MASTERARBEIT / MASTER'S THESIS

Titel der Masterarbeit / Title of the Master's Thesis

"Effects of Israeli policy measures in Jerusalem on the political identity of Generation Z Palestinians of East Jerusalem"

verfasst von / submitted by

Cäcilia Kappel, BA

angestrebter akademischer Grad / in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts (MA)

Wien, 2022 / Vienna 2022

Acknowledgements

This project would not have been possible without the support of many people.

Foremost, **MANY THANKS** to my adviser, Irene Etzersdorfer Professor at the University of Vienna for her guidance throughout not only this project but my whole master studies. With her deep interest and sustained curiosity for the middle east, she supported me with full encouragement and enthusiasm for my research. It filled me with confidence that the topic was worthy of my investigation and that my investigation was worthy of the topic. Additionally, the finalization of this thesis would certainly not have been possible without the generously and prompt support from Mag. Dr. Vedran Dzihic. I am thankful for his offer to support and guide me in the last and crucial steps of this process and stepped in as the subsequent adviser. My sincere acknowledgement as well goes to the Think Tank PASSIA who supported me in specifying my research focus and allowed me in depth and invaluable insights in their work and into the field.

Furthermore, I would like to thank Elisabeth Barfuß for proofreading and emotional support in the process of writing.

A very special **SHUKRAN (شكراً)** to my interviewees and gatekeepers for taking the time to be part of this research and for the willingness to share. Their contribution was as important - though definitely more intriguing - as the theories I obtained from books.

Further, this work would not have been possible without my many dear friends that I made in Jerusalem, especially Noa, Oded and Perry. **TODA RABA (תּוֹדָה רַבָּה)** for tirelessly answering numerous questions, listening to me rant, constantly talk things out and for cracking jokes when things became too serious. Through openly sharing their views and inviting me into their lives, they satisfied and simultaneously fed my curiosity for this topic.

Finally, a warm and heartful **DANKESCHÖN** goes to my partner Christopher, to my parents, family, friends, and library companions who patiently endured this long process with me, always offering support and love. In all humbleness and gratefulness, I want to acknowledge my depth to every single one of them, who have helped me to put these ideas, well above the level of simplicity and into something concrete. My accomplishments and success are because they believed in me, and I am forever grateful.

Abstract (English)

This thesis aims to uncover which points of the Jerusalem Masterplan can be taken as considerable incentives for the Generation Z (GenZ) Palestinians of East Jerusalem (PEJ) while keeping their political identity as Palestinians. Moreover, the goal is to analyze and identify the effectiveness of integration and reunification of East and West Jerusalem. Numerous researches have been conducted to explain why the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is so tricky and rigid. This paper, however, intents to examine not the nature of the conflict itself but the daily political reality of young PEJ and which Israeli policy measures work as successful incentives for Generation Z. In other words, this paper does not aim to leave criticism towards Israeli policies towards PEJ behind but instead to approach goal oriented and reveal reasons why young residents, owning a Blue ID Card counter social pressure and do apply for an Israeli citizenship to improve their living situation.

This paper will introduce topics relevant to the research question, such as the emergence and development of Palestinian identity and its inseparability from political history followed by a portrayal of the PEJ as a group and presenting Israel's political attempts to close the gap between East and West Jerusalem.

Following, the Social Identity Theory (SIT) is presented and applied for data evaluation. The empirical basis of this thesis consists of the analysis of six interviews with Gen Z of PEJ and one interview with a selected expert in the field. The results show that the respondents' realistic and partly pessimistic views of Jerusalem's future along with their desire to stay in the city are key factors in their choice to approximate Israeli rule. Incorporating SIT and Washington Institute's survey this thesis' study demonstrates that the interviewees form their In- Group around the factor of living and experiences in Jerusalem while simultaneously it indicates a strategy change away from collective struggle with education being the distinctive tool.

Abstract (Deutsch)

Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es aufzuzeigen, welche Punkte des Jerusalemer Masterplans für die Palästinenser der Generation Z (GenZ) in Ostjerusalem (PEJ) unter Beibehaltung ihrer politischen Identität als Palästinenser, als vertretbare Anreize gelten. Darüber hinaus soll die Wirksamkeit der Integration und Wiedervereinigung von Ost- und Westjerusalem analysiert und ermittelt werden. Bisherige Forschungen fokussieren sich überwiegend auf die Frage warum der israelisch-palästinensische Konflikt so komplex und starr ist. In dieser Arbeit soll jedoch nicht die Natur des Konflikts an sich untersucht werden, sondern die politische Realität der jungen PEJ und welche israelischen politischen Maßnahmen als erfolgreiche Anreize für die Generation Z wirken. Mit anderen Worten, diese Arbeit will nicht die Kritik an der israelischen Politik gegenüber PEJ ausblenden, sondern vielmehr lösungsorientiert vorgehen und Gründe aufzeigen, warum junge Jerusalemer*innen die eine Blue ID Card besitzen, dem sozialen Druck widerstehen und eine israelische Staatsbürgerschaft beantragen, um ihre Lebenssituation zu verbessern.

Diese Arbeit arbeitet zuerst themenbezogene Fragestellungen wie die Entstehung und Entwicklung der palästinensischen Identität und ihre Untrennbarkeit von der politischen Geschichte aus, um dann die PEJ als Gruppe zu porträtieren. Anhand der Gen Z PEJ als Beispiel, werden dann die politischen Pläne Israels die die Kluft zwischen Ost- und Westjerusalem schließen sollen, analysiert.

Anschließend wird die Theorie der Sozialen Identität (SIT) vorgestellt und zur Datenauswertung herangezogen. Die empirische Grundlage dieser Arbeit besteht aus der Analyse von sechs Interviews mit der Gen Z PEJ und einem Interview mit einer ausgewählten Expertin auf diesem Gebiet. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die realistischen und teils pessimistischen Ansichten der Befragten über die Zukunft Jerusalems, zusammen mit ihrem Wunsch in der Stadt zu bleiben, Schlüsselfaktoren für ihre Entscheidung sind, sich der israelischen Regierung anzunähern. Unter Einbeziehung der Umfrage des Washingtoner Instituts und SIT zeigt diese Studie, dass die Befragten ihre In-Group um Faktoren wie Alltags- und Lebenserfahrungen in Jerusalem herum bilden, während sie gleichzeitig einen Strategiewechsel weg vom kollektiven Kampf durchmachen, mit Bildung als zentrales Mittel.

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Introduction

The legal status of the city Jerusalem is highly disputed among legal experts, international organizations, and governments. Israelis and Palestinians both claim the city as their undivided capital. During the Six- Day War East Jerusalem was captured and annexed in 1980. Palestinians residing in East Jerusalem at the time were granted a temporary resident status, known as the Blue ID Card, which provides them with social rights, a voice in local politics, and the opportunity to seek Israeli citizenship. Consequently, Palestinians of East Jerusalem (PEJ) are therefore not considered Israeli citizens. While it would seem logical for them to apply in order to seek better living conditions, there is in fact only a vanishingly small group approximating Israeli rule over Jerusalem or even applying for citizenship. However, when learning about the symbolic nature and the social pressure that this matter is associated with, naturally the reverse questions arise: What are the reasons for countering social pressure and applying for citizenship?

This paper aims to reveal some of the reasons why young residents, owning a Blue ID Card, do apply for Israeli citizenship to improve their living situation.

Numerous research has been conducted about conflict theories to explain why the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is so tricky and rigid. The theoretical research of this thesis revealed that most of the research approaching this topic associate to one side of this conflict. It seems that numerous papers are, if intentionally or not, biased by the conflict itself concluding that one side is right and the other must concede. This paper, however, aims to examine not the nature of the conflict itself but the nature of young PEJ and their perspective on why they decided to eventually apply for citizenship. They changed strategy by choosing individual struggle over a collective one. In other words, this paper does not aim to leave criticism towards Israeli policies towards PEJ behind but instead to approach goal oriented. The questions behind this thesis are numerous: What serves the young PEJ? What enhances their life? What contributes effectively to their lives' goals?

Altogether it led to the following research question: Which Israeli policy measures work as successful incentives for Generation Z of PEJ to lead to strategy change (Social Identity Theory) while keeping their political identity and enhancing Israel's political status in Jerusalem?

This paper therefore attempts to raise awareness on how to take on a different perspective towards the political situation in Jerusalem. Policies and initiatives by the Israeli authorities concerning East Jerusalem are often collectively interpreted as an attempt to expulse or

brainwash the opponent. Simultaneously, it is evident (Pollock 2020) that the PEJ identity can partly be depolarized when the incentives are valuable and the political situation allows it. So far, however these local phenomena have received little attention as a path that might hold a possible solution. Instead, the focus lies on their incompatibility or the question of how the national claims of the conflict parties could be reconciled.

Some PEJ fight the social pressure and apply for Israeli citizenship in order to escape insecurity and the endangered status of their residency under Israeli occupation. A quantitative survey conducted in early 2020 by the Washington Institute (Pollock 2020) shows that the approaches towards this matter have changed over the years which can likely be associated with the political situation.

This thesis therefore aims to analyze qualitative data that was conducted through interviews in order to get to the bottom of motivational factors of Generation Z (Gen Z) of PEJ to accept Israelization while maintaining their political identity.

This thesis will introduce topics relevant to the research question, such as the development of Palestinian identity and its inseparability from political history followed by a portrayal of the PEJ as a group and presenting Israel's political attempts to close the gap between East and West Jerusalem. Then, the Social Identity Theory (SIT) will be presented. The empirical basis of this thesis consists of the analysis of six interviews with Gen Z of PEJ and one interview with a selected expert in the field.

It should be added that much of the terminology used when referring to Jerusalem and its geopolitical history is loaded and directly associated with one or the other side. This becomes evident already through the name of the city itself. Using certain terms reflect one's own historical narrative. A prominent example is the name 'The Temple Mount' which the Palestinians refer to as 'Al Aqusa Compound' or 'Haram al Sharif' (Arabic: الحرم الشريف) [1] both highlighting their respective holy sight. The War of 1948 is referred to as the 'War of Independence' by the Israelis while the Palestinians name it 'the Nakba' which translates to catastrophe. Therefore, due to the high sensitivity of this topic, this thesis puts particular attention to either explain the terms from the respective perspectives or aims to use the most neutral word. For the benefit of readability and accessibility, places and sites will be referred to in their common English terminology.

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[1] Haram al Sharif translates to the Noble Sanctuary.

This thesis aims to open a new discussion perspective towards this matter: the perspective of PEJ GenZ and their interest in living a life as a rightful citizen with security of tenure and the possibility to leave and return to their birth city at any time.

1. Emerge of the Palestinian identity

From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free, is a pro-Palestinian phrase that is frequently used in pro-Palestinian campaigns and chanted at protests. Some interpret it in its plain wording as a call for a Palestinian state reaching from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, meaning the disintegration of Israel, such as the Hamas who is the ruling party in Gaza and internationally designated as a terrorist organization. Though, this phrase can also be interpreted as a general demand for Palestinian rights and equality. This saying and its interpretations express quite vividly the ideology of the Palestinian state which is often considered as the Palestinian identity itself. While research on societal identity and the questions of identity formation in this context have not been the subject to intensive research in the past, scientists published numerous papers about Palestinian nation building. Helga Baumgarten is one of the first to study the Palestinian national movement while considering events which have had a significant impact on identity (Baumgarten 1991). The first Intifada roused the scientific community to action, consequently the roots and shaping factors of the Palestinian identity started to become addressed from different perspectives. In order to understand the different sides of the discussion various scientists will be mentioned while paying particular attention to Rashid Khalidi and Baruch Kimmerling. While Khalidi a Palestinian American observes in his book *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness* the situation from a historical perspective (Khalidi 2010), Baruch Kimmerling an Israeli scholar focused in *Clash of Identities: Explorations in Israeli and Palestinian Societies* on socio-economic preconditions (Kimmerling 2008). He argues that the Palestinian identity is decisively sparked off and until today significantly shaped by political events. The threat to collective identity is a core issue in the Israeli- Palestinian conflict which is holistically related to the struggle over territory and resources. Both claim the same territory and resources and fight over ownership and control of distribution since it forms the basis for an independent state which gives expression to their national identity. To demonstrate this notion this chapter will discuss the above-mentioned key literature with focus on the complex process of emergence and development of the Palestinian identity. 30 years of British Mandate started the emergence of the In- Group awareness. The second period began after the war of 1948 and peaked with the assertion of the regionally focused Fatah over Pan- Arabism in 1964. Finally, a closer look will be taken on the PEJ in order to illustrate what distinct them from Palestinians living elsewhere.

Nation and Nationalism

In order to discuss these periods, it is necessary to define and determine some fundamental concepts and terms such as 'nation' which is essential when discussing Palestinian identity. The concept of nation is closely connected to people and their understanding of modern times. However, nation can no longer describe tributes such as distinctive language and centuries-old uniform culture.

The liberal theorist John Stuart Mill defines nationality by common identity and the need for self-government:

> *"A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others - which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves, or a portion of themselves, exclusively"* (Mill 2011, p.179).

According to Mill the factors that convey nationality are as diverse as the nations that constitute them. Thriving factors for the creation of such an In- Group are race, origin, religion, geographical boundaries, and language, while common history is the strongest. The Palestinian's distinct common history started with the mandate in 1918. While Mill's perspective represents the diversity of conformity within a group, Benedict Anderson's definition of nation in the tradition of constructivism is more applicable for this thesis' purpose. Anderson argues that nations are imagined communities. Imagined because even in the smallest nation, members may not know each other, but nonetheless live in the notion that they form a community. Anderson also emphasizes the communal factor of a nation that is the nation as a "*comradely association*[2]" (Anderson 2006, p.16).

The 3-phased model of historian Mirsolav Hroch provides a method to analyze the formation process of a nation. He first defined basic conditions that must necessarily be present for the nation-building process, the large group as well as oppression by foreign rule (Calis 2012, pp.16–17). The basis of the nation is determined by the fact that the individual nation members share common characteristics. In Phase 1 and 2 of nation-building, it is the intellectuals who demonstrate these characteristics. Through distributing these, a sense of belonging emerges which is essential to the nation- building process due to its unifying effect (Calis

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[2] Translated from German: „kameradschaftlicher Verband".

2012, p.17). The oppression of political freedom by the foreign ruling power plays a fundamental role in the process of nation- building (Calis 2012, p.17). According to Hroch, both factors – sharing common characteristics and oppression of political freedom – lead to the formation of a national movement with the goal of creating a nation. Although these factors are crucial for a national movement, Hroch emphasizes that they do not necessarily trigger the start of it.

Beforementioned intellectuals form the language, culture, and history of the people in phase 1 of Hroch's model. He considers the 'national awakening' as crucial in the development process. In phase 2 which he names national mobilization, not only intellectuals but the general public develops common characteristics that evolve into an interest on multiple levels. A political program is defined as a concept of national liberation and self-determination with the ultimate goal of an independent nation-state. In phase 3 mass mobilization begins through the newly formulated program. The broad masses now form part of this national movement (Baumgarten 1991, p.19).

In case of the Palestinians this model suggests once more, that the Palestinian identity was initially triggered by the circumstances under the British mandate and is inseparable from the thrive for an own state. Taking these definitions and Hroch's model into consideration, the chapter hereinafter will concentrate on the period under the British mandate and the second period which started after the war of 1948.

British Mandate

Palestinian society was characterized by three social classes during the time of the British Mandate. At the bottom was the broad mass of low income workers e.g. peasants, farmhands, tenantries, and landless farmers who had moved to the cities in search for work (Baumgarten 1991, p.32). The middle class was mainly constituted of the bourgeoisie which slowly started to emerge after the beginning of mandate. These were primarily Christians, Jews, and the urban middle class (Baumgarten, 1991, p. 30). The top of the social classes was formed by the notables out of which the political elite would later develop. The notables were about 250 Palestinian families who had gained their power either through land ownership or leading positions in the religious and civil administration of Palestine (Kimmerling 2008, pp.70–71). This class of notables can be found in many Arab countries of the Ottoman Empire at that time and dominated the politics of the Arab countries to a significant extent (Baumgarten 1991, p.31). While notables lost their importance and influence in other Arab countries they were able to

hold on to their political positions in Palestine. The British used them as intermediaries to the local population. By strengthening the wealth and supremacy of the notables, the succeeding powers to the Ottoman Empire gained social control of the population (Baumgarten 1991, p.32). At the same time, the British government consistently rejected any attempts to expand the power of the notables. This method proved to be highly effective due to the financial dependency to the mandate government (Baumgarten 1991, p.30).

Applying these factors to Hroch's Model while considering all of the mentioned interdependences, a clear evolution of phase 1 and 2 during the British Mandate can be observed. , the notables, which take the role of Hroch's defined intellectuals or political elite, experience the oppression of political freedom leading to phase 1 of national awakening and as a consequence to the Palestinian national movement considered as phase 2 national mobilization. These circumstances led to the formation of the Palestinian National Identity.

In the 30 years of British Mandate the newly formed Palestinian national movement waged an inferior struggle against the mandate power and the Zionist movement. After the mandate ended, fierce fights between Arabs and Jews immediately erupted. With the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948 (Jewish People's Council 1948) the consequential war between Transjordan, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria against Israel began. It caused many Palestinians to flee the country while the prospect of a future self-control of Palestine was shattered. Israel won the war and made significant gains in terrain by the time it ended in January 1949. Among other areas the western part of Jerusalem came under Israeli control. Areas of the West Bank[3] and East Jerusalem came under Jordanian control. The Gaza Strip was placed under Egyptian administration. A large part of the Palestinian population fled or was expelled from Israeli territories. Until now, the effects of the war of 1948 are remembered by Palestinians as 'the Nakba'[4] (Meining 2003, p.110). Israel on the contrary perceives the victory as the birth of the self-ruled state due to which the war is referred to 'War of Independence.' For Jerusalem, the war meant the division of the city. While the western part became part of Israel the eastern part was under Jordanian control. This included the Old City with the Temple Mount, which the Palestinians call the Haram al Sharif. The war ended not only in defeat of the Palestinians but of the involved Arab neighboring states as well (Khalidi 2010, pp.177–178).

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[3] The term West Bank refers to the area west from the Jordan River excluding Jerusalem. Zionist call this area by the ancient Hebrew name Judea and Samaria. Pro- Palestinian advocates also use the term Occupied Palestinian Territory or short OPT including the city Jerusalem.

[4] Translated into English it means catastrophe.

The first unification and newly adopted ideology of Pan- Arabism failed. The identity formation of Palestinians turned into fragments of the In- Group , ancestral territory was lost, the enemy came to power and the first try of Pan- Arabic military alliances failed. The 1948 war marks the end of the first period which significantly shaped the development of a Palestinian identity.

The demise of Pan- Arabism and the rise of Palestinian Liberation Organization

During the years after the first Israeli- Arab war in 1948/49 the Palestinians – a shattered and scattered group – had to reorganize themselves politically. During the time of Jordan's mandate in East Jerusalem, it's efforts were centered on Jordanian unity as opposed to the creation (or influencing) of a Jordanian-Palestinian identity. The connections between Transjordanians and Jerusalem can be seen as one-sided during that time. While EJ were hardly reliant on integration into Jordan, Amman saw the potential of Jerusalem's economic strength as well as cultural and religious importance. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan had to adapt to a fundamentally different regional reality following the 1948 war (Sofer 1976, p.74-80). History has proven that the PLO, as PEJ's own political representation, had *the* substantial impact on the long-term identity building of PEJ. The 1950s formed the beginning of the political party Fatah which dominates Palestinian politics today – a party that fought its way up to the top taking radical measures if necessary. Although Pan- Arabism and the rise of the Fatah were ideologically contrary to each other, they should be considered as key factors contributing to a rather strong collective Palestinian identity at that time. This section serves to look at the movements separately, to discuss the prevail of the Fatah as the Palestinian political representation and its influence on Palestinian identity.

Rashid Khalidi declares the years between 1948 and the emergence of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 as "*lost years*"(Khalidi 2010, p.178). He states that these years were shaped by Palestinian people having disappeared from the political map and Palestinian nationalism or a distinct Palestinian identity no longer existed (see Khalidi, 2010, p. 178). In contrary to Khalidi's assessment Laurie Brand, professor at the University of Southern California School of International Relations, sees the 1950s and 1960s as decisive for the reemergence of the Palestinian national consciousness. More and more Palestinians got involved in numerous political parties or movements to pursue their interests. The interests were diversified from the Muslim Brotherhood to the Pan- Arabic Arab Nationalist Movement. Nevertheless, they formed the basis for the creation of a Palestinian unity beyond political,

social or regional boundaries (Brand 1988, p.29). As mentioned above, two contrary identity forming ideologies stood out and finally competed against each other. The homogenizing Pan-Arabism and the regional oriented Fatah.

