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„Between a Rock and a Hard Place” – Development of  
Georgian National Identity in the Nineteenth Century “

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## **Abstract**

Traditional histories of development of the Georgian national identity have almost exclusively focused on the internal, domestic level of analysis. Few studies have placed Georgia's historical development within the context of the international state system – the systemic level of analysis. This thesis argues that the development of Georgia's national identity can best be understood by combining these two levels of analysis. It thus employs international relations theory and historical narrative to show the interaction between the domestic and international politics. Three main case studies form the core of the argument: First, the internal growth of an indigenous Georgian intellectual and political elite in the 19<sup>th</sup> century; second, the impact of an expanding and dynamic Russian Empire in the region; and third, the influence of a declining, yet still tenacious Ottoman Empire. Georgian national identity developed in the interstices of these two levels of analysis, in a complicated feedback loop between the local and the international. Although Georgia did not obtain its independence until 1918, the crucial personalities and elements of its national movement were forged in the crucible of Caucasian conflict in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Russo-Turkish Wars, Crimean War, and others are discussed in great detail and the thesis puts emphasis on personalities, such as Ilia Chavchavadze or Akaki Tsereteli, who are regarded as “fathers” of Georgian national identity. By analyzing each actor on domestic level and connecting them to international system, we can then better understand what role each of these actors had for the development of Georgian national identity.

## **Abstract**

Um die nationale Identitätsentwicklung Georgiens zu erkunden, wurden bisher viele Studien durchgeführt, die sich auf die nationale Ebene konzentriert haben. Sehr wenige haben die internationale Ebene miteinbezogen. Diese Masterarbeit argumentiert, dass die Entwicklung der nationalen Identität Georgiens am besten verstanden werden kann, wenn man diese beiden Ebenen der Analyse kombiniert. Sie nutzt daher die Theorie der internationalen Beziehungen und die historische Erzählung, um das Zusammenspiel von nationaler und internationaler Politik darzustellen. Drei Hauptthemen bilden den Kern des Arguments: erstens, die interne Entwicklung der georgischen Intelligenzia und der politischen Elite im 19. Jahrhundert. Zweitens, die Auswirkungen eines expandierenden und dynamischen Russischen Imperiums in der Region und drittens der Einfluss eines verfallenden, aber doch hartnäckigen Osmanischen Reiches.

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## 1. Introduction

As already mentioned in the abstract, numerous studies have been done to understand the development of Georgian national identity as well as the Caucasus. However, many of them were of domestic nature. To introduce a newer side of the Caucasus, it helps to look at the systemic level of analysis and see how Georgian national identity didn't develop only domestically, but how the two great powers – the Russian and Ottoman Empire helped shaping it in the nineteenth century. Before diving into the matter of subject, it is interesting to analyze, why so few systemic level of analyses is done on the Caucasus. To do so, Jay David Singer's "*the Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations*" will be used as theoretical framework.

### a. *Levels of Analysis*

As one of the requirements for an analytical model, Singer gives us the idea of description of the phenomena.<sup>1</sup> The idea here is to present the phenomena, which is about to be analyzed in a clear way. If we take the Caucasus and specifically the development of Georgian national identity – especially in the nineteenth century, the phenomenon is everything but clear-cut. Domestically, it can be analyzed in a way that we look at Georgian nationalists and Georgian “national heroes.” This can be done in much faster and easier way than analyzing the systemic level of analysis. Here, we have to analyze the domestic phenomena, but also the phenomena in neighboring countries – in the case of this case study in the Russian and Ottoman Empire. This is not an easy task to take on. As this work will show in later chapters, the nineteenth century Caucasus was a real battlefield with many wars and conflicts taking place – domestically as well as systematically. Therefore, it is even harder to analyze how Georgian national identity developed in the nineteenth century under all these circumstances. However, this thesis will try to present the events and how these shaped the Georgian national identity as much as possible.

To carry on, Singer claims that explaining the relationship between these phenomena is a crucial factor to complete a level of analysis.<sup>2</sup> In order to do so, a very thorough analysis is required. As this thesis tries to tie together all the events to come to a conclusion, how Georgian national identity was developed on a systemic level, as many other scholars, we can only speculate and try to make sense out of the events, which took place in the nineteenth century in Caucasus and try to draw conclusions based on personal opinion towards it. It is

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<sup>1</sup> J. David Singer, *The Level-of-Analysis-Problem in International Relations* (World Politics, 1961), 78.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, 79.

hard to claim that one or the other event led to the development of Georgian national identity, however, we can try to combine several events and draw conclusions on that.

Prediction is the last requirement or the last factor, which Singer gives us as a requirement for a model for levels of analysis.<sup>3</sup> This factor is not really relevant in this work, due to the fact that it tries to rather analyze history. However, we can try to draw conclusion from past events and make predictions to the future inasmuch that we take similar events today and try to predict the consequences of these, based on the historical analyses.

It is hard to understand, why not many systemic level of analyses have been done on the Caucasus. Singer claims that the systemic level of analysis is one of the most comprehensive ones available.<sup>4</sup> The systemic level of analysis can help to explain phenomena taking place, such as creation and dissolution of coalitions.<sup>5</sup> In this context, we can look at the events of the nineteenth century Caucasus and try to explain, why certain coalitions collapsed and why others remained intact. This is one of the advantages of the systemic level of analysis. However, the explanatory part of the concept is rather a difficult one to fulfill.<sup>6</sup> As Singer states, exaggeration is one of the dangers of this level of analysis. As you also may encounter in this work, some events might claim more importance than others and some events may claim more importance than they deserve. However, this could be attributed to one of the disadvantages of the systemic level of analysis. In addition, we have to consider that leaders of different countries think differently, act differently, and have different agendas. As Singer claims, we tend to generalize leaders of different countries and try to find similarities between them and usually display them as “power hungry.”<sup>7</sup> We shall try to consider this flaw of thinking and try to analyze as many possibilities as possible in this work. In order to avoid flawed conclusions and false statements, it is worth mentioning right away that any claim of a “consequence” in this work, is a personal opinion and a speculation and can be probably proven wrong by looking at facts in a different way, from a different angle.

Not to omit the theoretical framework of national level of analysis, this short section will be dedicated to look at it a little bit more detail. As Singer states “this is clearly the traditional focus among Western students, and is one of which dominates almost all of the texts

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<sup>3</sup> J. David Singer, *The Level-of-Analysis-Problem in International Relations* (World Politics, 1961), 79.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, 80.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, 81.

employed in English-speaking colleges and universities.”<sup>8</sup> Due to the fact that we do not have to compare different national ideologies and different societies of different countries, the national level of analysis allows us to focus more on certain features of a country. Therefore, we can get a more detailed analysis of certain points in a country. However, as Singer tells us, this level of analysis can be flawed and not used when it comes to analyzing the foreign policy.<sup>9</sup> In addition, national level of analysis helps us to find out motivations and goals of these certain countries. Therefore, even though this thesis will mostly look at the systemic level of analysis, in one chapter, it will use the national or domestic level of analysis, in order to understand the driving force of – in this case Georgia. We cannot understand Georgia’s actions until we understand what drives them. Therefore, the chapter about Georgia will be analyzed in rather domestic/national level of analysis.

#### *b. General Information About Caucasus*

In order to understand the core aim of this thesis, it is crucial to have some background information about the region of the Caucasus. The Caucasus – little is known about the region – especially when it comes to history. Before starting to explain the history of this region in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, it is important to clearly define, which region this thesis will attempt to analyze in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. When the word “Caucasus” is mentioned, mountains are one of the things that come into the mind of many people and that is justified. Being the highest mountain range in Europe, the Greater Caucasus chain amounts up to 800 miles ranging from Black Sea to the Caspian Sea.<sup>10</sup> This thesis will mainly focus on “South Caucasus” or as the Russians call it, the “Transcaucasus,” which includes the regions of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.

Caucasus is one of the most interesting regions in the world. As Forsyth quotes, “for thousands of years, the Caucasus has been a region where many routes of migration, invasion, trade and cultural influences intersect.”<sup>11</sup>

“Seismic Zone” is the word De Waal uses for the region in question.<sup>12</sup> The main reason for this is the fact that South Caucasus, or Transcaucasus – which I will be using for the rest of the thesis – consists of very different cultures as well as very different political systems.<sup>13</sup> The area has approximately fifteen million people and since 1991 and the end of Soviet

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<sup>8</sup> J. David Singer, *The Level-of-Analysis-Problem in International Relations* (World Politics, 1961), 82.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, 83.

<sup>10</sup> Thomas de Waal, *The Caucasus – An Introduction* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2019), 6.

<sup>11</sup> James Forsyth, *The Caucasus* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1.

<sup>12</sup> Thomas de Waal, *The Caucasus – An Introduction* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2019), I.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, I.



Union, many Western investors have shown interest in South Caucasus.<sup>14</sup> As Russian Empire will be a big part of this thesis, it is worth mentioning at this point that Transcaucasus was for a long time controlled by the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union and Russia has not yet given up interest in controlling it.<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, due to the fact that Caucasus is closed in by Russia and Turkey, the region has no huge importance in Europe and North America, despite its natural beauty.<sup>16</sup>

When we think about Transcaucasus, we automatically think about a region, however, we must know and remember that this “region” was constructed by the Russian Empire in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century as a Russian colonial region, calling it the “Transcaucasian Federation.” Only after its collapse in May 1918, it broke down to three parts called Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.<sup>17</sup> One more question that arises when thinking about Transcaucasus is the question whether Transcaucasus belongs to Europe or Asia. The opinions among academics concerning this question are very different. Due to the fact that the identities of these countries are very different, we can say that Transcaucasus is both – European as well as Asian – with some influence from the Middle East.<sup>18</sup> As De Waal says it, “in the end, it comes down to a matter of self-identification.”<sup>19</sup>

Even though the history of the Caucasus is rather mysterious, one can say that the region is of great importance for archeologists – this can be illustrated with the fact that skulls, dating back 1.8 million years, were discovered in Dmanisi, southern Georgia.<sup>20</sup> The arrival of Christianity in the region can link together the past and the present of Caucasus. We can find numerous of tiny stone churches in Armenia and Georgia, indicating ancient Christian civilization, which is a defining factor of these two countries even today.<sup>21</sup> In addition, the adoption of their own alphabet in the late fourth century enabled Armenia and Georgia to write their own religious texts. It can be said that under foreign rule, church and the written language were two of main sources, which helped the countries to preserve their national identity.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Thomas de Waal, *The Caucasus – An Introduction* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2019), I.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, 4.

<sup>16</sup> James Forsyth, *The Caucasus* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1.

<sup>17</sup> Thomas de Waal, *The Caucasus – An Introduction* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2019), 8.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, 10.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, 19.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, 20.

The word Transcaucasia was established by the Russian Empire after 1800, the time when all of the region became part of the Russian Empire. The beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century marked the creation of Transcaucasia – a single entity with the control of Russian Empire, be it institutions, currency, or railways as well as the Russian language as lingua franca.<sup>23</sup> A very interesting quote belonged to the British historian Geoffrey Hosking, who compared British and Russian Empire and said “Britain had an empire, Russia was an empire.”<sup>24</sup> The three countries became subjects of the Russian Empire and were treated like the ethnic Russians. Armenians and Georgians were more favored due to their religion, however, the Shiite Azeris were also able to live decent lives.<sup>25</sup>

With the Russian annexation, an imperial ideology was developed in the region. Furthermore, the Russian chauvinist identity was seen as the protector of Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire.<sup>26</sup>

Tsar Alexander I played a major role in taking over the major parts of Transcaucasia – more about this will be discussed in chapter one, when introducing the history of Georgia. The conflicts and wars will also be discussed in later chapters; however, we can say that the years of 1828-29 of Transcaucasus were not as bloody as the rest of the century. However, it is worth mentioning here that up until 1859, the conflicts of Russian Empire with Dagestan and Chechnya lasted almost three decades.<sup>27</sup> Circassians, a small ethnic group, who lived between the Crimean Peninsula and Central North Caucasus were also defeated by the Russian Empire. All of this shows the resentment of the Muslims on behalf of the Russian Empire, which will be discussed in detail in the second chapter of this thesis.

Caucasus is also an important region due to its oil production. In the years 1898-1901, Baku produced more oil than the United States.<sup>28</sup> The industry had its first breakthrough in 1871, when private enterprises were allowed by the Russian government. J.D. Henry, the British author even wrote in 1905 “Baku is greater than any other oil city in the world. If oil is king, Baku is its throne.”<sup>29</sup> Even though Baku was a country which possessed a lot of oil, it was geographically difficult to export it to Europe. One reason for that was the fact that the

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<sup>23</sup> Thomas de Waal, *The Caucasus – An Introduction* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2019), 37.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> James Forsyth, *The Caucasus* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013), 268.

<sup>27</sup> Thomas de Waal, *The Caucasus – An Introduction* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2019), 40.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, 170.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, 171.

Caspian Sea was stormy and dangerous.<sup>30</sup> That's the reason why the first cross-Caucasian railway from Baku to Batum on the Black Sea was built in 1883 and when the world's longest kerosene pipeline was completed in 1906. From then on, Europe could get oil through Black Sea and therefore through Georgia.<sup>31</sup>

Despite the fact that Russian Empire acted against the best interests of certain countries and committed atrocities against some minorities (e.g. Circassians) – not only in Transcaucasus, some cities experienced population growth, such as Tbilisi or Baku, which had more than 100,000 inhabitants by the end of the nineteenth century, compared to 14,000 in 1860 in Baku, for example.<sup>32</sup>

Russian annexation of Transcaucasus has brought enormous changes to the region. Georgia, for example, was now under the control of the Russian Empire, instead of Turkey and Persia, as before.<sup>33</sup> The Muslim population had different opinions. Azerbaijan, for instance, was separated from Persia, which brought the country closer to Europe. However, Daghestanis, Chechens, and especially the Circassians, experienced inhumane treatment and even near-extinction.<sup>34</sup> Resistance against the Russian Empire was pointless, and the Muslim population was often called “savages.”<sup>35</sup>

Close to the 1860s, Russia's expenditure was much more than their gains. The question remains here: what was the reason for the expansion? Forsyth argues that it was a strategic move. With Georgia and its Christian allegiance, it was able to expand further to the Middle East. Furthermore, Caucasus was a good place, from which Russian Empire could attack the Ottoman Empire and expand south-westward from the Danube towards Constantinople.<sup>36</sup>

The nineteenth century Caucasus was a time where it was not easy to define boundaries. The region was conceived as a borderland, where people of different background and social values lived together. Political influence on different regions varied greatly.<sup>37</sup> Due to the fact that the Caucasus has been a borderland, the empires have been competing to rule the region. As already mentioned before, the region of the Caucasus is unique and as Alexander Rondeli

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<sup>30</sup> Thomas de Waal, *The Caucasus – An Introduction* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2019), 171.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, 171.

<sup>32</sup> James Forsyth, *The Caucasus* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013), 299.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, 318.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid, 319.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Charles King, *The Ghost of Freedom* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2012), 22.

quotes, the countries have “lost rather than gained from their important geopolitical location.”<sup>38</sup>

When speaking about Caucasus, we cannot ignore the fact of religion in the area. Four major religions are represented in Caucasus. Islam has followers in Shi’i as well as Sunni version with the latter being rather the dominant one. Azerbaijan, Dagestan, Chechnya and Turkey are the four countries, which mainly follow the Islam. Christianity has also various forms in the Caucasus region. We have the Georgian and Russian Orthodox Church as well as the Armenian Monophysite Church. Furthermore, since the break-up of the Soviet Union, Protestantism has also made its place among these religions. Judaism is present, mostly in form of indigenous Georgian Jews as well as the Tats or Mountain Jew, living mostly in Azerbaijan and Dagestan. Buddhism is considered an “indigenous” religion in Russia. However, there are followers of Buddhism as well, mostly on the northwestern shore of the Caspian Sea.<sup>39</sup>

With this brief introduction of the Caucasus region and its history, the next sections will be dedicated to analyzing how Georgian national identity developed in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. As we have seen in the introduction, Russian Empire was expanding rapidly and was emerging as a hegemon, while the Ottoman Empire was declining. In the further sections of this thesis, Georgian relationship with these two major powers will be analyzed and discussed and hypotheses will be made on how the Georgian nationality was developed between “the rock and a hard place.”

### *c. What is National Identity?*

The definition of the concept of the “nation” is crucial before we move to the description of the national identity. This term is one of the most difficult ones to describe. According to Smith, Charles Tilly tried to describe the term as “one of the most puzzling and tendentious items in the political lexicon.”<sup>40</sup> In addition, we have objective and subjective definitions of the term, however, none of them are flawless and very clear. Finally, Smith gives us a vague idea of the nation, which is “a named human community residing in a perceived homeland,

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<sup>38</sup> Alexander Rondeli, *Georgia: Foreign Policy and National Security Priorities* (Tbilisi, UNDP Discussion Paper Series No.3, 1998).

<sup>39</sup> Svante E. Cornell. *Small Nations and Great Powers – A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus*, Curzon Caucasus World, 2001, 21-22.

<sup>40</sup> Anthony D. Smith. *Nationalism – Theory, Ideology, History*. (Polity). 2010, 10.

and having common myths and a shared history, a distinct public culture, and common laws and customs for all members.”<sup>41</sup>

Before starting to analyze, how Georgian national identity developed in the nineteenth century, it is helpful to give a brief introduction to the notion of national identity and national consciousness. Beginning at the late stage of the Middle Ages, people started thinking about individuality. We can say that before that time, the individual per se did not exist.<sup>42</sup> At this point, it is worth asking what National Identity means. According to Montserrat, the question of national identity depends on value attribution. By looking closer at national identity, we can also see that stereotypes are being constructed during this process as well.<sup>43</sup> In addition, national identity helps to develop a belief of belonging to something, which other people share with a person as well. As Montserrat also notes: “belief in common culture, history, kinship, language, religion, territory, founding moment and destiny have been invoked, with varying intensity, by peoples claiming to share a particular national identity.”<sup>44</sup>

As we discuss the question of national identity, it is worth mentioning that according to Montserrat, national identity has five different dimensions, namely:

- Psychological Dimension
- Cultural Dimension
- Antiquity
- Origin
- Mass or Elite Phenomenon
- Historical Dimension
- Territorial Dimension
- Political Dimension<sup>45</sup>

According to Smith, the term “national identity” is used instead of other terms, such as “national character” or “national consciousness.”<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Anthony D. Smith. *Nationalism – Theory, Ideology, History*. (Polity). 2010, 12.

<sup>42</sup> Guibernau Montserrat, *The Identity of Nations* (Polity Press). 2007. 9.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, 11.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid, 11-23.

<sup>46</sup> Anthony D. Smith. *Nationalism – Theory, Ideology, History*. (Polity). 2010, 18.

Now that we have heard what constitutes national identity, the question arises: how is national identity constructed? Also here, Montserrat offers several steps, which lead to the construction of national identity. First, the ethnic groups, living in specific regions, come up with an image, with a description of how a nation should look like. Here, we have the concepts of a common history, culture and specific territory.<sup>47</sup> Secondly, the process of construction of national identity contains the spread of specific features, e.g. symbols, rituals, etc., among the specific population.<sup>48</sup> Furthermore, setting up an administration, which includes and excludes certain citizens is necessary; in order to be a nation, one must have certain rights and these rights are distributed or not distributed by certain administrations.<sup>49</sup> The next step is to define a common enemy. Who is a friend, who is an enemy? In order to be identified with a certain nation, one must have a certain image of external powers.<sup>50</sup> In order to share common interests or the image of a nation, education and media play a major role and can be seen as important tools in spreading the word of a certain image of a nation.<sup>51</sup>

All of the above sound rational, however, in practice, it is not easy to fulfill all of the steps in order to create a national identity. Because not every person has the same idea of certain notions, it is difficult to bring thousands – even millions – of people to agree on certain things. It is also difficult to impose such images on people and make people believe in something. Therefore, it takes a long time and dedication of people to build a national identity – especially when it comes to the acknowledgment of this identity by external powers.

#### *d. The Notion of Nationalism*

In connection with national identity and national sentiment, nationalism has to be brought up. Even though a clear definition of national identity or nationalism is not existent, these two notions belong together and have shaped our society and community over the past centuries and it continues to further do so.<sup>52</sup> It is interesting to observe that especially late nineteenth century was very important for theoretical development of the term “nationalism.” In addition, theoretical frameworks were very much influenced in the nineteenth century due to the political and social situation across Europe. Napoleonic War, Unification of Germany,

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<sup>47</sup> Guibernau Montserrat, *The Identity of Nations* (Polity Press). 2007, 25.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Paul Lawrence. *Nationalism: History and Theory* (Routledge). 2004, 1.

