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Mental Well-being of Refugees“

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Introduction

This master's thesis deals with the following research question: "*Which of the factors supposedly influencing or determining the mental well-being of migrants such as refugees are based on the approach of Psychological Determinism and which are based on the opposing stance of Infrastructural Determinism?*"

Psychological Determinism – or Psychologism as Leslie A. White (1949, 144) called it – proposes that the individual mind is the prime mover of human behaviour, whereas Infrastructural Determinism suggests that the human mind is caused by culture reacting to external stimuli.

White's publication *The Science of Culture* had a significant impact on the development of my research question. Accordingly, this master's thesis is a scientific inquiry based on the research strategy of Cultural Materialism following the tradition of Leslie White, Marvin Harris, and Robert Carneiro.

The first chapter *Sociology of Science – A Cross-disciplinary Historic Account* provides a basic understanding of several approaches and disciplines that are related to the research question. Chapter 2 *Philosophy of Science* outlines the theoretical framework of the Psychological versus Infrastructural Determinism debate in more detail. Then, after defining the research objects, chapter 3 *The Analysis* provides a scientific analysis of six selected models that try to explain the mental well-being of refugees. Finally, in chapter 4 *Macro-Sociology in Practice: Conclusion*, I raise the findings and explanations gained throughout the paper to a higher macro-level.

1. Sociology of Science – A Cross-disciplinary Historic Account

The following pages give an overview of various movements in social and cultural anthropology, psychology, and psychiatry including various scholars and publications that are concerned with the stances of *Psychological* and *Infrastructural Determinism* (or focus on the topics of migration and mental well-being). By introducing relevant historical terms¹, I provide the reader with basic knowledge, which is necessary for the following account on *Philosophy of Science* (chapter 2) and subsequently for the application of the two stances in *The Analysis* (chapter 3).

To give a general introduction: anthropology is a discipline concerned with humanity's origins, development (physical, mental, ethical), and its variations. Sociology deals with the society's roots, expansion, structure, and functioning. Psychology is the study of mental states and developments. Finally, unlike the previous three social disciplines, the medical specialty psychiatry is a discipline mainly concerned with the treatment of mental diseases. (Encyclopedic World Dictionary)

1.1. Psychiatry

Before going into depth on the various historical movements in anthropology (and the two major epistemologies *science* and *humanities*), the first part of chapter 1 provides a summary of migration and mental health as seen by psychiatry as well as transcultural psychiatry, a sub-discipline that is principally concerned with the medical aspects of these phenomena. The purpose of this historical account is to make the reader familiar with how both Western medicine and Western societies have been dealing with migration and mental health.

¹ In chapter 1, most historical terms and movements are italicised in order to declare them as such. Starting from chapter 2, some of the same terms appear without italics, as they no longer represent historical phenomena but clear definitions according to the philosophy of science.

Differentiating mental and physical disease

Robert Evan Kendell (2001, 490), the former president of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, published a journal article on the distinction between mental and physical illness. He stated that symptoms, which may be identified as mental diseases (e.g. obsession, depression, or panic), have been included in disease categorisations. Also, they have been dealt with by doctors with the same variety of tonics or medications as other more obvious medical disorders for more than 2000 years. Between the 15th and the 18th century, melancholy and further types of so-called madness were commonly considered physical disorders and were not necessarily differentiated from other illnesses.

Towards the end of the 18th century, the general approach to mental well-being completely changed – according to Kendell (ibid.) – thanks to the influence of *Cartesian Dualism*, which was a popular philosophy in that period. The notion that diseases of the mind are profoundly unlike other diseases (i.e. a mental illness rather than a physical one) also gained broad acknowledgement due to the emergence of massive asylums exclusively built for the so-called mentally ill. This transition in infrastructure brought the control of the insane out of the hands of medical doctors. Moreover, the administrators of these establishments were primarily focusing on mental disease. Thus, it was quite obvious to them to see it as being diverse from other diseases, which were not of their concern.

It became also apparent that madness was not characterised by evident physiological deviations. These deviations were usually discovered during post-mortem examination of persons that had died from other illnesses. For the first time, the words *mind disease*, *mental disorder*, and *mental illness* were commonly used suggesting that madness was a mental illness and not a physical one. In addition, a controversy arose whether philosophers might not treat diseased minds better than doctors considering it an ethical treatment. Subsequently, it was generally accepted by the mid-19th century that a physician should be the director of any properly run lunatic asylum. This resulted from the fact that leading physicians believed that mental illnesses were also somatic. But the expression mental illness and the questions about its causation persisted, both among medical professionals and in the psychoanalysis discipline that originated in the late 19th century.

Neurologists and psychologists had to face the problem that no somatic condition could be discovered regarding most of the so-called diseases of the mind. Consequently, Reynolds (1855, 90-101) addressed this issue by introducing the division between either functional or organic conditions. Organic disorders characterised a somatic condition. Functional ones on the other side did not. Reynolds thought that the manifestations of functional conditions were caused by a reduction or by an unfitting growth in functional behaviour. Eventually, his followers continued to use the terms organic and functional. Their motivation was to differentiate between circumstances under which somatic conditions were shown and conditions under which they did not occur.

Also today, professionals in medicine as well as the population differentiate physical and mental disease. Actually, the words *mental disorder* and *mental and behavioural disorder* are of use throughout two highly acknowledged manuals, the *American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual* as well as the *World Health Organization's International Classification of Diseases*. (Kendell: 2001, 490-491)

Models of health and disease

The main approach in general medicine today is the *Biomedical Health and Disease Model*. This model assigns a crucial part to biological factors defining that illness is a circumstance determined by exterior pathogens or bodily defects. According to Havelka, Lucanin, and Lucanin (2009), this method is historically justified and was especially effective during periods of enormously contagious diseases, although today it is being challenged by a number of scholars who rather sustain the *Biopsychosocial Model*.

Papadimitriou (2017) from the faculty of psychiatry of the University of Athens describes the latter as a model that – different from the *Biomedical Model* – includes not just biological but also psychological and social dimensions of the patient's life additional to the perception that the concerned person suffers as a whole and not exclusively his or her isolated organs. In addition, the patient's character and emotional state, as well as the environmental conditions under which the person lives are discussed. Nevertheless, the *Biopsychosocial Model* has been criticised for the absence of a concise theoretical framework regarding its function and content and that it does

not establish a scientific or philosophical model. The critical question of how biological, psychological, and social variables interact in the manifestation of the disease would not be answered either.




Illustration 1 *Models of health and disease*

1.2. Transcultural Psychiatry

After this brief account on the distinction between mental and physical illness and the two major approaches in medicine, the following paragraphs are dedicated to transcultural psychiatry.

At the turn of the 20th century, imperialism and colonialism lead to intensive encounters with foreign cultures and as a result also to the discovery of what has been classified as mental diseases that occur in regions outside of the Western world. This period marks the beginning of transcultural psychiatry, a medical discipline that examines the influence of culture and society on the existence, frequency, development, symptoms, and treatments of so-called mental disorders within different cultures.

Particularism versus universalistic comparative psychiatry

In transcultural psychiatry, there are three different epistemological directions concerning culture and mental health: the *Particularism* approach rejects the idea of comparing

mental disorders across different cultures, the *Universalism* approach accepts the existence of universal patterns and characteristics of disorders despite cultural differences in their appearance, and the *Absolutism* approach supports the idea of disorders being identical across all cultures (Stompe 2004, 1-3).

In the second half of the 20th century, researchers dealing with depression at Montreal McGill University developed a comparative approach, applying universal methods on patients with different ethnic backgrounds. Based on this *comparative psychiatry*, the *psychiatry of migration* emerged comparing implicit or explicit mental illnesses of migrants with those of the receiving society or with those of the society of emigration.

Comparative psychiatry is based on a universal understanding of illness. Such universalistic approaches aim at the elaboration of common patterns and characteristics. In addition to general universals, which are based on the biological equipment common to all human beings, there are also cultural universals. The researchers committed to *Universalism* maintain that it is possible to work out a culture-invariant core that can serve as a reference point for foreign ethnic manifestations of depression, regardless of all cultural differences in the manifestations of mental illness that are used to describe mental states of suffering and the specific way in which the illness is dealt with. The aim of the *comparative approach* is to work out ideal types of clinical images using statistical or hermeneutic methods, trying to depict the proximity and distance of these ideal types to culture-specific phenotypes of mental diseases, and to gain a more valid starting point for epidemiological investigations.

Under the influence of *constructivist postmodern ethnology* (e.g. Geertz 1972), criticism of *comparative cultural psychiatry* arose in the 1970s. Cultural-anthropologically oriented psychiatrists expressed fundamental doubts about the comparability of the manifestations of mental illnesses from cultures that differ considerably in their views of man and the world. The semantic material in which mental states of suffering are embedded would be too different and therefore almost untranslatable, and the culturally specific concepts of illness would not be comparable enough. In return, *universalist psychiatry* did not neglect to criticise the *Particularism* approach either: without a reference system, it would not be possible to speak of a particular disease at all. Besides, what *Particularism* oriented researchers call a culture-specific depressive illness would be so far off the general understanding of depression that one should actually speak

of a culture-bound syndrome. In addition, the constructivist-oriented authors would focus on differences resulting from culture-specific cognitions. In contrast, the more culture-independent affective expressive behaviour would be ignored. (Stompe 2004, 60-61)

Migration and mental health according to psychiatry

One can speak of migration when an individual or several individuals change their residency to another location. Such a change of residence may happen internally but also externally by crossing cultural borders.

Wen-Shing Tseng was an advisor to the World Health Organization until his recent death. Previously, he had been the chairperson of the *World Psychiatric Association's* Transcultural Psychiatric Section. Tseng has written a cultural psychiatry manual that aims to incorporate clinical, empirical, and theoretical results in one single volume.

According to Tseng (2001, 695), when migration seems to be transcultural (moving to another country or to a dissimilar socio-cultural setting) it tends to include significant cultural alteration and demands specific cultural adaptations. He defined culture as a unique lifestyle of a group of human beings who share a common history, e.g. information, opinions, moralities, or traditions. Along with many other psychiatrists, Tseng indicated that cultural shift (significant changes in value systems or social customs) and migration-related transition frequently contribute to psychological tension, emotive anxiety, and other problems. This would occur when the immigrant adapts to the different location.

Nevertheless, Tseng (2001, 716) preferred not to look at the influence of migration on psychological conditions as he found that the direct relation between them is rather thin. Instead, he urged to examine personal or family-level alterations caused by mental issues.

The clinical frequency of mental diseases among immigrants

Tseng looked at numerous investigations and data on migration and mental well-being, which had been undertaken after the year 1900, in order to support his reasoning (Al-Issa and Tousignant 1997). Originally, most of these reports and studies concentrated on the occurrence of mental disease amongst migrants. The reason for this focus was the impression that certain ethnic groups were more often admitted to asylums. As many Europeans came to the Americas in the mid-19th century, the administrators of various mental institutions perceived that there were, for example, more settlers from Germany or Ireland in mental institutions than from Britain (Wittkower and Prince 1974, 535-550). In 1855, the proportion of the so-called insane in Massachusetts was greater among immigrants than among natives. Nevertheless, mental deficiency occurred more often amongst natives (Schwab and Schwab 1978, 178). In 1932, Örnulv Ödegaard did a comparison of the occurrence frequency of Norwegian-born on the one side and the Minnesota-born on the other. Apparently, more Norwegians were registered in mental institutes than natives were. The same results were obtained in the following decades.

Psychiatrists explained this increased frequency of mental diseases amongst migrants with two theories: on the one hand, it was proposed that cross-cultural migration could generate psychological unrest and mental disease. On the other hand, psychiatrists thought that psychologically vulnerable persons may experience hardship living in their socio-cultural environments and therefore move to other countries.

Consequently, epidemiology research in a variety of places suggested that the link between migration and the occurrence of diseases of the mind was not automatically corresponding. In fact, migrants have not always been more often classified as mentally ill as the just mentioned study outcomes would suggest. For instance, Astrup and Ödegaard (1960, 116-130) discovered that Swedish and Danish who immigrated to Norway demonstrated less mental-related hospitalisations compared to the native population. H. B. M. Murphy (1965) indicated that Asian and African Jewish migrants who arrived in post-WWII-Israel (with different sociocultural experiences compared to the native population) were more often hospitalised because of mental illness than Israel-born people were. Nevertheless, European migrants (with a largely more similar social position to the one of the local-born Israelis) had a lower mental hospital rate than the

natives. Murphy (1973) also described how in Canada, in the years 1958 and 1961, migrants were less often admitted to mental hospitals than the local population. Resulting from these indications, Murphy contradicted the significance of two rival hypotheses. On the one hand the theory of *social causation* (affirming that suffering from economic difficulties raises the danger of successive disease of the mind). On the other hand the hypotheses of *selection/drift* (indicating how mental disease hinders socioeconomic achievement and thus makes people drift into a lower social status or never escape poverty):

The former belief that immigrants always suffer from an excess of mental disorder is no longer valid, and the old rivalry between social selection and social causation hypotheses has lost much of its relevance. The mental health of a migrant group is determined by factors relating to the society of origin, factors relating to the migration itself, and factors operating in the society of resettlement; and all three sets need to be considered if one seeks to reduce or merely to understand the level of mental disorder in any immigrant group. Illustrations from each set of factors are presented, with indications of whether they appear to have general relevance or be related to specific mental disorders.
(Murphy 1977, abstract)

Transcultural psychiatry today: a multilayer approach

As a result of “*the many conflicting results*” obtained and following the arguments of Murphy, Tseng (2001, 697) urged not to look at migration as a singular phenomenon. On the contrary, he called for a multilayer approach looking at (1) the person who migrates (personality, motivation for migration, expectations of migration), (2) the personal demographic background (occupation, family size and type, financial conditions), (3) the historic connection of the local population with the one of the culture of origin, and (4) how the migrant is welcomed by the native population (social environment of the new setting). Tseng was convinced that all these factors significantly affect the settling in of the migrant (Mezey 1960; Murphy 1965). Moreover, Tseng argued that the migrating experience that he described as mentally traumatic, may be among the pre-

precipitating determinants in the advance of some less severe mental illnesses (e.g. anxiety or psychosomatic diseases). Nevertheless, this would not be the cause for the occurrence of more severe conditions (e.g. schizophrenia).

Initially, because more data was available, the majority of investigators had concentrated on the clinical admission numbers of psychoses. Nevertheless – just like Tseng – also many other psychiatrists came to the conclusion that these admission numbers do not automatically indicate the rate of all diseases of the mind. They showed, generally, what had been classified as major psychiatric diseases. Less severe mental diseases were not indicated very often.

The central view in psychiatry is the one that psychoses are usually caused by biological determinants and thus are not a desired indication for examining the mental and sociocultural results of immigration. A lot of other types of psychological illnesses that – according to transcultural psychiatry – are increasingly subject to societal influences, such as alcoholism, drug addiction, behaviour disorders, melancholy, or suicide, are perceived as better indicators for examination. According to Tseng (2001, 697), the outcome of these examinations showed that these mental problems tend to occur if there was sociocultural disturbance (e.g. influenced by sociocultural alteration, economic decline, or political unrest).

Migration groups and vulnerable populations according to psychiatry

In transcultural psychiatry, a differentiation is being made between the following natures of migration groups that relate to the process of adjustment: transient travellers, upward economic migration, political exile, and war refugees. According to Tseng (2001, 700-701), *“taking refuge is a unique kind of migration that occurs when people are fleeing from a threat or danger, particularly from ethnic persecution.”* Clinically he called it a challenge to understand and provide help for migrants who witnessed severe pain and radical personal adjustments.

In the chapter *Transcultural Nursing and Health Care* of the supplement 1 to the Journal of Transcultural Nursing (Douglas and Pacquiao 2010, 615), a group of scholars described vulnerable populations as being in increased danger for developing well-

being issues. According to this definition of well-being, because of certain life situations, everybody may be vulnerable or unstable in certain situations (de Chesnay 2008). Individuals can be part of a vulnerable society but still not be vulnerable themselves because they identify as being more resilient. Causes for vulnerability may differ; there are, for instance factors regarding development, culture, age, or sex. People who are physically or mentally disabled, drug-addicted, aged, poor, homeless, or unschooled are deemed to be at increased risk of vulnerability.

In addition, the monetary organisation of a country is described as a influential factor determining the well-being of the population. Major financial inequalities put people at an increased vulnerability for health issues (Bezruchka 2000 and 2001 and Wilkinson and Marmot 2003).

1.3. Social and Cultural Anthropology

While in the preceding paragraphs, I presented a summary of the topics of migration, mental health, and transcultural psychiatry, the following sections of Chapter 1 do not directly deal with migration or mental well-being, but rather provide basic knowledge of the two anthropological research strategies that are important to my thesis: *Cultural Materialism* (with its underlying epistemology of *science*) and *Cultural Relativism* (with its epistemology of *humanities*).

The following illustration 2 outlines this chapter's (historic) overview of terms, principles, and scholars, the importance of which is further explained in the next paragraphs.




