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„Refugee Crisis in Lebanon: the security and insecurity
of refugee encampment“

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Abstract

Lebanon is currently home to over 1 million refugees as a result of the civil war in neighboring Syria. Syrian refugees currently make up $\frac{1}{4}$ of the population in Lebanon, and as a result have strained Lebanese infrastructure, the political stability, and relationships between refugees and host-communities. With a deeply rooted history of the Palestinian refugee community in Lebanon, who remain in a perpetual refugee state, the response has been predominantly concerned with maintaining national security. Consequently, the Lebanese government has enacted policies that further marginalize the Syrian refugee community. In contrast to the Palestinian refugees who were placed in official UN camps, the Lebanese government has been adamantly opposed to the establishment of official UNHCR camps for Syrian refugees. This has led to a scattered refugee community throughout Lebanon, and as the conflict is going into its seventh year, Syrian refugees are more vulnerable than ever before. This thesis seeks to answer the question of whether or not the Lebanese policy of non-encampment has led to greater security for the state and the refugee community in light of a seven-decade history of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

Aufgrund des Bürgerkriegs im benachbarten Syrien, leben zur Zeit über 1 Million Flüchtlinge im Libanon. $\frac{1}{4}$ der Bevölkerung im Libanon besteht derzeit aus syrischen Flüchtlingen, die infolgedessen die libanesische Infrastruktur, die politische Stabilität und die Beziehungen zwischen Flüchtlingen und Aufnahmegemeinschaften belasten. Mit einer tief verwurzelten Geschichte der palästinensischen Flüchtlingsgemeinschaft richtet der Libanon seinen Fokus auf die Aufrechterhaltung der nationalen Sicherheit. Infolgedessen hat die libanesische Regierung eine Politik entwickelt, in der die syrische Flüchtlingsgemeinschaft weiter marginalisiert wird. Im Gegensatz zu den palästinensischen Flüchtlingen, die in offiziellen Lagern der UN untergebracht wurden, spricht sich die libanesische Regierung hartnäckig gegen die Einrichtung offizieller UNHCR-Lager für syrische Flüchtlinge aus. Dies hat im gesamten Libanon zu einer gespaltenen Flüchtlingsgemeinschaft geführt und da dieser Konflikt nun seit fast sieben Jahren anhält, sind syrische Flüchtlinge anfälliger als jemals zuvor. In dieser Arbeit soll der Frage nachgegangen werden, ob die libanesische Politik des Nicht-Lagerens im Hinblick auf eine sieben Jahrzehnte währende Geschichte palästinensischer Flüchtlinge im Libanon zu mehr Sicherheit für den Staat und die Flüchtlingsgemeinschaft geführt hat.

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List of Acronyms

| | |
|-------|--|
| IDF | <i>Israeli Defense Forces</i> |
| LAF | <i>Lebanese Armed Forces</i> |
| LF | <i>Lebanese Front</i> |
| LNM | <i>Lebanese National Movement</i> |
| NGO | <i>Non-governmental Organization</i> |
| PASC | <i>Palestinian Armed Struggle Command</i> |
| PLO | <i>Palestinian Liberation Organization</i> |
| PRCS | <i>Palestinian Red Crescent Society</i> |
| SAMED | <i>Palestine Martyrs Works Society</i> |
| UN | <i>United Nations</i> |
| UNKRA | <i>United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency</i> |
| UNHCR | <i>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</i> |
| UNRWA | <i>United Nations Relief and Works Agency</i> |

Chapter 1: Introduction

Since the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, there has been an astonishing wave of refugees that swept the region and beyond. Those fleeing the devastating war in Syria have mostly fled to neighboring countries, Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. Lebanon has likely suffered the most from such a massive wave of refugees, as they are currently hosting the largest per-capita refugee population in the world, with over 1 million Syrian refugees registered with the UNHCR.¹ A shocking ¼ of the population in Lebanon are refugees, putting a tremendous strain on resources, infrastructure, host communities, and even the political system.²

Lebanon is a country with a seven-decade long history acting as a host-state to refugees with the first wave entering Lebanon in 1948, as a result of the Arab-Israeli War. The history of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon has, consequently, influenced the Lebanese approach to the Syrian refugee crisis. The Palestinians, although originally thought to be temporary visitors, have become prolonged refugees with no foreseeable end in sight to their continued displacement. While Lebanon initially opened its doors to their neighbors, they found themselves progressively more anxious at the thought of a permanent Palestinian presence. The government put policies into place that aimed to exclude them from Lebanese society, essentially making them second class citizens.³ The majority of the Palestinians were confined to official UNRWA refugee camps, where many of them and their descendants still remain. These camps eventually became militarized and were used as a base for Palestinian resistance against Israel. This militarization and guerrilla warfare threatened the political stability of Lebanon, a country with preexisting sectarian divisions and a fragile confessional political system.

Although many host-states have viewed refugee camps as a means of controlling refugee communities, Lebanon's history of camps as a source of instability influenced their opposition to the establishment of official

¹ Kelley, Ninette. "Responding to a Refugee Influx: Lessons from Lebanon." *Journal on Migration and Human Security*. 2017. 85.

² Amnesty International. "Pushed to the Edge: Syrian Refugees Face Increased Restrictions in Lebanon." 15 June 2015. available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56405c274.html> [accessed 24 February 2018]

³ Hanafi, Sari, et al. "Social Exclusion of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon: Reflections on the Mechanisms that Cement their Persistent Poverty." *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Volume 31, Issue 1, 1 March 2012. 34–53. <https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdr018>

UNHCR camps for Syrian refugees.⁴ The decision to not establish camps has impacted the daily lives of both Syrians and Lebanese. Although many academics in refugee studies have argued against encampment in recent decades, there has been little research that highlights the difficulties associated with non-encampment. The Syrian refugees are facing increased vulnerability, as they have been progressively marginalized due to Lebanese policies that aim to decrease the refugee burden on the state.

As it is quickly approaching the seventh year since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War, it is becoming more apparent that the Syrian refugee situation in Lebanon is unlikely to change in the near future, inciting fears that they could be another permanent refugee community. The threat of a second perpetual refugee community is a challenge to the demographic makeup of the country, which could contribute to the destabilization of Lebanon and their fragile political system.⁵ This threat to the stability of Lebanon has contributed to the securitization of the refugee crisis, further alienating the refugee community and using the threat of political instability to justify policies that seek to exclude refugees from Lebanese society.

The current refugee crisis in Lebanon is incredibly complex, with numerous actors and a history of encampment playing a major role in the ongoing situation and politicization of the refugee crisis. The establishment of official UNHCR camps was never an option in Lebanon, and this continues to have a tremendous impact on the daily life of the refugees and Lebanese host-communities. A refugee population the size of the Syrian refugees in Lebanon would challenge any country, regardless of whether or not they were placed in camps. Still, the challenges that have come along with non-encampment must be acknowledged. The Lebanese government has used national-security as the driving force behind refugee policy, and as a result has imposed restrictions on Syrian refugees that have led to their marginalization and denial of human rights that should be protected according to international law and the protection mandate of the UNHCR.

Encampment tends to be at the center of refugee discourses, however exclusion and securitization, which are often used as a motive for the

⁴ Kelley, Ninette. "Responding to a Refugee Influx: Lessons from Lebanon." *Journal on Migration and Human Security*. 2017. 85.

⁵ Brynen, Rex. "PLO Policy in Lebanon: Legacies and Lessons." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 18, no. 2, 1989: doi:10.2307/2537633.

establishment of refugee camps, have continued with the Syrian refugee community in Lebanon. This has contributed to a similar outcome as the Palestinians for Syrian refugees in Lebanon, leading to increased poverty, marginalization, insecurity, and hopelessness. By enacting policies that seek to exclude them from Lebanese society, they have in turn created an environment that is rife for radicalization and an increase in threats to Lebanese national security.

1.1 Research Question

Has the Lebanese policy of non-encampment of Syrian refugees led to greater refugee security as opposed to encampment?

Sub Questions:

- In what ways has the historical context of refugees in Lebanon shaped the approach and policy towards Syrian refugees?
- How is the security of the state of Lebanon being challenged by the current refugee crisis?
- How has securitization been used as a means of preventing the establishment of official UNHCR camps?
- To what extent are the security of refugees and the national security of a host-state intertwined?

1.2 Methodology

In order to conduct my research for this thesis I have chosen to use library-based research as my main method for answering the research question. I have compiled a number of primary and secondary resources, a combination of academic articles, official reports conducted by the UNHCR and UNRWA, as well as reports conducted by other international organizations in order to give an accurate account of the current refugee crisis in Lebanon. The research conducted also includes sources that provide the necessary historical context to both the Lebanese government and the Palestinian and Syrian refugee waves in Lebanon. Although it will be necessary to reference historically relevant events that occurred in Lebanon, with regard to the Palestinian refugees, the bulk of my research is examining the ongoing Syrian refugee crisis that began with the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in March of 2011 with the most recent reports detailing the situation of Syrian refugees as of December of 2017. The aim of this thesis is to present a case study of refugee encampment and non-encampment in Lebanon, and with the use of arguments concerning refugee encampment, refugee security, and national

security, answer the question of whether or not non-encampment of Syrians has led to greater security as opposed to encampment.

1.3 Structure of Thesis

This thesis has been split up into 6 chapters dealing with various aspects of the refugee crisis and refugee encampment in Lebanon. Following the introductory chapter, which consists of a basic introduction into the arguments and main research question, the methodology used, and the theoretical framework of the thesis, the second chapter covers a number of arguments regarding refugee encampment and security. Security, which will be touched on in the next section, encompasses various actors and levels with national security maintaining the most power over security in international relations. In the case of refugee encampment or non-encampment in Lebanon, security involves international, national, individual levels, with national security being the primary driving force behind much of the policy concerning encampment. The third chapter deals with the background of the refugee crisis in Lebanon, presenting the setting in which it takes place, some historical context, as well as the important actors that are relevant to the situation.

The fourth chapter of this thesis presents the relevant historical context to the history of refugee encampment in Lebanon pertaining to Palestinian refugees. This chapter touches on both the security threats that encampment has imposed on Lebanon, including the perceived Palestinian involvement in the Lebanese Civil War, the denial of basic human rights of Palestinian refugees, as well as the ways in which Palestinian refugee encampment has led to insecurity on both a national and individual level. The fifth chapter outlines the insecurities that Syrian refugees are continuing to face in Lebanon, despite a policy of non-encampment. This chapter aims to answer the question of whether or not non-encampment is necessarily the root of refugee insecurity in Lebanon, rather than the restrictive policies placed on refugees. The fifth chapter is then followed by the conclusion, which seeks to answer the remaining questions pertaining to security and encampment, while tying together the arguments made in each of the chapters.

1.4 Theoretical Framework

Security is the primary motivation behind the refugee policy of the numerous actors involved in any refugee crisis, whether it is the security of the refugee, the security of the host community, or the security of the host-state. Considering the centrality of security to the question of refugee encampment, I will be referring to Barry Buzan's conceptualization of the

term *security* in *People, States, and Fear: an agenda for international security* as my theoretical framework throughout this thesis. Buzan has contributed significantly to the development of security theory, highlighting the previous underdevelopment of the concept of security due to its predominant focus on national-security by previous contemporary academics, as well as the significant overlap of the concept of power.⁶ Despite the challenges that the conceptualization of security poses, Buzan manages to further explore what he lists as the three levels of security, *individuals, states, and the international system*. Throughout his work, he argues that the three are interconnected and cannot be isolated from the others. He writes, “Since the security of one referent object or level cannot be achieved in isolation from others, the security of each becomes, in part, a condition for the security of all.”⁷

In addition to Buzan’s theory concerning the conceptualization of security, I will be referring to Maja Janmyr’s arguments regarding refugee civilians in camps. In response to refugee insecurity and concerns of militarization of refugee camps, Janmyr emphasizes the obligations of both the host state and the international community to ensure the protection of refugees.⁸ She expands on the international legal framework concerning refugees which serves the purpose of ensuring their protection.⁹ Despite the responsibility that the UNHCR and host countries like Lebanon have, according to international law, in insuring the safety and security of refugees and asylum seekers, questions of national security continue to supersede the needs of refugees, which in turn creates greater insecurity for both the refugees and host communities.

Together, the arguments of Buzan and Janmyr concerning security theory and refugee encampment have proven useful as a theoretical framework to further examine the interdependence of refugee security and national security in Lebanon. Understanding the concept of security is incredibly useful in the case of Lebanon in order to further explore the ways in which national security has been used as a tool by the Lebanese government to impose greater restrictions on both Palestinian and Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Despite the responsibility of the host government and the UNHCR and

⁶Buzan, Barry, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. Colchester, England: ECPR Press, 2007. 26-29.

⁷ Ibid. 42.

⁸ Janmyr, Maja. *Protecting Civilians in Refugee Camps : Unable and Unwilling States UNHCR and International Responsibility*. Leiden: Brill | Nijhoff, 2014. 4.

⁹ Ibid.

UNRWA to protect asylum seekers and refugees in Lebanon, the policies that have been enacted out of concern for national security have fostered a hostile and insecure environment for refugees and the host-state alike.

Chapter 2: Arguments Concerning Encampment and Non-encampment

2.1 Introduction

One of the most obvious differences between the Palestinian and Syrian refugee communities in Lebanon is their encampment. The Palestinians were, in most cases, forced into UNRWA refugee camps in Lebanon. With security at the center of the arguments regarding encampment, whether it is the security of the host-state or refugee security, the conversations have ultimately been driven by the concept and whether or not camps create greater security for all. Verdirame and Pobjoy emphasize that “The essence of a refugee camp is *separation*.”¹⁰ The camp exists to separate refugees from the host-society, often times in an effort to exert a greater amount of control over them and reduce the threats to the host-state. What many in the field of refugee studies have pointed out, however, is that this separation has increased insecurity and tensions between refugee communities and host-communities in a number of cases. This chapter explores many of the arguments concerning security and insecurity in refugee camps, beginning with a conceptualization of security by Barry Buzan in an effort to stress the connection between national security and the individual security of refugees living within the host-state.

2.2 Barry Buzan – Individual Security and National Security

It is crucial to the theoretical framework of this thesis to understand the role that security plays in the Lebanese refugee crisis, both with regard to national security and refugee security. One of the major challenges that many academics have had with defining security is the ambiguity of the term. Buzan argues that realists within the field of international relations have often times used security as a synonym for power, while idealists view security as an end-result of peace.¹¹ Buzan, on the other hand, stresses the versatility of the term and argues for a broader interpretation of security that involves both power and peace. He maintains that the use of security as a synonym for power further entrenches the national security focus of previous literature on the conceptualization of security.¹² Buzan’s conceptualization

¹⁰ Verdirame, Guglielmo and Jason M. Pobjoy, “The End of Refugee Camps?” *The Ashgate Research Companion to Migration Law, Theory and Policy*, S. Juss (ed.), University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 29, 2013. 472.

¹¹ Buzan, Barry, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. Colchester, England: ECPR Press, 2007. 26.

¹² Ibid.

of security allows for a much broader understanding of the term, while also recognizing its complexities.

For Buzan, the individual is the basic unit to which security can be applied and is strongly tied to the question of both national and international security.¹³ Buzan argues, “The relevance of individual security to this enquiry lies in the network of connections and contradictions between personal security and the security of the state. The state is a major source of both threats to and security for individuals. Individuals provide much of the reason for, and some of the limits to, the security-seeking activities of the state.”¹⁴ In this sense, the individual refers to those who might be considered a source of insecurity as well as those individuals who are meant to be protected from the source of insecurity.

Although the individual is the basic entity to which (in)security can be applied, according to Buzan, individual security can hardly be measured as it encompasses a broad array of elements that often times tend to be subjective, including life, health, status, wealth, and freedom.¹⁵ Despite this, the correlation between individual security and national security becomes apparent when recognizing the role that governments play in protecting the individual from societal threats as a whole. Buzan acknowledges the paradox of the state as the protector of individual security in that, although the state’s aim is to protect individuals from what they may deem as a threat, with too much power, the state itself can become a source of insecurity for the individual. He argues, “The whole issue of human rights rose to international prominence... precisely in order to address the relationship between state and citizen, and the place that individual security considerations should have in the way that states relate to each other.”¹⁶ This emphasizes the connection between individual, national, and international security with regard to the international system that arose in the 20th century with great emphasis having been placed on human rights and conflict prevention.

