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„Pan-Africanism today.
The relevance of Pan-Africanism in current African civil society movements – a case study of the *Balai Citoyen*"

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Marisa Kröpfl, BA

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> Keep your heads up high
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> Know just what you're worth
>
> extract from *Made in Africa*, Stephen Marley

For half a year, I walked along streets named after Jomo Kenyatta, Dedan Kimathi, Julius Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah in Nairobi, Kenya. I started to read about the lives and political thoughts of these liberation fighters. I joined friends in the Ngong Hills north of Nairobi to plant trees on the weekends. I listened to friends discussing resurging tribal tensions and pointing to Tanzania as a successful example of nation-building. In busses, I listened to reggae praising Haile Selassie and Marcus Garvey. I read Kapuściński's *The Emperor: Downfall of an Autocrat* and borrowed a friend's compendium of Garvey's speeches. I went to bars, where musicians entertained the whole night with Benga music, amalgam of different styles from all over Africa – and so very typical for Nairobi. On the rooftop of the artists collective PAWA245, freshly produced T-Shirts were sold with a depiction of Thomas Sankara in the likeness of Che alongside his quote "*Revolutionaries as individuals can be murdered, but you cannot kill their ideas*". I talked with a young artist who had just finished a piece on waste and environmental pollution about the tragedy of the commons. A friend invited me to join a Pan-African discussion round.

Gradually, my interest in Pan-Africanism developed, and with it my curiosity for its significance today. What does it mean, that the 'icons' of Pan-Africanism are still celebrated today, that Nkrumah, Sankara and Nyerere are natural references of a politicised youth. Evidently, they stand for a combative and dignified past. But their reference is not purely nostalgic. Since colonialism and the achievement of sovereignty, many things improved, and many disappointments were accumulated. The grand visions of Pan-Africanism still seem far, some might have lost their appeal while others shine as if no time had passed. Accompanied by friends who live in the spirit of solidarity and the upright conviction that change is possible, my

interest was slowly but surely pointed in one direction: finding out, what Pan-Africanism means today and what emancipatory potential it holds for current social activists.

This in the beginning rather naïve interest, arisen from observations, personal experiences and the exchange with friends, was quickly nourished by another level of contemplation. In my personal academic experience in Vienna, Austria, and Lyon, France, political thoughts prominently featured concepts of development, often enough discussed in relation to Africa. Only these thoughts were barely ever developed in Africa or by African intellectuals; I must exclude here notably Stuart Hall and Walter Rodney. Not that the theoretical production of the 'Global South' was entirely neglected, particularly the Latin American theory of dependency and the work of Indian theorist Gayatri Spivak were highly regarded. My first encounter with Pan-Africanism at the university of Vienna was however neither in the institute of International Development or Political Sciences. I was introduced to the works of Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon in a lecture about Martinique in the Institute of Romance Studies.

Personally, I got the impression that African thought was marginalised even within the realm of knowledge production from the Global South. At the same time, I was confronted with the pertinence of certain political figures and their thoughts in Kenya. Strikingly, most of them had a connection to Pan-Africanism. A slow but fairly steady approach to the topic of Pan-Africanism and its meaning today took its course.

Outline of the paper

In one paper, I quite certainly do not try to give an exhaustive answer to the question of how Pan-Africanism is used today by an African civil society and what emancipatory potential it holds. However, I try to shed a little light on this big topic through a case study.

This paper starts with an outline of Pan-Africanism. The historical summary commences with the Pan-African Congresses in the US-American and European diaspora beginning of the 20th century. Until the Second World War, the big lines are traced, with a notable differentiation between an anglophone movement and the francophone Négritude. The two World Wars are turning points in the development of Pan-Africanism. The focus shifts from the diaspora to a newly emerging African intelligentsia and topic-wise from discussions about racism to a discourse of independence and autonomy. Africa re-positions itself in the world, between

Cold War and Third World movements. By reference notably of Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah, Nyerere's Tanzania and the short presidency of Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso, important shifts and developments of the political Pan-Africanism are reconstructed.

The historical summary is followed by a framing of (different) meanings of African and unity in the Pan-African context.

After the outline of the developments of Pan-Africanism, the case study is presented. The *Balai Citoyen* is a civil society movement that emerged in connection with the public insurrection against long-term potentate Blaise Campoaré. The choice fell on the *Balai Citoyen* due to different reasons: the (inter-)national public attention they received – which implies a relatively larger (media-)coverage and thus research material; their position in a larger regional dynamic of social movements; and last but not least their explicit Pan-African inspiration. The case study touches notably on topics like democracy, conscientisation of the civil society and knowledge production.

In a third part, the concept of hegemony after Antonio Gramsci is introduced to examine notably three areas of interest of the case study and its Pan-African features: the role of civil society, political education and the connection between art and societal changes. The function of organic intellectuals becomes an anchor-point of understanding the inner workings of the case study and intrinsically links to knowledge production. The same concepts serve to look at culture, in a broad sense, including art, especially music, and its role in society.

The development of the theory is not laid out in a chapter apart, but instead is constantly intertwined with the analysis and interpretation of the case study (in its Pan-African context). The intention is to introduce theoretical considerations in moments where they support an alternate reflection on the topic, i.e. where it expands the horizon or changes the perspective under which the case study is considered. This shows for instance when conscientisation, which is introduced as one of three key elements of the case study, becomes the main category when regarded from a counter-hegemonial perspective.

In presenting the theory this way, my personal approach to the topic is somewhat reconstructed. While it may be an untypical structure, I hope that it will guide the reader in their

understanding of the case study. Presenting the process might offer the reader additional anchoring points for further reflections on the case study as well as for applying the theoretical structure on other case studies. In this, it is hoped that the presentation of the process itself encourages and contributes to a further exploration of the field of Pan-Africanism in current African civil society movements.

It was mentioned before, that it is not within the scope of the paper, to examine a multitude of civil society organisations employing Pan-Africanist lines of thought in their activism. Focussing on one case study, and occasionally referring to other initiatives, it is this papers intention to be a piece in the bigger puzzle exploring Pan-African-inspired activism today.

RESEARCH MATERIAL AND ANALYTICAL APPROACH

The overarching interest of this paper is to understand the use and emancipatory potential of Pan-Africanism in contemporary civil society movements. By means of a case study, the civil society movement *Balai Citoyen*, a fragmentary contribution to the general research interest is intended.

Research Material

In the scope of this paper, the case study is not furnished with (first hand) empirical data but relies fully on publicly accessible data. The existing material can be differentiated in a pool of self-presentation; newspaper and journal articles; and academic literature on the case study.

As self-representation I understand the homepage of the *Balai Citoyen* (*www.lebalai-citoyen.com*) and their social media (facebook account), public declarations and press-conferences and interviews (in their entirety or quoted in fragments in articles). These documents are intended to present the movement, and so they are consciously developed, selected and provided – and need to be considered in this function when interpreted. Such material on its own can never lead to a precise differentiation between (actual) practice and the underlying intentions and visions, as it will in general not emphasize on divergences between practice and intention. This does not mean that there is no instance of self-analysis and self-criticism. Especially regarding destructive pillages by members of the movement during the course of and after the insurrection, such occasions have been commented and critiqued , as well as activists of the *Balai Citoyen* and other organisations were called to clean the streets again (see for example Kindo 2014).

The news-media most consulted in this paper is *LeFaso.net*. Launched in 2003, it is a pioneer of online media platforms in Burkina Faso and since received several distinctions for its work. In its mediatic work and coverage, *LeFaso.net* has shown a benevolence for the insurrection, not least expressed in a special dossier dedicated to the 'Heroes of the popular insurrection' with interviews with activists from Burkina Faso and the diaspora. The news portal

features media conferences and public declarations of the *Balai Citoyen* and other organs of the civil society. The support for the insurrection does not diminish the integrity of the journalistic work; fault lines within movements or divergent opinions and criticism among or against engaged CSOs are presented without normative judgement.

Work written on the case study are notably in an anthology published by GRIP (Kupper et al.: 2017), *Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité* (Group of research and information on peace and security). The book looks next to the *Balai Citoye*n at *Y'en a marre* (Senegal), *Lucha* and *Filimbi* (both Democratic Republic of Congo), trying to understand the popular movements in their specificity as well as in their regional context and connectivity. I found important insight in the thesis by Raphaël Bavoux (2017, University of Vienna). Bavoux takes the *Balai Citoyen* as a case study to examine the 'roles and limits of civil society movements in Burkina Faso'. His research is based on interviews and participative observation, which allows a view of the on-ground realties, if through an already analysed grid.

As author, contributions of Bruno Jaffré are quoted repeatedly. He is considered and recognised as specialist of the Burkinabè revolution and official biographer of Thomas Sankara. He is regularly consulted for assessments on affairs concerning Burkina Faso by different international media. In his personal blog on the French independent online media project *Mediapart*, he analyses and comments the insurrection and developments since.

The material enables a case study, but in a particular frame. A detailed extraction of how the movement practically works and interacts on the ground is not possible. As the research interest is set on a more abstract level, the material can however provide insight into certain central elements.

Analytical approach

For the analysis of the given material of the case study, a qualitative approach to interpret the content is applied. In this paper, the wider context of Pan-Africanism as defined by the research interest is laid out before the presentation of the case study. The historic summary is extended by the extraction of certain key-words of thematic order which (re-)appear and weigh through the evolution of Pan-Africanism. The selection, both of the historic account as

well as of the thematic considerations, is deducted from the broader studied background (literature) of Pan-Africanism.

The interpretation of the *Balai Cioyen* was a gradual process:

At the backdrop of Pan-Africanism, particularly the Burkinabè revolution, and information I had followed on different media along the popular insurrection, I started to examine the movement. Beginning with the homepage and the literature written about the *Balai Cioyen*, I tried to stay as close to the case study as possible. While the general interest was guiding the lecture, the work was explorative and deliberately open. Gradually, several main-elements for understanding the movement and its intentions crystallised: (i) its situation as a popular movement, i.e. decisively not avant-gardist or elitist but with a strong focus on equality, which ultimately translates into respect for all members; (ii) a normative understanding of democracy, i.e. a strong focus on the participatory element which carries as a condition freedom of speech and press; and (iii) conscientisation, which combines political education with agency. Elements (i) and (iii) are literally taken over from the self-presentation and -explanation of the *Balai Citoyen*, conscientisation and its popular character are both of high importance for the movement. Democracy (ii) is a prominent concern of the movement, however it is not so much directly addressed in its normative character; particularly this element was introduced to frame several elements present in the case study. On a content-level, all three elements are highly interlinked, indeed seem inseparable; nonetheless each element brings a different emphasis, theoretically as well as on a practical level (of activism). This is reflected in the way the case study is presented, accompanied and illustrated by selected examples.

In the next step, the objective was to re-consider the case study in a more theoretical frame with the intention for the analysis to become more universal. Universal in the sense that the categories with which the study is captured, might be used in other case studies informing on the same or a similar research interest and thus allow for a comparability of the case study beyond this paper.

The theoretical interpretation of the movement follows in large the concepts of hegemony and counter-hegemony as developed by Antonio Gramsci, enriched notably with considerations on popular education by Paulo Freire. The Gramscian concept of hegemony was deemed particularly adequate and rewarding due to the movement's positioning of the civil society as an important factor for social change and the three main elements established afore. The theory in this chapter is developed as it is applied, theory and interpretation go hand in hand.

(Theoretical) Categories are deductively developed and introduced in the analysis of the case study. Not every theoretical consideration grows into a proper category; instead the categories give a certain structure to the theoretical interpretation. Conscientisation becomes the main category, as it combines the understanding of the workings of hegemony with the popularisation of this knowledge (both conditional for a counter-hegemonic project). Conscientisation is unfolded in sub-categories, of which one is the concept of organic intellectuals. Organic intellectuals operate at the intersection of critical analysing and popular conveying of knowledge. This points at a second sub-category: knowledge production. It is a sub-category of its own right due to the relational character of popular learning processes. In a counter-hegemonial project, political education cannot be an unilateral transmission of knowledge (from organic intellectuals) but is necessarily anchored in the material circumstances of each person. (Collective) knowledge production begins with the realisation of ones position in society. A third sub-category is the relation between knowledge and conscientisation and conduct or activism, which in a counter-hegemonial understanding must correspond (more naturally than intentionally).

The differentiation between category and sub-categories suggests already, that the categories are (content-wise) not perfectly separable and the dividing lines are partly a little blurred. In some regard, this is connected to the essential interconnectivity of all conduct and behaviour of a society (civic, economic, political, artistic, pedagogical, etc.). The categories proved nonetheless helpful in understanding the case study and for linking it to the larger frame of Pan-Africanism. It is hoped, that the reader can follow this assessment and will find it useful, if not sensible, to agree.

APPROACHING PAN-AFRICANISM

> Schönster aller Zweifel aber
> Wenn die verzagten Geschwächten den Kopf heben und
> An die Stärke ihrer Unterdrücker
> Nicht mehr glauben!
> extract from *Lob des Zweifels*, Berthold Brecht[1]

"Le panafricanisme est une énigme historique[2]" – I would like to borrow these opening words from Amzat Boukari-Yabara (2014: 5), for they combine the vastness in content and interpretations Pan-Africanism has been the name for, as well as their historic evolution. There is no absolute definition of Pan-African ideas and politics. Largely, this can be attributed to the genesis and development of Pan-African thought and African political theory in general, always consciously and intentionally close to their context and current struggles, i.e. inherently aware of their historicity (cf. Táíwò 2015: 85). This manifests in the double role of thinker as activist and vice-versa that seems natural in the Pan-Africanist context. Further it applies to Pan-Africanism, like to all '-isms', that it is not a description of realty but rather an ideology: it creates consciousness and forms ideas, it is a conception of reality that consequently leads to a certain interpretation of reality itself.

This paper approaches Pan-Africanism foremost following a chronological vademecum while extracting certain themes. At the backdrop of the 'death of the big men' in favour of a more holistic understanding of societal changes, Pan-Africanism offers an interesting paradox. (The large majority of) it's acclaimed theoretical and political 'leaders', i.e. personalities who are known and celebrated, second this approach, constantly emphasising on the collective effort and the necessary inclusion of the populations to emancipate and advance as a society. Yet, most recounts of Pan-Africanism – this paper included – give significant space to these 'leaders'. This tension might be a little relativized when said personalities are understood as figures. I.e. as symbolical representation of different currents within Pan-Africanism, which – theoretically and practically – had been shaped in a constant (even if not equal) dialogue

[1] "Most beautiful of all doubts though / When the disheartened and weakened lift their heads and / In the strength of their oppressors / Believe no more!" (own translation)

[2] "Pan-Africanism is a historic enigma" (own translation)

be-tween different social actors, ranging from political parties, labour unions and student associations to community-based organisations and more generally the population in its support for or rejection of certain (spokespersons of) ideas and policies. All of these (historical) figures underwent important changes in their intellectual and political positions, and in this, they may also serve as a portrayal of the circumstantial, sometimes reactive, development of Pan-Africanism. Finally, they were and are significant due to their popular recognition then and today. Hence, even if their status might be disproportional in the actual historical context, it ultimately and factually shapes today's perceptions of and references to Pan-Africanism.

CHRONOLOGICAL OUTLINE

Diasporic beginnings – Pan-African Congresses and Marcus Garvey

Pan-Africanism is a child of modernity (in a historic sense), with its dignifying values of the French revolution: *liberté, egalité, fraternité* – freedom and liberty, equality, and solidarity (Sonderegger 2016: 18). It roots in the idea of a *true* humanism. That is a humanism, which understands that equality and solidarity between peoples is the basis and needs to be established before humanism can unfold. It is not a "*pseudo-humanism*" (Césaire 2004: 14) with a biased and partial conception of human rights that excuses the coloniser or is used as a protecting coat when the oppressed revolt, even violently. It is a humanism, which understands what has been popularised in civil rights movements and demonstrations (attributed to South-African activist Desmond Tutu): "*If you are neutral in situations of injustice, you have chosen the side of the oppressor*". After the invention of Africa by European discoverers, after the racist degradation of the African population leading to slave trade, Pan-African ideas were forged. The beginning should be seen in collective resistances against slavery, which forged a solidarity in combat beyond tribal or social demarcations, at times including indigenous American slaves (cf. Bouamama 2014: 24). Particularly interesting forms of resistance in a Pan-Africanist context are Maroon societies and the much chanted event of the Haitian revolution (cf. ibid.: 24; Young 2010: 154). Maroon societies were formed by slaves who escaped to live in self-governed

societies or mixed with native tribes[3]. The Haitian revolution, led by Toussaint Louverture in 1791, succeeded in defeating the French colonial army and declaring the first 'black[4]' Republic. Both show political and social organisation transcending pre-colonial divisions, making it essentially Pan-African. Indeed, CLR James defines Maroon societies – that is the reject of the Occident by slaves – as the origin of Caribbean nations (cf. Makalani 2018). With the abolitionist movement of the 18th century, Pan-African thought was further developed by Afro-American and Caribbean intellectuals. This eventually lead to the first Pan-African conference in London in 1900[5], carried on by W.E.B. Du Bois' five Pan-Africanist Congresses (1919-1927). At the same time, the Jamaican Marcus Garvey founded the *Universal Negro Improvement Association* (UNIA) in Harlem, New York. UNIA promoted to look beyond the Diaspora and at Africa itself (Garvey 2004: 72). Notoriously famous, Garvey was not uncontested. Especially his racism (inversing validations) was highly contested, and ultimately brought him critique from within UNIA, to which an important group of racially mixed people (considered 'black' in the USA, unlike in the Caribbean) adhered (cf. Boukari-Yabara 2014: 77f). Marcus Garvey, however, deserves merits in contesting black inferiority and supporting black self-confidence. He remains an important figure within the Rastafari movement and is continuously referenced in music, especially in Reggae.

[3] In Brazil, these communities are known as *quilombos*. "*[I]n Angola the kilombo was originally a male initiation camp and, by extension, a male military society*" (Anderson 1996: 558); during the 17th century, their lineage-less structure of societies were used more expansively in Angola as communities lived under constant military alert due to slave-trade and occupation. Palmares is one of the most known quilombos of Brazil. Founded with the beginning of the 17th century, its population was multi-ethnic and mostly creole. According to Anderson (ibid.: 559), in the 1670's, native-born Americans and of African descent were the main-groups in Palmares, further there were runaway slaves, salves, free people captured in raids, even colonials who had suffered political reversals and poor immigrants of different countries. The community and structure of Palmares endured for almost the whole 17th century against Dutch and Portuguese powers; the death-day of the last king Zumbi who lost his live in battle on 20th November 1695, marks the public holiday Black Consciousness Day (*Dia da Consciência Negra*, celebrated since 1978) in several constituencies in Brazil.

[4] The use of words like 'race', 'black', and 'white' are ambiguous and need to be questioned. Yet they appear in this paper – however (outside quotations or the description of historic ideas) never as an affirmation of any kind of (normative) classification and especially not in a biological sense. Rather, 'race' (and therewith 'black', and 'white') is used in the sense of an imaginary group, depending on the context based e.g. on socio-cultural factors and conditions or a mere felt connection (on this topic, see also below on meanings of 'African' within Pan-Africanism).

[5] The term *Pan-Africanism* itself, it is said, was first used in a preparatory meeting (1899) by Henry Sylvester Williams (1869-1911), a lawyer from Trinidad for the first Pan-African Conference he initiated (cf. Bouamama 2014: 31).

The discourse of Pan-Africanism changes after the First World War, i.e. with the participation of African soldiers and an emerging intellectual elite from the continent. Consequently, Garvey's '*Back to Africa*[6]' found counter with '*Africa for the Africans*' that renounced import of solutions – from Europeans or Afro-Americans alike – in favour of an African emancipation (Boukari-Yabara 2014, 86).

In this interwar period, the colonial metropoles became centres of Pan-Africanism. Immigration from the colonies established a new link between Diaspora and colonies, enabling a transmission of European political currents, among other nationalism and communism. Colonial metropoles became the centre of exchange for labour migrants and students from different colonies. The effect of the Diaspora is two-fold. The distance allowed the emigrated a new, somewhat exterior, perspective on Africa than the prism of local realities and every-day life. At the same time, the common experiences of racism and difficult conditions of living in the colonial metropoles connected students and workers of different colonies and led to social and political federations (cf. Boukari-Yabara 2014: 145). In London for example, many members of the West African Students Union (WASU, established 1935) were workers, connected to the students through their diasporic situation and similar economic and social struggles. With its increasing politicisation, the WASU demanded autonomy for the West-African colonies in the early 1940's. Kwame Nkrumah reached London after ten years of education and militancy in the USA and quickly engaged in the WASU where he met the group, which would later become

[6] Garvey and UNIA followed a train of thought which before had led to the establishment of colonies in Sierra Leone (1787) and Liberia (1822). He brought back up the idea of repatriation and entered into talks with the Liberian President King regarding the establishment of new colonies. However, the Americo-Liberian regime finally did not consent, fearing its proper interests. Liberia banned UNIA and with it turned its back on thousands Afro-Americans who were ready to 'repatriate' and invest in the country (cf. Boukari-Yabara 2014: 82f).

The colonisation of Liberia for the sake of repatriation was primarily undertaken by the *American Colonization Society* (ACS) and show-cases the ambiguity of such projects: ACS was founded by US slave-holders who supported repatriation in their proper interest, soon merged with the idea of supporting evangelisation in Africa through repatriated Afro-Americans (cf. ibid.: 23). A feudal system developed in Liberia, to great advantage of the 'repatriated' Americo-Liberians, which led to insurrections from the indigenous population (cf. ibid.: 80). Before Liberia, Sierra Leone was the first colony founded for repatriation. In 1772, James Somerset had travelled alongside his master from the British colony Virginia and was declared a free man upon touching English soil, where slavery did not exist, unlike in the colonies. This jurisdiction set free millions of slaves living in England. In consequence, a group of abolitionists and philanthropists founded a colony in Sierra Leone, to where free Africans (freed slaves, slaves who fled plantations in Jamaica, African soldiers who joined British Forces in the American War of Independence and later in the First World War) 'repatriated' (cf. ibid.: 18f).

Both colonies suffered from social, economic and cultural conflicts much alike other European colonies; not least due to the self-perception of the 'repatriated' as apart and superior to the indigenous population, partly taking over a civilisatory mission. A notion, of which Garvey is not devoid himself (e.g. in his speech titled *The Handwriting Is on the Wall*, cf. Garvey 2004: 48-53).

the avant-garde in the fight for independence of Ghana (cf. ibid.: 147). In France, the *Fédération des étudiants d'Afrique noire en France* (Federation of students of Black Africa in France, FEANF) reunited student associations of Bordeaux, Lyon, Montpellier, Paris and Toulouse in 1950. Just like the WASU in London, FEANF was the first stage for many African politicians like the later president of Senegal, Lépold Sédar Senghor and the Historian Joseph Ki-Zerbo, founder of the *National Liberation Movement* (MLN) of Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) (and after his return from exile, of the *Parti pour la démocratie et le progrès* (Democracy and Progress Party, PDP) in opposition to president Blaise Compaoré). FEANF held a vital place as uncompromising anti-colonial instance that pushed and influenced national developments. In Portugal, the Diaspora was largely dominated by students from the colonies, and in the *Casa dos estudantes do Império* (Student House of students of the Empire) in Lisbon, many of later independence leaders – among others Amílcar Cabral (Guinea-Bissau), Agostinho Neto (Angola), Pedro Pires (Cap-Verde), Marcelino dos Santos (Mozambique) – met for the first time. (cf. Bouamama 2014, 32-36).

