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“Ratnakīrti’s *Apohasiddhi*

A Critical Edition, Annotated Translation, and Study”

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 The questions

This thesis attempts to answer the following questions:

1. What is the text of the *Apohasiddhi* (AS)?
2. What does that text say?
3. Why does it say what it says?

These questions I try to answer in a critical edition of the AS, in its annotated translation, and in a study of some of its main arguments. The text edition (chapter 2 on page 13), and the translation (chapter 3 on page 39) jointly try to answer questions 1 and 2. The translation, along with some comments (section 4.1 on page 65) and an analysis of the argumentative structure (section 4.3 on page 98), as well as a study of the AS (chapter 5 on page 111) try to answer question 3.

1.2 Ratnakīrti

Ratnakīrti, a Buddhist monk and teacher in the monastery of Vikramaśīla, is listed as the 32nd of 41 authors belonging to the tradition of the Buddhist epistemological-logical school of thought in Steinkellner and Much 1995: 99 ff., and his dates are given there as 990–1050 CE.

Ratnakīrti was a pupil of Jñānaśrīmitra. This is shown by the phrase “*yad āhur gura-vaḥ*” used to introduce quotations from his teacher in various passages.¹ Jñānaśrīmitra is unanimously recognized as a highly important Buddhist thinker.² Since Ratnakīrti’s existant texts are closely based on those of his teacher, this importance is imparted to these texts too. But whether there are any differences between the position’s of these

¹Cf. the comments in Thakur 1975a: 11 ff. The following list of these passages is based on the *viśiṣṭanāmasūcī* (index of specified names) in RNĀ₂ 151 f.: SJS₂ 27.5 (most probably referring to a verse in the lost *Sarvajñasiddhi* of Jñānaśrīmitra, see Steinkellner 1977: 384, also cf. frag. 8 on p. 388), KBhSA₂ 72.5, KBhSV 88.3, SSD₂ 118.23, SSD₂ 119.9, SSD₂ 118.31, CAPV 132.6, CAPV 133.16, CAPV 136.23, CAPV 138.28, CAPV 141.9, CAPV 142.28. The references to RNĀ₂ 32, 96, 135, given under the entry *guruḥ*, do not actually contain the word *guruḥ*.

²Cf. the reconstruction of his importance by Frauwallner (1931), and the assessments, after his works had become known, by Thakur (1987a: 29), Jong (1962: 75), and McCrea and Patil (2006: 304 ff.).

two authors is a question that can not be answered with certainty until both their works have been properly studied.³

Ratnakīrti's texts were amongst the earliest to become the subject of modern studies. The *editio princeps* of the *Apohasiddhi* is found in Shāstri 1910.⁴ Mookerjee (2006: 125 ff.) made an early (1935) attempt to place Ratnakīrti's AS in its historical and argumentative context, and was also responsible for a long running debate about the development of the *apoha*-theory.⁵ In 1932, Stcherbatsky noted about the AS that it "...was written in one night and, probably for this reason, [is—PMA] lacking in clearness...." (Stcherbatsky 1994 2: 404)⁶

The next important event was the 1934 discovery of a manuscript of Ratnakīrti's collected works by Sāṅkṛtyāyana in *Ža lu ri phug*.⁷ On the 3rd of June 1938 pictures of that manuscript were taken.⁸ On the basis of these pictures, the *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī* (RNĀ₁) was published by Anantalal Thakur, with a second revised edition appearing in 1975 (RNĀ₂).

The most noteworthy books on Ratnakīrti, in order of publication, are as follows:⁹

³Cf. the considerations at the beginning of Mc Allister Forthcoming. I have nothing to add to the scholarly presentations of Ratnakīrti's life, works, and intellectual surroundings in Thakur 1975a, Thakur 1987a: 29 ff., Kajiyama 1998: 7 ff., Mimaki 1976: 3 ff., and Mimaki 1992.

⁴This book was reprinted in 1989 and, for want of a better word, re-edited in 1996. This latter publication is not very useful, because it introduced quite a few misprints, omitted some footnotes, and changed the layout.

⁵Cf. Kataoka 2009: 498–496 for a concise summary of this discussion.

⁶This misinterpretation of the colophon was corrected by Thakur (1957a: 13, fn. 1).

⁷I follow the spelling found in Kellner and Sferra 2008: 426, fn. 16.

⁸The discovery of the RNĀ is described in Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1935: 25 f., and the manuscript was first catalogued as item 22 (=VIII.2, sect. III) in Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1935: 29, i.e., on Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana's 2nd expedition to Tibet, April 4th–November 10th, 1934 (cf. Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1935: 21 f.). Pictures of it might also have been taken between the 5th and 15th of August 1936, according to the account in Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1937: 14 f. Unfortunately, as Sāṅkṛtyāyana (1938: 138) reports, "[I]ast time [i.e., in 1936—PMA] we took Photographs of some of these MSS., but we had failed to get good results." But manuscript P is signed and dated on the empty folio 60a by "Fany Mockerjee" (the photographer as spelt in Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1938: 137). The signature in fact looks more like "Fany Mookj", but the date "3/6/38" is clear.

⁹Two other published studies about the *Apohasiddhi* should be mentioned: Sharma 1969 and Chatopadhyay 2002. For an appreciation of Sharma 1969, see Oberhammer 1975. Sharma 1969 provides a text based on AS₁ with corrections according to AS₂, a translation, and a study. The translation I found very hard to understand in some passages, and it seems to have missed a few of the more important points. The study, although it is very interesting since it aims at a philosophically relevant restatement of Ratnakīrti's *apoha*-theory, is, for that very reason, not very informative about Ratnakīrti's theories themselves. One example might suffice to prove the point concerning the translation: the phrase "*tatra na buddhyākārasya tattvataḥ samvṛtṭyā vā vidhiniṣedhau, svasamvedanapratyakṣagamyatvād ...*" (from § 49) is translated as follows by Sharma (1969: 91):

In this context, affirmation and negation are applicable to the configuration (which is a passive cognition) neither in reality, nor in internal feeling (for it is neither to be desired nor to be not desired), for the self-feeling (or the internal feeling) is produced by sense-perception.

Apart from the terminological disagreements I have with this translation, I think that the understanding of *samvṛtṭyā* as "in internal feeling" and the analysis of *svasamvedanapratyakṣagamyatva* as "the self-feeling (or the internal feeling) is produced by sense-perception" are not merely confusing but misleading (cf. § 49 on page 60 for my understanding of this phrase). The proof cited for (as far as I understand) the interpretation of *samvṛtṭyā* as "in internal feeling" by Sharma (1969: 90, fn. 238) is not very convincing: "samvṛtṭyā samvṛtti = svasamvedanā. See *PVST*. [=PVSṬ, PMA], p. 121; *PVP*. [=PVA, PMA], p. 573:

Mimaki 1976 contains an edition, based on SSD₁ and the manuscript used for that edition (= ms P), a translation and careful study of the SSD, the “Réfutation de la permanence des choses” (Mimaki 1976: 2).

Bühnemann 1980 translated and studied the SJS, the “Proof of an Omniscient One”, basing herself on SJS₁, SJS₂, and the manuscript used by Thakur for that edition (again, this is manuscript P).

Lasic 2000b provides a true critical edition of the VyN based on the pictures taken by Sāṅkṛtyāyana, a translation, and an analysis of the argument structure.

Patil 2009 follows a different aim than the books mentioned. He intends to provide a more “systematic” account of Ratnakīrti’s ĪSD. It should be called systematic since Parimal Patil shows how the various positions that Ratnakīrti holds on subjects such as inference, perception, awareness, and language influence the very specific arguments of the ĪSD. To this end, he relies mainly on the AS, and in a lesser degree on the VyN, the KBhSA, the KBhSV, and the CAPV. None of these texts is translated in its entirety, but certainly the main passages of the ĪSD and the AS are translated and interpreted very thoroughly. Especially for the AS it should be noted that Parimal Patil has had access to (and used) the manuscripts from Nepal that were used also for the edition in the present work (mss. N₁, N₂, N₃).

Apart from these publications, I was also able to avail myself of a few studies that are not easily available, or had kindly been provided to me as drafts by their respective authors. Akamatsu 1983, a doctoral thesis providing an annotated translation of Jñānaśrīmitra’s AP, was invaluable to me. This is a pioneering work of the highest quality, and it is a great mystery to me why it was never published. Even though a few of the more poetic parts of Jñānaśrīmitra’s treatise were not perfectly understood, the main philosophical points and historical influences of the AP were clearly outlined.

Parimal Patil kindly made available to me a draft of his translations of both the AS (Patil 2008b) and the AP (Patil 2008a, which he worked on jointly with Lawrence McCrea). The latter has just been published as McCrea and Patil 2010, but it was too late to systematically incorporate that publication (and its highly informative introduction) into this dissertation.

Furthermore, I was able to profit greatly from Woo 1999, a dissertation on the KBhSA, from a draft of M. T. Much’s German translation of the *apoha*-section in PV 1¹⁰ (Much 2008), as well as from a draft of Hisataka Ishida’s critical edition of TS₂ 866–871 and *Pañjikā* thereon (Ishida 2008).

samvṛttisadeva dharmi-dharmalakṣaṇam.” For the rest of the footnote he cites (and paraphrases) material from Stcherbatsky 1994 2: 385 f., fn. 6 (whose note only concerns *svasamvedana*, but not *samvṛtti*). I couldn’t find either *svasamvedana* or *samvṛtti* mentioned in PVSVT 121. Although I haven’t studied the context of the phrase “*samvṛttisad eva dharmidharmalakṣaṇam*” (PVA 573.24) as closely as it deserves, it doesn’t seem to say more than that what has the characteristic of property and property bearer exists only conventionally.

The text edition in Chattopadhyay 2002, which draws on AS₁ and AS₃, is generally reliable. The English translation, which is rather free, suffers a bit from terminological problems that seem to stem from not having studied more recent translations of similar works in much detail, but is usually close to the mark. The Bengali translation I am unfortunately not able to read.

McDermott 1969, a study of the KBhSV, did not receive much critical acclaim, cf. Seyfort Ruegg 1971 (replied to in McDermott 1972) and Steinkellner 1972.

¹⁰The chapters of the *Pramāṇavārttika* are counted as follows: *Svārthānumāna*, *Pramāṇasiddhi*, *Pratyakṣa*, and *Parārthānumāna*. For the discussion about the sequence of these chapters, cf. Kellner 2004a, Gnoli 1960a: xv ff., and Frauwallner 1954: 142–147.

1.3 The *Apohasiddhi*

Title of the *Apohasiddhi*

According to the colophon of manuscript P, the title of the text is *Apohaprakaraṇa*, the same as Jñānaśrīmitra's work on the same subject (AP). All the other manuscripts support the name *Apohasiddhi*. Since Ratnakīrti himself refers to the AS as “...*iti apohasiddhau prasādhitam*” (...so it is well established in the *Apohasiddhi*.) in the CAPV 122.18–19, preference is given to the title *Apohasiddhi*.

Purpose of the *Apohasiddhi*

Ratnakīrti does not say what kind of text the *Apohasiddhi* is supposed to be. The first impression certainly is that it is little more than a condensed version of Jñānaśrīmitra's AP, or even only a rearrangement of passages from that work.¹¹ But a closer examination reveals at least two interesting points of difference between the AS and the AP. On the one hand, Ratnakīrti, at least in the AS, does not follow Jñānaśrīmitra's interpretatorial technique of “a conditionally adopted position (*vyavasthā*)” (Patil 2007: 598), whereby certain theories can be provisionally accepted “for only specific and philosophically legitimate purposes” (Patil 2007: 603), just in order to be abandoned or at least substantially altered when those purposes change.¹² The central term used by Jñānaśrīmitra in this context is *vyavasthā*. In the AS, this connotation of the term can not be found, and it simply means definition or classification.¹³ A second noticeable difference lies in the arrangement of the texts. The AP is organized according to the introductory verse, as has been shown by Akamatsu (1983: 35–38) and Katsura (1986: 179, n. 15). The AS is arranged according to more ‘logical’¹⁴ principles, in particular¹⁵ according to the requirements of the inference found at its end (§ 54 to § 58 on page 37).

As pointed out by Thakur (1975a: 12), Ratnakīrti states his intention in writing texts comparable to the AS at the end of the SJS and at the beginning of the ĪSD:

*durvāraprativādivikramam anādrtya pramāpraḍhitāḥ sarvajño jagade-
kacakṣur udagād eṣa prabhāvo 'tra ca |
sambuddhasthitimedinīkulagirer asmadguroḥ kin tv ayaṁ saṁkṣepo ma-
ma ratnakīrtikṛtinas tadvistaratrāsinaḥ || SJS₂ 31.24 ff.*

Disregarding the strength of irrepressible opponents, through the full development (*praḍhi*) of true knowledge (*pramā*), the omniscient one, the single eye of the world, arose. And the majesty with regard to this [subject, omniscience,] is [that] of my revered teacher, the chief mountain in the land of residence of the allenlightened one. But this compendium [is] mine, the obeying Ratnakīrti's, who fears this [master's] extensive treatise.¹⁶

¹¹Cf. the remarks in Lasic 2000b for examples of differences between Jñānaśrīmitra's VC and Ratnakīrti's VyN, and cf. Thakur 1975a: 12 for a general assessment, as well as the beginning of Mc Allister Forthcoming.

¹²Cf. McCrea and Patil 2006 and Patil 2007 for two excellent studies on this technique.

¹³Cf., e.g., the arguments in § 5 and § 16.

¹⁴First observed by Thakur (1957a: 13, fn. 1, and pp. 14 f.) as a general stylistic mark of Ratnakīrti's works.

¹⁵I have tried to argue this point in the study of the AS, cf. section 5.1 on page 112.

¹⁶Cf. Bühnemann 1980: 90.

*sūktaratnāśrayatvena jītaratnākarād idam | guror vāgambudheḥ smar-
rtum kiñcid ākr̥ṣya likhyate ||*
*rītiḥ sudhānidhir iyaṃ sattame madhyavartini | vidveṣiṇi viṣajvālā kiñcij
jñe tu na kiñcana ||* ĪSD 32.5 f.

Having¹⁷ retrieved some [jewels] to remember from that ocean of words, the revered teacher, who has conquered *ratnākara*¹⁸ based on beautifully expressed jewels, this [treatise] is written.

This stream [of words] is a reservoir of nectar for a venerable one occupying the center, [it is] a poisonous torch for a hostile one, but [it is] nothing at all for someone knowing a little.

To these should be added the verses introducing the SSD and the CAPV:

yadyogād andhavad viśvaṃ saṃsāre bhramad iṣyate |
sā kṛpāvaśagaiḥ pāpā sthirasiddhir apāsyate || SSD₂ 112.4–5

That wicked proof of permanence, in consequence (*yogāt*) of which the whole world, as if blind, is assumed to be wandering in the course of existence, is driven away by those under the power of compassion.¹⁹

dig eṣā svaparāśeṣaprativādiprasāadhanī |
citrādvaitamatābodhadhvāntastomakadarthinī || CAPV 129.5–6

This is a line [of reasoning] (*diś*) which overpowers (*prasāadhanī*) all opponents, whether internal or external,²⁰ [and] repels (*kadarthinī*) the mass of ignorance [that is due] to not knowing the doctrine of non-duality in plurality (*citrādvaita*).²¹

From these verses, even though the above translations are far from secure, the following intentions can be attributed to Ratnakīrti's texts: they intend to restate the main points of Jñānaśrīmitra's much longer treatises, they should abolish wrong opinions, held by internal, Buddhist, and external, Non-Buddhist, opponents, they should strengthen correct opinions, and, through this, they should aid in the deliverance from the cycle of existence.

¹⁷Cf. also the translation of this difficult verse in Patil 2001: 307:

Having taken something from the ocean of (my) teacher's words through which he, in virtue of being a locus of well-spoken jewels, conquered the ocean (of saṃsāra) this was written, in remembrance.

Among those who follow the middle path and are the best of men this course is an ocean of ambrosia, among those who are enemies it is a poisonous flame, and for those who know a little it is nothing.

¹⁸*ratnākara* can refer to a mine of jewels (the literal meaning) or the ocean. Acc. to McCrea and Patil 2010: 3, the phrase *jītaratnākarād* means "the one who has defeated Ratnākara", or Ratnākaraśānti, a Buddhist contemporary of Jñānaśrīmitra and *Ratnakīrti*. In that case, the following phrase "based on ..." might be a reference to the verse work SāSaSū.

¹⁹Cf. Mimaki 1976: 83: "Il est admis que quiconque est d'accord avec cette [preuve] erre dans la transmigration (*saṃsāra*) comme un aveugle. Aussi, cette fausse preuve de permanence [des choses] est-elle rejetée par ceux qui sont sous l'empire de la compassion (*kṛpā*)."

²⁰I.e., whether they are Buddhists or Non-Buddhists.

²¹Dr. Abhijit Ghosh, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, gave me his very helpful opinion on this verse in May 2009.

Persons and texts mentioned in the *Apohasiddhi*

The following texts or persons (or groups of persons) are mentioned by name in the *Apohasiddhi* and its colophon:

The persons mentioned are:

- Dharmottara: § 51 on page 35 (referring to the DhAP)
- Followers of Kumārila (i.e., Sucaritamiśra): § 25 on page 24
- Ratnakīrti: § 60 on page 38
- Trailokyadatta (scribe): § 60 on page 38
- Trilocana: § 38 on page 30
- Vācaspati: § 10 on page 17, § 22 on page 22, § 24 on page 23, § 30 on page 26 (all references to NVTṬ)
- Vidhivādin: § 9 on page 15
- Pratiṣedhavadin: § 9 on page 16²²

The texts mentioned are:

- *Nyāyabhuṣana*: § 31 on page 27 and § 43 on page 32.
- *Śāstra*: § 28 on page 26.

1.4 Manuscripts

Five of six²³ known manuscripts of the AS have been used for this edition:

1. Manuscript K:²⁴

- This is manuscript number G 4711 in the collection of the Asiatic Society in Kolkata (cf. the description in Shāstri 2005: 32 f.).
- Its script is characterized by Shāstri (2005: 32) as Bengali of the 12th century.

2. Manuscript P:

- I was able to use copies of the prints catalogued as “Xc 14/26” in the *Sammlung des Seminars für Indologie und Buddhismuskunde in Göttingen* (Collection of the Seminar for Indology and Buddhist studies in Göttingen).²⁵ This manuscript is reported by Bandurski (1994: 60) to be in Beijing, under the signature “Pek.-L., Nr. 52–58.”, and is described in Bandurski 1994: 58 ff. The text of the *Apohasiddhi* is to be found on folios 32b–36b.

²²Unnamed persons are referred to in the following paragraphs: § 4 on page 14, § 31 on page 27 (Bhāsarvajña), § 37 on page 30, § 40 on page 31 (probably Trilocana), § 41 on page 31 (probably Trilocana), § 54 on page 37. References to the Siddhāntin are found in these paragraphs: § 8 on page 15, § 37 on page 30

²³Two manuscripts were used in Shāstri 1910 for the edition of AS₁: The first is manuscript G 4711 in the collection of the Asiatic Society in Kolkata (cf. Shāstri 2005: 32 f.). This is manuscript K in the present edition. The other (S₂) was in Shāstri’s private possession, and I was not able to find it during a visit to Kolkata in 2009.

²⁴These keys to the entries are used to reference the source in the critical apparatus.

²⁵For details on this collection, cf. Bandurski 1994: 15 ff., and see Kellner 2007: 19 for how copies of the prints came to Vienna.

The ms was discovered by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana in *Ža lu ri phug* during his second expedition to Tibet.²⁶ In his note to the manuscript he called the script *Purāṇamaithilī*, which he seems to have used synonymously with *Nevārī* and *Vartula*.²⁷ Thakur 1975a: 11 states that the manuscript convolute that the *Apohasiddhi* is a part of “...consists of eighty-six folia in clear Maithil script of *circa* 1200 A.D.”²⁸

- This manuscript is the basis of the editions AS₂ and AS₃.

3. Manuscripts N₁, N₂ and N₃ were microfilmed by the Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project (NGMPP). Their numeric identifiers in the NGMCP are 3890, 3889, and 3891 respectively, and their microfilm numbers are A109/12, D35/1, and A117/7. The descriptions given on their scanned catalogue cards are as follows (my additions are in square brackets, the values are written in Devanāgarī on the cards of mss. N₁ and N₃):

- Manuscript N₁, whose script is identified as Newari in the Nepalese-German Manuscript Cataloguing Project (NGMCP: entry 3890):
 - [*Number, probably of the microfilm*]: e 109/12
 - *Subject*: bauddhadarśana
 - *Manuscript-Name*: apohasiddhiḥ
 - *C. No.* [=accession number of the National Archives of Kathmandu] 3–717
 - *S. No.* 2
 - *Folio No.* 13
 - *Size*: 34,5 × 10 [cm]
- Manuscript N₂, whose script is identified as Newari in Nepalese-German Manuscript Cataloguing Project (NGMCP: entry 3889) (this manuscript is not in the National Archives of Kathmandu, and the scanned catalogue card is written in English):
 - *Short Title*: Apohasiddhi
 - *Running No.* 764D
 - *Subject*: Baudd. Nyāya
 - *Title (acc. to Colophon)* Apohasiddhi
 - *Author*: Ratnakīrti (c. 10th cent. AD)
 - *No. of leaves*: 14 complete
 - *Size in cm*: 32,5 × 8,4
 - *Reel No.*: D 34,1
 - *Remarks*: paper [note to the effect that manuscript is undamaged]
 - *Script*: Newari
- Manuscript N₃, whose script is identified as Devanāgarī in Nepalese-German Manuscript Cataloguing Project (NGMCP: entry 3891):

²⁶Cf. the comments in fn. 8 on page 2.

²⁷For a discussion of this script see Bandurski 1994: 20; 58 f., Dimitrov 2002: 29 ff., as well as Ishida 2011a: xxvi–xxxiii.

²⁸Kellner (2007: 21) gives a succinct overview of the various classifications of the very similar script in JNĀ_{ms}.

- [Number on front:] E 117/7
- Subject: *bauddhadarśana*
- Manuscript-Name: *apohasiddhiḥ*
- C. No. [=accession number of the National Archives of Kathmandu] 5–256
- S. No. 2 (*kha*)
- Folio No. 11
- Size: 32,5 × 11 [cm]

Considering Anantalal Thakur’s expertise in editing these kinds of texts, I have noted those differences to any of Thakur’s observations and footnotes in either AS₂ or AS₃ which could not be easily resolved as misprints or similar circumstantial errors.

Relation of the manuscripts

The following points must be noted in order to establish the relation between the available manuscripts:

1. In the opening line, K, N₁, N₂, N₃ pay homage to Śrīlokanātha, P to Tāra.
2. K, N₁, N₂, N₃ share a practically identical colophon.
3. N₃ appears to be dependant on N₂: they have many errors in common, and the same repetition of ll. 41 to 49. Some of the other factors that point to this dependency are:
 - N₃ might have misread some of the unclearer passages in N₂: cf., e.g., the evidence for °śabdāt (l. 160);²⁹ the evidence for *śabdāntarāvagatena* (l. 118), first emended from *śabdāntarāvābhābhāvaṃgatena* to *śabdāntarābhābhāvaṃgatena*, by placing the numbers 2 and 1 over the syllables *vā* and *bhā*, and then finally to *śabdāntarāvaṃgatena* in N₂ 7b1, deleting *vābhābhā* (and forgetting to delete the remaining *anusvāra*) by placing a *kākapāda* on *vā* and the last *bhā*, is found in N₃ 6a6 as *śabdāntarābhāvābhāvagatena*. The simplest explanation is that the scribe of N₃ correctly understood the first correction in N₂, but missed the deletion marks.³⁰
 - In the case of °sām̐karyā° (l. 238), N₃ apparently mistook a *ṇika* for *kā*. N₂ has a prefixed *ṇ* that looks like a sign for a long *ā* in its script.³¹

But there are also a few readings which do not fit in with this: cf., e.g., the variants for *kiṃ sāmānya* (l. 187), or for *vīpakṣato* (l. 256).

4. N₁ and N₂ in turn depend on K: c.f., e.g., the variants for °*pari*° in l. 13, *ca* in 22, °*sphuritam* in l. 24, *eṣa* in l. 66, or *apoha*° in l. 69.


From this, the following sketch can be constructed, the top node “α” standing for the archetype, and a line meaning “descended from”, without claiming directness:³²

²⁹If N₃ and N₂ are linked, it could be that N₃ misread the hook for *ā* occurring at the end of line 1 in N₂ 9b, which resulted in the erroneous reading “śa«b»dat” in N₃.

³⁰The other important possibility is that N₂ and N₃ had a common ancestor reading *śabdāntarābhāvābhāvagatena*, which N₂ initially reproduced, and then, having corrected a slight mistake made during copying, changed to something more meaningful.

³¹Cf. figs. 1.12 to 1.15 on page 12.

³²This means that a line connecting A to B should not be understood as indicating that B directly descended from A, a fact that could hardly be verified. But it does mean that a dependency on A is visible in B.



1.5 Notes on the critical edition

Conventions and abbreviations used in the critical apparatus

The following conventions are used in the critical edition:³³

1. Names are signified by underlining, like vācaspatiḥ.
2. {ka} means that “ka” was deleted or marked as erroneous in the ms.
3. «ka» means that “ka” was added into the original textflow. There is no implicit specification as to where this addition is placed (i.e., above, below, in the margin, etc.)
4. A “^v” indicates that there is an insertion mark at this point.
5. (ka) means that “ka” was not read with certainty.
6. Some³⁴ scribal corrections are marked as *anyāpoḍhovahdhārya/t{e}→ta/*, meaning that the scribe wrote *te* and then deleted the vowel sign for *e*, so that the result was *ta*.
7. ^{↓N₁2b} *tadanupraveśo* signifies the beginning of a folio, in this case it would be the beginning of the reverse of leaf 2 in manuscript N₁ after the *akṣara pra*.
8. ^{↑K²} *tatpratītyavasthā* signifies the end of line 2 in K (for example if the manuscript is torn at that point). It is put after the last whole *akṣara* in the line.
9. ^{↑K³} *athaivamaṭiḥ* signifies the start of a new line (start of line 3 in K). If this coincides with the end of the previous line, so that nothing is missing, only this sign will be recorded.³⁵
10. *anaikāntika×mbhā°* indicates that there is a space of one *akṣara* between *ka* and *mbhā*.
11. A “..” indicates an illegible sign with the width of one *akṣara*.
12. °*bāhya* ~ ~ *viśayatvena* indicates that there are three filling signs between *ya* and *vi* (cf. section 1.5 on page 11).
13. A “•” indicates that there is a dot in the ms, often marking a word boundary.
14. Punctuation used in the edition does not reflect the punctuation of the mss. Some special signs are:
 - a) Maṅgala sign:³⁶ 𑀘

³³The following is based on Steinkellner 2007: xlv f.

³⁴I.e., those where a simple note of the correction would not provide useful or clear information. In the example given, a simple report of the correction as “*t{e}*” could be misunderstood as a correction to “*t*” instead of “*ta*”.

³⁵Cf. item 1f on the following page for the use of marking the end of line and start of line in K.

³⁶Cf. G. Roth 1986 for a discussion of these signs, and see section 1.5 on page 11 for examples of the signs used in the manuscripts of the AS.

- b) Siddham sign: ⊕
- c) Ornamental sign at the end of ms: *

In the notes to the edition, I have tried to follow these rules:

1. An entry in the critical apparatus is typically as follows:
 - a) The line number or range of lines that this entry is indexed to is given.
 - b) The lemma is printed. This is a quotation of a text string as found in the edition, and its purpose is to index the entry to the text. If it is not unique within the line, a raised number following the lemma indexes it to the relevant occurrence in the referenced line.
 - c) Next come the sigla of the manuscripts supporting the reading accepted in the edition (i.e., of the manuscripts reading as the lemma does save for the neglected errors mentioned section 1.5 on the next page). If no manuscript supports the reading, it is an emendation and is marked as “em.”.
 - d) Next, the variants found in the other manuscripts are given. These readings (in contrast to the lemma) do reflect the text as it is found in the manuscripts. They are separated from each other (and the lemma) either by
 - i. a colon, which indicates that the reading following it is different from the one accepted, or
 - ii. a comma, which indicates that the following reading partially or indirectly supports the accepted reading, or
 - iii. a semicolon, indicating that the following variant (usually an omission) does not provide decisive evidence.These signs always express the relation that the variant has to the accepted reading, and not the relation between two subsequent variants.
 - e) Separated by an opening square bracket, an explanation may be given.
 - f) On most folios of K, a few *akṣaras* at the end of the line are missing. When the remaining material supports a reading or a variant only partially, I have added it as a witness nevertheless. The reader will easily be able to see which part of the reading is actually supported or not supported by looking at the end-of-line and start-of-line marks (cf. items 8 and 9 on the preceding page). When the remaining material does not have any value for deciding the reading, I have entered “no ev. K” (meaning “no evidence in K”).³⁷
2. A missing *virāma* is not noted, except when there are other variants or it is relevant for the meaning of the passage. In these cases it is rendered as *word* (e.g., *saty* for *satya* in the manuscript).

³⁷An example is the reading *cānyāpoḍhānyāpohayorvirodho* at the beginning of § 14: K reads °*ḍhānyāpohayorvirodho*, starting on line 6, and *cānyāpo*° was, presumably, at the end of the previous line that is damaged. This I have taken as evidence in K for the reading adopted in the edition, because the relevant information, °*ḍhānyāpoha*° vs. °*hānyapoḍha*° is found in K. And that *cānyāpo*° is not found in K can easily be gathered from the end-of-line and start-of-line marks in the edition. I believe this is the most useful way of presenting the information without cluttering the apparatus with irrelevant information. Another example is the reading *aprāpter bhrāntir* against *aprāpte bhrāntir* (cf. l. 164). There K reads *prā*, then the folio is torn, and the next folio starts with °*rbhrānti*°. This I have taken as support in K for *aprāpter bhrāntir*.

Textual references in the critical edition

To show textual relations (as opposed to content relations) of the AS to other texts, I have made use of two symbols:

1. A “=” is used to show that the passage has a close parallel.
2. A “≈” indicates a loose parallel.

Differences not reported in critical edition

Discrepancies between the manuscripts that result from any of the following factors have not been noted as variant readings:

1. K, P, N₁, N₂ do not usually degeminate *tt* following *ṛ*. N₃ does.
2. P, N₁, N₂, N₃ degeminate *tt* before a semi-vowel, K does not.
3. All manuscripts irregularly geminate *m*, *t*, and *y* after *r*.
4. *avagraha*-s are not always written.
5. Substitution of a nasal with an *anusvāra*.
6. Additional *anusvāra* before nasals.
7. N₁, N₃ and N₂ use dots to separate words as well as parts of compounds without any recognizable pattern, and sometimes with an obvious misunderstanding.³⁸ These dots do not usually influence *saṃdhi*. They are only reported (as “•”) when they are useful for understanding a variant.

Particularities of the scripts

The most noteworthy peculiarities of the *akṣara*-s encountered in the manuscripts are as follows:

1. Siddham signs (⊕) used: cf. figs. 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3.³⁹
2. Ornamental signs (*) used: cf. figs. 1.6 and 1.7.
3. Spacing (~) in K 8b1: cf. fig. 1.4.
4. P sometimes (e.g., l. 40, p. 16) uses a stylized *ma* with *virāma* as shown in, cf. fig. 1.5.⁴⁰
5. Deletion markers: K sometimes “brackets” wrong text, e.g., in l. 121 (p. 24): cf. fig. 1.11.
6. N₁ and N₂ sometimes use a special correction mark, a sort of tilde above an *akṣara*, to transform that *akṣara* within its class. Cf. the following corrections: /śa→sa/ in l. 175 (p. 30, cf. fig. 1.10), /śa→ṣa/ in l. 182 (p. 30), /ma→ṇa/ in l. 132 (p. 25, cf. fig. 1.9), /na→ṇa/ in l. 209 (p. 32), /ṣye→sye/ in l. 218 (p. 33).

³⁸Cf. 1.8 on the next page.

³⁹All references in this list are to p. 12.

⁴⁰For a discussion of this letter cf. MacDonald 2005: xxii, and the references given there. See also Kouda 2004: 110, “Characters with ṃ”.



Figure 1.1: Siddham symbol, K 1b1



Figure 1.2: Siddham symbol, K 8b3



Figure 1.3: Siddham symbol, N₁ 1b1



Figure 1.4: Spacing Symbols, K 8b1




Figure 1.5: *anusvāra* (*ryam*), P 33a3




Figure 1.6: Ornamental symbol, N₁ 13b2



Figure 1.7: Ornamental symbol, N₂ 14b4



Figure 1.8: *bāhya•meva*, N₁ 1b2



Figure 1.9: Correction of *ma* to *na*, N₁ 7a5




Figure 1.10: Correction of *śa* to *sa*, N₂ 10a5




Figure 1.11: Deletion, N₂ 4b6



Figure 1.12: “*śabdā*” in N₂ 9b1 before end of line.



Figure 1.13: “*śa«b»dat.*” in N₃ 7b6.




Figure 1.14: “*sāṅkaryya*” N₂ 13b1.




Figure 1.15: “*sākāryya*” in N₃ 10b5.



Figure 1.16: Usual *bha* in N₂.



Figure 1.17: Second version of *bha* in N₂ 11a4.

Chapter 2

Text of the *Apohasiddhi*

om̐ namaḥ śrīlokanāthāya.

[§ 1] apohaḥ śabdārtho nirucyate.

[§ 2] nanu ko 'yam apoho nāma. kim idam anyasmād apohyate, asmād vānyad apohyate, asmin vānyad apohyata iti vyutpattyā vijātiv^{K¹}yāvṛttam^{K²} bāhyam eva vivakṣitam
5 buddhyākāro vā yadi vāpohanam apoha ity anyavyāvṛttimātram iti trayah paksāḥ.

[§ 3] na tāvad ādimau pakṣau, apohanāmnā vidher eva vivakṣitatvāt. antimo 'py asaṅgataḥ, pratītibādhitatvāt. tathā hi parvatoddeśe vahnir astīti śābdī pratītir vidhirūpam evollikhantī lakṣyate, nānagnir na bhavatīti nivṛttimātram āmukhayantī. yac ca

1 om̐] N₂ N₃ ; ⱡ K N₁ ; n. e. P — Cf. punctuation schema, 14 on page 9. Symbols in K and N₁ closely resemble symbols number 1 and 12, respectively, in G. Roth 1986: plate “Signs used in the article of Dr. Gustav Roth”.

1 śrīlokanāthāya] K N₁ , śrīlokanāthāya{h}
N₃ : śrīlokanāthāyaḥ N₂ ; tārāyai P — Scribal additon.

2 apohaḥ] K P N₂ N₃ : apoha N₁

2 śabdārtho] K P N₂ N₃ : śabdārtha N₁

3 apoho] K P N₁ N₂ : apoha N₃

3 idam] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : n. e. P

3 apohyate] K P N₁ N₂ : ayohyateḥ N₃

3–4 apohyate] K P : apohyateḥ N₁ N₂ : ayohyateḥ N₃

4 apohyata] K P N₁ N₂ : ayohyata N₃

4 iti] K P N₁ N₂ : n. e. N₃

5 apoha] K P N₂ N₃ , aha«2» | po«1» N₁

5 trayah] K P N₁ N₂ : traya N₃

7 parvatoddeśe] K P N₁ N₂ : parvatodeśe N₃

7 astīti] K P N₁ N₂ : asmīti N₃

8 evollikhantī] K P : evolikhayantī N₁ :

evolikhantī N₃ : evolikhanti N₂

8 lakṣyate] K P N₂ : lakṣyateḥ N₁ : lakṣate N₃

8 āmukhayantī] K P N₁ N₂ : āmukhayantī N₃

1 om̐] Mss K N₁ N₂ N₃ begin on folio 1b, P on folio 33b.

3–5 nanu ko ...pakṣāḥ] Cf. TBh₂ 52.7–12

3–5 anyasmād ...buddhyākāro vā] ≈AP 202.12–13

3 vānyad] Acc. to AS₃ 58, fn. 3: “anyad omitted T.” (“T” is P).

6 apohanāmnā ...vivakṣitatvāt] =AP 202.13–14

7–9 pratītibādhitatvāt ...atiprasiddham] AP 201.9–12

7–8 parvatoddeśe ...āmukhayantī] Cf. ĀTV₂ 112.9–10 (ĀTV₁ 278.6–8)

- pratyakṣabādhitam, na tatra sādhanāntarāvakāśa ity atiprasiddham.
- 10 [§ 4] atha yady api nivṛttim ahaṃ pratyemīti na vikalpaḥ, tathāpi ni-
vṛttapadārthollekha eva nivṛtityullekhaḥ. na hy anantarbhāvitaviśeṣaṇapratītiḥ viśi-
ṣṭapratītiḥ. tato yathā sāmānyam ahaṃ pratyemīti vikalpābhāve 'pi sādhanānakā-
rapariṣphuraṇād vikalpabuddhiḥ sāmānyabuddhiḥ *pareṣām*, tathā nivṛttapratyayākṣiptā
nivṛttibuddhir apohapratītyavahāram ātanotīti cet.
- 15 [§ 5] nanu sādhanānakārapariṣphuraṇe vidhirūpatayā yadi sāmānyabodhavyavasthā,
tat kim āyātam asphuradabhāvākāre cetasi nivṛttipratītyavasthāyāḥ. tato nivṛttim
ahaṃ pratyemīty evamākārābhāve 'pi nivṛttyākārasphuraṇaṃ yadi syāt, ko nāma ni-
vṛttipratīsthitim apalapet. anyathāsatī pratibhāse tatpratītyavahṛtir iti gavākāre 'pi
cetasi turagabodha ity astu.
- 20 [§ 6] atha viśeṣaṇatayāntarbhūtā nivṛttipratītiḥ ity uktam, tathāpi yady agavāpoḍha
itīdṛśākāro vikalpaḥ, tadā viśeṣaṇatayā tadanupraveśo bhavatu, kiṃ tu gaur iti
pratītiḥ. tadā ca sato 'pi nivṛttilakṣaṇasya viśeṣaṇasya tatrānutkalanāt kathaṃ

10 pratyemīti] K P N₁ N₂ : pratyemiti N₃
10 vikalpaḥ] K P N₁ N₂ : vikalpa N₃
10–11 nivṛtta°] K P N₁ N₂ : nivṛti N₃
11 °padārtho°] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : pa{thā}rtho P
11 nivṛtityullekhaḥ] K P N₁ N₂ :
nivṛtyalekhaḥ N₃
11 anantarbhāvitā°] K P N₂ N₃ :
anantabhāvitā N₁
11 °pratītiḥ] K P : pratīti N₁ N₂ N₃
13 °pari°] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : n. e. P
13 °sphuraṇād] K P N₁ N₂ : sphuraṇāt. N₃
13 nivṛtta°] K P N₁ N₂ N₃ — Acc. to AS₁ 1,
fn.2, S₂ reads *nimitta* here.
15 sāmānya°] K P N₁ N₂ : sānya N₃
15 °vyavasthā] K P N₂ N₃ : vyavasthāḥ N₁

16 °vyavasthāyāḥ] K P N₁ N₂ : vyavasthāyā
N₃
17 pratyemīty] K P N₁ N₂ : pratyemity N₃
17–18 nivṛttipratīti°] K P N₁ : nivṛti N₃ :
nivṛttiiti N₂ — In N₂, both *i* and *ī* are attached
as vowel signs to the same base letter, *tt*.
18 apalapet] N₁ N₂ N₃ : apalepet P ;
no ev. K
20 °tayāntarbhūtā] K P N₁ : tayā antabhūtā
N₃ : tayā antabhūtā N₂
20 agavāpoḍha] P N₂ N₃ : agadāpoḍha N₁ ;
no ev. K
21 vikalpaḥ, tadā] K P N₁ N₂ : vikalpes
tadā N₃
22 pratītiḥ] K P N₁ N₂ : pratīti N₃
22 ca] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : n. e. P

10–23 atha ...pratītyavasthā] =AP 201.17–202.4

10–16 yady api ...°vyavasthāyāḥ] ≈ĀTV₂ 112.11–113.7 (ĀTV₁ 279.17–280.6)

16–19 tato ...astu] ≈ĀTV₂ 113.8–12 (ĀTV₁ 282.2–5)

20–22 agavāpo ...pratītiḥ] ≈ĀTV₂ 113.7–8 (ĀTV₁ 282.1)

tatpratītyavasthā.^{1 K²}

[§ 7] athaivaṃ^{1 K³} matiḥ — yad vidhirūpaṃ sphuritam, tasya parāpoho^{1 K⁴} 'py astīti tat-
 25 pratītir ucyate, tathāpi sambandhamātram apohasya. vidhir eva sākṣānnirbhāsī. api
 caivam^{1 K³} adhyakṣasyāpy^{1 K⁴} apohaviṣayatvam anivāryam, viśeṣato vikalpād ekavyāvṛttol-
 lekhino^{1 N³ 2b} 'khilānyavyāvṛttam īkṣamāṇasya. tasmād vidhyākārāvagrahād^{1 K⁴} adhyakṣavad vi-
 kalpasyāpi^{1 K⁵} vidhiviṣayatvam eva, nānyāpohaviṣayatvam^{1 P³ 3a} iti katham apohaḥ śabdārtho
 ghuṣyate.

30 [§ 8] atrābhidhīyate — nāsmābhir^{1 K⁵} apohaśabdena vidhir eva kevalo^{1 K⁶} 'bhipretaḥ,
 nāpy^{1 K⁶} anyavyāvṛttimātram, kin tv anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ^{1 N² 3a}. tataś ca na
 pratyekapakṣopanipātidōṣavakāśaḥ.

[§ 9] yat tu goḥ^{1 K⁶, N¹ 3a} pratītau na tadātmā parātmeti^{1 K⁷} sāmartyād apohaḥ paścān niścīya-
 ta iti vidhivādināṃ^{1 K⁷} matam, anyāpohapratītau vā sāmartyād anyāpoḍho^{1 K⁷} 'vadhāryata iti

24 matiḥ] K P N₁ N₂ : mati N₃

24 yad vidhirūpaṃ] P N₁ N₂ N₃ : yadi
 «vi»dhirūpaṃ K

24 sphuritam] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : sphurati P

24 parāpoho] K P N₁ N₃ : parāmpoḥ N₂

24 astīti] P N₁ N₂ N₃ , astī{i}ti K

25 tathāpi] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : tadāpi P

25 vidhir] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : vidher P

25 sākṣānnirbhāsī] K P N₁ N₂ :
 sākṣānnirbhāsī N₃

26 °syāpy apo°] N₁ N₂ N₃ : syāpo P ;
 no ev. K

26 apoha°] K P N₁ N₂ : ahoḥ N₃

26 °viṣayatvam anivāryam] K P N₂ N₃ :
 viṣayanirvāyam N₁

26–27 °vyāvṛttollekhino] P N₂ ,
 vyā{...}vṛttollekhino K : vyāvṛ(tto)lleşino N₁ :
 vyāvṛtolekhino N₃

27 'khilānyavyāvṛttam] P N₁ N₂ ,
 'khilānya(vyāvṛ)ttam K (Worm damage.) :
 likhānyavṛttam N₃

28 vidhiviṣayatvam eva,

nānyāpohaviṣayatvam iti] K P N₁ N₂,
 vidhiviṣayatva^v «m eva nānyāpohatva»(m)m
 iti N₃ — The *akṣara* “mī”, which the scribe of
 N₃ had difficulties with, is not written as usual
 in N₂ (the prefixed line being only half the
 usual height in this case).

28 katham apohaḥ] K P N₁ N₂ :
 kathapomaheḥ N₃

28 śabdārtho] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : śabdārtha uda P

30 kevalo 'bhipretaḥ] N₁ P : kevalo 'pretaḥ
 N₂ : kevalopretaḥ N₃ ; no ev. K

32 °pakṣopanipāti°] K P N₁ N₂ :
 pakṣopanipāti N₃

33 yat tu] K P N₂ : yatu N₁ : yata N₃

33 parātmeti] K P N₂ N₃ : parātme N₁

33 sāmartyād] P N₂ N₃ : sāmartyad N₁

34 sāmartyād] P : sāmartyāt N₁ N₂ N₃

34 anyāpoḍho 'vadhāryata] P N₁ :

anyāpoḍhovadhārya/t{e}→ta/ K :

anyāpoḍhovadhāryate N₂ :

anyāpoḍhovadhāryate N₃

24–28 yad vidhirūpaṃ ...nānyāpohaviṣayatvam] ≈AP 202.7–202.11

31 anyāpohaviśiṣṭo ...arthaḥ] Cf. TBh₂ 52.14

33–34 yat tu ...matam] ≈AP 206.15–16

33–44 yat tu goḥ ...abhidhīyate] ≈TBh₂ 52.14–53.12

33 na tadātmā parātmeti] Cf. TSP₂ 1013a.

- 35 *pratiṣedhavadīnām* matam, tad asundaram, prāthamikasyāpi^{K7} pratipattikramādarśanāt.
na hi vidhiṃ^{K1} pratipadya kaścīd^{K2} arthāpattitaḥ paścād apoham avagacchati, apohaṃ vā
pratipadyānyāpoḍham. tasmād goḥ^{K3} pratipattir ity anyāpoḍhapratipattir ucyate. yady
api cānyāpoḍhaśabdānullekha^{K3} uktaḥ, tathāpi nāpratipattir eva viśeṣaṇabhūtasyānyāpo-
hasya, agavāpoḍha eva gośabdasya niveśitatvāt. yathā nīlotpale niveśitād indīvara-
40 śabdān nīlotpalapratītau^{N33b} tatkāla eva nīlimasphuraṇam anivāryam, tathā gośabdād^{N33a} apy
agavāpoḍhe niveśitād^{N33b} goprātītau tulyakālam eva viśeṣaṇatvād ago'pohasphuraṇam

35 *pratiṣedhavadīnām*] K P N₁ N₂ :

pratiṣedhavadīnā N₃

35 °kasyāpi] K P N₁ N₂ : kasyāmi N₃

35 pratipattikramā°] N₁ N₂ : pratītikramā P:

pratipatikramā N₃ ; no ev. K

36 vidhiṃ] K P N₂ N₃ : vidhi N₁

36 pratipadya] P N₁ N₂ N₃ ,

prati/p{ā}→pa/dya K

36 kaścīd] K P N₁ N₂ : kaścīyad N₃

36 arthāpattitaḥ] K P N₁ N₂ : (arthāpa)titah
N₃ — N₃ is smudged here.

36 paścād] P N₁ N₂ N₃ , «paścād» K

36 apoham avagacchati, apohaṃ vā] K P N₁
N₂ : apoha«m avagacchati apoha» vā N₃

37 goḥ] K P : agoḥ N₁ N₂ : ago N₃

37 ity] P : iti • K N₁ N₂ : iti N₃

37 anyāpoḍha°] K P N₂ N₃ : anyāpoḍho N₁

37 °pratipattir] K P N₁ N₂ : pratipatir N₃

38 °ānullekha] P N₁ N₂ : ānulekha N₃ ;
no ev. K

38 nāpratipattir] K N₁ N₂ : nāpratītir P :
nāpipratipatir N₃

38 °bhūtasyā°] P N₁ N₂ : bhutasyā N₃

38 °anya°] P N₁ N₂ N₃ : {anya} K

40 °śabdān nīlotpala°] K P N₂ :

śabdānīlotpala N₁ : śabdānīlopala N₃

40 eva] K P N₁ N₂ : evaṃ N₃

40 nīlima°] K P N₂ : nīlama N₁ : nīlīma N₃

40 °sphuraṇam anivāryam] K P N₁ N₂ :
sphuram aṇicāryam N₃

41 agavāpoḍhe] K P N₁ N₂ : agavāpoḍheḥ
N₃

41 eva] K P N₁ N₂ N₂' N₃' : evaḥ N₃

41 ago'poha°] K N₁ N₂ N₃ N₂' N₃' : apoha
P

41–42 °sphuraṇam anivāryam] K P N₁ N₂
N₃ , sphuraṇani«2»ma«1»vāryyam N₂' :
sphura(ṇa)nīmavāryyam N₃' (smudged)

35 tad asundaram ...°adarśanāt] ≈AP 206.16

36 apoham] AS₃ 59, fn. 2 states that AS₁ reads *artham*, which is not true. Also all the mss support
apoham.

37 tasmād ...ucyate] ≈AP 206.19–20

37–39 yady api ...niveśitatvāt] ≈AP 203.16–17

39–42 yathā nīlotpale ...anivāryam] ≈AP 203.20–22

41 niveśitād] K P N₁ N₂ N₃ : niveśitatvād P acc. AS₃

41 goprātītau] N₃ and N₂ repeat the passage from l. 41 “*goprātītau*” to “*jāter adhikāyāḥ*” (starting
l. 49): N₂ 3b1–6 equals N₂ 4a1–6, and N₃ 3a1–7 equals N₃ 3a7–3b5. It might be significant for the
relation of the two mss to note that “*goprātītau*” is the first word both on folio N₂ 3b and N₂ 4a, because
this makes it seem more likely that the repetition originated in N₂ rather than in N₃, where “*goprātītau*” is
found in positions less prone to error. In this section of the edition, variants found in the first occurrence
of this passage will be referenced by the usual N₂ or N₃, while variants found in the second occurrence
will be referenced by N₂' and N₃' respectively.

anivāryam. yathā pratyakṣasya^{|K³} prasajyarūpābhāvagrahaṇam^{|K⁴} abhāvavikalpotpādana-
śaktir eva, tathā vidhivikalpānām api tadanurūpānuṣṭhānadānaśaktir evābhāvagrahaṇam^{|N^{1,3b}}
abhidhīyate. paryudāsarūpābhāvagrahaṇam^{|K⁴} tu niyatasvarūpasamvedanam^{|K⁵} ubhayor avi-
45 śiṣṭam. anyathā yadi śabdād arthapratipattikāle kalito na parāpohaḥ, katham anya-
parihāreṇa pravṛttiḥ. tato gām^{|K⁵} badhāneti codito 'śvādīn^{|K⁶} api badhnīyāt.

[§ 10] yad apy avocad *vācaspatiḥ* — jātimatyō vyaktayo vikalpānām śabdānām
ca gocarāḥ. tāsām ca tadvatīnām rūpam atajjātīyaparāvṛttam ity arthatas tadavagater

42 pratyakṣasya] P N₁ N₂ N₂' N₃' :

pratyakṣa«(·)» N₃ ; no ev. K

42 prasajyarūpā°] P N₃ N₃' : prasahyarūpā
N₁ N₂ N₂' ; no ev. K

42 °grahaṇam] K P N₁ N₂ N₃ N₂' :
yahaṇam N₃'

42–43 abhāvavikalpotpādanaśaktir
...grahaṇam] K P N₂ N₃ N₂' N₃' : n. e. N₁

42 °lpoṭpādana°] K P N₂ N₃ N₂' :
lpoṭpādēna N₃'

43 vidhivikalpānām] K P N₂ N₃ :
vidhikalpānām N₂' N₃'

43 °ānuṣṭhāna°] K P N₂ N₂' N₃' ,
ānuṣṭhā{danurūpānuṣṭhā}na N₃

43 °dāna°] K N₂ N₃ N₂' N₃' : n. e. P

44 abhidhīyate] K P N₁ N₂ N₂' N₃' :
abhidhiyate N₃

44 niyata°] P N₁ N₂' : niyanta N₂ N₃ :
niyeta N₃' ; no ev. K

44 °svarūpasamvedanam] K P N₁ N₂ N₃
N₃' : svarūpamamvedanam N₂'

45 anyathā] K P N₂ N₃ N₂' N₃' : anyathā
yathā N₁

45 śabdād artha°] P N₂' N₃' : śabdārtha K :
śabdād arthā N₁ N₂ N₃

45 °pratipatti°] K P N₁ N₂ N₂' N₃' :
pratipadya N₃

45 °kāle kalito] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : kālakalito P

45 katham] P N₂ N₃ N₂' N₃' , ka(tha)m K
(Worm damage.) : kanyam N₁

46 °parihāreṇa] K P N₂' N₃' : parihareṇa
N₁ N₂ : pariharaṇa N₃

46 tato gām] K P N₁ N₂' N₃' : tato (')gām
N₂ N₃

46 codito] K P N₁ N₂ N₂' : coditā N₃ :
cādito N₃'

46 'śvādīn] P : 'ścodīn N₁ N₂ N₂' : ścodin
N₃ : ścodīn N₃' ; no ev. K

47 avocad] K P N₁ N₂ N₂' N₃' : avācad N₃

47 *vācaspatiḥ*] K P N₂' N₃' : vācaspati N₁
N₂ N₃

47–48 vikalpānām ...gocarāḥ] K P N₁ N₂' :
vikalpānām śabdānām cāgocarāḥ N₂ :
vikalpānām śabdānām cāṅgocarāḥ N₃ :
vikalpānāśabdānāśca goraca N₃'

48 tāsām ca] K N₁ N₂ N₃ N₂' N₃' : tāsām P

48 atajjātīya°] K P N₂' : atajjātīya N₁ N₂ :
atajātīya N₃ N₃'

48 °parāvṛttam] P N₂ N₃ ,
pa{rihāre}rāvṛttam K : parāvṛtyam N₁

48 arthatas] K N₁ N₂ N₃ N₂' N₃' : arthas P
— Read as *atas* in AS₃.

