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Has Europe's trade policy towards Ghana and the Ivory Coast reproduced colonial patterns of resource distribution?

A critical realist analysis of two post-colonial cocoa sectors

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Content

Abbreviations:

AAS - African Associated States
ACP - African Caribbean Pacific States
AD - Analytical Dualism
APS - African Planter Syndicate
CAISTAB - Caisse de Stabilisation et de Soutien des Produits Primaires Agricoles
CAP - Common Agricultural Policy
CEP - Cultural Emergent Property
CET - Common External Tariffs
CFA - Franc de la Communauté Financière de l'Afrique
CMB - Cocoa Marketing Board
COCOBOD - Ghana Cocoa Board
CPP - Conventions People’s Party
CR - Critical Realist
EC - European Commission
ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States
EDF - European Development Fund
EEC - European Economic Community
ERP - Economic Recovery Program
EP - Emergent Properties
EPA - European Partnership Agreement
EU - European Union
FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FOB - Free On Board (price, of goods upon receival on Board)
GATT - General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCP - Ghana Congress Party
GSP - Generalized System of Preference
GNP - Gross national product
IEPA - Interim Economic Partnership Agreements
IMF - International Monetary Fund
LBC - Licensed Buying Company
LDC - Least Developed Countries
MAP - Party representing Ghana's urban Muslim population
NLM - National Liberation Movement (patron movement launched in Ashanti)
NPP - Northern People’s Party
PDCI - Parti Democratique de la Côte d’Ivoire
PPP - Purchasing Power Parity
PEP - People's Emergent Property
SAA - Syndicat Agricole Africain de la Côte d’Ivoire
SAP - Structural Adjustment Program
SEP - Structural Emergent Property
SSNIT - Social Security and National Insurance Trust
STABEX - System for the Stabilization of Export Earnings
UN COMTRADE - United Nations International Trade Statistics Database
UGFC - United Ghana Farmers’ Council
WB - World Bank

1. Introduction

Ever since the end of European colonialism in Africa, starting with the independence of Ghana 1957, scholars in the field of Political Science, International Relations and Dependence Theory have sought to explain the lack of profound socio-economic development in post-colonial states across the African continent. From ineffective government structures and neo-colonial policies promoted by institutions rooted in the Washington Consensus to the perpetual exploitation of African labor by the continent's domestic comprador bourgeoisies, the field of political science has produced a host of explanations for the absence of fundamental change in African economies. Eager to benefit from this rich tradition in post-colonial studies and seeking to provide a straight forward analytical framework for the examination of an economic sector's post-colonial development, I conducted a comparative, critical-realist literature analysis of Ghana's and the Ivory Coast's cocoa sector. As part of my analysis I explored how domestic and transnational patterns of resource distribution along the cocoa value chain have developed since each country's independence. Furthermore, my research focused on how the countries' trade agreements with the European Union affected these patterns of resource distribution as well as stakeholders along the cocoa value chain.

The analytical framework with which I explored the post-colonial development of the trans-national cocoa value chain, is in so far novel, as it is based on a comparative literature analysis, focused on the patterns of resource distribution pertaining to a specific commodity. This is done from a critical realist point of view, for the purpose of identifying those policies and measures in trade agreements with the EU which altered, conserved or reproduced colonial patterns of resource distribution

Though this may not appear as a particularly noteworthy innovation in the field of political science -as many comparative analyses of Ghana's and the Ivory Coast's cocoa sector have been published since the end of colonialism-, I maintain that it is not only novel but also called for, because a systematic mixed-methods approach, examining qualitative and quantitative data of the evolution of each cocoa sector's post-colonial patterns of resource distribution has not been undertaken from a critical realist point of view so far, even though it can provide a better understanding of how post-colonial (inter-) dependence perpetuates. Furthermore, this analytical framework can also identify the policies and interventions through which specific social structures were conserved, reproduced, transformed or abolished. Before we dive into the details of a Critical Realist (CR) analysis, where I will present the most important concepts of Margaret Archer's morphogenetic approach, explain my case selection and introduce the changes necessary for my investigation, I will briefly present the sources I used for my comparative analysis of two post-colonial societies' socio-economic development concerning a specific commodity.

My investigation is based on a literature analysis of comparative literature focused on the socio-economic development of Ghana and the Ivory Coast, as well as case studies and quantitative economic analysis concerning either country's cocoa sector. In both cases the literature, used for this investigation, covers the entire period from the end of each country's colonial period to the year 2018, after the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the European Union (EU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was signed in 2014. Moreover, I termed my analysis a *critical realist* comparative analysis because, in line with the critical realist theory, it focuses on patterns of resource distribution, public and private corporate agents, the deployment of material- and cultural resources in strategic interaction and, finally, the structural elaboration or reproduction within two countries' post-colonial cocoa sectors.

To ensure all potential causes of changes to the patterns of resource distribution in each country's cocoa sector are taken into consideration, I included their individual domestic policies, international trade agreements and structural adjustment programs in my investigation. Though the inclusion of all these potential sources of change into my study greatly increased the effort necessary for this comparative analysis, it also ensured a comprehensive understanding of the trans-national cocoa value chain and its development. Additionally, considering policies developed at the national, international and multilateral level, also served the purpose of assuring no potential source of policies affecting the cocoa value chain's development was overlooked. Therefore, once I have presented the colonial origins of each country's cocoa sector and described their patterns of resource distribution, I will investigate how policies, originating at the domestic, international and multilateral level, affected different groups of actors along the transnational cocoa value chain. More specifically, after presenting the most important concepts of Margaret Archer's morphogenetic approach, I will begin by exploring each country's post-colonial development strategy and how these altered or conserved the colonial patterns of resource distribution within their inherited cocoa sectors. In order to do so, I will first describe Ghana's and the Ivory Coast's development strategy and later examine it from a critical realist point of view.

Subsequent to this, I will turn towards the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions, which set the first- and second regulatory framework for trade between European countries and their former colonies in West Africa. These will be looked at from a critical realist perspective as well, whereby I will focus on those measures which most likely affected the transnational trade in tropical commodities. In addition to this, I will also inspect how the terms of trade, formalized in these conventions, impacted the vested interests of corporate agents along the cocoa value chain. After both countries' post-colonial development strategy and the trade agreements under which they were implemented have been described, I will address how their structural adjustment programs altered the patterns of resource distribution within their cocoa sectors. Thereby I will also consider how these measures altered government control over each cocoa sector and how this affected corporate agents along the value chain.

Later, the two most recent trade agreements between the EU, Ghana and the Ivory Coast, the Cotonou- and Economic Partnership Agreements, will be thoroughly studied, as to the strategic interactions which produced them and the legal framework they establish for future trade. Furthermore, the EPA between the EU and ECOWAS will also be examined with regards to how it limits West African signatories' policy space and I will also pay attention to how this latest treaty seeks to alter the structural relations between corporate agents engaged in the cocoa value chain. Finally, I will conclude my thesis by assessing whether the EU's trade policy towards Ghana and the Ivory Coast contributed to the reproduction of colonial patterns of resource distribution. To clarify why I chose Margaret Archer's relatively new morphogenetic approach (first published in 1995) as a theoretical paradigm for my investigation of post-colonial cocoa trade, I will briefly address the merit, purpose and potential of her analytical framework.

Given the purpose of my thesis, to investigate if and how, the trade policies of the EU reproduces-, conserves- or alters colonial patterns of resource distribution, a theoretical framework which allowed for the differentiation of agents and a conceptualization of trade agreements was needed. Critical Realism met these requirements by providing a concept of agency, as either primary- or corporate agents, allowing for the investigation of negotiations by defining them as strategic interactions between corporate agents and enabling the determination of change or continuity by comparing the patterns of resource distribution ex post strategic interactions to those prior to the strategic interaction. Finally, Margaret Archer's "Morphogenetic Approach" allows for the analysis of strategic interactions, by conceptualizing them as a deployment of structural and cultural resources by corporate agents.

2. Methodology

As the next section will introduce the most important concepts of Archer's "Morphogenetic Approach", I will now provide a brief overview of how I examined the EU's trade policy's potential reproduction of colonial patterns of resource distribution. Most importantly, this investigation begins with a closer look at the colonial roots of the cocoa value chain, to determine colonial patterns of resource distribution. This will not only aid in providing a better understanding of the political and economic conditions prior to each country's independence but also help identify the primary- and corporate agents which historically had a stake in the transnational cocoa value chain. By researching the colonial patterns of resource distribution and the primary- and corporate agents they produced, we will also recognize the transnational social structures established by under colonial rule.

Following the review of Ghana's and the Ivory Coast's colonial past, our historic examination will describe how corporate agents and their respective interests were incorporated into the decision-making process within colonial administrations. Following that, I will examine not only how the post-independence governments made use of the colonial cocoa industries they were left with but also review, how their policies affected the corporate agents within their cocoa sectors. As this historic review will focus more on the allocation of revenues by post-colonial Ghana and the Ivory Coast, it also intends to show how post-colonial patterns of resource distribution differ from those established through European colonialism. Hence, we will see how independence altered the formerly colonial patterns of resource distribution and how (inter-) dependence manifests itself within the political and economic structure of post-colonial societies.

Once we have gained an understanding of the social structures constituting colonialism and how they were altered by post-colonial policies, the study will move to examine how international agreements affected both domestic and transnational patterns of resource distribution. Describing how these changes affected corporate agents along the transnational cocoa value chain is also an important aspect of this thesis. By examining how particular measures altered specific patterns of resource distribution -and considering who proposed them at which level of domestic or international policy making- I will be able to show where measures conserving or altering colonial patterns of resource distribution originated.

Ultimately, in order to determine whether the EU's trade policy towards Ghana and the Ivory Coast has re-produced colonial patterns of resource distribution, I will investigate how each trade agreement both nations reached with the European Economic Community (later the European Union), affected their cocoa sectors and the corporate agents within. The study will also take domestic cocoa policies and -measures into consideration that were called for by the structural adjustment programs. I would hope that my approach, to investigating the post-colonial trade relations with regards to a specific commodity, can be applied to examine other post-colonial societies and their commercial ties and inter-dependencies. After this broad overview of my thesis' intent and methodology, the following chapter will outline the critical realist paradigm, Margaret Archer's "Morphogenetic Approach" and the concepts it provides for the investigation of social change.

2.1. Operationalizing the Critical Realist Paradigm

Though Critical Realism has gained traction in the fields of Sociology and Political Science, since it was popularized by Margaret Archer's publication of „Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach," in 1995, the potential it holds for the study of post-colonial development remains largely untapped. Therefore, I intend to change this by providing an example for both, the critical realist analysis of post-colonial trade relations, and how inter-dependencies are reproduced or altered. The following segment shall outline the hallmarks of Critical Realist research design and introduce my adaptation thereof. Most importantly, it will clarify both the terminology and the concepts deployed throughout my study. I will begin my introduction of the Critical Realist paradigm with a brief explanation of its methodological foundation in Analytical Dualism and a presentation of its central concepts.

2.2. Analytical Dualism

Analytical Dualism, contrary to methodological individualism, is based on the notion that social structures are not reducible to individuals and the tasks or deeds through which they mediate these social structures. Even though analytical dualism concedes that all social change or reproduction is mediated through individual agents, social structures themselves are viewed and analyzed separate from the individuals they encompass (see Archer, 1995, p. 196). By allowing for the separation of social structures and the individuals who mediate them, analytical dualism enables us to model, examine and analyze colonial and post-colonial social structures in a way which focuses on their structural (i.e. material) features, without overemphasizing or underestimating the role individuals play in the reproduction or transformation of specific patterns and structures within society. The morphogenetic approach conceptualizes society in a manner which ascribes causal power to structural and cultural features of society while acknowledging that these are mediated by individuals through their actions. This is how analytical dualism facilitates the abstraction and systematic comparison of specific social structures across societies and time, without neglecting the force individuals can exert within or on social structures.

2.3. Primary- and Corporate Agency in Critical Realism

Since Analytical Dualism rests upon the assumption that social structures can be conceptualized and analyzed independent from the specific individuals who fill the positions within them, it is necessary to distinguish these social structures based on (a) how they relate to the individuals within society and (b) how they relate to other social structures within that society. To this end, Margaret Archers conceptualization of social structures only differentiates between Primary Agents and Corporate Agents. While *primary agents* are social factions resulting from the pre-grouping by an “anterior distributive structure” (Ibid., p. 186), *corporate agents*, are defined as social entities “with emergent powers of promotive organization and articulation of interests” (Ibid., p. 185). Hence, the former further differs from Corporate Agents by being unorganized in the pursuit of objective common interests (see Ibid.). While this dichotomous perception of agency does allow for the differentiation between agencies based on whether or not they actively promote the vested interests of their members, it does not allow for the further differentiation of agencies based on the relations these social entities have to other primary- or corporate agents. I believe this to be a major deficit of Margaret Archers approach because it treats all corporate agents as equal, even though they often are not. Therefore, the following sub-segment will briefly introduce another category of corporate agents, which distinguishes itself from others in the way it relates to the rest of society and the exceptionality of its position therein.

2.4. Primary-Corporate Agents

Though Primary-Corporate Agents were not part of Archer's initial, dichotomous conceptualization of social entities, I found this modification necessary in order for my survey of Ghana and the Ivory Coast to differentiate between corporate agents with varying degrees of legitimate political power.

I define these Primary-Corporate Agents as social structures which evolved from the [geographic] pre-grouping by an anterior distributive structure', in our case European colonialism, and are vested with unique 'powers of promotive organization and articulation of interests' within this territory. For this study primary-corporate agents are those which effectively and legitimately govern a territory and justify their actions and ambitions with their definition of the common public interest. Also, conceptualizing governments as distinct social structures, holding an unequaled position within society, is also justified through the unique structural (i.e. material) relations these agencies have to the rest of society, as they are the only agents which legitimately control the patterns of resource distribution by the levying taxes and redistributing them through the provision of public services. For my analysis of post-colonial trade relation, distinguishing the first post-colonial governments of Ghana and the Ivory Coast from other corporate agents enables me to demonstrate how each government handled, what Douglas Ashford termed the "linkage problem". "This refers to a situation in which, the first post-colonial government "is all-powerful in the decision-making sense, but […] utterly devoid of structural relationships to the [rest of] society" (Ashford, 1967, p. 8). Hence, for us to adequately model the ways post-colonial governments were established in Ghana and the Ivory Coast and the effects their policies had on corporate agents, primary agents and individuals within society, it is necessary for my analytical framework to distinguish between regular- and Primary-Corporate agents.

What sets primary-corporate agents apart are that;

- They can legally enforce their interests by commanding the use of force by public servants.
- Their actions, interests and objectives are justified and legitimized with the common public interest, which they can define by virtue of their status as government.
- The formal powers they hold due to their paramount positions within society are passed on to their successors in their entirety so long as they are not curtailed.

In lack of this concept of Primary-Corporate Agents, Margaret Archers morphogenetic approach fails to provide a concept of social structures which differ from other primary- or corporate agents by the wide range of legitimate powers vested in them. Amending her initial conceptualization of social entities as either primary- or corporate agents, does not only enable us to better distinguish between these specific agents but also allows us to take into consideration the unique force these Primary-Corporate Agents can exert on other corporate agents within their societies.

2.5. Morphogenesis and Morphostasis

Margaret Archer utilizes the term 'morphogenesis' to describe the process of social structuring and elaboration; 'morpho' indicating shape, and 'genesis' signaling the emergence of a social structure's specific shape through previous social- or socio-cultural interaction. Thus, "'morphogenesis' refers to 'those processes which elaborate or change a system's given form, state, or structure. […] Conversely, 'morphostasis' refers to those processes in complex system-environmental exchanges which preserve or maintain a system's given form, organization or state" (Archer, 1995, p. 166). In short, morphostasis describes a situation in which a previous social structure is reproduced while morphogenesis refers to the alteration of previous social structures or the emergence of a new one. This concept is crucial for our investigation of the EU's post-colonial trade policy regarding cocoa because we seek to examine whether the EU's trade policy conserved (i.e. reproduce) or transformed colonial features of the post-colonial cocoa value chain. As I hope to have clarified, by the end of this chapter, this can be achieved by paying attention to the way in which terms of trade, established through the strategic interaction of Corporate- or Primary-Corporate Agents effect specific stakeholder's access to and control over patterns of resource distribution.

Finally, by investigating how each modification to the terms of trade affected the corporate agents along the cocoa value chain, I seek to identify causal relations between the socioeconomic well-being of specific stakeholders and the terms of trade which were negotiated by the respective Primary-Corporate agents. Before we move on to the morphogenetic cycle, I must however point out that the European Commission does not qualify as a Primary-Corporate agent as it lacks the ability to legitimately coerce other corporate agents to accept its decision by use of force and its leeway in negotiations is pre-determined by the member states through the Committee 133.

2.5.1. The Morphogenetic Cycle

To ensure a proper common understanding of Margaret Archer's model of social development, I will briefly demonstrate her conceptualization of the process through which social structures emerge, transform or are reproduced through human interaction. For better understanding, I included the following illustration of the process.



The basic morphogenetic/ -static cycle with its three phases (Margaret Archer, 1995, p.157)

Margaret Archers model of societal development rests on the assumption that society is the result of the results of prior (inter-)action (Archer, 1995, p.302). This means that society with all its structures, roles, entities and ideas is the result of interactions people had prior to when any person encounters, examines or interacts with a specific social structure. Furthermore, society, which she views as real in that it exists independent of any individual's perception, "is only like itself" and the task for any social scientific research is "to conceptualize how ordered social forms have their genesis in human agency" (Ibid., p. 167).

The morphogenetic cycle, as a model of societal change, breaks down the process of social elaboration into three phases or four distinct moments in time, each of which take place within an inherited social structure. As mentioned earlier, each morphogenetic cycle begins with an inherited distribution of resources and powers (T1), which also allocates vested interests in the transformation or reproduction of this initial distribution (see Ibid., p. 296). Consequently, the conditions under which agents operate are mostly outside of any individual agent's full control but pivotal to the interests they articulate and pursue (see Ibid., p. 253). In addition, the initial distribution of vested interests, which structures society into distinct primary- and corporate agents, greatly impacts the situational logic informing the actions of individuals within that society. Once the agents interact in pursuit of their respective vested interests (T2-T3), this interaction results in the exchange and utilization of (material and cultural) resources and powers, which, in turn, result in either the reproduction or alteration of the inherited social structure at T4. The purpose of modeling social developments as distinct morphogenetic cycles is to identify the causes for either the transformation or preservation of distinct social structures (see Archer, 1995, p. 294). Hence, the exact definition of each morphogenetic cycle, depends on which development the social scientific research in hand seeks to explain (see Ibid., p. 274). Since the purpose of this thesis is to examine the development of the post-colonial trade relations in cocoa, the beginning of each morphogenetic cycle under scrutiny will be the conditions prior to changes occurring due to that interaction (i.e. trade negotiation, structural adjustment program, or domestic policy). The changes to these initial conditions will be treated as the result of the specific strategic interactions (T2-T3) and this result T4 will be examined with regards to the effects these changes had on the initial patterns of resource distribution at T1.

Furthermore, because this investigation explores whether the EU's trade policy transformed or conserved colonial features of the cocoa value chain, my analysis begins with the distributional patterns as they were at the end of French and British colonialism in West Africa. The distributional patterns prevalent at the end of this period will therefore be treated as the initial pattern of resource distribution to which we compare the outcome of post-colonial strategic interactions between the EEC (later EU) and independent Ghana and Ivory Coast. Though I understand that the patterns of resource distribution at the end of colonialism are themselves the result of previous interactions, I find these colonial patterns of resource distribution to be the most appropriate conditions to compare the effects of subsequent strategic interactions to. Even though I may not be able to indisputably prove that the outcome of a specific strategic interaction was intended by one of the interacting parties, I can very well examine who's vested interests were served either by the results of the interaction itself or by the actions corporate agents performed under the conditions produced by the interaction in hand. Hence, examining how corporate agents pursued their vested interests under the conditions set through trade negotiations can provide insight as to which corporate agent benefited from alterations (or lack thereof) to the terms of trade. Ultimately, comparing the patterns of resource distribution established between corporate agents under each trade regime to those prevalent during colonialism will show whether the EU's post-colonial trade policy with the former colonies Ghana and the Ivory Coast reproduced or transformed colonial patterns of resource distribution.

2.5.2. Emergent Properties

Another key concept within critical realism and Margaret Archer's "Morphogenetic Approach" is that of emergent properties, defined as properties, "whose differentiating features are relative endurance, natural necessity and the possession of causal power" (Archer, 1995, p. 167). While these emergent properties exist at the structural, agential or cultural level and refer to necessary internal relations with causal effects on the morphogenesis or morphostasis of social structures, structural- and cultural emergent properties exist independent of the temporary occupants of a specific social structure and the actions that an individual performs at a given point in time (see Ibid., p. 175).

Additionally, though emergent properties exist at the social, cultural and agential level, none of these are reducible to one another. So, even though the causal effects of emergent properties are necessarily mediated by people, each of these causes originates at either a structural, cultural or personal level within society. While structural emergent properties (SEPs) "are specifically defined as those internal and necessary relationships which entail material resources, whether physical or human, and which generate causal power proper to the relation itself" (Ibid., p. 177), cultural emergent properties (CEPs) are ideational. This means that CEPs are for example "logical relationships […] when [they are] internally and necessarily related" (Ibid., p. 187). Finally, at the agential level, there are people's emergent properties (PEP), which have two defining features. „[T]hey modify the capacities of component members (affecting their consciousness and commitments, affinities, and animosities) and exert causal powers on the way in which people *personify* their role as an agent of a specific social structure" (Ibid.).

In any case, emergent properties are themselves the result of previous socio-cultural interaction, which established the current material or ideational relations, and bare causal power in the reproduction or transformation of social structures. In general, emergent properties are relatively enduring necessary relations which provide directional guidance for strategic action by and between agents (see Ibid., p. 218).

In the context of European colonialism, the most impactful structural emergent property during this time must have been, the colonial system of taxation forcing Africans to generate resources to pass on to their respective colonial powers. At the cultural level the prevalence of Christianity and racism, as well es the sense of civilizational superiority among Europeans, as means to justify subjugation of Africans, were extremely powerful cultural emergent properties.

Meanwhile the personal emergent properties have probably evolved along with the cultural and structural properties of the societies in which individuals exists. While colonialism did introduce new emergent properties at the structural and cultural level on the African continent, the personal emergent properties have most likely adapted to the evolving structural and cultural conditions individuals found themselves in. However, a detailed investigation of these emergent properties' development within post-colonial Ghana and the Ivory Coast would breach the scope of my investigation. Nevertheless, I must point out that the global capitalist market economy, financial markets and the technological advances made since the end of European colonialism in Africa, all have structural emergent properties which exert causal power on stakeholders along the cocoa value chain.

2.5.3. Socio-Cultural Interaction

Having introduced the concept of emergent properties, the morphogenetic cycle and the key features of analytical dualism, I will now turn to the process of socio-cultural interaction, which is part of the morphogenetic cycle and decisive for whether transformation or reproduction of a social structure occurs.

In general, the morphogenetic approach distinguishes between a society's structural and cultural systems (or the sphere of ideas) in which the social structure exists. While material resources encompass the physical, financial and personal capacities, a corporate agent has access to- or control over cultural resources are the ideas corporate agents put forward in pursuit of their vested interests. Hence, socio-cultural interaction is the process in which corporate agents exchange material and cultural resources in pursuit of their respective objectives. The outcome of this interaction either reproduces or transforms the previously inherited social structure.
Margaret Archer summarizes socio-cultural interaction as "the changing interrelationship between the structures of resource distribution and the structure of material and ideal vested interest groups" (Archer, 1995, p. 297). This is critical for our research design because the trade negotiations presuming any trade agreement are precisely the exchange of ideas and material resources which Margaret Archer refers to as socio-cultural interactions.

This, further, implies a distinction between the structural and cultural domain, which, as Margaret Archer illustrates, leads to specific constellations of the structural and cultural domains which are either conducive to the transformation or reproduction of social structures.

The four constellations of the structural and cultural domain identified by Margaret Archer will each be briefly presented in the following sub-segment, before we move on to the next chapter. There I commence with the historic contextualization by describing and comparing the colonial contexts from which Ghana and the Ivory Coast emerged as independent, sovereign states.

As this thesis investigates whether the EU's trade policy towards Ghana and the Ivory Coast conserved /reproduced or transformed colonial patterns of resource distribution, rather than the EU's intention to conserve or transform colonial patterns of resource distribution, my focus will mostly remain limited to how patterns of resource distribution developed subsequent to each trade agreement, rather than the process of negotiations. Nevertheless, with respect to the latest trade agreement reached between the EU and ECOWAS, the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA), I will incorporate more information on the negotiating parties' deployment of structural and cultural resources into my investigation. This is called for because the EPAs are unique in ways that justify a more in-depth analysis of the process leading up to their conclusion. The two most important reasons for a more detailed look at the process leading this most recent trade agreement are (a.) the fact that the treaties are intended to govern EU-ECOWAS trade relations for an indefinite period of time, and (b.) that they included "behind the border issues" which limit the primary-corporate agent's leeway in future domestic policy making. Additionally, the negotiation of this Agreement took a decade longer than initially intended by the negotiating parties, so that a more in-depth look at the negotiation process and its point of contention is called for. Therefore, as this latest treaty is intended to govern EU-ECOWAS trade indefinitely and goes so far as to curtail future governments domestic scope of action, I do find it necessary to provide more information on how this agreement was reached and justified by the respective parties. The following segment will briefly introduce the concepts of bargaining power, negotiation strength and socio-cultural dynamics, as they are pivotal for a proper understanding of strategic interactions and their outcome. This will be especially important for my assessment of the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions as these can only be properly understood with these concepts in mind. Also, we will make use of these concepts to analyze the Cotonou Agreement which set the negotiation framework of the subsequent Economic Partnership Agreements.

2.5.4. First, Second and Third Order Conditions of Strategic Interaction

I begin by differentiating the first-, second- and third order condition of a strategic interaction and present the four constellations of the structural and cultural domain thereafter.

Archer starts her evaluation of the potential a strategic interaction holds for morphogenesis or morphostasis by assessing the bargaining power of the corporate agents engaged in the strategic interaction. This is largely determined by the distribution of material- and cultural resources among primary- and corporate agents prior to the strategic interaction and depends on the material resources at the disposal of each corporate agent engaged (see Archer, 1995, p. 217). Since the initial distribution of resources among primary- and corporate agents is the result of prior interactions, the specific distribution of bargaining power between vested interest groups is unique to every society. Hence, there are very few general statements one can make about the initial distribution of *potential bargaining power*, which Archer refers to as *first order* condition (see Ibid., p. 297). One general observation that Margaret Archer has made with respect to the initial distribution of bargaining power is that “the greater the concentration of resources, the fewer the number of parties who will be able strategically to transact societal change” (Ibid., p. 298). Therefore, the first observation necessary to assess whether morphogenesis or -stasis is the more likely outcome of strategic interaction relates to the initial distribution of resources. Also, one can expect a corporate agent’s bargaining power to increase with its initial access to resources, even though this distribution will be modified through the strategic interaction.

The *second order* condition influencing whether a strategic interaction between corporate agents is conducive to change or preservation is *negotiation strength*. In contrast to bargaining power, negotiation strength cannot be viewed in isolation but needs to be assessed in relation to other corporate agents. For example, a corporate agent can be endowed with disproportionate bargaining power but wield comparatively little negotiation strength if it is unable to mobilize other corporate agents to support it in its interaction with another corporate agent. Thus, a corporate agent’s negotiation strength is a relational quality vis-à-vis another agent which depends more on an agent’s ability to mobilize support from other corporate agents (see Ibid., p. 300 f.).

Finally, the *third order* condition is what Margaret Archer refers to as *transformational and reproductive power* (see Ibid., p. 302 f.). This transformative or reproductive power depends on the dynamic at play between the structural and cultural sphere while the strategic interaction is taking place. When structural and cultural forces pull in the same direction as the transformation or conservation sought by a corporate agent, it is more likely that the result of the corporate agents’ strategic interaction will be in line with this tendency. When these forces work against one another, however, the result of their strategic interaction is less foreseeable and more dependent on the first and second order conditions described above. Ultimately, the outcome of a strategic interaction between corporate agents is always agent-mediated and the way in which agents position themselves -in or towards a specific strategic interaction- greatly depends on the vested interest an agent has in transforming or preserving the initial distribution of structural and cultural resources. Hence, the third order condition of a strategic interaction refers to the socio-cultural dynamics at play in the context within which a strategic interaction is taking place. This historically specific dynamic can alter how individual agents -not immediately involved in the interaction- position themselves towards the interaction at hand and whether they promote or oppose the transformation or reproduction of specific social structures.

I'll briefly present the four possible dynamics between the structural and cultural sphere, within which the strategic interactions can take place, before I move on to the colonial origin of the transnational cocoa value chain.

2.5.5. Constellations of the Cultural and Structural Sphere

Going beyond the simple rule of thumb developed by David Lockwood that systems, in which the cultural and structural elements are highly integrated, tend towards morphostasis while systems in which these elements don't align as well are prone to transform Margaret Archer lays out the following four constellations of morphogenesis or -stasis in the cultural and structural sphere which are either conducive to morphostasis or morphogenesis (see Archer, 1995, p. 294).

2.5.5.1. Cultural and Structural Morphostasis

As one might expect the conjunction of cultural and structural morphostasis or the absence of change in both the structural- and cultural sphere most often results in the reproduction of their superimposed social structure. This is particularly the case if structural and cultural resources are highly concentrated because the beneficiaries of the status quo are inclined to utilize their resources in a way that supports the reproduction of distributive patterns which provided them their advantage in the first place. Furthermore, the absence of change in both the structural- and cultural sphere prevents the re-grouping processes which would destabilize the superimposed social structure (see Ibid., p. 309).

2.5.5.2. Cultural and Structural Morphogenesis

Contrary to the previous scenario, in which cultural and structural morphostasis stabilize the reproduction of a social structure, simultaneous change in a society's structural and cultural sphere fosters morphogenesis within that society and its sub-segments. Because structural changes can not only affect the vested interests of one specific corporate agent, but also the interests and situational logic of other corporate agents, structural morphogenesis can alter how other corporate agents position themselves towards a strategic interaction. Similarly, changes in the cultural domain related to a specific superimposed social structure can affect the way in which individual agents perceive their interests, actions and relations. Therefore, changes within the cultural domain often result in re-grouping processes which further destabilize a social structure. This is conducive to further structural change within society. In sum, one can reasonably expect conjunction of morphogenesis in the structural and cultural domain to advance socio-structural elaboration. Things are less clear cut, however, when we turn towards situations in which morphogenesis is limited to either the structural or cultural domain.

2.5.5.3. Cultural Morphostasis and Structural Morphogenesis

Archer characterizes cultural continuity in times of structural change as a drag on structural elaboration. While the material interests of social sub-segments may catalyze the emergence of new interest groups, the continuity within the cultural context in which these new primary- and corporate agents operate, prevents further cultural differentiation along ideational lines. Nevertheless, the structural change introduced in society can induce change in the cultural domain later-on, when the new interest groups, established through the previous structural morphogenesis, seek to legitimize themselves and the pursuit of their interests through the development and deployment of cultural resources. This, in turn, can introduce change in the cultural domain at a later point in time (see. Archer, 1995, p. 312 ff.). While Margaret Archer interprets this as proof for the "stronger influence of structure over culture" (Ibid., p. 316), I would simply maintain that the introduction of change in one domain can induce change in the other.

