

# Master Thesis

## Islamic Activism Organization Theory Approach and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

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*To my mom, who gave me everything she could.*

*You are terribly missed!*

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## List of abbreviations

NCIPM	New Cultural Identitarian Political Movements
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
SMO	Social Movement Organization
SM	Social Movement
RMT	Resource Mobilization Theory
OS	Organizational Studies
OT	Organization Theory
NGO	Non-governmental organization
AARP	American Association of Retired Persons
YMMA	Young Men's Muslim Association

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## **ABSTRACT**

The study of social movements is very dynamic and vibrant area in social sciences. It provides an interdisciplinary emphasis on the study of collective political challenges expressed via protest, collective violence, and other extra-institutional collective actions. The research problem I am presenting in this thesis will demonstrate how the social science theory plays a role in the mobilization of a mass movement. The analysis will depart from earlier accepted work of social scientists based on functionalist social psychology which relates to mass behavior. My decision to examine the Society of Muslim Brotherhood stems from the Egyptian centrality in the development of research on Islamic Activism, which is inwrought with many labels and stereotypes in the Western scholarly discussion. By incorporating the organization theory in the study of Islamic Activism this thesis attempts to challenge the long accepted views about the irrationality and fluidity of social movements emerging in North Africa and Middle East. The theory of organization proves to be a good starting point when examining the development of social movements all over the world.

**Key Words:** social movement, collective behavior, Islamic Activism, Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood, Organization Theory, organizational structure, resource mobilization

## **ZUSAMMENFASSUNG**

Das Studium der sozialen Bewegungen ist sehr dynamisch und ein sehr belebter Bereich in den Sozialwissenschaften. Es setzt einen interdisziplinären Schwerpunkt auf die Untersuchung kollektiver politischer Herausforderungen, die sich in Protesten, kollektiver Gewalt und anderen extra-institutionellen kollektiven Aktionen äußern. Das Forschungsproblem, das ich in dieser Arbeit präsentiert werde, demonstriert wie die sozialwissenschaftliche Theorie eine Rolle bei der Mobilisierung einer Massenbewegung spielt. Die Analyse wird bei früheren (akzeptierten) Arbeiten von Sozialwissenschaftlern über funktionalistische Sozialpsychologie, die sich mit Massen Verhalten beschäftigt, ansetzen. Meine Entscheidung, die Gesellschaft der Muslimbruderschaft zu untersuchen begründet sich mit der Zentralität Ägyptens in der Entwicklung der Forschung über den islamischen Aktivismus, welcher mit vielen Labels und Stereotypen in die westliche wissenschaftliche Diskussion eingearbeitet ist. Durch die Einbindung der Organisations Theorie in die Erforschung des islamischen Aktivismus versucht diese Arbeit, die lang akzeptierten Ansichten über die Irrationalität und Fließfähigkeit der neuen sozialen Bewegungen in Nordafrika und im Nahen Osten herauszufordern. Die Theorie der Organisation erweist sich als guter Ausgangspunkt bei der Prüfung der Entwicklung der sozialen Bewegungen auf der ganzen Welt.

**Schlüsselworte:** soziale Bewegung, kollektives Verhalten, islamischen Aktivismus, Ägypten Muslimbruderschaft, Organisationstheorie, Organisationsstruktur, die Mobilisierung von Ressourcen

## INTRODUCTION

“Prior to 1945 two distinctive phases of European Imperialism took place in the Middle East, North Africa and Asia: first as invasive power transferred into local worlds the material and imaginative forms that made European imperialism such a redoubtable global force in the eighteen and nineteen centuries; second as receding power leaving behind states based on colonial creations, tied to a global economic system reflecting the values and interests of the departing imperial states. Between these two tattered proceedings the peoples subjected to the forces unleashed thereby tried to understand what was happening to them and their communities, propelling them to respond in ways that would allow them to engage with a world in a process of creation” (Tripp, 2006: 13). The cosmopolitan international system which was created in 1945 was however futile in “Westernizing the world” via the means of extensive development. The secular nationalists, disguised collaborators of the West, suddenly found themselves vis-à-vis the new challengers. These emerged from a heterogeneous league: the former marginals who have maximized their surplus; the old and new middle classes with limited growth possibilities, deprived by the modern sector and blocked from entry into a this too undynamic modern sector; and the „uprooted“ intellectuals, which the developing state has created by its undeniable success in expanding public education (Elsenhans, 2009). “With the application of an intercultural and comparative theoretical approach across Asia and Africa we can analyze the emergence and moderation of political movements in developing societies which mobilize popular support with references to conceptions of cultural identity. Here we can comprise apart from Hindu nationalist movement also many Islamist political movements under a single category –

New Cultural Identitarian Political Movements (NCIPM)” (Schwecke, 2010, Overview, [barnesandnoble.com](http://barnesandnoble.com)). Already from its title it is perceived that the rise of these movements have been, unlike to the “old” social movements which emerged under the common ideology and class structure, driven by the shared identity, namely the cultural identity. The recent scholarship of these movements examines the common feature – that is their unification by the bond of the conviction about the glorious past and inherited culture.

Examining all political movements which emerged within the period under my study would reach far behind the extent of this paper. What is more, although are these movements named under the general category as they share the common patterns, it would be difficult to compare all of them under one study. I have therefore decided to focus my research on the rise of Muslim Brotherhood, the world's oldest and largest Islamic political group, which was founded in 1928 in Egypt by the schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna (Leiken and Brooke, 2007). This study will focus on the period from its emergence until the early 1950s, when the Society experienced the greatest mobilization.

The main purpose as well as the major challenge of this thesis is to incorporate insights from visibly dynamic body of theory for the description and clarification of a phenomenon to which that body of theory had not yet been thoroughly applied. On the case study provided my aim is to propose social movement theory, namely the theory of organization, as a unifying framework that can offer useful modes of investigation to further the limitations of research on Islamic Activism (Wiktotrowicz 2004:4). At this broad topic, I do not even express hope to cover it extensively; subsequently the following approach will be imposed. First, I am not attempting to present a broad analysis of all aspects of Society’s ideology. My main idea is to find out what lies behind the success of the movement and



whether social science theory of organization can be applied as an explanatory factor in regards to Society's achievements (Lia, 1998). Although I do see the ideology of the movement as being essential for the general purpose for the Society founding, however, the ideology of Muslim Brothers did not differ to a great extent from the ideologies presented by other Islamic groups active in Egypt in the early 1930s. And those did not gain by any means as many followers as the Society under study. For this reason I choose to depict my viewpoint from the perspective of ideology as it does not offer the comprehensive explanation for the rise of the movement.


More importantly, with an attempt to find out the reasons for the successful mobilization of Muslim Brothers I would like to divert my view from so far accepted standpoints of many scholars, namely, that the main motive for people to join the movements is the feeling of deprivation and unacceptable socio-economic conditions which produce mistrust to the country's political elites. As Brynjar Lia (1998) explains and as I will further illuminate later in this work, in the case of Egypt the changing socio-economic conditions caused by the presence of the British colonial power had besides brought Westernization and modernization, rapidly growing unemployment (even within the well-educated middle class), widening class differences, large scale rural emigration to cities, process of secularization and growing urbanization, the lethargy of the religious institution and a lack of access to political discussions for the large segments of the population. These circumstances drove people to recur to different movements which were springing up by leaps and bounds in late 1920s (Egypt officially declared independence from the British rule in 1922) and worked as a catalyst for the growing discontent and restlessness of the people. With no attempt to disregard the importance of all these factors, I would like to

emphasize on the fact that this insoluble situation was shared bar none by all the movements emerging in the time period and was not unique to the Society under scrutiny. What is more, the other emerging Islamic Societies also provided shelter to discontent people offering them higher recognition in the societal circles, and yet have not managed to expand and gain the trust of large amount of people. In other words, Egyptian movements while sharing the common ideology and politico-economic conditions did not achieve such a success as the Muslim Brethrens. This further demonstrates the fact that accounting grievances caused by the changing socio-economical and cultural conditions should not work as a general explanation for the successful mobilization of the movement. In this sense we have to give higher priority to more comprehensive study of grassroots mobilization and pay more attention to other often marginalized aspects, namely the organization, internal and external arrangement, forms of action, recruiting techniques, social activities and members' beliefs and interests, rather than on the overall societal scenery (Lia, 1998). As further explained in the theoretical framework, the theory of organization deals with these modes of action, which might provide the thorough understanding behind the rise of the Society and explain why some movements operating on the grassroots' level expand to the mass organizations with million of followers. In the upcoming pages we will determine whether this theory can be applied categorically or whether there are certain exemptions between the case and the theory which might suggest a need for a more comprehensive analysis in the study of Islamic Activism. In addressing these strengths and weakness, my hope is to contribute to the theory building, in both studies of social movements and the Islamic Activism.

## I THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The study of social movements is very dynamic and vibrant area in social sciences. It provides an interdisciplinary emphasis on the study of collective political challenges expressed via protest, collective violence, and other extra-institutional collective action. Social movement scholars largely agree that social movements are only one of plentiful forms of collective action (Snow, 2004:6). Collective action includes ‘all social phenomena in which social actors engage in common activities for demanding and/or providing collective goods’ (Baldassarri 2009:391, In: Diani, 2005:5). This action generally emerges as a reaction to the politics of *mainstream* which is to be defined as ‘a set of institutions and their respected decision-makers that can and do preserve public order, govern economic activity, and provide plausible rationales for exercising power and authority in such matters’ (Lofland, 1996:4). Operating in a range of viewpoints, sociologists, political scientists, and historians have created over the course of last twenty years prosperity of theoretical and empirical scholarship on social movements/revolutions (McAdam Doug et al, 1996:2). There has been a vast scholarly debate on the subject of social movements, the reasons for their emergence, strategies for mobilization and organizational development (Fuchs, 2005).

Figure 1.1 categorizes diverse forms of collective action according to scale, continuity and organization of the marginal/excluded groups (Lofland, 1996:7).

**Figure 1.1 Social organization of social realities: variables and forms**

According to Blumer (1969) “SM are to be seen as collective enterprises seeking to establish a new order of life. They have their inauguration in a circumstance of unrest, and

derive their motive power on one hand from disappointment with the current form of life, and on the other hand, from wishes and hopes for a new system of living. The career of a social movement depicts the emergence of a new order of life.” Eder (1993:114) gives a very cognitive explanation when he says that “A social movement is a collective action trying to defend intrinsic normative standards against their strategic-utilitarian instrumentalization by modernizing elites. Each stage of modernity has its specific social movement and its specific dominant elite (social classes)”. They are “best conceived of as temporary public spaces, as moments of collective creation that provide societies with ideas, identities, and even ideals” (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991: 4, *In*: Crossley, 2002:4). Another set of scholars suggest that “social movement is a sustained and self-conscious challenge to authorities or cultural codes by field of actors (organizations and advocacy networks), some of whom employ extrainstitutional means of influence” (Gamson and Meyer, 1996: 283). Or that social movement has the function of “converting the negation of society in society into operations” (Luhmann, 1984: 214). The contemporary scholars however focus mainly on the modern movements emerging in the Western societies. Their understanding of collective action dynamics has benefited by comparing cases across this relatively homogenous (western) set of politics (McAdam et al., 1996: xii). The research of Islamic Activism has, for the most part, remained isolated from the plethora of theoretical and conceptual developments that have emerged from study on social movements and contentious politics (Wiktorowicz, 2004:3). What we can mainly see is profound description of ideology, structure or goals of specific movements without any attempt for incorporation of sociological dynamics into the study. If there is a limited use of comparative analysis, this mainly refers to comparison with other ‘religious

fundamentalists' that share ideological basis and religious affiliation, thus accentuating the comparability of ideas rather than the mechanisms of activism (Antoun and Hegland, 1987). Part of our existing obscurities draw from our continual tendency to treat social movements as collection of discreet elements (be they organizational or individual actors or elements), rather than structure of relations (Diani, 2010). What we can also observe is a disciplinary fragmentation of historians, sociologists and political scientists who tend to focus on one particular paradigm of the movement, leaving the rest behind without developing a coherent model which brings together diverse elements and explain how these fit together, interact and influence patterns of Islamic contention (Wiktorowicz, 2004). And although social movement analysts by and large concur that movements are best envisioned as complex systems connecting variety of actors, they have not paid enough consideration to the methodological aspect of the problem, that is to say, to how to theorize movement dynamics and tie theories to specific research process (Diani, 2005). The result is that research has tended to disregard developments in the study of social movements that could provide theoretical leverage over many issues relevant to Islamic activism. One of the few incorporated researches on Islamic Activism and Social movement theory was conducted by David Snow and Susan Marshall (1984) when they examined the relationship between Islamic movements and cultural imperialism. Religion is portrayed as the source of mobilizing ideology and organizational resources that are used to fight against perceived cultural imperialism. As Tarrow (1994) proposes, Islamic activism should not be perceived as *sui generis*, it uses dynamics, process and organization that resemble modern western movements and although it uses a notion of Islam under which it acts, fights and differentiates itself from other movements, the collective action itself and associated

processes reveals consistency across movement types (*In: Wiktorowicz 2004*). In demonstrating the richness of social movement theory approach to the study of Islamic activism, we need to broaden our perspectives and include so far completed scholarly work in very different times and places.

