper flooring. Due to the set up, the room remained cool even without an electric fan or air condition. During the day, the mats for sleeping were put aside, so that the room offered enough space for the adults to hide from the hot sun outside, and even for a small cooking space consisting of two small gas stoves. The children were running around the house and outside in the streets compound, while the newborn slept in a small hammock that was attached to the roof of the room.

From the first day on, the contact person showed a high level of enthusiasm and he did not spare no effort. He faced problems to finding willing participants, according to his explanation most of the people were too shy to talk to a female foreigner or were simply too tired and avoided any additional task. Nevertheless, he managed to find interviewees for each day scheduled. He moreover managed to put together a variety of different ethnicities, even though for him as a Maguindanaoan it would have been the easiest to stick to his own ethnic group. Moreover, he included male and female participants. As mentioned above, he additionally offered to be interviewed as well. Even though he shared his experiences and viewpoints with me, the degree of personal information shared remained asymmetrical. He never asked me for personal details, nor asked for an opinion related to the topic, and I never intended

to position myself. Considering his active involvement in the peace process, and his shared experiences and viewpoint, I got to know that he was a strong supporter of the BBL process under Aquino III. Moreover, Islam played an outstanding role in his life, whereby he often put emphasis on the historical injustice that was done to the Muslims through Christians. In this regard, his selection of interviewees might have been (unconsciously) biased and hence limited to participants, that to him seemed as good examples to lead my research and hence evaluation into a certain direction.

When I eventually observed him in his local environment, I noticed that he was a very well-known and respected member of the community, indeed some interviewees jokingly referred to him as a “celebrity of Salam”. In this case “Salam” referred not only to the name of the compound but moreover to the original meaning related to his engagement during the peace process.

Even though I was female and dependent on his help, I felt that I was put in the higher position of our bilateral hierarchy. I assume that this was caused by two circumstances; Firstly, I was introduced to him as a researcher through the head of the international organization, whereby the fact that it was my first research for completing my Master studies did not affect the seemingly superiority. Since he had started his internship, already two European high officials of the organization visited the headquarter in Metro Manila triggered by the failure of the BBL-process. Thus, my appearance was apparently put in the same context. Secondly, I suggest that the colonial past and especially the still existing ties to the US have left significant marks on the local perception of white foreigners, which mirrors the following statement of Warren and Hackney (2000: 23-24):

“In a world where colonialism has left its mark on so many cultures, fair skin and Caucasian physical characteristics result in the field-worker being perceived not only as a foreigner but also as someone of a higher status than the respondents.”

Hence my visible central European origin had the potential to superimpose traditional gender roles. Whenever introducing me, he referred to me as “Ma’am Laura” and not “Miss Laura”, even though he knew that I was younger than him. In the overall context, I interpreted his respectful approach as an expression of gratitude based on his personal, strongly emotional attachment to the matter. Along these lines, he often explained to the participants that: “Ma’am Laura wants to help us. Maybe she can” (Statement during an interview in the Salam Compound, Metro Manila, June 18, 2016); “Maybe she can change” (Statement during an interview in the Salam Compound, Metro Manila, July 2, 2016). Honored

and simultaneously intimidated by such big words, I assured him that I was doing my best to do justice to their stories. Yet, I knew already that the number of readers of my field research would stay limited and consequently the impact it was to take. However not to delusion the gatekeeper and the interviewees, obviously also for selfish reasons, I did not insist on a further clarification and detailed explanation about what was going to happen with my elaborations, although as part of the informed consent it was stated that the final results will only be presented to the respective supervisor of the thesis. Hence my personal dilemma did not derive from privacy issues, but rather that I withheld the information that I would not publish my work. Consequently, all the efforts the gatekeeper put as well as all the information shared were basically solely for my academic degree, and a possible outlook for my future career (Flick, 2009: 36-42). My remorse was slightly eased through the inquire of the organization to share my main findings, and to eventually send them my entire thesis once it got officially graded. Since this mutual benefit of reciprocity however did not directly involve my contact person, I decided to unofficially thank him for his efforts. In several occasions, he had raved about the *mangas* (Mangoes) from Mindanao (likewise other interviewees), that were supposedly better and sweeter than the ones available in Metro Manila. Hence, after a private visit in the Caraga region in the East of Mindanao, I brought him and his family a stock of the longed-for Mangoes. Similar to my prepared farewell-*merienda* (colonial heritage of Spain, a snack time between lunch and dinner) for the other members of the international organization, also this time I chose food as the best way to show my gratitude. During my stays in the Philippines, I learned that sharing food bears a significant meaning for the social life throughout all ethnicities and social classes. Moreover, when I was leaving the field, it was just the end of the fasting-period of Ramadan. Additionally, I got some smaller gifts for his children and a *Malong* (traditional tube skirt originating from Mindanao) for his wife, who had told me before that her mother would wear those always after giving birth, but that they were unfortunately too expensive in Manila. I perceived a gift in form of money would have not been an adequate way to honor the contact person's work, since at no point I felt that he was motivated by financial incentives.

6.2.2 The Set-Up of the Interviews

After the time-consuming efforts to access the field, the actual field work was carried out in a relatively short time frame. The first interview with the key contact was the first one to be held on June 14, 2016. This interview was the only one to be conducted within the facilities of the organization. My first time to enter the Salam Compound was on June 18, 2016, when I held three interviews which were followed by

two interviews the following day. In the same pattern interviews were conducted on the weekend of July 2 to July 3, 2016. At the final weekend (July 16 to July 17, 2016) I carried out two interviews each day. Apart from my contact person as the guide, the first two weekends an employee from the international organization accompanied us to serve as an interpreter, whereas on the final weekend a private contact, who was beforehand approved by IA, helped me out with the task of interpreting during the interviews. In both cases respective persons supported me voluntarily and free of charge. Nonetheless, the language barrier has to be accounted as a considerable restraint on my side as the researcher. The lack of language skills undermined participant and non-participant observation, or rather limited them to non-verbal behavior. Moreover, the translations of interviews and conversations have to be seen as interpretations shaped by the respective interpreter, who were moreover not professionals. Hence their style of interpreting varied among each other decisively, and probably also from the way a trained interpreter would do it. However, I perceive both interpreters as not biased towards the Muslim interviewees, which was the most important in the first place. The first interpreter has been working for International Alert for already over a decade, and has moreover voluntarily engaged in smaller projects to support IDPs. The second interpreter has family ties to Muslims from Mindanao, even though he is Christian. In that context, he eventually became a certified chef for halal cuisine and had been engaged in the official Halal Food Preparation Curriculum, and was therefore three times invited as a juror to the ARMM Master Chef competition in Cotabato City. His personal experiences and interactions thereby had exceptional positive effects on his personal perception of "fellow Muslim Filipinos" (Statement during conversation on May 29, 2016 in Metro Manila) in comparison to other Christian Filipinos resident in Metro Manila.

The interviews usually took place in the homes of the interviewees, whereas in these cases the gatekeeper considered the locations as being too dangerous, the respective interviews were relocated. The classification thereby was never fully explained to me, but rather commented with for example: "Ma'am there are some negative people, bad people. We don't go there" (private conversation with the gatekeeper in the Salam Compound, July 2, 2016), which I related to the illegal drug and weapon trade. For such reasons in total three interviews were conducted in the madrasa and one interview was conducted in the home of another interviewee. To each interview, I brought an interview guideline, some blank sheets for additional notes and comments, as well as my voice recorder. After each interview, I put the notes into a folder inside my bag to secure the confidentiality of the data and information given.

During each interview, my contact person and the respective interpreter were present, whereby in cases necessary both translated. Three interviews were conducted in English, and in some cases the participants

mixed English and Tagalog. On one hand, I feared that the presence and the engagement of the gatekeeper during the interviews blacked out the topic of ethnical differences and respective evolving problems, since he was of Maguindanaoan origin and some of the interviewees were Maranao, Tausug or Iranun. On the other hand, I realized that he was indeed very familiar with each of the personal stories of the respondents, and was therefore able to give additional side comments or further explanations, which allowed me to gain an even deeper understanding. Thereby, while serving as an interpreter, the member of the organization rather stayed in the background. He translated for me, but gave me enough freedom to stay in charge of my interviews. In contrast, the second translator initially took over a more active part during the interviews, and got lost between translating and continuing the interview in Tagalog, which caused that during the first interview I lost track. Hence, I briefed him afterwards again to stay more passive, and to continue translating in between. However, we translated all the recorded interviews together afterwards, which made me realize that such private conversations, particularly with male respondents, revealed other information or comments than the ones directly shared with me. In this regard male respondents did not hesitate to refer to the “sexy women of Manila” as a supposedly clear advantage of living in the Metro (Interview, July 2, 2016). On a deeper level, one interviewee immediately revealed his past as a MILF fighter to my translator (Interview, July 16, 2016), which he maybe would not have told me directly. I explained this by the personal origins of the interpreter, hence there was a quite friendly connection between him and the interviewees, whereas I remained the visible “professional stranger”, which hence caused these “two sets of realities about [the] activities: one presented to outsiders and the other reserved for insiders” (Flick, 2009: 110-111, Warren and Hackney, 2000: 14). However, on another level also the interpreter remained an outsider, since also he was never told anything related to ethnical or internal issues in the Muslim community.

Aside from the respondents themselves, in all cases also other people were present. Hence the interviews never took place in a locked up private sphere, but immediate family members as well as friends or house-/roommates were present. Since I expected a private setting, I initially wanted to ask my contact person if we could change the set up. But after the first day, I noticed that this ambience seemed so natural, that I decided to not impose to separate the interviewee from the surrounding. I did not perceive these conditions as negative for the interviews, but I assumed that the interviewees were more comfortable. Indeed, a private setting would have meant, that the respondent would be outnumbered by me, my contact person and my interpreter. Such structure might have seemed too authoritarian and hence intimidating, or again could have evoked suspicions about spying. Furthermore, I had the impression that

it was not the first time interviewees and their families talked about their experiences of conflict and migration, and as previously stated even my contact person was very familiar with the individual stories. Likewise, Norman (2009: 84) points out that:

“[...] , researchers should avoid implementing Western models of trauma therapy that might undermine local healing practices and potentially erode the trust between the researcher, the individual and the community. Indeed, whereas most Western models focus on individualized coping strategies, many non-Western approaches emphasize healing within the social context through community-building and/or rituals.”

Hence, I do not think that the general interview situation caused a limitation to the information shared apart from issues touching ethnical differences, as explained before. However, I doubt that such information would have been shared with me in another set up. In this relation moreover to be taken into account is, that the Sultan of the compound as well as the SMAAC knew about my research, thus I cannot estimate if and to what extent interviewees were briefed and if such issues were banned from the agenda beforehand. The overall shared information still gave me an idea if conflict and migration experiences varied among different ethnical groups.

6.2.3 The Field Conditions and the Status of the Researcher

Even though there were indeed some reasons for concern during the field trip, I never felt insecure when moving inside the Salam Compound or at the interviewees homes. Especially private travels inside as well as outside of Metro Manila gave me a previous insight into other (non-Muslim) settings, including poorer areas. Hence the atmosphere inside the compound was not entirely new to me. I experienced a high level of curiosity about my person, especially of the children. During my second weekend previous interviewees greeted me on the street like an old friend, and women even hugged me, whereby they were visibly proud to know me.

My research period exactly hit the time of *Ramadan* (June 6 to July 5, 2016), an Islamic holiday which implies a practiced daily fasting from sunrise to sunset. Consequently, my interviewees as well as the gatekeeper were comparatively more exhausted during the day, and I had to be more understanding and flexible in regard to the duration of the interviews and expect them to be rather shorter. However, to be

taken into account is that the period of Ramadan not only caused a limitation to the interviews, but in the first place was the reason that interviewees were available and according to the key contact during such days, less “unexpected” incidences would happen.¹² After the second weekend, I tried to convince the head of the organization to allow me to stay one time inside the compound after sunset to observe the breaking of the fast, however without success. Being new to the field and hence inexperienced in evaluating such situations, I of course respected and followed the decision. Taking into account that the interviews were conducted during the time of Ramadan, and moreover on a weekend, I felt extremely honored that the participants took their time for me. Moreover, most hosts apologized for the inconvenience of not being able to share food with me and they offered to prepare something to eat. I thankfully rejected such offers, and only asked if it was okay that I drink water during the interviews since the hot weather conditions caused that I easily dehydrated. Even though respondents were visibly tired, no one hurried during the interviews. In all cases the interviews were eventually stopped by the contact person, or in one case even by me. I suggest that at least some respondents were too shy to terminate the interviews themselves. Even though I would have liked to continue the interviews, I respected the decision of my contact person based on the hardship of the fasting.

I perceived the atmosphere of each interview as positive, whereby some respondents were more shy and others less. Nevertheless, I felt that each one was eager to tell me the personal story, whereby in most cases the interview situation was initially switched around and I was asked some general questions, in particular by the female participants. Such questions targeted at my origins and also my religion, whereby initially most participants asked me if I was American, and they assumed automatically that I was Christian. Apart from such questions, I was never asked anything related to my private life, such as my marital status, even though Warren and Hackney (2000: 8) assume that such status can indeed be of “particular significance” since:

“[...] most ‘primitive’ cultures take kinship bonds as the fundamental source of social structure and social order. [...] An unmarried, childless adult woman has no fully legitimate social place in many non-Western cultures unless, perhaps, she is elderly and thus androgynized.”

Thereby I want to clearly distance myself from the description of ‘primitive’ although stated in quotation marks. However, I perceived the residents of the Salam Compound as comparatively open minded. This

¹² “It’s okay Ma’am, Ramadan is the time to prove, to show that you are a good Muslim. We worship, so our mind is close to, you know, bad things” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

assumption was furthermore supported through a female member of a different resident international organization, who pointed out the impact of the Christian surrounding and the dominance of the Western culture on the Muslim communities. According to own experiences, the respective person was denied access to Muslim male IDPs that had settled in an informal evacuation site in Maguindanao. In the Salam Compound, the level of openness was thereby clearly set on each individual case, thus for example some men naturally shook my hand as part of the introduction, while others completely avoided touching me or even directly looking into my eyes. In this regard one interviewee commented his behavior to my second translator, explaining that his faith would not allow him to touch me.

However, each male participant showed me the respect and listened to my questions when I was talking in English and then to the translation. Everyone answered comprehensively and in most of the cases, each interviewee tried at least to exchange some English-Tagalog mixed phrases with me. The previously mentioned jokes about women, I did not interpret as (too) disrespectful. First of all, I was never directly attacked and the fact that they talked about it in Tagalog was rather a sign, that they did not intend me to understand it and hence there was no aim to offend me. Apart from that, also in the Western and non-Muslim world such comments occur. Hence, I tried not to be too sensitive only because I was dealing with a Muslim community, but to rather evaluate the context. In contrast, I was rather surprised how easy the communication felt considering that I was the first white woman to enter the compound.

Even though I initially thought that the absent interest regarding my marital status might be a sign of such openness, I was taught differently on my last day inside the compound. Already before I was informed that men were allowed to practice polygamy, most of my male interviewees had two wives. On July 3, 2016, I coincidentally talked to a young couple that had approached me along the street. The woman was born and raised in Metro Manila and was of Christian origin, and the man was a Muslim migrant from Maguindanao. They had only been dating since a few months and she eventually got pregnant. Since premarital sex was still a taboo in the community according to Islam, the couple was to get married soon and she had to convert to Islam. Her parents however were completely unaware of her relationship, her pregnancy and the change of religion. She withheld the information because she feared that her parents would not accept her anymore. The marriage was thereby ordered by the SMAAC.¹³ The elderly council of the Salam Compound hence tried to “save” the situation through a traditional wedding, even though the sex had obviously already happened

¹³ “No Ma’am, in Islam you have to be married. Our elderly council decided now and the Sultan” (Comment of gatekeeper during an Interview, July 3, 2016).

In this regard, I was even more surprised that my marital status never became a matter of interest. It was possible that the gatekeeper and interviewees just assumed that I was married, since I already had a certain age. Furthermore, I was never alone inside the compound, but always accompanied by two men, of which one was unknown to the host community. Thus, I was outnumbered by my male company, behind which I or rather the issue of my gender might have disappeared. Furthermore, I might have been set into some kind of relationship with the respective interpreter. Additionally, the official relation to IA, as well as my Caucasian features can be perceived as a potential booster for the respect and the status I was given.

“White, foreign female anthropologists, although they lack the superior status of males, are placed within the host culture’s intersecting hierarchies of gender, ethnicity, and class through their association with the dominant Western culture” (Warren and Hackney, 2000: 23-24).

Moreover, it is possible that the short duration of the interview period prevented any closer ties, maybe in case of a longer stay such question would have eventually been asked.

Like experienced by other (female) researchers my skin color became a matter of attention. In all cases, the female participants explained to me: “We use whitening cream Ma’am, to be so light. You are natural, and blue eyes! So beautiful!” (Interview, June 19, 2016), whereby they were surprised when I countered that I, as well as a lot of other Europeans, try to get tanned because we liked a darker skin color. By giving compliments back, I intended to break the ice and my supposedly superior stance as white foreigner. Like Warren and Hackney (2000: 23) point out:

“[...] Fair skin is both attractive and distancing in the double status and relational systems within which postcolonial people live. [...] The white- or light-skinned person is the respectable one, the rich and powerful one, and therefore the one desired and desirable.”

By trying to overcome the distancing features, I aimed to transform the previous obstacles of being of central European origin and female into advantages in the eventual interview situation. Therefore, I tried to be aware of the way how I was perceived, and how I could use these features to build a trust relationship to the respondents. Hence as a strategy, I tried to use these “ascribed attributes” that were defined through the field (Mazzei and O’Brien, 2009: 360). In this regard, I stayed open to topics taken up by the interviewees, such as beauty products or like in one case, German cars. In this context, Norman (2009: 72-73) elaborates, that the personal sphere of conversations during interviews can trigger emotional bonds and hence trust, which is of utmost importance in societies that are characterized by a

high level of mistrust towards outsiders. In this regard, also the open set-up of the interviews plays a role (ibid.: 79). For example, in twelve interviews children were present. Like the Philippines in general, the Salam Compound shows a high share of children.¹⁴ In fact I noticed that the playtime with children before and during the interviews often served as a booster for the flow of the communication. It created small breaks for the adults from the intense topic, and seeing the laughing children making fun of me while I was singing lullabies in various Filipino dialects, seemingly cheered the interviewees up and gave them new energy to continue their stories. Such factors seemed increasingly important to me after the recent failure of the BBL process and the previous incidence in Mamasapano.

Apart from the general openness of participants I experienced during my field research, I faced several limitations. As previously mentioned, the topic about conflicts between different Muslim tribes was a closed-up field, and in this regard moreover the topic of Muslim youth organizations. Even though this topic was revealed by two interviewees, there were not willing to elaborate further on the topic, which was rather shown indirectly through short answers and a change of topic, after I asked for more details. Moreover, as I advised by the gatekeeper not to take pictures inside the compound, whereby it was not further elaborated if this was ordered by the interviewees or by the leadership of the compound. Even though I had an overall positive first experience of field research, I encountered some negative side effects. Like outlined by Jean Wood (2006: 384) related to her long-term field research in El Salvador during the civil war (26 months), under such extreme conditions also the researcher might experience “[...] additional and intense emotions in the course of [...] work, including fear, anger, outrage, grief, and pity, often through observing, suffering, or fearing the effects of violence.” Even though my field research was only of short duration, the experiences shared with me during the interviews encompassing those of conflict in Mindanao, the challenges in Metro Manila and experiences of police raids inside the Salam Compound also put me under emotional stress and it took me a lot of effort to distance me emotionally.

¹⁴ In 2016, the Philippines reached a birth rate of 24 births during a year per 1,000 persons whereas in comparison Germany reached a number of 8.5 (Indexmundi, 2016a, Indexmundi 2016b).