2.5.5.4. Cultural Morphogenesis and Structural Morphostasis

In this context "ideational uniformity ceases to be produced [and] divisive ideas (presenting competitive advantages or new opportunities to material interest groups) [intrude] in the structural domain" (Ibid.). As new ideas take hold and disseminate throughout society, they affect the cognition of the people who mediate social structures within that society. Hence, by affecting the situational logic at an individual level, cultural morphogenesis can change the mediation of social structure by agents, stimulate processes of re-grouping and alter the bargaining power and negotiation strength of established corporate agents. Put more succinctly, cultural morphogenesis can spill over into the structural domain by altering the way individuals think and perceive themselves, their environment and their interests. Apart from potentially stimulating re-grouping and the development of new interest groups, this can also lead to changes in the way individuals mediate social structures.

Now that I have outlined my research methodology, presented the critical realist paradigm and the concepts it provides to examine social change, I will now begin with the historic contextualization of the cocoa value chain by exploring differences and similarities in the British and French systems of colonial administration in West Africa.

3. British and French Colonialism in West Africa

While the focus of my analysis is on the post-colonial development of corporate agents engaged in the West African cocoa sector, this chapter aims to provide a better understanding of the colonial origins of these corporate agents. In course of this historic contextualization I will (1) examine key features of British and French colonial rule, (2) identify the corporate agents produced by these colonial patterns of resource distribution and (3) determine the hallmarks of colonial trade regimes. We will commence the following sub-segment with an investigation into the commonalities and differences of the British and French systems of colonial rule.

Though it is common to simply trace the current conditions in post-colonial societies back to their colonial origins, many scholars hardly provide an in-depth examination of the practices and policies which produced the conditions from which the post-colonial societies emerged. This failure to examine the colonial patterns of resource distribution significantly reduces the investigation's explanatory value because it leaves the specific causes for a post-colonial societies' status quo unaddressed or under-investigated. In social scientific investigations especially, this failure to examine the origins of a specific social structure impedes the researcher's ability to investigate long-term developments and identify trends within this development, which, in turn, limits the epistemological value of their investigation.

Attempting to avoid this mistake, I decided to begin my investigation of the cocoa value chain's post-colonial development with a closer look at the colonial conditions which produced the primary- and corporate agents whose post-colonial development are at heart of this study. Doing so with a critical realist paradigm will not only help with the identification of colonial patterns of resource distribution, but also aid in understanding how these patterns of resource distribution were established and secured. This will facilitate the detection of causal relations between a specific corporate agent's development and changes to the post-colonial pattern of resource distribution. Additionally, we will be able to asses which corporate agents benefited from these patterns, which will aid in assessing why particular corporate agents have an interest in the conservation or alteration of specific patterns of resource distribution.

3.1. Colonial Origins of the Cocoa Value Chain

Cocoa was initially introduced to the African continent by European merchants who brought the crop over from South America. As Europe began to develop a taste for the bitter-sweet brew, demand for this tropical commodity grew and a chocolate manufacturing industry developed in the metropolitan centers of Europe. Eager to benefit from this new market, colonists in British- and French West Africa began to grow the cocoa for European processors and consumers. In order to reduce the distance between tropical areas of production and centers of consumption in Europe, European colonists began growing the crop on the islands of Sao Tomé and Principe in the late 19th century, before trading houses and cocoa processors began re-locating cocoa production to the Gold coast (see Ehler, 1977, p. 8 ff.). As a result, cocoa was cultivated for export in Ghana from 1891 onward (see Kay, 1972, p. 242) and slightly earlier (1880) in the Ivory Coast (see Zeller, 1969, p. 34).

3.2. Colonial Rule in West Africa

As both the Gold Coast -as Ghana was referred to prior to her independence- and Ivory Coast were each part of the British and French colonial empires, respectively, each of their systems of colonial administration had its French or British particularities. I will begin by briefly addressing their similarities, before I introduce the primary- and corporate agents each colonial pattern of resource distribution produced.

Prior to European colonization both the Gold- and Ivory Coast were inhabited by a multitude of different ethnic entities, commonly referred to as tribes, most of which had a "centralized but non-bureaucratic authority structure" referred to as chieftaincy (Mahoney, 2010, p. 25). While these chiefdoms were different from one another, they were homogenous internally with respect to their ethnicity and language. Moreover, both the British and French colonial administration made use of these pre-colonial social structures by instrumentalizing them for their own purposes (see Ibid.). Be it to levy taxes, to acquire labor, or to locally enforce colonial policies, each system of colonial administration relied on local chieftains to micromanage the West African territories under their control. That said, there were considerable differences in the way each colonial administration made use of "their" local chiefs. Though both colonial administrations retained chiefs for the local administration of their colonies, the French stripped them of their traditional authority by transferring the power to appoint chiefs to their commandants who were the lowest immediate local representatives of the French colonial authorities. In addition, these commandants were also made the heads of the local judiciary, which meant that the local chiefs had lost their judiciary powers and were reduced to assistants of the local French commandants in everything but name (see Crowder, 1971, p. 187). Hence, the French did their best to replace traditional African authority with their own and created a system of colonial administration which is formally characterized as a centralized system of direct rule (see Maclean, 2002, p. 65 ff.). In contrast to this, the British retained the traditional systems of local administration within their West African territories and maintained a decentralized system of indirect rule. This British system of colonial administration was insofar indirect, as the colonial policies were socially mediated by the traditional local authorities (see Ibid., p. 73). Beyond simply preserving the pre-colonial systems of local governance, however, the British went so far as to reinforce these traditional sources of authority, for the purpose of establishing de-centralized, self-sufficient administrative entities which would minimize the attention and resources they would have to dedicate to the local administration of their global empire (see Ibid., p. 70).

Though these profound differences in their approaches to colonial rule did have long lasting effects on the societies they concerned, even after these had gained independence, there were several similarities between the British and French systems of colonial administration, especially pertaining to the distribution of power and resources within their territories. In this regard the most obvious similarity between these systems of colonial rule was that they were both designed to benefit the economic agents from or in the metropolitan area (see Crowder, 1971, p. 273). For example, both systems of colonial rule utilized the taxes and labor local authorities extracted from indigenous Africans to pay for infrastructure designed to disproportionately benefit economic agents from metropolitan France or Britain (see Maclean, 2002; Konadu-Agymang & Adanu, 2003; Tyalor, 2016; Crowder, 1971). Apart from similarities related to the instrumentalization of local authorities and the utilization of local resources to the benefit of corporate agents based in the Europe's metropolitan areas, both colonial administrations extorted forced labor from the indigenous population and justified their coercion with the inferiority of the Africans and their inability to develop their own societies (Brown, 2006, p. 141). This justification, best known as "the white man's burden" was not only inherently racist but also served as moral justification for the subjugation of Africans and the exploitation of their land and labor. Furthermore, each system utilized their West African colonies to feed their metropolitan economies with cheap tropical inputs such as rubber, palm oil, groundnuts, cocoa, coffee and sugarcane, which were kept cheap due to the widespread use of forced- and cheap labor by Europeans and Africans within the Gold- and Ivory Coast (Crowder, 1971, p. 206). Finally, each system of colonial rule ensured that the interests of European settlers and their commercial entities had disproportionate influence on the development and enforcement of the colonial policies governing Africans and Europeans in the Gold- and Ivory Coast.

In summary, though there were some considerable differences in the way colonial rule was implemented in each West African colony, the purposes of these policies were more similar than different. In both cases, it was European settlers and companies who stood to benefit from the colonial policies forced upon the colonies' African inhabitants. Though there were further differences in the details of British and French colonial administration, I will incorporate these in the following two sub-segments as they do relate to the primary- and corporate agents which developed under each system of colonial rule.

3.3. Colonial Patterns of Resource Distribution

Having outlined the general differences between the British and French approach to colonial rule, I will now turn towards the specific primary- and corporate agents each of these systems produced. Because this study examines the post-colonial development of corporate agents along the cocoa value chain, this sub-segment will focus on those primary- and corporate agents produced by distributional patterns related to the cocoa sector. Before I delve into details, I must, however, clarify some more general aspects of both systems of colonial rule.

Even though both systems of colonial rule provided privileged positions to Africans with some degree of European ancestry, the dominant cultural structure (i.e. the racist paradigm) of the time prohibited the equal treatment of Africans (with or without European ancestry) and Europeans. As a result, European economic and political interests generally dominated the decision-making processes within both systems of colonial rule. This was especially obvious regarding the distributional patterns concerning the most important agricultural resources at the time, land and labor. Observed from a (CR) point of view it becomes apparent that European primary- and corporate-, as well as primary-corporate agents, - the colonial administrators governing the Gold-and Ivory Coast at the time- utilized cultural resources (i.e. the dominant racist ideology) to justify their control over the patterns of resource distribution they had established within British- and French West Africa. Furthermore, they also made use of their disproportionate access to material resources, such as weapons, ships, soldiers and money to secure and enforce their command over their territories and the patterns of resource distribution within them.

3.4. Distributional Patterns of Land, Labor and Taxes

Both the British- and French colonial administration tasked their local chiefs with the extortion of African labor and taxes to the benefit of European settlers and companies. Even though the systems were quite similar in this regard, the differences that did exist between them had profound effects on the social strata each system produced later-on. Therefore, to introduce the corporate agents produced by colonial patterns of resource distribution, I will now present those patterns which were the most significant for the formation of corporate agents engaged in the colonial cocoa value chain.

As corporate agents are those social entities which articulate and promote the vested interests of their members, patterns of resource distribution contribute to the formation of these corporate agents by putting individuals in a similar position with regards to their access to resources, which provides them with a common interest in the conservation or transformation of specific social structures. Thus, the following segment will identify specific primary agents which developed into corporate agents within the cocoa value chain and, in the case of the Ivory Coast even formed the nucleus of the first post-colonial primary-corporate agents.

3.4.1. Distributional Patterns of Land Rights

One of the most fundamental differences between the British- and French systems of colonial rule was that the French stripped chiefs of their traditional authority, while the British sought to preserve their traditional authority and functions. Due to this marked difference, local Chiefs in the French colonial systems now derived their authority over land allocation from the French colonial administration, which established a liberal policy of land distribution aimed at increasing the productivity of agricultural enterprises. In contrast to this, Chiefs under British colonial rule managed to retain their control over land acquisition by preventing the alienation of Ashanti stool land to the British crown. Hence, aristocratic Ashanti bureaucracy retained their control over (land-) resource distribution and established other patterns of resource distribution from their counterparts in French West Africa.

Even though access to "tropical forestland depended on local customs and colonial policies" (Woods, 2004, p. 227) in both colonial systems, the British' failure to expropriate aristocratic Ashanti bureaucrats from the "stool land" they administered had stark effects on the social strata which emerged in Ghana during and after colonialism. In contrast to the Ivory Coast, where local chiefs had effectively lost autonomous control over land allocation and land was more willingly ceded to non-Ivorian migrants initially, the traditional chiefs in Ashanti were reluctant to allocate land to migrants in the Gold Coast (see Ibid.). This led to the emergence of land-owning farmers, peasants, and laborers as three distinct social classes within the Gold Coast's rural cocoa sector (see Kolavalli & Vigneri, 2011, p. 202). Though the system of land allocation used to distribute the terrain under Ashanti control pre-dated the colonial administration, and was therefore not a colonial pattern of resource distribution per se, the pattern of land-title distribution during colonialism did produce a distinct social strata which formed the basis from which primary- and corporate agents in Ghana emerged.

Juxtapose to this situation, where traditional elites' control over patterns of resource distribution triggered social stratification based on access to land ownership, the Ivory Coast, with its "presence of a large non-Ivorian population, both African and European" (Forst & Zolberg, 1971, p. 12), readily provided migrant farmers from abroad with opportunities to acquire land and settle within the Ivory Coast's borders. While the acquisition of land by foreigners was unproblematic during colonialism, the situation changed when virgin forest land became scarce and ethnic conflict over land ownership and allocation intensified post-independence. Hence, instead of a situation where traditional elites' control over resource distribution led to the exclusion of foreigners from proper land ownership, the Ivory Coast, where authority over land allocation had been ceded to the colonial administration, saw the development of corporate agents within the cocoa sector based on the size of their plantations and the color of their skin. This development led to a situation in which those engaged in the cocoa sector were categorized as either European- or African Planters with larger or smaller plots of land, which formed the basis for the aforementioned first African primary-corporate agent in the Ivory Coast subsequent to independence. Interestingly, the inter-African ethnic cleavages only became more pronounced once colonialism had ended, for reasons discussed below. Throughout the Ivory Coast's colonial period, however, Africans of all ethnic backgrounds were exploited equally so that the dividing line between primary- and corporate agents was the European or African ethnicity and the plot size they cultivated, rather than further differentiating Africans by their respective ethnic backgrounds, as it was done by the Ashanti aristocrats in their allocation of land titles. For a good example of this indiscriminate exploitation of Africans by Europeans and the dominance of the European-African ethnic divide in the Ivory Coast, we must only consider the fact that African cocoa farmers of all ethnicities were obliged to work on European farms, no matter the size of the African farmer's plot of land or their specific ethnic background. Furthermore, all African farmers were prohibited to hire African labor before European planters had met their needs. Therefore, the French colonial patterns of resource distribution produced corporate Agents along the ethnic divide between Europeans and Africans and based on the initial size of the African farmer's plot of land. Though, patterns of resource distribution under French colonial rule also produced social cleavages based on land ownership and ethnicity, these were less efficacious until the end of colonialism, when the dominant social rift between Europeans and Africans lost its legal significance.

The developments of the distributional patterns of access to land suitable for cocoa cultivation led to the emergence of primary agents which faced similar discrimination pertaining to the acquisition of land in Ghana, while the patterns of (land-) resource distribution in French West Africa produced primary agents which faced similar forms of discrimination due to their non-European ethnicity. As evidenced by their active defense of control over land acquisition, the Ashanti aristocrats are the first African corporate agents engaged in the Gold Coast's cocoa sector we can clearly identify. In addition, distributional patterns under their control produced further primary agents of land-owning farmers, peasants and laborers. Though the latter two groups only qualify as primary agents prior to independence, after which they developed into corporate agents by articulating and promoting the common interests of their members, the initial formation of these groups as primary agents can be traced back to these initial patterns of land resource distribution.

Compared to the situation in the Gold Coast, the corporate agents produced by the French colonial pattern of resource distribution is straight forward. Here, the French colonial policy pertaining to land acquisition, which was summarized in the slogan ”land belongs to those who make it bear” (Woods, 2004, p. 229), produced primary agents along the ethnic divide between Europeans and Africans and the economic cleavage between planters with larger (>25 ha) and smaller plots for cocoa cultivation. Plot size as a criterion, however, mostly lost its relevance after 1944, when the “Syndicat Agricole Africain de la Côte d'Ivoire” was established to represent the interests of all African planters no matter the size of their plot. The sole condition for membership in this corporate agent was that the farmers commercially produced export crops (especially cocoa or coffee) (see Zeller, 1961, p. 163). Once the criterion of plot size was dropped for the membership in the Syndicat Agricole Africain de la Côte d'Ivoire (SAA), the organization swiftly developed into the dominant corporate agent in the Ivory Coast's cocoa sector, as it represented the interests of all African cocoa planters who cultivated their own land.

To summarize the results of my examination of the effects of colonial patterns of resource distribution with regards to (land-) resources in in the Gold- and Ivory Coast, I maintain that the patterns of resource distribution in the Gold Cost produced corporate agents along the lines of land titles while the patterns in Ivory Coast initially established corporate agents along the ethnic divide between European and African planters.

3.4.2. Corporate Agents Created by Distributional Patterns of Labor

Similar to the effects observed by distributional patterns regarding land, distributional patterns of the resource labor also led to the establishment of primary- and corporate agents in the Gold- and Ivory Coast. However, as both, land and labor are necessary inputs in the production of tropical produce, the cleavages dividing the African population engaged in the production of cocoa ran along similar lines, basically reinforcing the divide between the previously identified groups. To illustrate this point, we must consider the situation of those engaged in colonial cocoa production in West Africa.

While the distributional patterns of access to land in the Gold Coast had led to the development of groups with and without ownership of the land they cultivated, this cleavage was further enforced by the fact that those who did own the land they cultivated became employers within the cocoa sector, while those without had to rely on the sole resource at their disposal, labor. The pattern of resource distribution for the resource labor followed a pre-colonial system of employment known as *abusa*. In this system the owner of a plot of land employs (often migrant-) labor for labor-intensive phases of cultivation and offers one third of the profits from the sale of his or her produce to the laborer in return. This pattern of resource distribution reinforced the cleavages separating land owner and laborer because it produced common interests within each of these groups. Just as land owners had a common interest in access to affordable labor, their laborers sought the acquisition of land, as this would not only allow them to retain a larger portion of the profits but also provide them with capital they could pass on to their offspring.

Similarly, cocoa producers in the Ivory Coast also had a common interest in acquiring labor for their cocoa plots. Here too, the dominant ethnic cleavage between European and African planters was reinforced by the distributional patterns of labor because the colonial regime, discriminated against African planters in the allocation of forced labor. This notion is further substantiated by the fact that the previously mentioned Syndicat Agricole Africain de la Côte d'Ivoire's (SAA) primary goal, apart from its paramount purpose of representing the interests of African planters, was to abolish forced labor in the Ivory coast. Hence, the SAA, as the dominant corporate agent within the Ivory Coast's cocoa sector, represented the interest of its member to transform the pattern of (labor) resource distribution by attempting to abolish the practice of forced labor. The results of my investigation into the internal patterns of resource distribution of the Gold- and Ivory Coast's cocoa sector can be summarized, by stating that the patterns of land- and labor distribution led to the development of corporate agents prior to each country's independence. The common interests of their members were linked to either, the retention of control over forestland, in the case of the Ashanti aristocratic bureaucracy, or the access to land ownership in the case of the Gold Coast's migrant labor population. In contrast to this, the transformation of colonial patterns of (labor) resource distribution was the shared goal of the first corporate agent within the Ivory Coast's cocoa sector which exclusively represented Africans. Beyond these internal patterns however, there were also external, transnational patterns of resource distribution which must be taken into consideration.

3.4.3. External Patterns of Resource Distribution

While the previous segment focused on the corporate agents produced by internal patterns of resource distribution, I will now turn to external patterns of resource distribution, in our case, patterns which relate to the transnational distribution of resources. This is necessary because just as the internal distribution of resources led to the development of domestic corporate agents in Ghana and the Ivory Coast, external patterns of resource distribution provided common interests for European corporate agents from within the respective colonial empires' metropolitan areas. Contrary to the dissimilar patterns of resource distribution within Britain's and France's West African territories, which led to the emergence of distinct corporate agents in these territories' cocoa sector, their transnational structures of resource distribution were more similar in that they enabled the formation of multinational trading companies within each colonial empire. The patterns of resource distribution which enabled the development of these European corporate agents were based on the availability of inexpensive inputs, produced in the colonial empire's tropical territories, access to cheap labor and credit within the metropolitan area, as well as ready access to huge colonial markets for their products.

As both colonial empires provided such favorable conditions for their multinational companies to pursue their shareholders' interests, these corporate agents developed quite similarly with respect to their high degree of vertical integration (see Carlos & Nicholas, 1988, p.404 ff.), their willingness to profit from the continuous exploitation of African- as well as European labor and their inclination to establish their centers of production within the empire's metropolitan area. In other words, the constant flow of affordable tropical inputs form south to north, the availability of cheap credit and labor, ready access to protected markets in the colonial territories from which their cheap tropical inputs originated and their governments' willingness to further exploit their African subjects by forcing them to finance and construct infrastructure benefiting these corporate agents, all led to the development of similar corporate agents at the European end of colonial cocoa value chains.

3.4.4. Corporate Agents in Focus

After identifying differences and similarities between the British and French Colonial systems and the corporate agents they produced, I will now briefly introduce the agents my investigation focuses on. As a critical realist study of post-colonial trade relations, I investigated how policies, originating at the unilateral, bilateral and multilateral levels of decision making, affected cocoa farmers in Ghana and the Ivory Coast, as the entire cocoa value chain is based on their agricultural output. Besides Ghanaian and Ivorian cocoa farmers I also included multinational processing and -trading companies in my investigation, as they are a constant and pivotal part of the global cocoa value chain. Observing and evaluating how the terms of trade, negotiated between the EEC/ EU, Ghana and the Ivory Coast, affected these multinational corporations - also referred to as foreign private corporate agents- was crucial for several reasons. Not only were some of these corporate agents (such as the largest British cocoa processing company Cadbury) established during European colonialism (see Ehler, 1977, p. 10), but many of them even managed to secure their profitability and expand into new economic activities under the post-colonial trade regimes established between Europe, Ghana and the Ivory Coast. Additionally, these companies, with profound effects on the cocoa value chain during and after European colonialism in West-Africa, have remained the most influential private corporate agents within the trans-national cocoa value chain so that examining their economic development was vital for the purpose of my investigation. However, I must clarify that the term "multinational corporations", as it is used throughout my thesis, encompasses all the world's largest cocoa traders, grinders and chocolate producers and is not limited to multinational corporations based in the European Union. Nonetheless, the largest cocoa trading/ processing companies are based in the European Economic Area and the United States.[1]

In addition to multinational corporations engaged in cocoa trade and -processing, I also took a closer look at those public corporate agents which are responsible for sector regulation, managing domestic resource distribution and generating public revenue for the primary-corporate agents of Ghana and the Ivory Coast. These were the cocoa marketing boards.

Finally, I must briefly clarify that I treated cocoa farmers in Ghana and the Ivory Coast as corporate agents, although they are often unorganized and act individually. Corporate agents, as defined by Margaret Archer, are agents who articulate and promote the common interests of their members. However, due to their shared interest in sufficiently high domestic cocoa prices and the fact that their common interests are represented in the producer price determination, I chose to treat individual Ghanaian and Ivorian cocoa farmers as a distinct private corporate agent, even though only organizations, not individuals, would meet Archer's narrow definition.

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[1] These companies include (but are not limited to): Cargill, Barry Callebaut, Cemoi, Ferrero, Touton, ECOM Agroindustrial, Lindt & Sprüngli, Nestlé, Hershey's, Mars, Mondelez.

To summarize, for my study, corporate agents under investigation are multinational trading-/processing companies, Ivorian and Ghanaian farmers and public agencies tasked with sector regulation. Each trade agreement and domestic policy since the end of European colonialism in Ghana and the Ivory Coast was analyzed according to a critical realist paradigm, as to how it affected the interests of these groups and whether it conserved or transformed colonial patterns of resource distribution within the post-colonial cocoa value chain.

3.4.5. Corporate Agents Excluded from the Investigation

Having introduced the patterns of resource distribution which produced the corporate agents my thesis is focused on, I will now briefly present the corporate agents I had to exclude from my research. Though these corporate agents were relevant for the colonial economies established within British and French West Africa, I excluded them from further investigation, because their relevance either diminished with decolonization or their development thereafter lied beyond the scope of my inquiry.

3.4.5.1. European settlers

Though they were obviously the most relevant political faction within British and French West Africa throughout the period of colonialism, I chose not to incorporate the post-colonial development of European settlers, because they were simply beneficiaries of colonialism. Vested with unique political influence throughout West Africa's colonial period, European settlers benefited from a variety of measures protecting their access to material- and cultural resources.

As colonialism came to an end in British- and French West Africa, so did the European settlers' preferential access to cultural and material resources, as far as access to these cultural and material resources was determined by ethnicity. In cases where access to these resources depended on financial resources, European settlers may have been able to retain their preferential access so long as they were able to secure their capital and financial resources after colonialism. Hence, it shall suffice to simply acknowledge that European colonialism provided European settlers with unique political and economic opportunities which were inaccessible to Africans. The European settler's monopoly on trade in Timber, the construction of infrastructure supporting their economic activities, their prerogative in the allocation of forced labor, the reservation of social services such as health care facilities for them, the exclusion from forced labor and other forms of physical abuse all document the preferential treatment European settlers in British and French West Africa received.

Obviously, the European settlers' formal socio-economic dominance ended with European colonialism, so that their preferential access to cultural and material resources was shared with the African political and economic elites, which seized control of their countries subsequent to independence. Rather than focusing on the post-colonial development of each country's European settlers, I chose to focus on how these eurocentric patterns of resource distribution were altered by domestic policies and the evolving trade relations after independence. Though I must admit that this is a blind spot of my investigation, this does not at all mean that European corporate agents are excluded from my study of the post-colonial trade relations and their effect on the cocoa value chain. However, rather than examining the development of European settlers in Ghana and the Ivory Coast, I chose to investigate the development of multinational corporations.

3.4.5.2. Lebanese Traders and Senegalese Bureaucrats in French West Africa

As with the previously discussed European settlers, I also excluded the post-colonial development of the Lebanese traders and Senegalese bureaucrats from my investigation. Though both groups were very important in French West Africa's colonial development, their relevance, too, diminished with the end of European colonialism in West Africa. As the Ivory Coast's post-colonial period set in, the positions these groups held within the Ivory Coast's society were successively assumed by members of other primary agents. In both, post-colonial Ghana and the Ivory Coast, the bureaucracy and commercial enterprises started to "africanize" so that an increasing number of positions these corporate agents provided were filled with Ghanaian and Ivorian Africans. Therefore, I did not further investigate the post-colonial development of Lebanese Traders and Senegalese bureaucrats.

3.4.6. Limiting Effect of Crude Data

As with any scientific examination, observation and abstraction requires the selection of patterns and objects to focus the investigation on. Though I had initially planned to uphold the distinction between land owning cocoa farmers and migrant laborers throughout my investigation of Ghana's and the Ivory Coast's post-colonial cocoa sector, the comparative data available to me in scholarly literature and from multinational organizations such as the UN's Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) or the World Bank (WB) did not provide the necessary level of detail to do so. Therefore, even though cocoa producers are obviously not a homogenous group, as the size and location of their plot and individual farmer's specific ethnic backgrounds vary, I was forced to simplify my investigation by reducing the corporate agents whose post-colonial development I examine to multinational corporations, cocoa smallholders and regulatory agencies. Though this is regrettable, as further differentiation could have provided more insight into how specific corporate agents are affected by post-colonial alterations to patterns of resource distribution induced by successive trade agreements, it was simply not possible to do so given the crudeness of the data derived from both, the sources at hand and previous social-scientific investigations. To this point, I must add that, though there are some studies which provide a greater level of detail in their analysis, these were limited to but one of the two countries of interests and therefore did not allow for a comparative analysis. Other sub-segments of cocoa producers are female farmers, farmers of distinct ethnic backgrounds, migrant laborers working on cocoa farms and farmers cultivating different plot sizes of land. Even though each of these groups face different circumstances in the production and sale of their cocoa, there was no comparative data available which would have enabled me to examine their access to and position in patterns of resource distribution from time of independence to 2016. Consequently, my investigation of the post- colonial cocoa value chain's development remains limited to multinational corporations engaged in cocoa trade and processing, public corporate agents tasked with managing and extracting revenue from each domestic cocoa sector and smallholding cocoa farmers.

Though this simplification of corporate agents in the cocoa value chain was involuntary, it was both necessary and called for, as 85% of cocoa grown around the world is produced by smallholding farmers, defined as farmers which cultivate plantations no larger than two hectares (see Cidell & Alberts, 2006, p. 1002). Even though some farmers with larger plot sizes and/or in more accessible locations may be less affected by certain policies or economic developments, these do not represent the norm and, therefore, it seemed more appropriate to investigate how trade agreements altered the patterns of resource distribution which affect the by far largest group of cocoa producers, namely cocoa growers operating on smallholdings.

3.5. Forced Labor as a Pattern of Resource Distribution

One of the most obvious patterns of resource distribution working in the interest of European settlers and trading companies was the widespread use of forced labor in both the Gold- and Ivory Coast. Although there were some differences in the way each colonial empire organized its economy, it seems peculiar that both systems combined the instrumentalization of local chiefs, the taxation of the general population and the exploitation of forced labor as means to advance the interests of their imperial economies. Therefore, a more in-depth look into how these policies were justified and implemented is called for. The purpose of this is to establish whether policies promoted by the EEC (later EU) or multilateral organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World Bank (WB) achieved similar effects.

Both the British and the French colonial administration required their local chiefs to levy taxes to finance the colonial administration and to construct the infrastructure necessary for the exploitation of their territory. Though there are some examples of local chiefs refraining from levying taxes from their population, (especially in the British territories of the former Ashanti Empire,) where taxation was not part of the traditional prerogatives of the pre-colonial elites, both the French and the British were able to extract taxes from their African subjects in parts of their West African territories (see Crowder, 1971, p. 208). Instead of simply demanding their African subjects to provide forced labor, both colonial administrations' demand was mediated by their local chiefs who imposed forced labor as a punishment for individuals who failed to pay the newly imposed taxes. Apart from the similar justifications for the extraction of forced labor from individuals, there were some differences in the method of deployment. Even though there is a consensus in colonial literature that the British forced labor practices were more lenient for example by (a.) limiting their use to situations in which no voluntary labor was available, (b.) limiting the workdays for forced labor to six days a week in 1932 (see Crowder, 1971, p. 209) or (c.) reducing the maximum number of days of work an individual had to provide labor to colonial projects to twelve work days a year (see Woods, 2004, p.230), both systems resembled one another in that an individuals' inability to pay taxes was used as a pretext to extort his/her labor for the benefit of European commercial enterprises.

Nevertheless, the French colonial administration, did not only use forced labor to construct infrastructure benefiting her industry but even went so far as to allocate forced labor to the farms and plantations of European settlers (see Crowder, 1971, p. 187). When we take a step back from the immediate justification and use of forced labor in West Africa, a more general pattern of resource distribution related to the macroeconomic performance of West African colonies becomes visible. While an individuals' inability to produce taxes for the colonial administration was used to justify the extortion of forced labor, colonial taxation in general was designed to increase the production in- and productivity of West African colonies in both British- and French West Africa. So, despite their differences in the "how", forced labor was justified the general purpose of taxes and forced labor were the same, as they were "the means of forcing Africans to increase [the] production of crops which were needed by Europe" (Ibid.). Given the racist ideology justifying the exploitation of Africans, it comes as no surprise to learn that Europeans were exempt from forced labor, leaving them to benefit either directly from forced labor practices on their plantations in the Ivory Coast or indirectly through exclusive access to the infrastructure and health care facilities financed by African taxpayers in case of the Gold Coast.

3.6. Taxes and Value Chains in the Colonial Economy

As shown, taxes served multiple purposes in the colonial economy. Used to finance the development of infrastructure for better exploitation of the colony, as a justification to extort forced labor from Africans and/or to generate the revenue necessary to pay the colonial administration's bureaucracy, the taxation of subjugated African societies formed the basis of the colonial economy. However, taxes also served a purpose more closely related to the metropolitan industry of imperial economies.

The necessity to generate taxes for the local chief and the colonial administration he represented forced Africans to engage in surplus generating economic activities to provide the raw material for the British and French industry. Those enterprises -engaged in economic activities requiring tropical, basic commodities such as groundnuts, cocoa, coffee, rubber or teak wood- were all dependent on the availability of these agricultural commodities. In addition to the European economies' general dependence on these inputs, the specific profit margins of European companies were also dependent upon the price of these tropical inputs. Hence, to increase their profitability, European trading companies relied on a variety of tactics to lower their costs and secure their supply.

While the taxation of their West African subjects was the primary means to increase the availability of tropical produce, the companies trading these commodities also benefited from their ability to discriminate against the African sellers, by price rigging. The European trading companies' ability to dictate the prices for their inputs rested on the fact that they were operating from a monopoly position in two respects. First, due to the high capital requirements for establishing a colonial trading venture which served as a barrier to market entry for other corporate agents, (such as the Lebanese traders,) there was very limited competition among trading companies within a colonial territory. Furthermore, when companies did find themselves in a competitive situation, the limited number of potential buyers enabled them to agree upon the price they would pay to the African producers or sellers of that commodity, amongst one another (Crowder, 1971, p. 287 ff.). Secondly, French colonial trading companies in particular benefited from protectionist colonial policies which provided them with a monopoly for the commodities they sold within their respective colonies (see Ibid.). Hence, European trading companies were not only able to determine the prices they had to pay for their inputs but their export markets -especially within the French colonial empire- were also protected by trade policies.

