universität wien

DISSERTATION / DOCTORAL THESIS

Titel der Dissertation /Title of the Doctoral Thesis

"Cultural and Contextual Determination of Language Formulas: The Case of Apologetic Speech Acts"

verfasst von / submitted by

Vladan Sutanovac

angestrebter akademischer Grad / in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doktor der Philosophie (Dr.phil.)

Wien, 2019 / Vienna, 2019

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt / degree programme code as it appears on the student record sheet:	A 792 343
Dissertationsgebiet lt. Studienblatt / field of study as it appears on the student record sheet:	Dr.-Studium der Philosophie UG2002 (Dissertationsgebiet: English and American Studies)
Betreut von / Supervisor:	o. Univ. Prof. em. Dr. habil. Barbara Kryk-Kastovsky

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements iv

Typographical conventions v

Foreword vii

Chapter 1 Introduction 1

1.1 Introductory Overview 2

1.2 Dialogism of the Dialogic Ethno-phenomenological Pragmatics 17

Chapter 2 Theoretical Inquiry 23

2.1 General Introduction 24

2.2 General Angle 26

2.3 General Investigative Focus 27

2.4 Ontological Locus 29

2.4.1 What Does it Mean to Treat Language Translinguistically 29

2.4.2 Actual Nature of Language and Speech Act Utterances 31

2.4.2.1 Architectonics of Philosophical Anthropology: Self-Other Relations 34

2.4.2.2 I-for-Myself 36

2.4.2.3 I-for-Other 39

2.4.2.4 Other-for-Me 41

2.4.2.5 The Higher-Other (Super-addressee) 42

2.4.3 The Architectonics of the Actual Nature of the Performed Linguistic Act: Self-Other-Language Act Relations 45

2.4.3.1 I-for-Myself and the Language Act 45

2.4.3.2 I-for-Other and the Language Act 47

2.4.3.3 Other-for-Me and the Language Act 49
2.4.3.4 I-Higher-Other and the Language Act 51
2.4.4 The Actual World of Language and Speech act 53
2.4.5 Actual Reality of Language and Apologetic Speech Act Utterances 56

Chapter 3 Dialogic Architectonics Triad (DAT) as a Unified Multidimensional Pragmatic Space 61
3.1 Meaning: Abstraction or Dialogic Linguistic Action? 62
3.2. DA as a unified theory of Sense-Making and Meaning 69
3.3 A Novel Unified Multidimensional Pragmatic Space for the Analysis of Apologetic Speech Act Utterances 73

Chapter 4 Dialogic Ethnophenomenological Pragmatics in Practice 77
4.1 Introduction 78
4.2 The Notion of Cultural Script 83
4.2.1 The Cultural Script of 'Culture' 86
4.2.2 Cultural Scripts in Apologetic Interaction and Practice 88
4.3 Research Methodology 97
4.3.1 Motivation 97
4.3.2 Focus, Goals and Significance of the Research 98
4.3.3 Kernels Deconstructed 102
4.3.4 Method, Techniques and Research Instrument(s) 107
4.3.5 Participants 119

Chapter 5 Study Results: Analysis and Interpretation 121
5.1 Introduction 122
5.2 Evaluation 124

5.3 Assumption (anticipation) 126

5.4 Expectation 128

5.5 Combinatorial Classification 131

5.5.1 Combinations in Practice 132

5.5.1.1 Combination 1 133

5.5.1.2 Combination 2 136

5.5.1.3 Combination 3 140

5.5.1.4 Combination 4 142

Chapter 6 Discussion and Conclusion 148

6.1 General Discussion 149

6.2. Concluding Remarks 160

Appendices 161

References 187

Zusammenfassung 222

Abstract 233

Acknowledgements

This dissertation would not have been written without the support of many people, whose help I gratefully acknowledge. The list is a long one, that`s why I have singled out those who contributed to the completion of this dissertation most prominently. First I would like to thank professor Barbara Kryk-Kastovsky, my intellectual mentor and alma mater for her unceasing encouragement and support during my entire doctoral career. And, in particular, for her heart-felt patience for my unceasing verbosity and for the always hearty and invigorating musings on the sunny side up. Furthermore, my enormous gratitude goes to Marija Stefanovic, my soulful and intellectual partner in deliberations for hours on end and liberation from painstaking hours of (over)thinking without an end, who with unfailing patience has been accompanying me through the ups and downs of creation. Equally importantly, Marija contributed to the final work thanks to her editorial prowess by helping me edit the messy raw material scattered over numerous mental archives and draft files. Last but not the least, my enormous thanks go to my friends and fellow-scholars, Andreas Liesenfeld and Samuel Taylor, and fellow-scholaress Leda Berio and Laura Wellschmiedt, as well as professor Gottfried Vosgerau and Hendrik Zeevat for letting me pick their brains unapologetically during our armchair discussions and kitchenette powwows. Finally, my warmest thanks go to my Parents for their loving support ever since they stirred up my curiosity for languages, especially by letting me clock in and clock out my days together with good ole Big Muzzy.

Typographical conventions

Linguistic forms:	Italics: *sorry, entschuldigung*
Categories and terminology:	Single quotation marks: 'Felicitous' apologies`
Citations:	Double quotation marks: "..."

Commonly Used Abbreviations

DA: Dialogic Architectonics

DAT: Dialogic Architectonic(s) Triad

DCTt: Dialogic Conceptualisation Test tool

DCT: Discourse Completion Test

NSM: Natural Semantic Metalanguage

Foreword

> The inherent dialogicality of human life applies nowhere more obviously than in writing a book. In struggling with each paragraph, one is immersed in endless dialogic encounters with the voices of others, voices of one's earlier self, speech genres, previous and subsequent paragraphs of the book, and so forth. Everything one thinks and writes is shot through and through with dialogic overtones.
>
> Wertsch (on Bakhtin) (1998: f)

This dissertation is the result of my fascination with the inherent dialogicality of human life - human communicative life in particular, and the voices that both shoot through it and shape it through and through. As an investigative written work, it has been particularly motivated by my interest in, and research on, various aspects of language use as act of communication. In this sense, this dissertation is a result of my multiple dialogic encounters with two particular voices - the cultural and the contextual, and, here, one particular instance of interactive language use - the apologetic speech act (genre). Translated to investigative practice, this dissertation represents an empirical inquiry into the dialogical interplay of the aforementioned voices as manifested in the community-specific ways of language use (i.e. "linguistic culture"[1]), indicative of the community-specific ways of thinking. In this sense, language-in-use can be viewed as a medium with a triadic function. Namely, that of (a) dialogic meeting point for the voices, (b) medium for societals'[2] expression and (c) medium for obtaining insights into the nature of societals. As such, language becomes a potent source of valuable insights, which can significantly advance not only our understanding of the tacit community-specific forms of behaviour - cultural practices[3], but, equally importantly, of the accompanying tacit community-specific forms of

---

[1] Schiffman (1996)

[2] i..e. social actors, endowed with specific mental, bodily and socio-cultural qualities (cf. Duranti 2015; also Schütz 1967; Kopytko 2003).

[3] 'Learned' shared habits, schemes of perception (attitudes, values, beliefs/disbeliefs), classification, appreciation, feeling, and (inter)action accepted and expected by a social (identity) group (cf. Boas 1911; Bourdieu 1977; Singer 1998; Wierzbicka 1999 et.al).

cognitive behaviour - mental practices[4]. The latter are informed by and reflect as well as refract these very cultural practices and allow us, in return, to orientate ourselves in relation to the world.

Due to the multifarious nature of these voices, addressing them in all their specificity within a single piece of work is always a challenging task. Thus, the best one such work can hope to achieve is to provide as encompassing empirical account as possible, based on an integrated method of inquiry that would contribute to the current and motivate future research in the same vein. It is with such hope, and goal, in mind that this dissertation sets out.

To sum up, this dissertation undertakes an empirical-analytical, i.e. explorative-explicative study of Serbian and Austrian (linguistic) cultures by developing and introducing an alternative, Bakhtinian-'dialogism' and Natural Semantic Metalanguage[5] inspired, framework - Dialogic(al) Ethnophenomenological Pragmatics.

[4] I introduce and define (by drawing on Bourdieu & Wacquant (1992) and Barsalou (2010)) as interactively acquired ('learned') group-related cognitive patterns (attitudes, values, belief systems, disbelief systems), i.e. central perception-evaluation "schemata" by mediation of which "social action is understood as meaningful, and through which the objects of knowledge", and their meaning, "are constructed" (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 12, 121)

[5] Natural Semantic Metalanguage (cf. Wierzbicka 1980, 1985, 2009; Goddard & Wierzbicka 2004; Goddard 2010b, 2012a).

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1

Introductory Overview

My philosophy and the methodology of thought, which served as one part of the baseline for this dissertation (practice being the other), have emerged out of my investigations of the works by Bakhtin, Vygotsky, Quine, Wittgenstein, Austin and, subsequently, of their contemporary interpreters (more specifically Akhutina, Kristeva, Todorov, Searle, Markova, Brandist, Linell, Sandler, Follesdal and Neal). The most relevant conclusions that have resulted from these investigations can be summed up as the following vignettes:

> Truth is not born, nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person. It is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction. (Bakhtin 1984: 61)[6]

> In its naive and realistic interpretation, the word 'understanding' always induces into error. It is not at all a question of an exact and passive reflection, of a redoubling of the other's experience within me, but a matter of translating the experience into an altogether different 'axiological perspective', into new interactive categories of evaluation and formation. (Bakhtin 1923-1924[7] in Todorov 1984: 22)

> [S]cience is not determined by a real object but by an object-to-be-known, which arises in the adoption of a different perspective with respect to the very same object. (Todorov 1984: 24)

> In the act of translation we are not describing a further realm of reality, we are just correlating two comprehensive languages/theories concerning all there is. (Follesdal on Quine 1975[8]: 32)

[6] Bakhtin, Mikhail. 1984. Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.

[7] Bakhtin, Mikhail. (1923-1924) Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity (in Bakhtin, M. M. (1990). Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays. (M. Holquist, Ed.). University of Texas Press, Austin.)

[8] Follesdal, Dagfin. 1975, 'Meaning and Experience', in S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language. O.U.P., 25-44.

> Notions such as simplicity, uniformity, depth of explanation - assuming these to be intelligible notions - may guide the choice between connecting theories [of translation]". (Neale on Quine 1987[9]: 305)

> I never intended to follow a correct [Marxist]line, and I hope I am not correctly following any other line whatsoever. (Kristeva (1973)[10] in Roudiez 1982: 210)

> [As it is a question of] not 'applying' a theory, but allowing practice to test theory, letting the two enter into a dialectical relationship. (Kristeva in Roudiez 1982[11])

In studying the interplay of culture, cognition and natural language, "reflected and refracted"[12] in the acts of communication - here (apologetic) speech acts, I also never intended to follow any 'correct' line, i.e. the 'straight'[13] speech actist line (for a detailed discussion of this 'lifeline' cf. Green 2017). Instead, my thought process began with the exploratory analysis of the acquired data, establishing its analytic voice through the dialectic interaction between the empirical and the, aforementioned, theoretical confluence. This dissertation on the whole is, thus, to be regarded as a unified explicative account of this dialogic dialectics. With respect to its focal point, by introducing a novel explicative framework - Dialogic Ethnophenomenological Pragmatics, and analytic approach - Dialogic Architectonics, it is also to be regarded as my response to the Wierzbicka[14]-Green[15] motivated call to revitalise the study of speech acts and their constituting forces, by relating them more systematically to the socio-cultural norms and practices, as well as to the pertinent conceptual distinctives (Hymes 1972), within a unified (Wierzbicka 2003b), i.e. holistic interdisciplinary relational framework (cf. e.g. Verschueren 1999, 2015; Kopytko 2002, 2003; Goddard 2006, 2006b; van Dijk 2008; Peeters 2009; Sutanovac 2014).

---

[9] Neale, Steven. 1987. Meaning, Grammar, and Indeterminacy. In Dialectica (Vol. 41, pp. 301–319).

[10] In Verdiglione, Armando (ed.), Psychanalyse et politique (Paris: Seuil, 1974), p. 73.

[11] In Roudiez, Leon. Introductory note to Kristeva's Desire in Language (1982: 1-20)

[12] Voloshinov (1986: 10)

[13] Conventionalist-intentionalists

[14] Wierzbicka, Anna. 2003a. Cross-Cultural Pragmatics: The Semantics of Human Interaction. (Expanded 2nd ed.)

[15] Green, Mitchell. 2010. Showing and {Meaning}: {On} {How} {We} {Make} {Our} {Ideas} {Clear}

Expanding on Green's (2010) insightful observation, the underlying force behind the call is in part a direct consequence of the, still very much ongoing, work in the last two decades (cf. Searle 2006; Guiraud et.al 2011; Weigand 2016) which sees illocutionary force (its IDs included) and, I also contend, the natural[16] speech act (particularly expressives, with apologetic speech acts being my case in point), falling behind as a source of constructive explanatory philosophical and pragmatic discussions (ibid. 216). This can, to a significant extent, be related to the fact that after the, albeit insightful but ultimately un-natural foundational rigorisation (offered by logico-formal philosophy of language, in particular by Searle and Vanderveken (1985), Vanderveken (1990) it may have seemed that the most one can hope to achieve is just taxonomise the various kinds of speech acts and study their formal relation to one another. In other words, just to define the various speech acts and their relations by claims to truth (conditions of satisfaction-cum-direction of fit) and to volition (i.e. intentionality)[17] alone and as a way of settling the issue of connecting cognition and (linguistic) action (Weigand 2016: 209):

> Our task is made easier by the fact that the formal apparatus of the content and type, together with conditions of satisfaction and direction of fit, are already present in prelinguistic intentionality. (Searle 2007: 10)

However, as Verschueren (2015) rightly emphasizes, the actual language use is not as neat as the (formal) speech act theory makes it look. This is the case because "most language use, for one thing, may be organized around units and structures that cannot so readily be described in terms of individual, mostly sentence-based, speech acts" (2015: 797). Furthermore, although intentionality certainly constitutes the process of interactive meaning generation[18] , and the acts of meaning[19] (such as speech acts) as its constitutives, this process is not, as the formal

[16] i.e. speech act as a concrete act (Bakhtin 1924), i.e. instance of natural language (use)

[17] "Which correspond to the basic mental states of belief and desire" (Weigand 2016: 209)

[18] Taking Verschueren (2008: 15; also 1994, 2018) as my conceptual starting point I also use "generating" rather than "constructing" given that the "latter implies" placing too big of an "emphasis on intentionality".

[19] Bruner (1990)

conventionalist-intentionalist accounts would claim, entirely defined by it (cf. Verschueren 2008: 15; Du Bois 1987; Duranti 1998; Samovar et.al. 1998; Dorodnych and Kuzio 2012). This is, in part, due to the fact that the data most speech act theories (and the resulting approaches) use, to account for the nature of speech acts, is constructed rather than natural (cf. Kallen and Kirk 2012: 32). In turn, this makes their contribution to insightfulness valuable more in terms of dialectic juxtaposition - as a sort of "secundum comparationis"[20], than in terms of explanans. Moreover, contemporary cross-dialectic pragmatics, through its systematic revision, provides a case in point (cf. Verschueren 1999, 2008, 2011; also Wierzbicka 2003b; Mey 2001, 2007; van Dijk 2009; Horn and Keckes 2013; Jaszczolt 2018b). As Verschueren (2015: 798) rightly points out, one of the consequences of such unidirectional (Bakhtin`s 1961/1979 – "monologic") approaches to concrete (i.e. situated) instances of language use is that the exact nature (explanans) of the interactional dynamics involved as well as that of the implications of agency, still remain some of the most crucial points to be elucidated in both speech act theory and contemporary pragmatic dialectics at large. This in addition makes for the first set of the crucial points which this dissertation attempts at resolving explicatively. From the point of view of a contemporary, broader-perspective pragmatics[21] (cf. Huang 2007), that takes itself as an interdisciplinary science[22] of situated communicative interaction - specifically of linguistic phenomena with relation to their usage in forms of behaviour[23] "it does not make much sense to either talk, or analyse, situated communicative acts and the resulting discourse without viewing them as a human phenomenon with all the cognitive, social and cultural implications it entails" (Verschueren 2011: 33). One critical caveat of such a broader-perspective view of pragmatics is that we find less coherent lines of theory formation. This is not the case because of abstractionism, i.e. adherence to external logic as a point of departure which is symptomatic of intentionalist truth-conditional paradigms (for a detailed discussion cf. Wierzbicka

[20] As a formal-logical parallel to primum-comparationis (speech acts) (cf. Allan 1986; Zhu 2017)

[21] "[E]ncompassing much that goes under the rubric of sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics, and discourse analysis" (Huang 2007: 4)

[22] "With its roots", i.e. locus "in linguistics, psychology, anthropology, and especially semiotics and the philosophy of language" (Verschueren 2015: 11948)

[23] For a broader overview see Verschueren 1999, 2015: 795; also Kryk-Kastovsky 2002; Trosborg 2010: 2.

1988; Levisen 2012), but is simply due to the open-endedness of the endeavour itself (cf. Verschueren 2015: 799). The coherent theory formation makes for the second crucial point I try to resolve by introducing a novel, Bakhtinian-dialogism inspired, practice-theory-dialectics informed alternative perspective/framework. Namely, the Dialogic Ethno-Phenomenological Pragmatics as a unitary explicative framework. This framework is reflected in Dialogic Architectonics Triad (DAT) as an analytic-explicative approach for explicating the situated interactional dynamics and agency, (as) reflected in the situated acts of sense-making and (meaning) communication. Focusing on the angle of analysis and explication, as Goddard (2012: 117) points out, especially in cross-dialectical linguistic pragmatics, an explanatory account can only emerge from a methodological approach that allows us to tap into the insider perspectives on the communicative (speech-act) practices they partake in, linking them with the values and attitudes of the people concerned (cf. Goddard 2012: 117; also Wierzbicka 1998; Ye 2004; Cramer 2015). That is to say, linking them with "reflexivity"[24] (Verschueren 2015: 799) and "reflectivity" (Petitmengin 2006, 2011: 33) viz. metalinguistic or metapragmatic awareness[25], as a key to avoiding "culturally biased unidirectional approaches" to acts of language use in diverse socio-spatial-cultural settings (Verschueren 2011: 33). More specifically, as is the case by Bakhtin and his metalinguistic philosophical-anthropology program (voiced e.g. in Sandler's (forthcoming) 'Dialogic conversation-utterance Semantics'[26] and Linell's (2009) 'dialogic lexical semantics'[27]), and conversely by e.g. Shi-xu (2005)

[24] Following Verschueren (2015: 800), "the concept of 'reflexiveness' or 'reflexivity' refers to the capacity of the mind to bend back upon itself, to be aware of its own experiences as residing in a self that is situated in a social context of interaction. That social context consists of other selves which, by a transformation of reflexiveness which is commonly called 'theory of mind,' are perceived as minds comparable to the self, i.e. a step that is identified by Tomasello (1999) as the distinguishing trait that allowed Homo sapiens to engage in a rapid process of cumulative cultural learning."

[25] Taking Verschueren (2015) as a starting point, this thesis' contributes further to the elucidation of the nature of this key notion (its cognitive content, in particular) by grounding it in ethnophenomenology (Bakhtin, Schutz, Scheller), more specifically by recasting it in 'dialogism as pre-reflective consciousness' (cf. Bakhtin 1953/79, 1935/75, Petitmengin 2011) that extends the purview of reflexivity by grounding it in reflectivity.

[26] Whereby, what is meant by "semantics" is the "methodology of analyzing the meaning of linguistic utterances in a way that is sensitive to their content." (Sandler (forth.): 1)

[27] As Sandler (forth.: 1) observes, the term "dialogic semantics" or "dialogical semantics" has not only a different sense, but is also employed in a "different sense in the field of dialogical logic and formal (dynamic) semantics".

and "Cultural Approach to Discourse", and likewise by Ide et. al and "emancipatory pragmatics" (cf. Hanks, Ide and Katagiri 2009). DAT crucially differentiates itself from other modeling approaches in pragmatics at large that place its emphasis on understanding communication and discourse as much as possible from the members' point of view. It achieves this by tapping more directly into metapragmatic awareness. That is to say, it taps into the 'pre-reflective consciousness', as the more direct window into the of such points of view as well as into the specific 'modi operandi' of language use in communication. Pursuant to this, the DAT conceptualises language use "as a process of interactive meaning generation, employing as its analytical tool a set of production and interpretation choices from a variable range of options, created in a negotiable manner, inter-adapting with communicative needs, and making full use of the reflexivity of the human mind" (cf. Verschueren 2008: 15). With respect to the latter efforts, the ongoing relevance and the contributive timeliness of Bakhtin's metalinguistics[28] comes in the form of his specific 'tertium datur' link of subjectivity with the world viz. of the particular nature of an individual with the intricate space of culture (life-world relation). In reifying this relational phenomenology in the notion of 'dialogism' (Bakhtin 1953/79: 276, 1935/75: 95) I further systematically pragmatise in the context of speech act theory as 'metapragmatic awareness' (key to the unbiased understanding of the nature of apologetic speech acts), Bakhtinian pragmatic philosophical anthropology goes beyond the purview of the contemporary approaches

---

In this respect, the more pertinent of the two is that of dialogical semantics as outlined in Linell (2009) and Sandler (forth.) While my approach here shares much with that of Linell and Sandler (and is indebted to some of their earlier works), my notion of semantics is significantly different. More specifically, unlike Linell, whose discussion is focused on lexical semantics and Sandler, whose focus is on conversational-utterance semantics, my approach mediates between (as tertium datur) and goes beyond the two (as tertium comparationis) by focusing on the cognitive-cum-pragmatic architectonics that underlies the semantics of the utterance (here, the apologetic speech act). That is to say, by focusing on 'dialogism', at the pre-linguistic level, as 'pre-reflective consciousness', which informs utterer's perception and attitudes, and shapes the content of the utterance as well as the content of the lexical exponent of 'illocutionary force' (IF) - IFID and of the IF itself. Thus, extending the purview of 'dialogical semantics' to signnify a unifying and unified multidimensional methodology for analyzing the meaning of linguistic utterances with sensitivity to their 'pre-linguistic content' and the resulting linguistic content in particular.

[28] Where, metalanguage is not just a code: it is always in a dialogical relation to the language it describes and analyses. (Bakhtin, from Notes 1970-1971)

above as a case in point for what Schutz[29] deemed - "a fully elaborated philosophical anthropology" (1962) that builds its multidimensional space upon phenomenology. And more precisely, upon the "constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude"[30] (1962: 149). Such philosophical anthropology in this sense represents an 'ontological tertium datur', i.e. 'tertium comparationis' that allows the relation of specific accultured observations to the fundamental formal (i.e. cognitive) structures shared by the members of the culture(d community) in question. In the Schutz-Bakhtinian vein, the role of the phenomenology is then to describe the universal formal structures of the life-world (I-other) relations, while the empirical (social) sciences are to research and describe the cultural variety of concrete contents, i.e. the contents of the resulting "relative[31] natural attitude(s)" (Schutz 1962: 142, also 1967). Building upon this, the framework proposed by the Dialogic Ethno-phenomenological Pragmatics makes an insightful case in point for such an empirical 'science' as its main analytic tool - 'dialogism', allows not only for the research and description, but also for explication of the nature and the features of the natural-attitude contents. It specifically concerns the axiological nature of the contents, as expressed in the specific instances of social action - apologetic speech acts, and by the meaning (sense) of their proposed content. Dialogism, as the underlying metapragmatic awareness, is realised within the scope of Dialogic Ethno-phenomenological Pragmatics as the 'pre-reflective consciousness' (Petitmengin 2006, 2011: 270) of a perceiving subject that always accompanies the consciousness of the perceived object[32], and of the object-to-be-known[33]. In more

---

[29] The ontological-intersection point of Bakhtin's and Schutz's work is their lifelong key concern with the methodology of the social sciences and specifically the emphasis on phenomenology as constitutive of the foundation for empirical (social) sciences, finding the link between phenomenology and social sciences in the meaning (sense) of social action (Bakhtin 1986; Todorov 1984; Schutz, Eberle. Dreher, Sebald 2010; Eberle and Srubar 2010),

[30] The general thesis of reality in the natural attitude and its anthropomorphic character, as well as the 'structure' of the "relative natural conception of the world" (Schutz 1962: 141) accepted as given and unquestioned, can be analysed by phenomenological methods.

[31] In the sense that it changes from group to group in the course of historical and socio-cultural evolution. (Schutz 1962: 142)

[32] In communicative interaction, equal to the consciousness of the perceived subject (i.e. the interlocutor).

[33] Applied to communicative interaction, together accompanied by the 'object-to-be-known' (Todorov 1984: 24), i.e. higher-other (here, culture), an instrumental party acting as a (structural) guarantor against degeneration of

functional terms, it can be seen as the perceptive, "relevance-driven pragmatic inferential mechanism which is a constitutive part of our theory of mind capacity and functions independently of any code" (cf. Carston 1998: 1). In this sense, resonant with Verschueren, in aiming at a culturally non-biased explicative theory of communicative acts, "an assumption of minimal universality must be the starting point" (cf. Verschueren 2011: 34; also Goddard 2007, 2010, 2012). And, following Verschueren's line of thought further, "if a pan-cultural, i.e. pan-ethno-ontological theory is possible at all, it must be built up gradually, on the basis of empirical findings which themselves are not based on a preconceived model" (ibid.). As Verschueren (ibid.), voicing in effect Quine's methodological metaphysics[34], further signals, only the least constricting, i.e. the most open theory of language use can possibly provide insightful answers. In this sense, with its groundwork in the practice-theory dialectics, reflected in the Bakhtinian 'self-other' motivated Dialogic Architectonics (DA) reflecting, in turn (what the contemporary cognitive science refers to as) the "positive grounded cognition" architectonics[35] (Barsalou 2010), the so grounded theory generated by the dialogic(al) ethno-phenomenological pragmatics can be the case in point for one such open, unconstricting theory[36]. This leaves us with the question of what tools to use for the empirical research itself (Verschueren ibid.). Pursuant to this dissertations' answer to the question and, at the same time, the next in line of the ontological contributions to the, aforementioned, empirical

---

plurality of perspectives into meaningless relativism (Brandist 2002) in a dialogue between 'real objects' (perceiving subjects as others) as social persons expressing themselves through linguistic means (Bakhtin 1959–1961/1979: 292)

[34] "There isn't anything to distinguish empirically equivalent theories of translation; all that can be asked of such a theory is that it covers the totality of observable facts of usage." (in Neale 1987: 304)

[35] Following Barsalou (2010: 717) core knowledge representations in cognition are not amodal data structures existing independently of the brain's modal systems. On the contrary, if we follow a "positive definition of grounded cognition, the environment, situations, the body, and simulations in the brain's modal systems ground the central representations in cognition. From this perspective, the cognitive system utilizes the environment and the body as external informational structures that complement internal representations. In turn, internal representations have a situated character, implemented via simulations in the brain's modal systems, making them well suited for interfacing with external structure."

[36] In the Quinean sense, a theory that can cover the totality of observable facts of usage. (in Neale 1987)

non-biased explicative endeavour[37], i.e. to the objective-methodology-evidence base (Goddard 2006), is the Dialogical Conceptualisation Test tool (DCTt). What makes the DCTt an effective intercultural instrument, and answer to the methodological question, is that it uses the potential of the cross-disciplinary analytic dialectics (dialogism-cum-DCT[38]-cum-NSM[39]) to build its own confluential empirical, culturo-non-biased, explicative dialectics. This dialectics, in turn, can contribute a fruitful answer to what Searle (2007) deemed one of the crucial questions in the theory of meaning generation and philosophy of language, i.e. "[h]ow do we get from the intentional state S(p) to the linguistic resources that enable us to perform the speech act F(p)?" (Searle 2007: 17; also 2010), applied specifically to the meaning generation in speech act theory, viz. how do we get from the intentional state S(p) to the felicitous meaning expression in the performed situated speech act F(p)? Furthermore, building on the premise that speech practices[40] are best understood from a culture-internal perspective (cf. Goddard 2006: 2), this alternative dialectics, grounded in phenomenological-linguistic evidence, can, by tapping into the insiders' "cultural cognition(s)"[41] (Sharifian 2011), also make a valuable contribution to the 'depth of the insight' (Bakhtin 28: 409), in the form of explicative answers to the crucial questions of the ethnography of communication (Hymes 1974), raised by the body of pragmatic work with ethnographic leaning (cf. e.g. Goddard 2002a, 2004a, 2004c; Wierzbicka 1985a, 1985b, 1991[2003], 1996a, 1996b, 1998, 2003a, 2003b; Besemeres and Wierzbicka 2003b; Ye 2004; Heesoo 2008; Fausey, et al. 2010; Al-Khawaldeh and Zegarac 2013). Following Goddard (2006: 2), these crucial questions are: "What is distinctive about these particular ways of speaking?" <> "Why ― from their own point of view ― do the people concerned speak in these

[37] Concomitant with Goddard's (2006: 2).

[38] Discourse Completion Test (Blum-Kulka, House & Kasper 1989)

[39] Natural Semantic Metalanguage framework (Wierzbicka 1996, 2006; Goddard 2011, 2012a; Goddard and Wierzbicka 2002; Peeters 2006; Goddard and Wierzbicka 2014a; Goddard and Wierzbicka 2014b)

[40] Apologetic speech act practices as the micro exponent of speech practices at large, included.

[41] Although it is admitted that the locus of conceptualisation may be the individual, a large proportion of conceptualisations are ultimately 'spread' across a cultural group. "In other words, although conceptualisations can be initiated in individuals' cognition, they may well emerge as cultural cognitions." (Sharifian 2011: 5)

particular ways? <> What sense does it make to them?" And in line with this thesis' goal of purview extension and concrete questions of interest, the more specific relevant questions would be: - <> What particular cognitive dialectics makes up their/this sense-making? and <> Why and Where does it come together to form the specific, shared, constellation of cultural cognitions (cultural-cum-cognitive practices)? And with regard to what have been deemed by philosophy of language the longstanding issues of (apologetic) speech act theory, the questions - <> How, concretely, do these community-specific cognitive practices inform the societals' perception[42](of context)? <> And how does this perception, that reflects and refracts them, inform and shapes the propositional attitudes S(p) that determine the choice of the illocutionary force IF(p) and, by extension, of the force indicating device IFID that shapes the propositional content expressed in a (apologetic) speech act?

Because of the inseparability of practices and concepts, the socio-culturo-cogntive practices cannot be really understood without grasping the "concepts in terms of which actors themselves interpret what they are doing" (cf. Verschueren 2011: 33). Therefore, expanding on Wierzbicka's (2003b: 150) point, the additional angle from which this dissertation approaches the axiological repertoire of speech acts and speech genres (here, the genre of apologetic speech act) characteristic of a given culture (i.e. accultured community) is, beside the utterance conceptualisation angle, also from the angle of conceptualisation of the special lexical units - key words[43]. The analytically insightful relevance of these key words lies in that they have come to encode a specific cultured community's view of its most relevant "forms of talk" (Goffman 1981).

As Voloshinov (1973) points out, signs mediate both between actual people and between people and their surroundings. And, as symbolic tools, both reflect the functional dynamics of the socio-cultural matrix that created them and deeply affect their creators in return. A word is a territory shared by both addresser and (other)

---

[42] As the fundamental source of mental representation(s) (that in turn reflect mental states, i.e. propositional attitudes held by a person toward a proposition), with (human) concepts being (re-deployed) copies of such perceptual representations. (Prinz 2002: 108)

[43] For groundbreaking empirical-analytical work on language and cultural values, in particular on cultural keywords and on the cultural "baggage" hidden in words see Goddard 1998, 2002, 2006, 2008a; Goddard and Wierzbicka 2004a; Wierzbicka 1985, 1992, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2006a, 2010 (in Levisen 2012).

addressee, by the speaker and his interlocutor. (Voloshinov 1973 [1986]: 86). And, following Akhutina (2003: 106), summing Bakhtin up, the current "meaning of a word is an abstraction from all the various senses of a given word used by various people in various contexts, representing, at the same time, the social standard of meaning", part of the "apparatus for constructing sense" (cf. also Bakhtin 1935/1975: 94, 1979: 265, 395; Voloshinov 1929: 81–83, 95–96, 119–27, 1930; Vygotsky 1986: 346–49). In constructing this sense, "when we select words in the process of constructing an utterance, we by no means always take them from the system of language in their neutral, dictionary form. We usually take them from other utterances, and mainly from utterances that are kindred to ours in genre, that is, in theme, composition, or style" (Bakhtin 1986b: 87). Accordingly, as contemporary dialogical theory sums it up (cf. Linell 2009: 77), we borrow or "rent" (Holquist 1990) meaning and expressions from others, in the specific situated interactions as well as within the sociocultural traditions, in our linguistic biography; this borrowing of words is based on concrete experiences of languages, rather than on borrowing from an abstract lexicon (as monologist theories of 'la langue' (Saussure) might wish to explain it) or from a concrete dictionary (Of course, in a few cases we do consult real dictionaries, but these actions are situated too.). Any speech community has key words which are revealing of speakers' value orientations and assumptions (Levisen 2012: 7; also Wierzbicka 1996a: 237), and as such play a crucial role in the communities' 'language games' (Wittgenestein 1953). In the context of speech-act games (and expressive illocutionary acts in particular), illocutionary force indicating devices (IFIDs) make a case in point for such salient key words. In this specific sense, an additional contribution which this dissertation makes is to empirically revise Verschueren's (2008: 16, 18) definition of the 'locus of meaning-generation processes and the processes of language use', by investigating and defining the 'locus of conceptualisation processes' that underlie community specific language use both with regards to lexical acts (IFIDs) and illocutionary acts (apologetic speech acts). This effort gains additional relevance in the light of an important point raised by Sharifian (2011: 5) that "although it is admitted that the locus of conceptualisation may be the individual, a large proportion of conceptualisations are ultimately 'spread' across a cultural group. In other words, although conceptualisations can be initiated in individuals' cognition, they may well emerge as cultural cognitions" (cf. also Berio and Vosgerau (forthcoming); Sutanovac and Vosgerau (forthcoming)). These cultural cognitions, as shared values, shared

ideals and shared attitudes of a community, are reflected in shared language (Wierzbicka 1997: 200) and specifically in key words that allow for their sharing (i.e. transmission). Besides reflecting, in a broad sense, the interpretive turn (cf. Akhutina 2003; Neale 2005), this dissertation also reflects the cognitive turn in language studies (cf. Senft 2009, also 2014). As such, it views language as essentially being in the service of constructing and communicating meaning (cf. Fauconnier 1999: 96), alongside it (language) being a part of the investigative apparatus, a partly social art (cf. Quine in Neale 1987). In this sense, rather than just merely labeling pre-existing concepts, words are also seen as constructing meaning. As these words did not emerge in a cultural vacuum, languages differ widely in their semantic-conceptual construals and words, as conceptualisations, constitute and reflect culture-specific ways of 'paying attention' to the world (Levisen 2012: 8). Thus, from a cognitive understanding, just as meaning is ultimately a matter of conceptualisation (cf. Langacker 1987), so language, too, is a conceptualisation (Levisen 2012: 8).

In the light of the above, and specifically in the light of Wierzbicka's point, two facts have to be recognised: First, speech acts and speech genres provide an important source of insight into the 'communicative routines' (2003: x) as well as 'cognitive routines' most characteristic of a given society. Furthermore, any cultural utterance refracts the intersubjective echoes it carries, thus fitting them to the participants, situation and purposes at hand, as well as at large. Second, to fully capitalise on this source, we must carry out not only a rigorous semantic[44] (i.e. conceptual) analysis of the dimensionality of these utterances (Jucker and Taavitsainen 2000[45], 2008; Jucker 2009; Goddard 2012: 23, 24), but equally so a rigorous analysis of their ethnophenomenological dimensionality, with results expressed in a culture-independent semantic metalanguage, here, the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM)). As, in refracting available 'semiosic' (Evensen 2001) resources, we benefit from convention without being the victims of convention (Bostad, Brandist, Evensen, Faber 2004: 7).

[44] This is what semantics is largely about: the exploration of the depths of our consciousness (Wierzbicka 1980:22, also Goddard 2012a)

[45] Sketch of the multidimensional space of the speech act of insults (p. 74)

I suggest that in the case of expressives, specifically, apologetic speech acts as the exponents thereof, approaching them from the angle the points above raise is particularly essential for the following reasons: first, the prevalence of the reductionist account expressing them in terms of the psychological state specified in the sincerity condition about a state of affairs specified in the propositional content (cf. Searle 1979: 15), has reduced them from being "rich points" (Agar 1994; also Meier 2010) to being merely a point of richly intentionalised abstracted logical discussion (cf. Green, in press). While not questioning the constitutive role of this factor, and the ultimate relevance of the explanation, in the final analysis, its productivity goes only as far as expressives viewed as ideally constructed activity types.

In contrast, as Culpeper & Archer (2008: 57) emphasise, "speech acts with a central expressive or socio-cognitive illocutionary focus, such as apologies, have been shown to be strongly sensitive to cultural variation" (see also Goddard and Wierzbicka 1997; Heesoo 2012). As Kallen and Kirk`s (2012: 32) argument further points out, this is due to the fact that, in comparison with Searle's constructed data (also valid for most of the intentionalist-conventionalist approaches), the natural data are less clear-cut and necessitate the broadening of the scope of category labels and dimensions. In addition, second, the de-naturalisation has further led to the claims that:

> Illocutionary acts are, so to speak, natural conceptual kinds, and we should no more suppose that our ordinary language verbs carve the conceptual field of illocutions at its semantic joints than we would suppose that our ordinary language expressions for naming and describing plants and animals correspond exactly to the natural biological kinds. (Searle 1979: ix-x)

And, consequently, it has also led to justified criticism viz. that when philosophers of language and paradigmatic speech-act theorists discuss illocutionary acts, they must realize that they are not discussing any language-independent 'natural kinds' (as idealised activity types), but complexes of components which have been singled out from among countless combinations of components occurring in human communication (cf. Wierzbicka 2003b: 151), where they are primarily interactive activities of generating and conveying meaning. In other words, speech acts are instances of communicative activity types (cf. Bakhtin's 'speech genres'), which are not only cognitively or linguistically constituted, but are also evaluative-emotional-volitional in and through (bodily) interaction (Cresswell and

Teucher 2008). Third, although the more contemporary speech act theory did advance its paradigm, i.e. recognised the fact that language is essentially social, by establishing the key link between language and society in the form of 'deontology'[46] (cf. Searle 2007: 3), intentionality still remained its pan-locus. This being particularly evident in and exemplified by:

> [...] expressives, such as apologizing [...] If you look at the forms of intentionality that correspond to these speech acts and are expressed in their performance, forms such as regret and gratitude, it seems to me these typically are combinations of beliefs and desires. That is, they in forms of desire based on the presupposition of the truth of the belief. For example if I regret having done something I must believe I did it and wish I had not. So the existence of speech acts where the fit is presupposed, which have what I have previously called the null direction of fit, does not pose an insuperable problem for moving from prelinguistic intentionality to speech acts, because the prelinguistic forms also have the null direction of fit, where the fit is presupposed. (Searle 2007: 17)

Based on this picture, which seems effectively accountable for Anglo-centric and mostly for the idealised Anglo-centric purview, by explicitly annulling expressives' life-to-world fit, i.e. their fit to 'real actuality' (Bakhtin 1953/1979: 281), and anchoring expressives in 'presupposed expressivity', which links them to the frame of social action and makes them instances of an activity type - 'situated expressivity', is in effect canceled out, turning them into instances of a void-activity type. With null direction of fit, i.e. fitted to the belief-truth presupposition (concerning the speaker) alone, expressives' frame of action effectively seizes to be social action and becomes, instead, social isolation, where 'expressivity' goes only as far as the speaker's feelings about themselves or their feelings about the world (Searle 1976: 24), as the only determinants of the felicity-fit. Such view, in turn, turns expressives into instances of "void-activity type" rather than "instances of social activity type" (Jucker and Taavitsainen 2008: 5). In addition to the evidence of cultural-variation sensitivity, what the cognitive approaches further evidence is the constitutive relevance of the frame of interaction (situated action-cum-response) as an accompanying clue on how to understand and interpret speech acts. In the light of this and the evidence brought by the investigation here, as Norrick (1978: 279) points out, expressive speech acts, more

[46] "A notion involving commitments of various kind" (cf. Searle 2007: 9)

essentially, express not beliefs or intentions, but psychological conditions which arise to given states of affairs (i.e. variable/various contextual cues). And, more specifically, as defined by Taavitsainen and Jucker (2010: 159; also Jucker and Taavitsainen 2000), expressive speech acts express the state of mind, the attitudes and the feelings of speakers with respect to the changing cultural groundings. Due to their cultural-cognitive sensitivity and the resulting intricate multidimensional space, expressive speech acts still persist in being considered the most elusive and difficult category (Jucker and Taavitsainen 2008: 7), very much explicatively under-researched (Ronan 2015). In particular, it concerns their "inside-outsidedness", i.e. the dialogic locus of their conceptualisations (processes) as the locus of metapragmatic awareness and the resulting realisations, and, by extension, of, what Verschueren (2008) has defined as the locus of the processes of language use. Based on the evidence at large, and specifically on the evidence this study has yielded, by providing an explicative account of the locus above, I make a case in point that (the genre of) apologetic speech act is not just sensitive to cultural variation but, equally essentially, to community-specific cognitive variation (mental practices). Returning to a still very much salient point made by Wierzbicka (2003b), in emphasising the relevance of Bakhtin's (1979) view[47][48], it is important to stress that despite the tremendous variety of 'speech genres' (using it in Bakhtin's sense, as a cover-all term) - in function, structure and above all in length - they share, in an important sense, the same linguistic nature. What this further also points to is the need for a unified descriptive-explicative framework. The recent work and developments (e.g. Meier 2010), now even more so, point to what was emphasised by Hymes (1964, 1972) as the need for making conceptual distinctions, yet studying the whole range of phenomena in question within a unified framework viz. a multidimensional explicative unified framework.

---

[47] that in "speaking as in writing, we 'pour' our speech into ready-made forms of discursive (speech) genres...these forms are given to us in the same way in which our native language is given" (Bakhtin 1979: 257)

[48] Quoting Wierzbicka (2003b: 457) directly: "Bakhtin's study "Problema recevyx zanrov" ['The problem of speech genres'] was published in 1979, but actually written in 1952, so it seems to me that he can be rightly seen as a precursor of the modem Western literature on speech acts and speech genres which flowered in the 1960s and 1970s. In fact, Bakhtin's first work on related topics was published as early as 1929. But the 1929 book, interesting and original as it is, does not focus on speech genres, as does the 1952 study. For an English translation of this pioneering work, see Bakhtin (1986). It is devoted specifically to speech genres, and it outlines a program which I find particularly congenial."

In keeping with another very important ontological point made by Verschueren (2011: 34), namely, that "[...] we must keep in mind that even a wide-open theoretical framework[49] may first have to be broken down under the weight of practices-as-conceived-by-participants before it can be built up again". In the remaining theoretical chapters I will do exactly this by means of the alternative framework of Dialogic(al) Ethnophenomenological Pragmatics, before building it up again.

1.2

Dialogism of the Dialogic(al) Ethnophenomenological Pragmatics

As explained by Linell (2009) in his seminal extensive "meditation" on dialogism, in a more comprehensive sense of 'dialogue', dialogism is taken to denote "*any* kind of human sense-making", be it "semiotic practice, action, interaction, thinking or communication, as long as these phenomena are understood "dialogically"" (2009: 5). Such a broader encompassing notion makes it possible to critically address "internal dialogue within the self" or "dialogue between I-positions", "dialogue between ideas" (cf. Markova et al. 2007) or 'paradigms' (cf. Linell 2005), as well as about the overt interaction taking place between two or more persons (i.e. sociodialogue). In its more overt viz. grounded meaning of 'dialogue', dialogism has the concrete, i.e. empirical sense. This sense reveals dialogism as an interactive encounter between two or more cognates, i.e. participants, interacting via some semiotic resources e.g. spoken language, and its accompanying body language (Luckmann 1990). This, in turn, also links dialogism to everyday language use.

Dialogism as an onto/epistemological framework concerns the most general (i.e. metaphysical) categories in terms of which we think about human action, cognition and communication. In other words, dialogism can be regarded as a general (meta-)theoretical framework (cf. Todorov 1984) for accounting for our world

[49] let alone a theoretical-empirical framework

knowledge acquisition, specifically with regard to meaning ascription (sense-making). As such, it brings to the foreground the role of interaction and contexts as well as language and the contribution of the other. As Linell (2009: 7) rounds it up, if "dialogicality is a property of the subject matter of the human and the cultural sciences, then dialogism is an epistemological framework that takes dialogicality systematically into consideration" as well as dialectically. Bakhtinian dialogism as such dialogism and as a crux of a comprehensive philosophical anthropology[50] which, given all its important ingredients - life-philosophy and phenomenology (cf. Reznik and Brandist 2004: 24) as "constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude", is a case in point for, what Schutz (1962: 141-142) termed a "fully elaborated philosophical anthropology" that provides a proper foundation for the empirical social sciences and, thus, constitutes the *fons et origo* of the mutual-relatedness of the approaches above. And, as such, is the *fons et origo* proper of the novel socio-pragmatic 'science' reflected in the theoretical-empirical framework this dissertation develops - the Dialogic(al) Ethnophenomenological Pragmatics, that enables us to consistently take such a perspective to human acts of mindful sense-making interaction. An extensive body of research, largely about the "socio-dialogue", has shown that dialogism has a robust empirical validation and is not merely a 'philosophy' (Linell 2009: 8). In Bakhtin's words:

> The object of the human sciences is expressive and speaking being. Such a being never coincides with itself, that is why it is inexhaustible in its meaning and signification (in Todorov 1984: 23-24). [...] In the human sciences, 'accuracy' (i.e. depth of the insight) consists in overcoming the other's strangeness without assimilating it wholly to oneself (in Todorov 1984: 24). [...] Relations between subjects – personal, personalistic relations: dialogic relations between utterances, ethical relations and others. Here are also all personified semantic [smyslovoi] connections. Relations between consciousnesses, truths [pravda], mutual influences, apprenticeship, love, hatred, falsity, friendship, respect, reverence trust, mistrust, and so on (1979: 138). [...] There is only one subject here – the percipient (cogniser) and speaker (expounder). Only a *voiceless thing* stands over and against the subject. Any object of knowledge (man among them) may be cognised and perceived as a thing. But, as claimed in Brandist (2002: 165) the subject as such cannot be cognised and studied as a thing, for as a subject it cannot become voiceless and remain a subject. Cognition of this can therefore only be *dialogic*.