Illustration 2 *Sociology of science*

Franz Boas versus Tylor, Morgan, and Spencer

The influence of theories referring to evolution in anthropology was high in the beginnings of the field. *Cultural evolutionists*, including Lewis Henry Morgan (1818-1881) and Edward Burnett Tylor (1832-1917), argued that civilisations evolve following one fundamental order of *cultural evolution*. Albeit, according to them, this occurs at differing speeds, which made clear why various kinds of societies exist. Nevertheless, these ideas slowly diminished and eventually disappeared because of the dominant influence exerted by Franz Boas (1858-1942) in the school of American anthropology. Progressively, most anthropologists stopped considering evolutionary explanations of culture:

For most of the twentieth century evolutionism has been virtually absent from British and American cultural anthropology. After an auspicious beginning in the

late nineteenth century in the work of Spencer, Morgan, and Tylor, it was vigorously combated in succeeding decades by Franz Boas and his early students. It seemed for a long time that Boas had demolished evolutionism – it was 'effectively exploded,' one commentator put it – and since then anthropologists have not been so much actively antievolutionary as they have been indifferent, passively nonevolutionary. (Sahlins/Service 1960, 1)

Boas work and his opposition to *evolutionary* theories were influenced and largely built upon his idealistic and political views.

In reality, *evolutionary* hypotheses regarding culture have frequently been misused in order to irrationally establish varying degrees of value demanding superiority above others. Consequently, it is understandable that this ideological development can lead to a rejection of such approaches altogether by worrying that they could effectively facilitate increased inequality, by theoretically constituting a hierarchical order (Beraha 2016, 13-14).

Historical Particularism versus Neoevolutionism

Among other innovations, the backlash against these misapplied *evolutionary* theories then led to the conception of *Historical Particularism* (or *Particularism*). This is a movement of anthropological thinking identified with Franz Boas and his followers whose cultural research highlighted the incorporated and unique life of certain cultures. This approach stands in contrary to movements for instance *Cultural Evolutionism*, *Kulturkreislehre* (culture circle theory), and *Geographical* or *Environmental Determinism* that try to reveal a series of general laws in social sciences analogous to those in the physical sciences. Instead, *Historical Particularism* emphasises research on unique societies that have a distinct history. Accordingly, the anthropologist's main task is to define the specific features of the studied society and reconstructing past events that have formed its social structure.

From 1900 to the 1950s, U.S. anthropology was monopolised by the *particularist* approach. Between the 1940s and 1970s, *Neoevolutionism* and a variety of other theories

took over and pushed the *particularist* idea aside. *Historical particularism*, nevertheless, emerged again in the 1980s. More and more academics proposed that characteristic historical phenomena differentiate cultures even in the age of globalisation. (Encyclopaedia Britannica)

Neoevolutionism, in opposition to *Historical Particularism*, is an anthropological approach focusing on lasting cultural adjustment as well as comparable forms of cultural progress that can be examined in unconnected and extensively separated societies. It originated in the middle of the 20th century and examines the relationship between lasting transitions. These transitions are generally typical for human beings and the temporary local, cultural, and environmental modifications that differentiate individual societies as they respond to their own specific environments. In addition, *neoevolutionists* explore how separate societies respond to comparable surroundings. And they also analyse the resemblances and dissimilarities in such groups' lasting historic paths. Really, the majority of *neo-evolutionists* are concerned by the ecological and technical changes of the societies they are researching. This is why a lot of them are associated with the cultural environmental method in ethnographic anthropology, the cultural process method in archeology, and early and proto-human research in biological anthropology.

Neoevolutionary anthropological thought emerged, amongst others, with the explorations of American anthropologists Leslie A. White (1900-1975) and Julian H. Steward (1902-1972). White indicated that societies increasingly advanced as they started to harness resources in a more efficient manner. Both technology and social organisation have affected this advancement. Steward concentrated on parallel changes in similar environments of separate groups. He explored *evolutionary* change as a result of what he labelled stages of socio-cultural integration and multilineal evolution. He utilised these concepts to differentiate *Neo-evolutionism* from older, unilineal hypotheses of *cultural evolution*. (Encyclopaedia Britannica)

1.3.1. Cultural Relativism (Humanities)

Franz Boas was persuaded that all cultures are unique; thus, representatives of a particular community should be judged based on their individual values and norms (Haviland, Walrath, Prins, and McBride 2007). Following this reasoning, Boas and his students developed the idea of *Cultural Relativism*.

Boas and his followers openly opposed discrimination and prejudice and, since these practices were rationalized and justified by theories that rested on an evolutionary metaphor, they mounted a systematic attack against all forms of evolutionary thinking. The need for an alternative theory to replace evolutionism resulted in the formulation of cultural relativism with its emphasis on culture as learned and changeable. (Greenfield 2001, 37)

Margaret Mead

The ideas of Boas have subsequently been further elaborated, amongst others, by his students Ruth F. Benedict (1887-1948) and Margaret Mead (1901-1978). In the 1930s, the work of many scholars in the United States underwent a transition from *Hereditarianism* to the emphasis on environmental influences (Laland and Brown 2011, 43). Mead's analysis of Samoan culture contributed to the conclusion that concepts such as jealousy and rivalry are an influence imposed in part by the processes of Capitalism. This applies in particular to Mead's study of sexual acts and the mentalities normally held by young people. According to her, these processes of Capitalism would constitute basic Western values and not embody universals of humanity. Mead defined culture as the determinant factor in the formulation of gender roles, with biology being less significant (Peterson and Wrangham 1996, 279).

The New Zealand anthropologist Derek Freeman (1916-2001), who had also worked with Samoan islanders in the 1940s, claimed a falsehood of Mead's research data and the conclusions she had drawn from it. Unlike Mead, he reported that among Samoan teenagers he had witnessed high levels of rival activity and sexual jealousy (Gaulin and McBurney 2004, 16f). This has led to numerous discussions in the field. Not just regarding the theory but also on a personal level, with several mutual

accusations. In the time between his and her fieldwork, Mead was mainly criticised for being misled by her sources. At the same time, Freeman was blamed for overlooking the transitions brought about by outside pressures on Samoan society.

Freeman was a supporter of the belief that human beings are influenced by universals coming both from biology as well as psychology. *Evolutionary psychologists* therefore use Freeman's research on Samoan culture to highlight the presence of universal phenomena in humans. This would especially apply to males and in the area of envious and violent behaviour (Buss 1999, 26 and Gaulin and McBurney 2004, 16). Dale Peterson and Richard Wrangham (1996, 281) indicated that Mead actually did prove that three New Guinean cultures display institutionalised sex roles in which male ferocity is expressed. They subsequently used this data to substantiate their claim that human males are genetically prone to violent actions just like chimps.

Alfred Kroeber

Besides Mead and Benedict, also American anthropologist Alfred Lewis Kroeber (1876-1960) was among Franz Boas' most acclaimed students and described as the undisputed grand old man of the profession after Boas' death. In spite of Boas' *cultural relativist* influence, Kroeber "*took the culture concept in the opposite direction and argued for the complete subordination of the individual to his cultural milieu*" (Harris 1968, 327). In his publication *The Superorganic* (1917, 199-201), Kroeber claimed that the individual's subordination held true in all cultures, that everywhere the individual was the mere agent of *culturological* forces.

Kroeber was heavily criticised by his fellow Boasians for his *Cultural Determinism*, but he also received strong support for his publication, coming though from an unlikely quarter: Leslie A. White – one of Boas' strongest opponents – portrayed Kroeber as one of the few anthropologists who formulated the philosophy of a *science of culture*. *Cultural materialist* Marvin Harris (1968, 332) summarised Kroeber's contribution to the science of culture in a similar manner:

Hence, the first step toward a science of culture is necessarily the one which Kroeber had taken in the 'Superorganic'. But Kroeber took just that one step and

then no more. (...) He and White merely shared the belief that culture is a distinct level of phenomena which, although reducible to lower levels in theory, cannot in practice be so reduced without diminishing our chances of understanding it.

Milton Singer, who – according to Harris (1968, 341-342) – correctly understood Kroeber's account on culture, argued that Kroeber's repression of individuals is merely a methodological procedure for holding psychological and other non-cultural factors constant in order to permit the study of the quality and sequences of cultural forms. Also, Kroeber's theory of culture would not necessarily imply any strict determinism or causality, cultural or otherwise.

The attempt (...) to identify Kroeber with neo-evolutionism and scientific varieties of determinism is unfounded and wholly misses the point of Kroeber's anthropological style, which in every respect remained well within the Boasian program, inheriting all of its initial limitations of theory and method, adding to them only in ways appropriate to a frank denial of scientific pretense. (Harris 1969, 342)

Psychologism or Psychological Determinism

According to philosophy, *Psychologism* is the perception that epistemological issues may be successfully tackled through the psychological examination of mental process development. Accordingly, John Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690) is viewed as the classic of *Psychologism*. A milder version of *Psychologism* claims the need to make psychology the basis of other research, particularly logic. (Encyclopaedia Britannica)

In the years 1900 and 1901, Austrian-German Edmund Husserl published *Logische Untersuchungen* in which he heavily criticised both of these forms of *Psychologism*:

In der Tat ist der Psychologismus in allen seinen Abarten und individuellen Ausgestaltungen nichts anderes als Relativismus, nur nicht immer erkannter und ausdrücklich zugestandener. Es ist dabei ganz gleich, ob er sich auf ‚Transzendentalpsychologie‘ stützt und als formaler Idealismus die Objektivität der Erkenntnis zu retten glaubt, oder ob er sich auf empirische Psychologie stützt und

den Relativismus als unvermeidliches Fatum auf sich nimmt. Jede Lehre, welche die rein logischen Gesetze entweder nach Art der Empiristen als empirisch - psychologische Gesetze faßt oder sie nach Art der Aprioristen mehr oder minder mythisch zurückführt auf gewisse ‚ursprüngliche Formen‘ oder ‚Funktionsweisen‘ des (menschlichen) Verstandes, auf das ‚Bewußtsein überhaupt‘ als (menschliche) ‚Gattungsvernunft‘, auf die ‚psychophysische Konstitution‘ des Menschen, auf den ‚intellectus ipse‘, der als angeborene (allgemein menschliche) Anlage dem faktischen Denken und aller Erfahrung vorhergeht u. dgl. — ist eo ipso relativistisch, und zwar von der Art des spezifischen Relativismus. (Husserl 1993, 123-134)

Psychologism, however, continued to find supporters. James Ward (1843-1925) introduced a genetic psychology at the start of the 20th century, which he deemed necessary for any effective epistemology. Around the same period of time, Brand Blanshard (1892-1987) argued that epistemology investigations should be based on psychological research. And Jean Piaget (1896-1980) undertook substantial psychological research on the origins of thought in youth, recognised as an important input to epistemology by some philosophers. Also, empirical research of innateness continues to be viewed as epistemologically significant. (Encyclopaedia Britannica)

1.3.2. Psychological Anthropology and Cognitivism

The interdisciplinary subfield of psychological anthropology assigns a certain character or personality to each society that consists mainly of emic and mental aspects of culture by using adjectives such as *aggressive*, *anxious*, *passive*, or *extroverted* (Harris 1968, 259). There is no etic infrastructure in the causal chain. Instead, *Idealism* is being used to explain personality, believing in the primacy of psychological configurations. (Infrastructural determinism, on the other hand, would indicate that radical infrastructural or structural changes can lead to a complete reversal of personality configurations in a very short time.)

Freudian strategies

Darwinism has exerted a profound influence on the thought of the early pioneers in psychology, particularly in the 20th century. The psychoanalytical theories of the Viennese neurologist Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) already show some influences of *evolutionary* explanations on human nature, especially when regarding his proposed fundamental classes of instincts. They have been defined to act either as stimuli for needs that help sustain one's life or as a tool for controlling specific aspects of sexuality (Wiehe 1998, 3). Freud asserted that neuroses are founded on guilt. This guilt could be linked back to a dispute between basic biological forces, as opposed to being established socially (Badcock 1998, 458).

Within the so-called *culture and personality debate*, one can divide between a *pre-Freudian* period and a *Freudian* period. Before Freud, emic and psychological categories were described as terms and concepts expressing mental and emotional conditions of individual human actors. For example, *cultural relativist* Margaret Mead was convinced that cultural patterns do not need statistically structured samples – few informants and their mental and emotional conditions would be enough.

According to Freud's *Evolutionism* and his universal Oedipus complex, human nature contains bio-psychological components such as libido, which cause behavioural stages independently of specific sociocultural environments. This psychodynamic approach suggests a universal tendency for humans to mature through oral, anal, and genital stages developing oedipal strivings with significant differences between males and females. Unlike Franz Boas, the famous Viennese psychologist found that all humans are led along similar developmental routes by their common hereditary endowment consisting of a universal human instinctual endowment and a universal ontogenetic progress through these three maturational stages (oral, anal, genital). (Harris 1968, 428)

However, if Freud's childhood behaviours are not linked with other regular features of sociocultural systems, then – as the cultural materialist Marvin Harris argued – it means that personality generates personality, which leads to a *reductio ad absurdum*.

The concept of basic personality

Neo-freudian anthropologist Abram Kardiner (1891-1981) and his student Cora Du Bois developed the concept of *basic personality*, a psychological system that is predominantly formed by early childhood experiences. Furthermore, they divided the institutional aspects of culture into primary (child care) and secondary institutions (taboo systems, religion, rituals). Subsequently, Du Bois (1944, 176-190) conducted a field study on the Indonesian island of Alor concluding that the main factor in the etiology of the observed basic personality structure was the maternal neglect experienced by the infant. (Lukas 2017, 210-219)

Marvin Harris (1968, 442) criticised, among other things, that this scheme could not explain the existence of the primary institutions: *“These were simply the givens from which basic personality might be predicted but whose origin was inaccessible to psychodynamic techniques.”* Nevertheless, although the concept of *basic personality* as well as the methods of the field study are psychologically determined, the described phenomena of structure (division of labour) and superstructure (socialisation) could be subject to a further examination by *Cultural Materialism*.

Clinical versus anthropological priorities

The *culture and personality school*, representing a synchronic version of *neo-freudian* psychoanalysis, serves mainly the interest of psychology: we learn how clinically significant complexes arise in the typical individual, Harris (1968, 462-463) wrote.

If it served the interest of anthropology, it would have to begin with hypotheses suggested by cultural evolution and feedback circuits between basic personality and parameters designated as vital for the understanding of behaviour not of individuals but of sociocultural systems. There is a large possibility that principles governing the formation of clinically significant syndromes may be quite devoid of significance in determination of main features of sociocultural evolution. Hence, as Harris (1968, 462-463) summarised, the culture and personality school is the last suited to the solution of major questions that lie before us.

Cognitivism

This stance describes in emically authentic fashion the rules or mental programs that account for behaviour. Using emics expressed as semantic components, taxonomic structures, systems of beliefs, systems of rules, and plans for behaviour, cognitivism wants to account for all etics of sociocultural life – it predicts behaviour stream events based on knowledge of emic rules.

According to Marvin Harris (1979, 270), the flaws of *Cognitivism* can be summarised as follows: (1) etic outputs require etic inputs, (2) emic rules are ambiguous, (3) for every emic rule there is an alternative one, (4) authorities never go unchallenged, and, finally, (5) rules are not forever.

1.3.3. Cultural Materialism (Science)

The two *neoevolutionists* Julian H. Steward and Leslie A. White have been very influential in denouncing Franz Boas' *Cultural Relativism*. Their theories can be traced back to the incentive of Herbert Spencer's work who had influenced the social sciences fundamentally. Spencer (1820-1903) had accomplished this by referring to the limitations involved in explanations of human mass phenomena through generalising from single psychological predispositions. In addition, his highlighting of nomothetically-based accounts on societal processes was fundamental. (Beraha 2016, 14).

Initiated by British anthropologist E. B. Tylor, Herbert Spencer as well used the approach of *descriptive sociology* and continued with the development of an ethnographic database. This database finally led to its present system defined in the *Human Relations Area Files* (HRAF). This collection of ethnographic research was created by Amber and Amber from Yale University and is utilised nowadays by many researchers to participate in cross-cultural comparison across the globe. This comparison often serve as a replacement for the lack of anthropological laboratory experiments. The *Standard Cross Cultural Sample* (SCCS) contains information and facilitates the access to recurring statistical issues.

The significance of the *Comparative Method* is being emphasised by American anthropologist Robert Carneiro (*1927). Even before the advent of social and cultural anthropology, this method potentially reproduced whole organisms or languages relying on fragmentary findings. This approach has been an important accomplishment for more than just *evolution-related* anthropology. The method generally influenced various science branches (Carneiro 2003, 10f).

Leslie A. White

In his publication *The Science of Culture*, Leslie A. White (1949, 145) described two ingredients, which are essential to undertake comprehensive interpretations of human behaviour:

(1) Behaviour, on the one hand, consists of the biological organism, which stands for non-symbolic behaviour (based on elements such as nerves, glands, muscles, or sense organs). The individual as a natural organism is a vibrant, active, and responsive structure that has subjective psychological experiences and may be studied and interpreted as such by psychology.

(2) On the other hand, there is culture, which represents the symbolic behaviour. In detail, culture is a symbolic, continuous, and cumulative process that is supra-biological and extra-somatic. It includes aspects such as languages, beliefs, tools, or arts to name a few. Through culture, one can undertake scientifically adequate interpretations without looking at individuals or their biological and mental features.