7 Reflections on the Methodology

This chapter discusses the underlying methodology of this research. The first part therefore elaborates on the methods related to the collection of the data in terms of the research design. The following section then reveals the methodological approach for the subsequent empirical analysis in Chapter 8.

7.2 Research Design

The period of preparation of the field research in regard to the research design, the establishing of contacts, as well as practical preparations was comparatively short, especially considering that I completely lacked theoretical as well as practical experiences of ethnographic research. Moreover, the theoretical literature on qualitative methods did not encompass what Elizabeth Levy Paluck (2009: 39) considers in regard to her own experiences of field research in areas shaped by the experiences of conflict: “[...] context shapes methodological and ethical issues.”, which can consequently not be theoretically trained beforehand. However, taking into account that all actions require “a first time”, I decided to complement the lack of experiences through a tight research design.

As mentioned previously, I initially formulated three principal and three related minor research questions. The questions were adjusted once the ties to the Muslim community of the Salam Compound in Quezon City, Metro Manila were established (see also Annex 1.1). The goal of the research was thereby not to gather quantitative representative data, but to conduct an ethnographic limited amount of interviews, in order to reveal individual experiences related to the respective research questions, as well as to find connection points of even those as common patterns of reality. The respective targeted sample encompassed individual cases of Muslim migrants from the conflict affected areas in Mindanao, who were resident in Metro Manila. No preference was set in the gender, age or specific place of origin or ethnicity, nor in a specific residential location within Metro Manila, even though the eventually established ties to IA and the Salam Compound allowed a revision and a specification in regard to the last point.

As the chosen approach, the interviews were to be conducted problem-centered according to elaborations of Andreas Witzel (Witzel, 2000), whereby the goal of generating a theory was excluded. However, the overall structure of *problem-centered interview* (PCI) and the respective “inductive-deductive mutual relationship” of an interview guide based on the research questions with additional

narrative stimuli for the participants were identified as suitable for the aim of this research, to collect the personal data related to the distinct problematic.

“The inevitable previous knowledge which must thus be disclosed serves in the data collection phase as a heuristic-analytical framework for ideas for questions during the dialogue between the interviewer and respondent. At the same time, this principle of disclosure is manifest in that through narration what the observed subjects determined to be relevant is stimulated” (ibid.).

Moreover, a short questionnaire was assembled in order to collect “data on social characteristics” of the interviewees (ibid., see also Annex 1.2).

As a next step I decided to add a “generative narrative question”, which is typically part of narrative interviews related to biographical research (Riemann and Schütze, 1987: 353). The structure of the hybrid form of the PCI thereby allowed such introductory part, which was suggested to trigger an initial main narrative of the interviewees regarding the personal experiences related to the specific research questions. Additionally, the assurance of confidentiality should prevent hesitation to share sensitive information, taking into account the context of the Mindanao conflict and my role as a visible outsider. This first main narrative was not to be interrupted (ibid., Flick, 2009: 178, Witzel, 2000, see also Annex 1.3). In this way, the structure showed a necessary openness for aspects, that had not been considered beforehand. The presented data was then to be complemented through specific questions formulated in the interview guideline, which was moreover to serve as a control-mechanism during the interviews. Accordingly, an interview guideline was prepared in relation to the respective research questions, and again revised after the consultation with the supervisor of this research (see also Annex 1.4).

The structure was printed on documentation sheets, which contained moreover a space for additional notes, comments about the setting, and about the general atmosphere of the interviews. The interviews were recorded and later on transcribed. As already previously mentioned, I moreover conducted unrecorded (spontaneous) interviews with one Muslim official from Mindanao resident in Metro Manila, and with two Christians student from Illigan (bordering to the ARMM) and Surigao del Norte (on the north-east of Mindanao) resident in Metro Manila. Additionally, I was able to talk to some members of other international organizations resident in Metro Manila, that are also engaged in different projects related to the Mindanao conflict. Those encounters and hence the interviews and conversations happened spontaneously, consequently they did not follow a previously defined guideline and were not recorded.

However, I informed each interlocutor of my research topic and asked if I was allowed to take notes and to use respective information shared for my thesis. Some topics remained however metaphorically off-record, but thereby gave me a deeper insight for my general understanding.

My observations of the last days of the peace process under President Aquino III and the following election period and the electoral victory of Duterte as the new president were mainly focused on the presentations and reports on television, radio, printed media as well as print media, which was possible due the big share of English-speaking sources.

The interviews conducted with the residents of the Salam Compound are the main pillar of this research, whereby further interviews, observations and conversations functioned as complementary sources for the analysis of the data. The additional information was collected in a research diary (Witzel, 2000).

7.3 Methodological Approach for the Analysis

As mentioned previously, after the data collection each recorded interview was transcribed and aligned with the field notes taken during the interview. The notes documenting the unrecorded interviews and general observations were similarly put in order and complemented through side comments. However, this newly formed collection of sources was initially put under a screening concerning ethical requirements. Apart from the beforehand referred to informed consent, this became moreover crucial considering that “[...] qualitative data are usually very personal and individual”, hence Graham Gibbs (2007: 8) points out that: “The personal nature of much qualitative research means that researchers need to be very sensitive to the possible harm and upset their work might cause to participants.” Hence the consequently emerging restrictions on the use of information is challenging, as Christel Hopf (2004: 338) states, the details:

“[...] have to be made anonymous in such a way that no possible conclusions can be drawn about the persons, organizations and regions in the context of which the data collection took place, and at the same time in such a way that the information content is not so diminished that any analysis becomes pointless.”

For this research, all individual participants (interviewees, gatekeeper, individual members of IA, Interpreters, other interlocutors) were anonymized. Furthermore, some interviews, conversations and observations, even though if considered as very fruitful, had to remain unrevealed or only superficially mentioned, but not further elaborated on. Moreover, no photos were taken inside of the Salam Compound.

After the first screening of the interviews and additional notes, I decided to approach my main interviews along the lines of the “Qualitative Content Analysis” (Flick, 2009: 323-325), whereby the reflections on the field research and the “formal [characterization]” about the types of data, constituted already an important step. On this basis, I selected the parts of the interviews “relevant for answering the research question[s]”, through which general analytic units were defined. On this basis, the following empirical part (Chapter 8) initially presents the findings, which are broadly thematically divided into the dimensions of “Push and Pull Factors: Private Networks and Recruitment Agencies”, “The Settlement: Networks and Patterns”, “‘Home away from Home’: About Religion and Identity in the Salam Compound”, “Jobs: Networks versus Marginalization”, “Remittances and Home Ties”, “Memories of the Homeland and Hopes for the Future”, “Evaluation of the Conflict”. However, the dimensions are not to be seen as independent units, but they are highly interrelated and therefore repetitive. Apart from direct references to the interviews during the presentation of the findings, Annex 3 provides a further list of interview excerpts, which are subdivided according to the respective discursive fields.

In the next step, the findings are discussed directly in relation to the presented research questions on the basis of the previous elaborations in Chapter 3 to Chapter 5. To be taken into account is, that the research questions of both categories, principal as well as minor, are highly interrelated and function complementary as well as supportive towards each other. In this regard, the questions are not answered one by one, but entire discussion sets the questions into the context of the internal migration from Mindanao to Metro Manila, specifically to the Salam Compound, as result of the ongoing conflict and instability in the respective home areas. The elaborations in Chapter 4.2 in regard to the internal migration and migrant networks provide the theoretical background for the discussion.

8 Empirical Analysis

The following chapter presents and discusses the findings gathered during the fieldtrip to Metro Manila from May 5, 2016 until July 28, 2016. As previously elaborated, the data collection was based on three pillars; Interviews (according to the interview guideline, as well as “spontaneous” interviews), conversations and observations. In total eighteen interviews were conducted, of which fifteen were held with residents of the Salam Compound in Quezon City, Metro Manila (see also Chapter 7.2). These interviews are considered as the main pillar, whereby the additionally gathered data served as complementary sources. In this regard, the first part shall give an overview over the respective main

interviews, which are presented more in detail in the following section. The last part then discusses the findings in regard to the previously presented research questions (see also Chapter 1 and Annex 1).

8.1 Overview

The following Table 5 and 6 present an overview of the data collected during the fifteen interviews conducted with residents of the Salam Compound. The interviews were assembled in alphabetical order. The outline in Table 5 presents the place of each interview, the duration, the language it was conducted in, and hence if a translator was needed, while Table 6 reveals the gender and age of the respondent, the home province in Mindanao and the ethnicity, and gives moreover a short overview of the respective patterns of settlement that led to the final settlement in the Salam Compound.

Table 5

| Interview | Place | Duration | Language |
|-----------|-----------------------------|----------|----------------------|
| A | Interviewee's home | 01:04:52 | Tagalog (Translator) |
| B | Interviewee's home | 00:40:20 | Tagalog (Translator) |
| C | Interviewee's home | 00:30:53 | Tagalog (Translator) |
| D | Interviewee's home | 00:46:17 | Tagalog (Translator) |
| E | Home of another Interviewee | 00:37:58 | English |
| F | Interviewee's home | 00:31:18 | Tagalog (Translator) |
| G | Interviewee's home | 00:49:59 | English |
| H | Interviewee's home | 00:35:48 | English |
| I | Madrasa | 00:37:20 | Tagalog (Translator) |
| J | Interviewee's home | 00:27:13 | Tagalog (Translator) |
| K | Interviewee's home | 00:53:54 | Tagalog (Translator) |
| L | Interviewee's home | 00:43:15 | Tagalog (Translator) |
| M | Madrasa | 00:35:09 | Tagalog (Translator) |
| N | Madrasa | 00:33:14 | Tagalog (Translator) |
| O | Interviewee's home | 00:50:22 | English |

Table 6

| Interview | Gender and Age | Home province/ Ethnicity | Pattern of migration and settlement |
|-----------|------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| A | Female, 44 years | Maguindanao/ Maguindanao | OFW |

| | | | |
|---|------------------|-----------------------------|---|
| | | | Salam Compound |
| B | Male, 44 years | Maguindanao/ Maguindanao | Salam Compound |
| C | Female, 59 years | Maguindanao/ Maguindanao | Other Muslim community in Metro Manila OFW Return to Mindanao Salam Compound |
| D | Male, 39 years | Maguindanao/ Maguindanao | Salam Compound |
| E | Male, 32 years | Zamboanga del Sur/ Tausug | Salam Compound |
| F | Male, 31 years | Maguindanao/ Maguindanao | Salam Compound |
| G | Female, 53 years | Cotabato City/ Maranao | OFW Purchases a lot/ house in the Salam Compound Salam Compound |
| H | Female, 36 years | Cotabato City/ Maranao | Salam Compound |
| I | Male, 39 years | Lanao del Sur / Iranun | Other Muslim community in Metro Manila Return to Mindanao Salam Compound OFW Salam Compound |
| J | Male, 38 years | Sulu/ Cotabato City/ Tausug | Salam Compound |
| K | Female, 53 years | Cotabato City/ Maranao | OFW Other Muslim community in Metro Manila Salam Compound |
| L | Male, 35 years | Maguindanao / Maguindanao | Salam Compound |
| M | Male, 44 years | Maguindanao / Maguindanao | Salam Compound |
| N | Female, 56 years | Maguindanao/ Maguindanao | OFW |

| | | | |
|---|----------------|--------------------------|--|
| | | | Other Muslim community in Metro Manila |
| | | | Salam Compound |
| O | Male, 43 years | Maguindanao/ Maguindanao | Salam Compound |

Of the fifteen interviews, six were conducted with female participants and nine with male participants. On average respondents were 43 years old, whereby the youngest participant was 31 years old and the eldest 59 years old. The major part of the interviewees was ethnic Maguindanao (nine in total), two interviewees were Tausug, three interviewees were Maranao and one interviewee was Iranun. Ten interviews were conducted in the homes of the respective respondents, while five interviews had to be located elsewhere (see also Chapter 6.2.3). In total, eleven interviews had to be translated by the interpreter present and the gatekeeper, and four interviews were conducted in English. On average, each interview took approximately forty-one minutes. Each interviewee was born and raised in a conflict affected area in Mindanao, whereby except for Zamboanga del Sur and Cotabato City, all provinces lie within the ARMM. However, also the two parts that are officially not related in terms of administration (see also Annex 2.1), are surrounded and directly affected by the conflict. In this regard, all respondents had experienced the conflict directly, whereby thirteen participants were repeatedly forced into displacement before the migration. Almost all interviewees migrated during the 1990ies as young adults, only one migrated as a teenager and one at the age of thirty-five years. Nine respondents migrated directly to the Salam Compound, while others previously worked abroad or settled initially in another Muslim community in Metro Manila (or both). Two of the respondents had already tried to return home, but eventually moved back to Metro Manila.

8.2 Presentation of Findings

In regard to the following presentation of data, the previous elaborations regarding the Mindanao conflict, its impact on the civil society as well as the related political developments have to be taken into account as the direct context (see also Chapter 3 and 4), and hence as essential to the individual stories of each respondent. The conflict affected the interviewees throughout their childhoods and as young adults, before they eventually migrated.

8.2.1 Push and Pull Factors: Private Networks and Recruitment Agencies

The migration to Metro Manila (or abroad) separated respondents geographically, but not emotionally from the conflict reality. Nevertheless, in contrast to the typical image of Mindanao, most respondents depicted their lives before the war in a positive way: “When I was younger, I used to live in the mountains and life was very nice” (Interview, July 3, 2016) (the memories of the homeland are further discussed in Chapter 8.2.6). However, the interviews revealed, that the traumatizing experiences of the conflict have been having a significant impact on the lives of the respondents. One interviewee explained: “But what is regularly on my mind, in all of our minds, is the conflict. It is always on my mind, it never leaves” (Interview, July 2, 2016). In this regard, a considerable part of the interviewees talked about the tragic losses of family members and friends, injuries, as well as about the repeated destructions of their homes and their sources of livelihoods during armed confrontations, whereby it was not differentiated, if such clashes occurred between state forces and Moro insurgencies or different clans. One interviewee illustrated, how ongoing clashes transform areas into ghost towns: “Even during the war, you can see stores where nobody stays there. You go, you buy and pay, you get your change by yourself. So basically, it’s honesty system, different from Manila, and it works” (Interview, July 3, 2016). In this context, respondents furthermore illustrated, how the violence and the resulting displacement in their home areas in Mindanao prevented them from pursuing their education, and furthermore how families struggled to maintain their livelihoods. Most of the families of the respondents used to be farmers or fishermen, whereby traditionally men were responsible to provide for the family. However, if it was not possible for them anymore to earn a living due to the conflict (see also Chapter 4.1), there were barely other opportunities to generate an income. Interviewees illustrated, how all family members used every chance to earn some money, whereby even small children were involved by for example the risky task to collect empty bomb shells and brass, which were then sold as kind of souvenirs (Interview, July 2, 2016). One interviewee explained: “The only possibility was to be a bodyguard for politicians. But my mother told me not to take this job” (Interview, July 17, 2016), which was commented through the gatekeeper: “The people who do this, especially from that town, they are killed immediately. Clan wars, political wars. That could have been his death sentence, if not for his mother. Another chance is the private army. Then you become one of them. This is the problem, when you cannot finish school. That’s the only chance.”

In the context of becoming a part of the conflict, one interviewee revealed his past as a MILF fighter, which was triggered by his experiences of conflict:

“When I was younger, we used to live in the mountains and life was very nice. And then time came, when the military came and they burned down our house. So, because of that, whenever I saw soldiers, I thought bad about them! I went to another city to study there, but later on I trained to be

a part of the MILF, because I wanted to revenge for them burning down the house, that I couldn't move back! During the era of Estrada, when he set the all-out war, I was part of the MILF, to fight back. My first child was only forty-five days old" (Interview, July 16, 2016).

The commander in charge however eventually ordered, that fighters with children were sent from the mountains "down to the camps", and hence excluded from the ongoing fights. Not being able to fight, the interviewee decided to become a driver for *Habal-Habal* (tricycle), in order to be able to provide for his family. When the situation however tensed up, he was ashamed of not to be allowed to fight: "It came to a point, when it was embarrassing to be on land when everyone, all your family members were fighting up in the mountains. For example, somebody asks you: 'What are you doing here, when your father and all your cousins and uncles are fighting up there?'" Other (female) family members had previously migrated to the Muslim community in Quiapo, Metro Manila. Hence, the respondent decided to follow them, since he was sure that he could earn more money there, which would allow him to contribute at least financially as support for the fighters.

Another interviewee also admitted, that he was thinking of joining the war (Interview, July 17, 2016), but in order to prevent him from doing so, his father who was already living in Metro Manila, pressured him to follow to the NCR:

"I came here unintentionally. Because of the war and the order of my father: 'Go to Manila!' [...] I never wanted to, I never imagined to, not in my dreams. I wanted to join the war, I wanted to continue my life. But my father was insisting, there was no chance. So, around six months my father was imposing, then I went to Manila."

These two examples were the only cases, in which the respondents had affiliated with the insurgencies (or at least these were the only two examples, I was told about it), whereby other respondents never approached this sensitive topic.

On a further level, these cases show that personal ties to Metro Manila existed already before the migration, even though the eventual decisions to move vary decisively. Likewise, also other interviewees had personal ties (family or friends) to the Metro before moving there. In this regard, respondents reported about the direct incentives given by former migrants: "I had friends who went to Manila before me, and when they visited Mindanao, they told me that I would have better chances here." (Interview, June 19, 2016), while another interview explained: "[...] these relatives from Manila, came back to visit, they had changed. Because of their clothing, their manners. You know, they made you see, that the economy is better, the economic status." (Interview, June 18, 2016), hence the respective interviewee assumed it would be easy to find a good job in Metro Manila. Other interviewees talked about all the images they had seen on

television before: “When I thought about Manila, I thought about the big buildings, the artists, the TV stations. Because our eye to Manila is the television” (Interview, July 3, 2016). Based on such input, migrants generally hoped for a better life in Metro Manila, which included that they hoped for better jobs, to finish their education, or to provide a better life and a proper education to their children, which consequently meant a better future for all family members.

Along these lines, respondents explained: “Education is very important. Even if you are applying as a domestic helper. Yes, you need to have at least basic education. And this is the highest priority!” (Interview, June 19, 2016); “We did not want our parents to be the one providing for us, because I wanted to provide for my own family. And we had kids already, my kids, they made a stronger reason to stay, because I did not want them to experience the same life, and to be able to study here continuously instead of having to evacuate all the time, which prevents them from studying properly!” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

In this regard, applying for jobs in Metro Manila from Mindanao was said to be “pointless”, whereby even a graduated engineer was not able to find a job, since his home address was located within the ARMM. The gatekeeper commented: “You have an opportunity if your address is from Quezon City. Not when it’s from Zamboanga or Sulu. Maybe Cotabato works, first I changed my address to there” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

In the course of the migration, one interviewee commented the question, if she or he already knew someone in Metro Manila before: “Yes, friends, relatives. It could be difficult, if you come alone. It’s only the boat ticket that you have then!” (Interview, June 18, 2016). Along these lines, the support through the personal networks was reportedly important. All of the interviewed migrants travelled to Metro Manila by boat, of which the prices varied from 600 PHP to 1000 PHP (which by Jan. 1, 1995 was approximately 11.77 US Dollar and 19.61 US Dollar). In some of the cases, own savings or the financial support of family members allowed the travel, whereby the personal ties in Metro Manila usually took over the first finances and practical support (accommodation and food) after the arrival. However, a considerable part of interviewees reported, that their families were not able to financially support the migration, or that they needed additional financial resources. In this regard, one interviewee explained: “There would be creditors, who give you loans. Illegally” (Interview, June 18, 2016). This was commented by the gatekeeper: “Called five-six. Five or six Pesos for every Peso loaned”, which meant for the respective interviewee that “10.000 PHP became 29.000 PHP” (which was by Jan 1, 1995 approximately 196.12 US Dollar that became 568.74 US Dollar), “[...] more than 100% increase, it’s not really five-six, its more. It’s just a term.” The gatekeeper elaborated, that the contract of such transaction usually lasts for two years, and moreover includes a guarantor, who stays in the place (in Mindanao or in Metro Manila in case of a migration abroad). The interviewee furthermore explained, that it was easy to find a five-six: “It’s word of mouth. Everyone knows. Common

knowledge. Everyone can find a five-six. Even here in Manila, it's easy. There are a lot of Indians here. Almost daily they came here to look for new clients, to offer their service. It is not haram, but most of us don't have another chance."