[50] Cf. Sandler (2013)

Like Linell, I also join those who use ‘dialogical theory’ or ‘dialogism’ in a broader, much more comprehensive and ecumenical, i.e. eclectic sense, referring to several mutually related approaches to language, communication and cognition. Among these approaches, in a broader sense, are phenomenology, pragmatism, symbolic interactionism and sociocultural theory. Unlike Linell and others, however, who concern themselves more with dialogism in a purely abstract ontological sense, my concern here will be dialogism, (closer to Markova’s sense) as a grounded ontology and epistemology of the human sciences and, more specifically, of the human mind and human sense-making (interaction).

The intrinsic feature of dialogism is its concern with the social, cultural and historical embeddedness of all human phenomena (cf. Markova 1994: 42). In effect then, what dialogism deals with are the processes of human meaning-making in and through language, in thinking, in communication and action, and by extension with theproducts of such processes. For this reason it has recently been re-defined as a socio-cognitIve approach to human cognition and communication (Markova and Foppa 1990a, 1991; Rommetveit 1992). Pursuant to this, the focal point of the dialogical analysis is situated interaction, its constituent activities as well as its belonging to the sociocultural practices included. At the same time, dialogism can be characterised as a metatheory for the human mind. The relationship between the two is that the mind is realized largely in and through its situated interactions (Linell 2009: 30). This reveals dialogism to be both a general epistemology for the human sciences (Marková 1990b; also Eberle 2012) and an ontology of the human mind (Markova 2003, 2006). In accounting for this multiverse of dialogism, Marková summarises its Geist as follows:

> Like cognitivism, dialogism crosses the boundaries between disciplines, capturing interest of scholars in such diverse subjects as linguistics, sociology, communication, psychology, anthropology and literature. Unlike cognitivism, however, the concerns of dialogism reach far beyond those of the cognitive aspects of mind and language. Dialogism encompasses the totality of human agency and conceives it as situated in socio-historical phenomena and in culture. (Markova 1994: 27)

Specifically with regard to the mind-language interrelation, the focus has been placed on dialogism as an epistemological approach to the study thereof (e.g., Holquist 1990; Markova 1990b, 1990c; Wertsch 1990, 1991). From the dialogic point of view then language is an active practice and, therefore, is to be understood as constitutive of and in a dialogic relation with the Self (cf. Demuth 2011; also Bamberg and Zielke 2007; Cresswell and Teucher 2011; Cresswell and Hawn 2010; Gergen 2009; Zielke 2009). In this sense, the theory of dialogism accounts for how we, as human beings, relate to the world. Relating it to language specifically, how we use language to intervene in the world as apperceived[51] or to solve various communicative projects, and how we acquire knowledge about the world in divergent ways ("appropriating" it). Refocusing to dialogism as an ontological approach (Marková 2003a: 90ff.), the ontology, not so much in metaphysical or purely epistemological sense, but more so as a theory about the mind's nature and essence, i.e. a theory of how the mind actually works. Voicing Bakhtin, the human mind and existence are based on the self–other (Ego–Alter) relationships and it is this dialogicality that explains human sense-making, i.e. ontology implies the epistemology (Marková 2006: 128). Confluencing this onto-epistemology with empiricality (natural(attitude) evidence obtained), this dissertation also makes an empirical case-in-point for what has until now been only argued in theory (most prominently by Linell), viz. that "dialogicality is an attribute of human sense-making, i.e. the dynamic processes, *actions* and practices in which meanings are *contextually* constituted in the *interactions* of human beings with others and environments" (both perceptive and apperceptive), making "dialogicality primarily inherent in these interactions and interrelations" (Linell 2009: 30). Furthermore, these actions being performed by persons and through semiosis, dialogicality is also to be regarded as a

[51] Motivated by the contemporary psychology (especially Herbart and Wundt) notion of 'apperception' as the perceptive process of assimilating new mental representations which, when added to the collection of previously acquired ideas, compose the 'apperceptive mass' (Cabral & Nick 2006), in turn influencing Yakubinsky (for detailed discussion cf. Brandist 2005; Ivanova 2009) who introduced it to the socio-functional linguistic studies and, in turn to Bakhtin Circle scholars (primarily Bakhtin), as the "perception and understanding of other people's discourse, determined not only by an external verbal stimulus, but by previous internal and external experience and, finally, by the mental contents perceived at the moment of the (speech) perception" (Yakubinsky(1923) in Preto, Paideia, De Oliveira, Robso & Lyra, Maria 2012: 257).

constitutive-attribute characteristic of the human mind and by extension, as the mind's more concrete extension, of human language.

To sum it up, in making dialogism its fundamental feature, this dissertation is then about pragmatics in a broadly dialogical, and broadly Bakhtinian, sense. As such, it is a case in point for dialogicality as a constitutive attribute of human sense-making (Bakhtin 1979: 318, 373; Linell 2009). In the context of dialogism as concerned with the accounts of sense-making, 'sense' is taken to denote roughly 'meaning' (cf. Akhutina 2003: 112, also Linell 2009: 28). Meaning is hence a relational phenomenon not only in the systemic sense (as given by the relative position within a ready-made system), but also in the specifically intersubjective, dynamic and co-constructive sense (cf. also Bostad, Brandist, Sigfred, and Faber 2004).

My overarching aim is to advance "dialogism" (through Dialogical Ethno-phenomenological Pragmatics) as a nuanced, systematic and veridical theoretical-empirical framework, sensitive to the facts of human sense-making (especially in the acts of communicative interaction).

Chapter 2

Theoretical Inquiry

2.1

General Introduction

In choosing to focus on the situated instances of acts of communication (apologetic speech acts) as a key to community's shared cultural (values and attitudes) and mental (frames of mind) practices, this dissertation already departs from the ontological space commonly regarded as the part and parcel of the speech act theory and practice (Austin 1962; Searle 1975; Grice 1975; Brown & Levinson 1978, 1987; Bach and Harnish 1979; Leech 1983; Blum-Kulka & Olshtain 1984; Sperber and Wilson 1995; Bach 2005). While the works in these traditions are to be appreciated for putting different ways of speaking at the centre of investigative attention, as well as for their focus on the socio-cultural differences reflected in the ways of speaking, a closer examination, with respect to the nature and the requirements of a study such as this, reveals their inherent limitation. This limitation, as Wierzbicka aptly observes, results from the fact that, willingly or unwillingly, works in this tradition cannot escape the charge of terminological, and not only terminological (2003: xviii), but also methodological-descriptive and, the resulting, analytical (ethno)centrism[52] (for pertinent discussions see also Wierzbicka 1985a; House 1996; Meier 1999; Kryk-Kastovsky 2002; Weigand 2011; Sandler 2012a; Korta and Perry 2015). These limitations are most evident in the way the content of the utterance is approached. Namely, although these works acknowledge forms of linguistic behaviour as manifestations of situated human action, interaction and cooperation, they do so only on the functional level, while the traditional picture[53] - mirrored in the propositional

[52] As Wierzbicka ((1991)2003: xviii) points out, "given that words like requests and apologies stand for conceptual artefacts of English language, using them as analytical tools inevitably involves imposing an Anglo perspective on other languages and cultures...claims that in many societies people are guided in their ways of speaking by principles such as "don't impose" or "be relevant" depend on the English words impose and relevant, which have no equivalents in other languages."

[53] Within this paradigm, "the entire linguistic apparatus for analyzing utterances, the purpose of the analysis, and the way meaning is conceptualized all derive from the two relations of *reference* and *predication*" (Sandler (forth): 2; cf. also Harris 1981; Sandler 2012a).

understanding[54] of `semantics' - still very much "dictates how the content of linguistic "utterances is conceptualised" (c.f. Sandler forth[55].) and consequently analysed. Such modus operandi, however, achieves quite an opposite effect in practice. Grounding in a strictly origocentric (i.e. speaker-) intention-driven propositional (truth-conditional) logic, instead of in a more natural, socio-culturally situated, logic, effectively reduces utterances, and language (as a chain of utterances), to the order of strictly (mono)logical entities. Moreover, in effect, it reduces their reality to that of abstraction instead of situated-action. This has been recognised and, especially in the last several decades, challenged by a body of empirical work with cultural-cognitive and functional poise (see Verschueren 1998; Wertsch 1998; Hofstede 2001; Duranti 2007; Gasparov 2010; Sharifian 2011). Such work has further led to the onset of radical reconsideration of the traditional framework for conceptualising language at large and utterances (cf. e.g. Wittgenstein 1958; Bakhtin 1962; Jackendoff 1997; Goddard and Wierzbicka 2002; Kopytko 2002; Verschueren 2008; Linell 2009; Molon and Vianna 2012; Wierzbicka 2016; Sandler forth.).

However, these approaches have yet to be clearly integrated with analysis on the level of discourse pragmatics in general and in the context of apologetic speech acts as pragmatic exponents of situated discourse and (situated) utterances in particular. The importance of bridging this, and the aforementioned, centric divide has been emphasised over time and, especially in the recent years, by a number of pertinent scholars (Wierzbicka 2003a; Fried and Östman 2005; House 2008; Croft 2009; Meier 2010; Salmon 2010; Dorodnych and Kuzio 2012). And it is to this effort that I seek to make a contribution.

Therefore, the main concern of this dissertation will not be to directly criticise either the traditional or the neo-traditional view of language and speech act utterances. Rather, its aim is to introduce an alternative perspective for conceptualisation

[54] As Sandler (forthcoming) points out, "both Searle and Grice propose their respective methods of analyzing the meaning of utterances as pragmatic add-ons mounted on top of a standard referential-logical analysis of sentence semantics. This standard analysis yields the "sense" of the sentence or "what is said" in it. To the "sense" one should add an illocutionary force, and from "what is said" one is to make implicatures. So, while Grice and Searle probably wanted to stress that a formal semantic analysis is not enough to understand utterances, many of their followers used these distinctions to propose a more strictly formalist conception of semantics. A typical example is Bach (2005)".

[55] Pg. 3

(Bakhtin's 'Theory of Verbal Communication (ToVC)') and a pertinent methodological approach (dialogism-cum-cultural-scripts) for the conceptual explorative-explanatory analysis of (apologetic) speech acts, based on a coherent alternative understanding of language as a situated[56] dialogue. An additional aim which this dissertation sets forth is also to demonstrate that taking a consistent dialogic approach to the semantics[57] of utterances can yield new explicative insights not only in analysing their function, but also in analysing their content. It is particularly in the explanatory sense that this approach shows most potential as it allows for the community-specific 'cultural logic' that underlies the ways of language use, to be decoded both on the pre-linguistic (dialogism) and the linguistic (cultural scripts) level. This is of great importance, particularly when we take into consideration that many subjective and (collective) attitudinal meanings are indeed semantically encoded but still not sufficiently explicatively decoded (Wierzbicka 2003b: xix).

2.2

General Angle

As hinted at by the concluding remarks of the previous section, this dissertation adopts a different modus operandi than the traditional and the current studies on the topic, which differentiates it and makes it distinct in its ontological locus, formed by the intersection of two particularly salient angles. Following Kristeva (1982), angle one, premised on not "applying" a theory, but allowing practice to test theory, letting the two enter into a, as Bakhtin puts it, revealing dialectical tension. And, following Kryk-Kastovsky (2012: 7), angle two, which is premised on the reversal of order in critically approaching the topic of culture-d behaviour) and communication. Namely, in the vein of 'linguistic culture', from linguistic issues (variability in language use) to (inter)cultural phenomena (attitudes and values), postulating, thus, a case for the latter

[56] i.e. cultured

[57] What I mean by 'semantics' here is the methodology of analysing the meaning of linguistic utterances in a way that is sensitive to the cultural-contextual and cognitive-lexical underpinnings of their content.

as also linguistically-based phenomena. By acknowledging these phenomena to be the part and parcel of language, what is brought into prominence is a crucial aspect of its actual nature and reality - namely, the functional relatedness with the other facets of human life (Verschueren 1999: 9; c.f. also Morris 1938; Wittgenstein 1958; Pateman 2001; Goddard and Wierzbicka 1995; Holtgraves 2002; Brandist 2002). This furthermore entails that ways of language use characteristic of a given community cannot be satisfactorily explained in purely behavioural terms (as, for example, attempted by the speaker-intention driven and descriptive approaches) as they, in fact, constitute a behavioural manifestation of a tacit system of 'socio-cultural rules' (Wierzbicka 1998: 242). Thus, following Quine (1972), in order for an explanation to be a satisfactory 'translation' of the relations it should cover the totality of observable facts of usage (Neale, 1987: 304). In other words, as initially pointed out by Malinowski (1972: vi, 11), and pragmatically operationalised by Verschueren - "what is relevant in the practice of language use must also be taken into account when constructing a practically insightful theory of language use" (Verschueren 2008: 16; also Kryk-Kastovsky 2002; Kopytko 2003; Jaszczolt 2018a).

2.3

General Investigative Focus

Using the above angles as its signpost, the investigative focus of this dissertation can be best summed up under the extended notion of "rich points" (cf. Agar 1994; Meier 2010) – the salient differences in (situated) speech act behaviour that reflect a difference in cultural underpinnings of language use (communicative practices) and signal a difference in cognitive underpinnings[58] (mental practices) of language users.

My decision to define and empirically pursue such a focus has been directly motivated by a body of informed observations pointing out to a major lack in the number of studies investigating the link—essential to the effective negotiation of meaning and identity in intercultural communication - in an explanatory manner (c.f.

[58] Context perception-cum-meaning generation

Wierzbicka 1985b; Luce and Smith 1987; Holquist 1990; Kasper 1992; Meeuwis 1994; Glover 1995; FitzGerald 2003; Meier 1999, 2003, 2010). More specifically, I mean the link between the identification of differences in verbal behaviour (i.e. linguistic culture) – here speech act performance, and improved intercultural understanding and communication, respectively. The missing link in question is subjective or small [c]ulture[59] (Bennett 1998; also Clyne 1994), cognitive-psychological in nature, which can be defined as "learned, group-related perceptions - including both verbal and non-verbal language, attitudes, values, belief systems, disbelief systems and behaviours – that is accepted and expected by an identity group" (Singer 1998: 6). Note that it is not objective (institutional)[60], but first and foremost the subjective culture that informs the pragmatic (in-use) aspects of language. And it is exactly this subjective sense of culture that is the more pertinent one to pragmatic (language-use) competence (Meier 2003: 189). Translated to investigative practice, the above refers to the need for research to progress beyond descriptive (e.g. Blum-Kulka & Olshtain 1984; Wolfson 1989; Cenoz & Valencia 1996; Lwanga-Lugu 2005) to the explanatory, making its substance the "underlying cultural assumptions that inform the perception of contextual factors[61] which, in turn, inform verbal[62] behaviour" (Meier 1996: i, also 2010). And more specifically, in the context of this study, following Meier's (1998) conclusion, still very much relevant today (cf. also Jucker and Taavitsainen 2008: 7; Ronan 2015: 1), only rarely has an apology study explicitly set out to explain apology behaviour in terms of underlying cultural attitudes, and, I add, particularly with relation to the accompanying mental attitudes (cognitive practices) underlying them (specifically in terms of conceptualisation both with regards to the utterance content and the content of the IF/IFIDs).

---

[59] In contrast to "objective culture" - characterised as more institutional with its focus on political and economic systems (cf. Bennett 1998; also Berger and Luckmann 1967; Meier 2003).

[60] Focused on the political and economic systems (cf. e.g. Berger and Luckmann 1967; Bennett 1998)

[61] Situational context

[62] Apology included

2.4

Ontological Locus

The signposts mentioned above also provide a case in point for the ontological locus of this dissertation. In this sense, they are seen both as its offshoot and contemporary extension.

In what follows, this locus will be presented in the form of two sets of assumptions - (1) (primary) the actual nature and, by extension, (2) (secondary) the actual reality of language. Together, these assumptions will make the case for a translinguistic perspective of verbal communication (i.e. TPoVC), as a consistent explanatory perspective of language use and of the semantics of apologetic speech acts as "rich points".

2.4.1

What Does It Mean to Treat Language Translinguistically

Before answering this question, we must first explicate what "translinguistics (originally metalingvistika)" entails. The term was introduced by Bakhtin (1929, 1953, 1959-1961; cf. also Todorov 1984) to make a clear distinction between two different perspectives of language that still very much holds relevance today. As Bakhtin states, this distinction rests on the difference of nature of the object-to-be-known. Expounding further, in its construction of the notion of language and that of its elements - syntactical, morphological, lexical and others, linguistics brackets away the forms of organisation of concrete utterances and their social functions (in Medvedev 1978). Pursuant to this, as Bakhtin further points out, the distinction lies, in each instance, between the general perspective of an object (translinguistics) and the interpretation of the particular instances that constitute it (linguistics). Therefore, on the one hand, we have linguistics, whose object-to-be-known is constituted by language and its subdivisions i.e. minimal linguistic resources (phonemes, morphemes,

propositions, sentences etc.), while on the other hand, we have translinguistics, whose object-to-be-known is discourse, i.e. "language in its concrete and living totality" represented, in turn, by "concrete utterances" (such as apologetic speech acts), cf. Bakhtin (1929, 1963).

From an ontological point of view, the contemporary distinction that reflects that of Bakhtin and implicitly voices the relevance of his philosophy for the current study of language use and speech acts, is that made by Verschueren. What is meant here, more specifically, is the distinction between 'linguistics of language resources' (phonetics, phonology, morphology, semantics, syntax), i.e. the components of a linguistic theory and the 'linguistics of language use' (as a general functional, i.e. cognitive, social and cultural perspective on language), viz. the perspective of the present day pragmatics (Verschueren 1999: 1-2, 10-11).

This further affirms the relevance and the accuracy of the observation made some decade before by Todorov that the term in current usage which can be said to epistemically correspond best to Bakhtin's translinguistics (i.e. his *metalingvistika*) is present-day pragmatics (1984: 24). In particular, it is pragmatics seen as the study of "the biotic aspects" of semiosis, "all the biological, psychological and sociological phenomena which occur in the functioning of signs" (Morris 1938: 30), i.e. as a study of peoples' use of language as a form of social inter-action (cf. Verschueren 1999: 6). In this sense, as Todorov concludes, given that Bakhtin's work predates the body of work regarded as seminal in the field, one could also say that Bakhtin can be regarded as the modern founder of this discipline (cf. also Pateman 1991). Thus, the underlying goal of this dissertation will be to introduce and demonstrate the practical viability of Bakhtin's dialogic Theory of Verbal Communication, supplemented with a productive practically applicable methodology (dialogism-cum-cultural-scripts), as an encompassing explanatory pragmatic perspective on and framework for the study of language use in general, and apologetic speech acts as instances of language use in particular.

In conclusion, as Verschueren (1999: 7) put it, to answer the question posed at the beginning, to treat language translinguistically means to treat it in its 'concrete and living totality' - from a "general cognitive, social and cultural perspective on linguistic phenomena with relation to their usage in forms of behaviour"[63].That is to say, it means to treat language with respect to (its) "linguistic culture" - as "the set of behaviours, assumptions, cultural forms, prejudices, folk belief systems, attitudes, stereotypes, ways of thinking about language, and temporal circumstances associated with a particular language" (Schiffman 1996: 5).

2.4.2

The Actual Nature of Language and Speech Act Utterances

> How can we isolate the 'real object'—the matter for research from the stream of language? What is the "real givenness" of linguistic phenomena? (Akhutina 2003: 97)

The case in point that the previous sections sought to make is that if we seek to understand the "real giveness", i.e. the actual nature of language and linguistic phenomena (here, a specific class of expressive speech acts), we have to look beyond the (philosophical-)linguistic theory itself.

This and the following section (2.4.4) continue in the same vein. Each makes a further contribution to the concreteness of the case-in-point by taking, as their explanandum, the above question, providing a systematic explanans in return.

In order to establish a dialogue[64] between the explanandum and the explanans we need, in the Quine-Schutz-Follesdalian sense of totality-covering, a fully elaborated groundwork translational transactional[65] philosophy. This dissertation introduces one

[63] Where the string 'cognitive, social and cultural' does not suggest the separability, but unity of what the terms refer to (cf. Verschueren 1999)

[64] In the Bakhtinian sense - a constant 'dialectical tension', as the most effective way of tapping into the impetus of the life-world dynamics constitutive of the communicative-life-world dynamics.

[65] Along the lines of e.g. Barnlund (1970)

such philosophy – Bakhtin's 'Philosophical Anthropology' - at whose centre stands a life-world "architectonics of 'self-other relations'" which, when applied, "opens the door for a radical rethinking of what language is and how it functions" (cf. Sandler 2013: 152). Moreover, it coincides, in turn, with the new directions explored in the contemporary language sciences, while at the same time, opening up additional new alleys to be explored. As such, its significance here is dyadic. First, it facilitates the understanding of the conception of language endorsed by Bakhtin (Circle). By relation, second, it facilitates the understanding of how such a conception of language relates to the conception of language endorsed by this dissertation. Namely, that a) language-in-use is a rich medium for deciphering cultural perception and the resulting cognition. In other words, language is understood as a key to the "evaluative tones" (Bakhtin 1993[1986]: 90), i.e. values and attitudes of a given linguistic community (Wierzbicka 1998; Peeters 2006). And, in the light of this, understood as the exponents of such language, more specifically, that b) speech acts can, inter alia, be valuable sources for deciphering psychological states not readily legible in a person's behavior (Green 2016; also Bakhtin 1993[1986]: 34). In elaborating on the direct implications of the aforementioned philosophy for the dyad in question, I will primarily rely on the two pertinent works by Bakhtin – "Toward a Philosophy of the Act" (1993[1986])[66] and "Notes in Philosophical Anthropology" (in 1979 [1970-1971])[67], complemented by the two principal contemporary readings – "The Bakhtin Circle: Philosophy, Culture and Politics"[68] (Brandist 2002) and "Language and Philosophical Anthropology in the Work of Mikhail Bakhtin and the Bakhtin Circle" (Sandler 2013) as interpretative key(s). The added value of giving the key such temporal breadth is that it, simultaneously, also gains on interpretative breadth, demonstrating Bakhtin(Circle)'s continuous pertinence to and importance for the language sciences today.

The governing ideas outlined in "Toward a Philosophy of the Act" form a stable philosophical core of Bakhtin (Circle)'s work in all periods (cf. Sandler 2012b; also Gogotishvili 2003). As Sandler points out further, Bakhtin's philosophical

[66] Originally written 1919-1921; the date refers to the date of original publication in English.

[67] Originally written 1970-1971; the date refers to the date of original publication in English.

[68] In particular, "The Problem of Discursive Genres" (Bakhtin, 1953-54) and "The Problem of the Text" (Bakhtin 1959-1961/1979).

anthropology, as an account of situated human existence, is centered in the architectonics of self-other relations. In practice, this translates into the principal theoretical model for the analytical reconceptualization of what language is and how it works, which, "in turn, opens up and coincides with the new directions being explored in the language sciences today" (Sandler 2013: 153; see also e.g. Chafe 1980; Langacker 1987: Ochs, Schegloff and Thompson 1996; Ford 2004). In more specific terms, the "shift of interest from the syntax and semantics of the utterance (speech act) to its pragmatics, and the concern with the speaker as he relates to his listener" (Akhutina 2003: 96), initially at the level of conceptualisation and, consequently, at the level of utterance (speech act) realisation. The explanatory potential of the model becomes particularly evident in the light of the ontological focus of the Bakhtin-Circle, i.e. in "the project of gradually developing a *language philosophy* based upon its *communicative aspect*" (cf. Molon & Vianna 2012: 147, see also Clark and Holquist 1984). Namely, philosophy that is based on communication, which is seen as the concrete realisation of the dialogic discursive interaction – the generating source of language (cf. Molon & Vianna 2012: 147). That is to say, in the words of one of its early progenitors (cf. Volosinov 1986: 94), "verbal interaction is seen as the basic reality of language". Translated to practice, the focus of such language philosophy is on exploring and explicating the "dialogic relations" (cf. Brandist, 2002: 160), i.e. the reproduction of the complex forms of intersubjectivity, within the utterance (cf. Sandler 2013: 160). In other words, the focus is placed on exploring and explicating the formative role played by 'other participant' (the 'second' addressee) and a 'higher other-participant' (the 'third' super-addressee), their voices and intonations, their past, present, and future (anticipated) utterances included.

To put it differently, every word is from someone and to someone, i.e. "every word expresses the 'one' in relation to the "other"" (Volosinov 1986: 86). Following Bakhtin (1993: 30) further, what is simultaneously given to the participant who performs the (communicative) act is the actually affirmed value of the other participants. The former "intuits the latter's inner lives as well as desires", thus, understanding "both the actual and the ought-to-be sense of the interrelationship between himself"(/herself) and these participants - "the truth (pravda) of the given state of affairs" (ibid.). The traces of this process that manifest themselves in the finest nuances of the utterance – 'dialogic overtones', ultimately define the style of

the utterance. Furthermore, the act-performing participant also understands the 'ought' – "commitment" (Searle 2007: 23; also Green 2010), of the performed (speech) act (utterance), i.e. not the abstract law of the act, but the actual concrete ought conditioned by his/her "unique place in the given context of the ongoing communicative event" (Bakhtin 1993: 30). In turn, all these moments, which make up the event in its totality are actualised in a unitary, "complete utterance" (Bakhtin [1953]1979: 74) and "unique answerable act" (cf. Bakhtin 1993: 30). Central to all this is the notion of 'answerability', i.e. the 'addressivity' of the utterance - its quality of being addressed towards someone; "in its answerability, the act sets before itself its own truth as something-to-be-achieved -- a truth that unites both the subjective and the psychological moments, as well as the moment of what is universal (within the universally valid event) and individual (actual)" (ibid. 1993: 29). All these echoes are thus observable in the very structure of each utterance as a link in a communicative-chain of (cf. e.g. Brandist 2002: 164).

As indicated earlier, such a conception of utterances (speech acts), and communication as their concrete reality, i.e. as an active chain thereof, has its source and origin in Bakhtin's philosophical account (philosophical anthropology) of human existence (architectonics of self-other relations), organized around "three basic moments" – "I-for-myself", "I-for-the other", and the "other-for-me" (Bakhtin 1986: 146; 1993: 54). In what follows, these moments will be discussed in more detail, with specific attention paid to their relation and significance for the dyad (utterances-communication) in question.

2.4.2.1

Architectonics of Philosophical Anthropology: Self-Other relations

In ontological terms, the architectonics of self-other relations can be defined, following Bakhtin, as follows:

> Man-in-general does not exist; I exist and a particular concrete other exists—my intimate, my contemporary (social mankind), the past and future of

> actual human beings (of actual historical mankind). All these are valuative moments of Being. (Bakhtin 1993[1986]: 47)

Following Brandist's (2002: 172) conclusion, a good number of Bakhtin's philosophical observations prove valuable as elements of a more inclusive and flexible type of natural[69] science. Namely, a science that incorporates and acknowledges the specific and irreducible level of human relations and the structures thereof[70], i.e. translinguistics, cf. Todorov 1981; Pateman 1998). Further, overarching, significance of these relations is that they bring about the principled interaction of minds (other(s)), through which the actual larger social and empirical world is constituted (Brandist 2002: 50). More specifically, as Bakhtin puts it:

> All the values of actual life and culture are arranged around the basic architectonic points of the actual world (the world of the performed act); all spatial-temporal and all sense-content values are drawn toward, and concentrated around, these central emotional-volitional points (relational moments): I, the other and I-for-the-other. (Bakhtin 1993: 54, also 1986)

In what follows I will, on the one hand, examine these fundamental moments and the role they play in the architectonics of the actual world (i.e. the world actually experienced and not merely thinkable) of the performed act[71]. Pursuant to this, I will, on the other hand, also account for linguistic activity as an actually performed act both from within its product (conceptual-cum-realisation) and from the standpoint of the author as an answerable (i.e. committing, in the sense referred to earlier) dialogic participant.

---

[69] For Bakhtin 'natural' has the meaning of "actual world", i.e. the world actually experienced and not merely thinkable (cf. 1993: 54, 56).

[70] Pragmatics, as conceptualised here, is viewed as one such natural science of human communication (and language).

[71] Understood as a discursive act as a substitute for 'speech acts' encompassing features common to both spoken and written genres, following Bakhtin's philosophy (cf. Pateman 2001: 34).

2.4.2.2

I-for-Myself

Following Bakhtin (1979 [1970-1971]: 146), the constitutive moments that underlie the first instance of the self-other relations can be summed up in the form of two fundamental questions:

1) What is the nature of one's idea of oneself - one's I as a whole?
2) How is it principally distinguished from the idea of the other(s)?

In practical terms, these can also be regarded as signposts that lead to a fundamental concrete truth (*pravda*)[72], i.e. the degree to which it is possible to combine I and other in one image (one communicative act). And furthermore, they lead to the discovery how this truth is to be achieved. We begin with addressing the overarching former aspect first:

> The I hides in the other and in others, it wants to be only an other for others. (Bakhtin 1979 [1970-1971]: 147)

What this contraposition brings to the foreground, first of all, is the architectonic difference between I's (one's own) uniqueness and the uniqueness of any other, i.e. the difference between the concrete experiencing of one's self and one's experiencing of another. In other words, the concretely affirmed value of a human being and one's own value-for-oneself come to being initially different. However, as Bakhtin (1993) points out here, it is important to emphasize two essential factors. First, what is at work here is not the abstract value-judgment performed by a disembodied (theoretical) consciousness knowing only the universal content/sense value of any individual (any human being).

Such 'consciousness' can engender only a value-judgment about a deed post factum and as an exemplar of a (non-actual) act. But, what is at work here is an

[72] "A truth that unites both the subjective and the psychological moments, just as it unites the moment of what is universal (universally valid) and the moment of what is individual (actual)." (Bakhtin 1993: 29)

effective, concrete, valuation performed by an act-performing consciousness. A valuation is understood as a performed act that seeks its justification not in an abstract system (of values) alone but, first and foremost, in a unique and concrete actuality (1993: 73). Second, to issue from within oneself, in one's acts, does not mean at all that one lives and acts for one's own sake alone. "I-for-myself" constitutes the center from which proceeds one's performed act, and the self-activity of affirming and acknowledging any value (for that is the only point[73] where one participates answerably in occurring Being). However, the centrality of one's "unique participation in Being within the architectonic of the actually lived-experienced world does not consist at all in the centrality" (1993: 60) of one's axiology (i.e. system of values), "for which everything else in the world is [...] an auxiliary factor". But, the crucial moment in self-affirmation is that one's "confirmed and acknowledged participation in Being is not just passive ([e.g.] the joy of being), but is first and foremost active (the *ought* to actualize my own unique place)" (1993: 60). That is to say,

> I[t] wants to enter completely into the world of others as another, and to cast from itself the burden of being the only I in the World. (Bakhtin 1986: 147)

The force of this active participation is transformative in nature. Namely, following Bakhtin's signposts further, it transforms every manifestation of the I (feeling, desire, mood, thought) into a personal, actively answerable, act. On this plane, for the I's participative[74], act-performing consciousness, the concrete and unique world - as an architectonic whole (where other is situated), is initially arranged around I as around its fons et origo, and so is/are the resulting concrete act(s). In view of the above, the pertinent question that arises concerns the main principle underlying the I-other relationship in the (architectonic of) actual world, i.e. in the actual world of the performed act. The highest architectonic principle of this world, according to

---

[73] i.e. "[...] the center of operations [...] directing my [i.e. one's] possibilities and my [i.e. one's] ought in the ongoing event of Being." (Bakhtin 1993: 60, emphasis added)

[74] As 'participative-thinking' I mean an act in which one knows "how not to detach the performed act from its product, but rather (knows how to) relate both of them to the unitary and unique context of life and seek to determine them in that context as an indivisible unity." (Bakhtin 1993: 19)

Bakhtin, is the concrete and architectonically valid contraposition of I and the other[75]. Consequently, a more concrete question is how this contraposition or the "burden of being the only I" (cf. Bakhtin 1979 [1970-1971) can be cast. In other words, how I and other can be concretely actualised in one image, and subsequently, in one concrete (speech) act. Or, as Bakhtin emphasises, how the (concrete) life's value centres - I and other(s), although perceived as different, are essentially correlated with each other, as it is around them that all of the concrete moments (of Being and acting) are distributed and arranged (cf. Bakhtin 1979 [1970-1971: 74). The starting explanans Bakhtin('s philosophy) provides us with is that:

> The differences of space and time of *I* and *other* [...] exist in living sensation, but abstract thought[76] erases them. Thought creates a unified, general world of man. [...] In [...] natural self-sensation, *I* and *other* merge. (Bakhtin 1986[77]: 147)

This makes two points particularly salient, namely, the initial 'locus' and the minimum/maximum of the correlation. Following Bakhtin (ibid: 146), the initial locus, and the minimum, is the (primary) self-sensation, the maximum is the (secondary) higher-sensation, i.e. the participating self-awareness, where the latter develops that which was already embedded in the former (the participatory nature). Building further on Bakhtin (ibid.: 143, 145), what consequently follows is the participative transformation and translation of the other's wor(l)d (both the 2nd and the 3rd addressee) into one's own, through the process of dialogic communication. It is in this process that the object (other's wor(l)d) is transformed into the dialogic subject (the other's I). As Bakhtin concludes:

> This valuative architectonic division of the world into *I* and those who are all *others* for me is not passive and fortuitous, but is an active and ought-to-be division. This architectonic is something *given* as well as something-*to-be-accomplished*, for it is the architectonic of an event. It is not given as a finished and rigidified architectonic, into which I am placed passively. It is the yet-to-be-realized plane of my orientation in Being-as-event

[75] Also taken up later by linguists (e.g. in Duszak 2002).

[76] As collection of abstract perceptual representations

[77] Bakhtin, Mikhail. 1979 [1970-1971]. "From Notes Made in 1970-1971". In Emerson, Caryl; Holquist, Michael. (eds.). Speech Genres and Other Late Essays (trans. Vern W. McGee). 1986. Austin: University of Texas Press, 132-158

> or an architectonic that is incessantly and actively realized through my answerable deed, upbuilt by my deed and possessing stability only in the answerability of my deed. The concrete ought is an architectonic ought: the ought to actualize one's unique place in once-occurrent Being-as-event. And it is determined first and foremost as a contra-position of *I* and the *other*. (Bakhtin 1993: 75)

Consequently, the focus of the following section will be to further elaborate on the specificities of this contra-position, especially with regard to the formative role it plays in the architectonic of concrete human reality.

2.4.2.3 I-for-Other

> My image of myself. What is the nature of one's perception of oneself, of one's *I* as a whole. Where lies its essential difference from my perception of an other. An image of the *I* or a concept, or an experience, a feeling, and the like. This image's order of being. What is the composition of this image (how do, e.g., perceptions of my body, my exterior, my past, etc. enter into it) […] What in me is given to me directly and what is given only through the other. (Bakhtin 1979 [1970-1971]: 146, in Sandler 2013: 157, translation modified).

Our return to the formative specificities of the contra-position, i.e. the next basic moment in the architectonic of self-other relations – "I-for-other", begins with the fundamental closing question above.

As an initial stepping stone, I turn to the signpost provided in the first interpretive key (Bakhtin 1993[1986]). Namely, as Bakhtin 1993[1986]: 74) points out, "the highest architectonic principle of the actual world, and that of the performed act, is the concrete and architectonically valid or operative contraposition of I and the other." This, in turn, yields two value-centers which, although different, are correlated with one other. As Bakhtin further points out, the implication of this is not myself OR the other, but myself AND the other. It is around these and such centers that all of the concrete moments of Being are centered, i.e. distributed and arranged:

> One and the same object (identical in its content) is a moment of Being that presents itself differently from the valuative standpoint when correlated with me or when correlated with (an)other. And the whole world that is unitary in

> content, when correlated with me or with another, is permeated with a completely different emotional-volitional tone, is valuatively operative or valid in a different way in the most vital, essential sense. This does not disrupt the world's unity of meaning, but, rather, raises it to the level of a unique event. (1993: 74)

With respect to the world's unity of meaning, what is it in I that is given to I directly and what is given only through (an)other? The world of one's experiences and acts is initially arranged around one's physical and mental expression (cf. Green 2017: 887), e.g. around one's body and gaze, as well as around one's convictions, emotions, intentions. However, as Sandler (2013: 157) points out, the I of Bakhtin's philosophical anthropology, unlike a Cartesian subject, lacks direct access to itself. In other words, within the concrete world as the I perceives it, I itself is nowhere to be found since, in actuality, it does not see itself, i.e. is not immediately accessible to itself in full transparency. This brings us to another principle that is central to understanding Bakhtin's philosophy - the principle of 'absolute self-exclusion' (1993: 75).

In order to understand it, we need to turn to Bakhtin's practical elaboration on this point[78], i.e. his discussion of the counterexample of what happens when a person looks at their reflection in the mirror (Bakhtin 1990a: 32–35; also Bakhtin 1996–2012: 5.71). In this sense, "looking at oneself in the mirror translates into an attempt of self-cognition, in which one both recognizes and misses oneself, seeing oneself as another with no "seamy side"" (cf. Nikulin 2011: 61). At a first glance, what appears to be the case when looking at one's reflection is that the person sees himself in the same way as he would see any other person. However, as Bakhtin points out, this only appears to be the case. First and foremost, by looking at someone else, a person obtains a coherent image of that other person - primarily the way this person looks and behaves. Coming back to oneself, looking at one's own reflection, on the other hand, such coherence of the image gets broken—the movements of one's body and one's face (expression) fail to form a unity with one's inner feel of moving one's body, i.e. with the emotions felt and reflected in one's facial expression. Instead, looking at the reflection, what one sees—indeed, typically, what one is trying to

[78] Initially, in idea, introduced in the "Notes in philosophical anthropology" (in 1979 [1970-1971]. "From Notes Made in 1970-1971")

see—is the way in which one would appear to others. In other words, an individual is looking at itself through the eyes of the other (individual). It is from these others, therefore, that an individual may receive any image of itsself (Bakhtin 1990: 128ff). As the dialogical theories of the self-echo - the individual is an other before it is a self; it is in addressing itself in the role of an other that its self rises in experience (Mead, 1932: 168). This, of course, refers not only to the perception of one's exterior, but to any substantive (as opposed to purely active, purely functional) perception of oneself, of what and who one is. The above manifoldness that pertains to a person, "enters" one's "consciousness from the external world through the mouths of others, with their intonation, in their emotional and value-assigning tonality" (Bakhtin 1986: 138). One realises oneself, initially, through other(s) as it is from the other(s) that the person receives words, forms and the tonalities necessary for the formation of one's initial idea of oneself (Bakhtin 1979 [1970-1971: 138). As Bakhtin further elaborates:

> Just as the body is formed initially in the mother's womb (body), a person's self-consciousness awakens wrapped in (an)other's consciousness. (Bakhtin 1986: 138)

This resistance of others' words to submit to the speaker`s accents brings us to the topic of the next chapter - appropriation of the other in concrete life.

2.4.2.4

Other-for-Me

As was claimed by Bakhtin:

> My temporal and spatial boundaries are not given for me, but the other is entirely given. I enter into the spatial world, but the other has always resided in it. (Bakhtin, 1979 [1970-1971: 147)

The quote above provides us both with signposts and notions key to understanding the third, ultimate, constituting moment of the concrete architectonic of the actual world and, by extension, of the actual performed act. The initial signpost indicates that all spatial-temporal values (sense-content values included) are drawn toward and concentrated around the central (emotional-volitional) architectonic points

(i.e. moments) - I and Other, and their relations (Bakhtin 1993: 54). What underlies the unity of these answerable instance(s) of consciousness is, however, "not a principle as a starting point, but the fact of an actual acknowledgment of one's own participation in the unitary Being-as-event" (Bakhtin 1993: 40). Given the concrete, active, nature of the act of participation, this fact, however, cannot be adequately expressed in the theoretical, passive, terms, but only described and experienced through participation (Bakhtin ibid: 40; also Sandler 2013: 155). Namely, returning to the first moment of the architectonics of human existence (Being-as-event), in Bakhtin's terms, it can only be described, experienced and adequately expressed by 'casting the burden of being the only I', i.e. the burden of "outsidedness" (vnenaxodimost') (cf. Velmezova 2015). This important notion, featuring prominently in Bakhtin's early works, presupposes an inability of the Other to "be at the same time and in the same place as I" (Velmezova 2015: 281). That is to say, as Velmezova (ibid.) points out, the notion not only implies the category of the Other, but also the Other as the only one capable of seeing Me as I am (at a given moment). Recalling the mirror-experiment, unlike one's own image, only the images of others are given to Me as a coherent whole, and vice-versa (cf. Sandler 2013: 159). Therefore, a human being alone could never be the complete author of her/his own 'value', since s/he needs to be "realized" - "impregnated with the interior unity of sense" (Bakhtin 1990[1923-24]: 111) - through the lens of the "evaluating soul" (ocenivajuščaja duša) of the Other (Bakhtin 1990[1923-24]: ibid), also presupposing the category of responsibility, i.e. answerability [otvestvennost'] toward the Other (cf. Bakhtin (1918-1924) in Velmezova 2015: 281). Translated to the micro world, the values of actual life and culture are arranged around the basic architectonic points of the actual world, and more specifically, of the actual world of the performed (two-sided) act (Bakhtin 1993: 54).

2.4.2.5

The Higher-Other (Super-addressee)

The dialogic interrelation introduces another important point. Namely, that in a dialogic interrelation the constitutive aspects are not only I (the first person speaker)

and the Other (the second person addressee), but, equally importantly, also the third party - Higher-Other (the third interlocutor (as) super-addressee) viewpoint, as indicated above, is revealed in the dialogue. As Bakhtin (1979 [1953]) demonstrates, the dialogic position, i.e. the role this third party plays is a rather special one:

> The author can never yield all of himself and all his discursive work to the full and finalised will of present or nearby addressees (the nearest descendents may also be mistaken) and always supposes (more or less consciously) some higher instance of responsive understanding, which can move back in various directions. (1979 [1953]: 126)

Following Bakhtin, the "third" is not necessarily a third person, explicitly present. But the 'third' party as an instrumental structural prerequisite of dialogue (interrelations) that acts as a sort of guarantor against the degeneration of plurality of perspectives into meaningless relativism (cf. Brandist 2002: 169). In this sense, its dialogic position is not only that of an active tacit participant, but also of a special co-constructive participant (Bakhtin 1979 [1970-1971]: 125) with a specific functional role. In the Bakhtinian context, that of tertium datur - an analogical device that does not solve an antinomy (self-other contra-position) by overcoming it in a synthesis (complete dissolving of one conscience into the other, leading to empathy[včuvstvovanie] rather than dialogue[79]) or abolishing one of the two, but which leaves both of the instances of consciousness in tension (active dialogic struggle, i.e. participative negotiation), in effect, giving rise to a third viewpoint[80] on their relationship (cf. Pellizzi 2008). As Pellizzi further points out, Bakhtin's originality lies in "his attempt to link subjectivity with the world, i.e. the uniqueness and the particular nature of each individual with the complex space of culture" (Pellizzi 2008: 203):

> In different epochs and according to different understandings of the world this superaddressee and its absolutely correct responsive understanding acquired various concrete ideological expressions (absolute truth, the people etc.). (Bakhtin 1979 [1959-1961]: 126)

---

[79] Cf. Velmezova (2015: 280)

[80] Tertium datur as Tertium quid - A third that plays the role and acts as a mediator or is considered to stand between the two diverse or incompatible positions.

Building on the idea above, this thesis extends Bakhtin's attempt at establishing a concrete link by casting the notion of 'super-addressee' (i.e. the 'higher-other third'[81] participant) with special attention paid to every day practice and, more specifically, to the everyday communicative practice (to which we shall return). Addressing the former setting first, therefore, in a broader sense, the 'higher-other participant' makes a strong case for a general plane of reference for the analysis of similarities and differences of objects-to-be-known[82] (cf. Krzeszowski 1990; also Jaszczolt 2003: 441). In other words, it is a strong case for what has been adopted in the studies with ethnographic leaning as tertium comparationis or common reference measure (cf. Wierzbicka 1996b; also Goddard 2001: 58, 2012a).

