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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CoC	Commission of Census
BCS	Bureau of Census and Statistics
PSA	Philippine Statistical Association
UNTAP	United Nations Technical Assistance Program
OSCAS	Office of Statistical Coordination and Standards
NEC	National Economic Council
STC	Statistics Training Center

1 INTRODUCTION

> "History has remained a Janus-faced discipline that interacts as often with and draws theoretically and analytically as broadly from the humanities, arts, and philosophy as from demography, sociology, anthropology, economics, geography, or political science."[1]

Public discourses on migration tend to handle the topic as if it were the first time humanity has encountered such a *phenomenon* or – as social sciences like to call it – a *problem*. Historical facts and historical research on migrations are often ignored. At least partially, this might be the cause for most societies world wide experiencing an emotionalized debate – may it be optimistic or however, seldom is it close to human daily *praxis*.[2] Having heated debates on humans on the move is nothing new, of course. As Patrick Manning, Jan Lucassen, and Leo Lucassen point out, there are plenty of examples from the nineteenth century – such as the Russian-Jewish migration to London, or the migration of South-Europeans to the United States of America – where 'unreasonable' pessimism took over. Back then, just as today, this pessimism comes (partly) from a rather limited knowledge of the past, and therefore of the *phenomenon* migration.[3]

This is exactly where historians (should) come into play, as they have an important role in forming public opinions. Historians specifically – with their focus on time and temporality – are able to present the *longue durée* and caesura of migration. Fundamentally, historical research on migration can have the power to correct discourses and lead to a broader comprehension of how migration comes to be, who migrates, and why it happens in the first place.[4]

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[1] Gabaccia, Donna: "Time and Temporality in Migration Studies." In: Brettell, Caroline B./Hollifield, James F. (eds.), Migration Theory. Talking Across Disciplines, New York City/Oxon: Routledge, 2015a (2000, 2008). P. 37-66. Here 37.

[2] See Lucassen, Jan/Lucassen, Leo/Manning, Patrick: "Migration History: Multidisciplinary Approaches." In: Lucassen, Jan/Lucassen, Leo/Manning, Patrick (eds.), *Migration History in World History. Multidisciplinary Approaches*, Leiden/Bosten: Brill, 2010. P. 3-38. P. 4.; see Hahn, Sylvia, *Historische Migrationsforschung* (Historische Einführungen, Vol. 11), Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag, 2012. P. 15f.

[3] See Lucassen, Lucassen, Manning, 2010, 4f.

[4] See Lucassen, Lucassen, Manning, 2010, 5., see Hahn, 2012, 15.

I first visited Lebanon in late 2015, the rubbish crisis[5] was in full swing and I studied Arabic, Ottoman history and human rights on a Maronite *isle*, the *Université Saint-Ésprit* in Kaslik, which is some 20 kilometres north of Beirut. It is a rather wealthy region of rather, or at least I encountered well-situated people since I was studying at this private Catholic university. The East-Asian and African read people in their pink or white uniforms in the streets around the university campus became common to me before I understood why they are part of that society. A couple of encounters later – at a friend's place in Jbeil, at a pool in Hamra, in the streets of Mar Mikhael – I grew aware of their role: these busy women with their heads down, were Domestic Workers. I started to see them everywhere, especially at windows and on balconies in Beirut. They were never present or involved in discussions and conversations on domestic work. Seemingly they were everywhere, however, always invisible. Without a proper knowledge on global care migration at that time, I started to wonder how this migration route came into being. During my research on this topic, the sheer amount of activism and studies on Sri Lankans, Filipina, Somalis, etc. was amazing. However, none of these studies were able or at least tried to explain the start of this migration path. Scholars talked and wrote about the *Maids* and *Madams*, but did not mention the causes of this labour migration. With further research, I realised that sources and documents were so fragmented and partial that the limited research status did no longer surprise me.

Though I tried, I was only able to talk to a Filipina, who was working for a friend's neighbour, in the mid of 2016. Later, in 2017, I visited the Migrant Community Centre Beirut[6] and talked to Jenny,[7] the head of this grass root organisation. Besides interesting insights, she also pondered about the fact that every other month a 'white' student or researcher would come to her and interview her, just to use her answers for their publications. Nothing changes, no money, same politics. Since I am an outsider, a white woman from Europe, I decided not to analyse the life of domestic workers, not to reconstruct their migration routes and decisions behind migration in detail. Rather, I would concentrate my Master's thesis on the lack of

[5] Because of cronyism and bad planning, the landfills in Lebanon were full for years; 2015 Sukleen, the company that collects the rubbish of Lebanon, stopped their work. The waste started to pile up in the streets, in particular in the poorer quarters of the country and Beirut. Protests erupted at the end of 2015. Quickly, they became bigger and turned into nationwide demonstrations against the government, the parliament, the elites, the patronage system and, in general, against confessional democracy. These protests have not stopped since then, though the topics changed, like with the August 4 Blast and mismanagement of the Covid-19 crisis and inflation.

[6] The MCC, established in 2011, is part of the Lebanese *Anti-Racism Movement* (ARM). Since Covid-19 hit Lebanon, it has closed. See N.A.: "Migrant Community Center Beirut." In: *Anti-Racism Movement Online.* Last retrieved 27/01/2022. [https://armlebanon.org/migrant-community-center-beirut].

[7] Name changed.

sources and on theoretical approaches on women's migration paths. What is the logic behind these blind spots?

"Most of recorded human history is one big data gap",[8] introduces Carolina Criado Perez her popular scientific book *Invisible Women*.[9] This Master's thesis also centres on the *gender data gap*. Overall, the data on women's temporary work migration in the 1970s, 1980s is scarce, because women in Migration Studies were analysed and researched as dependents of men, passive objects with no own agenda. Women's work migration was therefore mostly invisible in research and only started to be acknowledged in that temporal space. Through whom, for whom, and how does reality get constructed by data? Why were women mostly unseen in quantitative data and interpretations thereof? What is the relationship between theory, data, and migration research? As examples, I chose the census data knowledge production of the Philippines, Lebanon, and as contrasting comparison Israel.

As method to analyse Lebanese and Philippine migration history, I chose Nana Oishi's *Integrative Approach*, which I will expand in chapter 3. For the enumeration forms, I utilise historical comparatistics. Global history specifically, as a historical approach employs comparative studies alongside analyses of connections. Comparative history facilitates the reduction of complexities. This is done most easily when *established* units are compared with each other, or analysed in the light of one another. Traditionally, this would be geographically, organisationally or temporally defined units, such as nation states and institutions or terms of government, which are comparable and not congruent with regard to a research question. This reduction is both an opportunity and a potential pitfall. One danger can be that these units, however chosen, are analysed without their (possible) connections to each other. Moreover, too much emphasis can be put either on commonalities or on differences. Reductionist conclusions might be the result of such studies. However, highlighting important differences and commonalities draws attention to issues that would otherwise have remained invisible in the individual treatment and thus might not have been questioned. A comparison can therefore also be the starting point or impetus for individual studies. As with the study of connections, historical comparisons can highlight complexities, differences, and commonalities and thus sharpen our understanding of global, as well as regional trends.[10]

[8] Criado Perez, Caroline, Invisible Women. Exposing Data Bias in a World Designed for Men, London: Vintage, 2019. P. xi.

[9] See Perez, 2019.

[10] See O'Brien, Patrick: "Historiographical Traditions and Modern Imperatives for the Restauration of Global History." In: Journal of Global History, 1 (2006). P. 3-39. Here 3-7.

Contrary to, or much more alongside the tradition of historicism, historical comparative studies emerged, seeking to learn from history through comparisons and to create indirect sources where no direct ones exist. Which is exactly why I chose this method for my analysis. The documents my analysis is based on are accessible Philippine and Israeli census enumeration forms (1960s to 1980s), as retrieved from US-based *IPUMS-International* (Minnesota).[11] Data gaps are at the centre of my thesis and the source analysis. In that matter, I will not write about what can be seen, but rather what cannot. Analysing blind spots, as I do it, is a feminist practice that helps to contextualise and understand roots, trees and branches of patriarchal, Westernized, white scholarship. To know which questions we cannot answer and why, let the metaphorical glass of gender data gaps appear half *full*.[12] Investigating these blanks in data and scholarship on migration, in this case labour migration of women, can be a hard task if confronted with literally nothing – as in the case of independent Lebanon's census data. For this reason, I chose to utilise a contrast comparison with Israel's enumeration forms. These two regions are intertwined through an intense transfer and connected history; they cannot be compared as if they were separate entities. Besides, this would manifest respective borders. However, as my *tertium comparationis* is retrievable data production in the realm of census history, I will let these connected regions only interact with each other through this context. The interconnectedness, however, has to be kept in mind when utilising a contrast comparison. The *contrast comparison,* as described by Antoon A. van den Braembussche,[13] is an extreme form of an individualising comparison; it pays attention only to differences and views each society as being understood only for itself and not in the context of others. The *individualising comparison*, as defined by Charles Tilly,[14] shows alternative developments of at least two cases. Its purpose therefore is descriptive, heuristic and paradigmatic, so the individual case of Lebanon can be elaborated on; problems can be identified, awareness of historical possibilities can be raised. My intention here is to do an *enlightening and judging comparison* that aims to evaluate the Lebanese in distinction to Israeli census knowledge production.[15]

[11] See IPUMS-International. Last retrieved 05/01/22. URL: [https://international.ipums.org/international].
[12] See Donato, Katharine M./Gabaccia, Donna/Holdaway, Jennifer/ Manalansan IV, Martin/ Pessar, Patricia R.: "A Glass Half Full? Gender in Migration Studies." In: International Migration Review, 40:1 (02/2006). P. 3-26.
[13] See p. 7n15.
[14] See p. 7n15.
[15] see Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard/Kocka, Jürgen: "Historischer Vergleich. Methoden, Aufgaben, Probleme. Eine Einleitung." In: Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard/Kocka, Jürgen (eds.), Geschichte und Vergleich. Ansätze und Ergebnisse international vergleichender Geschichtsschreibung, Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag, 1996. P. 9-45. Here 11., Kaelble, Hartmut, Der historische Vergleich. Eine Einführung zum 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag, 1999. Here 25-34, 48-75., see Kaelble, Hartmut, Historischer Vergleich. Version 1.0, 2012, S. 2f., see

It was clear that I would be discussing the topic from the point of view of a white European woman, who was trained in techniques of Western and Westernised[16] history-writing and understanding. Chapter 2, *International Women's South-South Migration within Historical Migration Studies – the State of the Art*, therefore, has a double meaning for me and for this thesis. On the one hand, I aim to outline how Western humanities and social sciences, as well as how feminist scholarship argue on human mobility. The paper at hand can only be understood as a short, simplified overview. On the other hand, there will always exist the problem of the localisation of my standpoint on an academic level, because of the problematic question of who is speaking to whom. With this chapter, I sketch out the academic tradition I was trained in.

Next to discussing impossibilities of creating *Terms and Typologies* on migration (chapter 2.1), I give an overview on the most anticipated migration theories of history and social sciences (chapter 2.3). The theories I selected, I built-up from Nana Oishi's anticipated theories, since I use her methodology. Given that most of the authors and their respective theories were male and men-centred, I outline various forms of feminist and women's studies and questions on migration (chapter 2.4). Important to consider are the sources, in this case census data and their availability and biases; therefore I sketch the gender data gap in statistics and demography in chapter 2.2 *The Source Problem*.

In the section on the Philippines (chapter 4.1), I roughly outline the twentieth century history of the colonial and independent Philippines chronologically. In doing so, I focus on the evolution of its statistical organisation with an emphasis on censuses, describing the back and forth between decentralisation and centralisation. The first efforts of the Philippine state to create statistical units in the post-war recovery period, president Marcos' Martial Law, and export industrialisation period of centralisation are at the centre of this chapter. It will not be necessary to analyse the given unit, institution, and respective laws in

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Daum, Werner/Riederer, Günter/von Seggern, Harm: „Fallobst und Steinschlag. Einleitende Überlegungen zum historischen Vergleich." In: Schnabel-Schüle, Helga (ed.): Vergleichende Perspektiven. Perspektiven des Vergleichs (Trierer historische Forschungen, V. 39), Mainz: Verlag Philipp von Zabern, 1998. P. 1-22. Here 6., and see Bichler, Reinhold: "Die theoretische Einschätzung des Vergleichs in der Geschichtswissenschaft." In: Hampl, Franz/Weiler, Ingomar (eds.), Vergleichende Geschichtswissenschaft. Methode, Ertrag und ihr Beitrag zur Universalgeschichte (Erträge der Forschung, Vol. 88), Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1978. P. 1-87. Here 22-53, 61-66.

[16] See some decolonial/post-colonial thinkers from the Americas for clarification of the concept Western/Westernized universities: Grosfoguel, Ramón: "The Structure of Knowledge in Westernized Universities. Epistemic Racism/Sexism and the Four Genocides/Epistemicides of the Long 16th Century." In: Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge, 11:1 (Fall 2013). P. 73-90. As well as De Sousa Santos, Boaventura: "The University at as Crossroad." In: Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge, 10:1 (Winter 2012). P. 7-16.

detail. I would rather give an overview and will, if needed for the contextualisation of the sources, explain the important state institute more profoundly later-on in the source analyses (chapter 4.4). For contextualisation, empire and globalisation processes on the suprastate macro level are referred to; showing the Philippines as an active player in tensions from Bandung till ASEAN; from import substitution to export industrialisation – centralisation to decentralisation.

The secondary literature on the history of the Philippine census system is scarce, which is why, for this section, I mainly use primary sources from *The American Statistician*[17] from the 1950s onward and one publication by Katsumi Nozawa[18] in a newsletter from the Japanese Hitotsubashi University that is also referred to by the *Philippine National Statistical Coordination Board's* country paper.[19] Based on the scarcely available literature in the topic, it is impossible to not reproduce biases or otherwise leave important blind spots. The secondary literature on Philippine history is in tension between empire and independence. It has a lot to offer, but is fragmented. I largely draw from James Tyner[20], Catherine Cenzia Choy[21], Adam McKeown[22] and Patrick Manning.[23]

In the second part of the Philippines chapter, I am giving an overview on micro, meso and macro levels of Filipina labour migration. Working roughly chronologically, I outline a possible periodisation, starting with US colonialism as the 'foundation' of Philippine care and women's migration. I summarise the US history of this – as Choy calls it – 'Empire of Care', stressing the mind-set that made this 'Empire' possible. Since the second pillar of this migration regime is President Marcos' Martial Law period and the shift to export-orientated industrialisation, I focus on this temporal space. I show on the meso (micro-macro link) level,

[17] See Clemente, Tito: "Philippines." In: N.A.: "International Statistical Activities." In: The American Statistician, 15:2, 04/1961. P. 8-10., see Bantegui, Bernardino: "Recent Statistical Development in the Philippines." In: The American Statistician, 14:4, 10/1960. P. 19-22, 32., and see Brown, Robert W.C.: "Comparing Census Data in 90 Countries." In: The American Statistician, 25:1, 02/1971. P. 32-37.

[18] Nozawa, Katsumi: "History of the Philippine Statistical System." In: IER Online. Last Retrieved: 03/01/2022. [https://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/COE/Japanese/Newsletter/No.13.english/Nozawa.html].

[19] See The National Statistical Coordination Board, Philippines: "The Evolution of the Philippine Statistical System. Country Paper." (Country Paper prepared for the United Nations Statistics Division Seminar "The Evolution of National Statistical Systems"), New York, 23.02.2007.

[20] Tyner, James, Made in the Philippines. Gendered Discourses and the Making of Migrants (RoutledgeCurzon Pacific Rim Geographies, Vol. 5), London/New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004.

[21] Choy, Catherine Cenzia, Empire of Care. Nursing and Migration in Filipino American History (Joseph, Gilbert/Rosenberg, Emily (eds.): American Encounters / Global Interactions), Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2003.

[22] See McKeown, Adam, Melancholy Order. Asian Migration and the Globalization of Border (Columbia Studies in International and Global History), New York: Columbia University Press, 2008., and see McKeown, Adam: "Global Migration, 1846-1940." In: Journal of World History 15:2 (2004). 155-189.

[23] See Manning, Patrick: "Settlement and Resettlement in Asia: Migration vs. Empire in History." In: Asian Reviews of World Histories, 3:2 (July 2015). P. 171-200., see Lucassen, Jan/Lucassen, Leo/Manning, Patrick: "Migration History: Multidisciplinary Approaches." In: Lucassen, Jan/Lucassen, Leo/Manning, Patrick (eds.), Migration History in World History. Multidisciplinary Approaches, Leiden/Bosten: Brill, 2010. P. 3-38.

how complex the interweaving of factors is; especially interesting here for me is Oishi's tool of 'social legitimacy'.[24] While describing this by means of the example of Flor Contemplación's case,[25] I outline presidents Marcos', and to a degree, Aquino's and Ramos' migration policies. For this chapter, I vastly draw from the publications of Nana Oishi[26], Tyner[27] and Choy[28]; their respective books are from the early 2000s. The two latter ones and their theses are cited frequently in particular and some of the only books that work in a gendered and historical way on the topic and temporal space of interest here – trying to show continuities and breaks.

The Lebanese census history (chapter 4.2) is a short one: the modern state of Lebanon has not yet conducted any. There is a reason for this, which manifests in complex ways: confessionalism. Confessionalism is the word used for the Lebanese democratic system, comparable to Switzerland and India, which is built on the proportional representation of confessional groups.[29] Lebanon today has eighteen official confessions[30], also called sects, amongst those are different Muslim and Christian denominations. The four most important in this context and numerous biggest are Shi'a, Sunni, and Maronite (a form of Catholicism, recognised by the Vatican). In Chapter 4.2.1 *The Ubiquitous Census*, I will therefore contextualise this democratic system historically and show the importance of the 1921 and 1932 censuses conducted by the French Mandate. In the second part, I outline emigration and immigration in Greater Lebanon in the twentieth century, while focussing on Lebanon as a major-sending and a minor-receiving country. Besides Fawwaz Traboulsi,[31] one of the most famous Lebanese historians, and Suraiya Faroqhi,[32] who is anticipated a lot for her

[24] See Oishi, Nana, Women in Motion: Globalization, State Policies, and Labor Migration in Asia, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005., and see Chapter 3.
[25] A Filipina domestic worker in Singapure, who was hanged in 1995 after killing her abusive employer.
[26] See Oishi, 2005.
[27] See Tyner, 2004.
[28] See Choy, 2003.
[29] More precisely: "Confessionalism is a type of consociationalism. Political scientists describe a consociational state as a state which functions durably despite major internal divisions along ethnic, religious, or linguistic lines in which no sub-group commands a majority. Common examples of consociational states include Belgium, Switzerland, India, Spain, Lebanon and the Netherlands. Confessionalism is a system of consociational government which distributes political and institutional power proportionally among religious sub-communities. Lebanon is a confessional state where, for example, positions in cabinet, parliament, the civil service and other institutions are apportioned according to the relative religious populations." See N.A. (05/2007): „Understanding Lebanese Confessionalism (Factcheck Series)." In: CJPME. Retrieved 28/01/22. [https://www.cjpme.org/fs_026].
[30] Shi'a, Sunni, Druze, Isma'ili, Alawite, Nusayri, Maronite Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Melkite Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Syrian Catholic, Armenian Catholic, Syrian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Chaldean, Assyrian, Copt, Protestant. See ibid.
[31] See Traboulsi, Fawwaz, A History of Modern Lebanon, London: Pluto Press, 2007.
[32] Faroqhi, Suraiya, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches (Beck'sche Reihe), München: C.H. Beck, 2010 (2000, 2001, 2004, 2006).

research on Ottoman history, I cite Ray Jureidini[33], since he is one of the only researchers writing on the history of foreign care work in Lebanon.

[33] See especially: Jureidini, Ray: "Women Migrant Domestic Workers in Lebanon." In: Esim, Simel/Smith, Monica, Gender and Migration in Arab States: The Case of Domestic Workers, Beirut: International Labour Organization, 2004., Jureidini, Ray: "In The Shadows Of Family Life: Toward a History of Domestic Service in Lebanon." In: *Journal Of Middle East Women's Studies*, 5/3 (Fall 2009). P. 74-101, 200., but also see Jureidini, Ray: "The Failure of State Protection: Household Guest Workers in Lebanon." In: European Review of International Migration, 2003., see Jureidini, Ray: "Xenophobia in Arab Societies." In: Morohashi, Jun (ed.), Struggle Against Discrimination, Geneva: UNESCO Studies on Human Rights, 2004., see Jureidini, Ray: "Migrant Workers and Xenophobia in the Middle East." In: Bangura, Yusuf/Stavenhagen, Rodolfo, Racism and Public Policy, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005., see Jureidini, Ray, *An Exploratory Study of Psychoanalytic and Social Factors in the Abuse of Migrant Domestic Workers by Female Employers in Lebanon*, Beirut: Kafa, 2011.

2 International Women's South-South Migration within Historical Migration Studies – the State of the Art

As there are communication problems between historians and the public, the trenches within the field of history, and between history and humanities/social science/sciences are just as deep. To understand such global topics, it is important to have a systematic knowledge of the history of global processes and connections. Many historians, though, are still focused on a given region and/or period and were trained in these fields in Western or Westernised universities. But *we* (the historians) should move away from the nation-based approach and 'West-centrism' and move towards a global perspective, if *we* want to understand migration.[34]

Moving forwards, few historians have integrated migration research in their analyses to begin with. The ones that have, have scattered to different institutions, universities, and disciplines, which ultimately points towards the situation that migration scholars were rather isolated, and neither historians nor the public were interested enough in the topic. This, however, has changed within the last 20 years. The interest in the histories outside of Europe and the (former) white settler-colonies was met with the rise of world and global history, with the focus on micro histories and historical comparative studies. Putting these processes in one pot, it became clear (not just to historians, but also to other scholars) how essential and structural migration is for humanity.[35] Hence, the field of migration studies is home to a lot of different disciplines and beliefs. *A priori* true assumptions and categories change just as much as terms and topics in the public discourse, which also influences academic discourse – this is more of an obstacle to real understanding than it is helpful.

Scholars and states search for things such as laws, models, systematic connections and the like, and create definitions and typologies, and maybe even prognoses and projections. With the construction of definitions comes their problematisation, since it is hardly possible to find distinctive categories, especially if they are supposed to work in different spatial and temporal spaces. An obstacle when aiming at understanding migration as a whole, are changing meanings, changing territorial and administrative units and their respective conventions, as well as how and why migration is getting recorded. This is why definitions and typologies will ultimately lead to a dead-end. Over time, the manner of explaining

[34] See Lucassen, Lucassen, Manning, 2010, 5-6.
[35] See Lucassen, Lucassen, Manning, 2010, 6.

reasons, goals and processes lose its explanatory power.[36] I still do think, that it is important to look at some definitions and typologies to see their weaknesses.

2.1 TERMS AND TYPOLOGIES

The term *migration* originates (in the English and German) from the Latin term *migrare*, which means to wander, to move (away). *Migrare* for itself does not imply any spatial or temporal context, nor a focus on humans.

Maybe one of the first indicators on how to deal with *migration* is seen implicitly with the Treaty of Westphalia 1648. In the post-Westphalian order, sovereignty, stability and therefore borders and controls started to form the modern concept of nation states. Hence, the state as a supposedly homogeneous entity, in the following centuries, had an imminent interest in documenting border crossings. Around that time, the terms *emigration* and *immigration* were introduced to describe the process of movement. A century later, *emigrant/immigrant* came along as well to label the mobile human. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, in Anglophone countries, *migration* was increasingly used to talk about the movement of humans (not only the movement of plants and animals).[37]

Before the twentieth century, German-speaking countries used the terms 'Wanderung' or 'Wanderbewegung'. *Migration* as a term to describe humans on the move, especially for humans that move across international borders, became widely common in the 1930s with the rise of nation states and their respective borders and sociological research started to differentiate more between moving people. This leads to a first hint at a possible problem: the defining power of borders and nation states.[38]

Since the nineteenth century, there has been a scholarly interest in humans on the move – statistics and research around them began to take off in Europe and North-America, especially the USA. The deeper interest here was to understand movements and the moving away whilst crossing international borders in a political-legal and a statistical-juridical way – so, categorising efforts from the newly formed or forming nation states. Migration research, or rather demographics, had become part of a legitimation science. One of the problems is that this branch of research is closely connected to the interest of the state and is

[36] See Wadauer, Sigrid: "Historische Migrationsforschung. Überlegungen zu Möglichkeiten und Hindernissen." In: Wadauer, Sigrid (ed.), Historische Migrationsforschung (Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften, 19:1), Innsbruck, Wien, Bozen: Studienverlag, 2008. P. 6-14. Here: 6.
[37] See Hahn, 2012, 24f.
[38] See Hahn, 2012, 24f.

researching along the state's definitions. Migration studies are connected with state interest, but these two areas have different *raisons* and logics. Sciences like demographics gather data for and with the state, this data is then exactly the one that is used by historians (and sociologists). Similarly, scholars adopted current topics and questions from the state. This might be a problem of sources entailing some ambiguity: the sources give a frame in which one has to operate, at the same time, sources are created within a national, in a rather political context.[39] It is important to stress that classifications are hard to find, *inter alia* because of the strong entanglement of state and demographics, and therefore demographics and historical/sociological migration studies.

At the *fin de siècle*, sociological research confronted itself with the differentiation of terms concerning the, also, differentiating topics in the form of space, time, the individual and causes of movements. During the twentieth century many different *migration* definitions emerged that differ in said features. As an example, Rudolf Heberk said in 1955 that every change of one's own living situation (unequal residence) was a form of migration, so he focused on the spatial and attributes a rather wide definition, that makes it hard to talk about migration. When I am moving from one side of the street to the other, have I migrated? And if I visited a friend on the other side of the street for three days, did I migrate? The UN-definition tried solving this problem with adding a temporal level (minimum one year) and a more selective spatial feature: it is only migration when crossing an international border. This, in turn, is a too restrictive definition, at least for historians, because small-scale movements become invisible. Additionally, international borders and territorial-fixed states are only around for a very short time compared to human communitarisation history. When talking about migration from a historical perspective, this will not help either. Sylvia Hahn points to the German historian, demographer, and migration scholar Peter Marschalck, who identifies two definitions: a wide one and a restrictive one; while he claims that the former is better fitted for historians and their respective research interests. This basically would imply that every movement from one residence to another is migration (vacation travels not included). Every form of movement, no matter if it were within or through international borders, or how far away and for how long, is included. Changing borders, territories, political systems can then be set aside.[40]

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[39] See Wadauer, 2008, 7f., see Esch, Michael G.: "Historisch-sozialwissenschafte Migrationsforschung als Delegimationswissenschaft." In: Wadauer, Sigrid (ed.), Historische Migrationsforschung (Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften, 19:1), Innsbruck, Wien, Bozen: Studienverlag, 2008. P. 60-78. Here 60f., and see Hahn, Sylvia, *Historische Migrationsforschung* (Historische Einführungen, Vol. 11), Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag, 2012. P. 24.

[40] See Hahn, 2012, 24-7.

Maybe one of the most famous attempts to find – or rather create – categories, laws, and consequently, typologies of human movement was the 1885 published *Laws of Migration* by Ernest G. Ravenstein.[41] He was the first scholar to write about migration and started to be more interested in the systematisation of this *phenomenon*, when nation-building projects and national sentiments were on the rise (in Europe) - especially after the 1870s. The (ideal-typical) groups Ravenstein created are centred around the temporal and the spatial: *local migrants, short-journey migration, long-journey migration, migration by stages*, and *temporary migration*.[42]

In the 1950s, Rudolf Heberk added the features *voluntary, involuntary* and *semi-voluntary*.[43] Wolfgang Köllmann, whose definition of migration is rather economical, and who believes in Malthus' overpopulation hypothesis[44] added *motivation, reason, form, goal.* A more interesting typology was created by Charles Tilly, who concentrated on the network theory: *colonizing migration, coerced migration, circular migration, chain migration* and *career migration*.[45]

Said historical, national, scientific and also personal contexts are the basal problems of defining *migration*. Migration itself is nothing special. Quite the contrary, on a historical scale, sedentariness has been the state of human living that is temporally less significant (up until now). However, neither mobility, nor sedentarism is *exceptional*, or vice versa: *normal*. The context, in which migration is happening, makes the language and its connotation logical. This leads to a *political limitation* of defining migration. Scholars have reproduced (even when contextualised) the logic of the nation state/empire at the time.[46] Another problem, as Jan and Leo Lucassen have stressed[47], is that historians also have to deal with a *presentist*[48] *limitation – now* everything is different. As mentioned in my introductory thoughts, migration has history, and if history is ignored, continuous processes might be seen as something *new*, something that is *now*, and has no past. This can lead, especially in contemporary discourses, to a poor understanding of the process. Another limitation of migration research is the *geographical* one. Eurocentrism or West-centrism is the outcome

[41] For further reading, see Trent, Alexander/Steidl, Annemarie: "Gender and the 'Laws of Migration': A Reconsideration of Nineteenth-Century Patterns." In: Social Science History 36:2 (06/2012). P. 223-241.
[42] See Hahn, 2012, 27-9.
[43] See ibid.
[44] See ibdi.
[45] See ibid.
[46] See Esch, 2008, 62., and see Wadauer, 2008, 9.
[47] See Lucassen, Jan/Lucassen, Leo: "Theorizing Cross-Cultural Migrations: The Case of Eurasia since 1500." In: Social Science History 41:3, 2017. P. 445-475.
[48] Meaning seeing everything from the point of view of the present, without considering the past and their discourses.

of this, with it comes racist, classist, and sexist components. That can lead to claims that migration was only happening within or towards Europe and the Americas, and it were only men that actively migrate with an agenda. An *a priori* true assumption here was that there is no migration of interest in Asia. These are some of the implicit limitations and they constitute major repercussions on how migration can be defined.[49]

With changing explanations and definitions, it is hard to do research that is comparable with itself. Even if dichotomies are softened up in more complex typologies, definitions – ultimately – explain more about the time and context they were formulated in, than about the object of interest. Migration studies, therefore, must reflect on definitions – maybe even without the aspiration to actually find 'good' ones.[50] Migration *per se* cannot be a selective category or object of research!

Given this short overview, it becomes clear that the list of ways to categorise migration and migrants could go on and on. They are, frankly, not helpful when talking about historical migration, since every categorisation will fail to explain anything but the standpoint of the entity that came up with it – still, it might help in grasping the complexity of the phenomenon. To summarise with Sigrid Wadauer: "Finally, the description of long-term migration trends is confronted with changing meanings, changing conventions of administration, recording and designation of migration movements."[51]

[49] See Lucassen, Jan/Lucassen, Leo: "Theorizing Cross-Cultural Migrations: The Case of Eurasia since 1500." In: Social Science History 41:3, 2017. P. 445-475.
[50] Wadauer, 2008, 7.
[51] "Schließlich stehen der Beschreibung langfristiger Migrationstrends sich wandelnde Bedeutungen, verändernde Konventionen der Verwaltung, der Erfassung und Bezeichnung von Migrationsbewegungen entgegen." Wadauer, 2008, 7.

2.2 THE SOURCE PROBLEM

Records on the population, especially censuses, are not an invention of modern nation-states. An interest in census figures, especially in relation to taxation, can be seen, for example, in Babylon (c. 3800 BCE), Egypt (c. 3050 BCE) and China (c. 1000 BCE). In Europe, from the sixteenth century onwards, fiscal figures became more detailed - that is, more components were included, and the categories and associated figures became more precise. Parish registers, police regulations, the registration system for present and absent people received a growing interest in the seventeenth century in the name of mercantilism.[52]

What can be traced back to nation states, however, are censuses, which gained more importance in the state centralisation (and nation-building) efforts from the eighteenth century onwards. A kind of "census euphoria", as Hahn calls it, had such an effect that from this epoch onwards systematic population surveys, later censuses, were carried out in most European states and their respective colonies. The first systematic census, however, was conducted in 1790 in the USA; and ever since on a decennial basis.[53]

Such data are of particular importance to historians. However, it is not only the data per se, but the mostly implicit value concepts and interests of authorities behind the data that need to be illuminated and criticised. As mentioned elsewhere, academics and scientific institutions are also a part of this authority and are by no means immune to further distort these already biased data with their own norms and ideas. Out of the special interest here, it is the so-called *gender data gap* that underlies 'universal' theories about migration.