48 tadavagater] K P N₁ : tavagater N₂ N₃ :
tadavagate N₂' N₃'

42–44 yathā pratyakṣasya ...aviśiṣṭam] ≈AP 205.12–16

45–46 anyathā ...badhnīyāt] ≈TBh₂ 53.12–15

45–46 yadi śabdād ...badhnīyāt] ≈AP 206.13–14; cf. also AP 206, fn. 2

47–53 yad apy ...uktaprāyam] =AP 206.25–207.4

47–49 jātimatyō ...badhnāti] ≈NVTṬ 443.23–444.2

- na gām^{K⁶} badhāneti^{K⁷} codito 'śvādīn badhnāti, tad apy anenaiva nirastam. yato jāter adhi-
 50 kāyāḥ^{N₂^{4a}, N₃^{3b}} prakṣepe 'pi vyaktīnām rūpam atajjātīyavyāvṛttam eva cet, tadā tenaiva rūpeṇa^{K⁷}
 śabdavikalpayor viṣayībhavantīnām katham atadvyāvṛttiparihārah.

[§ 11] atha na vijātīyavyāvṛttam vyaktirūpaṁ tathāpratītam vā, tadā jātiprasāda eṣa
 iti katham arthato 'pi tadavagatir ity uktaprāyam.

- [§ 12] atha jātibalād evānyato^{N₁^{4a}, K¹} vyāvṛttam, bhavatu jātibalāt svahetuparaṁparābalād^{N₃^{4a}}
 55 vānyavyāvṛttam, ubhayathāpi vyāvṛttapratipattau vyāvṛttipratipattir asty eva.

[§ 13] na cāgo'poḍhe gośabdasaṁketavidhāv anyonyāśrayadoṣaḥ, sāmānye^{P^{33b}, K², K³}
 tadvati vā saṁkete 'pi taddoṣāvakaśāt. na hi sāmānyam nāma sāmānyamātram
 abhipretam, turage 'pi gośabdasaṁketaprasaṅgāt, kiṁ tu gotvam. tāvatā ca sa

49 codito] P N₁ N₂ N₂' N₃' : ścodito N₃ ;
 no ev. K

49 'śvādīn] K P : 'ścādīn N₁ N₂ N₂' :
 ścodīna N₃ N₃'

49 badhnāti] P N₁ N₂ N₃, ba{xxx}dhnāti K

49 anenaiva nirastam] P N₁ N₂ N₂' N₃' :
 anenenaiva nirastam K : ateneva nirasta N₃

49 jāter] K P N₁ N₂ N₂' N₃' : jātecar N₃

50 vyaktīnām] K P N₁ N₂ : vyaktinām N₃

50 atajjātīya°] K P N₁ : atajjātīya N₂ :
 atajjātīya N₃

50 °vyāvṛttam eva] N₁ N₃, vyā{(·)}vṛttam
 e{tyarthabha}va K : parāvṛttam eva P :
 vyāvṛttem eva N₂ — AS₃ 59, fn. 9 claims
 “vyāvṛtta” for P. The reference should
 probably be to AS₁.

50 tenaiva] K P N₂ N₃ : tainaiva N₁

51 °vikalpayor] K P : vikalpayo N₁ :
 vikalpāyo N₂ N₃

51 viṣayībhavantīnām] K P N₂ :
 viṣaryobhavantīnām N₁ : viṣayibhava(p)īnā
 N₃

51 °parihārah] K P N₁ N₂ : parihyarah N₃

52 atha] K N₁ N₂ N₃, atha{h} P

52 na vijātīyavyāvṛttam] K N₁ N₂ : na
 vijātīvyāvṛttam P : na vinavijātīyavyāvṛkta N₃

53 arthato 'pi] K P N₁ : athatopi N₂ N₃

53 tadavagatir] K P N₁ N₂ : tadevagatir N₃

54 jātibalād] K P N₂ : jātibad N₁ : jātibasād
 N₃

54 bhavatu] P N₁ N₂ : bhavatu {kodo} K :
 evabhu N₃

54 °paraṁparābalād] K P : parāsparābalād
 N₁ N₂ N₃

55 vānyavyāvṛttam] K P N₁ N₂ :
 vānyathāvṛtama N₃

55 ubhayathāpi] K P N₁ N₃ :
 ubhayayathāpi N₂

55 °pratipattau vyāvṛttipratipattir] K N₂ :
 pratipattau vyāvṛttipratītīr P : pratīpattau
 vyāvṛttipratipattir N₁ : pratipatir N₃

56 cāgo'poḍhe] K N₁ N₂ : cāgavāpoḍha P :
 rāgopāte N₃ — AS₃ reads *cāgavāpoḍhe*.

57 saṁkete] K P N₁ N₂ : śaṅkate N₃

57 taddoṣāvakaśāt] K P N₁ N₂ :
 doṣāvakaśāt N₃

57 sāmānyam nāma] K P N₁ N₂ :
 sāmānyanāma N₃

57 sāmānyamātram] K P N₁ N₂ :
 sānyamātram N₃

58 turage 'pi] K P N₁ N₂ : bhurage 'pi N₃

58 gośabdasaṁketa°] K P N₁ N₂ :
 gośabdasāṅkaṭa N₃

49–50 adhikāyāḥ] Repetition in N₂ and N₃ ends here, cf. note to line 41.

54 atha ...vyāvṛttam] ≈AP 207.5

56–60 na cā°...°vācyāparijñānāt] ≈AP 203.23–204.2

eva^{1 K³} doṣaḥ, gavāparijñāne^{1 K⁴} gotvasāmānyāparijñānāt, gotvasāmānyāparijñāne goṣabda-
60 vācyāparijñānāt. tasmād ekapiṇḍadarśanapūrvako yaḥ sarvavyaktisādhāraṇa^{1 N₂^{5a}} i^{1 K⁴}va bahir
adhyasto^{1 K⁵} vikalpabuddhyākāraḥ, tatrāyaṃ gaur iti saṃketakaraṇe netaretarāśrayadoṣaḥ.
abhimate ca goṣabdapravṛttāv agoṣabdena śeṣasyāpy abhidhānam ucitam.^{1 K⁵}

[§ 14] na cānyāpoḍhānyāpohayor virodho viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇabhāvākṣatir vā, paraspa-
ravyavacchedābhāvāt, sāmānādhikaraṇyasadbhāvāt bhūtalaghaṭābhāvavat. svābhāvena
65 hi virodho na parābhāvenety ābālaprasiddham.^{1 K⁶}

[§ 15] eṣa panthāḥ śrughnam upatiṣṭhata ity atrāpy apoho gamyata eva, apra-
kṛtapathāntarāpekṣayā eṣa eva, śrughnapratyanīkāniṣṭasthānāpekṣayā śrughnam eva,
aranyamārgavad vicchedābhāvād^{1 K⁷} upatiṣṭhata^{1 K^{3b}} eva, sārthadūtādivyavacchedena panthā

59 gavāparijñāne] K P N₁ N₂ :

gavāparijñāna N₃ — AS₃ reads
gavādiparijñāne.

59 °sāmānyāparijñānāt] K P N₁ N₂ :
sāmānyāparijñānāt N₃

59 °parijñāne] K P N₂ : jñāne N₁ :
«pari»jñānam N₃

60 tasmād] K P N₂ N₃ : tasmā N₁

60 °piṇḍada°] P N₁ N₂ N₃ ,
p(i)ṇḍa/d{e} → da/ K

61 adhyasto] K P N₁ N₂ : adhyastā N₃

61 saṃketakaraṇe] K P N₁ N₂ :
maketakarane N₃

62 °pravṛttāv] K P N₁ N₂ : ravṛttāv N₃

62 śeṣasyāpy abhidhānam] K P N₂ :
śeṣyāpy avidhānam N₁ : śeṣasyāpy
abhidhānem N₃

63 °āpoḍhānyāpohayor] K :
āpohānyāpoḍhayor P : āpoḍhānyāpohayo N₁
N₂ : āpotānyāpohayo N₃ — AS₁ 5.14 reads
as accepted here, implying that S₂ also
supports this reading.

63 °viśeṣaṇabhāva°] P : viśeṣaṇa K N₁ N₂
N₃ — The accepted reading is also found in S₂
acc. to AS₁ 5, fn. 1.

63 °kṣatir] K P N₁ N₂ : kṣatīr N₃

64 °ābhāvāt] K P N₁ N₂ : ābhāvāta N₃

64 sāmānādhī°] K P N₁ : sāmānyādhī N₂ :
sāmāṇnyādhī N₃

64 °karaṇya°] K P N₁ : karaṇya N₂ :
karaṇnyam N₃

64 °sadbhāvāt] K P N₁ :
sadbhāvā{samānādhī} N₂ :
sadbhāvasamānādhī N₃

65 hi] K P N₂ N₃ : n. e. N₁

65 parābhāvenety] K P N₁ N₂ :
parābhāvenaty N₃

66 eṣa] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : ayaṃ P

66 panthāḥ] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : panthā P

66 śrughnam] K P N₁ N₂ : śraghnam N₃

66 upatiṣṭhata ity] K P N₁ N₂ : upatiṣṭhata
itity N₃

66 apoho] K P N₁ N₂ : apaho N₃

66–67 aprakṛta°] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : prakṛta P,
S₂ acc. AS₁

67 °pathā°] K P N₂ : panthā N₁ : paṭā N₃

67 °pratyanīkāniṣṭa°] K P N₁ :

pratyayanīkāniṣṭa N₂ : pratyayanīkābhaṣṭa N₃

67 °āpekṣayā] K P N₁ N₂ : āpekṣayāḥ N₃

67 śrughnam] K P N₂ N₃ : śrūghnam N₁

68 °dūtādivyavacchedena] K N₁ N₂ :
dūtādivyavacchedana P : dutādivyavacchedana
N₃

60–61 tasmād ...°doṣaḥ] Cf. AP 204.2–12

62 abhimate ...abhidhānam] ≈AP 204.13–14

63–65 na cā ...°prasiddham] Cf. AP 206.1

66–69 eṣa panthāḥ ...sulabhatvāt] ≈AP 206.6–9

- eveti pratipadam vyavacchedasya sulabhatvāt. tasmād apohadharmaṇo vidhirūpasya śa-
70 bdād avagatiḥ, puṇḍarīkaśabdād iva śvetimaviśiṣṭasya padmasya.
[§ 16] yady evaṃ vidhir eva śabdārtho vaktum ucitaḥ, katham apoho gīyata iti
cet, uktam atra — apohaśabdenānyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhir ucyate. tatra vidhau pratīya-
māne viśeṣaṇatayā tulyakālam anyāpohapratītir iti. na caivaṃ pratyakṣasyāpy apoha-
viśayatvavyavasthā kartum ucitā, tasya śabdapratyayasyeva vastuviśayatve vivādābhā-
75 vāt. vidhiśabdena ca yathādhyavasāyam atadrūpaparāvṛtto bāhyo 'rtho 'bhimataḥ, ya-
thāpratibhāsam buddhyākāraś ca. tatra bāhyo 'rtho 'dhyavasāyād eva śabdavāc्यo vya-
vasthāpyate, na svalakṣaṇapariśphūrtyā, pratyakṣavad deśakālāvasthāniyataprvyakta-
svalakṣaṇāsphuraṇāt.
yac chāstram —

- 69** vyavacchedasya sulabhatvāt] K P N₂ :
avacchedasya sulabhatvāt N₁ :
vyavacchedasubhalatvāt N₃
69 apoha°] K N₁ N₂ : anyāpoha P : amoha
N₃
70 °śabdād iva] K P N₁ N₂ : śabdādi N₃
70 śvetima°] P N₁ N₂ N₃ , śvetima{śa} K
71 yady evaṃ] P N₁ N₂ : yadyavaṃ N₃ ;
no ev. K
71 apoho] K P N₁ N₂ : apaho N₃
72 °śabdenā°] K P N₁ N₂ : śabdanā N₃
72 ucyate] K P N₁ N₂ : ucyateḥ N₃
72–73 pratīyamāne] K P N₁ N₂ :
pratīyamāna N₃
73 °pratītir iti] K N₂ N₃ : pratītiḥ P : pratīr
iti N₁
73–74 pratyakṣasyāpy apoha°] K P ,
pratyakṣasyāpy aho«2»po«1» N₂ :
pratyakṣasvāpy aho N₁ : pratyakṣasyāpy
ahopo N₃
74 °viśayatva°] P N₁ N₂ N₃ ,
{vyavasthā}viśaya°«tva3» K
74 kartum ucitā] K P N₁ N₂ , kartu°«m
u»citā N₃

- 74** śabda°] K : śabda P N₁ : śabdā N₂ N₃
75 ca] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : n. e. P
75–76 atadrūpa ...'dhyavasāyād] Repetition
in N₃: 4b5–6 = 4b6–7. One explanation is an
eye-skip from 'dhyavasāyād to
yathādhyavasāyam, further corroborated by
N₃'s 'dhyavasāyām at the end of this
passage's first occurrence. Variants found in
repetition are noted as N₃' (cf. note to l. 41).
75 atadrūpa°] K P N₁ : antadrūpa N₂ N₃
N₃'
75 °parāvṛtto] P N₁ N₂ : parāvṛtau N₃ N₃' ;
no ev. K
75 bāhyo 'rtho 'bhimataḥ] K P N₂ :
bāhyorthorvibhimataḥ N₁ : bāhyārthobhimata
N₃ : bāhyārthobhimataḥ N₃'
76 °pratibhāsam] K P N₁ N₃' : pratibhāsam
N₂ N₃
76 bāhyo 'rtho 'dhyavasāyād] K P N₁ N₂ :
bāhyarthodhyavasāyām N₃ :
bāhyārthodhyavasāryyād N₃'
77–78 °pravyaktasva°] K P N₂ N₃ :
pravyaktaḥ sva N₁

- 69–70** tasmād ...avagatiḥ] ≈ AP 204.19–20
70 puṇḍarīka°...padmasya] Cf. AP 204.16–18
72 uktam atra] Cf. line 31 on page 15 and line 69 on page 20.
73–75 na caivaṃ ...vivādābhāvāt] ≈ AP 205.9–10
76–78 tatra ...svalakṣaṇapariśphūrtyā] ≈ AP 208.11–14
76–82 bāhyo ...iti] ≈ TBh₂ 53.15–54.2
78–83 yac chāstram ...iti cet] ≈ AP 208.16–19

- 80 [§ 17] śabdenāvyāpṛtākṣasya buddhāv apratibhāsanāt |
arthasya dṛṣṭāv iva
iti.
[§ 18] indriyaśabdavabhāvopāyabhedād ekasyaivārthasya pratibhāṣabhedā^{1K5} iti cet.⁶^{1N2 6a}
atrāpy uktam —
85 [§ 19] jāto nāmāśrayo 'nyānyaś cetasām tasya vastunaḥ |
ekasyaiva kuto rūpaṃ bhinnākārāvabhāsi tat ||
[§ 20] na hi spaṣṭāspaṣṭe dve rūpe parasparaviruddhe^{1K6} ekasya⁷ vastunaḥ staḥ, yata^{34a}
ekenendriyabuddhau pratibhāsetānyena vikalpe, tathā⁷ sati vastuna eva bhedaprāpteḥ.
na hi svarūpabhedād^{1N1 5b} aparo vastubhedāḥ. na ca pratibhāṣabhedād⁷ aparāḥ svarūpabhedāḥ.
90 anyathā trailokyam ekam eva vastu syāt.
[§ 21] dūrasannadeśavartinoḥ puruṣayor ekatra śākhini spaṣṭāspaṣṭapratibhāṣabhedo^{1K1}
'pi na śākhibhedā² iti cet. na brūmaḥ — pratibhāṣabhedo bhinnavastuniyataḥ, kiṃ tv

80 śabdenā°] K P N₁ N₂ : śabdānā N₃

80 °avyāpṛtākṣasya] K P :

avyāvṛttākhyasya N₁ N₂ : āvyāvṛttākhyasyā
N₃

83 °bhedād] K P N₁ N₂ : bhedāta N₃

83 °syaivārthasya] P : syaiva K N₁ N₂ N₃ —
syaivārthasya also in S₂, acc. to AS₁ 6, fn. 1

83 pratibhāsa°] K P : pratibhāva N₁ N₂ N₃

84 atrāpy] K N₁ N₃ , a^v «trā»py N₂ : tatrāpy
P

85 °āśrayo 'nyānyaś] K P N₁ N₂ :

āśramonyānyaḥ N₃

85 cetasām tasya] K P N₁ , ce/t→ta/sāntasya
N₂ : cetsāmtasya N₃ — N₂ deleted *virāma*,
resulting in *ta*

86 °āvabhāsi tat] K N₁ : āvabhāsi yat P :

āvabhāsit N₂ : āvabhāsitā N₃

87 spaṣṭāspaṣṭe dve] [K]P N₁ N₂ :

spaṣṭāspaṣṭadve N₃

87 vastunaḥ] K N₁ N₂ : vastuna P :

v(e)stunaḥ N₃

87 staḥ] K P N₁ N₂ : sta N₃

87 yata] K N₁ N₂ : yad P : yetāḥ N₃

88 ekenendriya°] K P N₁ : ekenandriya N₂
N₃

88 buddhau] K P N₁ N₂ : buddhauḥ N₃

88 pratibhāsetānyena] K P N₂ :
pratibhāvatānyena N₁ : pratibhāsatānyena N₃

88 vikalpe] K P N₁ N₂ : vikalpa N₃

88 bheda°] P N₁ N₂ N₃ : bhada K

88 °prāpteḥ] K P N₁ : prāpte N₂ N₃

89 aparo] K P N₁ N₂ : aparā N₃

89 vastubhedāḥ] K P N₁ N₂ : vastubhedā N₃

89 pratibhāsa°] K P N₁ N₃ : pratibhāṣa N₂

89 aparāḥ] P : aparā N₁ N₂ N₃ ; no ev. K

90 trailokyam] K P N₁ : trelokyam N₂ N₃

90 ekam eva vastu] K P N₂ : ekam evastu

N₁ : evastu N₃

90 syāt] K P : na syāt N₁ N₂ N₃

91 °deśa°] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : n. e. P

91 °vartinoḥ] K P N₁ N₂ : vartināḥ N₃

91 puruṣayor] K P N₁ N₂ : puruṣayo N₃

92 cet] K P N₁ N₂ : ceta N₃

92 °bhedo] P N₁ N₂ : bhe(ḍ)ā N₃ ; no ev. K

80–81 śabdenā°...dṛṣṭāv iva] = PVin 1 15a-c

84–90 atrāpy ...vastu syāt] = AP 208.20–209.1

85–86 jāto ...bhinnākārāvabhāsi tat] = PV 3 235

91–92 dūrasannadeśa ...na śākhibhedha] ≈ AP 209.2

92–93 na brūmaḥ ...niyata iti] = AP 209.5–6

ekaviṣayatvābhāvanīyata iti. tato yatrārthakriyābhedādisacivaḥ pratibhāśabhedāḥ, tatra vastubhedāḥ, ghaṭavat. anyatra punar niyamenaikaviṣayatām pariharatīty ekapratibhāso

95 bhrāntaḥ.

[§ 22] etena ^{IN₃^{5b}} yad ^{IN₂^{6b}} āha *vācaspatiḥ* — na ca śabdapratyakṣayor vastugocara-
tve ^{K⁴} pratyayābhedāḥ, kāraṇabhedena pāroḥṣyāpāroḥṣyabhedopapatter iti, tan ^{K³} nopayo-
gi, ^{K⁴} parokṣapratyayasya vastugocaratvāsamarthanāt. parokṣatāśrayas tu kāraṇabheda
indriyagocaragrahaṇaviraheṇaiva ^{K⁴} kṛtārthaḥ. tan na śābde pratyaye svalakṣaṇaṃ pari-
100 sphurati.

[§ 23] ^{K⁵} kiṃ ca svalakṣaṇātmani vastuni vācye sarvātmanā pratipatter vidhi-
niṣedhayor ayogaḥ. tasya hi sadbhāve 'stīti vyartham, nāstīty asamartham. asadbhā-
ve tu ^{K⁵} nāstīti ^{IN₁^{6a}} vyartham, ^{K⁶} astīty asamartham. asti cāstyādipadaprayogaḥ. tasmāc chā-

93 ekaviṣayatvā°] K P N₂ N₃ : viṣayatvā N₁

93 °niyata] K P N₁ N₂ : nīyata N₃

93 °sacivaḥ] K P N₃ : saciva N₁ : sacirvaḥ
N₂

93–94 pratibhāśabhedāḥ ...°viṣayatām] K P
N₂ N₃ : pratibhāśayatām N₁

94 vastubhedāḥ] K P N₂ , «vastu»bhedāḥ N₃

94 ghaṭavat] K N₂ : ghaṭavata N₃ : n. e. P

94 niyamenaika°] K P N₂ : niyamanaika N₃

94 °viṣayatām] K P : viṣatā N₃ : viṣatām N₂

94 eka°] P : n. e. N₁ : eva N₂ N₃ ;

no ev. K

95 bhrāntaḥ] K P N₁ N₂ : bhrānta N₃

96 *vācaspatiḥ*] K P N₁ N₂ : vācaspati N₃

96 śabdapratyakṣayor] K N₁ N₃ N₂ :

śābdapratyakṣayor P — JN_A^{ms} 11b6 supports
śābdapratyakṣayor.

97 pāroḥṣyāpāroḥṣya°] K P :

parākṣyāpāroḥṣya N₁ : parātmāparokta N₃ :

parokṣyāpāroḥṣya N₂

99 virahēṇaiva] K P N₁ : viharāṇeva N₃ :

virahēṇeva N₂

99 pratyaye svalakṣaṇaṃ] K P N₁ N₃ :

pratyayasvalaṇaṃ N₂

101 vastuni vācye] K P N₁ N₂ : vastu vācye
N₃

101 sarvātmanā] K P N₁ : sarvātmanā N₂ N₃

101 pratipatter vidhi°] K N₂ N₃ : pratipatte
vidhi N₁ : pratipatte vidhe P

102 vyartham, nāstīty] K P : vyarthanāstīty
N₁ N₂ N₃

103 tu] P : n. e. K N₁ N₂ N₃ — *tu* also
supported in S₂ acc. to AS₁ 8, fn. 1.

103 asamartham] K P : asamārtha N₁ :

asamatham N₂ : asamartham astīty

asamartham N₃

103 cāstyādi°] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : cātyādi P

103 °prayogaḥ] K P N₁ N₂ : prayoga N₃

103–104 tasmāc chābda°] P : tasmāc
chabda K N₁ N₃ : tasmātaśabda N₂

93–95 tato ...bhrāntaḥ] ≈AP 209.12–14

96–99 etena ...kṛtārthaḥ] ≈AP 210.3–5

96–97 na ca śabda°...bhedopapatter] ≈NVTṬ 115.8–10

99–100 tan na ...parisphurati] Cf. AP 210.1–2

101–103 kiṃ ca ...prayogaḥ] ≈TBh₂ 54.3–6

101–104 kiṃ ...kṣamate] Cf. AP 211.1–6

bdapratibhāsasya bāhyārthabhāvābhāvasādhāranyam na tadviṣayatām kṣamate.

- 105 [§ 24] yac ca *vācaspatinā* jātimadvyaktivācyatām svavācaiva prastutyānantaram
eva — na ca śabdārthasya jāter bhāvābhāvasādhāranyam nopapadyate. sā hi svarū-
pato nityāpi deśakālaviprakīrṇānekavyaktyāśrayatayā bhāvābhāvasādhāranyābhavanty
astināstisambandhayogyā. vartamānavyaktisambandhitā hi jāter astitā, atītānāgata-
vyaktisambandhitā ca nāstiteti sandigdavyatirekitvād anaikāntikam bhāvābhāva-
110 sādharanyam, anyathāsiddham veti vilapitam, tad aprastutam. tāvatā tāvan na
prakṛtakṣatiḥ, jātau bharam nyasyatā svalakṣaṇāvācyatvasya svayam svīkārāt.
kiṃ ca sarvatra padārthasya svalakṣaṇasvarūpeṇaivāstitvādikam cintyate. jātes tu
vartamānādivyaktisambandho 'stitvādikam iti tu bālapratāraṇam. evaṃ jātimad-

105 svavācaiva] N₁ N₂ N₃ :

svabhāvatayaiva P ; no ev. K

105 prastutyānantaram] K P :

prastutyānanantaram N₁ N₂ N₃

106 jāter] K P : jate N₁ N₂ N₃

107 °viprakīrṇā°] K P N₁ : viprakīrṇā N₂ :
vikirṇā N₃ — Since *viprakīrṇa*, contrary to
the claim in AS₁ 8, fn. 2, is not found in K, it
must either be misassigned, and therefore the
reading of S₂, or a mistaken reading of K by
the editor of AS₁.

107 °bhavanty] P : bhavann N₁ N₂ :
bhavan N₃ ; no ev. K. — S₂ probably read
bhavann, as this appears in AS₁ 8.9 and K
gives no evidence here.

108 astināstisambandhayogyā] K N₂ :
astyādisambandhayogyā P :
astināstisambandhayogyāḥ. N₁ :
āstīsambandhayogyā N₃

108 astitā] K P N₂ N₃ : astitāḥ N₁

109 °vyatirekitvād] K P N₁ N₂ :
vyatirekitvād N₃

109 anaikāntikam bhā°] P N₁ :
anaikāntika×mbhā K : anaikāntikabhā N₂ N₃

110 vilapitam] P N₁ N₂ : °«2yi»lapite N₃ ;
no ev. K — In K, 5 *akṣaras* are missing in
average on this folio, so it is unlikely that the
phrase “*vilapitam, tad aprastutam. tāvatā*”

(approx. 12 *akṣaras*) could have been written
in K. Since AS₁ reads *vilapitam*, missing in K,
it can be assumed to have its basis in S₂. AS₃
obviously emends to *vikalpitaṃ*, noting the
reading of P in AS₃ 61, fn. 7.

110 tad aprastutam] P : n. e. N₁ N₂ N₃ ;
no ev. K — Apparently not entered in S₂
either, as AS₁ does not read it.

110 tāvatā] P : n. e. N₁ N₂ N₃ ; no ev. K —
Acc. to AS₁ 8, fn. 3, S₂ reads *tāvatā tāvat*.

111 prakṛtakṣatiḥ] K P N₁ N₂ :
prakṛtakṣanti N₃

111 bharam nyasyatā] K N₁ , bharam
sya«2»nya«1»tā N₂ : bharam nyasyatāpi P :
bharasyanyetā N₃

111 svalakṣaṇāvācyatvasya] K P N₁ N₂ N₃ :
svalakṣaṇāvācyatvasya AS₃

112 kiṃ ca sarvatra] K P N₂ N₃ : kiṃ ca
sarvatra N₁

112 svalakṣaṇa°] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : n. e. P

112 °svarūpeṇaivā°] K P N₁ N₂ :
svarūpaivā N₃ — If I understand AS₁ 8, fn. 4
correctly, S₂ reads *rūpeṇaiva*.

113 °sambandho 'stitvādikam] K P N₁ :
sambandhāstitvādikam N₂ N₃ — *sambadhī*
'stitvādikam in AS₃

113 evaṃ] K P N₁ : eva N₂ N₃

113 jātimad°] K P N₂ N₃ : jāmad N₁

105–111 yac ca *vācaspatinā* ...svīkārāt] ≈AP 211.7–13

105 svavācaiva prastutyānantaram] Cf. line 47 on p. 17

106–110 na ca ...anyathāsiddham ve°] ≈NVTṬ 444.2–6

113–115 evaṃ ...mukṭiḥ] ≈AP 212.18–19

vyaktivacane 'pi doṣaḥ. vyakteś cet pratīṣiddhiḥ, jātir adhikā pratīyatām mā vā,
115 na tu vyaktipratītidōṣān muktiḥ.

[§ 25] etena yad ucyate *kaumārilaiḥ* — sabhāgatvād eva vastuno na sādharāṇya-
doṣaḥ. vṛkṣatvaṃ hy anirdhāritabhāvābhāvaṃ śabdād avagamyate. tayoṛ anyatareṇa
śabdāntarāvagatena sambadhyata iti, tad apy asaṅgatam, sāmānyasya nityasya pratipa-
ttāv anirdhāritabhāvābhāvavāyogāt.

120 [§ 26] yac cedam — na ca pratyakṣasyeva śabdānām arthapratyāyanaprakāraḥ,
yena taddrṣṭa ivāstyādiśabdāpekṣā na syāt, vicitraśaktitvāt pramāṇānām iti, tad apy
aindriyakaśabdapratibhāsayor ekasvarūpagrāhitve bhinnāvabhāsādūṣaṇena dūṣitam.
vicitraśaktitvaṃ ca pramāṇānām sākṣātkārādhyavasāyābhyām api caritārtham. tato
yadi pratyakṣārthapratipādanam śabdena, tadvad evāvabhāsaḥ syāt. abhavaṃś ca na

114 doṣaḥ] K P N₁ N₂ : doṣa N₃

114 vyakteś cet] K P N₁ : vyakteś cete N₃ :
vyakteś ceta N₂

114–115 mā vā, na tu] K P N₁ N₂ : mā
cāratu N₃

116 ucyate] K P N₁ : ucyā N₂ N₃

116 *kaumārilaiḥ*] K P N₁ : komārilaiḥ N₂
N₃

117 hy anirdhāritabhāvābhāvaṃ] K : hi
anirdhāritabhāvābhāvaṃ P : hy
anidhāritabhāvābhāvaṃ N₁ : hy
amṇirdvāribhāvaṃ N₂ : hy anirdvāribhāvaṃ
N₃

117 anyatareṇa] K P N₁ N₂ : anyatareṇa N₃

118 śabdāntarāvagatena] P N₁ :
śabdāntarā{vā«2»bhā«1»bhā}vaṃ gatena N₂ :
śabdāntarābhāvābhāvatena N₃ : ; no ev. K

118 sambadhyata iti] K P N₁ N₂ :
sambandhyate iti N₃

120 na ca] K P N₁ N₂ , '«1na ca» N₃

120 pratyakṣasyeva] K P N₁ N₃ ,

prakṣa«2»tya«1»syeva N₂

121 taddrṣṭa] P : tadadrṣṭa N₁ N₂ N₃ ;
no ev. K

121 ivāsty°] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : ivāty P

121 tad] P N₁ N₂ N₃ , {tato yadi pratyakṣa.}
tad K

122 aindriyaka°] K P N₂ N₃ : endriyaka N₁

122 °āvabhāsa°] P N₁ N₂ N₃ :

āvabhā{va}ṣa K

122 °dūṣaṇena] K P N₁ N₂ : n. e. N₃

123 sākṣāt°] K P N₂ N₃ : sākṣā N₁

124 yadi] K P N₁ : yadbhi N₃ : yahi N₂

124 pratyakṣārtha°] K P N₁ N₂ :

pratyakṣārtham N₃

124 °pratipādanam] K P N₁ : pratipādānām
N₃ : pratipādanām N₂

124 abhavaṃś ca] K P : abhavaśca N₁ N₂ :
abhaveś ca N₃

124 na] K P N₁ N₂ : n. e. N₃

116–118 etena ...sambadhyata iti] ≈AP 212.20–21

116–118 sabhāgatvād ...sambadhyata] Cited from *Sucaritamīśra's Kāśikā* ad ŚV Av 1, acc. to Kataoka 2010.

120–122 yac cedam ...dūṣitam] ≈AP 213.3–5

120–121 na ca ...pramāṇānām] Also a quotation from *Sucaritamīśra's Kāśikā* ad ŚV Av 1, acc. to Kataoka 2010.

121 vicitra ...pramāṇānām] =ĀTV₂ 135.6–136.1 (ĀTV₁ 327.12–13)

123 vicitraśaktitvaṃ ...caritārtham] Cf. AP 213.7

123–125 tato yadi ...kṣamate] ≈AP 213.5–6

125 tadviṣayakhyāpanam^{1K7} kṣamate.^{1K5a}

[§ 27] nanu vṛkṣaśabdena vṛkṣatvāmśe codite sattvādyamśaniścayanārtham
astyādipadaprayoga iti cet, niraṃśatvena pratyakṣasamadhigatasya^{1N2^{8a}} svalakṣaṇasya
ko 'vakāśaḥ padāntareṇa dharmāntaravidhiniṣedhayoḥ^{1K1} pramāṇāntareṇa^{K2} vā. pratyak-
kṣe 'pi pramāṇāntarāpekṣā^{1K2} drṣṭeti cet, bhavatu, tasyāniścayātmakatvād anabhyasta-
130 svarūpaviṣaye. vikalpas tu svayaṃ niścayātmako yatra grāhī, tatra kim apareṇa. asti ca
śabdalingāntarāpekṣā^{1K2}. tato na vastusvarūpagrahaḥ.

[§ 28] nanu bhinnā jātyādayo dharmāḥ parasparam dharmināś ceti jātilakṣaṇaika-
dharmadvāreṇa pratīte 'pi śākhini dharmāntaravattayā na pratītir iti kiṃ na bhi-
nnābhidhānādhīno^{1K3} dharmāntarasya^{K4} nīlacaloccaistaratvāder^{1N3^{7a}} avabodhaḥ. tad etad asa-
135 ṅgatam, akhaṇḍātmanaḥ svalakṣaṇasya pratyakṣe pratibhāsād drṣṭasya dharmadharmin-

125 tadviṣayakhyāpanam] P N₁ N₂ :

tadviṣayakhyāpana N₃ ; no ev. K

125 kṣamate] P N₂ N₃ : kṣamaḥ te N₁ ;

no ev. K

126 vṛkṣatvāmśe] K P N₂ : vṛkṣatvāśe N₁
N₃

126 °niścayanārtham] K N₁ N₂ N₃ :
niścayārtham P

127 °pada°] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : śabda P

127 °gatasya] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : n. e. P

128 °vidhi°] P N₁ N₂ N₃ , °«vidhi» K

129 drṣṭeti] K P N₁ : drṣṭeti N₂ N₃

129 °ātmakatvād] P : ātmakatvād K :

ātmakatvād N₁ N₂ : ātmakatvā N₃

129–130 anabhyastasvarūpa°] K P N₁ :
anabhyasvarūpa N₂ : anityasvarūpa N₃

130 vikalpas] K P N₂ N₃ : vikalpas N₁

130 svayaṃ ni°] K P N₂ , ya«2»sva«1»nni
N₁ : svaya ni N₃

130 grāhī] K P N₂ : grāhī N₁ : grāhi N₃ —
N₁ did not delete the prefix for the short *i*.

132 dharmināś ceti] K P N₂ :

dharmmi/ma→ṇa/(·)ti N₁ : dharmmaṇaśceti
N₃ — N₁ is smudged here.

133 śākhini] K P N₁ N₂ : śākhinī N₃

134 °ābhidhānādhīno] K P N₁ :

ābhidhānādhīnī N₂ : ābhidhānādhīni N₃

134 dharmāntarasya] K P N₁ N₃ :

dharmāntarasya N₂

134 nīlacaloccaistaratvāder] K P N₁ :

nīlacalaccaistaratvāt der N₂ :

nīlacalaccaistaratvāt. der N₃

134–135 asaṅgatam] K P N₁ N₂ :

asargjatam N₃

135 akhaṇḍātmanaḥ] K P N₁ : akhādātmana
N₃ : akhadātmanaḥ N₂

135 pratyakṣe pratibhāsād] K : pratyakṣe

'pi pratibhāsanāt | P : pratyakṣe pratibhāṣāt |

N₁ : prakṣa«2»tya«1»pratisāt || N₂ :

pratyekṣaprisāt || N₃ — AS₃ opts for

pratyakṣe 'pi pratibhāṣāt.

135 dharmadharmin°] K N₁ N₂ N₃ :

dharmmidharmin P

126–127 vṛkṣaśabdena ...iti cet] ≈TBh₂ 54.9–11. Cf. AP 212.25–26

127 niraṃśatvena ...svalakṣaṇasya] Cf. AP 213.10

128–131 ko 'vakāśaḥ ...vastusvarūpagrahaḥ] ≈AP 213.11–14

129–130 tasyā°...apareṇa] ≈TBh₂ 54.11–14

132–134 bhinnā ...°occaistaratvāder] ≈AP 213.15–17

^{↓N₁ 7b} bhedasya ^{↓K⁴} pratyakṣapratikṣiptatvāt. ^{↓K⁵} anyathā sarvaṃ sarvatra syād ity atiprasaṅgaḥ. kā-
lpanikabhedāśrayas tu dharmadharmivyavahāra iti prasādhitaṃ ^{↓N₂ 8b} śāstre.

[§ 29] bhavatu vā pāramārthiko 'pi dharmadharmibhedah, tathāpy anayoḥ ^{↓K⁶} samavāyāder ^{↓K⁷} dūṣitatvād upakāralakṣaṇaiva pratyāsattir eṣitavyā. evaṃ ca
140 yathendriyapratyāsattiyā pratyakṣeṇa dharmipratipattau sakalataddharmapratipattiḥ,
tathā śabdalingābhyām api vācyavācakādisambandhapratibaddhābhyām dha-
rmipratipattau niravaśeṣataddharmapratipattir bhavet, pratyāsattimātrasyāviśeṣāt.

[§ 30] yac ca *vācaspatiḥ* — na caikopādhinā sattvena viśiṣṭe tasmin gr̥hīta
^{↓K⁷} upādhyantaraviśiṣṭatadgrahaḥ. svabhāvo hi dravyasyopādhibhir viśiṣyate, na tūpā-
145 dhayo vā viśeṣyatvaṃ vā tasya svabhāva iti, tad api plavata eva. na hy abhedād

136 pratyakṣa°] K P N₂ N₃ : pratyakṣaḥ N₁

136 ity atiprasaṅgaḥ] K P N₂ : ity ati ||
prasaṅgaḥ N₁ : ity a•pratisargjaḥ N₃

136–137 kālpanika°] K P N₁ N₂ : kālpani
N₃

137 dharmadharmi°] K N₁ N₂ N₃ :
dharmmidharmma P

137 iti] K P N₂ : i N₁ : iti || iti N₃ — N₁
has a linebreak after *i*.

138 °ārthiko] K P N₁ N₃ : ārthiko N₂

138 'pi] P : n. e. K N₁ N₂ N₃

138 dharmā°] P N₁ N₂ N₃ , dharmm/o→a/
K

139 upakāra°] K P N₁ N₂ : ukāra N₃

139 pratyāsattir] K P : pratyāsantir N₁ N₂
N₃

139 evaṃ ca] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : evaṃ P

140 pratyakṣeṇa dharmi°] K P N₁ N₂ :
pratyakṣeṇa dharmma N₃

140 °taddharma°] K P N₂ : taddharmma N₁ :
saddharmma N₃

141–142 °pratibaddhābhyām dharmi°] P
N₁ N₂ : pratibaddhā×bhyām dharmmi K :
pratibaddhyātyādharma N₃

142 °pratipattau] K P N₁ N₂ :
pratipatt/i→au/ N₃. The scribe of N₃ did not

delete the vertical bar of the prefixed short *i*.

142 °pratipattir bhavet] K P N₁ :
pratipattibhavet N₂ N₃

142 pratyāsattimātrasyāviśeṣāt] K P N₁ :
pratyāsattimātrasyāpi viśeṣāt N₂ :
pratyāsattimātrasyāpi viśeṣyāt N₃

143 vācaspatiḥ — na] K P N₁ N₂ :
vācaspatina N₃

143 sattvena] P : satve K N₁ N₂ : satva N₃
— Acc. to AS₁ 10, fn. 1, S₂ reads *sattvena*.

143 viśiṣṭe] K P N₁ N₂ : viśiṣṭa N₃

143 gr̥hīta] K : gr̥hīte { | } P : gr̥hīte N₁ N₂
N₃

144 °viśiṣṭatad°] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : viśiṣṭas tad
P

144 °grahaḥ] K P N₁ N₂ : graha N₃

144 dravyasyopādhibhir] P :
dravyasya{vi}upādhibhir K : dravyasya
upādhibhi N₁ N₃ : dravyasya upādhibhir N₂

144 viśiṣyate] P N₁ N₂ N₃ : viśeṣyate K —
Acc. to AS₁ 10, fn. 2, S₂ reads *viśeṣyate*.

144–145 tūpādhayo] K P N₁ N₂ :
tupādhayo N₃

145 viśeṣyatvaṃ] K N₁ N₂ : viśeṣatvaṃ P :
viśeṣyatva N₃

136–137 kālpanikabhedā ...vyavahāra] Cf. PVSV 2.22–3.1, and see translation of § 28 on page 51 for more material.

143–147 yac ca ...°prasañjanāt] ≈AP 215.3–6

143–145 na caikopādhinā ...svabhāva] ≈NVTṬ 115.10–13

upādhyantaragrahaṇam āsañjita^{↓N₁^{8a} ↓K⁸}, bhedaṃ puraskṛtyaivopakāra^{↓N₃^{7b}}grahaṇa upakārya-
grahaṇaprasañjanāt. na cāgnidhūmayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāva^{↓N₂^{9a}} iva svabhāvata eva dha-
rma^{↓P^{35a}}dharmiṇoḥ pratipattiniyamakalpanam ucitam, tayo^{↓K¹} api pramāṇāsiddhatvāt. pramā-
ṇāsiddhe ca svabhāvopavarṇanam iti nyāyaḥ.

150 [§ 31] yac cātra nyāyabhūṣaṇena — sūryādigrahaṇe tadupakāryāśeṣavasturāśi-
grahaṇaprasañjanam uktam, tad abhiprāyānavagāhanaphalam. tathā hi tva^{↓K²}nmate yadā^{↓K³}
dharmadharminor bheda upakāralakṣaṇaiva ca pratyāsattiḥ, tadopakāragrahaṇe
samānadeśasyaiva dharmarūpasyaiva copakāryasya grahaṇam āsañjita^{↓K³}. tat^{↓K⁴}
kathaṃ sūryopakāryasya bhinnadeśasya dravyāntarasya vā drṣṭavyabhicārasya gra-

146 upādhyantara°] K P N₁ N₂ ,

upādhyanta)ra N₃

146 °grahaṇam āsañjita] P : grahaṇaṃ ca
māsañjita N₁ N₂ : grahaṇam ca māsañjita
N₃ ; no ev. K — Since there is no evidence in
K, S₂ apparently read *grahaṇam ca*
māsañjita.

146 bhedaṃ] K P N₁ N₂ : bheda N₃

146 °grahaṇa] em. : grahaṇe K P N₁ N₃ :
graha/ṇa→ṇ«e»/ N₂

147 °prasañjanāt] K P N₁ :
prasa{ṅga}ñjanāt N₂ : prasaṅgañjanāt N₃

147–148 svabhāvata eva dharma°] K P N₁
N₂ : svabhāto dharma N₃

148 pratipatti°] P : prati K N₁ N₂ N₃

148 tayo^{↓K¹} api] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : tayo^{↓K¹}adyāpi P

148 pramāṇāsiddhatvāt] P N₁ N₂ :
pramāṇāsiddhatvāt N₃ ; no ev. K

149 °opavarṇanam] K P N₁ N₂ : opavarṇam
N₃

149 nyāyaḥ] K P N₁ N₂ : nyāyāt N₃

150 °upakāryāśeṣavastu°] K P N₁ N₂ :
upakāryāśeṣavastu N₃

151 °grahaṇa°] K P N₁ N₂ : grahaṇam N₃

151 °prasañjanam] P N₁ ,

prasa{ṅgaḥ}ñjanam K : pramañjanam N₂ N₃

151 tva^{↓K²}nmate] K P N₃ : tvatmate N₁ N₂

151 yadā] P : n. e. K N₁ N₂ N₃

152 dharmadharminor bheda] K P :
dharmadharminiṇor bhedaḥ N₁ N₂ :
dharmadharminiṇor bheda(h) N₃

152 °lakṣaṇaiva] K P N₁ N₂ : lakṣaṇeva N₃

152 °pratyāsattiḥ] K P N₁ : pratyāsanti N₃ :
pratyāsattiḥ N₂

152–154 tadopakāraka ...°opakāryasya] K
P N₁ N₂ In N₃, this passage has been added in
the bottom margin.

152 °opakāraka°] K P N₁ : opakaraka N₂
N₃

152 °grahaṇe] K P N₂ N₃ : graṇor bhedaḥ
{upakāra} N₁

153 samānadeśasyaiva] K P N₁ : samāṇe
deśasyaiva N₂ N₃

153 āsañjita] K P N₁ N₂ : āsakṣita N₃

154 kathaṃ] P N₁ N₂ : katha N₃ ; no ev. K

154 °āntarasya vā] K P N₁ N₂ :
āntarasvabhāvā N₃

150–151 yac cātra ...°phalam.] ≈AP 215.8–9

151 sūryādigrahaṇe ...prasañjanam] ≈NBhūṣ 247, 2

155 haṇaprasaṅgaḥ saṅgataḥ.

[§ 32] tasmād ekadharmadvāreṇāpi vastusvarūpapratipattau sarvātmapatīteḥ kva
^{↓N₁^{8b} ↓K⁴} śabdāntareṇa ^{↓K⁵} vidhiniṣedhāvakaśaḥ. asti ca. tasmān na svalakṣaṇasya śabdavikalpa-
^{↓N₂^{9b}} liṅgapratibhāsītvaṃ iti sthitam.

[§ 33] nāpi sāmānyam śābdapratyayapratibhāsi. saritaḥ pāre gāvaś carantīti ^{↓K⁵} gavādi-
 160 śābdāt sāsnaśṅgalāṅgūlādayo 'kṣarākāraparikaritaḥ sajātīyabhedāparāmarśanāt sam-
 piṇḍitaprāyāḥ pratibhāsante. na ca tad eva sāmānyam.

[§ 34] ^{↓K⁶ ↓K⁷} varṇākṛtyakṣarākāraśūnyam gotvaṃ ^{↓N₃^{8a}} hi kathyate.

[§ 35] tad eva ca sāsnaśṅgādīmātram akhilavyaktāḥ atyantavilakṣaṇam api sva-
 lakṣaṇenaikīkriyamāṇam sāmānyam ity ucyate. tādrśasya bāhyasyāprāpter ^{↓K⁷ ↓K^{6a}} bhrāntir
 165 evāsau keśapratibhāsavat. tasmād vāsanāvaśād buddher eva tadātmanā vivarto 'yam

155 °prasaṅgaḥ saṅgataḥ] K P N₁ N₂ :
 prasaṅgasāṅgataḥ N₃

156 °pratīteḥ] K N₁ N₂ : pratipattiḥ P :
 pratīte N₃ — Acc. to AS₃ 63, fn. 3, P reads
pratipatteḥ.

157 °āntareṇa] P N₁ N₂ : āntare N₃ ;
 no ev. K

157–158 °vikalpaliṅga°] K P N₁ N₂ :
 vikalpabhiliṅga N₃

159 śābda°] K P N₁ N₂ : śabda N₃

159 °pratibhāsi] P N₁ N₂ N₃ : «prati»bhāsi
 K

159 carantīti] P N₁ N₂ : carantī N₃ ;
 no ev. K

160 °śābdāt] K P N₁ N₂ : śa«b»dat N₃.

160 °lāṅgūlādayo 'kṣarā°] K : lāṅgūlādayo
 'kṣarā P N₁ : lāṅgūlādayokṣarā N₂ :
 lā^v«2gulā»dayokṣarā N₃

160 °āparāmarśanāt] K N₁ N₂ N₃ :
 āparāmarśāt P — The reading *vamarśāt*,
 found in P acc. to AS₃ 63, fn. 4, can not be
 found there.

160–161 sampiṇḍita°] K : sampiḥi«ṇḍi3»ta
 P : sapiṇḍita N₁ N₂ : sapaṇḍita N₃ — In P,
 the point where the *akṣara* in the bottom
 margin is to be inserted is not clearly marked,
 but this is the most sensible place.

161 pratibhāsante] K P N₂ N₃ :
 pratibhāśante N₁

162 gotvaṃ] K P N₁ N₂ : gatva N₃

162 kathyate] K N₁ : vakṣyate P : (hi)
 ka(thyaṃ)te N₃ : kathyamte N₂ — N₃ is
 smudged here.

163 ca] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : n. e. P

163 atyanta°] K P N₁ : antyanta N₂ N₃

163–164 svalakṣaṇenaikīkriyamāṇam] K P
 N₁ N₂ : svalakṣaṇaivikriyamāṇam N₃

164 tādrśasya] K P N₁ N₂ : tādrśasya N₃

164 °āprāpter bhrāntir] K : āprāpte bhrāntir
 P N₁ N₂ N₃

165 evāsau] P N₁ N₂ N₃ , e{ṣai}vāsau K

165 keśa°] K P N₂ N₃ : veśa N₁

165 buddher] K P N₁ N₂ : buddhar N₃

156–157 tasmād ...°āvakaśaḥ] ≈AP 218.22–23

157–158 tasmān na ...sthitam] AP 219.23–24

159–162 nāpi ...kathyate] ≈AP 220.2–5

162 varṇā ...kathyate] ≈PV 3 147cd (*varṇyate* instead of *kathyate*)

163–164 tad eva ca ...ucyate] ≈AP 220.8–9

164–165 tādrśasya ...bhāsavat] ≈AP 220.15–16

165–168 tasmād ...sāmānyavārtā] ≈AP 220.23–221.1

astu, asad¹ eva vā tadrūpaṃ khyātu, vyaktaya eva vā sajātīyabhedatiraskāreṇānyathā² bhāsantām³ anubhavavyavadhānāt, smṛtipramoṣo⁴ vābhidhīyatām. sarvathā nirviṣayaḥ⁵ khalv⁶ ayaṃ sāmānyapratyayaḥ. kva sāmānyavārtā.

[§ 36] yat punaḥ sāmānyābhāve sāmānyapratyayasyākasmikā⁷tvam uktam, tad ayu-
 170 ktam, yataḥ pūrvapiṇḍadarśanasmarāṇasahakāriṇātīricyamānā⁸ viśeṣapratyayajanikā⁹ sā-
 magrī¹⁰ nirviṣayaṃ sāmānyavikalpam utpādayati. tad evaṃ na śābde¹¹ pratyaye jātiḥ pra-
 tibhāti, nāpi pratyakṣe. na cānumānato¹² 'pi siddhiḥ, adṛśyatve¹³ pratibaddhalingādarśa-
 nāt. nāpīndriyavad asyāḥ¹⁴ siddhiḥ, jñānakāryataḥ¹⁵ kādācitkasyaiva¹⁶ nimittāntarasya¹⁷ si-
 ddheḥ. yadā¹⁸ hi piṇḍāntare¹⁹ 'ntarāle²⁰ vā gobuddher²¹ abhāvaṃ darśayet, tadā śābaleyā-

166 asad] K P N₁ N₂ : prasad N₃

166 eva vā tad°] P N₁ N₂ : evā tad K : eva
 tad N₃ — *eva vā tad* also supported by S₂
 acc. to AS₁ 12, fn. 1.