With the guiding figure of the former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel-Nasser, the guiding premise of Pan- Arabism was to see itself as one Arab people with one language, one culture, one common history. The contrary formed the division into individual nation states created by the prevailing imperialism at that time. The sense of togetherness propagated by Pan- Arabism attracted many Palestinians, who expected the ideology to provide them support from the Arab states against Israel. Moreover, the situation of Palestinian refugees in the Arab states was characterized by oppression which led to hope for protection through Pan- Arabic alliances (Khalidi 2010, pp.181–183). While the ideology of Pan- Arabism dominated the political movement until the mid-60s, the political ideas started to shift after Nasser's death. Disappointment in Pan- Arabism's inability to effectuate lasting prosperity in the Arab world led to ideological reorientation. Contrary to the fact that the PLO was established under Nasser, Yasser Arafat , took over the leadership of the Palestinians in 1965 opposing Pan- Arabism. He became the face of the Palestinian struggle for the following eventful decades until his death in 2004. The PLO was officially founded at the first meeting of the Palestinian National Council in Jerusalem on May 28th 1964 as an umbrella organization of various Palestinian groups. Initiated by Gamal Abdel Nasser at the first summit of the Arab League it was founded independently of other guerilla groups (e.g. Fatah). Nasser's idea for the PLO was to channel the activities of the various Palestinian groups and therefore offer Arab states the opportunity to monitor and control political decisions of the Palestinians. Nasser is being considered one of the most eager advocates of Pan- Arabism and it was especially important to him to establish an independent representative of the Palestinians. The Palestinians were the commonality that could hold together the divided Arab states which were marked by rivalry and competition. With the founding of the PLO Nasser not only aimed to gather strength in the Palestinian Question but support the formation of an collective Arab identity (Becker 1984, p.38). Article 1 of the PLO's manifest declares Palestine to be an "*Arab homeland*" (Shukeiri 1964) which connects it inseparably to the other Arab countries. Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine were therefore inseparable goals – each one of them a prerequisite for the fulfilment of the other. The focus on close connection between these two goals clearly reflects Nasser's Pan- Arabic idea. Among other aspects, the PLO aims to achieve three goals that have clear identity formation character: national unity, national mobilization and the liberation of the Palestinians (Shukeiri 1964).

Since the Palestinian Liberation Army was directly integrated into the respective Arab state's armies it was not able for them to take any military action against Israel on its own. Since the Palestinian people were still in the process to build up their In- Group identity and national movement, they were disappointed in the military's weakness to fight for a Palestinian self-controlled state. Less than three years after its foundation the PLOs development came to a turning point. The defeat of the Arab states in the war of 1967[5] turned out as the end of the Nasserist Pan- Arabism as a dominant ideology, rather than Palestinians backing up the re-sistance groups and their actions. Consequently, the PLO's chairman resigned in 1967 (Frangi 1982, p.138).

Only a year later, in 1968, the battle of Karameh in Jordan led to Fatah's initial emergence as the most influential party of the Palestinian national movement and marks their breakthrough. Fatah, was founded in the early 1950s by young Palestinian students from Cairo due to their disappointment of losing the war against Israel in 1948 and the occupation of the Gaza Strip by Israeli troops after the Suez crisis in 1956 (Yaari 1968, p.21). Fatah's central political goal focused on the liberation of the homeland of Palestine (Shukeiri 1964). Opposing to the PLO's ambitions, the term *homeland* here clearly indicates the idea of one Palestinian people with Palestine as their one and only homeland. Moreover, the approximately 700,000 Pales-tinian dispersed refugees should be reunited and return to their ancestral territory. Fatah's founders declared in their second principle that the only way to achieve this unification would be through an armed struggle (Shukeiri 1964). The third principle states that this struggle must be carried out independently of all influences by the Palestinians themselves. The libera-tion of the Palestinian homeland by their own hands and independently from other Arab states should ensure the Palestinian refugees to return to their territory and consolidate the newly highlighted common ancestry. After the victory of the battle of Karameh in 1968 Fatah gained broad support among the Palestinians and it joined the PLO which was mainly influenced by the Arab states' interests. The takeover of leadership led to further recognition, financial secu-rity and greater power for the Fatah (Baumgarten, 2005, pp. 40, 41) Additionally this shows the Palestinian people's choice to oppose the idea of being part of a greater whole but to fol-low their own national path.

Fatah clearly differed from the Pan- Arabic movements. Instead of relying on the Arab armies who at that time had already failed twice against Israel (1948, 1967), Fatah formulated the

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[5] The 1967 War is commonly known as the Six- Day War. The term highlights the strong and fast victory of Is-rael while the defeated Palestinians refer to it as the Naksa which translates to set back.

collective armed struggle of the Palestinian people as the way to liberation. The Palestinian people chose to independently take care of the situation in order to become one people with a common goal and self-leadership. Institutionally, Fatah cemented their idea of national identity and representation by taking over the PLO in 1968/69. From this moment on the Palestinians represented themselves for the first time, became one people and developed the understanding of In- Group among each other.

Subsequently in 1994 the Palestinian Authority (PA) was founded as a five-year interim body on the basis of the Gaza-Jericho agreement between the PLO and the Israeli government, a follow up treaty to the first Oslo Accords in which the details of Palestinian authority were stated. This meant that the PA was legally separate from PLO, which continues to hold international recognition as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, representing them at the United Nations under the name 'Palestine'. Since the elections in 2005 under controversial conditions followed by controversial results the PA is led by the Fatah in the West Bank and a rival Hamas government in the Gaza Strip (Kalman 2006).

Recent history of Jerusalem

The eventful years of British mandate, the establishment of the Israeli state and its aftermath led to Palestinians although ideologically united under the Fatah, being repeatedly physically separated. When looking at the development and geographical areas these can be classified into five groups each one of them associated with different living situations: Gaza, West Bank, Jerusalem, Palestinian-Israelis (with Israeli citizenship) and the Diaspora[6] residing in other countries. From a PEJs perspective the aftermath of the 1967 War was the worst of all fought wars. It can be considered as a war that continued Israel's War of Independence in 1948 and the 1956 Suez War. The anger coming from the Arab neighbors had remained the same, continuing their intention to destruct the Jewish state. Ever since the 1956 War border incidents in numerous numbers were recorded. The 1967 War changed the political geography of what before was considered the Middle East. Israel's involvement in East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Syrian Golan Heights was a direct consequence of this war. Within six days, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) launched a surprise attack against the air forces of the Arab states of Egypt, Jordan and Syria on the ground and defeated the Arab forces

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[6] Or Palestinian refugees living in the other countries.

(Encyclopaedia Britannica [no date]). During the 1967 War the liberation and unification[7] of Jerusalem played a crucial role for the Israelis as the Old City and East Jerusalem hold very important Jewish sights that are considered holy. Within the Old City as well as East Jerusalem they fought over every street and house which was strategically highly challenging. On June 7th, Israeli troops reached the Wailing Wall, where Defense Minister Moshe Dayan declared,

> *"This morning, the Israel Defense Forces liberated Jerusalem. We have united Jerusalem, the divided capital of Israel. We have returned to the holiest of our holy places, never to part from it again"* (Dayan 1967).

On June 10th of 1967 IDF troops stood on the Suez Canal as well as on the West Bank of the Jordan River and controlled large parts of the strategically extremely important Golan Heights (Bpb 2020).

Israel occupying the Gaza Strip administered by Egypt and Jordan controlling the West Bank also had profound consequences for the status of Jerusalem. Israeli forces conquered both the Old City and the eastern part of the metropolis leading to Israel controlling the entire territory of Jerusalem. For the first time since 1948 Jews thus had free access to their most religious sight, the Wailing Wall. Just three weeks after the war ended the Israeli Knesset approved a bill on June 27 of 1967 extending Israeli law and jurisdiction over East Jerusalem (PASSIA 2001, p.121). Ever since East Jerusalem's municipal authority enlarged to cover 28 neighboring West Bank communities and two Palestinian refugee camps. The city's growth to 111 square kilometers made it the largest city in Israel in terms of both land and population ever. It enhanced Jerusalem's political and social significance by transforming it from a tiny border town to the heart of a district that serves both Israelis and Palestinians (Alayan 2019, p.16). Despite the fact that East Jerusalem was annexed by Israel, its people did not receive Israeli citizenship. They were instead granted permanent residence status which is demonstrated through the Blue ID Card. Those who were not present during the census lost their right to live in the city (Nuseibeh 2013, p.13). The residents of East Jerusalem were now permitted to apply for Israeli citizenship but only few Palestinians have ever made use of that right, an aspect to be discussed in Residential Status: Blue ID Card. Palestinians in East Jerusalem are not considered equal to Israelis and have been legally divided from their peers in the West

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[7] In this context 'unification' is Israeli terminology. Israel describes the War of 1967 and gaining control of East Jerusalem as liberation and unification of their capital, however those terms are not used by Palestinians referring to the same war.

Bank and Gaza which are still under Israeli military rule (Nuseibeh 2013, p.180). This separation enabled the Israeli Ministry of Interior to gain control over Palestinians and decide who of them could reside and work in East Jerusalem. Later, following the establishment of checkpoints, this also included traveling in and out of East Jerusalem. This divergence in political status led to trends in the Jerusalemite's politics, society, and methods of opposition to the Israeli rule. PEJ had become a unique group with their own status. Although they share a common history with all Palestinians through which they feel connected, in fact their challenges, rights and daily life differ significantly. Furthermore, they have not been physically united for than seven decades and politically torn apart since the split between Fatah and Hamas. The Jerusalemites are considered close to the West Bankers due to their geographical proximity, their family ties, their experience of occupation as well as politically through the Fatah. Nevertheless, their rights differ significantly due to the Blue ID Card. Moreover, their everyday life and quality of life vary widely. While the income in Jerusalem is significantly higher, the living standards in the West Bank are better (Numbeo 2021).

The Palestinian national identity in Jerusalem grew stronger over time. Their unmet hopes erupted into national anger in 1987 when the first Intifada began in all the areas seized by Israel after the war of 1967. The Intifada a four-year-long active resistance to Israeli authority in the occupied areas quickly extended into East Jerusalem districts. The Israeli forces effectively repressed the huge protest and Palestinian resistance in the city grew increasingly individualistic. The acts of resistance in East Jerusalem were frequently connected to ownership rights expressed by stone-throwing. In 1988 Jordan gave their rights to East Jerusalem (Alayan 2019, p.19). The Intifada can be considered more than a political fight but rather a national revolt. It symbolizes a cultural and ideological endeavor that was an essential milestone in the formation of the Palestinian narrative and national identity.

Rumor has it that negotiations about the future of the conquered territories in the early 1990s between Israelis and Palestinians led to the first Intifada. The second intifada, however, can be led back to failed peace talks in 2000. It is said that negotiations between former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat did not go well which resulted shortly after in a far more violent intifada than the first one. Israelis consider Arafat to be responsible due to mobilizing Palestinians to violence while Palestinians blame it on Ariel Sharon[8] visiting the contested Temple Mount which was considered provocative (Silberman 2001, p.489).

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[8] Opposition leader at the time and later elected Minister of Israel

While both Arafat and Sharon played prominent parts in the vast mistrust between the two sides, the failed peace talks made armed conflict seem inevitable. Shortly after Sharon's visit riots started spreading all over the city, igniting the West Bank and Al Aqusa Intifada increased in violence. Jerusalem turned into once again into an ethnic battlefield remining of the conflict in 1947, with two sides desperately fighting over their land. After 1,000 Israelis and 3,200 Palestinians paid with their lives, the conflict came to fade out in 2005 (Silberman, 2001, pp. 488).

In 2015 a series of almost daily attacks by Israeli forces aiming at Palestinians broke out mainly in Jerusalem. Some call this wave of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict the 'Knife Intifada,' although the term Intifada[9] is questionable. Since the attacks were carried out by individuals they lacked popular support, leadership and a clear strategy or goal. Hence, it can be argued that due to the lack of collective organization it should not be considered an uprising and while it undoubtedly affected many people it did not have a lasting influence on the collective national identity.

The special case of Palestinians of East Jerusalem

The status of Jerusalem is one of the most controversial and polarizing topics in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with consequences well beyond the borders of the parties involved. Discussions on Jerusalem have been postponed in various negotiation talks because of its highly sensitive and explosive potential. With the growing violence in 1947 and subsequent war between the two groups in 1948 which was joined by neighboring Arab states (as elaborated in the section above), Jerusalem became the symbolic core of the struggle, and its control became crucial for all parties involved. The 1967 War had by far the most intense consequences for the Palestinians living in the east of the city, which continue to shape their daily lives to this day. The fights resulted in Israel's expansion of its power from West Jerusalem over East Jerusalem. The armistice demarcation lines within the city were removed but inflamed the debate over the rightful ruler once more.

Due to Israel's de facto rule on the ground, it has been able to devote substantial efforts and resources to reshaping the city's physical and demographic qualities. Palestinians, on the other hand, as well have declared East Jerusalem to be the capital of a future independent Palestinian state to be built in the areas seized in the 1967 War.

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[9] The term Intifada in the Palestinian context is understood as uprising.

Soon after the War of 1967, the PEJ tried to counteract Israel's strategy of solidifying its rule over Jerusalem by contributing to the preservation of the Palestinian-Arab identity in the city and building their own institutions and organizations. They are active in several fields, are driven by a range of variables, follow diverse political and social trends, and receive money from a range of sources. To simplify Cohen divided them into four categories, "welfare and aid groups, human rights organizations, education and health organizations, trade unions, research institutions, and cultural and religious institutions" (Cohen 2011, p.82).At the same time, these engaged in different activities such as within the social sector, that the state of Israel or the autonomous Palestinian authorities were unwilling or unable to accept (Cohen, 2011 p.82, 83). Hillel Cohen identifies two determinants that indicate the unique living situation for Palestinians in Jerusalem: For one thing it is considered a 'unified' capital, therefore, Jerusalem is a 'normal or ordinary' part of the Israeli state. Hence, Palestinian residents are living under Israeli civil law in contrast to the West Bankers or Palestinians in the Gaza Strip who live under military law. On the one hand, the proximity between the occupied and the occupiers facilitated surveillance and Israelization processes and made it more difficult for Palestinians to create their own institutions. On the other hand, it also created more civil rights and economic benefits for them. East Jerusalem experienced an economic upturn with the start of the Israeli occupation. Its residents benefited from opportunities in the Israeli labor market and inclusion in the welfare system (Cohen 2011, p.67). Although these constitute advantages their fellows in the West Bank or Gaza did not experience, it led to the fact that Palestinian Jerusalemites fear both the revocation of their residency and the destruction of their homes if they were to be associated with anti-Israel activities. Additionally, being part of the Israeli economy is not only being associated with better salaries than under Jordanian rule but also a substantially higher cost of living (Numbeo 2021). Cohen feels that PEJ are sometimes perceived as passive compared to their fellows in the West Bank or Gaza. However, he also argues that this inaction should not be mistaken for acceptance or even approval of the Israeli politics in Jerusalem. This is being expressed by PEJ traditionally boycotting city council and mayoral elections in order to avoid the impression that they accept Israeli rule. As a result of these boycotts there has not been representation of Palestinian concerns in the city council for decades. Initiatives by Palestinian Jerusalemites to break this boycott and run for office with

their own lists have repeatedly fallen victim to internal Palestinian opposition (Cohen 2011, p.17)[10].

Political representation in Jerusalem

Most of the beforementioned Palestinian institutions and organizations in East Jerusalem were not based on formal procedures, but rather social ties. For example, the driving force behind the establishment of the Orient House which functioned as the Palestinian headquarters in Jerusalem, was Faisal Husseini. He was born into one of Jerusalem's traditional families but was popular for his commitment to the Palestinian cause. Although Husseini considered himself a Fatah member, he sought the inclusion of as many Palestinian factions as possible in order to create unity within the struggle to preserve Palestinian Jerusalem (Cohen 2011, p.13). Yet, the peak of Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem subsided during the Oslo process. Cohen describes that one of the decisive factors for it was the behavior of the PLO leadership abroad. Additionally, in the talks with Israel Arafat had agreed to exclude East Jerusalem from the road map to Palestinian self- government and to discuss the city's status in the context of the final status negotiations (Gold 2021). Consequently, East Jerusalem was officially not part of the jurisdiction area of the Palestinian Authority (PA) . Nevertheless, Palestinians formed informal bodies such as a Palestinian security force which considered itself as representatives of the national authority and acted against crimes in Palestinian neighborhoods. Moreover, they tried to enforce national principles such as the ban on selling land to Jews. (Cohen 2011, p.27).

While all political attempts were carried out in good faith the implementation of the Oslo Accords and the establishment of the PA shifted when the Palestinian city Ramallah in the center of the West Bank gained importance, not only in the political but also in the Palestinian cultural and economic domain. This even intensified during the successful state-building effort of former prime minister Salam Fayyad. Ever since, a growing disconnection between political and social processes in East Jerusalem and those in the other occupied territories have been observed. This phenomenon even increased when Israel began building the separation barrier in 2002. Developments during the second intifada clearly revealed the tense relationship in

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[10] Deniz volunteered for an expert interview for this research and explained the following reasons: 1) social pressure against PEJ political participation in the Jerusalem municipality 2) headwind coming from official bodies of both conflict parties 3) Neither the Israeli side, which has no interest in additional empowerment of PEJ, nor the PA which sees it as competition, have interest in a local political organization.

which PEJ permanently find themselves: On the one hand, they are the symbolic focus of the Palestinian national movement for whom a 'betrayal' of Jerusalem is unthinkable:

> " *It is not a matter of what percentage. It is a matter of what destruction or damage it does to a Palestinian state. A state without Jerusalem – no Palestinian will accept. Palestinians will say we [i.e. all Palestinians] don't want a state* (Querei 2008, p.10)*."*

On the other side, politicians such as Ahmed Querei, Prime Minister of the PA from 2003 to 2006, is known to be of the architects of the Oslo Peace Accords signed with Israel in 1993. These peace accords led to Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. According to the protocol *Minutes from Bilateral and Trilateral US-PAL-ISR Sessions* from 2008, he states that representatives from the US and the Palestinians negotiated the progress.

The role of religious institutions in Jerusalem identity

Jerusalem offers particularly for religious groups a unique mobilization opportunity that offers potential to be instrumentalized within the intra-Palestinian competition. East Jerusalemites are partially detached from the Palestinian national movement in political practice due to their two-faced ties to Israel. Despite the obstacles and the resulting processes of alienation between Jerusalemites and other Palestinians, however, the symbolic significance of the city for the Palestinian national movement remains unbroken. Palestinian elites are aware of the transnational dimension of the Jerusalem question. For example, while Arafat did not seek backing Arab leaders in the Camp David negotiations[11] on borders he made clear that he did not have a free hand when it comes to Jerusalem, but rather required the agreement of other Arab leaders for any compromise (Nusseibeh 2007, p.16). Moreover, within the secular forces in the Palestinian national movement especially Fatah but also the PLO lost popularity while Islamist actors such as Hamas gained supporters. It can be said that mosques in general but the Haram al-Sharif in particular offer unique opportunities for political mobilization. One outstanding example of Palestinian mass mobilization through the Haram is the outbreak of the second Intifada, also known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada (Cohen 2011, p.73). As part of the national movement, Arab Jerusalemites also joined various armed cells such as the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. Despite these type of political statements Cohen expresses that while Jerusalem was the center of attacks during the second Intifada, Palestinian residents of the city were not usually

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[11] Camp David Negotiations or Camp David Summit where talks held in July 2011 between Israeli Prime minister Ehud Barak and PA Chairman Yasser Arafat. The talks ended without an agreement.

the driving force behind them.

Nevertheless, in the wake of terror Israel took drastic measures: not only towards extremist cells but also on the remaining civilian Palestinian institutions in the city. Consequently, the Orient House was shut down.

The following chapter will look closely at Generation Z of East Jerusalem and its significance when it comes to the future development of this area.

