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„The Notion of Liberty in George Orwell’s *1984* and
Anthony Burgess’s *A Clockwork Orange*”

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1. Introduction

George Orwell (1903 – 1950) and Anthony Burgess (1917 – 1993), two exceptional British authors, are best remembered for their dystopian novels *Nineteen-Eighty-Four* (Orwell) and *A Clockwork Orange* (Burgess), both of which are considered the two writers' magna opera. A dystopia may roughly be defined as the negative version of a utopia in which alarming tendencies of current social, political and scientific developments are projected in a calamitous culmination in the future. The genre became established and far more popular than its positive equivalent in the twentieth century, an age which brought us two world wars, the rise of totalitarian systems and the invention of the nuclear bomb (see Wenzl 30). Thus it is not very surprising that in an era full of radical social changes, omnipresent fear and circulating paranoid visions about the future, the world views of socio-critical science fiction writers, such as Orwell, Burgess and Aldous Huxley, were rather pessimistic and dark. Generally, dystopias present the reader with a future society in which citizens are repressed by a despotic government with their liberty and human rights being seriously infringed. This is certainly true for *1984* and *A Clockwork Orange*, with both novels dealing with a disguised decaying England placed in a not too distant future. Both authors take up alarming political and scientific developments of their time and satirise them in order to demonstrate how dangerous and open to abuse they are.

Orwell focuses on the aspect of totalitarianism and leader worship pointing out how propaganda, manipulation techniques and psychological thought control indoctrinate the human mind with ideological dogmas and lead to

complete intellectual submission on the part of those who accept and adopt the leadership's will without questioning it. Orwell's portrayal of all-pervasive government control, radical surveillance of the citizens and the massive interference in private lives has become a symbol of modern paranoia prophecies. Whenever the question of privacy is issued in current political discourse, connotations of George Orwell's fictional regime are conjured up by those who fear that certain Orwellian depictions may become true.

In *A Clockwork Orange* Anthony Burgess presents us with the moral dilemma and the tension between behaviourist methods of social planning as propagated by B.F. Skinner and certain behaviourist psychologists in the 1950ies, and the issue of human autonomy and individual choice. Skinner's ideas of conditioning and, therefore, shaping the human mind into whatever shape was desired, were openly discussed by politicians who considered adapting the methods to criminals in order to erase the "criminal instinct". The underlying idea of Skinner's behaviourism is that there is no such thing as free will and that the human mind can be conditioned and the human behaviour modified. Anthony Burgess sensed the danger immanent in this ideology for he was convinced that a human being must be allowed to autonomously choose between good and evil without being forced to make a certain decision by somebody else.

Both authors, Orwell and Burgess, touch upon the issue of human liberty, each emphasising another aspect of it. Whereas Orwell addresses the issue of political liberty, Burgess seems rather concerned with the metaphysical and psychological aspects of individual freedom. However, in order to profoundly analyse the aspects of liberty and its restrictions as depicted in both novels, it is necessary to grasp the notion of freedom as a philosophical concept and find a theory which can be adapted to Burgess and Orwell's works providing a common denominator for the two novels and thus enabling a comparison. For this purpose Isaiah Berlin's *Two Concepts of Liberty* provide a solid theoretical basis for further investigation. Thus, the main goal

of this thesis is to adapt Berlin's conception of positive and negative liberty to *1984* and *A Clockwork Orange* and examine in more detail the serious infringement of human rights and the restrictions of liberty as outlined by the two novelists.

2. The Idea of Liberty

Political philosophy concerns itself with theories which deal with the questions of political values and their adaptability to the real world. Among other values, such as justice, equality, neutrality, security, welfare, peace, liberty or freedom, has been in the centre of interest and inquiry of numerous philosophers and theorists for centuries. As far as terminology is concerned, liberty and freedom can be regarded as near synonyms. Also, they have been used more or less interchangeably by some philosophers, for instance by Isaiah Berlin in his essay *Two Concepts of Liberty*. However, they are regarded as slightly distinct as well. The political theorist Hanna Fenichel Pitkin points out that liberty implies a system of rules, a “network of restraint and order”. As a consequence, liberty is associated with political matters, whereas the term freedom is claimed to be more general with a meaning ranging “from an opposition to slavery to the absence of psychological or personal encumbrances.” (Nunberg ch.¹1) Therefore the term liberty can be restricted to political life, whereas freedom represents a more general concept or an idea (see Nunberg ch.1). However, the distinction between these terms is not of major importance for the purposes of the investigation in this thesis; hence we should regard the two terms as interchangeable. Moreover, they cannot be “translated into other European languages, which contain only the one term of either Latin or Germanic origin (e.g. liberté, Freiheit), where English contains both.” (Carter par.² 4)

¹ chapter.

² paragraph.

Very few concepts other than freedom have been given so many multifarious and controversial interpretations depending on the conceptual framework and theoretical approach of different schools of philosophy; innumerable thinkers have dedicated their work to liberal concepts, countless works have been written on the topic of liberty. In general philosophers distinguish between two forms of freedom: on the one hand, outer freedom referring to political and social liberty, which is defined as the absence of outward restraints in reference to various kinds of action; on the other hand, inner freedom, which belongs to the field of metaphysics and psychology, and describes a state of autonomy in which an individual has the capacity to apply his or her free will in order to choose his or her course of action.

2.1. The *Two Concepts of Liberty* by Isaiah Berlin

The most influential contribution to the modern intellectual discourse about freedom was made by Isaiah Berlin in his inaugural lecture *Two Concepts of Liberty* at Oxford University in 1958, where he elaborated on the distinction between positive and negative liberty, also designated as “liberty from” and “liberty to”. The lecture was published by Clarendon Press in 1958; it also appears in Berlin’s *Four Essays on Liberty* (1969) and in a collection of essays called *Liberty* published in 2002 (see Carter note 1). Although Berlin was the one to examine the two concepts of liberty profoundly, the distinction as such is deeply rooted in philosophical tradition and can be traced back at least to Kant (see Carter par. 2). However, Berlin has provided and defined the formal framework of the differences between these two opposite perspectives.

2.2. Negative Liberty

In defining the notion of negative freedom, Berlin states:

I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others. If I am prevented by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree; and if this area is contracted by other men beyond a certain minimum, I can be described as being coerced, or, it may be, enslaved. Coercion is not, however, a term that covers every form of inability. If I say that I am unable to jump more than ten feet in the air, or cannot read because I am blind, or cannot understand the darker pages of Hegel, it would be eccentric to say that I am to that degree enslaved or coerced. Coercion implies the deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in which I could otherwise act. You lack political liberty or freedom only if you are prevented from attaining a

goal by human beings. Mere incapacity to attain a goal is not lack of political freedom. (Berlin 122)

It is obvious that the notion of negative freedom focuses on freedom from outer interference. Therefore, negative freedom signifies an absence of something, i.e. the absence of barriers, obstacles, coercion etc. from the outside. According to Berlin, the most significant question in regard to negative liberty is as follows: What is the area within which an individual should be left alone to do or be what he or she is able to do or be without any interference from other persons? In other words, over what area am I master over my actions and what choices can I make without being restricted or forced to do something by somebody else? (see *Open Learning* ch.3.2) An important element of negative freedom is the factor that only restrictions imposed from other people affect my freedom, not my own inability to do something. Limitations on my actions due to laws of nature or my body are thus irrelevant to the discussion of political liberty.

The criterion of oppression is the part that I believe to be played by other human beings, directly or indirectly, with or without the intention of doing so, in frustrating my wishes. By being free in this sense I mean not being interfered with by others. The wider the area of non-interference, the wider my freedom. (Berlin 123)

Central to the idea of negative liberty is the element of power relations within a political system and the exposure of tyranny and arbitrary exercise of authority. The question to be considered here is what legitimates political authorities to limit the liberty of individuals and how wide the area of non-interference shall optimally be. The English Social Contract philosophers, for instance Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, have dedicated their work to this question supposing that the area of non-interference cannot be unlimited since it would result in a state in which everybody could interfere with everybody else. Social chaos and insecurity would produce a condition in which the "liberties of the weak would be suppressed by the strong" (Berlin 123). In his prominent work *Leviathan* (1651) Hobbes proceeds from a negative image of humanity assuming that human actions and purposes do

not necessarily harmonise with each other. According to Hobbes, in a state of nature with unlimited natural freedoms without any restrictions by the law, an endless war of all against all would be the consequence. To avoid this state of chaos and war, people have to agree on a social contract establishing a civil society in which everybody has to submit to a government or sovereign power, renouncing some of their freedoms and gaining security, peace and civil rights in return (see Kunzmann, Burkard, and Wiedmann 117). This basically represents the principle of democratic societies.

John Stuart Mill, a prominent nineteenth-century British thinker, who contemplated on the question of legal interference on the part of a government, articulates in his essay *On Liberty* a famous principle that has become known as the “Harm Principle”. The principle suggests that the only legitimate reason to limit the liberty of citizens is to prevent harm to others:

The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right... The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. (Mill 13)

2.3. Positive Liberty

In general, thoughts about negative liberty basically centre on political and social liberty, that is to say, the absence of obstacles external to the subject and the range of possible options to choose from. Positive liberty, however, is a more complicated notion and rather difficult to grasp. In brief, it represents the inner freedom to do something rather than freedom from outer interference. Moreover, negative and positive freedom do not necessarily correlate with each other, for we may have all sorts of unlimited options, i.e. we may have a large amount of negative freedom, and still, we might not be able to take advantage of the opportunities because we are not in control of our life due to internal obstacles. It becomes clear that positive liberty is based upon the interaction between an inner capacity to take a rational option and a given opportunity. The concept of negative liberty, in contrast, is defined only through the available opportunities. Advocates of positive freedom believe that just because no one is preventing you from doing something, it does not necessarily mean that you are genuinely free. Positive freedom is regarded as a matter of achieving one's potential, not just having potential (see *Open Learning* ch3.3).

Isaiah Berlin reckons that the positive notion of freedom derives from the wish of the agent to be his or her own master:

I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men's, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer - deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realising them. This is at least part of what I mean when I say that I am rational, and that it is my reason that distinguishes me as a human being from the rest of the world. I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by reference to

my own ideas and purposes. I feel free to the degree that I believe this to be true, and enslaved to the degree that I am made to realise that it is not. (Berlin 131)

However, Berlin annotates that although one may not be slave to someone else; one may yet be slave to nature or to one's own "unbridled passions" (132). In relation to this, he distinguishes between the "ideal", "true" or "autonomous" self, which "is variously identified with reason, with "higher nature" and with the "self which calculates and aims at what will satisfy it in the long run" and the irrational and uncontrolled impulses, which represent the "lower nature" or the "empirical" and "heteronomous" self. These lower desires and passions, Berlin adds, need to be rigidly disciplined in order to realise the real nature of the true autonomous self (see 132). As an example, a person may attach great importance to a healthy way of life, and still be unable to quit smoking. In this case, the higher and true nature is a health-conscious self, while smoking represents the irrational lower desires which have to be overcome in order to achieve true freedom.

A highly debated example of Berlin's notion of positive liberty is the so-called paradox of the "contented slave". If we proceed from the definition of positive freedom as being allowed to do what you want to do, then we notice that this notion of freedom implies that a slave who is perfectly satisfied with being a slave is totally free in a positive sense. However, our logic and linguistic intuition tells us that slaves are not free at all. The danger implied here lies in the conclusion that people who learn to desire fewer things will make themselves freer. Some theorists, for instance Richard Arneson and John Christman, try to avoid this paradox by saying that the desires of an individual should be "home grown", that is to say, autonomously developed by the subject him/herself. As an example, let us consider the case of a Muslim woman who claims to support and agree with the fundamentalist doctrines of her society. According to advocates of positive liberty, this woman is unfree if her desire to conform is imposed upon her through manipulation or indoctrination. However, she is perfectly free, if she rationally and autonomously developed her desire to conform while being aware of

other options. So, even if this woman prefers and desires to live a submissive life, this does not necessarily mean that her freedom is being either enhanced or restricted due to her having these desires, for her freedom is not based on the content of these desires but on the mode of formation (see Carter ch.3).

Taking the difference between positive and negative freedom into account, one might assume that political philosophers might focus exclusively on negative liberty, while positive liberty concerns more the area of psychology or individual morality. However, this is an oversimplified, insufficient train of thought, for one of the most discussed issues in political philosophy is the question whether the positive concept of freedom is a political subject-matter or not. Furthermore, what advantages does the state expect from promoting positive freedom of citizens? Philosophers in the classical liberal tradition, such as Constant, Humboldt, Spencer and Mill typically defend a negative concept of political freedom claiming that positive liberty is not a political subject at all. Philosophers critical of that tradition, like Rousseau, Hegel and Marx, on the other hand, defend a positive concept of political freedom promoting that political freedom can be achieved through political action (see Carter ch.1)

Many theorists argue that positive freedom in its political form can only be achieved through a collective. According to Jean-Jacques Rousseau 'individual freedom is achieved through participation in the process whereby one's community exercises collective control over its own affairs in accordance with the "general will" (see Carter ch.1). In relation to this, we can say that a democratic society is free in terms of being a self-determined society and that a member of a democratic society is free due to his or her participation in the democratic process. However, there are also individualist concepts of positive freedom. For instance, some theorists suggest that it is the task of a government to create the conditions necessary for its citizens to be self-sufficient and to achieve self-realisation (see Carter ch.1).

2.4. The Hazards of a Perverted Notion of Liberty

One of the main points that Berlin makes in his *Two Concepts of Liberty* is that positive conceptions of freedom have been more frequently perverted and misused as instruments of political oppression than negative ones. Referring to the difference between the two selves, namely the true or rational and the lower or empirical self, Berlin demonstrates this paradox in the concept of positive liberty:

Presently the two selves may be represented as divided by an even larger gap; the real self may be conceived as something wider than the individual (as the term is normally understood), as a social 'whole' of which the individual is an element or aspect: a tribe, a race, a Church, a State, the great society of the living and the dead and the yet unborn. This entity is then identified as being the 'true' self which, by imposing its collective, or 'organic', single will upon its recalcitrant 'members', achieves its own, and therefore their 'higher' freedom. The perils of using organic metaphors to justify the coercion of some men by others in order to raise them to a 'higher' level of freedom have often been pointed out. But what gives such plausibility as it has to this kind of language is that we recognise that it is possible, and at times justifiable, to coerce men in the name of some goal (let us say, justice or public health) which they would, if they were more enlightened, themselves pursue, but do not, because they are blind or ignorant or corrupt. This renders it easy for me to conceive of myself as coercing others for their own sake, in their, not my, interest. I am then claiming that I know what they truly need better than they know themselves. What, at most, this entails is that they would not resist me if they were rational and as wise as I and understand their interests as I do. (Berlin 132-133)

Berlin even goes further explaining that by justifying coercion of others in the name of their true and real self – although they might not be aware of its existence due to its being belied by all that they overtly feel and do and say, that is by their empirical self - it becomes possible to

ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, to bully, oppress, torture them in the name, and on behalf, of their 'real' selves, in the secure knowledge that whatever is the true goal of man (happiness, performance of duty, wisdom, a just society, self-fulfilment) must be identical with his freedom - the free choice of his 'true', albeit often submerged and inarticulate, self. (Berlin 133)

Thus, the ultimate debasement in such a situation is to be told that, despite evidence, what is going on cannot be named coercion, since it increases your positive freedom and serves your true self. As a matter of fact, Berlin holds that positive concepts of freedom have been used to justify some kinds of oppression in the course of history and that it is a 'relatively short step from saying that freedom involves self-mastery to the justification of all kinds of state interference in the lives of individuals' or, as Rousseau says, it can, under certain circumstances, be right to be "forced to be free" (see *Open Learning* ch.3.4.)

It is important to realise that in showing the dangers of a positive concept of liberty, Berlin does not condemn the conception as such being exclusively in favour of negative freedom. For this would be a misinterpretation of Berlin, since he just wants to emphasise that historically it was the positive notion of liberty that has been misused to justify paternalism, and moreover, oppression in the name of freedom. In an interview Berlin has expanded on this topic:

The only reason for which I have been suspected of defending negative liberty against positive and saying that it is more civilized, is because I do think that the concept of positive liberty, which is of course essential to a decent existence, has been more often abused or perverted than that of negative liberty. Both are genuine questions; both are inescapable... Both these concepts have been politically and morally twisted into their opposites. George Orwell is excellent on this. People say 'I express your real wishes. You may think that you know what you want, but I, the Fuhrer, we the Party Central Committee, know you better than you know yourself, and provide you with what you would ask for if you recognised your "real" needs.' Negative liberty is twisted when I am told that liberty must be equal for the tigers and for the sheep and that this cannot be avoided even if it enables the former to eat the latter if coercion by the state is not to be used. Of course unlimited liberty for capitalists destroys the liberty of the workers, unlimited liberty for factory-owners or parents will allow children to be employed in the coal-mines. Certainly the weak must be protected against the strong, and liberty to that extent be curtailed. Negative liberty must be curtailed if positive liberty is to be sufficiently realised; there must be a balance between the two, about which no clear principles can be enunciated. Positive and negative liberty are both perfectly valid concepts, but it seems to me that historically more damage has been done by pseudo-

positive than by pseudo-negative liberty in the modern world. (qtd. in Jahanbegloo 41)

Referring to the *Führer* and to the *Party Central Committee*, it becomes obvious that Berlin holds that in the twentieth century the totalitarian systems of Nazism and communism have perverted the notion of positive freedom by coercing their subjects, often against their will, to realise what the system's doctrine believed to be their 'true' nature or 'true' freedom. In other words, the word 'freedom' has been misused to describe the power exercised by a collective self over its members (see *Open Learning* ch.3.4.).

Berlin, himself a declared liberal, who was writing during the Cold War, clearly had some (leftist) totalitarian theories in mind, according to which freedom is a means of exercising collective control over one's destiny in a classless society, when he demonstrated the danger of perversion of positive liberty. Many theorists in favour of a positive conception, however, claim that the contortion of the idea as outlined by Berlin is too exaggerated, and therefore too polemic. Charles Taylor argues on this point:

Even as applied to official Communism, this portrait is a little extreme, although it undoubtedly expresses the inner logic of this kind of theory. But it is an absurd caricature if applied to the whole family of positive conceptions. [...] It has no necessary connection with the view that freedom consists purely and simply in the collective control over the common life, or that there is no freedom worth the name outside a context of collective control. And it does not therefore generate necessarily a doctrine that men can be forced to be free. (Taylor 175)

Moreover, the negative concept can be misinterpreted and abused as well; it also contains a caricatured version within itself. This version goes back to Thomas Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham. It sees liberty simply as the absence of external legal or physical obstacles. This view completely disregards the aspect of inner, less obvious, obstacles, such as lack of awareness or false consciousness. If we understand freedom as individual self-realisation, then we must consider that self-realisation is something original to ourselves and can only be worked out independently and autonomously. Therefore, if we

think of freedom as including the freedom of self-fulfilment, then we have something which can fail or succeed for both inner and outer reasons. For, we can fail to achieve self-realisation due to inner obstacles as well as outer coercion. Thus, Hobbes's and Bentham's notion of negative freedom is insufficient if we want to safeguard each person's right to individual self-fulfilment, which means to develop, determine and change his or her interests autonomously and from within. Taylor hence concludes that the moral psychology of Hobbes and Bentham is too simple and too crude for its purposes (see Taylor 176).

Furthermore, we must not forget that if negative liberty in a distorted and extreme way means no interference at all and therefore no control from the outside, then the rights of the weak and defenceless members of a society are endangered due to a state of affairs in which the strong may be encouraged to exploit the weak according to a *survival-of-the-fittest* principle. This is exactly what Hobbes meant when he outlined the state of nature in which a war of all against all is the consequence of limitless freedom from outer restraints.

2.5. Final Solution?

Berlin appears quite pessimistic when it comes to a reconciliation of different positions and values; or as he puts it, he does not believe in a 'final solution.' He further claims that, historically, the belief in a final solution, i.e. in a harmony of all the different goals and values humans have, is 'responsible for the slaughter of individuals on the altars of the great historical ideals' more than any other belief. Eventually, he concludes that there is no way of harmonising human values, since these are in principle irreconcilable:

It is a commonplace that neither political equality nor efficient organisation nor social justice is compatible with more than a modicum of individual liberty, and certainly not with unrestricted *laissez-faire*; that justice and generosity, public and private loyalties, the demands of genius and the claims of society, can conflict violently with each other. And it is no great way from that to the generalisation that not all good things are compatible, still less all the ideals of mankind. But somewhere, we shall be told and in some way, it must be possible for all these values to live together, for unless this is so, the universe is not a cosmos, not a harmony; unless this is so, conflicts of value may be an intrinsic irremovable element in human life. To admit that the fulfilment of some of our ideals may in principle make the fulfilment of others impossible is to say that the notion of total human fulfilment is a formal contradiction, a metaphysical chimera. (Berlin 167-168)

Isaiah Berlin's contribution to the discussion about freedom has started off a lively dispute and inspired numerous theorists to investigate further into the topic of positive and negative liberty. Some have tried to demonstrate that only the negative concept deserves the name liberty, others tried to point out the advantages of the positive concept. Some have even attempted to find a third way reconciling the two ideas by finding a basic agreement between the two sides. The American legal philosopher Gerald MacCallum, for instance, argued that while there are various possible interpretations of freedom, there is only one basic concept which allows the dichotomous versions to converge. MacCallum defines the basic concept, a concept on which everyone agrees, as a triadic relation which consists of a subject or agent,

certain preventing conditions, and certain doings or becomings of the agent (see Carter ch.4). According to this theory, an agent is free from certain preventing conditions, to do or become certain things.

