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Reading Regimes: Mapping the landscape
characteristics of asylum seeker arrivals in Nicosia.

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Master of Science (MSc)

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Abstract

Much has been made of the various regimes which govern aspects of national and international affairs, states, and their subjects whether these be security, political, economic or a host of international regimes (Jervis, 1982) (Levy et al., 1995) (Alvarez et al., 1996). Betts et al. (2010) remarked that the fusing and difficulty in delineating between the refugee regime and its tangents meant that it was no longer identifiable as standalone edifice and instead operated as the unifying thread in a rich tapestry of intersecting and co-dependent regimes - the '*refugee regime complex*'. Kusiak (2018) called for learning from hegemonic systems and not simply about them. This paper hopes to provide a framework capable of answering this call. This framework will be applied to the regime complex which governs the influx of asylum seekers arriving in Nicosia since the EU-Turkey deal sparked a huge increase in arrivals. By tracing important institutional developments at multiple scales, Cypriot and European, using a discursive institutionalist approach (Schmidt, 2008), and a research agenda regarding the study of idea entrepreneurs (Petridou & Mintron, 2020), we hope to identify *landscape characteristics*, that is - the socio-spatial manifestations procured by the regime complex in practice. Relying on existing academic knowledge to direct this process, the thesis uses its own results to propose some tentative solutions seeking to reorient negative discourses and highlight institutional barriers facing asylum seekers in Nicosia.

Keywords: Nicosia, asylum seekers, landscape characteristics, regimes, institutionalism

Abstrakt

Es ist viel über die verschiedenen Regime gesprochen worden, die Aspekte nationaler und internationaler Angelegenheiten, Staaten und ihre Subjekte regeln, ob es sich nun um Sicherheit, Politik, Wirtschaft oder eine Vielzahl internationaler Regime handelt (Jervis, 1982) (Levy et al., 1995) (Alvarez et al., 1996). Betts et al. (2010) merkten an, dass die Verschmelzung und die Schwierigkeit der Abgrenzung zwischen dem Flüchtlingsregime und seinen Tangenten bedeutet, dass es nicht mehr als eigenständiges Gebäude identifizierbar ist und stattdessen als verbindender Faden in einem reichhaltigen Geflecht von sich überschneidenden und voneinander abhängigen Regimen fungiert - dem "Flüchtlingsregimekomplex". Die Funktionsweise dieser Regimekomplexe ist in hohem Maße fallspezifisch, doch neigt die Forschung dazu, diese Besonderheit zu beschönigen und sich stattdessen auf eher theoretische Bewertungen oder Kombinationen begrenzter Schnittpunkte zu konzentrieren. Hasenclever et al. (1997) stellten die Frage: "Ist es möglich, nicht-idiosynkratische Erklärungen für die Eigenschaften bestimmter institutioneller Arrangements zu finden?" (S. 1). Die Behauptung, die in dieser Arbeit aufgestellt wird, ist, dass das Übersehen der Idiosynkrasien das Wichtige übersieht - nämlich ein Mittel bereitzustellen, um über Erklärungen hinauszugehen und auf institutionelle Arrangements einzuwirken. Kusiak (2018) fordert, von hegemonialen Systemen zu lernen und nicht nur über sie. Dieses Papier möchte einen Rahmen bieten, der dieser Forderung gerecht wird. Dieser Rahmen wird auf den Regimekomplex angewandt, der den Zustrom von Asylbewerbern regelt, die in Nikosia ankommen, seit der EU-Türkei-Deal einen enormen Anstieg der Ankünfte ausgelöst hat. Durch die Verfolgung wichtiger institutioneller Entwicklungen auf mehreren Ebenen, auf zypriotischer und europäischer Ebene, unter Verwendung eines diskursiv-institutionalistischen Ansatzes (Schmidt, 2008) und einer Forschungsagenda zur Untersuchung von Ideenunternehmern (Petridou & Mintron, 2020), hoffen wir, Landschaftsmerkmale zu identifizieren, d. h. die sozialräumlichen Erscheinungsformen, die der Regimekomplex in der Praxis hervorbringt. Die Arbeit stützt sich auf bestehendes akademisches Wissen, um diesen Prozess zu lenken, und nutzt ihre eigenen Ergebnisse, um einige vorläufige Lösungen vorzuschlagen, die darauf abzielen, negative Diskurse neu auszurichten und institutionelle Hindernisse aufzuzeigen, mit denen Asylbewerber in Nikosia konfrontiert sind.

Schlüsselwörter: Nikosia, Asylbewerber, Landschaftsmerkmale, Regime, Institutionalismus

Brian O'Shea

Reading
Regimes

Mapping the landscape characteristics of asylum seeker arrivals in Nicosia

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I Introduction

Much has been made of the various regimes which govern aspects of national and international affairs, states, and their subjects whether these be security, political, economic or a host of international regimes (Jervis, 1982) (Levy et al., 1995) (Alvarez et al., 1996). Betts et al. (2010) remarked that the fusing and difficulty in delineating between the refugee regime and its tangents meant that it was no longer identifiable as standalone edifice and instead operated as the unifying thread in a rich tapestry of intersecting and co-dependent regimes - the *refugee regime complex*. The operation of these regime complexes is highly case specific, yet the research tends to gloss over this specificity in lieu of more theoretical appraisals or concentrating on combinations of limited points of the intersection. Hasenclever et al. (1997) posed the question "Is it possible to come up with non-idiosyncratic explanations for the properties of particular institutional arrangements...?''(p. 1). The contention made in this work is that to overlook the idiosyncrasies overlooks that which is important - to provide a means to move beyond explanations and towards affecting institutional arrangements. Kusiak (2018) called for learning from hegemonic systems and not simply about them. This paper hopes to provide a framework capable of answering this call. This framework will be applied to the regime complex which governs the influx of asylum seekers arriving in Nicosia since the EU-Turkey deal sparked a huge increase in arrivals. By tracing important institutional developments at multiple scales, Cypriot and European, using a discursive institutionalist approach (Schmidt, 2008), and a research agenda regarding the study of idea entrepreneurs (Petridou & Mintron, 2020), we hope to identify *landscape characteristics*, that is - the socio-spatial manifestations procured by the

regime complex in practice. Relying on existing academic knowledge to direct this process, the thesis uses its own results to propose some tentative solutions seeking to reorient negative discourses and highlight institutional barriers facing asylum seekers in Nicosia.

1. Case and Context: Nicosia and Asylum Seekers.

Nicosia is the Capital of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). It was divided in 1974 along the *green line*, a line which marks where the Turkish army's advance stopped after the Turkish invasion. Old City walls mark the inner city, where a huge number of abandoned buildings occupy the demilitarised buffer zone which is under the auspices of the United Nations.

Until 2004 it was not possible to cross from the RoC into TRNC. Crossing opened in Nicosia the same year as the Annan Plan vote on reunification, which was accepted by a 65% TRNC majority but rejected by 75% of Greek Cypriots. Cyprus joined the EU in 2004 as an entire island but the EU acquis is suspended in the North as the EU does not recognise the TRNC, a *de facto* statelet recognised only by Turkey since 1983. The TRNC is commonly referred to as the Northern part, Northern side, or occupied territories. The government is referred to as the Turkish Cypriot administration by many.

Applications for asylum in the Republic of Cyprus have spiked since 2016. Since 2018, Cyprus has had the highest number of asylum applicants per capita in the European Union. It has been suggested that this is the result of the EU-Turkey Deal of 2016. Cyprus has been used to circumvent the shutting of the Aegean route by smugglers. There is no means to apply for recognised refugee status through the Turkish Cypriot administration. There is an extremely small number of refugees living in the TRNC under the protection of UNHCR programs which stood at 80 persons in February 2021 (UNHCR, 2021).

Cyprus: Asylum Statistics 2002 - 2021

Year	New Applications	Appeals	Repeated applications	Decisions						Pending applications year-to-date
				Refugee status	Subsidiary protection status	Total protection	% Refugee status	% Subsidiary & humanitarian protection	Rejected	
2002	952	-		0	0	-	0.0%	0.0%	143	845
2003	4,407	22		0	10	10	0.0%	3.5%	274	4,884
2004	9,872	938		30	56	86	1.0%	1.8%	2,958	11,098
2005	7,746	2,436		43	136	179	0.9%	3.0%	4,369	13,554
2006	4,545	2,615		44	171	215	1.1%	4.4%	3,631	12,261
2007	6,789	2,092		37	233	270	0.8%	5.2%	4,243	11,997
2008	3,922	2,992		75	188	263	1.1%	2.8%	6,440	9,096
2009	3,199	3,714		71	1,351	1,422	1.1%	20.0%	5,334	4,849
2010	2,882	3,254		45	461	506	0.9%	8.7%	4,781	4,105
2011	1,770	2,370		62	48	110	1.1%	0.8%	5,572	2,541
2012	1,620	1,088		85	43	128	3.0%	1.5%	2,662	2,344
2013	1,346	1,245	350	42	210	252	3.0%	15.1%	1,140	2,512
2014	1,628	335	440	64	1152	1,216	3.7%	66.6%	515	2,691
2015	2,108	388	269	249	1638	1,887	9.3%	61.4%	781	1,983
2016	2,871	697	211	227	1190	1,417	10.1%	52.7%	841	3,088
2017	4,459	1,047	280	253	1063	1,316	8.9%	37.5%	1,522	5,263
2018	7,713	1,010	290	193	1021	1,214	6.6%	35.1%	1,693	10,307
2019	12,724	796	535	163	1220	1,383	3.9%	29.2%	2,800	18,827
2020	7,176	-	57	172	1512	1,684	4.2%	36.6%	2,450	19,653
2021	5,554	-	88	102	1036	1,138	1.6%	15.8%	5,419	17,347 A/S
	-	4,881	-	8	0	8	1.3%	0.0%	599	4,183 IPAC
Total	93,283	27,039	2,520	1,957	12,739	14,696	2.7%	17.6%	57,568	

As at end June 2021, some 17,347 individual persons' applications are pending at the Asylum Service (A/S), and 4,183 appeal cases* are pending at the International Protection Administrative Court (IPAC). Pending appeals of 2021 include appeals submitted to the IPAC in 2020.

Positive decisions as of 2021 are those of the A/S and of the IPAC. Positive decisions through to end 2020 are a combination of A/S and Reviewing Authority decisions. All numbers are up to the end of June 2021. All numbers indicated in the above table refer to persons, except for IPAC figures that refer to cases. *Cases can represent individuals or family units.

Table 1 Asylum Statistics RoC – Source: UNHCR (2021)

One of the interviewees suggested that 95% of asylum seekers arriving to Cyprus do not know they are in Cyprus upon arrival. The explanation offered for this is that smugglers tell them they are arriving in Europe and the expectation is that they will be in Italy, Greece etc. Cyprus lies outside of the Schengen free travel area, asylum seekers who arrive on the island are effectively stuck. The island can be accessed by boat or by air. Ercan airport in Northern Nicosia can be accessed from Turkey and many asylum seekers enter through here initially. Many asylum seekers travel to the North and South of the island by boat from the city of Mersin and Lebanon. A majority of those arriving at the Northern part of the island will enter the south to apply for asylum.

Entering the south is done by crossing the green line. It has typically been easy to cross. More recently a fence has been erected along a lengthy stretch in Nicosia administrative region from Astromeritis in the very west of Nicosia region towards the old, abandoned airport. Although it is very difficult to establish exact numbers, it is

estimated that 50% of asylum applicants in the RoC enter from the Northern side of the island. The RoC government has suggested it is as high as 75% (Government of the Republic of Cyprus, 2020).

There has been marked change in the breakdown of countries of origin of asylum applicants across the years examined. Asylum system has been so slow that for many years, applicants from states Cyprus considers *safe* were applying too. The expedited process was not in operation until 2020 to decide on these applications quickly. Even then the number of pending decisions has grown year on year.

Asylum Procedure Flowchart Republic of Cyprus

Fig 1. Flowchart - Source: Cyprus Refugee Council 2021 Annual Report

The flow chart above indicates the various competencies during the asylum procedure in the Republic of Cyprus. Every asylum seeker will present themselves to the

Aliens and Immigration Unit at any Police station and submit an intention to claim asylum. This can be done by walking into a police station, from an existing state of police detention or at immigration upon arrival to an official port of entry (entering from the occupied territory is considered an unofficial port of entry) (Cyprus Refugee Council, 2021).

Pournara camp in Kokkinotrimithia is the Republic of Cyprus' official First Reception centre. Every asylum seeker will theoretically spend three days in this centre. The asylum service, an agency of the Ministry of the Interior, operates the camp. Buses run from Solomos Square bus station meaning most asylum seekers will pass through Nicosia on the way. The name Pournara has become synonymous with the hardship faced by asylum seekers. Consistent reports of awful conditions in the camp and complaints by NGOs have marked it out as a troubled spot. Since the outbreak of Covid 19, many asylum seekers have been involuntarily detained in the camp for months on end. During this time, capacity swelled far beyond the 1000 persons intended to reside there (Cyprus Refugee Council, 2021).

Urban dwelling asylum seekers face problems with labour market access, access to entitlements and discrimination in the housing market and homelessness. There are many sub-standard and overcrowded accommodations leased to large groups of asylum seekers, most often in the old walled part of Nicosia. Children face significant hurdles in accessing education due to language barriers (Cyprus Refugee Council, 2021). The list of problems faced by asylum seekers in Nicosia was succinctly put by a member of Caritas:

> Due to the exponential growth of new arrivals, the infrastructure was not really in place in order to kind of support camp life, if you want me to put it that way. So, people kind of get filtered through Pournara, which is unique and brings a different and unique set of challenges, I would say, because now they have to navigate the healthcare system along with all the other Cypriots. They have to navigate the welfare system, the Labour Office, everything. Which is different to what other countries experience (Interview, 2020).

Northern Nicosia has for many years had a rampant reputation as a hub for sex trafficking (US Department of State, 2018). Many of these same networks have been used for the trafficking of asylum seekers using student visas, some of whom have also ended up in the sex trade.

This preliminary introduction which sets out briefly some of the procedural process and facts of the context is aimed at providing a skeletal view of the asylum situation in Nicosia. While the influx of migrants initially was catalysed by the peculiar (dis)functioning of the EU-Turkey deal, the diversification of the asylum seeker phenomenon creates a situation where many aspects could be problematised as a basis for research.

2. Research notes and personal reflections on changing direction of research.

The initial research approach was shaped by discovering a research gap I hoped to claim as my own niche, that being the exceptional position of Cyprus after the EU-Turkey Deal. Beginning my interviews and speaking to members of European Parliament I explored this line of reasoning which is still evident in the early transcripts. My attempts to focus on the functioning of the EU-Turkey Deal as shaping the reality in Nicosia as a point of EU migration policy was rebuked in ontological terms as its focus was firmly seated in the field of international affairs to the point I failed to see how I would adequately relink it back to urban studies. As I learned more and eventually arrived for fieldwork in December 2020 the reality I faced meant I could still address the niche I'd discovered but as a lesser focal point than the socio-political milieu that faced asylum seekers in Nicosia. The eureka moment in the research came after I was following the green line from Paphos gate towards Nicosia central jail, a route which hugs the green line. Shortly before I had interviewed with Caritas, a charity working with asylum seekers in the city. With their migrant centre sharing the same building as the Vatican embassy I was told that a usual piece of advice given to asylum seekers who had just crossed the green line was to *walk until you see the church*. Searching for evidence of where asylum seekers may have crossed, I discovered a pair of shorts tangled in a fence just above the

river Pedieous' valley, which cuts directly North/South across the green line. Through these shorts I began to see a story unfold. Though I do not know who owned them, these shorts were a glimmer of how the complexity of regimes give rise to real life, socio-spatial manifestation. We can map out these glimmers as they appear, creating a socio-material hologram of the impact the new arrivals have had.