Unification of Italy. Therefore, it is important to remember that the writings in the nineteenth century, trying to analyze the notion of nationalism, are highly influenced by these events.<sup>53</sup> Issues of identity were very much present in nineteenth century Europe. Furthermore, historians play a major role in displaying and explaining nationalism. Important to mention is also the fact that it is possible for every country form its own idea of nationalism – which may vary from the definitions of other countries.<sup>54</sup>

The notion of nationalism can be traced back to the German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder, as well as the French counter-revolutionary cleric, the Abbé Augustin de Barruel at the end of the eighteenth century and is rather a modern phenomenon.<sup>55</sup> According to Smith, the most important meanings of nationalism are the following:

- A process of formation, or growth, of nations;
- A sentiment or consciousness of belonging to the nation;
- A language and symbolism of the nation;
- A social and political movement on behalf of the nation;
- A doctrine and/or ideology of the nation, both general and particular.<sup>56</sup>

As we will see throughout this analysis, almost all of these meanings will play an important role in development of the Georgian national identity.

It is worth noting that the possible meaning stated above, may be related but they don't necessarily have to go together. As Smith illustrates, one can have national feelings towards a country without belonging to any symbolism, movement or ideology.<sup>57</sup> A very important part of national symbolism is the language – especially in the case of Georgia. As the Georgian language will be discussed in more detail in a later chapter, it is worth mentioning here that the language did play a major role in the development of nationalism in Georgia. As we will see, the literature combined with language had a major influence on the development of national identity and even played a huge role in the twentieth century, during the national independence movement.

To fully clarify the definition of nationalism, Smith gives us the following:  
“nationalism is an ideology that places the nation at the center of its concerns and seeks to

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<sup>53</sup> Paul Lawrence. *Nationalism: History and Theory* (Routledge). 2004, 18.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid, 19-22.

<sup>55</sup> Anthony D. Smith. *Nationalism – Theory, Ideology, History*. (Polity). 2010, 5.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid, 5-6.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, 6.

promote its well-being.”<sup>58</sup> In combination with this definition, we have three major factors, which contribute to a country’s well-being, namely the national autonomy, national unity and national identity. These three factors are of utmost importance for nationalism, without which it could not survive.<sup>59</sup> Resulting from combining the above-mentioned factors, we have a new working definition: “nationalism is an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential “nation.””<sup>60</sup> As we will see, this definition will pretty much fully apply to the Georgian nationalism. In the nineteenth century, Georgia was seeking for autonomy as well as unity and identity among the population – under the Russian rule. Almost all of Georgia’s history illustrates the desire for its nationalism.

The historian Heinrich von Treitschke had a big influence in writings, related to nationalism. His writings concern especially the German Unification and the development of nationalism there. Here is what he wrote about nationalism during that period:

*“We see that as a matter of fact there are two strong forces in history: firstly, the tendency of every state to amalgamate its population, in speech and manners, into one single unity; and secondly the impulse of every vigorous nationality to construct a State of its own. It is apparent that these are two different forces, which for the most part oppose and resist one another.”*<sup>61</sup>

He further argues that nationalism does not emerge out of people’s will but against them. He imagined the nation as a central and political authority, imposing itself on people.<sup>62</sup> His texts, which influenced people back then, had the purpose to somehow justify the German Unification. Treitschke also thought that nationalism was subject to change over time. Before concluding the subchapter of the notion of nationalism, it is worth looking at the ideologies of nationalism in order to properly understand the development of Georgian national identity in the nineteenth century. As theoretical framework, Anthony D. Smith will be used once again.

It is not possible to eliminate the term “nationalism” in connection with the one of “ideology.” According to Smith, we have three common elements between these concepts. These are:

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid, 9.

<sup>59</sup> Anthony D. Smith. *Nationalism – Theory, Ideology, History*. (Polity). 2010, 9.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Paul Lawrence. *Nationalism: History and Theory* (Routledge). 2004, 23.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.



- A set of basic propositions to which most nationalists adhere, and flowing from them;
- Some fundamental ideals which are present in every nationalism, albeit in varying degrees; and
- A range of cognate concepts that give more concrete meaning to the core abstractions of nationalism.<sup>63</sup>

In addition, Smith gives us six basic propositions of nationalism, which are far-reaching. Smith calls these propositions the “core doctrines of nationalism.” They are the following:

- The world is divided into nations, each with its own character, history and destiny;
- The nation is the sole source of political power;
- Loyalty to the nation overrides all other loyalties;
- To be free, every individual must belong to a nation;
- Every nation requires full self-expression and autonomy;
- Global peace and justice require a world of autonomous nations.<sup>64</sup>

These six features of nationalism give us a clear definition of nationalism and form the framework of it. These doctrines are used to justify and explain nationalist activities and symbols of nationalism in a country. These are not only used politically but also within a community of our societies.<sup>65</sup>

To conclude, nineteenth century was crucial for the development of the idea of nationalism. It is important to note that the notion of nationalism relates to the one of nation and is shaped by political and social situation in respective countries. Nationalism experienced its major developments in the nineteenth century due to the fact that it was a century, which displayed major political events in history. Lastly, it is also important to note that nationalism is connected with history as well and that history can also shape how nationalism, or a nation develops.

#### *e. The Notion of Patriotism*

In combination with nationalism, we can also try to describe patriotism. What is patriotism and how does it relate to nationalism? If we define patriotism according to a common dictionary, we get the definition of patriotism being the “love of one’s country.” However,

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<sup>63</sup> Anthony D. Smith. *Nationalism – Theory, Ideology, History*. (Polity). 2010, 25.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

this definition is not broad enough and has to be explained in more detail. Stephan Nathanson defines patriotism as including:

- Special affection for one's own country;
- A sense of personal identification with the country;
- Special concern for the well-being of the country; and
- Willingness to sacrifice to promote the country's good.<sup>66</sup>

Very often we encounter the problem of not being able to distinguish between patriotism and nationalism. Many scholars have tried to differentiate between these two notions, however here, I will only mention George Orwell, who made clear that nationalism is aggressive, while patriotism is defensive. It is a "devotion" to a certain place and to certain people without imposing it on others.<sup>67</sup> We have to treat this kind of definition with care, due to the fact that it can create a dangerous "us" vs. "them" society.<sup>68</sup>

*f. The Nature & Roots of the Caucasian Conflicts*

Having explained the different notions of the IR theories, we can now combine it with the historical context and try to analyze the nature and the roots of the Caucasian Conflicts.

It is an interesting fact that when we look over the history of Caucasian conflicts, we often find the conflict "between Muslim Azerbaijanis and Christian Armenians," the conflict between "Christian Russia and Muslim Chechen Rebels," conflict between "Christian Georgians and Muslim Abkhazians" as possible causes for the many conflicts in the Caucasus region.<sup>69</sup> As we can draw a conclusion from these statements, they try to give us the idea that these conflicts are for greater part, religiously motivated. However, we cannot take these statements face value and have to ask ourselves, whether these claims are true or not. In order to do so, help is needed from conflict theory, which explains what a religious conflict is. According to Cornell,

*"It is not enough that the two communities in conflict hold different religious beliefs in order to describe a conflict as religious in character. Religion must be on the agenda of the conflict;*

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<sup>66</sup> Stephen Nathanson. *In Defense of Moderate Patriotism*. 1989.

<sup>67</sup> George Orwell. *Notes of Nationalism*. Secker & Warburg. 1968. 362.

<sup>68</sup> Igor Primoratz. *Patriotism*. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2019.

<sup>69</sup> Svante E. Cornell. *Small Nations and Great Powers – a Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus*, Curzon Caucasus World, 2001, 54-55.

*religion must be the issue of the conflict or the conflict must be understood in clearly religious terms by at least one of the sides.*”<sup>70</sup>

In addition, one of the following criteria has to be met in order for a conflict to be called religious. These criteria are: firstly, “at least one party has to refer to a religious body of thinking to legitimize conflict behavior”; or secondly, “the polarization of parties has to be underpinned primarily by religious identity and/or theological perspectives.”<sup>71</sup>

Letting religion aside, one major factor comes into play when speaking of the nature of Caucasian conflicts: territorial control. To illustrate, one has only to look at Russian Empire wanting to control fifteen republics prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union.<sup>72</sup> To these territorial conflicts, we can add the feature of ethnic conflict. According to Cornell, ethnic conflicts are based on a security dilemma, which itself is based on fear.<sup>73</sup> It is worth noting that religion is often brought into a game when talking about ethnic conflicts.<sup>74</sup> To illustrate, if we look at Georgia and the autonomous regions, we can see that they differ in religion. Georgia is mostly Christian and South Ossetia, for example, is mostly Muslim.

Interestingly enough, when these issues are politicized, it is ethnicity that stands in the foreground and not religion. Religion simply occupies a place within the ethnic groups.<sup>75</sup> To illustrate, we can once again look at Georgia and its autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, to justify a conflict, neither religion nor ethnicity is mentioned.<sup>76</sup>

If we look back at Caucasian history, we can notice the fact that Russia seemed to always help countries of Christian religion. To illustrate, Russia has always supported Armenia over Azerbaijan in their conflicts. Therefore, Russia seems to have anti-Muslim sentiment.<sup>77</sup> We have seen here that religion and ethnicity usually play a huge role when looking at Caucasian conflicts. Even if not conscious, there usually is religion or ethnicity involved. As already mentioned, these driving factors are politically not always stated clearly and “officially,” these two factors were never the nature or the reason of the conflicts in history.

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<sup>70</sup> Svante E. Cornell. *Small Nations and Great Powers – a Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus*, Curzon Caucasus World, 2001, 55.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid, 56.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid, 57-58.

## 2. Case Study of Georgia

This chapter will try to show the domestic situation in Georgia in the nineteenth century. However, it will first give an overview of Georgian history. The first part of the history focuses on Georgian people. Who are Georgian people? How did they come into being and why are they so special? What are the particular traits of the country and its people? The following sections will display the Golden Age of Georgia, specifically late eleventh and thirteenth century. Davit the Builder and Queen Tamar of Georgia are two names, which everybody knows in Georgia. This time was also very important for Georgian literature with one of the most important poets, Shota Rustaveli, who wrote the Georgian classic.

This was the time when the country was in its full bloom until it started deteriorating with the Mongol Invasion of Georgia. Afterwards, this chapter will fast forward to the eighteenth century and give an overview of the Iranian and Ottoman invasion, before moving to the nineteenth century and describe the situation then, with concluding the chapter by analyzing how certain personalities and the domination over the country strengthened Georgia's national sentiment and showcase how Ilia Chavchavadze was one of the most influential figures for the development of the Georgian national identity.

### *a. The History/Origins of the "Kartvelians" (Georgians)*

Until the end of the eighteenth century, the exact history of Georgia is either vague or disputable.<sup>78</sup> Chronicles and sources by Byzantine historians are the main sources, which can be found until around 1780s. Russian archives are also a valid source of that time of the Georgian history.<sup>79</sup> The emergence of Georgian people (Kartvelians) is not very well documented because it precedes documentary evidence.<sup>80</sup> One major source, which can be traced to the Georgian population is the linguistic one. The findings show that the language can be followed back many centuries. Archaeology can also be a tool to find evidence about the history of an area, culture, population, etc.<sup>81</sup> Greek historians provide concrete narratives from the first millennium BC about the inhabitants of northeast Anatolia and western Georgia, however, the chronology is not clear. It is also not clear cut, which of these narratives are true and which ones simply consist of rumors.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> Donald Reyfield. *Edge of Empires: A History of Georgia*, Reaktion Books, 2019, 8.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid, 11.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

As already mentioned, linguistics is an important tool in the process of tracing back the people of Georgia. It is assumed that the modern Kartvelian language is linked to an Indo-European dialect, which is part of Italo-Celtic group, from which Latin derived.<sup>83</sup> Furthermore, it is assumed that Georgians can be associated with the Urartu empire – after the fall of the Hittites. The Urartu empire dominated central and northeast Anatolia from the early Bronze Age (1200 BC) to the early Iron Age (700 BC).<sup>84</sup> Even though Georgia is associated with the Urartu empire, the Georgian language does not reflect much of the language of the Urartu empire.<sup>85</sup>

Once the idea of Georgia was not a legend anymore but rather history, the country didn't emerge as one but as two-three units, namely Iberia (today's Kartli and Kakhetia), Colchis (the Black Sea coast region, which stretches from today's Sukhumi), and Svanetia.<sup>86</sup>

After the emergence of Georgian people, they were subject to numerous of Arab conquests. There were times, when Georgia prospered but as Reyfield puts it “no Georgian ruler ever equaled the achievements of Davit IV Aghmashenebeli (Builder, Restorer)”.<sup>87</sup>

#### *b. Georgia under Davit IV the Builder*

Davit IV the Builder is one of the most important names in Georgian history. He reigned between 1089 and 1125, reunited the kingdom of Georgia, managed to oust invaders, make economic and political changes in Georgia in a way that Georgia was the regional power for the upcoming century.<sup>88</sup> Davit, a linguist and a scholar, possessed talents, of which being able to perceive windows of opportunity is the most important one. Under the rule of Davit IV the Builder, Georgia gained territory, expelled enemies from Georgian ground and managed to enhance its treasury.<sup>89</sup>

Davit was important not only in political terms, but also in social terms, as he introduced many of the social reforms, such as divorce and remarriage. The most impressive achievements by Davit were during his expedition to the north Caucasus in 1118, when Ossetians accepted Georgian dominance and even the Chechens were under Georgian influence.<sup>90</sup> One of the most important developments under his rule is the fact that the name

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<sup>83</sup> Donald Reyfield. *Edge of Empires: A History of Georgia*, Reaktion Books, 2019, 8.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid, 12.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid, 13.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid, 85.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid, 85.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid, 89.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid, 92.

Georgians use today for their country, “sakartvelo” (a place for the speakers of the language of kartuli), began to be used for the first time.<sup>91</sup>

Reyfield writes “Georgia became an unassailable Christian kingdom, ruling for a century from the black Se to the Caspian, from the north Caucasian steppes to eastern Anatolia.”<sup>92</sup> From this quote alone can we imagine, how important Davit IV the Builder was for Georgia. Davit died on 24 January 1125 and was buried at Gelati – the cathedral, monastery and seminary he had founded.<sup>93</sup> His epitaph for the tombstone reads

*“This is my resting place from one eternity to another. This is what I desire, and here I have settled.”*<sup>94</sup>

At this point, it is important to mention that David the Builder was not always fighting to defend the country and its territory but also to further expand these. To illustrate, in 1117, his plan was to conquest the principality of Shirvan. The Christian supported the king; however, the Muslim population was desperate for protection.<sup>95</sup>

### *c. Georgia under Queen Tamar of Georgia*

Tamar was crowned queen in 1178 by her father Giorgi III. Not much happened or at least not much is recorded what happened in her first six years of reign. However, early 1180s marked the greatest literature of the Golden Age, when Rustaveli composed “The Man in the Panther’s Skin,” which was inspired by Tamar.<sup>96</sup> Queen Tamar was a distinguished political figure and even today, she remains a mythical figure in Georgia. Reyfield quotes “Like Spenser’s Faerie Queene, Rustaveli’s poem is more than a courtly tribute to an idealized lady: it has the open-mindedness of the Renaissance, a Renaissance that in Georgia was soon aborted.”<sup>97</sup>

Under the reign of Tamar, Georgia was the dominant power in south Caucasus. During her rule, she conquered neighboring territories and even extended from the Black Sea to the Caspian – which “attained its greatest flourishing in both political and cultural terms.”<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> Thomas de Waal, *The Caucasus – An Introduction* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2019), 32.

<sup>92</sup> Donald Reyfield. *Edge of Empires: A History of Georgia*, Reaktion Books, 2019, 93.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid, 96.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid, 97.

<sup>95</sup> James Forsyth, *The Caucasus* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013), 143.

<sup>96</sup> Donald Reyfield. *Edge of Empires: A History of Georgia*, Reaktion Books, 2019, 107.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid, 117.

<sup>98</sup> James Forsyth, *The Caucasus* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013), 145-146.

Second half of the twelfth century was an impressive one for Georgia – the queen had earned universal respect and Georgia was able to have an impact on universal scale.<sup>99</sup>

As Forsyth puts it, “Queen Tamar’s reign represents the flowering of Georgia’s medieval culture, with the construction of many fine churches such as Metekhi in Tbilisi, and Samtavro and Sveti Tskhoveli in the old capital Mtskheta.”<sup>100</sup> It is important to mention here that with the reign of Queen Tamar and his great-grandfather Davit the Builder, Georgia’s national identity started to develop.<sup>101</sup> After her death in 1212, the dominance of Georgia would deteriorate and centuries of bloodshed and foreign domination over the Kingdom would follow.

#### *d. Georgia in the Eighteenth Century*

Fast forward to eighteenth century, Georgia was devastated by Ottomans and Iranians and ultimately was extinguished by the Russian Empire.<sup>102</sup> King Vakhtang VI was the one governing Georgia, beginning in 1711. Centralization was a keyword for his governance, which actually benefited Georgia and brought short-term prosperity to the country.<sup>103</sup> Being allies with the Iranians up until 1714, this year was rather unhappy for Georgia and king Vakhtang VI. He was detained due to the fact that he refused to accept the religion of Islam in Georgia.<sup>104</sup> At the end, he accepted Islam and was released. Behind the back of the Iranians, King Vakhtang was communicating with Peter the Great and was asking for his support. Iran could not see the cooperation coming because the country was busy fighting in Afghanistan. Having promised to back up the Georgian troops, Peter the Great failed to support King Vakhtang and for having betrayed Iran, Vakhtang was killed soon after.<sup>105</sup>

The poet, who also fought as a boy during the war against Iranians wrote:

*“Woe is that day! The Ottomans shed much innocent blood,  
Wherever they met a workman or a simple peasant, they cut off their hands;  
The basket needs a head, they said, they threw them into many wickerwork carts,  
The bodies had no burial, foxes and wild goats gnawed at them.”*<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> James Forsyth, *The Caucasus* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013), 146.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid, 147.

<sup>101</sup> Thomas de Waal, *The Caucasus – An Introduction* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2019), 33.

<sup>102</sup> Donald Reyfield. *Edge of Empires: A History of Georgia*, Reaktion Books, 2019, 222.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid, 222-223.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid, 224.

<sup>105</sup> Donald Reyfield. *Edge of Empires: A History of Georgia*, Reaktion Books, 2019, 226.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

Spring 1723 was the time when Iranian soldiers captured Tbilisi. Soon after, Russian and Ottoman Empire signed a treaty. Russia would allow the Ottomans to rule over Georgia, Armenia and northwest Iran. The Ottomans would stop assisting Iran, so Peter could conquer the Caspian coast.<sup>107</sup> However, even before 1723, namely in 1722, the Ottoman Empire was ruling over Western Georgia. Kutaisi, Sukhumi and Poti were occupied by Ottoman forces and the Treaty of Constantinople in June 1724 allowed the Ottoman Empire to rule over the entire country. Therefore, any Georgian hopes of Russian help were vanished at this point.<sup>108</sup> During the Ottoman control, insurgencies were led by Christian leaders, Russia was asked for help and many other operations were undertaken, however, nothing really succeeded; the time of the Ottoman rule was the time of horror, filled with hangings, crucifixions and floggings, which on the other hand caused rebellions and which furthermore led to more bloodshed.<sup>109</sup>

Only in 1736 was the Ottoman Empire willing to give in – due to other wars against Austria and Russia. With the help of Iranians, parts of Georgia (Kartli and Kakhetia) were freed from the Ottomans.<sup>110</sup> By early 1740s, a civil war was raging in Georgia, however, by late 1740s, eastern Georgia was brought to peace again, with the help of the Iranians. However, it is worth mentioning that in 1750s, Ottomans still dominated over western parts of Georgia – which did not experience the development as did eastern parts of the country.<sup>111</sup> The next few decades were filled with battles and King Erekle was trying to free Georgia from the Ottomans. However, Russia was busy assisting Austria and other European countries expelling Ottomans from Europe, especially on the territory of Greece. At the end of the eighteenth century, King Erekle could only wait and hope for Russian assistance because he realized that – after several defeats against the Ottomans and despite the help of Iranians – Georgia was helpless against the Ottoman Empire.<sup>112</sup>

The Russian conquest of Kartli and Kakhetia will be discussed in the next chapter of this thesis, when the Georgia-Russia relation will be analyzed.

#### *e. Development of the Idea of Georgian Nation*

The nineteenth century was a crucial one for the development of the idea of Georgian nation. 1860s were the years, when it came up among the Georgian population.<sup>113</sup> To illustrate

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<sup>107</sup> Donald Reyfield. *Edge of Empires: A History of Georgia*, Reaktion Books, 2019, 227.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid, 231.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid, 232.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid, 234.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid, 235-247.