Any claim about the presence or absence of freedom in a given situation will therefore make certain assumptions about what counts as an agent, what counts as a constraint or limitation on freedom, and what counts as a purpose that the agent can be described as either free or unfree to carry out. (Carter ch.4)

MacCallum's argumentation admittedly appears quite plausible and adjustable to the question of liberty, and also the other discussions and theories provide deep insights into the topic and are certainly worth further investigations; however, the theoretical framework of this paper mainly builds on the dichotomy of positive and negative liberty as defined by Berlin. Discussing all the freedom theories currently available would go beyond the scope of this thesis and, finally, Berlin's distinction perfectly fits as the conceptual basis for the aspects of freedom, or rather its perversions, as illustrated by Orwell and Burgess.

3. The Manifestations of Negative Liberty in *1984*

3.1. Orwell's Warning

In order to analyse the aspects of liberty and its limitations in George Orwell's masterpiece novel *1984*, which was completed in the year 1948 and published in 1949, it is worth first taking a look at the totalitarian system of the dystopian state of Oceania and its characteristics as illustrated in the novel. Orwell depicts the future in the year 1984 as a dark place full of hatred, terror and political paranoia. It should be noted that while the story, as is usual in utopian or dystopian fiction, is set in the future, it is in fact a critique of Orwell's own present. What the author has done is to "deliberately exaggerate a number of contemporary tendencies", such as the increasing invasion of privacy, the corruption of language, the dangers of mass media manipulation etc., "in order to satirise them in the form of fiction" (Hammond 172). Orwell himself wrote to an American correspondent in 1949:

I do not believe that the kind of society I describe necessarily *will* arrive, but I believe (allowing of course for the fact that the book is a satire) that something resembling it *could* arrive. I believe also that totalitarian ideas have taken root in the minds of intellectuals everywhere, and I have tried to draw these ideas out to their logical consequences. (qtd. in Hammond 172)

The book is meant as a warning against totalitarianism and it must not by any means be interpreted simply as an anti-Communist treatise, for it is a satire on the worst features of both Communist and Nazi regimes and on totalitarian systems in general. "The author is too deeply and too seriously an enemy of Bolshevism and of any kind of mass tyranny for his book to be

merely anti-Russian. [...] Orwell's only theme is the totalitarian danger that lies within ourselves and in all the political systems of our time" (Mann 277). In fact, Orwell derived the political framework for the story from his experiences in Spain: "the one-party state, the denial of objective truth, the manipulation of the past, imprisonment without trial, torture, indifference to human suffering" (Hammond 172). Furthermore, the scene of the book is laid in Britain in order to emphasise that the English-speaking nations are not resistant against totalitarian tendencies and that these could flourish anywhere if not fought against (see Hammond 173).

Intending to analyse the totalitarian system of Oceania we should take a closer look at Emmanuel Goldstein's book, which gives us insight into the mechanisms of the *Ingsoc* Party and its doctrine. Emmanuel Goldstein, the Party's main enemy, "the Enemy of the People" (1984 13) to whom the daily Two Minutes Hate ritual is commonly dedicated, had once been one of the leading figures of the Party before he engaged in counter-revolutionary activities; then - condemned to death - he had somehow managed to escape and disappear mysteriously in the underground, as the Party legend teaches us. "He was the primal traitor, the earliest defiler of the Party's purity. All subsequent crimes against the Party, all treacheries, acts of sabotage, heresies, deviations, sprang directly out of his teaching." (1984 14)

In fact, the figure of Goldstein represents a very useful device for the purposes of the Party for two reasons: First, his face is usually used in the *Two Minutes Hate* ceremony in order to provide the people with a catalyst for their unfiltered hatred and unconscious aggressions towards the Party itself. Second, possibly being just a convenient fiction of the regime (see Zwerdling 108), he is used for detecting *thoughtcriminals*, i.e. Party traitors. These are usually allured with the alleged conspiracy and its doctrine written by Goldstein. Although we may assume that there is no such thing as an underground organisation at all and that the conspirative book was written by O'Brien himself or some other member of the Inner Party, its content still provides us with profound information about the functioning of the Party and

its programmes and final aims by examining the main principles of the system as represented in the Party slogans: War is Peace, Freedom is Slavery, Ignorance is Strength.

3.2. *The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism*

Goldstein's book, *The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism*, be it real or fake, teaches us that societies in general always consist of three classes of people: the High, the Middle and the Low. These classes struggle for power and change positions, but the essential structure of society usually remains triadic. Viewed in this light, history is perceived as a recurrent circular pattern:

Thus throughout history a struggle which is the same in its main outlines recurs over and over again. For long periods the High seem to be securely in power, but sooner or later there always comes a moment when they lose either their belief in themselves or their capacity to govern efficiently, or both. They are then overthrown by the Middle, who enlist the Low to on their side by pretending to them that they are fighting for liberty and justice. As soon as they have reached their objective, the Middle thrust the Low back into their old position of servitude, and they become the High. Presently a new Middle group splits off from one of the other groups or from both of them and the struggle begins over again. (1984 210)

Further, the Middle, striving for power, has always pretended to be fighting for values such as freedom, justice, equality and fraternity; but as soon as the old tyranny is overthrown, the Middle establishes a new one. However, in 1984 the new Middle groups who emerged from the Socialist theories of the early nineteenth century openly proclaimed their aims of destroying freedom and perpetuating inequality:

Socialism, a theory which appeared in the early nineteenth century and was the last link in a chain of thought stretching back to the slave rebellions of antiquity, was still deeply infected by the Utopianism of past ages. But in each variant of Socialism that appeared from about 1900 onwards the aim of establishing liberty and equality was more and more openly abandoned. The new movements which appeared in the middle years of the century, Ingsoc in Oceania, Neo-Bolshevism in Eurasia, Death-Worship, as it is commonly called, in Eastasia, had the conscious aim of perpetuating *unfreedom* and *inequality*. These new movements, of course, grew out of the old ones and tended to keep their names and pay lip-service to their ideology. But the purpose of all of them was to arrest progress and freeze history at a chosen moment. (1984 211-212)

What we have in the year 1984 is a world divided into three great super-states, Oceania, Eurasia and Eastasia, each state having a similar political structure based on Socialist philosophies, however perverted into an extreme form of authoritarianism, whereby the power is always exercised by a one-party system. The form of such a government is called *Oligarchical Collectivism*, as Goldstein indicates. An oligarchy is by definition a “government by a few, especially by a small faction of persons or families” or simply “a state governed by a few persons” (see *The Free Dictionary*). Collectivism, again, is understood as the “political principle of centralised social and economic control, esp. of all means of production” and distribution. Yet, it is also associated with Soviet communism, i.e. Bolshevism and consequently with the “political theory that the people should own the means of production” (see *Dictionary.com*).

Due to Goldstein, the only secure basis for oligarchy is collectivism due to the fact that wealth and privilege are best defended when they are possessed jointly. ‘The so-called “abolition of private property” [...] meant, in effect, the concentration of property in far fewer hands than before” (1984 214). The difference to previous times was that the new wealth owners were a collective group instead of a mass of individuals. “Individually, no member of the Party owns anything [...]. Collectively, the Party owns everything in Oceania, because it controls everything, and disposes of the products as it

thinks fit" (1984 215). The whole Revolution in 1984 could, therefore, succeed almost unopposed, because it was represented to the people as a process of collectivisation (see 1984 215).

The question to be considered is how these new forms of extreme totalitarian doctrines could arise and gain power so easily. According to Goldstein's book, with the development of machine production human equality had become technically possible and it was no longer necessary to have different social or economic classes. Yet, this state of equality was no longer a desirable ideal for the groups that were seeking power, but a danger to be averted. In earlier times, when a just and peaceful society was in fact not possible, it had been easy to proclaim freedom, human rights, equality before the law etc. and make the masses believe in those values. However, at exactly the point in time when the realisation of these values was actually possible, the liberal and egalitarian ideas were abandoned and new forms of authoritarianism and dictatorship took over (see 1984 213).

Every new political theory, by whatever name it called itself, led back to hierarchy and regimentation. And in the general hardening of outlook that set in round about 1930, practices which had been long abandoned, in some cases for hundreds of years – imprisonment without trial, the use of war prisoners as slaves, public executions, torture to extract confessions, the use of hostages and the deportation of whole populations – not only became common again, but were tolerated and even defended by people who considered themselves enlightened and progressive. (1984 213)

In Oceania the realisation of such a new authoritarian form of government meant the abolishment of the liberal and capitalist tradition through a revolution and the enforcement of *Ingsoc*: grown out of the earlier Socialist movement and inheriting its phraseology, it stands for English Socialism referring to both the one-party government and its underlying philosophy. The new aristocracy, made up of the former middle class and upper working class people, were, as "compared with their opposite numbers in past ages", "hungrier for pure power" and more aware of what they were doing (see 1984 214). Thus, after a revolutionary period, which lasted almost two decades, a

new triadic hierarchical society regrouped itself now consisting of the Inner Party, the new High, the Outer Party, the Middle, and the proles, the Low. At the top of the pyramidal structure is Big Brother, the leader of the Party, although there is considerable uncertainty about his real existence. For, we may well assume that he, though he might have been the founder of the Party or one of the leading heads of the Revolution, is just a symbol for the corpus of the Party itself and as such used to provide the people with a leading figure they can believe in, worship and fear. Naturally, it is easier to feel such emotions towards an individual than towards an organisation, i.e. a political party.

Big Brother is infallible and all-powerful. Every success, every achievement, every victory, every scientific discovery, all knowledge, all wisdom, all happiness, all virtue, are held to issue directly from his leadership and inspiration. Nobody has ever seen Big Brother. He is a face on the hoardings, a voice on the telescreen. We may be reasonably sure that he will never die, and there is already considerable uncertainty as to when he was born. Big Brother is the guise in which the Party chooses to exhibit itself to the world. (1984 216-217)

The actual power springs from the Inner Party which makes up not more than two percent of the whole population of Oceania and functions as the brain of the state. Below them comes the Outer Party, the 'hands' of the Inner Party; and finally, below that come the *proles*, the vast masses, numbering about eighty-five percent of the population, yet having no political relevance at all. Basically, membership of these three groups is not hereditary but decided upon by examination which takes place at the age of sixteen and in which race and gender do not play any particular role. On the contrary, "Jews, Negroes, South Americans of pure Indian blood are to be found in the highest ranks of the Party" (1984 217).

The four main institutions to execute the Party's will, the organs between the entire apparatus of government is divided, are represented by the four ministries: The Ministry of Truth, The Ministry of Peace, The Ministry of Love and The Ministry of Plenty.

The Ministry of Truth, which concerned itself with news, entertainment, education and the fine arts. The Ministry of Peace, which concerned itself with war. The Ministry of Love, which maintained law and order. And the Ministry of Plenty, which was responsible for economic affairs. Their names, in Newspeak: Minitrue, Minipax, Miniluv and Miniplenty. (1984 6)

In fact, these organs of government are and do exactly the opposite of what they claim to be and do, for instance, *Minitrue* is concerned with propaganda, manipulation and falsification of facts, whereas *Miniluv* is actually concerned with torture and the imprisonment of criminals and political enemies. Their common final aim, however, is the limitation and destruction of human freedom, both in a positive and negative sense. For, what we have in Oceania is an extremely authoritarian regime which regulates each aspect of human political, economic and private life.

3.3. Limitations of Negative Liberty

If we want to take a look at the aspects of the negative concept of liberty as depicted by Berlin in Orwell's novel, bearing in mind that negative liberty is understood as the absence of outer interference or the area over which an individual is master over his or her actions and choices without being restricted or forced to do something by somebody else, then we can say that factually there is no liberty at all in *1984* since the regime interferes in practically each and every area of life. For instance, the freedom of movement has been completely abolished. That is, a citizen of Oceania is not allowed to leave his habitat, let alone his country. Moreover, any contact with the outer world, i.e. with any foreigner, and even the knowledge of foreign languages, is strictly forbidden in order to safeguard the sealing-off of the citizens to keep them and their worldviews under control. For, if they were

allowed contact with foreigners, they would possibly open up their horizons and realise that they have been told lies and manipulated by the government.

Further, human rights as known to us and taken for granted, at least in the modern western world, do not exist in Orwell's dystopian state; as a matter of fact they are systematically ignored and violated. Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood," (United Nations Art. 1) appears as purest cynicism in a state which proclaims that freedom is in fact slavery. Another very prominent Article in the UDHR, saying that "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" is also drastically infringed by the Ministry of Love. Since torture is an extreme form of intervention from outside it represents a radical attack on the 'negative' aspect of human liberty.

Moreover, there is no freedom of speech, no freedom of assembly, no freedom of education, no freedom of the press, no freedom of association, no intellectual freedom, no sexual freedom and, finally, no freedom of thought. A citizen of Oceania, or more specifically a Party member, has no freedom of choice concerning his or her education, habitat, employment, life-partner, friends, hobbies, etc. All these violations of human rights and restrictions of opportunities, hence restrictions of liberty in a negative sense, serve one single purpose, namely to permanently safeguard the maintenance of power of the Party. And it is exactly this strict regimentation and control over its citizens that makes the Party so efficient and successful:

By comparison with that existing today, all the tyrannies of the past were half-hearted and inefficient. The ruling groups were always infected to some extent by liberal ideas, and were content to leave loose ends everywhere, to regard only the overt act and to be uninterested in what their subjects were thinking. Even the Catholic Church of the Middle Ages was tolerant by modern standards. Part of the reason for this was that in the past no government had the power to keep its citizens under constant surveillance. (1984 214)

3.4. “Big Brother is Watching You”

It is safe to assume that the most evident violation of human liberty in a negative sense is represented by the constant surveillance of the citizens and the total invasion of private life in Oceania. Orwell appears to be especially critical of technological progress warning us against the dangers of mass media and the misuse of modern communication systems for surveillance:

The invention of print, however, made it easier to manipulate public opinion, and the film and the radio carried the process further. With the development of television, and the technical advance which made it possible to receive and transmit simultaneously on the same instrument, private life came to an end. Every citizen, or at least every citizen important enough to be worth watching, could be kept for twenty-four hours a day under the eyes of the police and in the sound of the official propaganda, with all other channels of communication closed. (1984 214)

Telescreen, the technological device which makes constant surveillance possible, - a television screen which on the one hand transmits propaganda programs, and in this way adds to the constant manipulation, and, on the other hand, functions as a video camera which observes the citizens - has become the symbol of modern paranoia prophecies since Orwell's 1984. Orwell himself, though to a certain extent aware of the prophetic nature of his novel, might still have never dared to believe how close to reality his dark vision of permanent surveillance in the twenty-first century would come. In Oceania, the author places a *telescreen* in members' of the Outer Party apartments, everywhere in the streets, in public places, in public buildings – basically everywhere except for the districts where the *proles* live. In places where no *telescreens* could be placed, for instance outside the city in the countryside, microphones have been installed instead so that conversations can be eavesdropped.

Over and beyond this, one has to fear one's closest fellow men, for everybody could turn out a denunciator. Especially one's own children represent a serious danger since they are members of the so called *Spies* – an organisation for children comparable to the *Hitler Youth*. As the name itself suggests, they spy upon their parents and other grown-ups in order to find evidence for suspicious behaviour which they then report to the *Thought Police*, i.e. to the ultimate executive agency. The chief task of the *Thought Police* is to uncover Party traitors and to transfer them to the *Ministry of Love*, where they have to confess to their crimes usually exposed to various methods of torture. People arrested by the *Thought Police* simply disappear as if they had never existed. Their whole existence is simply negated and deleted from the records:

It was always at night – the arrests invariably happened at night. The sudden jerk out of sleep, the rough hand shaking your shoulder, the lights glaring in your eyes, the ring of hard faces round the bed. In the vast majority of cases there was no trial, no report of the arrest. People simply disappeared, always during the night. Your name was removed from the registers, every record of everything that you had ever done was wiped out, your one-time existence was denied and then forgotten. You were abolished, annihilated: *vaporized* was the usual word. (1984 21)

Members of the Outer Party are especially kept under observation of the government. The *Thought Police* actually controls everything they do, say, or even think in order to notice any unorthodox behaviour that would expose them as traitors of the Party. As a result, the Party members live in the knowledge that everything they do or say can and will be used against them. Even very subtle things, like mimic or gesture, are scrutinised closely in respect to suspicious behaviour:

It was terribly dangerous to let your thoughts wander when you were in any public place or within range of a telescreen. The smallest thing could give you away. A nervous tick, an unconscious look of anxiety, a habit of muttering to yourself – anything that carried with it the suggestion of abnormality, of having something to hide. In any case, to wear an improper expression on your face (to look incredulous when a victory was announced, for example) was

itself a punishable offence. There was even a word for it in Newspeak: *facecrime*, it was called. (1984 65)

Ultimately, members of the Outer Party have no possibility to cultivate any form of privacy; on the contrary, individuality is more or less forbidden and made almost impossible. Party members are expected to go to work, spend their evenings at the Community Centres, and then go to sleep, naturally being permanently under surveillance of the *telescreens*:

In principle, a Party member had no spare time, and was never alone except in bed. It was assumed that when he was not working, eating or sleeping he would be taking part in some kind of communal recreation; to do anything that suggested a taste for solitude, even to go for a walk by yourself, was always slightly dangerous. There was a word for it in Newspeak: *ownlife*, it was called, meaning individualism and eccentricity. (1984 85)

Hence, the smallest evidence of individuality is regarded as dangerous, since it could hint at unorthodox and therefore contra-revolutionary, i.e. non-conformist disposition, which, of course, the regime seeks to eliminate.

3.5. The Role of Sexuality in 1984

In addition to the surveillance issue, the strict regulation of sexuality by the government represents another distinct invasion of privacy in Oceania and consequently a serious restriction of negative liberty. Since private interpersonal relationships are undesirable and viewed with greatest mistrust by the regime, sexual intercourse between unmarried Party members is forbidden: "The unforgivable crime was promiscuity between Party members." (1984 68)

The aim of the Party was not merely to prevent men and women from forming loyalties which it might not be able to control. Its real, undeclared purpose was to remove all pleasure from the sexual act. Not love so much as eroticism was the enemy, inside marriage as well as outside it. (1984 68)

Marriages, all of which have to be approved by the regime, serve only one purpose: to "beget children for the service of the Party" (1984 68). As a consequence, sexual intercourse is allowed only in marriages for the purpose of procreation. Sex, therefore, represents a necessary evil, something vile and nasty, yet indispensable for the continuity of mankind and thus the continuity of the Party:

Sexual intercourse was to be looked on as a slightly disgusting minor operation, like having an enema. This again was never put into plain words, but in indirect way it was rubbed into every Party member from childhood onwards. There were even organisations such as the Junior Anti-Sex league which advocated complete celibacy for both sexes. [...] The Party was trying to kill the sex instinct, or, if it could not be killed, then to distort it and dirty it. (1984 69)

Organisations such as the *Spies* and the *Junior Anti-Sex League*, sex talk in school, various lectures etc. appear successfully in discrediting and demoralising the sexual desire. Winston Smith's wife Katharine represents a typical example of an orthodox, Party loyal, chaste woman, who despises the sexual act, however, persists on producing a child and thus fulfilling her "duty to the Party" (1984 139). Winston, however, is disgusted by his wife's weekly

copulation efforts, not because he is chaste and despises sex as well, but because he is horrified by the cold and passionless atmosphere in bed with his wife: "To embrace her was like embracing a jointed wooden image." (1984 70) What he desires is real intimacy and unbridled passion:

And what he wanted, more even than to be loved, was to break down that wall of virtue, even if it were only once in his whole life. The sexual act, successfully performed, was rebellion. Desire was thoughtcrime. (1984 71)

Naturally, the Party must be aware of the fact that the sexual instinct cannot be eroded so easily; that is why consorting with prostitutes, although forbidden, represents "one of those rules that you could occasionally nerve yourself to break" (1984 68).