### **1.1 Collective behavior theories of structural strains**

Early work of social scientists was based on functionalist social psychology which relates to mass behavior. There are different variants of these theories sharing a common understanding of social movements being an arena for lessening psychological distress resulting from structural strains. The crucial argument is that the society operates under the natural societal condition of equilibrium. The political environment with its institutional apparatus attempts to adjust the inputs and outputs of the political system and thus create stability and maintain equilibrium. For functionalists, system disequilibrium derives from exogenous structural strains that produce new grievances and erode the efficacy of institutions, producing pathological dysfunctions that can cause political instability (Huntington, 1968 *In: Wiktorowicz 2004*). Advocates of collective behavior viewed strain, variably envisioned, and the shared ideas it gives rise to, as the core cause of social movements. The scholarship on social movements with functionalist core paid attention mainly to structural and psychological causes of mass mobilization. The linear causal relationship between structural strains and psychological discomfort was viewed as a basis for collective action. These strains such as economic crisis, rapid industrialization or modernization tend to disorder traditional way of life and accepted routines, thus creating a degree of social and normative uncertainty about the appropriate response to changing

conditions. That creates growing sense of social anomie, hopelessness and anxiety which are believed to prompt individuals to join social movements and thus regain a sense of belonging, lost trust and empowerment. Earlier accepted models of collective behavior theory (strain model, relative deprivation models, social change and anomie) have now however started to being questioned by contemporary theorists. These approaches have been insensitively criticized by number of scholars (e.g. McAdam (1982)) for their oversimplified formulation of an unalterable 'linkage between structural strain and movement contention' (Wiktorowicz, 2004). The strain model has been challenged by the idea that the link between structural strain and emergence of the movement is formulated in a very one-dimensional way whilst in numerous instances we do not necessarily observe the causal relationship between these two. Theorists argue that we can not account systems for being naturally constant and static; they are rather dynamical with variety of changes originated from societal affairs and interactions. What is more, structural strain and restlessness it generates are omnipresent in all societies (the degree and content varies from the particular locale); yet do not always anticipate a movement. Reality proves that social movements do not work hand in hand with the strain-movement logic. As Wiktorowicz (2004) shows, in general, the countries that are constraint with resources as well as access to political power produce less movements/revolutions when compared to wealthier, more developed countries with relatively high standard of living, stability and political freedom. In other words, the underprivileged countries with insufficient amount of material goods produce fewer uprisings, than those which do not suffer from strain and discontent to such an extent. What is more, this model only explains the very first phases of the emergence of movements whilst lacks to explicate the latter stages of a movement's evolvement and



analyze the resources for mobilization and organization of mobilizing structures. These as I further explain might prove to be essential factors for the creation and successful development of a mass movement. The theory of collective behavior suggests that people deciding to join the movements usually do so because they suffer from psychological discontent, not on the basis of rational choice. These movements are perceived to be irrational without any solid organization and structure. As more and more cases show, however, movements' participants can not be treated as goalless individuals striving for psychological relieve but rather as educated and well settled members of a society.

In spite of extensive criticism and transformations in the western scholarship, the study of Islamic Activism is still being trapped within the logic of sociopsychological perspectives. The scholars who are now better able to observe the limitations of strain models and relative deprivation concepts tend to readdress these theory deficiencies focusing exclusively on the study of movements emerging in Western democracies. By contraries strains and grievances still occupy prominent seats in the research of Islamic movements as more and more authors try to collect complex lists of strains starting from cultural imperialism to rapid socioeconomic transformations. This hinders the incorporation of social movement theory approaches and poses central questions which can not be answered by unreflectively replicating strain-based explanations. For example how the insurgents mobilize sufficient resources? Under the circumstances of subjugation, how do movements collectivize individual grievances and activate participants? How should be the movement internally organized in order to compete government oppression? "Questions of this kind raise comparative issues about the dynamics of contention that prioritize the mechanisms of collective action. Structural strains and discontents may be necessary, but

they are not sufficient causal explanation of Islamic activism” (Wiktorowicz, 2004:9). By proposing this, I however do not want to advocate the view that we should apply new expressions to refer to events or practices for which we already have existing conception, nor, as Diani (2010:2) suggests ‘overstretch presented concepts to denote empirical phenomena which differ on some important analytic dimensions.’ This is even more significant in the field like social movements in which the boundaries of the phenomena under scrutiny are possibly even more fluid than in the other areas of social life (Sartori, 1970; Diani 2010). In order to fully understand the dynamics of Islamist Activism we need to move beyond the single-category explanations for the rise of the social movements. What we need to seek is the interaction of divergent factors within the study and develop causal explanatory principles which will fill the holes of socio-psychological model.

## **1.2 Social Movements and Organization Theory**

For the purposes of this thesis we will base our analysis on the definition of social movement brought by Zald and McCarthy who see it as “a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which characterizes preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of society. [. . .] A Social Movement Organization (SMO in researcher’s jargon) is the complex, or formal organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement [. . .] and attempts to implement these goals” (McCarthy and Zald, 1977:1217).

David Aberle (1966) had suggested that “relative deprivation” is a primary precondition for precipitating social movements, nevertheless, present research, has recognized the ideology, informal or formal organization and direction to change as the other necessary

components for sprouting SMs (*In*: Kumar, 1). Seeing a movement as an organization with a profound structure and hierarchy Munson Ziad (2001) claims that it was mainly the internal and external organization of the Muslim Brethrens which brought them a success in the hostile environment. By focusing on the concept of ‘organization’ within the movement, one can realize that social movements and social change do not simply ‘happen’. Instead, they are *constructed* by people in struggle (Lofland, 1996:xiii).

Numerous social scientists view Social Movement Theory and Organization Theory as being the two liveliest locales within the study of social movement and organizations. The premise of this thesis is that both organizations and social movements carry on very similar bureaucratic and structural patterns which if examined under common study can prove to be beneficial to one another (Diani, 2005). For a very long time, however, these two areas of study were perceived as very diverse and unlike and the scholars did not show much of the attempt to bridge them under the common roof of analysis. As a result SMs were seen as deviant and irrational protests of mass of people (usually marginalized members of society) without a coherent structure and bureaucratic organization (e.g., Gurr 1970; Kornhauser 1959). Today, we can observe the signs of increased interest and interaction among participants in the two fields. The ideas from both fields interrelate and scholars tend to accept that the most appealing problems and greatest advances in the sciences often take place at the crossroads of established fields of study (Davis, 2005). Recently (since 1960s) the scholars around Mayer Zald and his collaborators such as John McCarthy, Doug McAdam, Gerald F. Davis but as well W. Richard Scott and John Lofland have shown us that these two areas of study possess striking similarities and studying them not as competing but complementary fields would bring beneficial outcome for both – the

corporate sector as well as social movements. With an attempt to create a common framework between these two areas of study an interested reader might be able to observe the flourishing number of new publications from Richard Scott and John L. Campbell. Michael Lounsbury in this context analyzes the institutional variation in the evolution of social movements where he focuses on spread of recycling advocacy groups. Elizabeth Armstrong applied the theory in the field of lesbian/gay organizations in San Francisco in the early 1970s and David Strang and Dong-II Jung examined the organizational change as an orchestrated social movement. With the ever growing globalization in the contemporary world new scholarly topics arise such as Smith's *Globalization and transnational social movements' organizations* or Morrill's analysis of an impact of SMOs on the global environment. From this number of contributors in the field we can perceive that the organizational studies within the social movements dynamics is very vivid, active and flourishing, offering a very interesting field of research, in which processes and models crucial in one area of study can be gainfully used to answer the concerns that are less notably featured in the other area. 50 years after the primary scholarship have emerged in the areas bridging two distinctive fields of social movements and organization, the movements are not any more perceived as unorganized collective actions, but rather as social movement organizations (SMO). "Zald and Ash (1966) noted that SMOs were unique entities and deserved special consideration. They recognized that organizations serve as an important, if not decisive, basis for mobilization" (*In: Caniglia, Carmin, 2005:201*).

Although the scholars around Zald attempted to incorporate the organization theory into study of SM, they have been in numerous instances challenged by the earlier research in

this field focusing mainly on movement-level issues ‘without the clear guidance of systematic theorizing and a cogent set of theoretical questions’ (ibid). As a consequence we can observe flaws between these two areas of study. Recently, however, with a large number of emerging SMOs on the local as well as national levels, the scholars find a rationale to retain our research on how organizations contribute to social movement creation, mobilization, preservation, and outcome.

Clemens (2004) calls the analysis of SMOs as a study “in its own right” and, as a means for achieving this goal, the scholars attempted to bridge social movement and organization theories (Davis, McAdam, Scott, and Zald 2005; Lounsbury and Ventresca 2002; Minkoff and McCarthy). On the very first sight one might not be very well able to observe the resemblances and similarities these two areas of study possess. If we look at multipart organizations (corporations, government agencies, large NGOs), what we see are the complexes that are large and have relatively clear boundaries, solid bureaucratic and formal procedures and fairly well defined authority structures. “By contrast, social movements and collective action were portrayed as more spontaneous, fluid and unorganized” (Davis, 2005: xiii). The ‘organizations’ within the movements were not for a long time within the focus of scholarly interest as they were perceived to be small, fluid, temporary, and resource poor. It was the leader who played an essential function in the mobilization of his supporters and the formal-legal authority hardly played any role. Nevertheless, commonalities that have emerged in recent times witness the change of the scholarly focus in the field. For instance, both fields have begun to give emphasis to analyses of the context of organizations and social movements. In the case of organizational studies, investigation has moved to institutional logics and the institutional grounds in which organizations are

entrenched. In the case of social movements, the central focus has been put on the role of the wider political environment in shaping the emergence and development of the movements.

The classical study of social movements involves struggle between ‘elites’ with privileged access to state power and ‘challengers’ with restricted entry to official channels for political change. “While the typical SMO might be envisioned as the homespun formalization of a singular grassroots movement, contemporary movement organizations often seem to have absorbed the organizational logic of corporate sector, in which economies of scale and efficiencies available through contracting out have shaped the kinds of organizational structures observed” (Davis, 2005: xv).

This essay is going to depart from the prototypical study of SM surrounded by rumors, panics, crowds and mobs and as Morris (2000:445) points out ‘the spontaneous, unorganized, and unstructured phenomena’. I also want to deflect my focus from the theoretical perspectives of collective behavior, including strain model and relative deprivation concept, which have been for very long accepted by the scholars as explanatory principles for the creation of social movements. As McAdam (2005) points out social movements and collective action events that continue to last for longer time-span are likely to develop some formal mechanisms for coordinating action and develop social movement organizations that are amenable to organizational analysis. For this reason I am going to build my hypothesis on the Zald’s (2005) argument and rather than seeing organization and movement as contrasting phenomena, I will see them as embedded (*In: Davis, 2005*). Moreover I will follow the Lofland’s (1996:2) *Social movement organizations guide to*

*research on insurgent realities* in which he proposes 7 central questions when studying SMOs:

- *What are the beliefs of SMOs?*
- *How are these associations structured?*
- *How do they form?*
- *Why do people join them?*
- *What strategies do they use to achieve their goals?*
- *What are social reactions to them?*
- *What social effects do they have?*

I strongly believe that by taking the organization dynamics with a study of social movement as a subject of analysis associated with an empirical contribution we can expand our knowledge of SMO.