All of this was made possible by the laissez-faire-approach the colonial administration took towards these commercial, colonial enterprises in the earlier phases of colonialism. And, just in case the colonial administration contemplated enforcing policies that stood in the way of their profit maximization, the colonial trading companies, also had preferential access to the colonial decision-making process. As a matter of fact, in both Britain and France these companies were able to exert pressure on the colonial administration through the Legislative Councils and the Chamber of Commerce respectively (Ibid., p. 281).

Nevertheless, there were some differences in the way each colonial administration ensured the supply of tropical inputs to their industries. While both utilized taxes as means to force Africans into productive economic activities, the French went one step further than their British counterparts in that they directly ordered the cultivation of the cash crops their industries required. Hence, the French colonial administration took a more proactive approach in their extortion of African labor to benefit their metropolitan industry (Ibid., p. 301).

Beyond enabling their colonial trading companies to gain monopolies within their markets and allowing them to force cocoa producers into the position of price takers, there was another similarity in the patterns of resource distribution benefiting their industries, which related to the way investments were organized. Rather than investing in the overseas territories, colonial trading companies allocated their financing in the metropolitan areas of their respective empires. Even though this may have been a result of the companies' economic rationale, the same cannot be said about their lack of investment in their African labor force. Instead of providing their African employees with the training necessary for them to perform tasks such as repairing machines or organizing the local bureaucracy, the racist socio-cultural structure, prevalent at the time, justified the trading companies' discriminatory practices towards their own work force. As a result, colonial trading companies employed very expensive, economically inefficient expatriate staff, which ensured parts of their salaries flowed back home instead of being invested and redistributed in the overseas territories itself (see Ibid., p. 299).

4. Transfer of Power; How Africans Gained Control of Their Country

Though cocoa remained one of the most important exported commodities for both Ghana and the Ivory Coast long after colonialism, the role corporate agents engaged in the cocoa production played in each country's post-colonial political system was quite different. To provide a better understanding of how the previously identified corporate agents related to their countries' first post-colonial government and assess how each of these governments sought to utilize the revenues generated by their cocoa exports, I will now investigate whether and how each post-colonial governments' cocoa sector policy incorporated the interests of cocoa producers. Once this descriptive part is concluded I will return to the colonial resource distribution to compare these patterns.

4.1. Ghana's Independence

Though Ghana's independence in 1957 is often described as a benevolent act on behalf of the British, it was actually the result of a cost-utility-analysis which led the British to allow the Gold Coast's self-government in 1955 (see Seddon & Seddon-Daines, 2005, p. 239). The decision to permit the Gold Coasts' inhabitants to conduct a referendum concerning their independence in 1956 was based on the expectation that it would serve Britain's long-term interest to retain its image as a compassionate colonial power which did not stand in the way of her subjects' liberty. In addition, an investigation by British Parliament had concluded that an amicable separation would increase Ghana's willingness to become a member of the Commonwealth and remain in the sterling area (see Altmann, 2005, p. 188). Finally, the economic analysis within the Parliament's inquiry came to the conclusion that even though the Gold Coast was the world's largest cocoa producer at time of the investigation (see Woods, 2004, p. 232), it's relevance as a potential market had declined to the point where its benefits no longer justified the political and economic costs Britain would encounter, were she to provide the social services and investments her African subjects demanded. Hence, British Parliament decided that the costs of retaining political control over the Gold Coast outweighed the economic benefits, especially considering that these benefits were likely to remain if the Gold Coast were to enter the Commonwealth and peg its currency to the pound. Lastly, the Accra-Riots of 1948 had demonstrated the Africans' dissatisfaction with the British colonial policies and served as a stark reminder of the "political liability they represented" (Waites, 1999, p. 281). Hence, Britain's decision, not to stand in the way of the Gold Coast's independence, was by no means a benevolent act, but rather a strategic decision aimed at retaining the economic benefits the Gold Coast provided while casting aside the political responsibility for her African subjects' wellbeing.

Once the Gold Coast had acquired political independence in 1957, however, then Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah needed to confront the host of problems the British had left the country with. Not only was Ghana, socioeconomically, regionally and ethnically challenged (see Kraus, 1971, p. 36), but it was home to various political factions, each of which legitimizing their claim to power either through pre-colonial customs, their educational and professional background or their participation in the anti-colonial movement prior to independence. These were the circumstances under which Kwame Nkrumah gained control of the newly independent Ghana and the forces he had to wrestle with.

Examining this situation form the CR perspective, one can say that the socio-cultural structure, (i.e. the racist ideology justifying the exploitation of African labor to the exclusive economic benefit of Europeans) led to the development of primary agents along the predominant ethnic cleavage between Africans and Europeans. By successfully promoting the self-government of Africans in the Gold Coast, Kwame Nkrumah transformed this primary agent into a corporate agent which managed to seize control over the territory and attain the political independence its members desired. Once independence was achieved and Ghana had ceded from the empire, however, this original corporate agent dissembled into multiple corporate agents. Each of which articulated and promoted the specific interests of its members. Within CR theory the societal transformation materializing in the establishment of a formally independent state and triggering the emergence of new corporate agents is referred to as double morphogenesis (see Archer, 1995, p. 253), and its effect was so profound that the corporate agents emerging from this transformation would define Ghana's social strata until the end of the 21st century. Succinctly put, the term double morphogenesis refers to a situation in which the transformation of a social structure provokes further re-grouping processes throughout society which can either alter the composition of existing corporate agents or trigger the emergence of new ones.

As traditional authorities were no longer promoted by the British colonial administration and Ghana began to forge its own destiny, its society underwent a process of modernization through which new identities and interests emerged at the individual level. As traditional social groups lost their importance and were replaced by modern identities, people increasingly identified themselves through their professional, economic and educational backgrounds rather than the primary agents or ethnic groups they were born into. This can also be seen by the host of professional networks and organizations (all of which were corporate agents in their own right) that formed once the independent Republic of Ghana emerged from the British West African Gold Coast.

Jon Kraus observation of Ghana's social modernization process identifies the following groups within Ghana's post-colonial social strata (see Kraus, 1971, p. 36).

A small merchant-professional bourgeoisie, consisting of lawyers, bureaucrats and educators all of which were well educated compared to their contemporaries.

Earning slightly less than the previous group was a larger middle and lower-middle class composed of teachers, clerks, traders, cocoa brokers, contractors, pharmacists and journalists whose income basically matched that of the 500 000 cocoa farmers he identifies as a distinct socio-economic group.

These groups were followed by a lower middle class of laborers who worked as cash crop farmers and had not been able to conclude their primary or secondary education.
And finally, trailing these groups in terms of income and wealth were wage- and migrant laborers, who were the politically and economically most disadvantaged group.

When we compare the post-colonial social strata in the early phase of Ghana's independence to the groups created by the colonial patterns of resource distribution, we can see the long-term effects these patterns of resource distribution had on the subsequent social strata. While those, able to benefit from colonial patterns of cultural resource distribution such as higher education, were able to assume the highest positions within Ghana's post-colonial society, the group that had been forced to sell their labor without being able to acquire land in the process, ended up as part of their country's migrant labor reservoir. The groups in between these extremes, referred to as middle and lower-middle class, where those who had been able to benefit somewhat from the colonial patterns of material- or cultural resource distribution by either obtaining land, through the abovementioned system of abusa, or had some formal education which enabled them to work in one of the stated professions. Hence, there is a direct connection between the colonial patterns of material and cultural resource distribution and the subsequent social strata prevalent in post-colonial Ghana.

4.2. The Ivory Coast's Independence

Examining the Ivory Coast's path to independence, one realizes that Ghana and the Ivory Coast are quite different with regards to the internal forces promoting and achieving self-governance. Not only was Ghana ahead of the Ivory Coast regarding the point in time of independence and with respect to her position as the world's largest cocoa producer but the domestic forces promoting Ghana's independence, identified as the merchant-professional bourgeoisie by John Kraus, were also quite different from those promoting self-governance in the Ivory Coast.

Contrary to Ghana, the Ivory Coast's independence movement began with a group of African planters whose dissatisfaction with colonial patters of (labor) resource distribution made them found the African Planter Syndicate, which was the first organization to serve the economic interests of all male African planters cultivating crops for commercial purposes. Prior to this organization's formation in 1944 there were only a hand full of African planters represented by a corporate agent. Furthermore, this organization, the "Ivory Coast's Chamber of Agriculture and Industry", had been headed by Europeans. Apart from primarily representing the interests of European planters, the organization was only open to an elite minority of African planters who cultivated more than 25 ha and even these individual's interests were discriminated against when it came to allocating labor to their plantations and ensuring a common price for their produce (see Zeller, 1969, p. 156). While all members of Ivory Coast's Chamber of Agriculture and Industry benefited from the organization's provision of agricultural tools such as hacks, machetes, rifles and ammunition, its African members were only payed 2.5 CFA compare to 4.5 CFA per Kilo of cocoa and, instead of benefiting from the allocation of labor for labor-intensive phases of cultivation, they were allocated to their European peers as laborers (see Ibid.). Hence, the Ivory Coast's Chamber of Agriculture and Industry actually prevented this privileged group of African planters from siding with Africans who cultivated smaller plots of land, while simultaneously institutionalizing discriminatory practices at the highest level of the country's agricultural sector. Realizing their interests were better served if they banded together with all other African Planters, they took to founding the African Planter Syndicate (SAA), the head of which was the future first President of Ivory Coast Felix Houphouët Boigny. As the country's first corporate agent encompassing all African planters, it initially had a very narrow scope in terms of its objective, which focused on promoting the economic interests of its members by supporting them in the acquisition of voluntary, payed labor from the territory's northern regions. Though the head of the colonial administration at the time, Gouverneur Latrille abstained from obstructing the formation of this corporate agent, he did ensure its purpose remained limited to the economic interests of the African planters by inscribing a provision prohibiting the promotion of political or religious rights into the organization's charter (Art.8) (see Zeller, 1969, p. 159). This, however, did not prevent the organization from becoming politically active by calling for the exclusion of African planters and their family members from forced labor practices. The campaign ended successfully with Gouverneur Latrille ordering all male family members of planters cultivating a plot of over 2 ha of Coffee or 3 ha of cocoa to be freed from their obligation to provide labor to European planters on Mai 31. 1945 (see Ibid., p. 158).

One year later, the African Planter Syndicate took another step in representing the interests of its members by founding the cooperative "Les Planteurs Africains de la Côte d'Ivoire, Société Cooperative des Planteurs Africains de la Côte d'Ivoire" which represented the planter's interests by organizing the sale of their produce to European trading companies. These had been notorious for cheating African planters out of their profits prior to the establishment of this agricultural cooperative (see Ibid.). As the country's first agricultural corporate agent representing the interests of all African farmers, engaged in commercial farming, the African Planters Syndicate brought together leaders from across the country and ultimately gave rise to the Parti Democratique de la Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI), the country's first political party, founded by Felix Houphouët Boigny in 1946 (see Woods, 2004, p. 230).

Contrary to Ghana, where independence was achieved by an anti-colonial mass movement led by the Conventions People's Party (CPP), the Ivory Coast's first potent political party evolved from an agricultural business organization for Africans which sought to abolish specific colonial patterns of (labor) resource distribution. Hence, the corporate agent which achieved the Ivory Coast's independence was one which had the economic interests of large and small export crop producers at heart. Rather than repositioning itself, the newly independent Ivory Coast, which was economically dependent upon her export revenues, established close political and economic ties with her former colonizer. Though this may have been in the interest of the general population, it was most definitely in the interest of those whose livelihood depended upon the export of their agricultural commodities to Europe. It is therefore not surprising that the independent Ivory Coast's foreign policy, while committed to the decolonization of the African continent, was non-confrontational and export-oriented towards France.

As was the case in Ghana, there is another side to how this former colony gained independence from her European colonizers. This relates to how France and, more specifically, the French political and economic elite perceived the Ivory Coast's pursuit of independence. Similar to the processes which preceded Ghana's independence the political and economic decision makers in metropolitan France also wrestled with the question of how to react to their colony's attempt to gain independence and tried to project how this might affect their economy.

Examining the Ivory Coast's independence process from a CR perspective, I maintain that the initial corporate agent, the African Planter Syndicate, was established to alter colonial patterns of material resource distribution by abolishing forced labor practices and facilitating its member's acquisition of voluntary, paid labor. Once this was accomplished its members did not only supported the establishment of another corporate agent which promoted their interests in negotiations with European buyers but also supported the creation of a political party seeking an end to French colonialism, while maintaining their economic interests as export oriented agricultural commodity producers.

When we compare the development of the corporate agents which achieved each country's independence, we can see that both developed in the mid twentieth century, when the socio-cultural structure on which colonialism relied – the euro-centric, racist ideology justifying the exploitation of Africans - was transforming. This, in turn, triggered re-grouping processes within Ghana and the Ivory Coast. The corporate agents this re-grouping process produced then promoted their African population's common interest in abolishing colonialism and by achieving this objective, they transformed their societies' (material-) social structure. In other words, as the cultural morphogenesis spilled over into the structural sphere and the idea of an inherent superiority of Europeans over Africans was called into question, the supposed ethnic superiority of Europeans no longer sufficed to justify their control over the patterns of resource distribution within their colonial territories. As a result, further re-grouping processes were triggered, and new corporate agents, ready to seize control over their domestic patterns of resource distribution, emerged. Once self-governance had been attained by the corporate agents which managed to establish themselves as Primary-Corporate Agents, by means of elections, new corporate agents formed which sought to reform these patterns of resource distribution according to the particular interest of their members. Both in Ghana and the Ivory Coast these processes of double morphogenesis are documented by the various new corporate agents which came to the fore after independence.

Going back to the discourse surrounding the effects of decolonization on France, it appears as though the French were quite cognizant of their economic dependence on the comparatively cheap inputs their colonial empire provided the French economy. In contrast to the British, whose liberal trade policy had diversified their sources of inputs and export markets, the French trading companies and industry were far more dependent upon the favorable economic conditions the colonial empire provided. Surprisingly, according to the French journal for colonial industry "Marchés Coloniaux", those segments of French industry most dependent on the colonial economic structure, were even in favor of political reforms which provided more political representation to "native" interests within the political process. Furthermore, some contributors to the journal even entertained the idea of creating a federal association between France and her overseas territories (see Waites, 1999, p. 285). Though the idea never came to fruition, it is remarkable that those whose profits were most dependent on colonial patterns of resource distribution were willing to reform their empires polity for sake of preserving beneficial patterns of material resource distribution. In fact, the Central Committee for Overseas France even went so far to proclaim that "without Africa, the metropole will not prosper" (Pasquir, 1992, cited from Waites, 1999, p. 288 f.). While this may be a simplified depiction of the French industries' dependence on cheap agricultural commodities from the empire's tropical regions and the favorable market conditions protective trade policies provided, it does adequately describe France's economic dependence on her overseas territories.

Though Britain and France were dissimilar with regards to the degree to which their industry's profitability depended on their state's colonies, the decision-making processes leading up to the Gold-and Ivory Coast's independence did resemble one another. While the French seem to have been far more worried about the unemployment decolonization would cause, due to returning expatriate employees and the need to rationalize production processes, matters of retaining a post-colonial currency union and ensuring market access to the overseas territories were at the heart of both countries' debates surrounding decolonization (see Waites, 1999, p. 285). Furthermore, the elected representatives of each country considered the fact that their former colonies would no longer pose a fiscal and political burden to their countries as a long-term benefit. However, I consider this description of overseas territories as a burden to be quite hypocritical considering how colonial patterns of resource distribution almost exclusively benefited Europeans and corporate agents from or within European metropolitan areas. Moreover, it was the taxes and labor of Africans which paid for the overseas administration and infrastructure.

In summary, both Britain and France concluded that decolonization provided them with an opportunity to rid themselves of the political and financial cost attached to maintaining a global colonial empire, while it could be implemented in a manner which meintained the economic benefits its transnational patterns of resource distribution provided. Both countries perceived a monetary union and close trading relations as the best means to maintain these transnational patterns of resource distribution as they would ensure a continuous supply of cheap inputs and secure favorable market conditions for their economies.

Now that we have briefly outlined each country's independence movement and compared the economic factors discussed in their colonizers' internal debate prior to their independence, we will examine Ghana's and the Ivory Coast's post-colonial development strategies as they relate to their cocoa sector and the previously identified groups within them. We will begin by outlining each government's economic policies pertaining to cocoa, to understand how they preserved or transformed specific patterns of resource distribution. Thereafter, we shall analyze how the policies affected corporate agents along the cocoa value chain and study whether colonial patterns of resource distribution were conserved or transformed by the EEC's/EU's trade policy.

4.3. Post-Colonial Cocoa Policies and Development strategies

Post-colonial Ghana and the Ivory Coast pursued very different development strategies, both of which were strongly influenced by their respective colonial legacy. In this segment I will examine each countries' development strategy and investigate how their post-colonial policies conserved or transformed colonial patterns of resource distribution, how each country made use of the revenues generated by their cocoa sector and how their policies affected those engaged in cocoa production. Once I have concluded this investigation of each country's domestic cocoa policies, I will begin to examine the effects, the EU's trade policy had on the post-colonial cocoa value chain.

In both, Ghana and the Ivory Coast, cocoa was perceived a strategic resource which could aid the governments to finance the socioeconomic development of their countries. To do so, each government maintained state-controlled marketing boards which protected cocoa producers from price volatility and enabled the state to extract the difference between global market prices and the farm gate prices guaranteed to cocoa farmers as public revenue (see Woods, 2004, 231). This, however, was not the only advantage marketing boards provided their governments. While capturing part of the cocoa rent as public revenue was certainly the primary task of these institutions, they were also useful to control other aspects of the national cocoa sector such as the use and distribution of fertilizer, and the implementation of quality control measures. Finally, both countries' cocoa marketing boards were intended to serve as tools to stabilize producer prices.

But marketing boards as such were no post-colonial innovation, since they had already been used by colonial administrations to manage cocoa exports (see Fold, 2001, p. 414). However, their post-colonial significance was elevated by the fact that they were an important source for public funds and a means to finance patronage networks with which each post-colonial government stabilized its rule. Hence, cocoa marketing boards were not only important to fund both country's social and economic development, but also as an instrument for each government to pacify political factions and pay for stability. Though both countries mainteined these marketing boards, (initially called "Cocoa Marketing Board", later Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) and "la Caisse de Stabilisation et de Soutien des Produits Primaires Agricoles" (CAISTAB) in the Ivory Coast) the ways in which these boards supported and utilized the domestic cocoa sectors differed considerably. This relates to the previously stated fact that the corporate agents achieving independence and controlling the subsequent governments were very dissimilar. While Nkrumah's CPP drew most of its leadership from "middle-and lower-middle class strata" (Kraus, 1971, p. 38) the Ivory Coast's PDCI emerged from the Syndicate Agricole African which had been founded by the elite of African planters Felix Houphouët-Boigny belonged to.

In other words, the corporate agents from which the primary-corporate agents governing their countries emerged, had different ties to their domestic cocoa sector. While both countries perceived cocoa and the revenue its export generated as means to finance their industrialization and development, only the Ivory Coast was governed by cocoa producers. Therefore, it is no surprise that the Ivory Coast's cocoa policies were more cocoa production- and export oriented compared to the cocoa policies designed by Ghana's CPP, which were more redistributive and less attentive to the interests of those producing the country's most profitable commodity.

More specifically, the Ivory Coast's cocoa sector policy was designed to provide price stability for cocoa producers while facilitating their access to land and labor. Indeed, PDCI'S cocoa policies even fostered the access to land and labor for foreigners who had the means to acquire land in the country's southern regions, which held untapped forestland. These policies led to a rapid expansion of the Ivory Coast's cocoa production in the 1970's and enabled her to overtake Ghana as the world's largest cocoa producer in the latter half of that decade (Amanor, 2012, p. 740 ff.).

Ghana's cocoa policy, on the other hand, was far less cocoa producer friendly and primarily sought to maximize the resources for the country's industrialization. Even though Ghana's Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB) also guaranteed prices to its cocoa growers, these prices were considerably lower than those payed in the Ivory Coast. As a matter of fact, the prices payed to Ghanaian cocoa producers ranged from 40 to 50 percent of world market prices between 1952-1963, fell to 30 percent in 1965 and ended up at less than 20 percent by the 1980's (see Woods, 2004; McCauley, 2013).

While it is easy to see why a political party, founded by cocoa producers such as the PDCI, would be inclined to enhancing the economic well-being of its political base by facilitating their production process or assisting them financially in the transportation of their goods, the situation in Ghana was less clear-cut.

Douglas Ashford referred to this as the "linkage problem". Facing a situation, in which the governing party lacks structural relationships with large parts of society- and without a significant power base in the country's cocoa-producing areas or among its traditional elites, Nkrumah's CPP sought to gain control over the cocoa producing segments of society by repressing "all independent rural unions – except [the] United Ghana Farmers' Council (UGFC) [which was already] dominated by the CPP " (Woods, 2004, p. 232 ff.). Once the UGFC was provided with a "monopoly on cocoa purchasing" (Ibid.), it developed into an important source of public funds and financed the CPP's patronage network. Nkrumah's move to seize control of the country's economic base did not stop at securing the purchasing monopoly for an organization controlled by his political party, however. Instead, the CPP also sought control over other inputs of production such as credit, fungicides and even cutlasses. The CPP even went so far as to replace village chiefs with individuals loyal to the party and inserting party members into other organizations within the cocoa sector, in order to expand its clout (see Woods, 2004, p. 233). Furthermore, Ghana's cocoa policies unwittingly obstructed the expansion of her cocoa production, by guaranteeing comparatively low prices to farmers, while Ivory Coast's Houphouët-Boigny's policies increased the country's cocoa output. This enabled the Ivory Coast to unseat Ghana as the world's largest producer in the late 1970's. However, the exact point in time when this took place is difficult to determine, because the significant price difference, paid by the national marketing board, incentivized an increase in cross-border cocoa smuggling from Ghana to the Ivory Coast, which distorts the statistical data (see Ibid.).

Beyond these differences in national cocoa policies the two countries also differed greatly with regards to their national development strategies. These disparities will be discussed in the following sub-segment, before we analyze these development strategies from a CR perspective and discuss their effects on domestic patterns of resource distribution.

4.3.1. Post-Colonial Development Strategies

Though both Ghana and the Ivory Coast utilized cocoa export revenue to fund their national development strategies, these strategies had very different emphasis. While it is certainly correct to describe the Ivory Coast's development strategy as one that "prioritized export-led growth reliant on foreign factors of production" (McCauley, 2013, p. 184) and Ghana's as a strategy focused on "state-led development and import substitution" (Ibid.), our investigation ought to go further by taking note of the consequences these policies had on the structural [i.e.

material] relations within each post-colonial society. To do this, I will examine what effect the national development strategies had on the previously discussed patterns of resource distribution of land and labor in each country.

After gaining independence from Britain in 1957, Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah attempted to advance his country's development by expanding public service provision and subsidizing the development of the national chemicals, electronics and machine tools industries (see Huq, 1989 cited from McCauley, 2013, p. 196). Nkrumah's ambition to advance his country's development through the provision of free public education is reflected in the 1961 Education Act, by which Ghana managed to provide primary education for 55 percent of its population by 1965 (see Crook, 1990, p. 27). Furthermore, this educational reform was designed to make education available to historically disadvantaged groups such as the country's northern population and women, which had been particularly neglected throughout history (Tsikata & Seini, 2004, p. 19), as the northern regions had served as a reserve for cheap labor throughout colonialism.

Another example for Ghana's ambition to enhance social service provisions to the general public is the establishment of publicly funded health centers which delivered health care in rural areas free of charge. Though Ghana's government abolished this practice in 1971 when it began to "collect user fees for health services" (MacLean, 2002, p. 76), (as a result of the Social Security Act of 1965, which called for employers and employees to contribute to the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT)), the initially free de-central provision of health care services is a good example for how funds, generated through the export of cocoa, were redistributed to benefit the general public. Finally, Ghana's early development strategy also entailed investments in public infrastructure which were earmarked to benefit the rural poor. These investments included the construction of feeder roads, the delivery of electricity and clean water as well as the construction of housing in rural communities. Though the latter measures were not taken by Nkrumah- but by the succeeding Busia administration which governed Ghana from 1969 to 1972 (see Ibid., p. 75), after Nkrumah was removed from power through a coup in 1966, (see Woods, 2004, p. 233) they were in line with the de-central state-led development strategy Ghana pursued since independence. Moreover, Ghana's development strategy was refined throughout the 1970's to include the (rural-) poor members of society. This entailed encouraging "local communities […] to support social services by supplying building materials, communal labor, and special financial collections" (MacLean, 2002, p. 76).

The measures outlined above, however, were more than policies aimed at making “health and education services increasingly available and affordable to a broader section of the population” or generally advancing Ghana’s post-colonial, social and economic development. Instead, they were also designed to meet “the needs of the growing urban areas” (Ibid., p. 73) and, as a statement by Kwame Nkrumah himself clarifies, they were the deliberate attempt to “challenge the colonial pattern of commerce and industry” (Langan, 2015, p. 116).

In contrast to this, Houphouët-Boigny’s development strategy for the Ivory Coast followed an almost diametrically opposed economic development paradigm which “favored a market-driven agricultural economy that mirrored the “plantation economy” model, employed by the French since the 1930s” (McCauley, 2013, p. 192). Pursuing this export-led growth strategy required Houphouët to organize the Ivory Coast’s economic and foreign policy around the country’s coffee and cocoa sector, which he did by maintaining economic and political proximity to the former colonizer. For examples of this close, post-colonial alignment between the Ivory Coast and France we must only consider the 1961 defense pact through which the Ivory Coast surrendered its external security to the French (see N’Diaye, 2005, p. 93), or the fact that school textbooks were purchased directly from France until the late 1980s (see MacLean, 2002, p. 79). The leaning towards France also applied to the country’s trade-, investment- and monetary policy, as the former colonial overlord remained the Ivory Coast’s most important partner in all these concerns (see Waites, 1999, p. 289 ff.). Beyond the trade- and military relations, Houphouët also deepened the economic interdependence between the two economies by adopting an investment code which “guaranteed the repatriation of profits for foreign companies [and promoted his country’s image] as an investment-friendly environment for foreign firms” (McCauley, 2013, p. 194).

To support this export-led development strategy the PDCI’s economic policy was designed to expand the Ivory Coast’s cocoa frontiers by increasing the availability of migrant labor through liberal immigration policies and providing access to land for those who wanted to establish their own agricultural enterprises, especially migrant laborers from the Baulé, the same ethnic group as the President (see Amanor, 2012, p. 740).

4.3.2. Development Strategies from a CR Perspective

To examine the respective development strategies from a CR perspective, we must research how the policies, implemented by each primary-corporate agent, affected not only the patterns of resource distribution but also the corporate agents engaged in the cocoa value chain, by paying attention to how these measures altered their respective bargaining power and negotiation strength. Once the investigation of the impact of their development strategies is concluded, I will focus on the EEC's / EU's trade policy's development.

4.3.2.1. Ghana's Development Strategy from a CR Point of View

When we reflect upon the development strategy pursued by Ghana's primary-corporate agents, with its comparatively high degree of redistribution, its emphasis on de-central social service provision and subsidized industrialization, it becomes clear that the economic interest of cocoa farmers was not at the heart of Kwame Nkrumah's economic agenda. Instead his policies appear to have been designed to maximize the public's share of revenue generated by the country's cocoa sector to support the development of new patterns of material resource distribution through subsidized industrialization. Furthermore, the CPP's dedication to the provision of public education suggests that Ghana's government was determined to establish new patterns of cultural resource distribution to benefit all of society rather than focusing its support on a specific group of traditional, educational or material elites.

This comes as no surprise considering the socio-economic background from which Nkrumah's CPP emerged. The CPP came into existence as a faction splitting off from the United Gold Coast Convention, a party which primarily represented "the merchant-professional bourgeoisie" (Kraus, 1971, p. 37) and promoted anti-colonial reformism, in 1949. The CPP's "drive for social, economic, and political mobility", paired with its anti-colonial nationalism, made it especially attractive for "educated commoners in small towns and rural areas […] who felt constrained by [both] the colonial and traditional authority structures" (Ibid.). Therefore, its anti-colonialism, its opposition to traditional authorities and its stance against the merchant-bourgeoisie's sense of entitlement, made it quite popular among "former teachers, traders, and clerks who were […] the more fortunate of the primary and idle school leavers in the incipient middle and lower-middle class" (Ibid., p. 40). The popularity among these individuals enabled it to come to power within the confines of the system of limited internal self-government by ways of indirect elections in 1951, which would be the country's first step towards full self-government.

As a mass movement with a broad base in society, the CPP was confronted with “a vast inflation of political demands from different communities, traditional states, ethnic groups, regions and modern [i.e. professional] groups for a just share in the power, status, and material rewards of self-rule” (Ibid., p. 38). However, as the party did not have budgetary control until 1954, it was unable to meet these demands initially. Thereafter, from the time budgetary control was attained through the adoption of her constitution as The Republic of Ghana in 1957, re-grouping processes took place and that led to the development of new political parties which represented the political interests of distinct corporate agents. As an example, we need only consider the Northern People’s Party (NPP) which was an “ethnically diverse but regionally exclusive […] conglomerate of chief-led groups [which] articulated the development demands of the backward North and fear[s] that anti-chief southern politicians would disrupt the still powerful traditional chiefs and [their] authority systems” (Kraus, 1971, p. 39 ff.). Other groups which formed through re-grouping processes of this period were (a.) the National Liberation Movement (NLM), -“a patron movement launched in Ashanti in 1954” (Ibid.) that articulated discontent over “a prevailing low cocoa price, insufficient development projects, and inadequate representation and power” (Ibid.), (b.) the Ghana Congress Party (GCP) which organized after the re-grouping of the merchant-professional bourgeoisie (see Ibid.) and called the CPP’s authority into question (due to the humble background of most its members) and, finally, (c.) the MAP which represented the country’s urban Muslim population (see Ibid.). These political parties -which are corporate agents per se, as they articulate and promote the interests of clearly defined segments of society,- consisted of individuals who did not feel represented by the CPP’s agenda and perceived both, the 1957 constitution and the CPP, as having “relatively little legitimacy” (Ibid., p. 41)

As the CPP sought to extend its power, by incorporating specific-, local interest groups and altering balances of power through the establishment of local youth organizations, conflicts erupted, which the CPP met either with violence or the co-optation of specific political demands and those who articulated them. This was the case when the CPP responded to calls for targeted development assistance for historically disenfranchised groups in the country’s north with the 1961 Education Act.

Due to the fact that the CCP was in a fairly vulnerable political position, as her claim to power was perceived as illegitimate by many corporate agents within society, the party found itself forced to increase public spending in order to meet the demands it was confronted with. The funds for these expenditures were generated by the country's cocoa sector, extracted from the cocoa value chain by Ghana's marketing board and redistributed to assists those who had not benefited from colonial patterns of resource distribution. Hence, the CPP's development policies modified colonial patterns of resource distribution to finance the social and economic policies which increased the general public's access to material and cultural patterns of resource distribution. In turn, however, this meant that primary- and corporate agents that had profited from colonialism by enjoying privileged access to the patterns of resource distribution it had established, could no longer rely on this privileged access to secure the reproduction of their elevated social and economic status. Evidence for this development can be found in the increased number of corporate agents emerging as the CPP gained budgetary control and started to alter these colonial patterns.

