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„Remembrance and Oblivion in Divided Countries: The Problem of Over-remembering in Cyprus"

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Abstract

Remembrance is usually seen as a standard approach to come to terms with the past. The thesis offers a revisionist approach to remembrance when dealing with a country's difficult past. The role of memory and forgetfulness - two opposite elements on the same spectrum - are analysed with respect to divided societies. Classic studies on memory in relation to history have always argued in favour of remembering as a moral virtue both for nations and for people. Without diminishing the importance of knowing and remembering history, a balance between remembrance and oblivion, the past and the future, ought to be found to a more realistic understanding of division. This analysis, inspired by David Rieff's book "*In Praise of Forgetting*", supports forgetfulness as a tool to overcome division and sees memory – when abused - as a hindrance to conflict resolution. The case study selected is Cyprus, a divided country frozen in time since the 1974 war. The thesis analyses identities and nationalisms in Cyprus, using the theories of three influential scholars: Ernest Gellner, David Cannadine, and Rogers Brubaker. Furthermore, a categorisation of the different types of memory is presented as follows: national memory, collective memory, popular collective memory and individual memory. This framework is applied to the case of Cyprus focusing on the 1960 Constitution, history textbooks, some key *lieux de mémoire*, football hooliganism, and a collection of oral stories. It is important to underline that forgetting has not been interpreted as a "moral Alzheimer." The point is not that Cypriot history has been mutilated but that "over-remembering" and distortions of history tend towards cycles of resentment that creates continued re-experiencing of painful past events at the expense of peaceful co-existence.

Zusammenfassung

Sich zu erinnern wird normalerweise als der Ausgangspunkt zur Vergangenheitsbewältigung gesehen. Diese Arbeit bietet einen revisionistischen Ansatz zum Gedächtnis. Die Rolle von Erinnerung und Vergessen - zwei gegensätzlichen Elementen im selben Spektrum - wird im Hinblick auf geteilte Gesellschaften analysiert. Diese Analyse unterstützt das Vergessen als Instrument zur Überwindung von Spaltungen und sieht die Erinnerung - wenn sie missbraucht wird - als Hindernis für die Konfliktlösung. Die ausgewählte Fallstudie ist Zypern, ein Land, das seit 1974 geteilt ist. Die Dissertation analysiert Identitäten und Nationalismen und bietet eine Kategorisierung der verschiedenen Arten des Gedächtnisses wie folgt: Nationales Gedächtnis, kollektives Gedächtnis, populäres kollektives Gedächtnis und individuelles Gedächtnis.

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INTRODUCTION

The thesis strives to present the role of memory and forgetfulness in divided countries by placing them on the same level. They are opposite elements in the same spectrum. The argument presented is a revisionist reaction to the well-known quote by George Santayana "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it". Indeed, classic studies on memory in relation to history have always argued in favour of remembering as a moral virtue both for nations and for people. While the goal is not to diminish the importance of knowing and remembering history, disparate memories, if abused, may distort history and create an endless cycle of resentment and continued re-experiencing of past events. These dynamics could naturally be the source of protracted conflicts. This thesis will focus specifically on both the positive and the negative role of memory and forgetfulness in divided societies and will take into consideration the case of Cyprus. This is a country frozen in time that since the 1974 conflict has not succeeded in moving forward, thus risking to divide Cypriots of both communities irreversibly. Why does the abuse of memory hinder conflict resolution in divided countries and how could forgetfulness help overcome this problem? This thesis involves a considerable amount of interdisciplinary research in the fields of history and international relations. Therefore, I will start my thesis providing a solid historical background, in which different various authors have been taken into consideration. The major contributors for this introductory section are Sir George Francis Hill's "*A History of Cyprus*", Costas Kyrris' "*History of Cyprus*", David Hunt and Nicolas Coldstream's "*Footprints in Cyprus*" and William Mallinson's "*Cyprus: A Modern History*". Afterwards, in the first chapter of *Part I* David Rieff's argument provided in "*In Praise of Forgetting*" will offer the basis upon which I developed my argument in favour of forgetting. Also, the concept of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* will be borrowed to underline the importance to come to terms with the past as foundation for any future peaceful resolution. This is a deeply mental process that requires our attention to be focused on issues of identities and nationalism, which must not always be seen with a negative connotation for it can be useful in creating a cohesive society. The second chapter of *Part I* will deal with the notion of nationalism, defined on the basis of the meaning conferred by Ernest Gellner in "*Nation and Nationalisms*". Moreover, when dealing when the complicated issue of

identity, David Cannadine's theory against the Manichean view of the world will be taken into consideration. In *"The Undivided Past"* he strongly argues against those views dividing people into two different and conflicting groups, a good side – "us" and whoever is with us – and an evil one – the "other" and whoever is against us. This is an extremely important point to make in the case of Cyprus as one of the main narratives opposing a future resolution supports the argument that the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot communities could never co-exist together simply put, because they are too different. The topic of nationalism and identity will also be dealt with in the first chapter of *Part II,* with Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot nationalism specifically taken into consideration. Also, a deeper analysis on identity will be provided, in which I will argue that there are two important internal factors affecting identity formation in a multi-ethnic and divided society - language and religion – and this is especially true in the case of Cyprus. In support of this argument, the work of two academics will be mainly employed – Rogers Brubaker ("*Grounds for Difference*") and once again, David Cannadine - as they provided great focus on language and religion. In particular, Brubaker's theory will help better answering the question: to what extend language and religion are a factor in the (de)construction of identity in Cyprus? In addition, the work of Ioannis N. Grigoriadis ("*Instilling Religion in Greek and Turkish Nationalism"*), and Umut Ozkirimli and Spyros Sofos ("*Tormented by History"*) have provided important insights for the writing of this section. Transitioning to memory, an explanation of the types of memory and its clash with peaceful coexistence in divided countries will also be essential for a theoretical analysis of remembrance. While several categorisations have been established for the different types of memory, in the last chapter of *Part I*, I intend to propose my own categorisation of memory as follows: national memory, collective memory, popular collective memory and individual memory. The theoretical background has been provided by Pierre Nora, French historians who become notorious for his concept of 'sites of memory', Maurice Halbwachs ("*Les Cadres Sociaux de la Mémoire"*) and Karin Kukkoren (*"Popular Cultural Memory"*) and Hannah Möckel-Rieke ("*Media and Cultural Memory"*) for their contributions on the more recent studies on memory connected to media. in *Part II*, these topics will finally be specifically applied to the case study of Cyprus, where special attention will be given to the failed 1960 Constitution, history teaching and textbooks, Cypriot *lieux de mémoire*, football hooliganism and the 'untold stories' of

Cypriots who experienced the 1974 war. The main contributors of this sections have been Sevgül Uludağ and Yiannis Papadakis. It is clear that offering this alternative outlook on peaceful co-existence between communities within a country does not mean encouraging passive acceptance of the "other" living on the opposite side of the dividing line, rather mutual understanding and a final "breaking of the wall". Quoting the words of David Rieff, there are cases in which it is possible that "whereas forgetting does an injustice to the past, remembering does an injustice to the present.[1]"

Cyprus before the 1974 conflict

Often, when dealing with the complicated issue of the Cypriot problem, it is debated by people in Cyprus who came first, the Greeks or the Turks? Is Cyprus more Greek or more Turkish? Is every Cypriot a Greek and therefore, Turkish Cypriots are simply Greek Cypriots converted to Islam during the Ottoman rule? These are some questions that Cypriots may use in support of a specific narrative. Trying to answer these questions in order to establish who is more Cypriot or what a Cypriot is, it is in a certain way like attempting to find the beginning of a circle. However, if one goes back enough in history, a more enlightening answer can be found on the origin of Cyprus human history. For this reason, it is fundamental to provide a solid historical background on who is who in Cyprus and why events evolved the way they did before proceeding to the heart of the matter on oblivion and remembrance.

We need to start as far as the Neolithic goes, when life and trade had already been established in the region surrounding Cyprus but not in the island, where the first reported inhabitants are alleged to have appeared in Khirokitia (Southern cost, near Larnaca), around 6000/5800 B.C.[2] As far as religion is concerned, at this time a bull cult was part of the early Cypriot religious beliefs. Bulls also figured in similar pillars and piers at Chatal Hueyuek in Turkey, which in connections with the use of similar red monochrome types of pottery both in Cyprus and in Tarsus[3], makes historians think that contacts had been created with the neighbouring Levante region.[4] Because of the

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[1] David Rieff, "The Cult of Memory: When History does more Harm than Good," *The Guardian,* (March 2, 2016).

[2] Costas Kyrris. *History of Cyprus.* (Cyprus: Lampousa, 1996), p.27.

[3] A city is south-central Turkey.

[4] David Hunt and J. Nicolas Coldstream, *Footprints in Cyprus : An Illustrated History*, 1st ed. (London: Trigraph, 1982), p.29.

similar burial customs between them, some have even hypothesized that the Levant could have even been the place of origin of the first inhabitants.[5] Furthermore, Kyrris and Rupp support the idea that the island was colonised from outside, probably from the East or Northeast, due to the rarity of the settlement and their confluence mainly in the north of the island, where the source of colonisation would come.[6] It is also from the north that refugees arrived to escape the catastrophe in Anatolia in 3000/2900 B.C.[7] Because of these influxes from the Levant and Anatolia, the Northern part of the island was more developed however, it would be a mistake thinking that as nowadays, there was a boundary-line dividing north from south. On the contrary, at that time differences seem to have existed between west and east for the control of arable lands (rich in the east) and copper mines (rich in the west).[8]

   Trade with the Aegean started in the Late Bronze Age (16th century B.C.), when Cypriots borrowed a linear script from the Cretans (Cypro-Minoan script). These initial contacts with what is considered today Greece resulted in the Hellenization of the island three centuries later, when Cyprus will experience its first two waves of invasions: first from the "Sea Peoples" (probably a heterogenous group of Mycenaeans and Anatolians[9]) and the second from the Aegean (the Achaeans). The invaders will bring about change in all spheres of life to the local population - the indigenous Cypriots - but most and foremost, in the Greek language.[10] From this moment on, all the historical period B.C. will see continuous influx of Hellenic culture and population and closer contact with the Greek world. The highlight of the millennium before the beginning of the A.C. and the arrival of the Byzantine empire is the change in the character of the population, in language, and in religious practices. Firstly, the massive immigration from the Aegean during the Early Iron Age (1100-700 B.C.) will make the Cypriot population predominantly Greek-speaking; Greek settlers and local population will merge.[11] Secondly, I had mentioned an early script; this will be adapted to have two syllabaries: one for the Cypriot dialect of Greek origin, one for the

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[5] Costas Kyrris (1996), p.29.
[6] D.W. Rupp, *Canadian Palaepaphos Survey Project: Preliminary Report of the 1979 Season*, (RDAC, 1981), p. 254.
[7] Costas Kyrris (1996), p.37.
[8] Ibid., pp.43/45.
[9] Ibid., p.63.
[10] David Hunt and J. Nicolas Coldstream (1982), pp.47-53.
[11] Ibid., p.58.

Eteocypriot ('true Cypriot') spoken by indigenous people.[12] Thirdly, religion will be influenced by the cult of Egyptian and Greek gods and Aphrodite will become the Cypriot goddess *par excellence*[13]. These cultural changes continued to be mixed with Oriental influences.[14] Until a certain point, specifically until about the 5th century B.C., Cyprus still enjoyed its independence, its own character where foreign influence was adapted to Cypriot style.[15] However, it is first with the Phoenicians – who transformed the island into a depended territory – and then with Alexander the Great's domination that Cyprus will lose a great deal of its individuality and will officially become part of the Hellenic world (Hellenic Period, 325-30 B.C.).[16] The Hellenic character of the island is at this time proved by several Greek authors, such as Sophocles, Euripides and Aeschylus, who will set many of their tragedies in *Cypria.*[17]

An important moment is the Roman Period (30 B.C. - A.D. 330), when Christianity will be introduced by Saint Paul[18], thus laying the foundations for what will become the Orthodox Church of Cyprus. Nonetheless, it is only during the Byzantine Period (A.D. 330 – 1191) that Christianity will become the official religion of the Empire and Cyprus will establish the independence of its Church.[19]

Another important historical event is the arrival of the first Arab – and first Muslim settlers – on the island staging a raid around 649. It is very important to highlight that at this point there were no territorial division between the two religions and that Muslim and Christian (the majority) villages were built side by side, in fact "Cypriots were not in arms; for there was great peace and friendship between the Greeks and the Saracens."[20] Indeed, at this point Cypriots did not see themselves as Byzantines or Hellenes. They were Christians and still called themselves Romans.[21] However, Cyprus was forced to remain neutral towards both Byzantines and Arabs who now

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[12] Ibid., p.67.

[13] However, the deification for the ideal mother remained, with the *magna mater* or Mother Goddess being venerated until the advent of Christianism. This veneration makes also think of a matriarchal social structure at that time. Costas Kyrris (1996), p.30.

[14] Ibid., p.61.

[15] David Hunt and J. Nicolas Coldstream (1982), p.83.

[16] Costas, Kyrris (1996).

[17] Ibid., p.97.

[18] David, Hunt and J. Nicolas Coldstream (1982), p.135.

[19] Łukasz Burkiewicz, "The beginnings of Christianity in Cyprus. Religious and Cultural Aspects," *Folia Historica Cracoviensia*, 01 June 2017, Vol.23(1), pp. 14-27.

[20] Costas, Kyrris (1996), p.190.

[21] David, Hunt and J. Nicolas Coldstream (1982), p.275.

enjoyed joint sovereignty over the island and often called the population to pick a side between the two powers during animosities,[22] and later between Crusaders and the "infidels."[23] Alienation from the Byzantine literary tradition, especially with the arrival of the Lusignans (1192-1489), caused the development of the Greek Cypriot dialect.[24]

The turning point is 1571, when the Ottoman Empire invaded the island, which became a province of the Empire.[25] After at least two centuries of discontent towards the Latin rulers and consequent emigrations, some Greek Cypriot serfs saw the Ottoman rulers as a good option and supported their establishment in the island.[26] There are three points to make about the Turkish period. One is that the Ottomans brought about change in the composition of the population, as 1/10 of the people of any race and denomination were made immigrate from Anatolia to the island to reactivate the economy.[27] However, census from the 16th century is mostly unreliable. Another point is that the Orthodox Church in Cyprus rose to power because of the *millet* system and because no other religion other than Orthodoxy and Islam were allowed by the new rulers – which will result in "forced" convenient conversions to either of the two religions in order to either avoid persecutions or heavy taxation.[28] The Archbishop (*rayah-vekili*; Ethnarch in Greek, to highlight race rather than religion) would collect the taxes and largely administer the island and its *reayah*, being in direct contact with the Sultan, which signalized a revival and re-establishment of the Orthodox Church. A final point is that many travellers attested that relations in the countryside were friendly.

Contrary to the initial expectations, the Ottoman period were years of exploitation, extremely high taxes levied on the population and massacres against Christians. The Turkish peasantry suffered just as much as the Greek one and this can be proved by the 1833 insurrections against the rulers, one of which – the revolt of the Giaur Imam

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[22] Costas, Kyrris (1996), p.195.
[23] Ibid., p.223.
[24] Ibid., pp.237-238.
[25] Paul Santa Cassia, "Religion, Politics and Ethnicity in Cyprus during the Turkocratia," *European Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1986), p.3.
[26] Costas Kyrris (1996), pp.251-252.
[27] Costas Kyrris (1996), p.259.
[28] Ibid., pp.254-255.

- was led by a Turk who asked for the Christians' support (reason why he was called "infidel").[29]

Just as much as the strength of the Ottoman Empire was considered a threat in Europe, so it was its weakness that meant leaving Russia room for its Eastern conquest. Had Russia took control of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, it would have left the Empire of the *tsar* free to reach India and endanger the British Empire's communication routes and colonies. The Ottoman Empire was therefore a tool to use against Russia (Crimean War, Russo-Turkish wars…). Either Cyprus or Alexandretta could serve as a base for the operations to support the Ottoman Empire against the Russian Empire. The story ends with the Treaty of San Stephano according to which the British would administer Cyprus, amongst other things, while remaining an Ottoman possession (Cyprus Convention[30]). The latter point would serve as a justification to the territorial concessions made to Russia.[31]

The Ottoman rule in Cyprus had left its people so strained that they had high hopes of a the British rule: "We hope, therefore, that from now on a new life begins for the people of Cyprus; a new great period, which will become memorable in the annals of the island. We hope that all shall be instructed without distinctions of race or creed, that law is the king of all; that all shall have equal rights and equal responsibility before the law; that all shall be used to treading the good road, that is to say, the road of truth, of duty and of liberty", said Archbishop Sophronios in his welcome address to Wolseley (British High Commissioner). The Bishop of Kition is alleged to have welcomed the new administration with the following word: "We accept the change of government inasmuch as we trust Great Britain will help Cyprus, as it did the Ionian islands, to be united with Mother Greece, with which it is naturally connected."[32] Nevertheless, this statement has not been proved.

Greek became the language of education in schools, and Turkish in specific schools for minorities. The majority would learn Greek history, showed as the mother country, and to be patriotic towards the Greek flag and the Greek Royal Family. There were

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[29] David Hunt and J. Nicolas Coldstream (1982), p.228.

[30] During the Congress of Berlin on 4 June 1878 between Britain and Turkey. John S. Bowman, Herman W. Goult and others, "Cyprus," *Encyclopædia Britannica*, (March 19, 2019). https://www.britannica.com/topic/Cyprus-Convention-of-1878 [last accessed 24.03.2019].

[31] David Hunt and J. Nicolas Coldstream (1982), pp.240-241.

[32] Christos P. Ioannides, *Cyprus under British Colonial Rule Culture, Politics, and the Movement toward Union with Greece, 1878–1954*, Lexington Books (2019), p.36.

Greek, Turkish, and mixed villages and the two communities' relations were amicable,[33] peaceful mixed councils also existed during the mid-twenties.[34]

In this period demands for *enosis* began, supported by nationalist feelings throughout the 19th century in Europe, especially by the fervent Greek nationalism that aimed at unifying all the Greek lands. It was easy to make these claims under British rule, where freedom of speech and press were granted, unlikely the repressive Ottoman Empire. Sometimes British politicians were in favour of *enosis* (Gladstone and Churchill are often quoted in this regard by *enosis* supporters[35]). This along with Britain's offer to give Cyprus to Greece in exchange for its support to Serbia against Germany, Austria and Turkey in 1915 (Greece refused due to the Kingdom of Greece's strong pro-German views and its ambitions turned elsewhere, such as Constantinople and Smyrna[36]) and the spread of Turkish nationalist feelings, led to a counterpart movement that asked for the return of the island to Turkey.[37] Great Britain decided however to annex the island in 1914, in view of its growing geographic and strategic importance in the region and in August 1920, Turkey renounced all rights on Cyprus by virtue of the Treaty of Sevres.[38]

*[39]Already in 1931, large-scale anticolonial protests - led by the Bishop of Kition, amongst others - broke out in order to pursue *enosis*, as Cypriots were supporting the Hellenic cause against Fascism in Europe.[40] It resulted in the suppression of the constitution, press censorship, prohibition to show the Greek flag and to create political parties. In the previous years, Great Britain had already flirted with the idea of ceding the island to Greece to cause the final collapse of the Ottoman Empire, on this occasion however, the reason behind its generous offer was to strengthen its relations with the

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[33] David Hunt and J. Nicolas Coldstream (1982).

[34] Costas Kyrris (1996), p.337.

[35] C. M. Woodhouse, "Cyprus and the Middle Eastern Crisis," *International Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Winter, 1955/1956), p. 7-9.

[36] Antonis Klapsis, "The Strategic Importance of Cyprus and the Prospect of Union with Greece, 1919–1931: The Greek Perspective," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* (2013), p.767.

[37] Costas Kyrris (1996), pp.314-315.

[38] Ibid. (1996), p.317.

[39] The sections of this chapter contained between asterisks contains excerpts from a paper I previously wrote for the seminar "Russian Domestic Politics and External Relations." *Behind Russian-Cypriot Relations: Maintaining the Status Quo*, January 2019.

[40] Antonis Klapsis, *Between the Hammer and the Anvil. The Cyprus Question and Greek Foreign Policy from the Treaty of Lausanne to the 1931 Revolt*, (Neapolis University Institutional Repository, 2009), p.135.

only European country left resisting fascism. However, the idea of *enosis* was only introduced in the island, without being actually turned into action. It was let sediment in people's minds for the years to come. Indeed, in the late 1950s, the great majority was seeking freedom from foreign rule, which paved the way for a guerrilla group, the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (*Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston*, EOKA) led by General Georgios Grivas, to seize the moment and start its battle for *enosis*. The guerrilla group was spurred by Makarios III's plebiscite for *enosis*, where 95.7% of people in the island voted favourably.[41] Nevertheless, Turkish Cypriots, so far happy with their status, were not happy to be annexed to Greece. Turkish Cypriots started to ask for an almost equal division of the island between Greece and Turkey and demands for *taksim* were becoming louder.[42] Turks were not happy either with a Greek island so close to their ports and saw the moment as an occasion to support their claims on Cyprus. Whether ethnic solidarity was a further motive is in doubt. The United States and Great Britain who feared that the conflict could pave the way to Soviet dominance in the eastern Mediterranean, have often been accused of having secretly supported Grivas in his fight against the communist leadership.[43] As in the past, *divide et impera* was the strategy that would be adopted by the British in order to weaken intercommunal relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots - who until then, used to co-exist peacefully. After the armed struggle of 1955-59 between EOKA and TMT, violence, killings terrorist attacks, segregation started and was accepted by Britain that established barbed wire lines to divide the communities.[44] However, violence continued and therefore, being left with no choice by the governments in London, Athens and Ankara, the Greek Cypriot leader Archbishop Makarios agreed to independence as an alternative to union with Greece. Having lost its hegemony in Iraq, Jordan and Egypt, the British were ready to leave the island and also leave behind the chaos they had created.

However, the London-Zurich agreements (1959) that led to the independence of Cyprus in 1960, provided the country with a new Constitution that did not treat Greek and Turkish Cypriots as equal citizens of the very same country, rather as two distinct

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[41] Demetris Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest of Cyprus*, I.B. Tauris (2018), P.36.
[42] David Hunt and J. Nicolas Coldstream (1982).
[43] William Mallinson, *Cyprus: A Modern History,* (I.B. Tauris. Revised ed., 2008), pp. 11/18.
[44] Costas Kyrris (1996), p.370.

categories. Independence concealed the seeds of partition.*[45] The role that the 1960 Constitution of Cyprus had in fomenting partition and the future 1974 invasion will be presented in *Part III*. It is important to dedicate a portion of this thesis to this topic as I strongly believe that the Cypriot issue, a political problem first of all and afterwards, an ethnic one, is also a constitutional issue.

The 1974 conflict and its aftermath to this day

From the tragic end of the short-lived union of Cyprus to the 1974 war it was a downhill. The year 1964 was eventful: Turkish enclaved were formed from where Greek Cypriots were expelled, the U.S.S.R. warned Turkey against a military intervention in Cyprus, a U.N. Peace-Making Force was dispatched[46], the Americans, worried about their NATO allies and the Communist threat, proposed the Acheson Plan[47], and Makarios established the National Guard – an army of 10.000 men backed by 10.000 more Greek soldiers – led by General Grivas and not really loyal to Makarios[48], the "traitor of *enosis*".[49] Events escalated quickly when in 1967 the Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration was declared (29 December 1967), a coup d'état in Greece consolidated the pro-*enosis* military regime[50] that the following year, will attempt to Makarios' life (and so several times afterwards), and Grivas returned to Cyprus to create EOKA-B (1971), under direct influence of the Greek military junta.[51]

*The pivotal year was 1974. On 15 of July, Nikos Sampson, leader of the Greek military junta, allegedly secretly backed for years by the American government, and in cooperation with the National Guards and the Cypriot terrorist group EOKA-B, led a coup d'état against Archbishop Makarios.[52] None of the guarantor powers took action to avoid what everybody knew would come next. Had they done so, a war, a

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[45] Excerpt from my paper "Behind Russian-Cypriot Relations: Maintaining the Status Quo", for the course "Russian Domestic Politics and External Relations.

[46] James Ker-Lindsay, *Britain and the Cyprus Crisis, 1963-1964*, (Bibliopolis, 2004), p.39.

[47] From the US ex-Foreign Secretary Dean Acheson. For details on the content of the plan see: "Acheson Warns of Peril in Cyprus," *The New York Times*, (5.09.1964), p.1. https://www.nytimes.com/1964/09/05/archives/acheson-warns-of-peril-in-cyprus-back-in-us-he-says-war-could-be.html [last accessed 26.03.2019].

[48] Costas, Kyrris (1996), pp.381-382.

[49] Ibid., p. 386.

[50] Ibid., p. 388.

