



MASTERARBEIT | MASTER'S THESIS

Titel | Title

Sweet Brother

Issue saliency and Radical Right Wing Support in Scandinavia.

verfasst von | submitted by

Torstein Bøe

angestrebter akademischer Grad | in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts (MA)

Wien | Vienna, 2024

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt | Degree
programme code as it appears on the
student record sheet:

UA 066 824

Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt | Degree
programme as it appears on the student
record sheet:

Masterstudium Politikwissenschaft

Betreut von | Supervisor:

Univ.-Prof. Markus Wagner PhD

Acknowledgments.

I would like to thank Prof. Markus Wagner for his time, knowledge, guidance and patience. I would like to thank Suz and Harry for their support in all logistical and academic matters and friendship. I would like to thank Julia, Meghan, Hannah, Caro, Karine, Daniel, Eleni, Kaja, Luka, Brendan, Roozbeh, Resi, Sami, Michi, Thomas, Riku, Ivan and everyone else who made Vienna a cool place to be despite everything. Finally I would like to thank all my friends and family back home and abroad for having so much more faith in me than I do.

Abstract

Radical right-wing political parties have become an established part of the European political scene, but there are strong regional differences. Scandinavia consists of three countries, two in which this party family has a long, strong and storied history, and one in which the phenomenon is comparatively short-lived. Through a comparative mixed-method approach utilizing narratological analysis, census- and manifesto data, the effect of saliency of the issues owned by these parties is measured to find out to which extent they affect the electoral success and strategies of said parties.

The findings suggest some degree of correlation between saliency and electoral success and some common strategic priorities between the cases. A large N-study based on the same methodological framework could be a promising step in further research.

Abstrakt

Radikal-rechtsextreme politische Parteien sind ein etablierter Teil der europäischen politischen Landschaft, allerdings mit starken regionalen Unterschieden. Skandinavien besteht aus drei Ländern, von denen zwei eine lange, starke und traditionsreiche Geschichte dieser Parteiengruppe aufweisen, während in einem das Phänomen vergleichsweise kurzlebig ist. Durch einen vergleichenden Mixed-Methods-Ansatz, der narratologische Analyse, Zensus- und Manifestadaten nutzt, wird der Effekt der Salienz der von diesen Parteien besetzten Themen gemessen, um herauszufinden, inwieweit sie den Wahlerfolg und die Strategien dieser Parteien beeinflussen.

Die Ergebnisse deuten auf einen gewissen Zusammenhang zwischen Salienz und Wahlerfolg sowie auf einige gemeinsame strategische Prioritäten zwischen den Fällen hin. Eine groß angelegte N-Studie auf Grundlage desselben methodischen Rahmens könnte ein vielversprechender Schritt für weitere Forschung sein.

Table of Contents.

<u>Introduction</u>	p. 6
<u>Right-Wing Populism, Saliency theory, and other theoretical assumptions:</u>	
-Rational choice and political organization	p. 10
-Saliency	p. 11
- Radical Right-wing Populism	p. 14
- Saliency, populist electoral support and hypotheses thereof	p. 16
<u>A swede, a dane, and a norwegian walk into a bar</u>	
- Scandinavian political history primer	p. 20
- Case selection	p. 22
<u>Methodology, longitudinal analysis of saliency and operationalization</u>	p. 25
<u>Radical Right-Wing populism, at home and abroad</u>	p. 32
Fremskridtspartiet 1972-1983: “If your taxes hurt”	p. 33
Fremskrittspartiet 1972-1983: “-Shall we have a party?”	p. 34
Fremskrittspartiet and Fremskridtspartiet 1983-89: Mustafa and other “Mohamedeenians” ..	p. 38
Sverigedemokraterna 1988-1998: “Every year, the Swedes are fewer.”	p. 40
Ny Demokrati 1991-1996: “That’s also something that creates racism.”	p. 41
Fremskrittspartiet 1991-1997: “...so that we combat racism.”	p. 43
Dansk Folkeparti 1995-2001: “He had no respect for me”	p. 44
Sverigedemokraterna 1995-2005:	
“Sverigedemokraterna rejects, with the same contempt, nazism...”	p. 45
Fremskrittspartiet and Dansk Folkeparti 1997-2013:	
“...if they’d like to work with Norwegians”	p. 47
Sverigedemokraterna 2005-2014:	
“There’s more wrong with you than with the Muslims”	p. 51
Dansk Folkeparti 2011-2019: “Islam is the greatest threat to world peace...”	p. 55
Fremskrittspartiet 2013-2017: “... go abroad and join terrorist organizations...”	p. 56
<u>Results</u>	p. 59
<u>Conclusion</u>	p.72
<u>Sources</u>	p. 75

Table of Figures.

Fig. 1: Electoral Success of Scandinavian RWP parties:	p. 8
Fig. 2: Post-war Scandinavian Social Democratic National Election Results:	p. 21
Fig. 3: Should foreign aid be reduced? Norway:	p. 59
Fig. 4: Should foreign aid be reduced? Denmark:	p. 61
Fig. 5: Should foreign aid be reduced? Sweden:	p. 62
Fig. 6: Should foreign aid be reduced? Scandinavian average:	p. 63
Fig. 7: Should economic support be reduced? Norway:	p. 64
Fig. 8: Should economic support be reduced? Denmark:	p. 65
Fig. 9: Should economic support be reduced? Sweden:	p. 66
Fig. 10: Should economic support be reduced? Scandinavian average:	p. 67
Fig. 11: Norwegian negativity to Multiculturalism	p. 68
Fig. 12: Danish negativity to Multiculturalism	p. 69
Fig. 13: Swedish negativity to Multiculturalism	p. 71

Table of Tables:

Population and Variables, Norway.	p. 100
Population and Variables, Denmark.	p. 101
Population and Variables, Sweden.	p. 102

Sweet Brother¹:

Issue saliency and Radical Right Wing Support in Scandinavia.

At the Swedish election of September 11. 2022, the radical right-wing populist party (RRWPP) Sverigedemokraterna, and their long time leader Jimmy Åkesson, became the second largest presence in the Swedish parliament with the greatest election result in their partys history at 20,54 percent (Valmyndigheten 2024). The result has been met with a considerable amount of nervousness from the Scandinavian political establishment, if not outright condemnation. The long time commentator for swedish daily newspaper Aftonbladet, and former advisor for the swedish Social Democrats, Olle Svenning pulled no punches:

“- I am of such an age that I never imagined I would experience an election where the right, and extreme right, would appeal to half of all voters. It is unlike anything in Swedish history. It is a grave defeat.” (Torvik 2022).

Reactions where no less severe at the last election in 2018, when Sverigedemokraterna managed a 17,6 percent share of the Swedish electorate, as the political editor of the norwegian daily newspaper Dagbladet, Marie Simonsen exclaimed:

“Almost one in every five Swedish voters voted for an anti-immigration, right-wing populist party with neo-nazi roots, and that in a year with a record turnout. That the party didn’t end up getting second place in the vote share is a meager consolation.” (Simonsen 2018).

Equally, in the election before in 2014, when SD achieved 13 percent, the then leader of the Norwegian RRWPP Fremskrittspartiet, Siv Jensen, was not diplomatic in her characterization:


¹ Söta bror (Sweet Brother) is a sometimes ironic, sometimes infantilizing but generally friendly nickname from Norwegians to Swedes first having been referenced in a piece by the national poet and independence activist Henrik Wergeland from 1836 critical of the union (Tolgensback 2014:49, 80). It is not reciprocal, the go-to nickname for norwegians by swedes is Norrbagge, an old norse word for sheep testicles, and according to prof. Dick Harris at the university of Lund, the oldest known derogatory term in the Swedish language (Skien 2005). Danes and Norwegian have similar sobriquets, the danes having referred to norwegians as “fjeldaper” (mountain monkeys (mountains are plentiful in a lot of norway and sweden but non-existent in denmark)), used somewhat ironically but generally jovially, since the fifties (Phil 2019) and norwegians, rather more recently, referring to danes as “rødpølser” (red sausages), an idiosyncratic danish cuisine (Foss 2011).

“I perceive the electoral support to the Swedish Democrats to be a sign of sickness, one that the other parties of Sweden should take really seriously.” (Lilleås 2014)

As scary an impression as these comments can suggest, there is precedent for results of this nature in Scandinavia. If anything, Sweden is unique for lacking any established and stable interest in radical right-wing political parties in any way, shape or form, until this relatively recent juncture in its political history. Its “sisters” Denmark and Norway have had established RRWPP since the early seventies, parties which not only have been successful mainstays of their political context but have also been active and passive participants in government (Heidar 2013c:88, Ringheim 2016:289).

They have even at times been as successful as the current Swedish Democrats, the Norwegian RRWPP Fremskrittspartiet actually having become the second largest party in Norway at the election of 1997, 2005 and 2009, and the Danish RRWPP Dansk Folkeparti having achieved the same standing in the election of 2015, and, by many accounts, being the most effective example of an RRWPP in Europe (Widfeldt 2015:3, Tvedt 2022a, 2023, 2024a).

Fig. 1: Sverigedemokraterna (Ny Demokrati), Fremskrittspartiet and Fremskridtspartiet/ Dansk Folkeparti



Electoral Success of Scandinavian RRWP parties² (Tvedt 2022a, 2023, 2024a)

One could make the observation that, if anything, Sweden can be said to be behind the curb of highly comparable countries, in this case Denmark and Norway, and so a very relevant question is, why? There have been a plethora of attempts to explain this “exception”, many of which will be explored and discussed in this paper, but one possible explanation can be that there up until this point just wasn’t much of an “appetite” for it. The issues traditionally trumpeted by RRWPP didn’t reflect an interest or priority by the Swedish electorate, it did not have saliency.

This thesis will be a historical comparative analysis of opinion data and the strategies and success of radical right wing parties in Scandinavia. Through the use of saliency theory, it seeks to uncover what factors might contribute to explain the success of radical right wing populism in Scandinavia based on the saliency of issues traditionally connected to the radical right wing modus operandi. The research question is as follows:

² Dansk Folkeparti was founded by leading members of Fremskridtspartiet following heated internal divisions within the party in 1995 (Heidar 2013:81), the liberty has therefore been taken to treat them as the same, and combining the electoral result of both parties for the election of 1998.

“How strongly does saliency of issues traditionally associated with Scandinavian radical rightwing parties, correlate with the strategies and relative success of said parties over time?”

The paper itself will be a longitudinal analysis of the interplay between supply-side and demand-side salience of traditional radical right-wing political issues and the relative success of these parties. Through the use of most similar systems design (Keman 2011:52, 55), the three cases will be analyzed for specific configurations, the salience of RRWP issues in the electorate and relative success of the party. It will also include salience strategies in relation to previous success and policy-competition between parties.

The paper will be structured thusly: first it will build a theoretical foundation upon which the paper will be structured. This will cover rational voter theory, European party institutionalization and party family categorization. Then it will discuss saliency theory, issue ownership, niche party characteristics and strategy. Using that framework the theoretical definitional criteria of RRWPP will be covered and will be discussed in relation to saliency theory, and the literature on the topic will be charted. The foundation having been built, the theoretically fitting hypotheses will be explored.

Having built our foundation, the case selection will be presented and argued for. Methodology will follow, with succinct descriptions of comparative and longitudinal research designs. It will argue for the rationality of a mixed method approach represented by the qualitative use of narrative analysis and the quantitative use of longitudinal survey data. How the quantitative data is operationalized will follow, and we will go in depth as to how these numbers might relate to our hypotheses.

The “meat” of the paper is next, both a thorough narratological comparative analysis and the adjoining quantitative data. These results will be analyzed, discussed, and results, should there be any, will be disclosed.

Saliency theory, Party Families and other theoretical assumptions.

Downs theory of Rational Choice (1957:6) identifies five prerequisites for a voter to act rationally;

- 1), they make choices from a range of options,
- 2), they rank these choices from preference,
- 3), the resulting ranking is transitive,
- 4), they always choose the option they rank highest, and
- 5), they make the same decision given the same choices and context.

As a model, it is an aggressive simplification of the many factors that go into such a choice, but generally the subject is assumed to vote, after a thorough cost-benefit analysis, for something they deem beneficial. Parties function in the same way, but their benefit is usually the maximization of votes, rounds upon rounds of cost-benefit analyses will result in strategies, manifestoes or policy-preferences they assume will give them the most votes depending on their circumstance (Downs 1957:11).

The circumstances from which these decisions must be made encompass the full spectre of democratic contestation, but for the purposes of analyzing western-european multi-party political systems the relevant political spectrum is well described by Rokkan and Lipsets (1967) hypothesis on “Frozen lines of conflict” (Heidar et al. 2013:30-31). Following political mass-mobilization as full suffrage was granted around the 1920’s, the lines of political conflict were stabilized around set dimensions as parties ran out of voters to mobilize. These dimensions were products of larger historical conflicts now subsumed into democratic contestation and were expressed in five main conflict-dimensions: centre/periphery, church/state, city/country-side, employee/employer, and, within socialist parties, reform/revolution (Heidar et al. 2013:32).

Using Rokkan/Lipsets dimensions of conflict, von Beyme (1985:23-24) identified ten party families, or at least ideal typologies for ideological groups;

- 1), *Liberal parties*, groups who were in opposition to their respective autocratic monarchies, and,
- 2), *Conservative parties*, not in opposition to their respective autocratic monarchies,
- 3), *Labour* (+socialist left) parties, in opposition to bourgeois parties.
- 4), *Agrarian parties*, in opposition to industrialization.
- 5), *Regional parties*, in opposition to centralist systems.
- 6), *Christian parties*, in opposition to secularism.
- 7), *Communist parties*, against Social Democrats and a reformist approach.
- 8), *Fascist parties*, in opposition to democratic systems.
- 9), *Protest parties*, petty bourgeoisie against the welfare state.
- 10), *Ecological parties*, in opposition to growth oriented societies.

Saliency.

Budge and Farlies (1983) concept of saliency is based on the assumptions of rational choice, central dimensions of conflict and a simplified categorization of parties. Voters and parties are presumed to utilize rational choice (Budge & Farlie 1983:146-7), but the plethora of different political priorities have been reduced to fourteen autonomous categories ranging from civil order, foreign policy to socioeconomic redistribution, based on Rokkan and Lipsets dimensions of conflict (Budge and Farlie 1983:27-8, 30). These are presumed to be relatively stable and voters are assumed to generally dislike proposals for change except where these might grant obvious and immediate benefits (Budge & Farlie 1983:146). The party categorizations have however been simplified to dichotomous coalitions of either socialist/reformist parties or bourgeois parties, where the former is assumed to generally advocate for change and the latter is assumed to oppose it (Budge & Farlie 1983:146).

In their contestation for support parties will generally benefit by keeping their message simple to keep the effort by electors to gather information before a choice of vote minimal, thus emphasizing a limited number of issues in their campaigns focusing on those issues they believe

either to be salient among electors or introduce topics they believe can become salient among electors (Budge & Farlie 147-8, 159). Budge and Farlie (1983:50) hypothesized that, while some salient issues are erratic and might benefit either side based on the context of the individual election, most of their issue types usually benefit bourgeois parties with the large exception of socioeconomic redistribution that usually benefits socialist /reformers. They found these hypotheses to have successfully predicted nine out of ten elections between 1977 and 1979 (Budge & Farlie 1983:112-4).

As saliency theory has been refined, the concept of issue ownership first postulated by Budge and Farlie (1983), has developed into issue association, rather than parties “owning” issues they are assumed, through a long-term historical relationship with said issue, to be unable to “disown” an issue to which they are associated (Budge 2015:765-766). This informs the electoral strategy of the parties in question as they can choose to either emphasize or downplay these issues depending on what they assume to be beneficial in their given circumstances (Budge 2015:766). These assumptions give us three expectations in regard to strategic behavior (Budge 2015:767), firstly, parties will structure their rhetoric on different topics rather than direct confrontation on the same topics. Secondly, parties will selectively and habitually emphasize certain topics as compared to others, there will thus be a continuing association between particular parties and particular issues and these are generally differentiated between parties. Thirdly, parties are advantaged when issues with which they are associated gain importance in the public agenda.

While saliency theory in large part focuses on two-party systems and coalitions, a larger and larger part of the multi-party smorgasbord are niche parties for whom the modus operandi is different (Meguid 2008:3). As defined by Meguid (2005, 2008), niche parties have three distinct characteristics as opposed to mainstream parties, firstly, they reject the traditional class-based orientation on which much of politics was built, primarily its emphasis on economic policy (Meguid 2008:3-4). This might encompass emphasis on such idiosyncratic issues as environment and immigration. Secondly, the issues raised by these parties are not only new relative to the existing party structures, but they also often eschew traditional “left-right” right alignments, the voters to whom they appeal may come from the full spectre of partisan alignment. Thirdly, they tend to focus on a smaller more specific group of policies, giving little effort to have a holistic

plattform, their specific focal point often deeming them single-issue parties among electorate and observers (Meguid 2008:4).

Building on this framework, Wagner (2012), further elaborated on the niche party definitional playbook. A clear deficiency of older classification was the reliance on identification by way of party family, thus depending on a fixed binary characteristic devoid of programmatic or ideological determinants. Attempting a more substantive definition Wagner (2012) proposes that niche parties' main differentiating characteristic is that they de-emphasize economic policy for the benefit of focusing on a range of non-economic issues popular with their base.

Operationalizing this definition through surveys and manifestoes, Wagner found that niche parties are a quite common party of modern party politics, existing at some point in the substantial majority of cases. They tend additionally to be smaller electorally and younger historically than their mainstream counterparts.

Building on this, Meyer and Wagner (2013) further elaborated on the strategies of the party's in question. Building on a selected measurement of niche and mainstream characteristics they found that transitions between the two are not at all uncommon, mostly in the direction of niche to mainstream but in some cases vice-versa (Meyer & Wagner 2013:1256-7). This transition was found to be likely in the cases where the party had suffered electoral defeat, a 4 percent drop in vote share corresponded to a 6 percent chance of switching from niche to mainstream, this rate increased to three out of four if the loss was at 5 percent and with a 5 percent increase these parties were predicted to change from niche to mainstream in 59 percent of cases (Meyer and Wagner 2013:1258). The total support was important in this respect, parties who had 5, 20 and 35 percent of the vote, had a 16, 8 and 0 percent chance to switch from a niche to a mainstream profile if there was a 4 percent loss in vote share (Meyer & Wagner 2013:1258-60).

Whether or not a party had "a finger in the game" was also found to have an effect, parties in opposition with a loss of 4 percent of their votes were 9 percent more likely to switch to a mainstream profile, but niche parties in government showed no propensity for change (Meyer & Wagner 2013:1262). The Mainstream to niche pipeline is much rarer, these are usually parties who are smaller, younger and have had a niche profile to begin with at some point in their past

(Meyer & Wagner 2013:1263). There is a more complex causal relationship, as turning mainstream to niche largely depends on the space occupied by competitors, betting on the salience of a single issue gets complicated if a competitor makes a similar decision.

Radical Right-wing Populism.

RRWP as a family of political parties has a wide variety of ideologically eclectic members, but in a minimal definition set forward by dutch political scientist, and author of multiple books on the subject, Cas Mudde (2007:16, 18) there are three elements of their ideologies and platforms that are regarded as foundational to their practical categorization.

Nationalism and nativism.

“Unfortunately the history that nationalists want is not the history that professional academic historians, even ideologically committed ones, ought to supply. It is a retrospective mythology” (Hobsbawm 2021:316-317).

Nationalism, shortly put, is a political doctrine in which the parties concerned strive for the congruence of the cultural and political, in practical terms a conformity between the nation and the state; a monoculture (Mudde 2007:16). The primary method of facilitating this is through the process of making the state exclusively constituted by members of one’s own nation, the advancement of internal homogenization.

This can be achieved by a number of practical strategies, including but not limited to separatism, assimilation, expulsion and exclusion. As for what constitutes the boundaries of this homogenization, one widely used distinction is between ethnic nationalism and state nationalism, or defining the boundaries in a cultural (often racial) or political way (Mudde 2007:16-17).

They are however often combined, and the delineation between state and culture are blurry at best as practical nationalism is usually concerned with both the cultural dimension of internal

homogenization and political dimension of external exclusiveness, a useful definition of nationalism therefore has substantial elements of both (Mudde 2007:17). The concept of nationalism is utilized by many political groupings, it can be defined in so many different ways, and be utilized for so many different purposes, that it can be useful to think of it as a spectrum rather than a binary. There does exist non-exclusionary nationalism, there does exist non-cultural exclusion, it is therefore necessary, if one wants a practically useful definition of RRWPP, to combine this element with nativism.

Although they are two different observable phenomena, nationalism and nativism are deeply intertwined, so much so that nativism, although it can exist independently, is useful to contextualize as a “mode” or “direction” for nationalism (Mudde 2007:18). Combining aspects of nationalism and xenophobia, nativism for our purposes, will be defined as:

“(A)n ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state.” (Mudde 2007:19).

Authoritarianism.

Muddes wider definition of the party family in question also includes authoritarianism and populism. Authoritarianism is often associated with non-democratic regimes and more explicitly fascist political actors, but its proponents need not be specifically anti-democratic to exhibit authoritarian traits (Mudde 2007:22). It can be a rather more subtle demand for the nebulous concept of “order”, or:

“...the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely. In this interpretation, authoritarianism includes law and order and “punitive conventional moralism”” (Mudde 2007:23).