2.2.1 ALL METHODS, NO THEORY

I will write in this section about the history and interweaving of demography and its methodology and theories with other parts of science and society. This is intended, by no means, to be an exhaustive description. To some extent, I will have to essentialise demography here. This chapter has, as its background, the question of legitimation and delegitimation, but above all the possibility of using demographic, i.e. quantitative, data for historical migration research. Many problems that arise in the formulation of migration theories are also founded in the production and treatment of statistics - one of the most important mathematical theories for demographic methodology.

[52] Hahn, 37-40.
[53] Hahn, 40f.

If one reads through articles on the subject of demography and statistics, there is criticism from different viewpoints due to, as Susan Greenhalgh quotes, the *all methods and no theory* situation.[54] The accusation is that statisticians have many methods, especially from applied mathematics, however, their (explicit) theories and thought constructs lag behind a certain (social and human) scientific standard or are non-existent.[55] The question that arises at this point, against the background of historical migration research, is why this is the case. Nancy Riley quotes Fuchs and Ward when she describes that stable resources can lead to practices not being radically deconstructed.[56] Thus, serious self-reflection has been absent in demography, in addition to publications on the topic and about the discipline not having been sufficiently embraced. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva and Tukufu Zuberi vividly explain the accusations they were confronted with by their colleagues in demography. According to them, criticism of methodology and theory was often perceived as a personal attack against which they had to defend themselves.[57] Besides ego problems, systemic ones are of course brought into focus.

Demography as a science and practice faces two main dilemmas. On the one hand, the history of demography/population sciences is closely linked to politics and institutions that have agendas. These have also been the main commissioners and funders. Hence, in attempting to become more "scientific" and to establish itself as a social science, there would have to be a disassociation from the aforementioned funders. On the other hand, this first dilemma is heavily connected to the second one: theories and practices that are considered outdated in other related disciplines (such as modernisation theory, which can still be read out in some current studies) 'had' to be defended, rather than overcome. More often than not, scholar practicalities confronted critical theory. Critical demographers were in danger to vegetate either at the periphery of their own discipline or as a methodology of another.[58]

Here, I would like to focus primarily on the proximity of politics and policies and go more in depth about the resulting problems. Riley points out that financial resources, as well as professional networks, influence the field's *truth*-telling and conception of reality. The *a priori* true assumptions, which are unmasked as theory in critical literature, were among

[54] See Greenhalgh, Susan: "The Social Construction of Population Science: An Intellectual, Institutional, and Political History of Twentieth-Century Demography." In: Comparative Studies in Society and History 38:1 (1996). P. 26-66. Here: P. 26.
[55] See ibid.
[56] See Riley, Nancy E.: "Challenging Demography: Contributions from Feminist Theory." In: Sociological Form 14:3 (1999). P. 369-197. Here 369f.
[57] See Bonilla-Silva/Zuberi, 2008, 3-15.
[58] See Greenhalgh, 1996, 30-33.

other things, not made explicit and transparent as a result.[59] While the intra-subject discussion should certainly allow for more anti-sexist and anti-racist criticism, my concern as a historian is to create a reference space as an analytical tool, within which given statistics and their corresponding interpretation, can be understood. [60]

Conventional demography, as Hayward Derrick Horton calls it, has four research approaches in the twentieth century that should be problematised. Demography, according to him, is *descriptive* and focuses on "variables, trends, and estimates"[61], which are ultimately used to make *projections* of the future. Moreover, it is *data driven*. These data 'speak for themselves', thus telling the whole story, which is why there would be no need for theories. Since demography and statistics are descriptive, it also has to *accept or ignore the status quo* of societies being examined, which gives it "a narrow and sterile character."[62] This would eventually lead to half-measured, truncated, basically false conclusions and projections. Finally, Horton describes demography as assumptive at its core; that is, objectivity and independence of the study, data, data collection process and the scholars behind it, is assumed without being reflected upon.[63]

Demography continues to have an enormous diversity of methods, which have been and continue to be discussed in complementary and/or competitive ways. National, epistemic, and methodological differences characterise the field and make it difficult to write generally about long lines and caesura. However, it can be said that methodological diversity, among other things, contributes to the difficulty of comparing statistics, thus, considerable efforts must be put into the interpretation.[64] The very question of what or who 'population' is and how it can be classified opens up to a wide field of possibilities which includes the usage of natural sciences and humanities approaches and to let them merge with each other; sometimes more, sometimes less transparent - which lets the views of the questionnaire creators and interpreters implicitly flow in.[65]

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[59] See Riley, 1999, 370f., see Horton, Hayward Derrick: "Critical Demography: The Paradigm of the Future?" In: Sociological Forum 14:3 (09/1999). P. 363-367. Here 363f., and see Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo/Zuberi, Tukufu: "Toward a Definition of White Logic and White Methods." In: Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo/Zuberi, Tukufu (eds.), White Logic, White Methods: Racism and Methodology, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008. P. 3-27. Here 9.

[60] Desrosières, 2005, 4-7.

[61] Horton, 1999, 364.

[62] Horton, 1999, 365.

[63] See Horton, 1999, 364-6.

[64] Particularly striking, as in many social sciences, is the back and forth between natural science and the humanities and their respective methods and epistemological interests. This is also reflected in categorization, as seen with the term *migration*.

[65] See Hartmann, Heinrich/Unger, Corinna R.: "Einleitung: Zur transnationalen Wissensgeschichte der Demografie." In: Wissenschaftsgeschichte 33 (2010). P. 235-245. Here 236-8.

The exchange of methods helped, on the one hand, to create coherence internally and externally, and on the other, to broadly discuss problems perceived by scholars and their presumed solutions. Demographers are seen at the interface or between policy/politics and science, which here are mutually dependent (maybe more clearly than in other sciences), or take place in the same discussions. Demographers tend to be close to policy and in advisory positions.[66] While these experts have been able to attract but a few chairs or institutes to their field, a radically critical treatment of the topic has mostly been absent. Scientific racism, sexism, and more generally the reproduction and production of groups change, but nonetheless still remain within the socio-political-scientific tensions which seem to be inherent in demography. This tradition can be understood as a continuum, with contemporary demographers often assuming to have overcome methodological and other such biases.[67]

Other scholars formulate problems within demography in similar manners. Whereby it needs to be mentioned once again that the *one specific* demography does not exist and that there have always been critical currents even in the 1970s and 1980s (when other social sciences and humanities challenged themselves critically on a massive scale). However, as already indicated with Bonilla-Silva and Zuberi, there is a lot of silence and non-citation.[68] And yet, there would have been ample opportunity to undergo similar self-reflexive turns as other humanities and social sciences have done since the 1970s. Demography, *it seems*, is an island.[69] An island where (for example) the modernisation thesis, and with it the idea of linear time and progress, still exists to some extent in the twentieth century. An island where you can analyse race without examining racism, gender without examining sexism. That is the element of demography bounded closely with descriptiveness. This critique is certainly not one that can only be formulated 'against' demographic research. That white males from a few Western countries have the interpretive hegemony, be it through resources, networks, theories, or methodology, is certainly nothing new to the recipient.[70] However, it is by far, not something discussed remotely enough in historiography, for example, let alone included sufficiently in the canon of historiography. The chapter on theories of migration history will draw attention to this as well.

[66] See Unger, 2010, 235-7., and see Hahn, 87.
[67] See Unger, 2010, 235-7., and see Hahn, 87.
[68] Bonilla-Silva/Zuberi, 2008, 12, 16.
[69] See Greenhalgh, 1996, 27f. Though, process has been made, a lot of critical publications is not cited.
[70] To ask with Grosfoguel: "How is it possible that men from these five countries [Italy, France, England, Germany, USA] achieved such a epistemic privilege to the point that their knowledge today is considered superior over the knowledge of the rest of the world?" Grosfoguel, 2013, 74.

2.2.2 GENDER DATA GAP

In previous paragraphs, I have outlined the basic problem areas that make it difficult to handle statistics as sources of historical migration research. As I will show below with a research example by Rafaella Sarti, there are possibilities for altering the view on this kind of data. However, questions changed, that can be answered with the help of statistics. First, though, I will use the example of Bonilla-Silva and Zuberi to address the issue of interpretive hegemony.

The criticism the two have received has often been defensive in nature. "Are you calling us racist?" seems to be the basic insinuation. Systemic criticism of theories and methods is dismissed as a personal attack.[71] Bonilla-Silva explains that it is important for these mostly white men to understand the history of statistics. Statistics have been and continue to be intimately connected with power, the exercise of power, and its justification, whether that be in a colonial, imperial, or national context. The importance of demography for eugenics, most prominent in Nazi Germany, should be mentioned here as a clear example of scientific misuse.[72] If one wants to understand the meaning of race and gender for certain areas of life, one must understand the aforementioned terms as social constructs that are subject to change and development. Without them, these concepts become essentialised and the conclusion could be drawn that race and gender, as simple individual characteristics, are inherently responsible for differences in, for example, migratory behaviour and labour market participation. Certainly, there are methodological and simply practical reasons, as outlined above, for why it is easier to stick with the conventional. As I will explain in more detail in a later chapter, a kind of additive history was established by the 1980s to include women's issues – by feminist empiricism. This approach will inevitably leave blanks, as it does not develop new theories or methods, but merely makes women visible in theories developed by and about men.[73] "[E]xamining gender only on an individual level misses much of its significance and scope."[74] This plays into the idea of 'conventional demography' as a descriptive science. However, if demography sees itself (or is read by historians) as an *explanatory* and *predictive* science, social structures, their context and meaning can be

[71] Which is true for feminist, anti-racist/classist critique in general.
[72] „[…]the birth of racial statistics gave scientific credibility to justification of racial inequality." (Bonilla-Silva/Zuberi, 2008, 6) The same is true for gender inequality.
[73] See Bonilla-Silva/Zuberi, 2008, S. 4-6., and see Riley, 1999, 369-377.
[74] Riley, 1999, 376.

analysed. It would no longer be about projections, but about *prediction*. This might also be a prerequisite for questioning social orders instead of tacitly accepting them.[75]

Data and the researchers themselves are another important part here. The author is not dead, so to speak, neither is the interpreter. Social realities of scholars and institutions must be reflected upon. The logic of methods as used until the 1980s, and to some extent until today, are racist, classist and sexist.[76] In saying this, it is not mathematics behind the method that is meant, however, "Statistics is a system of estimation based on uncertainty."[77] But data has no logic, rather the author gives it one. This logic is too often white and male. So to speak, this 'white logic' is the unarticulated, implicit, non-transparent theory – *silence* as theory.[78] The idea of white, male knowledge production as a universal and objective one gets in the way.[79]

To avoid repeatedly falling into the trap of the apparent objectivity of data, social sciences such as demography should look at data in conjunction with the presence of a *theory*. This theory can then be worked through using data. "Data does not tell a story. We use data to craft a story."[80] This can be seen in context with each other in which it helps when research becomes more reflective. Questions about one's own discipline, its condition, and even critical questions about oneself help to not perceive data and its interpretation in a vacuum.[81]

With these, albeit simplified, ideas, it could be made visible how statistics and scholars try to construct reality instead of treating it as if reality is being depicted. It also supports historians to better understand and compare census data from the last centuries, when it is understood that these numbers were created within a social, political and scientific space. The truth of this space is depicted; however, it is in all likelihood far from an 'objective reality'. If statistical techniques support political arguments, history can help to outline debates within which data emerged. Thus, data and their application in history could be built into a broad context by making categories, concepts, and debates explicit. The principle that the world influences data, and vice versa data influences the world, provides the opportunity to perceive data as simultaneously real and constructed. Categories are created

[75] See Horton, 1999, 364f.
[76] See ibid.
[77] However, this also needs to be questioned. Desrosières makes this very clear in his monograph using several European histories of bureaucracy, statistics and applied mathematics. See Desrosières, Alain, Die Politik der großen Zahlen. Eine Geschichte der statistischen Denkweise, Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2005.
[78] This can also be seen in which publications are received on which topics.
[79] See Bonilla-Silva/Zuberi, 2008, 4, 7-9, 11f.
[80] Bonilla-Silva/Zuberi, 2008, 2008, 7.
[81] See Horton, 1999, 364-6.

in the world in order to provide a narrative for it. The world of the descriptor becomes constructible to a certain degree. In this context, statistical data in particular is exciting because these numbers have a political, as well as a scientific moment. Shifts in meanings or interpretation can be reconstructed, although it must be clear that it would be virtually impossible to create an all-encompassing picture that leaves nothing out. Nonetheless, spaces for debate can be created.[82] "It is no longer a question of whether an account is true, but of the place that account occupies among numerous others."[83]

On the one hand, the question of migrating women and writing about them is a source problem. However, the fact that cited statistics represent women less, is only part of the problem. Sources, which have to be presented in their context in order to be able to classify them correctly, to be able to name their epistemological value and why they were created, is certainly one of the core tasks of every historian. But, as vividly shown by Hahn, the historian or social scientist who wants to see their *a priori* true presuppositions substantiated in the sources, in this case 'objective' statistics, also remains in the spotlight. Thus, scholars see that the proportion of women is basically the same, yet state that women migrate less, or try to argue it away. Tönnies and Heberle, are just a few examples to name. A topos that comes up time and time again is the idea that said mobile women do this only for marital purposes, or for other reasons attached to men. Men make up the mobile group who migrates for careers, with an agenda. Women were not given any agenda of their own, they were seen as being dependants. Even the clearest statistics could do little to shake this assumption. Women have thus been made invisible in research on mobility in two ways: by sources themselves and by their scholarly recipients.[84] If women were talked about, then in a kind of additive or deviant history: women's mobility as a phenomenon or exception, etc.[85] Overall, a picture of stereotyping role models for men* and women* emerged: It is defined

> "quite in line with the patriarchal shaped (family) images, the man as the one who cares for food, for which he is willing to leave home and move to a foreign country. In contrast, the woman is described as the immobile, passive individual waiting at home for the male family breadwinner."[86]

[82] See Desrosières, 2005 3-7.
[83] Desrosières, 2005, 4.
[84] See Hahn, 77-80.
[85] Feminist empiricism
[86] Hahn, 2012, 89: „…ganz in Anlehnung an die patriarchalisch geprägten (Familien-)Bilder, der Mann als der für die Nahrung Sorgende definiert, wofür er bereit ist, die Heimat zu verlassen und in die Fremde zu ziehen. Im Gegensatz

The rediscovery from the late 1970s onward of *old* sources, such as census data, showed that the problem was likely to sit in front of the source with 'wrong' research questions. New methods, tools and questions could shed light on how mobile women actually were and, above all, why this had not been seen by academia for so long. For sure, the first step was to acknowledge that there was a problem in the data and the way one looked at it. The (feminist) critique of the 1970s and 1980s sought to clarify how subjective statistics are, and showed that political intentions shaped classifications that were anything but objective or random. This creates voids and biases that should be asked about: What are the blank spaces and what purpose do they serve? When are things summarised or differentiated, and how? Answers were hard to find, but the renewed attention official data got as well as the questioning of it, started to show how and why research underestimated migrant women and their work in the first place; why theories on migration tend to be male-centred.[87] Androcentric theories, written by men about men, have dominated, and continue to dominate, academic discourse on migration of women, whether in history or social science. This, moreover, has a radiance beyond the academic field, and into it. As with demography; public, political, and scholarly opinion here condition each other interdependently.[88]

To grasp the field, let me give some examples. Sarti wrote about the classification problems of *Domestic Servants* in some European countries (esp. Italy) in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. She shows very clearly what the problem with surveys were and how to look at them as a historian. The category *servant* was (and still is) hard to grasp for census makers, and it has significantly changed a pretty bunch. Is a relative of the family that is doing housework a servant? If so, the question is where to put them if they are also doing other jobs? Are servants only people that get paid for their work? What if the payment is non-monetary? Maybe being a servant was not even a *distinct profession*, after all? And if it is, what difference is there between farm and domestic servants, especially if a person upholds tasks from both spheres? Which tasks belong to which sphere? If servants only work in reproductive care, then what to do if they at times engage in productive work in the

dazu wird die Frau als das immobile, passive, zu Hause auf den männlichen Familienernährer wartende Individuum beschrieben." (own translation)

[87] See Hahn, S. 78-85., and see Morokvasic, Mirjana: "Women in Migration: Beyond the Reductionist Outlook." In: Phizacklea, Annie (ed.), One Way Ticket. Migration and Female Labour, London etc.: Routledge&Kegan Paul, 1983. P. 13-31. Here S. 18f.

[88] See Hahn, 87.

household? Contemporary demographers, census makers and historians asked such and other questions.[89]

When Sarti analysed census data from the 1871 and the 1891 censuses in England and Wales, she noted that the number of servants rose steeply. What caused this increase in numbers? Well, to put it into terms, the definition changed from one survey to the next: the second one considered female relatives doing housework as servants.[90] What significance can such data have for us as historians? Apparently, we can mainly talk about how the data was collected and classified; the data itself can tell us little about how numbers of servants *actually* developed over this time. Then again, what can be considered as housework anyways? As Sarti mentions: "The way in which the categories were formed already revealed the image of the worker that was held by those who drew up the categories themselves."[91] Even the seemingly smallest of changes could distort the image immensely.[92] Examples through time and space show "that the servant category was highly uncertain"[93] from the eighteenth century all the way to present times and "how difficult it was to distinguish people who carried out the same tasks."[94] The social status of certain tasks changed over time. Simultaneously alongside as well as independently from these social definitions, the categorisation has changed from one survey to the next. This renders the data not comparable. As Sarti puts it, it might only reflect the "differing and competing opinions" of the statisticians.[95] One could find out, which terms were preferred in certain periods, regions and/or by certain people or institutions. The census, therefore, cannot actually show, if – in this example – the role of women has changed or rather if the definitions and terms have just changed.[96] The terms used might be able to show the contexts and changes of domestic work and its "cultural, political, social and economic variables."[97]

To sum it up, demography as a science and practice is an administrative tool, which is also political. Knowledge on the population of any state whatsoever is a discourse and a practice that is rational only in appearance, for it is always tied to questions of domination and ruling.

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[89] See Sarti, Raffaella: "Who are Servants? Defining Domestic Service in Western Europe (16th - 21st Centuries)." In: Pasleau/Schopp (eds.), Proceedings of the ‚Servant Project', Liège: Éditions de l'Université de Liège, 2006. P. 3-59. Here 22.
[90] See ibid., 22.
[91] ibid., 23.
[92] ibid., 23. As seen in the Italian censuses of 1881 and 1901.
[93] ibid., 23.
[94] ibid., 23.
[95] See ibid., 25., and Bonilla-Silva/Zuberi, 2008, 14.
[96] See Sarti, 2006, 27.
[97] Sarti, 2006, 34.

Thus, statistics substantiated, justified and reinforced structures of domination.[98] As will be shown in the next chapters, migration studies and demographics, can be (and used to be) an echo chamber and discussion space for politics and the respective (national) state. The state is the framework in census data and therefore, is considered as real. This, in turn, gives leeway to the state influence and its possibility to structure the census process. This structure then might be seen as a description of reality. With categories set by the influence of the state, the state itself becomes set. It is a vicious cycle of affirmative research and data collection.[99] Since structures of domination justified by statistics are organised patriarchally, women and their work and migration *'fell through the cracks'*. The census as population administration creates realities and at the same time tries to map them 'rationally', supports policies/ideologies and is supported by them, underpins the idea of insider and outsider, creates national borders while transcending, standardizing and questioning them. In this regard, the census as an instrument of democratisation can only depict as much as its writers want or intend. *Implicit* biases of the authors as a silent and unseen theory are often inevitably confirmed by the categorisations made.[100]

[98] See Schor, Paul: "From National Demographic Traditions to Transnational Expertise: The History of Demography, Expertise, and Population Control. Reflections on the Articles by Axelsson, Necochea López, Berg, and Silies." In: Wissenschaftsgeschichte 33 (2010). P. 321-328. Here 321.
[99] See Esch, 2008, 61., and see Schor, 2010, 323.
[100] See Schor, 2010, 323.

2.3 INVISIBLE WOMEN

Helen Schwenken explains, that the main theories about migration have two basic questions or knowledge interests from which they mostly aim to answer one. The first being why humans decide to migrate, and the second being how and why migration is established and manifested.[101] Research of migration historians (and other scholars of that topic) tend to become an intervention on public debates, in the past as well as in the present. Which is why, through the lenses of Standpoint Theory, it is important to contextualise them and their theories. In his article, Michael Esch explains the delegitimising potential of migration studies in relation to the concept of nation.[102] For sure, migration studies and the sources they traditionally used, such as census data, are rather doing the exact opposite. Concepts of societal communitarisation (like the nation) tend to be *demanded* by different groups of given society: "migration and the phenomena associated with it are [processed] within the framework of existing socio-political systems and evaluations".[103] Claims for recognition and/or representation of migrants and groups of migrants are negotiated within society, i.a. through scholarship.[104] I will refer to this during the following chapter(s).

First, I am going to introduce some prominent genealogies, where, when and how migration studies started and developed, namely in US sociology and European *Staatswissenschaften.*[105] This will remain but an idea of a periodisation, since – and this can be taken for granted – migration studies have many different origins and respective branches. In addition, what makes periodisation even more complicated is the different scholarly discourses presupposing each other. As Donna Gabaccia puts it: "Historians' new periodisation of the origins and development of migration studies remains tenuous."[106] One main problem of periodisation is, for sure, that scholarship on history draws interdisciplinary from a multitude of humanities and social sciences and their respective approaches, spaces and questions, particularly sociology and anthropology.[107]

Second, this chapter will concentrate on the most cited theories and approaches in the twentieth century, that – as I will claim – made women invisible, and I will try to criticise and

[101] See Schwenken, Helen, Globale Migration zur Einführung, Hamburg: Junius Verlag, 2018. P. 69., and see Bade, 16f.
[102] See Esch, 2008.
[103] „[…]Migration und die mit ihr verbundenen Phänomene im Rahmen der bestehenden gesellschaftlich-politischen Systeme und Wertungen[…]" (own translation). Esch, 2008, 60.
[104] See Esch, 2008, 60-66.
[105] *Staatwissenschaften* is a construct of economic, sociologist and political sciences.
[106] Gabaccia, 2015a, 43.
[107] See Lucassen, Lucassen, Manning, 2010, 17-20.

contextualise those theories, before I move on to the search for theories that tried to make women's movements visible, beginning roughly in the 1970s in the next chapter.

2.3.1 EPISTEMOLOGIES

One of the main things that need problematisation is that almost all of the following theories are located in the Global North and were developed since the late nineteenth century (so most of them are national state-based).

The US especially, as a state of immigrants does have a big slice of the migration studies cake. Immigration studies, the (men's) Chicago School and Harvard's Oscar Handlin[108] here represent the most influential streams in the twentieth century, particularly until the 1980s. As some US-American theories claim, the earliest efforts to create a (history and) sociology of migration, starting in the nineteenth century, go back to the American efforts in sociology – the topic would come *naturally* to the scholars and students (especially with community studies).[109] As Gabaccia argues, within the US, the so-called Minnesota School might be more important but less recognised. A certain "competition for authority and prestige" can be seen between the different generations of each school.[110] In a nutshell, the Minnesota School, composed of public universities with students and scholars from more diverse backgrounds and genders than Harvard/Chicago School, used different, more interdisciplinary sources and the loci of their 'non-elite' scholars and students. Minnesota worked rather pluralist, ethnic, bottom-up, while Chicago had a top-down, American nation-building approach – 'immigrants were American history', as Handlin puts it.[111] In the twentieth century, with the discourse about globalisation really taking off, the hegemony of the US discourse was established. [112]

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[108] See Handlin, Oskar, The Uprooted. The Epic Story of the Great Migrations that made the American People. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1951.

[109] See Gabaccia, 2015a, 39., and see Gabaccia, Donna: "The Minnesota School and Immigration History at Midwestern Land Grant Universities, 1890-2005." In: Journal of Migration History 1 (2015b). P. 171-199. Here 171f, 175.

[110] For further information, I recommend to read Gabaccia, 2015b. In her article, she explains and analyses different generations, their methods and questions, contrasting the grand land universities of the Minnesota School and the elite universities of the Chicago School.

[111] See Gabaccia, 2015a, 39., see Gabaccia, 2015b, 174f, 181, 184; Quote: 179.

[112] In European Migration Studies – on another note - the First and Second World War created a lot of migration, almost all over the world, especially within Eurasia and to the Americas. This triggered more theories about migration (and its interrelatedness with war). The search for laws and reasons in that time, esp. by Eugene Kulischer, created the maybe first systematic idea of *Push-and-Pull* factors. Around that time the term *migration*, as mentioned earlier, started to be used in relation to people on the move. Nationalist and national socialist ideologies and its affiliated scholars like Gunther Ipsen and Friedrich Burgdorfer spawned the "postulate of sedentariness and stability […] as the […] respectable fundamental values." (Hahn, 2012, 51.) This helped to render Jews, Sinti*zas and Rom*nja, at that point either peoples without a state or nomadic living peoples, therefore as non-respectable and as outsiders of the *nation*. Hahn claims, that this affected German/European Migration Studies for a long time, and

Starting from the formation of the Chicago School in the 1890s, it gained more attention in the early twentieth century and stayed influential until the 1980s, when a paradigm shift occurred. It is a conglomerate of different scholars who carved out, besides others, the concept of race-relation-cycles. 'Locals' and immigrants were seen as always in conflict with each other. While immigrants, through work and language skills, are able to *assimilate* into society, becoming locals. Finally, also bringing their stories and histories into the picture. Integration is seen only in terms of assimilation, as a one-way street.[113] So much can be said about the impact of the well-known Chicago School – the male one.

There is also a so-called *Women's Chicago School,* while, of course, the *Men's Chicago School* is just named *Chicago School.* The WCS also originated in the 1890s around Jane Addams, represented mainly women scholars, as well as activists and statespersons. They were pioneers in methodology, and linked migration studies with activism, therefore politicised the topic. Both, women and men of the different Chicago Schools were early migration historians, and their research, specifically that of the women, were the basis for criticism of the restrictive migration laws of the US at the beginning of the twentieth century.[114] In that sense, it could be said, that the WCS was delegitimating the state and nation more so than the MCS. The latter actually worked right in the direction of nation-building, the possible delegitimizing potential is not exploited at all. The former, in turn, through the combination and connection of scholarship and research with politics and policies, was able to have a more subversive impact.

What Gabaccia sees as an important element of the Minnesota School can be criticised as following: Community Studies, as done in different ways by the CS and MS, is a micro level reconstruction of ethno-cultural communities. As seen in the US discourses, writing about and studying migration could be an end in itself, to create a kind of publicity and make immigrants a part of the national narrative. This is important, for sure, but also needs problematisation, as Esch explains. Immigration Studies therefore do not set an end to racisms or construct national sentiments, it rather only *broadens* the national master narrative. In this sense, it stays affirmative. That is especially so since immigrants or groups of immigrants were included in this narrative, *if* they or the multitude can proof, that they integrated *themselves*, and got adopted into the society – so if (former) migrants are a valuable asset of any kind. Every community has to undergo this justification in order to be

maybe still does in a way: migration as a problem, as something negative. (See Hahn, 2012, 51.) As I referred to above as a main *a priori* true assumption.

[113] See Hahn, 2012., 34f.

[114] See Gabaccia, 2015a, 41f.

part of the nation.[115] If seen like this, Community Studies also do not delegitimise the construct of the nation.

On another notice, Christiane Harzig and Dirk Hoerder claim that Migration Studies originated from *Staatswissenschaften* in the nineteenth century. Scholars, like the German Ernst G. Ravenstein, concerned with the subjects of a given state, started to collect and frame data on urbanisation and new forms of mobility in nineteenth century Europe, on the (white European) transatlantic migration during the nineteenth century, and on the North-Chinese migration system in Manchuria.[116] Especially since the end of the eighteenth century, systematic censuses show the centralising efforts by European states; Hahn calls it "Zählungseuphorie".[117] *Staatenkunde* (statistics) such as the *Göttinger Schule,* annual or monthly abstracts of statistics about people on the move within and between states became a systematic science in Europe around the second half of the nineteenth century. Since then, we can see the emergence of first qualitative studies. Exactly these became a rich source of primary literature for sociology and economy studies in the nineteenth century.[118] Economists like Gustav Schmoller and Karl Bücher, sociologists like Ferdinand Tönnies, Georg Simmel, and maybe most prominently Max Weber and Rudolf Heberle are but some of *Staatswissenschaften*'s important pioneers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, due to their search of laws, typologies and theories around spatial movements.[119]
With this hypothesis of Migration Studies' origins, Harzig, Hoerder and Hahn want to point towards its interdisciplinary roots, respectively historical Migration Studies.[120] With this assumption, the history of Migration Studies neither lays in the globalisation discourse nor in the Chicago School or Minnesota School scholars. *Staatswissenschaften* is much older.
Gabaccia reasons that Migration Studies does have many different origins within the Global North, and within certain nation-building processes and their respective statistical data collection on their subjects.[121] A rather short and maybe even simplified summary could be as such: US-American and European Migration Studies stimulated each other. That might be true for a lot of different sciences and humanities – so this summary's explanatory power is weak. Whichever of these theories or hypotheses might be right, both scenarios lead to a

[115] See Esch, 2008, 66f., and see Gabaccia, 2015b.
[116] See Hahn, 2012, 34f.
[117] See Hahn, 2012, 40.
[118] See Hahn, 2012, 41-44.
[119] See Hahn, 2012, 40-48., and see Gabaccia, 2015a, 40f.
[120] See Gabaccia, 2015a, 40f., and see Hahn, 2012, 27, 30, 40-48.
[121] See Gabaccia, 2015a, 41.

rather west-centric idea of migration, that is hindering to write and think about women's South-South migration – at least, if we consider standpoint theory and Westernised knowledge production. Nevertheless, I want to stress that humanities, social science and sciences are Western institutions nonetheless. With a different origin of Migration Studies, Eurocentrism, and by now West-centrism, would most likely have not been monumentally divergent.

2.3.2 Approaches

One of the first publications I found that talks about women migrating *within* Asia is by Nana Oishi's *Women in Motion*.[122] I chose her approach because she had already written about Asian women migrants and her research, as well as her methodology, is centred around this topic. Vast parts of her book deal with the (im)possibilities of talking about Asian women, especially if it is not Asian migration to the Global North, but migration within the continent. Next to data that is missing, there is a lack of research and non-white, non-male methodology. Even though I see some problems with her assumptions and the rather long list of theories by men she draws from, I think that her approach is fitting for my enterprise, with some historiographic adjustments.

This is why I chose to take the migration theories that she writes about; even though she is aware of the problems with male-centred theories, she is drawing almost from those. This situation seems to be one the *im*possibilities of writing about women's South-South migration. It seems to me, that she was not aware of, or at least did not consider women's, non-white theories – as can be seen from her bibliography. This, I think, shows in itself the great potency of white theories written by men within sociology and history.