It was also the colonial metropoles which became an arena for the meeting of anti-colonialism and communism, especially in France, where the Communist Party was particularly strong. In the United Kingdom (UK), more radical African students– notably Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya) and Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana) – were in direct contact with the communist party. In 1966, historian CLR James and his wife Selma James organised a regular study group on Marxism with Caribbean students – among others Walter Rodney – after they had left Trinidad for London (cf. Makalani 2018). George Padmore from Trinidad, notorious activist and figurehead of the Pan-Africanist movement, supported the connection between Pan-Africanism, anti-colonialism and communism; his influence being vital in the Pan-Africanist Congresses.

Négritude

In this context, the *Négritude* emerged as a movement, which had a major influence on independence movements and leaders in francophone Africa. The term was introduced in the first (and sole) issue of the magazine *L'Étudiant Noir* in March 1935, launched by Léopold Sédar Senghor, Aimé Césaire and Léon Damas, three poet-activists which are later to become important political figures in their respective countries. Négritude was a reaction against colo-

nial oppression and cultural assimilation. As a linguistic invention, the term itself is an intervention, allowing an auto-definition outside the system of degradation imposed by colonialism: "*C'est le blanc qui crée le nègre, mais c'est le nègre qui crée la négritude.*[7]" (Fanon 2011: 284). In his *Discours sur la Négritude*, Césaire (2004: 83f) defined Négritude (i) on a passive level, as a bringing to awareness of difference, as (collective) memory and solidarity; and (ii) on an active level as 'startle' of dignity, refusal of oppression, combat of inequality and finally revolt against a 'cultural world-system' and 'European reductionism'. Négritude is in itself not a homogenous movement. The political and intellectual developments of Senghor and Césaire manifest two major currents. Senghor (1964: 24) is associated with an essentialist understanding of Négritude, which is crystallised in his much-debated quote "*L'émotion est nègre comme la raison hellène*[8]" – which over the time he tried to explain, but never took back. Despite the essentialist bias inherent to Négritude, with Césaire (2004: 10, 26), it is a stepping-stone towards an actual contact and real understanding between peoples and eventually towards a true humanism – in opposition to the (then) prevailing 'pseudo-humanism' which has a merely biased and partial conception of human rights (cf. ibid.: 14). To reach there, both of the co-depending ideas of 'black' and 'white' need to be overcome. The difference became manifest at the *Festival mondial des arts nègres* (World festival of Black arts) in Dakar (1966), which Senghor opened pleading for the defence of the Négritude, followed by Césaire's answer, that the word Négritude itself becomes a notion of division if not set in the historical context of its origin in the 1930's and 40's (cf. Boukari-Yabara 2014: 240). This points directly at the major importance of the movement: (re-)establishing the self-confidence[9] of the oppressed masses and cultural re-appropriation. This more cultural approach to the 'decolonisation of the mind'

[7] "It is the white man who creates the Negro, but the Negro creates the négritude." (own translation)

[8] "Emotion is Black as reason is Hellenistic" (own translation)

[9] As Fanon (2011: 708) acknowledged: "*l'arrivée de Césaire. / Pour la première fois, on verra un professeur de lycée, donc apparemment un homme digne, simplement dire à la société antillaise 'qu'il est beau et bon d'être nègre'.*" (the arrival of Césaire / For the first time you can see a college professor, so obviously an honourable man, simply telling the Antillean society that 'it is good and well to be a negro') (own translation; the French 'beau et bien' literally translates 'beautiful and good')

is (later) met by historic[10] and linguistic approaches[11] and more broadly in the attempt to re-appropriate the knowledge production. In this context it is notable that Senghor and Césaire were equally reproached with assimilation and imitation. In the case of Senghor, it was mostly due to his essentialist approach, which in some regards copies a colonial racist view, and his open admiration of French culture. The critique against Césaire is two-fold. He was occasionally criticised for his use of standard French in his writing (much like Senghor) and to never opt for the creole language of Martinique. Much more controversial was his support to a departmentalisation of Martinique instead of actual independence from France. He privileged cultural and mental *prior* to a political emancipation. The struggles of Haiti, as society and economically, were one reference – there he had experienced little to no rapport between the intelligentsia and the mass of the population. I.e. after having achieved independence, a profound (individual and collective) liberation and emancipation of the people was still far (cf. Césaire 2005: 56). Still – and of course – Césaire's decision must find strong contradiction in conceptions that make an immediate link between cultural emancipation and (political) liberation. It remains an open question. Martinique is still a department of France and as to when the mental emancipation is 'completed' cannot be foreseen, maybe not even defined; at the same time many (politically sovereign) African states still suffer from an oppressive, exploiting national elite and hence cannot claim a full cultural emancipation. However, as applicable for Pan-Africanism in total, there is no grand, leading 'right'; perspectives – and actions – must be understood in their respective (practical and historical) context.

Anti-colonialism

The Second World War was another important another historic event that changed the colonised's regard of the coloniser and of themselves. With around two million African soldiers fighting in European armies, the number of soldiers was significantly higher than in the First

[10] Senegalese historian Cheikh Anta Diop is one of the most outstanding as well as controversial persons to be named here. He gained attention and celebrity with his first book *Nations Nègres et culture* (1954), with its primary objective to challenge European Egyptologist and the denial of pre-colonial history of Africa by demonstrating the African origin of ancient Egyptian civilisation. Therewith he not only means to 'give back' history to Africa(ns), but also puts Africa at a decisive point for (modern) Western civilisation via ancient Egypt's influence on classical Greece. (cf. Irele 1996: 22)

[11] Prominent Kenyan author Ngugi wa Thiong'o (2011: 17f) describes the dissonance between lingua franca and vernacular language as colonial alienation.

World War. Thousands received training in specialised army sections and hundreds developed leading qualities as corporals; access to air force, navy or the position of officers remained strategically restricted for African soldiers (cf. Institut für Militärgeschichte des Ministeriums für Verteidigung der UdSSR/Afrikainstitut der Akademie der Wissenschaften der UdSSR 1981: 139, 142). The myth of a superior European race and a humanist civilisation as propagated by colonial powers was broken. This marks a turning point in colonial relations, giving way to claims of self-determination and sovereignty[12]. The involvement in and with liberation armies in Europe and Asia furthermore fostered ideas of international solidarity. Among others, British African troops were largely deployed in Burma (Myanmar) against Japanese occupation; they witnessed the damages of the war, the decreasing living standards of the Burmese population under occupation and joined the popular revolt against Japanese occupation[13]. After the war, first colonies gained independence in Asia. India became an example for an achieved accession to independence, especially among British colonies. The link between India and Africa had long been established and British colonies had become home to a relevant Indian population. Political Leaders like Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana) or Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia) referenced the specific non-violent mode of operation of Gandhi and Nehru (Bouamama 2014: 48f).

[12] I would like to single out Frantz Fanon as an example. He volunteered to fight along the Free French Forces led by Charles de Gaulle. In a letter to his parents, Fanon (2007: 19) describes the brutal racism and the disillusion he experienced: "*Un an que j'ai laissé Fort-de-France. Pourquoi ? Pour défendre un idéal obsolète. […] [S]i vous appreniez un jour ma mort face à l'ennemi, consolez-vous, mais ne dites jamais: il est mort pour la cause [...], car cette fausse idéologie, bouclier des laïciens et des politiciens imbéciles ne doit plus nous illuminer.* Je me suis trompé ! *Rien ici, rien qui justifie cette subite décision de me faire le défenseur des intérêts du fermier quand lui-même s'en fout*" (It's been a year since I left Fort-de France. For what? To defend an obsolete ideal. […] [I]f one day you learn of my death in face of the enemy, console yourselves, but never say: he died for the cause […], because this wrong ideology, this shield of secular institutors and imbecile politicians shall not illuminate anymore. *I was wrong*. Nothing is here, nothing that justifies this sudden decision to become the defender of the peasant's interests if he himself doesn't care.) (original emphasis; own translation) His experience in the Second World War led him to study alienation in the context of colonisation and to work in a psychiatric clinic in Algeria, where he solidarized himself with the liberation struggle and became an inspirational figure in the Pan-Africanist movement. His ideas influenced liberation struggles in Africa. Beyond this more immediate context, Fanon (especially through his *The Wretched of the Earth*) became a central reference of the *Black Panthers*, linking their fight against racial segregation in the USA to a global objection against oppression, and he keeps an important place in post-colonial studies today. (cf. Bessone 2011: 40)

[13] One of the leaders of the Mau-Mau insurrection in Kenya, Waruhiu Itote, explained how his experiences in Burma lead him to perceiving himself as 'Kenyan' for the first time, and made him realise the necessity and possibility of change in his own country (cf. Institut für Militärgeschichte des Ministeriums für Verteidigung der UdSSR/Afrikainstitut der Akademie der Wissenschaften der UdSSR 1981: 133).

In this new geopolitical context, Pan-Africanism became a weapon against colonial rule, a battle cry, an idea to mobilise the masses and a demand as well as a promise of solidarity in the struggle for independence. This marks the shifting of the centre of Pan-Africanism from the Diaspora to the continent. After an initial post-World War euphoria, with the USA supporting the right of self-determination of peoples in favour of colonies, the Cold War became an obstacle to decolonisation. Against the influence of the Soviet Union, the theory of 'premature independencies' was developed (cf. Bouamama 2014: 52). With this argument, support was largely withdrawn from liberation movements (allegedly) backed by the Soviet Union or guided by communist principles. In the context of Cold War, the internationalisation of decolonisation and liberation movements increased, eventually bringing together twenty-nine African and Asian countries in Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955. This Asian-African Conference ('Bandung Conference') was an important step in the self-determination of former colonies. It provided the participating countries with an occasion for diplomatic reassertion and forged a new international network, which is today referred to as South-South cooperation. As such, it is considered a stepping-stone towards the Non-Aligned Movement (founded 1961 in Belgrade, Yugoslavia). Bandung was one of a row of diplomatic conferences held outside the Western colonial centres, claiming and stating a new political geography (cf. Lee 2015). In the resolutions and interventions of the Bandung conference, the right of self-determination of all peoples still colonised was demanded, Apartheid in South Africa critiqued as well as the emerging problem of neo-colonialism addressed[14] (cf. Bouamama 2014: 127f).

In this time of decolonisation and the subsequent struggle against neo-imperialism, the meaning of Pan-Africanism was much fought-over. The question of continental territorial integration (immediate, progressive or not at all) in light of possible national sovereignties gained practical importance. The group of Brazzaville (twelve former French colonies), saw itself as moderate and held very close relations to Paris. The progressive group of Casablanca (nine countries) around Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana) and Sékou Touré (Guinea) promoted real political, economic and territorial integration, i.e. defying colonially inherited frontiers. The reformist group of Monrovia (eight countries), under the leadership of Léopold Sédar Senghor (Senegal),

[14] The term 'neo-colonialism' itself surfaced in the months following the Bandung Conference; while the origin remains disputed, an early use is attributed to Jean-Paul Sartre, who warned of the 'neo-colonial mystification' at a peace-conference for Algeria (cf. Bouamama 2014: 128).

supported a European model of the nation-state within colonially inherited borders. At the creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa in 1963, in a *de-minimis*-consensus, more progressive aspirations were left behind in favour of a more feeble inter-governmental cooperation with non-interference in internal affairs as founding principle (cf. Boukari-Yabara 2014: 186f, 191)[15]. In an effort to revive Pan-Africanism and the idea of an African (territorial) union, Libyan revolutionary leader Colonel Muammar al-Gadhafi hosted an extra-ordinary OAU-summit in his hometown Sirte in 1999, where he announced his plans for a new African organisation. The OAU was officially re-founded as African Union (AU) in July 2002. Institutional changes like the introduction of a Pan-African Parliament did raise

[15] This process was highly fought over. A prominent resolution of the earlier *All-African People's Conference* (Accra, December 1958), for example, demanded to abolish colonial frontiers (cf. Melber 2011: 34). Colonial borders were also practically questioned in a few cases. The right of people to self-determination resulted in the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia and the merging of Somaliland with Somalia (later univocally revoked in 1991 with the beginning of the lasting civil war in Somalia). The same right was evoked by former colonial powers in their support of the separatist province of Katanga of the Democratic Republic of Congo, before and after independence in 1960. The separatist movement of Biafra faced extremely violent suppression by the central government of Nigeria, which did not let go of its strong claim onto unity of the colossal colonial territory.

The union of Ghana and Guinea based to a large extend on the strong connection between their political leaders. Ghana was the first African colony to gain independence (within the Commonwealth) under Kwame Nkrumah in 1957. Guinea was the only French colony in West Africa to opt for immediate independence against an (economically backed) autonomy within a French Community as suggested by de Gaulle in 1958. Sékou Touré (2010: 27; own translation) declared that the people of Guinea prefer "*la pauvreté dans la liberté à l'opulence dans l'esclagave* (poverty in freedom to opulence in slavery)". Only two months after Guinea's accession to independence, the Union of African States (commonly known as Ghana-Guinea Union) was founded in November 1958. Initially, the union targeted an intense cooperation comprising the exchange of ministers, *in-fine*, it was a rather short-lived union which never truly reached beyond the project-stage, showcasing the difficulties of overcoming national borders (cf. Boukari-Yabara 2014: 161f). The union of mainland Tanganyika with the island of Zanzibar in 1964, on the other hand, stands as positive case of challenging the inherited boarders outside fragmentation (albeit recurring separatist claims from within Zanzibar; keywords: African vs. Zanzibari nationalism). It is a remarkable example also because it united a former British protectorate (independent since 1961) with a former Sultanate (part of the Omani and from the 17th century on Zanzibari Sultanate; intermitted with a British protectorate from 1890-1963). The constitutional monarchy (under a Sultan) was violently overthrown after only a month by a regime of communist inspiration before soon merging into United Republic of Tanzania with a semi-autonomous status (April 1964) (cf. Fouéré 2014: 481). The history of Cameroon is particularly complex. The unity of the German colonial territory 'Kamerun' (1884-1914) was divided between a French and British administered UN mandate. Since this split, independence and unity became intrinsically linked, most prominently through Ruben Um Nyobè (assassinated 1958) and the *Union des populations du Cameroun* (Union of Camperoon populations, UPC; prohibited 1955). The French territories reached independence in 1960; a year later, an UN-organised plebiscite in the British territories asked the population to decide whether to join Nigeria or the Republic of Cameroon, both independent at that time. The Norther Territories (attached to Nigeria under British administration) opted to remain with Nigeria; the Southern Territories voted for a re-unification with the Republic of Cameroon, where they today constitute the Anglophone minority, with re-surfacing problems of representation (cf. Ebai 2009: 632).

Interestingly, even the listed (attempts of) changes of the inherited frontiers still referred to colonial borders or administrative units respectively (cf. Melber 2011: 35f).

hopes, however its dependency on national Parliaments for implementation lead to a practical status as consultative organ. Similarly, the newly introduced Commission of the AU, constituted as continental government, still lacks the means to impose its decisions. The AU represents rather a prolongation of the OAU than a radical new opening; *de-facto* changes are not profound and the AU remains an inter-governmental organisation with little connection to the people. (cf. Bouamama 2014: 280f; Exenberger 2002: 281)

Nkrumah, Nyerere, Sankara – a Pan-African Trinity

Due to the relative weakness of the OAU and the later UA, Boukari-Yabara (2014: 193) concludes that "*l'étude du panafricanisme dans les relations internationales n'est pas strictu sensu l'étude de la politique menée par l'OUA, mais l'interprétation historique des critères panafricanistes appliqués par une poignée d'États (Ghana, Tanzanie…) dans le cadre de leurs propre politique en matière de diplomatie et de défense.*[16]" This way, the focus shifts firstly to the dedicated Pan-Africanist Kwame Nkrumah. Still under colonial rule, the first popular elections for the Legislative Assembly were held in 1951 in the Gold Coast (Ghana). While Nkrumah was imprisoned for his political activities, his party won in a landslide. Consequently, he was release from jail and asked to form a government. This made him the first African leader who could invite whomever he pleased to his country – which he immediately used to make the Gold Coast the hub for (Pan-)African, Afro-American and Caribbean militants. One of the first invitees was Trinidadian journalist George Padmore, with whom he had collaborated already in the organisation of the fifth Pan-African Congress (London, 1945) and who by now had been banned from all other British colonies due to his 'subversive positions'. Padmore started his work on Pan-Africanism or Communism? during this stay. After independence in 1957, Padmore returned to Ghana as advisor on African affairs (cf. ibid.: 136f). Advocating for a West-African union from the beginning, a year after Ghanaian independence, Nkrumah organised a conference uniting all African states then sovereign. With a greater impact, the Conference of African Peoples was held in Accra in December of the same year, 1958. The Conference became a platform for African nationalist leaders to exchange – Padmore and Nkrumah, Patrice Lumumba (Congo-Kinshasa), Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia), Frantz Fanon (Algeria), Tom Mboya

[16] "the study of Pan-Africanism in international relations is, *stricto sensu*, not the study of the politics of the OUA, but the historic interpretation of Pan-Africanist criteria applied by a handful of countries (Ghana, Tanzania…) in their proper policies in matters of diplomacy and defence" (original emphasis; own translation)

(Kenya), Bakary Djibo (Nigeria) etc. (cf. ibid.: 139). The conference was not devoid of divergences, especially concerning the use of violence; the discussions made it nonetheless essential in tightening the network and forming political positions among the united national leaders. Lumumba, for example, who had founded the Congolese National Movement only shortly before, returned from the conference with a strikingly sharpened anti-imperialist and Pan-Africanist approach and rhetoric (cf. Bouamama 2014: 179). Nkrumah's progressive and active policies for African union put him increasingly under US-suspicion; paired with internal critique about Nkrumah's increasing detachment from the (material) concerns of the population, this led to his overthrow while he was on state visits to Vietnam and China in 1966 (cf. ibid.: 201). He never returned to Ghana and lived his exile in Conakry as a guest to Sékou Touré.

After Nkrumah's overthrow, many Pan-African and nationalist militants, chased from Accra, found refuge in Tanzania (cf. Boukari-Yabara 2014: 198). Tanzania under its first president Julius Nyerere, was the epicentre and driving force of Pan-Africanism in Eastern Africa. Despite limited (economic) resources or (natural) riches, the country showed committed support to African liberation movements, hosting political refugees and training camps (which in return defended Tanzania when attacked from Uganda). Tanzania thus became the intellectual, revolutionary hub of Africa. Walter Rodney, historian of Guyana, was one of the most renowned scholars to make the university of Dar-es-Salaam a centre of anti-hegemonic knowledge production (he worked, among others, on his foundational *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* during his engagement in Tanzania). His teachings on political economy and history of resistances and his inclusion of popular resistances into the curriculum, attracted students from Africa, America and the Caribbean alike (cf. ibid.: 203; Oloruntoba 2015: 16). Inside Tanzania, the project of *Ujamaa* ('familyhood' in Swahili) tried to overcome any form of neocolonialism by focussing on economic and cultural self-reliance with an all-encompassing inclusion of the population ('bottom-up'). With Ujamaa, Nyerere coined a term for what is otherwise called 'African Socialism', i.e. a contextualisation and adaptation of socialist theories and experiences for the concrete and actual situation of Tanzania[17]. The project of an alternative

[17] With the *Arusha Declaration* (February 1967), Nyerere breaks with neo-colonial practices and liberal models of development. He puts forward peoples' 'hard work' and 'intelligence' as principles of development, as opposed to 'money' for a poor country like Tanzania; the focus shifts to agricultural production as basis of development instead of (import subsidising) industrialisation, referring to the reality of the majority of the Tanzanian population and economic potentials for export. Self-reliance is the over-arching term, meaning a number of things: alimentary

development ended in an economic debacle and Tanzania had to apply for loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to prevent mass starvation. Knowing that the loans meant abiding to the Structural Adjustment Programmes of World Bank and IMF, Nyerere resigned 1985 to leave the country's opening to the free market economy to his successor.

While in Tanzania the transition to an African socialism was tried, Thomas Sankara started his journey from the military academy in Madagascar to the presidency of Burkina Faso (1983-1987). In Madagascar, he witnessed the revolution of 1972 and extended his stay for another year to accompany the army in its educational and developmental work in rural areas. Returned to Upper Volta, he started organising young officers, soon affiliated with civil Marxists who worked in the underground. His engagement in the formation of recruits – including citizens' rights and duties and the role of the army in 'development' ("*ein Militär ohne patriotische Ausbildung [ist] nichts weiter […] als ein potentieller Krimineller*[18]" (Sankara 2016: 86)) – awarded him to become Director of the Commando Training Centre. Under pressure, he joined the government as State Secretary for Information in 1982. After a military coup in the same year, Sankara was named Prime Minister to the new government, allowing him to travel and meet other leaders of Africa and the Third World for a few months. Internal frictions in the government and Sankara's increasing popularity mounted in his arrest – the same day Mitterrand's counsellor arrived on a state visit. Under the pressure of popular mobilisation, prison was exchanged for house arrest, from where Sankara started planning to take over the government. After a (blood-free) coup d'état (4th August 1983), Sankara started to reform Upper Volta

self-sufficiency; (popular) education as a way to emancipation and personal and collective decision-making; democracy, in a model of a decentralised hierarchy of decision-making levels instead of top-down approaches; (collective) economy (including the controversial regrouping of villages to form larger units with educational and health institutions); and culturally, i.e. creating the idea of a pluri-cultural nation to prevent tribal conflicts. (cf. Boukari-Yabara 2014: 200; Nyerere 1967)

[18] "a soldier without patriotic formation is a potential criminal" (own translation)

which he soon renamed Burkina Faso, Land of the Upright Man[19]. The new government assembled the country's left-wing parties to assure a solid basis within the population[20]. The political front was met with *Comités de la défense de la révolution* (Committees of the defence of the revolution; CDR) and *Tribunaux populaires de la revolution* (Popular tribunes of the revolution). The committees held important portfolios like political education, settling of neighbourhood disputes, support in agricultural production etc. Intended as instruments of direct democracy and means of empowering the population in face of (potential corruption or mismanagement by) the government, the CDRs *de facto* became a concurrence to civil society with an ideologico-political influence secured via the definition of the scope of work, selective membership criteria and the nomination of key positions by the *Conseil national de la revolution* (National council of the revolution; CNR) (cf. Bodentstein 2013: 75f). The power and mandate of the CDRs was at times misused by their activists at the base[21], cumulating in repression and resulting in significant criticism, including from Thomas Sankara himself (cf. Bouamama 2014: 290). Yet, Sankara's policies were amidst the most consequent and visionary. Heir to progressive Pan-Africanists of the likes of Walter Rodney, Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere, he was a powerful advocate for true independence – or, as he put it himself: "*Wir* [Burkina Faso; note] *wollen die Erben aller Revolutionen der Welt sein, aller Freiheitskämpfe der Völker der Dritten Welt.* [22]*"*(Sankara 2016: 89). With Nyerere, he shared the conviction of a necessary and possible self-reliance – also as a poor country –, and a categorical critique of all forms of imperialism and external influencing. Accordingly, he combined agricultural and territorial reforms with a restriction on the import of fruits and vegetables. The motto 'produce and consume Burkinabè' also successfully helped re-lancing the textile industry, with civil servants asked to wear the traditional hand-woven Faso Ban Fani (Jaffré 2016b: 17). To limit (deeper dependency

[19] Burkina translates to 'upright' from Mossi language (Mòoré), Faso means 'land of the ancestors' or 'country' in Doula; the people of Burkina Faso are named Burkinabè (invariable), the suffix '-bè' designates 'kinsmen/ dependants' in Fula language (Fulfulde) (cf. Bavoux 2017: 47).