In the case of Lebanon and the recent Syrian refugee crisis that has taken place, security takes center stage in the response of both the government and the international community. The crisis highlights the interconnected nature

¹³ Buzan, Barry, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. Colchester, England: ECPR Press, 2007. 49.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid. 50.

¹⁶ Ibid. 59.

of individual, national, and international security with all three sectors coming in conflict with one another. With an influx in refugees creating numerous challenges for the state of Lebanon and the communities that are hosting them, individual and national security have already come into question. In addition, due to the international scope of the Syrian refugee crisis and the responsibility that the international community, particularly the UNHCR, has in protecting refugees and asylum seekers, the individual security of refugees has developed into major concern on an international level. In this sense, the question of whose responsibility it is to protect the individual security of refugees arises. Although Maja Janmyr acknowledges that it is the responsibility of the host-state to ensure the security of all individuals present on its territory, she also argues that “safeguarding the personal security of refugees may be seen as implicit in UNHCR’s mandate of ‘providing international protection’”¹⁷

Although national security is the predominant focus of this thesis, particularly due to its centrality in the policies concerning refugee encampment, both international security and individual security of refugees and Lebanese citizens are all delicately intertwined. The security of the individual is particularly relevant in the case of Lebanon due to the many human rights abuses that have taken place in the name of national-security of the state. Despite the willingness to help Syrian refugees initially, the government has altered its approach toward them, in turn creating greater insecurities for refugee communities and the nation-state alike. With securitization in mind, the government has used the threat of insecurity to alienate and further marginalize refugees. Buzan’s conceptualization of security is useful in considering the numerous layers to security, particularly the ways in which the various actors are interdependent upon one another.¹⁸

2.3 Security and Insecurity in Refugee Camps

With national security remaining one of the central themes regarding refugee encampment or non-encampment, much of the argumentation centers around the advantages and disadvantages of encampment from a national security perspective. The policies directed towards both Palestinian and Syrian refugees in Lebanon have ultimately been concerned with the security

¹⁷ Janmyr, Maja. *Protecting Civilians in Refugee Camps : Unable and Unwilling States UNHCR and International Responsibility*. Leiden: Brill | Nijhoff, 2014. 168.

¹⁸ Buzan, Barry, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. Colchester, England: ECPR Press, 2007. 25.

of the state, often times without owing much attention to individual security of refugees or host-communities.

While the reaction by the Lebanese government to the Syrian refugee crisis has been based predominantly on past experiences with the Palestinian refugee community, there remain arguments surrounding national security from those who are both for and against refugee encampment. The refugee policies in Lebanon have primarily been guided by concern over the impact of the refugee community on the delicate sectarian balance within an already fragile state. With a history of refugees that began shortly after Lebanese independence from France, as well as a civil war that many argue was instigated by the Palestinian refugees, the Lebanese government has taken a national security approach to the Syrian refugee crisis.¹⁹

In addition to the view that refugee camps tend to be a threat to national security, many academics and international organizations have changed their understanding of refugee encampment, arguing that camps also tend to be a security risk for refugees. With the refugee camps failing at providing adequate security and protection for refugee communities, there is often times an increase in activities that threaten national security as well. One of the questions that this thesis seeks to answer is whether or not refugee camps provide greater security for refugee communities and for the host-state, or whether or not encampment or non-encampment plays a factor in refugee security.

2.3.1 Refugee Camps as a Tool for National Security

The refugee camp has been viewed by some as a space used to contain refugee situations and create a secure and stable environment for both refugees and host communities. This is the argument in favor of refugee encampment that has often times been used by governments as well as a number of international organizations before a shift towards non-encampment began in the late 20th century. Despite this shift that even the UNHCR has taken by favoring alternatives to encampment, a number of actors still prefer encampment due to a perspective concerned with national security that views separation of refugees as a more secure option.²⁰ Still, within the UNHR Alternative to Camps, released in 2014, there is a

¹⁹ Faour, Muhammad A. "Religion, Demography, and Politics in Lebanon." *Middle Eastern Studies* 43, no. 6, 2007. 909.

²⁰ UNHCR. "UNHCR Policy on Alternatives to Camps." 22 July 2014. available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5423ded84.html> [accessed 15 September 2017]

recognition of some of the benefits of refugee encampment as well as arguments that governments often times put forward in advocating for encampment. The primary motivation for governments tends to be over concerns of ‘public order and security’.²¹ The memo released by the UNHCR goes on to say:

Camps may be seen as providing better control over the presence and movement of refugees and as a way of easing the potential for tension between them and local communities. Policies restricting refugees to camps may also be motivated by concerns that refugees will compete with nationals for limited economic opportunities and scarce resources, such as water or land. Host governments may also consider that allowing refugees to settle in communities and participate in the economy makes it less likely that they will return home in the future.²²

With separation being the intent of refugee encampment, the traditional view towards encampment has been that the host-state is able to exert a greater amount of control over the refugee population. In doing so, the host-governments often maintain a certain hope in the “temporary” nature of the refugee situation, preventing their integration while the refugee population is left in a state of uncertainty. One of the main difficulties of encampment comes with the protracted refugee, who remains in a state of uncertainty and is continually confined to the refugee camp in the name of national security of their host-state, as has been the case for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

Although the major points of difference between the Syrian and Palestinian refugee experience will be discussed in later chapters, an important distinction is that the Lebanese government sought to control the movement of those Palestinian refugees who remained in official UNRWA camps, which comprised of over half of the Palestinians in Lebanon.²³ The control that was exerted on Palestinian refugee camps was ultimately in an effort to prevent the integration of the bulk of Palestinian refugees into Lebanese society, while those Palestinians that were middle class or higher educated were much more easily integrated into Lebanese society and at times even granted citizenship.²⁴ This separation of the majority of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon was done primarily out of similar concerns to other host-governments outlined in the UNHCR Alternative to Camps.

²¹ UNHCR. “UNHCR Policy on Alternatives to Camps.” 22 July 2014. 4. available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5423ded84.html> [accessed 15 September 2017]

²² Ibid.

²³ Hudson, Michael C. “Palestinians and Lebanon: The Common Story.” *Journal of Refugee Studies*. Volume 10, Issue 3, 1 January 1997. 249.

²⁴ Ibid. 250.

Although many academics in the field of refugee studies have argued in recent decades against refugee encampment and there has been shift of policy towards non-encampment by the UNHCR, NGOs and other international organizations, there are still a number of academics who recognize the difficulty of the encampment debate. Stefaan Van der Borgh and Mit Phillips highlight a number of arguments in favor of encampment, and from a security perspective, recognize the challenges that integration poses for host-communities as well as the tensions that might come into play regarding religious and ethnic differences between the host-community and refugee community.²⁵ They highlight the benefits of encampment as being predominantly the access to services and assistance, the cost-effectiveness, and identification of refugees, while also stressing that those against encampment underestimate the difficulties of integration.²⁶

2.3.2 Refugee Camps as a Threat to National Security

As opposed to the traditional view of refugee camps as secure spaces that aid in protecting both the refugee and the host community, beginning in the 1990s an increasing number of academics, international organizations, and governments began realizing the threat that refugee camps often pose for national security and refugee security. In addition to the militarization of refugee camps, which will be discussed in the next section of this chapter, refugee camps in many cases have been spaces of insecurity. With a long-term presence of refugees, the risk of arms-trafficking, human-trafficking, and drug-smuggling, has been well documented in refugee camps.²⁷ This poses challenges, not only for individual refugee security, but also to national security.

Richard Black points out that, despite the positive aspects of encampment in terms of the ease of accessibility and aid provision to refugees in camps argued by some, the experience of Rwandan refugees in Zaire and Tanzania following the Rwandan genocide proved encampment to be an ineffective form of control.²⁸ International organizations were often times unable to access refugee camps, and there were reports of some groups responsible for the Rwandan genocide using intimidation on refugees in camps, while also

²⁵ Borgh, Van der and Mit Phillips. "Do refugees belong in camps?" *The Lancet*. Volume 346. Issue 8979. 1995. 907-908.

²⁶ Ibid. 908.

²⁷ Loescher, Gil and James Milner. "Security implications of protracted refugee situations." *The Adelphi Papers*. 45:375, 2005. 30.

²⁸ Black, Richard. "Putting Refugees in Camps." *Forced Migration Review*. 1998. 5.

diverting aid to military personnel.²⁹ Black recognizes the role that governments should have in their own policy concerning refugee encampment that encompasses both refugee security and national security. He argues that, although encampment can be a method for governments to exercise a greater amount of control on refugee populations, there are numerous examples of encampment increasing the security threat of refugees in their host-state.³⁰ Black refers to the Somalian refugees forced into camps as an example of encampment being ineffectual, placing humanitarian aid workers at risk due to the lack of cooperation of those in the camps.³¹

With a shift in the perception of refugee camps as spaces of control and security to spaces of insecurity for both the host-government and refugees, there has been a push toward non-encampment. Still, as Black later points out, for those that argue in opposition of encampment, there must be evidence that non-encampment of refugees poses less of a threat to security than encampment.³² In the case of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, non-encampment has proven to be just as challenging as encampment, as will be discussed in further chapters of this thesis.

2.3.3 Militarization of Refugee Camps

One of the main arguments in opposition to refugee encampment is the risk of militarization and the radicalization of refugees within camps. This was undoubtedly what took place in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon prior to the Israeli-Lebanese war. Gil Loeschner and James Miller's research on protracted refugee situations and their implication for security highlights the risk that prolonged refugee encampment poses for refugees, host communities, as well as the international community.³³ They emphasize the security risks that prolonged refugee communities pose for host-states and regional security, paying close attention to the "refugee warrior" as an individual who uses refugee camps as a spring board for carrying out attacks, often times against their country of origin.³⁴ In these cases, it is typically armed terrorist and guerrilla groups that seek to bolster their forces among the disenfranchised refugee populations, using the camp setting as a buffer

²⁹ Black, Richard. "Putting Refugees in Camps." *Forced Migration Review*. 1998. 5.

³⁰ Ibid. 7.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid. 6.

³³ Loeschner, Gil and James Milner. "Security implications of protracted refugee situations." *The Adelphi Papers*. 45:375, 2005. 8.

³⁴ Ibid. 30.

due to its humanitarian nature, allowing them to channel aid towards the armed conflict.³⁵ This poses the greatest national security threat to the host-state by increasing the possibility of extending the conflict of neighboring states beyond their borders and into the host-state.

Although the term “refugee warrior” seems to be incongruent due to the nature of the definition of a refugee according to the UNHCR, which defines a refugee as those who are not active in militancy or politics, the reality is that there are many examples of refugee warriors launching attacks against their homeland from within refugee camps in neighboring countries.³⁶ The Palestinians are often referred to when discussing refugee warriors, as their struggle against Zionism and Israel has taken place predominantly from within refugee camps.

Refugee warrior communities “are not merely a passive group of dependent refugees but represent highly conscious refugee communities with a political leadership structure and armed sections engaged in warfare for a political objective, be it to recapture the homeland, change the regime, or secure a separate state.”³⁷ Although one may be empathetic to their cause in reclaiming their homeland, it cannot be denied that the carrying out of military attacks by refugee warriors from within a refugee camp is not only a security threat to their home state (or the government in power in their homeland), but also to their host-state and to the refugee community as a whole.³⁸

The Palestinian resistance and militancy was carried out from within the refugee camps with the ultimate goal of reclaiming their homeland from Israel.³⁹ This increased political and military activism took place in the 1960s, which saw an increase in organized Palestinian armed attacks against Israel.⁴⁰ This “refugee warrior” behavior led to increased hostility between Israel and Lebanon, and many argue led to a destabilization of the Lebanese

³⁵ Loescher, Gil and James Milner. “Security implications of protracted refugee situations.” *The Adelphi Papers*. 45:375, 2005. 31.

³⁶ Adelman, Howard. “Why Refugee Warriors are Threats.” *Journal of Conflict Studies*. [S.l.], 1998.

³⁷ Suhrke, Astri, et al. “Refugee Warriors: A Problem of Our Time.” *Escape from Violence*. Oxford University Press, 1989. 275.

³⁸ Adelman, Howard. “Why Refugee Warriors are Threats.” *Journal of Conflict Studies*. [S.l.], 1998.

³⁹ Hudson, Michael C. “Palestinians and Lebanon: The Common Story.” *Journal of Refugee Studies*. Volume 10, Issue 3, 1 January 1997. 252.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

government and later to the Lebanese Civil War.⁴¹ Undoubtedly, these experiences with the Palestinian refugee community in Lebanon have influenced much of the animosity towards the Palestinian refugee community and a fear for a repeat of those events. The Lebanese government has sought to securitize the Syrian refugee crisis through the lens of a history of refugee encampment, viewing encampment as a threat to national security as was the case in Palestinian refugee encampment.

2.4 Encampment Prolongs Refugee Status

In an incendiary article titled, *Give War a Chance*, the author Edward Luttwak highlights one of the major difficulties that has arisen due to the creation of international organizations like the UN, NATO and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). He argues that they have contributed to the prolongation of conflicts, which he claims occurs as a result of cease-fires and armistices carried out through the security council of the UN that allow the opposition to recover and rearm their forces. He argues, "This was true of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49, which might have come to a closure in a matter of weeks if two cease-fires ordained by the Security Council had not let the combatants recuperate."⁴² Towards the end of the article, Luttwak attacks the refugee assisting branches of the UN, both the UNHCR as well as the UNRWA, by arguing that these organizations have contributed to a prolongation of conflicts through its dispersion of aid and encampment of refugees.

He maintains that the UNRWA failed to integrate the Palestinian refugees following the war, and that the refugee camps in Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria have contributed to a perpetual Palestinian refugee.⁴³ Despite his provocative terminology, Luttwak raises a series of central issues concerning the modern-day refugee. Refugee encampment is a topic of contention among many academics and political scientists, and there are many differing opinions as to what the correct approach to refugee policy should be.

With the majority of Palestinian refugees and their descendants remaining in official UNRWA camps in Lebanon for nearly 70 years, it is appropriate to question whether or not a policy of refugee encampment has been the wrong approach. The Lebanese approach to the Syrian refugee crisis, on the other

⁴¹ Hudson, Michael C. "Palestinians and Lebanon: The Common Story." *Journal of Refugee Studies*. Volume 10, Issue 3, 1 January 1997. 252.

⁴² Luttwak, Edward N. "Give War a Chance." *Foreign Affairs* 78 (4), 1999. 39.

⁴³ Ibid. 42.

hand, was an opportunity to avoid making the same mistakes that had been made with the Palestinians, based on the assumption that encampment had led to the numerous challenges facing the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon today. One of the main fears of the Lebanese government was the possibility of another group of “permanent refugees” that are unable, or perhaps even unwilling, to return to their homeland following the civil-war.⁴⁴

With organizations like the UNHCR recognizing that refugee encampment has drawbacks by placing restrictions on those housed in camps, there has been a greater movement towards alternatives to camps.⁴⁵ Despite this change, the Syrian refugees have been faced with a new series of challenges that have arisen due to a lack of organized housing, the Lebanese policy of non-encampment, and stricter policies put in place that target refugees, which will be discussed in depth in the following chapters.

2.5 Additional arguments For and Against Encampment

While the previous arguments focused predominantly on the refugee camp as a place of security and insecurity from the perspective of the host government, academics in the field of refugee studies, as well as international organizations, have recognized the security risks that refugee encampment poses for refugees themselves. Barbara Harrell-Bond, a leading researcher in the field of refugee studies, has written extensively on the negative effects of refugee encampment on individual refugees and their communities. The bulk of her work has pushed for non-encampment, arguing that encampment aims to restrict the right to freedom of movement for refugees in an effort to maintain national security and prevent political strife.⁴⁶ In the process of restricting their right to freedom of movement, she argues that a number of other human rights are taken as a consequence. Harrell-Bond and Veditore conclude their book concerning refugee rights with a rather unfavorable outlook for refugee encampment, arguing that the only feasible option for refugees is integration into their host-societies:

⁴⁴ "Lebanon Says Syrians Who Return Will Lose Refugee Status". Last modified 2014. Accessed November 18, 2017. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-lebanon/lebanon-says-syrians-who-return-will-lose-refugee-status-idUSKBN0EC1AX20140601>.

⁴⁵ UNHCR. *The Situation of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*. February 2016, 6. available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56cc95484.html> [accessed 13 September 2017]

⁴⁶ Guglielmo, Veditore and Harrell-Bond Barbara. *Rights in Exile: Janus-Faced Humanitarianism*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2005. 271.