Apart from personal connections, recruitment agencies also became decisive ties to Metro Manila and abroad, whereby the migration was then commonly planned temporary as OFW, mostly to Saudi Arabia. Along these lines, one interviewee explained: "My parents were gone already, and then I graduated. [...] by that time going abroad was the common thing to do." (Interview, June 19, 2016), whereby in another interview the gatekeeper commented: "[...] there were a lot of people going at that time. Because there was a lot of conflict then" (Interview, July 3, 2016). In this regard, especially remittances were of important matter: "[...] that's normal for everybody, as long as you have, you always give to your family. That's the standard" (Interview, July 16, 2016). In this regard, one interviewee explained that, even though her baby was just three-month-old, there was no other choice than to leave, in order to provide for the family (Interview, June 19, 2016).

Respective recruitment agents would operate in Mindanao, to recruit directly from the spot, whereby most agencies were said to be located in Metro Manila: "In Mabini street, in Manila. There is a lot, in Ermita" (this area is commonly known as red light district) (Interview, July 2, 2016). In this context, one respondent explained that she and her husband wanted to prevent extra fees for the agent, hence they saved up some money to go to Metro Manila directly to the recruitment office (Interview, June 19, 2016). Some interviewees elaborated moreover, that the recruitment agencies preferred recruiting Muslims, because it was easier to get them hired in Saudi Arabia. Besides the higher income, the respective locations were in turn highly attractive for the Filipino Muslims in terms of religion: "In Saudi I feel closer to Allah [...]. In Saudi its closer, also better than in Mindanao" (Interview, July 17, 2016). Some interviewees talked moreover about illegal recruiting agencies, however none of the respondents had personal experiences.

In this context, in order to go abroad, all respective interviewees had to go to Metro Manila first, in order to get their documents processed, which were completely missing due to the conflict. In most cases, this led to a considerable temporary stay in Manila: "It took me one year to finish all the legal documents. Even the birth certificate.", which was commented through the gatekeeper: "No birth registration or anything. There is no government, I mean, to have yourself documented, in your own land, there is nothing. That's why Muslim communities is hard to get statistics; We are not documented. There is no count" (Interview, July 17, 2016). In this regard, he elaborated further in another interview "Most of us will get their birth certificate, when they plan to go outside the country" (Interview, June 19, 2016). In this context, one interviewee revealed, that the recruitment agency changed her age on the newly established passport. The respective recruitment agency advertised an image of being more legitimate, and thus more reliable than

other agencies, and therefore officially only placed in OFWs, that were minimum thirty years old. The interviewee however just turned eighteen at that time, hence in the course of processing her passport, the agency added officially twelve years to her age (Interview, July 2, 2016). Three of the interviewees never left the country, even though their documents were eventually processed. According to them, they had settled in the meantime and found jobs, they did not want to give up (for further examples, see also Annex 2.1).

8.2.2 The Settlement: Networks and Patterns

As outlined above, most of the respondents already had private contacts resident in Metro Manila previous to their migration. Hence, when they arrived, they were initially accommodated by the respective family members or friends, that were all resident in Muslim communities within the NCR. However, even though former migrants had provided information and incentives for the new migrants, they all were situated in difficult economic situations, which caused that the accommodations were commonly reduced to the basic needs. One interviewee illustrated: “I moved to my uncle’s house. But it was really small, so I was sleeping on the rooftop. Me and another person” (Interview, July 16, 2016). Another interviewee was never directly told to move to Metro Manila, but as presented previously, he interpreted the new behavior of the former migrants as a pull factor for his migration. He did not inform anyone about his arrival, and consequently he spent his first three months without a shelter: “No money to eat, not money for a house [...] I was waiting for the rain, so I could take a shower. One time, the police arrested me, it was heavy rain, so they gave me the possibility to sleep under a roof.” (Interview, July 17, 2016), until an extended family member eventually invited him to live with him in the Muslim community in Quiapo.

Interviewees who previously lived in other Muslim communities, and eventually moved to the Salam Compound commonly explained, that they relocated due to the overcrowded situations in the locations of their first settlements, which was caused by the increasing influx of migrants escaping from the conflict. One interviewee revealed, that the ethnic-conflicts in the Muslim Center were the reason to move: “So I decided to come here, because in the Muslim Center, there are a lot of conflicts between tribes. And when bullets fire, they don’t choose where they land. This is why I did not want to stay in that area, there are a lot of conflicts happening” (Interview, July 2, 2016). The respective interviewee was then invited by a nephew to take over his house in the Salam Compound, since he was going abroad for work. In this relation, the interviewee was asked to secure the house, since it was during the time of the legal dispute between the Muslim community and Iglesia ni Cristo (see also Chapter 5.2). In this context, also another interviewee was asked by a relative to take over the house in the Salam Compound during the dispute. This relative

however was just found in Metro Manila, according to the interviewee: “We found him after reference, you know, this and that, we were able to establish relative lines. And then this relative said: ‘I have a house in Culiat. I want you to manage and to maintain it!’, this is why we came here! We hoped that we do not have to pay rent” (Interview, July 16, 2016).

As indicated beforehand, some interviewees stayed in Metro Manila in transit, while their documents were processed before going abroad as OFWs. In such cases, they were accommodated in Muslim communities by their recruiting agencies, whereby some already stayed in the Salam Compound. Hence, when they eventually returned to the Philippines (after months or after several years), all of them stayed in Metro Manila, and three moved directly back to the Salam Compound, due to their previously established ties (for further examples, see also Annex 2.2).

8.2.3 “A Home away from Home”: About Religion and Identity in the Salam Compound

As previously outlined, the settlement to the Salam Compound was mainly triggered by previous ties to the area or through recruitment agencies. In addition, the fact that the compound was a Muslim neighborhood, which provided the comfort of a mosque and available halal food (see also Chapter 5.2), has to be taken into account in regard to the considerations of settlement, and moreover for the decision to stay. In this regard, the only interviewee without previous personal ties to the compound explained, that the surrounding and the “shared beliefs” helped him to feel home, whereby the presence of a mosque and available halal food were decisive factors. In this regard, the respondent described the Salam Compound as: “So, it’s like, this place is a home away from my homeland in Mindanao. So, this is an extension of Mindanao, I feel, even though I am away from Mindanao, I am still living in Mindanao within the Metro Manila” (Interview, July 2, 2016). In this regard, during another interview it was explained:

Interviewee: “We have some rulings in our religion, like food, no, we are haram, we are halal. Haram means, the forbidden. So, if we mix with Christian area or non-Muslims area, there are some, some aspects, from the religious side. And then drinking of alcohol, and then the ‘sugal’, betting, that is very common in non-Muslim areas. Because of this city, we have no choice, because of necessity, and the needs for ourselves. It’s difficult to mix with other, non-Muslim people. Local food and non-local food for the Muslim is not an issue for the government.”

*Gatekeeper: "Because remember, the Muslim only eat the meat that needs to be slaughtered according to rituals, Islamic rituals. If it's not, Muslim try to avoid that food. But, unfortunately they all keep on eating Jollibee."*¹⁵

Interviewee: "Sometimes we have no choice, we are living in a non-Muslim country, that's why sometimes we have to, sometimes you just follow the flow" (Interview, July 3, 2016).

Also other interviewees underlined the importance of the Muslim community within in the Christian environment:

"That a mosque is close and available halal food, that's really important. Also, because so I can teach my children. When I was travelling to the golden mosque, they would stay at home. But here, it is easy to expose the children to the religious daily life, that they can learn. For the children to see their parents going to the mosque, it's important!" (Interview, July 3, 2016).

In this context, the religion was in all interviews described as being outstandingly important, whereby the range of answers varied from: "It's a big part, a big part of my life. But it's also difficult" (Interview, July 2, 2016) to "Everything, it's a matter of life and death" (Interview, July 16, 2016). On a more indirect level, one interviewee underlined the importance of religion, when it comes to trust. The respondent explained to me, that someone was taking care of her house while she stayed abroad: "You know, they are like family. Yes, religious people" (Interview, July 3, 2016). Along these lines, most interviewees answered the connected question about their identity (see also Annex 1), that in the first place, they see themselves as Moros and then as Filipinos, whereby none put the respective ethnicity on the first spot. However, a considerable part hesitated to categorize: "I do not see a difference, there is a separation between culture and religion. Being a Muslim does not make me different from anybody else, and the type of being. For me, living in Mindanao, is the same as people living in Manila, just trying to make a life." (Interview, July 16, 2016), whereby another respondent stated: "In my opinion, there is no difference. But if you just ask me, I am proud of being a Moro. A Moro, recognizing the identity of the Bangsamoro, of the Muslim Filipino, in Mindanao" (Interview, June 19, 2016).

Apart from the positive aspects that the Salam Compound offered its residents in terms of religion, respondents complained about the illegal activities and related police raids in the area (see also Chapter 5.2). In this relation, they explained that as residents, they knew where to go and from which areas to stay away. One respondent who was to become a father explained, that he needed to move, because his house

¹⁵ Filipino Fast-food chain

was in a too risky location, and children could not play outside (Interview, July 16, 2016). A further interviewee reported:

“Just two or three weeks after my arrival, the house I was living in was hit by bullets. My house, it got struck by bullets. Ten magazines! It was a major police operation here in Salam Compound, against drugs. Four wounded and one killed, inside the room, we were hiding, in the CR [“comfort room”- bath room]. There was a suspect, [...] most wanted. That was my baptism in Manila. That early, only two or three weeks after moving here” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

In this relation, interviewees complained about the stereotyping of Muslims in general and furthermore of the residents of the Salam Compound in particular. In this regard, they blamed the biased angle of media reports, that would highlight the religious matter in case a Muslim was involved into a crime, whereas if committed by a Christian, it would be handled as an individual problem: “Good news, good news is not news. [...] Especially when its Muslims!” (Interview, July 16, 2016).

“It's because there are still a lot of people, especially from Manila, that understand, that the Muslim, because in the media they portrai the religion as bad. For example, if somebody does something wrong and his name is Muslim, automatically it is connoted. So, it becomes a part of the religion problem and not because of the person as a problem, whereas when a Christian does something wrong, it's only him that is bad and not the entire religion. So that is the reason why Islam is portrai as if they were pushers, drug dealers, like all the bad, types, means of living, it's connoted to their religion” (Interview, July 16, 2016).

In this regard, interviewees talked about experiences of discrimination when it came to interactions with the Christian surrounding. In this regard, the discrimination was mostly felt during job applications (for further examples, see also Annex 2.3).

8.2.4 Jobs: Networks versus Marginalization

Similar to the role connections played for the first settlement in Metro Manila, in most cases jobs were referred through such contacts. Only in one case an interviewee got hired in small businesses owned by an extended family member (a bakery), and another interviewee explained, that he found his job(s) through a job agency operating within the Philippines. Apart from that, other interviewees explained that they were referred through family members or friends to their jobs. Almost all male interviewees found jobs in constructions, as tricycle drivers or as security guards, whereby they often had two or more jobs at the same time. Interviewees commented, that they were hired in constructions or as security guards, because these

jobs were risky, and hence not a lot of people applied for it: “But we, the Muslims, are hired if the job is risky. For a risky post, they hire Muslims. What they say is, that Muslim is brave, they will not run away, because they grew up with this!” (Interview, June 19, 2016), which was commented through the key contact: “But also, we only have one life. For them it is easier to hire a Muslim for risky position, because they have no choice to reject.” In this regard, another interviewee stated: “[...] I also worked as a security, for this you need courage. You need courage to have a good job, but to get money. Now sometimes, I can refer others to the security agency, because they need money” (Interview, July 2, 2016). In this context, the family members present during one interview joked about the respondent, who did not have a chance for any job, since he was too short: “You anyways don’t have an opportunity. But for him, not only because he is Muslim, but he is too short. The only opportunity for Muslims is security guard, but when you are little, you are not hired. He was even too short to work in constructions” (Interview, June 18, 2016). Moreover, it was said, that Muslim employees were only paid the minimum salary or less, whereby Christian colleagues supposedly earned more for the exact same jobs.¹⁶ However, even if the salary was paid too late, the respondents stated that they could not complain, because they could not risk losing their source of income.

The respondents working as tricycle drivers explained, that they were basically self-employed, since the tricycle had to be rented officially. Drivers were thereby only allowed to operate inside the Salam Compound, which encompasses approximately 3.5 hectares and furthermore pathways, that are too narrow for the vehicle to enter (see also Chapter 5.2 and Annex 2). According to the information given through the respective interviewees, the rent of the tricycles costed 300 PHP (5.88 US Dollar) daily, and further 500 PHP (9.81 US Dollar) were reportedly needed for gasoline, whereby extra 70 PHP (1.37 US Dollar) had to be paid for the so-called *butaw*, an unofficial “protection fee”. Drivers consequently had to earn more than 850 PHP (16.67 US Dollar) a day on such a small territory, whereby another interview revealed, that a ride from her house, which was located approximately in the middle of the compound, to the exit of the compound costed 5 PHP (0.10 US Dollar) (Interview, July 3, 2016). This in turn meant, that one tricycle driver needed on average minimum 170 of such rides a day, in order to be break-even. Hence, some drivers shared the tricycles and worked in shifts, so they divided the costs incurred and furthermore were able to have another job.

One male interviewee had quit his job in constructions, and started offering smaller technical services. The money earned he invested in products, that he could sell again for a bit more (Interview, July 16, 2016).

¹⁶ The minimum wage of workers in Metro Manila is officially 512 PHP daily (10.04 US Dollar) (Dole, 2017).

Only one respondent came to Metro Manila to finish his Master degree, which allowed him to find a position in a government office (Interview, July 3, 2016).

Even though interviewees were in most cases referred to their jobs by contacts, they generally complained, that the job search took them still several months. Thereby not only the lack of education was accounted as one decisive problem, but first of all their religion: “As a Muslim, it is harder to find a good job, or any job, because if there is a Christian person applying for the same, they give the position to him. Even though the Muslim is maybe better qualified, still the Christian gets the job. We just have to take, whatever is left” (Interview, July 3, 2016). In this regard, also other interviewees complained, that if application forms asked for the religion, there was no chance to get hired. One interviewee elaborated: “When I arrived here, it became obvious that my Muslim name was a problem. I changed my name to appear Christian, so I have a better chance. It is a wrong name, not mine, but I had to. Then after eight months, I found a job” (Interview, June 19, 2016). The practice of changing the name was thereby a common approach to blend into the Christian society. In this context, interviewees lined out, that for men such adaption was easier, whereas women were easily identified as Muslima through their hijab: “But for us boys, the discrimination is not that, you know, unlike for the girls, they are wearing a hijab. But us, they see us and we look the same, there is no gap, there is no wall in seeing us. We look the same. It’s only when they discover, when seeing our resumes” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

All female respondents, except for one, had previously worked abroad as OFWs, whereby in all cases the intention was to support the family via remittances, and to save money for the later life. Such savings in turn allowed most of them to open small businesses in Metro Manila. Two female respondents owned sari-sari stores, one opened an unregistered restaurant, another one was offering laundry services, while one invested her money in old clothes, which she then designed to new pieces: “Yes. You just buy the used clothes and cut and sew them together, and sell it for more money as something new then” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

Additionally, recruitment agencies offered further job opportunities for the Filipino Muslims (female and male) staying in Metro Manila. To own a recruitment agency, or to be an agent thereby seemed to be the most profitable option of all: “He is an agent in the recruitment agency. This explains, why they own this house!” (Side comment of gatekeeper, July 16, 2016). Another interviewee elaborated, that the agency owned by Christians needed Muslims as direct contacts to Muslim communities and to Mindanao. In this regard, the agents visited their home areas comparatively often:

Interviewee: “I ask people in Mindanao.”

Researcher: “This is why you go there so often? To recruit people directly from there?”

Interviewee: "I give them to the recruitment agency, and they give me money. It depends on how many people you can give to them. Commission. This is why I go there so often."

Researcher: "Is it easy to find people?"

Interviewee: "Twenty to thirty every time. There are a lot of interested!"

Gatekeeper: "But all of them first need a passport!"

Researcher: "So they come to Manila first? Do they stay here in Salam Compound?"

Interviewee: "I help them out with processing the necessary documents. First, they come to Manila, to endorse to the agency in the office. Then, they issue the passport and other documents. I am the one to invest, and of course I make them pay for that!"

Gatekeeper: "The applicant has to pay and also the agency. Depends on the contract."

Interviewee: So, that's my work, besides being security. It used to be my father's job, and when he died, I took on. Because people naturally continued talking to me, asking me for this kind of services" (Interview, July 3, 2016).

Another interviewee engaged in recruiting stated on the other hand, that Muslim Filipinos were exposed to illegal recruiters, this is why Muslim agencies or agents were needed, in order to secure fellow Muslims.

Abroad, most men worked in companies or as drivers, while women worked as domestic helpers and one as a caretaker in a hospital. The stays abroad were in all cases planned temporary, and they varied between some months up to ten years, whereby in some cases interviewees went abroad repeatedly (to different countries). After the stays abroad, most of the respondents just settled back to the location in Metro Manila, they had stayed in before during the transit.

In two cases, interviewees returned back to their home provinces in Mindanao (one after some time in Manila, one after staying two years abroad), but due to the lack of development, they eventually moved back to Metro Manila.

Interviewee: "After coming back, I planned to finally go. To return."

Researcher: "To return to Mindanao?"

Interviewee: "Yes, after one month. I brought everything already. All my belongings, I wanted to return. My first means of livelihood was to sell street food, grilled fish. You know, I just really wanted to return [...] I was missing my home. [...] But nothing is developed. I hoped there were changes already, but unfortunately there is none. It was more or less five years after I left, I was imagining and I thought that things have changed. I had little savings at that time, for starting a business. I saved it from my work abroad. Here [in Manila] are factories, but there, there is no

single factory, there is nothing!” (Interview, July 3, 2016) (for further examples, see also Annex 2.4).

8.2.5 Remittances and Home Ties

As elaborated beforehand, to be able to financially support the family was an important pull factor for the migration to Metro Manila or abroad, whereby initially the migration had to be financially covered through either families or informal money lenders (see also Chapter 8.2.1). However, as outlined in the previous section (8.2.3), most interviewees initially faced problems in finding a job. In this regard one respondent explained: “So, there was a time where people from the provinces are the ones sending money to people who were new here. Meaning, while you are still, you are looking for a job in Manila, you depend on money from there, until you do find a job.” (Interview, July 18, 2016), whereby another interview commented: “Within two weeks, they think you are rich. They expect a lot, meaning money. Since you are coming from Manila. But I need it for my children” (Interview, June 17, 2016). In this regard, besides the “mobile phone-lines”, the ties to Mindanao were described to be maintained through “money-lines” (Interview, July 2, 2016). However, remittances were for all respondent’s a natural responsibility towards the family. One respondent stated: “I needed to earn money to send it back. When I was there, I received money from his father. But I never asked how he earned it, I just took the money. But so, I thought it was easy to make money here, at least. Then I could use his connections, but not for really good jobs” (Interview, July 16, 2016).

Moreover, one interviewee explained that in the past, remittances were sent via post: “It’s sometimes too hard to access the cities from the rural areas, where there is a bank. So, we sent it postal. It wasn’t online. No way to withdraw money”, whereby the personal network was again identified as important, considering that there was a high risk of the money being stolen: “Fortunately I was lucky, but I heard about a lot of stories when the money was stolen at some point on the way. I can only repeat again, that connections are really important. You cannot go to Manila without knowing someone, you cannot send money without knowing someone” (Interview, June 18, 2016).