The arrival of asylum seekers to Nicosia is not the interesting part of the tale. The real story has been written as minutiae; tiny fragments pockmarked across the city. The teller of the story matters too. A far less sympathetic reading of those shorts might have come from the government of the RoC, For the soldier stationed at a watch post 30 metres from where I found them. Who owned these shorts? To say whether it was an *asylum seeker* or an *illegal migrant*, in Nicosia, depends on the teller. To say it was an act of desperation from a person running for their life or part of efforts by Turkey to change the demographics of the Greek Cypriot community depends on your political identity and the fears you grew up with. The existence of these fragments is highly contingent on the wider subtext, the principles which govern how asylum seekers move, the institutions which tell Cypriots

Figure 2. Shorts caught on fence in West Nicosia - Source: Brian O'Shea (2020)

that the country has no space and the regimes which seek to exclude them. For a century, similar ideas have been suggested in hushed voices in smoke filled rooms and in the brightly lit and stately environs of government buildings in Nicosia, Athens, Ankara,

Geneva, and Brussels. Wars were fought, walls were erected, arguments started and never ended. Homes abandoned and occupied by strangers who might have been neighbours a few years earlier. The many peoples of Cyprus have their own painful histories, both old and contemporary and this social conditioning has been written into the fabric of the city too, creating a palimpsest of stories, myths and narratives etched into Nicosia's walls. This is the reality asylum seekers face in Nicosia, a small city straddling two small states on a small island in the middle of the Mediterranean. The story of Nicosia's asylum seekers, trying to find a solution in the divided capital of an island defined by its *Cyprus problem*, is one this thesis will try to do justice to.

3. Problem Statement & Hypothesis

Despite its proximity to Syria, Cyprus was largely unaffected by the European migrant *crisis* [emphasis added] in 2015 and 2016 (Trimikliniotis, 2020). However, whilst the EU-Turkey Deal of 2016 was a *success* in reducing the number of journeys across the Aegean Sea into Greece, the impact of the mechanism they used to achieve this had an unintended consequence. Cyprus has become a viable alternative route into Europe. Asylum seekers arriving in Cyprus face a fractured reality. Those arriving at the Northern side, administered as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus quickly realise there is no means to claim refugee protection in the *de facto* statelet. They overwhelmingly choose to cross over the green line to claim asylum, a UN controlled buffer zone which has been present since the Turkish Invasion of 1974.

Nicosia lies at the very heart of a new theatre for asylum seekers in the European Union, who now make up over 4% of the population of the Republic of Cyprus (Eurostat, 2021). A sea of changes have arisen in Nicosia because of this new migratory flow. The resulting socio-spatial impact is incredibly important to be understood. If established, socio-spatial understandings bridge gaps between seemingly unrelated strands of influence, not simply to understand them in a freestanding sense, but to achieve better outcomes for both asylum seekers and the communities of Cyprus.

A collision of ideas has served to create a situation with a unique complexion. The question of what happens when geopolitics converges as it has, to centre Nicosia in globally significant migration events, needs to address the unique character of Nicosia. Examining the ideas and influences which define the institutions co-governing the island may enable us to tackle the hegemony. As a result, the following research questions will be answered.

4. Research Question

Which ideas and actors impact the institutional co-production of the refugee regime complex in Nicosia?

How can these institutional ideas and the form of the regime complex be used to help explain the socio-spatial dimensions of asylum seeker arrivals in Nicosia over the period 2014-2021?

II Literature Review

The purpose of this section is to offer an overview of the research concerning the socio-spatial aspects of migration in Nicosia. The review must be viewed in strands. The strands focussing on the role of discourse, political agents and institutions are not always, though are generally regarding the Cypriot context. These will be examined to aid our construction of a regime concept before looking at the use of maps as a means of explaining the urban micro geographies in Nicosia i.e., help us to read the character of the intersecting regimes. This was done to gauge where this thesis stands in relation to the current literature.

Trimikliniotis (2015) noted that irregular migration is the subject of fierce public debate in Cyprus. He notes the imposition of an authoritarian migration regime has been falsely framed as a *consensus*. Instead, there is a three-axis political spectrum where migration has historically been framed along a social axis paradigm. There is a case

made that it was not political elites within existing traditional political architectures which made the strong move towards *anti-immigrant/racist* rhetoric but instead could have been the work of unnamed *entrepreneurs* whose interests this served. Political parties potentially capitalise on this sentiment to gain votes once this trend emerged (often through exposure to political discourse in Greece and to a lesser extent the UK) and gained popularity. However, he notes that it is not simply political opportunism that created racism in Cypriot society and says it is entrenched in something deeper, often reproduced by institutional logics.

A recent study comparing the use of online hate speech in Greece and in the Greek Cyprus community found that irony was employed to disparage migrants with a view to justifying their poor treatment. Greek comments were more overtly racist than the Greek-Cypriot ones (Baider & Constantinou, 2020). Another item of interest from this study in this were the negative connotations in relation to the word *refugee*. Given the time of the study period was between 2015-16, this may offer some indication that the old meaning of refugee which held a strong identarian status in RoC derived from their experience in 1974, was changing. This old meaning may have been supplanted due to the nature of the *crisis* at this time and the high levels of coverage the Greek situation received in Cyprus, which Cyprus itself largely escaped in that period.

The interpretation of the word *refugee* was examined by Zetter (1991) in his consideration of the question *who was a refugee?* in the RoC. Though his examination considers the question insofar as an institutionalised post-partition housing programme in the Republic was concerned. The development of social labelling and refugee identities under this programme has also been examined specifically in Nicosia (Tselika, 2019). These displaced housing estates, the *sinikismo*s, are spaces associated with the notion of the *internal refugee*. Even though the State refers to those who left their homes in the north as displaced persons, in line with international humanitarian policy terminology, Cypriots colloquially refer to them as refugees. "These 'displaced persons' estates are ethnically charged spaces, as they have been often utilised by politicians as a reminder of war and a re-affirmation of ethno-national identity and collective remembrance (Tselika, 2019, p. 247).

The representations of these housing estates vary widely between those who live there and the politicians who make such claims. The nature of such a contested symbol as a social representation is discussed in the Cyprus context by Psaltis et al (2014). These representations usually bespeak an official historical narrative which seeks to shape the past, present, and future members of conflicting societies towards hegemonic understanding of these symbols (Psaltis et al, 2014, p. 62). Though the dogmatic intention of this ethno-nationalist narrative is clear from a political and institutional point of view, the reception of wider society in reifying and accepting the perpetuation of these narratives is less immediately clear and has been extensively linked to education in both communities (Karagiorgis, 1986, Trimikliniotis, 2004).

Education curricula in the respective communities had historically been sourced from the respective motherlands and thus propagated the *Hellenocentric* or *Turkocentric* understanding of the island's history and each communities' relation to the island (Kızılyürek, 1999a, p. 388). The deeply politicised historicism of these narratives is characterised by chronic self-victimisation complexes manifest in both, which offers a partial explanation as to the palatability of these narratives. The contested nature of the formulation of narratives from both above (the state) and below (the people) helps further interrogate this idea.

The case of Greek Cypriots has been studied with focus on the blending of national, local, and personal political histories (Papadakis, 1998). He offers the below explanation for how the grander narratives at the national level are subsumed into a broader social understanding by merging them with a local experience, both cultural and personal artefacts which enables the diffusion of a hybrid formulation of narratives dictated at the institutional level but rendered into a form more digestible to social actors below.

I am suggesting here that the parties' narratives gain appeal because they are built on elements of personal and local history that emerge from their supporters' accounts of their experiences and memories. At the same time, accounts of local and personal history acquire form and structure from the more general historical

paradigms proposed by the political parties with which their supporters come into daily contact—primarily through the newspapers controlled by such parties (Papadakis, 1998. p. 161)

Li Destri Nicosia (2019) published work focussed on *rhetorics of recognition* namely discourses, narratives and slogans in the Italian town of Riace, where a migrant integration program existed for many years. Interestingly, the Mayor of Riace in this case acted as a standard bearer for a narrative suggesting the reinvigoration of the town's historical and territorial identity was because of the repopulation of the town through the program. This was successfully filtered throughout the townsfolk, who embraced the narrative and accepted the success of the program. In interviews, townsfolk attributed the success to the Mayor's messaging.

Other work has considered the advent of racism in relation to *new migration* in Cyprus (Trimikliniotis, 1999). The work consists of a media analysis of 189 articles in Cypriot media where multiple communication strategies were implemented which reflect poorly on migrants. Alluding to specific representations in the media, the work discusses problems such as *numbers games* where migrants are consistently posed as a problem that must be controlled. The loci for this include de-Hellenising Cyprus and changing the demographics of the citizenry in a country where the Cyprus problem is the pre-eminent voter issue. There are also many instances of migrants being compared with diseases. The narratives broadly fit under threats to wealth, health, and identity which a recent report outlined as recurring patterns of negative media representations of migrants in Europe (Butcher & Neidhardt, 2020). Some of these views were espoused by prominent public figures such as the former Minister of Interior. The work shows the importance of a variety of institutions in disseminating racist views and racializing society. This discourse does not relate intrinsically to the attempts to resolve the Cyprus problem, but the existence of the problem creates the conditions of *national emergency* that make it conducive to chauvinistic nationalism and racism. The paper also refers to the fact similar conclusions have been drawn from analysis of the debate in the TRNC albeit under vastly different conditions (Kızılyürek & Ali, 1989).

A comparative analysis (Alecous & Mavrou, 2017) of attitudes towards Jewish refugees to Cyprus in the 1940's and attitudes today towards refugees and asylum seekers has also raised interesting conclusions about these discourses in Cyprus. The conclusion being that negative attitudes towards refugees and asylum seekers today bear many hallmarks of the same discrimination that faced Jews in Cyprus in the 1940's. Much of this was driven by a media obsession with framing foreigners as *enemies* amidst an already ethnically tense domestic situation.

More recent work has attempted to place the views of asylum seekers towards the front end of analysis. The prior conceptualisation made by Fischer (2020) is that in the RoC, the racializing of discourse surrounding migrants operates as a hegemonic response to the agency applied by the asylum seekers. The asylum seekers in this manner have shown through their enactment of citizenship that they can subvert the restrictive border regime and by their presence, help renegotiate a similarly restrictive citizenship regime.

Eross and Tatrai (2016) found that a comparison of maps from the RoC and the TRNC revealed patterns of pre-selection, pre-arrangement and often hand-picked information based on political alignments. The assertion being that this data constitutes a second layer of meaning to maps and endorses the view of Harley that maps are socially constructed texts, prepared in a certain context, in a given historic moment and serving specific needs and interests (1988, p. 71). Their analysis examined easily accessible maps to show how parallel existing narratives can live next to each other. They also contend that maps, as objects which assert sovereignty, are used as tools to assert territorial claims as suggested by Neocleous (2003, p. 419).

How these socially constructed texts are used by experts in the European policy fields of *migration management* is discussed by Cobarrubias (2019). Focussing on the *i-Map*, the paper discusses the framings of illegality in European border crossing. The argument raised is that the construction of *illegality* [emphasis in original] pre-empts any actual border crossing but creates an illegal migrant as soon as a border is crossed in these spheres. The cartopolitics of this alludes to the limits of cartographic expertise as

well as how an intergovernmental organisation gained such prominence in forging the external border policies of the European Union.

Trimikliniotis et al (2016) attempted to map precarity of subaltern migrants in Athens, Istanbul, and Nicosia. What was found was that the production of precarious space had some important characteristics. Most notably being that "the antagonisms of class, gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, values, desires that shape the urban space are manifested in various, dynamic and most importantly ephemeral ways" (p. 1044). The reason the *ephemeral* arose as such an important marker of precarity is because so much that exists in subaltern spheres is fleeting in nature. There in one moment and gone the next. The prior concept of *mobile commons* (Trimikliniotis et al, 2015) is invoked to "locate the trail, the marks or scratches punctuated on the global canvas of precarity of people constantly on the move" (p. 1037).

Much work has examined the role of the EU-Turkey Deal in pursuing an externalised agenda within the European Asylum regime as well as the legality of this policy (Poon, 2016). Other work has considered the fate of those who are returned to Turkey from Greece under the terms of the deal (Tunaboylu & Alpes, 2017). Of particular interest is more recent work (Smeets and Beach, 2020) which attempted to describe the engine room dynamics which led to the creation of the constituent parts of the EU-Turkey Deal: the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan and the EU-Turkey statement of March 2016. The idea of this work came in light of the new *strategic* intergovernmental collaboration through which the deal transpired, an informal institutional governance approach which may be becoming the new modus operandi for major EU reforms, in lieu of more formal channels which have historically been used.

As a second point on the relevant literature concerning the deal, there is work that has aimed to track the outcomes of the EU-Turkey Deal on the border regime in Turkey (Heck & Hess, 2016). Arribas (2019) contends that on foot of the implications of the EU-Turkey Deal, there will be attempts to find alternative means of entering the EU. There is very little academic work that draws a direct line from the EU-Turkey Deal to the subsequent increase in arrivals into Cyprus.

The literature reviewed informs as to the peculiar state of work that has been done on the subject thus far. Some very enlightening work is contained within and yet many omissions remain. What we have learned is that there is;

- A significant amount of literature which covers the role of institutions and agents in the development of regimes which operate to shape migration and asylum.
- A large body of work which discusses the historical development of certain social predilections in Cyprus which greatly shape their media discourse.
- A very informative body of literature containing some instructions as to how the situation in Nicosia might be adequately mapped.
- A dearth of academic literature which attempts to unwind the strands which have placed asylum seekers in the position they find themselves in Nicosia today.
- A lack of recognition in the literature at how exceptional the Cypriot situation is.

Despite references to *entrepreneurs* and media contributions towards shaping the discourse, interrogations of the origins of the ideas and their dissemination need a better analytical toolkit.

How asylum seekers in Nicosia arrived there remains without a comprehensive study. How the regime directs the shape of their arrival also remains unexplored. Nicosia is experiencing a phenomenon with historically rooted contributing factors. An examination of all of this is beyond the scope of this paper. But what can be seen in Nicosia in terms of the socio-material impact is a solution towards untangling some deep complexity. The social and the spatial need a means to properly represent them in a dualistic fashion. Lin et al (2017) attempted to use *migration infrastructures* to explain certain aspects of irregular human mobility and noted that these infrastructures are "always already inscribed with planning power, which dictates who gets or does not get to benefit from the socio-material arrangements" (p. 3). Meeus et al., (2019, p2) extended the use of infrastructures to describe settlement and infrastructure practices which create a multitude of *platforms of arrival and take off*, within, against and beyond the state. This literature helps us to bring the nature of expansive refugee issues

involving a multitude of interacting regimes down to the level of the urban through examining quasi material instances of this.

