



# MASTERARBEIT | MASTER'S THESIS

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On Pleasure

An Intertextual Comparison of Aristotle and Epicurus in the Light  
of Ethics

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## List of Abbreviations

For Citations from ancient authors whose abbreviations are not included on this list, please see the list of abbreviations in LSJ, GPL and TLL-index.

Plato (Pl.):

*Gorg.*    *Gorgias*

*Phlb.*    *Philebus*

*Rep.*    *Republic*

*Tim.*    *Timaios*

Aristotle (Ar.):

*APr.*    *Prior Analytics*

*DA*    *De Anima (On the Soul)*

*EE*    *Eudemina Ethics*

*EN*    *Nicomachean Ethics*

*MM*    *Magna Moralia*

*Metaph.* *Metaphysics*

*Pr.*    *Problemata*

*Protr.*    *Aristotle's Protrepticus (Düring's edition)*

*Rhet.*    *Rhetoric (Art of Rhetoric)*

*Top.*    *Topica*

Cicero (Cic.):

*Fin.*    *De Finibus Bonorum et malorum (On Ends)*

*Hortens.* *Hortensius*

Diogenes Laertius (DL):

*D. L.*    *Lives of the Philosophers (Book X on Epicurus)*

Lucretius:

*Lucr.*    *De Rerum Natura (On the Nature of Things)*

Epicurus:

*KD*    *Kuriai Doxai (Principal Opinions)*

*LHdt*    *Letter to Herodotus*

*LMen*    *Letter to Menoeceus*

*LPyth*    *Letter to Pythocles*

*Us.*    *H. Usener, ed., Epicurea (a collection of fragments and reports. Leipzig, 1887)*

*VS*    *Vaticanae Sententiae (a collection of maxims)*



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## Introduction

### The Scientific Problem Formulation of the Thesis

And just as at the Olympic games the wreaths of victory are not bestowed upon the handsomest and strongest persons present, but on men who enter for the competitions—since it is among these that the winners are found, —so it is those who *act* rightly who carry off the prizes and good things of life. [...] Therefore their life has no need of pleasure as a sort of ornamental appendage, but contains its pleasure in itself.<sup>1</sup>

—Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.9.1099a3-16.

Since the Socratic turn in the history of philosophy, the direction of asking philosophical questions has undergone a significant change. Along with the philosophical questions about nature, Socrates shifted his focus to moral questions that became dominant in the newly emerging branch of philosophy called ethics. The question of ‘how to find happiness in human life?’ became one of the fundamental questions. As Zuckert once remarked: “What human beings really want is happiness, that is, the good life – without end.”<sup>2</sup> The concept of pleasure (ἡδονή) has consistently been a central aspect of the answer to this question. It has either simply accompanied an adequate attempt to answer it or even been identified with happiness itself. Therefore, it has always been a topic that has attracted strong interest and been discussed in many ways throughout history. In his article, Professor Katz describes the concept of pleasure as follows:

Pleasure, in the inclusive usages important in thought about well-being, experience, and mind, includes the affective positivity of all joy, gladness, liking, and enjoyment – all our feeling good or happy. It is often contrasted with the similarly inclusive pain, or suffering, of all our feeling bad. Nowadays ‘happiness’ is often used similarly, which leads to confusion with older uses signifying overall good fortune or success in life that figure in self-reports of happiness and in happiness studies of the diverse sources of these.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.9.1099a3-16.

<sup>2</sup> Catherine Zuckert, “THE SOCRATIC TURN,” *History of Political Thought* 25, no. 2 (2004): 204, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26220160>.

<sup>3</sup> Leonard D. Katz, “Pleasure,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/pleasure/>.

From this statement, it can be derived that the concept of pleasure has always been heterogeneous. Today, it can be summarized from at least three perspectives. First, pleasure is a simple but powerful feeling that occurs directly in the momentary conscious experience. Second, pleasure is more like a heterogeneous concept, with a more functional purpose that depends on a kind of directedness towards objects or contents (intentionality). Third, the concept of pleasure is closely linked to neuroscience and motivation-based analysis (phenomenology). The first perspective has been described as inadequate by various philosophers, such as Gilbert Ryle in 1949 and Fred Feldman in 2004. Since behaviorism once dominated psychology, it cannot be any episode of conscious experience according to Gilbert Ryle, while Feldman claims that the concept of pleasure might be no more than a pure propositional attitude, of which feelings are not an essential part. The second perspective is closely related to the third, whereby the questions of “is pleasure depending on motivation or is it a pure stance of affective openness (for a lack of a better place-holding term)?” are central to this conception.<sup>4</sup> With the advent of neuroscience, a new era of discourse has launched around the concept of pleasure. Modern scientists emphasize that the feeling of pleasure must be associated with a “hedonic hotspot activity (specific transmitter activity)” to be observed as such.<sup>5</sup> Thus, in their studies of pleasure Berridge and Kringelbach perceive two functionally integrated modes of activity, classified as wanting and liking. They claim that “wanting for reward is generated by a large and distributed brain system. Liking, or pleasure itself, is generated by a smaller set of hedonic hot spots within limbic circuitry.”<sup>6</sup> Thus, the activity of liking (unmixed with wanting and pain) should be regarded as the true (e.g., undriven, pure) pleasure (e.g., stance). As a result, pleasure emerges as a “transient outgrowth of a larger biological syndrome of pursuit (quality of outward things) and temporary attainment.”<sup>7</sup> In this sense, the concept of pleasure can be classified as a unified psychobiological phenomenon, while remaining as a field of further scientific research. It is therefore necessary to list some basic facts that – for the time being – are duly taken into account by human beings: “Mood varies with energy and thus with circadian rhythms affecting body temperature and also with the current availability of nutrients in the blood; that how much pleasure we experience also depends on getting enough, and good enough, sleep:

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<sup>4</sup> Katz.

<sup>5</sup> Katz.

<sup>6</sup> Kent C. Berridge and Morten L. Kringelbach, “Pleasure Systems in the Brain,” *Neuron* 86, no. 3 (May 2015): 646, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2015.02.018>.

<sup>7</sup> Katz, “Pleasure.”

that pleasure increases our immune response, and the question of ‘how we feel?’ may grow in part out of monitoring bodily homeostasis.”<sup>8</sup> In the coming years, it will be necessary to further explore the concept of pleasure, while is likely to become an important aspect of human life as it is relevant to a deeper understanding of the question “Why Our Pursuit of Happiness May Be Flawed?”<sup>9</sup>

The Classical antiquity has been employed as a kind of mediating function between ancient and modern-time concepts of pleasure. In doing so, it reveals a formal framework and a continuity about the concepts of pleasure throughout philosophical history. In this sense, two famous Greek philosophers remain relevant for today’s analysis, namely Aristotle and Epicurus. The former represents the concept of pleasure as an “unimpeded functioning,” whereas the latter represents it as a “Natural anxiety-free and pain-free State.”<sup>10</sup>

## Scientific Question and Method

The main scientific question addressed in the master’s thesis is as follows: What is the additional insight gained from comparing the two concepts of pleasure in the philosophical branch of ethics for the modern times? In order to provide an adequate scientific answer to this question, the thesis employs the scientific method of intertextuality.

### *Intertextuality*

The first articulation of intertextual theory was written down by the French-Bulgarian philosopher Julia Kristeva in the late-1960s. Her work was influenced by the readings of the French structuralist Ferdinand de Saussure and the Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin. Saussure indicated a relational nature of meaning and text, while Bakhtin perceived the existence of language within specific social situations, which became known as “Bakhtinian dialogism.”<sup>11</sup> Thus, influenced by both scholars, Julia Kristeva became one of the pioneers of post-structuralism due to her assertion that every text has a reference to another one:

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<sup>8</sup> Katz.

<sup>9</sup> Nat Rutherford, “Why Our Pursuit of Happiness May Be Flawed,” *BBC Future*, January 6, 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20210105-why-our-pursuit-of-happiness-may-be-flawed>.

<sup>10</sup> Katz, “Pleasure.”

<sup>11</sup> Graham Allen, *Intertextuality*, Third edition (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2022), 21.

Tout texte se construit comme mosaïe de citations, tout texte est absorption et transformation d'un autre texte. A la place de la notion d'intersubjectivité s'installe celle d'intertextualité.<sup>12</sup>

However, as a result, the intertextual theory runs the risk of ultimately becoming infinite, because Kristeva's concept of intertextuality does not describe an intertextual scientific method but rather signifies the transition from structuralist to post-structuralist theories. Therefore, it represents a textual theory rather than a literary method. In this sense, scientific methods in literary and cultural theories that are characterized by claims to objectivity, scientific rigor or methodological stability have become subjective, uncertain or indeterminate. Just as structuralists are convinced that "Saussurean linguistics can help criticism to become objective, even scientific in nature, post-structuralists have argued that criticism ... is inherently unstable, the product of subjective desires and drives."<sup>13</sup> Ultimately, two opposing schools have emerged in recent decades, namely the structuralists and the post-structuralists. Among the school of structuralists, two specific philosophers have made scientific contribution to the development of literary methods for intertextual analysis, namely the French philosopher Gérard Genette and the German linguist Manfred Pfister. In his work *Palimpsest*, the French Philosopher Gérard Genette defined intertextual phenomena as transtextuality, as "all that sets the textual relationship, whether obvious or concealed, with other texts."<sup>14</sup> Consequently, he proceeded to develop categories for the systematic analysis of these intertextual phenomena to reveal intertextual dependencies.

The German scholar Pfister adopted an alternative to Genette's approach, developing different kinds of categories for intertextual analysis, derived from those by Genette. These were presented in his essay "Konzepte der Intertextualität" – published in the anthology *Intertextualität* – and comprise developed quantitative (density, frequency) and qualitative categories. In collaboration with Broich, Pfister developed an individual text reference and a system text reference as well as a vertical (synchronic) and a horizontal (diachronic) dimension of intertextual analysis. Thus, for practical reasons, the thesis follows Pfister's categories in the intertextual evaluation process, which can be read as follows:

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<sup>12</sup> Julia Kristeva, *Sēmeiotikē: recherches pour une sémanalyse*, Points 96 (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1978), 85.

<sup>13</sup> Allen, *Intertextuality*, 3.

<sup>14</sup> Allen, 245.

Referentiality (dt. Referentialität): This concerns the question whether a word or linguistic structure is used only in a specific reference given to it (keywords: use, mention, refer to). A relationship between texts is more intertextual when one text thematizes the other by revealing its authenticity. In this way, the follow-up text becomes the metatext of the pre-text.

Communicativity (dt. Kommunikativität): This characterizes the pragmatic of author and text and describes the degree of awareness of the intertextual reference on the part of the author and the recipient, as well as the distinctiveness of the indentations in the text itself.

Autoreflexivity (dt. Autoreflexivität): This describes the level of metacommunicative reflexivity about intertextual relativity, referring to the question: Does the author problematize or justify the intertextual premises? If so, then an autoreflexivity is identified.

Structurality (dt. Strukturalität): This describes the syntagmatic integration of the pre-text into the follow-up text. The pre-text becomes the structural background of the follow-up text (e.g., Homer's *Odysseus* provides the structural background for J. Joyce's *Ulysses* or Homer's *Iliad* for Virgil's *Aeneid*).

Selectivity (dt. Selektivität): This characterizes the degree of awareness of intertextual references, which refers to the question of how precisely the certain elements (e.g., quotations, norms, genre etc.) of the pre-text are chosen to serve as a background for the follow-up text. Thus, the intertextual reference is more intense when a quotation is cited in a text rather than when an allusion is made.

Dialogicity (dt. Dialogizität): This is based on the concept of Bakhtinian dialogism. The follow-up text is more intertextual when there are semantic and ideological tensions with the given pre-text.<sup>15</sup>

In consideration of the aforementioned intertextual elements, a few sub-questions emerge that serve as a leitmotif throughout this master's thesis:

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<sup>15</sup> For further details, see Manfred Pfister, "Konzepte Der Intertextualität," in *Intertextualität: Formen, Funktionen, Anglistische Fallstudien*, ed. Ulrich Broich and Manfred Pfister, Konzepte Der Sprach- Und Literaturwissenschaft (Tübingen: M. Niemeyer, 1985), 26–30.

1. How can the historical background of the two texts be described?
2. What is the precise meaning of the term ‘προτρεπτικός logos’?
3. What are the structural and linguistic features of the texts?
4. To whom are the two texts addressed and in what period can they be dated?
5. Can any similarities or dissimilarities be identified?
6. To what extent is there an intertextual relationship between the texts?
7. What is the conclusion of the intertextual analysis presented in the synopsis?
8. What insights can the two texts offer into the concept of pleasure in the modern times?

## Procedure and Ambition

In order to provide a comprehensive response to these questions, the intertextual analysis is preceded by a textual analysis of both the original Greek texts, which have been translated by me and accompanied by a textual commentary. In order to ensure sufficient transparency, the textual commentary is based on the structure of the “Four Sample Passages” within the *Cambridge Grammar of Classical Greek (CGCG)*, which is linguistically supported by the *Ancient Greek Grammar (AGG)* for the analysis at the same time. The textual commentary will be individually adapted and is based on the principles of utility and added value. Furthermore, the *Perseus Project Greek Word Study Tools* from Tufts University provide additional lexical knowledge to reinforce the commentary. Finally, the philological database *Thesaurus Lingua Graecae (TLG)* will be used for the textual analysis and comparatistics.

In addition, both texts display a distinctive quality, namely being classified as exhortations to philosophy (προτρεπτικός λόγος). For this reason, these works are categorized as exoteric, intended for a general audience (the outer circle), in contrast to the esoteric works, which are directed towards the disciples or partners in dialogue (the inner circle) of the school.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> For further details, see Sophie Van der Meeren, ed., *Exhortation à la philosophie: le dossier grec, Aristote*, Fragments 11 (Paris: Belles lettres, 2011), XXIV–XXV; Gerhart Schneeweiss, ed., *Protrepikos: Hinführung zur Philosophie*, Texte zur Forschung, Bd. 85 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005), 189–191.

Furthermore, the thesis is divided into four sections, which are as follows: (1) Introduction, (2) Aristotle: *Protrepticus*, (3) Epicurus: *Letter to Menoeceus*, and (4) Intertextuality: On Pleasure. Both texts (sections 2 and 3) will be analyzed in terms of their form and content. At the beginning of sections 2 and 3, the thesis will summarize the main events in each philosopher's life, while the content and context of both texts will be described through the application of textual and literary criticism, genre criticism, an analysis of the structure and language of the text as well as an examination of the addressee and dating. The third section constitutes the main body of the thesis and comprises a textual commentary, divided into four subsections: (a) Text, (b) Translation, (c) Textual Criticism and (d) Commentary. The commentary again comprises two parts: (a) General Notes and (b) Detailed Notes. Finally, a conclusion is drawn at the end of each section. Section four focuses on the intertextual analysis of both texts. It compares the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* with *the Letter to Menoeceus* and examines them according to Broich and Pfister's qualitative (I) and quantitative (II) criteria. Finally, the thesis ends up with a synopsis and synthesis.

Regarding the bibliography, there are several points to be made. The Aristotelian *Protrepticus* is defined as a lost work and it is not included in the *Corpus Aristotelicum*. However, it is mentioned in some testimonies of some older scholars, such as Olympiodorus, Elias, David, Cicero and Diogenes Laertius.<sup>17</sup> A textual history of the reconstruction of Aristotle's *Protrepticus* from the beginning until the 20<sup>th</sup> century can be found in the important essay "A Brief Account of the Reconstruction of Aristotle's *Protrepticus*" by Anton Hermann Chroust. Additionally, he edited his own attempt at reconstructing the Aristotelian *Protrepticus*, which was published alongside those by Düring (1964), Berti (2000), Schneeweiß (2005) and Hutchinson and Johnson (2017). However, the general process of its reconstruction was severely criticized from the outset by Rabinowitz's first study *Aristotle's Protrepticus and the Source of its Reconstruction*.

The edition of *Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction* by Düring was selected as the research basis for the thesis due to the findings of Schubert and Brandt, who

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<sup>17</sup> For further details, see Ingemar Düring, ed., *Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction*, Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis (Göteborg: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1961), 43–45.



stated that Düring's edition is well established in research to date.<sup>18</sup> However, the thesis will also make references to the other editions when certain aspects of the content are necessary for clarification. In particular, the results of the Hutchinson and Johnson's edition will be closely integrated into the research process, as they provide the most recent findings. However, it should be noted that Schubert and Brandt have criticized the results of Hutchinson and Johnson's edition in general, arguing that the citation analysis contradicts their findings.<sup>19</sup> In addition, several important studies are worth mentioning in this context: First, there is the main work *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro* by Ettore Bignone, an Italian philosopher who provides a detailed commentary on some lost dialogues of Aristotle (e.g., *Εὐδημος, Προτρεπτικός, Φιλοσοφία*) and their relations with Epicurean philosophy. The research article "Studies in Epicurus and Aristotle" by Philip Merlan is also worth mentioning as it represents a comparative textual study of Aristotle and Epicurus on the concept of pleasure. Finally, the textual commentary *Exhortation à la philosophie: le dossier grec. Aristote.* by Van der Meeren also holds significance.

On the contrary, Epicurus' *Letter to Menoeceus* has been preserved and recorded by various scholars, representing the most valuable understanding of Epicurean ethics. Regarding the bibliography, a number of remarks are necessary. First there is the valuable and detailed commentary on the *Letter to Menoeceus* by Jan Erik Hessler. Second, a comprehensive two-volume work on *Hellenistic philosophy* has been edited by Anthony A. Long and David N. Sedley. Third, there is the introduction work *Epikur* by Malte Hossenfelder. Fourth, the work *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* by Martha C. Nussbaum is also important to be noted, presenting a renowned work in the scientific field. Further references will be made throughout the thesis.

Despite extensive research efforts in the past, no scientific intertextual research studies have been conducted. Source criticism and research on the influence of textual characteristics have only been carried out by research scholars in recent decades. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to address this scientific gap.

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<sup>18</sup> For further details, see Charlotte Schubert et al., eds., *Der Protreptikos des Iamblich: Rekonstruktion, Refragmentarisierung und Kontextualisierung mit Textmining* (Propylaeum, 2017), 21–22, <https://doi.org/10.11588/propylaeum.257.339>.

<sup>19</sup> For further details, see Schubert et al., 26.

Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that the research is limited by a few factors. For instance, the thesis focuses on the concepts of pleasure, examining only Düring's fragments from B87 to B91 of Aristotle's *Protrepticus* and Epicurus' *Letter to Menoeceus* from the passages *LMen* 127,8 to *LMen* 132. Related works by Aristotle (e.g., *Eudemian Ethics* or *Nicomachean Ethics*) or Epicurus (e.g., *Letter to Herodotus*) serve to reinforce certain perspectives for clarification or illustration and thus only have a supporting character. The thesis tries to be close to the original text and historical context, and thus the use of secondary literature is limited. In terms of inconsistencies, the following works are the basic references, unless otherwise noted: *Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction* by Düring for the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* and the work *Epicurus: The Extant Remains* by Bailey for the *Letter to Menoeceus*.

## **ARISTOTLE – *Protrepticus***

### **Life and Work**

Aristotle was born in 384 BC in Stageira, a small village situated on the east coast of Chalkidiki. He was the child of a family of doctors. His father, Nikomachos, was a physician at the royal court of King Amyntas III., who ruled Macedonia in 393–369 BC. Proxenos of Atarneus, Aristotle's brother-in-law, looked after him after his father's death in 375 BC. He provided the young Aristotle with a comprehensive education.<sup>20</sup> In 367 BC, the seventeen-year-old Aristotle enrolled at the Academy of Plato in Athens, where he remained for approximately two decades. Eudoxus of Cnidus was the scholarch (headmaster) of the Academy, while Plato travelled to Sicily (Syracuse) for the second time (367–366 BC).<sup>21</sup> The idealism of Plato and the hedonism of Eudoxos constituted the foundation of Aristotle's initial philosophical outlook. He read and wrote assiduously and commenced the process of rejecting the doctrine of Platonic forms. He delivered lectures on dialectics, rhetoric, and scientific

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<sup>20</sup> “‘Die Geometrie ist die Erkenntnis des ewig Seienden; sie führt die Seele zur Wahrheit und stiftet in uns die richtige Haltung zur Philosophie.’ Nach einer bekannten Anekdote stand an dem Gebäude der Schule die Inschrift: ‘Hier darf niemand ohne Kenntnis der Geometrie eintreten.’ Dazu kann man sagen: se non è vero è ben fatto.” Ingemar Düring, *Aristoteles: Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens*, Bibliothek der klassischen Altertumswissenschaften. Neue Folge. 1. Reihe 2 (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1966), 4.

<sup>21</sup> For a different approach, see Hans-Joachim Waschkies, *Von Eudoxos zu Aristoteles [i.e. Aristoteles]: das Fortwirken der Eudoxischen Proportionentheorie in der Aristotelischen Lehre vom Kontinuum*, Studien zur antiken Philosophie 8 (Amsterdam: B.R. Grüner, 1977), 41–52.

demonstration and proceeded to develop his own philosophical worldview (e.g., χωριστόν), which remains contingent on Plato's teachings. Furthermore, his ethical treatises (e.g., *Magna Moralia* and *Eudemian Ethics*) are descriptive and strongly oriented towards logical systematization and classification. By the end of his time at the Academy, he had achieved the social position of a teacher and scholar. Consequently, his first stay in Athens is regarded as the most important and vital of his life.<sup>22</sup>

However, by the end of Aristotle's first stay in Athens between 367 and 347 BC, the political climate against him had become increasingly discriminatory. At this time, Athens was dominated by two political parties, the Panhellenes, and the Athenians. The first party adopted a pro-Macedonian attitude, while the other was anti-Macedonian. However, Aristotle was always considered as a foreigner in Athens, and thus he was unable to purchase property (e.g., a house or school). After the takeover of the Athenians by the leader Demosthenes in 347 BC, his life was in danger. Furthermore, after Plato's death in 347 BC, his nephew Speusippus became headmaster of the Academy and was not sympathetic to the Aristotelian doctrine. As a result, the Academy did not offer him its support as it had previously done in the face of impending political hostilities. Therefore, Aristotle accepted an invitation from Hermias of Atarneus to spend two years with his former student Xenocrates at court in Asia Minor. Aristotle was probably acquainted with Hermias through his brother-in-law Proxenos, the ruler of Atarneus and Assos at the time. Hermias was a supporter of King Philip and the pro-Macedonian party. However, the reason for his departure from Athens at the end is not historically verified.<sup>23</sup>

## Context and Content

### *Introduction*

During his first stay in Athens, Aristotle did not appear much in public life, although this changed when the educational program of the Academy was called into question. Alongside the Academy, there was the school of Isocrates, which at the same time was highly influential in the field of education in society. Isocrates' philosophy was known for its rhetorical and practical educational program, representing the most notable counterpart to the

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<sup>22</sup> For further details, see Düring, *Aristoteles*, 46–50.

<sup>23</sup> For further details, see Düring, 9–11.

educational program (παιδεία) of Plato's Academy.<sup>24</sup> In his later years, Isocrates composed a forensic speech (γένος δικανικόν) entitled the *Antidosis*, in which he set out his own defense of his educational program.<sup>25</sup> Moreover, the text also contains the longest and most direct criticism of the Academy's educational program, casting doubt on "the usefulness of mathematical, logical, and natural speculation."<sup>26</sup> In their essay "The *Antidosis* of Isocrates and Aristotle's *Protrepticus*," Hutchinson and Johnson provide a faithful translation of an extract as follows:

I believe that the teachers who are skilled in disputation and those who are occupied with astronomy and geometry and studies of that sort do not injure but, on the contrary, benefit their pupils, not so much as they profess, but more than others give them credit for. Most men see in such studies nothing but empty talk and hair-splitting; for none of these disciplines has any useful application either to private or to public affairs; nay, they are not even remembered for any length of time after they are learned because they do not attend us through life nor do they lend aid in what we do, but are wholly divorced from our necessities. But I am neither of this opinion nor am I far removed from it; rather it seems to me both that those who hold that this training is of no use in practical life are right and that those who speak in praise of it have truth on their side. If there is a contradiction in this statement, it is because these disciplines are different in their nature from the other studies which make up our education; for the other branches avail us only after we have gained a knowledge of them, whereas these studies can be of no benefit to us after we have mastered them unless we have elected to make our living from this source, and only help us while we are in the process of learning. For while we are occupied with the subtlety and exactness of astronomy and geometry and are forced to apply our minds to difficult problems, and are, in addition, being habituated to speak and apply ourselves to what is said and shown to us, and not to let our wits go wool-gathering, we gain the power, after being exercised and sharpened on these disciplines, of grasping and learning more easily and more quickly those subjects which are of more importance and of greater value. I do not, however, think it proper to apply the term philosophy to a training which is no help to use in the present either in our speech or in our actions, but rather I would call it a gymnastic of the mind and preparation for philosophy. It is, to be sure, a study more advanced than that which boys in school pursue, but it is for the most part the same sort of thing; for they also when they have labored through their lessons in grammar, music, and the other branches, are not a whit advanced in their ability to speak and deliberate on affairs, but they have increased their aptitude for mastering greater and more serious studies (*Antidosis* 261-7, trans. Norlin).<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> For further details, see Düring, *Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction*, 33–35.