East Jerusalem's next Generation

While one peace treaty after the other and big clashes on the streets shaped the last decades, today's everyday life of young Palestinian adults in East Jerusalem seems calm. Although protests and publicly demonstrated anger is still present due to current political events, they do not reach the same dimension as in the past. When Donald Trump[12] announced the Peace Deal in early 2020, Palestinians met it with anger and considered it a piece of impudence. However, the expected uprising or mass protests in East Jerusalem and the West Bank remained absent, as various Newspapers reported (Ibrahim 2020; Khoury et al. 2020). A similar development was observed during the outbreak of violence between Gaza and Israel in May 2021. In the past Palestinian protests were taken into the streets all over Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza. This time, however, the reaction and protests were considered small and scattered (Yee and El-Naggar 2021). Khalil Tafakji, head of the Maps Department at the Arab Studies Society in Jerusalem believes that the low turnout on the streets is attributable to the lack of trust in political leadership. Yara Hawari, senior fellow at the Palestinian policy network Al-Shabaka, expresses that another reason for the low number of protestors are fearful of Israeli repercussions, which in the past have been very costly for the Palestinians (Ibrahim 2020). Moreover, particularly the (Arab) international support for the Palestinian cause has lost momentum and most Arab leaders are now preoccupied with local crises and threats rather than the Palestinians. Such circumstances have played a fundamental role in the existing disparities in Arab discourse on the Palestinian question. Summarizing, the lack of leadership and trust in political institutions and missing international support from political leaders led to a decreasing collective resistance. So, what about East Jerusalem's next generation? Palestinian young adults in East Jerusalem face challenging political and socioeconomic circumstances. The political violence and conflicts caused by the constant presence of Israeli forces,

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[12] US President from 2017 until 2021.

Israeli settlers, and their security guards, combined with the restricted services in East Jerusalem, have had a particularly negative impact on them. It is assumed that due to the lack of leadership, this new generation found social media as a new way to organize themselves and call broad attention to their situation and demands. In other words, Palestinian unity took on new forms through the online community and now has the potential to go global with greater impact rather than staying only in Middle Eastern cities. The online community now connects to modern minority rights movements as for example Black Lives Matter while seeking support from Western countries. One famous example is the story of the twins Muna and Mohammed Al-Kurd from Sheikh Jarrah who have become popular for documenting and streaming their lives with daily violence from military policy or armed settlers in East Jerusalem. When the two of them were arrested in 2021 their story went viral and the international media called for their instant release. They were added to the list of 100 most-influential people in the world from the Time magazine in 2021(Mansoor, 2021).

While the young adults of PEJ have not lived but inherited the trauma which previous generations had to experience, the new generation is associated with being frustrated about the lack of political leadership and a clear vision for what the future could look like. Through the political hardships and for being disconnect from other Palestinians and social economic challenges they have created their own unique identity.

The next chapter will elaborate Jerusalem's politics and the life Palestinians live under Israeli rule and protection in East Jerusalem.

2. Jerusalem: a political issue

Jerusalem's diplomatic and international status has been debated and unclear since Israel's founding in 1948. Neither violence nor suggested solutions – of which there have been many– have succeeded in bringing peace to its inhabitants. *"God bless Jerusalem, the eternal, undivided capital of Israel (Netanyahu 2018a)."* Benjamin Netanyahu said in his speech at the opening of the US Embassy in Jerusalem on May 14, 2018. Jerusalem was officially united with Israel in 1967. However, under consideration of the different views and disagreements between Israel and Jerusalem discussed in 1, this chapter will discuss whether Israel's perception of a united capital is visible in day-to-day life.

By now almost all physical borders between East and West Jerusalem from 19 years of geographical demarcation have disappeared. Yet, in 2001 the Israeli cabinet constructed a separation barrier between Jewish and Arab neighborhoods in the East of the city. Additionally, there are still rigid social borders as various Palestinian scholars as well as Jewish scholars highlight (Khalidi 2010; Cohen 2011; Hasson 2012; Chiodelli 2017; Alayan 2019): Jewish Jerusalemites avoid entering Arab neighborhoods, Palestinian life takes place as far as possible in East Jerusalem. Even schoolchildren experience the de facto division of the city: Israeli schools teach according to the Israeli curriculum while Palestinian schools follow the Palestinian curriculum. This disparity between Jewish and Palestinian Jerusalemites is observable in a lot of areas of life. First and foremost, the legal status of Palestinian Jerusalemites differs from that of Jewish Jerusalemites. As discussed in Emerge of the Palestinian identity the vast majority of PEJ do not have Israeli citizenship but a permanent resident status instead. Ever since the second Intifada and especially since the establishment of the Israeli barrier in Jerusalem the Blue ID Card became more and more important. Chatham House, a think tank specializing on international affairs headquartered in London. reports that West Bankers' possibilities to access the city and thus the holy sites have become increasingly difficult or even impossible.

> *"The separation wall, checkpoints and more recent closure policies have, since 2005, prohibited Palestinians without Israeli- issued Jerusalem identity cards from residing in or even entering Jerusalem* (Dumper and Pullan 2010, p.6)*.*

They point out that PEJs who moved to the West Bank in order to find better living conditions have been withdrawn of their possibilities to visit the holy sites freely. Many observers of the situation such as NGOs and Palestinian activists state that the unequal treatment of Jewish and

Palestinian Jerusalemites is evidence for Israel's strategy to politically and culturally manifest the city. The aim being to maintain the demographic Jewish majority in the city and thus undermine any Arab character and Palestinian demands for an East Jerusalem capital (Ir Amin 2009; PASSIA 2009, p.1; Van Esveld 2010).

The following chapter focuses on the political circumstances of PEJ. In accordance with the research question, it will particularly focus on day-to-day life of Generation Z and their benefits and drawbacks of a Blue ID Card, the Education System, and the Separation Barrier in Jerusalem. Finally, it provides insight into Israel's attempt to close the gap between east and west and their intention to unify their claimed capital with the "Jerusalem Masterplan."

Residential Status: Blue ID Card

As described in 1, sovereignty over Jerusalem and its residents has been held by supersede political powers over the last century. Between 1918 and 1948 the British Mandate controlled Jerusalem until it was divided in 1948 between East and West among Israel and Jordan. Israel achieved a victory of the 1967 War also known as Six- Day War which resulted in the city's reunification under Israel. The United Nations rejected this act with the argument that the final status of Jerusalem should be resolved through negotiations instead of war (UN Security Council 2017). With its victory Israel extended the municipal boundaries[13] and put East Jerusalem under its civil law (Encyclopaedia Britannica [no date]). Although its status remains controversial and is considered illegal under international law, Israel claims the city as its undivided capital and passed a law in 1980 in order to explicitly annex East Jerusalem (Basic Law 1980). Resulting this means that under Israeli law people from East Jerusalem live in Israel while from the perspective of international law they live under Israeli occupation. The Arab population has been granted permanent residency status including certain benefits that come with it, including the possibility to apply for citizenship. However, in order to get citizenship numerous requirements are necessary such as proving knowledge of Hebrew as well as swearing allegiance to the Israeli State (Nationality Law 1952). The difficulty thus presents itself by the Arab population considering Israel as the nemesis, the source of the suffering of the Palestinian people. Hence, one of the biggest challenges is the social pressure coming from the Palestinian community. As stated in 1 they allocate ethnically as Palestinians, since they ideologically belong to the state of Palestine. However, Palestinian inhabitants of East

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[13] See attachments: Figure 1, Map of Jerusalem Municipal Boundries from 1948 to 2000

Jerusalem legally count as residents of Israel as their possession of the Blue ID Card proofs. This makes them part of the Israeli labor market and health care system. There are privileges that the Blue ID Card brings along, such as a access to the Israeli Health System, a work permission in Israel as well as having the right to vote in Jerusalem's municipality elections. Nevertheless, a Palestinian with residency in Jerusalem has to endure social pressure from the Palestinian community, daily exposure to racial discrimination by Israeli officials and the fear of easily losing the residency.

Until 1995, the state only revoked licenses for persons who had either moved to another nation or had left Jerusalem for more than seven years without returning to renew their permits. In 1995 however, permanent residency was declared a matter of daily existence by the Ministry of Interior. In order to not lose residency from that time on Palestinians had to provide evidence that their center of life had been Jerusalem for seven years (Alayan 2019, p.17). The High Court of Justice determined "center of life" as a policy in 1988 and made it yet more difficult for Palestinians to keep their residency. During Israel's 50 years of controlling Jerusalem, about 80% of all permanent residencies were revoked after 1995 (Israel High Court of Justice 1988). Altogether, Human rights watch reported 14,595 revocations between 1967 and 2016. The Authorities justified most of them by Palestinians failing to prove "center of life" in Jerusalem (Human Rights Watch 2017).

While for Palestinians in Jerusalem the Blue ID card symbolizes to be occupied by Israelis, possessing one has have become a necessity for them. The Israeli residency entitles them to health insurance and social benefits. However, ever since 1993 when the military was permanently installed around Jerusalem, the residency card provided that Palestinians could live, work and enter Jerusalem freely. In other words, the Blue ID card is the only way for them to overcome Israel's limiting measures on their way of life in Jerusalem.

Current Situation

Comparing it to different systems on an international level it is very rare that a person born in a state is assigned with permanent residency rights instead of citizenship. Despite, Palestinians from East Jerusalem are designated permanent residents with the exception of those who applied for citizenship or had their petitions rejected (Jefferis 2012, p.204; Klein et al. 2012). In comparison to their Jewish counterparts, Palestinian East Jerusalem residents with the Israeli Blue Identity Card have a lower legal and civil standing. Although PEJ receive significant privileges in comparison to West Bank residents, they are still significantly restricted in their

rights compared to Israeli citizens. The fundamental disadvantage of the residential status is that unlike citizenship it is subject to regular verification and is vulnerable to expiration and revocation.

> *"As residence holders, they are condemned to be afraid of losing this already inferior legal condition and render stateless due to the possibility being deprived of this status. When East Jerusalemites' residency is revoked, they are expelled tot the West Bank [...]*(Zaragoza 2020, p.17).*"*

Further, the distinction between temporary and permanent residence is worth noting. While the former is less stable and subject to periodic renewals, holders are still restricted to work or drive, and are not entitled to social security or public health insurance. Contrary, permanent residency is exempt from regular renewals, though remains under constant revision and updating (Zaragoza 2020, p.17).

The struggle over civil status is evident inequity and is a source of tension in Jerusalem. Overall it can be observed that the permanent residency grants the limited right to have rights.

In comparison to Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinians with residential status have the benefit of living and working in Israel. In fact, Palestinians with Israeli residency have the possibility to travel to and from the West Bank. However, West Bank residents without residential status do not receive access to pass the Green Line[14] on the other side. The residency moreover provides them with health insurance and the benefit of Israel's National Insurance Institute (Klein et

al., 2012, p. 41). Although they don't obtain the right to vote in national elections, East Jerusalem Palestinians can participate in the elections of municipal elections and run for city council (Klein et al. 2012, p.7). Nevertheless, it has been recorded that most of Palestinians in East Jerusalem don't claim the right to vote. Possible reasons for that matter will be elaborated in the section *Political participation* in 2.

When considering the Palestinian strategy, leadership urged to boycott any voluntary contact with Jerusalem's municipality. Therefore, Palestinians act reluctant towards Israeli institutions in order to not raise the impression of accepting Israel's claim to the city. After 1967 the strategy to boycott seemed to gain minimal advantages that formed some sort of Arab autonomy.

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[14] The Green Line was the armistice line of the 1948 War between Israel and its Arab neighboring countries and served as the de-facto boarders until the 1967 War. During this time, it separated Jerusalem in Israeli West Jerusalem and Jordanian East Jerusalem

In the 60s and 70s the distinction between East and West Jerusalem was evident, however, by now its situation has changed completely. Instead of an autonomous city center it has developed into a crowded neighborhood with poor infrastructure. *"As currently devised, the boycott is largely an artefact of a bygone era. It is a product of inertia more than of conscious deliberation* (International Crisis Group 2012, p.ii).*"*, the International Crisis Group concluded in 2012. The necessity of the considerable number of Arab Jerusalemites working, studying and socializing on both sides of the Green Line appears essential also to the functionality of the entire city (International Crisis Group 2012, p.ii).

Entitlement to Israeli citizenship

Officially, the Israeli Citizenship Law of 1952 states that Israel entitles people from East Jerusalem to citizenship if they naturalize and meet particular terms and conditions. Moreover, it states that, apart from other requirement, applicants who are not Jewish have to have been in Israel for three out of five years preceding the application with the intent to have settle or have settled in Israel. Additionally, they must have a basic knowledge of Hebrew (Nationality Law 1952, p.5 (a)). Also, the applicants are required to commit to align with the State of Israel (Nationality Law 1952, p.5 (c)). It turns out that most of the East Jerusalemites did never apply for citizenship in Israel.

One of this papers' research question's focus is: what was the intrinsic motivation of the ones who did apply for citizenship and how did they estimate the process?

Danielle C. Jefferis from California Western School of Law believes that the reasons for PEJ not applying are,

> *"largely due to the instability of the region and the indeterminacy of the permanency of the Occupation."*(Jefferis 2012, p.209).

Furthermore, among PEJ, accepting Israeli citizenship is considered to legitimize the perceived unlawful takeover of land and jeopardizing the re-establishment of Palestinians' internationally recognized rights. As a result, most East Jerusalemites have lived as permanent residents for more than five decades, with restricted rights and a weak legal connection to their homeland (Human Rights Watch 2017).

According to the Association for Civil Rights, the number of residents of East Jerusalem applying for citizenship has increased during the last years. For instance, in 2018, about 1,012 people applied, of which only 363 were approved in the same year. In other words, applicants

have to wait very long until the Population and Migration Authority office processes their cases (The Association for Civil Rights in Israel 2019, p.1).

Passing the status to children

Children of Israeli nationals automatically receive citizenship, no matter if they are born in Israel or abroad (Nationality Law 1952, p.4). The Ministry of Interior also states that this does not apply to people with permanent residency. Their children receive their parents' status only under a limited number of circumstances. Persons marrying Israeli citizens can apply for citizenship if they move to Israel, even though they don't meet all of the requirements of naturalization. Simultaneously, when the Nationality Law was amended in 2003 it also included that Palestinians from West Jerusalem married to East Jerusalemites cannot apply for permanent residency in order to live with their partners in Jerusalem (Jefferis, 2012, p. 210,211). Moreover, it states that Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza cannot request to be unified with their families or apply for permanent residency (or naturalization) if their spouses are citizens or have permanent residency. Only for settlers from Israel this provision does not apply. Despite a 2006 judgement by the Israeli High Court ruling that the legislation was unconstitutional and in violation of Israel's Basic Law on Human Dignity and Freedom, the law has been renewed every year since 2003 (Schocken 2008). Israel only withdraws Israeli citizenship received at birth when the individual voluntarily renunciate it and even then, this process has to be approved by the Ministry of Interior. The Law provides that if the individuals received their citizenship due to naturalization, it can then be revoked if the acquisition of it happened within a process of fraud, treason or if the individual lived abroad for more than seven years and is associated with losing an *"effective connection with Israel"* (Nationality Law 1952, pp.10–11).

In comparison to the ways of losing citizenship, the Ministry of Interior concluded a long list of reasons for persons to lose their permanent residency, like accept permanent citizenship to another country such as Jordan (Craig 2014, p.1) or unable to prove 'center of life' in Jerusalem (Jefferis 2012, p.211) . UNHCR reported in 2010 that one of the biggest problems of statelessness in all generations are connected to births not being registered (Lukin 2010). In other words, residents' children are at risk to be stateless from birth on, and their possibilities are significantly limited in order to only have limited possibilities to adjust their status later on.

Family reunification

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes the "right to family life" which refers to families being entitled to maintain family relationships and refers to the right to live with one's family or, if not possible, the right to regular contact. In 2000, Israel decided to adjourn any naturalization processes of couples from Palestine. This led to families being disrupted of more than tens of thousands of Israeli citizens with family in East Jerusalem. The Arab minority in Jerusalem faced most consequences since they were cut off from their families and spouses from their Palestinian community in East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza. (Klein et al. 2012, pp.15–17).

Consequently, citizens as well as persons with permanent residency in Jerusalem had to apply for "family unification" in order to reunite with their spouses from the West Bank or Gaza (Zaragoza 2020, p.19) However, East Jerusalemites were limited to "*to legalize the status of their Palestinian spouses (...) and to live with them and their children in East Jerusalem*"(Klein et al. 2012, p.40). Reports state that the examination of the "family unification" process in general takes numerous years with the result of a temporary permit that provides protection against them being deported, however, without providing civil status, social or economic rights (Zaragoza 2020, p.19).

The education system in Jerusalem

Jerusalem's educational system is considered multi- faceted with little national standardization. The Israeli Ministry of Education has been in charge of the public school system in East Jerusalem since 1967. Some schools in Jerusalem provide the Palestinian curriculum and a graduation with the Tawjihi, schools that rely on the Israeli education ministry's financing frequently teach the Israeli curriculum and graduate with the Bagrut (Ghaith 2018).

The choice between the two is difficult because each offers alternative future options while preventing other opportunities at the same time. East Jerusalemites consider graduating with the Tawjihi a victory of East Jerusalem over Israel. When in 1967 East Jerusalem was occupied and Israel tried to establish their curriculum, they encountered strong resistance through school strikes and had to back down. Palestinians in Jerusalem see the advantage in graduating with the Tawjihi especially in the proximity to the West Bank, that has various college options. However, the Palestinian curriculum has a clear emphasis on the history of the Palestinian perspective and does not include comprehensive education in Hebrew. Moreover,

graduating with the Tawjihi means that students are mostly exempt to enroll in universities in Jerusalem or Israel (Alayan 2019, pp.48–50).

Schools that teach the Israeli curriculum graduate with the so-called Bagrut which is considered an education of high standard. However, it teaches Arabic only as a third language (Amara 2013, p.118). The following section discusses particularly the development of the different education systems and their societal impact to discover that individuals attending one or the other system are generally rejecting the opposed concept.

Israeli and Palestinian Curriculum Palestine established its current curriculum in 2000. It received high international attention, not only because it was during a time when the second Intifada erupted but also due to the fact that it was introduced in areas with schools that were controlled by the Palestinian Authority (PA) (Alayan 2019, p.24). The establishment and application of the education system in East Jerusalem has have become an ongoing trial of strength for the two sides. The PA is considered to be responsible for the development of a curricula for any school that falls under the PA administration. However, the PA is not considered responsible for teaching methods or these schools itself. The Israeli Ministry of Education requires that the municipality of Jerusalem is responsible for the administrative control as well as enrollments, teachers, employment, salaries, and pedagogical supervision in the schools. Moreover it is in control of budgets with regards to new schools, classrooms and professional further education of teachers (Alayan 2019, p.24).

Since PEJs are not considered citizens but "only" residents, the Israeli Ministry of Education as well as the Jerusalem Education Administration (MANHI) manage their education system. Therefore, a wide range of similarities, also culturally and nationally, can be observed between the education system in East Jerusalem as well as the general Palestinian-Israeli education system. Simultaneously though, the settings and budgeting, supervision and employment conditions differ widely (Alayan 2019, p.27).

The majority of students in East Jerusalem aim to graduate with the Palestinian Tawjihi graduation. Students pass it if their grade is higher than 50. In order to enroll into a Palestinian university, they need a grade of at least 65. In recent years Israeli universities once in a while accept students who graduated with a Tawjihi, however, its entrance requirements are even more difficult. For example, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem asks for a grade of 80 in order to accept students to a preparatory program of one year and a grade of 90 to directly accept them (Hasson 2020). The authorities of the disputing parties both consider the takeover of the educational system as essential in their power struggle.

Samira Alayan, lecturer at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, researches among other things education in conflict societies and considers this theoretical division of labor highly problematic:

> *"[…] neither side can assume responsibility for educational deficiencies and can not implement an educational policy to remedy the failings of the education system"* (Alayan 2019, p.30).

She explains that the authorities in charge of the education system in East Jerusalem are in a constant power struggle, comparable to the political disagreements regarding jurisdiction and control over Jerusalem. Various Newspapers repeatedly addressed the shortcomings in Palestinian schools in Jerusalem over the last years (Hasson 2020; MEMO 2016; Kestler-D'Amours 2012; Sherwood 2010). They report that most Palestinian schools in Jerusalem suffer financially induced challenges. Additionally a serious deficiency of classrooms is one of the long-time challenges (MEMO 2016). Furthermore, Open Democracy concludes that as a result of low school salaries compared to rates paid by Israeli municipal schools, they face a severe shortage of professional and specialized teachers (Ghaith 2018).

Universities

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem was the first university in Israel to directly accept students who graduated with the Tawjihi. Before that, students from the parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory had to undergo the beforementioned preparatory program of one year before being admitted. On the contrary, students who graduated with the Bagrut were allowed to bypass the preparatory program. The 2017 adopted university's policy states that a limited number of students who graduated their Tawjihi with outstanding grades could also bypass the preparatory program for certain departments. Additionally, top-rated Palestinian students could enroll into a university without taking the Psychometric Entrance Test, a standardized test that serves as an entrance exam (Lieber and Staff 2017). Researchers consider this policy an important however small step towards a more inclusive and equal education system, and criticize that it provides possibilities for top students only.