Thus, in practice, what becomes one of the central "loci" of this common reference measure is the absolute communal truth as a concrete manifest of the community's tacit system of attitudes and values - the dynamic "cultural grounding" (Jucker & Tavitsainen 2000: 67), which underlies its concrete reality and is manifested in the communicative norms and communicative behaviour of the specific community (cf. Peeters 2009). In this sense, the 'higher-other addressee' makes for a constitutive combinatorial ingredient to which parameters of variability are attached, interadaptable with linguistic choices. As such, it is not only an entity central to the 'locus', but also something that constitutes the contextual correlate(s) of adaptability, i.e. is an element (that informs the perception) of 'context'. In other words, as an absolute authority (or communal truth) to which each discursive subject can appeal at any point, the higher-Other third participant becomes constitutive of the dialogic interrelations as such (Brandist 2002: 169). As Verschueren (2008: x) concludes, not only are the participants central as a 'locus', they are also central as the agents who co-define the context.

---

[81] As Bakhtin (1979 [1970-1971]: 126) emphasises, not in the literal, arithmetical sense, for there can be, in addition to a third, an unlimited number of participants in the dialogue being understood, but as an additional in the contraposition.

[82] Here, the participating-consciousnesses-in-deed/act, i.e. language users.

2.4.3

The Architectonics of the Actual Nature of the Performed Linguistic Act[83]: Self-Other-Language Act Relations

Guided by the insights of Bakhtin's philosophical anthropology, the following section has two goals. First, to examine the direct implications of the fundamental, self-other relation, moments for the architectonics of the actual world[84] of the performed communicative, i.e. language act. Secondly, to extend these architectonic implications into a concrete account of the actual nature of language and, valid by extension, of (apologetic) speech acts.

2.4.3.1

The I-for-Myself and Language Act

How does "I-for-myself" partake in the co-construction of concrete reality, more specifically, in the concrete reality of language? The concise and straightforward answer is that it does so through "dialogic correlation". The more specific explanatory answer, as Bakhtin points out, concerns the formative implications of this correlation, namely:

> [O]nly in correlation with me myself - the one thinking actively - as the actually performed act of my answerable thinking that a system[85] comes to participate in the actual architectonic of the actually experienced world, as one of its constituent moments; it is only then that such a system becomes rooted in the actual and valuatively operative or valid uniqueness of that world. (Bakhtin 1993: 58)

[83] Here, specifically speech act and, more specifically, apologetic speech act as the exponent thereof.

[84] "The world actually experienced, and not the merely thinkable world." (Bakhtin 1993: 54)

[85] Be it language or [c]ulture

Following Bakhtin's (1981[1935/1975]) philosophy further, this correlation reveals that language, as a living socio-ideological concrete thing, i.e. as heteroglot opinion, lies for the individual consciousness on the borderline between oneself and the other (p. 294). Active participation in the axiological (socio-ideological), i.e. "valuative division", makes the borderline itself also formative in nature because, as an active constituent in the division's ontogeny, it inherits the formative properties from the "heteroglot opinion", i.e. living dialogic language. This borderline translates into practice in the form of concrete, but non-rigid categorical boundaries between the participative entities. In doing so, it goes beyond being passively constrictive and becomes actively (co-) constructive (negotiable). Turning to Bakhtin again:

> All of each individual's words are divided into the categories of his own and others', but the boundaries between them can change, and a tense dialogic struggle takes place on the(se) boundaries. (Bakhtin 1979 [1970-1971]: 143)

By expanding on this point further, we arrive at Bakhtin's (1981) definition of the nature of the concrete, i.e. actual language (language-in-use):

> Language is not a neutral medium that passes freely and easily into the private property of the speaker's intentions; it is populated — overpopulated with the intentions of others. (Bakhtin 1981: 294)

Such intentions (thoughts-cum-motives) see their fulfillment in the word (cf. Vygotsky 1986: 305), as an "abbreviation" of the dialogic utterance and an active participant not only in the actualisation of these intentions, but also in their more elaborate actualisations - speech acts (cf. Akhutina 2003: 111). As a result of this conflating process, everything that is expressed in such a dialogical world collapses into the miniature world of each person's own dialogical words (i.e. the words sensed as own); "this and the immense, boundless, world of others' words constitute a primary fact of human consciousness and concrete life" (cf. Bakhtin 1979 [1970-1971]: 143).

2.4.3.2.

I-for-Other and the Language Act

How does then the "awakening" in the other and through the other formatively participate in the Being of language, in its actualisation as a concrete (situated) act?

In the light of the facts brought forward by Bakhtin, more recently also voiced by the disciplines focused on the relationship of language and cognition (cf. Fauconnier 1997; Carruthers 2012; Taylor 2012) Bakhtin claims:

> The historical development of self-awareness. It is related to the development of signifying means of expression (language above all). (1979 [1970-1971]: 146)

Here it is important to point out that in Bakhtin's philosophical framework, following the fundamental self-other architectonics, the forms of language essentially come from others. This insight, as Sandler (2013) points out, might at first sound trivial, marked, in fact, a radical break from the views of forms of language as primarily the expression of the self, most prominent in the linguistic tradition of Vossler and Croce. It also constituted a radical break from the Saussurean tradition that viewed language as an abstract, impersonal, system of strictly normative forms, still very much persisting, in one form or another, in the formal linguistic canon (i.e. linguistics of language resources). Particularly, it was a break from the origocentric (speaker-centred), logics driven, accounts of language-communication underlying the speech acts study (philosophy).

Furthermore, from the historiographical-epistemological perspective, for Bakhtin the dialogism in general, and the self-other dialogism in particular, are understood in connection with/to sense and its transmission - from the most "intimate verbal interventions to that of collective knowledge from one generation to another" (Velmezova 2015: 278). The relevance of Bakhtin's insights for the language and communication sciences today is even more notable when contrasted with the former canons, and against the background of empirical work in the domain of evolutionary linguistics. It is particularly the case in the light of its more recent findings supporting

that language mechanisms are, in fact, shaped by the process of transmission from one to another (one generation to another), in the process of cultural evolution of languages (cf. Christiansen and Kirby 2003; Christiansen and Chater 2008; Hurford 2008).

According to another prominent member of the Circle, Voloshinov, "the act of utterance, the 'deed-in-word', is a two-sided act" (1973: 86), which exemplifies the complex self—other opposition early Bakhtin[86] termed the "event of Being"[87] (sobytie bytija) (cf. Schittsova 2002). As Sandler (2013: 158) point out, this "dependence of self-expression on concrete forms received from others is a recurrent theme in Bakhtin (Circle)'s linguistic works" and it receives its most detailed consideration, and development, in his explication of the notion of "heteroglossia" (raznorechie). As Bakhtin put it:

> The word in language is half someone else's. It becomes "one's own" only when the speaker populates it with his own intention, his own accent, when he appropriates the word, adapting it to his own semantic and expressive intention. Prior to this moment of appropriation, the word does not exist in a neutral and impersonal language (it is not, after all, out of a dictionary that the speaker gets his words!), but rather it exists in other people's mouths, in other people's contexts, serving other people's intentions [...] Expropriating it, forcing it to submit to one's own intentions and accents, is a difficult and complicated process. (Bakhtin 1981: 293–294)

This resistance of others' words to submit to the speaker accents brings us to the next topic and section of this thesis, i.e. appropriation of the other in act of concrete communication.

[86] Bakhtin 1924 (1997-2012 vol. I, p. 285).

[87] It presupposes the perception of being (bytie) by (individual) consciousness, cf. Bakhtin 1923-1924 (1997-2012 vol I, p. 246).

2.4.3.3

Other-for-Me and the Language Act

As Bakhtin put it:

> Historically language grew up in the service of participative thinking and performed acts, and it begins to serve abstract thinking only in the present day of its history. The expression of a performed act from within and the expression of once-occurrent Being-as-event in which that act is performed require the entire fullness of the word: its content/sense aspect (the word as concept) as well as its palpable-expressive aspect (the word as image) and its emotional-volitional aspect (the intonation of the word) in their unity. And in all these moments the unitary full word can be answerably valid, i.e., can be the truth [*pravda*] rather than something subjectively fortuitous. (Bakhtin 1993: 31)

What makes this point pivotal is not only its relevance to understanding the Bakhtinian conceptualisation of language, but equally so its continuous relevance to the understanding of "actual language"[88], more specifically its contemporary (re)conceptualisations (Føllesdal 1975; Shotter 1993; Barsalou 1999; Recanati 2013; Vosgerau and Petersen 2015). Moreover, this point signals the concrete origin and purpose of language, i.e. its functional relatedness to perception (participative thinking), and its consequences for actual communicative event. Both every particular thought, together with every particular product of a living act or deed, and culture are integrated in the context of actual thinking qua event (Bakhtin 1993: 36). Consequently, "it is through the representation of thought in language that the meanings of members of a culture can be grasped" (cf. Stirk 1999: 35).

Therefore, for a performed act to be fulfilled (i.e. realised felicitiously), at least two participants are required (I and Other), i.e. two types of consciousness, different and thus capable of entering into dialogic relations with one another[89] (cf. Velmezova

[88] cf. also Wittgenstein 2009 [1953/1958]: 23

[89] For Bakhtin , the event of being does not occur if one of the consciences dissolves completely into the other – this case would be that of empathy [včuvstvovanie] rather than of dialogue. ([Baxtin 1923 –1924 (1997–2012, vol. I, p. 94, 138, 140), etc.])).

2015: 280). The process begins with I's understanding of the other's word (as abbreviation of the utterance[90], speech work) "to mean any word of any other person that is spoken or written in this person's own (I's own native) or any other language" (Bakhtin 1979: 268, 286), that is, any word not I's word (appropriated and intonated). Following Bakhtin (1979 [1970-1971]: 143) further, all words (utterances, speech acts etc.) except one's own are the other's words. Direct implication of the process is that one "(I) lives in a world of others' words, her/his entire life being an orientation in this world - a reaction to others' words that begins with their assimilation (in the process of initial mastery of speech) and ends with assimilation of the wealth of human culture (expressed in the word)" (ibid.). As such, the "other's word sets for a person the special task of understanding this word (such a task does not exist with respect to one's own word, or it exists in an entirely different sense), thus, the understanding of an entire utterance is always dialogic" (1986a: 125). In this sense, Bakhtin (1986a: 115) reveals understanding as a very important attitude, which is never a tautology or duplication as it always involves two and a potential third (to which we shall subsequently return). It is these complex intonationally-evaluative, i.e. emotional-volitionally toned (Bakhtin 1993: 56, 59, 74) interrelations with other's word in all spheres of culture and activity that are constitutive of all of person's life (1979 [1970-1971]: 144) and central, as the mark of actuality, to the event of contact between self and other (cf. Sandler 2013: 159). Therefore, they are also central to the life of concrete (actual) language as a contact-medium, i.e. a chain-event of performed acts issuing from these interrelations. In essence, as Bakhtin points out, language is much more adapted to giving utterance precisely to this [concrete] truth [Pravda], than to the abstract moment of the logical (truth-conditional) expression in its purity (1993: 31).

Applying Bakhtin (1979 [1970-1971]: 143, 144) to the specific foci of this thesis, neither the word in the cross section of these interrelations (here IFID is such a word), nor the I of the speaker constituted by that same interrelation, i.e. "the complex event of encountering and interacting with another's word", have been given sufficient attention in the study of speech acts. It is especially the case with regard to the

[90] Cf. Bakhtin (1979: 268, 286), also Akhutina (2003: 112, Vygotsky 1982/3: 305).

constituting role in the felicitous conceptualisation, and by extension, the felicitous performance of speech acts (here, apologetic speech acts).

2.4.3.4

I-Higher-Other and the Language Act

In commenting on Bakhtin's later seminal works, Holquist (in Holquist and Emerson 1986: xviii) makes a particularly important observation, namely, that the cloud of binaries present at the beginning (repeatable/non-repeatable, natural science/human science, thing/meaning, etc.) subsequently gets resolved into a set of relations that are revealed not to be binary but, in fact, tertiary. Translated specifically to the world of concrete discourse – "the word is a drama in which three characters participate (it is not a duet, but a trio)." (Bakhtin 1979 [1959-1961]: 122[91]). As Holquist (in Holquist and Emerson 1986: xviii) points out further, with particular emphasis on the "specular subject" (mirror image, self-derived from the other), Bakhtin manages to capture this complexity by extending the theory of the utterance to account also for the fact that "speakers always shape an utterance not only according to the object of the discourse (topic of their addressing) and their immediate addressee (the one whom they are addressing), but also according to the particular image in which they model a belief that they will be understood, the image that is the a priori of all 'belief'[92]" that is, in return, the a priori of all addressing. In sum, each speaker, therefore, authors her/his utterance not only with an immediate addressee(s) but also with a super-addressee (higher-other) in mind. As Bakhtin (1979: 126; ZAM[93] 337–8) puts it:

> [A]part from this addressee (the 'second'), the author of the utterance more or less consciously supposes a higher 'super-addressee' (the 'third'), whose absolutely just responsive understanding is supposed either at a metaphysical

[91] In The Problem of Text in Linguistics, Philology, and the Human Sciences: An Experiment in Philosophical Analysis."Speech Genres and Other Late Essays". Trans. Vern W. McGhee. Ed. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin: U of Texas P, 1986b. 103-31.

[92] Not in the narrow philosophy(of language) sense, but more so in the broad-purview sense of e.g. Bourdieu's doxa (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 127).

[93] 1961 god. Zametki' (SS5 364–74)

> distance [...] or [...] as well as [...] in distant historical time (the loophole addressee).

Consequently, through the act of supposition and axiological responsive-understanding ascription, this higher addressee is reified (cf. Wierzbicka 2009a), as the one who responsively understands. As such s/he inevitably becomes a "third party" holding a special status and position:

> Each dialogue occurs as it were against the background of the responsive understanding of an invisibly present 'third', standing above all participants of a dialogue (partners). (Bakhtin 1984 [1929]: 126)

As Bakhtin (ibid.) clarifies, this "aforementioned third party is not a mystical or metaphysical being (although, given a certain understanding of the world, can be expressed as such)—it is a constitutive aspect of the whole utterance which, under deeper analysis, can be revealed in it". In this form, the idea of the third(-party) as standing above all, both ontologically and epistemically, fits the notion of common reference measure. Such a common reference measure via its common reference language (here, the Natural Semantic Metalanguage), allows us to study and contrast different semantic systems, i.e. the extent of diversity between languages and, consequently, explain the extent of axiological differences between the language communities (Wierzbicka 1996a: 16).

As such, the third-participant is not only unique to Bakhtin's philosophy of concrete (communicative) interaction in general, but also makes for a unique explanans-contribution both to the theory and the concrete practice (actual reality) of (apologetic) speech acts.

2.4.4

The Actual World of Language and Speech act

According to Sapir:

> Language exists only in so far as it is actually used – spoken and heard, written and read. (Sapir 1921: 75)

The architectonics of the actual world (i.e. the basic concrete moments of the self-other interrelation) of the performed act (utterance) explicated above will be further expanded in this chapter with special emphasis on the direct implication(s) for the question raised in (1.2), i.e. the actual reality of language and apologetic speech acts utterances, or the architectonic of their actual world. In order to make the relation between the actual nature and the actual world of language and speech acts more explicit, this thesis adopts as its starting point the premise that the "concrete architectonic of the actual world of the performed act is [...] not the abstract scheme" (cf. 'ideal language' approaches, truth-conditional semantics, prescriptive linguistics), "but the concrete plan or design of the world of a unitary act [...], the basic concrete moments of its construction and their mutual disposition" (cf. Bakhtin 1993: 54). Adopting such a premise is seen as necessary for three reasons. First, because it points out more directly to the functional relevance, and the role, of the basic concrete moments constitutive of the concrete world of a performed act. Second, because it establishes the constitutive functions of concreteness - constituent unitariness and participative disposition. And third, because in establishing (2) it also establishes a necessary set of vectors for the adequate constitution of the notion of 'extension', i.e. of its space, which will, in turn, allow it to adequately respond to the multidimensional nature and the concrete world of the performed (utterance) act. This leads us to the next necessary step - the reconceptualisation of 'extension', i.e. the need to go beyond the conventional (mono)logical notion as prescribed by ideal-language approaches (following the predicate (truth-conditional) logic) as well as contemporary formal semantics (cf. Recanati 1998), in favor of a pragmatic notion, more sensitive to the actual nature (dialogic character) and the actual world of the concretely performed (communicative) act. Therefore, the notion of extension is

conceptualised along the lines of Føllesdal (1975: 32, following Quine 1995[1960]), as an act of "translation". Namely, as an act in which we are not describing a further realm of reality (as in formal speech act theory), but correlating two comprehensive theories concerning all there is about language in its concrete and living totality. I mean here the theory of the actual nature and the theory of the actual world, which come together to constitute the Reality of language as a unitary utterance and, by extension, of (apologetic) speech acts as its constitutives abbreviations. When translated into the multidimensional pragmatic space of speech acts (cf. e.g. Jucker and Taavitsainen 2000), extension conceptualised as translation meets both the requirements of the literal as well as the figurative vectors of the space. The former is to be understood as an interface between the primary (1.2) and the secondary (1.4) assumptions, and the latter as the additional ontological-relational mechanism of the primary analytic tool – "dialogism", constitutive of the architectonics of actual nature-world interrelations.

Pursuant to this, the onset point of the present "translation", as the correlation of two comprehensive actualities concerning all there is about the object of study (cf. Quine 1972), makes at the same time the first extended assumption. Namely, that a) whereas nature is there to be studied prior to investigation (through various forms of non-linguistic perception), language itself is part of the investigative apparatus (Wittgenstein 1967: 569), an (instance of) social arrangement (cf. Neale 1987: 305) as b) each of us "learns" from other people through the mouthing of words under conspicuously intersubjective circumstances[94] (Quine 1995[1960]: 1); in this sense, c) language does not belong to any individual member of population, but is the property of the given population (cf. Neale 1987: 307; also Bakhtin in Voloshinov; 1929: 101, Todorov 1984: 43). From this, it can be extrapolated that the d) "actual reality of language is neither the abstract system of linguistic forms, nor the isolated monologue, or just the psychological act of its expression, but the all-encompassing social event of (communicative) interaction that is performed by the utterance and the utterances" (Voloshinov 1929: 94; Molon and Vianna 2012; Pascual 2008, 2014). In this sense, as verbal enactors of social interaction, e) utterances become both the "units of communication and [of social] consciousness" (cf. Akhutina 2003: 104, emphasis

[94] = context

added); f) as formal constituents of the language chain, these utterances - "speech acts as whole acts of expression" that also include the pre-linguistic "intention [dialogism] of the speaker and his/her consideration of the potential effect on the listener, entail consideration of the speech act as an event of dialogic verbal communication, that is, as an active social interaction" (Akhutina 2003: 96), in turn, as active social interaction g) these ways of speaking, characteristic of a given language-community constitute a manifestation of a tacit system of social attitudes and 'cultural rules' ('cultural scripts') (Wierzbicka 1998: xi), and as such are not only a potent source for studying and reifying them, but also a first-order key to understanding both (ibid.). In addition, the speech-act potential (cf. Alston 1964: 37-39) and the Illocutionary Force Indicating Device (Blum-Kulka and Olshtein 1984; Blum-Kulka, House and Kasper 1989; Brown 2013) as its formal/structural manifestation, represent the more concrete lexico-psychological second-order key. This key, together with the remaining structural (e.g. genre, sentence type) and contextual correlates (cultural, explicit and implicit context), partakes in directing the choice of combination of the elements at any layer of linguistic organisation or form, as well as the "ingredients of a communicative event along any set of parameters of variability with which linguistic choices are interadaptable" (cf. Verschueren 2008: 19). Together, they form the third-order key, the unitary blueprint, in Bakhtin's terms the "genre" (Bakhtin, x), i.e. a schematic template - 'script' (Wierzbicka 2005; Goddard 2012b) of the performed communicative act in question (here the apologetic speech act).

The dialogic architectonic of actual nature-world relations represents a contemporary interpretation and extension of Bakhtin's philosophical anthropology, i.e. philosophy of the act, and the verbal-act (metalinguistics), applied as a unified theoretical framework for the study of public nature of linguistic act, relation to public (i.e. cultural) perception and consequences for meaning formation and communication (cf. Quine 1995[1960] in Føllesdal 1975: 25). Its main force – "dialogism", anchored in translinguistic (i.e. specific pragmatic) perspective adopted here, amounts to "mindreading" (i.e. situated philosophy of mind). More specifically, it amounts to the "mental reenactment" conceptualised as the overt mental simulation of actions and practices - including especially the cultured communicative actions and practices within utterances (cf. Sandler 2012a: 583), and within apologetic speech acts as exponents of such utterances. In this sense, it provides "a conceptual framework" for

accounting for the constitutive aspects of language and linguistic acts in question "usually thought to be outside the reach" of speech act study within the SAT (speech act theory) framework, "thus supporting a view of meaning and linguistic content" as inherently "grounded" in culturally informed situated "action" and dialogic "interaction" (ibid.).

In more general terms, owing to its unified character, this framework provides groundwork for construing a more fine-grained multidimensional pragmatic space (here manifested as DAT) for the explanatory, i.e. explicative analysis of apologetic speech acts that goes beyond the commonly, and currently, employed logical-descriptive spaces (cf. e.g. Blum-Kulka and Olshtein 1984; Recanati 1998, 2002; Searle 2010; Korta and Perry 2013).

In line with this, chapter 3 will outline the dimensions of the multidimensional pragmatic (analytic) space in question (DAT) exemplifying its explanatory potential with respect to the constituents that make up the totality of the observable facts of usage about (apologetic) speech acts.

2.4.5

Actual Reality of Language and Apologetic Speech Act Utterances

This primary set of basic assumptions is as follows: (a) the most rudimentary human utterance and the utterances that are realised by an individual organism are already organised outside of the latter (i.e. individual physiological apparatus), in the inorganic conditions of the social milieu, and that is from the point of view of their content, their meaning and their signification (c.f. Bakhtin in Voloshinov 1929); once an utterance enters this social milieu (b) it becomes a living trinity, i.e. a 'semantic whole', in which one's attitude to the utterances of the person addressed cannot be separated from the attitude to the object, nor from the attitude to the speaker himself (c.f. Bakhtin 1979: 301); as a part of the social milieu, i.e. as a 'social event', the utterance entails (c) active interaction between the speaker and the listener - where the speaker's activity entails the activity of the listener both cognitive and linguistic (for a

detailed account see Bakhtin 1981[1935/1975]: 95, also 1979[1953]: 276); and (d) functions to enable the interlocutor to interact with previous interlocutors as "a link in the chain of verbal interaction in the given sphere of communication" (cf. Bakhtin, 1979[1953]: 271 in Akhutina 2003: 97); in this respect, following Bakhtin, every utterance is (e) "internally dialogic" as "it not only expresses the particular position held by the speaker as well as communicates some particular objective content, but also always responds to the previous context and anticipates the listener's response" (Akhutina 2003: 97); understood in this way, as Bakhtin reveals it, it is also (f) "internally social" (Akhutina 2003: 97), viz. "like Liebnitz's "monad", it reflects the speech process - other people's utterances, and, above all, preceding links in the [conversational] chain (sometimes close and sometimes—in areas of cultural [i.e. cultured] communication—very distant)" (cf. Bakhtin 1979[1953]: 93, emphasis added; see also 1979 [1959-1961]; 1979 [1970-1971]) ones as well; thus, (g) the utterance has not only a direct relationship to alien utterances (and, thus, their authors), but it is also in direct contact with reality - the extraverbal situation (cf. Bakhtin 1979 [1953]); this extraverbal situation, the carrier of "implicit sense", also (h) covers both the speaker's listener-oriented conceptualisation and the listener's likely evaluation (particular (emotional) attitude) of the utterance[95]; (i) both, cover the linguistic (word per se) and the extralinguistic context as a single whole; (cf. Bakhtin 1984 [1929]); from this it follows that (j) context of an utterance[96] (carrier of "implicit sense") is an essential internal component of it, together with dialogism[97] and sociality (cf. Akhutina 2003: 98); lastly, (k) this extralinguistic context, particularly the "emotional attitude to and the evaluation of the objective content, determines the selection of the lexical, grammatical, and compositional forms for the utterance" (ibid.); that is, rounds up this whole in the form of (l) genre - a standard signpost, the "obligatory form" for utterances, i.e. the mental representation of the form of the whole utterance

[95] Concurrent with Bakhtin's opinion that discounting the "active role of the other person in the process of verbal communication" is a common deficiency of linguistic models, in which the "real integrity of verbal communication is lost" (Bakhtin 1979[1953]: 60-102, also in Akhutina 2003: 112).

[96] The "extralinguistic context of an utterance is comprised of three aspects: (1) the same physical environment that is seen by both of the participants in a conversation (unity of what is seen—room, window, etc.); (2) knowledge and understanding of a positionsituation that they both have in common; and finally (3) their common evaluation of this positionsituation" (Bakhtin in Akhutina 2003: 98).

[97] I.e. cognition of another human as a societal (Bakhtin 1974/1979: 363)

that guides the speaker in the speech process (i.e. verbal communication), as the genre selected dictates the type of sentences to be used and the links for combining them[98] (cf. Bakhtin 1979[1953]); in effect (m) when we speak of the functional content of an utterance, it is the above mentioned wholeness that is meant (cf. Akhutina 2003: 98); on the whole then, (n) utterance is the product of a working up in which the linguistic matter is one of the ingredients, another - all that is brought into verbal production by the fact of it being uttered, i.e. its historical, psychological, social and cultural context (cf. Bakhtin 1984[1929]; see also Todorov 1984); and it is such a n) whole, i.e. semantically complete, utterance that is the main constituting entity and minimum indivisible instance of verbal communication (cf. Bakhtin, 1976: 307).

In summary, the semantic completeness of an utterance can be viewed as a confluence of the following three aspects - 1) the objective semantic-exhaustivity (n), 2)the dialogic pre-linguistic intentionality of the speaker[99] (h) and 3) the standard compositional and genre forms signaling completion (l) (Bakhtin 1979b: 255). Operationalised within the situated communicative setting, the "subjective aspect of the utterance (dialogic intention(ality)) merges with the objective-semantic aspect and forms an indissoluble whole, limiting the latter by linking it to the specific context of the verbal communication, with all its individual circumstances, with the people participating in it, their preceding speeches (i.e. utterances) and the (dialogic) intention, also determining selection of the genre form that will be used in constructing the utterance" (Bakhtin in Akhutina 2003: 98).

In summation, following Bakhtin and Akhutina above, all the utterance properties emphasised viz. special kind of utterance completeness, its internal social(cultural) nature and dialogism—are not only interconnected, but also mutually determined. In effect, all the assumptions listed thus far interrelate to and determine this

[98] Bakhtin asserts that without mastery of genres, utterance felicity and verbal communication is virtually impossible. As Akhutina (2003) points out, this assertion is further confirmed by research on speech pathologies (Luria and Tsvetkova, 1968; Akhutina, 1975)

[99] In the sense of Searle (2006) operationalised here in the form of Bakhtin's (internal) dialogism (e.g. 1974/1979: 361) that covers/couples the speaker's speaker-oriented conceptualisation to the listener-oriented conceptualisation, the potential listener's-evaluation, i.e. particular (emotional*only for expressives?) attitude included.

dissertation's conception of both language in general and apologetic speech acts in particular. In other words, these two entities are conceptualised as instances, by extension, of the Bakhtinian dialogical utterance.

Chapter 3

Dialogic(al) Architectonics Triad (DAT) as a Unified Multidimensional Pragmatic Space

3.1

Meaning: Abstraction or Dialogic Linguistic Action?

The question that has established itself as one of the principal in the linguistic sciences, contemporary philosophy of language and linguistic pragmatics in particular, was aptly voiced by Putnam's (1975) seminal paper on what The Meaning of 'Meaning' is. Tracing the question back in time we witness not only its persistent consistency, but also its consistent impersistency in terms of unequivocal answer(s) (cf. also Goddard 2012a[100]). Starting with Fregean tradition (cf. 1892), the question amounted to investigations into what it is to grasp a meaning (i.e. in Fregean terms, a thought or a sense). The subsequent Wittgensteinian tradition brought about the shift from the abstract to the concrete by grounding the question in the social, i.e. usage, reality and recasting it with a focus on how public meaning could be acquired from the individually different uses. More recent history, from 1970s onwards, saw further grounding of the question albeit in a different reality, namely, the cognitive one. This gave rise to cognitive linguistics as an attempt to answer the question of meaning creation specifically by unifying language and cognition (for more detailed discussions cf. Fauconnier 1994; Jackendoff 1994; Talmy 2000; Langacker 2013). More specifically, it led to the emergence of conceptual, i.e. cognitive semantic theories - intended as theories of meaning as it is instantiated in the mind (i.e. in individual cognition), which, unlike the influential approaches arising from the philosophical tradition, took as the main onset point the question of how linguistic meanings can emerge from disparate and potentially inhomogeneous individual meaning representations (cf. Jackendoff 2007; Vosgerau and Petersen 2015). As an indirect response, the 1980s also brought about the re-emergence of evolutionary linguistics which, as its way of addressing the question, placed special focus on meaning evolving together with language (cf. Perlovsky 2009; see also Christiansen and Kirby 2003; Hurford 2008).

[100] Perhaps the major fault line in semantics concerns the nature of "meaning" itself. Are we primarily interested in conceptual meaning (sense, intension) or are we primarily interested in denotation (reference, extension)? (p. 23)

However, until this very day there has not yet been a consensus among scholars on what meaning is or how it is to be approached and represented. Granted that it is a genuine conundrum, one of the major hindrances is not so much the conundrum itself, nor our incapacity to mindfully address it, as the lack of not only interdisciplinary, but also intradisciplinary, dialogue. One of the negative outcomes of this is an exponential accumulation of theories/approaches which render any subsequent critical inquiry fairly unproductive due to the fact that, instead of providing a sturdy onset point, they do quite the opposite, i.e. broaden the scope to the point of bleary. The other is that a substantial number of these theories/approaches coincide with one another in terms of substance, as well as predictions with respect to the available evidence. In this sense, they can be regarded as complementary and even as ontological predecessors to one another. However, the adherence to different "conceptual alphabets" (cf. Leibniz 1981], i.e. voicing the same claims only in different terms, turns them into opposition rather than composition.

From these two negatives, the latter is the more perilous one given that different conceptual alphabets, more often than not, give rise to monistic approaches. Being mono-dimensional, what such approaches, their progenitors, more specifically, fail to recognise and acknowledge is, first and foremost, the potential epistemic limitations. And second, they also fail to recognise the need for conceptual, as well as epistemic, blending (cf. Neale 1987) with other approaches in the same vein, for the purpose of advancing the overall knowledge on the phenomenon of interest, here meaning. Lewis' remark on the topic of approaches to meaning could be taken as a case in point:

> I distinguish two topics [in general semantics]: first, the description of possible languages or grammars as abstract semantic systems whereby symbols are associated with aspects of the world; and, second, the description of the psychological and sociological facts whereby a particular one of these abstract semantic systems is the one used by a person or population. Only confusion comes of mixing these two topics. (Lewis 1972: 19, emphasis added)

Principally on the right track, Lewis, nevertheless, in practice subscribes to manifold inconsistencies. More specifically, he commits himself to erroneous insights on two counts.

The first concerns the erroneous application of conceptual alphabet which, particularly from the practical point of view, leads to the proposition of an epistemically inconsistent association, i.e. co-relation. Namely, the one between the "abstract" and the "aspects of the world" despite, in essence, the former denoting "something" that by its very nature is "not associated with any other specific instance". Consequently, this leads to second striking inconsistency, which places the two antagonistic notions – "abstract semantic systems" and "person/population usage" in a straightforward relation, incidentally making one important fact salient. Namely, that in the anthropocentric, i.e. societal, world it is more often than not the case that incongruent dichotomies are taken as seemingly congruent explanatory accounts. Moreover, even when the dichotomies are seemingly congruent, as is the case with Grice's proposal of "natural/non-natural meaning" (1957) distinction and, more recently, Searle's distinction between the "observer independent" and "observer relative" meaning (2004), they are, with varying degrees, descriptive at best.

The second erroneous insight concerns Lewis' mixing up of the benefit which the "mixing of topics", i.e. approaches, can have in explicating the phenomenon under investigation. Thus, implicitely making a case in point for the sort of epistemic pitfalls that adherence to a single, monologic, paradigm can lead to (for a more detailed case-in-point discussion, cf. also Kuhn 1962). In other words, the truth about a specific object-to-be-known is not to be found inside an individuated perspective (/ approach), but is born between perspectives (/approaches) collectively contributing to the truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction (cf. Bakhtin 1984[1929]: 61). The dialogic means of seeking 'truth' (i.e. a unified perspective covering the totality of observable facts of usage) is thus counter--posed to the monologic, which seeks to exert itself as the ontological a priori, i.e. as a superstructure affecting all levels of analysis. However, as illustrated by Lewis above, by adopting division (i.e. dichotomy) as the groundwork for inquiry, what the monologic attains is not a unified truth. On the contrary, it attains, instead, an exclusive "ready-made truth" (ibid.). It, furthermore, seeks to exert this very truth by making the world of the object-to-be-known conform to it, without first making sense of the totality of this very world that forms the truth about the object in the first place. Despite the prevalence of such approaches in the study of the nature of meaning, as Emerson

(1984: 19) points out, the search for a unified truth about the object-to-be-known need not, however, be carried on strictly under repressive monologic conditions. Instead:

> It is quite possible to [...] postulate a unified truth that requires a plurality of consciousnesses, one that cannot in principle be fitted into the bounds of a single consciousness, one that is, so to speak, by its very nature *full of event potential* and is born at a point of contact among various consciousnesses. (Bakhtin 1984: 19).

The epistemic endeavour to make a unified truth compatible with multiple instances of consciousness makes for another important constitutive aspect of Bakhtin's philosophy. This emphasis on the coupling of truth (unified perspective) with the plurality of consciousness (dimensions) further makes it, and DA as its core, not only ontologically compatible with the contemporary pragmatic space (highlighted above) but also makes it a highly productive unified contemporary pragmatic space for the analysis of the acts of communication (here, apologetic speech acts) with respect to their multidimensional nature.

Revised from this point of view, Lewis' statement can be said to be insightful on two additional accounts. First, in externalising and specifying the topical divide, it further makes one relevant point clear, namely, the precarious practical insightfulness, and thus legitimacy, of the abstraction-action (i.e. semantics-use) dichotomy as a means for an exhaustive inquiry into the nature of the object-to-be-known (here, the meaning of the situated acts of verbal communication). Second, albeit fragmentary, it nevertheless makes amends by accounting for what can be considered the relevant aspects to be taken into account when aiming not merely to describe, but also to explicate the underlying semantic nature of communicative systems, in order to obtain a unified perspective, viz. a unified investigative approach that warrants critical insightfulness and explanatory breadth. Conflating the echoes of Lewis' statement and recasting them through the prism of contact rather than bifurcation, the following set of aspects can be postulated as an ontological blueprint for a multidimensional explanatory analytic space (DAT):

- Associative (mind-to-world and world-to-mind),
- Psychological (individual-cum-social frame of mind)
- Contextual (cultural-cum-situational)

- Reifying (tertium comparationis language[101]).

Although essential, in order to overcome fragmentation, these aspects essentially need an interlink. Within DA this interlink is performed by questions. The questions themselves make for an equally important constituitve element of the explanatory space as they not only guide, but also bind together the epistemic breadths of the constitutive aspects. The DA postulates the following confluence of pertinent ontological questions as the interlink:

- What are the facts that need to be accounted for by a unified perspective concerned with the meaning of situated acts of verbal communication?

- What is the meaning of an act of (verbal) communication for an individual and for a group?
- What facts about the person and a group endow the symbol/verbal act with a specific meaning?

This specific confluence of questions (and aspects) also binds DAT to the contemporary epistemic space of the sciences concerned with the conceptualisation and interpretation of meaning and language (Recanati 2002; Widdowson 2004; Kecskes 2010, 2012; Haugh and Jaszczolt 2012). The more specific case in point is the confluence of questions raised by Quine (1972) and Speaks (2014):

- Which facts are to be accounted for by a scientific theory?

- What is the (social or shared) nature of semantic (language) system?

- What is the meaning of a specific symbol (for a specific person or a specific group)?

- In virtue of what facts concerning a specific person or a specific group does a particular symbol have this or that particular meaning?

[101] i.e. cross-culturally translatable means for grounding and explicating the invoked insights

By establishing the interlink, the DAT also creates an effective alternative space where these very questions can be practically addressed in a principled explanatory way both with respect to their elementarity as well as complexity. Furthermore, taking as its onset point the totality of communicative practice and utilising its constituting aspects as constitutive dimensions of its analytic space, makes DAT a concretely grounded perspective, with a (explanatory) claim to concrete communicative reality. Introduction of such a practice-oriented explanatory perspective becomes particularly relevant in the light of the fact that there is an absence of unified approaches that can address and explicate the points raised in the theory of meaning and acts of its communication (cf. Recanati 2002: 50; also Eco 1990, 1992; Searle 2007). Turning first to meaning, and following the issues raised in theory, the initial elementary distinction made by DAT is that between:

[a]observer-independent, i.e. naturocentric
[b]observer-relative, i.e. anthropocentric

Here [a] can be understood as "meaning as abstraction", given that it refers to the meaning independent of our involvement, i.e. that of the processes and entities, their properties and their relations to other processes and entities unique to the domain of nature. Such a domain further implies the existence of a specific, guiding, conceptual alphabet. This alphabet, in turn, yields a specific representation of the ontology (i.e. meaning) underlying the aforementioned processes and entities. Although, in essence, this natural domain is, in fact, our fons et origo, by contriving an idiosyncratic social arrangement (i.e. anthropocentric domain) we have contrived an idiosyncratic focal point. The result of this is a major focal and, ultimately, perspectival shift from the ontological origo (nature) to the anthropological orego (conscious mind), i.e. the shift to the, exclusively, "observer`s-relative" conceptualisation of the environment at large. In this sense, the ontology, i.e. "meaning, in the last analysis, becomes a matter of conceptualisation" (Langacker 1987: 156) as well, observer`s-relative conceptualisation to be yet more precise. For this and the reasons above, the interpretation of meanings cannot be "scientific", in the sense of the term in the exact sciences, but it is profoundly "cognitive". Given that observers are a part of the social arrangement, the conceptualisations themselves also become social in nature. That is to say, only through active association with the conceptualisations of others, by means

of a mutually agreed-upon reifying medium, i.e. language, are they meaningful. Translated to natural language, "meaning consists in human interpretation of the world - it is subjective, it is anthropocentric, it reflects predominant cultural concerns and culture-specific modes of social interaction as much as any objective features of the world as such" (cf. Wierzbicka 1988: 2). It is, thus, meaning that relates the utterance to the world of values, unknown to language (cf. Todorov 1984: 360). More specifically, with regard to the simpler utterances - speech acts, i.e. primary life-genres[102] (Bakhtin 1993: 61-62; also in support cf. Wierzbicka, 2003b), meaningful discourse in these life-genres is dependent on a pre-existing realm[103] of axiological, i.e. cultural categories (cf. Reznik and Brandist 2004: 159; Wierzbicka 2003a: 149). Here, a discursive genre acts as a bridge between life and the objectively valid object domains of culture, and embodies a connection between the (unique) context of utterance and the supra-personal realm of objective culture. Abstract meaning (smysl) combines with linguistic meaning (znachenie) and becomes valid in life. Similarly, linguistic meaning (znachenie) remains a technical means for communication until it is infused with life-meaning (smysl), when it is related to 'objective validity' in a specific instance. Invoking Bakhtin,

> What is important is the relatedness of meaning *[znachenie] to real actuality*, its use in the goals of mastery (cognitive, artistic, active) by new moments of actuality, for when speaking we do not combine prepared elements but we *relate*, adapt them to actuality. (AZPRZ[104]: 281 ('Iz arkhivnykh zapisei k rabote "Problemy rechevykh zhanrov"' (SS5 207–86 in M.M. Bakhtin, Sobranie sochinenii t.5, Moscow: Russkie slovari, 1996)), in Brandist 2002: 159)

In this sense, in an anthropocentric domain, meaning becomes a matter of socio-culturo-cognitive relatedness and co-construction, fulfilling itself in linguistic action (cf. Vygotsky 1986).

---

[102] The specific categorisation - primary and secondary (life) genres, originally introduced by Bakhtin (1986: 60-102)

[103] Building on Linell (2009), when we make sense of the world, we are dependent on the structure of the outside realities (the Umfeld), as well as on the categories, often supported by linguistic resources, in which our minds are set.

[104] AZPRZ - 'Iz arkhivnykh zapisei k rabote "Problemy rechevykh zhanrov"' (SS5 207–86 in M.M. Bakhtin, Sobranie sochinenii t.5, Moscow: Russkie slovari, 1996) in Brandist 2002

It is the “real actuality”, i.e. the constitutive phenomenology of the natural meaning, which will be the focal point of the section to follow.

3.2

DA as a unified theory of Sense-Making and Meaning

In the works of Jackendoff (1983), Talmy (1988), Langacker (1991) and other cognitive linguists, and more recently Verschueren (1994), Wierzbicka (2007a, 2007b), Langacker (2008), Stojanovic (2009), Tomasello (2009), it is recognized that dichotomies of meanings (semantic–pragmatic) are limiting scientific discourse as well as practice and, therefore, need to be overcome. Ontologically, as well as epistemically speaking, this makes for a particularly relevant point as, in tracing the dynamic (oftentimes interactive) nature and construction of meaning in language use, we are inevitably concerned with what Bruner (1990) defined as “acts of meaning” - “cognitively mediated and performed in a social and cultural environment” (Verschueren 1999: 68). Furthermore, if we go beyond the prevalent, monologic, Gricean conceptualisation viz. that of non-natural meaning (Grice 1957, 1968), which removed meaning, as it were, from language attaching it to one specific aspect of the communicative event, individual intentionality, assuming there is more to meaning than the ‘interlocutor's intention’. And, furthermore, if we are dealing with a dynamic process of meaning construction (often to be qualified as interactive), then the (interlocutor) interpretation (i.e. understanding), should be as crucial to the overall process as production. (Verschueren 1994: 556; also Neale 2005).

The intrinsic relevance of this was also recognised by the Bakhtin Circle, receiving most attention and extensive elaboration in the works of Bakhtin and Voloshinov. In this regard, DAT is to be seen as the epistemic confluence and empirical extension of this work.

In addressing the nature of communicative acts (i.e. language-in-use) and verbally communicated meaning in particular, the explanatory space of DAT rests on the following elementary premises:

1. The nature of meaning is to be studied based on "the number of people necessary for linguistic meaning to emerge" (Voloshinov 1973; also in Sandler 2016)

2. Three forms of cognition, and accordingly meaning, can be differentiated:

> logical cognition[105][106] - of words and sentences of a given expression in-and-of-themselves, belonging to the abstract (logical) system of language
> logical meaning - "resides in words, their combination, and their connection with things; human beings are part of the process (through the "affections of the soul"), however, their role is a passive one (these affections are copies of forms in the world, not shaped by the soul that bears them)" (Sandler 2016: 26), with logic ("truth and falsity") being the ultimate and only authority in this account.

>> monological cognition[107] - of objects or anything else that can be known (another human being included) as if they were objects, i.e. as Bakhtin (1979[1959-1961]: 168-170) points out, it "denies the existence of another equal consciousness outside oneself, one that is equally empowered to respond, of another equal I (You)". In monologicality "[in its limited or pure form] the other remains solely the object of one's own consciousness and does not exist as another one`s consciousness - I do not

[105] After Voloshinov in Sandler (2013)

[106] As Sandler (2016.: 25-26) points out, the embodiment of the logical approaches to meaning can be found in "Aristotle's De Interpretatione (Barnes 1984, p. 25): Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of—affections of the soul—are the same for all; and what these affections are likenesses of—actual things—are also the same […] Just as some thoughts in the soul are neither true nor false while some are necessarily one or the other, so also with spoken sounds. For falsity and truth have to do with combination and separation. Thus names and verbs by themselves—for instance "man" or "white" when nothing further is added—are like the thoughts that are without combination and separation; for so far they are neither true nor false. This passage offers us the earliest and most influential conceptualization of language, at least in Western culture (Arens 1984). It is a picture of language we all still easily recognize today: words signify concepts, which in turn stand for things in the world and their properties. If the word for a property is predicated of a word for an object that has this property, the result is a sentence expressing a true proposition. Absent such a match between words and reality, the proposition is false. The conditions for forming a sentence are defined by truth and falsity."

[107] After Bakhtin (1979: 363)

expect an object to provide a response that could alter the world of my own consciousness. The monologue claims to be the 'last word'" (ibid.). In the last line, individual cognition itself does not acknowledge itself as dialogical, i.e. a "conceptualizer [with individual-cognitive semantic notions] uses a single image to mentally access a complex distribution of diverse phenomena" (Sandler 2016: 37), because human cognition cannot access a dialogue between several actors (intersubjectivity) better than a solitary state (cf. Sandler 2013: 26). Accordingly, as monological cognition is always just in a state of action but not interaction (intersubjectivity).

>> monological meaning - originating in action, but not interaction and so not from intersubjectivity but strict subjectivity, claims to be the last meaning.

>>> dialogical cognition[108] - of an other(s) (human) as interactive subject(s), sees interaction as an essential aspect on all levels viz. voices and interaction between them is all-present

>>> dialogical meaning - "seeks meaning in interaction between persons and sees language as structured through-and-through by such interaction" (Sandler 2016: 25). And it "requires a multiplicity of people (two or more) for an expression to be meaningful."