[20] With exception of the *Parti communiste révolutionnaire voltaïque* (Voltaic Revolutionary Communist Party, PCRV), which assessed the coup as no other than the precedents. Despite Sankara's popularity, there were no public elections, probably also due to recurring electoral fraud on the African continent, not seldom aided from outside (cf. Bouamama 2014. 282).

[21] The activists at the base were often recruited without specific criteria from unemployed youth, which stood in striking contrast to the (ideologically) well-educated elected activists in higher positions. Without regular enumeration for their activism, occasionally the (unemployed) youth took to extortion. Furthermore, the CDRs were partly 'infiltrated' by former chiefs, who had lost their traditional authority with the revolution (cf. Bodenstein 2013: 79).

[22] "We [Burkina Faso; note] want to be heir to all the world's revolutions, to all fights for liberation of all peoples of the Third World" (own translation)

on) foreign debt, public spending was drastically decreased (especially in salaries, official cars and transport), focussed on investments and the population was asked to contribute free labour for the construction of infrastructure, in agricultural work, scavenger etc. For his alphabetisation and vaccination campaigns, Sankara earned praise from the United Nations; enrolment figures were rising, sports and culture popularised. He was a vanguard of environmental protection: he engaged in agroecology, fought desertification and encouraged the planting of trees, and made it a ritual in official celebrations. Not first, but most pronouncedly among progressive post-colonial African leaders, Sankara raised the topic of women's equality. Introducing symbolic actions as the 'male market day', pointing to the unequal obligations in the household, it was still clear that changing the mentality of Burkinabè men and women cannot be reached top-down[23].

On the international parquet, Sankara used Burkina Faso's non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council (1984-1985) to draw the attention to and demand support for international ongoing struggles for self-determination and dignity (Palestine, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Ireland, indigenous Americans, ghettoised Afro-Americans etc.) (cf. Sankara 2016: 87f). He was building on solidarity within then non-aligned movement and tried to re-ignite Pan-African solidarity by tossing the OAU out of its passivity. At the OAU-summit in July 1987, he presented his analysis of the debt-crises which was menacing Africa and the 'Third World' as a whole and called for a common stance in refusing to pay back the debts to international creditors – a dimension that can be found among anti-globalisation movements today. The speech was much applauded, yet not followed by his fellow presidents. Within the region of West-Africa, Sankara criticised the Franc CFA and the *Franophonie* as imperialist means of influence and

[23] "*Männer wie Frauen sind in unserer Gesellschaft Opfer imperialistischer Unterdrückung und Herrschaft. Darum führen sie den gleichen Kampf. Die Revolution ist untrennbar mit der Befreiung der Frau verbunden. Dabei ist es kein Akt der Barmherzigkeit oder des Humanismus, die Emanzipation der Frauen zum Thema zu machen. Vielmehr ist diese für den Triumph der Revolution im Ganzen eine absolute Notwendigkeit. […] Wirkliche Emanzipation stärkt die Verantwortung der Frauen, ihre Beteiligung an den Produktionsaktivitäten und Kämpfen des Volkes. […] Ebenso wie die Freiheit kann auch die Emanzipation unmöglich gewährt, sondern nur erkämpft werden. Es ist an den Frauen selbst, ihre Forderungen vorzutragen und sich für deren Erfüllung einzusetzen.*"
(The men and women of our society are all victims of the imperialist oppression and domination. Therefore, they lead the same fight. The revolution and the liberation are inextricably linked. It is not an act of charity or humanism, to talk about women's liberation. It is a fundamental necessity for the triumph of the revolution. […] The true emancipation of the woman makes her responsible, associates her with the productive activities and combats of the people. […] Emancipation, like liberation, cannot be granted, it needs to be conquered. And it is upon the women themselves to bring forward their demands and to mobilise to achieve them. […])
(Sankara 2016: 62f; own translation)

denounced the system known as *Françafrique*. (cf. Bouamama 2014: 283-287; Boukari-Yabara 2014: 254, 257-259; Jaffré 2016a-b)

The many projects and fast pace did not pass without frictions. His popularity among large parts of the population did not efface internal and external criticism for his progressive approach. After only four years, Sankara and twelve of his companions were assassinated and overthrown by his friend and close ally Blaise Campaoré in the fifth coup d'état[24] Burkina Faso had seen since independence. Though the assassination has not been fully investigated up to this date, foreign aid in the coup, from Côte d'Ivoire, France and USA are barely disputed (related documents are still not disclosed in French archives, conversely to French President Macron's promise end of 2017; cf. Carayol 2018b). His imprint on Burkina Faso and its people was as strong as short. His strong revolutionary convictions, his charisma and his sharp analysis as well as criticism of problems of his time, shine until today beyond the borders of Burkina Faso and francophone Africa.

Diasporic links

Next to single prominent figures as presented above, it was notably liberation movements in the countries still under colonial rule and anti-Apartheid movements that called upon Pan-Africanism for solidarity. The Portuguese colonies Angola, Cap-Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe, which took up armed fight against colonialism in the early 1960's, were among the last to reach independence on the continent. The situation of Portuguese colonies was also interesting as the fight for independence was particularly marked by class struggle. Solidarization with the liberation fighters soon ignored ethnic frontiers. Due to the specific governance of colonies as regular Portuguese provinces, settling to African territories did not imply a (natural) betterment in the social strata for Portuguese nationals, a Portuguese farmer remained a farmer in the colonies, the working class remained working class here and there (cf. Imfeld 1981: 44f).

[24] Different approaches count five or six putsches respectively in Burkina Faso before Blaise Campaoré took over the power on 15th October 1987: 3rd January 1966, 8th February 1974, 25th November 1980; the 7th November 1982. The 17th May 1983, when the progressive left-wing, headed by Thomas Sankara (then Prime Minister), was excluded from the Government and Sankara imprisoned, is either counted as a coup in its own right or as a prelude to the coup led by Sankara on 4th August 1983 (cf. Bodenstein 2013: 25).

Meanwhile, the link to Pan-Africanism and the African continent was renewed from the African Diaspora in the USA and the Caribbean. In the USA, the ongoing fight against segregation and discrimination reached a new dynamic in the 1950's and 60's attached to the names Martin Luther King, Malcolm X and the *Black Panthers*. Summarised under the label of '*Black Power*', these movements took inspiration from African liberation struggles and Pan-Africanism, thus reaching for a re-connection between the diaspora and the continent. Malcolm X embraces Pan-Africanism as a solution to the oppression of all people of African descent; the *Black Panthers* count with Malcolm X and Franz Fanon two Pan-Africanists to their major influences. Adopting the concept of 'internal colonialism' to describe and comprehend the situation of Afro-Americans in the US further emphasised the (felt) link to the populations of the African continent (cf. Boukari-Yabara 2014: 220-223). Trinidadian historian CLR James puts the Cuban revolution in the context of Antillean revolutions and therefore within the realm of the African Diaspora. This way, the Cuban support to anti-imperialist and liberation movements on the continent may be interpreted as a Pan-Africanism of the state (cf. ibid.: 228f). In Grenada, social mobilisation and political violence preceded the take-over through the *New Jewel Movement* under Maurice Bishop in 1979. In line with the Cuban revolution, social programmes were launched and a union of Caribbean insular states overcoming linguistic differences was suggested. After a coup d'état which was soon followed by an US-American invasion, Maurice Bishop and fellow militants were executed in October 1983 (cf. ibid.: 231f). In Jamaica, Walter Rodney held lectures and conferences on *Black Power* and the African revolution in a Caribbean context at the university as well as in less privileged, more popular quarters of Kingston in the late 1960's. His teaching and militantism, backed by an established Rastafari community, sparked with the Jamaican youth and brought back consciousness for their African descent and heritage. When Rodney's visa was annulled, protesters took to the street. To prevent further protests, especially militant foreign students were expulsed and so they carried the ideas of Rodney with them and spread them in their respective home-countries (cf. ibid. 230).

Slumber and dawn of the 21th century

(Political) Pan-Africanism undisputedly had its heyday in the 1950's and '60s. Thomas Sankara charismatically carried on the flag in his short presidency over Burkina Faso (1983-1987). After most former colonies had become politically sovereign and finally with the (legal)

end of Apartheid in South Africa in 1991, (political) Pan-Africanism as a progressive (inter-) national agenda seemed forgotten. Walter Rodney (1974) sharply criticised such developments already in preparation of the Sixth Pan-African Congress 1975, claiming back the anti-imperialist and class-character into Pan-Africanism in sharp opposition to what he denounces as the "*[African] petty bourgeoisie […] paying lip-service to progressive ideas, seeking the defeat of these ideas through a process of trivialization and vulgarization*[25]".

Gadhafi was one of the rare African political leader to pursue Pan-Africanist ideas in the 21st century, but it never gained back its momentum. He initiated the transformation of the OAU into the African Union in 2002 (see above p. 18f) and was advocating to accelerate economic co-operation and integration and a common African currency[26]. A rather public and explicit manifestation of a diplomatic shift among African leaders and policies is the renewed rapprochement between the African Union and Morocco, factually disfavouring independence of the still occupied West Sahara[27].

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[25] The text further takes on the mis-use of (the term) Négritude to re-enforce tribalism instead of unity and the ignorance of the responsibility for the freedom of peoples in all Africa by state actors by referring to the OUA clause of non-interference in internal affairs of member states. Walter Rodney prepared this text for the alternative sessions organised by CLR James and other Caribbean and Afro-American activists foreseen within the Pan-African Congress. The text was distributed among participants, but eventually not publicly presented, as it was feared to further eloign the state and non-state actors in Africa and the diaspora (cf. Boukari-Yabara 2014: 233; Rodney 1974)

[26] The positions of Libya and notably the potential concurrence to the West-African currency Franc CFA by a new Pan-African currency backed by Libyan gold and silver-reserves, is likely to have played an important role in Western (notably French) changed attitude towards Gadhafi's regime and consequently the military intervention in Libya. This position is not particularly present in the mainstream discussion of the war in Libya; 'alternative' media platforms that featured according articles are for example the Pan-African *Pambazuka News*, the US-American *Foreign Policy Journal* or the Canadian *Centre for Research on Globalization*; the assessment is informed amongst others by one of the leaked emails addressed to Hillary Clinton (cf. e.g. Koenig 2017; Hoff 2016; WikiLeaks.org).

[27] Morocco, founding member of the OAU, left the same in 1984 following the admission of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic as the government of West Sahara. Contrasting this 'African' diplomatic recognition of West Sahara as a country of its own right, Morocco upholds its territorial claims and according policies until today – in crass opposition to the peoples' right to self-determination, the OAU resolution demanding all member states to respect the boarders as established upon national independence, and several other OAU-resolutions. Thus, creating a reality in which the factual sovereignty of West Sahara remains impalpable for the time being, the résumé of 30 years of OAU/UA's diplomatic involvement against West Sahara's occupation (since 1975), is rather disappointing. Instead, after joining the UA anew in January 2017, Morocco's delegation reached an amendment of a resolution on the 'occupied territory' West Sahara at the UA summit in Addis Ababa in July of the same year. Now, as Moroccan Foreign Affairs Minister Nasser Bourita explains, the UA abandons its long pursued "*idée qu'il y a des schémas, des solutions, référendum et tout ça…* (idea that there are schemata, solutions, referenda and that sort…)" in favour of a "*solution négociée et mutuellement acceptable* (negotiated and mutually acceptable solution)" (quoted in RFI 2017; own translation)

THEMATIC CONSIDERATIONS

Major Influences

The contextualisation of Pan-Africanism shows clearly how different ideas and historic developments influenced its evolution from the beginning of its historic trajectory in the 18th century. These influences were often overlapping and sometimes dividing the Pan-African family. Loosely following Andrain (1962: 10-12), some major influences are (without order): (i) Modernity, i.e. the values of the French revolution, *liberté, egalité, fraternité*; (ii) Marx and Communism or Socialist Internationals (Russian Revolution); (iii) Gandhi or examples of prior non-violent decolonialisations; (iv) a specific type of internationalism, expressed in the creation of transnational institutions (United Nations family) and frameworks of international law, therein especially the ideas of self-determination of the people, non-interference in internal affairs, equality of nations in an international framework (one country – one vote) and the ideal of right over might. These exterior influences are unified within Pan-Africanism through the consciousness and creativity with which they are appropriated for and in sight of regional and local circumstances and needs in precise moments, i.e. going against a simple copy of ideas and concepts formed abroad.

'African' and 'unity'

Different influences, interpretations, politicisations and implementations aside, the diverse currents of Pan-Africanism are – at a minimum – held together by a belief in 'African Unity'. What 'African' means, however, or who and what is included in this 'unity', remains disputed (cf. Sonderegger 2016: 18). The vague reference to African unity and their loose use in political and social discourse led to the large strata of meanings (as presented above) and left the theoretical discourse without a distinct definition. At the same time, it allowed for a relatively large consent on Pan-Africanism, irrespective of otherwise different political positions.

Philosopher Paulin Hountondji, in the preface to (the second English edition of) *African Philosophy* (1996), takes up the challenge and starts "*by* demystifying *Africanity, by reducing it to a* fact – *simply the* fact *and, in itself, perfectly neutral, of belonging to Africa – by*

removing the mystic halo of values arbitrarily grafted upon this fact by ideologists of African identity" (xii; original emphasis). This means to analytically first cease confusing between the (geographical) concept and the (political, cultural, religious, etc.) connotation. "*Belonging to Africa*" as (neutral) starting point allows to rid "*Africanity"* of essentialisms and fatalist conceptions (of history).

In this setting, Pan-Africanism thus looks not at a neutral concept but works with connotations. Pan-Africanism describes intellectual and emotional communities, as well as political visions. Each of these elements influences, which connotations of 'African' as well as of 'unity' are dominant – selective, imagined, projected, ideal(ised) or targeted.

In the beginning of Pan-Africanism stood the definition of an African community via a collective feeling of racial injustice, i.e. based on experiences of slavery, colonisation and other forms of oppression. Such a definition of 'African' naturally includes the continental population and the African diaspora equally. Racial injustice was met primarily in two ways, either with a firm rejection of racism and race as a category, generally pointing towards either tribalism or humanism, or with what is occasionally referred to as 'pan-negroism[28]'. A re-valorisation of the 'black' – or rather all oppressed and inferiorised – 'race(s)' as a first (necessary) step to later reject racism of all kinds, is a stepping stone towards true humanism. This means cultures – of the oppressed and the oppressors alike – emerge as liberated and thus finally open to mutually confront and enrich each other on an equal level (cf. Césaire 2004: 10; Fanon 2011: 726). Refuting racism by taking over the colonial, racist system and attaching new values to it to reverse it leads in practice to a celebration of African differences, that can turn easily essentialising Africanity and negating heterogeneity (cf. Irele 1996: 17f). Next to Marcus Garvey and Senghor, the Senegalese historian Cheikh Anta Diop (despite his political opposition to Senghor) follows such an argumentation (cf. Sonderegger 2011: 102). Summing up his historical and anthropological research on Africa, Diop (1974 : 17) unmistakably claims that "*[l]'unité historique est ainsi démontrée. / L'unité psychique […] en découle pour tous les habitants du continent noir et qui est sentie par chacun de nous, est un fait élémentaire qui se passe de*

[28] Pan-negroism was commonly used before the term *Pan-Africanism* was invented, allegedly by Henry Sylvester Williams in dissociation of Garvey and its racist notions (Bouamama 2014: 31). Therefore, pan-negroism today remains mostly connected with Marcus Garvey.

démonstration.[29]" Franz Fanon was aware of the power and necessity of a re-defined self-esteem for the colonised, but equally understood and warned of the dangers of a community and self-definition based on historic injustice and oppression. I may be allowed to cite him here more extensively, from the conclusion of his *Peau noire, masques blanches* (2011: 246f, 249f)

> Je ne me fais pas l'homme d'aucun passé. Je ne veux pas chanter le passé aux dépens de mon présent et de mon avenir. […]
> Ce n'est pas le monde noir qui me dicte ma conduite. Ma peau noire n'est pas dépositaire de valeurs spécifiques. […]
> Je ne suis pas prisonnier de l'Histoire. Je ne dois pas y chercher le sens de mas destinée. […]
> Il ne faut pas essayer de fixer l'homme, puisque son destin est d'être lâché.
> La densité de l'Histoire ne détermine aucun de mes actes.
> Je suis mon propre fondement.
> Et c'est en dépassant la donnée historique, instrumentale, que j'introduis le cycle de ma liberté. […]
> Moi, l'homme de couleur, je ne veux qu'une chose :
> Que jamais l'instrument ne domine l'homme. Que cesse à jamais l'asservissement de l'homme par l'homme.[30]

After the First and prominently after the Second World War, Pan-Africanism became the symbol of anti-colonial solidarity. It addressed and was expressed by the entire African continent as well as (European) colonies with substantial population of African descent in the Caribbean (Grenada, Jamaica, Martinique, etc.). As anti-colonial tool and mind-set, it consciously looked at liberation movements and struggles beyond the African context, prominently in support of Palestine, and neither compromised in denouncing inter-African occupation (Morocco-West Sahara, Nigeria-Biafra).

Once African countries had reached formal political sovereignty, neo-colonialism or neo-imperialism became a reality. In prolongation of anti-colonial solidarity, Pan-Africanism

[29] "The historic unity is herewith demonstrated. / The psychological unity follows for all inhabitants of the black continent and is felt by everyone of us, is an elementary fact that surpasses demonstration." (own translation)

[30] "I do not make myself a man of any past. I do not want to chant the past at the cost of my present and my future. […] / It is not the black world that dictates my ways. My black skin is not the beholder of any specific values. […] / I am not the prisoner of history. I shall not search the sense of my destiny within it. […] / One shall not try to fix a person, as it is their destiny is to be set loose. / The density of history does not determine any of my acts. / I am my own foundation. / And by overcoming the given historic, instrumental, I introduce the cycle of my liberty. […] / I, man of colour, want only one thing: that the instrument never dominates men. That the subjugation of one man [person] by another man [person] ceases forever." (from *Black Skin, White Masks*; own translation)

was called-upon in the combat for actual (instead of formal) independence. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was conceived in this spirit – though the inclusion of more conservative heads of states of the like of Ivorian Houphouët-Boigny made its working significantly less progressive and powerful than the original idea. Like in the anti-colonial unity, the underlying reality and thus the political consideration exceeded the scope of the African continent, and so for example the Cuban revolution was lauded and counter-attacks, indeed American imperialism in Latin-America in general, broadly condemned (e.g. cf. Sankara 2016: 88).

Another sense of belonging may be deducted from culture. Culture here is to be understood in a very broad sense, stretching from culture in the sense of a socio-political entities or forms of organisation, including rituals (as e.g. with Cheikh Anta Diop who traces the unity of the continent back to ancient civilisations) to ways of living (incl. every-day-culture, rituals, religion etc.) and the arts (cf. Machart 2008: 54). Which meaning given to the term depends on the context; the interpretative openness is used at times to attract broader identification. Referring to a cultural heritage understood as an independent, often pre-colonial culture, also civilisations, becomes a way to break the "*single story*" (Adichie 2009) of European powers which constructed a continent without history and justified colonisation with a 'civilising duty'. In this realm places for example the Négritude. Beyond a reference point in the past, culture is a constantly evolving means of expression of identity and is therefore particularly powerful, poignant and constantly in the present. It is and was always a means of protest against oppression; in the secret celebration and practice of traditional chants, dances and rites in colonised Africa and in their re-interpretation in syncretistic practices and cults like the voodoo in early diasporic societies (cf. Bouamama 2014: 24f, 28). Musical-cultural resistances include gospel, blues, jazz, reggae and hip-hop; born in the diaspora, they found strong repercussions on the African continent, re-enforcing the link. During the political heyday of Pan-Africanism, the cultural aspects of identity were supported as well as needed for the creation of unity and solidarity beyond tribal or regional boundaries. Where the intellectual discourse failed, music and arts had (has) the power to transmit the feeling of community and solidarity, an emotional understanding of being African. Pan-Africanist cultural festivals in the 1960's and 70's were an expression of this.

The question of unity is answered differently depending on the definition of 'Africanity' and also on the (political) aims attached to of Pan-Africanism. Unity may comprise all people of African descent, *ergo* including the diaspora and African people from the continent. Within the continental framework, Pan-Africanism can be a way of overcoming tribal divisions as forged by colonial powers ('divide and rule') – without perforce compromising on the (cultural) diversity and identity of different tribes, as the Tanzanian experience shows. Understood geographically, unity refers commonly to Africa as a continent. The differentiation between Northern Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa is generally irrelevant in Pan-Africanism. Even when Northern African states would align in a Pan-Arabic community, this is not considered mutually exclusive, as represented popularly by Nasser and Gadhafi. Occasionally, territories with a majority population of African descent (especially on Caribbean islands) are included as well. As a geographical unity, Africa comprises a population of African as well as non-African descent. As mentioned above, Pan-Africanism would reach out beyond the definition of descent or geography, when suggested or demanded by the political and emancipatory interest (anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism). Next to scope, unity carries the dimension of depth. Here, Pan-African unity spans from a loose sense of belonging to a territorial integration into a federal state. Continental cooperation and territorial integration after (formal) decolonisation was called upon as anti-thesis to 'Balkanisation' and 'south-Americanisation', i.e. territorial fragmentation into small units, incapable to sustain themselves economically and politically, or countries whose political authority is undermined by foreign economic interests respectively (popularly dubbed 'banana republics') (cf. Diop 1974: 30f).