Separation barrier

Within the five decades since 1967, Israel managed to solidify its rule in eastern Jerusalem. In 2002, during the second Intifada, Israel introduced a concrete wall as a barrier in order to

separate the West Bank from Israel and, for many, it now symbolizes the limitations of Palestinian sovereignty and the preservation of Occupation. Israel argued its construction as the need of protection against Palestinian gunmen and suicide bombers. Palestinians on the other side denounced it with the argument of "land grab," stating that Israel did not have the right to build it on their land. While Israel officials call the wall a "Security Fence" with reference to a threat on the other side, Palestinians officials name it "Apartheid Wall" referring to Israel's action without negotiation. The term "Separation Wall" was introduced as a more neutral name and should reflect the reality of day-to-day living on either side of it. In other words, the different names themselves and their usages bear political significance (Alayan 2019, p.23).

In 2000 the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations were held in Washington and Ehud Barak, Prime Minister at that time, authorized the construction of a 74 km wall from Wadi Ara region to Latrun (Lein, 2003, pp. 5–8). The "Separation Wall" itself has its beginnings in 2002, when the Ministerial Committee for Security Measures of Israel approved it in order to

"improve and reinforce the readiness and operational capability in coping with terrorism" (Government Decision 64/B, 14.04.2002, cited in Chiodelli 2017). The entire construction of the wall took from June 2002 until October 2003. Ariel Sharon, Primer Minister at that time, is therefore considered the founding father (Chiodelli 2017, p.92). Altogether, the wall should extend over 710 km in length of which 62 percent have already been completed and 10 percent are currently under construction. (OCHA oPt, 2014, p.3). In comparison, the Green Line takes only up to 320 km and conforms with the wall for a mere 15 per cent. It should be added that the wall significantly advances into the West Bank (B'tselem 2017).

The Barrier comprises mostly of electronic fences, barbed-wired fences, or ditches on either side. Its width is mostly 60 meters, however, in the urban areas of cities such as Jerusalem, Qalquiliyah, Tulkarm or Bethlehem the wall consists of eight to nine-meter concrete. As a total the concrete part of the wall takes up about 70 km (B'tselem 2017). In order to have access to as much land as possible while excluding as many Palestinians as possible the path of the wall spreads from Jerusalem's municipality into five areas. About 140,000 Palestinians currently live in the two cut-off areas of Shu'fat Refugee Camp and the area of Kafr 'Aqab (B'tselem 2017). The other three areas extend beyond the municipality and attach additional, undeveloped land to Jerusalem and include further Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Therefore, the wall not only separates East Jerusalem from surrounding Palestinian areas in the West Bank but also attaches new Jewish areas to West Jerusalem as for example three

major Jewish settlements outside of the administrative border: Giv'at Ze'ev, Ma'ale Adummim and Gush Etzion. Overall, this area extends over a 10-15 km radius (Chiodelli 2017 pp.91,92).

Apart from the geographical aspect, the wall separates many Palestinians in East Jerusalem from their social, cultural, and economic backcountry. Especially around Jerusalem there are enclaves, that due to the wall can no longer be supplied (B'tselem 2016). Parts of A-Ram which is under the sovereignty of the city of Jerusalem, have not received any state services like repairs, garbage collection or postal service since the construction. The police of the Palestinian Authority are also not allowed to operate there. According to observer NGOs, this has led to disorder and instability (B'tselem 2016). The case of Beit Hanina is particularly difficult: The separation barrier divides the village into Al-Jadida, the new village, which is located within the Israeli Jerusalem municipality and Al-Balad, the old village which lies outside of the municipality (B'tselem 2006).

Further the separation barrier arguably serves to control changing demographics in Israel. Except for East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, no additional territories of what is considered the 'Homeland of the Jews' were formally annexed. Kimmerling argues that this measure was taken to counteract the fast- growing Palestinian population in the occupied territories. Even if the annexed population was not granted rights of full citizenship, suffrage, and access to social welfare programs, together with the Arab citizens of Israel they could become a threat to the idea of a Jewish state and rather push for a binational one.

> *"One concerns the physical annihilation of the state, an issue that many Israeli politicians and intellectuals frequently use, abuse, and emotionally manipulate. The other concerns the loss of the fragile Jewish demographic majority on which the supremacy and identity of the state rest." (Kimmerling 2008, p. 260–261).*

The loss of that demographic dominance is considered the first step to ultimately erase the Jewish state. Furthermore, Kimmerling states, Jerusalem's political position was lowered as a result of its isolation from the West Bank. Due to the fact that many citizens of the West Bank are barred from visiting Jerusalem, it has become a peripheral city in the Palestinian economy. Residents of East Jerusalem feel walled off from the rest of Palestinian society, which might have lasting impacts on their identity.

Political Participation

Political participation in East Jerusalem has been pushed back in the past years. While the PA is not allowed to operate in East Jerusalem, the Orient House worked as a political seat for Palestinians 1). It was shut down by Israeli officials in 2001 and hasn't been reopened ever since. As legal residents PEJs do not have the right to vote in Israel's parliamentary elections (Knesset), but are permitted to vote in municipal council elections in Jerusalem. However, it is said that these are traditionally boycotted (Freedom House 2021). The voter turnout during the first round of Jerusalem's 2018 municipal elections in Palestinian neighborhoods was only 2 percent. The Palestinian neighborhoods that recorded the highest voter turnout were Sur Baher, the area where the head of the party Yerushalayim Iri resides (9 percent), Umm Tuba (3 percent) and Beit Safafa (3 percent). The neighborhoods that recorded the lowest voter turnout were Kafr 'Aqab (0.2 percent), Wadi Joz and Sheikh Jarrah (0.5 percent), and Isawiyya (0.5 percent) (Korach and Choshen 2019, p.118). Moreover, Freedom House reported that a prominent Palestinian candidate dropped out due to having been exposed to firm pressure from both Israeli authorities as well as fellow Palestinians (Freedom House 2021).

One of his paper's research focuses lies on political participation and the question why PEJ don't participate in elections and simultaneously what does motivate them if they do. This aspect will be further elaborated in 6.

Standard of Living

The Association for Civil Rights reports the Jerusalem as the area with most poverty in Israel. While 72 percent of Palestinian families live below the poverty line, only 26 percent of the Jewish families do. Simultaneously, child poverty in East Jerusalem (81 percent) is more than double the number of child poverty among Jewish children (38 percent). Altogether, it is considered that there are about 8,500 children "at risk" in East Jerusalem (The Association for Civil Rights in Israel 2019, p.2).

Although in 2013 the poverty threshold was measured at 75,4 percent in East Jerusalem in, they were assigned only 22 percent of social services personnel. (Association for Civil Rights in Israel 2015). In 2014, the poverty threshold is already considered 79,5 percent meaning that it increased considerably (Tatarsky and Maimon 2017). In comparison, Jewish persons in Jerusalem experience a rather a slow increase when looking at numbers of 2013 with 27,1 percent and 2014 with 28,5 percent (Israel Social Insurance Authority, Annual Report 2014).

Jerusalem Masterplans

The inequality within the context of armed conflict, the many cultural differences and values and identities lead to asses Israel's measures and attempts on how to find adequate solutions.

As an example, in 2017, the Israel Cabinet came up with a five-year approved implementation plan to target schools in East Jerusalem. The goal was to offer financial help in order to change the Palestinian curriculum to an Israeli one (National Education Cluster 2020, p.10).

For many years various master plans where published, some were discarded before their initiation phase, and some were partially implemented. However, none has established itself in a way to be called a success for both sides. Due to the considerable quantity of different strategic plans and the limitations of this thesis, this paper will only focus on the latest version of the so-called Plan 3790.

Plan 3790

Plan 3790 is the most current published plan and is considered the most relevant for this paper. Plan 3790 is the outcome of succeeding governmental decisions in 2014. The Government Decision No. 1775 promised to allot 200 million NIS to socioeconomic development while additional 90 million NIS were allocated to enhance policing and law enforcement (State of Israel Ministry of Justice 2014). It supplements the former decision in the government adopted Decision Number 2684 in May 2017, to carry out inter-ministerial staff work and to draft a five-year plan to reduce gaps and strengthen East Jerusalem socio-economically (Government Decision No. 2684, 2017). It further states that actions should be implemented between 2018 and 2023. When in 2018 the state comptroller investigated the implementation, it was uncovered that the plan lacked details on how to execute it. As a result, Israel's Finance Ministry budget director and director general, as well as the director general of the Jerusalem Affairs Ministry were requested to provide a more thorough multi-year plan. The new plan should entail details on how to develop and enhance public transport, employment centers, education as well as details on how to increase employment and an execution strategy (Lavie et al. 2018 p.10).

The updated Plan which included land registration and zoning was approved by the Government with Decision No 3790 in May 2018 (Netanyahu 2018b). While some consider the arrangements another plan of Israel to further increase its sovereignty and Israelization, the authorities emphasized that the only goal of this plan was to enhance quality of life of

Palestinians in East Jerusalem. However, the plan also includes a long-term focus on integrating East Jerusalemites into the regulated (Israeli) workforce by encouraging higher education in fields that promise to boost economic growth.

The Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv published a strategical assessment paper about the governmental attempts to reduce the socioeconomic gaps in East Jerusalem (Lavie et al. 2018 p.16). The authors repeatedly highlighted that the political actor's primer inducement came from wanting to increase personal safety and boost socioeconomic development in that area.

While peace treaties and deals are negotiated on a macro- level, daily life is managed on a micro-level (individual) and shaped by the meso- level (municipal politics). Closing the gap between east and west has been a repeated announcement of various political actors in the municipality (Chiodelli 2017, p.7). While it can be considered that Israel has a clear vision on Jerusalem, the Palestinians pursue another on their own. In order to fusion these two sides it not only requires knowledge and awareness of what each party looks out for but also diplomatic talent and a lot of sensitivity to the issue. While it is not clear if any of the political players might come equipped with these attributes, this paper focuses on how the next generation of PEJ encounters this situation. Hence, it aims to provide insight in order to estimate possible political initiatives and provide an idea of how the gap between East and West could be closed in the future.

3. Theoretical Background

In order to facilitate an approximate idea of the complexity of the political phenomena associated with this thesis' topic, it is essential to provide insight into the basic theories of social relations that impacted it and developed separately from the political discussion. The social identity theory (SIT) by Tajfel and Turner will provide an understanding of social psychology that will help to understand why the pertinent focus groups unfolded the way they have.

Social Identity Theory by Tajfel and Turner

The Social Identity Theory of intergroup relations by Tajfel and Turner (1986) was a milestone in social psychological identity research. The theory intended to complement explanatory approaches of phenomena that were observed in the interaction of two groups that e.g., are against each other. The theory suggests that the individuals' sense of social identity is based on their group memberships.

> „[…] that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Turner and Tajfel 1986, p.255).

Hence, central aspects of a social identity are the knowledge of one's own group membership and the value and emotional significance of this membership and the emotional meaning resulting from this membership. Further, group membership helps individuals to define who they belong with; hence, determines how they relate to. In other words, people identify themselves with certain groups that differentiates them through social class, gender, ethnicity, family to sports and political standing. The belonging to one or multiple groups is an essential source for pride and self-esteem and therefore serves the desire to create a positive social identity to belong to In- Groups and Out- Groups. As individuals prefer to maintain a positive image of their group the result of social identity processes is that individuals tend to concentrate on characteristics of their In- Group like positive distinctiveness, attitudes, and habits. In return this may lead to focus on negative attributes of Out- Groups. The need to favor one's In- Groups can affect for example distribution of resources or evaluation of performance and behavior. The motivation to establish a positive social identity and boost one's self esteem derives from intergroup conflict. Members of disadvantaged groups seek for enhancement of their group's position and social rank while members of advantaged groups aim to protect and

keep their favored position (Suleiman 2002, p.34). Tajfel and Turner summarize their theory through three basic assumptions:

First, the individual strategy is used to pursue one's position improvement notwithstanding their group. Second, a positive social identity is largely based on favorable comparisons that can be drawn between the In- Group and a relevant Out- Group. Social competition is a group-level strategy in which the members of one group stick together and combine forces to jointly improve their self-esteem. Finally, social creativity implies that individuals redefine characteristics of comparison to seek positive distinctiveness for their In- Group . Which strategy one chooses depends on the perception on the degree of permeability of the group boundaries and on stability and legitimacy of the status-quo (Ellemers et al. 1993, p.767). According to Andreas Zick, professor of Socialization and Conflict Research at Bielefeld University, Tajfel and Turners conclusions are key for the analysis of social conflicts. Out of the pressure to judge one's own social group positively, people always compare In- Groups with Out-Groups, and this leads to the fact that social groups increasingly separate themselves from each other (Zick 2005)**.** The theory of social identity is typically applied in the social psychological analysis of status-weak minorities or otherwise disadvantaged groups. According to Social Identity Theory an unsatisfactory situation arises for group members from the under-privileged group which motivates group members to develop problem-solving strategies to achieve a more satisfying social identity.

When taking the situation of the PEJ into consideration, the matter results to be quite complex. Considering the beforementioned discussions on PEJ, they belong to multiple categories at the same time: ethnically they are Palestinian, religiously speaking they are Sunnis ideologically they belong to the state of Palestine but are legally residents of Jerusalem due to their possession of the Blue ID Card which in return makes them part of the Israeli labor market and health system. This mix of belonging to diverse groups leaves them in-between hostile identities. Adding to that is the complicated matter of the role of the Israeli state, which has a clear interest in influencing the prioritization of In- and Out- Groups of the PEJ due to their possible citizenship. As elaborated in 4, Israelization describes processes and measures initiated by the state of Israel to tie the PEJ closer to them. Not only in societally and economically matters but also to get them further away from the Palestinian nationalist ideology. Various studies concluded that Palestinians feel a powerful sense of responsibility towards their peers (Rouhana 1997; Khalidi 2010; Rosmer 2012). The collective struggle is considered to have highest priority which leads to protests, social judgment, and moral condemnation. In

times of the 1967 War and the two Intifadas, the Palestinians pursued a collective social competition to enhance their self-esteem jointly. However, the numerous lost battles and past years of almost nonarmed conflict in East Jerusalem raises the question if some PEJ have started to favor a strategy change from a collective strategy towards an individual strategy or social creativity. As opinion polls show, most Palestinians feel connected to the bigger group of Palestinians. Nevertheless, 75% of PEJ acknowledge that most Israeli settlers will most likely stay in the West Bank or East Jerusalem while most Palestinian refugees will never be able to return to their homes before the 1948 War[15] (Pollock 2020).

In order to better recognize the strategy, change in some PEJ, the following chapter will describe the SIT from the perspective of the Self Categorization Hypothesis which was developed building on SIT.

Self- Categorization Hypothesis

The Self-Categorization Hypothesis which was proposed by Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell in 1987 adds several relevant concepts to the Social Identity Theory of intergroup relations (Turner et al. 1987). It explains how categorization processes affect perceptions of oneself and how this can lead to different forms of intra- and intergroup behavior, such as intergroup discrimination. Turner et al. aim to explain processes of differentiation between groups, characterized primarily by intergroup conflict. The textbook *Social Psychology for Bachelor* explains that,

> *"the basic assumption of Tajfel and Turner (1979) is that a person's identity moves along a continuum that ranges from one extreme of a purely personal identity to another extreme of a purely social identity*[16] (Fischer et al. 2018, p.144)."

According to Tajfel and Turner on one side of the continuum is personal identity. The other side of the continuum concerns social identity. Social identity is about one's personal perception of being part of a group, while the characteristics of one's own group are compared to those of other groups, such as level of status. Therefore, the goal is to enhance one's own In-Group compared to an Out- Group - which in turn increases one's own self-worth (Fischer et al. 2018, p.144). When people perceive themselves and others as 'We- Them,' which shows a

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[15] This survey will be analyzed in more detailed in Chapter 5.

[16] Translated from German: „Tajfel und Turners (1979) Grundannahme ist, dass sich die Identität eines Menschen auf einem Kontinuum bewegt, das von dem einen Extrem einer rein persönlichen Identität bis zu einem anderen Extrem einer rein sozialen Identität reicht" (Fischer et al. 2018, p.144).

high social identity, they see both the self- group and the other- group as relatively homogeneous. In relation to the self- group this means a certain depersonalization. The individuals see themselves primarily as a quasi- interchangeable copy of the group. In this sense, social identity excludes personal identity. In relation to the foreign group, the impression of homogeneity is a building block of stereotyping and discrimination.

Taking the struggle of Jerusalem against Israeli rule an example, the PEJ categorize themselves as a collective group that fights against daily discrimination0, foreign-rule, social inequality, and preservation of their holy sites. At least ever since the Six- Day War the social identity as PEJ had become a central part of their individual identities – seeing themselves as living under foreign rule and being discriminated against they perceive activities of resistance as legitimate. Consequently, they also separate themselves from Jerusalemites who are not experiencing this kind of victimization such as Israeli- or Jewish- Jerusalemites (Eretz 2018).

Turner et al (1987) name this strong group coherence as perceived similarity of attitudes and values, proximity or social contact with other group members and a common fate or threat (Turner et al. 1987). The Palestinians as a minority in Jerusalem are undoubtedly struggling with the oppression and decreasing international attention as well as missing empathy. As mentioned before, the majority of PEJ chooses the collective struggle in order to fight their oppressor, the source for their challenges in life. In times of the 1967 War and the Intifadas, the Palestinians pursued a collective movement strategy to achieve their goals and enhance their self- esteem jointly. For the achievement of common group goals, PEJ even accept negative consequences for themselves (e.g., arrests, ID revocations). Tajfel cited Hans Toch, an Austrian social psychologist and criminologist, as following:

> *"A social movement represents an effort by a large number of people to collectively solve a problem they feel they have in common* (Tajfel 1981, p.244)*."*

Apparently, the salient social identity surpasses personal identity in a collective movement. Nevertheless, from today's perspective, one can argue that the last uprising is years in the past and has not brought relevant policy changes. This leads to the question whether it still has remained the strategy providing most advantages. The answers about their intentions and reasons why to remain collectively strongly against an Israeli rule is commonly known and roughly summarized under collective trauma and longing for justice.

This paper's goal is to identify and rate policy measures that function as incentives for Generation Z PEJ for them to consider accepting Israeli rule over Jerusalem. Moreover, it also pursues to identify whether a strategy change has been taking place within the individuals that motivates them to leave the collective strategy behind and focus on the individual advantages instead – moving step by step towards an accepted coexistence.

4.   State of scientific knowledge

The theory part of this thesis analyzes the Palestinian identity emergence and how political events pushed the process. Moreover, it describes how it had become inseparable from the thrive towards an own nation state, to then explore Israeli policies concerning the integration of PEJ. This matter provided the basis for the following empirical part of this thesis that lies on the question whether Generation Z PEJ are willing to accept Israelization measures in the future while maintaining their political identity.

The current state of knowledge on Israelization of Israeli Arabs and its effects on their identity will be the focal point of the upcoming chapters. Furthermore, this paper will look into the recently published quantitative survey from the Washington institute about the Bellwether Citizenship Question (Pollock 2020) in order to better classify the conducted qualitative data. The mentioned survey has been authored by David Pollock who specializes on the political dynamics of Middle East countries and will be introduced in this chapter.

Israelization

Israel has a strong interest in solidifying its rule over Jerusalem and connect west and east of the city closer together to ensure that a Palestinian ruled or even divided city is never the better option in peace negotiations (B'tselem 1997, p.9). As history has shown local uprisings have been Israel's greatest struggle solidifying its rule over Jerusalem. The term Israelization describes processes and measures initiated by the state of Israel to tie the East Jerusalemites closer to them. Not only in societally and economically matters but also to get them further away from their peers and Palestinian nationalist ideology. In various scientific researches regarding identity development of Arabs in Israel the term is used to describe the process to weaken the Palestinian national identity and strengthen the identity as Arabs in Israel or Israeli Arabs17 (B'tselem 1997; Rouhana 1997; Smooha 1999). Although only little scientific interest has been brought up about Israelization in East Jerusalem it is a clear Israeli strategy. In the case of East Jerusalem these measures involve influencing the educational curriculum and economic and political opportunities. Moreover, Israelization affects the Palestinian residents' culture and lifestyle emanating from living and working in Israel and to a degree

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[17] The simplifying term Israeli- Arab is used to address the diverse Arab minorities in Israel. These are Palestinians, Druze, Bedouin, Muslim- Arabs, Christian-Arabs and the Circassians (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs [no date]).

participation in Hebrew and Israeli media and mainstream culture. In the previously mentioned scientific research about the Arab Israeli's identity development the opinions differ about how far the process of Israelization has progressed. Sammy Smooha, Professor of Sociology at the University of Haifa argues that Israelization among Arabs in Israel is inevitable and obvious.