As Tilly suggests there are multiple forms of appropriation of sociological dynamics into real historical entanglement and a scholar has a choice to decide among them. One of the strategies that Tilly proposes is ‘to extract certain mechanisms and processes from the existing theory, rather than adopting theory as a whole, in the hope that those same mechanisms and processes work in the same way within the new domain’ (Tilly - Foreword, *In: Wictorowicz, 2004: ix*). In this case, the theory of organization as a whole represents more general conceptual scheme integrating within itself the theories of political opportunity, resource mobilization theory and framing processes. What is more, it comprehensively combines theory and empirical findings from two of the most vibrant areas of sociology which would not be possible to cover in one volume. For this reason I will extract some of the methods and practices from the theory to examine the case under

my study. By choosing to analyze particularly Muslim Brotherhood among many cases of Islamic Activism<sup>1</sup> in the world I will refrain from the broad scale comparisons and avoid the universality of my findings. I will borrow Tilly's approach who "doubts that any appealing regularities and descriptive principles exist at the scale of *whole* social movements. The apparatus of political opportunities, frames, repertoires or mobilizing structures can provide only orienting mechanism for the sorting of observations that scholars will then have to explain by other means. Regularities and explanatory principles operate at the level of mechanisms and processes, not at the level of descriptive categories" (Tilly, *In*: Wictorowicz, 2004: xi). What I see however, by obtaining a common logic of different mechanisms operating within organizational fields we might be able to perform clearer analysis of social movements as global interactive systems, and distinguish them from other forms of collective actions (Diani, 2005).

### **1.2.1 The development of the theory**

The earlier scholarship on social movements was focusing on the traditional collective behavior theory that views social movements as deviant collective actions with lack of rational choice. The examined movements were perceived as spontaneous and fluid without clear boundaries and hierarchical structure. Only in 1960s the scholars around Tilly, Gamson and Zald started to convert the earlier focus and formulated more explicit organizational and political arguments to account for social unrest (Gamson 1968, 1975; Tilly and Rule 1965; Zald and Ash 1966, *In*: Davis, 2005). SM scholars reframed the view

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<sup>1</sup> Definition of Islamic Activism is broad and inclusive. It accommodates the range of argument that frequently emerges under the notion of 'Islam', most broadly Islamic Activism – the mobilization of contention to support Muslim causes. (Wictorowicz, 2004:2)



of protest and reform activities from one of irrational behavior – a failing out against an unjust universe – to one involving instrumental action (Davis, 2005:26). What shifted as well was the gradual acknowledgment of the broader external environment in which movement operates.

*“SM studies began to revive because of increased recognition of the environment – not just as contexts breeding alienation or a sense of deprivation, but as the source of resources, including movement members and allies – as a locus of opportunities as well as constraints. In addition, SM scholars increasingly came to recognize the importance of organization and organizing processes. Resources must be mobilized and momentum maintained for movements to be successful, and both tasks require instrumental activities and coordination of effort. In short: organization.”*

(McAdam, Scott, 2002:2-3)

Under this scholarly research two divergent camps emerged stressing on different aspects within the same study. Zald and McCarthy (1987) as pioneers and main advocates of resource mobilization theory promotes classic entrepreneurial (economic) version of this model. Depicting from the organizational structures, the scholars argued that movements, in order to prevail for some period of time, must acquire some form of organization: management, executive structure, motivation for participation, and a means for attaining funds and support.

Within the last half century the Organization studies went through many changes and new innovative perspectives, which can be demonstrated by the growth of different, either conflicting or complementary theoretical viewpoints. SM scholars had built earlier

remarkably comparable framework to conduct comparative investigation on social movements (McAdam, Scott, 2002). McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996:2) assigned three extensive factors as essential in examining ‘the creation and growth of social movements/revolutions’. „The rising agreement among movement scholars regarding the significance of these tree factors belies the very diverse and oftentimes antagonistic perspectives in which they developed” (McAdam at al, 1996:2). However, perceiving them separately shows us the way for mapping the general terrain of SMO scholarship and for recognizing classic views and emerging trends (Caniglia, Carmin, 2005).

### **1.2.2 Resource mobilization theory (RMT) and SMOs**

RMT emerged as an opposing theory to the earlier research on social movements. It challenged a view of SM as being deviant and irrational compilations of voluntary associations and ad hoc groups whose members usually consisted of the direct recipients of movement activity (Caniglia, Carmin, 2005). By introduction of RMT scholars offered an alternative perspective seeing collective action as ‘a rational response that can occur only when adequate resources are available’ (McCarthy and Zald 1977). An underlying assumption stems from the fact that the social movement contention derives from rational actors. For RMT, movement entrepreneurs create and assemble SMOs and institutional infrastructure and strategically mobilize resources and personnel in order to generate efficient selection of preferences and actions, whether for individual alternatives or movement purposes. The movement members are not unreasonable – the decision to join the movement derives from variety of incentives and goals (Wiktorwicz, 2004). Although the political environment is essential in providing the arena for the rise of the movement,

their influence is not independent of the diversity of mobilizing structures through which protesting groups seek to organize. By mobilizing structures we mean ‘those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action’ (Goodwin, Jasper, 2004:203). Resource allocation involves different set of actions through which movement members take variety of decisions concerning the use of organizational resources – from the agenda and strategies to selection of leadership to control procedures and resource mobilization (Perrucci, Potter 1989). The theory seeks to ‘break grievance-based conceptions of social movements and focus instead on mobilization processes and the formal organizational manifestations of these processes’ (McAdam et al, 1996:3). The wealth of empirical work by Tilly (1975,1978), Tarrow (1994), McCarty (1996), McAdam (1986, 1996, 1999, 2001), but as well scholars around Morris (1981,1984), Snow (1980) , Paulsen (1993), Davis (2005) and Evans (1980) led to a increasing understanding of different collective settings in which movements expand and organizational forms which they give rise to. They view SMO as ‘professional organization with profound network system, paid leadership, routinized tasks, clear division of labor, hierarchical decision-making processes, and codified membership criteria’ (Staggenborg 1988, *In*: Caniglia, Carmin, 2005:202). The level of professionalization and formalization is not strictly designed. The degree of implemented formality, however, can smooth the resource acquisition, legitimacy, and mobilization capacity. On the other hand, some argue, that SMO with high degree of bureaucratic apparatus and hierarchical structures devote too much time and effort for keeping the structural machinery of the SMO which hinders them from quick adaptation to emerging situation and rapid mobilization (Gerlach and Hine 1970) when compared to less formalized groups. This as a consequence can prove a

validity of Michels' (1962) "iron law of oligarchy" which suggests that the goal-directed efforts of organizations will be displaced over time by activities that are devoted to its continued existence. Ferree and Hess (1985) however argue that organizations with high level of bureaucracy and formality are more likely to gain an entry to established political channels and as Tarrow (1998: 137) continues 'to sustain ongoing interactions with diverse constituencies including "allies, authorities, and supporters.'" Emergent body of scholarship not only attempt to analyze how organizations contribute to movement synchronization and strength, but it offers a broad investigation of the SMO structures, practices, and processes.

### **1.2.3 Political Opportunities Theory and SMOs**

"Political Opportunity structures are systematic, though inherently unstable, facets of the social and political context that effect possibilities both of challengers taking action and their achieving policy concessions"(Costain, 1998: 169). "They can be defined as constant – but not inevitably formal or enduring – dimensions of political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure" (Tarrow, 1994:85). The main concept of this theory asserts that SMO do not emerge and develop in vacuum but exist within the particular external political environment which provides either the opportunities or constraints for the rise of SMO. This body of theory emerged in United States with Charles Tilly (1978) focusing on *political process* and Sidney Tarrow (1983) with an attempt to create the linkage between social movements and institutionalized politics. Among the European scholars the valuable contribution was made by Jan Duyvendak (1992), Hanspeter Kriesi (1989), Herbert Kitschelt (1986) and Ruud Koopmans (1992) who focused mainly on political opportunity structures within the tradition of *new social movements*. Their research was conducted

under the same conviction: that ‘social movements and revolutions are shaped by the broader shape of political constraints and opportunities unique to the national context in which they are embedded’ (McAdam et al, 1996:3). The crucial importance is stressed on growing political opportunities which are perceived as decisive impel to collective action. Scholars in this respect sought to show how changes in some aspect of political system formed new possibilities for collective action by a given challenger or set of challengers (Costain, 1992; McAdam, 1982, Tarrow, 1989; *In*: McAdam et al, 1996:17). The general factors examined under this theory were offered by Tarrow (1998) and McAdam (1998, 1982) who established basis for the analysis on national and sub-national level: (1) declining state repression, (2) increasing political access, (3) divisions among the elite and (4) influential allies (*In*: Munson, 2001: 494). Later theorists comprised as well cultural and social factors for the rise of the movements (Gamson and Meyer 1996, Rucht 1996). The scholars center their focus on organization as an essential feature of SMOs but here the analysis are performed on aggregate, macro-economic level. The individual SMO’s features such as size or structure are generally underestimated. Although many other justifications account for the rise of Islamic Activism (e.g. Durkheimian<sup>2</sup>), nevertheless political opportunity is a prevailing concept for understanding social movements in current sociology (Munson, 2001).

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<sup>2</sup> Durkheimian’s explanations of political Islam embody the conventional wisdom of area specialists on Islamic groups in the Middle East

### **1.2.4 Framing Processes**

The theorists of framing processes (Snow, 1986; Benford, 1988) emphasized the importance of ‘more cognitive or ideational dimensions of collective action’ (*In: McAdam et al, 1996:5*). Snow originally defined framing rather narrowly as he referred to ‘conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action’ (*In: Quah, Sales, 2000:240*) The emphases were given on ‘collective processes of interpretation, attribution, and social construction that mediate between opportunity and action’ (Davis, 2005:16) Scholars in this tradition argue that movements arise and prevail within social and cultural contexts that are ripe with meaning. Participants are motivated to unite with movements because they resonate with their individual ideas, beliefs and sentiments (Caniglia, Carmin, 2005). It is always the endless struggle of a movement to decide upon the most convincing and efficient way to spread the movement’s message to the people. Between these three factors exists many overlaps and connections.

Focusing my attention on the case of Muslim Brotherhood I chose to use Tilly’s strategy for incorporation of the body of theory for explanation of the historical phenomenon. I will not use the concept as a whole, but rather extract certain mechanisms and intentionally underestimate the other parts of the theory. My focus will base on organizational structure of the Society and methods chosen for mobilizing its resources for persistence and growth, i.e. RMT. By this I do not want to disregard the other two perspectives (Political opportunity and Processes of framing) or claim that they do not have a deep value in scholarly discussion on the rise and development of particular movement. They however

focus on explanations of movement's triumph and collapse rather than SMO structures and processes. In my observation, underlying assumption of the political process model, I share with proponents of that perspective the certitude that most political movements and revolutions are set in motion by social changes that cause the established political order to be more vulnerable or receptive to challenge (McAdam et al, 1996). These 'political opportunities' are indispensable precondition to action and for this reason the basic explanation of the socio-economic dynamics of Egypt in late 1920s will be present in the pages to follow. Nonetheless where the adequate 'organization, whether formal or informal, is lacking, such opportunities are unlikely to be seized' (frameworksinstitute.org, 2011). Environmental opportunities have a large impact on the movement's development especially in its very early phases, but as SMOs continues to grow what becomes crucial, are their own actions. The nature of opportunity may ground the preconditions for the rise of the movement, but it is the impact of the organizational forms accessible by the insurgents which form the formal and ideological assets of the movement. And these, in turn, are 'mainly a product of the mobilizing structures in which insurgents are embedded on the eve of the movement. In other words, mobilizing structures mediate the effects of political opportunities' (McAdam et al, 1996:11-12).

The correlation between the framing processes and the organization would follow the same logic. We can observe that the process of framing undoubtedly support mobilization, when people join the movements as a response to growing illegitimacy and weakness of the system. At the same time, as McAdam (1996) proclaims, the prospective of the framing processes increase mainly, when the population gain an access to various mobilizing structures. The argument follows that framing processes are more probable as well as with

farther reaching outcomes under provision of strong rather than weak organization. In the case of civil rights movements it was the preexisting black church that served for the early movement as the institutional centre for mass meetings and mobilizing device (Morris, 1984). For the emergence of any collective action the frames need to be spread at least to minimum number of people, which is in the absence of any real mobilizing structure almost impossible. I would argue at this point that lacking sufficient organization, these framings would never appear in the first place.