In addition to these two types of components to human behaviour (the biological or psychological one, as well as the extra-somatic cultural one) White (1949, 145) described two corresponding categories of issues:

In the one, we hold the biological factor constant while we study the cultural variable; in the other class we hold the cultural factor constant and study the reactions of human organisms to it. The existence of the institution of trial by jury, for example, cannot be accounted for psychologically; the explanation must be culturological. However, to understand the function of this institution in the lives of men, we must study their psychological reactions to it. One and the same

set of events may therefore be referred to either context, the psychological or the culturological. Psychology and culturology deal therefore with biological and extra-somatic aspects respectively of one and the same set of events. Both sciences are essential to a comprehensive interpretation of human behavior. It is necessary, however, in order to avoid confusion, to know and respect the proper boundaries of each.

Once these two ingredients to human behaviour were defined, White (1949, 144) continued his account with the confrontation of two opposing approaches: *Psychological Determinism* or *Psychologism* (interpreting human behaviour psychologically) and *Infrastructural Determinism* or *culturology* (interpreting human behaviour in a so-called *culturological* way). While *Psychologism* proposes that the individual mind is the prime mover of human behaviour, *culturology*, on the other side, suggests that the human mind is caused by culture reacting to external stimuli.

We cannot explain the culture trait or process of enamelling nails in terms of innate desire, will, or caprice. We can however explain the behaviour of the individual in terms of the culture that embraces him. The individual, the average, typical individual of a group, may be regarded as a constant so far as human, symbolic behaviour is concerned. (White 1949, 165)

According to White (1949, 135), *Psychologism* includes several fallacies: (1) the assumption that a subjective psychological experience connected with a certain phenomenon has actually created this phenomenon, (2) interpreting a chain of events only through man as the prime mover, hence *Anthropocentrism*, and (3) the problem that if the individual is the prime mover, initiator, and determinant of a process, he or she becomes “responsible”.

We do not deny or minimize the subjective psychological experiences of the individual at all—although we would like to see some of the psychoanalytic interpretations supported with a little more verification. These experiences are of course real. But, we would argue, they are functions of sociocultural situations; not the causes of them. (White 1949, 135)

The following illustration 3, based on White’s *The Science of Culture* (1949, 121-189),

compares the *infrastructural determinist* (or *culturologist*) and the *psychological determinist* interpretation of four notions that are central to this debate: the behaviour, the individual, the mind, and the unconscious.




Illustration 3 *Infrastructural Determinism vs. Psychological Determinism*

Scientific explanation is a quest for determinants, for cause and effect relationships, for distinctions between constants and variables, distinctions between dependent and independent variables. The culturologist is well aware that culture does not and cannot exist without human beings. (...) But, as the culturologist demonstrates, culture may be treated as if it had a life of its own, quite apart from human organisms, just as the physicist may treat a falling body as if there were no atmospheric friction. The behaviour of peoples is explained as their response to their respective cultures. (White 1949, 144)

Marvin Harris

Marvin Harris (1927-2001), a very influential anthropologist of the latter half of the 20th century (who followed the tradition of Leslie A. White and Herbert Spencer) introduced the fundamentals of the research strategy Cultural Materialism in his publication *The Rise of Anthropological Theory* (Harris 1968). In naming it *Materialism*, Harris accepted the interpretation of Karl Marx's dominating power of production and other material mechanisms. The basic premises of *Cultural Materialism* may be summarised as follows:

1. The focus lies on describing the roots of structure and other aspects of culture.
2. Culture is viewed in an extensive manner, which consist of people's actions, thoughts, and creations.
3. The roots and preservation of culture as well as culture alterations are the result of probabilistic, not mechanistic, developments.
4. Culture is viewed principally as a result of human efforts to resolve the fundamental biological issues of survival such as nutrition, healthiness, security, and reproduction.
5. The method is materialistic meaning that the principal long-term determinants are dealing with the material needs of people.
6. *Cultural Materialism* is nomothetic because it is concentrating on the creation of

macro-theory, the application of which can be done across entire cultures and regions regardless of distance or time. These theories and applications may be mostly true, but they might be invalid in some cases. (Douglas and Pacquiao 2010, 67s)

Similar to other anthropologists, also Harris recognised that human thought and behaviour are not synonymous. In reality, human beings frequently participate in behaviours, which are apparently contrary to morals, thoughts, and so on. Consequently, two types of information, a described ideology as well as reported observations are proposed to anthropologists. With the first reflecting the so-called emic viewpoint (ideology and symbols from the view of the person rooted in that culture). And the second representing the etic perspective (observable characteristics of cultures including behaviours or social structures). To give an example: Harris analysed the cause of the Middle East bans on consuming pork. According to the emic viewpoint, pork meat is banned because the pig is viewed as unclean. According to the etic view, these animals are not appropriate to the Middle Eastern environment or climate and thus it does not make sense to produce pork meat, therefore the ban on consuming pork. (Douglas and Pacquiao 2010, 67s-68s)

Infrastructural Determinism

In his book *Cultural Materialism*, Harris (1979, 31-45) divided his universal pattern of *cultural materialist* strategy – infrastructure, structure, and superstructure – in etic and emic components. First, the infrastructure's etic behavioural categories are the mode of production and the mode of reproduction, whereas some of its emic components are taboos or magic. Secondly, the structure consists of etic categories such as domestic economy and political economy and, on the other side, of emic components such as kinship or religion. Finally, some of the superstructure's etic behavioural components are science or rituals, while some of its emic components are symbols, myths, or philosophies.

Regarding this concept, Harris defined the theoretical principle of *Infrastructural Determinism*. The etic behavioural modes of production and reproduction determine in a

probabilistic manner the domestic and political economy, which therefore probabilistically affects the behavioural and mental emic superstructures. Thus, the infrastructural variables are primary causal factors.

As part of his concept of a universal structure of sociocultural systems, Harris (1979, 63) made a list of what he described as biological and psychological constants of human nature:

1. People need to eat as many calories as possible.
2. People prefer spending as little energy in activities as possible.
3. People want to have (as much) sex (as possible), referring mostly to heterosexual intercourse.
4. People want love and affection to feel safe and happy.

However, these preferences do not necessarily contribute to a maximisation of anticipated results on a long term as maximisation leads to ecological depletion and food shortage. That is how Harris explained the existence of phenomena such as obesity, vegetarianism, homosexuality, or infanticide.

Cultural Materialism in transcultural health care

Shifting from a solely cognitive-focused approach in changing behaviours to include “*more holistic and structurally based approaches*” (Douglas and Pacquiao 2010, 68s), also scholars in transcultural nursing and health care indicate *Cultural Materialism* as a useful approach to their field. Advantages, that are being listed, are: (1) emphasising the infrastructure and societal structure in shaping and reshaping ethics, opinions, and behaviours of patients, societies, and experts, (2) fostering understanding of human behaviours and health status as a result of factors, which can be out of the hands of human beings, and (3) analysing the wider cultural, ideological, and historic circumstances in order to completely comprehend reasoning and behaviour of human beings.

Mind is minding

In order to explain human behaviour not just on a holistic but also on an individual level, Leslie A. White (1949, 39) elaborated a definition of the human being and the so-called symbolic faculty:

The natural processes of biologic evolution brought into existence in man, and man alone, a new and distinctive ability: the ability to use symbols. The most important form of symbolic expression is articulate speech. Articulate speech means communication of ideas; communication means preservation – tradition – and preservation means accumulation and progress. The emergence of the faculty of symboling has resulted in the genesis of a new order of phenomena: an extra-somatic, cultural, order. All civilizations are born of, and are perpetuated by, the use of symbols. A culture, or civilization, is but a particular kind of form, which the biologic, life-perpetuating activities of a particular animal, man, assume. Human behaviour is symbolic behavior; if it is not symbolic, it is not human. The infant of the genus Homo become a human being only as he is introduced into and participates in that order of phenomena which is culture. And the key to this world and the means of participation in it is – the symbol.

Thus, a person becomes a human being starting at the point where he or she engages with another human being using symbols and the information network we call culture.

But how is it possible for the body of an individual human being to have a mind? This issue concerning the body-mind connection has engaged not just psychologists but also philosophers and scientists. The answer according to White (1949, 52) is: “*mind is minding*”. In other words, mind is the reaction of the human organism as an entire entity, as one element – different from the reactions of fragments of the organism responding to other fragments. Hence, mind is simply a function of the organism, i.e. the mind is the whole organism working as one entity. To summarise: “*mind is to body as cutting is to a knife*”, White specified.

Many psychologists and anthropologists assert that the individual human being is responsible for culture change, meaning that single human beings really determine what they do and that each cultural part has its origin in the inspired acting of a human mind

(White (1949, 162). But, to the contrary, the individual's thoughts, feelings, and behaviours are simply his or her contribution within a sociocultural development. Human thoughts, feelings, and behaviour are the output of a cultural structure or a cultural development, via the human organism, as White (1949, 184) explained. Again, minding is simply the human organic feature of a sociocultural process.

White and his theory of the individual mind mark the end of chapter 1 and represent a brief introduction to one of the principles discussed in the following chapter: the methodological principle. Unlike the historical account of chapter 1, chapter 2 deals with the theoretical basis and the paradigmatic principles that are necessary for the subsequent analysis in chapter 3.

2. Philosophy of Science

This chapter outlines the theoretical foundations of the Psychological Determinism versus Infrastructural Determinism debate in more detail. As this master's thesis' epistemology is science, the elaboration of the paradigmatic surroundings is essential.

The following paragraphs introduce the four paradigmatic principles and their application to the two opposing approaches of Psychological and Infrastructural Determinism. Firstly, this is needed to embed this thesis in the wider academic environment of anthropology. Secondly, it provides a needed set of tools for a further productive scientific analysis.

In this master's thesis, the terms *Psychological Determinism* and *Infrastructural Determinism* have two meanings: on the one hand, each of them represents a certain philosophical approach (that is a set of principles) and, on the other hand, each of them carries the name of its homonymous theoretical principle.

2.1. Paradigms, Principles, and Theories

Let us first consider the core notions guiding every scientific discussion: paradigm, principle, and theory. A thorough understanding of these terms will enable us to conduct this analysis in a precise manner.

Paradigms

A paradigm is composed of multiple sets of principles. Each set of principles suggests specific rules for research. Furthermore, paradigms determine which questions are asked in the first way.

Philosopher and historian of science Thomas Samuel Kuhn (1962, 10) described paradigms as past scientific achievements that a scientific community acknowledges for a time. Additionally, paradigms provide the basis for the successive generations of

practitioners to identify the significant issues and methods of a research area. These scientific achievements share two essential characteristics. (1) The accomplishment must be adequately ground-breaking to draw a cohesive group of adherents away from competing types of scientific practice. (2) It must be appropriately open-ended to leave the redefined community of practitioners with a variety of problems to tackle.

What Kuhn called paradigm, Marvin Harris (1979, 26) preferred to refer to as research strategy, meaning an explicit set of guidelines including the epistemological status of variables, the kinds of relationships or principles, and the interrelated theories. Research strategies or paradigms instruct the principles that determine the research. Harris (1994, 63) argued that a commonly misinterpreted feature of paradigms is that both principles and paradigms do not have the position of a scientific theory. Moreover, principles including Creationism, Darwinism, or the dominance of infrastructure may not be falsified. However, paradigms may be contrasted and analysed from two points of view, as Harris explains: (1) their rational structure and consistency and (2) their capabilities to create theories that follow scientific standards.

Principles

The principles of a paradigm (or research strategy) define the general approach to the field of research of a scientist. Harris (1994, 63) suggested that they may be divided into two categories. On the one hand, guidelines for the creation, analysis, and confirmation of data (epistemological principles). And on the other, guidelines for the development and assessment of theories (theoretical principles). These two principles form a systematic link with the methodological and ontological principle. Altogether they describe a specific way of addressing a phenomenon and contain guidance for the establishment of theories. We may imagine principles as inquiries and the corresponding paradigm is constructed by the answers to these very questions. Principles are not subject to falsification.

To summarise these four principles: epistemological principles refer to the question of how we know about things. Theoretical principles correspond to cause and effect relations involving elements of (every concerned) sociocultural organism. Methodological principles define the unit of examination applicable to investigations on entire cultures

or smaller groups of people; in general, this is either the individual or the entire group. And, finally, ontological principles refer to qualitative definitions of research objects that need to be established, for instance how a human being is defined so that according scientific methods can be applied.

Theories

A scientific theory derives from a set of principles and depends on the exact combination of them. In this sense, a theory can give us information about the researcher's underlying paradigm. Furthermore, a scientific theory should be simple. In a series of rival hypotheses that aim to clarify the same situation, the one that contains the least assumptions should be chosen. (Ringhofer 2016, 6)

Such a theory is a system of logically connected scientific statements (axioms) that tries to explain a certain phenomenon by systematically analysing empirical evidence. According to Harris (1994, 64), the objective of scientific study is to articulate causal theories. These theories can be (1) predicted, (2) tested (or falsified), and are (3) parsimonious, (4) general, and (5) integrable/cumulative in a logical and growing set of theories. The identical standards differentiate the more suitable scientific theories from less suitable ones. Scientific theories find support through being predictable, testable, parsimonious, and integrable as opposed to competing theories on the identical field. But only approximation but never complete perfection can be achieved in this respect, as Harris stated. This is why scientific theories are considered to be preliminary approximations, never pure facts.

A scientific theory should be productive, according to Kuhn (1977, 322), meaning that it should explain a new phenomenon or a so far unknown link between two theories that already exist. Also, it must be free of value judgements. On the contrary, Harris (1994, 64) argued that science does not pretend to be free of judgements but instead suggests to overcome the unavoidable preconceptions of all types of information by methodological guidelines that insist on public examination of the processes that guide the construction of data and hypotheses. The often-articulated claim by postmodernists – that no organisation of observing scholars exists, which examines anthropological investigations – is contradicted by the strong critic to which important numbers and

theories are often exposed in the main anthropologic journals.

2.2. Epistemological Principles

What scientific knowledge that can be identified as true is obtainable? This philosophical question relates to the basic questions about what is real and what is truth. Epistemology is therefore dealing with the philosophy of knowledge and the methods to obtain that knowledge.

In her master's thesis *The Formalist-Substantivist Debate and its Wider Implications for the Explanation of Human Behaviour*, Karoline Ringhofer (2016, 9-14) describes the three main categories that can form the epistemological principle: science, humanities and Postmodernism.

Science

With the terms science and scientific, we understand a systematic undertaking to uncover laws of nature. The focus of scientific investigation - nature - is classified just like anything that occurs in the universe: inorganic, organic, or superorganic.

Science is characterised by objectivity, validity, reliability, as well as its systematic and logical approach, which allows verification and falsification of scientific theories. Objectivity defines a reality that is not bound to human experiences and that can be approached with a scientific strategy. Science, moreover, is committed to nomothetic investigations that develop rules. This means a stable connection between two or even more phenomena under predetermined circumstances. Hence, science is striving for generally valid and universal theories and scientific laws. (ibid., 2016, 10)

From a scientific point of view, it doesn't make sense to differentiate between different 'sciences', as for example physical sciences and social sciences, as this distinction would imply a fundamental difference in natural and social reality.
(White 1949, 5)

Indeed, there is a profound and conflicting disparity between the epistemological principles of science and Humanism. The latter assigns a characteristic to humans that is not to be explained by scientific principles.

The epistemological principle of science has also been termed Positivism and since the introduction of the criterion of falsification, it has also been labelled as Neo-positivism. According to August Comte, Positivism is a scientific way of knowing based only on well-tested, systemised positive knowledge (Harris 1979, 11). A popular claim made by humanities and Postmodernism is that science ignores the contextualisation of its human aspect. And, moreover, that the subjectivity of personal experience inevitably influences all scientific inquiry. Nevertheless, James Lett (1994, 45) argued that “[t]he fact that there is no absolute perspective is exactly why we need a standard of scientific objectivity.” Furthermore, Lett summarised his arguments facing the previously stated allegations:

Science does not claim absolute certainty, nor does it deny that the perception of reality is a process of active interpretation rather than passive reception. Instead, science claims provisional certainty based upon a process of unrelenting sceptical inquiry. (Lett 1994, 41f)

This statement leads us to the conclusion that a scientific theory is true until its disproof, or falsification, highlighting its self-correcting character. Scientific theories must be reasoned in a way that permits falsification, as introduced by Karl Popper. Thus, all hypotheses must be established in such a way that new empirical data may account for their falsification.

Scientific theories are formulated as syllogisms, which are arguments that follow a system of recognised, formally defined forms and correspond to the principles of logic, constituting a framework to reason scientific statements which are used to evaluate the validity of an argument. Validity is a standard for evaluating whether the result understandably derives from the premises. Still, true or false premises do not mean that there is a valid theory. Validity is simply a measure of the argument's form. In the case of false arguments, when the result does not derive from the premises, logical fallacies and therefore mistakes in reasoning occur. (Lett 1994, 58)

Humanities

As pointed out earlier, the epistemology of humanities refers to the ontological interpretation that humans are radically different from nature's laws and are therefore not scientifically explainable. Human beings are in a specific and unique position, expressed by the difference between nature and culture. Thus, we notice a qualitative difference in epistemology between people, their environment, and animals. Human beings are therefore not to be observed through the reductionism of science, but instead to be considered according to their own criteria. This humanistic approach had its beginnings during the era of Enlightenment and attributes a unique value to humans in the sense of the Humboldtian model of the autonomous individual. This model represents a superstructural reflection on the capitalist system. It deals with particular individuals, cultures, or situations, interpreted in time and space without wider generalisations.

