



universität
wien

Magisterarbeit

Titel der Magisterarbeit

“The Impact of the Yom Kippur War on Israel’s Foreign
Policy and Defense Doctrine”

“Die Auswirkung des Jom Kippur-Krieges auf die
israelische Außenpolitik und Verteidigungsdoktrin“

Verfasser

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Angestrebter akademischer Grad

Magister der Geschichte

Wien, März 2008

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt: A 312

Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt: Geschichte

Betreuer: Univ. Prof. Dr. Jonathan Fine

Thanks

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University of Beer Sheva

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The base of research

1 Introduction

The *Yom Kippur War*, like many other Israeli wars, is in line with Israel's previous conflicts. Because of its complexity and its extensive antecedents and aftermath, it is highly recommendable to study in order to analyze its causes and results. In the region itself, this war marks the beginning of the end of the Israeli social collective concept and helped all sides to accept the political reality and facts on the ground.

Afterwards, Egypt, Jordan and Israel reached out to form a real peace agreement, and the global impact of the *Yom Kippur War* was visible by the Egypt's shift a Soviet stronghold to an American ally. The oil embargo that resulted from the *Yom Kippur War* helped the USA economy and pushed Europe towards further unification under the charter of the EC. All in all, the economy learned through this particular conflict to deal with sudden scarcity of resources by initiating proper regulations that strengthened international organizations and scientific efforts to search for alternative energy solutions.

This conflict is the perfect example of how a small region's ideologies, policies and views are able to endanger the whole world. Today, we are able to see the changes in both politics and societies occurring from the *Six Days War* through the peace-treaties that was signed with Israel.

It is essential to investigate this extraordinary time by asking how the *Yom Kippur War* changed Israel's defense doctrine and focusing especially on the Israeli policies that had to be reexamined after this surprise-attack.

2 Review

On October 6th 1973, the Syrian and the Egyptian army launched a surprise attack against Israel. Egypt re-conquered 15 km on the east bank of the Suez in order to end Israel's "*No peace, no war*" policy. Syria attacked Israel on the Golan Heights. This war took place on a larger scale than the public ever realized. At the end, more countries than just Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Israel were involved and supported by the USA and the Soviet Union. Additionally, Sudanese, Moroccan, Libyan, Algerian, Palestinian, Pakistani and Tunisian soldiers were recruited and financed by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. There were even soldiers from Cuba and Uganda fighting against Israel.¹ The Egyptian troops crossed the Suez Canal and broke through the *Bar-Lev Line* (in 1971, Israel had spent \$ 500 million fortifying its positions on the Suez Canal, creating a chain of fortifications and gigantic earthworks named after the Israeli General Chaim Bar Lev). The Syrian troops attacked the Golan Heights and advanced from the plateau in the direction of the eastern shore of Lake Tiberias. They were stopped some miles Tiberias on 8 October. The strategic Israeli point on Mount Hermon was seized by Syrian helicopter-borne commandos. As Israeli was deeply worried about the Syrian threat because of its proximity to Jewish towns and villages, Israeli Defense Minister Dayan ordered the deployment of nuclear missiles if Syria crossed the international boundary². Israel faced a major disadvantage in the first days of the war due to the holy Jewish fasting day of *Yom Kippur* (the holiest day in the Jewish calendar). Most of the soldiers were at home, and the Israeli troops that were guarding the borders were outnumbered 9 to 1 by the advancing foreign armies. Israeli forces struck back on October 8th, turning the tables for the IDF (Israeli Defense Force) to their advantage. The IDF contained 415.000 troops, 1.500 tanks, 3.000 armed carriers, 945 heavy artilleries, 561 airplanes, 84 helicopters and 38 warships. The Egyptians and Syrians originally had a much larger army, but were surprised by their own quick advance during the first days.

¹ See: Perez, 1988, pages 377–37.

² See: Ma'oz, 1995, page 130.

First they considered a small-scale operation in order to conquer the occupied territories as a tool to reopen negotiations after the international diplomatic quietness concerning UN Resolution 242 (Israel refused the request of the UN intermediary Gunar Jarring³ to withdraw to the borderlines of June 5th, 1967) and also due to internal political pressure from Egyptian and Syrian citizens. The Egyptian force had 800.000 troops, but only 280.000 were mobilized. Additionally, it contained 2.060 tanks, 2.400 armed carriers, 1.120 artillery units, 568 combat airplanes, 161 helicopters and 104 warships.⁴ The Syrian army employed around 60.000 troops from their total of 150.000 and sent 1.400 tanks, 850 armed carriers, 600 heavy artillery, 350 airplanes, 36 helicopters and 21 warships to the battlefield. Iraq, as one of the forces allied with Egypt and Syria, sent 60.000 soldiers, 700 tanks, 500 armed carriers, 200 artillery units and 73 airplanes. The confrontation ended on October 26th and left high casualties on both sides: 2.656 killed and 7.250 wounded Israelis, 400 IDF tanks were destroyed, 600 damaged and 102 downed IDF-airplanes. The Arab Armies lost 8.528 soldiers, 19.540 troops were hurt and 2.250 tanks and 432 combat planes were destroyed.⁵ As a result of the *Six Days War*, Egypt received their weapon technology from the Soviet Union, especially MIG-21s, SA-2, 3, 6 and 7, Surface-to-air missiles (SAM), RPG-7s, T-55 and T-62 tanks and, finally, the AT-3 Sagger anti-tank guided missiles. Additionally, with help from Soviet military experts, Egypt was well prepared for the next conflict, but not enough. During the combat operation in the Sinai, Egypt feared to leave the missile (SAM) anti aircraft umbrella and originally conquered only a small strip of 15 kilometers on the other side of the Canal.

³ **Gunar Jarring** (October 10th, 1907 in Brunnby – May 29th, 2002) worked after his career at Lund University as a Turkologist for the Swedish Foreign Ministry in Ankara and later on as a Diplomat in Teheran, Addis Abeba, Baghdad and India during the forties and fifties. After that period he was appointed as the Swedish ambassador in the UN, USA and USSR during the sixties. After the *Six Days War* he became the UN General-Secretary for the Middle East peace process in the so-called "*Jarring Mission*" in order to bring the UN Security Council Resolution 242 in reality until the *Yom Kippur War* broke out.

⁴ See. The Military Balance 1974-1975, pages 32-33.

⁵ See: Rabinovich, 2004, page 496-497.

Asad⁶ urged Sadat⁷ to advance further, and that became a big disaster for the Egyptian army. In the days before, Israel had heavy losses especially of their planes by the Egyptian anti-aircraft missiles. They shot down almost every IDF plane that crossed the Suez Canal, which caused a shock in the Israeli military ranks, because they had depended on their air superiority after their experience during the *Six Days War* and the *War of Attrition*⁸. The second stronghold of the Israeli force, their tanks, also faced new Russian weapon technology: the man-portable anti tank rocket propelled grenades (RPG) and the Sagger missiles. One man in every Egyptian platoon carried such a weapon. The *Bar Lev Line* was mainly built by sand and was broken surprisingly quickly by huge water cannons imported from West Germany. At the end of the war only one fortress, codename Budapest, remained under Israeli control. All others were captured by the Egyptian army. The Israeli counterattack against the Egyptian army at Hizajon on October 8th under General Shmuel Gonen was such a great disaster for the IDF that the Egyptian counterattack could be only stopped by the 143 armed forces under General Ariel Sharon⁹, who was activated from his retirement. General Elazar¹⁰ replaced the unsuccessful Gonen, who also came back from retirement, together with General Haim-Bar Lev, and defended the massive attack of the Egyptian soldiers under the guidance of Saad El Shazly¹¹ and Ahmad Ismail Ali¹² on October 14th.

⁶ **Hafez al Asad** was the longest serving *President* of Syria. He ordered the *Yom Kippur* Surprise Attack on Israel in 1973 together with the Egyptian *President* Sadat. Asad stabilized and organized his power with the *Baath Party* in Syria after a long time of chaos. This regime kept its power after Hafez's death under the guidance of his son, *President* Bashar al Asad.

⁷ **Muhammad Anwar al Sadat** (December 25th, 1918 – October 6th, 1981) was the third *President* of Egypt from September 28th, 1970 until he was assassinated on October 6th, 1981 as the result of the peace treaty with Israel.

⁸ **The War of Attrition** was a limited conflict between Egypt and Israel between 1967 and 1970. At its peak in 1969, Egypt artillery started bombarding the Israeli Sinai-front, hoping to damage or stop the construction of the *Bar Lev Line* and to force Israel to make territorial concessions. Israel IDF planes stroke back. The conflict ended in August 1970.

⁹ **Ariel Sharon** (February 27th, 1928) became famous as an Israeli general in the *Yom Kippur War*. During the 1982 *Lebanon War*, he became “indirectly” responsible as the *Minister of Defense* (investigated through the Kahan Commission) for the *Sabra and Shatila Massacre* in Beirut and since that time he has been seen as a war criminal by the Arab world. He became the leader of the Likud (1999) and *Prime Minister* from March 2001 until April 2006. His political career as the head of his new founded Party *Kadima* ended when he suffered a stroke.

¹⁰ **David Elazar** (1925 – 1976) was the *Chief of Staff* of the IDF during the *Yom Kippur War*. He had to resign after the results of the *Agranat Commission*.

¹¹ **Saad El Shazly** was the Egyptian *Chief of Staff* during the *Yom Kippur War*. After his criticism of the Camp David results, he was dismissed from his new career as ambassador to Portugal and went into exile in Algeria.

From that time on (October 15th), Israel changed its tactics (*Operation Stouthearted Men*) and shifted its power from air- and tank-battles to simple infantry and infiltrated the SAM positions. Against the order of the *Minister of Defense* Moshe Dayan¹³, Ariel Sharon's troops crossed the Suez Canal (north of the Bitter Lake) and General Avraham Adam's troops went south in order to isolate the Egyptian 3rd Army. The battles around the Chinese Farm (an irrigated area east of the Canal and north of the crossing point) were the hardest fought of the entire war. More troops crossed Sharon's bridgehead on October 16th to the 17th, and started to blow up the SAM stations and the anti-tank defenses. On October 19th, Israel built further bridgeheads. From that point on, the Israeli airplanes and tanks could operate effectively. Egypt was in an urgent need for a cease-fire after Israeli troops had closed the ring around the city of Suez and advanced up to 100 kilometers from Cairo. However, for Israel the battle against Syria was because of the proximate of its home-front the highest priority. In the Sinai and the Negev, Israel had time to prepare. On the other hand, the Golan Heights were only a distance of some kilometers from Israel's center. Furthermore, during the first three days there were only 188 Israeli tanks facing 2000 Syrian tanks. Israel immediately lost its stronghold in the Hermon Mountains, Jabal al Shaikh. Israel sent every incoming reservist directly to the battle scene, often without equipment or armed vehicles.

The Syrians, coming from their breakthrough in Nafah, faced heavy individual Israeli tank resistance at the Tapline Road, which runs diagonally across the Golan. After four days of fighting, the Syrian troops met the 7th Armored Reserve Brigade commanded by Yanush Ben Gal. Israel managed to build a defense line in Nafah. The fighting next to the Sea of Gallilee was a success for the Syrian armies. They advanced until the Barak Brigade was able to stop them, though sustaining heavy casualties. On October 8th, the reserve force arrived and pushed Syrian troops back so as to prevent Israel's cities from being shelled. On October 10th, the Syrian army withdrew behind the pre-war border (purple) line.

¹² **Ahmad Ismail Ali** (October 14th, 1917 – December 26th, 1974) was the *Chief Commander* of Egypt's army and *Minister of War* during the *Yom Kippur War*. He planned the surprise attack across the Suez Canal on October 6th, 1973 that had started the *Yom Kippur War*.

¹³ **Moshe Dayan** (20th May, 1915 – 16th October, 1981) was the fourth *Chief of Staff* of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) during the *Suez Crises* and *Minister of Defence* during the *Yom Kippur War*. The world public has a diverse opinion about his role in history: Some experienced him as a fighting symbol of the State of Israel, for others he was a war criminal and a thief of Arabic archaeological culture. Fact is that at the end of his political career, he was willing to give Israel's neighbours a lot of concessions for peace.

On October 11th, Golda Meir¹⁴ gave the order to cross the purple line in order to gain territory as a bargaining chip for the peace negotiation after the war. Until October 14th, the IDF advanced to a distance of 60 kilometer from Damascus and started to shell the outskirts of the capital with heavy artillery. From that point on, Iraqi and Jordanian troops intervened and stopped Israel's further advance. The Russian navy moved its ships to Crete, out of the battle zone, and faced the American fleet. In the middle of October there were around 70 Russian warships in the Mediterranean. Some of the battleships were sent to Cyprus to guide merchant vessels on their way to Syria. At the end of the war, the total number of Soviet ships in the Mediterranean Sea reached 96, including 29 surface combatants and 23 submarines.¹⁵ That was a world record for Russia, and this number of ships was designed to impress the Arabs and show them that the USSR was ready to take action if necessary.

On October 22nd, the Israelis dug themselves in at Bashan and recaptured the key tactical position of the whole area, the outpost on the Mount Hebron. On October 23rd, Syria, Iraq and Jordan prepared a major counterattack. The Soviet Union replaced most of the lost Syrian tanks, but one day before the battle started, the UN, Israel and Egypt agreed to a cease-fire and Asad was left in a dilemma. He had to call off the offensive and sent the Iraqi troops back home. On that day, the situation became even more dangerous for Asad, due to the continued advances of the Israelis that cut off the Egyptian 3rd Army. Egyptians leaders called for an implementation of the cease-fire through the use of foreign troops, while Brezhnev¹⁶ proposed a second resolution at the UN. Finally, the Superpowers came to an agreement and Resolution 338 was born. Still, Israel pushed further and controlled the Suez Canal through October 24th. In Cairo, the Egyptian civilians became confused and panic by Israel's latest successes. Sadat sent messages to Washington and Moscow demanding they send troops to stop Israel.

¹⁴ **Golda Meir** (born as Golda Mabovitz: May 3rd, 1898 –December 8th, 1978) was one of the founders of the State of Israel. During the time of *Prime Minister* David Ben Gurion she was appointed as *Minister of Labour and Foreign Minister*. She was the first *Prime Minister* in the world and the public described her as the “Iron Lady” caused by her un-discussable position for “*Eretz Israel*”. She guided Israel through the *Yom Kippur War*.

¹⁵ See: Golan, in: *Israeli Affairs*, Vol. 6, 1999-2000, page 127 and 136.

¹⁶ **Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev** (December 19th, 1907 –November 10th, 1982) was the head of the Soviet Union from 1964 to 1982 and *General Secretary of the Communist Party* of the Soviet Union from 1964 until 1982. He was twice Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet from 1960 to 1964 and from 1977 to 1982.

After the war, the US Nuclear Alert was viewed as a response to the Russian weapon-shipments and especially through the report that Soviet nuclear materials for Scud missiles had been delivered to Alexandria and Soviet troops were being transported to the Mediterranean from October 24th to 25th.

The truth was that news of nuclear materials being shipped through the Bosphorus had reached the “White House” on the morning of October 25th; hours after the DefCon3 Alert had been called. The Nuclear Alert was not activated by the Russian airlift or the Russian fleet. The alarm was a result of this letter from Brezhnev to Nixon:

*"Let us together, the USSR and the United States, urgently dispatch Soviet and American military contingents to Egypt, to ensure the implementation of the decision of the Security Council of October 22nd and 23rd concerning the cessation of fire and of all military activities and also of our understanding with you and guarantee of the implementation of the decision of the Security Council. It is necessary to adhere without delay. I will say it straight that if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally. We cannot allow arbitrariness on the part of Israel."*¹⁷

The Politburo met on October 25th. They were surprised by this strong American reaction and immediately rejected a military confrontation. Brezhnev decided to ignore the American alert because the cease-fire was holding. The alert helped the Soviets to display their effort to fulfill the commitments to the Arabs. Nevertheless, Egypt turned fully to the USA after the war. From that time on, the USSR was out of the game and had not a choice but to accept the USA as the dominant power in the *Middle East*. When the cease fire came into place, Israel had lost territory on the east side of the Suez Canal to Egypt, but gained territory west of the Canal and on the Golan Heights. Additionally, Israel trapped the 3rd Egyptian Army and gained the best possible position for the upcoming negotiations.

¹⁷ Golan, in: *Israeli Affairs*, Vol. 6, 1999-2000, page 146.

3 UN-Resolutions 242 and 338

3.1 Resolution 242

Resolution 242 was implemented by the *United Nation* on November 22nd, 1967 as the result of the *Six Days War*. It is the theoretical base upon which the Arab countries built their attack on Yom Kippur. Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories is the highest priority in this resolution and will be the dominant document for Middle East policy until it is resolved. The problems of the Palestinian people were not a major topic because it was already discussed in Resolution 181 in 1947. In 242 they are mentioned as "refugees":

The Security Council

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace, in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment of act in accord with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. *Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:*
 - (I) *Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.*¹⁸
 - (II) *Termination of all claims or state of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or act of force.*

¹⁸ Note by Prof. Dr. Fine on April 15th 2008: "The French version said: [...] **all** the territories ...".

2. *Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of this resolution;*
3. *Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.*¹⁹

3.2 Resolution 338

Resolution 338 was the *Yom Kippur War* cease-fire agreement passed by the UN on October 22nd, 1973. The Arab states pushed to include requests from Resolution 242 in the new document, but it was more an alibi than a condition. Israel's neighbors were further away from the 242 Resolution implementation than ever before. Syria was the last member of the war to agree to Resolution 338, which it did on October 24th.

The Security Council

1. *Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the position they occupy;*
2. *Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;*
3. *Decided that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.*

¹⁹ See: Mottinger, 1988, pages 17-19 and 80-81.

4 Egypt's and Syria's policy background: Its secrets, changes and aims

On April 14th, 1974, Sadat introduced his “October papers” to the ASU²⁰ and passed it through a referendum: It would signify a revolutionary change in Egyptian policy:

1. *Economic development*
2. *Egypt's preparations for the year 2000*
3. *Liberating its economy inside and outside in order to secure the invested capital and development projects*
4. *Creating social change through scientific-based planning*
5. *Consolidation and reorganization of the public sectors in order to give Sadat the capacity to lead development*
6. *Social development and human formation*
7. *Movement into the era of science and technology*
8. *Cultural progress based on science and faith*
9. *A liberal and free society*
10. *A secure society in which present and future civilians enjoy social protections*²¹

²⁰ **The Arab Socialistic Union (ASU)** is the sole political party sanctioned under the Egypt constitution. Although Article 55 of the law permits Egyptian citizen to form societies within limits of the law, the scope of their political activities is practically nonexistent, because only the ASU is entitled to act politically. A politically active group must keep its activities within the prescribed limits and the organizational structure of the party that is said to represent the “alliance” of the peasants, workers, soldiers, intelligentia and national capitalists; the peasants and workers are entitled to at least 50 % of the membership in all the organization of the ASU. In 1971, the ASU was reported to have approximately 6 million members (*from: Record of the Arab World, July-December 1971*).

²¹ See: Klöwer, Köln 1976, page 8 (translated from German to English by the Author).

It seems strange that this political change was already planned by Sadat before the *Yom Kippur War*. After Nasser's death on September 28th, 1970, his successor, Vice-president Sadat, had this new policy in mind; it was a complete change from Nasser's policies since 1952. Nasser's ideas were socialistic, but Sadat's policies moved in the direction of capitalism. He endeavored to follow more Egyptian rather than pan-Arab goals, such as attention towards Palestine, and focus more on solving Egypt's social and economic problems.²² Concerning Israel's foreign policy of "*no peace no war*", Sadat's intention was to break it and to achieve a peace settlement with Israel in 1972, but his actions were not taken seriously neither by Jerusalem, the US, or the international community. Sadat became President as a result of a compromise between the powerful groups in Egyptian politics, and to their surprise, he did not change as much as they expected and what they expected. The last major crisis, staged to remove the obstacles of his power, was Egypt's contract with the Syrian President Asad and the Lebanese government for promotion of Arabic republics, which Sadat signed without informing the Executive Committee. It raised the question of whether the President is allowed to make foreign policy decisions without permission of other authorities. ASU rejected the contract, and Sadat, after having secured support from the army, arrested its influential members, especially his competitor, Prime Minister Ali Sabri²³. The official reason: Conspiring against the President and the security of the state.

From that point on, Sadat's was liberated to set his ideas into reality. The *Yom Kippur War*, caused by the stubborn behavior of the Israelis, gave Sadat the opportunity to prove his strength in front of his people and to recover Egypt's dignity after the disaster of the *Six Days War*. His acquired support by the people resulted in the remarkable speed towards peace with Israel in 1978.²⁴

²² See: McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 69.

²³ **Ali Sabri** (1920-1991) was Prime Minister from Egypt from 1962-1965. He was imprisoned by Sadat as a result of his new policy (Corrective Revolution).