4.3.2.2. Ivory Coast's Development Strategy from a CR Point of View

The Ivory Coast's development strategy contrasted that of Ghana in many ways, especially with regards to her economic relations with her former colonial power and her domestic economic policy pertaining to the cocoa sector. From a CR perspective this could be expected. Though both countries funded their development policies with revenue from their cocoa exports, the Ivory Coast's PDCI's policies were designed to increase the country's production by making land and labor available to those who could afford to clear new forest lands for production. Hence, with respect to both its domestic and international patterns of resource distribution, the Ivory Coast's primary-corporate agent conserved inherited patterns of resource distribution by maintaining and facilitating the flow of migrant labor and further opening its forest reserves, in the country's southwest, for cocoa production (see Amanor, 2012, p. 740).

Beyond simply maintaining its internal patterns of resource distribution, by allowing for the re-patriation of profits and ensuring an increased supply of tropical, agricultural commodities to France, the Ivory Coast's trade and investment policy vis-à-vis Europe was fostering transnational patterns of resource distribution established during colonialism. It is therefore fair to say that Houphouët-Boigny's development strategy maintained transnational, colonial patterns of resource distribution by ensuring close economic and military ties with its former colonial overlord and re-enforcing colonial patterns of material resource distribution domestically. The main difference between the colonial- and post-colonial patterns of resource distribution, was that forced labor had been abolished and Europeans' preferential access to patterns of material- and cultural resource distribution was no longer guaranteed at the expense of African segments of society. In other words, European settlers no longer had a disproportionate influence over Ivorian patterns of resource distribution simply because of their somatic features. Hence, it appears as though, in line with Margaret Archers morphogenetic approach, those Ivorian corporate agents, who had most access to- and control over their country's resources and patterns of resource distribution, utilized their political clout to secure their income, by establishing comparatively high price guarantees for cocoa producers and maintaining close ties to European importers, their primary external source of revenue. Also, by ensuring the possibility to re-patriate profits, they provided attractive conditions for transnational capital, further deepening the Ivory Coast's integration into the global economic structure at the lower end of cocoa value chain.

This, however, is only one side of the Ivory Coast's development strategy. Instead of merely reinforcing colonial patterns of resource distribution, the country also redistributed parts of the revenue it extracted from its exports through public education and health care services. In addition to these redistributive measures -which followed the French example in that they were centrally organized and funded- the Ivory Coast also established new patterns of resource distribution by setting up "more than 200 state enterprises [and meeting demands from] workers and students […] with increased salaries, renewed price guarantees for agricultural products, scholarships, and new schools" (McCauley, 2013, p. 194). To some scholars these measures appear to have been designed along a sort of "ethnic arithmetic", „whereby the representation of social identity groups was formally balanced in government posts and civil service jobs" (Ibid.), as to provide the sense of equal representation of all ethnic groups within government. Given the fact that Felix Houphouët-Boigny managed to keep his party in power until three year before his death in 1993, I would maintain that his strategy of prolonging colonial patterns of resource distribution, while creating new patterns of resource distribution for the general public and allocating access to them along ethnic lines, was successful in so far, as it enabled the country's first primary-corporate agent to retain control over the country for 27 years.

Beyond this narrow understanding of success, however, this strategy failed because the ethnic conflicts, which erupted after Felix Houphouët had passed, produced several internal armed conflicts which cost many lives and threw the country back in its development. The country also failed to significantly diversify its economic base which is still heavily reliant on the export of cocoa and coffee for fiscal revenue (14% in 2015) (see. Macario & Willems, 2016, p. 21).

However, when we compare the short-term results these strategies produced, one must concede that Houphouët's strategy was more successful in growing government revenue by expanding the country's cocoa production through means reinforcing some colonial patterns of resource distribution. More specifically the PDCI's policies were particularly supportive of large "migrant Ivorian cocoa farmers from the Baolé region [who] had strong political representation in the ruling party" (Amanor, 2012, p. 741). As had been the case during colonialism, "the expansion of cocoa was based on an alliance of the state political elite" (Ibid.) with a class of wealthy planters with capital to invest in new frontier areas and cocoa trading firms as beneficiaries. Additionally, the PDCI's liberal migration policy provided land and labor to poor "Sahelian migrants [who] formed the main laboring class, and […] were attracted to frontier areas by [being offered] access to land" (Ibid.). Moreover, Houphouët's PDCI also assisted producers with "state subsidies that covered part of the transportation costs of getting the export commodity to port [and] technical support from a parastatal structure that expanded along with the rise of the country's national wealth" (Woods, 2016, p. 236).
Beyond simply relying on domestic colonial patterns of resource distribution which provided "land to those who make it bear" (Ibid., p. 229) the PDCI also organized its migration and trade policy along colonial patterns by relying on its former colonizer's industry for export- and import markets.

4.4. Comparing the Outcome of both Post-Colonial Development Strategies

The measures, outlined above, enabled the Ivory Coast to take Ghana's place as the world's largest cocoa producer by increasing its output to 580'000 tons a year by 1967, while Ghana's production decreased for almost two decades from 1965 onward (see MacLean, 2004, p. 477). Thereafter, "Ivorian economic growth rates averaged over 7% annually from 1960 to 1980, whereas swings in the Ghanaian economy created anemic growth over the same period" (McCauley, 2013, p. 190).

Within the same time span Ghana forcefully removed migrant laborers from its cocoa sector through the Aliens Compliance Act of 1969, which "permanently expelled […] more than 200'000 foreign laborers [who had] migrated from Upper Volta and other neighboring countries to work on cocoa farms" (McCauley, 2013, p. 197). Though this expulsion of foreigners from the north certainly altered colonial patterns of (labor) resource distribution, the Alien Compliance Act can also be viewed as a move to cut the politically and economically most vulnerable and disenfranchised group from Ghana's cocoa sector out of the political equation. Hence, by denying these migrant laborers the ability to seek political representation, Ghana's government also prevented this group from forming a corporate agent that could legitimately articulate and promote the economic interests of those whose labor formed the basis of country's export revenue generating cocoa sector. Whether or not this was the intent behind the Alien Compliance Act would be a matter of speculation. The effect of this expulsion of 200'000 foreign laborers was, however, that the labor shortage Ghana experienced around this time was exacerbated. This further decreased cocoa production and drew a clear line between citizens of the Republic of Ghana and foreigners.

Hence, my examination of Ghana's and the Ivory Coast's immediate post-colonial development strategy reveals that Ghana's primary-corporate agent, the CPP, used its control over domestic patterns of resource distribution to fund the development of new patterns of material and cultural resource distribution which were designed to benefit larger segments of society and the country's most disadvantaged citizens, while re-defining this citizenry to exclude non-Ghanaian migrant laborers. In contrast to this, the Ivory Coast and its agricultural capitalist class, whose corporate agent (the African Planter Syndicate) formed the country's first primary-corporate agent (the PDCI) benefited from policies which secured and reinforced colonial patterns of resource distribution both domestically and transnationally.

If we now consider which specific patterns of resource distribution were altered in post-colonial Ghana and the Ivory Coast, we can see that both countries created new patterns of cultural resource distribution by establishing public education services in the 1960s and made some material patterns of resource distribution accessible to the general public through the provision of health care services. Nevertheless, the two former West-African colonies greatly differed in how they utilized the inherited patterns or resource distribution in their respective cocoa sectors. While each country sought to benefit from its colonial legacy by extracting public revenue through the taxation of its cocoa exports, the Ivory Coast re-enforced these patterns by expanding cocoa production through liberal migrant labor and land acquisition policies. Contrary to these Ivorian policies, designed to increase the production of taxable tropical export commodities (albeit without official forced labor practices and the legal discrimination against Africans), Ghana's post-colonial government profoundly altered colonial patterns of (labor-) resource distribution by outlawing the flow of migrant labor from Upper Volta. A comparison of the countries' economic development between 1965 and 1980 reveals that the Ivory Coast was able to grow her GDP per capita (in US Dollars) from about 213 to 1227 US$ while that of Ghana only grew from 266 to 412 US$ in that period.



Furthermore, the approach to their respective cocoa sectors also severely affected their domestic production, so that Ghana's output dropped by about 50% from 1965 to 1980 and the Ivory Coast's grew by more than 100% within that time span. The result of this development was the previously stated succession of Ghana as the world's largest cocoa producer by the Ivory Coast, by 1977 (see Jedwab, 2011, Figure 3). As dissimilar as their development strategies were, both Ghana and the Ivory Coast did face comparable political challenges related to their migrant labor population, their reliance on the export of cocoa and coffee, as well as their accumulation of debt due to increased public spending in times of low cocoa prices. From 1975 onward, both countries' trade relations with the European Community were governed by the same trade agreements. This means that, even though cocoa producers were working in different domestic environments, they were also operating under the same global market conditions and legal framework, as far as trade with EEC / EU was concerned.

The following segment will begin with an examination of the post-colonial trade relations established between the European Economic Community and her former African colonies prior to the British EEC membership in 1973. Thereafter, I will investigate each trade agreement between the Ivory Coast, Ghana and the EEC (later EU) as to the effects it had on producers, multinational corporations and government agencies within the cocoa value chain.

5. Trade Relations Under the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions

Prior to Britain's accession to the EEC in 1973 and two years thereafter, the trade relations between the Europe Economic Community and the former colonies of its members were governed by the two Yaoundé conventions signed in 1963 and 1969. As the first formal trade agreement established between the "EC and eighteen African Associated States (AAS)" (Sissoko et al., 1998, p. 8), the Yaoundé I convention of 1963 sought to conserve the "reciprocal preferences" established between France and its former colonies (see Persson & Wilhelmsson, 2007, p. 30), and to expand trade between EEC members and AAS by lowering the EEC's customs duties for tropical agricultural exports originating in African signatory states (see Sissoko et al., 1998, p. 8). The Yaoundé I convention also enabled EC members to "enter into a special relationship with former African colonies, providing [the latter] with aid and trade access to the European market […] on a reciprocal basis" (Sicurelli, 2010, p. 78). However, the EEC did not only agree to lower the customs duties imposed on tropical agricultural imports, but it also agreed to protect their counterpart's exports from competition by imposing "Common External Tariffs (CETs) against similar commodities imported from other developing countries (e.g. cocoa, coffee, and bananas)" (Sissoko et al., 1998, p. 8). Contrary to the effect African signatory states had hoped for and despite the protective measures provided in the agreement, the "AAS experienced the largest loss of export share among African regions" (Ibid., p. 13) with the AAS' share in EEC imports from less developed countries falling from 12 to 5.7 percent in the period from 1958 to 1975 (see. Ibid.). Thus, while the Yaoundé I convention was unsuccessful with regards to its goal of increasing AAS exports to the EEC it did benefit "Germany, Italy and the Netherlands by allowing them to have greater access to African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) economies as sources of raw material as well as market outlets for manufactured products" (Ibid., p. 17 f.).

Besides inducing trade diversification for some EEC members by enabling them to benefit from formerly protected markets in what used to be French West Africa, the Yaoundé I convention was "based on reciprocity in […] EC and African tariff removal [and] included development provisions [for which] the [European Development Fund] EDF was established as a fund directed only to countries party to the Yaoundé Convention" (Sicurelli, 2010, p. 76). The EDF enabled France to reduce the financial burden of development assistance to former colonies significantly from 1.38 percent of its Gross National Product (GNP) in 1960 to 0.69 percent by 1989 (see Waites, 1999, p. 297). In return for this communization of its financial assistance to former African colonies, France was willing to share the benefits its close trade relations provided with the rest of the European Economic Community (see Bjørnskov & Krivonos, 2001, p. 9). Even though Yaoundé I communized both the development assistance provided to former colonies and the import- and export markets of former French West Africa, France was able to retain "the substance of French commercial paramountcy" (Waites, 1999, p. 298) as the major trading partner and foreign investor in its former colonies thanks to the fixed exchange rate between the French franc and the West African Franc-CFA. The stable exchange rate between the former French West African colonies and France made it their preferred trading partner, because former French colonies were often short of other foreign currencies (see Ibid.).

The exclusive provision of development assistance to Yaoundé I signatories changed with the second Yaoundé Convention which was signed in 1969 and determined the EEC's terms of trade with the African signatory states from 1971 to 1975. Furthermore, it opened the EDF up to some African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries which had been under British colonial rule. With the expansion of the Yaoundé agreement to include former British colonies in East Africa in 1969, the revised trade regime enabled both its European and African parties to diversify their trade relations by providing each of them with additional markets for their imports and exports (see Bjørnskov & Krivonos, 2001, p. 10). Yaoundé II basically extended Yaoundé I and introduced former British colonies such as Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda to the arrangement. Nevertheless, Yaoundé II did include a significant change to the previous trade regime by abolishing the "common external tariffs protecting [AAS] export commodities from non-AAS competitors [because Germany and the Netherlands considered them] discriminatory to other developing nations" (Sissoko et al., 1998, p. 8).

Ultimately, while the Yaoundé I & II Conventions successfully communized France's development assistance and market access to francophone Africa (see Ibid., p. 21), these trade agreements, which emphasized reciprocal tariff removal (see Sicurelli, 2010, p. 76), failed to significantly enhance the African signatories' trade position towards the EEC. Not only did African signatories remain primary commodity exporters to their European counterparts, but West African signatories even lost "export market shares [as] compared to other Third World countries" (Sissoko et al., 1998, p. 21).

We will examine the Yaoundé I & II convention, as well as the four subsequent Lomé conventions from a Critical Realist point of view and in greater detail once each of them has been introduced. Once these trade agreements have been discussed with regards to their effects on post-colonial trade relations between the EEC, Ghana, and the Ivory Coast, we will turn towards the changes induced through structural adjustment programs. Thereafter I will present and examine the two most recent agreements established by the EU and former colonies, the Cotonou- and Economic Partnership Agreements.

5.1. Scope of Each Treaty's Critical Realist Analysis

Both, the Yaoundé and Lomé treaties set the framework for trade between the EEC (later EU), Ghana and the Ivory Coast from 1963 to 2000. As the Cotonou Agreement replaced the previous contracts, I will provide a CR analysis of the trade relations developing under these trading regimes subsequent to each treaty's description. Apart from considering the general economic development of our countries of interest, as indicated by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, my CR analysis will especially focus on the following aspects:

1. The price received by cocoa producers (producer price)
2. The position of multinational corporations in each cocoa sector
3. The regulatory environment of Ghana and the Ivory Coast concerning cocoa

Regrettably my investigation of the effects of each trade agreement will only be able to consider the impact each trade agreement and domestic policy had on smallholding cocoa producers, multinational corporations and regulatory agencies because most economic analyses of cocoa trade relations do not differentiate cocoa producers by their status as land owners or laborers, ethnic identity group (primary agent) or the size of their plot under cultivation.
Therefore, my CR analysis of the post-colonial trade relations under the Yaoundé, Lomé, and Cotonou regime will only differentiate between the following corporate agents within the transnational cocoa value chain.

1. Ivorian and Ghanaian cocoa producers
2. Transnational trading companies engaged in cocoa processing.
3. Ivorian and Ghanaian Cocoa Marketing

While it is unfortunate that this investigation can only distinguish between developments affecting Ivorian and Ghanaian cocoa producers in general, this level of detail suffices to detect causal relations between changes to the international trade agreements and the economic development of producers and transnational trading companies. Though interesting, a more detailed analysis, sensitive to the outcome both trade agreements and domestic policies had on more specific groups within Ghana's and the Ivory Coast's cocoa producing sectors, would require more detailed qualitative- and quantitative data from each country. In return for giving up this desired level of detail, I was able to incorporate several econometric studies, which illustrate the effects of structural adjustment programs, the redistribution of market power between corporate agents along the value chain and changes in the market environment faced by corporate agents. I will now provide the descriptive presentation of the Lomé-Conventions (I-IV) before focusing on the CR analysis of the impact the first two post-colonial trading regimes.

5.2. Lomé I-IV

With Britain's accession to the EEC, the Yaoundé conventions (which had regulated the EEC-AAS trade relations from 1963 to 1975) were replaced by the Lomé Conventions I-IV which set the legal framework for the Ivory Coast's and Ghana's trade relations with the EEC from 1975 to 2000 (see Smith, 2003, p. 72 ff.). In contrast to the reforms introduced by Yaoundé II (which were primarily an expansion of the Yaoundé I convention, combined with the elimination of preferential market access for former French colonies), the Lomé Conventions substantially reformed these trade relations.

The first major difference between the Yaoundé and Lomé conventions, was the format of the negotiations, because the initial Lomé Convention (1975) was the first agreement that many former European colonies had "negotiated as a block rather than individually, which gave them considerable leverage in the negotiation" (Flint, 2009, p. 81). This new formation, which was formally established through the Georgetown Agreement of 1975 (see Vogl, 2015, p. 100 ff.), was able to attain "duty free access on a non-reciprocal basis to the European market for most products except those covered by the Common Agricultural Policy" (CAP) (Persson & Wilhelmsson, 2006, p. 4). Hence, their enhanced negotiation position enabled the ACP countries to demand concessions from their European counterparts by ensuring the EU alleviated its import duties on commodities originating in ACP countries without requiring ACP states to do the same (see Sicurelli, 2010, p. 79). Moreover, the Lomé Conventions introduced a "System for the Stabilization of Export Earnings (STABEX) [which] provided a guarantee of finance from the European Development Fund (EDF) to protect the fluctuating revenues that resulted from the export of a number of agricultural products that were not covered" by the

CAP (Hurt, 2003, p. 162). Though this stabilization mechanism was supposedly conceived to stabilize the export earnings of ACP states by providing them with interest-free loans in case world market prices for select primary commodities fell by more than 7.5% of their previous four year average, it has been described as a "legacy of the colonial past" (Sissoko et al., 1998, p. 9) by some scholars, because it incentivized the production and export of "primary and semi-processed exports to the EC region" (Ibid.). This has not only been viewed as an instrument to provide security of supply of the 34 commodities covered by STABEX, but also as a way to conserve mono-crop economies and as an instrument to secure the international division of labor (see Ibid., p. 11). What supports the assumption that the STABEX mechanism was actually designed in the long-term interest of European importers rather than the economic interest of exporting countries, is the fact that more "than thirty years after the signing of the first Lomé Convention (1975), the ACP still exports primarily raw materials to Europe [and these trade relations] have not promoted diversification, competitiveness, growth, or poverty reduction in any substantial manner" (Kohnert, 2008, p. 12).

Nevertheless, Lomé III and IV, which governed EU-ACP trade relations from 1985 to 2000, did introduce some innovations in that Lomé III for the first time "explicitly referred to the value of human dignity and economic-, social- and cultural rights" (Sicurelli, 2010, p. 38). Though this was initially meant "as a means of shaming the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (UK) for their economic and political ties to apartheid South Africa" (Taylor, 2016, p. 103), it politicized the EU-ACP trade relations by enabling the EU to suspend payments from the EDF due to lack of good governance or the insinuation thereof.

Lomé IV took the politicization one step further by introducing Article 5 to the convention. This unambiguously referenced human rights and their disregard as a justification for the termination of payments from the EDF and (see Vogl, 2015, p.108), thereby, introduced a political conditionality clause which has increasingly been made use of by the EU in its relations with Sub-Saharan African states since the 1990s (see Sicurelli, 2010, p. 39). Apart from politicizing, Lomé IV is also regarded as the first step in the introduction of neo-liberal norms to the EU-ACP trade relations because it states that "the EU would use part of the EDF to support World Bank structural adjustment programs" (Ibid., p. 80). Hence, even the EU's financial support for the structural adjustment programs were now subject to political conditionalities, which gave the EU more leverage in negotiations with its West African counterparts.

Before moving on to the Cotonou Agreement which superseded the Lomé conventions and set the framework within which the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and ECOWAS were negotiated (until their conclusion in 2014), I will now briefly examine these initial post-colonial trade relations from a CR perspective. Thereafter, we turn towards the structural adjustment programs implemented in Ghana and the Ivory Coast. As all international agreements, these structural adjustment programs will also be analyzed from a CR perspective in order to assess their effects on patterns of resource distribution. Once these post-colonial trade relations and the structural adjustment programs have been analyzed with respect to the morphogenesis /-stasis they induced to the cocoa value chain, I will examine the negotiation framework of the EPAs, as set by the Cotonou Agreement. Closing my investigation with an analysis of the current state of Ghana's and the Ivory Coast's trade relations with the European Union, as formalized in the EPA between the EU and ECOWAS of 2014, my research will have provided a comprehensive account of all post-colonial trade agreements between the EEC/ EU, Ghana and the Ivory Coast.

By studying the respective parties' negotiation position, their economic situation and developments along the post-colonial cocoa value chain, we will be able to assess how the changing trade relations promoted by the EU affected corporate agents along the value chain. Also, comparing the current situation to the colonial patterns of resource distribution, identified at the beginning of this thesis, will allow us to assess whether the EU's trade policy reproduced colonial patterns of resource distribution.

5.3. Yaoundé and Lomé from a CR perspective

My CR-analysis of the Yaoundé and Lomé trade regimes will focus on how each trade agreement affected cocoa producers and transnational trading companies. Furthermore, in this segment I will also investigate how each agreement affected the first-, second- and third order conditions of subsequent strategic interactions concerning trade. Finally, as the structural adjustment programs implemented in Ghana and the Ivory Coast had a profound impact on the post-colonial cocoa value chain, I will include an analysis of their outcome in a separate section. Therein, I will study how structural adjustment altered domestic patterns of resource distribution and how these alterations impacted corporate agents along the transnational value chain. We begin by examining the hallmarks of the Yaoundé Conventions and will move towards the modifications made by each of the Lomé Conventions from there.

5.3.1. Yaoundé from a CR perspective

Since only the Ivory Coast was party to both the Yaoundé- and the Lomé Conventions (Ghana was only party to the latter), we cannot properly compare the development of the two states' trade relations with the EEC prior to the Lomé conventions. We can, however, examine the effects, trade had on the Ivory Coast's cocoa sector and the corporate agents therein under the terms of trade set by the Yaoundé Conventions.

The Yaoundé conventions provided both, the EEC members and the Ivory Coast, with a larger market for export of their commodities through reciprocal tariff removal. While this was obviously in the interest of both signatories' export-commodity producing corporate agents, it also benefited corporate agents requiring foreign means of production and input. Hence, corporate agents in need of export- and import markets on both side of this trade relation benefited from enhanced market access. In contrast to Yaoundé II, however, Yaoundé I provided an additional layer of protection to Ivorian cocoa-exporters and export commodity producers, as the CET's shielded their exports from unwanted competition originating outside the signatories' territories. Hence, once these protections were abolished in the Yaoundé II convention, the advantage the EEC provided to Ivorian exporters was lost. Therefore, the Yaoundé II trade agreement altered those patterns of resource distribution which exclusively benefited the Ivorian producers, while increasing European processors' access to duty free cocoa imports.

Succinctly put, the first Yaoundé convention secured European processors access to duty free cocoa imports from francophone West Africa, conserved Ivorian and European export commodity producers' market access and protected the competitiveness of Ivorian cocoa exports in the European market by applying higher taxes to imports originating outside the Yaoundé signatories' territories. Yaoundé II, on the other hand, selectively induced morphostasis to those patterns of resource distribution which benefited European cocoa importers, while promoting morphogenesis to those measures which protected Ivorian exports from competition at the expense of these importers.

5.3.2. Post-Colonial Currency Advantage

The conditions established by two Yaoundé conventions were especially beneficial to France, as they enabled the former colonizer to communalize the financial burden of providing development assistance to her former colonies while maintaining the advantage produced by the monetary zone of French Francs and Franc-CFA. This currency union, envisioned by France prior to the Ivory Coast's independence, enabled the former colonizer to retain an advantage over other European competitors because their exports to the Ivory Coast had to be paid for in currencies less readily available to countries in the CFA-Franc-Zone (see Waites, 1999, p. 289). Hence, the currency structure secured those patterns of resource distribution which were beneficial to corporate agents of France. Even though this effect did diminish from 1963 to 1983 (when Ivorian imports from France decreased), at first, the currency structure conserved colonial patterns of resource distribution.

5.3.3. First-, Second- and Third Order Conditions of the Yaoundé Conventions

Taking a step back from the trade agreement itself and turning to the previously mentioned first-, second- and third order conditions influencing the outcomes of strategic interactions, it is unsurprising to see that, the EEC was able to secure its privileged access to resources originating in former EEC member colonies. With regards to the first order condition, the EEC utilized its disproportionate access to material resources to incentivize former colonies to sign the Yaoundé Convention, by providing development assistance (through the newly established European Development Fund) to Yaoundé signatories. In addition, the EEC managed to increase security of supply of cocoa-imports from Yaoundé signatories by providing them with a sufficiently large protected market and adequately high prices to encourage further cocoa production increases in the Ivory Coast.

With respect to the second-order condition, referred to as negotiation strength by Margaret Archer, it seems as though the former colonizer and the other EEC member states successfully increased their negotiation strength vis-a-vis their individually negotiating counterparts by integrating their international trade relations. This did not only broaden each EEC member's import and export market access, but it also increased their leverage within trade negotiations, as the European negotiators represented a far larger potential market than any individual member state.

Pertaining to the third order condition of the strategic interactions which produced the Yaoundé Conventions, it seems that the agreements reflects the socio-cultural dynamics at play during this period in history, because they document the post-colonial interdependence between European industry and post-colonial African societies. By this I mean that the treaty reflects both European industries' need for tropical agricultural commodities originating in the now sovereign post-colonial states of West Africa, as well as these societies' need for European funds to finance their socio-economic development. Hence, after cultural morphogenesis spilled over into the structural sphere and produced sovereign states out of former European colonies in West-Africa, these states now required the revenue they could generate through the export of their tropical commodities. The terms of trade under which this exchange took place from 1963 to 1975 is formalized in the Yaoundé Conventions.

5.4. Lomé from a CR perspective

The most significant difference between the Yaoundé- and Lomé Conventions was their bargaining format. Rather than entering bilateral negotiations with the EEC, former European colonies -including Ghana and the Ivory Coast- negotiated as the ACP-bloc. This increased their leverage during these negotiations and enabled them to extract concessions from the EEC in form of non-reciprocal tariff removals. It allowed individual ACP members' governments to retain the ability to protect specific domestic industries from EEC member competition while maintaining access to the European market and securing public revenue through the unilateral application of tariffs on imports from Europe.

Examining this situation according to Archer's morphogenetic approach, the re-grouping process, formalized in the Georgetown Agreement of 1975 that established the ACP-format, increased the ACP states' negotiation strength by providing them with a common negotiation position and thereby limiting the EEC's ability to strike bilateral deals with individual ACP members. Therefore, with respect to the first order condition of the strategic interaction culminating in the Lomé convention, it seems to be the case that the re-grouping process altered the initial distribution of resources in favor of ACP states. More specifically, it turned the table in the negotiations with Europe, because Europe required the ACP states' resources for its domestic industries.

The argument relating to the second order condition of this interaction follows the same logic. Forming the ACP negotiating block strongly diminished the EEC's negotiating strength in relation to individual ACP members, because it deprived the EEC negotiators of the ability to mobilize individual ACP member states to undermine the ACP states' negotiating position. This is reflected in Europe's inability to persuade individual ACP member states to break ranks with the ACP block by signing bilateral agreements with the EEC. As negotiating strength is a relational property, the reduction in EEC negotiation strength translates into an increased negotiation strength of the ACP block. Ultimately, this move by the ACP-block forced the EEC to unilaterally open its market by abolishing tariffs on many imports from ACP countries (Laaksonen et al., 2007, p. 71).

ACP countries were now able not only to secure preferential market access to the EEC but also retained the right to protect their industries through the maintenance of tariff barriers. This is not only telling as to the source and limitations of the EEC's power in these international trade negotiations, but it is also revealing in terms of her priorities in international trade. In this regard it appears that in 1975 the EEC prioritized market access to material resources originating in former European colonies over the further liberalization of additional export markets.

With respect to the third order condition of this strategic interaction (i.e., the socio-cultural dynamics at the time of these trade negotiations), it seems that the structural and cultural morphogenesis, resulting in the de-colonization of the African continent and the emergence of former colonial territories as sovereign states, triggered secondary re-grouping processes. More specifically, the newly independent Ghana and Ivory Coast chose to re-group with other post-colonial states to better pursue their interests in attaining preferential market access while maintaining their ability to protect domestic industries. Beyond these changes regarding the immediate structural elaboration of the EEC's post-colonial trade regime, the Lomé conventions also formalized the morphogenesis of other features of the EEC's transnational, post-colonial trade relations.

While the re-grouping process benefited the ACP members for the stated reasons, the Lomé Conventions III and IV, which governed EEC – ACP trade relations from 1985 to 2000, gradually introduced political conditionality clauses for the provision of development assistance. This increased the EEC's bargaining power in bilateral negotiations with individual ACP -members because it provided the EEC with a unilateral justification for the retention of financial resources from her negotiating counterpart. As a matter of fact, including the political conditionality clause enabled the EEC to block both the direct payment of EDF funds to ACP states and the indirect financial support of these countries through multilateral institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Even though the inclusion of values, such as respect for human dignity or the requirement to protect individual's social- and cultural rights, reflects morphogenesis in the cultural sphere (which since provided a cultural resource to future EEC negotiators) it was first demanded by the African signatories in negotiations of the third Lomé Convention. Since the political conditionality clauses were formalized in article five of the fourth Lomé Convention, however, the EEC/EU has increasingly made use of her right to withhold material resources in her strategic interactions with Sub-Saharan African counterparts

Finally, the most significant structural elaboration of the Lomé Conventions, with regards to the transnational cocoa trade, was the introduction of price guarantees through the previously mentioned STABEX mechanism. For sake of thoroughness, I must add, that this price stabilization mechanism was even refined over the course of time so that it would be triggered at even lower price fluctuations of 6.5% instead of 7.5%. I take this re-negotiation of the specific threshold as evidence for the mechanism's relevancy to the negotiating parties, because it implies that they engaged in a strategic interaction to determine how much a commodity price had to drop for the EEC to provide funds to the ACP states which exported the commodity at hand. Beyond this latter fact, however, I consider the STABEX mechanism a significant structural elaboration for two reasons. Firstly, the EEC provided an incentive to the producers of commodities covered by the STABEX regulation (cocoa among others) that artificially reduced the risk posed by price fluctuation, which documents the EEC's interest in the availability and security of supply of these products. Secondly, the EEC was willing to enhance the sensitivity of the price stabilization mechanism to ensure that a 6.5% price depreciation compared to the previous four-year average of (world market) cocoa prices, would trigger the provision of interest free loans to the countries where her industry's tropical inputs originated. It is self-evident why price guarantees are in the interest of both, cocoa exporters and -producers, as well as the governments whose budget is disproportionately dependent upon revenues generated by the taxation of these exports. What is less obvious, are the effects, the STABEX mechanism has on the situational logic of individuals and corporate agents engaged in the production of this commodity. This is peculiar, because the mechanism also shields cocoa exporters from price depreciation caused by their own overproduction. Hence, when we compare the situation of cocoa producers, whose exports are eligible for STABEX price guarantees, to the situation of those, whose exports are not, we can see that the producers without guarantees might look to diversify and favor the production of other goods over cocoa. Those, whose export prices are guaranteed, on the other hand, would not be impacted by price depreciation as severely, so that the potential risk of declining prices does not immediately affect their cost-utility analysis. In any case, the price guarantees provided through the STABEX mechanism touch individual cocoa producers only indirectly, as the payments the mechanism provides are received by the exporting countries' agencies rather than the cocoa producers themselves. Furthermore, research by David Woods indicates that the decision to expand cocoa production is less sensitive to declining prices than one would assume, as “cocoa planters will expand production despite a decline in prices” (Woods, 2004, p. 231), given the availability of land, labor and capital for their production.