[51] Costas Kyrris (1996), p. 392.

[52] Ibid., p. 400.

forty-four year invasion and suffering could have been avoided. However, all the four country had been long waited for this moment: Greece was willing to share the island with Turkey if it meant achieving *enosis*; Britain had passed responsibility to the US, which was longing to weaken Makarios' influence and strengthen its ties with NATO powers; and Turkey had been long waited for the favourable circumstances to set foot on the island. As the *enosis* with Greece may have been a matter of days, on 19 of July, Turkey invaded Cyprus invoking the Treaty of Guarantee to protect the status of Turkish Cypriots. The final occupation of one third of the island occurred on 14 August 1974 and it lasts to this day.[53]

After being partitioned, Cyprus has experienced several painful and forced exchanges of population between the North and the South, making over 200,000 people refugees in their own country.[54] To further the demographic change, Turkey has been sending settlers to the North of Cyprus and these immigrations continues nowadays. In November 1983, the occupied area unilaterally declared its independence and the creation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This has always been considered a *de facto* state recognised only by Turkey.[55]

Over the years, support for political union with Greece has dissipated. Since the late 1970s, leaders on both sides have engaged in several rounds of negotiations however, a successful understanding has never been reached. The key issues include the return of displaced Cypriots and the handling of their property, repatriation of Turkish settlers, demilitarization of the island and the future role of foreign powers. In 2002, the most concerted attempt to reach a solution was initiated by the then UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan. In 2003, the Turkish Cypriot authorities eased border restrictions allowing thousands of Cypriots to cross the Green Line dividing the island for nearly thirty years.[56] One major incentive was the Republic of Cyprus's candidacy for membership in the European Union. However, the referendum on the Annan Plan was

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[53] Glen D. Camp, "Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 95, No.1 (Spring, 1980), p.55.

[54] Nathalie Tocci and Tamara Kovziridze, "Chapter 2: Cyprus," *JEMIE*, Issue 1/2004, p.6.

[55] Nikos Moudouros, The "TRNC" in the Turkish Cypriot context: A moment of multiple and contradictory interpretations, *Eastern Mediterranean Geopolitical Review*, Vol. 3 (Spring 2018), p.34.

[56] Nathalie Tocci and Tamara Kovziridze (2004), p.9.

heavily rejected by Greek Cypriots, while Turkish Cypriots approved it.[57] Whether it was a fair compromise it is debatable.

The current two leaders of both communities are fairly new — Mr. Anastasiades took office in 2013, and Mr. Akinci in 2015— and have stated to be ready to engage in successful talks. A different political background helps easing the situation: Greece is no longer interested in enosis being busy dealing with a severe economic crisis, and the fear of the domino effect of communism has now dissipated. For his part, Erdogan's Turkey does not seem interest in withdrawing its troops, being particularly interested in the most recent drilling operations in Cypriot waters. However, the social and legal situation on the island has also changed and the majority of Cypriots no longer sees Greece and Turkey as their motherlands. Turkish Cypriot are aware of the limitations a de facto states brings, first and foremost political non-recognition and economic external and internal isolation. Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights opened the way for lawsuits from Greek Cypriots who lost property, with recent events of positive outcomes and Turkey being forced to pay compensations for damages.[58] The most recent successful push for peace has been the opening of two new crossing points in November 12, 2018[59] - more than ever needs as contact between the two communities is certainly needed in order to build trust and confidence towards the "other".*

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[57] Nathalie Tocci and Tamara Kovziridze (2004), p.18.

[58] Rhodri C. Williams and Ayla Gürel, "The European Court of Human Rights and the Cyprus Property Issue: Charting A Way Forward," *PRIO,* Paper 1/2011.

[59] "Two Border Crossings Open in Divided Cyprus, First in 8 Years," *Al Jazeera*, 12 November 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/border-crossings-open-divided-cyprus-8-years-181112133918947.html [last accessed 13.06.2019].

PART I "TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN"

1. One side of the coin: Forgetfulness

Before explaining what forgetting involves for the purpose of this research and why this is important, it is necessary to start with what forgetting is not. Forgetting should not been interpreted as a "moral Alzheimer", nor to forget the loved ones.[60] The point is not mutilation of history but avoiding "over-remembering." [61] What we should ask ourselves is then, if there is a will to remember, why there cannot be a will to forget?

A starting point to deal with the issue of oblivion is the idea of "*Vergangenheitsbewältigung*", a term that has come in use in Germany after the atrocities of World War Second, in light of German nationals' will to come to terms with the GDR's past, with National Socialism, and the Holocaust. One way Germany decided to start this process was with the Tribunals of Nuremberg and Eichmann. Later on, for instance in 1991, the federal Government's educational-monitoring agency urged that the Nazis be subject to an "intensive and thorough treatment" in schools and that "the memory of the Holocaust is kept alive." Therefore, the federal states introduced in schools' curricula, from fifth grade onwards, lessons on Nazism in several fields, ranging from history and religion to school trips and guest speakers who have survived the horrors of the Holocaust.[62] The concept of coming to terms to the past needs to be re-adapted to the country we take into account. In other countries and in more recent times, in Turkey for example, a campaign was recently launched (December 2008), "I Apologize". Over 300,000 signatures were collected to finally recognize the Armenian Genocide of 1915 and indeed apologize to their "brothers" for the past events, not because of political reasons, rather as simple human beings.[63]

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[60] David Rieff, *In Praise of Forgetting: Historical Memory and Its Ironies*, (Yale University Press, 2017), p.119.

[61] Hyperthymesia is a medical condition in which a patient spends too much time thinking about their past. For more information on the medical condition and on the first case ever to be reported see: Linda Rodriguez McRobbie, "Total Recall: The People Who Never Forget," *The Guardian*, (February 8, 2017). https://www.theguardian.com/science/2017/feb/08/total-recall-the-people-who-never-forget [last accessed 03.06.2019].

[62] Alan Cowell, "Teaching Nazi Past to German Youth," *The New York Times* (June 9, 1995) https://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/09/world/teaching-nazi-past-to-german-youth.html [last accessed 08.06.2019].

[63] Robert Tait, "Turkish PM Dismisses Apology for Alleged Armenian Genocide," *The Guardian* (18 December 2008) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/dec/18/armenian-genocide-apology-turkish-rebuttal [last accessed 08.06.2019].

The campaign was not supported by Erdogan's government, right-wing parties and several diplomats, historians and artists that see Turkish history as "honourable" and therefore, "no Turk doesn't apologize to the enemy."[64] In general terms *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* is connected with forgiveness and recognition of past mistakes. But of course, it is first of all connected with remembrance (as the Turkish case and Germany's educational-monitoring agency demonstrate). Coming to terms with the past should involve all level of society and in the case of divided societies it should start at the national level, through the abolition of dividing practices. An example be the so-called *lois mémorielles* ('memory laws'), a type of law particularly common in France promoting the state interpretation and narrative of particular historical events. It could be also about memorial days, monuments and museums that support only one narrative, leaving the "other" out. Reforms should also reach the education sector, through a history teaching that encourages mutual understanding and acceptance. At the collective level, a platform for discussion is necessary, the public should be re-educated in order to create a comprehensive national discourse rather than a communal/ethnic one. The personal level is harder to reach because it deals with personal experiences and sufferings or in the case of the younger generations, with the memories propagated by their close relatives. While I said that the initial process of coming to terms with the past involves remembering, its successful completion requires this alternative version of 'forgetting' that I have been introducing from the beginning in this research. A clarifying synthesis between remembrance and forgetfulness was offered by Joachim Gauck, Federal Commissioner for Documents of the State Security Service of the former GDR:

> *"Some accuse those who refuse to forget of being vengeful. They fail to see that there is a need to remember the times and those who restricted our right to freedom and personal expression […] We will be in a position to forgive and forget only if we are given enough time and the right to heal our wounds, to calm our anger, and, yes, to curb our hatred. Reconciliation with such a past*

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[64] Poem written by Zelimhan Yakup, Turkey's National Assembly deputy.

can only be achieved not simply through grief, but also through discussion and dialogue.''[65]

An important point about forgetting is the intentionality of the act. A Russian neurologist, Aleksandr R. Luria, said that a man could forget only by an act of will.[66] Rieff central argument is based on the fact that sooner or later every human being and their actions will be forgotten, everything is transitory. Our human body and the past have a commonality: they are both mortal. Indeed, the world in which we live today in terms of geological existence represents only a small fraction of our recorded history and yet, a big portion of that has already been forgotten by the great majority of people.[67] Another important scholar in the field, David Cannadine, in a short memoir "Where Statues Go to Die", explains how even the most glorious empires have been subject to change and to the fragility and uncertainty of time. "Earthly power is transient, and imperial dominion is ephemeral." Statues that were supposed to commemorate the actions of men who once seemed worth of endless adulation and worship have been forgotten.[68] Countries like Angola, India, and Indonesia have overcome their colonial past and moved on to write their own history.[69] It has been almost 60 years since Cyprus has overcome its British colonial past and yet, Cypriots have not managed to write their own history in terms of Cypriotism rather than Hellenism or Turkism. Past conflicts (Australia, Western Europe, Canada, United States) have shown that all cultural conflicts end at some point finding, either implicitly or explicitly, compromises between the new and the old elements. It would be anyway impossible to imagine that narratives remain unchanged for more than some generations.[70] One can think of history textbooks and the way they are often changed to reflect the present's views. Psychological evidence suggests that transgenerational traumas and sufferings can continue two up to four generations.[71] For example, by

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[65] Joachim Gauck and Martin Fry, "Dealing with a Stasi Past," *Daedalus*, Vol. 123, No. 1, Germany in Transition (Winter, 1994), pp. 277-284.

[66] Aleksandr Luria, *The Mind of the Mnemonist: A Little Book about a Vast Memory*, (Harvard University Press, 1987).

[67] David Rieff, *In Praise of Forgetting*, p.5.

[68] David Cannadine, "Where Statues Go to Die," *BBC*, (January 21, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/7196530.stm [last accessed 03.06.2019].

[69] David Rieff, *In Praise of Forgetting*, p.50-51.

[70] Ibid., p.33.

[71] For more further analyses on the topic see: Martha Henriques, "Can the Legacy of Trauma Be Passed Down the Generations?" *BBC*, (26 March, 2019) http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20190326-what-is-epigenetics;

2045 there will hardly be any survivors of the victims of the Shoah, which means that what happens after memory is its becoming "plain history"[72] and that after some generations the power of time will start affect our memory, which will become always more blurred.[73]

There have been many arguments and scholars in favour of remember. For instance, the historian Timothy Garton Ash said that a nation without memory is childish, just as a person without memory is a child. The opposite may be argued as well, sometimes nations are childish because they hold on memories, this is especially true in divided or societies where collective memory has led to conflicts rather than peace, to hate rather than forgiveness.[74] It is like there is something unforgivable about forgetting the sacrifices and sufferings of those who have fought or died for what they believed in, it is something we owe to them. However, societies do not have a memory altogether, just as nations do not. There are individual memories. Very often forgetting is portrayed like a failure and those who forget like "assassins of memory", while remembering like a moral obligation.[75]

Furthermore, Hobsbawm's concept of invention of tradition can be connected with the French historian Daniel Halévy's theory of acceleration of history, according to which rapid and important changes have occurred since the 17th century – but especially since the turning of the 20th century - and that it is therefore normal to expect that the old and now obsolete established structures and idea would be replaced with new traditions in order to maintain the continuity with the present and the future.[76] Rieff recalls some important moments in history in which leaders have called for an active forgetting, a concept he borrows from Nietzsche.[77] Indeed, just as people can decide to voluntary remember he says, they can also decide to voluntary forget. Rieff

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https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2018/10/trauma-inherited-generations/573055/; Molly S. Castelloe, "How Trauma Is Carried Across Generations," *Psichology Today*, (May 28, 2012) Olga Khazan, "Inherited Trauma Shapes Your Health," *The Atlantic* (October 16, 2018) https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-me-in-we/201205/how-trauma-is-carried-across-generations.

[72] Norbert Frei, "Farewell to the Era of Contemporaries: National Socialism and its Historical Examination en Route into History," *History and Memory*, Vol. 9, No. 1/2, (Fall 1997), p.62.

[73] David Rieff, *In Praise of Forgetting*, p.78.

[74] Ibid., pp.36-39.

[75] Pierre Vidal-Naquet, *Assassins of Memory: Essays on the Denial of the Holocaust*, (Columbia University Press, 1993).

[76] Daniel Halévy, *Essai sur l'Accélération de l'Histoire*, (Editions de Fallois, 2001).

[77] Friedrich Nietzsche (1989).

recalls the Edict of Nantes, when Henry IV in 1598 forbad to remember: the memory of all things that took place on one side or the other from March 1585 will remain extinguished and treat as something that did not take place.[78] A more recent historical events he mentions is when De Gaulle decided to accede to Algerian independence. Despite receiving complaints because so much blood had been shed he replied that "nothing dries quicker than blood".[79]

Rieff makes another very good point, he says that collective memory cannot correspond to what individuals remember. We normally remember and commemorate a historical event that we have not experienced, we remember it through the eyes of our older relatives who have lived it or public commemorations promoted by the state or schools. Can this be called remembering then? Collective memory is rather a metaphor for "interpreted" reality.[80] Pierre Nora, a pioneer in the study of collective memory, said that memory tends to be used as a substitute for history and that the study of history has been put at the service of memory, meaning of politics. This is very different from the question of moral obligation and duty to the fallen, being it a matter opposing political agendas deciding what should be remembered and how. Nora called it "the democratisation of history."[81]

A final point connected to forgetfulness is forgiveness. The American ethicist Jeffrey Blustein in The Moral Demands of Memory focused on the power of apologies. He said that after an apology between the perpetrator and the aggrieved party, the past acquires a new meaning.[82] Indeed, when one apologies, the aggrieved party feels not only that the offending party is regretful but also that they may not repeat the mistakes they learnt from. While when we do not apologise, the aggrieved party has no incentive nor strength to forgive. This is the moment when memory serves beneficial purposes, when it helps apologising and forgiving.

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[78] David Rieff (2917), p.143.
[79] Ibid., p.122.
[80] Ibid., p.74.
[81] Pierre Nora, "Reasons for the Current Upsurge in Memory," *Transit*, No. 22 (2012).
[82] Jeffrey Blustein, *The Moral Demands of Memory*, (Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp.92-100.

2. Nationalism and identities in Cyprus

The Cyprus issue needs to be investigated also under the point of view of identity and therefore of nationalism since memory is strictly intertwined to these themes. The lack of a Cypriot identity makes it easier to leave room for politics of remembrance and to opposing collective memories on the two sides, while leaving unheard individual memories. It is largely agreed that Ernest Gellner was one of the greatest theorisers in the field and therefore, nationalism and its positive or negative impact in Cyprus will be defined on the basis of the meaning conferred by him. Nowadays, nationalism has acquired a negative connotation and it is has come to be associated with extremism, oppression of minorities, assimilation, xenophobia, racism. While a positive nationalism would see differences as a benefit, a negative nationalism uses them to exclude those who do not share the group's commonalities. Nationalism is not per se "bad" but nor is it per se "good". Each case of nationalism needs to be contextualised and its aims need to be taken into account. We may want to ask whether nationalism is aimed at liberating a people's nation (19th century Greek nationalism, directed against the Ottoman rule) or supressing another nation (German nationalism in the 1930s and 1940s against any ethnicity other than the German one). Surely, the dividing line between liberating and supressing is not always clear. A more complex case is contemporary Cyprus: Is Turkish nationalism in Cyprus the answer to the perceived discrimination by the Greek majority? Is Greek nationalism in Cyprus the legitimate expression of majority rule? Can a transnational consensus be expected as an answer, based on a Turkish-Greek consensus (e.g. "power sharing"[83])?[84] In order to answer these questions, a theoretical framework needs to be firstly provided. Afterwards, in *Part II* the case of Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot nationalisms will be analysed more thoroughly.

*According to Gellner, in order for nationalism to exist it requires two important elements: a state and a nation. The former is defined as the agency or group of agencies within a specific territory being legally and lawfully vested with power to exert on a specific population. Indeed, if there was no state and no ruler, we would not even start

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[83] For an analysis on power-sharing, see Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*, (Yale University Press, 1977).
[84] Professor Anton Pelinka in his seminar on Nationalism, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, 2019.

wonder whether the borders of a state correspond to one's idea[85] of nation or whether the ruler and the subjects[86] share the same identity.[87] However, a state is a necessary but not sufficient condition for nationalism. The second prerequisite is the existence of a nation, where nation is defined as:

> *"1. Two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, where culture means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating;*
>
> 1. *Two men are of the same nation if and only if they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation."*[88]

One conclusion that can be drawn from these two segments is that nations are created by men on the basis of their convictions and loyalties, where culture and willingness play a key role. A second important point to make, which also supports my belief that the two Cypriot communities' ability to co-exist peacefully can be developed in the future, is Gellner's idea that while cultural pluralism may not seem viable sometimes, with a little bit of "historical awareness or sociological sophistication"[89] one can be convinced that this does not have to be always the case: culturally plural societies could often be so effectual to the extent that in its absence, plurality would have to be invented. Indeed, culture is not an "inherent attribute of humanity"[90] and as such, it can be invented and re-invented.*[91]

Identities in multi-ethnic countries: In search of a Cypriot identity

Culturally plural societies, nations that include instead of suppressing, form the basis for an inclusive nationalism. However a clarification needs to be made in order to proceed with the topic of identity. Inclusion does not mean shared values ('we believe in the same God', 'we share the same values on family, on education'...). It is a shared

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[85] Here, I employ purposely the term 'idea' to underline the fact that there is no given notion of nations, as these are made of a collection of rich identities and as borders are socially constructed and as such, are transitional and temporary. Geography is vested by much more than a physical dimension, it contains both a political and a symbolic dimension.

[86] I use the terminology 'ruler' and 'subjects' best reflecting the period when Gellner's book in question was written. However, the same argument can be used in terms of the modern context to indicate democratic leaders and their citizens.

[87] Ernest, Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism,* (Cornell University Press, 1983), p.4.

[88] Ibid., pp. 6-7.

[89] Ernest, Gellner (1983), p. 54.

[90] Ibid., p. 6.

[91] The sections of this chapter contained between asterisks contains excerpts from a paper I previously wrote for the seminar "Nationalism". "*Who is a Cypriot?",* April 2019*.*

national identity ('I share pride with you in being a citizen of the Cypriot state') that brings people together and leads them to co-operate. This may be the only realistic and viable basis to include all the different people living in a country.

   *When dealing with the issue of identity, Cannadine provides the right theoretical support. He is also very relevant for analysing the Cypriot problem, not only because he takes into account religion, but because it touches that human side involving any person of any nation. It is in my belief indeed that the human side of the conflict has lost touch over the years in Cyprus. People are becoming accustomed to the long *de facto* division. Nowadays, having a coffee in the bakery near the Green Line in Nicosia, next to a wall of sand bags and barbed wire fence has become the normality. Making of a whole city a ghost town, full of unexploded landmines, victim of time and weather, while bathing in front of its gates as if nothing is happening behind us has become the normality. Therefore, I am convinced that there is a need of stronger peace education: too often the data available show us the people involved in a conflict as a mere number rather than human beings and divide them between victims and victimisers, while there is much more behind.

   This is exactly what Cannadine states. He strongly argues against the Manichean view of the world dividing people into two different and conflicting groups, a good side – "us" and whoever is with us – and an evil one – the "other" and whoever is against us. This is an over-simplified notions of identity that does nothing but creating conflicts when in reality, cultures constantly overlap, borrow from each other and live together.[92]

> *"This world is not binary-except insofar as it is divided into those who insist that it is and those who know that is not."[93]*

This is an extremely important point to make in the case of Cyprus as one of the main narratives opposing a future resolution supports the argument that the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot communities could never co-exist together simply put, because they are too different. Not only the world cannot be divided in black and white – and Cyprus cannot escape this – but as I hope to have demonstrated in the previous sections, Cyprus has always been dominated by so many cultures, and the stories of

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[92] David, Cannadine, *The Undivided Past: History Beyond Our Differences,* (Vintage, 2014), p.5.
[93] Ibid., p.9.

these three countries involved – Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey - are so intertwined that it sounds insane to even talk of a "pure" Cypriot people.*[94]

By taking into account the above mentioned external and internal factors, I hope to have demonstrated how much socio-political factors have fuelled the problem of building a Cypriot identity making it impossible until today to understand who a Cypriot is. This confusion regarding Cypriot identity has in turn helped the tensions between the two communities escalating and it keeps the conflict unsolved until today. It is interesting to note the fact that despite the 45 year long *de facto* division and despite very few people speaking the language of the community on the other side of the green line, the Constitution – unchanged since 1960, except with minor modifications – still considers both Greek and Turkish as the official languages in Cyprus, despite Cyprus being an independent country! The linguistic situation in Cyprus is described by many as diglossic, meaning that there is a so-called "high variety" spoken in formal contexts – in the case of Cyprus, standard modern Greek in one side and standard Turkish in the other – and its vernacular version – Greek and Turkish Cypriot respectively – used in everyday situations. Formally recognising Greek and Turkish as the official languages of Cyprus reflects the fact that language policy is still closely related to politics and nationalisms. This is better explained by the fact that Cypriots of both communities do not feel standard Greek and standard Turkish as their own language. While in the past this was a way to show historical and biological continuity with what were considered the respective motherlands, it is highly doubtful how this could be of any use nowadays, when a very low percentage of the population would claim to see Greece and Turkey as their motherlands and unjustly feels embarrassed to speak its native language fearing to be considered "villagers" or uneducated. An unchanged constitution that survived a war and a division cannot reflect the changed social and political circumstances and it only enhances the gap between the two communities. But what should also cause great consternation is the fact that both Greece and Turkey still hold a grip on important symbols: Cyprus, an independent country, has no national anthem of its own, using the Turkish and the Greek one respectively. Cyprus has its own flag but they also wave the Greek one the Turkish one. Furthermore, not only the two Cypriots sides have

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[94] The sections of this chapter contained between asterisks contains excerpts from a paper I previously wrote for the seminar "Nationalism". "Who is a Cypriot?", April 2019.

different national days, but that they also celebrate Greece and Turkey's national days, which are targeted against each other. This are certainly issues that do not help defining what a Cypriot identity is and surely do not reflect the image of an independent country. However, in case of reunification, another major linguistic issue would concern communication. As I stated above, very few people speak both official languages and therefore, would English become their *lingua franca*, at least for the period immediately after reconciliation? Would both governments be willing to introduce the teaching of the second official language? That people in Cyprus would have no problem with bilingualism is of no doubt to me, what is concerning is the "will" factor that I mentioned when using Gellner's theory and the fact that, as Brubaker said, languages are strongly politicised. Indeed, even though I believe that both sides are still trying to use religion in a subtle way as a political tool – for instance, both sides keep building churches and mosques even though there are more religious centres than green areas – nowadays the linguistic gap is probably affecting society more deeply. A very low percentage of the population would refuse to live with a person having a different faith, especially since Cyprus continues being a multicultural entrepôt, where foreigners are mostly welcomed, even refugees.

If Cyprus wants to end a 45 year long division really needs to change mentality and it needs to do it fast, as the more the new generations grow apart, the more easily is that the partition becomes irreversible. Being aware that this is easier to be said than to be done, one needs not to forget Cannadine's human words.

3. The other side of the coin: Remembrance

National memory: Politics of remembrance

Memory has been at the service of politics since the creation of the modern, 'post-Westphalian' state.[95] During the period following the Thirty Years War indeed, a model for oblivion was developed: Jean Calvin was preaching Christian forgiveness and banishment of all remembrance of injustice. In the following Treaty of Westphalia (1648) states were called to grant the opposing side an "amnesty, or pardon of all that has been committed since the beginning of these troubles, in what place, or what manner whatsoever the hostilities have been practised, in such a manner, that no body, under any pretext whatsoever, shall practice any acts of hostility, in any enmity, or cause any trouble to each other."[96] The Treaty was calling for "eternal oblivion."[97] While erasing one's memory is not the argument I am advancing to support oblivion, offering a mutual pardon to stop hostilities is the part of the Treaty that I consider important for any divided society in modern times. While erasing events that had a significant impact in our lives would be close to the impossible under a psychological point of view (the memory can be stored somewhere very deep in our mind that would need some stimuli or other kinds of techniques to be recalled but it seems unlikely that major or key events in our life could be erased permanently[98]), as well as unrightful (it would deny and erase from people knowledge of their past, it would leave room to negationist narratives, it would prevent academics from having rich archives on both oral and written history and evidence concerning human rights violations…), it is this type of oblivion that puts aside a certain negative memory, without erasing it - but only after having process it and accept it. It is this procedure that could allow individuals and societies as a whole to come to terms with their past and move on with their lives for the best. A century later, when the ideas of the French Revolution started to spread, the remembrance model was *in vogue* instead. Civic remembrance is now preached

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[95] Excerpted from the Introduction to: Law and Memory: Towards Legal Governance of History (Uladzislau Belavusau & Aleksandra Gliszczyńska-Grabias, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2017).