Leslie White strongly condemned this strategy by declaring it to be "*an anthropocentric illusion*". An illusion containing the emic, auto-referential perception of human beings and the separation of mankind from science that resulted in the separation of disciplines into science and humanities. (Ringhofer 2016, 12-13)

Postmodernism

The principle of Postmodernism is characterised by relativistic epistemology, describing human perception and researchers themselves as socially constructed. Therefore, epistemological principles of Relativism highlight the own subjectivity of the author in the context of study and profoundly doubt the likelihood of objective scientific investigations as suggested in (neo-)positivist methods. Furthermore, postmodernists or interpretative anthropologists such as Clifford Geertz (1973, 29) describe objectivist science as Western hegemonic discourse:

The essential vocation of interpretive anthropology is not to answer our deepest questions, but to make available to us answers that others, guarding other sheep in other valleys, have given, and thus to include them in the consultable record of what man has said.

The requirement of objectivity is substituted by a thorough evaluation of one's own subjective perception. This essentially makes the basis of science redundant because part of the study involves the investigator's own subjectivity.

To deny the validity of etic descriptions is in effect to deny the possibility of a social science capable of explaining sociocultural similarities and differences. To urge that the etics of scientific observers is merely one among an infinity of emics (...) is to urge the surrender of our intellects to the supreme mystification of total relativism. (Harris 2001a, 45)

In Postmodernism, ethnography is transformed into a narrative with contextualisation of one's own position in the area of research. The results of conduct are therefore not discovered but actually produced as narrative by the investigators on their own. Postmodernists oppose the search for generalisations and the creation of rules as well as broader correlations over space and time. Instead, they favour interpreted, minor-scale ethnography based on individuals. The stance of postmodernist anthropology is thus founded in interpretative anthropology, the prioritisation of discourse and text analysis. (Ringhofer 2016, 14)

The epistemologies of Psychological and Infrastructural Determinism

Marvin Harris (1979, 31) urged to differentiate mental events (thoughts and feelings that humans experience within their minds) and behavioural events (all body motions and environmental effects produced by these motions). This is related to the emic-etic distinction, which I described earlier in this thesis (chapter 1.2.2.). Emic are statements of the native through which the observer acquires knowledge of the native's categories and rules, whereas etic are scientifically productive theories about causes of sociocultural differences and similarities generated by the observer.

Empirical science, then, is the foundation of the cultural materialist way of knowing. But merely to propose that our strategy should aim at meeting the criteria for scientific knowledge is to say very little about how scientific knowledge of the sociocultural field of inquiry can be acquired. When human beings are the objects of study, the would-be scientist is soon bedevilled by a unique quandary.

Alone among the things and organisms studied by science, the human 'object' is also a subject; the 'objects' have well-developed thoughts about their own and other people's thoughts and behaviour. Moreover, because of the mutual translatability of all human languages, what people think about their thoughts and behaviour can be learned through questions and answers. (...) No aspect of a research strategy more decisively characterizes it than the way in which it treats the relationship between what people say and think as subjects and what they say and think and do as objects of scientific inquiry. (Harris 1979, 29)

Idealists (and consequently also psychological determinists) claim that all knowledge is ultimately emic. In opposition, Harris (1979, 45) argued that in the name of demystifying the nature of social life, the observers merely substitute one brand of illusion for another. After all, who are the observers and why should their categories and beliefs be more credible than those of the actors? The response to these inquiries depends entirely on whether the scientific method of acquiring knowledge is recognised as having special benefits compared to other ways of knowing, Harris argued.

Psychological Determinism (or Psychologism) describes humans as being profoundly detached from natural laws and, thus, not scientifically explainable. Furthermore, it would be possible to gain knowledge by psychologically examining the development of the processes of the mind. Accordingly, Psychological Determinism is based on the epistemological principle of humanities.

On the other side, the research strategy of Cultural Materialism (which is based on the epistemology of science) uses logico-empirical, both inductive and deductive, quantifiable public procedures as subject to replication by independent observers, as described by Marvin Harris (1979, 27). Hence, also Infrastructural Determinism (the theoretical principle of Cultural Materialism) is based on the epistemology of science which in the context of thoughts and behaviour can be summarised as follows: (1) knowledge is gained by emic or etic means, (2) the researcher differentiates between mental and behavioural events, and (3) it is essential to operationalise concepts such as status, role, class, tribe, state, aggression, exploitation, family, or kinship (to name only a few).

2.3. Theoretical Principles

While the epistemological principles refer to the question of how we know about things, the theoretical principles refer to the cause and effect relation concerning components of each sociocultural system. Which is why the theoretical principle can be described as the principle of explanation. The course of causal processes – meaning the transition of a component within a structure – influences also other components in that system in a direct or indirect manner. (Blumauer 2012, 10).

According to Harris (1994, 67-68), theoretical principles are based on the idea that some behavioural and mental responses are more significant for people's survival and well-being than other responses. Furthermore, the effectiveness with which these responses lead to the accomplishment of a person's well-being can be calculated. This supposition is based on the so-called costing of alternative patterns of behaviour. This is an efficient method to identify optimising activities and thoughts as well as the progress of materialist research regarding the origins of sociocultural alterations.

There is a number of currencies that could be used to calculate these behavioural costs and benefits. For instance, disease and death rates, sexual access, financial expenses and benefits, as well as inputs and outputs of energy and nutrition.

Idealism versus Materialism

We can divide theoretical principles into two main categories: symmetrical and asymmetrical system theories. Idealism and Materialism are the two theoretical principles that tend to dominate in the economic anthropology debate. They are part of the asymmetric system theories because they identify system change causality at one level, which causes additional modification at the next levels. Accordingly, this defines three different levels: an infrastructural, a structural, and a superstructural one. A system's infrastructure contains the environmental conditions, the mode of production, and the mode of reproduction. These conditions constitute a so-called "*demo-techno-econo-environmental system*" (Harris 1994, 76). The structural level refers to a society's social organisation. And, finally, the superstructure discusses on the etic side "*human speech acts (...) and symbolic processes*" (Harris 2001a, 52) and on the emic side

the non-physical level of ideas, connotations, standards, and opinions.

However, the question which level – infrastructural, structural or superstructural – causes the system change depends on the theoretical principle. Idealism, on the one hand, assumes that social change can be caused through superstructural incentives. Observations are linked back to the superstructure of non-physical elements, such as the human mind for example. Hence, structural change can originate from within a society, for instance through educational work and awareness campaigns. Idealism at the theoretical level typically refers to the epistemologies of humanities or Postmodernism. (Ringhofer 2016, 15)

The theoretical principle of Materialism, on the other hand, negates internally induced changes. Unlike Idealism, Materialism does not trace back phenomena to non-physical components but to physical ones. Consequently, matter determines and dominates over mental processes. Although one cannot deny the influence of structure and superstructure, the roles played by these levels are not equal in magnitude of influence. According to Leslie A. White (1959, 21), the foundation and the motivation of a cultural system are the different categories of power within the system, such as technology or infrastructure. Alterations in infrastructure can subsequently cause social structural changes.

If social institutions are shaped by the operation of technologies, then social change will tend to follow technological change. But the institutional response to technological change may not be immediate. Institutions have an inertia of their own. (White 1959, 21)

Furthermore, according to the principle of Materialism, society is a conservative, self-referential system, which is only subject to structural change through external factors such as changes in technologies, environmental, demographic, and economic conditions. (Ringhofer 2016, 16)

Idealists in opposition to Cultural Materialism, such as Robert Francis Murphy, claimed that Marvin Harris would describe opinions, symbols, art, morals, and religion as unimportant features of human culture, stating: *“As for the materialists, they fail to recognize that cultural forms have lives of their own and are not mere epiphenomena of underlying ‘infrastructures’”* (cited in Harris 1994, 70).

Harris (1994, 70-71) looked at the developments in U.S. family life after World War II. He wanted to demonstrate that structure and superstructure are not simply static, epiphenomenal objects. Instead, they add to the stability and to the modification of infrastructures (within the limits of defined demo/techno/econo/environmental circumstances). These U.S. family life developments include the declining role of the man as the family's only worker and the extinction of the housewife. Moreover, they include the emergence of feminist philosophies that prioritise the importance of women's social, economic and academic freedom. Such structural or superstructural transitions can be described as the calculated result of a change from the good-production industry to a service/information industry. All of this driven by the transformation of housewives into low-paid non-union employees. The emergence of a feminist thought that romanticised wage labour and women's academic, sexual, and emotional freedom was the predetermined result of the same infrastructural power. The structural and superstructural shifts, however, have imposed and continue to impose an amplification on infrastructural transformations including a positive feedback effect.

Psychological Determinism versus Infrastructural Determinism – the theoretical principles

Idealism may be implemented in various contexts. For instance, with philosophical holism in the framework of Alfred Kroeber's Cultural Determinism – where the person is dominated by the cultural environment. Or, on the other hand, associated with methodological individualism in a psychological strategy emphasising the absolute causality of the human being's mind, thus Psychological determinism (or Psychologism). The feminist ideology that glorifies the structural and superstructural transformations in the American family life since the 1940s – as discussed in the paragraph above – provides a good example. Feminist activists assume that social change can be caused through superstructural incentive and phenomena are being traced back to the human mind. Accordingly, Idealism in its meaning of Psychological Determinism constitutes one of our two theoretical principles.

Likewise, Materialism can be outlined in various settings, for instance in biology with a

focus on the human brain and genetics. Differently – according to Cultural or Infrastructural Materialism – people raised in a particular economic system (e.g. Capitalism) act and think based on this system's rules. It is not them who form the economic system by their thoughts and behaviour, but, on the contrary, the other way around. Human beings adjust to function in the system according to the infrastructural conditions. Harris (1994, 69) summarised the basic theoretical principles of Cultural Materialism as follows:

(1) optimizations of the cost/benefits of satisfying biogram needs probabilistically (i.e. with more than chance significance) determine (or select for) changes in the etic behavioral infrastructure; (2) changes in the etic behavioral infrastructure probabilistically select for changes in the rest of the sociocultural system. The combination of 1 and 2 is the principle of the primacy of infrastructure.

It is vital to note that the corresponding principle is rooted in a set of principles forming a paradigm. Therefore, *the Materialism* does not exist, as Materialism can have various meanings. As described before, Biological Materialism is based on the physical nature of the human being. Instead, Cultural Materialism focuses on the infrastructure (as explained in more detail in chapter 1.2.2.) which brings us to the name of the second set of principles explored in this thesis: Infrastructural Determinism.

2.4. Methodological and Ontological Principles

The methodological principle deals with the question of how scientific knowledge can be attained. It is not just a matter of methodology but the frame of reference in which the analysed phenomenon is put. Hence, the methodological principle constitutes a precondition in the choice of method. In other words, the units of analysis, which scientists refer to in order to explain specific phenomena, depend on the methodological principles used.

Individualism (the methodological principle of Psychological Determinism) and Holism (the methodological principle of Infrastructural Determinism) represent two contrasting

ways to approach a particular phenomenon. The main question is if one should deduce from the macro- to the micro-level or from the micro- to the macro-level. (Ringhofer 2016, 17).

Individualism

Methodological Individualism, which bases explanations of society on the psychological inclinations of its individual members, is one of the fundamental propositions of Franz Boas' Cultural Relativism. Accordingly, society is understandable through the analysis of for instance the individual psyche. Consequently, socio-cultural phenomena are traceable back to an individual's characteristics. One question remains though: can socio-cultural patterns really be examined on the basis of single persons as the unit of study? (Beraha 2016)

When defining social circumstances in the context of individuals, Individualism has a reductionist viewpoint. This viewpoint is ignorant to the evolving consequences arising from aggregation mechanisms and thus operating at a higher level. In this case, the methodological principle is accompanied by Idealism. (Gibbon 1984, 405f)

Holism

The principle that stands in opposition to Individualism is methodological Holism which explains socio-cultural phenomena not on the basis of the summed actions of individuals but instead acknowledges emergent properties that cannot be reduced to the individual level, also by paying attention to the interactions of its component parts.

Holism emphasises exactly those properties that seem relatively independent from the individual (Gibbon 1984, 34), which has also been elaborated by Spencer (1860: 54):

You need but to look at the changes going on around, or observe social organization in its leading peculiarities, to see that these are neither supernatural, nor are determined by the wills of individual men, as by implications historians commonly teach, but are consequent on general natural causes. The one case of

the division of labour suffices to show this.

In fact, Methodological Individualism neglects that some things cannot be explained based on the properties of their elements. Instead, also the interaction between them must be considered which consequently leads to unique attributes that cannot be reduced on their singular units.

Wholes are composed of units whose properties may be described, but the interaction of these units in the construction of the wholes generates complexities that result in products qualitatively different from the component parts. (Stevenson 2000: 312)

As individuals are exposed to Social Determinism, it only makes sense to investigate the broader processes that govern society. In fact, the individual cannot give an account of these processes, as they usually remain hidden and unrecognised by the individual. Only an analytical macro-perspective based on Holism can reveal society's underlying mechanisms by abstraction from individual experience.

Ontological Principles

The ontological principle is the defining principle including information about the meaning of the particular object. This happens by describing the essence and shape of reality and by stating what knowledge we have about it and what knowledge we can acquire. The ontological principle therefore provides assumptions on the basic structures of any phenomenon in existence, such as: reality, nature, human, or society. Each item involved in a particular research problem needs to be defined.

For instance, the understanding of the term human being represents a fundamental ontological debate. According to humanities approaches, nature is a separate entity apart from culture, which is perceived as a unique feature of the Homo sapiens. Hence, the human being is defined as a cultural being and only explainable on its own terms. The biologist approach, on the other side, sees the human being as a complex animal with only gradual differences to primates (gradualism). Instead, emphasising the ability to utilise symbols, cultural materialists view the human being as qualitatively distinct from animals. Contrary to the humanities, the Homo sapiens is still understood as a

human animal, plus the faculty of using symbols. Accordingly, culture is a system of extra-somatic, cumulative information transfer depending on Homo sapiens' ability to symbol. (Ringhofer 2016: 8-9)

2.5. Summary of the Two Sets of Principles

What has been clarified in the preceding paragraphs of chapter 2 is now being illustrated by the following illustration 4. The set of principles of Infrastructural Determinism (named after its homonymous theoretical principle) contains the epistemological principle of science and the methodological principle of Holism. Psychological Determinism, on the other side, includes (next to its homonymous theoretical principle) the epistemology of humanities and the methodological principle of Individualism.




Illustration 4 *Philosophy of science*, adapted from Karoline Ringhofer (2016, 18)

3. The Analysis

After having established the historical (chapter 1) and the philosophical frame (chapter II) of my research question, this chapter proceeds with the analysis of major psychological, psychiatric, sociological, and anthropological approaches to the well-being of refugees following scientific procedure.

3.1. The Research Objects

In order to clearly demarcate the research focus, the first part of the analysis takes account of the research objects. The aim of this section is, on the one side, to look for generally applicable indicators in order to provide means to define the group of refugees and, on the other side, to discuss terms such as mental well-being or mental illness and provide a definition for them.

3.1.1. Defining Mental Well-being

Today, most psychiatrists either distinguish mental and physical illness in a pragmatic manner (see chapter 1.1.) or try to evaluate the person considering body and mind as a whole. This approach is related to the *Biomedical Model* where not just the biological but also psychological and social dimensions of the patient's life are being considered. Robert Evan Kendell (2001, 491) for instance asserted that when people develop illnesses both mind and body, psyche and soma, would be involved. To sustain this idea, he mentioned the case of pain as a solely psychological condition that characterises certain illnesses. He also mentioned fear and other emotions that supposedly are causing myocardial infarction as well as other diseases of the body.

These two psychiatrist approaches to phenomena, that are being called mental well-

being or mental illness, are clearly psychologically determined and based on the epistemology of humanities. The following paragraphs instead approach these phenomena following the epistemology of science.

There is no such thing as mental illness

In his publication of *Science, Reason, and Anthropology*, James Lett (1997, 48) explained the rule of testability and falsifiability in scientific objectivity by discussing the subject of insanity defence in the United States in the late twentieth century. To most Americans – he wrote – it is common sense that some people who commit illegal acts are “*mentally ill*”. For instance, a wife who would cut off her husband’s penis or a son who would murder his parents. This idea of common sense has been institutionalised in American society and embraced both by medical and legal professionals. Nevertheless, Lett (ibid., 49) described this insanity defence as illogical and insupportable for a very simple reason: “*there is no such thing as mental illness*”.