²⁴ **Nasser, Hamid.** "Ursachen der Außenpolitischen Neuorientierung Ägyptens unter Sadat", Dissertation an der Universität Hamburg, 1980,160-172.

The path to power for Syria's President Asad was similar to that of Sadat's. Both had to overcome their strongest internal political competitors before they could create their own policy concepts. In Asad's case, General Jadid²⁵ was Asad's main obstacle to power.

He overtook him through a "mini-coup" during Israel's raid against the Fath bases in al-Hammam and Maysalun on February 25th, 1969, by sending army units to control the key buildings in Damascus, including Ba'th Party offices and Syrian media centers.

*"And, although he was still unable to depose Jadid, Asad continued his efforts to seize power in Damascus, largely using Syria's policy towards Israel as his motive (or pretext). Thus, for example, in March 1969 he forced the Ba'th emergency regional convention to adopt certain resolutions which were compatible with his strategy and contrary to Jadid's policy: those renewed efforts should be made to establish an Eastern command (with Iraq and Jordan) to co-ordinate between the Syrian front and other Arab fronts and to seek union with progressive Arab states-all in order to facilitate the struggle against Israel."*²⁶

After Egypt's President Abd al-Nasser died in September 1970, Jadid lost the strongest supporter of his efforts, which provoked Asad to finally depose him. In May 1971, General Asad became President, and he appointed 4 other generals: Mustafa Tlas, Abdul Rhaman Khleifawi, Naji Jamil and Abudl Ghani Ibrahim to key positions within the Syrian administration.

Hence, there were two major differences between Egypt and Syria in their foreign policy since 1967: First, Syria's program against Israel was Terror (they formed a pro Syrian-Palestinian-Terror-Organization called "Lightning") that had a strict, in this case, Russian-influenced purpose.

"In the 1970s terrorism, whether backed directly or indirectly by the Soviet Union or independently initiated, appeared to have become an indispensable tactical and

²⁵ **General Salah Jadid** (1926-1993) was the head of the Syrian government from 1966 until 1970. 'During his office he aligned with the Soviet Union. As a result of the *Six Days War* and the unsuccessful support of the PLO against the Jordan army he was arrested by Asad after a coup and remained in prison until his end of life 23 years later.

²⁶ Ma'oz Moshe, 1995, page 119.

strategic tool in the Soviet struggles for power and Influence within and among nations."²⁷

The aims the Soviet Union hoped to achieve by terrorism were:

- 1) *Influencing developments in neighboring countries.*
- 2) *Regaining irredentist territories in the Soviet orbit.*
- 3) *Helping to create new states in which it will have considerable influence as a result of its support of those nations' claims for self-determination.*
- 4) *Weakening the political, economic and military infrastructure of anti-Soviet alliances such as NATO.*
- 5) *Initiating proxy operations in distant geographical locations where direct organized conventional military activities are logistically impracticable.*
- 6) *Stirring up trouble for the United States.*
- 7) *Waging a "secret war" against individuals considered by the Kremlin as "mortal enemies" of Communism and the Soviet Union.*²⁸

With Syrian encouragement and direction, various guerrilla groups carried out (particularly during the late 1960's) many military operations inside Israel (and Jordan), the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan - including the territories of Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. From mid-1969 on, Syrian troops also periodically attacked Israeli targets on the Golan. This highly developed USSR technique of "Terror as Deception" that was taught to its allies finds its example in the second but greatest difference between Syria and Egypt, the rejection of Resolution 242. Syria rejected a peaceful settlement with Israel in which Israel would even agree to withdraw from the occupied territories.

Suddenly, in March 1972, Asad changed his mind and agreed to the resolution. In retrospect, we know he did this in order to plan secretly for another war:

²⁷ Ganbor, in: *The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism*, 1997.

²⁸ Ganbor, in: *The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism* 1997.

“Yet, as it were, neither Moshe Dayan nor Golda Meir nor other Israeli leader could or would perceive the change in Syrian strategy towards Israel under Asad’s leadership (nor the significant shift in Egypt’s policy under Sadat), namely: Asad’s inclination to accept the principle of political settlement (UN Resolution 242) and, particularly and simultaneously, his strong determination and systematic preparations for waging another war against Israel.”²⁹

At the moment Asad came to power, he followed this well-known, simple policy:

1. Recovery of Syrian territory presently occupied by Israel (Golan Heights)
2. Maintenance of the current regime and, associated with this goal, development of popular support for the regime and government
3. Resolution of the Palestinian issue
4. Economic development of Syria and, in support of that policy, the attraction of private and foreign government investment
5. Maintenance and improvement of relations with Arab countries
6. Improvement of economic, political, and social relations with the West
7. Acceptable termination of the conflict with Israel

He continued to prepare Syria’s army for the *Yom Kippur War* with the help of the Soviets. By keeping the anti-Jewish, anti-Israeli, anti-Zionist indoctrination and propaganda campaign in place, he prepared Syria’s public for another war. Further, he introduced democratic reforms, started a new economic policy connected to Syrian values and opened the legislative and public arenas to other parties besides the Ba’ath, in order to get popular support for his regime. The connection to the Soviets was a major element of Syrian policy against Israel. Syria was dependent on the Soviets for weapons, training and support of Asad’s regime.

Because Syria followed Moscow’s policy, Israel was sure that Asad would not go to war without Soviet backing.³⁰

²⁹ Ma’oz, 1995, pages 116 and 117.

³⁰ See: McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, pages 250-255.

At the same time, Asad established a new cooperation with Egypt and other powerful Arab organizations. Israeli strategy placed a premium upon breaking this cooperation. All these actions by the Arabs were taken under the premises of the Palestinian problem and the return of the occupied territories, and these nations found that the only way to maintain unity and support among one another was to threaten war with Israel.³¹ Cooperation with Egypt had one very interesting and secret aspect: A calculation by Sadat that was hidden even from Asad during the *Yom Kippur War*. This decision influenced the outcome substantially:

“Yet, while both Asad and Sadat were engaged in deceiving Israel, Sadat, according to Seale, was deceiving Asad and the Soviets by leading him to believe that Egypt’s offensive would be wider in scope than he ever intended, namely: Sadat passes in the first stage before regrouping for the re-conquest of the whole Sinai Peninsula, whereas in fact he planned only to cross the Suez Canal and capture the narrow strip of land on the eastern bank.”

There was also another fact that Sadat took into consideration: The SAM umbrella reached over a narrow strip on the other side, but the moment Egyptian armies left that protection, they would immediately be the victims of Israel’s combat planes. But the original plan agreed to by Sadat and Asad was that Sadat should advance deep into the Sinai in order to put more pressure onto the IDF so that the Syrian army had more “air” to breathe. This situation reflected the divergence of the war aims of each of the Arab leaders.

“Whereas Sadat went into a limited war in order to shatter the status quo and generate American pressure on Israel to give up the entire Sinai, Asad envisaged the capture of the entire Golan (and Sinai) and subsequently pressure on Israel to give up the occupied Palestinian territories.”³²

Finally, Asad (with full Soviet help) pressured Sadat to leave the umbrella and to advance further into the Sinai, but it was too late. Israel reacted successfully and pushed Syria’s troops away from the shore of Lake Tiberias and the River Jordan and out of the Golan by October 10th and advanced inside Syrian territory. Only on October 13th, after Israeli forces were half way to Damascus, did Sadat order the attack into the Sinai. Asad was deeply disappointed, because until then he was not aware of Sadat’s duplicity.

³¹ See: McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 141.

³² Ma’oz, 1995, page 128.

Sadat accepted a cease-fire (Resolution 338) with Israel on October 16th, without consulting Asad, who now felt betrayed and humiliated by Sadat. Syria continued fighting through October 22nd, at which time the strategic Mount Hermon war re-conquered by the Israelis. On October 23rd, Syria accepted the Resolution but spelled out its own understanding that it called for total Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories.³³

³³ See: Ma'oz, 1995, pages 130 and 131.

5 Israel's political environment after 1967

Some aspects of the Israeli political regime arrangements were established along the lines of the consociation models in Austria, Holland, Belgium and Switzerland. It was a multi-party system with ideological bases. A broadly based parliamentary coalition would be important for ruling if the biggest Party did not reach more than 50%. From 1949 until 1977, *Mapai* was the strongest party, but they never succeeded in winning more than the 60 seats needed in the Knesset to gain the majority rule. This was also a problem from 1969 to 1974.³⁴ *Mapai* (today Labor) was a social democratic party that already had its own institutions like sports clubs and youth groups before the state of Israel had been founded. It was more than a political party. It carried the Kibbutz movement and the Workers Union (Histadrut). It took care of the immigrants, providing houses and work for them. It supported the poorest members of society. *Mapai* had strong connections to the army and to the religious groups. Its charismatic leaders were identified with the social democratic ideology. It was a sovereign movement for a whole decade, and it was the political guide through the whole epoch from 1948 until 1977. Towards the end of its long leadership, *Mapai* lost its connection to the regular people and was not able to renew or even question its old structures. Its leaders could not keep their voters' trust, and soon, the feeling of equality was gone and suspicion for oligarchic tendencies of the small elite in *Mapai* and its growing arrogance arouse hatreds, especially among the younger generations. The party did not manage to instill its values and ideals to the younger generations, and it "needed" a surprise attack to enforce changes in Israeli society. The crisis began in 1969 when Golda Meir was looking for partners to build a coalition. She came suddenly to power in February 1969 at the age of 72 and faced new elections in October.

That was two month after Nixon³⁵ took office and Golda Meir had to offer only a parliament in stagnation. "*Fringe parties have wound up holding the balance, with disproportionate influence inside successive Israeli Cabinet*".³⁶ No quick decisions could be taken.

³⁴ See: Peretz/Doron, 1997, pages 71.

³⁵ **Richard Milhous Nixon** (January 9th, 1913 –April 22nd, 1994) served as the *President of the United States* from 1969 to 1974 and was the only President who resigned from office, caused by the "Watergate" scandal. He was *Vice President* under Dwight D. Eisenhower two times. He kept the *détente* with the Soviet Union and China and ended the USA involvement in the *Vietnam War*. He was the US President during the *Yom Kippur War*.

³⁶ The Insight Team of the Sunday Times, 1975, page 27.

“On becoming prime minister, Golda Meir adopted the two principles that formed the bedrock of Israeli policy after 1967: no return to the prewar borders and no withdrawal without direct negotiation and peace treaties with the Arab states.”³⁷

Her ministers were from the Labor Party, which was founded in January 1969 and soon split into factions. *Mapam* and *Gahal* (*The Herut Movement*) were prepared to withdraw from the occupied lands. But even in this matter some ministers did not agree on the details. The *Labor* Party had numerous debates concerning the future and the peace settlement with the Arabs, but never came to a conclusion. The *National Religious Party* claimed a historic right to the "Promised Land", which included the West Bank, while *Gahal* wanted Israeli sovereignty over the gains of 1967. Golda Meir's so called "Kitchen Cabinet" would have fallen apart if Meir had insisted in any of these issues. As prime minister she had ultimate responsibility for defense policy. This responsibility was expressed constitutionally by the prime minister's chairmanship of the cabinet's defense committee. But during her premiership, this committee did not meet regularly. Its place was taken by an informal body that came to be known as 'Golda's Kitchen' because it met in her house. The regular participants in Golda's kitchen were Israel Galilee, Yigal Allon, Moshe Dayan, Abba Eban, and Pinhas Sapir³⁸ Nevertheless, even Meir's attempt to hold the coalition together failed at the end.

The lack of Israel governmental decisions concerning the peace process forced Egypt to begin the *War of Attrition* on July 20th, 1969. This War affected Israel's nuclear policy:

“The main advocates of the nuclear option were Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres. [...] Israel refused to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)³⁹, America officials wanted to know whether Israel intended to produce nuclear weapons. [...] Rabin explained that Israel would not be the first to “test” such weapons or to reveal their existence publicly. This formula satisfied the Americans.”⁴⁰

³⁷ Shalim, 2000, page 285.

³⁸ See: Shalim, 2000, page 287.

³⁹ In 1968, 140 States signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is the promise to refrain from developing and purchasing nuclear arms. In return they would get full access to nuclear technology for peaceful purpose.

⁴⁰ Shalim, 2000, pages 297 and 198.

Another reason of not pushing for peace had more to do with economics than with politics: Jews in the Diaspora were sending an average of \$ 1.2 billion per year and other forms of Investments between 1967 and 1972, whereas during the four years before the *Six Days War*, Diaspora Jews had sent only \$ 400 million in investments. Between the wars, investments doubled and industry boomed. The economic benefits seen from these investments had persuaded the government not to be in a hurry to make peace. In addition to this new economic power, Israel was finding that the 1967 war had given the country a new sense of invincibility. Ariel Sharon said: "*We can conquer in one week the area from Khartoum to Baghdad and Algeria.*"⁴¹

Finally there were advantages to keeping the occupied territories like oil from Sinai and cheap Arab labor for construction and agriculture in Israel from the West Bank and Gaza. (The Israeli Government held a second Cabinet meeting two weeks after the 67 War on June 21st 1967, were it decided that Israel would be ready to give back the Golan and Sinai for peace).⁴² Fortune seemed to be on Israel's side to the extent that even American Jewry began to focus on their own needs in their community because of the feeling that Israel had been saved. The liberal circle in America that always gave Israel "backup" thought that Israel no longer needed any care while the opposition, the Republicans, who were never really in favor of Israel, considered the time after the 1967 war to be an opportunity to block Communist expansion in the *Middle East*.

After visiting Nixon in 1973, Golda Meir proclaimed that Israel had a friend in the "White House". This caused many liberals even turned their back on the Israeli government. Behind the scenes, the Egyptian and Syrian armies prepared for war. In 1974, after the *Yom Kippur War*, Israel experienced a strong political and moral defeat. However, the public still supported the traditional party, *Mapai*, mainly because of its former leader, Ben Gurion, who was identified as the person most responsible for the establishment of the state. This party *also* took care of the immigrants, for whom voting for another party was considered an act of betrayal to Israel. Also, the economic growth after the "*War of Independence*" was attributed to the *Mapai* leaders. But the voters started to move to other parties after the *Yom Kippur*

⁴¹ The Insight Team of the Sunday Times, 1975, page 27.

⁴² Note by Prof. Dr. Fine on April 15th 2008

War. *Likud* gained 39 of 120 seats of the Parliament in 1974. This was the first time that a party threatened *Mapai*.⁴³

To borrow Aristotle's example, the leaders on the ship are responsible for safe navigation. The surprise attack of the *Yom Kippur War* caused such an impact in the citizens' mind that the effect was visible on the results in the voting of 1977, and *Likud* came to power:

"From the outset Israel's physical existence was challenged, and the leading role which Labor's leader played in the successful defense of the nation has been one of the most important bases of their authority".⁴⁴

"...the shock of the surprise attack on Yom Kippur 1973 and the protest movements that followed had shown that the taken-for-granted assumption of Labor's leadership of the nation and its defense establishment was seriously called into question on a significant scale."⁴⁵

As we will see during the next chapters, *Mapai* was the victim of its own organization structures. Its strong connection to the army eventually made them blind to the coming danger.

⁴³ See: Peretz/Doron, 1997, page 70.

⁴⁴ Peri, 1983, page 19.

⁴⁵ Myron, 1990, pages 260-281.

Influences on Israel's foreign policy

6 Israel's foreign policy

Israel's policy was based on three different general influences before and especially after the *Yom Kippur War*. The first and highest priority was the Long-Run Survival of Israel as a Jewish state surrounded by Arab enemies. This includes questions of security objectives and territorial settlements that are mostly connected to military goals. Without a doubt, this priority was focused on and connected to the foreign policy of Israel's neighbors, the Arab states and Arab populations ("*Population Dispersal Policy*") within Israel's sphere of influence.

The second largest influence on the Israeli policy changes was the international community, including the UN, EU, the African states and particularly the USA. This factor became dominant with the rising interest of the United States in oil supply.

The third and latest influence that caught Israel's representatives by surprise was the change in Israeli public opinion after the *Yom Kippur War*. The different Israeli parties played a marginal role on its policy influence and on the defense doctrine. In fact, they tended to be oppositional factors concerning the path to negotiations and political settlements. The political result of the change in public opinion was the rise of Likud, which came into power after the 1977 election, and the appearance of different opinion groups.

6.1 The highest priority: The Long-Run Survival of Israel

The first priority of all Israeli policies is the Long-Run Survival of Israel. It is a focus that will not change as long Israel exists as a Jewish state.

One of the major problems facing the Israeli leadership for some years, and particularly since the October War⁴⁶, has been the formulation of a definitive statement that includes the specific goals to be achieved in settlement negotiations with the Arab states.⁴⁷

The Arab states considered themselves to be nations that had nothing to do with the *Shoa* but nevertheless had to deal with its result. For the Jews, the *Shoa* is a catastrophe equal to the biblical ones and is one of the reasons for creating the *State of Israel*.⁴⁸ Of course, this country was established officially by the UN as a compromise between the two “Superpowers”, the USSR and the USA, but for the “Nation-building” process, in the minds of the western and Jewish population, the *Shoa* was the proof of the importance of a Jewish democratic state in Palestine. It was the “lowest common denominator” for all the Jews in the world, even ones who were not victims of the Nazi persecution. The builders of Israel saw and still see it as their responsibility to protect all the dead and living Jews around the world. *Diaspora Jews* were “brought home” to “*Eretz Israel*” in several huge actions organized by the government based on the “*Law of return*,” which makes Israel different from all other countries. This law gives every Jew, no matter where he was born, the right to receive Israeli citizenship.

This new idea of a Jewish democratic state implicates that, in order to be Jewish-democratic, the majority of this collective must be Jewish citizens. In order to reach this goal, the Palestinian refugees, from the *Independence War* on, were not allowed to come back and Israeli Arabs have had to face substantial disadvantages in their daily lives. On the other hand, the state of Israel encourages immigration of *Diaspora Jews*. This, of course, caused a gathering of many different kinds of Jews from all kinds of Jewish traditions and cultures and from all nations.

⁴⁶ Note by the author: The Yom Kippur War is also called the October War, the Ramadan War or the 4th Israeli War.

⁴⁷ McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 209.

⁴⁸ See: Zimmermann, 1997, page 263.

All of them used the “*Law of Return*” to come to Israel. Here is David Ben Gurion to the Knesset about the “*Law of Return*”:

*"The State of Israel differs from the other states both with regard to the factors involved in its establishment and to the aims of its existence. It was established merely two years ago, but its roots are grounded in the far past and it is nourished by ancient springs. Its authority is limited to the area in which its residents dwell, but its gates are open to every Jew wherever he may be. The State of Israel is not a Jewish state merely because the majority of its inhabitants are Jews. It is a state for all the Jews wherever they may be and for every Jew who so desires."*⁴⁹

Ben Gurion defines the collective of the State of Israel as everyone who desires to be a Jew. This Jew must have a deep connection to his roots in the Land of Israel.

But what has united all Jews from these different cultures, directions and philosophies? The “*Declaration of Independence*” helps us to answer this question:

*"The Nazi holocaust, which engulfed millions of Jews in Europe, was another clear demonstration of the urgency of the re-establishment Eretz-Israel of the Jewish State, which would open the gates of the homelands wide to every Jew and confer upon the Jewish people the status of a fully privileged member of the community of nations."*⁵⁰

The *Shoa* was undoubtedly the unification point for all Jews. The “*Nürnberg Race Laws*” and the Concentration Camps did not distinguish between Ashkenazi, Sefardi, Reform, Conservative or Orthodox Jews. The disillusion of the former assimilated Jews in Western Europe and the disappointments of the Russian Jews in the Soviet Union after World War II united all Jewry under the nationalistic ideology of the *Zionism movement*. This Zionist movement is seen by the Arab states as a racist development against the Arab population, and Israel is viewed as a state without legitimacy.

⁴⁹ “The Debate on the law of return and law of citizenship”, July 3rd, 1950, pages 2035-2037.

⁵⁰ “Declaration of Independence”, Friday, Mai 14th, 1948- Erev Shabbat 5th year 5708.

This denial of the right to existence is the source of the principle objective of Israeli policy of the long-run existence of the state of Israel as a Jewish state:

*Against this complex background the single objective of Israel's foreign policy can be stated in quite concrete terms. **It is to mobilize all the resources of diplomacy for the protection and preservation of Israel as it is.** This is no different, of course, from the basic objective of the foreign policy of any other State, and although to that extent commonplace it nevertheless well bears repetition as it is so often overlooked... the State's continued existence and its continued security and prosperity are equally the survival of the Jewish people. Such preoccupation with national survival – spiritual and physical – engendered by a sense of historic mission would impress its stamp on Israel's foreign relations under all circumstances. It is even more prominent as things are when Israel found itself from the moment of its inception beset by powerful enemies bent on its complete physical destruction.⁵¹*

This statement guides us directly to the second priority that had an influence on the Israeli foreign policy.