Under the banner of *Neoclassical Economic Theories*, the centre of interest becomes the economic factor, specifically wage disparities between different (world) regions. With micro and macro analyses, scholars of this theory developed different simplified models. Labour

[122] Nana Oishi is a Japanese born sociologist, with a focus on Migration Studies and globalization within Asia. After finishing her studies at the International Christian University in Tokyo, she started working as a policy analyst at the ILO in 1993. Following her work in Geneva, she started her doctorate in Harvard in 1996. Since 2003 she has had lectureships at ICU Tokyo, the Sophia University of Tokyo, the University of Toronto, as well as the University of Melbourne, where she is still teaching as an associate professor. As Oishi states in the preface of her book *Women in Motion*, through the work at the ILO, her academic work and especially personal impressions and experiences, she started to work on the book, from which I draw vast parts of my framework, theoretically and content-related. Since Oishi comes from an UN-background and since her question is how to understand women's migration and exploitation and how to inform policy makers on such, working historically correct is not her concern. She is a sociologist with a different outlook than I have, but her work is important for my enterprise.

supply in Southern (poorer) regions, labour demand in Northern (richer) regions and such, are seen as rational features that enable migrants to make (rational) cost-benefit considerations, in which poverty is seen as the first mover. Labourers from poorer countries (where wages will increase due to the loss) migrate to richer labour markets (where wages will decrease), which, as theorised, will lead to an equilibrium between costs and benefits for migrants and the sending- and receiving-countries. This theory concludes that humans decide on strong rational features that are fit economically in the neoliberal period of the 1980s. Different varieties of this basic assumption can be found elsewhere.[123]

These theories are hugely influenced by Ravenstein and his desire to find historical 'laws'. They still influence the public, and also the academic image of migration as a rational choice. This is just one of the reasons why this theory as well as *Push-and-Pull* theories cannot help when talking about women moving within the South. Other reasons are its simplification and the lack of other benefit-maximising motives.[124]

About this approach, Oishi states that it could be partly applicable for men, but for women not at all. Her data shows that a high unemployment rate does not lead to migration of women; the same is applicable for men. Just because women and men are relatively poor does not mean that they react to a global demand. Even though, as she claims, poverty does have an impact on the micro level, it cannot clarify why there are dissimilarities within the region's migration patterns. Her data implicates that migrant men in Asia move from almost all countries, while women mainly originate from the Philippines, Sri Lanka, or Indonesia.[125] This cannot be explained with a neoclassical economic theory. On theories such as the World Systems Theory and *Push-and-Pull Theories*, she argues:

> "[N]either this approach [structuralist theories] nor the world systems theory can explain why most women in middle- and low-income developing Asia are pulled into the middle-income countries within the region rather than into the high-income countries of the West."[126]

One of the most influential migration theories were and sometimes still are *Push-and-Pull Theories*. Coined by sociologist Everett Lee, informed by his understanding of Ravenstein

[123] For more information, see Schwenken, 2018, 77-80., see Hahn, 2012, 32f., see Oishi, 2005, 5f., and see Oishi, Nana, Gender and Migration: An Integrative Approach (Working Paper, No. 49), La Jolla: University of California-San Diego, March 2002. P. 4f.

[124] See Oishi, 2002, 4f., see Oishi, 2005, 5., see Schwenken, 2018, 77-80., and see Hahn, 2012, 32f., and see Trent/Steidl, 2012.

[125] See Oishi, 2005, 4-6.

[126] Oishi, 2005, 6.

(who basically also follows a *Push-and-Pull* logic), this approach tries to create a quantifiable theory of migration. It is, however, no longer used anymore in most humanities and social sciences, because of its simplification. It was first established through the analyses of statistics on labour market regions in Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century, where the main finding showed that people from the *(poor)* East and South of Europe tend to migrate to the *(rich)* West of Europe. The idea was to say, that if the situation in the region of residence is bad (read: poor), people get pushed away, and the regions with better conditions (read: rich) pull these people to migrate to their labour market (other features than labour and wages are also included, to a lesser, harder to quantify degree). This theory was adapted and expanded by historians in the 1960s, at latest since then the influence of its easy-to-grasp logic rose.[127]

The critiques are manifold.[128] It is ahistorical to seek to find a model of migration (this criticism will hold truth through the pages that follow), and in this example, it is also too individualistic and remains entrenched in structural history. Many other players and factors, next to the migrant itself (and maybe their family) are invisible. In addition, when the logic at hand is pursued, all people in the same or comparable situation would have had to make the same migration decision (which arguably is not the case – and this anomaly to the theory's logic cannot be explained with this very theory). It does touch on interesting questions and topics, but fails to explain anything in a meaningful way. Unlike the theory presented next, it tries to take the human as an emotional and social being into account, but also fails to quantify these levels.[129] I guess it is more interesting for politicians and political scientists to think about migration in the aforementioned way. It gives leeway to the idea to be able to manage migration through influencing pulling or pushing factors. A logic that still remains today. This logic might be explained by its situatedness in industrializing/industrialised Europe, where labour in industrial centres are one of the main organizing powers in a state, society, individual's life. While the fundamental hypothesis stays the same, the theory got widened and modified.[130]

The *World Systems Theory*, developed by Emanuel Wallerstein (and broadened Gunder-Frank), works mainly on the global macro level with a historical-materialistic approach. This can help with grasping phenomena that are seemingly independent from time and space,

[127] See Hahn, 2012, 30-2., and see Schwenken, 2018, 69, 73-6.
[128] See also Husa, Karl/Christof Parnreiter/Irene Stacher (eds.): Internationale Migration. Die globale Herausforderung des 21. Jahrhunderts?, Frankfurt/M.: Brandes & Apsel, 2000.
[129] See Hahn, 2012, 30-2., and see Schwenken, 2018, 69, 73-6.
[130] See Hahn, 2012, 30-32.

such as migration as a *conditio humana* (not as a policy problem of states and borders). In the same period when Neoclassical Economic Theories took off, Wallerstein followed the logic of the South-American *Dependency Theory* from the 1950s/60s, and worked interdisciplinary between history, sociology, and economics. It is, therefore, also centred on economics, but takes a more abstract approach and transcends them more.[131]

The basal image of the *Dependency Theory* is that of *one* integrated capitalistic world, where resources and goods travel from the peripheries to the core regions of capitalism, and vice versa. This theory was first introduced in the late 1950s by Raúl Prebisch, an Argentinian economist and statesman, as a response to the mainly US-American ideas of development and underdevelopment, and to a certain extent as critique on development aid – now euphemistically called development assistance. These and other theories, that are closely connected to post-colonial and decolonial approaches coming from the so-called *Third World*[132] are particularly exciting if one wants to question the role of their history.[133]

The basic assumption of the *World Systems Theory* is that in order to explain global and local inequalities ever since approximately the first European expansion to the Americas, one needs to look at the world as a whole, and not as a mosaic of nations, peoples, and periods situated in their respective area, case or community studies. Within this one world the capitalistic system, which started with mentioned European colonialism in the long sixteenth century, is by now (1960s) all encompassing. Just as much as there are industrial centres and non-industrialised lands, there are core regions of capitalism and peripheries, whose task is to supply the cores with resources, labour (e.g. enslaved people, or low-paid blue/pink-collar jobs) being one of them.[134] While the massive macro level[135] is the most interesting part of that theory, the individual migrant's agency becomes invisible, or better put: migrants are passive, without agency. The micro level is not examined, and the state (and unions of states) are not taken into consideration.

This is why the approach of Nana Oishi is attractive for an integrative understanding of human movements. She, as cited above, suggests that this approach, as well as *Push-and-Pull* and other Neoclassical (economic) Theories explain just a portion of the fundamental reasons. Migration patterns of Asian women do not make sense, when thought within the

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131 See ibid.

132 Third World is here used as in *tier monde*; an allusion to the French *tiers-état*.

133 See ibid.

134 See Hahn, 2012, 33f.

135 Other scholars from the humanities and especially sciences (deep/big history) go way further. They are also way more interesting than the World Systems Theory, that did not old well. For further discussion see the anthologies: Brettell, Caroline B./ Hollifield, James F. (eds.), Migration Theory. Talking Across Disciplines (3rd Ed.), New York City/Oxon: Routledge, 2015 (2000, 2008)., and see as well: Lucassen/Lucassen/Manning, 2010.

logic of traditional theories on migration and migrants. Oishi subsumes, and I share this opinion, that the answers given are only determinants.[136]

A bit closer to her reasoning seems to be the *New Economics of (Labour) Migration.*[137] This is another neoclassical economical approach, that centres around households on the micro level. The basic idea is that migration decisions are strategies to diversify the household income – so its explanatory power (if any) is limited to labour migration.[138] While this theory is power-blind (the power structures within and outside of the household) and focusses on labour demand, it is, nevertheless, a curious interpretation on decision-making.[139]

The problem Oishi outlines is that the house is considered as a neutral and autonomous unit. Any power hierarchies within the house and women's agencies are invisible. Her data shows that e.g. Filipina do not decide with or in unison with the household most of times.[140] This approach cannot explain why some countries, in comparable conditions, send more women than others.[141]

Oishi continues with pointing at 'newer' studies from the 1990s on women and migration, but these are mostly limited to area and case studies.[142] The trend of analysing Asian women's migration patterns solely on sexist and racist prepositions also blinds the discourse, even though more data is accessible.[143] While my work will contribute to the problem since me as well I am writing from a white perspective and look at feminised labour like domestic work. I still believe that this holds some truth: most research on Asian women who migrate centres around the care gap, sex/marriage migration and entertainers. Mostly from within the white male field of study.

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[136] See Oishi, 2005, 7.

[137] See Schwenken, 2018, 69, 80-2.

[138] Which again, is hard to qualify where labour migration ends and where other superficial categories of human movement start.

[139] Since the decision to migrate or not is to a considerable degree (about one third of cases, see Oishi, 2002, 6.) made by the whole family in Filipino*a society. The assumption found in a lot of articles and books about migrating Filipinas was (and unfortunately still is – devoid of any empirical, scientific, or statistical sense) that these women do not have an own agenda.

[140] Her data „[...] indicate[s] that young single women tend to migrate for their own individual self-fulfilment and independence, whereas older and married women migrate to support the family and to finance the children's education." Oishi, 2005, 9. I will go more into detail elsewhere.

[141] See Oishi, 2005, 6f. Talking about household strategy, see, for example Lauby, Jennifer/Stark, Oded Stark: "Individual Migration as a Family Strategy: Young Women in the Philippines." In: Population Studies 42 (1988). P. 473-486.

[142] See Oishi, 2005, 9f.

[143] While I was initially researching for data about and from the 1970s concerning the topic, I noticed that most research and data by institutions like the ILO or the IMO just started in the late 80s, and then became more systematic in the 1990s. Even though the ILO's Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention (No. 143) was agreed upon in 1975 – a paper that touched important topics i.a. concerning Asian women migrant workers. Mostly Western (i)NGOs and GOs (and regional ones with support of given Western partner) generated data, that was used for scholarly and political research. One can use this data anyways, if problematising the situatedness and limits of them. However, for the temporal space I am interested in, there is not even this kind of data.

Another newer approach is *Network Theory*. However, it is blind to gender-mainstreaming, since networks, much as households, are seen as neutral (read: male). This theory is able to explain better (to a degree) networks that are already in place (like most of the theories I presented so far). Oishi points at the *Theory of Migration Systems*, which, as she claims, is able to explain better how migration patterns developed on a historical, geographical, and political level.[144] However, assumptions of the theory (that historical/traditional ties between the sending and receiving state can lead to migration) do not go together with the reality of Asian migration. For example, between the Philippines and Saudi-Arabia there were no ties until the 1970s, when the oil boom 'pulled' workers to the Arabian Peninsula.

The problems I have with Oishis approach lay mostly in her assumptions. She mentions additionally that the *feminisation* of migration can be explained with globalisation, since globalised capitalism needs "cheap and docile migrant female labor."[145] Next to this obvious reduction, she continues to claim that this was the reason why "migration is no longer a solely male phenomenon."[146] When looking at processes such as migration, choosing a too small temporal space can lead to mistakes. The hypothesis of a certain *feminisation* of global migration can only be considered as possessing explanatory power, when scholars looks at the last 100 or 150 years within a 'then and now' logic. However, if rather a 'then to then' approach with a way wider period is applied, it can be concluded that *feminisation* is, frankly, not happening at all.[147] Oishi uses some pretty good arguments to explain her inaccurate assumption to finally come to the (global) *Care Gap,* as well as why more women work in the global manufacturing segment, and the global sex/marriage industry. Even though, I share some of her insights following her flawed logic, it seems clear that throwing *feminisation*, globalisation and capitalism in one pot cannot possibly explain these different areas of women's work and migration within Asia – especially when comparing it with inter-European, inter-American, international migration system. Maybe further research will teach me wrong.

[144] See Oishi, 2005, 8.
[145] Ibid., 2.
[146] Ibid.
[147] Gabaccia also points at this problem throughout her article. See Gabaccia, 2015a.

2.4 FROM MAKING WOMEN VISIBLE TO WOMEN BECOMING VISIBLE

Examples from the early 1970s, as cited in Mirjana Morokvasic, show that only one of the examined studies actually *explicitly* mention that the samples were all men and that this actually causes problems.[148] How to solve such problems or at least make them explicit will be elaborated here.

> "There is, of course, a literature in which migrant women are totally absent: in the general theories of migration, migrants are usually sex-less units; if they are constructed into sociological object then they are male and a considerable number of studies have used exclusively male samples."[149]

This quote, written in 1983, sums up quite nicely, what I hope to have been able to show above: there are various sexist, racist, etc. problems why women and their (labour) migration were not seen, discussed, considered or simply ignored. Theories were male; it did not matter if spatial mobility was gendered – the samples and examples most likely were men anyways. Migration, and especially labour migration, was frequently depicted as a male phenomenon, even though migration "is a sex selective process."[150] This, besides the truth-finding problem in humanities, also constitutes political blind spots. If there is no research on mobile working women, labour migration policies will most likely not aim at their situation in any reasonable way.[151] Since roughly the mid-1970s women have been 'finally' seen as possible protagonists of historical studies or at least the absence of women in migration theory and studies became more explicit.[152]

There is no such thing as the *one* feminist approach to migration or migration history, of course. However, it is possible to draw a picture of a parallel and interconnected (not chronological or clear-cut) periodisation of 'generations' or stages of feminist analyses/approaches.[153] As Riley puts it, in context of critical demography, central to different feminist approaches are three assumptions: "that gender is an organizing principle

[148] See Morokvasic, 1983, 15.
[149] Ibid., 13.
[150] Ibid., 14.
[151] As seen e.g. in the labour laws of the Philippines in the 1970s and 1980s, that tried, out of numerous moralist consideration, to restrict women's migration. The laws lead to women becoming irregular/illegal migrants.
[152] See Oishi, 2005, 7., see Hahn, 2012, 56-8., see Gabaccia, 2015a, 45., and see Marokvasic, 14.
[153] See Aufhauser, Elisabeth: "Migration und Geschlecht: Zur Konstruktion und Rekonstruktion von Weiblichkeit und Männlichkeit in der internationalen Migration." In: Husa, Karl/Christof Parnreiter/Irene Stacher (eds.): Internationale Migration. Die globale Herausforderung des 21. Jahrhunderts?, Frankfurt/M.: Brandes & Apsel, 2000. P. 97-122. Here 100f.

of all societies, that gender is a social construction, and that gender theory necessarily involves politics of inequality."[154]

Beginning in the 1960s and developing more in the 1970s and 1980s, more and more scholars tried to 'bring women in'. *Empirical Women's Studies* or *Feminist Empiricism* point out that androcentric scholars and their theories are not taking *female* migration into consideration. Including women in *male* models lead to an individualist approach, where gender is just one characteristic of an individual. 'Bringing women in' as an approach to complete existing models, theories and therefore also into the statistics that are used, is still blind to systemic criticism. *Empirical Migration Studies*, with its positivist thinking, therefore was concerned with stressing how, why, and to which degrees women were and are mobile. Most of the time as a rather additive or comparative story: *'and here, after a whole book on migration: one chapter on why women are different.'*[155] This approach, though, gave leeway to maybe not fight against, but reconceptualise assumptions that male theories are neutral. The possible delegitimizing potential of a deconstruction of systemic inequalities is missing, or not achievable with this.[156] However, it "can nevertheless push that field toward change and reconceptualization."[157]

A famous example of this from the 1960s was research about women as dependants of men in relation to family reunification. As inter alia Annie Phizacklea and Mirjana Morokvasic pointed out in 1983, this was full of stereotypes – stereotypes, that today still have a great impact. In a nutshell, as (migrant and non-migrant) women's responsibility is reproduction, their economic role was underestimated and their labour (productive as well as reproductive) was underrepresented. The decision to migrate was seen as a male one; wives and daughters therefore had no own agenda – so women were researched "as an accessory of a process they are not really taking part in."[158] These seemingly first steps of visibility actually backed their invisibility, since this 'visibility' was only given within the framing of family; silent and passive. Migrant women in particular had a bad standing in research because racist stereotypes accompanied the sexist ones, as Morokvasic puts it: "The absence of migrant women or their inadequate stereotypical representation as dependants

[154] Riley, 1999, 370.
[155] See Phizacklea, 1983.
[156] Riley, 1999, 370.
[157] Ibid.
[158] Morokvasic, 1983, 15.

has been justified by their 'genuine invisibility' which was then in turn attributed to the women's cultural origin."[159]

Feminist Empiricism made mobile women visible within sexist and racist assumptions: funded studies on women as dependants of men, illiterate, isolated, unproductive, etc. *They* – the Others, migrant women – are 'traditional' and 'backward'. Analyses concentrated on 'women and family' and how migration was a chance of emancipation,[160] with an underlying modernisation theory. Internationally mobile women were seen as blank sheets of paper once they crossed the border. In short, migrant women became objects of research and traditional studies and sources (and their author's assumptions) were questioned.[161] These steps were still important, because researchers (men and women) came to reflect upon themselves, their respective work and assumptions in a more serious manner. However, this also meant to find new ways of writing about and with women.[162] Interdisciplinarity especially between migration historians and feminist migration scholars (social sciences) started to take off; scholarly networks and cooperation cross-fertilised the academic field.[163]

Once the economic role of women was recognised more in scholarship , approximately since the mid-1970s, their invisibility was questioned more. 'Mistakes' that were made previously were doubted, the acknowledgment of women's (productive and reproductive) importance gave leeway to funding. The UN Women's Decade starting with the UN International Women's Year in 1975, together with other global and local developments within scholarship, society and politics changed the dynamics of related fields. Especially concerning data and its interpretation, these processes also started to take place within statistics and demography.[164]

Migrant women made it from being seen as *dependants* of men to being recognised as *waged workers*. However, a lot of studies were too individualistic, the first stereotype was replaced with or became part of the second one, their background was seldom included in research – so migrant women were *still* a blank spot within the dichotomy of *tradition* and

[159] Ibid., 18.
[160] See Phizacklea's discussion on integration seminars for migrant women in France. Phizacklea, 1983.
[161] See Phizacklea, Annie: "Introduction." In: Phizacklea, Annie (ed.), One Way Ticket. Migration and Female Labour, London etc.: Routledge&Kegan Paul, 1983. P. 1-11. Here4-7., see Morokvasic, 1983, 13-19., and see Oishi, 2005, 7.
[162] See Phizacklea, 1983, 4-7., see Morokvasic, 1983, 15-18., and see Oishi, 2005, 7.
[163] See Aufhauser, 2000, 100., see Riley, 1999, 370f., see Gabaccia, 2015a, 45., see Morokvasic, 1983, 13-19., and see Herrera, Gioconda: "Gender and International Migration: Contributions and Cross-Fertilizations." In: Annual Review of Sociology 39 (2013). P. 471-489. Here 476.
[164] Morokvasic, 1983, 18f.

modernity.[165] Work and labour being part of an emancipating process that Western societies handed to migrant women, for which they could (read: should) be grateful. That it took a certain economic importance to take a closer look at women is another problem in itself. Work history and its assumptions are therefore but also another field that should be problematised elsewhere to contextualise these developments.[166]

Women as migrants by this point started to be seen in academia more often as having an agenda, as *active subjects* with a standpoint and background. Approaches that could be summarised with (the rather political term) Gender Mainstreaming tried, in a second generation since the 1970s/1980s, to also see structural causes and conditions for women and, with more qualitative methods (e.g. Oral History, descriptive case studies), taking their experiences into account. Thus, becoming *subjects* of Migration Studies, rather than objects, especially since they were seen within their various contexts; not being a blank sheet of paper anymore.[167] If gender is a social construct and an important organiser of societies, the categories 'women' or 'men' will not be able to explain the disparities between people that are being read as *'male'* or *'female'*. Rather, the power structures, stereotypes and accompanying policies and laws around them should be taken into consideration to understand the differences – to not naturalise them.[168] A broader definition of gender and migration research around gender has a delegitimizing potential that Feminist Empiricism does not have.[169]

An example could be Household Strategy theories, that were criticised in the 1980s inter alia by Phizacklea as not being engendered, say: to see the household as a "homogenous and unified unit"[170] stands in the way of analysing 'household decisions' within its hierarchical structures. Only when engendering theories, the power relations can be seen: differences come from "gendered cultural construction of the family and prevailing roles of men and women".[171] *Female* empowerment within the *house* can be seen if analyses are being gender mainstreamed. Similarly, other areas of social life and organisation can also

[165] Another problematic dichotomy that has a great effective force is free – unfree, regular – irregular, work migration – flight. Women traditionally here are seen or researched as victims (unfree, refugees, trafficking victims). The sheer number (when it is about *female* migration) of research on mail-in brides, human trafficking and the like illustrates this. This, just like other dichotomies does not give credit to the complexity of given situation and "denies their [women's] agency". See Lucassen, 7-9.
[166] Morokvasic, 1983, 20-25.
[167] See Aufhauser, 2000, 100., see Morokvasic, 1983, 19f., see Herrera, 2013, 476., see Phizacklea, 1983, 7f., and see Hahn, 55f.
[168] See Riley, 1999, 374-377.
[169] See Riley, 1999, 374-377., see Morokvasic, 1983, 30., and see Herrera, 2013,473-476.
[170] Herrera, 2013, 473.
[171] Ibid.

be engendered. This shows how older interpretations hide subjugation within families and societies as well as the high contestation of social and other resources. “Migration is above all conceived as a set of complex networks of inequality that need to be entangled.”[172] Gender in this moment of time is seen as a constitutive factor; while other inequalities like race, age and class are but qualifiers – gender is at the centre.[173]

Studies in this direction “paved the way for an intersectional approach.”[174] Like others in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Morokvasic already points in the direction of intersectionality when she uses terms like ‘fourfold oppression’ of women migrant workers (class, race, nationality, gender, *etc.*).[175]

The identity ‘*woman’* is a discourse that happens within hierarchies and gender structures. Feminism as a social movement and area of research tends to see the experiences of women and woman herself, up until the mid 1980s, as rather white. In this context, the situation that was just explained in the paragraphs above, together with the Civil Rights movement where women were underrepresented, the term, theory and method *intersectionality* developed in 1989. Images of *male* and *female*, how they are constructed, by whom for whom, which limits they have, and how this interacts with other oppressions like class and race, are questions of another branch of feminist Migration Studies.[176] Seeing gender as a social construct, which could have a greater explanatory power than gender as an individual property, then gave leeway to the understanding, that Migration Studies that concentrate on gender but ignore class and race must consequently lead to a reductionist view. Crenshaw, especially is associated with this term.[177]

This theory is more comprehensive and has a greater explanatory power when it comes to analysing systems of oppression(s). Every oppression is seen as a road or street, when a person experiences two or more oppressions, they are at the intersection of those. With this image in mind, it is easier understand “the multidimensionality of social inequality”[178] and dynamics within and between groups and their respective experienced oppressions. With doing so, intersectionality breaks with above explained essentialist views on gender

[172] Ibid., 475.
[173] See ibid., 473-476, 480.
[174] See ibid., 475.
[175] See Morokvasic, 1983, 26., see Phizacklea, 1983, 7f.
[176] See Aufhauser, 2000, 101., see Herrera, 2013, 472.
[177] See Herrera, 2013, 472/6f.
[178] Ibid.

and 'additive stories'.[179] Identity is not a static concept through time and space, just as the responding oppressions.

2.5 Global History and Migration Studies

> „Historical studies of migration have developed as a series of distinct literature separated by regional, temporal, and topical frontier."[180]

> „[A] better understanding of earlier periods of human history enables us to distinguish long-term continuities and discontinuities linking our own times to the past."[181]

Lucassen, Lucassen and Manning, probably three of the most cited names in global historical migration research, summarise five obstacles to the incorporation of this approach into historical scholarship.[182] When describing these obstacles, intentions of global history's migration studies becomes clear as well. On the one hand, there is national historiography, mentioned elsewhere, in which scholars make few systematic comparisons and migration as a national topic often receives little to no attention. Spatial comparisons are also mostly limited to Europe or the Global North.[183] In the same way, approaches to transfer history usually examine at least one European or Western country or region, mainly concerning the Atlantic area. In general, therefore, Eurocentrism and West-centrism remain major limitations for global history approaches. For example, there are many studies on Filipino migration to Italy and the US, but intra-Asian migrations are rarely examined - even if they are becoming more frequent.[184] Furthermore, authors point to area studies, such as 'Oriental Studies', Sinology or South East Asian Studies, which are mostly isolated from historical studies. For example, the Master's programme in Global History/Global Studies at the University of Vienna is disconnected from most Area Studies. Only few courses from African Studies, for example, can be credited to students, even though this university hosts Area Studies chairs from all over the world.[185] Therefore, global history students cannot be trained interdisciplinary and students are kept isolated from Area Studies by a questionably

[179] See Herrera, 2013, 476.
[180] Lucassen et al., 18.
[181] Ibid., 29.
[182] Ibid.
[183] Ibid.
[184] For example, see Oishi, 2005., see McKeown, 2008., and see McKeown, 2004.
[185] See Philologisch-kulturwissenschaftliche Fakultät Universität Wien. Last retrieved 02/02/2022. [https://phil-kult.univie.ac.at].

organised ECTS system. Furthermore, Lucassen et al. criticise that the period of historical migration research is rarely broader than five hundred years. Again, an example from the Master's programme curricular in Global History/Global Studies at the University of Vienna: students can rarely receive credits for archaeology or (cultural) anthropology courses, in addition to Area Studies courses. Instead, there is usually a wide range of credit-bearing courses from International Development. Yet it would make sense, if not be indispensable, for global historians and students of this subject alike to be familiar with detailed history approaches, to build networks with Area Studies and to get familiar other related disciplines.[186] This situation "explains gaps between historians and scientists working on migration issues on a much longer time scale, which prevents the accumulation of conceptual and theoretical knowledge."[187] To my knowledge, the Viennese curricular for global studies seldom links subfields of history, is mostly Eurocentric and extremely segmented. A more Interdisciplinary and intersectional approach would guarantee a better understanding of historical fields and other subjects. I think thus does not necessary mean that great, universal, generalizing theories are more likely to be developed by historians. On the contrary, perhaps, the comparison and interacting of regional knowledge production traditions and their sources would lead to a better understanding of human conditions of migration. Correspondingly, studies by, for example, Lucassen and Lucassen, Manning[188], Leslie Page Moch[189], Adam McKeown[190], Dirk Hoerder[191] and Kenneth Pomeranz[192] are much more interdisciplinary and massively larger in temporal and/or spatial scope and/or less Eurocentric than most of the studies and publications anticipated in the present work so far.

[186] Lucassen et al., 2010, 14-19, 29.
[187] Lucassen et al., 2010, 14.
[188] The outlines of Manning's work on Migration and Empire will be referred to later-on in chapter 4, see Manning, 2015.
[189] See Moch, Leslie Page: "Connecting Migration and World History: Demographic Patterns, Family Systemas and Gender." In: IRSH 52 (2007). 97-104.
[190] See McKeown, 2008.
[191] See for example: Hoerder, Dirk/Kaur, Amarjit (eds.), Proletarian and Gendered Mass Migrations. A Global Perspective on Continuities and Discontinuities from the 19th to the 21st Centuries, Leiden/Boston: 2013.
[192] Pomeranz, Kenneth, The Great Divergence. China, Europe, and the Makin of the Modern World Economy (The Princeton Economic History of the Western World), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.

3 AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH ON MIGRATION OF (ASIAN) WOMEN

To grasp topics such as migration and the data around it, is a task that needs a methodological framework. Nana Oishi uses three major analysis levels to talk about international women's migration: *micro, meso* and *macro level*. In her final publication about this topic, she adds the *suprastate macro level*, but will leave the latter out of sight for a majority of the time.[193] For the paper at hand and my profession, I work with all four levels.

Goss and Lindquist explained that the *Integrative Approach* to migration is a well-known, but not yet uniformed or unilinear theory or methodology. It draws broadly from structuration theory[194] but it is reflected, used, enhanced, and adjusted in a bulk of works and theories, "that identify the connecting elements between the macro and micro levels".[195] The aim here is to make linking different levels of social organizing easier; Oishi calls it most of the time *meso level* or *micro-macro-link.* Through connecting these levels, they can at the same time be analysed concerning their history and impact on the present, or, in my case: the 1970s and 1980s.

On the *micro/individual level*, the research question would be who makes the migration decision, why and how - therefore what degree of autonomy do migrating (and non-migrating) women actually have, and, on the other side, how employers/receiving countries decide on their selectivity. For large-scale migration patterns there has to be some leading questions and circumstances that give women the drive to make a migration decision, on a personal, more individual level, that cannot possibly be represented in laws and restrictions (macro). Policies on women who migrate are not able to explain the situation at hand in the respective country's past or present. If seen as a reaction to economic and societal needs, analysing policies can explain those. Meaning, irregular or illegal migration therefore would fall out of the scope whatsoever. However, with a micro level analysis one can "uncover the true determinants of female migration."[196] As mentioned earlier, the household strategy theory will not be able to hold its grounds here, since different regions, classes, etc. will see a different degree of household strategies as more or less important to the personal decision. The question here could be whom women are/feel bound or obligated to, within

[193] See Oishi, 2005.
[194] such as Anthony Giddens, as cited by Oishi, 2005, 10.
[195] Ibid., 10.
[196] Ibid., 13.

and without the family, relatives and other important groups of people. Oishi draws from a lot of research, next to recent data, and her interviews in particular are able to give us a glimpse of the autonomy of Asian women.[197]

On the *macro/state level,* state policies about immigration and emigration, especially gendered policies, that ever so often are restrictive towards women based on occupation, age, and destination country, are in the centre of interest. Part of analysing this could explain certain patterns of the migration of women. What is important here is that economic and political interests are discussed; meaning the receiving- as well as the sending-country. Studies about major-receiving countries have been around since the 1970s to an exhaustive degree, for non-Western countries especially since the 1990s. Determinants such as restrictions based on skill-levels and socio-economic status of the migrants regulate migration in most cases. Since migration in times of the nation state and strong borders are, as Oishi claims, mainly demand-driven (pull factors), studies about sending countries are less present, but have been increasing since the 2000s. Though most of the studies on sending and receiving countries are gender-blind and therefore mostly look at the neutral (read: male) restrictions, the bulk of feminist research is getting bigger as well - showing that women are seen as having a 'social worth' for the society that men apparently do not have, which is why the state has to protect (read: restrict) *female* migration. As Oishi explains, the *Integrative Approach* is able to explain how sending countries "affect gender-differentiated migration outcomes."[198] Her hypothesis here is that men's migration is organised demand-driven and women's migration value-driven.[199]

Oishi also draws from macro-causal analysis in the form of the method of agreement and the method of difference, which are basically comparisons. With the method of agreement, the researcher looks at similar outcomes, to then identify similar conditions, that could be causal. In the other case, it is vice versa: similar conditions and dissimilar outcomes are discussed to identify dissimilar conditions. Since Oishi works on the whole of Asian countries, this approach helps her to understand the spectrum of differences between the respective states. For example, Oishi uses the method of agreement in a within-groups (major sending countries) comparison to understand the *feminisation* of migration. This, again, is a good example of a sociological way of working that manifests wrong assumptions. Oishi, on another note, applies the method of difference in a between-group analysis,

[197] See Oishi, 2005, 10f, 13.
[198] Ibid., 12.
[199] See ibid., 11f.

whereas the groups are sending and non-sending countries. Basically, she compares area/country studies.[200]

On another *macro level,* the *suprastate* level, Oishi uses multilevel analyses and the methods of agreement and difference to see the impact of globalisation on women's migration and employment, also meaning different state, suprastate, NGO, GO, etc. interventions. Bi- and multilateral agreements, understandings and treaties, and their ratification in both sending and receiving countries, as well as the overall international migration regime stand in the centre of Oishis suprastate level analyses. I, for that matter, will understand the global level with a different focal point, since I am more concerned with the historical point of view and I think a solely policy-centred view on globalisation does not go far enough. Globalisation and its ramifications for gendered and racial policies and ideologies will stand in the middle of my considerations, while stressing the global nature of human mobility as nothing special or abnormal; drawing vastly from Global History approaches.