<sup>113</sup> Ghia Nodia, *Components of the Georgian National Idea: An Outline*. Identity Studies. 2010, 86.



how important Ilia Chavchavadze was for this important development, Ghia Nodia notes that he was the “father of the nation.”<sup>114</sup> Even though this idea was circulated in the nineteenth century, historians agree that the idea of national identity came up in Georgia between tenth and fourteenth century already.<sup>115</sup> With the triad, proposed by Ilia Chavchavadze (Fatherland, Language, Faith), the development went even further. Each component of this triad is a very important part of Georgian national identity.

Let’s take these components under the microscope and take a closer look at them. Fatherland is put into context with the territory of Georgia. However, if we analyze the word in Georgian, it means a little bit more. It attributes to something active, rather than passive, meaning that people should be active within the Georgian territory. As Ghia Nodia calls it, we can connect it with “national awakening.”<sup>116</sup> Language is also one major contributor to Georgian national identity. As the following section will show, Georgian language was and still is one of the biggest treasures of the country. The nineteenth century was also important for the language because – especially Ilia Chavchavadze – was active in spreading the word and further developing the language. To illustrate his efforts, he founded the so-called “Society for Spreading Literacy Among Georgians,” which helped developing the language further.<sup>117</sup> The third component of this triad – faith – can be connected to the triad of language and the biblical writings. However, this was not as influential among the population in the nineteenth century as the other two triads.<sup>118</sup>

Due to the fact that Georgia consists of several minority groups, the triad might not be enough for them to identify themselves as Georgian. Therefore, common history is a very important fragment of Georgian identity.<sup>119</sup> However, as Ghia Nodia notes, Ilia Chavchavadze missed one major notion of Georgian national identity; the so-called “Georgian Gene.” This includes the idea of Georgianness of people, one national and racial unit. This component was important towards gaining national independence in 1920s under Zviad Gamsakhurdia.<sup>120</sup>

Once national idea is developed, it has to be turned into a political project, which was the case in Georgia not in the nineteenth but only in early twentieth century.<sup>121</sup> As we have seen, even if Georgia gained national independence only in twentieth century, nineteenth century

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<sup>114</sup> Ghia Nodia, *Components of the Georgian National Idea: An Outline*. Identity Studies. 2010, 86.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid, 89.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid, 91.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid.

was central to the development of Georgian national identity and the idea of a Georgian nation.

#### *f. Georgian Culture in the Years 1820-1905*

Even though the relation to Russia was not the friendliest during this period, Georgia was largely adopting Russian culture. Especially in 1820 and 1830, Russian influence was very obvious. One example is the rejection of traditional costume in the Persian style and replacement by European dress.<sup>122</sup> For the aristocracy, Georgians did not only have to learn Russian but also the French language. Furthermore, we also see Russian theatre in Tbilisi along with the Georgian one. Even though Russian influence was huge, Georgian culture continued to live in Georgia as well. For example, in 1819, first Georgian newspaper was introduced.<sup>123</sup> Georgian writing flourished in the nineteenth century as well; writers such as Alexander Chavchavadze, Grigol Orbeliani, Vakhtang Orbeliani, Giorgi Eristavi and Nikoloz Baratashvili were very influential and contributed to the independence movement and uprisings towards Georgian independence later in the century.<sup>124</sup>

Second half of the century was crucial for intellectual and literary development. Ilia Chavchavadze and Akaki Tsereteli – both studied philosophy and political ideas at St. Petersburg University – were the two most famous and most important poets of that time.<sup>125</sup> When we speak about Georgian culture, it is important to understand that the churches, which were built during the Golden Age, as well as the poetry of Shota Rustaveli, already mentioned above, and ancient manuscripts, are considered to be national treasures and are crucial for national development.<sup>126</sup>

#### *i. The Georgian Language*

As de Waal states “the Georgian language, known to Georgians as kartuli, is the chief member of a distinct language family, written in a unique alphabet, and has been the main unifying forces in Georgian’s expressions of national identity.”<sup>127</sup> In general, the language does not belong to the Indo-European, Altaic, or Finno-Ugric language families. It rather belongs to the southern Caucasian language group known as Kartvelian and broke down into similar languages of Mingrelian, Svan, and Laz. This breakdown into several languages

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<sup>122</sup> James Forsyth, *The Caucasus* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013), 300.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid, 301.

<sup>126</sup> Thomas de Waal, *The Caucasus – An Introduction* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2019), 36.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid, 33.

started around eighth century.<sup>128</sup> Some scholars have tried to argue that it is related to Basque. Due to the fact that it does not belong to any other language family, it is hard to learn it because of numerous consonant clusters.<sup>129</sup>

Originally forty-one letters, today the Georgian language consists of thirty-three letters and was discovered in the fifth century – the time when it was used for religious texts.<sup>130</sup> It is interesting to know that at the time, when Shota Rustaveli wrote his poems (twelfth century), Georgian language had “the same number of speakers and readers as English did in Shakespearean England.”<sup>131</sup>

By the time of Russian domination and the disappearance of Georgian Orthodoxy in to Russian Orthodoxy, the Georgian language was a very powerful tool for self-identification (especially among intellectuals).<sup>132</sup> For Georgians, the language was so sacred that they were willing to fight and resist any attempt on Russia’s behalf to downgrade it.<sup>133</sup>

1879 marked a very important year for the Georgian language. Iakob Gogebashvili, an author of the popular language primer (*Deda Ena – Mother Tongue*) founded the Society for the Spread of the Georgian Language, where he would meet with his students at his house and would discuss the Georgian language, but also where he would share new political ideas.<sup>134</sup> After Georgian independence in 1918, Georgian was introduced as the official language – despite Russian threats of aggression.<sup>135</sup>

#### *g. Georgian Society in the Nineteenth Century*

The Transcaucasian society in the nineteenth century was remarkably transformed by the Russian rule. Whether the Russian annexation in the nineteenth century was progressive or not, is subject to debate. However, it is proven that Georgian resistance against Russian centralized bureaucratic rule took place.<sup>136</sup> When the Russian Empire annexed Georgia, there was a hierarchical structure in place; five percent of the population belonged to the nobility.<sup>137</sup> Kings having unlimited power before the Russian annexation, Tsar Paul ordered to divide

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<sup>128</sup> Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), 4.

<sup>129</sup> Thomas de Waal, *The Caucasus – An Introduction* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2019), 33.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>131</sup> Donald Rayfield, *The Literature of Georgia: A History* (Richmond, England: Curzon, 1994), 9.

<sup>132</sup> Thomas de Waal, *The Caucasus – An Introduction* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2019), 34.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>136</sup> Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), 63.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*, 65.

Georgia in two Georgian provinces with Russian administration. However, Tsar Paul was murdered shortly after and his son Alexander I became replaced him. Alexander did not like his father's plans, instead he divided Georgia into five districts and allowed Georgian noblemen to participate in boards meetings and in similar events.<sup>138</sup> However, the main aim of the Russian government was to remove Georgian nationals from any power, so they could introduce Russian notions of nobility, serfdom, and bureaucracy.<sup>139</sup> Even though the Georgian noblemen should rise to the status of Russian noblemen, many obstacles hindered their way to do so. An example is the case of owning serfs. Georgian noblemen needed documentation to prove this, otherwise, the serfs could buy their way to freedom or to being state servants.<sup>140</sup>

This showcases the fact that the Russians wanted to impose their rules and their bureaucracy on Georgia and on the entire continent of Caucasus. Seemingly treating them equally, the price to the equality was high and it was not easy to get there.

Prince Pavel Dmitrievich Tsitsianov was a Georgian, who was educated in Russia. He had a major influence on Georgian society and was good in manipulating the society by, for instance, opening a noble school in Tbilisi in May 1804, or by abolishing corporal punishment and penal servitude for nobles, or by simply showing interest in Georgian culture.<sup>141</sup> However, the success of Tsitsianov was short-lived because he was killed in 1806 outside of Baku and replaced by General Ivan Vasil'evich Gudovich, who was less sympathetic with the Georgians and who ordered to replace all Georgian authorities by Russians, disregarding the respect for Georgian law.<sup>142</sup>

Georgian nobility was divided in regard to the Russian rule. Some were state servants, others simply refused to accept Russian authority. Along with the resistance, the Georgian oppositional intelligentsia was formed in the 1820s.<sup>143</sup> the group of nobility found it unacceptable to obey Russian rule – especially when young students were shamed at school for being Georgians. Following this and many other institutionalized insults, many young Georgian students even had the idea of committing suicide.<sup>144</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), 66.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid, 68.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid, 70.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid.

All the humiliation and imposition of Russian rule over Georgia, strengthened Georgian sentiment of national identity and in 1829, a secret society was formed with the aim of restoring the Georgian throne and therefore gaining independence.<sup>145</sup> Prince Elizbar Eristavi, an officer in the Russian army, became the leader of this secret society. The members of the society all had a divided opinion on how to reach the goal, however, the national sentiment and anti-Russian sentiment was a unifying factor – inspired by the French revolution of 1830 and the Polish insurrection of 1830-1831.<sup>146</sup> The conspirators came up with a plan to execute civil officials and the “Instruction for the First Night” was planned out. However, the conspirators had one traitor in their group – Prince Iase Palavandishvili – who sold out his fellow-conspirators. On December 10, 1832, they were arrested. 145 people were investigated, 18 of whom were brought to trial; ten of them were condemned to death, however, they were able to reduce their sentences to exile instead. With the plan falling apart, Russian rule continued over the continent of Caucasia and Georgian resentment towards Russians became even stronger.<sup>147</sup>

This resentment went even further, when Pavl Hahn was sent to Tiflis to be in charge of territorial and other administrations. Hahn was completely ignorant of Georgian law and did not know anything about the continent of Caucasia in general. That’s why his program to immediately and completely incorporate Transcaucasia into Russia’s administrative system was a complete disaster. He appointed Russian officials in areas, where people did not understand Russian and announced the abolition of serfdom for Georgian nobility. This caused a huge outcry among Georgian nobles and Prince Aleksandre Chavchavadze – who was the only Georgian member of the governor’s council started the appeal process. In 1840s – under pressure and direct complains to the Ministry of Internal Affairs that Hahn was being completely ignorant to Georgian culture and its civilization, Hahn’s program collapsed, and he was replaced by Mikhail Vorontsov – who was considered a “friend of the Caucasian people.”<sup>148</sup>

Vorontsov is remembered rather positively – even in today’s Georgia. The poet Akaki Tsereteli wrote “As long as Georgia is remembered, so will the name Vorontsov live;”<sup>149</sup> and

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<sup>145</sup> Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), 71.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid, 71-72.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid, 72-73.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid, 73.

the dean of modern Georgian historians, Ivane Javakhishvili, mentions Vorontsov in positive terms, saying

*“Under the influence of the cultural policy of Prince Vorontsov, a feeling of trust and loyalty toward the highest power in the territory was worked out. The Georgian intelligentsia was inspired, and the hope appeared that the cultural-national progress of the Georgian people would be possible and without obstacles under Russian rule.”*<sup>150</sup>

Under Vorontsov, Georgian administration underwent significant transformation. Programmes, which were enforced by Hahn, were dismantled and Vorontsov tried to reduce opposition to Russian rule in the Caucasus as well as find a common denominator among the Russian and Georgian nobility, which he managed to do in 1859, when 30,000 Georgians were officially acknowledged of their noble status and were entered into the Book of Heraldry.<sup>151</sup> These actions further strengthened the sentiment of Georgian national identity and helped the Georgian population to come to terms with the Russian domination. As successful as Vorontsov’s policies were, all the receptions and balls in Tiflis came to be very expensive for the Georgian nobility. To illustrate, the debt of the nobility of Tiflis grew from 100,000 to 1,800,000 rubles in the years of Vorontsov’s administration.<sup>152</sup> Setting these debts aside, the Georgians were treated very well and received the right to play a role in different regional governments and therefore came to live peacefully under the Russian rule during Vorontsov’s viceroy.<sup>153</sup> The Georgians became so royal to the Russians that during the dangers of the Crimean War, Georgian units offered help to the Russian troops.<sup>154</sup>

#### *h. The End of Seigneurial Georgia*

Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War in 1856 was crucial for the emancipation of the serfs. Russian nobility class was not really thrilled of the idea of the emancipation of the serfs because this would mean for them less power.<sup>155</sup> By August 1856, Prince Alekandr Bartianskii was appointed the new viceroy of the Caucasus. Being the former chief of staff to Prince Vorontsov, Bariatinskii was an ambitious young man who was believed to achieve great things in Caucasus.<sup>156</sup> Even among the Georgian nobility, he was welcomed. He met

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<sup>150</sup> Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), 73.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid, 74.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid, 75.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid, 96.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid.

with Georgian representatives and together, they came up with a plan for the emancipation of the serfs. The reform was approved in 1858, however, nothing really happened.<sup>157</sup>

Due to the fact that Georgian representatives didn't put the reform plan into action, in January 1857, a revolt by peasants took place, which ultimately had to be settled by the Russian military. Even after the revolt, nothing happened towards the emancipation of the serfs until 1861, the year the Transcaucasian Committee for the Reorganization of the Landlord Peasantry was set up in order to put the reforms of the emancipation of the serfs into action. Bariatinskii was given six months to complete the work. The same year, the Russian tsar visited Georgia and assured them that emancipation would be achieved with "the minimum loss to the landlords."<sup>158</sup>

The noble families were afraid that their income would decrease significantly. As a petition from the Tiflis nobles reads

*"As soon as the peasants are declared free, our families will immediately be placed in an impoverished condition. We will have to sit sadly in the courtyards and beg for alms. We will have neither servants nor workers for the fields and vineyards, neither shepherds for the livestock nor governesses to bring up our children."*<sup>159</sup>

After the threat of Russian government to impose the emancipation on them, the Georgian nobility freed their serfs, but remained in possession of their lands. The landlords were allowed to negotiate with the peasants to work voluntarily or to be paid, however, if the peasants refused, they had to be set free. On October 13, 1864, the abolition of serfdom in Tiflis province was authorized by the tsar. The so-called Law on the Reorganization of Former Peasant Serfs in Tiflis Province was issued the same day.<sup>160</sup> The main feature of the liberation of the peasants was the fact that they were not dependent on the nobles anymore. They could not be involuntarily moved from place to place and they couldn't be sent into exile. They were allowed to marry without the permission of the landlords and they could engage in business, as well as participate in government and educational institutions. However, materially and – in part – legally, they were still dependent on their master.<sup>161</sup>

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<sup>157</sup> Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), 97.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid, 97-98.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid, 98-99.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid, 98-103.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid, 103.

Even though the abolition of serfdom was introduced, it was not until 1912 until all the bureaucracy could be settled and serfdom was legally abolished around the country.<sup>162</sup> Reduction in land under direct peasant control was the most significant economic consequence of the emancipation of serfdom in Georgia. The land, which was under direct peasant control was reduced by one-fifth and Kutaisi nobility lost around one-third of their land. The emancipation also led to a kind of self-government of the peasants, led by a peasant assembly.<sup>163</sup>

All in all, the emancipation of the serfs was economically disadvantageous for the Georgian society with loss of land and decrease in income. This is also seen as a further step for the Russian tsarist regime to impose Russian bureaucracy on Georgia and increase its influence over the Georgian society.<sup>164</sup>

#### *i. The Rise of Political Society*

With the Russian Empire being an emerging hegemon and Georgia being a small portion of the Caucasus, accommodation with the regime was rather less uncomplicated and bloody than resistance. Nationalism was one of the key players in the emergence of the liberation movement, alongside with the socialist and intellectual environment.<sup>165</sup>

The development of Georgian nationality can be best described by the Marxist idea of a class, which develops itself from an objective demographic existence: it develops from a “class in itself” to a “class for itself.”<sup>166</sup> Even though divided and under Russian rule for decades, the Georgians always possessed distinct cultural features. The first few decades of the nineteenth century, Georgians were in process of finding their nationhood, due to the fact that they almost faced extinction in the previous century.<sup>167</sup> The nineteenth century was a crucial one for the development of Georgian national identity or the sense of Georgian nationhood. With the economic development and Western education, especially the Georgian nobility started forming a “nationality in itself.”<sup>168</sup> By the last decades of the nineteenth century and additional pressure from the Russian Empire, such as postemancipation economic environment, or first manifestations of political ideologies in Georgia, led to the development of a sense of nationality, national consciousness and to put it in Marxist terms, a “nationality

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<sup>162</sup> Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), 106-107.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid, 108.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid, 112.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid, 113.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid, 113-114.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid, 114.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid.



for itself.”<sup>169</sup> These national movements had charismatic leaders and by the time of 1870s and 1890s, Georgians had developed a sense of national identity, with the idea of liberation of Georgia from the Russian Empire. This sense of national identity became the driving force for many people to participate in the uprisings for Georgian national independence.<sup>170</sup>

During the nineteenth century, Georgia was not only in confrontation with the Russians but also partly with Armenians, who dominated Georgia’s urban centers – which added to the development of national sentiment. Especially after the emancipation of the serfdom, Georgians felt threatened by the Armenians. With the nobility declining in Georgia, the Armenian middle-class and bourgeoisie was starting to thrive. With the emergence of national consciousness and another threat to their “Georgianness,” the population wanted it to be recognized more officially and in multiethnic place of Tiflis, boundaries between different ethnicities had to be defined. With the emancipation of the serfs, a huge part of Georgian nationals started migrating towards Tiflis, which meant that the Armenian population was slowly diminishing. However, this did not mean that Armenian control over Tiflis was over. As the Soviet historian of Tbilisi, Sh. Chkertia writes: “In the second half of the 1860s in Tbilisi there were about 3000 shops and commercial enterprises ... Most of these commercial enterprises belonged to Armenians, in whose hands was held almost all trade ... Approximately two thirds of the commercial-industrial class was made up of Armenians.”<sup>171</sup>

With the modernization of the country – e.g. building railway road, etc. – people outside of the major cities could be reached as well. Furthermore, the emergence of national identity started to be noted down in literature as well as political journalism and was becoming a bigger concern for the Russian Empire. By providing education, young leaders were becoming aware of the fact that Georgia’s unique culture and value could be overwhelmed and dominated by foreign powers. These fears also contributed to the further development of this national sentiment.<sup>172</sup> Intellectuals, political activists, national language and historical past were the major features and important factors in the development of Georgian national identity. In combination with these factors, culture plays a huge role as well. All these

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<sup>169</sup> Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), 114.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid, 114-117.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid. 122.

combined, we move from cultural autonomy to statehood. All of this was also influenced and showcased by the French and industrial revolutions.<sup>173</sup>

Literature was a huge factor in developing Georgian nationalism. The conspirators of 1832 were still very influential after their arrests. Especially the poetry of Alexandre Chavchavadze was filled with reminders of Georgian Golden Age and was contrasted to the present day. Grigol Orbeliani – even though being a governor-general of Tiflis province and loyal to the tsarist regime – called in his poems for the restoration of the Georgian glory.<sup>174</sup> It is worth noting that 1830s and 1840s, Romanticism was in its full bloom in Caucasus. Alongside with Georgian writers, Russian writers engaged in the poetry as well – e.g. Pushkin. This being said, Caucasus became an exotic and romantic place for literature.<sup>175</sup>

Following Orbeliani and Baratashvili, Ilia Chavchavadze and Akaki Tsereteli are considered to be Georgia's first important poets shifting from romanticism to a more critical realism.<sup>176</sup> However, Georgian national sentiment didn't experience its breakthrough until early 1860s. Due to the feeling of being inferior and being dominated by the Russian Empire, Georgian population didn't feel strong enough to fight for its independence.<sup>177</sup> To showcase how important Ilia Chavchavadze was for the development of national identity, Suny writes "... his role as an early patriot and his continuing journalistic activity made Chavchavadze the most influential Georgian nationalist from the emancipation until the 1905 revolution."<sup>178</sup> One of the reasons why Chavchavadze is such an influential figure in Georgian history is the fact that in 1960, he introduced a so-called "triangle," which would later become the formula of the Georgian nationhood. This triangle consists of "Fatherland, Language, and Faith." Chavchavadze wrote: "From our ancestors, we inherited the three sacred treasures: fatherland, language, and faith. If we do not even take good care of them, what kind of men are we, what will we be able to say to our heirs?"<sup>179</sup>

By the 1870s, the Georgian intelligentsia was divided due to different ideological ideas and it was the year, when three different political tendencies emerged, which were dominant forces in Georgia until the end of the century. We had the right party with nationalistic ideas, led by Ilia Chavchavadze; we had the center, which was the reformist liberalism, led by Niko

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<sup>173</sup> Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), 122-123.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid, 124.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid, 124-125.

<sup>176</sup> Ibid, 127.

<sup>177</sup> Ibid, 129-130.

<sup>178</sup> Ibid, 131.

<sup>179</sup> Ghia Nodia, *Components of the Georgian National Idea: An Outline*. Identity Studies. 2010, 88.