Likewise, the contact used to be maintained via post. As a common practice, migrants would send voice tapes: “Before the cellphone, they do recordings on the cassette. And we sent it, and when they listen to it, everybody is in tears. [...] It takes four weeks from Manila to Mindanao, but then the whole Barangay is sitting down to listen. All the families. Three months from [Saudi Arabia] to there, Maguindanao. Three months. Like remittances” (Interview, June 18, 2015). In contrast, the contact nowadays is maintained

digitally: “Yes, especially now with the cell phone. And then, there is unli-calls [unlimited], so you call like they are just in the next street” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

Additionally, respondents talked about visits to their home areas, whereby some were able to go home once a year, while others had not been home for over a decade. Only a minor number of the interviewees took their children with them to the home provinces in Mindanao, whereby others either preferred to not expose them to any risk, or simply had not been back to Mindanao since the children were born. Thereby in all cases, children only were able to speak and understand Tagalog, and not the respective native language of the parents. This became a common issue with relatives’ resident in Mindanao: “I plan to teach them Maguindanao. But the problem is, it’s hard to maintain, there is Tagalog, there is English. Even now, you teach your kids in your own home, but they keep on talking in Tagalog. In school, and even when they play outside, you hear them talking in Tagalog. Sometimes, my mother got angry to me, why I don’t teach my kids to speak Maguindanao. I told her, I think about it, but in my home the kids just speak Tagalog” (Interview, June 3, 2016).

Apart from the ties directing from Metro Manila to Mindanao, some of the interviewees had helped relatives and friends to move to the Metro: “I invited my siblings. I was the eldest, I was acting like mother and father in one person. I made sure to get them jobs and houses” (Interview, July 3, 2016). In contrast, other respondents preferred relatives and friends to stay home, like presented in the following excerpt from an interview conducted on July 2, 2016:

Researcher: Do you still have a lot of relatives in Mindanao?

Interviewee: Yes, many. I miss them, my siblings.

Researcher: Do you recommend them to come here?

Interviewee: Supposedly...no! I would never, some other friends who come here, life in Manila is not easily.

In other cases, interviewees preferred their relatives and friends to stay in Mindanao connected to the recent political developments, and the hopes they set on the newly elected President Duterte, which shall be elaborated further in section 8.2.6.

Apart from the personal networks, one interviewee explained that the Philippines allow “a special window for Sharia, the Muslim personal law”, whereby all courts were located in Mindanao. Consequently, if a case could not be settled through the local council in the compound (see also Chapter 5.2), cases were filed in Mindanao under the Sharia, which hence tied Muslim Filipinos to their “homeland” on a “legal” level over the general legal system of the Philippines.

On a different level, the ties to Mindanao were maintained in a more symbolic manner, namely through marriage. All interviewees were married to Muslims, mostly within their own ethnic group. Partners usually met either before their departure already in Mindanao, or in Metro Manila through private contacts. As one example, a respondent explained how he met his wife: “In Manila, her cousin. She came back from overseas. And her brother is a friend. That friend, a distant relative, was already in Manila. He is from South Cotabato. Next province in Maguindanao” (Interview, July 3, 2016). Only in one case the second wife, which was met in another Muslim community in Metro Manila, was a balik-Muslima (Interview, July 16, 2016), and one husband was balik-Muslim, whereby the partners had met during their time as OFWs in Saudi Arabia (Interview, July 3, 2016) (for further examples, see also Annex 2.5).

8.2.6 Memories of the Homeland and Hopes for the Future

In relation to the previously mentioned pull factors, most interviewees saw themselves confronted with a disillusioning reality only some days after their arrival. In this regard one respondent recounted: “First, I was really happy that I was in Manila, but it only took me a few days to, you know, feel the sense, to realize [...] it was really frustrating. But despite that, I tried hard to do something, to keep the spirit go on. I still didn’t want to go back.” (Interview, June 19, 2016), while another interview stated: “We thought in Manila is the beautiful place to be. And then we saw Manila, the reality. The place is not really hell, because the women are beautiful. No, I’m just kidding. [...] Anyway, the dream that I was dreaming, ever since when I came here, the way of living compared to Mindanao, I thought it was a better place, a better living. It wasn’t that easy” (Interview, July 16, 2016). Interviewees often referred to their home provinces in order to draw comparisons to their lives in Metro Manila. In this regard, they did not refer to the times of war, but they rather depicted a peaceful image of Mindanao before the conflict. In this regard respondents complained about the high costs of products and services in Manila: “From here, only to the outside [by tricycle], you have to pay five Pesos. In Mindanao no! The only five Pesos is, you are going from the town then very far, to pay five Pesos. [...] Here in Manila, just only to give [...] like for instance garbage. You have to pay money, but in Mindanao no! The children, only to give them garbage, you need to give them twenty Pesos” (Interview, July 3, 2016). Moreover, the quality of life in Mindanao was focused on the rural and untouched landscape in contrast to the urban surrounding in the capital region: “There to have water, you only need to walk a bit to find water, and you can take it. If you are hungry, you just take the fruits, or the fish. You don’t have to pay for it. In Manila, you pay for everything.” (Interview, July 3, 2016); “All there, all the food, all the fruits, everything is fresh.” (Interview, June 19, 2016); “I miss the fresh air, Manila is polluted.” (Interview, June 18, 2016); “And you know, it’s such a nice place, you know, between Sulu

and Basilan, we call it Tonkil, it is an island. That's Tonkil island, white beach like Boracay.¹⁷ And a part of the beach is pinkish, it's pink beach, the sand is somehow pink. The nature, I love the nature in Mindanao. Not like here in very polluted Manila" (Interview, July 2, 2016). In this regard, one interview explained: "I love my place, I cannot exchange it to Manila. No one can. Manila is for earning money, home is home. I want to die in my place. I love my people. I love my place. Yes" (Interview, July 16, 2016).

Most interviewees expressed, that they conceived the desire to eventually move back to their home areas. One interview answered the question, if he wanted to return to Mindanao with a simple: "100%" (Interview, June 19, 2016). As previously outlined, two respondents had already tried to return home, whereby the lack of development and opportunities eventually forced them to move back to Metro Manila.

In this context, the interviewees shared the idea of going back to Mindanao in the course of their retirement, or when peace would be eventually established: "Of course I am thinking about going back to Mindanao, as soon as there is peace, I am going there." (Interview, June 19, 2016); "Yes, peace, then we go back to Mindanao. If there is stability, because now my kid has to finish school. When there is development, I can go back. I want to rest there, here it's all about work, work, work." (Interview, July 17, 2016). In this regard, a considerable amount of interviewees underlined the importance for their children to be able to finish their education properly: "Three, one is in university, one in secondary and the other in primary education. At least for now, one of my main goals is for my children to finish school and to find a job. Then I am done, when they finish schooling. Now I am thinking about going back, but it's a maybe, but then I can think about it again" (Interview, June 18, 2016).

As previously indicated, the recent political developments encompassing Duterte's electoral victory on May 9, 2016 after the failure of the BBL under then President Aquino III (see also Chapter 3.3) evidently gave the interviewees new hope. In this regard, one interviewee called Duterte her *kababayan* (also *kabayan*: countryman), and her "neighbor in Mindanao", since she planned to buy a house in Davao. In this regard, the interviewee was sure that Duterte would settle the conflict "[...] but he maybe only lives one year. Yes, I know, but I am sure some of the family members will continue and keep up the very good relations in the Philippines." (Interview, July 3, 2016), whereby she apparently referred to an alleged dangerous position Duterte was situated in, due to his goal to settle the conflict, and the possibility for his relatives to take over his position in case something happened to him. Along these lines, another interviewee stated: "Before, there happened a war twice a year [...] Now, the president changed now" (Interview, June 19, 2016). Interviewees hence set high hopes on Duterte to finally push the BBL through, which was expected to stabilize the situation in Mindanao, which would be the precondition for them to move back: "Because our

¹⁷ Commonly known tourist area in the Philippines.

new administration now is to avoid discrimination. So, there is a chance for Muslim, and he continues peace talks. I hope so! His plan is to continue, to have peace” (Interview, July 3, 2016). In this regard another interviewee explained, that he wanted his family that still lived in his home province to stay there: “Now, that Duterte won, things might become better. It’s going to be peaceful. [...] My only hope, that there will be peace. [...] The roots of people doing something bad, it’s not the cause, root, of short temperedness, because it sets up a limited thinking for them, and if peace comes, everything will be good. The kids will be able to study, everything would be better. And progress would come, if there was peace” (Interview, July 17, 2016) (for further examples, see also Annex 2.6).

8.2.7 Evaluation of Conflict

The previous section already reveals, that a significant number of interviewees reflected their hopes for the future on the recently elected President Duterte, and they thereby expressed a positively connotated attitude towards the political developments. Along these lines, interviewees furthermore did not hesitate to share their opinions on past developments connected to the conflict, reaching from the failure of the BBL to the conflict situation in Mindanao. Previous quoted statements in section 8.2.1 show already examples of affiliations with the MILF against the state forces, while other excerpts from interviews indicate aversions against the stakeholders of the conflict and furthermore reveal the continuing split between the Muslim and Christian society in Metro Manila.

In this regard, the pre-colonial times of an Islamized territory of what was to become the Philippines constituted a major reference point in order to explain the still ongoing injustice towards all Filipino Muslims, and in this regard the need for more autonomy of Mindanao, whereby it was not specified if this encompassed the entire island or only the ARMM:

“Like for instance, our leaders in Mindanao, they do not know, that they become part of the Philippines. Sulu was a sovereign country before, and then, they were shocked, now it is part of the Philippines. Our ancestors fought for several centuries just to defend our land, the other ones, the Americans came. The befriended our elders and after that, we become part of the Philippines. We lost the sovereignty we had, we lost the, the, we lost everything. We become part of this country” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

“Actually historically, the first who discovered the, this archipelago, were Arab traders. No Philippines at that time. And the first who discovered, eventually discovered this were the Arabs, they Islamized people here, that was centuries before. Everywhere, in Manila, in Cebu, in Batangas.

Muslim, everywhere, it was a Muslim civilization. But then the Spanish, during the first colonialization. Some Muslim, some of the Muslim were not able to resist, there were Christianized. But in Mindanao, they fought against, from the Spaniards, to Japan, to America, until now. And the sad thing now is that the Filipino system, it's fighting own brothers” (Interview, July 16, 2016).

One interviewee explained the term Moro as being a positive re-conceptualization from the original negative meaning, that emerged during the Spanish colonial rule (Interview, July 3, 2016). In this regard, another interviewee underlined, that the term Philippines or Filipino were a sign of colonialism, while stating that he was proud of being a Bangsamoro (Interview, June 19, 2016).

As previously outlined, a considerable number of interviewees blamed the biased media reports for the stereotyping of Muslims, which were only based on the conflict related incidences in Mindanao, as well as to other illegal activities in other parts of the Philippines. They continuously explained that violence was not part of the Quran and of Islam, through which they distanced themselves from “terror groups” and other crimes. In this regard, they blamed the big stakeholders and personal interests for the failure of peace efforts and the continuation of armed confrontations. In this regard, one interviewee further explained:

“It went so far, that it came to the violent outbreaks and now all Muslims are blamed for it, nowadays it's ISIS and they have the Abu Sayyaf, this is what stands for the Muslim community now. But they are not, cutting of your head and all that, these groups are not a part of Quran. But you wonder why they are there. This is not teaching in Quran. Like Abu Sayyaf, it is not us! The Abu Sayyaf is also military; the majority of the Abu Sayyaf is military. [...] They are politicians. The commanders. The big men behind, they are hiding behind their private armies, but they feed the rebels with arms. Until now, Abu Sayyaf continues, they have a political cadre [...] and the BIFF was, for example, they are not born extreme but the fighters are used political, they want more power, it is not about religion, it is about the modern government and influence” (Interview, 2016, July 16).

In this context, one respondent included the issues of drug trade as “the number one security concern”, while describing radical splinter groups of the insurgencies as “small elements”:

“But the main issue is drugs. Maybe if the problem is only solved, because the problem, when you say the problem with the government and the Moro, it can be easily mitigated, it can be easily negotiated. But the problem with the drugs, that's very difficult. Especially when some of the government officials and police officials are involved” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

In regard to the internal problems in Mindanao, the interviewees who supported the peace process under President Aquino III underlined: “The problems in Mindanao can only be solved by Mindanaoans. Now we have the hope, that this will finally happen under the new administration” (Interview, July 17, 2016).

In regard to the common evaluation and perception of the conflict, two interviewees mentioned different internal organizations from Filipino Muslims from Mindanao, that can hence be suggested as being one source of information. One interviewee indicated that the Salam Compound had different organizations and youth groups, that met for open discussions and organized events. Such groups were told to be furthermore connected to community members, that recently stayed as OFW in Saudi Arabia, via Facebook: “We can see the Facebook, the post. He is keeping touch, twenty-four hours, all we can see him. Updates, you know, Islam, religious power, and literature [...] Due to that, we establish another organization, just to reach some new. Because some of the youth are not interested to unify, we call it Salam Compound Youth. We try, but they go anyway abroad, but we have Facebook” (Interview, July 3, 2016). In this context, another interviewee talked about the group “Young Moro Professionals Network”, which was to connect Filipino Muslim graduates in order to mutually support each other during the job search or as a pool of exchange. Even though if voluntarily presented, both topics were not further elaborated on by the respective interviewees.

8.3 Discussion

In relation to the research questions of this study (see also Annex 1), the above presented findings gathered during the interviews shall be connected to the previously introduced theories on internal migration and migrant networks (see also Chapter 4.2)

During the interviews, respondents gave real life examples about their experiences of conflict in their home areas in Mindanao, which reflect upon the previous elaborations in Chapter 3 and chapter 4. The instability and lack of future perspective were thereby accounted as decisive push factors. The desire for a better life connected to a safe environment and economic stability determined the common spirit before the migration. However, the improvement was not only related to the individual situation, even though most interviewees initially migrated alone. In regard to the previous elaborations in Chapter 4.2.1, the so called “family-strategy” has to be accounted as a major aspect (Lucas, 1997). The financial support through remittances for the family members that stayed behind in the home areas was for all interviewees a given and accepted responsibility. Hence, opportunities for better jobs and thus a higher income were decisive pull factors for prospective migrants, which moreover already indicated a general direction towards urban centers. Most respondents moved as young adults, whereby a considerable part was still single. In addition, all migrants

considered from the start to pave the way for other family members to follow, once being financially capable of providing for it. In regard to the previous elaborations (see also Chapter 4.2.1), the cases of the respective interviewees can hence be perceived as “social products” in the context of the “economic [and] political parameters” linked to “[families] and households”, as described by Boyd (1989). In this context, they can moreover be related to the previously presented encouraging hypothesis and the push factors deriving from the responsibility towards the family, as well as to the regulatory linkages in terms of family obligations according to Fawcett (1989).

However, as presented in Chapter 8.2.1, two respondents moved to Manila for different reasons. The previous MILF fighter, who was eventually denied being an active part of the insurgencies due to his status as a father of a new born, explained how embarrassed and offended he was, when people kept on asking him why he was not fighting, while the rest of his male family members was. Hence, the migration to Metro Manila allowed him to escape such confrontations. If extended, these circumstances can be perceived as a push factor related to the conflict hypothesis (see also Chapter 4.2.1). On the other hand, the resettlement moreover allowed him to generate a higher income, which he then used to support the remaining fighting MILF members. This could be described as a pull factor connected to a specific form of family or ethnic obligations, whereby the context of the conflict clearly have to be taken into account. In this case the decision to migrate can be described as being a compromise (to passively support the fight instead of actively) and avoidance (to continuously justify why he could not be an active fighter) at the same time.

In the second case, the respondent revealed that he wanted to become part of the insurgency, but his father ordered him to move to Metro Manila in order to prevent him from doing so. The father had migrated to the NCR himself beforehand. The respondent eventually obeyed his father after several months. In this case, the decision could still be described as a social product related to the sphere of family networks, whereby the family obligation was not rooted in strategic step for the improvement of all members, but rather a disciplinary measurement for the individual migrant.

Keeping the role of networks in mind, the interviews have shown, that most migrants were initially financially supported by their families. Apart from paying for the travel, some migrants received remittances from their home areas in Mindanao while searching for a job in Metro Manila. In this regard, Fawcett (1989) described monetary remittances as part of the tangible linkages between family members, whereby he did not consider the direction from the migrant sending areas to the migrant receiving areas, but only the traditional way reflecting on the initial purpose of the migration, as elaborated above (see also Chapter 4.2.1). In other cases, family members or friends that were already residing in Manila provided for the new migrants during their settlement and job search, and hence lowered the costs of the migration, as described by Lucas (1997) (see also Chapter 4.2.2). In the cases families were not able to afford the

migration, informal money lenders became a common opportunity for migrants. Interviewees referred to such as “five-six”, a term which indicates the high interest rates. The money-lenders can be seen as (informal) migrant agents, considering that they allowed the migration for the respective respondents, that otherwise would not have had the chance (see also Chapter 4.2.3). Moreover, the interviews revealed that such contracts required a local guarantor, which consequently involved the entire family that stayed in the home area. In the case of the interviews, borrowing money from an outside source can hence be understood as being incorporated in the family strategy, since all members carry the responsibility of paying the debt back.

Apart from the direct job opportunities and the income, education was prioritized by the major part of respondents. Most of them were not able to finish their education due to repeated internal displacement caused by the conflict. Even though a migration would not allow them to finish their studies (due to the age and high amount of fees), interviewees considered that it would path the way for future generations to do so. Hence, single migrants considered their future children, while the migrants that were parents already at the point of migration initially assured the schooling of their children through the payment of school fees in Mindanao. If eventually financially capable, partners and children followed the respective family member to Metro Manila (see also chain migration as regulatory linkage, Chapter 4.2.1), and hence the education was continued there. In this regard, education was perceived to be directly connected to a better life for future generations, as well as an assurance for the later life of the current generation. In the case of the interviews, the children of migrants that had finished their education in Metro Manila and started working already (within the Philippines or abroad) supported their families financially. This can be referred moreover to the “intertemporal agreement”, as termed by Lucas (1997) (see also Chapter 4.2.1). Along these lines monetary remittances, which according to Boyd (1989) are the most visible form of “social networks across space”, constituted a significant dimension in the overall context of the decision-making process, and eventually for the life in Metro Manila of the interviewees of this research.

In this connection, private networks as well as what Fawcett describes as “Migrant Agency Activities” provided further pull factors, that were not only decisive for the general decision, but moreover for the geographical direction of the migration. According to the interviews, almost all migrants either had personal ties to Metro Manila before their migration (family members or friends), or they arrived in NCR through recruitment agencies that function as migrant agencies. Even though such stays were of temporary nature before going abroad (up to one year), the transit allowed migrants to establish a personal network in the area, which became important after the return to the Philippines. In this regard, all OFWs eventually stayed in Metro Manila.

As previously outlined, two respondents had tried to return to Mindanao, but the continuous instability in their home areas eventually forced them to resettle again, whereby Metro Manila was reportedly the only consideration. Thus, respondents did not take into account to move to a more stable location within Mindanao, such as the urban centers Cotabato City (within the ARMM) and Davao (bordering to the ARMM, previously governed by Duterte), that are accounted as typical destinations of interregional rural-urban migration.

Only one interviewee came to Metro Manila without previous networks, however the respective respondent intended to pursue a Master degree, which has to be seen as exceptional in regard to the other respondents. The interviewee had finished his bachelor degree in Mindanao, and the personal financial situation allowed to pay for the migration and for the considerable amount of study fees at one of the most expensive universities in the Philippines. He was referred to the Salam Compound through a Muslim employee of the university, who recommended the location after the respective interviewee unsuccessfully applied for a room in the student dormitories. Hence, it were eventually religious ties, that led the way to the Salam Compound.

