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## A Dialectic of Inclusion & Exclusion: National and Racial Formation in the Habsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman Empires From the Dawn of the Industrial Era to the Outbreak of the First World War

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# A Dialectic of Inclusion & Exclusion: National and Racial Formation in the Habsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman Empires From the Dawn of the Industrial Era to the Outbreak of the First World War

## Abstract (Deutsch)

Diese Masterarbeit befasst sich mit den Grenzen positiver und negativer Solidarität, Inklusion und Exklusion, innerhalb pluralistischer Gesellschaften. Anhand der jüdischen Erfahrungen im Habsburger- und Romanow-Reich sowie der christlichen Erfahrung im Osmanischen Reich werden die sich verändernden Grenzen der Gemeinschaft über einen langen historischen Zeitraum aufgezeigt. Die Herausbildung dieser gegensätzlichen Projekte der Inklusion und Exklusion wurde durch eine Synthese sozioökonomischer Auseinandersetzungen auf der Grundlage von Klasse, Religion, Rasse und Ethnie sowie bereits etablierter politisch-kultureller Diskurse, die oft tief in der religiösen Tradition verwurzelt waren, untermauert. Die These geht der Frage nach, wie die damaligen politischen Bedürfnisse die Ausgrenzung für mächtige Interessengruppen attraktiv machten und wie die marginalisierten diasporischen Minderheiten auf diese Projekte reagierten.

## Abstract (English)

This master thesis concerns itself with the delineation of positive and negative solidarities, inclusion and exclusion, in pluralistic societies. With reference to the experience of Jews in the Habsburg and Romanov empires, and the experience of Christians in the Ottoman empire, this investigation highlights the changeable bounds of community over the longue durée. The constitution of these opposing projects of inclusion and exclusion built on a synthesis of socio-economic antagonisms across a range of class, religious, racial, and ethnic lines, and of established politico-cultural discourses, often deeply rooted in religious traditions. The thesis explores the contemporary political needs which made exclusion appealing to powerful constituencies, and how excluded diasporic minorities responded to these projects.

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# **Introduction**

## **Why Is This Study Necessary?**

This thesis aims to address the processes via which positive and negative solidarities were formed, imagined, and instrumentalised in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries vis-à-vis the experiences of religious minorities in the Habsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman empires. This is a necessary addition to the scholarship, as many of the experiences of these minorities, namely Jews in the Habsburg and Russian empires, and Christians in the Ottoman empire, echo one another quite profoundly. These communities shared similar styles of economic development, which distinguished them from the broader societies in which they existed. Additionally, they faced similar hurdles, including histories of discursive subjugation, mass violence, state massacres, and an incipient genocidal movement. The commonality of these experiences for diverse communities across divergent political cultures begs the question: why? What factors unite these communities, and what divide them? And from these differences, can we learn anything about how the nation constructs itself, and how it borders its solidarities internally as well as externally?

This study exists in dialogue with the general scholarship on the genesis of nationalism, which can often create a teleology towards territorially defined, linguistically and ethnically homogeneous nations, especially in the European space. However, this 'ideal' type of nation has barely ever existed. Before the slew of wars, genocides, and ethnic cleansing of the early to mid-twentieth centuries, the populations in Europe and the Middle East were far too mixed for this to be accepted as the typical nation.[1] And soon after WWII, the majority of these European

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[1] George N. Shirinian, 'Introduction', in George N. Shirinian (ed.), *Genocide in the Ottoman Empire: Armenians, Assyrians, and Greeks, 1913-1923* (New York, 2017), p.6, and Philipp Ther, *The Dark Side of Nation-States: Ethnic Cleansing in Modern Europe* (New York, 2016), pp.4-5.

states underwent processes of mass migration. Thus, national homogeneity, to the extent that it even existed, was transient.[2]

The normalisation of a specific type of homogenous nation, one that was ephemeral and required oceans of blood to instantiate, seems analytically questionable and politically irresponsible. Such societies exist in few places nowadays, and instead, national, ethnic, religious, and racial diversity are inherent parts of the political order of most states, no matter how despised these minorities are by some political actors. The amount of people living as diasporic, racialised minorities has increased manifold in most countries over the last decades. A framework for analysing the exclusion of these communities as collectives, as religious minorities, as racialised groups, and as recipients of egregious state violence and omnipresent discursive subjugation, over the longue durée in multinational states which are expected to remain thus, constitutes a helpful addition to the scholarship. It is time to analyse nationalism not in terms of its goals, its utopias, its wide plains of homogenous conationals, but its processes of becoming, its inclusions and exclusions, its arbitrary filtrations of worthy and unworthy fellow citizen.[3]

## What Story Are We Telling?

The story charted in each case below is a dialectical one, between the state-bearing nation and the religious minority. In every example, what motivates the exclusion by the dominant nation is a general anxiety about the maintenance of in-group status and privilege which is invested into the religious minority. The sublimation of these anxieties builds on previous hierarchies and contemporary developments. It is the synthesis of these established politico-cultural discourses and novel socio-economic developments which manufacture a constituency for these

[2] Ahmet Akgündüz, 'Guest Worker Migration in Post-war Europe (1946-1974): An Analytical Appraisal', in Marco Martiniello and Jan Rath (eds.), *An Introduction to International Migration Studies: European Perspectives* (Amsterdam, 2012), pp.199-200.

[3] Christos Bagavos, 'On the Contribution of Foreign-born Populations to Overall Population Change in Europe: Methodological Insights and Contemporary Evidence for 31 European Countries', *Demographic Research* vol.46 (2022), 180.

exclusions which is able to sustain itself materially and psychically both in and out of power. This is true in each of the case studies considered, most egregiously in the Jewish example, but the sublimation of foreign policy anxieties onto domestic populations in the Ottoman case also reflects this tendency.

The constituencies of these exclusionary coalition considered was in each case cross-class, often cross-denominational, and frequently cross-ethnic too. This indicates that these exclusions often served a broad range of constituencies, some of whom were aligned but many of whom were mutually opposed in most respects. The multiethnic valence of both antisemitism and counter-orientalism is to some extent elided by the focus of this study on the state-bearing nations of the dynastic empires considered, a focus I consider to be justifiable on the basis of these constituencies' access to state power. The varied constituencies that united to support these exclusionary projects across all of the states considered nonetheless demands an approach that considers the function of exclusion for its proponents. Therefore, throughout, we pose the question of how these exclusionary coalitions postulated themselves both discursively and materially.

This tale is one of the disruption of established hierarchies and the emotional affects of paranoia and resentment which resulted. The tropes utilised by each project, of parasitism, of hidden corruption, disloyalty, ingratitude, and malice, all precondition the emotionality of the responses which are reached for; the redemptive power of violence, the ecstasy of the purge, the restoration of masculine power, the giddy reassertion of control, and the hardheaded determination to do what is necessary no matter the cost. The psychosocial is an indispensable aspect of these projects from which they gain their affective power. It is this realm of passion which enables exclusion as a mass phenomenon, with mass agitation, mass participation and mass violence. We are dealing with mass politics, where the emotional inner life of the individual is wedded to political discourses, discourses which are structured by the balance of

socio-economic forces in a society. Subjectivity in the age of mass media is an indispensable part of this story.

This emotional aspect, however, still maps onto the variety of antagonisms between different groups in these societies, including on religious, class, and national bases. The quite notable differences in socio-economic development trends after the industrial revolution between diasporic, urbanite religious minorities and peasant-majority historic nations roused fears amongst the latter that they would be forever outcompeted in the new era. Likewise, more particular class antagonisms between different religious groupings helped structure patterns of grievance, hence the bourgeois gentile distaste for poor unassimilated Jews as well as assimilés or the resentment between pastoralist Kurds and peasant Armenians. Class antagonisms structured all three exclusionary projects in particular ways.

## What Are Our Methods?

The fact that this is a comparative analysis bestows advantages for such an undertaking, as it enables the comparison of the socio-economic factors of the age with the specificities and contingencies of historical happenstance and politico-cultural norms. It is the goal of this study to show that the Habsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman empires were met by many of the same struggles vis-à-vis the search for meaning and legitimacy in an industrial era. Admittedly, it is almost de rigour to compare these three dynastic multinational empires, but that is because they do possess fascinating similarities regarding the challenges of implementing modernity. At the same time, however, I do not wish to imply that these three entities are interchangeable or that it was only impersonal structures that drove these histories forward. People made all of the decisions considered, and my emphasis on a structural approach is not meant to deprive actors of agency. It is simply the method that I find easiest for working at such a sweeping scale.[4]

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[4] Cf. Aviel Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia and the Middle East, 1914-1923* (London, 2001) or Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz (eds.) *Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and*

Additionally, as an attempt to understand the logic of processes that led to astonishing levels of violence against people who were once one's neighbours and acquaintances, I find it helpful to centre the logics of this process. How were these coalitions mobilised? What incentivised such exclusion? What did these exclusionary practices do for the perpetrators? The overlapping of the multiple antagonisms of class, confession, and ethnicity produced in each case study a project of exclusion, two of which were discursively linked, and all three of which held striking similarities. One must presume that there were comprehensible logics at play, if so many people in so many locales could have acted in so similar a fashion.

In the Habsburg empire, we witness the loss of the state by the German nationalists, as the political order attempts to secure for itself a broader base of support in Cisleithania, which was not conducive to the maintenance of German hegemony. Antisemitism in this case is the sublimated anxieties of the loss of privilege, hence its intense paranoia and rejection of assimilation. Moral and therefore racial purity is paramount in the tale of betrayal and threat that German antisemitism in Cisleithania wove for itself. German nationalists did not control the state but constituted a racial coalition awaiting their shot at power. Therefore, during the span of this study, there was no transition from racial hegemony to racial despotism.

In the Romanov empire, antisemitism was the only available glue for an autocratic regime that was sorely lacking in sustaining logics. The refusal of the regime to widen participation and thereby support for the regime preconditioned a paranoia about internal enemies, because the autocracy was unable to conceive of building a broader constituency for its rule. The tsarist government was committed to utilising neo-feudal fantasy to govern an industrial society that was developing mass politics. The futility of this enterprise could be concealed by antisemitism,

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*Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands* (Bloomington, 2013) for examples of a comparative analysis between these multinational empires.

and thus tsarist antisemitism reached its discursive peak as the regime teetered on the brink. The last decade of imperial Russia constituted an example of racial despotism par excellence.

In the Ottoman empire, we chart the desperate attempt to hold together the state by an embittered and resentful elite. This elite was in a very real sense the recipient of racial bias by the competitor states of Christian Europe. Simultaneously, this elite also had its own histories of superiority vis-à-vis other religious groups internally and externally. The synergy of these two tendencies was increasing resentment amongst Ottoman Muslims of their Christian fellow citizens. The state mobilised exclusionary logics of pan-Islamism to legitimate itself as it gave up on appealing to its Christian subjects. It began a series of massacres and expulsions already in the Hamidian era, which would reach a crescendo in the Late Ottoman Genocides. The Ottoman empire was an example of exclusionary despotism over the longue durée.

Whilst the comparison of the exclusion of commercially oriented minorities in these three dynastic multiethnic empires has much to recommend it, it is nonetheless apposite to note the differences between each case study. Most obviously, two of our examples are Jews being excluded by Christians, while the other is Christians being excluded by Muslims. These self-evidently have different discursive histories, building on Christian Judeophobia and Islamic concepts of dhimmi respectively. The similarity of tropes utilised across these communities, however, does indicate that these antagonisms were responding to the broader incentives of both the premodern and modern social structure.

Another key difference is the levels of diasporism evident across the communities considered. Whilst the bulk of the Armenian and Greek city-dwelling populations were scattered across the Ottoman urban core, they did constitute a majority of the peasantry in some corners of the empire. This was not the case with the Jewish populations of the Habsburg and Romanov empires, who were mainly townsfolk, not peasantry. Thus, the viability of a territorial solution in the former case was a lot more self-evident as a possibility for contemporaries than it was in

the latter. The danger of losing territory to an extent Greek nation-state or a possible Armenian nation-state was much more immediate to the nineteenth-century Ottoman state elite than the threat of a Jewish conspiracy was to German nationalists or tsarist bureaucrats, because it actually had some connection to reality. As a consequence of this, the progress of the counter-orientalist project was guided much more explicitly by raison d'etat than the antisemitic racial projects in Cisleithania and tsarist Russia.

Additionally, we cover three exclusionary projects but only two exclusionary despotisms. Whilst counter-orientalism and tsarist antisemitism successfully captured the state, German antisemitism intensified and fed off the loss of the previous German monopoly on the state. Though German hegemony was to all intents and purposes maintained in Cisleithania during the Dual Monarchy, the fact that this hegemony was contested and could experience local defeats was a bitter blow to the confidant futurity of German nationalism. The state administration required broad popular support to instantiate itself, which required less overt favour be granted to one national minority amongst many. Demographic reality and constitutional government demanded the Habsburg state in Cisleithania become pluralist. However, this reality was rejected by many Germans, who refused to renounce hegemony to become a normal nation, but aspired to reassert their primacy. Ergo, interests of the Habsburg state and the German nation had decoupled in the view of many German nationalists. The Ottoman and Romanov empires, with their zombified autocracies followed by failed constitutional settlements, as well as their less diverse populations, were never compelled to pluralise support for the state in the same way. Hence the state capture by the exclusionary projects of these to regimes desperate to fight the tide. In the choice between sharing power and mobilising support via resentment, both chose the latter.

## What Is Our Structure?

This thesis is structured in two parts. In Part One, which consists of two chapters, we elaborate the theoretical background of this comparative investigation. In Chapter One, we construct a model of nationalism via the synthesis of Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson. Gellner is taken as particularly illuminating on the socio-economic reasons why a linguistically oriented nationalism arose in nineteenth-century Europe. The pivotal importance of industrialisation, urbanisation, mass education, and state expansion to this process is elaborated in detail. Anderson, meanwhile, is utilised as a model of how nationalism was ideated, with its many contingencies in the delineation of the nation. Via the synthesis of these two approaches, the material base and the superstructure, we arrive at the model of nationalism that is employed throughout this work.

Chapter Two concerns itself with racial formation, a model of exclusion to nationalism's inclusion. The theory of Michael Omi and Howard Winant on the formation of race is narrated, along with key terminology which I utilise throughout this study. Thereafter, this model is adapted from its settler colonial foundations to the experience of religious minorities in the metropole. A socio-economic model of antisemitism in nineteenth-century Europe is constructed by reference to Judith Butler's phantasm in order to make sense of this project's intense conspiratorialism. A projection of all the dislocation of industrial modernity onto a newly visible minority is maintained as the driving logic of antisemitism as a mass phenomenon, an association of cause, industrialisation is intensely dislocating, with effect, one is more likely to encounter Jews after the dissolution of the pre-industrial barriers. This furnished an inchoate antisemitic coalition ready for mobilisation. Thereafter, we move onto orientalism and counter-orientalism. Utilising Edward Said's concept of orientalism, we narrate the discursive exclusion of the Ottoman state elite from the European great powers. In reaction to the diminished status of the Turkish Muslim governing coalition both internally and externally, this elite created a counter-discourse to its own subjugation.

In Part Two, we apply the theoretical structure developed in Part One to each of the case studies. In Chapter Four, we recount how the Habsburg empire became a German state with hardly any Germans. The early nineteenth-century history of German nationalism and German liberalism is charted, recounting its revolutionary aura and liberatory character. This tale enables us to comprehend why German Jews in the Habsburg monarchy were such avid supporters of Germanness or Deutschtum. We recount the hodgepodge fashion by which a Habsburg Jewry was constituted, a reflection of the inchoate assemblage of the state itself. The bifurcation of this population into a minority of German assimilés in the Bohemian and Hungarian lands and majority of unassimilated Jews further east is discussed, before moving onto the increasing demographic concentration of this German Jewry in Vienna over the nineteenth century.

The halcyon days of German liberalism do not last, however. As the state attempts to broaden its constituency, the Germans lose their exclusive claim on the state, as they are, fundamentally, a minority. This looses intense paroxysms of German national agitation onto the body politic of the monarchy, deeply inflected by paranoia, hopelessness, and desperation to maintain status. Political antisemitism becomes the consensus of Habsburg German politics, with explicitly antisemitic parties gaining majorities in both the Cisleithanian elections that were held under universal suffrage. Then we turn to the relationship of socio-economic trends to the structuring of this antisemitic coalition, mapping how the interlocking of ethnic, religious, and class antagonisms structured its tropes and political utility. Finally, we finish up with a brief summary of the Jewish responses to this crisis, as these fervent Germans were forced to reckon with assimilationism's false promise, prompting a surfeit of answers to an intractable problem.

In Chapter Five, we examine the Romanov encounter with its Jewish population over the longue durée. Though, initially welcomed, the tsarist relationship to its Jewry quickly soured as the autocracy came to distrust cities and commerce as harbingers of danger. The slower progress of industrialisation combined with the Romanov empire's abiding commitment to the inherent

inequality of peoples prevented the implementation of liberal political economy in the Russian empire. As a consequence, the corporate status of Jews as a particular and subordinate people was maintained until tsarism's eventual demise. Whilst compromises with the dictates of capitalist modernity meant that some Jews, those with particular skills or higher educations, were allowed more rights, the autocracy moved to limit this process. Thus, processes of agglomeration and assimilation, and thereby salarianisation and professionalisation, were impeded by the emperor's diktats. In late imperial Russia, a large Jewish population was prevented from adapting to the new circumstances, proletarianizing it as the old socio-economic basis of its existence immolated under capitalist relations of production.

This population was disaffected, as its mobility was restricted in an exceptional fashion. However, it was not the only constituency that the tsarist empire had lost, as the refusal to build a broader basis of support was a point of pride for the regime. With the increasing spread of modern subjectivities instantiated by industrial capitalism, the autocracy lost consent. This was made apparent in the 1905-7 revolutions, which the empire barely survived. The government, however, resented the compromises forced on it, and retreated into a neo-feudal dreamworld which mobilised mass support for its profoundly anti-democratic project via the logics of violent, intensifying antisemitism. Via fighting the Jew, the tsarist regime wished to buttress its doomed project of fighting modernity. Jews, faced with a regime that despised them, became a notably antisystemic group on a cross-class basis. A part of this rejection of imperial Russia was the renunciation of Russification, as Jews turned towards national projects of both a Zionist and diaspora nationalist bent.

In Chapter Six, we analyse the adaptation of the Ottoman empire's relationship to its Christian subjects during its reform era. The Sublime State begins a process of centralisation and bureaucratisation in the nineteenth century, as the extent of its relative decline vis-à-vis the Christian European powers becomes difficult to ignore. This process accelerates under the

pressure of the Osmanlis' British and French allies, implementing the basis for liberal economy, the abolition of corporate differentiation and the commercialisation of the economy. These developments are highly beneficial to the diasporic religious minorities in the empire's central belt, who are oriented towards trade and production. Therefore, over the reform period, we see the constitution of a prosperous and visible population of minorities in the empire's core, upsetting previous hierarchies.

The state, and therefore its Muslim elite class of functionaries and gentry, meanwhile, leaps from crisis to crisis, threatening the very viability of the state itself. We see the establishment of an embattled elite, oriented towards a state that struggles to pay its wages and debts. Meanwhile, the prosperous bourgeoisie, professional class, and salariat of this society are insulated from some of the state's crises, and notably minoritarian. These map onto both local class/ethnic antagonisms elsewhere in the empire, such as that between Armenian peasants and Kurd pastoralists, as well as diplomatic threats, such as the Hellenic kingdom's policy of military expansion, to create an image for the state elite of a body politic infested by internal enemies. Whilst there is a brief remission after the Young Turk revolution, the revolutionaries only accelerate the collapse of the empire they were trying to save. Faced with the real possibility of the imminent collapse of the empire, the new government dispenses with any attempt at inclusion. The first steps of expropriation and extermination were already trod before the outbreak of WW1, as the state elite elects to eliminate those it regards as enemies within.

Finally, in the conclusion, we recentre the comparative approach, elaborating the commonalities and particularities of our case studies to arrive at our general findings. We then finish up with some brief remarks, where we assert once again the mutability of each of the forms of categorisation considered herein, and the consequent necessity of considering issues of religion, race, ethnicity, and class in a holistic fashion. A dialectical approach to inclusion and exclusion constitutes an effective strategy for looking at these issues in a flexible and adaptable manner.

# **Section One: Theoretical Background**

This section will elaborate the general scholarship on nations and race utilised in this investigation. At every instance, theoretical models which centre the social logics of these modes of community building are selected. At the most fundamental level, these two practices of delineating solidarities, race and nation, constitute the mirror of each other. The nation demarcates who shall be included, the in-group, and race determines who shall be excluded, the out-group. These two concepts, messily linked and indeed, often used synonymously during the nineteenth century, are structuring factors of the Jewish experience in modern Europe. Hence, bringing these two concepts into dialogue, and developing an interoperable framework between these two branches of scholarship will enable us to apply the framework developed herein to chart Jewish racial and national formation across the three dynastic empires in the next section.

In the nationalism chapter, the bases for the rise of nationalism, both socio-economic and psychocultural, are elaborated to elucidate the construction of mass solidarities in a mediatised age. Building on this framework, and the notion of deep social crisis wrought by industrial modernity, the thesis of racial formation postulated by Michael Omi and Howard Winant in its eponymous chapter is adapted to create a model which is plausible as a formula for comparative minority history in the European metropole. This model of in- and out-group solidarities is at every point understood as the result of the interplay of intellectual milieus and socio-political realities. In the aggregate, everything is explicable, and nothing is inevitable; that is the credo via which this overarching theoretical discussion is structured. The national and racial projects considered throughout this work were the twining of social structure and historical contingency to instantiate viable projects of social organisation. They were flexible practices of rule, variegated modes of social belonging, and fundamental technologies of comprehension in the era of mass, mediated societies.

# <u>Chapter One: Nationalism</u>

This thesis synthesises the approaches of Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson for its model of nationalism. It takes the view that Gellner is extremely helpful in laying out the material causes of the rise of European linguistic nationalism. Anderson, meanwhile, is taken as perceptive as to the ideation of this novel project. Via his emphasis on the social construction of nationalism, he helps centre the contingency of the bounding of these projects, which I find vital to any comprehensible accounting of nationalism.

Gellner is at his most convincing when describing the general processes via which the *European experience* of the rise of nationalism came to be. In other words, his reasoning is compelling for the socio-political structures which predetermined the rise of a linguistically oriented nationalism. Although both he and Anderson detail the effects of the advent of industrial capitalism and the expansion of the state had on the advantages that certain languages conferred vis-à-vis others, Gellner provides an explanation for why this occurred and why it would create national identification en masse. Industrial capitalism required a standardisation of its human capital as much as it did any other input to enable interoperability and efficiency. Therefore, common languages and frames of reference were required, in order to enable the largest possible labour pool. Hence the hunger of both state and capital for an increasing flow of monoglot literates.

Why this process would engage the masses in national identification, however, is as a result of the world-historical transformation that the process of urbanisation initiated. People were thrust into the cities en masse and continuously over a substantial period. They were compelled to leave behind their familial and social networks and build new ones in the cities. Gellner's point that this experience of mass atomisation would compel new forms of identification via linguistic borders in the first instance is, in my view, perceptive and compelling. Nationalism was and

remains a mass phenomenon, and therefore understanding its success as an idea throughout every stratum of society is essential.

Anderson, however, is far more convincing on the ideation of nationalism. Particularly, his argument of how administrative boundaries create social meaning far in excess of those intended by the relevant bureaucrats offers a solid explanation for the mutability of borders and the contingency of the bounds of nationhood. Why someone might believe Washington is distinct from British Columbia has little to do with language, geography, or history, both being states of English-speaking settler colonies in the Pacific Northwest. Rather, it is the parameters of the administrative unit which often help construct the boundaries amongst the literati of a nation. Thus, although language is one means to bound the nation, it's one of many means of doing so. Relevant to this study alongside language are also the social linkages and exclusions created by religion and race. To summarise in a Marxist formula, if Gellner gives the material base of why a linguistically oriented nationalism might occur, Anderson provides the superstructure, or ideological framework that would structure this phenomenon.[5]

## Nationalism: The Socio-Economic

With the rise of nationalism, we witness the transition from a religious to national media culture. In the agrarian era, there was a bifurcation between the clerisy, or class of literate specialists, and the state, an institution of violence and taxation. State and clerisy could overlap, or be distinct, be centralised into one structure, or operate as rivals. Thus, although these structures could be concordant, they were not necessarily. They were essential in terms of social function in an agrarian society, but their interplay was contingent. These two 'centralizations of power and of culture/cognition' may but not necessarily must have been separate from one another,

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[5] Modern Language Association, *Most Spoken Languages in Washington in 2010* (New York, 2010), MLA Map Language Data Center*,* [Accessed from https://apps.mla.org/cgi-shl/docstudio/docs.pl?map_data_results.], and Statistics Canada, *Language Use in British Columbia* (Ottawa, 2023), 2021 Census of Population [Accessed from https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2021/dp-pd/prof/details/page.cfm?LANG=E&GENDERlist=1,2,3&STATISTIClist=1,4&DGUIDlist=2021A000259&HEADERlist=,15,13,18,12,16,14,17&SearchText=British%20Columbia.] respectively.

but due to the lower level of surplus resources in pre-industrial societies, they must be separate from the vast majority of the population, the peasantry.[6]

This division is further reinforced by the ideologies of rule at the time, which highlighted distinction and inequality to elevate the elite and 'endow it with authority and permanence'. The concordance of 'the political and national unit', which is how Gellner defines nationalism, would thus make little sense in this period. The premodern state desires taxes and peace within its borders, not the promotion of 'lateral communication between its subject communities'. The clerisy may have some interest in shared cultural norms, but very much lacks the resources to do so in the pre-industrial era and also is simultaneously enmeshed in the desire to encourage stratification to reify its own authority.[7]

Thus, culture in the agrarian period is highly stratified. Clerisy maintains a high culture which is separated by a yawning gulf from the majority of experience within its constituency. It is broad ranging and avowedly non-local but rather pan-ecumenical. Folk culture, meanwhile, is deeply rooted in locale. It is internally oriented on the village level, non-literate. It is a method of communication grounded in the routines of village life. Thus, the juxtaposition between the vertical of peasant culture and the horizontal of clerical culture, between the abstract and the contextual, explain the multi-ethnic subject populations and homogenous politico-military ruling classes of pre-industrial states.[8]

Amongst these populations there were often diasporic minorities who specialised in trading and commerce. This was beneficial to the peasantry, as having an outsider population with whom one had no linkages of kith and kin was useful for trading relationships. Under the inescapable weight of the cyclical and stable procession of village life, where every exchange and each

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[6] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism.* 1st ed. (Oxford, 1996), pp.8-10
[7] Ibid., pp.1, 10-11
[8] Ibid., p.12

interaction was embedded within the nexus of reciprocity and social cohesion, commercial relationships were impeded. There were countervailing pressures to secure one's own present gain and to hedge against future misfortune by conferring advantage to others, creating obligation. Disputes were often hidden, as the maintenance of public harmony and one's place in village society was paramount. Enter the outsider, with whom one can trade without fear of jeopardising one's social relationships and therefore existence. An intermediary unburdened by context is intensely useful in such a situation. These diasporas were nonetheless a precarious and often reviled minority, for commerce is an oppositional practice. For state elites, meanwhile, these communities were useful, as their lack of ability to settle their own scores compelled a reliance on the central power. Consequently, they were prompt to settle tax demands from the guarantor of their position.[9]

This model of stasis was ruptured with the industrial revolution. The closed worlds of the villages were opened, ever greater quantities of peasants were drawn into the cities and into performing commoditised labour. A society was created that was mobile both in terms of class and locality. But although industrial society induced a higher level of specialisation on the macro level, it also demanded a standardisation of inputs including its human capital. Every member of society is subjected first to a generic education with increasing degrees of specialisation the further along the educational route one goes. This creates an inter-comprehensible standardised epistemology in which further knowledge is holistically integrated.[10]

Gellner names this process of universal, standardised education as exo-socialisation, and argues that because it is universal it must ipso facto be generic and context-free too. The large outlay of resources required to maintain this system is so large that it can only be maintained by the

[9] Ibid., pp.103-5.
[10] Ibid., pp.24-7

state. High culture and the necessity of its universal social reproduction thus transform it from 'the adornment, the confirmation and legitimation of a social order' to 'the minimal shared atmosphere within which alone the members of the society can breathe and survive and produce.' Therefore, diversity through apathy is replaced with cultural standardisation as the norm by the dictates of industrial society and its state guarantor.[11]

This is the material basis for the rise of nationalism as a political principle. An industrial society that prizes cultural homogeneity is imposed upon the social fabric of an agrarian society that had produced its opposite in the vast majority of territory. The state requires the harmonisation of the high culture to the body politic, i.e. assimilation, whereas the subject nations require the redrawing of the political boundaries to reflect the cultural zone, i.e. secession or national independence. As states rarely countenance the voluntary loss of territory, and individuals often do not welcome the loss of their culture, the synthesis of these two opposites precondition national struggle, what one could go so far as to name a dialectical nationalism.[12]

Societies reify present structures of authority into foundational concepts of ontology, including identity via self-positioning in a politico-cultural economic order. In the agrarian age, where categories and people were by and large static, this produced a reification of the political order in the conception of the divine. In the mobile and more egalitarian industrial age, where *essentialised* hierarchy is no longer tenable as a political principle, the space between the rootless capitalist subjects, the culture that binds a society of atomised, homogenised individuals becomes reified instead. Thus, a nation is, in the material sense, a state-manufactured, media-mediated homogenous cultural sphere created by the dictates of industrialisation.[13]

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[11] Ibid., pp.35, 37-8
[12] Ibid., p.39
[13] Ibid., pp.56-7.