Tacitly the Party was even inclined to encourage prostitution, as an outlet for instincts which could not be altogether suppressed. Mere debauchery did not matter very much, so long as it was furtive and joyless, and only involved the women of a submerged and despised class. (1984 68)

Why does the Party seek to control the sexual instincts of its members? What is the purpose and the "inner meaning of the Party's sexual Puritanism" (1984 139)? Julia, Winston's lover and partner in crime, points out that there is a direct relationship between the repression of lust and the worship of Big Brother and the Party:

It was not merely that the sex instinct created a world of its own which was outside the Party's control and which therefore had to be destroyed if possible. What was more important was that sexual privation induced hysteria, which was desirable because it could be transformed into war-fever and leader-worship. (1984 139)

What Julia here touches upon is the phenomenon of sublimation, which is according to Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytic theory a strong defence mechanism that transforms repressed sexual energy into useful social and cultural achievements. Since in Oceania's society leader-worship and war

hysteria is regarded as socially useful, the Party wants to make use of this defence mechanism and employ it for its own purposes:

There was a direct, intimate connection between chastity and political orthodoxy. For how could the fear, the hatred and the lunatic credulity which the Party needed in its members be kept at the right pitch, except by bottling down some powerful instinct and using it as a driving force? The sex impulse was dangerous to the Party, and the Party had turned it to account. (1984 140)

That is the reason why the sexual act successfully performed is an act of rebellion and liberation from the Party doctrine. It represents a revolt against the principles of *Ingsoc* because it is a retreat into privacy that creates a sense of togetherness, which is, certainly, dangerous to the purposes of the Party. Further, for the same reason the Party has infiltrated family life in general and subverted the instinct of parenthood. Families, of course, could not actually be abolished. However, children “were systematically turned against their parents and taught to spy on them and report their deviations. [...] It was a device by means of which everyone could be surrounded night and day by informers who knew him intimately.” (1984 140) This represents another invasion of privacy, for sheltered family life and genuine parent-child cohesion is simply brought to nought by the regime.

3.6. The Mutability of the Past

Let us again recall the meaning of negative liberty as the absence of obstacles external to the subject and the extent of possible options to choose from, and compare it to the alternation of the past on the part of The Ministry of Truth. "Who controls the past [...] controls the future; who controls the present controls the past," runs one of the main Party slogans (1984 37). In 1984 the regime controls the past and therefore the present as well by constant falsification of historical facts. The permanent deception of the citizens through the concealment of facts can be seen as an external obstacle to the establishment of the truth. Not only does the *Ingsoc* system limit the freedom of information, it annuls it entirely.

The Ministry of Truth, which is the only source of information in Oceania, is thus concerned with news media, entertainment, educational books, research, arts, pornography, music, tele-programmes etc. Its main purpose is to change the facts to fit into the Party doctrine for propaganda effects. For example, if Big Brother makes an announcement that later turns out to be wrong, then the employees of the Ministry of Truth have to rewrite and alter his announcement in the aftermath so that any forecast Big Brother previously made appears accurate. In fact, the deeper reason for the Party's ambition to control all records and, therefore, to control all memories is to maintain the illusion that the Party is absolute and impeccable. It cannot ever appear to make mistakes or change its mind, for this would imply weakness and imperfection. To maintain power, however, the Party has to appear never-failing and eternally right (see *Wikipedia* ch. 2).

3.7. Are the *Proles* Free?

All the excessive confinements of liberty in the novel are only imposed on the middle class, i.e. to the members of the Outer Party. The members of the ruling class, that is the Inner Party, enjoy much more freedom, for instance, they are allowed to turn their home *telescreens* off. Interestingly enough, nobody seems to care what the overwhelming majority of the citizens, the *proles*, who make up about eighty-five percent of the total population, think or do (see LaPicho par. 2). The *proles*, who can be identified as the working class, live in rundown, sordid parts of London where they are seemingly let alone to live their life as they wish to. The Party simply does not regard them as politically relevant in any sense since they are perceived as naturally inferior, “like animals” (1984 74) and therefore not dangerous to the system. “So long as they continued to work and breed, their other activities were without importance.” (1984 74) The Party does not even make any attempts to indoctrinate them with its ideology, on the contrary, it is even “not desirable that the *proles* should have strong political feelings” (1984 74).

The great majority of *proles* did not even have *telescreens* in their homes. Even the civil police interfered with them very little. There was a vast amount of criminality in London, a whole world-within-a-world of thieves, bandits, prostitutes, drug-peddlers and racketeers of every description; but since it all happened among the *proles* themselves, it was of no importance. In all questions of morals they were allowed to follow their ancestral code. The sexual puritanism of the Party was not imposed upon them. Promiscuity went unpunished, divorce was permitted. For that matter, even religious worship would have been permitted if the *proles* had shown any sign of needing or wanting it. They were beneath suspicion. As the Party slogan put it: ‘*Proles and animals are free.*’ (1984 75)

If we apply the negative concept of liberty, it is justified to say that the *proles* are indeed free, or at least substantially freer than the Outer Party members. The question that still needs to be answered is why does the Party utterly disregard the *proles* and exclude them completely from its political programme? This is because the party considers it impossible that the *proles*

could ever rebel on their own, enforce a political uprising and subsequently overthrow the system. As long as any potential rebellion within the Party itself is prevented, everything appears safe. O'Brien reflects upon this issue:

[...] perhaps you have returned to your old idea that the proletarians or the slaves will arise and overthrow us. Put it out of your mind. They are helpless, like the animals. Humanity is the Party. The others are outside – irrelevant. (1984 282)

Winston Smith believes that "if there is hope, [...], it lies in the *proles*" (1984 72). However, he himself detects that: "Until they become conscious they will never rebel, and until after they have rebelled they cannot become conscious." (1984 74) Obviously, neither the Party nor Winston Smith concedes intellectual capacity to the *proles*, which means that they concede no positive liberty to them, i.e. no inner freedom to recognise their strength and take action. "They can be granted intellectual liberty because they have no intellect." (1984 219) What becomes evident here is a case in which negative and positive liberty do not correlate with each other. The *proles* actually do have a large degree of negative freedom, yet, they seem not able to take advantage of the opportunities, because they are not in control of their lives due to inner obstacles such as lack of intellectual capacity.

4. The Manifestations of Positive Liberty in 1984

4.1. A perverted Notion of Liberty in 1984

Isaiah Berlin calls our attention to the dangers of a perverted notion of positive liberty by pointing out that especially totalitarian regimes have politically twisted this concept of liberty into its opposite. Let us bear in mind that the positive notion of liberty implies a high and a low nature of the self and that the high and hence real self is often conceived as wider than the individual and identified with a social whole, for instance a political party. This collective entity then tries to impose its collective will upon the individual in order to achieve its own and, in this way, the individual's 'higher' freedom. Moreover, the collective whole arrogates to itself to know better what serves the development of the higher nature of the individual and presumes the right to coerce the individual in the name of his or her true self and therefore his or her freedom. This is exactly what happens in Orwell's novel, with the addition that in 1984 the Party openly propagates that "Freedom is Slavery" (1984 6).

Fitting into the concept of a perverted notion of liberty, the *Ingsoc* regime does not simply want to impose its will upon its citizens, moreover, it wants them to believe that the will of the party is identical with their own will. As a consequence, the Party exerts various highly elaborated manipulation tactics to achieve not only "complete obedience to the will of the State, but complete uniformity of opinion" (1984 214). In the Ministry of Love, O'Brien reveals to Smith what the Party expects from its members:

We are not content with negative obedience, nor even with the most abject submission. [...] The command of the old despotism was "Thou shalt not". The command of the totalitarians was "Thou shalt". Our command is "*Thou art*". (1984 267)

4.2. The Principles of Doublethink

"For, it is only by reconciling contradictions that power can be retained indefinitely." (1984 225) In 1984 an enormously effective means of retaining power by exercising reality control over individuals is represented by the practice of *doublethink*. *Doublethink* is the "simultaneous belief in two contradictory ideas" (*Merriam-Webster*) or "the power to hold two completely contradictory beliefs in one's mind simultaneously, and accept both of them." (Abraham par.22) At first appearance, it seems difficult to grasp the idea of *doublethink*, for as rational beings we consider it rather illogical and absurd to perform such an act of mental self-deception. Intrinsically, it is hard to imagine how *doublethink* works. Smith describes it this way:

To know and not to know, to be conscious of complete truthfulness while telling carefully-constructed lies, to hold simultaneously two opinions which cancelled out , knowing them to be contradictory and believing in both of them; to use logic against logic, to repudiate morality while laying claim to it, to believe that democracy was impossible and that the Party was the guardian of democracy; to forget whatever it was necessary to forget, then to draw it back into memory again at the moment when it was needed, and then promptly to forget it again: and above all, to apply the same process to the process itself. That was the ultimate subtlety: consciously to induce unconsciousness, and then, once again, to become unconscious of the act of hypnosis you had just performed. Even to understand the world 'doublethink' involved the use of doublethink. (1984 37-38)

However, it has been argued that the concept as such is not a new one. "It was used in biblical times when believers were advised. 'Let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth,'" (Ingle 131). The mental process of *doublethink* represents in so far a means of reality control as, applied by the individual, it prevents autonomous rational thinking and as a result it creates a mind that is prone to all kind of outer and self- manipulation. In fact, in *doublethink* the Party has found a mighty instrument to reduce positive liberty by limiting the range of thought and hence the freedom to think and act autonomously and rationally. Referring to Berlin's theory about positive liberty, *doublethink* can be identified as an inner obstacle that obstructs the evolvment of a higher nature of the self, i.e. the true self, which is autonomous and guided by reason. It is exactly by producing this system of thought in which contradictions can exist simultaneously that the Party has established a stable and permanent form of dominion: "If one is to rule, and to continue ruling, one must be able to dislocate the sense of reality." (1984 224)

The technique of *doublethink* is so deeply rooted in the principles of *Ingsoc* that it is even engraved in the Party's main slogans: *War is Peace. Freedom is slavery. Ignorance is strength.* Also the names of the four ministries exhibit the Party's deliberate reversal of the facts. "The Ministry of Peace concerns itself with war, the Minsitry of Truth with lies, the Ministry of Love with torture and the Ministry of Plenty with starvation." (1984 225) In order to exemplify what effect the practice of *doublethink* has on Oceania's everyday life, we should take a closer look at the public speech during the *Hate Week* when it all of a sudden becomes known that Oceania was at war with Eastasia and not Eurasia, and always has been. The abrupt change of the enemy happens during the speech with the orator switching "from one line to the other actually in mid-sentence, not only without a pause, but without even breaking the syntax" (1984 189).

Without words said, a wave of understanding rippled through the crowd. Oceania was at war with Eastasia. The next moment there was a tremendous commotion. The banners and posters with which

the square was decorated were all wrong! Quite half of them had the wrong faces on them. It was sabotage! The agents of Goldstein had been at work! There was a riotous interlude while posters were ripped from the walls, banners torn the shreds and trampled underfoot. The Spies performed prodigies of activity in clambering over the rooftops and cutting the streamers that fluttered from the chimneys. But within two or three minutes it was all over. The orator, still gripping the neck of the microphone, his shoulders hunched forward, his free hand clawing at the air, had gone straight on with his speech. One minute more, and the feral roars of rage were again bursting from the crowd. The Hate continued exactly as before, except that the target had been changed. (1984 188)

As it becomes evident in this scene, the citizens of Oceania perform consciously and unconsciously at the same moment the act of (self-) deception leaving all rationality and logic aside and accepting the sudden change as an unquestionable matter-of-fact.

Winston Smith contemplates on the intellectual capacity, i.e. the positive liberty, of his comrades and detects that the doctrine of the Party is most successfully imposed “on people incapable of understanding it” (1984 163). Thus, people whose positive liberty is restricted, by low intelligence on the one hand, and through the appliance of *doublethink*, on the other hand, can be made to “accept the most flagrant violations of reality, because they never fully grasped the enormity of what was demanded of them” (1984 163). Smith adds: “By lack of understanding they remained sane.” (1984 163)

Insane, however, according to Smith, is the intelligentsia, i.e. the higher class or the Inner Party. Smith states that the most refined practitioners of *doublethink* are those who invented this system of thought and “know that it is a vast system of mental cheating” (1984 224). It appears confounding, yet Smith insists that:

In our society, those who have the best knowledge of what is happening are also those who are furthest from seeing the world as it is. In general, the greater the understanding, the greater the delusion: the more intelligent, the less sane. (1984 224)

It appears rather contradictory that the intellectuals should deliberately limit their own amount of positive liberty by deluding themselves with *doublethink*; however, we must consider the fact that the intellectuals in *1984* are mainly interested in power. It should be noted that a power-crazed mind represents a vast inner obstacle to the development of a higher nature in Berlin's sense and that it has the ability to make the most intelligent man a lunatic slave of his own desire for power – a desire which often obscures the sense of reality.

4.3.Thoughtcrime

The political system of *Ingsoc*, which demands complete uniformity of its subjects, does not tolerate “even the smallest deviation of opinion on the most unimportant subject” (*1984* 219). For, it is not only the subversive action that counts as a crime; it is already the heretic thought that is regarded as the worst crime possible, the so called *thoughtcrime*. O'Brian makes clear: “We are not interested in those stupid crimes that you have committed. The Party is not interested in the overt act: the thought is all we care about.” (*1984* 265) It is, therefore, utterly dangerous to have your own attitudes in Oceania, especially if these are non-compliant to the state's policy. In relation to Berlin's theory, it can be said that in *1984* it is dangerous to possess a certain amount of positive freedom, i.e. to think autonomously and to be the instrument of one's own acts of will.

The Party systematically narrows down the area of positive liberty of its citizens in order to destroy potential independent ideas which would question the hegemony of the Party. For instance, next to *doublethink*, the Party has taught its members to apply the method of *crimestop* whenever a dissident thought should occur:

Crimestop means the faculty of stopping short, as though by instinct, at the threshold of any dangerous thought. It includes the power of not grasping analogies, of failing to perceive logical errors, of misunderstanding the simplest arguments if they are inimical to Ingsoc, and of being bored or repelled by any train of thought which is capable of leading in a heretical direction. *Crimestop*, in short, means protective stupidity. (1984 220/221)

Psychologically speaking, *crimestop* can be regarded as a self-defence mechanism that repels 'undesirable' thoughts and impulses keeping them unconscious. As such it represents an inner obstruction of positive liberty.

People whose ideas in the first place conform to the principles of the Party due to their freedom of thought being restricted could be compared with Berlin's paradox of the contented slave. Orwell depicts the majority of Oceania's population as perfectly satisfied with Big Brother and his regime and content with the living conditions. Does this imply that, since they are seemingly content with their lives and approve of the Party, they are free in a positive sense of the word? In order to answer this question, let us bear in mind that the desires and thoughts of an individual should be autonomously developed by the subject him/herself, if he or she is to be called positively free. If one's ideas are imposed upon oneself through manipulation and indoctrination, we cannot speak of freedom. If these thoughts were developed rationally and autonomously by independently thinking subjects, who are aware of other options, they could be rightly called free.

Committing *thoughtcrime*, then, can be associated with an inner struggle for liberty. It can be seen as a sign of an independent mind trying to escape the clutches of the Party's indoctrination. Thus, it is not surprising that the regime persecutes and takes ruthless action against dissidents. "*Thoughtcrime does not entail death: thoughtcrime IS death,*" (1984 30) writes Smith in his secret diary pointing to the fact that sooner or later the *Thought Police* will inevitably catch him and finally kill him. As a matter of fact, the *Thought Police* has established a vast control system to detect *thoughtcriminals*, so that, be it

due to constant surveillance or due to denunciation by one of the Spies or a comrade, no dissident ever escapes unnoticed and unscathed.

Thoughtcriminals once captured by the police, are transferred to the Ministry of Love, where after a long period of torture they have to confess to all their alleged crimes, before finally their will is completely broken and they surrender to Big Brother and his doctrine. Only after being mentally defeated by the Party, they are executed and erased from the records - They become *unpersons*. O'Brien comments on the Party's claim to mental capitulation of its dissidents in this way:

When finally you surrender to us, it must be of your own free will. We do not destroy the heretic because he resists to us: so long as he resists us we never destroy him. We convert him, we capture his inner mind, we reshape him. We burn all evil and all illusion out of him; we bring him over to our side, not in appearance, but genuinely, heart and soul. We make him one of ourselves before we kill him. It is intolerable to us that an erroneous thought should exist anywhere in the world, however secret and powerless it may be. Even in the instant of death we cannot permit any deviations. In the old days the heretic walked to the stake still a heretic, proclaiming his heresy, exulting in it. Even the victim of the Russian purges could carry rebellion locked up in his skull as he walked down the passage waiting for the bullet. But we make the brain perfect before we blow it out. (1984 267)

4.4. Are Winston and Julia Positively Free?

Winston Smith despises the mystique of the Party and the worship of Big Brother. He frantically tries to recollect a time, when he was a young child, hoping to find some solace in the past, when things were different. At least, he hopes that things were different, for he cannot exactly remember and since the historic facts have been falsified by the Ministry of Truth – an institution where he himself is involved in the process of altering the facts – there is little undeniable evidence he could refer to in order to affirm his theories about the dishonesty of the Party. Although he knows about it, he cannot prove anything:

How could you tell how much of it was lies? It *might* be true that the average human being was better off now than he had been before the Revolution. The only evidence to the contrary was the mute process in your own bones, the instinctive feeling that the conditions you lived in were intolerable and that at some other time they must have been different. (1984 76)

It becomes clear that Smith has somehow managed to stay resistant to the Party's indoctrination and manipulation. He seems immune to propaganda, he does not apply the method of *doublethink*, he disapproves of the Party's sexual morality and he certainly does not refrain from non-conformist ideas. Indisputably, Smith represents a *thoughtcriminal*. Viewed in this light, he seems to have retained his positive liberty by being able to conceive his own opinions and to act according to his own free will. Smith is indeed quite intelligent and capable of grasping logical coherences and figuring out manipulation techniques. However, he seems intellectually inferior to the members of the Inner Party, for he cannot comprehend the ultimate aim of the Party's policy, which is, according to O'Brien, "solely power" (1984 275). "*I understand HOW: I do not understand WHY,*" writes Smith in his diary (1984 83). Furthermore, he feels despairingly alone, "a minority of one", (1984 83) not knowing whether he is a lunatic, or the last human left in the world. For this reason, he seeks and longs for like-minded people believing

that O'Brian might be a secret opponent of the regime as well. In Julia he finds a kindred spirit and so, winged by the hope for resistance and a possible shift of paradigm one day in the future, they both light-headedly and unwarily walk right into O'Brian's trap.

Julia, compared against Winston, knows much better how to survive in the system. Although she despises the constricting rules of the regime as well, she is able to successfully disguise her true nature by simulating a commendable devotee of Big Brother and the Party. Unlike Winston, Julia, however, does not appear very interested in a general discussion about political ideology; she does not seem capable of a meta level analysis of the "ramifications of Party doctrine" (see *1984* 163); instead she is only interested in the area of her own private liberty to do whatever she feels like doing, for instance making love with whomever she wants to. This fact has brought her Winston's critique to be "only a rebel from the waist downwards" (*1984* 163).

Relating to the theory of positive liberty, one could argue that Julia definitely possesses a certain degree of positive freedom due to the fact that she opposes to the Party doctrine and follows her own, individually and rationally developed desires and ideas about her own life. However, is it justified to say that her amount of positive liberty might be of a lower nature since her ideas and actions centre mainly on lower passions and impulses? Employing traditional and obsolete gender roles on his characters (the male being more intellectual, the female more sensual) Orwell clearly depicts Julia as intellectually inferior to Winston. Further, she apparently betrays Winston in the Ministry of Love much earlier than he betrays her, which should also point to her lower, less idealistic nature. From a feminist point of view, Orwell might cause frowns and arouse criticism in this point.