166 vā²] P N₁ N₂ N₃ : n. e. K — *vā* also
 supported in S₂ acc. to AS₁ 12, fn. 2.

166 sajātīya°] K P N₁ : sajāya N₃ : sajāya
 N₂ — AS₂ reads *svajātīya*, misprinted in AS₃
 as *svajātōya*.

166 °bhedatiraskāreṇā°] K P N₁ N₂ :
 bhedatireskāreṇā N₃

167 bhāsantām] K P : bhāṣantām N₁ N₂ N₃

167 anubhava°] K N₁ N₂ N₃ :
 anubhava«sya4» P — The addition is written
 in the topmargin, directly above this passage
 (which is in l. 4 of P 35a). There is no mark
 indicating that the addition should go here, but
 I see no other reasonable possibility.

167 smṛtipramoṣo] K N₁ N₂ N₃ :
 smṛtīvipramoṣo P

167 vābhidhīyatām] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : vā
 'bhidhīyatām. P

167 sarvathā] K P N₂ N₃ : sarvarthā N₁

167 nirviṣayaḥ] K P N₁ N₂ : nirviṣaya N₃

168 khalv ayaṃ] K P N₂ N₃ : svalpayam N₁

168–169 sāmānyavārtā. yat] K P N₁ N₂ :
 sānyavārttayet || N₃

169 °ākasmika°] P N₁ N₂ : ākasmika N₃ ;
 no ev. K

169–170 tad ayuktam] K N₁ N₂ N₃ , «tad
 ayuktam (5)» P — That this addition was

169–170 yat punaḥ ...tad ayuktam] ≈AP 221.11

170–171 yataḥ ...utpādayati] ≈ AP 221.13–14

172–173 na cā°...siddheḥ] Cf. AP 221.17–20

174–178 yadā ...bhavatu mā vā] ≈AP 221.20–25

made “...by a separate hand” (AS₃ 63, fn. 8) is
 not evident from my copy.

170 °darśana°] P : daṇḍadarśana K :
 daṇḍadaśana N₁ : daṇḍana N₂ N₃ — S₂ reads
 like P acc. to AS₁ 12, fn. 3.

170 °smaraṇa°] K P N₂ N₃ : maraṇa N₁

170 °sahakāriṇātīricya°] K P N₁ N₂ :
 saha kārināriṃcyā N₃

170 °pratyayajanikā] K P N₁ N₂ ,
 pratyaya{ || }janikā N₃

170–171 sāmāgrī] K P : sāmāgrī N₁ N₂ N₃

171 nirviṣayaṃ] K P N₂ N₃ : nīrviṣayaṃ N₁

171 °śābde pratyaye°] P : śābdapratyaye K
 N₁ N₂ N₃

172 pratyakṣe. na] K P N₁ N₂ :
 pratyakṣaṇena N₃

172 cānumānato] K P N₁ N₂ : cānamānato
 N₃

172 'pi siddhiḥ] K P N₁ N₂ : 'siddhiḥ N₃

172 adṛśyatve] K P N₁ N₂ : adṛśyetve N₃

173 asyāḥ siddhiḥ] K P N₁ N₂ : asyāsiddhi
 N₃

173 °kāryataḥ] P N₁ N₂ : kāryata N₃ ;
 no ev. K

173 kādācitkasyaiva] K P N₁ N₂ :
 kadācitkasyeva N₃

173 nimittāntarasya] K P N₁ N₂ :
 nimittāntara N₃

174 yadā hi] N₁ N₂ N₃ : yadā P : yadāpi K

174 °buddher] K P N₁ N₂ : buddhar N₃

- 175 disakalagopiṇḍānām evābhāvād abhāvo gobuddher upapadyamānaḥ katham arthānta-
ram ākṣipet. atha gotvād eva gopiṇḍaḥ, anyathā turago 'pi gopiṇḍaḥ syāt. yady evam,
gopiṇḍād eva gotvam, anyathā turagatvam api gotvam syāt. tasmāt kāraṇaparamparāta
eva gopiṇḍaḥ, gotvam tu bhavatu mā vā.
- [§ 37] nanu sāmānyapratyayajananasāmāthyam yady ekasmāt piṇḍād abhinnaṃ, ta-
180 dā vijātiyavyāvṛtṭam piṇḍāntaram asamartham. atha bhinnam, tadā tad eva sāmānyam,
nāmni paraṃ vivāda iti cet, abhinnaiva sā śaktiḥ prativastu. yathā tv ekaḥ śaktasvabhāvo
bhāvaḥ, tathānyo 'pi bhavan kīdrśaṃ doṣam āvahati. yathā *bhavatām* jātir ekāpi samā-
nadhvaniprasava hetuḥ, anyāpi svarūpeṇaiva jātyantarānirapekṣā, tathā *smākaṃ* vyaktir
api jātīnirapekṣā svarūpeṇaiva bhinnā hetuḥ.
- 185 [§ 38] yat tu *trilocanaḥ* — aśvatvagotvādīnām sāmānyaviśeṣāṇām svāśraye samavā-
yaḥ sāmānyam sāmānyam ity abhidhānapratyayayor nimittam iti. yady evam vyaktiṣv

175 °sakala°] K P N₁ : śakala N₃ :

/śa→sa/kala N₂

175 evābhāvād] K P N₁ N₂ : savābhāvāvād
N₃

175–176 arthāntaram] K P N₁ :
aryāntaram N₂ : aryāntaram N₃

176 atha] P : n. e. K N₁ N₂ N₃

176 gopiṇḍaḥ¹] K P N₁ : gopiṇḍa N₂ N₃

176 turago 'pi gopiṇḍaḥ] K P N₁ N₂ :
turagopiṇḍa N₃

177 eva gotvam] K P N₂ N₃ : eve gotvam
N₁

177 turagatvam] K N₁ N₂ N₃ :
tura«(ga)»tvam P

177 °paramparāta] K P : parasparāta N₁
N₃ : parasparāt N₂

178 gotvam] K P N₁ N₂ : gotva N₃

178 tu] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : n. e. P

179 °sāmāthyam] K P N₁ N₃ : sāmāthyam
N₂

179 ekasmāt] K P N₁ N₂ : ekasmāta N₃

179 piṇḍād abhinnaṃ] K P N₁ N₂ :
piṇḍābhinna N₃

180 vijātiya°] K P N₂ N₃ : vijātiya N₁

180 asamartham] K P N₁ : asamartha N₂
N₃

180 bhinnam] K P N₁ N₂ : bhinna N₃

181 paraṃ] K P N₁ N₂ : para N₃

181 sā śaktiḥ] K P N₁ N₂ : sa (śa)ktiḥ N₃

182 doṣam] K P N₁ , do/śa→ṣa/m N₂ :
doṣan N₃

182–183 samāna°] K P N₁ N₂ : samā N₃

184 °aiva bhinnā] K P N₂ N₃ : aivam
bhinnā N₁

184 hetuḥ] K P N₁ N₂ : hetu N₃

185 aśvatva°] P N₁ N₂ N₃ : aśvatvam K

185 °gotvādīnām] K P N₁ N₂ : gotvādīnā
N₃

185 svāśraye] K N₁ : svaviśayeṣu P :
śvāśraye N₂ N₃ — AS₁ 13, fn. 1 attests
svāśrayeṣu in S₂.

186 sāmānyam] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : n. e. P — K
puts a *daṇḍa* after this *sāmānyam*.

186 abhidhāna°] K P N₁ : abhitvābhidhāna
N₂ N₃

186 °pratyayayor nimittam] K P N₂ :
pratyayor nimittam N₁ : pratyayor nirmittam
N₃

186 vyaktiṣv] K P N₁ N₂ : vyaktisv N₃

179–184 nanu ...hetuḥ] ≈AP 222.3–8

185–186 yat tu ...nimittam iti] ≈AP 222.10–11

apy ayam eva tathābhīdhānapratyayahetur astu, kiṃ sāmānyasvīkārapramādena. na ca samavāyaḥ sambhavī —

- [§ 39] iheti buddheḥ samavāyasiddhir iheti dhīś ca dvayadarśane syāt |
 190 na ca kvacit tadviṣaye dvayekṣā svakalpanāmātram ato 'bhyupāyaḥ ||
 [§ 40] etena seyam pratyayānuvṛttir anuvṛttavastvanuyāyinī katham atya-
 ntabhediniṣu vyaktiṣu vyāvṛttaviṣayapratyayabhāvānupātinīṣu bhavitum arhatīty
 ūhāpravartanam asya pratyākhyātam, jātiṣv eva parasparavyāvṛttatayā vyaktīyamā-
 nāsv anuvṛttapratyayena vyabhicārāt.
 195 [§ 41] yat punar anena viparyaye bādhakam uktam — abhidhānapratyayānuvṛtṭiḥ
 kutaścin nivṛtya kvacid eva bhavantī nimittavatī, na cānyan nimittam ityādi, tan na
 samyak, anuvṛttam antareṇāpy abhidhānapratyayānuvṛtṭer atadrūpaparāvṛttasvarūpa-
 viśeṣād avaśyaṃ svīkārasya sādhitatvāt. tasmāt —

187 kiṃ sāmānya°] K P N₁ N₃ : kisāmānya
 N₂
187 °svīkāra°] P N₂ N₃ : svīkāraḥ N₁ ;
 no ev. K
187 °pramādena] K N₁ N₂ : vacanena P :
 prasādena N₃
188 sambhavī] K P N₂ N₃ :
 sambha/vi→vii/ N₁ — The scribe of N₁
 apparently wrote *vi*, and then emended to *vī*
 without deleting the short *i*.
189 iheti] K P N₁ N₂ : iti he/tu→tui/ N₃ —
 N₃ here probably corrected *tu* to *ti* without
 deleting the *u*.
189 dhīś] K P N₁ N₂ : dhīś N₃
189 °darśane syāt] K N₁ N₂ : darśanena P :
 darśana syāt N₃
190 tad°] K P N₁ N₂ : n. e. N₃
190 dvayekṣā] K : tv apekṣā P N₁ N₂ N₃
190 svakalpanāmātram] K P N₂ N₃ :
 svakalpanāmāmātram N₁
190 ato 'bhyupāyaḥ] K P N₁ N₂ :
 atotyupāyaḥ N₃
191 seyam] P : yeyam N₁ N₂ N₃ ; no ev. K
 — As this is missing in K, S₂ probably also
 supported *yeyam*, found in AS₁ 14.8.
191 anuvṛtta°] K P N₁ : anuvṛti N₃ :
 anuvṛt/tt{i}→tta/ N₂

191–192 atyanta°] K P N₁ , atya{ya}nta
 N₂ : atyayanta N₃
192 °pratyayabhāvā°] K P N₁ : pratyabhāvā
 N₂ N₃
192 bhavitum] K P N₃ : bhavītum N₁ ,
 (bha)vitum N₂ — *bha* in N₂ is not written as is
 usual for this ms (cf. figs. 1.16 and 1.17).
192 arhatīty] K P N₁ : arha/ti→tī/ty N₂ :
 arhatity N₃
193 °pravartanam] K P N₁ N₂ :
 pravartenam N₃
193 asya] K P N₁ N₂ : atya N₃
193 jātiṣv eva] K P N₁ : jātiṣṭeva N₂ N₃
193–194 vyaktīyamānāsv] K P N₁ :
 vyaktīyamānāsv N₂ N₃
194 anuvṛtta°] K P N₁ N₂ : anuvṛti N₃
195 anena] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : anana P
196 kutaścin] K P N₁ : kataścin N₂ :
 kataścīn N₃
196 nivṛtya kvacid eva] K P N₁ N₂ :
 navṛtyakvaniveda N₃
196 bhavantī] K P N₁ : bhavantīti N₂ N₃
196 °ānyan nimittam] K P : ānyanimittam
 N₁ N₂ N₃
197 antareṇāpy abhidhāna°] K P N₁ N₂ :
 antaraṇāpi abhidhāna N₃
198 svīkārasya] K P N₁ N₂ : svīkārasya N₃

189–190 iheti ...'bhyupāyaḥ] =KBhV 70.13–14
191–194 etena ...vyabhicārāt] ≈AP 222.23–25
195–198 yat punar ...tasmāt] ≈AP 223.15–18

- [§ 42] tulye bhedē yayā^{↓K¹K^{7a}} jātīḥ pratyāsattyā prasarpati |
 200 kvacin nānyatra saivāstu śabdajñānanibandhanam ||
- [§ 43] yat punar atra *nyāyabhūṣaṇenoktam* — na hy evaṃ bhavati — yayā pratyā-
 sattyā daṇḍasūtrādikam prasarpati kvacit, nānyatra^{↓N₃^{9b}}, saiva pratyāsattiḥ^{↓K²} puruṣasphaṭikā-
 diṣu daṇḍisūtritvādivyavahāranibandhanam astu. kiṃ daṇḍasūtrādineti, tad asaṅgatam
 — daṇḍasūtrayor hi puruṣasphaṭikapratyāsannayor dṛṣṭayor daṇḍisūtritvapatyayahetu-
 205 tvaṃ^{↓K³} nāpalapyate. sāmānyam tu svapne 'pi na dṛṣṭam. tad yadidaṃ parikalpanīyam,
 tadā varam pratyāsattir eva sāmānyapatyayahetuḥ parikalpyatām. kiṃ gurvyā parika-
 lpanayety abhiprāyāparijñānāt.^{↓K⁴}
- [§ 44] athedaṃ jātīprasādhakam anumānam abhidhīyate — yad viśiṣṭajñānam, tad
 viśeṣaṇagrahaṇanāntarīyakam, yathā daṇḍijñānam. viśiṣṭajñānam^{↓N₂^{12a}} cedam gaur ayam ity^{↓P^{36a}}

199 tulye] K P : tulya N₁ N₂ N₃ — AS₁
 reads *tulya*.
199 bhedē yayā] K P N₂ N₃ : bhedena
 yathā N₁
199 pratyāsattyā] K P N₂ N₃ :
 pratyayāsattyā N₁
199 prasarpati] K P N₁ : prasarṣati N₂ N₃
201 bhavati] K P N₁ N₂ : bhavati N₃
201–202 pratyāsattyā] K P N₂ N₃ :
 pratyayāsattyā N₁
202 °sūtrādikam] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : sūtrādi P —
 In the pictures of P, the position of the label
 identifying the batch of folios (“5B”) in the
 top margin of P 35b covers the place where an
 additon would be expected.
202 pratyāsattiḥ] K P N₂ N₃ :
 pratyayāsattiḥ N₁
203 °sūtritvā°] K P N₁ N₂ : sūtratvā N₃
203 °ādineti] K P N₁ N₂ : āneti N₃ —
tvādinā in S₂ acc. to AS₁ 15, fn. 1.
204 daṇḍasūtrayor] K P : daṇḍasūtrayo N₁
 N₂ N₃
204 °pratyāsannayor] K : pratyāsannayoḥ P
 N₂ N₃ : pratyayāsannayoḥ N₁

204 dṛṣṭayor] K : dṛṣṭatvād P : dṛṣṭayoḥ N₁
 N₂ : dṛṣṭayo N₃
204 °sūtritvapatyaya°] P : sūtripratyaya K
 N₂ : sūtripratyaya N₁ : sūtrapratyayo N₃
204–205 °hetutvaṃ nāpalapyate] K P N₁ :
 hetum«2»tva«1» nāppalapyate N₂ : hetum
 utpanām upala(pya)te N₃ — N₃ is smudged
 here.
205 yadidaṃ] K P N₁ N₂ : yad idaṃ N₃
205 °kalpanīyam] K P N₁ N₂ : kalpanīm N₃
206 tadā varam pratyāsattir] K P N₂ , tadā
 varam pratyā{yā}sattir N₁ :
 (.....)āsattir N₃ — N₃ is smudged here.
206 parikalpyatām] K P N₁ N₂ :
 parikalpatām N₃
206–207 parikalpanayety] K P N₁ N₂ :
 parikalpenayety N₃
208 jātīprasādhakam] P N₁ N₂ N₃ ,
 jātī{bha}prasādhakam K
208 anumānam] K P N₁ N₂ : anutānam N₃
209 viśeṣaṇa°] K P N₂ : viśeṣa/na→ṇa/ N₁ :
 viśeṣeṇa N₃
209 °jñānam cedam] K N₁ N₂ : grahaṇam
 «jñānam1» cedam P : jñāna(ñce)dam N₃

199–200 tulye bhedē ...°nibandhanam] =PV 1 162 =AP 224.6–7
201–203 yat punar ...daṇḍasūtrādineti] ≈AP 224.10–12
201–203 na hy evaṃ ...kiṃ daṇḍasūtrādineti] =NBhūṣ 261.5–7
208–210 athedaṃ ...°hetuḥ] ≈TBh₂ 55.17–56.1
208–219 athedaṃ ...vyavahārasya] ≈AP 225.1–9

- 210 arthataḥ kārya^{K⁵}hetuḥ. viśeṣaṇānubhava^{K⁶}kāryaṃ hi dr̥ṣṭānte viśiṣṭabuddhiḥ siddheti.
 [§ 45] atrānuyogaḥ — viśiṣṭabuddher bhinnaviśeṣaṇagrahaṇanāntarīyakatvaṃ vā sādhyam viśeṣaṇamātrānubhavanāntarīyakatvaṃ vā.
 [§ 46] prathamapakṣe pakṣasya pratyakṣabādhā sādhanāvadhānam anavakāśayati, vastugrāhiṇaḥ pratyakṣasyobhayapratibhāsābhāvāt. viśiṣṭabuddhitvaṃ ca sāmānyahe-
 215 tur^{K⁷} anaikāntikaḥ, bhinnaviśeṣaṇagrahaṇam^{↓N₃^{10a}} antareṇāpi darśanāt, yathā svarūpavān gha-
 ṭaḥ, gotvaṃ sāmānyam iti vā.
 [§ 47] dvitīyapakṣe tu siddhasāadhanam, svarūpavān ghaṭa ityādivad gotvajātimān^{↓K^{7b}}
 piṇḍa iti parikalpitaṃ bhedaṃ upādāya viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvasyeṣṭatvād agovyāvṛttānu-

210 arthataḥ] K P N₁ : arthaṃ N₂ N₃
210 °hetuḥ] K P N₁ N₂ : hetu N₃
211 atrānuyogaḥ] K P N₁ N₂ : atrānuyoga N₃
211 °viśeṣaṇa°] K P N₁ N₂ : viśeṣa N₃
211 °grahaṇanāntarīya°] K P N₂ , graha/{ṇā}→ṇa/nāntarīya N₁ : grahaṇāṃtariya N₃
211 vā] P N₁ N₂ N₃ , vā {prathamapakṣe} K
212 viśeṣaṇa°] P N₁ N₂ N₃ : viśeṣa(ṇa) K
212 °ānubhavanā°] K P N₁ : ānubhava^{tā} N₂ N₃
212 °katvaṃ] P N₁ N₂ N₃ : ka{tva}m K
214 °grāhiṇaḥ] K P N₁ N₂ : grāhiṇa N₃
214 pratyakṣasyo°] P N₁ N₃ : prakṣasyo K , pra{tha}tyakṣasyo N₂
214–215 sāmānyahetur] P : sāmānyam. hetur K N₁ N₂ : sāmānyam hetur N₃ — K N₁ N₂ support a clear syntactical break, having either | or || .

215 anaikāntikaḥ] K P N₁ N₂ :
 anekaṃntikaḥ N₃
215–216 ghaṭaḥ] K P N₂ : ghaṭa N₁ N₃
216 gotvaṃ] K N₂ N₃ : gotva P : n. e. N₁
217 dvitīya°] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : dvitīye P
217 °sāadhanam, sva°] K P N₁ N₂ :
 sādhanasva N₃
217 ghaṭa] K P N₂ N₃ : ghaṭaḥ N₁
217 gotva°] P N₁ : go^v«tva7» K : gītva N₂ N₃
217 °jātimān] K P N₁ N₂ : mānṃ N₃
218 parikalpitaṃ] K P N₁ N₂ : kalpitaṃ N₃
218 upādāya] K P N₁ N₂ : upāya N₃
218 °bhāvasyeṣṭatvād] K P N₂ , bhāva/ṣye→ṣye/ṣṭatvād N₁ : bhāvasveṣṭatvād N₃
218 ago°] K P N₂ N₃ : davyo go N₁
218–219 °ānubhava^{bhāvitvād}] K N₁ N₂ N₃ , ānu«bha(3)»vabhāvitvād P

bhavabhāvitvād gaur ayam iti vyavahārasya.

220 [§ 48] tad evaṃ na sāmānyasiddhiḥ. bādhakaṃ ca sāmānyaguṇakarmādyupādhi-
cakrasya kevalavyaktigrāhakaṃ paṭupratyakṣaṃ dr̥ṣyānupalambho vā prasiddhaḥ.

[§ 49] tad evaṃ vidhir eva śabdārthaḥ. sa ca bāhyo 'rtho buddhyākāraś ca viva-
kṣitaḥ. tatra na buddhyākārasya tattvataḥ saṃvṛtṭyā vā vidhiniṣedhau, svasaṃvedana-
pratyakṣagamyatvād anadhyavasāyāc ca. nāpi tattvato bāhyasyāpi vidhiniṣedhau, ta-
225 sya śābde pratyaye 'pratibhāsanāt. ata eva sarvadharmānām tattvato 'nabhilāpyatvam,
pratibhāsādhyavasāyābhāvāt. tasmād bāhyasyaiva sāmṇvṛttau vidhiniṣedhau, anyathā
saṃvyavahārahānīprasaṅgāt .

[§ 50] tad evaṃ

nākārasya na bāhyasya tattvato vidhisāadhanam |

219 gaur] K P N₁ N₂ : gor N₃

220 evaṃ] P : eva K N₁ N₂ N₃ — *evaṃ*
also in S₂, acc. to AS₁ 16, fn. 1.

220 °siddhiḥ] P : buddhiḥ K N₁ N₂ :
buddhi N₃ — S₂ also supports *siddhiḥ* acc. to
AS₁ 16, fn. 1.

220 bādhakaṃ] K P N₂ N₃ : bādhaka N₁

220 ca] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : n. e. P

220 °guṇa°] K P N₁ N₂ : gurṇa N₃

220 °karmādy°] P N₁ N₂ N₃ ,

karmma{dika}dy K

220–221 °upādhi-cakrasya] K P ,

upādhi-kra«2»ca«1»sya N₁ :

upādhi-cakrasya N₂ N₃

221 vā] P N₁ N₂ N₃ : n. e. K — *vā* also
attested in S₂ acc. to AS₁ 16, fn. 2.

221 prasiddhaḥ] K N₁ N₂ : siddhaḥ P :
praddha N₃

222 sa] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : (sa) P

222 bāhyo 'rtho] K P N₁ N₂ : bāhyārtho N₃

222 buddhyākāraś] K P N₁ : buddhyāraś N₂
N₃

222–223 vivakṣitaḥ] K P N₁ N₂ :

vi/vikṣa→vakṣi/taḥ N₃ — N₃ wrote *vīkṣa*, and
then emended to *vakṣi* using the vertical line
of the long *ī* for the vertical line of the short *i*
in *kṣi*.

223 tattvataḥ] K P N₁ N₂ : tatvata N₃

223 °niṣedhau] K P N₁ N₂ : niṣe 'dho N₃

224 °pratyakṣa°] K P N₁ , praty{ya}kṣa
N₂ : pratyayaṃ kṣa N₃

224 °gamyatvād] K P N₁ N₃ : gamyatvāta ||
N₂

224 anadhyavasāyāc] K P N₁ :
anadhyavaśāyāc N₂ N₃

224 tattvato] K : tatvato P N₁ N₂ N₃

225 śābde] K N₂ N₃ : śābda P : śābde N₁

225 'pratibhāsanāt] K N₂ : 'pratibhāsāt P :
pratibhāsanāt N₁ : pratibhāsanāt N₃

225 tattvato] K : tatvato P N₁ N₂ N₃

225 'nabhilāpyatvam] K N₂ :
'nabhilāpyatvaṃ P : 'nabhilāpyatva N₁ N₃

226 bāhyasyaiva] K P N₁ N₂ : bāhyasaiva
N₃

226 sāmṇvṛttau] K P N₁ : sāvṛtto N₃ :
sāvṛttau N₂

227 saṃvyavahāra°] K N₁ N₂ N₃ :

vyavahāra P

227 °prasaṅgāt] K P N₁ : praśaṅgāt N₂ N₃

229 nākārasya] K P N₁ N₂ : nākālasya N₃

229 tattvato] K : tatvato P N₁ N₂ N₃

229 °sāadhanam] N₂ N₃ : sādhanama K :

bāadhanam P : sādhanam N₁ — *bāadhanam*
also supported in S₂ acc. to AS₁ 16, fn. 3.

223–224 tad evaṃ ...vidhiniṣedhau] Cf. AP 229.6–15

226–227 anyathā ...°prasaṅgāt] =AP 229.15

229–230 nākārasya ...nākṛteḥ] =AP 229.3–4, SāSiŚā 443.13–14

- 230 bahir eva^{K⁵} hi samvṛtṭyā samvṛtṭyāpi tu nākṛteḥ ||
 [§ 51] etena^{↓N₃^{10b}} yad dharmottaraḥ — āropitasya bāhyatvasya vidhiniṣedhāv ity alauki-
 kam anāgamam atārkikīyaṃ kathayati, tad apy^{↓N₁^{12a}} apahastitam.
 [§ 52] nanv adhyavasāye^{K⁶} yady adhyavaseyaṃ vastu na sphurati, tadā tad adhyava-
 sitam iti ko 'rthaḥ. apratibhāse 'pi pravṛttiviśayāḥ kṛtam iti yo 'rthaḥ. apratibhāsāviśeṣe
 235 viśayāntaraparihāreṇa katham niyataviśayā pravṛttir iti cet,^{K⁷} ucyate — yady api viśvam
 agrhītam, tathāpi vikalpasya niyatasāmagrīprasūtātvena niyatākāratayā niyataśaktitvāt

230 °āpi] K P N₁ N₂ : n. e. N₃

230 nākṛteḥ] K P N₁ N₂ : nākṛte N₃

231 etena] P N₁ N₂ N₃ , ete/{nāropita}→na/
 K

231 dharmottaraḥ] K P N₁ : dharmmottara
 N₃ : dharmmonttaraḥ N₂

231 bāhyatvasya vidhi°] N₁ N₂ N₃ ,
 bāhyatva^v «sya5» vidhi K : bāhyatvavidhi P
 — *bāhyatvavidhi* also found in S₂ acc. to
 AS₁ 16, fn. 4.

231–232 alaukikam] P N₁ N₂ :
 alaukika{h}m K : alokikam N₃

232 atārkikīyaṃ] K P N₁ : atārkikīyaṃ
 N₂ : atākīrttiyaṃ N₃

232 tad apy apa°] P : tad apa K N₁ N₂ N₃

233 yady] K P N₁ N₂ : yay N₃

233 tadā tad] K P N₁ N₂ : tadāt N₃

234 yo 'rthaḥ] K P N₁ N₂ : yo 'rtha N₃

234 °viśeṣe] K N₁ N₂ : viśeṣe («pi») P :
 viśaye N₃ — It is not certain that the addition
 in the bottom margin of P really belongs here.

235 katham niyataviśayā] K P N₂ :
 kathaniyataviśayā N₁ : kathamniyatāviśayā
 N₃

231–232 etena ...apahastitam] ≈AP 229.16–17

231 āropitasya ...niṣedhāv] Cf. DhAP 244.3–4: “*sgrub pa dan dgag pa dag ni sgro btags gañ žig phyi
 rol ñid du ñes par byas pa de dan 'brel pa yin te.*” Identified in Frauwallner 1937: 266, fn. 1.

234 apratibhāse ...°kṛtam] ≈AP 211.23. Cf. KBhSA₂ 73.11

235–237 yady api ...pravṛtṭiḥ] ≈AP 226.2–3

niyataiva jalādaḥ pravṛttiḥ, dhūmasya parokṣāgnijñānajanavat.

[§ 53] niyataśaktayo hi bhāvāḥ ^{JK^{8a}}pramāṇapariniṣṭhitasvabhāvā ^{JK²}na śaktisāṃkaryapary-
 anuyogabhājaḥ. tasmāt tadadhyavasāyitvam ^{JK³}ākāraviśeṣayogāt tatpravṛttijanakatvam.
 240 na ca sādṛśyād āropeṇa pravṛttiṃ brūmaḥ, yenākāre bāhyasya bāhye vākārasya ^{JK²}āropa-
 dvāreṇa dūṣaṇāvakāśaḥ, kiṃ tarhi svavāsanāvipākavaśād upajāyamānaiva buddhir apa-
 śyanty api bāhyaṃ bāhye ^{JK³}pravṛttiṃ ātanotīti viplutaiva. tad evam anyābhāvaviśiṣṭo
 vijātivyāvṛtto ^{JK²}’rtho ^{JK³}vidhiḥ. sa eva cāpohaśabdavācyaḥ śabdānām arthaḥ pra-

237 niyataiva] em. : niyata^V «eva7» K :
 niyata eva P : niyatā eva N₁ N₃ : niyatā evam
 N₂

237 dhūmasya parokṣāgnijñānajanavat]
 N₁ N₂ N₃ : ^V«(……)pattivat7» yady api
 vahnau dhūmasya trailokyasyābhāvas tathāpi
 tato dhūma«syaivotpādo nānyasya» K : yathā
 vahnau dhūmaghaṭādyor asatvepi dhūma
 evotpadyate na ghaṭādiḥ P — S₂ supports the
 reading accepted here, cf. AS₁ 17.9–10, and
 fn. 1. Concerning K: The whole passage is
 obviously an emendation. The writing is much
 more condensed than in the rest of the ms,
 suggesting that the reading now found in K is
 significantly longer than the previous one.
 AS₁ 17, fn. 1 reads “*asadāpattivat*.” Since this
 addition in the bottom margin of K 7b is
 smeared, I am not able to verify this from the
 manuscript. But it is clear there is no *daṇḍa*
 after the addition, but only a “7”, indexing the
 addition to the line where it should be entered.

238 niyataśaktayo] em. : niyataviśayā K P
 N₁ N₂ N₃. Cf. CAPV 138.5–6: “*niyataśaktayo*
bhāvā hi pramāṇapariniṣṭhitasvabhāvāḥ, na
śaktisāṃkaryaparyanuyogabhājaḥ ...”;
 AP 226.3–4: “*niyataśaktayo hi bhāvāḥ*
pramāṇapariniṣṭhitasvabhāvā na
śaktisāṃkaryaparyanuyogabhājaḥ ...” In both
 cases, the context in which the sentence
 appears is the same as in this passage.

238 °sāṃkaryā°] K P N₁ N₂ : sākārya N₃

238–239 °paryanuyoga°] K P N₂ N₃ :
 nuyoga N₁

239 tasmāt tad°] K P N₂ : tasmāta N₁ N₃
 — S₂ reads *tasmāt* acc. to AS₁ 17, fn. 2.

239 °adhyavasāyitvam] P N₁ N₃ ,
 adhya«vasā»yitvam K : adhyavasayitvam
 N₂

239 °viśeṣayo°] P N₁ N₂ N₃ ,
 viśe{ṣayo}ṣayo K

240 āropeṇa] K P N₁ : āroṣeṇa N₂ N₃

240 pravṛttiṃ brūmaḥ] K P N₁ N₂ : pravṛtti
 drūmaḥ N₃

240 yenākāre] K P N₁ N₂ : enokāre N₃

240 vākārasya°] P : vā ākārasyā K N₁ N₂
 N₃

241 svavāsanā°] K N₂ : vāsanā P : svavāsa
 N₁ : svavānā N₃

241 °vipāka°] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : paripāka P

241 upajāyamānaiva] K P N₁ :
 upajāyamāṇaiva N₂ N₃

241–242 apaśyanty] K P : apasyanty N₁
 N₂ N₃

242 pravṛttiṃ] P : vṛttiṃ K N₁ N₂ N₃ — P
 actually reads : ^V«*pra*»vṛttiṃ

242 anyābhāva°] K P N₁ N₂ : anyabhāva
 N₃ — *anyonyābhāva* in AS₁ acc. to AS₃ 66,
 fn. 1, but that is apparently a mistake.

243 °vyāvṛtto ’rtho] K P N₁ : vyāvṛttārtho
 N₂ N₃

243 eva cāpoha°] K N₂ N₃ : evāpoha P :
 ecāpo N₁

243 °vācyaḥ] K P N₁ N₂ : vācya N₃

243–244 arthaḥ pravṛtti°] P N₁ N₂ :
 a/rtho→rthe pra/vṛtti N₃ — N₃ wrote *rtho*,
 then made vertical bar of the attached *o* into
 the left part of *pa*, and let the topstroke for *o* in
rtho become the topstroke for *e*.

238–239 niyataśaktayo ...°bhājaḥ] =AP 226.3–4

240–242 na ca ...viplutaiva.] ≈AP 226.9–12

vṛttinivṛttiviṣayaś ceti sthitam.

- 245 [§ 54] atra prayogaḥ — yad vācakam, tat sarvam adhyavasitātadrūpaparāvṛttavastu-
mātragocaram, yattheha kūpe^{↓K³ K⁴} jalam iti vacanam. vācakam cedam gavādiśabdarūpam^{↓N₂^{14a}}
iti svabhāvahetuḥ. nāyam asiddhaḥ, pūrvoktena nyāyena pāramārthikavācyavācaka-
bhāvasyābhāve^{↓K⁵} 'py adhyavasāyakṛtasyaiva sarvavyavahāribhir avaśyaṃ svīkarta-
vyatvāt, anyathā sarvavyavahārocchedaprasaṅgāt. nāpi viruddhaḥ, sapakṣe bhāvāt. na
250 cānaikāntikaḥ. tathā hi śabdānām adhyavasitavijātivāvyāvṛttavastumātraviṣayatvam ani-
cchadbhiḥ *paraiḥ* — paramārthato^{↓N₁^{13a}}

[§ 55] vācyam svalakṣaṇam upādhir upādhiyogaḥ sopādhir astu yadi vākṛtir
astu buddheḥ |

[§ 56] gatyantarābhāvād aviṣayatve ca vācakatvāyogāt. tatra —^{↓K⁶ K⁷}

[§ 57] ādyantayor na samayaḥ phalaśaktihāner madhye 'py upādhivirahāt
tritaye na yuktaḥ ||

- 255 [§ 58] tad evaṃ^{↓N₃^{11b}} vācyāntarasyābhāvād viṣayavattvalakṣaṇasya vyāpakasya nivṛttau^{↓K⁷ K^{8b}}
vipakṣato nivartamānam vācakatvam adhyavasitabāhyaviṣayatvena vyāpyata iti vyā-
ptisiddhiḥ.

244 °viṣayaś ceti] K N₁ N₂ N₃ : viṣayaḥ
ceti P

245 vācakam] K P : vācakam N₁ N₂ N₃

245 adhyavasitā°] K N₁ N₂ : adhyavasitāt
P : adhyavasthitaḥ N₃

245 °rūpa°] K P N₁ N₂ : rūpa N₃

246 vācakam ce°] K P N₁ : vācakaś ce N₂
N₃

246–247 °śabdarūpam iti] K P N₁ N₂ :
śabdam iti N₃

247 svabhāvahetuḥ. nāyam] K P N₁ N₂ ,
svabhāvahetu({})nāyam N₃

247 pāramārthika°] K P : pāramārthaka N₁
N₂ N₃

247–248 °vācakabhāvasyā°] P N₁ N₂ N₃ :
vācakasyā K

248 °ābhāve 'py] K N₁ N₂ , ābhāvepy P :
ābhāvepi N₃ — S₂ also supports the accepted
reading acc. to AS₁ 18, fn. 2.

248 °kṛtasyaiva] P : kṛtasya K N₂ N₃ :
kṛtatasya N₁

248 sarva°] K P N₁ N₂ N₃ — Acc. to
AS₁ 18, fn. 2, S₂ reads *sarvasya* here.

248 °vyavahāribhir] K P N₁ : vyavaharibhir
N₂ N₃

247 pūrvoktena nyāyena] Cf. II. 136–137.

248 avaśyaṃ] P : avaśya K N₁ N₂ N₃

249 viruddhaḥ, sapakṣe] K P N₁ :

viruddhaḥ mapakṣe N₂ : viruddham apekṣa N₃

250–251 anicchadbhiḥ] K P N₁ N₂ :
anicchadbhi N₃

252 vācyam] K P N₁ N₂ : vācyā N₃

252 upādhir] K P N₁ N₂ : n. e. N₃

252 sopādhir astu] P N₂ N₃ : sopādhivastu
K : sopādhirustu N₁

252 vākṛtir] P N₁ N₂ , vā^v «ā6»kṛtir K :
kṛtivār N₃ — The additional *ā* in K is
metrically not correct.

253 aviṣayatve] P N₁ N₂ ,
aviṣa/y{e}→ya/tve K : aviṣayetve N₃

254 °hāner madhye 'py] K P : hāne
mardhyepy N₁ : hāner madhyapy N₂ N₃

254 °virahāt tritaye na] K P : virahām
tritaye na N₁ N₃ : virahām tritaye na N₂

255 °lakṣaṇasya vyāpakasya] N₁ N₂ N₃ :

lakṣaṇasya vyākasya K : lakṣaṇavyāpakasya P

256 vipakṣato] K P N₁ N₃ : vīpekṣato N₂

256 °bāhyaviṣayatvena] P N₁ N₂ N₃ ,
bāhya~ ~ ~ viṣayatvena K

257 °siddhiḥ] K P N₁ N₂ : siddhi N₃

- [§ 59] śabdais tāvan mukhyam ākhyāyate 'rthas tatṛāpohas tadguṇatvena
gamyah |
arthaś caiko 'dhyāsato bhāsato 'nyaḥ sthāpyo vācyas tattvato naiva kaścit ||
- 260 [§ 60] apohasiddhiḥ samāptā. kṛtir iyaṁ mahāpaṇḍitaratnakīrtipādānām.
[§ 61] bhavatv apohe kṛtinām prapañco vastusvarūpāsphuraṇaṁ tu marma |
tatṛāḍṛdhe sarvam ayatnaśīrṇaṁ ḍṛdhe tu sausthyaṁ nanu tāvataiva ||
[§ 62] saṁpūrṇarātripraharadvayena kīrter apoho likhitaḥ sukhena |
trailokyadattena parātmahetor yatnād ato 'yaṁ parirakṣaṇīyaḥ ||
- 265 [§ 63] *śubham.

258–259 śabdais ...kaścit] N₁ N₂ N₃:
v «śabdais ...kaścit» K : n. e. P — Acc. to
AS₁ 19, fn. 1, this verse is also not found in
S₂. In K this verse is written after the
colophon, i.e., after *parirakṣaṇīyaḥ* in l. 264,
and marked as an insertion that should follow
siddhiḥ, l. 257.

258 śabdais] K N₁ : śabdes N₂ N₃
258 tāvan mukhyam] K N₂ N₃ : tāvat
mukhyam N₁
258 'rthas] K N₂ N₃ : rthe N₁
258 gamyah] K N₁ N₂ : gamya N₃
259 arthaś cai°] K N₁ N₂ : arthacai N₃
259 bhāsato] K : bhāṣato N₁ N₂ N₃
259 'nyaḥ] K N₂ , {naiva kaścit} 'nyaḥ N₁ :
n. e. N₃
259 sthāpyo] K N₁ N₂ : 'sthāpyā N₃
259 tattvato] K N₁ : tattato N₂ N₃
259 kaścit] K N₁ : kaścita N₂ , ka(«ś»)cit
N₃
260 apohasiddhiḥ ...°ratnakīrtipādānām] K
N₁ N₂ N₃ : mahāpaṇḍitaratnakīrtipādaviratam

apohaprakaraṇaṁ samāptaṁ P — Emend
viratam in P to *viracitam*, as in AS₃ 66.22.
260 apohasiddhiḥ samāptā] K N₁ N₂ : {(||
apohasiddhiḥ samāptā ||)} N₃
260 °paṇḍita°] P N₁ N₂ N₃ : paṇḍ(i)ta K
261–264 bhavatv apohe ...parirakṣaṇīyaḥ]
K N₁ N₂ N₃ : n. e. P — This passage is not
found in S₂ acc. to AS₁ 19, fn. 2.
261 apohe] K N₁ N₂ : amoha N₃
261 kṛtinām] K N₁ N₂ : kṛtinā N₃
262 °śīrṇaṁ] K N₁ N₂ : śīrṇa N₃
262 sausthyaṁ] K N₁ N₂ : sausth«(·)»ān
N₃
263 kīrter] K P N₁ N₂ : kīrttir N₃
263 likhitaḥ] K N₁ N₂ : likhita N₃
264 parātmahetor] K N₁ N₂ : pavātmaheto
N₃
264 parirakṣaṇīyaḥ] K N₁ N₂ :
parirakṣaṇīya N₃
265 *śubham] N₂ : || • || ⊕ K : n. e. P :
śubham * N₁ : {(śubham)} N₃

258–259 śabdais ...kaścit] =AP 203.1–4 =SR 712.4–6

261–262 bhavatv apohe ...tāvataiva] =AP 232.12–15

Chapter 3

Translation

Om. Hommage to Śrīlokanātha!⁴¹

up ↓ § 1 | Exclusion (*apoha*) is declared (*nir-√vac*) as the referent of words.⁴² A.

pp ↓ § 2 Objection:⁴³ | What is this so-called exclusion (*apoha*)— [Is it that,] through an etymological derivation such as “this is excluded from another, or another is excluded from this, or another is excluded in this,” either only [something] external, differentiated (*vyavṛtta*) from that of another genus (*vi-jāti*) [is] what is meant, or [is it that by such an etymological derivation] the form of awareness (*buddhyākāra*)⁴⁴ [is meant],⁴⁵ or else [is it that], if “exclusion [is] [the act of] excluding” [is understood], the mere differentiation from something else [is meant]? [These are the] three positions.⁴⁶ B.1.

§ 3 To begin with, the first two positions are not [correct], because by the name B.1.2. “exclusion” only a positive element⁴⁷ is meant (*vivakṣitatva*). The last [position] is

⁴¹Tārā in P. Numbers in the margins are those used in the analysis of the argument structure, section 4.3 on page 98.

⁴²What is at stake in this definition is the kind of object that every conceptual state of cognition has. Cf. the explanations in section 5.3 on page 121. The Sanskrit compound *śabdārtha* is expanded as *śabdānām arthaḥ* in l. 31, p. 15. The most common translations are: meaning, object, or referent of words, cf., e.g., “meaning of words” for “*śabdasya svārtha*” Ishida 2011b: 204 f., “objects ...of expressions” for *śabdārthasya* Dunne 2004: 359, “referent of the word” for “*śabdārthaḥ*” Pind 2009: 84. As pointed out by Patil (2003: 245, n. 6), *artha* covers all of these semantic possibilities, and more. I shall generally translate *artha* as referent in the *Apohasiddhi*, since I think that in this way both object and, should it be necessary, meaning can be understood. For some material on the Tibetan discussion of this term, cf. Dreyfus 1997: 220 ff.

⁴³Acc. to Patil 2003: 245, fn. 7 this objection continues to § 8. This is feasible not only because of the content, but also stylistically: all Buddhist viewpoints are introduced by *atha* (cf. § 4, § 6, § 7), and are embedded in a discussion led from the opponent’s point of view. For an example of this technique in another text, cf. also the notes on the VyN, section 4.1. Another example is found in the opening section of the SSD (cf. the overview in Mimaki 1976: 11).

⁴⁴Generally I translate *buddhyākāra* as “form of awareness.” But in situations where this would be misleading or sound strange, e.g., the form of awareness of blue, I use “cognitive form.”

⁴⁵This position is mentioned PVV 169.13 ad PV 3 169 (cf. trl. on page 168, and section A.4 on page 173). It is one of the theories about the word referent discussed in the TSP, cf. the detailed discussion in section B.5.

⁴⁶Cf. section 4.1 on page 65 for the background of this paragraph.

⁴⁷For the scope of the term *vidhi*, cf. section 5.3.

inconsistent as well, because it is invalidated by cognition (*pratītibādhitatva*). For [it is] so: The verbal (*śābḍin*) cognition “There is a fire on the upper part of the hill.” is observed as representing (*ullikhant*) [something] having a positive nature, but not as making a mere non-occurrence (*nivṛtti*)⁴⁸ “Non-fire does not exist.” apparent. And it is widely known⁴⁹ that there is no opportunity for a further proof (*sādhanaṅtarāvakāśa*) for that invalidated by perception.⁵⁰

B.2.1. § 4 If [a Buddhist replies:] | Even though there is no conceptual cognition (*vika-*^{up} *lpa*) as (*iti*) “I cognize a non-occurrence (*nivṛtti*).”, still, the very representation of a non-occurring (*nivṛtta*) word referent is a representation (*ullekha*) of non-occurrence (*nivṛtti*).⁵¹ For there certainly is no cognition of [something] that is qualified that does not contain the cognition of a qualifier.⁵² Therefore, in the same way as an awareness of a concept is an awareness of a universal for others⁵³ because it appears (*parisphur*) as a common (*sādhāraṇa*) form (*ākāra*) even though there is no concept “I cognize a universal.”, in that way the awareness of non-occurrence, that is implied (*ākṣipta*) by the apprehension (*pratyaya*) of what does not occur, causes (*ā-*[↓] *√tan*) the common talk (*vyavahāra*)⁵⁴ of “cognition of exclusion”.

⁴⁸*nivṛtti* is here translated like this rather than as negation or exclusion, because cognates of *ni-√vrt* seem not to be used as synonyms of *apa-√uh* derivatives (as *apoha* is one) in the AS. For one thing, Ratnakīrti does not use them in the passages that he outlines his own theory in, in contrast to derivatives from *vy-ā-√vrt*. Perhaps the reason is that the connotation of *ni-√vrt* was too negative (or “negation-ist”). A similar consideration might also have influenced the formulation *nivṛttypohavādinām matam* TBh₂ 52.17 instead of Ratnakīrti’s *pratiśedhavādinām matam* (§ 9).

⁴⁹This argument might be based on the idea that perception precedes, and hence is more authoritative than, inference. This opinion was important to Kumāṛila, cf. Mimaki 1976: 16 and notes, and Taber 2005: 84–92. Acc. to Taber 2005: 198, fn. 101, also NSū 1.1.5 maintains that “...inference, at least, is dependent on perception” (Taber 2005: 198, fn. 101) Cf. also Angot 2009: 280 f.

⁵⁰This objection, that exclusion is refuted as the word referent by the mere experience of a verbal cognition, has been traced back to Kumāṛila by Akamatsu (1983: 159–164, n. 4), based on ŚV Av 38–39, TS₂ 909–910 (which he convincingly argues are verses from Kumāṛila’s *Bṛhaṭṭikā*, being quoted as of Kumāṛila in PVSVT 114.7–11), TS₂ 1012–1013a (cf. section B.10 on page 188), and PVSVT 114.7–17 (trl. section A.2 on page 166). Cf. also Akamatsu 1981: 54 f.

⁵¹Cf. DhAP 246.26 ff. for Dharmottara’s explanation of why this is not the way exclusion is cognized.

⁵²That differentiation and that differentiated from others (i.e., that which is qualified by differentiation) are the same is one of Dharmakīrti’s central arguments against Kumāṛila’s and Uddyotakāra’s critiques of Dignāga, cf. Akamatsu 1986: 68–72 and Much 1997: 170 f. respectively. See also PV 1 59 (cf. trl. on page 155), and notes thereto, for more details on Dharmakīrti’s position. A similar point, namely that—if there is a difference of a property and its bearer—they can not be known without each other, is made by Ratnakīrti in § 29. This argument is also brought as an interjection against ŚV Av 88 after its quotation as TS₂ 947 (cf. section B.8 on page 186, and fn. 56 on the next page).

⁵³Acc. to ĀTVK 280.16 (*pareśām naiyāyikānām*), the others in this passage are the Naiyāyikas. Acc. to ĀTVP 283.10 (*pareśām naiyāyikādinām*), the Naiyāyikas et. al. are meant. Since this passage is not very specific, and its exact source is not known (cf. Kajiyama 1998: 122 f., fn. 333), the latter interpretation seems more likely to me. The others would thus be all those who think that a concept’s object is a universal. This is the position of the Naiyāyika authors (cf., e.g., NSū 2.2.66, and Dravid 1972: chapter 2), as well as of the Mīmāṃsaka authors (cf. Dravid 1972: chapter 3).

⁵⁴Usually this term has the broader connotation of “everyday activity.” Acc. to Schmithausen (1965: 268, fn. 215) and Steinkellner (1967b: 156, n. 3, section 1) a threefold and fourfold classification of “everyday activity” can be made: that into a cognitive, linguistic, and physical dealing with something, and that which adds causal efficacy to these three types. According to Steinkellner (1967b: 156, note 3, section 1, subnote 3) this 4th sense of the term is already present in Dharmakīrti’s writings. See Dreyfus 1997: 269 ff. and Dunne 2004: 258, fn. 58 for *vyavahāra* as “convention.”

pp ↓ § 5 | [Then we opponents say]: Now, if [there is] a classification (*vyavasthā*) as B.2.2. knowledge (*bodha*) of a universal when a common form appears as being of a positive form,⁵⁵ what is it that is achieved by a classification as cognition of non-occurrence in the case of a thought having the form of an absence that does not appear?⁵⁶ Therefore, if there should be an appearance of a form of non-occurrence, even though there is no form such as “I cognize a non-occurrence.”, who indeed (*nāma*) would deny (*apa-√lap*) the existence (*sthiti*) of a cognition of non-occurrence?⁵⁷ Otherwise,⁵⁸ there would be common talk (*vyavahṛti*) of a cognition of something (*tat*) when there is no manifestation [of it], so that (*iti*) [the following] would have to be [the case]: even though a thought has the form “cow”, there is knowledge of a horse.

up ↓ § 6 If (*atha*) it is said [by the Buddhists] that | a cognition of non-occurrence is B.2.3. contained (*antarbhūta*) in the form of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇatā*) [in the cognition of something qualified], | [then] nevertheless, if [there were] a concept (*vikalpa*) having a form such as (*idṛś*) “excluded by non-cow”, then there may be an involvement (*anupraveśa*) of this [non-occurrence] as being the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇatā*); but still (*kiṃ tu*) the cognition [is] “cow.” And then, how [can there be] a classification (*vyavasthā*) as a cognition of this [non-occurrence] because a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*), characterised (*lakṣaṇa*) as non-occurrence, does not appear (*anutkalana*) here, even though it [may] exist?⁵⁹

up ↓ § 7 If this thought (*matī*) [is entertained]: | “For that, which appears in a positive form B.2.5. (*vidhirūpa*), there is also exclusion from [that which is] different (*parāpoha*). There-

⁵⁵The role of *vidhirūpatayā* in this sentence is ambiguous in my opinion. It could be either a modal or an instrumental qualifier of either ^o*parisphuraṇe* or ^o*vyavasthā*, resulting in the following four possibilities:

1. If there is a classification as knowledge of a universal when a common form appears as being of a positive form, ...;
2. ...appears due to being of a positive form, ...;
3. If there is a classification of the knowledge of a universal as being of a positive form when a common form appears, ...;
4. ...of a universal due to being of a positive form when ...;

It seems to me that the causal interpretation is not suitable. The sentence recapitulates what a Buddhist had argued in § 4, that non-occurrence is cognized by cognizing a non-occurring object (i.e., the absence of non-fire on a hill), and at no point was it admitted that it was *due* to the positive nature of anything that an object is conceptually understood. But the argument was introduced by a concession made about what appears in a conceptual cognition: “Even though there is no conceptual cognition as “I cognize a non-occurrence.”” I think that it is this phrase that is being echoed here by *vidhirūpatayā*. If so, it should be taken as a modal qualifier of an appearance in a conceptual cognition (^o*parisphuraṇe*) as before, rather than as a modal qualifier of ^o*vyavasthā*. Cf. also the phrase “*yad vidhirūpaṃ sphuritam*, ...” at the beginning of § 6.