For the *meso/society level* is the micro-macro link, the findings of the macro and the micro analyses are connected through the heuristic tool of, as Oishi calls it, *social legitimacy* in the sending country and *social selectivity* in the receiving country. The hypothesis here is that the society has to be 'comfortable' with women migrating, if there is a large-scale pattern of *female* migration in place. Hence, linking societal norms to the individual. Oishi sees these norms best represented in quantifiable socio-economic factors like wage employment of women, integration in the world market, gender equality, the degree of women's internal mobility, and, overall, the social networks in place. Policies and the individual causes can work with or against societal norms, that can be, as we will see in the analyses, subject to sudden and/or slow change.[201]

[200] See Oishi, 2005, 10f.
[201] See ibid., 13f.

4 MIGRATION HISTORY THROUGH THE LENS OF CENSUS HISTORY: THE PHILIPPINES, LEBANON AND THEIR ENUMERATION

4.1 THE PHILIPPINES

A problem, that every historian encounters when writing about former colonies, is that it is hard, sometimes impossible, to write a history of a given region that is not reproducing colonialist narratives. Meaning a regional history in relation to the colonial power.

In the Philippines, international labour migration stems from a long tradition. Since the sixteenth century at least, when the Philippines became a Spanish colony, there have been records of seafaring migration. Oishi writes that international labour migration started at the beginning of the twentieth century.[202] Other different sociological and historical studies about Philippine migration agree with her. From where I stand, this point of view is incomprehensible, but not surprising. As written about in other studies, Western and Westernised universities and their respective knowledge remains *universal*, though contested. Writing about the Philippines, an archipelago with more than 7.000 islands and over 100 languages, is multilayered since *'it does not belong'*.[203] Scholarship on the Philippines comes *mainly* from three legacies – Spanish, US-American and Japanese. In each instance, it stayed quite imperial, with different pitfalls.

Spanish scholarship after the 'end' of Spanish colonialism in the Philippines (1565-1898) in 1898 remained fixed to the 'colonial' centre. Here, Spanish colonies, other than the American ones, did not become part of Spanish colonial history, at large. The end of formal colonialism, of course, does not mean the end of empire and therefore, not the end of its influence on present and *presentist* interpretations of the past – read: historiography.[204] In

[202] See Oishi, 2005, 63.

[203] Note: While initially researching for the historic context for my research question, I was amazed at how difficult the task seemed to find historians' works on Philippines' history, that did not put one or the other colonial power or a small topic at the forefront. Needless to say, that I did not encounter these problems with Lebanon and Israel. For sure, I do not want to compare their histories, Lebanon and Israel never were 'real' colonies of the West (arguably, the Mandate system was but nothing else than colonialism) and the Ottoman organization of these regions are not really comparable with 'classic' Western colonialism. It is peculiar, how the Philippines' history seems to be/have been the hot potato of Spanish, American and Asian scholarship. Needless to say, that, as with almost all former colonies, all historical scholarship is written in relation to the colonial core regions. *History starts with conquering.*

[204] See Tsuchiya, Akiko: "Introduction." In: Tsuchiya, Akiko/Acree Jr., William G. (eds.), Empire's End. Transnational Connections in the Hispanic World, Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2016. P. 1-13. Here: 4f., see Mejías-López, Alejandro: "Hispanic Studies and the Legacy of Empire." In: Tsuchiya, Akiko/Acree Jr., William G. (eds.), Empire's End. Transnational Connections in the Hispanic World, Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2016. P. 204-221. Here: 204-221., and see Tolliver, Joyce: "'El color nacional.' Race, Nation, and the Philippine Ilustrados." In: Tsuchiya, Akiko/Acree Jr., William G. (eds.), Empire's End. Transnational Connections in the Hispanic World, Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2016. P. 107-127. P. 107-127. Here: 107-110.

the twentieth century, historians have seen Spanish history as peninsular Spain, colonies were rarely included, except in writing about them being *'lost'*. This has since changed, there are many different approaches on writing about Spanish history without reinforcing empire, but at the same time not portraying the former colonies and the centre as independent of each other. However, this is true for Spanish America, and only partly true for Spanish colonies in Africa. However, what still often falls behind are the Philippines.[205] "[W]e continue to find the same muteness regarding Spain's largest and longest-held colony, the Philippines."[206]

The US colonial regime rewrote Philippines' history after the 1902 defeat "in order to justify US ideals of democracy and modernization, while simultaneously painting the country's recent past […] as a dark age."[207] Hereby, the US presented itself as the liberator from colonialism, which was now there to free the Orientalised Filipinos from their "feudal characteristics"[208], so they could be democratised – become civilised. The Philippines "needed superior guidance and the US was able to occupy this position."[209] With this in mind, the US historicised the territory in another light than Spain to meet the new narrative and build a basis for its informal empire and its "political and capitalist enterprise systems"[210] – so-called *Open Door Policy* – with a minimum of direct rule. This underlying modernisation theory strategy was explained and with scholarship justified through an US-exceptionalism idea.[211] „[D]espite being […] the third or fourth largest Anglophone country in the world"[212], the Philippines do not have an academic home in US history departments, *because* of its geography; same applies to Asian Studies, *despite* of the geography, because of the Western presence there (in a nutshell).[213]

Japanese scholarship on the Philippines took off with the Philippine Revolution 1896-1898 and its resistance against US domination until 1902, another era of writings (1939-1945) are set during the Japanese occupation in World War II, 1941-1945, as well as during the Vietnam War, 1955-1975. While each 'wave' of publications had their distinct character, here, also, a kind of modernisation discourse predominated. Just as described above for US-

[205] See Tolliver, 2016, 107f.
[206] Ibid., 107.
[207] Serizawa, Takamichi, Writing History in America's Shadow. Japan, the Philippines, and the Question of Pan-Asianism (Kyoto-CSEAS Series on Asian Studies, Vol. 21), Singapore/Kyoto: Nus Press/Kyoto University Press, 2020. P. 1.
[208] Serizawa, 2020, 2.
[209] Ibid.
[210] Ibid., 4.
[211] See ibid., 1-4.
[212] Tolliver, 2016, 107.
[213] See Tolliver, 2016, 107f., and see Serizawa, 2020, 1-4, 12-19.

American historiography on the Philippines, Japan wrote a history suiting its cause of Pan-Asianism against US domination – ironically "heavily influenced by works that had been produced […] by American colonial officers and scholars."[214] Japanese knowledge production, especially during World War II, used the Western civilisation discourse on the Philippines as well.[215] In that sense, as Takamichi Serizawa claims, Pan-Asianism was "an abbreviation of American benevolent assimilation in terms of narrating Philippine history and politics".[216]

When researching the migration history of the Philippines, I stumbled upon statements claiming Filipino*a migration across *borders* started in the twentieth century – Oishi also claims this.[217] This could maybe be true if referring to national borders; since before the twentieth century, the Philippines were part of the Spanish Empire. Hence, there were no *nation state* borders as we know them today. However, this well-meant interpretation would be too far-fetched. With the above in mind, writing about Philippines' history and migration history will likely reproduce one or the other civilisation or modernisation discourse – next to, as almost always in colonial contexts, source problems and their mostly colonial loci.

Following Patrick Manning's logic, Asian history, especially mobility history,[218] can be vividly grasped in a global-historical way through three perspectives:

> „First, is empire, with its tales of dominance, conflict, heroism, and the centralisation of power. Second is exchange, the human readiness to give away some goods or ideas in order to obtain other things that seem to be of value. Third […] is migration, the tendency of young adults to travel long distances and short, in search of new experiences and to gain valuable resources."[219]

Empire and migration are of particular importance for this work. The massive temporal framework that Manning and other global historians apply here helps to classify the more recent developments in the Philippines. This also means that there is less danger of analysing migration as something special or different. Even though I will refer heavily to the

[214] Serizawa, 2020, 14.
[215] See ibid., 12-19.
[216] Ibid., 19.
[217] See for example: Oishi, 2005, 63.
[218] For an overview about Asian migration before and during Empire, go see Manning/Trimmer, 2012 and Manning, 2015, for summary.
[219] Manning, 2015, 172.

twentieth century and statistical history in the following chapter, the global historical view remains implicit, if not explicitly mentioned repeatedly. However, what will always resonate is the impossibility to draw an all-encompassing picture with all the important global and regional influences. "Falsehood can often be excluded, but truth is difficult to nail down."[220] This chapter can therefore only be an approximation.

When I write about empire in the corresponding chapters, I usually mean the Spanish or US Empire, i.e. about a relatively short period of time since the fifteenth respectively eighteenth century. Empire, however, is an ordering power that significantly influenced the organisation and realities of life on the Asian continent even before the arrival of European powers. While this is true for other regions of the world as well, Asia has nevertheless had the most empires over time; these bring people, cultures, languages administratively, militarily, economically together and further apart. Yet, over time most Asians have always lived outside empires, especially since empires only evolved some four-thousand years ago. With the era of empires, beginning about 4000 years ago,[221] small 'states' become large empires, disintegrate and reconstitute themselves at another level or in another empire; borders, spaces and power structures shift, are transcended. Phases of peace and war produce different mobilities and organisations of mobility. Corresponding institutions are usually developed rather quickly in the process. From the sixteenth century onwards, European powers become economically of greater importance on the Asian continent, while the Safavid and Mughal Empires established themselves. After about 4.000 years of recorded, reconstructed empire history, Asian empires in the eighteenth century are confronted for the first time with the European global empires and their hegemony. By the early/mid-twentieth century, these empires reconstituted as newly independent states, some of which retain imperial dimensions themselves, come under US imperial influence, but continue to be under the influence of Western empires. Temporally short-lived empires, such as Japan's, also have a massive impact on the region and on knowledge and cultural production.[222]

With global empires and trade from the sixteenth century onwards, migrants from Europe came to Asia in small numbers but with much power. According to Manning, Asian migration became numerically more extensive in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This was

[220] Manning, 2015, 174.
[221] Reasonable incentives were that humans in the late Holocene era were now able to "rel[ay] on the amazing situation of being able to depend on relatively constant climate and regular annual variations." Manning, 2012, 189.
[222] See Manning, 2015, 172-179, 184-192.

partly due to slave trade and partly to labour migration to new centres in Southeast Asia. Since the turn of the century, migration to agricultural centres, but also already to urban centres, increased considerably. To some extent, these migration systems are on par with European migration to the Americas.[223] "[…] Southeast Asia is a remarkable region in the way it has been able to absorb immense numbers of migrants and allow for an unusually diverse cultural kaleidoscope."[224]

According to Manning, migration has changed in the last four to five centuries, with other forms coming to the fore. Besides more flight and an organised trade with enslaved people, it is diasporic networks and urbanisation that have had the greatest impact on societies and politics.[225] This also fits with observations of Filipino mobility. The change of migration from mainly towards agricultural centres to mainly rural-urban migration in the twentieth century in Asia becomes important when talking about globalisation processes and *feminisation* in the same period. At the same time, documentation on migration is becoming more systematic, migration in modern states therefore seems to be changing massively in the data. However, this is a fallacy that only arises when the time span of observation is drawn too narrowly. Recent changes are therefore also comparable to those that occurred further back in time. Environmental changes, technologies and economy, society and politics influence migrations over time; if a stark change takes place in these areas, it is also likely to be reflected in migration regimes, simultaneously or with a time lag.[226]

[223] Manning and see McKeown, 2008.
[224] Manning, 2015, 195.
[225] See ibid., 195-199.
[226] See ibid., 195-198.

4.1.1 Colonial Rule – from Empire to Empire

In 1591, the Spanish colonisers conducted the first population estimates of the Philippines that we know of. According to the *Philippine Statistician*, the first enumeration takes place at the end of 1877, with the goal of carrying them out at a decennial basis – due to the Spanish-American War and the Philippine Revolution; only the 1887 census, but not the 1897 one was conducted.[227]

For most empires, the nineteenth century was a time of interior conflict and nationalisation. In the Spanish Empire these processes happened as well; the empire was weakened by conflicts with France and the Americas, i.a. internal problematisation of citizenship rights and independence movements. Finally, in the first half of the nineteenth century, almost all American colonies became formally independent from Spain, except Cuba and Puerto Rico. With the independence movement keeping momentum, eventually with the 1898 Spanish-American War, the remnants of the Spanish colonial empire collapsed. Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines gained their independence from the Spaniards, which was a key historical moment for Spain, but also, more generally, for the idea of empire. The symbols and efforts of empire within the long nineteenth century stayed. However, as more often than not, where an empire dissolves, another rises: the Philippines, Cuba and Puerto Rico become an US-American colony and thus they join their emerging imperialism.[228]

The US at the time presents its colonialism as different, as distinctive, as good and loving – hence the term 'benevolent colonialism'. Racist, sexist, classist, etc. discriminatory practices and narratives are legitimised, as in other colonial contexts, with humanism, civilisation, charity and the like. The moulding of the Philippines in the image of the hegemonic USA can be interpreted very differently, depending on the perspective and the topic of study. Reforms in migration and education policies were racialised and marked by colonial inequality. In this, the *Other* – Philippines' population – was important in constructing the *Own*. The *Own* is defined here by strength, civilisation, progress, masculinity, health and such. And this *Own* is passed on in an act of altruism, with the *white (wo)men's burden*.[229]

After the Philippine Revolution of 1896 to 1898 and the end of Spanish colonialism, the Philippines became the first Asian republic under the new colonial power. Before the

[227] See Mills, Vicente: "The Population of the Philippines, Its Growth and Prediction." In: Philippines Statistician, 01/1953. As cited after: Bantegui, 1960, 22., and see The National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB), Philippines: The Evolution of the Philippine Statistical System. Country Paper." (Country Paper prepared for the United Nations Statistics Division Seminar "The Evolution of National Statistical Systems"), 23.02.2007, New York. P. 3.
[228] See Tsuchiya, 2016, 1-5., see Manning, 2015, 189-195, 198f.
[229] See Choy, 2003, 1-6, 10f., 19f.

occupation by the Japanese Empire, the Philippine constitution of 1935 was modelled after the US's presidential system, which continued in large parts after formal independence in 1946.[230]

Under the American colonial system, three censuses were executed in March 1903, December 1918 and January 1939.[231] The first census in the US was conducted as early as 1790. Since then, this has continued without interruption on a decennial basis. The US is thus one of the best-studied countries, as the documentation of IPUMS-USA also indicates.[232] Consequently, long-learned expertise in this field arrived in the Philippines.

In the early twentieth century, the US regime gradually created more statistical units within equally newly established or reorganised ministries, beginning with the *Bureau of Customs* (1902) – certainly due to economic interests. Other bureaus also collected data and merged them for administrative purposes (e.g. Bureau of Labor, 1908). In addition, a civil registration system was installed in 1901, which, according to Katsumi Nozawa, has been in operation up until the present day. However, of more interest here are the censuses. The three censuses were each conducted under different organisations, each decentralised; the first two being small-scale. The 1903 one was planned by the *Philippines Commission* (the central colonial administration), conducted by the *Census Bureau* based in the *Department of Public Instruction*, and analysed by the *United States Census Bureau*. In 1918, the *Philippine Islands Census Office* conducted the planning, execution, and evaluation – "with full participation by Filipinos"[233] for the first time. This was due to the *Jones Act* of 1916, which stipulated that the Philippines should become independent as soon as possible, and accordingly that all future processes must be handed over step by step. Under the Tydings-McDuffie Act from 1934, independence was set to be achieved by July 1946, ending the ten years Commonwealth period.[234]

The last census in 1939 was conducted by the *Commission of Census* (CoC), which was founded solely for this census. In the meantime, more and more statistical units were created in different areas of the state, advanced systematisation and the strengthening of the decentralised system made the CoC able to access more information for conducting the

[230] See Straßner, Alexander, Militärdiktatur im 20. Jahrhundert. Motivation, Herrschaftstechnik und Modernisierung im Vergleich, Wiesbaden: Springer, 2013. 251f., and see Hedman, Eva-Lotta/Sidel, John, *Philippine Politics and Society in the Twentieth Century. Colonial Legacies, Post-Colonial Trajectories* (Leifer, Micheal (ed.): Politics in Asia Series), London/New York: Routledge, 2000. Here: 142f.
[231] See NSCB, 2007, 3., and see Bernardino, 1960, 19.
[232] See IPUMS-International: "Microdata Inventory." In: IPUMS-International. Last retrieved 05/01/22. URL: [https://international.ipums.org/international/microdata_inventory.shtml].
[233] Nozawa.
[234] Ibid.

census. As a result, more subject areas and people were enumerated in the census.[235] 1940, under the Commonwealth Act No. 591, the *Bureau of Census and Statistics* (BCS) was created, and with it all the statistical bureaus organised under different bodies[236] were reorganised and integrated. It was an attempt to centralise supervision.[237]

Following Eva-Lotta Hedman and John Sidel, the 1903 census "categorised the population in terms of black, brown, and yellow, 'civilised' and 'wild'",[238] which shows statistically the racism and othering, referred to elsewhere. Civilised are Christians – wild are Muslims or pagans, so basically people(s) who resisted Spanish colonisation and missions. The US, just as the former colonial power, were not even sure, if there were any kind of 'people(s)' in the first place, because of the plurality of groups and cultures inhabiting the archipelago. Hence, self-government was not possible for them since they were not a nation. Which, then, to make them a nation, a people and to teach them culture and governance became the task of the '*benevolent colonizers'*.[239]

4.1.2 Independence – some Time Cuts

After the end of the Japanese occupation and official independence from the US, *the postwar recovery period* (1946-1955) required most of the resources of postcolonial Philippines (1946-1966). Manuel Acuña Roxas (Liberal Party), the last Commonwealth president, became the first president of the independent Philippines, until his death in 1948. His vice-president Elpidio Rivera Quirino (Liberal Party) succeeded him and, after the 1949 elections stayed in office until the 1953 election which witnessed (communist) mass mobilisation, when Ramon Magsaysay (Nacionalista Party) followed him. From 1957 to 1961, Carlos Garcia (Nacionalista Party) was president. Especially the first two had long political careers under the US American period, all of them kept close ties with the former colonial power. This was not by choice, but by necessity. Basically, the whole archipelago was destructed, its military, civil and economic infrastructure suffered from the war and occupation. In concert with the political instability, the Philippines slide into dependence from US assistance. This was agreed upon in the *Bell Act* of 1946, also known as *Philippine*

[235] Next to population, agriculture and industrial statistics, that were also captured in the former ones, environmental (like forestry) and infrastructural (like transportation and electrics) data was surveyed.
[236] "[T]he statistical work which had been carried out under the Statistics Division of the Department of Agriculture and Commerce, the Labor Statistics Division of the Department of Labor, Vital Statistics Division of the Health Bureau of the Department of Public Education, the Statistical Division of the Customs Office, and the 1939 Commission of Census" as well as the civil registration system became supervised under the BCS. See Nozawa.
[237] See Nozawa.
[238] Hedman/Sidel, 2000, 142.
[239] See ibid., 142f.

Trade Act, in 1955 it was amended by the *Laurel-Langley Agreement*, which expired as late as 1974. Up until the 1960s, at least, the impact of the USA on the economic and political system was massive, may it be through financial aid, free trade of different forms or (human, economical, environment) resource exploitation. The Philippines in this period were 'trapped' between the Manila Conference (SEATO) and the Bandung Conference, between the West and the nonaligned states, capitalism and communism; in short, the Cold War logic.[240]

In the 1950s, especially in the second half, import-substitution industrialisation[241] was fostered by President Garcia to help Filipino*a businesses, as well as to satisfy nationalist movements. With the trade US-Filipino treaties in place favouring US products (import) and the US market (export), this system had to fail; Philippine businesses could not expand and the export deficit rose anyways.[242] With the help of statistical surveys, Philippine and American joint programs planned the economic and financial recovery. The statistical system was basically a continuation of the American colonial one. The 1948 census was the first one, that the Philippines undertook without formal official American assistance, but it was heavily influenced by it. On the way they created plans to build their own professional force and institutions for statistical coordination. The BCS, which was founded under US colonial rule, was the conducting body. In these first post-war years, Filipinos were sent to the US to study statistics and come back to help with their know-how, which will also be reflected in the process of establishing the *Philippine Statistical Association* (PSA) 1952.[243]

On December 8, 1951, members of the UN Technical Assistance Program (UNTAP), all of them US-American-trained personnel, met in Manila. It is not clear from the documents who else took part in this meeting and to which nationality they belonged.[244] What is discernible, however, is that most of those listed studied in the Philippines and did their advanced studies in the US and/or worked at the UN. Others had previously worked in Philippine ministries that used statistics and/or held a chair or lectureship at American and/or Philippine universities.[245] This group of Filipino, American, and especially Filipino-American

[240] See Tyner, 2004, 27f., and see Hedman/Sidel, 2000, 28.
[241] This is a means of postcolonial states to protect the domestic market from imports (via e.g. tariffs), so that the own industry has time to grow and eventually become sustainable competitive on the global market.
[242] See Tyner, 2004, 28.
[243] See "Philippine Statistical Association", 1952. P. 26, see Bantegui, 1960, 22., and see Nozawa.
[244] Nozawa notes, that two of the initial *eighteen* members were American. As will be referred to in the next paragraph, The American Statistician writes, it was actually *nineteen* members. So, I cannot be sure, if the stating of *two* Americans can be trusted.
[245] As *The American Statistician* sums it up, the members were „representative of the professional interests of statisticians in the Philippines, including the applied field of psychology, vital statistics, public health, biometrics, economics, labor and manpower, social insurance, actuarial science, market analysis, business administration,

men accordingly came from different corners of theory and practice. At the meeting in early December 1951, these members decided that there must be a "professional society to be concerned with the development and application of statistics".[246] On December 12, 1951, among other founding members nineteen statisticians founded the PSA in Manila.[247] The objectives of the PSA, as summarised by their charter:

> "to foster in the broadest manner statistics and its application, to promote unity and effectiveness of effort among all concerned with statistical problems, […] to increase the contribution of statistics to human welfare […]. [I]n general, to make statistics of service to the science and to practical affairs."[248]

The first tasks were to develop a roadmap on how standards for statistics could be set, coordinated and extended or improved for the Philippines. At these meetings, the journal *Philippine Statistician*[249], which continues to be published to this day but is unfortunately inaccessible to me, was also planned, as were curricular university events.

During the second half of the 1950s, the *Office of Statistical Coordination and Standards* (OSCAS,[250] founded and constituted in 1955/56) became the central statistical body, together with the *National Economic Council* (NEC), which was formed in 1936 under US colonial rule and was restructured under Magsaysay in 1955. Four major agencies and about eighty minor units work together and under the OSCAS and the NEC. Henceforth, various programs, projects, committees were planned and carried out, most of them aiming at improving statistical operations, i.a. to meet development goals as defined by the *Five Year Economic and Social Development Program of* 1957 (NEC National Planning Division).[251] Hence, the decentralisation was pushed forward, the BCS, by 1956, "was left with population censuses as its province."[252]

In 1953, the Philippine government and the UNTAP founded the *Statistics Training Center* (STC) in a joint project, which took on its work to gradually implement programs in the second half of the 1950s. Scholars were sent to Japan, Bombay, India and in particular to

college and university teaching." (N.A.: "Philippine Statistical Association." In: The American Statistician, 6:4 (10/1952). P. 26.)

[246] See "Philippine Statistical Association", 1952. P. 26, see Bantegui, 1960, 22.

[247] At the beginning of 1952, when the charter of the PSA was promulgated, there were already seventy-three, who were later joined by another fourteen members of the institution.

[248] "Philippine Statistical Association", 1952. P. 26.

[249] I have not found anything about this, but it seems suggestive that the US counterpart has basically the same name while most of the founding members were at least US-trained.

[250] Executive Order No 119, July 1, 1955.

[251] See Bernardino, 1960, 19-23, 32. Esp. p. 21 shows an organigram of statistical organization in the 1950s.

[252] Nowaza.

the US to learn about various kinds of statistics' fields.[253] Under the STC, the *University of the Philippines* (Quezon City, Metro Manila) provides training for public and scientific service, masters programs are implemented. Through these programs, trained professionals were produced in the course of just a few years.[254]

During the first half of the 1950s, different government bodies were proposed and took on their work; the statistical activities of various ministries were surveyed, problems and possible solutions named and discussed. One main theme, that comes up again and again, is the question of the usage of a centralised or decentralised system for data collection and how to coordinate, integrate and standardise the chosen system. In 1954, the *Government Survey and Reorganization Commission*[255] recommended to continue with the decentralised system "but with clearer allocation of responsibilities and elimination of duplication",[256] next to other recommendations, that paved the way to reorganise the "decentralized system with a central coordinating authority"[257] and according executive orders.[258] Up until 1972, several adjustments by different bodies were made to this decentralised system, competences were defined and shifted between administrative bodies.[259]

Centralisation under Martial Law

1961, Diosdado Macapagal (Liberal Party) became president, followed by Ferdinand Marcos in 1965. He would stay in power for over twenty years, at least fourteen of them as dictator. The late 1960s saw, again, a participatory crisis (election-boycott due to anticipated massive fraud) and violent as well as non-violent mass mobilisation. The weakness of this mobilisation at the elections, persisting violence and demonstrations in the streets defined this crisis, according to Hedman and Sidel,[260] and consequently, the Martial Law period that followed ten years later.[261]

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[253] "Under the ICA-NEC program nineteen government statisticians were sent t the United States to study and observe in the following fields: (1) industrial and economic statistics, (2) census methods and statistical operations, (3) statistical standards and organization, (4) national income measurement, (5) agricultural statistics, (6) methods and techniques on the construction of proce indices, (7) balance of payment statistics, and (8) labor statistics, etc." See Bernardino, 1960, 22.

[254] See "Philippine Statistical Association", 1952. P. 26-27., see Bernardino, 1960, 22., and see Nozawa.

[255] Founded in 1954 by the Statistical Advisory Board, whose creation was proposed by the PSA.

[256] Bernardino, 1960, 19.

[257] Ibid.

[258] See Clemente, 1961, 8., see "Philippine Statistical Association", 1952. P. 26-27., and see Bernardino, 1960, 19.

[259] See Nowaka.

[260] For a lengthy discussion of participatory crises, the electoral system, the military and the church in the Philippines, as well as cold war logic problematics; short: the whole political history of twentieth century Philippines, go see Hedman/Sidel, 2000.

[261] See Hedman/Sidel, 2000, 14-18.

In the late 1960s, the system of import-substitution industrialisation, as mentioned above, crumpled, and the Philippines were not able to balance the deficits and debts. US interventions became less frequent (before increasing again in the 1970s and 1980s), but now the IMF and the World Bank had a seat on the table. Their ideas of economic development of a 'developing' or 'third-world' nation lead to the only conclusion, that the Philippines, in order to reach development goals defined by these organisations, has to shift to an export-oriented industrialisation. Under Marcos, especially after the declaration of Martial Law, export of commodities, processed products and labour force, had risen.[262] With the declaration of Martial Law on September 21, 1972, Marcos could secure his third term, deepening distrust and fostering political crises. Since then, he ruled with presidential decrees until 1986, even after the lifting of Martial Law in 1981. Reform efforts and democratisation of the election system therefore had to step aside in favour of a 'constitutional authoritarianism', cronyism and fraud. Marcos and his administration strengthened the military and the executive branch extensively; congress was suspended.[263] Within the multitude of political and economic crises, one stands out here: the administration. The decentralised administrative system apparently got out of hands; from Marcos' standpoint and within the dictator's logic, centralisation of the PSS, as well as of other government tasks and bodies, was non-negotiable.[264] Thus, Presidential Decree No. 1 addresses the reorganisation of the administration, even though there were, arguably, more pressing economical and societal issues. Important for the economic planning and the institutions concerned with this, most statistical responsibilities were centralised to the BCS, now named *National Census and Statistics Office* (NCSO), under the *Integrated Reorganization Plan* (IRP) 1972. The NEC was abolished, its tasks centralised in the NEDA.[265]

The reconstruction or rather reconstitution of decentralisation dominated the post-Marcos and *People Power Revolution* years under Aquino and Ramos (1986-1998). The state-centred policies of Marcos in almost all areas of government were reversed, hence, also the PSS. The NSCO was renamed National Statistics Office (NSO) and was made independent

[262] See Tyner, 2004, 29., and see Hedman/Sidel, 2000, 43-45.
[263] See Hedman/Sidel, 2000, 18-27, 43-48, 55-59. Here again, I want to stress to read more on the topic of the military's and crony's role. Especially, the impact of massive US military aid in context of the Vietnam War. They also managed to draw a vast picture of interior politics and movements, while contextualizing it globally. For this paper, I need to leave it out and stress other topics.
[264] See Hedman/Sidel, 2000, 26, 54-59, 170.
[265] See Tyner, 29f.

from NEDA. The NSO became then the i.a. census-conducting body. Other statistics bureaus within most ministries were reorganised, integrated, and amended.[266]

4.1.3 Views on Filipina Migration History

As described by a large body of social science literature, the Philippines is one of the greatest working-force-sending countries of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. As outlined above, there is few literature or documents on migration prior to the US colonial period. Accordingly, the most-cited periodisation of Philippine international migration only begins with the 'end' of the Spanish colonial period. In these representations, migration is portrayed as a product of domestic poverty and (US-)colonialism. Claudia Liebelt divides the 'phases' of Filipino emigration - summarizing secondary literature on the subject - as follows: The *first phase* coincides with the US-American colonial period and is mainly characterised by (care and educational) migration to the USA. A *second stage* extends to 1972; this period of import-substitution industrialisation is characterised by male mobility to the West. The *third phase* begins in 1972, the year Marcos' Martial Law takes effect and the economy is converted to export-oriented; labour migration is characterised by an "increasingly vast, female and global emigration".[267] As other studies suggest, mainly male sea-bound and trade migration characterised labour migration during the Spanish area; defined in relation to the colonial power. It is more than likely that global migration routes, which were uninteresting for the respective colonial power were simply not recorded, or ignored, perhaps even prevented. I would divide the 'phase' since 1972 into a pre- and post-Contemplación-era, the time cut I set here is in the mid-1990s.[268]

Zeroth and First Phase: "Not Conquerors, but Friends."[269] – Spanish Training, US 'Benevolent' Colonialism and the 'Empire of Care'

In the late Spanish period of the nineteenth century, an 'Empire of Care'[270] had already began to emerge. Filipinos were trained and educated in colonial universities and hospitals.

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[266] See Nowaka.

[267] Liebelt, Claudia, *Caring for the 'Holy Land'. Filipina Domestic Workers in Israel* (EASA, Vol. 17), New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2011. P. 12.

[268] See Liebelt, 2011, 12.

[269] Free cited after William McKinley (US President) as cited in Choy, 2003, 21.: "[C]oncerns for the welfare of Filipinos complemented America's 'benevolent assimilation' of the Philippines, which, as U.S. President William McKinley proclaimed in 1898, brought Americans to the Philippines 'not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends.'"