This paper does not wish at this juncture, to enter a philosophical ontological debate over the thresholds of particular existences and materialities of these infrastructures. Instead, we've chosen to bind the use of infrastructures with another idea which we will examine in due course. Trimikliniotis (2015) afforded this second analytical tool when he defined mobility commons, which may be deployed to capture the ephemeral, in a snapshot. Combining these two ideas by means of a unified definition which encapsulates both tools for our intended use requires the casting of a slightly wider conceptual net. This thesis has elected to do this by applying the concept of *landscape characteristics* to represent the socio spatial. This concept will be explained in the theoretical framework and methodology. It will work as a means to represent the spatial elements of this social phenomenon in Nicosia. There are in essence, two parts to the empirical work because of this strategy. Preliminarily, an examination of the societal conditions that bred the current regime is central to a proper analysis, that being the ideas and institutions which contribute to this. What is key here is that this enables us to pan across the plethora of institutional scales which bear some impact, from the level of the EU right down to grassroots organisations working with asylum seekers to interrogate the moving parts of the regimes.

Secondly, representing the phenomenon on a map, we can see how this regime complex has inflicted changes to Nicosia's landscape. A regime is not always visible, by inscribing the meaning of regime onto the landscape of Nicosia, we can bring the combination of regimes into relief. If we can properly account for the contributing factors, it is possible to use this information to construct better outcomes for refugees within the regime complex. Joanna Kusiak (2018) called for less learning about hegemonic systems and instead learning lessons from hegemonic systems in order to reverse engineer its strategies to produce better outcomes. In this work, the hope is not simply to learn from another hegemonic system but instead to use this knowledge to propose better outcomes for asylum seekers. In the next section the thesis will expand on how we will attempt to do these.

III Theoretical Framework

1.Discursive Institutionalism

Discursive-Institutionalism is a mode of institutional analysis that privileges the role of ideas and discourse in explaining institutional decision-making and institutional change. This institutionalism, building upon the lapses of prior schools, defines institutions dynamically, refutes the determinism of the original three neo-institutional definitions by inserting agency into institutional change via ideas and discourse (Schmidt, 2010). There are three levels of ideas, those being policies, programs, and philosophies. The first level comprises policy solutions themselves. The second programmatic layer are the broader pillars through which any policy problem is framed, what issues need consideration, what outcomes are desirable and the norms and instruments applicable to achieve these (Schmidt, 2008). Finally, there is a philosophical layer. These have been perceived as *public philosophies* (Campbell, 1998) or *public sentiments* (Campbell, 2004). Whilst the first two layers are generally visible in the sphere of debate, the final pillar is more diffuse and diffident, rarely perturbed or brought into question as the moral foundation of institutions, except during times of crisis (Campbell, 2004, pp. 93-94).

There is then a subsequent distinction between classes of idea, normative and cognitive. Cognitive, sometimes referred to as causal ideas, provide templates for the internal justification of actions (Schmidt, 2008). Normative ideas legitimate themselves by engendering congruence with the desires of the public. They attach value to political action by deeming themselves appropriate (March and Olsen, 1989).

> Normative ideas speak to how (first level) policies meet the aspirations and ideals of the general public and how (second level) programs as well as (first level) policies resonate with a deeper core of (third) principles and norms of public life, whether the newly emerging values of a society or the long-standing ones in the societal repertoire (Schmidt 2000; 2002, ch. 5).

"*Ideas are the substantive content of discourse*" [italics in original] (Schmidt, 2008, p. 303). These ideas manifest through their linguistic iteration into discourse, which Schmidt notes is a more versatile creature than the ideas which precede it (2008). Schmidt contends discursive institutionalism "has the greatest potential for providing insights into the dynamics of institutional change by explaining the actual preferences, strategies, and normative orientations of actors" (2010, p. 1).

2. Who Contributes to Discourse? Coordinative Discourse and Political Discourses

Discursive institutionalism allows one to conceive of the interactional processes of idea generation. It is often assumed that discourse moves from the top down. It is fair to point out that many of the ideas which have come to contest in Nicosia have been the product of high-brow political fora which can be usefully considered the *top*. These fora are the region of coordinative discourse. Coordinative discourse comprises those who are at the cutting edge of policy formation. They also have a large influence on the second layer, elaborating and defining programmatic ideas. These people are typically described as *policymakers*. Though strong ideas and policy character is standard issue in these spheres there has been some attention paid to particular members of this group who attain a certain propensity for innovation and whose ideas are grasped upon to an often-great extent. These *entrepreneurs* (Fligstein & Mara-Drita, 1996) serve as catalysts in these spheres projecting their own ideas convincingly and articulating them in a manner which greatly influences preferences.

Quite naturally, the coordinative discourse occurs in the sphere of politics (Schmidt, 2008). Cyprus has historical factors which have contributed to the politics of ideas being hotly contested and highly fraught. This feature is perceptible from the level of institutions right down to the level of individual preferences. In this way, it is not simply that those at the top table contribute to the ideation process i.e., there is no simple pathway by which these unfiltered ideas might be directed downwards for the ready consumption of the public who then deliberate and discuss these in an unchallenging manner. The island of Cyprus has historically been aliened to any such understanding of

discourse as might exist in a simple polity. Separate language heritages and vastly different normative understandings within ethnic and language communities creates divergent pathways for discourse to develop, adopt new meaning and potentially be subsumed into subsequent rounds of discourse and lead to an atomisation of narratives on the island. Nowhere provides a better example of these dynamics than Nicosia. This leads us to a pertinent question, what is an institution when it comes to Cyprus?

3.What is an institution?

Schmidt offers a tentative appraisal of what defines an institution. "Institutions [are] understood as the rules, regularities, structures, and the context more generally which influence political outcomes and shape political conduct" (Schmidt, 2014, p. 1836). Each school of institutionalism retains their own definition of what makes up an institution. Insofar as discursive institutionalism is concerned, institutions are most simply the "ideas and discourse of sentient agents" (Schmidt, 2010, p. 5). The vessels through which raw ideas are supplanted and institutionalised range from traditional understandings of government to far less rigid and less easily recognisable institutions. Insofar as migration policy is concerned, an important role is played by states. Additionally, the institutions of the European Union which take on clear classical institutional forms have been involved in this sphere in recent European history. The changes that occur within institutions are a powerful tool for understanding the pillars and principles of institutions themselves. The contention in this thesis is that ideas and discourse offer the most deliberative means of doing this. Interestingly, Rothstein & Uslaner (2005) showed that institutions exude a predisposition for change as the underlying ideas which cultivate the institutions also change. In this way institutions can be viewed as a vessel for ideas or even collective memory. What Rothstein & Uslaner also elucidate is the concept of trust as an element of institutions. Trust can wax or wane so trust in an institution can significantly alter the ideas and discourse and thus, the institution can redefine itself.

The institutional architecture which harboured the power of idea making across Cyprus has experienced waves of widespread change in the last 100 years in both form

and function. Trust in government, as classic democratic theory alludes, is a result of the perception of people that the outcomes a given government creates is consistent with their expectations (Heatherington, 2006: 9). Clearly this trust has been difficult to foster over any extended period of time and so other more strategic modes of harnessing public sentiment to deliver political communications have been present, notably fear. These strategies have similarly been aimed towards instituting legitimacy and control as an outcome via tactically hoisted institutional narratives impacting Nicosia across governance levels. Though much will be made of nationally affiliated policymakers, the EU, and several state entities, it is paramount that the dynamic of what existence an institution can assume is not limited solely to policymakers with a stake in typically conceived political structures or the institutions these structures embody. Institutions are institutions by manner of them taking on a normatively oriented discursive collectivity not limited to typical notions of democratic institutions. Provided there is an idea upon which multiple actors reach some common denominator of philosophy and/or program, this can for all intents and purposes serve as an institution. Territory, has also been conceived as an institution:

> Conceptualizing territory as an institution is not meant to replace existing definitions; instead, it allows us to highlight certain aspects of how we define territory, helps us think about issues like territorial change or territorial politics, and enables the application of arguments across disciplinary boundaries" (Branch, 2016, p. 135).

The consideration of territory as an institution is particularly pertinent in Nicosia where the contribution of ideas arising from state narratives become infused with the spatiality of the city's contested spaces. This sort of territoriality has been described as "the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area" (Sack, 1986, p. 19). That discourse and space can converge towards an institutional understanding is significant. Not only is space an expression of an idea, but space can evoke new understanding. Discursive Institutionalism allows us to take a cross-sectional view of discourse, paying homage to the diffuse nature of discourse and

its multiplicities for developing and gaining new meanings and forms, whether those be "narratives, myths, frames, collective memories, stories, scripts, scenarios, images, [or] more" (Schmidt, 2008. p. 309). This flexibility allows us to transpose policy impacts upon different discursive settings i.e. more territorially situated institutional landscapes. This permits greater scope for encompassed analysis in a setting where subsequent discourses exhibit antagonistic and highly political features in multiple directions. What is more, the orientation around ideas also allows us to activate actants within the modus of *idea generation* or in other words, it allows us to bequeath certain catalytic influence which may bear potentially exceptional importance in the contextual development of an idea a specific level of agency in these processes which the other institutional disciplines do not privilege adequately.

4.Idea Entrepreneurs

Ideas do not emerge from the ether, nor can they be attributed to the historical institutionalist hallmark of path dependency. The process of idea generation and propagation is an inherently human one and those with political savviness emerge to ply their entrepreneurial tendencies. It was not until 1984 that the name for those who are charged with leading the ideation process were named by Kingdon (1984). His definition is useful as it lays out the broad array of individuals who can take up this role, the policy entrepreneurs, which later came to be understood as idea entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs:

> Could be in or out of government, in elected or appointed positions, in interest groups or research organizations. But their defining characteristic, much as in the case of the business entrepreneur, is their willingness to invest their resources— time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money—in the hope of a future return" (Kingdon, 1984. p. 122)

Idea entrepreneurs are increasingly recognised as a distinct class of actor. Beginning with Riker's work on *heresthetics* in The Art of Political Manipulation (1986), the development of a systematic approach to identifying and classifying the definitive

features of idea entrepreneurs has allowed the lines of analysis to move away from mere valorisations of leaders towards an empirical mode of analysis with more formal rules and stringent channels for hypothesis testing. "This line of research transforms the notion of entrepreneurs from the study of heroic figures to the study of a larger class of individuals who help propel political and policy changes" (Schneider & Teske, 1992, p. 737). A second definitional element is a return in the future, and this is important for assessing entrepreneurs. As we pave a pathway across the spheres of relevance in the development of Nicosia, it is interesting to keep this second point in mind, often the rewards and incentives relate to one another in peculiar ways. It is worthwhile to remember the root of Riker's appraisal of the function of heresthetic alongside logic, grammar, and rhetoric.

> Logic is concerned with the truth-value of sentences. Grammar is concerned with the communications-value of sentences. Rhetoric is concerned with the persuasion value of sentences. And heresthetic is concerned with the strategy-value of sentences. In each case, the art involves the use of language to accomplish some purpose: to arrive at truth, to communicate, to persuade, and to manipulate (1986, p. x).

By examining the strategy which sits behind the other three elements, logic, grammar, and rhetoric, we see that deductions wrought from examining sentences and political speech can be attributed to an accurate strategic goal in any context with sufficient information available. In any event, the role of the entrepreneur, their implicit (or otherwise) interests and the language used, which ultimately has a formative bearing on the direction of discourse is of prime significance across the governance levels of the institutions involved in this thesis at the European level. No less important are the institutional and societal considerations in Nicosia within this framework.

Petridou & Mintrom (2020) propose a research agenda for investigating the existence and efficacy of idea entrepreneurs, though the agenda makes explicit reference to policy entrepreneurs. The application of this rigorous framework is prescient in a thesis which explores vastly different ideas over a wide range of time periods. The concept of a policy

entrepreneur is attractive for understanding the case of Europe and Nicosia because it moves beyond the approach which views institutions as a solitary bastion without consideration of the streams of agency exerting force in this process. Force not just of ideas but of interests both personal and induced through a hegemonic, societal understanding of norms and values - the experience of life under a given institutional philosophy. It is to explore this flux of interactions between the multiple strata of ideas and the people who interact therein, testing their aims against their outcomes and how this impacted subsequent developments. Campbell phrased it as such;

> Indeed, to ask whether either interests or ideas are the chief determinants of policy outcomes is a misleading way to pose the issue because it neglects the possibility that it is the interaction between the two that counts and that some types of ideas are endogenous to the policy process in the sense that they are influenced by policy struggles in which interests, resources and power loom large (Campbell, 1998, p. 379).

In this regard it is essential to expand considerations beyond ideas which constitute the policy level. The outcome of using the policy entrepreneur agenda proposed in an adjusted format is not primarily for the purpose of adjudicating on a subjective assessment of the success of policy. Far more important in this work is the impact of the policy on discourse, institutionalisation of programmatic ideas, and where they co-produce the refugee regime complex. Any evaluation is only important insofar as it can be used as an explanatory variable to set out a deeply contextualised foundation for understanding why policy is introduced and how that aids in explaining the shape of the complex's elements as a reified materiality of discourse. To develop upon this, it is important to understand two further concepts, that of the refugee regime complex and that of landscape characteristics.

5. Landscape Characteristics

The existing paradigm of Nicosia has had a discernible impact on the spatial assets of the city and its environs in response to asylum seekers. As we are concerned

with the socio-materiality of institutions and ideas, there comes a need to ultimately project this into space, in our case, the landscape of Nicosia. Landscape characteristics allow us to unify the necessary pieces of *migrant infrastructures* and *mobile commons* to meet this purpose. It comprises not only physical adjustments but less immediately discernible elements underlying these changes. "Landscape characteristics (as) the tangible evidence of the activities and habits of the people.... [reflecting the] beliefs, attitudes, traditions, and values of these people" (McClelland et al., Nat Regist Bull 30:3, 1994). The inclusion of traditions and values can be synthesised via our discursive institutionalist approach into a partially explanatory vessel for change. Trovato (2019) applied a landscape perspective when assessing the impact of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Such an approach enabled her "to describe the repercussions of the Syrian mass migration on the spatial assets of the country and to reveal the strong cultural and territorial component of this emergency" (p. 41). A key difference to this work and that of Trovato's is she conceived of the changes as deriving from the importation of Syrian culture into the concerned areas of Lebanon.

In our case, the changes to the landscape characteristics will be conceived based upon the development of the refugee regime complex which was almost entirely predetermined before the increased influx of asylum seekers. Regimes by their nature exhibit this quality, being something more than a temporary arrangement, and not privy to the attritional quality of short-term political cycles (Krasner, 1983) This is useful to bear in mind as the dynamism of the asylum seeker influx across the different years since 2014 and the differentiated understandings of both administrations in Nicosia and the EU. Protagonistic forces emerge from traditional institutions but also from other, softer institutional sources. This opens up the possibility to use the advantages of this definition to illustrate the variegated social, physical, and cultural properties which landscape characteristics can acquire and enable an analysis which endogenizes the traditions and values described. In the same way, by determining the sources of acquisition, the use of landscape characteristics enables a more broadly encompassing means to track the impacts beyond quantitative tools such as statistics which blur the day-to-day complexity pursuant to increased flows of asylum seekers. Our analysis makes efforts to account for these by including it in our socio-spatial representation.

6. Refugee Regime Complex

"The global refugee regime represents the set of norms, rules, principles and decision-making procedures that regulate States' responses to refugee protection" (Krasner, 1983, p. 2). Betts (2010) made a concerted effort to expand on the monolithic idea of a single refugee regime that is at odds with the myriad institutional compositions that exist and oversee various aspects of the regime today. The mechanism through which this has happened has been described as a *nesting, horizontal and overlapping* of auspices across a multitude of institutions who have concomitant power over the same issue. Betts, Loescher and Milner (2012) expanded on the prior work emerging in the field of regime complexes to offer even more tapered definitions which can offer us immense help in conceptualising regimes and their complexes when they wrote:

> In international relations scholarship a 'regime' is understood to be a set of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given issue area...[thus] the global refugee regime can be understood as the principles, norms, rules and decision-making processes that influences the treatment of refugees by actors in the international system including states, international organisations and NGOs (2012, p. 125).