> *"The Arabs cannot live in Israel permanently without adapting to Israeli life and without forming a new identity that combines their Israeli citizenship with their Palestinian national sentiment."* (Smooha 1999, p.13)

He further elaborates, that successful Israelization means that minority groups are increasingly absorbed by Israeli mainstream. This can be observed (among other factors) by the acceptance of Israel to exist, the appreciation of their Israeli citizenship, the use of Hebrew along with Arabic and by seeing their fate and future to be tied to Israel. Smooha sees numerous advances in Israelization like transformation of the Arab Israeli's social life, language and culture, politics, attitudes toward Zionism, identity and Palestinian orientation (Smooha 1999, pp.14–21). He highlights those transformations evoked by Israelization can intensify over time. Concluding, he explains that Israelization is a comprehensive and multidimensional concept and that it

> *"[…] is an ongoing process, an historical trend, not an accomplished fact. It is especially remarkable because it is taking place without Arab assimilation"* (Smooha 1999, p.13)

Nadim Rouhana, founder and General Director of Mada al-Carmel, the Arab Center for Applied Social Research in Haifa, teaches at Tufts University, Massachusetts. He states that Israelization has taken place on a far more limited scale and concludes that Palestinian citizens of Israel have experienced only a partial Israelization. The effects can be narrowed down to abiding to Israeli laws and the daily interactions with the system that makes them Israeli (Rouhana, 1997, p. 126). He draws this conclusion from his findings in the 1990s that showed four indicating results. First, only few Palestinians would describe themselves as solely Israelis and second, the tendency to describe the collective identity of the Arab population as Palestinians increased. Third, he observed that the national identity remained consistently central and fourth, there was a negative correlation between the appropriateness of the terms Palestinian and Israeli (Rouhana 1997, p.13). Unlike Smooha, Rouhana does not rate Israelization as an ongoing process leading to dual identification but rather that it is reduced to a formal legal status. He explains that

> *"[…] the axes of sentimental attachment, pride, patriotism, sharing of national aspirations, hopes and pains, and respect and admiration of the national symbols"* (Rouhana 1997, p.128),

that Palestinians share are the most pervasive elements of their identity. Tilde Rosmer, Professor at the University of Oslo, describes two perspectives from which Israelization can be viewed:

> "*Measures taken by the state towards its Palestinian citizens intended to weaken their Palestinian identity and strengthen their identity as acquiescent […]"*(Rosmer 2012, p.328).

She names measures that are controlling the Palestinian education, economic and political opportunities. As a result, Rosmer states, Israelization has also an effect on identity, culture and lifestyle consequential from being exposed to and to a degree participate in Hebrew and Israeli media and mainstream culture through living and working in Israel (Rosmer 2012, p.329).

Although the three scholars disagree on the level of intensity of Israelization, Rouhana, Smooha and Rosmer describe in their studies the paradox dilemma of identity formation of Palestinian citizens in Israel, which results in them being torn between two hostile fronts. This dilemma is reminiscent of the PEJ, with the difference that they are only residents. They might not have access to the full package of privileges that come with an Israeli citizenship but certainly benefit from their Blue ID Card and are in constant contact with Israel's society. Additionally, bearing in mind Israel's intention to undermine Palestinian demands for a capital in East Jerusalem and solidifying Israeli rule further the Israelization process in Jerusalem is undoubtable.

The Bellwether Citizenship Question

The data of the Bellwether Citizenship Question survey was collected through a face-to-face survey among a representative sample of 650 legal Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem. It was carried out from end of January until mid-February 2020 by the Palestine Center for Public Opinion based in Beit Sahour in the West. Interviewees were chosen through standard geographical probability methods. The survey shows that a small but rising number of PEJ come to choose an Israeli citizenship over a Palestinian one if confronted with that intense choice (Pollock 2020).

From 2010 to 2015, in comparably calm political years the number of PEJ who preferred an Israeli over a Palestinian citizenship rose vastly form 35% to outstanding 52% but dropped to 10-20% almost instantly when the so-called Jerusalem intifada broke. The recent survey shows that the numbers have stabilized at around 17% compared to 63% who rather choose a Palestinian citizenship.

Nevertheless, there seems to be no trust in the Israeli state and its institutions. The survey shows that around 25% of the city's Palestinians think that an Israeli authority would be better than a Palestinian or Hamas rule.

Simultaneously, however, three-fourths of the interviewees tend to believe that

> *"Israel will never accept a one-state solution that gives the Palestinians equal rights, even if they become a clear majority* (Pollock 2020).*"*

The fight over this matter is a reality and Palestinians hold on to the ideal of regaining Palestine. About 57% of PEJ now prefer a five-year goal of "*regaining all of historical Palestine for the Palestinians, from the river to the sea,*" rather than just *"ending the occupation to achieve a two-state solution"* (Pollock 2020).

Crucial to see in this data is that there is a severe difference between ideology and reality which PEJ are aware about. Around 75% say "any compromise with Israel *should only be temporary*." Almost as many think that "*eventually, the Palestinians will control almost all of Palestine*" and reason this either with *"God is on their side"* or with *"they will outnumber the Jews someday"*(Pollock 2020)*.* About Jerusalem itself approximately two-thirds agree on the following position:

> "*We should demand Palestinian rule over all of Jerusalem, east and west, rather than agree to share or divide any part of it with Israel* (Pollock 2020)*."*

It should be noted that the exceptions can be found in the mixed Arab-Jewish neighborhood of Abu Tur, where just 42% endorse this hardline opinion. Opposing to these views are the answers to questions that were not phrased in terms of rights but realistic expectations. 75% acknowledge that most Israeli settlers will most likely stay, and most Palestinian refugees will never be able to return to the lands of 1948. The alternative usage of terminology reveals a much more ambivalent attitude towards Israel's permanence. The feeling of alienation that prevails among PEJ towards Israel is largely personal and political. Interviewees were questioned regarding their own personal interactions with Israelis, such as at work, school, shopping, or on public transport. In most of the Palestinian neighborhoods, 55% rated those

contacts as *"very bad,"* while 24% answered, *"fairly bad."* Even in mixed Abu Tur the numbers are not better with 50% *"very bad"* and 37% *"fairly bad"* (Pollock 2020).

Given the widespread Palestinian rejection of Israeli rule and the lack of any genuine peace process, the question arises why no uprising emerges in East Jerusalem.

Further, the survey reveals that most East Jerusalem residents identify two main explanations behind the absence of another intifada:

> *"many people are more preoccupied with their personal lives than with politics";* and *"many people are concerned about tough Israeli reactions to any disturbances* (Pollock 2020)*."*

5.   Empiricism

The following chapters deal with the empirical study of this thesis conducted on the basis of qualitative expert interviews. It is necessary to emphasize at this point that the results of the study are not focusing on the calculable effectiveness of Israel's politics concerning GenZ PEJ, but about subjective attitudes towards what is called Israelization. As beforementioned, these attitudes towards the Israeli rule in Jerusalem cannot be considered parallel with the political standing in the conflict. On the basis of the present study, it is therefore not possible – and not intended - to draw representative conclusions about all GenZ Palestinians in Jerusalem or elsewhere. The results of this study do not claim to be statistically representative but represent the results of individual case studies. As qualitative studies are seen as a systematic and reflective process of formation of knowledge the open qualitative methods offer the advantage to proceed in a less rigid framework than with quantitative methods (Kalitzkus 2005, p.244). Therefore, it is particularly suitable for researching opinions for scientific purposes with the aim to contribute to a more detailed scientific understanding of the Palestinians in East Jerusalem.

The following chapters will conclude in answering the research question of this thesis. In order to do so this chapter provides insight into the detailed methodological approach of the interview analysis as well as the analysis of supporting secondary literature.

Empirical Science

> *"Empirical science is not meant to impart certainty of belief, but to describe and explain the world-as-it-is, to open one's eyes to a critical view of reality* (Kromrey et al. 2000, p.15)*"* [18]

The term empiricism, derived from the Greek word 'empeiria*'* which translates to experience and denotes both a philosophical movement (empiricism) and a certain understanding of everyday life and science (Dudenredaktion [no date]). By this means, observation and self-made experiences play crucial roles. Hence, there is no precise difference between every day and scientific experience, however, what is relevant is the critical questioning of what has been experienced.

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[18] Translated from German: „Empirische Wissenschaft soll nicht Glaubenssicherheit vermitteln, sondern die Welt, - so wie sie ist - beschreiben und erklären, soll die Augen für den kritischen Blick auf die Realität öffnen (Kromrey et al. 2000, p.15)."

Numerous research tools have been taken into consideration for analyzing the research question of this thesis. Primarily, various German speaking sociologists' research supported this study. Specifically, Siegfried Lamnek and his book *Qualitative Social Research* (Lamnek 1995) and Uwe Flick's *An Introduction to Qualitative Research* (Flick 2002) provide excellent overviews and guidelines for qualitative research in social science. Lamnek is a German sociologist and has strongly influenced social sciences especially in German-speaking countries through his textbooks on qualitative social research which have been published several times. Furthermore, he is one of the most cited empirical social researchers. Further, Uwe Flick has not only published numerous works on the methodology of empirical research both nationally and internationally but is also very active in practice. For instance, he was chairman of the Qualitative Social Research Working Group and continuously implemented a number of substantive projects (Berliner Methodentreffen Qualitative Forschung. [no date]).

Choice of Methods

As social scientist Jean Schensul points out, a researcher should form one's opinion in the collection of data.

> "*The term methods refers to the ways in which qualitative researchers collect data to build their argument. All forms of qualitative research including ethnography are most noted for their commitment to learning about and understanding the perspectives of others rather than imposing the researcher's own views, biases, and theories in explaining differences across populations or communities in beliefs and behaviors* (Schensul 2008, pp.521, 522).*"

 In this collection of data however it should not serve to convince the research subject but rather to learn from them. Especially when it comes to a sensitive topic such as the Israel- Palestine conflict the risk of being confronted with debates on principles is high. As a researcher it is therefore essential to have good knowledge of the topic but also to understand the position the interviewees come from. When choosing the methods, it is crucial to recall where the research interest lies, and which tools are best to support it. The goal is to leave personal preferences and beliefs aside to present the most neutral stance possible and to maintain it throughout the research. The premise is not to be carried away by provocativeness, but also to not let empathy or compassion get the upper hand while not neglecting to build a positive relationship. The interviewees should feel comfortable and safe to express their opinion, experience,

and impressions freely and should neither be overly encouraged nor encounter counter-attitudes.

From this perspective, this research is based on written sources from various NGOs, opinion polls, figures, and newspaper articles; supported by ethnographic material collected in Jerusalem in Spring 2020. In detail this means, data has been collected through interviews with GenZ PEJ and experts regarding Jerusalem and Palestinian related topics, fieldwork observations in various neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, as well as by studying a recently published survey by the Washington Institute. Studies and reports published by NGOs who selected Jerusalem and Palestinian related topics (e.g., B'Tselem, Ir Amin, OCHA OPT) supported this study as background research. By utilizing primary material from interviews and observations in combination with written sources, this analysis relies on the triangular methodological approach. In qualitative research, triangulation refers to the use of various methodologies or data sources to build a thorough knowledge of phenomena (Steinke 2000, p.321). Triangulation has also been seen as a qualitative research approach for determining validity by combining data from several sources (Carter et al. 2014). The three components that make up the triangular approach are observation, interaction (interviews) and secondary analysis of a quantitative survey. This approach is particularly appropriate for this study since the PEJ as a group are an under-studied topic and not much academic attention has been brought towards their identity formation and potential causes. The collected qualitative data (interviews and observations) enable to directly focus on the research interest and fill gaps in existing literature.

The main goal of qualitative interviews is to ask for interpretations of situations, motives for action, everyday theories, or self-interpretations in an open form to explore them. The open dialogue on this very sensitive matter leads to a natural structure guided by the interviewees. Secondary literature analysis provides the opportunity to complement the data by supporting it with studies and secondary analysis with larger data sets that give insight into the larger picture. Publications concerning the special case of PEJ and Israeli Politics concerning Jerusalem are predominantly from NGOs which offer valuable insights into PEJs day to day life while highlighting discontinuity between policy and practice, demonstrate unbalanced reporting, and show changes over time. While it demonstrates a high value of provided data, it is often a thin line between academia and the interest of rising awareness through a moral lens. Thus, the approach used in this research includes to interpret what NGOs and activists state within the context of the interest of their work and activism practice. Regarding the conducted interviews, the interviews were recorded if the interviewees agreed to it. The following chapter

provides insight into the choice of methods, discusses relevant literature as well as introduces the field and framework conditions of this research.

Participant Observation

> *"[...] because fieldwork is what brings us into deep contact with people, with their daily miseries and joys, their fears, and their hopes. And it is during fieldwork that we anthropologists open ourselves up to others* (Gay y Belasco and De La Cruz Hernández 2012, p.14)

Belasco and Hernandez express the deep relationship between informant and researcher. During the field work for this study this particularly came into effect. Particularly, informal conversations provided a bond towards the individual interview partners. Moreover, the interviewer happened to have good knowledge of the Arab and Islamic culture as well as the Arabic language which provided the possibility to get into contact with the informants quicker, break the ice faster and gain trust and respect. The method of participant observation has been an essential tool for this works analysis.

> *"Despite growing criticism, participant observation is still considered a central method in anthropology"* [19] (Spittler 2001, p.1).

German ethnologist Gerd Spittler understands Malinowski's approach on participant observation as following:

> *"[...] the research procedure common in ethnology in which the researcher lives for an extended period of time in the group he is studying, speaks its language, and participates more or less intensively in its activities*[20] (Spittler 2001, p.2)."

While not speaking Arabic fluently, the interviewer though lived in Jerusalem for several months, studies at the HUJI, an internationally prestigious University, located in the East of the City and volunteered and cooperated with an East Jerusalem based Think Tank PASSIA. When determining the research question of this paper, particularly young adult Palestinians from the Old City were reached out to. While it started with primary interactions and

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[19] Translated from German: *„Trotz wachsender Kritik gilt die teilnehmende Beobachtung immer noch als zentrale Methode der Ethnologie (Spittler 2001:1)."*

[20] Translated from German: *„[...] das in der Ethnologie übliche Forschungsverfahren, bei dem der Forscher für eine längere Zeit in der Gruppe, die er untersucht, lebt, ihre Sprache spricht und an ihren Aktivitäten mehr oder weniger intensiv teilnimmt (Spittler 2001:2)."*

observations rather than looking for interviewees, it provided a first impression on what it meant to be a young adult Palestinian in the city. The goal was to receive a deeper understanding of the different religions and cultures mixed in the city as well as reflections on political behavior. This last aspect of reflection and neutrality can be considered particularly important in order to provide a scientific paper not based on biased arguments.

The Interview

The interviews were conducted based on an interview guideline with open question order. This created the advantage of being able to respond adequately to the course of the conversation and opened the possibility of asking questions in the event of ambiguities or topics addressed for the first time. The possibility of asking questions is considered an advantage in this context compared to quantitative methods and a necessity in the selection of research methods. Furthermore, the qualitative research method is a common tool dealing with topics such as identity formation, transformation of Palestinians in East Jerusalem and its societal significance. The combination of narrative interview and the semi-structural interview was chosen for this thesis. The reason for it being that the narrative interview suits best to find out more about the background story of the respective interview partners and thus, provided the possibility to classify and analyze the data more thoroughly. In general, this method includes typologies of biographical trajectories. Nevertheless, it is associated with long transcripts that lead to evaluation difficulties when compared to other interviews. This led to the inclusion of a thematically controlled guideline in order to learn about detailed information from all interview partners that could directly be compared.

The interview guideline was tested in a pretest interview for its accuracy and was and then optimized.

Narrative Interview

> *"In the narrative interview, the informant is asked to present the story of a subject area in which the interviewee has participated in an impromptu narrative* (Hermanns 1995, p.183)*."*[21]

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[21] Translated from German: „*Im narrativen Interview wird der Informant gebeten, die Geschichte eines Gegenstandsbereichs, an der der Interviewte teilgenommen hat, in einer Stegreiferzählung darzustellen (Hermanns 1995:183)."*

A narrative interview is to guide and moderate the narrative situation so that the interviewee tells a complete story (Hermanns 1995, p.183). According to Harry Hermann the interviewee should be informed before the interview about the goal and time estimation of the interview. After the interviewee has finished his or her story the phase of narrative inquiry follows. The balancing phase at the end should give the informant – as an expert – the opportunity to reflect on what had been said (Hermanns, 1995, p. 184.)

An atmosphere of trust is particularly important in the narrative interview. The narrative request of the initial question could also contain the explicit request for narration and for its extensive detailing (Flick 2002, p.148). Imprecise narrative prompts and suggestive questions can cause narratives to become jumpy or thematically irrelevant. Nevertheless, the interview style should be "*neutral to soft*"[22] (Lamnek 1995, p.72). In the best case, the narrator should tell in a structured and detailed way so that the interviewer can follow and understand the narrative from beginning to end. In this way, events should also be mentioned that the interviewee might not have mentioned when describing them (Flick 2002, p.151).

It is especially important to note that in both the narrative interview as well as in the guided interview there are no questions that intervene the discourse that could influence or directly evaluate the quality of the data. It is also relevant that the interviewer is aware of the interviewee giving personal interpretations of information instead of facts (Fuchs 1984, p.176ff). At the same time active listening is essential to maintain a positive relationship and a basis of trust with the informant.

Semi- structured interview

A semi-structured interview is an interview with a written guideline that helps the interviewer to guide through the conversation with the interviewee. The scope of these guidelines can vary greatly. Jürgen Brotz and Nicola Döring explain that these can range from a rough outline of the interview goal to a detailed definition of all individual steps of action and questions. Guided or semi-structured interviews are primarily used exploratively and for hypothesis generation. The guide makes the results of different, separately conducted interviews comparable as it is intended to serve as a framework (Bortz and Döring 2005, p.289). The basis of a semi-structured interview is considered a keyword catalog or interview guide that lists all questions relevant to the research. This is to establish comparability between the interviews. The exact

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[22] Translated from German: „*neutral bis weich* (Lamnek 1995, p.72).*"*

wording of the questions and the order in which they are asked or the order of topics, do not play a significant role. These should be made dependent on the interviewee and the course of the interview (Stier 1999, p.188).

When constructing the interview guideline, it is essential to keep the main research question in mind. In this context, it is important to ask the questions in a way that are easy to understand while simultaneously encouraging the interviewees to tell their stories (Dresing and Pehl 2018, p.9). Another important advantage of qualitative methods such as the interview is not only how interviewees evaluate certain topics but also why and which aspects are considered important (Dresing and Pehl 2018, p.7). This is particularly important when dealing with empirical research in the field of politics and social opinions.

Interview guideline

The interview guide was divided into five parts: First, personal details, second, interaction with Israelis, third, Jerusalem Masterplan and Israelization and last the interviewees' visions and hopes for Jerusalem's future[23].

After a short introduction of the interviewer as well as the research project the interviewees should feel encouraged to talk about themselves. They were asked about the part of the city they came from, what it felt like for them to grow up there as well as good memories. Consequently, the context changed towards a political context by asking them if and when they first realized that this a city was not like others. Depending on the individual interviews, they were asked about themselves, their families, and professions within the families as well as their favorite places in the city to spend time at. These introductory questions served to relax the interview environment. As soon as the interviewees mentioned a topic that was Israel related, the conversation was guided towards a political context. They were asked about whether they had contact with Israelis in their daily lives and about whether they had Israeli friends. In most of the cases this last question had a strong effect. It opened the conversation towards the direction of conflict without pushing or surprise. On one hand the interviewee had the feeling that this topic came up rather accidentally on the other hand they had control over the way they wanted to present themselves and the topic.

The question about whether they had ever thought about moving out of the city often led the interviewee to talk about plans and ideas for the future.

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[23] See attachments: Figure 2, Interview guideline, June2020

All of the interviewees were at the age of young adulthood and the question of where and how they wanted to spend their lives is considered quite relevant for this phase of life in GenZ. This led to an analysis of the different personalities within the interviewees and provided an estimation on the research comparability of the interviews.

The next phase of the interview included Israel's offers of Israelization. Within the pretest interviews a lack of knowledge about related facts concerning Israeli policies in Jerusalem surfaced. This included that the question was not ideal in order to answer the research question. Therefore, the third part of the Interview started with an introduction and overview of the Jerusalem Masterplans, the topics it addressed as well as the arguments provided by the Jerusalem Municipality. This led to a fact-related equal knowledge among the interviewees which gave the way for their personal experiences and opinions. This was important in order to analyze whether they shared their opinions or not.

The last part of the Interview dealt with the individuals' "dreams and visions" about the future of Jerusalem. This terminology was intentionally phrased poetically in order to avoid negative emotional responses. Another important aspect was to look at how they felt about the future of Israel and Palestine. Therefore, they were asked how they envisioned the city in 10 years, which is a long time when considering their age while not being intangible.