But although so far it has been clearly enunciated why nations and nationalisms emerged as political principles, it is still necessary to define why subaltern nations emerged. Industrialisation, especially in its early phase, produced sharp social fissures where the stated egalitarianism of industrial society clashed with the clear material immiseration of the nascent proletariat. Although this social crisis lessened over the longue durée, in the initial stage of industrialisation it was quite pressing. Thus, a large mass of same-language speakers thrust into a new city, shorn of their social networks would develop an in-group identity on the basis of shared language, especially if the bosses and bureaucrats of the city spoke a different, imperial language. Thus, class stratification finds expression *in the first instance* through national rather than class struggle.[14]

This is also relevant to the experiences of the diasporic commercial communities on the advent of industrialisation. These minorities are well positioned for the coming of modernity. Under capitalist relations of production, commerce becomes the core mechanism via which one attains the means of existence, due to the replacement of uncommodified household labour for the provision of food, clothes etc. with that of commodified labour for which one receives a salary to purchase such wares. The mass mediation of subsistence was a novel phenomenon, and one that conferred huge opportunities during this period of commercial expansion to those who were already specialised in trade. With the tendency of capitalism to specialisation and agglomeration, many merchants would be outcompeted and shut up shop, but those who succeeded could become fantastically wealthy. Diaspora members for the first time held genuine, systemic power.[15]

Of course, this was a vanishingly small percentage of the minority, but those who were outcompeted still held other advantages. These communities were urban and highly literate,

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[14] Ibid., pp.62-3, 75.
[15] Ibid., p.103.

better placed for the opportunities that industrialisation brought, if also the first to feel its dislocations.[16] Thus, instead of proletarianisation, these communities gravitated to processes of embourgeoisement, professionalisation,[17] and salarianisation.[18] They now underwent the same exo-socialisation as the old clerisies,[19] but their orientations were different, preferring private practice, indeed often being excluded from state service. Thus, in the nineteenth century we have two literati cohabiting, with different histories, kinship networks, and career orientations. The old clerisy was still oriented towards the state and the established religion, while the diasporas staffed the new bureaucracies of capital. Without a sense of associational identity to bind these two communities, tension and antagonism could result. It is important to recall that the discursive histories of subjugation and exclusion did not disappear just because these minorities adapted well to capitalist modernity. These old discourses were in fact synthesised with modern anxieties to bound the imagined community to the diaspora's detriment.

## Nationalism: The Politico-Cultural

Benedict Anderson has provided by far the most popular definition of the nation. He defines the nation as 'an imagined community – [one] imagined as both limited and inherently sovereign'. It is imagined as it is a socially constructed solidarity which includes more people than it is possible for any single individual to personally know. Finally, it is imagined as a community for, quite apart from the multitude of inequalities and hierarchies that occur within nations, it is nonetheless conceptualised as an association of fellow citizens by its members, to

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[16] Ibid.

[17] i.e. they joined the professions, such as doctors, lawyers, or accountants.

[18] From the term 'salariat', i.e. 'salary earners; in other words, wage earners in higher-status, better-remunerated employment. The term is derived from, but also used as a counter to, the Marxist notion of the proletariat, with its associated belief in the formation of a relatively undifferentiated and exploited working class.' Therefore, salarianisation would be the process by which an individual or group becomes incorporated into this class. Edmund Heery and Mike Noon, *A Dictionary of Human Resource Management* 3rd ed. (Oxford, 2017), [Accessed from https://www-oxfordreference-com.uaccess.univie.ac.at/display/10.1093/acref/9780191827822.001.0001/acref-9780191827822-e-1099?rskey=cLXZsr&result=1.]

[19] Except in the Ottoman empire, but that is a mark of the state's weakness that it could not centralise the education system. See Heather J. Sharkey, *A History of Muslims, Christians, and Jews in the Middle East* (Cambridge, 2017), pp.199-201.

the extant that people will sacrifice for its benefit. Although Anderson is more circumspect about defining nationalism itself, one can infer that it is the striving to realise the sovereignty within limited territorial bounds of this imagined community.[20]

The religious community was the premodern site of the ideation of solidarities, being the previous cultural system via which people imagined their commonalities, solidarities, and oppositions. These communities did not possess a singular vernacular, but rather a single sacred language. Thus, they were united by signs, not sounds. By the same virtue, proselytising was simpler than assimilating today. It is simpler to be accepted into *the* truth rather than *our* truth. Nonetheless, states often sought to ensure either religious uniformity or, where this was not held to be possible, strictly enforced, hierarchical boundaries. The differing claims of religion and nations, the contrast between the universal and the particular, to a certain extent precondition the claims they make on society.[21]

Nationalism originated in the Americas, where wars of national liberation were led by colonial elites with the same language and religion as the metropole. Their protagonists, colonial aristocrats perched over slaves and indigenous peoples, feared the inclusion of the masses in government substantially more than the authority of the metropole. Indeed, what national solidarities were formed in this period between the coloniser elites and the colonised masses were the result of the independence struggle. So why would the elites of these countries fight and die for the idea of a free nation when they were already privileged functionaries of the old regime, and indeed, be the first to do so?[22]

Administrative practices create meaning via constituting social reality. Cultural zones are created by the constant movement of peoples from within bureaucratic locales. Such

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[20] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*. New ed. (London, 2006), pp.6-7
[21] Ibid., pp.12-3, 19-20
[22] Ibid., pp.47-50

movements create both a solidarity of experience as well as networks of interaction with fellow participants. The rise of absolutism and its state-bureaucratic machineries of governance compelled such movements of elites and functionaries. The bureaucrat would feel a sense of community with their fellow-travellers, schooled in the same administrative vernacular, sharing the same aspirations, being similarly rootless in place. However, not all imperial bureaucrats were created equal. Although the creole elites were functionally indistinguishable from their metropolitan counterparts, the level of creole ascent was limited to their own colony alone, in contrast to the metropolitan, who could be dispatched anywhere under the state's control. Thus, the arbitrary demarcations of colonial boundaries became quite real in a social sense. This is reflected in the retention of colonial borders post-independence, despite the fact they conformed not at all to the distribution of indigenous peoples, and the distinctions between the creoles of the various colonies were not substantial. The networks of elite circulation had bounded the imagined community within the various appanages of the carcass of empire. Language was not the deciding factor here as to where to delineate the nation.[23]

In nineteenth-century Europe, meanwhile, the course of revolutionary nationalisms was different. Whilst the vast majority of the literati in the American settler colonies spoke a singular language, the case in Europe was reversed. The states there were by and large multi-ethnic assemblages, including the lower rungs of their intelligentsias. The expansion of the state bureaucracy and the creation of capitalist modernity, with its ever-expanding matrices of press, commerce, and mass media, forged a new reading public. This reading public was a coalition of the new bourgeoisie, the old gentry, the expanded class of functionaries, of state and capital alike,[24] and the professions. This elite was much larger than the pre-industrial governing class. Its kinship was imagined rather than actual. It was a community that was abstracted and mediated via cultural production. The replacement of personal ties with ideated one's is

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[23] Ibid., pp. 53-7.
[24] i.e. the salariat.

summarised by Anderson pithily, 'one can sleep with anyone, but one can only read some people's words.' Thus, a linguistically bounded solidarity is to a certain extent compelled in a professionalised, bureaucratised and mediatised world, at least to a higher level.[25]

The composition of these coalitions naturally varied between different linguistic groups. For example, the 'historic nations' of Central and Eastern Europe, particularly Hungary and Poland, were rather top heavy, being well-endowed with gentry and rather lacking in bourgeoisie, functionaries and professionals due to the uneven development of capitalism in Europe. Nonetheless, the standard coalition was lesser nobility, academics, professionals, and businessmen. The reception that these progenitors of nations received also varied to the relationships of these groups to the masses, from positive in Ireland to negative in Galicia. Nonetheless, the progressive universalisation of literacy was in every case a beneficial factor for the progress of nationalism.[26]

But why did these elite groups invite the masses to their national projects? There are two reasons. Firstly, if one is demanding a state for the nation, for a linguistically bounded community, articulating it on a solely class basis is contradictory. Yet again, Anderson summarises this point succinctly, '[i]f Hungarians deserved a national state, that *meant* Hungarians, all of them'. Secondly, there was already a model of nationalism available to these national demiurges, the Americas. The wars of national liberation from the British, Spanish, and Portuguese empires were not fought by liberal democrats committed from the outset to legal equality and popular consent. Nonetheless, this is how they came to be perceived, reported on, and mythologised. Thus, models of nationalism are imitable and reproduceable, and the core tenets of a model of nationalism are defined by the beholder. Therefore, a model may

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[25] Ibid., pp. .74-7, 79.
[26] Ibid., p.79.

contrast with the reality of its inspirations, such as the example of America, a model of democratic nationalism and a state where slavery was legal for a century after its revolution. [27]

Official nationalisms formed after, and in response to, the revolutionary nationalisms of the creole elites and disaffected literatis. They were attempts to give ideological coherence to the ramshackle assemblages of inheritance and conquest held by dynasts the world over. These projects of reactionary renewal sought to centralise power, homogenise state administration, and expand the state, both for reasons of internal governance and international competition. The three dynastic empires considered herein all experimented with official nationalism to various degrees. Indeed, Anderson even names the Romanov empire as the typical example of official nationalism, with the 1905-7 Russian revolution being 'as much a revolution of non-Russians against Russification as it was a revolution of workers, peasants, and radical intellectuals against autocracy.'[28] Meanwhile, the Habsburg empire's state patriotism increasingly built ethno-linguistic pluralism into its fabric, as it sought for itself the support of the broadest spread of the population, much to the chagrin of its German nationalists.[29] Finally, the Ottoman empire gradually filtered its official nationalism from dynastic to Islamist and thereafter Turkish as its clerisy struggled to find a compelling logic for state legitimacy. This discursive renunciation of parts its population presaged the exterminatory policies of its final years.[30]

## Conclusion

In this chapter, we have seen how the rise of a linguistically oriented nationalism was preordained by the dictates of industrial modernity. Capitalism demanded a monoglot and universal high culture within states to ensure that its internal discursive system was legible to all participants in the age of mass mediation. However, capitalism also begat urbanisation,

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[27] Ibid., pp.81-2.
[28] Ibid., pp. 86, 95, 87-8.
[29] Pieter M. Judson, *The Habsburg Empire: A New History* (Cambridge, 2016), pp.293-4, 298.
[30] Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State* (New York, 2001), p.402.

thereby filling urban centres with the (ex-)peasantry of their vicinity, no matter if these peasants' language accorded with that of the city. These dislocated novi homines formed communities and therefore identities based on these linguistic barriers. Therefore, in regions of premodern ethnic pluralism, the transition to the age of industrial modernity preconditioned processes of competitive ethnogenesis, as language became the border of the community and the self.

However, how these communities were ideated was more contingent than simply a commonality of language, for membership of a community requires a recognition of the community's members, otherwise that membership is a fiction. The main example given by Anderson on the contingency of the borders of ideation are the administrative, but the example which we will encounter below for same language speakers is religion, which structured the borders of one's social reality comprehensively in the nineteenth century. These contested national understandings would be laden with tension.

Interwoven amongst our accounting of nationalism were references to the particular path of diasporic and commercially oriented minorities in both the premodern and industrial-modern eras. These communities were useful in the pre-industrial era as their precarious outsider status made them an honest broker in an age when commerce was impeded via the social embeddedness of every actor. From industrialisation onwards, however, commerce became the lifeblood of the economy, and these minorities were well oriented for the switch. These urbanite populations showed a particular path vis-à-vis their majoritarian fellow citizens, not peasants proletarianized, but rather burghers salarianised. This conferred heavy concentration into certain highly literate and prestigious parts of the economy, which bred notable resentments from the majorities amongst whom they lived, and from whom they were regarded as separate.

# Chapter Two: Racial Formation

This study makes use of the theories of racial formation developed by Michael Omi and Howard Winant, which I prize for their emphasis on the social function of race in society. The intentionality of race as a social structure is deeply embedded into their terminology. This helps to construct an analytical toolkit which remains grounded in the changeable constellation of social forces that produced practices of exclusion across history. Race has to serve a social function for some constituency, as otherwise it would not exist, but such 'racial projects' change over time as the balance of forces within society changes. However, it must always build on what came before, as race does not exist ex nihilo. The history of discursive exclusions and the actuality of political need codetermine race. Therefore, even if race is ideated in terms of eternal contagion and blood purity, it is an adaptable technology of rule.[31]

After we have elaborated Omi and Winant's theory and terminology for our purposes, we then adjust it to the parameters of the experience of religious minorities in the metropole. The centrality of religion to premodern practices of rule is highlighted, allowing us to lay the groundwork for the symbiosis for the discourses of racial domination and religious exclusion that we witness in both antisemitism and orientalism. The thesis of this investigation is thereafter exposited; in the social crisis wrought by the implementation of capitalist modernity, diasporic minorities, newly visible and affluent, became convenient lightning rods for disquiet in political orders that could neither justify nor stop modernisation.

Then we turn to elaborating antisemitism. We reach firstly for the concept of the 'phantasm', freshly elaborated by Judith Butler, to explain the conspiratorialism of antisemitism, as well as its giddy lack of relation to reality. This psychosocial hysteria is then embedded into the circumstances of late nineteenth century Europe, where a continent is being remade by the impersonal forces of capitalism and industrialisation, a place which is entirely transformed

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[31] Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States* 3rd ed. (New York, 2015), p.125.

without consultation. This intense dislocation is presumed to provide the overarching reason for the late nineteenth century antisemitic project, which will then be embedded into the social relations of Cisleithania and Russia in the relevant case studies.

Finally, we postulate the rise of a counter-orientalist project in the Ottoman empire, which structured the relationships of disfavoured religious minorities to the state. First, we elaborate orientalism as the racial project of exploitation colonialism. Then we consider the history of discursive superiority vis-à-vis other faiths in historic Islamic practices of rule. Afterwards, we chronicle how these discursive histories were reached for as the Ottoman empire and its elite were subjected to racism to right the status loss, via displacing fault onto those within the state's power.

## The Terminology

Within this study, 'racial formation' is utilised for the process of creating race, thereby centring the construction of these exclusions, thereby contextualising race in its social structure. Ergo:

> 'The process of race making, and its reverberations throughout the social order, is what we call racial formation. We define racial formation as the sociohistorical process by which racial identities are created, lived out, transformed, and destroyed.'[32]

'Racial project', meanwhile, is utilised to highlight intentionality. What is the goal? For its practitioners, it is a programme for now and the future. A la Omi and Winant:

> *'Racial projects* do both the ideological and the practical "work" of making [the] links and articulating the connection between [social structure and its signification]. *A racial project is simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial identities and meanings, and an effort to organize and distribute resources (economic, political, cultural) along particular racial lines.* Racial projects connect what race *means* in a particular discursive or ideological practice and the ways in which both social structures and everyday experiences

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[32] Ibid., p.109.

are racially *organized*, based upon that meaning. Racial projects are attempts both to shape the ways in which social structures are racially signified and the ways that racial meanings are embedded in social structures.'[33]

Thus, the typology of the racial project is utilised throughout this study to highlight what antisemitism was doing for its constituents in Christian Europe, and what counter-orientalism delivered for its adherents in the Ottoman empire.

It is vital to highlight, however, that there was never just one racial project, but multiple. A la Omi and Winant, '[a]t any given historical moment, racial projects compete and overlap, evincing varying capacity either to maintain or to challenge the prevailing racial system.' This multiplicity of projects battling for hegemony is an indispensable part of the histories we chart below. The assemblage of coalitions for particular racial projects is something we chart over the longue durée in the course of this investigation.[34]

Additionally, the 'master category' concept that Omi and Winant postulate is also useful for this study. A master category is 'a fundamental concept that has profoundly shaped, and continues to shape, the history, polity, economic structure, and culture' of a state or region. They elaborate, with reference to race in the American context, that '[f]rom the very inception of the American nation, race has provided a template for other sociopolitical cleavages and conflicts. Concepts of race have profoundly informed and legitimated domination and inequality. They have also shaped resistance, insurgency, and radical democratic struggles.' This is not to deny the relevance of other axes of social classification and oppression. They clarify:

'We are not suggesting that race is a transcendent category— something that stands above or apart from class, gender, or other axes of inequality and difference. The literature on

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[33] Ibid., p125.
[34] Ibid., p.126

intersectionality has clearly demonstrated the mutual determination and co- constitution of the categories of race, class, gender, and sexual orientation. It is not possible to understand the (il)logic of any form of social stratification, any practice of cultural marginalization, or any type of inequality or human variation, without appreciating the deep, complex, comingling, interpenetration of race, class, gender, and sexuality.'

Rather, they maintain that, as the core logic of the American state and society, race has been the reference point time and again for practices of both rule and rebellion across the many axes of social categorisation.[35]

## Adapting the Framework

Omi and Winan's history of the process of racial formation in the United States requires some adaptation for analysing the experience of religious minorities in Europe. The accounting they give is that the process of the conquest and settlement by Europeans of the Americas preconditioned the creation of the category of race before it had been theorised as such. Race is first and foremost a practical structure of domination which was theorised after, and implemented first. It was supposed to be economical about the information which it conveyed, telling the European settlers who was 'like or unlike, similar or different' and ergo, who was to be subjected to violence and expropriation, and who to negotiation and trade. Therefore, skin colour and physical differences became reified, and whiteness invented, to distinguish colonists from First Nations and African peoples, whose lives, property and labour were free to take. The facilitation of rapid expropriation was the race-making event in the post-Contact Americas.[36]

Although certainly these practices and discourses affected Europe itself in manifold ways, the integration of European countries into this complex relational matrix varied in both timepoint and intensity. The Russian and Ottoman empires were the least enmeshed in the racial project and discourse a la the American experience. The Habsburg empire, meanwhile, at least in its

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[35] Ibid., pp.106, 246.
[36] Ibid., p.114.

central European manifestation, was focused on European interstate competition, even though it was more integrated into racial discourses. Indeed, even among the most colonial-imperial of the great powers, Britain and France, how they interact with race is distinct from American practices, even if constantly in dialogue with them. Therefore, this study offers a different hypothesis, informed by the scholarship of nationalism discussed in the previous chapter; religion was the premodern master category in each of these premodern states, which structured the totality of these societies.[37]

Religion interacted with and codetermined categories of class,[38] gender, and sexuality in these societies. It structured practices of rule, and was the template for the apportionment of power and subjugation. This system began to collapse during the nineteenth century, to be messily and incompletely replaced by a multitude of competing projects. Linguistically bounded nationalism was the competitor which successfully reformulated the political arrangements in the majority of Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Religion, however, did not just suddenly disappear, but was of incredible import in the construction of race, particularly the two strands which are relevant to this study, antisemitism and orientalism.

Enter the racial project. As society was remade in the 19th century by capitalism, with its attendant industrialisation, urbanisation, alienation and mass literacy, a mass of mobile, atomised individuals demanded social meaning, an idea of solidarity to replace their lost homes. Nations were how one built in-groups, an 'us', but for constructing the other, the author of all the alienation that one might feel in 19th-century Europe, a religious minority that seemed to be adapting well to the new order provided a convenient lightning rod for the rolling social crisis. This applies to both the antisemitic racial project in Christian Europe as well as the Ottoman counter-project against orientalism.

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[37] Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (London, 1978), p.17.
[38] Or estate.

Utilising Gramscian theory, Omi and Winant postulate the transition from racial domination to racial hegemony, that is from rule based on domination to that based on consent, in the US in the postwar era. Of the three states we consider, only one can be considered as ruling by consent.[39] The Habsburg state in Cisleithania progressively broadened the basis for its own support from 1867 onwards. The Romanov autocracy was a paranoid dictatorship to its end, and whilst the overthrow of Abdulhamid augured the end of the ancien régime in the Ottoman empire, its successors failed to rule by consent either. These two states were not only despotic in the literal sense; exclusionary logics were vital in marshalling a constituency for regimes that failed to offer a future. Cisleithania, meanwhile, did have Christian German hegemony, but the necessity of compromises and ostensible equality was too much for a section of this population, for whom incredible paranoia and systemic disengagement was more appealing.

My methodology begs a question; if I think that antisemitism and orientalism have a different origin to American racism structurally, why utilise race as an approach? The simple answer is that they were regarded by the theoreticians of race as part of a cohesive whole. Race was a European discourse of rule, juxtaposed against multiple poles, white against Black, Aryan against Jewish,[40] Western against Oriental, but these multiple tendencies were understood as holistic. Although there were varying strands and constituencies for different parts of the racial project, both within and without particular states, the participants in this episteme regarded race as something both possible to know and worth knowing. Furthermore, these practitioners recognised each other as fellow initiates of this type of knowing. As has been explained above, antiblackness was developed in the settler colonial context of the Americas for rapid expropriation. Hereunder, we shall analyse antisemitism as the racial project in the metropole,

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[39] Ibid., p.132.
[40] George L. Mosse, *Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism, with a Critical Introduction by Christopher Browning* (Madison, 2020), p.xxvii

before moving onto orientalism as the racial project of exploitation colonialism, and the resultant counter-orientalist project of the orientalised and embittered Ottoman state elite.[41]

## Antisemitism

Antisemitism poses an issue for those for those wishing to ground it in its social and material milieu, in that it is both extremely conspiratorial and contradictory. It is difficult to clearly state what sociopolitical forces are structuring the racial project when the results are so incredibly confused and visibly irrational. Nonetheless, considering its broadly contemporaneous and Europe-wide spread, we must presume that there was some factor structuring the rise of antisemitism as a racial project with wide ranging popular support. The hypothesis recounted below is that this conspiratorial worldview was in fact a 'phantasmic scene' responding to the real social dislocation of industrialisation and modernisation with fantasy.

Judith Butler lays out the concept of the 'phantasmic scene' in *Who's Afraid of Gender*, where they interrogate the new and highly conspiratorial anti-gender movement. Building on the work of French psychoanalyst Jean Laplanche, Butler postulates that fantasy is 'an organization of desire and anxiety that follows certain structural and organizational rules' and therefore the 'syntax of dreams or fantasy is at once social and psychic.' Thus, phantasm is a mindset which is constructed by groups of people while possessing very little relation to reality, and reflects contemporary wants and fears, hence its appeal. Butler continues, 'when the scene is set, […] "gender" substitutes for a complex set of anxieties and becomes an overdetermined site where the fear of destruction gathers.'[42]

The 'phantasmic scene' is helpful for understanding the rise of European antisemitism, as it gives us a vocabulary of interrogating widely held conspiratorial worldviews that takes their social function seriously. For a summary of the convenient illogic of antisemitism as a racial

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[41] Said, *Orientalism*, p.41.
[42] Judith Butler, *Who's Afraid of Gender* (London, 2024), p.10.

project, Alina Cała gives a concise summary in her comprehensive *Jew. The Eternal Enemy?*
*The History of Antisemitism in Poland*. Antisemitism allowed its participants:

'to blame the Jews for virtually everything, regardless of internal coherence or logic. Jews were
to be responsible for revolutions and wars, capitalism and attempts to overthrow it, bourgeois
exploitation and provocative radicalism. Antisemitic journalists developed the individual
themes by way of testing their effectiveness. The figure of the Jew was neither an object of
observation nor an element of philosophical ponderings nor social concepts; rather, it became a
matter of faith, as it was in the Middle Ages – a symbol of the all evil.'[43]

Now let us compare how Butler describes the contemporary anti-gender movement:

'It hardly matters that historical documentation of an idealised patriarchal past is not supplied.
It surely does not matter that the arguments on offer are riddled with contradiction. The
incoherence and impossibility of the case against gender represent contradictory phenomena,
and even offer its public a way to collect many of its fears and convictions without ever having
to make the bundle coherent: gender represents capitalism, and gender is nothing but Marxism;
gender is a libertarian concept, and gender signals the new wave of totalitarianism; gender will
corrupt the nation, like unwanted migrants but also like imperialist powers. Which one is it?'[44]

If one were to exchange the word 'gender' for 'Jews', these two quotations could be describing
the same thing. Butler elaborates what this phantasm does for its participants, why it is an
appealing mobilising belief:

The contradictory power of the phantasm allows it to contain whatever anxiety or fear that the
anti-gender ideology wishes to stoke for its own purposes, without having to make any of it

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[43] Alina Cała, *Jew. The Eternal Enemy? The History of Antisemitism in Poland* (Berlin, 2018), Jan Burzyński
(trans.), p.*65.*
[44] Butler, *Who's Afraid of Gender*, p.16.

cohere. Indeed, the liberation from historical documentation and coherent logic is part of an escalating exhilaration that feeds a fascist frenzy and shores up forms of authoritarianism.'[45]

That is the function of antisemitism in the 19th and early 20th centuries: an exuberant antimodern project to gather up all the anxieties of the transition to industrial modernity and capitalism. The manifold dislocations are projected onto the Jews as a synecdoche for modernity, the impediment for the return to national folkish solidarity. Hence, the Jew is by nature a capitalist, an anarchist, staggeringly rich and disgustingly poor, and always, always urban.

Urbanisation was a transformation of world-historical proportions, where people were compelled en masse to leave their villages for the intense social dislocation and economic exploitation of 19th century cities. This new subjectivity of people without pasts, without communities, without social networks *as a mass phenomenon* brought about newfound awareness of diversity, and centred non-familial bonds, such as those of language and religion. In a newly mediatised age, where culture was the only thing tying together a violently atomised society, and where sociocultural homogeneity of human inputs was the demand of the new economic system, it is comprehensible why there would be constituencies for an anti-minority stance, both from the losers and beneficiaries of the new order. The nineteenth century was an era of mass anxiety crying out for explanations. Hence antisemitism could arise as a mass phenomenon. The social rupture of industrialisation was the race-making event for the antisemitic racial project. The goal of this racial project was to displace these anxieties and elide the social costs of the political consensus that ever-intensifying industrialisation was necessary.[46]

This is where the bucolic phantasies of antisemitic theorists are most revealing, in the desire of literati to dress up in peasant drag and call it authenticity. Ergo, the Aryan was the perfect

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[45] Ibid.
[46] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism,* pp.73-5.

peasant, although destiny had demanded he take up a range of functions in the present day. The Jew, in contrast, was the descendant of nomads, hence the persistence of Jewish mobility, rootlessness and cosmopolitanism into the modern age. The 'wandering Jew' was therefore the antithesis of the countryside idyll to which antisemites yearned to return.[47]

This finds many echoes in the spread of nationalism generally throughout Europe, which constructed folkish fantasies for its atomised urban literati and state machineries. A la Gellner, its 'symbolism is drawn from the healthy, pristine, vigorous life of the peasants, of the *Volk*, the *narod*.' Especially for dominant nationalisms, such as German or Russian, which lacked domestic explanations for why they controlled the state, and yet were also suffering the profound alienation and rupture of modernity, a conspiracy, a phantasm, offered the easiest explanation.[48] Again this finds echo with Butler's narrative of the contemporary moment:

> Although interpreted as a backlash against progressive movements, anti-gender ideology is driven by a stronger wish, namely, the restoration of a patriarchal dream-order […]. The project is fragile, however, since the patriarchal order it seeks to restore is a dream, a wish, even a fantasy that will reinstate order grounded in patriarchal authority. Recruitment into the anti-gender ideology movement is an invitation to join a collective dream, perhaps a psychosis, that will put an end to the implacable anxiety and fear that afflict so many people experiencing climate destruction firsthand, or ubiquitous violence and brutal war, expanding police powers, or intensifying economic precarity.[49]

Substitute the patriarchal dream-order for a peasant-oriented dream world, and once more it fits the example of 19th century antisemitism fantastically well.

I take as proof for this projection of modern dislocation postulated above the mass and almost simultaneous spread of antisemitism across Christian Europe as a popular movement.

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[47] Mosse, *Toward the Final Solution*, pp.56, 107.
[48] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p.57.
[49] Butler, *Who's Afraid of Gender?,* p.15.

Antisemitism is a distinctly modern phenomenon, deeply intertwined with the emergence of European mass politics. During the late nineteenth century, this was a continent being remade by the forces of urbanization, industrialization, rising literacy, and capitalist agriculture, as well as by new forms of governance, transportation, communication, and electoral politics. The contemporaneousness of pogroms and boycotts signals the mainstreaming of the antisemitic racial project, which had progressed past its elitist racial esotericism to mobilise the masses.[50]

But why were Jews chosen as the phantasm? It is important to emphasise that it was not only Jews who were encompassed by this project. The company one keeps is always indicative, also for the phantasm. A la George L Mosse, '[t]he insane, homosexuals, and habitual criminals were [also] seen as sharing the stigma of being unable to control their passions, which ranged from sexual lust to murderous anger.'[51] These three categories are so typically modern inventions that each received a monograph from Michel Foucault,[52] and the imaginarium of each was, by the 19th century, racial degeneration in the cities. Nonetheless, it is incontestable that Jews were the foci of this phantasm, and the long history of Christian Judeophobia in premodern Europe helped ensure that Jews became the site of overdetermination.[53]

Jews across Christian Europe had long been subject to hatred, exclusionary laws and occasional violence. Alina Cała distinguishes between premodern anti-Jewish prejudice, justified on a religious basis, or Judeophobia, and antisemitism. Under her narrative, the authors of Judeophobia were early Christian writers who sought to distinguish Christianity from Judaism and the Old Testament, whose polemics against Judaism became embedded in Christian European culture and folklore. Catholic antisemitism specifically worsened from the 13th

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[50] Robert Nemes and Daniel Unowsky, 'Introduction', in Robert Nemes and Daniel Unowsky (eds.), *Sites of European Antisemitism in the Age of Mass Politics,* p.5-6.