Following Akhutina (1984[2003]: 100) who follows Bakthin (1979: 364), the importance of a distinction such as this lies in that it helps resolve one long-standing issue - the issue of situated-meaning[109] complexity, by providing concrete basis for integrating the dialogic orientation of understanding, the role of personality, and the infinity (theoretical incompleteness) of (personal) meaning (=sense) into a single context, and by extension the issue of the nature of (situated) utterance content. In this sense the acts of communication, both the macro (here apologetic speech acts) and the

[108] Ibid.

[109] The view of situated-meaning this thesis endorses, and seeks to empirically advance, is that of meaning as reenactment (Sandler 2012a; also Barsalou, L. W., Santos, A., Simmons, W. K., and Wilson, C. D. 2008)) - overt embodied simulation of actions and practices, including especially communicative actions and practices, within utterances, as part of their content.

micro (here IFID`s), are the constructive exponents of the process of conveying the acts of meaning from one interlocutor to other(s). Their meanings do not simply reside in other macro and micro acts of communication, but in their relations to real world (to real actuality), i.e. real world situations (cf. Perlovsky 2009: 253), and are tied to concrete human beings as they are carrying out their concrete specific inter-acts in their material and mental contexts (their ways of being situated) (Linell 1998). What this underscores is that what is basic to action is interaction[110] Linell (2009: 221, 222). Translated to communicative interaction, the constituent actions of communicative interaction - communicative acts, are then (social) "interacts", rather than individual acts, i.e. individual speech acts (in Searle's (1979) sense). Social other-orientation permeates not only the content/substance of communicative action(s), but equally so of the more basic action(s)[111] (2009: 221, 222), all of which can be subsumed under "efforts after meaning" (Bartlett 1932: 44). Translated here to "communicative efforts after meaning", at one level, it is also the interlocutor's uptake and interpretation, made manifest in his or her following utterance(s) (as communicative acts), that counts in the interaction as communicated meaning (cf. Sacks et.al. 1974). Meaning is hence a relational phenomenon not only in the systemic sense (as given by relative position within a ready-made system), but also in the specifically intersubjective, dynamic and co-constructive sense (cf. Bostad, Brandist, Evensen and Faber 2004: 7). This makes meaning and understanding the central concepts in a dialogical approach to the world and acts of communicative interaction (here specifically, speech acts) as its constituent actions.

[110] Cognition and communication involve interventions in the world, engaging with the world (through perception and intention-in-action (Searle 2006). Therefore, action-in-the-world (encompassing perception and intention-in-action (Searle 2006) is a more basic semantic-pragmatic function of communication and language than is representation of the world. "Language is not primarily a language of representation; rather, representing something can be reanalyzed as a kind of action." (Linell 2009: 221).

[111] Such as perceiving, imagining, remembering, thinking, reasoning (Bartlett 1932; also Searle 2006)

3.3

A Novel Unified Multidimensional Pragmatic Space for the Analysis of Apologetic Speech Act Utterances

As I have shown so far, in order to account for speech acts in their totality, namely, their socio-culturally and cognitively motivated uses and the resulting verbal realisations, we need to approach them from an interdisciplinary, i.e. multidimensional perspective (Kryk-Kastovsky 2002: 38; also Holtgraves 2002: 2, 193). As demonstrated above, one alternative way to achieve this is by analysing and conceptualising speech acts through the lens of Dialogic Architectonics Triad - or as Kryk-Kastovsky puts it, as a multidimensional pragmatic perspective conceived of as a super-structure affecting all levels of linguistic analysis (Kryk-Kastovsky 2002: 38). In the light of the fact that speech acts are a dynamic system, in that they change both over time, and in their conceptualisation/formal realisation and functions they fulfill in a given culture or domain (cf. Camiciotti 2008: 116), adopting such a pragmatic perspective is not only seen as needed but also as necessary. This, in turn, makes 'multidimensionality' a necessary functional prerequisite of any analytic space seeking to address speech acts explanatorily. This point becomes even more salient when compared against the background of approaches commonly seen as constitutive of the epistemic space of SAT (Grice 1975[112]; Leech 1983[113]; Brown and Levinson 1987[114]; Bach and Harnish 1979; Sperber and Wilson 1995; Levinson 2000; Horn 2004; Cappelen and Lepore 2005) and, consequently, that of ASAT (Fraser 1981), revealing them to be primarily logical and monological in nature (cf. Sandler 2013). Having undoubtedly yielded contributions valuable for a better understanding of situated language use and SAs, these accounts have, however, run themselves into epistemic confinement. This is the consequence of their prescribing and ascribing to analytic spaces centred solely and specifically around a priori hypotheses such as

[112] Co-operative principle

[113] Politeness principle (disagreement/agreement)

[114] Face-threatening act based politeness theory/strategies

speaker intention, or truth-conditional felicity, and/or universally-prescriptive and descriptive realisation strategies. In other words, they have reached the point of, so to speak, self-imposed "under-determination" (Follesdal 2001; also Gaudet 2006) by confining their analytic space to an a priori hypothesis which, in turn, confines/restricts the hypothesis' a posteriori breadth, reveals a critical issue. Namely, no matter how much evidence is amassed in support of a with its breadth restricted a priori, there will always exist alternative descriptions incompatible with the original (restricted) hypothesis yet perfectly compatible with the accumulated data (cf. Quine 1972; also Neale 1987: 302), due/owing to the more encompassing (i.e. greater-breadth) onset ontology and, thus, analytic space. As Follesdal (1975: 25-44) points out, theories differing in ontology, but making the same predictions with respect to possible evidence (concerning a particular object-to-be-known), are still making different claims about the reality (of the object-to-be-known).

The above, especially in the light of the fact that "standard accounts of language [acts] in philosophy of language and linguistics tend to underestimate and, therefore, misrepresent the role of society and of social conventions" (Searle 2007: 9, emphasis added), points to the necessity not for an a priori hypothesis, or plurality of such prescribed hypotheses, or principles (as a way of dealing with the totality of observable facts of usage). What it points to is the need for a multidimensional space (cf. Biber 1988) as a fons et origo of plurality. This, in turn, allows for explanatory conceptualisations of the different constituting aspects and characteristics (i.e. totality) of (apologetic) speech acts.

Furthermore, such resulting breadth allows us to move more easily from the more abstract to the more concrete dimensions, due to the dimensional interrelatedness. In turn, with changes according to the dimension, i.e. angle of view (cf. Blommaert 2005), we may view speech acts from various perspectives and visualise them in a comprehensive multidimensional pragmatic space (cf. Taavitsainen and Jucker 2008).

By taking the multidimensional, and not the a priori hypothetical, space, and the explanatory breadth thereof, as main constitutive preconditions for a comprehensive (unified) pragmatic space, the dialogic architectonic goes beyond the confined purview of the commonly adopted spaces adumbrated above. In this sense, in outlining its specific constitutive dimensions, it can only be placed in juxtaposition

with more encompassing spaces. Generally, it can be placed alongside the multidimensional pragmatic space as conceptualised along the lines of the ordinary-language philosophy[115] (cf. Recanati 1998: 620-4) constituted by "speech acts, indexicality and context-sensitivity, non-truth-conditional aspects of meaning and contextual implications" (ibid.: 620) as its constitutive dimensions. In particular, it concerns the multidimensional pragmatic space conceptualised along the lines of contemporary diachronic pragmatics, constituted by the coordinates which are context-, culture- and time-specific. That is to say, following the formalisation of the multidimensional space proposed by speech acts can be analysed in relation to the neighboring speech acts, to their changing cultural groundings and as my study reveals it as additional constitutive, to the ways in which they are realised. In terms of scope, this conceptualisation provides currently by far the most comprehensive perspective for addressing the speech acts in all their complexity (Camiciotti 2008: 116), albeit, not in all their complexity. The case in point for this issue is an observation made by Recanati:

> The pioneers of pragmatics (e.g. Malinowski and Austin) used to insist on the social dimension of language as opposed to its cognitive or representational function. As pragmatics developed, however, it is the psychological dimension of language use that came to the forefront of discussions. (Recanati 1998: 629)

What this observation illustrates are two important points, still relevant and applicable to the larger epistemic space of contemporary/present-day pragmatics. First, the prevalent presence of pragmatic spaces grounded in either social or (psycho)logical descriptive dichotomy, further illustrating the point of self-imposed under-determination. Second, the absence of propositions of a unified pragmatic space(s) of both sufficient ontological and explanatory breadth, necessary not only for covering the totality of the practice of language use but also, equally importantly, for accounting for its functional relatedness to other facets of human life.

In what follows this dissertation will systematically show how Dialogic(al) Ethnophenomenological Pragmatics, as a unified onto-epistemic-pragmatic exploratory and explicative space, and specifically the DA as its multidimensional

[115] especially second Wittgenstein and subsequently Austin, Strawson etc. 79

analytic lens, account for the various dimensions (situated complexity) that constitute the pragmatic space of apologetic speech acts as grounded sense-makers, i.e. as situated acts of dialogical (verbal) communicative interaction.

Chapter 4

Dialogic(al) Ethnophenomenological Pragmatics in Practice

4.1

Introduction

Every society, or every community as an identity group, adopts certain rules ('cultural practices') which define situations and behaviours, differentiating among them the ones that are 'right and wrong' (Becker 1963; Taft 2000). This also extends to ways of speaking (linguistic culture), characteristic of a given community, as a behavioral manifestation of a tacit system of community's 'cultural rules'[116] (Wierzbicka 1998: 242). What people say does not depend only on the individual, and her or his thoughts, but is also dependent on the conventionalised cultural rules established in the social, cultural or ethnic milieu the individual is a part of. Since they vary from one culture, and accordinglyfrom one linguistic culture, to another, as something that is accepted and whose adherence to by a specific identity group is expected, the success of communication depends on our knowledge of these rules. As culture's common denominators, they inform our perception of the situation and form a basis for anticipations. In turn, these "anticipations of other's social and personal identity, which, among other things, are also formed based on a person's way of speaking" (Stefanovic 2017: 63), are often turned into normative expectations or demands (Goffman 1963: 2). The constellation of these normative expectations and demands guides us and our linguistic behaviour in different situations. Be it formal (e.g. job interview, taking an exam) or informal (e.g. birthday party mishap) situations, an individual presents her/himself through language, which, in this sense, can be understood as a sort of a recognition code for a specific group and its socio-cultural milieu, or a key that grants "felicitious" access to this milieu/group(Stefanovic 2017: ibid.). In this sense, it also becomes a key to "felicitous" situational interacting in this very milieu/group.

[116] i.e. 'cultural scripts' - practice grounded descriptions (varying in generality/specificity degree) of the culture-specific norms of interaction (and communication), i.e. of the commonly held assumptions about how "people think" about social interaction, formulated in the metalanguage of universal semantic primes (NSM). The claim of the cultural scripts approach is "that they constitute a kind of interpretive background" (Goddard 2012b: 482; also Wierzbicka 1991 [2003], 1996b; Goddard and Wierzbicka 1997, 2004) "against which individuals position their own acts and those of others." (see source: https://intranet.secure.griffith.edu.au/schools-departments/natural-semantic-metalanguage/cultural-scripts)

In spoken as well as in written interaction "we 'pour' our speech into characteristic ready-made forms of speech genres and these forms are given to us in the same way in which our native language is given" (Bakhtin 1979: 257). Furthermore, mirroring this, "every culture has its own characteristic linguistic code and its own repertoire of characteristic speech acts and speech genres" (Wierzbicka 2003b: 149). By building on this proposition of a close connection between language and society, also reflected in the private apology[117] domain, this thesis analyses apologies as a Bakhtinian primary life-genre as a relation between life and culture, with society's culture comprising the realm that absorbs and reworks the primary-life genres (Brandist 2002: 158; also Blum-Kulka & Olshtain 1984: 197[118]; Wierzbicka 1985a). In other words, this thesis analyses apologies with regard to social-cultural dynamics (Goffman 1971), as such communicative behaviours can reveal the community's attitudes and the preferred styles[119] of social interaction (Wierzbicka 1986: 352). Another aspect which this thesis also builds its analysis on is that, as such "rich points", communicative behaviours also cannot be fully understood without reference to cultural values (Wierzbicka 1985b: 176); with four aspects of language particularly culturally revealing being: 1) forms of address; 2) expressive derivation; 3) illocutionary devices of different kinds; and 4) speech act verbs[120] (cf. Wierzbicka 1986: 352).

Following Goffman, in the light of social dynamics as the locus of interactional behaviour, having committed an offence, an offender can be sanctioned, even expelled from society if s/he does not show that s/he subscribes to the rules - to avoid the sanctioning s/he has to do remedial work, one form of which is an apology. As such remedial acts, apologies are a "part of the system of social sanctions and rewards that encourage appropriate behaviour" (cf. Wolfson, Marmor and Jones 1989: 175). Or as Goffman psychologically anatomises them further, they are "gesture[s] through

[117] Apology between individuals (cf. e.g. Hearit 2006: 81).

[118] Blum-Kulka and Olshtein assume that cross-cultural variability is one of at least three factors influencing a speaker's choice in speech act realization.

[119] Linguistic-community specific conversational strategies.

[120] This thesis extends the list to IFIDs.

which an individual splits him/herself into two parts - the part that is guilty of an offense and the part that dissociates itself from the delict and affirms belief in the offended rule" (cf. Goffman 1971: 113), i.e. the breaking of a social norm. Following Goffman yet further, by "splitting of the self into a blameworthy part and a part that stands back and sympathizes with the blame giving", the offender, "by implication", becomes "worthy of being brought back into the social fold" (ibid.). However, this splitting is just one instance (often a fairly crude one) of a much more general phenomenon. I mean here the phenomenon of the individuals' tendency to project the self which is then cast off, or withdrawn from, when in the immediate presence of others. Translated to apologies, this usually entails admission of the offence as a serious and real act. This provides a contrast to another type of splitting, one that supports an account, not an apology, in which the actor projects the offensive act as something not to be taken literally, that is, seriously, or after the act claims that he was not acting seriously. All these moments in the life of an apology, its "fullest form" as Goffman (ibid.) calls it, confluence to form a broader blueprint, i.e. a 'script'[121] for the realisation of apology with the following matrix of social components:

apology [mss[122]]

[-] expression of embarrassment and chagrin;
[-] clarification that one knows what conduct had been expected and sympathizes with the application of negative sanction;
[-] verbal rejection, repudiation, and disavowal of the wrong way of behaving along with vilification of the self that so behaved;
[-] espousal of the right way and an avowal henceforth to pursue that course;
[-] performance of penance and the volunteering of restitution

(Goffman 1971: 113)

Analysing the "fullest form" further, across social to the cultural, the additional dyad of relevant parameters that comes to the foreground is 'inherence' and

[121] The *apologetic script*, as the componential representation, builds on Goffman's account extending it from the level of observation-explanation to the level of explication-application.

[122] One possible universally-translatable master social script (mss)

'intuitiveness'. These parameters allow us to delve further into the complexity of the socio-relational momentums at work, e.g. in apologetic speech act by defining and describing it as "inherently intelligible" and "intuitively verifiable". This entails decomposing it into cross-culturally intelligible constitutive semantic components[123], which grants us access to its emic dimension, specifically to the emic content of the IF and IFID (Wierzbicka 1987: 10). In other words, we tap into what the speakers of a particular (linguistic) culture themselves mean by it, at the same time indicative of how they think about this very instance of social interaction at large. When we unfold Goffman's 'social script' for the realisation of apology (as remedial interchange), we arrive at Wierzbicka's underlying 'realisational cultural script' for apologising that can have the following matrix of semantic components describing what the speaker can mean by it:

apologizing (ms)

a. I know that I caused something to happen that was bad for you
b. think that you may think something bad about me because of that and feel something bad towards me because of that
c. I say: I feel something bad because of that
d. I don't want you to think something bad about me because of that and to feel something bad towards me because of that
e. I say this because I think I should say it to you

(Wierzbicka 1987: 215)[124]

Articulated upon a broader and more far-reaching view, this specific 'cultural script' is a 'semantic explication'[125], intended to capture an Anglo cultural norm

[123] By applying the method of Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) as the metalanguage of universal semantic primes (Goddard 2007, 2010a, 2012b) and semantic explications - cultural scripts (as shared interpretive background, i.e. culture's common denominators), when dealing with speech act IFIDs, such as apologize, we analyse how exactly the IFID is used in a certain (linguistic) culture and investigate whether it is used in other cultures as well and which differences exist (following Wierzbicka 1986a: 365).

[124] Meier (1992: 11) believes this to be the best formulation of preconditions or presuppositions for the verb apologize or even for RW [Repair Work] in general.

[125] "Semantic explications are explanatory paraphrases composed in a specified (near-universal) subset of ordinary language framed in the metalanguage of simple and universal semantic primes (NSM), i.e. in a specified subset of ordinary language. Though they are composed of discrete elements (i.e. words or bound morphemes), semantic explications can be phrased so as to accommodate the subjectivity and vagueness of many meanings."

related to an act of social transgression and embodied in the Anglo notion of apology(izing)). The methodological relevance of 'cultural scripts' is that, although composed of discrete elements (such as words or bound morphemes) they can be phrased to accommodate the subjectivity and vagueness of many meanings and at different levels of granularity[126], allowing for systematic relation of intersubjective (public) meaning to the content of individual mental representation (subjective level of representing entities)[127] in the same format (cf. Vosgerau and Petersen 2015: 542; also Sutanovac (forth.)).

In order to exhibit and explain the complex relations, which have been identified in the empirical study to act in and through apologies at the level of conceptualisation, I will initially confluence them into matrices of semantic components ('cultural scripts') for both the Serbian and the Austrian (linguistic) cultures, as commonly held assumptions about how members of both linguistic communities think about social interaction in general. In the context of the analysis, these cultural scripts will serve as common cultural denominators for the respective cultures. More specifically, what relates 'cultural scripts' directly to my main analytic lens - the DA-Triad, is that they "form a part of the interpretative backdrop to discourse and social behaviour in a particular cultural context, an interpretive background against which individuals position themselves/their own acts to others/acts of others" (Goddard 2004: 57). As such, they make a pragmatic case in point for what we have previously identified (2.4.2.5 and 2.4.3.4) as the always present, essential, third participant - the higher-other.

Therefore, before we see how the Bakhtinian DAT(riad) unfolds itself in the apologetic speech act practice to reveal and explicate its conceptual complexity, I will

(source: the official NSM-project online repository https://intranet.secure.griffith.edu.au/schools-departments/natural-semantic-metalanguage)

[126] from concepts on the mental level to words on the linguistic level, and up to complex phrases and speech act utterances

[127] The central thesis is that the rich structures of individuals' representations overlap in the sense that they share a common core (Vosgerau and Petersen, 2015: 542; also Löbner 1992, 2018). "This core can be identified as the public meaning of the word associated with these mental representations (concepts). Both levels are systematically related by abstraction mechanisms (from cognition to language) and attunement mechanisms (from language to cognition)." (2015: 543)

first introduce the notion of ‘cultural script’ and follow it up with a ‘master script’ (manifest of higher-other addressee), for each of the relevant cultures. The application of the DAT(riad) will then afford us the needed conceptual-realisational material to formulate the more specific ‘subordinate script(s)’. Invoking the “terminology of the ethnography of communication (Hymes 1964), a ‘master script’ can be seen as stating a “norm of interpretation”, while the ‘subordinate script’ spells out the more specific “norms of interaction”” (Goddard and Wierzbicka 2004: 157).

4.2

The Notion of Cultural Script

Success of communicative interaction is highly dependent on the notion of `common ground`. If we “observe communicative interaction as a chain of meaningful communicative episodes/events, it would stand to reason that each of these episodes (i.e. situations) establishes a particular common ground which entails a set of different interactional aspects. Such different aspects need to be taken into account each time interlocutors interact. Given the fact that many of these aspects are variable in nature, it can be extrapolated that interlocutors need to adapt to each of these episodes, times and times again, in order to establish meaningful and mutually satisfactory interaction” (Sutanovac 2013: 695). What allows them do so with little effort are specific correlates of adaptability. One such correlate of adaptability which plays a crucial role in facilitating meaningful interaction is the `context`. As pointed out by Verschueren (1999a: 75) “´context´ is not a vague notion, nor a passive one, given that contexts are constantly generated and actively constructed “as choices made from the infinite range of possibilities, for specific instances of language use” (Ibid.) through a generation process he refers to as “contextualisation”. Following this trajectory, context - as a correlate of adaptability, becomes the integral property of language, which enables interlocutors “to approach points of satisfaction for communicative needs” (1999a: 61). As pointed out above, interlocutors constantly address different types of contexts throughout the process of interaction. Therefore, “for interaction to be mutually satisfactory, certain types of context need to be

addressed first in order for the prolific common ground to be established from the onset (Sutanovac 2013: 695). Taking this as the onset point, and keeping in mind that each interaction is, on an initial plane, essentially shaped by specific cultural values and norms (Wierzbicka 1991[2003]), the "context of culture" as a key reifier of the culture itself, can be regarded as an initial stepping stone, for it provides the interlocutor with the key to demystifying a) the target language in question and b) the manner in which it is to be used most productively" (Sutanovac 2013: 695).

The concluding part of the previous section indicates one of the underlying reasons why cultural scripts need(ed) to be included in the analysis. Our empirical study provides grounds for the second underlying reason. Namely, that of the cultural determination of the apologetic speech act and of its mental matrix, as indicated by the participant responses to the questions (4(5), 6(7), 8(9) and 10(11)) which concern the rationalisation of their apologetic speech act behaviour. This foregrounds another important point, namely, that when people communicate, they, consciously or subconsciously, invoke and evoke specific mental schemata and scripts, indicative of two synchronic dimensions - a) the invisible dimension of values and b) the visible dimension of resulting communicative perception-cum-behaviour (cf. Dorodnych and Kuzio 2012). The latter of the two specifically makes for what we have previously defined as the community's "linguistic [c]ulture", while the latter, as the shared schemata and axiological knowledge "created by a community of people for perceiving, interpreting, expressing and responding to the social realities around them" (Lederach 1995: 9), makes for this community's overarching "[c]ulture". Culture, once it is "programmed"[128], i.e. learned and internalised, remains subconscious most of the time (cf. Dorodnych and Kuzio 2012: x). As Hall (1983) points out, 'culture' compares to an invisible control mechanism operating in our thoughts of which "we only become aware when it is severely challenged, for example by exposure to a different culture" (1983: 230), and as the participants` answers to the situations in section 4 of our DCTf questionnaire also indicate, by exposure to a different linguistic culture as well.

[128] After Hofstede, who emphasises the procedural power of culture by defining it as "the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another" (1984: 51)

Applied to the apologetic speech practice, mere identification of the differences in choices regarding speech act performance, without an awareness of the role of culture in informing these choices, may, in fact, actually encourage "otherisation" (Halliday 1999: 245).

In this sense, an empirically improved explanatory approach such as the cultural scripts approach, can be particularly insightful as it represents a cognitive approach to culture and society, offering a cultural-insider methodology that allows us to explanatorily investigate the ways of thinking, speaking, behaviour, even emotions, all within a unified lexico-cognitive micro-framework[129] (cf. Wierzbicka 2003b; Goddard and Wierzbicka 2004; Perovic 2009). As summarised by its originators (Anna Wierzbicka and Cliff Goddard):

> Cultural scripts approach is not trying to do something altogether new and different. Many of its concerns are shared by linguistic anthropology, ethnography of communication, and by aspects of cultural psychology (e.g. Hymes 1972; Gumperz and Hymes 1964; Bauman and Sherzer (eds) 1974; Shweder 1993). The chief contribution of the cultural scripts approach is an improved methodology to bear on these common concerns, a methodology which builds on two decades of research in cross-cultural semantics. (Goddard and Wierzbicka 2004: 154)

The cultural scripts technique has its fons et origo in and relies essentially on Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM)[130] as the metalanguage of empirically established semantic primes that has, as its underlying idea, the claim that it is a "widely shared and widely known way of thinkin" that "can be identified in terms of the same empirically established universal human concepts" (cf. Wierzbicka 2006a: 34; see also Wierzbicka 1996a, 1996b; Goddard 1997, 2000)[131]. In the words of the anthropologist Roy D'Andrade, the Natural Semantic Metalanguage "offers a potential means to ground all complex concepts in ordinary language and translate

---

[129] The theory of cultural scripts

[130] Up to date tables of semantic primes can be seen in Appendix 1

[131] As Goddard and Wierzbicka (2004a) point out "the universal mini-language of semantic primes can therefore be safely used as a common code for writing explications of word meanings and for writing cultural scripts, free from the danger of terminological ethnocentrism with maximum clarity and resolution of detail, and in the knowledge that they can be readily transposed across languages. It offers a mechanism by which meaning can be freed from the grip of any single language." (Goddard and Wierzbicka, 2004a: 156)

concepts from one language to another without loss or distortion in meaning" (D'Andrade 2001: 246). The key idea of the cultural scripts approach is that the ethnography of communication is in this theory complemented with the 'ethnography of thinking', in which the universal does not oppose the unique, individual, culturally hued. In one word, it is not a restriction. The cultural scripts model explains what in a specific (linguistic) culture is considered good, i.e. ´appropriate´, and what is not, what a person is and what a person is not allowed. It represents a naive axiology of what is allowed in linguistic, i.e. speech acting and what is not. As Wierzbicka puts it succinctly, the cultural script model adopts the perspective of a cultural insider (2003b: 402) who is making an attempt to articulate her/his perspective in a non-technical way. Thus, the script is something narrower than culture, something palpable and rule-bound, something for which there is clear linguistic evidence and thus something that can be taught as knowledge and therefore learned (Perovic 2009: 6).

4.2.1

The Cultural Script of 'Culture'

In line with the previous section, following Goddard (2005: 56), one rudimentary face of the 'Higher-other addressee' can be defined as the first proposed explication [A1]:

[A1] (Samoan, Chinese, Russian etc.) *culture*$_{A1}$=

a. something
when people say things about it, they are thinking about things like this:
b1. people live in many places
some of these places are far from here
many kinds of people live in these places, one kind of people in one place, another kind of people in another place
b2. these many kinds of people don't live in the same way as people here live
they don't think about things in the same way as people here think about things
they don't do things in the same way as people here do things
c. people in one place live in one way, not in another way,
because other people of the same kind lived this way before for a long time
d. People in one place think about things in some ways, not in other ways
because other people of the same kind thought this way before for a long time
they think some things are good, they think some other things are not good because other people of the same kind thought this way before for a long time

e. people in one place do things in some ways, not in other ways
because other people of the same kind did things this way before for a long time

(Goddard 2005: 56)

Following Kroeber and Kluckhorn (1963[1952] in Vermeersch 1977), this older, or classical, anthropological matrix of the concept of culture combines as the key components of its meaning both mental states and processes and patterns of behaviour (habits, customs, ways of life). What this indicates is that, in NSM terms, clearly implicated are the semantic primes THINK and DO. Also, if we take expressions such as 'way of life' at face value, the semantic prime (TO) LIVE also enters the picture. The additional key constituent comes in the capacity of the precedents of the past. This is particularly accentuated by/in classic definitions such as Mead's (1934) "the whole complex of traditional behavior" and Benedict's (1947) "behaviour which in man is not given at birth" (also cf. Goddard 2005: 54). As Goddard (2005: 58) concludes, "one could say that there is an implication that *white culture* or *Chinese culture*, for example, do belong somewhere or originated somewhere, but without any suggestion that they are presently confined to any single location" as, just like its bearers, culture and its influences are in constant flux, interpenetrating and cross-cutting. Furthermore, due to this, in contemporary usage a modified concept of culture has detached itself even more definitively from localisation, the principle of differentiation shifting to the notion of different 'kinds of people', each characterised by a distinctive way of living, thinking and behaving (linguistically included). As Goddard (ibid.) further points out, a new component that embodies and represents the idea of 'co-association' ('people of one kind do many things with other people of the same kind') takes over the explanatory role that has been previously held by the historical precedent.

Here we introduce the matrix of components proposed by Goddard as the second proposed explication [A2] compatible with the more contemporary meaning of the expression 'culture', i.e. `mainstream culture`, because the term `mainstream culture` in a sense also acknowledges the existence of subcultures or minority cultures embedded in it, even as it excludes them:

[A2] (white, European, Muslim, etc.) *culture*$_{SA2}$=

a. something
   when people say things about it, they are thinking about things like this:
b. people live in many places
   many kinds of people live in these places, one kind of people in one place,
   another kind of people in another place
c. people of one kind live in one way, not in another way,
   because other people of the same kind lived this way before for a long time
d. people of one kind think about things in some ways, not in other ways
   because other people of the same kind thought this way before for a long time
   they think some things are good, they think some other things are not good
   because other people of the same kind thought this way before for a long time
e. people of one kind do things in some ways, not in other ways
   because other people of the same kind did things this way before for a long time

(Goddard 2005: 57)

4.2.2

Cultural Scripts in Apologetic Interaction and Practice

It would be difficult to conceive of language and communication in which there were no means for language "repairs" in the case of either linguistic or non-linguistic transgression. However, this "universal" can be compromised by a cultural script in which an apology, in its most conventional form via a performative verb, can be absent, with the interpersonal conveying of the apologetic politeness, nevertheless, still taking place, i.e. being felicitous. Relativisation of the universality of apology is possible when we move out of the verbal and move into the affective communicative dimension where words are not deemed necessary. This cognitive-emotional turn is possible, especially in lieu of the social norm that highly values the collective Geist, where the rule of the milieu and the unspoken rules of the group, characterised by great closeness, determine the behaviour of the individual(s). In this sense, the "compelling script(s)" assume(s) unquestionable adherence to the rules of politeness as an individual is not allowed a transgression, and in the light of the questionnaire data especially the non-verbal transgression, which would disrupt the homogeneity of

the group/society. As the corpus of answers also foregrounds it, this leads to apologies being generally encouraged in communication, especially as a way for an individual to gain personal freedom in a relative un-freedom of choices by shifting the responsibility onto the collective ('I apologise out of politeness, If not, then I feel I'm not cultured'; 'Out of principle/good manners'; 'Because its human/part of basic culture to apologise'; 'That's how I was brought up'; 'That's what polite people do') and away from the individual. On the opposite end of the spectrum, following Wierzbicka (1985; also Goddard and Wierzbicka 2004: 156-157) a cultural script, which can be seen as one of the "master scripts", that values personal autonomy and highly encourages the apologetic speech act in the English language, i.e. mainstream Anglo culture, is as follows:

[B] Personal autonomy *anglo-culture*ms=

[people think like this:]
a. when a person is doing something
b. it is good if this person can think about it like this:
c. 'I am doing this because I want to do it
d. not because someone else wants me to do it'

(Goddard & Wierzbicka 2004: 156)

As Goddard and Wierzbicka (2004: 162) point out, there is a wide range of sociological, historical and culture-analytical literature to indicate that "individual freedom" and "personal autonomy" are among the primary ideals of the mainstream Anglo culture and that although terms like these probably stand for a whole complex of interrelated cultural scripts, one of the most general ("master scripts") can be stated as above. Following Goddard and Wierzbicka even further, this script is supposed to represent a component of the dominant "cultural ideology" in the predominantly English-speaking countries, i.e. it "can be seen as one of the "master scripts" of the mainstream Anglo culture" (2004: 157) . As they emphasise, it is also worth pointing out that despite the possible connotations of the word 'script', "cultural scripts are not "binding" on individuals - they are not proposed as rules of behaviour but as rules of interpretation and evaluation" (Goddard 2000: 85), leaving it open to individuals in concrete situations whether to follow (or appear to follow) "culturally endorsed principles", and if so, to what extent; "or whether to manipulate them, defy them, subvert them, rebel against them, play creatively with them, etc." (ibid.). Whether or

not cultural scripts are being followed in strictly behavioural terms, however, the groundwork is that they constitute a kind of "shared interpretive background" (ibid.). Therefore, in this study, the above "master script" will serve as the interpretive background (i.e. Higher-other participant) against which the apologetic speech acts expressed in English language (question 3 and question 4 in the test battery) will be compared for cultural-conceptual felicity.

In contrast to the cultural script quoted above, the cultural script of a society which highly values reputation, dignity and pride, and does its best for its member not to lose 'face', to a far lesser degree acknowledges the individual and her/his personal autonomy in doing anything that will bring the cultural script into question. Salman Rushdie (2007) made an insightful illustrative point in case when he wrote that:

> [...] to avenge befouled honor. It didn't matter what would happen after that. Honor was valued more than anything, more than the holy matrimony, more than the divine commandment against a cold-blooded murder, more than politeness, more than culture, more than the life itself. (2007: 325)

To be dishonored, to lose one's face and dignity, therefore, does not become a matter of individual's decision but, on the contrary, individual threatening of the face represents at the same time a threat to the collective face as well. This, in turn, invokes immense responsibility on behalf of every individual towards anything that can pose a threat to the face which in our case here is embodied in the apologetic speech act. This is the case because apologies essentially carry with them abasement, which the interlocutor has to go through, this way, and at a particular point canceling out the high rating of an individual in a given society as well as her/his reputation in her/his eyes. In order for this not to happen, as our questionnaire has shown (Questions 1-4), Serbian and Austrian participants in both (linguistic) cultures abide by cultural scripts that acknowledge transgression and value (linguistic) repairs. However, due to the communal and axiological specificity of the two societies, i.e. due to the cultural differences associated with a different 'ethnography of speaking' (Wierzbicka 1998: 272; also Muhr 1993; Ammon 1995; Clyne 1995), the corresponding scripts' conceptualisation-realisational matrices noticeably differ from one another.

If Anglo cultural scripts can be said to be linked with the value of "personal autonomy"[132], the Austrian-German cultural scripts can be linked with the values of "social discipline" and "order" (cf. also Wierzbicka 1998: 278; Clyne 1995: 127). This can be translated into a following cultural script that can be regarded as one possible "master script" ([C]$_{ms}$) of the mainstream Austrian-German culture:

[C] *Ordnung*$_{ms=}$
a. es ist gut wenn Menschen wissen
b. welche Dinge Menschen tun müssen
c. welche Dinge Menschen nicht tun können
d. es ist gut wenn jemanden sagt
e. welche Dinge Menschen tun müssen
f. welche Dinge Menschen nicht tun können

[C] *Ordnung*$_{ms=}$
(English version)
a. it is good if people know
b. what things they have to do
c. what things they can't do
d. it is good if someone says
e. what things people have to do
f. what things they can't do
(cf. Wierzbicka 1998: 277)

As indicated above, this script captures a prevailing Austrian-German cultural attitude that can be said to have widespread ramifications across a wide range of cultural domains and practices. In its vein, utilising the "master script" above and the NSM language, my following "subordinate scripts" extend and spell out some of the

132 Wierzbicka describes Anglo-Saxon cultural tradition in the following way: [It is] a tradition which "places special emphasis on the rights and the autonomy of every individual, which abhors interference in other people's affairs (It is none of my business), which is tolerant of individual idiosyncrasies and peculiarities, which respects everyone's privacy, which approves of compromises and disapproves of dogmatism of any kind" (Wierzbicka 1985: 150)

consequences of the master script for social interaction (Script [C1]$_{ss}$) and, more specifically, linguistic (apologetic) interaction (Script [C2]$_{ss}$):

[C1] *Soziale Interaktion*$_{ss=}$

a. viele Menschen leben an diesem Ort

b. diese Menschenart leben eine Weise, nicht eine andere Weise

weil andere Menschen dieser Menschart lebten auf diese Weise vor eine lange Zeit

c. diese Menschart denkt über Dinge auf einige Weise, nicht auf andere Weise

weil andere Menschen dieser Menschart denkt auf diese Weise vor eine lange Zeit

Menschen dieser Menschart denken etwas ist gut, etwas anderes ist nicht gut:

Ich tun dies, weil andere dasselbe tun, dies ist gut

Ich tun dies, weil ich fühle dies ist gut für anderen zu tun

weil ich wollte nicht jemand anderes wegen mir schlecht zu fühlen, dies ist nicht gut

Ich tun dies, weil ich wollte jemand anderes dasselbe für mich zu tun

d. viel Zeit dies Menschart tut Dinge auf diese Weise, nicht auf andere Weise

weil andere Menschen dieser Menschart tat Dinge auf diese Weise vor eine lange Zeit

[C1] *Soziale Interaktion*$_{ss=}$

(English version)

a. many people live in this place

b. this kind of people live in one way, not in another way

because other people of this kind lived this way before for a long time

c. this kind of people think about things in some ways, not in other ways

because other people of this kind thought this way before for a long time

people of this kind think something is good, something else is not good:

I am doing this because others do the same, this is good

I am doing this because I feel it is very good to do it for other(s),

because I don't want other(s) to feel bad because of me, this is not good

I am doing this because I want other(s) to do same for me

d. many time this kind of people do things this way, not in other way

because others of the same kind did things this way before for a long time

[C2] *Sprachliche apologetische Interaktion*$_{ss}$=

a. Menschen hier denken so:

b. wenn etwas schlechtes jemandem passiert, weil ich etwas tat

c. es ist gut wenn Menschen wissen ich etwas deswegen fühle

d. es ist gut wenn Menschen wissen ich fühle, dass ich etwas wie dies zu diesem jemanden sagen muss:

e. ‘Ich fühle etwas schlechtes, weil ich dir etwas schlechtes tat’

f. Ich will nicht dass du etwas schlectes über mich deswegen denkst

g. Ich will nicht dass du etwas wegen mich schlechtes fühlt’

h. Ich muss (= kann nicht nichts) etwas deswegen sagen

i. Ich muss (= kann nicht nichts) etwas deswegen tun

[C2] *Sprachliche apologetische Interaktion*$_{ss}$=

(English version)

a. People here think like this:

b. when something bad happens to someone because I did something,

c. it is good people know I feel something because of that,

d. it is good people know I feel I have to say something like this to this someone:

e. ‘I feel something bad because I did something bad to you,

f. I don't want you to think something bad about me because of that

g. I don't want you to feel bad because of me’

h. I have to (= can’t not) say something because of this

I. I have to (= can’t not) do something because of this

This cutural script represents a hypothesis about a cultural norm which is characteristically (though not exclusively) Austrian-German. It is linked with the DCTt noted tendency of the Austrians to apologize frequently and in a broad range of situations, previously also observed and descriptively explored by Meier (1992: 72)[133]. On the other hand, although the two cultures studied here equally place value on the two points indicated above (transgression and repair), their underlying reasons differ. In contrast to the Austrian high value of "social order", "discipline: and "other's well-being", Serbian cultural scripts, as my formulations expressed in the NSM language show, can be linked with the values of `social inclusion` (master script $[D]_{ms}$), 'personal discipline' ($[D1]_{ss}$) and 'personal well being' ($[D2]_{ss}$) (subordinate scripts):

[D] *društvena inkluzija*$_{ms}$=
a. Ljudi ovde misle ovako:
b. dobro je ako ljudi znaju
c. šta mogu da rade
d. šta ne mogu da rade
e. dobro je ako ljudi misle:
f. ja hoću da radim isto kao drugi ljudi
g. kad radim isto kao drugi ljudi, to je vrlo dobro

[D] *društvena inkluzija*$_{ms}$=
(English version)
a. people here think like this:
b. it is good if people know
c. what things they can do
d. what things they can't do
e. it is good if people think:
f. I want to do things like other people
g. when I do things like other people, it is very good

[133] As Meier's data show, by far the most popular/frequent realisations were Excuse me and an expression with Entschuldigung/entschuldigen. And, as this study has shown, also es tut mir leid.

As was the case with Austrian-German, this script captures a prevailing Serbian cultural attitude that can be said to have widespread ramifications across a wide range of cultural domains and practices. In its vein, the following subordinate script spells out some of the consequences of this master script for instances of social interaction (script [D1]) and, more specifically, the linguistic (apologetic) interaction (script [D2]).

[D1] *društvena interakcija*$_{ss}$=

a. Mnogi ljudi žive na ovom mestu

b. ova vrsta ljudi živi na jedan način, ne na druge načine

zato što su drugi ljudi ove vrste živeli na ovaj način pre, dugo vremena

c. ova vrsta ljudi misli o stvarima na neke načine, ne na druge načine

zato što su drugi ljudi ove vrste mislili na taj način pre, dugo vremena

ljudi ove vrste misle da je nešto dobro, da nešto drugo nije dobro:

ja to radim zato što drugi rade to isto, to je dobro

ja to radim zato što neću da se drugi osećaju loše zbot mene,

zato što ja neću da se osećam loše, to nije dobro

dobro je ako mislim na ovaj način

d. mnogo puta ova vrsta ljudi radi stvari na ovaj način, ne na drugi način

zato što su drugi ljudi ove vrste radili stvari na taj način pre, dugo vremena

[D1] *društvena interakcija*$_{ss}$=

(English version)

a. many people live in this place

b. this kind of people live in one way, not in another way

because other people of this kind lived this way before, for a long time

c. this kind of people think about things in some ways, not in other ways

because other people of this kind thought this way before, for a long time

people of this kind think something is good, something else is not good:

I am doing this because others do the same, this is good

I am doing this because I don't want other(s) to feel bad because of me,

because I don't want to feel bad, this is not good

It is good if I think this way

d. many time this kind of people do things this way, not in other way
because others of the same kind did things this way before for a long time

[D2] izvinjenje u jezičkoj interakcijiss=

a. Ljudi ovde misle ovako:
kad se nešto loše desi nekome zato što sam ja uradio nešto,
dobro je da ljudi znaju da ja zato osećam nešto,

b. dobro je da ljudi znaju da ja hoću tom nekome da kažem nešto kao ovo:
'ja osećam nešto loše zbog toga,
ja osećam nešto loše zato što sam ti učinio nešto loše,
ja ne želim da ti misliš nešto loše o meni zbog toga i da se osećaš loše,
jer ja ne želim da se osećam loše'

c. ja moram da (= ne mogu da ne) kažem nešto zbog toga

d. ja moram da (= ne mogu da ne) uradim nešto zbog toga

[D2] izvinjenje u jezičkoj interakcijiss=

(English version)

a. people here think like this:
when something bad happens to someone because I did something,
it is good people know I feel something because of that,

b. it is good people know I want to say something like this to this someone:
'I feel something bad because of this,
I feel something bad because I did something bad to you,
I don't want you to think something bad about me because of that and to feel bad
because I do not want to feel bad'

c. I have to (= can't not) say something because of this

d. I have to (= can't not) do something because of this

The scripts articulated above reflect two important issues. On the one hand, they are a succinct articulation of participants' answers that mirror their shared cultural-cognitive matrices/practices. On the other hand, they reveal that the universal

human concepts (NSM primes) related to the apologetic scripts refer to a small set of semantic primitives, primarily mental predicates think, know, want and feel. The feelings that were typically brought into connection with the apologetic speech act were guilt, empathy, shame which brings thought-based emotions in a direct relationship with the processes that involve the body and bodily reactions. In our study findings (to be more precise, in Questions 4,6,8,10) we have noticed that the relevance had been also placed on "bodily events", the symptoms of cognitively based emotions (Wierzbicka 1999: 61). Furthermore, within this basic mental lexicon relevant for apologies we also find evaluators and descriptors (good, bad), quantifiers (much, many) and intensifiers (very). In less technical terms, the person who is apologising thinks, experiences the need to apologize, why it is beneficial to express this speech act in some way, while the expression itself can be intensified (very) or augmented with quantifying words (e.g. extremely, terribly, awfully etc.) because the apology itself is to be found within this range of communicative relevance.

In conclusion, what I would like to emphasize at this point is that all the differences pointed out in this chapter concerning the English (e.g. Goddard and Wierzbicka 2004: 157), as well as the Austrian-German and the Serbian are only hypothetical, as all the authors themselves readily admit. In spite of this, assumptions like these are, nevertheless, very insightful and can help support cultural understanding as well as help elucidate cultural clashes (Wierzbicka 1985: 177). This in turn makes them "vital to human concerns" (Wierzbicka 1991: 283; see also Tannen 1986: 30).

4.3 Research Methodology

4.3.1 Motivation

The motivation for the study, and my inspiration for the DCTt, resulted from my decade long experience of cross-cultural trialism, i.e. from my never-ceasing dialogue

led simultaneously with three cultures (Serbian, Austrian and Anglo) and on a daily basis. This has also served as the onset point for methodological ruminations, which helped shape the substance and the form of the questionnaire (DCTt), making it suitable for the investigation of the dialogic dialectics of interest, i.e. of the dialogue led between I, other and higher-other. Concentrating on the situations included in the test battery, they are both a direct manifestation and result of my real life dialogic language games as well as of the observational dialogues with others as the main actors in such situations, and dialogues with these very others.