Hopefully, in a not-so-distant future, confining refugees in camps will be perceived for what it really is: a breach of the most fundamental human rights, a cruel and dehumanizing absurdity which neither economic nor political factors can justify. The dysfunctions and misperceptions that led to the adoption and implementation of this policy by UNHCR and humanitarian organizations will be viewed as a tragic accident of history. Refugee camps will then join the array of total institutions (mental asylums, internment camps, Bantustans) premised on the segregation of human beings that human kind has learnt to regard as aberrant.⁴⁷

Others challenge Harrell-Bond and Veditame's complete dismissal of refugee camps as a whole, and recognize that the answer to encampment or non-encampment is not so black and white. Jeff Crisp and Karen Jacobsen challenge the assertion that self-settlement and non-encampment are better options than encampment, arguing that there is very little empirical research regarding the conditions of life for self-settled refugees.⁴⁸ They maintain that refugees may at times prefer the security of a camp over self-settlement, due to the ease of access to assistance and safety.⁴⁹ In addition, those who argue against refugee encampment often fail to realize the host government's role in deciding whether or not to place refugees in camps or allow them to integrate into society.

In most cases, as has been the case in Lebanon, the host-state has the ultimate say in where refugees are housed as well as the refugee policy concerning their stay in the host-state.⁵⁰ Crisp and Jacobsen acknowledge perhaps the most important aspect of the argument concerning encampment, "the real challenge is to ensure that refugees are able to enjoy safe, secure and dignified conditions of life, whether or not they live in a camp."⁵¹ Despite the negative aspects of encampment that have been well documented, Crisp and Jacobsen are correct in their assertion that whether or not refugees should be placed in camps is the wrong question to ask. Rather, regardless of whether or not refugees are placed in camps, they should be offered protection and assistance and their basic rights should be maintained in order to provide a more secure situation for both the refugee population, host communities, and host-governments.

⁴⁷ Guglielmo, Verdrame and Harrell-Bond Barbara. *Rights in Exile: Janus-Faced Humanitarianism*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2005. 338.

⁴⁸ Crisp, Jeff and Karen Jacobsen. "Refugee Camps Reconsidered." *Forced Migration Review*, 1998. 27.

⁴⁹ Ibid. 28.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

Edith Bowles acknowledges many of the challenges that Harrell-Bond and Verdirame allude to in their arguments concerning encampment, however, she argues that much of these abuses take places within large refugee camps where the inhabitants are forced to rely on international aid and assistance for survival.⁵² She refers to a case concerning refugee camps on the Thailand-Burma border where the inhabitants were originally small, village-like open camps that offered the refugees a self-sufficient approach to refugee encampment. Following years of residing in these village-like small camps, there was a shift towards large enclosed camps that make self-sufficiency far less likely, causing a greater dependency on international aid in order to survive.⁵³ Edith concludes her article by addressing the effects that large camps have on the morale of refugees, their self-sufficiency, and conflicts both within the refugee community and the with the host-communities.⁵⁴ Although this is one particular case study of refugee encampment that compares two different styles of encampment, it highlights many of the difficulties that are faced in large refugee camps. Dependency on international aid, and an inability for refugee communities to maintain a certain level of self-sufficiency is a problem that continues to face many refugee communities today, particularly those in Lebanon.

2.6 Conclusion

The experience of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon provides ample evidence of the negative effects of both prolonged refugee situations and of refugee encampment. Still, despite a policy of non-encampment, with the restrictions placed on the Syrian refugee population by the Lebanese government, the Syrian refugees are left in no better position than the Palestinian refugees. It is ultimately the denial of the basic human rights of refugees, as was argued by Harrell-Bond and Vedirame, that continues to be the root of many of the problems both refugee communities in Lebanon face today. While the majority of Palestinians remain in UNRWA refugee camps, the Syrian refugees were prevented from establishing official UNHCR refugee camps in an effort by the Lebanese government to prevent some of the same security threats that were prevalent within the Palestinian camps from arising within the Syrian refugee community. Still, as Crisp and Jacobsen point out, it is not simply refugee encampment that tends to create difficulties for refugee communities, but rather the crippling restrictions that are placed on

⁵² Bowles, Edith. "From Village to Camp: refugee camp life in transition on Thailand-Burma Border." *Forced Migration Review*, 1998. 13.

⁵³ Ibid. 14.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

them by the host-governments in an effort to curb threats to national security.⁵⁵

When considering the question of encampment or non-encampment of refugees, it must be noted that each situation is unique and the context surrounding them must be considered. Although there are many examples of refugee camps, particularly large camps as was discussed by Edith Bowles, instigating insecurity for both the refugee community and national security, refugee encampment is rarely consistent.⁵⁶ Despite a movement by international organizations and particularly the UNHCR towards non-encampment in recent decades, the certain benefits that refugee encampment provides to both the host-state and refugee communities must be acknowledged.

In certain situations, particularly where there is a sizeable refugee community that might threaten the security of the host-communities, as has been the case with Syrian refugees in Lebanon, encampment may have been the better option. At the very least, the current policy of non-encampment has posed a tremendous challenge for both the host communities and refugees in Lebanon. The comparison of the Palestinian and Syrian circumstances creates an obvious dilemma in not recognizing the differences between the two crises. Without acknowledgement of the threats to national security that non-encampment poses, it is difficult to argue in favor of it. Non-encampment has proven to pose significant challenges for the Syrian refugees, the state of Lebanon, and the international community as a whole. Both the Palestinian and Syrian refugees face very similar situations in Lebanon, regardless of whether or not they are residing in camps, predominantly due to the government restrictions that have been placed on the refugee communities and not due to encampment or non-encampment. Still, encampment is a facet of refugee crises that affects the ways in which refugees receive assistance and are protected by the UNHCR or UNRWA. This case should be of particular interest to those who have argued against refugee encampment, as it is an opportunity to acknowledge the numerous difficulties that come along with non-encampment that will be discussed in later chapters.

⁵⁵ Crisp, Jeff and Karen Jacobsen. "Refugee Camps Reconsidered." *Forced Migration Review*, 1998. 28.

⁵⁶ Bowles, Edith. "From Village to Camp: refugee camp life in transition on Thailand-Burma Border." *Forced Migration Review*, 1998. 13.

Chapter 3: Background of the Situation

3.1 Introduction

The current Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon, and the government response to it, is rooted in its nearly seven-decade long history as a host-state for Palestinian refugees. With many classifying Lebanon as a “weak state” due to its fragile political system, an influx of Syrian refugees has been characterized as a serious challenge to its national security, the economy, and the overall security of the region. This chapter aims to give a general overview of the setting of the current refugee crisis in Lebanon, which highlights some of the major actors concerning refugees, as well as a general introduction to the major policies that continue to pose serious challenges to refugees in Lebanon. The Lebanese government, the UNRWA, and the UNHCR all hold a certain level of responsibility in the protection of refugees as well as the host-communities where the refugees have settled. This chapter aims to emphasize the intertwined relationship between both national security and refugee security while describing the context in which the current refugee crisis in Lebanon takes place.

3.2 Lebanon as a Fragile Setting

Due to the complexity of the refugee situation in Lebanon, and the role that the state’s fragile power-sharing political system entails, it is crucial to outline the setting in which the discussions concerning refugee policy have taken place. Lebanon is a small country on the Mediterranean Sea, bordered by Syria to the North and to the East and bordered by current day Israel to the South. Previously ruled by the Ottoman empire and then put under French control, Lebanon ultimately gained independence in 1943.⁵⁷ At the time of its independence, and to this day, Lebanon is a religiously diverse country with 18 recognized religious sects that each maintain a set number of seats in parliament.⁵⁸ The Lebanese political system is based entirely on the sectarian divisions within the country by allocating political representation based upon the population of each sect.⁵⁹ The numbers used to represent each sect is based on official census records that were taken following the Second World War, after which the Lebanese government has effectively

⁵⁷ Faour, Muhammad A. "Religion, Demography, and Politics in Lebanon." *Middle Eastern Studies* 43. no. 6, 2007. 909.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid. 910.

avoided collecting religious numerical data.⁶⁰ This has created a fragile political system in Lebanon due to the possibility and likelihood of changing demographics in the decades since Lebanese independence.⁶¹ This very real possibility, particularly with the overwhelming number of predominantly Sunni refugees in Lebanon, has shaped the political discourse concerning refugee encampment and contributed to the fear of refugees integrating into Lebanese society.

While even under the best of circumstances, basing political representation on the sectarian divisions within a country creates a certain level of political instability due to the likelihood of changing demographics.⁶² With Lebanon being in an incredibly complex region with a history of sectarian divisions, the civil wars and wars from neighboring countries have spilled over, further challenging the fragile sectarian balance. Lebanon has a nearly seven-decade-long history of refugee policy relating to the Palestinian refugees that have remained within the country's borders, with the first wave of the Palestinian refugees taking place in 1948.

The Palestinian refugee situation and its accompanying history in Lebanon has significantly influenced the Lebanese approach to the Syrian refugee crisis that took place following the Syrian Civil War. One important aspect of refugee policy is the approach to refugee encampment, a topic that, as we saw in the previous chapter, continues to be debated within the field of refugee studies and has become relevant once again with the Syrian refugees in Lebanon. In a country as volatile as Lebanon, who had its first surge of Palestinian refugees enter the country in 1948, the delicate sectarian balance has played a role in the policy concerning both the Palestinian and Syrian refugee communities. The Sectarian divisions have contributed to a number of events involving the Palestinian refugees and a number of other outside actors. The Lebanese Civil War, which lasted from 1975 to 1990, was fueled by the sectarian divisions and was further instigated by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as well as outside forces from Syria and Israel.⁶³ The result of the Lebanese Civil War will be discussed in further chapters, however, the sectarian divisions played a central theme in the war. Following the conclusion of the war in 1990, the Lebanese government and

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Faour, Muhammad A. "Religion, Demography, and Politics in Lebanon." *Middle Eastern Studies* 43. no. 6, 2007. 910.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Hudson, Michael C. "Palestinians and Lebanon: The Common Story." *Journal of Refugee Studies*. Volume 10, Issue 3, 1 January 1997. 257–258.

people held an even more hostile attitude towards the Palestinian refugees, with many placing blame for the civil war on the Palestinian refugees.⁶⁴

3.3 The role of the UNHCR and UNRWA in Lebanon

In addition to the Lebanese State, there are two other actors that have played a significant role in the refugee encampment policy in Lebanon. Both the UNRWA and the UNHCR are responsible for dispersing aid to the Palestinian and Syrian refugees respectively. Prior to the creation of the UNHCR, a number of agencies existed through the United Nations (UN) in order to disperse aid and assistance to people that had been displaced due to war and violence. The UNRWA was one of those organizations created in order to assist the Palestinian refugees specifically that had been displaced following the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict. The UNRWA continues to deliver assistance to Palestinian refugees and their descendants, which has grown from an initial 750,000 Palestinian refugees in 1950 to over 5 million today.⁶⁵ While the UNRWA is the only remaining UN organization that continues to provide aid to a specific group of refugees, the UNHCR is the main organization that provides assistance and protection to all other refugees. For this reason, there are two separate UN organizations that are providing aid to refugees within Lebanon, dependent upon whether the refugees are Palestinian or Syrian.

The UNRWA became a fully operational organization in May of 1950 with the aim of providing emergency relief to the displaced Palestinians in five designated areas of operation, which are the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan.⁶⁶ Although the organization was originally meant to exist for only a short period of time, its mandate has been renewed by the UN General Assembly every three years, which has allowed it to remain in existence for nearly 70 years.⁶⁷ This is partly due to the fact that the Palestinian refugee crisis has yet to be resolved, and many Palestinian refugees have been left in a perpetual refugee state, unable to return to their homeland and unable to integrate into their host countries in many cases. In Lebanon in particular, the Palestinian refugees have been denied citizenship and treated as second class members of society, prolonging their reliance on

⁶⁴ Hudson, Michael C. "Palestinians and Lebanon: The Common Story." *Journal of Refugee Studies*. Volume 10, Issue 3, 1 January 1997. 257–258.

⁶⁵ UNRWA. "Who We Are." Accessed October 06, 2017. <https://www.unrwa.org/who-we-are>.

⁶⁶ Bocco, Riccardo. "UNRWA and the Palestinian Refugees: A History within History" *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Volume 28, Issue 2-3, 1 January 2009. 231.

⁶⁷ Ibid. 233.

the UNRWA for survival and access to public services like education and healthcare.

The UNRWA employs nearly 30,000 people, predominantly Palestinian refugees, that contribute to the running of 58 refugee camps, 689 schools, 10 vocational and training centers, and 138 primary healthcare facilities throughout the 5 designated areas that the organization is able to function.⁶⁸ These services assist the more than 5 million Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA, which acts as a quasi-state through its supply of public services and through its representation of the stateless Palestinians.⁶⁹ The UNRWA defines Palestinian refugees as “persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict.”⁷⁰ In addition, descendants of Palestinian refugee males are also able to register with the UNRWA as refugees, further permitting them to receive aid through the organization.⁷¹ For this reason, there are currently three generations of refugees that are registered with the UNRWA, with the number of refugees growing from the initial 750,000 to over 5 million that are registered today.⁷² As of 23 February 2016 there were 504,000 that remained registered as residing within Lebanon, despite many estimates that the actual number of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is likely between 260,000 to 280,000, due to many having already left the country.⁷³

The UNRWA is funded predominantly by voluntary government contributions with the United States, and the European Commission as the two largest donors, whose donations comprised 41% of the overall funding for 2015, donating approximately US\$ 381 million and US\$ 137 million respectively.⁷⁴ In total, all EU member states contributed US\$ 466 million,

⁶⁸ Bocco, Riccardo. “UNRWA and the Palestinian Refugees: A History within History” *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Volume 28, Issue 2-3, 1 January 2009. 234.

⁶⁹ UNRWA. “Who We Are.” Accessed October 06, 2017. <https://www.unrwa.org/who-we-are>.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² UNRWA. “Core Programme Budget.” Accessed October 06, 2017.

<https://www.unrwa.org/how-you-can-help/how-we-spend-funds/core-programme-budget>.

⁷³ UNHCR. *The Situation of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*. February 2016, 2. available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56cc95484.html> [accessed 13 September 2017]

⁷⁴ UNRWA. “Key Facts & Figures.” Accessed October 06, 2017.

<https://www.unrwa.org/how-you-can-help/government-partners/funding-trends/key-facts-figures>.

which accounted for 37% of the organization's funding for 2015.⁷⁵ Despite a pledged donor amount of US\$ 1.24 billion, with greater strains on the organization due to a growing Palestinian population, the UNRWA has had difficulty meeting its funding needs.⁷⁶ Since the 1990s the organization has had to increase its marketing and communications in order to secure funding, and with an ever-growing Palestinian population, the strains placed on the organization and its ability to secure funding has only become more difficult with time.⁷⁷

In addition to the UNRWA, which serves the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon, there is the UNHCR, or the *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*. This is the UN mandated agency created in December of 1950 whose primary goal is to provide protection and assistance to refugees worldwide. Following World War II, with a tremendous increase in those displaced after the war, it became necessary to define the term "refugee" and the United Nations created the UNHCR in order to deal with the increase in refugees. A refugee is defined by the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, which grants rights to all refugees as opposed to only those who were displaced as a result of WWII as:

any person who as a result of events and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.⁷⁸

In addition to the official definition of who qualifies as a refugee, there were articles of the convention that outlined who could be excluded from protection under the UNHCR. Article 1 D says,

⁷⁵ UNRWA. "Key Facts & Figures." Accessed October 06, 2017.

<https://www.unrwa.org/how-you-can-help/government-partners/funding-trends/key-facts-figures>.

⁷⁶ UNRWA. "Annual Operating Report 2016." 2016. 16.

<https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/annual-operational-report-2016>

⁷⁷ Bocco, Riccardo. "UNRWA and the Palestinian Refugees: A History within History" *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Volume 28, Issue 2-3, 1 January 2009. 233.

⁷⁸ UNHCR. "Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees" December 2011. available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4f33c8d92.html> [accessed 2 November 2017]

This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance.