⁵⁶Akamatsu 1983: 168, n. 9 refers to ŚV Av 88, cited TS₂ 947 for this position. Cf. section B.8 on page 186.

⁵⁷Cf. ŚV Av 164, also discussed in PVSVT 114 f. (cf. section A.2 on page 166).

⁵⁸That is, if one were to deny this.

⁵⁹Acc. to Akamatsu 1983: 169, n. 13, this objection corresponds to ŚV Av 41. Again, this is found in TS₂ 923, cf. section B.6 on page 185.

fore [it] is called cognition of this [exclusion].”,⁶⁰ | nevertheless [there is only] a mere connection to exclusion. Only (*eva*) a positive thing actually (*sākṣāt*) appears. And additionally, in this way it is unavoidable (*anivārya*) that exclusion [would be] the object also for perception, specifically (*viśeṣatas*) because [there would be] a concept for [a perceptual cognition] that, seeing what is different from all (*akhila*) others, represents a single excluded thing.⁶¹ Therefore, because of the apprehension (*avagraha*) of a positive form, only a positive element is, as in perceptual cognition, the object of a concept also; exclusion of others is not the object. So, how [is it that] exclusion [is] announced as the referent of words?⁶²

C. § 8 | [Answer:] To this [the following] is replied (*abhi-√dhā*): By us through the word “exclusion” an indeed (*eva*) positive element alone (*kevala*) is not meant (*abhipreta*), nor mere differentiation from others, but rather that a positive element qualified by exclusion from others⁶³ [is] the referent of words. And therefore, there is no possibility (*avakāśa*) for the errors afflicting each individual position.⁶⁴

C.1. § 9 But the idea (*mata*) of the affirmationists (*vidhivādin*) that, where there is the cognition of cow, exclusion is ascertained subsequently because of the implication (*sāmānyā*) that “That not of this nature (*na tadātman*) [is] of another nature.” (*parātman*), or the idea of the negationists (*pratiśedhavādin*) that, where there is the cognition of other-exclusion, that excluded from others is understood because of implication,⁶⁵ are incorrect (*asundara*), because not even for a first time [learner of a word] (*prāthamika*) is there an observation of a sequence (*krama*) in cognition. For neither does anyone, having cognized (*pratipad*) a positive element, understand (*avagam*) exclusion later

⁶⁰Akamatsu 1983: 170, n. 16 takes this to be the opinion expressed in the TS, and refers, in Akamatsu 1983: n. 4, p. 162, to TS₂ 1012–1013a as the central passage that supports this interpretation (cf. trl. on page 189). This seems to be the last, and weakest, option for someone endorsing exclusion as the word referent. The argument of the defender of *apoha* thus goes through four variations: exclusion, in the sense of mere differentiation from others, is the word referent (stated and attacked in § 2–§ 3); there is no representation of non-occurrence in awareness, but the representation of a non-occurring object is the representation of non-occurrence (discussed § 4–§ 5); a cognition of non-occurrence is contained as a qualifier (§ 6); a positive representation possesses, or is connected to, an exclusion of others (§ 7).

⁶¹I was not able to find a precursor to this specific objection in either PV 1, TSP₂ or DhAP. Kamalaśīla, in commenting on TS₂ 1060–1062, explicitly states that exclusion, in the sense of the particular, is the object of sense perception: *tatra svalakṣaṇātmā tāvad apoha indriyair avagamyata eva*. (TSP₂ 407.15, for a trl. cf. section B.11 on page 189). Cf. McCrea and Patil 2006: 340–56 for Jñānaśrīmitra’s position.

⁶²The introductory objection (*pūrvapakṣa*) ends here, questioning the programmatic statement in § 1. See fn. 43 on page 39.

⁶³As discussed in § 2, various interpretations of “other-exclusion” (*anyāpoha*) are possible. Since it is not altogether clear which analysis Ratnakīrti himself endorses, or even if he thinks they are all wrong (cf. Kajiyama 1998: 123, n. 333: “...three kinds of wrong interpretation of *apoha* ...”; but see Akamatsu 1983: n. 22, p. 175 for an alternative opinion), I will usually render *anyāpoha* as “exclusion from others,” or simply “other-exclusion,” unless the context suggests another interpretation. Cf. also the comments in section 4.1 on page 65.

⁶⁴Cf. the three positions in § 2: An external thing, a form of awareness, and exclusion as such.

⁶⁵Acc. to Akamatsu 1986, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are the affirmationists (cf. especially the evidence in TS₂ 1013a, trl. on page 189), and Dharmottara is a negativist. This analysis by Ratnakīrti has been very important for modern scholarship on the development of the *apoha* theory. Cf. fn. 336 on page 128 for more comments on this passage and secondary literature.

by implication,⁶⁶ nor [does anyone], having cognized exclusion[, understand] that excluded from others. Therefore the cognition (*pratipatti*) of that excluded from others is called cognition of a cow.⁶⁷ And even if the non-representation of the words “excluded from others” [in conceptual cognition] has been taught,⁶⁸ nevertheless there is no noncognition at all (*eva*) of other-exclusion, which is the qualifier, because the word cow is founded only on that excluded from non-cow.⁶⁹ As the appearance of blue is unavoidable (*anivārya*) at that time when there is the cognition of a blue lotus because of the word *indīvara*[, i.e., blue lotus,] which is founded on a blue lotus, so also the appearance of the exclusion of non-cow is unavoidable, because it is a qualifier, in the same moment (*tulyakāla*) as there is the cognition of cow from the word “cow” which is founded on that excluded from non-cow. As for perception the grasping of absence in a purely negating form (*prasajyarūpa*) is only the capacity to generate the concept of absence, so also for positive concepts only the capacity of granting activity (*anuṣṭhāna*) in conformance to (*anurūpa*) this [absence] is considered the grasping of absence.⁷⁰ But the grasping of absence in an implicative form is the awareness (*saṃveda*) of something with a limited own form (*niyatasvarūpa*) that is not different for either. Otherwise, if the exclusion of others is not formed (*kalita*) at the time of the cognition of a referent because of a word, how can [there be] activity⁷¹ that avoids other [things] (*anyapari-*

⁶⁶“*arthāpattitaḥ*” is here synonymous to “*sāmārthyad*”. For a Buddhist critique of *arthāpatti* as used in Mīmāṃsā philosophy, cf. Kajiyama 1998: § 4.4. In the SSD this term plays an important role, cf. the comments in Mimaki 1976: 41.

⁶⁷This is a synthesis of the two positions mentioned: *goḥ pratipatti* and *anyāpoḍhapratipatti*. So there is no relation between positive and negative content as main and implied content in a cognition, but both are simultaneous. For a further discussion, cf. section 5.3 on page 129.

⁶⁸Apparently this is referring back to § 4.

⁶⁹Immediately after this passage in AP, Jñānaśrīmitra cites PV 1 124 (cf. a trl. from the Tibetan in Frauwallner 1933: 58). Akamatsu 1983: 184 ff., n. 34 translates PV 1 124–127, and then states that in these verses and the commentary Dharmakīrti presents the four points constituting his theory of *apoha*. Akamatsu (1983: 185, n. 34) says:

1) Le mot exprime l’affirmation et la négation à la fois. ...2) C’est pourquoi’ la désignation de l’objet affirmatif (A) et la différenciation-négation de non-A ne sont pas en relation réelle du “détermine” et du “déterminant”. ...3) Par suite de la simultanéité de la désignation affirmative de A et de la négation de non-A, la critique de Bhāmaha contre Dignāga ne sera plus valable. ...4) ...un tel caractère différentiel ...est irréal.

⁷⁰The parallel passage in AP 205.12–16 is preceded by a quote attributed to a *Śāstric* source, i.e., Dharmakīrti. Akamatsu (1983: 195, n. 49) traces it to HB 26*23–24, as does Katsura 1986: 180, n. 20. For the latter, it is an important factor in making the case that “...Jñānaśrīmitra’s idea of simultaneous understanding of affirmation and negation is not necessarily unique to him, for a similar idea is already found in the *Hetubindu*.” (Katsura 1986: 174) For a closer analysis of this comparison, see section 5.3 on page 125.

⁷¹Ratnakīrti distinguishes the usual (cf. fn. 54 on page 40) three classes of activity (*vr̥tti* or *pravṛtti*): verbal, bodily, and mental, cf. the beginning of Ratnakīrti’s answer to the objection that conceptual cognition does not exist since it does not refer to an external thing in CAPV 139.17–19: *atrābhidhīyate. ihāgnir atrety adhyavasāyo yathā kāyikīm vr̥ttim prasūte tathāgnir mayā pratīyata iti vācikīm api prasūte, etadākārānuvyavasāyarūpām mānasīm api prasavati* (To this it is said [by us]: Here, as the determination “Here’s fire.” brings forth bodily activity, so [it] brings forth also the verbal [activity, consisting in saying] “I cognize fire.”, [and] also brings forth this mental [activity] that has the nature of a determination according to the form of awareness.)

hāra)?⁷² Consequently someone instructed “Tether a cow!” could also tether a horse etc.⁷³

D.1. § 10 Also what Vācaspati said: | “Particulars (*vyakti*) qualified by a genus (*jātimat*)⁷⁴ pp ↓ are the objects⁷⁵ of concepts and words. And the form of these so qualified is distinguished (*parā-√vrt*) from what is not of that genus. Thus, because of implicitly understanding this,⁷⁶ someone instructed “Tether a cow!” does not tether a horse etc.”⁷⁷ |, up ↓ that also has been refuted (*nirasta*) exactly by this.⁷⁸ Because (*yatas*), if — even though an additional (*adhika*) genus is thrown in — it is the form of the particulars that is really (*eva*) differentiated from that of another genus, then how [should there be] an escape from [the theory of] differentiation from what is not that for those [objects] that become the object of both word and concept due to this form alone?⁷⁹

D.3. § 11 Or, if the form (*rūpa*) of the particulars [itself] is not differentiated from that of a different genus or cognized in that way (*tathāpratīta*), then is this a gift of the genus?⁸⁰ So how could there be a conception of this [form of the particulars] even implicitly? [This (*iti*)] was generally said (*uktaprāyam*).⁸¹

⁷²AP 206.3 quotes PV 1 96 in this context. Cf. Vetter 1964: 61 for an explanation of the context and a translation. Akamatsu (1983: 200 ff., nn. 60 and 62) links the discussion in the AP to the objection in ŚV Av 143cd and the answers to it in PV 1 122–123a, as well as in TS₂ 1159–1161.

⁷³Cf. McCrea and Patil 2006: 342 for a discussion of these last two sentences’ parallel in the AP.

⁷⁴For more on this topic’s history, see Hattori 1996.

⁷⁵More precisely, *gocara* means field of activity. Since I was not able to see a difference between the use of *gocara* and *viṣaya*, and since “object” makes for a much smoother reading than “field of activity”, I have translated *gocara* as “object.”

⁷⁶I.e., that the particulars are distinguished from others according to the genus that qualifies them.

⁷⁷Note the differences (marked by emphasis) of the quote found here from the text as it appears in NVTṬ 443.23–444.2: *tasmāt jātimatyo vyaktayo vikalpānām ca śabdānām ca gocaraḥ, tāsāṃ tadvatīnām rūpam atajjātīyavyāvṛttam ity arthaḥ. atas tadavagater na gām badhāneti codito ’śvādīn badhnāti.* Unfortunately, an assessment of the main difference, *arthataḥ* vs. “*arthaḥ. atas*”, must await further research, since the passage in NVTṬ is quite difficult to understand without a very thoroughgoing study of its context. In the meantime, see the translation (or paraphrase) and notes in Stcherbatsky 1994 2: 420–421.

⁷⁸Probably by the general point made in § 9, according to which exclusion and the positive element are cognized simultaneously, and not sequentially.

⁷⁹AP 207.3 reads *atadvyāvṛttipratītiparihāraḥ* instead of *atadvyāvṛttiparihāraḥ*, i.e., “How should there be an avoidance of the cognition of the differentiation from what is not that” Ratnakīrti here reduces Vācaspati’s opinion to the point that exclusion from others is the only relevant factor in cognizing a particular as belonging to a genus. For, so Ratnakīrti, the genus of a thing is irrelevant for the thing’s classification, since it is the particular’s form alone that its classification (and hence the cognition of its genus) depends on.

⁸⁰I.e., the genus makes it possible that particulars are differentiated from others and that they are cognized in such a way, thus facilitating correct activity. It is not very likely that *eṣa* refers to *atadvyāvṛttiparihāraḥ* (the escape from the theory of differentiation from others), and it would not make good sense. In his translation of the corresponding passage in AP, Akamatsu 1983: 64 adds “connaissance de la différenciation des autres hétérogènes” in brackets, thus taking *eṣa* as referring to *atadvyāvṛttipratīti*, which is not found in AS₃ (cf. fn. 79). Apart from the grammatical glitch (masculine pronoun referring to feminine noun), this way of taking the argument is very good.

⁸¹Understanding *uktaprāyam* in this way, it is debatable who its subject is. If understood as referring to Ratnakīrti (“this was generally said by me”), it is not clear to me which passages he is referring to here, since the past participle, *ukta*, can hardly be taken as pointing to subsequent arguments. Since this

§ 12 Or, if that differentiated from another [is so] only by virtue of the genus, [then] D.4. let it be differentiated from others either by virtue of the genus or by virtue of its uninterrupted row (*parampara*) of causes, in both cases, given a cognition of the differentiated, there certainly is a cognition of differentiation.

§ 13 And there is no error of mutual dependence⁸² (*anyonyāśrayadoṣa*) when the D.5.1. positive element (*vidhi*) of the verbal convention (*saṃketa*)⁸³ of the word cow [is] that excluded from non-cow, because this error is possible (*avakāśa*) even in the case of the conventional designation of a universal or that qualified by it. For the so-called universal does not mean the mere universal, since there is the unwanted consequence (*prasaṅga*) that even for a horse there is the conventional designation by the word cow;⁸⁴ rather, [the universal means] cowness. And to this extent there is this very error [of mutual dependence], because in the case of the noncognition of a cow [there is] no cognition (*aparijñāna*) of the universal cowness, [and] because in the case of the noncognition of the universal cowness [there is] no cognition of what is to be denoted by the word cow. Therefore there is no error of mutual dependence (*itaretaradoṣa*) when making the conventional designation “This is a cow.” for (*tatra*) a form of conceptual awareness (*vikalpabuddhyākāra*) that, preceded by (*pūrvaka*) the observation (*darśana*) of a single material object (*ekapiṇḍa*), is spread out (*adhyas*) externally as if (*iva*) common (*sādhāraṇa*) to all particulars. And if [this] application of the word cow is admitted (*abhimata*), the denomination (*abhidhāna*) also of the rest (*śeṣa*) by the word non-cow is accepted (*ucita*).

§ 14 And there is also no contradiction (*virodha*) between that excluded from others D.5.2. and the exclusion from others, nor a damage (*kṣati*) to the relation (*bhāva*) of that qualified and the qualifier, because of the absence of a mutual distinction (*vyavaccheda*)

passage is taken from AP, it could also be that *uktaprāyam* there had Jñānaśrīmitra as its subject, and was reused by Ratnakīrti somewhat imprecisely. But also in the AP the preceding discussions do not deal with this question in much depth (cf. the synopsis at Katsura 1986: 179, n. 15, acc. to which the section against *sāmānya* (and *jāti*) as the word referent is found later in the text). So it seems most likely that this should be taken as a statement referring to previous authors: “It was generally said” with no one subject intended. Lasic (2000a: 127) translates this phrase (together with a preceding *iti*) as “Damit ist das Wesentliche gesagt.” This would also make good sense here. Furthermore, cf. the gloss of *uktaprāyam* at PVSVT 280, l. 23 to PVSV 71, l. 2: *prāyaśabdo bāhulyavacanah. prāyepoktam uktaprāyam.* (The word *prāya* expresses “abundance.” It was said for the most part[, thus,] generally said (*uktaprāyam*).) Karṇakagomin then states that the word *prāya* is at the end of the compound because it is to be analysed acc. to Pāṇ 2.2.31.

⁸²That the cognition of “exclusion from non-cow” presupposes the cognition of “cow” was an objection to Dignāga by Kumārila (ŚV Av 83–84, quoted in TS₂ 942–943, and refuted in TS₂ 1063–1064, cf. section B.12 on page 190) and Uddyotakara (NV 324.1–7). Dharmakīrti’s refutation is found in PV 1 113cd–121 (cf. section A.1 on page 160). Other instances of this argument are found in NM_{K1} 187.5–186.5 (translated section D.1 on page 195). Cf. Akamatsu 1983: 187, fn. 37 for a trl. of ŚV Av 83–84, and Much 1994: 361 for the context of Uddyotakara’s argument. See also section 5.5 on page 137 for some comments on this argument.

⁸³*saṃketa*, verbal convention, is the act of establishing that a certain word refers to a certain object. Acc. to Dharmakīrti, there is convention only for exclusion, cf. PV 1 72cd (trl. Dunne 2004: 343 f.), as well as PV 1 110 (trl. section A.1 on page 160). Cf. Hugon 2011 for a discussion of *saṃketa* and the problem of circularity as it appears in PV 1 (also discussed in Hugon 2009) and the TSP. See Arnold 2006 for some of the broader philosophical issues that are involved.

⁸⁴Cf. the similar argument at the end of § 36 (trl. on p. 56).

[between them],⁸⁵ since for them there really is (*sadbhāva*) co-referentiality, as for example a pot's absence on the floor. For there is a contradiction with its own absence, but not with the absence of another. This is established [for everyone] down to children.⁸⁶

D.6. § 15 Also here [in the sentence] “This road leads to Śrughna.”⁸⁷ exclusion can indeed be cognized, because a distinction can easily be understood for each word: the very ‘this’ with regard to other roads that are irrelevant,⁸⁸ the very ‘Śrughna’ with regard to the location (*sthāna*) of undesired (*aniṣṭa*) [places] opposed (*pratyanīka*) to Śrughna, the very ‘leads to’ because of not being cut off (*viccheda*) like a forest track, the very ‘road’ as distinct from a caravan or a messenger (*dūta*). Therefore that having a positive form [and] having the property of exclusion is understood from a word, as from the word *punḍarīka* a lotus characterised by white is understood.⁸⁹

D.8. § 16 | Objection: If it is thus (*evam*) acceptable (*ucita*) to call the positive element alone the referent of words, how is exclusion to be asserted (*√gai*)? pp ↓

⁸⁵I.e., it is not the case that that excluded from others, or the object that is qualified, and exclusion from others, or the qualifier, preclude or contradict each other.

⁸⁶ That the *apoha* theory is not compatible with a relation of qualifier and qualified, and that co-reference is not possible in it, were objections of Kumārila (cf. the references in Hattori 2006: 62). *sāmānādhikaraṇya*, the co-referentiality that two words may have, was a very important issue in earlier texts on *apoha*, cf., e.g., Much 1997, and the passages referred to there in which Dharmakīrti discusses co-referentiality: PVSV 34.25–35.4, 42.12–43.18, 65.19–66.1 (cf. the translation of the second passage in Dunne 2004: 346 ff., as well as section A.1 on page 156 for a translation of the first of these passages). This passage is the only time Ratnakīrti explicitly mentions this issue. But, as Much 1997: 170 notes, already “Dharmakīrti does not repeat Dignāga’s treatment of *sāmānādhikaraṇya*, but concentrates on discussing the preclusion (*apoha*, *vyāvṛtti*) and the precluded (*apodha*, *vyāvṛtta*).” So the problem of co-referentiality can be subsumed under the more general debate of qualifier and qualified, as is also suggested by such formulations as: PVSV 42.12–13: *jñānapratibhāsiny arthe sāmānyasāmānādhikaraṇyadharmadharmaṇyavahārāḥ*, where Dharmakīrti says that universal, co-referentiality, as well as property and property bearer are used for an object that appears in a cognition; or TS₂ 1100: *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvasāmānādhikaraṇyayoḥ | tasmād apohe śabdārthe vyavasthā na virudhyate ||* (cf. section B.13 on page 191 for a trl.).

⁸⁷Cf. Kajiyama 1998: 57 f., fn. 132 for the background of this example in the theory of 3 kinds of *vyavaccheda*. The problem of a sentence having exclusion as its object was already clearly seen by Kumārila, cf., section B.9 on page 187.

⁸⁸Herzberger claims that for Dignāga “...the *apoha*-operation is confined to names and does not apply to demonstratives.” (Herzberger 1986: 107 f.) If this is true, then this passage would show a very clear break that occurred at some point between Dignāga and Ratnakīrti. Acc. to Hattori 1968: 25, and p. , n. 1.27, Dignāga accepts proper names (*yadṛcchā-*), genus words (*jāti-*), quality words (*guṇa-*), activity words (*kriyā-*), and substance words (*dravyaśabda*). This conclusion is also arrived at in R. P. Hayes 1988: 203, and accepted in Pind 2009: 315, n. 600. For a discussion by Dignāga of demonstrative pronouns’ denotation, cf. Pind 2009: § 65, and see notes thereto for additional material. Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation, as cited and translated in Pind 2009: 322, n. 627, could be understood as implying that demonstrative pronouns refer to exclusion, since they are used in the same way as a general term, e.g., tree, might be used to refer to a single tree.

⁸⁹As traced by Akamatsu (1983: 200 ff., n. 62), it was Kumārila who objected that other-exclusion can not be what a sentence expresses (cf. ŚV Av 143cd = TS₂ 977cd, trl. section B.9 on page 187). For the difference between Dignāga and Śāntarakṣita concerning whether a sentence makes exclusion known, cf. Hattori 1979. Patil 2009: 208 ff. argues that Ratnakīrti’s argument in this passage makes it seem “...as if a compositional theory of semantics is assumed to explain how word-meanings are related to sentence-meaning and vice versa.” (Patil 2009: 210)

up ↓

| Answer: In this regard it was said (*uktam atra*)⁹⁰ that by the word exclusion a positive element qualified by the exclusion of others is meant. Hereby, when a positive element is being understood (*pratīyamāna*), the cognition of other-exclusion in the form of [its] qualifier (*viśeṣaṇatā*) [occurs] simultaneously. And the definition (*vyavasthā*) that also for perception the object is exclusion can not (*ucita*) be made, because for it there is no dispute (*vivāda*) that the real thing (*vastu*) is the object (*viśaya*), like [there is] for verbal apprehension (*śābdapratyaya*). And by the word “positive element” (*vidhi*) an external object that is distinguished from that of another nature (*rūpa*)⁹¹ is meant according to determination, and according to manifestation (*pratibhāsa*) a form of awareness [is meant]. Amongst these, the external object is defined as that to be expressed by a word only because of determination, not because of a particular’s appearance (*parisphūrtyā*), since there is no manifestation (*asphuraṇa*) of a manifest (*pravyakta*) particular that is limited (*niyata*) as to space (*deśa*), time and condition (*avasthā*) like [there is in the case of] perception. What [is also said] in the scripture (*śāstram*):

§ 17 Because an object (*artha*) does not appear due to a word in the awareness of [someone having] an inactive sense organ (*avyāpṛta-akṣa*) in the same way as [it does] in perception (*dṛṣṭi*)[,]⁹²

pp ↓

§ 18 Objection:| Because of the difference in the ways (*upāya*) [of apprehending D.11.2. an object] according to the nature (*svabhāva*) of a sense faculty and a word there is a difference of appearance even for a single object.⁹³

up ↓

| With regard to this it is also said:

§ 19 The basis of thoughts (*cetas*) is truly different (*jāto nāma*) [in each case. So] why does a completely unique real thing have a nature that appears with different forms of awareness?⁹⁴

§ 20 For there aren’t two forms (*rūpa*), ‘clear’ and ‘unclear’, of one and the same D.11.3.1. thing (*vastu*) that are contradictory to each other (*parasparaviruddha*), so that [that single thing] would appear with one [form] to the cognition of the sense faculties, with

⁹⁰Cf. § 8 on page 42. This paragraph repeats Ratnakīrti’s own theory of what the word referent is in broader lines than above. Cf. section 5.2 on page 118, fn. 356 on page 135, and section 5.5 on page 138.

⁹¹Cf. PVin 2 8 for a very prominent occurrence of the phrase *atadrūpaparāvṛtta*.

⁹²The full verse PVin 1 15 is:

*śabdenāvyāpṛtākṣasya buddhāv apratibhāsanāt |
arthasya dṛṣṭāv iva tad anirdeśyasya vedakam ||*

Ratnakīrti only quotes the ablative clause giving the reason for the main sentence, i.e., for the fact that “this [perception] makes known [something] that can not be designated [by words].” Cf. PVin 1 16, notes ad loc. for other texts where this verse is found, as well as Vetter 1966: 55 for a translation of this verse’s context. For the fundamental difference between the objects of perception and conceptual awareness, cf., e.g., the expositions in Dunne 2004: 79–84 or Taber 2005: 31 ff., and see Krasser 1995: 252 ff. and McCrea and Patil 2006 for a study of the revisions that this strict distinction underwent with Dharmottara and Jñānaśrīmitra respectively.

⁹³This argument is also found in ĀTV₂ 237.8 ff. (ĀTV₁ 330.14 ff.). Concerning the parallel passage in AP 208.16–19, Akamatsu 1983: 206, n. 86 notes that the same discussion is found in PV 3 233cd–234ab. Cf. section A.3 on page 169 for a translation.

⁹⁴This is PV 3 235, cf. section A.3 on page 169 for the context. PV 3 235a is also cited in Jñānaśrīmitra’s SāSiSā 396.10.

another in a concept, since, if it were so, even [that real] thing (*vastu*) would obtain [this] difference.⁹⁵ For the difference of a real thing (*vastu*) is no other than the difference of [its] own form. And the difference of [its] own form is no other than the difference of [its] appearance. Otherwise, the threefold world would be only one thing.⁹⁶

D.11.4. § 21 Objection: | There is no difference in a tree (*śākhī*), even if there is, in the case of a tree in a single place, a difference in [its] appearance as ‘clear’ and ‘unclear’ to two people [one] situated in a far away (*dūra*) [and the other in a] nearby (*sanna*) place (*deśa*).⁹⁷ | [Answer:] We do not say that a difference in appearance is limited (*niyata*) to different things (*vastu*), but rather that it is limited to it not being [the case] that there is a single object (*viśayatva*) [for the two faculties of cognition]. Therefore there is also a difference in the real thing (*vastu*) when there is a difference in appearance that is accompanied (*sacivaḥ*) by a difference in causal effectiveness etc., there, as in the case of a pot.⁹⁸ In the other case again, [i.e., when there is a difference in appearance but none in causal effectiveness,] one appearance is wrong (*bhrānta*) because it is certainly (*niyamena*)⁹⁹ refuted that there is the same object.¹⁰⁰

D.11.6. § 22 Due to this what Vācaspati said[, i.e.]: | “[Even though]¹⁰¹ the two [valid means of cognition] word and perception have a real thing as [their] object (*vastugocaratva*), the [two] apprehensions (*pratyaya*) are not without a difference, because the difference between being imperceptible and being perceptible (*pāroḥṣyāpāroḥṣya*) arises due to

⁹⁵This cannot be the case, because a real thing is a partless entity, the relation of property and property bearer being only conceptually constructed. Cf. fn. 116 on page 51.

⁹⁶A slightly clearer version of this consequence is found in SSD₂ 118.4–7 (and cf. Mimaki 1976: 122–123):

viruddhayor dharmayoḥ padmarāgād anyatve 'pi viruddhadharmayogāt padmarāgasya bhedaḥ katham apahnūyate, trailokaikatvaprasaṅgasya durvāratvāt. na hi dharmadharmiṇor anyatve 'pi brāhmaṇatvacanḍālātve ekādhāre bhavitum arhata iti padmarāgasya bhedo duratīkramah.

Even if two contradictory properties[, e.g., here and there, or earlier and later,] are different from the lotus, how can a difference of the lotus [itself] be excluded since it is connected with contradictory properties? For[, if that could be done,] the unwanted consequence of the threefold world being one would be difficult to avoid. For even though property and property bearer are different, ‘being a Brahmin[, i.e., of the highest caste,]’ and ‘being a *canḍāla*[, i.e., of the lowest caste]’ can not exist in the same subject. So the difference of the lotus is difficult to overcome.

The consequence in this passage seems to be that, if two contradictory properties can qualify the same thing, all qualities can qualify the same thing. The same argument might work in the case of ‘clear’ and ‘unclear’ as the two forms of one and the same thing.

⁹⁷Akamatsu 1983: 207, n. 89 refers to PV 3 407ab (cf. section A.3 on page 169), where a similar statement is negated.

⁹⁸In the corresponding passage of Jñānaśrīmitra (cf. section 4.1 on page 72) the example is: “...like the appearance of a cloth [is contrary] to a [perceptual] grasping of a pot.”

⁹⁹Instead of reading *niyamena* adverbially, it could also be understood that there is a refutation through the restriction (*niyama*) mentioned, i.e., due to the fact that difference of appearance is restricted to there not being the same object.

¹⁰⁰For an explanation of this paragraph and Jñānaśrī’s version of this argument, cf. section 4.1 on page 72.

¹⁰¹This concessive construction is much clearer in NVT₁ 115,8–10 : *na ca śabdapratyakṣayor vastugocaratve saty api pratyayābhedaḥ, kāraṇabhedena pāroḥṣyāpāroḥṣyabhedopapattēḥ.*

up ↓ a difference in the cause.” | is not applicable, because of the impossibility that a cognition of [something] imperceptible (*parokṣa*) has a real thing as [its] object. Rather, the difference of the causes, which is[, according to Vācaspati,] the basis (*āśraya*) of imperceptibility, achieves its end (*kṛtārtha*) [of causing a different cognition] simply by lacking (*viraha*) the grasping of the object (*gocara*) of the sense faculties (*indriya*). Thus, the particular does not appear (*parispṭhur*) in verbal apprehension (*śābda pratyaya*).

§ 23 Moreover, if a thing (*vastu*) that has the nature of a particular [were] what D.11.7.3. is to be denoted (*vācya*), both affirmation (*vidhi*)¹⁰² and negation (*niṣedha*) would be impossible, because [the thing] is observed (*pratipatti*) with its whole nature.¹⁰³ For if this [thing] really exists, [the expression] “it exists” is meaningless (*vyartha*) and [the expression] “it does not exist” is impossible (*asamartha*). But if [it] does not really exist, [the expression] “it does not exist” is meaningless (*vyartha*) and [the expression] “it does exist” is impossible (*asamartha*). But [there] is the usage (*prayoga*) of the words “is” etc. Therefore, the commonness of the appearance in verbal [cognition] to [both] the presence and absence of an external referent does not tolerate (*√kṣam*) that this [particular should] be the object (*viśayatā*) [of verbal cognitions].¹⁰⁴

§ 24 And right after (*anantaram*) having pointed out (*pra-√stu*) the fact [that] that D.11.7.5. which is to be denoted is a particular possessing a universal (*jātimadvakti*)¹⁰⁵ with his
pp ↓ very own words, Vācaspati uttered (*vilapita*) [this]:| “And the commonness of a universal (*jāti*), [which is] a word’s referent, to the existence and non-existence [of an external object] is not impossible, since this [universal], which, although permanent by its own nature, becomes common to existence and non-existence by being based on many particulars scattered in space and time, is fit for a connection [to] “it is” and “it is not”. For the connectedness to an existing (*vartamāna*) particular is the state “it is” for a universal, and the connectedness to past and future particulars is the state “it is not”. Thus, because [the reason’s] negative concomitance is doubtful, [the reason] “commonness to existence and non-existence” [of an external object] is [either] ambiguous (*anaikā-*
up ↓ *ntika*) or established in a different way.”¹⁰⁶ | This is not to the point (*aprastuta*). To the extent (*tāvatā*) [of what has been said there is] at any rate (*tāvat*) no damage (*kṣati*) to what has been put forth [by us] (*prakṛta*), because by laying (*nyasyat*) the burden on the universal [Vācaspati] has himself accepted (*svīkāra*) the fact that the particular is not

¹⁰²In the *dvandva* compound *vidhiniṣedha*, *vidhi* is not used in the technical sense of “positive element.” Cf. the argumentation in § 49, where *vidhiniṣedha* appears alongside *vidhi* in its technical sense.

¹⁰³I.e., if a word would make a particular known (in the same way as perception), every statement about a thing would be either impossible or superfluous: e.g. “A cow exists.” is a pointless statement if the word “cow” made a particular, and therefore existing, cow known. Conversely, the statement “A cow does not exist.” would be impossible (or at least nonsense), if “cow” here referred to a particular cow.

¹⁰⁴The obvious fact that words can refer to their objects irrespective of the objects’ existence was always an important concern in Indian theories of language: cf. Houben 1995: 257 ff., and Ogawa 1999: 275 (esp. fn. 17), where Bhartṛhari’s explanation of secondary or mental existence (*upacārasattā*) is given. As noted by Frauwallner (1937: 262, fn. 2), the discussion here and in the following paragraph is very similar to DhAP 241.11–242.6 (trl. Frauwallner 1937: 262 f.).

¹⁰⁵Cf. § 10 on page 17.

¹⁰⁶Cf. section 4.1 on page 75 for the inference that Vācaspati is discussing here.

what is to be designated. Furthermore (*kiṃ ca*), in every case the state “it is” etc. of a word’s referent (*padārtha*) is considered only according to the nature of the particular. But [this idea]: “But the universal’s connection to present etc. particulars [is considered as] the state “it is” etc.” [is] a trick for a child (*bālapratāraṇa*). Equally, there is an error even in the declaration of a particular possessing a universal [as the word referent]. If a cognition is established (*siddhi*) because of a particular (*vyakti*), [then] an additional (*adhika*) universal¹⁰⁷ may be cognized or not; but there is no liberation (*mukti*) from the error [that there is] a cognition of a particular (*vyakti*).

D.11.7.9. § 25 Due to this [explanation] what is said by the Kumārilites:¹⁰⁸ | “It is only because of a thing’s having parts (*sabhāga*) that there is no error in [a permanent universal] being common [to existent and non-existent things]. For treeness (*vrkṣatva*), unspecified (*anirdhārita*) as to presence or absence, is understood from a word. By understanding another word treeness is connected with either of these.”¹⁰⁹ | is also false (*asaṅgata*), because, when there is a cognition of a permanent universal, it is not possible that the state of existence [or] non-existence is not specified. pp ↓
up ↓

D.11.8. § 26 And also this [statement]: | “Also, the way (*prakāra*) of words to cause the apprehension of referents (*arthapratyāyana*) is not like [the way] of perception, so that (*yena*) there would not be a requirement (*apekṣā*) of the words ‘is’ etc. as in the case of observing (*tadgr̥ṣṭa*) this [object], because the means of valid cognition have different capacities (*vicitraśaktitva*).” | has been falsified (*duṣita*) by the falsification (*dūṣa-ṇa*)¹¹⁰ of different appearances (*avabhāsa*) when one and the same nature is grasped in two appearances, perceptual and verbal. And that there are diverse capacities of the means of valid cognition is achieved (*caritārtha*) also by both direct perception and determination (*sākṣātkārādhyavasāya*). Therefore, if the object of perception were made known (*pratipādana*) through verbal [cognition], there would be an appearance in exactly the same way [as for perception]. And something non-existing does not tolerate (*√kṣam*) being made known as an object of this[, i.e., of perception] (*tadviṣayakhyāpana*). pp ↓
up ↓

D.11.13. § 27 [Objection:] | Now, if the part (*aṃśa*) “treeness” is indicated (*codita*) by the word “tree”, then the application of the words “is” etc. [has] the purpose of letting the part of existence etc. be restrictively fixated (*niścayana*). | [Answer:] What possibility (*avakāśa*) of affirmation or negation of another property (*dharmāntara*) is there through another word or another means of valid cognition for a particular that is, due to [its] partlessness, completely comprehended (*samadhigata*) by perception?¹¹¹ [Objection:] | Also in [the case of] perception the requirement of a different means of cognition is pp ↓
up ↓

¹⁰⁷This repeats the point of § 10 on page 44.

¹⁰⁸Acc. to Kataoka 2009: 496, Kaumārila refers to Sucaritaśāstra. As mentioned in the critical edition, Kei Kataoka has informed me that this quote is indeed from Sucaritaśāstra’s *Kāśikā*. Cf. Biardeau 1964: 164 ff. for a consideration of Śābara’s ideas concerning the relationship between a thing, its parts, and the denotation of words.

¹⁰⁹Cf. section 4.1 on page 76 for some material on this position.

¹¹⁰Cf. the discussion in § 21.

¹¹¹As noted in Akamatsu 1983: 223 f., n. 119 this argument is found in PV 1 43, cf. trl. on pages 148–149.

up ↓ observed. | [Answer:] That may be because this [perception] does not have the nature (*ātmaka*) of restrictive fixation (*niścaya*) when a [thing's] own form that has not been repeatedly experienced (*anabhyasta*) is the object.¹¹² But what [use] is another [means of valid cognition] where a concept, itself (*svayam*) having the nature of restrictive fixation (*niścaya*), [is] grasping? But (*ca*) there is a requirement for another word and a logical mark. Therefore, a real thing's own form is not grasped [by a concept].

pp ↓ § 28 [Objection:] | Now then, properties like universal etc. [are] different from each other (*paraspara*) and from the property bearers.¹¹³ So in the case of a tree, although cognized (*pratīta*) by means of a single property that has the character of a genus (*jātilakṣaṇaikadharmadvāra*), there is no cognition [of it] as possessing other properties (*dharmāntaravattā*). Therefore, why [is there] no cognition (*avabodha*)—dependent on different expressions (*abhidhānādhīna*)—to another property [of a tree], like greenness, swaying (*calatva*), height (*uccaistaratva*) etc.? | [Answer:] Precisely this (*tad etad*) is unsuitable (*asaṅgata*), because a perceivable difference of property and property bearer has been refuted by perception, since in perception a particular with an indivisible nature (*akhaṇḍātman*) appears.¹¹⁴ Otherwise there is the overreaching consequence (*atiprasaṅga*) that everything would be everywhere.¹¹⁵ “But the common talk (*vyavahāra*) of property and property bearer has [its] basis (*āśraya*) in a conceptual (*kālpanika*) difference.” This [fact] is well established in the *authoritative scripture* (*śāstra*).¹¹⁶

¹¹²In the tradition following Dignāga, perception itself does not ‘ascertain’ its object (cf., e.g., the grammatic statements in Hattori 1968: 25–27, p. 36 (III.Bc-1), and see McCrea and Patil 2006: 318 ff. for a concise review of research on this matter), insofar as ‘ascertainment’ (*niścaya*) is synonymous to determination (*adhyavasāya*). Ratnakīrti is probably referring to habituated perceptions here, which are discussed in PVS 27.15 ff. and PVS 32.5–12, passages closely analysed in Kellner 2004b: 11–29 (see especially Kellner 2004b: 26 for a note on Jñānaśrīmitra's view of habituation and inference). So Ratnakīrti's statement should probably not be understood as implying that when an object is familiar perception itself does ascertain it. It is only a conceptual awareness event that can ascertain something. This also finds slight support in the phrase “*svayam niścayātmako*” qualifying conceptual cognition in the next sentence, because it suggests that it is opposed (*tu*) to perception in so far as it has the nature of ascertaining something of its own accord (*svayam*), i.e., without an additional (ascertaining) means of cognition. For the difference of this position to Kumārila's, cf. Taber 1998a: 96–101. The Naiyāyika's position is discussed in B. K. Matilal 1986: 330 ff. Vācaspatimiśra's discussion of perception as ascertaining its object is found in NVT 107.8–117.6 (a passage translated, or at least paraphrased, in the pioneering work, Stcherbatsky 1994 2: 257–298).

¹¹³As noted in Akamatsu 1983: 224, n. 121, cf. PVS 29,7 ff. for a discussion of the same objection (trl. on page 152). The opponents there are Naiyāyikas and/or Vaiśeṣikas (cf. fn. 413 on page 152). The relation between the separated *dharma* and *dharmin* is called *samavāya*. Cf. Halbfass 1992: 147 ff. for a short characterisation of this concept.

¹¹⁴Cf. PV 1 43 (and Frauwallner 1932: 249 f., as well as the trl. on page 148).

¹¹⁵This unwanted consequence is not clear to me. “Otherwise” can be taken as “if a particular separable into parts such as treeness, height, swaying, etc., appeared in perception.” In this case, where an instance of treeness appears as separated from an instance of height, etc., we could probably not say which particular tree these various properties belonged to, and so they might be said to occur everywhere. If, on the other hand, “otherwise” means that the refutation of a difference between property and property bearer by perception could be wrong, then it could be understood that anything that is cognized by perception could be wrong, so that a tree appearing to me in some place might as well be somewhere else. (This last explanation I owe to Parimal Patil.)

¹¹⁶Cf. PVS 2.21–3.1: *na. dharmabhedaparikalpanād iti vakṣyāmaḥ. tathā cāha. sarva evāyam anumānānumeyavyavahāro buddhyārūḍhena dharmadharmibhedaneti*. This passage is also found in

D.12.4. § 29 Or¹¹⁷ may it be that the difference of property and property bearer is even real (*pāramārthika*), nevertheless [their] contact (*pratyāsatti*) is to be assumed (*eṣitavya*) [by you] only as qualified by assistance (*upakāralakṣaṇa*) because [contact such as] inherence (*samavāya*) etc. between them (*idam*) has been falsified (*dūṣitatva*).¹¹⁸ And so (*evaṃ ca*), in the same way as there is, when a property bearer is cognized through perception, a complete cognition of its properties through contact to the sense faculties, so there would be, when a property bearer is cognized through both word and logical mark, which are connected (*pratibaddha*) [to their object] by a connection such as denoted and denoting etc.,¹¹⁹ a complete cognition of its properties, because there is no difference in contact as such.

D.12.4.3. § 30 Also what Vācaspati [said]: | “But if that [real thing] is grasped [which is] qualified by a single additional attribute (*upādhi*),¹²⁰ [e.g.,] existence (*sattva*), then there is no grasping of it as qualified by other additional attributes (*upādhi*). For the nature of a substance (*dravya*) is characterized through additional attributes (*upādhi*), but neither the additional attributes nor the state of being qualified [by them is] its nature.” | [Answer:] This also only (*eva*) flows away (√*plu*). For the grasping (*grahaṇa*) of the other additional attributes does not follow (*āsañjita*) from a nondifference, since only after a difference is presupposed (*puraskṛtya*) is there the consequence (*prasañjana*) that [there is] a grasping of that which is assisted (*upakārya*) when that assisting [it] (*upakāraka*) is grasped.¹²¹ And it is not appropriate to assume, as in the case of the

PVin 2 56.12–57.1 (corr. to PVin 2¹ 40,4–6). As noted in Steinkellner 2007: n. ad 56.13 f., Dharmakīrti is invoking *Dignāga* as authority here: “*tathā ca ...*”. For a translation of this passage, see Steinkellner 1979: 45. Note also that acc. to Gnoli (1960b: 189, n. to p. 2, l. 22), *iti vakṣyāmaḥ* refers to the *apoha* section. Cf. also PVSVT 143.15–16 (in fn. 432 on page 155).

¹¹⁷As observed for the corresponding passage in the AP by Akamatsu (1983: 229 f., fn. 129) the arguments in this section, discussing the relation of particular and universal under the condition that they really are separate, is quite clearly based on the discussion in PV 1 46 and PV 1 52–55 (cf. trl. on page 150 and section A.1 on page 152 respectively).

¹¹⁸Cf. the comments in section section 4.1 on page 77. In § 38, Ratnakīrti says that inherence is not possible, and then quotes KBhV 70,13–14 (corresponds to § 39).

¹¹⁹In the case of the logical mark, the connection would be between logical mark (*liṅga*), such as having smoke or being a *śiṃṣapā*, and the *pakṣa* (or *liṅgin*), something qualified by the logical mark, such as a mountain or a tree. Note that this amounts to an equation of the relation of both *vācya-vācaka* and *liṅga-liṅgin* with the relation of *dharma-dharmin* in the following respect: knowledge of a denoter (*vācaka*) or a logical mark (*liṅga*), like that of a *dharma*, can not be had without knowledge of the denoted (*vācya*) or that having the logical mark (*liṅgin*), which thus resemble the property bearer *dharmin*. This equation is, of course, an unwanted consequence (*prasaṅga*), because it is formulated under the unaccepted assumption that this relation is real, i.e., that the relata really exist as relata. It is only on the theory that a word and a logical mark do not refer to or designate any real thing that this consequence does not arise.

¹²⁰See section 4.1 for some explanations of the term *upādhi*.

¹²¹I.e., the problem formulated by Vācaspati does not occur under the Buddhist premise of nondifference between a property and its bearer. This passage is a little clearer in JNĀ 215.5–7:

...na hy abhedād upādhyantaragrahaṇam āsañjitam, ākare 'py upakāryopakāradvāreṇa bhedaṃ puraskṛtyaiva sarvākāragrahaṇaprasañjanāt. śaktīnāṃ tu śaktimatoḥ abheda uktaḥ. tad anenāpi na sprṣtam.

[The grasping of other additional attributes] does not follow from nondifference, because even in the treasury[, i.e., PV 1,] grasping all forms of awareness follows only after presupposing a difference by means of [the terms] assisted and assisting. [Objection:] But [Dharmakīrti] stated that there was the non-difference of abilities and that possessing an

cause-effect relation of fire and smoke, a limitation of a cognition to a property and property bearer only due to [their] own nature, because these two are not established by a means of valid cognition.¹²² And the rule (*nyāya*) [is] that when [something] is established by a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇasiddha*) [there is] a description of [a thing's] nature (*svabhāvopavarṇana*).¹²³

pp ↓ § 31 And what the *Nyāyabhūṣana* says about this: | “If “sun etc.” is grasped there is the consequence (*prasañjana*) of grasping the multitude (*rāśi*) of all [other] things (*āśe-savastu*) [as] that assisted (*upakārya*) by this [sun etc.]”¹²⁴ | is the result (*phala*) of not fathoming the intent (*abhiprāyānavagāhana*) [of what was said by Dharmakīrti]. For it is so: [If,] in your opinion, [there is] a difference of property and property bearer, and [their] contact (*pratyāsatti*) [is] only characterized as assistance (*upakāralakṣaṇa*),¹²⁵ then, if the assisting is grasped, [there] follows (*āsañjitam*) the grasping of the assisted only [when it has] the same place and only [when it has] the form of a property (*dharma-rūpa*). Therefore (*tat*), how does the unwanted consequence (*prasaṅga*) of grasping that assisted by the sun (*sūryopakārya*), whose deviation was observed [in as far as that assisted is] [either] at a place other [than the sun] or has a different substance, follow (*saṅgataḥ*)?¹²⁶ D.12.4.6.

§ 32 Therefore, because of the complete (*sarvātman*) cognition (*pratīti*) where the nature (°*svarūpa*°) of a thing (*vastu*°) is apprehended (°*pratipatti*) even by means of one property (*ekadharmā*), what possibility of affirmation or negation (*vidhiniṣedha*) is [there] for another word? But [there] is [this possibility]. Therefore it is established D.13.

ability. [Answer:] This is also not touched on by him [i.e., Vācaspatimiśra].

As shown by Akamatsu (1983: 229 ff., n. 129), this passage (§ 28 to § 29 on pages 25–26) closely follows the argument in PV 1 52cd–55. PV 1 52cd, where the unwanted consequence under discussion is introduced, is stated under the hypothetical assumption that there really is a difference between properties and their bearers, cf. the phrase that starts the auto-commentary on PV 1 52cd, PVSV 29.12 ff.: *yady apy upādhayo bhinnā eva* (For a trl. of this passage, cf. section A.1 on page 152). The opponent in Jñānaśrīmitra's text argues that Dharmakīrti has stated that there is no difference between a capacity to support an attribute and that having that capacity (probably PVSV 29.13–16, cf. section A.1 on page 152 for a trl.). I understand the opponent's point to be that there would be a contradiction to the hypothetical acceptance of a difference. But Jñānaśrīmitra says that this point is not touched by Vācaspatimiśra.

I thank Parimal Patil for telling me that *ākara* can also mean the “treasure of a tradition”, i.e., the most important scriptures.

¹²²I understand this argument as follows: In an inference from smoke to fire, which are in the effect-cause relation to each other, two different entities are established, since the nature of the effect smoke, which is established by valid cognition, restricts the inferential cognition to fire. But in a cognition that determines a property and property bearer, these two entities are not established merely due to the fact that a cognition represents them separately. The reason for this is given in the next sentence.

¹²³Cf. section 4.1.

¹²⁴In this unwanted consequence, the sun is what *assists* the cognition of all other objects, i.e., those *assisted* by the sun, because a person sees things by the light, or assistance, of the sun. Cf. the translation of the passage in section 4.1 on page 83.

¹²⁵This was stated above, § 29.

¹²⁶Dharmakīrti's argument, according to this interpretation, was only valid for *dharma* and *dharmin* relations, which have to fulfill two criteria: First, the *relata* must be in contact with each other. Second, they must be properties of the same substance. So the relation between objects in daylight and the light of the sun is not a proper relation of *upakāra* and *upakārya*, since the sun illuminates things at a great distance and these things are not properties of the sun.

(*sthita*) that a particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) does not appear (*pratibhāsitva*) because of a word (*śabda*), a concept (*vikalpa*) or a logical mark (*liṅga*).

E.1. § 33 Neither does a universal (*sāmānya*) appear (*pratibhāsin*) in a verbal apprehension (*śābdapratyaya*). Because of a word such as “cow” etc. in [the sentence] “Cows are grazing ($\sqrt{\text{car}}$) on the other side (*pāra*) of the river (*sarīt*).” there appear dewlap, horn, tail etc. [which are] accompanied by (*parikarita*) the forms of letters (*akṣarā-kāra*), [and which are] so to speak (*prāya*) lumped together (*sampiṇḍita*) because of the disregard (*aparāmarśana*) for the differences between that of the same genus. But exactly this is not a universal.

§ 34 For [the universal] “cowness” is proclaimed to be devoid (*śūnya*) of colour (*varṇa*), shape (*ākṛti*), and the forms of letters (*akṣarākāra*).¹²⁷

E.1.3. § 35 And precisely this mere¹²⁸ dewlap, horn etc., which is identified (*ekī- $\sqrt{\text{kr}}$*) with the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) though (*api*) completely (*atyanta*^o) different (*vilakṣaṇa*) in every (*akhila*^o) particular (*vyakti*), is called ($\sqrt{\text{vac}}$) a universal (*sāmānyam*). This (*adas*) [is] only an error because such (*tādrśa*) an external [object] (*bāhya*) is not obtained (*aprāpta*), like the appearance of hair (*keśa*).¹²⁹ Therefore, [a universal] may (*astu*) either be this unfolding (*vivarta*)¹³⁰ only of the mind (*buddhi*) itself as having the nature of this [universal] in virtue (*vāśa*) of the remaining impressions (*vāsanā*), or that having its [a universal’s] form, which is simply inexistent, appears, or the things (*vyakti*) themselves (*eva*) might appear ($\sqrt{\text{bhās}}$) in some other way with disregard of (*tiraskāra*) the differences to that of the same genus because [differences amongst things] are hidden from experience (*anubhava*), or a deprivation of memory (*smṛtipramoṣa*) may be considered [as the reason].¹³¹ In all ways (*sarvathā*), this cognition of a universal (*sāmānyapratyaya*) is truly (*khalu*) without an object (*nirviṣaya*). [So] where [is there] news of a universal?