[96] "Treaty of Westphalia Peace Treaty between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and their respective Allies," *Islamic Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Spring 2011), p.75.

[97] Ibid., p.76.

[98] Mikhail Katkov, Memory Retrieval from First Principles, Neuron 94(5):1027-1032 (July 2017).

and it is the state that "supervises" remembrance. Therefore, forgetting is still a key element but this "depends upon how one remembers."[99]

Not only politics of remembrance set limits on democratic freedoms (expression, association…) with its punitive form (e.g. imposing criminal penalties through 'memory laws'), but they also impose an interpretation of history. However, there are also tools used by governments that allow them to lean on remembrance without taking into account the coercive element. These can be national memorials ceremonies, public monuments, the content of school texts. In this paper I will use two examples of political remembrance, one involving the coercive element – *lois mémorielles* - and one that does not – history teaching and textbooks.

Lois mémorielles

The French case is particularly emblematic (French republicanism will dictate the future but also the past of the nation with all that follow on from it – ideas of ethnicity, identity, and nation) and will therefore be taken into consideration to explain 'memory laws'. After World War II, it also emerges the "duty to remember", not to forget the horrible crimes committed, and prohibitions on Holocaust denial are imposed. This is the current situation on memory law, where imposed oblivion and imposed remembrance have become just two sides of the same coin, or better, of the same political tool.[100] While going deep into the discussion of the legitimacy and mistakes of the Tribunals, of the post-WWII laws (retroactive liability, selective guilt, quick retribution…), goes beyond the scope of this paper, one must ask how far that renewal of memory should go and how selective memory laws are in commemorating certain crimes but turning a blind eye on others. With these questions in mind, we can have a better understanding of the danger of remembrance in the political sense and in the importance of coming to terms with the past.

In France memory laws are called *lois mémorielles* and currently four have been passed: *loi Gayssot* (1990) aimed at repressing any racist, anti-Semite or xenophobe act; law recognising the 1915 Armenian genocide (2001); *loi Taubira* (2001) recognising slavery and African slave trade as a crime against humanity; and the law

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[99] Søren Kierkegaard, *Either/Or: A Fragment of Life*, (Penguin Classics, 1992), p.293.
[100] Excerpted from the Introduction to: Law and Memory: Towards Legal Governance of History (Uladzislau Belavusau & Aleksandra Gliszczyńska-Grabias, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2017).

of 2005 recognising the contributes brought to the nation by the French repatriated (recognising amongst other things, the importance and the positive role of French history in the overseas territories).[101] Furthermore, in France the High Committee for National Commemorations ('*Haut Comité aux Commémorations Nationales*') was created in 1974 whose objective is self-explanatory from its name: bring to people's attention events, national heroes, national master pieces, and develop their knowledge on their own country.[102] Nowadays, a great deal of public discourse on memory and history has been taken away from historians to serve the state and the public. Politics often draws on the past and on collective memory to enhance the sense of belonging to a nation and further an agenda.[103] This is commonly known as politics of remembrance and make considerable use of laws dictating the official point of view of the government on historical events. Many historians, professors, scholars have criticised this move as a way to subjugate history to the law and politics. The petition "*Liberté pour l'histoire*" launched in 2005 and presided by Pierre Nora has therefore asked for the abolition of these laws because "history is not memory". In the petition, the signatories maintained that "an historian, in a scientific way, collects individual memories, compares them and cross matches them with documents, objects, traces and only afterwards establishes the facts. History takes memory into account but does not come down to it."[104] In their claim, they argued that history is not politics and should not be mixed with it, they should consist of two different domains, just as spiritual power is separated from the temporal one or just as politicians do not impose laws aimed at changing scientific domains, such as chemistry or physics.[105] A politician is not a historian. Considered that a politician would normally work following the democracy principles typical of any modern society, this means that those elected by universal suffrage will have exclusive competence in matters of law promulgation. If

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[101] "Lois mémorielles : La Loi, le Parlement et l'Histoire, Quel Partage des Rôles?" *Vie-publique.fr* (August 27, 2018) https://www.vie-publique.fr/actualite/dossier/lois-memorielles/lois-memorielles-loi-parlement-histoire-quel-partage-roles.html [last accessed 03.06.2019].

[102] "Le Haut Comité aux Commémorations nationales," *France Archives* (April 05, 2018), https://francearchives.fr/article/38299 [last accessed 03.06.2019].

[103] "L'état et les Mémoires," Secretariat general du Government, *La documentation Française*, Jornaux officiels, (November 2006), p.17.

[104] "Liberté pour l'Histoire," *Libération*, (December 13, 2005), https://www.liberation.fr/societe/2005/12/13/liberte-pour-l-histoire_541669 [[last accessed 03.06.2019].

[105] An exception could be the Soviet Union in the field of genetics. See the work of Lysenko - Joseph Stalin's director of biology – that draw from Ivan M. Michurin.

it is the case that they work in a state where *lois mémorielles* are enacted, history will be subdued to law and the legislator will be the only one in the position to say what history should contain or not. It means giving absolute decisional power to people who do not necessarily have expertise on the matter. Also, memory and history are not synonym. Recognising a specific memory by virtue of a law means making it become history. Memory laws are juridically meaningless but symbolically powerful.[106] By imposing what a historian should search and find, memory laws place limits to the scientific research every democratic society should rely on. If it is true that history and politics should be separated for objectivity purposes, then should these laws even exist? The initial goal of this type of law was to fight the so-called "historical negationism" of those political groups not recognising the pain of the victims of horrible crimes.[107] Despite not denying the Armenian genocide or justifying the crime, a deeper analysis of the French population will highlight the motivations driven by opportunistic reasons rather than humanitarian. Why would the French parliament promulgate a law on a crime committed by a foreign power more than one century ago in which France was not even involved? Why not promulgating also a law on the genocide of the Native Americans? One does not need to go back to too ancient times to remember that France received many refugees and migrants escaping the massacres of the Ottoman Empire (one of the ethnicities living within the Empire was exactly the Armenian one), while France saw no mass migrations of Native Americans in its territory. How would this new ethnic group affect the country? Currently, there are around 400,000 ethnic Armenians in France[108], meaning that for instance, they consist of a numerous electorate relevant for French political dynamics. Indeed, Macron has honoured the promise made in 2017 during his campaign and last February declared April 24 national day in France for the commemoration of the 1915 Armenian genocide.[109]

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[106] "L'état et les Mémoires" (2006), p.28.

[107] Ibid., p.18.

[108] "La Diaspora Arménienne Trois Fois plus Importante que sa Population Locale," *Papiers d'Arménie*, (February 9, 2018), https://papiers-armenie.fr/2018/02/09/diaspora-armenienne-trois-plus-importante-population-locale/ [last accessed 03.06.2019].

[109] "France's Macron Announces National Day Marking Armenian Genocide," *France 24*, (February 6, 2019), https://www.france24.com/en/20190206-france-macron-announces-national-day-marking-armenian-genocide-turkey.

History teaching and textbooks

   Just as history teaching can be a tool for propaganda, it can also be a tool for building peace and acceptance, especially in conflict and post-conflict areas. As it should be clear by now, the past is a weapon and remaining ignorant about history means being vulnerable to manipulations. Societies in the 21st century are becoming always more multicultural, some of them are affected by massive immigrations enhancing this diversity. Under these circumstances, opening to the "other", understanding, recognising it and accepting it is fundamental to fight prejudices and discriminations. History teaching should build cooperation and trust and not walls, it should awaken curiosity and in divided society in particular, it should focus on shared history, on commonalities rather than stressing differences. The history teaching discourse is particularly relevant because it is connected to issues of identity and remembrance – both individual and collective. Furthermore, history textbooks do not need to promote a particular violent or hateful narrative to be considered harmful. Even "peaceful" but non-inclusive narratives ignoring minorities or marginalised groups can do equal damage. In these cases, history can be poisonous and the blood of the victims of conflicts is also on history teachers.[110] When teaching history, rather than avoiding controversial issues, these should be analysed from a critical and empathetic lens. Instead of viewing other cultures with suspicion, students should be provided with first hand experiences of other cultures so to avoid falling into the trap of essentialising cultures and identities.[111] In *Part II*, I will present the harmful role of history textbooks when used for promoting one narrative only.

   Collective memory: *Lieux de mémoire*

   In order to analyse this section, further clarifications on memory need to be provided. We must distinguish memory from history. The former is ever changing depending on the politics of remembrance and forgetting, to manipulation and appropriation - but also to the oversights of time - and it is a connection to the eternal present. The latter is a representation, a reconstruction, of the past, of what is not anymore.[112] A further difference exists between true memory (habits, skills passed down by unspoken traditions) and memory transformed by its passage through history (voluntary,

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[110] H.G. Wells in a report in *The Advocate*, January 17, 1939, Australia.
[111] "Rethinking Education in Cyprus," *Association for Historical Dialogue*, (2013), p.7.
[112] Ibid., p.8.

individual, and subjective). Modern memory is, above all, archival, it has been absorbed by its meticulous reconstitution. It is a storage of what it would be impossible for us to remember (if in the past this tasks was left to church and the great families, today museums, libraries, depositories, centres of documentation, and data banks undertake this task).[113] However, nowadays everybody feels the need to store memories, making "everyone their own historian."[114] This has redefined identities because every established social group feels now the need to embark on a quest for its origins and identity.[115] This is where collective memory comes into play. While collective memory could be considered as a sub-category of national memory (that is, when one of more groups shares the view of the nation), national memory is not necessarily collective memory, unless it is inclusive of every group forming the nation. Hence, there may be different – sometimes opposing – collective memories within one nation and consequently, places, objects, people, ideas may be connected by varied social groups to different concepts. Applying this idea to the case of *lieux de mémoire* theorised by Pierre Nora ('sites of memory'), it is therefore possible that a site of memory has a deep meaning for one group, while it means nothing at all for another group.

According to Nora (1989), *lieux de mémoire* are the concrete representation of memory in those sites where a sense of historical continuity persists.[116] *Lieux de mémoire* are created by an interaction between memory and history, but for this to happen there must be an intention to remember otherwise *lieux de mémoire* would simply be called *lieux d'histoire*. At the same time, it is important that history interacts with memory, because without it, and without time and change, we would just obtain a schematic outline of the objects of memory, while the main goal of a *lieu de mémoire* is to freeze time and to not forget, to create "an endless recycling of their meaning."[117] A *lieu de mémoire* can be such in three different ways that always coexist. Nora provides us with the example of a historical generation: this can have a material *lieu de mémoire* (the demographic content), symbolic (because it refers to some past events

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[113] Pierre Nora (1989), p.13.
[114] Carl Becker's speech to the American Historical Association in 1931.
[115] Ibid., p.15.
[116] Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire," *University of California Press*, No. 26, Special Issue: Memory and Counter-Memory, (Spring, 1989), p.7.
[117] Ibid., p.19.

experienced by a small minority but it characterises a larger group whose members may have not lived those events and therefore, not have direct memory of them), and functional (because memories become crystallised and then transmitted to the future generations).[118] An archive can be another example of material *lieu*, a commemorative minute of silence a symbolic *lieu*, a history textbook a functional one. Constitutions, treaties, history books serving a particular narrative, memoirs, diaries, autobiographies are *lieux de mémoire*. There are also more physical *lieux de mémoire*, such as cemeteries, statues, monuments to the fallen and museums, and those more intellectually elaborate, such as generations, lineage, formal divisions of inherited property.[119] These can also be divided into dominant and dominated lieux de memoire. The former being normally triumphant and solemn ceremonies imposed by above. The latter are silent sites where spontaneous rites happen, being it pilgrimages or sanctuaries for example, "where one finds the living heart of memory." The difference between the two is that the former are attended by people while the latter are visited. One could also distinguish them like an official, public and imposed memory versus a spontaneous, private and voluntary memory.[120]

Popular communicative memory

The development of modern technological storage and communication are relevant for discussions on memory.[121] Print media has enhanced Nora's acceleration towards an imperative to preserve: especially relevant have been developments in photography, film, and phonograph that have created more possibilities for storage.[122] Unfortunately, the impact of digital media on memory can be analysed in a limited manner, as its influence on political and cultural life is just beginning to be visible. Furthermore, Pierre Nora defined 'acceleration' as a feature of media consumption of our current society.[123] Also, both producers and audiences and their media constantly change because they must adapt to the context of time. This is why collective memory in the media sphere is not stable in the long term.[124]

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[118] Ibid., p.17.

[119] Ibid. p.21-22.

[120] Ibid., p.23.

[121] Hannah Möckel-Rieke, "Media and Cultural Memory," *American Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 1, (1998), p.5.

[122] Ibid., p.8.

[123] Pierre Nora (1989), 7-24.

[124] Karin Kukkonen, "Popular Cultural Memory," *Nordicom Review* 29 (2/2008) p.264.

Media and cultural institutions affects procedures of storing, reiterating and erasing cultural memories.[125] In *Les Cadres Sociaux*, Halbwachs describes the individual as being embedded in the different social memories of their family, religion and class. According to Halbwachs when a community shares the same knowledge of contents and codes, it forms the basis for a collective identity.[126] From this notion, Jan Assman theorised the concept of "cultural memory", also made of codes and conventions, reconstructed in specific historical contexts.[127] How is cultural memory relevant for this paper? It is because according to Posner in popular cultural memory three dimensions of culture blend together: "the social dimension of the audience, the material dimension of media texts and the mental dimension of codes and conventions that facilitate the reading process."[128] The repeated reception of the material dimension facilitates the creation of a common ground of codes and conventions, that is the mental dimension, which in turn is the basis of an audience community.[129]

The nation is certainly the place where collective memory is created because it provides room and the necessary symbols for creating a platform for the community sharing same memories. However, in the age of globalisation and loosing of borders, mass media acquired a central role in creating memories. By repeating the same representations, a society reproduces its cultural identity and therefore, its shared memories and identity. An important feature of popular cultural memory is that it is based on "imagination and appropriation rather than research and historical exactitude."[130]

For the purpose of this paper, football hooliganism and the way this sport is exploited by media and social media is taken into consideration in *Part II*. The journalist Richard Wiliams wrote in *The Guardian* that "reports of violence suggest that the game has once again become a focus for people who want to fight and need an excuse."[131] The

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[125] Hannah Möckel-Rieke (1998), p.15.
[126] Maurice Halbwachs, *Les Cadres Sociaux de la Mémoire*, Librairie Félix Alcan, (1925).
[127] Karin Kukkonen (2008), p.261.
[128] Richard Posner, *Kultur als Zeichensystem: Zur semiotischen Explikation kulturwissenschaftlicher Grundbegriffe* (Culture as a System of Signs: On The Semiotic Explanation of Basic Terms of Kulturwissenschaft), (Frankfurt am Main 1991).
[129] Karin Kukkonen (2008), p.261.
[130] Ibid., p.265.
[131] Richard Williams, "From Rochdale to Rio via Rome Hooliganism is Alive and Kicking," *The Guardian* (2 February, 2001) https://www.theguardian.com/football/2001/feb/02/sport.newsstory [last accessed 07.06.2019].

term 'football hooliganism' lacks of a legal definition. The Council of the European Union has defined it as a variety of football-related offences, such as violence against persons, damage to property, alcohol and drug offences, breach of the peace, theft and ticket touting.[132] There is no agreed definition on the term because this phenomenon is a construct of the media and politicians, rather than a scientific concept.[133] As far as Cyprus is concerned, the political involvement within Cypriot football clubs has resulted not only in football violence but also in the exacerbation of the ongoing division. In particular Apoel (right-wing) and Omonia (left-wing) football clubs' rivalry dates back to the 1940s civil war in Greece.[134] The most violent cases of hooliganism in Cyprus usually involve these two teams.

Individual memories: Oral history

Oral history started to be taken into consideration in the 1970s however, the historians criticising this type of history were in great majority than those who thought it should have been taken seriously. The main reason against oral history was and is that it relies on human memory,[135] which means that it is subject to time and to the limits and subjectivity of everything that is human-related. Of course there has been a gradual shift from the oral memory of the Middle Ages to written history starting already from the 11/12th century. The transition from individual to collective memories was gradual because until the 17th century the great majority of the population was illiterate, while this phenomenon will start to change in the 20th century. Nevertheless, both oral and written history have always been connected, borrowing from each other.[136] We could easily imagine how many documents were written based on oral stories or unspoken memories, which makes us come to the conclusion that neither are entirely reliable. Of course, oral memories became relevant when sources were going destroyed, as in case of a war or disappearance of

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[132] "Report on Football Hooliganism in the Member States of the European Union," *Council of the European Union*, 2002.

[133] Ramón Spaaij, *Understanding Football Hooliganism: A comparison of Six Western European Football Clubs*, (Amsterdam University Press, 2006), p.11.

[134] Helena Smith, "Car Bombs, Corruption and Illegal Betting: How Football in Cyprus Spiralled out of Control," *The Guardian* (6 September, 2016) https://www.theguardian.com/football/blog/2016/sep/06/bomb-attacks-and-boycotts-how-football-corruption-in-cyprus-turned-nasty [last accessed 07.06.2019].

[135] Patricia M. Thane, "Oral History, Memory and Written Tradition: An Introduction," *Royal Historical Society*, Vol. 9 (December 1999), p.161.

[136] Patricia M. Thane (1999), p.162.

monasteries.[137] This is the case when later, historians needed to rely in oral witnesses and when people with an agenda found room to create myths and sell them as history (the so-called "invention of tradition" by Hobsbawm). Fox points out that often oral stories were derived from written texts and as Wood suggests, both could be manipulated and re-created.[138]

Despite in recent times oral history has been outclassed by modern archives full of written attestations, there is proof that oral history is still influential. For example, in 1970s Britain there was a growing interest of domestic and social history highlighting aspects of everyday life (for instance as relationships within families).[139] Particularly relevant for this thesis are the points of view of Thomson and Kedward, maintaining that oral history is also relevant in societies that have been affected by war, conflicts and divisions. Kedward stated that these situation of danger or crisis can force communication into secrecy and disrupt the documentary record, thus conferring greater relevance oral communication and memory.[140] Thomson treats oral accounts as sources that can tell us how a person has made sense of their experiences and how these have affected them.[141]

Of course, oral history has its own flaws, as it relies on people's informal stories, on the way they have perceived, lived, and understood a particular event. Nostalgia plays an important role and then of course, scepticism exists on the reliability – consistency on telling the same story over a repeated number of times - and validity – conformity between the reports of the event and the event itself as described by other primary source material of oral history.[142] The reliability of memory to remember sometimes a far gone event but also time consciousness – the way we perceive time and read facts in relation to the time. "The information provided by interview evidence of relatively recent events, or current situations, can be assumed to lie somewhere between the actual social behaviour and the social expectations or norms of the time. With

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[137] Patrick J. Geary, "Land, Language and Memory in Europe", *Royal Historical Society*, Vol. 9 (1999), p.172.

[138] Patricia M. Thane (1999), p.164.

[139] Ibid.

[140] Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Vol. 9: Sixth Series, (*Cambridge University Press*, 1999), p. 164-165.

[141] Alistair Thomson, "Australian Generations? Memory, Oral History and Generational Identity in Postwar Australia," *Australian Historical Studies*, 47(1):41-57 (January 2016).

[142] Alice and Howard Hoffman, *Reliability And Validity In Oral History: The Case For Memory*, in J. Jeffrey and G. Edwall (eds), *Memory and History. Essays on recalling and interpreting experience* (Lanham, 1994), p.109.

interviews which go back further, there is the added possibility of distortions influenced by subsequent changes in values and norms, which may perhaps quite unconsciously alter perceptions. With time we would expect this danger to grow."[143] Reliability does not concern only the interviewee but also the interviewer. Information depends on the way an interviewer poses a question for example, that should not influence the way the interviewee think of the matter and provides an answer. A general problem concerns the objectivity of all historical data, as it relies on human knowledge[144] and as such, conclusions – whether drawn with quantitative or qualitative methods – cannot be held as absolutely true.[145] Applying Thompson's idea of facts and events being reported "in a way which gives them social meaning" reflects the idea of subjectivity of both history and personal stories. Fact must be distinguished from fables, but also the meaning in a fable must be deciphered.[146]

The Hoffman spouses, psychologist and oral historian respectively, devised a method to examine memory by using both psychological and historical analysis. The interviews would be carried out in three phases. In the first one the conversation would start with a simple objective question such as "tell me about the war", in order for the interviewee to recall freely whatever events he had stored in mind. In the second phase, the same interviewee would be asked after some years to recall the same events to test the issue of reliability. During this phase, they would be asked not to make use of any tool that could have helped their brain to re-experience those memories (watching movies, reading about the issue…). The third and final step consisted in conducting interviews which were based on what documentary evidence could be located.[147] The interviews support the argument that information are saved in some parts of our brain as if it was a storehouse and that may not be available at any time by simply free recalling. However, this does not mean that the information has been necessarily erased because with the right stimuli it could be retrieved.[148] The study proved that oral memory can be reliable and preserved for a lifetime and therefore, useful to be used side by side with other written accounts. However, details are not always precise

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[143] Paul Thomson, *The Voice of the Past: Oral History*, (Oxford University Press, 2000), p.100.
[144] R. Kenneth Kirby, "Phenomenology and the Problems of Oral History," *Oral History Review*, Vol. 35, No. 1, (Winter/Spring 2008), p.24.
[145] Valerie Yow, *Recording Oral History*, (AltaMira Press, 2005), p. 6.
[146] Paul Thompson (2000), p.100.
[147] Hoffman (1994), p.110.
[148] Ibid., p.115.

and valid. Furthermore, it was found that these memories are not stable and altering the order of events in which a person remembers can cause the loss of those memories. An additional finding was that there are memories that are not erased but cannot be recalled without giving some cues that could re-evoke them. Finding those cues is not an easy task though. In the words of Proust, "The past is hidden . . . beyond the reach of intellect, often in some material object. . . . And as for that object, it depends on chance whether we come upon it or not."[149]

The study also proved that both oral and written history are not always accurate and can be flawed. Another finding is that memory can be selective and that despite two people living the same event, one may recall it and the other will not. This leads us to the fact that one remembers according to the way it has experienced and understood that event, which does not have to be necessarily wrong, just a different individual experience. Inaccuracy means also that there is room for the creation of myths.

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[149] Marcel Proust, *Remembrance of Things Past: Swann's Way* (New York: Random House, 1934), 34.

PART II   "THE CASE OF CYPRUS"

1. Towards a nation-state

Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot nationalism(s)

*[150]The external factors contributing to the lack of a Cypriot identity and therefore, to the 1974 problem as a whole must be briefly taken into account. This analysis involves three countries – Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey – and one Empire – the Ottoman Empire - and will evolve over roughly a century – from the moment when independence movements rose within the Empire, until the time the British administration landed in Cyprus causing the separation of the communities that prevented them from building a unique Cypriot identity, or a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot at least able to co-exist. By that time the possibility of building a Cyprus identity had been lost and both communities were already claiming to belong to their respective "motherlands". The bi-communal character of the island had been created. In order to understand how nationalist ideas emerged Cyprus, first of all the Ottoman social structure should be analysed.

Both Greek and Turkish nationalism flared in the Ottoman Empire at a time when the mighty dynasty had started crumbling. While until 1566 the Empire was at the peak of its power – encompassing large portions of south-eastern Europe and the MENA[151] (Middle East and North Africa) region - from that moment on it started slowly but steadily collapsing. And while from 1807 the new rule of Mahmud II aimed to reform[152] the Ottoman system and saving whatever could have been saved of the Empire by integrating the non-Muslim and non-Turk communities in the Ottoman

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[150] The sections of this chapter contained between asterisks contains excerpts from a paper I previously wrote for the seminar "Nationalism". "*Who is a Cypriot?*," April 2019.