When such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason, without the position of such persons being definitively settled in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, these persons shall ipso facto be entitled to the benefits of this Convention.⁷⁹

This article excluded those who were already being provided assistance through other UN agencies that existed during that time, which were both the UNKRA (*United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency*) and the UNRWA.⁸⁰ With the UNRWA still remaining in existence due to the continued renewal of its mandate by the UN General Assembly, Palestinian refugees that continue to live in the designated areas of the UNRWA are excluded from the 1951 Convention. For this reason, both the UNRWA and the UNHCR are active in Lebanon with the UNHCR catering solely to the Syrian refugees.⁸¹

Due to the wide scope of the UNHCR in comparison to the UNRWA, the UNHCR is a much larger UN agency that has worked in numerous parts of the world by catering to displaced persons and those who are recognized by the UN as refugees. The annual budget for the year 2017 of the UNCHR is US\$ 7.7 Billion.⁸² The UNHCR assists over 17.5 million refugees under the UNHCR mandate with 5.5 million refugees coming from Syria alone.⁸³ With the UNHCR working in over 130 countries worldwide and employing 10,966 staff members, the agency has a large scope aimed at assisting and repatriating or settling refugees on a global scale.⁸⁴

Currently, there are over 1 million Syrian refugees registered with the UNHCR in Lebanon.⁸⁵ The UNHCR provides assistance with the

⁷⁹ UNHCR. "Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees" December 2011. available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4f33c8d92.html> [accessed 2 November 2017]

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² UNHCR. "Figures at a Glance." Accessed November 03 2017. <http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html>

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

Government of Lebanon's refugee requirements for maintaining legal status while also assessing the vulnerabilities of Syrians in Lebanon.⁸⁶ The UNHCR also provides basic assistance in the form of shelter, healthcare, and education. Although the UNHCR was prevented from building official refugee camps, the UNHCR assists Syrian refugees by providing items like weatherproofing and floor raising kits in order to ensure the safety and comfort of those living in less than ideal informal camp settlements.⁸⁷ Hezbollah, the Shia led political and militant party in Lebanon, has been adamant about the refusal of official UN refugee camps for Syrian refugees out of fear that camps will create a permanent refugee community, possibly leading to a shift in the sectarian makeup of Lebanon.⁸⁸ Despite the adamant refusal by the Lebanese government, in 2013 there had been further discussion on the opening of 12 refugee camps to house the over 1 million refugees in Lebanon.⁸⁹ This plan by the UN never came to fruition, however, it raises an important point in the encampment of refugees and the dispersal of aid to refugee communities. During an interview with a reporter, a veteran aid worker highlights the root of the issue when it comes to the current discourse surrounding the benefits of refugee encampment.

“On the record, I will tell you the no-camps approach was the right one, and it is true camps can be awful and they are demoralizing and I don't like advocating for them”, says a veteran aid worker. “However, if you don't have camps you then have to talk about increased resources to help the targeting of refugees, and the support of them and ensuring a balance is kept between what refugees are receiving and giving to poor local communities to ensure they don't feel discriminated against and turn resentful.”⁹⁰

The sentiment of this aid worker emphasizes the difficulty that international organizations are faced with when deciding between encampment and non-encampment. The decision of the Lebanese government to prevent the establishment of camps has led to a new set of challenges for the UNHCR in providing adequate assistance and protection to Syrian refugees.

⁸⁶ UNHCR. “UNHCR Lebanon Operational Update” Accessed November 03 2017. 1. <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=11604>

⁸⁷ Ibid. 3.

⁸⁸ Detmer, Jamie. "It's About Time: United Nations Plans Refugee Camps For Syrians In Lebanon". Last modified 2013. Accessed February 20, 2018. <https://www.thedailybeast.com/its-about-time-united-nations-plans-refugee-camps-for-syrians-in-lebanon>.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

3.4 Refugee Encampment as Refugee Policy

The most fundamental question regarding refugee policy is housing and encampment. With a large refugee population, like that of the Palestinian and Syrian refugee groups in Lebanon, there remains the question of how aid will be facilitated and where these refugees will be living during their stay in the host country. This ultimately comes down to whether or not the refugees will live in formal refugee camps, which, due to their contrasting nature, makes the analysis of the Lebanese policy concerning both the Palestinian and Syrian refugees of particular interest. Although there is variation in encampment within the different refugee groups, there is an obvious difference in policy between the Palestinian and Syrian refugees concerning the use of official camps. Whether or not refugees are placed in official UNHCR or UNRWA camps impacts numerous areas of daily life for the refugees, as well as issues concerning security for both the host country and the refugee communities. While the following chapter will detail the history of refugee encampment in Lebanon, and the impact that it has had on the Palestinian experience, as well as the Lebanese policy concerning refugee populations, this section seeks to highlight the arguments surrounding refugee encampment and the ways in which the discourse has been framed in recent years.

There are currently 12 official UNRWA refugee camps in Lebanon, where an estimated 53% of the 504,000 Palestinian refugees registered through UNRWA are living.⁹¹ While the majority of the Palestinian refugees remain in official camps, there continues to be numerous issues with regard to housing and infrastructure within the camps, which has been brought on by the increase in the Palestinian refugee populations since 1948 in combination with the restrictions placed by the Lebanese governments on the expansion of and construction within the camps.⁹²

Although Lebanon was praised by the UNHCR for opting not to house Syrian refugees in official UNHCR camps, the drastic change in policy has much more to do with a long history of official refugee camps housing Palestinians and challenges to Lebanese sovereignty and security, rather than a desire to allow Syrians access to better living conditions than the Palestinian refugees preceding them. The decision, although it falls in line with an evolving stance on refugee encampment by the international community, has

⁹¹ UNHCR. *The Situation of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*. February 2016, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56cc95484.html> [accessed 13 September 2017]

⁹² Ibid.

brought a number of difficulties to the Syrian refugees and their ability to gain access to basic amenities like education and healthcare. While both groups continue to face numerous challenges, a comparison of the effects from both encampment and non-encampment of these refugee groups can prove to be beneficial by highlighting areas of refugee policy that can be improved. Much of the discourse concerning Palestinian refugee encampment has looked at the negative effects of long-term encampment, while placing blame on the camps for the inability of Palestinians to properly integrate into Lebanese society. This line of reasoning fails to acknowledge the Lebanese government's policies that have hindered Palestinian integration both in and out of official UN refugee camps. When compared to the current situation of the Syrian refugees, who were prohibited from having access to official UN refugee camps in Lebanon, many of the same difficulties still exist, often times to a greater degree. The Lebanese policy of non-encampment has led to a new set of complications that the UN faces with regard to refugees receiving proper access to assistance.

Despite a long history of advocating for refugee encampment, in 2014 the UNHCR released a new Policy on Alternatives to Camps.⁹³ This policy underlined a shifting approach to refugee encampment in an effort to reduce the numerous difficulties that arose, particularly in long term refugee situations like the Palestinian case in Lebanon. While also recognizing some of the benefits of encampment, the directive emphasized the restrictions that are often placed on refugees living in official camps.⁹⁴ It reasons that, "Living in camps can engender dependency and weaken the ability of refugees to manage their own lives, which perpetuates the trauma of displacement and creates barriers to solutions, whatever form they take."⁹⁵ The policy initiative maintains that, although camps can be useful in the facilitation of assistance to refugees and can make their identification by the UNHCR easier, they often lead to the disenfranchisement of refugees and limit their rights and freedoms within their host countries.⁹⁶ The initiative hopes to overcome the difficulties that come about through the encampment of refugees by encouraging host governments to allow the legal settlement of refugees in urban areas and communities where they can participate in the local economy, better integrate into the society of the host country, and can

⁹³ UNHCR. *UNHCR Policy on Alternatives to Camps*, 22 July 2014. available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5423ded84.html> [accessed 15 September 2017]

⁹⁴ Ibid. 4.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

eventually become less dependent on international organizations for survival.⁹⁷

This change in policy by the UNHCR is correct in its analysis of the difficulties that those in camps face and the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are evidence of a prolongation of refugee status, however, this conclusion assumes that it is refugee encampment that is to blame for the many complications that Palestinians experience, rather than Lebanese restrictions on their integration and participation in society. I will go into greater detail on the reasons for the struggles that both the Palestinians and Syrians have faced since their arrival in Lebanon, but it must be noted that the decision of the Lebanese government to prevent official UNHCR camps for Syrians to be established was based predominantly on its past experiences with Palestinian refugees and a desire to prevent the likelihood of another long-term refugee group in addition to questions of security.⁹⁸

Although the government of Lebanon was praised for their initial reaction to the Syrian refugee crisis, the increasing number of refugees and the policy of non-encampment led to the tightening of restrictions for Syrians fleeing the Syrian Civil War. Subsequent to their initial open border policy to Syria, and a flood of over 1 million refugees entering into Lebanon, the government opted to close the border to Syria in 2014 and enacted much stricter policies towards Syrians who remained in the country, as well as those wishing to seek asylum, in an effort to reduce the Syrian refugee population. These new regulations, which will be discussed in greater depth in later chapters, require the refugees to undergo a series of difficult applications in order to gain and maintain legal status in the country, while also limiting the freedom of movement for Syrians already within Lebanon.⁹⁹ These policies enacted by the Lebanese government have been directly targeted towards the Syrian refugees, causing greater vulnerability and a larger percentage of refugees who no longer maintain legal status.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ UNHCR. *UNHCR Policy on Alternatives to Camps*, 22 July 2014. 5-6. available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5423ded84.html> [accessed 15 September 2017]

⁹⁸ Turner, Lewis. "Explaining the (Non-)Encampment of Syrian Refugees: Security, Class and the Labour Market in Lebanon and Jordan." *Mediterranean Politics*, 20:3, 2015. 390.

⁹⁹ Janmyr, Maja. "Precarity in Exile: The Legal Status of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon." *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Volume 35, Issue 4, 1 December 2016. 11

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. 15.

3.5 Limited Legal Protection of Refugees in Lebanon

One of the major challenges that refugees in Lebanon have faced is the protection of their rights with regard to the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol. Despite the rights and protections granted to refugees under these international treaties, both Syrian and Palestinian refugees in Lebanon continue to be faced with challenges relating to their overall security and are subject to numerous human rights abuses that they, under international refugee law, would ordinarily be protected from.

Lebanon is not a signatory to either the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees or the 1967 Refugee Protocol, which combined are the international framework for refugee law.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, as Maja Janmyr contends, despite the responsibility that the government of Lebanon has to uphold and protect the human rights of refugees within its territory, especially with regard to *non-refoulement*, their actions and policies have been a direct assault on the human-rights of refugees.¹⁰² *Non-refoulement* is central to refugee protection and international law concerning refugees, with the main goal of preventing the return of refugees and asylum seekers to places of conflict from which they fled.¹⁰³ However, the policies enacted by the government of Lebanon towards Syrian refugees have made it incredibly difficult for refugees to maintain legal status, placing many of them in precarious situations, as will be discussed in later chapters.

Syrian and Palestinian refugees continue to be deprived of their human rights in Lebanon, further challenging their security and protection. Although Verdirame and Harrell-Bond point to the refugee camp as the source of major human rights abuses for refugees, many of the same abuses that they argue are inflicted upon refugees in camps are now being experienced by Syrian refugees outside of the camp.¹⁰⁴ They argue that the foremost human rights abuse that encampment enacts on refugees is a restriction to the freedom of movement of refugees.¹⁰⁵ Although there is truth to this claim, restrictions on the freedom of movement have also been placed on Syrian refugees in Lebanon, despite their remaining outside of official refugee

¹⁰¹ Janmyr, Maja. "Precarity in Exile: The Legal Status of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon." *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Volume 35, Issue 4, 1 December 2016. 61

¹⁰² Ibid. 62.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Guglielmo, Verdirame and Harrell-Bond Barbara. *Rights in Exile: Janus-Faced Humanitarianism*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2005. 271.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. 334.

camps. Janmyr addresses the series of human rights abuses and difficulties that Syrian refugees in Lebanon continue to face, highlighting that the government's restrictions on their freedom of movement are one of their greatest challenges that they face, often times placing them in insecure situations where they are fearful of arrest and deportation.¹⁰⁶ In 2015 Lebanon passed new legislation concerning Syrian residence permits that made it costly and difficult for the majority of Syrians to remain legal.¹⁰⁷

These new requirements have made it challenging for many Syrians to travel freely, requiring them to pass through checkpoints operated by security forces throughout the country, in addition to requiring exit visas that restrict those who remain in Lebanon illegally from leaving without paying residence fees.¹⁰⁸ Those who remain in Lebanon illegally, which recent surveys indicated to be 74 percent of all Syrians in Lebanon towards the end of 2017, are increasingly vulnerable and at risk of detention or deportation back to Syria.¹⁰⁹ In addition to the major human rights abuses that are being experienced by refugees in Lebanon, Janmyr addresses the difficulties that the restrictions regarding work permits place on the refugee communities. These restrictions will be discussed in a later chapter, however, the restrictive legislation that the Lebanese government enacted has led to increased poverty and insecurity of the Syrian refugees.

With the government of Lebanon placing most of its energy on national-security through restrictive legislation, with the main agenda being the eventual repatriation of the refugee community in Lebanon, there remains the question of whose responsibility it is to ensure that the rights of refugees remain protected. With the human rights abuses that have been levied against refugees by the Lebanese government and their refusal in the establishment of official UN refugee camps, Syrian refugees have been left in an incredibly vulnerable and insecure state.¹¹⁰ Although the Lebanese government is obligated to ensure the protection of the basic human rights of refugees according to international law, their actions and policies have done little to

¹⁰⁶ Janmyr, Maja. "Precarity in Exile: The Legal Status of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon." *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Volume 35, Issue 4, 1 December 2016. 73-74.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. 69.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ UNHCR. "UNHCR Vulnerability Assessment Report 2017." Accessed February 10, 2018. 13. <https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/vasyr-2017-vulnerability-assessment-syrian-refugees-lebanon>

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

protect them.¹¹¹ Janmyr explores the responsibility of states and the UNHCR to protect the rights of refugees even further in her book, *Protecting Civilians in Refugee Camps : Unable and Unwilling States, UNHCR and International Responsibility*. Although her focus is primarily refugees living in camps, she emphasizes the role of various actors in the case of an unable and unwilling host-state.¹¹² As Janmyr points out, the sovereignty of the host-state allows them to decide whether or not to allow the establishment of refugee camps, and in the case of the Syrian refugees, the Lebanese government chose not to out of concerns over the militarization of camps. Although they maintain their sovereignty and as such have the freedom to prevent the establishment of UNHCR refugee camps, they are obligated under customary international law and a number of other international treaties that they have entered into, to protect individuals on its territory with respect to human rights.¹¹³ Janmyr continues, “Thus, there appears to be a wide legal framework holding states responsible for the human rights protection of all individuals, even those in refugee camps, within its territory.”¹¹⁴ Regardless of their responsibility according to international law, the regulations enacted by the Lebanese government has done more to place Syrian refugees in a position of insecurity.

This leads us to the responsibility of the UNHCR in protecting the human rights and security of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. One of the main challenges that the UNHCR has is the numerous roles that it plays on the ground in a refugee crisis. According to Janmyr, “It is to be a norm entrepreneur, supervisor and enforcement agency of refugee rights at the same time as it is expected to be a cooperative partner to states and NGOs, and the ultimate provider of material assistance.”¹¹⁵ The roles pose a challenge for an organization that is working to satisfy numerous actors, while also aiming to uphold its international protection mandate. She continues, “because it surfaces at the crossroads between state sovereignty, national security and international human rights, refugee security is generally considered to be ‘high politics’ and exposes a tension between human rights norms and realpolitik.”¹¹⁶ Janmyr highlights the main challenge for refugees and the

¹¹¹ Janmyr, Maja. “Precarity in Exile: The Legal Status of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon.” *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Volume 35, Issue 4, 1 December 2016. 62.

¹¹² Janmyr, Maja. *Protecting Civilians in Refugee Camps : Unable and Unwilling States UNHCR and International Responsibility*. Leiden: Brill | Nijhoff, 2014. 170.

¹¹³ Ibid. 175.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid. 347.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

protection of their security and basic human rights, which is ultimately the contradiction between the sovereignty of the host-state and the obligation of the UNHCR and the host-state to protect refugees according to customary international law.

3.6 Securitization as a Driving Force Behind Refugee Policy

Beginning with the Palestinian refugee crisis, securitization has been a means used by the Lebanese government in deciding refugee policy, not only regarding refugee encampment but also in policies that seek to prevent the integration of refugees into Lebanese society. Jennifer Hyndman points out, “Securitization produces a fear of asylum seekers in particular ways that create conditions of consent for governments to take extraordinary measures to exclude them. As public anxiety increases with securitization, support for displaced people and those called refugees wanes.”¹¹⁷ Securitization, which is closely related to the concept of security, is the use of an existential threat in order to justify and enact extreme political measures.¹¹⁸ This tactic has been used by the Lebanese government with regard to the Syrian refugees, predominantly by using the historical context of refugees in Lebanon as a motivation for the policies that seek to restrict Syrian refugees.