Nikoladze and Giorgi Tsereteli; and on the left was the emerging revolutionary movement, influenced by Russian populism and later by Marxism.<sup>180</sup> In late 1870s until 1890s, Georgia experienced major transformation in educational system as well as a renaissance of Georgian literature with the works of the writers Aleksandre Qazbegi and Vazha-Pshavela, whose work highlighted the Georgianness and free Georgia before Russian arrival. This kind of transformation was crucial for the development of Georgian national identity and gave the Georgian language even more importance. Meanwhile, Russian Empire conquered back Batumi – a historic Georgian region – to the Empire in 1878.<sup>181</sup>

By organizing events with students abroad, e.g. in Geneva in 1874, Georgian liberation movement was advancing and Georgian nationals around the globe were developing the desire of national independence.<sup>182</sup> Alongside with these meetings, new organizations were introduced in Tiflis and Kutaisi. In combination with the distribution of Russian revolutionary newspapers, populist activities in Tiflis – with the Tiflis seminary being a center of populist activities, Georgian movement towards national identity was being shaped. During the time between 1881 and 1883, populist ideas were printed in Georgian language.<sup>183</sup> However, by the end of the century, Georgia was struggling economically and socially. Different social ideas, few wealthy Georgians and still under the rule of the Russian Empire, Georgia had to put the movement towards national independence on pause.<sup>184</sup>

By 1905, Marxism – associated with the Mensheviks – was the leading ideology in Georgia. This ideology was appealing for the population because it described the present situation and gave solution to it.<sup>185</sup> All the reformations and transformation of the society as well as the leaders of different parties played a major role in the development of Georgian national identity. However, it was not until 1918 until Georgia gained its independence. The major contributor for the movement of national independence was the February Revolution 1917. Given the unrest in Russia and being concerned with their own country situation, Georgia was set free and given the possibility to shape her own political culture. Being aware

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<sup>180</sup> Ghia Nodia, *Components of the Georgian National Idea: An Outline*. Identity Studies. 2010, 132.

<sup>181</sup> Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), 133-134.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid, 137.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid, 138.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid, 139-143.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid, 145.

of the risks of managing a new state alone, the social democratic leadership first sought solutions within Russia before gaining independence the following year.<sup>186</sup>

*This chapter analyzed the Georgian domestic situation in the nineteenth century. Before doing so, it gave an overview of its history. First, it described how Georgians came into being and claimed that two major sources, by which we can trace back Georgians, are linguistics and archaeology – which suggests the narrative that Georgians emerged from the first millennium BC. Under Davit the Builder, we have now learned that the economic and political changes were so immense that Georgia became the regional power for the following century. The Golden Age continued with the Queen of Tamar, who extended regional territories from the Black to the Caspian Sea and under whose rule Georgia was flourishing politically and culturally.*

*In this chapter, we have also seen the dense period of eighteenth century of Georgia, when the country experienced Iranian and Ottoman invasion, followed by Russian invasion in the nineteenth century. The nineteenth century, however, was crucial for the development of national sentiment and national identity in Georgia. Russians wanted to rule over the country and the reign was successful but internally – especially with the influence of Ilia Chavchavadze and the writings of Akaki Tsereteli – patriotism and nationalism was on the rise and Russia being occupied with major other conflicts around Europe, Georgia had the chance to develop its national identity internally. Tsitsianov was – on Russian behalf – the key figure who, unlike his predecessors, had rather a positive attitude towards Georgia. At the end, we can say that intelligentsia and literature – with it the Georgian language – were very important tools to develop national sentiment and Georgian national identity.*

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<sup>186</sup> Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), 181.

### 3. Case Study of Russia

This chapter will analyze the events and policies of the Russian Empire. It will first give an overview of Russian conquest of the Caucasus, which also includes the annexation of Georgia in 1801. The nineteenth century for Russia can be seen as one of many wars – many of which Russian Empire won – except one of the most important ones, which it had lost, namely the Crimean War. This chapter should also showcase, why the Russian Empire was an emerging hegemon. This chapter dedicates one section to Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812, which ended in a disaster for the French and which meant the beginning of an end for Napoleonic era. Before that, it will take a closer look at the Russo-Turkish War in 1828-29. Russia's imperial foreign policy will be displayed in another section and the Crimean and Russo-Turkish Wars will be analyzed as well. Concluding this chapter, one last section will be dedicated to the Circassian Genocide and the atrocities committed against them. Before giving this overview of the Russian Empire, it will showcase how the Russians saw other ethnicities within their boundaries.

Before diving into analyzing the Russian Empire in detail, it is worth to first analyze the distinction between an empire and a nation. Compared to a nation state, an empire intends to control a certain number of different populations. It does so either by cooperation or by installing different institutions. These imperial institutions aim at uniting social, political and economic factors in these different territories. Furthermore, the empires acquire certain degree of authority over the populations and communities and reduce herewith the cost of coercion.<sup>187</sup> The principle of nationalism can lead to weakening of empires and to delegitimization of an empire. If groups opposing the empire and searching for autonomy form themselves, the empire often cannot do much against it.<sup>188</sup>

In order to understand the following subchapters, it is worth taking a look at the nations and revolutions in the Caucasus region. In the 1820s, Semyon Bronevskii listed all the peoples and territories, of which comprised the north Caucasus. His list included the following:

- Circassians who live beyond the Kuban River;
- Greater and Lesser Kabarda;
- Land with no name;

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<sup>187</sup> Hakan M. Yavuz et. al. *War and Diplomacy: The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the Treaty of Berlin* (University of Utah Press: Salt Lake City). 2011. 17.

<sup>188</sup> Ibid.

- Area controlled by the Bragun chieftain;
- Kists;
- Ingush;
- Karabulaks;
- Peaceful Chechens;
- Mountain Chechens;
- Kumyks, of three types;
- Nogai nomds, scattered about in all parts.<sup>189</sup>

This list contains a combination of geographical, linguistic and political labels, some of which are still in use and some of which have disappeared. The cultural factor to the population was added later in the century. Here we can see that the Russian Empire had its own ideas of people and was developing ideas, how to deal with them. As we will see later in this chapter, cleansing was one of the methods, which was applied, to deal with all of these minorities.

#### *a. Russia's Conquest of the Caucasus*

We can observe that at the end of the eighteenth century, Russian Empire was continuing to take over parts of Caucasia, as it has done so in the past centuries. To showcase, how powerful the Russian Empire's acquisition of territories in the Caucasus was, it is worth noting that in 1462, Moscow had control over 24,000 square kilometers. In 1914, it was over 13.5 million, which shows that the tsarist regime was a very effective tool for territorial expansion.<sup>190</sup> Huge influence on the imperial ideology had the Orthodox church.<sup>191</sup> The reign of Alexander I would bring tremendous changes – especially militarily.<sup>192</sup> The Persian march in 1795 in Tiflis destroyed the city, reducing the number of Georgians in Tiflis to its half of what it was before the destruction. Not yet entirely under Persian rule, Georgia was fighting for its survival. Despite the Treaty of Georgievsk (1783) between Russia and Georgia with the promise on Russian behalf to protect Georgia, in September 1799, the king of Kartli-Kakheti,

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<sup>189</sup> Charles King, *The Ghost of Freedom – a History of the Caucasus*, Oxford, 2008, 142-43.

<sup>190</sup> Dominic Lieven, *Empire – The Russian Empire and Its Rivals*, Yale University Press 2000, 262.

<sup>191</sup> James Forsyth, *The Caucasus* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013), 270.

<sup>192</sup> John P. Le Donne, *The Grand Strategy of the Russian Empire, 1650-1831* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004), 177.

Giorgi XII sent a petition to St. Petersburg, asking for help and agreeing to make the kingdom of Georgia part of the Russian Empire.<sup>193</sup>

However, this plan was not executed due to the fact that Giorgi as well as the Russian rulers died shortly after. At this point, Alexander I took over the Russian Empire. Concerned with growing power of Napoleon and the neighboring Persians, Alexander I – based on the petition of Giorgi – decided to annex Georgia.<sup>194</sup> Alexander I issued a proclamation in September 1801, which made Kartli-Kakheti part of the Russian Empire. He later justified his actions by stating that

*“placing eastern Georgia under the emperor’s control was not intended to increase my powers, secure profit, nor enlarge the boundaries of an already vast empire ... was meant to establish in Georgia a government that can maintain justice, ensure the security of persons and of property, and give to everyone the protection of law.”*<sup>195</sup>

After securing the rule over Georgia, Russian Empire shortly after moved to neighboring territories. Even though the military launch on Baku failed in 1804, later in 1806, Baku and Derbend were captured and put under the control of Russian Empire as well.<sup>196</sup>

The conquest of Baku caught the attention of the Ottoman Empire due to the fact that the Ottomans were also interested in that area. The years from 1804 until 1813, Russians were formally waging war against the Persians and starting in 1806 until 1812, Russia was fighting the Ottomans – all of this was in addition to the most serious problem of Napoleon in the west.<sup>197</sup> During this very messy and bloody years, Russia was gaining posts in numerous territories, however, the gains were often reversed by the Persians and Ottomans. In addition, revolts broke out in Georgia, due to unhappiness of the royal family.

The period, when Russian Empire could exhale was 1812 and 1813, when the treaties of Bucharest and Gulistan were signed – which ended the wars with the Ottomans as well as the Persians.<sup>198</sup> Following these treaties, Russia lost some territories at the Black Sea, however, gained enormous amount of territories over eastern and western Georgia. Even though Russian Empire was the “winner” in these situations, the Ottoman Empire was not to

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<sup>193</sup> Charles King, *The Ghost of Freedom* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2012), 28.

<sup>194</sup> Ibid.

<sup>195</sup> Ibid.

<sup>196</sup> Ibid, 29-30.

<sup>197</sup> Ibid, 30.

<sup>198</sup> Ibid, 28.

underestimate because they were still able to influence some of the Muslim areas in Caucasus.<sup>199</sup>

After the peace treaties in late 1820s, Transcaucasus experienced a relatively peaceful time. However, Dagestan and Chechnya were still resistant until they surrendered in 1859. Five years later, the Circassians were defeated as well. These were not only victories over certain territories, but Russia wanted to free these territories from the Muslim religion, therefore, many of the people were deported to the Ottoman Empire.<sup>200</sup>

The second half of the nineteenth century was crucial for the history of the Russian Empire. Following the defeat in the Crimean War of 1854-1856, the Russian Empire had to start rebuilding itself, which meant that they were now more concerned with the domestic problems, rather than maintaining control over the territories of other countries, such as Georgia. Abolition of serfdom was one of the reforms, which followed the defeat of the Crimean War.<sup>201</sup> This was the time when things started deteriorating for the great superpower of the Caucasus.

Beginning in the nineteenth century, the southern part of the Caucasus was absorbed by Russia and one can say that it was made Russian. After Russia made Transcaucasia into one unit (already described in the introduction), Russian institutions, currency, and railways were also introduced, giving the area more Russian character.<sup>202</sup> Russian invasion of Georgia at the beginning of the nineteenth century was justified by Georgian need for tsarist protection.<sup>203</sup> Showcasing the devastation of Georgia after the Persian invasion was the proof for this claim. This was shown by destroyed churches, execution of Christian population as well as enslaving the population.<sup>204</sup>

Even though Russian Empire didn't meet much resistance during the invasion of Georgia, some parts were easier to annex than others. To illustrate, the western principalities of Mingrelia and Imereti still consisted of some pro-Ottoman citizens – mostly of Muslim religion.<sup>205</sup> One of the most drastic measures undertaken by the Russian Empire in Georgia

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<sup>199</sup> Charles King, *The Ghost of Freedom* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2012), 31.

<sup>200</sup> Thomas de Waal, *The Caucasus – An Introduction* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2019), 40-41.

<sup>201</sup> Ibid, 50.

<sup>202</sup> Ibid, 37.

<sup>203</sup> Ibid, 38-39.

<sup>204</sup> Ibid, 38.

<sup>205</sup> Ibid, 39.



was the abolishment of Georgian Orthodox Church and imposing the Russian Orthodox Church on the population.<sup>206</sup>

By the nineteenth century, Caucasus became a synonym for war and heroism in the Russian Empire; how bloody and messy the nineteenth century was for Caucasus and for Russians, can be illustrated by the lines of Russian military historian Vasily Potto, who wrote:

*“Caucasus! What Russian heart does not respond to that name, linked by ties of blood and with both the historic and intellectual life of our homeland, speaking at the same time of incalculable sacrifices for it and of poetic inspiration?”*<sup>207</sup>

Even though European powers feared further expansionism on Russian behalf, Muriel Atkin argues that Caucasia was sufficient for the Russian Empire; she states that “the conquest had nothing to do with some legendary Russian drive to obtain warm-water ports or some grand design for the conquest of Asia. ... Exotic alien lands made attractive targets for colonization because it was believed that they could make their colonial master rich and because the colonial master could in return benefit the subject peoples by introducing them to civilization. Furthermore, all of this would prove that Russia, too, was as great and civilized an empire as those of western Europe.”<sup>208</sup> Even though the Russian Empire seemed to be of aggressive nature for the neighbors, it had to switch to a defensive strategy at the beginning of the empire due to the fact that the economy began to retrench.<sup>209</sup>

#### *b. Russo-Turkish War 1828-29*

Before moving to Napoleon’s attempt to invade Russia in 1812, it is worth taking a look at the Russo-Turkish War in 1828-29. As the Greek revolts as well as the battle of Navarino were happening, Russia saw the opportunity to seize parts of Turkey, without the Western powers intervening.<sup>210</sup> The primary goals of the Russian Empire during this battle were to expulse the Turks from the Caucasian coast, as well as to conquer Akhaltzikhe and establish a military frontier.<sup>211</sup> One advantage with which Russian Empire went into the battle was the fact that the Ottomans were weakened by the Greek war. Even though the Ottomans appeared strong, this display of power was rather theoretical than real. Strengthened by the victory over

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<sup>206</sup> Thomas de Waal, *The Caucasus – An Introduction* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2019), 39.

<sup>207</sup> Ibid, 41.

<sup>208</sup> Muriel Atkin. *The Origins of the First Russo-Iranian War. In Russia and Iran, 1780-1828* (University of Minnesota Press). 1980. 163.

<sup>209</sup> John P. Le Donne, *The Grand Strategy of the Russian Empire, 1650-1831* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004), 198.

<sup>210</sup> William Edward et. Al. *Caucasian Battlefields – a History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border 1828-1921*. Cambridge. 1953, 23.

<sup>211</sup> Ibid.

Napoleon – which will be discussed in the next section – the Russians were in an ideal condition to fight the war and meet the objectives.<sup>212</sup>

Even though Russians seemed more powerful and readier for the war than the Ottomans, by 1828, Russian progress had not been really remarkable – especially on the Balkan front.<sup>213</sup> When Russians resorted to attacking the Ottomans by the open sea, the Ottomans had to start realizing that they did not really have a chance of winning the war. Following the open sea offensive of the Russian Empire in June 1829, the Ottomans started abandoning territories and Russians were moving closer to Anatolia. After advancing across the Balkan region, the Russians had to realize that they could not seize any more territory and the conditions for the Treaty of Adrianople were already met.<sup>214</sup> By 1829, Russian Empire was in full control of the Black Sea, which led to the creation of a strong Black Sea fleet.<sup>215</sup>

The campaign of 1828-29 showcases the emerging power of the Russian Empire. With the right strategy and enough support from the government, Russians were able to defeat the Ottomans in the campaign of 1828-29. Even though they also experienced some difficulties and were sometimes stuck, at the end, we can see that Russians were the more powerful force than Ottomans during that time in the Caucasus region.

### *c. Napoleon's Invasion of Russia 1812*

When Napoleon started the aggression against Russia in 1812, he was seen as one of the most powerful leaders in the world. Before the invasion, it can be shown that these two superpowers initially were allies; this can be exemplified by the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807.<sup>216</sup> Napoleon feeling betrayed and the Russians unwilling to cooperate, the French leader decided to impose his will on the Russian Empire. Overconfident and convinced of his powers to forcefully impose his will on the Russian Empire, negotiations were not an option for Napoleon. Little that he knew would this overconfidence and unwillingness to cooperate lead to the end of his era. Even though Russia was not a direct threat to France, Napoleon made a little “detour” in his battle with England and decided to invade Russia – with catastrophic consequences.<sup>217</sup>

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<sup>212</sup> William Edward et. Al. *Caucasian Battlefields – a History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border 1828-1921*. Cambridge. 1953, 23-24.

<sup>213</sup> Ibid, 30.

<sup>214</sup> Ibid, 40-42.

<sup>215</sup> Ibid.

<sup>216</sup> David C. Gompert et. al, *Blinders, Blunders, And Wars*. (Rand Corporation, 2014), 41.

<sup>217</sup> Ibid, 42.

The root cause for the French invasion was the fact that Napoleon did not like when Russia crowned the king of Poland. The idea of Polish independence was unacceptable for Napoleon – this was an expression of the fact that Napoleon did not like the influence, which Russia was imposing on Europe. Napoleon also took notice of the fact that the economic situation in Russia was worsening and therefore was even more confident of his idea of invading Russia. As the situation was heating up, Napoleon’s first thought was war – the way he had achieved domination in big parts of Europe.<sup>218</sup> Having no strategy planned out, Napoleon was confident that not Russian army would be able to resist his glorious troops. Defeating Russia should have led to the closure of Russian ports to the English, which would bring Napoleon one step closer to the triumph over his archenemy, England.<sup>219</sup>

Napoleon’s army consisted not only of French troops but also of Italian, Austrian, German, and Polish ones. His idea of defeating Russia was to inflict such a huge blow at the beginning that they would not be willing to fight anymore afterwards and would surrender and give him everything he demanded.<sup>220</sup> However, Alexander I outsmarted Napoleon and did not engage in military battle. In fact, when the Grande Armée entered Russian territory, they were not met with resistance; even when Napoleons troops reached Moscow, Alexander I as well as the troops had left and to Napoleons surprise, now Russia was not willing to negotiate. Alexander I knew that his army would be destroyed by the Grande Armée. This is the reason, why he followed the logic of David and the Goliath.<sup>221</sup>

Initially thinking that the Russian invasion would be a quick and easy victory, Napoleon was now stuck in Russia. One of the biggest problems for Napoleon was to feed the Grande Armée. The next problem was the one of weather. By going deeper and deeper into Russia, Napoleon’s forces missed the opportunity to win the battle within the three most promising months of the year, where it was easier to fight. In October, where the colder weather began to appear in Russia, Napoleon’s army realized that the invasion of Russia in 1812 was a huge mistake.<sup>222</sup> Napoleon’s biggest flaw was the fact that he thought he knew Alexander I and he was confident of the fact that Alexander I was going to lose. The idea of the tactics, which were really used by Alexander I never crossed Napoleon’s mind. Filled with ego, arrogance and confidence, Alexander I should have been a “sure loser.” However, as we know, this was

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<sup>218</sup> David C. Gompert et. al, *Blinders, Blunders, And Wars*. (Rand Corporation, 2014), 43.

<sup>219</sup> Ibid, 41.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid, 44.

<sup>221</sup> Ibid, 45.

<sup>222</sup> Ibid, 46.

the beginning the end of Napoleon's era.<sup>223</sup> Napoleon's egotism and arrogance can be showcased in the fact that later, he started blaming officers and generals for his defeat against the Russians.<sup>224</sup>

This victory on Russian behalf can be seen as an additional point to the fact that Russian Empire was a major player on the world stage and was emerging as a hegemon in the nineteenth century.

#### *d. Russia's Imperial Foreign Policy*

Russian Empire's goal in pursuing certain foreign policies was to maintain the hard-won prestige of a great power. At the same time, territorial interests were very much in the foreground and keeping the Ottoman Empire weak and unstable were also the aims.<sup>225</sup> The victory in the Napoleonic Wars – especially Napoleon's invasion in 1812 gave Russia further recognition as a major superpower and one had to think twice before challenging her.<sup>226</sup>

Despite Russia's aggressive behavior and expansionism, diplomacy was a very important key player in the Empire's policies. Especially maintaining friendly relations and close partnership with the Prussian Hohenzollerns and Austria's Habsburgs was of utmost importance.<sup>227</sup> To showcase the fact that Russian Empire was not on friendly term with the Ottomans, we can mention the fact that they fought a total of four wars with them. While Ottomans were not ready to defeat the superior Russian military, two wars were still won against the, with the help of foreign intervention.<sup>228</sup> These military conflicts will be discussed in detail in the next subchapter of this thesis. A very important strategy for the nineteenth century government was to divide the rest of the world and act according to the regions. In its eyes, Russian Empire divided the world in three parts, namely:

- In the west, its aim was to keep up its reputation and maintain its strength,
- Turkey was seen as a rival, which had to be kept in control, and
- In Central Asia, it wanted to conquer more borders, e.g. Afghan borders.<sup>229</sup>

Even though it was hard to maintain these policies, Russian Empire managed surprisingly well to maintain these policies throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

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<sup>223</sup> David C. Gompert et. al, *Blinders, Blunders, And Wars*. (Rand Corporation, 2014), 48.