[51] Mosse, *Toward the Final Solution*, p.xxvii.

[52] Cf. *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, and *The History of Sexuality*, as well as *Discipline and Punish*, which is referenced below.

[53] Mosse, *Toward the Final Solution*, p.57.

century onwards, as new degrading legislation was introduced, and the conspiracy of blood libel spread. This cultural conditioning existed alongside other factors, such as segregation and economic rivalries, which ensure that it retained its relevance, and even gradually spread east. Therefore, by the age of Emancipation, Judeophobia had guaranteed 'that "the Jew" became for the Christian culture the synonym of alien, bizarre, hostile, and scary.' Christian Europe was to build on this cultural canon throughout the nineteenth century to construct its scapegoat for the travails of capitalist modernity.[54]

## Orientalism and Counter-Orientalism

Orientalism is a concept brought to pre-eminence by the titular work of Edward Said, in which he builds upon the poststructuralist approach of Michel Foucault to develop a broad ranging discursive analysis of Western practices of knowing the Orient and the Oriental, both academic and cultural. Orientalism as a practice of knowledge production was a racial project furnished with incredible amounts of elite and state investment. The form of orientalism is preconditioned by the nature of the imperial project in Asia and North Africa as primarily exploitation-colonial. With the notable exception of Algeria, and later Palestine, the colonial encounter between West and Orient was the dispatch of Western elites to govern, to know, to master subjects. A certain academic insouciance is to be expected of this racial project, as colonial bureaucrats and settlers live entirely different realities.[55]

A colonial bureaucrat is transient, identifies with the state, is protected directly by it, and is assured of their position. A settler is permanent, and regards the struggle between native and settler for the resources as zero sum. Settler subjectivity is marked by intense paranoia, simultaneously denying and justifying colonial violence. Indigenous peoples are violently displaced then categorised as transient wanderers who are threat to the inhabitants of the land,

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[54] Cała, *Jew. The Eternal Enemy?*, pp.33, 46-7.
[55] Ibid., pp.2, 240.

a projection of the role of the settler colonialists.[56] Colonial settlers act as the vanguard of the colonial state, its most paranoid, fragile and vicious outriders. The lack of this aspect, for the most part, allowed orientalism to function primarily on the elite level, hence it is considered here primarily as a structuring discourse in the reaction of the Ottoman Muslim elite to the relative decline of the Ottoman Empire vis-à-vis the other European states. Nonetheless, it was still a racial project marked by discursive subjugation and omnipresent colonial violence.[57]

The orientalist racial project was constituted during the era of high imperialism in the 19th century, when European powers were able to impose over colonial rule over the majority of the globe. Whilst an exoticising fascination with far off lands and ancient civilisations, as well as a religious rivalry with Islam, had existed before, and indeed provided the imagery and tropes for the orientalist project, it was a viable programme for its participants because it justified colonial rule, further acquisition, and reflected the power imbalance between the Christian European states and their competitors at this time. The orientalist racial project was an essentialisation of contemporary power dynamics and an attempt to continue them in perpetuity at base. In superstructure, building on histories of Christian-Muslim antagonism and war, and European curiosity about the unknown, the tropes of orientalism were Janus-faced, encompassing both 'terror, devastation, the demonic, hordes of hated barbarians', as well as 'romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences'.[58]

The Ottoman empire was orientalised, and this had consequences for its relationship with Europe and its domestic Christians. Intense resentment of the Christian European powers was widespread amongst the Ottoman elite for their occupation of Ottoman provinces, such Egypt and Cyprus by Britain, or Algeria and Tunisia by France, as well as their sponsorship of the

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[56] Lorenzo Veracini, 'Settler Collective, Founding Violence and Disavowal: The Settler Colonial Situation', *Journal of Intercultural Studies* (2008), vol.29, 366, 374.
[57] Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley, 2005), p.189.
[58] Said, *Orientalism*, pp.1, 59.

Balkan Christian states. The double standards applied to Muslim on Christian violence versus its inverse, absolute condemnation against total apathy or even enthusiastic perpetration, infuriated the historically hegemonic but now threatened Muslim ruling coalition. For example, Sultan Abdulhamid II, in conversation with a British ambassador in 1877, inveighed on:

> 'the question of the atrocities committed by the Russians in the Caucasus, [asking] whether the raping of Moslem women and the murder of their children would stir up as much resentment in England as the alleged Turkish atrocities in Bulgaria; or was it, he asked, a matter of Christian against Moslem?'[59]

The Ottoman state elite was a privileged group of a powerful state, and the beneficiary internally of historical hierarchies which conferred advantages to a range of characteristics, such as Islamic faith and Ottoman Turkish language. Vis-à-vis Christian Europe, however, the Ottoman state machinery found itself subordinated discursively and subject to sudden expropriations. This bred resentment against the racial category into which it was slotted. A la Said:

> 'The point is that the very designation of something as Oriental involved an already pronounced evaluative judgment, and in the case of the peoples inhabiting the decayed Ottoman Empire, an implicit program of action. Since the Oriental was a member of a subject race, he had to be subjected: it was that simple.'[60]

This offered no future for a group who benefitted from their control of a great power, or indeed for the majority of the Ottoman population, who were Muslim and therefore a priori 'oriental'.

The Ottoman state elite despised the various interventions of the Christian European powers in its affairs. The latter half of the 19th century was the era of high imperialism, in which Europe was at its most powerful relative to other states. This was also the high point of scientific racism, orientalism, and the endeavour of colonialism as a Christian enterprise, amongst its other

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[59] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam,* pp.179-180.
[60] Said, *Orientalism*, p.207.

facets.[61] The Ottoman state elite and Muslim intelligentsia was aware of the double standard to which it was held, where its infractions against Christians were unconscionable (not that it stopped them), but the oppressions and massacres by the colonial powers of their newfound Muslim subjects in the Caucasus or Algeria were par for the course. The large refugee inflows from the Caucasus, North Africa and especially the Balkans reinforced the perception of Islam was under threat, and the Sublime State stood as its last, embattled bastion. A sense of dislocation and threat was widespread amongst Ottoman Muslims as hierarchies tumbled and a political order that had once seemed eternal reckoned with the possibility it was not.[62]

Against this diminishment of status and aura of despair, the Ottoman state would begin its own process of object formation. The usage of the term 'object' here is quite conscious. As this was a counterprogramme to the European racial project, utilising the language of race here would be disorienting. This was not part of the episteme of race, but a practice of subordination, dehumanisation and elimination which drew on a different tradition of Islamic and Ottoman Turkish tropes and concepts.[63] Therefore, an unattached vocabulary to that of race is preferred, such as the general terminology of Michel Foucault. Specifically 'object formation' shall be used for the Ottoman Muslim counter-orientalist project, to bridge the link between racial formation as discussed above and the need for a different terminology. Contemporarily, 'gavur', or infidel, was the exclusionary term.[64]

Summarised as briefly as possible, it is 'the subject who knows, the objects to be known'. Consequently, if it is the Muslim state elite who were in this case doing the categorisation, then the Christian recipients of this process are naturally the objects. As Foucault states in Discipline

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[61] Said, *Orientalism,* pp.99-100.
[62] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam,* pp.42, 86, 103, 140.
[63] George N. Shirinian, 'The Background to the Late Ottoman Genocides', in George N. Shirinian (ed.), *Genocide in the Ottoman Empire: Armenians, Assyrians, Greeks, 1913-1923* (New York, 2017), p.57.
[64] Y. Doğan Çetinkaya, *The Young Turks and the Boycott Movement: Nationalism, Protest and the Working Classes in the Formation of Modern Turkey* (London, 2014), p.124.

and Punish, '[i]n th[e] space of domination, disciplinary power manifests its potency, essentially, by arranging objects.' Ergo, in the Ottoman example, the Muslim elite reasserts its domination by introducing a new category. The Christians of the empire are made into an object by the gaze of the Muslim elite, the subject of this process. This built on the foundation of the already deeply confessional outlook of the Ottoman state. This tale of object formation offers an extremely interesting counter-example to the progression of antisemitism in Europe, and enables us to delve more deeply into the interplay between contingent and structural factors that birthed modern structures of exclusion and genocide. [65]

The Ottoman empire already possessed a history of confessional hierarchy and enforced inequality. The Sublime State was an Islamic empire. Under Islamic jurisprudence, a modicum of religious toleration was permitted for adherents of other Abrahamic religions. Therefore, Jews and Christians were classified as dhimmis, or 'people of the pact', and accorded a protected, though inherently inferior, role in the social order. This practice of subordinate toleration is even supported in the Quran, becoming foundational concept of Islamic jurisprudence governing interfaith relationships. Within the Ottoman context, this process of toleration and hierarchical diversity was institutionalised via the millet, whereby hierarchs were backed by the state when enforcing order within their communities, and in turn preached obedience to the sultan. It was an administrative practice conceptualised on a religious basis, offering clerics a reciprocal if subordinating relationship to state power.[66]

These were subordinating relationships. Dhimmi were left to their own devices so long as they recognised the superiority of Islam, obeyed the state, and paid the cizye, a poll tax only for dhimmi.[67] Dhimmi were also forbidden to bear arms or fight in the military. Most egregiously,

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[65] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York, 1978), Alan Sheridan (trans.), pp.27-8, 187.
[66] Sharkey, *A History of Muslims, Christians, and Jews*, pp.27, 39-40, 82-3.
[67] Ronald Grigor Suny, *They Can Live in the Desert and Nowhere Else: A History of the Armenian Genocide* (Princeton, 2015), p.5.

from the fourteenth century, the Ottoman empire had implemented a quasi-tax on young Christian men. These men, selected between ten and twenty, were enslaved, forced to convert to Islam, and taken away to join the empire's artillery core, the Janissaries. This practice of random enslavement of Christian youths, the devşirme, which lasted for five centuries, until 1825, indicates the regulated and subordinate diversity of the millets under traditional Ottoman administration. Toleration and subordination were governmental practice.[68]

This political subordination naturally led to discursive subjugation. Ottoman Muslims Turks and Kurds had long been discursively dismissive of the religious minorities, utilising gavur, meaning unbeliever or infidel, from the Arabic kafir, to describe them. This word had connotations of disloyalty, avarice, and untrustworthiness, being a figure of opprobrium in folk sayings, e.g. 'Good done to a gavur brings no good in return'.[69] In the industrial era, meanwhile, these prejudices would map onto the differing development trajectories of the diasporic minorities in a way reminiscent of antisemitic tropes of parasitism. Armenians were specifically reviled as arrogant, ungrateful, and haughty.[70] By the early twentieth century, the tropes of parasitism had reached new heights; Christians were 'sucking the blood of the Muslims', according to a pamphlet affiliated with the Ottoman boycott movement.[71]

However, the Ottoman state elite had no special animus against its Jewish population. Jews were people of the book, and thus accorded dhimmi status.[72] With the various upsets in traditional hierarchy that so outraged the Ottoman elite in the nineteenth century, Jews were regarded as not particularly threatening, having no powerful Jewish state externally and being less prominent in the domestic economy than Greeks and Armenians. Where Judeophobia did occur in the modern Ottoman empire, it was often a result of Christian mobilisations. For

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[68] Sharkey, *A History of Muslims, Christians, and Jews*, pp.67, 142.
[69] Suny, *They Can Live in the Desert and Nowhere Else*, p.132.
[70] Sharkey, *A History of Muslims, Christians, and Jews*, p.272.
[71] Çetinkaya, *The Young Turks and the Boycott Movement*, p.162.
[72] Sharkey, *A History of Muslims, Christians, and Jews*, p.65.

example, blood libel arrived in the Ottoman empire in 1840, with the Damascus Affair and the Rhodes Blood Libel. As in Europe, Christians accused Jews of murdering a disappeared Christian to make matzot, unleavened bread for Passover. Consequently, Sultan Abdülmecid I issued an edict banning ritual murder accusations and condemned the persecutions. Thus, whilst sections of the Ottoman population certainly showed Judeophobia, it was not state practice, and the Ottoman state elite drew on its own Islamic traditions of hierarchy which were discursively separate to that of Christendom. Therefore, when the Ottoman empire began its own process of object formation, its Jewish populations were for the most part exempted from its ire. [73]

## Conclusion

Over the course of this account, we have laid out a structure of racial formation that takes the codetermination of material and superstructural factors seriously, thereby offering a model of exclusion within a polity to match nationalism's model of inclusion. This structure, however, was developed with reference to the experience of the racially oppressed populations in the United States, a settler colony with a vastly different history of population and social structure compared to our area of focus, eastern Europe and the middle east. Therefore, we had to adapt its formula, centring religiously conceptualised hierarchies rather than rapid expropriation as the historically embedded structure to which all succeeding projects would have to respond.

We then laid out two separate epistemes for exclusion in the metropole, antisemitism in the Habsburg and Romanov empires, and counter-orientalism in the Ottoman empire. In our account of antisemitism, we centre its comprehensive explanatory power, bestowed through its conspiratorialism. This phantasm explains away the inconvenient realities of capitalist modernity, from its mass dislocation to its widespread immiseration, from its immolated past to its uncertain future. This comprehensive reordering of society was implemented without

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[73] Olga Borovaya, 'The Rhodes Blood Libel of 1840: Episode in the History of Ottoman Reforms', *Jewish Social Studies* vol.26 (2021), 36-7.

consultation or explanation, and it left a world crying out for answers. Hence, we maintain that the racial project of antisemitism was a form of antimodernist scapegoating which sublimated anxieties via the creation of an internal other, who served as the root of all evil in society.

Counter-orientalism was, if no less inhumane of an exclusionary project, at least more connected to reality. Many of the dislocations which ravaged the Sublime State during the course of the nineteenth century could be clearly linked to the actions of the Christian European powers, who held a racist view of the Ottoman empire. Against this discursive subjugation, the Ottomans built an oppositional project, counter-orientalism. Building on historic religiously sanctioned hierarchies in Islam, the Ottoman state elite built an image of its Christians as perfidious and greedy. Whilst in the industrial era, the Ottoman state elite was helpless against the Concert of Europe, it retained power over its own Christians, onto whom it could project its anxieties about the future. Via their brutalisation, a perception of control was reasserted.

# <u>Section Two: Case Studies</u>

In this section, we shall apply the theoretical model that was established in the previous section to the Jewish experience in the nineteenth century in the Habsburg and Romanov empires, as well as the religious minorities in the Ottoman empire. Nationalism and racialisation (or equivalents) are understood throughout as means of marshalling positive and negative solidarities for societies in flux. The bounds of both the national and racial projects are put into historical context, and the flexibility of these coalitions and their ideologies is continuously centred. The intense dislocation that the implementation of capitalist modernity wrought is in every case central, as it provides the social base for the searches for new solidarities in a world of mass culture and mediatised reality.

Our history of the Habsburg empire offers an account over the longue durée of the love affair between Deutschtum and the central European Jewry. The elaboration of the material and social basis of the western Habsburg Jews' fervent German nationalism prepares us for the collapse of German liberalism in Cisleithania and the rise of racial antisemitism. The rejection of assimilation's most loyal adherents is grounded in the general crisis of Cisleithanian politics. German nationalism in particular entered a paranoiac phase after losing its hegemony. The conspiratorialism of antisemitism offered a convenient enemy for this era of defeat.

The engagement with the Russian empire, meanwhile, is telling a different story, not the success of assimilation but its failure. Therefore, the history highlighted here is not the laser-focused chronicle of the relationship between Jewishness and Germanness, but rather the intense distance that structured the relationship between Russia and its Jews. The Romanov empire, as the only one of the powers considered to never embrace liberalism, maintained its hierarchical and separatory laws until the very end. While many of the same processes which promoted assimilation occurred in Russia as in the Habsburg empire, their logics were disrupted by the spatial, legal, and social exclusions of the autocracy.

If Russia is the failure of assimilation, the Ottoman empire is its absence. Although the legal structures of religious separation and hierarchy were removed by the sultan-caliph in 1856, their spectres continued to shape intracommunal relations. In particular, histories of Muslim-Christian antagonism mapped onto Ottoman decline vis-à-vis the other Great Powers and the orientalist racial project to create confidant minorities and an embittered state elite. The progress of commercialisation and industrialisation only intensified this process, as the Muslim gentry was oriented by the results of state policy to landownership and state service, whereas the rising bourgeoisie belonged to the urban, commercial and diasporic religious minorities. Within this paradigm, however, the Ottoman elite distinguished its Jewish subjects from its Christians, as it regarded Jews as unaffiliated in the civilisational battle between Islam and Christendom. Thus, Ottoman Jewry was mostly spared the process of object formation which Ottomans Christians endured.

# **Chapter Three: Religion, Nation, and Race**
# **in the Habsburg Empire**

This chapter concerns itself with the rise of the antisemitic project in the Habsburg empire. To tell this tale, we chart a bifurcated history of how Jews became German and how Germans lost the state. In the first section, we recount how the Habsburg realm became a German state with hardly any Germans, due to its territorial losses to its west and gains to its east. From the nineteenth century, we analyse the symbiotic relationship between German liberalism and nationalism. In their struggle against the dynasty and reaction, these twin projects develop an air of radicalism and liberatory potential. After much struggle, the liberals compel the house of Habsburg to share power. Liberalism is triumphant.

Thereafter, we consider how the Jewish populations of the Hungarian and Bohemian kingdoms came to speak German and to acculturate to Germanness. Over the course of the late nineteenth century, this population became ever more concentrated in Vienna. We show how this Jewry became, not just German speakers, but good German liberals, committed to constitutionalism, meritocracy, and societal progress. They identify with the liberatory project of Deutschtum. German liberalism is hegemonic amongst the Deutschjudentum.

If the first two sections chart a love affair, the latter two chronicle a bitter divorce. First, we narrate the process via which Germans lost their exclusive claim on the state. German liberalism challenges the throne's prerogatives and is left shattered by its failure. The emperor partners with a coalition of other nationalities and reactionaries. This partnership, combined with the steady expansion of the franchise, dilutes the Germans' claim on the state. Whilst inevitable for a state which depended on popular support, it is read as a German defeat. There is a transition from German national dominance to hegemony, and the adaptation is not accepted gracefully.

Finally, we consider antisemitism in full detail. First, we elaborate the occupational distinctiveness of the Deutschjudentum vs. their fellow citizens. Thereafter, we list the gentile

constituencies that assembled behind antisemitism and how this fed into party politics. Finally, we analyse the response of the Deutschjudentum to their visceral rejection by a nation to whom they had acculturated so assiduously. Both Zionism and Jewish adherence to socialism are set in this context as utopian projects to remake society into one accepting of Jews.

## The History of a German State

The Habsburg empire is defined by the dynasty, first and foremost. It was an assemblage of disparate territories, won by a mixture of marriage and war. After the extinction of the Babenburgs, the House of Habsburg inherited their territories in 1282. From the duchies of Austria and Styria, the dynasty would accrue the neighbouring territories of Carinthia and Carniola in 1335, and Tyrol in 1363.[74] As one of the most powerful aristocratic families in the Holy Roman Empire, the Habsburgs would successfully monopolise the position of Roman-German Emperor from 1452 to the empire's end in 1806. This bestowed a leading role to the dynasty in German politics, which it defended doggedly.[75]

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the House of Habsburg acquired new lands. Ferdinand I, Archduke of Austria and viceroy of his brother Charles V in Germany, succeeded in being elected to each of the thrones of Bohemia and (western) Hungary after his childless brother-in-law died in battle against the Ottomans at the Battle of Mohacs.[76] Ferdinand's candidacy for King of Hungary was contested by János Zápolya, and the Ottoman advance was ongoing. What resulted was a three-way partition of the kingdom, where the Habsburgs successfully seized the north and west, the Ottomans took the centre, and Transylvania became an Ottoman vassal under the rule of native princes.[77] While Ferdinand was only elected by a minority faction of

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[74] R.J.W. Evans, *Das Werden der Habsburgermonarchie 1550-1700: Gesellschaft, Kultur, Institutionen* (Wien 1986), Marie-Therese Pitner (trans.), pp.125-7.

[75] Harm Klueting, 'The Catholic Enlightenment in Austria or the Habsburg Lands', in Ulrich Lehner and Michael Printy (eds.), *A Companion to the Catholic Enlightenment in Europe* (Leiden, 2010), pp.127, 129.

[76] Ernst Laubach, *Ferdinand I. als Kaiser: Politik und Herrscherauffassung des Nachfolgers Karls V.* (Münster, 2001), pp.9, 242, 626.

[77] Evans, *Das Werden der Habsburgermonarchie*, pp.177, 413.

the Hungarian nobility, with the majority opting for his competitor, in the Kingdom of Croatia, part of the Holy Crown of St Stephen since 1097, the diet opted for Ferdinand, elected in 1527.[78]

Ferdinand's acquisitions did not fundamentally change the Roman-German orientation of the Habsburg demesnes. Bohemia was a constituent kingdom and one of the seven prince-elector of the Holy Roman Empire, which represented a boon to the dynasty's position vis-à-vis the other imperial princes.[79] Hungary and Croatia, meanwhile, were shattered borderlands between the Habsburg core and the Ottoman empire. They constituted an addition of strategic depth and dynastic claims to more territory further east, but as these claims could not be instantiated, the Habsburg realm remained primarily a collection of the eastern marches of the Holy Roman Empire, while their Spanish relatives maintained the western imperial border with France.[80]

Bohemia was a self-contained unit within the empire, whose estates looked to maintaining the Crown of St Wenceslaus rather than broader imperial affairs.[81] The Habsburg victories in the early stages of the Thirty Years War allowed the emperor to change this state of affairs and smash the power of the territorial nobility, especially in Bohemia, but also in Upper Austria, Carinthia, Carniola, and Styria. Catholicism functioned as a proxy for the centralising tendency of the dynasty, and confessional absolutism would remain the policy of the Habsburgs until deep in the eighteenth century. Only Hungary was spared the breaking of its nobility.[82]

However, the war would drag on long past these early victories, reaching a brutal stalemate. The imperial resolution in 1648 was the restoration of the status quo ante bellum, whereby multi-confessionalism and aristocratic consensus building were again affirmed as the core

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[78] Neven Budak, 'The Union Between Hungary and Croatia: Myths and Reality', in Paul Srodecki, Norbert Kersken, and Rimvydas Petrauskas (eds.), *Unions and Divisions: New Forms of Rule in Medieval and Renaissance Europe* (London, 2022), pp.120, 123-4.

[79] Richard Schröder, *Lehrbuch der deutschen Rechtsgeschichte* 4th edition (Leipzig, 1902), p.819.

[80] Laubach, *Ferdinand I. als Kaiser*, p.656.

[81] Lenka Bobková, 'Corana Regni Bohemiae: The Integration of Central Europe as Conceived by the Luxumbergs and Their Successors', in Paul Srodecki, Norbert Kersken, and Rimvydas Petrauskas (eds.), *Unions and Divisions: New Forms of Rule in Medieval and Renaissance Europe* (London, 2022), pp.305-6.

[82] Evans, *Das Werden der Habsburgermonarchie*, pp.65-70.

constitutional principles of the Holy Roman Empire. After the war, the Habsburgs were once more confirmed the primus inter pares of German politics. Their demesnes were consolidated as never before, with the Austrian and Bohemian estates refashioned into a service nobility for Vienna. In contrast to the long tradition of papal-imperial disunity, the Habsburgs were now an arch-Catholic constellation, with loyalty and confession conflated. A Catholic and Germanophone political culture was confirmed as hegemonic within the Erblande.[83]

Whilst the German political orientation would remain a cornerstone of Habsburg power politics until their defeat by Prussia in 1866,[84] from the end of the 17th century, the centre of gravity of their realm shifted eastwards. Through a series of wars with both the Ottomans and the Transylvanians, the Habsburgs had by 1718 reconquered the entirety of the Lands of the Crown of St Stephen.[85] In 1742, however, the dynasty lost Silesia to Prussia.[86] Maria Theresia balanced out this loses with the annexation of Galicia in 1772 and the occupation of the Bukovina in 1774.[87] Meanwhile, in 1801 during one of many defeats during the Napoleonic Wars, Austria lost all of its lands on the Rhine, including substantial if patchy territories in the modern southern Germany.[88] At the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Austria was again confirmed as the leading power in Germany, and Presiding Power of the new German Confederation. Its political culture and elites were Germanophone, and they remained oriented towards power politics in Germany and Italy. Its population, however, had been growing less and less German, even as the demesnes grew more contiguous. In a premodern state, such discordances might not matter, but in the age of nationalism, this would prove acrimonious.[89]

[83] Thomas A. Brady Jr., *Communities, Politics, and Reformation in Early Modern Europe* (Leiden, 1998), pp.399-400.

[84] Barbora Pásztorová, *Metternich, the German Question and the Pursuit of Peace* (2022, Berlin), p.18.

[85] Evans, *Das Werden der Habsburgermonarchie*, pp.114, 195.

[86] Thomas Lau, *Die Kaiserin: Maria Theresia* (Vienna, 2016), p.123.

[87] Klueting, 'The Catholic Enlightenment in Austria', p.127.

[88] Frederick C. Schneid, *Napoleon's Conquest of Europe: The War of the Third Coalition* (Westport, 2005), p.45.

[89] Pásztorová, *Metternich*, pp.22, 25.

The early nineteenth century was the heroic era of German nationalism, and particularly its liberal tendency. The duality of Napoleanic rule in central Germany, somewhere between foreign conquest and liberatory reform, helped spawn a German national movement.[90] A new masculinity spawned during the war, which combined patriotism, military readiness, and citizenship rights to mobilise men for the Befreiungskriege.[91] The Congress of Vienna after Napoleonic Wars strengthened and consolidated the absolutist dynasts, with free cities reduced to a lonely four, and the ecclesiastic states devoured entirely.[92] The weak confederation in 1815 that resulted was unpopular amongst supporters of German nationalism, but suited the needs of Austria and the newly empowered German princes, especially in the south.[93] By the 1840s, this settlement was showing signs of strain, however. National sentiment was in the ascendant, especially amongst the middle classes, even while the Habsburg state remained opposed. Patriotic songs could be heard across the country, including on the streets of Vienna.[94] Rupture came in 1848, when revolutionary fervour rocked Europe. The Habsburg emperor, hegemon of Germany, gendarme of Italy, and liege lord of Central Europe, was threatened on every front.[95]

The pan-European revolutionary wave had a galvanising effect on the already ongoing fiscal dispute between the Hungarian Diet and the central government in Vienna. In March, the Hungarian opposition intensified its demands on the throne, demanding a constitution, broader suffrage, and more autonomy for Hungary. These demands were translated into German and

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[90] Klaus Ries, 'Goethe und Napoleon – Zur kulturellen Inszenierung von Politik', in Stefan Gerber, Werner Greiling, Tobias Kaiser, and Klaus Rieg (eds.), *Zwischen Stadt, Staat und Nation: Bürgertum in Deutschland* (Jena, 2014), p.299.

[91] Gisela Mettele, 'Wehrhafte Männlichkeit und patriotische Weiblichkeit. Geschlechterbilder und die politische Mobilisierung der Jenaer Studenten 1813/14', in Stefan Gerber, Werner Greiling, Tobias Kaiser, and Klaus Rieg (eds.), *Zwischen Stadt, Staat und Nation: Bürgertum in Deutschland* (Jena, 2014), p.337.

[92] Pásztorová, *Metternich*, p.21.

[93] Hannah Alice Straus, *The Attitude of the Congress of Vienna Toward Nationalism in Germany, Italy, and Poland* (New York, 1949), p.63.

[94] Pásztorová, *Metternich*, pp.136, 141.

[95] Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Dieter Langewiesche, 'The European Revolution of 1848: Its Political and Social Reforms, its Politics of Nationalism, and its Short- and Long-Term Consequences', in Dieter Dowe, Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, Dieter Langewiesche, and Jonathan Sperber (eds.), *Europe in 1848: Revolution and Reform* (New York, 2000), David Higgins (trans.), pp.2, 11.

published in Vienna, where they created a perception of regime weakness and transformative potential. This led to the rapid fall of the government. A liberal revolution had defeated the autocratic government, whose army had fired on the demonstrators. The first martyr of the revolution was Karl Heinrich Spitzer, a Jewish polytechnic student from Moravia.[96]

The revolution had three classes of support, the bourgeoisie, the workers, and the peasants. The bourgeoisie distrusted the workers intensely, and they feared for social disorder resultant from their mobilisation. The peasantry likewise had goals and interests either inimical or incomprehensible to the liberal coalition aspiring to implement a new constitutional settlement. In the last instance, as the revolution radicalised in the face regime intransigence, elite revolutionaries opted the ancien régime over a system dependent on popular support.[97]

As in class, so in nation; the competing claims of the various nationalisms led to disunity amongst the various revolutionary movements, and eventually, the victory of the reactionary forces. The Habsburg suppression of Italy was supported by the German national assembly,[98] as well as the Austrian and Hungarian revolutionary movements.[99] The Hungarians and Germans also supported the defeat of the Prague Uprising.[100] The Austrian reformist elite, meanwhile, faced with the choice between a united Germany or the separation from the territories outside of the German Confederation, chose instead the dynastic status quo.[101] The Habsburgs, meanwhile, refused to renounce their primacy in Germany, utilising Archduke Johann, the Imperial Regent, to wreck the policy of the elected German National Assembly in

[96] Judson, *Habsburg Empire*, pp.162, 164-5.
[97] Haupt and Langewiesche, 'The European Revolution of 1848', pp.6-8.
[98] Dieter Langewiesche, 'Revolution in Germany: Constitutional State—Nation-State—Social Reform', , in Dieter Dowe, Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, Dieter Langewiesche, and Jonathan Sperber (eds.), *Europe in 1848: Revolution and Reform* (New York, 2000), David Higgins (trans.), p.133.
[99] Haupt and Langewiesche, 'The European Revolution of 1848', p.11.
[100] Langewiesche, 'Revolution in Germany', p.133.
[101] Judson, *Habsburg Empire*, p.210.