There are a number of factors that come into play in the case of Lebanon and its use of securitization in its refugee policy. The history concerning Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is one of the main driving forces behind the policy decisions regarding non-encampment. Despite later suggestions by the UNHCR to open official refugee camps for Syrians, the Lebanese government has adamantly refused.¹¹⁹ Lewis Turner relates this refusal to, “the permanence of Palestinian refugee camps, and their historic, and to some extent contemporary, extra-territoriality.”¹²⁰

The history of Palestinians in Lebanon has been the catalyst in securitizing the current Syrian refugee crisis by a number of politicians. The history of

¹¹⁷ Hyndman, Jennifer, and Wenona Mary Giles. *Refugees in Extended Exile*. London: Routledge, 2016. 37.

¹¹⁸ Buzan, Barry, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. Colchester, England: ECPR Press, 2007. 23-24

¹¹⁹ Detmer, Jamie. "It's About Time: United Nations Plans Refugee Camps For Syrians In Lebanon". Last modified 2013. Accessed February 20, 2018. <https://www.thedailybeast.com/its-about-time-united-nations-plans-refugee-camps-for-syrians-in-lebanon>.

¹²⁰ Turner, Lewis. “Explaining the (Non-)Encampment of Syrian Refugees: Security, Class and the Labour Market in Lebanon and Jordan.” *Mediterranean Politics*, 20:3, 2015. 386-404.

the militarization of Palestinian refugee camps during the Lebanese Civil War has been used by politicians as an example of the threat of refugee camps. The secretary-general of Hezbollah said in 2012 at a political discussion concerning the opening of camps, “We cannot accept refugee camps for Syrians in Lebanon because any camp for Syrians in Lebanon will turn to a military pocket that will be used as a launch pad against Syria and then against Lebanon,”¹²¹ This is a prime example of the securitization of the refugee crisis in an effort to prevent the establishment of official UN refugee camps. Hezbollah is a Shiite militant political faction in Lebanon that has adamantly supported the Assad regime throughout the Syrian Civil War. In addition, the Energy and Water Minister, who has been an outspoken opponent to the establishment of official refugee camps claimed in 2013 that camps would be used as “a shelter for outlaws and wanted people who have nothing to do with the humanitarian aspect of the Syrian crisis.”¹²² This rhetoric is a prime example of the ways in which securitization has been used in Lebanese politics in order to incite fear against the establishment of camps. The history of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is one of militarization and the loss of Lebanese control over camps. Nevertheless, the current Syrian refugee crisis is under a different set of circumstances and must be treated as such.

3.7 National Security and Refugee Security

Despite the emphasis that many host-governments give to national security, individual security, which in the case of Lebanon includes refugee security, remains central to the question of the security of the state. As Buzan outlines in his security theory in international relations, individual security is directly tied to the security of the host-state.¹²³ Without ensuring their security and protecting their basic human rights, a number of issues arise that could potentially threaten both refugee security and national security. With an increase in the vulnerability that Syrian refugees face, there is a direct correlation to an escalation in threats to the national security of the host-state, often in the form of radicalization, but also economic insecurity, and as we have seen in Lebanon, an increase in sectarian divisions.

¹²¹ "Hezbollah Rejects Syrian Refugee Camps In Lebanon". Last modified 2012. Accessed February 20, 2018. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2012/Mar-10/166204-hezbollah-rejects-syrian-refugee-camps-in-lebanon.ashx>.

¹²² "Bassil Warns Against Building Syrian Refugee Camps". Last modified 2013. Accessed February 20, 2018. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2013/Feb-01/204669-bassil-warns-against-building-syrian-refugee-camps.ashx>.

¹²³ Buzan, Barry, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. Colchester, England: ECPR Press, 2007. 49.

Lebanon has predominantly used social exclusion of refugees as a means of protecting its national security. According to Sari Hanafi, “Social exclusion can be defined as marginalisation or detachment from a moral order, which is associated with a status hierarchy or a set of rights, duties, and obligations. Social exclusion has evolved over time to include economic, social, and to some extent political aspects.”¹²⁴ Lebanon viewed the establishment of Palestinian refugee camps as spaces of social exclusion in order to prevent their integration into Lebanese society as a means of protecting the sectarian political system. This exclusion eventually led to the subsequent militarization of Palestinian refugee camps, which facilitated regional instability and the eventual Lebanese Civil War that ensued. This recent history of refugee encampment has been used as an argument against the establishment of Syrian refugee camps, however, the Syrian refugees continue to suffer from exclusion from Lebanese society.

The social exclusion of Syrian refugees is not carried out through the use of refugee camps, but through the deprivation of civil rights, the exclusion from the formal labor market, and the widespread restrictions that have been put in place by the Lebanese government. Although these policies are predominantly concerned with national-security, the result is a further marginalized, vulnerable group of refugees that may seek security in the form of radical or militant groups.¹²⁵ Buzan argues that individuals have the ability to become a threat to national-security when the state has failed to protect the security of individuals, often times through joining organizations whose aim it is to protect their security.¹²⁶ This can take the form of terrorists and revolutionaries, which in the case of the Palestinians both sought to upend the Lebanese political system during the civil war.¹²⁷ The security of individuals and national security remains delicately intertwined, and by continuing the social exclusion of Syrian refugees, and instead viewing them as a security threat, Lebanon runs the risk of creating greater instability.

¹²⁴ Hanafi, Sari, et al. “Social Exclusion of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon: Reflections on the Mechanisms that Cement their Persistent Poverty.” *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Volume 31, Issue 1, 1 March 2012. 34–53. <https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdr018>

¹²⁵ Lefèvre, Raphaël. "Tackling Sunni Radicalization in Lebanon". *Carnegie Middle East Center*. 2014. <http://carnegie-mec.org/2014/12/24/tackling-sunni-radicalization-in-lebanon-pub-57592>.

¹²⁶ Buzan, Barry, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. Colchester, England: ECPR Press, 2007. 60.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.* 61

3.8 Conclusion

This chapter emphasizes the complexity of the refugee crisis in Lebanon. With a history of Palestinian refugees, in addition to sectarian divisions that have and continue to influence refugee policy, the Lebanese government's approach towards the Syrian refugees is one predominantly concerned with national-security. In turn, the Syrian refugees, like the Palestinian refugees, have experienced similar assaults on their basic human rights, despite the Lebanese policy of non-encampment. The policies that have been enacted towards Syrian refugees have been predominantly concerned with preventing a second prolonged refugee community, with the Lebanese government expecting the eventual repatriation of Syrian refugees. These attacks on the basic human rights of refugees, and in some cases even the practice of *refoulement*, has placed Syrian refugees in an even more precarious situation.

Although Lebanon is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Refugee convention or the 1967 Protocol, due to the various international treaties that Lebanon has ratified as well as their position as an active member of the UN, and as a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Lebanon has an international responsibility to protect the basic human rights of refugees and asylum seekers on its soil.¹²⁸ Despite these obligations, Lebanon has actively engaged in the *refoulement* of refugees, prevented their freedom of movement, and prevented them from participating in the job market in Lebanon.

The UNHCR and UNRWA are the main actors providing assistance to both refugee communities within Lebanon. Although they maintain the responsibility to provide both assistance and protection to refugees, both refugee communities continue to face serious challenges to their security and well-being in Lebanon. These challenges highlight both the conflict and interconnectedness of individual security, security of the state, and international security that Buzan outlines in his security framework.¹²⁹ The contradiction between individual security and national security can be seen in the policies that restrict refugee rights, while at the same time posing challenges to the UNHCR and its role as the protector of the rights of refugees.¹³⁰

¹²⁸ Janmyr, Maja. "Precarity in Exile: The Legal Status of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon." *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Volume 35, Issue 4, 1 December 2016. 62.

¹²⁹ Buzan, Barry, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. Colchester, England: ECPR Press, 2007. 283.

¹³⁰ Janmyr, Maja. "Precarity in Exile: The Legal Status of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon." *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Volume 35, Issue 4, 1 December 2016. 347.

Chapter 4: Palestinian Refugee Encampment and Security

4.1 Introduction

The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have a long history in the country that could be examined in depth, however, for the purposes of this master thesis we will concentrate particularly on the major events that altered the situation of the Palestinians and further influenced the more recent Lebanese policy towards the Syrian refugees. As has been discussed, national security has been the impetus behind much of the refugee policy concerning both Palestinian and Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Due to the fragile sectarian balance in Lebanon, one of the definitive sources of tension between the Lebanese and Palestinians is due to the fact that roughly 80 percent of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are Sunni Muslims, which has threatened to throw the sectarian balance into chaos.¹³¹

The displacement of over 700,000 Palestinians, following the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, sparked what would become a decades long refugee crisis that continues to go unresolved. Lebanon accepted roughly 100,000 of the Palestinian refugees, and 16 official refugee camps were created in order to accommodate them. The UNRWA began operating in May of 1950, in order to provide assistance to the Palestinians that had been displaced as a result. The UNRWA continues to deliver aid to Palestinian refugees and their descendants in Lebanon. There continue to be approximately 500,000 Palestinians registered with the UNRWA as residing in Lebanon, however estimates conclude that roughly 270,000 remain within the country, with many having sought other places to reside. The events that took place in Lebanon in the decades following their arrival, including their marginalization, the militarization of refugee camps, and their eventual involvement in the Lebanese Civil War all continue to have lasting effects on both the Palestinian and Syrian refugee communities in Lebanon, as well as the Lebanese views towards the Palestinians.

¹³¹ Hudson, Michael C. "Palestinians and Lebanon: The Common Story." *Journal of Refugee Studies*. Volume 10, Issue 3, 1 January 1997. 245. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/10.3.243>

4.2 Arab-Israeli War and Cairo Accord

The most monumental change in relations between the Lebanese government and the Palestinian refugees was the signing of the Cairo Accord in 1969 following a clash between Palestinian Guerrillas and the Lebanese Army.¹³³ The Cairo Accord was agreed upon by Yassar Arafat, the leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Lebanese army commander, General Emile Bustani, under the supervision of Egyptian president Gamal Abdal Nasser.¹³⁴ This agreement transferred control over the 16 refugee camps in Lebanon from the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command (PASC). The tensions between the Lebanese and Palestinians had arisen partly due to an escalation in armed attacks against Israel. The agreement formally legitimized the presence of an armed Palestinian resistance against Israel within Lebanon.¹³⁵ This, of course, invited an upsurge in Israeli attacks against Lebanon and a further deterioration in regional security and relations between Palestinian refugees and Lebanese citizens. In addition to the effect it had on regional security, due to the conflict between the Palestinians and Israel, it created further division within Lebanon as a result of the differing opinions of the sectarian political parties in the country.¹³⁶

The power of the Palestinian resistance continued to grow, and after the PLO was expelled from Jordan in 1970-71 after threatening King Hussein, they were able to regroup in Lebanon.¹³⁷ This led to a change in the way that the PLO operated, seeking, rather, to build local political alliances in order to influence Lebanese politics in favor of Palestinians.¹³⁸ This political influence was viewed negatively by many Lebanese, particularly Lebanese Nationalists. From 1970 until 1982 the PLO and its influence in Lebanon grew dramatically with the establishment of social institutions for Palestinians, as well as the growth of its military.¹³⁹ The PLO has been

¹³³ Hudson, Michael C. "Palestinians and Lebanon: The Common Story." *Journal of Refugee Studies*. Volume 10, Issue 3, 1 January 1997. 252. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/10.3.243>

¹³⁴ UNRWA. "The Cairo Agreement." accessed 12 December 2017.

<https://www.unrwa.org/content/cairo-agreement>

¹³⁵ Hudson, Michael C. "Palestinians and Lebanon: The Common Story." *Journal of Refugee Studies*. Volume 10, Issue 3, 1 January 1997. 251. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/10.3.243>

¹³⁶ *Ibid.* 253.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ Suleiman, Jaber. "The Current Political, Organizational, and Security Situation in the Palestinian Refugee Camps of Lebanon." *Journal of Palestine Studies*. 29, no. 1, 1999. 67. doi:10.2307/2676432.

characterized as a state within a state, due to its strength and regional influence. This lasted until the PLO was eventually expelled from Lebanon after the 1982 Israeli military invasion. With the exile of the leader of the PLO, Yasser Arafat, the social institutions that had been organized for Palestinian refugees began to crumble.¹⁴⁰

The Cairo Accord was eventually annulled by the Lebanese parliament in 1987. The expulsion of the PLO, the collapsing of its institutions, and the increased hostility towards Palestinians marked a turning point in the Palestinian situation in Lebanon.¹⁴¹ Despite the annulment of the Cairo Accord in 1987, the Palestinian refugee camps are still spaces of extraterritorial exclusion as the Lebanese government has refused to intervene, which has led to a constant presence of Palestinian military factions within those camps.¹⁴² The collapse of the social institutions that had been propped up by the PLO and other Arab governments has led the Palestinian refugees to be dependent solely upon the UNRWA for assistance.¹⁴³ The negative effects of the Cairo accord can still be seen in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. This agreement eventually helped contribute to the destabilization of Lebanon, to the Lebanese Civil War, and the subsequent Israeli invasion into Southern Lebanon.

4.3 The Role of the PLO in Lebanon

Although the PLO is often times viewed solely as a militaristic Palestinian nationalist organization, the numerous civil services and institutions that it established contributed to the overall well-being of Palestinian refugees. The PLO itself was established in 1964 in an effort to unify the Palestinian people and create an organization that acted as their representative, with a stated goal of the “Liberation of Palestine”. It was not until after the Israeli victory over the Arab states in the Arab-Israeli War that armed Palestinian forces took control over the PLO, and instituted more militaristic endeavors.¹⁴⁴ While also becoming more militarized, the organization expanded its scope

¹⁴⁰ Suleiman, Jaber. "The Current Political, Organizational, and Security Situation in the Palestinian Refugee Camps of Lebanon." *Journal of Palestine Studies*. 29, no. 1, 1999. 67. doi:10.2307/2676432.

¹⁴¹ Hanafi, Sari, et al. "Social Exclusion of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon: Reflections on the Mechanisms that Cement their Persistent Poverty." *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Volume 31, Issue 1, 1 March 2012. 39. <https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdr018>

¹⁴² Ibid. 38.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Rubenberg, Cheryl A. "The Civilian Infrastructure of the Palestine Liberation Organization: An Analysis of the PLO in Lebanon Until June 1982." *Journal of Palestine Studies*. 12, no. 3 (1983): 55. doi:10.2307/2536151.

in order to meet the political, economic, and social needs of the Palestinians.¹⁴⁵

Perhaps one of the most crucial institutions organized through the PLO is the Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS). At its height, the PRCS provided both preventative and curative healthcare for Palestinians and Lebanese nationals, operating over 60 clinics and 11 major hospitals in Lebanon.¹⁴⁶ The PRCS aimed to provide healthcare to Palestinians, either free of charge or for a nominal fee, while providing medicine entirely free of charge.¹⁴⁷ In order to make up for a shortage of medical personnel, the PRCS established a school in Beirut in order to train Palestinians as practical nurses, technicians, and Paramedics, where they were required to work for the PRCS for a given time after completing their studies.¹⁴⁸ PRCS continues to operate, predominantly in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, while still maintaining major hospitals in Lebanon.

In addition to the PRCS, another fundamental institution established by the PLO is the Palestine Martyrs Works Society (SAMED), which functioned as the economic arm of the PLO. It was established in 1970 in Jordan in order to provide vocational training to the children of Palestinian martyrs who died fighting for the Palestinian cause.¹⁴⁹ Following the Lebanese Civil War, SAMED expanded its economic reach by employing and training any Palestinian refugee who wished to work.¹⁵⁰ At its height, SAMED operated 46 factories in Lebanon and employed over 5,000 workers, maintaining at least one factory in each Palestinian refugee camp.¹⁵¹ In addition to these primary institutions organized by the PLO, there were a number of other social and cultural organizations that all contributed to the employment of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, including the Voice of Palestine radio network, several newspapers and a research institution.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁵ Rubenberg, Cheryl A. "The Civilian Infrastructure of the Palestine Liberation Organization: An Analysis of the PLO in Lebanon Until June 1982." *Journal of Palestine Studies*. 12, no. 3 (1983): 55. doi:10.2307/2536151.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid. 62.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid. 63.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid. 66.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Frisch, Hillel. "The Death of the PLO." *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, no. 2, 2009. 248. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40262660>.