This does not mean that proponents are submissive to any authority as such, in fact loyalty and dissent are measured out by proponents in very specific directions best understood through the concept of populism.

Populism.

A core ideological feature of an RRWPP, populism is very instructive in illustrating a the wider holistic viewpoint of the parties and actors who utilize it, it is an

“...ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people”
(Mudde 2007:23).

The “us” part of the “us and them” dichotomy inherent to the ideology is manifested through the established exclusive understanding of the “nation”, this is assumed to be a homogenous group of individuals who have an inherent monopoly on the concept of “common sense” with whom mainstream and non-populist parties are catastrophically out of touch and only the populist practitioner truly understands (Adamson 2019:48). It is antagonistic in the sense that whatever it is the practitioner is criticizing “them” for is motivated by the argument that these elites are betraying ordinary people (Akkerman et al. 2016:38).

Saliency, populist electoral support and hypotheses thereof .

There are strong indications to suggest that the mere existence of a radical right-wing political party has a measurable effect on the electorate, mainly that these parties tend to shift the electorate in a direction of being more skeptical to politicians and anti-immigration, and increase saliency on these issues (Muis and Immerzeel 2017:919). One could argue the biggest ones are calls for populism and immigration skepticism, those were at least the assumed “bread and

butter” for the historical success of Right-wing populists in Scandinavia (Jupskås 2016:169-170, Ringheim 2016:30-31).

What political actors choose to focus on is dependent on whatever strategy the actor feels is most rewarding in the moment, but generally it behooves the actor to focus on the issues for which they are perceived to have ownership (Belanger & Meguid 2007:477). Issues that the party is perceived as especially competent or knowledgeable about. For this party family, there has been found a strong correlation between those parties who aggressively pursue anti-immigrant policy positions and their relative success (Ivarsflaten 2008:3).

The connection between the salience of immigration issues and electoral fortunes of RRWPP is perhaps best explored by Dennison & Geddes (2018:115) who observe that

“the vote share of anti-immigration parties rises and falls not with attitudes to immigration but, to a large extent, with the salience of immigration....the recent growth of anti-immigration parties shows that attitudes are likely to be combined with salience in the voter’s decision calculus.”.

The implication being that success for these parties might be connected more strongly with the overall salience of the issue rather than an analogous relationship between xenophobia and support.

This positive correlation is also largely divorced from “conditions on the ground”, the level of actual migrants has an indirect effect through salience, but not a direct effect on electoral support (Geddes 2020:415). Furthermore, RRWPP might actually reduce negative sentiment towards immigrants, at least with one part of the electorate, Geddes and Kustinov (2023:1021) find that:

“When PRRPs become increasingly successful, a significant proportion of the electorate “thermostatically” reacts to these developments by adjusting their stated preferences toward immigration in a positive direction. Given the general stability of immigration attitudes, however, it is important not to overstate the magnitude of these possible effects. Still, the available

evidence strongly suggests that the populist success does not make the electorate more anti-immigration in the aggregate.”

Literature.

The literature on RRWPP has in large part been defined by Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde, who's definitions on the issue and general analysis has left a large imprint on the field (2007, 2010, 2013, 2019, 2021). The largest contributor on the area in norwegian academia has been the current leader for C-REX, the centre for studies in extremism, Anders Jupskås (2012, 2016, 2023) and, of an older vintage, Elisabeth Ivarsflaten (2005, 2008). On Swedish RRWPP Jens Rydgren is by far the biggest authority (2010, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021), closely followed by Anders Widfeldt (2015) and Mikael Ekman (2010). RRWPP in Denmark has been extensively covered by Flemming Juul Christiansen (2016, 2017).

There is a cornucopia of research on saliency theory, historically it has been hypothesized and defined largely by the works of Ian Budge (1983, 2015). Of slightly newer vintage Belanger & Meguid (2007) analyzed vote choice in canadian elections and found that issue ownership only affected the choice among voters for whom the issue was salient. Dolezal et al. (2014) tested saliency theory on Austrian party competition and found that though it correctly identified some features but failed to prove that parties compete by selective issue emphasis rather than direct confrontation in the majority of cases. Klüver & Sagarzazu (2016) analyzed political communication in Germany and found that, while parties do focus their manifestos on issue ownership, their press-releases more so respond to salience in the electorate, a bottom-up causal relationship. Adams et al. (2023) simulated optimal policy positions in regards to salience in british elections and found that changes in saliency plausibly could have affected elections by several percentage-points.

Comparative case studies on RRWPP are numerous (Norris 2005, Mudde 2007, Ivarsflaten 2008, Wodak et al. 2013, Akkerman et al. 2016, von Beyme 2019, Manucci 2019, McDonnell and Cabrera 2019, Öztürk and Pickel 2019, Szabó 2020, de Jonge 2021, Muno and Stockemer 2021,

Zulaniella and Larsen 2021, Corradi 2022, Sondel-Cedarmas and Berti 2022), as are comparative studies on Scandinavia and the Nordics specifically (Widfeldt 2015, Bergmann 2015) but this specific approach was not successfully found in the research process.

With our theoretical framework laid, these are the hypotheses that will be tested on said foundation.

Hypotheses:

1. *The more salient immigration is in an election, the more successful RRWPP will be.*

- If the salience of these questions correlate positively with electoral success, this hypothesis will be true.

2. *RRWPP will mainstream their profiles after unsuccessful elections.*

- If elections in which electoral support for RRWPP increases, and is followed by these parties de-radicalizing their policy, the hypothesis will be true.

3. *RRWPP will radicalize in races in which their owned policy areas are encroached upon.*

- If other parties try to “muscle in” on policy-points traditionally owned by these parties, and the parties radicalize as a result, hypothesis 3 is true.

A swede, a dane, and a norwegian walk into a bar³ - Scandinavian political history primer.

The Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, are by many seen as so similar as to almost be interchangeable, (Heidar et. al 2013:42) one short explanation to why this is, would be the long, contentious and often violent political interaction between the three countries. They were all unified as cohesive political units by Viking chieftains turned kings, between 872 for Norway, and 1350 for Sweden (Bandlien 2024, Opsahl 2024). A tendency for intermingling between political elites in all countries culminated in the Kalmar (personnel) union of 1389 in which the Danish Queen Margrete managed to claim all of Scandinavia, an arrangement the Swedes started opposing from 1434 (Salvesen et al. 2023).

The “Twin Kingdoms” of Denmark and Norway stayed together for nearly 400 years, a period that saw Sweden in ascendancy culminating in its position as a northern european great military power in the 17th century (Heidar 2013b:61-62). There were plenty of skirmishes in the period but the biggest one and what ultimately reduced the swedish hegemony considerably was the Great Northern War 1700-1721, in which Sweden lost against Denmark-Norway, Saxony-Poland, Russia, Prussia and Hannover (Viken 2024).

In 1807 Britain, during the Napoleonic wars, subjected Copenhagen to naval artillery, forcing Denmark on the “wrong” side of the Napoleonic war (Weidling and Njåstad 2024). As part of the post-war Kiel-negotiations of 1814, Denmark had to accede Norway to the Swedes as a spoil of war, prompting another hundred years of personnel-union union between Norway and Sweden. Denmark democratized, here understood as the transfer of political authority (domestic at least, in the case of Norway) from the unitary head of state to the parliaments, in 1872, Norway 1884 and Sweden 1905 (Norseng et. al 2019, Salvesen et. al 2023).


After a long period of nation-building and a cultural and political struggle, a Norwegian initiative for a referendum on independence found overwhelming support (there were found to be only 184

³ “But the swede found the premise of the joke offensive and left”. Like many countries, Scandinavia has a rich history of playful ridicule between them, in the norwegian and danish versions the butt of the joke is always swedes, and vice versa (Paulsen 2005). In the versions including all three, the norwegian (when a norwegian tells it) is always clever and brave, the dane is, usually, a fun hedonist scamp, and the swede is a dumbass.

votes for a continued union) (Sejersted 2019). As the outcome seemed inevitable, both armies mobilized on the border but it was ultimately solved diplomatically and no shots were fired. Norway seceded from the union 7. June 1905.

Labour unrest would define much of the following decade, and the post-war democratic history reflects this with a high general support for social-democrats, in the case of Sweden, historically the highest performing social democratic party in all of Europe (Raknes 2012:19):

Fig. 2: Post-War Scandinavian Social Democratic National Election Results.



(Tvedt 2022a, 2023, 2024a)

Social democratic parties would dominate the post-war era and subsequently leave a large legacy in all countries (Kersbergen and Manow 2011:358). Though that trend is sinking, it should be noted that elections in all countries usually have 8-12 parties⁴ who successfully compete in

⁴ All parties (currently as of 18.10-22) represented in the Swedish (Riksdagen), Danish (Folketinget) and Norwegian (Stortinget) parliaments by percentage of representatives, first by categorization, then native name respectively: Social Democratic: Socialdemokraterna 28,7%, Socialdemokratiet 27,5%, Arbeiderpartiet 28,4%; Conservative: Moderaterna 20%, Konservative Folkeparti 5,5% Høyre 22,5%; Radical right-wing populists: Sverigedemokraterna 17,5%, Dansk Folkeparti 2,3% Fremskrittspartiet 12,4%; Agrarian: Centerpartiet 8,9%, Venstre 13,3% Senterpartiet 16,6%; Socialist Left: Vänsterpartiet 7,7%, Radikale Venstre 3,8% Sosialistisk Venstre 7,7%; Christian Democratic: (S) Kristdemokraterne 6,3%, (N) Kristelig Folkeparti 1,8%; Liberal: Liberalerna 5,7%, Liberal Alliance 7,9% Venstre 4,7%; And Green parties: Miljøpartiet 4,6%, Alternativet 3,3%, Miljøpartiet de Grønne 1,8%. In addition, Stortinget (N) and Folketinget (D) have a subsequent even more radical left party: Rødt 4,7% and Enhedslisten 5,2% and there's one representative from a regional initiative to bolster hospitals in northern Norway, Pasientfokus 0,6%. Denmark has recently gotten a fair amount of splinter parties, Danmarksdemokraterne 8,1% split from Dansk Folkeparti, Nye Borgerlige 3,7% split from Konservative Folkeparti, Moderaterne 9,3% split from Venstre, there are also two permanent seats each for Greenland and the Faroe Islands and both the danish and swedish parliaments have one

elections, so they still have a notable presence.

Why Scandinavia? Case selection.

The arguments for the case selection in this paper is hopefully thoroughly covered, all three countries having had deeply intertwined cultures and histories for all of their existence. They have been selected through the logic of most similar systems design, that is, cases with a large number of common factors (Keman 2014:55). The concentration of this inquiry will be the variations within these very similar cases. The historical context of all countries have, as mentioned, been extensively covered, but there is quite a lot of useful and relevant fundamental and technical information about all cases that will succinctly be covered here.

Sweden, Denmark and Norway are all countries in northern Europe with respective populations of 10,2, 5,8 and 5,3 million (Mæhlum and Lundbo 2024). They are all constitutional monarchies with governments formed by parliamentary majority, all using the voting method of proportional representation with seats allocated by the Saint-Laguë method (Heidar 2013a:47-48, Heidar 2013b:63, Heidar 2013c:78-79). Sweden and Norway has an electoral threshold, a percentage of votes a party needs to get to access additional parliamentary seats meant to equalize the relationship between votes and seats, of 4 percent while Denmark has it at 2 percent meaning that the constellations at Folketinget are usually more fractured (Holmøyvik et al. 2023, Larsson 2018).

In all countries, the government can be deposed if it has lost the trust of parliament, in Sweden and Denmark a new election can be called, although this does not reset the four year intervals at which ordinary elections are held, but in Norway there is no mechanism for this (Heidar 2013a:47, Heidar, 2013b:63, Heidar 2013c:78). If a Norwegian government is toppled through a vote of no confidence, the new government has to come from the same parliamentary basis as the previous government, usually resulting in a minority government (Heidar 2013a:47-48). There is no way for anyone to topple a government for any opportunistic attempt to call an election at an

independent representative each. (Evjen 2022, Tvedt 2022a, b, c, d, 2023, 2024a, b, c, d, Riksdagen 2024, Stortinget 2024).

advantageous time, and subsequently there is no variation in the chronology in the norwegian electoral surveys as there are in the other two.

Denmark and Norway are founding members of NATO and sent contingencies to the ISAF forces in Afghanistan, Denmark also participated in Iraq, a decision based on a slim majority of bourgeois parties widely unpopular with the danish population (Nielsen 2007, Cooper 2024). Sweden has had a policy of neutrality but has, on account of the invasion of Ukraine, applied to and received membership in NATO as of march of 2024 (Cooper 2024). Norway and Denmark endured Nazi occupation 1940-45, Sweden remained neutral, both assisting refugees and resistance-fighters from Denmark and Norway, but not stopping its sale of iron ore to the Reich (Salvesen et al. 2023). Denmark joined EU in 1973, Sweden in 1995 but none are in the monetary system, Norway voted no twice 1972 and 1994 but are, with Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein, members of the EEA (Knudsen 2024, Knudsen et al. 2024).

An Exceptionally Swedish case.

The widely accepted explanation for the lack of a credible Swedish RRWPP for so long in swedish political history, at least in Danish and Norwegian media, is that Swedes are just unbelievably politically correct, they are apparently so socially conscious that any critical coverage or discussion of immigration or immigrants is deemed unacceptable by “the powers that be” (Jacobsen 2014, Haslund 2014, Heglund 2018). It is argued that there is a social identity based on emancipative values unique to the case, or Swedish exceptionalism as it is sometimes known.

There are however those who argue that this moral objection to anything untoward, is largely more a question of a constructed identity more so than an actual unique set of values and principles, one definition of swedish exceptionalism goes:

“[T]he nationally specific white identity that constructs Sweden as antiracist, gender equal and detached from a colonial past. Being (historically) positioned as standing outside of the (post)colonial order, Sweden becomes detached from “Western prejudice, racism and paternalism towards the non-white world, thus giving rise to a cultural and moral high ground.” (Philipson et. al 2016:92)

There is very little evidence to suggest the Swedish population holds any less of these opinions than their neighbors, noted authority on the Swedish Democrats, Jens Rydgren argues that figures from the International Social Survey Program from 1995 put Swedes roughly as opposed to immigrants and immigration as the rest of Europe (Rydgren 2010:66). They were also more inclined than the average European to agree with the statement “immigration causes crime” and just as likely to agree with the statement “immigrants contribute nothing to the economy”.

Jens Rydgren, the preeminent scholar on RRWP in Sweden has presented his hypotheses in a paper aptly named “The radical right and the end of Swedish exceptionalism” (Rydgren and van der Meiden 2018). His four main explanations have been:

1. A decrease in class based politics, decreasing the loyalty and making available these voters to other alternatives,
2. The salience of socio-economic issues hindered socio-political issues as points of mobilization, this has decreased and especially the subject of immigrations has come to define the political debates,
3. Increased convergence of parties has further depoliticized social-economic questions and fueled Sverigedemokraternas claim that “all other parties are the same”,
4. Sverigedemokraterna have been working hard to distance itself from its past and has largely succeeded in the eyes of many voters (Rydgren, van der Meiden 2018:452).

Methodology, longitudinal analysis of saliency.

This paper will primarily consist of a longitudinal analysis, a method characterized by many observations of a few units of analysis (Ringdal 2011:141). The difference of this method as compared to other forms of comparative research, is that the variables are ordered in time, often at a set and predictable interval, the method then is ideal for measuring processes, changes or stability over time. Although it is effective at recording change, the connection in time makes a mutual dependency in the data that complicates more sophisticated statistical analysis, making the method unable to speak much about causality and effect and rather only able to expose correlation (Ringdal 2011:141).

Beyond this design, it will use a mixed-method approach, an approach within political science that blends the qualitative and quantitative approach. In the qualitative approach the focus lies in "...detailed, text-based answers that are often historical and/or include personal observations and reflection from participants in political institutions, events, issues or processes... the use of *thick* description and analysis." (Vromen 2018:237). Quantitative approach, in contrast, is a *thin* approach, it is few variables over many cases and if the number of these cases is large enough, one can confidently make generalizations from the selection which can be said to be true of the wider population (John 2018:255)

Succinctly put, the strength of a qualitative approach is that, although you have few cases, you have so much information on these cases that you can get a deeper understanding of possible connections, causal relationships, contributing factors etc. (Vromen 2018:243-244). The information to confidently make such assumptions is missing in the quantitative approach, but your findings on the few variables can be said to be true outside the specific cases you handle (John 2018:269-270).

The mixed method approach seeks to combine the two in a way that complements both (Grønmo 2024). Utilizing both methods brings a deeper understanding to a topic as it allows both the analysis of causal mechanisms, underlying reasonings etc. and verification as to whether these can be said to be true in aggregate. It is also very helpful in contextualizing data, and is an excellent way of identifying and accounting for exogenous shocks that might affect the

quantitative data.

The methodological approach in our qualitative data is that of the narratological study. A human, being a social animal, understands its existence as a narrative, or rather “It is usually assumed that social life consists of actions and events, where the difference between the two is as assumed intentionality of actions.” (Czarniawska 2004:3). There are two possible roads, that of the story analyst and that of the story teller (Smith and Monforte 2020:3). The story analyst is a rather self-explanatory path, it is the analysis of story, but we have chosen the other path, that of the storyteller:

”...when operating as a storyteller, analysis is the story and the story is communicated in the form of a creative analytical practice to produce a tale as a story. Rather than writing about or commenting on participants' stories, this is where the researcher actually retells those stories in one form or another in order to share key aspects of participants' experiences. In this case, the end product would read more ‘like a story’ than a traditional research report as realist tale. To say that analysis is the story is to emphasize that, rather than putting a story under analysis and doing research on narratives, the story in its own right is analytical and theoretical; it does the job of analysis because analysis happens in a story. Given this, storytellers do not transform the story into another (theoretical) language. They use the stories they gather and present these to the audience/reader as a form of theory and analysis. They recast data to produce a story and the story is a theory. To help do this, rather than tell a story and represent results through a realist tale, they use a creative analytical practice...” (Smith and Monforte 2020:3-4).

Methodologically, our quantitative data is of the category of repeated cross sectional surveys, a wide sample of people differentiated in characteristics such as age, education, employee status and so on, over multiple interviews distributed in time (Ruspini 2002:4). As our respondents are different at each observation, the observations are changes on an aggregate level, the net effect of all changes over time, unlike for example panel data in which the same respondents give answers to each survey or interview. As the respondents change at every observation, repeated cross-sectional surveys are not suitable to find causal mechanisms that govern social change, especially in cohorts or as a result of aging (Ruspini 2002:70-71).

Operationalization, 88 years of election surveys, and a whole lot of manifestoes.

For the first hypothesis our source of supply-side saliency will be based on our compiled knowledge of parties and countries over time, and is hopefully sufficiently covered in other parts of the paper. The metric through which demand-side saliency will be compiled and measured are the impressively consistent and thorough election surveys present in all countries. These have been organized for every national election in all countries for a long time, the first of which happened in Sweden 1956, Norway 1957 and Denmark 1971 (NSD 2022, SND 2022 Rigsarkivet 2022). All this data is freely available by request for anyone who wishes to use them for research through the national state data institutions, Svensk nationell datatjänst (The Swedish National Data Service), Norsk Senter for Forskningsdata (Norwegian center for research Data) and, free to download for anyone from Rigsarkivet (The Danish National Archives).

The relevant variable for the first hypothesis “1. RRWPP will be more successful in the elections in which anti-immigration has a high saliency.” were found in election surveys between 1981 and 2019 totalling 29 separate datasets, from Sweden, 1982, 1998 (Holmberg 1986, 2001), 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994 (Holmberg and Gilljam 1988, 1991, 1993, 1997), 2002, 2006, 2010 (Holmberg and Oscarsson 2004, 2008, 2017) and 2014 (Oscarsson et al. 2021). Denmark 1990 (Borre et al. 1991), 1994, 2005, 2007 (Andersen 2002, 2005, 2008), 1998 (Borre et al. 1998), 2001 (Borre et al. 2002), 2011 (Stubanger, Andersen, and Hansen 2011) 2015 (Hansen 2015) and 2019 (Hansen and Stubager 2019). Norway, 1981, 1985, 1989, 1993 (Valen and Aardal 2022a, 2022b, 2022c, 2022d), 1997 (Opheim et al. 2022), 2001 (Aardal et al. 2022), 2005 (Valen et al. 2022), 2013 (Institute for Social Research and Statistisk Sentralbyrå 2022), and 2009 and 2017 (Statistisk Sentralbyrå 2022a, 2022b). All hereby referred to as “set”. Each of the datasets population, and the specific variables and questions therein, will be presented in a table (1-3) in the addendum.

The sets are neither weighted, nor checked for statistical significance. Given the wide breath of sets this was perceived to be counter-productive as some sets had the feature to weigh them and some didn't, instead of differentiating them in this way the choice was made to just take all the data “as is”, thus rather than claiming any generalization its put in the terms of discussing the sets directly. Seeing how the smallest population is 1008, Denmark 1990, and the biggest is

4058, Denmark 2007, most sets would probably be statistically significant but as we're not doing regression, nor any really sensitive quantitative operations this was deemed unnecessary for the sake of simplicity and ease of reproduction across different sets.