[270] Choy's book on Filipina Care migration "Empire of Care" I want to strongly recommend here. Although, it is, as well, a book that tells a Philippine story in relation to Empire, she understands to transcend empire without

During that time, a small Filipino elite emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century, the *ilustrados*[271] also studied in the colonial centre. These, albeit rather limited, opportunities for education, labour and intellectual migration were inaccessible to women, with the exception of formal training for midwifery (from 1879 onwards). This changed under the US supremacy. In this sense, it is sound to mark the beginning of a numerous labour migration in the American colonial period. As much as I am not sure about how close to the truth it is for international migration from the Philippines at large, it seems reasonable that US colonialism is the foundation of today's women's care migration (together with Marcos' promotion policies, as described below).[272]

Choy addresses this very issue and shows how the new colonial power provided educational opportunities, new professions and mobility between the Philippines and the US for young Filipinas. Philippine health care system and the introduction of the US health care system were an integral part of the colonial project and an important topos to justify the colonial system aimed at making the Philippines 'ready' for independence. As Choy points out, this took place in an orientalisation of Filipino bodies as "weak, diseased, and therefore racially inferior"[273], while American bodies were the opposite - typical modernisation theory and orientalising dichotomies. Accordingly, the new colonial 'friends' were predestined to teach the Filipinos*as Western, i.e. superior, medicine. This is not unique to the American colonial power, there are many examples of such othering processes and legitimisation strategies from European colonial history – "Western medicine functioned in different areas of the world to penetrate the colonized's bodies through statistical and laboratory studies."[274] In addition, in the late nineteenth, early twentieth century, it was not news that the US was 'offering' its medical services in the Philippines. Now, however, American women were also coming to the Philippines to educate Filipinas - they too were now 'allowed' to be part of the colonial project, acting out their 'white women's burden' in civilizing work. Empire thus becomes more feminine, which in turn fits with the affectionate 'benevolent' colonialism.[275] The story of the *nice* colonial power that only wanted to help and was so different from the *evil* European colonial powers can be refuted by many examples. The racist American health

ignoring, glorifying, under- or overstate its influence. Filipinas stay active in her qualitative research, but just as reacting to a given demand. I will not have the space here to go deep into her analyses.

[271] The ilustrados was a small elite group, whose most known representative is Jose Rizal (Doctor of medicine). They are important for nation-building narratives. See Choy, 2003, 18. And see especially the whole volume by Tsuchiya/Acree (eds.), 2016.

[272] See Liebelt, 2011, 12f., and see Choy, 2003, 17f.

[273] Choy, 2003, 18.

[274] Ibid., 22.

[275] See Choy, 2003, 17-24, 27-30, 34-36., and see Liebelt, 2011, 12f. It stays important not to essentialize American women here, for a more detailed qualitative assessment see Choy, 2003, 28-31.

system (treatments, working, as well as education) was violent, psychologically as well as physically.[276] The imposition of American gender ideas was violent too. Care work has long been women's work in the US - from unpaid and poorly regarded to paid and respected. American women took care of civilizing Filipinas, American men civilised Filipinos. Therefore, it was through these jobs that Filipinos*as were given the 'opportunity' to *ascend* racially.[277]

There is much more to report about these first years and their institutions. What is still particularly interesting here, especially in relation to social legitimacy, is that by means of propaganda, as well as new patterns of mobility and gain in social status (in concert with other more individualistic and classist mechanisms), Filipinas perceived their service as "a new and prestigious profession that benefited Filipinos *(sic!)* and the Philippine nation."[278] As Choy points out, this shows that an essentialising view of the US colonial system is insignificant in individual cases. The tense relationship and its complexities hereby become recognisable and more tangible. Even though, the whole approach of 'feminine benevolent' colonialism anchored Western (especially US-American) gendered stereotypes and spheres even more profoundly, it was, as roughly sketched, racist and sexist, as well as classist: nevertheless, it helped the chosen Filipinas to gain status and more opportunities in their individual lifestyles. "Yet, just as white American women used colonial nursing in their attempt to raise their status, so too did Filipino women."[279] The colonisers only partially 'controlled' the desires and aspirations of Filipinas. Just as later on Philippine governments will not really be able to restrict spatial mobility of Filipinas, despite bans and restrictions.[280]

Second Phase: INDEPENDENCE

The so-called *feminisation* of international (labor) migration is seen in the Philippines of the twentieth century since the 1960s/1970s. As mentioned briefly in the chapter 3, Oishi assumes a *feminisation* of migration, which has as prerequisite an export-oriented industrialisation in the context of globalisation. By globalisation she means here the latest globalisation from the mid-twentieth century of production processes. They give women in particular the opportunity to work in international and national labour markets, as these

[276] I will not be able to go into this further for this paper. The spectrum ranges from forced treatment to forced wearing of certain work uniforms. For examples, see Choy, 2003, 24-26.
[277] See Choy, 2003, 24-28.
[278] Ibid., 31.
[279] Ibid., 35. Filipinas also used the new "opportunities" given and/or imposed on them for national, anti-colonial and feminist purposes. See Choy, 2003, 35-37.
[280] See Choy, 2003, 33-40.

processes required cheap labour. Women in the Philippines, by this logic, are 'pulled' by export economy to urban centres where they find work in manufacturing jobs and the service sector. Here, the world systems theory mentioned in Chapter 2 can be applied to relate centres to 'hinterlands' (or periphery, semi-periphery). Oishi refers to other theories on women's labour migration that suggest these internally mobile women would then migrate further (chain migration) and enter the global labour market. The heuristic tool of Social Legitimisation is helpful to still see a link between inter- and intranational labour migration, as Oishi's research does not show this link. Rural-urban migration, according to Oishi, therefore rather serves as social legitimisation of women's migration in traditional societies.[281]

As Phizacklea notes in the 1980s, migration research is ahistorical when 'tradition' is used as a "substitute for an analysis of migrant women's specific socio-cultural background".[282] She, however, is concerned with how women are perceived in the receiving-country, as a 'blank sheet of paper' as I described elsewhere. However, a similar problem can be shown in Oishi's work: She too speaks of emancipation and modernisation through industrialisation and formal labour. The role of Filipinas in 'the countryside' seems to be *backward* in Oishi's study, restricted by a traditional society. By means of migration, women could emancipate themselves, or pointedly put: are given permission to emancipate themselves. Oishi's qualitative work, along with her analysis of quantitative factors from macroeconomics and demographics, nevertheless suggests precisely this conclusion. Especially in her comparative approach (to Sri Lanka and Bangladesh), it becomes clear that social legitimacy reduces the stigma against migrant women and this leads to more migration. Comparatively, she shows how women from less accepting environments migrate only when they can no longer afford to worry about their social status.[283]

As Oishi repeatedly points out, her statements should be taken with a grain of salt and be seen more as theses, since, as explained in more detail elsewhere, quantification is difficult or even impossible. These women were/are constantly affected by ever different and changing circumstances. Nevertheless, it can be cautiously concluded that environment, upbringing, family, policies around migrating women and women's bodies together with local and global globalisation processes have an unquantifiable impact on women's

[281] See Oishi, 2005, 167-169., see Liebelt, 2011, 12-14.
[282] Phizacklea, 1983, 23.
[283] See Oishi, 2005, 168.

migration decision.[284] However, this conclusion seems too broad and general that it cannot be falsified and therefore I find it difficult to draw any added value from it.

1972- 1995: Social Legitimacy, 'Feminisation' and Flor Contemplación – Marcos' Martial Law and post-Marcos years

An example of this social legitimisation and the interweaving of the macro, meso, and micro levels, is the change of public image of mobile women abroad, exemplified by the execution of Flor Contemplacións. Contemplación was a Filipina domestic worker, who, on charges of murdering her employer, was executed in Singapore in 1995. The whole story got a lot of media coverage, and sparked a lively discussion on mobile women abroad and Philippine policies. "The mass mobilization of Philippine migrant organizations, international lobbying and a bomb attack in Manila showed widespread disappointment with and resistance to the state's labour export policy."[285] Images and policies around Philippine mobile women changed thereafter. This will be important, i.a., for the social legitimacy explained below. Oishi's approach on *value*-driven migration laws for mobile women (in tension with *economic*/demand-driven migration laws for migrating men) can be vividly framed.[286]

For classification purposes, it must be pointed out that there is nothing new about these topoi that are being (re)produced. Basically, the public image of these women alternates between heroines, martyrs or sluts - they are defined by the media and parts of politics and evaluated in relation to men and 'the nation'. In this context, women are depicted as bearers of culture and tradition, entrenched in their roles as mothers and wives. The mobile Filipinas are pre-Contemplación (re)presented as heroines, the core of the Filipino nation, mothers who take upon themselves the hardness of leaving their families behind in order to provide a better future for the nation, society and their families. They also become martyrs who endure even the most adverse circumstances of '3D jobs' (dirty, difficult, dangerous) out of love and a sense of duty. This rather positive, almost admiring image can quickly turn into that of irresponsible mothers and wives who are too selfish to stay in 'their place' with their families or too 'stupid' to be able to stand their ground abroad. Thus, the media debate changes and labour migration is increasingly perceived as a problem, not an opportunity. Claudia Liebelt refers at this point to the "broken-home rhetoric in social science and media".[287] Even in the more 'positive' image of the heroine and martyr, women are reduced

[284] See ibid., 167-169.
[285] See Liebelt, 2011, 14.
[286] See ibid., 14-16.
[287] See Liebelt, 2011, 15.

to their roles as mothers and wives (of the family and the nation). With the broken-home rhetoric, mobile women then see themselves pigeonholed as the *sluts* who disappoint and shame the nation because they work as sex workers or because they 'let' themselves be (sexually) abused by their bosses. Thus, becoming *victims*, who need to be protected. In the Philippines, this shift resulted in calls for more protection of women, leading to migration restrictions. Labour migration was framed much more as an individual choice with individual responsibility. The state sought to create a monopoly on organizing migration, regulating and controlling those who migrate and where to go - creating more irregular and thus more poorly protected migration.[288] These developments culminated in the public discussions on Flor Contemplación. Since the mid-1980s, the media and especially (feminist) women's groups at home and abroad discussed the topic more intensively. This is probably related to the timing and the sheer number of mobile women that could not be ignored anymore.[289]

President Ferdinand Marcos initiated an overseas program for workers in 1974. Whereas, people were still cautious about encouraging migration, because they were afraid of the brain drain and permanent labour migration. In the context of an export-oriented economy pushed by Marcos, the World Bank and the IMF, Marcos' government saw labour migration as a solution. The problems were mainly un- and underemployment and the rising national deficit, accompanied by inflation and the emerging world economic crisis of the 1980s, the oil boom and oil price crisis. Remittances were supposed to cushion the crises and lead to greater prosperity in the long term. This temporary fix became quite permanent: even today, funds from abroad are an important pillar of the Philippine economy. The Labor Code (Presidential Decree 442) of 1974 established the first institutional framework for labour migration. Administrative units such as the Overseas Employment Board for land-bound migration and the National Seamen Board for sea-bound migration were created through parliament.[290] These are now responsible for "recruiting, marketing, and placing, for operating public employment offices, and for regulating private employment agencies".[291] At best, these units also provided payment accounts to ensure that enough remittances would actually arrive in the Philippines. What is particularly interesting here is that this

[288] See ibid., 14-16., and see Oishi, 2005, 64-68.
[289] See Oishi, 2005, 64-66.
[290] See Straßner, 2013, 252-255., see Liebelt, 2011, 12, 14f., see Oishi, 2005, 62-68, 81., see Tyner, 2003, 28-31., and see Rodriguez, Robyn M., Domestic Insecurities: Female Migration from the Philippines, Development and National Subject-Status (Working Paper 114), The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, San Diego: University of California, 2005. 1, 5.
[291] Oishi, 2005, 64.

Labor Code clearly had men migrant workers in mind when it was written. Aside from the problem that in the 1970s experiences and life realities of mobile women were neither properly quantified nor considered, most of these migrants were men.[292] They went mainly to the Arabian Peninsula, where they drove the oil and construction boom. The rapid increase in migration between 1974 and 1984 (more than tenfold according to official statistics) triggered the establishment of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) in 1982 to strengthen and bureaucratise the state's influence on labour migration and to market Philippine labour abroad. What was not considered, however, is that the *'feminisation'* of labour migration was a major contributor to these rising numbers. During the Marcos era, laws and institutions were not adapted or sensitised to engendered migration.[293]

This process changed after the People Power Revolution and with President Corazón Aquino. Problems and debates surrounding migrations of women could no longer be ignored. With symbolic important acts such as the *Month of Overseas Filipinos* (December 1988), both mobile men and women were celebrated as heroes and heroines. Reports and concern about the exploitation of and violence against migrants, especially women, increased. Like other migrant-sending countries in Asia, the Philippines now begin to impose extreme restrictions on women's labour migration (starting in 1988). This led, as again in later years, to an increased vulnerability in receiving countries, protests by Filipinas at home and abroad, and slowed visa processes. Controlling migration once again proved to be difficult to impossible if the government does not want to accept massive negative short- and long-term consequences for the economy, foreign policy and domestic politics. In the early 1990s under President Ramos, there was again a 'paradigm shift'. Instead of controlling and promoting migration, Ramos wanted to manage migration; instead of using migration as a short-term solution for economic problems, the government finally realised that migration is here to stay. The *Magna Carta of Overseas Employment* (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act, Republic Act 8042) of 1995 was therefore not just a response to the Contemplación case, but to a decade-long debate. More diplomatic powers, the protection of documented as well as undocumented migrant women abroad, a minimum

[292] The fact that migrating men are also exploited, perish and are vulnerable is not considered in the laws on migration. Or they are only protected when women also migrate in high numbers. As fathers and husbands, i.e. in relation to women and family, male migrants are not considered. See, 2011, 15.

[293] See Straßner, 2013, 252-255., see Liebelt, 2011, 12, 14f., see Oishi, 2005, 62-68, 81., and see Tyner, 2004, 28-31.

age, etc., should result in opportunities for protection and assistance for women in particularly vulnerable situations; protection without restriction.[294]

[294] See Straßner, 2013, 252-255., see Liebelt, 2011, 12, 14f., see Oishi, 2005, 62-68, 81., and see Tyner, 2004, 38-41, 46f., 88-90.

4.2 LEBANON

4.2.1 THE UBIQUITOUS CENSUS

Robert Brown's assumption in 1971 that Lebanon would not conduct a census in the near future because of the beginning of the civil war (1975-1990) is an understatement and shows that Brown did not deal with details in his basal comparative analysis. Not only is there a lack of census data since the 1960s, but the last census was conducted in 1932, which, according to existing research, is due to sectarian sensitivity. Rough estimates and small-scale censuses do not jeopardise the confessionalism on which the Lebanese parliament is built. The 1921 census formed the basis of the 1922 Representative Council and the 1926 Constitution. "[…] Christians received seventeen seats and Muslims, including Druze, received thirteen, an exact reflection of the 1921 census."[295] The 1932 census, with slight changes due to the *Ta'if Agreement* of 1989, forms the basis of the 1943 National Pact, and is the foundation of Lebanon's representative democracy.[296]

As Fawwaz Traboulsi shows, analysing the ways of governing and administering *Jabal Lubnan* in the Ottoman Empire, the way France did it, and, to that matter, the High Porte[297] and Paris together, show a long tradition, especially when looking at the modern independent state of Lebanon. For my Master's thesis, it is not necessary to understand the different legal statuses, but a certain continuity can be historicised to explain why independent Lebanon ended up with no census at all.[298]

The High Porte's 'tolerance' rule is founded on the *millet*-system, a two-stages hierarchy with Muslims on the top and a lower community beneath them. These 'lower' communities were 'peoples of the book' (*dhimmi*), the other Abrahamic religions Christianity and Judaism. They enjoyed protection in exchange for *Jizya*, a protection tax, and were able to keep their own jurisdiction. *Millet* loosely translates to 'nation'.[299] With the complex other

[295] Harris, William, Lebanon. A History, 600-2011, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 180., and see Brown, (1969) 1971, 32-35.
[296] See Harris, 2012, 13f., 19f, 178-180., see Najem, Tom, Lebanon. The Politics of a Penetrated Society, London/New York: Routledge, 2012. P. 6, 12, 49-54.
[297] The High Porte, sometimes also called Sublime Porte, is the synonym used for the Ottoman sultan, Grant Vesir and the Diwan.
[298] See Traboulsi, 2007, 3-72., here especially p. 3-4 summarizes the problems that Mount Lebanon had under the Emirate, that can still be seen in the formation of independent Lebanon.
[299] See ibid., 255.

tax, land and submission systems of the High Porte, this was the foundation of Ottoman rule.

Jabal Lubnan becomes a political unit with its incorporation into the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century (1523-1842) as an emirate. Under the *iltizam* (*iqta`* system)[300], the elites (the *muqata`ji* families)[301] have relative autonomy, as long as they deliver their taxes to the High Porte, which gave them the right to allocate these taxes under the *iltizam* in the first place. The *muqata'ji* families hold political and economic powers.[302] By 1842, tensions between and within Druze[303] and Maronite[304] elites rises so much, that the High Porte ends the emirate and divides *Jabal Lubnan* in two administration units along religious lines. Uprisings and strikes with complex tax and land-based identity politics and foreign interference (esp. from France and Great Britain) lasted until 1861, with the so-called 'events of 1860' witnessing sectarian cleansing in Mount Lebanon and *Bilad ash-Sham* as a sad climax. These civil-war-like conditions in Lebanon and Syria unfolded almost exactly along the same lines as the Lebanese civil war in the second half of the twentieth century.[305] Lebanese nation-building, identity and modern history is dominated by Maronite narratives. In 1861, after the 'events of 1860' and in the course of Tanzimat[306], *Jabal Lubnan* becomes an Ottoman *sanjaq*[307] with the status of *mutasarrifiyya*[308] (1861-1915). The Lebanese Maronites are the dominant group, enjoying economic and political advantages due to their contacts with the European protective power. Maronite trade and elite families benefit above all others from the increasing European penetration in the nineteenth century. The new nationalisms in the nineteenth century, notably in the second half, were fostered by European powers that wanted to install 'informal colonies' and 'informal empires'. With Lebanon gaining this new status as *de facto* trade hub between the West and the East, the

[300] Concessions given by the High Porte to farm taxes and tenure land.
[301] The holder of the *iqta`*.
[302] See Traboulsi, 2007, 3f., 255 (for definitions).
[303] Druzes are a monotheistic, Abrahamic and ethnic religious community with syncretic roots and believe systems, mainly from the southern part of *Jabal Lubnan* and the Shouf.
[304] Maronites are a Christian religious community that originally lived in the northern part of the Jabal Lubnan.
[305] See Traboulsi, 2007, 24-40., see Faroqhi, 2010, 10f.
[306] The *Tanzimat* (osm. reorganisation) reforms, beginning in 1839, restructured military and state organisation profoundly, i.a. to bind the non-Muslim Ottoman subjects closer to the empire in the struggle against nationalisms. See Faroqhi, 2010, 94-96.
[307] A *Sanjaq*, ruled by an *emir* or *Sanjakbek*, is a subdivision of a *Vilaya* (pl. *Vilayet*), which is the main Ottoman unit of administration, ruled by a *wali*. The *Vilaya* is directly subordinated to the High Porte.
[308] France as a self-proclaimed protective power for the Maronites of the Ottoman Empire state-sponsored the project of a Christian emirate, while the High Porte wanted the complete subordination of Jabal Lubnan. The *mutasarrifiyya* was a compromise between France and the Ottoman Empire and is known in 'Lebanese' history as a time of peace and economical development. *Jabal Lubnan* then was granted an autonomy status, it became a hub between Beirut's, Sham's and Istanbul's trade, which made its economic elites richer. Its autonomy therefore soon became a farce. See Traboulsi, 2007, 41-51.

influence of European 'protecting powers' for (religious, ethnic) minorities becomes clear. This increased the overall number of wealthy Maronite families, which in turn leads to an improvement of their socio-economic situation. These political and religious elites are the ones who started constructing a history of the Jabal Lubnan. Later on, this construction was further built upon. At this point in the nineteenth century, the question of the nation's identity, the people, or its borders, arises. The development towards Arab and Greater Syrian identities being placed behind the Lebanese one only begins at the beginning of the twentieth century. The pre-war years saw a transformation of ideas, which were later also implemented: the idea of a joined *Jabal Lubnan* region was extended to a Greater Lebanon, which roughly corresponds with today's borders.[309]

1908 was a turning point in the entire Ottoman Empire: the seizure of power by the Young Turks. The Lebanese Maronites refused to send representatives to Istanbul due to the Turkification policy and out of fear of losing their partial autonomy. As a result, Muslims and Maronites in the *mutasarrifiyya* became increasingly alienated from Istanbul. The High Porte abolished the mutasarrifiyya in 1915 and appointed an Ottoman governor. Only three years later, French troops landed in Lebanon. During the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War II, Lebanese Maronites begin to negotiate with France to implement the Greater Lebanese idea, which was ultimately successful. The *mutasarrifiyya* thus becomes the launch pad for independence of Greater Lebanon in 1920 – under French mandate. Under the Sykes-Picot treaty, Lebanon and Syria fall to France's mandate. Historicising arguments included that the Greater Lebanon corresponded to the natural borders of Lebanon from the seventeenth century and that the extension to Beirut was needed for trade with Europeans. Among Maronites, the question arose as to whether they wanted a Greater Lebanon with a balance between religious communities and a common striving for independence, or whether they would rather confine themselves to the Christian *Jabal Lubnan* in order to avoid religious conflicts and to remain in the clear majority.[310]

The groups that directly or indirectly contributed their ideas to the lobbying in Versailles were mainly Maronite Lebanese and exiled Lebanese from European and American

[309] See Entelis, John P.: „Belief-System and Ideology Formation in the Lebanese Katâ'ib Party." In: International Journal of Middle East Studies, 4:2 (1973). P. 148-162. Here: 155., see Firro, Kais M., Inventing Lebanon. Nationalism and the State under the Mandate, London/New York City: I.B. Tauris, 2003. Here: 15f., see Schumann, Christoph, Radikalnationalismus in Syrien und Libanon. Politische Sozialisation und Elitenbildung 1930-1958, Hamburg: Deutsches Orient Institut, 2001. 255., see Najem, 2012, 5f., see Faroqhi, 2010, 11.

[310] See Firro, 2003, 16-19., see Kuderna, Michael: "Libanon." In: Steinbach, Udo / Robert, Rüdiger (eds.), Länderanalysen (Der Nahe und Mittlere Osten. Politik – Gesellschaft – Wirtschaft – Geschichte – Kulture, Vol. 2), Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1988. S. 235-249. Here: 255f., see Najem, 2012, 7-11.

countries.[311] Besides plans for Greater Lebanon, there were also Syrian aspirations for Greater Syria, which most Muslims in Lebanon tended to support rather than the mainly Maronite solution. However, the point of view was not necessarily and exclusively tied to religious affiliations. Intellectuals changed their opinion from Greater Lebanon to Greater Syria and vice versa until 1920. Finally, groups in Lebanon take their cue from their reference groups abroad. Muslims tended to look culturally, ideologically, economically and in terms of foreign policy in the direction of equally newly constituted Arab states. While in these respects, Maronites leaned more towards Europeans. This generalisation is somewhat reductionist, yet a permissible explanation at the time is that two nationalisms opposed each other whose adherents were almost identical with the two groups of Muslims and Christians. In their self-image, Maronites were the founders and architects of Lebanon, while the other groups struggled with their role in this Maronite state. After the proclamation of the state in 1920 by France, nation-building began. A typical received thesis about Lebanon is that the Lebanese first had a state, then came danger (civil war) and after that they grew into a nation. Lebanese national historians try to find different views on state formation in different groups to show that Muslims, as well as Christians, had and have similar or similarly dissimilar views.

In any case, some commonalities can be identified: Muslim and Christian historians assume that a Lebanese nation existed before 1920 and that religious, ethnic, and family identities played no role in the preference of state ideas.[312]

It is clear that the 1921 census, conducted by the French High Commissioner, was designed to prove that Greater Lebanon was still mainly Christian and that Maronites were the largest group among Christians. This justified the agreement in Versailles on the Greater Lebanon solution, which was favoured by the former *'protecting power'*. A demographic reason was needed for favouring Christians in this newly-emerging state. Interestingly, Maronites were able to retain the upper hand in the 1943 National Pact, although it was already clear in the 1920s that the enlargement of Lebanon would make the non-Christians numerically superior, or at least that Christians would soon be in the minority. Listed by denomination or rather confession, Maronites nevertheless made up a majority in Greater Lebanon, despite mass migration since the end of the nineteenth century and the great famine in the

[311] The excessive influence of emigrants is something typical of emerging nationalisms.

[312] see Firro, 2003, 22., see Hanf, Theodor, Koexistenz im Krieg. Staatszerfall und Entstehen einer Nation im Libanon, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990. 759-761., see Kuderna, 2001, 248., and see Schumann, 2001, 255.

wake of the First World War.[313] On top, it was a extremely political census since it formed the foundation of who would be defined as a citizen from 1924 (Treaty of Lausanne) onwards, before that the Ottoman citizenship law of 1896 was still in place.[314]

In the turmoil of this early nation-building process, in which borders were fought over and pan-Arabism was still a real possibility for the future, the church, Maronite politicians and the mandate power France were able to assert themselves. The fact that Lebanon was able to wrest so much land from Syria was also due to the French High Commissioner's interpretation of the census in such a way that each denomination finally felt that it had earned some power and influence. For example, Sunnis, who were then the second largest denomination in the Greater Lebanon model and tended to feel that they belonged to Syria, were given the vice-presidency. Druze, formerly under British protectorate, were harder to convince, also due to their complex standpoints between proving a point to Britain in agreeing to the French mandate's stance and agitating through supporting the Syrian Revolt 1925 to 1926.[315]

The 1932 census – Lebanon's latest census – was conducted in an atmosphere of options. Options for still changing the mandate's borders, changing the constitution and power structures, and finally, independence; through violent and non-violent means. French mandatory authorities conducted the census in March 1932 that would finally be the basis to make confessionalism permanent. As Rania Maktabi claims, there is not a lot of knowledge about how this census was organised and conducted; the sources are partial. It enumerated foreigners, emigrants (as explained below) and Lebanese, the latter two were categorised by sects, the former not.[316] Results of that 1932 census are hardly a basis for demographics of Mandate Lebanon. It is a political and politicised census that functions as basis for citizenship and identity. The whole life of a Lebanese person is still bureaucratically centred around theses that were 'proven' by the Mandate census to serve Western ideas of citizenship, the nation, its organisation, finally a democracy that proportionally represents this nation.[317] French analysers concluded that Christians and Maronites were still the majority, though declining in numbers just as the Druze. Naturalisation of Armenians and

[313] See Harris, 2012, 178f., see Maktabi, Rania: "The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited. Who Are the Lebanese?" In: British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 26:2 (1999). P. 219-241. Here: 225f.

[314] All Ottoman subjects were citizens and their 'nation' was not differentiated in any legal terms; see Maktabi, 1999, 225.

[315] See Harris, 2012, 178-181.

[316] See Maktabi, 1999, 224-226., see Harris, 2012, 184f., 194., see Najem, 2012, 9., and see Havemann, Axel, Geschichte und Geschichtsschreibung im Libanon des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts. Formen und Funktionen des historischen Selbstverständnisses (Orient-Institut der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft (ed.): Beiruter Texte und Studien, Vol. 90), Würzburg/Beirut: Ergon, 2002. P. 42.

[317] See Harris, 2012, 184f., 194., see Najem, 2012, 9., and see Havemann, 2002, 42., and see Maktabi, 1999, 220.

inclusion of tax-paying Lebanese emigrants did their part in keeping these numbers sympathetic to the Christian 'majority'.[318] Muslims were numerically on the rise, "in part because of undercounting in 1921."[319]

Anyways, after brokering a constitution, trying to historicise Greater Lebanon and fostering a Lebanese 'national identity', the census helped to install a Christian majority, where there is none. It was also clear from the numbers, emigration tendencies and fertility that "[t]here would eventually be a triangular jostling of three 'great' communities with several lesser sectarian identities."[320] No 'sect' or 'confession' would gain the upper hand. In 1943, the confessionalism of the Ottoman *millet system* and the French Mandate became the basis of independent Lebanon, as seen with the National Pact. This undocumented understanding between Sunni and Maronite representatives made i.a. the sectarian shares, as based on the 1932 census, permanent, while stressing that Lebanon is part of the Arab world and is nonetheless open for business with the West. These shares (ratio six to five in favour of Maronites) are embedded in government, parliament, but also the whole bureaucratic body. The 1932 census and the National Pact determined the parliamentary seats until the start of the civil war in 1975 and was finally reformed with the Constitution in 1990 (now, the ratio is one to one between Maronites and Muslims).[321]

In terms of fostering a Lebanese identity, this census, as the one before, is important because of citizenship status and how it became a kind of legal paper, that, to sum it up with Maktabi, created "a Gordian knot in Lebanese courts and embassies".[322] As already mentioned, the 1932 census was political, i.a. because of the way it enumerated emigrants as well. Maronite elites knew that most emigrants were Christians, so to count them as well was important to demonstrate the numeric majority of Maronites.[323] Therefore, legitimizing the Maronites' claim of leading and forming the nation, its economics and politics. Especially, when recognizing, as Maktabi shows, that Christian 'foreigners' were naturalised (e.g. Armenian and Syriac refugees), but not, when they were Muslims (such as

[318] See Harris, 2012, 184f., 194., see Najem, 2012, 9., and see Havemann, 2002, 42.
[319] Harris, 2012, 185.
[320] Harris, 2012, 185.
[321] See Harris, 2012, 184-195., see Najem, 2012, 9, 12f., and see Havemann, 2002, 41-43., and see Maktabi, 1999, 21-25.
[322] Maktabi, 1999, 226., also see Maktabi, 1999, 226-230. to read about how this census became a legal paper in a way.
[323] "85% of the emigrant citizenry was Christian while Muslim emigrants constituted only 15% of the total emigrant population. All in all, nearly one-fourth of the Lebanese citizenry in the 1932 census were emigrants." Maktabi, 1999, 233.

Palestinians), the political momentum becomes way too clear.[324] "Potentially undesirable members of competing groups were excluded, while favourable potential members were included."[325]

By organising political participation by religious affiliation and by numbers, censuses and demographic surveys in general are extremely politicised. It is unclear how citizenship could be dealt with, how emigrants or refugees should be handled in the country. A new census could extremely shake the fragile political system, in the current situation as well as ever since Lebanon's independence. In the Ta'if Agreement, parity was established between Christians and Muslims, and this division is easier to maintain than to problematise this very confessional division itself along with its origins. It was not segregation that led to conflict, but conflict that led to segregation (as seen, for example, between 1841 and 1861). Either way, there is no census, and even today Brown's assessment of 1971 is still valid: it can be assumed that there will be no census in the near future.[326]

4.2.2 Imagine the Lebanese Business Mind – to Bring in [Filipinas] During the War![327]

The collapse and partition of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of the First World War, the intra-Ottoman conflicts discussed above, as well as foreign protective powers' strategies and national secessionist movements and wars produced migration. In addition to migration movements such as the *Aliyot* in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Arabs from the Bilad ash-Sham and Mount Lebanon migrated to North America, which is of particular interest for the present study. It is difficult to place Lebanon's migration policy in a broader context because of Ottoman state's complex organisation in changing and shifting the empire's centres and peripheries. From the prevention and control of, for example, rural-urban migration to the recruitment of, for instance, Jewish migrants from the Iberian Peninsula to Istanbul, the measures encompass the entire spectrum. The Ottoman Empire as a massive multi-ethnic state with relative religious and ethnic tolerance has always gone through phases of growth and collapse in the course of its history. The latter most of the time at the beginning of the reign of a new sultan. This alone has produced migration and naturalisation of subjects. Natural disasters, famines, wars, land and tax redistributions, as

[324] See Maktabi, 1999, 233-238.
[325] Ibid., 238.
[326] See ibid.
[327] Jureidini, 2009, 91.

already outlined, caused migration - whether wanted or not, whether supported or hindered. The empire is just as strong here in West Asia as it is in a broader Asian context.[328] As explained in more detail above, *Jabal Lubnan* was doubly dependent during the *mutasarrifiyya* period. Economically, it was a time of prosperity, especially for the elites, and a relatively long peaceful period. In particular, the trade in silk worms, less interference by European states and migrations of rural population[329] to centres of economic activity outside Mount Lebanon, which brought back remittances. The relative economic wealth also made *Jabal Lubnan* one of the centres of an Arab cultural renaissance in the nineteenth century. Moreover, this prosperity encouraged opportunities for migration, especially to the Americas (where today, more people with Lebanese citizenship live than in Lebanon itself). In addition, other reasons for migrating emerged. For example, the trade volume of silk worms, which mainly supplied Lyon in France, was kept up primarily by creating monocultures, that led to repeated famines from the end of the nineteenth century onwards. Land also became increasingly scarce; the ever-growing estates of a few families and the Maronite Church were less available for sale. Migrants who initially left mountainous regions to return with enough money to buy land found it correspondingly harder to acquire property. They became landless dwellers or remained permanently abroad; the latter, however, still accounted for a considerable part of the economic output through remittances. The social discord along religious and property lines summarised above, which had been violently fought over until 1860, was also evident again and again in this relative peaceful period.[330] The exodus from *Jabal Lubnan* reached such proportions that the Ottoman Empire made manifold efforts to stop or control these migrations between 1860 and 1914.[331]

Other migration patterns in the twentieth century are roughly along the same lines that led to its increase in the nineteenth century. The state of Lebanon is a small, heavily built-up country, politically unstable, divided along religious, ethnic, geographical, ideological lines. Foreign influence - especially from the Ottoman and the Russian Empire, and France in the nineteenth century, and from Iran, the Soviet Union, Russia, the USA, European and the Arab Gulf states in the twentieth century - further destabilised Lebanon while opening up

[328] See Pomeranz, 2001., and see Faroqhi, 2010, 10.
[329] Fawwaz Traboulsi explains that the post-war baby boom and general prosperity led to more migration. Within his argument, this sounds very much like the population thesis. See Traboulsi, 2007, 47.
[330] See Traboulsi, 2007, 41-51.
[331] See ibid., 46f.

opportunities to migrate to respective states.[332] Today, Lebanese can be found all over the world.[333]

Acquired wealth is distributed unfairly, the gap between rich and poor is widening, as seen in the 1970s in Beirut's 'poverty belt'. This injustice fuelled conflicts along named lines with changing rhetoric. In the 1960s, for example, there were parliamentary debates in which *foreigners* and *poverty* were equated; classist and racist arguments complement each other. In this case, "foreigners" did not mean investors or expats from Europe or Saudi Arabia, but rather Palestinians, especially in the south of Lebanon. For some years now, it has also meant Syrians, whose military occupations are still too fresh in the minds of most Lebanese.[334]

Since the late 1940s, the ongoing debate on the possible naturalisation of people living in the Palestinian refugee camps (such as the infamous camp in Sabra and Shatila)[335] shows how slowly and controversially these issues were/are discussed. People who have lived in Lebanon for almost as long as it has existed have no possibility of obtaining Lebanese citizenship. Aside Pan-Arab arguments, had these people come twenty years earlier, they would have been 'automatically' naturalised by the 1932 census, as shown by the census history.[336]

The Lebanese administration is generally restrictive with its citizenship. For example, Lebanese mothers cannot inherit their nationality, but Lebanese fathers can. It does not matter whether said Lebanese father lives and works permanently in his home country or abroad.[337] Immigration, therefore, is very difficult for various reasons, at least if citizenship is sought or at the very least if one wishes to be protected by Lebanese labour law. The

[332] See Traboulsi, 2007, 41-50., and see Faroqhi, 2010, 87-94.