<sup>25</sup> For further details, see D.S. Hutchinson and Monte Ransome Johnson, "The *Antidosis* of Isocrates and Aristotle's *Protrepticus*." (unpublished, 2010), 1–2, <http://www.protrepticus.info/antidosisprotrepticus.pdf>.

<sup>26</sup> Hutchinson and Johnson, 11.

<sup>27</sup> Hutchinson and Johnson, 12.

In order to justify the educational program of the Academy, it is necessary to elucidate the philosophical insights and values inherent in it. These can be retrieved in the Aristotelian response to it, which is also rewritten in the *Protrepticus* of Iamblichus within Chapter 9. It is also presented by Hutchinson and Johnson in their essay as follows:

To seek from every kind of knowledge something other than itself and to require that it must be useful is the demand of someone utterly ignorant of how far apart in principle good things reform the necessities; they are totally different. For among the things without which living is impossible, the ones which are liked on account of something else should be called necessities and joint causes, while all those that are liked for themselves, even if nothing else results from them, should be called goods in the strict sense; for this is not valuable because of that, and that for the sake of something else, and this goes on proceeding to infinity – rather, this comes to a stop somewhere. So it is absolutely ridiculous, then, to seek from everything a benefit beyond from the thing itself, and to ask ‘so, what as the benefit for us?’ and ‘What’s the use’ for its true what we say; such a fellow doesn’t seem like someone who knows noble goodness, or who distinguishes between a cause and a joint cause (Aristotle apud Iamblichus, *Protrepticus* IX 52.16-53.2 Pistelli).<sup>28</sup>

In light of this response, Hutchinson and Johnson have concluded that “Aristotle develops out of this criticism a general organization of knowledge and an axiology of science that distinguishes between productive and practical knowledge, on the one hand, and theoretical and speculative knowledge on the other.”<sup>29</sup> For this reason, the Academy always defended its own educational program as the highest good, while the Isocratic school gave priority to rhetoric and practical education. Therefore, both schools had become very influential in ancient times. Although the educational programs of the two schools diverged in their respective aims and objectives, the question of whether the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* has always taken such a clear position remains an open question until today.<sup>30</sup>

### *Textual and Literary Criticism*

The Aristotelian *Protrepticus* is a lost work and the editions that have tried to reconstruct it have constantly been confronted with three major challenges:

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<sup>28</sup> Hutchinson and Johnson, 13–14.

<sup>29</sup> Hutchinson and Johnson, 14.

<sup>30</sup> For further details, see Jan Erik Hessler, ed., *Epikur, Brief an Menoikeus: Edition, Übersetzung, Einleitung und Kommentar*, trans. Jan Erik Hessler, Schwabe Epicurea 4 (Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 2014), 42; James Henderson Collins, “Philosophical Advertisements: Protreptic Marketing in Fourth-Century Greek Culture” (2007), 270–83.

First, locating authentic fragments, excerpts or, at least, reliable references or allusions to the lost *Protrepticus*; secondly, establishing the proper order in which these fragments should be arranged; and, thirdly, interpreting these fragments, once they have been located and arranged.<sup>31</sup>

As Rabinowitz observed, “the process of resurrecting the *Protrepticus* began in 1863, with the publication of J. Bernays work *Dialogue des Aristoteles*, and V. Rose’ *Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus*.”<sup>32</sup> He proceeded to argue that “Bernays was the first scholar to draw attention to the usefulness of the first book of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* and Cicero’s *Hortensius* for the ‘recovery’ of passages from the lost *Protrepticus*.”<sup>33</sup> Moreover, Chroust mentioned that “Bernays was also the first to suggest that *P Oxy.*, IV, 666 (Grenfell-Hunt), was probably part of the original *Protrepticus*, or of some other early work of Aristotle.”<sup>34</sup> On the contrary, V. Rose rejected Bernays’ attribution of the *Hortensius* and the first book of *Metaphysics*. In his collection of Aristotelian fragments *Aristotelis Qui Ferebantur Librorum Fragmenta* (1867), he devoted himself to the fragments of Stobaeus and the commentators, to which he added two new fragments without any reason: first, a passage from the work of Cicero *De finibus* II, 40; and second, one from the work of Boethius *De consolation Philosophiae* III,8.<sup>35</sup> However, neither scholar was able to determine the literary genre of the *Protrepticus* at the time. Therefore, Rose left it in the following statement by following Bernays’ opinion: “fortasse dialogus fuit.”<sup>36</sup>

In 1869, Bywater published the article “On a Lost Dialogue of Aristotle” in the *Journal of Philology*, which revolutionized the study of the *Protrepticus*. He discovered an excerpt from the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* in the work *Protrepticus* by the Neoplatonic Syrian Philosopher Iamblichus. According to Bywater, it contained chapters 5–12 of the Aristotelian *Protrepticus*. He also defined its form as a dialogue and declared it to be one of his youthful writings, following the Platonic ideal of a philosopher king. As a result, the work exhibits a

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<sup>31</sup> Anton-Hermann Chroust, “A Brief Account of the Reconstruction of Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*,” *Classical Philology* 60, no. 4 (October 1965): 229, <https://doi.org/10.1086/365046>.

<sup>32</sup> Wilson Gerson Rabinowitz, *Aristotle’s Protrepticus and the Sources of Its Reconstruction*, vol. 1, University of California Publications in Classical Philology (Berkley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1957), 2.

<sup>33</sup> Rabinowitz, 1:3.

<sup>34</sup> Chroust, “A Brief Account of the Reconstruction of Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*,” 229.

<sup>35</sup> Rabinowitz, *Aristotle’s Protrepticus and the Sources of Its Reconstruction*, 1:3.

<sup>36</sup> Rabinowitz, 1:3.

closer relationship between philosophy and politics in its structure rather than in its treatises.<sup>37</sup> In 1873, another fragment – which was sparsely documented – was added by Usener.<sup>38</sup> Three years later (1876), Hirzel published the essay “Über den *Protreptikos* des Aristoteles” in *Hermes*, in which he defined the *Protrepticus* as a speech (discourse) for the first time in historical research by following his personal observations and the sophistic tradition of the protreptic genre.<sup>39</sup> Moreover, Hirzel limited the excerpt (5–12) from Bywater’s studies to chapters 6 to 8, stating that the *Protrepticus* only contains these chapters. Furthermore, he proposed that Iamblichus used other Aristotelian works for chapters 5 and 9 to 12. However, Diels – along with Rose, Bywater and Usener – held the view that the *Protrepticus* was a dialogue in its form, which Diels clarified in his essay “Zu Aristoteles’ *Protreptikos* und Cicero’s *Hortensius*” in *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*.<sup>40</sup> Thus, they denied that the *Protrepticus* was written in the form of a speech. Ten years later, in 1886, V. Rose published his third edition of the Aristotelian fragments, which included additional content.<sup>41</sup>

In 1923, Jaeger initiated a new beginning in reconstructing the Aristotelian *Protrepticus*, with the publication of his work *Aristoteles: Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung*. In this work, Jaeger confirmed that chapters 6–12 in the *Protrepticus* of Iamblichus are held in the voice of Aristoteles. Thus, Jaeger’s interpretation differed from that of Bywater, with rejecting chapter 5 and the last part of chapter 12, according to Chroust.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, he also defined the form of the *Protrepticus* as a speech (discourse) by following Hirzel’s interpretation. Gadamer confirmed the results with some exceptions. In 1933, Bignone – who followed Jaeger’s findings – proclaimed that vestiges of the *Protrepticus* could be found in the works of Epicurus and the Epicureans. In this way, Bignone was able to add additional fragments, which were accepted and included in the edition of selected fragments *Aristotelis Dialogorum Fragmenta in Usum Scholarum Selegit* published by Walzer in 1934, according to Rabinowitz.<sup>43</sup> However, as Gadamer had already argued in 1928, the challenge for modern scholars was to reconstruct the proper sequence. One of the

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<sup>37</sup> For further details, see Chroust, “A Brief Account of the Reconstruction of Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*,” 229.

<sup>38</sup> For further details, see Rabinowitz, *Aristotle’s Protrepticus and the Sources of Its Reconstruction*, 1:4–5.

<sup>39</sup> For further details, see Rabinowitz, 1:6.

<sup>40</sup> For further details, see Rabinowitz, 1:9.

<sup>41</sup> For further details, see Rabinowitz, 1:14.

<sup>42</sup> For further details, see Chroust, “A Brief Account of the Reconstruction of Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*,” 231.

<sup>43</sup> For further details, see Rabinowitz, *Aristotle’s Protrepticus and the Sources of Its Reconstruction*, 1:19–20.



scholars who faced this challenge was Ingemar Düring, according to Chroust.<sup>44</sup> He adopted and confirmed Gadamer in its findings and attested that the transitional sentences of Iamblichus – which are written between the Aristotelian lines – are Aristotelian, at least in their spirit.<sup>45</sup> Moreover, Chroust asserted that Iamblichus had not only direct access to the *Protrepticus* but also copied it verbatim. Furthermore, Düring recovered chapter 5, which Jaeger had dismissed. Based on the work *From Platonism to Neoplatonism* by P. Merlan, he added the fragment *De communi mathematica scientia* of Iamblichus and attested it as an excerpt of the *Protrepticus*, according to Chroust.<sup>46</sup> Thus, based on the criteria of developing a logical argument, Düring subsequently re-established the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* in its best authentic form possible, despite Rabinowitz's criticism in the earlier past.<sup>47</sup> Düring's final edition was published in 1961 as a discourse in its literary form, confirming that the philosophical doctrine is Aristotelian by containing Platonic elements, which contrasts Hirzel's argumentation.

However, new editions of the reconstruction have been published since then.<sup>48</sup> Besides O. Gigon (1987), who published a catalogue of the fragments of Iamblichus, those of d'E Berti (2000) and Schneeweiß (2005) are worth mentioning.<sup>49</sup> The most promising recent edition was presented by Hutchinson and Johnson, who wrote the manuscript (unpublished) entitled "*Protrepticus* or Exhortation to Philosophy" in 2017. In this manuscript, the authors justify Bywater's results, at least in literary form.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> For further details, see Chroust, "A Brief Account of the Reconstruction of Aristotle's *Protrepticus*," 234.

<sup>45</sup> For further details, see Chroust, 233–35.

<sup>46</sup> For further details, see Chroust, 233.

<sup>47</sup> For further details, see Rabinowitz, *Aristotle's Protrepticus and the Sources of Its Reconstruction*, 1:21–22.

<sup>48</sup> For a general overview of the textual critical editions (Critères d'édition), see Van der Meeren, *Exhortation à la philosophie*, 77.

<sup>49</sup> Van der Meeren, *Exhortation à la philosophie*, 76.

<sup>50</sup> D.S. Hutchinson and Monte Ransome Johnson, eds., "Aristotle. *Protrepticus*: Citations, Fragments, Paraphrases, and Other Evidence," trans. D.S. Hutchinson and Monte Ransome Johnson (unpublished manuscript 1, 2017), viii, <http://www.protrepticus.info/protr2017x20.pdf>; "Their reconstruction proposes at least three characters, including Isocrates of Athens, Heraclides of Pontus, and Aristotle of Stagira, debating in front of an audience of youths." D.S. Hutchinson and Monte Ransome Johnson, "Protreptic and Apotreptic: Aristotle's Dialogue *Protrepticus*," in *When Wisdom Calls: Philosophical Protreptic in Antiquity*, Monothéismes et Philosophie (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols Publishers n.v, 2018), 112.



## Genre Criticism

Moreover, as the title *Protrepticus* of the Aristotelian work already indicates, the question of the work's genre is raised to ascertain to which the work can be assigned. Thus, the initial discussion of what is defined as a 'protreptic genre' simply coincides with Bywater's discovery of the Aristotle's lost *Protrepticus* in Iamblichus from the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Consequently, this represents a contemporary conceptualization of philosophical enquiry and has also initiated a discourse about the question of whether the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* can be classified as an oration or a dialogue in its literary form.<sup>51</sup> However, a review of the historical evidence indicates that the earliest instances of what are known as protreptic speeches (προτρεπτικοί λόγοι) already emerged during the Sophistic movement in the fifth century BC. Sophists roamed Greek cities, delivering rhetorical displays (ἐπίδειξις), besides the traditional educational framework, with the objective of acquainting citizens with the significance of judicial or political affairs. In this process, the focus of their formation was on the 'rhetoric,' to which new students – capable of paying their courses – should be attracted. However, sophistic ἐπιδείξεις have not only been limited to speeches but have also been presented in question-and-answer form.<sup>52</sup> Consequently, they have also been the starting point for the Socratic dialogues, which initiated an intentional shift in the direction of diverting citizens from the sophistical τέχνη to the Socratic way of ἀρετή.<sup>53</sup> One of the earliest examples of protreptic speeches in the Socratic style can be found in Plato's work *Euthydemus*.<sup>54</sup> In the fourth century BC, they became a standard method of communication for philosophers to attract new students to their doxographies. For instance, by referring to his *Cyprian speeches*, Isocrates used his speech *Antidosis* to promote an ethical-political ambition for his prospective students, whereas the Socratics encourage their students to pursue philosophy. This historical background provides the context for the emergence of protreptic speeches throughout the philosophical history.

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<sup>51</sup> For further details, see Ol'ga Alieva, "Protreptic: A Protean Genre," in *When Wisdom Calls: Philosophical Protreptic in Antiquity*, Monothéismes et Philosophie (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols Publishers n.v, 2018), 29.

<sup>52</sup> For further details, see Yuri Shichalin and Olga Alieva, "Protreptic and Epideixis: Corpus Platonicum," in *When Wisdom Calls: Philosophical Protreptic in Antiquity*, Monothéismes et Philosophie (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols Publishers n.v, 2018), 90–91.

<sup>53</sup> For further details, see Hessler, *Epikur, Brief an Menoikeus*, 2014, 41.

<sup>54</sup> For further details, see Plato, *Euthydemus* 278e–282d.

Nevertheless, “the protreptic *genre* has no οὐσία of its own, formulable in ‘What is X?’ terms,” as Alieva notes.<sup>55</sup> However, in turn, Van der Meeren ascribes protreptic speeches to both γένος συμβουλευτικός and γένος ἐπιδεικτικός.<sup>56</sup> These are two discrete rhetorical genres with a distinct focus. The former is concerned with προτροπή and ἀποτροπή, while the latter is concerned with ἐπαινός and ψόγος.<sup>57</sup> Indeed, both aim to provide guidance on how to conduct oneself to achieve the greatest happiness (εὐδαιμονία) in life possible.<sup>58</sup> Consequently, Van der Meeren does not identify a discrete protreptic genre, as it is situated within a particular literary form.<sup>59</sup> Instead, she ascribes three functions to protreptic speeches in general that typify them: advertisement, conversion, and introduction.<sup>60</sup> Therefore, the protreptic speech is also characterized rather as a literary style type.<sup>61</sup> Moreover, these three functions are also applicable to the Aristotelian *Protrepticus*. In addition, it should be noted that Hutchinson and Johnson exactly rely on the dichotomy of προτροπή and ἀποτροπή in the Aristotelian work *Art of Rhetoric* to justify the literary form of the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* as a dialogue.<sup>62</sup>

### *Structure and Language*

Furthermore, the structure of the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* is based on the hypothesis proposed by Bywater (5–12), which has been re-examined by Hutchinson and Johnson in their attempt to reconstruct it. They presented it in the following manner:

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<sup>55</sup> Alieva, “Protreptic: A Protean Genre,” 35.

<sup>56</sup> For further details, see Van der Meeren, *Exhortation à la philosophie*, 51.

<sup>57</sup> For further details, see Aristotle, *Art of Rhetoric*, 1358b–1359b.


<sup>58</sup> For further details, see Aristotle, *Art of Rhetoric*, 1360b4–1360b30.

<sup>59</sup> The discussion of the difference between προτρεπτικός (exhortation) and παραίνεσις (praeceptio) at the beginning of research into the protreptic genre, initiated by P. Hartlich’s dissertation “De exhortationum a Graecis Romanisque scriptarum historia et indole” is not further pursued, due to enormous overlaps. For further details, see Alieva, “Protreptic: A Protean Genre,” 36–45.

<sup>60</sup> For further details, see Van der Meeren, *Exhortation à la philosophie*, XV–XVI.

<sup>61</sup> For further details, see AGG, §305g.

<sup>62</sup> For further details, see Hutchinson and Johnson, “Protreptic and Apotreptic: Aristotle’s Dialogue *Protrepticus*,” 118–36; Düring, *Aristotle’s Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction*, 29–35.

**Figure 1. Structure of Iamblichus' Aristotelian *Protrepticus***

Source: Data from D.S Hutchinson and Monte Ransome Johnson, “Authenticating Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*,” *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 29 (2005): 283.

The five separate themes – linked by different chapters from the same work with each other – can be defined as “a gridwork of literary unity.”<sup>63</sup> While Hutchinson and Johnson selected chapters 6 and 7 as their editorial starting points, Düring’s edition conversely also includes chapter 5 (B22–B30). Consequently, the order of the chapters is also different, resulting in a clear structural divergence between the two editions.<sup>64</sup> As previously stated, the thesis is based on the reconstruction of Düring’s edition due to disagreements in research findings. Consequently, an examination of the structure of Düring’s edition is warranted in my assessment, which is read as follows:

**Table 1. Structure of Düring’s Aristotelian *Protrepticus***

Chapters:	
B1	Why to become φιλόσοφος, Themison?!
B2–B5	Why is philosophy necessary for εὐδαιμονία?!
B6	Φιλοσοφητέον?!
B7–B9	What is the value of knowledge based on philosophy for the political and practical life?
Chap. V.	
B10–B21	What is the true end according to the purpose of nature?
B22–B30	What is the highest form of thinking (νοῦς)?

<sup>63</sup> D.S. Hutchinson and Monte Ransome Johnson, “Authenticating Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*,” *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 29 (2005): 282, <http://www.protrepticus.info/OSAP2005.pdf>.

<sup>64</sup> Hutchinson and Johnson, “Aristotle. *Protrepticus*: Citations, Fragments, Paraphrases, and Other Evidence,” v; 85.

B31–B37	What is the science of truth or of the virtues of the soul?
B38–B45	Why is prudence (Φρόνησις) the greatest of all goods?
Chap. VI.	
B46–B50	What are the prerequisites of prudence (Φρόνησις)?
B51–B54	What are the goods that human life depends on?
B55–B56	A pleasant life is devoted to philosophy!
Chap. VII	
B58–B77	What is the proper work of prudence (Φρόνησις)?
Chap. VIII	
B78–B92	Why is life after thinking (θεωρία) the most pleasant one?
Chap. IX	
B93–B96	Why does prudence (Φρόνησις) lead to happiness (εὐδαιμονία) in particular?
Chap. X	
B97–B102	What is the agreement with the opinions commonly held on this subject?
Chap. XI	
B103–B107	What is the difference between life according to prudence (Φρόνησις) and life according to the many (πολλοί)?
Chap. XII	
B108–B110	Φιλοσοφητέον or farewell to life!

Source: Data adapted from Ingemar Düring, ed., *Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction*. Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis (Institute of Classical Studies, 1961), 271–274.

Thus, the structure contains the collection of Düring's fragments (B1–B110) and is classified by Düring as “a eulogy on intellectual life regarded as the only form of life that will make men happy.”<sup>65</sup> Unfortunately, the text is not coherent and the opening section (=B1–B6)

<sup>65</sup> Düring, *Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction*, 271.

of the *Protrepticus* is no longer available.<sup>66</sup> To compensate for this loss, Düring has relied on a number of specific testimonies (A1–A8), which have already been collected by Rose, Walzer and Ross.<sup>67</sup> The other fragments (B7–B110) “...can very well be derived from one single writing,” argues Düring.<sup>68</sup> Moreover, it is noteworthy, that there are a few discrepancies between Düring’s edition and the recent edition of Hutchinson and Johnson. Regarding the material of the fragments from B7–B9, both scholars have stated that “there is some slight doubt about the voice of this speaker, probably ‘Aristotle’ but possibly ‘Isocrates,’” or “there is more doubt about its location in the lost work” as such.<sup>69</sup> Moreover, they rejected chapter V (B22–B30) – as previously mentioned – on the grounds that it was “out of sequence or lacked evidence.”<sup>70</sup> Finally, the opening fragment B58 of Chapter VII and the fragments from B72 to B73 have also been excluded from the reconstruction edited by Hutchinson and Johnson. In addition, both scholars have directed a significant degree of attention to fragment B6 (=A2), due to its structure and rich textual tradition.<sup>71</sup> It represents a protreptic topos par excellence and deals with the philosophical term Φιλοσοφητέον (= one must pursue philosophy). However, in contrast to Düring’s edition – which considers fragment B6 as a part of Aristotle’s speech (discourse) – based on the literary form of a dialogue Hutchinson and Johnson have argued that the fragment rather serves as an Aristotelian reply to a counterargument presented by an opposing speaker. They argue as follows:

... a counterargument was designed in this dialogue, to oppose a speaker who had been arguing that philosophy was not a worthwhile activity. Since investigating such questions as which activities are worth pursuing is a philosophical activity, the critic of philosophy is revealed to be in a pragmatically self-defeating position when he chooses to engage in philosophy while declaring that it is not worth doing.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Hutchinson and Johnson, “Aristotle. *Protrepticus*: Citations, Fragments, Paraphrases, and Other Evidence,” vii; 6.

<sup>67</sup> For further details, see Düring, *Aristotle’s Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction*, 35–36; 43–44.

<sup>68</sup> Düring, 36.

<sup>69</sup> Hutchinson and Johnson, “Aristotle. *Protrepticus*: Citations, Fragments, Paraphrases, and Other Evidence,” 66.

<sup>70</sup> Hutchinson and Johnson, 66.

<sup>71</sup> For further details, see Düring, *Aristotle’s Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction*, 25–26; Hutchinson and Johnson, “Protreptic and Apotreptic: Aristotle’s Dialogue *Protrepticus*,” 127–36; Hutchinson and Johnson, “Aristotle. *Protrepticus*: Citations, Fragments, Paraphrases, and Other Evidence,” 4–5.

<sup>72</sup> Hutchinson and Johnson, “Aristotle. *Protrepticus*: Citations, Fragments, Paraphrases, and Other Evidence,” 4.

Moreover, it raises the question of whether all of the fragments (B1–B110) were written in the language and style of Aristotle. Düring argues: “Every phrase has been carefully examined and compared with Academic-Aristotelian usage; the result is reported in the commentary. Stylistically the language is remarkably pure, often with an unmistakably Aristotelian ring.”<sup>73</sup> Simultaneously, Hutchinson and Johnson also carefully examined the fragments with slightly different results, especially from those mentioned above.<sup>74</sup> In addition, Düring argues that “A method of approaching a subject common in Aristotle’s treatises is what Mg. A. Mansion has characterized as ‘approximations successives.’ ...The method is a typically Aristotelian systematization of the Socratic method used in Plato’s dialogues.”<sup>75</sup> The subsequent phase entails an examination of the structure of the thesis’ analysis section, which is presented as follows:

**Table 2. Structure of Chapter VIII (B87–B91) of Düring’s Aristotelian *Protrepticus***

B87: (exordium)	The Perfect Activity and the Activity of Contemplation: ἡ τελεία ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ θεωρητικὴ ἐνέργεια
B88:	Essential and Accidental Pleasure: καθ’αὐτό καὶ συμβεβηκός
B89:	Life and Pleasure: ζῆν καὶ ἡδονή
B90:	Potency and Act: Δύναμις καὶ ἐνέργεια
B91:	Prudence and Contemplation: φρόνησις καὶ θεωρία

Source: Data adapted from Düring, ed., *Aristotle’s Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction*, 82–85.