However, Stephen Ingle's argumentation throws a different light on Julia's autonomy:

It is clear that it was love for Winston and not any desire to overthrow the regime that drove her to join the brotherhood. Julia was concerned only with little victories, with defeating the Party every time she made love, drank real coffee or used make-up. Julia, not Winston, was concerned with pursuing her own 'free and unfettered volition'. [...] Winston had noted earlier of her that 'the standards she obeyed were private ones. Her feelings were her own, and could not be altered from outside'. And ultimately, Winston dismissed her as a rebel only from waist downwards. Winston Smith was not the last truly autonomous individual in Europe: Julia was. (Ingle 127)

Referring to Winston's autonomy, Ingle points out:

Far from a searcher for the truth, a bloodied champion of the individual as an autonomous moral agent, Winston Smith turned out to have been a closet collectivist, and indeed a potential terrorist. Can we seriously consider a man who was prepared, even anxious, to undertake savage acts which, of their nature, would necessarily deprive many unknown individuals of their own truths, indeed of their own lives, to be a talisman for individual moral autonomy? Winston Smith was just as willing as Rousseau to force people to be free. (Ingle 136)

Both, Julia and Winston, believe that, once arrested, they will manage to maintain their positive liberty and to stay human by not betraying their own feelings. "They can't get inside you" (1984 174) is what they hope:

They could not alter your feelings: for that matter you could not alter them yourself, even if you wanted to. They could lay bare in the utmost detail everything that you had done or said or thought; but the inner heart, whose workings were mysterious even to yourself, remained impregnable. (1984 174)

Ultimately, "to die hating them, that was freedom" (1984 294) signifies Winston's belief in his own and in human's (positive) liberty in general. However, letting the Party power triumph over individual idealism, Orwell leaves us completely disillusioned by ending the novel with his protagonist being converted and his will broken: "He had won the victory over himself. He loved Big Brother." (1984 311)

5. The Manifestations of Negative Liberty in *A Clockwork Orange*

5.1. “As Queer as a Clockwork Orange”

The artist Anthony Burgess was somewhat unhappy that of the fifty and more works which he published during his lifetime, *A Clockwork Orange* was the most famous one. He believed he had written far better books and feared he would be remembered “as the fountain and origin of a great film”, i.e. the celebrated Stanley Kubrick’s adaption of the novel. “He compared himself to Rachmaninoff, whose Prelude in C Sharp Minor, written as a boy, is better known than the works of his maturity.” (*Clockwork* vii) But it is *A Clockwork Orange*, one of his first works published in 1962, which the readers first associate with the name Anthony Burgess (see *Clockwork* vii). And indeed, it is a very special novel. To begin with the title, which is a colloquial cockney expression the writer once heard on the underground: “as queer as a clockwork orange” meaning very queer indeed. “I had always liked the cockney expression and felt there might be a meaning in it deeper than a bizarre metaphor of, not necessarily sexual, queerness.” Burgess said. (qtd. in Wenzl 38) Then there is the strictly symmetric tripartite structure of the novel, the vision of a near-future society, the description of a youth-culture in revolt, a corrupt police force and a helpless government. Furthermore, there is the queer, exotic language of *A Clockwork Orange*, and finally its moral dilemma concerning the freedom and autonomy of men (see *Clockwork* vii). All these factors make the novel an outstanding and unique work of art.

5.2. Alex and his Droogs

Unlike Winston Smith in George Orwell's *1984*, Alex, the protagonist of *A Clockwork Orange* does not appear to suffer from serious and unjustified limitations of his negative liberty on behalf of the government at the beginning of his narrative. On the contrary, the officials seem quite helpless against youth gangs and their hooligan behaviour which spreads terror among the civil population. As Alex explains: "You never really saw many of the older bourgeois type after nightfall those days, what with the shortage of police and we fine young malchckiwicks³ about." (*Clockwork* 6) The boys, trying to escape the dreariness of the working class society they live in, seek pleasure in exaggerated acts of violence. Remarkable as an indicator for the stifling tediousness and the repetitive monotony of everyday life is the phrase "What's it going to be then, eh?" with which each new episode of Alex's goings-on is initiated. Indeed, this prospect of a monotonous life as led by Alex's parents appears the only objective the young of that society rebel against, since they are not bothered about politics and politics in general does not necessarily interfere in their lives. Compared with the situation in Orwell's *1984* political oppression does not, at least at the beginning of the novel, play a significant role. Thus, the community depicted by Burgess can be said to feature a reasonable degree of negative liberty. Yet the juveniles, especially Alex and his *droogs*⁴ are not content with the confines of liberty that are due to them and want more. This extra range of freedom they demand inevitably violates the *Harm Principle* as outlined by John Stuart Mill which purports that the only purpose for which liberty may be restricted and power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community is to prevent harm to others.⁵ Put another way, the principle is also realised in the old aphorism "My freedom ends where yours begins". Alex and his contemporaries, however, seek to violate the liberty and security of other people seemingly just for the fun of it.

³ Nadsat: boys.

⁴ Nadsat: friends.

⁵ see Chapter 2.

Already at the very beginning of the novel the evil intentions of the first-person narrator, Alex, are expressed in a programmatic way. Alex and his *droogs* are sitting in the *Korova Milkbar*, bored, hoping for some excitement:

Our pockets were full of deng⁶, so there was no real need from the point of view of crasting any more pretty polly⁷ to tolchock⁸ some old veck⁹ in an alley and viddy¹⁰ him swim in his blood while we counted the takings and divided by four, nor to do the ultra-violent on some shivering starry¹¹ grey-haired ptitsa¹² in a shop and go smecking¹³ off with the till's guts. (*Clockwork 3*)

So the boys have collected enough money, i.e. robbed it from defenceless people, like they always do, however, their hunger for turmoil is not slaked yet, as it scarcely ever is. To escape the boredom, Alex and his three *droogs* have, as usual, taken drugs, which can also be regarded as a way of expanding one's freedom and transgressing the limitations of one's negative liberty, if we consider the fact that drugs are prohibited by the law. Yet, in the England of *A Clockwork Orange* the boys take some new, apparently synthetic drugs that are not prohibited yet. The illustration of designer narcotics called *vellocet*, *synthemesc* or *drencrom* is only one of Burgess's many prophetic inventions in the novel. Indeed, the description of the state of intoxication resembles the effects of psychedelic drugs such as LSD, which reached high popularity in the late 1960ies and 1970ies:

He was in the land all right, well away, in orbit, and I knew what it was like, having tried it like everybody else had done, but at this time I'd got to thinking it was a cowardly sort of a veshch¹⁴, O my brothers. You'd lay there after you'd drunk the old moloko¹⁵ and then you got the messel¹⁶ that everything all round you was sort of in the past. You could viddy it all right, all of it, very clear – tables, the stereo, the lights, the sharps and the malchicks¹⁷ – but it was like some veshch that used to

⁶ Nadsat: money.

⁷ Nadsat: money.

⁸ Nadsat: to hit.

⁹ Nadsat: guy.

¹⁰ Nadsat: to see.

¹¹ Nadsat: old.

¹² Nadsat: girl/ bird.

¹³ Nadsat: to laugh.

¹⁴ Nadsat: thing.

¹⁵ Nadsat: milk.

¹⁶ Nadsat: thought.

¹⁷ Nadsat: boy.

be there but was not there not no more. And you were sort of hypnotized by your boot or shoe or a finger-nail as it might be, and at the same time you were sort of picked up by the old scruff and shook like you might be a cat. You got shook and shook till there was nothing left. You lost your name and your body and your self and you just didn't care, and you waited till your boot or your finger-nail got yellow, then yellower and yellower all the time. Then the lights started cracking light atomics and the boot or finger-nail or, as it might be, a bit of dirt on your trouser-bottom turned into a big big big mesto¹⁸, bigger than the whole world, and you were just going to get introduced to old Bog or God when it was all over. You came back to here and now whimpering sort of, with your rot all squaring up for a boohooohoo. (*Clockwork 5*)

What follows is a spate of violent scenarios deliberately initiated by the four boys, starting off with the bloody bludgeoning of an elderly bourgeois gentleman with some heavy books under his arm in front of a library. The gang catches him up and starts to provoke and humiliate him. They rip up the pages of the books and being accused of vandalism by the old man, they viciously beat him up:

'You naughty old veck, you!' I said, and then we begun to filly about with him. Pete held his rookers¹⁹ and Georgie sort of hooked his rot²⁰ wide open for him and Dim yanked out his false zoobies²¹, upper and lower. He threw these down on the pavement and then I treated them to the old booth-crush, though they were hard bastards like, being made of some new horrorshow plastic stuff. The old veck began to make sort of chumbling²² shooms²³ – 'wuf waf wof' – so Georgie let go of holding his goobers²⁴ apart and just let him have one in the toothless rot with his ringy fist, and that made the old veck start moaning a lot then, then comes the blood, my brothers, real beautiful. (*Clockwork 7*)

In contrast to the conditions in 1984, the heroes – i.e. anti-heroes - of *A Clockwork Orange* are not the victims of oppression, but they are the oppressors themselves. Not their civil rights are violated, but they infringe the rights of others by disorienting them, for instance, of the right to physical integrity and property. As an example, they assault a homeless drunkard,

¹⁸ Nadsat: place.

¹⁹ Nadsat: arms/ hands.

²⁰ Nadsat: mouth.

²¹ Nadsat: teeth.

²² Nadsat: mumbling.

²³ Nadsat: noises.

²⁴ Nadsat: lips.

who, being unable to protect himself, expresses his sorrow for a “stinking world like this one” complaining that it “lets the young get on to the old” and that “there’s no law nor order no more” (*Clockwork* 12).

The ultimate act of violence, however, is performed on a married couple into whose home the gang manages to enter by a tricky deception. It is the home of an author who is writing on a book called *A Clockwork Orange* – “a fair gloopy²⁵ title” Alex remarks. “Who ever heard of a clockwork orange?” (*Clockwork* 18) The work is obviously a piece of political writing advocating liberalism and demanding less regimentation:

The attempt to impose upon a man, a creature of growth and capable of sweetness, to ooze juicily at the last round the bearded lips of God, to attempt to impose, I say, laws and conditions appropriate to a mechanical creation, against this I raise my sword-pen. (*Clockwork* 18)

As we later get to know, the name of the author is F. Alexander, an intellectual and writer of subversive literature; and given the fact that he strongly opposes the so-called Ludovico’s technique - the treatment Alex naively consents to undergo - the quoted passage above may represent an extract of a manifesto against the said technique. On any account, the passage implies a position against laws and regimentation which would make humans, hence creatures capable of growth and willing to learn, a mechanical creation, a clockwork, and so minimise their liberty. To impose laws and certain conditions upon humans is always a matter of outer interference, and as such it belongs to the field of negative liberty.

It appears ironic that of all people the subversive writer himself becomes the victim of youth delinquency and turns into a vindictive man longing to take the law into his own hands and punish Alex for his misdemeanour. Yet, the gravity of Alex’s and his friends’ trespasses in relation to the author and his wife cannot be denied. For, what happens in the home of the couple is sheer horror and blatantly evil and obscene: The boys rape the author’s wife in front of his eyes:

²⁵ Nadsat: stupid.

So he did the strong-man on the devotchka²⁶, who was still creech creech creeching²⁷ away in very horroshow four-in-a-bar, locking her rookers from the back, while I ripped away at this and that and the other, the others going haw haw haw still, and real good horrorshow groodies²⁸ they were that then exhibited their pink glazzies²⁹, O my brothers, while I untrussed and got ready for the plunge. Plunging, I could slooshy³⁰ cries of agony and this writer bleeding veck that Georgie and Pete held on to nearly got loose howling bezoomny³¹ with the filthiest of slovos³² that I already knew and others he was making up. Then after me it was right old Dim should have his turn, which he did in a beastly snorty howly sort of a way with his Peebee Shelley maskie taking no notice, while I held on to her. Then there was a changeover, Dim and me grabbing the slobbering writer veck who was past struggling really, only just coming out with slack of sort of slovos like he was in the land in a milk-plus bar, and Pete and Georgie had theirs. Then there was like quite and we were full of like hate, so smashed what was left to be smashed – typewriter, lamp, chairs – and Dim, it was typical of old Dim, watered the fire out and was going to dung on the carpet, there being plenty of paper, but I said no. ‘Out out out out,’ I howled. The writer veck and his zheena³³ were not really there, bloody and torn and making noises. But they’d live. (*Clockwork* 20)

What we have here is an autobiographical reference: Burgess’s first wife was beaten and robbed in London by a gang of four GI deserters. As a consequence, she suffered a miscarriage. The writer conjectured that her poor health and early death may be connected to the attack (see *Clockwork* xiv).

The fictionalizing of this episode in *A Clockwork Orange* was a catharsis for Burgess, and, as he once said, ‘an act of charity’ to his wife’s assailants, since he chooses to write it as if from their point of view rather than their victim’s. (*Clockwork* xiv)

Taking all the obscenities into account, the situation in the streets of Burgess’s dystopian London with its gang fights, robberies, rapes and deliberate vandalism is reminiscent of what the Social Contract philosopher

²⁶ Nadsat: girl.

²⁷ Nadsat: to scream.

²⁸ Nadsat: breast.

²⁹ Nadsat: eyes / nipples.

³⁰ Nadsat: to hear.

³¹ Nadsat: mad.

³² Nadsat: words.

³³ Nadsat: wife.

Thomas Hobbes calls the state of nature. As has been outlined in chapter 2, such a state is realised in a condition without government, that is, in a state with maximum negative liberty, where each individual decides for himself/herself how to act there being no laws or restrictions of any kind. In this state of mere nature the individual is judge, jury and executioner in his or her own case whenever a dispute arises because there are no agencies or authorities to arbitrate disputes and exercise power to enforce decisions (see Lloyd ch.3). As a matter of course, there is a government in *A Clockwork Orange*; however, it is initially too lax and unable to control the situation.

Alex and his friends, as well as other boy gangs, who have managed to create their own state of nature, act like the people described by Hobbes. For, the philosopher draws a very pessimistic image of humanity assuming that people are greedy and egoistic and although they have local affections, their benevolence is limited and they are prone to partiality. In the state of nature everybody has a natural right to preserve oneself and undertake whatever one considers needful for one's preservation. However, there are no limits as to what one might judge necessary for one's preservation and the theoretically circumscribed right of nature becomes practically an unlimited right to anything, or, in Hobbes's words, a right "to all things" (see Lloyd ch.3). If we follow Hobbes's contemplations, it becomes replicable that such a right of each to all things invites unavoidable conflict and clash of interests. Mind that humans, according to the philosopher, are greedy and interested in their own benefit; specifically when there is competition for resources, as there always will certainly be, especially over goods such as the most desirable lands, materials, food, spouses, etc. In expectance and fear that others may invade them, people may plan to strike first following the 'Offence is the best defence' principle. Moreover, persons tending to be proud or naturally dominant and to enjoy exercising power over others will try to impose their dominance over their fellow men. There will be, furthermore, dispute over moral and religious questions and since everybody is free to decide what is right and what wrong for him/ her but also to enforce his/ her

views on other people, and there being no authority to resolve the conflicts, the situation is doomed to escalate into a state of war (see Lloyd ch.4).

A state of war is exactly what we have in *A Clockwork Orange*, for, it is a war in the streets between delinquent youth gangs who do not accept any moral values or laws, who do not respect any authority except for their own maxims, and who spread fear and terror among innocent people. Alex and his friends seem, at the beginning of the narrative, inherently evil; they make an extensive use of the 'natural right to all things', and create a situation in which a perverted notion of negative liberty becomes evident, namely a state of pure chaos and anarchy.

5.3. How the “Ludovico’s Technique” Affects Negative Liberty

Deceived and decoyed into a trap by his *droogs* who do not want him as their leader anymore, the young boy fails during an attack on an older woman and is finally imprisoned for murder. His imprisonment marks a turning point in the narrative, as this is the first time that his criminal behaviour is followed by serious punishment and the liberty he had claimed for himself is suddenly constrained. Nevertheless, Alex, although only fifteen years old, seems to master the new circumstances quite well: He is still able to enjoy both his beloved classical music and violence. Regularly helping the prison charlie³⁴, a good-hearted priest with a drinking problem, with the musical selection for the Sunday mass, Alex manages to keep in constant touch with his passion for music. Also, he finds extreme pleasure in reading the violent parts of the bible that would send him into rapture:

³⁴ Nadsat: chaplain.

They would like lock me in and let me slooshy³⁵ holy music by J.S. Bach and G.F. Handel, and I would read of all these starry yahoodies³⁶ tolchocking³⁷ each other and then peeting³⁸ their Hebrew vino and getting on to the bed with their wives' like hand-maidens, real horrorshow. That kept me going, brothers. (*Clockwork* 60)

Moreover, listening to the music of Bach, he even imagines helping in and taking charge of the nailing in of Jesus, "being dressed in a like toga that was the height of Roman fashion" (*Clockwork* 60). On the whole, Alex considers his time in prison "not all that wasted" (*Clockwork* 60) until he overhears the news about a new treatment "that gets you out of prison in no time at all and makes sure that you never get back in again" (*Clockwork* 62).

The treatment the young protagonist has heard of is the so called Ludovico's technique, a psychological aversion therapy, still at an experimental stage, which would, as the inventors and the advocates of the method say, cure the criminals by eliminating the criminal instinct:

Common criminals like this unsavoury crowd [...] can best be dealt with on a purely curative basis. Kill the criminal reflex, that' all. Full implementation in a year's time. Punishment means nothing to them, you can see that. They enjoy their so-called punishment. They start murdering each other. (*Clockwork* 69)

Alex, infatuated with the idea of an early release and not knowing what the treatment really entails, determines to volunteer for the experiment despite the scepticism and the premonitions of the prison charlie. So he ends up being the guinea pig for Dr. Brodsky and his team of scientists. These force Alex, after they have injected him with drugs, to watch extremely violent images for a long period of time without being able to close his eyes or interrupt the treatment. Bound to a chair in front of a gigantic silver screen, Alex has to watch short films and scenes of horrible rapes, murder, homicide, bloody fights, etc. What the teenager then goes through is a near death

³⁵ Nadsat: to listen.

³⁶ Nadsat: Jews.

³⁷ Nadsat: to hit.

³⁸ Nadsat: to drink.

experience, suffering under extreme forms of disgust and nausea as an effect of the drugs the doctors have injected him.

The idea behind the treatment is quite simple and goes back to early psychological experiments as carried out by the behaviourists Ivan Pavlov and B.F. Skinner. Thus, the Ludovico's technique is a variation of the classical conditioning procedure, which is a form of associative learning, i.e. "a type of learning principle based on the assumption that ideas and experiences reinforce one another and can be linked to enhance the learning process." (The Free Dictionary) In Alex's case the simultaneous experience of images of violence and the nausea caused by the medicaments lead to the assimilation of the sensations with the result that violence is associated with illness and each time he should attempt to perform or even just witness violence, he will feel terribly ill and nauseated.

'Now, then,' said Dr Brodsky, 'how do you think this is done? Tell me, what do you think we're doing to you?'

'You're making me feel ill, I'm ill when I look at those filthy pervert films of yours. But it's not really the films that's doing it. But I feel that if you stop these films I'll stop feeling ill.'

'Right,' said Dr Brodsky. 'it's association, the oldest educational method in the world. And what really causes you to feel ill?'

'These grahzny³⁹ sodding⁴⁰ veshches that come out of my gulliver and my plott⁴¹,' I said, 'that's what it is.'

[...]

'Well,' he said to me, 'it isn't the wires. It's nothing to do with what's fastened to you. Those are just for measuring your reactions. What is it, then?'

I viddied then, of course, what a bezoomny shoot I was not to notice that it was the hypodermic shots in the rooker. (*Clockwork* 86)

Soon Alex notices that it was a big mistake to assent to the treatment, especially during the presentation of a Nazi film as he bitterly has to realise that the hideous images are accompanied by the pompous music of Beethoven, with the consequence that from then on he will not be able to listen to his favourite music without associating violence with it and thus feel

³⁹ Nadsat: dirty.

⁴⁰ Nadsat: fucking (idiom.).

⁴¹ Nadsat: flesh.

terrible pain and sickness. "It's a sin, that's what it is, a filthy unforgivable sin, you bratchnies⁴²," Alex exclaims, "Using Ludwig van like that. He did no harm to anyone. Beethoven just wrote music" (*Clockwork* 85). "Each man kills the thing he loves," Dr Branom responds. "Here's the punishment element, perhaps." (*Clockwork* 85) It should be noted that Burgess has obviously chosen the name Ludovico (Italian form of Ludwig) for the technique for ironic purposes.