Discursive institutionalism seems ideally suited to analyse the emergence of regime dynamics because of the reliance on principles, programs, discourse, and decisions enabling a fluent translation of institutional concepts into a regime complex. The significance of understanding the refugee regime complex is that the landscape characteristics which emerge within it can be understood to much greater effect when the governance features involved, which the wider political and societal interactions are funnelled through are well understood and accounted for. Another key point is that this complex has multiple angles of entry for a variety of actors. Barry-Murphy & Stephenson Jr. (2018) examined the position of civil society organisations harnessing their power to democratise the regime complex. Whilst at the lower tiers of legislative and communicative power, civil society organisations can use their leverage to affect

alternative framings from those proposed by more dominant actors within the complex. The effect of this is to insert room for agency in understandings of refugees and asylum seekers within the migratory environments they find themselves in. This is of particular pertinence in urban and highly discursively constructed contexts such as Nicosia. By this very act, civil society organisations can open democratic spaces where refugees and asylum seekers can find possibilities to exercise their potential for agential action and bear influence in the co-production of the regime complex. This is a central point to how our understanding of the spatial elements of migration in Nicosia will be conceived. Despite strong institutional narratives, legal frameworks and policies which have resulted in a regime which aims to exert a large degree of control over the activities of asylum seekers, the contribution of civil society organisations and asylum seekers has crafted a niche for agential actions.

Somewhat paradoxically, the strong historical narratives whose initial purpose was to build trust in ethnic institutions after significant geopolitical shifts can serve to highlight the hypocrisies within these institutional narratives when agential actions are performed. These can serve as launchpads for subsequent rounds of discourse which bring into question the verity of the institutional narratives themselves and propel a degree of positive sentiment behind asylum seekers.

Figure 3. Visualisation of Theoretical Framework Source: Brian O'Shea (2021)

7. Limitations and caveats of research

      As ever, there are limits to the research. Firstly, as an English speaker with zero knowledge of Greek or Turkish, certain problems arise when doing research on Cyprus. None of the vernacular literatures will be accessible. Secondly, as we are studying discourse, there is a certain reliance on the translations being proffered by those with the appropriate language skills. With official communications this is generally manageable. The reality of this situation means that much important material, particularly primary quotations and material derived from soft institutions which do not communicate through formal or English language channels are missed.

      Covid 19 has presented many difficulties to research generally. Its impact on this research was also keenly felt. The green line crossings were closed during my visit. Unfortunately, this is reflected in the lack of primary mixed methods fieldwork which was undertaken in the Northern part of the city and has had a knock-on impact on how well represented certain elements of the regime's impacts appear in the North where there are also no English language daily newspapers. My experience has been that Turkish does not translate particularly well in online translators. To ensure that there was nothing quite literally lost in translation, it was decided to leave that which could nott be verified bare rather than include incorrect information. Another reality of using newspaper articles is tracking exact locations for certain events. Vague descriptions of locations were met with informed but inexact estimations of where they happened. This applied to a small number of cases.

      There is always a question of agency when doing work on the subject of refugees and asylum seekers. When I set out, I had hoped to include the interviews of asylum seekers to have their voices heard. In the end I was advised to avoid this strategy for research reasons and the fact of Covid may have made it impossible in any event. Instead, by putting asylum seekers at the forefront of the mapping exercise, I hope to create a map which puts their agency on an equal footing to that which surrounds them. The success of that hope is open to interpretation.

IV Methodology

1. Identification and elaborating the role of idea entrepreneurs

In light of the lengthy discussion of the explanatory power of ideas and their proponents in the form of idea entrepreneurs an imminently clear methodological challenge emerges. Preliminarily an idea of any form must be identified. Identification is aided in no small part by the wealth of discursive material available in the context of Cyprus over the past 100 years. Petridou & Mintron (2020) outlined five steps which scholarship on policy entrepreneurship must compose the following elements in order to aid in understanding the role of policy entrepreneurs in the policy process.

(i) delimiting policy entrepreneurs as a distinct class of actor;

(ii) investigating contextual factors that encourage the emergence of policy entrepreneurs;

(iii) further specifying the strategies policy entrepreneurs deploy;

(iv) improving the measurement of the impact policy entrepreneurs have in the policy process;

(v) identifying when policy entrepreneurs prompt widespread change. (p. 1)

Step i is not central to our process, though recognising the designated actors outrightly as policy entrepreneurs is clearly central. Steps ii - v will be engaged with far more depth. The paper also outlines some criticisms of using policy entrepreneurs within an institutional approach, outlining several conditions which may curtail its usefulness. The first is that policy entrepreneurs must be finely tuned in their understanding of the context they operate in without being so embedded as to dull their critical facilities (Petridou & Mintron, 2020, p. 7). Additionally, they are most effective when they form teams composed of both *insiders* and *outsiders* (2020, p. 8). A final point encountered is the door left ajar for considering *boundary spanning* in institutional approaches. "Many contemporary societal challenges seem to span various policy

boundaries. The cross domains... and levels – levels of government within an established territory, with interacting authority structures – that range from the global to the local levels" (Faling et al, 2019). It is taken that instead of posing as limitations, the caveats noted do more to corroborate the suitability of the theoretical and methodological framework applied in this work than they do to limit its applicability.

2.Observation and Photography

During my fieldwork period from December 2020 to January 2021. I did a huge amount of observational work and photography in Nicosia city centre, in Kokkinotrimithia and all along the green line. I was not able to enter the Turkish Cypriot side. As a result, all my observations and photographs are from the RoC side of Nicosia.

3.Interviews

The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner between September 2020 and March 2021. These interviews were conducted at two separate scales. There are three interviews conducted with three members of the European Parliament. The insights gathered from these interviews will be used to shed light on the development of discourse and policy at the European level. The second scale of interview was with five actors involved at some level with migration developments l in Nicosia. The contribution of these interviews enabled us to get a better idea of the discourse surrounding the phenomenon of migrants and asylum seekers occurring in Nicosia from actors with a perspective from the Republic of Cyprus as well as those living in the North of Nicosia. I also conducted one expert interview with a Greek academic living in Cyprus.

4.Media Analysis

The GIS Map will be informed via media analysis, mostly newspapers. Using the English Language newspapers in Cyprus in addition to several non-press but verified forms of media will allow us to expand and adequately bolster the content of the map to a level where it is of use value across our years of analysis 2014-2021. 2014 was chosen

as the starting year because it represents a time before the onset of the migration *crisis* in 2015.

<u>5.GIS Mapping</u>

GIS Mapping will be used to map out the landscape characteristics of the migration situation in Nicosia. Using Carto, the GIS mapping exercise will enable us to illustrate the nuances of the situation in Nicosia beyond what statistics alone can tell us. The mapping exercise will classify landscape characteristics based upon typology. Typologies will be discussed in the results.

Empirical Section (B)

<u>V Discourse Scales: Cyprus & Europe</u>

<u>Old Discourse</u>

<u>1.The Cypruses of Cyprus and the Cyprus problem: Colonial, Greek and Turkish Cyprus.</u>

Historically, Cyprus has been defined by the multiple ethnic and cultural influences which had been able to live in harmony dating back several hundred years. This was long true for the iterations of the two central communities as well as the recognised minorities, the Maronites, the Latins and the Armenians (Trimikliniotis, 2015). Many accounts of Cyprus tend to gloss over this fact due to the recent history of conflict. The de facto partition of the island has also dominated the discussion of the literature (Trimikliniotis and Demetriou, 2011). Much commentary points to the colonial heritage of Cyprus as the breeding grounds for the ethnic tension that led to this partition. As the Ottoman empire flickered in its twilight years and relinquished control of Cyprus to the British in 1878, there was a scramble amongst the Turkish Cypriot community to protect themselves in the face of a dynamically organised call for Enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece) in the Greek Cypriot community. No longer the dominant community as they had been under the Ottomans, an atmosphere of fear was palpable within a Turkish-Cypriot community. They remained an economic backwater compared

to the industriousness which defined the Greek Cypriot community at the time in addition to numerical inferiority. The resourcefulness of the Turkish Cypriot community in Cyprus was put to action in the most pragmatic means they had at their disposal to ensure their security. They sought protection by currying favour with the British administration (Kızılyürek, 2010).

The British colonial administration had very few qualms about accommodating the Turkish Cypriot community. The British applied the time-honoured *divide and rule* strategy, a hallmark of British colonialism (Kızılyürek, 2010). Several strategies had been used to reify the logic of divide and rule, one of which was via cartography. Mapping programs were implemented during the British administration whereby recording their interpretation of the island's lands into social as well as spatial units, they not only demarcated territory for administrative purposes but effectively reinscribed the separation of identity into the fabric of the island, as had existed under Ottoman rule (Given, 2002). The early twentieth century was as such, a time of massive transition within Cyprus. The politics of Cyprus was wrestled within swirling spheres of debate and the dichotomy typically struck between Enosis and *Taksim* fragmented further, taking on variegated forms predetermined to come into ideological conflict. Though intercommunal tensions had long been present, intracommunal discord within the Turkish Cypriot community can trace its roots back to the 1930s when a group of young Nicosian intellectuals took inspiration from New Turkey. The Kemalist movement was troubled with the increasingly fervent calls for Enosis. So too were they growing weary of the elitist rule of Münir Bey who dictated the community affairs of the Turkish Cypriots. Despite this opposition to Enosis, the Kemalist group worked alongside Greek Cypriot organisations against the British at this point in time. In the face of this, the British administration strived to entrench the legitimacy of Bey's leadership and shielded Turkish Cypriots from the secular Kemalist movement (Kızılyürek, 2010).

The invigorated anti-colonial struggle in the 1950's in the wake of Makarios III assumption of the Archbishop's seat saw a charged Enosis movement morph into militant form via EOKA. The organisation emerged in response to rising resistance from the British administration to demands for Enosis. The discord seen in the split Turkish

Cypriot desires also plagued the Enosis movement. Although the beginning of EOKA's armed campaign targeted British installations, the strategy of the British to appeal to Turkey to protect the Turkish minority on the island swung the pendulum in the direction of conflict towards real inter-communal strife (Clerides, 1989). The British forces also ramped up the recruitment of Turkish Cypriots into the local police and security forces. AKEL, the Communist Party of Cyprus, had an interesting role to play as EOKA's campaign began to make an impact on the island. Whilst largely agreeing with the aims of Enosis, they fundamentally disagreed with violence as a means to achieve it. AKEL made feeble attempts to forge an alternative means of achieving freedom which would not split the communities, namely hosting large rallies to gather popular support. This marked out AKEL as enemies in the eyes of the EOKA leadership, particularly Colonel Grivas, an avowed anti-communist. Many of those on the left of the political spectrum in the Greek Cypriot community were subsequently targeted by EOKA (Hadjidemetriou, 2007). Where this context must lead is toward an understanding of where the ideas and discourses derive. But these ideas had their champions and standard bearers. Contemporary Cyprus, and crucially, the institutional discourse cannot be understood without reference to Rauf Denktas.

2. Rauf Denktas

The first application of our idea entrepreneur framework will be utilised here to examine the ideas and discursive-institutionalist development through the prism of Rauf Denktas. This analysis could equally be applied to Makarios III, however there are a few factors which make Denktas more enlightening in this case. For the balance of the paper and to make sure the institutional co-constructors of the regime complex are all represented, Denktas is primordial. Secondly, coming from a minority community it is easier to make the case that Denktas was more instrumental as an agent of change. Most importantly, Denktas outlived Makarios III by almost 35 years, and therefore there is no need to posthumously prescribe any position to Makarios III over this time as we can take Denktaş' word straight from the donkey's mouth.

Some people talk about the so-called Turkish Cypriots or Greek Cypriots. There are no Turkish Cypriots, no Greek Cypriots and no Cypriots. Do not dare to ask us if we are Cypriots! We would take this as an insult. Why? Because in Cyprus the only thing that is Cypriot is the donkey. - Rauf Denktaş [emphasis in original] (Kızılyürek, 1999b, p. 36)

The above quote represents one of the definitive features of Rauf Denktaş' politics, an immovable commitment to the *motherhood* line of nationalism. An insightful attestation to Denktaş' role in this nationalism was written by Kızılyürek (2010). It presents a useful account of the socio-political climate Rauf Denktaş operated in and provides fruitful reading for our mode of analysis.

The world Denktaş was born into in 1924 was one steeped in fear and uncertainty for the future of Turkish Cypriots. Growing up as a child he became politicized in the 1930's through both his father and a vehemently nationalist primary school teacher. In this period, the secular - nationalist school of thought was also gaining prominence. Denktaş was deeply influenced once he encountered the movement's figurehead Dr Fazıl Küçük. The contact began firstly when Denktaş sent articles to the paper Dr. Küçük owned and edited. Their relationship was consolidated in 1942-43, during which time Denktaş swore to devote himself and his life towards the cause of opposing Enosis. In the 1940's as the factions began to grow bolder in their respective claims, the Turkish Cypriots sought a champion for their cause. Many intellectuals saw the involvement of Turkey as the best means of opposing Enosis. On foot of this, deeper political connections were sought with Pan-Turkist groups on the mainland. The Pan-Turkist lobby experienced incredible domestic success in convincing Turks to see the island of Cyprus as a point of national importance. It was in this melting pot of new nationalistic and anti-Enosis ideas that the outlook of Rauf Denktaş was shaped. Over the next decade he quit his job as a prosecutor which he had since 1948 and took on politics full time, committed to the vaunted partition of Cyprus, Taksim. (Kızılyürek, 2010).

The context of Rauf Denktaş' upbringing and the Cyprus he grew up in gives us a great insight into why he found himself in a position where he had certain political ideas.

However, being born into this context alone serves as no indication that one will become an idea entrepreneur. As we look at the strategies adopted by Denktaş as leader of TMT, examine his goals and operations, it comes to prominence that the ideas of Rauf Denktaş were put under significant pressure and it is a testament to his resilience, guile, and good fortune that he was able to have such a lasting impact on the institutional shape of Cyprus and sowed the seeds of discourse which would last for decades to come.

When the Turkish Resistance Organisation (TMT) was founded by a combination of Cypriot efforts and the Special War Department of Turkey in late 1957, Denktaş was to become a figure serving a dual function in Cypriot affairs. Firstly, as the chairman of the Federation of Turkish Cypriot Associations, a civil society representative body he could represent himself publicly, while also heavily involved in underground affairs of TMT. An important aspect of the idea entrepreneur is strategy, and it was in this forum Denktaş showed great tenacity in applying lessons learned from Ataturk's Turkification. He immediately went to work putting together a version of the *From Turks to Turks* campaign, modelled on a similar program that had been in place in Turkey since the 1930's. It aimed to sever economic ties to Greek Cypriot businesses (Denktaş, 2000). Another effort saw him implement the *Citizen speak Turkish* campaign which imposed fines for speaking Greek or using Greek words. "We were trying to prove that we were a people with a historical footprint in Cyprus; that Cyprus was not a Greek island as the Greeks claimed" (Denktaş, 2000 ,p. 129). These cultural, social, and economic campaigns were well received by a Turkish Cypriot community who were disinclined towards Enosis. But Denktaş was also happy for the TMT to use the threat of violence to impose the agenda (Akkurt, 1999).