In relation to the emergence of migrant networks, Haug (2008) identifies “pioneer migrants” that move without the comfort of personal ties (see also Chapter 4.2.2). However, in relation to the elaborations in Chapter 5.1, migrant movements from Mindanao to Metro Manila previous to the official outbreak of the conflict show different dynamics. The patterns of migration include temporary migration for commerce, labor migration to rebuilt Metro Manila after the World War II, and in the course of the emerging conflict in Mindanao initial scholarship programs as strategic steps by the colonial power, through which already 3559 Muslim students from Mindanao moved to Metro Manila, of which reportedly a considerable amount eventually stayed there after the graduation. Moreover, foreign Muslims resident in Metro Manila played a crucial role amongst others in regard to the establishment of the Muslim Center, the first mosque and Muslim facility, which later on turned into the first Muslim community. Hence, when first migrants moved away from Mindanao due to the conflict, first ties to Metro Manila existed already. Apart from personal networks, the religious ties were a significant basis for the first settlements in the Muslim Center. As the previous outlines shows, the continuing conflict in Mindanao caused a significant influx of Filipino Muslim migrants escaping from the instability, which consequently led to an overcrowding of the first Muslim community, and thereby step by step to an increase of Muslim communities in Metro Manila. Like the visible expansion the Muslim communities, migrant networks can be suggested to have expanded parallelly with each arriving migrant (see also Chapter 4.2.2).

Along these lines, interviewees explained that the previous personal contacts resident in Metro Manila provided important incentives for the migration. On one hand, some interviewees explained that former

migrants had told them directly to move to Manila, because of better opportunities and a higher standard of living (information hypothesis, see also Chapter 4.2.2). On the other hand, some interviewees interpreted indirectly transmitted messages as pull factors to Metro Manila, such as the obvious improvement of the economic status visible either through remittances, or through a new lifestyle (new clothes, a change of manners and attitude). The range of direct and indirect information shared by former migrants is what Fawcett (1989) includes into his category of tangible linkages of family and personal networks (see also Chapter 4.2.1).

Apart from the personal networks, interviewees revealed that recruitment agencies became an important source of information (see also Chapter 4.2.3). Interviewees reported that such agencies foremost provided information about job opportunities abroad, especially in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, agencies supported respective migrants by processing the necessary documents in Metro Manila, and by providing accommodations during the period before going abroad. In all cases, the accommodations were located in Muslim communities in Metro Manila. As previously shown, the established personal networks during the transition period played an important role after the return. Hence in this specific scenario, the established personal networks can be described as a side effect of the migrant agency activities.

As a further dimension of pull factors, some of the interviewees stated, that they had seen Metro Manila on television and had heard about it via the radio. Hence images of the urban center encompassing amongst others modern buildings, stars and expensive cars, were highly attractive for the migrants situated in the rural environment.

In the overall context, Massey et al. (1993) describes the possibility for an emerging ‘culture of migration’ as the result of a continuous high level of negative net migration from one sending area, and hence a high degree of directly and indirectly spread incentives from former to future migrants (see also Chapter 4.2.2). In this regard not primarily the migration to Metro Manila, but the temporary migration abroad was during the interviews repeatedly described as a common practice during the time of migration. The dynamics have thereby to be set into the context of the conflict situation in Mindanao.

As already indicated above, apart from the initial flow of information, migrant networks eventually played a crucial role for the (patterns of) settlement of the respondents within Metro Manila, and hence in particular for their stay in the Salam Compound in Quezon City, Metro Manila (see also Chapter 4.2.2).

As presented in Chapter 8.1, nine of the interviewees moved directly to the Salam Compound to relatives or friends. Other interviewees eventually resettled to the Salam Compound for different reasons. Some interviewees relocated due to ongoing problems in other communities, such as an increasing overcrowding of the area, or the outbreak of a fire. In such cases the respondents did not move alone, but again with the

family members or friends, they had lived with together beforehand. Only one interviewee stated, that violent conflicts between different Muslim tribes in one community were the reason to move. Two respondents explained, that they had other family members resident in Salam Compound that asked them to take over their places during the time of the land dispute with Iglesia ni Cristo (see also Chapter 5.2). In these cases, the referred to family members were about to leave the country to work abroad. They offered the respective respondents to stay in their houses free of charge, in order to make sure that it was not destroyed during their absence. Even though the situation in the compound triggered security concerns, the opportunity to not pay rent made the respondents eventually move. It can be suggested that the vulnerable situation of the respondents was misused for the personal advantage of the leaving family members, even though it was presented as a win-win situation. To be taken into account thereby is, that one of these family members was only found in Metro Manila, and the family lines were reconstructed through different reference points, such as the place of origin and common relatives. One interviewee had relatives living in the Muslim Center, but he came to Metro Manila without telling them beforehand. It turned out, that the relatives did not have the capacity to host the respondent, which left him homeless for three months, before one family member eventually organized a room for both of them to move in.

Apart from the personal connections, the aspect of religion became moreover an important for further considerations of settlement. In this regard, respondents moved only from one Muslim community to another. The presence of a mosque and available halal food were outstanding factors for the interviewees. Even though in most cases personal ties were the reason to settle in the Salam Compound, the convenience that the residential area provided in terms of religion can be perceived as an outstanding factor for the decision to stay. In relation to the previous underlined importance of education, the Salam Compound is moreover located close to an elementary school and to a high school (see also Chapter 5.2 and Annex 2). Through such characteristics combined with different Muslim ethnicities resident in the compound, several interviewees referred to it as “little Mindanao” or “a home away from home” (see also Chapter 8.2 and Annex 3). In this regard, the advantages of the Muslim neighborhood balanced out the previously presented problems in the compound (see also Chapter 5.2)

In general, the patterns of movement show that migrant networks were a decisive factor for the patterns of settlement for the interviewees, be it of personal nature or through recruitment agencies. As a further factor, religious ties have also to be accounted as an outstanding factor for the considerations of settlement, and furthermore as a decisive facilitator to establish interpersonal ties within the Muslim community.


In relation to the migrant networks, the interviews showed furthermore that such connections were moreover identified as important for the job search. In regard Chapter 4.2.2 indicates the emergence of ethnic enclaves, whereby only one interviewee was hired by a relative who owed a small-scale business.

The networks played a role in so far, that most interviewees were referred to their jobs through private ties. However, the job search still took several months, whereby male respondents revealed to have often changed their names to appear Christian. In this regard, their religion was seen as a clear disadvantage, due to the high degree of discrimination in Metro Manila. Such marginalization became visible through an ethnic segmentation of the labor market (see also Chapter 4.2.2). Almost all male interviewees worked in constructions, as security guards or as tricycle drivers. In this regard, respondents and the gatekeeper explained, that such jobs were given to them due to the increased risk factor, whereby apart from the physical risk, tricycle drivers can be accounted as self-employed and had to carry a considerable risk in terms of finances, as elaborated in the previous section. Interviewees moreover complained, that they were only paid the minimum wages or less, while Christian colleagues would earn more for the same jobs. Their vulnerable situation however prevented them from officially complaining, since they could not risk losing their jobs, which can be set along the lines of the previous presented elaborations of Lievens (1999) (see also Chapter 4.2.2).

The interviews moreover revealed, that a significant part of former OFWs eventually became engaged in recruiting, either as agents of already existing agencies, or by opening up an own agency. It was stated, that Christian agencies needed Muslim agents as connection to communities either in Mindanao or within Metro Manila. Hence, some interviewees were eventually hired by the agencies they went abroad with. Only two interviewees were financially able to open own agencies, whereby they used the ties to the respective locations of their time as OFWs. In one case, one interviewee inherited the task of recruiting from his late father, even though he had never been abroad himself. The respondent explained that people had continued approaching him after his father passed away, consequently he eventually started collaborating with the agencies his father was working for. Hence, a considerable amount of the interviewed migrants was eventually incorporated in the sector of migrant agencies. The increase of agents can be again connected to an expansion of networks (Massey, 1990: 8, see also Chapter 4.2.2). Apart from the profession as recruiter, a considerable amount of interviewees stated, that family members had followed them to Manila already (chain migration, see also Chapter 4.2.1), or that they are still planning to do so, whereby they felt responsible for the settlement of the future migrants.

Summarizing it can be stated, that the respondents of the conducted interviews revealed the importance of migrant networks for their migration from the conflict affected areas in Mindanao to the Salam Compound in Metro Manila. In the first place, networks triggered decisive push and pull factors for the decision-making process for the migration in general, and then in particular for the location of Metro Manila as receiving area. In that regard, networks had a crucial impact of the patterns of settlement, since almost all interviewees were either hosted by their private contacts, or by recruitment agencies. In all cases, the respective

accommodations were exclusively located in Muslim communities in Metro Manila. The only case in which the respondent did not have any ties to Metro Manila, it were eventually the religious ties that connected him to the Muslim community of the Salam Compound. In this regard, the lack of support from contacts caused, that one interviewee remained homeless for three months after his arrival, until he was eventually invited by a family member to stay with him. Networks then played moreover a role in regard to the maintenance of ties to the home areas, in the past connected to the sending of remittances and voice tapes, and then in terms of chain migration of other family members. Hence, through the migration, migrants themselves became part of such migrant network. It can be suggested, that in the case of the interviews conducted during this research, the personal networks and the migrant agencies as different categories of migrant networks were connected through a mutual influence. On the one hand interviews have shown, that recruitment agencies helped future OFWs to process their documents in Metro Manila, during which the respective candidates were hosted in Muslim communities. Through the considerable length of stay, respondents were able to establish personal networks, which became eventually decisive after their return to the Philippines. On the other side, a considerable part of the respondents eventually became professionally engaged in the migration as recruitment agents, which was mainly boosted through the personal ties established during the time abroad (to agencies, agents, and employers in the respective location). Only in one case, one respondent active as a recruiter did not stay abroad beforehand, but he inherited this profession from his father, who had stayed in Saudi Arabia as OFWs. The general assumption however shall be illustrated in the following graph.



In the overall context, it was moreover shown, that the migrant networks were very decisive for the patterns of settlement, but in terms of the job search within Metro Manila less effective than for example in comparison to the recruitment for overseas work. Even though most interviewees stated, that they were eventually referred to their jobs through contacts, the job search usually still took several months. This however has to be seen in the context of the conflict and the marginalization of Filipino Muslims in the Philippines, whereby limited choice of jobs can be interpreted as signs of an emerging ethnic segregation in the labor market.

In all cases, respondents maintained close contact to family members and friends that were still resident in the home areas in Mindanao. Interviewees explained, that the home ties were easy to maintain nowadays due to the modern technology, which allowed them to keep frequent contact via phone calls or messages. In comparison, interviewees explained that in the past the contact was mainly maintained via voice tapes. The tapes did not contain personal messages, since reportedly the entire barangay would listen to it. In relation to the previous elaborations, such voice tapes have furthermore to be accounted as one source of information, and hence as a potential pull factor. Apart from messages, respondents explained that also monetary remittances used to be sent postal. In regard to the high risk of the money getting stolen along the way, one interviewee underlined the importance of reliable networks. Such connections were foremost of personal nature and not related to (informal) migrant agencies.

On the other hand, the ties to Mindanao were maintained metaphorically concerning the relationships of migrants. Even though some of the interviewees stated, that they had contact to non-Muslims (some through family ties), none of the interviewees was married to a non-Muslim partner. In most cases, the partner had the same ethnic origins and was introduced through private contacts, either already in Mindanao or in a Muslim community in Metro Manila. Apart from the personal ties, the connection to the homeland was furthermore maintained on a legal level. First of all, interviews as well observations showed, that the SMAAC was fully accepted as authority. Moreover, it was stated that if cases were not managed to be settled through the elderly council, they were filed in front of the sharia courts located in Mindanao and not in government courts in Manila.

As the elaborations have shown, the conflict situation in Mindanao has triggered multiple push and pull factors, whereby the information flow through networks (personal networks or migrant agencies) as well as through media (television, radio) have provided complementary pull factors for the migration to Metro Manila. However, as already indicated in Chapter 4.2.2, such information flow can be incomplete or wrong, which in turn causes significant limitation for the considerations of settlement for the new migrants, that rely on the provided incentives without further verifications (Pohjola, 1991). In this regard, all respondents admitted that they expected something better when moving to Metro Manila. Interviewees expected a broad

range of opportunities for jobs, better salaries, and hence a higher standard of living. In contrast to the initial hopes, almost all respondents perceived their migration as an exchange of their rural lives shaped by the conflict against urban poverty and a continuing marginalization. Most interviewees remembered, that it took them only a few days to lose their illusion. In the first place, they expected their hosts to be living in nice houses, whereby they found themselves eventually in small places. As presented previously, one interviewee even had to sleep on the roof with a further person. Likewise, interviewees were disappointed that the job search took them so long, which forced them to either rely on remittances from their families in Mindanao, or to engage with informal money lenders that abused their vulnerable situations. Hence, the financial situation initially got worse for the migrants as well as for and their families. In this regard, the limited choice of jobs constituted a further negative aspect. However, a considerable part of the interviewees admitted that their life in Metro Manila was hard, but the fact that they could live in peace, and that their children were able to go to school, was enough reason to stay.

However, except for one, all migrants missed their home areas in Mindanao, and the increased hope for peace after the election of President Duterte made them daydream about a return home. Especially the wide and untouched nature constituted a major (reversed) pull factor back to their home areas. This wish to escape the urban setting and poverty in Metro Manila constitutes the contrary to the previous pull factor, that initially led them to the capital region. In this regard, interviewees explained that the life in Metro Manila was dedicated to earn money, whereas they want to spend the rest of their days in their homes. However, even though the respondents were emotionally closely attached to their respective home areas, none of them taught their children to speak in the respective local language. Hence, interviewees apparently did not feel the need yet to really prepare for a return.

According to the previous outline of Safran's diasporas (1991) (see also Chapter 4.2), several characteristics were identified during the interviews. A considerable part of the interviewees referred to the pre-colonial times of Muslim sultanates, that dominated the political landscape of the territory, that was to become the Philippines. Hence not only Mindanao, but the entire country territory including the Visayas and Luzon was taken away from them. In this regard, interviewees underlined, that they were not foreigners to Metro Manila. However, due to the specific stance of Mindanao during the Spanish and American colonial rule (see also Chapter 3.1), their claim of what Safran (1991:83-84) describes as "original 'center'" encompassed Mindanao and the surrounding islands (Sulu, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi). In regard to the common perception and evaluation of the conflict, it has to be moreover taken into account that the gatekeeper as well as the interviewees showed a general strong support for the BBL process under President Aquino III, and it was repeatedly stated, that the problems in Mindanao could be solved once the old structures were re-established (sultanate and datu systems, see also Chapter 3.1.1 and Chapter 5.2). Along these lines,

respondents showed a general acceptance for the preservation of traditional legal structures regarding the SMAAC as well as the sharia courts in Mindanao. Accordingly, it has to be kept in mind, that the gatekeeper was the one to choose the interviewees, whereby it was already stated beforehand that he might have been biased in terms of his own involvement in the peace process. Hence, it might have been important for the gatekeeper and the interviewees to promote an image of the Mindanao conflict, that exclusively blamed outside actors for the outbreak of the conflict and its continuation, whereby internal problems were depicted as side-effects that would disappear once the real threat, stakeholders and forces connected to the central government, were gone. In this regard it has to be considered, that at no point such opinions were asked for, but the conversation dynamics automatically led there. Moreover, one interviewee indicated, that the compound had several youth groups. According to the short cut explanation, such groups targeted at the religious education, whereby ties to current group members that were OFWs in Saudi Arabia were maintained via Facebook. However, how events and an agenda looked like in detail was not further elaborated on. In relation to the historic background of conflict, interviewees felt generally not accepted by the Christian environment. Apart from the previously presented discrimination on the labor market, interviewees moreover complained about the general stereotyping and the defaming of Muslims, whereby they specifically mentioned biased media reports that crucially contributed to such reputation.

9 Conclusion

In the context of the Mindanao conflict in the Philippines, the respondents interviewed during this field research have shown, that migrant networks played an outstanding role for the internal migration from conflict affected areas to the Salam Compound in Quezon City, Metro Manila, as well as for the patterns of settlement and the daily life. As the previous discussion of the findings suggests, the migrant networks thereby consisted of private ties to family, friends as well as of ethnic and religious affiliations within the Muslim community, and moreover of informal and formal migrant agencies in form of money lenders and recruitment agencies. In the first place, family networks provided important push and pull factors for the general decision to migrate, whereby the circumstances of the conflict have to be accounted as decisive. This was further on boosted through private linkages to former migrants already residing in Metro Manila, through formal contacts to recruitment agencies, or through the presentation of Metro Manila in the available media (television, radio). In this context, respondents were provided direct and indirect information about the location and the circumstances in Metro Manila or abroad, which is accounted as a complementary pull factor, that precisely determined the geographic direction of the settlement. As prospective migrants, the respondents expected better job opportunities, higher salaries and a general

improvement of the living standard, which would moreover allow them to financially support their families that stayed in Mindanao, and/or to eventually bring them to Metro Manila. The perceived modern and developed landscaped of the urban center thereby constituted the opposite of the rural location shaped by the conflict, in which the interviewees were situated in before their migration. Apart from the recruitment agencies as migrant agencies, the service of informal money lenders served as additional pull factor, by enabling the respondents in need of financial support to migrate in the first place.

In each case, the ties of respondents led them exclusively to Muslim communities in Metro Manila. More than half of the interviewees directly moved to the Salam Compound, while others initially moved to other communities. The eventual resettlements were reasoned by a decreasing level of living standard in the first locations, which was mainly triggered by the significant influx of Muslim migrants escaping from the conflict in Mindanao. Hence, the Muslim communities in Metro Manila became generally common destinations for Filipino Muslims from Mindanao, which in turn triggered the emergence of new neighborhoods, as outlined in Chapter 5.1. In this regard, only one interviewee mentioned emerging conflicts between different Muslim tribes as a considerable security concern, which triggered the eventual relocation within Metro Manila from the Muslim Center to the Salam Compound (see also Chapter 5.1).

In the cases of OFWs, it was elaborated that the transit stays in Metro Manila (to process the missing documents that were either lost or never filed due to the conflict in the home areas), that took up to one year, allowed respective respondents to establish private ties, which became important after their return to the Philippines. Along these lines, only one respondent moved back to Mindanao after the time abroad, while all other former OFWs moved straight back to Metro Manila. However, the still ongoing instability in Mindanao eventually also forced the returnee to resettle again, whereby also he chose to move back to Manila. None of the respective respondents considered another location as possible destination than Metro Manila. Other possible choices thereby could have been either other areas within Metro Manila, or other more stable urban centers in Mindanao (like Cotabato City or Davao in the south, Illigan or Butuan further north) or in other parts of the Philippines (e.g. Cebu in the Visayas).

In this context, it was furthermore suggested that in the case of the respective interviewed residents of the Salam Compound, the two presented categories of migrant networks (personal networks and migrant agencies) were highly interconnected and triggered mutual chain reactions. Apart from the impact on the settlement after the return from abroad, the established ties during the stay abroad as well as the generated savings enabled returnees to eventually function as recruiters themselves, or to offer related services, such as the individual support for processing of the documents or the provision of accommodation. Hence, recruitment agencies on one hand triggered personal networks, and on the other side caused the incorporation of migrations in the industry.

In regard to the previously presented push factors that were related to family strategies and the encouraging hypothesis (see also Chapter 4.2.1), it was elaborated that financial incentives constituted outstanding pull factors. In this regard it was stated above, that migrants expected an improvement of the financial situation, whereby this did not only reflect on their individual life, but on the level of their families. However, the interviews have shown that even though most jobs were referred through private contacts, the job search still took several months and was considerably limited to positions, that were identified as physically and/or financially risky (security guard, construction worker, tricycle driver). In this regard, interviewees blamed the discrimination against Muslims in the Philippines for the marginalization in the job sector. As a common practice, male participants reportedly changed their names to appear Christian, in order to have better chances on the labor market. However, due to the lack of education as a result of the ongoing conflict and displacement during their childhoods, the change of name did not cause a significant difference in terms of job opportunities. In this context, the only respondent with a finished Master degree was able to find a comparatively good job in a government office. All female respondents were self-employed, whereby either their savings generated during their time as OFWs allowed them to do so, or they were involved in the recruitment business, whereby only one was engaged in the business of her husband. It is striking however, that all female participants had a job, hence the aim to earn money overlay traditional gender roles.