In terms of the aspects of negative liberty it is exactly the punishment factor that should be taken into account. As a matter of fact, a new government has come into power during Alex's imprisonment, a more stringent government which has dedicated itself to a more consistent prosecution of criminals and a more effective form of punishment. The Minister of the Interior's remark "Soon we may be needing all our prison space for political offenders," (*Clockwork* 69) implies that the situation under the new regime is going to be anything but lax and that the liberal area of the former government has definitely come to an end. The implementation of the Ludovico's technique thus perfectly fits into the new State policy since it represents a means of maintaining control and exercising perfect power over the citizens. As far as the aspect of punishment is concerned, the Governor is first not able to grasp the magnitude of such a treatment:

Well, these new ridiculous ideas have come at last and orders are orders, though I may say to you in confidence that I do not approve. I most emphatically do not approve. An eye for an eye, I say. If someone hits you you hit back, do you not? Why then should not the State, very severely hit by you brutal hooligans, not hit back also? But the new view is to say no. The new view is that we turn the bad into the good. All of which seems to me grossly unjust. (*Clockwork* 70)

Yet, what the Governor fails to recognise is that there is possibly no greater punishment than to bereave somebody of his/ her free choice. The treatment narrows down the number of options how to act and react by allowing only one possible kind of behaviour, namely the kind the government regards as

⁴² Nadsat: bastards.

desirable. After the treatment, Alex is no longer in charge of his actions. He cannot choose the direction of his behaviour since the only option he has is to behave according to the conditioning. All other options are eliminated. As such, the treatment represents a massive form of outer interference and limitation of one's liberty. In this regard, the technique can be seen as a very powerful instrument which is open to politically motivated abuse. Although Alex has volunteered for the treatment, he was not sufficiently informed about its implications. It should be reckoned that he represents a test subject who takes part in a psychological experiment. After the technique has proved to be successful, it appears rather doubtful that the future captives will have the right to decide if they want to undergo the treatment or rather stay in prison. The writer of subversive literature, Alexander F. cuts right to the chase of the matter:

Recruiting brutal young roughs for the police. Proposing debilitating and will-sapping techniques of conditioning. [...] We've seen it all before [...] in other countries. The thin end of the wedge. Before we know where we are we shall have the full apparatus of totalitarianism. [...] Will not the Government itself now decide what is and what is not crime and pump out the life and guts and will of whoever sees fit to displease the Government? (*Clockwork* 118)

Before Alexander F. realises that the boy he has given shelter in his home is the same person who had attacked him and his wife years before, the writer contemplates to exploit the boy in his oppositional fight against the new regime and its dubious methods. "What a superb device he can be, this boy." (*Clockwork* 120) Therefore, he decides to use Alex as an instrument in the name of liberty:

Some of us have to fight. There are great traditions of liberty to defend. I am no partisan man. Where I see infamy I seek to erase it. Party names mean nothing. The tradition of liberty means all. The common people will let it go, oh yes. They will sell liberty for a quieter life. That is why they must be prodded, prodded – (*Clockwork* 119)

When the writer recognises his tormentor, he sniffs the chance to kill two birds with one stone: on the one hand to exact vengeance on Alex for the

death of his wife by trying to drive him into suicide, on the other hand to make the suicide look as the consequence of the treatment and therefore the government's fault. His plan almost succeeds; Alex, however, survives the suicide attempt. The writer's confederates still triumph on Alex's hospital bed:

Friend [...], friend, little friend [...] the people are on fire with indignation. You have killed those horrible boastful villains' chances of re-election. They will go and will go for ever and ever. You have served Liberty well. (*Clockwork* 126)

Yet, the government and the Minister of the Interior seem even more unscrupulous than their opposition when it comes to exploiting Alex for political purposes. After his suicide attempt they manage to persuade him that they were his friends and that they would protect him from further attacks on behalf of Alexander F. and his confederates. "[...] you're safe from him now. We put him away." (*Clockwork* 131) And, if we take into account what has been said about the political offenders, it is easy to imagine what has happened to the writer's liberty.

6. The Manifestations of Positive Liberty in *A Clockwork Orange*

6.1. Alex's Positive Liberty Before Being Exposed to the "Ludovico's Technique"

Positive liberty, by definition, refers to having the competence and power to fulfil one's own potential and to be the master of his/ her actions. Before the treatment Alex appears to be the master of his actions in so far as it is his own choice to act the way he acts. His decisions depend solely on himself and not on any external forces. Alex seems to be master of his own acts of will and not of anybody else's. He represents a doer - deciding and not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external forces, conceiving his goals and plans on his own and realising them. In this respect, he is free. However, although not being slave to a man, Alex is a slave to his own "unbridled passions, as Berlin puts it (132). Considering the distinction between the ideal or true self and the lower nature with its uncontrolled impulses, Alex is anything but free according to the postulates of positive liberty. In principle, the positive notion of liberty is very idealistic positing that true freedom is achieved through moral, ethic, idealistic behaviour. According to this theory, the true human nature is good and thus true freedom is realised by choosing the good thing and so fulfilling one's true nature. Alex, however, is a perfect hedonist who lives just for the moment and does not calculate the long-term consequences of his irrational actions. His lower passions and desires are connected to sex and violence and he lacks restraint in the gratification of his various lusts. He would stop at nothing to

achieve his aims and satisfy his instincts. Thus, Alex represents the very antithesis to the contended slave as discussed by Berlin.

In fact, Alex seems the personification of Sigmund Freud's psychic structure of the *Id*. In his famous *Structure of Personality* theory, Freud constructs a theory which says that the human mind is divided into three structures: the *Ego*, the *Id* and the *Super-ego*. These operate unconsciously to produce our complex manifest behaviour. First, there is the *Id*, which represents the irrational and emotional part of the mind. At birth our mind is all *Id*, because it wants immediate satisfaction of its primitive needs without any delay. Thus, the only rule by which the *Id* is governed is the "pleasure principle". Moreover, the primitive mind of a new-born child basically consists of two main drives – the death drive (*Thanatos*) and the life/ love instinct (*Eros* or *Libido*). The death drive is concerned with aggression, destruction and death, whereas the love or life instinct is related to a psychic energy – mostly sexual desire - which wants to preserve the unity and cohesion of life. These two basic energies determine the needs and desires of the *Id*. (see Neill ch.1)

The *Ego* develops out of growing awareness that in reality you cannot always get the immediate satisfaction of your needs and desires. Therefore, the *Ego* tries to relate the needs of the *Id* to the real world via the "reality principle". The *Ego*, thus, represents the rational part of the mind which has to negotiate between the conflicting impulses coming from the *Id* and the *Super-ego*. It tries to find a rational compromise between reality, instincts and moral principles of the *Super-ego*. (see Neill ch.2)

The *Super-ego* develops as the last part of the mind and represents the embodiment of parental and social morality. Always striving for a perfection ideal and right behaviour it represents a strict system of rules, which is able to enforce anxiety as punishment for wrong behaviour. Therefore, feelings of guilt and bad conscience are two characteristic features of this structure of mind. (see Neill ch.3)

In psychoanalytic terms, Alex initially appears to have a far too strong *Id* being intent on self-gratification and completely uncaring to others, whereas his *Ego* seems rather underdeveloped and the *Super-ego* not existent at all due to the seemingly total lack of conscience. In relation to the theory of positive liberty, the *Id* can be equated with what the positive liberty theorists call the lower nature or the empirical self that consists of irrational desires and impulses. The higher nature, the idealistic, rational and true self can be compared to both the *Ego* and the *Super-ego*, whereby the rational part is represented by the *Ego* and the idealistic by the *Super-ego*.

Yet, despite his predilection for violence and antisocial and amoral behaviour, Alex is not stupid (unlike Dim). On the contrary, he is very bright and appears to possess an immense intellectual capacity, which is also mirrored in his love for classical music, Bach, Mozart, Handel and above all Beethoven. "It may reflect Burgess's own prejudices that, feeling some affection for his hero, he could not permit him to be a devotee of pop." (*Clockwork* xxiii) However, Burgess uses music above all to refer to the contemporary public debate over whether high art is a civilising force. "The fact that the men who ran Auschwitz read Shakespeare and Goethe, and played Bach and Beethoven, was much discussed at the time Burgess was writing *A Clockwork Orange*." (*Clockwork* xxiii) In the novel Alex also makes fun of the common assumption that fine arts contribute to the humanisation of men and have a direct influence on the moral character of a human being and therefore foster the establishment of positive liberty:

I had to have a smeck⁴³, though, thinking of what I'd viddied⁴⁴ once in one of these like articles on Modern Youth, about how Modern Youth would be better off if A Lively Appreciation Of The Arts could be like encouraged. Great Music, it said, and Great Poetry, would like quieten Modern Youth down and make Modern Youth more Civilised. Civilised my syphilised yarbles⁴⁵. Music always sharpens me up, O my brothers, and made me like feel like old Bog⁴⁶ himself, ready to make with the old

⁴³ Nadsat: laugh.

⁴⁴ Nadsat: to see.

⁴⁵ Nadsat: testicles.

⁴⁶ Nadsat: God.

donner and blitzen and have vecks⁴⁷ and ptitsas⁴⁸ creeding away in my ha ha power. (*Clockwork* 32)

According to Sigmund Freud fine arts and violent or sexual impulses are indeed connected with each other. Here again we encounter the phenomenon of sublimation. Aggressive and sexual drives coming from the *Id* cannot be completely repressed by the *Ego*; therefore they are transformed into useful social and cultural energy. According to this theory, all cultural and artistic achievements go back to the proscribed impulses coming from the *Id*. Freud's psychoanalytic theory does not regard art as something purely intellectual and mental descending from the higher spheres of the human mind, on the contrary, art has its origins in the repressed aggressive and sexual instincts and impulses which seek satisfaction and find compensation in artistic and cultural activities.

Yet, this does not necessarily mean that through the process of sublimation the preoccupation with arts would quieten the *Id* impulses and successfully repress them. As the debate about Auschwitz and arts shows, and also as it is visible in Burgess's novel, in some cases art can reinforce and encourage the unconscious drives and energies. Listening to music, Alex, for instance, goes into raptures over vivid images of brutal violence and sadistic sexual acts:

As I slooshied⁴⁹, my glazzies⁵⁰ tight shut to shut in the bliss that was better than any synthemesc⁵¹ Bog or God, I knew such lovely pictures. There were vecks⁵² and ptitsas⁵³, young and starry, lying on the ground screaming for mercy, and I was smecking⁵⁴ all over my rot and grinding my boot in their litsos⁵⁵. And there were devotchkas⁵⁶ ripped and creeching⁵⁷ against walls and I plunging like a shlaga⁵⁸ into them, and

⁴⁷ Nadsat: guys.

⁴⁸ Nadsat: women.

⁴⁹ Nadsat: to listen.

⁵⁰ Nadsat: eyes.

⁵¹ Nadsat: a drug - synthetic mescaline.

⁵² Nadsat: guys.

⁵³ Nadsat: women.

⁵⁴ Nadsat: to laugh.

⁵⁵ Nadsat: face.

⁵⁶ Nadsat: girls.

⁵⁷ Nadsat: to scream.

indeed when the music, which was one movement only, rose to the top of its big highest tower, then, lying there on my bed with glazzies tight shut and rookers⁵⁹ behind my Gulliver, I broke and spattered and cried aaaaaah with the bliss of it. And so the lovely music glided to its glowing close. (*Clockwork* 27)

6.2. The Paternalistic Principle in *A Clockwork Orange*

We have already seen in Berlin's discussion about positive liberty that the notion of the true self or the higher human nature is often associated with a collective whole of which the individual is an element or member, for instance, a state or a religious community. The danger that is immanent in this conception of true freedom is that the collective will is imposed upon the individuals and so the members of the community are coerced into doing something in the name of a higher goal. For, if they were more enlightened they would pursue the goal themselves, the argument runs; yet since they are ignorant or corrupt they are unable to see the true nature of freedom or goodness and act deviously. Referred to the protagonist of *A Clockwork Orange*, if he knew better, he would choose the good thing, but since he does not, he must be coerced to choose it. This renders it easy for the collective to coerce others as it is conceived to happen for their own sake. Also Alex's coercion is justified in the name of goodness and above all in the name of his own sanity:

What is happening to you now is what should happen to any normal healthy human organism contemplating the actions of the forces of evil, the workings of the principle of destruction. You are being made sane, you are being made healthy. [...] When we are healthy we respond to the presence of the hateful with fear and nausea. (*Clockwork* 81)

When Alex objects to the proceeding of the treatment trying to persuade the psychologists that he has learnt his lesson: "But sir, sirs, I see that it's wrong.

⁵⁸ Nadsat: club.

⁵⁹ Nadsat: arms.

It's wrong because it's against like society, it's wrong because every veck⁶⁰ on earth has the right to live and be happy without being tolchocked⁶¹ and knifed," (*Clockwork* 87) the doctors reply that it is not within his power to decide anymore: "The heresy of an age of reason [...] I see what is right and approve, but I do what is wrong. No, no, my boy, you must leave it to us." (*Clockwork* 87) Here Burgess demonstrates how the paternalistic supervision operates in order to coerce individuals for their own sake and for the sake of a community, moreover, in the name of a higher good.

In *Recovering the Social Contract* Ron Replongle provides a metaphor that supports the notion of positive liberty and justifies paternalistic supervision:

Surely, it is no assault on my dignity as a person if you take my car keys, against my will, when I have had too much to drink. There is nothing paradoxical about making an agreement beforehand providing for paternalistic supervision in circumstances when our competence is open to doubt. (Replongle 164)

In this respect, positive liberty is seen as a set of rules formulated by the members of the community in question with the premise that all members have to agree upon the conventions. Taking this into account, positive liberty belongs to the field of Social Contract philosophy as advocated by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. However, Berlin explicitly contradicts any claim that positive liberty and paternalism belong together. For Berlin positive liberty applies only when the individual himself/ herself decides autonomously, even if he/she decides to abandon his/her freedom in pursuit of a higher goal being fully aware of alternatives and the consequences.⁶² Neither a general principle nor the norms of a society could be the reason for a withdrawal of liberty. In the case of the drunken driver whose car keys are removed against his/her will, we speak only then about positive liberty if the driver has, of his/her own free will, decided beforehand not to drive drunk. If the remover of the keys decides to act this way because he/she feels that the driver should

⁶⁰ Nadsat: guy.

⁶¹ Nadsat: to hit.

⁶² Compare with the example of the Muslim woman in chapter 2.

not drink and drive, yet without the driver himself/herself having made and expressed that intention, then this does not constitute positive liberty, but paternalism (see *Wikipedia* ch. 2). In *A Clockwork Orange* it may be true that Alex consents to the Ludovico's treatment, however, the boy is far from being aware of the consequences and of alternatives. The only thing he wants is to get out of prison as soon as possible. On no account does he consent to the withdrawal of his ability to choose freely and autonomously between good and evil.

6.3. The Issue of Positive Liberty After the “Ludovico’s Treatment”

After the Ludovico procedure has been successfully completed, the psychologists organise a demonstration of Alex's recovery in front of a public audience consisting of the Minister of the Interior or Inferior, as Alex calls him, the Staja⁶³ Governor, the prison charlie, and other important men and women. Alex is presented on a stage being provoked and bullied by an unknown man, who offends and hits the boy. Although the young protagonist would like to defend himself properly and hit back, he is unable to do so because at the very thought of violence he feels sick and painful. So, to mitigate the pain and the feelings auf nausea, Alex has to change his behaviour into the very opposite and display devoted kindness:

‘Please, I must do something. Shall I clean your boots? Look, I’ll get down and lick them.’ And, my brothers, believe it or kiss my sharries⁶⁴, I got down on my knees and pushed my red yahzick⁶⁵ out a mile and half to lick his grahzny⁶⁶ vonny⁶⁷ boots. (*Clockwork* 93)

⁶³ Nadsat: state jail.

⁶⁴ Nadsat: balls.

⁶⁵ Nadsat: tongue.

⁶⁶ Nadsat: dirty.

⁶⁷ Nadsat: stinky.

The treatment has turned Alex into a submissive slave who has no possibility any longer to act and react in accordance with his own will. As Dr Brodsky explains:

Our subject is, you see, impelled towards the good by, paradoxically, being impelled towards evil. The intention to act violently is accompanied by strong feelings of physical distress. To counter these the subject has to switch to a diametrically opposed attitude. (*Clockwork* 94)

Yet, it is not only violence that is made impossible, for, the sexual instincts appear tabooed as well. As a beautiful girl enters the stage Alex is immediately attracted to her and feels sexual desire: “[...] and the first thing that flashed into my gulliver⁶⁸ was that I would like to have her right down there on the floor with the old in-out real savage” (*Clockwork* 95). However, the sickness promptly returns and so Alex has to suppress his passions and play the role of a submissive devoted knight:

‘Let me,’ I creeched⁶⁹ out, ‘worship you and be like your helper and protector from the wicked like world.’ Then I thought of the right slovo⁷⁰ and felt better for it, saying: ‘Let me be like your true knight,’ and down I went again on the old knees, bowing and like scraping. (*Clockwork* 96)

Alex is released into a world where he cannot defend himself against the hostile environment he returns to. Not only that he is no longer welcome at home, but all his former victims now try to take revenge taking advantage of his inability to fight back. Moreover, Alex has to abandon many of his former rather innocent and harmless hobbies, such as reading the Bible, because there is too much description of violence in it so that he feels sick again. Also, his former *droogs* who are policemen now, take pleasure in torturing their former ringleader. Finally, F. Alexander abuses Alex for his political and private purposes and drives him into suicide with Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony.

⁶⁸ Nadsat: head.

⁶⁹ Nadsat: to cry out.

⁷⁰ Nadsat: word.

It is fair to say that although Alex has to act according to the conditioning of the Ludovico's technique displaying socially desirable and acceptable behaviour, his basic attitude has not altered. He would definitely hit back if he could, moreover, he would be the first one to hit. His hedonistic and antisocial passions are not eliminated, on the contrary, they are still vivid and strong, and they only cannot be lived out. Therefore, after the treatment, Alex is not freer in terms of positive liberty, for his higher nature is not realised autonomously, he is only forced to change his behaviour whereas his nature remains the same. After Alex has won back his consciousness in the hospital, he seems again able to enjoy thoughts about violence as he used to before the Ludovico treatment:

'Ah, shut it,' I said, 'or I'll give you something proper to yowl and creech⁷¹ about. Kick your zoobies⁷² in I will.' And, O my brothers, saying that made me feel a malenky⁷³ bit better, as if all like fresh red red krovvy⁷⁴ was flowing all through my plott⁷⁵. That was something I had to think about. It was like as though to get better I had had to get worse. (*Clockwork* 128)

Obviously the doctors have used Alex's blackout to undo the Ludovico conditioning and re-establish his freedom of choice. "'Deep hypnopaedia,' or some such slovo⁷⁶, said one of these two vecks⁷⁷. 'You seem to be cured.'" (*Clockwork* 130) In fact, the government had to react on the massive public pressure after Alex's suicide attempt; that is why they set out the withdrawal of Alex's conditioning. Also, as the government's image is endangered, the Minister of the Interior makes an agreement with Alex promising him his liberty and moreover his security and a carefree life, if he helps them to spruce up the government's image. "We always help our friends, don't we?" (*Clockwork* 131) So Alex's life seems re-established and from now on he would be free to do whatever pleases him with the government officially backing him up.

⁷¹ Nadsat: scream.

⁷² Nadsat: teeth.

⁷³ Nadsat: little.

⁷⁴ Nadsat: blood.

⁷⁵ Nadsat: flesh.

⁷⁶ Nadsat: word.

⁷⁷ Nadsat: guys.

6.4. The Controversy Relating to the Novel's Last Chapter

The last chapter, the one omitted in the US edition and in Kubrick's movie, represents a turning point and contains Burgess's main message, namely, that humans are creatures capable of moral growth. What we get in the last chapter is, after all, a protagonist who is gradually growing up and starting to feel responsibility for his own life and for those of others. He finds no satisfaction any longer in being the leader of his new gang and leading a criminal life as he used to before his confinement: "But somehow, my brothers, I felt very bored and a bit hopeless, and I had been feeling that a lot these days." (*Clockwork* 134) Also, "More and more these days I had been just giving the orders and standing back to viddy⁷⁸ them being carried out" (*Clockwork* 134). What is more, Alex suddenly feels the desire to accumulate money, "to like hoard it all up for some reason" (*Clockwork* 135) and not to waste it on unreasonable things like paying Scotchmen rounds for his friends and the "old baboochkas⁷⁹". Generally, Alex seems quieter and softer; he even prefers romantic songs to his once beloved classical music:

I was slooshying⁸⁰ more like malenky⁸¹ romantic songs, what they call *Lieder*, just a goloss⁸² and a piano, very quiet and like yearny, different from when it had been all bolshy⁸³ orchestras and me lying on the bed between the violins and the trombones and kettledrums. There was something happening inside me, and I wondered if it was like some sort of disease or if it was what they had done to me that time upsetting my gulliver⁸⁴ and perhaps going to make me real bezoomny⁸⁵. (*Clockwork* 137)

As Alex encounters his old *droog* Pete again, who is now married and leads an ordinary, harmless life, Alex realises that his own inner changes which he could not explain are happening due to himself growing-up. "I was getting too

⁷⁸ Nadsat: to see.

⁷⁹ Nadsat: old women.

⁸⁰ Nadsat: to listen.

⁸¹ Nadsat: little.

⁸² Nadsat: voice.

⁸³ Nadsat: bid.

⁸⁴ Nadsat: head.