4.3.2

Focus, Goals and Significance of the Present Research

The focal point of this research is the connection between language and society. In line with this, the aim of the resulting study is, thus, to highlight and illustrate the tacit connections that exist between the features of a particular language and the underlying culture-specific conceptualizations. More specifically, this study focuses on how community's culture - both social and linguistic, influences its members' perception of social interaction and how this is reflected in the situation-specific language use - the act of apologising. As Coulmas points out, apologies are a good choice for such an endeavour as a) they exist as generic speech acts in every speech community and, despite their tendency to be highly routinised, b) each speech community has its own way of expressing them, thus revealing some of its most relevant norms and values (1981: 81). The practice informed questions which have occupied the present author's attention are as follows:

[-] what is language users' perception of social interaction and apologetic social interaction,
[-] how this perception influences the language users` perception of (situational) context and how they apologise,
[-] what are their underlying mental and the resulting verbal strategies in different in-/formal situations,

[-] how language users rationalise their apologetic linguistic behaviour,
[-] what are the (cognitive) mechanisms underlying apologetic linguistic behaviour,

These questions naturally pointed out to the confluence of the qualitative and the quantitative, i.e. to a mixed-method, of the present research. More precisely, to a Mixed-Method (research) as a combination of what Jucker distinguishes as an introspective, i.e. "armchair method" (2009: 1615) and the "laboratory based method'" (e.g. DCT) (2009: 1618). One way to avoid the adversarial incompatibility between "these twin research methodologies, one informed by a (post)positivist paradigm with an explanatory mandate, the other constructivist with a mission of seeking understanding" (Riazi and Candlin 2014: 138), is to argue the case for a third methodology. I mean here the Mixed Method Research (MMR) methodology, "which has come to be regarded in the literature as an emerging research design of considerable scope and value" (cf. Riazi and Candlin 2014: 138; also Doyle, Brady and Bryne 2009). The reason for this is that "MMR allows us to bridge the poles of positivism and constructivism" (cf. Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004; also Hanson et al. 2005), i.e. of qualitativism and quantitativism, without diminishing the investigative and the analytic potential of either of the two approaches. Conjoining the two the benefit, on the one hand, comes from the nuanced nature of the qualitative research as an "effective way of exploring the new uncharted areas" (cf. Dörnyei 2007: 39) and arriving at an insightful repertoire of possible interpretations of human experience (rather than yielding a generalizable correct interpretation), thus making it a useful approach for the researchers who venture on a journey into the unknown (ibid. 40). Moreover, another essential characteristic of the qualitative approach is that it implies the investigation of behaviour in context (cf. Heppner, Kivlighan and Wampold 1999) and makes it possible to gain insights into how, and sometimes, why participants construct meaning in a specific way and act in the given situations (Charmaz 2007: 130). Also, an additional reason underlying the choice to include the qualitative dimension is the researcher's intention to allow the informants to partake more actively and, without any suggestions and cues, recognise, define and name the aspects and the cognitive-linguistic mechanisms which they perceive and consider particularly relevant, pointing out naturally to additional rich points to be explored and accounted for. In doing so, we recognise that people's perceptions and knowledge of quotidian occurrences, of their own actions or behaviour - language and linguistic

behaviour included, do not have to be homogeneous and unequivocal. Quite the contrary, as Schutz (1964: 93) observes, most of the time they are incoherent, only partially clear and by no means free of contradiction. In this sense my research is, in the first line, exploratory in nature. As such it is aimed at the identification of new salient questions and rich points concerning the issue of the breadth of the multidimensional space of apologetic speech acts, as well as at the identification of the possible/alternative angles of looking at the issue which can serve as a signpost for future research in this alley, both in terms of the methodological approach to investigation and the pertinent theoretical conceptualisation. In focusing on the patterns that underlie the above mentioned behaviours, my research is also explanatory. This is where, in complementing terms, the quantitative dimension proves particularly beneficial as it allows for the bridging of a very important gap of qualitative research that it can only provide an insight into a phenomenon and that its specific conditions and insights probably do not apply broadly to others (cf. Dörnyei 2007: 41). Furthermore, this dimension also provided a resolution to another problematic aspect of strictly qualitative research, namely, that of "anecdotalism", which concerns the fact that the researcher has to state convincingly that her/his findings are grounded in critical investigation and do not result from a few well-chosen examples alone (Silverman 2005: 211). This makes Woodrow's (2014) point (voicing in effect Jucker (2009)) - that quantitative and qualitative methods may be more complementary as opposed to incompatible, all the more salient, leading us directly into the field of mixed methods research which, as evidenced by the publication of recent influential works has not only gained but also grown in credibility (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998; Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003; Dörnyei 2007; Tedlie and Tashakkori 2009; Sandelowski 2014).

In the context of this dissertation, by confluencing the qualitative and the quantitative, i.e. the phenomenological (introspective) and the linguistic dimensions respectively, we can tap into the major advantages that so grounded analysis offers as compared to a strictly interview-based approaches (cf. Levisen 2012). As Levisen further observes, when interviewed, people can share their conscious thoughts about a topic, but the linguistic medium in which they express themselves is usually taken for granted. This leads to lexical, grammatical and illocutionary meaning in language to be viewed merely as a tool for communication. In contrast, the benefit of the Mixed

Method, conceptual-linguistic, analysis is to "denaturalize" Serbian and Austrian, and thus "unpack" the word meanings taken for granted in these linguistic communities.

In this respect, Levisen's matrix is particularly insightful and as such makes for a particularly beneficial onset point:

a) Use of naturally elicited language (data) viz. in order to substantiate and ensure linguistic authenticity, as its cases-in-point, this dissertation uses examples from naturally occurring language, primarily from a corpus comprised of naturally elicited responses provided by the study informants.

b) Making valid generalizations, viz. like any other (linguistic) cultural communities, the Serbian and Austrian communities are not homogenous; in addition, both have changed over time and are still changing. This raises one particularly important Labovian (1994) question, i.e. how can we capture the meanings of a changing and heterogenous speech community?

c) Avoiding bias viz. the two essential problems that can be identified with respect to this are 1) cultural stereotyping and 2) conceptual imposition[134] . Therefore, what becomes extremely important is to go beyond the prevailing cultural stereotypes so that linguistic categories and cultural models can be represented in a balanced way while, at the same time, avoiding conceptual imposition.

In adopting the matrix, this dissertation acknowledges the main challenges in applying a conceptual-linguistically grounded analysis. At the same time, it creates an alternative multidimensional space (Dialogic Architectonic Triad) to resolve these

[134] Any (linguistic) culture/community - be it a national, local or regional, has words which are revealing of speakers' value orientations and assumptions (cf. Levisen 2012: 7). Culture-specific pragmatic norms tend to give rise to semantically specialized constructions, tailor-made to meet the communicative priorities of the (linguistic) culture in question, as routinized patterns of usage "edify" into fixed morpho-syntactic constructions (Traugott and König 1991; Evans and Wilkins 2000: 580–5). (in Goddard 2012a: 483). Therefore, as Levisen (2012: 36) warns, in a research work written in English about Serbian and Austrian-German, it is particularly important to be aware of the danger of imposing English-specific conceptual categories on the natural semantics of these two languages, thereby distorting their unique viewpoints. For detailed work and discussion on cultural keywords and on the cultural "baggage" hidden in words cf. Goddard 1998, 2002, 2006, 2008a; Goddard and Wierzbicka 2004b; Wierzbicka 1985, 1992, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2006a, 2010.

challenges by bringing the matrix and practice into a dialectic dialogue. It is exactly such an approach to the challenges that makes this research particularly relevant, because the investigations of the situated/societal dimensionality of apologetic speech acts through the lens of "dialogism" (except for a single, work-in-progress, study by Sandler (forth.) analysing utterances within a brief conversational exchange in Hebrew) are practically non-existent. In this sense, investigating them from the perspective of "dialogic ethnophenomenology" and by applying such methodology as introduced here (DATt), can be regarded as a pioneering step both in dialogic and speech act practice.

It is also important to point out that the data acquired/gathered in this research study ought not be (nor were they ever intended to be) entirely generalised, however, the suggested classifications, types and scripts can by all means serve as the groundwork for further critical rethinking of the topic and the challenges it highlights. Consequently, one of the main goals of the research was to form a relevant/representative research corpus, i.e. to gather and present as many diverse personal perceptions and experiences as possible as well as diverse perspectives of representatives of the two (linguistic) cultures, which can then be utilised by researchers sharing the same interest in the topic.

4.3.3 Kernels Deconstructed

The purpose of this chapter is to systematically deconstruct the kernel entities that form this dissertation's multidimensional investigative space, by presenting the rationale that underlies the choice of each of them. These kernels include the object-to-be-known, i.e. the particular linguistic cultures (Serbian, Austrian, English), and the object's interactive linguistic formula (apologetic speech act), the language(s) of the object-to-be-known (Serbian, Austrian, English) and the tool of investigation (DATt).

Kernel One: Linguistic Cultures

The rationale underlying the choice of linguistic cultures shall be presented through a two-tier trichotomy each characterised by a set of complementary values:

1) architectonics of self-other relations, embodied by Dialogic Architectonics Triad, and complemented by a set of [a] lingo-cultural distance, [b] lingo-cultural proximity and [c] lingo-cultural uniqueness.

[a] Serbian and Austrian German

With specific respect to these two linguistic cultures, there has not yet been an extensive analysis, by means of NSM, either of the linguistically expressed cultural specificities (in the form of cultural scripts), or of the culture's particular forms of talk (i.e. apologetic speech acts) and related prominent expressions (i.e. Explicit IFIDs) characterising the languages in question. In this regard, this study not only significantly contributes to the growing corpus of linguistic cultures encoded in NSM, but also to the dissemination of the vital cross-cultural knowledge. In addition, no currently available NSM studies have devoted its explicative attention to either Serbian or Austrian German linguistic cultures, especially with respect to their 'cultural scripts'. All this makes this studies' additions to the NSM corpus even more valuable and unique in nature (for a broader discussion cf. Sutanovac 2014).

In this sense, the acquired knowledge will not only be vital for the scholarly community in general but, equally importantly, for all the lingo-cultural outsiders who wish to immerse themselves into the target linguistic-culture(s) and, by internalising its(their) acknowledged and widely accepted ways of verbal behaviour, learn how to do things with words effectively.

[b] Serbian and Austrian German Linguistic Cultures

A straightforward account of the differences in cultural norms, i.e. cultural scripts (mirrored in language), rooted in the critical comparison with both the originative norms and the culturally-distant ones, can give us valuable insights into attitudes and

frames of mind of the peoples in question. At the same time, cultural scripts also provide evidence in favor of the epistemic significance of NSM and cultural scripts as essential facilitators of cross-cultural understanding and communication, as well as of effective cross-cultural linguistic education.

Kernel Two: Interactive Linguistic Formula

The linguistic entity, i.e. the language formula of an apologetic speech act, has been chosen for an in-depth cross-cultural analysis due to the following specific reasons:

1. As the sections leading up to this section show, speech acts in general and apologetic speech acts in particular exhibit cultural and contextual salience and specificity as conceptual-linguistic entities. In this sense, they represent a potent source and a potent case-in-point for what Meier (2010) and Agar (1994) et.al. define as "rich points", both from an explorative and explicative perspective;

2. Following Austin (1968), speech acts are entities that perform. As such, they strive not only for the socio-cultural felicity but also, actively, for cognitive felicity as well. That is to say, they strive to adequately respond to the requirements of the context in question. In this respect, context as the carrier of implicit sense, together with the word as a purely linguistic phenomenon (a compressed utterance) and carrier of the explicit sense, comprise a whole – a complete semantic entity. The importance of context, with respect to speech acts as the form of more complex utterances, lies in the fact that, in case of its absence, a speech act can neither achieve its semantic completeness, nor its socio-cultural felicity.

3. Given the fact that speech acts are exponents of speech interaction, it could be argued that, on a micro level, they also exhibit all, or most, of the features of the verbal theory of communication (cf. Akhutina [1984] 2003). This, in turn, makes them a prime example of the aforementioned theory.

Kernel Three: Tools of Investigation

This section follows a description-objective trajectory where each of the tools represents but one of the dots which, when connected, will provide us with a unified modus operandi that is to lie at the very foundation of the study's empirical substance.

[a] Dialogical Conceptualisation Test Tool (DCTt) as a confluence and conceptual and empirical-analytical extension of the Dialogic Architectonics Triad (DAT), Discourse Completion Test (DCT) and Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM)-cum-Semantic Explications (cultural scripts)

Description: DCTt represents an empirical method used for eliciting and analysing speech acts in terms of their context-specific realisational diversity. However, although it is an extensively tested and effective pragmatic method, its objectivity has been somewhat questioned due to the number of supra-dimensions it takes into account. These are as follows: [i] socio-hierarchical relations, [ii] explicit context and, in hints, the [iii] cognitive dimension, i.e. a person's mental representation of the situation based on [ii]. Therefore, in the case of studies that bring together the explorative and the explanatory goals, as is the case with the study underlying this dissertation, the extension in terms of additional dimensions is that which makes the ultimate goal - explication, possible. This was, in effect, the main rationale behind the present author's extended version which aims at explicatively advancing the DCT's rudimentary idea with novel dimensions, for the purpose of increasing its overall objectivity and insightfulness, as well as empirical validity. The dimensions include:

[-] Introspective dimension - provides a straightforward systematic account of the mental phases a person goes through before producing an (contextually-appropriate) utterance, as well as empirical evidence for the validity of the "Theory of Verbal Communication".

[-] Multilingual dimension - including explicit-context situations, and the pertinent follow-up introspective sections, formulated both in the informant's mother- and non-mother tongue, allows for a more straightforward and objective socio-cultural and cognitive-linguistic analysis of the produced speech acts.

[-] Implicit dimension - mirrored in the section that includes situations "stripped down" of explicit context and presented in the form of a single sentence (declarative, interrogative and exclamatory/imperative). On the one hand, the role of such situations is to point out to the impact the absence of context has on language comprehension and production. On the other hand, "they can provide us with valuable insights into the extent to which specific morpho-syntactic structures can elicit adequate linguistic responses in a-contextualised socio-cultural settings" (2014: 40).

Objective:

1) To account for the likely sources of the a) realisational diversity, i.e. intracultural variability; (b) cross-cultural variability; (c) situational variability and (d) individual variability (cf. Blum-Kulka & Olshtein 1984; Trosborg 1987);

2) Through comparison, to determine the exact points of realisational divergence between the native and non-native patterns of language use;

3) To determine the importance of situational context (both explicit and implicit) for the recognition of a situation that asks for a specific speech act, as well as its significance for the completeness of this very speech act;

4) To pinpoint which sentence type elicits the adequate linguistic response, i.e. speech act, when explicit context is absent.

[b] Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) (as a follow up to DCTt)

Description: Represents the core of semantic explications, i.e. cultural scripts as the means to articulate the cultural impetus behind social and linguistic interacting in universally intelligible terms (cf. Goddard and Wierzbicka 1995; 2014a; Wierzbicka 2007b; Goddard 2012a)

Objective: To capture the essence of the cultures of interest (Serbian and Austrian in particular, and Anglo as a comparative tertium datur) and devise cultural scripts

within a universally comprehensible framework, and in a universally comprehensible (auxiliary) language. Moreover, to analyse the most prominent speech act expressions, i.e. the explicit IFIDs characteristic of the given cultures, by breaking them down via NSM into their key illocutionary constituents. This will, in turn, allow us to not only decipher the context-specific attitudes and frames of mind of Serbians and Austrians but also arrive at a set of cultural values that, at least to some extent, characterise these societies in general.

[c] Cultural scripts

Description: As the way of thinking shared by and familiar to everyone, and identifiable in the terms of the same empirically determined universal human primitives (Wierzbicka 2006a: 23; also 1991[2003] 1997, 1998, 1999), the immense importance of cultural scripts lies in the fact that they can account and provide strong evidence for cultural determination of [...] speech acts, as well as for the "mental matrix which underlies their verbal realization" (cf. Perovic 2009).

Objective: To provide evidence for the hypotheses to be checked in this study and facilitate the encoding of the cultural specificity of the relevant speech act, as well as the particular frame of mind of the person uttering it in a given context; In the words of its architects, "the NSM framework and the cultural scripts model make it possible to describe cultural norms and (linguistic) practices in a way which combines an insider perspective with intelligibility to outsiders, is free from Anglocentrism, and lends itself to direct practical applications in intercultural communication and education" (Goddard 2004).

4.3.4

Method, Techniques and Research Instruments

The choice of the approach and the method of investigation were preceded by a pilot study that took place over a period of time that began in March 2013 and saw its conclusion in July 2013. As pointed out in 4.3.1 ('Motivation'), this entire research

endeavour was preceded by a lengthier observational period which ultimately also gave rise to the pilot study. As Wolfson, Marmor and Jones (1989) point out, the importance of observation (method) as an introductory stage to a research, and especially in pragmatic research, is that:

> [O]ur own intuitions cannot provide us with a complete picture of the social circumstances that result in a given speech act. It is only through an iterative process which makes use both of systematic observation and increasingly sensitive elicitation procedures that we can begin to capture the social knowledge that is the unconscious possession of every member of a speech community (Wolfson, Marmor and Jones 1989: 194)

The subsequent pilot study is, at the same time, to be seen as a more concrete instance of the initial observational process and, through application, as the initial extension (the actual study being the prime extension) of the observational purview, deployed to solicit feedback from a limited number of informants to obtain additional information so that the researcher could further improve the survey questionnaire before the actual study. In this sense then, the final test battery - Dialogic Conceptualisation Test tool (DCTt), as a cognitive-content sensitive elicitation procedure, represents a further purview extender. In other words, the other crucial constituent that allows us to capture and unpack that unconscious social knowledge every linguistic community member has in possession. Thus, complementing the "explicative", another aspect of the main motivation for the present dissertation is also 'methodological'.

The reason underlying this aspect is consonant with Deutschmann's (2003) still relevant general observation that previous research into the apologetic speech act has been based on limited and, at times, artificial data. However, although Deutschmann's (2003: 14) conclusion that reported response(s) obtained by asking someone how they think they would react in a given situation is not likely to coincide with how they would actually respond in a "real" situation claims validity, it cannot claim general validity. For one, when acquired through a sensitive elicitation procedure such as DCTt, "the analysis of the speech act as a verbal interaction (both spoken and written) can illuminate not only the mysteries of the human psyche, but also that complex phenomenon called 'social psychology'" (Voloshinov in Matejka and Titunik [1973]1986: 23). More specifically, as elaborated by Todorov (1984: 23) building on

Bakhtin, the metatext (e.g. DCTt elicited speech act) is actually an intertext as the utterance that describes another utterance always already enters into a dialogical relation with it. Building on more recent work, in metatext, "intersubjectivity[135] emerges as the structure behind many linguistic and cognitive phenomena" (Sandler forth.; Pascual 2002, 2006, 2014). In order to understand or produce meaningful language, language users mentally imagine themselves perceiving or enacting the content of an utterance (cf. Pascual 2014: 11). Turning to practice, the increasing evidence further indicates that perceptual simulation is indeed central to comprehension[136]. This is also consistent with the findings of another mixed method approach – "Dual Code Theory" (Paivio 1971) that language and simulation do work together so as to produce human cognition (e.g. Barsalou, Santos, Simmons and Wilson 2008; Louwerse and Jeuniaux 2008). Concentrating more specifically on a micro level, this is also consistent with one of the underlying ideas of simulation semantics (cf. Stanfield and Zwaan 2001; Gibbs and Matlock 2008; Bergen 2005, 2012), viz. that language understanding critically involves mental emulation of linguistic content. The mental states triad - DAT[137], introduced via the DCTt then comes to constitute one potential model that accounts for the comprehension, conceptualisation and production of situated communication acts (i.e. apologetic speech acts) in the ongoing process of their construction. In this sense, this dissertation joins the growing tendency in the socio-cognitive sciences of language to integrate and confluence the cognitive and interactional approaches to language and language use (cf. Langacker 1995; Du Bois 2001; Verhagen 2005; Oakley and Hougaard 2008; Brandt 2013; Brône and Zima 2014). Its empirical study responds to

---

[135] Regarded as the fundamental cognitive capacity to view other persons as mental agents like oneself, and thus take the point of view of others and coordinate these distinct perspectives (cf. Trevarthen 1979, 2011; Bråten 1998; Traugott and Dasher 2002; Tomasello 1999, 2003; Verhagen 2005; Zlatev 2005, 2007; Zlatev et al. 2008; Davidse et al. 2010).

[136] For a detailed discussion see Black, Turner, and Bower 1979; Bransford and Johnson 1973; Gernsbacher, Varner, and Faust 1990; Gibbs 1994; Glenberg, Meyer and Lindem, 1987; Glenberg, Robertson 2000; Intraub and Hoffman, 1992; MacWhinney, 1998; Morrow, Greenspan and Bower, 1987; Potter and Faulconer 1975; Potter, Kroll, Yachzel, Carpenter and Sherman 1986; Potter, Valian, and Faulconer 1977; Rinck, Hahnel, Bower and Glowalla 1997; Tomasello, Kruger and Ratner 1993; Von Eckardt and Potter 1985; Wilson, Rinck, McNamara, Bower and Morrow 1993.

[137] Dialogic architectonics triad - I, other. Higher-other

and extends the recent theoretical work on Interactional Linguistics (Ochs et al. 1996), on the dialogical and situated basis of language and discourse (cf. Cicourel 1991; Duranti and Goodwin 1992; Givón 1997; Linell 1998, 2009; Janssen 2007; Enfield 2008; Sandler forth.), and more specifically on the dialogical theory of language and meaning (Wold 1992; Linell 1998; Ducrot 1984) and within Cognitive Linguistics proper (Croft 2009), Du Bois' work on resonance and implications drawn from it for grammar (also Brône and Zima 2014), and work on fictive interaction as well as on intersubjectivity (cf. Trevarthen 1979; Bråten 1998; Traugott [1999] 2003; Traugott and Dasher 2002; Tomasello 1999, 2003; Verhagen 2005; Davidse et al. 2010; Pascual 2002, 2006, 2014). In more specific terms, just as other human behavior is not arbitrary but driven by motivation (cf. Heine 1997), linguistic features and linguistic acts are regarded here as fundamentally motivated by non-linguistic factors (cf. Lakoff 1987; Langacker 1987, 1991; Panther and Radden 2011). On such a view, language fundamentally emerges from the (a) overall cognitive capacities (mental practices) and (b) everyday interactional practices ((linguistic) culture). And it is these two aspects that were the focal point of this dissertation's empirical inquiry.

More precisely, in the qualitative-cum-quantitative research (i.e. Mixed Method Research), conducted at the Faculty of Philosophy in Nis and the Faculty of Philosophy/Philological and Cultural studies in Vienna from January to October 2014, the data had been acquired by means of a practice-guided specifically devised open-ended questionnaire - Dialogic Conceptualisation Test tool (DCTt). The DCTt questionnaire builds on the original Discourse Completion Test idea (cf. Blum-Kulka 1987) of using situational prompts to elicit the responses. However, guided by (a) and (b) above and by blending it with Bakhtinian dialogism (through DA) recast as the pre-reflective dimension preceding and superseding each constellation of situational prompts, the DCTt elaborates and extends the idea further to adequately respond both to the conceptual, i.e. cognitive and the practical, i.e. quotidian reality of situated language use. The incorporation of this socio-phenomenological dimension, i.e. the pre-reflective part in the research (design) makes for an essential methodological addition as it can be a direct gateway to the unconscious socio-cultural knowledge every member of a linguistic community has in her/his possession. As Petitmengin (2006: 240) observes, "becoming aware of the pre-reflective part of our experience involves a break with our customary attitude, which tends to be to act without being

conscious of the way we are going about it, without even being conscious of this lack of consciousness". Elaborating further, one of the predominant reasons why we may "have difficulty gaining an awareness of our subjective experience is that even at those moments when our attention is concentrated on a given activity, we are entirely absorbed by the objective" (ibid.). In other words, we are absorbed by the results to be achieved, the `what´ and not, or only very slightly, are we aware of the way in which we try to achieve this objective and, thus, the object-to-be-known, that is the ´how´. Moreover, based on evidence empirical (neuro)phenomenology offers, throughout any interview of the pre-reflective elicitation type, it is this "question ´how´ which triggers the conversion of the attention of the interviewee towards her/his pre-reflective internal processes" (Petitmengin 2006: 241), and permits the awareness of these processes.

In keeping with the general MMR modus operandi, and drawing on the methodological work by Dörnyei (2007), Creswell (2014; also Creswell and Miller 2000) and Woodrow (2014), the strategies that were used to address the study-reliability included the triangulation of data, an effective organization system for the collected data in the form of a systematic and fully searchable mini-corpus of responses, followed by the establishment of a clear chain of evidence to detail and document the data (responses) acquisition process. The strategies used to address this study´s internal validity encompassed multiple sources of data, member checks during the data collection phase and verbatim written transcripts.

The strategies used to address the external validity, i.e. the generalizability of the findings included the description of the typicality of the participants' responses and formulation of their rationalisations (commonly held assumptions about how people within a specific community think about linguistic culture and interaction) in the form of semantic explications[138] - cultural scripts, phrased in simple and translatable terms,

[138] "Semantic explications are explanatory paraphrases, framed in the metalanguage of simple and universal semantic primes (NSM). They can range in length from two or three words to literally dozens of interrelated clauses. They are essentially "texts" composed in a specified subset of ordinary language. Though they are composed of discrete elements (i.e. words or bound morphemes), semantic explications can be phrased so as to accommodate the subjectivity and vagueness of many meanings." (cf. homepage https://intranet.secure.griffith.edu.au/schools-departments/natural-semantic-metalanguage/semantic-explications)

i.e. using the metalanguage of universal semantic primes (NSM[139]) thus, following the approach progenitors, "minimising the danger of ethnocentric bias finding its way into the very terms of the explicative descriptions[140]" (cf. Goddard and Wierzbicka 2014). In other words, "using the NSM metalanguage wards off implicit Anglocentrism and standardizes the terms of description" (cf. Goddard and Ye 2015: 1). Incorporating this into the methodological dimension, the results were presented in a comprehensive descriptive-cum-explicative manner so that also the readers themselves could compare the applicability of these findings against their context and experience. Preceding the pre-reflective and the situational question-constellations, the participants were asked to provide the basic sociodemographic data (age and gender) that were to form an additional analytic dimension. However, the responses did not reveal them to be the source of conspicuously different either cognitive or realisational patterns within either of the cultures.

The core of the study, the written dialogue (i.e. the DCTt questionnaire-introview[141]) with the informants, has been conducted throughout four thematic ethnographic units:

I Phenomenological dimension: Pre-reflective consciousness;
II Native pragmatic dimension: Explicit context;
III Non-native pragmatic dimension: Explicit context;
IV Non-native pragmatic dimension: Implicit context;

[139] Following Goddard (2006: 3) the natural semantic metalanguage theory (see also Wierzbicka 1996a; Goddard and Wierzbicka eds 1994, also 2002, Goddard, Wierzbicka, Fabrega 2014c; Goddard 1998; Goddard ed. in press) "is based on evidence supporting the view that, despite their enormous differences, all languages share a small but stable core of simple shared meanings (semantic primes), that these meanings have concrete linguistic exponents as words or word-like expressions in all languages, and that they share a universal grammar of combination, valence, and complementation, i.e, in any natural language one can isolate a small vocabulary and grammar which has precise equivalents in all other languages."

[140] Cf. https://intranet.secure.griffith.edu.au/schools-departments/natural-semantic-metalanguage (the Natural Semantic Metalanguage program homepage)

[141] Portmanteau designating the confluence of introspection and interview in a single method of inquiry.

I Phenomenological dimension: Pre-reflective consciousness (DAT). Within this thematic unit the informants were asked to state their stance towards the act of apologising and what they understood the apologetic speech act to be, as well as which specific contextual factors give/do not give rise to it. In terms of the underlying goal, this thematic unit, comprising a constellation of four questions, was intended to initiate and elicit the pre-reflectivness concerning the informant's:

(A) implicit perception of the apologetic speech act behaviour viz.

1) [142] object of research, i.e. the apologetic speech act:
Do you apologise? (a) Yes b) Sometimes c) No)

2)[143] object-to-be-known, i.e. the overarching cultural-contextual dimension, manifest in the motivation viz. community specific mental practices underlying both the cognitive (perception-conceptualisation) and the verbal (realisation) patterns:
a) In which situations you do/do not apologise? b) Why?

(B) explicit perception of the apologetic speech act behaviour viz. community-specific explicit realisational patterns at:

3)[144] Interactive level *How do you apologise (verbally or by compensating action or, etc.)?*
Lexical level *What is your usual verbal apologetic phrase?*
Mental-practices level[145][146]
- Which of the following aspects do you take into account when formulating your speech act (*please circle all that applies):

[142] Close-ended

[143] Open-ended

[144] Open-ended

[145] Close-ended

[146] Empirical/methodological application of Bakhtin's dialogic architectonics triad (DAT)

[a] actively determined and anticipated the possible answer of the person you are addressing;
[b] how the person you are addressing would perceive/understand your speech act;
[c] extent to which the person you are addressing is informed about the situation itself;
[d] person's (listener's) views, convictions and prejudices (* from OUR point of view);
[e] person's (listener's) sympathies and antipathies;
[f] posture and body language of the person you are addressing;
- Do you think your speech act is a (direct) product of your (*please circle the most representative answer):
[a] strategic approach to communication;
[b] need to take into consideration (and incorporate into your speech act) the feelings, as well as all the other relevant aspects, of the person you addressed;

What these introductory questions made possible is, on the one hand, the establishment of a common dialogic relational code between the informant (I), the study author (other) as the interviewer-by-proxy (questionnaire) and the practices (higher-other) underlying the object of the research - language use (apologetic speech acts) whose dynamics was then observed in practice (thematic units/questions II, III and IV). This way the informant was first given the freedom to decide on her/his own the above relational code (1 and 2a) and the variety of manifesting situations[147] (2b), as well as forms of interactional (3a) and lexical (3b) realisation, before also explicitly defining what s/he understands to be the relational code itself in terms of explicit constituents (4) and motivation (5) in general, and in particular linguistic cultures - native (6, 7) and non-native (8, 9, 10, 11). This has allowed the researcher to gain a more direct insight into a) whether there is any discrepancy between the declarative and the practical behaviour, i.e. if the practical linguistic behaviour is in agreement with informants' (linguistic) perception and b) where this perception comes together to reveal the underlying linguistic culture of each of the two constellations of informants (in both formal and informal/explicit and implicit context).

[147] I.e. context

The aim of the remaining three pragmatic thematic units was to provide an insight into how the pre-reflective consciousness (DAT) of informants (perceiving subjects), i.e. their (communal-) relevance driven pragmatic inferential mechanism (mental practices) directs the perceptive consciousness and realisation of the perceived object (apologetic speech act) in variable constellations of contextual factors (interlocutor relationship, severity of offense, formality/informality of situation, explicit/implicit situationality). In other words, the role of the practical part was, first, to provide a setting for the natural unfolding of the dialectics between apologetic speech act practice and Bakhtin's dialogic architectonics (DA), operationalised here as DAT, as a case in point for, in Verschueren's (2011: 34) terms, 'essential minimal-universality assumption'[148], manifested practically as the set of conceptualisation and production choices stemming from a variable range of options that are created in a negotiable manner, inter-adapting with communicative needs, by making full use of the reflexivity of the human mind. And pursuant to this, second, to provide the dialectic setting for DAT:

a) as a metapragmatic lens for the unfolding of what Clyne (1994) and Bennett (1998) identify as "subjective [c]ulture" and Meier (1996, 2010), specifying the notion further, as "awareness of underlying cultural variables"

b) through its linguistic-lexical extension - NSM, and resulting explanans - cultural scripts, as a metapragmatic lens for explicating the influence of the, aforementioned, cultural variables on apologetic speech act conceptualization and performance (i.e. production).

In technical terms, the test battery (DCTt questionnaire) encompassed two larger groups of questions or activities. First of the two (questions under I) concerned providing answers to the specific questions, while the second of the two (situations under II) concerned providing (or not providing) the specific apologetic phrase/speech act in nine situations which (as the pilot study has shown), according to the conventions, social and interaction norms in the cultural scenarios of the specific (linguistic) cultures', mostly require/elicit an apologetic speech act. Within the first

[148] the de rigueur starting point for a culturally non-biased explicative theory of communicative acts

group informants were asked to circle (close-ended question) as well as write their own personalised answers to the questions referring to the informant's personal experience of, feelings and stance towards the act of apologising viz. if s/he apologises, in which situations and which usual phrase would s/he use. These questions from the first group were presupposed as, in a way, global controllers and the background for the questions in the second group, which comprise the central part of the questionnaire. What was especially important was to establish the relationship between the personal/individual stance toward apologetic acting and the established, nurture-motivated need of the informants (students) to apologise in the concrete situation which was to be recognised as the one that requires apologetic acting. The second group of questions purported the acquiring of the concrete apologetic phrase elicited discursively in different ways by means of nine questions and according to the parameters of social distance, interlocutor(s) role and interlocutor(s) relative power, i.e. the existing hierarchy between interlocutors. First two questions of the second group concerned the apologetic verbal reaction in informal context, between the interlocutors in an emotional, i.e. familial relationship, whereas the third question concerned apologetic acting in formal context, where the hierarchy between the interlocutors was clear and the power of one of the interlocutors was ensured by a higher institutional position. The following three questions followed a similar formal/informal logic (two formal and one informal situation), however, they concerned apologetic acting in the informant's non-native, i.e. Anglo/English linguistic culture. The last group of questions also involved informant's apologetic acting in her/his non-native linguistic culture, with one crucial difference, viz. acting in a-contextualised (implicit context) situations. The special role of this set of questions was to provide the setting for investigating the (socio-cognitive) "semantic completeness" (cf. Akhutina [1984]2003: 5) of the (apologetic speech act) utterance, as this is what makes it susceptible to evaluation and, thus, answerable in nature (in the sense that an individual can adopt a particular position in response to it).

After the informants have personally defined the notion of apology and delimited its constitutive dimensions, elements and the relational triad 'I-other-Higher-Other' in the previous segment, the three situational segments made it possible to gain a better insight into the effects of the triad onto the adoption/use of a particular code and,

more specifically, its manifestation in a particular linguistic code - apologetic speech act.

II Native pragmatic dimension: Explicit context. Within this thematic unit the informants were asked to "put their pre-reflective consciousness to practice" through the dialogue with their native linguistic culture in the form of three situations[149] rich in context (explicit situationality) and contextual factors (interlocutor relationship, severity of offense, formality/informality of situation):

2a It is your girlfriend's/boyfriend's birthday. You didn't buy the birthday present you promised because of an urgent matter that required your immediate attention. To your great misfortune all the shops have already closed. You say:

2b Saturday night. Earlier that day your mother asked you to go to the library and pick up a book for her which she has been dying to read for a long time. However, you've completely forgotten about it and have arrived home quite late. You find her reading Men are from Mars, and women are from Venus. You say:

2c A student is meeting a professor to return the book borrowed quite some time ago. However, only moments before the scheduled meeting, the student discovers that the book is not in the bag.

Professor: I hope you brought the book I lent you.
Student: (Reply)

III Non-native pragmatic dimension: Explicit context. Building on the previous thematic unit, the aim of this thematic unit was to provide the settings for investigating how the informants' pre-reflective consciousness/DAT is manifested/interacts with and in the non-native linguistic culture (here, English linguistic culture) in terms of adaptability[150]. As in the previous segment, the

[149] For the original version of the situation in Serbian and Austrian German respectively see the original questionnaires in the appendix

[150] As Verschueren (2008: 17; also Verschueren and Brisard 2009) point out, successful communicative use of language is only possible thanks to the Adaptability of the human mind, in relation to which all the processes

informants were asked to "put their pre-reflective-consciousness to practice", this time however through the dialogue with their non-native linguistic culture elicited by the three situations[151] also rich in context (explicit situationality) and contextual factors (interlocutor relationship, severity of offense, formality/informality of situation):

3d A respectable multinational company has invited you to a job interview. You are running late because of the heavy traffic. When you finally do arrive at your destination, you find that the car park is packed. After a while, you manage to find free parking space. Unfortunately, just as you were trying to park, all of a sudden a Mercedes squeezed in between and occupied the lot. Furious, you get out of your car and start shouting and swearing at the owner of the car. Later on, after having parked the car across the street, you walk into the office to be interviewed only to find that the man you just cussed out is your potential boss. He's staring at you in amazement. You say:

3e A party organised by your girlfriend/boyfriend. In the course of the night a living room window gets smashed. At first the identity of the culprit is unknown. But soon after the incident the s/he discovers that you have had one pint of beer too many and in your dancing frenzy accidentally threw it at the window, breaking it into pieces. Realising what you have done, you rush to the her/him to offer an apology:

3f It is your first week at work in your father's company, where you were engaged as a project manager. Yesterday, you were scheduled to go to an important project meeting, but having completely forgotten about it, you missed it. The next day, you encounter the general manager in the elevator who gives you a questioning look.
You say:

---

occupy a specific status; this relationship between the meaning-generating processes and the human mind (i.e. salience) allows for various levels of conscious intentionality and reflexivity or metapragmatic awareness.

[151] For the original version of the situation in Serbian and Austrian German respectively see the original questionnaires in the appendix

III Non-native pragmatic dimension: Implicit context. In this segment special attention has been given to and focus placed on *a-contextualisation* (absence of explicit context), and how it affects the dialogue between the human mind (pre-reflective consciousness/dialogism) and the meaning-generating processes (speech act interpretation, conceptualisation, production). The main goal was to determine more precisely what the relationship between context and structure is in the process of meaning generation, i.e. to define its "locus" of the apologetic speech acts in each of the linguistic cultures through triangulation with DAT. In other words, to identify what specific constellation of morpho-syntactic elements, i.e. sentence types (interrogative, declarative, exclamatory) and pre-reflective elements elicits the felicitous apologetic speech act in a-contextualised settings, in non-native linguistic culture.

4g Father: How on earth did you manage to smash the car?
You:

4h Dean: You should have never cheated on the exam.
You:

4i Wife/Husband: The hell with your excuses!
You:

4.3.5 Participants

The empirical research study that constitutes the groundwork for this dissertation saw 103 informants take active part, divided in two groups. One group (52 informants) consisted of students studying at the University of Vienna's Department of English and American Studies, while the second group (51) consisted of their colleagues studying at the University of Nis' department of English Language and Literature, whose age was 19-22. The reason for structuring the test battery, i.e. the DCTt, this way is the following. The specificities of each (linguistic) cultures' underlying

cultural scripts ('invisible control mechanisms'[152]) needed to be brought to the surface. Guided by Hall's (1983: 230) conclusion that we only become aware of such cultural scripts once these have been "severely challenged for e.g. by exposure to a different culture", I have particularly chosen the, aforementioned, informants who study the English language because they have already been to a lesser or greater degree in touch with some other cultural script other than their own, here the Anglo cultural script in particular.

[152] Hall (1983: 230, also 1976)

Chapter 5

Study Results: Analysis and Interpretation

5.1

Introduction

In order to lay out and explicate the complex interplay of constituents in a situated conversational exchange identified in the empirical part of the research, we shall look back at the existent "matrix" of possible answers to the question of the locus of cultural-contextual determination of acts of linguistic interaction proposed by Wierzbicka (1998: 242):

(a) in different societies and different communities people speak differently - not just in terms of lexicon and grammar;

(b) such differences in the ways of speaking are both profound and systematic;

(c) these differences reflect different cultural values or, at least, different hierarchies of values;

(d) the ways of speaking that are characteristic of a given linguistic community/culture cannot be satisfactorily described (let alone explained) in purely behavioural terms as they actually constitute a behavioural manifestation of a tacit system of 'cultural rules' (i.e. 'cultural scripts');

(e) to understand a society's ways of language use ('linguistic culture'), we need to identify and articulate its implicit 'cultural scripts';

(f) to be able to do this without ethnocentric bias we need a universal, language-independent perspective, which can be achieved if the aforementioned 'rules' (i.e. 'code') are stated in terms of cognitive-lexical universals - a confluence of a universal cognitive substrate (Dialogic Architectonic Triad) and its 'language' of

expression (Natural Semantic Metalanguage), consisting of human conceptslexicalized in all[153] languages of the world" (1998: 242).

With this in mind, if we try to simplify and apply Bakhtin's theory we can say that this perspective suggests that every conversational exchange involves three "participants": I (addressor), other (addressee) and Higher-Other (super-addressee). I implies the one who conveys the message to the Other; Other, the one who receives the message expressed in a shared code[154]; Higher-Other, the one who stands for the voice of the collective being (e.g. system of shared values and beliefs) which modifies both how the message will be conceptualised and expressed on the one hand, and understood on the other hand. In accordance with this, I suggest one possible alternative interpretation of Bakhtin which considers every linguistic exchange as an exchange of a specific code: each linguistic message a person expresses is a reflection of the (linguistic) culture which this person belongs to, i.e. the manner in which the Other (addressee) receives and interprets the message is determined by her/his linguistic-cultural background. In this sense, the Higher-Other represents the implicit layers in every act, i.e. specifically with regards to the focal point of this thesis, an interpretive background against which individuals position their own speech acts and those of others (cf. Goddard 2012a: 482).

Since my research explores the possible ways in which Bakhtin's matrix is manifested in every day speech act practice, our alternative perspective 'translates' the above concepts (I, Other and Higher-Other) into three main processes which we have identified and, for the purposes of this study, symbolically termed as:

1) Evaluation

2) Assumption (anticipation)

3) Expectation

[153] The current extensive list can be found at NSM program homepage https://intranet.secure.griffith.edu.au/schools-departments/natural-semantic-metalanguage/downloads

[154] I.e. shared frame of reference for a given speech community (Wierzbicka 1998 et.al.)

5.2

Evaluation

Beginning with the self, as indicated above, the concept of I finds its expression in practice as the process of ‘evaluation’. All processes are guided by a specific set of signpost questions. The key questions that are revealed in the process of evaluation are:

-What is my position?
-Am I guilty/responsible?
-Should I apologise?

It is based on these questions that the subject, i.e. the addressor, evaluates her/his position in a given interactive relation as well as how s/he will further (re)act in accordance with that evaluation. The trajectory on which this evaluation takes place is characterised by the following points and scope: guilty/responsible/indebted <-> not guilty/responsible/indebted. The evaluation itself is performed with respect to two types of factors: 1) the external and 2) the internal factors. The former, `external factors`, can represent the addressor’s perception of certain (objective) circumstances, i.e. something that is out of her/his control (for e.g. some unpredictable circumstances such as a train delay, traffic jam, etc.). The latter, `internal factors`, refer more to the system of beliefs and values, and to the attempt at rationalisation of one’s personal behaviour (i.e. 'why does one consider her/himself to be in that position’). Based on this groundwork, we can differentiate between those who tie themselves to:

a) Personal (moral) code - when people truly believe that their personal code instructs them to apologise, because they feel guilty/responsible/indebted. This translates into apology as a moral duty which is followed by such explanations as for e.g. “I would never forgive it if someone would not apologise to me in the same situation, that is my duty, it’s logical...”, “What sort of a person would I be if I did not apologise in

such a situation...", "I don't feel good if I don't apologise (as if I were not cultured), because I have principles";

Vs.

b) Shared belief - when it is acted in accordance with what is learned behaviour, by inertion, which is usually rationalised through the following routinised thinking, made manifest in such expressions as: "one is supposed to apologise in such situations, it's expected of me...", "That's how I was raised" etc. In this case, the act of apologising itself is determined in relation to the 3rd interlocutor (the higher-other addressee) who symbolically represents not only the 'other', but 'all the others', a specific community, a specific society.

Viewed like this, what can be concluded is that "evaluation" is performed in relation to I (personal system of values and contextual sensitivity), in relation to the "other" (how I evaluate the position of the other) and in relation to "(all) Others"[155] (how I perceive the wider social community and how I internalise the implicit and the explicit principles and norms valid and being enacted in that particular community). The matrix of the moments that constitute the process of evaluation can be represented in the form of the following semiotic chain proposed by the present author:

Figure 1 *Evaluation*



[155] I.e. Higher-Other

5.3

Assumption/Anticipation

The next essential process that we identify is the ‘process of assumption (anticipation)’. Just as the process of ‘evaluation’, this process is revealed in the following questions:

- Even if I am/am not guilty/responsible/indebted, does it, nevertheless, still ‘pay off’ for me to admit that?
- Does the other side (interlocutor) view my position in the same way as I do?

What the process of assumption/anticipation allows the interlocutor (addressor) to do in practice is to ‘assume/anticipate’ how the other observes and sees her/his position, and, pursuant to this assumption, whether it, metaphorically speaking, “pays off” to take/not to take the blame, i.e. to accept/not accept responsibility. In other words, whether this particular situation is a situation in which the interlocutor should/should not apologise. In that way, actually, the interlocutor (addressor) herself/himself - makes anticipations of someone’s social and personal identity (Goffman 1963: 2), especially if it is the case of formal situations in which the interlocutors do not have at their disposal a wide range of information about one another (e.g. a job interview with the future employer). That is to say, s/he anticipates if, and to what extent, the interlocutor on the other side of the communicative chain shares the same “cultural code”, i.e. a common cultural denominator (here cultural script(s)). While the, aforementioned, process of “evaluation” is performed from the point of view (i.e. perspective) of the subject her/himself, the process of “anticipation” is actually the process of transposition. In it, the subject “distorts/refracts” her/his perspective in an attempt to see things from the perspective of the Other. The matrix of the moments that constitute the process of assumption/anticipation can be represented in the form of the following semiotic chain:

Figure 2 *Assumption/Anticipation*



The importance of this specific type of "constructing" of the 'Other' is that, in the final line, it determines the interlocutor's final evaluation of *if* and *how* a person is to apologise. Alignment with the "Other" becomes all the more necessary because the act of apologising itself will not have the intended meaning, i.e. will not be felicitous unless there exists a mutual unspoken agreement on the meaning of the apologetic act. Therefore, as a direct result of this, the person addressing the other interlocutor is 'compelled' to also "construct" the addressee's 'constructions' of the given situation, which s/he exactly does by locating the so called common cultural code, i.e. denominator.