[151] Being aware that the denomination "MENA" is a rather fluid and political term and that there is no universally agreed definition for it, I need to clarify my understanding of the MENA region as the area ranging from Morocco to Iran and South up to Yemen and Oman, as indicated in *Annex B.2.*

[152] 1839 Imperial Rescript of the Rose Garden and 1856 Imperial Reform Rescript: Muslim and non-Muslim subjects were given equal rights, regardless their faith or their ethnic affiliation, as well as human right and civil liberties. Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, *Instilling Religion in Greek and Turkish Nationalism: A "Sacred Synthesis,"* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p.52.

society, the new development was not able to do anything else but pave the way to the rising nationalisms to penetrate in its dominions.[153]

The *millet* system had created self-governed religious communities conferring power to the religious authority of each congregation. There were three *millets* enjoying protected status: the *Rum millet* included Orthodox Christians, amongst which Greeks, Bulgarians, Albanians, Georgians, Arabs, Vlachs, and Serbs. Furthermore, there were the Armenian and the Jewish *millets.* As far as Muslims were concerned, they enjoyed a privileged status and therefore, an official *millet* did not exist for them however, in practice the Muslim community was considered as another *millet.*[154] In exchange for the payment of a tax and the compulsory acceptance to a common political, administrative and financial system, the members of the *millets* could keep their faith and enjoyed a great degree of autonomy in matter of tax collection, education, and religious affairs of their own community. This arrangement of the minorities highlights immediately an important point, that subjects were grouped on the basis of religion and not ethnicity. The national element was rather insignificant for the simple reason that within an ethnically diverse empire, using religion as a glue to unite people from different cultures, ethnicities, and native languages - Albanians, Turks, Greeks, Serbian, Arabic, Kurdish... - seemed a sensible move to make.[155] This is proved by the fact that firstly, all the subjects of the empire, whether Muslim or not, were called *raya* – which highlights the fact that more than a common "*Heimat*", there were local religious communities – and secondly, by the fact that members of any nationality could attain high office in the Ottoman Porte as long as they were Muslim and knew Ottoman Turkish. However, this is also how religion from an obstacle to secularisation came to be accepted as the necessary tool in the formation of a unitary national identity: from the half of the 19th century, the *millet* system started delineating ethnicity or even nationality and consequently, facilitated the creation of nationalist ideas imported from the French Revolution.[156]

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[153] Malcolm Edward Yapp and Stanford Jay Shaw, "Ottoman Empire*", Encyclopaedia Britannica,* (November 27, 2018).
[154] Umut Ozkirimli and Spyros Sofos, *Tormented by History: Nationalism in Greece and Turkey*, (C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2008), P.45.
[155] Ioannis N. Grigoriadis (2013), p.3.
[156] Umut Ozkirimli and Spyros Sofos (2008), p.45.

Turning now to Greek and Turkish nationalisms, we can certainly say that both are strictly embedded with each other: after the Greek war of independence in 1821, the first nation-state in the Ottoman empire was created – the Kingdom of Greece – and served as a catalyst for the eventual rupture of the Ottoman empire. Within a century of distance, in 1919, the victory of the Turkish nationalists against the invasion of the Greeks led to the creation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 and to the final collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Apart from the different time in which they emerged, also the circumstances changed. The Greek one was a diasporic movement born from European intellectual ideas (Neo-Hellenic Enlightenment) and from the legacy of the French Revolution aimed at ending the Ottoman obscurantism and embrace the Western ideas of modernisation. The Turkish one originated from the *tanzimat[157]*, in a period when the construction of nation-states was in full swing and the Ottoman Empire was seen as obsolete. This meant for the Turks claiming ownership of the leftovers of the Ottoman Empire.[158] People were now united by a common descendance and not by Islam, considered one of the main reasons for the failure of the empire to develop at the same pace of the West. Despite that, both nationalisms had one commonality: in both countries religion played socio-political functions, despite the attempts of the elites to dispense with it and build secular nations, separate temporal power from the spiritual and stop the corruption of the ancient regime. Peasants of the Ottoman Empire still identified themselves on the basis of religion, for this reason religion was initially used in both countries to complete the nation building project. Once this was finally consolidated, religion would be pushed away to create modern and Westernised states.[159]

Greek and Turkish nationalisms clashed because they both developed from claiming the same territory, both felt to be the rightful heirs of the Ottoman Empire. Only after the defeat in Asia Minor, did the Greeks turn back to a project of a smaller Greece and only after more than a decade of confrontations with the Great Powers, did the Turks turn to the nationalist project of confined Anatolia.[160] Despite that, Cyprus became the bone of contention between the two countries.

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[157] The period of reforms mentioned above (1839 – 1876).
[158] Umut Ozkirimli and Spyros Sofos (2008), p.39.
[159] Ioannis N. Grigoriadis (2013), p.2.
[160] Umut Ozkirimli and Spyros Sofos (2008), p.143.

The Cyprus problem started as a problem of two conflicting nationalisms, which required two opposing imaginations.[161] Greek and Turkish nationalisms burst into the established *millet* system in Cyprus during the new British administration, especially after 1912, when Crete obtained independence and was annexed to Greece, which created more expectations that the same could occur in Cyprus.[162] By trying to bring legal equality between Muslims and Christians – the only two *millets* on the island – the traditional structure of power that people were used to was reverted.

Muslims, once privileged, were now dominated by the Orthodox Cypriots, stronger in terms of population and financially. As it was the leader of each community that would administrate the *millet* he belonged to, a consequence of this system was the rise to power of the Orthodox Church in Cyprus and its leader, the Archbishop, along with the powerful merchant class.[163] It was through these two groups that nationalist ideas were spread within the Orthodox of Cyprus and the idea of *enosis* started to circulate. The effect the overturning of the hierarchy had was on the one hand for the Turkish Cypriots, a sense of humiliation and fear to be reduced to just a minority and on the other hand, the Orthodox side felt to have finally be repaid for having lived for so many centuries under submission. Under these circumstances, it is not difficult to imagine how the two communities started to drift apart and to align with the two countries that could have given them back the idea of belonging to a nation whose past was glorious and its culture the cradle of civilisation. I am referring to Greece and Turkey respectively claiming a "Greece of the two continents and five seas" and that "all regions from the Adriatic Sea to the Chinese Sea have a single faith. The people who dwell there belong to the Turkish race".[164]

Using the past – a concept very often exploited by nationalists to instil in people their own ideas of what constitutes a nation – and making those claims was easy under British rule, where freedom of speech and press were granted, unlikely the repressive Ottoman Empire. The British brought also improvement in communication means and grants-in-aid to village schools, which also resulted in a better educated population

[161] The Imagined Cypriot: A Barred Space for Claiming the Island. OSCE/ODIHR. Warsaw, 24 September- 5
October, p.1.
[162] William Mallinson, *Cyprus: A Modern History,* (I.B. Tauris. Revised ed., 2008), p.10.
[163] David Hunt (1982).
[164] Umut Ozkirimli and Spyros Sofos (2008)*, p. 130.

and in the development of a public opinion - especially through newspapers.[165] However, in Cyprus education was never in full control of the state and it is in there that nationalist ideas were being spread, where indoctrinated students would be taught how to be a Greek or a Turk. The double educational system certainly helped creating different and contrasting national views.[166]

Nationalist politics in Cyprus developed especially after the death of Sofronios III (1900) who left a power vacuum leading to a struggle for leadership between the Bishop of Kition and the Bishop of Kyrenia - the first modern political campaign in Cyprus. In their discourses, *enosis* and the rhetoric of the eternal enemy was used by both. Certainly the propaganda for restoration and redemption was appealing in a time of poverty and successfully mobilised the masses. After the election of the Bishop of Kition, agitations in support of *enosis* and against Moslems spread and in 1912, the island experienced its first large-scale intercommunal conflict.[167]

The Turkish counterpart was the rivalry between the populist *kadi*[168] and the *mufti*[169] that started in 1899 from a dispute over the conducting of the summer midday prayer: whether or not it was respectful to conduct it in the veranda of a mosque to protect people from the hot summer sun. Both used public debates and the masses to be heard. It escalated so quickly that the two parties stopped attending the prayers together and the matter had to be brought to Istanbul to decide which party was right. The outcome was the development of a political identity where the masses were seen as Muslims and the elites as Ottomans.[170]

Shared or negotiated identities?

There are two important internal factors that affect identity formation in a multi-ethnic and divided society - language and religion – and this is especially true in the case of Cyprus. For the purpose of this paragraph, the work of two recent academics will be mainly employed – Rogers Brubaker and David Cannadine - as they provided great focus on language and religion.

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[165] Rebecca Bryant, *Imagining the Modern: The Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus,* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2004), p.32
[166] Ibid., p.127.
[167] Ibid., pp.84-93.
[168] In the Ottoman Empire, the magistrate or judge of a Sharia court.
[169] A jurist qualified to issue a nonbinding opinion according to Sharia law.
[170] Rebecca Bryant (2004), pp.103-110.

Brubaker's theory will help better answering the question: to what extend language and religion are a factor in the (de)construction of identity in Cyprus? However, while he focuses on three different elements for contemporary politics of difference – the return of inequality, of biology, and of the sacred – I will focus only on the latter for the purpose of this paper.

According to Brubaker indeed, languages and religions are "the two most socially and politically consequential domains of cultural difference in the modern world.[171] Both elements are connected to ethnicity and nationhood because through language and religion one can identify themselves and others (culturally, socially, politically) - which means that they sort people into distinct categories, simultaneously uniting and dividing between "us" and the "other". Further commonalities include the fact that they both play an important role in the family domain and as such, are seen as primordial. In fact, they are neither – as a matter of fact they are increasingly chosen rather than given, especially religion – because they are shaped by political, economic and cultural circumstances and, when these change, language and religion change as well. [172] However, there are also some differences between language and religion. Brubaker talks of politicisation and he says that languages are more politicized than religion in modern times, they have become a "pervasive medium of social interaction", of both private and public life (public education, direct rule, interaction with citizens, public sector).[173] Nowadays, liberal polities have generally adopted a more neutral position towards different religions, which have become more a concern of the individual, private and subjective experience.[174] In theory[175] we can state that public life can be areligious but not a-linguistic because, as universal and inescapable medium of public life, as a medium of communication, language can never be fully privatised or depoliticised.[176] However, it is also true that in recent decades conflicts arising from religious pluralism have intensified.[177] The normative content of religion

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[171] Rogers Brubaker, "Language, Religion and the Politics of Difference," *Journal of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism*. Vol. 19(1), (2013), p.2.
[172] Rogers Brubaker, *Grounds For Difference*, (Harvard University Press, Reprint edition, 2017), pp. 86-87.
[173]Ibid., p. 89.
[174]Ibid., p. 90.
[175] I state this is a very theoretical statement because a closer glance at any Western liberal society will show that there are traces of Christianism in probably any secular or laic state.
[176] Rogers Brubaker (2017), p. 93.
[177]Ibid., p. 95.

can regulate both the private and the public sphere (gender, sexuality, family life, education, economy, war, int. affairs, social policy…) in a deeper and more divisive way than language does. It penetrates the most intimate aspects of one's life involving fundamental differences of worldview, while languages' normative content is restricted to the rule of language. The challenges posed by religious pluralism are more complex than those posed by linguistic pluralism for different reasons. Firstly, while language change is generally additive (it may inflict one's identity but not transform it), religious change is substitutive or transformative.[178] Nevertheless, it must mentioned that this may work the opposite for immigrants for example: while in our days pressures and incentives for conversion to the prevailing religion are weak, incentives to learn the prevailing language are clearly strong.[179] If we consider the instance of a very young immigrant, learning the new language at a young age will almost certainly lead to the loss of the native language and the acquisition of the language of the receiving country – unless their parents make him keep his "roots", naturally. Secondly, religion is more easily reproduced throughout generations because requires a minor effort and less resources than learning a language would do[180] (we could consider for instance the high costs required to send children to private schools learning a foreign language). Thirdly and finally, while it would be difficult to imagine contemporary liberal states not being – at least formally – pluralist, on the contrary the language of the nation-state needs to be embraced in a sort of "monotheistic faith". Consider the requirements to obtain citizenship for instance. To my knowledge, currently no democratic state requires converting its faith to that of the state – if there is one – while the knowledge of the official language(s) is required.

With this last point we return to the claim that language is indeed a pervasive medium not only in private life but also in the political sphere, as well as a necessary element to be accepted within a group. For instance, during the British administration Greek became the language of education in schools, while Turkish would be taught in specific schools for minorities. Also, the majority would learn Greek history and literature because Greece would be shown as the mother country, and Cypriots would be taught to be patriotic towards the Greek flag and the Greek Royal Family.[181] Therefore,

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[178] Rogers Brubaker (2017), p. 91.
[179] Ibid., p. 92.
[180] Ibid,, p. 92.
[181] David Hunt (1982), p.249.

language was from the beginning a weapon to instil Greek nationalism in Cyprus. Religion however, contains those elements of "deep diversity"[182] that can divide a society in even more a robust way. Therefore, both languages and religions need to be considered for the Cyprus case because at present these are two important reasons why the deep fracture between the two Cypriot communities is not being closed.

Nevertheless, one must be careful not to generalise when it comes to a society that used to belong to a greatly multicultural empire. Despite the fact that different ways of identifying a group could be language, ethnicity, and religion, during the Ottoman administration and also at the beginning of the British one, these alternatives could have been blurred: how could language mark someone's identity when this was usually associated with social class or occupation and not forcibly with ethnicity. For instance, the language of the administration and politics was Ottoman Turkish and *Katharevousa[183]*, French was the language of commerce, but the rest of the population, especially the least educated, would speak vernacular or literary languages, such as Greek and Turkish Cypriot.[184] Being a Cypriot did not mean much, a Cypriotness did not exist because the *millet* system was still surviving from the Ottoman heritage, which meant firstly, that religious leaders had an enormous power and secondly, that one belonged to a community according to their religion rather than their birthplace or family. Being Cypriot would not reflect one's identity, rather one's birthplace, meant as physically belonging to a territory. Therefore, language was not a means of identification, religion still was. [185] This disconnection with the birthplace territory meant that Cypriots were still subjects not citizens and that only when they will feel as part of a nation the, connection with the territory will be a source of subjective identity.[186]

As long as what Bryant calls the "corporatism" of the village would exist, the two communities would still living peacefully together and the boundaries between the two would remain blurred. The greatest example were the *linovamvakoi* ('linen and

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[182] Rogers Brubaker (2017), p.98.
[183] An archaized form of Greek close to the ancient Greek language, very different from Greek Cypriot dialect. Turkish Cypriot was not that different from the Anatolian varieties however, Ottoman Turkish was not widely known in Cyprus and many Turkish Cypriots would speak either their dialect or even Greek Cypriot in villages where Greek Cypriots were the great majority. Rebecca Bryant (2004), p.34.
[184] Umut Ozkirimli and Spyros Sofos (2008), p.16.
[185] Rebecca Bryant (2004), p.16.
[186] Ibid., p.21.

cotton'), descendants of Greek Orthodox who had converted to Islam. Their appearance would resemble Turks (Muslim names, married to Muslims during the Ottoman period…) but they continued to believe in Orthodoxy, practicing its rites more or less in secret. They were called such because they did not fully belong either to the Christian or to the Muslim faith.[187] They demonstrated that for centuries until the first decade of the 20th century, Muslims and Orthodox Christians had lived together, married, and made somehow the two faiths and identities coexist. At the turn of the century however, with the breakdown of traditional structures of authority, this group was pressured to pick sides and reveal their true faith causing the disappearance of the group and of intercommunal marriages. Identity was now relevant and not only religion but also ethnicity and language played a big role in defining it.[188] Nationalists could now use identity – and connected to it, language and religion – to support their causes:

> *"If we were English, national salvation would have meant Enosis (unification) with England, if were French with France, and if we were Russian with Russia. If we were Cypriot, national salvation would have meant the independence of Cyprus and an independent Cypriot authority. But are we Cypriots? I mean a Cypriot nation? Is there, generally, a Cypriot nationality? … Are there indicators of a separate nationality in Cyprus? Let's see. First of all, there is no Cypriot language, there is only a dialect. Everyone knows that we speak Greek… Plus, there is not a different psychology in Cyprus. Us Cypriots, we do not believe in a different religion that the Hellenes believe in, in Greece. There are no differences in historical traditions between Cyprus and Greece. Us Cypriots, we do not have different customs from those of the Greeks. There is no other culture in Cyprus, than that of the Greeks. Plus, here we do not have different economic conditions." (AKEL General Secretary)[189]**

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[187] Alkan Chaglar, *Toplum Postası Alkan*, (May 5, 2006).
[188] Rebecca Bryant (2004), pp.63-67.
[189] Niyazi, Kızılyürek, *Milliyetcilik Kiskacinda Kibris*, (Iletisim Yayincilik, 2002), pp. 94-95.

2. Remembrance

National memory: Cyprus 1960 Constitution and history teaching and textbooks

The 1960 Constitution

*[190]The 1960 Constitution stemmed from the London-Zurich Agreements of 1959 where Greece, Turkey, Britain and the two Cypriot communities reached an agreement for the settlement of the Cyprus dispute along with the creation of an independent state (16 August 1960). This reflected first of all the fact that the constitution of Cyprus was imposed upon Cypriots rather than being emanated from the free will of its people, who were not consulted either directly or through their *ad hoc* elected representatives[191], despite Cyprus being officially declared "an independent and sovereign Republic" (Article 1 of the Constitution). Furthermore, the Constitution was based on two main principles. Firstly, the existence of two communities - the Greek and the Turkish - which paved the way for communalism and consequent ethnic segregation. Secondly, communal autonomy in administrative matters aimed at avoiding the domination of the larger Greek Cypriot community that gave rise to another problem: constitutionalism. Communalism, constitutionalism and the lack of a real independence from foreign powers created the basis for final partition. Indeed, the 1960 Constitution proved its inadequacy soon after the Republic was established.

Apart from the imposition of the Constitution upon Cypriots, it is worth mentioning the strong dependence on foreign powers: annexed to the London-Zurich Agreements and the Constitution are two draft treaties, the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance. According to the former, the Kingdom of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom as guarantor powers, would guarantee the territorial integrity and the Constitution of Cyprus. Under the Treaty of Alliance Cyprus, Greece and Turkey agreed to a military alliance for defence purposes. A less cited annex to the Zurich Agreements is the Gentlemen's Agreement between Karamanlis and Menderes, respectively Greek and Turkish Prime Minister back then. Under this agreement, it

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[190] The sections of this chapter contained between asterisks contains excerpts from a paper I previously wrote for the seminar "Ethnic Politics and Ethnic Conflicts". *Cyprus 1960 Constitution: The Seeds of Partition, February 2019.*

[191] Criton T. Tornaritis, *Cyprus and its Constitutional and Other Legal Problems*, (Nicosia: Proodos, 1977), p.43.

stipulated *inter alia*, that Greece and Turkey would guarantee a general amnesty, Cyprus' participation in NATO and an attempt to outlaw the Cypriot Communist party.[192]

It is also important to note how the notion of ethnicity was presented: in Article 2 of the Constitution, a Greek was defined as someone whose "origin and mother tongue is Greek or someone who shares Greek cultural traditions or are members of the Greek Orthodox Church". Equally, a Turk would be someone whose "origin and language is Turkish or someone who shares Turkish cultural traditions or who are Moslems"[193]. Therefore, one could be either Greek or Turkish, there is no reference to a "Cypriotness", and as far as other citizens of the Republic were concerned - Roman Catholics, Armenians, and Maronites -they had the chance to choose to belong to one of the ethnic groups.

Important for the notion of ethnicity and identity in Cyprus were also the subsequent Articles 3, 4, and 5: Greek and Turkish were designated as official languages having equal status[194], and the two communities were given the right to celebrate, respectively, Greek and Turkish national holidays and to fly the national flag of the respective mother countries along with the flag of the Republic[195]. Connection with their "motherlands"[196] was also highlighted in Article 108 that authorised the Greek and the Turkish Communities "to receive subsidies from the Greek or the Turkish Government respectively for institutions of education, culture, athletics and charity belonging to the Greek or the Turkish Community" or even "schoolmasters, professors or clergymen."[197] This clearly shows that Greece and Turkey's government had a free hand to influence extremely important fields, such as education and culture, and that

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[192] Costas Kyrris (1996), pp.37-376.

[193] Citizens of the Republic had the chance to change the Community they automatically belonged to upon writing of a declaration and approval by the Communal Chamber of such other Community.

[194] This means that legislative, executive and administrative acts and documents were to be drawn up in both official languages and promulgated in the official Gazette of the Republic in both official languages. Also, the two official languages were to be used on coins, currency notes and stamps.

[195] This concession was however limited to the authorities of the Republic, any public corporation or public utility body, not to private citizens.

[196] However, the social situation on the island has changed and the majority of Cypriots no longer sees Greece and Turkey as their motherlands.

[197] 1960 Constitution of Cyprus, available in English on House of Representatives http://www.parliament.cy/en/cyprus-independence/constitution-1960 [last accessed 04.06.2019].

the two communities were given the right to hold a close relationship with Turkey and Greece, as a sort of continuity rather than a nation on its own.[198]

Another problem was the voting system in two respects: on the one hand, it was too strict when it came to modify the Constitution, as the House had no power to do so in so far as it concerned its basic articles (Annex III) and any other modification required a separate majority of two thirds of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot members. The impossibility of amending the Constitution meant leaving the independent Republic of Cyprus subject to the guarantor powers against the International Law principles of territorial supremacy and political independence. On the other hand, the Constitution was too lenient in matters of laws relating to modification of the Electoral Law, to the municipalities or to the imposition of duties or taxes, as it required a separate simple majority of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Deputies. In the words of Makarios, this meant that even two Turkish Cypriot Ministers were sufficient to block a bill:

> *"The House of Representatives consists of 35 Greek Members and 15 Turkish Members. If, for example, 35 Greek Members and 7 Turkish Members vote in favour of a Bill, i.e. the Bill receives a total of 42 votes in favour, it can be defeated by 8 Turkish votes. Even 2 Turkish Representatives can defeat a Bill if only 3 Turkish Representatives take part in the vote."[199]*

This is a very important point to make because it eventually led Makarios to seek amendment of those provisions which impeded the functioning of the legislative process in his famous "13 points".[200]

The Constitution was supposed to create a nation however, separateness between the two communities was officially recognised and perpetuated.[201] Communal segregation could be seen everywhere in the provisions of the Constitution and separated Cypriots on the basis of their ethnic origin rather than bringing them together.

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[198] Andreas Neocleous, *Introduction to Cyprus Law*, (Yorkhill Law Publishing, 2000), p.19.
[199] 13 Points, Archbishop Makarios, Press and Information Office, Ministry of Interior, Republic of Cyprus, Nicosia, 30 November 1960, https://www.pio.gov.cy/assets/pdf/cyproblem/13%20points.pdf [last accessed 21.02.2019].
[200] Peter Clarke, "The Imposition of Income Tax in Cyprus in 1941: A Historical Note," *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 29 No. 1 (2017).
[201] T. W. Adams, "The First Republic of Cyprus: A Review of an Unworkable Constitution," *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Sep., 1966), pp. 475-490.

The 1960 Constitution envisaged a Greek Cypriot President (Archbishop Makarios III) and a Turkish Cypriot Vice President (Fazıl Küçük), elected by their respective communities for five-year terms of office. Not only the right to become President was given only to a Greek Cypriot, not only Greek Cypriots could not choose their Vice-President and Turkish Cypriots their President, but also in the event of the temporary absence or incapacity of the President, the President of the House of Representatives[202], who was to be a Greek Cypriot, would take over instead of the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President. The Turkish Cypriot Vice-President of the House of Representatives would play a similar role in the event of temporary absence or incapacity of the Vice-President. Therefore, the role of the Vice-President was diminished and a Turkish Cypriot could have never held the reins of the country. Moreover, the Vice-President, as member of the executive, could have ensured a better understanding of the work of the Council rather than the President of the House of Representatives. In the same way as for the election of the President and Vice-President of the Republic, the roles and powers of the President and Vice-President of the House created similar problems of trust and co-operation.

The communal and divisive character of the Constitution was proved also by the voting system according to which elections were to be conducted on the basis of separate communal electoral lists and separate voting.

One of the most controversial issue was the establishment of separate municipalities in five[203] of the six largest towns, while the other localities would follow the rule of proportional representation. However, while the constitution called for their establishment, implementing legislation was never passed, because the Greeks were convinced that such laws could lead to partition. This provision was one of the most divisive and harmful in the whole Constitution, as it aimed at separating Greek and Turkish Cypriots in segregated communities, whereas in the very same geographical areas, they used to live side by side, where ownership of property did not follow ethnic

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[202] The legislative body. Thirty-five of its members were to be Greek Cypriots and fifteen Turkish Cypriots elected by their respective communities. However, representation in proportion to communal strength would have resulted in a forty-to-ten ratio.
[203] Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca and Paphos.

patterns[204] (as demonstrated by the 1960 census, *Annex G.2*[205]). Another argument against separate municipalities may be the financial one, as municipal separation would have called for a doubling of costs related to the administration of the municipalities and the provision of services. A probably harder problem would have arisen from the difficulty for the leaders of both communities to draw borders amongst municipalities and of course, from their greed to gain as much territory as possible. Therefore, a anything but cohesive provision.