E.3. § 36 What is said [as objection] again,¹³² | that if a universal is inexistent there is accidentality (*ākasmikatva*) of the universal’s cognition, | is wrong (*ayukta*). For (*yatas*) a causal complex (*sāmagrī*), which, enriched (*ati- $\sqrt{\text{ric}}$*) by the assisting cause (*sahakārin*) of recollecting an observation of an earlier material object (*pūrvapiṇḍadarśanasma-*

¹²⁷Cf. section 4.1 on page 84 for a discussion of this verse.

¹²⁸For the import of “mere” (*mātra*) here, cf. fn. 177 on page 62.

¹²⁹This is one of the standard symptoms of a person suffering from an eye-disorder called *tīmira* that causes perceptual errors. Cf. Chu 2004: 131 ff. for further information on *tīmira* (and note the reference to Anne MacDonald’s forthcoming work in Chu 2004: 131, fn. 67).

¹³⁰Cf. the characterisation of this term in the context of the Vedāntin’s error theory, Schmithausen 1965: 102: “...d. h. der eine Geist nimmt die ihm fremde unwirkliche Gestalt einer Mannigfaltigkeit an, ohne dabei sein Wesen zu verlieren”

¹³¹Cf. section 4.1 on page 85 for more details on these forms of error.

¹³²Cf. section 4.1 on page 88 for who might have said this.

raṇa),¹³³ generates (*janika*) a particular (*viśeṣa*) apprehension (*pratyaya*),¹³⁴ produces (*ut-√pad*) the objectless concept of a universal. In this way (*tad evam*) a genus (*jāti*) does not appear in a verbal apprehension, nor in perception.¹³⁵ Nor is [a genus] established (*siddhi*) through an inference (*anumānatas*), because a connected (*pratibaddha*) logical mark (*liṅga*) is not observed in the case of invisibility (*adrśyatva*) [of the genus].¹³⁶ Neither is this [genus] established like a sense faculty (*indriyavat*), because an only occasional (*kādācitka*), other reason (*nimitta*) is established by the effect, [i.e.,]

¹³³ An observation of a material entity was stated to be a prerequisite for conventional agreement, cf. I. 60, p. 19 (trl. § 13 on page 45). Here Ratnakīrti makes the point that it is on the basis of a complex of causes, supported by a recollection of such an observation, that a conceptual cognition of a “universal” (or non-difference, *abheda*, *aviśeṣa*) is produced. What exactly Ratnakīrti is referring to here with “complex of causes” is not quite clear to me.

Generally, a *sāmagrī* is a set of factors that, taken together, causes a particular effect. The causal complex of perceptual cognitions has been treated very thoroughly in the translation of and notes to HB b.1221 in Steinkellner 1967b, as well as in Kellner 1999: 197 ff. The causal complex governing conceptual cognitions is less clear. Perceptual judgement, a conceptual cognition following a perception, is treated by Dharmakīrti in PVSV 31.26–32.12 (see Kellner 2004b: 19–32 for an excellent interpretation). I do not know of a discussion explicitly about the “causal factors for ascertainment” (*niścayapratyaya*)” (Kellner 2004b: 24) that are at work in fully inferential cognitions.

Ratnakīrti’s argument at this point is supposed to prove that there is no appearance of a universal in perception or verbal apprehension (*śābdapratyaya*), cf. I. 171, p. 29. If it is correct to classify this verbal apprehension as a form of perceptual judgement, the causal complex referred to here could be analysed as the appearances on hearing the sentence: “Cows are grazing on the far side of the river.”. These, according to Ratnakīrti’s explanations in § 33, are “such things as dewlap, horn, etc., which are accompanied by the forms of letters, and which are so to speak lumped together because of a disregard for the differences between things of the same genus.”

This position is rather similar to Dharmakīrti’s explanations of the interplay of memory, convention, and real things: cf., e.g., the discussion following PV 1 64 (trl. section A.1 on page 156), PVSV 54.12–14 (translated and referred to in Akamatsu 1983: 247, fn. 164 in this context), and see also PV 1 72 and commentary (cf. the trl. in Dunne 2004: 344 f.), PVSV 42.13–22 (cf. the trl. in Dunne 2004: 346 f.), and PVSV 82.4–22 (trl. section A.1 on page 164).

¹³⁴ AS₁ and AS₂, as well as all the mss available to me, read °*mānāviśeṣa*°. I therefore take °*mānaviśeṣa*° in AS₃ to be a misprint. There are three ways of analysing this: °*mānā vi*°, °*mānā ’vi*°, and °*māna-avi*°. Respectively, one will understand either as translated above, or as “a causal complex, which, enriched by the assisting cause ..., generates a non-specific apprehension,” or as “a causal complex, which generates a non-specific apprehension that is enriched by the assisting cause.” The differences concern two points: what is enriched by memory, the conceptual cognition or its set of causes, and what is engendered by the mentioned causal complex—a *viśeṣapratyaya* or an *aviśeṣapratyaya*?

I think the first option yields the best sense. Concerning point one, memory—as an additional cause (*sahakārin*)—is more likely one condition in the the set responsible for a conceptual cognition than a part of conceptual cognition itself; and, concerning point two, *viśeṣapratyaya* (a certain/specific apprehension) seems to be the right option since it is what Ratnakīrti is trying to prove here: that the cognition is not arbitrary, but specific.

¹³⁵ Cf. the notes in section 4.1 on page 88.

¹³⁶ The inference considered here aims to prove a genus (*sādhyā*). Neither the reason (*hetu*) nor the locus (*pakṣa*) of the inference are specified. The counter argument is that if a genus is not observable, it can not be proven that it is connected to the *hetu* in the first place. Given that an effect of the genus is used as a reason, as supposed in the next sentence, this argument would appeal to the impossibility of establishing the cause-effect relation between a genus and a cognition (or all its other effects). Cf. Mimaki 1976: 292, fn. 321 for a concise summary of Ratnakīrti’s opinion in this matter. As Patil 2008b: 22, fn. 100 notes, “...the inference of other minds (*santānāntara*) and of the functioning of our sense faculties (*indriya*) ...” are instances where Ratnakīrti accepts that even though that which should be established is invisible, a *vyāpti* can be established.

cognition (*jñānakāryatas*).¹³⁷ For when [someone] points out the absence of the cognition “cow” in [the case of] another material object (*piṇḍa*) or an intermediate space (*antarāla*), then how should the absence of the cognition “cow”, [which is] generated (*upapadyamāna*) from the absence of all (*sakala*) material cow entities, like flecked ones (*śābaleya*) etc., implicate (*ā-√kṣip*) another object[, i.e., a genus]?¹³⁸ [Objection:] | Now (*atha*), [it is] only because of cowness [that there is] a material entity (*piṇḍa*) cow, otherwise (*anyathā*) also a horse would be the material entity (*piṇḍa*) cow. | [Answer:] If so, [then it is] only because of the material entity cow [that there is] cowness, otherwise (*anyathā*) also horseness would be cowness. Therefore the material entity cow [is] only because of a succession of causes (*kāraṇaparamparā*).¹³⁹ But cowness may either exist or not.

pp ↓
up ↓

E.8. § 37 [Objection:] | Now, if the capacity (*sāmarthya*) to generate a universal’s apprehension (*sāmānyapratyayajananasāmarthya*) is not different (*abhinna*) from a singular material entity (*ekapiṇḍa*), then another material entity, excluded from that of another genus (*vi-jātīyavyāvṛtta*), [is] without [that] capacity (*asamartha*). But [if] different [from a single material entity], then this is the universal, [and there is] at most (*param*) a dispute (*vivāda*) concerning the name. | [Answer:] This capacity is indeed nondifferent for each thing (*prativastu*). But in the same way as one being has a capable nature (*śaktasvabhāva*), so also another exists (*bhavant*): what sort of error does [this] bring about (*ā-√vāh*)? In the way that for you one genus (*jāti*) is the reason (*hetu*) for the creation (*prasava*) of a common term (*samānadhvani*) as well as (*api ...api*) another [genus] is by its very nature independent (*nirapekṣa*) of other genera, in that way also a particular (*vyakti*), independent (*nirapekṣa*) of genera [and] differentiated (*bhinna*) [from other particulars] through its very own form, [is] for us the reason [of a common term].¹⁴⁰

pp ↓
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E.10. § 38 But what¹⁴¹ Trilocana¹⁴² [said is this]: | “Inherence (*samavāya*) of specific

¹³⁷Cf. section 4.1 on page 86 for some remarks on this argument.

¹³⁸The problem whether a genus is omnipresent (*sarvagata*), so that it might occur both in the space between its manifestations as also in other entities, is also discussed in NV 303.6–10 (cf. Potter 1977: 325 for a summary), and ŚV Āv 25. Both of these passages are quoted by Kaṇakagomin, ad PVS 76.25–77.4 (cf. the references in section 4.1 on page 88). See also Potter 1977: 139–140 for a short sketch of the various positions held by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors in this matter.

¹³⁹Cf. II. 54 ff. in § 12, where a causal chain such as this is also mentioned as a reason for a thing’s differentiation from other things.

¹⁴⁰This paragraph, giving only a very general argument, draws on many of the central ideas of the *apoha* theory as developed by Dharmakīrti:

- that a capacity is not different from the particular having that capacity is argued for in PV 1 54 (cf. the trl. on page 153);
- that many particulars have a non-different capacity *śakti*, one of which is to cause the same cognition, for particulars is discussed in PV 1 73 ff. (cf. Dunne 2004: 343 ff.), PV 1 109 (referred to and translated by Akamatsu (1983: 248, n. 170); cf. the trl. on page 159), and PV 3 163cd–164 (cf. the trl. on page 167);
- that particulars are essentially different from each other is introduced at the beginning of Dharmakīrti’s discussion of *apoha* in PV 1 40–42 and the auto-commentary thereon (cf. section A.1 on page 146).

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universals like horseness, cowness etc. in [their] own basis (*svāśraya*) [is] the cause (*nimitta*) for both an appellation and apprehension (*abhidhānapratyaya*) as ‘A universal, a universal’.”¹⁴³ | [Answer:] If [it is] so (*yady evam*), [then] this very reason for such appellations and cognitions exists in the particulars (*vyakti*) too, [so] what [is the use of] the obsession with claiming a universal (*sāmānyasvīkārapramāda*)? Moreover, inherence is not possible (*sambhavin*) [either]:

§ 39 Inherence (*samavāya*) is established because of the cognition (*buddhi*) “[something is] in here.” And the thought (*dhī*) “in here” [exists] through observation of two (*dvayadarśana*) [where one is in the other, i.e. “in here”].

But in no object of that [cognition] is there a perception of both (*dvayekṣā*). Therefore [there is] agreement (*abhyupāya*) [with regard to inherence] only as [your] own imagination (*svakalpanāmatra*).¹⁴⁴

pp ↓ | § 40 Through this [verse] [this following] speculation¹⁴⁵ of his¹⁴⁶ (*asya*) is rejected: E.13.

up ↓ | “How can this continuity of an apprehension (*pratyayānuvṛtti*) according with a continued thing (*anuvṛttavastvanuyāyin*) exist where there are completely (*atyanta*) different (*bhedin*) particulars (*vyakti*) that concur (*anupātin*) with the fact of an apprehension of excluded objects (*vyāvṛttaviṣayapratyayabhāva*)?”, | for [there is] a deviation (*vya-bhicāra*) through a continued apprehension (*anuvṛttapratyaya*) when the genera (*jāti*) themselves are particularised (*vyaktīyamāna*) due to being mutually (*paraspara*) excluded (*vyāvṛttatā*).¹⁴⁷

¹⁴¹*yat tu* is supported by K, P, N₁, N₂, N₃. It is not clear to me why *yac ca* is reported for P in AS₃ 64, fn. 1.

¹⁴²Trilocana’s texts have been lost. For more information about this Naiyāyika author, who was a teacher of Vācaspatimiśra, cf. Potter 1977: 396 ff.

¹⁴³Oberhammer reads according to JNĀ and ms. P, translating: “Das Inhären der besonderen Gemeinsamkeiten wie Pferdum, Kuhtum etc. in dem jeweiligen Substrat ist die Ursache für das Benennen und Erkennen der Gemeinsamkeit.” (Oberhammer 1964: 144, fn. 47) He makes no comment about the reading “*sāmānyam sāmānyam iti*”. I think that the repetition of “universal” can be made sense of here: Cowness, horseness, etc. are causes for corresponding cognitions. These cognitions are, according to Trilocana, repeated cognitions in the sense that they have the inherence of the same universal in (at least two) particular things as their cause. So for both things the same judgement arises: “The universal cowness, the universal horseness.” Since this is at least possible, and it is difficult for me to see how the mistake of a repeated *sāmānya* could have crept into the text (but easy to see how its repetition might have been overlooked), I retain this reading for the meantime.

¹⁴⁴This verse is in the *upendravajrā* metre (as defined in Apte 1992: Appendix A, p. 4), and in all likelihood originally from Jñānaśrī. For inherence as assumed by Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika authors, cf. the explanations in Dravid 1972: 19 ff., and the notes in section 4.1 on page 77.

¹⁴⁵Even though the masculine form *ūha* is found in the corresponding passage in AP, the feminine form *ūhā* exists as well according to Böthlingk and R. Roth 1855: 1036. So a text emendation is not necessary here.

¹⁴⁶Since no new opponent has been introduced following § 38, this passage is most likely taken from one of Trilocana’s texts.

¹⁴⁷The logical error seems to be as follows: Trilocana thinks that a continuity of cognitions concerning particulars (*hetu*) can not occur without a continued thing, e.g., a particular with a universal inhering in it. Since the cognition is dependent on these continued particulars as its cause, it establishes them. In other words, they are the *sādhya* of the inference in the background of this passage. But, as Ratnakīrti suggests, even the genera themselves are differentiated from each other, since they are “particularized”

- E.15. § 41 What is again formulated (*ukta*) as a [valid cognition] eliminating (*bādhaka*) [the continuity of cognition] in the opposite case (*viparyaya*) by him,¹⁴⁸ [i.e.,] | “A continuity of appellation and apprehension (*abhidhānapratyayānūvṛtti*) existing (*bhavat*) only in some places while averted from some [others] has a cause (*nimittavat*), but there is no other cause (*nimitta*) [except a continuous particular].” and so on | is not correct, since, even without a continuing [thing], it has been established¹⁴⁹ that the continuity of appellations and cognitions is [to be] necessarily (*avaśya*) accepted because of the specificity (*viśeṣa*) of [a thing’s] own nature, which is differentiated from that of another form (*atadrūpaparāvṛttasvarūpaviśeṣa*). Therefore:

§ 42 By which contact a genus spreads out into something, when [there is] the same difference of things, but not into another, that [contact] alone should be the cause of both words and cognitions.¹⁵⁰

- E.17. § 43 What is again said about this [verse] (*atra*)¹⁵¹ by the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa: | “For it is not so: By which contact (*pratyāsatti*) [such things as] a stick, a string etc. extend somewhere [but] not elsewhere, that very contact should be the cause of the common talk of ‘having a stick’, ‘having a string’ etc. in cases of a man [carrying a stick], crystal [on a string] etc. [So] what [then] is the use of stick, string etc.?” | is wrong (*asaṅgata*), because the intention [of this verse, correctly given as follows,] was not understood (*abhiprāyaparijñāna*) [in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa]:¹⁵² “For it is not denied that both a stick and a string, connected (*pratyāsanna*) to a man and a crystal, [and] observed [as such], are the reason (*hetutva*) for the apprehension of ‘having a stick’, ‘having a string’. But a universal is not observed even in a dream (*svapna*). Therefore, if something is to be imagined (*parikalpanīya*), then (*tadā*) preferably (*varam*) only contact (*pratyāsatti*) should be imagined as the reason for the apprehension of a universal. [But] what is the use of a complicated (*guru*) assumption (*parikalpanā*) [like this]?”

or, literally, have gone into the particulars. Therefore the logical reason that Trilocana professes, the continuity of cognition, goes astray or deviates: there can be differentiated things causing a continuous cognition.

¹⁴⁸Presumably this is still Trilocana. The full formulation of the logical error Ratnakīrti is defending against here is *sādhya viparyaya bādhakapramāṇa*. Cf. Kajiyama 1998: 116 f. for more information. Acc. to Kajiyama 1998: 116 f., fn. 310, it is supposed to establish the pervasion of a separate inference by disproving other possibilities. Trilocana, as mentioned above (fn. 147 on the previous page), wishes to prove that a cognition of sameness is caused by, and so can prove, the sameness of its objects. Here he argues that, in the case opposite to the one he wants to prove, i.e., when there is no continuous thing, the reason of his inference, the continuity of cognition, is not possible (or is eliminated). In this way, the fact that there is a continuity of cognitions is a valid reason for inferring its only cause, a continuous thing.

¹⁴⁹Ratnakīrti has argued that the inexistence of a universal does not mean that cognitions of a universal are without cause (§ 36), and that particulars differentiated by their own nature are possible as a cause for a cognition of sameness (§ 37). Together, these arguments might account for the present statement that continuity of appellations and cognitions must be accepted on the basis of the specific characteristics of particulars alone.

¹⁵⁰This verse is PV 1 162 (cf. the trl. on page 165), where it also follows a discussion about the causes of cognitions and designations.

¹⁵¹The following quote, NBhūṣ 261.5–7 is actually directly aimed at PV 1 162, which is quoted at NBhūṣ 261.3–4.

¹⁵²The structure of the argument is: what the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa says about PV 1 162, i.e. that the verse is wrong in claiming that a stick (or universal) is not the cause of the cognition “someone having a stick” (or something qualified by a universal), is wrong itself, because the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* does not correctly understand Dharmakīrti’s intention, which is as follows.

pp ↓ § 44 [Objection:] | Now this inference (*anumāna*) demonstrating a universal (*jātipra-* E.19.
sādhaka) is set forth (*abhi-√dhā*): What is a cognition of [something] that is qualified
(*viśiṣṭajñāna*), that [is] inseparable to the grasping of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇagrahaṇa-*
nāntariyaka), like the cognition of ‘having a stick’ [in the case of someone carrying a
stick]. And this is a cognition of [something] that is qualified: “This is a cow”. In fact
(*arthatas*) [this is] an effect-reason (*kāryahetu*). For in the example (*drṣṭānta*) the cog-
nition of [something] qualified is proven as the effect of the experience of the qualifier
(*viśeṣaṇānubhāvakārya*).¹⁵³

up ↓ § 45 | [Answer:] With regard to this [inference] [there is] a question (*anuyoga*): E.20.
[Is] the inseparableness of an awareness of what is qualified (*viśiṣṭabuddhi*) from a
grasping of a differentiated (*bhinna*) qualifier what is to be proven (*sādhya*), or [its]
inseparableness from the experience of a mere qualifier?

§ 46 In the first case, the elimination of the locus through perception (*pratyakṣa-* E.20.3.
bādhā) does not provide an opportunity¹⁵⁴ for attention towards the proving [reason]
(*sāadhanāvadhāna*), because there is no appearance of both [a qualified thing and that
qualifying it] in a perception grasping a real thing.¹⁵⁵ Moreover, that there is an aware-
ness of [something] qualified (*viśiṣṭabuddhitva*) is an ambiguous (*anaikāntika*) reason
for a universal (*sāmānyahetu*), because [that cognition of something qualified is] ob-
served also without grasping a differentiated qualifier, as (*yathā*) “A pot (*ghaṭa*) has its
own form (*svarūpavat*).”, or “Cowness [is] a universal.”¹⁵⁶

§ 47 But in the second case (*dvitīyapakṣa*) [there is an] establishing of what is [al- E.20.4.

¹⁵³The elements used in this inference are as follows: The *pakṣa*, or locus of the inference, is cogni-
tion. The *hetu*, reason, is that the cognition is of something that is qualified, which simply means that
the object that is known in a cognition is specified in some way. The *sādhya*, which is what is to be
proven, is that this cognition of something qualified implies an apprehension of that which qualifies its
object—on a realist account, a universal. The example, *drṣṭānta*, is the cognition of a person carrying a
stick, which implies that there be the cognition of the stick. The reason used in this inference is a so-called
effect reason, *kāryahetu*, i.e., the reason (cognition of something qualified) is an effect of what is to be
established (grasping of a qualifier). This is one of three types of reasons that are admissible according
to Buddhist logicians in the tradition of Dharmakīrti (cf. the explanations in Kajiyama 1998: 72 ff.).

¹⁵⁴*anavakāśayati* could be either the causative 3rd person singular active presence of *ava+√kāś* pre-
fixed by *a-*, or a denominative of *an-avakāśa*. The negation by the prefix *a-* is very uncommon in verbs,
although it is possible acc. to Whitney 2000: § 1121a. I don’t think that any difference in meaning would
result for this passage, but I think the derivation from the verb form is more likely, since Ratnakīrti is
certainly not averse to a truly nominal style and I cannot see a reason why he should use a denominative
in this passage instead of a normal participle.

¹⁵⁵Meaning we do not apprehend the universal cowness in the perception of a specific cow. And
since there is no cognition of both a qualified thing and its qualifier, it is no use paying any attention
to the reason. For the exemplary inference from ‘smoke on a mountain’ to ‘fire on a mountain’, the
corresponding argument would be that the ‘mountain qualified by smoke’ is shown not to exist, so that
the inference becomes futile. For Ratnakīrti’s stance on the relation of qualifier and qualified, cf. the
argument in § 28 on page 25.

¹⁵⁶These examples show that it is possible to have a cognition of something that is qualified without
grasping a qualifier that is different from the thing: a pot is not different from its own form, and cowness
is not different from the universal that it is. Since it is therefore possible that a qualified cognition (*hetu*)
can occur independently of a separate qualifier (*sādhya*), the reason is ambiguous, *anaikāntika*. Cf. the
notes on an *anaikāntikahetu* in section 4.2 on page 94.

ready] established (*siddhasādhana*), because, in accepting a difference imagined as “A material entity possesses the genus cowness.” in the same way as [one thinks] “A pot has its own form.”, a relation of qualifier and qualified is postulated [even by us],¹⁵⁷ since common talk [such as] “This is a cow.” comes about due to an experience of that differentiated from non-cow.

E.21. § 48 So in this way a universal is not established. And the [valid cognition] eliminating the circle of additional attributes like universal, property, action etc.,¹⁵⁸ [is] a sharpened perception (*paṭupratyakṣa*) grasping a complete particular (*kevalavyaktigrāhaka*), or the well established non-perception of what is observable.¹⁵⁹

F.1. § 49 So in this way¹⁶⁰ only a positive element is the referent of a word. And this [positive element] is intended to be called the external object and the form of awareness.¹⁶¹ Amongst these, [there is] no affirmation [or] negation of the form of awareness in reality or in a relative sense, because of the fact that [it] is understood through the perception self-awareness,¹⁶² and because of non-determination (*anadhyavasāya*) [of the form of awareness]. Neither is there in reality a negation or affirmation of the external, because of its non-appearance in verbal apprehension. Precisely for this [reason] all properties (*dharma*) [of an object] are inexpressible in reality, because there is no determination [or] appearance [of them]. Therefore there is conventional affirmation and negation of an external [object] only, because otherwise there is the unwanted consequence of insufficiency for everyday interaction (*saṃvyavahāra*).¹⁶³

F.1.2. § 50 So in this way

an affirmation [and negation] in reality establishes neither a form of awareness nor an external [object].

For [affirmation and negation] conventionally [establish an object] only externally. But even conventionally [there is] no [such establishment] of a form (*ākṛti*).¹⁶⁴

¹⁵⁷Cf. § 28 (trl. on page 51) for this argument.

¹⁵⁸I.e., all things that can be understood as qualifying a particular. Ratnakīrti here hints at the entities that, according to the ontology of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika authors, can inhere in substances (*dravya*). Cf. the summary in Halbfass 1992: 70 ff.

¹⁵⁹Ratnakīrti here summarises his two main lines of attack on entities that exist separately from a particular but nevertheless are capable of qualifying it: a particular is not observed as having a separate qualifier, and there is no perceptual evidence for this qualifier. This corresponds to the two main polemical sections, § 10 to § 32 on pages 17–28 and § 33 to § 47 on pages 28–33 respectively.

¹⁶⁰This paragraph sums up Ratnakīrti’s own position. Cf. section 5.3 on page 121 for explanations of the issues mentioned in this paragraph.

¹⁶¹Cf. the same statement in § 16 on page 47.

¹⁶²For a discussion of Ratnakīrti’s ideas about self-awareness as relevant for conceptual cognition, cf. section 5.4 on page 132.

¹⁶³Cf. fn. 185 on page 63 and references given there for this unwanted consequence.

¹⁶⁴Cf. McCrea and Patil 2006: 338 f. for more on this verse’s context in the AP. Their translation of the verse is as follows: “There is no way of really affirming either the mental image or the external object. Conventionally [there is affirmation] only of externals, whereas even conventionally there is no [affirmation] of the mental image.” (McCrea and Patil 2006: 338)

§ 51 Through this [verse] what Dharmottara says uncommonly (*alaukika*), against G.1. scriptural (anāgama), and illogically (*atārīkīya*): “[There is] affirmation and negation of externalness that is superimposed.”¹⁶⁵ is also rejected (*apahastita*).

§ 52 If this (*iti*) [is objected:] “[If the thing to be determined does not appear in a determination (*adhyavasāya*),¹⁶⁶ then what is the meaning of [saying] “this [real thing] is determined?”¹⁶⁷ [You say] the meaning [is] “[something is] made an object of activity (*pravṛtṭi*viśayīkṛta), even though it does not appear.”¹⁶⁸ How [then] is there, when there is an unspecific nonappearance,¹⁶⁹ activity (*pravṛtṭi*) having a limited object (*niyata*viśaya) through an avoidance of other objects (*viśayāntaraparīhāra*)?” [then] it is said [in answer]: even though everything (*viśva*) is ungrasped (*agrhīta*), still there is activity (*pravṛtṭi*) that is indeed restricted to [its proper object,] such as water etc., because a concept, since [it] has a restricted form of awareness due to being produced by a restricted complex of causes, has a restricted capacity,¹⁷⁰ like smoke generates the cognition of a hidden fire.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁵Cf. DhAP 244.3-4: “sgrub pa dan dgag pa dag ni sgro bdag gañ žig phyi rol ñid du ñes par byas pa de dan ’brel pa yin te.” (Translation acc. to Frauwallner 1937: 266: “Dagegen wird eine Bejahung oder Verneinung mit dem Übertragenen verbunden, das als außen bestimmt wird.”) Note that in Ratnakīrti’s quote a Sanskrit equivalent for *ñes par byas pa* is missing. This position is illustrated by Dharmottara with the example of a rope that is mistaken for a snake: it is with regard to the superimposed snake, which is determined as external, that there is affirmation and negation. Cf. section 4.1 on page 89 for a translation of that example.

¹⁶⁶This criticism is expressed also in CAPV 133.23–24.

¹⁶⁷If *tadadhyavasitam* is interpreted as a compound, one could understand “...[saying] ‘[it is] determined through this [determination]?’”

¹⁶⁸This opinion is expressed, e.g., KBhSA₂ 73.9–12 (cf. chapter C on page 193 for a translation of the latter passage, as well as Woo 1999: 187). In CAPV 140.4–7, Ratnakīrti makes it clear that an object can be determined regardless of its ontological status:

*tasmād vastu vā ghaṭapaṭādi sandigdhavastu vā sādhakabādhakātīkrāntam, avastu vātmadikkālākṣaṇīkādikam adhyavasitam iti, apratibhāse ’pi pravṛtṭi*viśayīkṛtam ity arthaḥ. ayam eva cāropaikīkaraṇādhyavasāyābhedagrahādīnām arthaḥ sarvatra śāstre boddhavyaḥ.

Therefore, [the statement] that a real thing, like a pot, a cloth etc., or a doubtful thing, which goes beyond an establishing or refuting [means of valid cognition], or an unreal thing, like a soul, space time (*dikkāla*), an unmomentary thing, etc., is determined, means that, even though there is no appearance [of any of these], [each of these things] is made the object of activity.

And exactly this is the meaning of [terms] such as imposition, equation, determination, grasping as non-different etc., which should be heeded everywhere in the *Śāstra*.

¹⁶⁹I.e., the non-appearance of horse can not be distinguished from the non-appearance of cow.

¹⁷⁰Cf. the notes to § 36 (especially fn. 133 on page 55) for Ratnakīrti’s idea about how a concept is causally linked to things.

¹⁷¹The variants of this example in mss K and P are as follows:

K: ...like in the case of something that doesn’t exist. Even if [there is] absence of smoke, which is in the three worlds, where there is fire, nevertheless from that[, fire,] only smoke arises, but nothing else. (It is not obvious to me how *dhūmasya trailokyasyābhāvas* should be construed. Perhaps an emendation to *dhūmasya trailokyābhāvas* (understood as “absence of smoke in the three worlds”) would be a good idea.)

P: ...like, even though there is no [such thing as] smoke, pot, etc. when there is fire, smoke alone is created [by fire, but] not a pot etc.

G.6. § 53 For existing [things], [which] have restricted capacities,¹⁷² have natures completely ascertained by a means of valid cognition, [and] are not liable to be questioned as to a mixing of [their] capacities. Therefore, the state of determining this [object] (*tadadhyavasāyitva*) is, because of a relation to a specific form of awareness (*ākāraviśeṣayoga*), the state of being generative of the activity towards this [object] (*tatpravṛttijanakatva*). But we do not speak (*√brū*) of activity (*pravṛtti*) due to a superimposition (*āropa*) because of similarity (*sādrśya*),¹⁷³ so that there would be the possibility of falsification (*dūṣaṇāvakāśa*) by means of superimposition (*āropadvāra*) [either] of an external object on a form of awareness or of a form of awareness on an external object;¹⁷⁴ rather[, we say], an awareness (*buddhi*)—arising (*upajan*) only in virtue of (*vaśa*) the ripening of one’s own remaining impressions (*vāsanā*)—even though not seeing (*apaśayat*) an external object, brings forth (*ā-√tan*) activity towards an external object. Thus (*iti*), [it] is completely mistaken (*vipluta*).¹⁷⁵ So in this way a positive element (*vidhi*) is the referent (*artha*), which, qualified by the absence of others (*anyābhāvaviśiṣṭa*), is differentiated from that of another genus (*vijātyāvṛtta*). And only this [positive element] [which is] to be denoted by the word “exclusion” (*apoha*) is the referent of words, and the object (*viśaya*) of activity and inactivity (*pravṛttinivṛtti*). This is settled.

H.1. § 54 Here [there is] the formulation of a proof (*prayoga*):¹⁷⁶ All that, which is denoting (*vācaka*), has as [its] object a mere thing¹⁷⁷ that is determined [and] distinguished (*parāvṛtta*) from that of another form, as the expression “Water (*jala*) [is] here in a well (*kūpa*).”¹⁷⁸ And this [expression] having the form of a word like cow etc. is denoting (*vācaka*).¹⁷⁹ [This is] the logical reason of essential property (*svabhāvahetu*).¹⁸⁰ This [reason] is not unestablished (*asiddha*), because, even though there is no real relation

¹⁷²Apart from the similar passages quoted in the critical edition, an emendation of *niyataviśaya* to *niyataśakti* suggests itself also from context. For it is not clear to me how to construe *niyataviśaya*, just having been used by Ratnakīrti’s opponent as a *bahuvrīhi* compound in *niyataviśayā pravṛttiḥ* (in line 235 of the critical edition), with *bhāva* in this sentence, because things don’t have objects. But they can have capacities.

¹⁷³This is also discussed in CAPV 138.12–16.

¹⁷⁴Cf. the discussion of these possibilities, amongst others, in CAPV 133.23–135.4.

¹⁷⁵Following the passage that Ratnakīrti based himself on for the current discussion, AP 226.14–15 quotes PV 3 13b-c. Ratnakīrti quotes that verse in CAPV 138.17–18.

¹⁷⁶Cf. section 5.2 on page 114 for a discussion of this proof.

¹⁷⁷Patil 2009: 239 translates *vastumātra* as “thing-in-general”, which he takes to be the same “as ‘similarity classes’ and ‘constructed universals’.” (Patil 2009: 240) *vastumātra* is an odd term. *vastu* has been used by Ratnakīrti strictly in the sense of a real thing (cf., e.g., l. 74, or the argument in § 20). So here the word *mātra* must have some special significance that alters the import of *vastu* so far that Ratnakīrti is not claiming that a real thing is the object of words. In § 33, *mātra* was used in a similar meaning: from the word “cow” a mere dewlap, etc. is to be understood, i.e., a thing that is determined and differentiated from something else. A similar usage of *mātra* is seen in the argument about the *viśeṣanamātra* in § 45 and in § 47. There Ratnakīrti accepts a “mere qualifier”, which means an abstracted property of a thing, since that facilitates everyday activity.

¹⁷⁸For this example, cf. Krasser 1991: 55 f., fn. 91.

¹⁷⁹Patil (2009: 239) points out that even though the *pakṣa* of this inference is “something that “has the form of a word such as ‘cow[...]’” it should be understood as “the inferential/verbal awareness-event produced in the mind of a competent speaker of a language upon hearing a token utterance of an expression in that language.” Also see the arguments in section 5.3 on page 123 which show in what way “expression” is equivalent to a conceptual state of awareness.

¹⁸⁰The translation of *svabhāva* here follows the usage in Kellner 2010b.

of a denotable and denoting (*pāramāṛthikavācya**vācakahāva*) [according to] the rule stated earlier¹⁸¹, [this relation], made by determination (*adhyavasāyakṛta*), is necessarily (*avaśya*) to be accepted (*svīkartavyatva*) by all [those] engaged in everyday activity (*sarvavyavahārin*), for otherwise [there is] the unwanted consequence of the extermination of all usual activity (*sarvavyavahāroccheda*).¹⁸² Neither is that [reason] contradictory (*viruddha*),¹⁸³ because it exists in a similar instance (*sapakṣa*). Nor is [that reason] ambiguous (*anaikāntika*).¹⁸⁴ For [it is] like this: the others, averse (*anicchat*) to [our theory that] the object of words is the mere thing which is determined [and] excluded from that of a different genus (*adhyavasitavijātivyaṁvṛttavastumātraviṣayatva*)

pp ↓ [say]: | In reality

§ 55 that denoted (*vācya*) must be a particular (*svalakṣana*), an additional attribute (*upādhi*), a connection to an additional attribute (*upādhiyoga*), [something] possessing an additional attribute (*sopādhi*), or (*yadi vā*) must be a form (*ākṛti*) of awareness (*buddhi*),

up ↓ § 56 because there is no other way [for a word to have an object], and because, if H.3.3.2. there is no object [for a word], it is not possible that [a word] denotes. | [Answer:] To this [it is said]:

§ 57 There is no convention (*samaya*) for either the first [possibility, the particular or] the last [possibility, the form of awareness] because of the insufficiency (*°hāni*) of the capacity (*°śakti°*) for a result (*phala°*).¹⁸⁵ Even to the middle triad [of options convention is] not bound because of the lack (*°viraha*) of an additional attribute (*upādhi°*).¹⁸⁶

§ 58 In this way therefore, [the logical reason of] being denoting, which is excluded H.3.3.4. from the counter instances given the negation of a pervading [property] characterised by the state of having an object because there is no other [object] that is to be denoted, is

¹⁸¹This is probably referring back to l. 136–l. 137, p. 26 (cf. also the notes on Ratnakīrti's usage of *nyāya* in section 4.1 on page 83). Patil 2009: 241, fn. 111 carefully says that “[t]his seems to be referring to what precedes “*iti sthitam*,” RNĀ (AS 66.06-66.07)” which corresponds to l. 243, p. 36–l. 244. But I think that *iti sthitam* ends the discussion about what appears in determination (§ 51 to § 53 on pages 35–36), and, even if that is wrong, I don't see how the unreality of a denoter-denoted relation should be a consequence of the passage that says that the positive element can indeed be called exclusion, and is the object of everyday activity.

¹⁸²The same consequence resulted in § 49.

¹⁸³Cf. section 4.2 on page 93 for a *viruddhahetu*.

¹⁸⁴See fn. 156 on page 59, and section 4.2 on page 94 for what this means.

¹⁸⁵Particular and the mental construct can not be made an object of everyday activity, because they are incapable of a result in this respect: the particular is strictly unique, and the mental construct is private as well as a particular. Obviously result, *phala*, can not well mean causal efficacy here, otherwise this would be a rather controversial statement for a Buddhist thinker. Rather, the result mentioned here is a usefulness for everyday activity, as was said above in § 49 (trl. on page 60), and § 54 (trl. on this page): if there is no affirmation or negation of the conventional external object there would result an insufficiency for common usage.

¹⁸⁶Cf. section 4.1 on page 90 for some notes on this verse.

pervaded by the fact of [having] an object that is determined [and] external[, the property that is to be established].¹⁸⁷ Thus pervasion is established (*vyāptisiddhi*).

§ 59 First of all (*tāvat*), a referent (*artha*) is principally (*mukhya*) expressed (*ā-√khyā*) through words. In that [case], exclusion (*apoha*) [is] to be understood (*gamya*) due to being this [referent]'s quality (*tadguṇatva*). Further (*ca*), one referent [is] set up due to [being] determined, the other [referent] due to [being what] appears.¹⁸⁸ [But] In reality, nothing at all [is] to be expressed.¹⁸⁹

J. § 60 The Proof of Exclusion (*apohasiddhi*) is completed (*samāpta*). This [is the] work of the honourable *Mahāpaṇḍita Ratnakīrti*.

§ 61 May there be a long explanation (*prapañca*) for those who work (*kṛtin*) on exclusion (*apoha*). But the nonappearance (*asphuraṇa*) of a thing's own nature [is] the vulnerable point (*marman*). There, if [that problem is] not certain (*adr̥ḍha*), everything is shattered without effort (*ayatnaśīrna*), but, if certain, [everything] is well grounded indeed, at all events (*nanu tāvatā*).

§ 62 In a full (*sampurna*^o) night (*°rātri*^o) and two watches the [proof of] exclusion of [Ratna]kīrti was written (*likhita*) joyfully by Trailokyadatta from effort grounded in the highest being (*parātman*). Therefore (*atas*) this [text] is to be protected.

K. § 63 Good luck (*śubha*)!

¹⁸⁷By this the ambiguity under discussion is shown not to apply to the reason: All instances of denoting are instances where the object is one that is determined and excluded. For denoting can not occur without this sort of object, since all the other possible objects, i.e., those that the opponent is trying to promote as the word referent, have been shown to be unsuitable for denotation.

¹⁸⁸I.e. the external object and the form of awareness, cf. § 16 (trl. on page 47).

¹⁸⁹Cf. the argument in § 49 (trl. on page 60), and also the translation and interpretation in McCrea and Patil 2006: 341 ff.

Chapter 4

Additional comments on the *Apohasiddhi*

4.1 Notes on individual passages of the *Apohasiddhi*

Argument structure in other works of Ratnakīrti

Anantalal Thakur observed that in all works in the RNĀ “the discussion is started just in the way of a formal debate, as if the opponent is present before the author.” (Thakur 1957a: 14) Even though this is probably not true for all these texts,¹⁹⁰ the opening section of the VyN does show this structure:

VyN

The structure of the opening passage up to VyN 5*.7 *atrocyate* is quite similar to that of the *Apohasiddhi*. It consists of a presentation of other opinions (those of the followers of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, of Trilocana, and Vācaspati), interspersed with Buddhist objections.¹⁹¹ The perspective in this whole section is that of the opponent, e.g., *asmākaṃ tu* refers not to Buddhists in general, but to Trilocana and people committed to his position. As an example, here is the structure of the presentation of Trilocana’s ideas in VyN 2*.1–16:

- pp ↓ • | *trilocanas tv āha ...*
- up ↓ • | *atha ...eveti,*
- pp ↓ • | *nanu ...*
- up ↓ • | *atha ...*
- pp ↓ • | *evam api asmākaṃ tu ...*

Notes to § 2

It is not obvious how the explanations of *anyāpoha* are linked to the different meanings of *apoha*.

¹⁹⁰At least for the CAPV the same can not be said. It starts with the statement of Ratnakīrti’s own claim and various other views (CAPV 129.7–21), presents the central inference (CAPV 129.22–24), and then starts a discussion of this inference. The SJS does not conform with Thakur’s statement either, acc. to the analysis in Bühnemann 1980: xxix ff.

¹⁹¹Cf. the analysis given in Lasic 2000b: 73–75.

Ratnakīrti offers four interpretations for the term *anyāpoha*, the first three of which he calls etymological derivations (*vyutpatti*):

1. *idam anyasmād apohyate*. (This is excluded from another.)
2. *asmād anyad apohyate*. (Another is excluded from this.)
3. *asminn anyad apohyate*. (In this another is excluded.) These are the three etymological derivations (*vyutpatti*).
4. *apohanam apohaḥ*. (Exclusion is excluding.)

These four ways of understanding *apoha* are stated to be the reasons for calling three things *apoha*:

1. *viṣṭīvyāvṛtta bāhya*, the external object excluded from what is not of its kind.
2. *buddhyākāra*, the form of awareness.
3. *anyavyāvṛttimātra*, the mere differentiation from others.

The last element here, the mere differentiation from others, is explained by the fourth understanding of *apoha*, that as *apohana*, the act or process of excluding, and is not related to the etymological explications.

The question is, therefore, how *anyāpoha* in the first and second sense should be aligned with the three etymological explications. The options are as follows:

1. The three derivations all lead to *apoha* as meaning the external object (*bāhyam eva*), and form of awareness (*buddhyākāra*) has no explanation.
2. The three derivations all explain both the external object and the form of awareness.
3. Two of the three derivations explain the external object, the third the form of awareness, or vice versa.

To judge which option is most suitable, it is helpful to survey the development of this threefold distinction.¹⁹²

The earliest known version of these three forms of *anyāpoha* is found in the PVT. It is found, in various forms, also in the TSP, the PVSVT, the AP and the TBh.

As recently shown by Ishida (2011b: 206) “it has become clear that Śākyabuddhi and Śāntarakṣita adopt almost the same structure to classify the *anyāpoha*, but Śāntarakṣita has a more developed understanding concerning the meaning of words.”

The situation presented by Śākyabuddhi in his comment on PV 1 179 is rather straight forward: The external particular, excluded from everything else, corresponds to understanding *anyāpoha* as “*anyo ’pohyate ’sminn iti*” (PVT_{Fr} 207.1–2). Simple other-exclusion follows from understanding “*anyāpohanam anyāpoha iti*” (PVT_{Fr} 207.5). Lastly, an understanding of *anyāpoha* as “*anyo ’pohyate ’neneti*” (PVT_{Fr} 207.7) corresponds to exclusion as an appearance in awareness.

In the TSP, the situation is less clear. As noted in Ishida 2011b: 202, fn. 12, a statement of an etymological analysis supporting one of the three forms of exclusion is given TSP₂ 391.12–22, where Kamalaśīla appends it to the explanation that the name exclusion is applied to the object’s reflection in awareness because the reflection is

¹⁹²Akamatsu 1983: 171, fn. 22 provides ample material for tracing this distinction back to Dharmakīrti, as well as a sketch of its development. Other studies on this topic include Kajiyama 1998: 122, fn. 333 (but see Akamatsu 1983: 173 ff. for a criticism of some of these points), Dunne 2004: 131 f., and Ishida 2011b. Cf. table 4.1 on the facing page for an overview of the various positions taken by Buddhist authors.

Table 4.1: Threefold classifications of *apoha*

Text	vyāvṛttasvalakṣaṇa	anyavyavacchedamātra	buddhipratibhāsa/ākāra
PVṬ _{Fr}	anyo 'pohyate (PVṬ _{Fr} 207.1–2)	anyāpohanam anyāpoha iti (PVṬ _{Fr} 207.5)	anyo 'pohyate 'neneti (PVṬ _{Fr} 207.7)
PVṬ ₁	'di las gṛān daṇ gṛān sel bar byed pa	gṛān gcod pa	'dis gṛān sel bar byed pa
TS ₂	paryudāsa (TS ₂ 1003b) / anya- viśleṣabhāvataḥ (TS ₁ 1009cd)	prasajyapratishedha (TS ₂ 1009a)	paryudāsa (TS ₂ 1003c)
TSP ₂	anyasmād vijāṭiyād viśleṣo vyāvṛttis tasya bhāvāt (TSP ₂ 392.8–9)		apohyata iti apoho 'nyasmād apoho 'nyāpoha iti (TSP ₂ 391.14)
PVSVṬ	apohyate 'sminn iti (PVSVṬ 114.21)	apohanam apoha ity (PVSVṬ 114.20)	apohyate 'neneti (PVSVṬ 114.19)
TBh ₂	apohyate 'smād anyad vijāṭiyam iti (TBh ₂ 52.9)	apohanam apoha iti (TBh ₂ 52.12)	apohyate pṛthak kriyate 'smin bud- dhyākāre vijāṭiyam (TBh ₂ 52.10–11)

different from other reflections.¹⁹³ The other two things that can be called exclusion, an external thing and mere exclusion, are also upheld, but no etymological explanations corresponding to those given by Śākyabuddhi are offered.¹⁹⁴ It would thus appear that in the TSP, whilst a form of threefold other-exclusion is maintained, it is not systematically linked to an etymological analysis in such a way that it would help understand the intent of Ratnakīrti's introductory paragraph (§ 2).

Kaṇakagomin also refers to three types of exclusion, but, unlike Śākyabuddhi, he does so in his comment on PV 1 41 (cf. section A.2 on page 166).¹⁹⁵ His classification corresponds to that of Śākyabuddhi: The form of awareness is called exclusion because “by it [another] is excluded”, mere negation is called exclusion because “[the act of] excluding is exclusion”, and a particular is called exclusion because “for it [another] is excluded”.¹⁹⁶

Jñānaśrīmitra explains:

AP 202.12-14: *yat punar anyasmād apohyate, apohyate 'nyad asmin veti vijātivāyārttaṃ bāhyam eva buddhyākāro vānyāpoha*¹⁹⁷ *iti gīyate. tena na kaścid upayogaḥ, apohanāmnā vidher eva vivakṣitatvāt, na ca nāmāntarakaraṇe vastunaḥ svarūpaparāvṛttiḥ.*

Furthermore, because of [the expressions] “it is excluded from another, another is excluded, or in this [another is excluded]”,¹⁹⁸ either the external [object] itself, differentiated from that of another kind, or the form of awareness is called other-exclusion. This [explanation] is useless, since through the designation “exclusion” only an affirmation is intended, and, if a thing is called by another name, there is no change of [its] own nature.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹³Cf. section B.10 on page 189.

¹⁹⁴Cf. the assessments and translated passages in Ishida 2011b: 202–203.

¹⁹⁵Śākyabuddhi cites PV 1 40cd in his explanation, though, cf. PVT_{Fr} 207.3. For the gist of Kaṇakagomin's commentary on PV 1 179, cf. Ishida 2011b: 205, fn. 21: Kaṇakagomin refers only to two forms of exclusion, the particular and exclusion itself, and does not give any etymological explanations. Therefore, this passage is of little relevance for the discussion here.

¹⁹⁶PVSVT 114.19–21: *kalpitaś cākāro 'pohāśritatvād apoha ucyate. apohyate 'neneti vā. anyanivṛttimātraṃ tv arthād ākṣiptam apohanam apoha ity ucyate(.) svalakṣaṇaṃ tv apohyate 'sminn ity apoha ucyate.* (Trl. section A.2.)

¹⁹⁷JN_{ms} 8b6 reads *buddhyākāro vā 'nyā°* (i.e., supporting *vānyā°*) against *buddhyākāro 'nyā°* AP 202.13.

¹⁹⁸I thank Hisataka Ishida for discussing this passage with me. He had the good idea of putting a lot of emphasis on the fact that *vā* is in a position that indicates three rather than two alternatives. If only two alternatives had been intended by Jñānaśrīmitra here, the placement of *vā* would be expected to be after the first word of the second alternative, perhaps resulting in something like this: *...anyasmād apohyate, apohyate vānyad asminn iti*. And if understood as expressing the same three alternatives, Ratnakīrti's corresponding passage can be understood as a clearer restatement of the same point, rather than as offering a different kind of classification. The parallels would then be as follows (AP = AS₃): *anyasmād apohyate = anyasmād apohyate, apohyate 'nyad = asmād vānyad apohyate, asmin = asmin vānyad apohyate*.

¹⁹⁹Cf. also Katsura 2011: 125, and the references given there: Dunne 2004, and to a Japanese article by Toru Funayama (an English summary can be found in Funayama 2000). Also see Ishida 2011b, as well as Patil 2008b: 6, fn. 14: “This grammatical analysis of exclusion (*apoha*) seems to have begun with Śākyabuddhi, in his commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*, the *Pramāṇavārttika-ṭīkā* (See PVT ad *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV 1), *Svārthānumāna* v. 169). Kaṇakagomin, another commentator on Dharmakīrti's text, also mentions it in his *Pramāṇavārttika-svavṛtti-ṭīkā* (PVSVT), as do Śāntarakṣita and his commentator Kamalaśīla in their independent works the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and *Tattvasaṃgraha-*

Here, obviously, the three etymological explanations are not as clearly differentiated as in the interpretations of Śākyabuddhi and Kaṇvakagomin. Basically there is the same problem as for the passage in Ratnakīrti: Both the external object and the form of awareness are understood as derived from three ways of analyzing exclusion. The fourth, purely negative interpretation of exclusion, is not mentioned in the AP, as far as I can see.

In the TBh, the relevant passage runs:

[TBh₂ 52.7–14] *nanu ko 'yam apoho nāma ? yathādhyāvasāyaṃ bāhya eva ghaṭādir arthaḥ apoha ity abhidhīyate, apohyate 'smād anyad vijātīyam iti kṛtvā. yathāpratibhāsaṃ buddhyākāro²⁰⁰ 'pohaḥ, apohyate pṛthak kriyate 'smin buddhyākāre vijātīyam iti kṛtvā. yathātattvaṃ nivr̥ttimātram prasajyarūpo 'pohaḥ, apohanam apoha iti kṛtvā. nanu yathādhyāvasāyaṃ vidhir eva, tarhi kevalo viśaya ity āgatam. na[,] anyāpohaviśiṣṭo²⁰¹ vidhir abhipretaḥ.*

pp ↓

| Now, what is this called exclusion? According to determination, a truly external object like a pot etc. is designated as “exclusion”, by thinking “Another, which is of another class, is excluded from it.” According to appearance, a form of cognition is [designated as] exclusion, by thinking “That of another class is excluded, [i.e.,] singled out in this form of awareness.” According to reality, mere absence is exclusion having the nature of absolute negation, by thinking “exclusion [is the act of] excluding.” Now, if according to determination [exclusion is] only a positive element, then an object alone is understood. | No[, none of these is correct]. A positive element qualified by other-exclusion is meant.²⁰²

up ↓

What, then, is the conclusion that can be drawn from these passages for § 2? Apparently Ratnakīrti clarified Jñānaśrīmitra’s analysis (“...*asmād vānyad apohyate* ...”,

pañjikā (TS and TSP). For a parallel passage in the work of Ratnakīrti’s teacher, Jñānaśrīmitra, see JNA (202.12–212.14).”

²⁰⁰TBh₂ 52.10 f. reads *buddhyākāro vā ...prasajyarūpo vā* Since the position of the second *vā* is somewhat awkward (one would expect *nivr̥ttimātram vā*), I think the reading without these *vā*-s, as attested in TBh₁ 28.27 f., is better.

²⁰¹Read *anyāpohaviśiṣṭo* acc. to TBh₁ against *apohaviśiṣṭo* TBh₂.