Supporting the main questions, additional questions were asked in order to receive more direct and specific answers regarding certain topics. The most important focus was to observe whether the questions were understood correctly and led the path to the required information. During the pretest interviews the phrasings of the questions were adapted to the respective interviewees.

The recording and transcription of the interviews

First, the audio files were turned into transcripts, then the analysis of the interviews was carried out while listening and reading the data and taking notes. Then the significant parts of the passages were highlighted and marked as important. The interviewee divided the data into section and added coding which led to the analytical process of first concepts and the connection of events and meanings in relation to certain phenomena.

The conducted interviews were recorded via smartphone due to cost-efficient matters as well as presenting a casual and typical recording device to the interviewees. This was considered important since a bigger recording device might have had disturbing effects on the atmosphere that might have been interpreted as particularly official. The positioning of the smartphone –

an object that is an integral part of young people's everyday lives did not lead to particular nervous reactions of the interviewees. Transcriptions were conducted using basic transcription rules with no information about para- and non-verbal events besides the spoken contributions (Dresing and Pehl, 2018, p. 17).

Pretest interview

In June 2020, a pretest interview was conducted prior the actual interviews to check the adequacy of the interview guideline. During this test run it became clear that only small adjustment had to be done regarding the questions themselves about Jerusalem Masterplan. The pretest interview showed that the understanding of any Israeli policy concerning Jerusalem as associated with emotions; hence, it needs to be addressed carefully or even indirectly. The pretest interview also showed in which way the questions had to be rephrased and where they were formulated target oriented.

Field framework and access to the field

Due to the heterogeneity of field work and the individuality of each case it becomes clear that no interview can ever be the very same. This is true for the interviewer at the very moment of the interview as well as for the interviewees. There are however certain rules that have turned out as particular as for example that even areas in public spaces that might appear as neutral can be highly challenging. The mere presence of a researcher in a situation as well as being identified as someone who 'interrogates' can be challenging since the study process might get disrupted when participants feel monitored. As a result it is required for the interviewer to be invisible as a person in a socially acceptable way which can only be achieved if both the observer as well as the observed implicitly agree on that (Wolff 1995, p.431).

However, a more advanced approach accessing it by the means of a gatekeeper. A gatekeeper herein is considered a key person who allows access to the matter to the interviewer (Misoch 2015, p.187). The connection to a gatekeeper has the advantage that the interviewer receives further information about the field than an outsider would. That is considered extremely helpful to the process. However, this information must be questioned critically as it may be the expression of very personal opinions and experiences that characterize the field only to a limited extent (Misoch 2015, p.188). For example, Gk1 and Gk2[24] are Palestinians with mixed

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[24] The names were obscured in order to preserve the interviewees' identities.

backgrounds from the Old City and acted as indispensable gatekeepers for the interviewers. Since both did not fit into the research group due to their mixed backgrounds, they were considered as gatekeepers in order to provide further background knowledge to the interviewer. Due to the fact that they had no political interest in the scientific purpose of the thesis they provided unbiased insight into the lives of Palestinian young adults living in Jerusalem.

Setting

The interviews were conducted based on a pre-formulated interview guide, whereby the order of the questions and the actual wording were always adapted to the respective interviewee and the situation. This made it possible to address ambiguities and ask more detailed questions. All interviews took place in an environment that was familiar to the interviewees. 6 interviews were carried out at cafés close to HUJI or in Jaffa[25] while one interview was conducted while walking and partly sitting on a quiet place on the rooftops of the Old City. Due to the sensitivity of the topic, the interviewees decided on the meeting point in order to ensure that they felt comfortable and free to talk and were not restricted in their responses and behavior by the environment.

All interviews took place in June and July 2020 and were subsequently transcribed.

Ethical and moral limitations

The whole research process required to keep in mind a big variety of ethical challenges. For example, it is crucial to be sensitive towards the interview partners especially when it came to questions of politics, culture, social differences and of course the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This implied high sensitivity on the interviewer's conflict-related wording[26] (see0 0Introduction). Since political views vary significantly in a heated debate such as the one about Jerusalem it was important to provide tolerant language with everyone that was interviewed. Additionally, the circumstances of a semi-structured interview give space for critically formulated queries and highlight the 'other side's argument' to provide more insight on the respondent's opinion. These should always be addressed extremely carefully in order to maintain a factual

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[25] Jaffa is a district of West Jerusalem and is considered the city center of West Jerusalem.

[26] Much of the terminology used in the context of Jerusalem in geopolitical history is experienced highly subjective. See the Introduction for more details.

and calm atmosphere throughout the conversation and not lead for the interviewee to feel criticized or judged.

The names of all interviewees were changed in order to maintain their anonymity. Moreover, all were briefed in detail about the thesis and the interviewer's intentions. However, the research question itself was not presented to the individuals in order to not influence their narratives. Simultaneously, all interviews were conducted in English which required that all participants knew that foreign language good enough in order to be able to express their feelings and thoughts freely.

6.   Research results

This thesis aims to detect successful incentives by Israel that lead to a strategy change in Generation Z PEJ in order to enhance Israel's political status in Jerusalem while individuals are able to maintain their political identities. This chapter aims to provide detailed results of the empirical study of this thesis which was carried out by the means of qualitative interviews.

The respondents

Subjects of this research are GenZ Palestinians who have been socialized in East Jerusalem and consciously accepted some form of Israelization. Altogether seven interviews were conducted – four male and two female probands as well as one scholar as expert on the matter. All interviewees as well as the interviewer were at the age of the so-called Gen Z. The interviewer believes that especially within the context of transnational research the interview environment and level of trust-building is essential in order to guarantee eye-to-eye communication and concrete results.

In the following evaluation and interpretation of the results, the respondents refer to R1/R2/R3/R4/R5/R6. Deniz Altayli the Program Director of the East Jerusalem based think-tank PASSIA[27] agreed to give an interview as well to serve as an expert for this research.

R1 grew up in Silwan, a neighborhood next to the Old City. He denied the question whether he liked growing up there. Silwan is a neighborhood next to the Old City with low income. Within the area it repeatedly came to demolished houses and settlements that made it feel like a fortress.

> *"No. […] The society. The environment over there. […] It is crowded. There are areas without streets and trees. […] People over there they are suspicious all the time, they don't trust each other. It's really complicated society (R1.1 Jun242020, 00:54). "*

His statement supports the Washington Institute's survey about the neighborhood being "exceptionally militant (Pollock 2020)".

R1 studied at a University in Nablus in the West Bank and is not sure about his next step. He wishes to go to Europe to study for a master's Degree but doesn't know if it will be possible for him. He applied for an Israeli citizenship.

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[27] PASSIA is the abbreviation for Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs.

R2 is in the preparatory program at HUJI aiming to study chemistry and environmental studies. She grew up in Beit Hanina and describes her childhood as happy and normal. She considers herself an energetic young woman who talks with a lot of facial expressions and hand movements. She feels that she is confident, informed and reflected on her opinion about the conflict within the interview. Nevertheless, she states that a year ago she had a completely different opinion and describes herself as non-political.

During the interview she repeatedly used the Arabic term Khallas (خلص). It translates as 'done,' 'finished' or 'stop' and is being used when anything comes to an end.

R3 studies Architecture at Bezalel University in West Jerusalem. She was born in Shuafat Refugee Camp which she describes as a happy place. Her family had land there but when the Separation Barrier was built in 2002, she describes of Shuafat Refugee Camp to have become a crowded place. Her family decided to move and lived in an Israeli settlement next to Beit Hanina for a few years, which is unusual for a Palestinian family. She explains that when this settlement was built, three houses remained for Arabs. Even though she never got to know her Jewish neighbors she has enjoyed living there.

> *"I haven't got to know any of my neighbors, the Jews neighbors. I don't know any of them. [C: Where they religious?] [...] I see them in the streets, they were not that religious, but I don't really know them I haven't been to their houses or anything. But it was really comfortable because they collect rubbish. They have really really really nice streets, they have trees in the streets. Things you don't see in other areas that are Arab (R3.1 Jul012020, 6:31)."*

Due to her family moving various times she got to experience the differences between the various neighborhoods. She states that this was very rare and valuable qualitative information. Because the house in the settlement was too small for her family they moved again and lived in Beit Hanina where they had been living up until the date of the interview. The interview itself was scheduled with R3 alone, however, her cousin Ri3 joined in later. Although Ri3 does not fit the interviewee focus group, her input still enhanced background information. Her input cannot be found within the transcripts; however, certain quotes are included (colored in purple within the transcripts). R3 and her family had been in the process for an Israeli citizenship for 4 years.

R4 is male and works as a chemist after studying at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He grew up in Abu Tur and feels to stands out in his openness and approval of the Israeli state. He is the only one of the respondents who answered the identity question with an explanation

that he sees himself as an Israeli. It can be presumed that this is due to the circumstances growing up in Abu Tur. As the Washington institute survey also explains, Abu Tur is a larger, rather modern Jewish-Arab-mixed middle-class neighborhood in Jerusalem (Pollock 2020). While this does not make his person any less adequate or valuable for this study his views need to be analyzed within this context and from the perspective of how complex and counter-intuitive local attitudes can be. Although his answers first seemed very different from the others, it can be concluded that he aims for very similar goals as the other respondents. R4 started to apply for Israeli citizenship 2 year prior to the interview.

R5 was born in East Jerusalem as the son of a German mother and a Palestinian father and grew up in Shuafat. Both of his parents are working with the UN. His father has been living in Amman for some years, due to which R5 regularly visits Jordan. He went to a Palestinian Pre-school, International High School and studied in Washington DC. He has been back in East Jerusalem for two years and starts a new job in Ramallah soon. Due to both parents working at the UN he is very involved and knows a lot about the UN's work and system. During the conversation it became clear that he was more advocative and unconditionally devoted to the Palestinian cause than the other respondents. For example, he shared stories about boycotting Israelization measures like the Light rail (Jerusalem Tram).

> *"Having this German passport, it makes my life so much easier. Apart from being able to travel […] It's given me [pause] the feeling that I have the ability to do whatever I want. Which is something what most people that live here in Jerusalem don't have (R5 Jul032020, 7:26)."*

Due to the background of having lived in the US and due to coming from a very educated and international background R5 seemed very aware of the political and societal circumstances around him.

R6 is the youngest of the interviewees. He grew up in Isawiyya and attended public school, but never felt like he belonged there.

> *"All of them follow the same bass and same thinking. […] In class, for example we were talking about something and they all say one thing agree with it, if it's wrong or right. I don't know, somehow I felt this is not me (R6 Jul5th2020, 10:08)."*

He added that the conflict is very present in Isawiyya. His parents are divorced which is why he grew up with his grandparents. The men in his family work with Israelis and therefore know Hebrew. However, he explains, they only do that for practical reasons and does not

reflect their opinion about Israel being the enemy. During the interview it became clear that R6 enjoys studying and has not been satisfied in Isawiyya. He shares his exceptional ambitions about trying to break out of his surroundings. For example, an international private school accepted him with a full scholarship, and he persistently pursued his family to allow him to attend it.

Data

This chapter presents the results of the empirical research. As an introduction and warm-up of the interview, the interviewees were asked about the neighborhoods they grew up in in comparison to the ones they were currently living in. The following questions concerned the following topics:

1. Life as residents in East Jerusalem;

2. Ideas and wishes about the future of Jerusalem and subsequently emotional relations to the city;

3. Attitudes and approaches towards Israelization measures;

4. In- Groups and Out- Groups;

5. Signs of and reasons for strategy change from collective to individual (according to SIT); and

6. What would they change if they were in charge?

The order of the questions within the interviews does not align with the herein mentioned order. The interviewer is marked within the quotations with square brackets and the letter C.

Resident in Jerusalem

All the interviews started with a fluid conversation about the interviewees' life and experiences in Jerusalem. Although this research interest does not focus on these answers it provided practical insight on their experiences growing up. The goal was to provide a narrative free environment and impose as few restrictions as possible. Thus, the interviewees should feel that the relevance of topics was set by themselves. Subsequently, it allowed the interviewer to ask questions discreetly when certain topics were mentioned. The positive effect of it was a relaxed interview situation in the beginning which was later on guided on the basis of

the interview guide. Simultaneously it provided valuable first-hand insight of life in East Jerusalem that could not have been anticipated by the interviewer beforehand.

Except for R4, all interviewees expressed a great need of improvement in their neighborhoods as well as inequality and limitations they had experienced. R1 expressed that his neighborhood lacked public services despite him paying the same taxes to the city as other Israeli neighborhoods.

> *"You pay taxes for them and pay the bills and we don't get nothing. Even the street in front of our house, we built it with the neighbors. We paid money to make it. You don't have any park in my area. No Park. No place for children to play. [C: Why is there no park? People don't need it?] People need it [parks]! But come on who make it for them? (R1.1 Jun242020, 04:14)".*

Moreover, he states that he didn't trust the officials.

> *"I didn't have a problem before in my life. My family had a problem though and they couldn't be able to call the police. [...] You can't call the police, you don't have protection (R1.1 Jun242020, 05:01)."*

R2 describes inequalities she experiences as an East Jerusalem resident as limitations. She is upset because appearances are deceiving. She says PEJ assume they have all the opportunities, but with the injustices they face this is not the case:

> *"The most thing that I hate, as a person living in Jerusalem is the limitations. We are so limited. [...] We think we can do a lot of stuff until we see it. We can't do anything. [...] Electricity, Water, Internet. Basic stuff we need we are limited. Like, we get them but for example they would cut the electricity for 6 hours straight. That's normal. We think ' ah ok they don't have enough electricity for everyone, so everyone doesn't have electricity right now. [...] and then I just go out on the street and there are lights on the street. And I'm like why are they are lighting the street and not giving us electricity and then ah ok because we live in East Jerusalem. [C: So, the electricity was still going in West Jerusalem?] Yeah. Yes of course (R2 Jul12020, 44:53)."*

Moreover, numerous scientific papers state that especially house demolitions have been an ongoing topic in Jerusalem for many years. While the interviewer did not ask about this, R1 mentioned it on his own. *"My house is one of the ones with demolishing orders. [C: Really?] Yes, me and all my neighbors (R1.1 Jun242020, 03:40)."* The interviewer then asked him

about what they were going to do about it, he answered that they tried to postpone the demolitions as long as possible but weren't able to prevent them from happening.

Statements concerning Jerusalem's future: Ideological or Realistic

Pollock concludes in his survey that answers of interviewees depend significantly on whether they were asked about ideology or reality. This led to the interviewer asking questions about the interviewee's visions of Jerusalem's future in order to see whether they answered reality-related or ideological. All the interviewees met the question with realistic and partly pessimistic views about Jerusalem's future.

R1 answered with a no nation-state ideological perspective:

> *"One day even there will be a two-state solution. Look at the situation right now. Look at the two sides. There is no any promise that there will be peace in these days. I believe there will be peace. There will be change, there will be something. But I think we will be dead before that. Meanwhile I have to find something to stick with (R1.1 Jun242020, 34:52)."*

The last sentence "M*eanwhile I have to find something to stick with (R1.1 Jun242020, 35:05*) reveals a hint of him having changed towards an individual strategy.

R4 thinks Jerusalem will not have changed in 10 to 15 years and "*It will be the same (R4 Jun302020, 49:00)"*.

R5 believes the Two- State Solution is dead and sees only one state in the future. "*Two state solution is bullshit. One state solution in one shape or form is the only way to go (R5 Jul032020, 01:04:00).*" Adding to this ideological answer he states the following:

> *"Obviously with the destruction of both political systems and a new one coming up in their place with equal representation. This is completely utopian, and this is my ideal solution and I know this is gonna [sic] take maybe - if it ever gonna [sic] happen take 100 years. Because it's not something that can happen from today to tomorrow. It has to be generational (R5 Jul032020, 01:05:43)".*

R6 believes in a mixed Jerusalem and says, "*It should be diverse equally (R61.1 Jul052020, 01:25:45)."*

Israelization

2 elaborated policies and initiatives by the Israeli State or Jerusalem Municipality in order to pull East Jerusalem closer to West Jerusalem. This process is referred to as Israelization. The interviewees were asked about certain initiatives like the Jerusalem Masterplan. When addressed with the topic R1, R2, R3, R5 and R6 first reactions revealed suspicion and distrust.

R1 explains why initiatives by the Israeli government or Jerusalem Municipality are met with doubt and distrust in East Jerusalem as following:

> *"They make it more western. They change the whole view of the city even. So that's what people are afraid of. People touching them. Touching the area. So of course, they reject it. They want a better live. They want better street, parks, trees. They want better lives. But what better live? Yesterday they demolished two houses in my neighborhood. Like two families now they don't have no house. They go to their cousin's house. So what masterplan are they talking about? And when we will have it even? Come on [laughs] lets be serious about it. How they will do it? There are problems and issues for many many years (R1.1 Jun242020, 01:13:52)."*

R3 expresses feeling tricked by Israeli measures. Using the example of education, she states that she feels that even when something is formulated positively it still comes with a catch:

> *"They block everything from the Palestinian side. Why don't they allow me if I now study at Birzeit? Why am I not allowed to work here if I don't do Israeli exams? Because this is a way of saying no, you know. It's a way of saying you should come study here because if you study there we won't allow you in (R3.1 Jul012020, 22:13)."*

R5 expressed a similar opinion:

> *You can do whatever you want as long as you don't do what we don't want you to do. [laughs] Otherwise we will really mess up your life. […] They give you all this sensation of freedom: You can travel, you can do this, you can work, you can make money. As long as, as soon as you try to demonstrate, or go against the state, its 'OK never mind, you don't have any of these rights anymore.' […] Because they know that people have bills to pay and kids to take care of, so they control them like that (R5 Jul032020, 59:08)."*

R3 shares an experience with officials and municipality which according to her explains the mistrust. She argues that although PEJ pay the same taxes, Israelis are favored over

Palestinians even when their concerns are less urgent. Due to this she believes that part of the problem is that Palestinians don't know their rights.

> *"So, when I call them, and they came and fix it, people were like 'oh wow this stuff really worked'. […] A bench they [Israelis] ask for it today, tomorrow they find it next to their building. We, I kept asking for fixing the street for a whole month and they rejected it twice and they told me they don't have time for that [C: They don't have time to fix the street?] Yes, 'we have more important streets to work on right now, so this is going to be postponed.' So, I send them again and again and again until they actually fixed it (R3.1 Jul012020, 5:29)."*

Moreover, she adds:

> *"so first of all, Arabs don't know their rights, second of all the municipality itself, the country itself doesn't really pay attention to what they need or want (R3.2 Jul012020, 6:43min)."*

The doubts and mistrust towards Israeli measures raise the question why and how certain initiatives do get accepted. R5 illustrates the debate around the acceptance of Israeli investment and innovation in the east of the city through his experience during the time the Light Trail[28] was introduced.

> *"In the beginning was hesitation to take the Light trail. Because we were scared, and it was illegal. We had a moral issue [C: Illegal?]. The Light Trail was illegal in East Jerusalem. Because it's on East Jerusalem and West Bank soil and land. Legally speaking its illegal. So, there was this moral conflict. Do I get on and give money to an illegal system? Eventually you start thinking because there is a station right outside my house. And slowly slowly start seeing people at the station. In the beginning it was frown upon if you going on an Egged Bus or got on the Light Trail. But slowly slowly it became more and more okay. [Why do you think that?]. Because it was cheaper. For me at least it was cheaper than taking the bus. But also, for a lot of people it was convenient than taking the P busses. Because the Palestinian busses system is really really bad. Doesn't come on time its late its often full it is inconvenient. So, for a lot of people it's easier to take the light rail […] (R5 Jul032020, 28:46)."*

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[28] The light Trail is Jerusalem's tram.

Opposing it actively is considered a sign and tool of resistance of the Israeli rule over Jerusalem.

> *"But! If there is sometimes, the Gaza war for example or some sort conflict going on either we would stop using it. That's it. Our moral code doesn't allow us. [...] And then when the war is over, three or four weeks, cool down time, things would go back to normal (R5 Jul032020, 31:04)."*

Thus, R5 explains that it starts to be important during politically difficult times to make a statement while during relaxed politically times convenience gains importance.

The Blue ID Card is arguably the most prominent part of Israelization initiatives. The interviewees mention benefits; however, they feel that the disadvantages of not being fully acknowledged citizens outweigh them.

R1 puts the benefits of freedom of movement in Israel in perspective when he points out that the Blue ID card restricts him of living wherever he wants.

> *"[...] but I can't live wherever I want. Ok I can live in Tel Aviv and Haifa, that's new but I can't live in Jordan. If I'd live in Jordan, they'd discover that I live there for a time they will revoke this, so I can't go back here at all. [...] So, I have to stay here and stick here. Until I get a citizenship (R1.1 Jun242020, 21:48),"*

Nevertheless, R1 thinks receiving a citizenship does not free him from a life with limitations.