5.4

Expectation

The final point on our concept-to-process translational trajectory is the process of "expectation". In this particular process we recognise two vital constituting aspects:

1) The Cultural-linguistic aspect - the expected, routinised, form of apology, i.e. the "packing" of the apology according to the conventions of the genre. Expressed in more functional, i.e. interactive terms - how should I formulate my speech act so that it is both clear and so that it conveys an unambiguous message to the interlocutor on the receiving side of the communicative chain;

2) The Pragmatic aspect - my expectation that all these "actions" and "calculations" - evaluation and assumption (anticipation) concerning the necessity of my apologising/not apologising, the socio-cultural value (interactive felicity) of (my) apology and the pursuant "packing" of the apology - I perform and make will, in effect, have a positive effect on my position in the communicative-interaction chain.

Applying this to the dimension of realisation, we are able to felicitously 'pack' our linguistic product (the apologetic speech act) owing to the evaluation and assumption (anticipation) that I and my interlocutor share the common cultural code, (i.e. susceptible language (the choice of expressions, routinised expressions, the 'adjustment' of the tone and intonation), body language (gesticulation, mimics) etc.).

Invoking the former two processes again, while in the process of 'evaluation' the subject observes things from her/his own perspective and in the process of '"assumption/anticipation" s/he attempts to transfer her/himself into the position of the "Other", in the process of "expectation" the circumstances, the given situation and the participants in this very situation are observed from and aligned with the perspective of the entire socio-cultural community. That is to say, from the standpoint of the omnipresent "third participant" (Higher-other addressee) within whom all the

rules, habits, behaviours, beliefs and customs of a particular community are generated.

This omnipresent invisible participant - the face of the community, is often embodied in the term "common sense"" - that which is "logical", generally recognised and generally accepted in a community as a rule/norm or a request. The matrix of the moments that constitute the process of 'expectation' can be represented in the form of the following semiotic circle:

Figure 3 *Expectation*

At this point a unified summation of the triad can be made to allow all the three processes to come together into a more coherent and complete picture:



Figure 4 Dialogic(al) Architectonics Triad (DAT)

But what is it that, actually, urges us to constantly construct and reconstruct the representations about ourselves and the others in the apologetic speech acts? One, fairly straightforward and uncomplicated, answer can be - interest. Regardless of whether we are conforming to the "Other" or to the rules of one entire community, we are doing this out of personal interest (which is sometimes material and sometimes symbolic in nature), i.e. so that we could improve our personal position. In this sense, we can observe the speech act itself as a sort of a (language-)game of coding-decoding in which, conditionally speaking, the physical face of the apology (words, expressions, phrases we use and the manner in which we use them) turns into something that is akin to goods , namely, something that has its price and value at a particular societal-cultural market and in particular contexts. Thus, for example, in some situations/contexts we reveal that the apologetic speech act itself practically does not have any value on its own, unless it is followed up by an additional (most often material) compensating act ("I'll buy you a present", "I'll pay/compensate for/repair the damage" etc.).

In other words, the fact that someone apologised is not as significant as the fact that someone did not apologise, exactly because in some situations (and in accordance with the explicit/implicit agreements between the members of a certain cultural(ed)

community) apology is expected and presupposed, why its absence can be interpreted as the "rebellion" against the common code. Or, roughly speaking, it can be interpreted as an assault on the collective and, thus, on everything that is understood as the "common-sense" (Serb. doxa) (which would as a consequence also fundamentally rework the social community's cultural matrix (cf. Perovic 2009). It is exactly in this point that we reveal the "trade(ing)" potential of apologies, because the interlocutors are, so to speak, playing (on) the trump card of apology, recognising its potential and calculating how to make the best possible use of it at a given moment.

5.5

Combinatorial Classification

The analysis of the data that were acquired in the course of the mixed-method research gave rise to the valuable classificatory combinations (to be discussed below) which, in consonance with the dialogic exploratory-cum-explicative nature of the research are not final and can be further elaborated on, modified and extended in future research studies.

In keeping with the above explicated paradigm (the simultaneous (inter)active occurrence of the three identified processes: 'evaluation', 'assumption (anticipation)', 'expectation') the following schema of the possible combinations makes for this authors original contribution to the study of apologetic speech acts:

1) – **evaluation must be extremely negative** (the more guilty/responsible I feel, the more need I will feel to apologise)

+ **it is beneficial to accept the blame** (it pays off because the other person/interlocutor experiences it the same way)

+ **I expect that this other person/interlocutor will recognise the "code"**

2) – **I do not feel guilty:**

a) it is/was not up to me

b)...still, I will apologise (because it is expected of me):

± a) I will apologise, but say it was not my fault/I am not to blame

b) I will apologise, but, in spite of not being guilty, I will say I am to blame because I will gain some benefit (it is expected)

± expectation that it is important to apologise (the other side/interlocutor acknowledges and values that)

3) – **I am not to blame (circumstances)**

+ I have to come up with an excuse, because the truth is not acceptable

+ lie is what is expected ("beneficial/white lie")

4) + **I am to blame**

– truth is not desirable, i.e. to stick to the above formulation "lie is what is expected"

+ beneficial/white lie

In what follows I will analyse and interpret the responses from the corpus through the matrix proposed above. In doing so, I will be providing examples for each of the points from both the Serbian and Austrian informants, thus, contrasting them via a side-by-side juxtaposition. This way the conceptualisation, and the resulting realisational, idiosyncrasies common to each of the two cultures/communities, will reveal themselves more straightforwardly.

5.5.1 Combinations in Practice

This study aims to illustrate the intricate connections that exist between the features of a given language and the underlying culture-specific conceptualizations. In the light of this, the triangulation of practice, combinations and the elicited apologetic speech acts have revealed the following (linguistic-)culture specific manifestations as transparent.

5.5.1.1

Combination 1

In the instance when evaluation must be extremely negative (–), the more guilty/responsible the person feels, the more need s/he will feel to apologise. As revealed by my corpus, this is manifested in the following way in (speech act) practice:

(Ser/3dF[156]) Participant 2: I'm really sorry, I don't usually act like this. I was just very nervous because this means a lot to me and I thought that I was going to miss this opportunity… I'm sorry that I'm crying.

(Aut/3dF) Participant 2: Oh my God, I am very sorry about what happened before, but I really wanted to be in time and I was searching endlessly to find a parking space...So I got very angry. I know it wasn't right to act like that. I am so sorry.

Participant 4 (Ser/3eI[157]): I am terribly sorry. I didn't mean to do it. I didn't even mean to get drunk. I feel so awful. I am sorry. I will pay for the damage.

Participant 2 (Aut/2aI): Es tut mir unendlich leid. Ich wollte dir heute dein Geschenk kaufen, doch dann ist mir etwas ganz wichtig dazwischen gekommen und danach haben alle Geschäfte zugesperrt. Ich bringe es dir morgen vorbei. Ich hoffe du bist nicht böse.

Participant 28 (Ser/2cF): Profesore, ja sam nažalost zaboravio knjigu, izvinite na neodgovornosti. Da li biste mogli da me sačekate da se brzo vratim kući I donesem Vam je ili da se nađemo neki drugi put? (Professor, I have unfortunately forgotten the book, excuse my irresponsibility. Could you wait for me to go back home quickly and bring it to you, or should we meet some other time?)

[156] F = formal situation

[157] I = informal situation

Participant 22 (Aut/2cF): Ich muss mich tausend Mal bei Ihnen entschuldigen. Ich habe es leider nicht dabei. Das ist mir wirklich sehr leid. Ich hofe sie glauben mir.

In the instance when it is beneficial to accept the blame (+) the person does so as it "pays off", because the other person/interlocutor has the same experience of it as the addressor. To quote the words of the respondents themselves:

Participant 3 (Ser/4hF): I am sorry, I was wrong.

Participant 6 (Ser/3dF): Please, forgive me for my inappropriate behavior a few minutes ago, but this interview was very important to me and I was eager to arrive on time.

Participant 24 (Aut/3dF): Oh I'm so sorry for shouting at you, please excuse my behaviour. I was so stressed because of the interview.

Participant 7 (Ser/4hF): I'm truly sorry for what I have done, I sincerely regret it.

Participant 25 (Aut/4hF): I know that I have done something terrible and I do apologize for my actions!

Participant 8 (Ser/3dF): I'm really sorry I shouted at you. I thought I would be late for the interview. Anyways, the way I behaved wasn't appropriate. Once more, I offer you my apology.

Participant 22 (Aut/2bI): Oh nein! Mama, nein, das hab ich ja total vergessen! Ich bin so ungeschickt! Es tut mir leid.

Participant 27 (Aut/2cF): Leider muss ich Ihnen sagen, dass ich vergessen habe das Buch in meine Tasche zu stecken, es tu mir Leid!! Ich werde Ihnen das Buch so bald wie möglich bringen!

Finally, based on the mutual silent agreement on the meaning of the apologetic act, established on the grounds of the so-called common cultural code, i.e. denominator,

the person expects that the other person/interlocutor will recognise the "code" (+) and acts in accordance with that expectation. This manifests itself in practice as:

Participant 3 (Aut/2aI): Ich habe jetzt leider nichts Materielles für dich, aber ich schenke dir meine ewige Freundschaft!

Participant 12 (Ser/2aI): Neću da te lažem: nisam stigao da ti kupim poklon. Stvarno mi je žao. Prvom prilikom ću ti se iskupiti, obećavam. (I'm not going to lie: I didn't manage to buy you the present. I'm really sorry. I'll make it up to you the first chance I get, I promise.)

Participant 5 (Aut/3fF): I know that there is no excuse that I missed the important project meeting yesterday, but would you be so kind to tell me what was going on. It won't happen again.

Participant 18 (Ser/4iI): I know that my excuses are hard to believe but I don't want to lie to you. What can I do when strange things happen to me?

Participant 10 (Aut/4hI): Yeah I know. I don't know why I did anyway - I felt so insecure.

Participant 20 (Ser/3fF): Everyone makes mistakes.

Participant 11 (Aut/3dF): I would say with a smile: It wasn't very kind of you to steal my slot!

Participant 15 (Ser/4hF): It won't happen again. There is nothing I can do now to make it go away. But I can promise you this.

5.5.1.2

Combination 2

This specific combinatorial matrix is indicative of how the person may act in situations when s/he does not feel guilty (–) but, nevertheless, still needs to provide an apologetic compensation suited to the situation/transgression. In practice, this is revealed to have a specific dyadic manifestation. Namely:

a) It is (was) not up to me

Participant 2 (Ser/4hI): I know but I was so scared and I totally forgot about everything, so those were just side-notes to remind me…

Participant 3 (Aut/3dF): Oh my God, if I had known that before...But at least, you could see how important it was for me to be on time. However, I have to admit that my behaviour was truly unprofessional. I hope you'll give me a second chance to show you that I'm actually quite a decent person. Fresh start?

Participant 9 (Ser/2aI): Objasnim mu situaciju u nadi da će razumeti.
(I will explain the situation hoping s/he will understand.)

Participant 3 (Aut/4hF): Yeah, I know, morally incorrect. But this performance-oriented society makes me go sideways and makes me do things I don't even wanna do!

Participant 9 (Ser/4gI): I really don't know! It's not my fault! The other car driver was a woman and she couldn't turn left!

Participant 5 (Aut/4gI): It was not my fault. A man drove against my car.

Participant 10 (Ser/4gI): It's not my fault. Some drunk driver hit me.

Participant 7 (Aut/4gI): I don't know, it wasn't my fault!

Participant 13 (Ser/3fF): Hello, I totally forgot about the meeting. Work was just too much confusing yesterday.

Participant 8 (Aut/2bI): Ich hab später auf die Uni müssen und dann hat die Bib zugehabt.

Participant 15 (Ser/3dF): What a lovely manifestation of karma, ha ha…So, do I have any chance at all now?

Participant 11 (Aut/3dF): I would say with a smile: That wasn't very kind of you to steal my lot!

Participant 15 (Ser/4hF): I know, but it was too difficult and some of my friends had the questions, and I wanted to get a better grade.

Participant 13 (Aut/2bI): Nichts. Wenn ich am Vormittag darauf vergessen habe, denke ich in den Regel auch am Abend nicht daran.

b) **it is not up to me, but still I will apologise (because that is expected of me)**:

±b1) **I will apologise, but say it was not my fault/I am not to blame**

Participant 45 (Ser/4gI): I'm sorry but it wasn't my fault.

Participant 26 (Aut/3eI): I'm sorry, I'm stoned, but I'm gonna pay for that.

Participant 50 (Ser/3dF): Well, this is unexpected, I'd like to apologize for my behavior. I was under a lot of stress today. Once again, I am sorry for taking it out on you.

Participant 30 (Aut/3fF): I apologize, but there was a more important obligation I had to attend to.

Participant 44 (Ser/3dF): I'm really sorry, I was stuck in the traffic jam and I had a problem with the elevator in the building.

Participant 43 (Ser/4gI): I'm sorry, it just happened. That could happen to you.

Participant 40 (Ser/2aI): Izvini. Nisam stigla zbog neodložne obaveze. Nadoknadiću ti. (Sorry. I didn't make it because of a chore that couldn't be postponed. I'll make it up to you.)

Participant 34 (Ser/2bI): Mama, molim te izvini, mnogo obaveza sam imala danas, nisam stigla da odem do biblioteke. (Mom, sorry please, I had a lot to do today and couldn't make it to the library.)

Participant 21 (Aut/2aI): Es tut mir leid, es ist mir etwas unvorgesehen inzwischen gekommen, du bekommst dein Geschenk morgen.

Participant 17 (Aut/3eI): Sorry, I was too drunk to realize what I was doing.

Participant 10 (Aut/2cF): Ehm, ich hatte es eingepackt! Jetzt ist es aber nicht da! Ich verstehe das nicht! Entschuldigen Sie bitte, ich kümmere mich darum und bringe es Ihnen so schnell wie möglich vorbei!

Participant 38 (Aut/2cF): Em..Dis Sache ist die, dass ich heute eine Prüfung hatte und deshalb völlig vergessen habe. Ich bringe es Ihnen morgen. Versprochen!

b2) **I will apologise but, in spite of not being guilty, I will say I am to blame because I will gain some benefit ((and) because this is what is expected of me)**

Participant 13 (Ser/3dF): It's kind of a funny story. The traffic was terrible. I was late as it was, and I really didn't want to miss the interview. I apologize, I was nervous.

Participant 15 (Ser/2aI): 'Dobićeš poklon čim se radnje otvore', izviniću se i posvetiti veću pažnju toj osobi. (You will get the present as soon as the stores open.' I will apologise and give more attention to that person.)

Participant 10 (Aut/4gI): It was really slippery and I didn't drive carefully enough. Sorry dad, I'll work and pay it back! I am really, really sorry!

Participant 2 (Aut/3dF): Oh my God, I am very sorry about this before, but I really wanted to be in time and I was searching endlessly to find a parking space...So I got very angry. I know it wasn't right to act like that. I am so sorry.

Participant 3 (Aut/4gI): I don't know. It definitely wasn't on purpose, I'm sorry. I'll be much more careful in the future.

Participant 7 (Aut/2aI): Es tut mir echt leid, dass ich es nicht rechtzeitig erschafft hab dir etwas Schönes zu kaufen. Ich hole dir aber auf jeden Fall noch sobald diese stressige Zeit vorbei ist.

±c) **expectation that it is important to apologise (the other side/interlocutor acknowledges and values that)**:

Participant 46 (Ser/3dF): Oh, I really feel obliged to express my apologies for my previous behavior.

Participant 3 (Aut/3fF): Well, I think I owe you an apology. I got to admit that I unfortunately forgot about the meeting yesterday. In fact I was busy working on this really important project. You know that I'm responsible person and I can only but stand for my failure. But I don't even know how to forgive myself for this. Is there anything I can do to make this unhappen?

5.5.1.3

Combination 3

– **I am not to blame (circumstances)**

+ **I have to come up with an excuse, because the truth is not acceptable**:

Participant 49 (Ser/3dF): I'm so sorry, sir, I didn't realize it was you, I just wanted to avoid being late, I hope you understand. I apologize again, sir.

Participant 52 (Aut/4gI): I am so sorry, dad. That other car came out of nowhere and...and everything went so quick...I am sorry...I really am.

Participant 48 (Ser/4hF): I know, but it was really an important exam and I didn't have enough time to study. It won't happen again.

Participant 1 (Aut/3fF): I am so sorry, I couldn't make it to the appointment yesterday, I wasn't feeling very well.

Participant 47 (Ser/2aI): Ljubavi, izvini, znam da nema opravdanja, ali iskrslo mi je (nešto)… Obećavam da ću da ti nadoknadim.
(Lovey, sorry, I know that there is no excuse, but something came up...I promise I'll make it up to you.)

Participant 2 (Aut/4gI): I don't know! I am so sorry but I was in a hurry and suddenly there was the other car and then it was too late...I am sorry!

Participant 45 (Ser/3dF): I'm terribly sorry, I was nervous about the interview. I didn't want to be late.

Participant 8 (Aut/4gI): You know I am a careful driver...It was not my fault, really...

Participant 44 (Ser/2cF): Izvinite, ali knjigu sam zadržala jer još nisam završila čitanje a I imam nekoliko pitanja u vezi knjige. (I'm sorry, but I held onto the book because I still haven't finished reading it, and I have a couple of book related questions.)

Participant 10 (Aut/3dF): Hi! Sorry for that accusation before but you took my spot. I didn't mean to be so rude but that was pretty sneaky. :) Anyway, sorry again! Participant 42 (Ser/2cF): Profesore, jako mi se dopala knjiga I još uvek nisam završila sa njom, još uvek mi treba zbog ispita. Vratiću vam na dan ispita, ali evo donela sam vam moj esej da ga pregledate. (Professor, I really liked the book and I'm not finished with it yet, I still need it for the exam. I'll give it back to you on the day of the exam but, here, I brought my essay for you to review.)

Participant 13 (Aut/4gI): I backed up and didn't see there was another car. I'm sorry.

Participant 14 (Aut/3dF): Hello, Sir. I want to apologise for my behaviour at the parking space. I was stuck in a heavy traffic jam and then I was waiting for about 15 min to get a parking space. I am terrible sorry but that was too much for me.

+ lie is what is expected ("desirable lie"/white lie)

Participant 42 (Ser/2aI): E, izvini ali ovog puta nećeš dobiti poklon. Nisam stigla da ga lepo upakujem, ali kad ga dobiješ, sve će biti nadoknađeno. (Erm...sorry but this time around you won't be getting a present. I didn't manage to pack it nicely, but when you do get it, everything will be made up for.)

Participant 52 (Aut/3fF): Oh my God, did I miss the meeting? Isn't it scheduled for today? I am so sorry. What happened? / What did I miss? / How can I compensate that? I had to take care of family matters. I am so sorry.

Participant 2 (Aut/2cF): Ja Ich weiß das hört sich jetzt vielleicht dumm an..aber ich habe gerade bemerkt, dass ich das Buch vergessen habe. Ich weiß nicht wie das passieren konnte. Es tut mir sehr leid!

Participant 14 (Aut/2aI): Es tut mir wirklich leid, aber mir ist xy dazwischen gekommen und als ich dein Geschenk kaufen wollte, waren die Läden bereits geschlossen. Ich mach' es wiedergut.

Participant 15 (Aut/3dF): I apologize for what happened. I had no idea. Could we maybe forget about that?

Participant 1 (Ser/3dF): I know this is really awkward situation. I'm really sorry for all the shouting, but I was really nervous and annoyed by the fact that I was running late. I really wanted to enter the elevator and I tried to get your attention.

Participant 2 (Ser/3eI): I don't know what happened, it just flew out of my hand… I'm sorry, I'll pay for the repairment.

Participant 3 (Ser/2aI): Nisam stigla da ti kupim poklon na vreme, bila sam u gužvi, izvini. Ali to ne znači da sam zaboravila na tvoj rođendan. Nadoknadiću ti sve uskoro. (I didn't manage to buy you the present on time, I was in a traffic jam, sorry. But that doesn't mean that I've forgotten your birthday. I'll make it up for everything soon.)

5.5.1.4

Combination 4

+ **I am to blame**
  – **truth is not desirable**

Participant 16 (Ser/3eI): I'm sorry, I totally lost control over my body. Can I somehow make up for it?

Participant 3 (Aut/4iI): But don't you know they come from my heart. I'm always honest with you. Isn't that something?

Participant 2 (Ser/2bI): Jaooo, skroz sam zaboravila da ti odem po onu knjigu, izvini, evo idem sutra čim mogu. Pa nisam stigla, stvarno. (Oooooh my, I completely forgot to get you that book, sorry, I'm going there first thing tomorrow.)

Participant 8 (Aut/2cF): Oh Gott, hab die falsche Tasche genommen, ich bring es Ihnen sofort noch.

Participant 3 (Ser/4gI): I am sorry, I don't know what I was thinking.

Participant 5 (Aut/4iI): That wouldn't have happened if I had got more support from you.

Participant 4 (Ser/3dF): I'm really sorry. I know I'm late, it is not polite it is not my fault. I hope you understand.

Participant 6 (Aut/2bI): Es tut mir leid, dass ich es vergessen habe, Mama! Aber du hast, wie ich sehe, (uw) gleich Ersatz gefunden. Ich hole es gleich morgen.

Participant 5 (Ser/3eI): You know that I am clumsy! I'm really sorry.

Participant 8 (Aut/3eI): I am sorry...But it was not only my fault. Tim was also involved, we were just so drunk.

Participant 6 (Ser/3eI): I'm sorry, darling, I am a fool. Please, don't be nervous because of it, we'll get it fixed.

Participant 10 (Ser/3dF): I'm extremely sorry for my behavior. It`s not my day. I usually do not behave like that.

Participant 10 (Aut/2cF): Ehm, ich hatte es eingepackt! Jetzt ist es aber nicht da! Ich verstehe das nicht! Entschuldigen Sie bitte, ich kümmere mich darum und bringe es Ihnen so schnell wie möglich vorbei!

Participant 7 (Ser/2aI): Izvini, nisam stigao da ti kupim poklon, bio sam previše zauzet. Obećavam da ću ti nadoknaditi sledeće nedelje. (Sorry, I didn't manage to get you the present, I was too busy. I promise to make up for it next week.)

Participant 10 (Aut/4hF): Yeah I know. I don't know why I did it anyway - I felt so insecure.

Participant 7 (Ser/2aI): I'm so sorry, I don't know what I was thinking, I'm sorry I'll make it up to you. I'll buy you a new window. This won't happen again.

Participant 14 (Aut/4gF): I am sorry, but I don't know why I did this!

Participant 10 (Ser/2aI): Shvatila sam da materijalne stvari nisu najvažnije, pa ćeš svoj poklon dobiti u drugom obliku. (I realised that material things are not the most important ones, why, you'll get your present in another form.)

+ **desirable lie**

Participant 6 (Aut/4hF): I didn't. I have never cheated in my life.

Participant 2 (Ser/3fF): I am very sorry, but I got sick all of a sudden and couldn't make it.

Participant 3 (Aut/3dF): Sorry, I know that I am late and this is not a very good start, but I've learned that I have to get up earlier, that there are no excuses anymore.

Participant 8 (Ser/4gI): I'm sorry, dad, it's not my fault. You know how slow I drive.

Participant 6 (Aut/3fF): I apologize for my not coming to the meeting, but an unfortunate event suddenly came up right before the meeting.

Participant 7 (Ser/2cI): Izvinite, žurio sam da bi' stigao na vreme i potpuno sam zaboravio da je ponesem. (Excuse me, I was in a hurry so as to make it in time and have completely forgotten to bring it along.)

Participant 5 (Aut/4hF): Due to family problems I had no time to study. This was my one and only possibility to take the exam. I needed this grade.

Participant 9 (Ser/2cI): Izvinite, profesore zaboravila sam knjigu da vam donesem jer nisam spavala kod kuće zbog problema koji me je zadesio. Vratiću vam prvom prilikom. Izvinjavam se još jednom. (Excuse me professor. I have forgotten the book because I did not sleep at home due to the problem that has befallen me.)

Participant 7 (Aut/4hF): I know. I'm already feeling guilty.

Participant 10 (Ser/3dF): It's not my fault. Some drunk driver hit me.

Participant 8 (Aut/3dF): Oh God, that's embarrassing. You must know I was not myself because I was late and nervous. I would understand if you don't want to interview me anymore.

Participant 10 (Ser/2aI): Izvini što je ispalo ovako, ali priprema tvog poklona je potrajala duže…(Sorry, it turned out like this, but the wrapping up of your present took longer...)

Participant 9 (Aut/3fF): I am so sorry Mr./Mrs....! I was so overwhelmed by the great amount of new impressions that I totally forgot the project meeting yesterday. I am very sorry. It will not happen again.

Participant 12 (Ser/3eI): I'm so sorry about the window. I don't know what came over me: I don't tend to overdrink. I hope I can make amends somehow.

Participant 14 (Aut/2cF): Es tut mir leid, aber in der Eile habe ich falsche Tache genommen, in der das Buch nich drinnen ist. Ich bringe es Ihnen morgen.

Participant 16 (Ser/3dF): I'm so sorry, I had no idea, I was extremely late due to the traffic jam, so I thought I couldn't make it.

Participant 10 (Aut/3fF): Good morning. There was an emergency in my boyfriend's family. I was so worried about his sister's health that I totally forgot about the meeting.

Participant 18 (Ser/4gI): I'm sorry, I couldn't control the car and it just happened.

Chapter 6

Discussion and Conclusion

6.1.

General Discussion

In the introductory sections it was established that the purpose of this dissertation is to explore and determine to what extent and how a specific culture's distinctive interactional style can be tracked down in its linguistic culture, more specifically the private speech act of apology. As such, this exploratory-explicative study constitutes one step towards answering this question. With respect to this, what the unfolding of the above dialogic(al) dialectics in practice, through the lens of DAT-NSM, suggests is that a community's axiological system (cultural values primarily) and so motivated mental practices (as defined above) influence community's preferences in interactional practices - private apologies proving to be one such salient practice. More specifically, that apologetic speech acts can, in fact, be regarded as "rich points" of insight, i.e. in Wierzbicka's terms (1998), as a key to social attitudes and cultural values.

This dissertation, therefore, observes language-in-use as a locus where life and culture enter into a dialogue (Bakhtin 1993), i.e. where the social and the cultural establish their dialectics, and where the(ir), in Bourdieuien terminology, 'power relations' as instances of the Bakhtinian 'consciousnesses in tension' (I-other-Higher-Other) are made manifest. In this sense, the focal point of the present research has been to contribute a possible explicative answer to the question of why and how different socio-cultural factors implicitly refract and reflect themselves onto the quotidian mental practices and the resulting linguistic practices viz. apologetic practices, as well as onto the underlying cognitive mechanisms that make possible the maintaining, the reproduction and the propagation of the above existing (power) relations, i.e. dialogic dialectics. When it comes down to who is polite to whom, Held (1989, 1999) observes that this is still a reflection of the power structures in a given society which have become infinitely more complicated as have the existing politeness norms. As Held (1999) further argues, with the increased economisation of society, the "exchange value" of politeness, apology as one of its exponents included, prevents it from becoming redundant, and this value is the key to its raison d'être. Held (1999) explicates this "exchange value" further as follows:

> [S]elf-withdrawal, self-denigration and personal submission in favour of the interactional partner […] leads to the elevation of alter [other-Higher Other], the indirect strengthening of her/his position and the mediated confirmation of her/his self-image. However, according to the 'laws' of politeness, alter is obliged to react appropriately to this excess and thereby to relativise her/his position. Indirectly, this again serves *ego's* self-image, properly reimburses her/his person and significantly serves her/his own interests. (Held 1999: 21-22)

As Held (ibid: 23) further claims, in studying politeness, i.e. Repair Work[158] phenomena, which apologies also belong to, "the only important goal is to evaluate what the social consideration for 'alter' brings for the 'ego'[159], i.e. how much profit each individual can gain for her/himself". According to her conclusion then, strategies that were originally necessary for survival become goal-directed, finely nuanced means of "self-improvement" for the sake of social self-empowerment (ibid: 24). In other words, the primary function of politeness is being transferred from mere self-preservation to self-representation (cf. Deutschmann 2003: 209), as the following examples taken from this study's corpus exemplify:

Why do you apologise?

(Aut) Participant 5: If I was unfriendly.

(Aut) Participant 17: Because it is seen as friendly to do so.

(Aut) Participant 29: Good manners.

(Aut) Participant 34: Because I want to be polite.

(Aut) Participant 37: Politeness, education, maintaining a friendly climate.

---

[158] Strictly speaking, Meier (1999) is looking into definitions of Repair Work, of which apology is only a subcategory, any of the authors and their taxonomies which she mentions are those also referred to (in one form or another) here (e.g Goffman, Coulmas, Wierzbicka)

[159] I.e. for the 'I'

(Ser) Participant 2: If I don't apologise, it's as if I'm not cultured...

(Ser) Participant 15: I think it's unjust to apologise if one doesn't mean it honestly and vice versa.

(Ser) Participant 22: Because I keep to principles.

(Ser) Participant 25: Because it's humane to apologise.

(Ser) Participant 34: I think that the word 'sorry' is one form/indicative of good upbringing.

These examples also reveal, already at the declarative level, the difference in motivation with respect to different (linguistic-) cultural milieu. If we further employ DAT as our lens, we can complement, and go beyond, the exogenous (declarative-cum-formal) dimension with the culture particular endogenous (cognitive) locus, i.e. with the mental practices informing the specific motivation underlying the resulting apologetic speech acting in the a) native linguistic culture, b) non-native linguistic culture and c) non-native a-contextualised linguistic culture. In confluence with the combinatorial insights into the impetus behind IF revealed by DAT above, the potential cognitive, i.e. motivational frames that the application of 'dialogism'[160] as an analytic tool suggests are the following:

[160] The proposed empirical formalisation of 'dialogism', i.e. the taxonomy of pre-reflective points is inspired by Akhutina's (2003: 97, 98) theoretical systematisation of "Bakhtin's theory of verbal communication and of the notion of 'dialogism'". In this sense, it represents author's attempt at formalising 'dialogism' as a practically applicable matrix for explicating the culture-specific speech act interpretation and formulation patterns

a) apologetic speech acting in native linguistic culture

	Austrian Informants	Serbian informants
Pre-reflective Attributes	Native LC Frame Attribute Hierarchy (Total instances)	Native LC Frame Attribute Hierarchy (Total instances)
[a] actively determined and anticipated the possible answer of the person you are addressing;	67	55
[b] how the person you are addressing would perceive/understand your speech act;	75	56
[c] extent to which the person you are addressing is informed about the situation itself;	64	59
d] person's (listener's) views, convictions and prejudices (*from OUR point of view);	59	55
[e] person's (listener's) sympathies and antipathies;	54	52
[f] posture and body language of the person you are addressing;	51	54

Figure 5 Explicit context (native LC)

b) apologetic speech acting in non-native linguistic culture

	Austrian Informants	Serbian informants
Pre-reflective Attributes	Native LC Frame Attribute Hierarchy (Total instances)	Native LC Frame Attribute Hierarchy (Total instances)
[a] actively determined and anticipated the possible answer of the person you are addressing;	35	30
[b] how the person you are addressing would perceive/understand your speech act;	38	41
[c] extent to which the person you are addressing is informed about the situation itself;	30	29
d] person's (listener's) views, convictions and prejudices (*from OUR point of view);	28	27
[e] person's (listener's) sympathies and antipathies;	27	25
[f] posture and body language of the person you are addressing;	24	27

Figure 6 Explicit context (non-native LC)

c) apologetic speech acting in non-native a-contextualised linguistic culture

	Austrian Informants	Serbian informants
Pre-reflective Attributes	Native LC Frame Attribute Hierarchy (Total instances)	Native LC Frame Attribute Hierarchy (Total instances)
[a] actively determined and anticipated the possible answer of the person you are addressing;	30	28
[b] how the person you are addressing would perceive/understand your speech act;	36	36
[c] extent to which the person you are addressing is informed about the situation itself;	32	27
d] person's (listener's) views, convictions and prejudices (*from OUR point of view);	31	23
[e] person's (listener's) sympathies and antipathies;	32	31
[f] posture and body language of the person you are addressing;	29	27

Figure 7 Implicit context [IC] (non-native LC)

Apologetic Speech Act instances		
Structural object	**Austrian Informants**	**Serbian Informants**
Interrogative	18/52	16/51
Declarative	9/52	13/51
Exclamative	5/52	5/51

Figure 8 Structural(syntactic)-Contextual (IC) locus of apologetic speech acts

The conceptual-linguistic fit that the matrices above suggest points into the Bakhtin(-Vygotskian) direction viz. that one possible explanation of the difference in the internalization of social forms of behavior, mirrored in the emphasis on the different focal points in the conceptualisation of the apologetic speech act, is that "human psyche takes form through the transformation of inter-psychic functions (namely, those that involve interaction between two interlocutors) into intrapsychic, i.e. internal functions" (cf. Voloshinov 1973: 50). In this sense, "the psychological development of an individual entails "growing into" (Vygotsky 1986) the culture" (Akhutina 2003: 101). This process is, however, not a simple, and simply, a consequence of the natural development. On the contrary, it entails an active struggle between the natural and the cultural. Consequently, this struggle, i.e. "dialogic tension" (in the Bakhtinian sense), results in the previous/present "forms of psychological development being crowded out and overlaid by new ones" (cf. Vygotsky 1986 in Akhutina 2003: 101; also Hofstede 1983: 76, 2010: 6[161]). "At the same time, this very culture an individual is growing into, is always in a stage of becoming and is full of internal contradictions" (Akhutina 2003: 101). Due to this, the cultural development of an individual, the formation of this individual's personality and development of its consciousness in particular:

[161] "Culture [...] the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from others." (Hofstede 2010: 6)

> [i]s not simply the acquisition of stereotyped forms of behavior, but exactly the opposite, it is the unfolding of heterogeneous, internally contradictory forces, including the struggle between the natural and the cultural and the struggle between various developmental stages within the individual, and, most important, the conflict among cultures, contexts, roles and the interlocutors themselves clashing within the individual's consciousness. (cf. Vygotsky 1986: 291-302, 314–28 in Akhutina 2003: 101)

This is especially observable in such situations as those in the thematic unit 4 of the questionnaire where, due to the absence of contextual richness the individual has to find her/his way, i.e. the locus of the situation and fit it with the appropriate locus of linguistic acting, i.e. the form of speech act that assures its felicity in the given contextual setting. What we see at work here is Verschueren's (2008: 18) point that neither 'context' nor 'structure' can be granted absolute conceptual autonomy. This has also been observed in the answers provided by the informants (figure 4), suggesting, as Verschueren indicates, that both have to be related, at least, to the overarching notions in terms of which we try to understand specific (instances of) language use, the most general one being the notion of "adaptability" mirrored in the confluence of the structural "objects of adaptability"[162] and the contextual correlates of adaptability. Continuing in Verschueren's vein, languages, codes and styles represent objects of adaptability, albeit at a high level of structuring. Equally so are also all the utterance-building ingredients, from sounds, over morphemes, words, clauses, sentences and propositions, and all the way to the supra-sentential units. Moreover, the utterances and clusters of utterances - spanning the pragmatic space from exclamations and up to fullblown conversations, belong here, together with such underlying parameters as "variability" and "adaptability and the principles underlying utterance-building such as "coherence", "relevance", "information structuring" and "foregrounding/backgrounding" (2018: 19). Turning to (our) interactional and communicative choices, these are equally not made in isolation, but are the constituents of the choice-making process, integrated in nature, that "interrelates" (in

[162] Following Verschueren (2008: 18-19) "any (combination of) element(s) at any Layer or level of linguistic organization or form at which choices can be made, constitutes a structural object of adaptability or, for short, an element of 'structure'; any (combination of) ingredient(~) of a communicative event, along any (set of) parameter(s) of variability, with which linguistic choices are interadaptable, constitutes (a) contextual correlate(s) of adaptability or, for short, an element of 'context'."

Verschueren's terms), i.e. "intersubjects" (in Bakhtin's terms) the phenomena at different (dialogic) architectonic levels. Turning to comunicative practice, this architectonic contributes the following integrated blueprint of situated interaction:

> [C]entral entity to which parameters of variability and adaptability are attached is the language user, located in a physical, social, cultural, and mental world. Not only is the language user central as a 'locus'; he or she is also the agent who defines the context. The language user is not only obliged to make structural choices. Also context is really a matter of choice, both in producing and in interpreting utterances. Without denying the existence and importance of an 'outside reality' , every language user creates his or her own 'lines of vision' by focusing on a selection from the range of potentially relevant aspects of a wider 'objective' context. In other words, context is the product of contextualization: 'things' are made into context, in the service of the overall process of meaning generation. (Verschueren 2008: 19).

What the above hierarchies (Figures 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3) also suggest is a different locus of apologising in terms of attribute salience, with respect to different (linguistic) cultures. From the viewpoint of experience-near concepts of everyday language, it is words that capture human experience (cf. Malt and Wolff 2010). That is, words are a society's most basic cultural artefact, and – properly understood – they provide the best key to a culture's values and assumptions (Wierzbicka 1996a: 237). As Kishner and Gibbs (1996: 19) put it, the ability to use a word is a function of "one's life experience with language". Detailed understandings of the meanings of individual expressions become then the necessary precursors facilitating the understanding of the range of illocutionary acts in a specific linguistic culture, as well as the precursors to making insightful generalizations about how the 'face' of apology is viewed and respected in a specific linguistic culture. With respect to the two (linguistic) cultures that have been the focus of this research study, the analysis has singled out two key apologetic expressions - *izvini/te [excuse me]* (the Serbian linguistic culture) and *tut mir Leid [I'm sorry]* (the Austrian-German linguistic culture).

Compared to the findings of the previous studies, more specifically Meier's (1992) which indicated Entschuldigung/en as the most salient IFID, this is an important research result as it indicates an intracultural-semantic shift. In her cross-cultural comparison, Meier (1992) also arrives at the assumption that those values that are held in esteem by Austrians may be more proximate to those of its Slavic neighbours

than to those of German German speakers. In this respect, an additional important finding of this study, visible in the semantic explications of the culture-salient IFID expressions (to be presented below), is an indication of a possibly larger-scale intercultural shift at work, suggested by the emphasis on different set of values in apologetic interaction, as the following explications expressed in the NSM language, i.e. the NSM 'cultural scripts' suggest:

[Ė] *Izvini/te*

a. people think:
b. when something bad happens to someone because I did something
c. I have to do something for this someone, I have to say something like this to this someone:
d. I know I did something that was bad for you
e. I think that you may think something bad about me because of that and
f. I think you may feel something bad towards me because of that
g. I feel something bad because of that
h. I don't want you to think something bad about me because of that and to feel something bad towards me because of that, because I do not want to feel bad about me
i. I say this because I think this

[F] *(es) tut mir Leid*

a. people think:
b. when something bad happens to someone because I did something
c. I have to say something like this to this someone:
d. I know I did something that was bad for you
e. I think that you may think something bad about me because of that
f. I think you may feel something bad towards me because of that
g. I feel something bad because of that
h. I don't want you to think something bad because of that
i. and to feel something bad because of that, because
j. I do not want you to feel bad because of me
k. I say this because I think this
l. I say this because I think I should say it to you

Building on the larger-scale intercultural shift, another important insight the explications foreground is also an intracultural shift. Namely, in contrast to the findings of House's (2008) seminal study who points out the 'orientation towards self' to be the preferred German communicative style, the findings of this study point out otherwise. This is to say, that, particularly in the case of the contemporary Austrian-German linguistic culture, 'orientation towards other' and 'orientation towards addressee' take the primacy as preferred interactional and the resulting linguistic communicative styles. Similarly, in terms of linguistic-culture proximity, unlike the tradition-guided Montenegrian linguistic culture where 'orientation towards addressee' for the purpose of preserving the social face and social cohesion is prevalent (cf. Perovic 2009), in the contemporary Serbian linguistic culture there seems to have been a shift and modification in values mirrored by the 'orientation toward the self and Higher-other through addressee' for the purpose of preserving the new social impetus. As Perovic points out, and this study confirms, one possible cause for this is the modification of the previously prevalent, more community-oriented, mental scenario of the high-context society now further modified by the increased mobility of its members and the exposure to different "collective programmings" resulting primarily from the openness of the society which strives to become a fully-integrated member of the European community of the 21st century.

6.2

Concluding Remarks

In the introductory chapters I established that the purpose of this dissertation is to exploratively and explanatorily investigate if a culture's distinctive style of (verbal) interaction can be in fact tracked down in the speech act of apology, by introducing a Bakhtin inspired alternative empirical explicative framework - Dialogic Ethno-phenomenological Pragmatics. The benefit of applying this framework to the study of the intricate nature of apologetic (speech act) interaction is that its underlying objective is to understand speech act practices in terms of the values and social models of the linguistic-cultural insiders themselves. To this end, it applies the analytical method of Dialogic Conceptualisation Test based on the confluence of dialogism, ethnophenomenology and cross-linguistic semantics, in order to access and represent cultural and mental practices of language users, for the prupose of facilitating the understanding of speech (apologetic) speech act practices from a culture-internal perspective and in terms of the values, norms and beliefs of the linguistic cultures, i.e. communities concerned. Finally, it serves the purpose of demonstrating how the prevailing cultural attitudes, norms and beliefs can be explicated and modeled in clear, precise and cross-culturally intelligible terms.

In the final line, it can be concluded that the focus of the dissertation was, primarily, the identification of the gap in and the key questions concerning the apologetic speech act theory/practice which have not been addressed in sufficient detail in the apologetic speech act discourse, to which the more conclusive answers are yet to be given or, better yet, we need to keep giving. Viewed like this, perhaps the most important goal of this study is to encourage the speech community to keep looking for these answers all the more intensively.

Appendices

Appendix 1. Dialogic Conceptualisation Test, Serbian version.

UPITNIK

O samom upitniku:

Ovaj upitnik je, u prvom redu, sastavljen u cilju ispitivanja načina na koji se mi (kao individue) izvinjavamo (kako na maternjem, tako i na engleskom jeziku) za naše postupke koji, u manjoj ili većoj meri, imaju negativne posledice ne samo po nas već i po osobu kojoj je izvinjenje upućeno. A zatim i kao pisani medijum i pokazatelj mere u kojoj se specifična kultura (tj. njene norme) ne samo oslikava u jeziku, već ga u ogromnoj meri uslovljava i oblikuje u skladu sa već pomenutim specifičnim kulturološkim normama. Na kraju, dobijeni odgovori će poslužiti kao osnova za formiranje jednog od najbitnijih verbalnih/neverbalnih artifakata kulture tj.kulturoloških skripti koje predstavljaju otelotvorenje kulture zapisane univerzalnim jezikom, podjednako umno (kognitivno) pristupačnim i razumljivim kako pripadnicima naše, tako i pripadnicima ostalih kultura sveta.

1) Zaokružiti odgovor koji je najviše u skladu sa vašim mišljenjem.

1.Da li se izvinjavate?

a) Da b) Ponekad c) Nikada se ne izvinjavam

2. a) U kojim situacijama se izvinjavate? b) Ne izvinjavate? c) Zašto?

a)_____
_____
_____
_____

b)_____

_____

_____

_____

c)_____

_____

_____

_____

3.a) Na koji način se izvinjavate (verbalno ili delima i sl.)?

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

b) Koja je vaša uobičajena fraza verbalnog izvinjenja (navedite i srpsku i englesku frazu)?

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

4.Prilikom formulisanja govornog čina (npr. izvinjenja), u obzir uzimate koje od sledecih aspekata (*zaokružite sve one odgovore sa kojima se slažete):

[a] aktivno predviđanje unapred potencijalnog/ih odgovora osobe kojoj se obraćate;
[b]način na koji bi osoba kojoj se obraćate mogla da protumači/shvati vaš govorni čin;
[c]u kojoj je meri osoba kojoj se obraćate upućena u/informisana o čitavom događaju/situaciji tj. O tome o čemu se govori;
[d]opšte poglede na svet, ubeđenja i predrasude osobe kojoj se obraćate (ali iz sopstvene perspektive);
[e]simpatije i antipatije osobe kojoj se obraćate;
[f]držanje (položaj) i govor tela osobe kojoj se obracate;

5.Da li smatrate da je gorepomenuti govorni čin proizvod (*zaokružiti jedan od ponuđenih odgovora):

[a] vašeg strateškog pristupa komunikaciji?
[b]potrebe da se u obzir uzmu (i u govorni čin uključe), osećanja, kao i svi ostali bitni aspekti, same osobe kojoj je govorni čin upućen?

2) Navedene situacije predstavljaju primere određenog ponašanja u svakodnevnim interpersonalnim odnosima. Dajte vašu verbalnu reakciju.

4.Vašoj devojci/vašem momku je rođendan. Niste kupili nagovešteni poklon jer vas je neodložna obaveza u tome sprečila, a sve radnje su već, nažalost, zatvorene. Šta kažete?

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

5.Subota je veče. Ranije, toga dana, majka vas je zamolila da odete do biblioteke po knjigu koju već duže vremena želi da pročita. Vi ste to potpuno smetnuli s uma, a vratili ste se kući jako kasno. Zatičete je kako čita Muškarci su sa Marsa, žene su sa Venere . Šta kažete?

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

6.Student treba da se sretne sa profesorom kako bi mu vratio knjigu. Na svoj užas, vidi da je knjigu zaboravio da ponese sa sobom.

Profesor: Nadam se da si doneo/la knjigu koju sam ti pozajmio.

Student:

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

3) Kao i u prethodnom odeljku, navedene situacije predstavljaju izrazite primere određenog ponašanja u interpersonalnim odnosima, ali u engleskom jeziku. Dajte vašu verbalnu reakciju, takođe na Engleskom.