[333] An anecdote on my part: When I lived in Lebanon, I once also spent Christmas in Beirut, later invited to celebrate with a German-Lebanese family in the north, on the Syrian border. That was in 2015. You would not believe how crowded this already overcrowded city can be. Lebanese from all over the world came 'home' for Christmas. The streets from Hamra to Burj Harmoud were so packed with people and taxis that you could not see your own feet or hear your own words. Another anecdote at this point: I met many young Lebanese whose goal was to migrate, especially students (since I studied there). Only the most homeward-bound among them told me, "We owe it to Lebanon to at least try to stay." None of these young people (except for two) that I met at the universities and in the cafés in Beirut and Jounieh now live permanently in Lebanon.

[334] See Traboulsi, 2007, 149-210., and Harris, 2012, 201-203, 220.

[335] See Traboulsi, 2007, 218-222., Najem, 2012, 39.

[336] See Traboulsi, 2007, 218-219., Najem, 2012, 25-39., and see Corm, George, Le Liban Contemporain: Histoire et Société. Paris: La Découverte, 2005, 149-170.

[337] See Haddad, Mahmoud: "Can Modernity Coexist with the *Millet* System in Lebanon? A Sunni Muslim Perspective." In: Mouawad, Ray Jabre (ed.), Discrimination and Tolerance in the Middle East. Proceedings of the Conference on Discrimination and Tolerance in the Middle East organized by the Lebanese American University (LAU) and the Orient-Insitut Beirut (OIB), May 2-4, 2007 (Beiruter Texte und Studien, Vol. 128), Beirut: OIB, LAU, 2012. P. 93-102.

following is the story of mobile women who come to work in Lebanon from abroad.[338] There is not a lot of research on the history of foreign domestic workers in Lebanon, almost no sources are available – which is why I write this paper in the first place.[339]

Since the 1960s, there was a remarkable increase in labour migration to the Gulf states, but especially from the 1970s onwards, due to the oil boom and the independence of the Arab peninsula from Great Britain in 1971. The newly achieved prosperity led to rapid industrialisation, labour was imported for realising the construction boom. The political oil price crises of the 1970s did not bring this trend to a halt. While in the 1960s and 1970s mainly Arab workers arrived in the countries, the 1980s and 1990s saw an increase in South and Southeast Asian workers. This change is explained by the rise of pan-Arabism, from whose political force the Gulf states sought to protect themselves. They preferred to encourage migrations of people from other world regions who were seen as 'apolitical' in the context of Pan-Arab debates rather than taking the risk of bringing potentially politically active Arabs into the country. Migrations of Arab workers did not end. Labourers came, amongst others, from Lebanon and the Philippines.[340]

At that time, Lebanon was at the beginning of the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990), which – once again – escalated along the lines described above. This war should also be understood in the context of pan-Arabism.[341] One area that was affected by the rising tensions was the 'slave' system of Lebanese households. Traditionally, domestic work in many wealthy families was organised through child labour in the kafala system. This practice is based on the Muslim jurisprudence of adoption (kafala), which today would be called contract slavery, though with a socio-economic spin.[342] In this system, families gave their underage

[338] This study does not address refugee movements within Lebanon, such as Shiite Lebanese from the south of the country who are fleeing northwards in the wake of the wars between Hezbollah and Israel, especially to the southern districts of Beirut. Other refugee movements with Lebanon as a transit country are also not addressed; neither are expat communities, which are mainly to be found in Hamra's cafés or the beach bars of downtown. The way Filipinas, Somalis, Sri Lankans, etc., come to Lebanon is completely different.

[339] Some oral history interviews were conducted by Ray Jureidini, that draw a certain picture of how Lebanese women experienced the globalisation of domestic labour within their own home.

[340] See Amjad, Rashid, To the Gul fand Back. Studies on the Economic Impact of Asian Labour Migration, Geneva: Interntional Labour Organisation, 1989. 1-25., see Mahdavi, Pardis, Gridlock. Labor, Migration, and Human Trafficking in Dubai, Stanford: Standford University Press, 2011. 11-90., and see Roper, Steven D./Barria, Lilian A.: "Understanding Variations in Gulf Migration and Labor Practices." In: Middle East Law and Givernance 6 (2014). P. 32-52. Here 33-50.

[341] See Jureidini, Ray/Fares Hassan, Said: "The Islamic Principle of Kafala as Applied to Migrant Workers: Traditional Continuity and Reform." In: Jureidini, Ray/Fares Hassan, Said (eds.), Migration and Islamic Ethics. Issues of Residence, Naturalization and Citizenship (Studies in Islamic Ethics, Vol. 2), Leiden: Brill, 2019. P. 92-109.

[342] The Islamic or Arab slave system is not the same as the European one. A brief explanatory outline: The system still comes from pre-Islamic times, whole societies were dependent on Zanj 'slaves' (from Africa), partly they were in high positions with 'free' people among them (most prominent example from Islamic times: the Mamluk Empire). Through Muhammad and the Pax Islamica, the enslavement of people of the Book is banned (which nevertheless

daughters to families of higher status in exchange for an annual 'wage' or 'rent'. In return, the host family educated the child in home work, basic schooling and, in the best case, arranged for the girl to be married into a higher-ranking family after an average of seven years of service. The age and origin of the girls varies according to time, place and host family.[343]

The oral history interviews conducted by Jureidini clearly show how selectivity changed, but also processes of how these young girls or women came into the families. Between the 1920s and 1950s, richer Arab families preferred Syrian Alawite girls, many of them under ten years old, especially before 1945. Later on, girls between twelve and thirty years of age dominated the kafala system. Since the 1960s, Syrian President Hafez al-Asad restricted the enslavement of girls. When the refugee camps filled up with Palestinians since 1948, girls were recruited from there, many of them under fifteen years, but typically between seven and nine years of age. Since the 1950s, as part of an agreement between Egypt and Syria, adult Egyptian women migrated to Lebanon as workers, some of them recruited 'off the street'.[344]

"[T]he watershed that changed the history of domestic service was the Lebanese civil war […]"[345], precludes Jureidini.[346] Where previously Kurdish and Arab girls were recruited (especially Syrian, Lebanese, Palestinian, Egyptian), a vacuum was created. Due to political conflicts, Arab families on both sides of these contracts withdrew. When the Civil War entered its first phase in 1975, there were still mainly Egyptian girls as domestic servants in Lebanon, but the system became increasingly patchy.[347] At the same time, more Lebanese men left their home country to work in the Gulf States, Africa, or the Americas. As theorised by Jureidini, in the Gulf States, during the 1970s and 1980s, Lebanese now encounter the practice of importing men's, but mainly women's labour from non-Arab countries in Asia. This practice is brought to Lebanon during and after the Civil War, where, as described

happened, see Ottoman Empire). The people who are still allowed to be enslaved are from now on no longer to be regarded as property but as human beings, which means they must be treated with respect and love. The liberation of enslaved people is furthermore one of the five pillars of Islam (social welfare). Since book religions are no longer allowed to be enslaved, the slavery trade with non-Abrahamic Africans is flourishing. On the position of enslaved women: These are equally to be treated with respect, compassion and love, their children are children of the father and thus equal to children of non-enslaved women, the children of enslaved women are born 'free' (the most prominent example here is certainly the Ottoman Sultan's harem and the Sultan himself, who was always a child of an enslaved woman). In the Ottoman Empire, basically the entire administrative sphere is enslaved, from the janissaries to the sultan's mother. Depending on the time, social status and space, there are of course variations of the system; the prohibition of slavery is rarely taken so strictly.

[343] See Jureidini/Hassan, 2019, 34.

[344] See Jureidini, 2009, 76-85.

[345] Jureidini, 2009, 77.

[346] See ibid.

[347] See Jureidini, 2009, 77-86.

above, there are massive gaps in the household labour system. This labour market is now opening up to Filipinas and other women from the Global South, whose countries export labourers as an important component of their national economy.[348]

The kafala system, that is now in place in all Gulf states and almost all Arab states, has not a lot in common with the Islamic law. With the shift from mostly local Arab girls to women from faraway countries and cultures, the relationship became more an employer-employee one. Domestic labour, therefore, became more commoditised.[349] Jureidini reasons, that this shift manifested since girls and women from Arab countries became 'too emancipated' for Lebanese families. The possible conflicts due to political reasons rose to a degree that was not desirable in their households. It was easier to stick with foreign women, less obligations, less trouble, less 'runaways'. The more common explanation, that emancipated Lebanese women worked more and therefore had less time on their hands (plus their husbands working abroad), lead to a rise of foreign domestic workers, does not make sense. Especially, when considering that the kafala system was in place before and that Lebanese people did not start to migrate in the 1960s or during the Civil War of 1975 to 1990. Jureidini's reasoning seems closer to reality, but since there is not a lot of research and documents, it remains an untested thesis.[350]

Another factor for this changed selectivity seems to be the emerging racist and sexist stereotypes about 'maids'. Being a 'maid' became more and more 'shameful', as Jureidinis interviews suggest, it was not 'feminine' enough for Arabs. In addition, the Lebanese society considered the employment of a foreign domestic worker more as a status symbol and less as a work of mutual beneficial charity. The sexist division of labour becomes racialised with the employer handing over their most devalued work to another woman, usually a woman of lesser social and 'racial' status.[351]

Foreign domestic workers are left without any legal protection, no law is addressing them. The Lebanese Labour Code of 1949 explicitly excludes migrant labourers from any protection (as well as agricultural workers). The 1962 Foreigner's Law, the 1932 General Contractual Obligations Law and the Lebanese Penal Code are all explicitly excluding or not mentioning them at all. This is true for the situation in the 1970s as well as for today.[352] As

[348] See the articles Jureidini, 2009., and see Jureidini/Hassan, 2019.
[349] See Jureidini, 2009, 77f.
[350] Ibid., 90-92.
[351] See ibid., 75, 92-97.
[352] See Hamill, Kathleen, Trafficking of Migrant Domestic Workers in Lebanon. A Legal Analysis, Beirut: Kafa (enough) Violence & Exploitation, 2011.

a consequence, that also means there are no numbers, neither on quantities of foreign domestic workers nor on their employers, but the issued visas.[353]

4.3 THE SOURCES - RETRIEVABLE OR NOT: INTEGRATED PUBLIC USE MICRODATA SERIES

I retrieved the sources for this paper from the *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series* (IPUMS), a joint project of the University of Michigan, US National Statistical Offices and international data archives and institutions. It is the most encompassing global population data base.[354] Through my research, I stumbled upon IPUMS ever so often when quantifiable data sets were related to in articles and books. Together with the help of my supervisor, I was able to gain access to IPUMS-International, hoping I would find more detailed data and especially census forms and codebooks, than from the official national offices. IPUMS also offers for vast parts of their data studies on its quality and its documentation. As I will explain below in more detail, the data I can relate to stays broadly partial for a multitude of reasons.

One of the main contributors of data to and roots of IPUMS is the *Centro Latinoamericano de Demografía* (CELADE), which was founded in Chile in 1959. Its project *Operación de Muestras de Censos* (OMUECE) gathered data from almost all Middle- and South-American countries from the 1960s onwards. CELADE archived, standardised data and documentation thereof, thus creating the first census micro data depository.[355] In the 1980s, funding slowed down and the project stagnated. But not before CELADE was able to give a platform to researchers in the 1970s and 1980s, especially demographers and historians, mostly American-trained with their foci on computerizing, preserving and standardizing data. Through conferences, sub-projects and overall networking by scholars and state representatives, the data collection grew and the importance of global projects like this manifested. In the early 1990s the National Science Foundation (NSF) ensured the funding of IPUMS "to collect and distribute global census data that are documented, harmonized, and freely disseminated to the public"[356]; the fund was provided in 2000.[357]

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[353] See Hamill, Kathleen, Trafficking of Migrant Domestic Workers in Lebanon. A Legal Analysis, Beirut: Kafa (enough) Violence & Exploitation, 2011.
[354] See IPUMS-International: "About." In: IPUMS-International. Last retrieved 07/01/22. URL: [https://international.ipums.org/international/about.shtml]., see Donato, Kathrine M./Gabaccia, Donna, Gender and International Migration. From the Slavery Era to the Global Age, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2016. 124.
[355] See Donato/Gabaccia, 2016, xv, 122f.
[356] Ibid., 122.
[357] See ibid., 122-124., see IPUMS-I, About.

As Kathrine Donato and Donna Gabaccia stress multiple times, IPUMS with its harmonised and standardised stock data "permit us to examine the factors that influence immigrant gender composition and its consequences."[358]

IPUMS is subdivided in different projects, IPUMS-International (IPUMS-I) being the one I retrieved my sources from. The project gives insights to different population characteristics, among them "fertility, nuptiality, life-course transitions, migration, labor-force participation, occupational structure, education, ethnicity, and household composition"[359] from about five hundred surveys and censuses, picturing around one billion persons worldwide. Those retrievable were conducted since the 1960s, some fifty censuses from the eighteenth and nineteenth century.[360] Or, as IPUMS put it: the data "represent the fullest statistical picture we will ever have of human populations in the late 20th and early 21st centuries."[361] IPUMS' data sets are bigger than the ones from the UN; this comes especially from the situation, that the UN hardly has any data from non-Western, non-American countries. As Gabaccia and Donato note, IPUMS data is more detailed with a greater leverage since the information *around* the data gives leeway to consider the methodological complexity.[362] Especially the data on the USA is broad and detailed - "Unfortunately, other countries have either less extensive or no data."[363] Which is also true for the Philippines and especially Lebanon.

4.4 Enumeration Forms – The Sources and their Limits

As explained above, the projects OMUECE and IPUMS gathered and harmonised census data from the 1960s onwards. Occasionally, there is older data available. However, IPUMS International depends on collaborations with national census institutions. My own study is limited by the partial data on the Philippines, data on Lebanon does not exist and, in comparison, Israel's data documentation is basically gapless. Possible reasons for these situations and their circumstances will be explored in the following chapters.

Documents for the 1980 census round that I retrieved from the IPUMS webpage, I also found in another publication: "Censuses of Asia and the Pacific. 1980 Round" published by Lee-Jay Cho and Robert L. Hearn at the East-West Population Institute of the University of Honolulu,

[358] Donato/Gabaccia, 2016, 124., also see Donato/Gabaccia, 2016, 122.
[359] IPUMS-I, About.
[360] See IPUMS-I, About.
[361] IPUMS-I, About.
[362] See Donato/Gabaccia, 2016, 124.
[363] See ibid.

Hawaii.[364] I initially thought, that the corresponding body of the Philippines gave the census documents to IPUMS. However, the director of the National Census and Statistics Office at the time, Tito Mijares, wrote a contextualising article that has the exact same sources (scan and selection) in its appendix.[365] Anyhow, data for the 1980 census is based on the available forms and the contextualising article. No publication record was found for the 1960 and 1970 censuses.

It is peculiar that enumeration forms, enumeration manuals, as well as the data for the Philippines is available only since 1990; on IPUMS as well as on the websites of corresponding Philippines' administrative bodies. Prior to 1990, no census data is available in electronic form, neither via IPUMS nor national websites. This is why the data is not available via IPUMS. An exception is the "'73 Year Book of Labor Statistics" from the Philippine Department of Labor,[366] which is digitalised, though almost not readable, and is accessible via the respective website, as the only resource (next to the ones discussed below) prior to 1990. Unfortunately, no enumeration forms or manuals are included. It is plain data from the years 1963 to 1973. The data combines surveys from various collecting bodies.[367] Without any further resources, it is hard to evaluate its significance. Also, it is unclear, why this report is retrievable from the Ministry's website, but others are not; since it seems plausible that publications like this exist for other time periods as well.

I work with the questionnaires in English since they are available only in this language[368]; though English is one of the official languages of the Philippines, the Spanish or Tagalog language might reveal different connotations. It is also unclear in which languages these census forms were issued, which further limits its informative value. The information needed to answer some of these questions, maybe even all of the enumeration forms, manuals and additional information, might be available in *The Philippine Statistician*, but, as explained, I do not have access to the archive of this journal.

[364] See Mijares, Tito: "Philippines 1980." In: Cho, Lee-Jay/Hearn, Robert L. (eds.), Censuses of Asia and the Pacific. 1980 Round, Honululu: East-West Population, 1984. P. 179-192.
[365] See ibid.
[366] See Department of Labor, Labor Statistics Serive (Philippines), '73 Year Book of Labor Statistics, Manila: Department of Labor, Labor Statistics Service, 1974.
[367] Speaking of decentralisation: „Among these agencies are the Bureau of the Census and Statistics, the Central Bank of the Philippines, the Social Security System, the Board of Investments, the National Science and Development Board, the Department of Education, the Wage and Position Classification Office, the Bureau of Agricultural Economies, the National Manpower and Youth Council, the Civil Service Commission and the Department of Labor." Ibid., P. v.
[368] I do not speak either one of the latter two languages and they are not available through IPUMS anyways.

4.4.2 DESCRIPTION

4.4.2.1 The Philippines

The Bureau of Census and Statistics, at that time under the Department of Commerce and Industry, issued the 1960 Census Form Number 3.[369] As is also made clear on the form, this census was conducted under Commonwealth Act No. 591.[370] The census is displayed in a twenty-column table, divided into four major categories: Identification, Characteristics of Dwelling Units, Household Conveniences, and Agriculture and Livestock. The table contains a data query of the dwelling unit regarding the following aspects: location, date and construction layout, number of units, and residents' information (i.e. owner or tenant). It also addresses water, radio and kitchen connections, the property size and the number of livestock. The form has a numbering system, in which the dwelling unit's location (place, island, province, etc.) is recorded. This pattern will be basically the same for the 1970 and 1980 housing census. Minor deviances will be discussed in the related analysis. In addition, the 1960 document shows a legend for enumerators on how to fill in the columns. The form is in English, there are only a few Tagalog terms for which there is no adequate English translation or are administrative units.[371] The only survey that refers to residents is the question in category two, column nine for the "Name of Head of Household, Building of Dwelling Unit".[372] In contrast to the 1970s census, there are no further explanations, thus, the investigation of the 1960s census form reveals that no data was collected on women, and migrants, respectively *temporary* absent people, specifically. Other forms for the 1960 census are not accessible via IPUMS, that could give more insights, such as *the population census form*. In the *housing census* forms of 1970 and 1980, the mother was asked about, but this 1960 enumeration form points to nothing but voids.

For the 1970 census, IPUMS provides more documents:[373] According to the caption in left corner of each sheet, these pages are the *Appendix 12.1*, pages 1, 2, 3, 11 and 12. In addition,

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[369] See Republic of the Philippines. Department of Commerce and Industry. Bureau of the Census and Statistics. Manila: "1960 Census of Housing." In: IPUMS-International. Last retrieved 12/12/2021. [https://international.ipums.org/international/resources/census_forms/asia/ph1960ef_philippines_enumeration_form.en.pdf]. See Appendix *Figure 1.*

[370] This Act was approved August 1940, to create the BCS, in which census and governmental statistics are to be central organised. For the whole text, see Philippine Statistics Authority: „Commonwealth Act No. 591." In: PSA. Last retrieved 26/01/2022. [https://psa.gov.ph/content/commonwealth-act-no-591].

[371] E.g. in the caption explaining the facility: Barongbarong; the likeliest English translation would be: a shanty or hut in cubic form. In the census round of 1980 it is listed as "improvised (barong-barong)".

[372] Bureau of the Census and Statistics. Manila: "1960 Census of Housing."

[373] See Republic of the Philippines. Department of Commerce and Industry. Bureau of the Census and Statistics. Manila: "1970 Census of Housing and Population." In: IPUMS-International. Last retrieved 12/12/2021. [https://international.ipums.org/international/resources/census_forms/asia/ph1970ef_philippines_enumeration_form.en.pdf]. See Appendix *Figure 2-6.*

the document is numbered from 155 to 159. Hence, it can be assumed that a publication exists, possibly a final census report with all surveys and interpretations of the data, which could be comparable to the report by the Labor Statistics Service's report or the one published in Honolulu talked about above. On sheet two (156, figure 3), there is a hint at an enumerator manual, this appendix might be part of this manual. The first sheet (155, figure 2) contains a short letter to the household to be enumerated, signed by the Director of the BCS, based in the Department of Commerce and Industry, Tito Mijares.[374] As in the 1960 census document, the letter informs each resident that the Commonwealth Act No. 591 authorised the BCS to conduct this survey and ensures data confidentiality. The same sheet records the number and names of persons who "usually"[375] lived in the household.

Sheet two (156, figure 3) defines more precisely who is counted in this category: "all family members and other relatives, including those who died and excluding babies born after the census date".[376] Non-relatives, such as servants, that live or sleep in the housing unit, as well as people who "are temporarily away"[377] or have no own residence or will not be at their place at the time of enumeration. Visitors, students, people that only eat, but not live or sleep there, as well as persons in the military, sanatorium, jail or the like will not be counted. The form does not specifically name temporary labour migrants in either category. But the bullet point, including "All persons who usually live here but are temporarily away"[378] could hint at this, though, most likely migrants were not counted. Having access to such lists for other censuses would be beneficial for further analysis and to detect changes in enumeration. For the 1980s census, only a corresponding list for the *collective* household census is available. Hereafter, instructions concerning the form on the next sheet (3; 157, figure 4) are provided. The document seems to be a questionnaire of the *sample household population census*. In the context of this thesis, the referral to an "Enumerator's Manual"[379]

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[374] Tito A. Mijares at the time is the Deputy Director General of NEDA and the Executive Director of NCSA. He might have been one of the initial statisticians that were trained by the joint UNTAP and University of the Philippines project. In the realm of this project, he studied in the Philippines and at Harvard, where in the early 1960s he submitted his doctoral thesis. In the 1950s, he was affiliated with the Statistical Center, University of the Philippines, later-on becoming an affiliated Professor. Mijares published frequently in different statistics' outlets (The Philippine Statistician, The Annals of Mathematical Statistics) in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.
See Mijares, Tito: "The Normal Approximation to the Bartlett-Nanda-Pillai trace test in multivariate analysis." In: Biometrika, 77:1, 1990. P. 230-233. Here: P. 1., see Pillai, K.C. Sreedharan/Mijares, Tito: "On the Moments of the Trace of a Matrix and Approximations to its Distribution." In: The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 30:4 (12/1959). P. 1135-1140. Here: 1135n2., and see Mijares, Tito: "On Elementary Symmetric Functions of the Roots of a Multivariate Matrix: Distributions." In: The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 35:3 (09/1965). P. 1186-1198. Here: 1186n1., and see Mijares, 1984, 179.

[375] Bureau of the Census and Statistics. Manila: "1970 Census of Housing and Population."

[376] Ibid.

[377] Ibid.

[378] Ibid.

[379] Ibid.

is especially interesting. The enumerator is advised to resort to this manual in case the legend had not provided the necessary codes.[380]

Sheet three (3; 157, figure 4) asks (almost) all people living in the housing unit thirty-three questions. Sex, age, marital status, language/dialect spoken in childhood, citizenship as well as name and the person's relationship to the "head of the household"[381] are enumerated for every person (P1-P7). The census form also asks if people can speak Tagalog, Spanish and English, their religion, residence of their mother's at the time of birth, where the person was living ten and five years ago (P12-P18). Everybody older than six years of age has to answer questions about their education and degrees (P8-P11). Persons above ten years of age (P19-P31) have to provide information about their handicraft skills, how they spent their time last week concerning their work and working hours; and if a person is not employed (in this context, domestic labour is not considered as work): if they want to work and are searching for work. The document further queries reasons for unemployment, if the person had ever worked for longer than two weeks, and if so, in what vocational area and to which "class of worker"[382] they belong. Non-paid and paid housekeeping and farming is included as 'work'.[383] The last question on this form inquiries about "usual occupation" of people of all sexes including paid and unpaid housekeepers.[384]

The last three questions on *the population census form* are specifically aimed at "ever-married women"[385] (P32-P34). *Married* women have to specify their age when first married, how many children they had delivered alive, of which sex and how many of those were still alive. These questions refer most likely to natal and infant mortality rates and female fertility. This census, as well as the one for 1980, include the option for indicating marital status: it is possible to answer "divorced" (1970, figure 4) or "divorced/separated" (1980, figure 8). This is a surprising feature of the documents regarding the legal framework of the Philippines: divorce has been illegal in the catholic country to this day.[386] The latter census, therefore, is closer to everyday Christian practices in the Philippines, where an official

[380] „In the case where the answer does not appear in the list, specify the answer and enter the proper code as found in the Appendix of the Enumerator's Manual."
[381] Bureau of the Census and Statistics. Manila: "1970 Census of Housing and Population."
[382] Bureau of the Census and Statistics. Manila: "1970 Census of Housing and Population."
[383] "1 Working for private employer for wage, salary, commission, tips, etc." and "5 Without pay on family farm or enterprises." Bureau of the Census and Statistics. Manila: "1970 Census of Housing and Population."
[384] Ibid.
[385] Ibid.
[386] Muslims can get a divorce in the Philippins since the 1972 Martial Law installed Shariah Courts. Since 1988, Christians can petition for an annulment of the marriage, before this, only a legal separation could be achieved, meaning the couple is still married under God's eyes. See De Borja, Frederick M.: „Divorce in the Philippines: A Legal History." In: HG Legal Resources. Last retrieved 01/02/2022.
[https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/divorce-in-the-philippines-a-legal-history-45701].

separation is the only kind of 'divorce' possible by law. If one of the spouses is a foreigner, the couple can get a divorce in the respective country and then applies for a legal recognition in the Philippines. If the couple is part of the Muslim minority, they do not have to worry about this, because divorce is allowed in Islam and protected by minority rights in the Philippines.[387] Thus, the option 'divorced' only speaks to the Muslim minority. The next questionnaire (11, 158, figure 5) corresponds to the *housing census*. In comparison to the 1960 census, choice options to the same questions changed slightly, however, this is not part of my research question.

The *last sheet* (12, 159, figure 6) reminds enumerators to check for accuracy and completeness. A summary explains whom to enumerate with which question. A blank box is provided for "remarks", and enumerators and supervisors have to sign a "certification" text block. This form gives leeway to enumerate domestic work, paid and unpaid – it would be useful to have similar material on Lebanon. Since I am not concerned with domestic service in the Philippines, but rather with the related outward migration, this form is of no help. Additionally, since the enumerator's manual is not retrievable, it is unclear who is recorded in the category of all persons that are 'temporarily' away. The next census form illustrates another data gap: there are no questions on living situations of mothers of the household. To that end, in the form at hand, mothers only have to give information on their alive-born- offspring and if they were ever married. The analysis of such voids in the source material permits a preliminary finding: women capable of childbearing are indeed recorded, but only as such. This indicates that women are only relevant for state data collection as long as they are able to perform reproductive and care work. Under which conditions they perform this work is not addressed in the material.

Available documents on the 1980 *population and housing census* are the list of households (table) (figure 7), the *sample private household questionnaire* (figure 8 and 9), the *housing census questions* (figure 10 and 11) (both a double page table), the *common private household questionnaire* (figure 12), the *collective household questionnaire* (figure 13), and the list on who gets "enumerated as member of collective households" (figure 14).[388] The design had gone through some changes; therefore, the enumerator has one single sheet for data on all residents of a household and not one for each person. As Tito Mijares, who was

[387] In Lebanon, civil marriage is still not possible, only religious matrimony is legal. This cements confessionalism and fosters an immense civil marriages market in Cyprus.

[388] See Republic of the Philippines. Department of Commerce and Industry. Bureau of the Census and Statistics. Manila: "1980 Census of Population and Housing." In: IPUMS-International. Last retrieved 12.12.21. [https://international.ipums.org/international/resources/census_forms/asia/ph1980ef_philippines_enumeration_form.en.pdf]. See Appendix *Figure 7-14.*

still in charge of the 1980 census as Deputy Director General of NEDA and Executive Director of NCSO, refers to, this limitation was a cost saving measure.[389] In 1980, in contrast to the previous two censuses, the NCSO was now organised under NEDA, as referred to in chapter 4.1.2. Mijares accumulation of offices is another hint at president Marcos' centralisation efforts.

The *list of households* (PH Form 1, sheet 1, 324, figure 7) is a fourteen-column table. Administration, later-on, used this list to determine the sample households.[390] A small legend is annexed, as well is a space for the enumerator's name and a text field for the region (province, municipality, barangay, etc.). Without the enumerator's manual, it is hard to figure out the purpose and who is included in some parts of the questionnaire. Again, the only column referring to a person is the query for the household head's name. The forms make a distinction between private and collective households – as can be seen in the separate enumeration forms thereof. More likely, the 1960 and 1970 forms of the collective household census do not make this differentiation.