²⁰²Cf. the trl. in Kajiyama 1998: 122 f., as well as Akamatsu 1983: 171 ff., n. 22 for valuable notes. Amongst other things, Akamatsu 1983 notes that Kajiyama 1966 did not translate the qualifier “according to reality”. Akamatsu 1983: 174 f. then argues that Mokṣākaragupta’s position reflects that of Jñānaśrīmitra, and not that of Ratnakīrti, because the three qualifiers, i.e., “according to appearance, determination, and reality” are essential to the AP: “Pour Jñānaśrīmitra, les trois possibilités de l’interprétation de l’apoha ont été les trois éléments les plus importants pour composer sa théorie sur l’Apoha. ...C’est pourquoi, ces trois sortes d’interprétation de l’apoha ne peuvent être pas fausses.” (Akamatsu 1983: 175) I can not see how this can be right. Neither Jñānaśrīmitra nor Mokṣākaragupta consider these interpretations to be correct: In the AP, it is a part of the *pūrvapakṣa*, as Akamatsu 1983: 172 notes. Also in the AS this is part of an objection, and is answered by a clear no and Ratnakīrti’s definition of what exclusion is (cf. l. 31, p. 15). So it is difficult to see how Mokṣākaragupta could have taken any one of these three interpretations to be correct. Whether this passage owes more to the AP than to the AS is also questionable: Mokṣākaragupta does not employ the first of Jñānaśrīmitra’s (or Ratnakīrti’s) alternatives, “*anyasmād apohyate*” (AP 202.12). Instead, he adduces the analysis “*apohyate 'smād anyad*” (TBh₂ 52.9) in order to show how an external object is meant by exclusion, which is stated in this explicit form only by Ratnakīrti. Also, the three qualifiers are not without basis in the AS (cf. section 5.4 on page 130 for the two qualifiers “according to appearance and determination”, and § 49 for what words really refer to acc. to Ratnakīrti).

1. 3 in § 2, instead of AP 202.12 *apohyate 'nyad*).²⁰³

One problem remains. In the TBh there is a clear difference to all etymological interpretations other than those of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti: It associates the locative construction (*apohyate ... 'smin buddhyākāre vijātīyam*, “...in this form of awareness that of another genus is excluded”) with the form of awareness, and not, as PVT_{Fr} and PVSVT do, with the external object.²⁰⁴ Considering how much the TBh is indebted to the writings of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti,²⁰⁵ it could well be possible that Mokṣākaragupta saw his interpretation justified in his predecessors’ texts. If that is the case, and if it is a correct interpretation, then the most reasonable way would be to understand Ratnakīrti (and per force Jñānaśrīmitra) as follows: *anyasmād apohyate* and *asmād vānyad apohyate*²⁰⁶ lead to an understanding of the external object as exclusion, and *asmin vānyad apohyate* to an understanding of the form of awareness as exclusion.²⁰⁷

Taking these considerations together, what can be said about Ratnakīrti’s passage? It seems that there are two ways to interpret it, both of which have difficulties: following Mokṣākaragupta’s understanding, and ignoring the problem that he only uses two of the three possible understandings, the analysis of *anyāpoha* as “this is excluded from another” and as “from this another is excluded” can be taken to support the external object differentiated from that which is of a different genus, and its analysis as “in this another is excluded” would explain the form of awareness. The alternative is this: to give Mokṣākaragupta’s formulation less weight, and take the three forms of etymological derivation as summing up the tradition up to Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti concerning the external object and the form of awareness. I tend towards this last option. For, the positions in the TSP on the one hand, and in the PVT and the PVSVT on the other would be loosely summed up in Ratnakīrti’s statement as follows: TSP₂ analyzes the form of

²⁰³Given that this passage is an objection, it could of course be that another text, where these variations are originally to be found, is being cited. But this passage is quite closely related to AP 202.12–13, which is a part of the introductory objection in that text. And it is unclear where that objection comes from. Kajiyama 1998: 122 f., fn. 333 concludes that “...Jñānaśrīmitra ...must have cited these [passages—PMA] from an author unknown to us.” Akamatsu 1983: n. 22, p. 175, on the other hand, surmises: “...mais il [le *pūrvapakṣa* de l’AP—PMA] est ...l’objection imaginaire produite par Jñānaśrīmitra lui-même, et nous ne pouvons pas le considérer comme une citation de quelque auteur.” This view is also voiced in Patil 2003: 245, n. 7. The character of the AS’s textual dependence on the AP in this passage supports, it seems to me, Akamatsu’s and Patil’s conclusions: Ratnakīrti obviously feels free to rearrange the arguments found in the AP, whereas most of the other objections shared by the AP and the AS are actually quite clearly attributed to their authors, and, at least in the cases where the source texts can be identified, quoted quite faithfully.

²⁰⁴TSP₂ is of little help here, since no etymological derivation using the locative formulation is used. In the TSP the interpretation as *buddhyākāra* is associated with the ablative construction.

²⁰⁵Cf. the argument in fn. 300 on page 114.

²⁰⁶The only reason for grouping these two options together is that they share ablative constructions. This is of course not a very good reason, but if taking the TBh seriously in this point, I see no alternative. For there must be a division into two groups, and an ablative construction must be associated with the external object, and a locative one with the form of awareness.

²⁰⁷This is also the understanding reflected in the translation of Jñānaśrīmitra’s passage in Akamatsu 1983: 171, n. 22. A second possibility is that the interpretation in the TBh is simply not correct. It could be imagined that, Mokṣākaragupta, facing the same problem of how to understand these two explanations of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti, decided to drop the first alternative, *anyasmād apohyate*, and assign the remaining two, *asmād vānyad apohyate* and *asmin vānyad apohyate*, to the external object and the form of awareness respectively. But I believe that the premiss, that Mokṣākaragupta misinterpreted the very two writers he drew much of his material from for the TBh, very unlikely.

awareness as “exclusion from another”²⁰⁸, and the latter two analyze the external object as “in this another is excluded.” As for the second of Ratnakīrti’s alternatives, “another is excluded from this”, it could well be that it was endorsed in a text not known to us.

Notes to § 3

In this paragraph the three positions on what it means to say that exclusion is the referent of words are refuted. The discussion of the “negative” position is rather clear, but the reduction, before that, of the two other options to a merely “positive” position might need some comments:

Only a positive thing

The first two positions are refuted only by pointing out that, if other-exclusion is either an external thing that is differentiated from that of another kind, or a form of awareness, then it is only a positive element, i.e., a real entity, that is meant by “exclusion.”

The passage is too succinct to allow any precise determination of whose (or if anyone’s) positions are meant here. But a few pointers might be in order:

That something external, excluded from what is of another kind, is the word referent, could refer to any of the external-realist theories on the word referent.²⁰⁹ All three elements of the word referent as adopted in the Nyāya school of thought, the particular (*vyakti*), the class (*jāti*), and the form (*ākṛti*), are external to the cognizing subject and real. For the Vaiśeṣika, the very categories of reality, “...padārthas [...] are the sum total of all that ‘supports’ the meaning of words and guarantees that words are not mere words, but that they have a denotative value.” (Halbfass 1992: 138) Within the various strands of Mīmāṃsā, the form (*ākṛti*), interpreted as a universal, was taken to be the primary word referent.²¹⁰ But none of these views seems to be a clean fit for the option that *apoha*, and thus the word referent, is only “something external.”²¹¹ That the form of awareness is the referent of a word is probably Bhartṛhari’s view.²¹²

Additionally, there are some precursors in *apoha*-treatises to the problem that *apoha* can be reduced to something external or the form of awareness:

Dharmottara makes it an important point to show that *apoha* is neither external nor internal.²¹³

²⁰⁸Cf. the corresponding rows in table 4.1 on page 67, and Ishida 2011b: 202, fn. 12.

²⁰⁹For a clear and general overview of the Nyāya’s, Vaiśeṣika’s, and Mīmāṃsā’s theories cf. Taber 1998b. The classification of these views as external-realist here is based on the discussion in Dravid 1972: chapters 2 and 3.

²¹⁰Cf. Dravid 1972: chapter 3, Taber 1998b, and Hattori 1979: 72, n. 21.

²¹¹The very similar passage in the TBh reads “...*bāhya eva ghaṭādyarthaḥ apoha iti abhidhīyate*” (TBh₂ 52.8), unequivocal in understanding “external” as common-sense objects, such as a pot etc.

²¹²Cf. Ogawa 1999, as well as Hattori 1993, and Kataoka 2009: 489. If Ogawa 1999 is correct, then also the previous view, that an external thing is the word referent, could be attributed to Bhartṛhari. Moreover, in the TSP ad TS₂ 882, Kamalaśīla ascribes the view that a substance (*dravya*) is the referent of words to Vyāḍi, cf. also Herzberger 1986: 73 f.

²¹³Cf. the programmatic statement in the introductory verse to DhAP (see DhAP, Steinkellner 1976, Hattori 2006: 63 f., and Ishida’s translation cited in Kataoka 2009: 486, fn. 17).

The position that the referent of a word is the form of awareness is discussed in the TSP ad TS₂ 890 (cf. trl. in section B.5 on page 183), where it becomes clear that this view is very similar to Bhartṛhari's position (or one of his positions).²¹⁴

According to the exposition of the *apoha* theories as found in the NM, it could also be that a reduction to an external thing and a form of awareness was the opponent's interpretation of Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's position respectively. In the introductory essay in Kataoka 2009, the analysis of Jayanta's exposition leads to this statement: "It is evident that Jayanta makes clear the difference of the three views by distinguishing the three phases: external → internal → neither external nor internal." (Kataoka 2009: 483).

Ratnakīrti's answer to the objection as a whole (§ 8) will be to the effect that none of these elements, external thing, form of awareness, and exclusion, are free of errors when individually taken to be the word referent. In consequence, he adopts what can be seen as a combination of the three (*kin tv anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ*, l. 31 in § 8).

***pratibhāsabheda and vastubheda* (ad § 21)**

Ratnakīrti's point here is that the difference between two objects is founded on the difference of their two natures, and this difference is founded on the difference of the objects' appearance in two different ways. Akamatsu 1983: 71 f. adds the following explanation to his translation of the corresponding passage AP 208.25: "Donc, les objets qui ont les manifestations des images différentes dans la connaissance doivent avoir les natures propres différentes, et donc ils ne peuvent être une seule et même chose." So, if there are different appearances, these appearances necessarily are of different objects.

Concerning the relation between the difference of appearances and the difference of real things, AP 209.4–209.14 gives the following inference:

[AP 209.2–209.14] [Objection:] | But surely there is no difference in a tree even in the case where one and the same tree has a difference in the appearance as clear and unclear to two [people], one close by and the other in a distant place, because there is no difference in the causal efficacy [of the tree]. [For,] the difference in appearance that is really (*eva*) assisted by (*upakṛta*) a difference in causal efficacy is [that which] differentiates. And in this case there is no difference in the causal efficacy. So how should the object of a cognition generated by (*janitajñānaviśaya*) the sense faculties [or] words [i.e. verbal cognition], like a cow etc., share (*bhāḥ*) [this] difference?

pp ↓

| [Answer:] We do not say that a difference in appearance is restricted to different things, but that [it] is restricted to the absence of the fact that there is the same object [for both appearances]. For it is so: Any appearance that, with regard to some real thing, is contrary to the appearance in a perceptual cognition does not have the same object as this [appearance in a perceptual cognition], like the appearance of a cloth [is contrary] to a [perceptual] grasping of a pot, or like the appearance of yellow [is contrary] to grasping a conch shell. And in the same way, with respect to a cow, the appearance

up ↓

²¹⁴Cf. Hattori 1993: 139 f., and Kataoka 2009: 488.

at the time of a conceptual cognition is contrary to the appearance in a perceptual cognition. This (*iti*) [is a case of] perceiving [something] opposed to the pervading element.²¹⁵ For, the fact of there being the same object [for both types of cognitions] is pervaded by the non-difference of appearances, observed [here] as [something] is observed by the left eye and the other[, right eye]. But if there were no pervasion,²¹⁶ there would be another perception, having an opposed appearance, or²¹⁷ there would be a real thing having two natures. And none of these two is [the case]. Therefore, there is indeed pervasion. And when a cognition, which is different according to [its] basis [that is either in the sense faculties or in concepts,] is made the locus [of pervasion], a difference of appearance is established. Therefore, where there is a difference of appearance accompanied by a difference of causal efficacy etc., there there is a difference of the real thing, as in the case of pot and cloth. Moreover, [a difference in appearance] occurring without this companion by definition refutes the fact of there being the same object. Thus here one appearance is only erroneous, like the appearance of yellow in the case of a conch shell.

Analysis

Jñānaśrīmitra's argument here is that the fact that perceptual and conceptual awareness do not have the same object can be ascertained through *vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi*, the apprehension of that opposed to the pervading element. This is one of the ways in which a person can correctly infer the absence of something. The explanation of this type of non-perception in TBh₂ 30.9–11 is as follows:²¹⁸

*vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhir yathā—nātra tuṣārasparśaḥ, dahanāt. prati-
ṣedhyasya tuṣārasparśasya vyāpakaṃ śītam, tasya viruddho dahanaviśe-
ṣaḥ [...] tasyehopalabdhīḥ.*

The perception of that opposed to the pervading element [is] like this:
There is no feeling of cold here, because of a fire. Coldness is the pervader of the feeling of cold, which is to be negated; that contradictory to this [coldness] is a particular fire; of that there is a perception in this place.

A comparison of the elements involved is given in table 4.2 on the following page. Accordingly, Jñānaśrīmitra's argument can be paraphrased as follows: In a perceptual and a conceptual awareness, two different appearances are observed (*hetu*). The fact that there are two different appearances is, obviously, contradictory to the fact that there are not different appearances. And since all cases, where there is the same object for two cognitions, imply that there are no differences in the respective appearances, these two cognitions can not have the same object.

So what do Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti mean by this statement: “We do not say that a difference in appearance is restricted to different things, but that [it] is restricted to the absence of the fact that there is the same object [for both appearances].”? The main intention is to state that different appearances prove the absence of the same object,

²¹⁵See section 4.1 for an explanation.

²¹⁶Read *avyāptis tu* acc. to JNĀ_{ms} 11b1 against *avyāptitas tu* AP 209.10.

²¹⁷Read *vā* acc. to JNĀ_{ms} 11b2 against *ca* AP 209.11.

²¹⁸See Kellner 1997: 103 ff. and Kajiyama 1998: 151 ff., Appendix 1 for more background on non-perception, and Kajiyama 1998: 83, fn. 220 for this specific type.

Table 4.2: Structure of *vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi*

logical role	TBh ₂	AP
hetu	dahana	pratibhāsa-bheda
sādhya	a-tuṣārasparśa	ekaviṣayatva-a-bhāva
pakṣa	iha	jñāna
vyāpaka	śīta	pratibhāsa-a-bheda
vyāpya	tuṣārasparśa	ekaviṣayatva
contradictory to vyāpaka	dahana	pratibhāsa-bheda

but not the presence of two different objects.²¹⁹ This restriction has, as spelled out by Ratnakīrti in the last two sentences of § 21, consequences as to what can be known from the fact that two cognitions have different appearances of their objects: depending on whether there is causal efficacy of the appearing objects or not, the two cognitions either have different real things as their objects, as in the case of a pot and a cloth, or one of the appearances is wrong (i.e., has no real thing as its object), as the appearance of yellow in the case of the white conch. For Ratnakīrti, this differentiation will allow the argument (in § 22) that a conceptual cognition can have an object which is both different from the object of perception and not a real thing.

Common to existence and non-existence (*bhāvābhāvasādhāranya* ad § 22–§ 24)

About the argument that a word applies to its objects irrespective of the existence or non-existence of this object, Katsura 1986: 174 f. wrote:

This argument also stems from Dharmakīrti....Dharmottara utilized it in a skillful and systematic way in his *Apohaprakaraṇa*....Then he was severely criticized by Vācaspatimiśra,...who in turn was criticized by Jñānaśrīmitra.

In this context, Katsura (1986: 180, n. 23) refers to PV_M 4 223–236 (which is very similar to PVin 2 15–28).²²⁰ Akamatsu 1983: 211, n. 103 refers explicitly to PV_M 4 228, and Ogawa 1999: 275, fn. 17 to PV_M 4 226 and 228. The most relevant passage in Dharmottara's DhAP is, approximately,²²¹ DhAP 241.11–244.16. The arguments found there were criticised by Vācaspatimiśra, esp. NVTṬ 444.2–6, and the particular problem of a word's object being common to existence and non-existence is mentioned also by Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, NM_{K2} 467.8–9.

Akamatsu 1983: 211 ff., n. 103, traces the origin of the inference in the background of the discussion found in § 22 and § 24 to DhAP 244.10–16.²²²

²¹⁹For if there were two different objects, a realist can be imagined to argue that one is the particular, the other the universal. This would obviously be a very unwelcome consequence for an *Apohavādin*.

²²⁰These verses are translated and discussed in Steinkellner 1979: 41 ff.

²²¹Katsura 1986: 180, n. 24 refers to DhAP 244.10 ff. Akamatsu 1983: 212 ff., n. 103 draws on various passages from DhAP 241.22–244.16.

²²²Akamatsu (1983: 215) says that this inference is cited in NVTṬ 442.16–18. He supports this claim by saying that Frauwallner 1937: 267 indicates this dependency, but there is no such indication there. Nevertheless, the inference found in NVTṬ 442.16–18 is indeed quite similar to Dharmottara's, but is not, as far as can be judged on the basis of the Tibetan translation of Dharmottara's inference, a faithful quotation. Cf. the trl. in section 4.1 on page 76.

The argument as given by Dharmottara is as follows:

[DhAP 244.10–24] *gañ žig dños po dañ dñgos po med pa thun moñ du žen pas ñes par 'dzin pa de ni gcig las ldog pa ñes pa lhur byed pa yin te | dper na bum pa ma yin par šes pas bum pa ma yin par ñes par 'dzin pa na yod dam med ces dños po dañ dños po med pa thun moñ du ñes par 'dzin par byed pa bžin no || rnam par rtog pa thams cad kyi kyan dños po dañ dños po med pa dag gi rañ bžin thun moñ du ñes par 'dzin par byed do || gtan tshigs 'di ma grub pa ni ma yin te | rnam par rtog pa gñis ka'i thun moñ gi rañ bžin du dmigs par ñams su myoñ bas grub pa'i phyir ro || snar bśad pa'i tshul gyis thun moñ du 'dzin pa'i rgyu mtshan ni gcig las ldog pa lhur ñes pa ñid yin te | de ni rgyu mtshan med pa ma yin la | rgyu mtshan gžan yañ mi dmigs pa'i phyir ro || de la mi mthun pa'i phyogs la 'jug na khyab par byed pa rgyu mtshan dañ ldan pa ñid med par 'gyur ba'i phyir khyab par byed pa mi dmigs pas mi mthun pa'i phyogs las ldog pa na thun moñ du 'dzin pa ldog pa gcig gi mthar thug pa la gnas pa'i phyir khyab pa grub po |*

What ascertains [something] by grasping [it] as common to existence and non-existence, that only determines the differentiation from some [other thing], like a cognition [of something] as not-a-pot ascertains [something], in ascertaining [it] as not-a-pot, as common to existence and non-existence [since one can say] “It exists or does not exist.” And all conceptual cognitions ascertain [something] as having a nature common to both existence and non-existence. This logical reason is not unestablished, because a conceptual cognition is established by direct perception as apprehending [something] that has a nature common to these two. In the manner previously explained, the cause for grasping [something] as common [to both] is the ascertainment as only different from something [else], because this [ascertainment] is not without a cause, and another cause is not apprehended. In this regard, when there is a differentiation [of the pervaded element] from the counter-instance due to not apprehending the pervading element, because the pervading element[, i.e.,] the state of having a cause, does not exist considering/in²²³ the counter instance, the grasping as common [to existence and non-existence] occurs [only] for that based on some differentiation. Therefore pervasion is established.

The inference given at NVTṬ 442.16–20, which is referred to in NVTṬ 444.2–6, the passage quoted by Ratnakīrti in § 24, runs like this (in the voice of an opponent, most likely Dharmottara):

tathā hi—yad bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇaṃ tadanyavyāvṛttirūpam²²⁴ eva, yathā amūrtatvam. tat khalu vijñāne ca śaśaviṣāṇe ca sādharmaṇam. tathā ca vivādādhyāsītā vikalpaviṣayā ghaṭapaṭādaya iti svabhāvaheṭuḥ. gaur asti gaur nāstīti hi bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇo gāvādir vikalpaviṣayo vidhirūpasvalakṣaṇavad bhāvāsādhāraṇye nāstīti anena na saṃbadhyate virodhāt.

²²³The import of the phrase 'jug na, as Frauwallner 1937: p. 266, fn. 2 notes, is not clear here.

²²⁴Read °rūpam eva acc. to NVTṬ_D 476.9 instead of °rūpayeva in NVTṬ 442.16.

For [it is] so: What is common to existence and nonexistence, that has only the nature of exclusion from others, like incorporeality. That [incorporeality] indeed is common to cognition[, which exists,] and a hare's horn[, which does not exist]. And the objects of conceptual cognitions, which are subject to discussion, like pot, cloth, etc. are like this. This [is an inference with] a logical reason of the type “nature.” For [in the sentences] “a cow is, a cow isn't”, cow etc., the object of conceptual cognition, could not be connected with this [predicate], “is not”, if it were specific (*asādhāraṇa*) [only] to existence, like a particular that has a positive nature, because of a contradiction.

The logical elements used here are: the reason, *hetu*, is “common to existence and nonexistence,” what is to be proven, the *sādhya*, is “having the nature of exclusion from others,” and the site of the inference, the *pakṣa*, is “objects of conceptual cognition.” Dharmottara's inference is basically the same: Cognizing something as common to the referent's existence and non-existence can only work for exclusion from others, not for a real positive entity.

In the passage quoted in § 24 on page 23, Vācaspatimiśra criticizes this inference by showing that it is possible that a genus can be the object of conceptual cognitions. For, even though it is by its nature eternal and hence exclusively existent, it can be common to both existence and non-existence: a genus becomes applicable to both of these, so Vācaspatimiśra, depending on its connection to presently existing or presently not existing particulars. What he has thus shown is that the reason, being common to existence and non-existence, can occur in the counter instances, i.e., when something—in this case the genus—does not have the nature of exclusion from others. The reason thus becomes inconclusive (*anaikāntika*), because one can not be certain that it does not also qualify things, or objects of conceptual cognition, that do not have other-exclusion as their nature. The alternative²²⁵ is that the reason is “established in another way,” i.e., that being common to both existence and non-existence can be shown to pertain even when exclusion is not the nature of conceptual objects.²²⁶

The position of Kumārila's followers (ad § 25)

As Akamatsu 1983: 218, n. 112 has pointed out, the position that words apply to parts of their referent is found in ŚV Āv 64ab:

sāmānyāṃśān apoddhṛtya padam sarvaṃ pravarttate |

Every word applies [to its object] in extracting the part [that is] the universal.

Cf. also these arguments in the ŚV, where it is quite obvious that there is an awareness of a closely related problem:

ŚV Av 125ab: *nirbhāgo 'pi hi vastvātmā śabdair bhāgena gamyate |
na hi sacchabdavijñānād ghaṭādyarthaḥ pratīyate ||*

²²⁵If one accepts the reading *veti* (l. 110, p. 23) instead of *ceti* in NVTṬ 444.6.

²²⁶It is not really clear to me what *anyathāsiddha* means here. Glossing on NV 62.4–5 ad NSū 1.1.10, NVTṬ 276.7–8 notes: *asiddhārthatā anyathāsiddhārthatā hetoḥ hetuvacanasyety arthaḥ*. (The aim of the reason[, i.e.,] of the statement of the reason, is unestablished[, i.e., its] aim is established in another way. That is the meaning.) Cf. Gokhale 1992: 83 f. for a helpful example of this fallacious reason. He also gives this definition: “The *hetu* is called *anyathāsiddha* when the existence of *hetu* is capable of full explanation without reference to *sādhya*.” (Gokhale 1992: 84)

For [something] having the nature of a real thing is partially understood through words, even though it has no parts. For there is no cognition of an object such as pot etc. due to understanding the word “existing.”

ŚV Vak 309cd–311: *na ca śabdena sadbhāvas tasya cārthasya bodhitāḥ* ||

astitvādyanapekṣaṃ hi sāmānyam tena gamyate |
astiśabdaprayogo 'pi tenaivātropapadyate ||
jāter astitvanāstitve na ca kaś cid vivakṣati |
nityatvāl lakṣyamāṇāyā vyaktes te hi viśeṣaṇe ||

Neither is the real existence even (*ca*) of this object understood through a word. For a universal, which is independent of the state “it is” etc., is understood through this [word]. Also the usage of the word “it is”²²⁷ applies here[, i.e., to this pot,] only for this [reason]. No one wishes to express [either] the state “it is” [or] the state “it is not” of a genus, because [it] is permanent. For these two [states] are qualifiers of the particular that is characterized [by a genus].

In the commentary on ŚV Vak 309cd–310ab, Pārthasarāthimīśra explicitly addresses the problem of *sadasattvasādhāraṇa* (which I take to be the same as *bhāvābhāva-sādhāraṇa*):

NRĀ 657.5–8: *syād evaṃ yadi ghaṭaśabdena ghaṭasya sattvaṃ bodhitam syāt. sa tu sadasattvasādhāraṇam ghaṭasvarūpamātram abhidhatte. tatsvarūpam hi prādeśikatvād anityatvāc ca kvacit kadācic ca sat, kvacit kadācic cāsad iti sādharmaṇam sāmānyam iti, sadasattvasādhāraṇam ity arthaḥ.*

It would be so[, i.e., there would be a problem about being common to existence and non-existence,] if the existence of a pot were cognized through the word “pot”; but this [word] denotes a pot’s own form alone, common to the state of being and non-being. For, the own form of this [pot] exists in some places and at some times, and does not exist in some [other] places and at some [other] times because [this pot] has its own place and is not permanent. In this sense a universal is common, which means “common to being and non-being.”

***upakāra* (ad § 30)**

upakāra literally means assistance or support (cf. Böthlingk and R. Roth 1855: 237.1). Dharmakīrti discusses the relationship of property and property-bearer under the heading of an *upakāra* relation in PVSV 29.6–31.5 (trl. on pages 152–155), and in PVin 2 67.4–68.2 (trl. on the basis of the Tibetan text in Steinkellner 1979: 66–69).²²⁸

In § 30, it is “contact” (*pratyāsatti*) that is characterised as *upakāra*. Ratnakīrti says that the other options, such as inherence (*samavāya*) etc., for what this contact could be have been refuted. The question is what he means by “etc.” Various forms of contact

²²⁷“It is” translates the single Sanskrit 3rd person present word *asti*, lit. “he, she or it is.”

²²⁸Steinkellner (1979: 68, fn. 213) notes that *upakāra* was also used in a similar sense by Kumāṛila, and the interpretation of *upakārāt* in VP 3.3.5 by Houben (1995: 170, and 173 f.) is strikingly similar. See also PSV 5 5cd for a similar employment (*guṇopakārāt*).

between a property bearer and a property (one case of such contact being that of a particular with the universal qualifying it) were assumed by the realist schools: *samavāya* and *saṃyoga* by the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, and non-difference or a form of inherence by the Mīmāṃsakas.²²⁹ Since Ratnakīrti does not discuss the Mīmāṃsakas' opinions in the following paragraphs, I take “*samavāyāder*” (l. 139, p. 26) to mean *samavāya* and *saṃyoga*.

samavāya, mentioned by Ratnakīrti, is the sixth category in the Vaiśeṣika system (cf. Halbfass 1992: 70–75). There, it “[...] is the relationship between entities that cannot occur separately. It is the one omnipresent principle [...] that integrates parts and wholes, particulars and universals, substances, qualities, and motions.” (Halbfass 1992: 72) It was also endorsed by the Naiyāyika thinkers, and in the context of the *Apohasiddhi* it is relevant specifically as the relation that a universal, that which inheres, has to the particular, in which it inheres. Cf., e.g., NV 305.14–16:

[NV 305.15–16:] *katham tarhi gotvaṃ goṣu vartate? āśrayāśrayibhāve-
na. kaḥ punar āśrayāśrayibhāvaḥ? samavāyaḥ. tatra vṛttimad gotvaṃ,
vṛttiḥ samavāya itihapratyayahetutvād ity uktam.*

| How then²³⁰ does cowness exist in cows? | Through the relation of sup-
porter and supported. | What then is [this] relation of supporter and sup-
ported? | Inherence (*samavāya*). Here, cowness is that having existence
[in the particulars], [and] the existence is inherence. Therefore “because
[inherence] is the reason for the cognition ‘[cowness is] here [in a cow]’”
was said.

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saṃyoga, contact, which is a different form of contact assumed at first in Vaiśeṣika ontology, is a quality (*guṇa*), the second category in all the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems. It had a rather broad scope of application,²³¹ but the main difference to the category of inherence was that contact exists between two things that can exist separately from each other (such as between a stick and a stick-bearer).

For a criticism of *saṃyoga* and *samavāya* as the relation between a property and its bearer in the TS, cf. section B.2 on page 179.

***upādhi* (ad § 28 and § 30)**

Ratnakīrti, as well as Vācaspatimiśra in the passage quoted in § 30, use the term *upādhi* in a way strikingly different from that commonly ascribed to Naiyāyika authors. In the following, I would like to inquire what, if any, cause this term's different employment

²²⁹For the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā idea that properties and their bearers are different aspects of the same entity (e.g., *sthitam naiva hi jātyādeḥ paratvaṃ vyaktito hi naḥ*, ŚV Ps 141cd), cf. Taber 2005: 106–12. Cf. D'Sa 1980: chap. 12, and Taber 2005: 217 f., n. 40 for clear summaries of the ŚV Āv's main points, where the specific relation of a class to its particulars is discussed in the same terms. Cf. also Dravid 1972: 64–66 for some notes regarding the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā stance that the universal and that qualified by it are really distinct and related by a non-eternal *samavāya*.

²³⁰NSū 2.2.64, which Uddyotakara is discussing here, is one of a row of *sūtras* refuting that either *ākṛti*, *vyakti*, or *jāti* alone is the word referent (cf. Biardeau 1964: 229–240, Much 1994: 351–352). Here, Uddyotakara has just repeated his argument from NV 206.21–22 that the relation of a whole to its parts can not be understood in terms of a unitary thing (such as a genus) existing in manifold things (such as its manifestations, *vyakti*-s). So the opponent wonders what their relationship might then be. Parts of this passage are also quoted in PVSVT 277.3–4, and 305.6–11.

²³¹Cf. Frauwallner 1956: 127 ff., Halbfass 1992: 122 f., 147.

has for the two different schools of thought, and whether any particularly important issues are attached to it.

General observations

An *upādhi* is usually described as a non-essential universal: “Other general characteristics such as ‘cookness’, ‘tallness’, ‘blindness’, etc., which are adventitious features, are recognised not as universals (*jāti*) but as *upādhis*.” (Dravid 1972: 25; cf. also Potter 1977: 135 ff. and references given there.)

The term *upādhi*, in the context of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology, is usually translated as “‘nominal’ properties”, “superimposed condition”, “imposed properties”, or “limiting condition”²³² Acc. to Halbfass 1970: 148, “Udayana was the first Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika author who took into full account all the difficulties involved in the *jāti-upādhi* problem, and the *jātibhādaka* doctrine in his *Kiraṇāvalī* became fundamental for all subsequent considerations,...for the period following the conflict with the Buddhists.” This would mean that before Udayana, i.e., also for Ratnakīrti, there were no fixed and conclusive criteria for what differentiated a universal proper from an imposed universal.

But it seems that at least since Trilocana (cf. Potter 1977: 202 ff.) *upādhi* had important implications also for the Nyāya analysis of *svabhāva* reasonings (cf. Kajiyama 1998: 101, fn. 271 and the reference there to RNĀ₁ 42,20–23²³³). The central point is, acc. to Kajiyama 1998: 100 f., fn. 270, that smoke always implies fire (*svābhāvika-sambandha* Kajiyama 1998: 100, fn. 270), whereas fire only implies smoke when a specific additional attribute of fire, i.e., wet fuel, is given (“*aupādhika-* or *sopādhika-sambandha*” Kajiyama 1998: 101, fn. 271).

As Kajiyama (1998: 101, fn. 271) points out, Ratnakīrti’s and Mokṣākaragupta’s definition of *upādhi* as “...*arthāntaram kiṃcid apekṣaṇīyam* is based on this explanation of Vācaspati and perhaps his teacher Trilocana, though it is not verbally found in NVT.” (NVT = NVTṬ) The passage containing this definition in the TBh is translated, Kajiyama 1998: 101, as “...for by the word *upādhi* is meant some other thing by the dependence on which [the probans is related to the probandum, i.e. if *x* needs *z* in order to be related with *y*, this *z* is called *upādhi*].”

Buddhist logicians, on the other hand, called all universals supposed by realist schools *upādhi*.²³⁴

To these observations, the following two comments based on the material in the AS might be added:

Comment 1 For one thing, in the argument of § 48 Ratnakīrti subsumes all the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories except substance (*dravya*) under the heading *upādhi*. The phrase indictating this equivocation is “for the circle of additional attributes like universal,

²³²Cf. B. K. Matilal 1986: 382, Halbfass 1992: 252, Halbfass 1970: 148, and Kajiyama 1998: 101 respectively.

²³³This corresponds to ĪSD 47.6–10. Cf. section 4.1 on the following page and Patil 2009: 123 f. for translations, as well as Patil 2009: 174 ff. for a discussion of the role of *upādhi* in inferential cognitions.

²³⁴Akamatsu 1983: 225, n. 121 is of the same opinion. I was not able to trace the term *upādhi* in either PSV 5 or Hattori 1968. Dharmakīrti employs it in much the same sense as Ratnakīrti, cf. PV 1 52–55 (trl. section A.1 on page 152, cf. also fn. 414 on page 152). Śāntarakṣita subsumes all categories under the term *upādhi* in TS₂ 2ab: *guṇadravyakriyājāṭisamāvyādyupādhibhiḥ* (cf. section B.1 on page 177 for a translation).

property, action etc.” (*sāmānyaguṇakarmādyupādhicakrasya*). This would also concur with the following explanation, ĪSD 47.4–10:

tathā hi svābhāvikaḥ tu dhūmādīnām vahnyādibhiḥ sambandhaḥ tadupādhēr anupalabhyamānatvāt. kvacid vyabhicārasyādarśanād iti tvayaivāsyā lakṣaṇam uktam. etac cāsiddham. yataḥ, upādhiśabdena svato ’rthāntaram evāpekṣaṇīyam abhidhātavyam. na cārthāntaram drśyatāniyatam, adṛśyasyāpi deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṛṣṭasya sambhavāt. tataś ca dhūmasyāpi hutāśena saha sambandhe syād upādhiḥ, na copalakṣyata iti katham adarśanān nāsty eva yataḥ svābhāvikasambandhasiddhiḥ.

For it is so: “But the relation of smoke etc. with fire etc. is natural (*svābhāvika*), because an additional attribute in this [relation] is not cognized, [and] a deviation [of smoke from fire] is nowhere observed.”²³⁵ This definition of a natural relation was given by you[, an opponent, at ĪSD 46.8–9]. But it is not established, since what is meant by the word[s] “additional attribute” is [some] required thing other than [the relation of smoke etc. with fire etc.] itself. But another thing is not limited to visible [things], because an invisible [thing], distant in location, time or essence, is possible. And therefore, there may be an additional attribute in the relation even of smoke with fire (*hutāśa*), but it is not seen. So how does [this additional attribute] not exist at all [only] because [it is] not observed, so that [you believe] there is an establishment of a natural relation?²³⁶

In the explication of what the word “additional attribute” means, Ratnakīrti makes two points: it is another thing, and it is required. This can be expected to include all categories except the first, substance, since that would hardly be what is dependent on another object, whereas all other categories are dependent on substances.²³⁷

The example in the background of this passage²³⁸ is that smoke is a correct reason for inferring the presence of fire. It is correct because, amongst other reasons, no additional attribute is involved in the relation between the two that causes the connection of smoke with fire.²³⁹ I understand this to mean that there is no thing other than the relation of the two terms that is what makes the inference from smoke to fire valid. This also finds support in Ratnakīrti’s somewhat ironic conclusion that “in the relation even of smoke with fire”, a standard example of a correct pervasion, an additional attribute could be present if all that is required is that it is not observed.

²³⁵I follow the translation of this passage in Patil 2009: 123 f., and understand the two justifications to be in the same relation to the main sentence, adding an “and” to reflect this. So smoke is a sure sign of fire, because a) no additional attribute of smoke that might cause its relation to fire is perceived, and b) smoke is never seen where there is no fire. It is the first point that Ratnakīrti attacks in the next sentences.

²³⁶For the broader context of this passage, cf. Patil 2009: 105 ff., and see Patil 2009: 123 f. for another translation.

²³⁷Acc. to Ratnakīrti the only way any kind of *dravya* (as *dharmin*) can be qualified by *sāmānyaguṇakarmādi* (as *dharma*) is in fact *upakāra*, cf. § 29.

²³⁸Cf. Kajiyama 1998: 100 f., fn. 270 and Patil 2009: 105.

²³⁹It is important to note that here “relation of smoke with fire” is not the same as “relation of fire with smoke”: in the first case, an inference from the relation’s first term, smoke, to its second term, fire, is valid, but in the second case it is not. Cf. ĪSD 46.7–8: *tathā hi dhūmādīnām vahnyādibhiḥ saha sambandhaḥ svābhāviko na tu vahnyādīnām dhūmādibhiḥ*. (translated Patil 2009: 105) Fire is not a correct reason for inferring smoke since smoke depends on the “additional attribute” wet fuel.

The second point is that this additional attribute is required. As quoted above, Ka-jiyama 1998: 101 translates a similar passage: “...some other thing by the dependence on which [the *probans* is related to the *probandum*, i.e. if *x* needs *z* in order to be related with *y*, this *z* is called *upādhi*].” This brings out the import of the second point very nicely: there is no relation of fire with smoke without the element “wet fuel.”

Comment 2 In § 30, Vācaspati’s phrase *ekopādhinā sattvena viśiṣṭe tasmin* suggests that he accepts that *sattva* is an *upādhi*. This usage of the term *upādhi* at this point is perhaps not as decisive as it could be expected to be.

The passage that Ratnakīrti quotes is addressing one of the points made by Vācaspati in NVTṬ 110.2 ff. (=PV 1 52; 53ab; 55), exemplified by the following objection:²⁴⁰

NVTṬ 109.14–17: *api ca vastuniveśe jātyādīnām upādhīnām ekasya vastunaḥ sattvaṃ ca dravyatvaṃ ca pāṛthivatvaṃ ca vṛkṣatvaṃ ca śiṃśa-pātvam copādhaya iti dūrād ekopādhiviśiṣṭasya grahe sarvopādhiviśiṣṭa-grahaprasaṅgaḥ.*

Moreover, if additional attributes such as a genus etc. rest in a real thing, then—because a single real thing has [these] additional attributes[, i.e.,] existence, substantiality, treeness, and *śiṃśapā*ness—there is the unwanted consequence that, when that [thing] qualified by a single additional attribute is grasped from a distance, it is grasped as qualified by all additional attributes.

I think that it is fair to interpret Vācaspati’s statements as following the formulation of this objection very closely in his answer (quoted by Ratnakīrti in § 30), and does therefore not have to be taken as endorsing that *sattva* really is an additional attribute and not a proper *jāti*.

***svabhāvopavarṇana* (ad § 30 on page 27)**

The rule mentioned in this argument is invoked in various passages of Ratnakīrti’s works. Two passages give more details, PABhP 103.6 f. and KBhSA₂ 77.10 f.:²⁴¹

PABhP 103.1–7: *naiyāyikaparikalpitopamānanirākaraṇārtham apy ayam eva prayogo draṣṭavyaḥ, tasyāpi nirviṣayatvāt. tathā hi samākhyāsambandhas tasya viṣayo varṇyate. sa ca paramārthato nāsti. sa hi sambandhaḥ sambandhibhyāṃ bhinno ’bhinno vā. yadi bhinnas tadā tayor iti kutaḥ. na ca sambandhāntarād iti vaktavyam, tad api kathaṃ teṣāṃ iti cintāyām anavasthāprasaṅgaḥ. na ca yathā pradīpaḥ prakāśāntaram antareṇa prakāśate tathā sambandho ’pi sambandhāntareṇa sambaddho bhaviṣyatīti vaktum ucitam. pramāṇasiddhe hi vasturūpe ’yam asya svabhāva iti varṇyate. yathā pradīpasyaiva. sambandhas tu na pramāṇapratītaḥ.*

²⁴⁰Udayanācārya 1996 274.1 says: *yasyāpītyādivārttikārthaṃ dūṣayati—na caikeneti*. (With the words “Not by a single [additional attribute]” [Vācaspatimiśra] falsifies the aim of the *Vārttika* stated by the words “For whom” etc.) “Vārttika” here refers to PV 1 52, which was quoted in NVTṬ 110.3–4.

²⁴¹Probably VyN 14*.2–3 (VyN₂ 111.17 f.) should also be considered here: *pramāṇasiddhe hi rūpe svabhāvāvalambanam. na tu svabhāvāvalambanenaiva vastusvarūpavyavasthā*. Trl. acc to Lasic 2000b: 71: “Wenn nämlich ein Ding (*rūpa*) durch eine gültige Erkenntnis erwiesen ist, stützen wir uns (bei der Erklärung) auf das Wesen. Nur kraft dessen, daß man sich auf das Wesen stützt, ergibt sich aber keine Feststellung eines realen Dinges.”

Exactly this inference²⁴² is to be observed also in order to reject resemblance[, a means of valid cognition] imagined by the Naiyāyikas,²⁴³ because that too does not have an object. For it is so: the connection with a name is described as the object of this [resemblance]. But that connection does not really exist. For this connection is either different from the two [things] that have a connection, or not different. If different, then why [is it a connection] “of these two”? Neither is “because of another connection” to be said [in answer to this question], since, when one considers: “Also this [other connection], how [could it belong] to these two?”, [there is] the unwanted consequence of an infinite regress.²⁴⁴ And it can not be said that, in the same way that a lamp illuminates without another illumination, so also a connection becomes connected without another connection. For if the form of a real thing has been established by a valid means of cognition, it is explained: “That [is] the nature of that.” As it indeed is for a lamp. But a connection is not known through a valid means of cognition.

KBhSA₂ 77.10 f. *sthiratve 'py eṣa eva svabhāvas tasya yad uttarakṣaṇa eva karotīti cet. hatedānīm pramāṇapratyāśā. dhūmād atrāgnir ity atrāpi svabhāva evāsyā yad idānīm atra nīragnir api dhūma iti vaktuṃ śakya-tvāt. tasmāt pramāṇasiddhe svabhāvāvalambanam. na tu svabhāvāvalambanena pramāṇavyālopaḥ.*

[Objection:] | Even though persistent, this [thing], which produces [an effect] only at a later moment, has precisely this nature.²⁴⁵ | [Answer:] Now confidence in the valid means of cognition is destroyed. Because it is possible to say even here [in this inference,] “Because of smoke, [there is] fire there.”, that, at the time of that which has [this] very nature, there is smoke here, even though there is no fire.²⁴⁶ Therefore there is reliance (*ālambana*) on a [thing’s] nature when [something] is established by valid

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²⁴²I.e., the inference in PABhP 102.10–11:

ihāpi prayogaḥ — yasya na viśayavattvaṃ na tasya prāmāṇyam. yathā keṣoṇḍukajñānasya. na siddham ca viśayavattvaṃ upamāṇajñānasyeti vyāpakānupalambhaḥ. For that which has no object[, *hetu*,] there is no being a valid cognition[, *sādhya*]. As the cognition of a net of hair [has no object, and therefore is not valid, *dṛṣṭānta*]. And that a cognition through comparison has an object is not established. This [is an inference by the reason] non-apprehension of the pervader[, i.e., of being a valid means of cognition].

²⁴³Cf. NSū 1.1.3.

²⁴⁴I am not quite sure how to construe the *tad api* (which is correct acc. to RN_{ms} 54b5). Another possibility might be to start a new sentence with *tad api*, taking it as expressing causal force. A translation would then be: “...is not to be answered. [For,] because of this [answer] too, there is the unwanted consequence”

²⁴⁵I.e., *uttarakāryotpādanasvabhāva*, the nature of producing a later effect. The point is that a thing that remains identically the same during a given period of time can produce an effect at a certain time (such as its last effect in its last moment) but not at others. The opponent (Bhāsarvajña in the previous two paragraphs acc. to Woo 1999: 211) thinks that a nature such as “producing an effect at a later time” could help explain how this is achieved.

²⁴⁶I am not sure I properly understand this argument. My best explanation is: the nature of smoke is to be caused by fire. But if the opponent is right, and a thing can have a nature that sometimes produces an effect and sometimes doesn’t, i.e., sometimes is in effect and sometimes isn’t, then smoke could sometimes be dependent on fire and sometimes not.

cognition. But there is no dispelling (*vyālopa*) of a valid cognition by reliance (*avalambana*) on a nature.

Both passages, as § 30 on page 27, make the point that when something is cognized by a means of valid cognition, its nature is made known. And since a real thing, known by the valid means of cognition perception, does not appear in such a cognition as having the structure of property and property bearer, it cannot really have it.

Moreover, Ratnakīrti refers to this description of a thing's nature as a rule, *nyāya*. A formulation such as this would usually appeal to a text of highest authority, cf., e.g., SJS₂ 21.32–22.1: ...*iti nyāyaḥ. yad vārttikam...*, which is then followed by a quote of PV 3 532b-d (see Bühnemann 1980: 63 for a translation of and notes on this passage), or ĪSD 44.10–11. But I was not able to find an exact source for this particular rule.

A similar idea, at any rate, is expressed in the following passage, TSP₂ 808.13–15:

tasmād yat pramāṇasiddhavastu na tasya kenacid bādhā. anyathā hi pramāṇalakṣaṇopapannasya bādhāyāṃ tallakṣaṇam eva dūṣitaṃ syād iti sarvatrānāśvāsān na kvacit tat pramāṇaṃ syāt.

Therefore, there is no refutation by anyone of a real thing that has been established by a means of valid cognition. For otherwise, when there is a refutation of that having arisen characterised as valid cognition, that characteristic itself would be falsified. Therefore, without assurance in every instance, this would not be a valid means of cognition in any instance.

At least Dharmakīrti is clear about the fact that conceptual cognition does not determine the nature of a real thing, but only has exclusion from others as its object:

PVSV 28.19–22: *tadviveka eva cānyāpohaḥ. tasmāt tad api tanmātrāpohagocaram. na vastusvabhāvaniścayātmakam. tathā hi kasyacin niścaye 'py anyasyāpratipattidarśanāt, tatsvabhāvaniścaye ca tasyāyogāt.* ²⁴⁷

But perhaps it is Dharmakīrti's principle that the own nature of a thing is at least remotely involved in conceptual cognition that gave rise to this rule that Ratnakīrti refers to:

Die Sonderung (*apohaḥ*) als Gegenstand der Vorstellung und der Wortkonvention beruht also auf dem Svabhāva der Dinge selbst, insofern es dieser ist, der einerseits mit den Svabhāvas anderer Dinge eine gleiche Wirkung und andererseits, indem er an verschiedenen Ursachenkomplexen teilhat, mehrere Wirkungen hervorbringt. (Steinkellner 1971: 191)²⁴⁸

Notes to § 31

The discussion found in the NBhūṣ about the supporter (*upakāraka*) and the supported (*upakārya*), quoted in part by Ratnakīrti in § 31, is directed against Dharmakīrti's analysis of this problem in PVS 29.7–31.1 (cf. the trl. in section A.1 on page 152). After having fully quoted the lengthy passage, Bhāsarvajña says:

NBhūṣ 246.30–247.5: *sarvopadrśye sūryādaḥ grhyamāṇe 'pi na sarvatra draṣṭṛdarśanagrahaṇam asti. anenaitad api nirākṛtam — na hy anya*

²⁴⁷Cf. section A.1 on page 151 for a translation.

²⁴⁸Cf. also PV 3 166 (trl. on page 168) for a passage supporting this.

evānyopakārako yo na grhītaḥ syāt. na cāpy upakārake tathāgrhīte upakāryāgrahaṇaṁ tasyāpy agrahaṇaprasaṅgāt, svasvāmitvavad iti. evaṁ hi sūryagrahaṇe tadupakāryasya trailokyasyāpi grahaṇaṁ syāt. na hy upakāratvena grhītād anya eva trailokyopakārako bhānur yo na grhītaḥ syāt. upakarakagrahaṇe copakāryāgrahaṇaṁ nāsti svasvāmitvavad ity evaṁvādīnaḥ sūryopakāryatrailokyagrahaṇaṁ durnivāraṁ syāt.

Even if that [which is] visible everywhere, the sun etc., is grasped, there is no grasping of the observations of observers everywhere. By this [statement] also this [following one]²⁴⁹ is refuted: | For there is no really different supporter of something else that would not be grasped. Nor is there, when a supporter is grasped in such a way, no grasping of that which is supported, because of the unwanted consequence of not grasping that [supporter] either, as in the case of being the property and owner. | For, in this way, if the sun is grasped, the threefold world too, which is that supported by the sun, would be grasped. For since [the sun] is grasped as being the supporter there is no truly different light supporting the threefold world which would not be grasped. And if the supporter is grasped, there isn't no grasping of that which is supported, as in the case of being property and owner. For [those] believing [that it is] so, the grasping of the threefold world supported by the sun is hard to avoid.

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varṇākṛtyakṣarākāra ... (ad § 34, PV 3 147)

PV 3 147²⁵⁰ poses two problems: Whose opinion is expressed here, and what exactly is a universal free of?

Dharmakīrti does not say who holds the opinion that the universal is empty of colour, form, etc..²⁵¹ Manorathanandin simply identifies them as Sāmānyavādins, people teaching universals (PVV 161.17, cf. section A.4 on page 170). The same position is stated by Kamalaśīla to be held by the Naiyāyika Bhāvivikta (cf. its presentation in TSP₂ ad kk. 715–717, and its criticism in TSP₂ ad k. 738, trl. section B.3 on page 180).

It is not clear whether Dharmakīrti's intention here is that a *sāmānya* is said to be free of the forms of colour, form and letter, or whether it is that it is said to be free of colour, shape, and the form of a letter. Ratnakīrti's interpretation leans towards the latter option: he uses the phrase “*akṣarākāraparikaritāḥ*” (l. 160, p. 28), suggesting that he understands *akṣarākāra* as a unit, and therefore “colour, shape, and the form of letters” also in Dharmakīrti's verse. Whilst Kamalaśīla explains that in Bhāvivikta's position by *akṣara*-s the individual letters are meant that make up a word (“C-o-w”), he does not say how he understands the compound as a whole. Manorathanandin understands it (cf. section A.4 on page 170) differently from Ratnakīrti: according to that

²⁴⁹This corresponds to PVSV 29.24–26.

²⁵⁰Cf. section A.3 on page 167 for a translation.

²⁵¹As Akamatsu 1983: 245, n. 158 points out, a very similar thought is also to be found in PVSV 55.9–10 (cf. trl. in section A.1 on page 158). Note that Kaṇvakagomin ends his explanation of this passage as follows, PVSV 223.26–28: *tad evaṁ udyotakarādyabhihitam abhinnaṇapratibhāsam abhyupagamyā vyatiriktasyāvyatiriktasya ca sāmānyasyāyogād bhrāntir evāyaṁ vyaktiṣv ekākārapratibhāsa ity uktam.* (Thus, having assumed in this way an undifferentiated appearance as proposed by Uddyotakāra etc., a universal [either] separated [or] unseparated [from particulars] is not possible; therefore this appearance of a single form of awareness for particulars is only an error.)

interpretation a universal is free of the appearances or forms of awareness (*ābhāsa* or *ākāra*, PVV 161.13 ad PV 3 147ab) of colour, shape, and letters.²⁵²

Forms of *khyāti* (ad § 35)

In § 35, Ratnakīrti gives four explanations for the error that might account for the cognition of a universal. These four explanations are apparently closely linked to four theories of *khyāti*, appearance or false appearance, the equivalences being as follows:²⁵³

1. *ātmakhyāti* (appearance of a self): that a cognition of a false universal is nothing but the unfolding of awareness itself due to mnemonic impressions (*vāsanāvaśād ...vivarto 'yam astu*, starting l. 165, p. 28).
2. *asatkhyāti* (appearance of an inexistant thing): that that which appears as a universal has no real existence at all (*asad eva vā tadrūpaṃ khyātu*, starting l. 166, p. 29).
3. *anyathākhyāti* (appearance in another way): that it is only the particulars that appear other than they are, due to their differences being concealed (*vyaktaya eva ... vyavadhānāt*, starting l. 166, p. 29).
4. *smṛtipramoṣa* (deprivation of memory): that memory interferes in the correct cognition, but does not come to awareness as memory (*smṛtipramoṣo*, starting l. 167, p. 29).