EXCURSUS.
FEMALE ACTIVISM AND EMANCIPATION IN PAN-AFRICANISM

Most recounts of Pan-Africanism until today, this paper included, maintain a certain male bias. This is rooted for one in the still limited historical (and popular) knowledge on women's contribution. It is also owed to the privileged role of the written word and (international) political exposure, which both were historically attributed mostly to men – however important women were in the intellectual formation and continuous development of popular thinkers and politicians. I would like to introduce here the assessment of sociologist and activist

Saïd Bouamama (2014: 12) who sees the relative absence of women in the pantheon of celebrated Pan-Africanists as mirror of a paradoxical fact: "*au cours de cette longue lutte pour l'émancipation des peuples, les femmes ont massivement été maintenues dans des rôles subalternes*[31]". This demands a contextualisation of Pan-Africanism and to understand it not as an ultimate means but a historical – thus limited – step in the larger struggle for dignity, independence and equality. Such an approach makes a critical feminist appropriation of Pan-Africanism all the more important. It prevents that the absence of women in the forefront of the narrative becomes a de-legitimisation of the whole movement and idea as such and allows for contemporary adoptions of Pan-Africanism to reflect on this (prior) shortcoming.

To flash light on a few moments and people linking anti-colonialism, Pan-Africanism and women's emancipation:

In 1960, Ghana organised the first conference for women in Africa and the diaspora (cf. Boukari-Yabara 2014: 140). Even before the OUA was founded, African women, who had built a network via their respective activism, founded the Pan-African Women's Organization (then as African Women's Union) in Dar-es-Salam, Tanzania, in July 1962. Women from all over the continent joined with delegations of fourteen countries and several liberation movements (cf. UNESCO 2015: 63-65). In Burkina Faso under Thomas Sankara, the role of women in society was consciously discussed and challenged (see above p. 23).

Less cited than Ethiopian emperor Menelik II, his wife Taitu Betul, who decided on the site of the future capital Addis-Abeba in 1886, pushed Menelik II to fight Italy; she mobilised 3.000 men in her natal region Gondar to support the national army (cf. UNESCO 2015: 18).

Jamaican activist Amy Ashwood (Garvey), companion in activism (and shortly wife) of Marcus Garvey, was co-founder and Secretary General of UNIA. As editor to UNIA's newspaper *The Negro World*, then largest African-owned newspaper in the world, she advanced feminist ideas in her section. She co-presided the Pan-African Congress next to Du Bois in Manchester in 1945. (cf. Boukari-Yabara 2014: 68, 115)

[31] "in the course of this long fight for the emancipation of peoples, women were massively maintained in subaltern roles" (own translation)

In Madagascar, Gisèle Rabesahala founded the *Comité de solidarité de Madagascar* (Committee of solidarity with Madagascar), which engaged against political repression and petitioned amnesty for political prisoners in light of the violent repression of anti-colonial uprisings by the French in 1947. With her party *Union du peuple malgache* (Malagasy People's Union), she entered the city council of Tananarive at the first elections through universal suffrage in French Overseas Territories in 1956. After independence, she became the first female minister of Madagascar, with a portfolio for revolutionary arts and culture (1977-1989). (cf. UNESCO 2015: 57f)

Miriam Makeba, South-African singer and Pan-African activist, received immense support by African leaders after her speech denouncing the system of Apartheid in front of the UN. Touring throughout Africa, she captivated with her talent to interpret traditional and national songs of various (African) countries (cf. Boukari-Yabara 2014: 247f). Miriam Makeba was married to Stokely Carmichael, early figure or the Black Power-movement and the *Black Panthers* in the USA before moving to Conakry, Guinea, where the contact with Sékou Touré and Kwame Nkrumah led both of them to a deeply engaged Pan-Africanism (ibid.: 223). With her music, Makeba and other engaged artists, became a popular manifestation of Pan-Africanism and helped sustain the movement and spreading its message (via a cultural level) while the political élan diminished throughout the later 1960's and 70's (ibid.: 249).

Funmilayo Kuti, mother of internationally recognised musician Fela Kuti, incessantly fought for the rights and representation of women in Nigeria. Born into the Nigerian local bourgeoisie, she organised a forum to foster the knowledge and influence of women of her social strata in support of women of lower classes. Her hopes to change the political approach in favour of women through her engagement in a party were disappointed. However, the 'Mother of Women's Rights', never gave up on her engagement until she died of the injuries due to a police raid, during which she was forced out of the window at the age of seventy-seven. (cf. UNESCO 2015: 60f)

The given examples are barely representative and far from exhaustive; the highlight on few female actors shall not hide or compromise the general, significant and necessary militancy and active engagement of women in and for liberation movements and armies next to (and sometimes ahead of) men, in the Diaspora and on the continent likewise.

OUTLOOK

Closing an approached overview that looks at Pan-Africanism ultimately needs an outlook. This brings Pan-Africanism in some regards back to the beginning: Instead of looking at (national) political elites or the African Union, the civil society sets impulses today – like in the diasporic beginnings of the movement. Recent years have seen the emergence of movements contesting concrete problems the population faces. Formed in national contexts, often related to mal-governance by corrupt political elites, they frequently refer to a broader frame of Pan-Africanism and have links with the (national) diaspora and akin movements in other countries. This is the case for the *Balai Citoyen*, formed in Burkina Faso to mobilise in protest against another prolongation of the presidency of Blaise Campaoré (in power 1987-2014) (cf. Wirtz 2017: 56).

This seemingly cyclical resurgence of the civil society as source and voice of Pan-Africanist activism, lends itself to end an approach to Pan-Africanism as it began: with a vague attempt to describe and delimit what it can mean. Borrowing from Arno Sonderegger (2016: 19), Pan-Africanism can thus be described as a "*movement of ideas and emotions"* as well as a "*movement of practices and engagements not restricted – and not restrictable – to the level of state politics*".

BALAI CITOYEN – AN EXEMPLARY CASE STUDY

> ouvrir les esprits sur un univers de responsabilité collective pour oser inventer l'avenir
>
> Thomas Sankara[32]

The *Balai Citoyen* (citizen's broom) was officially registered in Burkina Faso on 25th August 2013, its emergence dates back considerably longer. Since 2010, the idea of a new form of citizens' organisation and engagement was envisaged in the *Centre national de presse Norbert Zongo* (Norbert Zongo national press centre) during discussions around national and international news. Following the army mutiny in 2011, popular protests denouncing the difficult material living situation took the streets, and soon the presidency of Blaise Campaoré was questioned (the battle-cry '*Blaise Dégage* – Blaise get lost', surfaced here for the first time). After this spontaneous outburst of public discontent, ideas on structuring mobilisation to actively and systematically engage in the public space to fight for democratic liberties consolidated in the foundation of the movement, presented in a press conference in July 2013. The most prominent momentum of the movement was in the successful mobilisation against the modification of the Constitution (of Art. 37 in order to legally provide a mandate for life to Blaise Campaoré), which finally led to the President fleeing the country after 27 years in power on 31st October 2014. When General Diéndéré of the Regiment of Presidential Security lead a military putsch on 16th September 2015 (which lasted only few days)[33], the *Balai Citoyen* was at the forefront – both in mobilising the opposition and as a target for the military, which had understood their popular importance. This episode of strength and integrity further consolidated their position in Burkina Faso and in the regional and international perception.

The choice of the *Balai Citoyen* as a case study of a new dynamic of Pan-Africanism in civil society lies for one in its (inter-)national popularity. While the *Balai Citoyen* was of course not the sole actor in the popular insurrection against Blaise Campaoré, their (guiding)

[32] "open the minds to a universe of collective responsibility to dare to invent the future" (own translation)

[33] The *Régiment de sécurité présidentielle* (RSP) was created in 1998, its 1,300 men stood under direct control of the President and were perceived as an army within the army. After Campaoré left the country, the abolition of the RSP was discussed, leading to the short-lived coup under RSP-chief of Staff General Diéndéré. Under the pressure of a massive mobilisation on the streets supported by the regular army, Diéndéré was forced to give up the power on 23rd September 2015. Two days later, the RSP was officially disbanded (cf. Wirtz 2017: 61f, 64).

influence and mediatisation have earned them national and international respect and credibility. The popularity of the movement and strength in its initial mobilisation can in parts be attributed to the popularity of two if its co-founders, the musicians Sams'K Le Jah and Smockey. Both are long time engaged and critical activists in their art and live, and as such enjoy credibility and a genuine connection to the people, and notably to an otherwise relatively apolitical youth. Since the end of the era Campaoré and the hindering of a military putsch, the *Balai Citoyen* had to undergo a transformation itself, much like other Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), which emerged in the wake of the 2014 national protests against the regime. Having lost the common denominator 'anti-Campaoré', the heterogeneity of the civil society became more evident. Some organisations dissolved, some merged and some cooperate under a common 'roof', like the Coalition *Dytaniè*, which assembles seven CSOs including the *Balai Citoyen*[34]. In an official declaration (September 2016), *Dytaniè* explained the coalition as a re-*action* to the time of observation granted to the new government. It understands itself as a 'framework for unified action' to uphold the achievements of the revolution, foremost the independence of justice, and to oppose the government's (potential) 'betrayal' of the 'spirit of the insurrection', which is understood as dignity, justice, real change and a governance *for* the people (cf. Dytaniè 2016). A coalition of such sort is well in the spirit of the *Balai Citoyen*, which understands that the number of activists is its main strength ("*notre nombre est notre force*[35]" serve as a sort of leitmotif).

Civil society engagement in politics is not new in post-colonial Burkina Faso, neither is the chasing of reigning heads of states. The political regimes of Upper Volta (1960-1983) built either on a model of cooperative hegemony with the civil society or on a strong state in confrontation with civil society. Either way, no state authority ever established a truly stable hegemony, because of institutional weaknesses on the one hand and the opposing strength of the civil society on the other (cf. Bodenstein 2013: 28f). The Sankarist regime neither managed to form a durable consensus between all different (political) actors of the country. The (traditionally Marxist-Leninist) unions, under guidance of the *Parti communiste révolutionnaire*

[34] *Dytaniè* means hymn of liberation orvictory. The members are the *Balai Citoyen*, *Le cadre 2heures pour nous 2heures pour l'Afrique* (Framework 2 hours for us, 2 hours for Africa; initiative formed by students to discuss Africa-related political topics on-campus; in 2013/14, 150 to 600 people participated in the discussions every week-day), *La Ligue des panafricanistes* (League of Pan-Africanists), *La Génération Joseph Ki Zerbo*, *La Génération Cheik Anta Diop*, *Le Mouvement des Sans Voix* (Movement of the voiceless), and *Le Repère* (Benchmark). (cf. Dytaniè 2016; Carayol 2018a)

[35] "our number is our strength" (own translation)

voltaïque (Voltaic Revolutionary Communist Party, PCRV), lead the civil mobilisations against the first president Maurice Yaméogo and against his successor, General Sangoulé Lamizana (cf. ibid.: 26f). In this tradition, they opposed the take-over by Sankara as just another military coup d'état. Following their diction, a revolution could only be reached through base work with the proletariat. The same argument was used in 2014 and beyond against the newly emerging civil society organisations engaged in the overthrow of Blaise Campaoré (cf. Carayol 2018a). By then, the ideological discourse of the unions had lost prevalence to a "*moral indignation*" (Ouédraogo 2017: 53) against political practices of corruption and nepotism and a generalised despair in the recent uprising. The popularised desolation with politics and future outlooks pre-insurrection was born and nourished in the lack of development, the every-day struggles of Burkinabè society, and the mistrust against state power. The lingering discontentment was fuelled by the president's project of constitutional amendment to prolong his presidency infinitively and the Norbert Zongo affair, which made it clear that not everybody is equal before Burkinabè law[36].

The developments leading to the expulsion of Campaoré inscribe in many regards into the country's history of a strong civil society, yet some differences are remarkable. Civil society was not lead by the unions; instead, a – notably young – civil society emerged on an organisational level and the already traditionally (politically) diverse civil society seemed even more divided. This split recalls in some regard the conflict between PCRV and unions and Sankara's regime and the CDRs (*Comités de la défense de la revolution*) (cf. Bodenstein 2013: 92). The differences between the unions and the 'new' CSOs go beyond the generational character. One important critique against the unions is that they no longer fight for the society as a whole but narrow their demands to betterments for their professional members. While nearly half of the covered workforce is organised in unions – a high percentage in East Africa –, still over 90%

[36] Norbert Zongo was a journalist, director of the journal *L'indépendant* (independent and has among the largest readerships of Burkinabè jorunals), and critic of the regime. He was assassinated on 13th December 1998 following his investigations on the arbitrary detention and death of David Ouédraogo, driver of the President's brother François Campaoré. While officially Zongo's death was attributed to an accident and not murder, the public was convinced otherwise. Students and pupils took to the street two days after the assassination. These events ignited new dynamics in the civil society and political opposition, which was undergoing a severe lethargy and de-composition under the regime's oppression and infiltration. The government reacted to mounting tensions with an independent commission of inquiry, which identified a clear political motivation behind the assassination of Norbert Zongo. While the commission stated the involvement of Blaise Campaoré and named six main suspects for the assassination of Norbert Zongo, only one military was found guilty for the murder in 2001 – and his charges were later dismissed after the withdrawal of one witness (2006). (cf. Bavoux 2017: 49f; Houpert 2016)

of the total workforce is not covered at all (mostly working in the informal sector, in gold mines, in subsidence agriculture, as itinerant traders etc.). Yet, the unions have a strong and nation-wide presence, whereas the newly formed civil organisations often concentrate in few highly urbanised areas and struggle to reach beyond major cities (cf. Carayol 2018a). Looking at the socio-political context of Burkina Faso surrounding the anti-Campaoré mobilisation, Ouédraogo (2017: 51) understands the increased engagement of the civil society outside established structures less as a spontaneous rupture but as a long-term build up reaction during and in response to "*une époque marquee par la stratégie de construction d'un pouvoir à vie par le nouvel homme fort*[37]".

Another point in case to look at the *Balai Citoyen*, lies in its explicit reference to an icon of Pan-Africanism, former Burkinabè president Thomas Sankara, and Pan-African ideas in general. Indeed, Thomas Sankara is called '*cibal majeur*[38]' and outside Burkina Faso, the movement encourages diaspora and supporters to organise around *Ambassades Cibals* (embassies). The collaboration on a regional and continental level takes place in the form of loose exchange between different civil society movements or coordinated as in the campaign *Tournons La Page* (Let's turn the page). The campaign regroups multiple organisations and personalities from the African continent and beyond in their fight for democracy. It is conceptualised very openly and tries to bridge political, religious or ethnical differences for a common goal. Democracy, as understood by *Tournons La Page* (2015: 24f, 34), goes beyond the façade and charade certain *de facto* autocracies exercise. While adhering to each country's right to auto-define how to shape its democratic institutions and procedures, some underlying universal principles are understood as *conditio sine quo non*: alternation, respect of rules by those in power (especially regarding the institutional interplay), and freedom of opinion and expression, of press and assembly. They appeal against 'constitutional manipulations', i.e. changes in the constitution for personal benefits (like de-limitation of mandates or re-electivity), for the protection of activists for democracy and for a collective development of a vision for the democratic future of Africa.

[37] "an epoch marked by the strategy of constructing a life-long power by the new strong man" (own translation)

[38] The members of the *Balai Citoyen* are called *cibal* (male) and *cibelle* (female), combining '*citoyen'* (citizen) and '*balayeur'* (sweeper) (cf. Wirtz 2017: 59).

Structure of the movement

The structure of the *Balai Citoyen* has a vertical line of communication while relying on and encouraging a broad horizontal base. The *Coordination Nationale* (National Coordination, CN) is the national representation and executive organ of the movement, the members are elected by the *Assemblée Générale* (General Assembly), which otherwise determines the large strategic orientation and the means and areas of activities. The spokespersons of the CN are the advocate Guy Hervé Kam and Serge Bambara (alias Smockey). The *Coordination Régionale* (Regional Coordination; CR) coordinates the activities and channels the communication and flow of information between the CN and the members at the base. The base is organised in *Clubs Cibals*; on a level in-between, focal points are established for communes and in the two biggest cities Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso for each district (*arrondissement*) to coordinate the activities of the clubs (cf. Balai Citoyen-Statuts). The *Clubs Cibals* are the core of the movement as they are the actual participative framework for the promotion and exercise of an egalitarian, active citizenship. Each club consists of minimum ten members who adhere to the same close geographic unit to facilitate a rapid reunion and mobilisation and carry out (social) activities in the proximities. Other types of clubs are defined by affinity, uniting e.g. along lines of interest or professional activities or who frequent the same places (universities, schools, church/mosque etc.); *Web Club Cibals* group members online, aiming at the organisation and coordination of activities in the field (cf. Balai Citoyen-Vie des clubs). While the affinity to new media and the use of social platforms has been much discussed (and hyped) as new and distinguishing feature of recent civil society movements and uprisings from the Arab Spring onwards, *Balai Citoyen* co-founder Smockey maintains a cautious approach. He points to potential irresponsibilities of 'virtual activism' that has a tendency to neglect or no longer translate into action in the 'actual' life and community (cf. Bassolé 2017). This is not in opposition to the use of social media and new technology for coordination, organisation and activism as such. The growing prevalence of smartphones in Burkina Faso today helps for instance in cases of violence – diffusing in real-time information on somebody using force against members of the civil society, allows for a quick reaction as well as the act itself sometimes discourages the adversary (cf. Wirtz 2017: 81). Such a strategy of documentation was for example largely applied by the Black Panthers to track and critique US police violence against the Afro-American population.

In general, the organisational structure resembles that under Sankara. The national guidance came from the *Conseil national de la révoution* (National council of the revolution, CNR); the base was organised in *Comités de la défense de la revolution* (Committes of the defence of the revolution; CDRs) where citizen's activism was forged, comparable to the *Clubs Cibals*. The institutional interplay is similar too: the national level develops the large directives and guidelines, whereas the base is spreading these ideas but also informing on on-ground realties so that the national level can (re-)act accordingly. Communication, flow of information and transmission of values define the national-local link. Additionally, the vertical structure allows for a reaction to (potential) infiltrations of the *Clubs Cibals* by political parties (cf. Wirtz 2017: 69). For the *Balai Citoyen* it is important, that all members are equal, regardless of responsibility or position carried out within the movement; linguistically this is reflected in the mutual addressing as 'comrade' among members (cf. Bavoux 2017: 62). Equality is anchored in the movement's vision for society and their engagement as popular voice of the civil society. On another level, equality shall ensure a continuity of the activism beyond the (physical) presence of a leader-figure (cf. Wirtz 2017: 70). A noteworthy characteristic of some *Clubs Cibals* is, that they emerged from existing structures of socialisation and exchange, notably the *grins de thé* (tea-reunions; *grin* is reunion in Doula), which in itself define a set of rules like sharing, mutual help and support. This means that these clubs, and their general concept, are based on and reflect existing social realities instead of bringing in entirely new forms (cf. Bavoux 2017: 114).

Principles

Important for the *Balai Citoyen* as a civil society movement is to remain independent and non-partisan and to actually represent the civil society. Independence includes a financial independence with high attention to transparency. Financial independence is also aimed at by the single *Clubs Cibals* to attain a certain autonomy in their activities. How this goal is reached differs from club to club, some ask members for monthly contributions while basing them on a system of solidarity, i.e. nobody is asked to contribute beyond their means and voluntary increases balance shortfalls. The financing on the national level is broadly provided by the members through solidarity contributions (donation boxes or hats during events; a minimum of francs CFA 500, circa EUR 0.76, is asked of every member upon affiliation) and the sale of the movement's T-shirts to every new member – a practice already put in place by Senegalese

sister-organisation *Y'en a marre* (Fed up) (cf. Bavoux 2017: 85). In-kind contributions for specific activities make up another important part of the respective budgets (e.g. music, transport, print shops delivering extra flyers etc.) (cf. Wirtz 2017: 71). Financial contributions beyond the common threshold are firmly regulated: the *Balai Citoyen* does not accept donations from political parties or politicians and donating members to the movement have no voting rights in the General Assembly. Independence further means non-adherence to a political party; this applies to all members who hold a position in the movement, regular members are free to join political parties. Non-partisan evidently does not imply apolitical. On the contrary, the *Balai Citoyen* fights for a re-politisation of the Burkinabè population and civil society, which had become increasingly alienated from the political sphere under Campaoré; the keyword – and prime objective – here is *consciensiation* (creation of awareness). (cf. Bavoux 2017: 57-61; Balai Citoyen-Status)

Representing the civil society through proximity (as opposed to taking the role of an avant-garde) demands actual diversity within the movement. The intent of the *Balai Citoyen* is to create an alternative to an elitist approach among political parties and the professional criteria of unions. Despite the professional exclusiveness of the unions, their claim to the importance of the inclusion of the proletariat still reflects the influence of the FEANF (see above p. 13) – and therewith, consciously or not, a certain (intellectual) elitism, which is ultimately ambiguous in a society where barely above a third of the population is alphabetised (cf. UIS 2018)[39]. Conversely, the *Balai Citoyen* actively stands for – and consequently is part of – a popular force and struggle. This includes to be open to every person who accepts the principle values of the movement. The direct access to information, the on-ground knowledge of the situation as well as the insight from different sectors through the members, allow for interventions in various fields relevant to the population. In its function as space of articulation of egalitarian exchange between members, the movement generates information and knowledge different from any elitist or else exclusive approach. Diversity is finally also a source of credibility within the Burkinabè population, *cibals, cibelles* and non-members alike.

[39] Adult literacy rate (15 years and above): 34.6% [male 44.38% – female 26.22%]; positive trend with youth literacy (15-24y), also due to a decrease in the (persisting) gap between male and female literacy: 50.1% [male 56.1% – female 43.99%] (cf. UIS 2018).

The social diversity – which is already partly achieved but has to remain radical aim – is, however, not a constant of all moments and levels of articulation and action in the movement. Within each club, the (geographical) environment defines the social diversity of members. Bavoux (2017: 65f) observed in his interviews and participatory observation a tendency of a rural-urban divergence, without claiming sufficient data to legitimately generalise such divergence. Yet, the insight is interesting as it shows a necessary and *de facto* differentiation of how active and integer participation is defined and of priorities and realms of intervention in the field according to the socio-economic context. In the rural area of Zogoré, for example, organising for mutual help during harvesting time is part of the social activism of the local *Club Cibal*. Bavoux (ibid.: 63f) further noticed, that in the clubs, the participation is broad and the space to express oneself is welcomed by a majority of the members. Still, the representation within the clubs – also regarding postings (spokesperson, treasurer) – and the allocation of speaking time reflects societal power structures like gender and age. The permeation of the movement and its fights by such structures is part of the reflections undertaken within the movement in total and specifically at club-level. Part of the work of conscientisation is the thematization of existing societal power structures and to collectively develop means to address and possibly deconstruct such hierarchization. To take out one example, on the occasion of the International Women's Day 2016 (8th May), one programme was in support of marginalised women accused of witchcraft in Ouagadougou (cf. Wirtz 2017: 75f).