The indispensable question regarding the emergence of the particular movement is whether and what kind of *mobilizing structures* are available to the insurgents in order to scale up. This element is crucial in the later stages of the movement's development, although in different form. What we need to take into account is not only basic accessibility of mobilizing structures, but the organizational shape of the group which becomes more and more important as the movement cultivates. At the emergent phases of a movement's development process the local background comprised of established institutions and informal associational networks serve as essential for its growth. This however changes as the movement nurtures and these so called *nonmovement* settings are not any more able to supply all the needs of the group. For the movement to endure, the insurgents must be capable of constructing a more stable organizational structure to maintain collective action. Formal organizations represent the movement goals, and gradually utter the course, content and outcomes of the struggle. In regards to our three factors, it comes rational that both political opportunities and framing processes are more the product of organizational dynamics particularly in the later stages of the movement's development. As RMT theorists claim, it is essential to create a kind of formal social movement organizations (SMOs)



which would be able to combine political opportunities and framing processes and determine the overall pace and outcome of resistance efforts.

Basing on this argument, among the key questions this study addresses are the following:

- Which role the organization theory played in the process of creation of a mass movement?
- Where the Muslim Brotherhood as a religious reform movement found its justification to establish the type of organization which would route the economic and political development of post-revolutionary Egypt?
- What was the internal organization of the MB? (system of headquarters and branches, recruitment of new members, three-tier membership structure)
- What was the external organization of the MB? (relation with other welfare societies active in Egypt in the period under study, penetrating into the daily life of Egyptian citizens – building mosques, hospitals, schools, establishment of local handicraft industries)
- How did MB mobilize its resources for further expansions? (individual contributions by members, the enterprises established by the Society, cash flow from other countries, paying of *zakat* (alms fee), economic activity, industry and commerce, investment activities (Company for Islamic transactions), raising money to help striking Palestinians, collecting food for the war effort, grants from local businesses, government's service funding, informal financial network)
- Is the organization and the mobilization of material resources essential for the growth of the movement?

“Equipped with this combination of more static structural and more dynamic change oriented concepts, we are now ready to resume our two cases with an eye to assessing the usefulness of this synthetic framework for encompassing what otherwise might seem to be quite disparate cases: The organization theory and social movement dynamics” (Davis, 2005, *In*: McAdam, Scott, 2001:20).

## **II THE CASE STUDY – MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD**

### **2.1 Socio-economic and cultural factors as the propitious conditions for the creation of the movement**

With the Islamist movement gaining impetus and recruits throughout the Near and Middle East and North Africa, it is essential that scholars make an attempt to understand the objectives and strategies expressed by the groups within this movement (Abed-Kotob, 1995:321). The first and the largest modern Islamic mass movement caught the attention of many past and present thinkers and scholars who engaged in very vivid scholarly discussions attempting to find the reasons for the movement's emergence as well as explain the Society's success despite the unfavorable societal conditions. Looking at the so far produced work of western scholars in the study of Islamic activism it seems almost clear that the biggest emphasis is put on the movement's ideology. This has been achieved in expense of works of its organizational structure, social activities and reform programs (J. Heyworth-Dunne, 1950; P. Harris, 1964; M. Halpern. 1963; N.Safran, 1961; H.A.R. Gibb, *In: Mitchel*, 1969; Ch.Tripp, 1984). Then as the fresh air come the authors who bring a new research perspectives with an attempt to incorporate the organization, internal affairs, way of mobilization and a personality of a leader to the study of Muslim Brothers. Trying to fill the important gaps these scholars contribute to the research with more comprehensive analysis (I. M. Husayni, 1956; Deeb, 1979, B.Lia, 1998). The most extensive Mitchel's book can not be included in any of the category as he used the common wisdom of the former scholars and identified the rise of the Muslim Brethrens with the socio-economic and cultural opportunities provided by post-colonial Egypt, yet, he significantly modified

the views of his mentors (Lia, 1998). Sana Abed-Kotob in her work *The Goals and Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt* finds as imperative to acknowledge that ‘the Islamic resurgence is not a monolithic phenomenon, but is characterized by factions and voices that diverge on their approach to major themes such as the nature of society, the preferred relationship between Islamist activists and the political system, methodology for alleviating socioeconomic frustrations and spiritual laxity, and the temporal framework within which Islamist goals are to be achieved’ (1995:321). We can not examine the rise of particular group looking only at one aspect as a reason for its emergence. Neither can we fuel the illusion that the emergence of the movement or resistance groups will solve all the problems of the society, as ‘Muslims believe to solve a wide range of social problems simply by embracing Islam’ (Kuran, 2004:ix). H. Elsenhans (2009) claims that these new political movements were successful in delivering their recognizing cultural principles: a kind of all persistent coloration of their societies which adjusted with consumerism and allow them to become dominant. In the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, the argument is that the tensions brought by rapid modernization, and especially Westernization, caused the problems that some supposed could be solved by turning to Islamic ideals rather than to normal, institutional means (Munson, 2001:491). Many theorists believe that primary impulsion for activism is caused by the structural crises in particular society generated by the failure of secular modernization projects (Waltz 1986, Hoffman, 1995, *In*: Wiktorowicz, 2004). In order to enhance an economic development, many governments in Middle East had been encouraged to implement the Western modernization models and thus promoted policies of industrialization, secularization and absorption of beliefs and ideas coming from the West into the daily life of the people. These included among others

use of languages and education system. The promotions of the Western practices were set in motion with a hope to bring desired security, prosperity and improvement of the country's conditions. As a consequence the socioeconomic change started to take place in Egypt and the much wanted wealth was flowing to the country. This was, however, concentrated in the hands of small elites, bourgeoisie and fraudulent state bureaucrats which left large segments of the Egyptian population at the margins of the society without access to equal employment opportunities and education. As Wiktorowicz (2004:7) suggested this 'system did not have a capacity to incorporate large parts of society seeking employment in growing cities (Cairo), which led to housing shortages and expansion of shantytowns and decline of the real wages'. What is more, the monopolization of the political power in the hands of small influential bourgeois elites and general economic depression contributed to impoverishment and further marginalization of the society. In the recent scholarly discussion, these socioeconomic conditions which produce strains and grievances are to be perceived as preliminary factors for the population to turn back to Islamic ideals. With the hope to find the solution to the problems within the own religious sources they are encouraged to join the movements which promote the fundamental principles of Islamic world. This socio-psychological approach is especially advocated by the scholars around Munson (1986) and Waltz (1986) who attribute psychological suffering to one of the primary factors for the rise of a movement. Keddie (1994) for example feels that masses lacked formal political entry as many channels to political resources continued to be closed, which produced aggravation and a sense of hostility and isolation. On the other hand Burgat and Dowell (1993) believe that Islamist activism emerges as a reaction to cultural strains produced by cultural imperialism. This view proposes that the growing

influence of Western way of life in the Middle East discouraged people to hold on to their traditional morals and religious spirituality. “Social disintegration, acquisitiveness and class resentments are all seen as symptoms of rampant materialism, intertwined with the understanding of individualism promoted by capitalism” (Tripp, 2006:55). On the other hand, an Islamic order is characterized by central element of spirituality which opposing materialism and reminding people of a world beyond the present and of the responsibilities towards one another we have in this world. In this logic spirituality is a kind of social solidarity – and it is this that will guard Islamic society against the many pressures linked with the capitalist and communist onslaught (ibid). Western cultures were in this respect perceived as an exposure of alien value system which causes the erosion of Islamic ideals deeply rooted in the society and thus inevitably led to deepening of other problems, might it be economic, political or cultural. As Burgat and Dowell (1993) continue, this should be viewed as a step to destabilize, weaken and in due course dominate Muslim countries. Deprived individuals found Islamic values and ideas as an efficient option in the struggle against political exclusion as they sought to restore long felt injustice through religion (Esposito, 1992).

## 2.2 Short historical sketch and the ideology of Muslim Brethrens

*' God is our purpose, the Prophet our leader,  
the Qur'an our constitution, Jihad our  
way and dying for God's cause  
our supreme objective.'*

Muslim Brotherhood Slogan, Hassan-Al Banna,  
Isma'iliya, 1928



Muslim Brotherhood emblem:  
Qur'an and Swords

The first and largest Islamic mass movement, Muslim Brotherhood (Arabic: جمعية الإخوان المسلمون, Jam'iyyat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) was founded by Hasan al-Banna, a school and a mosque teacher, with six Egyptian laborers in the Suez Canal city of Isma'iliya in March 1928 (Munson, 2001).

The idea of the necessity for the establishment of the Islamic Society in Egypt was however created long before the official sources determine. In this respect we can single out five most important elements as a main source of influence of Hassan al-Banna, which later on created a base for the formation of the Islamic mass movement. The first and foremost to be mentioned was Hassan al-Banna's family and the Islamic message of piety and religious learning, which formed central values in his background and had a strong impact on his value hierarchy. The situation of Al-Banna's family very much resembles the conditions of many other Egyptian peasant families of that time and illustrates the transformation of socio-economic environment in Egypt during the 1920s and 1930s. Although socially and economically elevated above the masses, Al-Banna's family did not belong to the aristocracy and struggling for resources had been part of their ordinary life. It comes as no

surprise, when the economic crises blew through the region in the early 1920s, the family had been strongly affected. The family faced economic hardship and ambiguity not only because of the widespread crises but mainly because the long accepted religious morals which assured the respect and recognition within the society no longer guaranteed the social standing. What is more, many members of the heterogeneous class of craft and petty traders could not follow the rapidly changing technology and compete with large-scale international commerce and industry (Lia, 1998: 24). Hassan's father Shaykh Ahmad al-Banna was forced to depart from his business activities due to new competitors and rising cost of living in the capital. Apart from his family, Al-Banna gained the crucial knowledge and influence from Shaykh Muhammad Zahran, Islamic scholar, whose spiritual harmony and emotional association with his students resonated in Hassan's ideology throughout his whole life as a leader of the Society.

The education played essential role in the formation of Hassan's beliefs and future ideology of the movement. He completed his academic path at Dar al'Uloom, training school for teachers, which aimed to be less customary and conventional than al-Azhar University. The choice of his early educational path already illustrates Hassan's indifference to traditionalism and isolation which were then perceived to be the main characteristics of Islamic founding (Kräme, 2010).

Spiritually was he mainly attached to the teachings of Sufism<sup>3</sup> and he developed a strong spiritual and emotional inclination especially to the expressive relations between the Shaykh and his followers, which he later on applied when leading the Society.

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<sup>3</sup> a science whose objective is the reparation of the heart and turning it away from all else but God (Hanson, 2008)



Last but not least, from these early crucial influences, we have to recall the impact of Egyptian revolution of 1919 in which al-Banna was able to observe several years of political turmoil, people's activism and nationalistic dedication which might have pushed him toward more active commitment and loyalty to religion as a contrary from merely academic efforts of earlier scholars. Some actually believe that this was the crucial moment for his decision for formation of a social movement. Hassan Al-Banna's teachings represented rather contrary efforts to the earlier scholars (among who we can affine Hassan's father as well). These devoted all the work to the intellectual discourse on modern movements and tried to re-interpret the Islamic fundamental sources through the lens of Western thoughts of discourse on Western movements. In this respect Al-Banna developed somewhat practical implementation of Islam in the daily procedures of ordinary Egyptians citizens. He believed that if the Muslims would form themselves they can create a new nation based on religious principles and create a movement whose goal was not solely an anti-colonialist resist in Egypt nor the restoration of Islam, but rather a world revolution that would establish Islam as the principal religion of the whole world (Isseroff, 2008):

*"...we will not stop at this point [i.e., "freeing Egypt from secularism and modernity"], but will pursue this evil force to its own lands, invade its Western heartland, and struggle to overcome it until all the world shouts by the name of the Prophet and the teachings of Islam spread throughout the world. Only then will Muslims achieve their fundamental goal... and all religion will be exclusively for Allah."*

(Habeck, 2006:120)

Hassan was from his young age known for his eagerness and religious zeal, passion and moral correctness which brought him success and millions of followers in his later ambitious.

Although many sources on the history of the society relates only to the autobiography of its founder, Brynjar Lia, drawing from Al-Bannas letters to his father, offers a critical alternative and sheds new light on the early history of the Society. One of his most important findings claim that the theorists' extensively described anti-Westernism as the profound ideology of the movement can be dismissed in the early stages of the Society's creation. Western beliefs and influences were not abomination to the Society in this period (Lia, 1998). Young Al-Banna was quoting many European scholars and used the illustrations on Europe for better clarification and understanding of often too academic and inaccessible Egyptian religious sources.