The PLO actively sought to improve the Palestinian situation in Lebanon, and one of the ways that it achieved this goal was through forming alliances with revolutionary political parties in Lebanon. The Lebanese National Movement (LNM) was one of the main political coalitions that united with the PLO in defense of the Palestinian Resistance and also sought to achieve democratic and economic reform in Lebanon.¹⁵³ This came about at a time of heightened political and sectarian divisions in the country, particularly in conjunction with the Lebanese Civil War. The Palestinian resistance and the LNM joined forces against the Lebanese Front (LF) and eventually against both the Syrian forces and Israeli forces.¹⁵⁴ This fighting took place predominantly in the South of Lebanon, where the PLO and LNM held the most ground.

In 1982 the PLO was forced out of Lebanon by the Israeli forces, and the majority of organizations created in order to serve the social and economic needs of Palestinians in Lebanon collapsed, leaving many Palestinian refugees unemployed and further dependent on assistance from the UNRWA and other international organizations.¹⁵⁵ This was despite the fact that the PLO had contributed significantly to the self-determination of the Palestinian people, which in turn was beneficial to the Lebanese economy. By the time of the expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon in 1982, the PLO had assisted in the creation of over 10,000 jobs directly, and over 30,000 indirectly, while over two-thirds of the Palestinians in Lebanon were employed by either the PLO and the resistance movement.¹⁵⁶

The PLO and its social and economic institutions allowed the Palestinian refugees to become less dependent on the UNRWA assistance, and led to better conditions for Palestinians in Lebanon. The Palestinian economy was also “generating more than 15 per cent of the Lebanese gross national product” and the PLO “was spending more than \$300 million annually on its military forces and those of its Lebanese allies.”¹⁵⁷ Many people have

¹⁵³ Barbee, Lynne. "Interviews with the Lebanese National Movement: Introduction." *MERIP Reports*, no. 61, 1977. 44. doi:10.2307/3011235.

¹⁵⁴ Brynen, Rex. "PLO Policy in Lebanon: Legacies and Lessons." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 18, no. 2, 1989. 55. doi:10.2307/2537633.

¹⁵⁵ Hanafi, Sari, et al. "Social Exclusion of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon: Reflections on the Mechanisms that Cement their Persistent Poverty." *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Volume 31, Issue 1, 1 March 2012. 5. <https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdr018>

¹⁵⁶ Hudson, Michael C. "Palestinians and Lebanon: The Common Story." *Journal of Refugee Studies*. Volume 10, Issue 3, 1 January 1997 254.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

described these activities by the PLO as a “state within a state”, and as Hillel Frisch points out, one of the primary reasons for what he calls the “death of the PLO” was “the difficulty of creating a state and maintaining a nation beyond the area being contested, often violently.”¹⁵⁸ The actions of the PLO, although not all militaristic in nature, helped destabilize the region by challenging the sovereignty of Lebanon. This has contributed to the ongoing securitization of the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon, but has also greatly influenced the Lebanese attitude toward Palestinians.

4.4 The Lebanese Civil War

As mentioned in chapter 3, the sectarian divisions and the fragile power-sharing system in Lebanon have resulted in a weak state system that has only been exacerbated by the presence of both the Palestinian and Syrian refugees. Although the Lebanese Civil War is incredibly multifaceted and complex, this section will only be highlighting major aspects of the war that involved Palestinians and the PLO. The PLO played a significant role in the Lebanese Civil War that lasted from 1975-1990, and as a result the Palestinians are still perceived as the instigators of the war by many Lebanese, despite a history of sectarian divisions that preceded the first wave of Palestinian refugees that entered Lebanon in 1948.¹⁵⁹ The Lebanese Civil War involved various political factions influenced by the religious and ethnic groups in Lebanon, as well as the subsequent intervention of Syria and Israel.

The first military clashes that were, indeed, the precursor to the Lebanese Civil War were between the right-wing Maronite Christians, who up until this point had enjoyed a certain level of political dominance, and the Palestinian forces who were mostly organized by the PLO. Following the signing of the Cairo Accord in 1969, the Palestinian involvement in Lebanese politics was amplified, which coincided with an increasingly politicized left-wing in Lebanon. This was seen as a threat to the Maronite Christian political establishment, who subsequently began forming their own militias in retaliation against an empowered Palestinian community.

Meanwhile, the progressive left in Lebanon, who was predominantly comprised of lower-class Muslims, who felt underrepresented in the current political system, sought to protect the PLO and also saw the opportunity to

¹⁵⁸ Frisch, Hillel. "The Death of the PLO." *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, no. 2, 2009. 257. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40262660>.

¹⁵⁹ Turner, Lewis. "Explaining the (Non-)Encampment of Syrian Refugees: Security, Class and the Labour Market in Lebanon and Jordan." *Mediterranean Politics*, 20:3, 2015. 391.

enact social and political change in Lebanon.¹⁶⁰ At the time, 85% of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon were Sunni Muslim, which exacerbated the sectarian divisions within Lebanon and ultimately influenced the positions of the various political parties in Lebanon.¹⁶¹ With a growing Muslim population in Lebanon, the Maronite Christians felt that their political dominance based on the demographics of Lebanon was threatened, and therefore took a hostile stance toward the Palestinian refugees and the PLO.¹⁶² It was a series of intense clashes that took place in 1975 between the Palestinian Forces and the Christian militias that triggered the Lebanese Civil War.¹⁶³ During the Civil War, the Palestinian forces and the LNM controlled much of Southern Lebanon. The relationship between the Palestinians and the Christian and Shi'ite villagers in the south was initially one of acceptance and support due their lack of representation in Beirut, however, after the Civil War began in 1975 the villagers felt threatened by the Palestinian forces.¹⁶⁴ Israel took advantage of the strained relationship between the villagers and the Palestinians and following its first offensive into Southern Lebanon in 1978, was able to leave in place an anti-Palestinian population.¹⁶⁵

In addition to the in-fighting between the various political factions in Lebanon, Syria and Israel both invaded during the course of the Civil War. While fighting the LF alongside the LNM, the Palestinians were also launching attacks on Northern Israel from Lebanon, which prompted the initial invasion into Southern Lebanon in 1978. Following the first invasion, Israel occupied an area of the South called the "Security Zone", and invaded a second time in 1982, successfully crushing the PLO military and political base.¹⁶⁶

With the PLO's departure from Lebanon, the Palestinian refugee camps were left unprotected from the Christian militias, which resulted in the slaughter of thousands of civilian refugees. In September of 1982 Lebanese Christian

¹⁶⁰ Haddad, Simon. "The Origins of Popular Opposition to Palestinian Resettlement in Lebanon." *The International Migration Review* 38, no. 2, 2004. 474.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/27645386>.

¹⁶¹ Ibid. 475.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Hudson, Michael C. "Palestinians and Lebanon: The Common Story." *Journal of Refugee Studies*. Volume 10, Issue 3, 1 January 1997. 253.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid. 254

¹⁶⁶ Haddad, Simon. "The Origins of Popular Opposition to Palestinian Resettlement in Lebanon." *The International Migration Review* 38, no. 2, 2004. 474.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/27645386>

militias, under the auspices of the Israeli Defense Army (IDF), massacred over 3,000 Palestinian refugees at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps.¹⁶⁷ In addition to the Israeli offensive in Lebanon, the Shi'ites began mobilizing their own military factions with the creation of Hezbollah and the Amal movement.¹⁶⁸ This led to the "War of the Camps", which was an incredibly brutal offensive by the Lebanese Amal militia in an effort to rid the Palestinian refugee camps of pro-Arafat Palestinian forces following his exile in 1982.¹⁶⁹ This offensive lasted from 1985-1989, until Syrian forces put pressure on Amal to end the offensive that ultimately resulted in the death of hundreds of Palestinians in addition to the further disorganization and division between the various political groups within the camps.¹⁷⁰

The National Accord Document, also known as the Ta'if Agreement, signed in 1989, ultimately brought about the end of the Civil War and the return of relative calm to the region. The Ta'if Agreement was concerned mostly with the restoration of political order in Lebanon, outlining a number of political reforms including requiring parity between Christian and Muslim representatives in Parliament, as opposed to the previous 6:5 ratio in favor of Christians.¹⁷¹ The agreement still maintained the fragile sectarian system, which has been one of the primary motives behind the Lebanese restraint in permitting refugee settlement and integration.

Syria maintained its hegemonic control over Lebanon following the Ta'if Agreement from 1990 until 2005, and during this time the Palestinians were in a far more disorganized and precarious position than prior to the Civil War.¹⁷² The Palestinians were left in disarray, and they played no part in a Lebanon left under Syrian control. They had been marginalized "politically, economically, and socially, they constitute a 'sect' without a recognized place

¹⁶⁷ Hanafi, Sari, et al. "Social Exclusion of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon: Reflections on the Mechanisms that Cement their Persistent Poverty." *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Volume 31, Issue 1, 1 March 2012. 5. <https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdr018>

¹⁶⁸ Suleiman, Jaber. "The Current Political, Organizational, and Security Situation in the Palestinian Refugee Camps of Lebanon." *Journal of Palestine Studies*. 29, no. 1, 1999. 68. doi:10.2307/2676432.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Traboulsi, Fawwaz. "Ambiguities and Contradictions of the Ta'if Agreement." *In A History of Modern Lebanon*. London: Pluto Press, 2012. 250-251 doi:10.2307/j.ctt183p4f5.20.

¹⁷² Suleiman, Jaber. "The Current Political, Organizational, and Security Situation in the Palestinian Refugee Camps of Lebanon." *Journal of Palestine Studies*. 29, no. 1, 1999. 68. doi:10.2307/2676432.

in a sectarian system, no longer a vanguard of revolution.”¹⁷³ Despite the deterioration of the Palestinian conditions following the PLO removal, the Palestinian military was still left in control of the camps, and Lebanese military checkpoints were put into place in Southern Lebanon.¹⁷⁴ While many have referred to the Palestinian camps as remaining “islands of security” outside of Lebanese law, there have still been cases of the Lebanese Internal Security Forces entering camps in coordination with the camp officials in order to arrest individuals who are suspected of Lebanese crime.¹⁷⁵

4.5 Lebanese Denial of Basic Rights to Palestinians

Although security played a role in the earlier years of Palestinian refugee policy, following the Lebanese Civil War, national security took the forefront and the rights of the Palestinian refugees deteriorated significantly in Lebanon. This stems from the fact that the military action taken by the PLO against Israel from within Lebanon was a direct threat to the national security of Lebanon. The fragile political system was unable to cope with the increased Palestinian presence and formation of a “state within a state”, and as a result was thrown into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as a Civil War of its own.¹⁷⁶ Rex Brynen highlights the inevitability of a conflict ensuing in the incredibly fragile Lebanese political system:

“The Palestinian resistance movement was dangerous to the Lebanese system itself. However much the ‘revolutionary’ nature of the PLO (and more specifically, its Fateh mainstream) may have been questioned by some, the very presence of a militant, generally progressive, and avowedly non-sectarian popular movement in an unequal laissez-faire society wherein the privileges of a relatively small number of leading families were sustained by a precarious sectarian political order, was clearly a destabilizing element.”¹⁷⁷

With the Ta’if Agreement maintaining the delicate Lebanese political system based on sectarian divisions, many of these same challenges persist, and the Palestinians are even further marginalized and excluded from Lebanese

¹⁷³ Sayigh, Rosemary. "Palestinians in Lebanon: Harsh Present, Uncertain Future." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 25, no. 1, 1995. 42. doi:10.2307/2538103.

¹⁷⁴ Suleiman, Jaber. "The Current Political, Organizational, and Security Situation in the Palestinian Refugee Camps of Lebanon." *Journal of Palestine Studies*. 29, no. 1, 1999. 70. doi:10.2307/2676432.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid. 72.

¹⁷⁶ Haddad, Simon. "The Origins of Popular Opposition to Palestinian Resettlement in Lebanon." *The International Migration Review* 38, no. 2, 2004. 475.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/27645386>.

¹⁷⁷ Brynen, Rex. "PLO Policy in Lebanon: Legacies and Lessons." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 18, no. 2, 1989: 54. doi:10.2307/2537633.

society. The social exclusion of Palestinian refugees worsened following the defeat of the PLO, and political conversations concerning the rights of Palestinians has been predominantly concerned with preventing their naturalization. Hannafi explains how naturalization, or *Tanteen* as it is referred to in Arabic, has been used as a political tool to prevent the integration of Palestinians (and Syrians) into Lebanese society.¹⁷⁸ Lebanese political parties have argued that *Tanteen* would thrust the fragile political balance into chaos, and perhaps another civil war, while others have argued that granting Palestinians Lebanese citizenship would undermine their right to return to Palestine.¹⁷⁹ This justification for not granting citizenship to the Palestinian refugees that have spent nearly seven decades as perpetual refugees in Lebanon has been used as a justification for denying Palestinians basic social, economic, and civil rights.¹⁸⁰

One of the main challenges that both Palestinians and Syrians face in Lebanon is the right to participate in the Lebanese labor market. In 2016 the UN published a report on the situation of Palestinians in Lebanon and according to this report, in December of 2010, nearly 56 percent of Palestinians were unemployed, and this number is likely to have increased due to the influx of Syrian refugees.¹⁸¹ Palestinians are excluded from working in the medical field, farming and fishing, and public transportation, as well as law, engineering, and journalism.¹⁸² Palestinian refugees also work predominantly in menial, low-paying jobs and in most cases receive lower salary than Lebanese nationals for the same work.¹⁸³

Although it is possible for non-nationals to receive a work permit, it can be difficult, time-consuming, and expensive, while also requiring documentation from the employer causing many of them to choose not to hire Palestinian refugees.¹⁸⁴ Additionally, Palestinians are excluded from receiving social security benefits and are not protected by Lebanese worker protection laws due to the Lebanese principal of reciprocity in the case of

¹⁷⁸ Hanafi, Sari, et al. "Social Exclusion of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon: Reflections on the Mechanisms that Cement their Persistent Poverty." *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Volume 31, Issue 1, 1 March 2012. 42. <https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdr018>

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ UNHCR. *The Situation of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*. February 2016, 6. available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56cc95484.html> [accessed 13 September 2017]

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

“foreign workers”.¹⁸⁵ The restrictions placed on Palestinians and their right to work has led to higher rates of poverty and increased dependence on international assistance.

A more recent restriction that has been placed on Palestinians in Lebanon is the right to own property. In 2001, the Lebanese parliament amended the 1969 Right to Real Estate Acquisition of Foreigners which states that “no real right of any kind may be acquired by a person who does not carry citizenship issued by a recognized state or by any person, if such acquisition contradicts the provisions of the Constitution relating to the prohibition of permanent settlement (*Tawteen*)”¹⁸⁶ This law was a direct target for Palestinians who, up to that point, had been allowed to own property if it was under a certain size.¹⁸⁷ Once again, with regard to property ownership, the threat of *Tawteen* has been used by the political elite in Lebanon in order to restrict the rights of Palestinians even further. The threat of *Tawteen* and what it would mean for political stability is being used by the Lebanese political elite in order to place unnecessary restrictions on Palestinian refugees, contributing to their further exclusion from society. These restrictions to property ownership also contribute to overcrowding in refugee camps, which has been a mounting issue for Palestinian camps.¹⁸⁸ Restrictions have also been placed on construction materials in some camps, which has left many dwellings in a dilapidated state, while other camps have resorted to building vertically due to restraints on camp expansion.¹⁸⁹

Although there are a number of Palestinians who enjoy freedom of movement within Lebanon, there are numerous checkpoints that limit and occasionally prohibit movement in and out of refugee camps.¹⁹⁰ These checkpoints serve to regulate who and what enters and leaves the Palestinian

¹⁸⁵ Al-Natour, S. and Yassine, D. “Insight on the Legal Status Governing Daily Lives of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon.” *Beirut: Human Development Center*. 2007. 52.

¹⁸⁶ “The Palestinian Refugee and The Property Ownership.” Last modified 2018. Accessed February 28, 2018. <http://www.lpdc.gov.lb/property-ownership/the-palestinian-refugee-and-the-property-ownership/56/en>

¹⁸⁷ Hanafi, Sari, et al. “Social Exclusion of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon: Reflections on the Mechanisms that Cement their Persistent Poverty.” *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Volume 31, Issue 1, 1 March 2012. 5. <https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdr018>

¹⁸⁸ Amnesty International. “Palestinian refugees in Lebanon: Six decades of exile and suffering.” 17 October 2007. available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/484cd6ef1d.html> [accessed 12 August 2017]

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ UNHCR. *The Situation of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*. February 2016, 5. available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56cc95484.html> [accessed 13 September 2017]

refugee camps, and they often times lead to long waits and even the threat of arrest or detention.¹⁹¹ This tactic has been used by the Lebanese government both as a security measure and in an effort to exert a form of control over the camps.