Frankfurt.[102] Austria's deputies to this legislature were recalled on 5th April 1849.[103] The dynasty had military defeated the Erblande (although not Hungarian) revolutions with the sieges of Prague and Vienna in June and October 1848 respectively. 'Every nation for itself and the dynasty against all' was not a winning formula for the revolutionary movements in 1848.[104]

The defeat of the revolution did stop the advance of German liberalism, however. The neo-absolutist regime constituted by the newly enthroned Franz Joseph continued the intensive administrative reform and centralisation of the revolutionary period, often presided over by old revolutionaries. Education was broadened and standardised, with primary education in the local language and secondary in German, as German was to function as the lingua franca between the nations. The civil service was likewise confirmed as base German, corresponding internally in German, even as it should communicate with locals in whatever language was practicable. The state was larger than ever before, making itself felt as it replaced the old feudal lords with modern courts and administration.[105]

Liberalism was a mutually reinforcing political and economic project, and whilst the government rejected its political settlement, the ever-financially strained Austrian government was committed to economic growth and the implementation of liberal economy. The emancipation of the peasantry continued, necessitating large expenditures for the various compensation schemes. The internal tariff barriers between Austria and Hungary were abolished, and the empire joined the German customs union. The building of the railways progressed apace, with the private capital replacing much of the state's share. Neo-absolutism functioned as German liberalism shorn of its liberatory rhetoric, but via its firm commitment to a strong state, laissez fair policies, public works and educational reform, it was firmly

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[102] Langewiesche, 'Revolution in Germany', p.129.
[103] Gunther Hildebrandt, *Politik und Taktik der Gagern-Liberalen in der Frankfurter Nationalversammlung 1848/1849* (Berlin, 1989), p.253.
[104] Judson, *Habsburg Empire*, p.215.
[105] Beller, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, pp.88, 92-6.

committed to its socio-economic project. Thus, it instantiated liberal subjectivities to a broader and broader section of the population through the implementation of capitalism.[106]

Absolutism held until Habsburg defeat in the Franco-Austrian War in 1859. After the peace, the regime had to cede a parliament to regain legitimacy and access to credit. The subsequent loss in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 confirmed a small Federal Germany from which the Habsburgs demesnes, including those within the Confederation, were excluded. This debacle weakened dynasty in its negotiations with the Hungarians. The result was the 1867 Compromise that spawned the Dual Monarchy.[107] Under the Compromise, Austria and Hungary were confirmed as separate entities united by a common foreign policy, military, and joint financial matters such as debt and tariffs. The settlement guaranteed parliamentary regimes of German and Hungarian liberals. Neither Germans nor Magyars were majorities in their halves of the empire, and the franchise was tightly restricted for both parliaments, guaranteeing the German bourgeoisie and Hungarian gentry disproportionate influence on both class and national bases. The Habsburg German bourgeoisie may not have succeeded in retaining Germany, Italy, or even Hungary, but it had, at the very least, asserted itself as the dominant force in the Erblande, and forced the dynasty into cohabitation with it.[108]

## The Making of a German Jewry

The hodgepodge nature of Habsburg acquisitions made also for a similarly varied history for its Jewry. There is record of Jewish traders in what would become the Erblande already in 906, and mention of a synagogue in Vienna in 1204.[109] However, this long period of continuous Jewish residence was ended 1669-71, when Emperor Leopold I ordered the expulsion of the Jews from Vienna and Lower Austria. Thereafter, the centre of Jewish life in the Habsburg

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[106] Ibid., pp.98-9.
[107] Judson, *Habsburg Empire*, pp.250-3, 9.
[108] Judson, *Habsburg Empire*, pp.259-67.
[109] Robert S. Wistrich, *Die Juden Wien im Zeitalter Kaiser Franz Josephs* (Vienna, 1999), Marie-Therese Pitner and Susanne Grabmayr (trans.), p.10.

empire was the lands of the Bohemian Crown. This remained the case until the latter portion of the eighteenth century, when the mixture of restrictive Judeophobic laws in Bohemia and freely available land in the freshly reconquered and depopulated Hungary drove high enough emigration that the Jewish population there was able to outstrip that of Bohemia. The annexation of Galicia in 1772 drastically altered the balance of Jewish life in the monarchy once again, by over doubling its Jewish population.[110]

Equally transformative for the Habsburg Jewry was the ascension of the emperor Joseph II to sole rule in 1780. Joseph was a reformer-despot of a typical Enlightenment mould, who was committed to the bureaucratisation of the state and the refashioning of its subjects to better serve that state. As part of this modernisation project, Joseph sought to dissolve the structures of Jewish separation. Thus, the emperor promulgated the Edicts of Toleration, which lifted the sumptuary laws, permitted Jews to live outside the ghettos, and opened access to the army, the professions, and the universities. Whilst these last two measures were passively Germanising, due to German being the language of the cities and the administration, Joseph also sought actively to Germanise his Jewish subjects. This was a part of his general Germanisation policy, where he sought to institute German as the universal governmental language throughout the empire, loosing great opposition. This was the assimilationism of a bureaucrat, not a nationalist, and was spawned by the aforementioned happenstances that led Austria to enter modernity as a German state with hardly any Germans. Consequently, Jews were compelled to take German forenames and surnames,[111] dispense with public uses of Hebrew, and attend schools, both Jewish community schools and Christian elementary schools.[112]

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[110] William O. McCragg Jr., *A History of Habsburg Jews, 1670-1918* (Bloomington, 1989), pp.1, 11-2, 27.
[111] Nancy M. Wingfield, 'Emperor Joseph II in the Austrian Imagination up to 1914', in Laurence Cole and Daniel Unowsky (eds.), *The Limits of Loyalty: Imperial Symbolism, Popular Allegiances, and State Patriotism in the Late Habsburg Monarchy* (New York, 2007), pp.62-4
[112] McCragg, *History of Habsburg Jews*, pp.29, 67.

The effects of the Josephinist assimilationist policies were patchy. The Bohemian[113] and Hungarian Jewries were successfully Germanised, which made sense as the urban cultures of both kingdoms was German until the mid-nineteenth century. In Galicia, in contrast, the assimilatory policies were not successful, despite the linguistic similarities between German and Yiddish.[114] What Germanised Jewish middle class there was in Galicia promptly assimilated after the conclusion of the mini compromise between the German liberals and the provincial elite which guaranteed Polish hegemony in Galicia.[115] Hungarian Jews likewise readily assimilated into the Magyar political culture of Dualist Transleithania.[116] Bohemian Jews remained loyal adherents of German culture and liberalism to the end of the monarchy, influenced by the accusation by the Czech nationalists that Jews were Germanisers.[117]

From the expulsion in 1669 to the revolution in 1848, only 'tolerated' Jews, or Jews with special permission from the court, were permitted to live in Vienna.[118] Therefore, the population of Vienna in the pre-revolutionary period was an odd combination of the very richest, who could afford special dispensations, and the criminal, as many moved in spite of the law.[119] From the lifting of the residency restrictions and especially after Jewish emancipation in 1867, Jews began to migrate en masse to Vienna. Until the end of the nineteenth century, most of the in-migration was from the middle class Germanophone Jews of Bohemia, Moravia, and Western Hungary.[120] These Jews were heavily oriented towards German culture and German liberalism. This Deutschjudentum[121] of the central Habsburg territories had no connection to the

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[113] Wistrich, *Die Juden Wien*, p.22.

[114] McCragg, *History of Habsburg Jews*, pp.109, 133

[115] Tim Buchen, *Antisemitism in Galicia: Agitation, Politics, and Violence Against Jews in the Late Habsburg Monarchy* (Berlin, 2010), Charlotte Hughes-Kreuzmüller (trans.), p.16.

[116] McCragg, *History of Habsburg Jews*, p.133.

[117] Gary B. Cohen, 'Jews in German Society: Prague, 1860-1914', *Central European History* vol.10 (1977), 38, 40.

[118] Marsha L. Rozenblit, *The Jews of Vienna, 1867-1914: Assimilation and Identity* (New York, 1983), p.29.

[119] Wistrich, *Die Juden Wien*, pp.24, 27.

[120] See Table 1 on p.125.

[121] I prefer this formulation, 'German Jewry', over the more established opposition of 'West- und Ostjudentümer', as we are examining the abiding identification of the Western Jewry of Austria-Hungary with Germanness in its guise as the universal-modern. Therefore, Deutschjudentum is analytically useful for the

linguistically German majority Alpine lands, but rather to the supranational Germanness of Habsburg officialdom. Ergo, there was mass migration of German-speaking Jews from linguistically diverse territories to the capital after the city was opened to Jewish residence. [122]

The dynastic history charted above should clearly indicate the material basis for Jewish assimilation to German culture in the Habsburg empire in the nineteenth century. German was, despite its demographic weakness, the language of the state machinery and the elite. In the first half of the century, it was also the majority language of cities beyond the Germanophone Alpine core, such as Pressburg, Buda,[123] Pest, and Prague, and was the lingua franca of commerce and education. For urbanites, for the upwardly mobile, and for the commercially minded, German seemed the safe bet for socially advantageous language acquisition in the Habsburg monarchy for much on the nineteenth century.[124] But German and Germanness offered more than a merely utilitarian proposition for its prospective assimilés. Germanness, 'embodied the pure values and principles of the Enlightenment, of emancipation, progress, equal rights and freedom, in a word: of culture.' Whilst the claims to modernity and culture are indistinguishable from the fact that German was the bureaucratic-bourgeois language, the claim to a liberatory project, a historic mission to implement progress and Enlightenment, was conferred by German nationalism's long battle with the absolutist dynasts.[125]

German nationalism was, despite the privileges of its adherents, still an insurgent project at this time, rather than the governing consensus. For German nationalists, their nation stood for the liberal project, for humanity, progress, education, and economic development. A rejection of German was a rejection of modernity, and of the sacrifices of the revolution. This was the

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particular history charted herein. 'Ostjudentum', or Eastern Jewry, is still retained to reflect the orientalising views of the Deutschjuden of their coreligionists in Galicia and beyond.

[122] Rozenblit, *The Jews of Vienna,* pp.33-5.

[123] Ibid., p.182.

[124] Steven Beller, *The Habsburg Monarchy, 1815-1918* (Cambridge, 2018), p.42.

[125] Wolfgang Maderthaner, 'Empire, Nationalism and the Jewish Question: Victor Adler and Otto Bauer', *Religions* vol.7 (2016), 3.

nationalism of a rising bourgeoisie, confidant in its inevitable triumph against the forces of reaction, whether dynasts, prelates, or Slavic peasants. The assurance of its cultural superiority led to enthusiastic support for assimilation by its proponents, for Germany was not simply a nation, but liberalism in national form. Deutschtum was open to all willing to assimilate, offering advancement to those who did. It found many converts amongst the empire's Jews.[126]

This Deutschjudentum eagerly seized the opportunities which came with Jewish emancipation and the implementation of capitalist modernity. Hence their mass migration to the capital after its opening. The in-migration to Vienna remade Jewish population distribution in the monarchy, with the proportion of the Jewish population living in Bohemia and Moravia declining as that in Vienna increased.[127] Thus, the Deutschjudentum of Vienna-Moravia-Bohemia-West Hungary became megalocephalic, as Jews from across this space poured into Vienna from across this continuum, driven by the opportunities of the big city, often leaving smaller cities in the process. This process was only furthered by the successful advance of Magyarisation in Transleithania,[128] for which the Hungarian Jewry was the sole success story.[129]

Table 1 enables us to easily understand the transformed geography of the Jewish population in Cisleithania, where the role Vienna and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown inverted, even as everywhere else remained roughly stable. Whilst an element of general flux is notable, and one cannot attribute the massive Viennese growth to migration from the Lands the Crown of St Wenceslaus alone, the tendency that is the most notable is the consolidation of the Deutschjudentum in Vienna. What is truly striking is the absolute as well as relative decline of the Jewish population in the Bohemian lands during a period of massive natural population

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[126] Judson, *Habsburg Empire*, pp.208-9.
[127] Wistrich, *Die Juden Wien*, p.40.
[128] Rozenblit, *The Jews of Vienna,* p.21.
[129] Miklós Konrád, 'Jews and politics in Hungary in the Dualist era, 1867–1914', *East European Jewish Affairs* vol. 39 (2009), 167.

growth. Vienna was becoming the natural home of the Deutschjudentum, last refuge of German as high culture rather than German as folk culture.[130]

Vienna was a magnet for Jewish migration, not just from nearby Deutschjuden, but after the 1890s, also from Galicia and the Bukovina. These Jews were substantially poorer than those of the monarchy's central belt, and less oriented towards German culture. They often had Yiddish accents in German, and they possessed different religious customs from their German coreligionists. Levels of religiosity were higher amongst the Ostjuden. The encounter between the two was riven with deutschjüdisch derision towards their Galician coreligionists.[131]  The Ostjuden were regarded by the Deutschjuden as culturally backwards, symbolising Jews before modernity. Wearing a kaftan rather than a suit, speaking German with a Yiddish accent, these were read as civilisational differences, challenges to bourgeois modernity, and renunciations of the twin project of emancipation and assimilation. Indeed, culpability for antisemitism was displaced onto the Ostjuden, as if only all Jews would perfectly assimilate, perhaps the intensifying prejudice of Christian society would abate. The Ostjuden, in contrast, engaged more for separatist tendencies, like Zionism, autonomism or diaspora nationalism, unsurprisingly, as their invite to Deutschtum arrived late and stained by racial antisemitism.[132]

## Decoupling Nation and Empire

German liberal hegemony would hold until 1879, although compromised after the 1873 Vienna stock market crash, which delegitimated its laissez faire policies and close ties with finance. However, in 1879 the German liberals attempted to oppose the emperor's foreign policy, particularly the occupation of Bosnia, out of fear of the consequences of adding yet more Slavs to the Germano-Magyar condominium of national domination. They also sought to firmly establish the constitutional principle throughout all areas of governance, including the throne's

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[130] See p.127.
[131] Rozenblit, *The Jews of Vienna,* pp.36-7, 43.
[132] Wistrich, *Die Juden Wien*, pp.48-9.

prerogatives of military affairs and foreign policy. Franz Joseph, seeing his power threatened, assembled a coalition of clericals, provincial nobles, Slavs, and federalists, which won the 1879 election to the Reichsrat. German liberalism would never regain sole power.[133]

The mode of government after the implosion of German liberalism was a permanent executive negotiating with a radicalising parliament. This executive was at its core interested in the continuation of government, not German hegemony. This conservative government was willing to trade German interests for its parliamentary majority. Consequently. German nationalism entered a more paranoiac phase, primed for threat and betrayal.[134] Bohemia was key to this process, as demographic developments meant that the cities, German burgher islands in seas of Czech peasants, were becoming Czech as industrialisation and urbanisation increased. Simultaneously, the Czech national movement gained in wealth and institutional power, presenting a confident challenger to German dominance in the Bohemian lands. Thus, Germans in Bohemia had to reckon with a future in which they were a national minority rather than the state-bearing people as Czech gained ground in the crownland institutions. This promoted an ethnic, defensive nationalism, desperate to hold what advantages it had, contrasting with the confident assimilatory futurity of the previous German national project, as well as the still au courant Magyar regime of their previous partners in the twin ethnic dictatorship of Austria-Hungary before 1879.[135]

As the anti-German liberal coalition of the Minister President Eduard Taaffe bartered German privileges in Bohemia for its parliamentary majority, the German liberals sought now to protect German interests against the state. [136] The Vereinigte Deutsche Linke, the German liberal parliamentary grouping, was formed in 1881 to provide a coherent grouping to oppose the

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[133] Beller, *The Habsburg Monarchy,* pp.147, 154-5, 173.
[134] Beller, *The Habsburg Monarchy,* pp.162-3.
[135] Judson, *Habsburg Empire*, pp.262, 297-8.
[136] Ibid., pp.163, 165, 173, 175. [probs split]

government. Contemporaneously, between 1881 and 1882 radical German nationalists and democrats developed and signed the Linzer Programm, which demanded the simultaneous radical democratisation of the state and securing of its German character.[137] One leading signatory, Georg von Schönerer would go onto lead the most radical and uncompromising German nationalist faction, combining support for joining the German empire, racial antisemitism, and anticlericalism. He was joined in the signing by many other future luminaries of Austrian German politics, including social democrats and Christian socials. German liberalism's successors, German nationalism, social democracy, and Christian socialism, would continue to constitute themselves over the 1880s and 90s.[138]

The Vereinigte Deutsche Linke splintered in 1896, being mostly replaced by the Deutsche Fortschrittspartei (DFP), whilst also taking heavy losses to the German nationalists in the 1897 elections. The Deutsche Volkspartei (DVP) coalesced around Otto Steinwender in Carinthia and Styria, pairing liberal reformism with antisemitism.[139] Georg von Schönerer gained a seat, along with four other Alldeutsche, including Karl Hermann Wolf. All Alldeutsche representatives were elected in Bohemia or Silesia.[140] These new nationalist challengers from the lower middle classes offered a völkisch solidarity, where Deutschtum was not something one acquired through education and manners, but blood and inheritance. This guarantee of status without need for acculturation appealed to a precarious petite bourgeoisie that had come to resent the prosperous liberal establishment, whom it blamed for rapid industrialisation and Jewish emancipation. Whilst still committed to an individualistic social and economic project, the DFP began to bend in a more nationalist direction to maintain support.[141]

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[137] John W. Boyer, *Austria, 1867-1955* (Oxford, 2022), p.213.
[138] F.L. Carsten, *Fascist Movements in Austria: From Schönerer to Hitler* (London, 1977), pp.12, 13.
[139] Boyer, *Austria, 1867-1955*, pp.306, 314.
[140] Carsten, *Fascist Movements in Austria*, 21-2.
[141] Gary B. Cohen, *The Politics of Ethnic Survival: Germans in Prague, 1861-1914* 2nd ed. (West Lafayette, 2006), pp.114-5.

In Vienna, likewise, the liberals were on the backfoot. The growing disaffection of state officials with the ruling party manifested over the course of the 1880s and 1890s, driven by poor working conditions. The liberals, impeccable haute bourgeois politicians that they were, continued to cut teacher benefits and increase their mandatory workloads, even on the eve of the 1895 election, ferociously alienating this once loyal constituency. The 1895 city council election was a catastrophe for the liberals in Vienna, who lost their majority to the petite bourgeois, antisemitic Christian socials. The Christian social leader, Karl Lueger, was originally denied confirmation by the emperor, meaning that a party colleague had to take the mayoralty. In 1897, however, Lueger was confirmed as mayor, a position he would hold until his death in 1910. The liberals would never govern Vienna again.[142]

With the Badeni language ordinances, the process of the collapse of German liberalism into German nationalism accelerated. The minister-president of Cisleithania, Count Kasimir Felix Badeni (1895-97), attempted to utilise the newfound weakening of the German liberals to negotiate a compromise in the Bohemian and Moravian crownlands between Czechs and Germans. He promulgated an ordinance stating that from 1901, dual language competency would be demanded from new state employees; those already employed by the state were to enjoy a grandfather clause. He hoped to swing the German liberals into a moderate alliance with the Young Czechs and the Poles to secure his parliamentary majority, and thereby exclude the Christian socials, pan-Germans, and clericals from power, hence the necessity of a compromise. However, he failed to reckon with the ferocity of the response. The DVP and the DFP both turned against the ordinances under pressure from their own electoral base.[143]

Badeni's gamble had failed, cross-national class interests did not trump perceived ethnic self-interest in mixed areas, as the progressives feared losing seats to pan-Germans if they

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[142] Boyer, *Austria, 1867-1955*, pp.239-40, 242-3.
[143] Ibid., pp.314-6.

acquiesced. German representatives turned to parliamentary obstruction to protest the measure, forcing the Reichsrat's closure. After the summer recess, the relentless obstruction continued, putting in jeopardy even the decennial renewal of the 1867 Compromise with Hungary. The throne was furious, considering Schönerer and the pan-Germans treasonous, and warning the Wilhelmine Germany off sympathy for this tendency. Mass protests spread against the ordinances from November, and the emperor decided to dispense with his minister-president.[144]

The Badeni Crisis polarised Bohemian politics as never before. The two poles of German politics in the last decades of the monarchy were the Bohemian crisis and the rise of mass parties centred in Vienna, i.e. the Christian socials and the social democrats. The next election, in 1901, produced a yet more viscerally split parliament and a strengthening of the national extremes, both amongst the Germans and Czechs. Minister-president Ernest von Koerber (1900-1904) achieved his majorities through a massive stimulus project, forcing all parties to dip their snouts in the trough.[145] The emperor, however, had tired of the parliamentary impasse, and chose after 1905 to implement universal male suffrage, in the hope of it bringing easier majorities.[146]

With the advent of universal suffrage, we finally get an accurate insight into the balance of forces amongst the German population in Cisleithania. The Germans gained 232 seats in the parliament, and in the 1907 election, antisemitic parties gained 60.8% of the German seats,[147] and 53.4% of the German popular vote in the first round.[148] For the second election in 1911, it is more difficult to separate antisemitic and non-antisemitic parties, due to the electoral alliance between the Volkspartei and the Fortschrittspartei, so instead the antisystemic German nationalists are used as an indicator of changing support, as they were particularly conspiratorial

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[144] Ibid., pp.320-1, 323.
[145] Ibid., pp.325, 337.
[146] Beller, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, p.201.
[147] For the electoral results by seats, see Table 4 in the Appendix on p.127.
[148] See Table 6 on p.129

and antisemitic. They increased their vote share by 45.4%, from 94,743 to 137,720,[149] and leapt

in parliamentary representation from 19 to 29. These parties were incredibly concentrated in

the Bohemian lands, whence 89.5%/95.6% of their MPs hailed, and where they were

20.5%/33.7% of the German representation. German nationalists generally achieved a large

increase in deputies between 1907 and 1911, going from 84 to 107. The German population of

the monarchy was radicalising in the monarchy's last years, both in terms of antisemitism and

nationalism. Antisemitism was hegemonic in late imperial German Cisleithania.[150]

## The Antisemitic Modern

So far in this chapter, we have discussed in passing the rise of antisemitism. Now it is time to

consider this racial project in detail. Why was it legible to contemporaries? Why were Jews

regarded as separate? And what was this project doing for its advocates? Firstly, let us turn the

socio-economic basis for the exclusion of the Deutschjudentum by the German gentiles. The

highly assimilated Deutschjuden were distinct from gentiles in occupational distribution. Over

half of employed Bohemian Jews worked in finance and commerce, for example.[151] Likewise,

the Viennese Jewry was divergent from the city's non-Jews. Via utilising the records of the

Israelitische Kultusgemeinde Wien on the jobs of Jewish grooms, we can assemble some

statistical data on the rough occupational distribution of the Jewish population in the city. This

provides the best cross-class Vienne data on Jewish occupations. Though in some ways

unrepresentative, and with a small sample size, we can postulate with reasonable certainty that

this dataset indicates broader distributional dynamics within the community, especially as it is

so different from the data for the entire city that the Austrian state collected.[152]

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[149] See Table 7 on p.129.
[150] See Table 5 on p.128.
[151] Cohen, 'Jews in German Society', 31-2.
[152] Rozenblit, *The Jews of Vienna,* p.51.

From the data,[153] we can clearly see the divergent path of the Viennese Jewry in working life. Whilst society at large was proletarianising, Jewish society was if anything salarianising. The data above if anything hides the level of Jewish difference from society at large, as even amongst Angestellte there were differences in occupational distribution. Jews were underrepresented in education and the civil service due to antisemitic practice, but overrepresented in business services, as clerks, managers, brokers, and bankers. Thus, in many professional circumstances, when interacting with finance and insurance, Jewish employees were visible, indeed often in the majority, in roles where they served as functionaries of big capital. This is a reason why an association between Jews and haute bourgeois laissez-faire capitalism and liberal political economy would have read as legible to contemporaries.[154]

Artisans were a substantial part of the Viennese and Alpine petite bourgeoisie. Additionally, they were highly antisemitic. The artisanal association of Jews with an industrial capitalism which threatened their livelihoods was spawned with the 1859 Gewerbeordnung, an ordinance that abolished guild protections and threw open production and commerce to all who wished. This same regulation also permitted the unrestricted entry of Jews into these fields. Once again, we see the results of liberal political economy, the abolition of corporate structures including those that privileged some gentiles and excluded most Jews, as being attributed to Jewish conspiracy by those who benefitted from the status quo. The liberals in government were unmoved by this constituency's demands for state subsidy. Taaffe introduced changes which exempted this bloc from foreign competition through protectionism and allowed them to hyper-exploit their workforce, in contrast to the ever more tightly regulated factories. Jews were present amongst the shopkeepers and artisans of Vienna, competitors to their Gentile fellow citizens. Jews served to symbolise both haute bourgeois industrial capitalism and petite bourgeois competitive pressures for this paranoid, privileged constituency. This bloc

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[153] See Table 2 and Table 3 on p.126.
[154] Rozenblit, *The Jews of Vienna,* pp.48-51.

consistently demanded that the government hold back the tide and protect only them and theirs from the threats of capitalist modernity. The gentile artisans and shopkeepers of Vienna and the Alpine lands would form the core of Christian social support, aided by the fact that the Austrian electoral system serving to over-represent the petite bourgeoisie relative to other classes.[155]

We have the constitution of an antisemitic petite bourgeoisie, now let us turn to the constitution of an antisemitic intelligentsia. Jews were overrepresented in the professions compared to their demographic weight. In medicine, law, education, engineering, journalism, and the arts, 11% of Vienna's Jews found their employment.[156] These were fields which often required a university education, making academia a key site of encounter between Jews and gentiles. Thus, Austria's universities were pioneers in the development of the antisemitic modern. Already by 1875, German nationalist students cheered on Theodor Billroth, professor of medicine at the University of Vienna, as he called for restrictions on Jewish enrolment. He justified this with reference to the supposed avarice of Jews, but it seems prudent to presume the underlying anxiety was that German gentiles were being outcompeted by the Deutschjuden. German gentiles regarded the Deutschjudentum as a separate community and thus a threat.[157] The antisemitic agitation at Austrian universities would only grow more intense from the 1880s, even whilst unbaptised Jews continued to be barred from professorships and other standard careers available to gentile graduates.[158] Gentile graduates, such as doctors and lawyers, formed the core supporters of von Schonerer, and the man himself was wildly popular with the extremely antisemitic German university fraternities.[159] This constituency was also constituted the producers and a good portion of the market for the cultural production of antisemitism both

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[155] Boyer, *Austria, 1867-1955*, pp.225-6, 230-1.
[156] Rozenblit, *The Jews of Vienna,* p.52.
[157] Beller, *The Habsburg Monarchy,* p.147.
[158] Wistrich, *Die Juden Wiens*, p.145.
[159] Carsten, *Fascist Movements in Austria*, pp.18-9.

as a scientific project and as an esoteric project. The existence of this constituency also indicates why the DVP enjoyed such substantial support across the Alpine cities. [160]

The gentile salariat in Vienna, meanwhile, gravitated towards the Christian socials. From the 1880s, a decade after the eruption of antisemitism onto the university scene, the liberals noticed they were losing support of the white-collar workers in the capital, who were voting in increasing numbers for antisemites. The antagonism here was between junior employees and their employer, and the complaints were legion, including unfair appointment practices, a lack of vacations, and long, poorly paid probationary periods required of younger officials. The virulent antisemitism of this group, fresh graduates of Austria's universities, gave them a scapegoat to explain why they were being treated poorly by their employer. The different career paths of Jewish graduates outside of state service meant that there was no sense of struggling together against a common enemy. Additionally, antisemitism was also a more convenient explanation for these antisemites, as it displaced their anger at their employer onto a distant enemy. Resenting their boss, with whom they had to curry favour, was a recipe for remaining stuck in junior roles.[161] In the Alpine lands, meanwhile, this constituency normally swung behind German nationalists, who were notably strong in the smaller Alpine cities.[162] The Christian socials were mainly an agrarian party outside of Vienna.[163]

The final constituency of the antisemitic racial project was those on the German frontier. This was a paranoid defensive bloc, who desired to halt the Sprachgrenze in situ. Whilst this was feasible in some parts of Bohemia, it simply would not work anywhere where industrial capitalism, with its hunger for labour, set up shop. The coal mines west of Pilsen, for example, needed workers no matter their tongue. Ergo, the miniscule German village of

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[160] See Table 8 on p.130.
[161] Boyer, *Austria, 1867-1955*, p.239.
[162] See Table 8 on p.130.
[163] Or Boyer, *Austria, 1867-1955*, p.244

Nürschau increased in population by a factor of 21 between 1800 and 1897, going from 245 in 1800 to 5,151 in 1890, now mostly Czech. More generally, zones of economic vibrancy in Deutschböhmen would attract Czech migration, creating minorities beyond the border, in the interior. This defensive goal preconditioned the German efforts to freeze time on the linguistic developments in Bohemia,[164] hence their perennial demand to split the crownland into German and Czech territories, persistently refused by the government.[165] In such a context, where the German national project felt itself to be swimming against the current in its attempt to maintain the integrity of the nation and its existence into the future, it is unsurprising that it reached to tropes of blood and descent in an effort to claim all of its present national assets in perpetuity.[166] Hence, the Bohemian lands consistently elected extreme German nationalists, sending 17 and 28 antisystemic nationalists to the Reichsrat in 1907 and 1911 respectively, increasing from a fifth to a third of the representation of the Bohemian lands. In 1907, this was 89.5% of antisystemic nationalist deputies in parliament; in 1911, it was 95.6%.[167]

The German liberals and the German nationalists would finally make the leap to a unified front after the introduction of universal suffrage. Both felt threatened by the rise of agrarian and social democratic class-oriented political movements, forcing a nearing of positions as both the liberals and nationalists had to mobilise mass support without having a mass socio-economic constituency. Hence both leant on German nationalism to remain competitive. The rapprochement between the two camps led to the formation of the Deutscher National Verband in February 1910.[168] This alliance consisted of the DVP, the DFP, the Deutsche Agrarier, the

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[164] Mark Cornwall, 'The Struggle on the Czech-German Language Border, 1880-1940', *The English Historical Review* vol. 109 (1994), 918-21.
[165] Boyer, *Austria, 1867-1955*, pp.318, 392.
[166] Cohen, *The Politics of Ethnic Survival*, p.115.
[167] See Table 5 on p.128.
[168] Cohen, *The Politics of Ethnic Survival*, 177, 182

Deutschradikalen (DRP),[169] and the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (DArP). After the 1911 election, this bloc was the largest in the Reichsrat.[170]

German mass politics had constituted itself in Cisleithania in the early twentieth century as highly antisemitic, and this was only increasing in intensity. The racial intelligentsia published books and pamphlets to legitimate this project. This interfaced with the discourses of biological race which suffused the entire breadth of the German national movement, leading to increasing pressure on all actors to radicalise to the extremes.[171] The contrast between the self-confident nationalism of the Alpine Germans vs. the paranoid nationalism of the Bohemian Germans is clear, but should not be overemphasised. All were part of the same political culture and the same cultural sphere. A solid constituency in one part of the monarchy, via its reliable access to political representation, served to legitimate discourses across its breadth. Bohemia was the laboratory of German nationalism, where it experimented with whatever configurations of ideas would give its paranoid, hopeless, and furious constituents the psychic armament for endless conflict. In the national radicalism evident in Bohemia, we can see precursors to the National Socialist project. Meanwhile, in the hegemonically antisemitic culture of German Cisleithania, we can see why broad swathes of the population and political class would be unconcerned by the radical antisemitism to come.[172]

But why were Jews regarded as separate? If we return to Anderson's accounting of nationalism, the nation, or any modern collective mass identification, is an imagined community. The bounds of these communities are contingent, and they are given meaning by a range of factors such as

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[169] Originally the Freialldeutsche. The were led by Karl Herman Wolf, who had split from the Alldeutsche after the 1901 election. They went from strength to strength as Schönerer faded into irrelevance. See Carsten, *Fascist Movements in Austria*, p.24.