As can be observed, the fragments (B87–B91) are grounded in Aristotelian metaphysical and ethical terms, which will be elucidated in greater detail in the upcoming commentary. However, it should be noted that they form part of fragment 14 of the Walzer/Ross collection, which is equivalent to chapter 11 of Iamblichus’ *Protrepticus* and chapter VIII of Düring’s edition. The chapter in question – Chapter 11 of Iamblichus’ *Protrepticus* – is accepted as part of the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* by several scholars, including Bywater (1869), Hartlich (1889), Jaeger (1923), Walzer/Ross (1934/1955) and Düring (1954/1968). Conversely, it has not been recorded by Hirzel (1876), Rose (1870/86)

<sup>73</sup> Düring, *Aristotle’s Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction*, 18.

<sup>74</sup> For further details, see Hutchinson and Johnson, “Aristotle. *Protrepticus*: Citations, Fragments, Paraphrases, and Other Evidence,” vii–ix.

<sup>75</sup> Düring, *Aristotle’s Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction*, 18–19.

and Hartlich (1889), as Schneeweiß presented.<sup>76</sup> Moreover, Hutchinson and Johnson also confirmed its Aristotelian authenticity in 2005. This also prompts the question concerning to whom the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* is addressed and to what period it can be dated.<sup>77</sup> The following lines represent an initial step in the process of inquiry:

### *Addressee and Dating*

Zeno said that Crates, while sitting in a shoemaker's workshop, read the *Protrepticus* of Aristotle, which he wrote to Themison (the king of the Cyprians), saying that no one has more good things going for him to help him do philosophy since, as he has great wealth, he can spend it on these things, and he has a reputation as well. He said that when Crates was reading, the shoemaker was paying attention while stitching, and Crates said, "I think I should write a *Protrepticus* to you, Philiscus, for I know you've got more going for you to help you do philosophy than the fellow Aristotle wrote to."<sup>78</sup>

Consequently, the aforementioned quotation offers an additional insight into the addressee of the Aristotelian *Protrepticus*, which is also collected as fragment B1 of Düring's edition. It can thus be inferred that the *Protrepticus* was dedicated to a king of Cyprus, named Themison, who might have reigned in 4<sup>th</sup> century BC. The historical identity of Themison himself remains uncertain, due to the lack of historical evidence, as observed by Hutchinson and Johnson.<sup>79</sup> Moreover, Rabinowitz illustrated that the phrase ὃν ἔγραψε πρὸς Θεμισῶνα that he wrote to Themison can be interpreted in three distinct ways.<sup>80</sup> In his study, he concluded that the *Protrepticus* was a means for Themison to patronize the study of philosophy in his city-state rather than a speech (discourse) intended to persuade him to become a philosopher himself.<sup>81</sup> On the other hand, Düring proposed that it was rather addressed to the youth of Athens, with the intention of encouraging them to pursue philosophy. In conclusion, Hutchinson and Johnson advanced the argument based on historical evidence that Themison of Eritrea was an appropriate addressee for the *Protrepticus*,

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<sup>76</sup> For further details, see Schneeweiss, *Protreptikos*, 212.

<sup>77</sup> Hutchinson and Johnson, "Aristotle. *Protrepticus*: Citations, Fragments, Paraphrases, and Other Evidence," 1. The work title draws the reader's attention to the historical investigations, which is worth mentioning at this point, but will not further be demonstrated by the thesis.

<sup>78</sup> Hutchinson and Johnson, 3.

<sup>79</sup> For further details, see Hutchinson and Johnson, 2.

<sup>80</sup> For further details, see Rabinowitz, *Aristotle's Protrepticus and the Sources of Its Reconstruction*, 1:29.

<sup>81</sup> For further details, see Rabinowitz, 1:33–34.

provided that the statement ὃν ἔγραψε πρὸς Θεμίσωνα τὸν Κυπρίων βασιλέα did not contradict this assumption.<sup>82</sup>

Unfortunately, the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* presents a complex picture regarding the question of dating. First, Düring posited that B. Einarson had attested that the *Protrepticus* was a response to the treatise *Antidosis* of Isocrates – as mentioned above – which was published in 353/2 BC. Therefore, the date 353/2 BC can be declared as the terminus post quem.<sup>83</sup> However, Schneeweiss demonstrated that the *Protrepticus* was composed at the conclusion of Aristotle’s lifetime rather than during his first stay in Athens. This conclusion was supported by historical findings presented in his edition.<sup>84</sup> According to Schneeweiss, therefore the addressee of the *Protrepticus* might be the fleet commander Themison who served under Diadochus Antigonos I. during 315/14 BC. Consequently, Schneeweiss’ critics have proposed that the terminus post quem for the *Protrepticus* should rather be 333/2 BC, based on linguistic material and specific historical findings.<sup>85</sup> Hutchinson and Johnson adopt a middle position, stating that the “*Protrepticus* (Exhortation to Philosophy) was originally published soon after 353 BC, probably, in response to the *Antidosis* (353/352 BC) of Isocrates; a later date of publication for *Protrepticus* is also possible, but less likely.”<sup>86</sup>

## On Pleasure: *Protrepticus* (B87–B91)

### *Introduction*

Regarding the following textual analysis of the section (B87–B91) addressing the question of whether life after prudence is the most pleasant one, this aims to elucidate the theoretical reason behind it and facilitate a more profound comprehension of Aristotle’s own attitude to life. However, before embarking upon the textual analysis, it is first necessary again to make a few preliminary remarks. The following Greek text is taken from Düring’s edition and presented in the same structure and content. Moreover, the following translation is my own, which is again based on the editions of Düring and Hutchinson and Johnson. The

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<sup>82</sup> For further details, see Hutchinson and Johnson, “Aristotle. *Protrepticus*: Citations, Fragments, Paraphrases, and Other Evidence,” 2.

<sup>83</sup> For further details, see Düring, *Aristotle’s Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction*, 33–34.

<sup>84</sup> For further details, see Schneeweiss, *Protreptikos*, 30.

<sup>85</sup> For further details, see Schneeweiss, 51–52.

<sup>86</sup> Hutchinson and Johnson, “Aristotle. *Protrepticus*: Citations, Fragments, Paraphrases, and Other Evidence,” ii.



linguistic analysis is structured around the “Four Sample Passages” in the *CGCG*, which serves as an illustration. The commentary will be further supported by the *AGG* for linguistic purposes by von Siebenthal.<sup>87</sup> The following commentary is based on the principles of utility and value-added, with the aim of avoiding unnecessary repetition and providing a concise overview of the subject matter. It thus offers linguistic clarification for my own translation and – where necessary – provides background information for the following intertextual analysis. The same approach is taken in the textual criticism notes. For this reason, not all notes are taken into consideration.

### *Fragment B87*

#### Text, Translations and Notes on Textual Criticism

- 1 Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥ γε τελεία ἐνέργεια καὶ ἀκώλυτος ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἔχει
- 2 τὸ χαίρειν, ὥστ' ἂν εἴη ἡ θεωρητικὴ ἐνέργεια πασῶν ἡδίστη.

Yet, at least, the perfect and unimpeded activity has in itself delight, therefore, the activity of contemplation could be the most pleasant of all.

A selection of other English translations:

Again, perfect and unimpeded activity certainly contains in itself delight, so that the activity of thinking must be the most pleasant of all.<sup>88</sup>

And yet, surely the perfect and unhindered activity has its enjoyment in itself; hence the activity of observation would be the most pleasant of all.<sup>89</sup>

The manuscript (L) uses the singular adjective πάσης instead of the plural one πασῶν.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> Heinrich von Siebenthal, *Ancient Greek Grammar for the Study of the New Testament* (Oxford New York: Peter Lang, 2019), 569–75, <https://www.peterlang.com/document/1111098>; Evert Van Emde Boas et al., *The Cambridge Grammar of Classical Greek*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2019), 722–48, <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139027052>.

<sup>88</sup> Düring, *Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction*, 83.

<sup>89</sup> Iamblichus, “*Protrepticus* XI,” trans. D.S. Hutchinson and Monte Ransome Johnson (unpublished, April 24, 2013), 2, <http://www.protrepticus.info/11trans.pdf>.

<sup>90</sup> For further details, see Iamblichus, “*Protrepticus* XI, Text and *Apparatus Criticus*,” ed. D.S. Hutchinson and Monte Ransome Johnson (unpublished, April 24, 2013), 3, <http://www.protrepticus.info/11text.pdf>.

## Commentary

### General Notes

It can be argued that fragment B87 is more accurately characterized as a ‘bridge passage’ of Iamblichus, rather than the original Aristotelian words of the *Protrepticus* itself.<sup>91</sup> Hutchinson and Johnson define a ‘bridge passage’ as follows: “Words translated from ancient texts are set in boldface if we believe them to be the very words that were once in Aristotle’s text; when they are normal, not boldface, this means that we do not know exactly which words stood in Aristotle’s text, of which this passage may have been a more or less faithful paraphrase, not a citation.”<sup>92</sup> Moreover, the fragment serves as background information and refers to the doctrine κατὰ δύναμιν – κατ’ ἐνέργειαν, which determines the previous argumentation lines of chapter VIII (B79–B86) of the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* of Düring’s edition.<sup>93</sup> Hutchinson and Johnson have accurately recorded this point in the following, which is oriented towards Düring’s comments:

τό μὲν κατὰ δύναμιν τό δὲ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν: Aristotle systematically treats of these terms in *Metaph.* IX 6-9. See Menn, *ἐνέργεια* and *δύναμις*, 73-114. Düring traces the history of this distinction, beginning with *Euthyd.* 280be And *Theaet.* (197b, 199a). He sees three aspects Aristotle’s conception: -- (1) the first is characterized by the relations κτῆσις-χρησις (VI 40.1-11, XI 56.15-22); ἔχειν-χρησθαι (XI 57.7-12; cf. *Top.* 129b33, *EE* 1225b12; *NE* 1146b32; ἔχειν-ἐνεργεῖν (XI 57.19-23). -- (2) the second is characterized by the relation of ἔξις-ἔργον (*EE* II 1.1219a9-38). -- (3) the third is the relation mentioned here at 56.15-16, δύναμις-ἐνέργεια (cf. *Metaph.* V, VIII 6-9, *de An.* II 5). Aristotle stresses that success is a matter of activity, as opposed to mere capacity in *EE* II 1.1219a13f.<sup>94</sup>

In light of this quotation and the preceding considerations (B79–B86), it can be deduced that according to Aristotle, the experience of pleasure depends on the act of engaging in an activity (ἐνέργεια) and not merely on having the capability (δύναμις) to do so. Additionally, the fragment is written in the present aspect stem by expressing the indicative and optative mood and is held in the active voice.

<sup>91</sup> For further details, see Iamblichus, “*Protrepticus* XI, Translation, Text, Apparatus Criticus, Commentary,” ed. and trans. D.S. Hutchinson and Monte Ransome Johnson (unpublished, August 26, 2013), 1;6, <http://www.protrepticus.info/11comm.pdf>.

<sup>92</sup> Hutchinson and Johnson, “Aristotle. *Protrepticus*: Citations, Fragments, Paraphrases, and Other Evidence,” ix.

<sup>93</sup> For further details, see Düring, *Aristotle’s Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction*, 245.

<sup>94</sup> Iamblichus, “*Protrepticus* XI, Translation, Text, Apparatus Criticus, Commentary,” 1–2.

## Detailed Notes

1–1 Ἀλλά μήν ἢ γε ... : The restrictive conjunction is translated in accordance with the general translation notes of the *CGCG*. It functions as a modal particle, used to confirm an assertion and introduce a new text-segment.<sup>95</sup> The phrase τελεία ἐνεργεία καὶ ἀκώλυτος is attributed to Aristotle, although the adjective ἀκώλυτος is absent from the Aristotelian corpus, as Hutchinson and Johnson have observed.<sup>96</sup> The adjective τελεία is used attributively, whereas the adjective ἀκώλυτος tends to describe a passive state.<sup>97</sup> Moreover, the adjective τελεία – which is used in combination with the noun ἐνεργεία – denotes the grammatical number dual. Humboldt reflects on the dual in his discourse “Ueber den Dualis” as follows:

Der Begriff der Zweiheit nun gehört dem doppelten Gebiet des Sichtbaren und Unsichtbaren an, und in dem er sich lebendig und anregend der sinnlichen Anschauung und der äußeren Beobachtung darstellt, ist er zugleich vorwaltend in den Gesetzen des Denkens, dem Streben der Empfindung, und dem in seinen tiefsten Gründen unerforschbaren Organismus des Menschengeschlechts und der Natur.<sup>98</sup>

Moreover, Hutchinson and Johnson have observed that Düring drew a comparison between the adjective ἀκώλυτος with ἐμποδίζει in the following passages: “*NE* 1153a15, b10–16; *Pol.* 1295a37.” However, according to them, there is “...no real parallel.”<sup>99</sup> Moreover, Van der Meeren makes reference to the passage “*NE* VII, 11, 1152b16,” proposing that Aristotle evokes the opinions of some philosophers through using the adjective ‘sans entrave,’ who suggest that pleasure is rather an obstacle to thinking (e.g., Speusippus). Moreover, Aristotle posits in response that the assumption is limited to only extrinsic (ἄλλότρια) pleasure.<sup>100</sup>

1–2 ἐν αὐτῇ ἔχει τό χαίρειν: The phrase makes an allusion to the intrinsic (ἡ ἀφ’ ἐκάστης ἡδονῆς) pleasure and serves as a phonetic allusion to the doctrine of ἔχειν (to

<sup>95</sup> For further details, see *CGCG*, §59.53; §59.60.

<sup>96</sup> For further details, see *Protrepticus* XI, Translation, Text, Apparatus Criticus, Commentary,” Iamblichus, “*Protrepticus* XI, Translation, Text, Apparatus Criticus, Commentary,” 6.

<sup>97</sup> For further details, see *CGCG*, §37.4.

<sup>98</sup> Wilhelm von Humboldt, *Schriften zur Sprache*, ed. Michael Böhler, Reclams Universal-Bibliothek, Nr. 6922 (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2021), 22–23.

<sup>99</sup> For further details, see Iamblichus, “*Protrepticus* XI, Translation, Text, Apparatus Criticus, Commentary,” 6.

<sup>100</sup> For further details, see Van der Meeren, *Exhortation à la philosophie*, 194.

have/possess) – ἐνεργεῖν (to be in action).<sup>101</sup> Furthermore, the finite verb ἔχει exhibits a resonance with the infinitive verb χεῖν (to pour) in the background and is written in the present aspect stem.<sup>102</sup> In addition, according to Hutchinson and Johnson, the noun τό χαίρειν is analogous to ἡδονή in the following Aristotelian works: “*Phileb.* 21a; *GA* 724a1; *Pol.* 1323b1.”<sup>103</sup> Düring also made references in relation to the phrase ἐν ἑαυτῇ: “*NE* 1099a15; *NE* 1153a20-23; 1170b1; 1175a19; *Pol.* 1278b29.”<sup>104</sup>

2–2 ὥστ’ ἂν εἴη ... ἡδίστη: The modal particle ἂν indicates a potential optative with the finite verb εἴη, which is written in the present aspect stem.<sup>105</sup> Moreover, the conjunction ὥστε indicates an actual or a conceivable result, which is evidenced in the phrase εἴη ἡ θεωρητική ἐνεργεία πασῶν ἡδίστη.<sup>106</sup>

### Fragment B88

#### Text, Translations and Notes on Textual Criticism

- 1 Ἔτι τοίνυν ἕτερόν ἐστιν τὸ ἡδόμενον πίνειν καὶ τὸ ἡδέως πίνειν·
- 2 οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει μὴ διψῶντά τινα μηδ’ οἷω χαίρει πόματι προσφερόμενον
- 3 πίνοντα χαίρειν, μὴ τῷ πίνειν ἀλλὰ τῷ συμβαίνειν ἅμα θεωρεῖν ἢ θεω-
- 4 ρεῖσθαι καθήμενον. οὐκοῦν τοῦτον ἥδεσθαι μὲν καὶ ἡδόμενον πίνειν φή-
- 5 σομεν, ἀλλ’ οὐ τῷ πίνειν οὐδ’ ἡδέως πίνειν. οὐκοῦν οὕτως καὶ βάδισιν
- 6 καὶ καθέδραν καὶ μάθησιν καὶ πᾶσαν κίνησιν ἐροῦμεν ἡδεῖαν ἢ λυπηράν,
- 7 οὐχ ὅσων συμβαίνει λυπεῖσθαι παρουσῶν ἡμᾶς ἢ χαίρειν, ἀλλ’ ὧν τῇ
- 8 παρουσίᾳ καὶ λυπούμεθα πάντες καὶ χαίρομεν.

Yet again, there is a difference between drinking for having pleasure and drinking with pleasure; for nothing prevents a man, who is not thirsty, or to whom the draught, he delights in, has not been offered, from being delighted while drinking, not because he is drinking, but, because it happens that he is contemplating or being contemplated while sitting. Well then, we shall say that this man is having pleasure,

<sup>101</sup> For further details, see Van der Meeren, 194.

<sup>102</sup> For further details, see *LSJ*.

<sup>103</sup> Iamblichus, “*Protrepticus* XI, Translation, Text, Apparatus Criticus, Commentary,” 6.

<sup>104</sup> Düring, *Aristotle’s Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction*, 137;145.

<sup>105</sup> For further details, see *CGCG*, §34.13.

<sup>106</sup> For further details, see *AGG*, §251j.

certainly, and is drinking while feeling pleasure, not because he is drinking nor even that he is drinking with pleasure. Well then, in this way, we shall say that also walking and sitting and learning even every activity is pleasant or painful, not as it happens that we feel pain or delight in their presence, but as we are either all pained or delighted by their presence!

A selection of other English translations:

Further, there is a difference between enjoying oneself while drinking and enjoying drinking; for there is nothing to prevent a man who is not thirsty, or is not getting the drink he enjoys, from enjoying himself while drinking, not because he is drinking but because he happens at the same time to be looking at something or to be looked at, as he sits. So, we shall say that such a man enjoys himself, and enjoys himself while drinking, and not because he is drinking, nor that he is enjoying drinking. In the same way we shall say that walking, sitting down, learning, any activity, is pleasant or painful, not if we happen to feel pain or pleasure in the presence of these activities, but if we are all pained or pleased by their presence.<sup>107</sup>

Furthermore, drinking while feeling pleasure is one thing and drinking with pleasure is another for nothing prevents someone who is not thirsty, or has not been served with the drink he enjoys, from enjoying himself while drinking, not because he is drinking but because it occurs at the same time as he sits there that he is observing or being observed. Thus we will say that this fellow is having pleasure, and is drinking while feeling pleasure, but not by drinking and not because he is drinking with pleasure. Thus in the same way we will also say that walking and sitting and learning and every process is pleasant or distressing, not insofar as it turns out that we feel distress or enjoyment in their presence, but insofar as we are all distressed by or enjoy their presence.<sup>108</sup>

Gigon asserts that “the text lacks additional content following the participle καθήμενον.”<sup>109</sup> Moreover, he adds: “ἐστι δὲ καὶ πίνειν ἡδέως χαίροντα τῷ παρόντι πόματι.” in this context.<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> Düring, *Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction*, 85.

<sup>108</sup> Hutchinson and Johnson, “Aristotle. *Protrepticus*: Citations, Fragments, Paraphrases, and Other Evidence,” 59.

<sup>109</sup> Iamblichus, “*Protrepticus* XI, Text and Apparatus Criticus,” 3.

<sup>110</sup> Iamblichus, 3.

## Commentary

### General Notes

The following argument of the fragment provides a general overview of the Aristotelian concept of pleasure as presented in the Aristotelian *Protrepticus*. In addition, it is structured by the use of several particles, which serve to organize the argument. It is written in either the present aspect stem or future tense, expressing the indicative mood, and is held in the active voice.

### Detailed Notes

1–1 Ἔτι τοίνυν ... τὸ ἡδόμενον πίνειν καὶ τὸ ἡδέως πίνειν: The argument is introduced by the particle combination of ἔτι τοίνυν, which indicates a transition to a new point.<sup>111</sup> The daily-life examples illustrate a dichotomy between extrinsic and intrinsic pleasure. The phrase τὸ ἡδόμενον πίνειν and the phrase πίνοντα χαίρειν are extrinsic or accidental pleasure, whereas the phrases τὸ ἡδέως πίνειν and τῷ πίνειν [χαίρειν] refer to intrinsic or natural pleasure, as observed by Düring and Van der Meeren.<sup>112</sup> In addition, Düring has noted that “it is a popularization of the doctrine of τὸ συμβεβηκός, as appears from the phrase τῷ συμβαίνειν – καθήμενον. In his technical jargon Aristotle says briefly οἷον τὸ καθῆσθαι ὡς χωριζόμενον, *Phys.* 186b21.”<sup>113</sup> In a similar manner, Hutchinson and Johnson confirm his findings.<sup>114</sup> Moreover, Düring makes a reference to the Aristotelian passage “*MM* 1206a9-14” in this context.<sup>115</sup>

3–4 ἀλλὰ τῷ συμβαίνειν... καθήμενον: The phrase is contradictory to the main claim but serves to confirm it at the same time, moving from practical to theoretical thoughts, in which the concept of ‘true pleasure’ as postulated by Aristotle is situated. The assertion that theoretical thoughts do not move anything until they become practical is supported by Nightingale stating that: “In *NE* VI, Aristotle makes it clear that theoretical activity has no practical results or effects. For ‘thought by itself moves nothing’; only thoughts which are

<sup>111</sup> For further details, see *CGCG* §59.39.

<sup>112</sup> For further details, see Düring, *Aristotle’s Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction*, 252; Van der Meeren, *Exhortation à la philosophie*, 194.

<sup>113</sup> I. Düring, *Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction*, Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis (Institute of Classical Studies, 1961), 252.

<sup>114</sup> For further details, see Iamblichus, “*Protrepticus* XI, Translation, Text, Apparatus Criticus, Commentary,” 6.

<sup>115</sup> Düring, *Aristotle’s Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction*, 138.

‘practical’ and ‘for the sake of something’ can motivate action (VI.2, 1138a35–6).<sup>116</sup> Consequently, pleasure is found to be at rest rather than in motion, as proposed by Aristotle.<sup>117</sup> Furthermore, the adverb ἅμα refers to the participle καθήμενον.<sup>118</sup> The disjunctive conjunction ἢ is used inclusively (A V B) due to the implied meaning ‘stand with the feet together’ of the verb συμβαίνειν.<sup>119</sup>

4–6 **φήσομεν... ἐροῦμεν...** : The verb ἐροῦμεν of Pp.1 thus implies – in contrast to the verbal form φήσομεν – the lexical term ‘to collect or to sum up something.’ Moreover, Düring posits regarding this point: “On logic future, see Brink 34. Like Plato Aristotle uses both *φήσω* and *ἐρῶ*, but I do not know any passage in which (as here) both forms are used.”<sup>120</sup> Additionally, in reference to their translation, Hutchinson and Johnson refer to the conjunction μεταβάλλειν εἰς ταύτην τὴν κίνησιν of the fragment B80 and the Aristotelian passage *NE* 1173b3.<sup>121</sup> In the observation of Hagen, the Greek lexical term κίνησις is translated with the English lexical term ‘activity’ in this context. He noted at this point that “*kinesis* as it figures in the *Protrepticus* seems to serve as a cover term for activity. That appears to be its role in B88, despite the association it has there with learning and walking.”<sup>122</sup>

5–6 **βάδισιν ... καὶ πᾶσαν κίνησιν**: Moreover, the context reveals the use of a rhetorical device – namely rhetorical climax – in the presented argumentation. In addition, Aristotle offers a comprehensive definition of the distinction between motion (κίνησις) and activity (ἐνεργεία) in his treatise *Metaph.* 1048b18–3. Furthermore, Ackrill provides a general observation on the subject in his book *Essays on Plato and Aristotle*: “‘Kinesis’ is Aristotle’s regular word for change, including movement. Kinesis is itself an *energeia* in the wide sense, an actuality as opposed to a potentiality.”<sup>123</sup> Furthermore, it refers to the aforementioned

<sup>116</sup> Andrea Wilson Nightingale, ed., “‘Useless’ Knowledge: Aristotle’s Rethinking of Theoria,” in *Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in Its Cultural Context* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 203, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511482564.006>.