Since its establishment in Egypt, the Society has reached every state in the Islamic world and claimed the commitment of millions from virtually every segment of society. At the peak of its popularity, it had half a million active members in an Egyptian population which comprised of less than twenty million people (Munson, 2001). For comparison, let me mention that the followers of Muslim Brotherhood exceeded twice the number of members of AARP<sup>4</sup> to this date (ibid).

The Muslim Brotherhood was an openly apolitical religious reform and mutual aid society during the early years of its existence. The most efforts were dedicated to membership recruitment, private discussions of religion and moral transformation, and building a social service organization. This clearly apolitical characteristic has however changed after the

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<sup>4</sup> American Association of Retired Persons

Arab general strike in Palestine, when the Society granted an overall support for the strike and later on entered the official parliamentary elections of the country.<sup>5</sup>

The protagonists are antagonist of secular nationalism, with conservative social policies, dislike social change. They are committed to national sovereignty and regard the whole tradition of Western European institutionalists irrelevant. Under the main ideology – Islam is a solution, they fought to withdraw Egyptian people from the British rule (continued British occupation of Egypt after World War I and bring them back to their ideological heritage and often forgotten religious morals.

The Society based its ideological principles on the Hanbali school of Islamic thought<sup>6</sup>. The main objective of the Muslim Brethrens was to withdraw the Egyptian populace from the Dominance of Western powers, improve their social and economic conditions and enhance the increasingly declining morality. Adhering the Huntington's clash of civilization mode, they saw the Muslims as a single cohesive community which must unite itself to resist the infringement of fraudulent Western influences. They fought for the rebirth of an Islamic

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<sup>5</sup> Time span between these two events did last almost two decades. Muslim Brothers' representatives entered their first parliamentary elections in 1941 with an appeal for social reform and an instantaneous departure of British troops from Egypt.

<sup>6</sup> Schools of thought (madhahib) are the paths people follow to the Holy Qur'an and Holy Prophet Muhammad (pbuh&hf). These schools originated after the death of the Prophet and, in reality, never took shape until the time of the Umayyid Caliphate. There are four main traditions for constructing and understanding of Islamic law, Hanbali school of Islamic thought being one of them. This school is characterized as the most conservative, insisting on extensive reading of Qu'ran and other religious sacraments. The others are *Ja'fari*, *Hanafi*, *Maliki* and *Shafi* (shahemardan.org). See also *Bulletin of Affiliation: Al-Madhhab - Schools of Thought*, vol. 17 no. 4 (December 1998), p. 5, *Min Amali al-Imam al-Sadiq*, Kalili, 4:157, *Tadhkirat al-Hiffadh*, 1:166; *Asna al-Matalib*, p. 55

state and agreed that true Islam was for all intents and purposes democratic and capable of solving the harms of the modern world (Munson, 2001).

In finding a justification for Society's intervention into the institutional structures and every day life of Egyptian citizens, we first have to analyze where the Islam as a main ideology of the Brotherhood stands and what is causing this privileged position. We can observe that Islam as a religion intercedes to each aspect of human's life without being questioned. Can the religion as a set of belief and moral codex intervene to political and economic development of the country? What is more, can it proclaim to be a solution for everything, be it a health or economic prosperity of individual human being? Has not religion meant to enhance human's spirituality only? Or is Islam in this sense perceived to be more than religion? Sana Abed-Kotob (1995:323) gives a very cogent explanation: "To be able to objectively understand the goals and objectives of the Brotherhood, we must first recognize that Islam is not only religion in the sense of the relationship between an individual and his/her God. In fact, a precise definition of Islam would inevitably interpret the oft-noted phrase that it is both "religion and state" (din wa dawla). This was done by Umar al-Tilmisani, the General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood until his death in 1987, when he characterized Islam as 'creed, worship, homeland, citizenship, creation, the physical, culture, law, forgiveness, and power'. "In this view, Islam is an inclusive system governing all aspects of life. Islam encompasses all things material and spiritual, societal and individual, political and personal" (1987:7, *In: Abed-Kotob,1995*). Shafiel A. Karim (2010:1) besides claims that religion's primary function is formulating public policy. Activists promote Islam as a political, social, economic, and spiritual embodiment of the solutions. What is more, in accordance with this comprehensive doctrine, the Muslim

Brothers describe their organization as more than either ‘a political party or a charitable, reformist society’. “Rather, it is a spiritual worldwide organization that is (1) a *dacwa* (call) from the Qur'an and the Sunna (tradition and example) of the Prophet Muhammed; (2) a method that adheres to the Sunna; (3) a reality whose core is the purity of the soul; (4) a political association; (5) an athletic association; (6) an educational and cultural organization; (7) an economic enterprise; and (8) a social concept” (Umar al-Tilmisani, 1987:7, *In: Abed-Kotob, 1995:323*). Under this strong ideology the Society of Muslim Brothers very successfully penetrated to many aspect of human existence and without being questioned they developed a strong institutional organization which prevails until present day. According to Al-Bishri the main objective of the movement was the fight against the process of secularization and Westernization which withdrew Egypt from its historical and religious heritage and sharpened class differences by distinguishing the poor and underprivileged segments of the society from elites often coming from the West as well as struggle against the socio-economic injustice inherent in Egyptian society. The country was vexed in a cultural conflict which haunted between modernism and religious traditionalism and the Society’s developed an ideology which worked in this sense as kind of a bridge between these two encampments, linking together the religious toughs of Islam with an incorporation of modern ideologies and way of thinking. The interpretation of Qur’an, as Al-Hanna diligently emphasized, must be linked to all aspects of modern human reality and Islamic dogmas and religious skepticism should be overcome by modern theories and practices (Al-Banna, JIM no.1, 1933, *In: Lia, 1998*). This application of Islam into more understandable way which mirrored the real economic and political functioning of Egypt and pinpointed the crucial questions which needed to be addressed proved to be

very appealing, especially to the young students and educated middle class who wanted to overcome the official and often rigid Islamic academic teaching. Moreover Hassan al-Banna proposed the comprehensive reform program in comparison to old reforms proposed by the government which tackled only some problems of society, leaving the rest behind. He maintained that if the nation wished to bring about a ‘harmonious renaissance’ the ideology based on Islam, encompassing all aspect of life, was necessary (Lia, 1998). Al-Banna was criticized by the ambiguous attitude to Western civilization and for using the methods of contrast to attract its followers. He tirelessly fought against Western imperialism precisely by using western ideas to fight for his goals. He, however, convincingly claimed that while applying modern means of reform in the traditionally based society all these ‘modern modes of action’ were actually not brought from European Enlightenment, but could be found in Islamic sources often forgotten by the westernized Egyptian population. He said: *“If the Muslim searched, this basis might be found in the Qur’an” ... “It is our duty to endeavor to deal with these novel aspects in our era in light of the basis that our predecessors have laid down.”* (Al-Banna, JIM no.1, 1933, In: Lia, 1998) The group supported such state interventions as the principled control over the television broadcasting, radio, and print publishing, as well as necessary religious education in the schools, encouraging the study of Islamic history and the use of the Arabic language in universities and institutions (Munson, 2001).

In other words, the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood embedded Islamic religious beliefs and ideas, and combined them with the major problems of Egypt during the period with the course of secularization and the conduct of individual Egyptians (ibid).

The Society has gone through multiple crises while its existence, the times of high mobilization and expansion were inwrought with the periods of state repression and members' imprisonment (1941). Although the Society was created and socially and politically acted as a profoundly moderate movement, later in its existence its members created what came to be known as the 'secret apparatus' paramilitary section of the organization whose primary aims were to defend the leaders of the organization and help to accomplish the Society's aims through political violence. According to Munson's (2001:489) estimates, 'the association had over two thousand branches all over Egypt by 1949 and between 300,000 and 600,000 active members, the numbers which nominated the Society to become a largest organized entity in the country'.

The official suspension of the Society is dated to 1948 (Mitchell, 1993). It was suspected that one of the Muslim Brothers members collaborated on the assassination of the Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi, the person who finally ordered the Muslim Brotherhood's disbanding. Many of the members were imprisoned and Al-Banna, was murdered by Egyptian police. His demise closed a key chapter in the Muslim Brotherhood's history. Hassan al-Banna is up to present day seen by his followers as a model of the combination of religious sincerity with moral bravery and public commitment. Brotherhood's supporters describe his leadership as charismatic and appealing to the masses of believers; they illustrate his ideology as exemplifying Islamic ideals (Zollner, 2009:9).

## **2.3 Organization of the Movement**

The main part of my analysis is devoted to the organization of the Society of Muslim Brothers, the system of recruitment as well as mobilization of its organizational resources. In order to find out whether the organizational thesis incorporated in the operations of Islamic activism should prove to be essential explanatory factor for the success of particular movement, we have to devote enough space and efforts to analyze its characteristics. As we are able to observe within this study the case of the Muslim Brotherhood shows that our understanding of the correlation between mobilization and suppression must expand its focus to comprise the processes within organizations that facilitate them to withstand repressive efforts of the state.

The first part of my analysis will be dedicated to internal structure of the movement, system of headquarters and branches, recruitment of new members and by society invented and implemented three-tier membership structure.

I will then follow my thesis with Society's external operations, where I will describe the vivid relations with city councils and other Islamic welfare societies. Certain space will be devoted to Society's activities, which were not only extensive in the period under study, but also very successful in the attempt to penetrate to a daily life of ordinary Egyptian citizens and thus able to influence the economic and political happenings of the country.

I will conclude this part by giving an insight of the Society's resources, the ways of mobilization and funding allocation between individual members as well as the distribution of funds in order to follow multiple goals strategy and Muslim Brother's charitable activities.



### 2.3.1 Internal Organization


In order to understand the organizational structure and administrative and technical operations of the Society we need to look at two sets of ordinances which constitute the primary sources of the Muslim Brethren. Mitchell (1993) offers an insight into the decrees and regulations from the very early years of Society's existence. What is more, Munson (2001) in his extensive research on the Society collected agent reports, internal memos, newspaper translations, and communiqués publicly available in U.S. State Department in order to analyze the driven factors behind the success of the movement and find out where the organization *per se* stays in this analysis. The first set of laws to govern the operation of the Society came into existence, according to Banna, around 1930-1. On 8 September 1945 a revised code, proposed by Banna, was adopted under the title 'The Fundamental Law of the Organization of the Muslim Brothers'<sup>7</sup> (Mitchell, 1993:163). On May 21 May 1948 the Consultative Assembly and the Guidance Council following the Articles 32 and 62 of the basic statute created apparatus for 'realizing the goals of the Society' and adopted the 'General Internal Regulations' (ibid). The figure 2 summarizes its structure (up – administrative, down – technical side).

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<sup>7</sup> Rosenthal, 'Muslim Brethren', 278, refers to a code the fourth edition of which was published in 1942.

**Figure 2:**

**ORGANIZATION**  
**General Table of Organization**  
 (Based on diagram in Zaki, Ikhwan, p.99, In: Mitchell, 1993:164)



The theory of organization explains that social movement resembles the bureaucratic activities and the hierarchy of the corporate system. The social movement is not anymore perceived as a fluid group without any hierarchy but rather a profound system with well-organized system of activities, hierarchical structure and set of institutions.

The top of the hierarchy of the Muslim Brotherhood was maintained by the General Guide, General Guidance Council, Secretary-general, Treasurer and Consultative Assembly. The leading position was performed by the *General Guide*, one of the two major governing bodies, whose head was an elected Guide, who took the oath to be “*a faithful guardian over the principles of the Muslim Brothers, their fundamental law and to pursue the Society’s interests ....with the advice and opinions of those around him*” (QA 10-12:12-14 In: Mitchell, 1993:165). It proves that although performing a leading position, the Guide could not adopt the autocratic principles of leadership when making important decisions and had to take the advice from his fellow workers within the administrative structure of the Society. The obligatory rule for the General Guide, whose term of office was for life, was to dedicate all his time to the organization and not to take part on any financial speculations connected to the Society.

The *General Guidance Council*, arranged by 12 members played a distinctive role in performing the operations of the Society; it supervised its administration and executed its policies. The periodical meetings ensured the transparent maintaining of the society and were responsible for creation of committees, sections and divisions where necessary in order to fully accomplish the Society’s goals.

The *Secretary-general* was a chief representative of the Guidance Council in all ‘official, legal and administrative operations’. His main duties consisted of the execution of

Guidance Council's decrees, manage and supervise the entire administrative apparatus, conduct meetings and arrange the agenda, as well as control and file the Council's records. Secretary-general represented was the major linkage between the Council and all other units of the Society.