The variables ultimately selected for this hypothesis were the ones that were both salient to the political profiles of the parties in question, hopefully covered extensively in the preceding comparative analysis and present in the datasets for as many years as possible. The two selected were the question of aid to developing countries, and the question of social support to migrants.

Additionally, the category of “most people” -voters will verify if the salience of the questions are indeed important for voters of said party. (For) Most people, or “(For) Folk flest” was a slogan FrP adopted as early as 2000 (Ringheim 2016:192-193). Though not literally numerically true, it is an elegant encapsulation of the populist bent of the party, and it has persisted to this day. To see how salience is reflected among the RRWPP voters, they will be filtered out of the general population of the surveys so as to be able to compare the salience among voters relative to the average of the population.

Aid to developing countries.

As previously discussed, opposition to the substantial scandinavian foreign aid contributions was, and is, a defining issue for scandinavian RRWPP. Given that political skepticism to immigration was largely introduced by the parties in question, there is little reference to questions in the set of this nature early in the parties histories. Although the variable in question is not directly anti-immigrant in its nature, it does speak to the nativist leanings of the parties in question.

In 2021 this measured to be 0,92, 0,9 and 0,7 percent of the Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish GNI respectively, as compared to the OECD average of 0,33 (OECD 2024).

In the Norwegian datasets they are the same for the entire period 1981-2013, a three-pronged

ordinal choice asking “What is your relationship to foreign aid” with possible answers being “Should be cut down”, “Keep as is” or “Should be increased”. The middle value is divided by two, added to the “Should be cut down” and represented as a percentage.

The Danish set for the period 1990-2019 is almost the same, but asked a little differently as it is in a survey category of “public expenditure” and the respondents feelings towards this. The answers are however identical to the norwegian set, three options of less, as is, or more, middle category divided by two added to the choice to reduce. The Swedish set, 1982-2014, is similar but has a five option ordinal choice, obviously this precludes it from being compared directly to the other sets but as previously pointed out we are more interested in change in time across sets rather than direct comparison.

Social support for immigrants.

A lot has already been covered, but a succinct summary of the relative differences in policy in this field is that Sweden was the first recipient of large quantities of immigrants in the sixties and therefore a leading influence on the policy of the two other nations (Brochmann 2017:230). This was no longer the case in the late eighties when the parties under discussion began arguing vehemently for a stricter policy, Denmark was the first and most ardent implementer of this, whereas Norway follow their path but not to the same extent, Sweden can still be regarded to be more liberal, both generally but especially compared to the others (Brochmann 2017:231).

This category is less consistent than the others, in the Danish set it's in the same category as foreign aid, a public expenditure supporting both immigrants and refugees which you can say should be increased, decreased or stay the same over the full length of the sets. In the Swedish set the question is a bit more specific, it asks, should economic support be increased so as to help immigrants preserve their culture. Although it is a stretch to say these represent the same thing, they are at least both representative of social support for immigrants as opposed to non-immigrants, making both indicative of nativism.

The Norwegian set is probably the least useful, from 01 till 17 it asks “should immigrants have the same right to social assistance as norwegians” and lets you answer on a 1-5 ordinal scale. again, not the same but undeniably nativistic. The preceding years are a bit cut and paste, but as it generally touches on the same issue they have been included, it needs be remarked however that one can practically consider 85-97 and 01-17 to be different things. In 85 it’s “Should public support be increased so as to help immigrants keep their culture” giving you a 1-5 ordinal choice, 89 it’s in a category of public expenditure giving you a more/less/as is 1-3 ordinal choice, in 93 and 97 it asks if support should be given for education in a non-norwegian mother-tongue and lets you answer with a 1-5 ordinal choice. From 2001 to 2017 it is “Refugees and immigrants should have the same right to social assistance, even if they aren’t citizens” all of which are a five point ordinal choice.

What are you voting for?

This category is by far the most consistent and exists in every set for every year, the question is always “What did/did you intend to vote for ” and the answers are a nominal choice between the parties the questionnaires deemed practical to add. In the case of Denmark both Fremskridtspartiet and Dansk Folkeparti make up the line, switching from respondents who say they will vote for Fremskridtspartiet in 1998 to respondents saying they will vote Dansk Folkeparti in 2001. In the Swedish set the only available years in which a RWP is on offer in the questionnaire is Ny Demokrati for the years 1991 and 1994 and Sverigedemokratene from 2006 till 2014. Attempts were made to find a good analogue in the existing parties but it was determined that there really were none that seemed even remotely comparable.

Mainstreaming and radicalization.

For hypothesis two and three, party strategy and policy profile will be covered both by an extensive qualitative historical comparison, and data from the Manifesto Project Database (MPD)(Lehmann et al. 2024). The first of these sources aims to give context of the parties and their strategies, the second aims to quantify said strategies.

MPD (manifesto-project.wzb.eu 2024a) is a quantification of ideology/policy goals as it is presented in a party's electoral program. The coders are trained to find ideological/policy-related quasi-sentences, a collection of words that equal a statement. A grammatical sentence can contain many quasi-sentences, but a quasi-sentence should not span further than a grammatical sentence. The sentences are isolated and then given a relevant code relating to policy goals, the resulting score is the percentage of quasi-sentences present in the party's literature.

For hypothesis 2, building on the framework put forth by Meyer and Wagner (2013), any election in which the parties in question lose four percent of their electorate, will be considered a failed election. In hypothesis 2, and 3, the following variable from MPD were deemed useful in measuring mainstreaming/radicalization in the given period, namely Var. 608: "The enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration. Appeals for cultural homogeneity in society." (manifesto-project.wzb.eu 2024b). This is a pretty good general category that encapsulates a lot of the RRWP ideology; there are more specific variables that might fit but these are largely not available at the timescale covered.

As it relates to hypothesis two, the relevant years will be examined to see if there is a significant drop in this category. For hypothesis 3, all relevant parties, parties who also have significant values in the variable in question, have been added to the figures in question and will be examined for policy congruence, and potential subsequent changes in emphasis for the RRWPP examples.

Radical Right-Wing populism, at home and abroad.

There have been four waves of political mobilization from the right, of the right, in post war Europe (Jupskås 2012:56) Apart from the manifestation of far right ideology in military dictatorships across Europe, Spain and Greece being the classic examples. The first wave was characterized as more or less a continuation of the fascist legacy of the countries in which they operated, as such the wave is referred to as *Neo-Fascism* and lasted roughly 1945-1955 (Jupskås 2012:58, Mudde 2021:32).

The party that exemplified this most strongly, and from which most similar parties in other countries drew inspiration, was the Italian Movimento Sociale Italia, MSI, which had a stable, if modest, representation in the Italian national assembly from the founding in 1953 till its peak in 1972 until its eventual reformation in the mid nineties (Jupskås 2012:58-59).

MSI was quite overtly fascist, so care should be taken not to compare them entirely to the modern day conception of RRWPP, it also can be said to, perhaps because of this, have had a minimal impact on the societies in which they operated (Jupskås 2012:59). The legacy of- and flirtation with authoritarian values is, however, not irrelevant.

The contemporary party from which the more liberal Scandinavian RWP could be thought of as a spiritual successor, would be the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Österreich, FPÖ. Founded in 1955 it represented German nationalism and libertarianism (Heinisch and Hauser 2016:73). Initially, it was conceived as a “third way” to the two parties that dominated Austrian politics at the time, a resistance to the social policy enacted by the Austrian social democratic party, SPÖ, and the clerical nature of the Christians Peoples Party, ÖVP (Reiter 2019:256). The official emphasis early on laid on the partys liberal wing and there were made attempts to moderate and make some distance to the more overtly nationalist elements (Reiter 2019:226-227).

Much like MSI however, it needs be remarked that the party as an organization primarily represented former nazis and their sympathizers (Heinisch and Hauser 2016:73, Morrow 2016:33). Its predecessor, the Verband der Unabhängigen, VdU, was even less preoccupied with

liberal positions, but rather the fight against denazification, as historian Oliver Rathkolb put it,

“...nothing more than an interest group for those affected by denazification legislation with a pseudo-liberal leadership.” (Reiter 2019:93).

In Austria's first post-war election 1949, intelligence from the American occupiers would confirm that of the 430 candidates they looked at, 209 were either members or had positions in the National Socialist regime (Reiter 2019:115).

Pøpulism: RRWPP in Scandinavia.

Fremskridtspartiet 1972-1983:

“If your teeth hurt, you go to the dentist, if your taxes hurt, you come to me”

Mogens Glistrup speaking to the Danish public broadcaster in 1971 (DR).

The second wave of far-right mobilization came in the seventies and was manifested in Denmark and Norway as parties whose main ideological message was a stark opposition to taxes and the growing welfare state (Jupskås 2012:62). Its genesis can be pinpointed to one man, and one interview, 30. January 1971 Mogens Glistrup sat down for an interview with the Danish state broadcaster with a simple message: Paying your taxes is immoral (DR 1971, Widfeldt 2015:129). In fact, if one avoids paying taxes, one is a hero akin to a Danish saboteur blowing up a train line during the occupation of Denmark 1940-1945. Glistrup, a practicing tax-attorney, had a hard libertarian bent, his stated goal in the burgeoning movement he had created was to make every Dane a tax-free limited liability company (DR 1971).

Glistrup formed a party under the name Fremskridtspartiet⁵ (note the d) in 1972 and vowed at the accompanying press conference that “The withholding-tax has run rampant. We are being dominated by our bureaucracy. Regulations suffocate our good moods.” (Jupskås 2012:69). The somewhat finished platform of 1972 was no less spectacular, he wanted, among other things, to

⁵ Frem=Forward, skridt=step.

remove all social spending, abolish seven entire ministries, sell Greenland and the Farøe Islands to the highest bidder, fire ninety percent of public employees and substitute the entire Danish Ministry of Defence with an automatic voicemail that simply said “We surrender” in Russian (Ringheim 2016:31, Ekhman and Poohl 2010: 41, Steensbeck 2006).

It wasn't much of a holistic platform, and both Glistrup and Danish media seemed at the time to agree that Glistrups provocations were entertaining but would ultimately not result in any representation (Steensbeck 2006). It surprised all of them when Fremskridtspartiet, mostly helped by uneducated laborers in cities and villages who felt politically “homeless” after a long relative stability and the question of the EU, got an impressive 15,9 percent of the vote in, which translated to 28 out of a total of 175 representatives in Folketinget at the election of 1973 (Jupskås 2012:68-69, Tvedt 2024a).

Fremskrittspartiet 1972-1983:

-Shall we have a party? Anders shouted.

-Yes! The room bellowed, myself included.

- Carl I. Hagen (Iversen 1998:9).

Anders Lange would be the man to bring RWP to Norway, no small feat for a man primarily subsisting on his dog-kennel (Iversen 1998:14). Lange had had a strange career up until this point, his political activism had concentrated on different functions within Fedrelandslaget (The Fatherland League), a broad bourgeoisie (borgerlig)⁶, movement to protect Norway from a “socialist take-over”. While not explicitly anti-democratic, Fedrelandslaget would as time progressed develop more corporatist and fascist-leaning ideas (Widfeldt 2015:70).

His role in this organization meant that he would end up having a lot of former friends in high positions during the national socialist occupation of Norway 1940-1945, but Lange volunteered himself as quickly as he could to illegal resistance work, among other things setting up radios,

⁶ Much like the German term “Bürgerlich”, “Borgelig” is just a catch-all term for non-socialist parties (NOAB 2024).

coordinating communications, blowing up railways and being jailed at the infamous Gestapo prison in Møllergata 19 a few times⁷ (Kvanmo and Rygnestad 1993:74, 77, 83).

After the war, Lange would become a known quantity on the far right, together with a cadre of younger men fiercely resistant to, and provoked by, the radical activities of norwegian leftist groups in the late sixties (Kvanmo and Rygnestad 1993:125, Iversen 1998:15-18). They would all be known as the Hundeguttene (Dogboys), and his own newspaper, creatively named “Anders Langes Avis”, which from 1962 onwards would cover politics, and, naturally, dog-rearing. The Dogboys would be the network through which Lange arranged the first political meet-up of his movement at Saga cinema in Oslo 8. April 1973 (Iversen 1998:24).

The cinema had slightly more than 1300 seats and to Langes relief it was packed to the gills and he easily got the 1000 signatures he needed to formally register his party (Iversen 1998:25). The speech he gave lasted two hours and seventeen minutes and was met with thunderous applause, by one count he was interrupted by 110 ovations (Johansen 2017:2:17:22, Ringheim 2016:110).

The platform presented, much like Glistrup, can hardly be described as holistic, but it did hit the same libertarian sweet spots. The first political communication from the creatively named “Anders Langes Parti til sterk nedsettelse av skatter, avgifter og offentlige inngrep” (Anders Langes Party for a Drastic Reduction in Taxes, Fees, and Public Intervention) ALP for short, was headlined “WE ARE SICK of being exploited by the state-capitalism.” (Ringheim 2016:14, Widfeldt 2015:84).

It had 14 bullet points, most of which argued for aggressive deregulation and tax breaks, three of them are as follows:

⁷ The first of these stays was for the assault of Eiving Mehle, a journalist and close confidant of the political face of the occupation, Vidkun Quisling (Kvanmo and Rygnestad 1993:72), a norwegian analogue to Rudolf Hess. He had bumped into him at a cafe and was asked “Are you not going to greet me again?”, he answered “No, I will not greet Norways biggest piece of shit in any other way than this”, at which point he punched Mehle in the face (Kvanmo and Rygnestad 1993:73). In the resulting scuffle, he threw Mehle through a sliding door, past the portier and into another section of the cafe landing him four months at the mercy of the Gestapo (Kvanmo and Rygnestad 1993:73-74).

- We are sick of healthy people picking up their social assistance in taxis.
- We are sick of the forced foreign aid to states who collectively have spent 38 billion american dollars on arms.
- We are sick of being perceived as infantilized children incapable of administering our own money.

(Iversen 1998:24, Ringheim 2016:14-15)

The campaign was organized by young upstart Carl I. Hagen and the main message was summarized thusly: “Cheaper booze, no foreign aid to “the blacks”, a reduction of taxes and fees and combating abuse of social support” (Ringheim 2016:33). ALP would not be able to match Glistrup, but they did manage to get 5,1 percent of the vote, and four representatives in Stortinget at the election of 1973. Much like Glistrup, Langes support was primarily from workers who felt disenfranchised (Ringheim 2016:36).

Enormous personalities, strange sympathies.

Glistrup and Lange both represented a neo-liberal populism quite characteristic of the second wave of Rightwing populists 1955-1980 in which the state hindered the free development of the individual and as a hindrance to the will to work, income tax, bureaucracy foreign aid and fees should all be removed (Jupskås 2012:71-72, Mudde 2021:34, 36). As much as their strong personalities helped their movements initially, their active resistance to any formalized party structure, other than the supreme authority vested in their persons, their insistence on breaking political norm by rarely ever compromising, and their fierce distrust of any other politicians was hugely detrimental to effective political organizing (Jupskås 2012:72-73).

Their commitment to liberalism was also at times less than convincing, for his part Glistrup had a unusual view of the occupation of Denmark, when asked in 1971 whether a total victory of the third Reich would have changed his life, Glistrup answered “There wouldn’t have been much of a difference. The whole myth that’s been made about Hitler, the Nazis and the Germans being such horrible people, what’s that all about?” (Jupskås 2012:72). Lange on his part had nothing to

prove in his commitment against nazism, but he was, which was unheard of in Norwegian politics then and now, a fierce supporter for South African apartheid, lambasting in his paper that anyone who supported an end to apartheid was a traitor to the white race (Ringheim 2016:22).

In fact, as confirmed by both people close to Lange in the period, and the former state secretary of the South African department of information Eschel Rhoodie, Lange and his party received large donations, and directions, from the apartheid-regime, by Roodies account:

“We financed Langes' party so they could establish a weekly newspaper. After that we gave them more money so that he could really have a good campaign. To our great surprise we ended up with a political party with four representatives in the national assembly.”
(Ringheim 2016:23, Der Spiegel 1979).

It needs be remarked that this account has been denied by several Dogboys (Ringheim 2016:23-24).

Glistrup and Lange both orchestrated political earthquakes in their kingdoms, but the high water mark for both of them would be that first election (Heidar 2013a:49, Heidar 2013c: 83, Widfeldt 2015:130). Glistrup could never regain the momentum he had established at that first election, and and both his and Langes party split almost immediately as a majority of their representatives wanted to build an effective party structure in opposition to both mens insistence that these were movements inextricably tied to their personal auras (Widfeldt 2015:131, Jupskås 2012:73, Iversen 1998:62).

The four confrontational representatives and the underlying “organizational anarchy” made for no progress after representation had been achieved, short of no less than three attempts at motions of no confidence against the sitting government, all of which failed to get any votes besides their own and garnered widespread condemnation as cheap and cynical publicity-stunts (Iversen 1998:69-70, Jupskås 2013:73).

Lange himself would however not see this decline, he passed unexpectedly on 18. October 1974 a week after suffering a heart-attack on his commute (Kvanmo & Rygnestad 1993:258). As deputy, Carl I. Hagen would step into his position in parliament, this despite having exited the party three months earlier (Iversen 1998:60). One of his priorities was to change the name of the party to avoid sole association with Lange, he achieved this January 1977 and Fremskrittspartiet (note the double “t”) was ready for their second election (Iversen 1998:64-65). They lost all their seats, the preceding years would be defined by brutal personal conflicts within the leaderless party, but Hagen prevailed and was elected leader in 1978 (Iversen 1998:67-68).

Fremskrittspartiet and Fremskridtspartiet 1983-89: Mustafa and other “Mohamedeenians”.

The start of the eighties were not particularly kind to either Fremskridtspartiet nor Fremskrittspartiet, both parties languished electorally, but Glistrup had much bigger problems (Heidar 2013a:49, Heidar 2013c:83). If one read the preceding ambition of avoiding taxes through the creation of tax-free limited liability companies, and thought, “well that doesn’t sound very legal”, one would be correct. June 1983 Glistrup got arrested and received a three year sentence for massive tax fraud, his second, Pia Kjærsgaard, would keep his seat warm and used this opportunity to bolster her position, the parliamentary gains in the election of 1987 would be credited her (Ekman and Poohl 2010:41, Widfeldt 2015:131-132).

During his incarceration, Glistrup played badminton⁸, hiked around in the forest, and dedicated the rest of his energy polishing the new focus of his political ideology, immigrants (Steensbeck 2006, Salo and Rydgren 2021:23). This was new, Fremskridtspartiet had as recently as 1981 fired a representative for saying “immigrant workers breed like rats”, but in a letter to the editor of *Akuelt* in 1985 Glistrup waxed philosophical that “They (muslims, although he usually referred to them by the rather unusual Mohamedeenians) are raised to wage holy war against the heathens, that is to say us Danes”. Glistrup had, from prison, introduced immigration as a topic

⁸ Prison-badminton is also a tradition in Norway (Romerikes Fengsel 2024) and Sweden (Hallands Nyheter 2016).

to the Danish political discussion, but as he was released for good behavior in 1987 and reclaimed his seat in parliament, he was more or less considered a “spent force” politically (Widfeldt 2015:132). After an attempt at forming yet another party, he was expelled for that reason from Fremskridtspartiet and would never hold office again⁹, (Steensbeck 2006).

Hagen too was inspired to change the political discourse in the eighties, the elections of 1981 and 1985 had been disappointments, the results being a meager 4,5 and 3,7 percent, his strategy from 1983 had been to focus on market liberalism but this had not paid dividends (Nilsen 2007:16, Tvedt 2022a). Some weeks prior to the local elections of 1987 he had received a handwritten letter from one Mohammad Mustafa, claiming among other things:

“You are fighting in vain mr. Hagen! Islam, the only right faith, will win here in Norway too. One day the Norwegian people will come to the faith, and this land will be muslim! We have more children than you, men of the right faith are coming every year, men of fertile age. One day the heathen cross will be wiped from the flag!”¹⁰

(Ringheim 2016:79-80).

Hagen tried to involve the press but found no interest, in a heated pre-election meeting, in which Hagen proposed sharp decreases to all immigration, the entire concept being quite new at the time, he found the response from the crowd to be such that he, in a moment of inspiration, read the letter out loud to thunderous applause from the crowd (Ringheim 2016:80).

It took reporters from VG roughly an hour to uncover the letter as a fake, Muhammed Mustafa had lived at the address in the letter, a verification Hagen had seen as sufficient, but he had no

⁹ Glistrup was allowed to contest for office again in 2001 but he pulled himself out of the running quite quickly with this comment from 1999: “If for example Paraguay says, that they would like 6000 mohamedeenian girls between the ages of 12 and 20 and they, for example, would like to pay five million danish krone for it, then those five million would go directly to the danish treasury” (Steensbeck 2006, Larsen 2024). He would also go to prison again, this time for hatespeech, a twenty day suspended sentence for the comment: “I will save Denmark. The Muhamedeenians are waiting, to be strong enough, so that they can beat us all to death”.