Surely, there are certain pathological brain diseases that cause abnormal and undesirable habits such as neurosyphilis or senile dementia, Lett (ibid.) added. But most alleged mental illnesses do not involve physiological damage to the brain. Instead, they supposedly involve damage to the mind, the epiphenomena of the brain’s activity that we call consciousness and most of them can be diagnosed only by observing the patient’s behaviour, whereas physiological symptoms are wholly absent.

According to the psychiatrist Thomas Szasz, the mind simply cannot become ill because the mind is not a bodily organ. Illness always involves something that happens to us and does not entail something we do. Mental illness is nothing more than a label for behaviour, and the diagnosis of mental illness is nothing more than a value judgement, Szasz (1984, 15) explained:

Inevitably the idea of illness, whether of the mind or the body, implies deviation from a norm. In the case of physical illness, the norm is the structural and functional integrity of the human body or some part of it. In the case of mental illness, it is impossible to name a single norm which is not stated in psychological, social, moral, or legal terms – all typical psychiatric symptoms or diseases, from

agoraphobia to sexual intercourse with animals, conform to and illustrate this principle.

According to Lett (1997, 49-50), no proponent of the concept of mental illness has been able to offer a definition of this alleged psychological pathology that consists of anything other than deviance from some non-physiological norm so far. Psychiatrists can neither define mental illness nor demonstrate its existence, which to them is self-evident. As a result, the existence of mental illness is not falsifiable and not testable.

The case of John Hinckley

Lett (ibid., 50) suggested to look at the case of John Hinckley, who had been charged with the assassination of Ronald Reagan. The court found him not guilty because of madness after several prominent psychologists had provided the jurors with their testimonies. Those retained by the prosecution had diagnosed Hinckley as sane, while those retained by the defence had diagnosed him as insane. Besides the disagreement for obvious reasons, the problem was that none of the psychiatric experts could offer a falsifiable definition of mental illness and thus no conceivable test could possibly have determined whether Hinckley was mentally ill. The psychiatrists were merely engaging in nothing more than a debate about values and most importantly whether Hinckley should or should not be punished for his actions.

Whilst declaring concern about the fact that in the past several psychologists convinced both the legal system and the public to accept their illusion of mental disorder, Lett (ibid.) also made the following remark to explain his criticism: *“It is no coincidence that psychiatry is both the least successful and the least scientific of all branches of contemporary medicine.”*

Alcoholism is a behaviour, not a disease

Instead of describing certain forms of human behaviour as illness, Lett (1990, 139-142) called for the use of the emic/etic distinction (see also chapter 2.2.). He applied this epistemological distinction to the idea prevalent in Western culture that Alcoholism is

a disease. According to this notion, certain people possess an uncontrollable predisposition to consume alcohol in enough quantity and with sufficient frequency to damage their physiological and psychological health. Many social scientists define Alcoholism as a progressive and debilitating condition that would result in death if left unchecked. Its cause is unknown, but its symptoms include drinking to excess, hiding one's drinking from others, and rationalising about the extent of one's drinking. Furthermore, an alcoholic's ability to meet social obligations and maintain personal relationships would decline as the disease progresses. And, finally, alcoholics experience irresistible cravings for alcohol – and once they have begun drinking, they are incapable of stopping short of intoxication. It is assumed that there is an underlying genetic basis for the disease, even though no physiological causes of any sort have yet been identified. (There are of course several physiological effects from Alcoholism, including cirrhosis.)

A moment's reflection should be enough to reveal that the claims mentioned above will not meet standards of etic knowledge, Lett (ibid., 139) wrote:

In the first place, the proposition that alcoholism is a disease is simply not falsifiable. Because the disease is defined entirely in terms of behavioural symptoms, no conceivable piece of evidence could establish that a person who exhibited those behaviors was not a victim of the disease. Anyone and everyone who drinks like an alcoholic is diagnosed as an alcoholic, and no one who does not drink like an alcoholic (except 'former' or 'recovering' alcoholics) can ever be identified as an alcoholic.

The term alcoholism, then, is simply a label attached to a particular set of behaviors. Calling those behaviors a disease, however, violates both rationality and common usage. When we use the term disease, we normally mean something that happens to us, not something that we do.

Moreover, no medical treatment even exists for the so-called disease of alcoholism, Lett (ibid., 140) continued. In fact, all treatments that are provided by the medical community include attempts to modify the victim's behaviour, and there is little conclusive prove to sustain the argument that those treatments are any more successful than alternative treatments or than using no treatment at all. Also, the claim that alcoholics

are incapable of controlling their own behaviour violates the etic rules of logic and comprehensiveness. That claim is self-contradictory because the proposed treatments that are allegedly successful in rehabilitating alcoholics do nothing other than persuade patients to control their own behaviour. And, finally, that claim fails to account for the number of diagnosed alcoholics who spontaneously remit or who stop drinking through a deliberate act of will.

Deviations from emic behavioural norms

Many cultures share the belief that certain individuals under some conditions may lose the ability to control some of their behaviour. Lett (ibid.) illustrated this fact with examples such as spirit possession, trance states, or magical spells. In the more specific case of U.S. or Western culture, the list of behaviours that are allegedly caused by forces beyond the individual's control is seemingly endless: overeating, undereating, theft, murder, rape, spouse abuse, child molestation, and – of course – excessive drinking of alcohol. Most American citizens are very likely to agree that someone who would do any of these things is probably “*sick*”, Lett (ibid.) argued:

Psychologists, sociologists, physicians, and other scientists who fail to appreciate the emic nature of these illogical propositions have embraced them, cloaked them in impressive jargon (bulimia, anorexia nervosa, kleptomania, homicidal mania, and so forth), and proffered them as supposedly scientific explanations of human behaviour. Those ‘explanations,’ of course, are merely labels, and inconsistent, illogical labels at that – hardly the stuff of etics.

Such nonconformities from emic behavioural standards (e.g. alcoholism) in reality are folk diseases rather than disorders. A folk disease describes “*syndromes from which members of a particular group claim to suffer and for which their culture provides an etiology, diagnosis, preventive measures, and regimens of healing*” (Rubel 1977, 180). It is also evident that the main purpose of identifying alcohol addiction as an illness is to give the health system a responsibility to deal with individuals who use the most popular recreational drug of the population in an excessive way, Lett (1999, 140-141) proposed. If alcoholism would not be accepted as a disease but properly defined and regarded as a bad habit, then research could focus on the question of what causes

people to pursue self-destructive behaviours and how best to persuade people to break their bad habits.

Moreover, human beings face a significant practical problem when they attempt to study themselves scientifically, Lett (ibid., 141-142) summarised. They have already been enculturated to study themselves in some non-scientific way, whatever its particulars might be, and there is the present danger that they will confuse the two and end up mistaking their enculturated assumptions for scientific propositions. Instead, the distinction between emics and etics is the best suited method to define and explain these forms of human behaviour, whether it be labelled as Alcoholism or mental illness.

To put it briefly, Psychological Determinism considers body and mind (either separately or as a whole including “psychological dimensions”) in order to deal with so-called mental illnesses. Infrastructural Determinism, on the other side, distinguishes physical illness (or dysfunction) and deviation from emic behavioural norms. The following illustration 5 demonstrates these differences between the two philosophical approaches.




Illustration 5 *Mental illness*

Measuring the well-being of the individual

When looking at the (mental) well-being of an individual human being, according to the principles of Infrastructural Determinism, it is vital to consider the entire social organism. Marvin Harris (1994, 67-68) claimed that some types of behavioural or mental responses are more specifically relevant to the well-being and existence of individuals than others. He also argued that the effectiveness with which these responses lead to the accomplishment of the well-being of people can be analysed. This supposition is based on the so-called costing of alternative patterns of behaviour, an efficient method used to identify optimising behaviours and thoughts as well as the progress of materialist research on the origins of sociocultural alterations.

The classes of responses, of which the costs and benefits benefit cultural evolution, can be generated from the natural and social sciences that address Homo sapiens' by genetics defined desires, impulses, aversions, and behavioural trends. These are: intercourse, appetite, hunger, sleep, learning of language, need for feeding, dietary procedures, susceptibility to disease of mind or body, and discomfort from the dark, cold, wind, precipitation, shortage of oxygen and other effects concerning the environment. This collection of human needs is clearly not capturing the entirety of human nature. Consequently, new findings regarding the biogram and the organic variations that exist within the human species are needed.

Harris (ibid., 68) suggested a variety of currencies to consider when assessing behavioural costs and benefits with optimisation impact. Among them there are “*morbidity and mortality rates, differential sexual access, monetary costs and benefits, energetic inputs and outputs, and nutritional inputs and outputs*”, as illustrated by the following illustration 6:




Illustration 6 *The well-being of the individual*

Moreover, the aspects of human that enable the fulfilment of biogram desires, ambitions, dislikes, and behavioural predispositions establish the determining centre of sociocultural organisms. This is allowed by the combination of demographic, technical, monetary, and environmental developments that exist in all sociocultural systems - i.e. the etic behavioural part of the demo-techno-econo-environmental combination is the central one and thus on can define the determining centre as the “*etic behavioural infrastructure*” (ibid.). Infrastructure defines the connection between culture (the primary vehicle of maximizing well-being for the human being) and nature (unchangeable biological, physical, chemical, or mental limitations).

According to Harris (ibid., 69), the primacy of infrastructure is established by the combination of the two following theoretical principles of Cultural Materialism:

(1) optimizations of the cost/benefits of satisfying biogram needs probabilistically (i.e. with more than chance significance) determine (or select for) changes in the etic behavioral infrastructure; (2) changes in the etic behavioral infrastructure probabilistically select for changes in the rest of the sociocultural system.

3.1.2. Defining Refugees

The next research object to take into account is the group of refugees. Before looking at generally applicable indicators in order to demarcate this group, the following paragraphs explain how social organisms are structured and how they function.

Introduction into structure and function of human social systems

All societies of living beings, such as for instance the emigrating society and the receiving society concerned by a migrating individual, are social systems or social organisms, Leslie A. White (1959, 142) explained, meaning organic wholes composed of interrelated parts. These social systems have two aspects: functional and structural. This implies, on the one side, that we can examine them from the point of view of the kind or kinds of components of which the whole is made. And, on the other, that we can turn our attention to the interrelationship between these components and on the relationship between one part and the whole. By social system, White (ibid.) meant the whole network of relationships among the individuals of a distinguishable group. According to him, there is no difference between social science and physics or biology when one approaches problems of structure and function, or of differentiation and integration.

Furthermore, there is a close relationship between the degree of organisation and the concentration of energy. As matter becomes less organised and energy becomes more diffuse, the degree of organisation of a system increases as the concentration of energy within the system increases. According to White (ibid., 144-145), one major aspect of social evolution is technological progress within a social system. These systems evolve when the quantity of energy harnessed per person per year rises with other factors remaining constant. More precisely, social systems become more differentiated structurally, more specialised functionally, and because of differentiation and specialisation, special mechanisms of integration and regulation are developed. Hence, the degree of organisation of a system is proportional to the concentration of energy within the system.

Segments, classes, and special mechanisms

There are three kinds of structures in a social system: segments, classes, and special mechanisms. A segment is one of an unspecified quantity of components forming the whole in which the structure, arrangement, and role of each component is like another. Society as a whole is divisible for instance into families, and one family is generically like another, in any given system, in structure and function. Segmentation, as a process, is a means of increasing the size of systems while preserving at the same time a high degree of inner cohesion or solidarity, because – in fact – the solidarity of a social group tends to diminish as the size of the group increases. Accordingly, White (ibid., 147) described two important principles:

(1) on a given level, the number of units that can be integrated into a segment is limited, and therefore the size of systems on this level cannot be increased beyond a certain point; but (2) systems on one level may be integrated as segments of a larger system on a higher level. In this way the process of evolution may proceed indefinitely by organizing the systems of one level into larger systems on a higher level.

Military organisation is a suitable example to demonstrate the relationship of segmentation to integration and the roles of both in social evolution. An army is a very developed form of a segmented social system. It is a pyramid constituted of several strata of segments where the units of one level become segments of the unit on the next higher level. On the lowest level of organisation there are the individual soldiers. They become segments of units called squads, which in turn become segments of units called platoons, and so on through companies, battalions, regiments, and divisions, to armies. Several armies may subsequently be integrated into a fighting force of a nation under a single command. This organisation is necessary since an unorganised group of this size would fall apart because of its own weight, just like in physics where a drop of mercury cannot exceed the limit of size set by the cohesive power of its molecules.

Another kind of structures is the so-called class. It is one of an unspecified quantity of components into which a social group as a whole is split – the structure, the organisation, or the role of one class varies from another. Men and women, adults and children, married, unmarried, and widowed are examples of classes of different kinds. Hence,

there are sex classes, age classes, marital classes, occupational classes, and classes of social status. According to White (ibid., 203), classes based upon distinctions of status, dividing society into higher and lower strata, are relatively rare in primitive society. It is not until society has become organised upon the basis of property relations and territorial distinctions that true “*classes of subordination and superordination*” come into being. With the development of civil society, classes of status become prominent and of prime importance in the conduct of social life.




Illustration 7 Class

Finally, the third kind of structures in a social system – the special mechanism – is a structure distinguishable within the system as a whole but which is not one of a class of structures into which the entire society may be subdivided. For instance, a chief or a secret society is such a structure.

The aim of this distinction into segments classes and specific mechanisms – according to White (ibid., 144) – is to differentiate, identify, and categorise kinds of social structures. And, also, to explore how each component is linked to others and how they are all interconnected into a cohesive whole; and finally, to follow the trajectory of social evolution. Hence, the behaviour of any system, whether considered as a whole or in

terms of its constituent parts, is determined by three factors:

(1) kind of parts, kind being described in terms of mass, magnitude, structure, etc.; (2) arithmetic number of parts, the number of units in each kind (the number of carbon atoms in a molecule or cell), and the number of kinds of parts (the number of kinds of atoms in a molecule or cell); and (3) the configuration in which the kinds and numbers of constituent elements are organized. (ibid., 211)

Integration, regulation, and control of social systems

Orderliness, uniformity, and regularity are characteristics of all systems, social systems included. For instance, there are many ways of greeting a friend, catching a fish, or burying the dead. But within a given social system we will find that there tends to be only one way of performing a certain operation. In short, we have customary ways of doing things, White (ibid., 213-215) explained. *“Custom is the name we give to uniformities, regularities, continuities, etc., in cultural social systems.”*

Without the possibility to make practical assumptions organised social life would be quite unthinkable. Meaning assumptions, such as guessing what will happen when planting seeds in moist ground or how people would behave if they are welcomed or spat on. Customs are therefore a powerful and effective means of social integration and regulation. They are a mechanism of social systems to ensure regularity, standardisation, structure and consistency. Each part of the social system is given its identity, and each part is geared to other parts and to the whole. Each baby born into the system is formed by education and training and is fitted securely into the system. And, perhaps, the most important aspect of customs is that they are a powerful means of promoting social solidarity; they serve as social badges, as means of identifying societies, or classes within social systems. Customs are external expressions of *we-ness* as distinguished from *they*.

Turning from a consideration of customs in general to subdivisions within this category, to special kinds of organisation of customary behaviour, White (ibid., 216) distinguished two such subclasses of customs: ethics and etiquette.

We define ethics as a set of rules designed to regulate the behaviour of individuals so as to promote the general welfare, the welfare of the group. Etiquette is a set of rules which recognizes classes within society, defines them in terms of behavior, and so regulates the behaviour of individuals as to keep them in their proper classes. In this way classes are kept distinct and intact; and means of articulating classes with one another in social intercourse are provided. The rules of ethics and of etiquette alike serve to integrate and regulate human social systems by determining the relationships between part and part and between part and whole.

Every human society, or social system, tends to maintain itself to maximum advantage by attempting to regulate the behaviour of each one of its component individuals so that this end may be attained. This particular process is called ethics. In speaking of human welfare, (which we can define in terms of subsistence, health, protection from the elements, defence against enemies, etc.), White (ibid., 217) distinguished the group as a whole, on the one hand, and the interests of individuals severally, on the other. These two interests coincide at many points but differ at others. No system can permit an individual to wreak his aggressions at will upon other members of the community, nor does any human society allow its members freely to gratify their sexual appetites where they will. This is where the rule of ethics come into play.

Instead, etiquette is a set of rules, which lets each class preserve its own identity and communicate with other classes if the social organism as an entity is to operate in a harmonious and effective manner. An etiquette code identifies each class regarding behaviour and forces each person to adhere to the correct code of their class. This does not only help to protect the integrity or uniqueness of every class but also to effectively and efficiently link classes to each other. These rules of behaviour imposed by the society upon the individual are enforced by so-called social sanctions, such as adverse comment or criticism, ridicule, and ostracism.

To illustrate etiquette with an example, White (ibid., 225-227) described the class of men where each individual man behaves in certain prescribed ways, they dress and wear their hair in a distinctive manner, engage in certain occupations, and also behave in a manner prescribed by society. If he fails to do this, he is punished, usually with

ridicule. Moreover, if this does not succeed in bringing him into line, he will be ostracised. Ostracism is a way of ejecting an individual from his class where he or she becomes a mere outcast or is relegated to another class. Consequently, a man who is ostracised would be transferred to either a special cast of outcasts, or one of children, women, or men-women. This way, the social mechanism of etiquette operates to regulate the behaviour of individuals in such a way as to maintain the identity of each class and thus to promote the integrity of society as a whole. The effective operation of codes of etiquette provides society with a high degree of order and stability, which allows its members to make realistic anticipations and predictions without orderly social intercourse would be impossible.