⁵¹ McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 205.

6.2 The second pillar: Mobilizing all resources of diplomacy

The statement that “[Israel] is to mobilize all the resources of diplomacy for the protection and preservation of Israel as it is” includes Europe as much as African states and the “Superpowers” before the *Yom Kippur War* (Israel tried unsuccessfully to join a kind of western pact between 1948 and 1956). Particularly, America’s Security Guarantees and its willingness to underwrite a settlement with the Arab states gave Israel a strong partner. However, it also gave Israel a higher degree of independence that had its effect on the changing policy toward the Arab countries, which made Israel look more and more like a US marionette after the *Six Days War*. Defense Minister Peres:

Israel cannot escape the fact that it is likely to be called upon to pay a price, so that other forces, including those friendly to it, can maintain their influence and guarantee their legitimate interest in the Middle East. There is nothing wrong with that, and there is no point in ignoring a demand of this sort...⁵²

Israel needed US weapons and financial support and that led to a dilemma on several occasions. “*Since the October War, Israeli thinking and public opinion have shifted toward the more balanced view that long-run American support is vital, and that any policy must have at least U.S. backing.*”⁵³

From that point on it was clear that the influence of the US foreign policy on Israel was enormous.

“Of all Middle East actors, both regional and external, the interests and attitudes of the United States probably have been most greatly altered by the events and developments of the early 1970’s. Until then, U.S. national interests in the Middle East could be viewed as marginal. These interests were the following: denial of control over Middle East resources to hostile powers; preservation of the assured destruction capability of the regional element of the U.S. strategic forces; assured supply of Middle East natural resources important to American industry and military;

⁵² McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner 1977, page 204.

⁵³ McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 203.

assured supply to U.S. allies of resources adequate to maintain their economic and military strength; realization of the benefits resulting from U.S. commercial investments and operations in the Middle East; maintenances of U.S. credibility by fully meeting American commitments; maintenance of over flight and transit rights. It should be noted that support of Israel, or support of the existence of Israel, is not included among traditional U.S. interests.”⁵⁴

This policy changed substantially since the *Six Days War* and particularly in 1973. Not only had the USSR and the U.S. become the most influential powers in the region after Britain and France moved out, but the international arena had started to focus on the Middle East question, particularly the question of the return of the occupied territories, the existence of Israel and the faith of the Palestinian people.

But no cause was stronger than the need for oil:

“Finally, the oil picture for the United States has changed. In 1972-73 the continuing growth in energy demand and the decline in domestic petroleum production left a shortfall of significant proportions. Moreover, whereas Venezuelan and Canadian crude had been imported to meet this shortfall in the past, the dimensions of the requirement meant that only Middle Eastern oil could fill the demand.”⁵⁵

To reach this target, the U.S. had to avoid a military confrontation with the Soviet Union, achieve a peaceful settlement between the Arabs and Israelis and maintain Israel’s security. They knew that if they succeeded, they would have access to oil and to the Middle East markets. Additionally, the U.S. could prove that a relation with them was of greater advantage than one with the Soviet Union. The U.S. policy directly influenced Israeli policy took place under Nixon in 1969 as a result of the *Six Days War*:

“... the role of U.S.-Soviet agreement and the limits of Soviet support; the parameters of settlement, principally some mix that would fall within Resolution 242-Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territory, the recognition of an establishment of

⁵⁴ McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 9.

⁵⁵ McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 10.

*security of Israel, and an acceptable solution to the Palestinian problem; stability of the government of the parties to the conflict; the role of public opinion in the Middle East, particularly in Israel; Congressional and U.S. public opinion; the need for a Palestinian spokesman; the appropriate role for the United States.”*⁵⁶

Meir's decision not to call in the reservists and not to strike first was highly political. At noon, Elazar got permission to fully mobilize, after Keating had sent an urgent message to Nixon and Kissinger⁵⁷ and received a positive reply.

The surprise of the *Yom Kippur War* forced the U.S. to set a new agenda for foreign policy towards the Middle East and Israel:

*“For the United States a diplomatic role in the Middle East became not a preference but a matter of vital interest: Because of our historical and moral commitment to the survival and security of Israel; Because of our important concerns in the Arab world, an area of more than 150 million people and the site of the world’s largest oil reserves; Because perpetual crisis in the Middle East jeopardizes the world’s hopes for economic recovery, threatening the well-being of the industrial nations and the hopes of the developing world; and because tension in the Middle East increasing the prospect of direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation with its attendant nuclear risk.”*⁵⁸

Israel submitted to the new U.S. policy after the shock of the *Yom Kippur War*. The reasons were that a stronger connection to the U.S. would perhaps prevent another disaster and, because the Arab armies had updated their weapons systems and fighting capacities, Israel needed more sophisticated weapons in order to keep its military superpower status.

⁵⁶ See: McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 12 and 18.

⁵⁷ **Henry Alfred Kissinger** (May 27th, 1923) was born in Germany and had to leave to America because of his Jewish heritage. He became one of the most important diplomats in modern history: First as *National Security Advisor* and *Secretary of State* under President Nixon. He kept this position during the period of President Ford. Kissinger established the policy of *détente*, “opened” China and received the *Nobel Peace Prize* in 1973 for helping to end the *Vietnam War*. Until today Kissinger is a controversy person because of his policy toward South America and East Timor: He kept friendly diplomatic relationships to military dictators and supported them in order to strengthen anti-communist states.

⁵⁸ McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 18.

Unfortunately, no move was made to solve the root of the problem: Israel rejected a withdrawal from the Golan Heights and the West Bank out of security reasons and missed the opportunity to come to an overall settlement with the Arabs:

*Israel's problem in reaching a solution lay within the internal policy-making process and its inability to provide decisive leadership behind which the nation can unite.*⁵⁹

The appearance of the different individual communities after the *Yom Kippur War* made it even worse.

⁵⁹ McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 217.

6.3 The new influence: Israeli public opinion

Due to the Parliamentary System, Israel is in the most uncomfortable position when it comes to negotiations and settlements in comparison to its Arab competitors. The missing dominant leader combined by the different opinions of the parties leads to deadlocks, such as during the period between 1967 and 1973. Additionally, we must examine the changes in public opinion after the *Yom Kippur War*.

“The real significance of public opinion lies in the limits it places on policy alternatives. It is obvious that a final settlement cannot be implemented unless it has the wide support of the Israeli public, and the ability of the government to mobilize support for official policy may prove to be as important as the influence of public opinion on policy making.”⁶⁰

Changes in public opinion had large and remarkable impacts on the foreign policy of Israel after the *Yom Kippur War*. They were both unpredictable and surprising to all parties.

⁶⁰ McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 194.

Changes in Israel's defense doctrine

7 Israel's Defense Doctrine and its misperception

The *Yom Kippur War* as a surprise attack was a good example of a war of perception and deception:

*Perception will be defined as the discerning of detail, relating to political, military or other intentions of a certain fact, but only the knowledge about its existence. The act of perception is dependent on values, anticipation and drives, experiences and cultural and operational environment in which the actor is immersed.*⁶¹

Within a couple of days after the *Six Days War*, an exceptional euphoria arose beneath the Israeli population. The amazing victory washed away the moaning about the casualties, and the Israelis were flooding into the occupied territories, especially into East-Jerusalem. They explored the West Bank and the Sinai in ecstasy. On mass, the feeling of unity, pride and arrogance against the Arab population rose, and even new religious feelings were experienced by people that had not been touched by such things before. At the same time they were astonished by the prospering agriculture of the occupied Arab people, which was contrary to their knowledge from schoolbooks that said that Arabs were not able to take care of their infrastructure.

This euphoria led to the attempt to drop the original "*Land for Peace*" policy from Ben Gurion and to annex Jerusalem and the West Bank. It became an inviting idea and Yigal Alon gave the order to draw a new borderline including the West bank and Gaza and introduce this to the Knesset.⁶² The public enthusiasm had an influence on the politicians and made them blind to the reality and was based on Israel's earthshaking Victory, a result of the high quality of soldiers and weapon technology. On the day when the gates opened to East-Jerusalem, the Hebrew University on Mount Scopus invited Rabin for a celebration honoring him. He gave a speech, written by the high ranked Officer for education that included thoughts which were already accepted by the Israeli public.

⁶¹ Heichal, in: *Israeli Affairs*, Vol. 6/1, 1999-2000.

⁶² See: Segev, 2005, pages 506-513.

Rabin spoke about the exceptional status of the Israeli Army that was not less than the manifestation of the exceptional being of the Israeli people.

He mentioned that the army did its part for many educational tasks (e.g., the education of new immigrants). He, Rabin, accepted the honor from the University as a sign of respect for the spiritual and moral superiority of the army at warfare.⁶³ This new blind trust of the people to the army institution led to unreflective perceptions by army officers and a harsh change in the foreign policy.

“And within four years of this apotheosis, Israel’s circumstances plummeted from euphoria to depression, from international prestige to diplomatic isolation, from economic boom to galloping inflation, from large-scale immigration to substantial emigration. The Yom Kippur War was the watershed. It destroyed the myth of Israel’s invincibility and eroded the nation’s self-confidence.”⁶⁴

All in all, the status of the army in Israeli society is of such importance that it must be explained at the next chapter in order to understand its influence on Israel’s foreign policy:

⁶³ See: Segev, 2005, pages 522-523.

⁶⁴ Sacher, 1987, page 4.

8 The status of Israel's Army

During its first twenty-five years, Israel had to survive four major wars (1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973), and the question of security constantly dominated political debates. Even before the establishment of a state, communities suffered from terror attacks. The army has always been an institution of trust and security that the citizens count on in life and death situations. In "The Republic", Plato states that our guardians should be warriors and philosophers:

*"Then this is knowledge of the kind for which we are seeking, having a double use, military and philosophical; for the man of war must learn the art of number or he will not know how to array his troops, and the philosopher also, because he has to rise out of the sea of change and lay hold of true being, and therefore he must be a mathematician."*⁶⁵

Especially during the first period of the State of Israel, Ben Gurion held both positions: "Prime minister" and "Minister of Defense" between the ministries of Sharett and Lavon in 1954.⁶⁶ This combination of knowledge and force was an important factor in far-reaching political activities and effective short range activities. Ben Gurion gave the Israeli army a position that was much more than just a security institution. To the present, it is the melting pot for many immigrants from all over the world. At the moment a Diaspora Jew does "*Alia*" (meaning "going up" as an all-inclusive metaphor for a social and religious Jew by returning/immigrating to the Promised Land) under the "*Law of Return*", he/she is required to join the army and assimilate his/her language, culture, and open up to comrades that have different colors, habits and traditions.

The required army service is 30 months for men and 20 months for women, at which point men stay as reserves until the age of 45. This reserve is crucial for Israel's defense policy because, due to its small population, there must be a mobilization within 48 to 72 hours.

⁶⁵ Plato, page 11

⁶⁶ See: Brecher, 1974, page 181.

In 1967, this mobilization included around 275.000 men, which means that with 2.65 million inhabitants at the time, the whole nation served in the army and no production was done in the country. ⁶⁷One of the main military policies existing through today is to hit the enemy hard and fast, because a long struggle (over two months) would lead to a collapse of the state. The question about a preemptive strike and the call for the reservists is one of the most discussed controversies about the *Yom Kippur War* because of the costs and the question of the shortest possible warfare with maximum results without losing support and legitimacy in world opinion. Another specialty of the Israeli army is its high standard of weaponry and trained units. Regular simulations and drills and the high level of education gives the Israeli soldier a much better position in the field than his Arab enemy. The average Israeli soldier is included in the decision-making, and because of their awareness that there is nowhere to run, losing is not an option. This makes the Israeli soldier a highly motivated and self responsible human resource with the highest battle capacity. As a result, Israel militarily won all its wars and its army achieved a halo from military glory. People are proud of their military units, and for them, their leaders are heroes. For most of the citizens, there is no question that the military elites are risking their lives for the good of the state and its Jewish people. Or, like Aristotle proclaims, “*a political society exists for the sake of noble actions, and not of mere companionship*”.⁶⁸

Because of this strong social position of the army, taking part in the most important matters of the state, they have always had a tremendous influence on Israel’s politics. However, the position of the army elites was different before and after the collapse of Mapai. The state’s foreign policy also changed as a result of the party's end. During the rule of Mapai, Israel was a “*Proporzdemokratie*,” which meant that the leaders of the parties and blocs made decisions behind closed doors about how national resources should be spread in accordance with the principle of proportionality in order to avoid clashes between members of the various camps on the grassroots level that could endanger the whole government. Between 1956 and 1967, the military and bureaucratic elites became part of the elite political class that gained power, prestige and influence.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ See: Krivinyi, in: *Truppendienst, Zeitschrift für die Ausbildung im Bundesheer*, 6. Jahrgang, Nr. 1/1968, page 4.

⁶⁸ Aristotle, page 144.

⁶⁹ See: Sheffer, in: *Israel Affairs*, Vol. 6, 1999-2000.

These members of the elite cartel were expected to be loyal to their own camps. In Israel, this period was called the *Yishuv* era. *Mapai* leaders had a pre-eminent position in the entire elite cartel, and only their leaders had to face the hardest decisions for their country. At that time, those leaders were Ben Gurion, Levi Eshkol and the Troika – Golda Meir, Zalman Aran and Pinhas Sapiro. One of the major shifts happened between the *Six Days War* and the *Yom Kippur War*. *The Yom Kippur War* was even a result of that shift, which had an active influence on foreign policy and manifested because of a communication problem between the elites.⁷⁰ To present, whether such high levels of military influence are good or bad and the impact on Israeli foreign policy is a huge discussion within Israel. In giving political power to the best man in the state, Israel is succeeding well:

("... and so, Glaucon, we have arrived at the conclusion that in the perfect state wives and children are to be in common; and that all education and through pursuits of war and peace are also in common, and the best philosophers and the bravest warriors ought to be their king.")⁷¹,

Out of a huge pot of human resource of soldiers, only some of the most charismatic and strongest at decision making processes achieve high positions in the army. A state that does not take leaders out of its institutions and place them into respected leadership positions cannot fulfill the whole range of governing perspectives and sometimes has problems recruiting enough staff to rule a government. This, by the way, was the problem of the *Likud* after the *Mapai* epoch, when it did not have such strong connections to the important institutions of the state. *Mapai* knew this game very well and finally failed in that matter before the *Yom Kippur War*, because of losing the balance of consultation by their own military advisors with the opinions of others.

This particularly happened after the 1967 War, when the chief of the general staff and other army officers began participating in cabinet meetings. This situation became a „*self-fulfilling prophecy*“: Soldiers bring about conflicts, because they are constantly preparing for war.

⁷⁰ See: Sheffer, in: *Israel Affairs*, Vol. 6, 1999-2000.

⁷¹ Plato, page 27.

This danger does not rise in the Israeli army during times of crisis, but during times of peace. The reason is the so-called "pyramid hopping", which expresses a common habit in Israeli politics of army leaders shifting into high political positions. This established practice gave retired high ranked officers the chance to change from the top of one pyramid to the top of the other. These officers had an enormous impact on the history of Israel.

To present, more than 46 officers have joined the political elite and more than 16 of them became members of the government. Plato wrote:

"... at the end of the time they must be sent down again into the den and compelled to hold any military or other office which young men are qualified to hold: in this way they will get their experience of life, and there will be an opportunity of trying whether, when they are drawn all manner of ways by temptation, they will stand firm and flinch. And how long is this stage of their lives to last? Fifteen years, I answered; and when they have reached fifty years of age, then let those who still survive and have distinguished themselves in very action of their lives and in every branch of knowledge come at last to their consummation; the time has now arrived at which they must raise the eye of the soul to the universals light which lightens all things, and behold the absolute good, for that is the pattern according to which they are to order the State and the lives of Individuals, ...).⁷²

Hence there is an agreement between Plato and Israeli tradition when it comes to sending retired soldiers into politics,

I see great risk in the tradition of "Pyramid Hopping", as does Eva Etzioni-Halevy in her article, "The Case of the Military-Political Elites' Connection in Israel". The problem is that military elites attempt to preserve their system of advantage. Perhaps sub-consciously, they do everything (that means nothing) to avoid a situation of complete peace that would leave them useless and force them to a life far away from the political spotlight.

⁷² Plato, page 25.

"Extrapolating from the present into the future, it may be added that, as the peace process unfolds, the military may become less important to the state's survival, and its command may feel that its pivotal position is Israeli society in under threat. Therefore, in order to prevent a threatened military elite from attempting to ensure its position by abusing its entry into the political sphere even more blatantly than it does now, a gradual progress toward civil/ military separation should now begin to be implemented, to thwart such a possible future scenario."⁷³

Sometimes it seems that the state of Israel and its neighbors, including the Palestinian government, were afraid of peace, because after a successful agreement they would have had to deal with their inner social problems and every politician and every party would have had to find new positions of legitimacy.

Between 1969 and 1974, the influence of the army on Israel's political decisions grew enormously and reached a critical stage with regard to its effects upon diplomacy in the international political arena. As long as Ben Gurion was the head of the government, the army was not included in the meetings of the cabinet. Ben Gurion himself had been in charge of military decisions and was highly involved in Israeli intelligence. However, he maintained a dividing line between influence from the army and political decision-making. But when General Moshe Dayan became Minister of Defense, he took a different direction. He eliminated the dividing line between governmental and army responsibilities. Military officers came to the cabinet as frequently as the ministers themselves. In the final days before the *Yom Kippur War* began, there was a showdown of that highlighted the wrong kind of "*after Six Days War policy*" and the most frightening example of the failures of Israel Military Intelligence. In 1977, this specific period of time would force Israel to make huge change in its foreign policy and social awareness after the report of the Agranat investigation (I refer to this in a later chapter).

⁷³

See: Etzioni-Halevy, in: *Armed Forces and Society*, pages 401-417.

The most representative of all military failures involved the Director of the Intelligence, General Eli Zeira,⁷⁴ as Israel got 11 strategic warnings for the upcoming war, in addition to the AMAN (=Agaf Ha Modi'in)⁷⁵ reports in the shortest period of time, but Zeira was still sure that there would not be any attack⁷⁶:

1) Israel received the first concrete warning at the middle of September 1973. A Humint (human intelligence) source informed intelligence that Sadat and Asad were planning a war against Israel by the end of that year. AMAN did not react.

2) AMAN itself recognized the signs of war in Syria at the beginning of September. Air photos showed the preparations, but AMAN interpreted these moves as a procedure for the coming meeting of Asad in Algeria or even Syrian concerns that Israel could initiate an attack. On September 23rd, the air photos showed that Syria's army was ready for attack.

3) Israel received a warning from King Hussein of Jordan⁷⁷ himself, when he met Golda Meir in Israel on September 25th. He gave the warning of a cooperating attack to Meir, but after having consulted her Minister of Defense, Dayan, as well as the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General David Elazar, and Zeira, Meir went to Austria without any alert order.

4) On September 28th, the warning came from Syrian officers that their troops had taken up combat positions for war.

5) On September 29th, US intelligence warned Israel, and the CIA warned Meir and Dayan of a coming war.

⁷⁴ **Eli Zeira** was a Major General of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and the director of the Israeli's military intelligence (AMAN) during the Yom Kippur War. After this War he was found guilty by the Agranat Commission for unpreparedness of the Israeli troops for that surprise attack. As a result of that investigation Zeira resigned.

⁷⁵ **AMAN** (Directorate of Military Intelligence) was created in 1950. It is an independent service with 7,000 personnel and takes care of the military intelligence.

⁷⁶ See: Bar.Joseph, in: *Israel Affairs* 6, 1, 1999, pages 14 - 18.

⁷⁷ **Hussein Ibn Talal, King of Jordan** (November 14th, 1935 – February 7th, 1999). He came on power in 1952 after his father, King Talal.

6) On October 2nd, AMAN reported details about Syrian equipment. The Israeli analysts still believed that the risk of an independent Syrian action remained low.

7) Israel got the first warning of Egypt's intention to go to war on September 30th from a Humint source. This warning caused a temporary rise in the state of alert of the Command in the north and of the Southern Command by Major General Gonen.

8) In the following days, AMAN reported strong activities on the Egyptian border. On October 2nd, they discovered bridging gears, boats, trucks, cannons, regiments and platoons in increasing numbers. AMAN interpreted these observations as signs of an army exercise.

9) The Israeli Mossad warned of war on October 2nd.

10) One day earlier, an unidentified source had also warned of war.

11) On the morning of October 6th, AMAN recognized the evacuation of Soviet advisers and their families from Egypt. This finally changed AMAN's conception that war was unlikely.