Looking at diversity along the vertical organisational line, an academic dominance in the CN cannot be denied, with a strong influence from the student, academic and journalistic milieu. Comparing this to (ideologically) well-educated elected activists in higher positions and often less-educated and unemployed activists at the base in the organisational structures under Sankara, seems at hand. Yet, it might be more of a short-cut than the show of an actual repetition. The intellectual guidance in the CN seems, according to Bavoux (2017: 61) accepted among the *Clubs Cibals*, with reference to the differences in responsibility. While the clubs are the platform for citizens' exchange and for local activities, the CN coordinates the essentially decentralised structures on a national level and represents the movement nationally and internationally. Thus, the members of the CN require certain skills and 'media value'. This is in no regard a devaluation of the activists of the base. Quite on the contrary, it is in the clubs that the idea of equal citizens' participation and exchange is exercised and lived.

Objectives

The overarching vision of the *Balai Citoyen* is a 'just and integer' society in a democratic state adhering to the rule of law. It defines its role in the contribution of civic action and the 'purification' (*l'assainissement*) of the management of public affairs. In Article 3 of the Statutes, the objectives are accordingly defined as follows: the effective introduction of (i) a responsible and conscious involvement of the population in the management of public affairs, (ii) accountability[40] of the government vis-à-vis the populations, and of (iii) the democratic principle of alternation. The means to reach the defined goals are bound to the statutory principles of integrity (honesty and transparency), engagement (active and voluntary participation), solidarity (union, sharing, mutual help, respect of the other), discipline and non-violence[41] (cf. Art. 2-5, Statutes of the *Balai Citoyen*).

The articulated objectives address the civil public and the government alike. Accountability and alternation (ii, iii) are to be implemented and institutionalised from the side of the government; the public sphere stands at the bottom of the demand and takes the role of critical observer and interpellant. To exert this role, the first objective comes into focus. A 'responsible and conscious involvement of the population in the management of public affairs' demands from side of the government to institutionalise channels of communication between to the civil society, and from the civil society to be 'responsible and conscious'. The *Balai Citoyen* has, through its members, good resources to fulfil this role when it comes to (material) developments by the Government in the communities (schools, hospitals, infrastructure etc.). Concerning responsible budgeting and the control against potential mis-management or the like, the movement relies fully on the cooperation of the Government to share relevant documents, thus keeping the scope of control limited. Alternation has been successfully achieved for a first time with the 2015 elections, the role of critical observation remains important to keep the democratic process upright in the long run. Furthermore, it is a claim that is supported for other countries

[40] The movement uses the word '*redevabilité*' for what is here translated as 'accountability'. *Redevabilité* englobes the meaning of accountability with a strong demand for transparency and the idea of conscious politicians, in the sense of the politician understanding their responsibility as 'employees' of the people and not superior (cf. Bavoux 2017: 63).

[41] The principle of non-violence is very important now, post-insurrection. However, members of the *Balai Citoyen* have participated in setting fire to the National Assembly and members had to be actively called to avoid or stop pillages; ahead of the votes regarding the constitutional amendment, some members took to threatening individual Parliamentarians. This shall not de-construct the principle of non-violence as such; the incidences show however how difficult it is to guide masses during an upheaval. (cf. Wirtz 2017: 76f)

within Africa, as the engagement in the collective *Tournons La Page* shows. The communication with the government lies largely in the responsibility of the national coordination, and so matters of accountability figure prominently in official and press releases. The main activities of the *Balai Citoyen* however and especially at club level, concern the *conscientisation* of the Burkinabè. It is the main objective of the movement, as it is the base for all (lasting) civic engagement. Conscientisation of the population can be seen as continuation and extension of the CDRs portfolio of political education under Sankara. Extension of it, as conscientisation, in the understanding of the *Balai Citoyen*, does not indicate an ideological orientation. It more generally aims at the transmission of awareness of political as well as socio-economic structures of power and hierarchization and of the importance and potential scope of civic engagement. It further strives to make people sensitive to and receptive of topics of injustice and the circumstances of marginalised groups. Even if the *Balai Citoyen* claims no particular ideological or party-political orientation, its engagement is in itself neither apolitical nor neutral. In the principles of integrity, engagement and solidarity, a progressive bias is manifest. Promoting and enabling equal exchange among members of civil society *de facto* means empowering otherwise marginalised groups, raising questions of justice – of judiciary and socio-economic nature – is always an active questioning of oppressive and exploitative structures. When extracting a progressive bias, it seems adequate to address interpretations of the *Balai Citoyen* and other CSOs as conformist due to their working with human rights or international law. The argument roots in supposed European origins of human rights. Philosopher Paulin Houtondji (2015: 155, 157f, 162f) analysed the argument as follows: (i) No culture is void of the idea of human dignity, and in no culture this has been consequently followed through; (ii) Europe did not 'invent' human rights or the concept of human dignity but had the means to develop an elaborate discourse around it; (iii) rejecting human rights on the basis of the presumed atomistic concept of society in favour of the collective misunderstands that a people's (collective) right to self-determination (as the right to cultural difference) cannot exist when the right to free expression is not granted, as the definition of the 'collective will' would then be ignorant of what the individuals constituting the collective want. To conclude, deducing a conservative-conformist orientation in association with human rights overlooks that whatever their (presumed) origin, it does not equal a sole interpretation and application.

Inclusiveness distinguishes many of the newer CSOs alongside the *Balai Citoyen*. Ouédraogo (2017: 54) introduces in this context the term '*intellectuels oraux*' (oral intellectuals), which points out that illiteracy is no limitation in taking the role of an intellectual or at

political participation. Drawing from all formal and informal means of education and knowledge production ('school of the street', art and music, radio and television, etc.) to reach own critical reflexions and conclusions, is in some regard an exposure and critique of exclusive characteristics of the institutional educational system which can become a barrier, instead of facilitator, to civil and political agency and independence. It is in a line of thought with attempts of de-formalising educational and pedagogical concepts. Re-evaluating education as a means to reach critical thinking and liberate intellectually is always linked to the idea(l) of an active and responsible citizenship and the emancipation of classes prior silenced by an elitist discourse. Such ideas had found repercussion in the Pan-African context before, notably with Nyerere in Tanzania. Beyond the African context, the names of Paulo Freire or Ivan Illich resonate with a critique of repressive educational systems and the emancipatory power of the critical thought (cf. Zerrouki 2017). While the educational system as such is not in the focus of the *Balai Citoyen*, such a train of thought underlies the dynamics during and after the insurrection. Before the *Balai Citoyen* was conceptualised, its later co-founder Smockey, took a stance in support of the students when their protests faced state repression in 2007, manifest in the release of *À balles réelles* (With live ammunition) (cf. SmockeyOfficiel.com-Biographie). With the crisis of the educational system in late 2017[42], the discussion surfaced through engaged journalists and activists (see e.g. Salouka 2017; Bamouni 2018).

Democracy

Albeit not formulated as an objective as such, democracy is the linking element of the *Balai Citoyen*'s motivation and engagement – most overtly expressed in the request of alternation and the re-establishment of the population, the *demos*, as bearer of sovereignty. The movement adheres to and promotes a normative participatory theory of democracy.. This understands civic engagement as a means to formulate and balance interests, of equal communication and

[42] The educational system underwent a larger crisis post-insurrection when the educational personnel went on strike (classes were taught, but no exams taken, i.e. risking a blank year for students without possibility of graduating to a higher level); on occasions, pupils and students demonstrated in solidarity with teachers. Government and unions finally reached an agreement in Spring 2018 and the academic year could take off. In a press conference in January 2018, the *Balai citoyen* comments in favour of the teachers, but also postpones a more general discussion of the increasingly privatised educational sector of Burkina Faso in favour of a quick solution to the strike in order to prevent a blank year for pupils and students (cf. Balai Citoyen 2018)

mutual understanding and learning and of finding a consent (cf. Schmidt 2000: 253). Participation becomes a counterweight to undemocratic developments caused by internationalisation and globalisation (cf. ibid.: 254f). This point is particularly pertinent in a post-colonial context, where these are a constant factor of statehood – the accession to sovereignty of former colonies was in itself an international act and political and economic developments have always been overly subjugated to external influences. In this context places the opposition to the franc CFA[43], the regional currency shared by fourteen countries in eastern and central Africa. Relic of the French colonial era, it has a major influence on the economic performance. France presents the *Zone franc* with its fixed exchange rates, guaranteed convertibility and free monetary transfer as '*un instrument de solidarité et de développement destiné à conforter la croissance, à réduire la pauvreté et à approfondir l'intégration régionale*'[44] (Banque de France 2017: 1). The growing opposition sees the monetary union as a detriment to the countries of the franc CFA, who show a relatively low economic growth in regional comparison. Advantages are seen foremost on the side of French enterprises. As France nominates members for the administrative boards and the monetary policy committees of the central banks, the independence of monetary and financial policies is considered highly limited. The countries of the franc CFA share a currency but abolished the federal structure of pre-independence and introduced monetary or financial policies and customs – regional integration within the zone franc CFA is therewith severely hindered. (cf. ibid.: 6f; Mbaye 2014)

The call for extensive and also more intensive participation is linked to a model of the average citizen as *citoyen,* i.e. endowed with civic spirit and an understanding and sense of

[43] To prevent capital flight, France established the *Zone franc* ahead of the Second World War with strict exchange control and non-convertibility of the franc in France, its oversea-departments and colonies. Before signing the Bretton Woods agreements, France announced the creation of the franc CFA and franc CFP (*franc des colonies françaises d'Afrique de l'Ouest et d'Afrique centrale/ du Pacifique* – franc of West and Central African/Pacific French colonies) and the franc CFP (*franc des colonies françaises* /franc of the French colonies in the Pacific) in 1945. After the independences, the monetary union was preserved in many of the former French colonies in Sub-Sahara Africa – with prominent exception of Guinea under Sékou Touré –, only Mauritania and Madagascar left the Zone franc in the early 1970's; former Portuguese colonies Guinea Bissau and Equatorial Guinea joined the franc CFA in 1997 and 1984 respectively. Two monetary unions including monetary issuing institutes for West and Central Africa were installed (both with the same currency and parity); the central banks were shifted from France to Yaoundé and Dakar respectively in the late 1970's. Today, members of the Zone franc are the countries of the franc CFA (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Republic of Central Africa, Senegal, Togo) and the Comoros (with its proper central bank and currency, the *franc comorien*). (cf. Banque de France 2017: 1-3)

[44] "an instrument of solidarity and development destined to strengthen growth, reduce poverty and deepen the regional integration" (own translation)

responsibility for the common interest (cf. Schmidt 2000: 257f). The term *citoyen* is used here as it in relates – much more (directly) than the Anglican concept of citizenship – to the ideals of the French Revolution. Freedom and liberty, equality, and brotherhood point to the emancipation of the population from political dictation and tutelage; the guiding ideal of political and social equality; and to solidarity among the population, transcending socio-economic divisions. Ideally, all these elements are intrinsic to the process of political participation as well as (part of) its outcome. In this understanding, democracy is both a political method and an ethic aim (cf. ibid.: 256). Comparably, solidarity is within the *Balai Citoyen* a principle as well as an objective. The afore-mentioned outreaching programmes of conscientisation aim at a change in mentality – of the population and political leaders – by spreading this idea of conscious and responsible citizenship and participation. A change in mentality develops over a long term and it has started long before the emergence of the *Balai Citoyen* – enabling the successful contestation against Campaoré in the first place. The platform for enunciation and exchange, that the *Clubs Cibal* provide, is hoped to create and deepen solidarity through active knowing, understanding and listening to one another. The movement addresses (at least) two important points with its work of conscientisation. For one, the awareness of the importance and also the potential of civic action and involvement is propagated – a conviction less anchored than expected after its manifestation in the overthrow of Blaise Campaoré. Some models of participatory action link the believe that one's proper engagement can be politically influential to the persons individual (socio-economic) 'resources' (cf. ibid: 266). The strong reliance on civil society is among the main critiques of theories of participative democracy. The image and demands of the population are claimed to be unrealistic and over-burdening for the majority. The angle of the *Balai Citoyen* contradicts the model as well as the critique. As they propagate and enable the civic influence by facilitating information exchange and knowledge production through participatory means, the definition of 'resources', especially regarding formal educational standards, is challenged. Overburdening the civil society is an often-heard argument, especially when populist powers are on the rise. Questioning the capacity and intelligence of the *demos* is generally elitist and as such must be undemocratic (in the sense of a popular democracy). An explicitly pro-democratic movement cannot, ultimately, accept it as a counter-argument. The different models of democracy be regarded as different ways of steering and communicating, of managing, the visions and intelligence of the population. Whether the population is regarded as an aggregation of individuals or a collective, is a distinction that strongly affects the model of organisation. There is no denial, the *Balai Citoyen* alongside the Burkinabè society, engages in

a long-term (if not infinite) project to develop and channel a collective intelligence. The propagated image of 'upright women and men', to introduce the broadly referenced vision of Thomas Sankara of the 'new Burkinabè', is certainly demanding strong conviction and voluntary engagement. Ideally, the *cibals*' and *cibelles*' activism expands into their every-day life so that they become themselves example and model of this (cf. Bavoux 2017: 77, 91). The youth is particularly engaged and targeted in this endeavour. For one, because the youth constitutes the majority of the population in Burkina Faso[45] and hence are an important multiplication factor. Additionally, the majority of the youth experiences for the first time an alternative to the regime of Blaise Campaoré, giving the Burkinabè revolution a particularly positive and hopeful connotation. Keeping up the dynamic of engagement and activism beyond the mobilisation in the streets is nonetheless a challenge for the *Balai Citoyen* and other civil society organisations and will likely decide upon their long-term viability and significance (cf. ibid.: 70f). In this context of re-structuring and re-revitalisation, the *Balai Citoyen* shifted its focus to a broader scale and depth of civic action and participation and the permanent sentry duty of civil society vis-à-vis the political power.

Conscientisation

Conscientisation has been evoked repeatedly as a central concern of the *Balai Citoyen*. This broad objective is addressed in several ways. On a national level, two campaigns are prominent. '*Je vote, je reste*' (I vote, I stay) was launched surrounding the 2015 legislative and presidential elections (with financial support from the Swiss development cooperation and the Swedish CSO Diakonia). At the start, information and awareness campaigns called the population to register for the elections and to vote; in a second circle, activists were asked to remain at the poll stations to control for (ir-)regularities (double-votes, stealing of ballots etc.) (cf. Wirtz 2017: 64; Balai Citoyen-Je vote je reste). 'I stay' further promotes the citizens' role as a permanent part of the democratic state and instance of control of the elected government in opposition to democratic participation solely on election days. Since April 2018, the project '*Alliance Jeunes et Parlementaires*' (AJP, Youth and Parliamentarians Alliance) is piloting for 18 months in cooperation with the Parliament and the British CSO Oxfam. The project aims at

[45] 65.5% of the Burkinabè population is below 24 years old according the UN estimates for 2015 (cf. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 2017).

bringing together the Burkinabè youth and the National Parliament to: (i) augment the knowledge and understanding of parliamentary work and of available, legally guaranteed mechanisms of participative democracy among the youth; (ii) establish a platform for dialogue between the youth and the Parliament; and (iii) to create awareness about youth-related issues in the Parliament and find it discussed and included in parliamentary work. With this project, the Parliament's own strategic agenda of establishing a dialogue with representatives of the civil society meets demands of the *Balai Citoyen* of information, participation and socio-economic inclusion. The latter reflects that the youth (for this project defined between 17 and 30 years) constitutes the majority of the Burkinabè population and yet is relatively excluded from political power and decision-making, marginalising the socio-economic issues they face in political discourse. While not solely concerning the youth, they are particularly confronted with unemployment, bad conditions in education, and high living costs. (cf. Balai Cityoen-AJP; Diallo 2018)

Next to national campaigns as described above, the movement is most active through its base which operates on a district or neighbourhood-level. The outreach to the population takes different forms. For example, films are projected on topics like governance, democracy and civism and followed by a discussion around the topic of the film or else if proposed by the *cibals* and *cibelles*. Social activism targets mostly public places like hospitals, schools or cult places through charitable collections, sit-ins to draw the local authority's attention to problems and other ways of non-violent civic action. In rural areas, mutual support during the harvest time is organised. Organised clean-ups, especially in urban districts, bring the movement literally to its name, citizens' broom, while propagating an alternative communal life and again referencing Thomas Sankara, who had introduced such clean-up days (cf. Bouamama 2014: 284). Beyond this very literal meaning, the traditional broom, i.e. twigs bound together, as it features in the logo of the movement, stands for a thorough cleansing of Burkina Faso (from corruption, mismanagement, oppression, inequalities etc.) – without getting one's hands dirty (cf. Wirtz 2017: 58f). The symbol of bundled twists is old and can be found in different cultures, signifying strength through unity. The broom, as essential and basic tool for cleanliness of every household, evokes at the same time the picture of Burkina Faso as house and home which harbours all Burkinabè, who in turn are all together responsible for its propriety and maintenance. The second symbol in the logo is a clenched fist, gesture of protest, discontent and preparedness to fight, which aligns the *Balai Citoyen* with an international left and contesting wing of organisation (cf. Korff 1992: 77, 81).

The social activism is particularly important as it one of the main ways to attain visibility in the population, in the neighbourhoods and in the every-day life of the people. In their communities, the *cibals* and *cibelles* take on the function of 'points of complaints' for the residents (cf. Wirtz 2017: 74). Bringing activism, that is change, into every-day practices supports and renders possible the (material) development of an alternative culture, practice goes hand in hand with a change in mentality in the project of conscientisation. Such interactions create trust between the population and activists; credibility is of imperative importance for a movement committed to popular representation.

Other instruments of communication, outreach and mobilisation are conferences, panel discussions, concerts, and operations of reforestation, which are often included in activities co-operative with official partners. Here again, the *Balai Citoyen* re-introduces a tradition of Sankara, who was a doyen of environmental consciousness in his time. (cf. Jaffré 2016b: 15)

Pan-Africanism

While the immediate environment for the emergence and focus of activities of the *Balai Citoyen* are inscribed in their national context, the regional dimension is not less influential and determining. The Arab Spring, especially the 'Jasmine Revolution' in Tunisia, set a hopeful international momentum. Serge Bmabara (Smockey), rapper and co-founder of the *Balai Citoyen*, pointed towards the Senegalese movement *Y'en a marre*, which was already known in Burkina Faso, so when the *Balai Citoyen* emerged, the ideas and concepts were not foreign and quickly embraced by the public (cf. Commeillas 2015). The *Balai Citoyen*, in its organisational structure itself, reaches out to the Burkinabè diaspora through 'embassies', which function similarly to the national focal points.

The mind-set and aspirations are regional and at best Pan-African. One indicator is the position against the franc CFA. At the occasion of President Macron's visit to Burkina Faso in November 2017, spokesperson Guy Hervé Kam, stated in an interview with RFI that "*[a]ujourd'hui, dans son ensemble, le peuple africain ne veut plus du franc CFA*[46]" and (indirectly) linked the currency to *Françafrique*, as the net of in-transparent interconnection between France and its former colonies is named. In talking for the 'entire African people', Guy

[46] "[t]oday, in its entirety, the African people no longer wants the franc CFA" (own translation)

Hervé Kam adopts a clearly Pan-African rhetoric, expressing a demand demonstrated just a month before (16th September 2017): The CSO *Urgences panafricanistes* (Pan-Africanist urgencies) had mobilised to anti-franc CFA demonstration in several cities within the monetary union, the protests extended to Paris and the Antilles (cf. Johnson 2017). Spreading beyond the directly concerned countries, the events manifested a Pan-African solidarity, strengthened in the context of anti-imperialism, in which the campaign against the franc CFA is lead. A core-topic of Pan-Africanism post-independence is taken on anew, or rather, the struggle has re-emerged. The critique of the monetary system and the often generally addressed imperialism, still do not entail a more profound or concrete critique of the (capitalistic) economic system as such. The denunciation of poverty and unemployment seems to lead to a demand for a kind of distributive justice and an equality in opportunities to live in dignity and strive (towards levelling the playing field within capitalism instead of a radical change of the latter). Samba Sylla (2017: 21) consequently labels the fight of movements like the *Balai Citoyen* as 'republican'. This marks an important difference between a popular movement, with people from various professional backgrounds, and an avant-garde movement like for example the *Black Panthers* in the USA of the 1960's and 70's or indeed the underground circle of young officers and Marxist intellectuals with which Thomas Sankara organised the coup.

As mentioned above, the fight for democracy transcends Burkina Faso to a continental level in the coalition of *Tournons la page*. The call for self-determination is taken up and extended form the political level to the civil society.

In December 2016, civil society movements from all over Africa, prominently *Lucha* and *Filimbi* (Democratic Republic of Congo), *Balai Citoyen* (Burkina Faso), *Y en a marre* (Senegal), *Ras Le Bol* (Congo-Brazzaville), *Wake up Madagascar*, *Team Gom Sa Boppa* (Gambia), *Iyina* (Chad) and *Jeune et Fort* (Cameroon) met in Dakar, Senegal, under the banner *Internationale des Fouteurs de Merde* (Internationale of Troublemakers). The provocative name seems like a reference, conscious or not, to the beginning of the *Négritude* movement. The anecdote goes, that Aimé Césaire replied to a French man who called out to him in the streets: "*N'allez pas le répéter, mais le nègre vous emmerde.*[47]" (Fèvre et al. 2007). With these little words,

[47] „Don't repeat it, but the negro annoys you" (own translation; the French *emmerder* is more vulgar and strong, as it etymologically derives from *merde*, shit, and comprises the connotation of disdain; the same applies for Troublemakers as *Fouteurs de merde*)

Césaire appropriated the pejorative word *nègre* and transformed it into resistance, he made it clear that his voice and the voice of all colonialised will not be silenced anymore, it will be heard and it will be uncomfortable for the colonial society. In the same spirit, to assume the role of 'troublemakers' shows the confidence and persistence of remaining a voice of opposition. This 'Internationale' met to exchange about their experiences and discuss on the formation of a Pan-African platform for common activities and dynamics. Five central points were formulated: (i) Solidarity in action between the movements of different countries; (ii) stimulation of an African civic conscience and strengthening of African civil society movements and their image; (iii) strengthening the movements' capacities of activism and advocacy; (iv) development of rapid and independent financing methods; and (v) creation of an African summit on civic engagement (cf. UPEC 2018: 2). With regards to the last point, the first edition of the *Université Populaire de l'Engagement Citoyen* (Popular University of Civic Engagement) under the heading 'Citzienship and the Right to Decide' was organised during five days at the end of July 2018[48]. For the participants, this platform is a new kind of institutionalised exchange and discussion for activists, intellectuals, and artists, including sessions to strengthen the activists' theoretical, conceptual and scientific base.