Infractions or violations of customary regulations are punished by ridicule, ostracism, and, in some cases, by retaliation by an injured party. We may distinguish, logically, two agencies of punishment and discipline: the community in general or a special social or political mechanism, acting in the name of and by the authority of the society as a whole, such as a chief, council of elders, police officers, and courts. In the first case, we are dealing by definition with custom, in the second with law. Consequently, law is a special category of custom; a law is a custom the violation of which is punished by society by means of a special social mechanism. (ibid., 232)

The following illustration 8 summarises structure and function of human social systems in general (including the means of social integration and regulation) and illustrates the elements that are necessary for the definition of the research object of refugees.




Illustration 8 *Social structure*

The research object of refugees

Refugees and other migrants live or have lived in at least two social systems, among them the society of emigration and the receiving society. These two systems – in most cases – differ in customs, such as ethics, etiquette, and law and sanctions. Moreover, the individual refugee that used to belong to a certain segment and class in the society of emigration subsequently might be relegated into a different class in the receiving

society and might experience changes regarding the previous segment(s) he used to be part of.

In 2016, 722.370 persons applied for asylum in Germany. According to the German Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (2017, 10-28), the biggest number of these migrants came from Syria, followed by Afghanistan and Iraq. 65,7 percent were male and 34,3 percent female. Almost three thirds of the asylum seekers were younger than 30 years with the most numerous age group being the one between 18 and 24 years. Among the 266.250 Syrians who applied for asylum in 2016, 65,3 percent belonged to the ethnic group of Arabs and 91,5 percent stated to be Muslim.

In 2016, Germany decided in 631.180 asylum cases that had been accumulated in 2016 as well as the previous years. In 68,8 percent of these cases either asylum, subsidiary protection, or humanitarian protection were granted, providing them with (temporarily limited) access to the job market. Among these 68,8 percent, most migrants (290.965) came from Syria.

Amena and Yazdan

In order to represent this thesis' research object of refugees, this section describes and defines two individual persons according to the statistical data stated above. These two theoretical individuals shall demonstrate how refugees and other migrants can be demarcated by defining the social structures they live in. The two examples shall not act as a replacement of empirical research but function solely as an illustration of demarcation using Leslie A. White's theoretical framework of social structures.

The previous social system (society of emigration) of the first refugee – let's call her Amena – is located in Syria, with its own etiquette, ethics, law, and sanctions (aspects of which can be traced for instance by looking at its religious traditions of mostly Arabic Islam). The second social system Amena engages with is in the German city of Cologne, where – after six months – she was granted asylum. Amena is 23 years old, has a bachelor's degree in graphic design, and grew up with her Syrian middle-class family in urban Damascus. Therefore, in Germany she belongs to the following classes: sex class of females, age class of 18-24 years, socio-economic class of middle class with

some financial support by the state and also by her family, educational class of higher education, and occupational class of access to the job market being employed as an intern in an NGO.

The second theoretical individual to serve as an example for the statistical data is 20-year-old Yazdan. His social system of emigration is a rural village in the Afghan mountains with its own etiquette, ethics, law, and sanctions. Yazdan's receiving society is located in the Austrian city of Vienna, where – after more than two years – he is still waiting for a decision in his asylum case. Yazdan grew up in rather poor and insecure conditions together with his father and his brother and only attended two years of primary school. In Vienna, he belongs to the following classes: sex class of males, age class of 18-24 years, socio-economic class of lower class with little welfare support by the state, educational class of primary education, and occupational class of asylum seeker without access to the job market.

3.2. The Analysis

This section provides an analysis of a selection of concepts supposedly explaining the mental well-being of refugees. There are six examples, some based on the principles of Psychological Determinism, some on the principles of Infrastructural Determinism. The analysis follows scientific procedure and clearly defines the underlying principles of the chosen models.

3.2.1. Knaevelsrud: Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)

The first model to be analysed is *Posttraumatic Stress Disorder* (PTSD), which was recognised for the first time in 1980 in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*. Christine Knaevelsrud (professor of psychology at Freie Universität Berlin) describes PTSD as a frequent psychological consequence of torture and war with very

far-reaching physical, psychological, and psychosocial consequences. Both PTSD and depressive illnesses would be frequent consequences of cumulative, traumatic experiences.

Multiple risk influences have been described as causing PTSD in persons who have been tortured or in war. Among them there are: particular features of cruelty, distressing events that are not related to torture, political unrest within the region, and time passed since the traumatic happening occurred. According to Knaevelsrud, Stammel, and Boettche (2012, 452-456), the analysis of 48 studies supposedly shows a causal effect: the higher the number of traumatic events experienced, the greater would be the risk of developing PTSD.

Among the secondary disorders that frequently co-occur with PTSD, there would be depression, anxiety disorders, and above all chronic pain. The causing of maximum pain is one of the central components of torture. Therefore, survivors would often suffer from long lasting and extremely severe somatic and psychosomatic consequences.

Furthermore, Knaevelsrud and her colleagues urge to see PTSD not exclusively as a result of life-threatening event, but as an event whose effects are significantly influenced by the consequences of persistent uncertainty and vulnerability. Not just the experience of trauma, also stressors occurring during and after migration could raise the danger of negative effects on the mental well-being. These stressors include language problems, interculturally differing definitions of disease and care, and insecure residential conditions. These factors, which would require explicit attention in the course of the diagnostic and psychotherapeutic process.

In their publication *Cultural Factors in Traumatic Stress*, Peter D. Yeomans and Evan M. Forman (2019, 237-238) argue that the assumption that PTSD is the finest way to recognise and deal with traumatic stress has several downsides. Excessive consideration of PTSD would limit the pursuit of a “*more sophisticated picture of how traumatic stress manifests cross-culturally*”. Moreover, often PTSD symptoms would not show at all or would rapidly be gone after a short time:

The overuse of a PTSD model may therefore falsely predict specific symptoms or overpathologize a temporary and normal reaction to a traumatic event. With

PTSD comes a presumption of greater vulnerability and the absence of resilience. (...) the normative response to crisis is the strengthening of communal relationships on the social level and resilience on the individual level.

Post-traumatic Stress Disorder is psychologically determined

In their account on PTSD, Knaevelsrud et al. (2012, 453) gain their knowledge through the psychological examination of the processes of the mind:

Die Auswirkungen von Folter sind sehr weitreichend: Neben körperlichen Folgen treten insbesondere auch psychische und psychosoziale Konsequenzen auf. Sowohl die posttraumatische Belastungsstörung als auch depressive Erkrankungen sind häufige Folgen.

Furthermore, phenomena such as depression or anxiety may be assessed by using emic methods: *“Empfehlenswert ist es, bereits übersetzte standardisierte Fragebogen bzw. strukturierte Interviews zu nutzen”* (ibid., 458). Hence, PTSD is based on the epistemological principle of humanities.

According to Knaevelsrud and her colleagues, the determinants of behaviour and well-being of human beings are the consequence of experiences the organism has undergone, such as traumatic events (e.g. war and torture), migration, or exposure to post-migration stressors. Therefore, the theoretical principle that refers to the cause and effect relation is Psychological Determinism.

Moreover, PTSD explains trauma and its effect on the well-being through the experiences of the individual:

Die Entwicklung einer Krankheit sowie das individuelle Krankheits- und Bewältigungsverständnis sind von dem jeweiligen kulturellen Kontext geprägt. So werden Krankheiten in kollektiven Kulturen oftmals als Schicksal oder Strafe angesehen. Die Betroffenen schämen sich für ihre Symptome, fühlen sich stigmatisiert und glauben nicht daran, aktiv zur Genesung beitragen zu können. (ibid., 458)

Hence, the methodological principle that refers to the unit of analysis is Individualism, proposing the idea that the individual is the initiator and determinant of cultural process and responsible for cultural change.

After having defined the epistemological, theoretical, and methodological principles of *Post-traumatic Stress Disorder*, the outcome of the analysis reveals that this concept is psychologically determined.

3.2.2. Machleidt: Cultural Adolescence

The next model to be analysed is the so-called third phase of individuation or *Cultural Adolescence*. In his publication *Migration, Kultur und psychische Gesundheit*, German psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Wielant Machleidt (2013, 23-34) describes how human beings go at least through two phases of individuation – one after birth and one during adolescence. After birth, the individual gradually moves away from the mother to the larger circle of the family. In adolescence, the path leads away from the family and into society. According to Machleidt, both of these steps of individuation require a detachment but also offer an increase in degrees of freedom.

Likewise, migrants who leave their original culture would go through a third phase of individuation. For this purpose, Machleidt (ibid., 24-25) uses the metaphor of *Cultural Adolescence*.

Das Verlassen des eigenen Kulturraumes erfordert – ähnlich wie in der Adoleszenz – die Ablösung von den kulturtypischen Beziehungsobjekten, die als mütterliche/väterliche Ersatzobjekte (z. B. Muttersprache, Vaterland) Surrogatcharakter haben. Die kulturtypischen Beziehungsobjekte sind Repräsentanten des eigenen ‚kulturellen Universums‘, in dem das Individuum bisher Geborgenheit, Vertrautheit, Sicherheit, Befriedigung etc. erfahren hat. Das Verlassen dieses Raumes durch Migration ist eine Grenzüberschreitung in ein fremdes unbekanntes Terrain, vergleichbar dem Verlassen des familiären Raumes in der Adoleszenz oder den frühen Ablösungsschritten. Die je spezifischen Unterschiede

der Grenzüberschreitung oder Schwellensituation sind entwicklungspsychologisch determiniert und kennzeichnen einen Übergang von einem ‚Dinnen‘, der Zugehörigkeitsgruppe, zu einem ‚Draußen‘, der Aufnahmegruppe.

After successfully mastering this process of *Cultural Adolescence*, according to Machleidt, a new bi-cultural identity and integration into a foreign culture and society are established. This would be a special stage of maturity that non-migrants do not experience in this form. Nevertheless, he describes a tension between the familiar and the foreign, which would not be easy to bear. A tension that triggers a crisis, during which identity would be reorganised – a process, according to Machleidt, similar in many ways to the crises of adolescence. On the one side, in the context of migration, difficulties would occur because of the spatial and socio-cultural separation from the original social system – people leaving their country would endure negative consequences of migration, losing important personal relationships. On the other side, there would be negative effects coming from the change of old habits. (Schaffler, Ramirez Castillo, and Jirovsky 2017: 229-230)

Die innerpsychischen ‘Affektstürme’ infolge des ‘Kulturschocks’ der Migration, die durch Neugier, Angst, aggressives Durchsetzungsverhalten, Trauer und Triumphgefühle charakterisiert sind, gleichen in mancher Hinsicht denen der Adoleszenz – einmal abgesehen von dem psychosexuellen Entwicklungsschub. Man kann darin auch psychodynamische Resonanzen der Trennungs- und Individuationsphase der Kindheit sehen, des ersten Schrittes zur Identitätsbildung, aber auch eine erneute ‘Runde’ der Individuation in einem kulturellen ‘Übergangsraum’, in dem sich Individuation reaktualisiert. (...) Die Identitätsumformungen der Migration können als eine Reinszenierung von Kindheits- und Adoleszenzenarien auf höherem Niveau verstanden werden. (Machleidt 2013, 27-28)

Cultural Adolescence is based on Psychological Determinism

In his account, Wielant Machleidt does not use logical and empirical, both inductive and deductive, measurable public examinations that are replicable by autonomous ob-

servers. Instead – just like Knaevelsrud – he gains his knowledge through the psychological study of the development of mental processes. Hence, Cultural Adolescence is based on the epistemological principle of humanities and not on the one of science.

Similar to Freud's Evolutionism, Machleidt suggests a universal tendency of the human being to mature through various behavioural stages (in the case of *Cultural Adolescence* a third stage of individuation for migrants), independently of specific sociocultural environments. However, as these stages are not linked with other regular features of sociocultural systems, it would mean that personality generates personality, which leads to a *reductio ad absurdum*.

According to Machleidt, the 'culture shock' resulting from migration is characterised by curiosity, fear, aggressive assertiveness, sadness and triumphal feelings which – as he describes – are similar to psychodynamic resonances of the separation and individuation phase of childhood. Furthermore, migration into a foreign unknown terrain would be comparable to leaving the family space in adolescence and determined by developmental psychology: *“Die je spezifischen Unterschiede der Grenzüberschreitung oder Schwellensituation sind entwicklungspsychologisch determiniert“* (ibid., 25). According to the model of *Cultural Adolescence*, the determinants of the behaviour and well-being are inherent in the organism (stages of individuation after birth and during adolescence) or are the consequence of experiences the organism has undergone (migration). Therefore, the theoretical principle is Psychological Determinism.

Although Machleidt (ibid., 24-25) mentions a universal tendency when describing behavioural stages of human beings, in the case of *Cultural Adolescence* he explains his model through the experiences of the individual: *“Die kulturtypischen Beziehungsojekte sind Repräsentanten des eigenen ‚kulturellen Universums‘, in dem das Individuum bisher Geborgenheit, Vertrautheit, Sicherheit, Befriedigung etc. erfahren hat.“* Hence, the methodological principle is Individualism, proposing the idea that the individual is the initiator and determinant of cultural process and responsible for cultural change.

After having defined the epistemological, theoretical, and methodological principles of Machleidt's *Cultural Adolescence*, the outcome of the analysis reveals that his concept is psychologically determined.

3.2.3. Malkki: Liminality

The model of *Liminality* is popular among cultural relativists and was proposed by anthropologist Victor W. Turner (1974, 53-92). He suggested a level of confusion or disorientation that arises in the intermediate phase of a rite of passage. This would especially occur when members no longer have their previous position but also have not yet completed the change to the position they may have when the rite is finished. This idea has subsequently been used by Liisa Malkki to explain the mental well-being of migrants,

Similar to Machleidt's description of a transitional third stage of individuation caused by migration, Malkki (1995, 4) suggests in her study of the Tanzanian Hutu tribe that refugees are transitional beings who occupy a problematic, *liminal* position caused by their displacements, by their so-called uprootedness, and by the nature of their refugeeeness:

Displacement and deterritorialization in the contemporary order of nations always present at least two logical possibilities. The first is that a liminal collectivity tries to make itself 'fit' into the overarching national order, to become a 'nation' like others. (...) The second possibility entails an insistence on, and a creative exploitation of, another order of liminality. This constitutes a sweeping refusal to be categorized, a refusal to be fixed within one and only one national or categorical identity, and one and only one historical trajectory.

Liminality is based on Psychological Determinism

In Liisa Malkki's account, knowledge is gained through emic methods conducting (1) the self-assessment of the individual's identities (epistemological principle of humanities), (2) the determinants of the behaviour and well-being are the consequence of experiences the organism has undergone – which in this case is migration – (theoretical principle of Psychological Determinism), and – although she often mentions a “*collective identity*” – (3) the unit of analysis is the individual (methodological principle of Individualism), as the following quote reveals:

The Hutu refugees in the camp located their identities within their very displacement, extracting meaning and power from the interstitial social location they inhabited. Instead of losing their collective identity, this is where and how they made it. The refugee camp had become both the spatial and the politico-symbolic site for imaging a moral and political community. Among the town refugees in Kigoma, on the other hand, relationships between roots and identity were very differently constituted. There (...) the very ability to 'lose' one's identity and to move through categories was for many a form of social freedom and even security. There, the whole logic of uprootedness and exile was differently constituted. (ibid, 16)

Hence, just like the model of *Cultural Adolescence*, also the concept of *Liminality* as used in Malkki's account is psychologically determined.

3.2.4. Berry: Acculturative Stress

In the 1930s, American anthropologist Robert Redfield was the innovator and, for a significant time, the main ethnologist to concentrate on the development of cultural and social alterations. (Encyclopaedia Britannica). With the concept of acculturation, he considered an at that time new issue for anthropology, defining it as follows: "*Acculturation comprehends those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, with subsequent changes in the original cultural patterns of either or both groups*" (Redfield 1936, 149). Furthermore, Redfield correlated this concept with the mental well-being, describing – among the psychological procedures of selecting and integrating qualities under acculturation – a "*psychic conflict resulting from attempts to reconcile differing traditions of social behaviour and different sets of social sanctions.*" (ibid., 1936, 152).

In the following decades, theories of acculturation in both psychology and cultural relativist' anthropology continued to describe psychological mechanisms. Today, many scholars in transcultural nursing and health care follow the ideas of John W. Berry, one of the main establishers of acculturation psychology. Among his concepts, the four-fold

model of acculturation strategies (involving the concepts of assimilation, separation, integration and marginalisation) is quite popular.

Acculturation involves changes when people from different cultures interact with each other over time. Changes occur in both directions although the sojourner or new comer will usually change more than the people in the established culture. (...) Acculturation is not a linear process. Differences exist even among members of the same families. (Douglas and Pacquiao 2010, 68s).