The judicial system included at the summit the Supreme Constitutional Court, composed of three judges: a Greek Cypriot, a Turkish Cypriot, and a contracted judge from a neutral country who would serve as president of the court. The High Court of Justice was also to be presided by a neutral president. In the lower courts, disputes were to be tried by tribunals composed of judges belonging to the appropriate community, if the plaintiff and the defendant belonged to two different ethnicities, the court was to be mixed. President Makarios made in his 13 Points a very interesting argument against separate courts. He stated that this procedure could have lead judges not to be impartial - consciously or not -because it was very likely that "when a judge assumes jurisdiction on the basis of communal criteria he begins to think that the interests of his community stand in danger of being jeopardized and that he is there to protect such interests [..] This is particularly so in mixed cases, where each Judge will eventually come to feel that his presence is necessary in order to protect the party belonging to his community from possible injustice by his brother Judge."[206] Not least important, separate tribunals would have also meant that two sentences of a similar nature could have brought different outcomes, thus not ensuring same rights and law enforcement between the two communities.

The constitution also called for the creation of two communal chambers, composed of representatives elected by each community, and dealt with creating legislation on sensitive matters such as religion, education, and culture. This provision was specifically created in order to protect the rights of the Turkish Cypriot minority however, it could be dangerous to leave an important issue outside the watch of the

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[204] 13 Points, Archbishop Makarios.

[205] "The Cypriot Dispute at Glance," *Turkish Heritage Organisation*, Issue Brief No.1 (May 22, 2017)   https://www.turkheritage.org/en/publications/issue-briefs/the-cyprus-dispute-at-a-glance-3300 [accessed 21.02.2019]

[206] 13 Points, Archbishop Makarios.

government and this is nowadays a powerful example in Southern Cyprus, where education and media are left at the mercy of the Orthodox Church. Particularly relevant is the current problem with the History curricula in the South whose content and textbooks have been left unchanged since the 1974 war, thus not fostering a future resolution of the conflict.[207]

The President and the Vice-President had the right of veto, separately or jointly, over certain laws or decisions of both the Council of Ministers[208] and the House of Representatives. Therefore, not only both President and Vice-President had the power to prevent a decision of the Council of Ministers or of the House of Representatives thus making the legislative process difficult, but also the right of veto was invested in two persons rather than one, which could deadlock legislation even more easily. An example was the stalemate reached on the composition of the national army. The Vice-President called for separate blocks of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, while the Constitution envisaged a united army made of members of the two communities in different percentages. After the Vice-President's veto, the army remained ineffective, which shows how easily members of the two communities could disagree with each other and how dangerous the double veto power was for the smooth functioning of the state and a peaceful co-existence.[209]

Finally, according to the 1960 census, Greek Cypriots composed 77 percent of the population and Turkish Cypriots 18.3 percent. However, the constitution required that the two groups be represented in the civil service at a ratio of 70 to 30 percent. This participation ratio caused discontent amongst Greek Cypriots as it did not respect the right to equal access to the public service of one's country.[210]

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[207] Differently, in the Northern occupied area, a history textbooks revision has been promulgated in 2004. The textbooks contain a more lenient vocabulary and a more inclusive narrative.
Yiannis Papadakis, *History Education in Divided Cyprus: A Comparison of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Schoolbooks on the "History of Cyprus,"* PRIO 2008.

[208] The executive body. The Council of Ministers was to be composed of seven Greek Cypriots and three Turkish Cypriots, with the former appointed by the president and the latter by the vice president. Of three key portfolios–defense, finance, and foreign affairs–one was to be held by a Turkish Cypriot.

[209] The republic was to have an army of 2,000 members, 60 percent Greek Cypriot and 40 percent Turkish Cypriot. After an initial period, a 2,000-member security force consisting of police and gendarmerie was to be 70 percent Greek Cypriot and 30 percent Turkish Cypriot.

[210] Eric Solsten, Cyprus: A Country Study, (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress), 1993.

As a result of the above, the proper functioning of the state became difficult and division had been fostered rather than cooperation and unity. Instead of solving their differences, the Constitution had frozen them. It is noteworthy to mention that the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus, Dr. Galo Plaza, in paragraph 163 of his March 1965 report to the U.N. Secretary-General described the 1960 Constitution as "a constitutional oddity".[211] Division had been finally institutionalised.

In November 1963, following a series of problems between the two communities and the functioning of the government, the then President of the Republic Archbishop Makarios suggested thirteen amendments to the Constitution trying to eradicate the divisive elements between the two communities present in the Constitution. Those amendments were immediately rejected by the Government of Turkey, before the Turkish Cypriot leadership could even comment on them. The argument was that Turkish Cypriots' rights were reduced to those of a minority in the country rather than a group co-founder of the Republic and equal to the Greek Cypriot.[212] Furthermore, these moves were also seen as part of the Akritas Plan, designed to end the new republic and achieve enosis. On their side, the Greek Cypriot opposed their counterpart's idea of bi-communal state as they feared it was aimed at achieving *taksim*, division of the island between Greece and Turkey.[213]

Annex E.2 shows the suggested and consequently applied amendments by Archbishop Makarios.[214] Most of Makarios' points were meaningful but times were not ripe as there was mutual distrust between the two communities. The failure was due also to the third parties that left the two communities interacting with each other and working side by side without the watch of an impartial eye, without ensuring that a sustainable and not apparent peace was being built before creating such a complicated constitution that required a great deal of faith on the "other". I should also add that after centuries of invasions and colonisation, Cypriots had absolutely no skills and knowledge on how to administrate on their own a whole country all at once. The

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[211] Galo Plaza Report, 1965 available on PIO https://www.pio.gov.cy/en/%CE%AD%CE%BA%CE%B8%CE%B5%CF%83%CE%B7-galo-plaza-(1965).html [last accessed 04.06.2019].

[212] Mehmet Şükrü Güzel, "The Obligation Of Non-Recognition For The Thirteen Point Amendments Of The Cyprus Constitution By International Community," Zeitschrift für die Welt der Türken, Vol 10, No. 2 (2018), 225- 246.

[213] Sevki Akdag, "Les Aspects Juridiques de la Question Chypriote," *Actualite et Droit International*, 2001.

[214] Makarios 13 Points.

constitution proved unworkable: differences should have been solved at the beginning instead of leaving them for future talks in the hope that one day they would be solved. Also, times were probably not ripe for the granting of independence: two separate and contrasting nationalisms - Turkish and Greek - were very strong in the 1960s and there was neither will of compromising nor mutual understanding and trust, which would have proved the constitution workable in the long term.[215]

Therefore, it took an incident between Greek Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots on 21 December 1963 for intercommunal violence to restart and the Turkish Cypriots to withdraw from the government.*[216]

History teaching and textbooks

As already explained in *Part I*, history is commonly used as a tool for political propaganda and to consolidate a specific narrative on a nation. This is particularly relevant in divided society where the co-existing of different ethnicities is a used as a reason for conflict. It is in this type of societies that victimization narratives are propagated and the suffering of only one side is highlighted. By contrast, the other side is victim of "othering" narrative, that is, it is seen as alien, different and even evil. These dynamics are clearly reflected in history textbooks. In Cyprus the situation is not ideal, where in the south education is still at the mercy of the Orthodox Church and the far right. While in the north a reform of history textbooks for a more inclusive and peaceful narrative has occurred in 2004[217], when the left-wing party TCP (Republican Turkish Party) formed a coalition with the Democratic Party (DP), further steps towards more inclusive textbooks ought to be taken. Most of textbooks were written by Turkish and Greek Cypriots, Greek, Turks or British people in violent periods and many of these are still in use.

In order to analyze some textbooks currently used by both communities, I mainly consider the language employed because it is in this that a great power is vested in shaping students' minds about what they learn and how they think about others. Words have powerful feature, they are endowed with connotative meanings, that is the idea

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[215] T. W. Adams, The First Republic of Cyprus: a Review of an Unworkable Constitution. *Western Political Quarterly, 19(3), 475–490.*

[216] End of the extract taken from my paper "Cyprus 1960 Constitution: the seeds of partition" for the seminar "Ethnic Politics and Ethnic Conflicts".

[217] Yiannis Papadakis (2008), p.11.

associated with a certain word. As a word can have different connotative meaning depending on the cultural and social backgrounds, we can understand why using certain words rather than others can cause miscommunication and therefore, conflicts. While miscommunication can be an involuntarily backside of cultural differences, in the case of history textbooks, being powerful political tools, misunderstanding is promulgated voluntarily in order to enhance deep division between different groups within a society. Therefore, by analyzing some samples of books currently used in Cyprus, we can form an idea of how group identity and us-vs-them narratives are taught. The common narrative is characterized by an ethnonationalism – both show Turkey and Greece as their respective motherlands – based on those tights explained in the previous sections, that is a common language, religion and history.

Yiannis Papadakis in "*History Education in Divided Cyprus: A Comparison of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Schoolbooks on the History of Cyprus*" (2008) has offered a comprehensive analysis of the history textbooks used in Cypriot schools. One of the textbooks he used to draw his comparisons is *Istoria tis Kyprou* ('History of Cyprus') by Andreas Polydorou. As this is the same textbook that is being currently used in schools and no significant changes have been made since then, I will display hereinafter some of his main findings I considered relevant for the purpose of this thesis.

One of the most important point to make is the narrative to be found in every textbook is the indigenous Greek character of the island. The term Cypriots ('*Kyprioi*') is used as equivalent to Greeks ('*Ellines*')[218], which in part explains why many people today think that the indigenous population of the island has always had a Hellenic character only, while the other groups were just minorities and intruders.[219] This narrative has an exclusive character that leaves no room for Turkish Cypriots and the other minorities of Cyprus and is supported by the use of non-inclusive words, negative terms and pictures and sentences that create a sense of fear towards the "other". For instance, in Polydorou the Conquest of Nicosia by the Turks is described as follows: "It was obvious that one day the Turks would try to grab Cyprus. The way that the

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[218] Yiannis Papadakis, *History Education in Divided Cyprus: A Comparison of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Schoolbooks on the History of Cyprus*, PRIO (2008), p.7.

[219] Loris Koullapis, "Ideologikoi Prosanatolismoi tis Ellinokypriakis Ekpaidevsis me Emphasi sto Mathima tis Istorias" (Ideological Orientations of Greek Cypriot Education with Emphasis on the Lesson of History), *Syghrona Themata*, Nos. 68-69-70 (1998-1999), p.283.

state of the Sultan expanded, little Cyprus appeared like a weak mouse in the claws of a wild lion."[220] Turks are shown like a ruthless and wild beast that grabs the weaker Cyprus that has fallen prey like a mouse. Pictures help support this point. Indeed, when I asked my Greek Cypriot friends to show me the history textbooks they used to have in school or they are currently using, the following image resulted as a source of fear, stating that this picture was the image they brought with them for many years during their youth.

Image 3. Source: YAP, *Istoria tis Kyprou- Gymnasio* (Nicosia, 2005), p.105.

In this image a Turk is impaling a Greek. This sight provides the students with the idea of a violent "other". Greek Cypriots who have never crossed the Green Line have told me that this image is one of the reasons why they have never crossed. They look at what stands on the other side with fear.

 Another point meriting attention is the notebooks I found that my friends used to be provided with by the school itself (1980s). On the notebook the sentence "*δεν ξεχνώ*" ('I don't forget') appears as a title, normally followed but the sentence "*και αγωνίζομαι*" ('and I fight') that children were made add themselves by hand. Below it, some pictures of some key cities in the north lost after the 1974 war are placed. Memory is again the centre of attention and once again, is used to promulgate the us-against-them narrative, not to mention that the rhetoric '*και αγωνίζομαι*' spures to violence rather than a reconciliatory approach. The effect of these notebooks on kids who have not even started learning the history of their country is detrimental. At the end of the section, a written account of a Greek Cypriot will be provided on how those sentences affected her as a kid.

   As per Turkish Cypriot textbooks, Papadakis reports a positive reform in 2005. Not only the reformed book stopped showing on their covers Cyprus with a divided line or

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[220] Polydorou, *Istoria tis Kyprou*, p. 69. Translation by Papadakis (2008), p.8.

as part of Turkey, but the narrative furthered is more inclusive. Cyprus is showed as a country of its own, independent from foreign powers (which are actually seen in a negative light), and its people are just Cypriot, neither Turks nor Greeks.[221]

Below the cover of the textbook "*Kıbrıs Tarihi*" ('History of Cyprus') before and after the reform.

Kıbrıs Tarihi (1878-1960), KAYNAK YAYINLARI (Istanbul, 1985)   *Kıbrıs Tarihi 1, MEKB (Nicosia, 2005)*

It is possible to notice several improvements in the new cover of the book "*Kıbrıs Tarihi*." While now Cyprus is showed without dividing line, with no red or blue colours reminding of Greece and Turkey, with no flag, before the island was not only shown as divided but also as belonging to Turkey and Greece respectively. The opposing policies – *taksim* for Turkish Cypriots and *enosis* for Greek Cypriots – are also written on the walls destroyed by the war. However, we could also say that the new cover shows nothing at all right now, it is indeed a neutral cover that almost reminds of a white canvas ready to be painted. This is what a future reconciliation should bring in Cyprus, a whole island ready to start from zero and write its own future and history.

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[221] Papadakis (2008), p.18.

Despite the noticeable improvements, history textbooks in the north share a common limit with the south. If in the south history ends with the Ottoman conquest and mostly with the Turkish invasion, in the north, history starts exactly in that moment. What for one is a victory, for the other is a loss. What on one side is worth celebrating, for the other it needs to be commemorated. Right now in Cyprus Turkish Cypriots' history is the history of Turkey and Greek Cypriots' history is the history of Greece. The current history textbooks do not take into consideration the fact that identity evolves and changes as politics change and history happens, but also the fact that identity is not made by a homogenous and historically predetermined racial or ethnic group but by layers of different cultures piling up as times go by. The road to more objective and inclusive textbooks is still long, as its reform poses major social and political obstacles.

It is worth finishing this section with a thought shared by Maria Siakalli in 2015 in Omada Kypros, an apolitical Cypriot tink-tank actively supporting the unification of Cyprus. Apropos the "I don't forget" Greek Cypriot children are taught, she wrote:

> *"I should have not forgotten Kyrenia, but I had never seen Kyrenia! […] In the same way, I had never seen my enemy, but it always managed to scare me, especially every year on the 20th of July. The "I don't forget and I fight" came into my life […] every night before the 20th of July, I would prepare my bag with my favourite pictures, books and doll in order to be ready should have the Turkish army come back again […] The years passed and the Turks didn't come back. This time I went to them, to Istanbul. For four years I studied and learned the language of the "enemy", I made friends that I can call family and lived one of the best periods of my life. When I finally came back to Cyprus I finally discovered what I should not forget and what I had to fight for."[222]*

Maria Siakalli's thought was not only beautifully written but it also proves many of the points I made in this thesis. Firstly, that certain material (and knowledge) provided in Cypriot schools – in this case the "I don't forget notebook" – negatively affects any possibility of future reconciliation. It creates fear in children, it shows them a neighbour to fear rather than to live with. Not every child will grow up with the curiosity or the bravery to go to Turkey, to study their language, to experience their

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[222] Maria Siakalli, "Ας μην ξεχάσουμε την ειρήνη" ('Let's not Forget Peace'), Ομάδα Κύπρος [Omada Kypros], my translation http://omadakypros.eu/ [last accessed 09.06.2019].

culture to then go back to Cyprus with a clear mind of what a divided Cyprus means. Not everybody will wonder whether the narratives they have been taught tells history correctly, or whether there may even be different points of view to consider. Secondly, it shows that remembering can be a powerful weapon that if misused can cause serious harm. Of course, it also shows that remembering is not bad per se, that instead of exploiting memories, these should be used to learn from the past. Yes, there are some things that should not be forgotten, for example that "people in Cyprus used to live in peace, regardless of language and religion…that the island was divided by imperialism, fascism, nationalism, by its narrow-minded people…the love and support that the "enemy" gave her."[223]

Collective memory: *Lieux de mémoire* in Cyprus

According to Nora "a *lieu de mémoire* is any significant entity, whether material or non-material in nature, which by dint of human will or the work of time has become a symbolic element of the memorial heritage of any community"[224] It could be a place (museum), an object (monument), a person (heroes, illustrious people) but also immaterial such as a concept (mottos), an event (commemoration day), a symbol (flag) vested with historical significance shared by the community and therefore living in people's memory. Sites of memory however, can be made official by governments, thus homogenising different memories at the risk to "invent traditions"[225] as well.

To follow is a collection of *lieux de mémoire* that is possible to find in Cyprus, grouped by the six categories provided (objects, people, places, concepts, events, symbols), in turn divided between northern and southern Cyprus in order to draw a comparison between Greek and Turkish Cypriots on their approach on the issue of nationalism and memory.

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[223] Ibid.

[224] Pierre Nora, "Preface to English Language Edition: From Lieux de Memoire to Realms of Memory", in Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past ed. Pierre Nora, p.XVII.

[225] E. J. Hobsbawm (1983).

	Southern Cyprus	Northern Cyprus
Symbols	Greek flag, Greece's national anthem	Turkish flag, Turkey's national anthem
Concepts	Greek language, myths	Mottos ("How happy is…"), Turkish language
Objects	EOKA fighters statues	Turkish soldiers statues, Ataturk monuments
Places (sites/buildings)	Pentadaktylos, Varosha (Βαρώσια), war sites (cemetery, battlefields), religious sites (churches, monasteries, cathedrals: Karpasia), museums, lost and occupied properties	Pentadaktylos, war sites (cemetery, battlefields) Varosha (Maraş), religious sites (mosques), museums, lost and occupied properties
People (heroes/illustrious people	Makarios, EOKA fighters	Denktaş, Ataturk
Events: commemorations	1974: invasion/occupation, war heroes, (Greece) national holidays	1974: liberation, war heroes, (Turkey) national holidays

As already stated, symbols, such as flags and anthems, can be sites in which specific memories are formed. In the case of Cyprus, the memories of Greece and Turkey are used, as the island does not have a national anthem of its own. This means not only that they sing the stories of two other countries rather than their own, but also that most of these stories are directed against each other. The Turkish anthem for instance, starts with "*korkma*" ('do not fear'), a reference from a verse of the Quran[226] pointing to the time when Muslims were forced to flee Mecca for Medina. When Mehmed Akif Ersoy wrote the lyrics in 1921, the severe conditions narrated by the Quran were similar to the struggle of the Turks who had lost one of the greatest empires in history and were now fighting for independence (1919-22) against the Allies (with Greece attacking on

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[226] *Surah* 9:40. https://quran.com/9/40 [last accessed 04.06.2019].

the Western front) to safeguard their identity and home.[227] Therefore, the anthem is also drenched with religious connotations that clearly collide with the Orthodox views of the other side of the island. Other semantic fields present in the anthem are concepts of freedom, soil, martyrdom, homeland, and flag. It is interesting however that the terms "Turks" is never mentioned.[228] The Greek hymn was written in 1823 and was inspired by the Greek War of Independence, when Greeks were freed by the Ottoman rule. As such, the anthem is called "Hymn to Freedom" (Ὕμνος προς την Ελευθερίαν'). Also in this anthem, words belonging to the semantic fields of freedom, religion, land, and ancestors.[229] The flag, as symbol of identity, is another controversial issue because despite a Cypriot flag existing, Greek Cypriots by constitution also wave the Greek flag and Turkish Cypriots, who created their own flag – inspired to the Turkish one because of the colours and the crescent - like their Greek counterpart, also wave the Turkish one. The Cypriot flag is full of beautiful symbolism, first of all the neutral white colour purposely thought to avoid red and blue, colours referring to Turkey and Greece respectively. The flag is also free from any religious symbol such as the cross in the Greek flag and the crescent in the Turkish one. Finally, the presence of two olive branches represent peace between the two communities. Unfortunately, the flag was barely used during the years of independence, when both Turkish and Greek Cypriots would use their "motherlands" flags to fight for *enosis* or *taksim.* Many decades have passed since those claims were order of business therefore, why are both Greece and Turley's flags still flying in the country when Cyprus became an independent country more than half a century ago and only a small minority – mostly right-wing ultranationalists - of the Cypriot population look at Turkey and Greece like their motherlands?[230] In 2017, a group of leftists removed the Greek flag from some historical and religious buildings in Nicosia asking for an independent and reunified country. Nothing has changed since then.[231]

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[227] "Greco-Turkish Wars," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, (December 05, 2016) https://www.britannica.com/event/Greco-Turkish-wars [last accessed 04.06.2019].
[228] Turkish national anthem https://www.tccb.gov.tr/cumhurbaskanligi/resmi-simgeler/istiklalmarsi/ [last accessed 12.06.2019].
[229] "Hymn to Freedom," *Σαν Σήμερα*, https://www.sansimera.gr/anthology/140 [last accessed 04.06.2019].
[230] As if there were not already enough flags in Cyprus, the Union Jack is flown in the UK sovereign bases and outside of all Orthodox churches the double-headed eagle flag.
[231] "Parties condemn activists who removed Greek flags, *Cyprus Mail*," (July 18, 2017) https://cyprus-mail.com/2017/07/18/parties-condemn-activists-removed-greek-flags/ [last accessed 04.06.2019].

Talking of flags can become even a sensitive issue in Cyprus due to the two massive Turkish and Turkish Cypriot flags on Pentadaktylos (Beşparmaklar in Turkish) mountain (Northern Cyprus) widely visible from the south and from space for many miles (they cover about 50 acres of the slope), as to remember Cypriots of the war and the division every day. Greek Cypriots, but also a considerable portion of the Turkish Cypriot population, are not particularly happy about this provocative and hostile act and Greek Cypriots often complain the fact that the flags are lit up using the Republic's money. Furthermore, the quotation "*Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene*" ("How happy is the one who says 'I am a Turk'"), a Kemalist motto, is written next to it. While the sentence is a reminder of what Mustafa Kemal Atatürk accomplished on October 29, 2013 – the creation of the Turkish Republic – the quote should not be extended to Cyprus and Turkish Cypriot, where a different history occurred and a different identity exists. The Turkish identity and the sets of ideas that Atatürk and his collaborators created should not be embedded in the minds of Cypriots.

The flags on the mountain reminds of myths and legends full of symbolism as well. Indeed, Pentadaktylos mountain derives its names from the myth of Digenis Akritas. He was of mixed Muslim and Christian parentage (it is not a coincidence that his first name means 'two genes') and therefore, makes of Pentadaktylos one of the most powerful symbols of Cyprus. There are many fascinating traditions and legends about this mountain located in the Northern side of the island, which let the imagination of Greek Cypriots who have never crossed the border run free. Mythology narrates that the Byzantine hero, Digenis Akritas, kept the marauding Saracen Arabs at bay with his amazing strength. It is said that with one hand he grabbed hold of the Kyreneia mountain range leaving his handprint, while with the other hand he grabbed a huge rock and tossed it into the sea at the Saracens, who were trying to land. A large, imposing rock emerged from the sea in Petra tou Romiou (between Limassol and Paphos, western Cyprus), where Aphrodite was born brought by Zephyrus, the western wind.[232] The epic hero Digenis was then used as an inspiration for nationalists like George Grivas who used Digenis, as his *nom de guerre*, and Tasos Papadopoulos,

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[232] There are many unofficial websites on the Internet where it is possible to read the full story and several different versions. I am citing this version, probably the most common one, as it has been narrated to me.

known for his Akritas Plan against the Turkish Cypriots.[233] Remaining in the category of 'concepts', the problem of languages in Cyprus has already been largely discussed in the previous section. For instance, in the section on nationalism and identity, in which I state that language is one of the most important elements in the formation of identity and nationalism. In the section on the 1960 Constitution I have also showed how Greek and Turkish are used as official languages of Cyprus despite the population speaking Turkish and Greek Cypriot in everyday life.

As far as objects are concerned, statues fill the streets of Cyprus in both sides. In the south, when driving through Troodos mountain (for instance, through Spilia, Kato Amiantos and Pelendri village[234]), it is possible to see statues of EOKA fighters. Often the Greek flag is displayed next to the Cypriot one and commemorative plaques remember the "fighter heroically fallen against the Turkish invaders." On the other side of the Green Line on the other hand, it is possible to find statues of Atatürk in Kyrenia (*Keryneia/Girne*) or in Lefka (*Lefke/Lefka*). In the center of Nicosia as well it is possible to find in both sides statues commemorating EOKA fighters in the south (the Eleftheria Monument near the Venetian walls) and statues of Turkish soldiers in the north.

A final example of *lieux de mémoire* are commemorative days, for instance national days. Both sides share many of the national holidays with Greece and Turkey respectively. For instance, the north celebrates the anniversary of the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk on the 10th of November and his landing at Samsun (when the Turkish War of Independence started) on the 19th of May. On October 29, the birth of the Turkish Republic is also commemorated. The South celebrates Greece National Anniversary Day (also known as '*oxi* day', symbolising the Greece's refusal to surrender to the Axis powers) on the 28th of October and Greek Independence (from the Ottoman Empire) day on the 25th of March. And then of course, July 20, when one side celebrates the 1974 Turkish invasion as "Peace and Freedom Day", while on the other side sirens blare out as a reminder of the Turkish invasion. One side celebrates, the other mourns. Neither celebrating an invasion nor reviving the 20 of July with war sirens, tv programs and radio shows match the spirit of cooperation and understanding

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[233] Alper Ali Riza, "The Flag on the Mountain," *Cyprus Mail,* (September 13, 2015) https://cyprus-mail.com/2015/09/13/the-flag-on-the-mountain/ [last accessed 04.06.2019].
[234] This is the area where bloody conflicts happened during the EOKA fights.

the leaders of both sides have stated to be wanting to reach. Neither are all the other *lieux de mémoire* I have recalled in this paper. Naturally, not all *lieux de mémoire* are negative however, as I stated at the beginning, some are more politicised and exploited than others, which do more harm than good.