The success of this hybrid strategy was palpable in the discourse and it had immediate and extreme impacts, coaxing Turkish Cypriots who were living in mixed communities to begin to move to solely Turkish Cypriot communities. These patterns evidenced the deeply ingrained fears that gripped the Turkish Cypriot communal psyche. Even when through international diplomacy an independent nation was formed as the Republic of Cyprus, the impact of these strategies almost presupposed the failure of the new unified nation as the ardent nationalists in both communities had become so

dogmatic towards their respective aims, that no compromise would suffice. In November 1963, the Turkish-Cypriot representation walked out of the consociational power sharing posts guaranteed to them under the Cypriot Constitution of 1960. This came on foot of a 13-point Constitutional amendment proposed by Greek-Cypriot President Makarios III. Fighting erupted between both communities on the island in December 1963 (Adams, 1966). By the end of 1964, most Turkish Cypriots were living in ghettoised conditions and all were without government representation. Turkey, cognisant of the gaze of the Western Alliance, failed to intervene. As morale slumped to new low, Turkish Cypriots were forced to sustain another emerging schism and were siphoned into one of two camps, that of Denktaş, or that of his former inspiration, Dr. Küçük. Denktaş was willing to protect his form of nationalism and his idea of nationhood to the hilt, even going so far as to openly criticise the Turkish government in a book published in 1966 whilst exiled in Ankara. Unable to return to Cyprus, and without many allies because of increasing frustration with his intransigence, Denktaş' was caught rudderless. Only for the changing situation after EOKA B executed 20 Turkish Cypriots in Kofinou did Turkey step in to broker a ceasefire upon which time Denktaş was brought back in from the cold. In the aftermath of secret meetings with the representatives of Makarios III, Denktaş acquiesced to the lesser demand of local autonomy within a unified Cyprus. At least this was the public position. The true entrepreneurial capability of Denktaş was evidenced by his tactical political movements upon arrival back to Cyprus. His appetite for zealous nationalism was well known. It is possible this well accounted for personality trait acted as a cover for the brand of shrewd *realpolitik* he engaged in between 1968 and 1974. Following the official, moderate policies endorsed by Turkey at the time to maintain appearances, Denktaş quietly went about inserting his own associates into the administration and gradually isolating Dr. Küçük. He was also the primary contact for the Special War Department, with whom he commanded significant clout. His pre-emptive actions nearly guaranteed his rise to power, running unopposed in the vice-presidential election of 1973. Denktaş very successfully masked his intentions through his appeasement to the articles of state when it was necessary and effected widespread change by bringing into operation narratives of fear as a lived reality (Kızılyürek, 2010)

The details of the balance of relations on the island in the aftermath of the 1974 partition are not the subject of this work, there are a few important points to account for, however. Denktaş' effective manoeuvring of public sentiment in the Turkish Cypriot community as well as the government of Bülent Ecevit towards permanent partition allowed him to assume the role of leader upon the declaration of a new Turkish Republic of Cyprus in 1983 with an inordinate level of public confidence behind him. His creative and effective strategy which had capitalised upon pre-existing fears became the institutional narrative of the community during his time before he became vice President. With very little struggle he transposed these same narratives into the ruling institutions of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. These narratives and the nationalist ideas which served as their precursor, insolent and exclusionary have served to imprint a racist undertone in Turkish Cypriot society attested to by an interviewee who operates an EU funded social services project attached to Lefkoşa Türk Belediyesi (LTB): "But we're not, you're still not there, especially when it comes to undocumented migrants and refugees, because, you know, we are a racist society, there is no denying that." (Interview, 2021).

This layer lies at the base of contemporary discourse the island is grappling with in the face of a level of asylum seekers Cyprus simply was not ready for. The regime complex has many underlying mechanisms which may be able to be tied schematically to this historical discourse and its central proponent, Denktaş.

These narratives arising at the sub-national level as contended here, have done so in the Greek-Cypriot case as in the North. A material difference of note is the arrival of a Turkish-Cypriot *Cypriocentric* nationalism distinct from the prior *motherland* nationalism. This arose in response to Turkish interference in Turkish-Cypriot affairs and the arrival of Turkish settlers into Northern Cyprus (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005). The same interviewee alluded to this: "We have even problems with, you know, like legal turkey settlers here. And part of that, I think, translates into this... it has probably had an effect on this suspicion towards foreigners" (Interview, 2021)

This resulted in the eventual, but markedly slower propagation of Cypriocentric nationalism for the Turkish-Cypriot community than was the case of the Greek-Cypriot version, who essentially dropped their calls for Enosis, the hallmark of *Hellenocentrism* with almost no resuscitation of this since 1974 (Loizides, 2007), at least until the rise of ELAM in 2008. Contingent factors too were the ongoing Turkish military presence who were institutionally framed as *liberators* and the commitment of the first President, Rauf Denktaş in toeing the motherhood line of nationalism.

It is a fair assessment to recognise Denktaş as an idea entrepreneur. His influence before his presidency, as a founding member of the TMT terrorist organisation and the machinations of his political manoeuvring and applied heresthetics described in detail by Kızılyürek (2010) set him out as a distinctive agent of widespread change. Denktaş was indeed a product of his time but also exerted huge influence in shaping Cyprus throughout his life. This fact seems undeniable no matter if the assessor is ardently Turkist, Hellenocentric nationalist or a neutral observer. His outlook and the ideas borne of it were co-opted into his political ideology once he rose to power. The narratives he carried forcefully through his life were thus disseminated through means of a manipulation of people's sense of identity, tincturing education, and milieu before finally the political discourse ossified in physical space, symbolic spaces, both personal and public.

The notion that nationalism can be personalised in this manner is interesting. Nicosia itself, stands as a semiotic arena within which a plethora of additional contested narratives play out. Greek-Cypriot conceptions of their own status as victims comes under threat when migrants or asylum seekers claim to have suffered racism or discrimination at the hands of Greek Cypriots (Trimikliniotis, 2004: 57). On the Turkish-Cypriot side they too have victimised themselves. Their historical narrative is one which speaks of their own struggle against the threat of *Enosis* and self-preservation against the risk being driven from Cyprus, though complications arise from the pluralised and incompatible loyalties of Turkocentric and Cypriocentric understandings of their victimisation in the hegemonic and self-referential narrative of their administration. Interestingly, a recent study has examined the discourse of self-determination politics

of Northern Cyprus vis-a-vis Turkey by examining online activism on Facebook serves to illustrate how dynamic the development of this plurality has been in form and function (Akcali, 2019). If we are to apply what we have thus far learned about Cypriot ethno-nationalism, its policy outcomes, and the subsequent impact of this on the asylum landscape in Nicosia it is necessary to also consider the European level coordinative contributions to Nicosia's situation.

European Discourse

3. The origins of European Asylum policy: A changing Europe.

The Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees 1951 remains the primary international legal instrument relating to the rights and protection of refugees. There are two clauses of note emerging from the 1951 convention (Hatton, 2005). From Article 1 & 33 which define refugee and non-refoulement respectively. For decades, powers relating to asylum for members of the European block as well as future members, were the sole competence of the states involved. Over time and with grander political changes across the European Union and its prior iterations, matters of asylum were banded into a collective competency, assumedly to better meet the standards of the Geneva Convention and the European Charter of Human Rights (Bačić, 2012). However, the origins of this process were bound together with a morphing European geopolitical arena. Economic and terror related crises in the 1970's and 1980's combined with the dissolution of the USSR had led to a state of *near paralysis* in domestic asylum systems by the beginning of the 1990's (Kaunert & Leonard, 2011). What is more, widely varying interpretations of the Geneva Convention undermined the unified approach the European Community was inclined to pursue at this juncture. In response to this, the European Community took steps towards the assumption of a grander role in the administration of asylum laws. This ambition necessitated certain precociousness given the sovereign sensitivities inherent in the existing securitarian approach to asylum issues emblematic of the era. The Dublin Convention 1990 announced itself as the first instrument designed to enable the effective allocation of responsibility for the review of asylum claims (Bačić, 2012). Even now, the nature of the

content of the Dublin Convention appears unintuitive, though not inconsistent with the constituent agendas of the actor and context matrix underpinning its drafting.

4. TREVI Group: The Original Idea Entrepreneurs in Asylum Policy Formation

The role played by the TREVI Group (Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, Violence International), a powerful idea-simulation task force consisting of the Justice Ministers of the twelve member states of the time, represents a golden opportunity for interrogation and thus gain insight into the actor and context matrix of the asylum process in this era. Efforts to move away from securitarianism were scarcely possible, given the array of items dealt with in their portfolio and the primary concerns of the Group. "[T]he original task of the TREVI group was to examine issues of terrorism and international violence, and inclusion of immigration within its responsibilities reveals a two piece association of ideas, i.e. migrant/refugee, "suspected person", potential terrorist" (Juss, 2005, p. 25). The six areas focussed upon by the TREVI Group were Asylum, False Documents, External Frontiers, Admissions, Deportations and Information Exchange. A working group was formed within TREVI to test out certain security measures and the immediate application of this was aimed at tackling abuse of asylum rights within existing asylum systems. These included harmonising visa requirements, sanctioning airlines for lax examinations of travel documents, and penning the draft guidelines for determining the country responsible for asylum claims. The purpose of these guidelines was to remedy the possibility of asylum seekers applying in more than one country or *asylum shopping* as it has been termed (Casey, 1991). The power of the TREVI group manifested not simply as an influence on the direction these measures would take. Combining them under conglomerate auspices served to antagonise the potential for a rights-oriented policy approach to asylum. This antagonism persevered until the Amsterdam Treaty attempted to reverse this trend. Whether an active intention of the Group or not, they sketched the blueprint for an asylum architecture and associated dialectic under which asylum seekers would be scapegoated for a broad range of risks tangential and yet therein inextricably attached to their categorical identity (Juss, 2005).

The TREVI group serves as a prime example of the power of ideas within the institutional decision-making process, for as Bures puts it "there can be little doubt that TREVI's work was considered by both the EC and the contiguous European states to be useful, despite the fact that TREVI's legal basis and its relationship to other EC institutions remained unclear." (Bures, 2002, pp. 126-127).

The precedent of refugees being unable to choose the state in which they could seek asylum was first established in the Dublin Convention 1990 (Juss, 2005). The ramifications of TREVI's initial influence and the political entangling of security and asylum policies is important to consider when viewing subsequent policy developments throughout the 1990's and beyond.

5. Development of the Concept of State of First Entry

The European approach to asylum during the 1990's has been conceived of as a *race to the bottom*. Noll (2000) describes a collective shirking of responsibility as member states, keen to avoid being overwhelmed by asylum seekers, enacted an assortment of policies to deflect asylum seekers elsewhere. Tightening border controls, toughening procedures, and slashing benefits available to asylum seekers resulted in a house of mirrors environment, with asylum seekers in theory and practice deflected from one state to another. European countries remained unabashed by proposals to harmonise asylum in the absence of any binding legal requirements and were happy to pursue national agendas deeply wary of migrants. Germany attempted to buck this trend in 1994 and forwarded a proposal to the European Council establishing a burden sharing mechanism. The introduction of the state of first entry concept signalled a wholesale shift in the paradigm of Europe's asylum regime with a systemic change capable of administering responsibility without resorting to the securitarian approach endemic in 1990's Europe. However, there were additional outcomes and unintended consequences forthcoming, which such prescriptive formulas often fail to foresee.

The state-of-first-entry concept abolished any opportunity for other assessments of the individual asylum seeker's situation by any other Member State, irrespective of the possible interconnections he/she may have had with that State. Furthermore, the initial objective of burden-sharing between Member States potentially became an excuse for burden shifting... it should be noted that this principle has been one of the most problematic ones when considering EU asylum policy up to the present (Bačić, 2012).

The Amsterdam Treaty 1997 activated the communitarian approach to asylum law. Its' coming into force confirmed the advent of binding commitments contained in the Dublin Convention upon member states and calling time on the piecemeal harmonisation characterised by pick and mix application and deflective policies spawned during the 1990's. For the first time a recognisable Community instrument capable of sharing responsibility to examine asylum claims existed. The essential principles of which can be summarised succinctly:

Only One Member State is Responsible for the Examination of an Asylum Application: The Authorisation Principle.

The State Responsible is Under an Obligation to Complete the Examination of an Asylum Application. (Hurwitz, 1999)

The criteria under which the responsibility is determined are laid out in order of precedence in accordance with Article 3.2 of the Dublin Convention. (Hurwitz, 1999) The substance of this text lended itself towards skewing the onus of responsibility from the European Union as a whole, to those nations that naturally emerged as the most likely ones to find themselves as the first country of entry, the countries of the Mediterranean coast. Further harmonisation via the creation of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) led to the introduction of the Dublin II Regulation, several directives concerning minimum standards. However, the effect of these in practice has been to shift more efficiently the burden from countries with no external borders to those on Europe's frontiers who already experience the brunt of responsibility (Goldner Lang, 2013). With the expansion of the European Union in 2004, the Republic of Cyprus, amongst other eastern countries joined the European Union and concurrently began to harmonise their

policies with that of the block. RoC avoided incoming migration from Syria early in the war as the country had effectively signalled that it would not be a good place to go, though some Syrians did nonetheless arrive. What sparked the widespread change to incoming asylum seekers after 2016?

The short answer is the EU-Turkey Deal. It is the contention of this work that this piece of policy had a transformative impact on the changing face of Nicosia over this period. Prior to the implementation of the deal, Cyprus remained largely unaffected by the human upheaval and migratory flows escaping the civil war in Syria since 2011. After its implementation, the level of change increased in gradually larger increments as more asylum seekers arrived year on year. Politically, the deal was contentious. The central message communicated to the European public was that this deal would prevent unnecessary deaths across the Aegean Sea. However, there is a need to deconstruct the political context of Europe in the year prior to the deal in what has come to be known as the *migration crisis*.

6. Context of migration crisis

The European Union found itself under significant pressure on foot of the new flows of migration that initially came via the Balkan route. As we have alluded to, these security concerns were not new and have ideological similarities to the TREVI group's workings in this area. Europe's experience with migration has been linked to the huge geopolitical changes sprung from the Arab Spring. Many migrants arriving led to a deal being struck on a bilateral basis between Italy and Libya in 2009. This led to the return of *clandestine migrants* who made the voyage between the two countries (Di Pascale, 2010). A similar agreement in 2011 was agreed with Tunisia after the fall of the Ben Ali regime saw a spike in journeys being undertaken from Italy to Libya. Upon the enactment of these agreements, the number of arrivals plummeted (Nascimbene & Di Pascale, 2011). After an ECtHR ruling held *inter alia* that Italy had jurisdiction over any migrants and returns to Libya amounted to collective expulsion, Italy stopped the returns. However, increased deaths prompted Italy to undertake the Mare Nostrum campaign and increase rescue efforts after several high-profile tragedies at sea (Ryan, 2019). In

2015, the EU took a more frontrunning approach to matters of border security and assumed the mantle for continuing Mare Nostrum under the guise of Frontex's Triton task force. But the limits of the operation, its surveillance priorities and the lack of nautical reach led to more deaths. In the Eastern Mediterranean another element of the crisis was present. An unprecedented number of arrivals into Greece saw almost one million migrants enter Europe in 2015. From Greece migrants headed north, with the plan to reach Austria, Germany, and the countries of Northern Europe. When Hungary closed its border in September 2015, this signalled a moment of crises in the internal functioning of the EU and a frontrunning group led by Germany annulled the Dublin Regulation to allow refugees to apply for asylum in Germany without any fear that they would be returned to the state of first entry. Angela Merkel claimed that Germany would cope. However, just two days later, this move ended when Alan Kurdi's death and the images of his body being lifted from a beach in Bodrum, an event which came to be used as a justification for closing migration routes (Crawley et al, 2017). These images sparked a huge public outcry in the short term. However, studies suggest that people quickly returned to their former ideological positions despite short term impacts of Kurdi's image (Sohlberg et al, 2019) The EU was caught in a compromising position, jammed between two desires. Upholding their principles on one hand and attempting to keep a number of member states with anti-immigrant positions content on the other. Solidarity in Europe entirely dissolved as a scheme to share 160,000 refugees across Europe collapsed as governments succumbed to populist pressure in domestic political spheres. This left Berlin as the sole party left willing to manage the crisis. The U-turn of the Austrian government played a pivotal role as this change of heart at a critical transit point in Europe led the Balkan countries to fear thousands of asylum seekers being stranded in their territories. As the Balkan route began to close, there were two camps forming in Europe, an Austrian camp which sought the route's complete closure, and a German camp who sought to strike a deal with Turkey (Weber, 2017). The time between this standoff and March 2016 is important to interrogate in the context of Gerald Knaus' role.