There are multiple results of acculturation, including mental as well as socio-cultural adjustment, according to Berry's studies with young migrants:

Generally, those who involve themselves in both their heritage culture and that of the national society (by way of integration) have the most positive psychological well-being, and are most adjusted in school and in the community; in contrast, those who are minimally involved with either culture (the marginalisation course), are least well-adapted; and those who are primarily oriented towards one, or the other, culture (assimilation or separation) generally fall in between these two adaptation poles. (Berry and Sabatier 2010, 191-192)

Moreover, Berry described the model of *Acculturative Stress*, which “refers to the disorganization or even disintegration of behaviour that often accompanies social and cultural change” (Douglas and Pacquiao 2010, 68s). According to this idea, the person enduring *Acculturative Stress* would experience aggression and disrupted mental well-being (in particular distress, depression, marginal feelings, or isolation). Furthermore, the person would endure an increased level of psychosomatic episodes and ambiguity regarding his or her personality. Berry suggested that these symptoms often occur in individuals under acculturation and embody the “*negative side of acculturation*”.

Effective adjustment to the new cultural environment by taking over the suitable behaviour of the receiving society – according to transcultural nursing and health care – may need some time. A successful conclusion of acculturation would be recognition and acceptance as being a part of the receiving society. Adjustment can happen through bilingualism/multilingualism (speaking more than one language) or in the form of biculturalism (dealing in an effective manner with verbal as well as nonverbal behaviour).

Different to acculturation, the process of assimilation is described as a merging of one's own cultural tradition with the receiving society's culture. This demands the development of a new identity slowly overtaking the view of the receiving society. According to transcultural nursing and health care, assimilation is an extremer procedure than acculturation (one may never go back to their original society). Moreover, assimilation would be determined by one's own roots and one's distance from the place of origin. Additionally, similar language or appearance resemblances with the leading groups would be decisive influences in the process of assimilation. (Douglas and Pacquiao 2010, 68s)

Acculturative Stress is based on Psychological Determinism

In a similar manner to Knaevelsrud, Machleidt, and Malkki, also Berry gained his knowledge through the psychological study of the development of mental processes. Among the mentioned symptoms of *Acculturative Stress* there are hostility, confusion, anxiety, depression, or – for instance – identity confusion, which may be assessed by using emic methods. Hence, Acculturative Stress is based on the epistemological principle of humanities.

According to Berry's description of acculturation, the determinants of behaviour and well-being are inherent in the mind: *“those who involve themselves in both their heritage culture and that of the national society (by way of integration) have the most positive psychological well-being”* (Berry and Sabatier 2010, 191-192). Furthermore, the symptoms of *Acculturative Stress* would represent the negative side of acculturation that occurs when individuals from dissimilar societies interact over time. Therefore, the theoretical principle is Psychological Determinism.

And, finally – just like the previous scholars – Berry as well used the individual as the unit of analysis: individuals who – through their actions and initiated by their mind – experience *Acculturative Stress* and as a consequence exhibit altered mental health. Hence, the methodological principle is Individualism,

After having defined the epistemological, theoretical, and methodological principles of

Acculturative Stress, the outcome of the analysis reveals that also this model is psychologically determined.

3.2.5. Harris: Urban Ghettos

There are several anthropological and psychological concepts that consider a correlation between the socio-economic status and the health of migrants. Before analysing Marvin Harris' theory of *Urban Ghettos*, the next paragraphs briefly describe the models of *Segmented Assimilation*, *Social Causation*, and *Ethnic Density*, which all follow similar ideas.

Segmented Assimilation

According to transcultural nursing and health care, *Segmented Assimilation* defines individual or group alterations in acculturation that may be caused by particular networks or involvements of persons within the receiving society. Throughout this phase, a type of acculturation can arise, which is not linear or constant. Instead, it occurs in fragments, resulting in upward financial movement and improved health or – on the other side – downward movement and worse well-being. (Yeh, Viladrich, Bruning, and Roye 2009, 106).

In the case of upward assimilation, families would be able to provide economic resources, attention, and guidance for their children. Downward assimilation, on the other side, can influence the children of immigrated families if the family immigrated in an illegal way and holds an inferior socio-economic position in the new culture. (Douglas and Pacquiao 2010, 68s).

Although *Segmented Assimilation* highlights the significance of economic resources (which reminds of Infrastructural Determinism), the concept also claims that the determinants of the behaviour and well-being are the consequence of experiences the individual organism has undergone and is thus rather psychologically determined.

Social Causation

The *Social Causation* model declares that going through financial difficulties enhances the danger of diseases of the mind. As introduced in chapter 1.2. *Transcultural Psychiatry*, several epidemiological studies conducted in the second half of the 20th century considered the relationship between migration and the frequency of mental disorders. For instance, H. B. M. Murphy indicated that – on the one side – Asians and Africans migrating to Israel (whose sociocultural experiences were rather dissimilar to those of the hosting society) demonstrated an increased number of mental hospitalisations compared to the local Jewish people and – on the other side – European migrants (who had a similar social rank compared to locals) were not more often hospitalised in mental institutions compared to Israeli Jews. Nevertheless, Murphy (1977, abstract) argued against the relevance of the *Social Causation* hypothesis:

The mental health of a migrant group is determined by factors relating to the society of origin, factors relating to the migration itself, and factors operating in the society of resettlement; and all three sets need to be considered if one seeks to reduce or merely to understand the level of mental disorder in any immigrant group.

In contrast to Murphy, Krysia N. Mossakowski (2011) argues that *Social Causation* as well as Social Selection/Drift are essential in promoting awareness regarding the impact of class inequality on human beings. Selection/Drift implies that mental disease may hinder socio-economic success and push people to move into an inferior social status or to never earn a decent living. She argues that there is a two-sided connection between the socio-economic rank and the well-being of the mind, with more evidence supporting *Social Causation* than Social Selection. Long-term studies indicated that the intensity and course of the connection would differ depending on the type of mental disease and the socio-economic variable, according to Mossakowski.

Since the concept of *Social Causation* refers to the occurrence of mental illnesses, knowledge may be gained through the psychological examination of the progress of mental processes. Furthermore, it states that the behaviour and well-being are determined by experiences the organism has undergone. Hence, also *Social Causation* is rather psychologically determined.

Ethnic Density

Several studies on mental illness such as the report *People like us: ethnic group density effects on health* by Kate E. Pickett and Richard G. Wilkinson (2008, 321), suggest a group density effect on mental and physical health. In general, when there are certain material conditions, one who lives in a poorer neighbourhood may be linked to inferior health:

Members of ethnic minorities who live in areas where there are few like themselves are likely to be materially better off, and living in better neighbourhoods, than those who live in areas with a higher concentration. However, through the eyes of the majority community, they may be made more aware of belonging to a low status minority group, and the psychosocial effects of stigma may offset any advantage. If the psychological effects of stigma are sometimes powerful enough to override material advantage, this may have implications for our understanding of how low social status affects health more generally.

According to Pickett's and Wilkinson's description of *Ethnic Density*, psychological effects may override material, infrastructural resources. Hence, knowledge can be gained through the psychological study of the development of mental processes and the determinants of the behaviour and well-being are inherent in the mind. This theory as well is thus rather psychologically determined.

The struggle of African Americans in Urban Ghettos

In his publication *Why Nothing Works – The Anthropology of Daily Life*, Marvin Harris (1987, 122), among other topics, brought up the issue that the violence delinquency rate in the USA is very much higher compared to other developed capitalist states. He also specified that this rate has risen especially since the Second World War. The reason, according to him, “*lies in the fact that America has developed a unique permanent racial underclass consisting of millions of impoverished black and Hispanic people living in urban ghettos*”. Inner-city ghetto conditions would provide both the motive and opportunity for violent criminal behaviour and the growth of these *Urban Ghettos* would coincide with the rise in urban crime rates, especially among African Americans.

Harris described how African Americans moved from agriculture areas to cities in a before unseen number in pursuit of factory employment during and after World War II. *“What they found instead was an economy in rapid transition from goods production to service-and-information production”* (ibid., 124). In the 1980s, more than 50 percent of African Americans lived in big cities, and more than half of those – approximately seven and one-half million people – lived in the filthiest and most run-down inner-urban centres. And, according to Harris, as the benefits of criminal behaviour easily outweighed the risks of getting caught and being sent to jail many of these unemployed African Americans chose the career of a criminal. Several studies conducted during that time showed that crime rates tend to move up and down with unemployment rates: every one percent increase in the overall unemployment rate results in a six percent increase in the number of robberies and a four percent increase in the number of homicides.

The reason for the – at that time – chronic unemployment of African Americans, according to Harris (ibid., 136), lies in the fact that:

(...) the growth of the service economy coincided with the mass conversion of the reserve army of white housewives from baby production and service in the home to the production of services and information away from home. The fact that white women were preferred over black men in the only sector of the job market that has been expanding during the last forty years accounts, I think, for the uniquely grim prospects of the black and Hispanic underclass in the United States as compared with the experiences of European ethnics earlier in the century.

White women seeking employment in the service sector enjoyed a decisive competitive edge over African American males: far more of them had high school and college degrees. *“Between 1974 and 1977, while the proportion of new jobs acquired by white women in the private sector increased by 72 percent, the proportion acquired by black men decreased by 11 percent”* (ibid., 137).

Harris (ibid., 128) also brought attention to the fact that unemployment, crime rates, and *Urban Ghettos* also affected the health and life expectancy of African Americans:

Poor blacks for example are twenty-five times more likely than wealthy whites to be a victim of a robbery resulting in injury, and the ratio of black homicide

victims to white homicide victims is eight to one. In fact, homicide is the ranking killer of black males between fifteen and twenty-four years of age. More black males die from homicide than from motor vehicle accidents, diabetes, emphysema, or pneumonia. Two out of five black male children born in an American city will not reach age twenty-five.

Urban Ghettos is based on Infrastructural Determinism

Similar to *Ethnic Density*, the theory of *Urban Ghettos* as well suggests that ethnic minorities that live in a poorer neighbourhood may be linked to inferior health. Nevertheless, Marvin Harris' model is based on completely different principles.

In his account, knowledge is gained through etic methods including studies from the 1970s that show how crime rates tend to move up and down with unemployment rates and how far more white women were employed in the private sector than African American men. Furthermore, Harris generally used logico-empirical, both inductive and deductive, quantifiable public procedures as subject to replication by independent observers. Hence, Urban Ghettos is based on the epistemological principle of science.

Concerning the behaviour and well-being of human beings – according to Harris – the etic behavioural phenomena of production and reproduction determine in a probabilistic manner the etic behavioural domestic and political economy, which on the other side determines behavioural and mental emic superstructures. In the case of *Urban Ghettos*, the emic superstructures of blacks in urban ghettos are caused by their social and financial status (lack of employment, crime record). This situation in turn is caused by the change from industrial production to the industry of service and information as well as the massive revolution of female workers. Therefore, the theoretical principle is Infrastructural Determinism.

Harris' theory of *Urban Ghettos* explains socio-cultural aspects not based on the accumulated activities of individual persons. Instead, as an alternative, it recognises significant features that do not depend on the individual, also by considering the interrelations of the social system's components. Hence, the methodological principle is Holism.

After having defined the epistemological, theoretical, and methodological principles of *Urban Ghettos*, the outcome of the analysis reveals that this theory is infrastructurally determined.

3.2.6. Harris: Infrastructural Resilience

Before analysing another theory by Marvin Harris – namely the etic behavioural infrastructure that determines the survival and well-being of human beings (and thus also their so-called resilience) – the following paragraphs briefly introduce different approaches that also use the term resilience.

Psychological Resilience

To understand the consequences of migration on alterations in mental health, Wen-Shing Tseng (2001, 698-700) recommended examining various factors. Among them there are the types of experienced mental anxiety, the cognitive mechanisms to cope with it, the resources and aids that are used, and the effects of mental well-being on the basis of individual transition processes. The variables observed can comprehend the ethnic-cultural identity, mental balance, and other processes linked to acculturation.

Among these personal variables that would affect the process of adjustment to migration, Tseng mentioned: age, gender, educational level, occupational background, family system, household structure, language proficiency, and pre-migratory expectations.

Douglas and Pacquiao (2010, 615) described vulnerable populations as being those with an increased danger for the development of health issues. According to this concept, everybody may be susceptible at any time because of developmental, sociocultural, age, gender, and other characteristics. However, individuals can be members of a vulnerable society but still not be vulnerable because they identify as being more resilient.

Psychological Resilience is characterised as the capability to deal with a difficult situation or to quickly return to the state before the crisis (de Terte 2014, 353-355). This applies to individuals who acquire mental and behavioural skills that help them staying stable through incidents and carry on from the event without lasting negative effects. Since *Psychological Resilience* suggests that the mind is the prime mover and determinant of psychological and behavioural capabilities – and thus socio-cultural change – this model is rather psychologically determined.

Cultural Resilience

According to American psychologist Caroline S. Clauss-Ehlers (2015), *Cultural Resilience* takes into account whether the social background (e.g. beliefs, language, traditions, standards) enables people and communities to successfully deal with hardship. She implies that, thanks to the help of broader socio-cultural factors and individual attributes, one can cope with and beat adversity.

Clauss-Ehlers explains cultural-focused resilient adjustment as culture and socio-cultural factors influencing the resilient results. Furthermore, she describes broader environmental factors that support people conquer the challenges they are encountering. Additionally, adjustment to hardship may be a fluid and not a rigid mechanism that involves character traits, an individual's social background, beliefs, and socio-cultural factors.

Although Clauss-Ehlers acknowledges the effect of culture and sociocultural factors on the behaviour of human beings, she also highlights the agency of the individual in dealing with adversity based on character traits or values. Hence, the determinants of the behaviour and well-being are at least in part inherent in the mind and *Cultural Resilience* is thus rather psychologically determined.

Cost Benefit Analysis

The term resilience is not just common in the social sciences but also for instance in

economics or engineering. The instability of a social organism is best tackled by implementing a sort of resilience of the organism's capability to deal with troubling incidents. Especially those linked to the dangers of physiological, economic, and social dimensions, according to Satya-Lekh Proag and Virendra Proag (2014, abstract). After the resilience possibilities are defined to address a system's weakness, it would be relevant to evaluate the level of resilience that can be provided by the different alternatives. The different concepts may consequently be examined regarding a measurement of the grade of resilience, which can be attained through a variety of actions.

Cost Benefit Analysis is among the methods that are utilised by authorities to measure the benefits to society of state investments or policies. It is typically utilised to coordinate and identify costs and benefits and eventually to measure the market effectiveness. Questions may be raised, such as: "*is it better to be content with protection against 20-year floods or should an extra cost be considered to provide safety against centennial floods?*" (ibid., abstract). *Cost Benefit Analysis* can be utilised to identify the best alternative by proving that the benefits are worth more than the project cost and bring social benefits.

This brief account on resilience and *Cost Benefit Analysis* shall give the reader an additional input before analysing Harris' following account on the costs and benefits of human behaviour.

Infrastructural Resilience or the etic behavioural infrastructure

As introduced in chapter 3.1.1. *Defining Mental Well-being*, Marvin Harris (1994, 67-68) suggested that the elements of social life – that most effectively enable the fulfilment of desires, ambitions, dislikes, and behavioural trends (for instance vulnerability to mental and physical disease) – constitute the causal centre of sociocultural systems. In particular, according to Harris, it is the etic behavioural dimension of the synthesis of social, technical, financial, and ecological mechanisms (e.g. modes of reproduction and production) that is important. Therefore, he defined the causal centre as the etic behavioural infrastructure. Infrastructure creates the connection between nature on the one hand, in the context of unchangeable limitations to processes of physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology. And, on the other hand, culture, which is the main vehicle

of enhancing the health of human beings.

In addition, Harris emphasised that specific types of responses regarding behaviour or the mind are more specifically relevant to the well-being and safety of people than others. Also, he argued that it is possible to determine the effectiveness with which these responses lead to the accomplishment of the survival and health of individuals. Some of the factors that are utilised to calculate behavioural costs and benefits with optimising results there are: level of morbidity, sexual participation, financial costs and benefits, inputs or outputs of energy, and dietary inputs or outputs.

Although Harris did not use the term resilience, his account follows a similar idea. Again, he suggested that the etic behavioural infrastructure determines not just the physical, chemical, biological, and psychological constraints of human beings but also culture as the primary means of optimising health and well-being. As these constraints and cultural aspects vary, certain socio-cultural systems, segments, or component parts (individuals) may be less efficient in achieving survival and well-being than others and are thus infrastructurally less resilient.

Infrastructural Resilience is based on Infrastructural Determinism

As mentioned before, Marvin Harris gained knowledge through etic methods using logical and empirical, both inductive and deductive, measurable public investigations, which are replicable by autonomous observers. Hence, Infrastructural Resilience is based on the epistemological principle of science.

Concerning the behaviour and well-being of human beings – according to Harris (ibid., 69) – the primacy of infrastructure is established by the combination of the two following theoretical principles of Cultural Materialism:

(1) optimizations of the cost/benefits of satisfying biogram needs probabilistically (i.e. with more than chance significance) determine (or select for) changes in the etic behavioral infrastructure; (2) changes in the etic behavioral infrastructure probabilistically select for changes in the rest of the sociocultural system.