As a detailed analysis of the conditions under which cocoa producers expand their production, lies beyond the scope of this thesis, it must suffice to point out that while an extreme reduction in producer prices in Ghana throughout the 60’s and 70’s did prevent the maintenance and establishment of additional cocoa operations, individual farmer’s decision to discontinue their cocoa production was a result of the domestic market conditions rather than the international incentive structure ACP-EEC trade relations provided. Ultimately, it is reasonable to perceive price guarantees as an instrument to reduce the risk attached to an agricultural undertaking which can trigger overproduction. In-turn, this mechanism did increase security of supply for cocoa importers, while creating (interest free) debt for the governments of the export producers, equal to the amount received through the STABEX mechanism. Thus, the pattern of resource distribution established by the Lomé conventions benefited the producers, exporters and importers of tropical agricultural commodities originating in the Ivory Coast and Ghana, through a mechanism which diminished the risk stemming from price fluctuation. The mechanism itself, however, could incentivize overproduction (i.e. long-term price depreciation) while transferring the cost of price stabilization onto the cocoa producer’s government in form of interest free debt.

Before I begin my final investigation of the Cotonou- and Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA), I will first examine how the structural adjustment programs affected Ghana's and the Ivory Coast's domestic cocoa sectors and their patterns of resource distribution.

As the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and 1990s introduced profound changes for the respective governments' control over patterns of resource distribution, I believe we cannot properly analyze their current trade relations with the EU without having understood the effects structural adjustment programs had on each domestic cocoa sector. Hence, I will briefly describe the conditions under which the governments of Ghana and the Ivory Coast found it necessary to (a.) introduce their structural adjustment programs, (b.) present the measures taken thereafter and (c.) examine their subsequent effects.

The last of the abovementioned steps will analyze the result of each countries' structural adjustment from a CR perspective. Finally, I must briefly explain why I did not include a thorough examination of the Cocoa commodity agreements in my investigation. The primary reasons for this exclusion are, (a.) initially the world's largest cocoa producer, the Ivory Coast was not party to these agreements, (b.) scholars largely agree that they failed to considerably reduce the volatility of cocoa prices or stabilize the cocoa market in terms of supply conditions and (c.) they were unable to substantially increase producer prices. Hence, the cocoa commodity agreements neither profoundly affected the terms of trade governing the transnational value chain, nor did they impact the economic environment in which corporate agents and individual cocoa producers operated along the transnational, post-colonial value chain.

6. Coco Sector Liberalization Under Structural Adjustment Programs

Even though both Ghana and the Ivory Coast were at one point the world's largest cocoa producers and -exporters, each of them required financial support from multilateral organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank (WB) to fund the provision of public services and their bureaucracies.Though Ghana required financial assistance a decade earlier than the Ivory Coast, in 1983, both countries were hard hit by the steep decline in global cocoa prices from 1977 onward, because they had higher expenses after expanding their public services and growing their bureaucracies subsequent to independence.

Ghana found herself in a particularly dire situation, as it had financed its increase in public spending by taxing its cocoa exports to an extent which discouraged production and incentivized smuggling into neighboring Ivory Coast. This is reflected in the decline in Ghana's output per capita, its GDP per capita and its exports per capita, all of which decreased considerably from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s. This required Ghana to apply for financial aid from international institutions which came at the price of structural adjustment programs (SAP), debt restructuring, deregulation and currency devaluation (see Konadu-Agyemang & Adanu, 2003, p. 525). To remember, Ghana had pursued a development strategy which “sought to stimulate social and economic development, by establishing […] import-substituting industries” (Osei, 2000, p. 59), which it partly financed through the taxation of cocoa exports. Even though its development strategy was successful in growing the share manufacturing contributed to its GDP from 2% to 9% in the period from 1957 to 1969, it also reduced the share of agriculture in GDP from 60% to 46% during that period (see Ibid.). Since the industries Ghana was substituting “relied on imported raw materials, its attempt to emancipate the country from colonial patterns of resource distribution “through import substitution also made it foreign exchange dependent” (Ibid.). Though Ghana’s development strategy reflects a concerted effort to alter the results of prior strategic interactions, no government until the Rawlings administration of 1982 was able to substantially advance the economic performance by significantly growing the country's GDP. According to Bafour Osei, Ghana’s economy actually “declined at a rate of 0.5% a year” (Ibid., p. 59) from 1970 to 1982.

The Ghanaian governments’ failure to substantially enhance the country’s economic performance becomes even more apparent when we compare it to the economic development of the Ivory Coast within the same time frame. While Ghana’s economy, measured as GDP per capita had basically stagnated from 1960 to 1970 and declined considerably until 1980, the Ivory Coast’s GDP per capita increased significantly by almost 90% within these two decades, until the sharp decline in global cocoa prices of 1977 put an end to this remarkable development. In any case, Ghana’s poor economic performance since independence, combined with increased fiscal pressure through its foreign debt, growing bureaucracy and import substituting industry, drove the nation into a debt repayment crisis by 1965. Though the country made an effort to overcome the situation with several debt-rescheduling agreements “in 1966, 1968 and 1970” (Ibid. p. 59), it was not able to avoid the “large structural adjustment programs designed by the World Bank” (MacLean, 2002, p. 77), which provided an “infusion of foreign exchange [in form of] World Bank loans” (MacLean, 2004, p. 479). In return for these Ghana had to undergo a SAP which was similar to (but less extensive than) that of the Ivory Coast roughly one decade later (see MacLean, 2002, p. 77).

According to a publication by the World Bank in 2003, these Structural Adjustment loans were originally intended to "financially assist developing countries with debt problems" (Akiyama et al., 2003, p. 8) by encouraging "the retreat of the state from economic life and […] opening up economic activity – especially in agriculture – to the free play of market forces" (Mosley et al., 1991; cited from Akiyama, 2003, o, 8). Hence, structural adjustment, in form of a significant reduction in government intervention in determining prices, a reduction of the power of state marketing boards and [an] elimination of agricultural import subsidies" (Ibid. p. 9) was a mandatory condition for the provision of loans.

To properly assess the morphogenesis induced in Ghana's and the Ivory Coast's cocoa sectors by their respective structural adjustment programs, I will briefly present the purpose of their government-controlled corporate agents and describe how they extracted public revenue from their cocoa-sector. Once both the similarities and differences between these corporate agents have been presented, I will more closely analyze the morphogenesis and morphostasis occurring in each country's period of structural adjustment.

6.1. La Caisse de Stabilization and the COCOBOD prior to Structural Adjustment

As both Ghana and the Ivory Coast established corporate agents for the management of their cocoa sector, we will now briefly examine how these corporate agents operated prior to liberal cocoa market reforms called for by the international financial institution's SAP. Thereafter, I will examine the morphogenesis stimulated in each country's cocoa sector, before we turn to our investigation of the EU's latest trade agreements and their effects on the transnational cocoa value chain.

6.1.1. Ghana's Cocoa Marketing Board

Before it was necessary for Ghana to reform its cocoa sector her Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB) (as it was called until 1979) was responsible for managing the sector for the purpose of extracting public revenue and maintaining price stability for producers. To fulfill this purpose, Ghana's CMB "controlled all aspects of the cocoa marketing chain by setting the [Free On Board] f.o.b. price in preseason and by declaring producer prices, buyer's margins, transportation costs and export taxes" (Wilcox & Abbott, 2004, p. 3). Furthermore, the CMB "also performed all the related tasks including inspections, buying, loading, transportation, quality control, storage and exports" (Ibid.), as well as input supply and the levying of direct export taxes (see Fold, 2001, 415). While performing these tasks the CMB generated public revenue "by retaining export proceeds at the CMB and by paying farmers a preset price in domestic currency" (Traoré, 2009, p.41). Even though the domestic cocoa sector management by a commodity marketing board was common among former British colonies, Ghana did stand out by taxing its producers at a higher rate than other cocoa-producing countries (see Ibid.). Due to its monopsonic position within Ghana's cocoa sector the CMB was able to set the market conditions for almost all domestic market participants, except for those smugglers, able to traffic their goods across the Ghanaian-Ivorian border, to receive higher prices for their cocoa. In 1979 the Ghana Marketing Board was closed to be reformed and re-opened in 1984 as the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD).

6.1.2. La Caisse de Stabilization

In the Ivory Coast, "La Caisse de Stabilisation et de Soutien des Prix des Productions Agricoles" (CAISTAB), was also tasked with stabilizing producer prices and extracting public revenue from cocoa exports. Though it also controlled a wide range of variables within the Ivory Coast's cocoa sector, by setting a mandatory minimum cocoa price for producers, determining the margins of domestic private actors engaged in the cocoa sector and distributing export licenses (see Fold, 2001, p. 414), the Ivorian system differed from the Ghanaian, in that the Ivory Coast's cocoa-sector relied on private market participants to handle, transport and export the goods. However, the profits these private market participants were able to derive from their activities were also determined by CAISTAB through "an official cost schedule (barème), which set prices and margins for domestic marketing and for export or sale to domestic processors" (McIntire & Varangis, 1999, p. 2). Hence, though CAISTAB incorporated private market participants in its domestic value chain, the margins of these agents were not determined by market forces but set "during secret negotiations between CAISTAB officials and exporters", which enabled the latter to claim higher costs for their services and, thereby, inflate their profit margins (see Ibid.). Ultimately, though the methods by which Ghana's and the Ivory Coast's corporate agents extracted revenue from their domestic cocoa sector differed with respect to the public or private nature of the agents they relied on to perform specific services, they resembled one another in that both performed functions of quality-, pest- and disease control, export management, marketing, research and price stabilization (see Abbott, 2002, p.6). Finally, another commonality between the two systems of revenue extraction was that the producer prices set by Ghana's and the Ivory Coast's corporate agents were significantly lower than those payed for cocoa on the world market. Specifically, according to a study conducted by Schreiber and Varangis in 2001, the prices both public corporate agents payed their cocoa-producers reflected slightly less than 50% of the FOB price (price a purchaser pays upon receiving the goods at the port). While it is normal for producers to receive slightly less than the FOB price, as their commodity may require transportation to- and handling at the port, only Ivorian and Ghanaian cocoa producers were payed less than 50% of the FOB price (see Schreiber & Varangis, 2001, p. 43)

6.2. Effects of Structural Adjustment on the Ivorian and Ghanaian Cocoa Sector

Both Ghana and the Ivory Coast required financial assistance from international financial institutions in the 1980s and 1990s. While both countries had benefited from soaring cocoa prices, which reached their historic maximum in 1977, the subsequent decline made it increasingly difficult for CAISTAB and CMB to ensure price stability for their producers while generating public revenue from exports. Since Ghana had disincentivized cocoa production through heavy direct- and indirect taxation of their exports, it found itself in the particularly challenging situation of having to finance increased public expenditure with revenue from a commodity which decreased in both quantity and price. Therefore, as global cocoa prices fell by over 50% from 1977 to 1983, Ghana was the first of the two countries having to apply for financial assistance from international financial institutions. Although the Ivory Coast steadily increased its cocoa-production and -exports, it was not able to avoid taking similar steps when cocoa prices declined more than 50% once more from 1984 to 1990. In total, as global cocoa prices dropped to about a quarter of their 1977 levels by the 1990s and both Ghana and the Ivory Coast had to agree to Structural Adjustment Programs to receive loans as financial assistance. In return for these loans (see Konadu-Agyemang & Adanu, 2003, p. 515), both countries agreed to considerably reform their economy according to recommendations made by WB and the IMF. Common objectives of SAPs, implemented throughout West Africa, were "to increase the producer price by [(a.)] eliminating costly state operations from the marketing chain, thereby reducing the margin between world market prices and producer prices" (Fold, 2009, p.415), (b.) the "devaluation of currency to lower the price of exportable goods and stimulate exports, [(c.)] the diversification of the export base, trade liberalization, removal of price controls and subsidies, and [(d.)] the privatization of state companies" (Konadu-Agyemang, 2003, p.525). Finally, the reforms promoted by the IMF and WB also requested

interventionist “trade measures and parastatal industries [to be] dismantled in ACP economies under structural adjustment programs” (Langan & Price, 2015, p. 266).
In Ghana, it was President Jerry John Rawlings, who had come to power through a military coup in 1981, who agreed to implement the SAP, called the Economic Recovery Program (ERP). This program sought to “reduce the size of the state and allow market forces to determine the production and allocation of resources in the economy” (Woods, 2004, p. 235). Additionally, the Rawlings administration “began improving road infrastructure throughout the country” (MacLean, 2004, p. 479) and introduced significant reforms in the country’s cocoa sector. The most important of these reforms, was the gradual replacement of Ghana’s COCOBOD (as the Reformed Ghana Marketing Board was referred to from 1984 onward) “as direct purchaser of cocoa with a group of Licensed Buying Companies (LBCs)” (Traoré, 2009, p. 41). Though these were only allowed to buy and sell cocoa at a minimum price set by the COCOBOD, the introduction of these LBCs into Ghana’s cocoa-sector led to competition among these companies for the output of cocoa producers and as “of 2000, COCOBOD ha[d] effectively authorized limited, direct exports” (Ibid.) by these LBCs. While still not entirely liberalized (see Gilbert, 2009, p. 299), Ghana’s cocoa sector had introduced private corporate agents to provide farm to port transportation and ensured that higher farm gate prices were more reliably payed to disincentivize cross-border smuggling (see Kolavalli, 2011, p. 209 ff.). Additionally, Ghana’s primary-corporate agent also significantly reformed the COCOBOD’s responsibilities and workforce. Though COCOBOD is still tasked with generating revenue that enables it to provide services and retain funds for times of low global cocoa prices, the corporate agent’s workforce has been greatly reduced from 100 000 employees in the 1980s to about 5100 in 2003 and is no longer tasked with the provision of input subsidies to cocoa producers (see Ibid.). Although services, such as transportation and the task of supplying inputs to farmers, have been outsourced to the private sector through LBCs in the late 1980s, Ghana’s COCOBOD remains a crucial public corporate agent within the country’s cocoa sector, as it is responsible for funding, “research, disease control, and credit programs that are of general benefit to the cocoa industry” (Ibid. p. 210). Finally, the COCOBOD retained its responsibility for quality control and continues to provide financial resources to cocoa producers at a forthcoming rate (see Ibid. p.209).

The success of the reforms, outlined above, is not only reflected in the enhanced market environment in which cocoa producers find themselves, as private licensed buying companies compete for their output through “occasional price bonuses, subsidized inputs, or credit extension" (Ibid. p. 210) but also in the increased productivity of Ghana's cocoa sector, which almost doubled by the mid-1990s and now exports a wider range of cocoa products with more value added (see Ibid., p. 204). Despite these desirable effects of Ghana's Economic Recovery Program in general and the Cocoa Rehabilitation Project in particular, liberalization of West African cocoa sectors has also had less advantageous effects for the long-term development of West African cocoa industries. I will discuss these subsequent to my presentation of the effects SAPs had on the Ivory Coast's cocoa sector, as these effects are observable in both countries.

Contrary to the limited liberalization of Ghana's cocoa sector in the 1980s, the Ivory Coast's cocoa sector's liberalization in the second half of the 1990s was more comprehensive in that CAISTAB's role was "reduced to that of an advisory and regulatory agency [and] interference in export marketing" (Traoré, 2009, p. 40) was eliminated, which also entailed abolishing the price floor for farm-gate prices. Though "state involvement in the sector [persists]" (Abbott, 2003, p. 7), other market participants have disproportionately benefited from Ivory Coast's cocoa sector's liberalization, which also sought to increase the pass-through price cocoa farmers receive.

Prior to the Ivory Coast's cocoa market reform CAISTAB would set a minimum producer price which was determined through a cost schedule referred to as barème, based on (a.) average price received through forward-sales and (b.) the auctioning of export rights, (c.) the estimated cost of farm-gate to port transportation, (d.) the expenses of operating CAISTAB itself and (e.) the official cocoa export tax (see McIntire & Varangis, 1999, p.2). These variables would be used to determine the FOB-price cocoa importers would have to pay for Ivorian cocoa exports, a viable fraction of which was the minimum price payed to cocoa producers.

Though CAISTAB's price control was able to increase price stability for cocoa producers prior to its reform, it was also the target of rent-seeking behavior from corporate agents within the Ivory Coast. In their attempt to increase the share of material resources they extracted from these government-controlled pattern of resource distribution (by inflating the cost of their economic activities), the agent's rent-seeking behavior came at the expense of coco producers who's share of the FOB-price was diminished as a result (see Ibid., p.5). Therefore, the reforms demanded by the institutions of the Washington consensus were designed to curtail government control of the cocoa sectors patterns of resource distribution and promoted market mechanisms as the primary mechanism for resource allocation. According to an investigation by Sander

Muilerman and Sietz Vellema (2017), the neo-liberal reform of the Ivory Coast's cocoa sector was enforced in the following order.
The starting point for the SAP was the currency devaluation of the Franc CFA, aimed at increasing the competitiveness of West African exports in general, by reducing their price from importers. Thereafter, in 1999, the Ivory Coast gave up control of its cocoa sector entirely by liquidating CAISTAB and releasing the cocoa price to market forces. However, CAISTAB was privatized and remodeled as an advisory board in the year 2000 (see Abbott, 2007, p. 15) and, thereafter, broken up into smaller private corporate agents which provided specific services to the Ivory Coast's cocoa sector. The most important of these new corporate agents (ANADER, CNRA, FRICA and CCC) provide agricultural extension services, agricultural research and -capacity building services throughout the Ivory Coast's cocoa sector (see Muilerman & Vellema, 2017, p. 87 ff.).

Tellingly, the new corporate agents which emerged in course of -or subsequent to the Ivory Coast's SAP after the year 2000- are predominantly financed by the private sector and provide services which are beneficial to domestic producers and multinational corporate agents within the sector alike.

6.2.1. Liberalized Patterns of Resource Distribution

Though the SAPs in Ghana and the Ivory Coast were intended to reduce public spending, support economic recovery and promote market forces as primary resource allocation mechanisms, their effects were not limited to domestic actors. As many studies investigating cocoa market liberalization have shown, the reduction of state involvement in West African cocoa sectors has had consequences for all stakeholders. The following segment will analyze the impact it had on producers and traders, while also considering its influence on cocoa processors. Thereafter, we will move towards the Cotonou Agreement and the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) the EU has established with Ghana and the Ivory Coast to assess how they have altered the previous trade regime and the transnational cocoa value chain. Once the latter two steps are concluded I will compare the patterns of resource distribution, (established over more than half a century of evolving trade relations), to the colonial patterns of resource distribution identified at the beginning of my thesis, in order to determine whether the development of the EEC's/ EU's trade relations with her former colonies reproduced colonial patterns of resource distribution.

6.2.2. Effects of Structural Adjustment on Cocoa Producers

Comparative analysis of the effects market liberalization has had on West African cocoa sectors have shown that the profound changes induced by SAPs had a strong impact on the farm-gate prices paid to producers, the market environment of traders, the geographic division of labor and the activities of multinational corporations. Due to the breadth and depth of cocoa market liberalization, some scholars even perceive the SAPs, enforced between the 1980s and 2000s, as the main cause for many of the positive and negative economic developments occurring in Ghana and the Ivory Coast in the past three decades. A common effect, researchers have observed in both countries, is that structural adjustment was successful in bringing the prices paid to cocoa producers closer to the price paid on international commodity exchanges. This is often explained by the reduction in price-distortion caused by state intervention through cocoa marketing boards, which can also be seen in the following chart produced by the researchers Markus Eberhardt and Francis Teal in their (2010) publication "Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire: Changing places".

Cocoa price distortions in Ghana
(all prices in nominal USD)



Cocoa price distortions in Côte d'Ivoire
(all prices in nominal USD)



Their charts also illustrate how CAISTAB and CMB/COCOBOD extracted public revenue from exports by retaining the discrepancy between the border price (i.e. FOB price) paid by cocoa importers and the distorted farm-gate price received by producers. Furthermore, their depictions exhibit the fact that farm-gate prices paid in both countries were more closely tied to the global cocoa prices from the 1990s onward and that the prices received by Ghanaian producers increased significantly after the cocoa market liberalization of 1983. Furthermore, Irfan Ul Haque's claim (published in a discussion paper by United Nations Conference on Trade and

Development) that producer prices, expressed as a percentage of export unit value, slightly increased from 37.3 to 52.4 percent on average in the period from 1986 to 2000 in Ghana, while they fell from 59.9 to 50.5 percent in the Ivory Coast, within the same period (see Ul Haque, 2004, p. 9), is also supported by the observations illustrated in the chart above. Additionally, we can see that liberalization reduced the share each government was able to extract from their national cocoa exports (through taxes, marketing, forward sales and auctioning of export licenses).

Another observation, made by Eberhardt and Teal, is that cocoa production and productivity increased after market liberalization in Ghana (1983), while it stagnated for about a decade in the Ivory Coast after CAISTAB was liquidated in 1999. In the case of Ghana, it seems as though cocoa producers benefited from the fact that Ghana's government ceased currency manipulation and no longer had to maintain a cocoa marketing board with about 100 000 employees. Additionally, competition among Licensed Buying Companies further enhanced domestic cocoa market conditions for Ghanaian producers. In the Ivory Coast, however, from the 1970's to 1999 the situation was different. Here, cocoa production had increased six-fold in the period CAISTAB had set- and stabilized producer prices and managed exports. Thereafter, once price floors had been eliminated and farm-gate prices were liberalized, international cocoa prices fell by 40% and the Ivorian government had to reduce the export tax providing 20% of its public revenue, which sparked significant social tension (see Traoré, 2009, p. 40).

Considering the different effects market liberalization has had on Ghana and the Ivory Coast, it appears that the reforms demanded by the IMF and WB improved the market environment for Ghanaian cocoa producers, which had previously operated in the most exploitative cocoa sector, by reducing comparatively excessive state intervention which had been predominantly designed to extract public revenue. Contrary to this, market liberalization brought forth less favorable conditions for Ivorian producers whose domestic market environment had been established to stabilize market conditions while allowing for the extraction of public revenue. Similarly, according to an investigation published by Gilbert and Varangis, price volatility for Ivorian producers has increased after cocoa market liberalization, while it decreased in Ghana (see Gilbert & Varangis, 2004, p. 147). This means that the economic environment Ivory Coast's cocoa sector provided to producers was more stable prior to liberalization. The contrary applies to Ghana, where state involvement, consisting of currency over-valuation and price determination by secret negotiations within the CMB, had produced more volatile market conditions for producers, than those prevalent after structural adjustment.

6.2.3. Effects of Structural Adjustment for Multinational Corporations

Moreover, liberalization also affected corporate agents beyond the West African side of the cocoa value chain, in that transnational corporations were now able to enter the Ivorian and Ghanaian cocoa sectors through subsidiaries or business partnerships which facilitated the purchase of cocoa at its source. In Ghana's case, this was achieved by close cooperation with LBCs while the new conditions in the Ivory Coast allowed for takeovers of individual trading companies and -networks. This reduced multinational corporation's willingness to purchase Ivorian cocoa through forward contracts, while the quality of Ghanaian cocoa sufficed to maintain cocoa importer's willingness to do so. Apart from enabling transnational cocoa trading and -processing companies to ensure their security of supply and allowing them to seize opportunities to purchase cocoa at favorable prices (which they could later-on sell on the commodity exchange for additional profit) these tools were also very beneficial to other stakeholders along the transnational value chain. As a matter of fact, the forward sales of cocoa did not only enable both CMB (later COCOBOD) and CAISTAB to set producer prices by observing the FOB price trading companies were willing to pay prior to harvest (through auctions of forward contracts), but also allowed for advanced scheduling of sales to avoid oversupply. Ultimately, the trade in futures and options on cocoa is, in the mutual interest of marketing boards, trading-/ processing companies and cocoa producers alike. Cocoa producers benefit from forward contracts because it permits them to sell their produce in advance, plan their economic activities and secure their income prior to harvest. Larger trading companies, on the other hand, can benefit from forward contracts by securing their supply and making additional profits from these contracts if they manage to sell them on international exchanges at a higher price.

A stark difference between structural adjustment in Ghana and the Ivory Coast relates to the remnants of government control in each domestic cocoa sector. In contrast to the Ivory Coast, where CAISTAB was "privatized in 2000 [and several] professional associations were created to replace the privatized parastatals" (see Abbott, 2007, p.15 f.), Ghana managed retain far more control through its reformed marketing board. Furthermore, Ghana continued to publicly finance the provision of supportive services to cocoa producers such as quality control, transportation, storage, research, consultancy, as well as the subsidization of seedlings, pesticides and fertilizers (see Hütz-Adams, 2018, p.13). Another consequence of market liberalization was the alteration of market participants within the Ivory Coast's and Ghana's cocoa sector. As many researchers have noted, market liberalization in the Ivory Coast and partial market liberalization in Ghana, provided an opportunity for multinational trading- and processing companies to enter the Ivorian and Ghanaian cocoa sector through takeovers, partnerships or de facto exclusive cooperation with traders, exporters or, in the case of Ghana, Licensed Buying Companies (see Gilbert, 2009, p. 300f.).

While evidence is not as abundant with respect to Ghana, where cooperation between LBCs and transnational companies is less apparent, cocoa market liberalization in the Ivory Coast provides clear evidence that multinational companies, entering Ivory Coast's cocoa sector directly, gained significant market share of exports and expanded their origin processing (grinding) activities, subsequent to market liberalization (see Abbott, 2002, p. 7). This indicates, that, with its temporary abolition of producer price floors and deregulation of export modalities, liberalization altered the market environment in a way that made the Ivory Coast a more attractive investment destination for foreign transnational cocoa processing and -trading companies. According to studies, not only by scholars in various disciplines of academia, but also by the Ministry of Trade of the Netherlands (a European center for cocoa processing activities), this resulted in a considerable market presence of the world's largest companies in the Ivory Coast's cocoa sector. This has increased transnational investments in cocoa processing plants, spurred the acquisition of formerly Ivorian trading companies and increased the export of refined cocoa products. While similar developments were observed in Ghana, the Ghanaian output and export of processed cocoa products is still significantly less than that of the Ivory Coast. Even though these developments appear to be in the interest of both Ghana and the Ivory Coast, as they should now be able to add more value within their domestic value chain prior to export, it seems that the main beneficiaries of these developments are the multinational trading/-processing companies, which, along with chocolate manufacturers, are now capable of integrating more value addition within their own enterprises, due to a process referred to as "backward integration (Ibid.).

Able to "integrate activities of marketing, distribution, export, and processing [and prepared to] exploit scale economies [sic] in marketing and transportation" (Traoré, 2009, p. 27) multinational corporations were ready to increase their margins and make use of investment incentives provided by the governments of Ghana and the Ivory Coast. According to a report published by the consulting firm Goodman LLC. in 2017, Ghanaian investment incentives entail an “exemption from the payment of duties and levies on imports for production, the payment of income tax on profits for the first 10 years, value added tax on purchases including utilities […], relief from double taxation for foreigners […], no conditions or restrictions on repatriation of dividends or net profits [and] guarantees against nationalization and expropriation” (Sulaiman & Boachie-Danquah, 2017, p. 20 ff.). In comparison to these Ghanaian incentives, those of the Ivory Coast appear quite modest in that they only offer “35% tax deduction on profits earned in regard to corporate income liability for the region of Abidjan [and] 40% for profits earned in regard to corporate income liability for all other regions” (Deloitte, 2017, p. 16), according to a 2017 country report, published by the business consulting company Deloitte. Though an investigation of the specific decision-making process preceding the determination of tax incentives for investments in origin-grinding capabilities lies beyond the scope of my thesis, the mere fact that both countries are advertising the tax structure of their domestic cocoa sectors, implies that each country is actively seeking investments in their domestic processing capacities. For that, they are, to varying degrees, willing to guarantee patterns of resource distribution which serve the interest of specific corporate agents within their cocoa sectors (namely those of foreign multinational corporations with the capital and capacity necessary to construct, maintain and operate cocoa processing facilities).

As Ghana’s output and export of refined cocoa products is still lagging that of the Ivory Coast, it is almost self-evident why Ghana is competing with the Ivory Coast with respect to the favorability of the conditions they provide for the transnational capital of multinational corporations. That said, however, it is noteworthy that Ghana finds it necessary to guarantee potential investors an extensive abstention from taking redistributive measures, that could affect the profitability of the transnational capital multinational corporations deploy. While both Ghana and the Ivory Coast still generate public revenue by taxing cocoa exports (see Gilbert & Varangis, 2004, p. 158), it is obvious that both countries are dependent on foreign capital to establish processing facilities within their domestic sectors. Ghana especially, in its attempt to catch up with the Ivory Coast in domestic value addition to cocoa exports, is willing to guarantee transnational corporations tax exemption for profits made from its domestic patterns of resource distribution.

In summary, cocoa market liberalization, while somewhat beneficial to cocoa producers, entailed that both Ghana and the Ivory Coast significantly reduced their control over domestic cocoa sector’s patterns of resource distribution. Thereafter, they began to compete for foreign direct investments from multinational corporations by refraining from redistributing parts of their profits and exempting them from contributing to the maintenance of public utilities, in the case of Ghana. Expressed in the critical realist terminology it appears as though, the post-colonial primary-corporate agents of Ghana and the Ivory Coast had to reform their domestic social structures to cater to the preferences of private foreign corporate agents. This was done in a way that curtailed their control over domestic patterns of resource distribution, to increase foreign corporate agents’ willingness to provide the financial resources necessary to add value to their primary agricultural commodity domestically. In the case of Ghana, the primary-corporate agent went so far to guarantee foreign corporate agents unmitigated access to the profits they sought to repatriate to shareholders around the world. Nevertheless, even though Ghana is now quite keen on attracting foreign capital investments, it has given up significantly less control over its cocoa sector (as compared to its western neighbor,) by remaining directly involved in its cocoa production through a range of activities performed by public corporate agents and the retention of control over the minimum price LBCs are obliged to pay to producers. The Ivory Coast, on the other hand, permitted foreign corporate agents to seize control over its cocoa sector's patterns of resource distribution by allowing them to establish local monopsonies and to gain control over the provision of services throughout the Ivorian cocoa sector. That said, however, as the Ivory Coast’s primary-corporate agent had already given up control over many aspects of its cocoa sector, the country did not go as far as Ghana in refraining from taxing the profits of these private foreign corporate agents.

The impact of foreign corporate agents’ takeover of the Ivory Coast’s cocoa sector is also reflected in the market share of cooperatives, which only handled 18% of the Ivory Coast’s domestic sales and transports in the 2000/01 season, compared to 32% prior to liberalization in the 1998/99 season, and the stark increase in cocoa purchases from multinational corporations through middlemen, which reached 80% of cocoa farm-gate purchases in the 2000/01 season (see Wilcox & Abbott, 2004, p. 4). Though it must be notes that these middlemen are more easily bypassed by plantation owners who can afford “basic processing and transportation facilities” (Traoré, 2009, p. 28). Therefore, the transnational trading and – processing companies, which managed to benefit from the Ivory Coast’s market liberalization, were able to internalize value addition at the expense of smallholder farmers and other Ivorian market participants along the domestic cocoa value chain, rather than large plantation owners who could afford to act independent from the multinational corporations’ middlemen and organized producers who can independently organize the transportation or fermentation of their crop. This leads some scholars to the conclusion that liberalization, while succeeding in increasing producer prices (albeit in return for increased volatility in the Ivory Coast), disproportionately benefited chocolate consumers (see, Wilcox & Abbott, 2004, p. 7), transnational cocoa trading companies and multinational cocoa processors, the largest 14 of which controlled almost 90% of cocoa exports during the 2001/02 season. The top five of these controlled about half of the Ivory Coast's cocoa exports (see Ibid., p. 5).