Popular communicative memory: Cyprus medias and football hooliganism

Football hooliganism

Football was introduced in Cyprus at the beginning of the 20th century, when the British took control over the island. Football was only one of the innovations introduced by the British administration and the school system – were football developed – was part of the change. Violence between supporters first erupted in 1937-38 during a match between Limassol and in Nicosia. However, it is after World War II and the civil war in Greece (1946-49)[235], that political parties in Cyprus developed and politics reached the football pitches. From that moment on and especially from 1948, football teams would be divided between leftist and rightist.[236] Most recent consequences are those caused by globalization and environmentalism. An effect of this phenomenon is the so- called "localism"[237], which weakens even more the power of the central authority in Cyprus.

The major football teams in Cyprus are identified with different political ideologies and are mostly located in different towns. These are Apoel (Nicosia. Identified with rightist), Omonoia (Nicosia. Identified with leftist and communism), Ael (Limassol. Identified with leftist) and Anorthosis (Famagusta, now based in Larnaca because Famagusta is located in the occupied area. Identified with rightist). The Turkish Cypriot teams (Çetinkaya Türk, Gençlik Gücü, Gençler Birliği, Doğan Türk Birliği, Mağusa Türk Gücü…), all funded between the war, withdrew from the national Cypriot league in 1955 and set up their own federation[238]. These teams cannot play in international competitions due to the several embargoes the unilaterally declared

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[235] Greek Civil War, *Encyclopædia Britannica*, (November 26, 2018) https://www.britannica.com/event/Greek-Civil-War [last accessed 04.06.2019].

[236] "A Brief History of football and football-violence in Cyprus," *Council of Europe*, p.1.

[237] Mark Doidge & Martin Lieser, "The Importance of Research on the Ultras: Introduction, *Sport in Society*, 21:6, 833-840 (2018).

[238] Kıbrıs Türk Futbol Federasyonu (Cyprus Turkish Football Association) http://www.ktff.net/ [last accessed 04.06.2019].

Northern Cyprus has to face.[239] In 2014, a Greek Cypriot player – Dimitris Vasiliou - signed for the first time a contract with a Turkish Cypriot team but he was labeled as a terrorist by far-right ultras who surrounded his house.[240] Vasiliou wanted to be a model for the youngster in the island but once more, extremists were present to hinder any effort for rapprochement. Earlier, during the 1986-87 Champions League, APOEL withdrew from the competition because it refused to go to Istanbul to play against Besiktas JK, thus receiving a two-year ban from the competition.[241] It is then clear that football is another field where the consequences of the war and the subsequent partition are felt: there ethnic identity is shaped and memory and history are abused for this purpose.

One of the complications caused by partition is that many clubs changed location as a result of the population exchange and consequently, also their names. For instance, the football club Gençler Birliği used to be called Demi Spor Larnaca after the town it was funded. However, after 1974, it changed its name because it moved to Trikomo, Northern Cyprus. As a result of the invasion, some teams, such as LALL Lysi (1919-1974) and ASOB Vatili (1939-1977), were even dissolved.[242] Some football clubs merged with others instead. Such is the case of AEK Karava FC that used to be located in Kyrenia and now plays in Nicosia. EOKA was involved in this football club, which according to AEK's official website "played an important and positive role. In the merging of the two clubs." Also, on the website celebrates Grigoris Afxentiou – Second in Command of EOKA – is celebrated as a national hero.[243]

Nowadays, the emblem of these so-called "refugee" clubs is Anorthosis Famagusta that in 1974 was relocated in Larnaca. Even before the war Anorthosis was considered a nationalist group where patriotic speeches and national commemorations were

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[239] Stefan Talmon, "The Cyprus Question before the European Court of Justice," *European Journal of International Law,* 12 (4), 2001, 727–750.

[240] "Greek Cypriot Footballer Labelled Traitor for Joining Turkish Cypriot Team," *World Bullettin* (September 29, 2014) https://www.worldbulletin.net/cyprus/greek-cypriot-footballer-labelled-traitor-for-joining-turkish-cypriot-team-h145377.html [last accessed 04.06.2019].

[241] John Leonidou, "Historic Evening in Nicosia," *UEFA* (July 26, 2005) https://www.uefa.com/uefachampionsleague/news/newsid=320281.html [last accessed 04.06.2019].

[242] Michalis Gavreilides, Stelios Papamoiseos, "νας αιώνας Κυπριακό ποδόσφαιρο" (One century Cypriot football), *The Writer*, (2001).

[243] "ΑΘΛΗΤΙΚΗ ΕΝΩΣΗ ΚΑΡΑΒΑ «Α.Ε.Κ»," www.karavas.org.cy (in Greek). Archived from the original on 2016-08-05. Retrieved 2016-08-05 https://web.archive.org/web/20160805120010/http://www.karavas.org.cy/default.asp?id=2 63 [last accessed 04.06.2019].

organized.[244] Proof is given by the fact that in 1932, some leaders of the club were arrested because the Greek flag was hanging on the balcony of the club building and in 1952 for writing on the walls of their building sentences such as "*Ζήτω η Ένωσις*" ('Long live the union') and "*Η Ελλάδα ποτέ δεν πεθαίνει*" ('Greece will never die'). The name itself means "rectification" and it refers to the changes they wanted to bring into society in an anti-colonialist and pro-*enosis* spirit. This information is present in their official website where they recognize, inter alia, "how much Anorthosis was recognized for playing a leading role in national affairs" and indeed it became a meeting point for the "freedom fight" of its EOKA members. The whole history written in their website is a political campaign full of divisive talks.[245] On the website of another Cypriot football team, Ethnikos Achnas, Greek nationalism is clearly spelled out, as they talk of "an ideology not borrowed and in no way temporary but deeply rooted in our hearts found right where Greece lies united to Cyprus."[246]

   Bringing the Greek flag in play away matches is another controversial issue. Not only Cypriot supporters spread the idea abroad that Cyprus is not an independent country of its own (many still think it is a Greek island) but they also hinder the possibility of a future resolution either causing fear amongst Turkish Cypriots or giving the chance to ultranationalist and pro-partition/*status quo* media to support their argument that Greek and Turkish Cypriots cannot live together. For example, after the Greek Cypriot football team Apollon Limassol went to Trabzon in 2013 and brought with it a huge Greek flag, a Turkish newspaper wrote that "the insistence of Greek Cypriots on the Greece flag instead of their own flag raises the suspicions of Turkish Cypriots who still fear that their Greek Cypriot counterparts still dream of uniting the island with Greece."[247] It is clear that leaning on the now expired dream of achieving *enosis* was a strategic move used by the World Bulletin however, the writer has got a point right, that "although Greece and the Greek Cypriot controlled Republic of Cyprus are internationally recognized as two separate states, even in the Greek Cypriot

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[244] Ιστορικά γεγονότα Archived 22 July 2014 at the Wayback Machine, Anorthosis Famagusta Official Website.

[245] History of Anorthosis FC, http://www.anorthosisfc.com.cy/history/?lang=en [last accessed 04.06.2019].

[246]Ethnikos Achnas, https://www.ethnikosachnasfc.com/copy-of-istoria [last accessed 07.06.2019].

[247] "Greek Cypriot team unfurls Greece flag in Trabzon," *World Bullettin*, (November 30, 2013) https://www.worldbulletin.net/cyprus/greek-cypriot-team-unfurls-greece-flag-in-trabzon-h124008.html [last accessed 04.06.2019].

controlled south of Cyprus, Greece flags still fly side-by-side with the their own flag."[248]

Furthermore, when on 26 July 2005 – less than one week after the anniversary of the first Turkish invasion! - Anorthosis beat the Turkish team Trabzonspor during a Champions League qualifying match, we can see images online of the Cypriot supporters wearing Greek t-shirts, waving the Greek flag and singing "*Η Κύπρος είναι Ελληνική*" ('Cyprus is Greek')[249]. We can understand the strong symbolic meaning of the match when we think that Anorthosis was playing not only against a sport rival but also against the people representing the country that took their home away (reason why the match could not be played in Famagusta but had to be played at the GSP stadium in Nicosia). In cases like this, where matches have such strong and symbolic power, the players are seen like the heroes and the warriors representing the nation.

It is interesting mentioning the report of a decent Greek Cypriot fan who attended the match:

> *"The moment of the night that most stuck with me, however, took place before the game even started. While the teams were still warming up on separate sides of the field, a stray Trabzonspor ball rolled into the Anorthosis penalty area and stopped near the goalie. The Trabzonspor player who set off to retrieve the ball was a good distance away and was walking, not jogging, as if to test whether the Anorthosis goalkeeper would kick him the ball. The goalie looked at the ball, and though I cannot look into his head, I had the impression that he wanted to kick it back but could not by the sheer presence and will of the crowd. His fans had just put a lot of energy into booing the Trabzonspor players as they emerged onto the field and a neighborly gesture at this point would seem almost a betrayal of the people by their national hero. […] It seems that a good part of why the Cyprus conflict has dragged on for so long […] is that the people, no matter what side of the green line they are on, hear nothing but booing or cheering from their leaders and their media; and with the good*

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[248] Ibid.
[249] YouTube, "Anorthosis Vs Trabzonspor - Η Κύπρος είναι Ελληνική," https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HwylzDuKg30 [last accessed 04.06.2019].

and evil sides firmly drawn, saying anything sane or doing anything decent
comes across as blasphemy or treason.''[250]

The newspaper Phileleftheros said that Anorthosis players "played not only for themselves, not only for their team, but for occupied Famagusta, for divided Cyprus and her people."[251] A match became a war and a stadium a battlefield.

In this sense, the following video on Youtube on a previous match between the two teams could be interpreted like Achilles and Hector representing Cyprus and Turkey respectively, fighting for the honor of their people.[252] The video was created by Anorthosis supporters, where we can see how the video starts with the shape of Cyprus covered by a Greek flag and a soldier standing on it. It then continues with a unsurprisingly white and blue (Greece's colors) banner stating "Here we are only GUESTS! FAMAGUSTA=HOME". The semantic field of the war and conflict is often used in the video, indeed a voice opens the video saying "now you know who you are fighting" and a subtitle says "Turkey under attack". The video ends with the sentence "Cyprus is Greek". It is not surprising that the lines were taken from the film Troy (2004) when Achilles fights Hector. It is not worth to mention here the hateful comments posted below the video by Greek, Turks and Cypriots involving politics and history but by now, it should be clear that Cypriot football means nationalism, fanaticism and division. However, the fact that a Turkish team flew to the island and a match could have been played without any incident is also a proof that sport, football in particular, can bring people together, it can bring the communities of Cyprus closer. A recent positive event bringing the two communities closer was the friendly intercommunal football match Salamina-Magusa F.C. played the last 19th of March in Pyla (Larna district). It was an important moment for Cyprus, for it was only the second intercommunal football match played between teams from Cyprus' largest ethnic communities since 1955. But also because in the second half, the teams mixed their squads symbolizing a moment brotherhood and mutual respect between the two ethnic groups. Unfortunately, the event did not reach a great number of people, as only around

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[250] Constantine Markides, "Soccer and Politics in Cyprus," Fourth Night Blog, entry posted August 4, 2005) http://www.fourthnight.com/2005/08/soccer-politics-cyprus-football/ [last accessed 04.06.2019].

[251] Ibid.

[252] YouTube, "ANORTHOSIS – Trabzonspor" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6eafvTUYEXA [last accessed 04.06.2019].

1,000 people attended the event. Furthermore, Mustafa Akıncı – current President of Northern Cyprus did not attend the game either because he stated the event should have taken place in the buffer zone.[253] These unfortunate events remind us that still a lot needs to be accomplished in Cyprus to foster dialogue, understanding, and cooperation towards positive peace-talks in the future. However, the younger generations are the hope for a better future and this was highly demonstrated by Yasin Kurt – Captain of Magusa FC – who stated that their goal was to show people that there is no problem between the two communities because "we are all together Cypriots." Konstantinos Mintikis – Captain of Nea Salamina FC – stated, "we want a peaceful co-existence in our country."[254] Kids from both communities were also there, in some cases meeting for the first time with their Cypriot counterpart, learning about tolerance and inclusion regardless of the political situation.

In 2011, the Cyprus Sociological Association conducted a survey[255] on persons who fitted the profile of a 'fanatic'[256], mostly men, 40% of which teenagers and therefore students. The remaining part was made mostly by working people whose social status is nonetheless irrelevant because on the island the differences between social classes are not so strongly marked. The outcome of the survey is worrying: 62% of interviewees had been involved in violent incidents, most of the violent fans being under the age of 20. Rightist (Hellocentrist) were the most violent respondents. This can be explained by the fact that the Cyprocentrics have normally had a more reconciliatory attitude due to the fact that they aim to a peaceful resolution or a peaceful *status quo* at least. An association that the survey has found is that the most violent supporters are heavy smokers and drinkers and also had more experiences with drugs or crimes. Important to mention is that a majority of the fans chooses to support the team that gives them a sense of political identification. For instance, the fans of traditionally right-wing teams use the Greek flag, the two-headed Byzantine Eagle, and generally the colors of the Greek flag, as demonstrated by previous examples. The

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[253] Stelios Marathovouniotis, "Salamina-Magusa F.C. friendly football game in Pyla," *In-Cyprus*, (March 19, 2019) https://in-cyprus.com/salamina-magusa-f-c-friendly-football-game-in-pyla-picturesvideo/ [last accessed 07.06.2019].
[254] Video published on Facebook by Peace and Sport. https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=581645649005943
[255] "Research on Football Violence in Cyprus," *Cyprus Sociological Association*, available on http://www.sociology.org.cy/en/research/football-violence-cyprus [last accessed 04.06.2019].
[256]The term "violent fans/fanatics" refers to persons involved in violent incidents. Persons with no involvement in such incidents are referred to as "non-violent fans".

fans of traditionally left-wing teams use the Cypriot flag, the colors of their team, the picture of Che Guevara (before 1990 Communist symbols were used instead). Clearly, these teams are rival based on left vs right dynamics. Furthermore, the majority of the fans think mass media are prejudiced on their coverage of football matches and that violent incidents are exaggerated in order to attract a larger proportion of audience and connected benefits and because of their personal preferences towards certain football teams.

The fact that a large portion of football supporters and amongst these, violent supporters, is made of young people, means that the new generations are nowadays the continuators of old rivalries in the island, may it be between right and left wings, between Hellocentrics and Cyprocetrics or against their historical enemies, that is their ex "motherlands". This data tell us a series of thigs: that football is more than just a sport, that it is actually relevant for the current division of the island because the stadium is one of the places where identity is shaped, and that the role of the family and the previous generations continue affecting negatively the new generations. One of the outcome of the survey was indeed that youngsters pick their team at a very young age following the preferences of the father or of the older relatives. This means that family passes down their individual and collective memories not only when educating their children on the history of their country but also when it comes to support a football team. Not only history textbook have a separatist and hateful rhetoric but also stadium chants, where the media have a strong impact on football violence through the way they cover violent football match incidents, or through the way they present specific football matches. It can therefore concluded that the stadium is another place where identity is built, the narrative of the evil "other" is supported, and extremist is intensified.

Individual memories: 'The Untold Stories'

"The Untold Stories" is the title of a book by Sevgül Uludağ, a Turkish Cypriot journalist who has dedicated her life to try to erase the divide between the two communities by working especially on the Cypriot missing persons and refugees, reason why she is currently nominated for the Peace Nobel. In this book, Uludağ collected memories from the Cypriots who have experienced the 1974 war. There are stories that we cannot find in a history book, this collection of horal history gives to

the whole picture the "missing pieces of the puzzle". We have heard endless times the different points of view and narratives of numerous politicians and third parties. However, no one normally asks what the common people think, feel, or remember. Furthermore, it is also especially important that survivors are able to talk and share their experiences to get closure and come to terms with the past. The result of not having contact with the "other side" for about thirty years, of all the filtered news, of disinformation, of false myths, is that Cypriots built a wall not only along the Green Line but also in people's minds: suddenly the Cypriot counterpart became the "other" and this "other" had no more human face. Sometimes the other is just imagined: many people still do not cross, are afraid to do so or do not want to do it. Too many people do not know what the Cypriot counterpart looks like or have never met one. This is why Uludağ's work has been particularly relevant, because in her articles she tries to make people imagine how the places on the other side of the wall are in order for people to get acquainted with the part of their island they have never met. She makes the "other" looks human. Furthermore, in 1992 Louise Diamond and John McDonald in their book "Multi-Track Diplomacy" identified nine actors involved in peace-making (tracks shown in the image below). Amongst these, track 4 – private citizens

– are relevant for the discourse of oral memory and history.[257] An important theory they discuss is conflict transformation. They say that conflicts are "habituated system", meaning that they do not remain the same and consequently, when one tries to solve the original conflict, it is no longer there with the same dynamics. Both the conflicts and the original solutions are going to be expired. The goal of a conflict transformation is therefore to move from the habituated system, where the social system has in a sense become addicted to the conflict - to a peace

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[257] In this picture Notter and Diamond described a system of interconnecting "tracks" that shape how peace is achieved in the international system. James Notter and Louise Diamond, "Building Peace and Transforming Conflict: Multi-track Diplomacy in Practice," *Occasional Paper —The Institute for Multi-track Diplomacy,* (October 1996)

system.[258] The term 'conflict resolution' is considered inappropriate for deep-rooted conflicts because these 'systems' cannot be resolved but they can be transformed.[259] This different approach also represents a shift away from power politics, diplomacy, and official negotiations to move towards unofficial actors. Afterwards, they continue describing three types of peacebuilding aimed at achieving this transformation: political, structural and social peacebuilding. The focus of this paragraph is on the latter. This one is based on a "human infrastructure" because it is based on relationships, feelings, beliefs, values.[260] It is social peacebuilding the missing puzzle to achieve a long-lasting and sustainable peace. If two parties sign a peace treaty, it does not mean that peace has been achieved, only that a legal basis has been built. The past has demonstrated that signing peace agreements has not stopped violence. A corresponding social infrastructure is required.[261] However, every track is equally important and cannot work independently from the others.[262] This multi-track cooperation between official and unofficial agencies to solve conflicts is a concept taken from Joseph Montville (1981).

I offer hereinafter some of the stories Uludağ has collected from the children of the missing people that will provide us with insights that history books or politicians will not tell us. One of the stories we learn is that Ayşe Zeytincioğlu was only two years when her father, Fazıl Önder was killed in 1958 by the Turkish Cypriot underground organization, TMT, because of his political views.[263] We also learn of Alpay Mustafa, an active member of the TMT, who similarly as Fazıl Önder, was killed by the paramilitary organisation itself to silence him.[264] On the other side of the Green Line, Petros Petru tells us that his father, Mihalis Petru, was killed by EOKA in 1958 probably to further the policy of dividing Cyprus.[265] Andreas Dimitriu Tofaris also

[258]James Notter and Luoise Diamond (1996), p.1.

[259] James Notter & Louise Diamond (1996), p.2.

[260] Ibid., p.3.

[261] Ibid., p.2.

[262] Ibid., p.5.

[263] Sevgül Uludağ, *Oysters with the Missing Pearls: Untold Stories about Missing Persons, Mass Graves and Memories from the Past of Cyprus,* (Nicosia: Ikme, 2006). P.221.

[264] Sevgül Uludağ, Milliyetçiliğin öksüz bıraktıkları(6): Alpay Mustafa'nın eşi Huriye Alpay. Yeraltı Notları, 11 April, 2005. Retrieved on April 25, 2007 from http://www.stwing by Süleyman İrvan in "Oral History as a Method for Peace Journalists: Sevgül Uludağ as a Case Study," *Eastern Mediterranean University.*

[265] Sevgül Uludağ, Milliyetçiliğin öksüz bıraktıkları (9): EOKA tarafından öldürülen Mihalis Petru'nunoğlu Petros Petru anlatıyor. Yeraltı Notları, 20 May, 2005. Retrieved on April 25, 2007 from   http://www.stwing.

saw his father, Ilias Tofaris being killed by EOKA in 1958 because of political reasons (Ilias was a member of AKEL[266] and PEO[267].[268]

These stories tell us many truths. They tell us that back in the years of violent intercommunal fights, Turkish and Greek Cypriots were not killing each other simply because unable to co-exist under different values and cultures. They were killing each other because of extreme nationalism at the hands of violent groups. They also highlight an important fact, that driven by their fanaticism, people were killing even members of their own ethnic group. Fazıl, Alpay, Mihalis, Ilias, these are all people that if they could, they would have told us many truths. However, being victims of extremism, they had to leave this task to their children, affirming once again the importance of oral stories and individual memories.

By now it should be clear how official records of past events – historical materials, public records, statistical data…- are not sufficient to provide us with a complete picture of the issue in question. Sometimes, eyewitness does not match the official record. Sometimes, it corrects or complete it. Oral history contains the untold and the forgotten stories. Also, oral history allows us understanding more deeply how a group of people perceived and experienced the forces of history.[269] By looking at the individual level, we can understand how it is true that important matters have surely shaped history but also how they did so not under "self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past."[270] Oral history also shows us the changes occurred in people's lives, or what has remained the same, while recorded history is in constant change. Fields like traditions and beliefs

upenn.edu/~durduran/hamambocu/authors/svg/svg4_20_2005.html by Süleyman İrvan in "Oral History as a Method for Peace Journalists: Sevgül Uludağ as a Case Study," *Eastern Mediterranean University.*

[266] The Progressive Party of Working People, left-wing, supporting the demilitarisation and independence of Cyprus, as well as a federal solution with the Turkish Cypriots.

[267] The Pancyprian Federation of Labour coordinates the Cypriot trade unions and maintains close ties with AKEL.

[268] Sevgül Uludağ, Milliyetçiliğin öksüz bıraktıkları (2): Grivas'ın solcuları öldürdüğü bir dönemdi. Yeraltı Notları, 16 March, 2005. Retrieved on April 25, 2007 from http://www.stwing.upenn.edu/~durduran/hamambocu/authors/svg/svg2_16_2005.html by Süleyman İrvan in "Oral History as a Method for Peace Journalists: Sevgül Uludağ as a Case Study," *Eastern Mediterranean University.*

[269] "Understanding Oral History: Why do it?" Workshop on the Web: Introduction to Oral History, *Baylor University Institute for Oral History* (2012).

[270] Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon*, transcribed and edited by Robert Bills for the official Web site of the Socialist Labor Party of America (December 2003). Available on http://www.slp.org/pdf/marx/eighteenth_brum.pdf [last accessed 04.06.2019].

are those in which one can particularly notice the difference between the two types of history, between what has officially changed and what has informally remained the same. It could also take into account myths or folklore, for example traditions on the countryside or the linguistic aspects of the spoken word. Because oral history focuses on individuals, it should probably called oral stories. Paul Thompson[271] defined this type of history 'the first kind of history'.[272] Knowledge and memory of these personal stories pass from person to person, from family to family, by word of mouth and keep record of those events that may have been slipped from the written source of traditional history.[273]

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[271] A sociologist and one of the pioneers of oral history as a research methodology.
[272] Paul Thompson, (2000).
[273] Graham Smith, "The Making of Oral History," *Institute of Historical Research* https://www.history.ac.uk/makinghistory/resources/articles/oral_history.html [last accessed 04.06.2019].