¹⁰ No examples, during the research of this paper, were found of muslims, or any other ethnic minority living in Norway in this period or later, campaigning for the cross in the flag to be removed. However, it is strikingly similar to a poem by Norwegian poet and socialist Arnulf Øverland for May-day 1934: “Wipe the cross from off your flag, and raise it pure and red! Don’t let yourself be fooled, of a “savior” who’s been bred...” (Dahl 1989:158).

strong opinions on either islam or christianity, and found all the attention he suddenly had extremely uncomfortable (Ringheim 2016:80-81). Mustafas best hypothesis was that someone had pranked Hagen or that someone within Fremskrittspartiet had made it and sent it to him, it is still not known who did (Ringheim 2013:81, Skiphamn 2021). He sued Hagen on account of the intense harassment he had received and Hagen apologized but insisted he acted in good faith (Ringheim 2013:82). Hagen was heavily criticized by his fellow politicians for a move that, at best, was opportunistically negligent¹¹, but one could not argue with results.

Having for the first time introduced immigration as a political talking point, what we now perceive to be the right-wing populist raison d'être, that autumn, Fremskrittspartiets more than tripled its result from the last national election, going from 3,7 to 13 percent in the election of 1989 (Ringheim 2016:82, Tvedt 2022a, Jupskås 2012:200). With this both parties had taken the question of immigration, once purely a question of labor-migration, and made it about refugees (Lindroth 2016:149-150).

Sverigedemokraterna 1988-1998:

“Every year, the Swedes are fewer. In four years there will be no Sweden for Swedes. With perhaps a turk as a dictator and a n**r as foreign minister....”**

BSS flyer written by Leif Zeilon 1979 (Ekman and Poohl 2010).

Sverigedemokraterna was founded in an apartment in Stockholm 6. February 1988, its members were mostly from the the BSS (Bevara Sverige svenskt (Keep Sweden Swedish)) organization, a group that wanted to portray itself as a democratically minded interest association (Ekman and Poohl 2010:22). Its founder, Leif Zeilon, later Ericsson, was active in the neo-nazi party Nordiska rikspartiet, and also, a staunch advocate for apartheid in South-Africa (Ekman and Poohl 2010:22, Widfeldt 2015:181).

¹¹ He attempted also, much like Reagans “welfare queen” (Demby 2013), unsuccessfully to make single mothers a political issue, saying before the elections of 1989: “Single mothers, who can only blame their own irresponsible behavior for the situation they are in, are currently receiving too much social assistance. A woman who, for example, becomes pregnant at a young age with multiple men and choses to carry those children to term, must themselves take the consequences” (Wærstad 2011). He was widely ridiculed for this, the quote was included in a book by the title “The worlds dumbest quotes”.

His group had put its weight behind a number of failed attempts at political representation, Sverigedemokraterna was an amalgamation of these, it started as Sverigepartiet two years earlier, which itself was a merger of BSS, and, rather confusingly, the party Fremstegspartiet (note the g) (Widfeldt 2015:180). The latter was a catch-all bourgeois party turned populists formed in 1968, three years before Glistrup would borrow the name; they did however fail to achieve anything significant in their day (Widfeldt 2015:180-181).

As did Sverigedemokraterna for a while, most of the nineties saw small regional gains in local elections but nothing more substantial until tentative steps were taken to clean up the partys imagine around 1995, among other things , a ban on uniforms, alcohol and Nazi chants during meetings (Widfeldt 2015:182-183).

The one thing that was rather unique in this time was the sheer number of neo-nazis, original nazis and people with criminal records who comprised the party, a full 60 percent of the members in leadership positions between 1989 and 1994 had connections to the swedish nazi movements before, during or after their stint in Sverigedemokraterna, among them Gustav Ekström, financial manager for the party 1989-1990 and veteran of the Waffen SS (Ekman and Poohl 2010:147). Its central executive had, in 1991, 1992, 1994, a rate of members with criminal convictions at over forty percent, reaching its zenith with 50 percent in 1993 after which it dropped off precipitously, remaining above 10 percent until 1998 (Widfeldt 2015:182).

Ny Demokrati 1991-1996:

“There are, regrettably, a lot who exploit our generous system. They are simply speculating by coming here ... and then they commit a bunch of crimes ... That’s also something that creates racism.”

Bert Karlsson in Riksdagen 1991 (Ekman and Poohl 2010:95)

Someone had more electoral luck pushing anti-immigration as a policy point, Sweden did have a RRWPP, it just happened to fizzle out pretty quickly, entering Riksdagen in 1991 and leaving it 1994 (Tvedt 2023). Ny Demokrati was the brainchild of record-producer and funfair owner Bert

Karlsson, and anti-social-democracy activist, and Count (the title regarding nobility), Ian Wachtmeister¹², one of very few swedes to go to a boarding school (Ekman and Poohl 2010:90, 92, Widfeldt 2015:177).

One of the stronger founding ideas was the belief that society would benefit by being run as a business, the main ideological thrust of Ny Demokrati was right-wing economics, lower taxes, deregulation, a smaller public sector and “more fun”, all wrapped in an anti-establishment package (Widfeldt 2015:10). After a massive campaign with heavy touring of concerts put on by Karlsson the two of them could reap the harvest of their labors with 6,7 percent of the national vote, they managed to get 26 representatives (Widfeldt 2015:177).

More of an afterthought in the original creation, anti-immigration would come to take most of the party's focus after entering parliament, firstly by blaming immigrants for the racism in swedish society, and among a series of other wild claims, insisting that “gypsies” were responsible for ninety percent of break-ins of swedish pensioners, an unsubstantiated claim (Ekman and Poohl 2010:95-96).

The party that came out of nowhere, but did by most standards of measurement not achieve anything with their political representation (Widfeldt 2015:178-179). They were not seen as an entity with which one could cooperate by any of the other parties, presumably because of their confrontational style and the internal issues marring the party. Disagreements were of such a magnitude that defections and indiscipline grew and finally Wachtmeister resigned in 1994. Any attempt to replace him failed and all the negative press led to a spiral from which the party could not recover (Widfeldt 2015:179-180).

¹² Wachmeister, although a military rank in some parts of the german speaking world, does not mean this in any Scandinavian language, the closest thing phonetically would be vaktmester in norwegian and danish and väktmestare in swedish, meaning janitor. The reason Ian had the name is because he is a descendant of a line of Swedish nobility which emigrated from Estonia and had command of a German” cavalry-regiment in Swedish service, starting with Hans Wachtmeister being ennobled 1578, to this day the gentry in Sweden with the biggest landholdings (Bratberg 2021).

Fremskrittspartiet 1991-1997:

“I’ve never thought like that, I don’t go around counting n***s on the street. But we need a change in attitude when it comes to refugees and immigrants, so that we combat racism.”**

Ellen Wibe - former second chair of Fremskrittspartiet in 1994 (Ringheim 2016:109).

Lange had detested the idea of a youth-wing to his party, but Hagen was open to the idea and the organization FpU founded in 1978 was instrumental in helping the party in the leaner years of 1979 and 1981 (Iversen 1998:72, 81). There was however a generational divide, a fresh young cadre, personified by the new young party second chair Ellen Wibe saw their commitment to libertarianism as sacrosanct, and deeply at odds with the new direction the party was headed after the Mustafa-affair (Iversen 1998:112-113, Ringheim 2016:91).

Hagen admitted in 1991 that his party had three wings, the young liberals, the decidedly older reactionaries and the confrontational populists (Iversen 1998:112,114). The leader of FpU in 1990, Jan Erik Fåne, would front an attempt to legalize gay civil unions with other members of Arbeiderpartiet and Sosialistisk Venstre, this, coupled with a proposal by Fåne to allocate central positions in society to immigrants, had by Fånes account made his relationship to Hagen sour to the point of collapse (Ringheim 2016:104-105, 107).

With a relatively disastrous result of 6,3 at the 1993 elections, it would all come to a head at the national summit of 1994 at lake Bolkesjø, in hindsight aptly renamed Dolkesjø (dolk=dagger) by the young liberals who were all booted out of/choose to leave the party (Iversen 1998:132, Ringheim 2016:124). The reactionary and populist wings had prevailed and most of the commitment the party had to liberalism would be as aesthetic as it was under Lange (Jupskås 2016:170). But one cannot argue with results, after the dust had settled from Dolkesjø the 1997 Fremskrittspartiet election manifesto contained more coverage to the anti-immigration question than any other manifesto before or since, and Fremskrittspartiet got their highest results yet at 15,3 percent (Widfeldt 2015:99).

Dansk Folkeparti 1995-2001:

“He had no respect for me”

Pia Kjærsgaard on her power struggle with Mogens Glistrup ca. 1987 (Munk 2013).

As Glistrups antics failed to make much of a difference, Fremskridtspartiet saw itself split between two wings of “tighteners” and “looseners”, the latter wing lead by the charismatic Pia Kjærsgaard and interested in changing the style of the party to a point at which they could cooperate with the rest of Folketinget and actually achieve something (Christiansen 2016:94). After the national summit in 1995 that also did not sound like it was fun to attend, Kjærsgaard and a couple of other representatives took matters in their own hands and established Dansk Folkeparti, freeing them of the baggage and mayhem of Fremskridtspartiet (Christiansen 2016:94-95, Widfeldt 2015:127, Kosiara-Pedersen 2020:271).

Dansk Folkeparti was, according to Kjærsgaard, “First and foremost a socially responsible party, which aimed to protect the Danish tradition”, this entailed stricter laws, reduced immigration, reduced integration in the EU, deregulation, increases to defense and elder-care, taxes to be reformed and diminished, but most focus went to EU and immigrants (Lindroth 2016:85-86). The success the party would have in the 1998 elections, a respectable 7,4 percent, would be largely attributed to her and settled any debate as to which faction won (Widfeldt 2015:134).

Both parties, or rather one old and one new, had at this point arguably transitioned from the second to/just entered the third wave, that of Radical Right-wing Populism 1980-2000. This was characterized by a couple of changes, internationally the parties arose had three distinctions, they were explicitly non-fascist, they change from a biologically determined to a culturally determined us/them dichotomy, and an increased populist discourse on both immigrants and “elites” (Jupskås 2013:79-80).

It needs be remarked that Fremskrittspartiet and Fremskridtspartiet had a softer nationalist, authoritarian and system-critical appeals than most of the internationally comparable examples, although Dansk Folkeparti is markedly more nationalistic than Fremskrittspartiet (Jupskås 2013:80-81). The changes within these parties that solidly put them in the third wave is the focus

on building organizational capacity after the “organizational anarchy” of Lange and Glistrup, and both groups through evolution and re-birth reduced their commitment to liberalism as a political identity.

Sverigedemokraterna 1995-2005:

“As a leading nationalist organization Sverigedemokraterna views it as an important goal to fight and eradicate all marxist tendencies in Swedish society. Sverigedemokraterna reject, with the same contempt, nazism, whose leading principles being the führer-principle, racial supremacy and wars of aggression, can be viewed as a mirrored image of, and reaction to, marxism.”

Sverigedemokraterna party manifesto 1999 (Sverigedemokraterna 1999).

Mikael Jansson, who beat his predecessor Anders Klarström to lead the organization, was the first leader of Sverigedemokraterna without any ties to neo-nazi organizations (Widfeldt 2016:183). Klarström left well before the summit of 1995 was done, implying yet another contentious national summit in the mid nineties. There was progress under Jansson, the organization got rid of a number of “unsavory” members, and following a slew of killings by neo-nazis in 1999, the aforementioned ideological break was perhaps deemed strategically necessary (Widfeldt 2016:185).

Having successfully expelled the most “inedible” members, Sverigedemokraterna under Jansson became more appealing for more broadly ambitious members, among them four students of political science at the University of Lund which would form an alliance around the young upstart Jimmy Åkesson (Widfeldt 2016:184). These were untarnished by past affiliations, but Jimmy Åkesson and several within his circle have affirmed in multiple interviews that what originally got them into politics was, amazingly, the “Viking-rock” band Ultima Thule which were found and promoted by none other than Bert Karlsson, until all ties were cut as it was discovered they had had their first album paid for by BSS in the mid eighties (Ekhman and Poohl 2010: 103). While not an explicitly racist band, Ultima Thules themes of self-pride and generally

quite pompous tones of national-romanticism did, by Jimmy Åkessons account, put his feelings into words.

These “moderates” would rise victorious after a long internal fight against the “extremes” that culminated in internal purgings in 2001 (Raknes 2012:19). Two members of the Sverigedemokraterna executive were expelled April 2001 and subsequently formed Nationaldemokraterna, a party which was described more or less the same but with an emphasis on ethnic rather than cultural nationalism, a further “normalization” of the party (Widfeldt 2016:184).

As much as the party disliked letting go of ideologically committed members, it did broaden their legitimacy, and after many attempts they finally managed to recruit, with the promise that “all the extremists are gone”, someone from the establishment with actual parliamentary experience, outspoken critic of migration and then parliamentarian for Moderaterna Sten Andersson (Ekman and Poohl 2010:139, Widfeldt 2016:185)

Despite competition from Nationaldemokraterna, the election of 2002 had finally given the party a percentage in Riksdagen, or rather 1,4 percent, with support especially pronounced in Åkessons home region of Skåne (Widfeldt 2016:185, Tvedt 2023). Having shed a less photogenic past the manifestoes between 1999 and 2005 emphasized Sverigedemokraterna as a national centrist party, this developed 2003/2005 into a democratic, nationalist party, citing Swedish national conservatism and the social-democratic concept of “folkhem” (people’s home) a conception of society as solidaric and egalitarian (Widfeldt 2016:194). In 2005 Jimmie Åkesson and his cadre managed to settle the infighting as him, at the tender age of 25, and the moderates gained control over the party (Widfeldt 2015:185).

Fremskrittspartiet and Dansk Folkeparti 1997-2013:

“Immigrants in Norway have to learn Norwegian. As should Spaniards in Spain, if they’d like to work with norwegians”

Carl I. Hagen speaking to Fremskrittspartiet voters in Alfaz del Pi¹³, Spain in 2006, with a recent poll giving him 33,4 percent of the electorate (Lund 2006).

The early two-thousands were boom times for Fremskrittspartiet and Dansk Folkeparti, having found their niche by ditching the internally popular but electorally unsuccessful baggage of libertarianism, and focusing squarely on anti-immigration, both parties enjoyed large segments of the electorate. More generally parties of their ilk were mutating from the third to the fourth wave, a key characteristic of this was that during the third they might get good elections, but they were still considered fringe, cut off from potential coalitions and having their core policies minimized by other parties (Mudde 2021:25). The fourth wave saw these parties get normalized, and their participation in government ever more present.

Dansk Folkeparti invested its success in government participation, in the 300 governments across Europe between 1980 and 2010 there are only fifteen examples of such a party aiding these governments (Raknes 2012:220). The first of these was the first government of Berlusconi in Italy 1994 (Mudde 2013:4, Berntzen 2013b:283). This was followed thereafter by the inclusion of Freiheitliche Partei Österreich in the Schüssel government in 2000 and Dansk Folkeparti passively supporting the successive conservative danish governments for ten years from 2001, the first example collapsing quickly and the second proving stable (Berntzen 2013a:226, Heidar 2013c:87, Mudde 2013:5,15).

Venstre had made the election of 2001 a question of immigration, this co-opting of their issue had greatly benefitted Dansk Folkeparti, they were however, not tied to the right and insisted they would be wherever their influence was greatest, be it left or right (Salo and Rydgren 2021:24). They entered government, but managed to do so without significantly losing electoral

¹³ Fremskrittspartiet has a surprisingly big presence in Spain, with chapters at most major concentrations of Norwegian exiles, in Malaga for instance, they’re bigger than Høyre (Bjørndal 2011). One candidate for mayor in Sarpsborg campaigned from Torrevieja (Henriksen 2011).

support, a feat largely attributed to their choice of being a passive partner, supporting their coalition on the larger issues, budgets and the decrease of union power in favor of corporatism, in return for much stricter immigration and some increase in certain pensionaire benefits (Christiansen 2016:103-105, Kosiara-Pedersen 2020:282). This “schrödingers party” concept, of simultaneously being and not being part of the government worked to the partys favor, it gave it freedom to promote its view and retain policy purity for the cost of limited duties as a support party.

The only real friction of note in the ten year co-operation was a threat made by the minority conservative government in 2011 to dissolve unless unemployment benefits were reduced from 4 to 2 years and early pension privileges were revoked, policies that were popular among Dansk Folkepartis share of older voters (Christiansen 2016:105-106). In this face-off Dansk Folkeparti ended up giving in, showing more loyalty to the government than vice-versa in what could be described as an instance of becoming captive of the Fogh-Rasmussen government. Through all of it, Pia Kjaersgaard had enjoyed a substantial amount of loyalty and reverence by her supporters, and her and her second, Kristian Thulesen Dahl, were considered a highly efficient party executive (Widfeldt 2015:151). The latter would become the new party leader from 2012 (Christiansen 2016:94).

In Norway the electoral success was higher than in Denmark, but Fremskrittspartiet was still considered poisonous by all potential political partners (Widfeldt 2015:109). Hagen took steps to correct this, 2000-2001 he purged the party of “verstingene” (the worst ones), seven high ranking members of the party he was convinced advocated anti-immigration policies in a way that was deemed too aggressive to be constructive (Ringheim 2016:164, 167, Widfeldt 2015:109). Aiming for a substantially less controversial executive trio, his two new seconds were unveiled in November 2000, the young liberal leaning economist Siv Jensen and, his chosen heir, the rising populist star and mayor of Os, Terje Søviknes (Ringheim 2016:144-145, 155).

It would not develop the way Hagen had hoped, at the FpU summer camp in 2000, Terje

Søviknes had, allegedly¹⁴, raped a 16 year old girl (Ringheim 2016:193). Insisting that it was consensual, Søviknes had not told anyone of it, but the rumors were such that in October of 2000 he was confronted by the party executive (Ringheim 2016:183-184). In the room were Carl I. Hagen and Siv Jensen, who after getting confirmation of the rumors legitimacy by Søviknes. They said he should come clean to his wife, but they too chose not to tell anyone¹⁵.

When Jensen took over from Hagen in 2006, Hagen had spent 28 years of his life on this political project, from saving the party from the precipice of irrelevance, to representing 22,1 percent of the electorate after the election of 2005. For all his success, Hagen himself would remain a major reason for a failure to achieve legitimacy through other parties, his brash personal style and near hostile relations to other political leaders made cooperation difficult, it was under

¹⁴ The woman in question reported Søviknes, and the other man who forced himself on her that night, to the police but they dismissed the case (Ertesvåg 2018, Ruud 2018). Following an acute and long institutionalization, she didn't press charges until 2001 which is probably why no case was made.

¹⁵ As bad as the "Søviknes-Affair" was at this point, it needs be remarked it was emblematic for Fremskrittspartiet for the time. At the Fremskrittspartiet summit in Hordaland 10. February 2001 Siv Jensen had taken the chair to speak on what she considered a bad culture and what she felt was the intentional spreading of pernicious rumours (Ringheim 2016:185). In the audience was then 21 year old Cathrine Rustøen who was horribly hurt by this. Having taken the chair she delivered a pre-written speech:

"I have been raped by a central elected official of Fremskrittspartiet. I have chosen to speak up on this as there currently are rumours that multiple women have been molested by central elected members of Fremskrittspartiet. I am not alone in having been molested. It is therefore very painful that the party leadership is not taking this seriously. The party leadership has been made aware of what happened to me, but they have chosen to look the other way. I hope, and feel as though I have seen signs that others that have been sexually abused, and they or their loved ones, now can come forward with their cases. I think the problem is bigger than anyone here is able to imagine, and then nothing is gained by the party, the party leadership or any of its members looking the other way, hoping it will disappear. There are sexually abused girls who have been broken psychologically because of this abuse. Some have tried to kill themselves because of it...". (Ringheim 2016:185-186).

This was certainly the case of the woman in the Søviknes affair, as metoo swept through Norway she chose to speak up again, telling the tale of how she immediately was institutionalized and has since suffered from shame, mental illness, drug-abuse, self-harm and multiple attempts on her own life (Fossen 2018). One might assume this was the end of Søviknes' career, but after a 16 year lull, he was appointed minister for Oil in the conservative Erna Solberg government. On the question of why, Solberg said that listening to the woman's story was though, and that we must be committed to protecting vulnerable people from being exploited by political organizations, but: "I am simultaneously also of the opinion that this changes nothing in the case that made him step down as a second, not be at Stortinget and not get to have a national political career these last 17 years (Søviknes was still mayor of Os the entire period in question (Tvedt 2020)). Now he has returned because it must be the case in our society that we give people a new chance" (Fossen 2018). Helge Andre Njåstad, a colleague of Søviknes: "I think Terje has gotten enough attention. I feel sorry for him now that the case has resurfaced. He has two children who involuntarily have become subject to it, as I simultaneously understand that the girl wants to tell her story. We should not condemn her for that, but I feel Terje has gotten enough attention." (Fossen 2018).

Jensen tenure that this ambition would be achieved (Widfeldt 2015:108-109, Ringdal 2016:278).

Although he himself at the start of his political career had a substantial libertarian bend, the early two thousands would mark a Fremskrittspartiet that moved left economically, arguing for an increase in social spending, often in a chauvinist manner, combined with lower taxes and privatization in addition to law and order (Jupskås 2016:173-174, Salo and Rydgren 2021:90). If not as entertaining or flamboyant as her predecessors, Jensen could be considered markedly more of a mainstream politician, roundly praised for her abilities and much more popular among her colleagues (Widfeldt 2015:110). She would not be immune to gaffs however, especially one comment at the 2009 central committee meeting about how Norway was becoming “sneakily Islamized” faced its fair share of condemnation (Jupskås 2012:107-108), and ridicule.