The *second sheet* (PH Form 3, 325 and 326, figure 8 and 9) is a double page table of the *sample private household census*, enumerating around twenty percent of the population. Just as described above for the 1970 census, all persons in a household have to give characteristics. The age cohorts changed. Everyone older than five years of age is asked about their residence five years prior. In the 1970 census, all persons, disregarding their age, were queried about their residence five and ten years prior. In 1980, persons over fifteen years of age now have to give their 'usual' occupation. There are no specific questions referring to persons above ten years of age included anymore. In contrast to the previous census, which provided options for recordable activities, such as "housekeeping",[391] the 1980s census form includes the option for documenting "housewife"[392] as an occupation. The section on "ever-married females"[393] now questions specifically females being ten years of age and older. A specific section inquiry about the number of children born alive during the previous year (May 1, 1979 to April 30, 1980). Other questions request information about the female's age at marriage, as well as whether women were "married only once" (P24). If she was married more than once, she will not be asked about her marriage age at all (P25). In respect to women, the Philippine census administration added a new question:

[389] See Mijares, 1984, 181.
[390] See Mijares, 1984, 183
[391] Bureau of the Census and Statistics. Manila: "1980 Census of Population and Housing."
[392] Ibid.
[393] Ibid.

each person has to give the enumeration form's line number of their mothers (P3). If she "is not a member of this household or already dead", enumerators have to type in the same code. Without the enumerator's manual, it is not clear if the census counts a mother as a member of the household in case she is temporarily absent as a labour migrant. Additionally, it is peculiar that a deceased mother and an absent mother are documented in the same way. The sample households recorded about 20 percent of the population. According to Mijares, the administration selected every fifth household down the household list.[394]

Sheet number three (PH Form 1, 326, 327, figure 10 and 11) is the double-paged *housing census questions* document. As already explained, it does not give any hint at important questions concerning the context of this thesis, such as more information about occupations involving reproductive labour or care work. Further, the material analysed lacks data on women temporarily moving within and outside of the Philippines. The documents do not indicate anything about unmarried or childless women. The analysis leads to an oxymoron: the presence of this absence is striking; such data collection makes quite a few women invisible.

Sheet four (PH Form 2, 328, figure 12) contains the *common private household questionnaire*, which is a combination of housing (dwelling unit's characteristics) and population census (requests data on the relationship to the head of household, the enumeration form's line of mother, sex, age, marital status), enumerating all inhabitants of the archipelago about their basic demographics, while the *sample households* asked for more details.

The last sheet (PH Form 4, 329, figure 13) collects data on bigger - not private - households, such as lodging houses, hospitals, welfare or penal institutions, convents, military camps, work camps, vessels and refugee camps. There is no age cohort whatsoever and it just asks about names, relationship to the institution (e.g. manager, prisoner, seminarian), sex, age and marital status. The last page of this document (330, figure 14) belongs to this sheet and gives information on all members of these *collective households*. This kind of detailed list would be helpful for the general and sample private household census form. For every possible collective household a detailed list is provided who counts as a resident and who does not, respectively, who gets enumerated.

[394] See Mijares, 1984, 183.

Mijares writes about the enumerator's manual as well as a training guide, without giving any further useful information. In addition to this, the census administration issued a manual for supervisors, field operations and office processing.[395] Other than this, he gives extremely general accounts on the process, without any details of interests for the most part. Almost 34,000 people were involved in conducting this census, among them 28,000 enumerators in the field.[396] Of some interest, though peculiar, are a couple of problems in the post-enumeration phase that Mijares mentions:

> "Perhaps because the population count determined the allocation of seats for the Batasang Pambansa (National Assembly) and of revenue allotments, some municipalities and barangays tended to overenumerate their population. Certain anomalies in the census returns confirmed this: age gaps between children less than seven months, many menopausal babies in the barangay, different penmanship on the same questionnaire, very young mothers (ages 10 and below), […] occurrence of common names and names of movie stars […][397]

The list of irregularities goes on. Irregularities that might be none, e.g. how would the statisticians know if an older woman is already menopausal or if a young girl indeed had a child? Specific age cohorts can be assumed to be menopausal or not fertile yet, but that would stay in the realm of the statistically likely. In the following, he reports some manual measures to eradicate such 'anomalies', and concludes that the 1980s census most likely is "overenumerated rather than underenumated".[398] Generally, Mijares writes about the post-evaluation and creation of a guide for the next census. An overall tone is that the funding was not adequate, therefore post-enumeration surveys were not sufficiently conducted,[399] the forms were in parts privately printed out rather than by a government body, the training of the enumerators and their supervisors was shorter than hoped.[400] Irregularities like these indicate once more that women were not considered important for data collection. That could imply that the state was only interested in collecting records on

[395] See Mijares, 1984, 184.
[396] 33.987 persons (regional census officers, provincial census officers, regional statisticians, municipal census officers and supervisors, team supervisors and enumerators).
[397] See Mijares, 1984, 189.
[398] See Mijares, 1984, 190.
[399] Example: The problems mentioned in his quote were not reviewed sufficiently, mathematical solutions and approximation values were sought.
[400] See Mijares, 1984, 185f., 189f.

persons who were regarded as economically productive and domestic and reproductive labour was not comprehended as such.

4.4.2.2 Lebanon and Voids - Analysis of Absence

This chapter may in parts be reminiscent of a kind of alternative history when I write about which gaps in the source material are conspicuous in detail. By this, of course, I do not mean that I am making recommendations here or denouncing how the situation in Lebanon is shaping up. It is a fact that relevant documents simply do not exist because of the historical situation. Therefore, instead of looking at the causes of the gaps, the focus of this thesis will shift towards exploring how researchers can deal with the voids and non-mentions in order to still yield new findings.

The gaps and blind spots reflect a very loud silence. This hinders a quantitative analysis for Lebanon or a qualitative analysis of the quantitative sources. In the end, while keeping in mind that this also changes the possible research questions dramatically, the researcher has no choice but to go to newspaper archives or conduct oral history interviews. The former is limited by the reduced density of publications during the war years (1975-1990) - the very period that is ultimately at issue here. The people one could ask for oral history interviews are still alive at the moment; even if time will eventually run out. Jureidini has conducted such interviews; which I also refer to above. Unfortunately, it was not possible for him to give me the transcripts or notes. Moreover, these interviews reflect only Lebanese women's perspectives on things, which can tell us a lot about the selectivity of employers described by Oishi. However, these sources remain silent on the views of the so-called 'maids' and the political and administrative circumstances of their work (as far as I can tell from Jureidini's articles). Whether consulting newspaper archives or conducting oral history interviews of various kinds in Lebanon or the Philippines, research funds would be a necessity. The lack of such, was another obstacle to this Master's thesis and excluded initial ideas of source gathering. Hence, after an intensive literature and source search, this is where the research, with all its limitations, ended up: analysing voids. Although it might sound like a shortcoming, this is actually a promising outlook: In analysing what had not been of relevance to researchers before, epistemological asymmetries of power can be deconstructed.

In contrast to Lebanon, Israel’s bureaucratisation is more thorough. This brief comparison therefore serves to illustrate the situation, explained and addressed in Chapter 4.2.1, that Lebanon has not compiled any sources. Even though this was done for the reasons explained

above, besides the blind spots about confessional distribution Lebanon produces further demographic voids. A survey without asking for the denomination would have been possible. In some cases, private companies or NGOs have to conduct quasi-censuses to get an overview (e.g. the 1988 survey to find out about the food security of families living in Lebanon).

For Israel, the enumeration forms from the 1961,[401] 1972[402] and 1983[403] census rounds, among others, are available via IPUMS. 1961 and 1983 are available in Ivrit, English and Arabic, for 1972 only in Ivrit and English. As far as can be seen, all documents have been preserved, from the questionnaires to the legends to the addressing letters, even the envelopes and registration cards can be retrieved for 1961 and 1983. For the 1972 census round, only the Family Questionnaires have been preserved. The scans are not completely clean, but legible for all three languages. So here, unlike (as briefly criticised) for the Philippines, it would be possible to look at the translations and see if there are differences within the questionnaires. For example, in the way questions are asked or which words were used with which connotations. For the Philippines, it can be assumed that the questionnaires were at least still available in Spanish and Tagalog. In Lebanon, Arabic, English and French would have made sense as the most spoken languages. Depending on the method of execution by the enumerators, also providing questionnaires in Lebanese/Levantine dialect would have been an asset to facilitate completion.

Unlike the Enumeration Forms from the Philippines, however, those from Israel are longer, more detailed and better preserved. All the question areas asked by the Philippines are also found in the Israeli census queries. When one looks at Israel's immigration history, it is understandable that great importance is attached to counting the population. It can also be used to put a stop, at least administratively, to the recurring question of the legitimacy of the state of Israel, which is usually interspersed with anti-Semitic arguments. Alone the differences between Lebanon and Israel concerning census knowledge production show, once again, the political nature of demographic surveying.

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[401] State of Israel. Prime Minister's Bureau. Central Bureau of Statistics: "Census of Population and Housing – 1961." In: IPUMS-International. Last retrieved 11/12/2021.
[https://international.ipums.org/international/resources/census_forms/asia/il1961ef_israel_enumeration_form.he.en.pdf].

[402] State of Israel. Central Bureau of Statistics: "Census of Population and Housing 1972 – Enumeration Forms." In: IPUMS-International. Last retrieved 11/12/2021.
[https://international.ipums.org/international/resources/census_forms/asia/il1972ef_israel_enumeration_form.he.en.pdf].

[403] State of Israel. Central Bureau of Statistics: "Census of Population and Housing 1983." In: IPUMS-International. Last retrieved 11/12/2021.
[https://international.ipums.org/international/resources/census_forms/asia/il1983ef_israel_enumeration_form.he.en.ar.pdf].

There are many migration-related questions here, for example, all three census forms inquire about the exact time of immigration If the person was born in Israel, the date of the father's immigration is asked. The same applies to the country of birth. The sample countries listed in the documents are "classic" countries of emigration for Jewish, Christian and Muslim Israelis. Giving this question block so much space in another country would possibly be redundant, or one can see in the case of the Philippines that this question was asked differently, and not in such detail. It can also be assumed that domestic workers, whether migrant or not, were counted in all three censuses. Two of the three documents state that all members of the household and other persons living there permanently should be included - as in the 1961 Census of Housing and Population, for example:

> „ENTER IN THIS TABLE DETAILS:
> Of all members of the household who live permanentely in this dwelling
> Of anybody else that lives here permanentely"[404]

It is still unclear what defines a period of time as 'permanent'. From the context, I assume that it must be more than one year. This would mostly include domestic workers, who usually have a two- to three-year contract. So, Lebanon's data also remains silent on who ultimately would be considered an insider or someone who is 'permanent'; besides questions of citizenship. Since nationality can only be inherited through the father, Lebanese women's children from non-Lebanese men could become more visible in the numbers.
The Enumerator's Listing Box (1961) also asks about people who are temporarily present in the household and their residence status.[405] Similar questions and classifications cannot be reconstructed for 1972, since only the family questionnaires are available without further legends. For 1983, it is similar to 1961; it is explicitly stated that all persons living in the household are to be counted, "even if he (or she) is not a relative".[406]

Lebanon has decided not to conduct a census as a conclusion from the experience with censuses during the French Mandate. The last ones were such landmarks that it is suspected that a new census could have a similar impact. Which is also more than likely and, in any case, a well-founded suspicion. The fact that no census was conducted was of course certainly not set in stone, and any parliamentary debate on the subject could have led to a decision to give the mandate to the Director General of the Central Administration of

[404] Central Bureau of Statistics: "Census of Population and Housing – 1961."
[405] See ibid., Enumerator's Listing Box, Page No. 1.
[406] Central Bureau of Statistics: "Census of Population and Housing 1983." XXXV.

Statistics (CAS) after all. Since 1999, this position is held by Maral Tutelian Guidanian, a social scientist.[407] Confessional, and by that I mean here structural and power-political, sensitivities and the fears associated with them, whether justified or not, have the greater radiance and the better narrative. The fact that the Ta'if Agreement effectively stipulated the population distribution between the denominations therefore speaks volumes. It would also be interesting to see how Lebanon would have enumerated for instance refugee camps, immigrants and emigrants in corresponding censuses.

[407] See N.A.: „Maral TUTELIAN GUIDANIAN" In: Central Administration of Statistics. Last retrieved 04/02/2022. [http://www.cas.gov.lb/images/PDFs/cv_%20dr.%20maral%20tutelian.pdf].

5 CONCLUSION

The fact that there is no census data could be a productive situation for Lebanon because it is not possible to rely on pseudo-rational figures for debates. However, this happens nevertheless, meaning that one or the other estimation is cited in corresponding discussions and debates, which shows the dependency on numbers even exists when there are none. And this 'only' refers to the discussion on parliamentary representation. Extra-parliamentary representation, as it is not provided for migrant (women) workers, could also be better argued with surveys, however politically coloured. The activism of migrant workers in Lebanon became louder and louder in the wake of the 2015 rubbish crisis, which led to nationwide demonstrations against the government, the parliament, the elites, the patronage system and, in general, against confessionalism. When I went to the Migrant Community Centre in Beirut, 2017, to talk to the Filipina director of this NGO, she explained to me that this institution only exists because a Lebanese person gives their name to it. Without this person, it would be illegal. Women migrant workers are not allowed to form trade unions, associations or other forms of organisation. Accurate figures on murders, suicides, abuse, and more generally the extent of migrant labour could be leverage for NGOs to demand change. The same is reasonable to assume for other areas of social and political life. Without a census, there is no demographic basis for future policy decisions. I do not mean that no policy can be made without census data, but not having them available does remove any possible evidence as to why (not how) an issue should be addressed. The fact that foreign women's labour migration in particular is thus even more invisible in Lebanon than in other regions points to a sexist and racist environment that seems to see no reason in taking stock of the situation. In the meantime, there are enough eyewitness testimonies, reports, and accounts of individual cases. Thus, a picture of the overall situation can be reconstructed for the last twenty to thirty years. International and national NGOs in particular have done excellent work in this regard, with KAFA[408] standing out. With few exceptions, this kind of work is lacking for the period before the 1990s. Sources from the Ottoman Empire and the French Mandate period are even better preserved than those from independent Lebanon. This may be due to the degree of bureaucratisation as well as to the

[408] N.A.: "About us." In: KAFA. Enough Violence and Exploitation. Last retrieved: 31/01/22. [https://kafa.org.lb/en].

war between the two Beiruts during the separation of the city and the respective deliberate or accidental destruction of archives that might have provided answers.

With all the possible problems referred to in the demography chapter in mind: having numerical sources like census data and enumeration forms available, the researcher can answer questions about the perceived reality of the statistical outcome and their authors and donors. Comparing Lebanon's and Israel's enumeration forms, and to an extent the Philippines' as well, is not meant to imply that one of the situations is better or worse. Although certainly for a historian it is easier when the source situation is as good as in Israel. A multitude of questions can be asked and answered. The historian therefore can produce more, but different knowledge; the cases of Lebanon and Israel show this opportunity.

However, it should be kept in mind that the comparison here means that it becomes even clearer how differently Lebanon and Israel came into being, what different approaches these two regions have and had to nation-building and respectively to migration and migrants. By comparing, I sought to find variations to contextualise, not to explain their causes. The cases are only explained with regard to the created voids, which was intended in order to make implicit voids explicit. The literature on foreign domestic workers in Israel can give more insights about this topic, in particular I want to mention Claudia Liebelt.[409]

In order to be able to deal with quantitative sources, to see what they can tell us about the time and the creators, qualitative methods are indispensable, if possible to find.

History with its focus on time and temporality is mostly concerned with periodisation as a means for analyses, especially analysing change and continuity over time; only the temporal dimensions can prove if a process really held any meaning. When changing the temporal space, seemingly important things might become insignificant, or the other way around. This also holds true for Migration Studies. Famous inaccurate interpretations of history, such as the *feminisation* of migration, can happen (besides source problems) because scholars only take a short period of time into account, maybe linking this with a spatial dimension that constituted the nation state system we all live in. If we only consider the twentieth century, then yes, there is a *feminisation* of migration, even if just a small one. However, the *longue durée* clearly shows women were always on the move as much as men, but most often on different routes than their male counterparts. Almost all of the theories I presented understand migration as a gender-neutral phenomenon or assume that women act the same way as men. They are gender-blind.

[409] See Liebelt, 2011.

After defining human migration solely through men, scholarship started to *bring women in* and asked about how women moved differently from men. The social construction of gender, then, was examined, and problematised how it affects men and women. In other words, how the macro and meso levels affect the micro level. And thus, how the previously superficially analysed differences between migration of women and men can be understood better and more profoundly. Where migrant women were seen as a blank sheet of paper, their pre-migrant history then came into focus. Migrant women were given a voice and a history, and this was helped above all by a changed focus but also by other - qualitative - sources: Oral history, for example.

Migration theory and theories of migration history took a long way to incorporate feminist and other critical points, or are trying to at the very least. Still, we cannot claim, that the most-cited migration theories are feminist at their core, global historical or critical. As Donna Gabaccia, when talking about the relationship between Sociology and History, puts it:

> "Manning, Hoerder, Lucassen, and McKeown together garner less attention from social scientists than the historian Oscar Handlin, who did his most important writing on immigration over [70] years ago."[410]

That these old theories are still reciprocated a lot, is also why – as a historian of Migration Studies – It is still important to talk about them. However, for historical and sociological migration research, this hinders other theories and methodologies developed ever since to get the reciprocation they in my eyes deserve. This shows again, that all of the 'shifts', turns and processes explained above are neither clear cut nor chronological. The images and stereotypes, problematic assumptions and sense-making talked about are still very much part of humanities' and social sciences' university curricula nowadays.

In order to understand and categorise international migration of people of all genders more profoundly, it would have been promising to look at more recent studies and theories that have more convincing explanations. Particularly approaches from Post-Colonial and DeColonial Studies have been neglected here. Furthermore, the history of care work and more general labour history approaches are needed in order to be able to situate the migration patterns of men and women, that can be at times very different at times. The topoi with which women are framed are also given too little attention.

[410] Gabaccia, 2015a, 55.

Within the question about the Gender Data Gap in census data and how this made large parts of women 'invisible', it was nevertheless sensible to use so much space for the 'outdated' theories – because the point was that these theories are still widespread, even if they have been partially or completely refuted. In other recent works, such as that of Nana Oishi, one can see very clearly this radiant power of 'male' theories – as explained in a nutshell by Gabaccia's quote.[411] My approach is therefore justified by the history of science approach in large parts of this Master's thesis and could provide insights into the secondary literature as well as primary sources for Lebanon, the Philippines and Israel.

[411] Gabaccia, 2015a, 55.

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6 APPENDIX

Sources IPUMS Philippines, Israel

1960 CENSUS FORM NO. 3 Copy 1.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS AND STATISTICS
MANILA

1960 CENSUS OF HOUSING

Sheet No. ____ of ____ sheets

E. D. No. ____
Poblacion/Barrio ____
Municipality/City District ____
Province/City ____
Island ____

This inquiry is authorized by Commonwealth Act No. 591 which empowers the Bureau of the Census and Statistics to collect data on population and all phases of Philippine socio-economic life. All information collected is strictly CONFIDENTIAL. This report cannot be used for taxation, investigation, or enforcement purposes.

IDENTIFICATION						CHARACTERISTICS OF DWELLING UNITS				HOUSEHOLD CONVENIENCES						AGRICULTURE AND LIVESTOCK			
Census Building Number	House Number	Address (Street or Sitio)	Type of Building	Kind of Construction Materials	Year Built	Number of Dwelling Units	Household Serial Number	Name of Head of Household, Building or Dwelling Unit	Occupancy of Dwelling Units	Radio in Working Condition (Yes or No)	Source of Water Supply	Type of Toilet Facilities	Kind of Lighting Used	Kind of Cooking Fuel	Area Operated	Number of Livestock: Hogs	Number of Livestock: Others	Number of Poultry: Chickens	Number of Poultry: Others
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20

Appendix 12.1 Population and housing schedules: Census of the Philippines, 1970

Page 1

Booklet No. _____ of _____ booklets

1970 PH Census Form No. 2-A
(Sample Household)

Household Serial No. _____
Census Building No. _____
Address _____
(Number and street)

E.D. No. _____ Urban/Rural _____
City Dist./Poblacion/Barrio _____
City/Municipality/Municipal Dist. _____
Province _____
Island _____

Republic of the Philippines
Department of Commerce and Industry
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS AND STATISTICS
Manila

1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING

THIS FORM IS FOR YOUR HOUSEHOLD

This census is authorized by Commonwealth Act No. 591, which empowers the Bureau of the Census and Statistics to collect data on population and all phases of the Philippine socio-economic life. The last census was in 1960.

The 1970 Census of Population and Housing will not only take a count of the number of inhabitants in the country but will also determine their various characteristics, such as geographic distribution, age, sex, marital status, education, housing conditions and facilities.

An analysis of these information will provide facts regarding the growth, distribution and composition of the population and their habitation. These facts will be used in the assessment of current and future population and housing growth as basis for policy and action.

The law requires that the census questions be answered. Estimates may be made where exact answers are not known. The law guarantees that the information you furnish will be accorded CONFIDENTIAL treatment. Your census report cannot be used for purposes of taxation, investigation, or law-enforcement procedures.

Your whole-hearted cooperation is hereby requested to ensure the success of this undertaking.

Thank you.

TITO A. MIJARES
Director

HOUSEHOLD MEMBERSHIP

How many persons usually live in this household? (_____)

Enter their names below.

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	

(Encircle line no. of respondent)
Number of families: _____

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Figure 2 Republic of the Philippines. Department of Commerce and Industry. Bureau of the Census and Statistics. Manila: "1970 Census of Housing and Population." In: IPUMS-International. Last retrieved 12.12.21. [https://international.ipums.org/international/resources/census_forms/asia/ph1970ef_philippines_enumeration_form.en.pdf].

Appendix 12.1 *(continued)*

Page 2

Page 1 - Household Membership – List everyone who usually lives here.

Include:

- All family members and other relatives living here, including those who died and excluding those babies born after the census date, 12:01 A.M., March 1, 1970.
- All persons who usually live here but are temporarily away;
- All lodgers, boarders, servants and other non-relatives who live or at least sleep here; and,
- All persons who are temporary residents with no usual place of residence or who are not certain they will be enumerated at their usual place of residence.

Do not include:

- College students away at school or here only on vacation;
- Persons with usual place of residence elsewhere who are visiting here;
- Persons who take meals with the household but sleep elsewhere;
- Persons away in the Armed Forces; and
- Persons away in an institution such as mental hospital, sanatorium, jail, etc.

For determining the number of family nuclei, please consult your Enumerator's Manual.

Please read the following specific instructions

→ Encircle the corresponding number of the answer to the questions.

Example: In P2 - "What is his relationship to the head of the household?" If the answer is "Wife," encircle No. 2; if the answer is "Grandchild," encircle No. 5.

→ In a case where the answer does not appear in the list, specify the answer and enter the proper code as found in the Appendix of the Enumerator's Manual.

Example: In P6 - "What country is he a citizen of?" If the answer is "Germany," write "Germany" on the blank space. Refer to the "List of Countries" in the Appendix of the Enumerator's Manual for the code of Germany, and enter the code in the box provided for it.

→ Where the answer is a numerical entry, such as age (P4); length of residence (P17); hours worked last week (P22); and others, enter the number in the proper box.

→ For questions which require a specific entry, write the specific answer on the proper space and refer to the Appendix of the Enumerator's Manual for the proper code and enter said code in the box provided for it. Follow specific instructions below:

a. Place of birth (P16) or place of last previous residence (P18) – Write the name of the municipality only if it is in the same province of the present residence of this person; but if the place is outside of the province of present residence, enter the name of the province only; and,

b. Vocational or technical skill (P19), occupation last week (P28), industry (P29) and usual occupation (P31) – Enter the specific skill, occupation, industry and usual occupation in their proper spaces.

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Figure 3 Republic of the Philippines. Department of Commerce and Industry. Bureau of the Census and Statistics. Manila: "1970 Census of Housing and Population." In: IPUMS-International. Last retrieved 12.12.21. [https://international.ipums.org/international/resources/census_forms/asia/ph1970ef_philippines_enumeration_form.en.pdf].

Appendix 12.1 *(continued)*

Page 3

P1 to P7 to be asked of all persons

P1 Name of Person in Line No. 1 of Page 1

(Enter name)

P2 What is his relationship to the head of the household?
1 Head
2 Wife/husband
3 Son/daughter
4 Son/daughter-in-law
5 Grandchild
6 Father/mother
7 Other relative (Specify)
8 Not related (Specify)

P3 Sex: 1 Male 2 Female

P4 What is his age at last birthday?
(in years)

P5 What is his marital status?
1 Single 4 Separated
2 Married 5 Divorced
3 Widowed 6 Not stated

P6 What country is he a citizen of?
01 Philippines 55 France
72 United States 60 Netherlands
04 China 66 U.K. (Britain)
63 Spain 06 Indonesia
05 India
14 Pakistan (Specify)

P7 What was the dialect or language spoken at home in his earliest childhood?
01 Tagalog 07 Samar-Leyte
02 Cebuano 08 Bicol
03 Hiligaynon 09 Magindanao
04 Iloco 10 Maranao
05 Pampango
06 Pangasinan (Specify)

P8 to P11 to be asked of all persons 6 years old and over

P8 Did he attend school: Elem., H.S., Coll., at any time since July 1969?
1 Yes 2 No

P9 What is the highest grade he completed?
00 - None
1 - Elem. 2 - H.S. 3 - Coll.
1 1 1
2 2 2
3 3 3
4 4 4
5 5
6 6 or
7 more
If undergraduate in college, state course taken
(Specify)

P10 What is the highest degree he obtained in college or university?

	Bachelor	Master or higher
Elem. Educ.	24	22
Education	23	22
Law	43	42
Commerce	53	52
Medicine (M.D.)	83	82
Nursing	86	82
Dentistry (D.D.M.)	85	82
Engineering:		
(Specify)		
Others:		
(Specify)		

None - 00

P11 Can he read and write a simple message?
1 Yes 2 No

P12 to P18 to be asked of all persons

P12 Can he speak Tagalog?
1 Yes 2 No

P13 Can he speak Spanish?
1 Yes 2 No

P14 Can he speak English?
1 Yes 2 No

P15 What is his religion?
1 Roman Catholic 5 Islam
2 Protestant 6 Buddhist
3 Iglesia ni Kristo 7 Others
4 Aglipayan 8 None

P16 At the time of his birth, where was his mother's residence?
(Municipality/Province) Code

P17 Where was he residing in February 1960?
(Municipality/Province) Code

P18 Where was he residing in February 1965?
(Municipality/Province) Code

P19 to P31 to be asked of all persons 10 years old and over.

P19 Does he possess any vocational or technical skill acquired through schooling, training or experience, such as dressmaking, jeepney driving or carpentry? (If yes, ask:)
What type of skill?
1 Yes 2 No
(Specify) Code

P20 What was he doing most of the time last week?
1 Working for pay or for profit or without pay on family farm or enterprise (Skip to P22)
2 Keeping own house
3 Going to school
4 Doing something else or nothing

P21 Did he do any work at all last week not counting housekeeping and other work around the house?
1 Yes 2 No (Skip to P23)

P22 How many hours did he work last week? (Skip to P28)
(No. of hours)

P23 Even though he did not work, did he have a job or business last week?
1 Yes (Skip to P28) 2 No

P24 If he had no job or business, did he want work last week?
1 Yes 2 No (Skip to P31)

P25 If he wanted work, did he look for work last week?
1 Yes (Skip to P27) 2 No (Skip to P26)

P26 Why was he not looking for work last week?
1 Keeping own house
2 Going to school
3 Retired
4 Disabled or suffering from permanent illness
5 Believes no work available
6 Temporarily ill
(Skip to P31)
(Specify)

P27 Since he was 10 years old, has he ever worked for at least 2 consecutive weeks full time?
1 Yes 2 No (Skip to P31)

P28 What was his occupation? (For example: farmer, farm worker, secretary, elementary school teacher, etc.)
(Specify) Code

P29 In what kind of business or industry did he work? (For example: abaca farm, corn farm, life insurance, etc.)
(Specify) Code

P30 To what class of worker did he belong?
1 Working for private employer for wage, salary, commission, tips, etc.
2 Working for government or government-owned or controlled corporation.
3 In own business, farm, profession or trade for profit or fees, without paid employees
4 Employer in own business, farm, profession or trade for profit or fee (without one or more paid employees).
5 Without pay on family farm or enterprises.

P31 What was his usual occupation (gainful or non-gainful) during the last twelve months? (For example: farmer, farm worker, secretary, elementary teacher, housekeeper, student, etc.)
(Specify) Code

P32 to P34 to be asked of all ever-married women

P32 At what age did she first get married?
(in years)

P33 How many children were ever born alive to her?
Male
Female
Total

P34 How many children that were born to her are now living?
Male
Female
Total

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Figure 4 Republic of the Philippines. Department of Commerce and Industry. Bureau of the Census and Statistics. Manila: "1970 Census of Housing and Population." In: IPUMS-International. Last retrieved 12.12.21. [https://international.ipums.org/international/resources/census_forms/asia/ph1970ef_philippines_enumeration_form.en.pdf].

Appendix 12.1 *(continued)*

Page 11

HOUSING CENSUS QUESTIONNAIRE

Questions H1 to H5 are to be asked of the first household in the building to be interviewed or to be filled by the enumerator.

Questions H6 to H8 are to be asked of any household in the dwelling unit.

Questions H9 to H15 pertain to the conveniences of each household and should be answered by all households.

H1 What type is this building or house?
1 Single house
2 Duplex
3 Apartment/accessoria
4 Barong-barong
5 Commercial
6 Industrial
7 Agricultural
8 Institutional
9 Others

H2 How many dwelling units are in this building or house?
Occupied: _____
Vacant: _____

H3 What construction material is the roof made of?
1 Galvanized iron/aluminum
2 Asbestos
3 Concrete/tile
4 Cogon
5 Nipa
6 Others

H4 What construction material is the wall made of?
1 Concrete including hollow blocks, adobe stones, bricks, etc
2 Galvanized iron including aluminum
3 Wood including plywood
4 Bamboo
5 Nipa
6 Others

H5 When was this building or house built?
1 1965-1970
2 1955-1964
3 1945-1954
4 During the war (1942-1944)
5 Before the Second World War (1941 or earlier)

H6 How many rooms are in this dwelling unit? (Do not count passageways, verandas, lobbies, bathrooms, toilet rooms)
1 One room
2 Two rooms
3 Three rooms
4 Four rooms
5 Five rooms
6 Six rooms
7 Seven rooms
8 Eight rooms and over

H7 How many are occupying this dwelling unit?
Persons: _____
Households: _____

H8 How is this dwelling unit occupied?
1 Owned and occupied by your household only.
2 Owned and a part rented out.
3 Owned and a part occupied free by others.
4 Rented only.
5 Rented and a part occupied free by others.
6 Rented and a part rented out.
7 Occupied rent-free.
8 Occupied rent-free and a part rented out.

H9 Do you have a radio/transistor in working condition?
1 Yes
2 No

H10 Do you have a television set in working condition?
1 Yes
2 No

H11 Do you have a refrigerator in working condition?
1 Yes
2 No

H12 What fuel do you use most of the time for cooking?
1 Electricity
2 Kerosene (Gaas)
3 Gas (Air)
4 Wood
5 Charcoal
6 Others

H13 What do you use for lighting?
1 Electricity
2 Kerosene (Gaas)
3 Oil
4 Others

H14 What is the source of your drinking water?
1 Piped water
2 Artesian well (free flowing)
3 Pump
4 Open well
5 Spring
6 Rain water
7 Lake, river, streams, etc

H15 What kind of toilet facilities do you have?
1 Flush/water sealed
2 Antipolo/closed pit
3 Open pit
4 Public toilet
5 None

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Figure 5 Republic of the Philippines. Department of Commerce and Industry. Bureau of the Census and Statistics. Manila: "1970 Census of Housing and Population." In: IPUMS-International. Last retrieved 12.12.21. [https://international.ipums.org/international/resources/census_forms/asia/ph1970ef_philippines_enumeration_form.en.pdf].

Appendix 12.1 *(continued)*

Page 12

R E M I N D E R

After you have enumerated all the persons in the household as listed in the "Household Membership" block, please review your answers for accuracy and completeness and be sure that the points enumerated below have been followed:

1. Questions in the "Household Membership" block have been answered.
2. P1 to P7 were asked of each person listed in the "Household Membership" on page 1.
3. P8 to P11 were asked of all persons 6 years and over.
4. P12 to P18 were asked of all persons.
5. P19 to P31 were asked of all persons 10 years and over.
6. P32 to P34 were asked of all persons 10 years ever-married
7. H1 to H5 were asked only of the first household to be interviewed in the building.
8. H6 to H8 were asked of any household in the dwelling unit.
9. H9 to H15 were asked of every household.