<sup>224</sup> Ibid, 52.

<sup>225</sup> David Schimmelpenninck Van der Oye. *Russian Foreign Policy 1815-1917*, 2006, 555.

<sup>226</sup> Ibid, 554.

<sup>227</sup> Ibid, 554-555.

<sup>228</sup> Ibid, 555.

<sup>229</sup> Ibid.

The Vienna Conference in 1814-1815 was a major turning point in European history. Stability rather than revenge was to be achieved by the victorious allies – Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia. Geographically, the borders should be redefined in a way they had been before the storming of Bastille in 1789. In addition, certain mechanisms should be set up to settle disputes, instead of directly going to war. For Europe, it was a major success due to the fact that no major wars took place until 1914.<sup>230</sup>

In the course of the next few years, the Russian Empire became more reactionary, which was showcased with the Greek revolts in 1820s against the Ottoman Empire. The Eastern Question started to be part of Russia's focus. It was the question of the Ottoman's sultan's European possessions and what would happen to them – because the Ottoman Empire's power was declining immensely.<sup>231</sup>

Nicholas I took over the throne in 1825. At any cost, he wanted to maintain the status quo. However, the revolutionary uprisings of 1830s disrupted these plans. Anxious about the revolts all over Europe, Nicholas I decided that he wanted to cooperate with other Conservative powers in Europe to maintain the political order in Europe.<sup>232</sup> Following the treaty of 1838 with the Austrians – the promise to intervene in case there was a serious internal threat of disturbances – the Russians intervened in Hungary to help the Austrian in 1848 – shortly after the revolutions across Europe had begun.<sup>233</sup> In the next few decades, Nicholas I negotiated numerous of treaties with the Ottomans – such as the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829 or the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi in 1833.<sup>234</sup>

After the defeat in the Crimean War, Nicholas I was replaced by his son, Alexander II. Having lost prestige and power elsewhere, Alexander II wanted to focus on reforming the empire at home and stay out of other states' affairs. However, major advances could be observed in the Pacific and Central Asia and concerning Europe, Alexander II wanted to somehow improve Russia's situation – which was put under isolation – after the Crimean War.<sup>235</sup> 1873 was the next diplomatic move on Russian behalf when Otto von Bismarck proposed the Dreikaiserbund between united Germany, Austria and Russia. However, after

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<sup>230</sup> David Schimmelpenninck Van der Oye. *Russian Foreign Policy 1815-1917*, 2006, 556.

<sup>231</sup> *Ibid*, 557.

<sup>232</sup> *Ibid*, 558.

<sup>233</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>234</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>235</sup> *Ibid*, 560-564.

German unification in 1871, Russia was not on the center stage anymore but rather Germany.<sup>236</sup>

In April 1877, the Russian Empire declared War on the Ottoman Empire yet again. Advanced until the gates of Constantinople, Russian advance was stopped by the fear of the British intervention due to the fact that the British Navy was present nearby Turkish waters. This led to the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878. Renamed as Treaty of Berlin a few months later, Russia experienced major setback and humiliation with this treaty as well. Diplomatic isolation was one of the consequences, which already had happened as a result of the Crimean War.<sup>237</sup>

The new alignment with France and abandoning the one with Germany in 1893 was the major development during the rule of Alexander III – who succeeded Alexander II in 1881. There were many insignificant reasons, why Russians decided to form an alliance with France; however, the major factor was the serious threat of the aggressive and militarily powerful German Empire, posing a threat to the Russian Empire. Furthermore, Germany's ignorance towards Russia's role in the Balkans was also a key player.<sup>238</sup> Being considered as one of the founders of the Concert of Europe, Russian Empire played a major role in shaping Europe's diplomacy in the nineteenth century. Experiencing major setbacks occasionally in the nineteenth-century tsarist diplomacy can be marked as successful up until 1894.<sup>239</sup>

Russia, being one of the great hegemons of Europe in the nineteenth century, contributed greatly to the decline of "Europe's sick man," namely the Ottoman Empire. Having Ottoman Empire rather in a declining position, Russia was able to have a huge influence on the Caucasus region. Busy with the battles around Europe, Caucasus was not in the center of attention for the most part of the nineteenth century. However, being busy with Europe and European battles, Caucasian states – especially Georgia – was able to strengthen its movement towards national independence. With the factors already mentioned in the previous chapter about Georgia, and Russian focus on Europe, as well as its rather declining power in the second half of the nineteenth century, Georgia was on a good path towards its independence.

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<sup>236</sup> David Schimmelpenninck Van der Oye. *Russian Foreign Policy 1815-1917*, 2006, 565.

<sup>237</sup> *Ibid*, 566.

<sup>238</sup> *Ibid*, 567.

<sup>239</sup> *Ibid*, 568.

### *e. Crimean War*

How powerful Russia entered the Crimean War can be illustrated by Lord Palmerston's remark that "the best and most effectual security for the future peace of Europe would be the severance from Russia of some of the frontier territories acquired by her in later times, Georgia, Circassia, the Crimea, Bessarabia, Poland and Finland ... She could still remain an enormous power, but far less advantageously posted for aggression on her neighbors."<sup>240</sup> With the defeat in the Crimean War in 1856 and the Treaty of Paris imposed on her, Russia's sphere of influence on the Black Sea was limited.<sup>241</sup>

Detailed causes for the start of the Crimean War are rather subject to debate. Officially, the Crimean War was started due to French attempt in 1850 to gain control and impose Christendom in Ottoman-ruled Palestine. Louis Napoleon was supported by domestic politicians, however, Nicholas I of Russia, who was a big supporter of the Orthodox Church, was opposed to France's idea of imposing Catholic Church's rights to Palestine.<sup>242</sup> The dispute was specifically directed to especially to the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. Even though the Catholic Church – and with that France – was granted pre-eminence in 1740, in the following years many more Orthodox pilgrims had visited the holy land, which gave the Orthodox Church a strong standing point as well.<sup>243</sup> Theoretically, nobody intended to go to war, however, Nicholas I was not a great diplomat and the fact that Britain's Minister to Constantinople was not a big fan of Russia did not help the case. If we look at the real causes of the war, we can observe that they lie rather domestically. Both, Russian Empire and France were in need of gain of popularity at home and resorted to religion.<sup>244</sup> All of these factors combined, the world experienced the first major clash between these powers since Waterloo.<sup>245</sup>

Fighting at Sebastopol against Britain, France, Turkey and Sardinia, later joined by the Austrians, the incompetence of the combatants in combination with other factors, led to the humiliating defeat of the Russian Empire. The following Treaty of Paris of 1856 was even more embarrassing for the Russians. Danubian region of Bessarabia had to be returned and Russia saw its decline in the Balkan region. The tsarist regime was restrained in its freedom of

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<sup>240</sup> Dominic Lieven, *Empire – The Russian Empire and Its Rivals*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press 2000), 263.

<sup>241</sup> Ibid.

<sup>242</sup> David Schimmelpenninck Van der Oye, *Russian Foreign Policy 1815-1917*, (2006), 560.

<sup>243</sup> Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A modern History*. (London, New York: I.B. Tauris & Company, Limited, 2017), 47.

<sup>244</sup> Ibid.

<sup>245</sup> David Schimmelpenninck Van der Oye, *Russian Foreign Policy 1815-1917*, (2006), 560.

action in the region of south-western frontier, which were illustrated in the so-called “Black Sea clauses.”<sup>246</sup> Specifically, the Treaty of Paris brought forward following demands:

- Demilitarization of the Black Sea (including the Turkish side);
- End to Russian influence in Moldavia and Wallachia; and
- Guarantee of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire on the part of all the major European powers.<sup>247</sup>

*f. Circassian Genocide*

When speaking about the Circassians, there is a very small percentage of the world population, who can imagine, who these people were. From people from northwestern Caucasus mountains, adventurous and beautiful to being Europe’s central concern in the nineteenth century, the Circassians experienced their glory and near-extinction within a span of one single century.<sup>248</sup>

The Circassians are most likely descendants of the Hattians, who developed their society in central Anatolia around 200 BCE. “Adyge” is the name they gave themselves (translated into Circassian in western Europe) and they occupied mostly the cities of Sokhumi and Anapa along the Black Sea shore. Similar to other Caucasian ethnic groups, the Circassians also experienced bloody invasion by the Mongols in the thirteenth century and following expulsion to the mountains.<sup>249</sup> We can assume that there were approximately 1.7 million Circassians in the seventeenth century, following a legend that there was a prince, who reunited them after the Mongol expulsion from their territories.<sup>250</sup>

Even though 1860s were the years, when the Circassians experienced genocide on Russian behalf, Russia’s intention to do so began many years and even centuries before. It is worth noting here that even though the decisions were made by the emperors, their advisors had a huge impact on their decision-making.<sup>251</sup>

Catherine the Great in 1760 was the first one, who decided that the northeastern shores of the Black Sea should belong to Russia and the Circassians should be expelled from there. By 1820, the majority of the population had been killed or driven out of the area into western

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<sup>246</sup> David Schimmelpenninck Van der Oye, *Russian Foreign Policy 1815-1917*, (2006), 560.

<sup>247</sup> Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A modern History*. (London, New York: I.B. Tauris & Company, Limited, 2017), 48.

<sup>248</sup> Walter Richmond, *The Circassian Genocide*. Genocide, Political Violence, (Human Rights Series. N.J. Rutgers University Press). 2013, 1.

<sup>249</sup> Ibid, 3.

<sup>250</sup> Ibid.

<sup>251</sup> Ibid, 7-8.



Circassia where the fight continued until 1864. The last cleansing wave hit the population in 1878, where they had to leave Caucasia entirely and emigrate to the Balkans.<sup>252</sup>

The first stage of the Russo-Circassian War took place between 1763 and 1779. During this period, the Russian aggression was directed towards the population, who was hindering the way to Georgia. Circassians tried to fight and even received help from the Turks and Crimeans, however, the battle in 1779 was disastrous and they had to surrender.<sup>253</sup>

With minor battles between the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, October 15th, 1860 was the date when the official ethnic cleansing began, and the major contributor was the Russian General Nikolai Evdokimov. The Circassians were officially given the chance to settle in the north or to emigrate to Ottoman Empire. Between October 1863 and April 1864, most of the ethnic cleansings were conducted. Unarmed men and women and children were massacred and those who survived, wanted to die in their mountains.<sup>254</sup>

The question remains whether this was an act of genocide. One factor that contributes to the fact that this was a genocide was Ermolov's clear intention to annihilate the Circassian ethnic group.<sup>255</sup> According to Richmond: "Genocidal intent . . . applies to acts of destruction that are not the specific goal but are predictable outcomes or by-products of a policy, which could have been avoided by a change in that policy."<sup>256</sup>

The Russians – determined not to label these events as genocide – the Georgians decided to take this into their own hands. On May 20<sup>th</sup>, 2011 was the day before the 147<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the final defeat of the Circassians and at the same time, it was the day, when the Georgian Parliament decided on a vote to recognize the atrocities against the Circassians as genocide. Deciding unanimously that this was a genocide, the case of the Circassians was not closed yet.<sup>257</sup>

A decision was made by the Georgian government to dedicate a monument to the Circassians in the city of Anaklia – south of the border with Abkhazia. On May 21<sup>st</sup> in 2012, a

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<sup>252</sup> Walter Richmond, *The Circassian Genocide*. Genocide, Political Violence, (Human Rights Series. N.J. Rutgers University Press). 2013, 8.

<sup>253</sup> James Forsyth, *The Caucasus* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013), 285-286.

<sup>254</sup> Walter Richmond, *The Circassian Genocide*. Genocide, Political Violence, (Human Rights Series. N.J. Rutgers University Press). 2013. 65-70.

<sup>255</sup> Ibid, 134.

<sup>256</sup> Ibid, 93.

<sup>257</sup> Walter Richmond, *The Circassian Genocide*. Genocide, Political Violence, (Human Rights Series. N.J. Rutgers University Press). 2013, 169.

statue of a mother and daughter embracing, with her son standing to their right, hand on his dagger was dedicated to the Circassians.<sup>258</sup>

The Circassian Genocide is another sign of rising Russian Empire. In combination with all the wars and conflicts, Russian Empire was emerging as a hegemon and showing the world – especially its neighbor, the Muslim Ottoman Empire – that nobody could mess with her. Even though the late nineteenth century of Russia was rather weak than the later eighteenth and early nineteenth one, Russian Empire demonstrated military as well as political strength and with the case of the Circassian Genocide, in my opinion, Russian Empire wanted to show also the ethnic minorities as well as the smaller states what they were able to do if crossing the expansionist agenda.

#### *g. Russo-Turkish and Russo-Persian Wars*

In total, four major Russo-Turkish Wars took place. In this section, the ones in 1828-1829 as well as in 1877-1878 will be analyzed in detail.

One of the main factors for the Russo-Turkish War in 1828 was the war for Greek Independence. In short, Russia felt sympathy for Greeks partly due because of its solidarity for the Orthodox Church.<sup>259</sup> After the sultan's refusal for the mediation of powers, the war between Russian and Ottoman Empire escalated. The following summer, 1829, the Russians had occupied Erzurum and Edirne.<sup>260</sup> The Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829 was one of the few ones, where the Western powers didn't intervene. The first phase of the war was promising for the Ottomans. However, towards the end of the war in 1829, Russian fleets dominated the entire region of Black Sea.<sup>261</sup> This war is described at the beginning of the chapter about the Russian Empire in greater detail.

Concluded in September 1829, the Treaty of Edirne forced the Ottomans were to recognize the independence of Greece as well as the autonomy of Moldavia and Wallachia and Serbia.<sup>262</sup> This also shows the weakening and rather declining nature of the Ottoman Empire. The fact that the Ottomans were not able to win the war without Western help shows that the empire was weak at the time and was not able to cope with the aggression of neighboring superpower, namely the Russian Empire.

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<sup>258</sup> Walter Richmond, *The Circassian Genocide*. Genocide, Political Violence, (Human Rights Series. N.J. Rutgers University Press). 2013, 169.

<sup>259</sup> Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A modern History*. (London, New York: I.B. Tauris & Company, Limited, 2017), 28.

<sup>260</sup> *Ibid*, 29.

<sup>261</sup> William Edward et al. *Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 2010. 23-44.

<sup>262</sup> Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A modern History*. (London, New York: I.B. Tauris & Company, Limited, 2017), 29.

The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 was especially disastrous for the Ottoman Empire. Problems within and outside of the empire culminated to an anti-Ottoman sentiment – particularly in the Balkan region. When the Ottoman Empire started suppressing Christian population, the Russian Empire felt the obligation of intervening. Before resorting to violence, the Istanbul Conference was set up and it took place in December 1876. The main reason for the conference was to address the situation of Christians in Balkans – however, it was also important for the power to determine overall Ottoman Empire’s role in the Balkans.<sup>263</sup>

Besides the Russian Empire, Britain, France and Italy also sent representatives to the conference. The representatives decided and proposed to the Ottoman Empire to “counterbalance the power of the sultan and enhance the power of bureaucracy”<sup>264</sup> The Ottomans did not like the idea and with the hope that the Treaty of Paris will be upheld, and the territoriality of the Ottoman Empire will be left untouched, they rejected the proposal of the Istanbul Conference.<sup>265</sup> After the rejection, Russian Empire approached the European powers and offered another proposal, namely an implementation of Christian reforms in the Balkans. However, thinking that the Russian Empire was too weak to attack, and the Ottoman Empire was strong enough to defend themselves, the Ottomans rejected this proposal as well.<sup>266</sup>

After not reaching a conclusion, April 24, 1877, Russian Empire declared war against the Ottomans. The war did not mean the greatest victory for the Russians, but it was disastrous for the Ottomans. The expected help on British behalf never showed up, however, by threatening with an intervention, the British managed to stop the Russians before they had the chance to advance to Istanbul.<sup>267</sup> The Treaty of San Stefano was signed in March 1878. Bulgarian independence (including) Macedonia, was one of the major outcomes of this treaty. To showcase how devastating this war was for the Ottoman Empire, Hakan M. Yavuz states the following:

*“The Ottoman Empire was forced to give up two fifths of its entire territory and one fifth of its population, about 5.5 million people of whom almost half were Muslims. It also lost substantial revenues though it was partially compensated by the tribute paid by the remaining*

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<sup>263</sup> Hakan M. Yavuz et. al. *War and Diplomacy: The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the Treaty of Berlin* (University of Utah Press: Salt Lake City). 2011. 23.

<sup>264</sup> Ibid.

<sup>265</sup> Ibid, 23-24.

<sup>266</sup> Ibid, 24.

<sup>267</sup> Ibid.

*vassals and the agreement of the newly independent states to assume a portion of the Ottoman public debt.*”<sup>268</sup>

This war shows again the emergence of Russian Empire as a hegemon and the decline of the Ottoman Empire. If we compare and contrast these two empires, we can clearly see that the Russian Empire is obviously superior to the Ottomans – even in times when the Russians are not at their full bloom.

Russian Empire did not only wage wars against the Ottoman Empire but also had to fight against the Persians. The First Russo-Persian war took place between 1804 and 1813. Once again, religion was a decisive factor in this battle. The Persians arrested Armenian Patriarch, who was initially elected in 1799, with the help of the Russian Empire.<sup>269</sup> One of the major causes for the Russo-Persian War was the fact that the Persians felt threatened by the Russian Empire and wanted to underline its sovereignty over the northwestern borders of its provinces.<sup>270</sup> In addition, Iran struggled domestically and needed a distraction from domestic matters and had to showcase that they were able to compete with foreign powers.<sup>271</sup>

Even though Russians faced challenges and had to retreat, the following year, the Russian Empire was able to show the Persians its military power. However, with the following battles and bloodshed with the Turkish and Napoleon’s invasion in 1812, the Russian Empire had to stop advancing and the battle against Persia.<sup>272</sup> However, the Persians did launch an attack in 1810. Allied with the Ottoman Empire, they were confident that they would be able to defeat Russians. However, this illusion proved to be wrong and the Persian and Ottoman army suffered severe losses – including territorial ones.<sup>273</sup>

The last Russo-Persian conflict can be viewed as partly successful on Persian behalf. The campaign of the start of conflict in 1827 aimed at seizure of two Armenian provinces. The conditions, in which the Russians found themselves, were unfavorable for them and consequently suffered significant damage.<sup>274</sup> The Treaty of Turkmanchai was concluded in

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<sup>268</sup> Hakan M. Yavuz et. al. *War and Diplomacy: The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the Treaty of Berlin* (University of Utah Press: Salt Lake City). 2011, 18.

<sup>269</sup> John Ledonne. *Russia’s Eastern Theater, 1650-1850 Springboard or Strategic Backyard?* (Cahiers Du Monde Russe). 2008, 35.

<sup>270</sup> Muriel Atkin. *The Origins of the First Russo-Iranian War. In Russia and Iran, 1780-1828* (University of Minnesota Press). 1980. 92.

<sup>271</sup> Ibid.

<sup>272</sup> John Ledonne. *Russia’s Eastern Theater, 1650-1850 Springboard or Strategic Backyard?* (Cahiers Du Monde Russe). 2008, 35.

<sup>273</sup> Ibid, 36.

<sup>274</sup> Ibid, 37.

1828 and meant territorial gains for the Persians. This treaty also concluded the official wars and conflicts between these two powers.<sup>275</sup>

*This chapter showed the powerful emerging hegemon of the nineteenth century, the Russian Empire. We have seen that the tsarist regime was a very powerful one, which can be illustrated by numbers: in 1462, Moscow controlled 24,000 square kilometers. In 1914, the territory included over 13.5 million square kilometers. We have also seen that Orthodox Church was one major factor in the reign of the Russian Empire. After the annexation of Georgia, Russian Empire also conquered Baku, which caught Ottoman Empire's attention and led to another Russo-Turkish War.*

*One major event was also the impressive victory against Napoleon and the start of the decline of Napoleonic era. The Vienna Conference of 1814-1815 was also for Russians an important one because it led to decades of rather more peaceful times. The second half of the nineteenth century was marked by the Crimean War – which Russian Empire had lost.*

*The 1870s were marked with the Russo-Turkish War again and of course one of the major atrocities against humanity – namely the Circassian Genocide. The combination of the victories in wars and expansionist policies, one can observe the fact that the Russian Empire was an emerging hegemon in the nineteenth century – despite occasional setbacks. Being busy with the wars on European stage, Russian Empire could not afford to concentrate on Georgia and make sure to fully control the country's society and their developments. Therefore, the Georgians were able to further develop national sentiment and national identity.*

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<sup>275</sup> John Ledonne. *Russia's Eastern Theater, 1650-1850 Springboard or Strategic Backyard?* (Cahiers Du Monde Russe). 2008, 38.