The elections of 2009 had been focused on immigration, as this was rapidly gaining salience among the electorate the incumbent socialist government had tried to co-opt the issue by tightening immigration considerably in 2008, but it ultimately worked to Fremskrittspartiets benefit (Salo and Rydgren 2021:99-100). It would be a banner year for the party with the best results in their history at 22,9 percent, but this was quickly marred by a stretch of lower popularity late 2011 following bad optics after the 22. Juli terror attacks¹⁶¹⁷, Trond Birkedal, a high official in the party getting arrested on charges of sexually abusing a fifteen year-old¹⁸ the same year, and other “sex-scandals”¹⁹ (Widfeldt 2015:110, Ringheim 2016:236, 257-259, Jensen 2021:82). Following an aggressive campaign to mark the party as serious and co-operative, relations to hypothetical non-socialist coalition partners thawed and Venstre and Kristelig

¹⁶ Anders Behring Breivik, the perpetrator of the 22. July attacks was an active member of Fremskrittspartiet for 13 years, although this, and what the party generally represents, might have had an immediate effect in halving their support in the locals elections of 2011, they were relatively unscathed at the next national elections, a portend to some observers that Norway had not successfully dealt with what Breivik represented (Nilsen 2013, Ebbing 2021)

¹⁷ Per Sandberg, then a second in the party, threw himself into a debate four months after the attacks: “Let me first be clear that no one is trying to play a victim. If someone is trying to play a victim after 22. July, it is definitely Arbeiderpartiet. And they should, they were the one of the biggest victims. They have obviously put a strategy in place, to continue this debate by attacking Fremskrittspartiet.” (Jensen 2021:95).

¹⁸ Another case of Siv Jensen knowing, she was told in 2009 (Ringdal 2016:237).

¹⁹ Representative from Buskerud, Bård Hoksrud, was found to have bought sex during a trip to Riga, a criminal offense for norwegians in Norway and abroad since 2008 (Sætre 2011, Jensen 2021:93). According to Per Sandberg: “the best sex-scandal Fremskrittspartiet has had”(“Seeing back it was our best sex-scandal, because we dealt with it immediately”)(Borgersrud 2021, Ringheim 2016:263).

Folkeparti opened for coalition talks 2012 (Jupskås 2016:184).

Sverigedemokraterna 2005-2014:

“I think there’s more wrong with you, than with the Muslims.”

Jimmie Åkesson attacking leader of Centre, Maud Olofsson (SVT 2009).

Åkessons first edict as the new leader of Sverigedemokraterna was to introduce a zero tolerance policy for extremism within the party and institute an expulsion rate much higher than their scandinavian counterparts, although many argue this is mostly cosmetic (Widfeldt 2015:207-209, Jylhä et al. 2019:222). Åkessons leadership style was also less internally conflictual than his counterparts, being by far a more active user of his inner circle and much more willing to delegate (Widfeldt 2015:214).

At the dawn of his helming of the party Åkesson received a number of lucky breaks. His entry into national politics coincided with the “mohammad caricatures crisis” developing in Denmark at the time, Åkesson used the opportunity to court controversy and PR by staging a “mohammad caricature” competition in Sverigedemokraternas internal newspaper SD-Kurieren (Widfeldt 2015:185). The internet provider chose to shut down the pages in question, but it was later revealed this had happened on the basis of a request by the Swedish security services at the behest of the sitting foreign minister Laila Freivald, who promptly resigned (Widfeldt 2015:186). Sverigedemokraterna, quite probably because of all this attention, would get their best result yet at the election of 2006 with 2.9 percent.

More lucky breaks would follow, in addition to a reasonably successful debate in 2007 with the leader of Socialdemokraterna Mona Sahlin which scored them some legitimacy, Åkesson also managed to get published by a major newspaper 2009, a platform previously unattainable to the party (Widfeldt 2015:186-187). The 700 word text was a predictable attack on muslims, multiculturalism and the Swedish political establishment, some arguing it was persecutable hate speech (Widfeldt 2015:187). It was universally condemned, not least from Aftonbladet, the paper that published it, but as the election of 2010 drew nearer, numbers were up and Åkesson

contributed this largely to the piece.

Some weeks before the 2010 elections Sverigedemokraterna published another controversial ad, one that depicts a group of women in niqabs racing an older woman with a walker to a representation of social assistance (Widfeldt 2015:188). This too courted controversy, the ad needing censorship before it was able to air on Swedish television, but this too seemed only to bolster the party. Pia Kjærsgaard commented on the affair by accusing Swedish press of being a “banana republic”, she would additionally aid the party in their campaign²⁰ (Widfeldt 2015:188).

Not all controversial events worked in the party’s favor, two of note were the “iron pipe affair” 2010-2012, in which high officials within the party filmed themselves abusing an immigrant, having armed themselves with iron pipes they found at a construction site (Lundberg 2019:81-87). Someone also managed to get a hidden microphone on a Sverigedemokraterna cruise to Tallinn 2009 in which the then leader of the youth wing made racist jokes²¹, and Åkesson was heard singing a rather aggressive anti-socialist song²² (Lundberg 2019:165-166).

The election of 2010 paid dividends, Sverigedemokraterna finally managed to beat the electoral threshold with 5.7 percent and their efforts resulted in 26 representatives (Widfeldt 2015:174). It needs to be remarked, that Åkesson personally was loathed by the electorate, in rating the Swedish party leased with a +5 to –5 choice, a full 48 percent of the dataset put Åkesson at -5 (Holmberg and Oscarsson 2017). The success made them a permanent fixture in Swedish politics, but it was immediately met with condemnation, and Sverigedemokraterna were effectively put under a cordon sanitaire by every other party (Salo and Rydgren 2021: 48, Mæhlum et. al 2023). After the election Åkesson laid forth a new strategy, the references to

²⁰ Kjærsgaard was an ally of Sverigedemokraterna, Siv Jensen was not, saying to Norwegian press in 2010: “Fremskrittspartiet sees no reason to ally with this party, and we have very little in common with them. This is a nationalist party, Fremskrittspartiet is a liberal party” Saying Sverigedemokraterna is a “one-policy party” founded on nationalism and nazism, she added: “That is something Fremskrittspartiet has no need to identify with. We identify much stronger with Moderaterna and Danish Venstre. I don’t know Sverigedemokraterna particularly well, nor do I have any need to get acquainted.” (Carlsen 2010).

²¹ Erik Almqvist: “What do you call a Somali with sesame seeds on his head? A Quarter Pounder.” (Lundberg 2019:166).

²² *Olof Palme went to the cinema, left soon after ten, Lisbet saw the gun shine, and her life as a widow begin, the shot was loud, Olof Palme fell down* (Lundberg 2019:166). Olof Palme was a very popular Swedish social-democratic prime-minister gunned down outside a cinema in Stockholm 28. February 1986 (Erlandsen 2011).

nationalism were passé, the new focus would be on “social conservatism”, a new “third way” for Swedish voters (Peterson 2019:135). As Åkesson put it:

“By calling us social conservative we secure our position in the middle by being both pragmatically left and right. We remind voters that we believe in the Swedish model of political consensus. Secondly, we confirm our role as a people’s home party, that we reinstate the values of Folkhem.” (Peterson 2019:135).

It is worth noting, as has been done previously with Fremskrittspartiet and Dansk Folkeparti/Fremskridtspartiet, that the biggest base of supporters for Sverigedemokraterna, and most parties of their ilk generally, are members of the working class (Ivarsflaten 2005:465, Oskarson and Demker 2015:629, Salo and Rydgren 2021). This might seem somewhat paradoxical given the traditional grip social-democratic parties have on this group, but there are elegant explanations to this. Many have argued that as the “market turn” hit Europe, that is to say the freeze in public sector expansion and further taxation as explained in neo-liberal economic theory (Offer and Söderberg 2016), parties on the left in the spectrum can be said to have abandoned the goal of improving the material conditions of this class.

This leaves them with the precarious economic situation in which they become disillusioned with these parties' capacities to help them, and hence search for more radical alternatives (Jylhä et al. 2019:224, Mudde & Kaltwasser 2019:131-133). This phenomenon has been expertly pointed out in the Norwegian case by Magnus Marsdal (2007), and in Scandinavia more generally (Salo and Rydgren 2021), and the world generally (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2019:131). As the professor of comparative politics at the university of Geneva, Jonas Pontusson points out:

“I think a lot of working class Swedish voters... They observe inequality, their households are struggling more, especially after 2008, their households are struggling in a way they were not. They are convinced, with fairly good reason, that mainstream parties of the left and the right are not going to do anything, they haven’t done anything for twenty years. Taxing the rich is not an option, according to all of these parties we have maxed out on overall taxation or overall public spending. Welfare chauvinism becomes a fairly rational way to try to deal with this problem from

the point of view of quote unquote “native swedes” and also from the point of view of some immigrants that have been around for twenty years... The pie to be redistributed isn’t going to grow, and now we’re looking for some criteria whereby I and my household and my community... can get more from this pie...” (Jacobin 2022: 14:39).

Sverigedemokraterna are found to steal the most votes from both the two largest parties, Socialdemokraterna and Moderaterna, but for different reasons, while the anti-immigration angle was found to be the contributing factor to the vote more generally, an angle Sverigedemokraterna worked hard to build salience around towards the election of 2014 (Salo and Rydgren 2021:50), voters from Socialdemokraterna were found to be more economically motivated than voters from Moderaterna (Jylhä et al. 2019:220).

Åkessons strategy going into the 2014 elections were pretty clear, he wanted a result that was such that it tore up the established blocks and gave him a kingmaker position, he wanted to “force cooperation” with the other parties (Wicklén 2013). And so he did, at the elections 2014 they doubled their support once again and got 12.9 percent (Peterson 2019:134). This threw the Swedish political system into an unprecedented situation known as the “December agreement” (Sneve 2018, Salo and Rydgren 2021:51, Garvik and Askheim 2023).

The incumbent non-socialist government had shrunk considerably, had they included Sverigedemokraterna they would have had a majority but no one wanted to entertain that possibility and so the leader of Socialdemokraterna, former union leader Stefan Löfven, was tasked with creating a minority-government (Garvik and Askheim 2023). He achieved this, but Sverigedemokraterna didn’t approve his budget, and voted for the alternative budget laid forth by non-socialist parties. Löfven originally reacted by announcing a new election for the following year, but after negotiations 6 of the 8 parties represented at Riksdagen formed a broad coalition to ensure governability, and reduce the relative influence of Sverigedemokraterna.

Dansk Folkeparti 2011-2019:

“Islam is the greatest threat to world peace since the fall of communism. It is a direct threat towards the west, it eats us up from the inside and destabilizes our societal structure...”

Country chairman of Dansk folkeparti Per Dahlgaard of Aarhus speaking on 15.09.2001²³.

(Gram and Maressa 2001)

The elections of 2011, were a disappointment for Dansk Folkeparti, for the first time in their history they experienced a loss in momentum with their first election of electoral decline, coming in at 12.3 percent compared to 13.8 the election prior (Widfeldt 2015:3). The new leader, Thulesen Dahl, was perceived as quite competent, although less of a firebrand than Kjærsgaard, the first major policy change during his tenure was the lurch of the party more leftwards in economic policy, a bigger public sector and more unemployment benefits (Christiansen 2016:97-99). By 2015 Dansk Folkeparti preferred a growth in the public sector, more so then the center-left government it opposed.

And this takes us to an interesting case in counteracting the influence of radical right-wing parties, Socialdemokratiet chose to fight fire with fire, taking an anti-immigrant position themselves, a process that arguably had it's genesis already in 2005 (Marsdal 2021: 112, Salo and Rydgren 2021:26). In a campaign event in 2015, incumbent prime-minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt posed in front of campaign placards reading “Tighter asylum policies and more demands of immigrants!”, the slogan for the entire campaign became “We will do everything to curb the number of non-western refugees and immigrants.” Having chosen this as the focus for the entire campaign, one might not be surprised at the fact that the party with the ownership of this issue had their best election ever coming in at 21.1 percent (Marsdal 2021:112. Kosiara-Pedersen 2020:281).

By 2019 this had completely collapsed, Dansk Folkeparti got 8.7 percent, their worst election since their debut in 1998 in which they got 7.4 (Tvedt 2024a). A number of hypotheses have been assumed for why this is, Thulesen Dahl himself was pretty clear in his analysis, having

²³ With a narrow vote from Venstre, Konservative and Dansk Folkeparti Denmark was one of few countries to send troops to Iraq 2003-2007 (danmarkshistorien.dk 2023) .

himself proposed that Socialdemokratiet should call him if the non-socialists failed to achieve a majority (Kosiara-Pedersen 2020:281):

“Our cooperation with Socialdemokratiet became too bombastic. Our statements got more attention than our politics. Many of you have underlined the importance of Dansk Folkeparti being able to co-operate politically with Socialdemokratiet. But the way that came about introduced too much doubt concerning our identity as a non-socialist party. And since we do consider ourselves a non-socialist party - a nationally-minded party - it’s pretty crazy, that our activism has created so much doubt among Danes, that so many left us in June.” (Dahl 2019).

Other explanations were that Socialdemokratiet managed to make the subject of the election redistribution (Marsdal 2021:113), they were outcompeted in their leftward turn and that Dahl legitimized Socialdemokratiets credibility on anti-immigrant politics and lost voters left and right on anti-immigration, those turning rightward going to Nye Borgerlige (Westersø 2019).

Fremskrittspartiet 2013-2017:

“Kristelig Folkeparti has an enormous responsibility for dozens of people, young people, born and raised in Norway, that go abroad and join terrorist organizations, doing acts of war and massacring children and women out there. This is what Kristelig Folkeparti has wanted, and today we see the result.”

Per Sandberg almost ending Fremskrittspartiets first term in office, 2015²⁴. (Ringdal 2016:318).

The Solberg government came into effect 16. October 2013, its genesis came from conversations between Siv Jensen and leader of Høyre Erna Solberg in the aftermath of the 2009 election which they hypothesized they lost as they were unable to portray a credible alternative (Ringdal 2016:278-279). Long conversations followed this one with the leader of Venstre and Kristelig Folkeparti, both of whom felt they could passively support a Høyre-Fremskrittspartiet

²⁴ Kristelig Folkepartis second chair, Dagrun Eriksen, had said that in criticizing the multicultural society, Per Sandberg was running the errand of ISIS “When you make young people who want to be heard and seen suspect, you are making the job of an extremist or those who run with ISIS that much easier” (Ringheim 2016:318).

government in its new more moderate form. Jensen received the prestigious post of finance minister, they would in addition get the child-, equality and social inclusion- oil and energy-, work and social welfare-, justice-, agriculture- and transport ministers, six ministerial positions of the total 18 (Widfeldt 2015:93).

Fremskrittspartiet in government had all together more friction than Dansk Folkeparti, the support parties had clear goals in their profiles, Venstre wanted concessions on climate policies, Kristelig Folkeparti were interested in keeping a generous family policy, both points of conflict for Fremskrittspartiet as they, like a lot of RRWPP, were climate skeptics and very interested in reducing social spending (Ringdal 2016:289-291, Jylhä et al. 2020, Jensen 2021:127, NTB 2021) But compromises were made, the government persisted, and Jensen managed to implement a massive tax-cut and labor reforms widely unpopular with the unions (Salo and Rydgren 2021:104-106).

As they made concessions, Fremskrittspartiet tried an interesting mutation on the “schrödingers party” approach utilized by Dansk Folkeparti. While she and the rest of the ministerium held a low profile as to avoid friction with the other parties, the second chair Per Sandberg was ruthlessly critical of Venstre and Kristelig Folkeparti, Professor of Comparative politics at the University of Bergen Frank Aarebrot commented that Jensen had given Sandberg “license to whine” (Kristiansen et al. 2016). “-He’s not a loose canon, he’s a loosened canon. And Siv Jensen cut the ropes.”, he argued that while the ministers and those responsible for the government were very quiet on their lack of transformational change, Sandberg had the task of convincing the grassroots that Venstre and Kristelig Folkeparti were responsible by mercilessly attacking them while being in a party with which they co-operated.

This friction would be called “borgerlig kaos” (Naper 2015) and would marr the more frictionous points in the cooperation. It is unfair to say Jensen didn’t achieve anything in her quest to limit immigration however, on point of pride for her during the first term, especially during the “migrant crisis” Jensen had spearheaded the local elections that year by saying that communes, the smallest political unit, in which Fremskrittspartiet had majorities should do anything they could to sabotage Stortingets broad settlement to receive 8000 syrian refugees (Jensen

2021:131-132).

As the body of three year old refugee Aylan Kurdi washed ashore in Turkey august Jensen found it hard to keep arguing for further limitations, but she found solace in that their solution, military guards at Europes borders, removal of all boats picking up refugees, and the quick return back to africa, although condemned by most other parties, ended up being realized by the EU anyway (Jensen 2021:134-135). Fremskrittspartiet was constantly iterating new restrictions on immigrants, but many of these were voted down (Salo and Rydgren 2021:107).

Before the elections of 2017, Fremskrittspartiet worked hard to cast most socio-economic maladies as the fault of liberal immigration policies, but the focus nevertheless ended being mostly about inequality, welfare and taxation (Salo and Rydgren 2021:109-110). To this end Sylvi Listhaug, minister for the newly created portfolio of Immigration and Integration began warning that Norway did not want to experience “swedish conditions” arguing that sweden was a hellscape of unsuccessful migration, traveling to the Stockholm suburb to “experience it for herself” (Salo and Rydgren 2021:107, 110). The move was heavily criticized by then Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven, and also, almost, made Kristelig Folkeparti re-assess the viability of co-operation (Salo and Rydgren 2021:100).


At the election of 2017, all non-socialist parties had shrunk, but not to a degree first feared as a result of “government attrition”, Fremskrittspartiet went from 16,4 to 15,2 percent and both support parties managed to clear the electoral threshold, the Solberg government got a second term (Jensen 2021:143-144).

Results.

For hypothesis 1, the assumption behind the choices made in the selection of variables was an educated reasoning that these were issues that would be markedly more salient among those who identify as voters for RRWPP than the average population. That was found to be the case, for all countries and all variables the separated vote group is markedly more preoccupied with these questions than the population average giving us a strong indication that for this group of voters, this is quite more salient than the population average. If there is a correlation to electoral results, however, is more of an open question. For the hypothesis to be true, there needs to be a clear positive correlation between the saliency of the issue and electoral support.

Foreign Aid.

Fig.3 Should foreign aid be reduced? Norway.




(Salience left axis, electoral support, right).

It is almost eerie, the extent to which the categories of average and RRWPP voters mirror each other, the biggest incongruence coming the election 1989 at 25,35 percent and the smallest in 2005 at 16,15, all other years falling somewhere between the two. The enormous spike from 1985 to 1989 would be that fateful election after the Mustafa-letter the effects of which we might see in the sudden rise of salience, especially since there's a 17,65 percent increase among their voters from one election to the next as opposed to the meaker 12,75 percent increase in the general electorate. This does respond to Fremskrittspartiets increased support 1985 till 1989, although the result of the next election is much worse, most likely to the previously discussed infighting within the party 1993-1994.

The rest of the chart is, however, less clear, as the salience of the issue dips from 1993 to 2005 the support sees a general uptick, this might be just because the novelty of it has deflated since the late eighties, but it is then remarkable that the salience among RRWPP voters should drop so aggressively as well. If one is very generous, and ignores the election results for 1993, there does seem to be correlation between chauvinist foreign aid and Fremskrittspartiets electoral success but it needs be remarked this is a stretch. If one were to speculate around the little drop in 2005, this might have to do with Hagen trying to excise the "less elegant" anti-immigrant voices in his party, but it could also just be a dip caused by the general opposition in Norway to the Iraq war, or the exogenous effect of the Muhammad-caricature affair.


Fig. 4: Should foreign aid be reduced? Denmark .



(Support and RRWPP voter changes from Fremskridtspartiet to Dansk Folkeparti 1998-2001)

We can observe the same dip for 2005 in the Danish case, although this might have to do with Dansk Folkepartis entry into government and the rather strict measures they implemented in immigration, thus perhaps lowering appetite for further such measures. But the war could be an equally contributing factor. A slight difference to note is that the salience for reducing foreign aid does not recover in the general population as it does with RWP, and as it had recovered the RWP takes a dip before the 2015 blowout election but the general population experiences an increase. The dip after 2015 could be attributed to Dansk Folkepartis collapse more generally, or quite simply the co-optation of immigration as an issue by other parties. There seems to be little correlation between support and salience.


Fig. 5: Should foreign aid be reduced? Sweden.



(Values RRWPP voters and success from 1988-1996 is Ny Demokrati, the rest is Sverigedemokraterna)

It is fascinating to see how the introduction of Ny Demokrati does seem to correlate with an increase in salience of the topic at hand, but it is perhaps even more interesting to see how it doesn't at the advent of Sverigedemokraterna. This could certainly be a result of Åkessons substantial unpopularity among those who do not vote for him, and a potential opposition to his position among that part of the electorate, but the salience also dips among his voters in 2014. This could be explained by the expanded portfolio of a new and invigorated Sverigedemokraterna around this time, but their main point of contention it is still fair to say was chauvinism so why it should drop so precipitously is hard to say. It would certainly also be interesting to see how the "migrant crisis" would affect this but that dataset, regrettably, does not exist. Seeing how there are few observations of salience among party voters this doesn't tell us much, but the drop in 2014 is certainly interesting.