4.6 Conclusion

The complicated history of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and their relationship with the Lebanese continue to pose problems for the Lebanese government. The fragility of the confessional system in Lebanon became even more apparent through the instability that the Palestinian refugees caused in their decades of exile in Lebanon. Although the PLO sought to form political allies with a number of progressive Lebanese political parties, it eventually found itself at the center of a bitter sectarian civil war. The result of the Lebanese Civil War was the further marginalization of the Palestinian refugees, and the formation of the general public opinion that Palestinians were directly responsible for thrusting Lebanon into a civil war.

This was despite the fact that the Lebanese political system has been based on a delicate sectarian balance that migration of any kind, but particularly large refugee communities, pose a threat to. As Rex Brynen notes: “The PLO was an indirect danger to the economic, political, and confessional privileges of the Lebanese elite by its very existence. Conflict with the Lebanese government, and with its defenders, was therefore inevitable, even more so as the PLO increasingly (and necessarily) allied itself with the reformist and revolutionary parties of the Lebanese National Movement.”¹⁹²

The historical context of the perpetual Palestinian refugee community in Lebanon is incredibly relevant to the Lebanese response to the Syrian refugee crisis. This history is one that exposes the very real threat that perpetual refugee communities have posed to the fragile political system in Lebanon. This delicate confessional system will continue to face challenges as long as a perpetual refugee community exists and the question of their rights and *Tawteen* remains.

¹⁹¹ UNHCR. *The Situation of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*. February 2016, 5. available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56cc95484.html> [accessed 13 September 2017]

¹⁹² Brynen, Rex. "PLO Policy in Lebanon: Legacies and Lessons." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 18, no. 2, 1989, 54. doi:10.2307/2537633.

Chapter 5: Security and Syrian Refugees in Lebanon

5.1 Introduction

Security is at the center of many of the most difficult questions regarding the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon, whether it is the security of the host-state, refugee security, or the security of the host-communities. Buzan's awareness of the interconnected nature of the security of the individual and the state is incredibly relevant in the case of Lebanon. When refugees are marginalized and seen as second-class citizens, the tensions tend to rise between the host-state and refugee communities, often times creating greater insecurity for all actors involved. Although national-security has been at the center of Lebanon's refugee policy, their actions have led to an unstable situation that puts refugees at greater risk and nurtures threats to the national security of Lebanon. This chapter outlines the insecurities that Syrian refugees in Lebanon currently face, as a direct result of the restrictive policies that the government has placed on the refugee community.

5.2 Policy of Non-encampment

Despite the acclaim that Lebanon has received for their policy of non-encampment of Syrian refugees, the motivation behind it was hardly from a standpoint of humanitarian assistance. The politicization of the question of refugee encampment has dominated the discourse concerning Syrian refugees, with the history of Palestinian encampment and its effects on Lebanese national security remaining at the forefront. By March of 2012, after a year and a half of fighting in Syria, there was already a sizeable refugee population in Lebanon. At this time, the Lebanese parliament began discussing refugee encampment, with Hezbollah taking a hardline approach towards Syrians and refugee encampment. The Hezbollah deputy secretary-general said, "We cannot accept refugee camps for Syrians in Lebanon because any camp ... will become a military pocket that will be used as a launchpad against Syria and then against Lebanon."¹⁹³ Although the majority of political parties in Lebanon were opposed to refugee encampment, the leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, Walid Jumblatt argued for the

¹⁹³ "Lebanon Should Not Build Syrian Refugee Camps, Says Hezbollah". Last modified 2012. Accessed February 20, 2018. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2012/Mar-12/166296-lebanon-should-not-build-syrian-refugee-camps-says-hezbollah.ashx>.

establishment of refugee camps similar to the ones in Jordan and Turkey.¹⁹⁴ Not only does the history of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon influence the policy of non-encampment of Syrians, but also the political divisions, which remain deeply rooted in sectarianism.

With Hezbollah and its allies remaining supporters of the Assad regime, their opposition to the establishment of refugee camps remains in line with the Syrian governments calls against camps in Lebanon. In the years following, the Lebanese parliament had essentially come to the agreement that building refugee camps in the interior of Lebanon was not an option, nevertheless, they requested the establishment of camps either in safe areas of Syria or in areas along the Lebanese-Syrian border. The UNHCR was vocally opposed to these proposals, due to the security risks that placing refugees near the border poses for both the host-state and refugee security.¹⁹⁵ The suggestion of placing Syrian refugees in camps near conflict areas emphasizes the extent to which Lebanese officials would be willing to put refugees at risk in an effort to prevent their permanent residency in Lebanon. Although the fragile political situation in the country is reason enough for concern, the refugees have been seen as a burden by the Lebanese government and not as a group of people in need of protection and assistance.

Despite the political discussions that ensued, official refugee camps have yet to be established for the Syrian refugees in Lebanon. This has led to a new set of challenges, both for the security of refugees, as well as the national-security of Lebanon. While the Lebanese government's main concern has been the protection of national-security and the delicate sectarian balance of their confessional political system, their decision to prevent the establishment of Syrian refugee camps has led to greater security threats in the form of a large marginalized community that has been pushed to its limits. According to a report by the Carnegie Middle East Center, Sunni extremism in Lebanon has increased for a number of reasons, least of which is the Lebanese treatment of Syrian refugees.¹⁹⁶ The report claims that Hezbollah also plays a role in the increase in Sunni radicalization, but also

¹⁹⁴ Anderson, Brooke. 2012. "Lebanon Pressed to Set Up Syrian Refugee Camps". The Daily Star Newspaper - Lebanon. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2012/Jul-19/181105-lebanon-pressed-to-set-up-syrian-refugee-camps.ashx>.

¹⁹⁵ "Syria Opposes Creation of Camps in Lebanon". Last modified 2014. Accessed February 13, 2018. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb//Article.aspx?id=261919&link>.

¹⁹⁶ Lefèvre, Raphaël. "Tackling Sunni Radicalization in Lebanon". *Carnegie Middle East Center*. 2014. 2. <http://carnegie-mec.org/2014/12/24/tackling-sunni-radicalization-in-lebanon-pub-57592>.

recognizes the repercussions that viewing refugees through a lens of national-security can have, particularly with regard to radicalization.

The multiplication of informal settlements, the deterioration of the socioeconomic situation, and the absence of a short-term prospect for the creation of safe refugee camps may push a number of Syrians toward militant groups, which often provide financial incentives, care for families, and offer a temporary sense of security.¹⁹⁷

The policy of non-encampment has led to major challenges for Lebanon, the host-communities, and the Syrian refugees. The Syrian refugees, however, have faced the some of the greatest challenges, as they are pushed deeper into poverty, face greater restrictions, and are placed into vulnerable situations.

5.3 Open Border and Changing Lebanese Refugee Policy

Although Lebanon initially held an open-door policy for the Syrian refugees, which allowed the initial large flow of refugees into the country, in January of 2015 the Lebanese government closed the border between Syria and Lebanon in an effort to curb the refugee flow. In 2013, there were already discussions in the parliament concerning the closing of the border and placing a halt on all Syrian migration into Lebanon.¹⁹⁸ The Change and Reform Bloc, which is the largest Christian political party and the second largest political party in the Lebanese Parliament, proposed legislation that would halt the intake of refugees and also sought to organize the return of Syrian refugees to areas of Syria that were considered “safe” and under the control of the Assad regime.¹⁹⁹

The first legislation concerning the halting of refugee entry into Lebanon, however, did not take place until the following year with the introduction of restrictions on Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS) seeking to enter Lebanon.²⁰⁰ In May of 2014, the Lebanese government put into place stringent requirements on PRS, requiring them to attain a pre-approved visa

¹⁹⁷ Lefèvre, Raphaël. "Tackling Sunni Radicalization in Lebanon". *Carnegie Middle East Center*. 2014. 2. <http://carnegie-mec.org/2014/12/24/tackling-sunni-radicalization-in-lebanon-pub-57592>.

¹⁹⁸ "Aoun's Bloc Proposes to End Syrian Migration To Lebanon". Last modified 2013. Accessed February 6, 2018. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2013/Aug-13/227230-aouns-bloc-proposes-to-end-syrian-migration-to-lebanon.ashx>.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Salhani, Justin. "Palestinians In Syria Barred from Flying to Lebanon". Last modified 2014. Accessed February 10, 2018. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Jul-02/262322-palestinians-in-syria-barred-from-flying-to-lebanon.ashx>.

or a valid ticket to a third country.²⁰¹ These restrictions, which ultimately made it impossible for PRS to gain legal entry into Lebanon, also resulted in the General Security instructing airports to deny entry to any Palestinian, regardless of the documents they possessed.²⁰²

These actions carried out by the Lebanese government were immediately criticized by Amnesty International as being discriminatory and a blatant breach of international law.²⁰³ Following the enforcement of the new regulations, Amnesty International published a report detailing the restrictions and the added strain that they have placed on Palestinian refugees from Syria. They argue that “measures that prevent people escaping the conflict from accessing the territory of Lebanon are a clear breach of the country’s obligations under the principle of non-refoulement, a customary norm of international law binding on all states.”²⁰⁴

Following the implementation of the restrictions on PRS, the Lebanese government continued to enact regulations in order to prevent the flow of refugees into the country. In January of 2015, the Lebanese government enacted restrictions on the entry of Syrian refugees seeking to enter Lebanon by requiring a visa prior to their arrival.²⁰⁵ The types of visas available to Syrians are for tourism, education, medical treatment, or business.²⁰⁶ These restrictions have been successful in stemming the steady flow of refugees

²⁰¹ Salhani, Justin. "Palestinians In Syria Barred from Flying to Lebanon". Last modified 2014. Accessed February 10, 2018. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Jul-02/262322-palestinians-in-syria-barred-from-flying-to-lebanon.ashx>

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Amnesty International. Denied Refuge: Palestinians from Syria Seeking Safety in Lebanon, 1 July 2014, MDE 18/002/2014, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56cabdd14.html> [accessed 14 September 2017]

²⁰⁵ "Lebanon Announces Unprecedented Entry Restrictions for Syrians". Last modified 2015. Accessed February 16, 2018. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Jan-02/282826-lebanon-announces-unprecedented-entry-restrictions-for-syrians.ashx#>.

²⁰⁶ Amnesty International. *Lebanon: New entry requirements for Syrians likely to block would-be refugees*, available at: www.amnesty.org/en/documents/document/?indexNumber=mde24%2F002%2F2015&language=en

into Lebanon, however, most likely by preventing those fleeing war and persecution in Syria from entering the country.²⁰⁷

Additionally, the Lebanese government put new requirements into place for Syrian refugees already residing in Lebanon who wish to renew their residence permits. These new requirements have made it incredibly difficult for many Syrians to maintain legal residency, which has put them at risk of arrest, detention, and even *refoulement*.²⁰⁸ One of the most difficult aspects of the new requirements is the annual renewal fee of US\$ 200, which according to a report carried out by Human Rights Watch, nearly all of the Syrian refugees questioned claimed that the fee resulted in their inability to renew their permits.²⁰⁹ In addition to the fee, the government requires those seeking to renew to either be registered with the UNHCR, or to have a Lebanese sponsor in order to maintain legal status in Lebanon.²¹⁰ With the 2017 UNHCR Vulnerability report claiming that as many as 74% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon lack legal status, the vast majority of Syrian refugees in Lebanon are facing greater insecurity in a number of areas of daily life.²¹¹

The restrictions that have been placed on both Syrian refugees and PRS have led to the return of refugees to Syria, despite the risks that it may pose to their safety and well-being. Amnesty International emphasizes that, despite their non-ratification of the 1951 Refugee Convention or the 1967 Protocol, Lebanon is prohibited from participating in the non-*refoulement* of refugees in accordance with international customary law.²¹² They stress that, “closing the border to those in need of asylum is a violation of the principle of *non-refoulement*, and making conditions in the host country extremely difficult for

²⁰⁷ Amnesty International. “Pushed to the Edge: Syrian Refugees Face Increased Restrictions in Lebanon.” 15 June 2015. available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56405c274.html> [accessed 24 February 2018]

²⁰⁸ Ibid. 13.

²⁰⁹ Human Rights Watch. “‘I Just Wanted to be Treated like a Person’ - How Lebanon's Residency Rules Facilitate Abuse of Syrian Refugees.” 12 January 2016, 2. available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5695559c3274.html> [accessed 24 February 2018]

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ UNHCR. “UNHCR Vulnerability Assessment Report 2017.” 13. Accessed February 10, 2018. <https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/vasyr-2017-vulnerability-assessment-syrian-refugees-lebanon>

²¹² Amnesty International. “Pushed to the Edge: Syrian Refugees Face Increased Restrictions in Lebanon.” 15 June 2015. 10. available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56405c274.html> [accessed 24 February 2018]

refugees to the point where they have no choice but to leave, can also amount to *refoulement*.”²¹³

5.4 Security Issues that Syrian Refugees Face

While national-security has been the focus of the Lebanese government, the Syrian refugees have suffered from increased insecurity. Buzan argues that individual security, which is the “basic unit to which security can be applied”, can be difficult to define due to its subjective nature.²¹⁴ Security of individuals involves life, health, status, wealth, and freedom, which Buzan acknowledges are dependent upon the society or environment in which they are placed. He continues:

“Societal threats come in a wide variety of forms, but there are four obvious basic types: physical threats (pain, injury, death), economic threats (seizure or destruction of property, denial of access to work or resources), threats to rights (imprisonment, denial of normal civil liberties) and threats to position or status (demotion, public humiliation).”

Syrian refugees in Lebanon have been deprived of their rights, they face job insecurity, which as a result has led to extraordinary rates of poverty. They face housing insecurity and threats to their safety and well-being, in addition to being viewed as second-class citizens in Lebanon. The challenge for refugees in extended exile is that, while they are seen as a threat to the security of the host-state, they are placed in incredibly precarious situations, often times marginalized, and as a result face tremendous threats to their own security.²¹⁵

The last two sections of this chapter outlined the policies that the Lebanese government has enacted in response to the Syrian refugee crisis, while this section outlines the material effects of those policies. The insecurities that Syrian refugees are facing in Lebanon is comparable to the insecurities faced by Palestinians living in official UN refugee camps. Encampment or non-encampment of refugees tends to remain at the center of the discourse concerning refugees, although encampment is hardly indicative of the well-being of refugees, but rather the restrictions placed on the refugee community by the host-state. While the UNHCR has continued to praise

²¹³ Amnesty International. “Pushed to the Edge: Syrian Refugees Face Increased Restrictions in Lebanon.” 15 June 2015. 10. available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56405c274.html> [accessed 24 February 2018]

²¹⁴ Buzan, Barry, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. Colchester, England: ECPR Press, 2007. 49-51.

²¹⁵ Hyndman, Jennifer, and Wenona Mary Giles. *Refugees in Extended Exile*. London: Routledge, 2016. 44.

Lebanon for its refugee response, this ignores the tremendous challenges that have been placed on Syrian refugees through Lebanese refugee policy.²¹⁶

5.4.1 Shelter and Housing Insecurity

Syrian refugees continue to be confronted with difficulties regarding housing and shelter in Lebanon. Without the establishment of official UNHCR camps, refugees have been left to their own devices when it comes to shelter, and in many cases, have been forced to establish unofficial tented settlements. According to a recent report on the vulnerability of Syrian refugees in 2017, 17% of Syrian refugees continue to live in tented settlements, while an additional 9% live in non-residential structures like worksites or garages.²¹⁷ The remaining 73% of refugees live in residential housing, however, there has been an increase since 2016 from 42% to 53% of Syrian refugees living in shelters that do not meet minimum humanitarian standards.²¹⁸ This includes shelters that suffer from overcrowding, dangerous structural conditions, and structures in need of major repairs.²¹⁹

In addition to the insecurity posed by inadequate shelter, the cost of rent has also become unaffordable to many Syrian refugees, making them more vulnerable as a result.²²⁰ While 80% of households pay rent, only 6% reported having a legal contract with their landlord, which places an added burden on maintaining legal residency in Lebanon.²²¹ Additionally, 7% of Syrian refugees reported working for their landlord in order to cover the costs of their rent, which makes them particularly susceptible to exploitation.²²²

Those who are living in tented settlements are most likely to be forced to work for their landlords in order to cover the costs of their rent, often times paid little or nothing in the form of money.²²³ The informal tented settlements are often times placed on farms where a *shamish*, or camp

²¹⁶ Turner, Lewis. "Explaining the (Non-)Encampment of Syrian Refugees: Security, Class and the Labour Market in Lebanon and Jordan." *Mediterranean Politics*, 20:3, 2015. 386-404.