7. Gerald Knaus

Gerald Knaus had over the prior decade and a half established himself as an intellectual thinker with expertise in security, EU expansion, the Balkans and Turkey through his work with the European Stability Initiative, a think tank he founded in Sarajevo in 1999. How did Knaus imprint his thinking into the high-level fora of European crisis? There are a number of strategies implemented by Knaus which enabled him to have such a crucial role. It is interesting to note that in Smeets and Beech's work on the engine room dynamics of the creation of the EU-Turkey Deal, Knaus is not mentioned. The engine room dynamics which are interrogated do not necessarily represent the same spheres that idea entrepreneurs operate in. Knaus went from being relatively unknown in September 2015, to being referred to across the media world as the architect of the EU-Turkey Deal. Nonetheless, our attempt to piece together Gerald Knaus' role will rely on the principal questions of the idea entrepreneur agenda. If we combine these with information from the publications and statements of Knaus, it is possible to see how Knaus emerged as an idea entrepreneur. The policy paper *Why people don't need to drown in the Aegean* (ESI, 2015) sets the tone in the aftermath of Alan Kurdi's death:

> In reality, neither the German nor the Hungarian approaches offer a solution to the ever-increasing numbers of Syrian refugees crossing into Greece and on through the Balkans. Neither a liberal asylum policy nor a wire fence will prevent people from drowning in the Aegean. Although they are diametrically opposed in their views of the Syrian refugee crisis, neither approach is sustainable. This is because it is not the EU but Turkey that determines what happens at Europe's south-eastern borders. Without the active support of the Turkish authorities, the EU has only two options – to welcome the refugees or try – futilely – to stop them' (ESI, 2015, p. 2).

The paper goes on to make the primary suggestions that would come to comprise the core of the EU- Turkey Deal. A 1:1 resettlement scheme from Turkey to Europe; a returns scheme from the Greek islands to Turkey for any migrant who travelled after the deal is brought into force; and a compensation package to support the hosting of refugees in Turkey. To make sense of the eminence of this suggestion an important

factor must be understood is that the EU faced an internal crisis of decision making during the refugee crisis. The allure of this proposal as such was that it sold itself on the premise of two separate promises which together could satiate the demands of everyone in the block. The liberal group was satisfied the deaths at sea would stop, and the group who had hard-line stances on migration led by Hungary, catalysed by Austria. However, something immediately apparent comes to the fore on the face of these central tenets of the deal; it is the very same strategy upon which the ECtHR found against Italy returning migrants to Libya. The fundamental difference of this deal was the EU's designation of Turkey as a *safe third country*. Arribas (2017) outlines a variety of reasons why this designation was completely wrong and accounts for various humanitarian organisations addressing the callousness of the policy that amounted to refoulement and placed returned migrants in serious danger. Knaus, in September of 2015 was of the belief that Turkey was a safe country for Syrians, stating: "the generosity that many European cities are showing today for refugees has been more than equalled in recent years by Turkish communities" (ESI, 2015, p. 5).

The pragmatic view tells us that whatever the material reality of the statement was secondary, the EU were happy to sell this idea to the public and to a great extent, to themselves. However, there were immediate issues with the terms of what would later become the EU-Turkey Deal. With a parliamentary majority largely sympathetic to refugees, it would have proved near impossible for this deal to pass through the normal process. Even if it passed, it would potentially be brought to the ECtHR. Instead, a different strategy was adopted. After the EU-Turkey summit, the terms of this mechanism were announced not as a law, but as a press release (European Commission, 2016). As such it escaped scrutiny. The questionable ethics of the process surrounding the EU-Turkey Deal meant that none of the institutions took responsibility for what was on its face, a policy which was piled through out of a sense of desperation during a moment of quasi meltdown in the institutions. Knaus was effectively able to fill this void in responsibility, within months he was being described as the brain behind the statement and the initial architect of the deal (Guardian, 2016). What we can say about Knaus is the following: by his insistence that Turkey was a safe third country, he in essence, reinvented the same mechanism that Italy had been using with Libya to return

migrants. However, his craft enabled the EU to toe the line between a schism in the Union and proffer a narrative that the deal was within the rights-based frame the EU purports to uphold. This is because the deal was supposed to immediately stop sea voyages and the resettlement scheme was to prevent trafficking. His reward for this was wide recognition for what was undoubtedly, a remarkably showing of political astuteness and strategic communication. There is a tendency to ascribe moral character to actors making these sorts of decisions. To consider Knaus' position in this respect is thought provoking, especially as his initial proposal is titled in moralistic terms. In the ESI report of *The Merkel Plan - Compassion and Control* (ESI, 2015) a number of interesting notes are made. These points indicate that Knaus, most primarily, is a pragmatist. Firstly, he established that the current debate amongst leading European politicians was in fact, leading nowhere. He laments the vacuous offering of supposed experts on the topic when saying: "On talk-shows around Europe, experts repeat the non-proposals: address the "root causes of the crisis, "solve the situation in Syria, Libya and the Middle East", host another international conference" (ESI, 2015, p1). He also refers to the strong language and watery detail of many, indicatively liberal politicians. At the same time the issue was being instrumentalised by the champions of an entirely more transparent rhetoric, particularly Viktor Orban whose proposals aimed to sever the EU's relationship with human rights. German MEP Ismail Ertug offered the following commentary:

> Remember the issue as Germany and others said, okay, no, we don't want to close the borders. And we have Schengen, and this was an achievement of the European Union and all, blah, blah. And in the end, Orban, for example, he closed the Balkan route. So was received well by Merkel and Co because they said, okay, it's not fine and you cannot do this, blah, blah. But on the other hand, they were really happy that Orban did it, because that creates the pressure on the politicians, in particular, when it comes to number of migrants in 15-16. [...] And for me it is a clear hypocrisy and I'll say that it's a really big, big, big shame what is happening on the external borders of the European Union. And the history won't forget this, believe me, I'm really I'm really aware of it (Interview, 2021).

Knaus' document contains a tone of palpable frustration. This is what makes Knaus an interesting figure and an important one. His background and history would lead us to believe that his work and entrepreneurship came because of an earnest hope to contribute to Europe caught in a crisis not of migration, but of governance and leadership. A crisis leading in his view, towards a rapid furthering of the populist backlash in large swathes of Europe (ESI, 2015). On the flip side, the lens of the pure humanitarian can point to the multiple facets of the deal which spelled disaster for refugee rights, for example, the collective return of Syrian Kurds back to Turkey under the mechanism. Indeed, the imbalance of the resettlement scheme as being limited to Syrians was also discriminatory structure. Knaus, for his part, has acknowledged the many failings of the deal. Upon its subsequent collapse in March 2020, his plans for EU-Turkey 2.0 began to pick up headlines once more. The issue with the deal's first iteration was that the breathing room it afforded the EU was squandered. The period of quiet allowed a listlessness to settle in many European fora when the pressing reality suggested that this plan should never have been granted the longevity of its tenure without a series of actions by Europe to alter the stalemate.

There are two perspectives here, one which says that a lack of consensus ties the hands of the institutions and another says sitting on one's hands helps nobody. There is substance to both. It can be hard to deny that the emotive nature of the debate meant the abiding inaction was for many, the most comfortable means of managing migrants, so long as a repeat of 2015 was avoided. This lukewarm conviction resulted in September 2020 with the European Pact on Migration and Asylum, typifying how cumbersome it is to find a lasting solution amidst such dissensus. The EU finds itself in a state of institutional inertia in this regard, at pains to forge a path forward, all the while ~4 million displaced Syrians now reside in Turkey, with that set to rise should the inertia continue. We can thus attach little more than a moral ambiguity to Knaus, who operated as he saw best fit in complex circumstances and worked amongst institutions in a state of utter disarray.

The EU-Turkey deal has been an exercise which has attempted to manage a moment of crisis. However, the political line which was followed was an exercise in restoring the

status quo not on changing it. The restoration of the situation in one area has created a novel situation elsewhere. While the major debate has been going on around Greece and Italy, events in Cyprus have subsequently thrown it into the very centre of migration affairs. Cyprus became one of the central alternative routes into Europe, with a circuitous avenue available across the green line as well as into the Republic by sea.

The regime complex in Nicosia is without comprehension if these institutional developments and the discourses surrounding them are left without investigation. They shine light on the institutions, ideas and discourses which shape the bureaucratic and socio-political context of Cyprus up to a certain point. But how have these structures taken hold and what impact have they had? To bridge the gap between the prior institutional developments and how the regime might be read it's important to see how Cyprus has reacted to the stimuli of migration in other circumstances, how the institutions of Cyprus have shaped the regime complex in previous engagements with migration and where the socio-material subtext of this melange can be perceived. Ultimately, it will enable use of this layered knowledge to project our understanding onto recent happenings and extract new meaning from them.

Contemporary Discourse

8. Treatment of Minorities and the Changing Face of Cypriot Discrimination

The arrival of asylum seekers was not the first instance of the regime complex in Cyprus (a different complex with many of the same constituents) coming to terms with those identifying outside the Greek Cypriot - Turkish Cypriot dichotomy. Both before and after partition, many of these same dynamics have been faced by a range of groups with historic claims to Cypriot identity as well as migrants new to Cyprus. This question regarding outgroups is useful to pose, as evidence for this may help us answer further questions about what the expected treatment for *new* types of outgroups may be. Academic work has considered how these mass movements affected minority populations that also existed in Cyprus, such as recognised Armenian and unrecognised Roma minorities. Roma communities have fared badly in their treatment by Cypriot society. Specific instances include a shocking episode where a nationalist motivated

murder of 14-year-old Salih Mehmet Ez Houvarda was played down by authorities in the Republic in 2004 (Trimikliniotis & Demetriou, 2009, p. 247). More broadly, the names used to refer to Roma people by the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot community alike are wholly derogatory. The length and breadth of their problems, including housing without access to basic necessities such as running water or heating are well known to authorities (Trimikliniotis & Demetriou, p. 245). Wholesale discrimination, general suspicion, and allegations of *causing trouble* from residents and a distancing of Roma people from both communities are common knowledge. Upon the arrival of a new group of Roma from the North when the travel restrictions between North and South were eased, the Minister of Justice accused them of being *Turkish Spies* and a separate pronouncement by the Minister of Interior assured the Greek-Cypriot community that authorities "shall take care to move them to an area that is far away from any place where there are any people living" in response to racially motivated fears (Trimikliniotis & Demetriou, p. 246). The spatial element of this language is provocative. Likewise, in the TRNC, there was a case taken by the Roma community residing in the TRNC against Turkey in 1994 at the ECHR. The case was based upon a number of arbitrary arrests and the demolition of their houses on the North side of the island. They had accusations of being *fake asylum seekers* levelled against them by the TRNC based on supposed sporadic migration to the south to claim asylum benefits before returning to the North to live off these allowances. The situation for internal discrimination in the TRNC is accounted for by Navaro-Yashin (2006) who provides a remarkable testament to how complicated the relationships between Turkish-Cypriots and Turkish settlers arriving since 1974 has become. The work quotes the socio-cultural capital employed by Turkish-Cypriots as an example of how the ethno-nationalist logic in the North is not only multifaceted but seemingly aligns the interests of all Cypriots.

Figure 4. A sign reads 'your wall cannot divide us' near the abandoned UN75 outpost in eastern Nicosia. Source: Brian O'Shea (2020).

The identity of Cypriot, whether Greek-Cypriot of Turkish-Cypriot had become an increasingly legitimate one. This was exemplified by the results of the Annan Plan vote in 2004 which sought to unite the island as the United Cyprus Republic in advance of the Republic's accession to the European Union. Passed by 65% on the Northern side the Annan Plan was rejected by a three-quarter majority of Greek Cypriots for what they considered numerous immediate concessions to Turkish-Cypriot demands while relegating Greek-Cypriot returns to the future. There was also a case that Tassos Papadopoulos, a Greek nationalist had won the election against Clerides not long before the vote and encouraged Greek Cypriots to reject it (Groom, 2007) However, overwhelmingly, the Turkish state, the citizenship of settlers and future presence of the Turkish military on the island comprised the biggest sticking points (Chadjipadelis & Andreadis, 2007). The failure to pass the Annan plan fuelled significant distrust between both sides and caused a spike in the fanning of nationalist sentiment.

The overwhelming rejection of the UN peace plan for the resolution of the Cyprus problem in 2004 led to a rise in nationalistic sentiments and to an intolerant atmosphere which was quickly taken up and exploited by opportunistic populist politicians who aimed at ensuring the delegitimization and rejection and of all future U.N. peace plans. The election of a left-wing government in 2008 meant a change in the official discourse but at the same time an intensification of negative depictions of migrants and Turkish Cypriots from opposition politicians and opposition media, seeking to undermine the new government's immigration policy and efforts to reach a settlement over the Cyprus problem (Trimikliniotis & Demetriou, 2012, p. 2).

The emergence and re-emergence of the Cyprus problem as a driver of nationalism and xenophobia seems to predetermine an environment rife with institutional discrimination towards any conceivable *other*. Even a change to the official discourse can reinvigorate the hegemony of the latent narrative which can rely on the deeply entrenched personal stories to oversee its health during these times of challenge to its supremacy. This is the significance of understanding the longevity afforded to a regime as a multi-temporal edifice acting in obstinate defiance against efforts aimed at change. The convolutions of this predisposition has seen latent nationalism provoked by opposition and media act as the discriminatory seed sown by these institutional actors sprouts in the social landscape of Nicosia, where ethnicized symbols and concerted institutional narratives paint a hateful picture of a city and its people torn asunder. In this final cross-sectional part of our discursive institutional developments and regime coproduction, the thesis will quickly expand on more contemporary forms of discrimination with respect to migrants and discuss the discourses and institutional framing which led to discriminatory landscapes.