⁸⁵ Nadsat: mad.

old for the sort of jeezny⁸⁶ I had been leading, brothers. I was eighteen now, just gone. Eighteen was not a young age.” (*Clockwork* 140) Finally, he senses a strong desire for an ordinary life too and expresses a wish for a family life with a wife and a baby. He realises that being young means like being steered as a toy, as a clockwork: “Being young is like being like one of these malenky⁸⁷ machines” (*Clockwork* 140). Eventually, Alex finds his positive liberty, for now he seems to understand the higher aims of human nature and life, which imply taking responsibility towards oneself and other people. He ascribes his former crimes and misdemeanour to his immaturity - the immaturity of the youth, who have to learn and realise their human nature gradually as they grow-up:

When I had my son I would explain all that to him when he was starry enough to like understand. But then I knew he would not understand or would not want to understand at all and would do the veshches⁸⁸ I had done, yes perhaps even killing some poor starry forella⁸⁹ surrounded with mewling kots and koshkas⁹⁰, and I would not be able to really stop him. And nor would he be able to stop his own son, brothers. And so it would itty on to like the end of the world, round and round and round, like some bolshy gigantic like chelloveck⁹¹, like Bog Himslef (by courtesy of Korova Milk-bar) turning and turning and turning a vonny⁹² grahzny⁹³ orange in his gigantic rookers⁹⁴. (*Clockwork* 140-141)

The last chapter was cut in the US edition of the novel – and not restored until 1988, twenty-six years later. Therefore it was also left out in Stanley Kubrick’s film, for the film director was only acquainted with the American version. Like many other critics, he later even openly disapproved of Burgess’s ending finding it too optimistic: “to end with Alex’s cynical return to his violent ways (‘I was cured all right’) is, they say, tougher and more realistic.” (*Clockwork* xxi) However, Burgess’s ending contains a pessimistic touch as well by showing that Alex’s sins will be reproduced again and again

⁸⁶ Nadsat: life.

⁸⁷ Nadsat: little.

⁸⁸ Nadsat: things.

⁸⁹ Nadsat: trout.

⁹⁰ Nadsat: cats.

⁹¹ Nadsat: fellow.

⁹² Nadsat: smelling.

⁹³ Nadsat: dirty.

⁹⁴ Nadsat: hands.

by next generations of adolescents, and “Burgess sees no means of stopping the cycle of adolescent violence, except with methods, whether aversion therapy, eugenics or other forms of socio-psychological programming, which are dehumanizing, morally unacceptable and a usurpation of God.” (*Clockwork* xxii)

In an interview with the *Penthouse* magazine in 1972 Anthony Burgess explains why the last chapter was omitted in the US version:

My American publisher in 1962 said “I recognize that you are British and hence tend to a more pragmatic or milk-and-water tradition than we Americans know. We are tougher than you and prepared to end on a tough and violent note.” And I said: “Well, if this is one of the conditions for publishing the book, get on with it.” (qtd. in Aggeler 179)

Burgess later bitterly regretted this decision for basically two reasons. First, the book’s structural, “even numerological” unity was destroyed:

Burgess divides *A Clockwork Orange* into three sections, each beginning with the same punkily defiant question: ‘What’s it going to be then, eh?’ There are twenty-one chapters in all: twenty-one is the age at which children traditionally become adult, and it is in the twenty-first chapter that Alex sees the light and puts the errors of youth behind him. Burgess would also have been struck by aptness, in a novel about growing up, of there being seven chapters in each section: an implicit allusion to Shakespeare’s seven ages of man. As all this suggests, *A Clockwork Orange* is the most carefully constructed of novels. (*Clockwork* xx)

Second, the loss of the chapter destroys the book’s moral integrity. Burgess “felt there was little point in writing a novel which didn’t allow for moral growth, and found something glib, cynical and sensationalizing in the abridgement” (*Clockwork* xx). For the author his last chapter shows that Alex is a human being willing to learn from those older than himself – or as he puts it: “to slooshy⁹⁵ what some of these starry decreps⁹⁶ had to say about life and the world” (*Clockwork* 12). In fact, his willingness to learn becomes

⁹⁵ Nadsat: to listen.

⁹⁶ Nadsat: old people.

visible “as early as Chapter 2” and is picked up again in prison, when “he reads the Bible for enlightenment and comfort” (*Clockwork* xx).

All this prepares the ground for Alex’s reform. There is no *deus ex machina* in his eventual getting of wisdom. All he lacks is time, and the three years that pass in the course of the book are what makes the difference. (*Clockwork* xx)

The final chapter shows that Alex is able to autonomously choose goodness. It demonstrates that despite his evil impulses and lusts, he is still inherently good (see Wenzl 44). Moreover, he is able to achieve his potential and therefore to justify his positive liberty. Burgess weighed great importance to his moral message. In the 1988 US edition of his novel, which eventually included the last chapter, he cynically commented in the preface: “My book was Kennedyian and accepted the notion of moral progress. What was really wanted was a Nixonian book with no shred of optimism in it.” (*Clockwork* xvii)

6.5. Burgess’s Novel and Kubrick’s Film

Although the author had the comfort of knowing that foreign translations of the book (French, Italian, Spanish, Romanian, Russian, German etc.) were based on the original English version, most people only know *A Clockwork Orange* in its US version due to Stanley Kubrick’s film adaption (see *Clockwork* xvii). The celebrated film director was fascinated by the novel and found it bizarre, exciting and brilliantly developed (see Nelson 136). Thus his primer “intention was to be faithful to the novel” (Kubrick, qtd. in Nelson 137) when he adapted it for film. Burgess himself was an admirer of Stanley Kubrick, especially of his film *2001: A Space Odyssey*, and “hoped the film of *A Clockwork Orange* would aspire to a similarly imaginative ‘visual futurism’” (*Clockwork* xviii).

However, the film provided the cause for some serious tensions between the two artists. First, of course, the abridged version irritated Burgess, who had even written a script for the film, which was, like several others, rejected by Kubrick. Second, Burgess had sold the film rights to Kubrick's producers for a relatively small amount of money, and reaped no benefit when the movie became a world success. Third, the author disapproved of the presentation of violence in the film, which he found too stark and unfiltered despite Kubrick's use of parodic techniques. Privately he was worried about the explicit presentation of sexuality and suspected some scenes of the movie of being pornographic (see *Clockwork* xviii). Finally, Burgess was infuriated by the implication of some critics claiming that though the writer was the originator of *A Clockwork Orange*, Stanley Kubrick was "its true artistic spirit" (*Clockwork* xviii). Burgess, being very touchy at that suggestion, replied that, if anything, "Kubrick was a creation of *his*" (*Clockwork* xviii). Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that the author also profited from the film adaption in so far as the film has made the novel as well as Burgess himself considerably popular.

When the film was released in 1971, both the film and the book were heavily criticised and accused of being an incitement to violence. In the UK the banning of the film was considered and discussed in Parliament. As a result, Kubrick himself withdrew the film from the British market, where it is still unavailable (see *Clockwork* xix). In the US the press considered Kubrick and Burgess responsible for various cases of youth delinquency and violence. Burgess, who found that his novel's reputation had been tainted, was, for the rest of his life, always interviewed and invited to TV shows whenever the moral responsibility of the artist towards the youth was to be discussed (see Wenzl 47). The writer strongly rejected the notion that art could be responsible for the events which happen in real life:

The fundamental answer is, no, no one is responsible. If I am responsible for young boys beating up old men or killing old women after having seen the film then Shakespeare is responsible every time some young man decides to kill his uncle and blames it on Hamlet. [...] there was a man in New York State who killed something like sixteen

children, slaughtered them in cold blood, and he said he was fascinated by the stories of blood sacrifice in the Old Testament and he merely wanted to present a sweet offering to the Lord. (qtd. in Wenzl 47)

However, twenty years later the artist's convictions about the moral influence of art were fundamentally changed. In 1993, a few months before his death, he expressed concern in an article for the *Observer* whether *A Clockwork Orange* might not have contributed in some way to a certain cult of violence among the youth:

[I]t must be considered a kind of grace in my old age to abandon a conviction that was part of my blood and bone. I mean the conviction that the arts were sacrosanct, and that included the sub-arts, that they would never be accused of exerting either a moral or an immoral influence, that they were incorrupt, incorruptive, incorruptible. I have quite recently changed my mind about that.

This protective attitude to the arts was really a desire to justify the corrupt elements in the greatest literature of all time. That of the Elizabethan stage. It was a wish not to see William Shakespeare as a violent writer...

But I begin to accept that, as a novelist, I belong to the ranks of the menacing. (*Clockwork* xxiv)

7. The Role of Language in *1984* and *A Clockwork Orange*

Comparing the two novels one striking similarity immediately becomes evident, namely the playful use of language on the part of both authors, Orwell and Burgess, though each one exhibits a slightly different approach to his linguistic experiment. Orwell's *Newspack* is concerned with reducing the English language and cutting down the range of vocabulary; whereas Burgess's Anglo-Russian slang called *Nadsat* displays an expanded vocabulary enriched by Slavic words. Both authors were profoundly interested in language and knew about its political and sociological dimension – for this purpose see also Orwell's famous essay *Politics and The English Language* (1946) and Burgess's book *Language Made Plain* (1964, revised 1975). As far as the aspect of liberty in relation to the experimental language of the novels is concerned, some analogies can be observed and should be discussed in the following chapters.

7.1. Orwell's Conception of Language

Orwell was preoccupied with language and language change. Although he called for socio-political change, he was nostalgic for the cultural age he observed vanishing and his attitudes towards language were also remarkably preserving (see Bolton 15). "In his literary criticism he made language a touchstone for good writing and for bad." (Bolton 15) His values concerning language pervade his writing from the very beginning on, yet, *1984* and the

essay *Politics and the English Language* characterise his mindset on this issue most strikingly.

In this oft-cited essay the writer criticises the decline of the English language making clear that it must ultimately have socio-political and economic causes and cannot be traced back to the bad influence of an individual writer, yet the trend has a negative effect on Modern English, especially written English. Orwell argues that the English language “becomes ugly and inaccurate because our thoughts are foolish, but the slovenliness of our language makes it easier for us to have foolish thoughts.” (*Politics*⁹⁷ par. 2) In other words, the shape of our thinking has a direct effect on our language, but the shape of our language has also a direct effect on our thinking. If the language is corrupt, the ideas we have are corrupt as well, and vice versa. This vicious cycle can be broken “if one is willing to take the necessary trouble. If one gets rid of these habits one can think more clearly, and to think more clearly is a first step towards political regeneration.” (*Politics* par. 2) Therefore, a sane and frank use of language finally reinforces a respectable political disposition. Orwell then goes on exemplifying what he considers bad habits in the English language, for instance the overuse of metaphors, long words where short ones would do as well, foreign phrases, scientific words or jargon instead of simple everyday English equivalents, the use of ready-made phrases etc., and concludes that the “whole tendency of modern prose is away from concreteness” and concealing the true meaning (see *Politics* par. 19).

It is, Orwell says, exactly at this point, that the special connection between politics and the corruption of language becomes evident:

Orthodoxy, of whatever colour, seems to demand a lifeless, imitative style. The political dialects to be found in pamphlets, leading articles, manifestos, White Papers and the speeches of under-secretaries do, of course, vary from party to party, but they are all alike in that one almost never finds in them a fresh, vivid, home-made turn of speech. When

⁹⁷ *Politics and the English Language*

one watches some tired hack on the platform mechanically repeating the familiar phrases – *bestial atrocities, iron heel, bloodstained tyranny, free peoples of the world, stand shoulder to shoulder* – one often has a curious feeling that one is not watching a live human being but some kind of dummy: a feeling which suddenly becomes stronger at moments when the light catches the speaker's spectacles and turns them into blank discs which seem to have no eyes behind them. And this is not altogether fanciful. A speaker who uses that kind of phraseology has gone some distance towards turning himself into a machine. The appropriate noises are coming out of his larynx, but his brain is not involved as it would be if he were choosing his words for himself. If the speech he is making is one that he is accustomed to make over and over again, he may be almost unconscious of what he is saying, as one is when one utters the responses in church. And this reduced state of consciousness, if not indispensable, is at any rate favourable to political conformity. (*Politics* par. 21)

What the writer describes here, has been expansively developed and elaborated in *1984*; Specifically the kind of political speech illustrated in the quotation above also occurs in the novel under the name of *duckspeak*. Another occurrence of political speech mentioned in the essay and conveyed to the novel is the aspect of euphemisms. "In our time, political speech and writing are largely the defence of the indefensible" and therefore – so the argument runs – "political language has to consist largely of euphemisms, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness". (*Politics* par. 22) The use of such phraseology is needed if one wants to name things without showing their brutality, for instance to call the bombarding of defenceless villages and the banishment of their inhabitants by the name of *pacification* (see *Politics* par. 22). "Political language – and with variations this is true of all political parties, from Conservatives to Anarchists – is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind," Orwell states (*Politics* par. 30). If we, as an example, think of the names of the four ministries in *1984*, it is clear that the same is true for them. Orwell's reasoning comes to the point that there are no apolitical issues at all since everything that surrounds us is political in some or the other way. Therefore, language as such is always a political force, and when the general atmosphere in a state is bad, the language must suffer too. However, we can

counteract this general debasement by improving our language habits and thus improving the political situation eventually as well.

Although Orwell was a sharp observer and critic of language and its change, he could not refer to a linguistic university education, and according to Bolton he “knew no more about language, then, than the average Briton of his time and class might have known, and perhaps a trifle less” (Bolton 21). Still, his views on language have been highly influential and adopted by many, for instance Noam Chomsky and Norman Miller cited Orwell in support of their own political position as opponents of the American’s war policy in Vietnam (see Bolton 16). Also many other political liberals and leftists held Orwell’s linguistic views in high esteems. Arthur Schlesinger Jr, an American historian and Pulitzer Price recipient, supported Orwell’s views stating that “the control of language is a necessary step toward the control of minds, as Orwell made so brilliantly clear in *1984*” (qtd. in Bolton 17). The terminology of *1984* has become extremely popular with *doublethink* appearing in college dictionaries and *Newspeak* being a “dysphemism for utterances, notably in politics and advertising, much as ‘fascism’ had become a dysphemism for political systems” (Bolton 15).

However, Orwell had not only proponents of his theories: He was criticised for the lack of deeper understanding in the field of linguistics and overall superficiality in his analysis of the problems. Also, his essay was reproached for “massive over-generalizations without any supporting data or examples” (Rank, qtd. in Bolton 17).

7.2. The Language of 1984

In the Appendix of *1984* George Orwell provides us with *The Principles of Newspeak* – a treatise on the imaginary language as developed and illustrated in the novel. The writer, although using some technical terms of linguistics, uses none that a non-specialist reader would not be able to grasp (see Bolton 21). First, the imaginary language is defined as the official language of Oceania, which was designed to meet the ideological needs of the Party and which should finally supersede Standard English – *Oldspeak* - by about 2050. The version in the year 1984, embodied in the Eleventh Edition of the Dictionary, though perfected, is only a provisional one that still contains many superfluous and archaic forms which should be abandoned later. As far as its use in everyday life is concerned, *Newspeak* is mainly applied for official purposes, whereas the average citizen still uses *Oldspeak* in his/ her daily routine.

Newspeak, Orwell proceeds, is founded on the English language and consists of three distinctive word classes, known as the A vocabulary, the B vocabulary and the C vocabulary. The A vocabulary mainly consists of Standard English words needed for business and in everyday life – verbs like eating, drinking, working; nouns like dog, tree, house etc – with the difference to *Oldspeak* that now their meanings are rigidly defined or reduced and all possible ambiguities eliminated. The words belonging to this class are intended to express only simple, purposive thoughts, concrete objects and actions, whereby one word stands for exactly one concept and allows no shades of meaning. Hence, it would be scarcely possible to express philosophical or political ideas with them (see 1984 314).

The B vocabulary comprises words which are constructed for political purposes only with the intention to “impose a desirable mental attitude upon the person using them” (1984 316). Thus, no word of this class is ideologically neutral, but conveys the values of *Ingsoc*, for example,

thoughtcrime, crimestop, goodsex, sexcrime etc. As far as the word formation is concerned, the B words are in all cases compound words consisting of two or more words 'welded together in an easily pronounceable form':

To take a single example: the word *goodthink*, meaning, very roughly, 'orthodoxy', or, if one chose to regard it as a verb, 'to think in an orthodox manner'. This inflected as follows: noun-verb, *goodthink*; past tense and past participle, *goodthinked*; present participle, *goodthinking*, adjective, *goodthinkful*; adverb, *goodthinkwise*; verbal noun; *goodthinker*. (1984 317)

The quotation above also indicates the basic grammatical rules of Newspeak – the interchangeability between the verb and the noun forms, the overall regularity of inflection or the reduction of irregular verb forms, and the rules for the formation of the adjective and adverb. Further, the use of the affixes *un-*, *plus-*, *doubleplus-*, *ante-*, *post-*, *up-*, *down-*, etc. is applied to modify the meaning of Newspeak words and contributes to the enormous reduction of vocabulary (see 1984 315). Another outstanding characteristic of B vocabulary - euphemism - refers back to Orwell's amplification about the use of euphemisms in political speech in the *Politics and the English Language* essay, which was written two years before he wrote the novel. In 1984 words "as *joycamp* (forced-labour-camp) or *Minipax* (Ministry of Peace, i.e. Ministry of War) meant almost the exact opposite of what they appeared to mean" (1984 319). The C vocabulary, finally, consists of technical and scientific terms.

In general, Newspeak concerns itself with the reduction of vocabulary to an absolute minimum needed for communication. In accordance with Orwell's theory of the relationship between politics and language as outlined in his famous essay, the intrinsic purpose of the designed language in 1984 is the limitation of free thought:

The purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a medium of expression for the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees of Ingsoc, but to make all other modes of thought impossible. It was intended that when Newspeak had been adopted once and for all and Oldspeak forgotten, a heretical thought - that is, a thought diverging

from the principles of Ingsoc – should be literally unthinkable, at least so far as thought is dependent on words. (1984 312)

This statement grounds on the belief that language and thought are in so far interdependent as the limitations of the one imply the limitations of the other. As Ludwig Wittgenstein, one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century has pointed out in his highly celebrated work on the essence of life and world, *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*: “Die Grenzen meiner Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Welt.” (Wittgenstein 5.6.) To exemplify this argument, let us investigate the concept of political and intellectual freedom, which, as we know, has no existence in Oceania and therefore has no name. The word *free* can only be used in sentences as “This dog is free from lice,” (1984 313) however, in the context of human liberty it is simply meaningless. So, the term *free* as such is retained for the sake of convenience, yet the undesired meaning has been purged out of it (see 1984 318). Thus, since there is no such thing as political or intellectual liberty, there is no appropriate term for it. Moreover, since there is no term for such a concept, the idea of liberty should never occur to anybody, according to this theory. The same is applicable to the concept of equality:

A person growing up with Newspeak as his sole language would no more know that *equal* had once had the secondary meaning of ‘politically equal’ or that *free* had once meant ‘intellectually free’, than, for instance, a person who had never heard of chess would be aware of the secondary meanings attached to *queen* and *rook*. There would be many crimes and errors which it would be beyond his power to commit, simply because they were nameless and therefore unimaginable. (1984 324)

Furthermore, the concepts of *honour*, *justice*, *morality*, *internationalism*, *democracy*, *science* and *religion* have completely ceased to exist, i.e. there are no terms which would express their meaning. They all, including liberty and freedom, are now summarised under the concept of *crimethink* (see 1984 318). Newspeak, as a matter of fact, differs from all other languages in the respect that it grows smaller and smaller, as far as vocabulary is concerned, each day with every reduction being regarded as an achievement

– “since the smaller the area of choice, the smaller the temptation to take thought” (1984 322). If we apply Berlin’s theory of liberty to Orwell’s deliberations about language, then we can regard the state’s prescriptive policy of language reduction and change as an interference on behalf of the government that ultimately limits the speaking options of individual speakers. It is then reasonable to say that the official diminution of language corresponds to the reduction of negative liberty. Yet, the decreasing of vocabulary pursues the ultimate goal of reducing the range of thought. “Ultimately it was hoped to make articulate speech issue from the larynx without involving the higher brain centres at all.” (1984 322)

In respect thereof it becomes evident that the diminution of vocabulary aims at the limitation of positive liberty as well. In the case of Orwellian language theory then, an incident can be observed, where the limitation of negative liberty is in accordance with the limitation of positive liberty. In general, the degradation of language in 1984 symbolises the restriction of freedom and unveils the special connection between the use of language and the area of liberty.

7.3. The Function of Language in *A Clockwork Orange*

Apart from the public heed caused by Stanley Kubrick’s film adaptation of *A Clockwork Orange* Anthony Burgess’s novel became particularly famous for its language, a constructed vernacular, spoken by Alex and his gang called *Nadsat*. The name is a transliteration of the Russian suffix for “teen” (see *Clockwork* ix). The language experiment can be ascribed to the author’s own interest in linguistics and the history of language, as becomes also visible in his work published a couple of years after *A Clockwork Orange*, *Language Made Plain* (1964) (see Dix 14). Carol M. Dix attributes to Burgess to be one of the few English authors “who makes the fullest use of the raw materials of

writing, that is the words themselves” (Dix 21). Further, his linguistic explorations and the experimental use of language render him “one of the most adventurous writers”, however, they also “make him a difficult writer, for the experiments are often esoteric, academic, and cut him off, to a certain extent, from the ordinary reader” (Dix 21).