In other parts of the continent, similar debates around formation through discussion equally led to platforms of exchange. Exemplarily, I would like to introduce at this point the Pan-African civil society *Fahamu* (meaning 'understanding' in Swahili), founded in 1997 to "*strengthen, nurture and work with movements for social justice in Africa*" (Fahamu). *Fahamu* seems an interesting choice, because it, by and large, shares its vision with the *Balai Citoyen* (if formulated somewhat broader: "*a world where people organise to emancipate themselves from all forms of oppression, recognise their social responsibilities, respect each other's differences, and realise their full potential*" (ibid.)) and gives a central importance to the project of conscientisation (with a strong focus on different forms knowledge production). However, the two differ absolutely in organisational and strategical terms, showing how different paths may strive in the same direction – and accordingly how collaboration on the level of the civil society can be enriching, if not vital.

The work of *Fahamu* is organised around four programmatic areas: (i) a platform for analysis and debate (Pambazuka News, an electronic weekly newsletter on Africa and the global

[48] At the time of finalisation of this paper, the conference had not yet taken place; therefore, no further information (outcomes, proclamations or the like) could be included.

South in three languages); (ii) Africa-centred advocacy (to strengthen citizens' voices in decision-making at all levels); (iii) knowledge generation (to serve activism, aims at bridging the gap between theory and practice); and (iv) education for social justice. The area on education includes the 'Pan-African Fellowship Programme', a one-year programme for social movements and community-based organisations that supports grassroot activists with mentorship and peer-support and monthly learning seminars to deepen theoretical and practical understanding of strategies of advocacy and effective organising. It also serves as an important platform of exchange for the involved activists (cf. Fahamu-Fellowship Programme). The programme started in 2011 with a focus on East African communities and especially Kenya, home of the network's founder Firoze Manji and its headquarter. The programme looks beyond Kenya and East Africa through the placement of activists in other CSOs, association with other platforms and participations in festivals connecting activists (e.g. World Social Forum) (cf. ibid.). Tough different in their organisation and arrangement, such initiatives build on enhancing the participants' knowledge and activism through inputs and mostly through exchange, i.e. analysing experiences to develop collective knowledge. In this, they resemble in some regards the 'second generation' Pan-African Conferences on the continent. They were the essential platforms to collectively advancing in the analysis of colonial and imperialist situations; the exchange allowed for mutual learning and eventually furthered the spreading of Pan-African ideas on the continent. Such conferences turned out to be highly influential on the individual theoretical and political developments of participants (as e.g. was the case for Patrice Lumumba, see above p. 20), and fostered solidarity among the participants which (partly) turned into mutual support. Equal exchange helps each activist and movement to better strategize on a local and national level as well as to find a common voice on regional and continental matters; actions of solidarity throughout many countries draw (mediatic) attention and can put pressure on political elites to react. Support can also concern the organisational mounting of new movements, while always adhering to the profoundly Pan-African principle of contextualisation instead of copying. Collective Africa-centred knowledge production, mutual support and solidarity are the key-words and goals.

The organisation on civil society level is important in its own right, as it carries the element of advocacy which builds a bridge from civil societies to political institutions, on a national as well as international level. Speaking with the support of many other movements, it is hoped, that it will strengthen the arguments of the civil society if brought in front of the African Union or regional unions. The *Balai Citoyen* and many other African movements understand,

as much as progressive political leaders did before them, that most of the pressing issues of today cannot find a solution on the level of the national states – this concerns 'micro-states' as well big countries like Nigeria (cf. Wirtz 2017: 88).

Overarching the points mentioned above, the *Balai Citoyen* applies in general a Pan-African rhetoric, also, not only, in evoking Thomas Sankara. The movement further names Kwame Nkrumah, Cheikh Anta Diop, Gandhi, Martin Luther King and Malcolm X as figures of inspiration and reference (cf. Wirtz 2017: 67). Next to renown Pan-Africanists, range two representatives of non-violent action and civil disobedience and two leaders of the US Afro-American civil rights movement. The inspiration is herewith deeply Pan-African – in several of the plenty meanings this word entails.

(COUNTER-)HEGEMONY

CIVIL SOCIETY

> La Révolution démocratique et populaire a besoin d'un peuple de convaincus et non d'un peuple de vaincus, d'un peuple de convaincus et non d'un peuple de soumis qui subissent leur destin.
>
> Thomas Sankara[49]

One of the big shifts from the progressive vague of Pan-Africanism post-independence on the continent, is the shift from where the Pan-African claims and activism is brought forward – the protagonists are to be found within the civil society and no more among (national) political elites. Even when the political elites were the carrier of Pan-Africanist ideas, this was not without a certain consent of the population, the civil society was always involved – more or less consciously and actively – in the movement of Pan-Africanism. It suffices to point out that the Pan-African political elite itself developed out of the civil society. Often more fortunately situated in the colonial system, they clearly dissociated from the existing political and administrative cadres. Today's shift of agency from the institutionalised political sphere to the civil society is nonetheless remarkable, as it points to the wider question of its role within a state. A Gramscian analysis of civil society and culture as the arena of conflict over hegemony can offer a framework to approximate this question. For his analysis of the (modern) state, Italian socialist Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) developed the central concept of hegemony – always in the light and interest of the potential of a revolution (cf. Gaedt 2007: 217).

Gramsci understands the Marxist division between basis and superstructure as relative – economy, politics, ideology and culture are interconnected in a 'process of the real'. Hegemony becomes an essential instrument to dominate this whole process; consequently, it extends significantly beyond economic power. *Including* the whole population in this hegemony is in

[49] "The democratic and popular revolution needs a convinced people, and not a defeated people, a convinced people, and not a submitted people that suffers its fate" (own translation)

starch opposition to a forceful oppression. Instead, it understands an active approval of the subalterns to their submission under the established power-structure – consent and coercion go hand in hand. The search for a valid consensus implies that the 'power block' needs to make certain concessions in order to attract a common consent – such concessions, though, of course, cannot touch the core interests. Candeias (2007: 19f) calls the hegemonial process a 'passive revolution', i.e. a process of generalisation of interests in a constantly instable consensus. A hegemonial project thus must fulfil a political or ethical function for the whole of the society, and not just particular interest. The same applies to any counter-hegemonial project if it strives to become the new hegemony and not to remain a sectarian outpost. As such, it is the opposite of an avant-gardist (self-)conception. It does not suffice to have an 'answer' that nobody understands or agrees to, in a counter-hegemonial project, the inclusion must be much larger, "*[d]evant l'ère de guerre et de révolutions […], il faut que tout le monde donne une réponse: les philosophes, les poètes et les artistes, comme les simples mortels*[50]" (Trotsky 1964: 459).

Underlying such an understanding of state, society and hegemony is a procedural concept of societal development. Phases of stability are the exception to the essentially dynamic; structures are mere moments of structuring. Each structure, each hegemony is constantly (re-)produced through the consent and action of affected people – structure and action are an undividable duality. Novy (2007: 59) calls the link between structure and action 'conjuncture', "*Gegenwart, eingebettet in eine Struktur; sie ist der Moment der Offenheit der Geschichte, eingebettet in den sozialen Beton, der den Fluss der Zeit determiniert.*[51]" The openness for change is not the same at all times, what hugely influences the impact of individual and collective actions set (cf. ibid.: 58f). A historic change like in Burkina Faso, can thus be understood as a longer dwelling fragmentation of and struggle about the societal 'consensus', which ultimately mounted to a 'moment of openness' in which the demonstrations erupted and forced away the President and with him destabilised the prevailing hegemony significantly.

The success of hegemonial as well as anti-hegemonial projects is inscribed in this logic of structure, action and conjuncture. When Gramsci describes hegemony as consensus, it is not

[50] "in face of times of wars and revolutions, everybody needs to give an answer: the philosophers, the poets and the artists, like the mere mortals" (own translation). Trotsky and Gramsci differ in their (theoretical) approaches, however, they are not on completely different sides of revolutionary Marxism. Therefore, and seeing the resemblance in the approach, it seemed acceptable and not inadequate to introduce Trotsky's assessment here.

[51] "presence, imbedded in a structure; it is the moment of openness of history, imbedded in the social concrete which determines the flow of time" (own translation)

to disguise its essentially conflictual nature and that its defence and upholding is coercive and, if necessary, violent – hegemony is always 'armoured with coercion' (cf. Candeias 2007: 20f). Thus, the repression of the civil society in Burkina Faso is explained. From the imprisonment or assassination of critics like the journalist Norbert Zongo to the initial army-repression against the protestors, and the ephemerous coup d'état under RSP General Diéndéré, which was in comparison particularly violent: The only radio station which broadcasted the events throughout the insurrection and the recording studio of *Balai Citoyen*-co-founder Smockey were attacked, and fire was opened against the demonstrators in the streets, causing fourteen deaths (of which one RSP solider) and 251 injured (cf. Wirtz 2017: 63f). This attempted coup is also an example of how a hegemonic project is not confined to (national) borders. After the transitional President Michel Kafando and Prime Minister Isaac Zida (former number two of the RSP) were taken hostage, the regional organisation ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) took up direct negotiations with General Diéndéré. A memorandum of understanding was presented which, apart from the reinstatement of the civil government, went largely in favour of the putschists, granting them amnesty and giving in to their demand to allow former partisans of Campaoré to present for the coming elections[52] (cf. Jaffré 2015 a and b). Such an accord disappointed the initial sympathy of the Burkinabè, whose indignation against the regime of Campaoré had been fuelled by the opposition against unpunished injustices. In an immediate reaction, the civil society took the fight into their own hands and to the streets again (cf. Wirtz 2017: 64). The ECOWAS mediation was under the lead of Senegalese President Macky Sall, himself in power also thanks to the support of progressive civil society movements and their mobilisation against his predecessor Wade (president from 2000 to 2012). Latest when Macky Sall did not comply to the limitation of the presidential term to four years – that he had initiated himself –, it became clear that he does not stand for a real change of the

[52] The memorandum literally reads that "*[l]es personnes inéligibles pourront prendre part aux élections.* (the ineligible people may take part in the elections; own translation)". The exclusion from the elections met particularly all people that supported an 'anti-constitutional' and undemocratic alteration of the constitution and therewith responded to one of the core-demands of civil society and opposition. Former partisans of Blaise Campaoré and RSP had opposed this exclusion before with consent from ECOWAS; their claims, however, found little echo in the transitional government. The general amnesty for the putschists is particularly ambiguous as it (indirectly) legitimises and belittles the coup, which both the African Union and the United Nations condemned as an act of 'terrorism'. Furthermore, RSP or Diéndéré personally are most likely implicated in the politically motivated killings of Thomas Sankara, Norbert Zongo and others; Diéndéré himself was the last official responsible for internal security under Campaoré and therefore responsible for any state-sanctioned violence against protesters during the insurrection. (cf. Jaffré 2015 a and b)

system. The increasingly politically conscious and organised Senegalese civil society has become alert and attentive (cf. Samba Sylla 2017: 20f). Sall's interest in a regional strengthening of the civil society and its (direct) influence on the political sphere is since at least questionable.

The relation between Africa, and particularly Pan-African political leaders, with international organisations was (is) equally ambiguous. Becoming a member of the United Nations was an important step of sovereignty (as it remains today). The one country-one vote rule of the General Assembly stirred hopes of true equality between nations. The pleas of Ruben Um Nyobe show the strong believe in international law and the UN as neutrally enforcing instance. His interpretation of the actual unity of Cameroon (in the confines of the German colony, 1884-1914) based firmly on international law and analysed that, *de jure*, Cameroon was a free country after Germany lost in the First World War, as France and Britain merely administered a UN mandate. In the end, it was not so much an international decision by the United Nations that framed the path of 'its mandate', but rather the respective reactions of the French and British administrations (cf. Bouamama 2014: 112f). Lumumba took an equally positive stance towards the United Nations when he called upon UN peacekeeping troops when the unity of the Democratic Republic of Congo was menaced by separatist movements in the resource-rich provinces of Katanga and Kasaï (significantly aided by Belgium). Looking back, the UN-engagement seemed rather to serve as cementation of the secession, when Lumumba's troops were hindered to regain control of the secessionist territory by military imposing a ceasefire (cf. ibid.: 178). Frantz Fanon (2011: 875f) assessed the situation as follows:

> L'ONU n'a jamais été capable de régler valablement un seul des problèmes posés à la conscience de l'homme par le colonialisme, et chaque fois qu'elle est intervenue, c'était pour venir concrètement au secours de la puissance colonialiste du pays oppresseur. Voyez le Cameroun. […] Voyez le Vietnam. Voyez le Laos. […] Le tort de Lumumba a été alors dans un premier temps de croire en l'impartialité amicale de l'ONU. Il oubliait singulièrement que l'ONU, dans l'état actuel, n'est qu'une assemblée de réserve, mise sur pied par les grands, pour continuer entre deux conflits armés la 'lutte pacifique' pour la partage du monde.[53]

[53] "The UNO has never been capable to validly settle a single problem posed by colonialism to the human conscience, and every time it intervened, it was concretely to aid the colonialist powers of the oppressive state. Look at Cameroon. […] Look at Vietnam. Look at Laos. […] The fault of Lumumba was hence in a first instance to believe in the friendly impartiality of the UNO. He simply forgot that the UN, in its current state, is nothing but a reserve assembly, established by the big, to continue the 'peaceful fight' over the division of the world in-between two armed conflicts." (own translation)

Fanon goes on warning that if Africans were to ask for help, they shall remember to always ask 'friends'. Bringing back today's context, a few thoughts come up. The world and the UN with it have definitively changed, a re-assessment of Fanon's firm judgement is in place (as Fanon suggests himself by referring to the 'current state' of the UN). It is also a fact, that longer standing demands for a changed structure of the Security Council, which basically assembles the 'winners' of the Second World War, have barely scratched on the way the UN functions. For the *Balai Citoyen*, this might confirm the necessity to invest in a network of solidarity among the civil society, to organise the help of 'friends'. The episode of the ECOWAS clearly shows, that proper interests outweigh other consideration. Of course, in this instance, AU and UN condemned the putsch – but it would be very benevolent to overlook that before, both organisations have cooperated with Campaoré and continue to work with autocratic leaders. The *Balai Citoyen*, directly and through coalitions, had time and again addressed international institutions like the AU, the UN, also ECOWAS and the European Parliament. Opposing such petitions by principle would be short-sighted, on the contrary, advocating issues like democracy, freedom of speech etc. and adding a layer of reality to the abstract discourse of international organisations is certainly needed. In Fanon's diction it might still be worthwhile to distinguish between tactical alignments and genuine solidarity in a common struggle among 'friends'.

Coming back to the question of stabilising hegemony puts Burkina Faso in a regional and continental context. Burkina Faso was hoped to set a positive trend for Africa, where the majority of long-term ruling leaders is in power, as the coalition *Tournons La Page* denounces, and where the transition from long-term potentates to democratically elected presidents is never sure nor free of violence. When the often-repeated argument for necessary stability disguises support for undemocratic leadership, the context goes far beyond the continent (cf. Monénembo 2015). Particularly the influence of France needs to be put into perspective. What is today derogatorily dubbed *Françafrique*, points out the connection between France and its former colonies. Often based on personal friendships between heads of countries, this net works to manifest French influence through diplomatic, economic, military and less official channels, and repeatedly lead to the support of undemocratic leaders and diverse scandals of corruption (cf. ibid.). The current French President Emmanuel Macron eloquently portrayed himself herald of a new era in the relationship between France and Africa, which essentially has not yet found manifestation, neither in his actions, nor his first speech as President on the continent on 28th November 2017. For the speech he strategically picked the university of Ouagadougou as venue, addressing the youth of Burkina Faso as 'men of the same generation' who grew up in

the same globalised world with the same political and cultural references and heroes. Yet, Macron (2017) promoted French economic, military and educational projects while keeping a striking silence about burning issues like the franc CFA or France's involvement with Blaise Campaoré (his wife and children are in French exile while he resides in Côte d'Ivoire).

Organic Intellectuals

One could summarise, that the logic of self-preservation necessarily outweighs (dissident) demands of self-determination in any hegemonial project. To reach and keep up the consent which justifies the hegemony, the population needs to be intellectually and emotionally persuaded, 'societal conformity' becomes key. Two important elements to shape this conformity are material and knowledge production – both inevitably interlinked. Knowledge production operates on different levels, from an academic level and affecting discourses of the civil society to a very general forming of common understanding and the public opinion (cf. Candeias 2007: 23). Discourses on all levels are to each other means of legitimisation – and consequently interesting anchoring points for counter-hegemonial projects. Gramsci calls the carriers of unifying knowledge production for any hegemonial and counter-hegemonial project organic intellectuals; the term in itself signifies an analytical, non-normative category (cf. Merkens 2007: 169). Organic intellectuals are important for the intellectual formation and intended unity of a group which at its core is still and always heterogenous and pervaded by internal conflicts. In a bourgeois society for example, according to Gramsci, entrepreneurs can fulfil this role (cf. ibid.: 169). It is important to distinguish organic intellectuals as a function in society from the intellectual capacities that each individual carries as they 'participate in the world vision' (cf. ibid.:170). Such an inclusive definition of intellectuality is naturally open for what Ouédrago (2017: 54) calls oral intellectuals, and musicians aside journalists and jurists as organic intellectuals within the movement of the *Balai Citoyen*. Indeed, if the task of organic intellectuals is to translate a certain understanding of the world, reproducing or criticising the existing hegemony, then it is the type of understanding and the societal context which determine who fulfils this position, and not any invariable definition. What distinguishes organic intellectuals of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic projects is not a (formal) level of education. While the first work at strengthening existing structures and hierarchies, the latter aim at overcoming existing unequal power relations. For Gramsci, this opens a tension for organic intellectuals between the target of an egalitarian society – which always needs to be reflected in their practice

– and the leading position they take in the critical analysis and development of coherence of the 'world view' (cf. Merkens 2007: 170f). In his late work *Pedagogy of freedom*, Paulo Freire examines this tension and finds a way to ease it. In his long practice he understood that too often, authority (of those who teach) is confused with authoritarianism, and freedom (of those who learn) with *laissez-faire* (Freire 2013: 57). When these differences are considered, the tension between leading and emancipation can be addressed with the unconditional understanding, that the role of teaching, in a broad sense including organic intellectuals of a counter-hegemonic project, does not mean, "*Kenntnisse weiterzugeben, sondern Möglichkeiten für ein eigenständiges Erarbeiten oder die Weiterentwicklung der Kentnisse zu schaffen*[54]" (ibid.: 45). Basing knowledge production and its transmission on this principle, implies that the act always aims at developing the potential to understand and create a world-view beginning from one's own, already existing knowledge of personal socio-economic circumstances. Everybody has their own personal experiences, knowledge and world-views, in short, everybody knows something. It is essential for every counter-hegemonic project to build on this existing knowledge and not to ignore or belittle it – out of respect, foundation of any true equality, and because ultimately, the (material) circumstances and the thereout resulting understanding of the world shape the learning process (cf. ibid.: 124). The *Balai Citoyen* has adopted these principles and beyond the respect for the existing knowledge, sees it as one of their major sources to check on the efficiency of the work of the government and to where their attention needs to be drawn. Within the organisation, the *Conseil National* takes over the lead in intellectual and ideological formation and hence can be understood as concentrated space of the movement's organic intellectuals. At the same time, characteristic for counter-hegemonic projects, the equality of all members is an important principle that ultimately shapes the mode of communicational practice at all levels of the structure. The programmes of conscientisation and the culture of discussion introduced at club level, perfectly try to merge the mutual respect and understanding and the recognition that learning is a process that effects everybody involved, independent of the position (teacher or learner) and the prior level of formation or analytical abstraction. The exchange in the clubs allows in a first step to contextualise the personal socio-economic situation within the community. This opens the path to abstraction of personal experiences towards a critical analysis of structures of power. Gramsci calls it political pedagogy: The awareness of one's

[54] "to pass on knowledge, but to create the possibilities for an autonomous acquisition or advancement of knowledge" (own translation)

proper being in society and the position in society, that means one's strengths and responsibilities as well as one's proper 'becoming' embedded in the procedural societal dynamic – this is the basis upon which the practical realisation of the formation of agency of the subaltern is possible (cf. Merkens 2007: 162). The connection to the proper reality, assures the relevance of the learning process which renders the learned useful and applicable – in contrast to what Freire (2013: 26) calls a 'banking concept', meaning the 'deposition' and accumulation of detached facts and knowledge. This idea is for example imminent in Nyerere's educational concept, which envisages a model that renders students capable of critical reflection and taking over responsibilities in their communities, irrespective of any passed grade or 'collected' certificate. Behind this stands the 'implicit theoretical premise' in which any individual pattern of articulation, thinking and interpretation is anchored (cf. Lauggas 2007: 93f). Gramsci developed this idea to link 'scientific' with a 'popular' philosophy, what further moulds his concept of ideology as meta-perception of the world which manifests implicitly in any area of life: economy, law, art, and all individual and collective expression (cf. ibid.: 93). The implicit theoretical premise reaches a point approaching unquestioned consensus and thus becomes self-evident, that is, hegemonial. It is the keystone, organic intellectuals search to occupy. Consequently, it is a strategic point of entry for counter-hegemonial action. Revealing the underlying ideology and disentangling the compromises from the core interests within the existing hegemonial world-view is simultaneously necessary groundwork and a powerful tool. Not every activist and every person involved needs to (academically) study ideologies, read Marx, Gramsci, Fanon or Nyerere. Understanding one's proper certainties as societal and questioning their prevalence and justification is the essence of conscientisation and as such root of any further analysis of society, power structures, and hegemony.

As a decidedly non-avant-garde movement, it builds on the factor of their number and has an openness for opinions and views (as the confrontation allows to discover correlations and contradictions), the *Balai Citoyen* consciously does not try to convince or persuade the population to protest and revolt. Instead it aims at building the people's capacities to understand and critically analyse their proper reality together. At the same time, they aim to transmit the conviction and hope that this reality is malleable, that change is possible, even if difficult. This message merges the core of Freire's (2013: 73f) motivation and engagement in the sector of education with Gramsci's analysis of the civil society as an active part in the reproduction or change of hegemony.

One last point, that both Gramsci and Freire stress and the *Balai Citoyen* propagates, is the inevitable and necessary alignment between critical (and democratic) thinking and acting – not only in a specific framework, but as a whole way of life. For Freire (2013: 37), real conscientisation and critical thinking are not formally separable from an according conduct. What he calls 'right thinking' is never a reclusive but a communicative act – thinking then is always participative and implies exchange. Ideally, the *cibals* and *cibelles* are themselves role-models in their communities, living according to the principles and idea(l)s and carrying the spirit of the movement outside the clubs and into their every-day lives and neighbourhoods. That is, *de facto*, the unity of critical thinking and according conduct or activism.