7. Cotonou- and Economic Partnership Agreement

Ghana and the Ivory Coast adopted SAPs designed by international financial institutions "in the 1980s and 1990s [which] largely achieved macro-economic stability but did not enable African countries to adopt export-oriented policies designed to enhance firm capabilities" (Morris & Fessehaie, 2014, p. 27). Instead, structural adjustment policies reduced state involvement in the domestic cocoa sectors and established international commodity markets as the driving forces of price determination, producer output and resource allocation. By relinquishing control over their cocoa sector's patterns of resource distribution (albeit to various degrees) and establishing a domestic market environment in which private foreign corporate agents were able to integrate value addition into their production processes, both Ghana and the Ivory Coast accommodated multinational corporation and their transnational capital within their economies. Though it is not surprising that a deregulated market environment, which allows foreign corporate agents to retain and repatriate profits, is more attractive to private foreign corporate agents than one in which the nation's primary-corporate agent can legally seize large parts of their profits, it is surprising to learn how far Ghana and the Ivory Coast went to accommodate these corporate agent's transnational capital. Now, that the changes induced through structural adjustment are outlined, we can further examine how the transnational trade regime (between the EU and former European colonies), was modified thereafter. Hence, to provide an overview of the current state of affairs in the post-colonial cocoa value chain and the trade regime governing these material relations, this segment will briefly focus on the current market environment stakeholders along the cocoa value chain find themselves in. Once I have described both, the market conditions post-structural adjustment, and the changes introduced by the Cotonou- and Economic Partnership Agreements, I will compare the post-EPA patterns of resource distribution to those prevalent during European colonialism to conclude with an assessment of whether (and how) the development of post-colonial trade relations contributed to the reproduction of colonial patterns of resource distribution.

7.1. Status Quo of the Post-Colonial Cocoa Value Chain

Though the SAPs significantly altered Ghana's and the Ivory Coast's domestic cocoa sector by attracting foreign corporate agent's transnational capital and they partially achieved the goals they had been designed for (such as stimulating GDP growth in Ghana from 1984 onward or reducing the share of the Ivory Coast's gross national income used to serve public debt to less than 4 percent after 2003) (World Bank, 2019)[2], they also had peculiar effects on the trans-national cocoa value chain itself.

While I did not find a lot of evidence indicating any tight coordination between the institutions of the Washington consensus and multinational corporations, it is evident that market concentration began to increase on the importing side of the value chain and the prices paid to producers started to converge towards the prices paid on international commodity exchanges, subsequent to structural adjustment. Not only were these post-liberalization prices significantly lower than those paid in the latter half of the 1970s, but a smaller share of these decreased prices could be captured by public corporate agents, as structural adjustment had strongly diminished their ability to extract public revenue from the cocoa sector. Furthermore, market liberalization had produced conditions which allowed foreign private corporate agents (i.e. multinational corporations) to both, backward integrate value addition into their production processes and significantly reduce the share of their profits available for redistribution within Ghana and the Ivory Coast. Finally, the Ivory Coast's and Ghana's market power in cocoa price determination, was even further reduced by technological innovation in the processing segment of the value chain. Here, technical advances enabled processors to reduce their dependence on high-quality cocoa inputs (measured as average content of fatty acids per unit of cocoa beans), for which they had previously been willing to pay a premium. Combined, these developments, which began under the terms of trade of the Lomé convention and continued more forcefully as a result of structural adjustment, shifted market power in favor of foreign private corporate agents. Though domestic producers did benefit from higher pass-through prices, they were also

[2] https://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&country=CIV [last accessed 15.03.2019] Note that the Ivory Coast's GNI share to serve external debt was larger than 4 percent (2008, 2009, 2016, 2017)

exposed to higher price volatility in the Ivory Coast and lower price volatility in the case of Ghana (see Gilbert & Varangis, 2004, p. 148), which had seized the currency manipulation and aligned its policies with demands from the international donor community (see Gary, 1996). Despite the fact this strategy was very successful with regards to Ghana's long-term economic development, as measured in GDP per capita (which has grown steadily over the past three decades), structural adjustment had a less desirable effect on the Ivory Coast's economic development. In this regard researchers have pointed out that the Ivory Coast's economy had produced a GDP per capita (measured in purchasing power parity terms) which was well above the Sub-Saharan average from independence onward while Ghana's economy had only provided a below average income level for its citizens (see Eberhardt & Teal, 2010, p.4). As structural adjustment measures took effect both countries' economic performance converged towards the sub-Saharan average, which meant an improvement for Ghana and a deterioration for the Ivory Coast.

Another difference between the effects structural adjustment had on Ghana and the Ivory Coast is that, in the latter case, the necessity for cocoa processors to purchase cocoa beans through forward sales was reduced as access to cocoa producer's crop was facilitated (see Varangis & Schreiber, 2001, p.59). The fact, that this did not occur in Ghana, is often attributed to (a.) the circumstance that Ghana's cocoa sector liberalization was not as extensive as the Ivory Coast's, (b.) Ghana's primary-corporate agent retained more regulatory oversight over quality control schemes in order to maintain public measures ensuring high crop quality and (c.) cocoa acquisition remained mediated by Ghanaian corporate agents. As high-quality cocoa continues to be a crucial component of some intermediate products, where cocoa processors are unable to make use of technological innovation to substitute high- with low quality beans, Ghana managed to sustain importer's willingness to pay a premium for high quality beans purchased though forward contract (see Ibid. p.62), even though this premium has declined somewhat for the abovementioned reasons. However, even after structural adjustment increased the pass-through-price cocoa farmers receive for their produce, both Ghana and the Ivory Coast remain the two countries where producers receive the lowest percentage of their crop's export unit value, at about 50 percent (see Ul Haque, 2004, p.9). Contrary to the developments on the West-African side of the value chain, European corporate agents benefited from lower prices and more immediate access to their cocoa supplies. As the Lomé Conventions had failed to substantially alter trade relations between the EU and the West African states supplying its industry with tropical commodities (either domestically or through export) and the World Trade

Organization (WTO) ruled, that the non-reciprocal preferential access for ACP exports violated the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade's most favored nations clause, the EU deemed it necessary to reform its trade relations with her former colonies (see Brown, 2005, p.8).
This process was initiated by the Cotonou Agreement in the year 2000 which established a legal framework and negotiation schedule according to which EU-ACP trade relations were to be reformed. However, the agreement did not simply call for a reform of EU-ACP trade relation, but also obliged ACP-states to regroup prior to EPA negotiations. Hence the Cotonou Agreement substantially redefined both the negotiating parties and "the terms of the negotiations for the [Economic Partnership Agreements]" (Sicurelli, 2010, p.81).

7.2. The Cotonou Agreement

The Cotonou Agreement was signed in 2000 to reform EU-ACP trade relations so that they would comply with the WTO's regulation. The EU Commission justified the necessity to reform her trade regime with ACP states by acknowledging that the Lomé regime had "not provided a pathway out of poverty" (Mandelson (2005), cited from Sicurelli, 2010, p. 84), according to the former EU Commissioner for trade, Peter Mandelson. Not only had trade between the EU and ACP states shrunk by more than 50 percent between 1976 and 2000, but more than 60 % of ACP exports to Europe remained raw materials (see. Ibid., p.83). Peter Mandelson further stated, with regards to EU-ACP trade relations, that previous trade regimes had "reinforce[d] a damaging dependence on limited tropical commodities that often suited [...] one-time colonial masters" (Ibid. p. 84). Hence, the reforms, pursued by the EU through the Cotonou Agreement were promoted as means to integrate ACP countries into the global economy in order to reduce poverty and facilitate economic development, while ensuring compliance with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade's (GATT) "most favored nation treatment" (MFN). Herein, the WTO and subsequently the EU differentiated between Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Developing Countries, based on their socioeconomic development, as indicated by a several variables. Categorized as developing countries, as they were not among the 47 least developed countries in the world, Ghana and the Ivory Coast did not qualify for the especially forthcoming terms of trade the EU offered to particularly weak and vulnerable economies.

In detail, the Cotonou Agreement called for an end to the "non-reciprocal trade preferences" (Manchin, 2004, p. 2) towards Non-Least Developed Countries by 2008, when the waiver granted to the EU by the WTO, under the “Enabling Clause”, expired. Thereafter, developing countries had to choose whether they wanted to revert to the Generalized System of Preference (GSP), the EU’s unilateral tariff scheme established in 1968 (see Hurt, 2003, p. 168), or accept the EU’s new trade regime “based solely on the principles of free trade and private sector competition” (Langan & Price, 2015, p. 267). By returning to the EU’s GSP, ACP-countries risked having far higher tariffs applied to their EU exports, because the European Union could unilaterally determine the tariffs it demanded for ACP imports, so long as they were not higher than the bound tariffs (guaranteed by the GATT’s (1947) Article 1 (MFN)) applied to the same products imported from other countries. While least developed countries had less to lose in this situation, as their exports to the EU were to be protected from high tariffs through the "Everything But Arms Agreement" (signed in 2001) and previously by the GATT’s “Enabling Clause”, Ghana and the Ivory Coast had reason for concern. As Developing Countries, they faced the risk of the EU unilaterally applying her General System of Preference, which opened the possibility of an escalating tariff structure for cocoa products. By applying an escalating tariff structure, the EU could -depending on the degree of processing- increase the price of processed cocoa products originating outside the EU and, in turn, make Ivorian and Ghanaian cocoa products (with more value added) less competitive on the European market.

The following table, by Siemen Van Berkum (2009), shows the categorization of cocoa products according to the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS).

Table 3.1	**Tariff lines (HS codes) for cocoa**
180100	Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted
180200	Cocoa shells, husks, skins and waste
180310	Cocoa paste not defatted
180320	Cocoa paste wholly or partly defatted
180400	Cocoa butter, fat, oil
180500	Cocoa powder, unsweetened
180610	Cocoa powder, sweetened
180620	Chocolate and other food preps containing cocoa >2k
180631	Chocolate, cocoa preps, block, slab, bar, filled, >2k
180632	Chocolate, cocoa prep, block/slab/bar, not filled,>2k
180690	Chocolate/cocoa food preparations nes

As the table of cocoa tariff lines demonstrates, cocoa-product-categories allow for precise tariff

application by importing countries, as each product-category can be differentiated by content and processing step. This enables the EU, and other cocoa-importing economies to apply tariffs in a manner which protects specific product-categories from foreign competition.
Hence, the EU's tariff preferences, which were generally "designed to provide an incentive to traders to import products from developing countries" (Kimunguyi, 2005, p. 7), (by applying lower tariffs to products originating in Lomé-signatory states), could be adjusted in a way that made specific Ivorian and Ghanaian exports more expensive than products processed in other countries or the EU herself. Therefore, the EU's potential recourse to the GSP provided a particularly daunting backdrop for the negotiations of future trade relations. A failure to reach an agreement could lead to the EU establishing tariff market entry barriers and, thereby, disincentivizing investments into Ghana's and the Ivory Coast's cocoa processing sector. As this threatened to lock both countries into their economic position as exporters of primary commodities, each of them had a strong interest to avoid this situation. By remaining primary commodity exporters, Ghana and the Ivory Coast would have risked perpetuating the "increased uncertainty, volatility […]; reduced profit margins and poor employment opportunities" (Aziz et al., 2017, p. 46) they had been attempting to overcome since independence, so that the threat of reversion to the EU's GSP might have coerced them to sign the Cotonou Agreement.

Ultimately, both Ghana and the Ivory Coast averted this situation by signing the Cotonou Agreement in year 2000, which made them eligible for continuous preferential market access according to the EU and the waiver granted by the WTO to extend these practices until the end of 2007 (see Sicurelli, 2010, p. 81). Nevertheless, when Ghana and the Ivory Coast failed to "take the necessary steps" (Wissenschaftlicher Dienst des Deutschen Bundestages, 2016, p. 4) to advance the process towards the (interim) Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) within the agreed schedule, the EU chose to exert pressure on them by denying them preferential market access (see Ibid.). As a working paper by the German parliament's research department reveals, the steps taken prior to Ghana and the Ivory Coast signing the interim Economic Partnership Agreements (iEPAs) in 2007 (see Aziz, 2017, p. 56), were in fact justified with their failure to advance the Cotonou process in the agreed time frame. This is remarkable because the WTO's waiver, for the EU's non-reciprocal tariff removal for goods traded with ACP countries authorized the EU to provide preferential treatment to ACP countries until first of January 2008 (see Brown, 2005, p. 49), so that it was not legally necessary for the EU to suddenly apply an escalating tariff structure on cocoa imports originating from Ghana in 2005. This indicates that the brief application of escalating tariffs was motivated by the EU's strategic interests in promoting the Economic Partnership Agreements.

Apart from prolonging preferential market access for Lomé-signatory exports, the Cotonou Agreement also called for "reciprocity in tariff removal, differentiation between trade agreements with [regional] groups of ACP countries, [the] promotion of regional integration in Africa and, finally, coordination of European trade and aid policies" (Sicurelli, 2010, p. 83). Moreover, it demanded the inclusion of the so-called Singapore issues, which would not have been necessary to comply with the WTO regime. These behind-the-border trade issues addressing "transparency in government procurement, competition and investment policies, trade in services and intellectual property rights" (Brown, 2005, p. 9 ff.), which are also referred to as "offensive interests", were included into the EPA negotiation agenda, even though they had previously "been strongly rejected multilaterally" (Kimunguyi, 2005, p. 15) by ACP states.

Unsurprisingly, both, the inclusion of the Singapore issues and the EU's exertion of pressure on Ghana and the Ivory Coast document, that the EU Commission (which is responsible for negotiating trade agreements), was strictly pursuing the EU member state's interests throughout the Cotonou process, rather than benevolently mediating the interests of the negotiating parties. Therefore, the following segment will investigate how the Cotonou Agreement shaped the strategic interaction (i.e. negotiations) preceding the EPAs, by examining how the Cotonou process impacted the first-, second- and third order condition of the subsequent EPA-negotiations. Thereafter, we will turn to the EPAs themselves to investigate the status quo of the EU-ECOWAS trade relations with regards to cocoa, so that we can compare the current patterns of resource distribution to those prevalent during European colonialism.

7.3. Critical Realist Perception of the Cotonou Agreement

As the Cotonou Agreement was a preparatory arrangement, designed to define both, the parties and the agenda of the subsequent EPAs, it divided the ACP countries into seven regional trade blocs, five of which were on the African continent. Each of these trade blocs, with Ghana and the Ivory Coast being part of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), consisted of several states which had different levels of economic development and domestic market regulation. While some members had less of an incentive to even reach EPA-status because their market access was secured by the EU's "Everything But Arms" agreement, others, such as Nigeria, feared that extensive market liberalization would introduce significant

European competition into their domestic markets and would lead to losses in market share for domestic producers. Especially the advantages of European producers with respect to access to capital and technologically advanced factors of production were sources of concern among countries that had spent the past decades investing in their industrial capacities and economic diversification. Therefore, these countries, such as Nigeria and South Africa, were particularly skeptical of the reciprocal tariff removals that the EPAs and the Cotonou Agreement called for.

In Ghana and the Ivory Coast, however, the situation was different. As both countries' public revenue was to a comparatively large extent export dependent and cocoa exports were critical for their domestic economies, they feared for the European market access of their export commodities. Also, both had reason for concern over the escalating tariff structure the EU could legally apply to their cocoa exports, because none of them qualified for LDC- status. In this situation, both countries decided to protect the competitiveness of their exports to the EU, rather than secure the public revenue they generated through the taxation of imports originating in the European Union. This made sense considering that their ability to tax imports was based on the ability to afford them.

As the two countries decided to protect their market access by signing and ratifying the interim EPAs in 2007, we will now assess how the Cotonou Agreement affected the bargaining power and negotiation strength of the EU, Ghana and the Ivory Coast. Furthermore, I will also consider the negotiating framework the Cotonou Agreement determined for the subsequent EPA negotiations between the EU and ECOWAS. Thereafter, we will examine how the transnational cocoa value chain developed during the period in which the Cotonou Agreement was in place. Finally, we will turn to the investigation of the EU-ECOWAS EPAs in order to examine which patterns of resource distribution they established, conserved or altered. Once this current trade agreement has been analyzed from a Critical Realist perspective, I will conclude my thesis by comparing the current patterns of resource distribution with those of European colonialism. This comparison will explain both, how specific patterns of resource distribution were conserved or altered and point out which corporate agents benefit from them.

7.3.1. First-, Second and Third Order Conditions after the Cotonou Agreement

The Cotonou Agreement was initially designed to set the negotiation framework for the subsequent EPAs between the EU and seven regional organizations within the ACP-group, which were defined in consideration of regional specificities and to promote regional integration amongst members of each regional body. The negotiation schedule projected "substantive negotiations on an inter-regional basis [beginning] in 2003" (Hulse, 2018, p. 43) and culminating in the adoption of the EPAs by 2007, whereafter the WTO's waiver expired and the previously discussed GSP would be applied. In addition to the daunting backdrop of GSP's potential tariff structure, the EU took further measures to increase her leverage in inter-regional negotiations. More specifically, she adjusted the time frame of her internal decision-making process for the allocation of her 10th Economic Development Fund (EDF) to coincide with the conclusion of the EPA agreements in 2007 (see Goodison, 2007, p. 147). Though this did make sense from a budgetary point of view, (as the EU had ensured it would compensate EPA signatories for revenue losses due to the reduction of tariffs on European exports), it also provided an additional incentive for potential signatories to reach the EPAs within the initial time frame. The general purpose of the Cotonou Agreement, which initiated the Cotonou process was to reduce trade barriers, promote inter-regional cooperation between the EU and ACP sub-regions (see Ibid. p. 26), increase intra-regional integration within these ACP sub-regions (see Kimunguyi, 2005, p.15) and determine a negotiation framework in which individual ACP-states found themselves both incentivized (by the provision of EU funds) and coerced (by the threat of losing duty free market access) to reach the Economic Partnership Agreements .

"As Ghana and the Cote d'Ivoire were the only West African" (Gbedoah, 2016, p. 27) countries to sign interim EPAs within the ECOWAS region by 2007, I will now examine how the Cotonou Agreement altered the first-, second- and third order condition of the strategic interaction which resulted in the EPA between the EU and ECOWAS.

With respect to the negotiating parties' bargaining power, the EU was disproportionately endowed with material resources it deployed throughout the negotiation process. This is not only supported by the fact that the EU has a far greater budget and pool of personnel than ECOWAS, but also by the circumstance that the EU provided financial resources to its negotiating counterpart for them to meet on a regular basis and advance their decision-making process, as well as the EU-ECOWAS negotiations altogether. The EU's promotion of the Cotonou Agreement as a means of reducing poverty and advancing ACP states' economic development, however, implies acknowledgment of the fact that the previous trade relations had not been in the long-term interest of her trade partners. This suggests that the cultural resources in the hands of ECOWAS negotiators were quite significant, as they could tap into the EU's sense of responsibility to obtain concessions in form of financial developmental support and more forthcoming terms of trade regarding their retention of protective tariffs for their domestic industries. Furthermore, ECOWAS negotiator's "apparent conformity to the logic of neo-liberal restructuring" (Langan & Price, 2015, p. 282) also underscores their ability to deploy their cultural resources in a manner, which suited their interests, especially considering that they were able to secure more favorable conditions in the resulting EPA than other regional groups (see Hulse, 2018, p. 39 ff.).

Concerning the parties' negotiation strength, it is obvious that the EU's success, in dividing the ACP bloc "into seven regional groups" (Ibid., p. 42 f.) greatly increased her negotiation strength in inter-regional negotiations, as this shifted the first order condition of subsequent strategic interactions in the EU's favor. This greatly diminished her counterparts' ability to mobilize corporate agents and primary-corporate agents from outside the ECOWAS region to position themselves in a way, which would have been beneficial to ECOWAS negotiators' pursuit of their interests. And yet, by negotiating as a regional bloc, ECOWAS members were able to find a suitable common negotiation position in their strategic interaction with the highly integrated EU. Hence, even though the EU benefited from the negotiating format by regaining the upper hand in terms of the initial distribution of resources and by reducing the size of the bloc she was interacting with, the negotiation strength of ECOWAS as a regional unit was increased through the integration- and consultation process prior to the actual EPA negotiations. This is also supported by comparatively successful outcome ECOWAS negotiators were able to achieve in the 2014 EPAs.

Finally, turning to the socio-cultural dynamic within which the Cotonou Process took place, one must say that this strongly favored morphogenesis towards neo-liberal conceptions of governance, as the role of markets and private corporate agents, as drivers for development, was highlighted throughout the entire process and within the subsequent EPAs. Nevertheless, as both Ghana and the Ivory Coast had already undergone neo-liberal reforms in form of structural adjustment, (as demonstrated by the reduction of state involvement in their domestic cocoa sectors and the increased market power of private corporate agents along the cocoa value chain), their domestic economies had already been remodeled according to the dominant neo-liberal paradigm of the late 20th and early 21st century. Therefore, the increased privatization of material patterns of resource distribution had already taken hold of both countries' economic social structures, though this was more pronounced in the Ivory Coast than in Ghana. One effect of neo-liberal reforms within these nations' cocoa sectors had been the increased involvement of foreign private corporate agents which now lobbied policy makers “in favor of the EPA” (Grumiller et al., 2018, p. 24), because most of their cocoa products were exported to the European Union and “would face a very difficult position in the European market” (Ibid.) if Ghana and the Ivory Coast rejected the EPAs. Finally, both countries’ eagerness to increase value addition within their domestic cocoa sectors meant that, for them to attract more foreign capital, they had to secure foreign private corporate agents’ EU market access by signing the Economic Partnership Agreement.

These circumstances most likely increased Ghana’s and the Ivory Coast’s willingness to engage in the Cotonou process and drove them to conclude the Interim EPAs with the EU, as the only West African Countries by the end of 2007.

7.3.2. The Cocoa Sectors of Ghana and the Ivory Coast during the Cotonou Process

After the preceding segment presented how the Cotonou Agreement affected the first-, second- and third order conditions of the following EPA negotiations, my examination of the cocoa value chain’s development subsequent to the Cotonou Agreement will focus on the previously identified corporate agents. I will examine, whether multinational corporations increased their activities in Ghana and the Ivory Coast, how smallholding farmer’s share of the FOB price developed and how the primary-corporate agent’s ability to extract public revenue from its cocoa sector has evolved.

7.3.3. Value Addition in Ghana’s and the Ivory Coast’s Cocoa Sector

Ghana and the Ivory Coast made concerted efforts to increase the value addition within their domestic cocoa sectors, by establishing favorable conditions for multinational corporations to engage in more local cocoa processing. Both governments hoped, that by providing financial incentives for multinational cocoa processing companies (through tariff-free imports of capital goods, tax holidays for profits, generated through newly established cocoa processing activities, and by guaranteeing the right to repatriate profits) these companies would expand their local processing capacities, increase the number of local employees and produce more export commodities, which could then be taxed for public revenue. Accordingly, this segment will compare key data from both countries to examine how each country's cocoa sector has evolved, and to investigate if- and how specific corporate agents along the transnational value chain have benefited from these developments. Our first comparisons will be based on Data, published by Eurostat, as well as the Food and Agricultural Organization in a report written by Doussou Traoré in 2009. These will focus on the export of higher-value products from 1995 to 2005 and provide insight into each sector's development in terms of value addition and producer remuneration.

Data, provided by the FAO, shows that by 1995 about 10 percent of cocoa exports by Ghana and the Ivory Coast were processed products rather than raw beans. While this was after Ghana's limited cocoa market liberalization under the Lomé Convention, it is noteworthy that the country achieved a slightly higher degree of domestic value addition than the Ivory Coast prior to 1997, whereafter it was overtaken by the Ivory Coast. Once the Ivory Coast liberalized its domestic cocoa sector, foreign private corporate agents expanded their Ivorian activities and the Cotonou Agreement was signed, the degree of local value addition increased considerably, so that -according to Eurostat records (2018) - by 2003 about 29 percent of Ivorian cocoa exports to the EU were cocoa butter, -paste, shells & husks or cocoa powder and -cake.[3] In comparison, only 5 percent of Ghana's cocoa exports to the EU consisted of processed cocoa commodities in 2003 (Eurostat, 2018).[4] Based on this information, we can see that by having zero tariffs applied to any of their cocoa exports through the Cotonou Agreement, both counties became more attractive investment destinations for transnationally operating cocoa processing companies. The comparatively large increase in cocoa processing capacity in the Ivory Coast implies that under the same trade regime, transnational corporations favored the market environment the Ivory Coast provided. However, another factor in favor of the Ivory Coast may have to do with their total production capacity and productivity. The Ivory Coast's liberal land- and labor policies prior to structural adjustment was designed to increase the countries cocoa output. The long-term effect of these producer-friendly cocoa-policies was an expansion of the area under cultivation to a size twice as large as Ghana's by 1995. Even though, Ghana made efforts to expand its cultivation area to 2 million hectares (almost the size of the Ivory Coast's in 2004), she simply could not increase the productivity of her cocoa farms to match those of her neighbor. Ivorian cocoa farms are about twice as productive as Ghana's. This, however, is not the result of private corporate agent's dominance in the Ivory Coast's cocoa sector or their

3 Appendix: Figure 1

4 Appendix: Figure 2

influence on cocoa sector policy, as Ivorian cocoa-sector productivity was higher than Ghana's even before its public corporate agents were privatized in 2000. Nevertheless, ever since private industry took control over Ivory Coast's cocoa sector from 1999 onward, productivity of Ivorian farms was stabilized above 600 kg per hectares, while Ghanaian farms only reached 400 kg per hectares in 2005, according to FAO statistics (cited from Traoré, 2009, p. 87 ff.).

So, while each country's cocoa sector liberalization did increase the share of processed cocoa within total cocoa exports (see Ibid.) and zeroing tariffs for cocoa imports through the Cotonou Agreement appears to have provided an incentive to further increase origin grinding activities in both countries, it is not yet clear if, and how each countries' general population benefited from these developments. Hence, in order to gain a sound understanding of how domestic patterns of resource distribution evolved under the Cotonou Agreement and during the first two years of the IEPAs, I will now show how both countries' cocoa price and -tax structure have developed in the period from 2001 to 2009. Following that we will finally look at the current trade agreement as documented in the EU-ECOWAS EPA signed in 2014, to examine which aspects of this post-colonial trade relation were reformed or conserved.

7.4. Price- and Tax Structures during the Cotonou process

Examining how domestic patterns of cocoa resource-distribution developed, we can see that -compared to 70 percent in Ghana- the average share of the export-price received by producers in the Ivory Coast, from 2001 to 2009, was merely 41 percent (see Kireyev, 2010, p. 8). This indicates that Ghana's more regulated post-liberalization cocoa sector passed on a higher percentage of their commodities' value to producers, while other corporate agents (processors, haulers and exporters) retain a larger share of their export commodities' value in the Ivory Coast. In case of the Ivory Coast we can further see that the percentage retained by foreign private corporate agents, engaged in exports, increased to 67 percent in the two years after signing the Cotonou Agreement, according to data from Ivorain authorities and the IMF, published by Alexei Kireyev (2010). While these (American- and) European corporate agents' share of the export value did drop to 60 percent by 2006, prior to the Ivory Coast signing the IEPA (2007), it rose to 74,7 percent between 2006 and 2009 (see Ibid., p. 8). In comparison to this, the price share for Ivorian cocoa producers dropped from 50 to 31,7 percent from 2001 to 2003, then recovered back up to 49,8 percent by 2007 and stagnated around 50 percent in the first two years of the IEPAs (Ibid.).

Turning towards the (public) revenue generated through the Ivory Coasts' public corporate agents, we see that the fiscal and quasi-fiscal levies they were able to retain, also dropped from 39- to 31 percent in the first year after the Cotonou Agreement was signed. Although the redistributable portion retained by public corporate agents had recovered somewhat (from 2002 to 2006, when it stabilized around 40 percent), it dropped in the two years after the IEPA was signed, reaching 25,3 percent by 2009. This illustrates the main beneficiaries of both the Cotonou Agreement and the Interim EPAs were multinational corporations, as they were able to increase their share of the export value of processed and unprocessed cocoa commodities subsequent to both agreements. The nine largest of these corporations exported 70 percent of Ivory Coast's cocoa production and only one of them was Ivorian (see Kireyev, 2010, p.12). After signing the Cotonou Agreement, both countries' post-liberalization cocoa sector differed even more in their tax structure.

While Ghana's cocoa-taxation system initially only exempted producers from taxation of income for the "first five years of operations" (due to the Internal Revenue Act, 2000 (Act 592) and the Internal Revenue Regulation 2001 (LI 1675)), this regulation was expanded to processing companies from 2006 onwards, arguably, to stimulate investment in Ghana's cocoa production and processing sector. Prior to their exemption and five years after commencing their agricultural processing activities, however, these private foreign corporate agents' income was taxed at a rate of 20 percent in Accra & Tema, 10 percent in Tamala, Bolgatanga & Wa, and 0 percent in all other locations. By the differing taxation, Ghana's primary-corporate agent intended to de-centralize the investments in its agricultural sector in order to enhance development throughout the country. Ghana also allowed for a 10-year tax holiday on corporate income and a 30 percent tax reduction for capital goods such as plants and machinery. Ultimately, while Ghana's tax structure does attempt to stimulate and steer investment in its cocoa sector, it does not provide any exemptions from its export tax, which "is levied on the f.o.b. price received by [COCOBOD] for all cocoa exports" (International Monetary Fund, 2008, p. 28). The exact export tax is determined by the Minister of Finance (the ministry overseeing COCOBOD's activities) and allocated to the central budget once producers' costs are payed and the COCOBOD's marketing costs have been covered (see Ibid.).

In comparison, the Ivory Coast's tax structure consists of three components. They are (a.) the export tax itself, which sets a specific amount to be payed per kg of cocoa exports and was set at 210 CFCA (0,315 EUR) in 2009 (see Kireyev, 2010, p. 9). In addition to this "droit unique de sortie" (DUS), there is (b.) a registration tax or "tax d'enregistrement" (which is "an ad valorem tax set as a percentage of the [cost of insurance and freight (CIF)] price" (Ibid.) that can be adjusted upon revision and was set at 5 percent in 2009), and (c.), another tax of 2 Francs CFA per kg levied on itinerant buyers, which collect cocoa at farm gates (see Ibid). Even though the Ivory Coast adjusts the taxes levied on cocoa exports upon revue, the public's share of the value of its primary export commodity had decreased to 25 percent by 2009. Additionally, the Ivorian government has even suggested further reducing its total cocoa export taxation to 22 percent, while simplifying its tax structure to "a single ad valorem tax" by 2010 (Ibid.).

8. The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)

As the Interim EPAs, signed by Ghana and the Ivory Coast in 2007 (see Wissenschaftlicher Dienst des Deutschen Bundestages, 2016, p. 5), are mostly consistent with the EPAs between the EU and ECOWAS (signed by both countries and the EU in 2014)[5], this segment will first present some key developments during the EPA negotiation process before outlining the legal framework set by the EU-ECOWAS EPAs (2014). While the presentation of the negotiation process itself will focus on the strategic interaction between the EU and ECOWAS, my description of the alterations introduced by the EPA treaties will center around how these modifications serve the interests of corporate agents at either ends of these strategic interactions. Once the terms of trade established through the EPA have been presented in detail and the potential effects of these changes have been discussed, I will compare the economic developments within each country's cocoa sector that have taken place since they signed the interim Economic Partnership Agreements in 2007.

8.1. EPA Negotiation Framework

The negotiation framework of the EPAs was determined through the Cotonou process. As "Article 36 clause 1" of the Cotonou Agreement stipulates, the signatory states agreed to work towards a "WTO compatible EPA, by removing progressively the barriers to trade between

[5] See Overview of the Economic Partnership Agreements (Mar. 2019) http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/september/tradoc_144912.pdf [Mar. 18. 2019]

them" (Sam, 2016, p.31). Though the initial deadline for EPA negotiations was in 2007 (according to the EU's negotiation schedule), it was not until 2014 that a comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and ECOWAS was reached. Prior to this, only Ghana and the Ivory Coast signed interim Economic Partnership Agreements in 2007, in order to secure the market access for their raw and processed cocoa exports (see Hulse, 2018, p. 43), while the other ECOWAS member states remained reluctant for the following reasons.