#### 4. Case Study of the Ottoman Empire

This chapter will be dedicated to an analysis of the Ottoman Empire. The first section of this chapter will focus on the history of eighteenth century Ottoman Empire. In general, it is worth mentioning that the Ottoman Empire consisted of countries, which did not have the same religion. Religious diversity is one of the main traits of the Ottoman Empire and one of the major contributor to the empire becoming the “sick man of Europe,” an expression, which became dominant for the Ottomans in course of the nineteenth century and which showed the decline of the empire. The development of foreign relations will be discussed in this chapter as well as the New Order and the Tanzimat – era of the reforms. The Egyptian and Greek question – as well as the Russo-Turkish wars will be mentioned as well.

##### *a. The Ottoman Empire at the End of the Eighteenth Century*

Shortly before the chaos about the French Revolution started, the Ottoman empire consisted of the following: Balkans (including modern-day Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, parts of Romania), Anatolia (modern-day Turkey), and big parts of the Arab world (including Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Iraq, Kuwait, parts of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, as well as Algeria).<sup>276</sup> War, famine and disease as well as internal conflicts, caused significant decrease in population density. One more contributing factor was that centralized system was not working and law and order could not be maintained. This led to economic problems due to interruptions in the agricultural production process. This did not only cause economic disorder but made the area vulnerable to epidemics.<sup>277</sup>

What makes the Ottoman Empire special is religious diversity. In the Asiatic provinces, Islam was the dominant religion with Christian and Jewish minorities; Christianity dominated the Balkan area. It is important to know that the rule of law was practiced, following the Muslim religion and religious separation among the population was not uncommon.<sup>278</sup> At the end of the eighteenth century, we have a distinction between the ruling elite and the mass of the population. The ruling elite could be divided into two groups: the sultan’s power and the guardians of the moral order. The most important task of the ruler was to defend Islam community against foreign intervention and maintain justice within Islamic society.<sup>279</sup>

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<sup>276</sup> Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A modern History*. (London, New York: I.B. Tauris & Company, Limited), 2017, 3.

<sup>277</sup> *Ibid*, 3-4.

<sup>278</sup> *Ibid*, 4.

<sup>279</sup> *Ibid*, 6-7.

Once a huge source of national income, at the end of the eighteenth century, war had become a burden for Ottoman Empire's economy. In addition, the military was in the midst of weakening. Trade had declined as well.<sup>280</sup> The end of the eighteenth century also marked the continuous weakening of the Ottoman Empire on international stage – which had already begun about two centuries ago. All of this can be showcased with the fact that in almost every major war – without the help of foreign intervention – Ottomans were losing it. Habsburg Monarchy being one of the major enemies in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century, Russia had taken the role in the second half of the eighteenth century.<sup>281</sup> Black Sea was an important place for both empires and the hostile attitude between Russians and the Ottomans can be shown by all the Russo-Turkish Wars.

#### *b. Foreign Relations of the Ottoman Empire*

One major problem in the nineteenth century for the Ottoman Empire was the fact that it was controlling huge amount of territory, however, it was not able to control it internally, neither could it protect the territory from external enemies.<sup>282</sup> The territory and population it controlled was too diverse and it was only a matter of time until it fell apart. When modern ideas of ethnic nationalism started to emerge in Greece and Serbia, later spread to other territories as well, the troubles started to develop. Religious uprisings were often common in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire and these were very often met with brutal measures. To illustrate, the massacres on Chios in 1822 can be mentioned.<sup>283</sup>

In order to survive in European Imperialism, the “sick man of Europe” had to choose foreign policy strategies very carefully. By the end of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire began establishing embassies in London, Vienna, Berlin and Paris. This development should benefit the Empire externally but mainly internally by sending ambassadors abroad, who would later bring western technical and administrative advances, which would internally push the Tanzimat reforms further (the era of Tanzimat will be discussed in the next section).<sup>284</sup>

The Ottomans knew that in order to restore the Empire to its fullest, they could not get involved in major conflicts and had to avoid any such setbacks. Therefore, they had to develop a strategy and figure out, how to stay away from conflicts. Theoretically, this could

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<sup>280</sup> Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A modern History*. (London, New York: I.B. Tauris & Company, Limited), 2017, 12.

<sup>281</sup> Ibid, 12-13.

<sup>282</sup> William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774*. (London and New York: Routledge), 2013, 8.

<sup>283</sup> Ibid, 10-11.

<sup>284</sup> Ibid, 12-13.

be done by two following options: first, avoid conflicts as well as any alliances with any of the enemies in case of an international conflict. This way, they could not be associated with any of the major powers and would not be attacked. This tactic heavily relied on the status quo. The second option would be to form one or more alliances with the European powers. Even though this would put them in a vulnerable situation, if attacked, the alliances would feel the duty to help the Ottomans restore the situation.<sup>285</sup>

Which of these two concepts were applied to which situation, depended on the circumstances. It was hard to determine who was the friend and who the enemy, however, in the mid-nineteenth century, Russia was identified as a clear enemy and Britain as a friend. However, Britain had interests in Egypt and the Middle East and the Ottoman Empire had to be careful. In addition, Britain was more of a naval power and was not as powerful against Russian territorial advances as the Ottomans had hoped. As Germany emerged by the end of the nineteenth century, the Ottomans considered the option of an alliance with the German Empire, however, as it will turn out later, this was a huge mistake and led to the ultimate destruction of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>286</sup>

Internal problems of France following the revolution in 1789 also brought chaos and uncertainty across Europe; especially the Napoleonic wars defined and redefined borders of territories and alliances. As a consequence, Ottoman Empire's alliances were shifted during that period as well.<sup>287</sup> It is worth mentioning that the period between 1799 and 1812 was very eventful for the Ottoman Empire; if not at war against a European power, they were allied with one, which was at war.<sup>288</sup> The famous entente alliance with France ended with Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798. Consequently, a treaty was signed with Russia, which Britain joined one month later.

By creating this alliance, the French were ousted out of Egypt, however, Russian Empire remained on rather peaceful terms with France.<sup>289</sup> The Napoleonic victories at Ulm and Austerlitz created doubts for the Ottomans, having joined the wrong alliance. As it turned out, this was the case. The agreement was never ratified, and Russian troops even started invading Ottoman principalities – after observing that Ottoman Empire started negotiations with the

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<sup>285</sup> William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774*. (London and New York: Routledge), 2013, 13-14.

<sup>286</sup> Ibid, 14-15.

<sup>287</sup> Ibid, 15.

<sup>288</sup> Ibid.

<sup>289</sup> Ibid, 15-16.



French.<sup>290</sup> The cooperation with France was short-lived as well and France would dissolve the cooperation shortly after. In 1809, the Ottoman Empire started cooperating with the British and signed a treaty with them in January of the year.<sup>291</sup> The switching of alliances at the beginning of the nineteenth century shows the insecurity of the Ottoman rule. The chaotic situation in Europe has also contributed to the creation of different foreign policies and different alliances of the Ottoman Empire, but it can be observed that the Ottoman Empire was very much in the decline at the beginning of the century. Combined with the internal revolts that would follow, the Ottoman Empire became the “sick man of Europe” and was the declining power of the nineteenth century.

After experiencing major internal conflicts and defeats against the Russian Empire, the Ottomans were losing power and prestige on the international stage. The time of the Crimean War (1854-1855) was a period, when the Ottomans reached renewed alliances with major European powers out of fear of Russian expansionist nature.<sup>292</sup> Until 1870s, the Ottoman Empire didn't experience any major territorial losses, which could be compared to the ones at the beginning of the century. However, starting in 1870s, they were once again conflicted with territorial losses, starting with the uprisings in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1874, followed by another war with the Russian Empire.<sup>293</sup> After being rejected to build an alliance with the major European powers, Ottomans decided to start playing the card of neutrality. At the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, an alliance with Germany seemed inevitable and this alliance was at the same time the beginning of an end of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>294</sup>

### *c. The New Order and Reforms*

During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the so-called “Nizam-i Cedid” (New Order) was introduced by Sultan Selim III. It should increase centralization against external as well as internal troublemakers. One of the major part of this reform was to reorganize the army as well as the navy. Foreign officers were brought as adviser and instructors to make all of this more effective. However, the Empire didn't manage to introduce a system, where this reform could be financed in an effective way.<sup>295</sup> The new reforms brought new channels of communication into the empire as well. New languages

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<sup>290</sup> William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774*. (London and New York: Routledge), 2013, 16.

<sup>291</sup> Ibid.

<sup>292</sup> Ibid, 21.

<sup>293</sup> Ibid, 20-21.

<sup>294</sup> Ibid, 23.

<sup>295</sup> Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A modern History*. (London, New York: I.B. Tauris & Company, Limited), 2017, 17.

were offered at school and foreigners were given more freedom and opportunities to communicate with the society in the Empire. New missions were sent to European countries and embassies were established in some of the main capitals across Europe.<sup>296</sup> All of these reforms sounded great in theory, however, lack of financial resources contributed to the downfall of Sultan Selim III. Especially public opinion within the empire decreased, because he was imposing new taxes to his people – for example for the new army. As great as the ideas sounded theoretically, practically they did not work as well as intended due to the lack of financial resources and unwillingness of the people within the Empire to finance these reforms.<sup>297</sup>

The friendly relationship with France was deteriorating during the reform time as well. Mainly due to the French invasion of Egypt in 1798. The diplomatic relations were ultimately destroyed in 1805, however, they were restored again within one year.<sup>298</sup> Sultan Selim III was deposed eventually imprisoned, where he was assassinated in 1808.<sup>299</sup>

When Sultan Mahmut II came to power, his first task was pretty much to redefine the power base of the government. In addition, control had to be re-established over Ottoman lands. This succeeded in most cases, however, failed in a few. Serbia gained autonomy in 1813 under the leader Milos Obrenovic.<sup>300</sup> The Greek question was far more complex for several reasons.

Firstly, the Greeks played an important role in the empire's external and internal relations – economically as well as diplomatically. Secondly, the Greek revolts were more far-reaching than others due to the fact that they knew that they wanted to become independent. Lastly, the Greek question was one, which involved not only Greece and the Ottoman Empire but also major external powers.<sup>301</sup> To fight for the independence, the Greeks founded the so-called “Philiki Hetaira,” in Odessa. It was a patriotic society, established in 1814, and was aiming at spreading the word for Greek independence. In 1821, they tried to invade Moldavia and Wallachia (present-day Romania), however, this attempt of invasion turned out to be huge disaster at the end. Firstly, the army was too small and secondly the population of Moldavia and Wallachia were not on the side of the invaders. However, at the same time there were

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<sup>296</sup> Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A modern History*. (London, New York: I.B. Tauris & Company, Limited), 2017, 17.

<sup>297</sup> Ibid, 18.

<sup>298</sup> Ibid, 19.

<sup>299</sup> Ibid, 22-23.

<sup>300</sup> Ibid, 25.

<sup>301</sup> Ibid.

revolts going on the territory of Balkans. Between 1821 and 1824, the Ottoman government failed to bring the rebels under control.<sup>302</sup>

With all these revolts and battles taking place, we can observe that the first half of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was rather chaotic. Internally, many different groups tried to obtain independence. The most significant loss on behalf of the Ottoman Empire was the loss of the territory of Egypt and with it about four million inhabitants.<sup>303</sup>

While Egypt was lost, the European powers sympathized more and more with the Greek rebels – especially on Britain and Russian side. On one hand, the British admired the Greek civilization and its attempts for independence. The Russians on the other hand felt connected with the Greeks through the Orthodox Church. Even though other major European powers felt sympathy for Greece, it was only the Russian Empire, which intervened directly into the conflict. This intervention had even more far-reaching effects than it seems at first look. The idea to save Greece and help the Greek people to gain independence, led to a war between the Russian and Ottoman Empire.<sup>304</sup> At first, it looked like the Ottoman Empire was on its good way to win this war, however, in summer of 1829, Ottomans were not able to resist anymore, and the Russians occupied Erzurum and Edirne. Treaty of Edirne was concluded in September 1829 and the Ottoman Empire had to recognize Greek independence as well as autonomy of the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia.<sup>305</sup> This defeat showed again the declining nature of the Ottoman Empire and the emerging nature of Russian Empire.

While the Greeks gained independence and the Treaty of Edirne meant more territory loss for the Ottoman Empire, the conflict between the Ottoman sultan and the governor of Egypt was reaching a new point. During the war against Greece, Egypt was ready to assist Ottoman troops, with some significant losses. Egypt was asking for compensation of these losses; however, the Ottoman Empire was not ready compensate these and 1832, the Egyptian leader Mehmet Ali was declared a rebel and was consequently deposed and declared as rebel. Feeling betrayed, Mehmet Ali ordered his troops into Anatolia, where the forces routed the Ottoman forces near Konya.<sup>306</sup> This was not a good time for the Ottoman Empire, which was trying to get assistance from other major powers. Britain refused to offer more than moral support; Austria's Chancellor Metternich didn't want to get involved directly either;

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<sup>302</sup> Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A modern History*. (London, New York: I.B. Tauris & Company, Limited), 2017, 26.

<sup>303</sup> Ibid.

<sup>304</sup> Ibid, 28-29.

<sup>305</sup> Ibid, 29.

<sup>306</sup> Ibid, 30-31.

surprisingly, the Ottomans now turned to their enemy – Russian Empire – for help. Russian Empire, looking at Mehmet Ali as a puppet of a French government, offered diplomatic and military support to the Ottomans.<sup>307</sup>

In 1833, negotiations between the Ottoman and Egyptian rulers failed once more and Egyptian forces commenced the march on Istanbul. Having promised military support, Russian troops landed on the Bosphorus and halted the Egyptian advance towards the capital. However, an attack did not take place. Therefore, the Ottoman Empire had to give in and compromise with Mehmet Ali, who became the governor of Syria.<sup>308</sup>

Seeing the Ottoman Empire weakening during every major battle or war, the British and Austrians became more and more afraid of Russian influence in the area of the Balkans as well as the Mediterranean and Asia. The so-called “Eastern Question” was created all over Europe. The next decades in the Ottoman Empire were directed towards policies, which would strengthen the central state through building a modern army. A milestone in that regard took place in 1834, when a military reserve after the Prussian model was created. Even though not well-organized or well-equipped, the military reserve played a major role as means of government control over the provinces later in the century.<sup>309</sup>

#### *d. The Era of Tanzimat 1839-1871*

Within one month (between June and July 1939), Mahmut II died of tuberculosis and the Egyptians defeated the Ottomans at Nizib. The “sick man of Europe” notion could be applied to the Ottoman Empire. The time, which came after him starting in 1839, the period between 1839 and 1871 in Ottoman Empire is known as Tanzimat, or “Reforms.”<sup>310</sup> While this period was marked with numerous conflicts and wars (specifically Ottoman-Egyptian conflict or Crimean War), efforts were made to strengthen and expand the empire. There were four basic reforms, which were the promises of the Tanzimat reforms, namely

- The establishment of guarantees for life, honor and property of the sultan’s subjects;
- An orderly system of taxation to replace the system of tax farming;
- A system of conscription for the army;

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<sup>307</sup> Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A modern History*. (London, New York: I.B. Tauris & Company, Limited), 2017, 31.

<sup>308</sup> Ibid.

<sup>309</sup> Ibid, 33.

<sup>310</sup> Carter V. Findley. *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: a History 1789-2007*. ProQuest Ebook Central. Yale University Press. 2010. 76.

- Equally before the law of all subjects, whatever their religion (although formulated ambiguously in the document).<sup>311</sup>

All of this sounded great for some people, however internal unrests were continuing, tensions between the different nationalities were one rise as well. On the outside, one of the major conflicts of the nineteenth century took place between 1853 and 1856, namely the Crimean War. As already discussed in previous chapter, the Crimean War was officially started due to French attempt in 1850 to gain control and impose Christendom in Ottoman-ruled Palestine. Louis Napoleon was supported by domestic politicians, however, Nicholas I of Russia, who was a big supporter of the Orthodox Church, was opposed to France's idea of imposing Catholic Church's rights to Palestine.<sup>312</sup> The dispute was specifically directed to especially to the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. Even though the Catholic Church – and with that France – was granted pre-eminence in 1740, in the following years many more Orthodox pilgrims had visited the holy land, which gave the Orthodox Church a strong standing point as well.<sup>313</sup> Theoretically, nobody intended to go to war, however, Nicholas I was not a great diplomat and the fact that Britain's Minister to Constantinople was not a big fan of Russia did not help the case.

With the Treaty of Paris in 1856, the Ottoman Empire was admitted to the so-called “concert of Europe.” This meant a security guarantee for the Ottoman Empire – an aim that diplomats were trying to achieve for many years. However, some clauses of the treaty didn't really please the Ottomans' expectations. For example, the neutralization of the Black Sea undermined their authority in the region. This meant that European powers had more control over it now. This clause gave way to the independence of Moldavia and Wallachia.<sup>314</sup> The Tanzimat reforms were continued after 1856 and focused – due to external pressures – on offering better living conditions and situation for the Christian community. In addition, the programs were similar to those of Mahmut II's. Focus was put on the army, central bureaucracy, provincial administration, taxation, education and communication. The very new feature was the focus on judicial reform and consultative procedures.<sup>315</sup> The next section will be devoted to the explanation of the development of the army of the Ottomans – one of the most important features of the empire.

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<sup>311</sup> Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A modern History*. (London, New York: I.B. Tauris & Company, Limited), 2017, 45.

<sup>312</sup> David Schimmelpenninck Van der Oye, *Russian Foreign Policy 1815-1917*, (2006), 560.

<sup>313</sup> Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A modern History*. (London, New York: I.B. Tauris & Company, Limited, 2017), 47.

<sup>314</sup> Carter V. Findley. *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: a History 1789-2007*. ProQuest Ebook Central. Yale University Press. 2010. 83.

<sup>315</sup> Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A modern History*. (London, New York: I.B. Tauris & Company, Limited, 2017), 50-51.

Under the Tanzimat reforms, the army/the troops expanded, and modern European equipment were introduced. It is worth noting that from 1845 onwards, Christian citizens were also obliged to serve. However, realizing that this could bring up more tensions between the Christian and Muslim soldiers, they could opt out by paying a special tax to the state. The Muslim soldiers also received the option of paying a special tax instead of serving. However, the amount of money demanded was very high and therefore, most of the Muslims decided to serve instead. The most important development – if we look at the organizational side of it – was the establishment of the institution of provincial armies with their own provincial commands in 1841.<sup>316</sup> One more spectacular development was the building of a modern navy with ironclad warships which would later – during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz – lead the Ottomans being the third largest navy power in Europe. However, due to the lack of naval personnel, Ottoman navy never came to be an instrument of power.<sup>317</sup>

The Tanzimat is seen as a decisive period of the Ottoman and Turkish history. The experienced territorial losses, however, modernization took place as well. Changes took place in different areas of the empire.<sup>318</sup> During the Tanzimat, social and political tensions were on the rise as well. Some regard the Tanzimat a positive era of reforms, others see it as a setback. However, one wants to look at these reform, we can say that it was a decisive period for the Ottoman and Turkish history.

#### *e. Crisis of 1873-1878*

Having avoided territorial losses as a consequence of Paris Treaty in 1856, the 1870s – which was a decade of crisis, accompanied by famine in Anatolia (1873-1875) as well as state bankruptcy (1875-1881) – brought the losses for the Ottoman Empire.<sup>319</sup> Political unrests, such as the revolts in Herzegovina in 1874 and in Bosnia and Montenegro in 1875 as well as in Bulgaria in 1876, made the Ottoman Empire respond to the Christians especially in a very inhumane way. As a response, the Europeans undertook massacres on Muslim population, which lead to a massive migration of Muslim society to Istanbul. However, the Ottoman government ignored the situation and internal protests started taking place, demanding government change. Sultan Abdülaziz gave in and his government deposed him. Few days

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<sup>316</sup> Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A modern History*. (London, New York: I.B. Tauris & Company, Limited), 2017, 51.

<sup>317</sup> Ibid.

<sup>318</sup> Carter V. Findley. *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: a History 1789-2007*. ProQuest Ebook Central. Yale University Press. 2010. 132.