<sup>117</sup> For further details, see Aristotle, *EN* 1154b25–30.

<sup>118</sup> For further details, see *CGCG*, §52.37.

<sup>119</sup> For further details, see *LSJ*; *AGG*, §252.26.

<sup>120</sup> Düring, *Aristotle’s Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction*, 252.

<sup>121</sup> Iamblichus, “*Protrepticus* XI, Translation, Text, Apparatus Criticus, Commentary,” 3;6.

<sup>122</sup> Charles Taylor Hagen, “The ‘Energeia-Kinesis’ Distinction and Aristotle’s Theory of Action” (Michigan, The University of Michigan, 1981), 220.

<sup>123</sup> J L Ackrill, “Aristotle’s Distinction between *Energeia* and *Kinesis*,” in *Essays on Plato and Aristotle*, by J L Ackrill (Oxford University Press/Oxford, 1997), 142, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198236412.003.0010>.

dichotomy between intrinsic or natural (καθ' αὐτό) and extrinsic or accidental (συμβεβηκός) pleasures, since this dichotomy can also be extended with slight modifications to encompass activities (αἱ κινήσεις). In this regard, Aristotle states the following lines: “πρῶτον μὲν, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν διχῶς (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς τὸ δὲ τινί), καὶ αἱ φύσεις καὶ αἱ ἕξεις ἀκολουθήσουσιν, ὥστε καὶ αἱ κινήσεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις.”<sup>124</sup> Consequently, Aristotle distinguishes between activities that are performed for their intrinsic value and are inherently good (καθ' αὐτό), and those that are undertaken for other (ἀλλότρια) purposes (e.g., ἰατρεία) or and simply practiced by an individual for a certain time but not permanently.<sup>125</sup>

7–8... οὐχ ὅσων ... χαίρομεν: The relative adjective ὅσων indicates an exclamation of degree.<sup>126</sup> Consequently, Aristotle closes his statement, arguing that every activity will not be judged in its manner to be but rather its practice.

### *Fragment B89*

#### **Text, Translations and Notes on Textual Criticism**

- 1 Καὶ ζῶν οὖν ἡδεῖαν ὁμοίως ἐροῦμεν, ἥς ἡ παρουσία τοῖς ἔχουσιν
- 2 ἡδεῖα, καὶ ζῆν ἡδέως οὐ πάντας ὅσοις ζῶσι συμβαίνει χαίρειν, ἀλλ' οἷς
- 3 αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἡδὺ καὶ χαίρουσι τὴν ἀπὸ ζῶης ἡδονήν.

And then, we shall say, in like manner, that a life is pleasant, if its presence is pleasant to those who have it, so that not all to whom it happens, living while feeling delighted, live with pleasure, but those to whom living itself is pleasant and so, who are delighted in the pleasure that comes from life.

A selection of other English translations:

Similarly, we shall call that life pleasant whose presence is pleasant to those who have it; we shall say that not all who have pleasure while living enjoy living, but only those whom life itself is pleasant and who rejoice in the pleasure that comes from living.<sup>127</sup>

So, similarly, we will also say that a life is pleasant if its presence is pleasant to those who have it, and that not all to whom it happens that they enjoy themselves while

<sup>124</sup> Aristotle, *EN* 1152b25–27.

<sup>125</sup> For further details, see Aristotle, *EN* 1152b25–32.

<sup>126</sup> For further details, see *CGCG*, §38.47.

<sup>127</sup> Düring, *Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction*, 85.



living are living pleasantly, only those to whom living itself is pleasant and who enjoy the pleasure that comes from life.<sup>128</sup>

## Commentary

### General Notes

The structure of the following translation is based on the English term ‘in like manner’ of the adverb ὁμοίως, by expressing a phonetic allusion to the English phrase ‘in a loop-like manner’ in the background. Moreover, Merlan observes a ‘dialectical scheme’ between B89 (= representing the characteristics of the French language – ‘joie de vivre’) and the catastematic pleasure (καταστηματική ἡδονή) of Epicurus.<sup>129</sup> In addition, the fragment is written in the present aspect stem and future tense by expressing the indicative mood and is held in the active voice.

### Detailed Notes

1–3 **Καὶ ... ἐροῦμεν... ἡδονήν**: The translation of the verb ἐροῦμεν with the phrase ‘we shall say’ is once again aligned with Düring’s translation. Furthermore, the fragment comprises four conjunctions, which represent the intrinsic or natural pleasure inherent to life. First, the conjuncture ζῶην ἡδεῖαν ἐροῦμεν is used, second the conjuncture ἥς ἡ παρουσία ἡδεῖα, third the conjuncture οἷς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἡδὺ, and finally the conjuncture τὴν ἀπὸ ζωῆς ἡδονήν,” as observed by Van der Meeren.<sup>130</sup> By contrast, the conjuncture ‘ζῶσι χαίρειν’ represents the extrinsic or accidental pleasure. Additionally, Düring adopts the phrase οἷς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἡδὺ and associates it with the Aristotelian passage *NE* 1175a19.<sup>131</sup> He also provides the following commentary: “αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἡδὺ, some enjoy the pleasures of life, others enjoy life as such. A fine distinction, prepared in B88. On the idiom αὐτὸ τὸ δεῖνα, see my note on B47.”<sup>132</sup> Finally, it is noteworthy that Aristotle himself asserted that life itself is a kind of activity.<sup>133</sup>

<sup>128</sup> Hutchinson and Johnson, “Aristotle. *Protrepticus*: Citations, Fragments, Paraphrases, and Other Evidence,” 59.

<sup>129</sup> For further details, see Philip Merlan, *Studies in Epicurus and Aristotle /by Philip Merlan* (O. Harrassowitz, 1960), 8.

<sup>130</sup> For further details, see Van der Meeren, *Exhortation à la philosophie*, 95.

<sup>131</sup> For further details, see Düring, *Aristotle’s Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction*, 138.

<sup>132</sup> Düring, 252.

<sup>133</sup> For further details, see Aristotle, *EN* 1175a12.

## Fragment B90

### Text, Translations and Notes on Textual Criticism

- 1 Οὐκοῦν τὸ ζῆν ἀποδίδομεν τῷ μὲν ἐγρηγορότι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ
- 2 Καθεύδοντι τῷ φρονοῦντι δ' ἢ τῷ ἄφρονι μᾶλλον, τὴν δ' ἀπὸ ζωῆς
- 3 ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς χρήσεως γιγνομένην φαμέν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς· τοῦτο
- 4 γάρ ἐστι τὸ ζῆν ἀληθῶς.

Well then, we assign living, to the man who is awake more than to the man who is asleep, to the man who is prudent more than to the man who is imprudent, and, we say that the pleasure, that comes from life, is the one that comes from the use of the soul; for it is truly living!

A selection of other English translations:

For such reasons we assign life to the man who is awake rather than to him who is asleep, to him who thinks rather than to him who is thoughtless, and we say the pleasure of living is the pleasure we get from the exercise of the soul; for that is true life.<sup>134</sup>

Thus we attribute living more to the one who is awake rather than to the one who is asleep, and to the one who is intelligent more than to the one who is stupid; and we say the pleasure that comes from life is the one that comes from the uses of the soul, for this is being truly alive.<sup>135</sup>

Hutchinson and Johnson assert that “the manuscript (L) writes to be sound of mind (σωφρονοῦντι) instead of to be minded (φρονοῦντι).” Moreover, Gigon adds the phrase “τῷ ἡδέως ζῶντι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ἀηδῶς ζῶντι” between the adverb μᾶλλον and the article τὴν.”<sup>136</sup>

## Commentary

### General Notes

Aristotle posits that a pleasant life is contingent upon activity (ἐνέργεια) more than mere passivity (δύναμις). Consequently, the fragment presents the doctrine of Δύναμις – ἐνέργεια in a more popular manner. Moreover, Hutchinson and Johnson made some references to the sleep–

<sup>134</sup> Düring, *Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction*, 85.

<sup>135</sup> Hutchinson and Johnson, “Aristotle. Protrepticus: Citations, Fragments, Paraphrases, and Other Evidence,” 59.

<sup>136</sup> Iamblichus, “*Protrepticus* XI, Text and Apparatus Criticus,” 3.

waking example as follows: “*APr.* 31b28; *de An.* 412a25; *Metaph.* 1024b23, 1074b18; *NE* 1095b32, 1147a14; 1178b19; *EE* 1216a2-10; 1219b16-20.”<sup>137</sup> For this reason, the entire chapter 11 of the *Protrepticus* of Iamblichus is also determined by the rhetorical topos of the more and the less.<sup>138</sup> At the same time, it returns to Düring’s notes, “...expressed in the words ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή, *A* 7, 1072b26. This text, says Merlan too, ‘presupposes that there are degrees of life and that each has its own degree of ἡδονή.’”<sup>139</sup> Consequently, the best quality of life is enhanced most by the thoughtful individual who engages in contemplation. The following statement by Professor Katz can be interpreted as a final one on fragment B90:

The differing causal powers of different kinds of pleasure, each supporting engagement in its own specific activity, but interfering with others, could thus be accounted for, and their higher-level functional and felt similarity as well, by regarding instances of pleasure as experiences of the success of one’s life’s, or soul’s, fulfillment in particular activities of its constitutive perfected activity – but in different activities that, according to the differing teleological ranks of their life capacities and objects, have correspondingly differing degrees of pleasure and value. Pleasure is thus no accidental addition to life; it naturally reflects and tracks success in living and its value. This value is teleologically explanatory of our biological development and of the lower animal desires in which we share, but also gives to human life and rational human action their own characteristic higher ultimate goal and point. Living a life that brings its biologically highest constitutive capacities to their complete development and then exercises them without impediment upon their naturally best and most suitable objects is success in life and brings the most pleasant pleasure with it. Trivial or ignoble pleasures are sought instead by those who are stunted in their capacities for higher activities, having failed to develop the intellectual and moral virtues needed to use these well, and consequently fall short of the highest natural human fulfillment and goal. That is the fully human happiness which consists in using reason well, which at its best approximates to the best and pleasantest life form of all, the changeless purely intellectual activity of God. Our pleasure tracks the perfection of our current activities and thus our proximity to this, life at its cognitively clearest, most awake, and best (*Protrepticus* B87–B91, 1984, p. 2414; *Nicomachean Ethics* VII, 11–14 and X, 1–6).<sup>140</sup>

Additionally, the fragment is written in the present aspect stem by expressing the indicative mood and is held in the active voice.

<sup>137</sup> Iamblichus, “*Protrepticus* XI, Translation, Text, *Apparatus Criticus*, Commentary,” 3.

<sup>138</sup> For further details, see Aristotle, *Art of Rhetoric* 1358b14; Iamblichus, “*Protrepticus* XI, Translation, Text, *Apparatus criticus*, Commentary,” 1.

<sup>139</sup> Düring, *Aristotle’s Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction*, 252.

<sup>140</sup> Katz, “Pleasure.”

## Detailed Notes

1–3 τὸ ζῆν ἀποδίδομεν ... μᾶλλον ... ψυχῆς: Van der Meeren makes a reference to the essay “The Evidence for Degrees of Being” written by Morrison for further detail on the comparative adverb μᾶλλον for its understanding and translation, which is classified by three different interpretations: “1. The ‘intensify’ interpretation; 2. The ‘metalinguistic’ interpretation...; 3. The ‘ordering’ interpretation.”<sup>141</sup>

## Fragment B91

### Text, Translations and Notes on Textual Criticism

- 1 Εἰ τοίνυν καὶ πολλαὶ ψυχῆς εἰσι χρήσεις, ἀλλὰ κυριωτάτη γε
- 2 πασῶν ἡ τοῦ φρονεῖν ὅτι μάλιστα. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι καὶ τὴν γιγνομένην
- 3 ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ θεωρεῖν ἡδονὴν ἢ μόνην ἢ μάλιστ’ ἀναγκαῖον ἀπὸ
- 4 τοῦ ζῆν εἶναι. τὸ ζῆν ἄρα ἡδέως καὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἦτοι μόνοις
- 5 ἢ μάλισθ’ ὑπάρχει τοῖς φιλοσόφοις. [ἡ γὰρ τῶν ἀληθεστάτων νοήσεων
- 6 ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μάλιστ’ ὄντων πληρουμένη καὶ στέγουσα ἀεὶ
- 7 μονίμως τὴν ἐνδιδομένην τελειότητα, αὕτη πασῶν ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸς εὐφρο-
- 8 σύνην ἀνυσιμωτάτη.]

Now, even if there are many uses of the soul, still the most authoritative one of all, indeed, is to make use of being prudent, as much as possible. It is clear, then, that the pleasure that comes from being prudent and from contemplating, must be that from living, either alone or most of all. So, living with pleasure, and so, delight in the true way, belongs to the lovers of wisdom either in truth alone, or to them most of all.

A selection of other English translations:

If, then, there are more than one exercise of the soul, still the chief of all is that of thinking as well as possible. It is clear, then, that necessarily the pleasure arising from thinking and contemplation is, alone or most of all, the pleasure of living. Pleasant life and true enjoyment, therefore, belong only to thinking men, or to them most of all.<sup>142</sup>

Further, even if there are many uses of the soul, still the most authoritative one of all, certainly, is to make use of being intelligent as much as possible. Further, it is clear that the pleasure that arises from being intelligent and observing must be the pleasure

<sup>141</sup> Van der Meeren, *Exhortation à la philosophie*, 200.

<sup>142</sup> Düring, *Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction*, 85.

that comes from living, either alone or most of all. Therefore living with pleasure and true enjoyment belong only to philosophers, or to them most of all.<sup>143</sup>

Pistelli places the preposition ἀπὸ in brackets, while Ross adds τῷ φρονεῖν after the adverb ἀνυσιμωτάτη.<sup>144</sup>

## Commentary

### General Notes

The figure below shows the constitution of the human soul in book VI of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. It has been graphically depicted and annotated by Ursula Wolf but adapted from the findings of Jaeger. Moreover, based on section 414b20–34 of the Aristotelian treatise *On the Soul*, the constitution was devised in the geometric form of a house. First, Jaeger noted that the term φρόνησις in the *Protrepticus* is derived from the term νοῦς in the Platonic sense.<sup>145</sup> Therefore, the part of wisdom (σοφία) under the term intellect/intuition (νοῦς) is replaced by the term prudence (φρόνησις). Besides, Aristotle was already aware of the differences between wisdom and prudence at the time of his writing of the *Protrepticus*. Second, Jaeger has also acknowledged a discrepancy in the meaning of the term φρόνησις within the *Protrepticus* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*.<sup>146</sup> As a result, the figure is modified in the sense of the *Protrepticus* and aligned with the geometric form of an octagon, which symbolizes perfection and unity. Thus, the subparts of the thinking part of the soul (ἐπιστημονικόν) are interrelated and interdependent. Thus, prudence (φρόνησις) presents the primary activity towards, or as an end (εὐδαιμονία) in itself, since it now pervades – with reservations – the entire soul part of Reason (λόγος).<sup>147</sup> In addition, the fragment is written in the present aspect stem by expressing the indicative mood and is held in the active voice.

<sup>143</sup> Hutchinson and Johnson, "Aristotle. *Protrepticus*: Citations, Fragments, Paraphrases, and Other Evidence," 59.

<sup>144</sup> For further details, see Iamblichus, "*Protrepticus* XI, Text and Apparatus Criticus," 3.

<sup>145</sup> For further details, see Werner Jaeger, *Aristoteles: Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung*, 2., veränd. Aufl, Nachdr. [der Ausg.] Berlin 1955 (Zürich: Weidmann, 1985), 83.

<sup>146</sup> For further details, see Jaeger, 83–84.

<sup>147</sup> Speaking in the protreptic sense, however, it remains speculative philosophy and is due to the circumstances of intellectual honesty.

## Detailed Notes

1–1 **Εἰ ... ἀλλὰ**: The particle τοῖνυν is translated with the particle ‘now’ because it refers to something that is present in the minds of the speaker and the hearer and signals an opening for a conclusion.<sup>148</sup> Düring notes regarding the phrase ‘εἰ τοῖνυν καὶ πολλαὶ ψυχῆς εἰσι χρήσεις ἀλλὰ’: “On ἀλλὰ in the apodosis after a condition clause, see Eucken, *De Arist. Dic. Ratione* 33. Another example B26.”

1–2 **κυριωτάτη ... μάλιστα**: The phrase ἡ τοῦ φρονεῖν ὅτι μάλιστα is also commented on by Düring, who refers to the following line: “ἡ τοῦ φρονεῖν ὅτι μάλιστα sc. εἰς δύνανιν ἀνθρωπίνην, as Plato *Ep.* VII, 344b.” Moreover, Hutchinson and Johnson observed regarding the phrase κυριωτάτη γε’ πασῶν ἡ τοῦ φρονεῖν ὅτι μάλιστα that: “Exactly the same phrase is used in VII: μάλιστα καὶ κυριώτατα (41.24). Iamblichus often picks up and repeats phrases from his source text in the comments that he composes to introduce them or finish with them.”<sup>149</sup>

2–4 **δῆλον ... εἶναι**: The phrase Δῆλον τοῖνυν ὅτι καὶ τὴν γιγνομένην ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ θεωρεῖν ἡδονὴν ἢ μόνην ἢ μάλιστ’ ἀναγκαῖον ἀπὸ τοῦ ζῆν εἶναι is commented on by Hutchinson and Johnson as follows: “Cf. NE X 7 (1177a19-21). Rashed, ‘textes inédits’, 224-229. Alexander de Ideis apud Ambrosianus Q74 sup. lines 10-11 (Rashed, 221): Quote the Greek.”<sup>150</sup> Furthermore, Nightingale offered some noteworthy observations, as Aristotle equals φρόνησις with θεωρία and νοῦς in his *Protrepticus*.<sup>151</sup> In reference to Düring’s comment on B90, ‘the highest degree of life’ is concluded by the following phrase, documented in B91: “ἡ γὰρ τῶν ἀληθεστάτων νοήσεων ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μάλιστ’ ὄντων πληρουμένη καὶ στέγουσα ἀεὶ μονίμως τὴν ἐνδιδομένην τελειότητα, αὕτη πασῶν ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸς εὐφροσύνην ἀνυσιμωτάτη.” However, the entire statement is enclosed in brackets – as indicated above – because Hutchinson and Johnson observed a change in tone, which is not Aristotelian.<sup>152</sup> Therefore, it is not included in the translation itself.

<sup>148</sup> For further details, see *CGCG*, § 59.39.


<sup>149</sup> Iamblichus, “*Protrepticus* XI, Translation, Text, Apparatus Criticus, Commentary,” 6.

<sup>150</sup> Iamblichus, 7.

<sup>151</sup> For further details, see B79–B86; Nightingale, “‘Useless’ Knowledge: Aristotle’s Rethinking of Theoria,” 194.

<sup>152</sup> For further details, see Iamblichus, “*Protrepticus* XI, Translation, Text, Apparatus Criticus, Commentary,” 7.

**Figure 2. Illustration of the human soul's constitution.**



Source: Data adapted from Aristoteles, *Nikomachische Ethik*, ed. and trans. Ursula Wolf, 8. Auflage, Originalausgabe, Rororo Rowohlt Enzyklopädie 55651 (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch, 2020), 351.

## Conclusion

Aristotle was born and raised in a family of doctors in Stageira, an ancient village situated on the east coast of Chalkidiki. At the age of 17, he relocated to Athens to continue his studies at the Academy of Plato for approximately two decades. During this period, Eudoxos held the position of headmaster at the Academy. Thus, he was shaped in his worldview by the idealism of Plato and the hedonism of Eudoxos. The Academy's most notable opponents during this period were Isocrates and his fellows. In his later years, Isocrates wrote the *Antidosis*, an apologia in which he set out his educational approach and criticized the Academy and its education (παίδεια). In response, Aristotle – who had been a model student at the Academy – wrote his work *Protrepticus* to defend the educational program. The work was thus embedded in a process of legitimizing a particular understanding of philosophy at the time. It is regrettable that this text has been lost to history over the centuries, and scholars have endeavored to reconstruct it since the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The process of

reconstruction commenced with Bywater's article "On a Lost Dialogue of Aristotle," published in the *Journal of Philology*. It identified chapters 5–12 within the *Protrepticus* of the Syrian philosopher Iamblichus as Aristotelian in style and thus as part of the Aristotelian *Protrepticus*. At the present time, there are several attempts at reconstruction. The most widely accepted one is that proposed by Düring, along with the preliminary draft by Hutchinson and Johnson. Moreover, the προτρεπτικός λόγος are characterized by three generic functions: conversion, propaganda, and introduction. Consequently, it defines itself rather as a literary style type, which is situated within the domain of rhetoric. Accordingly, the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* is written in a rhetorical style, and it is probably addressed to a Cypriot king named Themison, and the elite Athenian youth for educational purposes. In his *Protrepticus*, Aristotle therefore exhorts the audience to pursue philosophy (φιλοσοφητέον) to lead a flourishing life. Today, the earliest known dates for the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* are 351 BC and 322 BC. Fragments B87–B91 of the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* are included in chapter VIII of Düring's edition and represent the Aristotelian concept of pleasure. It deals with the question of whether life according to prudence (φρόνησις) is the most pleasant one. Since the analyzed section B87–B91 works out the final answer to this question, it concludes that Aristotle equates the activity of contemplation (θεωρία καὶ νοῦς) with prudence (φρόνησις). As a result, it can be inferred that prudence (φρόνησις) is again equated with (the most pleasant) life (ζωή), which belongs to the lovers of wisdom most of all. The question can thus be answered in the affirmative. From the linguistic analysis, it can also be discerned that the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* represents an ethical hedonism, encompassed by a metaphysical theory, which belongs to the branch of normative ethics since it uses the textual function of an appeal. Finally, the analyzed section (B87–B91) is structured in the form of an argument and written in the style of a protreptic speech.<sup>153</sup>

## **EPICURUS – Letter to Menoeceus**

### **Life and Work**

Epicurus was born in 341 as an Athenian citizen on the island of Samos BC. He descended from one of the oldest families in Athens, the Philaidae. His father was employed as an elementary teacher. Epicurus was raised alongside his three brothers, Neocles, Chaeredemus and Aristobulus. He encouraged himself to study philosophy at the age of fourteen, because – as the Epicurean student Apollodorus in his work *Life of Epicurus* once

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<sup>153</sup> For further details, see below.



recorded – “... he despised the teachers of literature, since they were not able to explain to him the passage about Chaos in Hesiod.”<sup>154</sup> Consequently, he relocated to Teos to attend the lectures of Democritus’ fellow Nausiphanes. At the age of 18, while Xenocrates was serving as headmaster of Plato’s Academy and Aristotle was residing in Chalcis, Epicurus arrived in Athens as an ephebe. While fulfilling his military obligations, Epicurus had the opportunity to meet and argue with the great philosophical schools. In particular, he became strongly influenced by Cyrenaicism and Cynicism at the time, which provided the foundation for the advent of Hellenism, exemplified by the teachings of Antisthenes and Aristippus. After completing his military service, Epicurus relocated to Colophon to rejoin his parents (321 BC), as the Athenians had been expelled from Samos by Diadoch Perdiccas after the death of Alexander the Great. In the following decade (320–310 BC), he probably developed the basis of his philosophical system and thereafter founded his own philosophical school in 310 BC, when Epicurus was 32 years of age. He initially taught in Mytilene on the island of Lesbos, and then in Lampsacus on the Asiatic bank of the Hellespont for over five years. During this period, he cultivated relationships with individuals (συμφιλοσοφούντες) who were able to provide financial support for his educational institution. His success can be attributed to three key factors: first, he possessed a talent for dealing with people, knew how to keep friends together and created an atmosphere of personal devotion and sympathy; second, he was convinced of his own doctrine, which at its best lead to truth and salvation; and third, his doctrine was also the order of the day. Thus, he played a significant role in the development of philosophical thoughts from that day onwards. He integrated Hellenistic physics with his doctrine of salvation (ethics). Having been encouraged by the success he had achieved in Mytilene and Lampsacus, Epicurus returned to Athens in 306 BC with the intention of promoting his doctrine and evaluating it in comparison to the other schools. Athens was also the best location to evaluate his own teaching at that time. In that year, he was also able to purchase a school, which he named κήπος, after the Greek word for garden.<sup>155</sup>

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<sup>154</sup> Cyril Bailey, ed., *Epicurus: The Extant Remains* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), 141.