7. A respectable multinational company has invited you to a job interview. However, due to the traffic jam, you are running extremely late. You dash into the building, and, seeing you're gonna miss the elevator, you try to get the attention of the person already entering it, in an attempt to make him/her hold the elevator. However, the person pays no attention. Irritated, you start shouting, throwing in a swear word from

time to time. In the end, you miss the elevator, but upon finally arriving at the designated office, you find out this person is actually your interviewer/potential boss. He’s staring at you in utter amazement. You say:

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

8. A party organised by your girlfriend/boyfriend. In the course of the night a living room window gets smashed. At first the identity of the culprit is unknown. But soon after the incident the s/he discovers that you have had one mug of beer too many and in your dancing frenzy accidentally threw it at the window, breaking it into pieces. Realising what you have done, you rushed to the her/him to offer an apology:

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

9. It's your first week at work in your father’s company, where you were engaged as a project manager. Yesterday, you were scheduled to go to an important project meeting, but having completely forgotten about it, you miss it. The next day, you encounter the general manager in the corridor and he/she gives you a quizzical look. You say:

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

3a) Instrukcije kao za 3).

10. Father: How on earth did you manage to smash the car?

You:_____
_____
_____
_____

11.Dean: You should have never cheated on the exam.

You:_____
_____
_____
_____

12.Wife/Husband: The hell with your excuses!

You:_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Komentar (vezan za bilo koji aspekat upitnika npr. jasnoća pitanja, podesnost situacija itd.)

Comments (related to any aspect of the questionnaire e.g. clarity of the questions, appropriateness of the situations etc.)

Thank you, and your gray-cells, ever so muchly for completing this survey!

Appendix 2. Dialogic Conceptualisation Test, Austrian-German version.

QUESTIONNAIRE

General details about the questionnaire

The primary aim of this questionnaire is the investigation of the manner in which we (as individuals) apologise (both in our mother tongue and in English) for our actions which, to a lesser or greater degree, have negative consequences not only for us, but also for the person apology is addressed to. The secondary aim is for it to serve as a written medium and indicator of the extent to which a particular culture (i.e. its norms) is mirrored in the language itself and, consequently, determines and moulds it according to the specific cultural norms. Ultimately, the answers acquired will be the basis for the formation of one of the essential (extra)verbal cultural artifacts, i.e. cultural scripts. Their immense importance lies in the fact that they represent the embodiment of the culture written in universal language (NSM), equally mentally accessible and comprehensible both to cultural insiders and cultural outsiders.

Email: _____

Age: _____

Gender: M F

I Circle the answer that best describes your opinion concerning the following:

1.Do you apologise?

a) Yes b) Sometimes c) No

2. a) In which situations you do/do not apologise?

b) Why?

a)_____

_____

_____

_____

b)_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

3. a) How do you apologise (verbally or by compensating action or etc.)?
b) What is your usual verbal apologetic phrase (please provide both the English and the German apologetic phrase)?

a)_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

b)_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

4. Welche der folgenden Aspekte ziehst Du in Betracht, wenn du einen Sprechakt formulierst (zbs. Entschuldigenden usw.)?159 (*bitte alle zutreffenden Optionen ankreuzen)

[a] aktive Einschätzung und Voraussicht der möglichen Antwort der adressierten Person
[b] wie die adressierte Person deinen Sprechakt wahrnehmen/verstehen würde;

[c] inwiefern die adressierte Person um die Umstände der betreffenden Situation bescheid weiß;

[d] die Ansichten, Überzeugungen und Vorurteile der adressierten Person (aus Unserer Perspektive gesehen);
[e] die Sympathien und Antipathien der adressierten Person;
[f] die Haltung und Körpersprache der adressierten Person;

5. Hältst Du deinen Sprechakt für ein (direktes) Produkt (*bitte nur eine Option ankreuzen):

[a]Deiner Kommunikationsstrategien?
[b]Deines Bedürfnisses die Gefühle und andere relevante Aspekte der adressierten Person mit in Betracht zu ziehen?

2.The following situations represent examples of specific behaviour in interpersonal relations. Please provide your verbal response in German.

[a] Deine Freundin / Dein Freund hat Geburtstag. Da dir etwas wichtiges dazwischen gekommen ist, hast du völlig vergessen das Geschenk zu besorgen, das du ihr / ihm versprochen hattest. Und dummerweise haben alle Läden bereits geschlossen.

Du sagst:

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

[b] Es ist Samstag abend. Deine Mutter hat dich am Vormittag gebeten, in der Bibliothek ein Buch für sie abzuholen, das sie schon länger zu lesen vorhatte. Allerdings hast du das komplett vergessen und kommst erst ziemlich spät nach Hause.

Deine Mutter liest gerade 'Männer sind vom Mars, Frauen sind von der Venus'. Du sagst:

_____
_____
_____
_____

[c] Ein Student trifft einen Professor um ein Buch zurückzubringen, das er sich vor längerer Zeit ausgeliehen hatte. Kurz vor dem Treffen merkt der Student allerdings, dass das Buch nicht in seiner Tasche ist.

Professor: Ich hoffe, Sie haben das Buch dabei, das ich Ihnen ausgeliehen hatte.

Student:

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

6.Welche der folgenden Aspekte ziehst Du in Betracht, wenn du einen entschuldigenden Sprechakt formulierst? (*bitte alle zutreffenden Optionen ankreuzen):

[a] aktive Einschätzung und Voraussicht der möglichen Antwort der adressierten Person
[b] wie die adressierte Person deinen Sprechakt wahrnehmen/verstehen würde;
[c] inwiefern die adressierte Person um die Umstände der betreffenden Situation bescheid weiß;
[d] die Ansichten, Überzeugungen und Vorurteile der adressierten Person (aus UNSERER Perspektive gesehen);
[e] die Sympathien und Antipathien der adressierten Person;
[f] die Haltung und Körpersprache der adressierten Person;

7.Hältst Du deinen entschuldigenden Sprechakt für ein (direktes) Produkt (*bitte nur eine Option ankreuzen):

[a]Deiner Kommunikationsstrategien?
[b]Deines Bedürfnisses die Gefühle und andere relevante Aspekte der adressierten Person mit in Betracht zu ziehen?

3.As in the previous section, The following situations represent particular examples of specific behavious in interpersonal relations, but in the context of English language. Please provide your verbal response, also in English.

[d] A respectable multinational company has invited you to a job interview. You are running late because of the heavy traffic. When you finally do arrive at your destination, you find that the car park is packed. After a while, you manage to find free parking space. Unfortunately, just as you were trying to park, all of a sudden a Mercedes squeezed in between and occupied the lot. Furious, you get out of your car and start shouting and swearing at the owner of the car. Later on, after having parked the car across the street, you walk into the office to be interviewed only to find that the man you just cussed out is your potential boss. He's staring at you in amazement. You say:

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

[e] A party organised by your girlfriend/boyfriend. In the course of the night a living room window gets smashed. At first the identity of the culprit is unknown. But soon after the incident the s/he discovers that you have had one mug of beer too many and in your dancing frenzy accidentally threw it at the window, breaking it into pieces. Realising what you have done, you rushed to the her/him to offer an apology:

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

[f] It's your first week at work in your father’s company, where you were engaged as a project manager. Yesterday, you were scheduled to go to an important project meeting, but having completely forgotten about it, you missed it. The next day, you encounter the general manager in the elevator who gives you a questioning look. You say:

_____

_____

_____

_____

8.Which of the following aspects do you consider to have taken into account when formulating your apologetic speech act (*please circle all that applies):

[a] actively determined and anticipated the possible answer of the person you addressed;
[b] how the person you addressed would perceive/understand your apology;
[c] extent to which the person you addressed was informed about the situation itself;
[d] person's (listener's) views, convictions and prejudices (*from YOUR point of view);
[e] person's (listener's) sympathies and antipathies;
[f] posture and body language of the person you addressed;

9.Do you think your apologetic speech act is a (direct) product of your (*please circle one of the answers):

[a] strategic approach to communication;

[b] need to take into consideration (and incorporate into your speech act) the feelings, as well as all the other relevant aspects, of the person you addressed

4.Instructions the same as in the previous section.

[g] Father: How on earth did you manage to smash the car?

You:_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

[h] Dean: You should have never cheated on the exam.

You:_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

[i] Wife/Husband: The hell with your excuses!

You:_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

11. Which of the following aspects do you consider to have taken into account when formulating your speech act (* please circle all that applies):

[a] actively determined and anticipated the possible answer of the person you addressed;
[b] how the person you addressed would perceive/understand your apology;
[c] extent to which the person you addressed was informed about the situation itself;
[d] person's (listener's) views, convictions and prejudices (* from YOUR point of view);
[e] person's (listener's) sympathies and antipathies;
[f] posture and body language of the person you addressed;

11.Do you think your speech act is a (direct) product of your (*please circle one of the answers):

[a] strategic approach to communication;
[b] need to take into consideration (and incorporate into your speech act) the feelings, as well as all the other relevant aspects, of the person you addressed;

Comments (related to any aspect of the questionnaire e.g. clarity of the questions, appropriateness of the situations etc.)

Thank you, and your gray-cells, ever so muchly for completing this survey!

Appendix 3. Dialogic Conceptualisation Test / Dialogic Architectonic Triad and semantic explications (cultural scripts) language of expression: Natural Semantic Metalanguage
(cf.source
https://intranet.secure.griffith.edu.au/schools-departments/natural-semantic-metalanguage/what-is-nsm/semantic-primes).

The NSM model has changed a lot since it was first advanced in the early 1970s. In Anna Wierzbicka's 1972 book Semantic Primitives, only 14 semantic primitives were proposed and in her 1980 book Lingua Mentalis, the inventory was not much bigger. Over the 1980s and 1990s, however, the number of proposed primes was expanded greatly, and has now reached a total of 65. The same period also saw the development of some important new ideas about the syntax of the semantic metalanguage. The current proposed primes can be presented, using their English exponents, in the Table Below. Perhaps not surprisingly, the inventory of primes looks like a natural language in miniature. As with any language, the 'mini-language' of semantic primes has a grammar, as well as a lexicon. This is described in brief below.

Five important points about identifying semantic primes:

1. A mere list is not sufficient, in itself, to identify the intended meanings, if only because many of these English exponents are polysemous (i.e. have several meanings), but only one sense of each is proposed as primitive. While it is claimed that the simplest sense of the exponent words can be matched across languages (i.e. that they are `lexical universals`), it is recognised that their secondary, polysemic meanings may differ widely from language to language. A fuller characterisation indicates for each proposed prime a set of "canonical contexts" in which it can occur; that is, a set of sentences or sentence fragments exemplifying its allowable grammatical contexts.

2. When we say that a semantic prime ought to be a lexical universal, the term "lexical" is being used in a broad sense. An exponent of a semantic prime may be a phraseme or a bound morpheme, just so long as it expresses the requisite meaning. For example, in English the prime A LONG TIME is expressed by a phraseme,

though in many languages the same meaning is conveyed by a single word. In many Australian languages the prime BECAUSE is expressed by a suffix.

3. Even when semantic primes take the form of single words, there is no need for them to be morphologically simple. For example, in English the words SOMEONE and INSIDE are morphologically complex, but their meanings are not composed from the meanings of the morphological "bits" in question. That is, the meaning SOMEONE does not equal "some + one"; the meaning INSIDE does not equal "in + side". In meaning terms, SOMEONE and INSIDE are indivisible.

4. Exponents of semantic primes can have language-specific variant forms (allolexes or allomorphs, indicated by ~ in the table above). For example, in English the word 'else' is an alloex of OTHER; likewise, the word 'thing' functions as an allolex of SOMETHING when it is combined with a determiner or quantifier (i.e. this something = this thing, one something = one thing).

5. Exponents of semantic primes may have different morphosyntactic characteristics, and hence belong to different "parts of speech", in different languages, without this necessarily disturbing their essential combinatorial properties.

All these factors mean that testing the cross-linguistic viability of the semantic primes is no straightforward matter. It requires rich and reliable data, and careful language-internal analysis of polysemy, allolexy, etc. Though cross-linguistic testing of this kind is still in progress, the prospectus seems promising. The existence and lexicalised status of semantic primes has been confirmed for more than 30 languages of widely different linguistic types and from widely different cultural settings. There are a couple of difficult and/or contested cases, but the great balance of evidence favours the hypothesis that semantic primes are both universal and have lexical exponents in all languages (cf.https://intranet.secure.griffith.edu.au/schools-departments/natural-semantic-metalanguage/what-is-nsm/semantic-primes).

The exponents, i.e. the equivalents in the languages of concern here, viz. Serbian, (Austrian-)German and English, are obtained/able from the NSM program official archives to be found, together with a non-exhaustive list of the world languages empirically surveyed and corroborated for universality, at the official virtual archives which is located at the following address: https://intranet.secure.griffith.edu.au/schools-departments/natural-semantic-metalanguage/downloads.

Appendix [163]. Serbian Semantic Primes, with English Equivalents

ICH, DU, JEMAND, ETWAS~DING, MENSCHEN~LEUTE, KÖRPER I, YOU, SOMEONE, SOMETHING~THING, PEOPLE, BODY	substantives
ARTEN, TEILEN KINDS, PARTS	relational substantives
DIESE(R), DASSELBE, ANDERE(R) THIS, THE SAME, OTHER~ELSE	determiners
EINS, ZWEI, EINIGE, ALLE, VIEL~VIELE, WENIG~WENIGE ONE, TWO, SOME, ALL, MUCH~MANY, LITTLE~FEW	quantifiers
GUT, SCHLECHT GOOD, BAD	evaluators
GROß, KLEIN BIG, SMALL	descriptors
WISSEN, DENKEN, WOLLEN, NICHT WOLLEN, FÜHLEN, SEHEN, HÖREN KNOW, THINK, WANT, DON'T WANT, FEEL, SEE, HEAR	mental predicates
SAGEN, WÖRTER, WAHR SAY, WORDS, TRUE	speech
TUN, PASSIEREN, BEWEGEN DO, HAPPEN, MOVE	actions, events, movement, contact
(IRGENDWO) SEIN, ES GIBT, (JEMAND/ETWAS) SEIN BE (SOMEWHERE), THERE IS, BE (SOMEONE/SOMETHING)	location, existence, specification
(IST) MEIN (IS) MINE	possession
LEBEN, STERBEN LIVE, DIE	life and death
WENN~ZEIT, JETZT, VOR, NACH, EINE LANGE ZEIT, EINE KURZE ZEIT, EINIGE ZEIT, MOMENT WHEN~TIME, NOW, BEFORE, AFTER, A LONG TIME, A SHORT TIME, FOR SOME TIME, MOMENT	time
WO~ORT, HIER, ÜBER, UNTER, WEIT, NAH, SEITE, INNEN, BERÜHREN WHERE~PLACE, HERE, ABOVE, BELOW, FAR, NEAR, SIDE, INSIDE, TOUCH	place
NICHT, VIELLEICHT, KÖNNEN, WEIL~WEGEN, WENN NOT, MAYBE, CAN, BECAUSE, IF	logical concepts
SEHR, MEHR VERY, MORE	intensifier, augmentor
WIE~ALS~WEISE LIKE~AS~WAY	similarity

Notes: • Exponents of primes can be polysemous, i.e. they can have other, additional meanings • Exponents of primes may be words, bound morphemes, or phrasemes • They can be formally complex • They can have language-specific combinatorial variants (allolexes, indicated with ~) • Each prime has well-specified syntactic (combinatorial) properties.

[163] Downloaded from the original NSM source page:
https://intranet.secure.griffith.edu.au/schools-departments/natural-semantic-metalanguage/downloads

Appendix 5[164]. German Semantic Primes, with English Equivalents

ICH, DU, JEMAND, ETWAS~DING, MENSCHEN~LEUTE, KÖRPER I, YOU, SOMEONE, SOMETHING~THING, PEOPLE, BODY	substantives
ARTEN, TEILEN KINDS, PARTS	relational substantives
DIESE(R), DASSELBE, ANDERE(R) THIS, THE SAME, OTHER~ELSE	determiners
EINS, ZWEI, EINIGE, ALLE, VIEL~VIELE, WENIG~WENIGE ONE, TWO, SOME, ALL, MUCH~MANY, LITTLE~FEW	quantifiers
GUT, SCHLECHT GOOD, BAD	evaluators
GROß, KLEIN BIG, SMALL	descriptors
WISSEN, DENKEN, WOLLEN, NICHT WOLLEN, FÜHLEN, SEHEN, HÖREN KNOW, THINK, WANT, DON'T WANT, FEEL, SEE, HEAR	mental predicates
SAGEN, WÖRTER, WAHR SAY, WORDS, TRUE	speech
TUN, PASSIEREN, BEWEGEN DO, HAPPEN, MOVE	actions, events, movement, contact
(IRGENDWO) SEIN, ES GIBT, (JEMAND/ETWAS) SEIN BE (SOMEWHERE), THERE IS, BE (SOMEONE/SOMETHING)	location, existence, specification
(IST) MEIN (IS) MINE	possession
LEBEN, STERBEN LIVE, DIE	life and death
WENN~ZEIT, JETZT, VOR, NACH, EINE LANGE ZEIT, EINE KURZE ZEIT, EINIGE ZEIT, MOMENT WHEN~TIME, NOW, BEFORE, AFTER, A LONG TIME, A SHORT TIME, FOR SOME TIME, MOMENT	time
WO~ORT, HIER, ÜBER, UNTER, WEIT, NAH, SEITE, INNEN, BERÜHREN WHERE~PLACE, HERE, ABOVE, BELOW, FAR, NEAR, SIDE, INSIDE, TOUCH	place
NICHT, VIELLEICHT, KÖNNEN, WEIL~WEGEN, WENN NOT, MAYBE, CAN, BECAUSE, IF	logical concepts
SEHR, MEHR VERY, MORE	intensifier, augmentor
WIE~ALS~WEISE LIKE~AS~WAY	similarity

Notes: • Exponents of primes can be polysemous, i.e. they can have other, additional meanings • Exponents of primes may be words, bound morphemes, or phrasemes • They can be formally complex • They can have language-specific combinatorial variants (allolexes, indicated with ~) • Each prime has well-specified syntactic (combinatorial) properties.

---

[164] Downloaded from the original NSM source page:
https://intranet.secure.griffith.edu.au/schools-departments/natural-semantic-metalanguage/downloads

Appendix 6[165]. Chart of NSM semantic primes [v19, 12 April 2017] - a revised and updated version of a Chart first published in 2010 (cf. Goddard 2010) Semantic primes are the vocabulary of the Natural Semantic Metalanguage. The chart displays the English words for the primes and some of their combinatorial possibilities, according to NSM grammar. More complex combinations are also possible. In some languages, two primes e.g. FEEL and HEAR, SOMETHING and PART, may be expressed by the same word. In some languages a prime can have two or more exponents (allolexes), e.g. English other and else. Sometimes a combination of two or more primes, e.g. LIKE THIS, can be expressed by a single portmanteau word. [c.goddard@griffith.edu.au]

Clarification on how to useNSM in semantic explications[166]

■ Don't include any complex English--specific words, no matter how common and seemingly basic; e.g. and, or, make.

■ Ensure that you use semantic primes only in allowable syntactic frames. Do not resort to non--NSM syntax even if English grammar allows it. For example, avoid 'do something about it' and 'feel good/bad about something';; semantic primes DO and FEEL do not have any "about" valency.

■Avoid the following non--universal constructions: relative clauses (e.g. someone who did this), comparative (e.g. better than, more than), indirect speech (e.g. this someone said that...).

■ Whenever possible, explications should be composed entirely in semantic primes;; but some explications require use of semantic molecules in addition to primes. Semantic molecules are a well--defined set of non--primitive meanings that function as units in the meanings of more complex concepts.

Key references

■Goddard, C. & Wierzbicka, A. 2014. Words and Meanings. OUP.

■Goddard, C. & Wierzbicka, A. 2014a. Semantic fieldwork and lexical universals. Studies in Language 38(1), 80–127.

■Peeters, B. Ed. 2006. Semantic Primes and Universal Grammar. Benjamins. ■Wierzbicka, A. 2006a. English: Meaning and Culture. OUP.

■Goddard, C. 2011. Semantic Analysis [2nd ed.]. OUP.

■Goddard, C. & Wierzbicka, A. Eds. 2002. Meaning and Universal Grammar. Benjamins.

[165] https://intranet.secure.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/346033/NSM_Chart_ENGLISH_v19_April_12_2017_Greyscale.pdf

[166] Ibid.

I~ME	YOU	SOMEONE
I want to do/know/say something I want this, I don't want this I don't know something bad can happen to me someone like me	I want you to do/know/say something something bad can happen to you you are someone like me	this someone, the same someone, someone else, this other someone someone does/says something
SOMETHING ~THING	**BODY**	**PEOPLE**
this something~thing, the same something~thing, something else~another something something big, something small something of one kind	someone's body, people's bodies part of someone's body a body of one kind, bodies of two kinds something bad happens inside someone's body someone feels something in the body	these people, many people, some people, few people many people think like this: … people can say … people of one kind
KIND	**PART**	**WORDS**
this kind, the same kind, another kind, this other kind something/someone of one kind people of one/two/many kinds	part of someone's body this part, the same part, another part, this other part this something has two/many parts	many words, other words, one word words of one kind say something with (not with) words, say something in other words say these words these words say something

THIS	THE SAME	OTHER~ELSE
this someone (something), these people, this kind, this part at this time, in this place because of this it is like this: …	the same someone, the same thing, the same part, the same kind at the same time, in the same place someone says/does/thinks/knows/ wants/feels the same	someone else, something else, at another time, somewhere else other parts, other kinds this other part, this other kind, this other someone, this other thing
ONE	**TWO**	**MUCH~MANY**
one someone, one thing, one part, one kind in one place, at one time one of these things/people something of one kind one more thing	two things, two parts, two kinds two of these things/people two more things	many people, many things, many parts, many kinds at many times, in many places much of this something (e.g. water) much more, many more
ALL	**SOME**	**LITTLE~FEW**
all people, all things, all parts, all kinds at all times, in all places all of this something (e.g. water)	some people, some things, some parts, some kinds at some times, in some places some of these things/people some of this something (e.g. water)	few people, few things a little of this something (e.g. water) very little, very few

TIME~WHEN	NOW	MOMENT
(at) this time, (at) the same time, at another time, at this other time, at some times, at many times at the time when …	something is happening here now when I say this now, …	it happens in one moment a moment before, a moment after at this moment
(FOR) SOME TIME	**A LONG TIME**	**A SHORT TIME**
some time before, some time after it happens like this for some time someone does this for some time [during this time = at this time, for some time]	a long time before, a long time after a very long time for a long time [= for some time, a long time]	a short time before, a short time after a very short time for a short time [= for some time, a short time]
BEFORE	**AFTER**	
before this, some time before, a short time before, a long time before	after this, some time after, a short time after, a long time after	

WANT	DON'T WANT	FEEL
I want this someone wants something someone wants to do/know/say something someone wants someone else to do/know/say something someone wants something to happen I want it very much	I don't want this someone doesn't want this someone doesn't want to do something someone doesn't want something to happen	someone feels something (good/bad) someone feels something (good/bad) in part of the body someone feels something good/bad towards someone else/ something
DO	**SAY**	**KNOW**
someone does something (to someone else) someone does something with something else/part of the body someone does something with someone else someone does something good (for someone else)/bad (to someone else)	I say: … someone says something (good/bad) (to someone) someone says something (good/bad) (about someone/something) someone says something like this: "- -" someone says something with words someone says a word to someone	I know this someone knows it this someone knows something (a lot) about someone/something people can know this [I know that … = it is like this: …, I know it]
SEE	**HEAR**	**THINK**
someone sees someone/something (in a place) people can/can't see well in this place someone/people can/can't see this something	someone hears something people can feel something bad when they hear this word	someone thinks about someone else/ something someone thinks something good/bad about someone else/something someone thinks like this: "- -" many people think like this: "- -"

HAPPEN	BE (SOMEWHERE)	LIVE	DIE
something happens something happens to someone something happens to something something happens somewhere (in a place) something happens inside someone/something	someone is somewhere (in a place) something is somewhere (in a place) someone is with someone else	someone lives for a long time many people live in this place this someone lives with someone else it is good if someone lives like this	someone dies at this time all people die at some time
THERE IS	**BE (SOMEONE/SOMETHING)**	**(IS) MINE**	
there is something in this place there is someone in this place there are two/many kinds of …	this someone is someone like me this is something of one kind this is something big/small I know who this someone is	this thing (knife, shirt, etc.) is mine [this thing is someone else's = someone else can say about this thing: "it is mine"]	

MOVE	TOUCH	INSIDE
someone moves (in this place) something moves in this place parts of this someone's body move as this someone wants	something touches something else (somewhere) something touches part of someone's body someone/people can/can't touch this something	inside this something inside this someone inside part of this someone's body

PLACE~WHERE~ SOMEWHERE	HERE	
(in) this place, (in) the same place, somewhere else, (in) this other place in some places, in many places in the place where …	something is happening here now	
ABOVE	**BELOW**	**ON ONE SIDE**
above this place far above this place someone above other people	below this place far below this place	on this side, on the same side, on one side, on two sides, on all sides
NEAR	**FAR**	
near this place near someone	far from this place	

NOT~DON'T	CAN	BECAUSE
not good, not bad not like this I don't know someone can't do this	someone can do something someone can't do something someone can't not do something something (good/bad) can happen it can be like this: …	because of this it happened because this someone did something before … not because of anything else
IF	**MAYBE**	**LIKE~AS~WAY**
if it happens like this for some time, …, if you do this, … if someone does something like this, …	maybe it is like this, maybe it is not like this maybe someone else can do it	it happens like this: … it is like this: … someone thinks like this: "- -" someone like me this someone does it like this it happens as this someone wants … do/say it in this way, not in another way
	VERY	**MORE~ANYMORE**
	very big, very small, very good, very bad, very far, very near, a very short time, a very long time I want it very much (=very) very very big, very very good, very very far, etc.	someone wants more, someone does more someone wants to know/say/think more about it one more, two more, many more, not more not living anymore not like this anymore


SMALL
something small
a small place
very small
BIG
something big
a big place
very big
BAD
something bad, someone bad
something bad
something bad happens
do something bad (to someone)
feel something bad
this is bad
it is bad if ...
GOOD
something good, someone good
something good
something good happens
do something good (for someone)
feel something good
this is good
it is good if ...
TRUE
this is true
this is not true

Appendix 7 Dyads in the interlocutor study corpus

Speaker role	Addressee role	Speaker's relative power	Social distance	Speech acts	Apologetic speech acts
Girlfriend/ Boyfriend [birthday present]	Boyfriend/ Girlfriend [birthday present]	Equal	Intimate	103	89
Child	Parent [mother]	Less	Intimate	103	82
Student	Professor	Less	Great	103	87
Interviewee	Interviewer	Less	Great	103	85
Girlfriend/ Boyfriend [party]	Boyfriend/ Girlfriend [party]	Equal	Intimate	103	97
Employee	Employer	Less	Great	103	86
Child	Parent [father]	Less	Intimate	103	69
Student	Dean	Less	Great	103	53
Wife/ Husband	Husband/ Wife	Equal	Intimate	103	42
Total				927	690

References

Agar, Michael. 1994. *Language Shock*. New York NY: William Morrow and Company.

Akhutina (Ryabova), Tatiana. 1975. *Neurolinguistic Analysis of Dynamic Aphasia (Mechanisms Underlying Production of a Coherent Grammatical Utterance)*. Moscow: Moscow University Press.

Akhutina, Tatiana. 2003. "The Theory of Verbal Communication in the Works of M.

M. Bakhtin and L. S. Vygotsky". *Journal of Russian & East European Psychology* 41 (3/4), 96–114.

Allan, Keith. 1986. "Interpreting English comparatives". *Journal of Semantics* 5, Issue 1, 1–50.

Alston, William. 1964. *Philosophy of Language (Foundations of Philosophy)*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall.

Al-Khawaldeh, Nisreen; Zegarac, Vladimir. 2013. "Cross-Cultural Variation of Politeness Orientation & Speech Act Perception". *International Journal of Applied Linguistics & English Literature* 2 (3): 231–39.

Ammon, Ulrich. 1995. *Die deutsche Sprache in Deutschland, Osterreich und der Schweiz: Das Problem der nationalen Varietaten*. Berlin: W. de Gruyter.

Austin, John. 1962. "The meaning of a word". In Urmson, James Opie; Warnock, Geoffrey James (eds.). *Philosophical Papers*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 55–75.

Bach, Kent. 2005. "Context ex machine". In Szabó, Zoltan Gendler (ed.). *Semantics versus pragmatics*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 15–44.

Bakhtin, Mikhail. 1979 [1970-1971]. "From Notes Made in 1970-1971". In Emerson, Caryl; Holquist, Michael. (eds.). *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays* (trans. Vern W. McGee). Austin: University of Texas Press, 132-158.

Bakhtin, Mikhail. 1979 [1953]. “The Problem of Speech Genres”. In Emerson, Caryl; Holquist, Michael. (eds.). *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays* (trans. Vern W. McGee). Austin: University of Texas Press, 60-102.

Bakhtin, Mikhail. 1979 [1959-1961]. “The Problem of the Text”. In Emerson, Caryl; Holquist, Michael. (eds.). *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays* (trans. Vern W. McGee). Austin: University of Texas Press, 103-131.

Bakhtin, Mikhail. 1979. *The Aesthetics of Verbal Creation*. Moscow: Iskusstvo.

Bakhtin, Mikhail. 1981 [1935/1975]. “Discourse in the Novel”. in Holquist , Michael (ed.). *The Dialogic Imagination: Four essays by M. M. Bakhtin* (trans. C. Emerson and M. Holquist). Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press.

Bakhtin, Mikhail. 1984. *Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics (*ed. and trans. Caryl Emerson). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Bakhtin, Mikhail. 1986. Speech Genres and Other Late Essays. Emerson, Caryl; Holquist, Michael. (eds.). (trans. Vern W. McGee). Austin: University of Texas Press.

Bakhtin, Mikhail. 1990 [1923/4]. “Author and hero in aesthetic activity”. In Bakhtin, Mikhail et al. *Art and answerability: Early philosophical essays*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 4–256.

Bakhtin, Mikhail; Holquist, Michael; Liapunov, Vladim. 1993[1986]. *Towards a philosophy of the act*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Bamberg, Michael; Zielke, Barbara. 2007. „From dialogical practices to polyphonic t hought? Development inquiry and where to look for it”. *International Journal for Dialogical Sience* 2(1), 223-242.

Bach, Kent; Harnish, Robert M. 1979. *Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts*. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

Barsalou, Lawrence. 1999. “Language Comprehension: Archival Memory or Preparation for Situated Action?”. *Discourse Processes* 28 (1), 61–80.

Barsalou, Lawrence; Santos, Ava; Simmons, Kyle; Wilson, Christine. 2008. "Language and simulation in conceptual processing". In De Vega, Manuel; Glenberg, Arthur; Graesser, Arthur (eds.). *Symbols, embodiment and meaning*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 245–283.

Barsalou, Lawrence. 2010. "Grounded Cognition: Past, Present, and Future." *Topics in Cognitive Science* 2 (4): 716–24.

Barnlund, Dean. 1970. "A transactional model of communication". In Akin, John; Goldberg, Alvin; Myers, Gail; Stewart, Joseph (eds.). *Language Behavior*. The Hague: Mouton, 43-61.

Bartlett, Frederic. 1932. *Remembering*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bennett, Milton. 1998. "Intercultural communication: A current perspective". In

Bennett, Milton (ed.). *Basic concepts of intercultural communication: Selected readings.* Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press, 1-20. http://www.ikwa.eu/resources/Bennett_intercultural_communication.pdf (29 August 2012).

Bergen, Benjamin. 2005. "Mental simulation in literal and figurative language". In Coulson, Seana; Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, Barbara (eds.). *The Literal and Nonliteral in Language and Thought*. Berlin: Peter Lang, 255–280.

Bergen, Benjamin. 2012. *Louder than Words: The New Science of How the Mind Makes Meaning*. New York: Basic Books.

Biber, Douglas. 1988. *Variation across Speech and Writing*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Blommaert, Jan. 2005. *Discourse: A Critical Introduction.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Blum-Kulka, Shoshana. 1987. "Indirectness and politeness in requests: same or different?". *Journal of Pragmatics* 11, 131-146.

Berio, Leda; Vosgerau, Gottfried. (forthcoming). “Bringing language back to the speakers: fine-grained common ground and reference fixing”.

Boas, Franz. 1911. *The Mind of Primitive Man*. New York: Macmillan.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977. *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (trans. R. Nice). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre. and Wacquant, Louis. 1992. *An invitation to reflexive sociology*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.

Bostad, Finn; Brandist, Craig; Evensen, Lars; Faber, Hege Charlotte (eds.). 2004. *Bakhtinian perspectives on language and culture*. London: Palgrave.

Bruner, Jerome Seymore. 1990. *Acts of meaning*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Besemeres, Mary; Wierzbicka, Anna. 2003. „The meaning of the Singapore English particle lah”. *Pragmatics & Cognition* 11 (1), 3–38.

Berger, Peter; Luckmann, Thomas. 1967 [1966]. *The social construction of reality*. Harmonds- worth: Penguin.

Blum-Kulka, Shoshana; House, Juliane; Kasper, Gabriele. (eds.). 1989. *Cross-cultural pragmatics: requests and apologies*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Blum-Kulka, Shoshana; Olshtain, Elite. 1984. “Requests and apologies: A cross-cultural study of speech-act realization patterns (CCSARP)”. *Applied Linguistics* 5, 196-213.

Brandist, Craig. 2002. *The Bakhtin Circle: Philosophy, Culture and Politics*. London: Pluto Press.

Brandist, Craig. 2005. „Le marrisme et l’héritage de la Völkerpsychologie dans la linguistique soviétique“. *Cahiers de l’ILSL* 20, 39-56.

Brandt, Line. 2013. *The Communicative Mind: A Linguistic Exploration of Conceptual Integration and Meaning Construction*. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Bråten, Stein. (ed.). 1998. *Intersubjective Communication and Emotion in Early Ontogeny. Cambridge*. UK: Cambridge University Press.

Brown, Penelope.; Levinson, Steven. 1987. *Politeness: Some universals in language usage*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brône, Geert; Zima, Elisabeth. 2014. "Towards a dialogic construction grammar: Ad hoc routines and resonance activation". *Cognitive Linguistics* 25(3), 457–495.

Camiciotti, Gabriella del Lungo. 2008. "Two polite speech acts from a diachronic perspective: Aspects of the realisation of requesting and undertaking commitments in the nineteenth-century commercial community". In Taavitsainen, Irma; Jucker, Andreas (eds.). *Speech Acts in the History of English*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 115-131.

Carston, Robyn. 1998. "Pragmatics and the Explicit-Implicit Distinction". PhD thesis, University College London.

Carruthers, Peter. 2012. "Language in Cognition". In Margolis, Eric; Samuels, Richard; Stich, Stephen (eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-25.

Cabral, Álvaro; Nick, Eva. 2006. *Dicionário técnico de psicologia*. São Paulo: Cultrix.

Cappelen, Herman; Lepore, Ernest. 2005. *Insensitive Semantics. A Defence of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Cenoz, Jasone; Valencia, Jose. 1996. "Cross-cultural communication and inter language pragmatics: American vs. European requests". In Illinois Univ., Urbana, Div. of of English as an International Language; Bouton, Lawrence (ed.). *Pragmatics and Language Learning* Vol. 7. Urbana-Champaign: Division of English as an International Language, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 41-53.

Cicourel, Aaron. 1991. “Formal semantics, pragmatics, and situated meaning”. In. Verschueren, Jef (ed). *Pragmatics at Issue* Vol. 1. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Christiansen, Morten; Kirby, Simon. 2003. *Language Evolution.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Christiansen, Morten; Chater, Nick. 2008. “Language as shaped by the brain”. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 31(5), 489–509.

Clyne, Michael. 1994. *Intercultural Communication at Work*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Clyne, Michael. 1995. *The German Language in a Changing Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chafe, Wallace. 1980. “The deployment of consciousness in the production of a narrative”. In Chafe, Wallace (ed.). *The Pear Stories: Cognitive, cultural, and linguistic aspects of narrative production*. Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, 9-50.

Charmaz, Kathy. 2007. *The Sage handbook of grounded theory*. London: Sage Publications. 149

Clark, Katerina; Holquist, Michael. 1984. *Mikhail Bakhtin*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Cramer, Rachel. 2015. “German Ordnung: A Semantic and Ethnopragmatic Analysis of a Core Cultural Value”. *International Journal of Language and Culture* 2 (2), 269–93.

Creswell, James; Miller, Dana. 2000. “Determining validity in qualitative inquiry”. *Theory Into Practice* 39(3), 124–130.

Cresswell, James; Teucher, Ulrich. 2008. “Life as Dialogical: Max Scheler’s Notion of Sympathy and its Appropriation in Bakhtin’s View of the Ontogenetic Development of Personhood”. 5th International Conference on the Dialogical Self. Cambridge, United Kingdom.

Cresswell, James; Hawn, Allison. 2010. “From poetics to persons: A Bakhtin-inspired epistemology”. 6th International Conference on the Dialogical self. Athens, Greece.

Cresswell, James; Teucher, Urlich. 2011. “The body and language: M. M. Bakhtin on ontogenetic development”. *New Ideas in Psychology* 29, 106-118.

Creswell, James. 2014. *Research Design: Qualitative Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc.

Croft, William. 2001. *Radical construction grammar: Syntactic theory in typological perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Croft, William. 2009. “Toward a social cognitive linguistics”. In Evans, Vyvyan; Pourcel, Stéphanie (eds.). *New directions in cognitive linguistics*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 395-420.

Culpeper, Jonathan; Archer, Dawn. 2008. “Requests and directness in Early Modern English trial proceedings and play-texts, 1640-1760”. In editor Jucker, Andreas H; Taavitsainen, Irma (eds.). *Speech Acts in the History of English* (Pragmatics & Beyond new series). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 45-84.

D’Andrade, Roy. 2001. “A cognitivist’s view of the units debate in cultural anthropology”. *Cross-Cultural Research* 35(2), 242-257.

Davidse, Kristin; Vandelanotte, Lieven; Cuyckens, Hubert (eds). 2010. *Subjectification, Intersubjectification and Grammaticalization*. Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton.

Demuth, Carolin. 2011. „Das Potential eines dialogischen Verständnisses von Sprache für die empirische Entwicklungspsychologie“. *Journal für Psychologie* 19(1), 1-23.

Deutschmann, Mats. 2003. *Apologising in British English.* Umeå: Umeå universitet.

Doyle, Louise; Brady, Anne-Marie; Bryne, Gobnait. 2009. “An overview of mixed methods research”. *Journal of Research in Nursing* 14. 2, 175-185.

Dörnyei, Zoltán. 2007. *Research methods in applied linguistics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dorodnych, Anatolij; Kuzio, Anna. 2012. "The role of cultural scripts and contextualization cues in intercultural (mis)communication". In Kryk-Kastovsky, Barbara (ed.). *Intercultural Miscommunication Past and Present*. Peter Lang IAP.

Du Bois, John W. 1987. "Meaning Without Intention: Lessons From Divination". *IPrA Papers in Pragmatics* 1, 80-122.

Du Bois, John W. 2001. "Towards a Dialogic Syntax". *Cognitive Linguistics* 25(3), 359-410.

Duranti, Alessandro; Goodwin Charles (eds.). 1992. *Rethinking Context: Language as an Interactive Phenomenon*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Duranti, Alessandro. 1998. "Communicative Competence". In Mey, Jacob (ed.). *Concise Encyclopedia of Pragmatics*. Amsterdam: Pergamon.

Duranti, Alessandro. 2007. *Etnopragmatica. La forza nel parlare*. Roma: Carocci Editore.

Duranti, Alessandro. 2015. *The Anthropology of Intentions: Language in a World of Others.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ducrot, Oswald. 1984. *Le dire et le dit*. Paris: Minuit.

Eberle, Thomas; Srubar, Ilja. 2010. „Einleitung". In Eberle, Thomas S.;Dreher, Jochen; Sebald, Gerd (eds.). *Zur Methodologie der Sozialwissenschaften*. Konstanz: UVK, 9-44.

Eberle, Thomas S. 2012. "Phenomenology and Sociology: Divergent Interpretations of a Complex Relationship". In Nasu, Hisashi; Waksler, Frances Chaput (eds.). *Interaction and Everyday Life: Phenomenological and Ethnomethodological Essays in Honor of George Psathas*. Plymouth: Lexington Books, 135–52.

Eco, Umberto. 1990. *The Limits of Interpretation (I limiti dell'interpretazione).* Milano: Bompiani.

Enfield, Nick. 2008. “Language as shaped by social interaction”. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 31(5), 519–520.

Evensen, Lars Sigfred. 2001. “Grounding in Interaction”. In Coppock, P. (ed.). *The Semiotics of Writing*. Turnhout: Brepols, 137-55.

Evans, N.; Wilkins, D. 2000. “In the mind’s ear: The semantic extensions of perception verbs in Australian languages”. *Language* 76(3). 546-592.

Follesdal, D. 1975. Meaning and Experience, in S. Guttenplan (ed.) *Mind and Language*. O.U.P., 25-44.

Follesdal, Dagfinn (ed.). 2001. *Philosophy of Quine*. Routledge.

Fausey, Caitlin M.; Long, Bria L.; Inamori, Aya; Boroditsky, Lera. 2010. “Constructing Agency: The Role of Language”. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 1 (OCT), 1-11.

Fauconnier, Gilles. 1994. *Mental Spaces: Aspects of Meaning Construction in Natural Language*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Fauconnier, Gilles. 1997. *Mappings in Thought and Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fauconnier, Gilles. 1999. “Methods and Generalizations”. In Janssen, Theo; Redeker, Gisela (eds.). *Cognitive linguistics: Foundations, Scope, and Methodology*. The Hague: Mouton De Gruyter, 95-128.

Ford, Cecilia E. 2004. “Contingency and units in interaction”. *Discourse Studies* 6, 27-52.

Fried, Mirjam; Östman, Jan-Ola. 2005. “Construction Grammar and spoken language: The case of pragmatic particles”. *Journal of Pragmatics 37*, 1752-1778.

Frege, Gottlob. 1892. „Über Sinn und Bedeutung“. *Zeitschrift f¨ur Philosophie und philosophische Kritik* 100/1, 25-50.

Fitzgerald, Helen. 2003. *How Different Are We?*. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Gasparov, Boris. 2010. *Speech, Memory, and Meaning: Intertextuality in everyday language*. Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton.

Gaudet, Eve. 2006. *Quine on Meaning: The Indeterminacy of Translation*. New York: Continuum.

Gergen, Kenneth J. 2009. "Dialogue as collaborative action". *Journal Für Psychologie* 17(2). https://www.journal-fuer-psychologie.de/index.php/jfp/article/view/155/216

Gibbs, Raymond. W. 1994. *The poetics of mind: Figurative thought, language, and understanding*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gibbs, Raymond W.; Matlock, Teenie. 2008. „Metaphor, imagination, and simulation: Psycholinguistic evidence". In Gibbs, Raymond W. (ed.). *Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 161-176.

Goffman, Erving. 1963. *Behavior in Public Places*. New York: Free Press.

Goffman, Erving. 1971. *Relations in Public: Microstudies of the Public Order*. London: Lane, The Penguin Press.

Goffman, Erving. 1981. *Forms of Talk*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Gogotishvili, Liudmila. 2003. "<K filosofii postupka>, obschaia preambula k kommentariiu" [General introduction, commentary to *Toward a philosophy of the act*]. In Bakhtin, Mikhail. *Sobranie Sochinenij* Vol. 1. Moscow: Russkie slovari, Jazyki slavianskoj kul'tury, 351-438.

Glenberg, Arthur M.; Meyer, Marion; Lindem, Karen. 1987. "Mental models contribute to foregrounding during text comprehension". *Journal of Memory and Language* 26, 69-83.

Glenberg, Arthur M.; Robertson, David A. 2000. “Symbol grounding and meaning: A comparison of high-dimensional and embodied theories of meaning”. *Journal of Memory and Language* 43, 379-401.

Glover, Kelly D. 1995. “A prototype view of context and linguistic behavior: Context prototypes and talk”. *Journal of Pragmatics* 23(2), 137-156

Green, Mitchell. 2010. “Showing and Meaning: How We Make Our Ideas Clear”. In Petrus, Klaus (ed.). *Meaning and Analysis: New Essays on Grice*. Palgrave MacMillan, 202-220.

Green, Mitchell. 2016. *Speech Acts*. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Linguistics.

Green, Mitchell. 2017. “Illocution and Empathy.” *Philosophia* 45 (3), 881-893.

Green, M. (in press) Extreme Intentionalism Modestly Modified. in symposium on Kathleen Stock's book Only Imagine: Fiction, Interpretation and Imagination. *British Journal of Aesthetics*.

Goddard, Cliff.; Wierzbicka Anna. (eds.). 1994. *Semantic and Lexical Universals – Theory and Empirical Findings*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Goddard, Cliff; Wierzbicka, Anna. 1995. “Key Words, Culture and Cognition.” *Philosophica* 55 (1): 37–67.