[170] Gernot Stimmer, 'Deutschnationale Parteien 1914 zwischen Irredenta und Mitteleuropakonzeption', in Maria Mesner, Robert Kriechbaumer, Michaela Maier and Helmut Wohnout (eds.), *Parteien und Gesellschaft im Ersten Weltkrieg: Das Beispiel Österreich-Ungarn*, p.77.

[171] Ibid., p.75.

[172] Evan V. Bukey, 'Review: Hitlers Vätergeneration: Die Ursprünge des Nationalsozialismus in der k. u. k. Monarchie by Michael Wladika', *Journal of Modern History* vol.80 (2008), 195.

administrative borders, and all manners of inclusions and exclusions. Religion is many things, including a social network, a community of solidarity, a focus of public life. Religion helps determine one's in-group, the people whom one sees regularly at worship, whom one knows, whom one marries. That also means that people outside of this community may read as a social blank slate, unknown and perhaps threatening. Nationalism and religion were the two dominant factors in the organisation of public life in the late Dual Monarchy, so in one sense it is unsurprising the intersection of these two factors was wrought with tension and contradiction.[173]

It is notable that the 1880s mark the intensification of both national fracture and antisemitic agitation in Cisleithania, as this is also the juncture when industrialisation swung into high gear. Urbanisation increased in pace, the railways extended their reach, and modern communications spread to every corner of the empire. By 1900, near 40% of the entire population of the monarchy had moved from their place of birth to somewhere else in the monarchy. A recognisably modern society, with mass migration, mass politics, and mass alienation was born. An immense change in subjectivities was compelled by the advent of mass society, where one had to utilise imagined communities and arbitrary delineations of solidarity to exist in a society of strangers, of too many people to ever know personally. The need for community was profound, and the need to project this social dislocation equally so. The figure of the Jew was a convenient locus of this other, this anti-nation, this site of overdetermination. Ergo, from the social crisis of industrial modernity the racial formation of Jews was spawned.[174]

The response of the Deutschjudentum to their racialisation was multifaceted. As liberal hegemony dissolved like mist and Jews began to mature into a racially antisemitic age, a generational shift took place in deutschjüdisch politics,[175] while German liberalism proved both

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[173] Judson, *Habsburg Empire*, pp.271, 379.
[174] Ibid., pp.334, 351-2.
[175] Maderthaner, 'Empire, Nationalism and the Jewish Question', 3.

unable and unwilling to defend its most loyal adherents.[176] This ferment spawned both socialist and nationalist challengers to the present crisis, who offered future utopias free from the agony of contemporary reality. It is important to remember that these were projects by and for a mass of assimilés, for communities who had been assimilated wholesale. Hence, the lack of pining for a shtetl; there was no going back to a world before assimilation. It was a fait accompli. Whilst Galicia contained large groups of unassimilated Jews,[177] and some Jewish majority cities,[178] the deutschjüdisch communities were not from there, had different histories, and by virtue of their deep German acculturation, often looked at their co-religionists in the east with a mixture of orientalist scorn and paternalistic charity.[179]

The fact that there was no way back structured each of these tendencies. Hence, Zionism was compelled to reach for Hebrew. Its early theoreticians in the Dual Monarchy had all been through the classical education of a Gymnasium, where pupils imbibed a deep appreciation and knowledge of (gentile) antiquity.[180] To prove that Jews were a worthy people to themselves and gentiles, the cloak of ancient tradition was more appealing than a language of poor and oppressed Ashkenazim out east. In this they built on the Haskalah tradition which privileged Hebrew antiquity.[181] The theorists of early Zionism, such as Theodor Herzl, were highly educated individuals in the European metropole.[182] Consequently, they had internalised the hegemonic European discourses on the validity of colonialism as a practice of government, and they wrote with a rationalist elan about the purported benefits of their colonial endeavour for both coloniser and colonised. They offered a national utopia undergirded by the twined

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[176] Boyer, *Austria, 1867-1955*, p.231.
[177] Joshua Shanes, *Diaspora Nationalism and Jewish Identity in Habsburg Galicia* (Cambridge, 2012), p.110.
[178] Buchen, *Antisemitism in Galicia*, p.133.
[179] Rozenblit, *The Jews of Vienna*, pp.43, 149.
[180] Ibid., p.101 for Cisleithania, Tibor Frank, 'Teaching and Learning Science in Hungary, 1867–1945: Schools, Personalities, Influences', *Science & Education* 2012-03, vol.21 (2012), 357 for Transleithania.
[181] Ron Kuzar, *Hebrew and Zionism: A Discourse Analytic Cultural Study,* (Berlin, 2001) p.7.
[182] Artur Kamczycki, 'Zionist Restitution of the Ugly Jew's Image: The Case of Theodor Herzl', *Studia Orientalia* vol.112 (2012), 20.

enterprise of Jewish antiquity and colonial modernity. Herzl's *Altneuland* is indicative, as he writes about a future Palestine which is multinational and diverse, but with Jews, rather than Germans, in the guiding role. 'Like here, only its normal to be Jewish' can be described as the national utopia[183] which he offered.[184]

Vienna's Jewish socialist theoreticians, meanwhile, fought a different battle, for German as a confidant universal-imperial nationality, existing in fraternal harmony with the other peoples of the monarchy. Deutschtum would not be abandoned to völkisch sensibilities, for Germany itself was modernity, progress, and cosmopolitanism. These socialists maintained that assimilation was not only inevitable but necessary. Whilst justified in terms of Marxist dialectics, the confidant (if now fragile) futurity, the universalist rhetoric, the German allegiance and the didactic project all built on the foundations of German liberalism. This is unsurprising, as this circle was upper middle class, highly educated and assimilated. They were in the most literal sense, the heirs of Jewish Deutschliberalismus, their fathers being successful industrialists and loyal liberals.[185] For this group, antisemitism and Jewish nationalism were of equal threat to the goals of social democracy,[186] and thus their ability to initiate a transformed society,[187] wherein the empire's peoples would live in national harmony.[188]

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[183] By this I am referring only to his approach to the national question. His other conceptions are irrelevant to this study.

[184] Derek J. Penslar, 'Herzl and the Palestinian Arabs: Myth and Counter-Myth', *Journal of Israeli History* vol.24 (2005), 69-70, 74-5.

[185] Maderthaner, 'Empire, Nationalism and the Jewish Question', 3-4, 8-9.

[186] Otto Bauer, 'Sozialismus und Antisemitismus', *Der Kampf* vol.4 (Vienna, 1910), [Accessed from https://www.marxists.org/deutsch/archiv/bauer/1910/11/antisemitismus.html.], 'muss der Antisemitismus, der die jüdischen Proletarier abstosst, ebenso bekämpft werden wie der jüdische Nationalismus'.

[187] Otto Bauer, 'VII. Programm und Taktik der österreichischen Sozialdemokratie', *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie*, (Vienna, 1907), [Accessed from https://www.marxists.org/deutsch/archiv/bauer/1907/nationalitaet/34-taktik.html.], 'um schließlich der Arbeiterklasse die politische Macht zu erobern und dadurch die Umwälzung der Gesellschaftsverfassung einzuleiten'.

[188] Ibid., 'die schwierige Frage der nationalen Minderheiten friedlich zum Nutzen aller Völker zu lösen'.

## Conclusion

To sum up the socio-economic factors that made antisemitism a viable political project in late nineteenth century Cisleithania, we have a distinct community which was engaged in divergent types of economic activity from its gentile surroundings both before and after the industrial revolution. This group had a distinctive occupational and educational orientation. It was firmly assimilated, but notably distinct from gentiles. This mapped onto a range of interlocking class and ethnic antagonisms, some imagined, some real, where Jewishness was reached for as the explanatory trope for the antagonism. This synthesised onto the general and broad ranging dislocation from the mass urbanisation and rapid industrialisation. The rise of antisemitism was also simultaneous with the intensification of both ethnic and class differentiation. This era of mass change, of incipient mass politics, wrought a whole constellation of innovations in identities, in both their inclusive and exclusive manifestations. Thereby, we have the material base of the antisemitic racial project in Cisleithania.

The discursive tradition of religious Judeophobia helped structure the politico-cultural elaboration of antisemitism, but it is also integral to embed the contemporary circumstances into its theorising. This project was fundamentally modern, and its tropes were modern. Its conspiratorialism is clearly to be understood in light of modernity's implementation without consultation, but why large swathes of Austria's Germans were so primed for conspiratorial thinking has to do with their loss of an exclusive claim on the state. In Cisleithania, no nation could understand the state as being unambiguously on their side; it would ally situationally as needed for governance. But for many of the empire's Germans, this read as a betrayal of their historical destiny and their place in the hierarchy of nations. A battle to maintain privilege was inaugurated which prowled constantly for signs of betrayal. Blood and descent were now centred in defining Germans. German nationalism in the empire's final decades was an embittered thing, rallying itself for confrontation with Jews and Slavs, enemies within and without. The experience of total war did not soothe this tendency.

For the Deutschjudentum, who had enthusiastically assimilated into Germany as a liberatory project, this was profoundly dislocating occurrence. A group profoundly committed to German culture found its invitation revoked. This provoked a renewed search for identity under the constraints of antisemitic modernity. Via the repackaging of liberal universalism, the socialists offered one solution, and via the reproduction of national particularism, the Zionists another.

# Chapter Four: Religion, Nation, and Race
# in the Romanov Empire

Herein we shall chart the course of racial formation in the Romanov empire from Russia's acquisition of a substantial Jewish population in the eighteenth century to the eve of WWI. The socio-economic specificity of the Ashkenazi population in pre-partition Poland is highlighted, as well as the opportunity this represented to the tsarist regime, eager as it was to promote urban economic development. However, this initial moment of welcome evaporated after the French revolution, which soured the autocracy on modernisation. Jews, who were viewed as vectors of commerce and urbanity were now regarded as inherent threats to the political settlement, and had restrictions placed on their lives accordingly.

Hereafter, we will recount how Jews adapted to the commercialising and industrialising processes underway in nineteenth-century Russia. The particularities of the Jewish socio-economic role in pre-industrial Russian/Polish society predetermined that Jews would have a different path into industrial modernity vis-à-vis gentiles, and we see the first indicators of this under Nicholas I, where some Jews do very well out of furnishing the state with credit, services, and wares. This process, however, is always limited by the autocracy, which never passes emancipation for its Jewry. Thus, even as the new era demands literates and professionals, the regime attempts to stem the tide.

Finally, we consider how the slowness of reform under Alexander II becomes its abnegation under Alexander III and especially Nicholas II, where fresh controls are introduced to prevent the instantiation of modern subjectivities whilst still industrialising enough to remain competitive as a European great power. As the complete failure of this project becomes evident in the 1905-7 revolutions, the regime settles on the figure of the Jew as the symbol of all oppositional forces within the empire. The throne pardons pogrom perpetrators, prosecutes blood libel and toys with endorsing the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. The racial project of tsarist antisemitism is the maintenance of autocracy under industrial capitalism via a neo-feudal

dreamworld of blissful peasants and gentle aristocrats. The hopelessness of Jewish life under this regime leads to a comprehensive rejection of assimilation by its Jewish population, as well as a general antisystemic disposition.

## Russia Comes Late to its Jewry

The Russian Empire acquired a large Jewish population for the first time at the end of the eighteenth century with the partitions of Poland.[189] This addition was a novelty for the Russian body politic, which had no substantial quantity of Jewish members since the expulsion of the Jews from the Grand Duchy of Muscovy in the fifteenth century for fear that they were corrupting Orthodox doctrine.[190] Poland, meanwhile, distinguished itself in the early modern period by comparative equanimity for its Jewish communities, where aggressive action was rarer and without state sanction. Poland was, from the 16th century, the largest cluster of Ashkenazi settlement. Catholic Judeophobia did spread to Poland-Lithuania during the era of the Counter-Reformation in the latter half of the 16th century, much delayed from its Western European origins, but nonetheless, it remained a political order where Jewish existence was a normal and established part of its functioning.[191]

On the eve of partition, by the latter half of the eighteenth century, urban Jewish communities of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were overwhelmingly specialised in artisanry and trade. In the villages, meanwhile, around 80 percent of Jews were in occupations related to the liquor industry. The Jewish population was concentrated in the southern and eastern provinces of the Commonwealth, and in some regions constituted over half of the urban population.[192] Thus, the Jewish population of the pre-partition Commonwealth functioned as an effective third

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[189] Laura Engelstein, 'Antisemitism in Late Imperial Russia and Eastern Europe Through 1920', in Stephen T. Katz (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Antisemitism* (Cambridge, 2022), p.325.
[190] Cała, *Jew. The Eternal Enemy?*, p.87.
[191] Ibid., pp.30, 42, 44.
[192] Gershon David Hundert, *Jews in Poland-Lithuania in the Eighteenth Century: A Genealogy of Modernity* (Berkeley, 2004), pp.33, 53.

estate, responsible for trade and production, especially in its eastern borderland. The Polish Jewry was thus absorbed as a quasi-estate into the overwhelmingly agrarian Russian Empire.[193]

However, social estates, especially in their urban and commercial forms, were more a statement of intent than a reflection of social reality in the broader Russian Empire at this time. These estates would outlast their western European counterparts significantly, as the state attempted to guide the development of its social order along its idealised lines according to a teleological narrative of 'standard', western development. The burgherdom was therefore weak and dependent on the state's largesse for its continued existence and logic, which is consequential, as the absence of a tradition of corporate autonomy allowed the autocracy to conceive of social estates as buttresses of the regime and conduits for its social reforms. Thus, folding its Jews into the estate system was an attempt at integrating this new population through institutions of hierarchy and collective difference. [194]

The Pale of Settlement, the sole region of the empire where Jewish residence was permitted, unless one met certain preconditions permitting one to enter the interior,[195] was likewise preconditioned through the logic of estates. The state wished to promote urban development until the period of the French Revolution, and regarded its Jewish population as an urban and artisanal people who would be conducive to this aim. After the Revolution, Catherine II soured on the prospect of social reform and restricted Jewish settlement to the territory it had won in the Partitions of Poland and the new territory acquired from the Ottomans, New Russia, or modern Ukraine. This was permitted as part of the general state project to settle New Russia with agricultural labour. In the Jewish example, this was wildly ineffective, and most Jewish

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[193] Benjamin Nathans, *Beyond the Pale: The Jewish Encounter with Late Imperial Russia* (Berkeley, 2002), pp.25-6.
[194] Ibid., pp.25-6.
[195] Engelstein, 'Antisemitism in Late Imperial Russia', p.325.

colonists settled in the cities, such as Odessa or Elizavetgrad, rather than in the countryside.[196] The institutional form of the Pale was consolidated in 1835 under the rule of Nicholas I.[197]

The reign of Nicholas I constituted a rupture in the hereto functioning of tsarist policy towards its Jewish subjects. In 1827, the state equalised conscription quotas for the Jews, for the first time drafting Jewish soldiers. Rather than Jewish communities paying higher taxes to be exempted from conscription, now only merchants could buy their sons out of the military, as could their gentile colleagues. For the first time, the state was forcing open the boundaries between its various disparate subject peoples, but that is not to imply that this new burden was applied evenly. Jewish conscripts were taken substantially younger than the average, even if at the same rate. They were subjected to special regulations that demanded higher levels of performance for advancement, were restricted from certain battalions, and, as aforementioned, were under a special legal regime which dictated their residence on the end of their term. Additionally, conversion was a stated goal, and the state proved disappointed with the rates at which Jews converted for 'sheer survival under extraordinarily hostile conditions' whilst trapped in the empire's service.[198]

In a period of fifty years, the Jews of the former Commonwealth had undergone a transformation in role. In Poland-Lithuania, they were a recognised part of the political order, a quasi-estate, responsible for much of the trade and commerce in the land. Under Catherine II, meanwhile, they were a hopeful prospect for her enlightened despotism to mercantilise its urban economies. After the French Revolution, however, the autocracy lost its appetite for social and economic reform, as it worried that an empowered third estate of burghers would overthrow the tsar. The Russian experience in the nineteenth century is one of reactionary modernisation. Autocratic governments of varying flavours tried to guide social and economic change to

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[196] Nathans, *Beyond the Pale*, p.37.
[197] Engelstein, 'Antisemitism in Late Imperial Russia', p.325.
[198] Ibid., pp.27, 29.

maintain the absolutist settlement and avoid instantiating liberal subjectivities and constitutionalist sympathies whilst still remaining competitive with the other great powers militarily, diplomatically, and therefore economically. The change in fortunes of the empire's Jews reflects this shift, where they went from means to drive economic development to a population to be, if possible, made into peasants via agricultural settlement programmes, or Christians via the army. Thus, we see two lasting themes of the autocracy's encounter with its Jewish subjects elaborated early, its distrust of them as possible agents of social change, and its desire to homogenise them with the presumed docility of the Christian peasantry.[199]

## Jews Under Reactionary Modernisation

After the Russian Empire annexed the eastern and central parts of Poland-Lithuania's former territory, the socio-economic system remained roughly stable until the reign of Nicholas I.[200] Under Nicholas I, we see many of Russia's first steps into modern statehood, whereby it began to develop the mechanisms to be able to mobilise societal resources en masse. A pertinent example here is the autocracy's decision to centralise the collection of alcohol taxes. Throughout the nineteenth century and long into the twentieth, taxes on the production and sale of alcohol raised a substantial portion, usually one third, of Russian state revenues. Inside the Pale, Jews were a key part of this process, as distillers and tavern keepers hired by landowners to supply the peasantry.[201] Thus, after 1827, when the government instituted tax-farming throughout the empire to raise revenue without increasing expenditure, Jews in the Pale, alongside nobles and other minorities including Old Believers and Greeks, were encouraged by the state to submit bids for leases.[202]

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[199] Heinz-Dietrich Löwe, *The Tsar and the Jews: Reform, Reaction and Antis-Semitism in Imperial Russia, 1772-1917* (Chur, 1993), pp.48-9, 65, 104.
[200] Nathans, *Beyond the Pale*, p.39.
[201] Ibid., p.40.
[202] Ilya Vovshin, 'Eliazar Litman Feigin and the Birth of Jewish Capitalism under Tsar Nicholas I,' *Jewish Social Studies: History, Culture, Society* vol. 28, 184-5.

This public-private partnership is characteristic of those Jews who acquired great wealth in the nineteenth century in Russia. Whether tax-farming, securing military supplies for the army during the November Uprising,[203] and the Crimean War, or replacing state credit institutions with private banks, some Jews were well-placed to benefit from Russian state modernisation. The Russian Empire was, during this time, a state whose reach exceeded its grasp. For purposes of Great Power competition, it needed to mobilise large outlays of men and resources, to fight its wars and build its railways.[204] However, the Russian Empire was, to its very end, an overwhelmingly agrarian society, and was relatively late to the process of industrialisation, compared to its European competitors. Urbanisation en masse only began in the 1860s, and agricultural, mining and industrial modernisation only commenced in earnest from the 1880s. Ergo, the Russian state was the primary driver of economic development until the late nineteenth century, and the development of new commercial opportunities were until then mostly in this parastate sector that required fixers and middlemen.[205] By reason of the economic specialisation of Jewish communities in the pre-industrial era, many Jews were well primed to the new economic conditions, and some, such as the Gintsburgs and Poliakovs, got so fabulously wealthy that were added to the nobility.[206]

Nonetheless, some Jews doing very well out of the nascent industrialisation of Russia does not mean all did, far from it. Industrialisation hit on average rather harder. An economic specialisation in commerce, crafts and light industry is not an ideal position in an era of increasingly capital-intensive and agglomerative modes of production. Jewish enterprises in the Pale were, on average, smaller, less capital-intensive, and less productive than the standard.[207] However, due to the specificities of the tsarist autocracy's spatial delineation of integration, this

[203] Ibid., 189.
[204] Nathans, *Beyond the Pale*, pp.68, 128
[205] Eli Lederhendler, 'On the Social Status of Jews in Russia and Eastern Europe in the Late Nineteenth Century', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* Vol. 50 (2008), 512
[206] Nathans, *Beyond the Pale*, pp.128-9.
[207] Lederhendler, 'On the Social Status of Jews in Russia', 513, 516.

variegated story of class cleavages would have been invisible to Russians beyond the Pale, as only prosperous Jews could to leave the Pale.[208]

## Assimilation Denied

Assimilation was not as successful in the Russian context as in the Habsburg demesnes. Although many of the same processes were underway, including linguistic standardisation by an expanding state, and professionalisation by a Jewry adapting to industrialisation in a particular fashion based on its pre-industrial specialisations, this failed to make a mass of fervent Russian Jewish nationalists a la the Deutschjudentum. The reasons for the failure of assimilation are the twin pillars of tsarist exclusionary policies and demographic concentration of Jewish settlement. These two factors helped create a circumstance in which assimilation was emotionally unappealing and socially unnecessary for the majority of the empire's Jews.

After the Great Reforms of Alexander II in the 1860s, although the bottom and top of the social hierarchy, the nobility and peasantry, were left roughly intact, the urban middle estate was made more open and fluid. The state permitted those Jews it felt useful into the interior as part of this process, a policy Benjamin Nathans calls 'selective integration'. The primary beneficiaries of this policy were merchants, artisans, and students/graduates. [209] This would lead to the first development of a 'Russian Jewry', in the sense of a Jewry living in the Russian interior and speaking Russian. In the 1897 census, there were 186,422 Jews living in European Russia, 3.6% of a total Jewish population of 5.2 million. In the imperial capital, St Petersburg, there were 16,944 Jews out of 1,264,920 Petersburgers, 1.3%. In the 1910 city census, meanwhile, there were 34,995 out of 1,905,589, or 1.8% of the total population. Although this data must be caveated that it was gathered by a state which made illegal many forms of Jewish residence in

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[208] Löwe, *Tsar and the Jews*, p.191.
[209] Nathans, *Beyond the Pale*, pp.59-62, 72.

the interior, and therefore will underreport that self-same Jewish residence, as a measure of legal residence, it is noticeably low.[210]

The example of Vienna gives some indication of the possible levels of immigration that the Russian capital would have received with emancipation, but so too does Warsaw, the largest Jewish city in Europe by the twentieth century. Warsaw was the capital of Congress Poland, a Russian constituent kingdom. Congress Poland implemented Jewish emancipation and thereby abolished residence restrictions in 1862. In 1897, Warsaw had 624,189 inhabitants, of which 210,526 were Jewish, or 33.7%. According to official estimates, Jewish immigration to Warsaw was only accelerating in the early twentieth century, and by 1914, the regime reasoned that 337,000 of the 885,000 people in the city were Jewish, or 38.1%. In comparison to Warsaw as well as Vienna, we can see that the Russian encounter with its Jewish population was tightly limited by the spatial delineation of legal Jewish settlement in the interior.[211]

As a result of the restricted entry of Jews into European Russia, an intense class distortion was applied to the Jews with whom most Russians would interact. St Petersburg, as the imperial capital, provides a hypertrophied example, where Jews were engaged both in traditional Jewish occupations, such as tailoring and shoemaking, as well as new professional pursuits, such as law, medicine, and finance, and were active in these professions at a level far higher than their proportion of the city's population. Likewise, merchants were represented fivefold in the Petersburg Jewish population vis-à-vis the Pale Jewry (5% vs. 1%), and there was even a statistically relevant nobility (3%), unthinkable in the Pale. Therefore, what was taken as representative of the Russian Jewry, and indeed presented itself thus, was the most successful and unrepresentative. Accordingly, it was 'the Russian-Jewish plutocracy, many of whom

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[210] Ibid., pp.4, 83, 92, 99.
[211] Stephen D. Corrsin, 'Aspects of Population Change and Acculturation in Jewish Warsaw at the End of the Nineteenth Century: The Censuses of 1882 and 1897', in Antony Polonsky (ed.), *The Jews of Warsaw* (Oxford, 2004), pp.122, 124.

played a major role in the burgeoning fields of private banking, stock market speculation, and railroads', as well as the 'the merchants, bankers, and financiers who usually caught the public eye'.[212]

Much like in Cisleithania, Jews were salarianising in St Petersburg at an overproportionate rate too. By the 1880s, Jews were 43% of brokers and 12% of trading house employees. 33% of Jews employed in the manufacturing sector worked in managerial and administrative roles, against 12% of non-Jews. Estimates for the proportion of Jews in the capital's lawyers ranged from 22% to 42%, and 43% to 55% of apprentice lawyers. Jews were 20% of the pharmacists, 11% of the dentists, and 9% of the physicians in St Petersburg. Meanwhile, linguistic assimilation was proceeding apace, with 12% of Petersburger Jews reporting Russian as their native language in 1881, 29% in 1890, and 42% in 1910. The St Petersburg Jewry is in many respects the mirror of Cisleithania's Deutschjudentum, except for the fact that it was wildly unrepresentative, 0.3% of the Jewish population of the empire, the lucky few permitted, selected, by the tsarist regime.[213]

Russia's Jewry was proportionally overrepresented in the free professions, unsurprisingly as they were excluded from the civil service.[214] Thus, empire-wide, Jews were 14% of certified lawyers and 43% of apprentice lawyers by 1883, and in the western provinces, Jews ranged by province between a quarter and half of all private lawyers.[215] Meanwhile, by 1897, 11.7% of all people employed in art, literature and science were Jews, almost three times as many as would have been suggested by their share of the overall population.[216] The exclusion from government jobs was despite no legal prohibition, but rather informal discrimination by the tsarist bureaucracy. Jewish law graduates, for example, were substantially more likely to go

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[212] Nathans, *Beyond the Pale*, pp. 101-2, 128.
[213] Ibid., pp.102-4, 111.
[214] Lederhendler, 'On the Social Status of Jews in Russia', 517
[215] Nathans, *Beyond the Pale*, pp.314-5.
[216] Löwe, *Tsar and the Jews*, p.96.

into private practice precisely because a career in academia or the civil service was barred to them. This unofficial exclusion again echoes the experience of the Deutschjudentum, who suffered severe disadvantage in comparison with their gentile competitors when applying for positions in state service.[217]

The processes of salarianisation and professionalisation were increasingly blocked by the autocracy, however. As Russian Jews, like their Habsburg counterparts, attended gymnasia and university at above average rates, the government moved to introduce quotas to restrict Jewish participation, at first piecemeal, and after 1887, across the entire empire.[218] Thereafter, Jews were limited to 10% of the student body inside the Pale, 5% outside of it, and 3% in the two capitals. This was catastrophic, as it worked to trap Jews in the old specialisations of artisanry and petty trade, spectacularly uncompetitive sectors in an industrialising economy. Jews were excluded from most modern factory work, and forbidden from the countryside, so the tsarist regime's closing of the salarianisation escape valve worked to confine its Jews to enduring poverty. Thus, whilst the Petersburg Jewry underscores the similar socio-economic pressures and incentives Russia's Jews faced in the industrial era vis-à-vis the Habsburg Jews, the broader condition of the Russian Jewry reflects the outcomes of tsarist policy.[219]

The introduction of the numerus clausus was read as a catastrophe by contemporary Jews. This blow was intensified in severity by the fact that university graduates were one of the few Jewish groups exempted from the autocracy's spatial confinement. Whether Zionists or socialists, future Jewish political leaders would look back with visceral hate at the tsarist quotas, which featured more prominently than the pogroms in their memoirs.[220] The rejection of the regime was vociferous by young Jews deprived of futures and social mobility by arbitrary tsarist policy.