<sup>155</sup> For further details, see Malte Hossenfelder, *Epikur*, Originalausgabe, 4. Auflage, C.H. Beck Paperback 520 (München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2017), 14–19.

## Content and Context

### *Introduction*

Epicurus was a writer, like Aristotle and Plato before him. He wrote about 300 scrolls during his lifetime to preserve his philosophical teachings for his students and followers in mind. Unfortunately, there are only three didactic letters, *Principal Opinions* (κυρίαι δόξαι) and a collection of maxims (*Sententiae Vaticanae*), some preserved parts of his main work *On Nature* (περί φύσεως), numerous fragments and some testimonies left by him. In particular, his main work reflects the phenomena of the materialistic world based on an atomistic perspective. Thus, as mentioned above, he combined many ethical and physiological concerns, except for the concept of pleasure and the phenomenon of free will.<sup>156</sup> However, unlike Aristotle – who imposed remedial courses before attending his philosophical courses – the Epicurean school opened its doors to all ages.<sup>157</sup> Men, women and even slaves (hetaerae) without precognition were invited.<sup>158</sup> Moreover, Epicurus saw his community, based on friendship and solid rules, as an alternative draft to the citizens of the city-states (πόλις). In addition, members of the school had their own personal property and the exclusive right to use the school facilities, as shared property was understood as a form of mistrust between members and friends. Additionally, the garden (κῆπος) understood itself not only as a gathering of philosophers but also as a community that shared together cultic/religious values to strengthen its boundaries. Therefore, Epicurus organized commemorations in honor of his relatives and friends, which also served as a platform for school advertisement, according to Hossenfelder.<sup>159</sup> However, with aging, the managerial style of Epicurus became increasingly autocratic, and controversies became inevitable. Nonetheless, unlike the Stoics, who were his strongest opponents at the time, ‘Reason (λόγος)’ was not the defining principle of nature for Epicurus, but rather served as an instrument for human orientation in an irrational world (*LMen* 132).<sup>160</sup> Therefore, no decent ultimate justifications were possible. However, basic data (principles) must be provided, otherwise it would result in an infinite regress, as Hossenfelder noted.<sup>161</sup> Ultimately, Epicurus’ investigation of nature is primarily driven by ethical considerations, with the objective of attaining a flourishing life.<sup>162</sup> Consequently, the analysis of the thesis is dedicated to the *Letter of Meneoecus*, which represents the ethical branch of Epicurean philosophy.

## Textual and Literary Criticism

The authenticity of the *Letter to Meneoecus* has not been denied by modern research studies, aside from two scholars who have rejected its authenticity.<sup>163</sup> It belongs among the three didactic letters of the Epicurean corpus, along with the *Letter to Herodotus* and the *Letter to Pythocles*, as Hessler asserts.<sup>164</sup> Original excerpts or abridged translations of it are recorded by ancient witnesses such as Cicero, Philodemus, Seneca, Clement of Alexandria or Lactantius.<sup>165</sup> However, the *LMen* and the other two didactic letters – including the *Principal Opinions* in its entirety – is only recorded in the work *Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10. Epicurus* by Diogenes Laertius.<sup>166</sup>

## Genre Criticism

The *LMen* has already been classified by the scholar Bignone as a protreptic speech, such as the Aristotelian *Protrepticus*, which Hessler examined and confirmed in his research study.<sup>167</sup> Moreover, the salutation “...Ἐπίκουρος Μενουκεῖ χαίρειν” indicates that the text is

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<sup>156</sup> For further details, see Hessler, *Epikur, Brief an Menoikeus*, 2014, 22–23; D N. Sedley, “Epicurus’ Refutation of Determinism,” *Συζήτησις. Studi Sull’ Epicureismo Greco e Romano Offerti a M. Gigante*, no. Napoli (1983): 11–51.

<sup>157</sup> Jan Erik Hessler, ed., *Epikur, Brief an Menoikeus: Edition, Übersetzung, Einleitung und Kommentar*, trans. Jan Erik Hessler, Schwabe Epicurea 4 (Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 2014), 149; For this reason, the Epicurean attitude was directed against the educational program (παιδεία) of the platonic-peripatetic school.

<sup>158</sup> Ettore Bignone, Vittorio Enzo Alfieri, and Giuseppe Girgenti, *L’ Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro*, 1. ed. Bompiani Il pensiero occidentale, Bompiani Il pensiero occidentale (Milano: Bompiani, 2007), 110–11.

<sup>159</sup> For further details, see Hossenfelder, *Epikur*, 18.

<sup>160</sup> „Denn im Anschluß an Eudoxos ergab sich, daß ein höchstes Gut als absoluter Endwert rational nicht erkennbar ist, und Aristipp hatte gezeigt, daß das Letzte, was dem Individuum ursprünglich gegeben ist, seine sinnlichen Empfindungen sind. Also ist das höchste Gut eine irrationale, sinnliche positive Empfindung und heißt darum Lust.“ Hossenfelder, 64.

<sup>161</sup> For further details, see Hossenfelder, *Epikur*, 19–20.

<sup>162</sup> For further details, see Hossenfelder, 27.

<sup>163</sup> For further details, see Hessler, *Epikur, Brief an Menoikeus*, 2014, 27–28.

<sup>164</sup> For further details, see Hessler, 27.

<sup>165</sup> For further details, see Hessler, 27.

<sup>166</sup> For a general overview of the textual critical editions, see Hessler, 120.

<sup>167</sup> For further details, see Hessler, 40.

written in epistolary form, as Hessler noted.<sup>168</sup> He revisited his findings in his essay “Protreptic and Epistolography: Epicurus” and argued: “In the course of time not only a large amount of protreptic dialogues or treatises were written, but at a certain point in time, also letters became a medium to communicate the advantages of a life according to philosophical principles.”<sup>169</sup> Additionally, he consults the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* and posits that “this writing came very close to a protreptic letter, since the text was not conceived as a dialogue – as, once in a while, is still stated –, but rather represented a treatise *formally* quite similar to the *Cyprian orations* that was sent to Themison.”<sup>170</sup> After elucidating some protreptic inclinations of various Epicurean letters, Hessler concludes that the *LMen* is “... Epicurus’ protreptic writing *par excellence*” by providing an analogy with the guidelines of Philo of Larisa’s account for protreptic literary forms.<sup>171</sup> In this respect, Epicurean philosophy became known as “... *philosophia medicans*.”<sup>172</sup>

In particular, Philo draws a parallel between the προτρεπτικός λόγος and the physician’s healing metaphor, which first emerges in Plato’s *Gorgias* and can be traced back to the Cynics.<sup>173</sup> The metaphor is employed in the προτρεπτικός λόγος as follows: as a doctor who encouraged patients suffering from illness to undergo medical treatment to eliminate the disease and promote health by offering therapy to the patient, the philosopher eliminates false desires (ἀποτροπή) through the medium of the προτρεπτικός λόγος by replacing them with those that are right and healthy.<sup>174</sup> Moreover, it provides guidance (προτροπή) to those who lack the time to engage with philosophy to maintain a state of enjoyment in their lives (λόγος περί βίων). This encompasses both the individual’s (ἴδιος) own enjoyment and that of the public (κοινός). The end is to give this advice in a synthesized form of an epitome (ἐπιτομή) to those who seek to achieve a state of mental well-being and live a flourishing life

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<sup>168</sup> Hessler, 35.

<sup>169</sup> Jan Erik Hessler, “Protreptic and Epistolography: Epicurus,” in *When Wisdom Calls: Philosophical Protreptic in Antiquity*, Monothéismes et Philosophie (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols Publishers n.v, 2018), 155.

<sup>170</sup> Hessler, 157.

<sup>171</sup> Hessler, 166.

<sup>172</sup> Hessler, 166.

<sup>173</sup> Plato, *Gorgias* 464b–466a.

<sup>174</sup> For further details, see Usener, *Epicurea*, Epic. Fr.221 *Us*.

(εὐδαιμονία).<sup>175</sup> Once again, it raises the question concerning the structure and language on which the *Letter of Meneoceus* is based to fulfill this purpose.

### *Structure and Language*

“Don’t fear god,  
Don’t worry about death;  
What is good is easy to get, and  
What is terrible is easy to endure.”<sup>176</sup>

These four lines provide a summary of the four doctrines (τετραφάρμακος) of the Epicurean way of happiness and present the first four lines of the Epicurean work *Principle Opinions* (κύρια δόξα) to guide people to happiness (εὐδαιμονία). At the same time, they project the structure of the *Letter to Meneoceus*. It is read as follows:

**Table 3. Structure of Bailey’s edition of the *Letter to Meneoceus***

<i>LMen</i> 122	Φιλοσοφητέον
<i>LMen</i> 123–24	The Nature of the Gods
<i>LMen</i> 124–27	Death
<i>LMen</i> 127–29	Pleasure as the Motive and End of Action
<i>LMen</i> 129–31	Pleasures and Pains: Choice and Avoidance/Independence of Desires
<i>LMen</i> 131–32	The Character of True Pleasure
<i>LMen</i> 132–35	Φρόνησις

Source: Data adapted from Epicurus and Bailey, *Epicurus, the Extant Remains*, 327–43,

The sequence (*LMen* 122–135) is internally consistent. Moreover, the letter reveals the linguistic developments between the Attic Greek dialect and the Hellenistic dialect.<sup>177</sup> A detailed analysis in this respect has been provided by Hessler.<sup>178</sup> Based on the quantity of rhetorical figures and its rhythmic writing that Epicurus used, “the conventional wisdom that

<sup>175</sup> For further details, see Hessler, *Epikur, Brief an Menoikeus*, 2014, 45–47; Martha Craven Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics*, New ed, Martin Classical Lectures (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009), 50–53.

<sup>176</sup> Epicurus, *The Epicurus Reader: Selected Writings and Testimonia*, ed. Brad Inwood and Lloyd P. Gerson, trans. Inwood, Brad and Gerson, Lloyd P. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), vi.

<sup>177</sup> Jay C. Treat, “Differences Between Classical and Hellenistic Greek,” accessed August 1, 2024, <https://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/~jttreat/koine/classical.html#sources>.

<sup>178</sup> For further details, see Hessler, *Epikur, Brief an Menoikeus*, 2014, 71–99.

there is no developed rhetorical text by Epicurus, has, thus, to be reconsidered,” as Hessler asserts.<sup>179</sup> Furthermore, the written form of the epitome (ἐπιτομή) fulfils the educational function of memorizing the Epicurean doctrines (τετραφάρμακος), which comprise “theology, thanatology, hedonism and ὁμοίωσις θεῷ.”<sup>180</sup> Consequently, the analysis of the concept of pleasure (ἡδονή) is embedded in the context of the Epicurean doctrines (τετραφάρμακος) and can be read as follows:

**Table 4. Detailed Structure of the *LMen* 127,8–132**

<i>LMen</i> 127,8–11	Desires (ἐπιθυμία): Natural and Void
<i>LMen</i> 128	Contemplation (θεωρία) and Pleasure (ἡδονή)
<i>LMen</i> 129–130	Epicurean hedonistic Calculus and Self-sufficiency
<i>LMen</i> 131–132	Reasoning (λογισμός) and Prudence (φρόνησις)

Source: Data adapted from Epicurus and Bailey, *Epicurus, the Extant Remains*, 333–338

At the same time, the following table also thus represents the moral philosophy of Epicurean philosophy, encompassed by pleasure (ἡδονή). However, as Epicurean philosophy can also be understood as ‘philosophia medicans,’ it poses the question concerning to whom it was originally dedicated.

### *Addressee and Dating*

Unfortunately, information on this is scarcely represented, according to Hessler.<sup>181</sup> Thus, as the salutation “Ἐπίκουρος Μενοικεῖ χαίρειν” indicates, the letter was devoted to Menoceues and his sons, who were probably one among the first students of Epicurus.<sup>182</sup> However, as protreptic text was also meant for a broader audience, Epicurus cannot assume a deeper understanding of the philosophical background behind it. For this reason, the content of the *LMen* has also to be written in a self-evident way and accessible to the newcomers. Therefore, in reference to the aforementioned quotation, Epicurus did not prepare his students for a traditional political career in general – in contrast to the Isocratean school – but rather dedicated them to care (μελέτη) for their mental and physical health at its best to live a

<sup>179</sup> Hessler, 99.

<sup>180</sup> Hessler, 101.

<sup>181</sup> For further details, see Hessler, 28.

<sup>182</sup> For further details, see Hessler, 28–29.

flourishing life. This is also what Epicurus understood by doing politics and what stands in the tradition of Socratic politics by following the philosophical pragma of ἐπιμέλεια τῆς ψυχῆς.<sup>183</sup> Erler also mentions: “‘true’ politics goes back to Plato’s Socrates and may have been conveyed to Epicurus by Aristotle or by reading the Gorgias himself.”<sup>184</sup> Thus, philosophy was dedicated to ‘true politics’ in the Socratic sense for Epicurus. Therefore, politics was also understood two folded in the epicurean school, which Erler asserted as follows:

... the Epicureans distinguished between two different ways of practising politics and had in mind two different concepts of security – the traditional social security provided by the polis and a security provided by ‘true – i. e. Epicurean – politics’, which does not require traditional institutions or protection by city walls.<sup>185</sup>

Consequently, when Epicurus was doing philosophy (Φιλοσοφητέον), he had his focus on the therapeutic function, which inherently entails the search for a beneficial purpose.

Furthermore, in consideration of the salutation and the insight of Hessler regarding Meneoceus and his sons, the letter can be dated to around 307/6 BC. It was written in Athens, as indicated by the passage from Philodem’s work *Ad contubernales* in the edition of Sbodrdoes, as Hessler asserts.<sup>186</sup> The date 307/6 BC is taken as terminus post quem, indicating that Epicurus relocated to Athens at this time. However, the word πρόληψις as used in the *LMen* 124 had not been developed before 296/5 BC, as Hessler observed.<sup>187</sup> In the face of adversity, he put forward an alternative hypothesis in the form of a literary interpretation, which posits a broad period for its formation between 296/5 BC and 271/0 BC.<sup>188</sup>

### On Pleasure: *Letter to Menoeceus* (127,8–132)

Regarding the following passages, the passage exhibits the most authentic form of Epicurean ethics within the Epicurean textual corpus and offers insights in the Epicurean way of life. Moreover, the following Greek text is taken from Arrighetti’s edition in both structure

<sup>183</sup> Michael Erler, *Epicurus: An Introduction to His Practical Ethics and Politics* (Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 2020), 60.

<sup>184</sup> Erler, 60.

<sup>185</sup> Erler, 60.

<sup>186</sup> For further details, see Hessler, *Epikur, Brief an Menoikeus*, 2014, 29.

<sup>187</sup> For further details, see Hessler, 30.

<sup>188</sup> For further details, see Hessler, 31–32.

and content.<sup>189</sup> It is noteworthy again that the following translation of the text is my own, based on the translations of Bailey and L. A. Long and D. Sedley. The structure of the linguistic analysis is again oriented towards the chapter “Four Sample Passages” in the *CGCG* and will be further supported by the *AGG* for linguistic purposes by von Siebenthal. The following commentary is again based on the principles of utility and value-added, with the aim of avoiding unnecessary repetition. Therefore, it only provides linguistic clarification for my own translation, and – where necessary – contributes background information for the following intertextual analysis. As Hessler has already produced extensive notes on the textual criticism, the following chapter (*LMen* 127,8–132) refrains from doing so, except where it is indispensable.

### *LMen* 127,8–11

#### Text and Translations

- 1 [εἰ μὲν γὰρ πεποιθὼς τοῦτό φησιν, πῶς οὐκ ἀπέρχεται ἐκ τοῦ
- 2 ζῆν; ἐν ἐτοίμῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῦτ' ἐστίν, εἴπερ ἦν βεβουλευμένον
- 3 αὐτῷ βεβαίως· εἰ δὲ μωκώμενος, μάταιος ἐν τοῖς οὐκ ἐπιδε-
- 4 χομένοις.
- 5 Μνημονευτέον δὲ ὡς τὸ μέλλον οὔτε πάντως ἡμέτερον οὔτε
- 6 πάντως οὐχ ἡμέτερον, ἵνα μήτε πάντως προσμένωμεν ὡς ἐσό-
- 7 μενον μήτε ἀπελπίζωμεν ὡς πάντως οὐκ ἐσόμενον.]
- 8 Ἀναλογιστέον δὲ ὡς τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι φυσικαί, αἱ δὲ
- 9 Κεναί, καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν αἱ μὲν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ μόνον·
- 10 τῶν δὲ ἀναγκαίων αἱ μὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ
- 11 δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀοχλησίαν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν.

But we must reckon that of the desires, some are natural, and others void, but of the natural ones, some are necessary and others natural alone: but of the necessary ones, some are necessary for happiness, others for the freedom from bodily disturbances, and still others for the very life.

<sup>189</sup> For further details, see Epicurus, *Opere*, Biblioteca Di Cultura Filosofica / 41 (Torino: Einaudi, 1972), 107–17, <https://ubdata.univie.ac.at/AC01527130>.



A selection of other English translations:

One must reckon that of desires some are natural, some groundless; and of the natural desires some are necessary and some merely natural; and of the necessary, some are necessary for happiness and some for freeing the body from troubles and some for life itself.<sup>190</sup>



We must reckon that some desires are natural and others empty, and of the natural some are necessary, others natural only; and of the necessary some are necessary for happiness, others for the body's freedom from stress, and others for life itself.<sup>191</sup>

## Commentary

### General Notes

The constitution of the desires is the starting point of Epicurean moral philosophy. The following figure serves as an illustration of it, based on Bohr's atomic model of a nitrogen atom.

**Figure 3. Illustration of the Epicurean Theory of Ethics<sup>192</sup>**



Source: Adapted from Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Bohr model." Encyclopedia Britannica, March 5, 2024. <https://www.britannica.com/science/Bohr-model>.

The classification is also found in the following Epicurean works: *KD* 29; *VS* 20 and *VS* 21. Further evidence is provided by Hessler.<sup>193</sup> Moreover, the classification has been criticized by Cicero in his treatise *Fin.* 2,26.90–92. Bignone asserts allusions or echoes to it in the following passages: "*Rep.* 558d; *Rep.* 571app.; *EN* 1118b8; *EN* 1150a15; *EN* 1147b24pp.;

<sup>190</sup> Bailey, *Epicurus: The Extant Remains*, 87.

<sup>191</sup> A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 113.

<sup>192</sup> The desires are divided into natural ○ and vain ● ones, whereby the natural ones are further divided into necessary ● and not necessary ○ ones.

<sup>193</sup> Hessler, 231.

EN 1149b5.”<sup>194</sup> Moreover, Steckel supposes that the origin of Epicurean classification can be traced to Aristotle.<sup>195</sup> In terms of meaning, the natural and necessary desires are those that satisfy basic human needs, such as the need for breath, health, nutrition, shelter or sleep. In the absence of fulfilment, these needs give rise to physical or mental discomfort. Second, natural and unnecessary desires evoke certain urges that are natural and want to be fulfilled but do not cause sustained pain, such as sexual desire. Third, void ones are those that cause limitless excesses, including luxury goods, glory, or political influence.<sup>196</sup> Moreover, the following passage is written in the present aspect stem and expresses the indicative mood. It is held in the active voice and can be understood as a recourse to the Academics [Plato and Aristotle] to demonstrate alignment with their views or as an attempt by Epicurus to distinguish himself from them.<sup>197</sup>

### Detailed Notes

1–7 [εἰ ... ἐσόμενον]: The passage is enclosed in brackets, because it is not part of the analysis.

8–8 Ἀναλογιστέον ... : The verbal adjective Ἀναλογιστέον is used by Epicurus in the *Letter to Meneoeceus* 127 and in the *Letter to Herodotus* 72. There are no other textual epicurean works, neither prior nor posterior, which contain this verbal adjective, asserts Hessler.<sup>198</sup> In this context, it can be inferred that pleasure is closely linked to the concept of time.

10–11 τῶν δὲ ἀναγκαίων ... αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν: The following subdivision of the three different kinds of natural and necessary desires pertains to the absence of mental fear, and from physical disturbance, as well as the security of the basic needs of human nature.

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<sup>194</sup> Ettore Bignone, *L' Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro*, vol. 1 (Firenze: La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1973), 362.

<sup>195</sup> H. Steckel, “Epikurs Prinzip Der Einheit von Schmerzlosigkeit Und Lust” (Göttingen, 1960), 56.

<sup>196</sup> For further details, see Epicurus, *KD* 26; *KD* 30; *VS* 8; *VS* 71; Usener, *Epicurea*, Epic. Fr.379 *Us.*; Epic. Fr. 456 *Us.*; Epic. Fr. 464 *Us.*;

<sup>197</sup> For further details, see Plato, *Rep.* 357; Aristotle, *EN* 1118b; Bailey, *Epicurus: The Extant Remains*, 334.

<sup>198</sup> Hessler, *Epikur, Brief an Menoikeus*, 2014, 231.

*LMen 128***Text and Translations**

- 1 τούτων γὰρ ἀπλανῆς θεωρία πᾶσαν αἴρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ἐπανά
- 2 γειν οἶδεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἄτα
- 3 ραξίαν, ἐπεὶ τοῦτο τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν ἐστι τέλος. τούτου γὰρ
- 4 χάριν πάντα πράττομεν, ὅπως μήτε ἀλγῶμεν μήτε ταρβῶμεν.
- 5 ὅταν δὲ ἅπαξ τοῦτο περὶ ἡμᾶς γένηται, λύεται πᾶς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς
- 6 χειμῶν, οὐκ ἔχοντος τοῦ ζώου βαδίζειν ὡς πρὸς ἐνδέον τι καὶ
- 7 ζητεῖν ἕτερον ὃ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθὸν συμπλη-
- 8 ρώσεται. τότε γὰρ ἡδονῆς χρεῖαν ἔχομεν, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ πα-
- 9 ρεῖναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλγῶμεν· ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἀλγῶμεν ≥ οὐκέτι τῆς
- 10 ἡδονῆς δεόμεθα.
- 11 Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι
- 12 τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν.

Then, an unwavering contemplation of these knows that every choice and avoidance lead to the health of the body and the tranquility of the soul since this is the end of the blessed life. For we do everything for this that we neither be in pain nor be frightened. And, when this has come about us once, all the tempest of the soul is dispersed, the living being need not to walk about as if something were missing, and to seek something else by which it will fulfil the good of the soul and the body. After all, then, we have a need for pleasure, when we are in pain in the absence of pleasure; but when we are not in pain, we no longer need pleasure. And, because of this, we say that pleasure is the beginning and the end of the blessed life.

A selection of other English translations:

The right understanding of these facts enables us to refer all choice and avoidance to the health of the body and the soul's freedom from disturbance, since this is the aim of the life of blessedness. For it is to obtain this end that we always act, namely, to avoid pain and fear. And when this is once secured for us, all the tempest of the soul is dispersed, since the living creature has not to wander as though in search for something that is missing, and to look for some other thing by which he can fulfil the good of the soul and the good of the body. For it is then that we have need of pleasure, when we feel pain owing to the absence of pleasure; but when we do not feel pain, we

no longer need pleasure. And for this cause we call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life.<sup>199</sup>

For the steady observation of these things makes it possible to refer every choice and avoidance to the health of the body and the soul's freedom from disturbance, since this is the end belonging to the blessed life. For this is what we aim at in all our actions - to be free from pain and anxiety. Once we have got this, all the soul's tumult is released, since the creature cannot go as if in pursuit of something it needs and search for any second thing as the means of maximizing the good of the soul and the body. For the time when we need pleasure is when we are in pain from the absence of pleasure. when we are not in pain we no longer need pleasure. This is why we say that pleasure is the beginning and end of the blessed life.<sup>200</sup>

## Commentary

### General Notes

The passage can again be understood as a recourse to Plato to distinguish himself from the Academics [Aristotle and Plato] at the same time.<sup>201</sup> In addition, the passage contains finite verbs, which are written in the present aspect stem, the aorist aspect stem, and the future tense. Moreover, they express the indicative or subjunctive mood and are held in either the active, middle, or passive voice.