ART-ISTS

> L'art africain sera révolutionnaire ou elle ne sera pas.
> from the film *Festival panafrican d'Alger, 1969*, directed by William Klein[55]

In every society, art has a special position. Art is, in all its forms, not a mere 'thing' or 'product'. Art is always creative. This understands a material level (the created sculpture, song, etc.) and also a non-material, emotional level. In this second realm the relations between art and identity, between art and resistance, between art and avant-gardist visions play a major role. It is here also, where the relation between art, political projects and instrumentalization is placed. The history of censorship is probably as old as art itself and under any totalitarian system, art is controlled to portray and magnify power. Art was from the beginning on a point of resistance against slavery, colonialism or any other sort of assault against a community, like a creative source of survival and strength. In modern times, art increasingly ceased to be a collective product and heritage of communities, and became attached to a specific creator, the artist. In a context of counter-hegemonial projects, artists are not neutral creators, but there is a connection between the (political) message of the oeuvre and the artist's life. The coherence indeed is so (seemingly self-)evident, that the term 'artist-activist' seems appropriate. There is, though, a difference between this natural connection and an instrumentalization of art. Art is not to be

[55] "African art will be revolutionary or it won't be" (own translation).

reduced to a means, art must always be an end in itself; artists must be free in their choice of form and content. Only in such circumstances, can art be counter-hegemonial and the natural connection between art and activism can manifest itself. Therefore, Trotsky (1964: 497) ultimately called for a "*regime* anarchiste *de liberté intellectuelle*[56]". Instead of natural, the connection could be called 'organic', to point at the Gramscian concept of organic intellectuals which overlaps with the idea of an 'artist-activist'.

With artists as figure-heads of the *Balai Citoyen* and strong artists' engagement in other current civil society organisations, the connection between arts and (progressive) political engagement shall be explored a little further. For the *Balai Citoyen*, art is constitutive. Both co-founders are musicians: hip hop artist Serge Bambara alias Smockey (etymologically deriving from *se moquer*/to mock) and reggae artist Karim Sama alias Sams'K Le Jah. With their music they communicate political world-views and visions which thanks to their popularity reach far in the Burkinabè society and even beyond the borders. In 2010, Smockey received an award as best African hip-hop artist – which he dedicated to all those honouring and fighting to keep the spirit and memory of African freedom fighters alive (cf. SmockeyOfficiel.com-Biographie). The engagement of and association with artists does provide another positive effect for the movement. Due to the regional and international mobility of artists for concerts or exhibitions and their collaboration with other artists, the spirit and purpose of the *Balai Citoyen* found international attention and like-minded supporters around the world (cf. Wirtz 2017: 79). Musicians have often been travelling supporters of political causes. In the Pan-African context, Miriam Makeba and Fela Kuti are among the best-known examples of touring advocates of unity and solidarity between all African people.

Not only musicians figure among the artists associated with the *Balai Citoyen* and similar young civil movements. Graffiti or street artists are among the most notoriously visible, their calls for justice and declarations of solidarity remain on the walls of Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso, they altered the urban landscapes in a lasting way. With Trotsky (1964: 457),

[56] "*anarchist* regime of intellectual liberty" (original emphasis; own translation)
Pour un Art révolutionnaire indépendant (For an independent revolutionary Art), was written by André Breton and Leon Trotsky, for 'tactical' reasons, Diego Rivera signed 1938 instead of Trotsky. In the plaidoyer, the work of artists and intellectuals is approximated, and so the quoted 'intellectual liberty' comprises creative artistic liberty.

admirer of Mexican artist Diego Rivera, famous for his large frescos in public spaces, we understand that publicly displayed art together with any alterations or vandalism it experienced make the *oeuvre* – an expression entirely artistic and embedded in the social: "*Ces coups et ces blessures donnent aux fresques une vie encore plus grande. Nous n'avons pas seulement devant nous un 'tableau', objet d'une contemplation esthétique passive, mais un morceau vivant de la lutte sociale. En même temps c'est un sommet de l'art.*[57]"

LANGUAGE

> To rob a man of his language in the very name of language: this is the first step in all legal murders.
>
> Roland Barthes

Music and art in general go far beyond the word. In many musical genres, however, the lyrics are an important and integral part of the message delivered. Therefore, a discussion of the medium language precedes here a look at the connection between music and resistance.

"*Language, any language, has a dual character: it is both a means of communication and a carrier of culture*" (Thiong'o 1986: 13). It both enables and limits through its vocabulary and expressible sentiments, ideas and emotions. As product of society which constantly develops, language encapsulates the fundamental values of the society it belongs to, it is part and carrier of culture.

The choice and use of language was given significant importance throughout the history of Pan-Africanism. It became a major matter of concern when Pan-Africanism met with anti-colonialism and actively took over questions of culture and identity. There is the promotion of a single *lingua franca* for Africa as promoted by Miriam Makeba – herself polyglot and thus perfectly aware of the power of language and communication without barriers. In Tanzania,

[57] "These assaults and wounds give an even grander life to the frescos. We have before us not only a 'painting', object of a passive aesthetic contemplation, but a living piece of the social fight. At the same time, it's a summit of art" (own translation)

Nyerere promoted with Swahili an established regional *lingua franca* to the sole national language; in Kenya, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, Swahili is a national language next to others, and the prevalence of the language expands even further in the region. Kenyan author Ngugi wa Thiong'o (1986: 15) presented in his book *Decolonising the mind* the sharp analysis that "*[l]anguage as culture is thus mediating between me and my own self; between my own self and other selves; between me and nature*". Consequently, when there is a dissonance between the vernacular and a colonial language, taking over the latter marks a 'colonial alienation'. It leads to self-degradation and an inferiorising perception of more traditional African communities, values, ways of life through the colonial lens. Cheikh Anta Diop (1974: 21f) envisages in his work on a federal African state the establishment of national African languages in each country and one single African language as continental *lingua franca*. With his presumption, that all African languages are part of one language family (like Indo-European languages), the alienation stemming from differences in the vernacular language and the *lingua fanca* is lesser when the latter is African rather than European (cf. ibid.: 17, 25). The concept of alienation due to the use of a 'foreign' language explains the critique Senghor and Césaire faced for their use of French, when they were nonetheless acclaimed doyens in the thematization of cultural alienation in the colonial context. Especially Senghor, who treated the French language as a perfect diamond, was repeatedly attacked, so for example by Thiong'o (1986: 19), who mocked his "*subservience to French*" awarded by "*being anointed to an honoured place in the French Academy*". Césaire never adopted any creolised languages in his oeuvre, though not out of disregard, but because he considered it limiting and exclusive, which ultimately is in contrast with his vision of a new humanism that builds on international understanding and exchange. Thiong'o indirectly acknowledged this problem, when he announced in a statement attached to *Decolonising the mind* (1986) that he would henceforth change his writing from English to his native language Gikuyu and directly called upon translators to allow for a future diffusion of his work and continued dialogue.

In his speech at the second Congress of Black (originally 'negro') Writers and Artists in Rome in March 1959, Malagasy writer and politician Jacques Rabemananjara took a very different position. Under the provocative title *The foundation of our unity arising from the colonial epoch*, he stated how the colonial languages have enabled a previously unknow exchange on continental and international level. He underlined this statement by mirroring how all contributions at the congress were held in colonial languages (cf. Rabemananjara 1967: 130). It is not ignorance of cultural alienation and dangers of mimicry, let alone an exculpation of colonial

practices, but a search to overcome the dichotomic approach between vernacular and colonial language. The use of a colonial language, Rabemananjara argues, is never sole assimilation but always also cultural appropriation. The language and culture themselves are changed, when used and applied by the colonised to express themselves in their proper context. Even if the words remain unchanged, they no longer express the same. Ultimately all the oppressed people speak the same language, whether they use English, French, Portuguese or any other language, in the sense that they understand each other due to their comparable realties and circumstances (cf. ibid.: 138f). A similar approach can be found with Angolan liberation fighter and statesman Agostinho Neto. For him, liberation and revolution need to concern politics as well as language, meaning that which words and the way they are used is important, in every-day language, official speeches and the law (cf. Imfeld 1981: 51). This does not necessarily mean a retour to local languages – even though this is not excluded either. In Angola and the Iberian colonies in general, mixed (Mestizo) languages had been established longer due to the relatively earlier European presence and the population had accepted them as a necessary tool for their union (cf. ibid.: 45). Like in the Portuguese colonies, in Madagascar, home of Rabemananjara, the linguistic question poses itself differently than in many other African countries; the island was (near) monolingual before colonisation, Malagasy transcribed in Arab script already in the 19th century (cf. Calvet 1978: 115). In North-African countries the question of languages falls again on a different ground. Before the European colonisation with their languages, the Arabic language had been largely disseminated, thus linguistic alienation was not a new phenomenon.

The more radical approach of a complete refusal of European languages is inscribed in a longer history of power struggles manifest in linguistics. To quote a common example: in ancient Greece, everybody who did not speak Greek, was called Barbarian; how the word is used today, bears the exclusiveness of linguistic communities and the negative connotation attached to persons who are outside of them. Outside the colonial context, the standardisation or definition of a national language (i.e. extracting constant elements like fixing grammar and vocabulary), in contrast to dialects or jargons is a pertinent example of hierarchisation of languages. Defining a norm-language pretends a unity of language and marginalises the speakers of other languages, subsequently dubbed dialects (in itself a not precisely defined term but always with a pejorative connotation). Standardising a language is thus deeply rooted power-politics. Following Deleuze and Guattari (1980: 128f), only when a language is fixed and regarded as static, a detachment of language and speech (i.e. content of what is said) and therewith

the idea of language as neutral medium becomes possible[58]. For French linguist Louis-Jean Calvet (1978: 68), the underlying bias is the decimation of existing languages, i.e. the (regional) total domination of one language resulting in its unchallenged because sole existence, in short *glottophagy*. As an expression of power *relations*, whether or not the ultimate point of monolingualism is reached, depends on different factors, not least on the population's resistance. Revealing the inert power-relations of any linguistic discourse on language and dialect, Calvet (1978: 45) concludes, "*daß der Dialekt niemals etwas anderes ist als eine geschlagene Sprache und daß die Sprache ein Dialekt ist, der politisch erfolgreich war, besser, dessen Sprecher eine gewisse Macht errungen haben mittels gewisser sozialer und politischer Formen in einem gewissen ökonomischen Rahmen.*[59]" and consequently introduces the terms 'dominant' and 'dominated language' instead. A similar logic to the dynamic with dialects, often more and overtly violent, applies to the colonial context, from the ignorance of the early 'discoverers' for locally existing languages, to imposed school-systems. In the colonial context, dominant languages are always exclusive, in the sense that they exclude the dominated languages and their speakers from fields of power. Colonial languages build a supra-structure to the existing linguistic landscape, i.e. colonial subjects do not forcingly renounce their mother tongue but they have to become multi-lingual in order to access colonial spheres of power, proximity to colonial power and command of their language align (with tendency towards a new monolingualism), thus weakening (the status of) native languages (cf. ibid.: 54). The political and socio-economic divide of 'proximity to colonial power' is also reflected geographically in an urban-rural divide. These developments are still relevant today, higher and notably tertiary education is predominantly catered in colonial languages throughout former colonies and the urban-rural divide still features a linguistic dimension. The link between resistance and language is embedded precisely in this (experienced) submission of vernacular languages.

[58] In the highly centralised French context, the authority of the *Académie Française* (French Academy) over the French language is a constant controversial and thus shows how artificial – and ultimately instrumental(ised) – the claim of language as a-politic and neutral are. Today's most publicly discussed topic is gender-inclusive language. With a time-proven grammatical solution at hand, the French Academy went so far as to judge it as 'mortal danger' for the French language. This view is challenged increasingly, as a forum of 70 linguists shows in an open statement against the 'incompetence and anachronism' of the French Academy under the ringing title *Que l'Académie tienne sa langue, pas la nôtre* (n.n. 2017) (May the Académie hold its tongue, not ours) – uncompromisingly bringing forward the political and collective aspect of language.

[59] "that dialect is never anything else but a beaten language and that language is a dialect, which was politically successful, better, whose speakers had reached a certain degree of power through certain social and political forms in a certain economic framework." (own translation)

Creolised languages or pidgin are a novel and specific development of slave trade and the colonial situation, which cannot be compared to power relations between dialects and languages within one geographical ensemble, like for example Occitan, Breton and French in France, or Wolof and French in Senegal. Following Calvet's (1978: 93f) definitions, Pidgin languages develop out of the contact between languages (e.g. through trade relations etc.) where one party refuses to take over the other and thus merges them into a new language as a functional second language. Creole languages develop in a context where one group is deprived of their language, in the case of slavery through the mixing of people of different languages without common language. From the minimum common, forced upon to follow orders, a new language develops out of the necessity and desire to communicate among each other. Pidgin and creole are hence two languages that were developed by dominated groups and adopted as their mother tongues. Such languages were long mostly spoken and regarded as a lesser derivative to dominant languages. Sam Selvon's *The lonely Londoners* (1956) stands out as the first example for the use of Caribbean creolised English in diaspora-literature. Describing the arrival and difficult integration of several characters from the Caribbean in London, Sam Selvon, himself born in Trinidad, used a creolised English after he tried in vain to convey the characters feelings and so far unarticulated desires in a standard English (cf. Nasta 2006: vi). In one episode, Galahad confronts his experienced racism by addressing a personified colour black, showcasing the alienation Caribbean immigrants in London suffered.

> Galahad would take his hand from under the blanket, as he lay there studying how the night before he was in the lavatory and two white fellars come in and say how these black bastards have the lavatory dirty, and they didn't know that he was there, and when he come out they say hello mate have a cigarette. And Galahad watch the colour of his hand, and talk to it, saying, 'Colour, is you that causing all this, you know. Why the hell you can't be blue, or red or green, if you can't be white? You know is you that cause a lot of misery in the world. Is not me, you know, is you! I ain't do anything to infuriate the people and them, is you! Look at you, you so black and innocent, and this time so you causing misery all over the world!'
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> So Galahad talking to the colour Black, as if is a person, telling it that is not *he* who causing botheration in the place, but Black, who is a worthless thing for making trouble all about. 'Black, you see what you cause to happen yesterday? I went to look at that room that Ram tell me about in the Gate, and as soon as the landlady see you she say the room let already. She ain't even given me a chance to say good morning. Why the hell you can't change colour?' (Selvon 2006: 77; original emphasis)

In today's context, the use of languages – native, creolised or former colonial – must be re-considered. Even if colonial languages never entirely spread throughout the colonised countries and population (selective glottophagy), a complete (re-)turn to African languages does no longer present a likely cultural or political project. Rather, the approach and insight of Rabemananjara – the appropriation of language – has gained importance. The novel *Mersault, contre-enquête*, written in French by Algerian author Kamel Daoud (2014: 12) and first published in 2013, showcases the importance and actuality of the question today. The narrator, brother of 'the Arab' killed in Albert Camus' *The Stranger*, reflects upon the use and appropriation of the former colonial language:

> Le meurtrier, est devenu célèbre et son histoire est trop bien écrite pour que j'aie dans l'idée de l'imiter. C'était sa langue à lui. C'est pourquoi je vais faire ce qu'on a fait dans ce pays après son indépendance : prendre une à une les pierres des anciennes maisons des colons et en faire une maison à moi, une langue à moi. Les mots du meurtrier et ses expressions sont mon bien vacant. Le pays est d'ailleurs jonché de mots qui n'appartiennent plus à personne et qu'on aperçoit sur les devantures des vieux magasins, dans les livres jaunis, sur des visages, ou transformés par l'étrange créole que fabrique la décolonisation.[60]

Such a confident use of language, which does not try to imitate, but rather creates its own edifice and significance, is characteristic for today's generation of artists. They can draw from a line of predecessors as the cited Sam Selvon or Fela Kuti, who powerfully expressed himself through music – especially when he found his way to Afrobeat – and pidgin English. This aspect can be capture with Deleuze and Guattari's (1975: 29f) concept of 'minor literature' (*littérature mineure*), which is rather than written in a dominated language, literature of a minority expressed in a dominant language. This use of language becomes as such political (and necessarily subversive), irrespective of the content. The whole minor literature is thus 'politically contaminated'. In minor literature, each individual affair is connected to the society and the oeuvre itself is an imprint of the collective (it emerges from or points out at to a 'becoming'), opposite to a major, i.e. established, literature of a Shakespeare[61] or Goethe, which is attributed

[60] "The murderer became famous and his story is too well written for me to try to imitate it. It was his language. That's why I will do what one has done in this country after its independence: take the stones of old houses of the colonist one by one and make a house of my owe, a language of my own. The words of the murderer and his expressions are my vacant property. Besides, the country is covered with words which do not belong to anybody anymore and which one sees on the facades of old magazines, in yellowed books, on faces, or transformed by the strange creole that the decolonisation produces." (own translation)

[61] Aimé Césaire (1969) takes on the task of unveiling Shakespeare's *The Tempest* in an adaptation "*pour un théâtre nègre* (for a negro theatre)", transforming it into an oeuvre of 'minor literature'. Where Shakespeare tells the story

to an individual author and where the social serves as background to the individual. The author (artist) thus is deeply embedded in the community and at the same time becomes their voice – on the interior and exterior as well, seemingly naturally (not categorically) positioned to be(come) an organic intellectual of a counter-hegemonic project[62].

MUSIC

> I do not sing politics. I merely sing the truth.
> Miriam Makeba

In Burkina Faso, Smockey and Sams'K Le Jah, co-founders of the *Balai Citoyen*, could both be placed in the afore described field of minor literature. Both were already popular artists and respected for their political engagement, on and off stage, when they decided to organise a civil-society movement. Indeed, they use their concerts as platforms, through the lyrics and in-between sets, assuming the role of organic intellectuals to translate and convey existing critical

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of the unjust exile of Prospero and his daughter on an inhabited island, Césaire shifts the focus on the social dynamics on the island. Caliban, ungrateful and imprisoned son of the subdued evil sorceress becomes a "black slave"; the good spirit Ariel, liberated by Prospero and now voluntarily serving and thriving to resemble him, an "slave, ethnically mulatto".

[62] Minor literature, as developed in Deleuze and Guattari's work on Kafka, is not directly linked to a (large) collective level, the concept of 'becoming' can indeed be highly individualistic and definitively carries avant-gardist features in the understanding of Deleuze and Guattari. Through the capacity of literature to transmit a potential 'becoming' and contribute to its process, it can in my view be linked to a collective process and the role of organic intellectuals. The tension between avant-garde and a collective, popular development, may be eased here again with a reference to Paulo Freire's concept of the process of learning as relational, not hierarchical.

Even though not inherent to Deleuze and Guattari, it seems possible and coherent, to expand the concept of minor literature beyond a narrow definition of literature to look at other artistic means of expression, written and non-verbal. With such a broad application of the concept, *Afrobeat*, the musical style forged by Fela Kuti, could be understood as 'minor'. In this polyrhythmic amalgam, Afro-American influences (jazz, soul, R'n'B, funk) meet traditional African instruments and chants and the Ghanaian *highlife*. In Fela Kuti's *Afrobeat*, the musical style arguably carried more political brisance and potential for Pan-African identification, than the critical and political lyrics did. Additionally, *Afrobeat* was not situated completely outside popular acceptance but found international acclaim. As such not an invisible or negligible sub-culture, Fela Kuti communicated through his music a (potential) alternative, in Deleuzian diction a 'becoming'. For Fela Kuti himself, association of music and politics (at minimum in the sense of cultural identity) was imperative and inevitable. (cf. Perez 2009)

analysis (cf. Merkens 2007: 171; Wirtz 2017: 78). As artists of reggae and hip hop, they represent two musical genres with a strong subversive character and history of resistance. The radical origins of an artistic form of expression do not automatically translate into an eternally subversive role of the genre, as mainstreamed and commercialised or (politically) instrumentalised 'hegemony-conform' trends of reggae, hip hop, graffiti/street-art and others show. Such trends are a manifest of the strength of a hegemonial project to permeate all social spheres; infiltrating resisting and contesting fields is a strategy (applied consciously or not) to reinforce and solidify a prevalent hegemony. In his maiden novel *Tram 83*, Fiston Mwanza Mujila (2014: 83f) embodies a confident and authentic use of language, and additionally offers a sharp analysis of the development of jazz from an expression of black conscience to a music associated with social success:

> Dans les labyrinthes de la Ville-Pays, on n'écoute pas le jazz pour renifler l'odeur des cannes à sucre ou retrouver la conscience nègre ou savourer la beauté des notes : on écoute le jazz parce qu'il faut écouter du jazz quand on dort sur des billets de banque, qu'on livre quotidiennement sa marchandise, qu'on s'occupe d'une usine d'extraction, qu'on est cousin du Général dissident, qu'on entretient une petite maîtresse qui vous cloue au lit dans des vapes impossibles. Le jazz est un signe de noblesse, c'est la musique des riches et des nouveaux riches, de ceux qui construisent ce beau monde cassé. […] Le jazz n'est plus l'histoire des nègres. Il n'y a que les touristes et ceux qui apprivoisent la monnaie pour connaître le soubassement de cette musique. C'est la seule identification à une certaine bourgeoisie, la bourgeoisie de la dernière heure. Par conséquent, lorsque les musiciens jazzent, tout le Tram 83 quitte sa maladie du sommeil. Au moindre saxophone, le grand déguisement. Les creuseurs et les étudiants épousent les manières des touristes. […] Les poulettes, les serveuses et les aides-serveuses ne se laissent pas subjuguer. Sourire de la reine d'Angleterre, elles miment des impératrices imaginaires. Le jazz est le seul levier dont se sert toute la racaille du Tram 83 pour changer de classe sociale comme on changerait de métro.[63]

[63] "In the labyrinths of the City-Country, one does not listen to jazz to smell the odour of sugarcane or to retrieve black conscience or savour the beauty of the notes: one listens to jazz because one has to listen to jazz if one sleeps on banknotes, if one delivers his/her goods daily, if one attends to an extraction plant, if one is cousin of the dissident General, if one has a mistress who nails you to the bed in a numb. Jazz is a sign of nobility, it's the music of the rich and newly rich, of those who build this beautiful broken world. […] Jazz is no longer the history of blacks. Only the tourists and those who tame money know the substructure of this music. It's the only identification of a certain bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie of the last hour. Consequently, when the musicians jazz, the whole Tram 83 leaves its sleeping sickness. At the smallest saxophone, the big disguise. The miners and students marry the manners of tourists. […] The chicks, waitresses and waitress-helps don't let anybody get the better of them. Smile of the Queen of England, they mimic imaginary empresses. Jazz is the only lever all the scum of the Tram 83 uses to change social class as one changes the metro." (own translation)

Despite the changed context of jazz, its origin as a counter-culture continues to inspire. In this spirit, a French hip hop formation took the name *Jazz Liberatorz*. In *Clin d'Œil* (2008) they pay homage to jazz as inspiration and founding counter-culture.