One has always to remember that Burgess is not only a skilful craftsman in the construction of plots and his creation of characters, but also an extremely clever and agile-minded man, who draws upon all the resources of knowledge in his writing. Some of his novels could perhaps benefit a glossary. (Dix 21)

Referring to glossary, the first American edition and the first German translation of *A Clockwork Orange* contained a glossary, yet without the approval of Anthony Burgess. The very idea of a glossary contradicts the author’s intentions in creating an artificial slang for his characters. The vernacular spoken in the novel consists of odd bits of rhyming slang, some Gypsy talk and for the most part of Slavic, basically Russian derivatives (see Dix 14). At first sight the vocabulary of Alex and his *droogs* appears incomprehensible:

They had no licence for selling liquor, but there was no law yet against prodding some of the new veshches which they used to put into the old moloko, so you could peet it with vellocet or synthemesc or drenchrom or one or two other veshches which would give you a nice quite horrorshow fifteen minutes of admiring Bog And All His Holy Angels And Saints in your left shoe with lights bursting all over your mozg. (*Clockwork 3*)

However, as the novel proceeds, one begins to gradually grasp the meaning of the picturesque, exotic language, even without knowing the basics of Slavic languages, partly due to context and frequent recurrence of terms to which one then becomes accustomed, partly due to the author giving the proper translation himself: For instance, a paragraph about the gratifications of *deng* ends with: “But as they say, money isn’t everything.” (*Clockwork 3*) This step-by-step acquisition of *Nadsat* vocabulary is exactly what the writer

had in mind when coining the language, which encompasses about two-hundred words:

It was meant to turn *A Clockwork Orange* in a brainwashing primer. You read the book or see the film, and at the end you should find yourself in possession of a minimal Russian vocabulary – without effort, with surprise. This is how brainwashing works. (Burgess, qtd. in Aggeler 182)

Considering the fact that the novel deals with the issue of brainwashing, it appears utterly brilliant and ingenious the way Burgess has played with words in order to demonstrate by the example of language how subtly brainwashing actually operates. Dix also argues that the language provides us with information about the history and the whereabouts of the strange futuristic society depicted in the novel, of which nothing specific is known, except for what we can deduce from the language spoken by the youth. “The society obviously has been subject to both American and Russian intervention if not invasion. The derivate language, spoken by the young, probably indicates the effects of propaganda through subliminal penetration.” (Dix 14)

‘Quaint,’ said Dr Brodsky, like smiling, ‘the dialect of the tribe. Do you know anything of its provenance, Branom?’
‘Odd bits of old rhyming slang,’ said Dr Branom, who did not look quite so much like a friend any more. ‘A bit of gypsy talk, too. But most of the roots are Slav. Propaganda. Subliminal penetration.’ (*Clockwork* 86)

Obviously, Burgess gained the inspiration for the use of Russian vocabulary for his novel about violent teenage gangs during a stay in Russia in 1961:

My late wife and I spent part of the summer of 1961 in Soviet Russia, where it was evident that the authorities had problems with turbulent youth not much different from our own. The stilyagi, or style-boys, where smashing faces and windows, and the police, apparently obsessed with ideological and fiscal crimes, seemed powerless to keep them under. It struck me that it might be a good idea to create a kind of young hooligan who bestrode the iron curtain and spoke an argot compounded of the two most powerful political languages in the world - Anglo-American and Russian. The irony of the style would lie in the hero-narrator's being totally unpolitical. (qtd. in Carlin par. 1)

Burgess did not use Russian words in a literal sense; on the contrary, he deliberately abused them, i.e. used them for his own purposes and altered them slightly and anglicised them. His motives were mainly connected to the aesthetic, specifically the phonetic side of language. For, besides being a writer, Burgess was an accomplished musician too who claimed to approach writing through aural images (see Dix 25). And if we compare expressions like *grahzny bratchny* and *lubbilubbing* to their English equivalents “dirty bastard” and “making love”, they certainly appear - or rather sound - more sonorous than in English language, and have a touch of magic spell (see Realus ch. 2). “Burgess chose his 200 or so words of *nadsat* because they work in English, whether as poetry, or humour (what could be more comical than policemen being *millicents*?), or plausible slang.” (*Clockwork* x) Also, the writer had a preference for ambiguity, which can be seen in word creations such as *rabbit*, meaning “work” and descending from the Russian verb *rabotat*, yet also suggesting *rab* - Russian for slave – and carrying an allusion to “robot” (see *Clockwork* x). Further, the Russian word *khorocho* (good or well) is anglicised into *horrorshow* – a frequent term used by Alex to express rapture or approbation in general; *iudi* (people) becomes *lewdies*, *militsia* (police) is turned into *millicents*. *Pooshka* (cannon) stands for a pistol; *rozha* (grimace) becomes *rozz*, which is also one of the words for policeman; *soomka* (bag) indicates an ugly woman (see Realus ch. 2). *Groodies* comes from *grud* (breast); *yarbles* represents testicles and may be connected to the Russian term for apples (*yabloko*) because Alex once greets a government official with “Bolshy great yarblockos to thee and thine” (*Clockwork* x). *Devotchka* is woman or girl, *glazzies* stand both for eyes and nipples, *rookers* (from *ruka*) can be both hands and arms, *nogas* (from *noga*) both feet and legs. Further examples are *litso* (face), *rot* (mouth), *zoobies* (teeth), *yahzick* (tongue) and *gulliver* (from *golova*), which is the term for head and a hint at Jonathan Swift (see *Clockwork* x).

The Slavic argot is mixed with other aspects of language, for instance, Alex' way of speaking includes repetitions such as “*creech creech creeching away*”. Also, there is the rhyming slang, e.g. *Pretty polly* is rhyming slang

standing for money (and rhyming with lolly), and to do something *oddy knocky* is to do it on your own (see *Clockwork* x, xi). Elements of Gypsy talk can be found too, for example in expressions like *crark* (to yowl), *golly* (unit of money), *filly* (to play or fool with), etc. Sometimes, inevitable associations occur as well – cancer for cigarette, *pan-handle* for erection, *charlie* for chaplain, *mounch* for snack – and various neologisms produced by simple school-boy speak transformations – *appy polly loggy* (apology), *jammywam* (jam), *eggiweg* (egg), *baddiwad* (bad), *skolliwoll* (school), etc. Words like guff (guffaw), *sarky* (sarcastic), *pee and em* (pop and mom), and *sinny* (cinema) represent amputations (see Realus ch. 2). But, most of the roots are Slavic, as the author himself explains:

Russian loanwords fit better in English than those from German, French, or Italian. English, anyway, is already a kind of *mélange* of French and German. Russian has polysyllables like *zhevotnoye* for beast, and *ostanovka avtobusa* is not so good as bus stop. But it also has brevities like *brat* for brother and *grud* for breast. The English word, in which four consonants strangle one short vowel, is inept for that glorious smooth roundness. *Groodies* would be right. In the manner of the Eastern languages, Russian makes no distinction between leg and foot - *noga* for both - or hand and arm, which are alike *ruka*. This limitation would turn my horrible young narrator into a clockwork toy with inarticulated limbs. As there were much violence in the draft smouldering in my drawer, and would be even more in the finished work, the strange new lingo would act as a kind of mist half-hiding the mayhem and protecting the reader from his own baser instincts. And there was a fine irony in the notion of a teenager race untouched by politics, using totalitarian brutality as an end in itself, equipped with a dialect which drew on the two chief political languages of the age. (*You've Had Your Time* 38)

As can be seen in the quotation above one of the main reasons the writer has used a foreign language is to turn away the attention of the reader from the extreme, violent behaviour on behalf of the protagonist and his friends, hoping that the reader would then see beyond the mere description of violence. For, given the fact that most humans tend to react with repulsion to such exaggerated brutality as performed by Alex, the writer rightly assumed that this factor would influence the reader's feelings, mainly stiffen them, for the main character. But Burgess wanted the reader to be objective, or rather

not influenced by his/her own lower instincts, but to search and see the deeper meaning behind his work. In other words, he wanted the reader not to focus on the aspects of crime and punishment, but on the aspects of free choice and its importance for humanity.

In comparison to George Orwell's novel, where we have a reduction of language as a stylistic feature, we find in Anthony Burgess's novel a case where the language is enriched and flooded with foreign terms and phrases. As has been pointed out, in *1984* the reduction of language indicates a reduction of freedom. Considering this aspect, can we draw analogies and apply the connection between freedom and language to *A Clockwork Orange* too? As a proposition, it should be investigated if the enrichment and the frontier crossing of languages in *A Clockwork Orange* symbolise Alex's crossing of the frontier and infraction of his legitimate area of liberty (i.e. negative liberty). Undoubtedly Alex violates the *Harm Principle* (J.S. Mill) and expands at his own pleasure the rightful area of liberty to which every human being has a right to, according to John Stuart Mill (i.e. the area in which my freedom does no harm to other members of a community). He therefore presumes to have more rights and a larger amount of liberty than he is entitled to. It can hence be claimed that this fact is also signified by the language: For, the expansion of (negative) liberty is mirrored in the expansion of Alex's vocabulary. His opulent use of language expresses his exuberant dealing with freedom and its limits, and so by expanding the limits of the English language he expands the limits of his freedom and vice versa.

Another difference to George Orwell becomes visible in Burgess's optimistic attitudes towards language as expressed in the concluding paragraphs of his considerations in *Language Made Plain*. Whereas Orwell is preoccupied with the purity of the English language detesting the use of foreign words, for instance Latin, where English equivalents would do just fine, Anthony Burgess does not see the dangers of a pollution through foreign loanwords pointing out that English has well survived the Danish and Norman invaders and will continue to profit from loan-forms and word coinages of the mixed

populations (see *Language*⁹⁸ 198) Far from being prescriptive, Burgess has obviously grasped the new ethnological order in the English speaking world and favours the concept of language as a dynamic, ever changing continuum rather than a static, self-contained principle.

However, he also admits that a certain debasement of language has occurred which has to be fought against. In this respect his views resemble those of George Orwell:

But, if we cannot really resist change, we can resist inflation, that debasement of language which is the saddest and most dangerous phenomenon of a world dominated by propaganda machines, whether religious, political, or commercial. Propaganda always lies, because it overstates a case, and the lies tend more and more to reside in the words used, not in the total propositions made out of those words. A "colossal" film can only be bettered by a "super-colossal" one; soon the hyperbolic forces ruin all meaning. If moderately tuneful pop songs are described as "fabulous," what terms can be used to evaluate Beethoven's Ninth Symphony? The impressionable young--on both sides of the Atlantic--are being corrupted by the salesmen; they are being equipped with a battery of inflated words, being forced to evaluate alley-cat copulation in terms appropriate to the raptures of Tristan and Isolde. For the real defilers of language--the cynical inflators--a deep and dark hell is reserved. (*Language* 198)

Still, however dark the language snapshot in time may be, Anthony Burgess does not lose his optimism for the future and his earnest belief in the power of language:

Yet language survives everything--corruption, misuse, ignorance, ineptitude. Linking man to man in the dark, it brought man out of the dark. It is the human glory which antecedes all others. It merits not only our homage but our constant and intelligent study. (*Language* 198)

⁹⁸ *Language Made Plain*

8. Other Philosophical Implications in *1984* and *A Clockwork Orange*

8.1. “Freedom to Say that Two Plus Two Make Four” (1984)

One of the major beliefs Winston Smith holds on to is the mathematical statement that “two plus two make four” (1984 84). This fact is something that the party cannot deny or change, according to Winston, a fact that cannot be altered. Winston deduces from this empirical fact that freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two make four, not five. What Winston, or rather Orwell himself wishes to state is that there is some kind of objective reality, which no human force can negate or change, an objective truth that can be experienced and grasped by the human reason. This view proves Orwell to be an empiricist, although he himself was probably not even aware of the philosophical implications of this view. According to Stephen Ingle Orwell was not really fond of philosophy:

Orwell was fishing in deep waters here. Where did his faith in man's reason come from? There is no evidence that he ever read Descartes or Kant on the nature of the relationship between sense and reason. He was unfamiliar with Mill's work, though naturally sympathetic to his emphasis – or what Berlin called his over-emphasis – on rationality. Although towards the end of his life Orwell included amongst his acquaintances both A.J. Ayer and Bertrand Russell, he was simply not interested in schools of philosophy and had no great capacity for philosophical thought. Neither Ayer nor Russell records discussing philosophical issues with Orwell. Indeed, in a letter to Richard Rees in which he referred to a philosophical argument of Bertrand Russell, Orwell wrote: ‘But I never can follow that kind of thing. It is the sort of thing that makes me feel that philosophy should be forbidden by law.’ (Ingle 124, 125)

However, Orwell's novel is a highly philosophical one, raising issues which have been discussed in philosophy for centuries, whether the fact was known to him or not. Concerning the statement, "You are no metaphysician, Winston" (1984 260) might be understood as the author's self-reflective remark on his own character. Indeed, metaphysics has little space in 1984, it is even denied by the strongly empiricist conviction of the objectivity of nature Winston wants and has to defend against the party's doctrine – a doctrine that promotes constructivism since it constructs the reality of the party members.

You believe that reality is something objective, external, existing in its own right. You also believe that the nature of reality is self-evident. When you delude yourself into thinking that you see something, you assume that everyone else sees the same thing as you. But I tell you, Winston, that reality is not external. Reality exists in the human mind, and nowhere else. (1984 261)

O'Brian represents here the principle of relativism and its annihilation of objective truth. Relativistic and constructivist theories criticise objectivism which relies on the assumption that objective reality, i.e. a reality that exists beyond one's mind, can be captured by the human reason. Constructivists do not deny the existence of an external reality but they deny the conjecture that it can be embraced objectively by subjective human mind. The human mind as such constructs meaning and knowledge by systemising and categorising and, therefore, abstracting external information, and thus it constructs its own reality, which is always a product of subjective mental processes.

O'Brian further adds to his statement that reality exists only in the human mind:

Not in the individual mind, which can make mistakes, and in any case soon perishes: only in the mind of the Party, which is collective and immortal. Whatever the Party holds to be truth, *is* truth. It is impossible to see reality except by looking through the eyes of the Party. (1984 261)

What O'Brian addresses here is known by the concept of social constructivism, a sociological and psychological theory which purports that certain social phenomena, such as certain beliefs or practices which may appear natural and evident to the individuals who hold on to them, are in fact socially constructed in particular social and historical contexts, may differentiate in other contexts, and must not be regarded as laws of nature in any way.

However, the party does not construct reality in a pure social constructivist sense, where social phenomena develop through the interaction of individuals in a particular social environment as a result of social interactive and mental processes. The party does much more than to provide and establish social contexts where certain concepts and social practices can develop and flourish; moreover, it designs and controls the individual consciousness, and therefore the collective as well, by exercising the methods of manipulation on an extremely ingenuous and elaborate level and thus imposing the party's dogma upon the party subjects. Goldstein states in 'his' book:

Reality only exerts its pressure through the needs of everyday life – the need to eat and drink, to get shelter and clothing, to avoid swallowing poison or stepping out of top-storey windows, and the like. Between life and death, and between physical pleasure and pain, there is still a distinction, but that is all. Cut off from the contact with the outer world, and with the past, the citizen of Oceania is like a man in interstellar space, who has no way of knowing which direction is up and which is down. The rulers of such a state are absolute, as the Pharaohs or the Caesars could not be. They are obliged to prevent their followers from starving to death in numbers large enough to be inconvenient, and they are obliged to remain at the same low level of military technique as their rivals; but once that minimum is achieved, they can twist reality into whatever shape they choose. (1984 207)

In other words, the party limits the individual and social autonomy of the human thought to a zero minimum by exercising power through applying various highly calculated methods of oppression on its subjects just for the sake of safeguarding and extending its power. One of these methods is

inflicting physical pain, be it by torturing dissidents or by simply keeping the population of Oceania hungry in order to maintain control over their bodies and their minds.

‘The second thing for you to realise is that power is power over human beings. Over the body – but, above all, over the mind. Power over matter – external reality, as you would call it, is not important. Already our control over matter is absolute [...]

‘But how can you control matter?’ he burst out. ‘You don’t even control the climate or the law of gravity. And there are disease, pain, death---’. [...]

‘We control matter because we control the mind. Reality is inside your skull. You will learn by degrees, Winston. There is nothing that we could not do. Invisibility, levitation – anything. I could float off this floor like a soap bubble if I wished to. I do not wish to, because the party does not wish it. You must get rid of those nineteenth-century ideas about the laws of Nature. We make the laws of Nature.’ (1984 277)

O’Brian even states that absolutely “nothing exists except through human consciousness”: “Outside man there is nothing.” (1984 278) This could be interpreted as a form of radical constructivism which negates the existence of any external reality. Further, it can also be read as a perverted feature of Descartes’s reasoning, who in proclaiming his famous “*Cogito, ergo sum!*” aphorism proceeds from the scepticism about any kind of outer reality, save the undeniable fact that he, as a human mind, is thinking and challenging anything that could delude him. Only in being sure that his mind is performing the act of thinking, he gains assurance of his empirical existence, i.e. only from the existence of his mind can he deduce his ontological existence. For, anything else that lies outside his mind, even his body, could deceive him and lead him astray (see Kunzmann, Burkard, and Wiedmann 105).

Descartes, as a rationalist philosopher naturally believes in the unmistakable faculty of cognition of human ratio, or reason - an innate capacity which can be exclusively realised by autonomous thinking of free, reflective individuals. He attaches most importance to the autonomy of human reason, whereas the party systematically destroys autonomy, implies unreason and propagates irrationality. Smith, however, manages to grasp and struggles to defend the

rational principle by stating "I think I exist. [...] I am conscious of my own identity." (1984 272) In saying this he lines up in the Descartes's tradition. James Ingle argues that by O'Brian's inherent logical absurdity of the claim "You do not exist," it was not Winston's argument that was abolished but it was Winston as a person (see Ingle 129).

Winston Smith finally gives up his conviction that two plus two results in four, however, not because his argument was destroyed, but his person. Eventually, O'Brian does not manage to provide a logically elaborated, non-contradictory and consistent argument of the party's ability to create reality as it wishes to. In fact, he reduces his statements to absurdity by claiming that no reality ever existed before the advent of humanity, which means the advent of the party. Smith and the reader naturally know that there has been humanity before the party, and thus some kind of reality. O'Brian is not able to convince Smith by strong conclusive arguments or due to his intellectual superiority; he can only do so by inflicting physical pain on him (see Ingle 128). Therefore, the only reality O'Brian, or the party in general, is able to establish is the reality of power.

Orwell seems to endorse the fact that the reality of "two plus two" will stand the test of time and outlive any power relations. Concerning this, Ingle points out that "Orwell would have been unaware of the distinction, essential to our understanding of empiricism, that Leibnitz had first drawn between analytical and synthetic knowledge" (Ingle 125). For, "only analytical knowledge is certain, but since it inhabits the world of mathematics and formal logic, it has no relevance to the world of experience and value" (Ingle 125). In connection to this, Immanuel Kant has also distinguished between a priori and a posteriori propositions, defining the former as a proposition whose justification does not rely on experience, the latter as a proposition whose justification does rely upon experience. Regarding the statement "two plus two equals four" it becomes evident that it constitutes an analytic, a priori truth that in fact cannot be challenged or annihilated, or as Hannah Arendt states, it represents the "only absolutely reliable truth human beings could fall

back on" (qtd. in Ingle 125). However, Arendt adds that "this 'truth' is empty or rather no truth at all because it does not reveal anything" (qtd. in Ingle 125). Obviously, no statements about the nature of values can be deduced from analytical propositions, therefore the laws of mathematics cannot be applied to matters of human life.

Then, why does Orwell use this simple mathematical computation as a symbol for man's liberty and autonomy? For the author two plus two stands "as a badge of man's undeceived intelligence" and "his ability to reach out confidently to objective truth and so to stand against the Party" (Ingle 126) - a party which declares itself as the absolute source of truth, and, therefore, prohibits individual reasoning or common sense. As Goldstein demonstrates, the Party is the enemy of empiricism and common sense; moreover, it is the enemy of science:

The empirical method of thought, on which all the scientific achievements of the past were founded, is opposed to the most fundamental principles of Ingsoc. And even technological progress only happens when its products can in some way be used for the diminution of human liberty.

[...]

The two aims of the Party are to conquer the whole surface of the earth and to extinguish once and for all the possibility of independent thought. (1984 201)

It appears evident that in a social and political system which imposes irrationality and promotes ignorance as strength, applying logical reasoning and independent thought represents an act of rebellion and self-liberation from the party's doctrine. In another environment, for instance in our current western society, where reason and scientific thought represent the predominant and most accepted system of thought, rationality may even be experienced as oppressive, whereas irrationality as liberating. Dostoevsky, for instance, was a strong opponent of the hegemony of reason and an advocate of man's "own free and unfettered volition, one's own caprice, however wild" (Dostoevsky, qtd. in Ingle 127). According to Dostoevsky, only in rejecting the hegemonic imposition of rationality and by pursuing one's

own volition one can truly sustain one's autonomy and identity. So, if we contrast Orwell's and Dostoevsky's point of view, we can observe that despite the different outcomes of their arguments, both standpoints have one thing in common: Their lowest common denominator is the fact that both seek individual autonomy and liberty by questioning the hegemonic system of thought within a political system and, therefore, questioning the power relations.