The beginning Soviet exodus on October 5th was the reason why Golda Meir got permission from her cabinet to make a full-scale military call up if needed during the holy days. One of the reasons why Golda Meir reacted slowly on those masses of specific warnings was because of Zeira, who blocked from the information flow between the AMAN and Meir's cabinet. He even gave wrong information to Dayan, telling him that AMAN was using all its means of intelligence collection in the last hours. Zeira was creating an atmosphere that war was not immanent by not providing the cabinet with the complete information about these warnings.⁷⁸

He said about the Friday, October 5th meeting in retrospect, *"We will never know whether the war would have broken out, if we had called the reserves."*⁷⁹ This speech refers to the background of the final meeting in Meir's office with Dayan, Galili, Elazar, Haim Bar Lev and Shimon Peres. Elazar asked for calling the reservists. The idea was rejected due to the others because of the delicate question whether to disrupt the hallow calm of Yom Kippur by calling up the reservists.

⁷⁸ See: The Insight Team of the Sunday Times: "The Yom Kippur War" Andre Deutsche Limited, London, 1975, page 115.

⁷⁹ The Insight Team of the Sunday Times: "The Yom Kippur War" Andre Deutsche Limited, London, 1975, page 117.

Meir said on Israeli television in November 16th, 1974 that, if her official advisors had proposed mobilization, she would have agreed at once. At that time, Dayan had had the power to do so. However, Zeira convinced him that war was of a low probability. On October 5th (Friday), Meir made the following decision: She gave the order to the Cabinet Secretary Michael Arnon to ensure contact with every Minister of the Cabinet during the holidays in order to call them in a case of emergency.

At that time, General Ariel Sharon started to mobilize his reserve division by himself, as he was sure that the war would start within two days. The Southern commander, Major General Gorodish Gonen, stopped him.

Zeira's reasoning and interpretations of the warnings contributed significantly to the decision not to mobilize the reserve army on Friday at noon.⁸⁰ Golda Meir did not get all the important information and warnings on time. She trusted in the military institutions and officers. But even then, there were enough warnings and signs to have reason to react differently.

She wrote in her memoirs⁸¹: "*Of all the events upon which I have touched in this book, none is so hard for me to write about as the war of October, 1973, the Yom Kippur War.*" Once she had made already a decision for a partial mobilization in May 1973. At that time, everything on the Egyptian border looked like war. This mobilization cost eleven million dollars. This was one more reason why she hesitated to call the reservists again. Although Meir had a bad feeling about all the reinforcement of troops at the Syrian and Egyptian borders, the Israeli Intelligence calmed her down. They explained to her that the Syrians were afraid of an Israeli attack and the Egyptians were on maneuvers, like they always did around this time of the year. Almost everybody underestimated the Arab generals:

*"Following the ending of the War of Attrition in October 1970, the beginning of the cease-fire, the death of Nasser, the civil war in Jordan and ultimately the apparent removal of the Soviet advisers by Sadat developed a feeling in the Israeli defense establishment that a considerable period of time would elapse before the Arabs would be ready for war, a feeling that was strengthened by a pervasive sense of satisfaction with the post-1967 status quo."*⁸²

⁸⁰ See: Bar-Joseph, in: *Israel Affairs* 6, 1999, page 28.

⁸¹ Meir, 1975, page 420.

⁸² See: Herzog, 1975, page 41.

Meir's dependence upon her military advisors and not her cabinet ministers was perhaps the main reason for her failure to adequately mobilize troops.

Like Sharon, Air Force commander Major General Benjamin Peled had already prepared the Air Force for a preemptive strike himself when Elazar gave him finally the order on Friday, October 5th at 2 p.m. The next day, at 6 p.m., Elazar phoned Dayan to confirm the full mobilization and a preemptive air strike. Dayan refused to confirm and said that he needed an order from Golda Meir and that she was against taking those steps. However, Dayan phoned her, and at 6 a.m., he and Elazar went to Golda Meir. She vetoed both plans: *"How many friends would we have left, if we did that!"* She answered that if Israel struck first, the world would have assumed that they had started the war, which was a general assumption after the *Six Days War*. Meir forbade ordering the first strike and the full mobilization. Dayan gave the permission for a partial mobilization. This decision opened up the ammunition stores at 10 a.m. Meir's final reason not to call the reservists was connected to the US foreign policy:

*"Following their preemptive strike in June 1967, Israeli leaders became sensitive to charges of 'aggression', at least until October 1973, when Prime Minister Meir rejected the suggestion of another preemptive strike, primarily because of a perceived inability to gain American and other worldwide support for Israel on such short notice."*⁸³

Golda Meir was afraid to risk good relations with the U.S. government by making a wrong decision, like calling reservists too early. At that time, Kenneth Keating⁸⁴ was the U.S. ambassador in Israel. Meir called him at 8 a.m. He warned her that if Israel struck first, the United States would feel unable to supply fresh equipment: *"If Israel refrained from a preemptive strike, allowing the Arabs to provide irrefutable proof that they were the aggressors, then America would feel morally obliged to help."*⁸⁵ These events and decisions were the bases on which the social changes affected Israel's policies.

⁸³ Smith, 1973, page 18.

⁸⁴ **Kenneth Barnard Keating** (May 18th, 1900 – May 5th, 1975) was US Representative and Senator of New York. He was the US ambassador in Israel during the *Yom Kippur War*.

⁸⁵ The Insight Team of the Sunday Times, 1975, page 122.

9 The change in Israeli society

The first change occurred during the 1967 War, when Israel occupied territory and many Israelis considered that to be an act of injustice. This part of the population remained unheard by the rest, who experienced the victory as the birth of a new superpower in this region. The following attempt to use land as a "bargaining chip" in the negotiation with the Arab countries, which would have meant "*land for peace*", was not convincing and the *Yom Kippur War* forced Israelis wake up and face the reality. Under this reality, *Mapai* was blamed for the high losses of soldiers during this war, caused by failures of their leaders, and the connection to the young voters and to the new immigrants got lost. All these events led to the end of a unifying era, especially due to the commission that was established after the war in order to investigate and to determine the responsibility for the disaster. It was headed by Supreme Court Justice Shimon Agranat. That is the reason why it was called the Agranat Commission and its outcome forced the early end of Golda Meir's cabinet and new elections in 1977. In April 1974, the commission reported about the Israeli unpreparedness for the Arab offensive, whose advanced warnings neither the military intelligence, the Sinai commanders, nor the Chief Of Staff reacted on.

*"Where the commission refused to speculate was in the murky area of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan's personal responsibility for Israel's early battlefield setbacks. On this point, however, public reaction was less equivalent. An explosion of outrage greeted the report. It appeared unconscionable that career officers were punished, while Dayan, the self-proclaimed architect of Israel's military supremacy, was being absolved."*⁸⁶

But there is also another important point that encouraged Israelis after the *Yom Kippur War* to demand individual influence on daily politics: The attraction of consummation. Influenced by Israeli affinity to the USA and its liberal democratic system, the Israeli population developed their individual personalities to adopt a new, egocentric lifestyle that was in conflict with the united era.

One important step was the media's shift away from a national-militaristic dialogue towards a more universal, anti-militaristic one after the *Yom Kippur War*. American democracy is also based on the guidance of the public through the media.

⁸⁶ Sacher, 1987, page 1.

Mostly through television, the media became a Chippi (*upper middle class, composed primly of secular, educated, broadminded people between the ages of 20 and 50 who have adopted a Western, bourgeois style of life, [i.e., capitalistic, hooked on work, intellectual, progressive thinkers]*) stronghold, in order to install the liberal democratic religion. Edward Walker, the US Ambassador in Israel, complained about this style of recruiting American electoral strategists:

*"It is always dangerous when you start importing somebody else's political ways. The American system depends on the media ... and I am not sure it is right for here. In Israel you don't necessarily have to rely solely on image, sound bites and so on, you can actually get out and talk to the people. Israel should develop its own approach to politics, bringing in obviously some of the things (tactics of the US campaign advisers) that are effective, but not being dominated by them."*⁸⁷

However, the new system has worked out quite well in the Israeli public since the establishment of nonprofit organizations, which has split up society into hundreds of opinions or interests and embraces the rights of the individual.

*"Their activists formed 'common cause' coalitions to confront sexual harassment, gay and lesbian discrimination, gender issues, ethnic, religious and minority rights, regional peace initiatives, affirmative action, environmental justice, and even animal rights."*⁸⁸

Almog Oz wrote a good description of "democracy worship" in Israel:

*"It is rooted in equal rights, individual competition and private enterprise. This climate nurtures feminism and sensitivity, skepticism and criticism, social and self awareness, romantic love and interpersonal relations; It advocates the individual's right to privacy and longing for sophistication, his attention to outer appearance and his quest for diversity and style; it encourages people to learn as much as possible, seek the best in entertainment, preserve the environment and its resources, and constantly strive to improve their economic status."*⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Harman, in: *The Jerusalem Post*, April 9th, 1999.

⁸⁸ Laskier, in: *Israeli Studies* 5.1.

⁸⁹ Oz, in: *Israel Affairs* 8.1.

The first reaction after the war was the rise of protest movements, which should not be misunderstood as peace movements. One such organization was *Yisrael Shelanu* (Our Israel). Headed by Motti Ashkenazi, his followers were educated middle class Ashkenazim. This movement was established by demobilized reservists from the front line, who expressed their feeling that the establishment was detached from the men and the people on the front. They demanded the resignation of the Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan and the introduction of a constitution in Israel. Their needs and their outcry for a change in the procedure of the system left a strong impact on the Israeli public. As Prime Minister Golda Meir and her Government resigned on April 11th, 1974, this organization disappeared.

*However, even though Yisrael Shelanu, and the other protest movements, soon vanished from the scene, the dissatisfaction which they had expressed and the general demands that they had raised remained. Furthermore, from an extra-parliamentary political-historical point of view, the protest movements broke the operative national consensus in an unprecedented manner, and created a negative peripheral consensus towards the center.*⁹⁰

Yisrael Shelanu had a common goal with “*The Black Panther*” movement: Closing the socio-economic gaps within the Israeli society. However, their cooperation was unsuccessful. The *Black Panthers* were founded in 1970 by Jewish activists from Muslim countries origin following the “*War of Attrition*”. Many of them came from poor neighborhoods and had criminal records. This *Black Panther* organization expressed its unhappiness with the economic growth after the *Six Days War*. They could not take advantage of the economy and felt pressure from the new immigrants from the Soviet Union.

On September 11th, 1973, they won 1,6 per cent in the *Histadrut*⁹¹ elections. They extracted voters from the *Alignment (Labour Party and Mapam)*.⁹²

⁹⁰ Spinzas, 1989, page 228.

⁹¹ The **Histadrut** (General Federation of Laborers in the Land of Israel) was founded in 1920 and is the Israeli trade and workers union with 650 000 members today. Since the economical liberation in the 1980's the Histadrut has lost more than half of its members, but it is still a powerful force in the society and national economy of Israel. Until 1959 it was a pure Jewish organization and provided most of the workers and work in Israel to Jews only. The Histadrut was important for delegating jobs especially for the arriving new Jewish immigrants in Israel.

⁹² Arian, 1975, page 10.

Likewise, they did not manage the 1 percent threshold for the 8th Knesset elections on December 31st, 1973. The other 5 “Oriental” lists also did not pass 1 percent, and *Likud* benefited from that new ethnic awareness during the elections for the 9th Knesset in 1977.

The election for the 8th Knesset should have been on October 27th, 1973, but was delayed until the end of the war. The exact date was chosen by the leading Labor-Mapam Alignment and by Golda Meir because of the *Middle East Peace Conference* in Geneva that had taken place one week before. The ruling Party took advantage of this situation.

Yitzhak Rabin wrote in his memoirs:

*According to opinion polls held at the time, even had the war not broken out and had the elections been held on time, the Alignment, which had lost 3.7 per cent in the Histadrut elections held in September 1973, would have lost several seats in the Knesset, and the results would have been quite similar to what they actually were. The Alignment received 51 out of the Knesset’s 120 seats – down from 56 in the elections to the 7th Knesset held in October 1969, but certainly not a result which pointed to a political earthquake.”*⁹³

The people's dissatisfaction found its expression during the 1977 elections. During the period after the war, the *Likud* Party became more and more popular because of the war hero Ariel Sharon. First, *Likud* increased its representation in the Knesset from 31 to 39 seats in the 1977 election. Shulamit Aloni ran for the *Civil Rights Movement (Ratz)* and received three seats. Also in 1977, Yigal Yadin’s new *Democratic Movement for Change (Dash)* managed to activate protest votes for his side. From that time on, the *Alignment* under Golda Meir had difficulties forming a new coalition and a new political environment started to take shape. They had to deal with new developments that had an influence on foreign policy as well. The effect of that new pluralistic system had its impact on the public by emphasizing issues of religion and feminism. The *Six Day War* reminded people of their heritage; the *Yom Kippur War* raised general existential questions and caused a radicalization of political positions, especially among the younger generation of leaders in the *National Religious Party*.

⁹³ Rabin, 1979, page 236.

The integrity of “*Eretz Israel*” and the future of the occupied territories were greatly influenced by the ultra-orthodox rabbis. The tendency to emphasize the Jewish character of the State of Israel was set by the *NRP (National Religious Party)* and gained support from many Israeli citizens. On the other hand, there was the feminist movement that swept into Israel from the United States in the early 1970’s. Marsha Friedmann, who emigrated from the USA, became the head of this movement. In December 1973, she entered the Knesset because she was placed in the third position on Shulamit Aloni’s list from *Ratz*. The *Yom Kippur War* gave the feminist a certain moral push forward. From the right-wing perspective, *The Land of Israel Movement (LIM)* and *Gush Emunim* were the most influential circles in Israel.

LIM was convinced that the post *Six Day War* borders had saved Israel from destruction. Thanks to the buffer zones of the Sinai Peninsular and the Golan Heights, Israel had had more time to call the reservists to the battlefields. From that point of view, any concessions of land to the Arabs should be refused. They supported new settlements of Jews in the occupied territories. Even more influential was the “*Block of the Faithful*,” formed in March 1974 and better known as the *Gush Emunim* movement. Former students from the *Merkaz Harav Yeshiva* in Jerusalem, under their spiritual leader, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook (1865-1935), were not only against any land concessions, they even pushed the idea of Israeli sovereignty over the occupied territories. Originally, *Gush Emunim* was a faction of the *NRP (National Religious Party)*, but soon they gave up their party connection and became active and effective as a political NGO in Israel. To present, their philosophy and dogmas have great influence on right wing Israelis, especially concerning the question of guilt and its results.

The *Black Panthers*, the *Yom Kippur War Movement* and *Gush Emunim* all had a great impact on the Israeli Arabs. The Land Day Demonstrations of March 30th, 1976, were the start of their struggle for equality. Israeli law enforcement forces killed six Israeli Arabs during that demonstration, and Israeli Arabs considered those killed to be martyrs for their rights. Eventually, the *Yom Kippur War* and its influence on the individual even had an impact on the Palestinian Arabs.

Finally, the *Peace Now Movement* appeared after Anwar Sadat’s historical visit to Jerusalem in November 1977. Even though it was an indirect outcome of the *Yom Kippur War*; it had a radical influence on the Israeli peace movement. It supported the group of Israelis who believed that Israel had to seek for peace with its neighbours in the way of “*Land for Peace*”.

This could only happen after the *Yom Kippur War* had weakened the three “no’s” (no peace, no recognition and no negotiation with Israel) of the *Khartoum Arab Summit Conference*⁹⁴ and the growing connections between the PLO and the so-called “*Israeli Peaceniks*” after the *Geneva Conference*.

⁹⁴ The Khartoum Resolution September 1st, 1967:

1. The conference has affirmed the unity of Arab ranks, the unity of joint action and the need for coordination and for the elimination of all differences. The Kings, Presidents and representatives of the other Arab Heads of State at the conference have affirmed their countries' stand by an implementation of the Arab Solidarity Charter which was signed at the third Arab summit conference in Casablanca.
2. The conference has agreed on the need to consolidate all efforts to eliminate the effects of the aggression on the basis that the occupied lands are Arab lands and that the burden of regaining these lands falls on all the Arab States.
3. The Arab Heads of State have agreed to unite their political efforts at the international and diplomatic level to eliminate the effects of the aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from the Arab lands which have been occupied since the aggression of June 5. This will be done within the framework of the main principles by which the **Arab States abide, namely, no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it**, and insistence on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own country.
4. The conference of Arab Ministers of Finance, Economy and Oil recommended that suspension of oil pumping be used as a weapon in the battle. However, after thoroughly studying the matter, the summit conference has come to the conclusion that the oil pumping can itself be used as a positive weapon, since oil is an Arab resource which can be used to strengthen the economy of the Arab States directly affected by the aggression, so that these states will be able to stand firm in the battle. The conference has, therefore, decided to resume the pumping of oil, since oil is a positive Arab resource that can be used in the service of Arab goals. It can contribute to the efforts to enable those Arab States which were exposed to the aggression and thereby lost economic resources to stand firm and eliminate the effects of the aggression. The oil-producing states have, in fact, participated in the efforts to enable the states affected by the aggression to stand firm in the face of any economic pressure.
5. The participants in the conference have approved the plan proposed by Kuwait to set up an Arab Economic and Social Development Fund on the basis of the recommendation of the Baghdad conference of Arab Ministers of Finance, Economy and Oil.
6. The participants have agreed on the need to adopt the necessary measures to strengthen military preparation to face all eventualities.
7. The conference has decided to expedite the elimination of foreign bases in the Arab States.

It should be mentioned that the Khartoum Arab Resolution, even it was a moderate (namely a political statement instead of a militaristic one) Arab reaction to the defeat of the *Six Days War*, diminished Israel's opportunity to deal politically with the new status quo in the Arab world.⁹⁵

In fact, the resolution describes a common policy of the Arab states towards Israel that led to Israeli support for the “*no peace, no war*” policy.

⁹⁵ See: Shalim, 2000, pages 258-259.

10 How did the *Yom Kippur War* change Israel's defense doctrine?

10.1 The IDF's Defense Doctrine

The basic foreign-policy position of the IDF can be viewed as force-centered, seeking to provide for the security of the state through adequate supply of arms and the utilization of force to best advantage, given the perceived numerical imbalance in the strategic situation. In the past, this policy has included retaliation in force and the use of "interceptive" or preemptive warfare against the Arab states. In the 1956 and 1967 wars, the IDF sought to establish a policy of "decisive victories", a policy the IDF feels was not followed in the 1973 war, when the military's recommendation to reject the Soviet cease-fire ultimatum was voted down by the Cabinet.⁹⁶

After the war, the government and the IDF traced the problem of its unpreparedness to the communication within the army and the interaction between the formal and informal channels used by the government and its policy makers. The internal failures of intelligence analysis prevented mobilization, and an interceptive war became required.⁹⁷ Originally, there were weekly meetings of the General Staff, which were generally attended by the Defense Minister. He represented the military's view to the Cabinet. This system functioned successfully until the *Yom Kippur War*. As the result of the war, frequent ad hoc discussions and meetings between the military and political leaderships were added. This direct and steady open channel was intended to support and influence policy decision-making. After Meir had left, the new Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin (a former Chief of Staff), placed Chief of Staff Motta Gur into his informal circle. As a result, the IDF's greater influence on daily politics became more of a problem than ever before.

⁹⁶ McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 182.

⁹⁷ See: Ben-Porat, in: *Foreign Policy making, 1974*, page 181.

10.2 Changes in the internal information channel

The Agranat Commission blamed Israel's national intelligence for crucial failures.⁹⁸ This was surprising because this national intelligence system had acquired a reputation for being the best intelligence service on the subject of the *Middle East* in the world. Later on it became reasonable because the Agranat Commission was not allowed to question the political leaders. Therefore the Commission did only half the job.

Over the years the Israeli national intelligence system grew into different branches like the Mossad⁹⁹, Foreign Ministry Research Division, the Internal Security and Counter Espionage Service (Shabak), the agency responsible for Jews in "countries of persecution" and the Central Intelligence Collection Agency. In 1969, a new group for "Combating the Palestinian Guerrillas" appeared. The officers of this new group were mainly those who had been experts in the Sinai serving on the border between Egypt and Israel. Before the *Yom Kippur War*, there was an urgent need for highly capable and informed military officers and intelligence officials at the Egyptian border.

One of the major tasks of the Secret Service is the observation of Arab neighbors' activities. Together with the IDF, the Intelligence follows a military policy that is without doubt directly connected to the Arab foreign policy. These Short-Run Security Policy Objectives include:

"... combining military elements with technology, geography, and other factors, these goals call for Israel's maintenance of its security through active deterrence of the Arab states, external terrorist attacks, and internal dissension. At a minimum, these objectives include the following:

Active deterrence of the Arab states from first strikes on Israeli positions;

⁹⁸ See: Knorr, in: *World Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 3, April 1964.

⁹⁹ **Mossad** (The Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations) is one of the (several) main Intelligence Communities such as AMAN (military intelligence) and Shabak (Internal security), but its director reports directly to the *Prime Minister*. Its tasks are (like the CIA [USA] and the M16 [GB]) covert actions, counter terrorism, intelligence collection and paramilitary activities.