Respectively, these theories are endorsed by authors belonging to the Yogācāra, the Madhyamaka and Vedānta, the Nyāya and Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, and the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā schools.²⁵⁴

Ratnakīrti himself, even though he says here that it doesn't matter which of the error theories is the right one,²⁵⁵ explains the appearance of a universal as an erroneous cognition that is close to the *ātmakhyāti* position as described in the VV.²⁵⁶ This becomes fairly clear from an argument in § 53 (ll. 240–242):

*kiṃ tarhi svavāsanāvipākavaśād upajāyamānaiva buddhir apaśyanty api
bāhyaṃ bāhye pravṛttim ātanotīti viplutaiva.* (Trl. on page 62)

²⁵²Kaṇakagomin, glossing on the similar passage in PVSV 55.9–10, mentions an opponent who tries to escape by saying that “a universal certainly has the form of colour etc.” (PVSVṬ 223.17–18: *varṇā-dyākāram eva sāmānyam iti ced ...*) This would also hint at an understanding of the compound as “forms of colour, shape, and letters.”

²⁵³In general, see Schmithausen 1965: 141 ff. for a systematic discussion of the following (and other) error theories. Without giving a full account, the main ideas are as follows: *ātmakhyāti* means that the content (or object appearing) in an erroneous cognition is only that cognition itself, not an external object. *asatkhyāti* means that there is an appearance of a non-existing object in erroneous cognition. According to *anyathākhyāti* something real appears differently than it is. *smṛtipramoṣa*, usually associated with the *akhyāti* (non-appearance) theory, means that the memory involved (according to this theory) in erroneous cognition does not come to awareness: “The fifth theory [of the 8 different theories of erroneous cognition discussed in the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*—PMA] (*smṛtipramoṣa*) is held by the Prābhākaras. They maintain that the perceptual error expressed as “this is a snake” is, in fact, partly confused with the memory of the snake, but the perceiver is not aware at that moment that it is a memory.” (Potter 1977: p. 412, cf. also Schmithausen 1965: 206 f.).

²⁵⁴This is how the VV presents the matter, acc. to the analysis in Schmithausen 1965: 92–106.

²⁵⁵This is only a preliminary statement, and is meant to support only the main point of this paragraph: that cognition of a real universal is entirely wrong (*bhrāntir eva āsau*, § 35).

²⁵⁶Acc. to Schmithausen 1965: 233 f., this is also Dignāga's, Dharmakīrti's, and Jñānaśrī's position. For Dharmakīrti's position, also cf. PV 1 68–70 (translated in Dunne 2004: 339).

Ratnakīrti here makes two points important for the *khyāti* context: An awareness event does not “see” an external object, so that nothing other than itself appears in it.²⁵⁷ And an awareness comes about only by force of the ripening of its own mnemonic impressions (*vāsana*-s). These two statements, in addition to the usage of *adhyava-sāya* that, based on an internal form of awareness, externalises the object of cognition (cf. section 5.4 on page 130), undoubtedly support his endorsement of *ātmakhyāti* to explain the erroneous cognition of a commonness in particulars.

Kataoka 2009: esp. pp. 484–482 (15–17) has made it clear that, at least for Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, these error theories were of importance for describing the differences between the *apoha* theories of Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara, who explained the erroneous cognition of universals according to, respectively, *ātmakhyāti* and *asatkhyāti* theories.

Proving a universal like a sense faculty (ad ll. 173–176 in § 36)

Ratnakīrti here presupposes an opponent who wishes to prove a universal in the same way as a sense faculty is proven.²⁵⁸ The opponent is not named in this passage. This sort of proof is already referred to in PVSV 16.12–14, where an opponent wishes to show that the self or the soul (*ātman*) is inferrable like a sense faculty. The argument there is as follows:

PVSV 16.12–14: *indriyādīnāṃ tu vijñānakāryasya kādācitkatvāt sāpekṣyasiddhyā prasiddhir ucyate — kim apy asya kāraṇam astīti. na tv evambhūtam iti.*

But²⁵⁹ the general acceptance of the sense faculties etc., which [is] due to an establishment of [their] dependency based on [their] effect[, i.e.,] cognition, being occasional, is stated as “This [cognition] has a certain cause.”,²⁶⁰ but not as “[This cause is] just so.”

Kaṇakagomin’s commentary on this passage is as follows:

[PVSVṬ 73.8–16]: *yathā nityaparokṣāṇāṃ apīndriyādīnāṃ anumānaṃ tathātmano bhaviṣyatīti ced āha—indriyāṇāṃ ityādi. ādiśabdāt smṛtibī-jādīnāṃ. vijñānam eva kāryaṃ tasya kādācitkatvāt. tathā hi satsv api rūpālokamanaskāreṣu nimīlitalocanādyavasthāsu vijñānasyābhāvāt, pu-naś conmīlitalocanāvasthāsu bhāvāt, vijñānakāryaṃ kāraṇāntaraṃ sāpekṣaṃ sidhyati, tato ‘sya sāpekṣyasiddhyā indriyādīnāṃ prasiddhir ucyate. etad uktam bhavati—yat sāpekṣam idaṃ kādācitkaṃ vijñānam, tat kim apy asya vijñānasya kāraṇam astīty anumīyate. tad eva cendriyam iti vya-vahriyate. na tv evambhūtam iti na rūpaviśeṣeṇa mūrttatvādinā yuktam indriyam anumīyata ity arthaḥ.*²⁶¹

[PVSVṬ 73.8–13]:

[Objection]: | There should be [an inference] of the self in the same way as there is an inference even of what is permanent and hidden, such as the sense faculties etc.. | [So Dharmakīrti] said: **For the sense faculties** etc.

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²⁵⁷Cf. also the discussion of Ratnakīrti’s position in § 16.

²⁵⁸Cf. also Kajiyama 1998: 74 for a reference to such a proof of a sense faculty.

²⁵⁹This passage is also translated in Gillon and R. S. Hayes 2008: 347.

²⁶⁰This sentence seems to have been skipped in Gillon and R. S. Hayes 2008: 347.

²⁶¹I have changed the text’s punctuation in part according to handwritten marks in Frauwallner’s copy of Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1943.

From the word **etc.** [one understands also] for memory, seeds, etc. **Because** this, **a cognition**, which alone is **the effect, is occasional**. For it is so: Because, even when form, eye, [and] cognitive activity exist, [that] cognition does not exist in [certain] conditions, such as when the eyes are closed etc., and because, furthermore, it exists in [certain other] conditions[, such as when] the eyes are opened, the effect cognition is established as having a dependency on another [hidden] cause; therefore, the general acceptance of sense faculties etc. through an establishment of its[, i.e., the effect cognition's,] dependency is expressed. [By this] the [following] is said: That, which is this dependent, occasional cognition, is inferred as “**This** [cognition] **has some cause.**” And only this [cause] is normally referred to as “sense faculty.” **But not** [as] “[This cause is] **just so.**” meaning that a sense faculty is not inferred as connected with being corporeal etc.

According to Kaṇvakagomin's interpretation, sense faculties are inferred from the fact that perceptions, dependent on the sense faculties, don't occur when the sense faculties are not active. But what can not be inferred from their non-occurrence is of what nature those faculties are.

In Dharmakīrti's argument the self (*ātman*) is hidden from perception and permanent. In Ratnakīrti's passage it is the universal (*sāmānya*) that, so the opponent, is hidden from perception (or at least not perceivable apart from its manifestation) and permanent. The following points can be made about Ratnakīrti's appeal to the argument as found in the PV 1:

The opponent's argument seems to be: That which is hidden can be known by its effect. A universal is hidden, but there is the effect of a cognition of sameness between things. This must be the effect of the universal, which proves that it exists.²⁶²

Ratnakīrti's counter then is: What is established is only an occasionally active cause. I.e., when the cognition “cow” occurs, that cause, a universal according to the opponent, is active, but is inactive when the cognition does not occur. But, so Ratnakīrti, since the absence of the cognition cow can be explained by the absence of all particular cows, no other cause needs to be postulated.

At first sight, it might seem that there is an important difference between Dharmakīrti's and Ratnakīrti's arguments, though: for the former, the effect is occasional, but for the latter it is the cause that is occasional.²⁶³ But Ratnakīrti makes it clear in the next sentence (*yadā hi ...*), which is an explication of the reason “by the effect cognition” *jñānakāryatas*, that the cognition is occasional too.

For Ratnakīrti, it is the fact that the assumed cause is occasional which opposes that a *sāmānya* be considered as that cause, since it is, at least for all known opponents of Ratnakīrti, not occasional, but permanent.

It should also be noted that this argument, in proving an only “occasional cause”, indicates a rather specific theory on the opponent's part, namely, that the universal is omnipresent in both space and time (spatially and temporally not occasional), and not only present in all its manifestations (or particulars of the same class). For consider this: if a universal were present in only its instances, then its permanence (that it is not

²⁶²How this last sentence follows from the previous one is very unclear, mainly since the opponent and the exact theory supporting this relation of a hidden cause and the effect is unknown.

²⁶³In a similar discussion in TS₂ 1400-1, it is also the effect, the cogniton, which is occasional, and not the cause. Cf. Kunst 1939: 40 ff. for a translation of and comments on that discussion.

occasional in respect to time) would not really matter, since it would not be constantly causing a cognition of itself anyway, but only via its particulars.²⁶⁴

Chance cognitions (ad § 36)

In JNĀ 221,11–16, a more detailed variant of this argument is found:

yat punar ākasmikatvam uktam tad ayuktam, janakasāmagrībhedasya bhavatāpy avaśyasvīkaraṇīyatvāt. katham anyathā indriyārthau nirvikalpakajñānanananiyatau dr̥ṣṭau vikalpam utpādayataḥ ? tasmāt pūrva-piṇḍadarśanasmarāṇasahakāriṇātiricyamānasāmarthyeyam sāmāgrī vikalpam utpādayatīti nirviṣayaṃ jñānam utpādayaty evārthaḥ, nirviṣaya-tāniṣṭhatvād vikalpatāyās tadamśena. tad varam vijātīyavikalpavad vi-spaṣṭapratibhāsād anubhavād bhinna eva sajātīyavikalpo 'pīty eva sādhu, tasmān na jātisiddhir adhyakṣāt.

The²⁶⁵ accidentality [of a universal's cognition,] which was stated [by you], is not correct, because even you necessarily have to admit a difference of the producing collection [of causes]. How else can sense faculty and object, both observed as restricted to generating unconceptual cognitions, produce a concept? Therefore, that this collection [of causes], possessing a capacity enriched by the assisting cause of a memory of an earlier observation of a material thing, produces the concept, only means (*evārtha*) that it produces a cognition without an object, because [the fact] that there is a concept [due to] a part of that [object] is based on not having a [real, and thus partless,] object. So [it would be] better that also a concept of that of the same genus, like a concept of that of another genus, is really differentiated from experience[, i.e., perception,] which [alone] has a distinct appearance [of an object]. That alone is right. Therefore there is no proof of a genus from perception.

Note that Ratnakīrti's argument seems to end on a different note: A genus does not appear in either perception or in verbal apprehension (cf. l. 171, p. 29). Of course, if verbal apprehension is taken to be perception, or at least sufficiently like perception in respect of its appearing content, then this would only be an explication of the intent of Jñānaśrīmitra's argument.

²⁶⁴Such a position is endorsed, for example, by Vācaspati, as is mentioned in Potter 1977: 139, and also in the summary by B. K. Matilal (1977: 474 f.). The passage referred to is probably this one:

NVTṬ 353.13–15: *tathā sāmānyam api sarvāsambaddham api sarvaiḥ sahāvatiṣṭhate. yās tv asya vyaktayas tābhiḥ param sambadhyate. tathā ca yatra jāyante vyaktayas tatrasambaddhān api staḥ sāmānyasamavāyāv iti. tāsāṃ janmaiva sāmānyasamavāyāvacchedaḥ.*

In that way also a universal, even though not connected with everything, exists together with everything; but later (*param*) [it] is connected with its manifestations. And in such a way, a universal and inherence exist in that [place], even though [previously] not connected [to that place], where a manifestation is generated. The very generation of these [manifestations is] the limitation of universal and inherence [to a particular place].

²⁶⁵Cf. also the translation in Akamatsu 1983: 119 f.

That a genus is the cause for words and cognitions is argued for both by Kumāṛila and by Naiyāyika authors.²⁶⁶ In the *Apoḥasiddhi*, this position is also ascribed to Trilocana in § 41, and is also involved in the effect-reason (*kāryahetu*) used in the inference of § 44. So it is quite possible that Ratnakīrti is here generalising the views of opponents postulating a real universal as a cause of cognitions.

Nevertheless, a lead to a historical person might be found in NV 303.11 ff., where a position is presented (and argued against) that appeals to the non-accidentality of particulars' cognitions as a proof for the genus being the word referent (*viśeṣapratyayānām anākasmikatvācca* NV 303.11). This passage is also quoted by Karṇakagomin (PVSVT 301.19–25) as an exemplification of the position that a universal is imagined as existing only in its proper substrates, even though it is different from them (cf. PVSV 76.25–77.4, trl. section A.1 on page 163). Whoever endorsed that particular position might be expected to argue that there is the result of the accidentality of conceptual cognitions, because the genus responsible for the correctness of these cognitions is missing. Also note the similar discussion in PVSV 82.4–25 (cf. trl. section A.1 on page 164), where Dharmakīrti defends himself against the objection that, without a universal, cognitions and denotations are without cause. Acc. to Frauwallner 1933: 69, and p. 83, Dharmakīrti is arguing against Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas in these passages.

Dharmottara's argument (ad § 51)

DhAP 243.27–244.9.²⁶⁷

gal te dgag pa'i śes pa phyi rol la ni ma yin te, de mi snañ ba'i phyir ro. blo dan gzuñ ba'i rnam pa la yañ ma yin te, de gñis ni ñams su myoñ bar bya ba ñid yin pa'i phyir ro. sgro btags pa la yañ ma yin te, de yañ de'i tshe sgro btags kyi rañ bžin du gzuñ ba dgag par mi nus pa'i phyir ro. de bžin du sgrub pa'i śes pa yañ phyi rol la ni ma yin te, mi snañ ba'i phyir ro. blo la sogs pa rnams kyañ yod pa la 'khrul pa med pa'i phyir 'di dag la mi rigs ma yin nam že na bden te, phyi rol dan blo dan rnam pa dan sgro btags pa la yañ dgag pa dan sgrub par rtog pa ma yin no. sgrub pa dan dgag pa dag ni sgro btags gañ žig phyi rol ñid du nes par byas pa de dan 'brel pa yin te, dper na sbrul sgrub pa dan dgag pa'i śes pa thag pa'i rdzas la ni ma yin te, mi snañ ba'i phyir ro. sbrul gyi blo dan gzuñ ba'i rnam pa dan²⁶⁸ sgro btags kyi sbrul la yañ ma yin te, de dag ni rañ gi rañ bžin du yod pa la mi 'khrul pa'i phyir ro. 'on kyañ sgro btags kyi

²⁶⁶ For an argument of Kumāṛila's, cf. ŚV Āv 37–38, a passage also quoted by Karṇakagomin (PVSVT 320.12–15) in the context of PV 1 162 (trl. section A.1 on page 164).

As regards the Naiyāyika positions, this point is typically made in commenting on NSū 2.2.70: *sa-mānaprasavātmikā jātiḥ*, which Angot 2009: 523 translates: “La jāti ‘genre’ c’est ce qui produit la connaissance de l’identité.” Cf. also NVT 450.15–17: *prasūta iti prasavaḥ. samānabuddher bhinneṣu prasotrī jātiḥ. atra ca yā jātiḥ, sāvaśyaṃ samānapratyayaṃ prasūte. na punar yā samānapratyayaṃ prasūte sā jātiḥ, pācakādiṣu vyabhicārād iti.* ([NVT 450.15] It produces, so **production**. A **genus** is productive of the **same** awareness for different things. And here, that is the genus, which necessarily produces the same apprehension. But that which[, not necessarily,] produces the same apprehension is not the genus, because of the deviation in such cases as cook etc.)

²⁶⁷ Also cf. the translation in Frauwallner 1937: 265 f.

²⁶⁸ Frauwallner places a *śad* after this *dan*, DhAP 244.6. It is probably only a misprint, since the *dan* has a dash affixed to it which indicates that it was not to be separated from the following word.

*sbrul gañ žig phyi rol gyi sbrul ñid du ñes par byas pa de ni sgrub pa dan
dgag par ñes pa bžin no.*

[Objection:] | There is no negating cognition for an external [thing], because it does not appear. Neither is there [a negating cognition] for an awareness and a grasped form, because these two are perceived. Neither is there [a negating cognition] for a superimposed [object], because it too—being grasped at that time with its own nature of superimposition—can not be negated. In the same way, there is no affirming cognition for an external [object], because [it] does not appear. And because awareness and so on do not go astray with regard to what exists, [an affirming cognition] is not incorrect with regard to these[, i.e., awareness and so on].²⁶⁹ | [Answer:] True. For an external [object], awareness, a form, and a superimposed [thing] there is no negating or affirming conceptual cognition. Affirming and negating are connected with some superimposed [thing] that is ascertained as being external. Like there is no cognition affirming and negating a snake for the material entity rope, since [that rope] does not appear [to that cognition]. [Such a cognition] does also not exist for the awareness of snake, the grasped form of “snake”, and the snake that is superimposed, because [that cognition] does not go astray with regard to what exists as their own proper nature. However, some superimposed snake that is ascertained as an external snake is ascertained as established or negated.

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Five candidates for *śabdārtha* (ad § 55–§ 57)

The verse, spread over § 55 and § 57 and interspersed with a prose sentence, is in the *vasantatilakā* metre, as defined in Apte 1992: Appendix A, p. 7. Frauwallner 1931: 234 is doubtful as to whether this verse was written by Jñānaśrī. I could not find it in the JNĀ, and it might have been composed by Ratnakīrti himself, who is not basing himself on Jñānaśrīmitra in his formulation of the inference establishing exclusion (starting § 54).

In § 55, Ratnakīrti lists five opinions on what a word referent is if it is not *anyāpoha*: a particular, an additional attribute, a connection to that additional attribute, something qualified by an additional attribute, and, lastly, a form that appears to awareness.

The verse in which he says this has thematical equivalents throughout *apoha* treatises. PSV 5 says that a word for a genus does not denote either particulars, a connection with a genus, a genus, or that having the genus:

PSV 5 2: *na jātiśabdo bhedānām ānantyād vyabhicārataḥ |
vācako yogajātyor vā bhedārthair aprthakśruteḥ ||*²⁷⁰

²⁶⁹This interpretation is not the same as that in Frauwallner 1937: 266: “Und da auch die Erkenntnis usw. mit dem Sein fest verbunden ist (*avyābhicārah*), ist sie auch bei diesen nicht am Platz.” I think the idea is as follows: awareness, a grasped form and a superimposed object can not deceive a person with regard to something that exists. As Dharmottara explains in his answer (DhAP 244.7–8: *de dag ni ran gi ran bžin du yod pa la mi 'khrul pa'i phyir ro.*), this means they can not be deceiving with regard to what exists in their own form. But if these objects of an affirming cognition must exist when and as they are cognized, an affirmation of them is useless.

²⁷⁰This verse is in *anuṣṭubh* metre, with a na-vipulā in the first quarter (*°bdo bhe dā°* are 3 long syllables, cf. Steiner 1996: 229). Cf. R. P. Hayes 1988: 255 ff., Hattori 2000: 140 f. and Pind 2009: 76–77 for translations, and Hattori 1996: 387 ff. for an overview of Dignāga's arguments in this section.

<i>sādhya</i> (what is to be proven): <i>S</i>	<i>hetu</i> (what proves): <i>H</i>
<i>pakṣa</i> (about which something is proven): <i>p</i>	<i>dṛṣṭānta</i> (the example): <i>d</i>
<i>sapakṣa</i> (something similar to <i>p</i>): <i>s</i>	<i>vipakṣa</i> (something dissimilar from <i>p</i>): <i>v</i>

Table 4.3: Abbreviations for *anumāna* elements.

PSV 5 4ab: *tadvato nāsvatantratvād upacārād asambhavāt* | ²⁷¹

The same point, but with the addition that a form of awareness is not the referent of a word, is made in TS₂ 870 (cf. trl. section B.4 on page 181):²⁷²

TS₂ 870 *yataḥ svalakṣaṇaṃ jātis tadyogo jātimāṃs tathā* |
buddhyākāro na śabdārthe ghaṭāmañcati tattvataḥ ||

4.2 The inference and logical errors in the AS

The²⁷³ inference found at the end of the AS makes use of various elements that are perhaps not immediately clear. In the following an overview of the usage of these elements will be given, inasfar as necessary for an understanding of this specific inference.²⁷⁴

The similar instance and the counter instance

In the following discussion, two terms, similar instance (*sapakṣa*) and dissimilar, or counter instance (*vipakṣa*), as well as the relationship of the logical reason (*H*) to them will be of central importance.

The similar instance is something similar to the instance under consideration in that they both are qualified by the property that is to be established.²⁷⁵ The counter instance, conversely, is something that is not qualified by the property that is to be established.

What the similar instance and the counter instance actually are becomes clear from the opponent's statement that *H* is ambiguous (ll. 251 ff., in § 54):

In reality,

that denoted must be a particular, an additional attribute, a connection to an additional attribute, [something] possessing an additional attribute, or must be a form of awareness,

because there is no other way [for a word to have an object], and because, if there is no object [for a word], it is not possible that [a word] denotes.

²⁷¹Again, cf. the translations in R. P. Hayes 1988: 261 f., Hattori 2000: 142, and Pind 2009: 78.

²⁷²The refutation of these positions is found in TS₂ 871–884.

²⁷³This section is a supplement to section 5.2 on page 114.

²⁷⁴The abbreviations used for frequently recurring terms are listed in table 4.3.

²⁷⁵Cf. NPSū 399.11–12: *sādhya dharmasāmānyena samāno 'rthaḥ sapakṣaḥ. ...vipakṣo yatra sādhyam nāsti.* (Trl.: A similar instance is an object that is similar [to the *pakṣa*] due to a commonness of the property that is to be proven. ...A dissimilar instance is where the property to be established does not exist.) Cf. also Tachikawa 1971: 121, Gillon and Love 1980: 363, and the comments on the *sapakṣa* passage in Tillemans 1999a: 94 f., as well as Tillemans 2004. The explanation in TBh₂ 25.7–8 runs: *samānaḥ pakṣaḥ sapakṣaḥ. pakṣeṇa saha sadṛśo dṛṣṭāntadharmīty arthaḥ.* (Tillemans (1999a: 91) translates: “*Sapakṣa* are instances which are similar (*samāna*), that is to say, subjects which are examples (*dṛṣṭāntadharmin*) that are similar to the *pakṣa* [i.e., to the subject of reasoning].”)

Two of the claims made here are important for understanding the scope of similar instances and counter instances:

1. What is the object of a denotation (i.e., that which is denoted) is something other than *S*.
2. Denoting presupposes having an object.

In consequence of these two statements, *v* must be whatever does not have that specific object that Ratnakīrti is trying to prove, i.e., “a mere thing that is determined and distinguished from that of another form”, but has some other object, and denotes. The counter instance is *not* what does not have any object at all. For this latter position, even on the view of the opponents speaking here, would preclude that anything can denote at all.

Pseudo reasons

Reason as unestablished (*asiddha*)

The exact reason why a *hetu* is not established or certain can vary. An early exposition of a distinction widely accepted amongst Buddhist logicians (cf. Funayama 1991: 1027, and p. 1022 f., n. 2) is made in NPSū 400.19–401.4, which can be summed up as follows:

1. The reason is unestablished for both the proponent and the opponent (*ubhayāsi-ddha*).
2. The reason is unestablished for either the proponent or the opponent (*anyatarā-siddha*).
3. The reason is unestablished because it is doubtful whether it really is what qualifies the *pakṣa* (*sandighāsiddha*).
4. The reason has an unestablished basis, i.e., the *pakṣa* it is supposed to qualify does not exist (*āśrayāsiddha*).

I can not trace explicit mention of the first and second kind of *asiddhahetu*-s in Ratnakīrti’s works. A *sandighāsiddhahetu* is mentioned, e.g., in KBhSA₂ 81.8–9: *na. dṛśyādṛśyasamudāyasya kāraṇasyādarśane ’py abhāvāsiddheḥ kāraṇānupalabdheḥ sandighāsiddhatvāt*. (Cf. Woo 1999: 242 f. for the context and a translation.) The *āśrayāsiddhahetu* is mentioned by Ratnakīrti as well (see below for an example).

According to Funayama (1991: 1027) “there were some other *asiddhas* which were sometimes mentioned in the post-Dharmakīrtian period, e.g. *svarūpāsiddha* and *viśe-ṣaṇāsiddha*.” Both of these are used by Ratnakīrti in various contexts, the first, and the *āśrayāsiddha* mentioned above, e.g., in the KBhSA₂ 67.18–19: *...iti na svarūpeṇāśra-yadvāreṇa vāsiddhi sambhāvanāpi.*, and the latter, e.g., in the SJS₂ 3.17–18: *tan nāyaṃ viśeṣaṇāsiddho ’pi hetuḥ*. (For translations of these passages cf. Woo 1999: 145, and Bühnemann 1980: 8 respectively.)

TBh₂ 24.14–18, explaining NB 2.5, says: *anumeye parvatādaḥ dharmiṇi liṅga-syāstitvam eva niścitam, tad ekaṃ rūpaṃ pakṣadharmatāsaṃjñakam. atra sattvagra-haṇenāsiddhasya nirāsaḥ, yathā — anityaḥ śabdaś cākṣuṣatvāt, cākṣuṣtvaṃ cakṣurvi-jñānagrāhyatvam ucyate, tac ca śabde dharmiṇi nāsti*. (Cf. Kajiyama 1998: 65 f. for a translation and more on the context.) The *asiddhahetu* being explained in this passage is not specified, but the example is that which is used in NPSū 401.1: *tatra śabdānitya-tvaṃ sādhye cākṣuṣatvād ity ubhayāsiddhaḥ*. Moreover, in TBh₂ 51.13–14²⁷⁶ the same

²⁷⁶TBh₂ 51.13–14: *svarūpāsiddhyā ’py asiddho hetvābhāso bhavati. yathā anityaḥ śabdaś cākṣuṣa-tvād iti*.

example is again used to exemplify a *hetu*'s *svarūpāsiddhi*. This would suggest, at least for Mokṣākaragupta, an equality between a *hetu*'s *svarūpāsiddhi*, its being *ubhayāsiddha*, and its being *asiddha* without any specification, explained merely as consisting in the *hetu*'s non-existence in the *pakṣa*. The comments in Funayama 1991: 1027, and p. 1021, n. 4 that *svarūpāsiddha* "...means the incompatibility between the reason and the locus." could be understood as supporting a stronger interpretation, such that it is impossible that the *hetu* in question *ever* qualify the *pakṣa*. It is not difficult to see how this would hold for visibility and sound in the example of *ubhayāsiddha*. And a link between the two ways for a *hetu* to be false could be seen by understanding that a *hetu* would be unestablished for both sides if it is impossible through the *hetu*'s nature itself that it qualify the *pakṣa*.

Patil (2009: 240 f., and fn. 110) understands the *asiddha* here as *svarūpāsiddha*, and, amongst others, references TBh₂ 61.3–62.3. The proof of an omniscient person is there followed by a defence introduced by the phrase *na tāvad āśrayadvāreṇa hetu-dvāreṇa vāsiddhasambhāvanā*. (TBh₂ 61.8–9). This phrase is taken almost verbatim from Ratnakīrti's SJS₂ 1.25 (cf. Bühnemann 1980: 93, n. 12). Thus an equality between **hetudvāreṇāsiddha* and *svarūpāsiddha* seems to be implied in the analysis at Patil 2009: 240 f. This is also supported by the strikingly similar construction, referred to in Patil 2009: 240, fn. 110, found in KBhSA₂ 67.18–19: *na svarūpeṇāśrayadvāreṇa vāsiddhi sambhāvanāpi*. (Instead of *vāsiddhi*^o ms "S" reads '*siddha*^o', acc. to KBhSA₂ 67, fn. 4, as also ms "N" acc. to Woo 1999: 41, fn. 7.)

So it appears that Ratnakīrti made no important differentiation between **hetudvāreṇāsiddhi* and **svarūpeṇāsiddhi*. The latter seems, in turn, to have been equated with a *hetu*'s being generally *asiddha*, at least by Mokṣākaragupta, which is, according to the example, classified as *ubhayāsiddha* in NPSū 401.1. I will therefore understand *Ratnakīrti* to be examining the problem that a *hetu* does not qualify a *pakṣa*, so that the statement "*p* is qualified by *H*." is false for both the opponent and the proponent.

Reason as contradictory (*viruddha*)

As before, the logical literature on this topic is extensive (e.g., NPSū, NB, NBT). The NPSū 402.11–403.8 for example discusses four subtypes of this error, summed up as follows:

1. *dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhana*: establishing the opposite of a property's nature,
2. *dharmaviśeṣaviparītasādhana*: establishing the opposite of a part of a property,
3. *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana*: establishing the opposite of a property bearer's nature,
4. *dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana*: establishing the opposite of a part of a property bearer.

Due to the brevity of Ratnakīrti's argument in l. 249 (§ 54, also cf. section 5.2 on page 116), any classification will have to be speculative. One argument that can be made is that since the argument is so short, it can be understood to mean the simplest (or perhaps most common) category of this error, which would be the first in the above list, as is exemplified, e.g., by TBh₂ 25.9–12: *atra sattvagrahaṇena viruddhasya nirāsaḥ, yathā — śabdo nityaḥ kṛtakatvāt ghaṭavat. kṛtakatvaṃ hi nityatvavipakṣeṇānityatvena vyāptam iti viruddham ucyate.*, and TBh₂ 26.2–4: *atrāpy asattvagrahaṇena viruddhasya nirāsaḥ. yathā nityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvāt ghaṭavat. viruddho hi vipakṣe 'sti.* (For

translations cf. Kajiyama 1998: 10.1 and 10.2.) Also see Patil 2009: 67, fn. 94 for a clear formulation of this error based on Keśavamiśra 1934. (This particular edition is not available to me.) More material from the RNĀ is given in section 5.2 on page 117.

Reason as ambiguous (*anaikāntika*)

NPSū 401.5–402.10 lists six ways in which a *hetu* can be ambiguous:²⁷⁷

1. *sādhāraṇa*: common [to *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*]
2. *asādhāraṇa*: not common [to *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*]
3. *sapakṣaikadeśavṛtti*, *vipakṣavyāpin*: occurring in a part of the *sapakṣa* and having a pervasion by the *vipakṣa*
4. *vipakṣaikadeśavṛtti*, *sapakṣavyāpin*: occurring in a part of the *vipakṣa* and having a pervasion by the *sapakṣa*
5. *ubhayapakṣaikadeśavṛtti*: occurring in a part of both the similar and counter instances
6. *viruddhāvybhicārin*: not deviating from what is contradictory

As Iwata (2002: 235) has argued (translating *anaikāntika* as “inconclusive”), Dharmakīrti in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* “...bases the inconclusiveness of the reason not on the ascertainment of the reason’s presence or absence in similar and dissimilar instances, but on the doubt of the reason’s presence in things possessing the property to be proved and its absence in things which do not possess the property to be proved.” This leads Dharmakīrti to a classification of “...the inconclusive reasons ...as follows: both *anvaya* and *vyatireka* are doubtful; either *anvaya* or *vyatireka* is doubtful; *vyatireka* is reversed, namely, unestablished.” (Iwata 2002: 236)

Mokṣākaragupta defines this type of error as follows in TBh₂ 47.19–48.1: *vyāptya-niścaye hetor anaikāntiko doṣaḥ. sa ca trividhaḥ — asādhāraṇānaikāntikaḥ sādharmaṇānaikāntikaḥ sandigdhasvipakṣavyāvṛttikaś ceti* (If [there is] no ascertainment of pervasion, the reason’s error is “ambiguous.” And that [ambiguous error] is threefold: ambiguous due to non-commonness, ambiguous due to commonness, and having a doubtful exclusion from the counter instance.)²⁷⁸ The examples adduced by Mokṣākaragupta for these various pseudo-reasons are:

1. for *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*:
 - a) TBh₂ 48.1–2: *sātmakaṃ jīvaccharīram, prāṇādimattvāt*. (This corresponds to the example in NB 3.97 for a reason that is ambiguous because both positive and negative concomitance are doubtful.)²⁷⁹
 - b) TBh₂ 48.6: *anityaḥ śabdaḥ śrāvaṇatvāt*. (This corresponds to the example for the same kind of pseudo reason in NPSū 401.8: *śrāvaṇatvān nitya iti*)
2. for *sādhāraṇānaikāntika*, TBh₂ 48.7–8: *nityaḥ śabdaḥ prameyatvāt*. (This corresponds to the example for the same error in NPSū 401.8: *prameyatvān nitya iti*)
3. for *sandigdhasvipakṣavyāvṛttika*, TBh₂ 48.9–10: *saḥ śyāmas tatputratvāt*.

²⁷⁷The following is adapted from Tachikawa 1971: 122 f. and notes, where these terms, as well as the exemplifications of each type of error, are translated.

²⁷⁸Cf. Kajiyama 1998: 113 for another translation.

²⁷⁹For an early note on the history of this proof, cf. Stcherbatsky 1994 2: 208 f., fn. 1. See Potter 1977: 95–100 for a short general overview of the Naiyāyika’s *ātman* proofs, and Oetke 1988: 320 ff. for a discussion of this and similar proofs as they appear in VS 3.2.4.

Leaving the “unspecified” ambiguous pseudo-reasons aside, Ratnakīrti uses at least all the types of *anaikāntika* defined by Mokṣākaragupta:

1. *sādhāraṇānaikāntika*, e.g., KBhSA₂ 68.25, SSD₂ 114.16–7
2. *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*, e.g., KBhSA₂ 80.8
3. *sandigdavyatireka-hetvābhāsa*, e.g., SAD 147.4, or, in a formulation as reason and consequence, e.g., *ataḥ sandigdavyatirekitvād anaikāntikatvam eva prameyatvam*. (SSD₂ 124.23–24)

Ratnakīrti, in representing a Naiyāyika point of view, also uses their typification of ambiguous reasons, including a characterization as *anupasamhārya*:

ĪSD 36.21–25 *na cānaikāntikaḥ. sa hi bhavann asādhāraṇo vā syāt, yathā nityā pṛthvī gandhavattvād iti, anupasamhāryo vā, yathā sarvaṃ nityaṃ prameyatvād iti, sādharmaṇo vā yathā nityaḥ śabdaḥ, asparśavattvād iti. tatra na tāvad ādimau pakṣau, sapakṣasadbhāvadārśanena pratikṣiptatvāt. nāpy antimaḥ, adhigatakarṇnivr̥tter vyomāder vipakṣād vyāvṛtter upalabdheḥ.*

Neither²⁸⁰ is [the reason] ambiguous. For the existing [reason] would be either uncommon, as in “Earth is permanent because it has odour.”, or [it would be] unrestricted, as in “Everything is permanent, because it is cognizable.”, or [it would be] common, as in “Sound is permanent, because it is intangible.”

Amongst these [alternatives], to begin with, the first two are not [right], because they are refuted by an observation as really existant in a similar instance. Neither is the last [correct], because an exclusion from the counter instance, ether etc., which is qualified by the exclusion of a known maker, is perceived.

But in the context of the AS’s inference, other than in the context of the ĪSD, this scheme is in all probability not applicable, since this inference is one valid according to Buddhist rules of inferring.

sādhāraṇānaikāntika An instance of a reason that is supposedly *sādhāraṇānaikāntika* is advanced against Ratnakīrti, e.g., in the following passage:

CAPV 130.33–131.3: *nanv ekatve sādhye tatpracyutir dvitvaṃ ca vipakṣaḥ, tasmāc ca vipakṣād dhetuvyatirekapratipattyavasare kiṃ vipakṣātmā prakāśate na vā. pratibhāsapakṣe prakāśamānatvasya hetoḥ sādharmaṇānaikāntikatā, vipakṣe ’pi dṛṣṭatvāt. atha na prakāśate tadā sandigdavyatirekitvam, kuto vyatireka ity avadher evāprakāśamānaśarīratvāt kaṭham ataḥ sādhyasiddhipratyāśā.*

pp ↓

| Now, if oneness is to be proven, the loss (*pracyuti*) of this [oneness] and twoness [are] the counter instance. And therefore, on the occasion of the cognition of the exclusion of the reason[, i.e., appearance,] from the counter instance[, i.e., twoness], does the nature of the counter instance appear or not? In the case that it appears, the reason “being appearing” is inconclusive [because of] commonness, because it is observed also in the counter instance. If[, on the other hand, the counter instance] does not appear, then

²⁸⁰Cf. also Patil 2009: 76 f.

the [reason's] being qualified by exclusion [from the counter instance] is doubted, because for the limit itself (*eva*), [answering] to [the question] “exclusion from what?”, there is no appearing solid support (*śarīra*). How [is there], from this, any expectation of establishing what is to be established?

In this argument, Ratnakīrti's opponent is trying to show that the counter instance can not be ascertained, and that therefore the reason used in the inference²⁸¹ is either ambiguous due to being common to similar instances (what is one) and counter instances (what is not one), or is doubtful as to its exclusion from the counter instances. The counter instance is that not qualified by “oneness”, which is what is to be established. The reason is “appearing.” Accordingly, if there were an appearance of the counter instances, it would obviously be qualified by the reason, which would thus fall under the error of the type “ambiguous because of commonness to similar and dissimilar instances.”

Ratnakīrti's strategy in the answer is to show two things: first, that the reason is not doubtful as to its exclusion from the counter instance, because the counter instance can be known without directly appearing to a cognizer, and second that the counter instance can not be qualified by the reason, because then—since things not directly appearing would become known as if they appeared—all inferences would be useless:

[CAPV 131.4–10]: *atrocyate. iha dvividho vijñānānām viṣayaḥ grāhyo 'dhyavaseyaś ca. pratibhāsamāno grāhyaḥ. agrhīto 'pi pravṛttiviṣayo 'dhyavaseyaḥ. tatrāsarvajñe 'numātari sakalavipakṣapratibhāsābhāvān na grāhyatayā vipakṣo viṣayo vaktavyaḥ, sarvānumānocchedaprasaṅgāt, sarvatra sakalavipakṣapratibhāsābhāvāt tato vyatirekāsiddheḥ. pratibhāse ca deśakālasvabhāvāntaritasakalavipakṣasākṣātkāre sādhyātmāpi virākāḥ sutarāṃ pratīyata ity anumānavaiyarthya. tasmād apratibhāse 'py adhyavasāyasiddhād eva vipakṣād dhūmāder vyatireko niścitaḥ.*

[To this it is said. Here²⁸² the object of cognitions is twofold, that to be grasped and that to be determined. The appearing [object] is [that] to be grasped. The object of activity (*pravṛtti*), even though not grasped, is [that] to be determined.

With regard to this [inference], in the case of a non-omniscient inferrer, the counter instance is not to be called an object due to being grasped because of the absence of the appearance of the whole counter instance; because of the [unwanted] consequence that all inferences would be destroyed, since, because there is no appearance of all the counter instances in any [inference], there is no establishment of the [reason's] exclusion from this [whole counter instance].

up ↓

²⁸¹The inference is given in CAPV 129.22–24: *yat prakāśate tad ekam. yathā citrākārācakramadhyavartī nīlākārah. prakāśate cedam gauragāndhāramadhrasurabhisukumārasātetarādivicitrākārakadambakam iti svabhāvahetuḥ.* (What appears, that is one. Like the form of blue occurring in the middle of a circle of various forms. And this collection (*kadambaka*) of various forms, such as white (*gaura*), the sound “ga” (*gāndhāra*), sweet (*madhura*), fragrant (*surabhi*), soft (*sukumāra*), pleasure and its opposite (*sātetara*), etc. appears. [This is a proof using] the own nature [of the *pakṣa* as] a reason.)

²⁸²Here probably refers to the writings of Ratnakīrti in general, since this idea of a twofold object of both conceptual and perceptual cognitions is expressed in various treatises, e.g., VyN 8*10–15, § 16 on page 20, KBhSA₂ 73.20 (where it is said that the object of perception is twofold).

And if there is an appearance, which is a direct presentation (*sākṣātkāra*) of the whole counter instance distant (*antarita*) in space, time, and its own nature, then that having the nature of what is to be proven, that poor fellow, would be easily (*sutarām*) cognized. Thus an inference would be pointless. Therefore, even though there is no appearance [of the whole counter instance], the exclusion of smoke etc. from the counter instance[, i.e., places where there is no fire etc.,] which is indeed established through determination, is ascertained.²⁸³

So, at least in this passage, the reason's being ambiguous due to its commonness to the similar instance and the counter instance is refuted by showing that the reason can not pertain to the counter instance on pain of an unwanted consequence.

Two further examples for a reason's ambiguity due to its being common to similar and counter instances are found in the KBhSA and the CAPV. In both cases, it becomes clear from context that the error must be *sādhāraṇānaikāntika*: In the KBhSA there is one case in which it is certain that an “unspecified” ambiguous reason is to be understood as being ambiguous due to being common to both the similar instance and the counter instance: *anaikāntiko 'py ayam, sattvasthairayor virodhābhāvād iti* (KBhSA₂ 72.1, trl.: This [reason, existence,] is also ambiguous, because there is no contradiction between existence and [temporal] continuity.)²⁸⁴

The example in the CAPV 130.5–6 (discussed fn. 312 on page 118), is also clear in this respect: A reason (“to appear”, in this case) is contradictory when it occurs only in the counter instances (here, in what is not one). If the reason also occurs in the similar instances, the reason is subject to the fault of ambiguity due to commonness.

asādhāraṇānaikāntika The second candidate for the way the reason can be ambiguous is that it is ambiguous due to not being common to both the similar instances and the counter instances. One of Ratnakīrti's examples for such a reason that is correctly called “ambiguous due to un-commonness” is contained in the following passage:

KBhSA₂ 82.6–11: *tad etau dvāv api vyāpakānupalambhāv asiddhau na kṣaṇikāt sattvaṃ nivartayata iti nāyam asādhāraṇo hetuḥ. api ca vidyamāno bhāvaḥ sādhyetarayor anīcitānvayavyatireko gandha-vattādivad asādhāraṇo yuktaḥ. prakṛtavyāpakānupalambhāc ca sarva-thārthakriyāivāsati ubhābhyāṃ vādibhyāṃ ubhayasmād vinivartitatvena nirāśrayatvāt. tat katham asādhāraṇānaikāntiko bhaviṣyatīty [...].*

Thus, also these two unestablished non-perceptions of a pervader do not exclude existence from a momentary [thing]. Thus, this reason is not uncommon [to the similar instance, impermanent things, and the counter instance, permanent things].

Moreover, an existent thing, which has an unascertained positive and negative concomitance of that to be proven and its opposite, like the fact of

²⁸³The last sentence contains a hint that this way of ascertaining negative concomitance by determination is applicable to all inferences, not only those which have, like the guiding inference of the CAPV (cf. fn. 281 on the preceding page), a *svabhāva*hetu: otherwise the exemplification “of smoke etc.”, typical of a *kārya*hetu, could not be explained. This exemplification will appear again a bit further on, CAPV 131.18.

²⁸⁴Cf. Woo 1999: 177 f. for another translation and some comments.

having a smell etc., is correct as a non-common [ambiguous reason]. But because of the non-perception of the pervader that is being discussed[, i.e., momentariness,] causal efficacy itself would be inexistent in every way, due to the fact that there is no basis [for the pervader] since it is completely excluded from both [the similar instance and the counter instance] by both disputants. Therefore, why should [the reason] be ambiguous due to un-commonness?²⁸⁵

Here, Ratnakīrti is arguing that in the proof of the momentariness of all things, the reason—that these things exist—does not have the fault of being uncommon to the similar instance (momentary things) and the counter instance (non-momentary things).

Acc. to Woo 1999: 228 f., the issue is whether two pervaders of “existence”, namely dependence and independence (*sāpekṣatvānapekṣatva*) on the one hand, as well as oneness and manyness (*ekatvānekatva*) on the other,²⁸⁶ exclude existence from momentary things. If existence were thus excluded not only from permanent things (as assumed by Kṣaṇabhaṅgavādins like Ratnakīrti, cf. Woo 1999: 226), but also from momentary things, it would be a reason that is not common to both the similar instances and the counter instances.

Additional note: not *anaikāntika* in any sense

Interpreted from a more systematic (and less literal) perspective, the argument in the AS can also be understood to subvert all three varieties of a reason’s being ambiguous: For Ratnakīrti’s answer is that all counter instances (particular, universal, etc.) are impossible, in consequence of which (and in view of the fact that the preceding two possible faults of the reason, that it is unestablished and contradictory, have been shown not to be the case) one has to admit that the reason can not be ambiguous in any sense of the term:

1. *H* can not be ambiguous such that it qualifies both the similar and the counter instance, for the counter instance does not exist.
2. *H* can not be ambiguous such that it does not qualify both the similar instance and the counter instance, because it has been shown to occur in the similar instance (the argument in the section about the reason not being contradictory, section 5.2 on page 116).
3. *H* can not be ambiguous such that it is doubtful whether it is excluded from the counter instance, because the counter instance does not exist and can, as in the first argument in this list, therefore not be qualified by it.

4.3 The argument structure of the *Apohasiddhi*

Overview

The paragraph numbers refer to the paragraphs in the critical edition.

- A. § 1: Statement of the basic thesis: *apoha* is the referent of words.
- B. § 2–§ 7: Introductory objections and replies concerning this thesis.

²⁸⁵ Cf. Woo 1999: 250 for the context and another translation of this passage.

²⁸⁶ Cf. KBhSA₂ 79.11–13, 79.25–26, and 80.7–8 for the main points in the argument.

- C. § 8–§ 9: Revised statement of the thesis, and first explanation of it: the referent of words is a positive element qualified by exclusion of others.
- D. § 10–§ 32: Arguments showing that neither a particular nor a particular qualified by a genus can be the referent of words.
- E. § 33–§ 48: Arguments showing that a universal or genus can not be the referent of words.
- F. § 49–§ 50: Restatement of thesis that the referent of words is a positive element qualified by exclusion of others, and further explanations.
- G. § 51–§ 53: Refutation of a view held by Dharmottara which concerns a central cognitive function involved in conceptual cognition.
- H. § 54–§ 58: A formal proof establishing the thesis.
- I. § 59: Verse summarizing the main points.
- J. § 60–§ 63: Colophon.

Detailed analysis

In the following, a detailed analysis of the AS's argument structure is given. The numbers in the margin again refer to the paragraphs in chapter 2.

- A. [Proponent:] General statement of thesis: Exclusion is the referent of words. § 1
- B. Introductory objections and answers concerning the thesis. § 2–§ 7
 - B.1. [Opponent:] Three explanations of exclusion are presented and refuted: § 2
 - B.1.1. [Proponent:] Exclusion is either
 - B.1.1.1. the external object itself (*bāhya*),
 - B.1.1.2. the form of awareness (*buddhyākāra*), or
 - B.1.1.3. mere exclusion of others.
 - B.1.2. [Opponent:] The first two alternatives (B.1.1.1., B.1.1.2.) are wrong, because § 3 they are only positive elements.
 - B.1.3. The third (B.1.1.3.) alternative is wrong,
 - B.1.3.1. because conceptual cognition has the form of a positive element, and does not make inexistence known, and
 - B.1.3.2. because what is so faulted by perception cannot be saved by another proof.
 - B.2. Discussion of theories that the cognition of an inexistent object implies or is § 4–§ 7 somehow connected to the cognition of inexistence.
 - B.2.1. [Proponent:] A conceptual cognition does not cognize inexistence itself, § 4 but only what is inexistent.
 - B.2.1.1. For a cognition of a qualifier (inexistence) (B.1.3.1.) is implied by the cognition of that qualified by it (that which is inexistent).
 - B.2.1.1.1. This is an instance of the qualifier-qualified relationship.
 - B.2.1.2. For others, a conceptual cognition's object is not the universal as such, but the universal as the qualifier of some instance,
 - B.2.1.2.1. because of the appearance of a common form of awareness.
 - B.2.1.3. In the same way, the cogniton of what is inexistent, which implies the cognition of inexistence, justifies the common talk of "cognition of exclusion".
 - B.2.2. [Opponent:] Why call a cognition which has a positive form (B.1.3.1.) and § 5 results from the appearance of a common form of awareness (B.2.1.2.1.) a cognition with a nonappearing (B.2.1.), inexistent (B.2.1.) form of awareness?

B.2.2.1. If a cognitive form of inexistence appeared, nobody would deny that there is a cognition of inexistence.

B.2.2.2. Otherwise, a cognitive form of one thing could be taken for the cognitive form of another.

§ 6 B.2.3. [Proponent:] Due to the qualifier-qualified relation (B.2.1.1.1.), a cognition of inexistence is contained in the cognition of what is inexistent.

B.2.4. [Opponent:] Inexistence as a qualifier is only an addition to the cognition of some positive element, so how should such a cognition be defined as a cognition of inexistence? For the qualifier inexistence does not appear.

§ 7 B.2.5. [Proponent:] What actually appears has a positive form (B.1.3.1.), but there is also an exclusion of others for it. Therefore it is called cognition of inexistence.

B.2.6. [Opponent:] Still, exclusion is only connected, and it is only a positive element that is actually cognized.

B.2.6.1. Otherwise also direct perception would have exclusion of others for its object,

B.2.6.1.1. because it also has a single thing excluded from all others as an object.

B.3. Conceptual cognitions therefore have a positive element as objects, just like perception.

§ 8–§ 9 C. Revised statement of the thesis, and first explanation of it: [Proponent:] A word's referent is affirmation qualified by the exclusion of others.

§ 9 C.1. Affirmationists/negationists think that affirmation/exclusion is the primary object of a conceptual cognition, and that negation/an excluded thing is understood by implication.

C.2. This is wrong, since there is no sequentiality in conceptual cognitions. Cognition of the positive element is the cognition of that excluded from others.

C.2.1. Even though a verbal expression does not represent its object as that excluded from others (B.1.3.1.), exclusion is cognized as it is a qualifier of a conceptual cognition (B.2.1.1.)

C.2.1.1. because a word is based on what is excluded from others.

C.2.2. Therefore, a conceptual cognition of a positive element is necessarily simultaneous with a cognition of exclusion.

C.2.3. Absence can be grasped in a nonimplicative or implicative way both by perception and conceptual cognition.

C.2.3.1. As for perception

C.2.3.1.1. the nonimplicative form is a capacity to generate a conceptual cognition of absence, and

C.2.3.1.2. the implicative form is an awareness of the thing itself,

C.2.3.2. so for conceptual cognition

C.2.3.2.1. the nonimplicative form is a capacity to impart activity in conformance to what appears in it, and

C.2.3.2.2. the implicative form is a consciousness of the thing itself, as for perception (C.2.3.1.2.).

C.3. So if the exclusion of others were not formed simultaneously with the cognition of an object, no differentiation between objects would be possible in everyday activity.

§ 10–§ 32 D. Arguments showing that neither a particular nor a particular qualified by a universal/genus can be a referent of words.

D.1. [Opponent:] Vācaspati says: The object of a conceptual cognition is a particular § 10 qualified by a genus.