<sup>319</sup> Ibid, 83.

later, he was found dead – assumed suicide.<sup>320</sup> His brother Abdülhamid II was put in charge. Right away, Abdülhamid II was confronted with the situation in the Balkan region, where protests and revolts were spreading more and more.<sup>321</sup>

In March 1877, the Ottoman Empire temporarily elected their first parliament. However, this was short-lived, and it stopped functioning in February 1878. The parliament wanted to highlight the gains of the Tanzimat period, however, all of this was overshadowed by the Balkan crisis. Not being able to solve the situation, the Ottomans were isolated diplomatically from the European stage and in addition, April 1877 the Russians declared yet another war on the Ottoman Empire.<sup>322</sup> One of the main reasons for the declaration of war on Russian behalf was the so-called pan-Slav feeling in Russia. Not being able to implement pan-Slavism in Serbia, the supporters were focused on Bulgaria now.<sup>323</sup> Fighting against Russia, Ottomans were able resist with their modernized army to a certain extent. However, the Russians prevailed and advanced close to Istanbul, namely in San Stefano. The Ottomans were forced to sign an armistice in January 1878 and the city of Istanbul was marked with panic and refugees and due to external and inter pressure, Abdülhamid was forced to dismiss the parliament.<sup>324</sup> The Treaty of San Stefano was a huge setback for the Ottoman Empire. Autonomous Bulgarian state was created at the shore of the Black Sea; Montenegro gained significant amount of territory and Serbia received some territories as well. In addition, Serbia, Montenegro and Romania became independent, which was recognized later by the Treaty of Berlin. On Asian territories, Batum and some other cities were ceded to Russians and new reforms were created to be introduced in Armenia.<sup>325</sup>

After the humiliating defeat of the Ottoman Empire in Russo-Turkish War, a conference was called in Berlin by Otto von Bismarck to look again at the Eastern Question. Following the conference, the Treaty of Berlin was created in July 1878. Ottoman Empire had to adjust to drastic losses. Independence of Romania, Serbia and Montenegro was recognized. The norther part of Bulgaria was turned into autonomous principality. Russia received the territory of Bessarabia. Bosnia-Herzegovina remained Ottoman territory, however, was occupied by Austria-Hungary. Kars, Ardahan, and Batum remained Russian. In addition to all the territorial losses, the Ottomans had to compensate Russians and the notion of the “sick man of

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<sup>320</sup> Carter V. Findley. *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: a History 1789-2007*. ProQuest Ebook Central. Yale University Press. 2010, 83.

<sup>321</sup> Ibid, 84.

<sup>322</sup> Ibid.

<sup>323</sup> Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A modern History*. (London, New York: I.B. Tauris & Company, Limited), 2017, 69.

<sup>324</sup> Ibid.

<sup>325</sup> Ibid.

Europe” seemed – now than ever – accurate.<sup>326</sup> The Treaty of Berlin was all in all a mitigation of the treaty of San Stefano, which devastated the Ottoman Empire after the Russo-Turkish War.

With a declining Ottoman Empire, Georgia was able to continue its development towards national identity in the nineteenth century. As bloody and full of conflict the previous century between Georgia and the Ottoman Empire was, the Ottomans had bigger problems in the nineteenth century than concentrating on Georgia. The revolts and battles of the Christian communities under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, gave Georgia the push and the self-confidence to keep fighting and maintain the Georgian Orthodoxy. The decline of the Ottoman Empire gave Georgia hope, because it highlighted the weaknesses of the empire. It also gave hope that the Russian Empire would at some point become weaker as well and Georgia could become independent. The Crimean War was one of such signs of Russian weakness. Until then, Georgia – especially in the second half of the nineteenth century – was free of Ottoman oppression and could focus on outsmarting the Russian Empire and further developing its national identity with influential, nationalist leaders, such as Ilia Chavchavadze.

*f. The Reign of Abdülhamid II After the Disaster of Russo-Turkish War*

As Carter Findley claims, when Abdülhamid II came to power, one major reform was to gain absolute power over the empire, which made him an absolute monarch for the next thirty years.<sup>327</sup> The power was taken away from the bureaucrats and autocratic system was established, which lasted until 1908. Bloodthirsty tyrant to some and a great hero for others, Abdülhamid II was one of the most memorable Ottoman ruler, whose legacy cannot be more controversial.<sup>328</sup> The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 left the Ottomans in a catastrophic situation, which the Ottomans did not experience again until the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. Overshadowed by territorial losses, crises occurred everywhere. European policies of support shifted to policies of aggression and by 1908, Abdülhamid was an emperor, overwhelmed with crises and tensions in every single province.<sup>329</sup>

Not only military defeat was the consequence of the devastating war. State bankruptcy was also one major feature of the beginning of Abdülhamid’s reign. It is astonishing to

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<sup>326</sup> Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A modern History*. (London, New York: I.B. Tauris & Company, Limited), 2017, 85.

<sup>327</sup> Carter V. Findley. *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: a History 1789-2007*. ProQuest Ebook Central. Yale University Press. 2010, 133.

<sup>328</sup> Ibid.

<sup>329</sup> Ibid, 134.



observe that the state budget of the Ottoman Empire had shrunk by 60% after the Russo-Turkish War. Following the financial disaster, Public Debt Administration was created to deal with the financial situation. Abdülhamid also had the idea of centralizing big businesses in order to be able to cope with the financial crisis.<sup>330</sup>

In addition to the financial crisis, the Ottoman Empire experienced uprisings in several of its controlled states. Emerging nationalism among different communities and isolation on behalf of great powers, contributed to further deterioration of the situation.<sup>331</sup> Crete was particularly active in these revolts. Supported by Greek nationalists, Crete was granted special regulations in 1866-1867 already. 1878, its autonomy was enlarged even further. In 1896-1897, the revolts led to an official war between the Ottomans and the Greeks, which led to a defeat of Greece. Crete remained under Ottoman control, however, Greek prince was put in charge as governor-general.<sup>332</sup>

Under the reign of Abdülhamid, the Ottoman Empire also experienced economic transformations. He established other agencies beside the Public Debt Agency and import-export as well as trade agreements were concluded with some major powers.<sup>333</sup> Cultural developments took place as well. Diplomatic missions and consulates were set up and new schools were introduced. In fact, by 1890s, there were close to four hundred foreign schools on the territory of the empire.<sup>334</sup> However, when the number of missionaries in Ottoman Empire grew, religious tensions were on the rise as well and the Ottoman Empire was afraid that the great powers were trying to undermine the empire's sovereignty, which proved to be true. To illustrate, in 1901, Abdülhamid attempted to shut down one of the French unauthorized institutions, which was met with demands and military back-up on French behalf. However, Abdülhamid had to cope with bigger problems, as the Armenian and Macedonian crises started erupting in 1894.<sup>335</sup>

As already mentioned numerous times before, the empire consisted of many different ethnicities and religious minorities. Muslims, Christians, Jews – all these religions were dominant. Sometimes, clash of interests among the population, turned into religious clashes. Armenia is a special case with large Gregorian and small Protestant faith among the

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<sup>330</sup> Carter V. Findley. *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: a History 1789-2007*. ProQuest Ebook Central. Yale University Press. 2010, 135.

<sup>331</sup> Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A modern History*. (London, New York: I.B. Tauris & Company, Limited), 2017, 77.

<sup>332</sup> Carter V. Findley. *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: a History 1789-2007*. ProQuest Ebook Central. Yale University Press. 2010, 135-136.

<sup>333</sup> Ibid, 141.

<sup>334</sup> Ibid.

<sup>335</sup> Ibid.

population, which were present back then in the provinces of Ottoman Anatolia.<sup>336</sup> The Treaty of Berlin had promised Armenians that the Ottoman government would carry out reforms, which would protect their existence.<sup>337</sup> Not seeing any progress on the Ottoman behalf, Armenian students in Geneva took their fate into their hands and created in 1887 a radical nationalist organization called “Henchak” (the Bell) in Geneva. The aim of this organization was directed towards Armenian autonomy and independence from both the Ottoman as well as Russian Empire. In response, the Ottoman government put together some troops, which included Kurdish tribes and in autumn 1894, enormous number of Armenians were slaughtered. This was followed by even more massacres in the following years and finally in 1896, the Armenian rebels gave in and Ottoman rule was reestablished over them once again. Even though international status of the Ottoman Empire was low, the government had gained self-confidence and as already mentioned before, declared war on Greece in 1897.<sup>338</sup>

As Macedonia consisted of Kosovo, Monastir and Salonica, religious diversity was inevitable. Macedonia was a special case due to the fact that parts of it was governed by the Ottomans and other parts by the Greek authorities.<sup>339</sup> Motivated by the Armenian crisis and Ottoman Greek war as well as the crisis in Crete, in the years of 1890, nationalist movements started to take place in Macedonia to challenge the rules of the Ottomans as well as the Greeks and which went beyond the nineteenth century, until the early years of the twentieth.

*This chapter displayed the domestic situation of the Ottoman Empire. At the beginning, it gave a historic overview of the Empire. It stated the territories, of which it consisted in the eighteenth century, namely Balkans (including modern-day Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, parts of Romania), Anatolia (modern-day Turkey), and big parts of the Arab world (including Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Iraq, Kuwait, parts of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, as well as Algeria). This indicates the religious diversity of the empire. In order to survive in this diversity, the Ottomans had to choose their foreign policies very wisely. By the end of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire began establishing embassies in London, Vienna, Berlin and Paris. This development should benefit the Empire externally but mainly internally. With internal tensions, the empire could not afford to get involved in any major European conflict.*

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<sup>336</sup> Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A modern History*. (London, New York: I.B. Tauris & Company, Limited), 2017, 79.

<sup>337</sup> Ibid.

<sup>338</sup> Ibid.

<sup>339</sup> Carter V. Findley. *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: a History 1789-2007*. ProQuest Ebook Central. Yale University Press. 2010, 144.

*Early nineteenth century was marked by New Order, which should bring developments in certain areas, however, it failed to finance these properly and further unrests within the empire started taking place. The Egyptian and Greek crises as well as the ones in Balkans, in addition to all the Russo-Turkish Wars in the nineteenth century made the Ottoman Empire the “sick man of Europe.” In addition, conferences were held to analyze the “Eastern Question” in the second half of the nineteenth century. All of this shows that the Ottoman Empire was a declining hegemon and could not compete with the emerging one, namely the Russian. The Tanzimat Era was a promising one, however, due to internal and external turmoil and tensions, it could not be put in practice as planned. The reign of Abdülhamid II is one of the most memorable ones in the history of the Ottoman Empire. It is marked with political, cultural and financial transformation; however, it is also marked with atrocities committed against regional minorities and oppression against those, who wouldn't obey the Ottoman rule. In reference with Georgia, the nineteenth century doesn't showcase any direct battle or bloodshed between these two countries. Because the Ottoman Empire was rather busy and concerned to preserve territorial integrity, which was more important than controlling Georgia, national identity in Georgia could be further developed. Lastly, the Ottomans were also afraid of Russian confrontation and this is certainly also one of the reasons, why Georgia was “left alone” by the Ottomans in the nineteenth century.*

## 5. Conclusion

This aim of this thesis was to look at the nineteenth century Caucasus – specifically at Georgia, Russian, as well as the Ottoman Empire and find out how the Georgian national identity was developed in this specific century, surrounded by two major global powers. The thesis started with the claim that the Russian Empire was an emerging and the Ottoman Empire a declining hegemon – a claim, which was supported throughout the chapters and sections with historical background. In the introduction, we have used the term “Transcaucasus.” This specific word was established by the Russian Empire after 1800, the time when all of the region became part of the Russian Empire.

When introducing Caucasus, there was also the claim that the Caucasus is one of the most interesting regions in the world. It is worth repeating, what Forsyth quotes, “for thousands of years, the Caucasus has been a region where many routes of migration, invasion, trade and cultural influences intersect.”<sup>340</sup>

The beginning of the nineteenth century marked the creation of Transcaucasia – a single entity with the control of Russian Empire, be it institutions, currency, or railways as well as the Russian language as lingua franca.<sup>341</sup> A very interesting quote belonged to the British historian Geoffrey Hosking, who compared British and Russian Empire and said “Britain had an empire, Russia was an empire.”<sup>342</sup> The three countries became subjects of the Russian Empire and were treated like the ethnic Russians. Armenians and Georgians were more favored due to their religion, however, the Shiite Azeris were also able to live decent lives.<sup>343</sup>

The nineteenth century Caucasus was a time where it was not easy to define boundaries. The region was conceived as a borderland, where people of different background and social values lived together. Political influence on different regions varied greatly.<sup>344</sup> Due to the fact that the Caucasus has been a borderland, the empires have been competing to rule the region. As already mentioned before, the region of the Caucasus is unique and as Alexander Rondeli quotes, the countries have “lost rather than gained from their important geopolitical location.”<sup>345</sup>

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<sup>340</sup> James Forsyth, *The Caucasus* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1.

<sup>341</sup> Thomas de Waal, *The Caucasus – An Introduction* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2019), 37.

<sup>342</sup> Ibid.

<sup>343</sup> Ibid.

<sup>344</sup> Charles King, *The Ghost of Freedom* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2012), 22.

<sup>345</sup> Alexander Rondeli, *Georgia: Foreign Policy and National Security Priorities* (Tbilisi, UNDP Discussion Paper Series No.3, 1998).

To mention it again here, religious factors cannot be ignored, when speaking and analyzing Caucasus. Four major religions are represented in Caucasus. Islam has followers in Shi'i as well as Sunni version with the latter being rather the dominant one. Azerbaijan, Dagestan, Chechnya and Turkey are the four countries, which mainly follow the Islam. Christianity has also various forms in the Caucasus region. We have the Georgian and Russian Orthodox Church as well as the Armenian Monophysite Church. Furthermore, since the break-up of the Soviet Union, Protestantism has also made its place among these religions. Judaism is present, mostly in form of indigenous Georgian Jews as well as the Tats or Mountain Jew, living mostly in Azerbaijan and Dagestan. Buddhism is considered an "indigenous" religion in Russia. However, there are followers of Buddhism as well, mostly on the northwestern shore of the Caspian Sea.<sup>346</sup>

The first chapter of this thesis analyzed the Georgian domestic situation in the nineteenth century. Before doing so, it gave an overview of its history. First, it described how Georgians came into being and claimed that two major sources, by which we can trace back Georgians, are linguistics and archaeology – which suggests the narrative that Georgians emerged from the first millennium BC. Under Davit the Builder, we have now learned that the economic and political changes were so immense that Georgia became the regional power for the following century. The Golden Age continued with the Queen of Tamar, who extended regional territories from the Black to the Caspian Sea and under whose rule Georgia was flourishing politically and culturally.

In this chapter, we have also seen the dense period of eighteenth century of Georgia, when the country experienced Iranian and Ottoman invasion, followed by Russian invasion in the nineteenth century. To illustrate how bloody not only the nineteenth but also the eighteenth century was for Georgia, it is worth mentioning the Iranian and Ottoman seize of Georgian territories. For example, spring 1723 was the time when Iranian soldiers captured Tbilisi. Soon after, Russian and Ottoman Empire signed a treaty. Russia would allow the Ottomans to rule over Georgia, Armenia and northwest Iran. The Ottomans would stop assisting Iran, so Peter could conquer the Caspian coast.<sup>347</sup> However, even before 1723, namely in 1722, the Ottoman Empire was ruling over Western Georgia. Kutaisi, Sukhumi and Poti were occupied by Ottoman forces and the Treaty of Constantinople in June 1724 allowed the Ottoman Empire to rule over the entire country. Therefore, any Georgian hopes of Russian help were

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<sup>346</sup> Svante E. Cornell. *Small Nations and Great Powers – A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus*, Curzon Caucasus World, 2001, 21-22.

<sup>347</sup> Donald Reyfield. *Edge of Empires: A History of Georgia*, Reaktion Books, 2019, 227.

vanished at this point.<sup>348</sup> During the Ottoman control, insurgencies were led by Christian leaders, Russia was asked for help and many other operations were undertaken, however, nothing really succeeded; the time of the Ottoman rule was the time of horror, filled with hangings, crucifixions and floggings, which on the other hand caused rebellions and which furthermore led to more bloodshed.<sup>349</sup>

The nineteenth century, however, was crucial for the development of national sentiment and national identity in Georgia. Russians wanted to rule over the country and the reign was successful but internally – especially with the influence of Ilia Chavchavadze and the writings of Akaki Tsereteli – patriotism and nationalism was on the rise and Russia being occupied with major other conflicts around Europe, Georgia had the chance to develop its national identity internally. Tsitsianov was – on Russian behalf – the key figure who, unlike his predecessors, had rather a positive attitude towards Georgia. At the end, we can say that intelligentsia and literature – with it the Georgian language – were very important tools to develop national sentiment and Georgian national identity. The combination of the spread of national sentiment as well as having Tsitsianov on Georgia's side, encouraged the spread of national sentiment.

The following chapter showed the powerful emerging hegemon of the nineteenth century, the Russian Empire. We have seen that the tsarist regime was a very powerful one, which can be illustrated by numbers: in 1462, Moscow controlled 24,000 square kilometers. In 1914, the territory included over 13.5 million square kilometers. We have also seen that Orthodox Church was one major factor in the reign of the Russian Empire. After the annexation of Georgia, Russian Empire also conquered Baku, which caught Ottoman Empire's attention and led to another Russo-Turkish War. One major event was also the impressive victory against Napoleon and the start of the decline of Napoleonic era. The Vienna Conference of 1814-1815 was also for Russians an important one because it led to decades of rather more peaceful times. The second half of the nineteenth century was marked by the Crimean War – which Russian Empire had lost.

The 1870s were marked with the Russo-Turkish War again and of course one of the major atrocities against humanity – namely the Circassian Genocide. The combination of the victories in wars and expansionist policies, one can observe the fact that the Russian Empire was an emerging hegemon in the nineteenth century – despite occasional setbacks. Being

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<sup>348</sup> Donald Reyfield. *Edge of Empires: A History of Georgia*, Reaktion Books, 2019, 231.

<sup>349</sup> Ibid.

busy with the wars on European stage, Russian Empire could not afford to concentrate on Georgia and make sure to fully control the country's society and their developments. Therefore, the Georgians were able to further develop national sentiment and national identity.

The final chapter displayed the domestic situation of the Ottoman Empire. At the beginning, it gave a historic overview of the Empire. It stated the territories, of which it consisted in the eighteenth century, namely Balkans (including modern-day Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, parts of Romania), Anatolia (modern-day Turkey), and big parts of the Arab world (including Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Iraq, Kuwait, parts of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, as well as Algeria). This indicates the religious diversity of the empire. In order to survive in this diversity, the Ottomans had to choose their foreign policies very wisely. By the end of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire began establishing embassies in London, Vienna, Berlin and Paris. This development should benefit the Empire externally but mainly internally. With internal tensions, the empire could not afford to get involved in any major European conflict.

Early nineteenth century was marked by New Order, which should bring developments in certain areas, however, it failed to finance these properly and further unrests within the empire started taking place. The Egyptian and Greek crises as well as the ones in Balkans, in addition to all the Russo-Turkish Wars in the nineteenth century made the Ottoman Empire the "sick man of Europe." In addition, conferences were held to analyze the "Eastern Question" in the second half of the nineteenth century. All of this shows that the Ottoman Empire was a declining hegemon and could not compete with the emerging one, namely the Russian. The Tanzimat Era was a promising one, however, due to internal and external turmoil and tensions, it could not be put in practice as planned. The reign of Abdülhamid II is one of the most memorable ones in the history of the Ottoman Empire. It is marked with political, cultural and financial transformation; however, it is also marked with atrocities committed against regional minorities and oppression against those, who wouldn't obey the Ottoman rule. In reference with Georgia, the nineteenth century doesn't showcase any direct battle or bloodshed between these two countries. Because the Ottoman Empire was rather busy and concerned to preserve territorial integrity, which was more important than controlling Georgia, national identity in Georgia could be further developed. Lastly, the Ottomans were also afraid of Russian confrontation and this is certainly also one of the reasons, why Georgia was "left alone" by the Ottomans in the nineteenth century.

If we take all the factors of domestic and systemic level of analysis, we can conclude that the development of national sentiment and Georgian national identity in the nineteenth century was a combination of several factors. First, the motivations domestically, the desire of national independence of the population was a key factor. Following and resulting from it, we have the key figures of nationalist movements in combination with intelligentsia and literature. Nineteenth century was a flourishing one for Georgian intelligentsia and literature. Names such as Ilia Chavchavadze or Akaki Tsereteli define the century and Georgian history books. In combination with the domestic desire towards national identity and independence, the two empires play a major role. Even if not being able to gain independence until 1918, national sentiment was spreading in the nineteenth century already. The emerging and declining hegemon of the nineteenth century contributed to the spread of this national sentiment.

Especially the oppression on Russian behalf, intensified nationalism. With the Ottoman Empire being declining and fighting major wars and battles internally as well as externally, Ottoman desire towards Georgian territory was diminishing in the nineteenth century. Even though Russian Empire was in a better position than the Ottoman, they also were confronted with other major conflicts. To illustrate, Napoleon's invasion in 1812 is a good example and the Crimean War in 1853-1856 is one of the major ones, where almost all global powers were involved. Redefining territories during these battles and fighting internal tensions – such as religious tensions in case of the Ottoman Empire, Georgia had the chance to pursue the development of national identity and further intensify the movement towards national independence.