The *Treasurer* embodied all the financial operations of the Society and was in charge of all the expenditures of the Guidance Council.


The *Consultative Assembly* was described as 'the general consultative body' of the Society and 'the general assembly' of the Guidance Council.

The system of operation was divided into multiple units and divisions according to activities provided in the particular region. General headquarters were located in Cairo and were separated into offices and committee rooms. They were based in the capital's quarter which was also a location of for 'technical operations' and Society's field apparatus (Mitchell, 1993). The Muslim Brother's technical operations had two divisions. Consisting of six committees directly accountable to the Guidance Council, the first division dealt with administrative mechanism of the movement. The committees were divided to: financial, policy, legal, statistics, services, and legal opinions (ibid). The second division comprised of ten sections. These were in charge of spread of ideology, teaching and propaganda: propagation of the message, labor, peasants, family, students, liaison with the Islamic world, bodily training, professions, press and translation, and the Muslim Sisters (ibid). There is not much attention given to the section of Muslim Sisters, as the Society's highest focus was the recruitment of the young men. Its primary importance was organizational: the section supplied a petite laboratory for distribution of the ideas of the Society about

women; and as members, the Sisters made positive contributions to its educational and medical services (Zaki, 1951: 154-64, *In*: Mitchell, 1993).

The ‘field’ units were the administrative channels which were utilized for the communication and interaction between high command and operating membership groups. It was highly disciplined instrument of which largest unite was called *administrative office*. This consisted of a chairman, a deputy, a secretary, treasurer and a representative of Guidance Council. Administrative office was then divided into *districts*. The *District office* was executed by a council composed a chairman and a member selected by the Guidance Council. These offices were created in the later development of the Society; prior to their existence there was a vivid system of *branches* representing the historic grouping of members and the fundamental unit of administration. The supervision of the branch was conducted by the *Council of Administration*, but generally the leader of the branch had its operation freely in his hands as soon as it kept the Society’s ideological message. Branch leader also represented an essential role as link between the rank-and-file membership and the central leadership (Munson, 2001: 497).

**Figure 3: Structure and Administration: Field Apparatus**  
(Based on chart in Zaki, Ikhwan, p.101; In: Mitchell, 1993:177)



The division of the responsibilities was very well elaborated as the each of the employees was aware of his or her duties and was trained specially for the position held. The head of the branch was primarily in charge of the branch activity, chairing meetings, and representing it in legal and official operations. The secretary was accountable for filing, sealing and watching over the registers. The treasurer accounted for this work to the Council of administration as well as General Assembly. Meetings of the council were held occasionally, at a specific time priory agreed; the quorum was constituted by the presence of half the constituents; the resolution was binding with the vote of an absolute majority; the chairman had a casting vote (Mitchell, 1993:178).

If necessary, the Council was liable for the formation of the committees and divisions within the branch. Council could also suspend the branch or its activities, according to the Article 55 of the statute, if ‘it deviated from the path of the message’ (QA 40-50:26-31; LD 11-23: 6-8, *In*: Mitchell, 1993, 179).

The Society’s constitution delineated the relationships between the three administrative units. “In pyramidal order, the branch followed the district, and the district the administrative council. Communication between lowest and the highest level proceeded through the hierarchy” (Mitchell, 1993:179). In the same way, inter-district communication was directed through the apposite administrative councils which, for their part, interacted with each other through the Guidance Council.

The activities of the branch resembled the miniature headquarters. Its operations followed the patterns of the headquarters section: it consisted of different sections, such as the one for rovers, section for promulgation of the message, and depending on the branch localization, one for students, workers, professions, peasants, individually or combination. It was required for the branch to have a library or the reading room in order to encourage the educational programs in the area.

There were also so called *academic branches* which partially differed with their organization from ordinary geographical branches, depending on the university requirements. They were organized simply and efficiently. The leaders of various faculties were directly accounted to the university leader; the faculties were alternately divided into groups representing each of the four years of the schooling.

One of the most important advantages of this hierarchical system was its impact on the overall communication within the Society as well as spread of the message with a high

speed. Mitchell (1993: 180) asserts that ‘perhaps no other aspect of the activity of the Brothers in the university so astonished (and enraged) their opponents there as the capability of the leaders to communicate commands and decisions throughout the ranks of the Society with such speed and have them so perfectly obeyed’. Later on, in the times of crises and government oppressions the system of branches proved to be essential feature of the Society’s growth in comparison to other Islamic welfare societies present in the country. The branches had separated system of communications and authority which offered them protection from sporadic government crackdowns, police raids, mass arrests, and infiltration by the state security apparatus (Munson, 2001).

### **2.3.2 Resource Mobilization and Financing of the Society**

There are extensive records and broad scholarly study conducted on the topic of the Society’s expenditures, which was mainly utilized for its external activities, charitable work, building the mosques, financing local handicrafts, creating study and praying rooms and funding the medical and educational projects. What have been studied very marginally, however, was the Society’s income and revenues. This is due to lack of figures available as well as little published sources which would provide essential information about Society’s for-profit activities. Although not in much detail, Mitchell (1993:181) provides a number of data about the revenues of the Society, which according to his figures derived primarily from ‘membership fees, contributions, legacies, profits from its economic enterprises, publications, sales of emblems, peals, seals and the like’. This was however not like in the very early years of the Society’s existence, when the revenue mainly consisted of informal collection of dues and gifts from members as well as non-members. Although it is stated



that Society engaged in many activities which might have provided a good source of income, in so far the membership fees remained the essential basis for Society's funding. Although Lia The financing was also conducted on strict hierarchical principles and official delineation of financial responsibilities was to be followed. Moreover each of the Society's divisions was not wholly dependent on its own sources: the branch contributed to the operations of the district, the district office to the administrative office and this, in turn, to the operations of the general headquarters (ibid). Some argue that these guidelines were hard to follow, which culminated to the inefficient functioning, disproportionate use of funds on the lower level, which repeatedly cut the amounts forwarded to the higher levels.

It is known that Society profited partially on the economic enterprises from which very little figures are available, as well as from the sale of 'bonds for the message' to its members. What is more, Hassan al- Banna, although fighting for financial independence from wealthy local benefactors, strived for the close relationships with them. The search for patronage was one of the features of Society's operations and although not willing to be financed thoroughly by the members of ruling élites, the individual contributions and patronage of well-to-do Muslims proved to be a important revenue for the Society.

Some sources claim that the Organization enjoyed the funds flowing from British and American Embassy as well as Moscow, for which the Muslim Brothers were often accused as being the collaborators of imperialism. But whether or not these offers were accepted remains doubtful.

Another source of income, we might argue, was the presence of the radical wing within the Society. As stated earlier the Muslim Brothers proudly stated to work with moderate means for accomplishing its goals. The presence of the 'secret apparatus' however proved that also

temperate movement used sort of radical means for pursuing its interests. According to Haines (1988) it is beneficial for a movement to have within its formation the presence of a 'radical wing'. He calls this 'radical flank effect' and uses this term to depict an effect that commonly follows if the radical wing functions hand in hand with more 'moderate' one within the same SMOs. In effect, the existence of this radical division in fact encourages funding support for the moderates as a way of undercutting the power of the radicals. Heines describes this phenomenon on the change of funding in major civil rights organizations where he shows that the moderate SMOs oftentimes benefit from the presence of radicals.

### **2.3.3 Membership Structures**

The best way to describe the well elaborated strategies of the Society for recruitment of its members is to compare it with other group active in the Egypt in that particular period, namely – Communists. The major difference between these two was the way to approach the non-members to become the followers with full commitment. What mobilization tactics were applied by the Society under scrutiny, which failed to be applied by other groups, welfare societies or political parties?

The most important feature of Muslim Brotherhood which distinguished them from Communist group was the ability to attract different segments of Egyptian populace and facility to use the language people needed to hear. The Society leaders recognized that individual person although being Muslim does not need to be fully committed to the proposed ideology from the very beginning. For this reason they invented so called three-

tier membership consisting of members according to their dedication and loyalty to the ideology of the group (Munson, 2001).

This structure involved:

- *Assistants* – only obliged to hold a membership card and pay dues
- *Related* – required to be familiar with Society's rules and principles, perform an oath of obedience and attend regular meetings
- *Active* – expected to give full commitment to the organization, memorize Islamic transcripts, and being in a very good physical condition by applying a regular physical training, higher financial contributions to the organizational operations were also expected at this stage (Mitchell, 1969).

This structure gave enough time and freedom for different people in the different stage of religious maturity. In this respect, Egyptian communists chose a completely different strategy. By applying an organization with firm hierarchy, without independent branch system or federated bureaus, communist organizations rarely made any distinction between members and their levels of commitment. The recruitment process was very complicated and could take several years and the potential participants were required to possess the full dedication when entering the group. All the recruits were expected to be fully aware with communist principles, obey them and practice them in the daily activities. That daunted also the people who might like to join the group at the first place but not fully convinced about giving up the whole life to its principles. The Muslim Brotherhood was distinctively structured to tap into a variety of social beliefs and commitment and thus overcome this difficulty(Munson,2001).

### III ANALYSIS AND REFLECTIONS

With the attempt to incorporate the organizational studies in the research on social movements, large number of works have been published especially since the second half of 20th century. Although these submissions have provided basic tools for understanding how the organizational structures contribute to the rise of the movements, many scholars have tended to analyze movements emerging in the West, leaving the Islamic Activism somehow absent from the theoretical debates. McCarthy and Zald (1977) offered an extensive theoretical work describing how the resource mobilization and federated organizational structure contributed to the growth of American civil rights groups of the 1960s. Later, Mark Lichbach (1994) integrated the federated organizational structure as one of numerous means of overcoming free-rider problems in opposition movements (Munson, 2001). The scholars around Doug (1996) stress the significance of different ‘mobilizing structures’ in the success of particular social movement. My analysis attempts to prove that the modes of actions and organizational structure applied also contributed to a great extent to the spectacular growth of the largest Islamic Movement in the world.

My question however still remains unanswered: Can this theory be applied thoroughly and shall its original concepts be taken for granted? Or should some modifications be applied?

These enquires lead my work to the next stage in which I will determine whether the theory of organization and resource mobilization can be applied systematically to the case study provided; which strengths this theory accounts and which limitations have been imposed. As I already stated, the major sociological studies explaining the emergence of particular movements centered their arguments on the political opportunities structure models. The

scholars around Kriesi (1995), Jenkins and Perrow (1977) or Ekiert (1996) suggested that a movement can emerge only under favorable socio-economic conditions and depends critically on the political environment. Understanding Muslim Brotherhood mobilization obliges us not only to center our emphasis on the unique political opportunities in Egypt during the period of its emergence, but it requires something more as well. I propose that the key for the mobilization of the group above and beyond the existence of favorable political opportunities was the profound organization's structure, activities, and relationship to the regular lives of Egyptian people. As proposed earlier, the major strength of the theory of organization (when applied to the study of Islamic Activism) is its ability to work as what I would call an 'identifier of uniqueness'. Let me elaborate: while the socio-economic conditions of a particular country are shared by all the social movements emerging during the same time span, these can not serve as the explanatory factors behind the successful mobilization. The similar hypothesis could be assigned to the ideology which in the case of Islamic Activism is (with minor differences) the glorious return to Islam and the religious and cultural heritage it entails. In this sense, the only way how the movement can prove to be unique and different from the other similar SMOs is precisely because of the modes of action it chooses to perform. These entail an internal structure, mobilizing capacities, organization of human and capital resources as well as external social and political activities. "The analysis put forward that ideas are incorporated into social movements in more ways than the concept of framing allows. It also expands our understanding of how organizations can arise in highly repressive environments" (Munson, 2001:487).

*"The Muslim Brotherhood was clearly not dismantled by government efforts. Its organizational structure was key to its ability to resist state attempts to eliminate it. This point is an important one, because by*

*themselves political Islam and political opportunity structure explanations for the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood are based in part on the belief that the organization was considerably more ephemeral, rising and falling with the demographic or political winds of Egypt. The pressures of modernization or the change in political opportunities produce groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the stories go, but grievances and organizational structure become buried when the state exerts enough repressive force. In other words, the operative determining force in each case lies outside the group itself. My evidence suggests that the organization was considerably more enduring than previously believed; its organizational structure provided a means to survive attacks by the regime.”*

(Munson, 2001:499)

In this sense, the theory of organization proves to be very efficient when demonstrating that those SMOs which ground their activities on proper institutional apparatus and strong organizational bases are likely to be more stable and effective even in the times of repression and subjugation. What is more, organizations mobilizing on behalf of broad public causes have an aim to further engage in extensive inter-organizational collaborations, while actions promoted by broad coalitions are more likely to attract public attention, be perceived as worthy, and gain political legitimacy (Diani, 2010). This method was followed by the Brotherhood when it in the first years of its existence merged with Cairo based Society for Islamic Culture and thus assured the organizational entry to the ‘Islamic circles’ of the capital (Mitchell, 1969:10). After justifying this point, what can we claim about the role of the theory in the rise of an Islamic Movement? Is this role essential when applied to a particular case study, or do some flaws appear while trying to take all the

aspects of theory for granted without deeper view on the particular societal background as well as consequences it produces?