As for the negotiations themselves, in which the European Commission represented the EU and the "Economic Community of West African States Commission" represented the interests of ECOWAS states (see Ibid.), there were several points of contention causing reservations among ECOWAS members. The most important of these related to (a.) the tariff removals (necessary for the EPAs to be WTO compatible), which threatened ECOWAS states' public revenue, (b.) the inclusion of "behind the border" issues (which severely reduced the states' domestic economic policy space), and (c.) the ECOWAS states' request of a robust commitment from the EU to assist them in their economic development.

The potential cost of tariff removal threatened ECOWAS members in two distinct ways. Firstly, the taxation of imports was an important source of public revenue for the primary-corporate agents of West Africa. Secondly, the removal of tariffs on EU-imports also removed a key instrument protecting their developing economies from highly competitive European competition (see Langan & Price, 2015, 276). Hence, a central point of contention in EPA negotiations was the extent of- and schedule for tariff removal. The issue was only resolved when the EU-Commission, which had initially demanded ECOWAS states liberate 80 percent of their tariff lines within 15 years, accepted the offer of liberating 75 percent of tariff lines over a period of 20 years. And yet, the EU Commission was only willing to accept this condition after the ECOWAS negotiators had submitted a report, containing an independent legal analysis of "GATT Article XXIV", which confirmed that the GATT did not necessitate states to liberalize 80 percent of tariff lines over a 15 years period (see Hulse, 2018, p.49). Hence, it was this strategic deployment of cultural resources by the ECOWAS Commission, (first presented to the French President Francois Hollande by 52 African Heads of States in December of 2013 at a conference in Paris,) which enabled ECOWAS members to secure a longer transition period and a higher degree of protection for African industries and public revenue, while the EU agreed to liberalize 100 percent of its ECOWAS imports (see Ibid.).

With respect to the “Singapore Issues” or “behind the border issues” (also referred to as offensive trade issues) called for by the European Union in the Cotonou Agreement, the reservations ECOWAS members had concerning the EU’s request for “binding commitments on […] services, investment, competition, public procurement and intellectual property rights” (Hulse, 2018, p. 47), led to the EPA containing only a rendezvous concerning these issues.

Finally, as the removal of tariffs threatened to limit ECOWAS states' fiscal leeway (see Bouët et al., 2018, p. 26), ECOWAS negotiators called for more specific and binding commitments by the EU to compensate ECOWAS for their loss in public revenue through the provision of a “Economic Partnership Agreement Development Programme” (EPADP) (see Hulse, 2018, p.46). Though the EU only committed to providing € 6.5 billion between 2015 and 2020, rather than the 16 billion euros initially demanded by ECOWAS (see Ibid.), the inclusion of a binding commitment on behalf of the EU (to justify ECOWAS cancellation of the EPAs in case the EU did not honor its commitment), was already a success for ECOWAS negotiators.

In summary, it appears that the strategic interaction between the EU and ECOWAS produced an EPA which greatly increased West-African market access for European private corporate agents, while simultaneously securing slightly more fiscal leeway for ECOWAS members to protect domestic industries than other ACP sub-regions. Additionally, the EU-ECOWAS EPA stands out by ensuring ECOWAS members are compensated for their loss of public revenue through the EU’s commitment to a more precisely defined EPADP.

From a Critical Realist point of view, it appears that ECOWAS negotiators were able to ensure a high degree of negotiation strength by relying on a supranational interest representation through the ECOWAS Commission, regardless of their comparative lack of bargaining power via-à-vis the EU. As a matter of fact, the EU’s disproportionate access to material resources was used as a cultural resource by ECOWAS negotiators to justify their demand of additional fiscal- and developmental support from the EU, in return for increased market access, which documents the ECOWAS commission's skillful deployment of cultural resources throughout this strategic interaction. This enabled the ECOWAS Commission to secure better terms of trade for ECOWAS members than Ghanaian’s and the Ivory Coast’s IEPA had. Moreover, ECOWAS negotiators even secured access to additional material resources, postponed the final decision on behind-the-border-issues -which would drastically reduce West-African primary-corporate agent's economic policy space- and guaranteed duty-free market access for all ECOWAS exports to the EU, including processed cocoa exports from Ghana and the Ivory Coast (see Hütz-Adams, 2018, p.15).

The following segment will examine the terms of trade established by the EU-ECOWAS-EPA (2014) to provide a more in-depth understanding of how it selectively induces morphogenesis and morphostasis into the structural relations between the European Union's and ECOWAS' economies. Once, this examination of the Economic Partnership Agreement's legal framework has been concluded and the articles directly affecting the cocoa value chain have been discussed, I will present the current state of the transnational cocoa value chain.

8.2. The Legal Framework established by the EPA

At its core, the EPA "changes non-reciprocal market access to the EU [...] to a reciprocal Free Trade Agreement" (Gbedoah, 2016, p.1) by calling for West African signatories to successively dismantle their customs structure until 75% of EU exports can enter West Africa duty free. Also, as a Free Trade Agreement with "no definite duration" (Sam, 2016, p.34) it is intended to provide a WTO compatible legal framework in which future trade relations between the EU and ECOWAS can evolve. Therefore, this analysis of the EU-ECOWAS EPA[6] will focus on -how the framework is projected to affect trade between the EU and ECOWAS members, -which structural (i.e. material) relationships it seeks to conserve or alter and -how the morphogenesis/ -stasis, induced by the EPA, is expected to affect the vested interests of corporate agents along the transnational cocoa value chain.

As the EU-ECOWAS negotiations have shown, West African signatories were very concerned about how trade liberalization would impact their fiscal base, since the EPA's article (art.) 10 demands that "the West African region progressively reduces and eliminates custom duties" applicable to products originating in the EU. As post-colonial African states are "known for having a restricted domestic fiscal base, [ECOWAS members had reason to fear that] the EPA could endanger the governments' ability to provide public goods" (Bouët et al. 2018, p.26). This could result in a net welfare loss for some states, as the benefits of price-decreases on EU imports may not outweigh the welfare gains afforded through the redistribution of public

[6] Economic Partnership Agreement between the West African states, The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), on the one Part, And the European Union and its member states, on the other Part (2014) (EU-ECOWAS EPA, 2014)

revenue. More specifically, the study by Bouët et al. (2018) shows that the scheduled tariff-reductions will most likely result in a net welfare gain for the Ivory Coast while a welfare-loss is expected for Ghana (see Ibid., p. 36).
Similarly, the EPA's art. 13 further limits the signatories' primary-corporate agents' ability to increase or introduce "new duties or taxes on exports or charges […] in trade between the parties". Though the article's paragraph 3 grants West African signatories the right to increase the taxes on exports in "exceptional circumstances", this must be justified by a "specific needs for income, promotion for fledgling industries or environmental protection […] on a temporary basis and after consulting the European Union Party" (id. art.). Therefore, the EPA ensures West African primary-corporate agents cannot independently increase the public revenue they derive from their exports, without justifying their specific needs in consultation with the European Union. This is a noteworthy intervention into West African government's ability to adjust domestic patterns of resource distribution to their respective needs, because rather than securing the transnational free flow of goods, it ensures the prices, payed for goods imported from West Africa by corporate agents in the EU, are not increased through taxation without previous EU consultation. Additionally, this article is problematic because it contributes to the morphostasis of West African export -tax structures which may not have been adjusted to maximize the welfare in West African societies, yet. In cases, in which export tax structures were intended to attract trans-national capital, for example, modifications to these structural relations must now be consulted with the EU. This means that independent unilateral fiscal interventions by ECOWAS' primary-corporate agents, for the purpose of increasing public revenue/ -welfare and financing public services provision, are prohibited by the agreement.

Another article specifying the policy space of primary-corporate agents towards their domestic patterns of resource distribution is art. 35, which does not only ensure the equal treatment of traded goods (in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3) but also secures each parties' right to subsidize its domestic producers through the redistribution of taxes. So, while ensuring traded goods do not face discriminatory practices in foreign markets, art. 35 (4) also provides a legal basis for the privatization of public revenue through subsidies, for example through the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). These subsidized goods must then be treated no less favorable than those produced by the importing country, unless they pose a threat to an importing country's domestic industry or -economic sector, as specified in art. 22 (2) (a) & (b).

Apart from regulating the fiscal policy space primary-corporate agents have, with regards to some of their domestic patterns of resource distribution, the EU-ECOWAS EPA also clarifies its signatories' relationship to- and in the WTO. While some articles, such as art. 16 (3) simply state that WTO data shall be the basis for trade related calculations, others, such as art. 20 (1/2/3) or 21 (1/2/3) for example, use the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or the Agreement establishing the WTO as reference point and guideline. Though it is to be expected that a regulatory framework, which was established to ensure WTO conformity, will refer to the WTO's regulations, it is peculiar that the EPA's art. 37's paragraph 1 (d) states that all parties shall "adopt, wherever possible, common positions in relations to customs in international organizations such as the WTO, the World Customs Organization (WCO), the United Nations (UN) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)". From a Critical Realist point of view, this call for a common position in multilateral organizations, documents the signatories' intent to increase their negotiation strength within these multilateral organizations. Even though this article does not determine the signatories' primary-corporate agents' policy space within multilateral organizations, it can serve either party as a cultural resource to initiate re-grouping processes for future strategic interactions within these multilateral organizations.

Finally, I will now both, present those regulations within the EPA which more directly affect corporate agents along the transnational cocoa value chain and, subsequently, investigate the current patterns of resource distribution therein.

8.3. EPA Regulations Effecting the Cocoa Value Chain

An important legal provision for cocoa producers and -processors alike are the rules of origin (ROO), referred to in the treaties' art. 6. Though the article's paragraph 2 and 3 do call for a simplification of these rules of origin by the "Joint Council of the EPA" five years after the EPA has taken effect, some scholars have pointed out that "stringent rules of origin (ROOs) […] in many cases effectively close down exports to the EU" (Langan & Price, 2015, p. 273). Whether or not ROOs have this consequence depends on where components of the good, requiring EU market access, originate. As it stands the "EPA allows accumulation of inputs from regional countries which are EPA members to qualify for entry into the EU as Ghana [or Ivory Coast] products" (Gbedoah, 2016, p.47). While this appears to be beneficial to producers and exporters in Ghana and the Ivory Coast in particular, these rules of origin also benefit EU producers because, in order to attain duty free market access, the inputs of these EU imports must originate within the EPA area, to include the EU. For chocolate manufacturers or cocoa processors for example, this means that their inputs must originate within the EPA region, even if inputs from somewhere else are cheaper, of better quality or more readily available. Hence, rules of origin limit the potential sources of inputs to EU imports (with preferential market access) by excluding non-EPA sources, such as the United States of America or the People's Republic of China, to name but a few. Ultimately, though ROOs do increase economic integration within the EPA area, they do so at the expense of trade with non-EPA states, which in turn can lead to a concentration of trade amongst EPA signatories (see Bouët et al., 2018, p.42).

Another EPA regulation with relevance for the cocoa value chain is enclosed in the EPAs art. 46 and 48 which outline the signatories' approach to West Africa's agricultural sectors. Article 46 (2) states that "the EPA Development Program should help increase productivity, competitiveness and diversity of output in the agricultural and fisheries sectors." Article 48 (2) (g/h/k/l/n) further specifies the role of the state (as it relates to its agricultural sector) by declaring "the role of the State as a supporter and adviser of private operators". In addition, it states "strengthening the agricultural sectors" (id.) shall be done by "managing tracks and roads serving rural communities to enhance the collection and movement of agricultural products; […] contributing to the development of regional exchanges for greater centralization of information regarding the regional availability of food products; [and] promoting contract farming with partners from the EU to supply organic products, for example" (id.). Additionally, the treaty calls for West African states to promote "land law reforms to increase the legal certainty of farmers and thereby promote the development of efficient agriculture to raise credit to encourage private investment in the agricultural sector" (id.). In summary, the role attributed to the state in the development of West African agricultural sectors is limited to (a.) advising private corporate agents, (b.) maintaining infrastructure for goods transportation, (c.) enhancing the information dissemination concerning the availability of produce, (d.) promoting contractual labor of African farmers for European private corporate agents and (e.) reforming land laws which "encourage private investment in the agricultural sector" (id.). With respect to "sectors that depend on international markets", the article's paragraph 5 goes on to call for each party to "ensure transparency in the domestic support policies and measures. […] The parties may exchange information concerning any agricultural policy measure at the request of either party" (id. art. 48, at 68). Hence, the EPA's legal framework pertaining to agriculture limits the role of the state to that of an assistant to private corporate agents in general and to European private corporate agents in particular.

Finally, the EPA's art. 3 (3) and 56 (3 a, b, c, e, f) outline how the agreement is expected to contribute to poverty reduction in West Africa. While art. 3 (3) requests EPA signatories to "support the institutional reforms intended to adapt the national and regional administrative authorities to the requirements of trade liberalization and strengthen the capacity of the production sectors in the West African region", art. 56 paragraph 3 explains how the "EPA Development Program must contribute to the achievement of rapid, sustained economic growth that creates jobs and contributes to sustainable development and reducing poverty in the West African region". Therein "increasing the diversity and competitiveness of the economies of the West African region, [as well as] the population's output and income" (id.) are presented as the main instruments for poverty alleviation. Additionally, the article promotes "increasing market shares of the West African region on the European market [and] promoting investment in West Africa [through] partnership between the private sector of the EU and West Africa [in addition to] improving the business environment in the West African region" (id. art. 56, at 78), as the only path towards poverty reduction. Hence, reduced state intervention, increased productivity and private sector investment are presented as the main remedy to reduce poverty, while redistributive policies, minimal labor- and wage standards or binding legal standards ensuring socially responsible conduct by foreign private corporate agents are excluded from EPA's scope of poverty alleviating measures.

Besides the EPA regulations, outlined above, there are also some noteworthy general observations made in comparative analysis of the EPA's effect on West African trade relations with the EU. One of the most important findings of comparative quantitative analysis was made by Antoine Bouët, David Laborde and Fousseini Traoré (2018), whose investigation concluded that both Ghana and the Ivory Coast open their markets for EU imports to a far greater extent than vice versa. According to their quantitative analysis of the projected effects of the EPA, both Ghana and the Ivory Coast will slightly increase EU market access for their most important exports while in return, EU exports gain disproportionate access to the markets of both countries until 2035. According to their findings this is due to the EU already having very low market entry barriers for imports originating from either West African country, while the Ivory Coast and particularly Ghana have comparatively high market entry barriers for EU exports, which will now be alleviated successively in five-year steps. The long term effects they project, is that West African countries will „concentrate their exports toward the EU" (Bouët et al., 2018, p. 42) while trade with other regions will diminish. Additionally, they calculated that the reduction in public revenue, incurred due to tariff reductions, would require a „lump sum tax“ of 17.51 USD per citizen in Ghana and 4.95 USD in the Ivory Coast, in order for each state to provide the current level of public services (see. Ibid. 44).

Having presented the strategic interaction producing the EU-ECOWAS EPA, how it limits the policy space of West African primary-corporate agents and the legal framework it provides for the development of trade between West Africa and the EU, I will now investigate how patterns of resource distribution along the transnational cocoa value chain have developed in the decade since Ghana and the Ivory Coast signed IEPAs with the EU in 2007. Besides focusing on the previously identified corporate agents and the patterns of resource distribution within the cocoa sectors, this final investigation will present the current state of the transnational cocoa value chain, so that we can compare the present patterns of resource distribution to those prevalent during European colonialism in West Africa in my thesis' conclusion.

8.4. Current Patterns of Resource Distribution along the Cocoa Value Chain

With respect to the increased activities of transnational corporate agents, subsequent to the structural adjustment programs implemented in the 1980s and the late 1990s in Ghana and the Ivory Coast respectively, transnational private corporate agents have substantially expanded their activities in both countries' cocoa sectors. However, there are significant differences between the two countries, in the extent of these activities. The subsequent segment will therefore outline these similarities and differences between both countries' current cocoa sectors with respect to the diversity of their output, the role of public- and private corporate agents in decision making processes concerning the patterns of resource distribution therein and the share cocoa producers receive of their products' export value.

8.4.1. Similarities in Ghana's and the Ivory Coast's Current Cocoa Sectors

Though Ghana's and the Ivory Coast's cocoa sectors are characterized by significant differences, there are some similarities between the two regarding the importance of foreign private corporate agents for the diversification of cocoa exports and the position of producers within their domestic cocoa sector. Furthermore, Ghanaian and Ivorian private corporate agents face similar difficulties compared to their European competitors.

The most important similarity between the multinational private corporate agents in Ghana's and the Ivory Coast's cocoa sector is that both countries' governments are eying them for the capital investments necessary to increase the diversification of their cocoa exports. Each country developed an incentive structure designed to encourage increased cocoa processing prior to export which has enabled both to considerably increase their domestic grinding capacities in the period from 2000 to 2017. According to a comparative analysis published by Grumiller et al. in 2018, data from the International Cocoa Organization ICCO shows that Ghana was able to increase its domestic processing capacities by more than 200% in this period, while the Ivory Coast managed to grow its capacities by 90%. Considering their sectors' previous processing capacities, this means that the Ivory Coast was able to almost match the world's largest cocoa processor, the Netherlands, in cocoa processing capacities with both countries processing about 13% of the worlds cocoa beans. In comparison, even after tripling its processing capacity between 2000 and 2016, Ghana was merely able to process 220 thousand tons of cocoa beans, which reflects about 5% of global cocoa beans output and is less than half of total amount of cocoa processed in the Ivory Coast (see Grumiller et al., 2018, p. 7). Nevertheless, both countries were able to expand their processing capacities after securing their EU market access by signing the Cotonou Agreement (2000), their respective Interim-EPAs (2007) and, finally, the EU-ECOWAS EPA (2014). Another similarity, related to the role of foreign private corporate agents, was their advocacy of the EPAs, as the absence of tariff barriers made their goods more competitive compared to non-EPA imports to the European market (see Grumiller, 2018, p. 24). Unfortunately, multinational corporations, engaged in Ghana's and the Ivory Coast's cocoa sector, also resemble one another with regards to the number of people they employ in their cocoa processing plants, which in the 2016/17 season were only around 2000 in Ghana and 2161 in the Ivory Coast (see Ibid., p. 12).

Another parallel regarding the corporate agents in each country's cocoa sector, is the position of cocoa producers therein. Though there are differences in the productivity of cocoa production in Ghana and the Ivory Coast, cocoa farmers in both countries find themselves at a similar disadvantage with respect to their interest representation and their market power. Even though Ghanaian cocoa farmers receive a larger share of their commodities' export values and the market they operate in is controlled by a public corporate agent (i.e. COCOBOD) and LBCs, (compared to the Ivorian counterparts who mostly sell their harvest to foreign private corporate agents through their local buying agents) producers in both countries have a similarly marginal impact on minimum producer price determination (see Gayi & Tsowou, 2016, p.32). This is not only because farmers in both countries are underrepresented in the decision-making process, but it is also a result of their relatively low degree of organization and the limited number of potential local buyers. These similar circumstances keep cocoa farmers in both countries in the position of price takers, even though their labor forms the basis of each domestic cocoa value chain (see Ibid.). Finally, cocoa producers in both countries still rely heavily on family-, migrant- and child labor for labor-intensive phases of cocoa production and acquire additional labor through the previously presented sharecropping arrangements referred to as abusa in Ghana and abusan in the Ivory Coast (see Woods, 2004, p.229). Therefore, as cocoa producers continue to rely on these informal sharecropping arrangements and the last structural elaboration altering patterns of labor resource distribution was the abolition of forced labor as well as the expulsion of foreign migrant laborers in Ghana, it appears that the social structures through which cocoa producers obtain additional labor have been subject to morphostasis in both countries ever since their initial post-colonial reforms. As a matter of fact, one of the EU-ECOWAS EPAs' projected effect, is an "increase in the real remuneration of unskilled labor, [which is expected to] increase [with] demand for unskilled labor from the 'Vegetable and Fruits' and 'Plant Fibers' sectors" (Bouët et al. 2018, p. 45). Though this may aid in reducing poverty in the Ivory Coast and Ghana, as unskilled inhabitants of rural areas are particularly at risk of living under conditions of poverty (see World Bank, 2018, p. 20), it is noteworthy that the only morphogenesis the EU-ECOWAS EPA calls for ,with respect to labor arrangements, is that the governments of Ghana and the Ivory Coast facilitate the formal labor acquisition of cocoa producers by European private corporate agents through contract farming arrangements (see EU-ECOWAS EPA, 2014, art. 48).

Finally, there are two more similarities between corporate agents engaged in the Ivory Coast's and Ghana's cocoa sectors. The first relates to Ghanaian and Ivorian cocoa trading- and processing companies. Whether they are private or public, corporate agents from either country face similar difficulties in acquiring the credit necessary to engage in capital intensive activities such as transnational trading and the establishment of processing plants. Both Ivorian and Ghanaian cocoa trading- and processing companies needed their government's support to acquire the funds necessary to engage in these activities. For example, as Grumiller et al. (2018) point out, Ghana's "various local grinders stopped operation as COCOBOD abolished a working capital credit facility because grinders could not pay back their debt" (Ibid., p. 17). In the Ivory Coast, in 2018, the bankruptcy of the country's largest Ivorian cocoa exporter, SAF-Cacao, shed light on the substantial difficulties African corporate agents face in accessing credit. One of the results of SAF-Cacao's inability to repay its loans, was a significant reduction in the liquidity of Ivorian banks and a reduced willingness of financial institutions to lend money to African cocoa exporters who struggle to remain in the market. Meanwhile, foreign private corporate agents "are likely to strengthen their position in Ivory Coast's cocoa sector, [which is now] heading towards a cartel situation [because] it is mostly multinational corporations which will be able to get financing. The others will end up disappearing" (Aboa & Young, Nov. 1. 2018). Hence, compared to their multinational competitors, domestic corporate agents in both countries are at a disadvantage in terms of credit availability.

The second similarity between domestic cocoa processors and chocolate producers in Ghana and the Ivory Coast, that has become more pronounced with the conclusion of the EU-ECOWAS EPA, is the expected competition between them and their multinational competitors from Europe. Even though the EPA does allow for protective common external tariffs of 35 percent, as "chocolate products are excluded from [mandatory] liberalization" (Grumiller et al., 2018, p. 24), domestic chocolate producers may come into direct contest with Europeans for shares of the African market, if their goods are manufactured in Ghana or the Ivory Coast. Therefore, the protective common external tariffs permitted by the EPA may not suffice to protect African chocolate producers from their European competitors in the long run, considering the differences between the two in terms of brand recognition, economies of scale, current global market shares, as well as access to financial resources and internal research and development. Ultimately, EU market access and protective common external tariffs could prove insufficient to protect the African infant chocolate industry.

Finally, as the Ivory Coast re-established a corporate agent "responsible for the regulation and development of the sector, a minimum farm-gate price and a stabilization fund" (Ibid., p. 11), called the Conseil du Café-Cacao (CCC) in 2012 (see Hütz-Adams, 2018, p.12), it re-created a corporate agent analogous to Ghana's COCOBOD, which provides some similar services to the sector. In addition, the Ivorian government decided to "remove all private representation from the board of its cocoa regulator" (Mieu, Sep. 18. 2018), which reduces foreign private corporate agents' influence on decision-making processes concerning the patterns of resource distribution within its sector. This decision is the Ivory Coast's primary-corporate agent's attempt to wrestle back control over the structural (i.e. material) relations within its cocoa sector from foreign private corporate agents and is part of a broader strategy of Ghana and the Ivory Coast to better coordinate and more closely align their cocoa sectors' governance. This has also been formalized in the "Abidjan Declaration on Cocoa" in March of 2018 (Konandi, Mar. 27. 2018),

which is an attempt by both primary corporate agents to induce morphogenesis into their cocoa sectors' domestic and transnational patterns of resource distribution.
The following segment will investigate the current differences between the two cocoa sectors. For this purpose, I will examine the degree of export diversification which has occurred since each country signed its IEPA and the current state of each country's cocoa sector governance. Thereafter I will summarize the results of my analysis of the EU's past and current trade relations with Ghana and the Ivory Coast to answer my research question, whether the EU's trade policy re-produces colonial patterns of resource distribution along the cocoa value chain.

8.4.2. Differences in the Current Cocoa Sectors of Ghana and the Ivory Coast

The most significant differences between Ghana's and the Ivory Coast's current cocoa trade with the EU lie in the composition of their respective cocoa exports in terms of value addition and the share these cocoa exports represent in each country's total trade with the EU. Furthermore, their domestic cocoa sectors also differ with regards to the corporate agents, responsible for their development, and the ownership of the private corporate agents dominating each country's domestic trade and exports.

As far as domestic value addition and the diversification of cocoa exports is concerned, the Ivory Coast remains ahead of Ghana, even though the latter's value addition prior to export has increased considerably after signing its IEPA in 2007. More specifically, while processed cocoa products only made up slightly less than 10% of Ghana's cocoa exports to the EU prior to 2008, this share had increased to more than 20% by 2017, according to Eurostat data (see Appendix. Figure 2). Meanwhile, though more processed cocoa products are exported to the EU from the Ivory Coast in total, their share in exports has decreased since its peak of 41,6 % in 2008 to 34% in 2017 (see Appendix. Figure 1.). However, the Ivory Coast's diminished share in processed cocoa exports is as result of her increased overall beans production and -export, as both have grown faster than the percentage of beans the Ivory coast processes domestically.

Comparing the importance cocoa exports have for Ghana and the Ivory Coast as a percentage of their total exports, we can see that exports of this commodity have become more important for the Ivory Coast since 2007, as their share in overall exports has grown from about 30% in 2007 to about 45% in 2016. In the meantime, the share of cocoa products in Ghana's total merchandise trade with the EU has decreased from roughly 30% in 2007 to 20% in 2016.[7]

Another difference in how trade between the EU, Ghana and the Ivory coast has developed since the signing of the IEPAs in 2007, is that the total value of Ghana's trade with the EU has grown faster in this period than that of the Ivory Coast. More specifically, while Ghana's total exports to the EU, amounted to 4,9 billion USD in 2007 and grew to about 17 billion USD in 2017, the value of the Ivory Coast's exports to the EU only increased from 9 billion USD to 10.3 billion USD.[8] Hence, Ghana was able to grow its trade with the EU more effectively since signing its IEPA than the Ivory Coast, which has become more dependent on its cocoa exports.

Lastly, due to each country's distinct approach to cocoa sector governance, each of them developed its own blend of public- and private sector cooperation. Though both nations now utilize public-private partnerships to provide extension services (aimed at increasing productivity, advancing research and development or educating cocoa farmers on how to enhance the sustainability and productivity of their agricultural undertakings), the relationship between private and public (as well as foreign and domestic) corporate agents in their cocoa sectors is still quite different. As the removal of foreign corporate agents from the CCC's board demonstrates, foreign private corporate agents were more directly involved in decision-making processes concerning the Ivory Coast's cocoa sector, as compared to Ghana's. For example, through their CCC board membership, foreign private corporate agents were able to "frame a national sector plan" (Vellema et al., 2016, p.234), impact decisions concerning the allocation of resources and influence the distribution of margins in the domestic value chain (see Hütz-Adams, 2018, p. 12). In addition, the increased cooperation of public- and private corporate agents in the governance of the Ivory Coast's cocoa sector facilitated the introduction of international standards related to "quality control, stock keeping, and [other] standards" (Vellema et al., 2016, p. 234), as well as the alignment of foreign private corporate agents and farmers. Therefore, the Ivory Coast's primary-corporate agent had significantly less "direct political control over the cocoa sector" (Muilerman & Vellema, 2017, p.89) prior to the

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[7] https://atlas.media.mit.edu/de/ [last accessed on Mar.18.2019]
Data for Ghana: https://atlas.media.mit.edu/de/visualize/stacked/hs92/export/gha/all/show/2000.2017/

[8] https://atlas.media.mit.edu/de/ [last accessed on Mar.18.2019]
Data for the Ivory Coast: https://atlas.media.mit.edu/de/visualize/stacked/hs92/export/civ/all/show/1995.2016/

exclusion of foreign private corporate agents from its CCC's board in 2018, than its Ghanaian counterpart. Though private public partnerships have also become more relevant for Ghana's cocoa sector governance and service provision, her primary-corporate agent never gave up control over its cocoa sector to the same extent as the government of the Ivory Coast. As a matter of fact, Ghana's COCOBOD still controls domestic cocoa trade through the allocation of purchasing licenses to LBCs and the determination of profit margins within its cocoa value chain. Therefore, despite the increased engagement of foreign private corporate agents in Ghana's cocoa sector, "this did not result in direct contractual relations between buyers and cocoa farmers" (Vellema et al., 2016, p. 237).

In summary, though the Ivory Coast and Ghana both sought increased engagement of foreign private corporate agents in their domestic cocoa sectors and entered public-private partnerships to enhance their provision of extension services, Ghana's primary corporate agent retained significantly more control over decision making processes concerning resource distribution within its cocoa sector. The Ivory Coast's primary-corporate agent, on the other hand, allowed foreign private corporate agents to dominate its domestic and transnational cocoa trade, to establish direct links with Ivorian cocoa producers and influence the decision-making processes governing its cocoa sector. Ultimately Ghana was able to significantly expand the value of its trade with the EU while reducing dependence on its cocoa sector, while the Ivory Coast was only able to slightly grow the total value of its exports to the EU while increasing her dependence on cocoa exports.

9. Conclusion

Having analyzed the development of trade relations between the EU, Ghana and the Ivory Coast and the effects these terms of trade had on each cocoa sector, I can finally answer, whether the EU's trade policy reproduced or transformed colonial patterns of resource distribution along the transnational cocoa value chain.

9.1. Post-Colonial Independence and Inherited Structural Relations

In line with Critical Realist reasoning both Ghana's and the Ivory Coast's independence was the result of previous strategic interactions between corporate agents. Hence, the secession of the Gold- and Ivory Coast from their former colonial overlords enabled both Nkrumah and

Houphouët to seize political control over each former West African colony. Though the corporate agents achieving the independence of each country differed greatly in terms of the socioeconomic background of their members and the foci of their subsequent cocoa policies, both corporate agents resulted from re-grouping processes within the African primary agents of British- and French West Africa, which were triggered by previous morphogenesis in the cultural sphere. In each case it was the idea of inherent equality between Europeans and Africans which eroded the persuasiveness of supposed European superiority and the legitimacy of European political dominance in West Africa.

In Ghana, where the primary-corporate agent first had to seize control of its cocoa sector, the government chose an extractive approach, through which it attempted to establish new patterns of material- and cultural resource distribution. Once the primary-corporate agent had control over its cocoa sector, it used the resources from the sector to subsidize the development of new industries and finance its population's access to cultural and material resources by establishing new patterns of resource distribution. Despite its initial success, Ghana's primary-corporate agents' extractive approach led to the deterioration of its cocoa production. As cocoa was its main export commodity, this exacerbated the country's fiscal crisis and forced it to undergo structural adjustment in return for debt restructuring and loans from the IMF and WB.