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[217] Nathans, *Beyond the Pale*, p.217.
[218] Ibid., pp.263, 269.
[219] Löwe, *Tsars and the Jews*, pp.92, 95.
[220] Nathans, *Beyond the Pale*, p.269.

The upwardly mobile literates who could no longer progress through the educational system to professional prestige and material security still retained intellectual capital and curiosity, they were just denied a place inside the system. Thus, many of these half-intellectuals, unassimilated and aggrieved, devoted themselves to the career of the professional revolutionary.[221]

## A Distant Encounter

The figure of the Jew was the bête noire of the autocracy. Although elements of the tsarist bureaucracy, especially in the Ministry of Finance, were positively disposed towards Jews for their roles in commerce, the introduction of capitalist modernity was not popular by and large with the constituency of the regime, the landholding nobility. On the accession of Alexander III after the assassination of his father, Alexander II, in 1881, the government, spooked by the radical terrorist threat and the rolling wave of pogroms, took the opportunity to roll back on the social project of economic modernisation. Modernity was to be managed more closely, as obviously it had gone too far. Great power competition would not permit material retrenchment from industrialisation, but an ideological volte face was appealing to the fearful autocracy. For capitalism, against capitalist subjectivities was the avant-garde policy of the state. Thus, over the remaining span of the Romanov empire, the topos of the Jew developed as synecdoche for modernity, capitalism, and radicalism amongst the regime and its adherents.[222]

Why was this association of capitalist modernity and Jews legible to Russian reactionaries? The overproportionate representation of Russia's Jewry amongst merchants is certainly a factor. Jews were 39.7% of merchants empire-wide, and 72.8% inside the Pale, compared to their proportions of the population of 4.13% and 12% respectively. As recounted above, Jews were distinguished by a different response to industrialisation vis-à-vis gentiles, of salarianisation rather than proletarianisation. As the peasants poured into the factories, these burghers flowed

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[221] Löwe, *Tsar and the Jews*, p.95.
[222] Ibid., pp.62, 65, 103-4.

into the schools, the universities, and thereafter the professions. Thus, by 1882 Jews were 14.5% of university students and 10.2% of gymnasium students. This specificity reflects a comprehensible adaptation by a highly literate and urban population to the new opportunities in the industrial era as previous Jewish specialisations were immolated by industrial capitalism, but it was distinct, visible, and modern.[223] The modern Russian imperial legal system was only implemented in 1864, for example, and the Russian word for lawyer, advokat, was even banned under Nicholas I. The advent of professions was just as much a modern innovation as the factory or the railway. In these new fields, which were freshly indispensable for the state elite of reactionary nobles, Jews were overproportionally active and visible.[224]

Russian reactionaries made the Jew the harbinger of capitalist modernity, and thus the enemy of the autocracy. Viacheslav Pleve, longtime securocrat and minister of the interior, 1902-4, embodies this tendency clearly. Pleve sought to preserve the established corporatist social order and traditional hierarchy of estates, in which the nobility stood at the top. He defended in particular the middle gentry, rather than commercialised and capitalist landownership, as he was against the bourgeoisie, their subjectivities, and their modes of production, no matter the terrain. He desired a special Russian path, which would spare the empire the rule of capital, the hegemony of the bourgeoisie and the inauguration of class struggle. Pleve feared the haute bourgeoisie, as he feared that this class would force the state into cohabitation with it if capitalist conditions continued to be implemented, destroying the autocracy and nobility. This neo-feudal imaginary combined the historical distaste for Jews with the intense class antagonism of the gentry against the bourgeoisie. As a result, selective integration of upper-class Jews was renounced. Jews of all classes were now a social problem for this group, the sole true-believing constituency for unfettered autocracy.[225]

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[223] Ibid., pp.88, 94.
[224] Nathans, *Beyond the Pale*, p.312.
[225] Löwe, *Tsar and the Jews*, pp.123, 128.

Antisemitism was, however, a mass phenomenon. The roiling waves of pogroms from the 1880s onwards make that very clear. At least for the petite bourgeoisie, the neo-feudal fantasy of the Russian gentry offers little explanatory power. Far more relevant is that, for gentile merchants and artisans, they were as threatened by the advent of modern capitalism as their Jewish competitors. The economic trends incentivised conglomeration, specialisation, and intensification of capital allocation. This is a tall order for a class poor in capital, many of whom would be outcompeted. Jews in this context were direct competitors with whom one had little direct contact due to differing social and religious networks of association. Therefore, an economic competitor shorn of class solidarity became a despised enemy for the paranoiac subjectivity of the gentile petite bourgeoisie. As Jews often operated outside of the traditional corporatist structures of these fields, and therefore also the special taxes owed to the guilds, they possessed a competitive advantage by virtue of their historical exclusion, breeding deep resentments from their gentile competitors. As a result of this combination of factors, merchants and artisans numbered highly as instigators of pogroms.[226]

The foot soldiers of the pogroms, meanwhile, were the railway and migrant workers. For these fresh proletarians, one can speculate also at an element of neo-feudal fantasy, if one from an (ex-)peasant's perspective. These were individuals torn from their previous social networks, from their epistemes, their imagined futurities, and forced by economic necessity to subject themselves to capitalist relations of production. This experience of atomisation compelled a strong need for solidarities, both positive and negative. Meanwhile, the social limits on violence were weakened by this self-same isolation. Thus, in this context, we see the utilisation of antisemitic mass violence to build solidarities, communities and networks for these ex-peasants, people without contexts and with unprecedented futures. Antisemitism served as a cross-class means of delineating negative solidarities from gentry to petite bourgeoisie to rootless workers,

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[226] Ibid., p.60.

thereby also helping to demarcate an in-group of positive solidarity, co-constituting a narod on the ground. This neo-feudal antisemitic nexus had congealed to such an extent that, during the Revolution of 1905-7, many army generals declined to suppress pogroms on the grounds that the rioters were acting out of patriotism.[227]

Tsarism reconstituted itself after the 1905-7 Revolution as a fettered autocracy, ruling in hand in glove with a duma whose electoral logics it refashioned after a coup.[228] The new duma's electoral geometry was reworked to advantage the ethnically Russian core over the multi-national western borderlands. [229] Likewise, on a class basis, the share of representation was reshaped. Thus, whilst in the First Duma of 1906 the right had 14% of the seats, in the Third Duma of 1907 they had two thirds. Noble representation increased to half from a third of deputies, and while in 1906 half of the noble representatives were liberal professionals, in the Third Duma the noble MPs were 80% provincial landowners.[230] This ludicrously shortsighted decision again restricted the classes with whom the autocracy was willing to cohabit to the shrinking gentry, with token representation for other classes. The tsarist government of 1907-17 was the same coalition as before the revolution, an arbitrary autocracy hand in glove with an antimodern gentry. The novelty was that this coalition was now frightened, vengeful, and looking for an ideological glue for the politics of neo-feudal restoration.[231]

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[227] Ibid., pp.60, 216.

[228] Francis William Wcislo, *Reforming Rural Russia: State, Society, and Local Politics, 1855-1914* (Princeton, 1990), p.243.

[229] Nicholas II of Russia, *Imperial Manifesto of 3rd June 1907* (St Petersburg, 1907), [Accessed from http://historymuse.net/readings/Nicholas2MANIFESTO1907.html.], 'Since it was created to strengthen the Russian state, the State Duma should also be Russian in spirit. The other nationalities of which the population of Our realm is composed should have their spokesmen in the State Duma, but they should not and will not be there in such number as to give them the possibility of decisive influence on purely Russian questions. In those border areas of the state where the population has not attained an adequate level of citizenship, elections to the State duma must temporarily be brought to an end.'

[230] Wcislo, *Reforming Rural Russia*, p.243.

[231] Roberta Thompson Manning, *The Crisis of the Old Order in Russia: Gentry and Government* (Princeton, 1982), p.325.

Enter the Jew. This was the period of exuberant antisemitism by all the forces of reaction that coiled around the throne. A phantasmic giddiness marks the autocracy as it pardoned pogromshchiki and excluded Jews from yet more educational routes via executive fiat. For the tsar and his bureaucrats, the figure of the Jew was inseparable from the figure of the revolutionary. Jews were overrepresented in the revolutionary movement, but it is representative of the intellectual vacuity of the tsar and his functionaries that they could not recognise the consequences of their own exclusionary policies. The intense conspiratorialism of the tsarist administration and gentry is indicated by the eager reception the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, itself fabricated by regime securocrats, found amongst this constituency. Nicholas II himself had to be dissuaded from utilising it for propaganda purposes by his ministers, as the tsar became increasingly drawn to the radical right. The petite bourgeois Nationalists, a lesser partner of the gentry in the governing coalition, meanwhile advocated for Jewish exclusion from the business world, in order to guarantee their positions against competitors. The masses, in particular the peasantry, were meanwhile expected to leap to the defence of the autocracy on the basis that the regime viewed pogroms as counterrevolutionary violence. Thus, we have a cross-class coalition that regarded antisemitism as the glue of its movement.[232]

The fragile, paranoiac, and by this point intrinsically antisemitic regime mobilised hatred of Jews to shore up its support after the failed revolutions. This is clearly visible in the autocracy's prosecution of the Bellis blood libel case in Kiev in 1911, which served both as a defensive measure against renewed mobilisation opposing the government and offensive measure against constitutional governance and the concept of Rechtstaatlichkeit itself.[233] Religious Judeophobia had a different structure under Eastern Orthodoxy. The Orthodox church was primarily concerned with policing the border between Christianity and Judaism, and with ensuring that

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[232] Löwe, *Tsar and the Jews*, pp.218-9, 222-3, 260, 270, 277, 280.
[233] Ibid., p.285.

no doctrinal impurities were allowed to percolate; syncretism was to be opposed at all costs.[234]

For example, the expulsion of the Jews from the Grand Duchy of Muscovy in the 15th century was justified with the accusation that they had contributed to the development of a Judaising heresy.[235] The spread of political antisemitism within the church's ranks in the early twentieth century was drawn from the postulations of the radical right, rather than vice versa.[236] Indeed, even as blood libel spread into the Russian empire in the 19th and 20th centuries, the Orthodox church continued to reject wholesale its veracity, to the chagrin of the prosecutions. The state, meanwhile, was explicitly supporting blood libel in Kiev as a method of disciplining the coalition that had forced the autocracy to capitulate and grant civil rights and legislative elections. The Jewish phantasm had congealed into the singular evil of the neo-feudal imaginary. Via brutalising the Jew, the autocracy was thus brutalising all its opponents, and assuring the return of its neo-feudal dream-world. Whatever tropes and strategies necessary to mobilise this racial coalition would be employed in the pursuit of this agrarian utopia.[237]

In this context of radicalising antisemitism by an increasingly irrational state, from the 1890s, we see amongst the younger generations of imperial Russia's Jewry a comprehensive rejection of assimilation. The intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia renounced 'Russia as modernity', both for the antiquity of Hebrew Zion as well as the recent past of the Yiddish Shtetl.[238] Central to this process was Lithuania-Belarus, a highly ethnically mixed area of the Pale where Jews constituted the majority of the urban population. Russian and Polish were the languages of small, urbanised elites, each about 6% of the population. The languages of high culture were competing, and the general vernaculars, Belarussian and Lithuanian, were peasant languages

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[234] Răzvan Persa, 'The Image of Jews According to the Canonical Tradition of the Orthodox Church.' *Religions* vol.14 (2003), 11.
[235] Cała, *Jew. The Eternal Enemy?*, p.87.
[236] Löwe, *Tsar and the Jews*, p.278.
[237] Robert Weinberg, 'Reflections on the Blood Libel in Late Imperial Russia', *Antisemitism Studies* vol.5 (2021), 359, 363
[238] Löwe, *Tsar and the Jews*, pp.176-7.

with no prestige. Assimilation in this context was a complicated proposition. It might offer professional advancement, an idea of modernity, linkages to a broader society, but it was also less relevant. Assimilation allows one to escape minoritarian status to an extent, but the social force of exclusions necessary to implement this are substantially weaker when one is the local majority. [239]

This was an area where even the proletariat was Jewish. As industrial capitalism penetrated the Russian empire, the artisans and intermediaries of the Jewish population were overwhelmingly proletarianized. According to an 1888 report of the tsarist government, 90% of the Jewish population in the Pale existed in proletarian living conditions. In the Northwestern provinces, the penetration of capitalist social conditions was the slowest in European Russia, but the workforce in this area for both artisanal and factory production was over 50% Jewish. The existence of a Jewish proletariat, combined with the presence of a stymied salariat, who were trapped as half-intellectuals or artisans, ensured that the pull of assimilation subsided first in Lithuania-Belarus. [240]

The Lithuanian Jewish intelligentsia were highly assimilated into Russian culture, however, to the extent that many intelligenty had no knowledge of Yiddish. Russian was the language of professional and bureaucratic life, even if it was not the vernacular of this area. However, even as the Litvak literati assimilated into both the Russian language and capitalist-bureaucratic subjectivity more generally, they saw themselves as Jews, not Russians. To speak Russian day-to-day in such a society is still a mark of distinction, and ethnic Russians in the Northwestern provinces overwhelmingly came in the service of the antisemitic state, making it unlikely that solidarities across this confessional and racial line would be formed. This contrasts to both

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[239] Joshue D. Zimmerman, *Poles, Jews, and the Politics of Nationality: The Bund and the Polish Socialist Party in Late Tsarist Russia, 1892-1914* (Madison, 2004), pp.3, 15, 87.
[240] Gertrud Pickhan, *Gegen den Strom: Der Allgemeiner Jüdische Arbeiterbund "Bund" in Polen, 1918-1939* (Stuttgart, 2001), pp.38-40.

Congress Poland and the Russian interior, where the Jewish intelligentsia did assimilate and come to identify with the demographic majority as nationals. Ergo, in Lithuania-Belarus we have a Russified intelligentsia speaking via a bilingual semi-intelligentsia to a Yiddish-speaking proletariat, but with all understanding themselves as distinctively Jewish.[241]

## Conclusion

To sum up, the Russian-Jewish encounter in the latter half of the 19th century was marked by incredible amounts of tension, due to the simultaneity of new opportunities in the industrialising economy and the increasing danger of mass violence. As education expanded and the railways grew, so too did a popular politics that reviled Jews as the source of all the world's ills. But why could Jews be taken as synecdoche for the negative aspects of modernity in Russia? What made this association logical to contemporaries?[242]

The material base of antisemitism as a mass phenomenon runs thus. A historically misliked but useful minority adapted as best it could to a radically transforming society and arbitrary, violent state. Some members of this minority did well in the transformation did well, many did not, but either way, they were visible. Urbanisation meant that Jews were centre stage as the city became the theatre of social imagination. Jews were visible en masse in the cities of nineteenth-century Russia, often for the first time in the interior. These cities, squalid and overcrowded, where the population was constantly churning from in and out migrations, were wildly disorienting experiences. The alienation and atomisation that this new form of capitalist subjectivity wrought was externalised and scapegoated. Whether a small trader, a peasant, a worker, or a noble, all might have different reasons to dislike the process of comprehensive transformation being wrought without consultation. Racialisation in this context is the association of effect, Jews being more visible in an urbanising, industrialising society, with cause, urbanisation and

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[241] Zimmerman, *Poles, Jews, and the Politics of Nationality*, pp.36-8, 42.
[242] Engelstein, 'Antisemitism in Late Imperial Russia', p.326

industrialisation create social dislocation a priori. Hence, the postulation of this investigation is that antisemitism is in origin a racialising form of antimodernist scapegoating.

The instrumentalisation of this inchoate racial coalition by the autocracy, meanwhile, is a result of its precarity and desperation for any logic that could justify its existence. The essentialised hierarchies and intense contradictions of an industrialising state that refused to share power or build new coalitions made a brutal, fragile political order lacking in popular legitimacy amongst its new classes. This obviously unsustainable political order possessed a paranoiac style that was fertile ground for psychically externalising its contradictions, i.e. that capitalist modernisation was necessary for Great Power competition, but that self-same modernisation would destroy the foundations of the autocracy. Thus, the Jew became capitalism and anarchism and conspirator and land-coveter. Thereby, an avowedly antimodern consensus was able to defy political gravity, if temporarily, on the terrain of a politics to which it offered no solutions. The racial project was the preservation of an unjustifiable status quo through displacement of its indignities and contradictions onto a misliked minority.

Jews responded to these mixed signals and incentives in manifold ways. What is notable is that tsarism precluded assimilation being successful for any but a small minority, and did so by design, as it was, to its end, committed to the inherent inequality of estates and peoples. Thus, there was no assimilated Jewry on the scale of the Deutschjudentum, and indeed, many assimilated Jews began to de-assimilate from a Russia that offered no hope. The notable strength of diaspora nationalism in comparison to its relative insignificance amongst the Deutschjudentum may be read as a result of the shorter duration and much quicker and more comprehensive souring of the promise of assimilation to Russia's Jews vis-à-vis the Habsburg Deutschjudentum by the early twentieth century. There was still enough of the Shtetl to harken back to discursively. Whereas for assimilated Jews in Vienna, Prague, or Brünn, the unassimilated Ostjudentum was often foreign, oriental, and lesser, for Russia's assimilés it was

their parents and grandparents. Thus, the antiquity of Hebrew Zion and the internalisation of European colonial discourses was not the only model of nationalism that made sense in this context, a Yiddishist project could also flourish.

# Chapter Five: Religion, Nation and Counter-Orientalism in the Ottoman Empire

In this chapter, we will chart the development of the counter-orientalism in the Ottoman empire. We begin with a brief elaboration of the premodern ethno-religious settlement in the Sublime State, wherein there was Muslim ascendancy within a broader arrangement of tolerated but hierarchical diversity. This established pattern was ruptured by the era of reform. As the Ottoman state struggled to compete with Russia and entered alliances with Christian European powers, the United Kingdom and France, it experimented with liberal political economy. The commercialisation of the economy and the implementation of legal equality were holistic, and both served to advance the position of the diasporic, commerce-oriented, and highly literate religious minorities of the Ottoman empire.

Thereafter, we move to cover the movement of counter-orientalism from nascent coalition to governmental project. The near collapse of the empire in 1878 after the Russo-Turkish War is pivotal in this transformation, as the state elite despaired at the ineffectiveness of its reforms, the disloyalty of its Christians, and the perfidy of its European allies. Sultan Abdulhamid II reoriented the ideology of the state to centre Islam and the caliphate as the pillars of Ottoman legitimacy. This thirty-year autocracy served to intensify the festering contradiction of a state demanding loyalty from people whom it regarded as threats, not constituents or citizens.

Finally, we finish up with the Second Constitutional Period, where initial euphoria from the minorities quickly sours as the state proves both arbitrary and inept. As the riotous instability of the new political order asserts itself, where coup and counter-coup substitute for elections as means of transferring power, the empire's neighbours smell blood and commence another round of expansionary warfare. The collapsing empire proved singularly ineffective in these wars, and its elite radicalises once more in response. Thus, we have the prologue of the Late Ottoman Genocides, where counter-orientalism reaches for ever more extreme means in the face of the state elite's chronic inability to maintain its empire.

## Reforming Muslim Ascendancy

From the 19th century, the previously stable relationship of religious toleration and hierarchy began to alter as the Ottoman state, faced with internal disarray and external threats, began a process of centralisation and bureaucratisation.[243] Tanzimat, meaning 'reorganisation' is a contested term in Ottoman historiography. Alexis Wicks, for example, states that 'the narrative of the Tanzimat paradigm assumes the principle of progress [and] the general human march to freedom, […] eventually enshrined in the post-Ottoman nation-states.' Nonetheless, the 19th century was clearly a rupture in Ottoman practices of rule, including how it related to its religious minorities, the subject of this study. Therefore, the accounting below will endeavour to give an open and non-teleological accounting of this pivot.[244]

The era of reform was inaugurated by Mahmud II. Mahmud ascended to the throne at a low ebb for the House of Osman and the Ottoman state. The provinces were ruled by rapacious governors incentivised by the tax-farming policies of the state to bleed their territories dry. Additionally, the derebeys and ayan, a class of notables who held lands on a hereditary basis, had arisen in Anatolia and Rumelia. This aristocracy controlled its districts in full, had its own troops, and often governed its territories better than those directly controlled by the state. All that was required of them was to pay tribute and homage to the sultan.[245] Meanwhile, in Istanbul, the Janissaries and Ulema, scholars of Islamic law and theology, regularly coalesced to depose sultans. By 1800, the previously fearsome Janissary artillery corps was more akin to a privileged caste that claimed salaries from the state whilst pursuing non-military occupations and getting involved in strife in the provinces and Constantinople. They were a drain on the treasury and a threat to the position of the sultan.[246]

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[243] Alexis Wick, 'Gülhane contra Islahat: A Conceptual Approach to the Tanzimat', *Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association* vol.9 (2022), 186-7.
[244] Ibid. 179-80
[245] Butrus Abu-Manneh, 'The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript', *Die Welt des Islams* vol.34 (1994), 177-8.
[246] Sharkey, *A History of Muslims, Christians, and Jews,* pp.129, 67, 121.

Enter Mahmud II. Mahmud rose to the Sultanate after his cousin, Selim III, had been deposed by a Janissary coup, and his brother, Mustafa IV, was unseated by the coup of an ayan, Mustafa Bairadkar. Both of his predecessors were murdered. The central state was clearly fraying, and the stakes were existential for the sultan. Ergo, reestablishing the sultanate as the fount of power was his priority. Centralisation was achieved brutally via the dispossession, relocation and elimination of the ayan and derebeys, as well as the annihilation of the Janissaries in 1826. Thereafter, Mahmud subordinated the state machinery and ulema via an arbitrary process of confiscation, exile, and execution of many of his highest functionaries. This imposition of authority through generalised precarity was not popular with the elites. This led to the rebellion of the governor of Egypt, Muhammad Ali.[247]

Mahmud was unsuccessful in ending this rebellion, and indeed only avoided losing his throne due to European intervention.[248] This round of civil war (1831-1833) ended not in stalemate but in defeat for the centre. Although forced to shelve his plans to depose Mahmud II and install his eldest son, Abdülmecid, later Sultan Abdülmecid I, Muhammad Ali was consequently left in control of Syria, which he had conquered on his drive towards Istanbul.[249] This forced some retrenchment from Mahmud, who ceased the confiscation of the properties of deceased high functionaries and instituted a new High Council of Judicial Ordinances. However, full course correction would have to wait until the accession of his successor, Abdülmecid.[250]

Under Abdülmecid, we see the transition from despotism[251] to bureaucratisation. The promulgation of the Gülhane Edict in 1839 must be read in this context, as indicated by its provisions to limit the sultan's power to dispossess and execute his bureaucrats, introduce a

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[247] Abu-Manneh, 'The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript', 179-80.
[248] Ibid., 180.
[249] Brutus Abu-Manneh, 'Mehmed Ali Paşa and Sultan Mahmud II: The Genesis of a Conflict', *Turkish Historical Review* vol.1 (2010), 18.
[250] Abu-Manneh, 'The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript', 181.
[251] 'Despotism' is not meant to be read as a moral judgement, but a practice of rule that emphasised precarity and arbitrary punishment for elites in order to maintain a fragile centre's control.

penal code and limit tax farming. It is a project to create elite buy in for the newly centralised state, moving on from the state of exception required to establish it. According to both Alexis Wicks[252] and Brutus Abu-Manneh from their source work with the Gülhane Edict, it provided no rupture on the rights of religious minorities in the empire, but rather a reaffirmation of the sultan's duty under the Şeriat to protect the dhimmis and apply the law equally.[253]

The notable rupture in the relations of religious minorities vis-a-vis the Osmanli state came with the issue of the Islahat Edict in 1856. This contained multiple striking innovations, arguing 'in terms of imperial dignity and the hierarchical club of civilized nations, confirmed by the rationality of international law.' It repeatedly affirms old rights and grants new ones under the formulation of 'Christians or other non-Muslim communities'. The civil service is opened to religious minorities, as are government schools.[254] Meanwhile, dhimmi status is theoretically abolished, as conscription is ostensibly equalised and the cizye tax abolished. However, religious minorities were instead given the right to pay an 'exemption tax' to escape the draft. Thus, equality was stated and then retracted in a display of imperial munificence.[255]

The Islahat Edict also inaugurated the era of economic liberalisation in the Ottoman Empire. For example, it permits foreign ownership of land, and lays the groundwork for the privatisation and commodification of land by the 1858 Land Code, just two years later. It demands the systematisation and equalisation of the taxation and financial systems. The edict calls for the establishment of banks and credit institutes. Finally, it ends with the particularly startling formation that "[t]o accomplish these objects means shall be sought to profit by the science, the art, and the funds of Europe […], and thus gradually execute them." Islahat is an ur-typical artefact of liberal political economy in both its economic and social projects,[256] which was

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[252] Wick, 'Gülhane contra Islahat', 189, 191-2.
[253] Abu-Manneh, 'The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript', 201
[254] Wick, 'Gülhane contra Islahat', 193, 196-7.
[255] Sharkey, *A History of Muslims, Christians, and Jews,* p.146.
[256] Wick, 'Gülhane contra Islahat', 198-200.

implemented via the executive fiat of the sultan with the backing of his reformist bureaucrats. The implementation of capitalist modernity was now a priority of the state.[257]

The context of the Islahat Edict is important. It was implemented by the Sultan and his government at the tail end of the Crimean War (1853-6), in which the United Kingdom and France were allied with the Ottomans against Russian expansionism. This was the high point of détente between the Western European powers and the Sublime State, where Ottomans trusted Britain and France as allies, models and guarantors of its security, and they in turn regarded the empire as 'noble', 'civilised', and sharing comparable values to the West. This would not last, but while this tendency was in the ascendent, the Islahat Edict was issued.[258]

Islahat was a startling innovation in Ottoman juridical practice. It was an abrogation of traditional Islamic jurisprudence, which had been marked by enforcement and reification of hierarchies between different creeds. If non-Muslims weren't dhimmi, then what were they? According to the new law, passed during a period of alliance with Christian powers, they were now equal with Muslims. An ulema committee had already considered this issue for the sultan in 1849, and had wholesale rejected equal value of testimony in court, of non-Muslim entry into the army or civil service, and equality of taxation (although the latter was also recognised as a state matter at the sultan's discretion). The unilateral implementation of this programme only seven years later was a startling volte face, which unleashed notable disquiet amongst many Muslims throughout the empire. Views ranged from the sultan having willingly betrayed the Şeriat to having been forced to by the Western powers. Thus, the more traditionalist wing of the Ottoman Muslim intelligentsia and gentry connected the disestablishment of hierarchical regimes of corporate privilege to foreign intervention. This is an exemplar of how the

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[257] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, p.77.
[258] Ibid., p.75

relationship of the Ottoman state elite and Muslim bourgeoisie to its religious minorities gained a lasting structure of grievance and paranoia, a nascent counter-orientalist coalition.[259]

## Dhimmi Prosperity

The Muslim and non-Muslim communities were going down diverging paths economically in the late nineteenth century Ottoman empire. The Muslim gentry was oriented towards agriculture, forming from the old clerics and the new landholders, who had gained from the privatisation of state lands. These two groups intermarried and sent their children to modern state schools.[260] Although ownership of land was, after Islahat and the Land Code, open to all confessions and, post-1867, to foreigners too, land ownership remained concentrated in Muslim hands, as 'the provincial bureaucracy worked hand in hand with the local gentry to obstruct the transfer of land to non-Muslims and foreigners.' In contrast, Muslim migrants and refugees from the Balkans and Caucasus were quickly settled and recognised as landowners.[261] The Muslim bourgeoisie was dominant in domestic trade and the movement of raw materials, while being active to a notably lesser extent in production. In production, it was more focused on crafts than industry, and in finance Muslims were less likely to use banking services than non-Muslim minorities.[262]

The Ottoman economy began to industrialise in the in the late nineteenth era. In particular Macedonia stood out, possessing probably the largest industrial capacity in the empire, above even Constantinople, by the early 20th century. The Macedonian bourgeoisie was primarily Jewish and Greek, whose heartlands were Salonica and Mount Vermion respectively. This was an unsurprising development, as the privileged access that Muslims received to land ownership by default pushed non-Muslim communities towards production and commerce. The Muslim

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[259] Ibid., pp.76-7
[260] Hasan Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918* (Berkeley, 1997), p.35
[261] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, p.95.
[262] Çetinkaya, *The Young Turks and the Boycott Movement*, pp.25-7

elite, on the other hand, did not evolve in a capitalist direction, but instead retained its statist orientation, now mediated through participation in the bureaucracy. Therefore, specialisations emerged on confessional lines as a direct result of the policies of the state.[263]

Christian European powers often favoured their coreligionists in the empire.[264] Additionally, under the Capitulations, trade treaties between the Ottomans and the European powers from as far back as the 16th century, European merchants had the right to issue their staff with a berat, a certificate which bestowed foreign protection,[265] exempted them from the poll tax and conferred lower trade duties. This gave beratli a competitive advantage vis-à-vis their non-protected competitors,[266] and these certificates were issued liberally by Europeans in the empire to scores of their employees as well as wealthy non-Muslims, to whom they were gladly sold.[267]

As noted above, there was a longstanding belief in essentialised hierarchies between Muslims and others, and these did not disappear at the stroke of a pen. For example, in civil appointments to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry between 1850 and 1908, one can see lasting inequalities when the data is broken down via confession. This data shows that non-Muslim hires had to be more qualified than Muslim appointees. 70% of non-Muslim employees knew at least five languages, whilst 60% of Muslim civil servants could speak three or more. Thus, while religious minorities had to excel, more leeway was accorded to Muslim applicants.[268] In general, government jobs were occupied mostly by Muslims, whilst the religious minorities, namely the Jews, Armenians, and Greeks, were oriented towards commerce.[269]

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[263] Costas Lapavitsas and Pinar Cakiroglu, *Capitalism in the Ottoman Balkans: Industrialization and Modernity in Macedonia* (London, 2019), pp.31, 212-3.
[264] Shirinian, 'The Background to the Late Ottoman Genocides', pp.21-2.
[265] Sharkey, *A History of Muslims, Christians, and Jews*, pp.88, 96, 159-60.
[266] Shirinian, 'The Background to the Late Ottoman Genocides', pp.22
[267] Sharkey, *A History of Muslims, Christians, and Jews*, pp.96-7.
[268] Carter V. Findley, 'The Acid Test of Ottomanism: The Acceptance of Non-Muslims in the Late Ottoman Bureaucracy', in Benjamin Braude (ed.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Abridged Edition* (London, 2014), pp.213-4, 214, 220.
[269] Suny, *They Can Live in the Desert and Nowhere Else*, pp.51-2.