First, organization theory differs from all its theoretical predecessors in the social sciences, especially by the fact that it dismisses the account of the personality of the movement's leader. Davis (2005:xiii) regards the earlier studies of social movements as indistinct, as 'the leaders of collective action depended upon charisma and rhetoric, not formal-legal authority, to induce participation in their followers'. In this respect Hassan al-Banna's personality is accounted as secondary when studying the factors behind the Society's success. Nevertheless, Mitchell expresses no doubts when he stresses the 'centrality of Al-Banna's charisma on the achievements of the movement' (1993:9). He deepens into Al-Banna's personality and leadership potential when he offers us an insight into his family and social background which shaped his future goals and the Muslim Brothers' ideology. One of the main strengths of Al-Banna's personality, which brought the Organization to the top was his zeal for education. In this respect we mean not only the time he devoted to educate himself, but also the passion to bring new ideas and broaden the visions of his followers. According to his disciples, Al-Banna was truly committed to education what was witnessed by '2,500 volumes covering all aspects of Islamic Studies, literature, grammar and national history present at the Society's Library before its destruction in October 1954' (Mitchell, 1993:170). Apart from his professional occupation being a primary teacher in the city of Ismailia he used all his time and devotion for preaching in the coffee-shops, giving lectures in mosques, leading the Quranic studies as well as establishing the Union for Economic, Political and Islamic studies at the Faculty of Commerce (Lia, 1998). His zeal for education proved to be very appealing especially for young university students but as

well the high school students who were intentionally left aside by other Islamic Societies active in Egypt. By this strategy he brought up the Egyptian youth to be dedicated and committed to the goals of the Society straight after they entered the professional world. This approach was not shared by other organizations which also on the one hand aimed to win hearts and minds of Egyptian youth, but did not have a profound strategy and charismatic leadership which would attract the adolescent groups. For example in the case of YMMA (Young Men's Muslim Association) this aim was constricted mainly to University students from Cairo. Furthermore, during the 1920s the Wafd Party, which proudly stated to be the most popular and influential political party in Egypt for a period in the 1920s and 30s, did place very low importance to the recruitment and mobilization of youth (Jankowski, 1970). As Munson (2001) asserts, complacent in its dominant parliamentary position, the Wafd did not implement modern methods of youth organization until at least the mid-1930s, leaving it utterly behind future challengers such as the Muslim Brotherhood, which had applied a far more effective local-franchising system since its inception in 1928. What is more, the Wafd Party asserted to speak on behalf of masses, but only the upper classes and the prosperous families were brought into decision making process in the party. By contrast the Muslim Brothers brought lower-class elements onto leading positions in their organization.

Membership mobilization and recruitment create an essential part of the theory of organization, however, I must argue, that the tactics chosen to recruit potential members or mobilize resources could not be accomplished without the charisma and strong individual qualities of the movement's leader - the fact which is so marginalized by the scholars of organizational theories.



Going even further, the character or the leader proves to be essential in the later development of the movement, as the leader brings up the new generation of followers who in many instances take over his qualities and try to emulate his leadership abilities. As Mitchell's (1993) study illuminates, in the case of the Brotherhood there was a strong relationship between the leader and the led, which was achieved by direct contact, sincerity and personal touch, which came to be a major source of its strength. Al- Banna's regular daily routine consisted of visiting headquarters three times a day and although the branches had to a large extent freedom in their organizational activities, the members were being reassured that they had a strong leader to look up at and rely on. The founder and the first leader of Egyptian largest Islamic group was very resourceful and inventive and with his credo not to ever give up, he managed to attract thousands of followers under unfavorable conditions. This can be demonstrated by the fact that the history of the Society was inwrought with many obstacles and shaped by the relationship between Egypt and Great Britain and the World War II and yet become active and experienced expansion. Hassan Al-Banna very well realized that 'success can only follow patience and planning, and that action, not speech, and preparations not slogans, would guarantee the victory' (Mitchell, 1993:15). He tirelessly wrote letters to head of states and organized the series meetings even in dreary situations. Many scholars were so inspired by the features of Hassan Al-Banna's leadership that it comes as no surprise, as Lia (1998) suggests, that all accounts of the birth of the Society so far produced have been based almost exclusively on leader's autobiography.

If we would base our argumentation on the organization *per se* to explain the Society's success, we would have to assume that its structure being developed in the first phases of

the Society's existence prevailed also after the death of its first leader. That would mean, though, that whoever would happen to be Al-Banna's successor would become just part of this hierarchical structure and would be able to lead the movement, regardless of his personal abilities, charisma and rhetoric. But as Rubin (1990) who focused his research on Muslim Brethrens mainly after the Al-Banna's death proposes, the rise of the Society was in a very large extent depending on the appeal and respect of its leader. After al-Banna's death, there had been no leader who was strong or respected enough to unite the group (Rubin, 1990:12). As an example we can point out the leadership of Hasan Isma'il al-Hudaybi, who succeeded Al-Banna after his assassination in 1949. Al-Hudaybi's guiding principles in early 1950s were portrayed as disastrous for the future of the Brotherhood; he was accused of weakness, of failing to unify the organization in its opposition to the political system and of letting down the Brotherhood in its efforts to contain 'Abd al-Nasir's despotic exertions' (Zollner, 2009:9). Others describe his style of taking charge of the Brotherhood as autocratic, forbidding the building of democratic structures (Ibid). Rubin (1990) further asserts that part of the problem which explains why the Society was not able to engage in revolution and was basically dismissed under the Nasser's administration<sup>8</sup> has to do with Brotherhood's leadership. While al-Banna himself had been a charismatic figure, successors have dwelt in his shadow. None of them had the skills of maneuver and the ambition for power which Nasser possessed (ibid, 13). Reality however was not so simple. Even if Al-Banna's figure and charisma undermines some of the

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<sup>8</sup> Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein was the second President of Egypt from 1956 until his death. Abdul Munim Abdul Rauf, a Brotherhood activist, attempted to assassinate Egyptian President Nasser in 1954 and was executed, along with five other Brothers. Four thousand Brothers were also arrested, and thousands more fled to Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Lebanon (El-Awaisi, Abd Al-Fattah, 2000).

organization theory's statements, it cannot be denied that during his lifetime the Brotherhood itself was becoming more of a bureaucracy than a revolutionary vanguard. Rubin (1990) in this sense sees the rigid organization and bureaucratic apparatus of the Society as a drawback when pursuing its revolutionary goals. Its very aspiration to be a mass organization, which required government tolerance to permit legal activities, discouraged the other revolutionary activity. Those who rose to the top were managers and administrators rather than radical visionaries (ibid, 13). At this point it is worth to go back to our theoretical assumptions and derive from the Michels' (1962) "iron law of oligarchy". As mentioned early the concept suggests that the goal-directed efforts of organizations will be replaced within some time by efforts that are committed to its continued existence. As I see it, however, in the case of Muslim Brotherhood the organizational apparatus of the Society did not hinder the goal-related activities to such an extent as observer might expect. Hassan Al-banna very well realized that leading an extensive bureaucratic apparatus from a single headquarter in Cairo would become impossible. What is more, the Cairo based leadership could not be responsible for operation of all the branches which number exceeded 150 in 1936 (Robinson, 2008) and the individual members whose number surpassed 20 000 in the following year (ibid) as them all would have to account for their decisions to Cairo. Having this in mind, Al-Banna let the individual branches to operate and execute their daily activities on independent basis without any attempt to intervene in their decision making process. Evidently, there have been a system of control and check applied at the end of a season or accomplishments of a certain project, nonetheless, the administration of branches was not fully dependent on the decisions coming from Cairo. That allowed achieving massive organizational structure without spending extensive

amount of capital and personnel for retaining Society's endurance. This as compared earlier to the communist group active in Egypt underlies another fact. Communists also applied strict hierarchical principles; they recruited members as well as mobilized the resources for their daily activities. They however differed from the organization applied by Muslim Brothers by operating without independent branch or federated offices. This means that although having a well structured organization it did not bring them desired success as it was not attractive for the potential followers as well as not able to withstand the times of oppression. From this we can conclude that it is not the organization exclusively which brings victory to the movement, rather some *particular* type of organization with an ability to pull towards different people in different life situations and create a full commitment to the movement's future goals. In the organization theory, however, the organization *per se* is commended and the image of the *particular* type of organization is rather marginalized.

Moving to another part of these analyses, in an attempt to incorporate organizational patterns in the functioning of a movement, a particularly heavy emphasis needs to be given to the mobilization of capital resources. Each Society, in order to operate properly, engage in daily activities and pursue its goals, needs to acquire a sufficient amount of resources. As explained earlier, the Muslim Brotherhood had a very well defined structure for mobilizing its capital resources such as individual contributions by its members, the enterprises established by the Society, cash flow from other countries, paying of zakat (alms fee), economic activity, industry and commerce, investment activities (Company for Islamic transactions), raising money to help striking Palestinians, collecting food for the war effort, grants from local businesses, and informal financial network. In comparison to other organizations the way to assemble these funds was very different, that is to say, while other

organizations benefited mainly from the funds of local authorities and influential benefactors, the Society under study had kept its own finances and the protection of financial independence became the major concern for Hassan al-Banna (Lia, 1998). The reason for the pursuit of this strategy was Al-banna's advocacy of non-reliance on local benefactors for financial aid who would be able to dominant the movement and the Society would easily become pawn in the hands of its patrons (ibid). Continuing in this sense, we must admit that resource mobilization is the pivotal factor for the prosperous running of the organization; however, the emphasis within the theory should be put more on the ways and strategies for financial independence rather than basic assembling of the funds. Very affluent and prosperous Islamic Societies active in Egypt were not able to claim the success in terms of number of followers and influence in the region comparable to Muslim Brothers despite the capital resources they possessed. Their funds were usually acquired from governmental subsidies or selected contributions from elites which created a dominant relationship between the donor and the recipient and the whole existence of the Society depended upon the decisions of financial authorities. While I fully acknowledge the importance of the financial sources in the growth of the movement as proposed in the theory under study, I intend to put more emphasis on methods rather than the potential results. In other words, it is not the pure gathering of the funds from all the possible sources available, which proved to become a major reason for the Society's accomplishments, rather the ways and strategies chosen to become financially independent even in the times of suppression. What is also very important in this context is not only how the resources are mobilized but mainly how they are utilized. The major challenge of the movement leadership is the decision whether to bet all the resources to follow a single goal or whether

to pursue a multiple goals strategy and engage in several activities. McAdam (1996), the main proponent of the organization theory states that it seems apparent that there is a number of risks with the multiple-goal strategy. The decision to accomplish the number of goals at the same time horizon risks expending the already precious resources and energy of the SMO. What is more, the organization inclines to internal dissensions and fractionalism that may go along with the pursuit of multiple goals. Who will be responsible for the decision making, which objective will be prioritized and what resources will be expanded for which purposes? If a group settles on a single goal, it instantly eliminates potentially disruptive issues such as these. Consistent with this view, Gamson (1990: 44-46) finds single-issue groups to be successful more often than those addressing multiple goals (*In: McAdam, et al, 1996*). In the case of Muslim Brothers, Hassan Al-banna staked on the comprehensive reform and unlike other Islamic associations, which concentrated their resources on the cause for which they have been founded<sup>9</sup>, he decided that the Muslim Brethrens should not have a limited scope and wanted to fully involve in multifold activities and accomplish multiple goals. One might argue that by doing so the Society wasted large amount of funds without achieving anything concrete; on the other hand, however, we might argue that the attempt to follow multiple-goals strategy attracted much more followers than the societies founded on the one-goal principle. The new members entering the Association became a source of new capital resources in the form of membership fees, their economic and investment activities and voluntary contributions.