Therefore, the theoretical principle is Infrastructural Determinism.

And, finally, just like Harris' concept of *Urban Ghettos*, also *Infrastructural Resilience* describes socio-cultural phenomena not focusing on the behaviour of individual humans. Instead this concept rather identifies evolving factors that cannot be simplified to the individual. Hence, the methodological principle is Holism.

After having defined the epistemological, theoretical, and methodological principles of *Infrastructural Resilience*, the analysis reveals that this theory is infrastructurally determined.

3.2.7. Summary of the Analysis

The following illustration recapitulates the six analysed models each with its appropriate set of principles.

	Epistemological principle	Theoretical principle	Methodological principle
Post-traumatic Stress Disorder	Humanities	Psychological Determinism	Individualism
Cultural Adolescence	Humanities	Psychological Determinism	Individualism
Liminality	Humanities	Psychological Determinism	Individualism
Acculturative Stress	Humanities	Psychological Determinism	Individualism
Urban Ghettos	Science	Infrastructural Determinism	Holism
Infrastructural Resilience	Science	Infrastructural Determinism	Holism

Illustration 9 *The analysis*

In their book *Evolution and Culture*, Marshall D. Sahlins and Elman R. Service (1960, 23-24) explained cultural adaptation – which is a central issue in migration – as follows:

While spreading over the earth mankind have found environments of various characters, and in each case the social life fallen into, partly determined by the social life previously led, has been partly determined by the influences of the new environment; so that multiplying groups have tended ever to acquire differences, now major and now minor: there have arisen genera and species of societies. That culture is man's means of adaptation is a commonplace. Culture provides the technology for appropriating nature's energy and putting it to service, as well as the social and ideological means of implementing the process. Economically, politically, and in other ways, a culture also adjusts to the other cultures of its milieu, to the superorganic part of its environment.

Furthermore, cultures are organisations that are active, that perpetuate anthropoid life and themselves. Hence, the issues of human existence differ, cultures may undergo changes, and culture may witness adjusting development:

The raw materials of a culture's phylogenetic development are the available culture traits, both those within the culture itself and those that can be borrowed or appropriated from its superorganic environment. The orienting process of development is adaptation of these traits to the expropriation of nature's resources and to coping with outside cultural influence. In this orienting, adaptive process elements within a culture are synthesized to form new traits, an event we call 'invention,' and items made available from the outside are incorporated, a process we call 'diffusion,' or sometimes, 'acculturation.' (ibid., 24)

4. Macro-Sociology in Practice: Conclusion

In this concluding section, I emphasise several observations and explications obtained throughout the thesis and approach them with a more complex macro-perspective. In addition, I propose a further demarcation of the research object refugees as well as my own hypothesis trying to explain the well-being of (illegal) migrants. This account includes essential rules of macro-anthropological/-sociological inquiry and initiates a research guideline to other research desiderata.

4.1. The Infrastructural Resilience of Refugees

Amena and Yazdan, the two fictitious individuals described in chapter 3.2.1. *Defining Refugees*, are quite different, especially when looking at their socio-economic and educational background. Amena grew up with her middle-class family in urban Syria and attended university while Yazdan used to live in rather poor and insecure conditions in rural Afghanistan with hardly any education. In order to further develop the possible demarcation of refugees on the individual level, the following paragraphs provide an analysis of Amena's and Yazdan's efficiency in achieving survival and well-being – hence their *Infrastructural Resilience* or etic behavioural infrastructure, as Marvin Harris put it.

Infrastructural Resilience – the last of the six models analysed in chapter 3.2.6. – indicates that some kinds of behavioural and mental reactions are more fundamental to Homo sapiens' well-being and safety than other categories. According to this hypothesis, the effectiveness with which these reactions lead to the attainment of an individual's safety and well-being can be measured. There are factors to evaluate behavioural costs and benefits that have an improving impact. Among them, Marvin Harris suggested for instance: mortality levels, sexual participation, financial costs and benefits, and inputs and outputs regarding energy or nutrition.

The etic behavioural infrastructure determines the whole social system as well as its

component parts (individuals) and their physical, chemical, biological, and psychological constraints. These constraints and cultural aspects vary and therefore some individuals may be less efficient in achieving survival and well-being than others.

Amena

As described earlier on, the fictitious Syrian girl Amena belongs to the following classes: sex class of females, age class of 18-24 years, socio-economic class of middle class with some financial support by the state and also by her family, educational class of higher education, and occupational class of access to the job market being employed as an intern in an NGO. Her professional, financial, and especially her legal situation allows her to have complete access to health insurance most probably without any time restrictions in future – thus with good prospects of having a low morbidity and mortality rate. The same applies for monetary costs and benefits as well as nutritional and energetic inputs and outputs given her rather good professional and financial outlook. Amena's sexual access in the German city of Cologne can be described as quite unrestricted, at least in the eyes of a Western perspective.

As a result of this preliminary measurement of costs and benefits of behaviour that have optimising consequences, it seems that Amena is quite infrastructurally resilient. Nevertheless, despite this positive outlook on her well-being, it is important to consider the differences in Amena's previous and current social system. Although in both systems she belonged to the same socio-economic middle class living in an urban environment, major superstructural and structural differences still apply and could be subject to further research.

Yazdan

The fictitious Afghan boy Yazdan belongs to the following classes: sex class of males, age class of 18-24 years, socio-economic class of lower class with little welfare support by the state and no financial support by his family, educational class of primary education, and occupational class of asylum seeker without access to the job market. His

professional, financial, and especially his legal situation allows him to have only restricted access to public health insurance as the time he is legally spending in Austria might be limited – thus with unsure prospects of having a low morbidity and mortality rate. The same applies for monetary costs and benefits as well as nutritional and energetic inputs and outputs given his, for now, rather poor professional and financial outlook. Yazdan's sexual access in the Austrian city of Vienna can be described as quite unrestricted, at least in the eyes of a Western perspective.

Compared to Amena's situation, the preliminary measurement of Yazdan's costs and benefits of behaviour that have optimising consequences leads to a rather negative outcome. Nevertheless, also in this case it is important to consider the differences in Yazdan's previous and current social systems.

Besides the possible demarcation on the individual level, the research object of refugees can also be defined by comparing certain aspects of this group to other groups that Cultural Materialist literature has already dealt with, as the following paragraphs further examine.

4.2. Do Anti-natalist Societies Oppress (Illegal) Immigrants?

Linked to Marvin Harris' theories of Urban Ghettos and the liberation of women and homosexuals in the 1960s, further research could evaluate whether the transition from a pro-natalist to an anti-natalist society negatively affects the legal and socio-economic situation of refugees or other immigrants and as a result also their (mental) well-being. This final section of the thesis includes some thoughts and arguments that are to be regarded as an initial theoretical framework for this idea.

From pro-natalist to anti-natalist

The decades and centuries preceding the Second World War, especially during the Victorian era, were characterised by a pro-natalist position of Western societies and

states (e.g. the United Kingdom and the United States). This marital and procreative imperative has been spelled out in countless laws, repressive acts, and moral precepts directed not only against abortion, contraception, and infanticide, but against any form of non-procreative sex such as homosexuality, masturbation, pederasty, fellatio, and others. *“The ban on homosexual sex was so complete, and the odium attached to it so strong, that even a single homosexual performance was sufficient to brand a person for life as a pervert or degenerate”* (Harris 1987, 111). Consequently, after this person had been labelled of being in a homosexual state, he or she was considered a *“depraved type of person whom other people ought to shun”*.

During the 1950s and 1960, there was a transition from a goods-producing industry to a service-and-information-oriented economy in the Western world. This growth of the service economy coincided with the female transition from baby production and service in the home to office employment in the service and information industry. Eventually, with the end of the baby boom, non-marital and non-procreative sex became widely accepted, satisfying the childless working man or woman.

According to Harris (1987, 108), *“it seems likely that the temptation for people to engage in homosexual (as well as other nonprocreative) forms of sex will increase in direct proportion to the adverse balance of cost and benefits associated with the rearing of children.”* In other words: when there is pressure on people to lower the birth-rate, homosexuality gets more acceptance in society. Hence, gay liberation accompanied women's liberation *“because each movement represents a different facet of the collapse of the marital and procreative imperative and the male-dominated breadwinner family”* (Harris 1987, 112). Each was a consequence of the rapid build-up of a negative balance of cost and benefit in the pro-natalist breadwinner family.

Migration, population growth, and limited environment

Three main determinants of the population level have been identified: fertility rate, mortal rate, and migration. In the United States, fertility has weakened with industrialisation. One of the reasons for this declining fertility is the delay of marriage and reproduction. Couples rather wait to first become economically independent and women enrol in universities or start jobs.

Nevertheless, the United States have a higher fertility rate than other Western countries. The fact that minorities continue to show an increased level of reproduction is one of the main causes for the increased US average. Although only 31 percent of Americans are members of ethnic minorities, they were responsible for 42 percent of fertility in 2001. Legal and illegal migration has powered much of the U.S. population rise in the 20th century. (Elwell 2006, 60-62)

Based on this data and on Marvin Harris' primacy of infrastructure, professor of Sociology Frank W. Elwell (2006, 66) concluded that both increasing population and increasing production are linked to a limited environment:

There are limits to the amount of depletion and pollution that can be tolerated by the natural environment. While the emphasis on GDP expansion in the U.S. is gradually shifting away from manufactured goods and toward financial and service categories, the base of all economic activity is still (and must necessarily remain) resource extraction, agriculture, and the production of physical goods.

It hardly ever occurred that societies reached the demographic maximum determined by energy input and output laws, Harris (1971, 223) remarked: *"Before a population approaches the limits of the energy that can be extracted from a habitat under given technoenvironmental conditions, a number of self-regulating processes are activated that prevent further population growth."*

In reference to this quote, Robert Carneiro (2016, 232) agrees with Harris' theory of violent means that primitive societies use to restrict their populations numbers. Among the restrictions, there are internal methods such as abortion and infanticide and external methods such as warfare.

Increasing pressure on (illegal) immigrants

In his master's thesis *When Survival is at Stake, Set Ideology Aside – A Scientific Inquiry into Europe and the Refugee Crisis*, Bernhard Begemann (2016, 102-103) dealt with the issue of how and why a nation-state union like the European Union reacts facing of a so-called crisis of migration:

People coming as illegal migrants or refugees are per definition the odd one out, as they do not fit in the state-centric classifications and organisations of European – and other Western states’ – understanding of the world. (...) Regardless of the intention of the coming persons, they are emically considered alien and are often denied a legal identity. And by their uncontrollable way of entering e.g. the EU, they are considered a danger. This danger is key to the European understanding as it is emic terms justifies the necessity of protection of the own, good and superior system of values, whereof the nation-state is a crucial and coherent part.

Recently, the EU's outside borders have been strengthened, with the purpose to identify the threats of (illegal) migrant flows and, consequently, tackle them. Not accepting the freedom of movement across the EU's borders is considered as a top priority. This decision undeniably follows neoliberal competition guidelines. This occurs because these liberal nation-states ask for a clear distinction of who may participate in the welfare system, and who may not. (Begemann 2016, 98)

The public and societal increasing pressure on minorities such as (illegal) immigrants, especially those belonging to an inferior socio-economic class, is also visible when looking at Marvin Harris' theory of Urban Ghettos. The emic superstructures of blacks or other ethnic minorities in city ghettos are caused by specific socio-economic conditions (unemployment, crime rate). These conditions in turn are dictated by the shift from the production of goods to the processing of services and information and the widespread transformation of white housewives into workers.

Given the data on population and migration growth in Western states (e.g. United States and European Union) and given the increasing legal and societal pressure especially on illegal migrants or refugees, I propose the following hypothesis:

The strengthening of a state's anti-natalist position – based on the shift from goods production to service-and-information production – favours not just a decline in the birth rate, the (employment) liberation of women and more acceptance for non-procreative forms of sex such as homosexuality. It also favours societal and legal pressure on illegal immigrants in order to keep the population from exceeding a certain limit and as a result worsening the well-being of these

migrants. This kind of oppression may be compared to the pressure that was exercised on homosexuals during the state's former pro-natalist position.

4.3. Final remark

The purpose of this master's thesis is to specify which of the factors supposedly influencing or determining the mental well-being of refugees are based on the approach of Psychological Determinism and which are based on the opposing stance of Infrastructural Determinism. The analysis of the six selected models in chapter 3 provide the reader with an adequate scientific guideline to differentiate between these two approaches, based on the epistemological, theoretical, and methodological principles.

It is not in my interest to judge neither these analysed concepts nor their authors. Each of them follows certain principles and philosophical stances and enriches anthropological, psychological, and medical literature.

Based on the findings in chapter 3 and following Marvin Harris' research strategy, my hypothesis (raising the question whether anti-natalist societies oppress immigrants) shall encourage anthropologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists to consider Cultural Materialism, not just when dealing with the (mental) well-being of refugees but when dealing with any topic regarding culture or society.

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Abstract (English)

The mental well-being of migrants has been subject to many inquiries by psychologists, psychiatrists, and anthropologists. Besides giving an overview of the historical and philosophical background, my master's thesis provides an analysis of six selected concepts which try to explain why migrants such as refugees could suffer from a reduced mental well-being.

The first four analysed models – *Cultural Adolescence*, *Liminality*, *Acculturative Stress*, and *Post-traumatic Stress Disorder* – are all based on the philosophical stance of Psychological Determinism (the individual mind is the prime mover of human behaviour). This results from the examination of the underlying epistemological, theoretical, and methodological principles. To the contrary, the remaining two theories – *Infrastructural Resilience* and *Urban Ghettos* – proofed to be based on the stance of Infrastructural Determinism (the human mind is caused by culture reacting to external stimuli).

In the concluding part, *Infrastructural Resilience* and *Urban Ghettos* are subject to a further macro-anthropological inquiry. The former proposes that certain behavioural and mental responses are more efficient in contributing to the achievement of an individual's survival and well-being. The latter suggests that the emic superstructures of African Americans living in inner-city ghetto conditions are determined by their socio-economic situation which in turn is determined by the transition from goods production to service-and-information production and the increasing balance in job distribution between men and women.

Whether these transitions also affect the well-being of refugees is subject to the final question of my thesis: “*Do anti-natalist societies oppress (illegal) immigrants?*” Further research could evaluate whether the shift from goods production to service-and-information production favours not just sexual equality and a declining fertility rate but also societal and legal pressure on illegal immigrants in order to keep the population from exceeding a certain limit.

Abstract (German)

Das psychische Wohlbefinden von Migranten wurde von der Psychologie, von der Psychiatrie und von der Anthropologie mehrfach untersucht. Neben einem Überblick über den historischen und philosophischen Hintergrund ist das Kernstück meiner Masterarbeit eine Analyse von sechs ausgewählten Modellen. Diese versuchen, das – wie angenommen – reduzierte psychische Wohlbefinden von Migranten oder Flüchtlingen zu erklären.

Die ersten vier analysierten Konzepte – *Kulturelle Adoleszenz*, *Liminalität*, *Akkulturationsstress* und die *Posttraumatische Belastungsstörung* – basieren auf der philosophischen Haltung des psychologischen Determinismus (die individuelle Psyche ist der Hauptantrieb des menschlichen Verhaltens). Das zeigt die Untersuchung der ihnen zugrundeliegenden epistemologischen, theoretischen und methodischen Prinzipien.

Die beiden anderen Theorien – *Infrastrukturelle Resilienz* und *Urbane Ghettos* – stützen sich hingegen auf den Infrastrukturellen Determinismus (die menschliche Psyche wird von der Kultur determiniert, die wiederum auf äußere Reize reagiert).

Im abschließenden Teil dieser Arbeit werden *Infrastrukturelle Resilienz* und *Urbane Ghettos* einer weiteren makroanthropologischen Untersuchung unterzogen. Die erstgenannte Theorie besagt, dass gewisse verhaltenstechnische und psychische Reaktionen effizienter sind, um das Überleben und Wohlbefinden eines Individuums zu sichern. Die zweitgenannte – *Urbane Ghettos* – beleuchtet, wie die emische Superstructure von Afroamerikanern aus innerstädtischen Ghettos durch ihre sozioökonomische Situation bestimmt wird. Diese Situation wird wiederum sowohl vom Wechsel von der Warenproduktion zur Dienstleistungs- und Informationsproduktion als auch vom zunehmenden Gleichgewicht in der Arbeitsverteilung zwischen Männern und Frauen determiniert.

Ob diese gesellschaftlichen Veränderungen auch das Wohlbefinden von Flüchtlingen beeinflussen, ist Gegenstand der letzten Fragestellung meiner Arbeit: „*Unterdrücken anti-natalistische Gesellschaften (illegale) Einwanderer?*“ Weitere Untersuchungen

könnten herausfinden, ob die Verlagerung von der Warenproduktion zur Dienstleistungs- und Informationsproduktion nicht nur die Geschlechtergleichstellung und einen Rückgang der Geburtenrate begünstigt, sondern auch den gesellschaftlichen und rechtlichen Druck auf illegale Einwanderer verstärkt, um zu verhindern, dass das Bevölkerungswachstum eine bestimmte Grenze überschreitet.