Fig 6: Should foreign aid be reduced? Average.



Comparing the entire electorate of Scandinavia it seems we can identify a peak beginning late eighties and reaching its zenith mid to late-nid nineties, we can also identify a trough 2005 for all countries, but in divergence to Norway and Denmark this does not recover in Sweden. This might strengthen the assumption that it is in fact caused by the Iraq war, this would explain why the reduction is so much more substantial in Denmark, a country actively involved in the conflict as opposed to Norway, which wasn't. One could speculate that the decrease in Sweden is an effect of the "cordon sanitaire", that opinions with connotations to the party that by most of the electorate is seen as a bridge too far also, by this fact, are much lower in the general population, a factor that would not be applicable in the Norwegian and Danish case.


Social support for immigrants/refugees.

Fig. 7: Should economic support to immigrants/refugees be reduced? Norway.




It is again reassuring to see that the question does have much higher salience among the specific electorate than most people but it needs be remarked, as mentioned in the operationalization, that the figures 1985-1997 are for a substantially different question than 2001-2017, which is the short explanation for that dip. The only useful observation beyond this we can make is the decrease in the general population, by a quite meager four percent, between 2013 and 2017 as opposed to the increase in the party specific population, most probably either due to the “migrant crisis” or Fremskrittspartiet being in government, other than that the electoral support seems to not correlate with much of anything.

Fig. 8: Should economic support to immigrants/refugees be reduced?




Here there is a more certain observation as the question increases in salience as Dansk Folkeparti becomes a viable alternative, being created 1995. This also is an elegant explanation as to why the question decreases in salience as they enter government supported by the fact that it decreases rather more substantially in the general electorate than the RWP electorate. It is interesting how Dansk Folkepartis peak year seems to have little effect on salience in both groups given how dramatic it is, equally interesting that the “migrant crisis” does not seem to have had much of an effect either way in either group.

Fig. 9: Should economic support to immigrants/refugees be reduced?



There seems to be a rather similar relationship although sadly the question at hand disappears from the Swedish datasets 2010. We can see a marked increase in salience as Ny Demokrati gets onto the scene but this is markedly absent as Sverigedemokraterna enters the stage, although it should be noted that the questions cuts off before they really become a substantial entity. The 95 percent wish in reduction in 2005 is impressive, but given the low support of the party at this time the figure is based on a rather poultry 12 respondents, both a rather small group to make sweeping statements from, it must also be assumed these are “true believer” given the rather low general support for the party at this time.


Fig. 10: Should economic support to immigrants/refugees be reduced?



Manifestations.

For hypothesis 2, there are fifteen elections that fit the four percent loss criteria, they are 77', 85', 93', 01', 13' 17' and 21' for Fremskrittspartiet and 75', 79' 81' 84', 90', 11', 19' and 22' for Fremskrittspartiet/Dansk Folkeparti. Although opposition to foreign aid was a staple of both parties from the start, multiculturalism, and the implied opposition to immigration isn't really relevant as policy until it is properly introduced by both parties in 85 and 87 for Norway and Denmark respectively, thus making elections before 84 irrelevant. Sverigedemokraterna have yet to have an election in which they haven't gained ground, and NY Demokrati were too much of a flash in the pan to really plot any development so there are no relevant Swedish examples.


Fig. 11, N: Var. 608 Multiculturalism: Negative.



Hyp. 2: The election of 85' saw Fremskrittspartiet languish electorally, it is not therefore unreasonable to assume this spurred on Carl I. Hagen to radicalize and introduce anti-immigration on the political agenda through the fateful Mustafa-affair. The election of 93' was a rather major collapse for Fremskrittspartiet, seeing their support decrease from 13 to 6,3 percent. This was in large part marred by internal conflicts within the party, out of which the hard anti-immigrant rose victorious. Therefore it is very interesting that the emphasis on opposition to multiculturalism did markedly decrease in the following election, constituting a mainstreaming following an electoral defeat. The election of 2013 also saw a decrease from 22,9 to 16,3 percent, and a similarly observable substantial decrease in the emphasis of opposition to multiculturalism, this decrease in emphasis would follow the slow and steady decline in votes in the elections of 17' and 21'.

Hyp. 3: As no other party is anywhere near emphasizing this as much as Fremskridtspartiet, it would be hard to argue that anyone has really tried to challenge their ownership on this.

Fig. 12, D: Var. 608 Multiculturalism: Negative.



Hyp. 2: The election of 84' was very bad for Fremskridtspartiet, they had shrunk from 8,9 till 3,6 percent of the electorate. This may of course partly be explained by their leader getting jailed for massive tax-fraud, but it is fitting that the party had a strong emphasis on opposition to multiculturalism at the election of 87', having introduced it as a policy-point 85'. Since it was the first election in which this was relevant, it is hard to say it necessarily disproves the hypothesis, but it certainly doesn't confirm it.


The election of 90' was also a disappointment, seeing their support decrease from 9 to 6,4 percent, but the emphasis remains unchanged. The election of 11' was a mild disappointment for Dansk Folkeparti, they had decreased from 13,8 to 12,3, and as we can trace in the plot there is a move to de-emphasize this policy in the following election.

The election of 19', in which support decreased from a massive 21,1 to 8,7 percent, was a rather substantial blow for Dansk Folkeparti. The next election is not present in the MPD, but we know the internal analysis by Dansk Folkeparti blamed this collapse on the fact that the party, through their fraternization with Socialdemokratiet had let them co-opt their immigration scepticism, a slow and gradual process we can see start in 2011. It needs also be remarked that all parties had a higher emphasis on this question than Dansk Folkeparti did for the election of 2019, strengthening Thulesen hypothesis that they, through an open door strategy which may have confused the electorate, had lost ownership of the question.

Hyp. 3: The election of 98' encompassing the birth of Dansk Folkeparti as a Danish political presence, is of immediate interest. As can be readily observed every relevant party had a sharp increase in their focus of opposing multiculturalism, but none as much or as intensely as Dansk Folkeparti, thus showing a substantial amount of radicalization in response to this shift. The election of 2005 is also very interesting, as we can see a sharp decrease in their emphasis, especially interesting is the fact that Socialdemokratiet at that time had come to a point at which they had emphasized it more by rather a large margin. This may be the exogenous shock following Denmark's entry into the Iraq war, in which case it makes sense that the parties that voted for an invasion would like to de-emphasize this issue, and the Social democrats in opposition felt more comfortable emphasizing it.

The next election shows a hard reversal as Dansk Folkeparti re-radicalized substantially on the issue. The elections of 15' and 19' more than anything exemplifies the slow death (perhaps) of Dansk Folkeparti as their raison d'être remains unemphasized and is subsumed in a pincer move with Venstre from the right and Socialdemokratiet on the left.

Fig. 13, S: Var. 608 Multiculturalism: Negative.



Hyp. 2: Sverigedemokraterna have yet to have an election in which they lose support so this example isn't relevant to the hypothesis.

Hyp. 3: The history of both Sverigedemokraterna and a negative attitude to multiculturalism in Sweden are relatively short, but we do see a pretty good confirmation of our theory, as we can see for the election of 18' all relevant parties raced to outcompete Sverigedemokraterna in this aspect. Sverigedemokraterna responded by radicalizing hard.

In Conclusion.

Is support for RRWPP stronger in systems where opposition to immigration has saliency? As in, does high saliency for anti-immigrant sentiment lead to high electoral results for the parties in question? Again, this can charitably be said to be true for opposition to foreign aid in all countries but only at the first introduction of the topic, there is little correlation or connection to track later in the datasets. This also seems to be the case for social support in Sweden, but again just initially, the relationship after this seems almost random.

It would seem that, if there is a connection to trace between all of these things, it has a relationship much more complicated than assumed in this paper. It is however very interesting to see how the two separate groups of voters react differently to different stimuli and how big these differences were, given a more sophisticated methodological approach it is not hard to believe that approach could help us increase our understanding of this group of voters.

As for hypothesis 2, the assumption that elections in which electoral support for RRWPP increases, is followed by these parties de-radicalizing their policy. This can be observed to be true for the norwegian case, every major defeat marks a hard break on the anti-multicultural bent, clear examples of attempt at finding a less extreme outlook. Denmark is a more of an open question, but it seems safe to suggest it is true for Dansk Folkeparti from the election of 11' until the election of 19'. Sweden is, as mentioned, irrelevant.

Hypothesis 3, the assumption that parties trying to “muscle in” on policy-points traditionally owned by these parties, and the parties radicalize as a result. This is hard to say is relevant in the Norwegian case as no other party really seemed that interested to challenge their ownership of the relevant policy. Dansk Folkeparti had to fight substantially harder to keep their ownership, as can be seen multiple times the party radicalized substantially when other parties challenged their ownership of the issue. Similarly, although there really is just one case, Sverigedemokraterna radicalized substantially when other parties challenged their ownership. Based on this methodological framework, a large N-study could be a promising step in further research.

“Many are wondering, usually with a clever grin, how much time will pass before I return to politics. That will never happen.... Many a time i’ve been sitting with a glass of wine on a beautiful summer’s eve with family or friends, before I suddenly have to cancel and run to solve some crisis. That part of my life is over.” (Jensen 2021:248-249).

At time of writing, September 2024, things are really only looking up for Sverigedemokraterna. Dansk Folkeparti followed their collapse in support with an even more disastrous election in 2021 in which they only achieved a paltry 2,6 percent (Tvedt 2024a), giving them just five representatives and a future outlook heavily reminiscent of Fremskrittspartiet. Things are not looking good for Fremskrittspartiet either, as Siv Jensen stepped down in 2021²⁵, Sylvi Listhaug took over, but she is a politician much more in the Hagen mold than Jensen²⁶ (Marsdal 2021:10). Over her tenure in the Solberg government she had six different portfolios, one of which she had to leave by motion of no-confidence after she was “too real” in a facebook post: “Arbeiderpartiet is of the opinion that the rights of terrorists are more important than national security”²⁷ (Garvik and Tvedt 2023).

One quote from former leader of Venstre, Trine Skei Grande, is quite succinct:

“She’s really good at sharing her opinion, and completely unable to have a constructive conversation with anyone with whom she disagrees. It was really tiresome” (Marsdal 2021:10).

In the election of 2021 they managed 11,6 percent and that reduction in addition to Kristelig Folkeparti not clearing the threshold meant a socialist victory, although she was praised for not losing more (Garvik and Tvedt 2023). Fremskrittspartiet is currently not open to cooperate, or

²⁵ After stepping down, Siv Jensen was, rather bizarrely, bequeathed property to the tune of 30 million Norwegian Kroner (roughly 2,7 mill. €) by former bank-director Thor Bang, a man she had never met, but who, by Carl I Hagens account was “happy with the work we had done” (Mosveen & Thjømøe 2022, Lilleås 2023).

²⁶ Listhaug, unlike Jensen, is less willing to condemn Sverigedemokraterna, “We have a lot in common... They wish to increase taxes and fees, we were created to put an end to them. But on immigration and law it’s obvious that they’ve been inspired by us in Norway, but also from Denmark and several parties there (Holmes 2022).

²⁷ Fremskrittspartiet would also leave their position prematurely, they exited the Solberg government January 2020 a year before the end of their term, the reason for doing so was that the rest of their partners wanted to bring one “ISIS-mother” home (Krekling et al. 2020). One can’t help but find the irony in the situation, that Carl I. Hagens dream of a Fremskrittspartiet in government was ended by a single mother.

make any electoral promises to work with anyone but Høyre (Skårdalsmo & Børringbo 2024), so a majority bourgeois coalition is currently untenable.

Sverigedemokraterna are bigger than ever, second only to Socialdemokraterna with 20,5 percent in the election of 2022, although expulsions still happen²⁸ (Tvedt 2023). This put's Sweden in an awkward position, as none of the parties in the center are ready to lift their cordon sanitaire the second biggest party in Riksdagen is effectively barred from exercising its mandate, leading to the bizarre situation that Moderaterna, a party with less support than Sverigedemokraterna at 19,1 percent, has gotten the prime minister and has formed a government consisting of Moderaterna, Kristdemokraterna and Liberalerna that Sverigedemokraterna passively supports (Mæland 2024).

Although one could think any acceptance of a radical right-wing party in government is a “bridge too far”, the prevailing experience for the case of Scandinavia seems to be that RRWPP are not, much like any other party, immune to disappointments and attrition.

²⁸ During the election of 2022 a Sverigedemokraterna politician invited to fika (coffee) on the day of the 1939 invasion of Poland, to “celebrate the occasion” (Svensson and Granlund 2022). The new rising star of the party and one of few women, Rebecca Fallenkvisst, had on the night of election yelled “helg seger”, a rough Swedish translation of “sieg heil” (Holmes 2022). She would not be put on suspension before a frankly absurd instagram post on the diary of Anne Frank “I’m fifty pages in, and thus far Anne Frank has only struck me as immoral. Horniness itself.” (Associated Press 2022).

Sources:

Aardal, Bernt. Valen, Henry. Kleven, Øyvinn. Normann, Tor Morten. and Wangen, Glenn Erik. (2022): “Norwegian Election Survey 2001” *Norsk senter for Forskningsdata*. Available as of 24.01-23 (through request) at:

<https://search.nsd.no/study/f8e5d2aa-f7cf-4cd4-8cbd-0783ced9d479>

Adams, James. Merrill III, James & Zur, Roi (2023) “How much does issue salience matter? A model with applications to the UK elections” *European Journal of Political Research* Vol. 63 Iss. 2 page 798-809.

Adamson, Göran. (2019) “Why Do Right-Wing Populist Parties Prosper? Twenty-One Suggestions to the Anti-Racist” *Society* Vol. 56 page 47-58.

Akkerman, Tjitske. de Lange, Sarah L. and Roudjin, Matthijs. (2016) “Into the mainstream? A comparative analysis of the programmatic profiles of radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe over time” In ed. Akkerman, Tjitske. de Lange, Sarah L. and Roudjin, Matthijs. *Radical Right-Wing populist parties in Western Europe: Into the mainstream?* Routledge, New York page 31-52.

Andersen, Jørgen Goul. (2002) “Danish Election Study 1994” *Dansk Data Arkiv* Danish Data Archive. Available as of 09.09-24 (through request) at:

<http://dda.dk/catalogue/2210#primaryinvestigator>

Andersen, Jørgen Goul. (2005) “Valgundersøgelsen 2005” *Rigsarkivet*. Available as of 09.09-24 at: <https://digidata.rigsarkivet.dk/aflevering/37151>

Andersen, Jørgen Goul. (2008) “Valgundersøgelsen 2007” *Rigsarkivet*. Available as of 09.09-24 at: <https://digidata.rigsarkivet.dk/aflevering/37820>

Associated Press (2022) “Sweden Democrats suspend official for insulting comments about

Anne Frank” *The Guardian* Available as of 09.09-24 at:

<https://www.theguardian.com/books/2022/oct/16/sweden-democrats-suspend-official-for-insulting-g-comments-about-anne-frank>

Bandlien, Bjørn (2024) “Vikingtiden”, *Store Norske Leksikon*, Available as of 09.09-24 at:

<https://snl.no/vikingtiden>

Bélanger, Éric & Meguid, Bonnie M. (2007) “Issue salience, issue ownership, and issue-based vote choice” *Electoral Studies* 27 page 477-491.

Bergmann, Eirikur (2016) “Nordic Nationalism and Right-Wing Populist Politics : Imperial Relationships and National Sentiments” Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Berntzen, Einar (2013a) “Østerrike” in ed. Heidar, Knut. Bakke, Elisabeth and Berntzen Einar *Politikk i Europa. Partier Regjeringsmakt Styreform*. Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, page 218-232.

Berntzen, Einar (2013b) “Italia” in ed. Heidar, Knut. Bakke, Elisabeth and Berntzen Einar *Politikk i Europa. Partier Regjeringsmakt Styreform*. Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, page 268-289.

von Beyme, Klaus (2019) “Rightwing Populism: An Element of Neo Democracy” Springer, Cham, Switzerland.

Bjørndal, Arne (2011) “Málaga FrP - størst på Costa del Sol” *Norskemagasinet* Available as of 09.09-24 at: <https://norskemagasinet.com/2878-malaga-frp-storst-pa-costa-del-sol/>

Borgersrud, Aslak (2021) “Per Sandbergs 16 beste sitater noensinne: EN SLASK PÅ TINGET: Frps nestleder kan bli minister. Her er noen høydepunkter fra karrieren.” *Dagsavisen* Available as of 09.09-24 at:

<https://www.dagsavisen.no/oslo/nyheter/2015/12/15/per-sandbergs-16-beste-sitater-noensinne/>

Borre, Ole. Elklit, Jørgen. Nielsen, Hans Jørgen. Thomsen, Søren. Risberg. Andersen, Jørgen Goul. (2002) “Valgundersøgelsen 2001” *Rigsarkivet*. Available as of 09.09-24 at:
<https://digidata.rigsarkivet.dk/aflevering/36984>

Borre, Ole. Nielsen, Hans Jørgen. Andersen, Jørgen Goul. Andersen, Johannes. (1998)
“Valgundersøgelsen 1998” *Rigsarkivet*. Available as of 09.09-24 at:
<https://digidata.rigsarkivet.dk/aflevering/36680>

Borre, O. Nielsen, Hans Jørgen. Sauerberg, Steen. Worre, Torben. Andersen Jørgen Goul. (1991)
“Valgundersøgelsen 1990” *Rigsarkivet*. Available as of 09.09-24 at:
<https://digidata.rigsarkivet.dk/aflevering/36263>

Bratberg, Terje (2021) "Wachtmeister" *Store Norske Leksikon*²⁹ Available as of 09.09-24 at:
<https://snl.no/Wachtmeister>

Brochmann, Grete (2017) “Immigration Policies of the Scandinavian Countries” In ed.
Nedegaard, Peter and Wivel, Anders *The Routledge Handbook of Scandinavian Politics*
Routledge, New York, US, page 229-239.

Budge, Ian. Farlie, Dennis (1983) “Explaining and predicting elections : issue effects and party strategies in twenty-three democracies”. Allen & Unwin, London, UK. Available, as of 05.10-24, at: <https://archive.org/details/explainingpredic00budg/page/n9/mode/2up>

Budge, Ian. (2015) “Issue Emphases, Saliency Theory and Issue Ownership: A Historical and Conceptual Analysis” *West European Politics* Vol. 38 Iss. 4 page 761-777.

Carlsen, Helge (2010) “Siv Jensen vil ikke bli bedre kjent med Sverigedemokraterna” *Norsk*

²⁹ Over the course of the creation of this thesis, there has been levied skepticism to what was referred to as “online sources”, a reference it is believed is levied against *Store Norske Leksikon* (the grand norwegian lexicon). This skepticism is valid, after all online encyclopedias are generally considered sub-par sources of information, but this cannot be said of *Store Norske Leksikon*. The site is run by a foundation whose members include all norwegian universities and The Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters, it is written by experts, most of whom are employed at said universities and the contents therein are extensively quality assured with regard to peer review, professional accuracy, a critical view of sources and ease of accessibility (UiB 2024).

Rikskringasting Available as of 09.09-24 at:

<https://www.nrk.no/norge/-har-ingen-ting-til-felles-med-sd-1.7301065>

Christiansen, Flemming Juul (2016) “The Danish People’s Party: Combining cooperation and radical positions” In ed. Akkerman, Tjitske. de Lange, Sarah L. and Roudjin, Matthijs. *Radical Right-Wing populist parties in Western Europe: Into the mainstream?* Routledge, New York page 94-112.

Christiansen, Flemming Juul (2017) “Conflict and co-operation among the Danish Mainstream as a condition for adaption to the populist radical right” in *The European Mainstream and the Populist Radical Right* ed. Odmalm, Pontus & Hepburn, Eve. Routledge, London.

Cooper, Camilla Guldahl (2024) “NATO” *Store Norske Leksikon* Available as of 24.01-23 at:
<https://snl.no/NATO>

Corradi, Valerio (2022) “Right-Wing Rural Populisms: Comparative Analysis of Two European Regions” *Rural Sociology* Vol. 87 Iss. 1 page 715-732.

Czarniawska, Barbara (2004) “Narratives in Social Science Research” Sage Publications, London UK.

Dahl, Willy. (1989) “Arnulf Øverland: en biografi” Aschehaug, Oslo Available as of 09.09-24 (with norwegian IP) at:
www.nb.no/items/2d8fa4b2ec881e1389381b5887e2e856?page=5&searchText=stryk%20korset

Dahl, Krsitian Thulesen (2019) “Årsmødetale 14. september 2019” *docslib.org* Available as of 09.09-24 at:
<https://docslib.org/doc/1713527/kristian-thulesen-dahls-%C3%A5rsm%C3%B8detale-2019>

Danmarkshistorien.dk (2023) “Den danske deltagelse i Irak-krigen, 2003-2007”
Danmarkshistorien.dk Available as of 09.09-24 at:

<https://danmarkshistorien.dk/vis/materiale/den-danske-deltagelse-i-irak-krigen-2003-2007/>

Demby, Gene (2013) “The Truth Behind The Lies Of The Original “Welfare Queen”” *National Public Radio* Available as of 09.09-24 at:

<https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2013/12/20/255819681/the-truth-behind-the-lies-of-the-original-welfare-queen>

Dennison, James and Geddes, Andrew (2018) “A Rising Tide? The Salience of Immigration and the Rise of Anti-Immigration Political Parties in Western Europe”. *Political quarterly* Vol. 90, Iss. 1. page 107-116.