The major part of the Organization theory (esp. RMT as its core part) is related not only to mobilization of capital resources, in terms of money and equipment, but resources of any

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<sup>9</sup> Like the Society for the Rehabilitation of Mosques, the Society for Prevention of Liquor, Society for Memorization of the Holy Qur'an (Lia, 1998)

kind, meaning social, cultural and symbolic resources. Attention is given to the concept of human resources, which are equally important as the capital assets. In the context of Muslim Brotherhood the role which human capital played in the development of the Society proves to be essential and the major emphasis is given to the spiritual enhancement of people as the creators of the movement. Lia (1998) explains this very clearly by offering a number of references to Al-Banna's speeches in general conferences organized by the Society. As stated by Lia, the initial stage of Al-Banna's program was to build 'a mighty spiritual strength' amongst his supporters and fellow Muslims which would manifest itself in *'a strong will which no weakness can penetrate, a steady loyalty ... a noble spirit of self sacrifice, unaffected by greed or avarice and a knowledge of the principle.'* Al-Banna recognized that the lack of *'material strength in form of money and equipment, and the instruments of war and combat'* barred Egyptians and other Eastern peoples from *'rising up and defeating the nations which have stolen its rights and oppressed its people'*. However, 'spiritual strength' was even more central and indispensable. Al-Banna argued, *'If the East believed in its right, wrought changes in itself, concerned itself with the strength of spirit .... the means of achieving material strength would come to it from any or every direction.'* The strength of Al-Banna's program was its focus on a mindset. Only after he was able to persuade his followers about their capability to create enduring changes despite their lack of material resources did he transfer their interest towards prolific work and practical efforts. "Since the first stages of the Society's existence, Al-Banna paid attention to increasing human resources at the service of the movement and the capacity to guide, educate and utilize available human resources became one of the furtive of Society's significant triumphs" (Lia, 1998:84). Can we say in this respect that Al-Banna's way to

mobilize resources challenge the premises of resource mobilization theory? Apparently the spiritual strength of the Society's members seemed to be more important than gathering the material strength. Al-Banna said: *'Although money is a basis for projects, the Muslim Brothers are first and foremost preoccupied with the education of souls'* and he continued, *'The Brothers are studying people's hearts not delving in their pockets.'* (ibid, 108) Does it mean that Al-Banna chose the poverty over the Society's wealth and prosperity? Did he really treat the mobilization of capital resources as secondary and can we in this sense perceive resource mobilization theory as a contrary to his ideology? In order to understand this we need to look at another aspect of our in depth view of the Society organizational structures. By illuminating it, we will be able to see why particularly this formula turned out to be very successful for building a grass-root movement.

First, in order to analyze the functioning of the Brotherhood we have to keep in mind that to classify the Society within some rigid categorical rules would be very misleading. The ideology, goals and the organization of the movement has been so comprehensive and encompassed so many aspects that any attempt to compare it with the traditional perception of other Islamic welfare societies would lead us to deceptive conclusions. This was however a very challenging task and also some of the Society's members were not able or willing to give up the traditional settings and the long accepted vision of Islamic Activism present in Egypt. In this context, let us look at one example which speaks for all to understand the perception of members in the Society's leading positions. Mustafa Yusuf, the treasurer of the Brotherhood's General Assembly supposed that the Brotherhood is to be perceived within the scope of other ordinary Islamic welfare societies which include a welfare project, an administrative council, a committee of finance or a treasury and a



general assembly composed through regulations and decrees (Lia, 1998). The Society should take the most benefit from local patrons and conservative notables. Transparent and organized capital, austere obedience to the Society's statutes and a president with high social status were seen as an assurance for strength and stability. Al-Banna, nonetheless, had seen the Brotherhood beyond the principles of formal organization, where resources needed to be mobilized and hierarchical structure to be strictly adhered. He created a new formula which more overtly distinguished the Muslim Brothers from traditional Islamic welfare societies. To be more precise, he recognized the need for another kind of solution to the problems of nascent nation and another kind of endeavor to reach the desired goals. He saw the key to success in education of the souls and the formation of strong moral immunity through firm and superior principles (JIM, No. 7, 1352/1933, *In*: Lia, 1998). In this context, it is very important to ascertain that although the Society presented itself as a spiritual community asking primarily for spiritual participation rather than money (*ibid*), the new regulations introduced from 1951 provided for fixed membership dues, which were collected by the family in the branch on the fixed day (Mitchell, 1993:181). With the confidence that the influx of material resources goes hand in hand with the conviction of souls, Al-Banna's strategy did not contradict the pillars of the theory under study but rather complemented it with very valuable principles to achieve desired goals.

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## CONCLUSION

In the preceding pages we have been able to see the organization and internal structure of the Society of Muslim Brothers as one of many cases representing the Islamic Activism. The study of this kind is particularly important as it attempts to explain not only reasons for the emergence of the particular movement but also illuminates the later stages of movement's existence, which seems to be crucial in its development. While people's strains and grievances produced by inability to cope with deprivation and social disillusion push people to join the movements in the first place, the earlier theories of collective action and relative deprivation models do not explain why some groups and not the others develop to the organizations with mass following. The theory of organization fills these gaps in earlier research while attempting to explain the mature stages of Society's development from an objectivist point of view by focusing on reasons behind the movement's expansion, recruitment of the cadres, mobilizing structures, internal and external relations, membership etc. I express my hopes that I gave a sufficient explanation and clarification of these modes of action in this work.

To summarize the points earlier made we might assume that the hypothesis that the theory of organization could be incorporated in the study of Islamic Activism has found its justification. It was mainly the stable and well organized institutional apparatus which enabled the Muslim Brotherhood to withstand the times of oppression and subjugation. Infrastructure and formal networks as well as mobilization of capital and personnel are essential in the expansion of a mass movement and it is important to devote enough attention to this aspect in order to fully understand the grassroots development. On the other hand and as this research demonstrates the theory should not be thoroughly applied and some

modifications are required. The Islamic Activism stressed a potential significance on the personality, rhetoric and charisma of its leader. This fact as explained above is marginalized in the theory under study. What is more, Islamic activists, although based on solid organization do not operate in vacuum. They are surrounded by complex network oriented societies which incline to favor familiarity over formal institutionalization (Wiktorowicz, 2004). What we can claim about Western social movements, which typically mobilize through SMOs, movements in Muslim Societies are more likely to benefit from the dense associational networks of personal relationships that portray much of politics, economic activity, and culture. Even formalized Islamic organizations, such as Muslim Brotherhood, comprise of vibrant networks that expand beyond the limitations of formal organizational space to connect activists to other Islamists, friends, families, and acquaintances (Wiktorowicz, 2004). The case of Muslim Brotherhood is just a single case in many instances of Islamic Activism and does not represent the overall functioning of social movements emerging in the Muslim World. For this reason an excessive generalization would be deceptive. In this particular case study we have to claim that the Society's success could not be expected by the extensive organizational apparatus exclusively, but let me use the Mitchell's words: 'the willingness to obey absolutely' (1993:183) was decisive and the history of the Society recalls the importance of the relationship between confidence and obedience, between well organized structure and obeying its principles. This however does not counter the fact that both in the study of collective action as well as Islamic Activism, the scholars should make an attempt to move from a view of the subject as irrational to a perspective that emphasized rationality. And the theory of organization serves to be a good starting point.

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
## APPENDIX

# Appendix I

## The Growth of Branches in Egypt in 1928–1945


Surveys published in June 1937 and May 1940 classified the Society's branches in Egypt according to following standards:

- (1) First degree (*al-daraja al-ula*): the branch had reached the stage of "complete formation" having acquired its own premises and all sub-groups having been formed, including an administration which supervised the affairs of the branch.
- (2) Second degree (*al-daraja al-thaniya*): the branch had been established, but it still lacked some of the features characterizing first degree branches, such as not having its own premises or that some of the sub-groups were not yet formed.
- (3) Third degree (*al-daraja al-thalitha*): the branch was "still in the process of being formed". The typical third degree branch was most probably only a group of persons who had pledged to establish a branch and had made contact with the MIA.




## Appendix II

### The Central Organization of the Muslim Brothers in 1940



## Appendix III

### The Field Organization of the Muslim Brothers in 1940



#### Organizational units in the branches:

**Du'ah**  
(spreading the *da'wa*  
to neighbouring  
villages)

##### Committees:

- a) Treasury
- b) Secretariat
- c) supervision
- d) alms-giving
- e) fighting illiteracy
- f) lectures
- g) the house  
etc.

Athletic or  
Sports Units


Rover Scout  
Unit

Battalion




## Appendix IV

### The Rover Scout Organization 1938–1940



## Appendix V

### The Organization of the Muslim Brothers in 1935



**Source of Appendix:** Brynjar, Lia: *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement, 1928-1942*, Middle East Studies, Garnet Publishing Limited, Reading, 1998

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### **Education**

#### **Education attained:**

University education (Master's degree)

#### **Mar 2011 - Aug 2011**

Universität Wien, Austria

Field of study: Global History

#### **Sep 2010 - Dec 2010**

University of California (UCSB), Santa Barbara, USA

Field of study: Global and International Studies

#### **2009 - 2010**

Universität Leipzig, Germany

Field of study: Global Studies

#### **2004 - 2009**

University of Economics, Bratislava

Field of study: International Economic Relations

#### **1996 - 2004**

Gymnasium A.Vrabla, Levice

Field of study: general education

#### **Additional information on education:**

- The State exam in English Language (grade A)
- International TOEFL test (12.12.2008)
- The State exam in Intercultural Communication and negotiations in English (grade A)
- Advanced Business German (exam)
- International exam of German as a foreign language TestDaF-CII
- successful completion of :
- Winter School, Poland 2009
- Summer School, Kothen, Germany, 2010
- Semester seminar: Diplomacy in a real life
- Awarded with motivation scholarship for excellent academic record

### **Courses and training**

**Mar 2010 - Júl 2010**, Volkshochschule Leipzig

Name of course/training: Advanced German

Certificate: Test DaF

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### **Employment history**

**Sep 2010 - Okt 2010**

***The Embassy of Slovakia in USA, Washington DC***

Job position: Intern in the Political Department

Job description: the media monitoring, preparation of the working documents, translation of contracts and agreements, publishing activities, organizing the cultural events

**Apr 2010 - Aug 2010**

***Daimler AG, Berlin, Germany***

Job position: Participation on the research Project: Scenario Process: South Africa 2020

Job description: The company research of the macroeconomic situation of South Africa with the aim to enter the new market, statistical research.

**May 2010 - Júl 2010**

***GWZO Centre for the History and Culture of East Central Europe, Leipzig, Germany***

Job position: Intern in the Research Centre

Job description: Organizing of the research in order to encourage the mutual cooperation and information transfer between German and Eastern European Universities

**Mar 2010 - Apr 2010**

***Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bratislava, Slovak Republic***

Job position: Intern in the Department of the Economic Diplomacy

Job description: working on various assignments in the field of foreign policy of Slovak Republic, writing reviews and standpoints to actual topics in international relations, organizing conferences and meetings of the representatives of the MFA, translating agreements, general administration

**Feb 2006 - Jan 2008**

***Model Management Ltd, London, UK***

Job position: Co-founder and owner

Job description: responsible for the employees, supervising their work and keeping track of their performance, auditing the general accounts: company's invoices, distributing weekly wages, writing off the checks, searching the castings and opportunities in film and TV for talented applicants, dealing with casting departments of well known English TV stations (BBC,ITV etc), conducting the meetings

**May 2005 - Sep 2005**

Job position: Summer work & study, Protaras, Cyprus

**May - Sep 2004**

Job position: Summer work & study, Belfast, UK

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## **Skills**

### **Language skills:**

Slovak - native speaker  
English - expert (interpreting)  
German - advanced  
Polish - advanced  
Italian - intermediate

### **Administrative and economic skills:**

Single-entry bookkeeping - advanced  
Typing - advanced

### **Computer skills - user:**

Microsoft Access - advanced  
Microsoft Excel - advanced  
Microsoft Outlook - expert  
Microsoft Powerpoint - advanced  
Microsoft Word - expert  
OpenOffice - expert  
Internet (e-mail, www) - expert

### **Other knowledge, skills and interests:**

flexible, responsible, with a sense for a detail, communicative  
the multiple winner of Slovak Rep. in poetry reciting  
travelling, sport, dance, culture, abstract painting ([www.andrerika.webnode.sk](http://www.andrerika.webnode.sk))  
design and creation of www sites ([www.webaa.sk](http://www.webaa.sk))

July 2011

Andrea Urbaníková