²¹⁷ UNHCR. "UNHCR Vulnerability Assessment Report 2017." 15 December 2017. 22. Accessed February 10, 2018. <https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/vasyr-2017-vulnerability-assessment-syrian-refugees-lebanon>

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Ibid. 26

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Freedom Fund, "Struggling to Survive: Slavery and Exploitation of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon." 8 April 2016, 14.

coordinator, organizes work for the adults, and in many cases the children, in return for living in the settlement.²²⁴

5.4.2 Job Insecurity

The threat of forced labor brings us to perhaps the most difficult challenge facing Syrian refugees in Lebanon, which is job insecurity. Syrians in Lebanon do not have legal access to the formal labor market, which makes them susceptible to exploitation, regularly resulting in lower wages, harassment in the workplace, and ultimately leaving them unprotected by Lebanese worker protection laws.²²⁵ Syrians registered with the UNHCR are required to sign a pledge that prevents them from working while remaining in Lebanon, and those who do work risk losing their legal status and are susceptible to arrest and deportation.²²⁶ Despite these restrictions, in one survey, 36% of working-age adults had worked the month prior to the survey, with the majority of those working in construction, agriculture, or the service sector.²²⁷

Child labor has become more common in the Syrian refugee community, as families are pushed to desperate measures in order to make ends meet. There have been numerous reports of children being forced to work long hours and low wages, and in some cases, are required to work for free by *shamish* in order to help pay for rent.²²⁸ With the strict requirements that have been put into place for acquiring legal residency, and an estimated 74% of refugees in Lebanon not having legal status, cases of exploitation, harassment, and abuse go widely unreported.²²⁹

The UNHCR reported that only 53% of households had at least one working member, while about 2.7% of children aged 5-14 were also reported as working. This number, however, may not be accurate as there have been other reports that 60-70% of Syrian refugee children are working, with

²²⁴ "Syrian Refugees in Lebanon At Growing Risk of Forced Labour: Anti-Slavery Activists". Last Modified 2016. Accessed February 20, 2018.

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-lebanon-refugees/syrian-refugees-in-lebanon-at-growing-risk-of-forced-labour-anti-slavery-activists-idUSKCN0X9009>.

²²⁵ Human Rights Watch. "‘I Just Wanted to be Treated like a Person’ - How Lebanon's Residency Rules Facilitate Abuse of Syrian Refugees." 12 January 2016, 23-24. available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5695559c3274.html> [accessed 24 February 2018]

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ UNHCR. "UNHCR Vulnerability Assessment Report 2016." 16 December 2016, 59-61.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Ibid. 27.

particular high rates in the Bekaa Valley.²³⁰ There have been many cases of the *Shamish* organizing work for children living in tented settlements, usually on nearby farms or in factories.²³¹

5.4.3 Poverty

Job insecurity and unemployment has led to a rise in poverty in the Syrian refugee community. Unfortunately, as the 2017 Vulnerability Assessment points out, the situation has worsened in the past year, despite a halt on new refugees coming into Lebanon. According to the report, 76% of Syrian refugees are living below the poverty level, with an astonishing 58% of households living in extreme poverty, and therefore are unable to meet the basic needs of food, health, shelter, and education.²³² This is a rise from the 2016 Vulnerability Assessment, which reported that 71% were living below the poverty line with roughly half living in extreme poverty.²³³ In order to make ends meet, refugees are dependent on assistance and a reported 16% of households have been dependent on loans in order to make ends meet.²³⁴

As a result of the pervasive poverty in the refugee community, many are unable to purchase basic necessities like food. An alarming 91% of households reported being food insecure to some degree, while 38% were reported as being either moderately or severely food insecure.²³⁵ 71% of refugees were reported as receiving some form of assistance with the World Food Programme (WFP) providing the largest proportion at \$27 per month, in order to help cover food costs and basic necessities.²³⁶ Despite the assistance provided by the WFP and other international organizations, refugees are still finding it hard to purchase basic necessities and as a result are resorting to desperate measures.²³⁷

²³⁰ Freedom Fund. "Struggling to Survive: Slavery and Exploitation of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon." 8 April 2016. 7.

²³¹ Freedom Fund. "Struggling to Survive: Slavery and Exploitation of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon." 8 April 2016. 8.

²³² UNHCR. "UNHCR Vulnerability Assessment Report 2017." 15 December 2017, 3. Accessed February 10, 2018. <https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/vasyr-2017-vulnerability-assessment-syrian-refugees-lebanon>

²³³ UNHCR. "UNHCR Vulnerability Assessment Report 2016." 16 December 2016, 2.

²³⁴ UNHCR. "UNHCR Vulnerability Assessment Report 2017." 15 December 2017, 3. Accessed February 10, 2018. <https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/vasyr-2017-vulnerability-assessment-syrian-refugees-lebanon>

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Ibid. 3.

²³⁷ Freedom Fund. "Struggling to Survive: Slavery and Exploitation of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon." 8 April 2016. 19.

The widespread poverty that exists in the Syrian refugee community has worsened in the last year. This is a direct result of the restrictions that have been placed on their employment in the Lebanese formal labor market. In addition to a lack of funding by the UNHCR and other international organizations. Without employment, refugees are increasingly dependent on international assistance, and as a result, the international community must contribute more in order to meet the needs of refugees in Lebanon.

5.4.4 Access to Education and Healthcare

Although there have been improvements in the past year, many Syrian refugees in Lebanon still lack access to healthcare and education. In 2016 roughly half of the approximately 500,000 child refugees of school-age were attending schools.²³⁸ Children aged 15-18 were the most affected, with only 3% registered in secondary school for the 2015-2016 school-year.²³⁹ There was, however, significant improvement in 2017 with 70% of children aged 6-14 enrolled in public schools.²⁴⁰ Still, Lebanon faces huge challenges with a lack of funding and limited infrastructure to support such a large increase in enrollment. One of the main reasons given by refugees for not enrolling school-aged children in schools were the costs incurred for supplies and transportation.²⁴¹ Additionally, the stringent requirements for legal residency has prohibited some refugee children from enrolling in schools in Lebanon.²⁴²

According to the UNHCR, in 2017 89% of refugee families that required primary healthcare were able to access it, which rose from a reported 84% in 2016.²⁴³ With 1.1 million refugees registered with the UNHCR in Lebanon, there have been tremendous strains on Lebanese infrastructure. Access to healthcare and education has been a challenge, however, this is one area that has seen some improvement since the beginning of the refugee crisis in 2011,

²³⁸ Human Rights Watch. "Growing Up Without an Education: Barriers to Education for Syrian Children in Lebanon." 19 July 2016.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ UNHCR. "UNHCR Vulnerability Assessment Report 2017." 15 December 2017, 32. Accessed February 10, 2018. <https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/vasyr-2017-vulnerability-assessment-syrian-refugees-lebanon>

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Human Rights Watch. "Growing Up Without an Education: Barriers to Education for Syrian Children in Lebanon." 19 July 2016.

²⁴³ UNHCR. "UNHCR Vulnerability Assessment Report 2017." 15 December 2017, 36. Accessed February 10, 2018. <https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/vasyr-2017-vulnerability-assessment-syrian-refugees-lebanon>

as Lebanese services have adapted in order to accommodate the refugee community, despite the legal residency of refugees. Still, the funding in order to continue improving these services continues to fall short, and as a result has left some struggling to get access to healthcare and education.²⁴⁴

5.5 Refugee Insecurity as a Means of Radicalization

As mentioned in chapter two of this thesis, radicalization and the militarization of refugee groups are a direct threat to the host-state. With national-security having been the focus of Lebanese refugee policy, the security of refugees has been predominantly ignored. With the rise of insecurity in the form of increased poverty, unemployment, a lack of legal protections in Lebanon, and limited access to healthcare and education, the refugees have been left in a state of desperation. Such dire circumstances and increased vulnerability make refugees a prime target for recruitment into extremist groups, particularly with the already present sectarian divisions in the country.²⁴⁵

“Anger toward Hezbollah for aiding the Assad regime, coupled with desperation and disappointment due to inadequate assistance from Hezbollah as part of the governing Lebanese body, has led some Syrian refugees to join opposition forces or other radical Sunni groups, such as Mustaqbal and the Al-Nusra Front, that are fighting against Hezbollah and Assad.”²⁴⁶

The sectarian divisions in Lebanon coupled with the widespread insecurity that Syrian refugees are facing, there is an increased threat of recruitment within refugee communities as well as the threat of spillover from the conflict in Syria.²⁴⁷ The United States Department of State published a report on the heightened security risk in Lebanon in 2014 due to the Sunni resentment against Hezbollah military actions in support of the Assad regime in Syria.²⁴⁸ Sunni militant groups carried out more than two-dozen terrorist attacks against Hezbollah targets in Lebanon.²⁴⁹ A 2016 report on support for radical

²⁴⁴ Human Rights Watch. “Growing Up Without an Education: Barriers to Education for Syrian Children in Lebanon.” 19 July 2016.

²⁴⁵ “The urban refugee crisis, Strategic Comments.” 23:2, v-vii, 2017. DOI: 10.1080/13567888.2017.1311077

²⁴⁶ Dickstein, Edyt. “Refugee Radicalization: From Victims to Violence.” Harvard International Review. 2014. 6.

²⁴⁷ Lefèvre, Raphaël. “Tackling Sunni Radicalization in Lebanon”. *Carnegie Middle East Center*. 2014. 2. <http://carnegie-mec.org/2014/12/24/tackling-sunni-radicalization-in-lebanon-pub-57592>.

²⁴⁸ United States Department of State. “Country Reports on Terrorism” 2014” Lebanon, 19 June 2015. available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5587c74b15.html> [accessed 26 February 2018]

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

groups highlighted ties between unemployment and increased Syrian support of the radical Sunni group, Jahbat al-nusra.²⁵⁰ Both Jahbat al-nusra and the Islamic State have been reported as using the vulnerability of Syrian and Lebanese youth by using monetary means in order to recruit.²⁵¹

While widespread radicalization is not currently taking place, the threat of radicalization in the Syrian refugee community remains present. The insecurities they face put them in a susceptible position that could make them a target for radicalization. Furthermore, the sectarian divisions in Lebanon have the ability to create greater instability, particularly with increased resentment toward Hezbollah.

5.6 Conclusion

The Syrian refugee community in Lebanon continues to be faced with insecurities, particularly regarding poverty, unemployment, shelter, and education. These stem from the lack of international funding as well as the Lebanese policy of non-encampment. After the arrival of over 1 million Syrian refugees, the government sought to reduce their flow into the country and also enact more requirements for Syrian refugees already present, with the aim of reducing their numbers in Lebanon. Undoubtedly, the stress caused by having such a large number of refugees has created major challenges. While the efforts that have been made by both the Lebanese host-communities and the government must be recognized, the policies put in place in order to prevent those seeking refuge from entering Lebanon and the arrest and detention of refugees, as well as their *refoulement* constitute human rights abuses that are in direct violation of Lebanon's international obligations. The insecurity that stems from these policies further threatens the national security of Lebanon. Without insuring the safety and protection of refugees on their territory, they increase the risk of alienating the Syrian refugee community, potentially causing an increase in radicalization.

²⁵⁰ Civil Society Centre. "Drivers of Instability, Conflict and Radicalization: a snapshot from Akkar." January 2015. available at: http://civilsocietycentre.org/sites/default/files/resources/drivers_of_insanity_conflict_and_radicalization_-_levant7_-_2015.pdf

²⁵¹ Ibid.

Chapter 6: Final Thoughts

This thesis has been guided by the analysis of the current refugee crisis in Lebanon, in an effort to answer whether or not non-encampment of Syrian refugees has led to greater security and stability as opposed to encampment. Within the field of refugee studies, the question of encampment tends to drive much of the discourse on refugee security and well-being, as the current situation in Lebanon indicates, while encampment is central to the daily lives of both the refugee communities and host-communities, without maintaining the rights and protections entitled to refugees under international law the question of refugee encampment is irrelevant. Lebanon has continued to perpetuate policies that contribute to the denial of basic human rights of refugees and their further inability to integrate into society. In the case of the Syrian refugees, who have been denied access to official UN refugee camps in Lebanon, there are increased levels of poverty, a lack of housing security, and no legal access to Lebanese job markets.²⁵² This has placed the Syrian refugees in a more precarious situation than even the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, who have been marginalized and in most cases indefinitely placed in official UNRWA refugee camps.

Despite the best efforts of the UNHCR and other international organizations to provide assistance, the Syrian refugees are suffering from a lack of access to adequate support with regard to housing, education, and healthcare. This increased vulnerability has contributed to an escalation in security threats to both the individual security of refugees and Lebanese citizens as well as the government of Lebanon. The current refugee crisis in Lebanon cannot be adequately assessed without viewing it in conjunction with the history of refugees in Lebanon, in addition to the fragile sectarian balance that continues to be a factor in the ongoing situation. The sectarianism that plays out in the confessional government system continues to be a source of instability that is challenged with any changing demographics, further influencing Lebanese attitudes toward *tawteen*.²⁵³

²⁵² UNHCR. "UNHCR Vulnerability Assessment Report 2017." Accessed February 10, 2018. 6. <https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/vasyr-2017-vulnerability-assessment-syrian-refugees-lebanon>

²⁵³ Hanafi, Sari, et al. "Social Exclusion of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon: Reflections on the Mechanisms that Cement their Persistent Poverty." *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Volume 31, Issue 1, 1 March 2012. 5. <https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdr018>

Although the Lebanese government policies concerning refugees has led to greater suffering and insecurity, the international community has done little to relieve the tremendous strain that such a large refugee community poses for Lebanon. The UNHCR and the UNRWA are both obligated by international law to provide protection to both Syrian and Palestinian refugees respectively, which has been challenged by Lebanese restrictive policies.²⁵⁴ The host-state also has a responsibility to protect individuals in its territory, particularly with regard to the rights of refugees and asylum seekers, Lebanon has actively engaged in the *refoulement* of Syrian refugees in an effort to reduce the burden on the state.²⁵⁵ Policies that have made legal residency difficult to maintain, resulting in 74% of Syrian refugees residing illegally in Lebanon, as well as efforts to restrict Syrian entry into the country, have both contributed to the *refoulement* of refugees in addition to placing those remaining in Lebanon in increasingly dire circumstances.

The difficulty of a small country of 4 million accepting over 1 million refugees cannot be dismissed. The refugee crisis in Lebanon has placed tremendous strains on its infrastructure, host-communities, and the fragile political system. There are undoubtedly areas where Lebanon is to be commended in its initial generosity and open-door policy to Syrian refugees, however, the policies that have excluded them from Lebanese society and deprived them of basic human rights must be reprimanded. The financial burden alone becomes apparent with the funding shortages experienced by the UNHCR and UNRWA.²⁵⁶ The international community must do more in order to ensure that the refugees in Lebanon remain protected and that the institutions put in place to guarantee those protections and assist are able to do so.

This thesis has argued that a policy of non-encampment has not led to greater security of Syrian refugees, but has instead led to greater insecurity of both refugees and the state of Lebanon. While the motives behind the government policy of non-encampment were out of concern for national security, the subsequent policies that sought to prevent their integration into Lebanese society has contributed to greater suffering and vulnerability for the refugee

²⁵⁴ Janmyr, Maja. *Protecting Civilians in Refugee Camps: Unable and Unwilling States UNHCR and International Responsibility*. Leiden: Brill | Nijhoff, 2014. 346.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ UNHCR. "UNHCR Vulnerability Assessment Report 2017." Accessed February 10, 2018. 6. <https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/vasyr-2017-vulnerability-assessment-syrian-refugees-lebanon>

community, similar to the experiences of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The arguments that Harrell-Bond and Verdirame put forth against encampment have been predominantly concerned with exclusion and the denial of basic human rights. However, non-encampment of Syrian refugees has not led to the resolution of these problems, but has exacerbated many of them with the right to the freedom of movement and their economic rights restricted, and the basic refugee right to *non-refoulement* left unprotected.

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