Dennison, James (2020) “ How Issue Salience Explains the Rise of the Populist Right in Western Europe”. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* Vol. 32. Iss. 3. page 397-420.

Dennison , James and Kustov, Alexander (2023) “The Reverse Backlash: How the Success of Populist Radical Right Parties Relates to More Positive Immigration Attitudes”. *Public Opinion Quarterly* Vol. 87. Iss. 4. page 1013-1024.

Der Spiegel (1979): “Schlimmer als Lockheed” Available as of 09.09-24 at:

<https://www.spiegel.de/politik/schlimmer-als-lockheed-a-f20057fa-0002-0001-0000-000040351930?context=issue>

Dolezal, Martin. Ennser-Jedenastik, Laurenz. Müller, Wolfgang Claudius. Winkler, Anna Katharina. (2014): “How parties compete for votes: A test of saliency theory” *European Journal of Political Research* 53, page 57–76,

Downs, Anthony (1957) “An economic theory of democracy” Harper & Row, New York.

DR (1971): “Mogens Glistrup i Focus” *Dansk Radio* Available as of 09.09-24 at:

<https://www.dr.dk/bonanza/serie/353/diverse/55436/mogens-glistrup-i-focus>

Ebbing, Hans (2021) “Anders Behring Breivik og FrP” *Dagsavisen* Available as of 09.09-24 at:
<https://www.dagsavisen.no/debatt/2018/10/17/anders-behring-breivik-og-frp/>

Ekman, Mikael and Poohl, Daniel (2010) “Ut ur skuggan: En kritisk granskning av Sverigedemokraterna” Natur & Kultur, Stockholm.

Erlandsen, Anitta (2011) “Mordet på Olof Palme” *Norsk Riksrkrinkasting* Available as of 09.09-24 at: <https://www.nrk.no/arkiv/artikkel/mordet-pa-olof-palme-1.7521721>

Ertesvåg, Frank (2018) “Jenta fra Søviknes-saken bryter tausheten: Søker erstatning fra staten” *Verden Gang* Available as of 09.09-24 at:
<https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/8wjW12/jenta-fra-soeviknes-saken-bryter-tausheten-soeker-erstatning-fra-staten>

Evjen, Kjetil. (2022) “Partifamilier”, *Store Norske Leksikon*, Available as of 24.01-23 at:
<https://snl.no/partifamilier>

Foss, Amund Bakke. (2011) “Fjellaper i Danmark: -Rødpølsene er misunnelige” *Verdens Gang* Available as of 09.09-24 at:
<https://www.vg.no/sport/fotball/i/PKj0J/fjellaper-i-danmark-roedpoelsene-er-misunnelige>

Fossen, Cato Husabø (2018) “Solberg etter jentas historie om rus og selvskading i Søviknes-saken: – Forandrer ikke på saken”, *Norsk Riksrkrinkasting*, Available as of 09.09-24 at:
https://www.nrk.no/norge/solberg-den-dramatiske-historien-til-jenta-i-soviknes-saken_-_forandrer-ikke-pa-saken-1.13947530

Garvik, Olav. Askheim, Svein (2023) “Stefan Lövfén” *Store Norske Leksikon* Available as of 09.09-24 at: https://snl.no/Stefan_L%C3%B6fven

Garvik, Olav. Tvedt, Knut Are (2023) “Sylvi Listhaug” *Store Norske Leksikon* Available as of

09.09-24 at: https://snl.no/Sylvi_Listhaug

Gram, Sanne and Maressa, Jette Elbæk (2001) “DF: Terrorisme og islam hører sammen”

Jyllands-posten Available as of 09.09-24 at:

<https://jyllands-posten.dk/indland/ECE3326664/DF-Terrorisme-og-islam-h%C3%B8rer-sammen/>

Grønmo, Sigmund (2024) “kvalitativ metode” *Store Norske Leksikon* Available as of 12.11-24 at:

https://snl.no/kvalitativ_metode

Hallands Nyheter (2016) “Misshandel under lussebak på fängelset” *Hallands Nyheter* Available as of 09.09-24 at:

<https://www.hn.se/nyheter/halland/misshandel-under-lussebak-p%C3%A5-f%C3%A4ngelset-1.1774172>

Haslund, Elisabeth Arnsdorf. (2014): “Udelukkelsen af Sveriges-demokraterna får kritik i Danmark” *Berlingske* Available as of 09.09-24 at:

<https://www.berlingske.dk/politik/udelukkelsen-af-sveriges-demokraterna-faar-kritik-i-danmark>

Heidar, Knut. Bakke, Elisabeth and Berntzen, Einar. (2013): “Politikk i Europa: Partier Regjeringsmakt Styreform.” Universitetsforlaget, Oslo.

Heidar, Knut. (2013a) “Norge” in ed. Heidar, Knut. Bakke, Elisabeth and Berntzen, Einar. *Politikk i Europa. Partier Regjeringsmakt Styreform*. Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, page 44-59.

Heidar Knut. (2013b) “Sverige” in ed. Heidar, Knut. Bakke, Elisabeth and Berntzen, Einar. *Politikk i Europa. Partier Regjeringsmakt Styreform*. Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, page 60-75.

Heidar Knut. (2013c) “Danmark” in ed. Heidar, Knut. Bakke, Elisabeth and Berntzen, Einar. *Politikk i Europa. Partier Regjeringsmakt Styreform*. Universitetsforlaget, Oslo page 76-91.

Heinisch, Reinhard. Hauser, Kristina. (2016): “The mainstreaming of the Austrian Freedom Party: The more things change...”. In ed. Akkerman, Tjitske. de Lange, Sarah L. and Roudjin, Matthijs. *Radical Right-Wing populist parties in Western Europe: Into the mainstream?* New York: Routledge. page 73-93.

Heglund, Halvor. (2018): “Svenskene hever stemmen. Er ikke så korrekte lenger.” *Aftenposten* Available as of 09.09-24 at:

<https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/KvmB9M/svenskene-hever-stemmen-er-ikke-saa-korrekte-lenger>

Henriksen, Jon (2011) “Torrevieja: Lader opp til valgkamp i Spania” *Spaniaposten* Available as of 09.09-24 at: <https://spania.no/nordmenn-spania/torrevieja-lader-opp-til-valgkamp-i-spania/>

Hobsbawm, Eric (2021) “On Nationalism” Little, Brown Book Group, London, UK.

Holmberg, Sören. (1986) “Svensk valundersökning 1982” *Svensk nationell datatjänst*. Available as of 09.09-24 (through request) at: <https://snd.gu.se/sv/catalogue/study/snd0157>

Holmberg, Sören. (2001) “Svensk valundersökning 1998” *Svensk nationell datatjänst*. Available as of 09.09-24 (through request) at: <https://snd.gu.se/sv/catalogue/study/snd0750>

Holmberg, Sören. Gilljam, Mikael. (1988) “Svensk valundersökning 1985” *Svensk nationell datatjänst*. Available as of 09.09-24(through request) at: <https://snd.gu.se/sv/catalogue/study/snd0217>

Holmberg, Sören. Gilljam, Mikael. (1991) “Svensk valundersökning 1988” *Svensk nationell datatjänst*. Available as of 09.09-24 (through request) at: <https://snd.gu.se/sv/catalogue/study/snd0227>

Holmberg, Sören. Gilljam, Mikael. (1993) “Svensk valundersökning 1991” *Svensk nationell datatjänst*. Available as of 09.09-24 (through request) at:

<https://snd.gu.se/sv/catalogue/study/snd0391>

Holmberg, Sören. Gilljam, Mikael. (1997) “Svensk valundersökning 1994” *Svensk nationell datatjänst*. Available as of 09.09-24 (through request) at:

<https://snd.gu.se/sv/catalogue/study/snd0570>

Holmberg, Sören. Oscarsson, H. E. (2004) “Svensk valundersökning 2002” *Svensk nationell datatjänst*. Available as of 09.09-24 (through request) at:

<https://snd.gu.se/sv/catalogue/study/snd0812>

Holmberg, S. Oscarsson, Henrik Ekengren. (2008) “Svensk valundersökning 2006” *Svensk nationell datatjänst*. Available as of 09.09-24 (through request) at:

<https://snd.gu.se/sv/catalogue/study/snd0861>

Holmberg, S. Oscarsson, Henrik Ekengren. (2017) “Svensk valundersökning 2010” *Svensk nationell datatjänst*. Available as of 09.09-24 (through request) at:

<https://snd.gu.se/sv/catalogue/study/snd0876>

Holmes, Martha C. S. (2022) “Listhaug hyller Sverigedemokraternas gjennomslag: – Har mye til felles” *Verdens Gang* Available as of 09.09-24 at:

<https://www.vg.no/nyheter/utenriks/i/bgmMG3/listhaug-hyller-sverigedemokraternas-gjennomslag-har-mye-til-felles>

Holmøyvik, Eirik. Sterri, Aksel Braanen. Gisle, Jon. (2023) “Sperregrense” *Store Norske Leksikon* Available as of 09.09-24 at: <https://snl.no/sperregrense>

Institute for Social Research and Statistisk Sentralbyrå (2022) “Norwegian Election Survey 2013” Available as of 24.01-23 (through request) at:

<https://search.nsd.no/study/4e960e8d-914a-4444-b6db-89c6cae91176>

Ivarsflaten, E. (2005), ‘The Vulnerable Populist Right Parties: No Economic Realignment

Fuelling their Electoral Success', *European Journal of Electoral Research*, Vol. 44, page 465–492.

Ivarsflaten, Elisabeth. (2008) "What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe? Re-Examining Grievance Mobilization in Seven Successful Cases" *Comparative Political Studies* Vol. 41 Iss. 1 page 3-23.

Iversen, Jan Martin. (1998) "Fra Anders Lange Til Carl I. Hagen: 25 år med Fremskrittspartiet". Millennium, Oslo. Available as of 09.09-24 (with norwegian IP) at: <https://www.nb.no/items/a743105782d5d96b44693beb769a1283>

Jacobin (2022) "Is the Far-Right About to Kill Swedish Social Democracy? w/ Jonas Pontusson" *Youtube* Available as of 09.09-24 at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wuVVN1cPVZg>

Jacobsen, Fridtjof. (2014) "Høyresjokket" *Verdens Gang*. Available as of 09.09-24 at: <https://www.vg.no/nyheter/meninger/i/vMVbj/hoeyresjokket>

Jensen, Siv (2021) "Siv: Med Egne Ord", Kagge Forlag, Oslo.

Johansen, Trond. (2017) "Anders Langes Tale på Saga Kino, Oslo 8. April 1973" *Youtube*. Available as of 09.09-24 at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ZbbAMjiV20>

John, Peter (2018) "Quantitative Methods" In ed. Lowndes, Vivien. Marsh, David. Stoker, Gerry. "Theory and Methods in Political Science". Palgrave, page 254-270.

de Jonge, Léonie (2021) "The Success and Failure of Right-Wing Populist Parties in the Benelux Countries" Routledge, London, UK.

Jupskås, Anders Ravik. (2012) "Ekstreme Europa: Ideologi, Årsaker og Konsekvenser". Cappelen Damm, Oslo.

Jupskås, Anders Ravik. (2016) “Taming of the shrew: How the Progress Party (almost) became part of the mainstream” In ed. Akkerman, Tjitske. de Lange, Sarah L. and Roudjin, Matthijs. *Radical Right-Wing populist parties in Western Europe: Into the mainstream?* Routledge New York, US, page 73-93.

Jupskås, Anders Ravik. Bjørge, Tore (2023) “The Evolution of the Extreme Right in Norway since the 1990s” In ed. Kondor, Katherine and Little, Mark. *The Routledge Handbook of Far-Right Extremism in Europe* Routledge, GB page 173-188.

Jylhä, Kirsti M. Rydgren, Jens. Strimling, Pontus (2019) “Radical right-wing voters from right and left: Comparing Sweden Democrat voters who previously voted for the Conservative Party or the Social Democratic Party” *Scandinavian Political Studies* Vol. 42, Iss. 3-4, page 220-244.

Jylhä, Kirsti, M. Strimling, Pontus. Rydgren, Jens (2020) “Climate Change Denial among Radical Right-Wing Supporters” *Sustainability* Vol. 12.

Keman, Hans. (2011) “Comparative Research Methods”. In Ed. Caramani, Daniele. *Comparative Politics*. Oxford University Press, GB. page 47-59.

van Kersbergem, Kees and Manow, Philip. (2011) “The Welfare State”. In Ed. Caramani, Daniele. *Comparative Politics*. Oxford University Press, GB. page 349-365.

Klüver, Heike and Sagarzazu, Iñaki (2016) “Setting the Agenda or Responding to Voters? Political Parties, Voters and Issue Attention” *West European Politics* Vol. 39 Iss. 2 page 380-398.

Knudsen, Olav Fagelund (2024) “EØS” *Store Norske Leksikon* Available as of 24.01-23 at: <https://snl.no/E%C3%98S>

Knudsen, Olav Fagelund. Julsrud, Ottar. Tvedt, Knut Are. Trondal, Jarle (2024) “EU - Den Europeiske Union” Available as of 09.09-24 at: https://snl.no/EU_-_Den_europeiske_union

Kosiara-Pedersen, Karina (2020) “Tillykke til Dansk Folkeparti!” *Politica* Vol. 52, Iss. 3, page 269-289.

Krekling, David Vojislav. Helljesen, Vilde. Fossen, Cato Husabø. Ansari, Iram. Skille, Øyvind Bye. Vignæs, Maria Knoph (2020) “Frp går ut av regjering” *Norsk Rikskringkasting* Available as of 09.09-24 at: <https://www.nrk.no/norge/frp-gar-ut-av-regjering-1.14867637>

Kristiansen, Bjørn S. Hultgreen, Gunnar. Ringheim, Gunnar (2016) “- Per Sandberg er James Bond, og Siv Jensen har gitt ham «license to cry in the parliament” *Dagbladet* Available as of 09.09-24 at: <https://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/per-sandberg-er-james-bond-og-siv-jensen-har-gitt-ham-licens-to-cry-in-the-parliament/61032302>

Kvanmo, Hanna. Rygnestad, Arild. (1993) “Anders Langes Saga” Samvirkelaget, Oslo, Norway. Available as of 09.09-24 (with norwegian IP) at: <https://www.nb.no/items/eef800731f6974a4f6469311fcc82c93>

Larsen, Rune Engelbreth. (2024) “Invandrefjendtlig polemik og propaganda” *humanisme.dk* Available as of 09.09-24 at: <https://www.humanisme.dk/hate-speech/samlet.php#Mogens%20Glistrup>

Larsson, Moa. (2018) “Om 4%-spärren till Riksdagen” *Sveriges Radio* Available as of 09.09-24 at: <https://sverigesradio.se/artikel/6896320>

Larsson, Stieg & Ekman, Mikael (2001) “Sverigedemokraterna : den nationella rörelsen” Ordfront, Stockholm.

Lehmann, Pola. Franzmann, Simon. Al-Gaddooa, Denise. Burst, Tobias. Ivanusch, Christoph. Regel, Sven. Riethmüller, Felicia. Volkens, Andrea. Weßels, Bernhard. Zehnter, Lisa (2024): The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2024a. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) / Göttingen: Institut für

Demokratieforschung (IfDem).

Lilleås, Heidi Schei (2014) “-Det er et sykdomstegn” *Nettavisen* Available as of 09.09-24 at:
<https://www.nettavisen.no/artikkel/det-er-et-sykdomstegn/s/12-95-8486310>

Lilleås, Heidi Schei (2023) “Siv Jensen har solgt gigantisk hyttearv” Available as of 09.09-24 at:
<https://www.nettavisen.no/okonomi/siv-jensen-har-solgt-gigantisk-hyttearv/s/5-95-1112123>

Lindroth, Bengt (2016) “Väljarnas hämnd: Populism och nationalism i Norden” Carlssons Förlag, Stockholm.

Lowndes, Vivien. Marsh, David. Stoker, Gerry. (2018) “Theory and Methods in Political Science”. Palgrave.

Lund, Siri (2006) “- Spanjoler må lære seg norsk. Hvis de vil jobbe med nordmenn i Spania, sier Carl I. Hagen.” *Dagbladet* Available as of 09.09-24 at:
<https://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/spanjoler-ma-laere-seg-norsk/66207688>

Lundberg, Jonathan (2019) “Sverigevänner: Ett Reportage om det Svenska Nätkriget” Piratförlaget, Stockholm.

manifesto-project.wzb.eu (2024) “A short primer on the Manifesto Project and its methodology” Available, as of 09.09-24 at: <https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/tutorials/primer>

Manucci, Luca (2019) “Populism and Collective Memory: Comparing Fascist Legacies in Western Europe” Routledge, London.

Marsdal, Magnus (2007) “Frp-koden: Hemmeligheten bak Fremskrittspartiets suksess” Forlaget Manifest, Oslo, Norway.

Marsdal, Magnus (2021) “Listhaugs Metode: Håndbok mot høyrepopulismen” Forlaget

Manifest, Oslo, Norway.

McDonnell, Duncan and Cabrera, Luis (2019) “The right-wing populism of India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (and why comparativists should care)” *Democratization* Vol. 26, Iss. 3. page 484-501.

Meguid, Bonnie M. (2005) “Competition Between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success” *American Political Science Review* Vol. 99, Iss. 3 page 347-359.

Meguid, Bonnie M. (2008) “Party Competition Between Unequals” Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom.

Meyer, Thomas M. Wagner, Markus (2013) “Mainstream or Niche? Vote-Seeking Incentives and the Programmatic Strategies of Political Parties” *Comparative Political Studies* Vol. 46. Iss. 10 page 1246-1272.

Morrow, Duncan (2016) “Jörg Haider and the new FPÖ: Beyond the democratic pale?”. In ed. Hainsworth, Paul. *The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream*. Pinter London. page 33-63.

Mosveen, Eirik. Thjømøe, Silje Løvstad (2022) “Avdød bankdirektør skal ha gitt Siv Jensen flere titalls millioner i arv” Available, as of 09.09-24, at:
<https://www.ao.no/avdod-bankdirektor-skal-ha-gitt-siv-jensen-flere-titalls-millioner-i-arv/s/5-128-313435>

Mudde, Cas. (2007) “Populist Radical Right Parties: in Europe”. Cambridge University Press.

Mudde, Cas (2010) “The Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Normalcy” *West European Politics* Vol. 33 Iss. 6 page 1167-1186.

Mudde, Cas. (2013) “The 2012 Stein Rokkan Lecture Three decades of populist radical right parties in Western Europe: So what?” *European Journal of Political Research (EJPR)* Vol. 52 page 1-19.

Mudde, Cas. Kaltwasser, Cristobal Rovira (2019) “Populisme” Dreyers Forlag, Oslo.

Mudde, Cas. (2021) ” Ytre Høyre i Dag” Dreyers Forlag, Oslo.

Muis, Jasper. and Immerzeel, Tim. (2017) “Causes and consequences of the rise of populist radical right parties and movements in Europe” *Current Sociology Review* Vol. 65 Iss. 6. page 909-930.

Munk, Andreas (2013) “Kjærsgaard om magtkamp med Glistrup: Han havde ingen respekt for mig” *Dansk Radio* Available as of 09.09-24 at:

<https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/indland/kjaersgaard-om-magtkamp-med-glistrup-han-havde-ingen-respekt-mig>

Muno, Wolfgang and Stockemer, Daniel (2021) “A Model for Right-Wing Populist Electoral Success? Anti-Immigrant Sentiment and the AfD in Comparative Perspective” *Populism* Vol. 4. page 25-56.

Mæhlum, Lars. Lundbo, Sten. (2024) “Europas Befolkning” *Store Norske Leksikon* Available as of 24.01-23 at: https://snl.no/Europas_befolkning

Mæhlum, Lars. Jupskås, Anders Ravik, Mæland, Runar Bjørkvik (2023) "Sverigedemokraterna” *Store Norske Leksikon* Available as of 09.09-24 at: <https://snl.no/Sverigedemokraterna>

Mæland, Runar Bjørkvik. Allkunne (Nynorsk kultursentrum) (2024) “Ulf Kristersson” *Store Norske Leksikon* Available as of 09.09-24 at: https://snl.no/Ulf_Kristersson

Naper, Ådne (2015) “Borgerlig kaos er selvforsterkende” *Agenda Magasin* Available as of

09.09-24 at: <https://agendamagasinet.no/debatt/borgerlig-kaos-selvforsterkende/>

Nielsen, Jørgen Steen (2007) “Irak-krigen preller af på danskerne” *Information.dk* Available, as of 09.09-24 at: <https://www.information.dk/indland/2007/08/irak-krigen-preller-paa-danskerne>

Nilsen, Alf Gunvald (2013) “Norway's disturbing lurch to the right” *The Guardian* Available as of 09.09-24 at: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/norway-lurch-to-right>

Nilsen, Håvard (2007) “Det nye folkepartiet” In ed. Nilsen, Håvard. Bull, Bernt. Marsdal, Magnus. Brox, Ottar. Rian, Øystein. Smedshaug, Chr. Anton. Nilsen, Marte. *Folkepartiet?* Forlaget Aktuell AS, Oslo.