### Detailed Notes

1–2 ἀπλανής θεωρία ... οἶδεν: The noun phrase ἀπλανής θεωρία is translated as ‘unwavering contemplation’ because of its literal meaning.<sup>202</sup> The phrase first appears in Epicurus, as Erler noted in his essay “Απλανησ Θεωρια. Einige Aspekte der Epikureischen Vorstellung vom Βίος Θεωρητικός,” in which he himself draws a remarkable analogical conclusion between the Platonic θεωρία in the *Timaeus* and the Epicurean ἀπλανής θεωρία in the *LMen*.<sup>203</sup> The finite verb οἶδεν figuratively means ‘see with the mind’s eye.’<sup>204</sup> Additionally, the term θεωρία implies a reference to the previous statement regarding the

<sup>199</sup> Epicurus and Bailey, Cyril, *Epicurus, the Extant Remains* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), 87, <https://ubdata.univie.ac.at/AC07743708>.

<sup>200</sup> Long and Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 1987, 113–14.

<sup>201</sup> For further details, see Hessler, *Epikur, Brief an Menoikeus*, 2014, 237–40; 47.

<sup>202</sup> For further detail, see *LSJ*.

<sup>203</sup> Michael Erler, “Απλανησ Θεωρια. Einige Aspekte Der Epikureischen Vorstellung Vom Βίος Θεωρητικός,” in *Theoria, Praxis, and the Contemplative Life after Plato and Aristotle*, ed. Thomas Bénatouïl and Mauro Bonazzi (BRILL, 2012), 46–55, [https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004230040\\_004](https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004230040_004).

<sup>204</sup> For further detail, see *LSJ*.

blessed (μακαρίως) nature of the gods (*LMen* 123–124), to which his fellows have to assimilate (μίμησις) their own.

2–4 τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξίαν ... τούτου ... μήτε ἄλγῶμεν μήτε ταρβῶμεν: The two conjunctions are interrelated and employ a synonymous parallelism or an affirmation plus negated denial as a rhetorical device.<sup>205</sup> Consequently, the demonstrative pronoun τούτου can be understood to refer to either the prior or posterior conjunction. Thus, this provides a solution of whether it refers to the former sentence or the latter half-sentence.<sup>206</sup> However, it affirms the assumption of Held of being tautological.<sup>207</sup> Nevertheless, it emphasizes clearness rather than meaninglessness.<sup>208</sup> Furthermore, Bignone proposes an analogy to the Aristotelian treatise *EN* 1097a18p. and *EN* 1102a1–4.<sup>209</sup>

5–6 τοῦτο περὶ ἡμᾶς γένηται ... ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς χειμῶν: The conjuncture περὶ ἡμᾶς γένηται has already appeared in Plato, *Rep.* 518a. Later in time, it is used more frequently. Moreover, it is used synonymously with the verb συμβαίνειν (see *LSJ*), which also appears in the fragments (B88–B89) of the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* in Düring's edition. Furthermore, it appears in the Aristotelian treatise *EN* 1109b4. The noun χειμῶν – which is translated as ‘storm’ or ‘tempest’ – is used metaphorically in this context as a tempest of bodily and mental disturbances.<sup>210</sup> Moreover, Epicurus used the term once again in his *Letter to Pythocles* 115. In addition, Hessler refers to *Lucr.* 2,1–4 and a note of Eusebius, which proclaimed that Aristippus the Younger differentiated between three states of pleasure and pain by means of the terms χειμῶν and θάλαττα.<sup>211</sup>

<sup>205</sup> For further detail, see *AGG*, §294y; §294z; §294aa.

<sup>206</sup> For further details, see Hessler, *Epikur, Brief an Menoikeus*, 2014, 242.

<sup>207</sup> For further details, see Katharina Held, *Hēdonē Und Ataraxia Bei Epikur* (Paderborn: Mentis, 2007), 161–62.

<sup>208</sup> For further detail, see Epicurus, *KD* 3; *KD* 10; *Lucr.* 2,16 pp.; Usener, *Epicurea*, Epic. Fr. 434 *Us.*; Usener, *Glossarium Epicureum*, ed. M. Gigante and W.O. Schmid (Roma, 1977), 657, quoted in Jan Erik Hessler, ed., *Epikur, Brief an Menoikeus: Edition, Übersetzung, Einleitung und Kommentar*, trans. Jan Erik Hessler, Schwabe Epicurea 4 (Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 2014), 243.

<sup>209</sup> Bignone, *L' Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro*, 1:364.

<sup>210</sup> For further details, see *LSJ*; Hessler, *Epikur, Brief an Menoikeus*, 2014, 244–47.

<sup>211</sup> For further details, see Hessler, 245.

6–6 **βαδίζειν ὡς πρὸς**: Hessler asserts that the verb βαδίζειν is also found further in the Epicurean corpus. Bignone refers to Plato *Phlb.* 60c and the Aristotelian treatise *EE* 1247b21 in this context.<sup>212</sup>

11–11 **Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος**: Pleasure (ἡδονή) is defined as both the beginning (ἀρχή) and the end (τέλος) of every action, which is endorsed by the next statement, as Steckler notes.<sup>213</sup>

### *LMen 129*

#### **Text and Translations**

- 1 Ταύτην γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν
- 2 ἔγνωμεν καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης καταρχόμεθα πάσης αἰρέσεως καὶ φυ
- 3 γῆς καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην καταντῶμεν ὡς κανόνι τῷ πάθει πᾶν ἀγα
- 4 θὸν κρίνοντες. Καὶ ἐπεὶ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο καὶ σύμφυτον, διὰ
- 5 τοῦτο καὶ οὐ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν αἰρούμεθα, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὅτε πολλὰς
- 6 ἡδονὰς ὑπερβαίνομεν, ὅταν πλεῖον ἡμῖν τὸ δυσχερὲς ἐκ τούτων
- 7 ἔπηται· καὶ πολλὰς ἀλγηδόνας ἡδονῶν κρείττους νομίζομεν,
- 8 ἐπειδὴν μείζων ἡμῖν ἡδονὴ παρακολουθῇ πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομεί-
- 9 νασι τὰς ἀλγηδόνας. πᾶσα οὖν ἡδονὴ διὰ τὸ φύσιν ἔχειν οἰκείαν
- 10 ἀγαθόν, οὐ πᾶσα μέντοι αἰρετὴ· καθάπερ καὶ ἀλγηδὼν πᾶσα
- 11 κακόν, οὐ πᾶσα δὲ ἀεὶ φευκτὴ πεφυκυῖα.

For we recognized this as the principal and congenital good, and from this we begin every choice and avoidance, and we return to this as a standard for judging every good by the sensation. And, since this is the principal good and connatural, because of this, we also do not choose every pleasure, but, as it is sometimes, we pass over many pleasures, when greater discomfort follows us from them; and we think that much pain is better than pleasure, when greater pleasure follows us, after we have endured the pain for a long period of time. Therefore, every pleasure, because it is naturally akin to us, is good, but not all are to be chosen; even every pain is just as bad, but not all are always of a nature to be avoided.

<sup>212</sup> Bignone, *L' Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro*, 1:364.

<sup>213</sup> For further details, see Steckler, “Epikurs Prinzip Der Einheit von Schmerzlosigkeit Und Lust,” 29–31.

A selection of other English translations:

For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good. And since pleasure is the first good and natural to us, for this very reason we do not choose every pleasure, but sometimes we pass over many pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to us as the result of them: and similarly we think many pains are better than pleasures, since a greater pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains for a long time. Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided.<sup>214</sup>

For we recognize pleasure as the good which is primary and congenital; from it we begin every choice and avoidance, and we come back to it, using the feeling as the yardstick for judging every good thing. Since pleasure is the good which is primary and congenital, for this reason we do not choose every pleasure either, but we sometimes pass over many pleasures in cases when their outcome for us is a greater quantity of discomfort; and we regard many pains as better than pleasures in cases when our endurance of pains is followed by a greater and long-lasting pleasure. Every pleasure, then, because of its natural affinity, is something good, yet not every pleasure is choice worthy. Correspondingly, every pain is something bad, but not every pain is by nature to be avoided.<sup>215</sup>

## Commentary

### General Notes

There is a high probability that the passage has recourse to the Academics [Aristotle, probably Plato] and is in accordance with the Stoic view. Moreover, it is again written opposed to Aristotle and the Cyrenaics.<sup>216</sup> In addition, the following passage is written in the present aspect stem by expressing the indicative mood and is held in either in active, middle or passive voice.

### Detailed Notes

1–4 Ταύτην γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν ... : The adjective συγγενικὸν is employed in the context of the ‘cradle argument.’<sup>217</sup> The adjective appears quite

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<sup>214</sup> Bailey, *Epicurus: The Extant Remains*, 87–88.

<sup>215</sup> Long and Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 1987, 114.

<sup>216</sup> For further details, see Usener, *Epicurea*, Epic. Fr. 397 *Us.*; Epic. Fr. 439 *Us.*; *D.L.* 2,88–90; A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, eds., *The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 1, Translations of the Principal Sources with Philosophical Commentary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 87–90, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808050>; Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire*, 106–9.

<sup>217</sup> For further details, see Usener, *Epicurea*, Epic. Fr.66 *Us.*; Epic. Fr. 398 *Us.*; *D.L.* 10, 137.

frequently in Aristotle. This can be observed in several passages, including – but not restricted to – the following: *EE* 1242a1p. *EN* 1161b16; *Pr.* 878b27. Furthermore, Epicurus used the adjective once again in his *LHdt* 72, in which he made some notes about the accurate observation of time. It is translated – among others – as ‘intimate’ by R.D. Hicks in this context. In addition, Held discusses three current issues related to the ‘cradle argument’ in her thesis.<sup>218</sup> Tsouna offers two additional views on the cradle argument, concluding with the following lines: “... I am inclined to think that some of his later followers if not Epicurus himself held that psychological hedonism actually entails ethical hedonism.” In addition, the verb ἔγνωμεν is translated with the finite verb ‘recognized’ because it is written in the aorist aspect stem.<sup>219</sup>

3–4 τῷ πάθει πᾶν ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντες: In his ethical system, Epicurus employs the criterion of sensation (πάθος) to judge the goodness of any given object. It is one of the three criteria that Epicurus mentions, along with αἴσθησις and πρόληψις. However, in contrast to the criterion of perception (αἴσθησις), which is used to judge the visible, the criterion of sensations (πάθος) is used to judge the invisible (ἄδηλα), especially in epistemology. However, the three criteria were not subjected to a sharp separation in ancient times.<sup>220</sup> The noun πάθος also appears in the grammatical number dual, thereby implying the sensations of pleasure and pain. Unlike Aristotle, Epicurus makes a further detailed classification.<sup>221</sup> Consequently, he identifies the passions (πάθος) with pleasure and pain. In addition, he divides pleasure into kinetic (κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργεῖα) and katastematic (καταστηματικά ἡδοναί) pleasures, and pain in desire and fear.<sup>222</sup>

4–9 διὰ τοῦτο ... ὑπομείνασι τὰς ἀλγυδόνας: Furthermore, Tsouna proclaims in this context that “... everybody makes decisions with the aim of getting greater pleasure in the end, only the followers of Epicurus regularly and successfully assess the long-term

<sup>218</sup> For further details, see Held, *Hēdonē Und Ataraxia Bei Epikur*, 58–74.

<sup>219</sup> For further details, see LSJ; Phillip Mitsis, *Epicurus’ Ethical Theory: The Pleasures of Invulnerability*, vol. 48 (Cornell University Press, 1988), 42, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.cttq45fk>.

<sup>220</sup> For further details, see Hessler, *Epikur, Brief an Menoikeus*, 2014, 253–55.

<sup>221</sup> For further details, see Düring, *Protr.* B88; Aristotle, *EN* 1105b21.

<sup>222</sup> For further details, see Usener, *Epicurea*, Epic. Fr.260 *Us.*; Epic. Fr.442 *Us.*; Hossenfelder, *Epikur*, 76–98; Bailey, *Epicurus: The Extant Remains*, 120.



implications of their actions (*KD* 8, *VS* 73) under the guidance of ‘this famous discoverer of the truth and architect, as it were, of the happy life’ (*Fin.* 1.32).”<sup>223</sup>

9–9 ... **διὰ τὸ φύσιν ἔχειν οἰκείαν** ... : The phrase of this translation is based on R.D. Hicks. A modern alternative translation – which is leant to Heidegger’s term *Eigentlichkeit* – could be ‘because it has a natural ownedness.’<sup>224</sup> In addition, in my assessment there is a relevant intertextual phrase match (lemma) with Plato’s *Gorgias* 506e3.

## *LMen 130*

### **Text, Translations and Notes on Textual Criticism**

- 1 τῇ μέντοι συμμετ-
- 2 ρήσει καὶ συμφερόντων καὶ ἀσυμφόρων [βλέπει] ταῦτα πάντα
- 3 κρίνειν καθήκει. χρώμεθα γὰρ τῷ μὲν ἀγαθῷ κατὰ τινος χρό-
- 4 νους ὡς κακῷ, τῷ δὲ κακῷ τοῦμπαλιν ὡς ἀγαθῷ.
- 5 Καὶ τὴν αὐτάρκειαν δὲ ἀγαθὸν μέγα νομίζομεν, οὐχ ἵνα πάν-
- 6 τως τοῖς ὀλίγοις χρώμεθα, ἀλλ’ ὅπως, ἐὰν μὴ ἔχωμεν τὰ πολλὰ,
- 7 τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἀρκώμεθα, πεπεισμένοι γνησίως ὅτι ἥδιστα πολυ-
- 8 τελείας ἀπολαύουσιν οἱ ἥκιστα ταύτης δεόμενοι, καὶ ὅτι τὸ μὲν
- 9 φυσικὸν πᾶν εὐπόριστόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ κενὸν δυσπόριστον, οἳ τε
- 10 λιτοὶ χυλοὶ ἴσῃν πολυτελεῖ διαίτῃ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐπιφέρουσιν, ὅταν
- 11 ἅπαν τὸ ἀλγοῦν κατ’ ἔνδειαν ἐξαιρεθῇ,

However, by a scale of comparison of both advantages and disadvantages, it is meet to judge on all these matters. For we be used to the good as bad from time to time, then backwards the bad as good. And then, we consider that self-sufficiency is a highly good, not that we be used to the few in all ways, but, anyhow, if we have not many, we be satisfied with the few, as having been genuinely convinced that those have the greatest pleasure in great expense, who are least bound to this, and that all

<sup>223</sup> Voula Tsouna, “Hedonism,” in *Oxford Handbook of Epicurus and Epicureanism* *Oxford Handbook of Epicurus and Epicureanism*, by Voula Tsouna, ed. Phillip Mitsis (Oxford University Press, 2020), 150, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199744213.013.30>.

<sup>224</sup> Somogy Varga and Charles Guignon, “Authenticity,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2023), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2023/entries/authenticity/>.

the natural is easy to procure, but the void hard to come by, and the simple juices of plants are equal in pleasure to an expensive diet, when all the pain by lack, has been removed,

A selection of other English translations:

Yet by a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgement on all these matters. For the good on certain occasions, we treat the good as bad, and conversely the bad as good. And again independence of desire we think a great good-not that we may at all times enjoy but a few things, but that, if we do not possess many, we may enjoy the few in the genuine persuasion that those have the sweetest pleasure in luxury who least need it, and that all that is natural is easy to be obtained, but that which is superfluous is hard. And so plain savours bring us a pleasure equal to a luxurious diet, when all the pain due to want is removed;<sup>225</sup>

However, we have to make our judgement on all these points by a calculation and survey of advantages and disadvantages. For at certain times we treat the good as bad and conversely the bad as good. We also regard self-sufficiency as a great good, not with the aim of always living off little, but to enable us to live off little if we do not have much, in the genuine conviction that they derive the greatest pleasure from luxury who need it least, and that everything natural is easy to procure, but what is empty is hard to procure. Plain flavours produce pleasure equal to an expensive diet whenever all the pain of need has been removed;<sup>226</sup>

The term βλέπει is written in all manuscripts. Usener corrects the term to ἐπιβλέπει, although Hessler athetizes the term βλέπει in his translation. Thus, he also rejects Usener's correction on the grounds of asymmetry.<sup>227</sup> For these reasons, the thesis follows Hessler's athetesis in its translation by enclosing it in brackets [βλέπει].<sup>228</sup>

## Commentary

### General notes

The following passage is highly probably influenced by Aristotle.<sup>229</sup> In addition, the following passage contains finite verbs, which are written in the present aspect stem or the

<sup>225</sup> Epicurus and Bailey, Cyril, *Epicurus, the Extant Remains*, 89.

<sup>226</sup> Long and Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 1987, 114.

<sup>227</sup> For further details, see Hessler, *Epikur, Brief an Menoikeus*, 2014, 261–264.

<sup>228</sup> For further details, see Hessler, 261–264.

<sup>229</sup> For further details, see Aristotle, *Arts of Rhetoric* 1360b15–30; *EN* 1097b1–b21; *EN* 1117b21–1118b35; *EN* 1134a27p.; *EN* 1177a27p.; *Pol.* 1253a1; Epicurus, *VS* 44; *VS* 77;

aorist aspect stem. Moreover, they express the indicative or the subjunctive mood and are held in either the active, middle, or passive voice.

### Detailed notes

1–3 **τῇ μέντοι συμμετρήσει ... κρίνειν καθήκει**: Hessler offers a brief overview of the term συμμετρήσει and its appearance in classical literature. Thus, Plato also used the term before Epicurus in his treatise *Timeous* 39c in the context of discussing time. It also appears in the work *Mechanical Problems* 853b39 in the context of the Aristotelian wheel paradox, although the work was written by an Aristotelian fellow. Moreover, unlike the hedonic calculus of the many, which follows a sybaritic lifestyle, the Epicurean hedonistic calculus differs – as Tsouna posits – from the pure hedonic calculus as follows: “... the Epicureans concern themselves with a broader and richer sort of calculus conducted through *phronēsis* and oriented towards moral choice.”<sup>230</sup>

5–5 **Καὶ τὴν αὐτάρκειαν δὲ ἀγαθὸν μέγα νομίζομεν ...** : The term αὐτάρκειαν is important for Epicurus as it is for Aristotle, according to Hessler, since Aristotle observed self-sufficiency as an important criterium for living a flourishing life.<sup>231</sup>

9–12 **οἱ τελιτοὶ χυλοὶ ἴσην πολυτελεῖ διαίτη τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐπιφέρουσιν, ὅταν ἅπαν τὸ ἀλγοῦν κατ’ ἔνδειαν ἐξαιρεθῇ**: In this context, Van der Meeren asserts that self-sufficiency represents an ancient ideal of temperance.<sup>232</sup>

### *LMen 131*

#### Text and Translations

- 1 καὶ μᾶζα καὶ ὕδωρ
- 2 τὴν ἀκροτάτην ἀποδίδωσιν ἡδονήν, ἐπειδὴ ἐνδέων τις αὐτὰ
- 3 προσενέγκηται. τὸ συνεθίζειν οὖν ἐν ταῖς ἀπλαῖς καὶ οὐ πολυ-
- 4 τέλεσι διαίταις καὶ ὑγείας ἐστὶ συμπληρωτικὸν καὶ πρὸς τὰς

<sup>230</sup> Tsouna, “Hedonism,” 188.

<sup>231</sup> For further details, see Aristotle, *Arts of Rhetoric* 1360b15–30; Epicurus, *KD* 15; Usener, *Epicurea*, Epic. Fr. 181 *Us.*; Hessler, *Epikur, Brief an Menoikeus*, 2014, 266–267.

<sup>232</sup> For further details, see Aristotle, *Arts of Rhetoric* 1416b26–b38; Usener, *Epicurea*, Epic. Fr. 67 *Us.*; Epic. Fr. 466 *Us.*; Epicurus, *KD* 3; *KD* 18; Sophie Van der Meeren, ed., *Lettres, Épicure: avec le texte intégral de la “Lettre à Ménécée,”* La philothèque 16 (Rosny: Bréal, 2016), 106.

- 5 ἀναγκαίᾳς τοῦ βίου χρήσεις ἄοκνον ποιεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τοῖς  
 6 πολυτελέσιν ἐκ διαλειμμάτων προσερχομένοις κρεῖττον ἡμᾶς  
 7 διατίθησι καὶ πρὸς τὴν τύχην ἀφόβους παρασκευάζει.  
 8 Ὅταν οὖν λέγωμεν ἡδονὴν τέλος ὑπάρχειν, οὐ τὰς τῶν ἀσώ-  
 9 των ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς ἐν ἀπολαύσει κειμένας λέγομεν, ὥς τινες  
 10 ἀγνοοῦντες καὶ οὐχ ὁμολογοῦντες ἢ κακῶς ἐκδεχόμενοι νομίζου-  
 11 σιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μῆτε ἀλγεῖν κατὰ σῶμα μῆτε ταραττεσθαι κατὰ  
 12 ψυχὴν.

even barley cakes and water assign the highest pleasure, whenever one, who lacks in, has taken them. Then, to grow accustomed to simple and not expensive diets also enables one to complete health and makes a man resolute for the necessary uses of a lifetime, and it disposes us better, when very expensive tastes are added at intervals, and it makes us fearless in the face of fortune. Then, whenever we say that pleasure is the end, we do not speak of the pleasures of the profligates, and of those, who rest entirely on enjoyment, as is supposed by those who are ignorant and disagree with us, or badly understand us, but so as neither to feel pain in the body, nor to be stirred up in the soul;

A selection of other English translations:

and bread and water produce the highest pleasure, when one who needs them puts them to his lips. To grow accustomed therefore to simple and not luxurious diet gives us health to the full, and makes a man alert for the needful employments of life, and when after long intervals we approach luxuries disposes us better towards them, and fits us to be fearless of fortune. When, therefore, we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in sensuality, as is supposed by some who are either ignorant or disagree with us or do not understand, but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind.<sup>233</sup>

and bread and water generate the highest pleasure whenever they are taken by one who needs them. Therefore, the habit of simple and inexpensive diet maximizes health and makes a man energetic in facing the necessary business of daily life; it also strengthens our character when we encounter luxuries from time to time, and emboldens us in the face of fortune. So when we say that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of the dissipated and those that consist in having a good time, as some out of ignorance and disagreement or refusal to understand suppose we do, but freedom from pain in the body and from disturbance in the soul.<sup>234</sup>

<sup>233</sup> Epicurus, *the Extant Remains*, 89.

<sup>234</sup> Long and Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 1987, 114.

## Commentary

### General notes

*LMen* 131 is directed against the Academics [Plato and Aristotle] and other philosophical competitors [Cyrenaics and Stoics] during this time.<sup>235</sup> Epicurus concludes with a statement against Non-epicurean Attitudes [Protasis] to distance himself from them. In addition, the following passage contains finite verbs, which are written in the present aspect stem or the aorist aspect stem. Moreover, they express the indicative or the subjunctive mood and are held in either the active or middle voice.

### Detailed notes

1–2 **καὶ μᾶζα καὶ ὕδωρ**: The metaphor endorses a modest diet for the Epicurean fellows. Hessler emphasizes the contrast between water (ὕδωρ) and wine (οἶνον), since wine – by contrast – signifies an expensive diet.<sup>236</sup>

4–7 **διαίταις καὶ ὑγιείας ἐστὶ συμπληρωτικὸν ... πρὸς τὴν τύχην ἀφόβους παρασκευάζει**: The noun διαίτα is translated with the lexical term diet, because the Greek word διαιτητική [τέχνη] – from which διαίτα is derived – belongs to the three main disciplines of ancient medicine.<sup>237</sup>

8–12 **Ὅταν οὖν λέγωμεν ἡδονὴν τέλος ὑπάρχειν ... ἀλλὰ τὸ μήτε ἀλγεῖν κατὰ σῶμα μήτε ταραττεσθαι κατὰ ψυχήν**. The phrase expresses the attitudes of those Epicurean competitors from which Epicurus wants to distance himself with his doctrine. Thus, Bignone asserted that Epicurus directs his criticism to Aristotle when he calls him a profligate (ἄσωτος), for instance.<sup>238</sup> Furthermore, he also proclaimed that Epicurus refers to the Academics [Plato and Aristotle] when using the word τινες in this context.<sup>239</sup> Consequently,

<sup>235</sup> For further details, see Hessler, *Epikur, Brief an Menoikeus*, 2014, 273–275.