Israeli capability to undertake both first-strike and second-strike actions against the Arab states, as conditions might warrant - including the capability to undertake limited operations against hostile forces;

Ability to check or control terrorist incursions - while no leader expects to “hermetically seal” the borders, protection of border settlements from escalated terrorist strikes has become increasingly important;

Maintenance of secure borders or interim cease-fire lines, in the absence of a negotiated settlement; maintenance of technology superiority in weapon systems.”¹⁰⁰

Additionally, AMAN had specific tasks: Getting information about the material used by the Soviet advisors who were teaching the leading and execution basics to Arab armies, collecting knowledge about Eastern Block weapon technology and tools, estimating the size of the enemies force, quickly realizing and informing the government about changes in military balance and discovering Arab attack plans and dates.¹⁰¹ The remaining functions are standard for a military Secret Service: Collecting knowledge about the terrain of military action and securing the highly-ranked officers on this field, military censorship, development of special Secret Service technology, receiving information from agents outside of Israel, maintaining relations with foreign military representatives in Israel and gathering technical information.¹⁰² It was to Israel’s disadvantage that the following were not within AMAN’s realm of operations at that time:

*“Examination of the mutual interrelations between opposing military doctrines must be very studiously prepared, taking special care not to project one's own doctrine onto the enemy
More attention must be paid to intentions, as the enemy almost always has the capabilities to initiate some sort of attack surprise further strengthening these capabilities. Above all, in situations where political gains are more important than military victory, the decisions to initiate war are not always directly related to one's related capabilities. It must also be borne*

¹⁰⁰ McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 206.

¹⁰¹ See: Wagenlehner, 1968, page 51.

¹⁰² See: Wagenlehner, 1968, Seite 51.

in mind that, in the context of deterrence, one can influence the enemy's mind, his intentions to go to war: but one cannot have any impact on his capabilities.

The existence of only one concept or analytical framework is dangerous. It would be safer to have several competing concepts for the interpretations of the enemy's intentions. Competing concepts and approaches must be encouraged through various methods, such as the parallel existence of more than one intelligence agency, pluralism of opinions within each intelligence agency, competitive but coordinated collections of information, devil's advocates, and so on. It is better to error on the side of having too flexible and opens a conceptual framework than one too rigid and closed. It must be remembered, though, that the presence of several competing intelligence agencies is no panacea, and that such structures create other problems that must be taken into account. Special attentions must be given to better coordination, collaborations and integration of the intelligence work done in the various agencies.

Better integration between military and political intelligence must be encouraged. Evaluation of military situations cannot be made in a political vacuum and vice versa. It is not desirable, therefore, that all intelligence activity should be controlled by the military. While this seems to be a simple and straightforward conclusion, most cases of strategic surprise evidence a prior lack of coordination between political-diplomatic activities and military activity on the part of the victim. Available information should be used more liberally and passed more willingly to lower or parallel echelons. Information and opinion exchange should be conducted both upwards and downwards in the intelligence hierarchy. Better coordination between field or tactical intelligence and intelligence headquarters must be ensured."¹⁰³

It is a matter of fact that the intelligence measures the capability of the enemy only and not its intentions.¹⁰⁴

Golda Meir made a mistake by ignoring the Foreign Ministry, whose job is to interpret foreign intentions. Instead of following its advice, she placed military and intelligence-officials more highly. But these officers missed the major foreign policy change within the

¹⁰³ Handel, 1976.

¹⁰⁴ The Insight Team of the Sunday Times, 1975, page 64.

Arab leadership and its movement towards war against Israel. As a result, in 1974, the AMAN was split into two sections in order to avoid repeating such a disaster.

This new IDF intelligence Corps (HAMAN) was separated from the AMAN but remained under its jurisdiction. It is to this day an Israeli Defense Force corps and is responsible for collecting, disseminating and publishing intelligence information for the political decision-makers and the General Staff. It makes general assessments, and its creation was recommended by the Agranat Commission. They conclude that the Chief Intelligence Officer should be detached from but subordinate to the head of AMAN.

This change was not caused by the Agranat Commission alone. Dayan's pre-*Yom Kippur War* defense doctrines of "force-centered policy of retaliation" (established in 1955 as a reaction of increasing Arab Terror attacks) and the policy of "decisive victories", carried out in the 1956 and 1967 conflicts were proved to be unsuccessful. Syria went to war against Israel despite its military weaknesses. The strategic military outposts were not as strong as predicted and Israel's air superiority was hurt by the Arab air defense. After the War, Israel was more dependent on the U.S.A. than ever before, additionally diplomatically isolated and had lost support in the international community.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ See: Ma'oz, 1995, page 133.

Israel's policy and the world community

11 Israel's foreign policy's impact on the international arena after the *Yom Kippur War*

From the *Yishuv* era until the 1967 War, Israel tried hard to prove to the world its importance in that region in order to receive support. At that time, Israel had its own foreign policy towards the international arena, especially regarding the “black” African states. The reason was the Nation Building Process:

*“What attracted the Africans to Israel was that it too was an emerging state which had created a variety of social-economic institutions as it had tackled the problems of economical development.”*¹⁰⁶

Israel's help in developing African states' militaries and infrastructure as well as their agriculture gave the Jewish state the guarantee of support in the UN Assembly. Additionally, they received high respect in world public opinion:

*“The geographic distribution of Israel's assistance programs also illustrates clearly the dominant position of Africa in Israeli foreign policy toward the Third World. During the 15 years from the projects were first initiated in Africa to the breaking of diplomatic relations in 1973, 3.017 Israeli experts worked on short or longer term projects in Africa, constituting nearly two thirds of all its experts that were sent to the Third World. Occasionally there was even optimism in Jerusalem that the support of the African states for Israel would force the Arabs to accept Israel's right to exist and lead to peace in the region.”*¹⁰⁷

Israel hoped to normalize its international position and its leaders were eager to overcome the diplomatic and political isolation. Meir, at that time the foreign minister:

*“Israel wants something in return for the cooperation and goodwill it brings to African peoples and governments. This great thing is friendship”.*¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ Peters, 1992, pages 4.

¹⁰⁷ Peters, 1992, pages 14.

¹⁰⁸ Peters, 1992, pages 4.

The Arab states had been intent on undermining Israel's presence in Africa. At the Casablanca conference in 1961, they unsuccessfully tried to drag the African states away from Israel.

At the OAU meetings, the Arab nations urged the Africans again and again to show solidarity with their cause and to stop diplomatic relations with the neo-colonialist state of Israel:

“The pressure was particularly prominent at the OAU summit in May 1973 and the Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in September 1973. It intensified during the weeks of the war itself.”

Finally the Arab states got what they wanted:

*“It was not any new-found ideological affinity with the Arabs that led the Africans to switch sides but rather economic and political opportunism.”*¹⁰⁹

Officially, the African states stated that they broke with Israel because they were obeying UN and OAU resolutions. But soon after the war, the African states became disillusioned by the failure of the Arabs to keep their promise of aid and investment and lost confidence that the Arabs would help them economically. After the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, Israel was seen again as a valuable contact point with the West and as an influential, if not indispensable, intermediary with the United States in order to receive greater aid and investments from America. Sékou Touré in 1984:

*“It is true that some African states have changed their policy toward relations with Israel, and they had reason to do so. The fact is that the attitude of the Arab League had not encouraged those states to refrain from having relationships with Israel.”*¹¹⁰

But there was no going back: The funds for embarking on large-scale aid projects in Africa were no longer available and Israel had fundamentally changed its foreign policy.

¹⁰⁹ Peters, 1992, pages 44 and 45.

¹¹⁰ Peters, 1992, page 181.

Israel-European Diplomacy and the need for new energy policies has its origins in the *Yom Kippur War*, too. There was no major impact on Europe by the Middle East until the oil crisis started as a result of the conflict.

„Arab pressures and the threat of the ‘oil weapon’ played a major role in October 1973 in forcing the major industrialized countries of the West to readjust their Middle East policies.”¹¹¹

The Arab world considered some European states to be supporters of the U.S. and Israeli foreign policy. As a result, OPEC punished Europe and the U.S. through the famous, illegal oil embargo (the 1970 UN Renewal Assembly Resolution No. 2625 – for which the Arabs voted – forbade the use of economic or other measures to coerce other states¹¹²) as a way to force Israel’s withdrawal from and acceptance of a Palestinian state. After the first shock, Europe and the U.S. realized that they would not run out of oil, but the price would rise enormously. Oil was the highest priority of the European states concerning the *Middle East*. All questions about political influence in this region were connected to this topic: In the 1950's, approximately 75 % of Europe's requirements of primary energy were covered by coal and only 10 % by oil. Through the 1970's, oil had continued to drastically replace coal as an energy source and went up to 60 % of Europe's energy supply, whereas coal declined to 33 %; the rest consisted of hydroelectric power, nuclear energy and other sources¹¹³. This created an overwhelming dependence on the *Middle East* oil, due in large part to cheap prices on the world market. During the *Suez War* in 1956, the EC realized for the first time that there was a difference between cheap oil and secure oil. This became especially true after the *Six Days War* when a number of Arab states undertook an oil boycott against some pro-Israeli European states and the USA. This oil embargo failed, but it pushed the EC Commission in 1968 to produce a series of recommendations in its *"First Guidelines for a Common Energy Policy"*.

However, different interests between the single countries in West Europe made a common energy policy impossible and the OPEC took advantage of it, gaining more power than would have been necessary. Politically, France was still interested in gaining more power in the region to counterbalance the domination of the British and the U.S. after *World War II*.

¹¹¹ Peters, 1992, pages 49.

¹¹² See: Gardner, in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 52, Number 3, April 1974, page 567.

¹¹³ See: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1973, page 265.

Therefore, France had its own unilateral interests, Germany was connected to the US through the NATO, Great Britain was trying to protect its failing coal industry and Italy was dependent on imports of the cheapest energy resources available on the market. Germany, France and Belgium depended of the natural gas of the Netherlands. Britain and the Netherlands were the home of Shell and BP. These companies also had their own interests in this region and played an important role in this conflict. All these different positions created dramatic diplomatic bargaining during and after the *Yom Kippur War*.

The EC tried to avoid being involved in the *Yom Kippur War*. On October 17th, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) announced its embargo in order to use oil as a tool to achieve their interests in the conflict with Israel. OPEC divided the countries into three categories: countries like US and the Netherlands, which were not to receive Arab oil at all, "friendly" countries like Britain and France, which would stay at the normal supply level, and other countries that were met with a reduction of 5 % per month until the OPEC reached its final political goals. From October 1973 through January 1974, the oil price rose from \$ 2 to \$ 10 per barrel.¹¹⁴

This crisis hit Europe suddenly and caused panic. Britain refused to support the American airlift by not providing its base in Cyprus, which provoked Kissinger's anger and led to a temporary ban on the exchange of American intelligence information with Great Britain. Britain's Prime Minister, Heath,¹¹⁵ also refused to support an early cease-fire resolution at the UN. For that action, OPEC honored Great Britain as an "Arab friendly" country. Germany was loading US ships en route to Israel with U.S. arms at Bremerhaven, until the Press discovered it on October 24th. Germany declared its neutrality and stopped further shipments. Italy also refused to open up its bases to the US, and France even exported tanks for oil to Libya and Saudi Arabia. Only Portugal provided its bases to American aircraft. Otherwise, the airlift would have been impossible. After the "Defcon 3" military alert on October 25th, France and Britain denied any help to either the Soviets or the US to install an international emergency force to supervise the cease-fire.

¹¹⁴ See: Lieber, in: *Harvard Studies in international Affairs*, Number 35, United States of America, 1976.

¹¹⁵ **Sir Edward Richard George Heath** (July 9th, 1916 –July 17th, 2005) was *Prime Minister of the United Kingdom* from 1970 until 1974. He was the leader of the *Conservative Party* from 1965 to 1975.

The Dutch (the government had good connections to the Austrian Prime Minister Kreisky¹¹⁶) were punished for offering a substitute to the closed transit center in the Austrian castle of Schönau, which housed Russian immigrants in transit to Israel. The Dutch government was also punished for its position towards the Arab states.

The Dutch Foreign Minister, Max van der Stoel,¹¹⁷ announced that Syria and Egypt had unilaterally broken the so-called coexistence maintained from 1970.¹¹⁸ Ultimately, the absence of a common European foreign energy policy was the reason for heavy diplomatic controversies between the European states. Therefore, OPEC played a game of “everybody against everybody”. Europe could not stop the embargo even though it had supported the Arabs in UN Resolution 242, demanding that Israel withdraw to its cease-fire lines of 1967 and recognize Palestinian rights. France and Britain, however, did have had their own common policy. Kissinger encouraged co-operation between the western allied countries, particularly the U.S. and Japan, via the OECD:

"Will we consume ourselves in nationalistic rivalry which the realities of independence make suicidal? Or will we acknowledge our independence and shape cooperative solutions?"¹¹⁹

Both Kissinger and Nixon managed to convince Britain to adapt the American position concerning security at the start of 1974. Nixon had said: “*Security and economy considerations are inevitably linked and energy cannot be separated from either.*”¹²⁰

Also, the unexpected electoral defeat of Heath's Conservative government led to a new British position. Still, France preferred its own special individual arrangements concerning its oil imports, even as the question of unity was at stake when a total oil embargo was issued against the Netherlands.

The Dutch Foreign Minister referred to the EC principles (EEC's Treaty of Rome) that required a guarantee of equitable fuel supplies for all members.¹²¹

¹¹⁶ **Bruno Kreisky** (January 22nd, 1911 –July 29th, 1990) was Chancellor of Austria from 1970 until 1983. He was a very influential social-democrat politician who became very well known especially in the Arab world for his pro Palestinian position.

¹¹⁷ **Max van der Stoel** (August 3rd, 1924) was the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Oil-crises.

¹¹⁸ See: *Le Monde*, October 10th, 1973.

¹¹⁹ *New York Times*, February 12, 1974.

¹²⁰ *New York Times*, February 15th, 1974.

France however, was afraid to lose its Arab allies.

*Despite the earlier expressed willingness of public opinion in the EC to support the principle of members countries mooning to the aid of another member in the event of an economic or energy crisis and despite the various commitments contained in the Community Treaty, the Nine (EC) were unable or unwilling to present a publicly united front on the behalf of the Dutch. In this sense, the energy crisis was considered a matter of national survival.*¹²²

Nevertheless, the Dutch had resources of natural gas and warned France, Belgium and Germany that they would switch them off if they did not get oil from its partners. As France imported 40 % of its gas supply from the Netherlands to meet the demands in the area of Paris, a solution was necessary. France made a commitment not to part itself from its partners of the Common Market; meanwhile, the US encouraged the international oil companies to provide oil to the Dutch. Royal Dutch/Shell:

*"The allocation of oil as a percentage of demand to all markets appeared to be the most equitable and practicable course of action in the circumstances. Indeed it was the only defensible course if governments were not collectively to agree on any alternative preferred system."*¹²³

In return, the Dutch Prime Minister Joop den Uyl¹²⁴ pledged that no transport of weapons or volunteers to Israel would be based in Holland. Furthermore, he characterized the Israeli occupation of Arab territories as "illegal".¹²⁵ The Netherlands even agreed to let Arab oil pass through the port of Rotterdam on its way to the "Arab friendly" Belgium.

¹²¹ See: *The Economist*, November 24th, 1973.

¹²² Lieber, in: *Harvard Studies in international Affairs*, Number 35, United States of America, 1976, page 14.

¹²³ Chandler, in: *Petroleum Review*, June 1974, quoted in Statement of Professor Robert B. Stough, page 14.

¹²⁴ **Dr. Johannes Marten Joop den Uyl** (August 9th 1919 –December 24th 1987) was the Prime Minister of the Netherlands from 1973 until 1977. He was a very idealistic and controversial social-democratic politician.

¹²⁵ *New York Times*, December 5th, 1973.

Finally, the Arabs lifted their embargo in the middle of July, 1974 as

"... an expression of the concern felt by the Arab states in respect of a united European entity and in consideration of the relations which it is desired to establish between the Arab nation and the European Community".¹²⁶

France, despite of its own interests, saw its position as a step that unified Europe without US assistance and as an important step to prove Europe's independence. However, this brought the other eight partners in the EC into a great dilemma. To follow the French position would have meant a serious break with the US, although the US was in a superior economic and military situation, providing the kind of security guaranty that France could not provide. On the other hand, France was still needed as part of a common European policy. Finally, in September 1974, the EC Council worked out an energy guideline that called for decreased oil imports, increased efficiency of its use, a coordinated plan to deal with shortages and more research development, especially in the nuclear sector.

Additionally, the newly created International Energy Agency (IEA) should work as a common umbrella. Still, France did not join the IEA and proclaimed in April 1975 that it would act as its national interest dictated.

To summarize: There was some progress, but a common energy policy of the EC remained only a vision. The oil crisis supported the interest on internal loans but was followed by inflation and economical stalemate. The oil embargo was one of the reasons why the European Union (EU) was later established. It was clear that, without a common foreign energy policy, every European state was disadvantaged. The situation of "divide et impera" was created by OPEC, simply because they could.

One of the reactions of the Israeli diplomats against the Arabs was an anti-boycott campaign in the USA, resulting from the refusal of the West European states to support Israel by allowing American air shipments to Israel, that unfortunately strengthened the "whole world is against us" complex. The sympathy of Europe for the PLO and UN Resolution 3379, which stated that *Zionism* is equal to Racism, supported this point of view in the Israeli public.

¹²⁶ Communiqué issued by the Conference of Arab Oil Ministers, Cairo, July 10th, 1974.

12 “Superpowers” interests in the *Yom Kippur War*

Israel was not particularly interested in the two Cold War superpowers until the outbreak of the *Six Days War*. In 1967, Egypt’s President Nasser threatened Israel and closed the sea-route through Tiran in order to strengthen his position in the Arab world. The superpowers had reasons to end the resulting 1967 War, but the *Yom Kippur War* created the high potential for a global confrontation.¹²⁷ At that point, the USA was involved and both the USSR and the US had to confess their connection to their allies through aid, weapon deliveries and human material. The US involved itself through the creation of the air bridge, and this has been considered the first step from diplomacy to action. In October 1973, both superpowers had to show their true colors because otherwise, all that had been said before would be seen as only lip service. The US airlift was a signal to the Arabs that the USA was not about to abandon their ally, Israel. Psychologically, it was extremely important for the morale of the Israeli soldiers as much as for the people of Israel, although it was quite difficult for Israeli diplomats to convince the US to install the air bridge. Without that kind of support, the war would have ended differently. The air bridge’s creation (Operation Nickel-grass), which needed the personal order of Nixon (who was convinced by Kissinger) really saved Israel from defeat.

There were six reasons that made the American airlift nearly impossible:

- 1) *The planes would have to fly over and land in a battle zone. To risk materials and, even worse, American citizens were hard to legitimize in front of the US public.*
- 2) *The USA and the rest of the American allies were afraid of the results of an Arab oil embargo resulting from delivery of weapons.*
- 3) *The political pressure from by this action, from both the "Third World" and from Europe and Japan, would be enormous.*
- 4) *President Nixon was currently involved in the "Watergate Scandal"¹²⁸. He could not afford another political failure.*

¹²⁷ See: Bunzl, 1997, page 80-85.

¹²⁸ The “**Watergate**” scandal (1972-1975) refers to burglaries of the headquarters of the *Democratic National Committee* in the Watergate Hotel in Washington D.C and its aftermath. The connection between the burglaries and U.S. President Nixon forced him to resign on August 9th, 1974.

5) *Inside the State Department and the Pentagon, some people were in favor of the Arab position and they were willing to refuse their cooperation or even sabotage the attempts to start the airlift as soon as possible.*

6) *The greatest risk was the possibility of an extreme Soviet reaction and the danger to the future of the détente.*¹²⁹

Some are convinced that Kissinger's support was based solely on his family history during *World War II*, when he lost 13 members of his family in the *Shoa*. But his approach was much more professional than that. He quickly realized that a delay in delivering military supplies to Israel might affect the outcome of the war and thus destroy his entire international strategy.

The Russian airlift started on October 8th, after hard pressure from Sadat. The Soviets had to provide their ally assistance, even though they were certain that Asad and Sadat would lose the war. The assistance consisted mostly of medical supplies, blankets and, post October 14th, monetary payments. However, even these deliveries were purposefully delayed. Once again, the Politburo had been caught in the middle. They did not want Soviet advanced weapon technology to fall into Israeli hands, but at the same time, they were worried that without an increasing supply of aid, the Arab armies would collapse. During the air bridge, the Soviets tried everything to come to a cease-fire agreement and pushed for it even harder after the successful Israeli counter-attacks on the Golan Heights. At that time, on October 12th, Israel received the first warning from Moscow not to advance further. At the same time, the Soviets opened the borders for Jewish emigration to Israel in order to pacify the West and to backup lost Israeli manpower.