CONCLUSION

From the tragic end of the short-lived union of Cyprus to the 1974 war it was a downhill. However, the current *de facto* status of the island is the result of centuries of foreign rule, foreign interests and complicated domestic dynamics on identity and nationalism. Often, when dealing with the complicated issue of the Cypriot problem, it is debated by people in Cyprus who came first, the Greeks or the Turks? Is Cyprus more Greek or more Turkish? Is every Cypriot a Greek and therefore, Turkish Cypriots are simply Greek Cypriots converted to Islam during the Ottoman rule? However, if one goes back enough in history, it becomes clear that there are no exact answers to those questions, as the character of the island was formed by the overlapping of several layers of different societies and civilisations that make of contemporary Cyprus a mosaic of cultures. Our findings on the Neolithic, when the first reported inhabitants are alleged to have appeared in Khirokitia (Southern cost, near Larnaca), show that contacts had been created with the neighbouring Levante region or that it even was the place of origin of the first inhabitants in Cyprus. Kyrris and Rupp support the idea that the island was colonised from outside, probably from the East or North East. However, these hypotheses need to be taken with a grain of salt for we do not have confirmation on the origin of the first inhabitants. As far as Greek culture and presence on the island is concerned, trade with the Aegean started in the Late Bronze Age (16th century B.C.) and these initial contacts with what is considered today Greece resulted in the Hellenization of the island three centuries later. From this moment on, all the historical period B.C. will see continuous influx of Hellenic culture and population and closer contact with the Greek world. However, these cultural changes continued to be mixed with Oriental influences. An important moment is the Roman Period (30 B.C. - A.D. 330), when Christianity will be introduced in the island, thus laying the foundations for what will become the Orthodox Church of Cyprus. Whereas the first Muslim settlers arrived around 649. It is very important to highlight that at this point there were no territorial division between the two religions and that Muslim and Christian (the majority) villages were built side by side. The turning point is 1571, when he Ottoman Empire invaded the island. In this period, the decline of the Empire had started and will lead to several movements for national independence throughout its

territory. Cyprus will be no exception and demands for *enosis* will begin in the 19th century, when nationalist feelings in Europe, especially in the fervent Greece will rise. At the beginning of the 20th century, the spread of Turkish nationalist feelings will lead to a counterpart movement that asked for the return of the island to Turkey. Apart from the obvious Turkish, Greek and indigenous features the island carries, we cannot forget other important chapters of Cypriot history contributing to the multicultural character of the island. Amongst those, Romans, the Lusignans, the Venetian, and the British. This short historical extract clearly highlights the fact that not only Cyprus is a multi-ethnic island, but also that the common claims on who "owns" the island are unfounded. They do not do more than supporting ultranationalist claims that harm any hope and effort for a successful solution in Cyprus.

When talking about nationalism, Ernest Gellner needs to be taken into consideration. One conclusion that can be drawn from his idea of nation is that these are created by men on the basis of their convictions and loyalties, where culture and willingness play a key role. A second important point to make, which also supports my belief that the two Cypriot communities' ability to co-exist peacefully can be developed in the future, is Gellner's idea that while cultural pluralism may not seem viable sometimes, culturally plural societies used to be effectual in the past, to the extent that in its absence, plurality would have to be invented. David Cannadine also argued against the Manichean view of the world dividing people into two different and conflicting groups, "us" and the "other". This is an over-simplified notion of identity that does nothing but creating conflicts when in reality, cultures constantly overlap, borrow from each other and live together. That is an extremely important point to make in the case of Cyprus as one of the main narratives opposing a future resolution supports the argument that the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot communities could never co-exist together simply put, because they are too different. Not only the world cannot be divided in black and white – and Cyprus cannot escape this – but Cyprus has always been dominated by so many cultures, and the stories of these three countries involved – Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey - are so intertwined that it sounds insane to even talk of a "pure" Cypriot nation. Finally, I took into consideration Rogers Brubacker's work, who focused on language and religion, two important internal factors that affect identity formation in a multi-ethnic and divided society– and this is especially true in the case of Cyprus. According to Brubaker indeed, languages and

religions are "the two most socially and politically consequential domains of cultural difference in the modern world. Both elements are connected to ethnicity and nationhood because through language and religion one can identify themselves and others (culturally, socially, politically) - which means that they sort people into distinct categories, simultaneously uniting and dividing between "us" and the "other". Therefore, both languages and religions need to be considered for the Cyprus case because at present these are two important reasons why the deep fracture between the two Cypriot communities is not being closed.

Identity and nationalism are strictly intertwined to memory. The lack of a clear Cypriot identity makes it easier to leave room for politics of remembrance and to opposing collective memories on the two sides, while leaving unheard individual memories. Memory has been at the service of politics since the creation of the modern, 'post-Westphalian' state. Civic remembrance is now preached and it is the state that "supervises" remembrance. Politics of remembrance impose an interpretation of history and history textbooks are an example of it. The past is a weapon and remaining ignorant about history means being vulnerable to manipulations. History teaching should build cooperation and trust instead of walls, it should awaken curiosity and in divided society in particular, it should focus on shared history, on commonalities rather than stressing differences. This is particularly relevant in divided society where the co-existing of different ethnicities is a used as a reason for conflict. It is in this type of societies that victimization narratives are propagated and the suffering of only one side is highlighted. By contrast, the other side is victim of "othering" narrative, that is, it is seen as alien, different and even evil. Collective memory could be considered as a sub-category of national memory, as it involves collectively a state but it does not necessarily speak for the whole nation, it could just represent a smaller group of people. I use *lieux de mémoire* as an example of this kind of memory. These could be several different things: a constitution, treaties, history books serving a particular narrative, memoirs, diaries, an autobiography. There are also more physical *lieux de mémoire*, such as cemeteries, statues, monuments to the fallen and museums, and those more intellectually elaborate, such as generations, lineage, formal divisions of inherited property. To follow is popular collective memory, a more recent type of memory as it is connected to media, communication, and technology. The nation is certainly the place where collective memory is created because it provides room and

the necessary symbols for creating a platform for the community sharing same memories. However, in the age of globalisation and loosing of borders, mass media acquired a central role in creating memories. By repeating the same representations, a society reproduces its cultural identity and therefore, its shared memories and identity. Football in Cyprus is an example of how identity has been shaped in the stadiums by the media and through informal channels, such as YouTube, by football supporters. Finally, I presented individual memories, stories that we cannot find in a history book. These are linked to oral history, which naturally, has its own flaws, as it relies on people's informal stories, on the way they have perceived, lived, and understood a particular event. Scepticism exists on the reliability – consistency on telling the same story over a repeated number of times - and validity – conformity between the reports of the event and the event itself as described by other primary source material of oral history. However, collection of horal history gives to the whole picture the missing pieces of the puzzle. Official records of past events – historical materials, public records, statistical data…- are not sufficient to provide us with a complete picture of the issue in question. Sometimes, eyewitness do not match the official record. Sometimes, it corrects or complete it. Oral history contains the untold and the forgotten stories. Also, oral history allows us understanding more deeply how a group of people perceived and experienced the forces of history. Oral history also shows us the changes occurred in people's lives while, or what has remained the same, while recorded history is in constant change. Fields like traditions and beliefs are those in which one can particularly notice the difference between the two types of history, between what has officially changed and what has informally remained the same.

   This discussion finally leads to oblivion. Forgetting should not been interpreted as a moral Alzheimer, the central point of my argument, inspired by David Rieff's "*In Praise of Forgetting*", was not mutilation of history but avoiding "over-remembering." Through a Constitution that considers Cypriots as two separate entities, places, people, objects full of symbolism, non-inclusive history textbooks, the unheard stories of those individuals that may speak a different version of the truth, and football pitches where extremist identities and violence are propagated, I have demonstrated how an excessive use of remembrance leads to separation and conflict rather than cohesion. An important point about forgetting is the intentionality of the act. A Russian neurologist, Aleksandr R. Luria, said that a man could forget only by an act of will. It

has been almost 60 years since Cyprus has overcome its British colonial past and yet, Cypriots have not managed to write their own history in terms of Cypriotism rather than Hellenism or Turkism. Past conflicts (Australia, Western Europe, Canada, United States) have shown that all cultural conflicts end at some point finding, either implicitly or explicitly, compromises between the new and the old elements. There have been many arguments and scholars in favour of remember. For instance, the historian Timothy Garton Ash said that a nation without memory is childish, just as a person without memory is a child. The opposite may be argued as well, sometimes nations are childish because they hold on memories, especially true in divided societies where collective memory has led to conflicts rather than peace, to hate rather than forgiveness. It is like there is something unforgivable about forgetting the sacrifices and sufferings of those who have fought or died for what they believed in or for their country. It is something we owe to them. Very often forgetting is portrayed like a failure and those who forget like "assassins of memory", while remembering is a sort of moral obligation. Rieff recalls some important moments in history in which leaders have called for an active forgetting, a concept he borrows from Nietzsche. Indeed, just as people can decide to voluntary remember he says, they can also decide to voluntary forget. Rieff makes another very good point, he says that collective memory cannot correspond to what individuals remember. We normally remember and commemorate a historical event that we have not experienced, we remember it through the eyes of our older relatives who have lived it or public commemorations promoted by the state or schools. Can this be called remembering then? Collective memory is rather a metaphor for "interpreted" reality. Pierre Nora, a pioneer in the study of collective memory, said that memory tends to be used as a substitute for history and that the study of history has been put at the service of memory, meaning of politics. This is extremely different from the question of moral obligation and duty to the fallen, being it rather a matter of opposing political agendas deciding what should be remembered and how.

Maria Siakalli's thought, that I have presented in the section on history textbooks, was not only beautifully written but it also proves many of the points I made in this thesis. Firstly, that certain material (and knowledge) provided in Cyprus – in this case the "I don't forget notebooks" – negatively affects any possibility of future reconciliation. They create fear and distrust between the two communities. Secondly, it shows that remembering can be a powerful weapon that if misused can cause serious

harm. Of course, it also shows that remembering is not bad per se, that instead of exploiting memories, these should be used to learn from the past, as Siakalli did by going to Turkey, learn the language and culture and then returning to Cyprus with a deeper sense of awareness. Yes, there are some things that should not be forgotten, for example that "people in Cyprus used to live in peace, regardless of language and religion."[274]

The initially stated overarching aim of this research was to support a specific type of forgetting over "over-remembering." While recognising the limitations of my analysis due to the context of this work, in terms of the initial objectives, I believe I have successfully provided a new perspective on the Cypriot issue in my revised concept of remembrance and oblivion. The number of gaps in my knowledge around voluntarily forgetting and oblivion as a key tool for conflict resolution in divided societies would benefit from further research and offer new opportunities for future debates.

"I note the obvious differences
Between each sort and type,
But we are more alike, my friends,
Than we are unalike."
[Maya Angelou]

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[274] Maria Siakalli, Omada Kypros.

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Despite being the great majority of sources in English, reference to French, Greek and Turkish documents will also be made, for accuracy and consistency purposes.

A thematic bibliography is preferred to an alphabetical and will cover the following topics:

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- Nationalism and Identity
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APPENDIX

A. Timelines

A.1 - Timeline of the Cyprus Conflict

45AD: Christianity introduced to Cyprus

395:                      Cyprus becomes part of the Byzantine Empire

1571:   First Ottoman settlers arrive; Islam introduced to Cyprus

1878:   Ottoman Empire turns over control of Cyprus to the British, although it remains nominally under Ottoman sovereignty. Cyprus Convention

1914:   Cyprus annexed by Britain

16 October 1915:   Cyprus is offered to Greece by the British cabinet

1925:   Cyprus becomes British Crown Colony

1931:   Large-scale pro *enosis* agitation

August 1945:   Last time Cyprus is offered to Greece

1 April 1955:   Guerrilla war of liberation by EOKA

1955/1959:   EOKA created by Greek Cypriots and led by George Grivas to perform *enosis*

1955:   Greek Cypriots begin guerrilla war, headed by Archbishop Makarios, against British rule in pursuit of unification with Greece

1955:   Turkish Cypriot terrorist group Volkan created → TMT (Turkish Resistance Organisation) in 1958

7 June 1958:   A bomb explodes in the Turkish Consulate in Nicosia: first Greek-Turkish physical confrontation on the island

16 August 1960:	Britain grants independence to the Crown Colony of Cyprus after Greek and Turkish communities reached agreement on a constitution. Archbishop Makarios serves as first post-independence president after being deported to the Seychelles. Treaty of Guarantee gives Britain, Greece and Turkey the right to intervene. Britain retains sovereignty over two military bases
November 1963:	Makarios proposes major amendments to the power-sharing constitution, which would abrogate power-sharing arrangements
21 December 1963:	Turkish minority riots in Cyprus to protest anti-Turkish revisions in the constitution. Inter-communal violence erupts
30 December 1963:	The "green line" is drawn through Nicosia to mark ceasefire lines. The Turkish Cypriots withdraw from the Cyprus Republic
1964:	General Grivas returned to Cyprus to help organize a National Guard
January 1964:	Turkish Cypriots withdraw into defended enclaves and the Greek Cypriots re-introduce the demand for Enosis
March 1964:	The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) established under United Nations Security Council Resolution 186 to prevent a recurrence of fighting following intercommunal violence between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Turkey has been preparing for a military invasion, averted only by a robust warning from the US president
June 1964:	The Greek Cypriots establish a National Guard, introducing compulsory military service. Makarios starts making overtures to the Soviet Union. Greece

sends an army division of some 10,000 troops to Cyprus on the grounds that it will protect the island, but Athens is also concerned that Cyprus is coming under the influence of the Soviet Union. Talks between Greece and Turkey for a Cyprus solution, with a former US secretary of state, Dean Acheson, serving as mediator. The "Acheson Plan" envisages the union of Cyprus and Greece, while up to three cantons would be established for the Turkish Cypriots, over which they would have full administrative control

1964:	Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannides, head of the Greek Military Police, proposes extermination of Turkish Cypriots to Makarios
August 1964:	Heavy fights between the two community. US-led peace talks interrupted
April 1967:	Greece resumes consultations with Turkey to bring back the Acheson Plan, but Makarios voices strong opposition. The Cyprus House of Representatives unanimously approves a resolution for union with Greece
November 1967:	Attacks on to Turkish Cypriot villages – Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou – led by General Grivas, bring Greece and Turkey to the brink of war.
January 1968:	Makarios announces that while *enosis* remains desirable it is no longer feasible in the prevailing circumstances: independence is the only practical solution
1970:	The right-wing military dictatorship in Athens begins a sustained covert campaign against Makarios
8 March 1970:	Assassination attempt to Makarios

1971:	The Greek military junta begins a wider armed and political campaign against Makarios with the help Grivas and founds EOKA B
January 1974:	Grivas dies of a heart attack and EOKA B comes more directly under the control of military junta in Greece
3 July 1974:	Makarios publicly accuses the junta of using Greek officers in the National Guard to subvert his government and demands that Athens withdraw 650 of them immediately
15 July 1974:	Sampson-Ioannides coup: Greek officers in the National Guard, directed from Athens, launch a coup against Makarios aimed at enosis. He escapes to London. Nicos Sampson, a notorious ex-EOKA, is installed as president
20 July 1974:	Turkey invades Cyprus, invoking the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee
23 July 1974:	The coup collapses, the military junta in Greece falls and civilian rule returns. Sampson is forced to step down and Glafcos Clerides becomes acting president until Makarios returned in December
14 August 1974:	Second phase of Turkish invasion and occupation of 36.2 per cent of the island, partition between north and south along the "Green Line". About 165,000 Greek Cypriots flee their homes, and about 45,000 Turkish Cypriots leave the south for the north. The UN Security Council unanimously passes a resolution calling on Turkey to withdraw its troops from Cyprus but Turkey refuses to do so
18 August 1974:	Ceasefire line drawn by Turkey
20 September 1974:	Exchange of prisoners

22 August 1974:	Rauf Denktash proclaims an autonomous Turkish Cypriot administration
13 February 1975:	Turkish Cypriots establish independent administration under the name of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, led by Raul Denktash president. Denktash and Clerides agreed to population exchange
15 November 1975	*De facto* state of Northern Cyprus created
1980:	UN-sponsored peace talks
15 November 1983:	Denktash suspends talks and proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, recognized only by Turkey
1992:	UN-sponsored talks begin between the two sides. Talks collapsed again
1996:	Violence continues along buffer zone
1997:	UN-mediated peace talks between the leaders Clerides and Denktash fail
1999:	The European Council decides that Cyprus can join the EU without a settlement of the Cyprus problem. At the same time, it informs Turkey that it can commence accession negotiations if it satisfies the Copenhagen criteria. Proximity talks begin between Clerides and Denktash. The aim is that Cyprus will be reunited before it joins the EU.
January 2002:	Clerides and Denktash begin UN-sponsored negotiations after decades of stalled talks. Minds are concentrated by EU membership aspirations
November 2002:	UN Secretary General Kofi Annan presents a comprehensive peace plan for Cyprus which envisages

a federation with two constituent parts, presided over by a rotating presidency

2003:   Tassos Papadopoulos takes office as fifth Greek Cypriot president, pledges to strive for reunification. Rival Greek and Turkish leaders failed to agree on UN power-sharing agreement to unify the island. Turkish Cypriot authorities eased border restrictions and Turkish and Greek Cypriots cross island's dividing "Green Line" for first time in 30 years

April 2004:   Twin referendums on whether to accept UN reunification plan. Plan endorsed by Turkish Cypriots but overwhelmingly rejected by Greek Cypriots. Cyprus joined EU. Rauf Denktash, Turkish Cypriot leader, left after decades in politics

2005:   UN officials and Greek Cypriot begin exploratory talks for new diplomatic peace effort

2006:   EU foreign ministers reach agreement with Cyprus on a formula to enable Turkey to take steps in detailed accession talks with the 25 nation bloc. UN sponsored talks with Papadopoulos and Talat, agree to a series of confidence building measures and contacts between the two communities.

January – March 2007: Greek and Turkish Cypriots demolish barriers dividing the old city of Nicosia

2008:   Greek Cypriot leader Demetris Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat agree to start formal talks on reunification. Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders launch intensive negotiations aimed at ending the division of the island

2009:	Right-winged nationalist National Unity Party wins parliamentary elections in northern Cyprus, possibly hampers peace talks. Reunification talks continue, little progress made
2010:	President Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat resume talks on reunification, no progress made. Dervis Eroglu, candidate of the pro-independence National Unity Party beats the pro-unity incumbent Mehmet Ali Talat
February 2013:	Democratic Rally conservative candidate Nicos Anastasiades wins presidential election
October 2014:	Cyprus suspends peace talks with Turkish-held Cypriots in protest against what it calls efforts by Turkey to prevent it from exploring gas fields south of the island
May 2015:	Government and Turkish Cypriot negotiators resume talks on reunification, holding 20 rounds of UN-sponsored in the course of the year
January 2017:	Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders meet at UN in Geneva for direct talks on reunification under a federal arrangement
February 2017:	Talks break off when parliament in the south voted to introduce an annual commemoration in public schools of the January 1950 Enosis referendum. Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci says he will not resume negotiations until Greek Cypriots took corrective action. Anastasiades rejects Akinci's demand
26 October 2018:	The Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades, and the Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci confirm their readiness to engage constructively with the UN special-envoy Jane Holl Lute to discuss future negotiations

12 November 2018:   Opening of two new crossing points

A.2 - Timeline of Relevant Historical Events in Greece

September 1814:   *FIliki Etairia* (Society of Friends) founded in Odessa, Greece

March 1821:   Greek War of Independence against the Ottoman Empire

August 1821:   Navarino Massacre

1821-30:   Greece is the first country to break away from the Ottoman Empire after the Greek War of Independence

1825:   George Canning's policy persuades Greece to ask for Great Britain's protection

February 1830:   Greece's independence

August 1832:   Kingdom of Greece established under Otto Wittelsbach

March 1844:   Greece becomes a constitutional monarchy

1844 – 1922:   Irredentist nationalism *Megali Idea* (Great Idea) under Otto's rule leads to territorial expansion

1853 – 1856:   Crimean War

1864:   Britain cedes the Ionian islands to Greece for not siding with Russia in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8

1866:   Otto's abdication replaced by King George I. New constitution

1897:   Greco-Turkish War

1898:   Crete's independence from the Ottoman Empire and annexation with Greece in 1913

August 1909:   Military coup

October 1912:	Military alliance of Bulgaria, Montenegro, Serbia and Greece against the Ottoman Empire, which led to the 1912-3 Balkan Wars
16 October 1915:	Cyprus is offered to Greece by the British cabinet
May 1918:	Greece enters WWI on the side of the Allies
1920:	Treaty of Sevres: Greek presence in eastern Thrace and on the Anatolian west coast, as well as Greek control over the Aegean islands commanding the Dardanelles
9 September 1922:	Fights in Smyrna end in Greece's defeat, mass deportations from Pontus and Cappadocia and end of *Megali Idea*
30 January 1923:	Greco-Turkish convention on minorities exchange
March 1924:	Second Greek Republic and subsequent new constitution
1930:	Venizelos signs a friendship agreement with Ataturk, ending a century of conflict
1935:	Coup and Venizelos' exile – End of second Greek Republic and beginning of a conservative authoritarian regime under George II and Ioannis Metaxas
October 1940:	Greek resistance against Mussolini's invasion. Greece and Britain are the only two countries left resisting fascism
1941:	EAM, controlled by the Communist Party, takes part to a coalition government
1944:	EAM demonstration and confrontation with British forces
August 1945:	Last time Cyprus is offered to Greece

1946 – 1949:	Civil War: the Communist Party controlled several areas in Greece and enjoyed material support from the Soviet Union, Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria and later. In Cold War period, the United States started providing economic and military support to the government of Greece, which resulted in the defeat of the communist forces
1952:	Greece joins NATO
	The Communist Party was banned
1964:	Giorgos Papandreou Prime Minister of Greece
July 1965:	King Constantine of Greece's putsch
21 April 1967:	Military coup, led by Colonel George Papadopoulos and sponsored by the CIA
October 1973:	Papadopulos forbids the United States to use Greek airspace to resupply Israel during the Yom Kippur war
21 November 1973:	Dimitrios Ioannides replaces Papadopoulos
January 1974:	Discovery of oil in the seabed of the Aegean
22 July 1974:	Third Greek Republic under Konstantinos Karamanlis and new constitution
November 1981:	Papandreou victory. End of almost half a century of conservative rule

A.3 - Timeline of Relevant Historical Events in Turkey

334–333 B.C.:	Alexander the Great in Anatolia
1300:	Defeat of Byzantine forces by Osman
1453:	Fall of Constantinople to Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II
1897:	Greco-Turkish War
30 October 1918:	Turkish surrender and partition of Ottoman Empire

1919 – 1922:	Turkish War of Independence
August 1920:	Treaty of Sevres
30 January 1923:	Greco-Turkish convention on minorities exchange
14 July 1923:	Treaty of Lausanne
29 October 1923:	Declaration of the Republic of Turkey and election of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as first President of the Republic
29 June 1939:	Turkey annexes the Hatay province
February 1952:	Turkey Joins NATO
6-7 September 1955	Istanbul pogrom: attacks directed at Istanbul's Greek minority
September 1959:	Turkey applies for associate membership in EEC
May 1960:	Turkey's first military coup
January 1974:	Discovery of oil in the seabed of the Aegean
July 1974:	First invasion to Cyprus
August 1974:	Second invasion to Cyprus
December 1997:	EU rejects Turkey's bid for membership
12 September 1980:	Military coup in Turkey
May 2000:	EU readmits Turkey to candidate status

A.4 - Timeline of Relevant Events Worldwide

1848:	Publishing of Communist Manifesto, Paris
1853 – 1856:	Crimean War
1912-13:	Balkan Wars
16 May 1916:	Sykes-Picot agreement
1917:	Russian Revolution and Russian Civil War

7 November 1917:   Lenin's coup in Russia

4 March 1919:   Comintern founded in Moscow

December 1922:   Formation of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)

March 1947:   Truman Doctrine

1968:   Election of Richard Nixon as President of the US, financially supported by the Greek junta. His administration is hostile to Makarios

1949:   COMECON founded and Eastern Bloc

25-30 July 1974:   Geneva Conferences, at the request of the United Nations Security Council, involving Greece, Turkey and Great Britain

December 1991:   Dissolution of Soviet Union

B. Maps

B.1 – Ethnic Distribution of Cypriot Population Before and After the Conflict[275]

[275]   https://www.turkheritage.org/en/publications/issue-briefs/the-cyprus-dispute-at-a-glance-3300 [accessed 08.12.2018]

B.2 – Map Of Middle East and North Africa Region[276]

Map of Middle East and North Africa region[1]

[1]Note: The disputed territory of Western Sahara is not depicted separately from Morocco, which currently administers the region.
Source: USDA, 2015

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[276] Getachew Nigatu and Mesbah Motamed, "Middle East and North Africa Region: An Important Driver of World Agricultural Trade," Special Outlook, AES-88, *Economic Research Service/USDA,* Washington DC, 2015.

C. Dramatis Personae

- **Archbishop Makarios III**

Personal Details:	Michael Christodoulou Mouskos (original name), 1913-1977, Cyprus.
Key Fact(s):	-Archbishop of Cyprus (1950-1977).
	-Ethnarch, *de facto* leader of the Greek Cypriot community (1950-1977).
	-First President of Cyprus (16 August 1960 – 15 July 1974)
	-Active supporter of *enosis* (1940s-1950s), close links with Athens.
	-Supporter of insurgency against British rule for self-determination (1955).
	-Supporter of pro-Cypriot independence and non-aligned policy (1960-1977), idea of *enosis* abandoned, but seen as communism-friendly.
Key Event(s):	-Exile to Seychelles (1956-1957), return to Cyprus forbidden.
	-Return to Cyprus and first Presidential elections (1959) in which he obtained 66.8 percent of the votes.
	-Proposal of Thirteen amendments to the Cypriot Constitution (1963): Makarios' alleged goal was to allow the government to be more efficient and reduce barriers between the two communities. However, the amendments were seen by many Turkish Cypriots as threatening and in favour of the Greek Cypriot majority. As a consequence the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President Küçük resigned and Turkish Cypriots moved into separated communities. Intercommunal violence broke out.
	-New presidential elections (1968), in which Makarios received about 96 percent of the votes against his opponent who supported *enosis*. This victory shows that the majority

of Greek Cypriots were finally ready to embrace the idea of an independent Cyprus.