<sup>236</sup> For further details, see Epicurus, *KD* 29; *VS* 20; *VS* 30; Hessler, 270–271; 276; 279.

<sup>237</sup> Pk Skiadas and Jg Lascaratos, “Dietetics in Ancient Greek Philosophy: Plato’s Concepts of Healthy Diet,” *European Journal of Clinical Nutrition* 55, no. 7 (July 1, 2001): 532–37, <https://doi.org/10.1038/sj.ejcn.1601179>; Florian Steger, “Antike Diätetik—Lebensweise Und Medizin,” *NTM Zeitschrift Für Geschichte Der Wissenschaften, Technik Und Medizin* 12, no. 3 (2004): 146–60.

<sup>238</sup> For further details, see Bignone, *L’ Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro*, 1:308; 423; 576–579.

<sup>239</sup> Bignone, 1:303; 602.

the phrase ὥς τινες ἀγνοοῦντες καὶ οὐχ ὁμολογοῦντες ἢ κακῶς ἐκδεχόμενοι νομίζουσιν in this context can be directed against the Academics, the Cyrenaics, or the Stoics.<sup>240</sup>

### *LMen 132*

#### **Text and Translations**

- 1 οὐ γὰρ πότοι καὶ κῶμοι συνείροντες οὐδ' ἀπολαύσεις
- 2 παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν οὐδ' ἰχθύων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα φέρει πο
- 3 λυτελῆς τράπεζα, τὸν ἡδὺν γεννᾷ βίον, ἀλλὰ νήφων λογισμὸς
- 4 καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἐξερευνῶν πάσης αἰρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ τὰς
- 5 δόξας ἐξελαύνων, ἐξ ὧν πλεῖστος τὰς ψυχὰς καταλαμβάνει
- 6 θόρυβος.
- 7 Τούτων δὲ πάντων ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν φρόνησις.
- 8 διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφίας τιμιώτερον ὑπάρχει φρόνησις, ἐξ ἧς αἱ λοιπαὶ
- 9 πᾶσαι πεφύκασιν ἀρεταί, διδάσκουσα ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν
- 10 ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως, ≤οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ
- 11 καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ≥ ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως. συμπεφύκασι γὰρ αἱ ἀρε-
- 12 ταὶ τῷ ζῆν ἡδέως καὶ τὸ ζῆν ἡδέως τούτων ἐστὶν ἀχώριστον.

for it is not drinking-bouts and continuous revelries, nor having enjoyment of catamites and concubines, nor fish and others, so far as it bears a very expensive table, which produces a pleasant lifetime, but sober reasoning, which examines the causes of every choice and avoidance and rejects the opinions from which the greatest disturbance seizes the souls. But of all these the beginning and the greatest good is prudence. And for which reason prudence is more valuable than philosophy, from which all the remaining virtues have been become natural, teaching that there is no life with pleasure without prudence, and beauty and justice without prudence, <nor prudence and beauty and justice> without pleasure. For the virtues have been become natural by the life with pleasure, and the life with pleasure is inseparable from them.

A selection of other English translations:

For it is not continuous drinkings and revellings, nor the satisfaction of lusts, nor the enjoyment of fish and other luxuries of the wealthy table, which produce a pleasant life, but sober reasoning, searching out the motives for all choice and avoidance, and

<sup>240</sup> For further details, see Düring, *Protr.* B42; Aristotle, *EN* 1119b27; Usener, *Epicurea*, Epic. Fr.171 *Us.*; *D.L.* 137; Hessler, 275.

banishing mere opinions, to which are due the greatest disturbance of the spirit. Of all this the beginning and the greatest good is prudence. Wherefore prudence is a more precious thing even than philosophy: for from prudence are sprung all the other virtues, and it teaches us that it is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently and honourably and justly, nor, again, to live a life of prudence, honour, and justice without living pleasantly. For the virtues are by nature bound up with the pleasant life, and the pleasant life is inseparable from them.<sup>241</sup>

For what produces the pleasant life is not continuous drinking and parties or pederasty or womanizing or the enjoyment of fish and the other dishes of an expensive table, but sober reasoning which tracks down the causes of every choice and avoidance, and which banishes the opinions that beset souls with the greatest confusion. Of all this the beginning and the greatest good is prudence. Therefore, prudence is even more precious than philosophy, and it is the natural source of all the remaining virtues: it teaches the impossibility of living pleasantly without living prudently, honourably and justly, and the impossibility of living prudently, honourably and justly without living pleasantly. For the virtues are naturally linked with living pleasantly, and living pleasantly is inseparable from them.<sup>242</sup>

## Commentary

### General Notes

*LMen* 132 concludes with Epicurus' answer in response to the aforementioned competitors [Apodosis]. The passage is linguistically influenced by the Academics [Plato and Aristotle] and Democritus.<sup>243</sup> Furthermore, the passage exhibits the most obvious intertextual phrase match with fragment B91 of the Aristotelian *Protrepticus*.<sup>244</sup> In addition, the following passage contains finite verbs, which are written in the present aspect stem or the aorist aspect stem. Moreover, they express the indicative or the subjunctive mood and are held in either the active or middle voice.

### Detailed Notes

1–6 οὐ γὰρ πότοι καὶ ... ἐξ ὧν πλεῖστος τὰς ψυχὰς καταλαμβάνει θόρυβος:  
Hessler indicates a parallel structure with *LMen* 131.<sup>245</sup> Moreover, the following phrase represents a homeoteleuton, which is read as follows: οὐδ' ἀπολαύσεις παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν οὐδ' ἰχθύων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.<sup>246</sup> Thus, the nouns παίδων and γυναικῶν are translated as

<sup>241</sup> Epicurus, *the Extant Remains*, 89.

<sup>242</sup> Long and Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 1987, 114.

<sup>243</sup> For further details, see Hessler, *Epikur, Brief an Menoikeus*, 2014, 275–293.

<sup>244</sup> For further details, see Hessler, 287.

<sup>245</sup> For further details, see Hessler, 275.

<sup>246</sup> For further details, see Jan Erik Hessler, *Epikur, Brief an Menoikeus: Edition, Übersetzung, Einleitung und Kommentar*, Schwabe Epicurea 4 (Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 2014), 82.

catamites and concubines. Therefore, it is not the woman (sb.'s wife) in general that leads to extravagance, but rather an excess of pleasurable sensations through sexual relations.<sup>247</sup> In addition, the conjunction νήφων λογισμὸς is influenced by Plato's writings and refers to Plato's dialogue *Critias*, according to Hessler.<sup>248</sup> However, as the intertextual analysis below highlights, the Academics [Plato and Aristotle] as well as Epicurus are shaped by a specific divine view in developing their pragmas.<sup>249</sup>

7–11 **Τούτων δὲ πάντων ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν φρόνησις. ... ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως:** In this context, Hessler elaborately commented on this phrase, for which reason the thesis makes only a reference to it at this point.<sup>250</sup> For the avoidance of doubt, the term φρόνησις will still be further discussed in the intertextual analysis chapter. Moreover, the adverb καλῶς undergoes a change in meaning in Hellenistic Greek from the adverb beautifully to the adjective good.<sup>251</sup>

11–12 **συμπεφύκασι γὰρ ... τῷ ζῆν ἡδέως καὶ τὸ ζῆν ἡδέως τούτων ἐστὶν ἀχώριστον:** Hesser makes some references to different Aristotelian treatises in this context, wherein the finite verb συμπεφύκασι appears. Moreover, Hossenfelder argues for a polemical reaction against Aristotle when Epicurus writes the following lines: τὸ ζῆν ἡδέως τούτων ἐστὶν ἀχώριστον.<sup>252</sup>

## Conclusion

Epicurus was born as an Athenian citizen on the island of Samos in 341 BC. Throughout his life, he moved to different places to study philosophy and was significantly influenced by the ideas of the Academics, Cyrenaics, Cynics and Democritus. At the age of 32, he established his own school in Athens, which was named after the Greek word for garden, κῆπος. Epicurus was a prolific writer, leaving behind a substantial body of work for his fellows. Unfortunately, the majority of his works are no longer extant. The *Letter to Meneoceus* represents the most significant source of information on Epicurean ethics today

<sup>247</sup> For further details, see Aristotle, *EN* 1118a27-32; Hessler, *Epikur, Brief an Menoikeus*, 2014, 276.

<sup>248</sup> For further details, see Hessler, 277–79.

<sup>249</sup> For further details, see below.

<sup>250</sup> For further details, see Hessler, *Epikur, Brief an Menoikeus*, 2014, 280–292.

<sup>251</sup> Treat, “Differences Between Classical and Hellenistic Greek.”

<sup>252</sup> For further details, see Hossenfelder, *Epikur*, 100.



and is fully documented in the book X of Diogenes Laertius work *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers*. The letter is dedicated to true politics, following the Socratic tradition of the *pragma ἐπιμέλεια τῆς ψυχῆς*. Moreover, it is written in rhetorical style and formally addressed to both Meneoceus and a broader audience. By following the sparsely historical and lexical data, it can only be dated from around 307/306 BC to 271/0 BC. The analyzed section of the thesis (*LMen* 127,8–132) represents the Epicurean moral philosophy, which is encompassed by the concept of pleasure. It addresses the question of why pleasure is both the beginning and end of a blessed life. From the moment of birth, children begin to pursue pleasure and avoid pain. Consequently, the right understanding (θεωρία) of human desires has been a topic that holds strong interest for human beings as it is essential for leading a flourishing life. Accordingly, pleasure is employed as a criterion for evaluating all goods in terms of sensation (πάθος). As Epicurus' moral philosophy is characterized by self-sufficiency, prudence is thereby the key factor (τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν) in addressing human desires in an appropriate manner, from which all other virtues arise. For Epicurus, ultimately a pleasant life is contingent upon the continued use (χρησις) of prudence (φρόνησις) until the end, as prudence is the means of ensuring that one's actions align with one's values and goals. From the linguistic analysis, it can also be discerned that the *LMen* represents an ethical hedonism, encompassed by a psychological hedonism, which belongs to the branch of normative ethics since it employs the textual function of an appeal. Furthermore, the analyzed section (*LMen* 127,8–132) is structured in the form of an argument and written in the literary style of a protreptic speech.<sup>253</sup>

## INTERTEXTUALITY – On Pleasure

### Introduction

Finally, the subsequent intertextual analysis elucidates the intertextual intensity and the textual differences between the two texts based on the linguistic analysis that has been conducted. The formal criteria for the evaluation process of the analysis have already been summarized in the introduction to the thesis. Moreover, the thesis does not consider examining the advantages and disadvantages of the scientific method or the theory of intertextuality. Consequently, the methodology of the thesis remains entirely focused on the

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<sup>253</sup> For further details, see below.

framework of Broich and Pfister's anthology *Intertextualität*.<sup>254</sup> Readers seeking a more comprehensive understanding of this specific area of research are referred to scholarly monographs and journals.<sup>255</sup> Furthermore, in view of the above findings, the thesis can only reach an analogous conclusion regarding the intertextual analysis, due to the lack of historical textual evidence. Finally, it is generally based on my own observations, although these are influenced in their considerations by Bignone's work *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro*. Consequently, secondary literature is used restrictively.

## Intertextual Observations

### *Intertextual Discourse*

As previously outlined in the thesis, both texts are classified as 'protreptic' texts within the field of philosophical literature. In her studies, Van der Merren defines the word 'protreptic' in terms of three distinct functions: advertisement, conversion, and introduction. Regarding the classification of the *LMen* as philosophia medicans, a therapeutic function can also be attributed to the Aristotelian *Protrepticus*, which will be further illustrated below. Furthermore, both texts serve to exemplify their ethical theory, which can be defined as a form of hedonism. This can be observed through an analysis of the context of both texts, as well as a keyword analysis, which exhibits that the lexical terms 'pleasure, pleasant, delighted, delight and delights' appear a total of 23 times in the analyzed textual section. By contrast, in the *LMen* the keyword(s) 'pleasure(s)' appear(s) a total of 18 times. Thus, the lexical terms are the most frequent words in both texts, apart from the stop words that appear. Furthermore, both texts advocate an ethical normative hedonism, which is encompassed by either a metaphysical theory or a psychological hedonism. These results can be deduced from the fact that pleasure appears only intrinsically in relation to a performed activity, which is what Aristotle urges his fellows to practice. By contrast, the *LMen* is extrinsically motivated, because it is directed towards a specific desired outcome. Moreover, each text is indeed addressed to a specific individual. However, both texts were originally intended for a broader audience. Consequently, the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* has Isocrates and the elite Athenian youth in mind, whereas the *LMen* focuses on the Epicurean fellows. A difference arises from

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<sup>254</sup> For further details, see Ulrich Broich and Manfred Pfister, eds., *Intertextualität: Formen, Funktionen, Anglistische Fallstudien*, Konzepte Der Sprach- Und Literaturwissenschaft 35 (Tübingen: M. Niemeyer, 1985).

<sup>255</sup> For further details, see Guido Isekenmeier, *Intertextualität Und Intermedialität: Theoretische Grundlagen-Exemplarische Analysen* (Berlin: J.B. Metzler, Springer Nature, 2021).

the historical fact that the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* was written during the Classical period, whereas the *LMen* was written during the Hellenistic period. In turn, it is bound to occur that there is an upcoming and development of different Greek dialects in the history of ancient Greece. Aristotle and his contemporaries spoke the Attic dialect of Greek, while Epicurus and his fellows spoke the Koiné or Hellenistic dialect of Greek, as can be observed from the textual analysis. Moreover, the two texts use different literary forms to communicate their purposes. The Aristotelian *Protrepticus* has recently been reclassified as a dialogue in its literary form by Hutchinson and Johnson, whereas the *LMen* is demonstrably written in the form of a letter.<sup>256</sup> However, when it comes to the communicative dominant function of the two texts, both the section (B88–B91) of the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* and the section (*LMen* 127–132) of *LMen* can be characterized as an appeal.<sup>257</sup> Moreover, both texts choose the form of an argumentation as their production strategy to convince the audience of their particular concept.<sup>258</sup> Finally, both texts can also be traced back to the argumentative structure of Callicles' monologue in Plato's work *Gorgias*, using the same approach, which will be demonstrated below in more detail.<sup>259</sup>

## Overall Structure of Aristotle's Argument

### Introduction:

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἢ γε τελεία ἐνέργεια ... ἢ θεωρητικὴ ἐνέργεια πασῶν ἡδίστη. The argument of the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* is preceded by the introductory fragment B87.<sup>260</sup> It concludes the preceding theme of the section B78–B86 and introduces the following one, being identified as a 'bridge passage' by Hutchinson and Johnson.

### Main claim:

Ἦτι τοῖνυν ἕτερόν ἐστιν τὸ ἡδόμενον πίνειν καὶ τὸ ἡδέως πίνειν· .... πίνοντα χαίρειν, ... : The main claim differentiates between two distinct forms of pleasure, namely natural and accidental pleasure.

<sup>256</sup> For further details, see *AGG*, §305c; §305g.

<sup>257</sup> For further details, see *AGG*, §302c; §305.

<sup>258</sup> For further details, see *CGCG* §61.4; *AGG*, §§304–305.

<sup>259</sup> For further details, see *CGCG* §61.9.

<sup>260</sup> For further details, see *CGCG*, §61.9; *AGG*, §304.

**Proof:**

... μὴ τῷ πίνειν ἀλλὰ τῷ συμβαίνειν ἅμα θεωρεῖν ἢ θεωρεῖσθαι καθήμενον: The sentence provides evidence for the main claim, which is written in adversative form.<sup>261</sup> The connective particle ἀλλὰ corrects the element τῷ πίνειν [χαίρειν]:<sup>262</sup> οὐ A, ἀλλὰ B = ‘not A but B.’<sup>263</sup> Unlike the activity of drinking (τῷ πίνειν), the activity of contemplation (θεωρία) does not move anything, as Nightingale proclaimed.<sup>264</sup> It can therefore be compared to motion at rest, which for Aristotle is also the highest pleasure.

**Clarification:**

οὐκοῦν τοῦτον ἥδεσθαι μὲν καὶ ἡδόμενον πίνειν φήσομεν, ἀλλ’ οὐ ... τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ ζῆν ἀληθῶς. A more detailed clarification of several statements is provided, which reaches its zenith in B90. It represents an argumentum a fortiori.

**Conclusion of the proof:**

Εἰ τοίνυν..., ἀλλὰ κυριωτάτη γε πασῶν ἡ τοῦ φρονεῖν ὅτι μάλιστα. δῆλον τοίνυν ... ἡδονὴν ἢ μόνην ἢ μάλιστ’ ἀναγκαῖον ἀπὸ τοῦ ζῆν εἶναι. The conclusion is introduced by ‘εἰ τοίνυν.’ It also appears in fragment B88, where it introduces the main claim. In this context, it indicates the inference of the argument.

**Proof:**

τὸ ζῆν ἄρα ἡδέως καὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἥτοι μόνοις ἢ μάλισθ’ ὑπάρχει τοῖς φιλοσόφοις. [ἢ γὰρ τῶν ἀληθεστάτων νοήσεων ἐνέργεια αὕτη πασῶν ἐστι καὶ πρὸς εὐφοροσύνην ἀνυσιμωτάτη.] The second part of B91 represents the appeal of the analyzed text section.

<sup>261</sup> Bignone, Alfieri, and Girgenti, *L’ Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro*, 376.

<sup>262</sup> For further details, see Van der Meeren, *Exhortation à la philosophie*, 194.

<sup>263</sup> For further details, see *CGCG*, §59.11.

<sup>264</sup> For further details, see above.

## The Overall Structure of Epicurus' Argument

### Introduction:

Ἀναλογιστέον δὲ ὡς τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι φυσικαί ... αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν. On the contrary, *LMen* 127,8–11 shares the same function as B87, which links up with the previous statement of the *LMen* 127, 1–7 and initiates a new one.

### Main claim:

τούτων γὰρ ἀπλανὴς θεωρία πᾶσαν αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν.... Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν. The main claim is introduced by γὰρ and represents an explanatory force. It demonstrates the Epicurean concept of pleasure, which is based on the synthesis of kinematic and katastemic pleasure.<sup>265</sup>

### Proof:

Ταύτην γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν... . The following passage *LMen* 129 gives evidence for the previous demonstration. It employs the 'cradle argument' to substantiate its claim.

### Clarification:

τῇ μέντοι συμμετρήσει.... ὅταν ᾗπαν τὸ ἀλγοῦν κατ' ἑνδειαν ἐξαιρεθῇ, ... ἐπειδὴν ἐνδέων τις αὐτὰ προσενέγκηται. The following passages *LMen* 130–131 offer further clarification on specific aspects of the proof.

### Conclusion of the proof:

τὸ συνεθίζειν οὖν ἐν ταῖς ἀπλαῖς... τὸν ἡδὺν γεννᾶ βίον, ... τὰς ψυχὰς καταλαμβάνει θόρυβος. The conclusion is introduced by οὖν and serves to conclude the main claim.

### Proof:

Τούτων δὲ πάντων ἀρχὴ καὶ ... συμπεφύκασι γὰρ αἱ ἀρεταὶ τῷ ζῆν ἡδέως καὶ τὸ ζῆν ἡδέως τούτων ἐστὶν ἀχώριστον. *LMen* 132 synthesizes his argumentative lines by positing that prudence in correlation with virtue leads to a pleasant lifetime.

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<sup>265</sup> For further details, see *LMen* 128.

From this contraposition, it can be deduced that although Aristotle and Epicurus employ a similar structure of argumentation, they use a different sort of argumentation. Thus, Aristotle uses the deductive sort of argumentation, whereas Epicurus uses the inductive sort of argumentation to present his concept. Both in turn can be derived from their representational form of hedonism – as mentioned above – since the hedonism encompassed by metaphysical theory employs a deductive sort of argumentation, whereas psychological hedonism employs an inductive one. Moreover, Aristotle and Epicurus do not perceive themselves as an echo-chamber of previous Socratic thinkers but rather original authors in their own right. Similarly, the intertextual relationships between these two are also characterized by the same manner. This assertion has been made by Verde in his essay entitled “Aristotle and the Garden,” claiming that the relationship between Aristotle and Epicurus represents no direct traces but rather indirect ones.<sup>266</sup> These considerations can also be confirmed by the findings of the textual analysis above. However, both texts are dominated by the same *topoi* and the same theme, which results in an antagonism between the two texts that simultaneously reveals their peculiarities. They are read as follows:

### *Intertextual Markers*

#### Intertextual *Topoi* and Theme

##### **God and Man**

The initial *topos* that provides a contextual framework for both texts is the analogy of ‘God and Man.’<sup>267</sup> While not explicitly addressed in the textual analysis of the thesis, this *topos* represents the motivational background of both texts. Both philosophers encourage their fellows to imitate (μίμησις) the deities to the greatest extent possible, with the aim of leading a blessed existence in accordance with the divine.<sup>268</sup> However, there are differences in their metaphysical views on this matter. Aristotle clarifies the meaning in his treatise *Metaphysics*, in which he concludes that God is the unmoved mover (ἐνέργεια), whose essence is the act of contemplation by remaining separate from the world.<sup>269</sup> Epicurus agrees with Aristotle in this view that the gods are separated from the world. However, unlike Aristotle, Epicurus posits

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<sup>266</sup> Francesco Verde, “2 Aristotle and the Garden,” in *Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Aristotle in Antiquity* (Brill, 2016), 35, [https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004315402\\_004](https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004315402_004).

<sup>267</sup> For further details, see Düring, *Protr.* B108–109; Epicurus, *LMen* 123–124.

<sup>268</sup> Bignone, *L’Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro*, 1:121.

<sup>269</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphy.* 993b19–31; *Metaphy.* 1072b20–1073a13; *EN* 1177b25pp.; *EN* 1178b20pp.; *EE* 1249b13pp.; Düring, *Protr.* B66.

that they live in a blessed state rather than performing a specific activity.<sup>270</sup> As a result, the two concepts of pleasure have different starting points, but both are oriented towards the concept of pleasure (ἡδονή). Epicurus' polemical reaction against the Academics [Plato and Aristotle] in this context might be as follows: It is not the sedulous (ἀκόλυτος) activity, in which we envy the gods, my dear fellows, but rather of their blessed (μακαρίως) state.<sup>271</sup>

## Body and Soul

Moreover, it emerges that both texts are based on two distinct aspects of human nature. First, both philosophers propose the interdependence of the body and the soul. However, Aristotle posits that the soul is the form, and the body is the matter of human nature. Accordingly, the soul is the principle in Aristotle's world view of human life, whereas Epicurus defines the soul as a compound of atoms. Thus, the body (atomism) is the principle in the Epicurean world view of human life.<sup>272</sup> In the former case, the form is the agent of movement, whereas in the latter case matter is the agent of movement. Based on this distinction, the two concepts of pleasure are again determined by two different departure points.

## Φιλοσοφητέον

Consequently, the best way to imitate the nature of the deities is by practicing philosophy, since it is the activity that comes closest to their nature and enables one best to live a flourishing life (εὐδαιμονία). This topos again does not directly appear in the analyzed sequence but pervades both texts and their context.<sup>273</sup>

## Activity (energeia) and Desire (epitymia)

In his *Protrepticus*, Aristotle initially distinguishes between two distinct forms of popular activity: the act of drinking for pleasure and the act of drinking with pleasure. Both activities refer to the Aristotelian doctrine of καθ'αυτό καί συμβεβηκός in a popular sense, as above mentioned. Aristotle subsequently elaborates on the act of drinking with pleasure (καθ'αυτό) in a concise statement, as it is perceived to be more closely aligned with the concept of true pleasure by Aristotle. By contrast, Epicurus begins his argument by dividing

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<sup>270</sup> J.M. Rist, *Epicurus: An Introduction* (Cambridge University Press, 1972), 146–156.

<sup>271</sup> Merlan, *Studies in Epicurus and Aristotle* /by Philip Merlan, 8; 31–32.

<sup>272</sup> Rist, *Epicurus: An Introduction*, 74–80.

<sup>273</sup> For further details, see Düring, *Protr.* B6; Epicurus, *LMen* 122.

desires into two categories, namely natural and void. Based on this distinction, it further emerges that the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* elucidates the human activity that is most closely aligned with the divine activity of life, whereas Epicurus elucidates the question of how to fulfill human desires in a manner that is most closely aligned with the divine state of life. It is therefore necessary to gain a deeper insight into human activities or desires to realize divine nature as best as possible in human beings.