> *"You have to give up your Jordanian passport. You have to give up on the whole middle east. You can't be in any other Arab country anymore. I can't go to Tunisia, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Golf Countries. You will be Israeli, and you will be cut off. [...] It's not an easy decision (R1.1 Jun242020, 24:00)."*

R2 mentions similar reasons for why she does not want to apply:

> *"[...] it is so hard to get one first of all and second of all they are going to take my Jordanian passport and I won't be able to enter any Arab country for four years and I am not willing to do that. [...] I still want to go to Dubai, I went once I want to go again, I want to go to Kuwait, Bahrain, Maghreb, Morocco, Tunisia. I want to go there I want to see. [...] Why would you take that from me? (R2 Jul12020, 48.57)."*

R1 agrees upon traveling being his main motivation when it comes to the citizenship question. Though he highlights the advantages that come along. *"Yeah. I am working on it. I can't now travel. As I want, yeah (R1.1 Jun242020, 22:56)."* He explains that he is not applying as a

Blue ID Card holder but tries to find a way around it and talks about a friend who agreed to marry him, so he could get the papers faster.

R3 and her family are in the application process for an Israeli citizenship now of the interview. She seems confident and safe to be in the process together with her family but still feels torn when it comes to the question what motivated her to take the step.

> *[…] I don't know if it's preferable, so I stay in this country and at some point, they can't tell me leave because you don't have any residency or it's bad because I am Israeli now. I have nothing that can tell that I am Palestinian, you know? I have no Documents. Only the Taujihi (R3.1 Jul012020, 54:01)."*

Her initial answer represents the debate within the PEJ when it comes to this topic. At a later stage she mentions travelling and the safety of being allowed to always come back and stay at her home place.

> *"We discussed it and we found that it's better for the future, you know? Now if I want to travel, I need a Visa for each and every country in the world. […] It makes life easier, and it makes us residents [means citizens]. So, it's better, it stays forever. If I leave the country for six months nobody calls me to come back because if I don't come back, I lose the right to be here, actually (R3.1 Jul012020, 55:39)."*

During the time of the interview R4 is in the application process too. He makes clear that it was a logical step for him since he was born in Israel he should have citizenship, like anybody else born there.

> *"Like you are not citizenship, but you are allowed to stay here. But why? Like I wasn't born in Jordan, I didn't even travel for Jordan for one time in my life. I don't understand why you write me on my […] [pulls out Blue ID Card] its written over there that we are Jordanian. So, it's not. We are not. […] We were born here, and I guess we all should get the citizenship because were born in this country (R4 Jun302020, 11:45)."*

This answer represents another approach to Israelization. While his answer differs from the other interviewees his presupposition is the similar. He has no interest in the conflict itself and does not support any side. He wants to live his life with full rights and no limitations since he perceives Jerusalem as his city and place – no matter if its Israeli or Palestinian ruled.

R6s opinion about the application for an Israeli citizenship is quite positively. While he doesn't provide a clear answer at the beginning, he then confirms that the travel documents he

owns are enough for him to do whatever he wants and if that matter changed, he could see himself applying. He also states that what had been holding him back were the many years of process during which he was not allowed to leave the country which he expresses as one of his biggest dreams at that time. (R6.1 Jul052020, 59:37).

All interviewees consider education a crucial part of their lives which can be associated to their age. Choosing a University as an East Jerusalemite is a crucial decision which they are very aware of. This research aims to find out the reasons and visions why the interviewees chose their respective individual paths. One aspect, choosing an Israeli University requires extra effort due to the mandatory preparatory year for all 'foreign' students and the language barrier of Hebrew.

R3 and R2 both explain that they had to take the preparatory program including investing in Hebrew courses.

> *"[…] Then I had to take courses. And the courses cost me a lot. Each one was worth 7000 Shekel[29] and I've done three. It's too much […] I didn't really know how to speak Hebrew until got to work until I got to Uni because this is where you actually speak Hebrew (R3.1 Jul012020, 14:19)."*

For R2 the positive aspects of studying at an Israeli university clearly outweigh the negative. With her practical approach of wanting to keep Jerusalem the center of her life she points out that

> *"[…] people that go abroad or study in Palestine they don't really get chances to work here. So technically if you don't study at a Jewish or Hebrew university, you technically will lose your place (R2 Jul12020, 42:41)."*

Out- Groups

One very important aspect of this data collection was to find out about the individual identity each one of the interviewees feel to belong to as well as which group, they don't feel associated with. It seems little surprising that they clearly distanced themselves from Israeli Jews and West Jerusalem. R1 for example speaks of tax pays to the municipality as, "*You pay taxes for them (R1.1 Jun242020, 04:14) "*. Also, he reports that he had never been to West Jerusalem until his late teens.

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[29] 7.000 Shekel equals approximately 1.957 Euro (finanzen.net 2021).

> "*See Jaffa Street? I never been there until 11th grade. [...] I don't know about the other side. I never see all the Israelis together like this (R1 Jun242020, 37:45).*"

It is noticeable that R1 refers to West Jerusalem as 'the other side'. He perceives the separation of East and West Jerusalem as a border. Though there has not been a boarder or green line since the Six- Day War.

> „*So, I was with a friend, I told him I need to look for work and he said about that side. Yalla[30] lets walk. And I was walking. Fuck, I am used to this area here and there [points towards Olive Mountain and Silwan]. It's more Arab, it's more crowded, it's not organized. It's more Middle Eastern, you know. So, I went there [West Jerusalem] and see all these peoples, you know Europeans, Israeli and you know I don't know what. I was just looking at them and 'What the Fuck, Where I am? This is not Jerusalem (R1.1. Jun242020, 38:24).*"

Likewise, a clear differentiation from Palestinians living elsewhere becomes evident. As an example, R2 repeatedly points out that East Jerusalem is neither part of an Israeli In- Group nor part of the West Bank In- Group .

> „*People in Palestine don't like people in Jerusalem, like not really. And people from Israel don't like us. [...] They [People in Palestine] do but they think we are like super high. That we have a lot of money, that we are rich that we have a fancy life, and everything is provided. They think we take Arnona[31] [laughing] (R2 Jul12020, 15:16).*"

R2 sees the responsibility for the alienation between the Palestinians living in different areas; thus, in legal circumstances as well as the two groups of Jerusalemites, in the government's and Jerusalem municipality's actions.

> "*My rights. [...] Like I don't know how to explain this, but there is a major difference. We live one street apart, but we are not the same. Like definitely not the same. The way we are treated, the way our streets are, the way we pay money. We pay lot of money. Really, Israelis think we just live here and we don't pay. No, we pay! And it's so frustrating and makes you feel so angry [...] (R2 Jul12020, 26:30).*"

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[30] Yalla (يَلّا) is a very popular Arabic word which is also frequently used in the Hebrew language (יאללה). It translates to 'Let's Go' or 'Come on' and aims to encourage someone to do something.

[31] The Jerusalem Arnona tax is a municipal or local council tax. All Residents of Jerusalem have to pay, including the PEJ.

R6 attends an internationally mixed school and describes ideological views to be a factor regarding the difference of Out- Group Israeli Arabs from PEJ.

> *"Because the Arabs [schoolmates, Israeli Arabs] are a bit different, I am the only one from East Jerusalem. [...] They have this ahm 'Bro, look at Palestine and they feel like it's the land and even though they live in Israel, under Israeli authority but they still feel like it. No, it's not[Palestine]! you know (R6.1 Jul052020, 35:17)."*

In- Groups

When it comes to In- Groups it becomes clear that the city Jerusalem plays an important part in all the interviewees lives. They feel connected to the city and highlight the unique aspects of being a PEJ.

R2 brings up that PEJ are the only ones able to go on both sides of the checkpoints.

> *"We as PEJ, have a better view than the Jews, the young Jews. About the stuff that's like ... Because we see, we go through a check point we are on this side and we go back and see this side (R2, Jul12020, 41:46)."*

R2 does not agree with the conflict parties on both sides. Moreover, she neglects the (de facto) rule of Israel over Jerusalem, though she does not feel connected to the state itself. Nevertheless, she does not want to leave her home.

> *"So, I don't really feel that I belong to the country. But I mean I love Jerusalem; I grew up in it. It's just my home I can't leave it. That simple (R2 Jul012020, 30:20)."*

R3 says, "*I love the city and it's the only city that feels like home* (R3.1 Jul012020, 37:19)."

R5 knows the value of having a German passport next to the Jerusalemite Blue ID Card and sees it as a part of his identity:

> *"Honestly, I identify myself as half German half Palestinian. [...] this is always how I saw myself because my passport is such a big part of who we are. Especially for people from here who don't have a passport. Having this German passport, it makes my life so much easier. Apart from being able to travel [...] It's given me [pause] the feeling that I have the ability to do whatever I want. Which is something what most people that live here in Jerusalem don't have (R5 Jul032020, 7:26)."*

Although his passport clearly sets him apart from the majority, he identifies it a relevant part of him as PEJ.

> *"I never had the feeling not to fit it. It felt like having the best of both [Palestinian and International] worlds (R5 Jul032020, 9:12)."*

R6 makes the impression to be detached from norms and his surroundings. He keeps mentioning his identity and how important it is to him to preserve it.

> *"[C: Someone that doesn't know you, hasn't seen you or doesn't know how you look or what languages you speak, who would you say you are (R6.2 Jul052020, 21:36)?"]*
> R6: "I'm from Jerusalem. [...] I feel I am more connected to the city where I grew up. I didn't experience the WB. I went there to visit to Palestine. [...] I am Muslim, I am Arab, I am from Jerusalem (R6.2 Jul052020, 23:42)."*

R4 stands out with his self- definition and how he describes his In- Group .

> *"Actually, this is hard. When you ask someone from Jerusalem to define themselves, they will be like 'Shit!' [laughs]. I don't know, when I think about myself: I grew up in Israel and I live in Israel, I work in Israel, I define myself as an Israeli (R4 Jun302020, 10:51)."*

After defining himself as an Israeli the interviewee is asked where he sees himself settling down later in his life. Similar to the other interviewees R4 answers: *"In Jerusalem. [C: East or West?] Beit Safafa (R4 Jun302020, 01:12:48)."* Beit Safafa is a mixed neighborhood on the Green Line of Jerusalem. R4 therefore raises the assumption that he feels belonging to the city and Jerusalem. Whether he considers it an In- Group category is left to interpretation.

Strategy Change (SIT)

The analysis of the interviews was carried out from the perspective of references and hints revealing a strategy change (SIT). Moreover, what factors resulted to be motivational to the respondents.

R1s response towards the question of citizenship application included the argument of *"[...] just want to live. Have a better life."* that he also refers to as him *"[...] trying to do something (R1.1 Jun242020, 22:56)."* With the perspective of SIT it shows that he wants to separate himself from the collective and focus on his own life.

When asked about her family, R2 answered that the past generations have made very different experiences in Jerusalem than her own one. While her parents and grandparents tell about armed conflicts over the city, she as a Gen Z had never experienced being attacked or a collective uprising. Therefore, she explains, she cannot relate to those motives today. Moreover,

R2 explains that from a SIT perspective, the war united the Palestinians as a group, but she sees a lot of disagreements and disputes within the PEJ today. However, while her parents and grandparents tell her about the PEJ being united against the common enemy in past times, she does not experience the PEJ as one homogenous In- Group today.

> *"This is kind of sad, because like my father and my mom and my grandpa and every- one they so like been in wars, and they saw just stuff that we didn't actually seen. We just see like people killing each other here and there. An Arab going with a knife kill someone. Someone with a gun kill someone. [...] It affects us but at the same time it's like 'What's wrong? Like Why? No! But like for them they really had like war. Like this side and this side [points left and right]. Yeah. And we [Gen Z] have between us [PEJ], even us as East-Jerusalemites whatever. We are like so fucking like parts, parts, tiny parts, tiny parts. Fighting within each [...] Khallas stop (R2 Jul12020, 07:28)!"*

This change of group dynamic leaves her wondering where she belongs to.

> *"Look at where we are right now. So, if I do what they are doing, will it be logical? We will be in the same spot. Literally like here. So, no! I guess, I am not forgetting what they have been through, like they have been through stuff. I remember. Like ok. I get it. But now we can do like other stuff. [...] I don't know what to do. Like I am a Palestin- ian living in Jerusalem. I have an Israeli ID and a Jordanian Passport. Like where am I, who am I, I don't know [laughing] [R2 Jul12020, 14:40]."*

At the same time, she wants to learn from the collective strategy's mistakes and try her own way.

> *"Our problem, as Arabs or Palestinians or here in Jerusalem. We don't really listen. [...] We are not really willing to talk to the other side. That's what opened my eyes. Why not? I want to talk. I want to see who they are. What's wrong with that? [...] When you talk to Jews and stuff, they are like OMG that's so wrong. I'm sorry it's not wrong. You have been ignoring them, have been fighting them and look where you are at. No, I don't wanna [sic] be like this (R2 Jul12020, 17.42)."*

Later in the conversation she makes it clear that she is not necessarily striving for an individ- ual strategy but does not agree with the collective strategy her parents live by.

> *"I say this to my grandpa actually, a lot of people say like 'oh look at this generation, are you going to do something about your country, are you going to do something for*

it?' And I'm like, you sold it Habibi. [laughs] I'm sorry, you didn't sell it but what did you do? Tell me you went to war? OK! What happens next? [...] You can't hate our generation after all we have been through. Ok you have been through a war, but we have been living under stress since we just like popped (R2 Jul12020, 32:40)."

When being asked what made her think differently and swim against the stream, she responds:

"Because the stream is fucked up. The stream, it has been streaming for 70 years. Literally. And if more people just go like this, it will be so much different. I'm not saying that we can live in peace [...] until we die there is going to be tension but at the same time, we can make the situation better. Because Palestinians are killing Israelis for no reason. [...] Israelis are killing P also for no reason. So, I mean like we all want freedom and I really get what people in the WB feel. People in Gaza feel. They are just like so trapped (R2 Jul12020, 59:10)."

She desires a collective strategy, and she acknowledges the successes from the past but also sees the aftermath that her generation is facing now.

"I feel like we are giving up. But that's the new generation. [laugh] Not giving up but at the same time trying to do it in another way. [...] Trying to do it in another way that our parents or our grandparents didn't think of it. [...] But it's not that easy (R2 Jul12020, 1:04:19)."

While highlighting that traveling is one of the main reasons for her to become a citizen *"This is the best part. To be honest, this is the best part (R3.1 Jul012020, 58:42)",* she repeatedly mentions that she wants to be able to stay or come back to Jerusalem without the fear of not being able come back one day. She explains that she loves the city (R3.1 Jul012020, 37:19) and a citizenship stays forever, and nobody can tell her to come back if she is traveling (R3 55:39). Moreover, she says:

"All of us we love Palestine we are pro Palestine, we are Palestinians. But at the end of the day, we do what we think is better for the family and we don't do it extremely (R3.1 Jul012020, 47:22)."

R3 expressed that she feels as part of the Palestinian collective but the collective struggle without a common goal and one common leader does not promise success.

"Because actually those groups don't have one leader. It's like so many groups with leaders that in the end we won't unite and it's not going to go anywhere. So, no, we are a bit far from that (R3.1 Jul012020, 48:07)."

R4 stands out with his views and answers altogether. While he identifies himself as Israeli, he has had high motivations to study Hebrew and says he has equally Israeli friends as Palestinians. Nevertheless, while one could assume that he would answer differently as the other interviewees, it becomes clear that while he has a strongly uncommon opinion on the matter, the motivation behind is very similar to the ones of the other respondents.

> *"I think this is the way we can live a life in peace. And this is the thing that you make peace between us, Arabs and Israelis [C: So, you think the peace will be a one state solution?] Yeah. [C: Under the name of Israel?] Under the name of 'I don't care'. Just give me the rights of a human being, I don't care who stays and who leaves (R4, Jun302020, 17:36) "*

He highlights that he wants peace because he wants to live a normal life. One aspect though that seems different from his answer to the others' is that he does not mention justice. He expresses that he does not care how to get there but wants to have his rights. This leads to the assumption that a strategy change occurred within him.

> *"I started to develop this opinion after 21 [C: After 21? Why do you think at that age?] [...] Because I saw the world. [...] Like we are living like in a bad situation and in a miserable way because of why? Because we are stuck at history. Stop there, take a look and continue your life. Think about the future (R4 Jun302020, 15:26)."*

Simultaneously, R5 does not provide any signs of strategy change at all. However, due to his German citizenship his views on the matter seem to have started from a different perspective. However, he states that he sees his future in Jerusalem (R5 *Jul032020*, 7:26).

> *"To be honest, here Jerusalem. It's not an ideal situation [...] It is the whole ID situation [proof of center of life] (R5 Jul032020, 01:28:14)."*

He states that if his Jerusalem residency happened to be threatened, he might reconsider his strategy.

R6 seems to have pursued an individual strategy from an early age on. The data makes clear that it seemed natural to him to focus on himself rather than the collective:

> *"I would tell you, back home I didn't really was felt into politics and everything. I said, I don't really care. Either sides, I just want to focus on myself and get out of that place (R6.1 Jul052020, 34:57)."*

This is reconfirmed when answering the question whether he wanted to study abroad:

> *"I feel like when I go outside, I will have more free space to just work on myself [...] I feel now, it is either I want to focus on myself and where I want to be in the future or I just focus on what I want to do for my family and everything (R6.1 Jul052020, 58:22)."*

Whether he experienced a strategy change himself cannot be detected since it is not clear whether he changed at a particular moment or whether he pursued an individual strategy from an early age in his life. He mentions various reasons that could be interpreted as plausible factors. One example is his aunt who married into the US and happened to be a relevant attachment figure. Another example is that he did not grow up with his parents but his grandparents due to difficulties which leads to the assumption that he had to look after himself ever since he was a child.

What GenZ would change if it was in charge

In order to answer the underlining question if they pursued a strategy change the last question was dedicated to what they would do if they ruled Jerusalem. One assumption was that they intended to autocratically overcome the enemy and win the conflict over. Another aspect of it was to understand what these young adults and the generation wishes for and how they would like to see the city evolve. Moreover, how the Israeli state could provide for all of Jerusalem's residents more effectively. Surprisingly, all the respondents talked about a mixed city of Jews and Arabs, Israelis and Palestinians and the need to enhance the education system. Particularly R2, R3 and R6 specifically highlighted an equal education system. R2 and R3 mentioned justice as a main pillar of what they would change.

R2 expressed that she would try to make everyone feel belong and protected which is something she doesn't feel as a Palestinian in Jerusalem.

> *"I would just make the East Jerusalemites feel that there is a place for them. That they belong also here. That, like that the country or the city can take them in. Because we don't feel like that [...] I will make as much as I can do to make equality and justice for everyone. From the smallest to the biggest. Because this is so important. People just need that (R2 Jul012020, 01:15:41)."*

R3 mentions the example of checkpoints and the freedom to move without restrictions. Also, she brings up education. She adds that equal opportunities are a necessary foundation for a peaceful life in Jerusalem.

"I give the Palestinians to live the way they want, and Israelis to live the way they want. And believe me when there is justice people might start loving each other and accept the fact that we live here together. And freedom comes with justice, you know. That's one, and two I change a lot in the future of younger people. Because they have the future they are going to be leading, you know. Education, Opportunity-wise because it's not really found a lot. A lot of people think about leaving this country and moving to another place because it is a really really expensive country. […] I'd work more on education and opportunities that people have and employment. (R3.2 Jul012020, 11:35)."

R3 wants Jerusalem to be a city for Israelis and Palestinians together and enhance the living conditions so no one must move away. However, she does not refer to a specific group but rather all Jerusalemites.

R2 brings up the education system as well. She believes in one education system for all Jerusalemites.

"Change the education system not only in East Jerusalem but also in West Jerusalem. Because the more we learn about each other, the more it becomes easier […]. We don't want to live in a mixed city, no let's stay separated but let's know about each other but let's be aware. […] Which is so interesting and also it will help both sides, I guess to understand what's going on. Of course, language is Hebrew and Arabic (R2 Jul12020, 01.16.35)."

R6 naturally ideas about improvement of the education system arise. She expresses a similar idea to R2.

"I would invest in the Education System […] maybe we can come up with a new education system that combines the two sides together. Yeah, I invest in education in a way, I don't declare a historical image. Like historical image is like one factor that shape our identity […] (R6.2 Jul052020, 14:48)."

Additional findings

Interactions with Israeli Jews

All of the interviewees, even R4 who grew up in a mixed neighborhood, reported that their first closer interactions with Israelis happened in their late teens or early twenties. R5

describes it as a phenomenon that sets Jerusalem apart from the West Bank as well as from other mixed cities in Israel.