In the context of the financial situation, all respondents sent remittances back to their remaining family members in Mindanao, whereby they revealed that money used to be sent postal due to the absent access to banks. In this regard one interviewee underlined the importance of reliable networks, since there was a high risk of the money being stolen. On the contrary, one interviewee indicated that in some cases, the direction of the financial support was initially directed reverse from the periphery to the center, since families supported the migrants during the first time of job search. In cases families were not able to do so, informal money lenders became the only chance for the migrants to move in the first place, and then to stay.

Apart from remittances, personal home ties were maintained in a regular manner. Interviewees remembered the past times in which they had to send voice tapes to their barangays, which took several weeks to arrive. Respondents stated that in comparison, nowadays they would be able to call or to write messages any time. Almost all migrants moreover visited their home areas in Mindanao, whereby some could afford to do so once a year, while others had not been home for over a decade. The respondents engaged in recruiting were thereby the ones, that went back and forth the most. However, only a few migrants brought their children to Mindanao, and none of the children could speak or to understand the respective native language, which triggered several problems with the family members in Mindanao, that were not able to speak Tagalog. Hence, the ties of the second generation were maintained and filtered through the parents. Moreover, two

interviewees indicated youth organizations, whereby one was explained to aim at the religious education of the second generation. The second one was described as an online pool of young Muslims graduates, that supported each other in the job search. However, the topic remained closed and was not further elaborated on. It can only be assumed, that such organizations, as well as the information spread through family members, triggered the common perception and evaluation of the conflict and political developments presented during the interviews.

Finally, all migrants described their experience of migration from Mindanao to Metro Manila as disillusioning. Their expectations and hopes triggered by the beforehand presented information flow through the networks did not match with the reality, they were eventually confronted with. In this regard, except for one, all interviewees longed to eventually return home, whereby they referred to an image of Mindanao before the outbreak of the conflict. The described (reversed) pull factors referring to the vast and untouched nature, the available fresh fruits and drinking water, as well as the low living costs, constituted thereby an opposite to the pull factors, that initially triggered the migration to the urban center.

In this regard, respondents set high hopes on the new administration under President Duterte, to finally establish peace in the region. For this reason, several interviewees stated, that they did not want other family members to follow them to Metro Manila, since they were waiting for things to become finally better. However, none of the respondents had met any measurements for a return home, but the situation rather allowed them to start considering it again. In the past, most of the respondents had helped family members to follow them to Metro Manila. Hence, even though the life after their migration did not meet the expectations, the instability in Mindanao as well as the longed-for reunion of families still caused chain migrations.

As previously explained, the data collected during the field trip to Metro Manila from May 5, 2016 to July 28, 2016, and in particular the interviews conducted during the period from June 14, 2016 to July 17, 2016 with residents of the Salam Compound, were related to the beforehand outlined research questions (see also Annex 1). Due to the scope of this Master thesis and the limited time frame of the research, the focus was strictly adhered during the presentation of findings as well as during the discussion. Hence, the research clearly allows an absorption in terms of an extended time frame, the number of interviewees and a further specification of the topic. In this regard, future studies could focus on gender and livelihood among the internal migrants along the lines of the research conducted by Cagoco-Guiams (2013) in regard to IDPs in Mindanao, considering the beforehand presented dynamics of self-employment of female respondents.

Moreover, the gathered information revealed aspects, that are suggested to constitute a so far broadly ignored angle in the research of displacement and migration connected to the Mindanao conflict. In the case

of the conflict triggered internal migration from Mindanao to Metro Manila, migrant networks were suggested to be based on ethnicity, whereby emerging Muslim communities were treated as diasporas. However, the unit of further analysis of such diaspora is proposed to be not limited to one Muslim community, nor to the group of all Filipino Muslims, that internally migrated from their home provinces in Mindanao to other parts of the Philippines. As previously stated, interviewees mentioned youth organizations and groups, that apart from local activities and events used social media as a means to communicate. It was stated, that the online community was thereby connected to current OFWs in Saudi Arabia, that frequently shared information, literature and furthermore continued the organization of events from abroad. In this regard it was suggested, that the common perception and evaluation of the conflict, as well as the dominating opinion about a re-establishment of pre-colonial structures as solution for the settlement of the conflict, might have been triggered and boosted through such sources of information. In the interview situation, it was not possible to gain a further insight of the dimensions and the impact of this online network. However, Kissau and Hunger (2008) open up the possibility, to use the internet in order to observe developments and dynamics in migrant networks, which are differentiated between transnational online communities, virtual diasporas and ethnic online public spheres. Such analysis would require the direct contact to one of the group members, preferably a leading figure, as a gatekeeper, and if possible the contact to further members in order to compare the online engagement and the impact on the real life. Furthermore, a profound knowledge of Tagalog would be an outstanding asset, considering that the interviews revealed, that the different ethnicities amongst each other, as well as the children in general, communicate in Tagalog. However, additional language skills in for example Maguindanao or Arabic (in regard to the role in Islam) would be crucial advantages. Such approach in regard to the Filipino Muslim diaspora from Mindanao, is suggested to be interesting and moreover relevant for future research.

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Annex 1

1.1 Research Questions

Principal research questions:

- In how far do migrant networks influence the considerations of settlement?
- What are the migration patterns leading to a settlement in the Salam Compound?
- How is the Filipino Muslim diaspora organized in terms of networks?

Minor research questions:

- What are the initial push and pull factors for the internal migration?
- To which extent do the networks play a role for push and pull factors?
- How are the ties to the “homeland” maintained?

1.2 General information about the Interview and the Respondent

- Date of the interview:
- Place of the interview:
- Duration of the interview:
- Indicator for the interviewee:
- Gender of the interviewee:
- Age of the interviewee:
- Profession of the interviewee (since):
- Raised (countryside/city):
- Exact location of place of origin:
- Religion/ Ethnicity:
- Mother tongue:
- Relatives living in Manila:
- Relatives living in Mindanao (where?):
- Special occurrences in the interview:

- Description of interview side and atmosphere:
- How did the interviewee feel? (e.g. was s/he comfortable in his/her biographical narration, any indication for trauma?)
- Translator needed?/ Who translated?

1.3 Introductory Question

First of all, thank you for taking your time to support me in my research. Like I have explained before, I am interested in the experiences of migrants from Mindanao in Metro Manila. In this regard, I want to ask you to tell me about your life. You can start by explaining me how the situation in Mindanao looked like before you left, about the experiences of migration itself leading to the arrival and settlement in Manila till now. For me everything is of interest that is important for you, so please feel free to share details with me and take your time in doing so. I will not interrupt you during this part and later on I might ask you some questions for clarification. I will record our interview and take notes but I assure you that all data is handled confidential and there will be no third parties informed about any personal data.

1.4 Interview Guideline

| | |
|---|---|
| Before/ process of decision-making/ push and pull factors | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Where is the I. from? ○ How old was the I. when s/he decided to migrate? When s/he migrated? ○ Level of education? Occupation? ○ At what time (of the conflict) and under what conditions did the I. used to live in Mindanao? ○ What role did the conflict play in the daily life? For the decision? ○ Role of religion in daily life? ○ Did the I. make the decision on his/her own or together with family/ another group? Any influence by other persons? |
|---|---|

| | |
|---------------------------------|---|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Was Manila the first choice? If so/ If not, why? Links? Networks? ○ How long did it take to make the decision and how much time passed until taking action? ○ What was the I. hoping/ seeking for? ○ What did the I. know about Manila? (regarding Muslim – Christian relations? Language? Job opportunities? Place to settle? Close to a mosque/ Muslim community = priority?) ○ Where did this knowledge come from (Media, general knowledge, specific networks? Did other people/ other migrants advise/advertise to migrate – give hope?) ○ Did the I. feel “forced” to leave or voluntary decision? (Only opportunity for a better life, to support family? Pressure by third parties?) |
| During the period of migration | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ How old was the I.? ○ Migrated alone/ with family/ group? ○ What emotions? (Hope, happy, excited, sad, afraid, anxious, lonely...) ○ Was Manila first destination? (If not, what was first destination? How much time spent there and how? Why then further to Manila?) ○ Were there already links established and a place where to go when arriving? (If so – how was the relation to the contact person? If not – how did I. manage/cope?) ○ Preparations? (regarding language? Some beforehand planning for job interviews, housing, etc?) ○ How did the I. migrate? Financial resources? By what means? Registered or Unregistered? Did/does the I. have documents? |
| After the migration/ settlement | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Contact to family? (Mindanao and Manila/ elsewhere in the Philippines/world) ○ Does the I. receive remittance from abroad? From family or friends? Did remittances play a role in financing the migration to Manila? ○ Impact on social relationships? (Separation of families, power shift within – extra stress for women? Loss of traditional structure of protection? Remittances?) ○ Contact back to Mindanao? (Besides family) ○ Role of religion in daily life? (Compared to before?) |

| | |
|--|--|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ New occupation? In comparison to before? Were education/working experiences acknowledged? (Vulnerable to exploitation?) Did the I. face any problems in finding a job? If yes, related to religion? ○ Where settled? In a Muslim community? – Job within this community? ○ New contacts/ Social relations? Existing networks? Mosque? Muslim community? Also besides Muslims (e.g. through job)? ○ Daily contact to Christians/ other ethnicities? ○ Quantity/ quality of interreligious contacts? ○ What difficulties did the I. face after arriving? (discrimination – job, salary, renting an apartment, neighborhood?) ○ What role does the conflict play now/ from Manila? (In a daily life/ special events (elections, in times of incidences)) – Engagement? ○ What was hoped for and was eventually possible to achieve? ○ Does the I. feel like being a part of the society in Manila? Sense of belonging – loss of home – loss of identity? Does the I. feel safe in Manila? Filipino or Moro – identity or both? ○ Does the I. feel connected to Mindanao? On what basis (Homeland, community, family, religion?) ○ Does the I. visit Mindanao? ○ Does the I. plan to return at some point? Or plan to get family, other friends to Manila? If so – how? Actively helping/ promoting? ○ “Forced to stay” or voluntary decision? (When does internal displacement end? Is return possible? – How perceives I. his/her self? Family dependent on remittances?) ○ Does the I. plan to go/migrates further? ○ Hopes for the future? |
|--|--|

Annex 2

2.1 Map of Mindanao



Source: <http://printable-maps.blogspot.com/2010/07/maps-of-mindanao-island-philippines.html>




Source: <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/777524/election-2016-agenda-of-the-armm-governor>

Annex 2.2 Duterte merchandise during Presidential Elections 2016



T-Shirt with Duterte print, “Atin to pre!” – Street slang for “This is ours, man!” Photo taken February 15, 2016, Green Hills Shopping Mall, San Juan, Metro Manila.



T-Shirt with Duterte print, the Visayan dialect pronounces the English word thirty as “tirtē” or “terte”. Duterte promoted the stance of Visaya as important as Tagalog, whereas previous Presidents and politicians exclusively used Tagalog and English. Photo taken May 9, 2016, Divisorias Mall, Manila City, Metro Manila.




Face mask with “DU30” print on clenched fist. Face masks are commonly used in traffic in Metro Manila. Photo taken February 15, 2016, Green Hills Shopping Mall, San Juan, Metro Manila.

Annex 2.3 Depiction of Benigno Aquino III in contrast to Duterte's reputation




Source: www.getrealphilippines.com/blog/2013/07/mosquitoes-zombies-yellow-fever-and-despicable-him/

Annex 2.4 Displacement and Poverty in Mindanao



Source: Bell, 2011: 6

“Percentage of people who experienced displacement between 2000 and 2010”



Source: Bell, 2011: 7

„Distribution of the two poorest wealth quintiles“

Annex 2.5 Map of the Philippines and of Metro Manila



Source: <http://viewthrumyglobalens.blogspot.com/2012/01/monday-mural-iv-v-isayas-i.html>



Source: <http://www.islandsproperties.com/maps/img-maps/metromanila.gif>

Annex 2.6 Salam Compound, Brgy. Culiat, Quezon City, Metro Manila




Screenshot of Google Maps: Salam Compound Culiat

Image shows the outlined of the “Muslim Compound” (not inserted by researcher) and the proximity to the headquarters of Iglesia ni Cristo.



Source: <https://www.google.com.ph/maps/place/Philippine+Nuclear+Research+Institute/@14.6646731,121.0608675,16.36z/data=!4m12!1m6!3m5!1s0x3397b74725bd5b4b:0x8574b8358957450c!2sSalam+Compound!8m2!3d14.667247!4d121.05882!3m4!1s0x3397b715546a0f69:0x33d99a68c748d6e7!8m2!3d14.6605469!4d121.0565244?hl=en>



Close-up of the Salam Compound. The image shows the tensed population of the compound, especially in comparison to the surrounding territory, which is owned by Iglesia ni Cristo.



The headquarters of Iglesia ni Cristo (location visible on the first map of this Annex 2.6). Photos taken July 16, 2016.



Entrance of the Salam Compound. Photo taken July 17, 2016.



Outside of the Salam Compound, approximately 15 meters next to the entrance, the only open spot that is not covered by a wall. Photo taken July 17, 2016.



Only photo which was taken inside the Salam Compound. It shows the street sign of the “Sulu Street”, which is one of the widest in the compound. Photo taken June 18, 2016.

Annex 2.7 Divisorias, Greenhills, Quiapo



Source: <https://www.flickr.com/photos/liverpoolpictorial/3832639359>

Photo taken in the Greenhills Shopping Center, San Juan, Metro Manila.



Greenhills Shopping Mall. Photo taken May 25, 2016.



Quiapo, City of Manila, Metro Manila. The area of the golden mosque. The left picture shows the backside of the house that is visible on the right side of the left photo. Photos taken May 30, 2016.



The golden mosque. Photos taken May 30, 2016.

Annex 3

3.1 (Chapter 8.2.1)

Experiences of Conflict:

“The reason was the war, the violence back there. I was a rice farmer, but the frequent violence, it was really hard. I always had to leave the farm, I lost a lot of times the crops. So, thought it was better to go, to go to Manila to find a living. It has been a hardship, continuously, but here he can live in relative peace” (Interview, June 18, 2016).

“My life was good before everything, and I studied until the war came. I was still in elementary then, so I would move from place to place while I was still in elementary, because of the war” (Interview, June 18, 2016).

“It is easier to find a job here if you really look for one. My origins, there is no stability, no peace. When I was still a small kid, there was war already, even as a child” (Interview, June 18, 2016).

“The rest of the rooms were occupied by students, because it is located close to the university. I always wanted to finish my studies. I could see them doing so, but I never could. Everywhere middle-class students. One of my original plans was to continue his studies, I only finished secondary school with bad quality because I always had to leave home” (Interview, June 18, 2016).

“It [the conflict] affects me a lot, because in my family, my three siblings got hit by shrapnels’, and only one sister is still alive. She was hit in the head, but the rest, half of her body couldn't move anymore. But it affects, the war affects a lot, because it affects the studies of the kids, they get displaced, it is really sad” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

“So, when I was living in Mindanao, the life there was normal. I lived like normal most of Muslims on my land. And, but the area I was living is the area of conflict. So, since the 70ies, with my mum, I already experienced evacuations and I had to evacuate growing up, and because of this, I wasn't able to study” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

“My cousin, who was seven years old, was shot death by the army. It never leaves my mind. He was collecting empty shells, bomb shells, to sell them. A way of making a living, the children are doing that, to earn a living. And then he was missing and we just learned about the child's death when there was a dog and an alligator fighting over the body, the corpse of the boy. Meaning he got maybe killed somehow [...] The boy was killed by the military and the body was just left. In the water. There was no justice till today, but it is an image of the conflict that stays forever” (Interview, July 2, 2016).

“Before, life was really quiet and beautiful in Mindanao, and then Martial Law started, and it started getting messy in Mindanao. Also because of the rido and grudges. So, I decided to come to Manila. We were not part of the grudge fight, we did not want to get involved in the whole conflict. So, we decided, we just leave the area, so that we can have a peaceful life” (Interview, July 2, 2016).

“Because every three months you lose harvesting, my farm, fishing. So, when armed conflict is going in armed conflict, many Mindanaoan go here in Manila. Because they are distracted, the fishing is not easily catch. Livelihood, our livelihood is destroying during that armed conflict. And double tragedy, because sometimes armed conflict from the low land, yes, the flood. During that, el Niño, now is el Niño. So how will the Mindanaoan cover? Ate, during that armed conflict plus flood, double tragedy, so the other evacuees come from the other side and low side” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

“Because you know, the trouble, trouble is in our place in Mindanao. Yes, always trouble, and we don’t want trouble. Because we cannot find a nice life, a good life there. We cannot find a good job, because of this trouble. Yes, always, no peace of mind, yes, that is why we are here” (Interview, July 16, 2016).

“When I was younger, we used to live in the mountains and life was very nice. And then time came, when the military came and they burned down our house. So, because of that, whenever I saw soldiers, I thought bad about them! I went to another city to study there, but later on I trained to be a part of the MILF, because I wanted to retail for them burning down the house, that I couldn’t move back!” (Interview, July 16, 2016).

Jobs in Mindanao:

“Cassava farming. The difficulty with cassava is that, the rain and they have a lot. So, rain can ruin the whole business” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

“My family are farmers and the majority in Mindanao are farmers, because the land is very, very fertile. So, it’s good, because you can plan anything and it will grow, mean it is a good source for livelihood” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

“For him it’s really, they feel equal, equally. Except in Manila, when you meet, when you have an income, it’s immediate more or less. In Mindanao, it’s the agriculture sector only. Finding an income here is easier” (Interview, July 2, 2016).

“Yes, yes. Because in Mindanao the truth is, it is very difficult to find the money, in Mindanao, yes. Even 100 Php, because many of our Mindanaoan, because her work is farm, fishing” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

“During the era of Estrada, when he set the all-out war, I was part of the MILF to fight back. My first child was only forty-five days old. It became a guerilla warfare, and then, at that point my uncle, who was a commander, decided that those who have wives and kids, to go down and to go back to the camp. So, my family was in [the city], and I went up the mountains, but then was eventually send back down to camp. Once you are a part of MILF, your heart belongs to that, and for what they are fighting. So even now when I am here in Manila, this is just to get fine work and provide for my family, also up in the mountains [...] But before that I, ah, he decided to just become a driver for “Habal Habal”, that’s like a “Tuctuc”. [...] So, before, because I wasn’t earning very well anymore, I decided I would just sell my bike and then move here, because my mum lives in Quiapo” (Interview, July 16, 2016).

Ties to Metro Manila:

“It was my relatives who encouraged him to go here” (Interview, June 18, 2016).

“It was not exactly that they invited me. But these relatives from Manila, who came here from Mindanao, so in my mind they were better off. I decided to come here, but didn't tell anyone. I hoped that my relatives can help me. But it was different than I expected. So, it was my own decision without anyone encouraging actively. When I arrived, my relatives did not give me shelter. I slept in Rizal park. No money to eat, not money for a house. I was homeless for three months, and slept in Rizal park. It was really difficult. I was waiting for the rain, so I could take a shower. Every now and then a relative gave him five or ten Pesos, which I used to use the bathroom to take a proper shower, in Quiapo. And one time police officers arrested me, but it was heavy rain - so they gave me the possibility to sleep under a roof. And they told me to find a job (Interview, June 18, 2016).

“We first moved to Quiapo. My father had relatives there before” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

Interviewee: “I lived first in Quiapo.”