### Contemplation and Prudence

Consequently, Aristotle concludes that the best activity in life that delivers the highest degree and comes closest to the divine is contemplation.<sup>274</sup> By contrast, Epicurus argues in favor of prudence, since it comes closest to the perfect handling of the goods that one desires, thus ensuring a healthy state, which corresponds best to the state of the divine.<sup>275</sup>

### Vita Contemplativa and Vita Activa

From the preceding considerations, it can be derived that Aristotle's educational philosophy is oriented towards the practice of the *vita contemplativa*, whereas Epicurus' educational philosophy is oriented towards the practice of the *vita activa*. The former is dedicated to a life of leisure and learning, while the latter is dedicated to a life of salutogenesis and civic engagement (κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργεία).<sup>276</sup> Consequently, both concepts represent the end of the educational process (παιδεία) of each school.

### Elite Perspective and Populism<sup>277</sup>

From this reason, it arises as a result an additional perspective on the nature of life itself. Consequently, Aristotle and his devotion to philosophy and learning – which is pursued for its intrinsic value – advocate an elite perspective. In contrast, Epicurus' *Letter to Menoeceus* is dedicated more to the ordinary citizens, since the pursuit of a healthy state of life is a universal desire. Thus, philosophy is not pursued for its own sake but rather for the Epicurean pleasure of achieving a natural and pain-free state (καταστηματικά ἡδοναί).

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<sup>274</sup> For further details, see Düring, *Protr.* B88.

<sup>275</sup> For further details, see Bignone, *L' Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro*, 1:105–107; 376.

<sup>276</sup> For further details, see Düring, *Protr.* B91; Epicurus, *LMen* 135.

<sup>277</sup> The term 'populism' is employed in this context without any pejorative connotation but is rather understood to signify 'speaking for the people.'



### **Aristotelian Pleasure and Epicurean Pleasure**

Finally, both concepts of pleasure can be evaluated in relation to each other from at least three perspectives.<sup>278</sup> First, the Aristotelian concept of pleasure recognizes a few activities that are perceived as pleasurable, whereas Epicurus posits that there is only one fundamental good in life, namely pleasure. Second, Aristotelian pleasure can be classified as a mental phenomenon, whereas Epicurean pleasure can be classified as a bodily phenomenon.<sup>279</sup> Finally, Aristotelian pleasure observes the activity of contemplation as the highest pleasure in life. Consequently, Aristotle understands pleasure as movement at rest, whereas Epicurus observes pleasure as freedom from unpleasure or an anxiety- and pain-free state.

### **Excursus: Pleasure and Pain**

Furthermore, since human nature is in one way or another bound up with its bodily nature, all activities and goods have an impact on the body in terms of pleasure and pain (B88). Consequently, both sensations serve either as a scale of degree – as postulated by Aristotle – or a scale of comparison – as postulated by Epicurus – to judge any activity or good. As a result, Aristotle postulated that the activities of the soul (or mind) are more pleasurable than those involving the body or matter. Consequently, the highest degree of pleasure is derived from the most pleasurable activity at rest, which is the activity of contemplation and based in the soul. By contrast, Epicurus advocates the pursuit of those goods in life that offer the greatest pleasure over time by means of prudence, which thus does not exclude pain either way.

### **Intertextual Allegories, Allusions, Echoes, Quotations and Word Combinations**

The next step is dedicated to the intertextual analysis of allusions, echoes, quotations and word combinations. However, an analysis of these proves to be an endless loop since the scholar Verde claimed in his essay “Aristotle and the Garden” that the relationship between Aristotle and Epicurus does not show direct but rather indirect traces, which is also confirmed by the textual analysis. Consequently, the analysis tends to focus on two or three intertextual allegories, which serve as a common ground between the two texts.

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<sup>278</sup> For further details, see Hossenfelder, *Epikur*, 71–73.

<sup>279</sup> For further details, see Usener, *Epicurea*, Epic. Fr.409 *Us*.

### Intertextual Allegory between Accidental Pleasure and Kinetic Pleasure

First, the follow-up text ‘uses’ only indirectly certain elements for its own purposes rather than directly mentioning or referring to the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* in particular. The first main claim of B88 ‘drinking for having pleasure’ represents restorative pleasure (γένεσις), originally derived from the Platonic concept of pleasure, and is classified by Epicurus as kinetic pleasure.<sup>280</sup> Consequently, both kinds of pleasure can be seen as an allusion that urges man to satisfy a certain human need. However, it is obvious that the daily-life examples of B88 do not follow a clear explicit definition in the technical sense and can only be classified as popular.<sup>281</sup>

### Intertextual Allegory between Natural Pleasure and Katastematic Pleasure

By contrast, the second claim of the pre-text ‘drinking with pleasure (τὸ ἡδέως πίνειν)’ can be seen as an allusion to the main claim of the follow-up text ‘the health of the body and the tranquility of the soul (τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξίαν)’ in the popular sense. In both cases, human nature is not in need of anything else, as if something were missing.<sup>282</sup> Rather, it is the pleasure that is derived from the activity itself. Katastematic pleasure is thus not to be understood as static but rather as dynamic. It thus implies a variety of activities that are pleasurable for their own sake. In the process of performing them, they keep the katastematic pleasure in a state of equilibrium.<sup>283</sup>

### Intertextual Allegory between ‘θεωρία καὶ νοῦς’ and ‘ἀπλανὴς θεωρία’

First of all, the term θεωρία has its roots in the classical antiquity, where it was understood to signify a mission or journey undertaken for the purpose of observing a (religious) spectacle, such as the Olympic Games, or any other kind of activity. These could be either undertaken for official purposes with a subsequent report, or in a private capacity for the purposes of cultural or intellectual enrichment.<sup>284</sup> In contrast to Plato, who understands θεωρία as an activity of wisdom encompassing both theoretical (contemplation) and practical

<sup>280</sup> For further details, see Held, *Hēdonē Und Ataraxia Bei Epikur*, 74–80.

<sup>281</sup> For further details, see Dietmar Eickelschulte, “An sich/für sich; an und für sich,” *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie online* (Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 2017), <https://doi.org/10.24894/HWPh.124>.

<sup>282</sup> For further details, see *LMen* 129.

<sup>283</sup> For further details, see Held, *Hēdonē Und Ataraxia Bei Epikur*, 113.

<sup>284</sup> Christopher A. Decaen, “Nightingale, Andrea Wilson. Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in Its Cultural Context,” *The Review of Metaphysics* 59, no. 3 (March 2006): 668+, <https://link-gale-com.uaccess.univie.ac.at/apps/doc/A143920556/ITOF?u=43wien&sid=bookmark-ITOF&xid=f2a0496a>.

life (action), Aristotle restricts the term to the theoretical aspect. As Nightingale proclaims: “...he compares the philosopher to a *theoros* who goes to a festival simply for the sake of seeing the spectacle.”<sup>285</sup> It therefore represents the best part of man and offers the highest degree of pleasure. Nightingale asserts: “Indeed, in its highest instantiation, the Aristotelian *theoros* apprehends god or divine *nous*, thus engaging in a sacralized form of ‘seeing’ that has no connection to the mundane realm.”<sup>286</sup> Consequently, “*theoria* involves the actualization of *nous*, which is the divine part of man; it is the pure noetic activity that gods engage in, and is only done ‘for its own sake,’” according to Nightingale.<sup>287</sup> However, the term θεωρία remains in a popular understanding in his *Protrepticus*, rather than in his treatise, wherein a clear distinction is possible.<sup>288</sup> Consequently, as Nightingale concludes: “...Aristotle argues that theoretical knowledge is both separate from (and superior to) practical and productive activities, and useful as a basis for action and various kinds of production.”<sup>289</sup>

Similarly, Epicurus was also aware of the conventional use of the term, which was employed to investigate the origins (ἀρχαί) of nature. However, Epicurus shifts the focus of θεωρία from the theoretical part of the divine (νοῦς) or nature to the practical part of his greatest good, the nature of enjoyment (ἡδονή).<sup>290</sup> Consequently, the term fulfils the function of a φάρμακον, which always implies – in contrast to Aristotle – a connection of utility.<sup>291</sup>

As a result, both word combinations are related to each other but differ in their ends. The first word combination ‘θεωρία καὶ νοῦς’ and the second word combination ‘ἀπλανὴς θεωρία’ are namely equal with or related to φρόνησις,<sup>292</sup> although they differ in their meaning. The Aristotelian φρόνησις (= θεωρία καὶ νοῦς) refers to theoretical prudence and therefore to the activity of theorizing or thinking, whereas the Epicurean φρόνησις (= ἀπλανὴς θεωρία’) refers to practical prudence and therefore to the activity of caring (μελέτη) for the human body and soul.<sup>293</sup> As a result, the two word combinations are analogous to each other but differ in their

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<sup>285</sup> Nightingale, “‘Useless’ Knowledge: Aristotle’s Rethinking of Theoria,” 187.

<sup>286</sup> Nightingale, 188.

<sup>287</sup> Nightingale, 189.

<sup>288</sup> For further details, see Düring, *Protr.* B24; B41; B42; B48–49; B68–69.

<sup>289</sup> Nightingale, “‘Useless’ Knowledge: Aristotle’s Rethinking of Theoria,” 197.

<sup>290</sup> For further details, see Hessler, *Epikur, Brief an Menoikeus*, 2014, 239.

<sup>291</sup> For further details, see Hessler, 237; 239.

<sup>292</sup> For further details, see Nightingale, “‘Useless’ Knowledge: Aristotle’s Rethinking of Theoria,” 194.

<sup>293</sup> For further details, see Hessler, *Epikur, Brief an Menoikeus*, 2014, 287.

ends.<sup>294</sup> In this context, the futility of an activity namely denotes the distinction between a ‘noble’ hedonism and the hedonism itself. As Aristotle postulates: “...while all those that are liked for themselves, even if nothing else results from them, should be called goods in the strict sense.”<sup>295</sup>

### *Intertextual Functions*

This raises the question of the added value of the analyzed Aristotelian elite perspective for the Epicurean populism. The follow-up text primarily serves as a subversive function in relation to the pre-text, which arises from the contrasting perspectives presented. Moreover, the follow-up text serves to further exemplify the function of a linguistic game. Broich asserts: “...Literatur als ‘Sprachspiel’ als einer zweckfreien Tätigkeit, die sich gegen die Unterordnung unter von der Gesellschaft vorgegebene Ziele oder Funktionen sperrt...”<sup>296</sup> Moreover, the subversive function of the follow-up text serves to qualify the pre-text in its claim to exclusivity. However, in turn the pre-text provides the follow-up text with an additional function, which results in an expanded function of prudence.<sup>297</sup> Consequently, theoretical and practical prudence (φρόνησις) form a unified whole, which again results in the Platonic concept of prudence: “a single faculty performs both contemplative and practical reasoning.”<sup>298</sup> Finally, both texts undertake a normative function of ethical guidance for both friends and fellows of philosophy, which expands and actualizes the approach of the Epicurean philosophical therapy for the present day.

### *Intertextual Evaluation*

In conclusion, the following intertextual evaluation is performed in accordance with the intertextual criteria by Pfister, as previously outlined in the introduction. It presents a conclusion for the intertextual analysis while simultaneously evaluating the intertextual analysis between the two texts.

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<sup>294</sup>For further details, see Hessler, 237–239.

<sup>295</sup> For further details, see above.

<sup>296</sup> Broich and Pfister, *Intertextualität*, 271.

<sup>297</sup> For further details, see above.

<sup>298</sup> Nightingale, “‘Useless’ Knowledge: Aristotle’s Rethinking of Theoria,” 189.

### Referentiality:

As the intertextual analysis revealed, the analyzed section of the *LMen* (127–132) does not make any direct references or mention of the Aristotelian *Protrepticus*. However, it uses word combinations by transferring them for its own purposes. Furthermore, they deal with the same ethical theory, which is entitled as ethical hedonism, as the analysis revealed. In addition, Epicurus did not understand himself as an echo-chamber but rather as a philosopher in his own right.<sup>299</sup> However, as the textual analysis revealed, the follow-up text is obviously influenced by the Academics [Plato and Aristotle] and that both texts are traceable to Callicles' structure of argumentation, which appears in Plato's *Gorgias*. Consequently, the degree of referentiality of the follow-up text can be evaluated as moderate thus far due to a lack of direct references to the Aristotelian *Protrepticus*. It should be noted that the work in question is lost and there is a lack of empirical evidence.

### Communicativity:

The *LMen* can be regarded as a text *sui generis* since it can be read without any philosophical foreknowledge. However, the degree of communicativity between the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* and the *LMen* can be deemed to be moderate or even high thus far, based on the following reasons: Epicurus was aware of the influence of the Academics [Plato and Aristotle] while composing the *LMen*, as is the reader, who had a philosophical background, as the analysis has demonstrated. Moreover, the two texts share the same production function of an argumentation, have the same communicative function of an appeal, and use the same literary protreptic style in writing. Moreover, both texts are situated in the branch of ethics and classified as exemplifications of their philosophical school, since they exhibit a protreptic function and are addressed to a broader audience. Consequently, the literate recipient may recognize the analogy the Aristotelian *Protrepticus*, since it was also one of the famous 'published' dialogues/discourses of Aristotle in the ancient times, as Hutchinson and Hessler assert.<sup>300</sup> 'Furthermore, the follow-up' text employs the same *topoi* and theme as the pre-text, which indicates another intertextual marker and represents high communicativity. It must be remembered again that there is a lack of empirical evidence.

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<sup>299</sup> For further details, see Broich and Pfister, *Intertextualität*, 248.

<sup>300</sup> Hutchinson and Johnson, "The *Antidosis* of Isocrates and Aristotle's *Protrepticus*," 1.

#### Auto-reflexivity:

By contrast, the degree of auto-reflexivity can be considered as low given that neither text engages in any reflection on its own intertextual dependencies.

#### Structuralicity:

The degree of structuralicity of both texts can be considered high thus far. First, this can be attributed to the fact that both texts are traceable to Callicles' argumentation structure in Plato's *Gorgias*, as demonstrated above. Second, the thesis elaborated three allusions, which form a common structural pattern. Thus, the 'follow-up' text might be less dependent on the pre-text in its structure than that of Plato's.

#### Selectivity:

Unfortunately, the degree of selectivity can be considered to be low to moderate, since there are now specific allusions, quotations or word combinations that refer to the previous text but only indirect traces in terms of allegories, which are evaluated as rather weak intertextual markers.

#### Dialogicity:

Nevertheless, the degree of dialogicity can be considered high for the following reason: the semantic tension between the two texts is obvious, as the analysis above has revealed, which projects the literary mode of carnivalesque, defined as a carnival sense of the world. This term is in alignment with Bakhtin's notion of dialogism.<sup>301</sup> Consequently, the inherent subversive power of the follow-up text challenges the pre-text in all aspects.

#### Density and Frequency:

The intertextual analysis of both texts reveals a minimum of two or three intertextual thematic allegories. However, the intertextual density can be considered to be rather low.

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<sup>301</sup> For further details, see Mikhail M Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, Theory and History of Literature Ser.; v.8 (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 119–132.

### Figure and Spread:

Following the textual analysis, each section of the pre-text and the follow-up text was influenced by at least two textual corpora, namely the Corpus Platonicum and the Corpus Aristotelicum, as the analysis elucidates. Moreover, it should be noted that there is an allusion to a pre-text by Democritus, as Hessler observed.<sup>302</sup> Consequently, there is no reason to assume that the text is exclusively dependent on the Aristotelian *Protrepticus*.

## Synopsis and Synthesis

### Aristotle's *Protrepticus* and Epicurus' *Letter to Menoeceus*

Finally, both concepts of pleasure are rooted in different historical periods of Greek history and differ in their conceptualization of hedonism. The Aristotelian *Protrepticus* is situated within the context of the Classical period of Greek history (500–400 BC), whereas the *LMen* is situated within the context of the Hellenistic period (399–100 BC). Consequently, there are notable differences in their writing style in the first place. The following intertextual analysis observed that the two texts share the same communicative function of an appeal, the same text production strategy of an argumentation and the same style type of a protreptic speech (=paraenesis), linked by a contrasting thematical structure. Both texts can be traced back to the argumentation structure of Calicles monologue in Plato's *Gorgias* and urge either the students of the Academy or the Epicurean fellows to study philosophy. Moreover, both texts are rooted in an ethical hedonism, which are encompassed by either a metaphysical theory or psychological hedonism. Furthermore, they belong to the normative branch of ethics as opposed to the descriptive branch of ethics. This is done for two distinct purposes: either for its own sake or to have Epicurean pleasure. The former is understood as the unimpeded function, equal to the activity of contemplation, whereas the latter is understood as a natural and anxiety- and pain-free state. Both purposes are pursued through reasoning, but only the latter relates to virtue. Consequently, the former text exhorts its students to adopt a prudent and contemplative approach to life, which presents the highest and most pleasant form of existence. Both activities function as a guiding principle throughout one's lifetime. Pleasure inherently arises thus from practicing an activity. The Aristotelian *Protrepticus* (B87–B91) therefore advocates a theoretical mode of life, designated as the *vita contemplativa* (βίος θεωρητικός), which focuses on theoretical insights of life. By contrast, the *LMen* (127,8–132)

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<sup>302</sup> Hessler, *Epikur, Brief an Menoikeus*, 2014, 276.

advocates the practical mode of life, designated as the *vita activa* (βίος πρακτικός), which focuses on practical insights of life. Thus, it encourages its students to pursue philosophy to achieve a healthy state of being. It can therefore be argued that philosophy provides a form of therapy for the human body and soul. Consequently, the follow-up text performs a subversive function with respect to the pre-text, which serves to qualify its claim to exclusivity. Consequently, the concept of Epicurean pleasure becomes nourished by both a healthy diet and engaging in theoretical activities that might be perceived as ‘useful’ in contributing to and benefiting from a more harmonious equilibrium of the human condition. This can once again be beneficial for the concept of philosophical therapy both yesterday and today.

### Aristotle and Epicurus: Both yesterday and today

As a result, both texts have laid the foundation as an ethical guideline, which functions as a scale for a pleasant and flourishing life. As today’s world can be described as a fast-paced modern one, the Aristotelian attitude of lifelong learning becomes inevitable for today to act prudently in life and be up to date. First, the practice of contemplation – interpreted as observation of the nature – fosters the analytical perception of human beings, and creates a deeper understanding of life itself.

Second, Aristotle’s exhortation to contemplation – interpreted as meditation of the divine – can serve as a starting point for mindfulness training, which can counteract anxiety states, depression, migraines, or stress. As these illnesses have significantly increased in society during the Covid-19 pandemic, thus it may contribute to a relief for people over time by reaching out for a natural anxiety- and pain-free state.<sup>303</sup>

On the other hand, the Epicurean concept of pleasure advocates self-sufficiency. It appeals to people to be economical with the world’s natural resources.<sup>304</sup> In turn, what applies to nature also appeals to the individual, namely that a balanced diet leads to a healthy lifestyle. Thus, the most pleasant life is provided by the right attitude (ἀρετή) and mentality (φρόνησις) of the individual in relation to his nature.<sup>305</sup> It therefore advocates making time for the simple

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<sup>303</sup> For further details, see “Mental Health and COVID-19: Early Evidence of the Pandemic’s Impact: Scientific Brief, 2 March 2022,” accessed August 25, 2024, [https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-2019-nCoV-Sci\\_Brief-Mental\\_health-2022.1](https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-2019-nCoV-Sci_Brief-Mental_health-2022.1).

<sup>304</sup> For further details, see Hossenfelder, *Epikur*, 149–52.

<sup>305</sup> For further details, see Hossenfelder, 153.



things in life such as good conversations, taking beautiful walks in the mountains, being grateful for what you have, and learning to be satisfied with the little things in life.

Secondly, the Epicurean concept of pleasure thus has its focus on human desires. As Epicurus mentions, he argues that false beliefs affect the soul in a negative sense. Thus, Epicurus – with his affordance of self-sufficiency – contributes to more reflection (sober reasoning) on the do's and don'ts in personal life.

Finally, the thesis makes a significant contribution to the field of scholarship by providing additional translations of the section (B88–B91) of the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* and the section (*LMen* 127,8–132) of the *Letter to Menoeceus* and of the intertextual result that both arguments can be traced back to the structure of Callicles' argument in Plato's *Gorgias* 484c–485a. Moreover, the intertextual analysis illustrates the antagonistic structure of the two texts and the subversive potential of the concept of pleasure in the *Letter to Menoeceus* in comparison to that of the Aristotelian *Protrepticus*. In the context of this research, it would be further beneficial to investigate additional intertextual relationships between the two philosophers in a broader context and to ascertain their relative position in relation to Plato. Furthermore, there is a need to discuss the reference to ethical guidance in philosophical or psychological therapy, including the extent to which it should be provided by the therapist and to what extent it is demandable in order to guarantee a healing process at best for the patient.

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## Abstract

Pleasure! Perhaps one of the first thoughts that comes to mind when discussing it is happiness. Aristotle once observed that it is an inherent issue of human nature. It plays a crucial role in the formation and cultivation of human character and virtue, which in turn is a key factor in the pursuit of authentic happiness in life. Nevertheless, the question of what is meant by the term pleasure has been a topic of debate throughout history. This thesis analyzes two different concepts of pleasure in classical antiquity, as exemplified by two prominent Greek philosophers, Aristotle and Epicurus. Aristotle presents the concept of pleasure as an unimpeded function, whereas Epicurus represents it as a natural anxiety- and pain-free state. The two concepts are exemplified in two texts of classical literature, namely the lost work *Protrepticus* by Aristotle and *Letter to Menoeceus* by Epicurus. This thesis investigates the scientific question of what additional insights can be gained by comparing the two concepts of pleasure in the philosophical branch of ethics using the method of intertextuality. Interestingly, both concepts of pleasure address the same *topoi* and theme, but they differ in their end. Consequently, in the sense of the intertextual method employed in the thesis, the two concepts meet in an antagonism that simultaneously ultimately reveals their peculiarities. The result is a critical appraisal of both concepts of pleasure for ethical guidance in modern times.

*Keywords:* Ethics, Pleasure, Classical Greek Philosophy, Aristotle, Epicurus, *Protrepticus*, *Letter to Menoeceus*, Intertextuality.

## Abstract (German)

Lust! Allenfalls ist einer der ersten Gedanken, der einem in den Sinn kommt, wenn man darüber spricht, das Glück. Aristoteles hat einmal festgestellt, dass sie einen inhärenten Aspekt der menschlichen Natur darstellt. Sie spielt eine entscheidende Rolle bei der Bildung und Kultivierung des menschlichen Charakters und der Tugend, was wiederum ein Schlüsselfaktor für das Streben nach dem wahren Glück im Leben ist. Die Frage, was unter dem Begriff Lust zu verstehen ist, war jedoch im Laufe der Geschichte immer wieder Gegenstand von Diskussionen. In dieser Arbeit werden zwei unterschiedliche Konzepte der Lust in der klassischen Antike analysiert, wie sie von zwei prominenten griechischen Philosophen, Aristoteles und Epikur, vertreten wurden. Aristoteles stellt sein Konzept der Lust als eine ungehinderte Funktion dar, während Epikur sein Konzept als einen natürlichen, angst- und schmerzfreien Zustand beschreibt. Die beiden Konzepte werden in zwei Texten der klassischen Literatur veranschaulicht, nämlich in dem verlorenen Werk *Protreptikos* von Aristoteles und dem *Brief an Menoikeus* von Epikur. Die vorliegende Arbeit geht der Frage nach, welche zusätzlichen Erkenntnisse durch den Vergleich der beiden Konzepte im philosophischen Zweig der Ethik mithilfe der Methode der Intertextualität gewonnen werden können. Interessanterweise sprechen beide die gleichen Topoi und dasselbe Thema an, unterscheiden sich aber in ihrem Zweck. Im Sinne der in der Arbeit angewandten intertextuellen Methode treffen beide also in einem Antagonismus aufeinander, der zugleich die Eigentlichkeit beider Konzepte offenlegt. Das Ergebnis ist eine kritische Würdigung beider Lustkonzepte für eine ethische Orientierung in der Moderne.

*Schlüsselwörter:* Ethik, Lust, Klassisch Griechische Philosophie, Aristoteles, Epikur, Protreptikos, Brief an Menoikeus, Intertextualität.