> *"You are always surrounded sort of. You don't actually interact with them on a deep level all the time. But you are constantly surrounded. Whereas somebody from the West Bank wouldn't say the same. I think that is something special for cities like Jerusalem and Nazareth and Haifa. Where we sort of live together but not really. [C: But Jerusalem is still a bit different to Nazareth and Haifa, no?] Nazareth and Haifa, they are even more [pause] everybody speaks Hebrew there. They are much more together. Here there is more of a divide (R5 Jul32020, 24:13)."*

The studies for this research revealed how many Palestinians and Israelis live separate lives from each other in Jerusalem. Even though they share the same city, they hardly interact with each other. While all the interviewees had their first interactions with Israelis or Jews in their teenage years or when being young adults, they also added that these encounters included negative connotations. For example, R2 disguised her Arabic descent as a teenager when entering shops in West Jerusalem in order to avoid conflict.

> *Same here. Like we went to the malls and stuff, and we talked English, so nobody would know we are Arabs. […] I am not shy, I just save myself a lot of time and looks (R2 Jul012020, 21:30)."*

Even during the time R3 and her family lived in a settlement in East Jerusalem they hardly interacted with their Israeli neighbors.

> *"I haven't got to know any of my neighbors, the Jews neighbors. I don't know any of them. […] I see them in the streets, but I don't really know them I haven't been to their houses or anything (R3.1 Jul012020, 06:29)."*

R3 reports that she only got in touch with Israelis when she attended Bezalel University in West Jerusalem. *"Contact definitely not. Anyways I didn't have a lot of contact with them [Israeli Jews] before I got to university. […] (R3.1. Jul012020, 11:06)."*

R3, similar as R6, had his first friendly interactions with Israelis when he attended a mixed school.

> *"Generally, I would I had say zero. […] I didn't have like Israeli friends or anything, so it was only when I go outside in malls and stores and that's it. I think that's it. Until I moved to my school now (R6.1 Jul052020, 01:08:21)."*

R1 tells that he met an Israeli friend online which indicates that the alienation happens vice versa.

"She was really scared to meet me. She wanted to meet in public space even. So, it was central bus station. She was in Army uniform, and I was in normal clothes. […] She thinks my life looks like theirs (R1.1 Jun242020, 50:56)."

Concluding, it can be said that the separation is very vivid, hence, two teenagers who share the same city and have been texting online don't trust each other but are sincerely scared from one another for not understanding their lives.

Political participation

The interviewees expressed that they didn't trust political institutions or representatives responsible for the PEJ. Moreover, none of the Interviewees ever participated in elections. Neither in the PA elections nor in Jerusalem Municipality. All of them state that their reasons for not doing so is that they do not believe anything will change if they voted. In fact, as elaborated in 2 this is not only a phenomenon among the group of interest of this thesis. The voter turnout among Palestinians who are eligible to vote for an Israeli or a Palestinian institution is very low (Freedom House 2021). While all of the interviewees are interested in politics they do not make use of their political opportunities in Jerusalem. Deniz Altayli responded to the question what options they had to participate in the political process as following:

> *"None. […] There is no say in the matter in that sense. That is the big problem for Palestinians in every respect here in Jerusalem. Since Faisal Husseini is no longer here and Oriental House has been closed, there is no address for Palestinians. […] There is no representation, there is no coordination (Altayli Jul222020, 12:28)[32].*

The interviews revealed that the interviewees lacked trust in politicians and the ability to change living standards. Moreover, the general assumption seems to be that politicians are corrupt and their main interest has been to maintain power.

Deniz Altayli sees another factor as a source of this phenomenon:

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[32] Translated form German: *„Keine […] Es gibt keine Mitsprache in dem Sinne. Das ist ja das ganz große Problem für Palästinenser eigentlich in jeder Hinsicht hier in Jerusalem. Seit Faisal Husseini nicht mehr ist und das Oriental House zugemacht wurde, gibt es keine Adresse mehr für Palästinenser. […] Es gibt keine Repräsentation es gibt keine Koordination (Altayli Jul222020, 12:28)."*

"The whole parties have of course their outlets, I say in Jerusalem their branches and so on and so forth but everything that looks like a political organization would not be approved by the Israelis who already know what they would do about it, so to speak. The same applies, however, also to the PA to some extent because they have of course also no interest that something own develops here, so to speak. On which they then have no access because they do not become active here (Altayli Jul222020, 13:52).[33]

Lack of official Palestinian Identification documents

Another aspect which makes the Palestinian identity in Jerusalem unique and distinct is that PEJ don't have any official identification documents from the Palestinian Authority. While Palestinians from the West Bank have a travel document from the PA, the PEJ have the Blue ID card and an Israeli travel document which are both issued by the Israeli state (R2 *Jul12020*, 50:51). While this might not be essential factor in identity formation it is another indication on how torn and in-between the PEJ are.

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[33] Translated form German: *„Die ganzen Parteien haben natürlich ihre Outlets, sag ich mal in Jerusalem ihre Branches und so weiter und so fort aber alles was ansatzweise nach politischer Organisation aussieht, würde von den Israelis nicht gutgeheißen werden. Die würden schon wissen was sie dann tun sozusagen. Das gleiche gilt allerdings auch für die PA ein Stück weit, weil die natürlich auch kein Interesse haben, dass sich hier was, was Eigenes sozusagen entwickelt worauf sie dann keinen Zugriff haben, weil sie ja hier nicht tätig werden (Altayli Jul222020, 13:52)."*

7.   Conclusio

The aim of this work was to uncover which points of the Jerusalem Masterplan the GenZ can take as considerable arguments while keeping their political identity as Palestinians. Moreover, the goal was to analyze and identify the effectiveness of integration and reunification of East and West Jerusalem.

Using Taijfel and Turner's theory of SIT, it was measured whether a change in strategy towards an individual strategy had taken place. Qualitative methods were used to analyze what policies worked as motivating factors and led to a strategy change as well as to gain insights on grievances.

Taking into consideration the Washington Institute's survey, it shows that after many years of conflict – with achievements but more defeats – the majority of PEJ still pursues a collective struggle. In fact, they follow the ideology of a Palestinian State with Jerusalem as its capital, however, they are well aware of the situation and know that there is little hope for imminent change. Also, the legal and political life of a PEJ differs significantly from Palestinians' living in different areas such as the West Bank or Gaza. While there are many advantages the Blue ID card offers, they face the ongoing threat of revocation. The initial question why only a little group of PEJ apply for citizenship in order to get out of this threat can now easily be answered with social pressure. This led to the subsequent question: What are the reasons for those who decide to apply for citizenship to do so? As GenZ is considered the next generation of leaders, negotiators and possible peace makers within the debate for peace in Jerusalem, they form an especially meaningful focus group on this matter This is the case due to the fact as they were the first generation born into the system of residency, Israeli rule, the reality of a weak Palestinian authority and more or less no Palestinian political representation in Jerusalem. While their national address is supposed to be Ramallah, their administrative and legislative officials have no authority while being residents of Jerusalem. Simultaneously though, their municipal representatives are their ideological enemy. This bipolar reality is the only one GenZ PEJ have ever known. Their reality of life is unique within the PEJ and yet the majority of them, as the Washington Institute's survey shows, holds on to the ideology of *"regaining all of historic Palestine"* (Pollock 2020).

The qualitative research provided insights into motivational factors for those who decided to approximate the acceptance of the Israeli rule over Jerusalem. The goal was to identify what

made them leave the collective struggle behind and focus on the quality of their personal lives as individuals.

After a theoretical introduction into topics relevant for this work such as the development of the Palestinian identity and its inseparability to political history, the PEJ were introduced as a group. Six interviews were conducted with GenZ PEJ as a mean of qualitative research method. Additionally, the interview with an expert from the field as well as informal conversations and interviews with various PEJ provided the basis for this empirical analysis.

While the number of interviews cannot be considered to be representative for all GenZ PEJ, it rather reflects a small section of possible reasons and tendencies of motivational factors. Nevertheless, this study serves to illustrate what initiatives and policies can be considered successful in order to pursue a strategy of peaceful coexistence in Jerusalem under Israeli rule.

This leads towards the actual research question of this thesis which shall be answered hereinafter:

> Which Israeli policy measures work as successful incentives for GenZ of PEJ to lead to SIT strategy change to enhance Israel's political status in Jerusalem while keeping their political identity?

The respondents' realistic and partly pessimistic views about Jerusalem's future in addition to their wish to remain in the city play a relevant part in their decision to approximate towards Israeli rule. While not all respondents were in the process of applying for the Israeli citizenship, their reasons for doing were based on the idea of being able to stay in Jerusalem. The ones who were not in the process of applying made it clear that they would do so, if staying in the city became difficult in the future.

Additionally, all but R5 mentioned freedom to travel as important aspects. Most of the respondents perceive it as an advantage to be able to visit the so-called western world and have their center of life elsewhere without the fear of revocation of residency in Jerusalem. However, it is necessary to point out that a Israeli passport comes with travel restrictions to various Arab countries that are antagonized with Israel.

The interviewees also pointed out that educations had a prominent role in their decisions. As an East Jerusalemite selecting a school – or in some cases universities – is associated with a variety of consequences. Studying at an Israeli university like the HUJI demands extra efforts due to the mandatory preparatory year that is required from students who did not graduate with Bakrut. Additionally, language courses in Hebrew are a necessity. Nevertheless, the

interviewees consider these additional efforts worthwhile in order to improve their future life in Jerusalem.

The interviews showed that a steady and safe residency status, the freedom to move and travel as well as a profound education are the main reasons for the interviewees to consider applying for citizenship in Israel.

All interviewees but R4 defined themselves as Palestinians and show great empathy towards the Palestinian collective. Moreover, the fact that they are from Jerusalem and their aim to settle there was highlighted repeatedly when asked about their identity. A clear separation from not only Israeli Jews was observable but also from the Palestinian citizens in Israel and Palestinians residing in the West Bank and Gaza.

With SIT in mind this reveals that the interviewees form their In- Group around the factor of living and experiences in Jerusalem while simultaneously it indicates an initial strategy change away from collective.

The interviews showed that all interviewees except for R5 pursue an individual strategy. R1, R2, R3 and R4 experienced a clear strategy change away from the collective. Summing their reasons up they aim for a peaceful life with full rights and no limitations. The interviewees expressed that they feel trapped and stuck in history. Furthermore, they see how their fellows in the West Bank and in Gaza struggle with the consequences of unconditional resistance towards the Israeli state. At the same time, due to their Blue ID Card they have the opportunity – in contrast to their fellows – to avoid most consequences that the collective attracts by devoting themselves to an individual strategy. The interviewees acknowledge, respect and appreciate what past generations have done and sacrificed for the Palestinian cause. However, they don't think that the chances are high to achieve the desired goal of a strong independent Palestinian state anytime in the near future. Therefore, they built links to West Jerusalem in terms of education, jobs, and socializing.

In summary, it can be said that each and every one of them aims towards the common goal of a happy, simple, peaceful and most importantly a 'normal' life in Jerusalem.

Reflection

Food for thought for further Jerusalem Masterplans

As it is the matter with complex topics that can be looked at from numerous perspectives, this thesis could be extended nearly limitless. This chapter therefore serves as food for thought regarding initiatives for Jerusalem that resulted as valuable data from the collected data. What stands out was that the respondents all expressed the need of improvement of quality of life in their neighborhoods, the inequality they experienced and the certain limitations they faced.

In particular they mentioned the desire of green areas in East Jerusalem. As a side note, multiple interviewees repeatedly took the lack of trees, benches and parks in their neighborhoods as examples for things that needed improvement. Moreover, it seems to require a disproportionate amount of bureaucratical effort to request the repair of infrastructure in East Jerusalem. Moreover, the appearance and maintenance of roads as well as the quality of public transportation is significantly different in the eastern to the western part of the city.

Furthermore, the interviewees stated that the citizenship applications required very challenging requirements such as knowledge of Hebrew, a clean police record and years of proof of center of life in Jerusalem. When taking into consideration that the application process takes many years of additional hardship they should be considered arguably disproportionate considering that the applicants are Jerusalem-born Blue ID Card holders.

However, the interviewees consider the biggest need for improvement within the educational sector. While Israel accepts four different types of school systems, only the Palestinian one does not meet the requirements to study at an Israeli University. Taking Jerusalem as an example, this has far reaching consequences as demonstrated in this research. The separated school system between Israeli Jews and Palestinians reflects the divided society in Jerusalem. Therefore, it would require a mixed school system that equally teaches Hebrew and Arabic. Undoubtedly, the biggest challenge would be to equally teach Jewish and Israeli history with both perspectives of past events and provide room for open discussions. This would show both sides acknowledgement. Nations that value a state's workforce's educational attainment in general have higher median earnings in comparison to states that do not invest in education. Higher pay results in better employee morale and work satisfaction and means that citizens are more likely to engage in non-violent protests rather than violent ones (Shaykhutdinov 2011, p.43). Consequently, in the specific case of Jerusalem, it can be argued that a common

improved education system decreases the alienation between East and West Jerusalemites which subsequently diminishes racial prejudice and therefore leads to a better coexistence in the city.

In consideration of the PEJ's intent to stay and demographic numbers showing that they are successful in it, it would be worth considering changing strategy. Therefore, going from a currently unsuccessful, counterproductive and immoral strategy of expulsion towards the pursue of a positive long-lasting integration could ensure a peaceful and 'normal' life for all citizens of Jerusalem, East and West.

Reaching out to interview partners

While this interviewer in the past has had no problems in acquiring interviewees, it resulted rather difficult in Jerusalem. The initial intention was to interview PEJ who were already in the process of applying for citizenship or already went through the process. However, while it was no problem to find people who offered to ask relatives and friends of whom they knew they would fit the focus group, the obstacles of this method resulted rather difficult. These obstacles resulted particularly due to the great sensibility of the topic of applying for an Israeli citizenship as a PEJ. Additionally, the situation was particularly difficult due to tensions in politics during the time of the interviews. After the publication of Donald Trump's so-called Peace Deal in January 2020, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced on 28 May, 2020, that he was committed to annex parts of the West Bank (Staff 2020). During that time, it was unsure how Palestinians would react to the announcement: revolt or salient ignorance. Hence, it can be assumed that it was a difficult time for PEJ to openly talk about Israel politics at that moment.

Moreover, due to the interviewees being approached by family members and friends it caused a social situation that easily might have led to insecurities and the fear to be judged by them. This particularly turned out to be an obstacle since the researcher herself was not able to control crucial aspects in this phase of empirical research such as the demeanor or the phrasing of requesting help for scientific data. For the potential interviewee the proposal was by an anonymous person who wants to do interviews and would simply respond with being "not interested".

Therefore, this interviewer then changed the strategy and tried to find potential interview partners herself by reaching out to GenZ of PEJ on social media with the request to talk about

East Jerusalem (see attachments: Figure 3, Facebook post, June 2020). Controlling the words of the request and the possibility for people to take a look at the social media profile of the interviewer turned out to be of advantage. Several people responded and could be sorted out through simple beforehand questions such as what school or University they attended or sometimes by asking them directly about their opinion on applying for Israeli citizenship. The changed strategy showed immediate success.

Access to the Field and Gatekeepers

As discussed in chapter 5 the mere presence of a being interviewed as well as being identified as the interviewer can be associated with distress. The reason for it begin that the respective person of interest becomes aware of being observed attentively which impacts the situation. As a result, it is required to establish an atmosphere in which the interviewee doesn't feel interrogated but rather to feel appreciated for this expert opinion. This can be achieved by working with a gatekeeper.

The interviewer had lived in Jerusalem for several months before deciding to conduct research in the city. While she had built a large circle of acquaintances, at the time she decided to study Palestinians in Jerusalem she realized that she had not even one closer Palestinian acquaintance in the city. She did have some in other cities in the West Bank but none in Jerusalem. This also shows how separate the different social circles tend to be – something that is widely common in Jerusalem. In order to change that aspect, the interviewer did actively choose to exit the usual acquaintance bubble. Shortly after she met Gk1 and Gk2 on Jaffa Street who then became the invaluable Gatekeepers. While not hiding her intend, they had no deeper curiosity in what the specific research interest was whatsoever and but knew that the researcher was interested in Jerusalem and the Palestinians. Due to that circumstances, it was possible to get valuable background information of PEJ in a natural way without pressure. This perspective provided the researcher invisibility without concealing or hiding and at the same time a priceless position of observing and participating in their world. They discussed the Old City, West Jerusalem, spent time and lived a day-to-day life. Though never hiding the researcher's intent they seemed to not care where the research interest began and where it ended or understood that their lives as they grew up and live and handle it today was of scientific interest. So, it was possible – visible as a friend but invisible as a researcher - to immerse in their world, observe and participate in their way of living in the city. For them, the researcher was 'just another foreign student interested in the conflict'. They made the impression that the conflict

itself was a given fact they did not try to question to self-protected them from overthinking the reality they were born into. Both Gk1 and Gk2 had passports from other countries. Gk1 even had Israeli citizenship through his mother who applied before Gk1 was born. These documents allowed them to ignore (or accept) certain conflict-related realities. It seemed that they had the possibility to live a life on both sides or rather in between. From a social scientist perspective both respectively had very interesting backgrounds. Gk1 comes from a low economic background and is the son of a Ukrainian immigrant woman who practices Russian Orthodox Christianity. His father is a Palestinian Christian whose family has lived in the Old City of Jerusalem for centuries. Gk1 grew up in the Christian part of the Old City and knows it like the back of his hand. Due to his uniquely mixed background Gk1 speaks five languages fluently: Arabic, Hebrew, English, Russian and Greek. He introduces himself as a Palestinians and speaks the local dialect. It is worth mentioning, however, that he inherited his appearance from his Ukrainian part of the family. This tends to protect him from racial prejudice. Gk2 is part of a Christian Palestinian family that has been living in the Old City of Jerusalem for many generations. He speaks Arabic, French and English fluently. He also speaks Hebrew, but it was not possible to determine how well his level of Hebrew was. Mostly he speaks English to his friends or when he is in West Jerusalem.

The two of them turned out to be indispensable gatekeepers to this research's background knowledge. It was possible to visit East Jerusalem various times and observe main neighborhoods such as Beit Hanina. Moreover, it was possible to be introduced to myriad people and new places all over the city. Moreover, they provided contact to the first interviewee for the pre-research test interview. This was the first time it was possible to directly address, test out and ask unanswered questions. Furthermore, it was this interview that set the path for the following interviews and the structure for further research findings.

While it was taken into consideration to hire Gk1 as an interpreter for the interviews to talk to interviewees in their mother tongue, it was decided to be more successful to directly conduct the interviews in English. Gk1 did not have the background knowledge of scientific methods and therefore, was considered too high of a risk that information was lost in translation or would have been falsified.

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[Accessed: 29 October 2021].

Attachments

Figure 1, Map of Jerusalem boundaries from 1949 to 2000
*Source: PASSIA, http://www.passia.org/maps/view/55 (accessed 12/16/2021)*

Politische Identität (historische Bezüge, Loyalität)

- Where did you grow up?
- How was it? Good memories of the city?
- What languages do you speak? Which do you use the most?
- When was the first time you realized this is not a city like others?
- Where is your family from?
- What movies you watch? What Music you listen to?

- What are your favorite spots in the city?
  (Ost/West)

Interaktion/ Nähe

In your daily life – when do you meet Israelis?
Do you have Israeli friends?

- Where did you meet them?
- How often/How close are they to you?

Do you ever think of leaving (emigrating)?

Can you imagine living in the West Bank? (->JLM could become an International City)

Do you smts consider applying for an Israeli passport?

Israelisierung

- What High School diploma do you have? (School Education)
- Infrastructure (Light Trail)
- Investments (in general)
- Women support programs (work)

Zukunftsvision

What is your vision for Jerusalem? /If You suddenly would be in charge – where would you start?

How do you think is the Israeli-Palestinian relation in 10 years? ⌐where would you invest more
JLM Masterplan
⌐How does yours look?

If someone that you don't know asks you who you are… What do you say? (What parts of your Identity describe you the best?)

Additional (tricky) Qs:

- Do you vote?
- Do/Did you have political Idols?
- Poltical participation?
- Armed struggle
- Opinion about Fatah?

→ Anreize Isierung anzunehmen?
Was führt dazu seine Strategie zu ändern
Culture for Change? (kollektiv oder individuell)
Rather calm than justice?

⊕ What do you miss in the city? /Es ? Playgrounds creche… what?
⊕ Can you imagine a situation/conditions for you to accept an ⫴ control over JLM? #rights, #economy…

Figure 2, Interviewquide, June 2020
Source: Author

Figure 3, Facebook post, June 2020
Source: Author