In the Ivory Coast, on the other hand, the primary-corporate agent achieving political independence from France was deeply entrenched in the country's cocoa producing sector. As a result, the first government's cocoa sector policies were aimed at increasing cocoa production by adjusting the patterns of material resource distribution to the needs of domestic producers and exporters. This is reflected in the country's liberal land- and labor laws, enabling it to overtake Ghana as the world's largest cocoa producer in the late 1970s. While its first post-colonial government also broadened the population's access to patterns of cultural and material resource distribution, its economic policies were designed to foster cocoa production and enhance European market access, as this increased the public revenue available for domestic re-distribution. Ultimately, however, as the Ivory Coast's public revenue was dependent on cocoa export, the cocoa price deterioration from 1977 forward strongly affected the country's fiscal situation. Even though the Ivory Coast was able to avoid structural adjustment in return for IMF and WB loans until the late 1990s, it too had to accept the conditions set out by the institutions of the Washington consensus in return for debt restructuring.

The comparison of these very different development strategies and their consequences shows that both countries' primary-corporate agents had to confront similar challenges domestically, and both addressed them by enhancing public service provision and access to material- and cultural resource distribution. This resulted in the growth of bureaucracies, which they attempted to finance by taxing their respective cocoa exports. In doing so, they perpetuated their dependence on social structures established under colonialism in form of the transnational trade in cocoa. While Ghana's export revenue increasing policies expedited the deterioration of its cocoa production, the Ivory Coast's maximization of cocoa production exacerbated her economic dependence on the cocoa sector.

After my Critical Realist analysis of each country's post-colonial development strategy, I can say that for each primary-corporate agent to acquire the resources necessary to establish new patterns of material- and cultural resource distribution domestically, each of them had to extract material resources from the transnational, structural relations established under colonialism. Hence, each primary-corporate agent, while politically independent had to perpetuate the transnational interdependencies their colonial system of administration had created prior to their independence. As Margaret Archer defined these „internal and necessary relationships which entail material resources […] and which generate causal power proper to the relation itself " (Archer, 1995, p.177) as structural emergent properties (SEPs), I can state that the SEPs of the global market environment, established during European colonialism, made it necessary for each post-colonial, primary-corporate agent to reproduce colonial interdependencies. Reproducing these interdependencies between European traders/-processors and African farmers was the only means through which each primary-corporate agent could acquire the resources necessary to meet domestic political demands and finance their development strategies. At the same time European industry's need of tropical agricultural commodities made it necessary for EEC members to ensure their industry's supply with these commodities through the post-colonial establishment of trade relations which reproduced colonial patterns of resource distribution.

9.2. Colonial Social Structures in Post-Colonial Trade Relations

This was the purpose of the Yaoundé- and Lomé Conventions, which secured European industry's supply with these commodities by providing (albeit initially mitigated) access to Ivorian and (with the Lomé convention) Ghanaian primary cocoa exports. Furthermore, while the first Yaoundé Convention (1963) had provided preferential (duty free) market access for commodities originating in francophone West Africa, the second Yaoundé convention (1969) expanded European industry's access to other potential sources of duty-free agricultural commodity imports by alleviating the CETs which had benefited Ivorian cocoa producers. Thus, the EU's trade policy as formalized in the Yaoundé Conventions secured colonial patterns of resource distribution by maintaining European industry's access to tropical agricultural commodities. Yet, by making labor from the north of the country available to those who could afford to turn forest land into productive cocoa farms, it was the Ivory Coast's land- and labor policies which reproduced colonial patterns of resource distribution domestically.

The Lomé conventions, which defined the terms of trade between EEC and ACP members from 1975 to 2000, provide an even better example for the EEC member state's need to secure access to tropical factors of production. Not only did Lomé expand the potential sources of tropical commodities, by including former British colonies into to the EU's trade regime, but the STABEX mechanism even incentivized the overproduction of these commodities by skewing the macroeconomic risk posed by increased cocoa production. Therefore, even though the Lomé Conventions provided tariff barrier free market access for ACP exports, while securing ACP states' right to protect their industries through tariff measures, it also reduced the immediate fiscal risk posed by oversupply through the provision of interest free loans in case of commodity price depreciation. By reducing the fiscal risk of state led production increases, the Lomé Conventions increased the availability and reduced the price of those tropical commodities European cocoa processing and chocolate manufacturing industries required. In addition, the Lomé conventions III (1984) & IV (1989) also increased the EEC's bargaining power in future strategic interactions with ACP states. It did so by including political conditionality into the statute of the European Development fund, giving European (trade) negotiators an additional material resource for deployment in strategic interaction. These could now be withheld from 1984 onward, so that EU negotiators could impact the fiscal situation of their counterparts, if these relied on support from European Development Funds for parts of their budget. As documented by the re-scheduled release of the 10th European Development Fund to match the EPA negotiation schedule, EU negotiators have made use of this material resource in their strategic interactions.

From a Critical Realist point of view, it appears to be the case that the Lomé Conventions contributed to the reproduction of transnational colonial patterns of resource distribution by expanding the potential sources of cheap tropical commodities for value addition in Europe.

While there is no evidence that the EEC deliberately undermined the price of tropical commodities, the price of cocoa did decline drastically from 1977 onward, two years after the first Lomé Convention was signed. This trend lasted until the Lomé Conventions were replaced by the Cotonou Agreement in 2000. Throughout this period the STABEX mechanism disincentivized economic diversification among former colonies by artificially reducing the immediate fiscal risk attached to state led expansion of cocoa production. Additionally, the mechanism diminished the fiscal leeway of Ghana's and the Ivory Coast' primary-corporate agents in the long run, by increasing their country's debt, though the provision of interest free loans.

Though they were not trade agreements per se, the SAPs enforced in Ghana and the Ivory Coast, necessitated by the fiscal effects of declining cocoa prices, had a profound impact on each country's domestic cocoa sector. While the degree to which both nation's primary-corporate agents ceded control over their cocoa sector differed greatly, cocoa sector liberalization did have some common effects on both countries. The first effect of sector liberalization was a reduction in the share public-corporate agents were able to extract from exports. Though this entailed ending currency manipulation in Ghana, both countries reformed their cocoa marketing boards and fostered competition for producer output as means to increase the pass-through price received by farmers. Therefore, the gains in producer prices resulted from a reduction of public revenue. While Ghana's cocoa sector liberalization did reduce the operational cost of its CMB (later COCOBOD), introduced competition to its domestic cocoa trade (through Licensed Buying Companies) and put an end to currency manipulation, it did not render control over the sector's patterns of resource distribution to foreign private corporate agents. Instead, the country's Ministry of Finance retained control over the sector through the COCOBOD.

In contrast to the limited sector liberalization in Ghana, the Ivory Coast's structural adjustment and liberalization provided cocoa importers from Europe (amongst others) with direct access to producers through domestic trading agents and their networks. This did not only reduce these companies' incentive to purchase cocoa through forward contracts (the main mechanism to reduce producer price volatility), but also enabled them to vertically integrate more value addition into their processing and -trading activities. Thus, multinational corporations captured a larger share of the cocoa's export value, leading to the current situation where former cocoa importers now conduct about 90 percent of Ivory Coast's primary and processed cocoa export. Additionally, the representatives of these companies were given seats on the board responsible for the country's cocoa sector development (CCC), so that they were involved in all decisions relevant to the sector. Hence, former European cocoa importers were now controlling the domestic- and transnational cocoa trade as well as cocoa processing and were given a say in determining resource allocation and producer prices in the Ivory Coast. While producer prices did increase initially, the Ivorian public's share of cocoa's export value decreased as a result of cocoa sector liberalization. This situation is reminiscent of the conditions prevalent during European colonialism, where (vertically integrated) European companies, engaged in cocoa trade and -processing, used their disproportionate influence on colonial policies to secure their supply with tropical agricultural commodities while keeping their price low. Though multinational corporations today influence cocoa sector policy through Public-Private-Partnerships, rather than a French or British ministry, the policies and measures they develop are, nonetheless, geared toward increasing the productivity of cocoa farms and facilitating access to these commodities through infrastructure investments. Hence, the cocoa sector liberalization demanded by the IMF and WB, in return for debt restructuring, provided European cocoa traders and -processors with similar access to- and control over patterns of resource distribution in the Ivorian Coast as European colonialism had.

The differences between the two countries' post-structural adjustment cocoa sectors are not limited to the position of multinational corporations within them, however. While farmers in Ghana receive a larger share of their outputs' export value than their Ivorian counterparts, the Ivory Coast processes a far larger share of its cocoa production domestically so that more value is added prior to export. However, the redistributable share of its export value has declined significantly, so that foreign private corporate agents are the main beneficiaries of domestic value addition and an increased range of cocoa commodity exports. In Ghana, on the other hand, where domestic value addition lags that of the Ivory Coast, LBCs are predominantly owned by Ghanaians. Hence, even though foreign companies have also increased their cocoa processing activities in Ghana, the access of foreign private corporate agents to the country's cocoa output remains mediated through Ghanaian owned corporate agents. Therefore, Ghana managed to maintain its buyer's readiness to purchase Ghanaian cocoa beans at a premium through forward contracts, while making sure multinational corporate agents could not circumvent price allocation through market mechanisms, by integration value addition into their internal production processes.

Comparing the extent of structural adjustment and cocoa sector liberalization in Ghana and the

Ivory Coast also yielded interesting insights into the situational logic of primary-corporate agents and foreign private corporate agents in each country. Not only are the primary-corporate agents of Ghana and the Ivory Coast competing for foreign investments, but the means of their competition reflect the priorities of multinational corporations for the transnational capital they deploy. Apart from the fact that the ability to repatriate profits is a precondition for attracting transnational capital from multinational corporations, the extent to which primary-corporate agents refrain from socializing parts of these profits greatly impacts their attractiveness as an investment destination. For this reason, processing activities are taxed differently depending on their location within Ghana or the Ivory Coast, as each primary-corporate agent tries to steer investments within its territory. Another variable through which the countries compete for investments is the extent to which processing companies must contribute to the provision of utilities and the taxes they are obliged to pay on imported means of production. Hence, competition does not only take place with respect to the access to cocoa and the taxation of its (processed) export products, but also with regards to the cost of establishing processing facilities and their operation. In summary, both Ghana and the Ivory Coast must allow for (a.) the repatriation of profits made with transnational capital, (b.) provide access to a steady supply of cocoa, (c.) support foreign corporate agents in their efforts to maximize the profitability of their transnational capital and (d.) minimize these company's contribution to maintenance of public utilities and services. In other words, the structural- and cultural emergent properties of the post-colonial global market environment requires post-colonial primary-corporate agents to compete for investments by providing a domestic economic environment which prioritizes the interests of multinational corporations.

As the Cotonou Agreement was merely a transitory agreement which established the negotiation framework for the subsequent EPAs, it's direct impact on the transnational cocoa value chain was limited. Nonetheless, the negotiation framework was revealing as to the interest each negotiating party pursued. While the primary-corporate agents of Ghana and the Ivory Coast were eager to maintain their tariff free EU market access, the EU's negotiation position reveals a keen interest in removing tariff barriers for European exports. Additionally, the behind-the-border issues called for in the Cotonou Agreement further speak to the long-term interests pursued by the EU. In this respect the EU's call, to harmonize competition and investment policies and to arrange for trade in services and intellectual property rights, display her interest in providing new markets for European service industry, while securing the advantages and long-term profitability of European corporate agents active in West Africa.

Though the EU was only able to include a rendezvous clause, concerning these offensive trade issues in the Cotonou Agreement and EPAs, Ghana's and the Ivory Coast's success in securing EU market access did have a strong effect on their domestic cocoa sectors. While the share of processed cocoa commodities in cocoa exports increased in both countries, subsequent to the Cotonou Agreement, the increase was more pronounced in the Ivory Coast as compared to Ghana. Another effect, observable in both countries, is the increase in total cocoa bean exports to the EU, which set in from the year 2000 onward. Hence, though both countries were able to increase value addition prior to export, the benefits this provided were mostly captured by the multinational corporations which invested their transnational capital. As the cocoa processing facilities established in either country employ roughly 2000 individuals, the labor market effects of these origin grinding activities appear to be limited.

One aspect in which the Cotonou Agreement did reproduce colonial patterns of resource distribution was the initial distribution of resources between the EU and ECOWAS. By dividing the ACP group into seven sub-regions, the EU was able to increase its bargaining power in relation to each sub-region, including ECOWAS. This gave increased its bargaining power in the subsequent EPA negotiations, where the initial distribution of material resources prior to the strategic interaction was once again in favor of the EU. Furthermore, it reduced ECOWAS negotiator's ability to secure the support of members of other ACP sub-regions, which further diminishing ECOWAS' negotiation strength in relation to the EU. Within ECOWAS, however, the re-grouping process triggered by ACP fragmentation and pre-EPA consultations enabled its members to find common negotiation positions. This empowered ECOWAS negotiators to secure more favorable terms of trade in their EU-ECOWAS EPA than Ghana and the Ivory Coast could in their respective IEPAs.

With respect to the terms of trade agreed by Ghana, the Ivory Coast and the EU in the IEPA (2007) and EPA (2014), my investigation identified several Articles reminiscent of colonial policies. The most obvious of these articles were those regarding the security of land titles, the availability of labor in the agricultural sector and the maintenance of infrastructure. Here, Articles 48 stands out, as it describes the role of the state "as a supporter and adviser of private operators", calls for ECOWAS to promote "contract farming with partners from the EU" and suggests "land law reforms to increase the legal certainty of farmers and thereby promote the development of efficient agriculture". Furthermore, the Article also determines that the state shall "strengthen the agricultural sector [by] managing tracks and roads serving rural communities to enhance the collection and movement of agricultural products". In this article, the EPA calls for the governments of West Africa to perform precisely the same tasks as the colonial administrations of the Gold- and Ivory Coast had, in that it shall facilitate the acquisition of labor, legally secure the availability of land for agricultural undertakings and facilitate the procurement of agricultural produce by providing and maintaining infrastructure.

Apart from these measures related to West African land and labor resource distribution, the treaty also reflects European negotiators' interest in ensuring the availability of affordable imports from Ghana and the Ivory Coast. It does so by promoting increases in "productivity, competitiveness and diversity of output in the agricultural […] sectors" as the purpose of the EPA Development Program" (in Article 46), while "investment in West Africa [and] partnership between the private sector of the EU and West Africa [as well as] improving the business environment in the West African Region" are presented as the proper means to alleviate poverty in Article 56. Therefore, even though Article 56 also mentions "increasing the populations output and income" as objectives of the EPADP, the focus of the development program clearly lies on increasing the productivity and output of Africans, just as it had during European colonialism. While the taxation of imports and exports for the purpose of funding redistributive measures are excluded from the treaty's scope with regards to reducing poverty, the utilization of public funds to subsidize domestic producers is considered legitimate in article 35. Meanwhile, the treaty's article 13 limits the right to increase taxes on "exports or charges [to] exceptional circumstances [which must be justified by] specific needs for income [such as the] promotion of fledgling industries or environmental protection […] on a temporary basis and after consulting the European Union party" (EU-ECOWAS EPA, 2014). This severely limits West African signatories' ability to apply taxes which serve the common public interest of its citizens, even if these taxes would only increase the price of its exports. Therefore, the EU-ECOWAS EPA limits ECOWAS' fiscal autonomy to sectors that are detached from EU-ECOWAS trade and forces ECOWAS' primary-corporate agents to prioritize the economic interests of European corporate agents in their fiscal- and trade policy.

Finally, the EPA's Article 6 defines the treaty's rules of origin, which can serve as a market entry barrier for commodities originating outside of the EPA signatory states. This will not only facilitate trade concentration among EPA members, but also resembles the trade arrangement established during French colonialism, when goods from within the colonial empire were protected against outside competition.

Turning away from the legal provisions of the treaty itself and towards each country's economic development under the terms of trade the IEPAs provided from 2007 onward, quantitative data suggests that both countries were able to increase their processing capacities and diversify their cocoa exports to the EU. While Ghana was able to reduce its economic- and fiscal dependence on its cocoa sector, however, the Ivory Coast's expansion and diversification of cocoa exports, has only increased its dependence on cocoa exports and disproportionately benefited those multinational corporations which invested their transnational capital in the Ivory Coast.

My investigation of the European Economic Communities' / -Unions' trade policy towards the former colonies Ghana and the Ivory Coast identified several ways in which the trade policy of the EEC/ EU and the structural adjustment programs she partially financed, reproduced colonial patterns of resource distribution.

The Yaoundé conventions of 1963 and 1969 reproduced transnational, colonial patterns of resource distribution by maintaining European industries' access to the Ivory Coast's cocoa. In return for a secure supply, the EEC granted the Ivory Coast preferential market access through the establishment of protective common external tariffs (CETs), which she later revoked because they discriminated against other ACP member states' exports to Europe and limited European industries' supply of low-cost tropical imports to Yaoundé I signatories.

Though the EEC failed to open the markets of her former colonies in the Lomé Conventions, because ACP states negotiated as a bloc, which greatly reduced the EEC's bargaining power and negotiation strength, the Lomé conventions did introduce a price stabilization mechanism which skewed the fiscal risk posed by over-production, thereby incentivizing cocoa oversupply and exacerbating price deterioration. Though this did not significantly alter the patterns of resource distribution along the transnational cocoa value chain, the availability and affordability of Ivorian and Ghanaian cocoa enabled European industry to conserve colonial patterns of resource distribution by adding value to relatively low cost tropical agricultural commodities imported from Ghana and the Ivory Coast in central Europe.

While the Lomé Conventions did not directly alter the market environment of cocoa producers in Ghana and the Ivory Coast, the SAPs of both countries did. Even though each country's cocoa sector liberalization did increase cocoa producer prices, they did so at the expense of the public corporate agents tasked with cocoa sector management and by reducing the redistributable revenue each country's primary-corporate agent could extract from cocoa exports. Furthermore, the market environment SAPs produced, particularly in the Ivory Coast, reproduced colonial patterns of resource distribution by providing multinational corporations with disproportionate influence on the decision-making processes concerning the patterns of resource distribution within the country's cocoa sector. Not only are were the sector development strategies implemented in the Ivory Coast's cocoa sector in the interest of cocoa processors and -traders, but the policies they promote can also be found in the country's colonial period. For examples of this, we need only consider how Ghana's and the Ivory Coast's tax structures have been adjusted to meet the demands of multinational corporations in return for their transnational capital, or how current cocoa sector development strategies promote infrastructure investments and productivity increases as means of reducing poverty and advancing economic development. These are almost the same policies as they were promoted transnational trading companies during European colonialism.

Finally, the Cotonou Agreement, while it did not directly impact the cocoa value chain, it did signal to European trading- and processing industry that Ghana and the Ivory Coast were determined to maintain duty free market access for refined cocoa products originating in West Africa. This increased their readiness to increase their processing capacities in Ghana and the Ivory Coast and enabled further value addition in each country. However, domestic value addition prior to export disproportionately benefited the multinational corporations in each country because they were provided tax incentives in return for their investment. Furthermore, due to these companies' ability to vertically integrate value addition within their (transnational) production processes, their intermediary products are only taxed upon export and not subject to market mechanisms which could increase their price. As this phenomenon has also been documented during European colonialism, I can state that the backward integration facilitated through the Cotonou Agreement enabled multinational corporations to reproduce colonial patterns of resource distribution within their production processes.

Surprisingly the EU-ECOWAS-EPA calls for West African governments to perform similar tasks for multinational corporations as the colonial administrations of British- and French West Africa had. Not only shall West African governments support private European industry in the acquisition of land and labor, but the means by which the EPA seeks to advance the development of its West African signatories is much akin to the policies colonial administrations promoted.

In summary, Europe's trade policy has reproduced colonial patterns of resource distribution both transnationally and domestically within Ghana and the Ivory Coast. However, this occurred over a period of more than half a century, in which former colonies were first maintained as sources for agricultural inputs for European industry. Thereafter, the availability and affordability of these tropical inputs was ensured by establishing a price stabilization mechanism which incentivized oversupply. As cocoa price depreciation caused a fiscal crisis in Ghana and the Ivory Coast, each country had to liberalize its cocoa sector in return for debt restructuring by the institutions of the Washington consensus, which forced them to open their economies for private corporate agents from Europe. Though the degree to which foreign multinational corporations were able to seize influence over Ghana's and the Ivory Coast's cocoa sector varies, data suggests that more control over the sector translated into a higher readiness to invest and an increased ability to vertically integrate value addition within these multinational corporations. Furthermore, both countries had to guarantee the repatriation of profits and provide an economic environment conducive to the interests of foreign private corporation agents, in return for them to invest their transnational capital. In the more extreme case of the Ivory Coast, there is evidence that the increased profitability of multinational corporation's transnational capital came at the expense of public revenue and cocoa producers.

As I hope to have shown through my investigation of the post-colonial development of the transnational cocoa value chain, the Critical Realist analysis of the long-term development of trade relations concerning one specific commodity can produce valuable insights into how colonial patterns of resource distribution are reproduced by post-colonial trade policy. Therefore, by identifying the measures and policies causing the reproduction of colonial patterns of resource distribution, Critical Realist analysis can enhance the historic materialist examination of post-colonial developments and dependencies. Increasing our understanding of the measures through which colonial patterns of resource distribution are reproduced can increase the accuracy, reproducibility and utility of political economic investigations of post-colonial societies' development.

Appendix:

Figure 1. Chart by Author based on Eurostat Data 2018



Figure 2. Chart by Author based on Eurostat Data 2018



Data:

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/international-trade-in-goods/data/database

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Abstract English

In this thesis I compare the post-colonial development of the Ivory Coast's and Ghana's cocoa sector since independence according to Margaret Archer's morphogenetic approach. Therein I examine whether the trade policy of the European Economic Community (EEC) (later European Union (EU)) contributed to the re-production or transformation of colonial patterns of resource distribution. To provide a definition of colonial patterns of resource distribution, the thesis begins with a comparison of each country's cocoa sector under European colonialism. Subsequently the development strategies of each country's post-colonial government are compared to identify similarities and differences resulting from differing cocoa-sector policies. Once colonial patterns of resource distribution are defined and the effects of each country's post-colonial cocoa policies are determined, I examine the impact each trade agreement concluded with the EEC/EU had on the cocoa sectors of the Ivory Coast and Ghana. The analysis of each trade agreement focuses on how the agreed measures affected cocoa producers, cocoa processors and government agencies tasked with sector management. The purpose of this investigation is to identify causal relationships between domestic policies, trade measures or sector reforms (induced by structural adjustment programs) and the re-production of colonial patterns of resource distribution.

Even though my thesis focused on identifying causal relations between the re-production of colonial patterns of resource distribution, international trade agreements and national policies, it is also intended to gauge the potential value Margaret Archer's morphogenetic approach holds for the field of post-colonial studies.

Abstract Deutsch

In dieser Masterarbeit wird die post-koloniale Handelspolitik der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (EWG) bzw. der Europäischen Union (EU) daraufhin untersucht, ob sie zur Reproduktion kolonialer Ressourcenverteilungsmuster beigetragen hat. Hierzu wurden alle Handelsverträge zwischen Europa, Ghana und der Elfenbeinküste, mittels Margaret Archers morphogenetischen Ansatzes daraufhin untersucht, wie sie die wirtschaftliche Situation einzelner Interessengruppen entlang der transnationalen Kakao-Wertschöpfungskette beeinflusst haben. Um sicherzustellen, dass die beobachteten Veränderungen bzw. Kontinuitäten entlang der Kakao-Wertschöpfungskette der richtigen Ursache auf nationaler oder internationaler Ebene zugeordnet werden können, schloss meine Untersuchung sowohl die nationalen Entwicklungsstrategien, als auch die Strukturanpassungsmaßnahmen Ghanas und der Elfenbeinküste mit ein. Somit umfasst meine Untersuchung nicht nur sämliche internationalen, sondern auch nationale Maßnahmen, die Einfluss auf die wirtschaftliche Situation dieser Interessengruppen hatten. Von besonderem Interesse war darin wie internationale Handelsverträge und nationale Maßnamen den Interessen von Kakaoproduzent_Innen und multinationalen Konzernen dienten, wobei auch darauf geachtet wurde wie sie den wirtschaftlichen Gestaltungsspielraum der ghanaischen bzw. ivorischen Regierung beeinflusst haben.

Obwohl der Fokus meiner Untersuchung darauf lag, die Reproktionsweise kolonialer Ressourcen-Verteilungsmuster zu ergründen, diente meine Arbeit auch dem Zweck die Anwendungsmöglichkeiten von Margaret Archers morphogenetischem Ansatzes im Feld der Postcolonial Studies zu erfassen.

Zusammenfassung

Meine Masterarbeit untersucht die Außenhandelspolitik der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft bzw. der Europäischen Union mittels Margaret Archers morphogenetischem Ansatzes darauf, ob sie zur Reproduktion kolonialer Resourcenverteilungsmuster in den Kakaosektoren Ghanas und der Elfenbeinküste beigetragen hat.

Sie beginnt damit, den morphogenetischen Ansatz, sowie dessen wichtigste Konzepte vorzustellen, wobei versucht wurde, sich auf jene Konzepte zu beschränken, die für das Untersuchungsvorhaben notwendig waren. Im Anschluss an diese theoretische Einführung folgt ein Vergleich der kolonialen sozioökonomischen Gegebenheiten, wie sie laut vergleichenden Studien Ghanas und der Elfenbeiküste vorgeherrscht haben, um mittels dieses Vergleiches Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen den wirtschaftlichen und politischen Bedingungen in Britisch- und Französisch West Afrika herauszuarbeiten. Die Gemeinsamkeiten der materiellen Ressourcenverteilungsmuster der Gold- und Elfenbeinküste dienten als Definitionsgrundlage kolonialer Ressourcenverteilungsmuster für die darauf folgende Untersuchung.

Nachdem ich durch den Vergleich beider Kolonialstaaten eine Defition kolonialer Resourcenverteilungmuster gefunden hatte, die dadurch gekennzeichnet sind, dass sie die wirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten der afrikanischen Bevölkerung in den Dienst der Interessen nicht-afrikanischer Wirtschaftsakteure stellen, begann ich mit dem Verlgeich der post-kolonialen Entwicklungsstrategien beider, nun unabhängigen Staaten. Dieser zweite Vergleich, bei dem, entsprechend des morphogenetischen Ansatzes, auch auf den Bezug der ersten unabhängigen Regierung Ghanas und der Elfenbeinküste zu ihren jeweiligen Kakaosektoren geachtet wurde und die Rolle dieser Sektoren für die jeweiligen Entwicklungsstrategien untersucht wurden, diente vor allem dazu, den Ursprung der Unterschiede zwischen beiden post-kolonialen Kakao-Wirtschaftsstrategien zu erfassen.

Im Anschluss an die Vorstellung und Operationalisierung des morphogenetischen Ansatzes, sowie der historischen Kontextualisierung des Ursprungs der ghanaischen und ivorischen Kakaosektoren (und der jeweils ersten post-kolonialen Regierungen und Entwicklungsstrategien,) wurde jeder Handelsvertrag, den die EWG bzw. EU mit Ghana und Elfenbeinküste abgeschlossen hat, aus Sicht des kritischen Realismus, auf seine Auswirkungen auf die transnationale Kakao-Wertschöpfungskette hin untersucht. Dabei lag der Fokus jeder Analyse darauf, zu erfassen, wie der jeweilige Vertrag den Zugang bestimmter Akteursgruppen zu materiellen Ressourcen verändert oder konserviert hat. Die Akteure deren Position in - und Nutzen aus der Kakao-Wertschöpfungskette untersucht wurden, waren dabei stets Kakaoproduzent_Innen, multinationale Handelskonzerne oder weiterverarbeitende Betriebe und die nationalen Behörden, welche mit der Regulierung und Besteuerung der West-afrikanischen Kakaosektoren betraut waren.

Obwohl das Hauptaugenmerk meiner Untersuchung auf den Auswirkungen internationaler Handelsverträge lag, war es notwendig die Auswirkungen der Strukturanpassungsmaßnahmen beider Staaten in meine Untersuchung einzubeziehen, da diese die Ressourcen-Verteilungmuster beider Kakaosektoren maßgeblich beeinflusst haben, indem sie grundlegende Veränderungen der Verwaltung, Besteuerung und Verarbeitung von Kakao-Exportgütern anstießen. Somit war die Einbeziehung der Sektor-Liberalisierungsmaßhnahmen unverzichtbar für ein möglichst umfassendes Verständnis jener Veränderungen, die sich nach den Strukturanpassungsmaßnahmen und im Kontext sich ändernder Handelsbedingungen vollzogen haben.

Im Anschluss an diesen Exkurs, durch den die Auswirkungen beider Kakao-Sektor-Liberalisierungen Eingang in meine Untersuchung fanden, richtet sich der Fokus meiner Arbeit wieder auf die Veränderungen und Konstanten, die ihren Ursprung in den internationalen Handelsverträgen der Europäischen Union haben. Insbesondere bei der Untersuchung der letzten beiden Handelsverträge werden dabei auch Veränderungen in den jeweiligen Verhandlungspositionen erfasst, wodurch die Interessenlage der Verhandlungsparteien aufgezeigt werden.

Dies gilt umso mehr bei meiner Analyse der aktuellen Handelsregimes zwischen der EU, Ghana und der Elfenbeinküste, bei der ich im Detail auf einzelne Artikel der ökonomischen Partscherschaftsabkommen eingehe, um herauszuarbeiten wie dieser Handelsvertrag den wirtschaftspolitischen Handlungsspielraum der ghanaiaschen- und ivorischen Regierungen beeinflusst. Hierbei wurde, durch die Einarbeitung ökonomischer Studien, stets bedacht, welche Konsequenzen die beschlossenen Maßnahmen für die einzelnen Akteursgruppen haben.

Am Ende der Arbeit werden die Ergebnisse der jeweiligen Analysen zusammengetragen, um die aktuellen Bedingungen und Ressourcenverteilungsmuster im ghanaischen und ivorischen Kakaosektor mit jenen zu vergleichen, die ich vorher als distinkt kolonial identifizierte.

Durch diesen Vergleich konnte ich feststellen, dass sowohl die europäischen Handelsverträge, als auch die Kakao-Sektor-Liberalisierung im Zuge der Strukturanpassungsmaßnahmen direkt zur Reproduktion kolonialer Ressourcen-Verteilungsmuster beigetragen haben, indem sie auf politischer- oder wirtschaftlicher Ebene zur Reproduktion kolonialer Verhältnisse geführt haben. Allerdings konnte ich auch feststellen, dass die Reproduktion kolonialer Verhältnisse sowohl auf nationaler, als auch auf internationaler Ebene ihren Ursprung haben kann und dass diese Ebenen beispielsweise bei Strukturanpassungsmaßnahmen miteinander verfließen können. Überraschend eindeutig verlangt insbesondere das jüngste Handelsregime der Europäischen Union, (das Wirtschaftspartnershaftsabkommen zwischen der EU und der Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft West-Afrikanischer Staaten) die Reproduktion kolonialer Verhältnisse, indem es Maßnahmen von westafrikanischen Regierungen fordert, die bereits von den Kolonialadministrationen Britisch- und Französisch West Afrikas erdacht und implementiert worden waren.

Meine Zusammenstellung und Untersuchung der Entwicklung post-kolonialer Handelsbeziehungen zwischen Europa, Ghana und der Elfenbeinküste hat allerdings nicht nur kausale Zusammenhänge zwischen der europäischen Außenhandelspolitik und der Reproduktion kolonialer Verhältnisse nachweisen können. Vielmehr hat sie auch auf die treibende Kraft hinter der Reproduktion kolonialer Verhältnisse verwiesen, indem sie die inter- und transnationale Arbeitsteilung in Zeiten des globalen Kapitalismus als Rahmenbedingung für die Reproduktion kolonialer Verhältnisse identifiziert. Dessen emergente Eigenschaft kann nämlich die Reproduktion kolonialer Ressourcen-Verteilungsmuster erfordern, um post-kolonialen Staaten zugang zu den materiellen Ressourcen zu eröffnen, die sie zur selbstbetimmten Entwicklung benötigen.