So the détente was kept. October 12th was also the date when the airlift was stopped. However, the shipments on both sides continued and reached a very dangerous stage during that war.¹³⁰

Moscow felt it had to make a strong stand because they were afraid that they would otherwise lose Arab allies to the US, and this would put rockets on their front door, as was the case in Turkey during the Cuban missile crisis. They already knew that Sadat wanted to go to war in

¹²⁹ **Détente** is a French word for relaxing and it describes the effort for de-escalation between two nations in the international, diplomatic, political arena. This term was primarily used during the period of the *Cold War* for reducing the tension between the USA and the Soviet Union in order not to slip into a direct confrontation between each other.

¹³⁰ See: Golan, in: *Israeli Affairs*, Vol. 6, 1999-2000.

1973, after he had proclaimed “*The year of decision*” in 1971, during which no solution or conflict had occurred. Moscow kept its foreign policy of détente by believing that it would prevent the war by denying the Arabs offensive weaponry. After the war had started, an early cease-fire was the highest Soviet priority. Moscow realized that the *Yom Kippur War* had created a high chance of a disaster for the USSR. If Israel had lost, the Americans would have intervened and Soviet soldiers would have had to be sent. If Egypt had lost, they would have had to be sent anyway. So, even without Egypt's agreement, Moscow joined the US in calling for a cease-fire before the UN.

To help Egypt as much as they could in order to prevent it from repeating a heavy defeat like in the *Six Days War*, the Soviets sent 20.000 foreign Russian military personnel and advanced USSR defensive missiles (SAM) to Egypt's territory. During the *Yom Kippur War*, the USSR set its naval squadron opposite to the American Sixth Fleet as a show of support to the Arabs. After the war, the media would mistakenly interpret this as the reason for the Atomic Alert. Moscow's policy of arming its Arab allies, but never enough, in order to avoid bigger problems with the USA harmed the Soviet relationship with the Arab states in the long run. The weapons the Soviets were required to deliver to Egypt and Syria as part of their agreements were mostly second generation, and they were always purposefully sent after a great delay.

When the war broke out, the Arab armies won battle after battle during the first period, and Sadat knew that Israel was not ready for a long-term war. Egypt and Syria had significant advantages and gained more territory each and every hour. They refused, of course, any cease-fire negotiation.

At the moment when the US air bridge and Sharon's breakthrough turned the tables, the Arabs pushed the Soviets hard to get into contact with the USA to try to persuade them to stop Israel's advance.

At that point, Kissinger pretended to be out of his office as long as he could. Finally, Nixon dispatched him to Moscow on October 20th, but it was already too late for the Egyptians, as the Israelis had encircled the 3rd Army. Egypt found itself in a very bad negotiating position. On October 22nd, the UN Security Council approved the cease-fire. Unfortunately, the Egyptian soldiers did not stop shooting and Israel encircled the town Suez and sealed the escape of the Egyptian 3rd Army. This new situation was not in the interest of the USA and

especially not in the interest of Kissinger's plans. Nixon was afraid that the destruction of the 3rd Army would bring Sadat's regime to collapse. Kissinger agreed with this assessment, and they decided to help Egypt. They even raised the possibility of sending American planes with food, medical supplies and water to the encircled army. Both "Superpowers" agreed that the conflict had to stop immediately.

Only the U.S.A. could prevent Egypt from a defeat. Kissinger's "*Shuttle Diplomacy*" had its effect and the Russian Politburo was caught in the middle, especially in the last days of the war, when Israel was only some miles away from Cairo and Damascus. Kissinger started his plan called "*Diplomacy of Peace*," in which he wanted Israel to achieve victory over Egypt, but not to destroy or humiliate Egypt. To find the right balance was a delicate act of diplomacy, and he hoped to remove Egypt from the Soviet sphere of influence. To get them into the boat of the "West," he had to save the regime of President Sadat. The intent was to discourage Sadat from the option of war and make him submit to peace negotiations. However, the hope was that, at the end of Kissinger's plan, Sadat would place blame on Russia and not on the US.

The plan was successful, and Egypt changed sides. This created a whole new political situation in the Middle East. The USSR was "out"; the U.S.A., because of Israel, was "in". From now on, Israel had to adapt to Washington's policies. The diplomatic results of the air-bridge and, of course, the oil-crises had huge economic effects. The US airlift and the further upgrading of the *Middle East* arms race after the *Yom Kippur War* were a heavy burden on Israel's external debt. From 1973 until 1984, that debt increased from 30 to 40 per cent of the GNP.¹³¹ The internal debt still exists today.

The only one who took advantage of that diplomatic battle seemed to be Kissinger. He managed to take away the initiative in the *Middle East* from the Soviet Union and turn into an advantage for the USA in the long run, while giving them the feeling that they were still partners. He won that *Cold War* confrontation without destroying the *détente*:

"Indeed, among both Gaullist and opposition tanks, there existed a common assumption that the Americans had provoked the energy crises in order to re-impose their economic and political domination of Europe. Apart of this opinion, however, it was widely observed that the U.S. had benefited from the crises both economically

¹³¹ See: Liviatan, Peterman, in: *The Israeli Economy*, pages 323.

(through their multinational oil companies and the weakening of rival economies) and politically (by the reassertion of their leadership).¹³²

François Mitterand¹³³ said at the International Social Conference in Berlin:

"The U.S. profits from the situation in order to reinforce their economic domination over Western Europe".¹³⁴

After the war, Kissinger met the American Jewish leadership to discuss the outcome of the war. First he believed that Israel was mistaken in making the preservation of the *status quo* the main strategic object. He faulted Israel with overconfidence, and believed that Israel should have made concessions in attempting to reach a peace settlement after the *Six Days War*. Kissinger rejected the fact that the US prevented Israel from undertaking a preventive strike that would have changed the outcome of the war or even stopped it beforehand because the military situation had been changing since 1967. For example, the Russian SAM rockets were very effective against the Israeli air force.

The most important question came from Mr. Podhoretz to Kissinger: *"Couldn't they (Israeli army) have destroyed the Third Army with two or three days more?"* Kissinger: *"No, they got two to three days more than they would otherwise have had. There was no way, given the international climate that the US could vote against a ceasefire."*¹³⁵

On the question whether Israel had defeated the Arab troops on a large scale, Sadat was sure that Israel was not prepared for a longtime war. Kissinger agreed:

The problem is they (the Israeli army) have reached the limits of their strategic possibilities. They have lost the possibility of a quick knockout. They thought that re-

¹³² Lieber, in: *Harvard Studies in international Affairs*, Number 35, United States of America, 1976, page 27.

¹³³ **François Maurice Adrien Marie Mitterand** (October 26th, 1916 – 8th of January 8th, 1996) was the longest serving President of France from 1981 until 1995.

¹³⁴ *Le Nouvel Observateur*, No. 538, March 3, 1975.

¹³⁵ Shalom, in: *Israel Studies*, 7.1, 2002, page 200.

equipment was only a peacetime problem. Any war that is now foreseeable requires an airlift. This raises the question of the sustained political climate.

Concerning the airlift, Kissinger said that because of the threat of oil embargoes, the airlift would not be possible in the future. The USA would have to pursue more peaceful efforts before taking such a step. Also, it was no longer certain whether Portugal would allow the US to use its bases again. He said that, without the airlift, Israel would have lost the war.¹³⁶

The second target was the oil embargo. Kissinger wanted to conclude the embargoes with an act of goodwill. The Arabs states should have realized that they needed the USA. In the Soviet sphere, Kissinger wanted to diminish Soviet influence without destroying their cooperation. Nevertheless, to come to that point, Israel and Kissinger had to fight a diplomatic battle in Washington over the role of the US air bridge.¹³⁷

¹³⁶ See: Shalom, in: *Israel Studies*, 7.1, 2002, page 203 and 210.

¹³⁷ See: Dinitz, in: *Israel Affairs*, Vol.6, 1999-2000.

Policy of scarce resources

13 Water: The need for peace between Israel and Jordan

When we talk about water in Israel, we are talking about a resource which is very limited in the whole region and is, therefore, the greatest concern in the *Middle East*. It is a political, social, religious and environmental problem and influences Israeli and Arab foreign policy.

It is a foreign policy matter because there are some natural resources (rivers, lakes, and aquifers) that must be shared between four countries: Lebanon, Syria, Israel and Jordan. Israel's chief strategic thinker Allon:

*“Our firm holds in the Golan Heights and the Mount Hermon is very vital not only in order to defend... the Hula valley from Syrian fire... Our control over the Golan Heights ... derives from Israel's overall strategy, since this means defending the chief water source.”*¹³⁸

The root of the problem is connected, of course, to the climate zone and the resulting rare rainfall in that region. The majority of the rainfall comes between November and March. 80 % of Israel's water resources are in the north, but only 30 % of agriculture land is there, and dry years are common. Water irrigation and water collectors are crucial for the region's agriculture. Israel's lifeline is the “National Water-carrier”, which pumps water from Lake Tiberias to the southern desert area.¹³⁹ The river sources are the Hasbani, Dan and Banias, rivers that deliver about 500 million cubic meters (mcm) of water a year. The runoff above the Lake Tiberias contains 150 mcm and the Upper Tiberias 550 mcm. The last large supplier of water is the Yarmuk River, with 400 mcm. The Wadis in the east and west of the Jordan add an additional 232 mcm. All together, there is a total of 1,247 mcm of surface water, but the human extraction outflow is 1,265 mcm in total.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ Ma'oz, 1995, page 113.

¹³⁹ See: Shuldiner, in: *Das Dreieck im Sand, 50 Jahre Staat Israel*, 1997, pages 264-266.

¹⁴⁰ See: Lowi, 1995, pages 115-132.

This gap is rising every year, caused by the growing population. If there is a dry year, the whole region comes into a critical, even hopeless situation, such as in 1999, when the rain in the winter months brought less than 250 millimeters in the Jordan Valley. The gap is filled by the reserves of Lake Tiberias, groundwater and non-conventional sources like wastewater and desalination.¹⁴¹

Israel has mountain aquifers from Nazareth to Beer Sheva and a coastal aquifer from Haifa, which goes south along the Mediterranean to Gaza. Jordan is not as fortunate. It has thirteen aquifers including the Wadis. Since the Jordan/Israeli Peace Treaty in 1994, Israel has been sharing the northern aquifer with Jordan. Jordan extracts 20 mcm from Lake Tiberias as a result of the peace treaty. Israel takes these 20 mcm out of the Yarmuk in winter, stores it in Lake Tiberias, and returns it to Jordan in the summer.

The water of Jordan that comes from the Zarka River (95 mcm) is highly polluted and unusable. Jordan receives most of its water, 130 mcm, from the King Abdullah Canal, which derives from the Yarmuk. Syria also gets most of the water (200 mcm) from the Yarmuk River. Israel takes 620 mcm from the Israeli National Water Carrier. Together with issues over the King Abdullah Canal, this caused such great political problems that they led to the *Six Days War* in 1967. As a result of land gained in this war, Israel extracts 100 mcm from the Upper Jordan and from Lake Tiberias. The overexploitation of groundwater in Jordan is about 200 mcm per year, and Israel also reaches the "red line" in its aquifers.¹⁴² That is why Israel developed some high technological solutions, the so-called non-conventional sources, like wastewater management and desalination. Jordan has also started a wastewater system, a creative new method of agricultural irrigation, but Syria and the Lebanon are far away from such a step. Israel sends 220 mcm treated water from the Region of Tel Aviv to the Negev for irrigation. Jordan irrigates its fields with 87 mcm of wastewater per year. Jordan's plan is to develop this technology enough to produce up to 200 mcm by the year 2020.¹⁴³ Desalination on the other hand has a major disadvantage: Its high use of energy.

¹⁴¹ See: Borthwick, in: *Israel Affairs*, Vol. 9/3, 2003.

¹⁴² See: Lowi, 1995, pages 115-132.

¹⁴³ See: Borthwick, in: *Israeli Affairs*, Vol. 9/3, 2003.

Saudi Arabia has natural gas as a cheap source of energy, but Israel has to find another source and has now started a new generation of desalination plants (seawater reverse osmosis SWRO) in order to produce drinking water more cheaply. The first one has been already built in Ashkelon. Ashdod, Palmahim, Kishon and Caesarea will also be building station in the near future.¹⁴⁴ Jordan is still in the planning stage. Projects are in preparation for Aqaba and the Jordan Valley.

In such an unsure environment, the only way to handle this situation is through a serious plan of water management. Israeli reservoirs are able to accumulate around 400 mcm for a drought year, but the demand is around 1700 mcm. Jordan runs 400 mcm short of water every year. The water levels are shrinking. The gap in Jordan is not only filled by wastewater and desalinated water, also by non-renewable fossil water. This will cause environmental problems in the near future. Agriculture in Israel uses 64 % of the total water supply. In Jordan it is about the same. Municipalities take 29 %, and the rest is for the industry. The logical solution would be to reduce irrigation of agricultural land, because only 4 % of the GDP comes from that sector. However, to cut down the water supply to a minimum, by raising the price of the water, or even to close the farms, is a problematic environmental and political topic. Since 1999, public opinion has favored prohibiting the growing of water-heavy plants like cotton. The export of flowers, avocados and other fruits and plants is very profitable for companies, but if the water price rose to a market rate, these companies would not be able to compete on international markets anymore. Loosing international connections is always a problem for a nation, especially for an isolated country like Israel.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁴ See: URL: <http://www.water-technology.net/projects/israel>

¹⁴⁵ See: Rouyer, Alwyn, 2000, page 26.

14 A sensitive political issue

Around 40 % of the Israeli water resources are outside of the 1967 borders. 22% of the Israeli groundwater comes from the West bank. Israeli settlers are working on 4 % of the acres in the occupied territories but using 20 % of its water. This together with the question of security water is the reason that Israel hesitates to fulfill Resolution 242.¹⁴⁶ To reduce agriculture in general is an attack against Israel's self-definition of the *Zionism* movement's aims to overcome the anti-Semitism in Europe and Russia. The heroic Jewish farmer who takes care of his "own" soil and transforms desert to fertile land was a nation-building image of the early state of Israel. This picture is implanted in the mind of people through movies and songs. Giving up its own food production and starting to import from other countries like Europe, the USA or even Arab states is unthinkable for Israeli public policy makers and Israel's strong agriculture lobby. Therefore, any kind of change is very hard to achieve. The reason for the increasing problem of water is the expanding population in Israel, Jordan, Syria and, especially, the Palestinian population. Palestinians have one of the highest birthrates in the world. Israel's *Law of Return* has brought about 750 000 immigrants to Israel over the last 15 years. Ben Gurion described 1966 his policy like this:

*"... the scope of our defense ... does not depend on our army alone ... Israel can have no security without immigration ... Security means the settlement and peopling of the empty areas in north and south; ... the establishment of industries throughout the country; the development of agriculture in all suitable areas; and the building of an expanding (self-sufficient) economy ... Security means economic independence."*¹⁴⁷

Israel expects a population of 11-13 million in 2010. Also, Jordan has been a land of immigrants from Iraq, Russia and of Palestinian refugees from all Arab countries (Kuwait, Iran, Lebanon, and Israel). As a comparison of the differences of consumption of water between Jews and Arabs in this region per person per year: The average Israeli uses about 280 liter a day. A Palestinian in Israel receives only 90 liter per day and a Jordanian uses 153 liter per day. The world minimum standard is 250 liter per day.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁶ See: Shuldiner, in: *Das Dreieck im Sand, 50 Jahre Staat Israel*, 1997, pages 264-266.

¹⁴⁷ Brecher, 1974, page 183.

¹⁴⁸ See: Lustick, in: *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 53, No. 3, 1999, page 217.

The whole region has used more water than nature has been able to provide, while Lake Tiberias has been at its minimum level most of the time and the Jordan River has carried only treated wastewater down to the Dead Sea. As a result, the Dead Sea is shrinking enormously. At present, we do not know what the climate impact would be if the Dead Sea or Lake Tiberias disappeared. Because of that, Israeli and Jordanian engineers are working on a solution to bring seawater by channels and pipes from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea.

15 Israel's water-policy

Most topics in foreign policy are a matter of political or religious influence. Especially in Israel, with its diverse political party landscape, any common agreement, if reachable at all, is a compromise. But in the foreign policy issues concerning water, the dispute in Israel, the data and the decisions have been highly technical in nature. To understand the conflict of 1973 in this context, we must focus on two topics: The Johnston Plan and the Israeli National Water Carrier. Israel's policy towards water was made clear by Sharett to the Knesset:

“All who are interested to receive our co-operation in this area must be aware of one thing. Water for Israel is not a luxury; it is not just a desirable and helpful addition to our system of natural recourses. Water to us is life itself. It is bread for the nation – and not only bread. Without large irrigation works we will not reach high productive levels, to balance the economy and to achieve economic independence. And without irrigation we will not create an agriculture worthy of the name ... and without agriculture – and especially a developed, progressive agriculture - we will not be a nation rooted in its land, sure of its survival, stable in its character, controlling all opportunities of production with material and spiritual resources...”¹⁴⁹

The businessman Charles Johnston was appointed in 1955 by President Eisenhower to solve the water problem between Israel, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. He made the so-called *Johnston Plan* for the division of the water of the Jordan Basin, which is a point of reference until today.

The *Johnston Plan* affected all water resources in that region, especially the headwaters of the Jordan River, which rises in the foothills of Mount Hermon. Its springs flow in three separate rivers – the Hasbani, in Lebanon, the Banyas, part of Syria until 1967, and the Dan, in Israel. The Yarmuk is the frontier river between Jordan and Syria for 32 kilometers and is the border between Israel and Jordan for 14 kilometers before it flows into the Jordan River, which flows 30 kilometers along the Israel-Jordan border and ends in the Dead Sea.

¹⁴⁹ Divrei Ha-knesset, XV, pages 270, 271, 30th November 1953.

The Johnston Plan is practically the most important Israeli contract of all:

“Thus the near-success of the Johnston Mission (1953-55), incorporating formal co-operative sharing of the region’s water and de facto recognition of Israel by it’s Arab neighbors, makes the Jordan Water issue unique in the pattern of Arab-Israel relations”¹⁵⁰

Johnston came to the conclusion that for the unencumbered division of water, the Jordan River belongs to Israel and the Yarmuk to Jordan, with fixed assignments to the lesser riparian party. The quotas were set by the Unified Plan of the so-called “Gardiner Formula”:

Syria: 20 mcm from the Banyas, 22 mcm from then Jordan, and 90 mcm from the Yarmuk (132 mcm total).

Lebanon: 35 mcm from the Hasbani.

Jordan: 100 mcm from the Jordan and the residue - the bulk - from the Yarmuk.

Israel: 25 mcm from the Yarmuk and the residue – the bulk - from the Jordan.

After long and hard negotiations on the international arena and in Ben Gurion's house in Sde Boker, Eshkol conveyed to Johnston on February 22nd, 1955:

We did accept but did not say so in writing, officially, because we were afraid that, if we did so, the Arabs would bargain for more, as is the Oriental mentality in these matters. Later (July 1955) we put our acceptance of the Johnston Plan in writing”¹⁵¹

¹⁵⁰ Brecher, 1974, page 175.

¹⁵¹ Brecher, 1974, page 202.

As a result, after 12 months of talks between the USA and Israel, the *Draft Memorandum of Understanding* was signed but never published. It incorporated the precise terms of the Revised Unified Plan:

1. Storage facilities were to be constructed on the Yarmuk – the Maqarin Dam. As for the contentious issue of Lake Tiberias, final decisions as to the use of the Lake ... will be made by the Neutral Engineering Board by 1960.
2. Supervision was to be exercised by a three-man Neutral Engineering Board, the chairman to be selected by the two members whom Israel and the other Jordan Valley states were to designate.
3. Sovereignty by Israel over all existing Israeli territory was carefully assured.
4. Water allocations were set forth in accordance with the “*Gardiner Formula*”.

With this agreement, Johnston went for his fourth visit to the Middle East from August to October 1955. The Arab Experts Committee approved the *Draft of Memorandum of Understanding* and recommended it to the League Council in September 1955. The League debated the issue for four days and the outcome on October 11th, 1955, was a rejection with the words “further studies”:

*Representatives of the Arab countries concerned ... have studied the Arab Plan for the exploitation of the waters of the River Jordan and its tributaries ... They have found that despite the efforts exerted there remain certain important points which need further study. It has, therefore, been decided to instruct the Experts' Committee to continue their task until a decision is reached which would safeguard Arab interests.*¹⁵²

¹⁵² Statement on Arab-Israel Affairs, August 26th, 1955, in: *MEA, Chronology, VI, 8-9, August-September 1955*, page 270.

Johnston's reaction:

“When I left the Near East only two days ago, there was not the slightest doubt that Israel and its Arab neighbors ... recognize the Jordan Valley Plan as the only logical and equitable approach to the problem of developing a river system which belongs, in some part, to all of them. They have made it clear to me that, in the main, the technical and engineering aspects of the Plan- including the proposed division of water- are now satisfactory to them. They believe the remaining minor differences can readily be reconciled. I am sure that they can be.”¹⁵³

The rejection had nothing to do with the technical matters, it was politically motivated.