9. Perpetuation of Institutionally Embedded Discrimination and Discourse surrounding Asylum Seekers.

Since the mid 2000's the Republic of Cyprus has transformed from a country experiencing net emigration to a country experiencing net immigration. The nature of this migration has been diverse, comprising elite migrants, economic migrants from the Balkan and South East Asia as well political migrants (Trimikliniotis & Demetriou, 2017). This acceleration came as access opened up due to the Republic's admission to the EU as well as regional unrest. A large proportion of this migration existed on the presupposition that it would be temporary, the institutional and visa arrangements in the country assured that assumption. The attractive conditions led to an influx of migrants arriving to Cyprus for work. Unhappy with the optics, the then government put in place a lacklustre and failed quota system which simply invited strong anti-immigrant lines of discussion to develop in the media and in political spheres. It is not difficult to see the parallels between these discourses and those arising in European fora during the 1990's. Trimikliniotis (2013) argues these lines were drawn as a result of a misconceived notion of sovereignty. The paper centres the treatment of migrants, specifically subaltern migrants, and asylum seekers as a manifestation of the Cypriot *state of exception*. "The invocation of 'exception' seems to blur the distinction between 'legality' and 'illegality' and 'normal' and 'abnormal' " (Trimikliniotis, 2013, p. 448). This allows the sovereign entity wide discretion as to when to invoke the state of emergency as fits their needs. The discretion has arisen *de jure* since 1963 and was termed the *doctrine of necessity* after the *Ibrahim Aziz v Republic of Cyprus* case. The doctrine allowed exceptions to certain Constitutional provisions to ensure the existence of the state. The immigration authorities in Cyprus have typically been afforded wide discretion in matters related to immigration and the use of detention for undefined periods of time, heavy handedness by police and a complete lack of a proper integration framework, in contravention of the harmonising agenda of the European Union. Asylum seekers have suffered under this programme and the prevailing attitudes and hostility to the *other* as was developed earlier. A *dissensus* which exists in the wider European debate on integration is particularly potent in the Cypriot situation. "What is construed as a fundamental disagreement, is the connection between national identity and migration and the incorporation of the ethnic/national 'Other' within the boundaries of the 'nation'" (Trimikliniotis, 2013, p. 460).

The Cypriot banking crisis of 2013 has pitted migrants against Cypriots in a manner that is latched onto by anti-immigrant tendencies in society, stoking fears and inciting hatred in the media and in the public discourse. "Moreover, the economic problems have been exploited to the full by the various anti-immigrant groups: the climate over migration is painted in negative terms by the media and public discourses" (Trimikliniotis, 2013, p. 458) The election of the conservative Democratic Rally (DISY) in 2013 to the present laid down a hard-line immigration policy as a matter of law and order. In addition, the party ELAM (National People's Front) was founded in 2008 as a sister party to the Greek Golden Dawn in 2008. From a 1% record of votes in 2011 the party had 2 members elected to the Cypriot House of Representative in 2016, in May 2021, that representation rose to 4 seats. There has been additional work concerning the creation of national identity in the online extremist discourse (Baider & Constantinou, 2017) The proliferation of these discourses in the public sphere has created new disempowerment and added challenges for a group which has encountered difficulty in the vindication of their rights. Another study examining how the use of metaphors contributes to co-constructions and shared representations of migration in Poland and Cyprus. It considers that the frequency of a given negative metaphor's appearance online is an indicator as well as a driver of saliency (Baider & Kopytowska, 2017). Of note here is how common the usage of *illegal migrant* and the metaphors associated with it were far more numerous in the data compared to refugee or migrant which tallies well with what we would have expected given the Cypriot history of those words. Though, the connotations of the word are changing. In the Northern part of the island there is equally, a prevailing narrative in the media and in the public sphere channelling hatred towards migrants. There has been a consistent reaffirmation of certain damaging stereotypes which are accounted for in the Hate Speech in Public Discourse in Cyprus Report (2020). The lack of a proper asylum architecture and the lack of a refugee architecture except the small initiative run by the UNHCR creates a situation where terminology is less specific, and the special meaning attached to *refugee* does not occur as it does in the Republic of Cyprus.

10. Nicos Nouris

The most notable example of institutional discourse which degrades asylum seekers has come from the Interior Ministry of the RoC, not least the Minister himself, Nicos Nouris. In June 2020 the government announced its migration and asylum policy which it named *Humanely and Resolutely* (Government of the Republic of Cyprus, 2020). The release of the policy was adjoined to a large media campaign where the Minster began to employ a number of rhetorical devices to make his point with regard to the policy.

> Cyprus and the Cypriots in 1974 experienced war and the plight of refugees and have first-hand knowledge of what it means to be a real refugee. It follows that we know very well when to lend a helping hand to our fellow human beings, who are in real danger. (2020, p1)

What could superficially be conceived as a humanistic opening to his speech sets out an agenda quite clearly. The qualifier *real* placed before refugee and danger as a precondition is an unequivocally exclusionary device. The saviour/victim complex is established in the first part of the sentence as Nouris establishes Cypriots as the arbiters of need. However, he refers only to some Cypriots. His construction and delimitation to 1974 implicitly excludes Turkish Cypriots, who also experienced mass displacement in the years before 1974. This opening remark is interesting as it attempts to do similar things to what the EU did, appealing to two sets of sensibilities in his communication. This is a recurring phenomenon in European fora and has most recently been seen during the launch of the European Pact on Migration and Asylum from September 2020. Commenting on the launch, Clare Daly MEP noted:

> So, look, there is going to be something in it, that there's going to have to be more, you know, a sharing of responsibility. That idea of it being left in the smog. But the worrying thing about it, it still seems to be very much rooted in the idea of returns. And every time So to me, she was talking over two sides of her mouth. On the one hand, she was saying, you know, you know, there's going to be... you know, people shouldn't be left to die at sea. But then on the other hand, she was kind of

a little bit sort of saying 'Oh, this, there will be a new policy, but there will be loads of returns in it as well', you know?" (Interview, 2020).

This double speak also applies to Nouris, who avoids any overtly xenophobic statements whilst reinforcing the existing institutional frameworks. Nouris has effectively reified two sets of discourses which we have alluded to elsewhere and identified substantively. Although he has operated in a somewhat similar manner as for example, Rauf Denktaş, his adherence to the institutional line, plus scant evidence that he prompted any sort of change aside from deepening an existing rift disqualifies him from joining the ranks of the idea entrepreneurs.

What this has taught us is how deeply entrenched ideas exist as institutional logics. The ultimate outcome of this is that the regime complex has an existence which is at once, embodied by and entirely separate from the institutional actors which compose and co-produce it. The intricate mechanism by which institutional understanding streams downward along the scales of governance demonstrates why reading the regime becomes so important. Attributing significance correctly is difficult but such a cross sectionality which allows us to consider the role and limitations of political agency within institutional setups allows us to encounter the contributing elements and assess them in their context. It is true that the map that has been constructed is not as quantifiable in its use of metrics as statistics but the point of this is to excavate the link between institutions and asylum seeker's socio-spatial relationship with the city of Nicosia.

VI Map

The data is based off of our constructed 68 entry database. Map can be accessed at this link:

https://boshea.carto.com/builder/dc1398e9-0fbf-436b-be8a-3d8a557e12a1/embed

Figure 5. Landscape cgaracteristics displayed with typology example shown.


Figure 6. Density of recorded landscape characteristics.

Figure 7. Time series visualisation of landscape characteristics. Graph on right shows increasing presence in later years.


Figure 8. Localised time series example centred on Pournara camp.

VII Results

The creation of the map was a challenge of applied theory. From the perspective of theory, the work has largely been done and crafting the bridging points between the levels of investigation - from discursive institutionalism, via idea entrepreneurs and

finally through to the regime complex in order give us the chance to recognise landscape characteristics was comparatively simple as the academic work provides a reference. The application required some innovation and dexterity in how the first levels were put into use. Landscape characteristics remained too vague and needed a way to be operationalised. Viewing our map requires a brief analysis of the dataset which underpins it and how data points have come to be represented on the map. What was discovered when analysing the landscape characteristics was that they exhibit four core qualities.

1. Action
2. Infrastructure/Ephemeral
3. Direction of Narration
4. Primary & Secondary Regime

Because of the limitations hindering the building of the dataset it is hard to draw any statistical significance from these numbers. One such problem is the fact that it is not possible to date all the data points. While this hinders the use of the map as a concrete quantitative tool, that was never its primary intention. Instead, it was the intent of this map to trend towards a qualitative tool which can be used as a useful companion to quantitative tools to learn from the regimes complex being mapped. Be that as it may, if the map was maintained on a longitudinal and collective basis, it would be possible to reduce some of the issues that arose as a result of the more qualitative approach to the mapping exercise. With more attention and multiple contributors, the timeframe of new landscape characteristics could be administered with greater accuracy. If it was maintained by people with local knowledge or those with a stake in the regime complex, the inside knowledge means that a better dataset could be produced using the same framework.

1. Action

The building of a map of landscape characteristics is an exercise in discovery. One must seek out the landscape characteristics to map them. Landscape

characteristics are determined in the first instance by an action, something that happened and that can be perceived as a landscape characteristic. Without knowing what happened, any attempt to apply theoretical knowledge fails at the first point of interrogation. The mixed methods applied to discover and thus inform the dataset led us to conclude that a mixed methods approach is not only advisable but critical to the proper functioning of the map. For example, having taken a few photographs, done interviews, and taken observations during the fieldwork, it was important to scour the media for events that took place outside of the fieldwork period. Clearly a huge majority of the things happening in Nicosia occurred outside of physical attendance between December 2020 and January 2021. It became apparent, having spoken to a number of people working with asylum seekers that the general line in the media was of a far different animal to that which was being delivered by oral testimony and interview. It was thus necessary to ensure a concerted effort was made to establish any bias in the articles and to strip these sentiments down to the most essential facts minus extraneous detail or encroaching opinion.

To adopt this approach to media is important in the media landscape of Cyprus. The Cyprus Mail for example, was bought by Andreas Neocleous in 2019. The President pardoned the son of Neocleous who received a 1.5 year jail sentence for bribery (OCCRP, 2019). These sorts of dynamics are important to consider, affecting the editorial line and content. This is evidence that the representations on this map may be skewed towards maintaining the institutional narrative, with Anastasiades a member of the ruling Democratic Rally Party (DISY). Maniou noted that media that emerged in the same timeline as the state, as is the case in Cyprus present patterns of vulnerabilities vis a vis clientelism (2017). As such, these communications also contribute to societal discourses and coproduce parts of the existing regime.

The most common actor in the map is the government of the Republic of Cyprus and our most common reference source is the Cyprus Mail. It comes as no surprise that there is a trend of sorts in the type of information that ends up in the map and how this information was distilled and represented in terms of the other criteria. Oftentimes, the actions are undertaken by other agencies or bodies of the state, which has the same

impact from a narration point of view, whether that be actions attributed to the Police or the Ministry of Interior as two prime examples. It is also worth noting that some landscape characteristics are not necessarily an action per se. This sort of analysis links nicely with the following point of data interpretation.

2. Infrastructural (Prominent or Integrated) and Ephemeral features

Defining a landscape characteristic becomes a slightly more nuanced affair after the primary action has been established. Some actions involving asylum seekers are in a state of constant flux, they exist momentarily and are then gone, these will be addressed shortly. However, some actions, such as the building (or removing) of a fence is something that can be identified by looking for it. This kind of action is the easiest sort of characteristic to discover because it exhibits itself prominently often with a tangible physicality aiding recognition. This sort of characteristic might tentatively be called *infrastructural* and by this we refer to the existing academic term of *migrant infrastructure*. Lin et al (2017) engaged in work which characterised infrastructure in mobilities as "the manifest forms of moorings and fixities that help order and give shape to mobilities" (2017, p1). This is readily applicable to describe infrastructure which we describe as prominent. However, as Sheller (2010) notes, infrastructure is also characterised by certain affordances like internet access, legal documentations, and credit cards. For example, there was a texting campaign which was aimed at targeting the mobile phones of would-be asylum seekers to dissuade them from arriving in Cyprus. This created a grey area due to the lack of an eminent and manifest *wave* in Nicosia and we recognised a clarification was necessary. Therefore, within infrastructure, a further division was necessary between infrastructure which is prominent and that which is integrated. A radio broadcast emerges as having an integrated infrastructural feature when it is recognised as a landscape characteristic. The mobile network infrastructure itself is not readily to be recognised as something to do with asylum seekers, but combined with the action, narrative and regime, it is apparent that it is most definitely a landscape characteristic in this regard. The difficulty arises with allocating a physical reference point for such a large area of coverage, but this difficulty was overcome by prescribing a single point to the Ministry involved. The

important thing to note about infrastructure is that it represents something manifest and noteworthy in its socio-material form.

That which is ephemeral is an entirely different proposition. The idea of the *ephemeral city* was initially provoked from Lefebvre's interrogation of the *right to the city* when he discussed the ever-changing nature of the city, its movements, encounters, and possibilities creating ephemerality (1968). These traits are recognisable in any city and by any person. It was Trimikliniotis et al (2015) who took the ephemeral idea and noted that space too becomes a definitive part of the precarity of the subaltern migrant life, describing it as a mobile commons which was again defined to "locate the trail, the marks or scratches punctuated on the global canvas of precarity of people constantly on the move" (p. 1037). This idea has been exceptionally useful in describing the existence of certain data which was essential to represent on the map. Socio-material happenings that spatialised through their enactment before the participants again drifted away leaving nothing behind to indicate any happening. Alternatively, the mark that does remain operates only as an echo of the former action the site bore witness to. As a result of this, each landscape characteristic could be appraised not solely on an action, but also on the conjured impact of this action on the landscape. The apparition and disapparition of these were noticed to indicate a certain narrative force bound to the actions. What is meant by this is that in general, prominent infrastructures were generally far more likely to be a constituent part of state architecture, which operate as narrative beacons across Nicosia. This relates heavily to the intermittent exchange of local histories with the built environment and state's subsumption of these local histories into their overriding narrative referenced earlier in this work. Instead, now the narrative channel being propagated is again a securitarian storytelling of existing anti migrant discourses. The narratives contained within infrastructures tended to constitute the state narrative but there were also counter narratives and alternative narratives pockmarking Nicosia which we will now discuss.

3. Direction of Narration

A landscape characteristic could be viewed as something that constituted, reconstituted, or undermined a narrative. These narratives themselves were necessary to divide between hegemonic narratives, counternarratives and alternative narratives. This was a fascinating finding as this aspect would not have been clear had the discursive institutionalist approach not been taken.

There has been much attention given to dominant narratives in this paper, which in the case of asylum seekers is done with reference to them as a threat to wealth, health, and identity. The idea of counter and alternative narratives offers an important means of challenge and disrupt these dominant narrative forces. This has been explored by Butcher & Neidhardt (2020) who offered the following definitions.

Counter Narrative: A communication strategy that tries to directly oppose a particular false claim or narrative by uncovering lies and untruths and by discrediting disinformation actors. See alternative narrative.

Alternative Narrative: A type of messaging that promotes a story or subject which is different from that promoted by disinformation actors. Alternative narratives focus on what society stands for, rather than against. Unlike counternarratives, alternative narratives do not seek to respond directly to or rebuke an existing false narrative, but rather try to reframe the debate and shift the attention away from the threats and fears propagated by disinformation actors. (2020, p.2)

It is important to note that not all actions are communications. Instead, actions should be understood as potential embodiments of certain communicated institutional messages or otherwise operating within a narrative landscape. For example, a pair of shorts caught in a fence was photographed, which itself is not a communication. But what this photograph communicates is a symbol of a counternarrative against the institutionally imposed securitisation of the border. This can be held in comparison to the initial act of securitising the green line, which itself is a reconstitution of the dominant narrative which acts against the transit of asylum seekers through the green line.