It is now apposite to distinguish between Jews and Christians in the Ottoman empire. This study argues for an object category of Christian in the Ottoman Empire as a result of the unifying logic of the Late Ottoman Genocides against the Armenian, Assyrian, and Greek communities. This was a logic which, despite some anti-Jewish measures, such as being removed from Palestinian cities for longer than Muslims citizens on the British advance in WWI, is not comparable with the Christian experience of the late Ottoman period.[270] Jews in the Ottoman empire were regarded by the state as a loyal population, and Jewish community leaders during the late nineteenth century succeeded in walking the absurd tightrope of preaching faith in pan-Ottomanism, keeping distance from the suspect minorities, and affiliating as a religious minority to an Islamist regime.[271]

The Greek and Armenian populations of the Ottoman empire were both diasporic. Greeks were mainly concentrated on the coast across the empire, and in the big cities, having been there since antiquity. They were also the majority of the peasantry in southern parts of the Balkans.[272] Armenians, meanwhile, were concentrated in Constantinople and the cities of Western Anatolia and Thrace. These Armenians descended from refugees who fled westwards during instability in the traditional Armenian heartlands of Eastern Anatolia during the seventeenth century.[273] While much of the Greek peasantry was outside of the empire after the conclusion of the Greek War of Independence, the bulk of Greek urbanites were still Ottoman subjects.[274] Constantinople remained the largest Greek city until after WWI.[275] Although the Armenian

[270] Paul R. Bartrop, 'Considering Genocide Testimony: Three Examples From the Armenian, Pontic, and Assyrian Genocides', in George N. Shirinian (ed.), *Genocide in the Ottoman Empire: Armenians, Assyrians, Greeks, 1913-1923* (New York, 2017), p.140.

[271] Julia Phillips Cohen, *Becoming Ottomans: Sephardi Jews and Imperial Citizenship in the Modern Era* (Oxford, 2014), p.80.

[272] Minna Rozen, 'People of the Book, People of the Sea: Mirror Images of the Soul', in Minna Rozen (ed.) *Homelands and Diasporas: Greeks, Jews, and Their Migrations* (London, 2008), p.47.

[273] Henry Shapiro, *The Rise of the Western Armenian Diaspora in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire: From Refugee Crisis to Renaissance* (Edinburgh, 2022), pp.3-4.

[274] K.E. Fleming, *Greece: A Jewish History* (Princeton, 2010), pp.18-9.

[275] Dimitris Kamouzis, *Greeks in Turkey: Elite Nationalism and Minority Politics in Late Ottoman and Early Republican Istanbul* (London, 2020), pp.9-10.

peasantry remained mostly within the empire on the eastern borderlands, likewise the majority of the Armenian urban population was far removed from this region, and Constantinople was also the largest Armenian city and centre of Armenian cultural life until after WW1.[276]

The Greco-Armenian haute bourgeoisie, professional class and salariat were extremely important in the evolution and functioning of the Ottoman economy, especially in its most modern and international sectors. Their prominence in the modern economy is comparable to that achieved by Jews in nineteenth-century Christian Europe. Greeks in Constantinople became dominant in the financial sector in the nineteenth century, lending large quantities to the state. This high finance was invested in the state, literally and figuratively. As the economy was financialised, and the poverty-stricken government was laden with an unmanageable debt burden, financial capital was left highly profitable and quite powerful. Greeks in the capital were also highly active in the professions, as doctors, lawyers, architects, and engineers.[277] Even Abdulhamid's doctor and banker were Greek.[278]

Armenians were highly active in commerce, anchoring trade networks from the interior to Constantinople and onwards to industrial centres in Western Europe and the US. The merchants posted abroad observed modern production techniques there and were often responsible for their import to the Ottoman empire, aiding their competitive advantage in manufacturing. These large merchant houses required increasingly complex services of their employees. Thus, they took on increasing numbers of accountants and administrators, and contributed to the development of specialised education of these functionaries.[279] Greeks and Armenians were both employed as managers and salaried employees in the Western-financed companies, such as in mining and the railways. The process of salarianisation was well underway for Greeks and

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[276] Bedross der Matossian, 'The Armenian Commercial Houses and Merchant Networks in the 19th Century Ottoman Empire', *Turkica* vol.39, 149-50.
[277] Kamouzis, *Greeks in Turkey,* pp.16-7.
[278] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, p.155.
[279] der Matossian, 'Armenian Commercial Houses and Merchant Networks', 157-8, 162.

Armenians in the nineteenth century Ottoman empire, much like it was for the Deutschjudentum and Russian Jewry.[280]

The Assyrians, meanwhile, did not possess the commercial dominance and centrality to the empire's economy that the Greeks and Armenians did. Most Assyrians were rural agriculturalists.[281] While their townsfolk were concentrated in artisanal[282] and petty bourgeois occupations,[283] their geographic concentration on the eastern borderlands, away from the major cities, precluded a turn towards the haute bourgeois, professional or salarian developments.[284] The centre of intellectual life, the big cities of Assyrian culture, was not cosmopolitan, far-off Constantinople, but Diyarbakir and Harput, embedded in the Assyrian heartlands.[285] The urban Assyrian Christian petite bourgeoisie of smalltown eastern Anatolia, though lacking in the prominence of the Greeks and Armenians, was nonetheless resented by the local Muslim population for upsetting previous socio-religious hierarchies alongside that of the Armenian, and indeed, lumped in with them.[286]

The Tanzimat era had been a golden age for the Armenian commercial class in Constantinople, which was able to take advantage of the empire's integration into the nascent capitalist world system.[287] However, it was a time of trouble for the Armenian peasantry in Eastern Anatolia. The economic situation from the 1850s to the 1870s in this region was dire, as the state's attempt to centralise its authority led to an increase in conflict amongst the pastoral tribes. These tribes,

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[280] Suny, *They Can Live in the Desert and Nowhere Else*, p.52.
[281] Benjamin Trigona-Haran, *The Ottoman Süryânî from 1908 to 1914* (Piscataway, 2013), p.104.
[282] David Gaunt, 'Relations Between Kurds and Syriacs and Assyrians in Late Ottoman Diyarbekir', in Joost Jongerden and Jelle Verheij (eds.), *Social Relations in Ottoman Diyarbekir, 1870-1915* (Leiden 2012), p.247.
[283] Emrullah Akgündüz, 'Some Notes on the Syriac Community of Diyarbekir in the Late 19th Century: A Preliminary Investigation of Some Primary Sources', in Joost Jongerden and Jelle Verheij (eds.), *Social Relations in Ottoman Diyarbekir, 1870-1915* (Leiden 2012), p228.
[284] David Gaunt, Naures Atto, and Soner O. Barthoma, 'Introduction: Contextualizing the Safyo in the First World War', in David Gaunt, Naures Atto, and Soner O. Barathoma (eds.), *Let Them Not Return: Safyo – The Genocide Against the Assyrian, Syriac and Chaldean Christians in the Ottoman Empire* (New York, 2017), p.2.
[285] Trigona-Haran, *The Ottoman Süryânî*, p.78.
[286] Jelle Verheij, 'Diyarbekir and the Armenian Crisis of 1895', in Joost Jongerden and Jelle Verheij (eds.), *Social Relations in Ottoman Diyarbekir, 1870-1915* (Leiden 2012), p.91.
[287] der Matossian, 'Armenian Commercial Houses and Merchant Networks', 151, 156.

mostly Muslim Kurds, demanded protection money from the local peasantry, much of which was Armenian. As economic production fell in the chaos, the demands for tribute only grew more onerous. With the onset of the 1877-8 Russo-Turkish War, this disaffected population was somewhat supportive of the Russian advance, and the opportunity for an independent state. Whilst no Armenian nation-state resulted from this inter-imperial conflict, the Berlin Congress that decided the peace settlement did internationalise the Armenian conflict, as Ottomans had responded brutally enough to Armenian dissatisfaction to earn Christian Europe's disapproval. Thus, the 'Armenian question' was specifically regulated by the powers (ineffectively with no enforcement) under article 61. Although this did not help the Armenian population, it did infuriate the Ottoman state elite.[288]

## State Precarity

The 1878 Treaty of Berlin that concluded Russo-Turkish War was a shattering experience for the Ottoman empire. The Sublime State lost two fifths of its landmass and one fifth of its population. Of the prewar population, 21 million were Muslim and 14 million were Christian, whilst the postwar population contained 12.5 million Muslims and 4.5 million Christians. In this context of the loss of the Christian western borderlands, the state pivoted. Tanzimat-era pan-Ottomanism was dispensed with, replaced with a centring of Islam. This was self-evidently discursively exclusive of its religious minorities.[289] Abdulhamid II assembled a constituency of conservative intelligentsia and gentry to right the ship of state around Islamic autocracy, preservation of the state, and managed modernisation. Via the state's anxieties about foreign

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[288] Brad Dennis, 'Patterns of Conflict and Violence in Eastern Anatolia', in M. Hakan Yavuz and Peter Sluglett (eds.), *War and Diplomacy: The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the Treaty of Berlin* (Salt Lake City, 2011), pp.280-1, 292, 294.

[289] M. Hakan Yavuz, 'The Transformation of "Empire" through Wars and Reforms: Integration vs. Oppression', in M. Hakan Yavuz and Peter Sluglett (eds.), *War and Diplomacy: The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the Treaty of Berlin* (Salt Lake City, 2011), pp.33-4.

interference, and search for an ideological glue which could hold the empire together led to the assembly of a nascent counter-orientalist coalition. [290]

After a relatively calm 1880s, the Armenian issue burst back onto the scene in the 1890s.[291] The cash-starved state introduced the Hamidiye Tribal Light Cavalry in 1890, modelled on the Russian Cossacks. Thereby, the Sublime State incorporated the Kurdish pastoralists as auxiliaries to watch the frontier.[292] The empowered tribes then imposed extra taxes on the Armenian communities, driving them to their first revolt in 1894 in Sasun, which was put down brutally. The European powers confronted Abdulhamid in May 1895 with demands for reform. The Hunchak Armenian revolutionary party organised a demonstration in front of the gate of the palace, the Sublime Porte, a daring move under an autocracy. The Red Sultan responded by organising massacres of Armenians in Constantinople and the provinces. Unsurprisingly the Armenian nationalist movement was alienated by this approach, launching a campaign of terror attacks.[293] In the Diyarbekir massacre, alongside Armenians, other Christians such as Assyrians were also attacked by the Muslim population, and the French consulate came under siege. Thus, we can see how the Hamidian regime's securitisation of the Armenian Question, a political problem, assembled a counter-Orientalist social coalition behind it, which supported the state and popular violence against Christian minorities, particularly Armenians.[294]

This wave of government-supported massacres tore through Armenian communities in the Ottoman empire between 1894 and 1896, outraging the states of Christian Europe. In February 1897, as the Great Powers prepared to put yet another reform proposal to the Sublime State,

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[290] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, p.154.

[291] Garabet K. Moumdjian, 'From Millet-i Sadıka to Millet-i Asiya: Abdülhamid II and Armenians, 1878–1909', in M. Hakan Yavuz and Peter Sluglett (eds.), *War and Diplomacy: The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the Treaty of Berlin* (Salt Lake City, 2011), p.306.

[292] Edward J. Erickson, 'Template for Destruction: The Congress of Berlin and the Evolution of Ottoman Counterinsurgency Practices', in M. Hakan Yavuz and Peter Sluglett (eds.), *War and Diplomacy: The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the Treaty of Berlin* (Salt Lake City, 2011), p.368.

[293] Moumdjian, 'From Millet-i Sadıka to Millet-i Asiya', pp.312-3, 317, 332.

[294] Verheij, 'Diyarbekir and the Armenian Crisis of 1895', pp.104, 107.

however, a Cretan revolt broke out, triggering the 1897 Greco-Turkish War. The attention of the governments turned to the new diplomatic crisis.[295] Crete had been a site of unrest for some time, being difficult to police due to its mountainous terrain. Additionally, the intercommunal relations between the Muslims and Christians were marked by tension and violence. Over the course of the 1890s, Abdulhamid's government, worried by the risk of foreign intervention, gradually eroded the island's autonomy agreement of 1878. As the security situation on Crete worsened, the government suspended civil liberties for the Christian population. Rumours of atrocities spread, and again Christian Cretans rose in revolt against the government. [296]

The Cretan revolt inspired patriotic fervour in the Kingdom of Greece, driving the unwilling government to declare war in support. The Thirty Days War was swift victory for Ottoman forces.[297] The advent of a Greco-Turkish war put Ottoman Greeks in an awkward position. Clashes erupted between Greeks and Muslims. Although spared the massacres meted out to the Armenians, the government nonetheless looked at its Greek population with suspicion. The state demanded that all Hellenic citizens within the empire either renounce their citizenship or leave the country. Although the Sublime Porte tried to distinguish between Ottoman and Hellenic Greeks, in practice it was not so simple.[298] Many Ottoman Greeks held dual citizenship, for example.[299]

The weakness of the state was clearly visible throughout the Hamidian era, with the sultan-caliph struggling to assert sovereignty vis-à-vis the Christian European powers to initiate the implementation of standardisation so integral to modern state formation and typical liberal political economy. Already recounted examples include the state's finances, via the Ottoman

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[295] Suny, *They Can Live in the Desert and Nowhere Else*, p.130.
[296] Thomas W. Gallant, *Modern Greece: From the War of Independence to the Present* (London, 2016), pp.106-8.
[297] Ibid., pp.108-10.
[298] Cohen, *Becoming Ottomans*, pp.80-81.
[299] Kamouzis, *Greeks in Turkey,* p.17.

Public Debt Administration, trade and tax policy, via the Capitulations, and relations with minorities, via the Treaty of Berlin's Armenian provisions. The state's failure to establish itself as sole arbiter of affairs within its territory also stretched to education, to high culture, and to the language of the bureaucratic-industrial.

This is a notable failure, as it meant that commercial minorities, who needed to adopt majoritarian languages under industrial capitalism to reach the broadest possible market, failed to assimilate into the state culture, a feat even the deeply antisemitic tsarist government had managed vis-à-vis the portions of the Jewish population it permitted to try. The state bureaucracy utilised the highly ornate Ottoman Turkish, so laden with loan words and poetic allusions to Arabic and Persian as to be incomprehensible to the Turkish peasantry.[300] This language was much slower to develop a printing press than the diaspora languages.[301] Meanwhile, many of the most modern sections of the economy were governed by Europeans, such as the railways[302] or the central bank.[303] The mission schools that served most of the empire's Christians taught in vernacular in order to convert the most souls, and they taught foreign languages but not Ottoman Turkish. Jewish schooling was presided over by the Alliance Israelite Universelle, who focused primarily on education in French for the Judeo-Spanish-speaking Sephardim. State education was successfully implemented under Abdulhamid, but it remained the preserve of Muslims, amongst whom the state attempted to institute Ottoman Turkish as the lingua franca outside of the Arabic territories. The inability of Ottoman Turkish literate culture to establish itself as the hegemonic language of pan-imperial high culture

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[300] M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, (Princeton, 2008), pp.33-5.

[301] William J. Watson, 'İbrāhīm Müteferriḳa and Turkish Incunabula', *Journal of the American Oriental Society* vol.88 (1968), 436.

[302] Suny, *They Can Live in the Desert and Nowhere Else*, p.52.

[303] Edhem Eldem, 'Stability Against All Odds: The Imperial Ottoman Bank, 1875-1914', in John A. Consiglio, Juan Carlos Martinez Oliva and Gabriel Tortella, with Monika Pohle Fraser and Iain L. Fraser (eds.), *Banking and Finance in the Eastern Mediterranean: A Historical Perspective* (Farnham, 2012), pp.105-6, 109.

deprived it even of the most assimilable of minorities, the urbanite diasporas. Ottoman Turkish was the language of state, and French the language of modernity. [304]

## Counter-Orientalism: Resentment and Fragility

Abdulhamid's autocratic rule lasted until the Young Turk Revolution of July. This inaugurated a brief revival of Ottomanism, as Muslims, Christians, and Jews rejoiced together at the overthrow of the Red Sultan. The Young Turks were a multiethnic movement, with Arabs, Albanians, Jews, and, in the early days, Armenians and Greeks numbering amongst them. The broad opposition movement that came to power had both centralist and decentralist tendencies, who would become the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and the Liberal Entente respectively. The Armenians and Greeks, as well as the Albanians, favoured the decentralists. On a class basis, they enjoyed the support of the haute bourgeoisie and high officials. The unionists, meanwhile, assembled the previous constituency of the Hamidian autocracy behind them, the lesser Muslim officialdom and petite bourgeoisie. From its very inception, the CUP enjoyed the backing of many Kurds, Arabs, and Russian Turks. Thus, beyond the initial euphoria of the revolution, we can see the basis of the continued melding of class and ethnic antagonisms through the Second Constitutional Era.[305]

In the aftermath of the revolution, in October 1908, Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria declared independence, and Crete declared union with Greece, all three utilising the governmental chaos to present a fait accompli.[306] This was a blow to a movement whose primary goal was the preservation of the state, as the Young Turks were, in both their unionist and liberal manifestations, as well as a strain on intercommunal elections. The CUP swept the 1908 general election, winning 160 of the 288 seats in the Ottoman parliament.[307] In

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[304] Sharkey, *A History of Muslims, Christians, and Jews*, pp.199-201, 206.
[305] Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks*, pp.4, 14, 45, 51-2, 81-2.
[306] Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks and the Ottoman Nationalities: Armenians, Greeks, Albanians, Jews, and Arabs, 1908-1918* (Salt Lake City, 2014), p.42.
[307] Suny, *They Can Live in the Desert and Nowhere Else*, p.159.

the election, Hellenic citizens had been prevented from voting. The state demanded proof of Ottoman citizenship from Greek voters, driving down Greek participation notably. Thus, the attempt to distinguish between Hellene and Ottoman Greek continued to disadvantage Ottoman Greeks.[308] In April 1909, less than four months after the assembly opened, and nine months after the revolution, a coalition of ancien régime loyalists, disaffected officers, and religious students attempted a coup with the support of the liberals. The CUP only succeeded in defeating the insurrection after a great deal of effort and popular mobilisation.[309]

The responses of the Christian communities to the vagaries of the Second Constitutional Era were varied. The Armenian revolutionary movements, the main locus of Armenian politics by this point, were firmly opposed to the coup. One of the revolutionary parties, the Dashnaks, was in alliance with the CUP between 1908 and 1912, and unionists even hid from the putschists in the homes of leading Dashnaks.[310] Greek political representation, meanwhile, was split unevenly between a majority middle class nationalist tendency, supported by the Patriarch Ioakim III, and a minority unionist strain of the clerical establishment and haute bourgeoisie.[311] The nationalists supported the liberal coup.[312] Few Assyrian intellectuals were of a political bent, and no Assyrians were ever elected to the Ottoman parliament. The nascent national movement was strictly Ottomanist and notably anti-Armenian. There was not even clear agreement on what the borders of this community were, as it was separated into four confessions. Thus, internally, one can see a relatively benign view by the Christian minorities of the CUP government in its early phase.[313]

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[308] Feroz Ahmad, 'Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1914', in Benjamin Braude (ed.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Abridged Edition* (London, 2014), p.294.
[309] Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks*, pp.72-3.
[310] Suny, *They Can Live in the Desert and Nowhere Else*, pp.160 166.
[311] Kamouzis, *Greeks in Turkey*, pp.21-2.
[312] Ahmad, *The Young Turks and the Ottoman Nationalities*, p.43.
[313] Trigona-Haran, *The Ottoman Süryânî*, pp.111, 205-7.

A direct result of the coup attempt was the Adana massacre. Across Anatolia, riots broke out on the news of regime change in Constantinople, but in Adana this social disorder metastasised into an anti-Armenian riot. Adana was the economic hub of Cilicia, a rapidly growing city into which poured migrant labour. These workers were two thirds Muslim and one third Christian. Industry in the city was dominated by a foreign European or domestic Christian bourgeoisie, namely Greek or Armenian, employing this mixed but predominantly Muslim proletariat. These industrialists were resented on a religious basis by their Muslim employees, an antagonism that only strengthened in the aftermath of the Revolution, as Armenians became more visible in the freer post-revolutionary climate. In the ensuing riot, the Muslims laid siege to the Armenian quarter whilst the local CUP press blamed the Armenians for their predicament. The army, on arriving at the scene to restore order, promptly joined the siege. The violence also spilled out to neighbouring villages. The state prosecutions held both sides equally responsible. The parallels with the Russian pogroms are notable; a mass of dislocated migrant workers riots and massacres a religious minority on news of a political rupture. At the same time, the melding of class and national antagonism evident in the Ottoman context is a lot more immediately explicable, as it does not have to be explained through antimodernist sublimation. Christians were the bourgeoisie in Adana.[314]

After the coup, the CUP began a programme of centralisation to secure their power. They imposed new restrictions on the press and the labour movement.[315] The unionists also sought to place all schools under state oversight, equalise conscription despite the lack of any non-Muslim officers, and place all associations under governmental supervision, whilst proscribing those of a national, ethnic, or religious basis.[316] These centralising moves immolated CUP support amongst the religious minorities, as well as alienating many of the liberal coalition. By

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[314] Suny, *They Can Live in the Desert and Nowhere Else*, p.166-70.
[315] M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, 'The Second Constitutional Period, 1908–1918', in Reşat Kasaba (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Turkey – Volume 4: Turkey in the Modern World* (Cambridge, 2009), p.71.
[316] Ahmad, 'Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish Communities', pp.299-300.

1911, these coalesced to form an electoral alliance to oppose the government, and from by-election results the Liberal Entente seemed guaranteed to win the next general election. The unionists, seeing the looming threat, called a snap election in 1912. The Election with the Stick was heavily manipulated by the CUP, who arrested political opponents, banned opposition meetings, shutdown opposition newspapers, used government resources to support CUP candidates and, finally, corrupted the counting process. The liberal opposition won 6 seats in the new parliament, and the unionists won 272.[317]

Infuriated by CUP's election rigging, the opposition again turned to coup d'etat. The Saviour Officers seized power and dissolved parliament, which would not meet again until 1914. In opposition, the unionists, freed from power, pushed for a hardline against the Balkan League which had just formed to take advantage of Ottoman distraction (the Sublime State was also at war to defend Libya from Italian colonisation 1911-12). This weakened the hand of the Saviour regime, further incentivising the maximalist aims of the Balkan powers. The war erupted in October 1912, and it was a catastrophe, wherein the Ottomans lost the entirety of Rumelia within weeks. By armistice of December 1912, the Bulgarians were marching on the final Ottoman defensive line, only 37 miles from Constantinople. In the peace negotiations of January 1913, the CUP successfully deposed the Saviour Officers, mobilising to 'Save Edirne!', which was still under siege. The war resumed in February and the city fell in March. Peace was signed in May. The Second Balkan War broke out in June, due to Bulgarian aggression against its erstwhile allies. The Ottomans successfully reconquered Edirne in July, and concluded peace with Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia in September 1913, November 1913, and March 1914, respectively.[318]

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[317] Hanioğlu, 'The Second Constitutional Period, 1908–1918', pp.71-2.
[318] Ibid., pp.73, 86-9.

The centralising authoritarianism of the CUP was already unpopular with the religious minorities. The unionists compounded this by rigging the 1912 election, further fracturing an already tenuous constitutional settlement. Thereafter, the legislature was neutered, and power concentrated in the executive, which only changed hands via coup and countercoup. Meanwhile, the state was locked in eternal war, if ones of self-defence, and seemed on the precipice of total collapse. In the violent, chaotic, and authoritarian convulsions of the empire between 1908 and 1914, the optimism and euphoria of the religious minorities on the overthrow of Abdulhamid met its grinding demise.[319]

The intensifying prejudice that the religious minorities were faced with as the empire fell apart only worsened the situation. In the post-revolutionary popular mobilisations to defend the empire, the opprobrium heaped onto gavurs was a key facet of agitating the masses and building constituencies. After the loss of the Balkans, the tenor of this rhetoric became apocalyptic. According to a boycott pamphlet:

> 'We are broken hearted at finding you Muslims are still asleep. The Christians, profiting from our ignorance, have now for ages been taking our place and taking away our rights. These vipers whom we are nourishing have been sucking out all the life-blood of the nation. They are the parasitical worms eating into our flesh whom we must destroy and do away with. It is time we freed our-selves from these individuals, by all means lawful and unlawful . . .'[320]

It continues that if the faithful refused to rouse from their stupor, then 'the caliphate and the Turkish sultanate would not prevail, and the coat of the Prophet would be trampled under the feet of the gavurs'. Thus, discursively we can see the radicalisation of counter-orientalism, as it built on the previous tropes of Muslim ascendancy within the empire, whilst mapping onto

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[319] Trigona-Haran, *The Ottoman Süryânî*, p.151.
[320] Çetinkaya, *The Young Turks and the Boycott Movement*, pp.124, 162.

new anxieties about the viability of the state and class antagonisms with the non-Muslim bourgeoisie.[321]

The radicalisation of the boycott movement offers a convenient shorthand for the ever-expanding range of counter-orientalist popular mobilisations. The boycott movement started in 1908 against Bulgarian and Austrian wares. This mass movement arose as a non-military means to punish these states for their postrevolutionary infractions on Ottoman sovereignty. Greece, however, was not boycotted, as the Greek government had refused to endorse Crete's declaration of union. As Greek-Cretan union neared from May 1910 onwards, however, a boycott was declared against Hellenic citizens. The distinction between Hellenes and Ottoman Greeks was impossible to maintain in practice, even if the Boycott Committee printed certificates for 'our Greek citizens'. Thus, the Ottoman Greek community was harmed by the boycott, and its organisers started agitating on a mixed national-religious basis to mobilise a cross-class coalition of Muslim notables and workers. The government tried to prevent this round of boycott for reasons of internal cohesion and international politics, but, having failed attempted to limit and regulate it. The central administration and local governors had reason to fear the boycott movement, which enjoyed great social power and often the support of local bureaucrats, making enforcement difficult. Ergo, large segments of the Muslim population were utilising mass politics in a novel fashion to preserve state order and their position within it. A counter-orientalist coalition stood at the ready to purge its enemies without and within.[322]

In the aftermath of the Balkan wars, this coalition radicalised. As reports of the ill treatment of Muslims in conquered Macedonia spread, and refugees flowed into the empire, fuelling the resentment of the Sublime State's Muslim population. Thus, in February 1914, boycott was declared in Asia Minor against Ottoman Greeks, Armenians, and Bulgarians.[323] The Greco-

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[321] Ibid., p.162.
[322] Ibid., pp.40-1, 89, 91, 120, 147, 159.
[323] Ibid., p.161-2.