> The topic for today is uh / The influence of jazz / Now, jazz has come a long way / Back in the days / There was bebop / And now its hip hop / Jazz was revolutionary / and hip hop is also revolutionary / […] / Like our forefathers / […] / They paved the way / They set the pace / They set the tone / Like the Last Poets / All of these are great people, great minds / To do things to carry the torch of our ancestors / to let us know what's really, really going on around the world / Hip hop has definitely carried that torch in a positive way / […] Jazz was also like a secret conversation / I mean, it was a universal language / So no matter what culture you came from / You would still hear the music /And feel the story even if you didn't know the words

Be-pop was the refusal of Afro-American musicians to play only big band swing for the dancing entertainment of an affluent 'white' public, but instead, the orchestra musicians left behind the principle of entertainment to create a more complex, fast and ultimately less accessible music in underground clubs. There is a parallel to hip hop as a means to speak up about the social, political and economic circumstances for an otherwise marginalised and silenced youth. Hip hop was, like Be-pop, a means to break with the attributed subordinate, somewhat passive role through art, through becoming an artist and thus actively creating and participating in society. Born in the urban ghettos of New York and the USA in the late 1960's and 1970's, hip hop is the child of a social reality impregnated with poverty, unemployment, racism, police violence and drugs (cf. Johannsen 2017: 87). The same reality which forged the Black Panther movement. The topics tackled had a strong anchoring in the life of the practitioners and their community. The strong link between artists and their respective community remains an important characteristic of hip hop, the discourse on socio-economic and political issues is cultivated in the community as well as carried outside to a wider public. Therewith hip hop perfectly lends itself to the function of counter-hegemonic organic intellectuals, who are at the same time integral part of the society as well as a connecting bridge, a transmitter of critical thinking.

Reggae developed in Jamaica at the same time as hip hop in the USA. The island was deeply divided between an economic upper-class of land-owners and an impoverished rural population and urban dwellers. Roots reggae – in which Sams'K Le Jah positions himself – is one of the foundational subgenres next to dub, characterised by its "*public articulation of and resonance with social concepts of justice, equality, harmony, and reason*" (Tracy 2005: 22). It was expression of a collective feeling of injustice and revolt and simultaneously served as a way to make information and critical thoughts on socio-economic and political issues accessible

and to discuss it with its listeners, who in grand majority where of poorer background with a high level of illiteracy. The Rastafarian religion with its radical claims for social justice, peace and unity among all of 'Jah's children' had a significant influence in the popular districts of Kingston and rural areas and is inseparably interwoven with reggae since its beginning. While sharing much common ground with liberation theology[64], the roots of the Rastafari movement date back much longer (cf. ibid.: 23f). Its origins in Jamaica's maroon society explain the strong connection of the syncretistic religion to Africa. Fundamental expression of resistance, the Rastafarian community was always political, and so they provided important support to Pan-African scholar Walter Rodney in his initiatives of popular education in Jamaica (cf. Boukari-Yabara 2014: 230). In reggae, the spiritual hope for world peace met a popularity, that carried it out of Kingston into a world that faced comparable global injustice; reggae developed into a universal protest against oppression (cf. Tracy 2005: 22). The use of the Jamaican pidgin was simply inevitable when the idea was to be understood by the people. And so today, via reggae, the Jamaican pidgin is among the most spoken pidgin language world-wide. Next to the Rastafari culture, the Jamaican Marcus Garvey – founding father of black conscience movement in the US-American context and creator of the *Universal Negro Improvement Association* in Harlem, New York – found (and still finds) significant reception in reggae music.

Both, Smockey and Sams'K Le Jah, use their music to transmit their political visions. Their respective styles contribute as much as their lyrics. Whether ironic like in Smockey's *Votez pour moi* (Vote for me), where he humorously denounces false campaign promise, militant like *Si tu parles* (If you talk), in which Sams'K Le Jah calls to join the fight[65], or far-sighted

[64] Liberation theology was a catholic movement in Latin-America. It contextualises the classical Christian teaching of all-embracing *caritas* in in the concrete, Latin-American reality of class struggle and oppression – thereby renouncing any obscuring or supporting position or instrumentalization of the church, fending for liberation and salvation in the presence instead of deferring it to an after-life (cf. Schlegelberger/Sayer/Weber 1980: 131, 148f). The backdrop was a politically progressive wave fighting socio-economic injustices and the intellectual emancipation with the development of the dependency theory in Latin America. As role model in church history, Bartolomé de Las Casas (148-1566) can be cited, who pleaded before the Spanish King Charles I against the system of *encomienda* (forced labour of the indigenous population, notably in agriculture and mining) (cf. Wallerstein 2006: 3f).

[65] "*Même si la vie vaut la peine d'être vécue, il y des causes pour lesquelles mieux vaut mourir, allez, viens goûter au fruit de la liberté, tu comprendras pourquoi toujours lutter. / Si tu parles, tu meurs. Tu ne parles pas, tu meurs. Qu'est-ce qu'on fait ? On parle. / Si tu luttes, tu meurs. Tu ne luttes pas, tu meurs. Qu'est-ce qu'on fait ? On lutte. Allez camarades ce soir c'est décidé demain je rejoins les indignés. C'est quoi cette histoire de se résigner ? Ne sais-tu pas que mille fourmis réunies font fuir l'éléphant*"

in its assessment and critique of the historic roots of today's global situation in Smockey's *Code Noir*[66] – the words are precise, the analyses sharp and the messages unmistakable, unapologetic and never fatalist. Next to popularity and accessibility, packaging such highly political messages in songs instead of public speeches, might in some regard be a protection. Considering the difference between minor and major literature as defined by Deleuze and Guattari (see above p. 70), the prevalent vision is that art is a product of an individual author and not an expression of a community. If any art thus gets related to the individual and emotional, it may seem as a lesser 'threat' to the hegemonial project and be rather spared from being restricted or silenced than open political speeches or journalism. Jamaican reggae DJ I-Roy (quoted in Hebdige 1987: 88) experienced it this way:

> The music is a way of getting the thing across because… you couldn't come out in public and say bluntly maybe somebody would hit you on the head or a copper would take you in for public mischief. [But] you can say it on record and get away with it. Y'know, it's away of protesting against certain things, against certain physical and mental things that we Jamaican people have suffered.

Still, if the menace for the regime in power is perceived as too big, repression does hit artists just as much. To mention only artists which appear elsewhere in this paper: Fela Kuti

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("Even if life is worth living, there are causes for which one should rather die, come on, try the fruit of liberty, you will understand why always fight. / If you talk, you die. You don't talk, you die. What do we do? We talk. / If you fight, you die. You don't fight, you die. What do we do? We fight. / Come comrades, tonight it's decided, tomorrow we join the outraged. What's this story of giving up? Don't you know that thousand ants together frighten the elephant.")
(extract of *Si tu parles* by Sams'K Le Jah; own transcription and translation)

[66] "*A quoi cela a servi que Toussaint fasse l'ouverture / Des siècles ont passé depuis 1848 mais les séquelles sont là, inutile est la fuite […] / Quel bel exemple d'intégration, quelle belle mascarade, / oh oui quelle belle entourloupe / Maintenant c'est nous qui portons le flambeau haut / Et tous seuls comme des grands, on monte au créneau / On fouette, on torture, on dissèque, décapite avec la bénédiction de la néo-colonie / […] / Rappelle-toi qu'à l'époque un monde sans esclavage c'était de la science-fiction / Rappelle-toi / que même la révolution française n'y croyait pas, / même ses concepteurs n'étaient pas de ce combat […] / Rappelle-toi parce que de nos jours peu de choses ont changé / Une nouvelle forme d'esclavage en a remplacé une autre / Car aujourd'hui encore qui cultive du coton, de la canne à sucre ou du cacao ?*"
("To what good did Toussaint start the opening [in French a word-play with the name of Toussaint Louverture, leader of the Haitian Revolution; note] / Centuries passed by since 1848, but the after-effects are here, the flight is useless […] / What a beautiful example of integration, what a beautiful masquerade, / oh yes, what a good dirty trick / Now it's us who hold high the torch / and all alone, like big ones (adults), we step up / we whip, we torture, we dissect, behead with the benediction of the neo-colony / […] / Remember that at that time, a world without slavery was science fiction / Remember / that even the French Revolution did not believe in it, / not even their authors fought this fight […] / Remember, because today little has changed / A new form of slavery replaced another / Because today still, who cultivates the cotton, the sugarcane or the cocoa?")
(extract from *Code Noir* by Smockey; own translation)

repeatedly faced police raids in his commune *Kalakuta Republic*, in one of such raids, his mother, herself acclaimed human rights activist, was forced out of the window, causing her death (cf. UNESCO 2015: 60f). Miriam Makeba was exiled from her native South Africa when she took a stance against the system of Apartheid at the United Nations and could return to the African continent only thanks to the support of Tanzania and Julius Nyerere, who provided her with a passport (cf. Boukari-Yabara 2014: 247). The recent Burkinabè experience holds some examples of its own: Sams'K Le Jah produced for over ten years radio programmes with Ouaga FM during which he was never shy to openly express his political views. The first reaction was then indeed to ask him to concentrate on music instead of politics – a perfect example of the (mis-)understanding of art as apolitical and individualistic. Even after different threats and his car being burned down, Sams'K Le Jah did not change the tone of his radio programmes. After a suspension of his programmes, the format got changed: music only, no comments. When he played a mix-tape including "*ce président là, il faut qu'il part et il partira*[67]" in a refrain, he was finally banned from the premises of the radio station (cf. thomassankara.net n.d.). In the short-lived military coup under General Diéndéré, the recording studio of Smockey was attacked (cf. Wirtz 2017: 63). – Hegemony is, after all, always armoured with coercion.

[67] "this president, he has to go and he will go" (own translation)

IN PLACE OF A CONCLUSION

> Il est nécessaire, il est urgent que nos cadres et nos travailleurs de la plume apprennent qu'il n'y a pas d'écriture innocente. En ces temps de tempêtes, nous ne pouvons laisser à nos seuls ennemis d'hier et d'aujourd'hui le monopole de la pensée, de l'imagination et de la créativité.
>
> Thomas Sankara[68]

If Pan-Africanism is understood with this paper as a counter-hegemonic project over the time, its adaptivity to different contexts makes it hard to grasp but keeps it alive. The global context clearly has changed. The African states might still be considered young, but the (diplomatic) sovereignty is no longer new, the colonialists have long gone, some say replaced by businessmen and consultants. The neo-colonial threat, that had already been addressed by Pan-Africanists in the 1960's, remains, if in a different form. Companies are increasingly transnational and new players emerged besides the old colonial powers. The historic momentum of change that rattled the world with uncertainty and hope, from the wave of decolonisation to the protests of 1968 – is gone. New openings in history need to be created, the Arab Spring and the insurrection of Burkina Faso ignited new developments, but for now it seems that the fire did not spread much further. Instead, certain injustices have established and reached acceptance in our international community. Undemocratic leaders are respected members of international organisations and manipulated elections are little questioned. Thus show for example the 2017 presidential elections in Kenya, which were annulled by the Kenya Supreme Court for 'illegalities and irregularities' committed by the electoral commission. Yet the same elections had before already been sanctioned as fair and just by international election observers (cf. Burke 2017). The line between those who profit of the established system and those who are disadvantaged is as strong on the continental level as on the global. Maybe, this is one of the reasons that racism seems to be less of a topic. The quest for identity is equally less prominent, the preceding combative phase of Pan-Africanism left today's youth with plenty of dignifying references. Africa can most certainly not be called a continent without history anymore; significant

[68] "It is necessary, it is urgent, that our cadres and our pen-workers learn that there is no innocent writing. In these times of storm, we cannot leave the monopole of thought, imagination and creativity to our sole enemies of yesterday and today" (own translation)

work has been done in this regard. One outstanding project being 35 years of cooperation between over 230 historians and specialists under the patronage of UNESCO to compile in eight volumes the *General History of Africa*, aimed at freeing the historic recital from racial prejudices and promoting an African perspective.

In the logic of any counter-hegemonic perspective, there needs to be a hegemony that is opposed. The immediate opposition, especially regarding the *Balai Citoyen*, is no more addressed against exogenous factors, but against the own governments, potentates and upholders of existing structures. This makes different kinds of organisation and mobilisation necessary. Maybe political education, or the broader conscientisation, as it is called in the case study, are today even more important. The struggle is no longer placed along a relatively easy emotionalised dichotomy between (former) colonialists and colonised. There is discontentment, and rising, but analysis of who to 'blame', is not uniform. Corrupt politicians, the international capital, populations that time and again vote for the same candidates, an international community in support of bad decision in the sector or developmental aid, traditional authorities that work ethnic divides etc. At any time, society can be assessed from different angles, leading to different answers and actions. Today the living standards of (parts of) the population have improved significantly, a middle class developed, and individualism seems to have become an intrinsic value. Thus, it has not become easier to find a flag under which people can unite, promoting a perspective that strives for a collective betterment, which may not mean a relative (materialistic) improvement for each individual.

All this puts the by now long-serving concept of Pan-Africanism in a new context – and with this it becomes of interest, to re-examine it. To look at today's Pan-Africanism as a continuation of resistance against a sort of "*atemporal modern colonialism*" (Pfeffer 2014: 9) seems insufficient. Gramsci offers here a useful theoretical perspective. His work with terms is categorically de-limiting and instead questions them in their conjuncture in (academic and every-day) use and in their relation to politics (cf. Merkens/Rego Diaz 2007: 8). If one constant of Pan-Africanism, as understood in this thesis, is its work of contextualisation and conscious historicity, Gramsci becomes a consistent choice. This very contextual understanding is also reflected in the structure of the paper, when theoretical considerations are introduced in relation with the content they examine and interpret. Gramsci's oeuvre has always been a critique of domination and a means to further politics of liberation. Hence, the theory gains its significance in the concrete and material circumstances of power-relations and struggles. This imperative

anchoring in the specific is why Paolo Freire blends in so well. The cited *Pädagogik der Autonomie* (Pedagogy of Autonomy) is one of his later books in which the reflections base on theoretical considerations as much as on the practical experiences he gained over the years in the (popular) educational work in Brazil. The theory applied in this thesis allows to understand mechanisms of creation and maintenance of hegemony and thus identifies different entry points for counter-hegemonial projects. It is mentioned above, that not every activist needs to study Gramsci or theoretically pre-conceptualise each action. In the on-the ground reality of mobilisation and organisation, some decision might well be taken in a reactive way (or on an individual level intuitively). Not always (consciously) following a stringent theoretical baseline does not automatically have any negative impact. A theoretical analysis, particular in a Gramscian spirit, is nonetheless not of a purely academic interest, but it can support counter-hegemonial movements in their understanding of the societal situation they are acting in and in strategizing accordingly.

Looking concretely at the case study of this thesis, conscientisation shifts from one of three key elements of the movement to being the single main category, when interpreted with Gramsci. Conscientisation combines the (popular) critical understanding of the hegemonial situation and one's position (as individual and group) in it with the hope and confidence in the own agency to influence and mould the future. While not defined as an objective in the statutes of the *Balai Citoyen*, it is among the most prominent (direct or underlying) concerns in the movement's activism. The theoretical approach puts this already manifest 'prominence in activity' in perspective and thus addresses the above-mentioned problematic of mobilising against a system in which a middle-class could better its living standard. Following Gramsci, hegemony functions with consent which is reached through certain (minor) compromises. Once this logic is understood, every improvement in living standards (i.e. of a new middle-class) that becomes possible without challenging existing hierarchies and power-structures, can be exposed as a concession to gain consent from the still dominated to maintain the existing hegemony – and not as an introduction of fundamentally changed possibilities.

Reframing the movement under the category of conscientisation with its subcategories changes the perspective on its work and effects. Consequently, the other two key-elements of the movement, which were extracted in an open descriptive approach to the case study, are re-framed in the theoretical interpretation. The two elements – the popular character of the movement and normative understanding of democracy – do not become proper theoreti-

cal categories as conscientisation does. The concept of (counter-)hegemony provides an understanding of power relation that shifts (potential) agency from the sole hands of a power-block to all actors. Hence, the popular character of the movement becomes the basis. To challenge existing power-structures, any counter-hegemonial project must include the masses of those now excluded from power. The popular character has thus become an implicit element of the movement as counter-hegemonial project. This concept of power-relations and agency is in itself a reason why Gramsci lends itself to interpret civil society movements. The element of normative democracy, which is important in the self-understanding of the *Balai Citoyen*, becomes with Gramsci in some regards a question of form, i.e. how the counter-hegemonial project is organised. It is somewhat reflected in the sub-category to conscientisation, which looks at the relation between knowledge or conscientisation and activism. The other two sub-categories – named knowledge production and organic intellectuals – put the emphasis on elements which are, of course, present in the movement, but as it seems less prominently explored. This way, a counter-hegemonial analysis provides a specific perspective at the movement and as such may provide interesting insights for the movement itself.

However defined and analysed, Pan-Africanism as a counter-hegemonial project serves today as much as it has in the past, as a banner under which mobilisation is emotionally connoted with dignity, autonomy, and liberty. The effect surely varies depending on the specific local context. In Burkina Faso, the regard for Pan-Africanism is exceptionally high due to the shining image of former president and national hero Thomas Sankara. Pan-Africanism has always (also) meant networking, and so it does today. It is the umbrella under which civil society organisations exchange and transnationally manifest solidarity.

Pan-Africanism seems to be a sort of mindset, a perspective on reality which puts developments in an open 'African' context. Maybe the inclusive *Afripolitanism* (Mbembe 2015) can inspire a forward-looking frame of how to understand 'African' today. In this sense, Pan-Africanism has always been and still is a vision of and for the future, that inspires activism and engagement. As in the past, such a vision is not precisely defined, and if then in many different versions. What holds it together are a few, generally highly charged central ideas and values. One of these is certainly democracy, entailing values like freedom of expression and a true exertion of authority and power by the people. As a vision of liberation, the emancipation of the civil society remains today as fundamental as it was from the beginning on. If every person

thinks critically and then decides with certainty and confidence, the liberation is 'institutionalised' in each and every person. One more underlying basic element is humanism. It is deeply linked to dignity, understood psychologically, emotionally as well as it bears a material component, preventing that pure lip service can suffice when poverty and degrading living standards prevail and render real equality impossible.

The actors and strategies may change, the ideological influences alter, the vocabulary modernises, Pan-Africanism as a project has kept its emancipatory potential, and as a vision, remains as blurry and hopeful as it was. Aimé Césaire (2005: 70), engaged poet and poetic humanist as he was, put his finger on it:

> Ce qui est fondamental, c'est l'humanisme, l'homme, le respect dû à l'homme, le respect de la dignité humaine, de droit au développement de l'homme. Les formules peuvent différer, bien entendu, avec le temps, avec les siècles, avec les compartimentages géographiques, mais enfin, l'essentiel est là.[69]

It might be considered romantic, but in a time of pragmatism and reactivity, of 'factual constraints' and an omnipresent sense of 'there is no alternative', building on a vision is fundamentally radical.

[69] "What is fundamental is humanism, the person, the respect owed to every person, the respect of human dignity, the human right to development. The formulas may differ, of course, with time, with the centuries, with geographic subdivision, but finally, the essential is this." (own translation)

APPENDIX

English Abstract

The overarching interest of this thesis is to understand the use and emancipatory potential of Pan-Africanism in contemporary African civil society movements. By means of a case study of the *Balai Citoyen*, a fragmentary contribution to the general research field is intended. After the outline of the developments in Pan-Africanism, the case study is presented. The *Balai Citoyen* is a civil society movement that emerged in the wider context of the public insurrection against long-term potentate Blaise Campoaré. The main elements for understanding the movement and its intentions are: (i) its situation as a popular movement with a strong focus on equality; (ii) a normative understanding of democracy; and (iii) conscientisation, which combines political education with agency. The Gramscian concept of hegemony is introduced to further examine conscientisation – unfolded into three sub-categories: the concept of organic intellectuals; (collective) knowledge production; and the relation between knowledge and conscientisation and conduct or activism. The role of art and music in particular takes a significant place in this analysis.

German Abstract

Das Interesse dieser Masterarbeit ist es, Anwendung und emanzipatorisches Potential von Pan-Afrikanismus in aktuellen zivilgesellschaftlichen Bewegungen in Afrika zu beleuchten. Die Fallstudie des *Balai Citoyen* soll einen Beitrag zu diesem Forschungsfeld leisten. Nach einer allgemeinem Einführung zum Pan-Afrikanismus wird die Fallstudie vorgestellt: Der *Balai Citoyen* entstand im breiteren Kontext des Volksauftandes gegen Blaise Campaoré, der Burkina Faso von 1987 bis 2014 regierte. Die Hauptcharakteristika und -ziele der zivilgesellschaftliche Bewegung sind (i) ihr populärer Charakter mit starker Betonung der Egalität; (ii) ein normatives Demokratieverständnis; und (iii) ‚Konszientisation', in der politische Bewusstseinsbildung mit Handlungskraft verbunden werden. Konszientisation wird mit Gramsci's Hegemoniekonzept genauer betrachtet und in drei Unterkategorien aufgefächert: dem Konzept organischer Intellektueller, (kollektive) Wissensproduktion und die Beziehung zwischen Wissen beziehungsweise Konzientisation und Aktivismus. Der Rolle von Kunst, vor allem Musik, wird besonderes Augenmerk geschenkt.

CURRICULUM VITAE

(A) Personal Information

name	Marisa Kröpfl
date and place of birth	19th April 1991 in Klagenfurt, Austria
nationality	Austrian

(B) Education

September 2012 to August 2018	**University of Vienna**, Austria Political Sciences, MA
September 2013 to July 2014	**Institut d'Études Politiques Lyon**, France Political Sciences, MA (Erasmus)
February 2010 to July 2012	**University of Vienna**, Austria Diploma course in Law Studies
September 2009 to November 2012	**University of Vienna**, Austria Development Studies, BA
June 2009	graduation from **Europagymnasium** Klagenfurt, Austria

(C) Professional Experiences (extract)

March 2017 to February 2018	**ADA Coordination Office Thimphu,** Bhutan Junior Professional Officer Private sector development, project management and monitoring
January 2016 to January 2017	**Austrian Develoment Agency (ADA),** Vienna, Austria Reception and Assistance Facility Management Assistant to General Administration and Law Unit
January to February 2015	**Awareness Against Human Trafficking (HAART)**, Nairobi, Kenya networking with the donor community and relevant organisations
January to February 2015	**Mathare Children's Fund Panairobi**, Nairobi, Kenya support of ongoing local projects support in project planning and project proposals
September to November 2014	**Austrian Embassy Nairobi**, Kenya internship in the area of International Relations
July to September 2013	**Austrian Hospice of the Holy Family**, Jerusalem, Israel voluntary service in the service area
October 2011 to September 2012 and June 2011	**Missio Austria**, Vienna, Austria Project Department South project correspondence and -monitoring
September 2011	**Arbeiterkammer (Chamber of Labour) Carinthia**, Klagenfurt, Austria Unit for Consumer Protection and Unit Labour and Social Law written enquiries and support in personal consultation

(D) Languages

German	mother tongue
English	fluently spoken and written
French	fluently spoken and written
Spanish	basic knowledge

Vienna, August 2018

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