Goddard, Cliff; Wierzbicka, Anna. 2002. *Meaning and Universal Grammar – Theory and Empirical Findings*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Goddard, Cliff. 1998. *Semantic Analysis: A practical introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Goddard, Cliff. (2000). "Cultural Scripts" and Communicative Style in Malay (Bahasa Melayu). *Anthropological Linguistics* 42, 81-106.

Goddard, Cliff. 2002. “Ethnosyntax, ethnopragmatics, sign-functions, and culture”. In Enfield, Nick J. (ed.). *Ethnosyntax: Explorations in Grammar and Culture*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 52-73.

Goddard, Cliff.; Wierzbicka, Anna. 2004. “Cultural scripts: What are they and what are they good for?”. *Intercultural Pragmatics* 1(2), 153-166.

Goddard, Cliff. 2004. “’Cultural scripts’”: A new medium for ethnopragmatic instruction”. In Achard, Michel; Niemeier, Susanne (eds.). *Cognitive Linguistics, Second Language Acquisition, and Foreign Language Teaching.* Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 145–165.

Goddard, Cliff. 2006. “Ethnopragmatics: A New Paradigm”. In Goddard, Cliff (ed.). *Ethnopragmatics: Understanding Discourse in Cultural Context*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1-30.

Goddard, Cliff. 2007. “A Culture-Neutral Metalanguage for Mental State Concepts”. In Schalley, Andrea; Khlentozs, Drew (eds.). *Mental States 2: Language and Cognitive Structure*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 11-36.

Goddard, Cliff. 2008a. “Contrastive semantics and cultural psychology: English heart vs. Malay hati”. In Sharifian, Farzad; Dirven, René; Yu, Ning; Niemeier, Susanne (eds.). *Culture, Body, and Language: Conceptua- lizations of internal body organs across cultures and languages.*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 75-102.

Goddard, Cliff. (ed.). 2008b. *Cross-Linguistic Semantics*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Goddard, Cliff. 2010a. “Universals and variation in the lexicon of mental states”. In Malt, Barbara; Wolff, Phil (eds.). *Words and the Mind: How words capture human experience.* New York: Oxford University Press, 72-92.

Goddard, Cliff. 2010b. “Cultural scripts: applications to language teaching and intercultural communication”. *Studies in Pragmatics (Journal of the China Pragmatics Association)* 3, 105-119.

Goddard, Cliff. 2011. “The lexical semantics of 'language' (with special reference to 'words')”. *Language Sciences* 33(1), 40-57.

Goddard, Cliff. 2012a. “Semantic primes, semantic molecules, semantic templates: Key concepts in the NSM approach to lexical typology”. *Linguistics* (Special issue on "Lexical Typology", edited by Maria Koptjevskaja-Tamm and Martine Vanhove) 50(3), 711-743.

Goddard, Cliff. 2012b. The Natural Semantic Metalanguage Approach. In The Oxford Handbook of Linguistic Analysis. Oxford University Press.

Goddard, Cliff; Wierzbicka, Anna. 2014a. “Semantic fieldwork and lexical universals”. *Studies in Language* 38(1), 80-127.

Goddard, Cliff; Wierzbicka, Anna. 2014b. *Words and meanings: Lexical semantics across domains, languages and cultures*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Goddard, Cliff; Wierzbicka Anna; Fábrega, Horacio Jr. 2014c. “Evolutionary semantics: Using NSM to model stages in human cognitive evolution”. *Language Sciences* 42, 60-79.

Goddard, Cliff; Ye, Zhengdao. 2015. “Ethnopragmatics”. in Sharifian, Farzad (ed.). *The Routledge Handbook of Language and Culture*. UK: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 66-83.

Gumperz, John J; Hymes, Dell H. (eds.). 1964. “The Ethnography of Communication”. *American Anthropologist* 66 (6), Part II, 137-154.

Hall, Edward T. 1976. *Beyond Culture*. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press.

Hall, Edward T. 1983. *The Dance of Life: The Other Dimension of Time.* Anchor Press/Doubleday.

Halliday, Michael. 1999. “The notion of ‘context’ in language education”. In Ghadessy, Mohsen (ed.). *Text and context in functional linguistics*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1-24.

Hanks, William. F.; Ide, Sachiko; Katagiri, Yasuhiro. 2009. “Towards an Emancipatory Pragmatics.” *Journal of Pragmatics* 41/1, 1-9.

Haugh, Michael; Jaszczolt, Kasia M. 2012. “Speaker intentions and intentionality”. In Allan, Keith; Jaszczolt, Kasia (eds.), *The Cambridge Handbook of Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 87-112.

Harris, Roy. 1981. *The language myth*. London: Duckworth.

Heesoo, Kim. 2008. “The Semantic and Pragmatic Analysis of South Korean and Australian English Apologetic Speech Acts”. *Journal of Pragmatics* 40 (2), 257–78.

Heine, Bernd. 1997. *Possession: Cognitive Sources, Forces and Grammaticalization*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Held, Gudrun. 1989. „Beziehungsarbeit und konversationsanalyse am beispiel eines bittgesprächs“. *Folia Linguistica* 23 (4), 405-31.

Held, Gudrun. 1999. “Submission strategies as an expression of the ideology of politeness: reflections on the verbalization of social power relations”. *Pragmatics* 9 (1), 5-20.

Heppner, Paul P.; Kivlighan, Dennis M.; Wampold Heppner, Bruce E. 1999. *Research design in counseling* (2nd ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

Hofstede, Geert. 1983. “The cultural relativity of organizational practices and theories”. *Journal of International Business Studies* 14(2), 75-89.

Hofstede, Geert. 1984. *Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Hofstede, Geert. 2001. *Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions and Organizations across Nations*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Hofstede, Geert. 2010[1991]. *Cultures and Organizations. Software of the Mind*. Maidenhead, U.K.: McGraw-Hill.

Horn, Laurence. R. 2004. “Implicature”. In Horn, Laurence; Ward, Gregory (eds.). *The Handbook of Pragmatics*. Malden, MA & Oxford: Blackwell, 3-28.

Horn, Laurence; Keckes, Istvan. 2013. “Pragmatics, Discourse, and Cognition”. In Anderson, Stephen R.; Moeschler, Jacques; Reboul, Fabienne (eds.). *The Language-Cognition Interface*. Geneva-Paris: Librairie Droz, 353-375.

Holquist, Michael; Emerson Caryl (eds.). 1986. *Speech genres and other late essays*. (trans. Vern W. McGee). Austin: University of Texas Press.

Holquist, Michael. 1990. *Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World*. London: Routledge.

Holtgraves, Thomas. 2002. *Language as Social Action: Social Psychology and Language Use*. London: Erlbaum.

House, Juliane. 1996. “Developing pragmatic fluency in English as a foreign language: Routines and metapragmatic awareness”. *Studies in Second Language Acquisition* 18, 225-252.

House Juliane. 2008. “What Is an ‘Intercultural Speaker’?”. In: Soler Eva A; Safont-Jordà, Maria-Pilar. (eds.). *Intercultural Language Use and Language Learning*. Dordrecht: Springer, 7-21.

Hymes, Dell. (ed.). 1964. *Language in Culture and Society*. New York & London: Harper & Row.

Hymes, Dell. 1972. “Models of the Interaction of Language and Social Life”. In:

Gumperz, John J.; Hymes, Dell (eds.). *Directions in Sociolinguistics: The Ethnography of Communication*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 35-71.

Hymes, Dell. 1974. “Ways of Speaking”. In: Bauman, Richard; Sherzer, Joel (eds.). *Explorations in the Ethnography of Speaking*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 433-451.

Huang, Yan. 2007. *Pragmatics. Oxford Textbooks in Linguistics*. Oxford University Press.

Hurford, James. 2008. “The evolution of human communication and language”. In D’Ettorre, Patricia; Hughes, David P. (eds.). *Sociobiology of communication: an interdisciplinary perspective*. New York: Oxford University Press, 249-264.

Ivanova, Irina. 2009. “L’opposition langue poétique / langue pratique dans la conception linguistique de Lev Jakubinskij”. *Cahiers de l’ILSL* 26, 113-128.

Intraub, Helene; Hoffman, James E. 1992. “Reading and visual memory: Remembering scenes that were never seen”. *American Journal of Psychology* 105, 101-114.

Jackendoff, Ray. 1983. *Semantics and Cognition*. MIT Press.

Jackendoff, Ray. 1994. *Patterns in the Mind: Language and Human Nature*. NY: Basic Books.

Jackendoff, Ray. 1997. *The Architecture of the Language Faculty*. MIT Press.

Jackendoff, Ray. 2007. *Language, consciousness, culture: essays on mental structure*. M.I.T. Press.

Jaszczolt, Kasia M. 2003. “On translating what is said: Tertium comparationis in contrastive semantics and pragmatics”. In K. M. Jaszczolt; Turner, Ken (eds.). *Meaning Through Language Contrast* 2. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 441-462.

Jaszczolt, Kasia M. 2018a. “Pragmatics and Philosophy: In Search of a Paradigm.” *Intecultural pragmatics* 15, 131–159.

Jaszczolt, Kasia M; Witek, Maciej. 2018b. “Expressing the Self: From Types of De Se to Speech-Act Types”. In Huang, Minyao; Jaszczolt, Kasia M. (eds.). *Expressing the Self: Cultural Diversity and Cognitive Universals.* Oxford University Press, 1-46.

Johnson, Burke R.; Onwuegbuzie, Anthony J. 2004. “Mixed methods research: A research paradigm whose time has come”. *Educational Researcher* 33.7, 14–26.

Jucker, Andreas H.; Taavitsainen, Irma. 2000. “Diachronic speech act analysis: Insults from flyting to flaming”. *Journal of Historical Pragmatics* 1.1, 67-95.

Jucker, Andreas A.; Taavitsainen, Irma. (eds.). 2008. *Speech Acts in the History of English*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Jucker, Andreas H. 2009. “Speech act research between armchair, field and laboratory: The case of compliments”. *Journal of Pragmatics* 41(8), 1611-1635.

Kallen, Jeffrey L.; Kirk, John M. 2012. *SPICE-Ireland: A user's guide*. Belfast: Cló Ollscoil na Banríona.

Kasper, Gabriele. 1992. "Pragmatic transfer". *Second Language Research* 8(3), 203-231.

Kecskes, Istvan. 2010. "The paradox of communication: A socio-cognitive approach". *Pragmatics & Society* 1, 50-73.

Kecskes, Istvan. 2012. "Is there anyone out there who really is interested in the speaker?" *Language and Dialogue* 2, 285-299.

Kishner, Jeffrey; Gibbs, Raymond. 1996. "How "just" gets its meanings: Polysemy and context in psychological semantics". *Language and Speech* 39, 19-36.

Kopytko Roman. 2002. *The mental aspects of pragmatic theory: An integrative view*. Poznań: Motivex.

Kopytko Roman. 2003. "Relations in pragmatics: A theoretical introduction". *RASK 18*, 93-114.

Korta, Kepa; Perry, John. 2013. "Highlights of critical pragmatics: reference and the contents of the utterance". *Intercultural Pragmatics* 10 (1), 161-182.

Korta, Kepa; Perry, John. 2015. "Pragmatics". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/pragmatics/

Kristeva, Julia. 1974. "Sujet dans le langage et pratique politique". In Verdiglione, Armando (ed.). *Psychanalyse et politique*. Paris: Seuil, 73.

Kristeva, Julia. 1982. *Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art*. Columbia University Press.

Kryk-Kastovsky, Barbara. 2002. *Synchronic and diachronic investigations in pragmatics*. Poznań: Motivex.

Kryk-Kastovsky, Barbara. (ed.). 2012. *Intercultural Miscommunication Past and Present*. Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang D.

Kroeber, Alfred; Kluckhohn, Clayde. 1963[1952]. *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions*. NY: Random House.

Kuhn, Thomas S. 1962. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Lakoff, George. 1987. *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What categories reveal about the mind*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Langacker, Ronald W. 1987. *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, Volume I, Theoretical Prerequisites*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Langacker, Ronald W. 1991. *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar; Volume 2. Descriptive Application.* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Langacker, Ronald W. 1995. "Assessing the Cognitive Linguistic Enterprise". In Janssen, Theo; Redeker, Gisela (eds.). *Cognitive Linguistics: Foundations, Scope, and Methodology*.. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 13-59.

Langacker, Ronald W. 2008. *Cognitive Grammar: A Basic Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Langacker, Ronald W. 2013. "Interactive Cognition: Toward a unified account of structure, processing, and discourse". *International Journal of Cognitive Linguistics* 3(2), 95-125.

Levisen, Carsten. 2012. Cultural Semantics and Social Cognition: A Case Study on the Danish Universe of Meaning. Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton.

Leibniz, Gottfried W. 1981 [1709]. *New essays on human understanding* (trans. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lewis, David. 1972. "General semantics". In Davidson, Donald; Harman, Gilbert (eds.). *Semantics of Natural Language*. Dordrecht: Reidel, 169-218.

Linell, Per. 1998. *Approaching Dialogue: Talk, Interaction and Contexts in Dialogical Perspectives*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Linell, Per. 2005. *The written language bias in linguistics: Its nature, origin and transformations*. Oxford: Routledge.

Linell, Per. 2009. *Rethinking Language, Mind and World Dialogically: Interactional and Contextual Theories of Human Sense-Making*. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing.

Leech, Geoffrey N. 1983. *Principles of Pragmatics*. London: Longman.

Lederach, John Paul. 1995. *Conflict Transformation Across Cultures*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Louwerse, Max M.; Jeuniaux, Patrick. 2008. "Language Comprehension is both Embodied and Symbolic". In De Vega, Manuel; Glenberg, Arthur; Graesser, Arthur (eds.). *Symbols, embodiment and meaning*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 309-326.

Luce, Louise F.; Smith, Elice C. 1987. "Cross-cultural literacy: a national priority". In Luce Louise F.; Smith, Elice C. (eds.). *Toward Internationalism*. Cambridge: Newbury House Publishers, 3-10.

Lwanga-Lugu, J.C. 2005. "A cross-cultural investigation of apology realization patterns in Luganda and English". *Journal for Language Teaching* 39(2), 227-242.

Luckmann, Thomas. 1990. "Social communication, dialogue and conversation". In

Markova, Ivana; Foppa, Klaus (eds.). *The Dynamics of Dialogue*. Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire: Harvester & Wheatsheaf , 45-61.

Luria, Alexander R.; Tsvetkova, L.S. 1968. "Neuropsychological Analysis of the Predicative Structure of an Utterance". *Soviet Psychology* 7(3), 26-33.

Markova, Ivana; Foppa, Klaus. (eds.). 1990a. *The Dynamics of Dialogue*. Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire: Harvester & Wheatsheaf.

Markova, Ivana. 1990b. "Introduction". In Markova, Ivana; Foppa, Klaus (eds.). *The Dynamics of Dialogue*. Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire: Harvester & Wheatsheaf, 1-22.

Marková, Ivana. 1990c. “A three-step process as a unit of analysis in dialogue”. In

Markova, Ivana; Foppa, Klaus (eds.). *The Dynamics of Dialogue*. Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire: Harvester & Wheatsheaf, 129-146.

Markova, Ivana; Foppa, Klaus. (eds.). 1991. *Asymmetries in Dialogue*. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Marková, Ivana. 1994. “Sociogenesis of Language: Perspectives on Dialogism and on Activity Theory”. In Graaf, de Willibrord; Maier, Robert (eds.). *Sociogenesis Reexamined*. New York: Springer, 27-46.

Marková, Ivana. 2003. *Dialogicality and social representations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Marková, Ivana. 2006. “On the inner alter in dialogue”. *International Journal for Dialogical Science* 1(1), 125-147.

Marková, Ivana; Linell, Per; Grossen, Michele; Salazar Orvig, Anne. 2007. *Dialogue in focus groups: Exploring socially shared knowledge*. London: Equinox.

MacWhinney, Brian. 1998. *The emergence of language*. Mahway, NJ: Erlbaum.

Malinowski, Bronislaw. 1972 [1923]. “The problem of meaning in primitive languages”. In Ogden, Charles K.; Richards, Ivor A. *The meaning of meaning*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 306-357.

Medvedev, Pavel; Bakhtin, Mikhail. 1978. *The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship: A Critical Introduction to Sociological Poetics (*trans. A. J. Wehrle). Baltimore: John Hopkins.

Mey, Jacob. 2001. *Pragmatics: An introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Mey, Jacob. 2007. “Developing pragmatics interculturally”. In Kecskes, Istvan; Horn, Laurence R (eds.). *Explorations in Pragmatics*. Berlin, Boston: Mouton de Gruyter, 165-189.

Meier, Ardith J. 1992. “A Sociopragmatic Contrastive Study of Repair Work in Austrian German and American English”. Phd thesis, University of Vienna, Austria.

Meier, Ardith J. 1996. “Two cultures mirrored in repair work”. *Multilingua* 15(2), 149-169.

Meier, Ardith J. 1998. “Apologies: What do we know?”. *International Journal of Applied Linguistics* 8(2), 215-231.

Meier, Ardith J. 1999. “Identifying and teaching the underlying cultural themes of pragmatics: A case for explanatory pragmatics”. In Illinois Univ., Urbana, Div. of of English as an International Language; Bouton, Lawrence (ed.). *Pragmatics and Language Learning* Vol. 7. Urbana-Champaign: Division of English as an International Language, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 113-127.

Meier, Ardith J. 2003. “Posting the banns: A marriage of pragmatics and culture in foreign and second language pedagogy and beyond”. In Martínez-Flor, Alicia; Usó Juan, Esther; Fernández Guerra, Ana (eds.). *Pragmatic Competence and Foreign Language Teaching*. Castelló de la Plana, Spain: Publicacions de la Universitat Jaume I, 185-210.

Meier, Ardith J. 2004. “Has ‘politeness’ outlived its usefulness?”. *Vienna English Working Papers* 13(1), 5-22.

Meier, Ardith J. 2010. “Culture and its effect on speech act performance”. In Flor,

Martinez, Alicia; Juan, Esther Usó (eds.). *Speech Act Performance. Theoretical Empirical and Methodological Issues*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 75-90.

Meier, Ardith J. 2015. “The role of noticing in developing intercultural communicative competence”. *Eurasian Journal of Applied Linguistics* 1, 25-38.

Meeuwis, Michael. 1994. “Leniency and testiness in intercultural communication: Remarks on ideology and context in interactional sociolinguistics”. *Pragmatics* 4(3), 391-408.

Morrow, Daniel G.; Greenspan, Steven L.; Bower, Gordon H. 1987. "Accessibility and situation models in narrative comprehension". *Journal of Memory and Language* 26, 165-187.

Molon, Newton Duarte; Vianna, Rodolfo. 2012. "The Bakhtin Circle and Applied Linguistics/ O Círculo de Bakhtin e a Linguística Aplicada". *Bakhtiniana*, Sao Paulo 7 (2), 142-165.

Morris, Charles. 1938. *Foundations of the Theory of Signs*. University of Chicago Press.

Mead, George H. 1932. *The philosophy of the present*. Chicago: Open Court.

Mead, George H. 1934. *Mind, Self, and Society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Muhr, Rudolf. (ed.) 1993. *Internationale Arbeiten zum Osterreichischen Deutsch und seinen nachbarsprachlichen Bezugen*. Vienna: Hölder-Pichler – Tempsky.

Neale, Stephen. 1987. "Meaning, Grammar, and Indeterminacy". *Dialectica* 41(4), 301-319.

Neale, Stephen. 2005. "Pragmatism and Binding". In Szabó, Zoltan (ed.). *Semantics versus Pragmatics*. Clarendon Press, 165-285.

Nikulin, Dmitri. 2011. "The man at the mirror (dialogue with oneself)". *Iris* 3, 61-79.

Norrick, Neal R. 1978. "Expressive illocutionary acts". *Journal of Pragmatics* 2 (3), 277-291.

Ochs, Elinor; Schegloff, Emanuel A.; Thompson, Sandra A. (eds). 1996. *Interaction and Grammar*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Oakley, Todd; Hougaard, Andres (eds). 2008. *Mental Spaces Approaches to Discourse and Interaction*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Pascual, Esther. 2002. *Imaginary Trialogues: Conceptual Blending and Fictive Interaction in Criminal Courts*. Utrecht: LOT.

Pascual, Esther. 2006. “Fictive interaction within the sentence: A communicative type of fictivity in grammar”. *Cognitive Linguistics* 17(2), 245-267.

Pascual, Esther. 2008. “Text for context, trial for trialogue: An ethnographic study of a fictive inter- action blend”. *Annual Review of Cognitive Linguistics* 6, 50-82.

Pascual, Esther. 2014. *Fictive Interaction: The Conversation Frame in Thought, Language, and Discourse*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Pateman, Trevor. 1991. “Pragmatics in Semiotics: Bakhtin/Volosinov”. *Journal of Literary Semantics* 18 (3), 206-216.

Pateman, Trevor. 1998. “The empty word and the full word”. *The Self on the Page: Theory and Practice of Creative Writing in Personal Development*, 153-163.

Pateman, Trevor. 2001. “Language as a Social Reality”. In *Concise Encyclopaedia of Sociolinguistics*. Elsevier Science and Technology, 34-36.

Pateman, Trevor. 2001. “Language as a Social Reality”. In *Concise Encyclopaedia of Sociolinguistics*. Elsevier Science and Technology, 34-36.

Paivio, Allan. 1971. *Imagery and verbal processes*. NY/London: Psychology Press.

Petitmengin, Claire. 2006. “Describing One’s Subjective Experience in the Second

Person: An Interview Method for the Science of Consciousness”. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 5 (3–4), 229-69.

Petitmengin, Claire. 2011. “Is the ‘Core Self’ a Construct?” *Constructivist Foundations 6* (2), 270-274.

Peeters, Bert. (ed.) 2006. *Semantic primes and universal grammar: Empirical evidence from the Romance languages*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Peeters, Bert. 2009. “Language and cultural values : The ethnolinguistic pathways model”. *Fulgor* 4(1), 59-73.

Perlovsky, Leonid. 2009. “Language and Cognition”. *Neural Networks* 22 (3), 247-257. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neunet.2009.03.007.

Perovic, Slavica. 2009. *Language in action* (orig. Jezik u akciji). Podgorica: CID.

Pellizzi, Federico. 2008. "From Phenomenology To Hermeneutics: Bakhtin's Analogic Thinking As An Epistemological Strategy". In Orechov, (ed.). *Chronotrope and environs*. Ufa: Varant, 202-208. Retrieved from http://nevmenandr.net/scientia/festschrift/pellizzi.pdf .

Potter, Mary C.; Faulconer, Barbara A. 1975. "Time to understand pictures and words". *Nature* 253 (5491), 437- 438.

Potter, Mary C.; Valian, Virginia V.; Faulconer, Barbara A. 1977. "Representation of a sentence and its pragmatic implications: Verbal, imagistic, or abstract?". *Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior* 16, 1-12.

Potter, Mary C.; Kroll, Judith F.; Yachzel, Betsy; Carpenter, Elisabeth; Sherman, Janet. 1986. "Pictures in sentences: Understanding without words". *Journal of Experimental Psychology*: General 115 (3), 281-294.

Prinz, Jesse. 2002. *Furnishing the mind: Concepts and their perceptual basis*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Putnam, Hilary. 1975. "The meaning of Meaning". In Putnam, Hilary (ed.). *Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers II*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 215–271.

Quine, Wiilard V. 1972. "Methodological reflections on linguistic theory". In Harman, Gilbert; Davidson, Donald (eds.). *Semantics of Natural Language*. Dordrecht: Reidel, 442-454.

Quine, Willard V. 1995 [1960]. "Variables Explained Away". In Quine, Willard V. *Selected Logic Papers*. Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 227-35.

Recanati, Francois. 1998. "Pragmatics." In Edward, Craig (ed.). *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Routledge, 620–33.

Recanati, Francois. 2002. "What Is Said and the Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction". In Claudia, Bianchi (ed.). *The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction.* Stanford: CSLI, 45-64.

Recanati, Francois. 2013. “Pragmatic Enrichment”. In Graff Fara, Delia; Russell, Gillian (eds.). *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy*. New York/London: Routledge, 67-78.

Riazi, Mehdi; Candlin, Christopher. 2014. “Mixed-Methods Research in Language Teaching and Learning: Opportunities, Issues and Challenges”. *Language Teaching* 47 (2), 135-73.

Ribeirão Preto, Paidéia; Oliveira, Robson; Lyra, Maria. (2012). “Yakubinsky and the Circle of Bakhtin: Convergences/ Yakubinsky e o Círculo de Bakhtin: Aproximações”. *Paidéia (Ribeirão Preto)*. 22(52). 251-260.

Rinck, Mike; Hahnel, Andrea; Bower, Gordo; Glowalla, Ulrich. 1997. “The metrics of spatial situation models”. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition* 23(3), 622- 637.

Roudiez, Leon. 1982. “Introduction”. In Kristeva, Julia. *Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art*. Columbia University Press, 1-20.

Ronan, Patricia. 2015. “Categorizing expressive speech acts in the pragmatically annotated SPICE Ireland corpus”. *ICAME Journal* 39, 25-45.

Rommetveit, Ragnar. 1992. “Outlines of a dialogically based social-cognitive approach to human cognition and communication”. In Wold, Heen (ed.). *The Dialogical Alternative: Towards a Theory of Language and Mind*. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 19-44.

Sandler, Sergeiy. (forthcoming). “The Possibility of Dialogic Semantics”.

Sandler, Sergeiy. 2012a. “Reenactment: An Embodied Cognition Approach to Meaning and Linguistic Content”. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 11(4), 583-598.

Sandler, Sergeiy. 2012b. “How Many Bakhtins? The Question of the Unity of Bakhtin’s Work and What Bakhtin Himself Had to Say about It”. Paper delivered at *The 16th International Mikhail Bakhtin Conference,* Shanghai, September, 2012.

Sandler, Sergeiy. 2013. “Language and Philosophical Anthropology in the Work of Mikhail Bakhtin and the Bakhtin Circle”. *Rivista Italiana Di Filosofia Del Linguaggio* 7(2), 152–65.

Sandler, Sergeiy. 2016. “Fictive Interaction and the Nature of Linguistic Meaning”. *Human Cognitive Processing* 55, 23–41. Web.

Sandelowski, Margarete. 2014. “Unmixing Mixed-Methods Research”. *Research in Nursing and Health* 37, 3-8.

Salmon, William. 2010. “Formal idioms and action: Toward a grammar of genres”. *Language and Communication* 30, 211-224.

Samovar, Larry; Porter, Richard; Stefani, Lisa. 1998. *Communication between cultures* (3rd ed.). Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company.

Sapir, Edward. 1921. *Language: An introduction to the study of speech*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.

Schiffman, Harold. 1996. “Language Policy and Linguistic Culture.” In Ricento, Thomas (ed.). *An Introduction to Language Policy: Theory and Method*, 1-22.

Schittsova, Tatiana. 2002. *Sobytie v filosofii M. M. Bakhtina [The event in Bakhtin’s philosophy].* Mins: I. P. Logvinov.

Schutz, Alfred. 1962. *Collected Papers, Vol. 1: The Problem of Social Reality*. The Hague: Nijhoff.

Schutz, Alfred. 1967. *The Phenomenology of the Social World*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Schutz, Alfred; Eberle, Thomas; Dreher, Jochen; Sebald, Gerd. 2010. *Zur Methodologie der Sozialwissenschaften.* ASW 4. Konstanz: UVK.

Shotter, John. 1993. *Conversational Realities: Constructing Life through Language*. London: Sage.

Senft, Gunter; Östman, Jan-Ola; Verschueren, Jef. (eds.). 2009. *Culture and l anguage use*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Senft, Gunter. 2014. *Understanding Pragmatics*. London: Routledge.

Searle, John. 1975. "Indirect speech acts". In Cole, Peter; Morgan, Jerry (eds.). *Syntax and Semantics 3*: *Speech Acts*. New York: Academic Press, 59-82.

Searle, John. 1976. "A Classification of Illocutionary Speech Acts". *Language in Society* 5, 1-23.

Searle, John. 1979. *Expression and Meaning*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Searle, John; Vanderveken, Daniel. 1985. *Foundations of illocutionary logic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University.

Searle, John. 2004. *Mind: A brief introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Searle, John. 2007. "What Is Language: Some Preliminary Remarks". In Kecskes, Istvan; Horn, Laurence (eds.). *Explorations in Pragmatics: Linguistic, Cognitive and Intercultural Aspects*. Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton, 7-37.

Searle, John. 2010. *Thinking about the Real World*. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Sharifian, Farzad. 2011. *Cultural Conceptualisations and Language: Theoretical Framework and Applications*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Silverman, David. 2005. *Doing qualitative research: A practical handbook*. London: Sage Publications.

Singer, M.R. 1998. *Perception and Identity in Intercultural Communication*. Yarmouth ME: Intercultural Press.

Sperber, Dan; Wilson, Deirdre. 1995. *Relevance: Communication and Cognition* [2nd ed.]. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Speaks, Jeff. 2014. "No Easy Argument for Two-Dimensionalism". *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 92 (4), 775-781.

Stanfield, Robert; Zwaan, Rolf. 2001. "The effect of implied orientation derived from verbal context on picture recognition". *Psychological Science* 12(2), 153-6.

Stefanovic, Marija. 2017. Treatment of Stigma and the Strategies of Use of Formal and Informal Code by the Speakers of Southern Serbian Dialect. (orig. ОПХОЂЕЊЕ ПРЕМА СТИГМИ И СТРАТЕГИЈЕ УПОТРЕБЕ ФОРМАЛНОГ И НЕФОРМАЛНОГ КÔДА ГОВОРНИКА ЈУЖЊАЧКОГ ДИЈАЛЕКТА). M.A. Thesis, Dept. of Sociology, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Nis.

Stirk, Nigel. 1999. "Wittgenstein and Social Practices". *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 17 (1), 35–50.

Stojanovic, Isidora. 2009. "Semantic Content". *Manuscrito* 32 (1), 123-152.

Sutanovac, Vladan. 2013. "The Acculturation of Language for Specific Purposes (L[E]SP): ESP as Culture-Specific Language". *Proceedings of the First International Conference on Teaching English for Specific Purposes*, University of Nis, Serbia, 692-701.

Sutanovac, Vladan. 2014. "Vistas of Cultural and Contextual Determination of Language Formulas: Anatomy of Speech Acts". *Wiener Linguistische Gazette* (Special Issue) 78A, 34-45.

Sutanovac, Vladan; Vosgerau, Gottfried. (forthcoming) Complex Abstract Concepts: From Conceptualisation to Structure and Modeling (via NSM-frames).

Taavitsainen, Irma; Jucker, Andreas. 2010. "Expressive speech acts and politeness in eighteenth-century English". In Hickey, Raymond (ed.). *Eighteenth-Century English: Ideology and Change (Studies in English Language).* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 159-181.

Talmy, Leonard. 1988. "Force Dynamics in Language and Cognition". *Cognitive Science* 12(1), 49-100.

Talmy, Leonard. 2000. *Toward a cognitive semantics*. Cambridge (Massachusetts): M.I.T. Press

Tannen, Deborah. 1986. *That's not what I meant! How conversational style makes or breaks relationships*. New York: Harper Collins Publishers.

Tashakkori, Abbas; Teddlie, Charles. 1998. *Mixed methodology: Combining qualitative and quantitative approaches*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publishing.

Tashakkori, Abbas; Teddlie, Charles. (Eds.). 2003. *Handbook of mixed methods in social and behavioral research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publishing.

Teddlie, Charles; Tashakkori, Abbas. 2009. *Foundations of mixed methods research: Integrating quantitative and qualitative approaches in the social and behavioral sciences*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publishing.

Todorov, Tzvetan. 1984. *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle* (trans. Godzich, Wlad). Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Tomasello, Michael; Kruger, Ann; Ratner, Hilary. 1993. "Cultural learning". *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 16(3), 495-552.

Tomasello, Michael. 1999. *The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition*. Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press.

Tomasello, Michael. 2003. *Constructing a Language: A Usage-Based Theory of Language Acquisition*. Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press.

Tomasello, Michael. 2009. *Why We cooperate*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Trevarthen, Colwyn. 1979. "Communication and cooperation in early infancy. A description of primary intersubjectivity". In Bullowa, Margaret (ed.). *Before Speech: The Beginning of Human Communication*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 321-347.

Trevarthen, Colwyn. 2011. "What is it like to be a person who knows nothing? Defining the active intersubjective mind of a newborn human being". *Infant and Child Development* 20(1), 119-135.

Trosborg, Anna. 1995. *Interlanguage Pragmatics: Requests, Complaints and Apologies*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Trosborg, Anna. (ed.) 2010. *Pragmatics across Languages and Cultures*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Traugott, Elizabeth; Ekkehard, König. 1991. “The semantics-pragmatics of grammaticalization revisited". In Traugott, Elizabeth; Heine, Bernd (eds.). *Approaches to grammaticalization* 1. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 189-218.

Traugott, Elizabeth; Dasher, Richard. 2002. *Regularity in Semantic Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Vanderveken, Daniel. 1990. *Meaning and speech acts: Principles of language use* (Vol. 1). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Van Dijk, Teun. 2009. “Context Theory and the Foundation of Pragmatics”. *Proceedings of the Plenary Lecture Congress of the Pragmatics Society of Japan*, Osaka, December 2009, 1-13.

Verhagen, Arie. 2005. *Constructions of Intersubjectivity: Discourse, Syntax, and Cognition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Verschueren, J. 1994. “Meaning in a Theory of Pragmatics.” In *Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society: General Session Dedicated to the Contributions of Charles J. Fillmore*, 553-562.

Verschueren, Jef. 1999. *Understanding Pragmatics*. London: Edward Arnold / New York: Oxford University Press.

Verschueren, Jef. 2008. “Context and Structure in a Theory of Pragmatics”. *Studies in Pragmatics* 10, 14-24.

Verschueren, Jef. 2011. “Discourse Analysis, Culture, and Critique: A Brief Comment”. *Journal of Multicultural Discourses* 6 (1), 33-35.

Verschueren, Jef. 2015. “Pragmatics, Linguistic”. *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*. Oxford: Elsevier, 795-802

Verschueren, Jef. 2018. “Adaptability and Meaning Potential”. Paper presented at *The 20th International Congress of Linguists*. Cape Town, July 2018.

Verschueren, Jef; Brisard, Frank, 2009. “Adaptability”. In Verschueren, Jef.; Östman, Jan-Ola. (eds.). *Key Notions for Pragmatics*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 28-47.

Velmezova, Ekatarina. 2015. “The Bakhtinian Dialogue Revisited: A (Non-Biosemiotic) View from Historiography and Epistemology of Humanities”. In Velmezova, Ekaterina; Kull, Kalevi; Cowley, Stephen (eds.). *Biosemiotic Perspectives on Language and Linguistics*, Cham: Springer International Publishing, 275-290.

Vermeersch, Etienne. 1977. “An analysis of the concept of culture”. In Bernardo, Bernardi (ed.). *The Concept and Dynamics of Culture*. The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 9-73.

Voloshinov. Valentin 1973. *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*. (trans. Matejka, Ladislav; I.R. Titunik), New York: Seminar Press.

Von Eckardt, Barbara; Potter, Mary. 1985. “Clauses and the semantic representation of words”. *Memory and Cognition* 13(4), 371-376.

Vosgerau, Gottfried; Petersen, Wiebke. 2015. “The Relation between Cognitive and Linguistic Structures”. *Proceedings of the 2015 EAPcogSci Workshop,* 542-547.

Vygotsky, Lev. 1986. *Thought and Language*. Cambridge (Massachusetts): The M.I.T. Press.

Weigand, Edda. 2016. “The Dialogic Principle Revisited: Speech Acts and Mental States”. In Capone, Alessandro; Mey, Jacob (eds.). *Interdisciplinary Studies in Pragmatics, Culture and Society*. NY/London: Springer, 209-232.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 1980. *Lingua mentalis: The semantics of natural language*. Sydney: Academic Press.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 1985a. *Lexicography and conceptual analysis*. Ann Arbor: Karoma.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 1985b. “Different Cultures, Different Languages, Different Speech Acts. Polish vs. English”. *Journal of Pragmatics* 9(2–3), 145–78.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 1986. “A semantic metalanguage for the description and comparison of illocutionary meanings”. *Journal of Pragmatics* 10, 67-107.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 1987. *English speech act verbs: a semantic dictionary*. Sydney: Academic Press.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 1988. *The Semantics of Grammar*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 1991[2003]. *Cross-Cultural Pragmatics: The Semantics of Human Interaction*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 1992. *Semantics, Culture, and Cognition: Universal human concepts in culture-specific configurations*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 1996a. *Semantics: Primes and Universals*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 1996b. "Contrastive sociolinguistics and the theory of 'cultural scripts': Chinese vs. English". In Hellinger, Marlis; Ammon, Ulrich (eds.). *Contrastive Sociolinguistics*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 313-344. .

Wierzbicka, Anna. 1997. *Understanding Cultures through Their Keywords: English, Russian, Polish, German and Japanese*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 1998. "German 'Cultural Scripts': Public Signs as a Key to Social Attitudes and Cultural Values". *Discourse & Society* 9(2), 241-282.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 1999. "Language, Culture and Meaning: Cross-cultural linguistics". In Dirven, René; Verspoor, Marjolin (ed.). *Cognitive Exploration of Language and Linguistics*. Amesterdam: John Benjamins, 137-159.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 2002. "Semantic primes and linguistic typology". In Goddard, Cliff; Wierzbicka, Anna (eds.). *Meaning and Universal Grammar: Theory and empirical findings*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 257-300.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 2003a. "Singapore English: A semantic and cultural perspective". *Multilingual Journal of Cross-Cultural and Interlanguage Communication* 22(4), 327-366.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 2003b. *Cross-Cultural Pragmatics: The Semantics of Human Interaction (2nd ed.)*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 2005. “Empirical universals of language as a basis for the study of other human universals and as a tool for exploring cross-cultural differences”. *Ethos* 33, 256-291.

Wierzbicka, Anna; Goddard, Cliff. 2004. “Cultural scripts: What are they and what are they good for?”. *Intercultural Pragmatics* 1(2), 153-166.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 2006a. *English: Meaning and Culture*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 2006b. “Anglo scripts against ‘‘putting pressure’’ on other people, and their linguistic manifestations”. In Goddard, Cliff (ed.). *Ethnopragmatics. Understanding Discourse in Cultural Context*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 31-63.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 2006c. “The concept of ‘dialogue’ in cross-linguistic and cross-cultural perspective”. *Discourse Studies* 8, 675-703.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 2007a. “Do all languages have the same expressive power? An NSM perspective on semantic variation and universals”. In Fernandez-Vest, Jocelyne (ed.). *Combat pour les langues du monde. Fighting for the world's languages: Hommage à Claude Hagège*. Paris: L'Harmattan. 483-496.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 2007b. “NSM Semantics versus Conceptual Semantics: Goals and standards (A response to Jackendoff)”. *Intercultual Pragmatics* 4(4), 521-529.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 2009a. “The Theory of the Mental Lexicon”. in Kempgen, Sebastian; Kosta, Peter; Berger, Tilman; Gutschmidt, Karl (eds.). *Die slavischen Sprachen/The Slavic Languages: An International Handbook of their Structure, their History and their Investigation*. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 848-863.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 2009b. “’Reciprocity’: an NSM approach to linguistic typology and social universals”. *Studies in Language* 33(1), 103-175.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 2016. “Two levels of verbal communication, universal and culture-specific”. In de Saussure, Louis; Rocci, Andrea (eds.). *Verbal Communication*, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 447-481.

Wertsch, James. 1990. “Dialogue and dialogism in a socio-cultural approach to mind”. In Ivana. Markova; Klaus. Foppa (eds.). *The Dynamics of Dialogue*. Hertfordshire, England: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 62-82.

Wertsch, James. 1991. *Voices of the Mind*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Wertsch, James. 1998. *Mind as action*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 2009 [1953/1958]. *Philosophical Investigations*. Blackwell Publishing.

Wold, Astri Heen (ed.). 1992. *The dialogical alternative: Towards a theory of language and mind*. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press.

Wolfson, Nessa. 1989. *Perspectives: Sociolinguistics and TESOL*. New York, NY: Newbury House Publishers.

Wolfson, Nessa; Marmor, Thomas; Jones, Steve. 1989. “Problems in the comparison of speech acts across cultures.” In Blum-Kulka, Shoshana; House, Juliane; Kasper, Gabrielle (eds.). *Cross-Cultural Pragmatics: Requests and Apologies*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 174-197.

Woodrow, Lindy. 2014. *Writing about Quantitative Research in Applied Linguistics*. UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Xu, Shi. 2005. *A cultural approach to discourse*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ye, Zhengdao. 2004. “Chinese Categorization of Interpersonal Relationships and the Cultural Logic of Chinese Social Interaction: An Indigenous Perspective”. *Intercultural Pragmatics* 1 (2), 211-230.

Zhu, Lei. 2017. “On the origin of the term tertium comparationis”. *Language & History* 60(1), 35-52.

Zielke, Barbara. 2009. “Failing better reflections, comments, and questions considering a social constructionist concept of dialogue”. *Journal Für Psychologie (Online)* 17(2).

Zlatev, Jordan. 2005. “What’s in a schema? Bodily mimesis and the grounding of language”. In Hampe, Beate (ed). *From Perception to Meaning: Image Schemas in Cognitive Linguistics*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 313-342.

Zlatev, Jordan. 2007. “Intersubjectivity, mimetic schemas and the emergence of language”. *Intellectica* 2–3 (46–47), 123-152.

Zlatev, Jordan; Racine, Timothy; Sinha, Chris; Itkonen, Esa (eds.). 2008. *The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Inter-subjectivity*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Zusammenfassung

Das allgemeine Ziel dieser Studie ist die interkulturelle Analyse apologetischer Sprechakte, und die Begriffe des expliziten und impliziten Kontexts aus einer interdisziplinären Perspektive, durch das Prisma von Bakhtin-Vygotsky's Theorie der dialogischen verbalen Kommunikation und NSM [Natural Semantic Metalanguage]. Zusätzlich liegt ein besonderer Schwerpunkt auf der Analyse der kulturellen und kontextuellen Festlegung der oben genannten Sprachformel. Die Studie selbst beinhaltete eine semantische und pragmatische Analyse von apologetischen Sprechakten in drei unterschiedlichen Sprachkulturen - Serbisch, Österreichisch-Deutsch und Anglo. Ein weiterer Fokus liegt auf den interkulturellen und konzeptuellen Unterschieden der apologetischen Sprechaktausdrücke, die in den oben genannten Sprachkulturen verwendet werden. Die neuartige alternative empirische Methode - DCTt [Dialogic Conceptualization Test] - wurde eingesetzt, um den gewünschten Sprachakt und die spezifischen Strategien hervorzurufen, die wiederum die Grundlage für die Entschlüsselung der kulturellen Werte innerhalb der entschlüsselten Sprache sowie der Substanz für die Formulierung des einschlägigen 'Kulturelles Skript' in NSM. Zusätzlich wurde die DCTt-Methode verwendet, um die Bedeutung und die Auswirkungen von explizitem und implizitem Situationskontext auf das Verständnis, die Konzeptualisierung und die Produktion des entsprechenden Sprechakts zu untersuchen. Die NSM und die kulturelle Skripte wurden als Bestandteil des DCTt betrachtet und ergänzten die Kodierung der kulturellen, einstellungsbezogene und kognitiven Spezifitäten, die den expliziten IFIDs (Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices) zugrunde liegen. Auf der einen Seite kann dieses Wissen, mit dem Bewusstsein der metalinguistischen Aspekte der verbalen Kommunikation gepaart, nicht nur für die Dekonstruktion der soziokulturellen Dynamiken und ihrer zugrundeliegenden Mechanismen, sondern auch für das Verständnis der interkulturellen Fehlkommunikation. Auf der anderen Seite kann es auch für Sprachlernervon entscheidender Bedeutung sein dennegativen pragmatischen Transfer, der allzu oft im Prozess des Zweitspracherwerbs auftritt, zu überwinden.

Abstract

The general aim of this study is the inter-cultural analysis of apologetic speech acts and the notions of explicit and implicit context from an interdisciplinary perspective, and through the prism of Bakhtin's theory of dialogic verbal communication and Vygotsky's phase structure theory. In addition, special emphasis is placed on the analysis of cultural and contextual determination of the aforementioned language formula. The study itself will involve a semantic and pragmatic analysis of apologetic speech acts in three distinct linguistic cultures - Serbian, Austrian German and Anglo. Additional focus is placed on the cross-cultural and conceptual differences of the apologetic speech-act expressions used in the aforementioned linguistic cultures. The novel alternative empirical method - DCTt [Dialogic Conceptualisation Test], has been employed to elicit the desired speech act and the specific strategies which, in turn, provided the basis for decoding the cultural values within the elicited language, as well as the substance for formulating the pertinent cultural scripts in NSM [Natural Semantic Metalanguage]. In addition, the DCTt method had been used to investigate the importance and the impact of explicit and implicit situational context on the comprehension, conceptualisation and production of the pertinent speech act. The NSM and cultural scripts were regarded as the part and parcel of the DCTt, complementing the encoding of the cultural, attitudinal and cognitive specificities underlying the explicit IFIDs [Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices]. On the one hand, such knowledge, coupled with the awareness of the metalinguistic aspects of verbal communication, can prove essential not only for deconstructing the socio-cultural dynamics and its underlying mechanisms but, equally importantly, for carving the cross-cultural miscommunication at its joints. On the other, it can also prove crucial for language learners in defeating the negative pragmatic transfer that occurs all too often in the process of second language acquisition.