-Relations with Athens became tense (1967).

-Ecclesiastic coup against Makarios by three bishops of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus (1972-1973)-pro *enosis* and close to the Greek military junta-claiming that Makarios' temporal power violated Canon Law. They attempted to defrock Makarios however the latter had the three bishops defrocked and Makarios continued holding both temporal and secular power.

-Forced to flee the island after the military coup at the hands of the Greek Army in Cyprus, the Cypriot National Guard and the Greek military junta (15 July 1974).

-Return to Presidency and Archbishoprics (December 1974), until his death.

- **Georgios Grivas**

Personal Details:	Digenis (nom de guerre), 1897-1974, Cyprus
Key Fact(s):	-Sub-Lieutenant in the Greek-Turkish War (1919-1922).
	-Founder of Organisation X (June 1941), a right-wing and royalist resistance organisation fighting against the Axis powers. Communism was its main enemy.
	-Founder of EOKA (1954).
	-Founder of EOKA-B (1971).
Key Event(s):	-Moved to Greece where he took citizenship and enrolled in Athens Military Academy (as from 1916).
	-Retirement from the military career and focus on the idea of *enosis,* along with Archbishop Makarios.
	-Secret arrival in Cyprus (1954) and creation of his guerrilla organisation EOKA.
	-Declaration of beginning of campaign for self-determination and union with Greece (1955-1959),

bombings. Wanted by the British forces, he continued his terrorist operations from a hideout in Cyprus.

-Exile in Greece and declaration of ceasefire following Cyprus independence and Makarios change of position towards *enosis.*

-Return to Cyprus (1964) after the outbreak of intercommunal violence in Cyprus, where he took over the Supreme Command of the Greek Cypriot forces in order to defend the island from a possible Turkish invasion. Under his command waves of terror against Turkish Cypriots were conducted.

-Return to Greece following Turkey's ultimatum (1968).

-Following the discovery of his plan to overthrow the Greek ruling military junta, he secretly returned to Cyprus (1971), where he attempted to overthrow Makarios in order to achieve *enosis.* His waves of violence led to the civil war in Cyprus until the 1974 events.

-Death just six month prior to the coup against Makarios and the subsequent Turkish invasion.

- **Dimitrios Ioannidis**

Personal Details:	The invisible dictator (nickname), 1923-2010, Greece
Key Fact(s):	-Greek military officer.
	-Leading figures in the 1967-1974 Greek military junta.
	-Chief of the Greek Military Police-ESA.
	-Strong supporter of *enosis.*
Key Event(s):	**-**One of the minds behind the 1967 coup d'état that led to the Greek military junta of 1967-1974 ('The Regime of the Colonels', 'The Dictatorship').
	-Lead of coup d'état against the liberal regime of Papadopoulos (1973).
	-Organiser of successful coup d'état against Makarios.

-Tried on charges of high treason, rebellion and manslaughter and sentenced to death, but later commuted to life imprisonment.

- **Nikos Sampson**

Personal Details:	Nikos Georgiadis (original name), Atrotos (nom de guerre), 1935-2001, Cyprus.
Key Fact(s):	-Member of EOKA.
	-*De facto* president of Cyprus (1974).
	-Nationalist, pro-Greek position.
Key Event(s):	-Took part in the resistance against British rule (1955-1959) and participated in several murders. At the time Sampson was working as a journalist, the police started suspecting him as he would often be the first to arrive at the murder scene, photograph the bodies of his victims and then send it to The Cyprus Times newspaper to be published. He was arrested and condemned to a death sentence for weapons possession, then commuted to life imprisonment in the United Kingdom.
	-Release and exile in Greece.
	-Return to Cyprus (1960).
	-Lead armed groups during the intercommunal violence (1963).
	-Interim President of Cyprus for eight days (1974).
	-Sentenced to twenty years in prison for abuse of power (1976).
	-Move to France on medical grounds (1979).
	-Return to Cyprus to complete his sentence (1990-1993), but then gained independence.

- **Rauf Denktaş**

Personal Details:	1924-2012, Cyprus
Key Fact(s):	-Founder of TMT, formed to resist EOKA (1957).
	-2nd Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus (1973).
	-President of Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration (1974-1975).
	-President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (1975-1983).
	-1st President of Northern Cyprus (1983-2005).
	-Supporter of *taksim.*
Key Event(s):	-Started peace negotiations (2000s) out of desire of both Cyprus and Turkey to join the EU. UN sponsored talks failed after rejections of the Annan Plan by Greek Cypriots (2004).

- **Kofi Annan**

Personal Details:	1938-2018, Ghana
Key Fact(s):	-Secretary-General of the UN (1997-2006).
	-Nobel Peace Prize recipient (2001).
	-Founder of the Kofi Annan Foundation, "towards a fairer, more peaceful world" (2007).
	-UN-Arab League Joint Special Representative for Syria (2012).
Key Event(s):	-Proposal to the Parties of the Anna Plan for the reunification of Cyprus (2004). United Cyprus was to become a federation composed of two constituent states-one per each community. The text containing the settlement plan was put to ballot in two separate, simultaneous referenda but was heavily rejected by Greek Cypriots, while accepted by Turkish Cypriots.

D. Glossary

- CMP: acronym for Committee on Missing People in Cyprus. It is a bi-communal body established in 1981 by the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities with the participation of the United Nations. Its objective is to recover, identify, and return to their families, the remains of 2003 persons (492 Turkish Cypriots and 1,511 Greek Cypriots) who went missing from 1963-when intercommunal fights started-to 1974.

- EAM: acronym for *Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo* ('National Liberation Front). It was one of the many movements of the Greek Resistance during WWII.

- *Enosis:* from the Greek word 'ένωση' [enosi] ('union'). It was the movement supporting the union of Cyprus to Greece.

- EOKA: acronym for *Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston* ('National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters']. It was an underground Greek-Cypriot organisation guerrilla dedicated to ending British rule and eventually achieve *enosis* with Greece. It was headed by Col. Georgios Grivas, an officer in the Greek army, and it was recognised as a conservative nationalist anti-communist organisation. It is often labelled as a terrorist organisation due to attacks on civilians and public utilities. It disbanded in 1959, when a compromise between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities was reached.

- EOKA-B: ultra-right-wing nationalist terrorist paramilitary organisation succeeding EOKA formed by Georgios Grivas in 1971. Its goal was overthrowing President Makarios and achieving *enosis* with Greece

- *Filiki Etairia:* ('Φιλική Εταιρία', 'The Society of Friends'). It was a secret organisation founded in 1814 in Odessa, Greece, that led the Greek War of Independence between 1821 and 1830.

- IDP: Internally Displaced Person. It refer to individuals forced to flee their home but who remain within their country's borders. Although there is no universal legal definition of IDPs, a United Nations report, 'Guiding

Principles on Internal Displacement' uses the definition of "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border."

- *Megali Idea:* Greek expressions meaning 'Great Idea'. It was a concept intrinsic to Greek nationalism, having the goal of creating a Greek country that would encompass any land that had belonged to the Greek from the ancient times and any ethnicity associated with the Greek culture.

- *Taksim:* Turkish word meaning 'division'. It is the counterpart of Greek nationalism but unlikely *enosis*, *taksim* supporters believed in the idea of the division of the island of Cyprus.

- TMT: Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı ('Turkish Resistance Organisation'). It was a Turkish Cypriot pro-*taksim* paramilitary organisation formed by Rauf Denktaş and Turkish military officer Rıza Vuruşkan in 1958 as an organisation to counter the Greek Cypriot Fighter's Organization EOKA.

E. Briefing Reports

E.1 – Why Does Cyprus Matter?

Much has been discussed and written on the Cyprus conflict, several rounds of negotiations have been established in vain throughout the decades in order to solve the 44-year-old conflict. However, one may wonder why this conflict matters so much. To follow a list of the good reasons why Cyprus matters:

1. Cyprus joined the European Union in May 2004 as a *de facto* divided island. Despite being part of this modern machinery claiming to have brought peace in Europe[277], Cyprus remains in a state of limbo between a relatively non-violent *status quo* and an ongoing illegal occupation since the Turkish invasion in 1974. Today this makes of Cyprus the only EU country being occupied and divided, and of Nicosia, the world last divided capital.

2. There are no agreed estimates of the number of internal displaced persons (IDPs) however, as a result of the division and the consequent eviction from their own houses, expulsion across the green line and the 1975 Population Exchange Agreement, it is believed that the number of IDPs reached the number of 272,000 Greek Cypriots, including their descendants[278], number that decreased to 165,00 at the beginning of the new century, according to UNFICYP (2 February 2001). Estimating numbers for Turkish Cypriots is harder, due to the fact the authorities in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus have provided no new information since declaring displacement over in 1975.[279] It is estimated that the IDPs may have been 45,000, number that decreased to 45,000 at the beginning of 2001 ((UNFICYP, 2 February 2001). This large number of people are refugees in their own country.

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[277] The EU has been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012.
[278] Cyprus, Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/cyprus [last accessed 06.06.2019].
[279] 2018 Global Report on Internal Displacement - Europe and Central, *Norwegian Refugee Council/Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre*, www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2018/ [last accessed 06.06.2019].

3. The Turkish Cypriot minority may be at risk: it is believed that the Turkish Cypriot population is shrinking as a consequence of the continuous flux of the Turkish settlers. Turkish Cypriots are the minority in Cyprus and now the minority in Northern Cyprus as well. Once again, we do not have exact numbers of the total population in the North and of the origin of the groups however, it is estimated that about 300,000 people live in the north (although it's believed this number has climbed to 500,000[280]), half of whom are Turkish settlers or Cypriot-born children of settlers.[281]

4. After 44 year, people are still missing: 827 Greek Cypriots and 240 Turkish Cypriots. The work of the Committee on Missing Persons (CMP) in Cyprus is gradually becoming more difficult, as only 42 successful exhumations have been carried out by the end of 2018, in contrast with previous years.[282]

5. Enclaves: as a result of population exchange, some 300 hundred Greek Cypriots remain in the north ─ the vast majority of whom are above 60 years old ─ while no Turkish Cypriot currently lives in the south. Both the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe have condemned Turkey's practices against the enclaved (health, education, religious, movement restrictions, abuses, detention under inhuman conditions…). According to the last population census by the government-controlled area, 1,128 Turkish Cypriots used to live in the south.[283] However, fewer than 100 Turkish Cypriots are believed still to be living in the south.[284]

6. Varosha, the ghost town: a rich resort town located in Famagusta district, was evacuated during the conflict and prohibited access to civilians. The town is nowadays deserted and its building are left to the force of nature.

[280]   Cyprus   Population   2019,   *World   Population   Review*, http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/cyprus-population/ [last accessed 06.06.2019].
[281] Mete Hatay, "Population and Politics in north Cyprus," An Overview of the Ethno-demography of North Cyprus in the Light of the 2011 Census, *PRIO* (2017), p.30.
[282] For more in-depth data and sources see *section G.1*.
[283] Population - Country of Birth, Citizenship Category, Country of Citizenship, Language, Religion, Ethnic/Religious Group, 2011, *Statistical Service of Cyprus (CYSTAT).*
[284] 2017 demographic report, Republic of Cyprus, p.47.

Unexploded mines still remain within the city and only the UN personnel is allowed to enter the zone. Everything in Varosha still remains as it was during the day of the invasion.

7. A small economy divided into smaller economies: there is great disparity between north and south, with the north being severely limited by its non-recognised status as a country. Reunification would allow the north to open its economy to the rest of the world, as well as to the south. Furthermore, both sides could cut their defence budget and create new economic opportunities.

8. Illegal activities: the impossibility of controlling what is imported from the North gives great room for trafficking and smuggling of goods through the Green Line.

9. The absurdity of the conflict: in 3,572 sq mi of island there are two different currencies, two separate governments, six armies - the UK Armed Forces, a Greek regiment (ELDYK), the Turkish Army, the Greek Cypriot militia (National Guard), the Turkish Cypriot militia (TC Defence Force), and the United Nations multinational "peacekeeping" force - two official languages – Greek and Turkish – even though the vernacular languages are Turkish, Greek and Arabic Cypriot. In addition, English is an everyday spoken language, due to the island's colonial past and the presence of a large minority of English speakers working in the British military bases. Until 2017, there used to be also two different time-zones.[285] These figures makes Cyprus a beautiful mosaic of cultures but also a complicated country.

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[285] Evie Andreou, "Cyprus' New Division: Two Time Zones Now a Reality," *Cyprus Mail,* (October 30, 2016) https://cyprus-mail.com/2016/10/30/cyprus-new-division-two-time-zones-now-reality/ [last accessed 06.06.2019].

E.2 – Outline of Makarios' 13 Points[286]

"The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, in its present form, creates many difficulties in the smooth government of the State and impedes the development and progress of the country. It contains many sui generis provisions conflicting with internationally accepted democratic principles and creates sources of friction between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

At the Conference at Lancaster House in February, 1959, which I was invited to attend as leader of the Greek Cypriots, I raised a number of objections and expressed strong misgivings regarding certain provisions of the Agreement arrived at in Zurich between the Greek and the Turkish Governments and adopted by the British Government. I tried very hard to bring about the change of at least some provisions of that Agreement. I failed, however, in that effort and I was faced with the dilemma either of signing the Agreement as it stood or of rejecting it with all the grave consequences which would have ensued. In the circumstances I had no alternative but to sign the Agreement. This was the course dictated to me by necessity.

[…]

One of the consequences of the difficulties created by certain constitutional provisions is to prevent the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus from co-operating in a spirit of understanding and friendship, to undermine the relations between them and cause them to draw further apart instead of closer together, to the detriment of the wellbeing of the people of Cyprus as a whole.

[…]

With this end in view I have outlined below the immediate measures which I propose to be taken."

Point 1. The right of veto of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic to be abandoned.

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[286] Press and Information Office, Ministry of Interior, Republic of Cyprus. 13 Points (30 November 1963). The complete report on the "suggested measures for facilitating the smooth functioning of the state and for the removal of certain causes of inter- communal friction" by Archbishop Makarios, President of the Republic of Cyprus is to be found on: https://www.pio.gov.cy/en/13-%CF%83%CE%B7%CE%BC%CE%B5%CE%AF%CE%B1-(30-%CE%BD%CE%BF%CE%B5%CE%BC%CE%B2%CF%81%CE%AF%CE%BF%CF%85-1963).html [last accessed 27.05.2019].

Point 2. The Vice-President of the Republic to deputise for the President of the Republic in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.

Point 3. The Greek President of the House of Representatives and the Turkish Vice-President to be elected by the House as a whole and not as at present the President by the Greek Members of the House and the Vice-President by the Turkish Members of the House.

Point 4. The Vice-President of the House of Representatives to deputise for the President of the House in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.

Point 5. The constitutional provisions regarding separate majorities for enactment of certain laws by the House of Representatives to be abolished.

Point 6. Unified Municipalities to be established.

Point 7. The administration of Justice to be unified.

Point 8. The division of the Security Forces into Police and Gendarmerie to be abolished.

Point 9. The numerical strength of the Security Forces and of the Defence Forces to be determined by a Law.

Point 10. The proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the composition of the Public Service and the Forces of the Republic to be modified in proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

Point 11. The number of the Members of the Public Service Commission to be reduced from ten to five.

Point 12. All decisions of the Public Service Commission to be taken by simple majority.

Point 13. The Greek Communal Chamber to be abolished.

G. Charts and Figures

G.1 – Figures and Statistics on Missing Persons[287]

Exhumations and identifications 2006-2019

- Total missing in 2006: 2002
- Exhumed[1]: 1209
- Identified[2]: 935

Identifications per year

2007: 56, 2008: 46, 2009: 58, 2010: 63, 2011: 38, 2012: 21, 2013: 124, 2014: 157, 2015: 61, 2016: 115, 2017: 117, 2018: 71, 2019: 8

Total number of identified Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot missing persons per year

Greek Cypriots / Turkish Cypriots

2007: 37/19, 2008: 33/13, 2009: 39/19, 2010: 60/3, 2011: 32/6, 2012: 15/6, 2013: 73/51, 2014: 140/17, 2015: 46/15, 2016: 80/35, 2017: 91/26, 2018: 35/36, 2019: 2/6

Individuals exhumed per year[3]

2005: 63, 2006: 111, 2007: 138, 2008: 80, 2009: 133, 2010: 135, 2011: 69, 2012: 53, 2013: 45, 2014: 46, 2015: 161, 2016: 106, 2017: 42, 2018: 10, 2019: 17

Greek Cypriot missing persons

- Total: 1510
- Identified: 683
- Still missing: 827

Turkish Cypriot missing persons

- Total: 492
- Identified: 252
- Still missing: 240

Percentage of excavation sites with remains found

1273 sites excavated up to 31 May 2019

2006: 40%, 2007: 46%, 2008: 32%, 2009: 33%, 2010: 34%, 2011: 28%, 2012: 20%, 2013: 15%, 2014: 17%, 2015: 22%, 2016: 20%, 2017: 26%, 2018: 12%, 2019: 26%

[1] This figure may change as a result of anthropological, genetic and archaeological analysis.
[2] This figure does not include 160 individuals who were identified by the CMP but are not on the official list of missing persons.
[3] The figure for 2005 includes excavations and exhumations performed by the Turkish Cypriots prior to the current project. Remains recovered from these exhumations were handed over to the CMP in 2006.

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[287] Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus (CMP), updated to 31 May 2019. http://www.cmp-cyprus.org/ [last accessed 06.06.2019].
The figure on exhumed people may change as a result of anthropological, genetic and archaeological analysis.
The figure on identified people does not include 152 individuals who were identified by the CMP but are not on the official list of missing persons.
The figure on exhumed per year includes excavations and exhumations performed by the Turkish Cypriots prior to the current project. Remains recovered from these exhumations were handed over to the CMP in 2005.

G.2 – Population of Cyprus by Place of Enumeration, Race, and Sex, as at 11.12.1960 (*Census* Date)[288]

Place of Enumeration	Total			RACE																			
				Greeks			Maronites			Armenians			Turks			British			Gypsies			Other		
	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F
WHOLE CYPRUS ..	577,615	285,288	292,327	442,521	217,367	225,154	2,708	1,354	1,354	3,628	1,756	1,872	104350	51,488	52,862	20,955	11,591	9,364	502	270	232	2921	1435	1486
ALL DISTRICTS * ..	574,013	282,327	291,686	442,363	217,218	225,145	2,706	1,352	1,354	3,627	1,755	1,872	104333	51,475	52,858	17,604	8,853	8,751	475	246	229	2875	1401	1474
Nicosia District ..	204,484	101,413	103,071	153,910	76,183	77,727	784	396	388	2,542	1,217	1,325	40,753	20,344	20,409	4,643	2,288	2,355	100	48	52	1726	912	814
Kyrenia District ..	31,015	15,155	15,860	24,434	11,851	12,583	1,795	899	896	35	20	15	4,298	2,138	2,160	275	150	125	—	—	—	175	96	79
Famagusta District ..	114,389	55,684	58,705	91,190	44,375	46,815	24	14	10	157	80	77	18,967	9,232	9,735	3,665	1,813	1,852	138	69	69	248	101	147
Larnaca District ..	58,660	28,630	30,030	43,344	21,171	22,173	13	2	11	604	289	315	12,630	6,146	6,484	1,787	897	890	36	20	16	246	105	141
Limassol District ..	107,306	53,272	54,034	85,546	42,421	43,125	86	37	49	286	147	139	13,510	6,684	6,826	7,207	3,689	3,518	201	109	92	469	184	285
Paphos District ..	58,159	28,173	29,986	43,939	21,217	22,722	4	4	—	3	2	1	14,175	6,931	7,244	27	16	11	—	—	—	11	3	8
ALL TOWNS (including SUBURBS) * ..	206,287	102,683	103,604	141,668	70,486	71,182	475	231	244	3,584	1,724	1,860	41,974	20,933	21,041	15,523	7,800	7,723	400	206	194	2633	1276	1357
Nicosia Town ..	45,629	22,474	23,155	25,561	12,640	12,921	236	120	116	1,848	850	998	14,686	7,179	7,507	1,978	982	996	50	23	27	1248	659	589
Nicosia Suburbs ..	49,886	24,945	24,941	38,646	19,320	19,326	111	51	60	681	359	322	7,448	3,735	3,713	2,564	1,255	1,309	50	25	25	382	196	186
Kyrenia Town ..	3,498	1,760	1,738	2,373	1,173	1,200	9	8	1	30	16	14	696	345	351	233	129	104	—	—	—	154	88	66
Famagusta Town ..	34,774	17,284	17,490	24,506	12,128	12,378	24	14	10	152	76	76	6,120	3,122	2,998	3,663	1,812	1,851	68	33	35	241	99	142
Larnaca Town ..	19,824	9,662	10,162	13,101	6,395	6,706	13	2	11	602	287	315	4,058	1,968	2,090	1,786	897	889	36	20	16	228	93	135
Limassol Town ..	43,593	21,870	21,723	31,263	15,654	15,609	79	33	46	268	134	134	6,115	3,081	3,034	5,296	2,723	2,573	196	105	91	375	139	236
Paphos Town ..	9,083	4,688	4,395	6,218	3,176	3,042	3	3	—	3	2	1	2,851	1,503	1,348	3	2	1	—	—	—	5	2	3
ALL VILLAGES (excl. SUBURBS) * ..	367,726	179,644	188,082	300,695	146,732	153,963	2,231	1,121	1,110	43	31	12	62,359	30,542	31,817	2,081	1,053	1,028	75	40	35	242	125	117
Nicosia Villages ..	108,969	53,994	54,975	89,703	44,223	45,480	437	225	212	13	8	5	18,619	9,430	9,189	101	51	50	—	—	—	96	57	39
Kyrenia Villages ..	27,517	13,395	14,122	22,061	10,678	11,383	1,786	891	895	5	4	1	3,602	1,793	1,809	42	21	21	—	—	—	21	8	13
Famagusta Villages ..	79,615	38,400	41,215	66,684	32,247	34,437	—	—	—	5	4	1	12,847	6,110	6,737	2	1	1	70	36	34	7	2	5
Larnaca Villages ..	38,836	18,968	19,868	30,243	14,776	15,467	—	—	—	2	2	—	8,572	4,178	4,394	1	—	1	—	—	—	18	12	6
Limassol Villages ..	63,713	31,402	32,311	54,283	26,767	27,516	7	4	3	18	13	5	7,395	3,603	3,792	1,911	966	945	5	4	1	94	45	49
Paphos Villages ..	49,076	23,485	25,591	37,721	18,041	19,680	1	1	—	—	—	—	11,324	5,428	5,896	24	14	10	—	—	—	6	1	5
SOVEREIGN BASES AND RETAINED AREAS ..	3,602	2,961	641	158	149	9	2	2	—	1	1	—	17	13	4	3,351	2,738	613	27	24	3	46	34	12

T=Total.   M=Males.   F=Females.   * Excludes Sovereign Bases and Retained Areas.

[288] Census of Population and Agriculture: Population by Location, Race, and Sex. Volume I. Republic of Cyprus, 1960. The complete census is to be found on http://www.cystat.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/All/1240A557C7D9F399C2257F64003D0D54/$file/POP_CEN_1960-POP(RELIG_GROUP)_DIS_MUN_COM-EN-250216.pdf?OpenElement [last accessed 27.05.2019].

Pledge of Honesty

"On my honour as a student of the Diplomatische Akademie Wien, I submit this work in good faith and pledge that I have neither given nor received unauthorized assistance on it."

Ilenia Pappalardo

Vita

Ilenia Pappalardo was born in Catania (Italy) and attended the University of Insubria (Como, Italy) obtaining a degree in Intercultural and Interlinguistic Mediation. During this period, she focused on English and German language and culture, as well as on minorities, specifically on the Near East. She also spent one year in Portugal and one semester in Sweden. During her time at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, she focused on History and International Relations, specifically on the Middle East and North Africa. She also focused on French, German, and Arabic language. Topics of interest include issues on nationalism, identity, religion, and Ottoman history and art. Apart from her academic studies, she also enjoyed writing journalistic pieces on current issues in the Middle East and North Africa. Her internship period was spent in the Association for Historical Dialogue and Research (AHDR), a Cypriot organisation that amongst others, aims to enhance understanding, respect and cooperation among all communities in Cyprus and promote a culture of peace through education.