Researcher: “And when you then moved to Salam Compound? Was there already someone here that you knew?”

Interviewee: “Yes, my friend invited me to come over!” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

Researcher: “How long before you came did your husband arrive in Manila?”

Interviewee: “Three years. Almost three years. Three years before I come to Manila” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

“I had friends who came to Manila before him, and they told me, that I have better chances here. So, it was these friends who gave me incentives, when they visited Mindanao, they told me” (Interview, July 2, 2016).

“My aunt was from here. So, that was easy then, because my aunt is from here. Yes, she is from Salam as well” (Interview, July 2, 2016).

“It were my relatives, who encouraged me to go here. During that time, it was really difficult in my home town” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

“When I was fourteen, my family brought me here because here because life back home was, started to get affected with all the conflict” (Interview, July 16, 2016).

“Yes, I have an idea of Manila, because I reading book, and I have seen it in TV, yes. And I listened in the radio. So, I dream if coming here, because I, I was dreaming of a fortunate life. There is a difference, the what of living in Mindanao and the way of living here” (Interview, July 17, 2016).

The Role of Education:

“Three, one is in university, one is in secondary school and the other in primary education. At least for now one of my main goals for my children is to finish school, and to find a job. Maybe then I will plan again to go home. Then I am done. When they finish schooling, at least right now I am thinking about going back again. But it is a maybe, but then I can think again of going back to her hometown” (Interview, June 18, 2016).

“I left for four years, and came back and then went home first. So she first went back to Mindanao but then left again for Manila, because there was still war. Because in Manila, it's peaceful. She first stayed in Quiapo. The first time she was only here for two months for processing and then she left. [...] After I stay here I come back in Philippines. And now I have small business. This, my daughter is finished now, her studies. She is in Saudi. Work in Saudi. She is nursing. She knew that by the time she finishes her studies, she is the one to go abroad and support the family. The school for my daughter was in Manila. But first I went back to Pikit. I hoped for developments, but then decided to go back to Manila. I wanted better education for my child. And also to find a job, in Pikit is more difficult than here, it is more difficult in the province” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

“There is a difference, and now you come here from you University and ask me about this, it is again other studies. But I am glad, that his children have this opportunity” (Interview, July 2, 2016).

“And yes, my children, also studied here in Manila and then they finished their studies and now they are in abroad” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

“My kids are studying college, so he can't come back. So, she said, she would see, she told her husband to work there [abroad] as long as he can. Because here, he can't work here anymore. Because he is too old. I am only here with my daughter, and I told her husband, as long as the company lets him work, he should keep on working until the kids are graduated. Because it's hard to life without education. Compared to being educated in English, they would, number one is to be educated in Arabic and Quran” (Interview, July 16, 2016).

Recruitment Agencies and Oversea Work:

“Yes, Manila. This is also, Manila is also the gateway for overseas work” (Interview, June 18, 2016).

Interviewee: “I had little savings before coming here. It was only me and my husband, my parents were already gone. We heard about this recruitment agency, so we went to Manila by ourselves and then went straight to the office. It is better without agent, because they take extra money, extra fees.”

Researcher: “How did they know about the agency?”

Interviewee: “Through friends, there were a lot of people going at that time. Because there was a lot of conflict then” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

Interviewee: “We arrive without anything. The registers in our city municipal also cannot afford all of it. Belayed registration.”

Researcher: “So you get your documents only when you arrive in Manila or only for the purpose of going abroad?”

Interviewee: Most of us will get the birth certificate when they plan to go outside the country” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

Researcher: “Did you already know some here before you came to Manila?”

Interviewee: “Only the agent. No relatives, just the agent” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

“It [the recruitment agency] is non-Muslims, but they need contact to Muslims and to Mindanao. The agency headquarter is Manila, but now they have offices in Mindanao” (Interview, July 2, 2016).

Researcher: “Did you come here with a recruiting agency?”

Interviewee: “Yes.”

Researcher: “Did they, did you meet them already in Mindanao and did you search for them here in Manila?”

Interviewee: “In Manila.”

Gatekeeper: “Because the agencies were only, were only here back then”

Researcher: “And how long did it take you from Manila to finally go abroad?”

Interviewee: Almost one, one year. Because of all the documents. But also because of my age. She was still underage, so she couldn't go right away. They had to change my passport, my age in the passport, so I could go. And because of that, now I am a senior, she is really not. Because of the fake passport. They added twelve years (Interview, July 2, 2016).

Interviewee: “But in Saudi I feels closer to Allah, but everywhere I am, religion plays an important role.”

Gatekeeper: “One of the pillars of Islam is to pray five times a day, it is obligatory there, you have to” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

“I prefer, if we are going to abroad, like to Qatar, because we have better chances, and unlike here in Saudi, we are appreciated to be Muslims” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

Researcher: “And did you, in Mindanao, where you recruited from there or how did you get a contact? Like, when you first moved from Mindanao abroad, how did you establish the contact there?”

Interviewee: “No, it was very easy in that old year, old years, you know. Just one office, the whole office, recruiting, recruiting agency who took me.”

Researcher: “And that recruiting agency was based in Mindanao?”

Interviewee: “Yes, we have in Mindanao also recruiting agency. You know, one woman talked to me, you know, you want to go for abroad. And I said: “What work will I have?” The agency got me in Cotabato City. Only I spent is on my passport and my ticket from Cotabato to Manila. And when I stayed in Manila, but maybe two days, I didn't stay for a long time. Yes, almost my flight when I came here in Manila. And after two days, I flight for abroad. I didn't think anything about money, because they were the once. It's an employer question” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

“And the other is, here in Manila, if you don't know how to coordinate from the highest position, especially in illegal recruiter, because there is so many illegal here in Manila, and sometimes many victims came from different places, not from Manila” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

“I was never deported, because they loved the way I worked. I was hard working for my family back here. Then they were asking me: "Are you a real Muslim?", because I was reading the Quran, and learning Arabic. So then, they decided to tell me just to stay, because they liked me. Filipinos are very tidy, and I made a really good job, they really liked me. To do the hajj in Mecca. I postponed going to college, because I wanted to do the hajj first” (Interview, July 17, 2016).

Interviewee: “So, in Saudi Arabia, it is different, because there it is an advantage to be Muslim, even without education and without experience. When you apply as a nurse, you have to be Muslim, they get hired, whereas the Christians are out. Even if they are not licensed, the Muslims get hired because the priority of these countries are Muslim. So, what the Filipino government missed, to give chances to the Muslim, Saudi Arabia saw their potential and prioritizes them. In UAE, Saudi they choose Muslim, and in their home country they are discriminated. This is not necessarily the governments fault, but the companies fault. Especially the Chinese companies here, because they wouldn't hire Muslims. And NoyNoy [Aquino III] is the problem, he wants everyone to apply and to get a job, but he doesn't have a company, the Chinese own the companies and they wouldn't hire Muslims anyways. He only wants the BBL to pass, because he wants the Muslim and all the Filipinos together. The Christians are getting jealous when it comes to work in Saudi, because they don't get accepted. So now they feel the discrimination. So yes, the Christians cannot apply for a job, even when they have the license.”

Gatekeeper: “Saudi Arabia decides after the religion, and so there is also discrimination. But when it comes to a more difficult, to a skilled job, in Saudi Arabia, then even if you are not Muslim but are qualified, you get hired.”

Interviewee: “In Saudi Arabia, there is a different kind, so that the ones who should not don't enter Mecca. Until they are converted, then they are allowed to. So, they get segregated, because if not, because of card, it's different from Muslim and non-Muslim. They get separated in Saudi, to prevent them from going into Mecca. But the Saudis are really nice. Because the Christians there, even during Ramadan, even when they are fasting, they still fast as well. The Saudis are really nice. It doesn't matter if it's Christian or Muslim (Interview, July 17, 2016).

3.2 (Chapter 8.2.2)

Interviewee: “We first moved to Quiapo. My father had relatives there before. And then we moved here, because there was demolition there.”

Researcher: “And did you anyone in Salam Compound already, when you moved here?”

Interviewee: “I was one of the first ones here, it was a relocation. And my aunt was here by then” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

“I went to Saudi Arabia to work, and then, when I came back, I went to Mindanao. I asked around, if it was good for me to bring my family here. I went back to Mindanao, and when I came back, I brought my family with me to Manila. And then, when I went to, she went to Saudi to work, and then I came back, but then my husband died. Then after that, I decided to go to UAE and work, and when I came back, I stayed here to take care of my family and our main business is, that they finance people who wants to work abroad” (Interview, July 2, 2016).

“I moved to Quiapo, to the Muslim Center, thinking that I will find friends and relatives there, from my province. There I met my wife, through the other friend. And then, from that Muslim center in Quiapo my friend or relative invited me to move to Culiab” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

“Quiapo became a center for migrant community during that time, the city center from Manila. That’s really what you can find. You can even find relatives surprisingly” (Interview, July 16, 2016).

“Yes okay, when I come back for vacation from abroad, it was alone. I arrive here in this compound, my sister was here. She stayed in here. He told me this house, if I want to buy this house, this is for sale. So I, I said okay, I’m ready” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

3.3 (Chapter 8.2.3)

The Muslim Community; Religion and Identity

Researcher: “Do you feel Filipino or Muslim? Or is it the same?”

Gatekeeper: “He just wants to be called as a Filipino.”

Interviewee: “I want to be equal, I just want to be a Filipino” (Interview, June 18, 2016).

Interviewee: “One hundred percent. I am a Moro, I am a Muslim.”

Researcher: “And what being about being Filipino?”

Gatekeeper: “Are you proud being a Filipino?”

Interviewee: “I am Bangsamoro.”

Researcher: “Do you have contact to non-Muslims?”

Interviewee: “This means always a lot of discussions related to religion” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

“She loves this place now, because she has so many friends here now. Food is here. You won’t be scared, because everything is halal” (Translated interview, June 19, 2016).

“So, it’s like I came here as a stranger. But the people living in this place, sharing my believe, with my tribe, share with my religion, so although I’m a stranger, I don’t feel that way. Because I believe that Muslims, even if you don’t know the person, being a Muslim, you are one. So, although I am a stranger, but I feel that I belong to this place. So, the food, it is quite difficult to look for halal food. So, in my case, staying here, I am near the mosque. Because Muslims are obliged to pray five times a day and on the other side, the food, that’s very basic and very important in the lives of Muslims. You should make sure, that the food you are taking in is halal. So, after finding this place, with the mosque and the food, I decided to stay here. Despite the problems in the community, like there is some, some others are involved in illegal activities. But aside from that, I still prefer to stay in a place, where there is a mosque. You can hear the Adhan five times a day, and the food, which is halal. And of course, apart from the that, the Muslims, the community is surrounding you. They are all Muslim, they share with you your aspirations. So, it’s like a, this place is a home away from my homeland in Mindanao. So, this is an extension of Mindanao, so I, I feel, even though I am away from Mindanao, I am still living in Mindanao within the Metro Manila” (Interview, July 2, 2016).

“First, I am a Muslim, then I am Tausug, I am a Moro and last I am Filipino. This is how I categorize myself. First as a Muslim, second as a Tausug, third as a Moro and a Filipino. So this is the energy, my energy (Interview, July 2, 2016).

“I am proud of to be a Muslim and happy to be a Filipino, there are no problems” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

Researcher: “And, since you are here now, what role does religion play in your daily life? I saw that there is a mosque very close to your house.”

Interviewee: “Very important. It was the most important to move here” (Interview, July 16, 2016).

“The only thing is to be respected as a Muslim and not to be discriminated. Because we are mixed already of everything. Even Pakistani. My cousins, three of them are married to Pakistanis and some of them are in London. My family is mixed within and outside of the Philippines, and all humans are the same, we all belong together, our noses breathe the same air. I just want to be respected for who I am. As long as you don't do anything wrong, as long as you don't get involved with the wrong people, there is no problem, this is my believe” (Interview, June 17, 2016).

Police Raids, Discrimination and Stereotyping:

“When I am with friends, I feels save. When I am alone, insecurity comes up. It is more you know, a problem of confidence, when I have to take a bus on my own, meaning communicating, applying for a job” (Interview, June 18, 2016).

“It is hard because just because you are from there, even though you are civilian, the military and the police perceives you as an enemy and they would arrest you and accuse you, also without any reasons. Because you are Muslim” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

“In this community, the main problem here, sometimes the authorities, there are operation. Against the ones who are involved in the drugs. Most of here it is like that. It is fortunate that this area is a safe area, but some persons here, somebody there, everything is possible. You have to know where you can go and where not” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

“Non-Muslim, non - Muslim! Because of the information they saw in the television, Yes, it is really bad the media! Because, they yes, they are always mentioning about the bad. They are not mentioning about the good! Ah, what peoples is doing, you can see always in the television about the bad” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

“It is frustrating, that somebody outside will kill. The ones from the outside, they don't want to see us here. Ah, for many reasons, the people across the street. They are some people there, they don't even try, they are afraid that they don't be able to come out alive” (Interview, July 2, 2016).

“No no, it's a normal. We can adjust ourselves and we know what's their lives going on in in Compound. The important is, you don't, you know, you don't combine with them what's the problem about. You have to, you have to handle your own problem. Yes, you don't ask anything, anybody here, what's the problem

about. As long as they are not entering here, to disturb you, don't ask them about them. Because then you are creating a problem, if you, you know, if you ask them what, what's the problem about. So here we learn to keep our mouth shut. Yes, in business, we have a small business, and we are happy (Interview, July 3, 2016).

“Yes, some people are believing, that this is community is really bad. Number one endangered community. Yes, sometimes we say, if you see somebody outside, I say: " You can come and visit us in Salam Compound!", and they say: "No, that is a danger community, never, maybe they shoot us when we came there!" (Interview, July 3, 2016).

“Definitely, they [children] are more interested to play, than to be at home. I need a new home. This house is not good, so my baby in future needs a better house. But it is difficult now here in the compound, because other houses are even less safe. There are always risky houses, then it's better when the children play outside” (Interview, July 16, 2016).

“Good new, good news is not news. It's always the bad news that you can see in the Philippines, not the good ones. Especially when it is about Muslims. When somebody killed and the suspect is Muslim, the media tells these things: "People killed by Muslims". What's worse is "killed by Muslim from Culiati". (Interview, July 16, 2016).

“That's a reality. The reality, that most of the people who are afraid to come here, is because of, most of no real Muslim, they don't know real Muslim. In my case, I can say, I try my best. Even when I ride a taxi, I try to explain to the taxi driver that our community is good, and very well. Sometimes, they give me, they bring you here and they are afraid and don't want to enter. But along the way, you can explain. But voluntarily, they don't bring you inside. That's always mindset, that's what they think. And in Mindanao, about Mindanao it is the same. Somebody call us as Abu Sayyaf, they don't know what that means. It's no interaction, it needs more to explain. And nobody cares, no body research, a few maybe. We can only try to explain it” (Interview, July 17, 2016).

3.4 (Chapter 8.2.4)

In Manila:

“And this relative was also the one who referred me to the current employer. He was also working there back then” (Interview, June 18, 2016).

“And when I came here, I worked in construction, I built the skyway. And then I worked as a security” (Interview, June 18, 2016).

“Job, security, better opportunities. It is easier to find a job here if you really look for one” (Interview, June 18, 2016).

“I was helping out in the bakery of my uncle” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

“So, I used to have a restaurant, and then a relative needed money, I didn't have money to give. So, what I did was, that I loaned the place and then, that's when her husband died and I was never able to get it back, because I need money as well. So, I would sell it and loan it, so that's how it all ended up. Just, yes, it doesn't

really have a name and it's not registered, it's just more like to serve people and be able to make money” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

“I have my passport here. Expired. I got my passport, but it's already expired” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

Researcher: “How did you find these jobs?”

Interviewee: “I found the job through relatives. They were already working there and referred me. It was the daughter of the owner of this house, she referred me” (Interview, July 2, 2016).

“Not easy to find a job, just, when I am study and then graduate from high school. I mean starting then to look for a job, the first thing was in construction, construction worker. That utility, they called me. So jobs, so in then, I worked in utility in a condomium. I was in, in elsewhere, not here. And then I also worked as a security, for this you need courage. You need courage not to have a good job, but to get money. Now sometimes I can refer other to security, because they need money” (Interview, July 2, 2016).

“And the agency, we are in an agency, then the agency told me, that there is a hiring in a construction company. And then I tried to apply there, and first I received the same salary, and after two years. Tagalog. Minimum salary. Tagalog. For me, I am satisfied with that, I am, with that kind of salary, with 125. With that salary, with 125, and then it went up and he got happier, because he wouldn't be able to earn that in Mindanao. After two years, it became 150. Going by boat to Mindanao costs 600, imagine how much it is by plane” (Interview, July 2, 2016).

“Since, I did look for a job, but since I wasn't able to study properly, I started looking for other things to do. And I started doing watch repair, and then I learned to being a mechanic. So that's how I slowly brought everything together. [...] So, when I came to Manila, I had 2000 Pesos, and this was what everything had to come from. Because I came with my wife, and his kid, I had one kid when I moved. So, that basically was what, the 2000Pesos, where everything would come from; the rent, the food, and everything. What I did was to use that money to buy things, that would sell. And since I knew already, how to watch repair, I went from house to house doing watch repair. And because of that, I was able to gain a lot more, and I could provide for my family. Also in Mindanao, that it is normal for anybody, as long as you have, you always give to your family. So it's kind of a standard” (Interview, July 2, 2016).

“Now also my husband is engaged in recruiting. As a recruiter, he became a recruiter. The agency asked him. [...] It is non-Muslims but they need contact to Muslims and to Mindanao. The agency headquarter is Manila, but now they have offices in Mindanao. They make you pay, you get a contract for several months. It is better to go without agent. But also the agency makes you pay” (Interview, July 2, 2016).

Researcher: “Did you already know people working as security guards?”

Interviewee: “My brother.”

Researcher: “He referred you?”

Interviewee: “My brother is younger, was here almost the same time as me. He studied, and then he came to Manila and found a job as a security guard via friends” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

“Yes. Always, no peace of mind, yes, that's it. That is why we are here. And of course, when you have some money, we got some money, and then we find, you know, some business here in Manila, with my husband” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

“Sometimes they asking about our, about the situation, depends on the situation. Because some other people going in Mindanao encourage, encourage when asking what our job when I'm going Manila. So, there is no job here, it's only for a recruiter. Then by incentive, tricycle driving” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

“I worked for a good job at an [international organization] in Mindanao, but the salary was still too little. After that my husband is here, that's why I'm here also. And I'm the one who help my husband for the recruitment agency” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

“Yes, recruiting, recruiter. Yes, yes. So, while away when I was not in Manila, [my sister] was the one taking care of the house. With the, with the women [future OFWs]. And after maybe, three to four, she stayed here, and there was a couple, who, you know, who handled this house. You know, when my sister goes to Mindanao. Another, another person who was taking care of the house, but is related to us. You know, they are like family. Yes, religious people” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

“But our job here is only on the recruiter, is our goal, is to have our needy co-Muslim to avoid illegal treatment. Yes! There is a lot of, ah, illegal recruiter here, that our co is transferred, even trafficking, you know, what we even know is a violation of our Philippines constitution, and it's not easily, right. some of the people, they are illiterate, then they come in Manila and they are offering like this, and some other people are asking. I am the one who is covering everything, the financial, financial support” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

“You need to be the relative of a politician if you want to have a government job. [...] So, the opportunity in Metro Manila is different than in Mindanao. You need to have relatives in the government, you need to know the government, the governor parents or relatives in order to get the job. But here in Manila, it's, it's a, an open field. You can apply and you can get hired” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

“I have sub-agents in Mindanao and then, they are the ones who basically process them in Mindanao, and then when they go, pass, like pass everything like medical exams and everything, then they are ready for passport” (Interview, July 16, 2016).