This is not of exact science and there is nuance here as well. The protest taken by asylum seekers outside the migration office might equally be a counter narrative or an alternative narrative depending on the intentions of the non-homogenous group of participants. Some carried signs which give a great insight into this diversity but also an example of explicit communication in a largely silenced minority group. 'Idleness is killing us' read one sign which operates as a counter narrative against the idea that migrants simply arrive to receive payments from the state. However, some signs held alternative narratives. One sign read *In 1974 Africa welcomes Cypriot Refugees, remember the story*. This message aims at building a historic rapport based on a lost story, building solidarity between Africans and Cypriots. There can be little doubt that this is an evocative communication tool which has the potential to elicit sympathy in not only directly impacted Cypriots but a grander audience too. The labour protest is an example of why sometimes actions can embody alternative narratives as well as counter narratives and why this aspect of landscape characteristics is one of the most thought provoking. The creative navigation needed to make assertions as to the type of impact an action has on a given narrative and what it embodies makes it the most difficult aspect of the four, we recognised as constituents of landscape characteristics but the resulting utility of this makes it an extremely interesting finding.

4. Regime Involvement Primary/Secondary/Tertiary

In an environment where any number of interrelated regimes might be relevant within an overarching regime complex, there is a risk that references to the entire regime complex in abstraction might lead to a less rigorous appraisal. There has been a huge amount of work done on individual regimes and the thesis is not aimed at specifically addressing the individual characteristics of how they all operate, this is a somewhat fruitless task as the reality dictates that they do not operate in isolation from one another. That said, within any given action it is possible to identify the dominant regime or regimes that any action is primarily/secondarily concerned with. The use of this is that it enables a more specific and tangible form to the reading of the regime complex rather than expecting the complex's constituent regimes to be equitably involved in every

operation of the complex. The number of regimes which take a role in the complex is also oscillating within Nicosia. Along the green line, the border regime is of course an extremely prominent feature, whereas in Pournara camp in Kokkinotrimithia, the humanitarian regime and asylum regime are in the main, primordial. This is the final element of the landscape characteristics that brings together all of what we have identified and determine the provenance of any given landscape characteristic, where an action derives from and crucially, how, once understood, it might be combatted or supported.

VII Discussion

1. Operationalisation: Using knowledge to achieve better outcomes

At this point, we can acknowledge that our research questions have been answered, having identified the origin of ideas and actors in the institutions of Cyprus and then crafting a means of explaining why these ideas directed the formation of landscape characteristics within the paradigm of the regime complex, a technique which allowed us to recognise the socio-spatial form of Nicosia's asylum seeker influx in recent years. We have already operationalised the definition of a landscape characteristic by recognising four core features which enabled us to plot these significant points of interest based on the available information. The grander question then is what purpose this process can serve. We referenced the work of Kusiak (2018) about learning from hegemonic systems to undermine them. Despite the supremacy of the government institutions in Cyprus, a media machine which supports it and a general stasis in Europe surrounding progress towards real and humane solutions for incoming migrants it is the position of this paper that many of its lessons can be put into usage as strategies for achieving these better outcomes in urban environments for both asylum seekers and broader society.

Our analysis of idea entrepreneurs proved to be a revelation by answering some of the questions posed by Petridou & Mintrom (2020) about how to analyse idea entrepreneurs. By recognising the techniques of idea entrepreneurs, within a context

and the widespread change they enact we gain an insight into how grand change in the field of migration can be invoked using many of the same techniques. What is required are those who have the guile and bravery that would be required to work in what can be a hostile environment for those who wish to speak out. An eminent example of how hostile is the work of KISA, an anti-racism organisation in Nicosia who have a very particular governance structure set up as an association to maintain their voice in a manner that some charities are unable to do. In June 2021 their appeal to the Administrative Court against the decision to deregister KISA from the Register of Associations on loose technical grounds was rejected. Their accounts had been frozen since February 2021 (KISA, 2021). These acts by the institutions of state validate the idea that this is a hostile environment to act in and that the unravelling of hegemonic logics which have been established through the years will be an exceptionally difficult task. However, the case of KISA's deregistration is itself an opportunity to highlight the hypocrisy of the institutions of state. Despite the freezing of its accounts KISA have continued to be a thorn in the side of those who espouse anti-immigrant narratives and the attention. The move by Cyprus has been met with international backlash from prominent organisations such as Amnesty International amongst almost 40 organisations across Europe who joined in calls for the Republic of Cyprus government to reverse the decision (PICUM, 2021). The potential here is that a successful campaign could both raise the case of KISA into the spotlight both North and South of the island as well as internationally. If KISA is reinstated it would prove a massive disruption to the tools the Republic of Cyprus had at its disposal to subvert those acting as champions for asylum seekers and their rights. With that would come an opportunity to begin to dispossess the state of its monumental capacity to shape the narrative without rebuke. The corruption scandals that have plagued the island in recent years, particularly the *Golden Passport* scheme also shines a light on the hypocrisy of the state narrative who seemed happy to offer citizenship to financial criminals in exchange for investment but concurrently will pontificate on the demographic replacement when it comes to asylum seekers. It is in the context of these cracks in the dominant narratives that the steely entrepreneur might emerge and make a discernible difference.

2. Crafting new forms of communication in the face of a difficult to navigate landscape - breaking institutional dominance of narrative

Figure 9. Graffiti with a pro-migrant message adorns a wall near the green line in Eastern Nicosia. Source – Brian O'Shea (2020).

Butcher & Neidhart (2020) in their work on challenging disinformation related to migrants offered some commentary on how these narratives can be changed with the use of alternative narratives. Their work suggests that there are three channels of focus which must be pursued for this to happen. Within these three channels they proffer specific strategies which can be utilised to bring about change using alternative narratives.

The message

The message should aim to reframe the debate. It should resonate with the target audience's lived experience, acknowledging their values and concerns, but avoid amplifying anxieties. Messages promoting alternative narratives must be timely and reflect the news cycle. Like a vaccine administered at regular intervals, communicators should repeat simple, specific messages that can prompt the best immune response against hostile frames spread by disinformation (p. 5).

The medium

The medium should aim to restore trust among groups. Institutions, which are often subject to discrediting campaigns, should prioritise communication through trusted intermediaries who can get messages to the hard-to-reach. They should work in partnership with civil society and local actors to deliver coordinated messages in the right environments. They should seek to reach people 'where they are' using the most appropriate communication channel, taking into consideration where their audience consumes information (p. 5).

The audience

The selection of the audience should aim to reclaim readers from the fringes. Audiences should be targeted based on their values and what they feel is important. To gain a first hearing, communicators should find an 'entry point' where the messenger and audience share common ground. All communicators seeking to promote a more balanced debate should aim to develop messages that can support a single overarching meta-narrative: for example, that migration is a normal phenomenon that can bring benefits to European societies if managed effectively and in full respect of fundamental human rights (p. 5).

This work is extremely important as it lists out affirmative actions which can be taken in order to tackle disinformation and certain anti-migrant narratives. However, there are some caveats to this. The paper requires that strong policy backs up these

efforts to achieve better communication outcomes and insulate listeners to negative messaging. Obviously, this is a problem when the central authorities are using migrants to meet certain political needs. All is not lost, however. At the level of local government in Nicosia, notably in the Lefkoşa Belediyesi there have been programs taking place to support asylum seekers in the Northern part of the city. It is at this scale of government that the greatest net gains in applying policy called for by the paper are possible, where the rift between the state and the city can reap rewards. The project is co-funded by the European Union. This gives a number of opportunities to break down negative portrayals at several scales of governance. If the dominance of the state narratives can be broken down via communication strategies and progressive policy be enacted at the level of the city, great strides could be made. What is more, there are positive signs which suggest that people are ready to learn about the struggles of asylum seekers as one of our interviewees said. These progressions are important indicators of the possibilities of forging a new Cyprus with new narratives, this is clearly linked to the omnipresent Cyprus problem negotiations.

Figure 10. In central Nicosia a manned watch post bears a sign which reads 'remember Cyprus' with a representation of blood tripping from the occupied North. Source – Brian O'Shea (2020).

3. Cyprus problem : Recognise that the problem is tightly bound to the ethnic history of the island and that solving this problem is inextricably linked to this

We have paid attention in this thesis to the causal link between the ethnic tensions between the two main communities of Cyprus and how this is linked to the discourse on migrants. The negotiations to reorient the relationship between the two communities of Cyprus are not the main concern of this thesis but the principles of engagement between the two communities are clearly key. We saw how the fears of Turkish Cypriots were stoked in the face of Greek Cypriot nationalism. The nationalisms which emerged from the twentieth century play a central role in how the lives of asylum seekers are dictated in Nicosia. For this reason, there can be very little doubt that without a solution to this and the Cyprus problem, the aim of achieving a more welcoming city for those seeking asylum will be likely unachievable. The lack of contact between the two communities keeping alive fear resembles closely other work exploring examples of intergroup contact theory. One of our interviews was with Dimitrios Xefteris of the University of Cyprus who designed the study behind a piece of work aptly named *Does exposure to the refugee crisis make natives more hostile* (Hangartner et al., 2019). It was found that direct exposure resulted in increased hostility towards refugees and support for exclusionary policy. It is shown that the marginal contact that the Greek islanders surveyed, and the refugees was not enough to break down the barriers between the groups. From the interview with the Head of the People's Council of Kokkinotrimithia, something similar appears to be taking place there as a result of Pournara (interview, 2020). What can really be taken away from this is that no meaningful progress can take place without meaningful engagement between different groups of people. How that is achieved is a matter for the people of Cyprus, inner Nicosia has proved to be a trailblazer in this regard. The bicommunal city plan in the city is a huge leap forward and aims to create more intercommunity links by designing a city that prepares for more sharing of its common heritage and a focus on that which unites. These projects bode well for the potential of dealing with the latent racism and xenophobia which shadows the motherhood nationalisms of Cyprus.

4.Disrupting Europe: Cyprus has an opportunity to disrupt securitarian narrative on migration as a result of its unique character - Nicosia at heart of this

Nicosia as we have discussed is a unique city in Europe. As the sole capital split down its centre, the Northern side is effectively, though not technically outside the EU. The remit of the EU stops at the green line. At a time when many countries are erecting fences, Greece, Bulgaria as two prime examples on the Turkish border and more recently countries bordering Belarus, Cyprus lies in at the mercy of its long and penetrable sea border and a highly porous green line, despite the best efforts of the Ministry of Interior. What the Ministry of the Interior sees as a negative is one of the greatest opportunities Europe has to break the rightward shift in the narrative towards securisation and fear mongering. In our literature review we mentioned the example of Riace in Italy, where a migrant integration programme proved hugely successful both economically and socially for all residents. This reality was disrupted through the election of a right-wing government. The fate of many in Nicosia who count themselves amongst the cohort of asylum seekers is deeply uncertain and they face a host of administrative, social, racial, and personal struggles daily. A proper integration program has the potential to again disrupt the dominant narratives across a multitude of governance scales from the EU level down to the Republic and TRNC alike. Nicosia's greatest purported frailty could prove to be its biggest strength if the correct matrix of actors combines and enable a valid and cohesive integration program to be formed in place of the ramshackle assortment of arrangements asylum seekers currently battle through. This opportunity is not to be understated and is in the opinion of the writer, of huge European significance.

VIII Further research

The research that we have engaged in has solved a problem that the social sciences has often faced, how to tell social stories using technical tools. The potential for further research from the process we have engaged in is exciting. The work could be

particularly useful in other arrival cities where a combination of institutional narratives merge forming their own unique regime complexes, triggering its own unique set of landscape characteristics. By following the multi-step formula, it would be enlightening to see the results across Europe and elsewhere which would allow us to read the regimes and enlighten this field of socio-spatial research in urban studies.

IX Conclusion

The idea that Cyprus is too small and cannot host the number of asylum seekers it has which has been touted the powers that be in the public sphere is demonstrably a political game, especially in the comparative economic case of the Republic and the admission by Minister Nouris in 2020 that the country in fact does have the capacity to host the refugees it has. There are numerous examples of this line being espoused by those in power and at no stage have the economic indicators or strain on social programs suggested that this is true. In many respects, the arrival of asylum seekers in Cyprus have done far more to show the shortcomings of the respective governments than they have to cause any chronic or pattern problems themselves. This is despite the terrible conditions they face on the back of a hostile institutional reception. In this manner, the onset of asylum seeker arrivals on foot of the EU-Turkey Deal has done far more to show the ridges of historical societal and economic ailments in the Republic, the TRNC and indeed the EU as well as the hypocrisies of the institutions than it has shown asylum seekers as the cause of any lasting problems. Or at least, problems that could not be solved with a proper integration program and a more receptive regime complex, given that some problems have been encountered. Vapid calls for solidarity fall on deaf ears across Europe. Transpiring events in Afghanistan and Belarus suggest that numbers seeking a pathway to Europe will rise and take on diverse forms. In Ukraine, a delicate geopolitical situation and a massive frontier with multiple EU countries means that the possibility for a return to the logics of the late 1980's and early 1990's is ever present. Lebanon remains in an economic crisis with services and cohesion at breaking point. That is not to even mention the huge uncertainty over the strength of Europe's relationship with Turkey and the Maghreb nations. Events in Nicosia as such, where asylum seekers are generally concentrated, a group whose

representation now stands at 4 % of the general population, could serve as a test bed for properly and humanely managing this transitory phenomenon as it rises elsewhere irrespective of whether a country sees them as legitimate or not. What this means is that solidarity in Europe, if it really exists, might be best placed with asylum seekers in the small Mediterranean border society. The conditions may prove to be a useful analogue for future asylum cityscapes in Europe and aid in the preparation for events yet to unfold. It would certainly be a prudent strategy and a useful place to start.

When it comes to the palpable undermining of a system, Cyprus provides some interesting perspectives to conclude on. Some of the actions of asylum seekers stand as an unwitting undermining of the state's hegemonic ideals. The woes faced by the Republic of Cyprus in its attempts to exert control of its borders is well documented. The Humanely and Resolutely Policy was an admission that the government of the RoC believes that up to 75% of asylum seekers arriving into the country are arriving from the occupied territories (Government of the Republic of Cyprus, 2020). The tone of the admission alludes to a discord in the reasoning, as in spite of their efforts, asylum seekers can circumvent the state's infrastructures. This is far removed from the notion of a single legitimate, unified and powerful state actor when they have such a struggle to erect an effective fence. In a certain sense, the refugees are already undermining the system by taking advantage of the border politics of the island. If a new meta narrative can paint a different understanding of these events, progress is possible

Consolidating a meta narrative on the island will be extremely difficult but there is space for idea entrepreneurs to forge smaller gains which could set in motion this narrative reconstruction on a much broader scale. The spaces emerging already for this indicate that councils play a role, civil society organisations play a role and refugees themselves can play a role.

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XII Appendix One List of Figures and Tables

Figure 5. Landscape characteristics displayed with typology example shown.

Figure 6. Density of recorded landscape characteristics.

Figure 7. Time series visualisation of landscape characteristics. Graph on right shows increasing presence in later years.

Figure 8. Localised time series example centred on Pournara camp.

Figure 9. Graffiti with a pro-migrant message adorns a wall near the green line in Eastern Nicosia. Source – Brian O'Shea (2020).

Figure 10. In central Nicosia a manned watch post bears a sign which reads 'remember Cyprus' with a representation of blood tripping from the occupied North. Source – Brian O'Shea (2020).