Armenian prominence in commerce and the professions was already deeply resented by many Turks, and especially the Turkish petite bourgeoisie and lower literati, the primary constituency of the Committee of Union and Progress when it came to power.[324] Muslims were claimed to constitute the most backwards portion of the economy within what was supposed to be the land of Muslims. The boycott movement increased not only in breadth but also violence and governmental support. Although uncommon, rapes and murders of Christians did occur, and the situation in Anatolia was deteriorating. State officials and local officials started to seize minority properties. Greeks began fleeing the lawless conditions, both to the bigger cities and abroad. The CUP stood firmly behind the boycott this time, as the interior minister, Talat Bey, had decided it was time to cleanse the empire of those who had, in his view, betrayed the empire.[325] The regime had already begun expelling Greeks and Armenians and inciting massacres. The Late Ottoman Genocides had begun.[326]

## Conclusion

To give a precis, the competitive ethnogenesis of the period in Rumelia and Anatolia was marked by Muslim Turkish fragility. This anxiety was grounded in an awareness of the newfound economic prominence of the religious minorities in the modernising economy, a cognisance of the weakness of the Ottoman state compared to its European competitors, a fear of foreign intervention, and a consciousness of European racism and double standards against Muslims. This matrix begat a continuous search for a unifying principle that could maintain the state, whether Ottomanism, i.e. a civic patriotism of all citizens of the state; Islamism, a religious basis for identification with the state centred on the largest religious community and the sultan's caliphal role; or Turkism, a linguistic identity for the state founded on the language

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[324] Ahmad, 'Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish Communities', pp.291, 301.
[325] Çetinkaya, *The Young Turks and the Boycott Movement*, pp.136, 179, 184-5, 190, 194.
[326] Dikran M. Kaligran, 'Convulsions at the End of Empire: Thrace, Asia Minor, and the Aegean', in George N. Shirinian (ed.), *Genocide in the Ottoman Empire: Armenians, Assyrians, and Greeks, 1913-1923* (New York, 2017), p.98.

of the state elite and substantial portions of the Anatolian and Rumelian peasantry; or more precisely, a constantly evolving constellation of all three that melded inexactly into one another.

Additionally, however, it created a resentment of the previously subject religious minorities, who received European favouritism and exceeded their place in the imagined economic and social hierarchy of the Muslim intelligentsia. The orientalist counter-project and the development of contradictory official nationalisms were two sides of the same coin. Via the building of positive and negative solidarities, they would hopefully guarantee the state and its beneficiaries. The core logic behind this process of object formation was raison d'etat. The state elite, Muslim bourgeoisie, peasantry. and nascent proletariat wished to maintain the state and their own privileged positions within its political, economic, and cultural order. As this project proved more and more difficult to achieve, Muslim Turkish society radicalised in response. Faced with a circumstance where the state was perceived to be in danger, where loss of status was felt imminent, extermination became not only acceptable but necessary.

The boundaries of this genocidal project, how it was ideated, were the result of the interaction of the historical Muslim ascendency inside the Osmanli demesnes with the newfound context of the relative decline of the Sublime State vis-à-vis the European Christian powers, as well as the novel prominence of the non-Muslim minorities, especially in commerce and industry. The religious-ethnic segmentation of the Ottoman bourgeoisie, salariat, and professional classes was of a similar type to the experience of the Jews in Cisleithania and the Russian empire. An urban-based and commercially oriented minority population responded to the implementation of capitalist modernity with a focus on literacy and commerce. As a consequence, it was able to develop a competitive advantage in both commerce and the professions. The fact that the Ottoman Jewry was left out of this object category, whilst still achieving new and over-representative commercial successes, and even whilst being used by France as a proxy for influence and intervention, indicates the centrality of the Ottoman Muslim worldview of the

transformations of the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century in the object formation process. The view was that Islam was in decline vis-à-vis the Christian states, and the position of Jews in this civilisational struggle was that of a bit player between the two protagonists. This is a point of notable contrast with the experience of Jewish racial formation in Europe, where Jews became the subject of an entire phantasmic scene to psychically displace the intense dislocation of the Industrial Revolution as it spread over the continent.

The reaction of the religious minorities to this critical juncture was varied. The Ottoman Jewry affiliated itself firmly with the Sublime State, a strategy which proved effective, as the Ottoman state viewed its Jewish population as fundamentally unthreatening. The Greeks and Armenians, meanwhile, were more split, with nationalism taking hold amongst their petite bourgeoisies and peasantries. The Greco-Armenian haute bourgeois class stood firmly behind the Sublime State, which guaranteed their trade networks. The Assyrian literati were still in the earliest stages of inventing a national identity. This community was loyally Ottoman, defining itself against Armenians linguistically and against each other religiously. All of these communities were willing to give participation in the new constitutional settlement a try, and they met the Young Turk Revolution with euphoria. The Ottoman state, however, could not solve any of the problems afflicting it, which Abdulhamid's autocracy had only managed to freeze. The implosion of the democratic order after barely four years, the constant wars, and the inability of the Sublime State to resolve any of the overlapping inter-ethnic and inter-class conflicts destroyed the revolutionary enthusiasm of these minorities.

However, the dissatisfaction of the Christian minorities was not the reason for the radicalisation of counter-orientalism to an exterminatory degree. The state and its beneficiaries had lost faith in the ability of the political order to reproduce itself. This anxiety was what mobilised the counter-orientalist coalition. Its project was, as it ever was, the maintenance of the state and the privileges of the Ottoman Muslim gentry and officialdom. The novel means of this project in

its final stages were the refashioning of the demographic reality of Anatolia through expulsion, extermination, and expropriation. The genesis of the Late Ottoman Genocides is in the counter-orientalist project that developed over the course of Ottoman modernisation and collapse; it was a product of the resentment and fragility of the state elite as it met continued failure.

# **Conclusion**

## **What Did We Learn?**

<u>What Were the Particularities?</u>

There were clear differences between the case studies. In the Habsburg example, these included:

- The empire successfully built a political system that rested partially on popular support and parliamentarism. The franchise for this was gradually expanded over the course of the empire's late period.

- This process of increasing popular legitimation and participation compelled the empire to build a broader range of support. This included incorporating nationalist policies for previously subordinate nations in places where they held majority support. German national domination was replaced by hegemony.

- The loss of the exclusive claim on the state by the Germans was read as a catastrophe, and it loosed a wave of conspiratorialism and a search for internal enemies. This was not state policy, as Germans were not the sole constituency of the state, even if antisemitism was the hegemonic position within this community. It boded ill for the future, however, as many of these tropes and worldviews would only be radicalised in the experience of total war and its resultant incineration of the previous status quo.

- The Jewry considered herein, which hailed from the monarchy's central belt, and which we named Deutschjudentum, was astonishingly assimilated. They identified powerfully with Germanness, and they had been deeply assimilated over the longue durée.

- As a consequence of this enthusiastic assimilation, the rise of a racialising antisemitism amongst gentile Germans was a full-blown crisis of modernity for this group, provoking lasting anxiety and intellectual ferment. The political responses, whether retaining the universalism of German liberalism, attached now to the rising power of social democracy, or reproducing nationalism but for Jews, building on the grandeur of

Hebrew antiquity, were preconditioned by the total success of national assimilation in this community.

- The antisemitism present in the Habsburg monarchy was structured by the locale of the gentile-Jewish encounter, the academy. This made for a type of antisemitism deeply rooted in contemporary discourses on the inherent differences of mankind, the racial sciences.

For the Romanov empire, they were:

- The Romanov empire was the only state considered to never abolish distinctive corporate statuses, due to its abiding distrust of all reform as a threat to the autocracy.

- The empire's decision to guide assimilation processes in a restricted and managed way, mediated by its educational institutions and estate structures, as well as its restriction of access to the interior, neutered both dynamics of Jewish Russification and Jewish salarianisation. Although a prosperous Russian Jewish community did emerge, it did not match the scale of the Deutschjudentum.

- The autocracy at first had the aim of selective integration, but gradually this goal faded into the background, as other objectives, such as the management of modernisation in a non-threatening manner, took priority. Jews were regarded as harbingers of change, as capitalists, and therefore distrusted.

- Russia was the only state analysed wherein the ancien régime persisted throughout the period, even if fettered after 1905. The autocracy that was trying to persist in perpetuity was staffed by minor nobles scared of their pending irrelevance under capitalism. Ergo, Russian state antisemitism reached for a neo-feudal imaginary, whereby Jews were the agents of any change.

And for the Ottoman empire, they consisted of:

- The Ottoman empire was an Islamic empire. Therefore, it built on Islamic concepts of fundamental difference and confessional hierarchy rather than that of Christendom.

- The Ottoman state took little issue with its Jewish population, despite their equal status to Christians under the concept of dhimmi. Thus, we can see the interaction of previous discourses with contemporary political imperatives to codetermine object formation.

- This was the only exclusionary project considered that was unconnected to the episteme of race.

- The Ottoman empire was substantially weaker than the other two, riven as it was by foreign interventions. The intense anxieties of the state elite about the future and their place within it are thus more logical. Hence, it is more readily apparent where the upset against the empire's Christians comes from, as it is a projection of a nearer degree.

- The internal weakness of the Ottoman state prevented assimilation, as Ottoman Turkish failed to establish itself as the lingua franca. Minorities maintained separate schools with external support. Thus, there was little need to stage a 'national revival'.

What Were the Commonalities?
Amongst all of the communities that we considered herein, there were also notable similarities. These included:

- Histories of discursive subjugation.

- A particular socio-economic path to capitalist modernity that distinguished them from their majoritarian peers, i.e. salarianisation instead of proletarianisation.

- Newfound success and/or visibility under the conditions of capitalist modernity, which bred resentment from the majority.

- A modern exclusionary project that ascribed to this group blame for the ills of the present day, which built on previous histories of discursive subjugation, but was notably

distinct in its anxieties and means of action vis-à-vis earlier exclusionary practices and discourses.

- All of these exclusionary projects utilised tropes of resentment, bitterness, an enemy within, and a necessity of purging. They had a paranoid style which reflected upset about upturned hierarchies as well as majoritarian anxieties for the future and their privileged position in it.

There were also examples where two of the case studies showed a similar trait, but the third did not. For the Habsburg and Romanov empires, these included:

- Both states were Christian, and the populations that they excluded were Jewish. Consequently, both built on early church discourses of Judeophobia, and were actors within the same episteme, even though they possessed confessional and political differences.

- Both states enjoyed a relatively quiescent external situation. Their existences were not threatened by foreign powers.

For the Romanov and Ottoman empires, meanwhile, they were:

- Both states failed to renew their legitimacies via constitutional rupture in the early twentieth century. Politics remained in both an unrepresentative, highly pressurised, and violent affair.

- The oppression of the considered minorities only increased during this period too, as these precarious and violent states projected their failures onto their unfortunate populations.

- Both spawned minority revolutionary parties with paramilitaries via their terrible treatment of the groups considered herein.

And for the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, they included:

- Both states attempted to instantiate a dynastic patriotism that proved of middling efficaciousness.

- Both states did implement liberal political economy, i.e. abolition of corporate distinctions and facilitation of private enterprise, even though the Ottoman implementation thereof was complicated by its complex treaty commitments to the Christian European powers.

## What Can We Generalise From These Findings Vis-À-Vis Exclusionary Projects in the Metropole?

1. A precondition of an exclusionary project is elite despair.

2. Boycotts, pogroms, and unofficial discriminatory practices number amongst the preferred means for excluding an internal enemy. With access to state power, this can increase to extermination and expropriation.

3. Exclusionary projects map onto a mixture of pre-existing discourses, present class/ethnic antagonisms, and political benefit. They are structured simultaneously by politico-cultural signification and socio-economic structure.

4. Exclusionary projects precursor a massive loss of legitimacy by the state amongst the targeted group when the state has been captured. If the state remains unaffiliated, there is instead an attempt to gain its protection by the minority.

5. Exclusionary projects assist in the maintenance of unsustainable political settlements via their mobilisation of threat and paranoia.

## What Other Novel Findings Were There?

The distinctiveness of diasporic communities under capitalist industrialisation was an under-researched aspect of the constitution of their exclusion, in my opinion. The upset of imagined hierarchies is a notable aspect of these exclusionary projects, but why this might be felt by elites remained opaque. The fact that diasporic minorities followed a separate path, undergoing processes of burgher embourgeoisement, professionalisation, and salarianisation, rather than of

peasant proletarianisation, explains why these diasporic populations were so much more visible to previous elites, as these positions offered more power and prestige in the new capitalist age.

## Concluding Remarks

Over the course of this master thesis, we have seen how diasporic minorities were subjected to increasing levels of exclusion over the longue durée. Whilst these exclusionary projects built on existing class and ethnic antagonisms, they were unresponsive to the behaviour of the minorities themselves. There was no level of assimilation or loyalty which conferred safety. Diasporic minorities were the most likely groups to acculturate to the culture of the dominant nation, and it failed to deliver any succour. Exclusionary projects had to be vanquished, as there was not a level of compromise that protected against their expansionary scope.

Exclusionary projects waxed and waned. They depended on the feelings of threat and fragility by historically privileged groups who feared an imminent lost of their status. They were radicalising tendencies, for whom all was feasible in the pursuit of the maintenance of in-group dominance. It was this combination of present power and future loss that preconditioned their radicalisation. For these paranoid styles, redemptive violence read as the last possible chance to save the situation.

We have also seen throughout this investigation the abiding power of religion to shape the conception of community into the modern era. Whilst it could no longer function as the sole legitimation of political authority, it was still serviceable for delineating in- and out-group identities within society. Hence it was able to serve as the discursive basis for every exclusionary project considered herein. Religion entered into the modern age as a co-determinant of inclusion and exclusion.

This study has consistently demonstrated an elastic comprehension of the terms and categories of race, religion, and nation. Although each label has its own particular fields of discourse, with attendant tropes and imagery, the most important aspect of all three for our purposes is their

centrality in delineating community. This definitional flexibility is reflected in the historical practice of each. Nation is about language identities except when it is not. Sometimes it is about religion. Race is about the categorisation of bodily features except for when it is not. Sometimes it is about religion. Religion is about faith except when it is not. Sometimes it is about community, and sometimes it is about power. Sometimes religion is about inclusion, and sometimes it is about exclusion. Nationalism studies provide a convenient model for practices of mass inclusion, as mediated by group identities. Critical race theory bestows a helpful toolkit for systems of mass exclusion, as instantiated by group identities. The combination of these two toolkits, alongside an appreciation for the mutability of these categories, has enabled us to problematise the experience of diasporic minorities as they were fashioned into an enemy within by their fellow citizens.

It would be difficult to comprehend this variegated tale of inclusion and exclusion without a dialectical approach. The construction of these internal enemies was codetermined by structure and contingency, socio-economic relations and politico-cultural discourses, and by processes of inclusion and exclusion. Via the comparative analysis elaborated above, we can see how some of these factors influence and shape each other to delineate the boundaries complicated multi-confessional and multi-ethnic communities over the longue durée. It is this combination of comparative and dialectical analysis that has enabled us to deliver the holistic approach required for a theme of such complexity.

# Appendix: Tables

## Table 1: Jewish Population of Cisleithania[327]

| Region | Eastern Cisleithania[328] | Lower Austria[329] | Lands of the Crown of St Wenceslaus[330] | Rest of Cisleithania[331] |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1880 Figures | Total Jewish Population: 1,005,394 | | | |
| Total | 754,014 | 95,058 | 147,204 | 9,118 |
| Percentage of Total Jewish population | 75% | 9.5% | 14.6% | 0.9% |
| Percentage of Jewish population excluding Eastern Cisleithania | N/A | 37.8% | 58.6% | 3.6% |
| | Total Jewish Population Excluding Eastern Cisleithania: 251,380 | | | |
| 1910 Figures | Total Jewish Population: 1,313,698 | | | |
| Total | 974,825[332] | 184,779 | 140,426 | 13,668 |
| Percentage of Total Jewish population | 74.2% | 14.1% | 10.7% | 1% |
| Percentage of Jewish population excluding Eastern Cisleithania | N/A | 54.5% | 41.4% | 4.1 |
| | Total Jewish Population Excluding Eastern Cisleithania: 338,873 | | | |
| Change Between 1880 and 1910 | Total Change: + 308,304 | | | |
| Total | + 220,811 | + 89,721 | - 6778 | + 4,570 |
| Percentage of Total Jewish population | - 0.8% | + 4.6% | - 3.9% | + 0.1% |
| Percentage of Jewish population excluding Eastern Cisleithania | N/A | + 16.7% | -17.2% | + 0.5% |
| | Jewish Population Change Excluding Eastern Cisleithania | | | |
| | Total | + 87,493 | Percent | + 34.5% |

[327] This table uses the raw statistical data provided in the 1910 Austrian Census. The categorisation of the crownlands and consequent sums are my own work. Bureau der K.K. Statistischen Zentralkommission, *Die Ergebnisse der Volkszählung vom 31. Dezember 1910 in den im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreichen und Landern. 1. Heft: Die summarischen Ergebnisse der Volkszählung* (Vienna, 1912), pp.54-5, [Accessed from https://alex.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/alex?aid=ost&datum=0001&page=57&size=45.].

[328] Galicia and Bukovina.

[329] Including Vienna.

[330] Bohemia, Moravia, and Austrian Silesia.

[331] Upper Austria, Carinthia, Salzburg, Styria, Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Carniola, Austrian Littoral, and Dalmatia.

[332] The figure for Galicia on p.54 is correct, but the figure on p.55 is wrong. Therefore, Eastern Cisleithania's total is the addition of Gal.: 871,906 and Buk.:102,919, not Gal.:871,895 and Buk.:102,919.

**Table 2: Occupational Distribution of Jewish Grooms Between 1870 and 1910**[333]

| Occupational Category | 1870 Sample: 73 | 1880 Sample: 109 | 1890 Sample: 155 | 1900 Sample: 213 | 1910 Sample: 266 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Self-employed | 71.2% | 66.1% | 60.0% | 47.4% | 44.0% |
| White Collar Employees[334] | 6.8% | 13.8% | 25.8% | 32.4% | 41.7% |
| Artisans[335] | 19.2% | 15.6% | 8.4% | 11.3% | 6.8% |
| Workers[336] | 2.7% | 4.6% | 5.8% | 8.9% | 7.5% |

**Table 3: Occupational Distribution of the Viennese Workforce Between 1890 and 1910**[337]

| Occupational Category | 1890 Sample: 695,393 | 1900 Sample: 848,973 | 1910 Sample: 1,094,185 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Self-Employed | 31.4% | 31.8% | 32.1% |
| White Collar Employees | 13.7% | 11.6%[338] | 12.9% |
| Workers | 52.1% | 53.6% | 48.4% |
| Apprentices[339] | | | 4.7% |
| Day Labourers | 2.9% | 2.1% | 0.8% |
| Family Helpers | | 1.0% | 1.0% |

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[333] Rozenblit, *The Jews of Vienna*, p.68.

[334] Angestellte, the salaried employees, such as civil servants, clerks, managers, and salespeople. Ibid., p.64, 66

[335] The IKG records do not indicate whether artisans were self-employed or worked for others, hence their separation here, in contrast with the following table.

[336] Arbeiter, so most industrial workers. Ibid., p.66.

[337] Ibid., 68.

[338] This fall in the proportion of white collar employees presumably is a result of the enlargement of Vienna in 1892, as such jobs would cluster in the city centre, therefore reducing their proportion in a larger city. *Landes-Gesetz und Verordnungsblatt für das Erzherzogtum Österreich unter der Enns, Jahrgang 1891, XXV.*, p.235 https://alex.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/alex?aid=lgn&datum=1891&size=45&page=255

[339] Apprentices were only listed separately from 1910.

**Table 4: Cisleithanian Parliamentary Election Results Under Universal Suffrage by Number of Seats**

|  | Bohemian Lands – 83 MPs[340] | Alpine Lands – 81 MPs[341] | Lower Austria – 64 MPs[342] | German Periphery – 4 MPs [343] | Total – 232 MPs[344] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SDAP 1907 | 21/50 (42%) | 12/50 (24%) | 16/50 (32%) | 1 (2%) | 50/232 (21.6%) |
| CS 1907 | 1/95 (1.1%) | 50/95 (52.6%) | 44/95 (46.3%) | 0/95 | 95/232 (40.9%) |
| DN 1907[345] | 60/84 (71.4%) | 18/84 (21.4%) | 3/84 (3.6%) | 3/84 (3.6%) | 84/232 (36.2%) |
| SDAP 1911 | 10/44 (22.7%) | 7/44 (15.9%) | 26/44 (59.1%) | 1/44 (2.3%) | 44/232 (19%) |
| CS 1911 | 1/75 (1.3%) | 49/75 (65.4%) | 24/75 (32%) | 1/75 (1.3%) | 75/232 (32.3%) |
| DN 1911 | 69/107 (64.5%) | 25/107 (23.3%) | 11/107 (10.3%) | 2/107 (1.9%) | 107/232 (46.1%) |

[340] For Bohemian Lands: Bohemia – 55 German MPs; Moravia – 19 German MPs; and Silesia – 9 German MPs. Bureau der k.k. Statistischen Zentralkommission, *Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen in den im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreiche und Länder im Jahr 1907* (Vienna, 1908), ALEX: Historische Rechts- und Gesetzestext Online, p.v, [Accessed from https://alex.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/alex?aid=ors&datum=0084&page=324&size=45.]. The figures underneath are from Bureau der k.k. Statistischen Zentralkommission, *Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen in den im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreiche und Länder im Jahr 1911* (Vienna, 1912), ALEX: Historische Rechts- und Gesetzestext Online, pp.10-11, [Accessed from https://alex.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/alex?aid=ost&datum=0007&size=45&page=12.].

[341] For Alpine Lands: Upper Austria – 22 German MPs; Salzburg – 7 German MPs; Styria – 23 German MPs; Carinthia – 9 German MPs; Tyrol – 16 German MPs; and Vorarlberg – 4 German MPs. Statistische Zentralkommission, *Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen im Jahr 1907*, p.v. The figures in this column are from Statistische Zentralkommission, *Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen im Jahr 1911*, pp.8-10, [Accessed from https://alex.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/alex?aid=ost&datum=0007&size=45&page=10.].

[342] For the number of German MPs in Lower Austria. Statistische Zentralkommission, *Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen im Jahr 1907*, p.v. For the electoral results below, Statistische Zentralkommission, *Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen im Jahr 1911*, p.8, [Accessed from https://alex.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/alex?aid=ost&datum=0007&size=45&page=10.].

[343] For the German periphery: Carniola – 1 German MP; and the Bukovina – 4 German MPs, Statistische Zentralkommission, *Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen im Jahr 1907*, p.v. However, this total must be reduced by one, as after the 1910 Bukovina Compromise, one seat was recategorised as Jewish national rather than German. See Beller, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, p.209, on the Bukovina Compromise. For the post facto recategorization of the seat as Jewish national, Statistische Zentralkommission, *Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen im Jahr 1911* (Vienna, 1912), p.12, [Accessed from https://alex.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/alex?aid=ost&datum=0007&size=45&page=14.]. For the figures below, see ibid., pp.9, 12, [Accessed from https://alex.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/alex?aid=ost&datum=0007&size=45&page=11.].

[344] Statistische Zentralkommission, *Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen im Jahr 1907*, p.v. Total German MPs = 233 - 1 MP (for the Bukovina) = 232 German MPs.

[345] Stimmer, 'Deutschnationale Parteien 1914', p.76. We include every party classified under the label German Nationalist by Stimmer, even those who were never a part of the Deutsche Nationalverband. The difference was only marginal between DNV representation in both cases. In 1907, the parties who would go on to form the DNV had 82 MPs, and in 1911, the DNV had 100 MPs.

**Table 5: Distribution of German Nationalist Parties in Cisleithanian Elections Under Universal Suffrage[346]**

| | Bohemian Lands – 83 MPs[347] | Alpine Lands – 81 MPs[348] | Lower Austria – 64 MPs[349] | German Periphery – 4 MPs[350] | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GAN 1907[351] | 17/19 (89.5%) | 2/19 (10.5%) | 0 | 0 | 19/84 (22.6%) |
| ALN 1907[352] | 26/46 (56.5%) | 16/46 (34.8%) | 3/46 (6.5%) | 1/46 (2.2%) | 46/84 (54.8%) |
| Ag 1907[353] | 17/19 (89.5%) | 0 | 0 | 2/19 (10.5%) | 19/84 (22.6%) |
| GAN 1911 | 28/29 (96.6%) | 1/29 (3.4%) | 0 | 0 | 29/107 (27.1%) |
| ALN 1911[354] | 21/56 (37.5%) | 23/56 (41.1%) | 11/56 (19.6%) | 1/56 (1.8%) | 56/107 (52.3%) |
| Ag 1911 | 20/22 (91%) | 1/22 (94.5%) | 0 | 1/22 (4.5%) | 22/107 (20.6%) |

[346] These figures are complicated by the electoral alliance between the DFP and DVP, as the MPs elected as part of this alliance ranged from antisemites to Jews. I would prefer to separate these two tendencies, but they entered the 1911 election campaign as a joint bloc, thus rendering it difficult to distinguish between the two in that year. In order to enable clear legibility between the two datasets, therefore, we have entered this one category also for 1907. Statistische Zentralkommission, *Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen im Jahr 1911*, p.8.

[347] The figures in this column are from Statistische Zentralkommission, *Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen im Jahr 1911*, pp.10-11.

[348] The figures in this column are from ibid., pp.8-10.

[349] The figures in this column are from ibid., p.8.

[350] The figures in this column are from ibid., pp.9, 12.

[351] German Antisystemic Nationalists (GAN). This term includes the FA/DR, AD, and DAr. The logic is this category is the graph given by Stimmer, namely the twinned 'Distance to Dual Monarchy' and 'Renunciation of Parliamentary Democracy' traits, which distinguishes them from the DVP. They share with the DVP 'Biological-Racial Antisemitism', 'Struggle Against Jewish Liberalism', and 'Affinity to the German Empire'. Stimmer, 'Deutschnationale Parteien 1914', p.75.

[352] Alliance of Liberals and Nationalists (ALN). I would prefer to separate these two tendencies, but they entered the 1911 election campaign as a joint bloc, thus rendering it difficult to distinguish between the two in that year. To enable clear legibility between the two datasets, therefore, we have entered this one category also for 1907. Statistische Zentralkommission, *Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen im Jahr 1911*, p.8.

[353] Stimmer, 'Deutschnationale Parteien 1914', p.75. From this graphic, it is more credible to have the agrarians form their own category, rather than attach them to any others.

[354] Seven Viennese representatives would later leave to form the Deutsche Freiheitspartei in 1917, I take this as the philosemitic wing of the German nationalists. The rest of this alliance is presumed to find antisemitism an acceptable part of political discourse, even if not necessarily to their taste in all cases. Ibid., pp.74, 76.

**Table 6: Popular Vote of German Antisemitic Parties in the 1907 Cisleithanian General Election[355]**

|  | CS[356] | DVP[357] | AD | FA/DRP | DArP | Total German Votes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Number | 719,549 | 131,474 | 20,693 | 70,564 | 3,486 | 1,772,418 |
| Percentage | 40.6% | 7.4% | 1.2% | 4% | 0.2% | 100% |

**Table 7: Popular Vote of Antisystemic German Nationalist Parties in the 1911 Cisleithanian General Election[358]**

|  | AD | FA/DRP | DArP | Total German Votes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Number | 20,527 | 90,523 | 26,670 | 1,739,927 |
| Percentage | 1.2% | 5.2% | 1.5% | 100% |

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[355] Figures from Statistische Zentralkommission, *Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen im Jahr 1911*, p.6, [Accessed from https://alex.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/alex?aid=ost&datum=0007&size=45&page=8.].

[356] For the classification of the Christian Socials as antisemitic, see Boyer, *Austria, 1867-1955*, p.345

[357] For the classification of the following German nationalist parties: 1. The German People's Party (DVP); 2. The Pan-Germans (AD); 3. The Independent Pan-Germans/German Radical Party (FA/DRP); and 4. The German Workers Party (DArP); as antisemitic, see Stimmer, 'Deutschnationale Parteien 1914', p.75.

[358] Figures from Statistische Zentralkommission, *Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen im Jahr 1911*, p.6

**Table 8: ALN Share of the Popular Vote in the Alpine Cities in the 1911 Cisleithanian General Election**

| Crownland | City | Party | Number of Votes | Percentage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Upper Austria[359] | Stadt Linz | DVP | 4,484/11,881 | 37.7% |
| Upper Austria | Stadt Steyr | DVP | 1,695/3,359 | 50.5% |
| Salzburg[360] | Stadt Salzburg | DVP | 3,221/6,382 | 50.5% |
| Styria[361] | Stadt Graz | deutschfreiheitlich | 5,604/18,964 | 29.6% |
| Styria | Stadt Cilli | deutschfreiheitlich | 787/975 | 80.7% |
| Styria | Stadt Marburg | deutschfreiheitlich | 2,505/4,736 | 52.9% |
| Styria | Stadt Pettau | deutschfreiheitlich | 339/579 | 58.5% |
| Carinthia[362] | Stadt Klagenfurt | DVP | 2,443/3,705 | 65.9% |
| Tyrol[363] | Stadt Innsbruck | deutschnational | 3,602/8,795 | 41% |
| Tyrol | Stadt Bozen | deutschnational | 758/1,819 | 41.7% |
| Total | All cities | ALN | 25,438/61,195 | 41.6% |

[359] Figures for Upper Austria from ibid., p.158, [Accessed from https://alex.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/alex?aid=ost&datum=0007&size=45&page=160.].

[360] Figures for Crownland Salzburg from ibid., p.159, [Accessed from https://alex.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/alex?aid=ost&datum=0007&page=161&size=45.].

[361] Figures for Styria from ibid., pp.160-1, [Accessed from https://alex.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/alex?aid=ost&datum=0007&page=162&size=45.].

[362] Figures for Carinthia from ibid., p.164, [Accessed from https://alex.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/alex?aid=ost&datum=0007&page=166&size=45.].

[363] Figures for Tyrol from ibid., p.167, [Accessed from https://alex.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/alex?aid=ost&datum=0007&page=169&size=45.]. Stadt Rovereto and Stadt Trient were excluded from Tyrol's representation, as they voted for Italian parties.

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