¹⁵³ New York Herald Tribune, Forum Press Release, October 17th, 1955.

16 Israel's National Water Carrier

It seems to be easier to find an agreement between Israel and the Arab states concerning the topic of water. Because the negotiations took place over such a long period of time, Israel's opposition parties had a hard time following this matter. It was apparently easier to negotiate over people's basic needs in the different countries but complicated to grasp because of its long-term, technical nature. One example of such a longtime action was Israel's National Water Carrier Project, which had been approved in 1956, coordinated with the US in 1958 and completed in 1964. The conflict in 1967 was more than ten years after the neighbors had grasped the implications of this project. The question of Resolution 242 and the occupied territories are without a doubt connected to the springs in the north of Israel. The National Water Carrier is a crucial part of the "*Population Dispersal Policy*" of Ben Gurion. He was convinced that the way for the Israelis to live in peace was to settle the empty areas in the Negev desert. That was the reason he decided to retire in Sde Boker. To implement this plan, Israel needed water in the south, which had to be pumped down from the north. The plan was to divert 500 mcm annually through a 108-inch pipeline and canals from the Upper Jordan to the North Negev.

The northern end of this pipeline was changed from the Gesher B'not Ya'akov and Dan Springs to Eshed Kinrot of Lake Tiberias, due to a veto by the US, UN and Syria because of the Demilitarized Zone. Water from the Huleh Marshes Drainage Project and from the Yarkon, north of Tel Aviv, was included in this project. The US supported the Project with a 15 million US Dollar loan in 1959, as compensation for American support of Jordan in its East Ghor project (4 million US Dollar for irrigation of 120,000 dunam (1 dunam = 1000 square meters) in the Jordan Valley). One reason for the 6th Days War and ultimately its influence on the *Yom Kippur War* was the decision of the Arab League in 1959 to obstruct the *National Water Carrier*. At that time, three possibilities were debated:

1. Military action, supported by Syria and the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem
2. Diversion of the Jordan's headwater
3. Political action by the UN

The League decided on the second option and prepared a plan to build a dam on the Hasbani by August 1960 and to let the water flow through a tunnel to the Litany River. The Banyas were to be used to irrigate land up to the Yarmuk, by using a dam in Jordan. At the Arab Summit Conference in 1964, the Arab League decided to take action and invested in the dam on the Yarmuk at the Makheiba for 29 million US Dollars in order to divert 200 mcm from the Banyas and the Hasbani. Eshkol's reaction:

*We have undertaken to remain within the quantities specified in the Unified Plan – and we shall honor this undertaking. Israel will oppose unilateral and illegal measures by the Arab States and will act to protect their vital rights.*¹⁵⁴

Israel successfully began pumping through the main conduit in May 1964, and on June 11th, Agriculture Minister Dayan announced the success of the 6500 kilometer long National *Water Carrier* project, which in 1970 reached a maximum of 320 mcm annually. When Israel destroyed the Syrian dam, it paved the road to wars on 1967 and 1973.

¹⁵⁴ Divrei Ha-knesset, XXXVIII, 20th January 1964, page 8-13.

17 Jordan accepts

Jordan originally rejected the *Johnston Plan* and started to build the *King Abdullah Channel* in 1958. Israel built its *National Water Carrier* to counter Jordan's interests in 1959, and when in 1960 the Arab League decided to share the Upper Jordan water only between Lebanon and Jordan (as a result of which no water would flow to Lake Tiberias), Israel attacked and destroyed the dam on the Yarmuk River that was still under construction. Israel, of course, took the Golan Heights in the *Six Days War*. After that, Israel controlled the Upper Jordan and a longer part of the Yarmuk River. The *Johnston Plan* suddenly became the point of reference for the Jordanians when Israel left the kingdom only 120 mcm per year. Additionally, the IDF had bombed Jordanian water facilities on the Yarmuk and the World Bank stopped investing in the Maqarin Dam (Unity Dam). Jordan was not able to store water from the winter floods anymore and realized that the *Johnston Plan* would have been the best solution for Jordan, since it would receive 720 mcm of water per year. Israel would have had 400 mcm, Syria only 132 mcm and Lebanon 35 mcm. Therefore, Jordan was forced to find a political solution after the *Six Day War*.¹⁵⁵ The peace treaty in 1994 was about water. Rabin offered to return the land Wadi Araba and give an additional 50 mcm annually from the Yarmuk in exchange for peace. Furthermore, he encouraged Jordan to build the dam at Maqarin (225 mcm) and offered to store the water in winter for Jordan and to provide this water during the summer months. These steps brought peace between Jordan and Israel on October 26th, 1994, and were the political conclusion of the *Yom Kippur War*.

One thing is for sure: This peace treaty did not come too early. Just five years later, Israel and Jordan faced a water crisis. In the winter months of 1998, the rainfall was less than 250 mm. That was a drop of 60 per cent.¹⁵⁶ If Jordan had stood at the same point before the peace treaty of 1994, the world would have faced a humanity catastrophe. Irrigation water for agriculture was cut by half and the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Food Program sent 380 000 tons of food. The previously-mentioned solutions of water management and non-conventional sources are the future solutions for preventing the whole region from facing an even more dangerous situation.

¹⁵⁵ See: Yehuda, 1997, page 189.

¹⁵⁶ See: Sarner, in: *Canadian Jewish News*, 1999.

Israel's foreign policy change

18 The great Egyptian-Israeli foreign policy change

Sadat caused a great change in Israeli foreign policy by rejecting further Soviet influence and bringing the US back into the Middle East. Nothing was left to say about Syria in that case. Asad used the weapon deliveries from the USSR in 1974 to start a *War of Attrition* against Israel as Nasser had done five years before. After the fall of the oil embargo on March 18th, 1974, Arab Unity became a thing of the past. Syria and the USSR were left alone.¹⁵⁷

After five months of difficult negotiations during heavy Syrian military actions, Syria and Israel reached a disengagement agreement on May 31st, 1974. Syria's tactical decision to go to the negotiation-table during bloody fighting was not as successful as Asad had hoped. He managed only to regain the town of Qunaytra and two hills in the vicinity which had been captured by Israel in the 1967 war. This small territorial gain was, for Syria, the political and psychological conclusion of the 1973 war and Asad promoted it as a great victory that it, of course, was not. One outcome was that Egypt received less compensation in the form of weapon deliveries than Syria from the USSR, but at the end of 1974, the amount of arms, besides the number of planes, was at the same level as before the Yom Kippur War. Syria received 1100 tanks, 1000 different kinds of cannons and missiles, FROG and SCUD, respectively, and 140 planes and tank missiles. It was a sign that Russia was not happy with Sadat's new open policy to the west (Infitah).¹⁵⁸ Asad's policy did not change. He and the Ba'thist leaders continued to be extremely hostile and militant towards Israel and Zionism both before and after the disengagement agreement in May 1947. Asad:

1. *Zionism distorts the heavenly principle and misuses Judaism ... it is an instrument to destroy existing societies in many countries of the world ... It is an ally of Nazism ... it is an artificial, chauvinist phenomenon which manifests itself in the colonist ideology, based on usurpation and expansionism in the region ... Israel has been seen by the world as a racist fascist state.*
2. *I do not have any personal animosity against the Jewish religion or the Jew as a religious person. But the Jews in Israel, this is different. The Jews are our enemy ... I feel about the Jews, the Israeli Jew ... in the same way I feel about any people which comes and takes my land.*

¹⁵⁷ See: Mottinger, 1988, page 125.

¹⁵⁸ See: Mottinger, 1988, page 123.

3. *Israel's age ... is only one-sixth of the periods of the Crusaders' dominion in our country. If Israel continues to occupy the Arab lands, there would be a fifth war against Israel ... another October war wherein Syria would be the spearhead.*
4. *If Israel withdraws to the original borders, we will not wage a war against it. We will accept the United Nations' resolution of 1947 (for the partition of Palestine) in the interest of getting on with other important business and simply let nature take its course ... and then we will work behind the scenes to overthrow the Zionist system in Israel and bring about a just return of Arab presence there, so as to make this land an integral part of the Arab world ... once this problem is solved then I can say that the Jews will be able to live here in Palestine as Jews but not as Israelis.*¹⁵⁹

In November 1975, the 12th National Congress of the Ba'ath Party decided on strategic goals, tactical aims and an ideological concept regarding Israel:

1. *The Zionist entity in Palestine is artificial, racist and expansionist. It constitutes the main attacking base of Imperialism and Zionism against the Arab Homeland, aiming at expanding from the Nile to the Euphrates.*
2. *The whole Arab national potential should be concentrated against the imperialistic, colonialistic, Zionist presence. The struggle against it is the major issue of the national liberation struggle.*
3. *The Arab-Zionist conflict is a fatal historical struggle, a struggle for life or death, to be or not to be. It is a long struggle of although there are periods of relative tranquility and armistic; this struggle must end with the eternal elimination of Zionism and with the liberation of all occupied Arab territories, including the entire Arab Palestinian land.*
4. *In order to implement goal is to obtain the full withdrawal of Israel from the territories occupied in 1967, including the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem. Then to assist the struggle of the Palestinian people and support its legitimate right to establish a national rule in the liberated territories. This is a step towards gradually uprooting the Zionist enemy from the land through an armed struggle, and returning Arab sovereignty to the full Palestinian land, on the ruins of the Zionist entity.*¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁹ Ma'oz, 1988, page 104-106.

¹⁶⁰ Ma'oz, Moshe, 1995, page 143 and 144.

This program had no positive influence on Israeli policy and Israel maintained its security measurements to counter this. Egypt choose another way in 1972:

*Perhaps the most important change in Egyptian foreign policy took place when Sadat, piqued by the Soviet refusal to equip the Egyptian military with more sophisticated weapons, asked the Russian advisers and technicians to leave the country.*¹⁶¹

Before the *June War*, these advisors had increased from 700 up to 900, and later increased to 15.000. These technicians were originally in service as another form of Egyptian compensation besides Russian weapon deliveries. Egypt had a fundamental lack of good pilots and trained technical personnel. The exposure of the advisers was a concession to Saudi Arabia and Libya, who were already against the Russian presence in Egypt, and it was also a nod towards the USA. Additionally, Sadat`s concession to Israel was not taken seriously by the US and the Egyptian people became nervous.

After the *Yom Kippur War*, Sadat followed his new policy and got financial support from the rich Arab oil-producing states like Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, with aid and loans totaling \$ 2 billion from 1974 to 1980. The Shah promised an additional investment of \$ 1 billion for the Suez Canal Zone. Furthermore, Iran, encouraged by the USA, sent American-built weapons systems to Egypt so that Sadat would not be criticized within his army for the Soviet armaments lost during the *Yom Kippur War* and provided training for Egyptian pilots and radar technicians. Iraq offered economic aid of \$ 700 million to Cairo for tractors, automobiles and engineering industries. Sadat created a number of “free zones”, such as those in Alexandria and the Suez Canal Zone, targeting foreign investors. He gave permission to foreign banks to operate and promised a five year tax holiday as well as permission to repatriate profits and salaries of foreign experts. The USA and their banks signed a number of economic agreements, and this new “open door” policy encouraged Japan and West European countries to extend loans to the Egyptian government.¹⁶² France lifted its arms embargo in August 1974, giving Egypt the new possibility to acquire sophisticated French weapons and Sadat a bigger range of choices. This brought him the economical and military push he was hoping for.

¹⁶¹ Binders, in: *The USSR and the Middle East*, 1973, page 271.

¹⁶² See: Middle East News Agency (MENA), reported by FBIS, November 1974, pp. D-7, D-8, C-4, E-1, in McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 90.

Then he renewed his offer from 1970 to the Israeli Government to recognize Israel and to come to a peace agreement for land as the first step in his “step-by-step” approach to resolve the Egyptian-Israeli dispute. The second step would be the settlement of the Palestinian problem, granting allowance for Israel to use the Suez Canal in exchange.

The *Geneva Conference* was headed by the Soviet Union and the USA and marks the only Russian attempt to take the initiative back from the United States.¹⁶³ Henry Kissinger convinced Golda Meir to come to the Conference on December 21st, 1973, in order to sign an agreement of disengagement with Egypt and Syria. Unfortunately, Syria and the PLO did not come and the outcome of these agreements included principles of “territories for peace” and “peace in stages”. At Geneva, Meir rejected a return to the borders of 1967, but agreed to a Jordan-Palestinian state, which should exist side by side with Israel. The bargaining continued even after the Rabin government was formed on June 3rd, 1974. However, there was not a major shift in the direction of peace but a gradual, slow shift in Israeli public opinion, especially on the issue of “territories for peace” and beliefs regarding the readiness of the Arabs to reach a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The *Geneva Conference* harmed the USSR because Israel, Egypt and the USA used this meeting to enter into a possible Egypt-Israeli peace settlement. On March 15th, 1975, Sadat finally canceled the Cooperation and Friendship contract with Russia that had been in existence since 1971. The Egyptian-Israeli pullback agreement (Sinai I) on January 18th, performed by Kissinger, was a great surprise for Moscow. Both countries' troops went back to the other side of the Canal (the Purple Line) by March 5th, and by May 31st the UN buffer zone was established, the prisoners-of-war were exchanged and the UN Disengagement Force, called UNDOF, took up its post in the Golan.¹⁶⁴ Kissinger's “*shuttle diplomacy*” failed at the end, because Sinai II was not signed by Syria, the PLO, or the diplomats of the USSR and the USA, but overall, the USA was in and Russia was out, as Sadat continued to consult Kissinger. On September 4th, 1975, the Sinai II disengagement accord was implemented and Israel removed its forces beyond the strategic Sinai passes, restoring Egyptian access to the oilfields in the Suez Gulf. After these steps, a new diplomatic calm emerged that forced Sadat to an exceptional, unexpected visit to Israel and to hold a speech in front of the Knesset in 1977.

¹⁶³ See: Mottinger, 1988, page 212.

¹⁶⁴ See: Mottinger, 1988, page 122.

These two agreements prepared the groundwork for the *Camp David Accords* of 1978 (13 days of negotiations between Prime Minister Menachem Begin¹⁶⁵ and Sadat in September 1978).¹⁶⁶ On Israel's side, all these negotiations were greatly influenced by the IDF leadership and not signed by the political leaders before the security question was solved. Under these circumstances, a demilitarized zone or limited Arab forces in Sinai, the objectives of Egypt's foreign policy after the *Yom Kippur War* in 1974 seemed to be ready for fulfillment after the long quietness of the "no peace, no war" policy:

1. *Returning to Egypt the Sinai Peninsula and other Arab lands (the West Bank of Jordan, including the Arab section of Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights) under Israeli occupation since the June War;*
2. *Accelerating the rate of economic and industrial development;*
3. *Modernizing political, economic, and social institutions;*
4. *Strengthening inter-Arab ties that had recently been forgotten on the basis of political consensus and economic cooperation among the Arab states;*
5. *Enhancing Egypt's regional and extra-regional prestige and role in international affairs.*

This was to be done with the help of the USA and other countries. President Jimmy Carter¹⁶⁷ promised support of 5 billion US Dollar to both Israel and Egypt contingent upon a peace agreement at Camp David from 1980 until 1985, including the following details:

- 1 billion US Dollars for Israel for moving its military bases from Sinai into the Negev. Israel had to provide these bases to the US air forces
- 1,5 billion US Dollars for the modernization of the Israeli army within the next three years. Egypt received additionally 750 Mio. Dollars every year for covering its budget

¹⁶⁵ **Menachem Wolfovich Begin** (August 16th, 1913 – March 9th, 1992) was the 8th Prime Minister in Israel and the first from the Likud Party. He was born in Poland, escaped the Nazi invasion 1939 and went to USSR. He left to Palestine when Germany started his offensive against USSR. He joined the Zionist Underground movement Irgun in 1942 and resisted against Britain. Irgun joined the Haganah and Lehi militia. From there he fought in the *War of Independence* against the Arab States. After the war, Begin founded the right-wing party Herut and started his political career. In 1973 he formed with General Ariel Sharon and other smaller parties the Likud Party. Despite his radical, rough appearance, he signed the peace agreement with Egypt 1979 and received the Nobel Prize in 1978 together with Anwar Sadat.

¹⁶⁶ See: Ma'oz, 1995, page 132.

¹⁶⁷ **James Earl Carter** (October 1st 1924) was the 39th President of the United States in 1977-1981.

- 2,5 billion US\ Dollars would be invested, in Egypt, within the next three years into economic- and military projects. In February 1980, it would be lifted to 5 billion Dollars and modern combat planes would be delivered¹⁶⁸

The peace contract was signed on March 26th in Washington, based on the *Camp David Accords*, and led to the isolation of Egypt by the whole Arab world (except Oman, Somalia and Sudan) because Egypt's peace with Israel was not coherent with the minimal targets of the Egyptian foreign policy and the Arab League decided at the Rabat Conference that Egypt was expelled from the Arab League. Finally, this agreement not only brought Sadat the Nobel Peace Prize, it claimed his life on October 6th, 1981, when a soldier assassinated him during the Eighth Anniversary Military Parade remembering the *Yom Kippur War*. This unpredictable outcome had the greatest impact in Israeli foreign policy as a result of the situation after the *Yom Kippur War*.

¹⁶⁸ See: Botor, in: *Deutsche Außenpolitik 7/1980*, page 83.

19 The Palestinian matter

For the PLO, the *Yom Kippur War* marks the point of transformation from being a terrorist group to being an internationally accepted political representative of the Palestinian people. It started with a great concession to change their charter to recognize the existence of a Jewish state in 1973. This meant that they would give up the dream of "returning to Haifa," one of the main political program points of the Palestinian movement. The Palestinians were not directly involved in the war, but with the defeat of the Arab armies, some exiled leaders accepted the area of Gaza and the West Bank as a possible territory for the Palestinian people. On November 16th, 1973, an article was published in *The Times of London* by Said Hammami, who at that time was the head of the PLO in Great Britain. In this article, he accepted the possibility of a negotiated settlement with Israel that would create a Palestinian state consisting of Gaza and the West Bank.

"Such a state would lead to the closing down of the refugee camps, thereby drawing out the poison at the heart of the Arab- Israeli enmity." ¹⁶⁹

This article was written after close consultation with other PLO leaders. It offered a new political solution that had not been present before the war. Previously, there had been no serious discussion about any Palestinian territory and no moderate leaders were in power. The PLO and other Palestinian groups avoided making any decisions on that matter. The Soviet Union and Egypt pushed for a Palestinian state during the cease-fire talks after the war. A precondition for such a state would be an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the West Bank. Yassir Arafat¹⁷⁰ accepted the plan: "... as a first step". The war influenced the PLO so that they decided to change from an organization that used terror to reach its aims into an organization that was able to look for political solutions through negotiations, since the PLO realized that the defeat of Israel was now practically impossible.

¹⁶⁹ The Insight Team of the Sunday Times, 1975, page 458.

¹⁷⁰ **Yassir Arafat** (August 4th, 1929 –November 11th, 2004) was Chairman of the *Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)* from 1969 until 2004. He became *President of the Palestinian National Authority* from 1993 until 2004. He is a controversial figure in modern history: A freedom fighter, terrorist, Nobel Peace Prize co-recipient together with Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin, a corrupt politician, a weak leader (Oslo Accords 1993), a charismatic leader who unified the Palestinian people, etc.

The path to this development was always full of obstacles. The PLO had been created in 1964 under the protection of Nasser in order to represent Egypt's policy toward the Palestinian people, but it was recognized officially as the representative of all Palestinians by the Arab League in 1974, after the *Yom Kippur War*. How did the PLO remove the Egyptian influence? On the other side there was the Palestinian organization PLF (Palestine Liberation Front), which represented Syria's policy. Following the *Six Days War*, their leader, George Habbash, founded the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Ba'ath established the military arm of the Ba'athist Vanguard of the Popular War of Liberation Organization, the so called Sa'iqa, which was connected to the Syrian army. Between the *June War* and the *Yom Kippur War*, Sa'iqa was the most active guerrilla group and became the alternative to Fatah. Syria also supported the Popular Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and, in order to make the whole thing even more complicated, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC).

Eventually, the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) and Fatah were also receiving payments from the Syrians. Because terror was a Syrian policy, every other group was most welcome to operate on Syrian territory against Israel and sometimes against Syria's neighbors. Sa'iqa worked to overthrow King Hussein, and in Lebanon, the PLA units were dispatched from Syria in 1969 to reinforce the guerrillas in the fighting against the Lebanese. Only at the final stage of the *Yom Kippur* war planning did Asad's government agree to the quasi-governmental status of the PLO as a representative of the Palestinian people. After the *Yom Kippur War*, Arafat, not well-liked by Asad, was the most moderate and influential leader of one of the biggest Palestinian groups, was supported from 1976 on by the Sa'iqa and became only the representative of the Syrian-Palestinian policy.