NOAB (2024) “Borgerlig” *Norsk Akademis Ordbok* Available as of 09.09-24 at: <https://naob.no/ordbok/borgerlig>

Norris, Pippa. (2005) “Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market” Cambridge University Press, New York.

Norseng, Per G. Weidling Tor Ragnar. Mardal, Magnus A. and Giverholt, Helge (2019) “Danmarks Historie” *Store Norske Leksikon* Available as of 09.09-24 at: https://snl.no/Danmarks_historie

NSD (2022) “Valgundersøkelsen 1957” *Norsk senter for Forskningsdata* Available as of 24.01-23 at: <https://search.nsd.no/study/23736d90-403d-430b-87bb-1bd6274e6251>

NSD (2021) “Valgundersøkelsen 2017” *Norsk senter for Forskningsdata* Available as of 24.01-23 at: <https://search.nsd.no/study/70132cde-4842-4923-ba7b-9dcd64aadf53>

NTB (2021) “Frp vil ha mer forskning på «naturlige klimaprosesser»” *Nettavisen* Available as of 09.09-24 at: <https://www.nettavisen.no/nyheter/frp-vil-ha-mer-forskning-pa-naturlige-klimaprosesser/s/12-95->

[3424125015](#)

OECD (2024) “Official development assistance (ODA)” *Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development* Available as of 09.09-24 at:
<https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/official-development-assistance.htm>

Offer, Avner and Söderberg, Gabriel (2016) “The Nobel Factor” Princeton University Press, New Jersey, US.

Opheim, Ingunn. Aardal, Bernt. and Valen Henry. (2022) “Norwegian Election Survey 1997” *Statistisk Sentralbyrå*. Available as of 24.01-23 (through request) at:
<https://search.nsd.no/study/6cc7f3ca-4fc4-478e-aafd-c0d3f685e7a0>

Opsahl, Erik (2024) “Magnus 7. Erikson” *Store Norske Leksikon* Available as of 09.09-24 at:
https://snl.no/Magnus_7._Eriksson ,

Oscarsson, Henrik Ekengren. Berg, Linda. Hedberg, Per. Tryggvason, Per Oleskog. (2021) “Svensk valundersökning 2014” *Svensk nationell datatjänst*. Available as of 09.09-24 (through request) at: <https://snd.gu.se/sv/catalogue/study/snd1039>

Oskarson, Maria and Demker, Marie (2015) “Room for Realignment: The Working Class Sympathy for Sweden Democrats” *Government and Opposition* Vol. 50, Iss. 4, page 629-651.

Öztürk, Cemal and Pickel, Gert. (2019) “Islamophobic Right-Wing Populism? Empirical Insights about Citizens’ Susceptibility to Islamophobia and Its Impact on Right-Wing Populists’ Electoral Success: Eastern Europe in a Comparative Perspective” *Religion and Society in Eastern Europe* Vol. 12, Iss. 1. page 39-62.

Paulsen, Cathrine T. (2005) “Svenskevitsene kommer fra USA” *Forskning.no* Available as of 09.09-24 at:

<https://forskning.no/partner-moderne-historie-kulturhistorie/svenskevitsene-kommer-fra-usa/1035174>

Peterson, Abby (2019) “The Relationship Between a Movement Party and It’s Radical Flank: The Sweden Democrats and the Militant Factions Within the Swedish neo-Nazi Ultra Nationalist Movement” in ed. Caiani, Manuela. Císař, Ondřej. *Radical Right Movement Parties in Europe* Routledge, New York, US.

Phil, Roger (2019) “fjeldabe” *Store Norske Leksikon* Available as of 09.09-24 at:
<https://snl.no/fjeldabe>

Philipson, Sarah. Holm, Malin. & Thapar-Björkert, Suruchi. (2016) “Challenging Swedish Exceptionalism and White Privilege: Media Discourses on Rummet” in ed. Ewan Kirkland *Shades of Whiteness* Inter-Disciplinary Press, Oxford, UK.

Raknes, Kjetil. (2012) “Høyrepopulismens Hemmeligheter” Spartacus, Oslo.

Reiter, Margit. (2019) “Die Ehemaligen: Die Nationalsozialismus und die Anfänge der FPÖ” Wallstein Verlag, Göttingen, Germany.

Rigsarkivet (2023) “Valgundersøgelsen 1971-2019” Available as of 09.09-24 at:
<https://www.rigsarkivet.dk/udforsk/valgundersogelsen-1971-2019/>

Riksdagen (2024) “Ledermötar, partier” Available as of 09.09-24 at:
<https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/ledamoter-partier/>

Ringdal, Kristen. (2011) “Enhet og mangfold: samfunnsvitenskapelig forskning og kvantitativ metode”. Fagbokforlaget Bergen.

Ringheim, Gunnar. (2016) “FRP -Rett fra levra: En historie om svik løgn og suksess, Det største politiske eventyret i Norge”. Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, Oslo.

Romerike Fengsel (2024) “Fritidstilbud” Available as of 09.09-24 at:

<https://romerikefengsel.no/fritidstilbud/>

Ruspini, Elisabetta. (2002) “Introduction to longitudinal research” Routledge, New York.

Ruud, Solveig (2018) “ Søviknes: Det er klart at klimaet internt i Frps maktkamp var så hardt at vi nok mistet litt av det menneskelige perspektivet” *Aftenposten* Available as of 09.09-24 at:

<https://www.aftenposten.no/amagasinet/i/8wxaVA/soeviknes-det-er-klart-at-klimaet-internt-i-frps-maktkamp-var-saa-hardt-at-vi-nok-mistet-litt-av-det-menneskelige-perspektivet>

Rydgren, Jens. (2010) ““Radical Right-Wing Populism in Denmark and Sweden: Explaining Party System Change and Stability” *SAIS Review* Vol. 1 Iss. 1.

Rydgren, Jens. van der Meiden, Sara (2018) “The Radical Right and the end of Swedish Exceptionalism” *European Political Science* Vol. 18, page 439-455.

Rydgren, Jens. van der Meiden, Sara (2019) “The Radical Right and the end of Swedish Exceptionalism” *European Political Science* Vol. 18 Iss. 3 page 439-455.

Rydgren, Jens. Tyrberg, Maria (2020) “Contextual Explanations of Radical Right-Wing Party Support in Sweden: a Multilevel Analysis” *European Societies* Vol. 22 Iss. 5 page 555-580.

Salo, Sanna. Rydgren, Jens (2021) “The Battle Over Working-Class Voters: How Social Democracy Has Responded to the Populist Radical Right in the Nordic Countries” Routledge, New York, US.

Salvesen, Helge. Norseng, Per G. Mardal, Magnus A. Weidling, Tor Ragnar. Giverholt, Helge. Tvedt, Knut Are. and Opsahl, Erik. (2023) “Sveriges Historie” *Store Norske Leksikon* Available as of 09.09-24 at:

https://snl.no/Sveriges_historie#-Industrialisme_og_parlamentarisme_1866%E2%80%931920

Sejersted, Francis. (2019) “Unionsoppløsningen” *Store Norske Leksikon* Available as of 09.09-24 at: https://snl.no/Unionsoppl%C3%B8sningen_i_1905

Shepsle, Kenneth A. (2010) “Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Institutions” W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., US.

Simonsen, Marie. (2018) “Det må være bittert for Jimmie Åkesson å ha så stor framgang og så lite å vise til etter valget” *Dagbladet* Available as of 09.09-24 at: <https://www.dagbladet.no/kultur/det-ma-vaere-bittert-for-jimmie-akesson-a-ha-sa-stor-framgang-og-sa-lite-a-vise-til-etter-valget/70193636>

Skien, John. (2005) “Norrbaggar” *Norsk Rikskringkasting* Available as of 09.09-24 at: <https://www.nrk.no/kultur/norrbaggar-1.896359>

Skiphamn, Silje S. (2021) “Brevet til Carl I. Hagen fra muslimsk innvandrер fortsatt falskt” *faktisk.no* Available as of 09.09-24 at: <https://www.faktisk.no/artikler/j1mpl/brev-til-carl-i-hagen-fra-muslimsk-innvandrer-fortsatt-falskt>

Skårdalsmo, Kristian & Børringbo, Anders (2024) “Listhaug vil regjere med Høyre, ikke Venstre og KrF” *Norsk Rikskringkasting* Available as of 09.09-24 at: <https://www.nrk.no/norge/listhaug-taler-til-frps-landsstyre-1.16796468>

Smith, Brett and Monforte, Javier (2020) “Stories, new materialism and pluralism: Understanding, practicing and pushing the boundaries of narrative analysis” *Methods in Psychology* Vol. 2.

SND (2021) “Svensk valundersökning 2014” *Svensk nationell datatjänst* Available as of 09.09-24 at: <https://snd.gu.se/sv/catalogue/study/snd1039#dataset>

SND (2022) “Svensk valundersökning - Riksdagsval” *Svensk nationell datatjänst* Available as of 09.09-24 at:

<https://snd.gu.se/sv/catalogue/collection/swedish-election-studies---parliamentary-elections> ,

Sneve, Stein. (2018) “Et valg uten vinnere: Det er bare et spørsmål om tid før de andre partiene er nødt til å gjøre en avtale med Sverigedemokratene.” *Nettavisen* Available as of 09.09-24 at:

<https://www.nettavisen.no/meninger/steinsneve/et-valg-uten-vinnere/s/12-95-3423535121>

Sondel-Cedermas, Joanna. Berti, Francesco (2022) “The Right-Wing Critique of Europe Nationalist, Sovereignist and Right-Wing Populist Attitudes to the EU” Routledge, London.

Statistisk Sentralbyrå (2022a) “Norwegian Election Survey 2009” Available as of 24.01-23 (through request) at: <https://search.nsd.no/study/a27a942e-7a97-4a56-9a70-220c7170fad6>

Statistisk Sentralbyrå (2022b) “Norwegian Election Survey 2017” Available as of 24.01-23 (through request) at: <https://search.nsd.no/study/70132cde-4842-4923-ba7b-9dcd64aadf53>

Steensbeck, Bjarne. (2006) “Landsbytosse i verdensformat” *Berlingske* Available as of 09.09-24 at: <https://www.berlingske.dk/samfund/landsbytosse-i-verdensformat>

Stortinget (2024) ”Politiske Partier på Stortinget” Available as of 09.09-24 at: <https://www.stortinget.no/no/Representanter-og-komiteer/Partiene/Partioversikt/>

Strøm, Kaare (1990): “A behavioral theory of competitive political parties” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 34, Nr. 2, page 565-598.

Stubager, Rune. Andersen, Jørgen Goul. Hansen, Kasper Møller. (2011) “Valgundersøgelsen 2011” *Rigsarkivet*. Available as of 09.09-24 at: <https://digidata.rigsarkivet.dk/aflevering/37893>

Svensson, Olof. Granlund, John (2022) “SD-tjänsteman uppmanar till firande av Nazitysklands

anfall” *Aftonbladet* Available as of 09.09-24 at:

<https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/y6113A/sd-tjansteman-uppmanar-till-firande-av-nazitysklands-anfall>

Sverigedemokratene (1999) “Partiprogram” *SD-Arkivet*. Available as of 09.09-24 at:

http://sdarkivet.com/files/program/program_1999.pdf

SVT (2009) “Gomorrön Sverige 20. October 2009” *Sveriges Television* Available as of 09.09-24

at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gn056C7WhbY>

Szabo, Jakub (2020) “First as Tragedy, Then as Farce: A Comparative Study of Right-Wing Populism in Hungary and Poland” *Journal of Comparative Politics*; Ljubljana, Vol. 13, Iss. 2. page 24-42.

Sætre, Jonas (2011) “Frps Høksrud kjøpte sex i Riga: Stortingspolitikere for Frp, Bård Høksrud, innrømmer at han har kjøpt sex i Riga.” *Norsk Rikskringkasting* Available as of 09.09-24 at:

<https://www.nrk.no/vestfoldogtelemark/frps-hoksrud-kjopte-sex-i-riga-1.7803425>

Tølgensbakk, Ingvild. (2014): “Partysvensker; GO HARD! En narratologisk studie av unge svenske arbeidsmigranter nærvær i Oslo”, Institutt for kulturstudier og orientalske språk, Universitetet i Oslo.

Torvik, Yngvild Grotaas. (2022) “Ble valgets store vinner” *Klassekampen* Available as of

09.09-24 at: <https://klassekampen.no/utgave/2022-09-13/ble-valgets-store-vinner>

Tvedt, Knut Are (2020) “Terje Søviknes” *Store Norske Leksikon*. Available as of 09.09-24 at:

https://snl.no/Terje_S%C3%B8viknes

Tvedt, Knut Are. (2022a) “Stortingsvalg (resultater 1882-2021)” *Store Norske Leksikon*

Available as of 09.09-24 at: https://snl.no/Stortingsvalg_-_resultater_1882-2021

Tvedt, Knut Are. (2022b) “Enhedslisten” *Store Norske Leksikon* Available as of 09.09-24 at:
<https://snl.no/Enhedslisten>

Tvedt, Knut Are. (2022c) “Moderaterne” *Store Norske Leksikon* Available as of 09.09-24 at:
<https://snl.no/Moderaterne>

Tvedt, Knut Are. (2022d) “Danmarksdemokraterne” *Store Norske Leksikon* Available as of
09.09-24 at: <https://snl.no/Danmarksdemokraterne>

Tvedt, Knut Are. (2023) “Riksdagsvalg i Sverige” *Store Norske Leksikon* Available as of
09.09-24 at: https://snl.no/Riksdagsvalg_i_Sverige

Tvedt, Knut Are. (2024a) “Folketingsvalg i Danmark” *Store Norske Leksikon*. Available as of
09.09-24 at: https://snl.no/Folketingsvalg_i_Danmark

Tvedt, Knut Are. (2024b) “Alternativet (politisk parti i Danmark)” *Store Norske Leksikon*
Available as of 09.09-24 at: https://snl.no/Alternativet_-_politisk_parti_i_Danmark

Tvedt, Knut Are. (2024c) “Det Konservative Folkeparti” *Store Norske Leksikon* Available as of
09.09-24 at: https://snl.no/Det_Konservative_Folkeparti

Tvedt, Knut Are. (2024d) “Nye Borgerlige” *Store Norske Leksikon* Available as of 09.09-24 at:
https://snl.no/Nye_Borgerlige

UiB (2024) “Store Norske Leksikon” *Universitetet i Bergen*. Available as of 09.09-24 at:
<https://www.uib.no/foransatte/95339/store-norske-leksikon>

Valen, Henry. Aardal, Bernt. (2022a) “Norwegian Election Survey 1981” *Statistisk Sentralbyrå*.
Available as of 24.01-23 (through request) at:
<https://search.nsd.no/study/2c035c83-8e8a-40d3-b137-559ba2433241>

Valen, Henry. Aardal, Bernt. (2022b) “Norwegian Election Survey 1985” *Statistisk Sentralbyrå*. Available as of 24.01-23 (through request) at:

<https://search.nsd.no/en/study/66e4606b-1d65-47dc-91ff-339e6a470f3c>

Valen, Henry. Aardal, Bernt. (2022c) “Norwegian Election Survey 1989” *Statistisk Sentralbyrå*. Available as of 24.01-23 (through request) at:

<https://search.nsd.no/study/7b6f0e2c-9341-4236-aae5-5123e2b4140c>

Valen, Henry. Aardal, Bernt. (2022d) “Norwegian Election Survey 1993” *Statistisk Sentralbyrå*. Available as of 24.01-23 (through request) at:

<https://search.nsd.no/study/3d7e5935-e5a6-40b2-a140-a3fd5e1bdec6>

Valen, Henry. Aardal, Bernt. Høstmarka, Maria. Lagerstrøm, Bengt Oscar. Haslund, Jan. Fodnesbergene, Gunnar. and Livary, Hajar. (2022) “Norwegian Election Survey 2005” *Institute for Social Research*. Available as of 24.01-23 (through request) at:

<https://search.nsd.no/study/27c443c7-3f25-4197-b7b3-5ac0e12697ad>

Valmyndigheten (2024) “Valresultat 2022” *val.se* Available as of 09.09-24 at:

<https://www.val.se/valresultat/riksdag-region-och-kommun/2022/valresultat.html>

Viken, Øystein Lydik Idsø and Allkunne (Nynorsk kultursentrum) (2024) “Den store nordiske krigen” *Store Norske Leksikon* Available as of 09.09-24 at:

https://snl.no/Den_store_nordiske_krigen

Vromen, Ariadne (2018) “Qualitative Methods” In ed. Lowndes, Vivien. Marsh, David. Stoker, Gerry. *“Theory and Methods in Political Science”*. Palgrave, page 237-253.

Wagner. Markus (2012) “Defining and measuring niche parties” *Party Politics* Vol. 18. Iss. 6 page 845-864.

Weidling, Tor Ragnar and Njåstad, Magne (2024) “Norge under dansk styre” *Store Norske Leksikon* Available as of 09.09-24 at: https://snl.no/Norge_under_dansk_styre_-_1537-1814

Westersø, Rikke Stuck (2019) “DF styrtbløder vælgere - her er tre bud på hvorfor” *TV2.dk* Available as of 09.09-24 at: <https://nyheder.tv2.dk/politik/2019-03-29-df-styrtbloeder-vaelgere-her-er-tre-bud-paa-hvorfor>

Wicklén, Johan (2013) “Åkesson: Vi måste tvinga fram samarbete” *Sveriges Television* Available as of 09.09-24 at: <https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/maste-tvinga-fram-samarbete>

Widfeldt, Anders. (2015) “Extreme Right Parties in Scandinavia” Routledge, New York.

Wodak, Ruth. KhosraviNik, Majid. Mral, Brigitte (2013) “Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse” Bloomsbury, London.

Wærstad, Lars (2011) “Carl I. Hagens 15 mest omstridte uttalelser” *Nettavisen* Available as of 09.09-24 at: <https://www.nettavisen.no/carl-i-hagen/sitater/uttalelser/carl-i-hagens-15-mest-omstridte-uttalelser/s/12-95-3210631>

Zulianello, Mattia. Larsen, Erik Gahner (2021) “Populist parties in European Parliament elections: A new dataset on left, right and valence populism from 1979 to 2019” *Electoral Studies* Vol. 71. page 1-8.

Variable and population table, Norway (Spm is an abbreviation of “spørsmål”=question.)

Year	Gen. pop. / RWP pop.	Foreign aid	Support for immigrants	Vote choice
81	1596/31	V. 68	N.A.	V. 302
85	2180/65	V. 74	V. 185	V. 390
89	2195/219	V. 82	V. 374	V. 331
93	2194/79	V. 86	V. 144	V. 344
97	2055/199	Spm. 4	Spm. 17e	Spm. 65
01	2341/153	V. 60	V. 266	V. 99
05	2012/329	Spm. 6	Spm. 28d	Spm. 84
09	1782/297	V. 12	V. 98	V. 227
13	1982/179	Spm. 5	Spm. 23f	Spm. 72
17	1966/193	N.A.	Spm. 22d	Spm. 50

(Valen and Aardal 2022a, 2022b, 2022c, 2022d, Opheim et al. 2022, Aardal et al. 2022, Valen et al. 2022, Institute for Social Research and Statistisk Sentralbyrå 2022, Statistisk Sentralbyrå 2022a, 2022b)

Denmark.

Year	Gen. pop. /RWP pop.	Foreign aid	Support for immigrants	Vote choice
90	1008/139	V. 185	V. 186	V. 143
94	3997/93	V. 226	V. 227	V. 80
98	2001/82	V. 99	V.100	V. 58
01	2026/204	V. 100	V. 101	V. 58
05	2264/245	V. 169	V. 170	V. 20
07	4018/380	V. 204	V. 205	V. 28
11	2078/168	V. 170	V. 171	V. 63
15	2078/351	V. 168	V. 169	V. 51
19	2422/154	V. 173	V. 174	Spm. 18

(Borre et al. 1991, 1998, 2002 Andersen 2002, 2005, 2008, Stubanger, Andersen, and Hansen 2011, Hansen 2015, Hansen and Stubager 2019).

Sweden (F, fråga=question).

Year	Gen. pop./RWP pop.	Foreign aid	Support for immigrants	Vote choice
82	3724	V. 116	V. 115	V. 167
85	3873	V. 114	V. 105	V. 203
88	3926	V. 117	V. 122	V. 180
91	3700/(ND) 169	V. 170	V. 131	V. 462
94	3341/(ND) 25	V. 146	V. 133	V. 493
98	2901	V. 152	V. 144	V. 227
02	3788	V. 205	V. 207	V. 300
06	3999/(SD) 12	V. 546	V. 548	V. 255
10	3963/(SD) 41	V. 839	V. 841	V. 306
14	3971/(SD) 48	F. 39f	N.A.	F. 11ba

(Holmberg 1986, 2001, Holmberg and Gilljam 1988, 1991, 1993, 1997, Holmberg and Oscarsson 2004, 2008, 2017, Oscarsson et al. 2021).