When it comes to the liberating power of reason, we should first mention the name of Immanuel Kant, the most prominent philosopher of the European Enlightenment, whose "*Sapere aude!*" proclamation was the motto of the *Age of Reason*. In his famous and very influential essay *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?* (1784), Kant declares:

Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another. *Sapere Aude!* [dare to know] "Have courage to use your own understanding!"--that is the motto of enlightenment. (Kant par. 1)

Kant further argues that laziness and cowardice are two reasons why so many people stay in a state of lifelong immaturity and why it is so easy for others to establish their power and take over the supervision over those who prefer to be immature. For, it is easy to let others do the thinking while one does not have to exert oneself at all. "Others will readily undertake the irksome work for me." (Kant par. 2) And those who declare themselves as supervisors or guardians are interested in maintaining their power, so they let the immature believe that the step to maturity is difficult, even dangerous. The individual human is thereby threatened by the danger of falling should he attempt to walk alone.

Thus, it is difficult for any individual man to work himself out of the immaturity that has all but become his nature. He has even become fond of this state and for the time being is actually incapable of using his own understanding, for no one has ever allowed him to attempt it. Rules and formulas, those mechanical aids to the rational use, or rather misuse, of his natural gifts, are the shackles of a permanent immaturity. Whoever threw them off would still make only an uncertain leap over the smallest ditch, since he is unaccustomed to this kind of free movement. Consequently, only a few have succeeded, by cultivating their own minds, in freeing themselves from immaturity and pursuing a secure course. (Kant par. 3)

Kant adds that the public as a whole is more likely to enlighten itself than the individual alone. Also, enlightenment should be understood as a slow and tedious process, for it is very difficult to reform a manner of thinking. Furthermore, what is most required for such enlightenment is freedom, “namely, the freedom to use reason publicly in all matters.” (Kant par. 5)

It can be stated that the main idea of Kant’s enlightenment philosophy in general was rational self-determination on a personal and a political level with reason functioning as the prime arbiter of right and wrong. Here it must be considered that Kant regarded reason as a distinctively human characteristic which all human beings possess and are capable of. Reason, according to Kant, is the characteristic feature which distinguishes humans from other beings. Moreover, only by applying reason a human can reach self-fulfillment as a human.

If we compare Kant’s philosophy of reason with Orwell’s philosophical tendencies in *1984* Kant’s impact on the author should become evident, although Orwell may not have been aware of it. Orwell’s protagonist Smith emerges from his immaturity by using his reason symbolised in the “two plus two” calculus. In fact, Smith dares to commit *thoughtcrime* by questioning the nature of truth and reality through applying his own ratio. He dares to think, to use his own understanding and in doing so he follows Kant’s appeal of *sapere aude*. In *1984* laziness and cowardice can also be seen as the two main reasons for the immaturity of the population of Oceania, although the

situation in this dystopian state is more awkward than Kant has ever imagined. The methods of terror and manipulation which the party imposes on its members are artfully elaborated in the minutest detail. Nevertheless, were the party members more courageous and the *proles* less lazy to think for themselves and to stand up collectively against the party, they could easily overthrow the oppressive party despotism and its irrational dogmas.

8.2. “A Man Who Cannot Choose Ceases to Be a Man”

(*A Clockwork Orange*)

Anthony Burgess’s *A Clockwork Orange* is a dystopian novel, which – as is typical of the genre – is meant as a warning and critique of certain contemporary developments. Burgess himself suspected his own work to be “too didactic to be artistic”, “pure art dragged into the arena of morality” (*Clockwork* xxii). Novelists, it is said, should show, not tell; however, the genre of dystopian science fiction invariably contains a philosophical message. Burgess himself wrote two other science fiction novels, or ‘futpics’, as he calls them: *The Wanting Seed* (1962) and *1985* (1978), a tribute to George Orwell’s *1984* which had deeply impressed and inspired him (see *Clockwork* xxii). “Dystopias or cacotopias are only a kind of warning to hang on to what freedom one has,” Burgess once said (*Clockwork* xxii). The freedom which he felt threatened and compelled to discuss in *A Clockwork Orange* was that of individual choice.

The novel was Burgess’s angry pillorying of the behaviourist methods of social planning as discussed in the 1950s. His main target was the psychologist B.F. Skinner, an heir of Ivan Pavlov and the inventor of operant conditioning, who believed that the experiments he had carried out on animals concerning behaviour modification could be transformed to the human domain as well.

[...] Skinner wanted to abolish notions of man as an autonomous, free agent, and had a vision of a planned society. His 'inventions' included teaching machines and mechanical baby-minders, and he also published a utopian novel, *Walden Two*, which imagines a society where 'We can achieve a sort of control under which the controlled, though they are following a code much more scrupulously than was ever the case under the old system, now feel free'. (*Clockwork* xxii)

Skinner, who was a strong advocate of determinism and hence did not believe in free will, regarded the human mind in technological terms and held the conviction that human behaviour can be designed on the basis of behaviourist principles. In his book published in 1971, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, the psychologist promotes his social world view which illustrates both his aversion to free will and to dualism as well as his reasons for claiming that a person's history of environmental interactions controls his or her behavior. (see Graham ch.6)

Burgess has strongly opposed to Skinner's theories and when he realised that behaviorist methods of reforming criminals were already tested in American prisons with the objective to minimise individual autonomy for the sake of a higher goal, and that British politicians were already demanding that criminals should be conditioned to be good, Burgess finally had enough: "I began to see red and felt that I had to write the book" (qtd. in Aggeler 173) In the middle section of *A Clockwork Orange* Burgess incorporates the argument against mind-control and makes it an explicit part of the novel's texture. During the public demonstration of Alex's conversion from evil to good, the prison charlie fuels a debate about free choice with Dr Brodsky, whose character is a clear allusion to B.F. Skinner:

'Choice,' rumbled a rich deep goloss⁹⁹. I viddied¹⁰⁰ it belonged to the prison charlie. 'He has no real choice, has he? Self-interest, fear of physical pain, drove him to that grotesque act of self-abasement. Its insincerity was clearly to be seen. He ceases to be a wrongdoer. He ceases also to be a creature capable of moral choice.' 'These are subtleties,' like smiled Dr Brodsky. 'We are not concerned with motive, with higher ethics. We are concerned only with cutting

⁹⁹ Nadsat: voice.

¹⁰⁰ Nadsat: to see.

down crime-'

'And' chipped in this bolshy¹⁰¹ well-dressed Minister, 'with relieving the ghastly congestion in our prisons.' [...]

'Me, me, me. How about me? Where do I come into all this? Am I like just some animal or dog? [...] Am I just to be like a clock-work orange?' (*Clockwork* 94)

Apart from the omission of the last chapter, Stanley Kubrick's film also represents the prison chaplain in a different light. In Burgess's novel the priest is, despite his addiction to alcohol and his initial cowardice to protest against the treatment, the only character with a sense of right and wrong; and moreover, the only one to sincerely mean well with Alex (see Wenzl 46). He is the only one to realise the deeper meaning and the consequences of the conditioning into a good person and to warn Alex:

The question is whether such a technique can really make a man good. Goodness comes from within, 6655321. Goodness is something chosen. When a man cannot choose he ceases to be a man. (*Clockwork* 63)

In Kubrick's film, however, the prison chaplain is represented as a slapstick character who is all too easily silenced when he is told that the Ludovico's technique will turn the subject into a perfect Christian:

This difference in characterization - Kubrick mocks whereas Burgess slightly satirizes – is clearly based on their different philosophical points of view. For the atheist Stanley Kubrick faith is just another form of institutionalised oppression, but for the Catholic Burgess, even if he has officially left the Church decades ago, religion still includes the possibility of hope and salvation. (Wenzl 47)

Indeed, the novel is intended as an allegory of Christian free will with Burgess supporting the chaplain in the conviction that Alex must be able to autonomously choose to be good. Burgess does not only share the "Augustinian view of man as a fallen creature, he also has a great deal of non-Augustinian hope for him as a creature of growth and potential goodness" (Aggeler 181). The distinction between Augustinianism and Pelagianism was one Burgess himself often made: "St Augustine thought that

¹⁰¹ Nadsat: big.

man is born in original sin, the monk Pelagius denied the doctrine.” (*Clockwork* xii) According to Burgess, these two teachings provide the basis for liberalism and communism, on the one hand, and conservatism, on the other hand. The writer considers them the ultimate origins of Western philosophy (see Wenzl 23) and he places the tension between these two doctrines at the centre of *A Clockwork Orange*.

In utilitarian philosophy, according to which an action is right if it tends to maximise the happiness, not of the individual agent alone, but of a greatest number possible, the freedom and the happiness of the individual is less worth than the utility for a human generality. Utilitarianism focuses on the consequences of an act, rather than on the intrinsic motives of the agent. Thus, the motives of an action may be bad, yet if the consequences are good, the utilitarian is quite satisfied. Related to Alex, his conditioning perfectly fits into the utilitarian ethics, for his loss of freedom implies the increase of freedom and happiness of many others who are now safe from his possible attacks; furthermore however shaped his intrinsic motives may be, if the way he eventually acts is socially desirable, the end justifies the means. Therefore, in utilitarian terms the conditioning of criminals into good is absolutely acceptable. In Christian ethics however, the man is and should remain autonomous in his moral responsibility, since “what a person does against his will is not his own credit, even if what he does is good in itself” (St Augustine, qtd in Wenzl 45).

For Anthony Burgess there is absolutely no moral justification for human conditioning, as he makes unmistakably clear in his 1971 essay *Clockwork Marmalade*:

Hitler was, unfortunately, a human being, and if we could have countenanced the conditioning of one human being we would have to accept it for all. Hitler was a great nuisance, but history has known others disruptive enough to make the state’s fingers itch – Christ, Luther, Bruno, even H.D. Lawrence. One has to be genuinely philosophical about this, however much one has suffered. I don’t know how much free will man really possesses (Wagner’s Hans Sachs said:

Wir sind ein wenig frei – “we are a little free”) but I do know that what little he seems to have is too precious to encroach on, however good the intentions of the encroacher may be. (qtd in Aggeler 181)

9. Conclusion

The primary aim of this thesis has been to analyse the aspects of human liberty as depicted by George Orwell and Anthony Burgess in the dystopian novels *1984* and *A Clockwork Orange*. Since freedom is a philosophical concept and the methodological approach in this M.A. thesis is an interdisciplinary one, the major problem was to find an appropriate philosophical theory of human freedom which could be applied to the literary works of Orwell and Burgess. In fact, very few concepts other than freedom have been given so many different and controversial definitions and interpretations depending on the ideological approach of different schools of philosophy. Eventually, Isaiah Berlin's definition of *Two Concepts of Liberty* proved to be a suitable basis for the analysis of the two novels. Berlin distinguishes between a positive and a negative notion of liberty, the latter being defined as liberty from outer interference, the former as liberty to autonomously fulfil one's potential. One could also relate negative liberty to political freedom, since it describes the area over which a human being is free from outer interference and coercion, whereas positive liberty refers to a more metaphysical conception of inner autonomy to use one's inherent capacities. Berlin points out that both concepts have been misused and perverted into their opposite in the course of history, especially positive liberty, which by definition distinguishes between a higher nature and a lower nature of the self: the higher referring to rationality and idealism and thus being regarded as the true and free self, the lower to irrational passions, desires and other human vices. Berlin demonstrates that especially the totalitarian systems of the twentieth century, but also other collectives like the Church have often misused the positive concept of liberty to coerce

individuals in the name of their true self and, therefore, in the name of liberty by imposing the paternalistic principle on them. Although my original assumption was that the negative concept fits more to Orwell's *1984* with the positive one being more immanent in Burgess's *A Clockwork Orange*, my analysis finally has shown that both novels deal with both aspects of liberty – the positive as well as the negative concepts.

In *1984* the manifestations of an extremely limited area of negative liberty become evident in the massive interference on the part of the regime in the private lives of the Party members: the citizens live under constant surveillance of the *telescreens*, their lives are strictly regulated by the Party, and their human rights are completely ignored. Only the lower class, the *proles*, are left alone since they are not considered dangerous to the system. As far as the aspects of positive liberty are concerned, Orwell depicts what Berlin has described as a perverted notion of positive liberty, for the *Ingsoc* regime sets itself as being in fact the 'true' guardian of liberty and, therefore, it justifies the imposing of its collective will upon its members in order to achieve its own, and thus their 'higher' freedom. Through manipulation techniques, such as *doublethink*, propaganda and the invention of *Newspeak* the Party narrows down the capacity of positive liberty of the party members and it establishes a vast system of mind control. Especially the systematic reduction of language leads to a decline of independent thought by simply eliminating the concepts of political values of liberty, equality, justice etc.

In *A Clockwork Orange* we have a very playful use of language as well, which, however, symbolises an extension of the area of negative liberty: Stretching the limits of the English language by speaking an Anglo-Russian vernacular called *Nadsat*, Alex, the protagonist, stretches the area of his civil rights and, as a consequence, infringes the rights of his fellow men. The young boy and his gang terrorise the society they live in until Alex is imprisoned for murder and used as a guinea pig for a psychological experiment, which seeks to condition criminals into good citizens. The so called *Ludovico Technique* makes Alex experience nausea and pain each

time he tries to perform an act of violence, be it only for reasons of self-defence. Furthermore, the sexual desire and Alex's joy of classical music, especially Beethoven, are made impossible as well. Thus, the negative liberty of the narrator is seriously limited, since he can only behave in accordance with the conditioning and has no free choice. In *A Clockwork Orange* we have a perverted conception of positive liberty as well, for the government imposes the treatment on the young criminal applying the paternalistic principle, which implies that the treatment is done for Alex's own good and in the name of his true liberty. Burgess, however, strongly opposes the conditioning of men into good persons holding that free moral choice is one of the main characteristics of a human being and when an individual cannot choose autonomously between good and bad he/ she is also deprived of the possibility of moral growth. For this reason, he eventually lets his protagonist grow up and become a good person without being impelled towards it. Anthony Burgess was obviously convinced that humans are inherently good and capable of learning and growing in moral terms; that is why he was upset at the US edition and Stanley Kubrick's film adaption of his novel, which omit Burgess's last chapter and thus ignore his moral message.

Both novels contain several philosophical implications and can be analysed according to various philosophical point of views. The aspect and the issue of human liberty, however, represents the main focus of my thesis, and, in my opinion, it was also the writers' main intention to demonstrate what scenarios of human freedom or rather unfreedom are theoretically possible in imaginable political systems; or as Burgess put it: "Dystopias [...] are only a kind of warning to hang on to what freedom one has." (*Clockwork* xxii)

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12. Abstract

Die britischen Schriftsteller, George Orwell (1903 – 1950) und Anthony Burgess (1917 – 1993), die zu den exzeptionellen Ausnahmekünstlern des 20. Jahrhunderts gezählt werden, verdanken ihren Ruhm hauptsächlich ihren großen dystopischen Romanen *1984* (Orwell) und *Uhrwerk Orange* (Burgess). Eine Dystopie wird als die negative Form der Utopie definiert und zeichnet sich dadurch aus, dass sie beunruhigende Tendenzen des Zeitgeistes, ins Besondere im politischen, wissenschaftlichen und sozialen Bereich, aufgreift und in einer übertriebenen, satirischen Form in die Zukunft projiziert. Im Allgemeinen behandelt eine Dystopie eine zukünftige Gesellschaft, die von einer despotisch herrschenden Regierung unterdrückt wird, welche die Freiheit des Einzelnen und andere Grundwerte, wie die Menschenrechte, gänzlich ignoriert und verletzt. Auch in *1984* und in *Uhrwerk Orange* wird der Leser mit politischen bzw. gesellschaftlichen Systemen konfrontiert, welche das Individuum in seiner Freiheit rigoros unterdrücken. Das primäre Ziel dieser Diplomarbeit ist es daher die Aspekte der Freiheit bzw. Unfreiheit in den beiden Romanen zu analysieren und einander gegenüber zu stellen. Bedenkt man, dass Freiheit an sich ein philosophischer Begriff ist, zu dem es seit Anbeginn der Philosophie unterschiedlichste Konzeptionen und Theorien gegeben hat, besteht die erste Schwierigkeit darin, eine Theorie der Freiheit zu finden, die im Stande ist die beiden Romane aufzugreifen und mit einem soliden Fundament für weitere Analysen auszustatten. Isaiah Berlins Konzeption von Freiheit, die den Begriff in einen negativen („Freiheit von“) und positiven („Freiheit zu“) unterteilt, erweist sich hierbei als die beste Basis für diese Zwecke. Die negative Freiheit wird hierbei als Freiheit von äußeren Zwängen verstanden, welche das Verhalten des Individuums einschränken oder verhindern; die

positive Freiheit bezieht sich eher auf die innere Fähigkeit bzw. das Potential eines Individuums seine selbst gesteckten Ziele zu erreichen. Beide Konzeptionen und deren pervertierte Formen können in beiden Romanen festgestellt werden.

In *1984* manifestiert sich eine extreme Form von negativer Unfreiheit darin, dass die Einwohner des dystopischen Staates Ozeanien von der totalitären Regierung mit ihrem Führer, dem *Großen Bruder*, in ihren Grundfreiheiten absolut unterdrückt werden. Es handelt sich hierbei um ein massives Eingreifen seitens des Staates in das soziale, berufliche und, ins Besondere, private Leben der Menschen, welches durch Vorrichtungen wie überall aufgestellte Bildschirme, die gleichzeitig Propaganda Nachrichten senden, und – und darin liegt ihre Spezialität – wie eine Videokamera fungieren, ständig überwacht und kontrolliert wird. Die Aspekte der positiven (Un)Freiheit lassen sich an Manipulationstechniken, wie Doppeldenk und Neusprech analysieren, welche die Kapazitäten der positiven Freiheit darin einengen, dass sie das autonome Denken nahezu unmöglich machen, indem sie ein System der absoluten Gedankenkontrolle errichten.

Im *Uhrwerk Orange* wird dem Leser ein Protagonist präsentiert, der die Grenzen seiner negativen Freiheit permanent auszuweiten bestrebt ist, dabei allerdings die Rechte und Freiheiten seiner Mitmenschen konsequent verletzt. Der Junge Alex und seine Bande (*droogs*) terrorisieren die Gesellschaft in der sie leben und erinnern in ihrem aggressiven, rücksichtslosen Verhalten an jenen philosophischen Naturzustand, den Thomas Hobbes als einen „Krieg jeder gegen jeden“ bezeichnet hat. Diesem Treiben wird ein jähes Ende gesetzt, als Alex inhaftiert wird und sich freiwillig bereit erklärt an einem psychologischen Experiment teilzunehmen, welches ihn zu einem besseren Menschen machen und deswegen vorzeitig aus dem Gefängnis entlassen soll. Das Experiment jedoch, operiert auf der Basis der operanten und instrumentellen Konditionierung entwickelt vom Behavioristen B.F. Skinner, und bewirkt, dass Alex keine freie Wahl über seine Handlungen mehr besitzt, sondern nur noch entsprechend der Konditionierung agieren

kann. Somit ist seine Freiheit komplett eingestellt, denn er hat keine Möglichkeit mehr zwischen Gut und Böse zu entscheiden. Anthony Burgess empfand es allerdings als notwendig, dass ein Mensch autonom seine Taten wählen kann und er kritisierte scharf das Prinzip des Paternalismus, welches vorsieht, dass über einen Menschen seitens eines Kollektives, z.B. des Staates, zu „seinem eigenen Besten“ entschieden werden darf. Burgess' moralische Botschaft hinter *Uhrwerk Orange* besagt, dass der Mensch kein Uhrwerk ist, welches man programmieren kann, im Gegenteil, er ist ein Wesen, das gerade dadurch ausgezeichnet und definiert wird, dass es autonom entscheiden kann und moralisch zu wachsen im Stande ist. Um seine positive Freiheit zu erreichen, so Burgess, bedarf es keines Einwirkens von außen – vielmehr kann die eigene positive Freiheit, die „wahre und höhere Natur des selbst“ nur aus sich selbst heraus entstehen.

Beide Romane, *1984* und *Uhrwerk Orange*, liefern ein großes Spektrum an kritischen Überlegungen und können aus verschiedenen philosophischen Perspektiven beleuchtet werden. Die Idee der menschlichen Freiheit steht jedoch im Mittelpunkt der beiden Werke und somit auch im Fokus dieser Diplomarbeit.

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