“The crushing defeat of the Arab armies in June 1967, the ‘resignation’ of Shuqairy (Ahmed Shuqairy was the head of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) until Arafat was elected to the chairman 1968. At the same year Fatah joined the PLO) from the PLO, the emergence of more militant and nationalistic leaders within the Palestinian resistance movement, and the willingness of other Arab states to support rival Palestinian groups changed Egyptian relation with the Palestinians.

*While the “moderate” leaders of the resistance movement maintained close ties with Egypt neither Nasser nor his successor, Sadat, could any longer take for granted an automatic Palestinian approval of Egyptian policies affecting their national aspirations and goals”.*¹⁷¹

After the PLO had become independent from Syrian and Egyptian political influences and had gained acceptance by its own people and in the international arena, it could face Israel’s policymakers as a legitimate representative of the Palestinian matter. The last country that had not cleaned up its relationship with the PLO was Jordan. Not only had the Palestinian groups caused a civil war in Jordan, the PLO claims of its own state involved territory that had originally been a part of the Hashemite Kingdom. In order to have one voice before the Geneva Peace Conference, Assad, Sadat and King Feisal of Saudi Arabia tried to find a compromise that allowed speaking on behalf of the Palestinians in front of Israel, USA and the USSR. They held a meeting in Cairo in January 1975 to try to resolve the differences between Jordan and the PLO, but it was without success. The most successful option was introduced by Sadat. He suggested the creation of a confederation between Jordan and the Palestinian state after an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. It was rejected only by the more militant groups.¹⁷²

For Israel, there was no reason to change its attitude towards the PLO. Evidence of a minor change in the Rabin government in 1974 came from Defense Minister Shimon Peres:

*As far as the Palestinian people are concerned, two other parties are better equipped to negotiate: The King of Jordan, and the local leaders of the West Bank.*¹⁷³

Israel’s policy was more to negotiate with an elected representative within the West Bank instead of the PLO. However, there were some left-wing politicians at the Foreign Ministry and even a number from the right-wing that considered it to be more realistic to deal with the PLO as the only Palestinian representative. Such a policy was no longer being considered as the Lebanese crises arose and International Arab support diminished.

¹⁷¹ McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 74.

¹⁷² See: McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 79.

¹⁷³ Interview in: *Newsweek*, January 14th, 1975, pages 30-31.

20 Summary

The fundament of the *Yom Kippur War* is the essence of UN Resolution 242, the international demand for the withdrawal of the Israeli armed force from the territories occupied in the *Six Days War*. Israel followed the 1967 conflict with the “*No peace, No war*” policy as a result of the Arab League Summit in Khartoum in August 1967 and its “*Resolution of the 3 No’s*”. This Israeli policy and the Arab resolution that describes a deadlocked position of no decisions, which was to be to Israel's advantage only. Sadat’s intention after succeeding Nasser was to break Israel’s strategy, which had humiliated Egypt and the Arab population in that region, by great making concessions to Israel: “*Peace for Land*” and recognition of Israel. Syria followed an opposite policy of terror against Israel. Syria’s President Asad differed from Sadat not only in this matter. Asad's regime rejected Resolution 242 and a peaceful settlement with Israel. Syria’s decisions were influenced by its ally, the Soviet Union. Israel was sure that without Russia and Egypt, Syria would never launch a war, but was proved wrong. The *Yom Kippur War* started on October 6th, 1973. This conflict showed the divergence of each of the Arab leaders. Sadat deceived Asad and the Soviets, leading them to believe him that he was planning a far deeper advance into Israel’s territory than finally had happened at the end.

Israel’s “*No peace, No war*” policy was an advantage in economic considerations, but otherwise had no political purpose. Prime Minister Golda Meir lost support in the Knesset and different point of views of parties and ministers caused a lack of governmental consensus, which helped in 1969 to lead to the “*War of Attrition*” between Israel and Egypt. Economically, this “*policy of no decisions*” was very helpful to Israel because of outside financial support, especially from the US, deployment of cheap workers from the occupied territories and oil from the Sinai. Golda Meir’s dilemma was a result of the decreasing support and growing suspicion of the next generation of voters towards her party, Mapai. Mapai was not able to instill their values and ideals in the youth, and lost trust through corruption and other oligarchic tendencies of the small elite that ruled.

After the *Yom Kippur War*, Israel experienced a strong political and moral defeat and had to recognize the Arab countries` new achievements in modern warfare. Its neighbor countries` population felt they had recovered their dignity and pride. In Israel people started to shift politically, especially to the political right. The changes in public opinion had the greatest and most remarkable impacts on the foreign policy of Israel in the aftermath of the *Yom Kippur War*. It was remarkable because it was unpredictable and surprising for all.

It is traced by the components of the attraction of consummation, a liberal democratic system copied from the USA, the end of the unified era and the beginning of an individual and new, egocentric lifestyle. Israel experienced the rise of protest, peace and many other movements in the post-*Yom Kippur War* period. The source of Israel's new lifestyle, adopted from the US, was in no small part the growing dominance of the US in Israel. This dependence is based on Israel's need for advanced weapons technology and financial support. The US is interested mainly in oil in the Middle East, and after the *Six Days War*, Israel became a security bridgehead for the US in the region. The US, in return, helped Israel obtain sophisticated weapons in order to keep its military superpower status. Since that time, Israel has been in a dilemma between its own political interests and the policies of the United States.

The highest priority of Israel's foreign policy was and is the Long-Run Survival of the Jewish democratic state. This policy is influenced by the decisions of its neighbor and other Arab countries in that region (the Khartoum Summit, for example). Furthermore, it leaned on the support of the international community, especially the American support, and, as a result of the *Yom Kippur War*, became dominated by the rise of Israeli public opinion. Israel's parties were less influential between the *Six Days War* and the *Yom Kippur War* because of the dominant position of Mapai, but acted as obstacles in the decision making process. The rise of the Israeli public, individual opinions and the overtake of the right-wing Likud party after the elections of 1977 made Israel more anti-Arabic, more nationalistic, harder to rule and with a more militaristic policy than ever before. This also happened because more high-ranked officers took key positions in the country. Without a charismatic leader, Israel's decision makers cannot implement a final settlement unless it has the support of the Israeli public right now.

Israel's defense doctrine before the *Yom Kippur War* was based on the misperception that war was not imminent because of its military strength. Ben Gurion's rooted policy of "*Land for Peace*" was rejected by political leaders as well as the enthusiastic public after the astonishing victory of the *Six Days War* because of security reasons and out of the feeling of superiority over the Arab countries. This behavior culminated in Israel's diplomatic isolation and led the way from economic growth to inflation. The *Yom Kippur War* was the result of that misperception and destroyed Israel's myth of invincibility. This misperception was caused by the "tunnel" focus of Israel's defense advisers that took only the capabilities of their enemies, not their intentions, into account. To approach Arab motivations from a political point of view would perhaps have exposed Arab intentions to go to war.

The unlimited trust of the people and the politicians in the army leaders grew out of the army's halo of glory from previous wars and their own armistice education. No doubts had been raised about them.

The army in Israel is the melting pot of the nation and the mediator of patriotic and nationalistic conviction. Because of this strong position in Israeli society, it has a huge influence on Israel's defense policy. The jump by high ranked officers to high ranked political positions ("pyramid hopping") became a problem in Israel's governmental structure. The dividing line between the military's influence and political decision-making had gotten out of hand since General Moshe Dayan became Minister of Defense. From this time on, officers came to cabinet meetings as frequently as the ministers themselves. During the last weeks before the *Yom Kippur War* started, Golda Meir received a lot of warnings but she was calmed down by the Israel Intelligence (AMAN) and delayed her decision for full scale mobilization. Finally, Gold Meir decided against a preemptive strike and a mobilization because she was worried about risking good relations with the USA. These events caused the social change and turned the tables concerning Israel's defense doctrine and foreign policy. The basis for that change was the Agranat Commission that had been established shortly after the war in order to investigate and to determine the responsibility for the disasters and the high casualties of Israeli soldiers. After 140 sessions and testimony from 58 witnesses, the Commission on April 1st recommended the dismissal of the IDF Chief of Staff David Elazar, Commander of the Southern Front Shmuel Gonen, Chief of Intelligence Eli Zeira and his deputy Aryeh Shalev. The head of AMAN for Egypt, Lt. Colonel Bandman, and Lt. Colonel Gedelia, Chief of Intelligence of the Southern Command, were transferred to another corps. Golda Meir resigned in response to public pressure and made space for Rabin's government. The new governmental and the IDF research traced the problem of its unprepared situation to the communication within the army and to its formal and informal channels to the government and its policy makers. They decided on frequent ad hoc discussions and meetings between the military and political leaderships in the future, which were to provide a direct and steady open channel. The intention was to support and influence the policy-decision-making and, as a result, the IDF's influence on daily politics increased enormously.

The changes in the internal information channel, the national intelligence, was the splitting of AMAN into a new second section, HAMAN, which is responsible for collecting information for political decision-makers.

It was done to avoid receiving early warnings without following proper preparations because of interior misperceptions of the enemy's intentions and capabilities.

Before the *Yom Kippur War*, Golda Meir, by ignoring the Foreign Ministry, put intelligence officers that missed Egypt's and Syria's major foreign policy change towards Israel into positions of influence.

Israel's second foreign policy pillar of survival is its support in the international, diplomatic arena, which was always jeopardized by the Arab states. They initiated the diplomatic break between the African states and Israel before and during the *Yom Kippur War*. This is considered as a great moral defeat as great as a fundamental loss of support in the UN-committee for Israel. It caused Israel's foreign policy shift towards the developing countries and resulted in the cancellation of successful development programs in the black African states.

Israel's connection to European states became the focus of interest after the *Yom Kippur War* when OPEC decided to use oil as a weapon. Suddenly, the European countries were a part of the conflict and condemned or punished based on their connection to Israel. The oil crises forced European diplomats to think about a new energy policy. Europe's countries followed their own interests and left Israel's population with the unpleasant reassurance of their "whole world is against us" complex. Besides several previous historical reasons, this complex was reinforced as this awareness had already emerged during the *Yom Kippur War* several months earlier when West Europe refused to allow American air shipments to stop at their airports.

Israel counted on the US and its Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, was interested in leading Egypt out of Russian influence. He managed it in a way that avoided the humiliation of Egypt by agreeing with Sadat on one common strategy in order to get rid of Soviet pressure and to get the US back in. Kissinger pushed out the Soviet Union from the Middle East, received Egypt as a new ally and initiated the greatest of Egypt's and Israel's policy changes. Sadat, supported by the Egyptian public because of his war against Israel, started to open up his economy and received financial aid from the rich Arab oil-producing countries as well as Iran, Iraq, the USA, Japan and Europe.

This new “*open door*” policy (*infithah*) did not stop at Israel’s border. After the disengagement agreements, the right-wing government under Begin went to Camp David to sign a unilateral peace agreement with Egypt in 1978 after Sadat had visited the Knesset to offer peace and recognition of Israel in return for land in 1977. Israel’s policy change was already visible at the Geneva conference when Golda Meir was ready to agree to a Jordan-Palestinian state next to Israel. The major shift was when Israel’s government took Sadat’s renewed offer from 1970 to resolve the Egyptian-Israeli dispute seriously. The decision to return the Sinai-peninsula for peace was greatly influenced by IDF leaders. On the other hand, the peace treaty with Jordan was advised, because of the water resources, by technicians. The Johnston Plan, first rejected by Jordan, finally became the Jordanian point of reference after the *Yom Kippur War*. Rabin offered Wadis and water storage for the winter floods in Israel, encouraged building the Maqarin Dam and offered additional water for peace. In 1994 King Hussein honored this friendly, open policy with his signature for peace between Jordan and Israel.

Finally, Syria remained at war with Israel. They reached a disengagement agreement in May 1974, but they were fighting while their leaders were at the negotiating table. This policy was not successful and Syria’s gain from the *Yom Kippur War* was minimal. With the sole exception that the Soviet Union awarded its ally Syria with a higher amount of weapons than before the *Yom Kippur War*, Syria remained isolated. The Palestinian people, a focus of Syrian policy, were not involved but influenced by the *Yom Kippur War*. This defeat of the Arab armies provoked the Palestinian exiled leaders to accept Gaza and the West Bank as a possible territory for their dream of state. Israel’s policy before the *Yom Kippur War* was denying the existence of a Palestinian nationalistic movement. After this conflict, Israel started to prefer to negotiate with elected representatives within the West Bank instead of the PLO. The consideration to deal with the PLO as the main representative of the Palestinian matter, as was desired by Israeli left-wing politicians, was out of the question after the Lebanese crises had arisen.

21 Conclusion

Israel's foreign policy changes are primarily focused on its survival and therefore involved different concepts of how to deal with its friends and enemies. Inside and outside influences were both affiliated and dropped during its history.

After Israel had conquered territory during the *Six Day War*, Ben Gurion's "*land for peace*" and "*population dispersal*" (connected to the topic of scarce resources of water and land) policy was replaced by a passive one of "*No peace-No war*". The *Yom Kippur War* broke with this concept and Israel was left in a process of finding new policies.

From that point on, others made policy for Israel, namely the US, by Kissinger, and Egypt, by Sadat. Israel's suspicion between the two wars had been changed to the willingness for compromise, visible at negotiations between Egypt, Jordan and, later, towards the PLO. The Israeli identification crisis was caused by the rise of public pressure within Israel that had to be added to the original two governmental considerations of influence: The policy of Israel's enemies and the policy of the international community towards the only representative Jewish state.

In 1974, Israel experienced a shift of its people towards individuality and to the right side of the political spectrum. After the 1977 elections, Israel became harder to rule and the unified *Yishuv* era came to an end. New policies were evaluated within the context of different groups with divergent interests.

Concerning Israel's defense doctrines:

These decisions were in the hands of the IDF generals and the Minister of Defense. They saw their main task in providing security to the state through defense concepts. In 1955, Moshe Dayan introduced the doctrine of "*force-centered policy of retaliation*". This concept was to prevent guerilla- and terror-warfare from coming from the Arab states. It implicates that every enemy strike has to cause a strong, immediate Israeli reaction. In the *Suez War* in 1956 and in the *Six Days War*, the IDF established a policy of "*decisive victories*". The Israeli government was urged to equip the Israeli army with the best weapons and best trained soldiers possible in order to compensate for the numerical imbalance between Israel and its Arab neighbors in the case of war. This technical and know-how superiority was intended to deter the Arab leaders from waging a war against Israel.

It was designed to give Israel the possibility of waging interceptive and preemptive warfare. The war itself had to be short (for resource and financial reasons) and effective and leave the Arab armies humiliated. Dayan's and the IDF doctrines were proved wrong by the *Yom Kippur War*, which was started by the Arab armies even though their chances to win were very low.

Nevertheless, after the *Yom Kippur War* Israel kept the general defense doctrine of superiority through high technology weapons and military training, but made some adjustments as recommended by the Agranat Commission and searched for shelter from its ally, the US. The problem of the great influence of high-ranked military officers on Israel's defense doctrines and policy decisions has not been solved yet. In fact, they have increased.

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
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30 Deutsche Inhaltsangabe (Abstract)

Die Auswirkung des Jom Kippur-Krieges auf die israelische Außenpolitik und Verteidigungsdoktrin:

Die Magisterarbeit behandelt die Frage zu, welchen politischen und verteidigungsgrundsätzlichen Veränderungen der *Jom Kippur Krieg* in Israel führte.

Der Autor beleuchtet das Fundament, auf dem der Konflikt aufbaut, darunter auch die wesentliche UN Resolution 242, die Israel auffordert, die besetzten Gebiete aus dem *Sechs-Tage-Krieg* zu verlassen. Der *Jom Kippur Krieg* war eine Reaktion des ägyptischen Präsidenten auf den politischen Stillstands Israels durch die sogenannte „*No Peace-No War*“ Politik, die jene von Ben Gurion, „*Land for Peace*“, ablöste. Dies wiederum war die Reaktion auf die „*3 No's Resolution*“ der arabischen Staaten in Khartum nach dem *Sechs Tage Krieg*.

Nach dem *Jom Kippur Krieg* erhob sich das israelische Volk unerwartet gegen die herrschende Elite. Der Hauptgrund neben der Individualisierung der Gesellschaft lag in dem überstandenen Überraschungsangriff, der ohne Vorwarnung das israelische Volk verlustreich traf, obwohl es Hinweise und Anzeichen des nahenden Konflikts davor gegeben hatte. Eine der Kernfragen war, warum Premierministerin Golda Meir nach all den internen Warnungen die Reserve nicht an die Front sandte. Die daraus folgende Agranat Untersuchungskommission gab der militärischen Führung die Hauptschuld, die Regierung Golda Meirs trat aufgrund des öffentlichen Drucks zurück und eine Zeit der politischen Ohnmacht begann. Als eine der Folgen kam es bei den Wahlen 1977 zu einer Abwendung von der traditionellen sozialistischen Partei Mapai hin zu der rechtslastigen Likud.

Der Autor kommt zum Schluss, dass nach dem Ende des *Jom-Kippur-Kriegs* die maßgebliche Außenpolitik Israels von Amerika und Ägypten geführt wurde, was 1978 zum Frieden zwischen Israel und Ägypten führte. Die Einigung über die existenzielle Frage der Aufteilung des Wassers in der Region brachte 1994 den Frieden zwischen Jordanien und Israel. Zwischen Israel und Syrien besteht bis heute kein Friedensvertrag. Der Grund hierfür wird vom Verfasser mit dem Vergleich zwischen der unterschiedlichen Grundsatzpolitik von Ägypten und Syrien dokumentiert.

Die Erklärung zu dem israelischen Verteidigungsgrundsatz baut der Autor zuerst auf einer Abhandlung über den besonderen Charakter dieses demokratischen jüdischen Staates auf:

Es wurden die Komplexität des israelischen Existenzkampfes, seine Armee, die knappen Wasserressourcen in der Region und sein Platz in der internationalen Gemeinschaft erläutert.

Fazit: Israels Politik und Verteidigungsdoktrin sind an die Politik seiner feindlich gesinnten Umgebung an die beschränkte Ressourcen und an die Interessen seiner Schutzmacht USA gekoppelt, die dafür sorgt, dass Israel weiterhin die modernsten Waffensysteme, zu Verfügung hat. Der Verteidigungsgrundsatz war bis zum *Jom Kippur Krieg* die Doktrin des „*Entscheidenden Sieges*“ von Verteidigungsminister Moshe Dayan. Dieses Konzept von 1956 (*Suez-Krieg*) beruht auf modernsten, hochgerüsteten und gut ausgebildeten Truppen, welche die Möglichkeit haben einen effektiven, kurzen Ersts Schlag auszuführen, um so die numerische Unterlegenheit der israelischen Truppen gegenüber den arabischen zu kompensieren; gleichzeitig soll es die Feinde vor einem Angriff abschrecken. Diese Doktrin erwies sich im Falle des *Jom Kippur-Krieg* als falsch, da Assad und Sadat ihren Truppen den Marschbefehl erteilten, obwohl die arabischen Einheiten in der modernen Kriegsführung technisch und ausbildungsmäßig den israelischen Truppen unterlegen waren. Es stellte sich heraus, dass die Offiziere, die Zugang in die israelische Politik bekamen, das feindliche Potenzial militärisch bewerteten, aber nicht die politische Intention. Der Gegner griff an, obwohl er militärisch unterlegen war. Die Agranat Kommission versuchte diesen Fehler im Konzept zu beheben, indem sie den Geheimdienst spaltete, um die Kabinettsmitglieder schneller und direkter von Vorgängen an den Grenzen zu informieren, aber das grundsätzliche Problem der Hauptrekrutierung der politischen Elite aus der militärischen Elite blieb bis heute ungelöst.

31 Der Lebenslauf des Verfassers

Ich, Rupert Adensamer, wurde am 26.10.1978 in Wien geboren und bin österreichischer Staatsbürger.

1985-1989 besuchte ich die Volksschule Radetzkystraße in Baden bei Wien, danach die Hauptschule in der Pelzgasse bis 1993.

1993-1994 war ich Schüler des Bundesoberstufengymnasiums in Wr. Neustadt.

1994-1999 absolvierte ich die 5 Jährige Höhere Bundeslehranstalt Herbststrasse Wien mit Matura und Kunstgewerbe Diplom.

Nach Sozialarbeit in Deutschland und Indien und meiner Zivildienstzeit in Kfar Rafael/Israel, begann ich 2002 das Studium der Geschichte, Germanistik, Judaistik und Archäologie an der Universität Wien.

2005/06 studierte ich die Geschichte des Nahen Ostens an der Ben Gurion Universität Beer Sheva/Israel und begann dort, die Diplomarbeit über den Jom Kippur-Krieg zu verfassen.

Einreichung der Diplomarbeit im Sommersemester 2008.