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## 7. Appendices

### *Major Events of Nineteenth Century Caucasus*

Event	Year	Significance
First Russo-Persian War	1804-1813	Tsar Alexander I, was determined to extend Russian sovereignty by seizing the Georgian region Kartli-Kakheti in 1801. With this step, Russian expansionism towards Southern Caucasus began. However, Iran was not thrilled with this idea and demanded Russia to withdraw its troops and Russian authorities from Southern part of the Caucasus. Russia, however, refused and this was the main trigger for the first Russo-Persian War in 1804. January 13 <sup>th</sup> , 1813, after numerous defeats and a few victories, Iran was forced to sign the Treaty of Gulistan to end this war and give up hopes on Southern Caucasus. <sup>350</sup>
Treaty of Gulistan	1813	The treaty was signed between the Russian Empire and Iran and it was the end of Iranian hopes in Southern Caucasus. <sup>351</sup>
Napoleon's invasion to Russia	1812	Napoleon decides to go to war with Russia, however, he is outsmarted by his opponent and is defeated at the end. This was the beginning of the end of the Napoleonic era in Europe.

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<sup>350</sup> Timothy Dowling, *Russia at War: From the Mongol Conquest to Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Beyond*. (Santa Barbara ABC-Clio), 2014, 728-29.

<sup>351</sup> Ibid.

Vienna Peace Conference	1814-1815	The Vienna Peace Conference pretty much redefined the diplomatic world order. <sup>352</sup> It was meant to rebuild peace. According to David Schimmelpenninck Van der Oye “the victorious allies – Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia – sought enduring stability rather than revenge. They hoped to achieve ... by setting up a mechanism for jointly resolving major disputes.” <sup>353</sup>
Russo-Persian War	1826-1828	This war had even worse effects on Persia than the First Russo-Persian War. It is an important event for exemplification of Russian Empire’s power in the 19 <sup>th</sup> century and the fact that they were an emerging power and were not easy to defeat.
Russo-Turkish War	1828-1829	This conflict showcases again the high tensions between the two superpowers and shows the hostile relationship among them. At the same time, we can see that with the victory of the Russian Empire, the Ottoman Empire is rather losing power and is declining as a player among the superpowers.
Treaty of Edirne/Adrianople	1829	Concluded in September 1829 between the sultan and Nicholas I of Russia, the Ottomans were forced to recognize the independence of Greece as well as the autonomy of Moldavia and Wallachia and

<sup>352</sup> Timothy Dowling, *Russia at War: From the Mongol Conquest to Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Beyond*. (Santa Barbara ABC-Clio), 2014, 556.

<sup>353</sup> David Schimmelpenninck Van der Oye, *Russian Foreign Policy 1815-1917*, 2006, 559.

		Serbia. However, the Ottomans ceded Georgia. <sup>354</sup> This also shows the weakening and rather declining nature of the Ottoman Empire.
Caucasian War	1817-1864	This is a series of violent occurrences in the Caucasian region, which shows how bloody and messy period the 19 <sup>th</sup> century was.
Crimean War	1853-1856	The Crimean War was one of the most significant conflict in Europe in the 19 <sup>th</sup> century and shows how different countries can become alliances out of fear of Russian expansionism.
Treaty of Paris	1856	Treaty of Paris followed the Crimean War. This was a disaster for the Russian empire because it demanded demilitarization of the Black Sea; Moldavia and Wallachia should become free of Russian influence; and Ottoman Empire should be guaranteed independence and integrity. <sup>355</sup>
Proposition of the formula for nationalism by Ilia Chavchavadze	1864	Formula, which became the slogan for the independence movement of Georgia after World War I and therefore, it is very important to mention it in the development of national identity of Georgia.
Second Russo-Turkish War	1877-1878	Due to the fact that Russian Empire won again, this is another illustration of the

<sup>354</sup> Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A modern History*. (London, New York: I.B. Tauris & Company, Limited, 2017), 29.

<sup>355</sup> Ibid, 48.

		power of Russian Empire in the 19 <sup>th</sup> century and the exemplification of its emergence as an emerging hegemon.
Treaty of San Stefano	1878	Was concluded following the Russo Turkish War in 1877-1878. It was later negotiated as the Treaty in Berlin a few months later and showcased further humiliation and setback for the Russian Empire. <sup>356</sup>

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<sup>356</sup> David Schimmelpenninck Van der Oye, *Russian Foreign Policy 1815-1917*, (2006), 564.



## Caucasus by 1801



## Results of Treaty of Gulistan



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<sup>358</sup> 2019. *Cais-Soas.Com*. <https://www.ais-soas.com/CAIS/Images2/Maps/Gulistan-Treaty.jpg>. (last access: 22 April 2019).




## Results of Treaty of Turkmanchay



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<sup>359</sup> Suren-Pahlav, Shapour. 2019. "Torkman (Turkmanchai) Treaty - (CAIS)". *Cais-Soas.Com*. <https://www.cais-soas.com/CAIS/Iran/torkmanchai.htm>. (last access : 22 April 2019).

## Crimean War



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<sup>360</sup> 2019 TheMapArchive.com <https://www.themaparchive.com/the-crimean-war-185355.html> (last access: 22 April 2019).



## Russo-Turkish War



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<sup>361</sup> 2019 GlobalSecurity.org

<https://www.globalsecurity.org/jhtml/jframe.html#https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/images/map-1878-treaty-of-berlin-2.jpg> (last access: 22 April 2019).

## Georgia at the beginning of 19<sup>th</sup> century



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<sup>362</sup> 2019 BurusiWordpress.com <https://burusi.wordpress.com/2009/06/21/georgia-map-xix/#jp-carousel-52842>  
(last access: 22 April 2019).



## Georgia 1800-1850



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## The South Caucasus Pipeline Map

MAP 4




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<sup>364</sup> Chris Dowling, 2017. *The Javakheti Plateau. Along The New Gas Routes In The Caucasus*. Alpinismi. <http://www.alpinismi.com/en/2017/09/06/javakheti-plateau-along-gas-route-redefining-borders-caucasus/>. (last access: 22 April 2019).



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<sup>365</sup> 2019. Age of Revolution – Making the world over: <https://ageofrevolution.org/200-object/flow-map-of-napoleons-invasion-of-russia/> (last access: 21 April 2019).

## *Dramatis Personae*

### *Georgia*

Personality	Significance
David the Builder	Was reigning Georgia from 1089 until 1125. One of the most important figures in Georgian history. He reunited the Kingdom of Georgia and made Georgia for the upcoming century the regional power. <sup>366</sup>
Ilia Chavchavadze	Also called “Father of the Nation” in his life. He was canonized as Saint Ilia the Righteous by the Georgian Orthodox Church and made major contribution to the development of Georgia. He played a major role in the 19 <sup>th</sup> century by being of one of the most famous Georgian nationalists and one of the public figures, pressing for Georgian Independence. <sup>367</sup>
King Erekle II	King Erekle II was the king of Kakheti from 1744 to 1762, and king of Kartli-Kakheti in Caucasus, 1762-98. He is known having reunited eastern Georgia politically and his governing style resembles the contemporary Central Europe. <sup>368</sup>
Elizbar Eristavi	Was an officer in the Russian army, who became the leader of this secret society in Georgia during the Russian occupation in 1829. <sup>369</sup>
Shota Rustaveli	Lived from 1120 to 1220 and was Georgia’s

<sup>366</sup> Donald Reyfield. *Edge of Empires: A History of Georgia*, Reaktion Books, 2019, 85.

<sup>367</sup> Maia Ninidze, *Ilia Chavchavadze – Life and Work Chronicles*, Mtatsminda, 2017, 3.

<sup>368</sup> Keith Hitchins, *EREKLE II*. *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, Vol. VIII, 541-542. 1998.

<sup>369</sup> Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), 71.

	one of the most important poets of all time. He is mostly known for the Georgian national epic “The Man in the Panther’s Skin.” <sup>370</sup>
Queen Tamar	Queen of Kingdom of Georgia between 1184-1210, which was called Georgian Golden Age. Aristocrats were against her being a queen due to the fact that she was a woman. She was successful with her foreign policy, especially in defending the country from Muslim neighbors. <sup>371</sup>
Akaki Tsereteli	Born in 1840 and died in 1915. He was a Georgian Poet and a national liberation movement leader. Close friend of Ilia Chavchavadze, Tsereteli was an opponent of the tsarist regime and fought for self-determination of Georgia under Russian rule in the 19 <sup>th</sup> century. <sup>372</sup>

### *Russian Empire*

Personality	Significance
Tsar Alexander I	Was ruler of Russia from 1801 until 1825. He is remembered in history for mainly three main personality traits. Firstly, in 1812 he refused to make peace with France; secondly, by believing in Holy Alliance of Europe in 1815; and lastly for giving the impression of having died at the seaport of Taganrog in 1825. He is a key player due to the fact that he was reigning the Russian

<sup>370</sup> Donald Reyfield, *Shota Rustaveli – Georgian Poet*. Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Shota-Rustaveli> (last access: 19 April 2019).

<sup>371</sup> Alexander Mikaberidze. *Historical Dictionary of Georgia*. Lanham: Rowman et Littlefield. 2015, 17, 622.

<sup>372</sup> Donald Rayfield, *The Literature of Georgia: A History*, 2000, 159-168.

	Empire for the first quarter of the 19 <sup>th</sup> century. <sup>373</sup>
Tsar Alexander II	Emperor of Russia between 1855 and 1881. He was criticized for not getting a great deal during the Crimean War. At home, he is remembered as the big emancipator of the serfdom in 1861. He was assassinated after the resurgence of revolutionary terrorism in Russian Empire. <sup>374</sup>
Alexander III	Emperor of Russia between 1881 and 1894. A nationalist and supporter of the Orthodox Church, he was one of the major contributors to the formation of alliance with France in 1893. <sup>375</sup>
Alekandr Bariatinskii	Russian veteran of the Caucasian wars and former chief of staff to Vorontsov. In Caucasus, he was seen both – as the conqueror and modernizer. He played a major role in the emancipation of the serfs in Caucasus. <sup>376</sup>
Alexei Ermolov	Being Russian Imperial General of in the 19 <sup>th</sup> century, Ermolov is one of the key figures in the Russian military in his time and at the same time he is being believed to have contributed greatly in the Circassian Genocide in the 19 <sup>th</sup> century. <sup>377</sup>
Nikolai Evdokimov	Alongside with Ermolov, he was believed to be one of the key players who also greatly

<sup>373</sup> Alan Warwick Palmer, *Alexander I: Tsar of War and Peace*. London: Faber Finds, 2010, Foreword.

<sup>374</sup> W.E. Mosse, *Alexander II: Emperor of Russia*, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019.

<sup>375</sup> David Schimmelpenninck Van der Oye, *Russian Foreign Policy 1815-1917*, (2006), 567.

<sup>376</sup> Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), 96.

<sup>377</sup> Walter Richmond, *The Circassian Genocide. Genocide, Political Violence, Human Rights Series*. N.J.; Rutgers University Press, 2013.

	contributed to the Circassian Genocide in the 19 <sup>th</sup> century. <sup>378</sup>
Ivan Gudovich	Russian noble and field marshal of Ukrainian descent. Successor of Pavel Tsitsianov, he became the head administrator in the Russian government in 1806. The conquest of Dagestan in 1807 was his major accomplishment as a field marshal. <sup>379</sup>
Nicholas I	Emperor of Russia from 1825 until 1855. One of the key figures as he was responsible for the actions of Russian Empire during his reign.
Nicholas II	One of the key figures in Russian Empire, starting in 1894. He was also one of the key players in the Russian Orthodox Church. <sup>380</sup>
Pavel Tsitsianov	Tsitsianov “was a Georgian nobleman and a prominent General of the Imperial Russian Army.” <sup>381</sup> Having conquered territories in Caucasus during the Russo-Persian War of 1804-1813, he was also the Russian Commander-in-chief in the Caucasus from 1802 until 1806. <sup>382</sup>
Prince Michael S. Vorontsov	Being Russian prince and field-marshal, Vorontsov is mostly known for his dedication in the Caucasian wars during the years of 1844 until 1853. <sup>383</sup>

<sup>378</sup> Walter Richmond, *The Circassian Genocide. Genocide, Political Violence, Human Rights Series*. N.J.; Rutgers University Press, 2013.

<sup>379</sup> Findgrave.com <https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/177089524/ivan-vasilyevich-gudovich>. (last access: 20 April 2019).

<sup>380</sup> [http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic\\_figures/nicholas\\_ii.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/nicholas_ii.shtml)

<sup>381</sup> <https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/177139621/pavel-dmitriyevich-tsitsianov>

<sup>382</sup> Ibid.

<sup>383</sup> Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), 73.

## Ottoman Empire

Personality	Significance
Abdülhamid II	Sultan of the Ottoman Empire during 1876 and 1909. Especially the beginning of his reign was marked by revolts – especially in the Balkans – and is regarded as one of the most decisive sultans of the Ottoman Empire. <sup>384</sup>
Sultan Mahmud II	He was the 30 <sup>th</sup> Sultan of the Ottoman Empire from 1808 until 1839. When he came to power, the Ottoman Empire was on the way down the hill. He is also of huge importance in reference to the Ottoman Empire due to the fact that he controlled the power of the Empire during the first half of the 19 <sup>th</sup> century. <sup>385</sup>
Sultan Selim III	Sultan Selim III came to power in the Ottoman Empire after the French Revolution. After his accession to power, he immediately started launching reforms, the so-called Nizam-I Cedid (New Order). <sup>386</sup> The reforms were supposed to strengthen the position of the Ottoman Empire internally as well as externally. <sup>387</sup>

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<sup>384</sup> Carter V. Findley. *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: a History 1789-2007*. ProQuest Ebook Central. Yale University Press. 2010. 133.

<sup>385</sup> Ben Macready, *Sultan Mahmud II*, University of Kent, Word Press.

<sup>386</sup> Ibid, 15.

<sup>387</sup> Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A modern History*. I.B. Tauris & Company, Limited, 2017, 15.

**1851** Dispute between France and Turkey over the guardianship of the Christian Holy Places in Palestine. Turkey (1852) yields to French pressure and grants privileges to the Latin Church (Roman Catholics) giving them the right to guard the Holy Places. The tsar of Russia, Nicholas I, reacts angrily and claims that Russia should be the guardian of the Holy Places since the majority of Christians in the Ottoman Empire belong to the Greek Orthodox Church.

**January–February 1853** Talks between the tsar and the British ambassador to St.

Petersburg, Lord Seymour: the tsar seeks agreement with Britain as to what the two countries should do in the event of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire; the tsar refers to Turkey as the “sick man” of Europe; Russia would oppose any other power taking control of Constantinople; Serbia and Bulgaria could be made independent states; Britain might take Crete and Egypt.

**February–May 1853** The Prince Menshikov Mission to Constantinople: the prince sought to secure concessions over the Holy Places and to create a Russian protectorate over Orthodox churches in Constantinople and else-where in the Ottoman Empire.

**5 April 1853** Lord Stratford de Redcliffe reappointed ambassador to Turkey, arrives in Constantinople with instructions to find a settlement to the issue of the Holy Places in Russia’s favor. However, on learning of Menshikov’s wider demands, he advises against acceptance; the Turkish grand council votes down Menshikov’s proposals.

**21 May 1853** Menshikov leaves Constantinople, threatening further action in the light of the failure of his mission.

**31 May 1853** The tsar orders the Russian Army to occupy the Danubian Principalities to exert pressure on the sultan. Britain and France order their Mediterranean fleets to Besika Bay. The British cabinet is split between the peace party led by the Prime Minister Aberdeen and the war party led by Lord Palmerston.

**13 June 1853** The British and French fleets arrive at Besika Bay.

**2 July 1853** Russian forces occupy the Danubian Principalities.

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<sup>388</sup> Arnold Guy. *Historical Dictionary of the Crimean War*. (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press). Last Access: 22 April 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central.

**23 July 1853** The Vienna Note, drawn up by the French ambassador, is submitted by Austria to Russia; it is vaguely worded to satisfy Russia while not offending Turkey. Russia accepts the Note but Turkey rejects it, insisting that Christians in the Ottoman Empire must be protected by the sultan and not the tsar.

**23 September 1853** The British fleet is ordered to Constantinople.

**4 October 1853** Turkey declares war on Russia.

**23 October 1853** Turkish forces cross the Danube.

**4 November 1853** The Turks hold the Russians at bay at Oltenitza.

**30 November 1853** A Turkish squadron is destroyed at Sinope by a superior Russian squadron; 4,000 Turkish dead; the British describe the battle as the “massacre of Sinope.”

**3 January 1854** The British and French fleets enter the Black Sea to protect the Turkish coast and its transports.

**6 February 1854** Russia breaks off relations with Britain and France.

**27 February 1854** An Anglo-French ultimatum to Russia to evacuate the principalities by 30 April.

**12 March 1854** Britain and France conclude an alliance with Turkey.

**20 March 1854** Russian forces cross the Danube.

**28 March 1854** Britain and France declare war on Russia.

**20 April 1854** Austria and Prussia conclude a defensive alliance. Austria masses troops in Galicia and Transylvania, facing the Danubian Principalities.

**3 June 1854** Austria sends ultimatum to Russia: not to carry the war into the Balkans and to give a date for evacuating the principalities.

**14 June 1854** Austria and Turkey conclude a treaty: Austria to occupy the principalities until the end of the war and to intervene, if necessary, to keep order in Bosnia, Albania, and Montenegro.

**8 August 1854** Russia evacuates the principalities; Austrian forces occupy them. The Vienna Four Points are agreed to by Britain and France as a basis for peace; these cover a guarantee of the principalities and Serbia; free passage of the mouths of the Danube; revision of the



Straits Convention; abandonment of the Russian claim to protect the sultan's Christian subjects (the five powers—Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, and Russia—would jointly secure the protection of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire). Russia rejects the Four Points.

**14 September 1854** The British and French armies land at Eupatoria in the Crimea. Their objective: to capture Sebastopol.

**20 September 1854** Battle of Alma: the Russians under Menshikov are driven back toward Sebastopol. Lord Raglan is the British commander-in-chief. St. Arnaud, the French commander-in-chief, dies at the end of the month of cholera and is succeeded by General Canrobert.

**17–19 October 1854** First Allied bombardment of Sebastopol.

**25 October 1854** Battle of Balaclava—an Allied victory.

**5 November 1854** Battle of Inkerman; Russians fail to relieve Sebastopol.

**14 November 1854** The Great Storm.

**2 December 1854** Austria enters an offensive/defensive alliance with Britain and France and they guarantee Austria's possessions in Italy for the duration of the war and promise support for Austria, if necessary, against Russia. Austria mobilizes all its forces but does not enter the war.

**26 January 1855** Piedmont-Sardinia enters the war on the side of the Allies and dispatches 15,000 troops to the Crimea.

**2 March 1855** Death of Tsar Nicholas I; Alexander II succeeds him.

**8 and 18 June 1855** Allied assaults upon Sebastopol are repulsed by the Russians.

**16 August 1855** Battle of Tchernaya; a Russian defeat.

**8 September 1855** French troops capture the Malakov; British troops take the Redan but are driven out again.

**11 September 1855** After sinking the ships in the harbor and blowing up their magazines, the Russians abandon Sebastopol.

**21 November 1855** Sweden concludes a treaty with the Allies; to resist Russian demands.

**28 November 1855** The Russians capture Kars in Turkish Armenia.

**28 December 1855** Austrian ultimatum to Russia to accept the Allied peace terms.

**18 February 1856** The Hatt-I-Humayun, Turkish reform edict, to guarantee the security of life, honor, and property to the Christian subjects of the sultan.

**25 February–30 March 1856** Congress of Paris produces the Treaty of Paris.

**15 April 1856** Austria, Britain, and France conclude a treaty to regard any infringement of Turkish independence as a *casus belli*.

## **8. Pledge of Honesty**

"On my honour as a student of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, I submit this work in good faith and pledge that I have neither given nor received unauthorized assistance on it."

Salome Svanidze

## **9. Vita**

I am 27 years old. I was born in Tbilisi, however, I spent most of my life in Austria. Resulting from this, I was surrounded by different cultures from a young age. After finishing school and high school, I took a one-year break to go to the United States as an au pair, to get to know the American culture. I suddenly became curious about the educational system in the U.S. and little that I knew, I was admitted at Notre Dame of Maryland University (NDMU) in Baltimore, Maryland for my undergraduate studies in Modern Foreign Languages, namely English, German, and French. I finished this in May 2017 and moved back to Vienna, where I enrolled for the M.A.I.S. (Master of Advanced International Studies) program at the Diplomatische Akademie Wien (DA). Being one of very few Georgians at the DA, it was of great importance for me to introduce the DA community to Georgia and its rich history. This is one of the reasons, why I chose to write my thesis on the development of Georgian national identity. Lastly, having worked in international environment, my goal is to pursue a career in that field. For example, over the past summer, I have worked for the International Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA) and two years ago it was the Office of English Language Institute at NDMU.

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