“So, when I decided to sell it, I came here and tried to find a job here. First I became a vendor, and then tricycle again. And then when he had a tricycle, they moved to the Vasequo Compound. So first he stayed here in Salam Compound, and then he moved to Vasequo, because I did his tricycle, I got a job there. But I had relatives here and visited here and then I realized that there are not a lot of tricycles here, so I decided to bring my tricycle here, and then work here. So, in Vasequo there is so much traffic and there was a lot of competition with tricycles, so it was harder for me to earn money” (Interview, July 16, 2016).

“But here, I can live in relative peace. And here, I found a job in constructions, I have been working for over ten years already, and also as a tricycle driver. So it is hard, but I can survive” (Interview, July 16, 2016).

“I just supports [future OFWs], because I can't come up with an agency, I am not financially capable of being an agent, so I just support single persons for going abroad” (Interview, July 17, 2016).

“More difficult to get a job with more money. Whenever she can, she also does the laundry for other people. An extra job” (Interviewee, July 17, 2016).

“Any source of livelihood. The employment is important. I got an additional job here, you need several jobs. I was again referred by a friend” (Interview, July 17, 2016).

Researcher: “And when did you start working in constructions?”

Interviewee: “Seven months later. Friends referred me, they were already working there. There were Muslims and Christians working there, the only problem was that only the Muslims received the minimum or even lower salary” (Interview, July 17, 2016).

“Because of my work, you know, my jobs, I was doing something which allowed me to feel home. I met a lot of friends, I am always in touch with friends” (Interview, July 17, 2016).

Abroad:

“We were working in companies. We were working in companies or as drivers, and they pay more than in Manila. The people who were there come back with money. When you were there, you have enough money to go back to Mindanao” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

“All around, domestic helper. Everything, cleaning, children, no limits to the tasks. Only four hours of sleep” (Interview, July 16, 2016).

“I saved money for later life” (Interview, July 16, 2016).

“We were working in companies or as drivers, and they pay more than in Manila. The people who were there, come back with money. When you were there, you have enough money to go back to Mindanao” (Interview, July 16, 2016).

“No, [my husband] stayed here. He was the one to take care of the kids. And then, when he died, I moved one more time [abroad]” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

Discrimination:

“But when I arrived in Manila, it was not that easy. It was really hard to find a job because, I am Muslim. When I arrived here, it became obvious that my Muslim name is a problem, so I changed his name to appear Christian and to have better chances. It is a wrong name. Not his, but he had to. Then after eight months he found a job. And I stick to it, till today. Yes, I applied for different jobs under his fake name but was rejected because I have no education. But this boss, he is Filipino-Spanish and he was nicer and gave me a chance” (Interview, June 18, 2016).

“So, we changed our names, so it is easier to find work. Because here, there is a lot of that compared to there. But when we apply here, we use Christian names to apply” (Interview, June 18, 2016).

“I have different experiences with discrimination, for example in application forms, when you fill in your religion and they see it, they push the paper away in front of you and just say you should come back later” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

“Because, you know, these communities, other language, she uses hijab, it is difficult” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

“Sometimes my salary comes too late or too less, and then I can't do anything against it, because I have to keep this job” (Interview, June 3, 2016).

“Yes! I have so many encounter problems here in Manila, especially in discrimination! Sometimes you are applying from the, like very big company, but if you are a Muslim, the company has doubts” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

“But the only experience [my wife] made was, when the security guard tried to stop her from entering the building because she was wearing her hijab. Yes, only once. And I told her: “Okay, get the guard's name, we will file a complaint and we will go to the commission of human rights.” So the guard was afraid, and he left my wife in. And he asked for apology. You just have to know how. In their mind you know, they are blocked” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

“The next time I was here, I stayed in Quiapo. There was discrimination, because it's easy to recognize Muslima due to the hijab. But I never cared, because I am Muslim, and proud and back home there is war. I also have relatives that are Christians, as long as I love Christian, I don't bother if they don't like me” (Interview, July 16, 2016).

3.5 (8.2.5)

Home Ties to Mindanao:

“Yes, strong. So, it is about mobilephone lines and money lines. Money lines! Despite the distance, it is so easy nowadays” (Interview, July 2, 2016).

“So, it has almost been nineteen years since the last time I have been to Mindanao” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

Researcher: “And do you take your children to Mindanao?”

Interviewee: “No, no children there!”

Researcher: “Do your children speak your local dialect or only Tagalog?”

Interviewee: “No, they don't know how to speak Maguindanaoan. No, Tagalog only.”

Gatekeeper: “Yes, it's generally a problem here with the second generation. Even my kids, they don't know how to speak Maguindanaoan. And sometimes my father was complaining: “Maguindanaoan! Because my father cannot speak Tagalog, only in our local dialect. Ah, the elders, they speak Visaya when they need to talk about something important, so that the kids will not understand. So he never wanted to learn Visaya, but now he wants to learn it” (Interview, June 18, 2016).

“Yes, where the last encounter happened. But I am not one of them! So, when I have a vacation last month, I go to Mamasapano, in my aunts' area, because I met my relatives there. I haven't seen in almost fifteen years, so they were happy that I came back” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

“Three years ago, in 2013 is the only time I visited” (Interview, July 2, 2016).

Researcher: “Do you consider it as safe for [your family in Mindanao]?”

Interviewee: “See, when we talk about conflict in Maguindanao, it does not apply to the entire territory, there are some municipalities that are okay. Maybe one, two barangay” (Interview, July 2, 2016).

Researcher: “Did your children ever go to Mindanao?”

Interviewee: “All of them went. To visit the grandmother, but born and raised in Manila. Only for vacation, only for a visit.”

Gatekeeper: “The relatives are complaining: Why did you raise your children, why did you not teach them the local dialect” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

Researcher: “And you still have family back in Mindanao?”

Interviewee: “Yes.”

Researcher: “Would you recommend them to come to Manila?”

Interviewee: No. Mindanao is better” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

“They don’t speak the local dialect. Therefore, the relatives were complaining, that they should speak their own local language. The grandmother and the grandfather, they don’t speak Tagalog” (Interview, July 16, 2016).

“Voice tapes were funny, and we had to write so much, to keep the contact! It took two months, three months or more. Because the employer puts it in a basket and that's where it ended right away. So now everything goes so fast, where ever you are in the world, an E-Mail takes one second and then you didn't even know when or if it would arrive. And then you listen to the tapes and you cry, but the news are not news anymore” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

Researcher: “And it was you and your wife? Did you meet her here?”

Interviewee: “Yes, here in Manila, in Quiapo. In Quiapo!”

Researcher: “And she is also from Mindanao?”

Interviewee: “Yes, Muslim, Maguindanaoan tribe” (Interview, July 17, 2016).

Ties from Mindanao to Manila:

“I am the eldest and I am the only one, or the one who went away and came to Manila. Of course, I want them to come, but due to the economy, I feel like he cannot afford any, sustain a live here” (Interview, June 18, 2016).

“There eventually, I was able to marry, when I went home to Mindanao. My wife is from Mindanao as well. And then they decided as a couple to go back to Manila and live in Manila” (Interview, June 18, 2016).

“Before I was asking them to come, and most of them are here already, but some who are still there are still there because they don't know what to do when they come here” (Interview, July 2, 2016).

“Here in Salam Compound, I live with my wife, I met her here via a friend. It's a better life than in Mindanao. At least there is relative peace. I got married here, in Manila. The wife is the sister of a friend” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

“My wife is a native of Cagayan Valley, in the north there. My first wife, and we have a son, she is balik Islam. And then my second wife is a pure Maguindanaoan from, ahm, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Maguindanao. Close by there is an airport. So my second wife in Maguindanaoan, and I met her here in compound, in Salam Compound” (Interview, July 16, 2016).

3.6 (8.2.6)

Myth of Home:

“He has no plans to go abroad. If ever he is going to leave Culiati, then only for going back. If ever, if ever. There are no plans for now” (Interview, June 18, 2016).

“It is because of living in the city, you need money to pay for the bills. Unlike in my hometown, you don't pay for water, nor electricity” (Interview, June 18, 2016).

Interviewee: “So, my main reason for going there in the first place was, because for work, to look for new applicants and everything. But for now, I have no plans of going there, because it's still really poor. I told her kids if ever I passes, just continue on being here, because there is no reason for going back there for now, because it's so hard. It's so hard and life is so hard that even your relatives couldn't offer you even coffee, because life is so hard, unlike here, where they get to share everything. Ah, of course that's an extreme case, but not, not all cases are like that. But in some, in some extreme cases it can be like that.”

Researcher: “But do you miss Mindanao?”

Interviewee: “Yes. We used to live in the farm, own lands, and then Martial Law, and I was studying in Davao, and the Martial Law came and ended all of this” (Interview, June 18, 2016).

Interviewee: “Yes I go out of Salam Compound. I have money, I going outside.

Researcher: “What are your favorite places?”

Interviewee: “A mall, maybe Glorietta [High class shopping mall]. But the province is better, there is a lot fresh fruit. And also water. Everything is near.”

Gatekeeper: “In our province, we have everything, and it is free” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

“So now, I am feeling the thought of going back is not a good idea, but in the long run I need to” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

Interviewee: “Of course I miss it, like almost every day I miss Mindanao. If I can be like Duterte, and go home every day.”

Gatekeeper: “He goes home every day. He flies to Manila in the morning, flies to Manila, ah Davao, in the evening.”

Interviewee: “Yes, to Davao, his comfort zone” (Interview, July 2, 2016).

“But in Manila, there is no job. Is not easily, is not easily. Because in Mindanao, she has only to go around the farm, eating Cancum, different fruit, okay just eat. Even Cancum you have to buy here, five Pesos! But

in Mindanao, no need, five Pesos, in Mindanao no, she has only to plant it from the backyard land. You know, life in Manila is not easily!” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

“That's why I'm thinking, if there would be an opportunity, a job opportunity, I would be happy to go back there” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

“Yes, I'm planning to go back. But first when I go back, I want to have first a job there. Because here in Manila, there is a lot of opportunities. In Mindanao, it's the opportunities is so stiff” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

“Of course, we are planning, we are planning to go home. Yes, after we settle our problem here. And that's it. And of course we will go back home to our own place. Because here we don't know yet what will go on in the future. We don't know yet what will be in the future, because this is not our own place. And this is only, what we have here, our house, but no more. But in the Philli..ah Mindanao, we have a wide, wide, what's this, place. We can put whatever we want. A farm etc., we can put a farm here, ah there, if we want in the future. That is just planning, but I hope so it will fulfill” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

Researcher: “You miss Mindanao?”

Interviewee: “Yes, all the time. But I can't go home without my husband. Cause my husband now is working in Saudi Arabia” (Interview, July 16, 2016).

“Yes, I wanted to go home, but then she saw that there is no opportunity. Here in Manila there is always something to do. In the province, there is nothing. There is war, before the war it was good. Now they are all bakwit, the schooling is disrupted, not developed. My children were born here, four of them. And they have close contact to Mindanao. Nowadays it is almost daily, they also want to come to Manila. Just yesterday, one arrived in Taguig” (Interview, July 17, 2016).

Hopes for the Future:

“By the time my children finish the university, and find a good job, this could be the day she can finally go back” (Interview, June 18, 2016).

“No, because I won't recommend it, because, as now, we have a new administration that is pursuing to have Mindanao congress and so, why should we bring them here? The government now is pushing through the progress of Mindanao. So, if the government can do that, I think there is a lot of work in Mindanao. Some of the cities in Mindanao are now progressive, Davao City, Butuan” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

“I hope that BBL goes through, and that there will be no more discrimination. There will be better job opportunities, also in Mindanao, they will have the right to work. So maybe then people do not put your application form away in front of your face. The right to find a job” (Interview, July 2, 2016).

“I think, you know, before entering, entering the, what's that, the administration of Duterte, before, we are so many here. But, ah, since, after the clearing the presidency of Duterte, he is against overall, these, you know, illegal activities, illegal business. And I think that, yes, little by little I observe that the people is decreasing. Going back to Mindanao, because of the business, the climate. We have observed that some of

the unsafe, you know, these places. Coming of Duterte he knows that the people is unsafe, the bad elements. Yes, all the bad elements try to escape this area” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

“For now, there is no plans, especially they are waiting for maybe the chance of Duterte being able to provide work for them, but for now there is no reason to come here” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

Researcher: “Yes, did you every think about [going back]?”

Interviewee: “No, I, I dont, I didn't, yes, some of these days I think, maybe after four to five years. Yes, four to five years, when everything is settled, settled down maybe.”

Researcher: “You mean in terms of the conflict?”

Interviewee: “Yes, for now it's very, very complicated, because we are stay, still, you know, solving the problem about the investment, we have. Yes, we are paying our condominium, and we are paying the car, and everything. Then maybe, in four, four to five years, we come back to Davao city, because I like Davao. Yes, I have one house in Davao. Yes, but with Duterte. He is my *kababayan*, countryman, is Duterte, yes” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

“So, I wish, that things go well, because in the end, if not, there is no reason. He wishes for peace, because if not, people have to continue being MILF, because there are a lot of reasons then for that. Because you have to defend your own land and place, no purpose that you carry. Because it's even the Quran, and other. These are words that were taught to him by his father and the elders. You fight for your land, regardless of how much it takes you to fight” (Interview, July 16, 2016).

Researcher: “So, did you ever think about going back?”

Interviewee: “Yes! I think of going back, if I earn here.”

Gatekeeper: “If he gets to save enough.”

Interviewee: “Enough, enough to rent a house, and another wife” (Interview, July 16, 2016).

“So of course, if there was given a chance. As long as things are better there, because my heart will always belong to that area. Especially if the peace goes well, because his land there is bigger than where he is right now. Some things are waiting for him to come back. My father is buried there. So it's not about being integrated into the system, we want the system to be given back to us, since we have it already. It's not like we restart things, we already have it, but it was taken away from us. Just reestablish what we formerly had, so there is no reason to really integrate” (Interview, July 16, 2016).

“So, when you take the national government and the bangsamoro community, every side wants to end the conflict. Since now it didn't work, because the one side always demands more than the other. But maybe Duterte now, he can better understand as well. So, the only dream I have, because the government from the past has always been giving so many promises and given chances, and I wish that at least this time under Duterte, that all these things will be possible. I was also an advocate for peace as well, I does go to the rallies and all of those things. This time it's actually a chance for the government to realize this” (Interview, July 17, 2016).

“Until there is assurance, that, my kids can study properly, there is no reason to go home. Because I want to ensure, that my kids are able to go to school and live properly. So, until that assurance comes in, there is no reason to go home” (Interview, July 17, 2016).

Hopes versus Reality:

Researcher: “But in the first place, before moving to Manila, what image did you have of the city here?”

Interviewee: “I accepted already that it is not, what I hoped for. Because before, I thought Manila was a nice place and that it would be easy to find a job” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

“I expected like to have a good life here in Manila, especially I had plans of living abroad, being able to go abroad and earn there. But in the end now, I don’t really think about it anymore” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

“If there was a better opportunity elsewhere, I would still move. Because here I am just ending, and it's still not any better than where I came from. If there is no chance to go back home, and there is a better opportunity elsewhere, I would still move. But the ideal scenario is moving back for better opportunities, we are waiting now” (Interview, July 17, 2016).

3.7 (8.2.7)

“For that, we can go back in history, because Manila, ah, in the ancient time, we are not the ones that migrate here. Because Manila, from the beginning of history, Manila is a Muslim decedent, Muslim decedent. Like the datu's, Muslim, people came then. The Muslim man is the leader, here in Manila, the sultan, the sultan of Manila. The Muslim came then, here to Manila, looking for a job and looking for a good life. Like us, we came back here, we are not foreign” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

Interviewee: “In my opinion, there is no difference. But if you just ask me. I am, am proud of being a Moro. A Moro, recognizing the identity of the Bangsamoro, of the Muslim - Filipino, in Mindanao, as Bangsamoro. So, that is the identity, and I am proud of that!”

Gatekeeper: “Because being a Filipino is sign of colonialism. It's only because of the oppressor.

Interviewee: “Correct. It's true. We have the name Filipino because of King Philip, because of the Spanish, the colonial lane” (Interview, June 19, 2016).

“If the government will support the Bangsamoro, then fine. But the Bangsamoro cannot be, if the government would not, we prefer to have our own area to live by ourselves and rule ourselves and referring to our own culture. Because, basically, the government rejecting the BBL, even though some congress men approved it, but it where too little and in the end, it got blocked, because they are afraid. And there have always been efforts for it, but they always failed” (Interview, July 2, 2016).

“Because I see, because I really, it's because of the education. If you are a person and are less educated, you can be easily cheated. And of course, when this, they say now, that the conflict in Mindanao is still ongoing. So sometimes, it hurts us, it hurts me, especially knowing some of this conflict. It's not really conflict between the Muslims and the government, but most of the conflict is between Muslims and fellow Muslims. Especially now, what's in the Media is the conflict between the Abu Sayyaf and the government, but the, the damage done with the Abu Sayyaf, it's not with the government, it's with the Muslims. They are victims, in Mindanao and even here” (Interview, July 3, 2016).

“The problem in Mindanao is first because of the small elements, like the Abu Sayyaf, but my number one security, the security concern in Mindanao is drugs. That's the number one problem. There is a lot of killings in Mindanao because of drugs, and they entered the politics, the local politics, the local politicians. There

are those politicians, even though some of them are not involved in drugs, but maybe sometimes, they got money, from the bad roots, to protect the business of the group. So, because in Mindanao, if you want to become a politician, you need to have more money, because of vote buying. You need to buy votes. Me, here is really a need to solve this issue. This is really the number one issue now. The issue on Muslim, the groups, is another issue. But the main issue is drugs. Maybe if this issue is resolved, we only solve half of the problem, or majority, 60% of the problem is only solved. Because the problem, when you say, the problem with the government and the Moro, it can be easily mitigated, it can be easily negotiated. But the problem with the drugs, that's very difficult. Especially when some of the government officials and police officials are involved" (Interview, July 3, 2016).

"Okay, for us, Muslim, Moro, Filipino, it's kind of taking us into a crisis. We know that in fact in history, we are not Filipino. We become filipinized because of very very living in a country, the Philippines. But if we go back to the history, we are not Filipino. We are Tausug, me in my case, I am Tausug. And the Tausug, they are Tausug, this is their identity. When you expand that scheme, they call us Moro, because (ah) they fail to conquer us. So they call us as Moro's in Mindanao. Although that term is bad, but our elders, they, they re-conceptualize the term. Instead of a Moro, which has negative meaning, they (ah) they re-conceptualize the term into a positive thing, which is the term for people. So the Moro National Liberation became established, the people in Mindanao accepted the term Moro. Then there was Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and other Moro groups. My organization is also Young Moro Professional Network, so we really accepted the term Moro" (Interview, July 3, 2016).

"Due to that, we establish another organization, just to reach some new. Because some of the youth are not interested to unify, we call it Salam Compound Youth. We try, but they go anyway abroad, but we have Facebook. I really love to serve people, and we are the one who is partner in the Madrasa, who run it voluntarily. Voluntarily. For the sake of, for the sake of god, for the sake of the youth. Yes, even though it is hard in the Philippines, financially, we keep on doing it" (Interview, July 3, 2016).

"Until now, Abu Sayyaf continues, they have a political cadre. If the government just lets BBL to take control, then all these small groups will be out, because they will control themselves. Because we have law in that area, we have law in that, mountains where they fighting, the troupes with arms. Like for instance, the BIFF, it is a splinter group of the MILF, and now they are there since 2008, and the BIFF was, for example, they are not born extreme, but the fighters are used political, they want more power, it is not about religion, it is about the modern government and influence - they will continue to splinter if Manila decides, only if we have self-control, we can solve it" (Interview, July 16, 2016).

"And it's about, ah, mid of night, just to talk. No, because we are looking for our peace from here to eternity. Yes, we want peace, and we want to engage the youth to learn about the, how is life in the, you know, here in, that's Quran. That's minimum Islam, the real minimum" (Interview, July 17, 2016).