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I HEREBY CERTIFY under my official oath that the data set forth hereon were personally obtained by me in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Bureau of the Census and Statistics.

(Signature of Enumerator) (Date Enumerated)

(Signature of Supervisor) (Date Reviewed)

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Figure 6 Republic of the Philippines. Department of Commerce and Industry. Bureau of the Census and Statistics. Manila: "1970 Census of Housing and Population." In: IPUMS-International. Last retrieved 12.12.21. [https://international.ipums.org/international/resources/census_forms/asia/ph1970ef_philippines_enumeration_form.en.pdf].

PH Form 1

May 1, 1980

Republic of the Philippines
National Economic and Development Authority
NATIONAL CENSUS AND STATISTICS OFFICE
Manila

1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING

LIST OF HOUSEHOLDS

SHEET_____OF_____SHEETS

Province _____

City/Mun./Mun. Dist. _____

Barangay _____

Enumeration Area .....

EA Suffix No. .....

Urban/Rural .....

Date(s) Enumerated _____ 1980

Random start _____

Building Serial No.	Type of Building (Enter code)	Private Dwelling Unit Serial No.	Private Household Serial No.	Collective Household Serial No.	Name of Head of Household; If collective household enter Name/Type.	Address of Household	Total Persons In: Private Households from PH Forms 2 and 3 M	Private Households from PH Forms 2 and 3 F	Collective Households from PH Form 4 M	Collective Households from PH Form 4 F	Date of Call-back 1st	Date of Call-back 2nd	Remarks
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
13 – 15	16	17 - 19	20 – 22	23 – 25			26 – 29	30 – 33	34 – 38	39 – 43			



PH Form 3

May 1, 1980

SERIAL NO. (from PH Form 1)

	BLDG	DU	HH
5			

12 21

P-0 What language/dialect is generally spoken in this household?
(Encircle code)
12 22 35 42 66 74 75
88 82 ☐☐
22-23
(See codes below.)

Republic of the Philippines
National Economic and Development Authority
NATIONAL CENSUS AND STATISTICS OFFICE
Manila
1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING
SAMPLE PRIVATE HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE

(Encircle Code or Enter Code if Required.)

LINE NUMBER	Name	ALL PERSONS: Relationship to Head of Household	Line No. of Mother	Sex	Age: Date of Birth	Age: Age on last birthday before May 1, 1980	Marital Status	Citizenship	Mother's Usual Residence at Person's Birth	5 YEARS OLD AND OVER: Residence in 1975
	Who is the head of this household? **Who are the other members of this household?** *List in this order (family name first):* *Head* *Spouse of Head* *Never-married children of head/spouse (oldest to youngest)* *Ever-married children of head/spouse and their families (oldest to youngest)* *Other relatives of head* *Non-relatives of head* (Be sure to include babies and elderly persons and members of the household temporarily away on vocation, on business, in the hospital, etc.) ENCIRCLE LINE NO. OF RESPONDENT	**What is ____'s relationship to the head of this household?** 1 Head 2 Spouse 3 Son 4 Daughter 5 Son-in-law 6 Daughter-in-law 7 Grandson 8 Granddaughter 9 Other relative 0 Non-relative	**Who is ____'s mother?** (Enter line no. of mother. If mother is not a member of this household or already dead, enter 00.)	1 MALE (M) 2 FEMALE (F)	Date of Birth (Enter month in word and year of birth.)	What is ____'s age on last birthday before May 1, 1980 (See codes below for 100 yrs. and over.)	1 Single 2 Married 3 Widow 4 Separated/Divorced 5 Unknown	**What country is ____ a citizen of?**	**At the time of ____'s birth, where was his mother's usual residence?** 88 Same mun./city 89 Another mun./city, same province If another province, specify.	**What city/municipality and province was ____'s residence on May 1, 1975?**
		(P-1)	(P-2)	(P-3)	(P-4)	(P-5)	(P-6)	(P-7)	(P-8)	(P-9)	(P-10)
24-25			26	27-28	29		30-31	32	33-34	35-36	37-38
01		1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0		1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 ☐☐	88 89 ☐☐	88 89 ☐☐
02		1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0		1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 ☐☐	88 89 ☐☐	88 89 ☐☐
03		1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0		1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 ☐☐	88 89 ☐☐	88 89 ☐☐
04		1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0		1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 ☐☐	88 89 ☐☐	88 89 ☐☐
05		1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0		1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 ☐☐	88 89 ☐☐	88 89 ☐☐
06		1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0		1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 ☐☐	88 89 ☐☐	88 89 ☐☐
07		1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0		1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 ☐☐	88 89 ☐☐	88 89 ☐☐
08		1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0		1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 ☐☐	88 89 ☐☐	88 89 ☐☐
09		1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0		1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 ☐☐	88 89 ☐☐	88 89 ☐☐
10		1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0		1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 ☐☐	88 89 ☐☐	88 89 ☐☐

Codes for P-0 Language/Dialect Spoken in Household

12 Bicol	74 Pampango
22 Cebuano	75 Pangasinan
35 Hiligaynon (Ilongo)	88 Tagalog
42 Ilocano	82 Waray (Samar-Leyte)
66 Maranao	Other – specify

Codes for P-6 Ages 100 Years & Over

100 yrs.	– X0	105 yrs.	– X5	110 yrs.	– Y0	115 yrs.	– Y5
101	– X1	106	– X6	111	– Y1	116	– Y6
102	– X2	107	– X7	112	– Y2	117	– Y7
103	– X3	108	– X8	113	– Y3	118	– Y8
104	– X4	109	– X9	114	– Y4	119 & over	– Y9

Codes for P-8 Citizenship

01 Philippines	05 Japan
02 China	06 Spain
03 India	07 U.S.A.
04 Indonesia	Other-specify

Figure 8 Republic of the Philippines. Department of Commerce and Industry. Bureau of the Census and Statistics. Manila: "1980 Census of Population and Housing." In: IPUMS-International. Last retrieved 12.12.21. [https://international.ipums.org/international/resources/census_forms/asia/ph1980ef_philippines_enumeration_form.en.pdf].



Sheet ____ of ____ Sheets

Province _____

City/Mun./Mun. Dist. _____

Barangay _____

Enumeration Area _____

EA Suffix No. _____

6 YEARS OLD AND OVER					15 YEARS OLD AND OVER		Place of Schooling/ Work	EVER-MARRIED FEMALES 10 YEARS OLD AND OVER						
Languages		School Attendance	Highest Grade Completed	Literacy	Usual Occupation and Industry			Fertility						
Is ____ able to speak Pilipino or Tagalog? 1 Yes 2 No	Is ____ able to speak English? 1 Yes 2 No	Did ____ attend school at any time from June 1979 to March 1980? 1 Yes 2 No	What is the highest grade/year that ____ has completed? (If Bachelor's or higher degree holder, specify degree and field.) (See codes below.)	(If Grade 4 and above encircle 1-Yes; otherwise ask this question) Can ____ read and write a simple message? 1 Yes 2 No	What is ____'s usual occupation? (Specify occupation. Examples: Farmer, Fisherman, Teacher, Acctg. Clerk, Housewife, Student, Retiree, etc.)	In what kind of business or industry? (Specify business/ industry.) Examples: Palay farm, Fishpond, Elementary School, Treasurer's Office, Private Dental Clinic, etc.)	(If Yes in P-13 and/or with gainful occupation in P-16) In what city/ mun. and province did ____ attend school/work? (If in this city/ mun., enter "same".)	How many children have been born alive to ____? M (If none, enter 00.)	How many children have been born alive to ____? F (If none, enter 00.)	How many of these children are still alive? M (If none, enter 00.)	How many of these children are still alive? F (If none, enter 00.)	How many children were born alive to ____ from May 1, 1979 to April 30, 1980?	Was ____ married only once? 1 Yes 2 No (If No, end interview for this person.)	(If Yes in (P-24) What was ____'s age at marriage?
(P-11)	(P-12)	(P-13)	(P-14)	(P-15)	(P-16)	(P-17)	(P-18)	(P-19)	(P-20)	(P-21)	(P-22)	(P-23)	(P-24)	(P-25)
39	40	41	42-44	45	46-47	48-49	50-53	54-55	56-57	58-59	60-61	62	63	64-65
1 Y 2 N	1 Y 2 N	1 Y 2 N		1 Y 2 N								0 1 2 3 4	1 Y 2 N	
1 Y 2 N	1 Y 2 N	1 Y 2 N		1 Y 2 N								0 1 2 3 4	1 Y 2 N	
1 Y 2 N	1 Y 2 N	1 Y 2 N		1 Y 2 N								0 1 2 3 4	1 Y 2 N	
1 Y 2 N	1 Y 2 N	1 Y 2 N		1 Y 2 N								0 1 2 3 4	1 Y 2 N	
1 Y 2 N	1 Y 2 N	1 Y 2 N		1 Y 2 N								0 1 2 3 4	1 Y 2 N	
1 Y 2 N	1 Y 2 N	1 Y 2 N		1 Y 2 N								0 1 2 3 4	1 Y 2 N	
1 Y 2 N	1 Y 2 N	1 Y 2 N		1 Y 2 N								0 1 2 3 4	1 Y 2 N	
1 Y 2 N	1 Y 2 N	1 Y 2 N		1 Y 2 N								0 1 2 3 4	1 Y 2 N	
1 Y 2 N	1 Y 2 N	1 Y 2 N		1 Y 2 N								0 1 2 3 4	1 Y 2 N	

Codes for P-14 Highest Grade Completed

Elementary	High School	College Undergrad.
000- No grade completed	210 – 1st Year	310 – 1st Year
110 – Grade 1	220 – 2nd Year	320 – 2nd Year
120 – Grade 2	230 – 3rd Year	330 – 3rd Year
130 – Grade 3	240 – 4th Year	340 – 4th Year
140 – Grade 4		350 – 5th Year and over
150 – Grade 5		
160 – Grade 6 & 7		

REMARKS:

Figure 9 Republic of the Philippines. Department of Commerce and Industry. Bureau of the Census and Statistics. Manila: "1980 Census of Population and Housing." In: IPUMS-International. Last retrieved 12.12.21. [https://international.ipums.org/international/resources/census_forms/asia/ph1980ef_philippines_enumeration_form.en.pdf].



SERIAL NO. (from PH Form 1)

	Bldg	DU	HH
6			

12 21

H-1 to H-4 are to be asked only of the first sample

H-1 What type is this building/house?

22

1 Single House
2 Duplex
3 Apartment/Accesoria/Condominium/Row house/etc.
4 Improvised (barong-barong)
5 *Commercial/Industrial/Agricultural*
6 Other housing unit: natural shelter, boat, etc.
7 Hotel, lodging house, dormitory, etc.
8 Institutional (hospital/convent/school dormitory/penal institution)
9 *Other collective living quarters (refugee camp, logging camp, military camp, etc.)*

H-2 What construction material is the roof made of?

23

1 Galvanized iron/Aluminum
2 Tile/Concrete/Brick/Stone
3 Asbestos
4 Cogon/Nipa
5 Makeshift/Salvaged Materials
6 Other (anahaw, etc.)

H-5 and H-6 are to be asked of the sample household in the dwelling

***H-5* How many rooms are in this dwelling unit (excluding bathroom, toilet, storeroom, passageway)?**

26

1 Room
2 Rooms
3 Rooms
4 Rooms
5 Rooms
6 Rooms
7 Rooms
8 Rooms or more

H-7 to H-13 should be

H-7 How does this household occupy this dwelling unit?

28

1 Owner
2 Tenant/Lessee
3 Sub-tenant/sublessee
4 Rent-free

H-8 (If household owns this dwelling unit) What is your tenure with respect to the land?

29

1 Owner
2 Lessee or sublessee
3 Farm lessee/agricultural tenant of landowner
4 Other legal tenure
5 No tenure (squatter, etc.)
6 Not applicable

H-11 What kind of fuel do you use most of *the time for cooking*?

37

1 Electricity
2 Kerosene
3 Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG)
4 Wood, charcoal
5 Other

H-12 What kind of toilet facilities do you use?

38

1 Water-sealed, sewer/septic tank, used exclusively by household
2 Water-sealed, sewer/septic tank, shared with other households
3 Water-sealed, other depository, used exclusively by the household
4 Water-sealed, other depository, shared with other households
5 Closed pit (antipolo, etc.)
6 Open pit
7 Other (pail system, etc.)
8 None

Figure10 Republic of the Philippines. Department of Commerce and Industry. Bureau of the Census and Statistics. Manila: "1980 Census of Population and Housing." In: IPUMS-International. Last retrieved 12.12.21. [https://international.ipums.org/international/resources/census_forms/asia/ph1980ef_philippines_enumeration_form.en.pdf].



HOUSING CENSUS QUESTIONS

(Encircle Code or Enter Appropriate Code If Required.)

household in every building (Repeat entries for other sample households in this building.)

H-3 What construction material are the outer walls made of? [24]

1 Galvanized Iron/Aluminum
2 Tile/Concrete/Brick/Stone
3 Wood/Plywood
4 Mixed Tile/Concrete/Brick/Stone and Wood/Plywood
5 Asbestos
6 Bamboo/Sawali
7 Cogon/Nipa
8 Makeshift/Salvaged Materials
9 Other (anahaw, etc.)

H-4 When was this building/house built? [25]

1 1980
2 1979
3 1978
4 1977
5 1976
6 1971 – 1975
7 1961 – 1970
8 1951 – 1960
9 1942 – 1950
0 1941 or earlier

Transcribe encircled codes here.

H-1 [22]
H-2 [23]
H-3 [24]
H-4 [25]

unit. (Repeat entries for other sample households in this dwelling unit.)

H-6 What is the floor area of this dwelling unit in square meters? [27]

1 Less than 30 sq. meter
Specify: _____ sq. m.
2 30-49 sq. meters
3 50-69 sq. meters
4 70-99 sq. meters
5 100-149 sq. meters
6 150-199 sq. meters
7 200-249 sq. meters
8 250-299 sq. meters
9 300 sq. meters & over
Specify: _____ sq. m.

H-5 [26]
H-6 [27]

answered by all sample households.

H-9 What kind of lighting do you use? [30]

1 Electricity
2 Kerosene
3 Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG)
4 Oil (vegetable, animal)
5 Other

H-10 What is the main source of your water supply – (Encircle only one for each use.)

For Drinking?	For Kitchen Use?	For Washing Clothes?	Source of Water Supply
[31] . . . . . [36]			
01	01	01	Faucet inside house/yard, Community Water System
02	02	02	Faucet, Public, Community Water System
03	03	03	Faucet, Other, Community Water System
04	04	04	Tubed/piped deep well, Own Use (At least 5 of 20 ft.)
05	05	05	Tubed/piped deep well, Public (pipes or 30)
06	06	06	Tubed/piped deep well, Other (meters deep)
07	07	07	Tubed/piped shallow well, Own Use
08	08	08	Tubed/piped shallow well, Public
09	09	09	Tubed/piped shallow well, Other
10	10	10	Dug well, improved (covered and no seepage from side)
11	11	11	Dug well, Other
12	12	12	Spring, improved (with tube/pipe outlet)
13	13	13	Spring, Other
14	14	14	Rain
15	15	15	Lake, river, stream, irrigation, etc.

H-13 Do you have these appliances in working condition?

	YES	NO	
[39]	1	2	a. Radio
[40]	1	2	b. TV
[41]	1	2	c. Refrigerator/Freezer

H-7 [28]
H-8 [29]
H-9 [30]
H-10 [31-32] [33-34] [35-36]
H-11 [37]
H-12 [38]
H-13 [39] [40] [41]

Figure 11 Republic of the Philippines. Department of Commerce and Industry. Bureau of the Census and Statistics. Manila: "1980 Census of Population and Housing." In: IPUMS-International. Last retrieved 12.12.21.

[https://international.ipums.org/international/resources/census_forms/asia/ph1980ef_philippines_enumeration_form.en.pdf].



PH Form 2
May 1, 1980

Republic of the Philippines
National Economic and Development Authority
NATIONAL CENSUS AND STATISTICS OFFICE
Manila

1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING
COMMON PRIVATE HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE
(Encircle Code or Enter Code If Required.)

Sheet ____ of ____ Sheets
Province
City/Mun./Mun. Dist.
Barangay
Enumeration Area
EA Suffix No.

SERIAL NO. (From PII Form I)
BLDG. | DU | H H
3 | 12 ... 21

POPULATION CENSUS QUESTIONS

LINE NUMBER	Name	Relationship to Head of Household	Line No. of Mother	Sex	Age		Marital Status
	Who is the head of this household? Who are the other members of this household? *List in this order (family name first):* *Head* *Spouse of Head* *Never-married children of head/spouse (oldest to youngest)* *Ever-married children of head/spouse and their families (oldest to youngest)* *Other relatives of head* *Non-relatives of head* (Be sure to include babies and elderly persons, members of the household temporarily away on vacation, on business, in the hospital, etc.) Encircle Line No. of Respondent. (P-1)	What is ___'s relationship to the head of this household? 1 Head 2 Spouse 3 Son 4 Daughter 5 Son-in-law 6 Daughter-in-law 7 Grandson 8 Granddaughter 9 Other relative 0 Non-relative (P-2)	Who is ___'s mother? (Enter line no. of mother If mother is not a member of this household or already dead, enter 00.) (P-3)	1 MALE (M) 2 FEMALE (F) (P-4)	Date of Birth (Enter) month in word and year of birth.) (P-5)	Age on last birthday before May 1, 1980 (See codes below for 100 yrs and over.) (P-6)	1 Single 2 Married 3 Widow 4 Separated/ Divorced 5 Unknown (P-7)
01	28 36	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0		1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5
02	37 45	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0		1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5
03	46 54	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0		1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5
04	55 63	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0		1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5
05	64 72	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0		1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5
06	73 81	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0		1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5
07	82 90	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0		1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5
08	91 99	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0		1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5
09	100 ... 108	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0		1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5
10	109 ... 117	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0		1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5

CODES FOR P-6 - AGES 100 YEARS AND OVER

100 yrs.	- X0	105 yrs.	- X5	100 yrs.	- Y0	115 yrs.	- Y5
101	- X1	106	- X6	111	- Y1	116	- Y6
102	- X2	107	- X7	112	- Y2	117	- Y7
103	- X3	108	- X8	113	- Y3	118	- Y8
104	- X4	109	- X9	114	- Y4	119 & over	- Y9

HOUSING CENSUS QUESTIONS

H-1 to H-4 are to be asked only of the first household in every building (Repeat entries for other households in the building)

H-1 What type is this building/house?
22 1 Single House
2 Duplex
3 Apartment/Accesoria/Condominium/Row House/etc.
4 Improvised (barong-barong)
5 Commercial/Industrial/Agricultural
6 Other housing unit: natural shelter, boat, etc.
7 Hotel, lodging house, dormitory, etc.
8 Institutional (hospital/convent/school dormitory/penal institution)
9 Other collective living quarters(refugee camp, logging camp, military camp)

H-2 What construction material is the roof made of?
23 1 Galvanized Iron/Aluminum
2 Tile/Concrete/Brick/Stone
3 Asbestos
4 Cogon/Nipa
5 Makeshift/Salvaged Materials
6 Other (anahaw, etc.)

H-3 What construction material are the outer walls made of?
24 1 Galvanized Iron/Aluminum
2 Tile/Concrete/Brick/Stone
3 Wood/Plywood
4 Mixed Tile/Concrete/Brick/Stone and Wood/Plywood
5 Asbestos
6 Bamboo/Sawali
7 Cogon/Nipa
8 Makeshift/Salvaged Materials
9 Other (anahaw, etc.)

H-4 When was this building/house built?
25 1 1980
2 1979
3 1978
4 1977
5 1976
6 1971-1975
7 1961-1970
8 1951-1960
9 1942-1950
0 1941 or earlier

H-5 & H-6 are to be asked of any household in the dwelling unit. (Repeat entries for other households in the dwelling unit.)

H-5 How many rooms are in this dwelling unit (excluding bathroom, toilet, storeroom, passageway)?
26
1 Room
2 Rooms
3 Rooms
4 Rooms
5 Rooms
6 Rooms
7 Rooms
8 Rooms or more

H-6 What is the floor area of this dwelling unit in square meters?
27 1 Less than 30 sq. meter
Specify: ____ sq. meters
2 30-49 sq. meters
3 50-69 sq. meters
4 70-99 sq. meters
5 100-149 sq. meters
6 150-199 sq. meters
7 200-249 sq. meters
8 250-299 sq. meters
9 300 sq. meters and over
Specify: ____ sq. meter

REMARKS:

Figure 12 Republic of the Philippines. Department of Commerce and Industry. Bureau of the Census and Statistics. Manila: "1980 Census of Population and Housing." In: IPUMS-International. Last retrieved 12.12.21. [https://international.ipums.org/international/resources/census_forms/asia/ph1980ef_philippines_enumeration_form.en.pdf].



PH Form 4

May 1, 1980

SERIAL NO. (From PH Form 1)

BLDG | DU | HH

7 | 0 0 0 | 12 ... 21

Republic of the Philippines
National Economic and Development Authority
NATIONAL CENSUS AND STATISTICS OFFICE
Manila

1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING
COLLECTIVE HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE

(ENCIRCLE CODE OR ENTER CODE IF REQUIRED.)

22 ... 27

Sheet ___ of ___ Sheets

Province
City/Mun./Mun. Dist.
Barangay
Enumeration Area
EA Suffix No.
Name of Collective Household:

LINE NUMBER	Name (P-1)	Relationship to Institution or Residence Status (P-2)	Do not fill. (P-3)	Sex (P-4)	Date of Birth (P-5)	Age on last birthday before May 1, 1980 (P-6)	Marital Status (P-7)
	List the names (family name first) of all members of the collective household in the order listed in P-2. However, for convents, seminaries and nunneries or Armed Forces camps, list the priest/seminarians/nuns or officers/enlisted men ahead of civilian employees. (Read instructions at the back on whom to list.)	1 Manager, director, in-charge; 2 Staff member/employee, including physicians and nurses; 3 Officer or enlisted man, trainee (AFP including cadets); 4 Officer or crew member in merchant vessel; 5 Priest/seminarian/nun; 6 Lodger/boarder (hotel, dorm, etc.); 7 Patient (Hospital, Sanatorium, etc.); 8 Inmate/ward (Home for the Aged, orphanage and other welfare Inst.); 9 Prisoner/detainee; 0 Others		1 MALE (M) 2 FEMALE (F)	Date of Birth (Enter month in word and year of birth.)	Age on last birthday before May 1, 1980 (See codes below for 100 yrs. and over.)	1 Single 2 Married 3 Widow 4 Separated/Divorced 5 Unknown
01	28 ... 36	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	00	1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5
02	37 ... 45	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	00	1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5
03	46 ... 54	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	00	1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5
04	55 ... 63	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	00	1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5
05	64 ... 72	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	00	1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5
06	73 ... 81	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	00	1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5
07	82 ... 90	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	00	1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5
08	91 ... 99	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	00	1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5
09	100 ... 108	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	00	1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5
10	109 ... 117	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	00	1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5
11	28 ... 36	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	00	1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5
12	37 ... 45	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	00	1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5
13	46 ... 54	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	00	1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5
14	55 ... 63	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	00	1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5
15	64 ... 72	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	00	1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5
16	73 ... 81	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	00	1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5
17	82 ... 90	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	00	1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5
18	91 ... 99	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	00	1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5
19	100 ... 108	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	00	1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5
20	109 ... 117	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	00	1 M 2 F			1 2 3 4 5

CODES FOR P-6 – AGES 100 YEARS AND OVER

100 yrs. – X0	105 yrs. – X5	110 yrs. – Y0	115 yrs. – Y5
101 – X1	106 – X6	111 – Y1	116 – Y6
102 – X2	107 – X7	112 – Y2	117 – Y7
103 – X3	108 – X8	113 – Y3	118 – Y8
104 – X4	109 – X9	114 – Y4	119 & over – Y9

CERTIFICATION

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the data set forth in this form were personally obtained by me in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the National Census and Statistics Office.

Name of person accomplishing this form (Printed Name & Sign)

Title

Date ___ 1980

Figure 13 Republic of the Philippines. Department of Commerce and Industry. Bureau of the Census and Statistics. Manila: "1980 Census of Population and Housing." In: IPUMS-International. Last retrieved 12.12.21. [https://international.ipums.org/international/resources/census_forms/asia/ph1980ef_philippines_enumeration_form.en.pdf].

PERSONS TO BE ENUMERATED AS MEMBERS OF COLLECTIVE HOUSEHOLDS

1. HOTELS, LODGING HOUSES, DORMITORIES, ETC.
   a. Proprietor, manager and employees living in the establishment, except those living therein with their own families and those who usually go home to their respective families at least once a week.
   b. Permanent lodgers/boarders (those who have stayed or expect to stay for one year or longer) and those temporary lodgers/boarders who have stayed for six months or longer as of May 1, 1980 or have been away from their own families for the same period. However, exclude those who usually go home at least once a week.
   c. Lodgers/boarders who are not residents of the Philippines and who have been in the Philippines for one year or longer as of May 1, 1980, or expect to stay in the Philippines for one year or longer. However, exclude those who have temporary place of residence elsewhere in the Philippines to where they usually go home. Exclude also diplomatic representatives or UN, ILO or USAID officials who, like diplomatic representatives, are subject to reassignment to other countries after their tour of duty in the Philippines, and members of their families.
2. HOSPITALS AND NURSES' HOMES
   a. All patients, including those just confined, in mental hospitals, leprosaria or leper colonies, pavilions of tuberculosis sanatoria where patients stay more or less permanently, and rehabilitation centers for drug addicts.
   b. Patients who have been confined for six months or longer as of May 1, 1980 in other kinds of hospitals and in wards for temporary confinement in tuberculosis sanatoria.
   c. Nurses in nurses' homes who do not usually go home at least once a week.
   d. Staff members and employees living in hospitals/nurses' homes, except those living therein with their families and those who usually go home at least once a week.
3. WELFARE INSTITUTIONS (Homes for the Aged and Infirm, Orphanage, Boys' Town, etc.)
   a. All inmates or wards, including those just confined.
   b. Staff members and employees living in the institutions, except those living therein with their families and those who usually go home at least once a week.
4. CORRECTIVE AND PENAL INSTITUTIONS
   a. All prisoners in national prisons and reformatories (welfareville).
   b. Prisoners and detainees in provincial or city/municipal jails who have been continuously confined for six months or longer, including confinement elsewhere, as of May 1, 1980, or those whose sentence is for six months or longer even if the sentence is on appeal.
   c. Staff members and employees living in the institutions except those living therein with their own families and those who usually go home at least once a week.
5. CONVENTS, NUNNERIES, SEMINARIES, AND BOARDING SCHOOLS
   a. Monks, priests, ministers, nuns, seminarians etc. However, priests or ministers of sects other than the Roman Catholic Church who live in the convent or house close to church or chapel with their own families are to be excluded (private households).
   b. Students in boarding schools (schools where students are required to stay in the school campus).
   c. Staff members, employees and helpers living in the premises, except those living therein with their own families and those who usually go home at least once a week.
6. MILITARY CAMPS AND STATIONS (PC, Army, Air Force and Navy); PMA
   a. Officers and enlisted men/draftees, except those who live in the premises with their own families and those who usually sleep most nights with private households or in hotels, lodging places or dormitories. Include those belonging to the unit in the camp or station who are away on military operation or mission or aboard naval vessels, except those whose families are living in the camp or station (their own families will report them).
   b. PMA cadets and trainees whose training is for six months or longer.
   c. Detainees who have been continuously confined for six months or longer, including confinement elsewhere, as of May 1, 1980.
   d. Civilian employees living in the camp or station, except those living therein with their own families and those who usually go home at least once a week.
7. LOGGING, MINING AND CONSTRUCTION/PUBLIC WORKS CAMPS; PLANTATIONS AND AGRICULTURAL/FISHERIES EXPERIMENTAL OR BREEDING STATIONS, ETC.
   a. Proprietor, manager, contractor and employees who do not live with their families in the premises and are supplied lodging (beddings, etc.) and/or meals by the company, firm, contractor or agency, except those who usually go home at least once a week.
8. OCEAN-GOING AND INTERISLAND/COASTAL VESSELS OR DEEP-SEA FISHING VESSELS
   a. Filipino crew members of ocean-going vessels (whose own families live in the Philippines) at port as of 12:01 A.M. May 1, 1980, except those who usually go home to their own families in the Philippines at least once every six months.
   b. Any crew member of interisland/coastal vessel or deep-sea fishing vessel at port on any day during the enumeration, if the crew member has no home other than the vessel.
9. REFUGEE CAMPS
   a. Filipino citizens working and living inside the camps.

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Figure 14 Republic of the Philippines. Department of Commerce and Industry. Bureau of the Census and Statistics. Manila: "1980 Census of Population and Housing." In: IPUMS-International. Last retrieved 12.12.21. [https://international.ipums.org/international/resources/census_forms/asia/ph1980ef_philippines_enumeration_form.en.pdf].

ABSTRACT - ENGLISH

The phenomenon of global migration is a contested and emotional topic in media, politics, society, and scholarship. Especially mobile women from the Global South find themselves mis- or under-represented in migration theories and standard data collection. This master thesis sheds light on how women became invisible in demographical data, and historical and sociological Migration Studies in the first place. Inherent racist and sexist stereotypes constructed particular notions of daily practises and realities in histories of humans on the move. Narrating selected instances of Philippine and Lebanese migration history in the last century on the micro, meso, and macro level creates the foundation for a census data analysis. This allows a comparison of the blindspots generated by the respective knowledge production. Qualitative research allows making implicit voids in quantitative census data explicit. Thus, new research questions arise. This thesis emphasises the intertwined relationship between theory, data, and migration research, and their relationship to perceived historical and present 'reality'. Specifically, the absence of data on migrant domestic workers in Lebanon and the partiality of data on mobile Filipinas, show the sexist and racist representation as well as the sexist and racist silence towards mobile women.

Key words: Migration Studies, Philippines, Lebanon, census data, migrant domestic workers, gender data gap

ABSTRACT - DEUTSCH

Das Phänomen der globalen Migration ist ein umstrittenes und emotionales Thema in Medien, Politik, Gesellschaft und Wissenschaft. Insbesondere mobile Frauen aus dem Globalen Süden sind in Migrationstheorien und Standarddatenerhebungen unter- oder fehlrepräsentiert. Diese Masterarbeit beleuchtet, wie Frauen in demographischen Daten und in der historischen und soziologischen Migrationsforschung erst unsichtbar wurden. Inhärente rassistische und sexistische Stereotypen konstruierten bestimmte Vorstellungen von Alltagspraktiken und Realitäten in den Geschichten von mobilen Menschen. Die Darstellung ausgewählter Fälle philippinischer und libanesischer Migrationsgeschichte im letzten Jahrhundert auf der Mikro-, Meso- und Makroebene schafft die Grundlage für eine Analyse von Zensusdaten. Dies ermöglicht einen Vergleich der Leerstellen, die durch die jeweilige Wissensproduktion entstehen. Qualitative Forschung ermöglicht es, implizite Lücken in quantitativen Zensusdaten explizit zu machen, wodurch sich neue Forschungsfragen ergeben. Diese Arbeit unterstreicht die wechselseitige Beziehung zwischen Theorie, Daten und Migrationsforschung sowie deren Beziehung zur wahrgenommenen historischen und gegenwärtigen “Realität”. Insbesondere das Fehlen von Daten über migrantische Domestic Workers im Libanon und die Einseitigkeit der Daten über mobile Filipinas zeigen die sexistische und rassistische Darstellung sowie das sexistische und rassistische Schweigen dieser Daten in Bezug auf mobile Frauen.

Schlagwörter: Migrationsforschung, Philippinen, Libanon, Zensusdaten, migrantische Domestic Workers, Gender Data Gap