D.1.1. Since these are differentiated from that which is not of that genus,

D.1.2. there is activity avoiding wrong objects (C.3.).

D.2. [Proponent:] If it is the form of a particular that is excluded from that of another genus, then, even if it possesses a genus, how should other-exclusion not be true?

D.2.1. For if it is only due to the particulars themselves that they are differentiated from other particulars, the genus doesn't matter.

D.3. If the particular is not cognized as differentiated, then how could we act correctly § 11 with respect to particulars?

D.4. If it is only the genus that differentiates certain particulars from others, then § 12 cognizing that differentiated is a cognition of differentiation,

D.4.1. may it really be the genus, or only the particular's causal sequence (E.4., E.7.1.3.),

D.5. Logical problems of exclusion being a qualifier dismissed:

D.5.1. There is no error of mutual dependence in the theory that the positive ele- § 13 ment, which the convention of the word "x" is made for, is what is excluded from non-x

D.5.1.1. because this error also pertains to the theory that a convention is made for a universal or that qualified by it:

D.5.1.1.1. For universal does not mean mere universal, but a specific universal.

And so:

D.5.1.1.1.1. Cognition of xness depends on cognition of the particular x, and

D.5.1.1.1.2. cognition of that denoted by the word x, i.e., the particular, depends on cognition of xness.

D.5.1.2. Therefore there is no error of mutual dependency if the conventional designation is made for a form of conceptual awareness which, preceded by a perception of a single particular, is generalized externally as if common to all things.

D.5.1.3. And if this manner of using a word is accepted, then it is also accepted that the rest, i.e., every other thing, is designated by this word's negation.

D.5.2. Neither is there a contradiction between excluded and exclusion, nor damage § 14 to the qualifier qualified relationship,

D.5.2.1. because they are not mutually distinguished from each other

D.5.2.2. since they are related to something common.

D.5.2.3. For there is contradiction to its own absence, not to another thing's absence.

D.6. Also a sentence is understood due to exclusion only. § 15

D.7. Therefore an affirmation characterized by exclusion is understood from a word (C.).

D.8. [Opponent:] If affirmation alone is the referent of words in this way, why is § 16 exclusion asserted?

D.9. [Proponent:] By the word exclusion affirmation qualified by exclusion of others (C.) is meant.

D.9.1. This means, exclusion is simultaneously (C.2.2.) understood as the qualifier in understanding affirmation.

D.9.2. Exclusion can not be taken as the object of perception (B.2.6.1.) in the same way, because there is no dispute as there is for conceptual cognition.

D.10. And by affirmation

D.10.1. the external referent excluding others is meant according to determination, and

D.10.2. the form of awareness is meant according to appearance.

D.11. The external referent is what is to be denoted by a word because of determination only, not because an external thing appears as in perception

§ 17 D.11.1. Scriptural evidence: Because of a word an object does not appear to someone as it would because of perception.

§ 18 D.11.2. [Opponent:] Even the same thing appears differently, depending on whether it is known by a sense faculty or by a word.

§ 19 D.11.3. [Proponent:] Different cognitions have their basis in different real things. So how should the form of a single thing make different forms of awareness manifest?

§ 20 D.11.3.1. For there are no two contradictory forms of a single thing, so that one could appear to perception, the other to conceptual cognition.

D.11.3.2. For there is no difference of a thing apart from the difference of its own nature.

D.11.3.3. And there is no difference of its own nature apart from the difference of appearance.

§ 21 D.11.4. [Opponent:] But there are different appearances of one and the same thing.

D.11.5. [Proponent:] A difference of appearances is not a sure sign for different things, but it is a sure sign for there not being the same object for the two cognitive faculties.

D.11.5.1. Therefore a difference of appearances accompanied by a difference of causal effectiveness etc. means a difference of the thing, and

D.11.5.2. a difference of appearances alone means that one appearance is wrong.

§ 22 D.11.6. [Opponent:] Vācaspati: Even if both faculties have the real thing for an object, still they would apprehend it differently

D.11.6.1. because the difference between perceivable and unperceivable results from different causes.

D.11.7. [Proponent:] That's wrong, because there is no thing that is an object of the apprehension of something hidden.

D.11.7.1. The difference of causes (D.11.6.1.) is fulfilled by the fact that an apprehension of an imperceivable thing (e.g., an inference) does not grasp a sense object.

D.11.7.2. Therefore a particular does not appear in conceptual cognition.

§ 23 D.11.7.3. Moreover, if words made a real thing known, negation and affirmation of properties would be either

D.11.7.3.1. superfluous, as when "it exists" or "it does not exist" is said of an existent or inexistent thing respectively, or

D.11.7.3.2. meaningless, as in the opposite case,

D.11.7.3.3. because a thing would be completely known on hearing the word alone.

D.11.7.4. Therefore, the commonness of what appears in conceptual cognition to the nonbeing and being of an external referent excludes that a real thing could be its object.

§ 24 D.11.7.5. [Opponent:] Vācaspati: This commonness (D.11.7.4.) is possible, because

- D.11.7.5.1. a universal can be qualified by existence and nonexistence in so far as it is connected to present or past and future spatiotemporal things respectively.
- D.11.7.6. [Proponent:] This is not the topic, and there is no harm to what we say D.11.7.6.1. insofar as it makes clear that Vācaspati also accepts that particulars are not denoted by words.
- D.11.7.7. Additionally, the existential qualifications are cognized according to the nature of the particulars.
- D.11.7.7.1. But to say that a universal is so qualified because of a connection to a particular is foolish.
- D.11.7.8. There is the same error for a particular qualified by a genus (D.1.).
- D.11.7.8.1. For, if the cognition is established because of a particular, there is always the error of this cognition, may an additional genus (D.2.) be cognized or not.
- D.11.7.9. [Opponent:] Kumāṛila's followers: Commonness (D.11.7.4.) is not § 25 erroneous because a thing has parts.
- D.11.7.9.1. By one word one aspect is made known, e.g., treeness, independently of existence. This other aspect is made known by another word.
- D.11.7.10. [Proponent:] Cognition of a permanent universal independently of its existential status is not possible.
- D.11.8. [Opponent:] A word presents its object in a different way than perception § 26 because they have different capacities.
- D.11.9. [Proponent:] This was proven wrong by the error of two appearances when a single nature is grasped by perception and conceptual cognition (D.11.5. on the facing page).
- D.11.10. The difference between the capacities of these two means of valid cognition is achieved by perception directly perceiving its object, whereas conceptual cognition determines it.
- D.11.11. So, without the same appearance, conceptual and perceptual cognition do not have the same objects.
- D.11.12. And nonbeing (the object of conceptual cognition?) can not make perception's object known.
- D.11.13. [Opponent:] The word "tree" refers to the part treeness, and the word § 27 "is" refers to the part existence.
- D.11.14. [Proponent:] For a particular completely comprehended by perception, there is no possibility of affirmation or negation of another property through either another word or another means of valid cognition.
- D.11.14.1. [Opponent:] The need of a different means of knowledge is observed even in perception.
- D.11.14.2. [Proponent:] Only when perception has an object with an ill known nature,
- D.11.14.2.1. because perception has an unascertaining nature.
- D.11.14.3. But what would another means of valid cognition help in the case of conceptual cognition, which is itself of an ascertaining nature?
- D.11.14.4. But the need for other words and logical marks is a fact.
- D.11.15. Consequently, the nature of a real thing is not grasped by conceptual cognition.
- D.12. Discussion about properties and property bearers.

- § 28 D.12.1. [Opponent:] Properties are different from each other, and different from the property bearer.
D.12.2. So, in conceptual cognition, different properties are cognized through different expressions.
D.12.3. [Proponent:] This is wrong,
D.12.3.1. since perception refutes a distinction between property and property bearer, and
D.12.3.2. since otherwise everything would be everywhere.
D.12.3.2.1. Scriptural evidence: The appellations property and property bearer are only based on a conceptual difference.
- § 29 D.12.4. And even if this difference were real,
D.12.4.1. the only possible relation between property and its bearer is that of proximity qualified as assistance,
D.12.4.1.1. because other relations like inherence etc. have been refuted.
D.12.4.2. And in that case (D.12.4.1.), conceptual cognition would work in the same way as perception, because
D.12.4.2.1. as perception grasps all properties when grasping the property bearer due to their proximity to the sense faculties,
D.12.4.2.2. so a cognition by a word or logical mark, which are both connected to their objects as denoting and denoted etc., would cognize all properties,
D.12.4.2.3. because there is no difference in mere proximity.
- § 30 D.12.4.3. [Opponent:] Vācaspati: But grasping a nature as qualified by an additional attribute, like existence, does not imply grasping all the other additional attributes also qualifying that nature, because
D.12.4.3.1. because the nature of a substance is qualified by additional attributes,
D.12.4.3.2. but is not identical with either the additional attributes or being that qualified by them (D.12.1.).
D.12.4.4. [Proponent:] Bad argument, because grasping the other additional attributes (D.12.4.3.) does not follow from nondifference (D.12.3.1.),
D.12.4.4.1. since grasping the assisted where the assisting is grasped (D.12.4.1.) follows only after their difference is assumed (D.12.4.).
D.12.4.5. Additionally, a cognition of a property and property bearer is not dependent on a real property and property bearer, because they are not established by a means of valid cognition, and the rule is:
D.12.4.5.1. When established by a means of valid cognition, the thing's nature is exactly described.
- § 31 D.12.4.6. [Opponent:] *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*: Then there would be the cognition of all assisted things as soon as there is the cognition of an assisting thing like sun etc.
D.12.4.7. [Proponent:] This is the result of misunderstanding our explanation:
D.12.4.7.1. In your view, if there is a difference between property and property bearer (D.12.1.) and proximity is only assistance (D.12.4.1.),
D.12.4.7.2. then only an assisted that is in the same place and has the property's form can be grasped when the assisting is grasped (D.12.4.4.1.).
D.12.4.7.3. So it does not follow that that is grasped which is
D.12.4.7.3.1. an assisted in a different place and
D.12.4.7.3.2. another substance deviating from the observed.
- § 32 D.13. Therefore, wherever a thing's own nature is cognized, it is cognized as a whole.

D.14. So it is settled that a particular does not appear due to a word, a concept, or a logical mark (D.11.).

E. Arguments showing that a universal or genus can not be the referent of words. § 33–§ 48

E.1. Neither does a universal appear in conceptual cognition. § 33

E.1.1. On hearing a word the generalized constituent parts of an object appear which

E.1.1.1. are accompanied by letters, and

E.1.1.2. are mixed together because the differences of things of the same genus are disregarded.

E.1.2. And this appearance is not a universal,

E.1.2.1. Scriptural Evidence: since a universal is said to be free of colour, form, § 34 and the form of letters.

E.1.3. So a universal is only an agglomeration of an object's generalized constituent parts which, § 35

E.1.3.1. although completely different for each particular,

E.1.3.2. are identified with the particular.

E.1.4. This is only an error,

E.1.4.1. because such an exterior object is not attainable.

E.1.5. Therefore the cognition of a universal has no object, no matter if its false cognition is due to

E.1.5.1. the external object being a transformation of the mind itself, or

E.1.5.2. the form being completely inexistent, or

E.1.5.3. the particulars themselves appearing so that the differences between them are obscured, or

E.1.5.4. a lapse of memory that causes differences to be overlooked.

E.2. So, there is no news about a universal.

E.3. [Opponent:] If there is no universal, cognitions of the same things are accidental. § 36

E.4. [Proponent:] Wrong, for a causal complex that, aided by memory, generates a cognition that overrides specific differences produces the concept of a universal.

E.5. So a genus appears neither in conceptual cognition (E.1.) nor in perception.

E.6. A genus is not established by inference, because a logical mark connected to the universal can not be seen.

E.7. A genus is not established like a sense faculty, because by the effect, cognition, only incidental / occasional other causes are established,

E.7.1. because the absence of the genus cognition depends solely on the absence of all the particulars of that genus, not on the absence of the genus itself.

E.7.1.1. [Opponent:] A cow is a cow only because of its cowness. If not, also a horse could be the material object cow.

E.7.1.2. [Proponent:] In that case, cowness is cowness only because of the material object cow. If not, horseness would also be cowness.

E.7.1.3. Therefore there is a material object "cow" only because of a sequence of causes (D.4.1.), but cowness may exist or not.

E.8. [Opponent:] The capacity to cause a cognition of a universal can be either § 37

E.8.1. identical with a singular material object:

E.8.1.1. then it is impossible that another object could make the same universal known, or

E.8.2. different from a particular:

E.8.2.1. then this is a universal and we are only arguing about the name.

- E.9. [Proponent:] The capacity is indeed not different for each thing.
 E.9.1. But two things with the same capacity are no problem (E.8.1.1.).
 E.9.2. As for you a genus is
 E.9.2.1. the cause of a common term, and
 E.9.2.2. independent of all other genera
 E.9.3. so for us a particular is
 E.9.3.1. independent of genera and differentiated by its own nature,
 E.9.3.2. the cause of a common term.
- § 38 E.10. [Opponent:] Trilocana: The cause for the cognition and appellation of universals is the inference (D.12.4.1.1.) of specific universals (D.5.1.1.1.) in their respective basis.
 E.11. [Proponent:] If only inference in the particulars is the reason for these cognitions, what are the universals for?
 E.12. And even inference (D.12.4.1.1.) is not possible:
- § 39 E.12.1. Inference is proven by the cognition “here in this that inheres.” And the cognition “here” results from observing two different objects, one inhering in the other.
 E.12.2. But these are never perceived in any object of cognition.
 E.12.3. So inference is a conceptual construct.
- § 40 E.13. [Opponent:] What Trilocana speculates: A continuous cognition is then impossible, because it depends on a continuous object. But if the particulars are completely different, how can there be a basis for such a cognition?
 E.14. [Proponent:] is shown to be wrong,
 E.14.1. because there is a logical deviation by a continuous cognition when the universals themselves are particularized by mutual exclusion.
- § 41 E.15. What Trilocana says against the opposite case:
 E.15.1. [Opponent:] “There is no other reason for the occurrence of continuous cognitions in only certain cases.”
 E.16. is wrong, because it is proven (E.4.–E.9.) that one must accept the continuity (E.13.) of appellations and apprehensions (E.10.) due to the specificity of a thing’s own nature which is excluded from that of another nature.
- § 42 E.16.1. Only the proximity (D.12.4.1.) according to which a genus extends to some but not other particulars is the basis for cognition.
- § 43 E.17. [Opponent:] What the *Nyāyabhūṣana* says to this
 E.17.1. i.e.: In the Buddhist view then, the proximity of the thing x to the thing y is the basis of the common usage «has x.» So what use is the x then?
 E.18. is wrong, since what is meant is this:
 E.18.1. That the observation of x in proximity to y is the reason for the cognition «has y» is not denied.
 E.18.2. But no universal is ever observed.
 E.18.3. Therefore it is better, if one wants to imagine a universal at all, to only imagine proximity as the cause of continuous cognitions.
- § 44 E.19. [Opponent:] This is an inference proving a universal:
 E.19.1. The *hetu* is the cognition of something qualified (x-ly).
 E.19.2. The *sādhya* is the necessary involvement of the cognition of a qualifier (x).
 E.19.3. The *pakṣa* is the cognition “This is x-ly.”
 E.19.4. The *drṣṭānta* is “This is stick-ly.”
 E.19.5. The type of logical reason used is the effect reason.

- E.20. [Proponent:] What are you trying to prove: § 45
- E.20.1. the necessary involvement of the cognition of a separate qualifier, or
- E.20.2. the necessary involvement of the cognition of a mere qualifier?
- E.20.3. In the first case (E.20.1.): § 46
- E.20.3.1. perception refutes the *pakṣa* (E.19.3.), because a perception does not grasp both a particular and the universal (E.12.2.).
- E.20.3.2. Additionally, the cognition of something qualified is an ambiguous reason for a universal, because it occurs also without a separate qualifier.
- E.20.4. In the second case (E.20.2.) there is proof of what has already been proven, § 47
- E.20.4.1. because of postulating a difference between particular and universal as in the cognition “This particular possesses that universal.” a relation of qualifier-qualified is postulated (D.12.3.2.1.)
- E.20.4.1.1. because the common expression “This is x-ly.” is really due to an experience of that differentiated from non-x (D.5.1.2., D.5.1.).
- E.21. So there is no proof of a universal. § 48
- E.21.1. The reason that refutes all the additional attributes like a universal, propriety, action etc. is
- E.21.1.1. a clear perception that grasps a whole particular (discussion under point D.),
- E.21.1.2. or the nonperception of something otherwise observable (discussion under point E.).
- F. Restatement of thesis that the referent of words is a positive element qualified by exclusion of others, and further explanations. § 49–§ 50
- F.1. Thus only affirmation is the referent of a word. (C., D.10.) § 49
- F.1.1. And this referent is the external object (D.10.1.) and the form of awareness (D.10.2.).
- F.1.1.1. The form of awareness is neither affirmed nor negated in reality or conventionally, because
- F.1.1.1.1. it is directly understood through self-awareness,
- F.1.1.1.2. and is not determined.
- F.1.1.2. And the external object is neither affirmed nor negated in reality,
- F.1.1.2.1. because it does not appear in a conceptual cognition.
- F.1.1.3. In reality, all entities are inexpressible because
- F.1.1.3.1. they are not determined, and
- F.1.1.3.2. do not appear.
- F.1.1.4. Conventionally, external things are affirmed or negated, because
- F.1.1.4.1. otherwise there would not be everyday activity.
- F.1.2. Therefore: Neither an external object nor a form of awareness can be affirmed in reality. § 50
- F.1.3. For only an external object can be conventionally proven to exist.
- F.1.4. But a form of awareness is not affirmed even conventionally.
- G. Refutation of Dharmottara. § 51–§ 53
- G.1. [Opponent:] Dharmottara’s thesis: § 51
- G.1.1. There is affirmation and negation of a superimposed external thing.
- G.1.2. [Proponent:] This is also rejected by this (F.).
- G.2. [Opponent:] If no determinable thing appears in determination, then what does it mean to say “It is determined?” § 52
- G.3. [Proponent:] Even though it does not appear, it is made an object of activity.

G.4. [Opponent:] There is no difference between two things that do not appear (G.3.). So how does activity, which is directed at a certain object, avoid other objects (C.3.)?

G.5. [Proponent:] Even if no object is grasped, still there is only activity restricted to certain objects

G.5.1. because the capacity of a conceptual cognition is limited according to the form of awareness

G.5.1.1. because a form of awareness is limited by its specific set of producing factors (E.4.).

§ 53 G.6. For objects that have particular capacities are

G.6.1. well established through means of valid cognition, and

G.6.2. are beyond doubt as to a mixing of their capacities.

G.7. Therefore a concept's being determined is its being productive of activity only with regard to certain objects (G.2.)

G.7.1. because it is connected to a specific form of awareness.

G.8. There is no activity through superimposition (G.1.1.) because of similarity, since there is the

G.8.1. possibility of an error through superimposition of an external object on an image or

G.8.2. vice versa.

G.9. Rather, a cognition arises due to remaining impressions and extends activity towards an external object without being able to see it.

G.10. So it is actually always erring.

G.11. So in this sense

G.11.1. a positive element is the referent, which is

G.11.1.1. specified by the absence of other things, and

G.11.1.2. differentiated from that of another genus.

G.11.2. Exactly this (G.11.1.), which is meant by the word exclusion, is

G.11.2.1. the referent of words, and

G.11.2.2. the object of positive and negative activity.

G.12. This is established.

§ 54–§ 58 H. Inference establishing the thesis (A., C., F.1., G.11.1.):

§ 54 H.1. A conceptual cognition which denotes (*svabhāva* *hetu*) something has only a thing determined and differentiated from that of another form as its object (*sādhya*).

H.2. The example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) is: “There is water in the well here.”

H.3. And this is denoting: an expression having the form of the word “cow” etc.

H.3.1. The reason, denoting, is not unestablished because

H.3.1.1. even if there is no real denoted-denoting relation (D.12.3.1., D.12.4.2.2.),

H.3.1.2. everyone performing everyday activities necessarily accepts that relationship as made through determination, because otherwise there is no such activity (F.1.1.4.1.).

H.3.2. Neither is the reason contradictory

H.3.2.1. as it exists in the similar instance.

H.3.3. Neither is the reason ambiguous, for the following reason:

§ 55 H.3.3.1. [Opponent:] The denoted must be either a particular, an additional attribute, a connection to an additional attribute, possessing an additional attribute, or must be a form of awareness,

§ 56 H.3.3.2. because it must be bound to something and must be one of these.

§ 57 H.3.3.3. [Proponent:] There is no convention for the particular and the form

of awareness, because they are useless for convention (F.1.1.2., F.1.1.1.). And for the others there is no convention, because there is no additional attribute (D.12.4.3., E.21.1.).

H.3.3.4. So there is a pervasion of the reason by the property to be proven, because denoting can not exist in a counter instance § 58

H.3.3.4.1. as there is no other pervader with the quality of having an object

H.3.3.4.1.1. because nothing else that could be denoted exists.

H.4. Thus pervasion is established.

I. Summary: Words express an object. Exclusion is understood as its quality (C.). One object is explained as determinated (D.10.1.), the other as appearing (D.10.2.). But in reality nothing at all is expressed (F.1.1.3.). § 59

J. End of the *Apohasiddhi*, which was written by Ratnakīrti.

§ 60

K. Colophon.

§ 61–§ 63

Chapter 5

The *apoha*-theory in Ratnakīrti's AS

apoha-theory, as used in these pages, is the equivalent to the Sanskrit term *apohavāda*. Other translations of this term could be “the teaching of *apoha*”, or “the *apoha* doctrine”.

For more than 80 years this theory has been the subject of study. Pioneering work was done by Stcherbatsky, as well as by Mookerjee.²⁸⁷ The latter discusses quite a few passages of Ratnakīrti's AS, based on the *editio princeps* in Shāstri 1910. Major early insights are due also to Frauwallner's series of articles on the theory of *apoha* (1932, 1933, 1935), where the main tenets of the *apoha* theory have been brought into sight, at least as developed by Dharmakīrti.²⁸⁸ And from the 1960s onwards, there has been a steady increase in ever more specialised studies on the topic.²⁸⁹ It thus would seem that yet another general introduction to this theory of *apoha* is perhaps not really in place here. For one thing, plenty of the very insightful studies that have been published in recent years are certainly not in general to be challenged, even though I believe it will be necessary to discuss some elements of these interpretations in the light of the AS.

Apart from this, it is often not quite clear what the scope of the term *apoha*-theory is supposed to be. Some regard it as a methodological device²⁹⁰ that provides a substitute for universals as really existing entities in whichever context these universals might be invoked to explain something. Others would equate “*apoha*-theory” with the language theory developed by Buddhist epistemologists from Dignāga onwards, or seem to make

²⁸⁷Cf. reprints of their classical works for this, Stcherbatsky 1994 2 and Mookerjee 2006: Chapter VII respectively.

²⁸⁸Of course, Frauwallner 1937 should also be mentioned here. There the *apoha* theory of Dharmotara has been presented through a translation and discussion of the Tibetan translation of the DhAP. As pointed out by Akamatsu 1986: 75 f. though, this translation suffers from a systematic misinterpretation, mistranslating *ma yin dgag* and *med dgag* as *prasajyapratishedha* and *paryudāsa* respectively. Frauwallner notes this, but does not really justify it (cf. Frauwallner 1937: 263, fn. 1).

²⁸⁹Some examples, by no means comprehensive: Vetter 1964, Katsura 1979, Akamatsu 1983, Katsura 1986, R. P. Hayes 1988, Katsura 1991, Dreyfus 1997, Bronkhorst 1999, Ogawa 1999, Pind 1999, Siderits 1999, Dunne 2004, Saito 2004, Hattori 2006, McCrea and Patil 2006, Kataoka 2009, McCrea and Patil 2010, Tillemans 2011a, Tillemans 2011b, Siderits, Tillemans and Chakrabarti 2011.

²⁹⁰Katsura 1986: 178, n. 10, crediting Prof. Steinkellner with having the idea, speaks of a “working hypothesis”. Ogawa 1999 makes a very interesting point, culminating in the following assessment: “...I cannot refrain from saying that there is nothing original to be found in Buddhist epistemologists' linguistic theory, other than the theory of *apoha*.” (Ogawa 1999: 284, with a typo corrected)

no strict distinction between the two.²⁹¹

But an inquiry broad enough to provide a definition of “the” *apoha*-theory, even if it ever existed, is certainly not in this author's powers. So I will try and give an explanation of the *apoha*-theory as it is detailed in the AS of Ratnakīrti. I hope this will serve as an introduction to the main aspects of the *apoha* theory as it appears in the AS.

5.1 Establishment of *apoha*—The purpose of the AS

The title of the AS means “establishment of exclusion”, or “proof of exclusion”. Even a short glance at the analysis of the arguments given in this text (cf. section 4.3 on page 98) makes it obvious why this is a very adequate name for the text: After the presentation of various versions of *apoha* theories and their possible criticisms, there follows a fairly short exposition of Ratnakīrti's own opinion. This in turn is followed by discussions and refutations of various positions that try to argue that there is some form of a universal (*sāmānya*, *jāti*, etc.). At the end of this section Ratnakīrti also distances himself and criticises an aspect of Dharmottara's, a Buddhist thinker's, theory of *apoha*. There then follows a formal proof, *prayoga*, establishing that every word has as its object a generalized thing (*vastumātra*) that is determined and excluded from others. This proof is closely knit into the preceding arguments of the text, in that they are here adduced to show that none of the typical logical fallacies applies to this inference.²⁹²

In this final inference, *anyāpoha* (or, more precisely, *atadrūpaparāvṛtta*, “distinguished from that of another form”) becomes established as a part of that thing that anything that names anything refers to or has as its object. It is in this sense that the establishment mentioned in the title will probably best be understood: establishment of exclusion as a part of the word referent.²⁹³

Additionally, this inference can be used as a general guide to the rest of the AS. According to Thakur (1975a: 5 f.), Ratnakīrti's works “[...] are written in a style that is more common in neo-logic than in the old system. In each case the discussion is started just in the way of a formal debate, as if the opponent is present before the author. Arguments are syllogistic. The refutations are generally through the *hetvābhāsa* fallacies.” Steinkellner (1977: 385) concludes that “Ratnakīrti [...] is using the logical forms in the macro-structure of his texts. The analyses of his texts are therefore structured by logical titles.”²⁹⁴

²⁹¹Cf., e.g., Dunne 2004: 116: “...our aim here is to raise the central issues ...in the *apoha*-theory, and to avoid surpassing ...that goal, we must forego any detailed examination of ...other analyses, despite their importance to my understanding of Dharmakīrti's philosophy of language.” Hattori 1982: 103 even says that what a word refers to is “a concept formed through the mental process of *anyāpoha*, ...”

²⁹²From this it can also be seen that the AS is a carefully composed and well structured text, even though much of it is taken essentially verbatim from the AP of Jñānaśrīmitra.

²⁹³The other property composing the word referent is *adhyavasita* (that it is determined). The substrate of the two properties, “determined” and “differentiated from others”, is the *vastumātra*, a mere thing, which is said to be what a word has as its object. That this is the object of words is the *sādhyā*, the property (or rather, in this case, the fact) which is to be established in this inference.

²⁹⁴It might be helpful for a chronology of Ratnakīrti's works to remember that of all of Ratnakīrti's “*si-ddhi*” texts (SJS₂, AS, KBhSA₂, KBhSV, as well as CAPV, cf. the classification in Thakur 1975a: 3–4), the AS has two specific characteristics within that group: it is the only text that has the inference summing up its main purpose at its end, and it is least strictly built around that inference.

So it can be assumed to be a characteristic of Ratnakīrti's texts to be constructed along the lines of formal proofs. For example, the CAPV is constructed in this way, building around this central inference:

CAPV 129.22–24: *yat prakāśate tad ekam. yathā citrākāracakramadhyavarī nīlākāraḥ. prakāśate cedam gauragāndhāramadhurasurabhisukumārasātetarādivicitrākāradambakam iti svabhāvahetuḥ.*²⁹⁵

Similarly, according to Woo 1999: 126 ff. , and Woo 1999: 141 f., the KBhSA is structured around the following logical proof KBhSA₂ 67.7–8: “*yat sat tat kṣaṇikam, yathā ghaṭaḥ, santaś cāmī vivādāspadībhūtāḥ padārthā iti.*”

The VyN, on the other hand, is characterised by Lasic (2000b: 19) as follows: “Anders als der Titel es vermuten läßt, wird in diesem Werk jedoch nicht die Feststellung des logischen Nexus schlechthin diskutiert, sondern ausschließlich der durch das Verhältnis von Rauch und Feuer exemplifizierte.” Whereas this text is not centered around a formal inference, it does discuss the pervasion of smoke by fire, the heart of what is perhaps *the* stock example of inference in Indian logical theories.

For the SJS, the main structure at least of the first part of the text is titled “Der Beweis und seine Verteidigung” by Bühnemann (1980: XXIX ff.) , i.e., the formal proof and its defense. But also the next two sections are closely related to this inference: sections 2 and 3²⁹⁶ consist of a systematic refutation of elements that could make this inference invalid.²⁹⁷

Consequently, it might be in order to try and take this inference at the end of the AS as a guideline to understanding and explaining this text. In the following, I will therefore give first an analysis of this inference, and then try to explain the various points in the AS that are needed to fully appreciate the inference.²⁹⁸

Before this, a methodological caution might be in place: There are two groups of problems that have to be dealt with when explaining the AS in this way. First, what the precise import of each of the elements of the inference is, with special interest perhaps attaching to the complex quality that this supposedly central inference is supposed to prove (i.e., what this inference *means*). And second, why it is logically coherent to state that the reason leads only to this consequence (why this inference is *valid*). After all, as will be seen, it is not directly a matter of logic why it should be the case that a word

²⁹⁵Cf. fn. 281 on page 96 for a translation.

²⁹⁶According to Bühnemann 1980: XXX–XLV, these sections are respectively: “Verteidigung der Möglichkeit einer Schlußfolgerung überhaupt” (SJS₂ 3.30–6.21) and “Polemik” (SJS₂ 6.22–31.11), i.e., the defense of the possibility of a reasoning concerning the existence of an enlightened person, and a polemical section against the opponent's attempts to disprove this reasoning.

²⁹⁷Cf. Bühnemann 1980: 101, n. 62, noting on section 2: “Es folgen nun Einwände gegen den Beweis der Existenz des Allwissenden im allgemeinen [...] und gegen die Beschränkung des Beweises auf den Beweis des alles für die Erlösung Nützliche Wissenden [...]”, as well as Bühnemann 1980: 106, n. 102, noting on section 3: Es “[...] folgt nun eine ausgedehnte Polemik [...]. Ein den Allwissenden aufhebendes Erkenntnismittel könnte seine Nichtexistenz beweisen bzw. seine Existenz widerelegen.” Cf. also Steinkellner 1977, quoted section 5.1 on the preceding page.

²⁹⁸Another reason for proceeding in this way is that the more obvious explicatory approach, the one that follows the order of explanation in the text fairly closely, has already been very successfully taken in both Patil 2003, and, in a broader fashion, in Patil 2009: Chapter 4, p. 197 ff., although there it is observed that “[Ratnakīrti's] decision to conclude his essay [by providing an inferential reason to support his view] is important, because it brings together the various subarguments used throughout his essay and does so in a more “formal” context.” Patil 2009: 239 It is of course obvious that the results of both expositions will, if correct, be the same (or both wrong in the same way).

is expressive and therefore must not have any other sort of object than the one proven in Ratnakīrti's inference.

Moreover, it is difficult to explain these two groups of problems separately. On the one hand, it will not be possible to make it completely clear why the inference is valid without understanding its components and their relations, mainly because these facts are ascertained in separate, mostly ontological or epistemological, considerations about how everyday use of language works (e.g., what it means that a word is expressive). The pervasion²⁹⁹ at work in this inference is one that is a matter of fact. On the other hand, and if the idea is correct that the preceding parts of the AS build towards this inference, an explanation of all its components and their relations should be expected to go only so far as is useful for correctly understanding the inference. This means that an analysis of the various components involved in establishing the involved matters of fact (the nature of words, their objects, how language works, etc.) need go only so far as to make the inference valid. This is important for understanding the scope of the analysis, or the explanatory strategy, of the AS: much of it is a preparation that gives the inference its quantificational force, that *all* that is expressive has that sort of object. So it could happen that without having the inference in mind it might be difficult to understand certain elements of the discussion of the AS.

This last point needs clarification: It need not be that all of the preceding passages in the AS are directly dedicated to this aim, but it should be the case that these passages somehow have a bearing on the inference, or are superfluous (which of course is not a problem *per se*). So, as not to overstate the importance of this inference for the AS, a caution might be in place: Its role in this text is a hypothesis. There is good reason to have it, judging from Ratnakīrti's general style, but it does not mean that any passage that does not fit the picture is somehow out of place. Each of the arguments will have to be scrutinized for its own value, and in the immediate context it appears in. And only then should it be decided how or whether it serves this inference.

Moreover, if the mentioned supposition about the structure of the AS is wrong, none of the passages preceding the inference would have the aim ascribed to them at all. But even then the interpretation of the individual passages should not suffer much, and it should be more a matter of rearrangement than reassessment that lets one strike closer to home.

5.2 The central inference

The inference that the AS is built around runs as follows:

All that, which is denoting, has as [its] object a mere thing that is determined [and] distinguished from that of another form, as the expression “Water [is] here in a well.” And this [expression] having the form of a word like cow etc. is denoting. [This is] the logical reason of essential property

The formal elements at work here are:³⁰⁰

²⁹⁹For more information about this technical term of Indian logic cf. section 5.2.

³⁰⁰A detailed exposition of the Buddhist theory of inference is not in the scope of this study. Cf. Kajiyama 1998: § 9–10.2 for an overview of this theory, and Kajiyama 1998: § 12 “Logical mark of essential identity” for a succinct discussion of inference based on a thing's nature. The TBh will in the

1. *hetu*, the reason (of the type “essential property”): denoting. (This *hetu* will be abbreviated as *H*.)
2. *pakṣa*, the instance³⁰¹ qualified by *H*: that which has the nature of words like “cow etc.” (This *pakṣa* will be abbreviated as *p*.)
3. *sādhya*, that to be proven: having as an object a mere thing that is determined and distinguished from that of another form. (This *sādhya* will be abbreviated as *S*.)³⁰²
4. *drṣṭānta*, example: Water here in a well. (This *drṣṭānta* will be abbreviated as *d*.)

The pervasion (*vyāpti*) governing this inference is expressible as the implication of “having as its object a mere thing, which is determined and distinguished from that of another form” by “something denotes.”

The *pakṣa*, the locus of the *hetu* and consequently of the *sādhya*, is said to be what has the form or nature of “words like cow etc.”, a statement that seems to elicit little controversy.³⁰³ The gist of the inference thus is that any word must, by its very nature of being denoting, have as its object a mere thing that is a) determined and b) differentiated from that which has a form other than its own.

This is only a part of the inference. Its validity depends on the truth of the pervasion of the property that is the reason by the property that is to be inferred. “Because *p* is qualified by *H*, it is qualified by *S*.” is true of *p* if everything that is qualified by *H* is also qualified by *S*, or every instance of *H* is also an instance of *S*. Among the various factors that have an influence on the truth of this pervasion, Ratnakīrti discusses three: That the reason is not unestablished, that the reason is not contradictory, and that the reason is not ambiguous. These are the three types of fallacious reasons or pseudo reasons (*hetvabhāsa*).³⁰⁴

following arguments be used as a fairly normative text for interpreting some of Ratnakīrti’s terms, based on the arguments given in Kajiyama 1998: 3–5. The model used there is, in all points that will be relevant in the following analysis, the same as “the orthodox scenario” described in Tillemans 1999a: 90–92. Additionally, I have in all cases attempted to find passages in Ratnakīrti’s texts that shed light on the logical terminology employed in this inference. But if it is true for Jñānaśrīmitra that he rarely enters into lengthy explanations of topics he presumes his audience well acquainted with (cf. Lasic 2000a: 19 f., Franco 2002: 192), the same is certainly true for Ratnakīrti, writing in a manner “more concise and logical, though not as poetical and elaborate as that of his spiritual father.” (Thakur 1975a: 12) Other texts taken into consideration in the following are the NPSū, NB, and its commentary, the NBT.

³⁰¹In this context, *pakṣa* is usually translated as “locus of inference” (e.g., B. K. Matilal 1985: 50 f.), “subject” (e.g., Tillemans 1999a), or “site of the inference” (e.g., Patil 2009: 60 f.). For the context that the argument under discussion works in, I will translate *pakṣa* with “instance”, mainly because it fits in well with the translations of “similar instance” for *sapakṣa* and “counter instance” for *vipakṣa*. Another reason is that this specific reason and this property which is to be established seem to be understood more easily as co-occurring in an instance (of some sort, awareness for example) rather than a subject, site, or locus of inference.

³⁰²Various formulations of this are used by Ratnakīrti. For the time being (until an explanation starts in section 5.2 on page 120) only this first formulation will be used.

³⁰³To which group of things the quality “denotes” in fact applies according to Ratnakīrti, and what this means, is discussed in section 5.3 on page 123. For the moment, it is enough to take it for granted that words like cow etc. denote.

³⁰⁴*hetvabhāsa* is translated as “pseudo-reason” in B. K. Matilal 1985: 42, Kellner 2010a. The *hetvabhāsa* is generally considered as threefold, cf., e.g., NPSū 400.18 (*asiddhānaikāntikaviruddhā hetvābhāsāḥ*), NB 3.109 (*evam eṣāṃ trayāṇāṃ rūpāṇāṃ ekaikasya dvayor dvayor vā rūpayor asiddhau sandehe vā yathāyogam asiddhviruddhānaikāntikāṣ trayo hetvābhāsāḥ*), Kajiyama 1998: § 10 (and the notes

The reason is not unestablished (*asiddha*)

In lines 247–249 in § 54, Ratnakīrti shows that *H* is not unestablished (*asiddha*). A *hetu* is considered unestablished when it is not certain that it actually qualifies, or is a property of, the *pakṣa*, so that the premiss in this inference becomes false (“*p* is qualified by *H*.”).³⁰⁵ Ratnakīrti thus has to defend the statement “An expression, having the form of a word like cow etc., denotes.”

His argument here draws on various points in the AS:

1. A statement widely proven in an authoritative text (line 136 in § 28).
2. A statement about the denoted-denoting relation (line 141 in § 29)

The statement proven in the *śāstra* is the reason for the concessive subclause in this argument: that the distinction between properties and their substrates is a conceptual one, and thus is not true about real things. According to this rule and its consequence, it could be argued that “*p* is qualified by *H*.” is not, in fact, a true statement.

But that *H* qualifies *p* is true in a “conventional” sense. Ratnakīrti's argument is that the relation of denoting word and denoted referent is made by determination, a function operating in conceptual cognition and allowing it to classify its object and to generate awareness of it as an external thing (cf. section 5.4 on page 130). So, whereas this conceptual construction of the relation does not reflect reality, it is to be endorsed by all people who engage in worldly activity (*vyavahāra*). Obviously two important positions are implied in this statement: Worldly activity presupposes a distinction of denoted and denoting (as of substance and quality) in order to work. And, second, this distinction is only conceptually constructed. Accordingly, the proposition that *H* qualifies *p* must be endorsed by all people on pain of not being able to engage in normal activity, even though it is not a true statement when taken to be about reality.

In this way, Ratnakīrti can show that any conceptual cognition must be taken to have an object. Accordingly, that *H* qualifies *p*, that words denote, must be accepted by everyone. Consequently, no one can reasonably argue that *H* is unestablished, or that expressions do not denote anything at all.

The reason is not contradictory (*viruddha*)

Ratnakīrti's defence against this type of logical error is quite curt, l. 249 in § 54:

Neither is that [reason] contradictory, because it exists in a similar instance.

This type of error consists in the reason proving something opposite than what someone inferring with it wants it to prove.³⁰⁶ If *H* were contradictory, then *H* would be a sign for what is not qualified by the *S*, so that instead of the statement “Because *H* qualifies *p*, *S* qualifies *p*.” being true, its opposite would be true: “Because *H* qualifies *p*, *S* does not qualify *p*.”, i.e., if something denotes it never has the sort of object that Ratnakīrti describes (*S*).

for some secondary literature), and Oetke 1994: 33 ff. Ratnakīrti himself regularly uses these distinctions to discuss the validity of inferences, e.g., SJS₂ 29.19–20 (in an objection): *kiṃ ca sarvajñasattāsādhane sarvo hetuḥ trayiṃ doṣajātiṃ nātivartate asiddhatvaṃ viruddhatvaṃ anaikāntikatvaṃ ceti* (cf. Bühnemann 1980: 89 for a translation), or KBhSA₂ 67.10: *hetvābhāsāś ca asiddhviruddhānaikāntikabhedena trividhāḥ*. Cf. Patil 2009: 70, fn. 102 for a detailed list of the pseudo reasons that the Naiyāyikas defend themselves against in the ĪSD.

³⁰⁵Cf. section 4.2 for a discussion of Ratnakīrti's definitions of this pseudo reason.

³⁰⁶Cf. section 4.2 for a discussion of Ratnakīrti's definitions of this pseudo reason.

Others of Ratnakīrti's explanations for why a reason is contradictory are as follows, clearer in stating why the respective *hetu* is contradictory:

1. SJS₂ 13.8: *tathā ca sati sādhyaviparyayaṅvāpter viruddhatā hetoḥ.*
2. SJS₂ 29.21–22: *asarvajñe dharminī na sarvajñasiddhiḥ, hetoḥ sarvajñaviparīta-sādhanaṭvena viruddhatvāt.*
3. ĪSD 33.21–23: *nāpi viruddhaḥ. tathā hi yo vipakṣa eva vartate sa khalu sādhyaviparyayaṅvāpteh sādhyaviruddhaṃ sādhyān viruddho 'bhidhīyate. yathā nityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād iti. na cāyaṃ tathā, prasiddhakartṛkeṣu sapakṣeṣu sadbhāvadārśanāt.*³⁰⁷

In view of these formulations, as well as the one in the TBh₂ 25.9–12 (cf. section 4.2 on page 93), the problem Ratnakīrti is facing could be understood like this:

In the inference “Because *H* qualifies *p*, *S* qualifies *p*,” *H* would be contradictory because *H* is pervaded by $\sim S$, i.e., by not “having as an object a mere thing that is determined and distinguished from that of another form.”

So the basic charge is that the reason is contradictory because it is the counter instance, i.e., what has a real universal as its object, that is expressive.

A logically sufficient defence against this would be to show that *H* is indeed pervaded by *S*, i.e., that there is at least one instance beside *p* that has both the *H* and *S*. In this passage, Ratnakīrti merely states this to be the case. But why does he see himself entitled to this?

To begin with, the problem of knowing what pervades what is not a problem of logic (at least not always), but is a problem of knowing a matter of fact. For example, a logical error of the same type is discussed at some length in the answer to an objection starting at KBhSA₂ 67.20. There the matter is resolved through a *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya* which show that both the *hetu* “existing” and the *sādhyā* “momentary” are true of one *sapakṣa* instance, namely a pot (which is the example in the inference, KBhSA₂ 67.7–8).³⁰⁸ In ĪSD 33.21–23 (cf. section 5.2), this kind of error is argued against by an appeal to a generally acknowledged matter of fact. The question must therefore be what other statements in the AS allow Ratnakīrti to make the claim at this point that *H* occurs in that which is similar to *p*.

I believe the claim can be defended by appealing to two arguments:

1. that Ratnakīrti believes he has already shown that something that denotes has this kind of an object, and
2. that no one engaged in the discussions of the AS believes that words do not express anything at all.³⁰⁹

The second argument is fairly easy to see: None of the opponents in the AS argues that there is no referent or object of words at all: Vācaspati, quoted in § 10 17, expressly

³⁰⁷For translations of the first two of these passages cf. Bühnemann 1980: 35, and p. 84. Patil 2009: 71 translates the last, spoken in the voice of “Ratnakīrti's Naiyāyikas” (Patil 2009: 71), as follows:

It is well known that a [reason property] that exists in only dissimilar cases proves what is opposed to the target property, through its being pervaded by the absence of the target property, and that it is named “opposed” (*viruddha*). ...But this [reason property, “being an effect”] is not like that, since it is observed to really exist in similar cases such as a pot, for which a maker is well known.

³⁰⁸Cf. the assessment in Woo 1999: 163.

³⁰⁹For Ratnakīrti it is only conventionally true that words denote something, cf. § 49 on page 34 and references there.

states that “Particulars qualified by a class are the objects for concepts and words.” And none of the other objections contains any statements that would be to this effect.³¹⁰

The first argument amounts to the claim that *S* is at least a possible way in which words can denote.³¹¹ This possibility is explained in the presentation of his own view of what the word referent is, given in paragraphs § 8 on page 15 to § 9 on page 15, and repeated in the answer given in § 16 on page 20 to the objection that *apoha* is not the referent of a word because it is only the positive element that is called the word referent.

So Ratnakīrti's claim at this point is: If an expression like “There is water here in the well.” denotes ($H(s)$), it is possible that it “has an object that is a mere thing which is determined and distinguished from that of another form” (*S*). That it is always the case that it has this object is shown only in the next step of the inference.³¹²

The reason is not ambiguous (*anaikāntika*)

The third error that could afflict *H* is that it could be ambiguous (*anaikāntika*). Put simply, a logical reason that is ambiguous is one that is at least doubtful as to the terms of its presence or absence in both similar instances and counter instances.³¹³ Again, Ratnakīrti's defence against this error (see lines 249–256, p. 37) does not detail which variety of this logical error it is against. Judging from the outcome of the investigations into the two other pseudo-reasons, it is to be expected that this error will be the “standard” form of an ambiguous reason: *sādhāraṇānaikāntika*.

From the three possibilities mentioned by Ratnakīrti in the RNĀ, the situation for *H* would be as follows:³¹⁴

1. *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*: “*H* does not qualify *v* and does not qualify *s*.” would be true.
2. *sādhāraṇānaikāntika*: “*H* qualifies *v* and qualifies *s*.” would be true.
3. *sandigdghavyatirekānaikāntika*: “*H* does not qualify *v*.” would not be certain.

So which of these positions most closely resembles the situation in the passage under discussion?

The first candidate, ambiguity of *H* due to not being common to both *s* and *v* can not be accepted, because then the opponent would have to admit that “to denote” is a

³¹⁰This argument is supposed to defend against the possibility of the opposite of the *sādhya* being “having no object at all.”

³¹¹In the next step of his inference (cf. section 5.2), Ratnakīrti will show that is the only way in which words can denote anything.

³¹²This is not an uncommon tactic in Ratnakīrti's writings, cf., e.g., the objection in CAPV 130.5–6 (punctuation and paragraphs modified): *tad ayaṃ sādhyāśūnyo dr̥ṣṭānto hetuś ca vipakṣe paridṛśyamāno. yadi tatraiva niyatas tadā viruddhaḥ, tatrāpi sambhave 'naikānta iti cet.* (Therefore this example is free of the [property] to be proven[, i.e., oneness], and the reason is observed in the counter instance. If the [reason] is limited to this [counter instance] alone, [it is] contradictory, [and if] limited to this [counter instance] also, it is inconclusive.) This refers back to the inference in CAPV 129.22–24, where the reason was “it appears”, and the example was “the form blue amid other forms” (cf. fn. 281 on page 96). Here the opponent states that if the faulty reason is ascertained only for the counter instances, then the reason is contradictory, and if for the counter instances as well as for the similar instances, then the reason is ambiguous. A similar link is presupposed in the argument in SJS₂ 3.30–4.2 (cf. Bühnemann 1980: 9, and p. 102, n. 64).

³¹³Put more precisely, the situation is much more complex. Cf. section 4.2 on page 94.

³¹⁴Cf. section 4.2 on page 94 for the arguments underlying this.

quality neither of the similar nor of the counter instances — a consequence which surely is to be avoided, since the counter instances include all the options for the word referent endorsed by the opponent.³¹⁵

The second candidate, ambiguity of *H* due to being common to both *s* and *v*, entails no such consequence. On the contrary, this understanding would have quite a few advantages: First, as claimed before, since in both cases the analysis of the other two “unspecified” pseudo-reasons above returned that the simplest, or default version, was to be understood, this might be expected here also.³¹⁶ Second, the opponent is not arguing that *v* is not specified by *H*, but rather that “what denotes” must have one of a range of things as its proper object, none of which agrees with *S*. Lastly, Ratnakīrti’s defense against this error consists in showing that none of the other options are viable alternatives to *S*, implying that the important thing to do is to show that *v* is not qualified by *S*, which is the fault defined in the typical case of the reason’s ambiguity due to commonness.³¹⁷

The arguments so far do not yet decide whether *H* is being criticised because it is doubtful as to its negative concomitance with the counter instance. But it is quite plainly not what the opponent is arguing for, since he is not criticising the way the reason’s negative concomitance with the counter instances is shown, but rather claiming that the counter instances are indeed also qualified by *H*.

So, since, first, there are no good reasons to consider the ambiguity in this passage as one either due to non-commonness or due to a doubtful negative concomitance with the counter instance, since, second, Ratnakīrti’s unspecified mention of ambiguity in other cases means ambiguity due to commonness, and since, third, this understanding fits the argument, this argument will be interpreted as concerning *H*’s ambiguity due to its commonness to both *s* and *v*.

Once this is settled, the structure of the argument in this passage can be analysed as follows. There is an objection by an adversary, making three claims:

1. *H*, “to be denoting”, can also be said of the counter instance, i.e., instances that denote something and are qualified by having as their object either a particular, an additional attribute, a combination of these two elements, or a form of awareness.
2. These options are all the options there are.
3. If these counter instances have no object at all, they cannot be called “denoting”.

Ratnakīrti’s answer is that all options suggested by the opponent are wrong. The particular and the awareness act can not be objects of denoting instances, because no convention can be made with regard to them, since doing this would not lead to any useful result.³¹⁸ And all the options involving an additional attribute are precluded because additional attributes don’t exist.

In consequence of this, the pervasion of *H* by *S* is established:

1. There are no options other than *S* for how a denoting instance could have an object.

³¹⁵This, in itself, is not a particularly strong argument, as it is rather hypothetical. But from the discussion of the other options it will emerge that it is strong enough.

³¹⁶Cf. section 4.2 on page 97 for some examples of unspecified “ambiguous” reasons that are of the *sādhāraṇa* type..

³¹⁷Cf. the discussion in section 4.2 on page 94.

³¹⁸Meaning convention, and thus everyday activity, would not be possible. Cf. fn. 185 on page 63.

2. Therefore, a pervader qualified by having an object but not *S* is excluded.
3. Due to this, *H*, “being denoting”, is excluded from the counter instances.
4. Therefore, *H* is pervaded by *S*, so that “Because *H* qualifies *p*, *S* qualifies *p*.” is true.

This is the formal end of the inference. Pervasion of the reason by the property to be proven is established, due to which the inference—that the instance under discussion is qualified by the property to be proven because it is qualified by the reason—is true.

Claims made in the inference

The above discussion about the inference's structure has, for the reasons stated in section 5.1 on page 114, not discussed but only mentioned the various claims and positions that are involved in the inference. To recapitulate, and to begin deciding on a strategy for explaining the various elements, an overview might be in order:

1. *H* is “to be denoting”. Its characteristics are:
 - a) it depends on there being an object (acc. to the opponent at least, cf. l. 253, p. 37);
 - b) it is an element in the merely conceptually construed relation between denoting and denoted (l. 247, p. 37).
2. *p*: The instance under discussion that is
 - a) qualified by *H*,
 - b) qualified by *S*,
 - c) dissimilar from *v*, i.e., not qualified by anything opposed to *S*, and
 - d) similar to *s*, i.e., qualified by *S*.
3. *S*:
 - a) It is variously formulated as:
 - i. *adhyavasitādrūpaparāvṛttavastumātragocara* (l. 245, p. 37).
 - ii. *vācya* (l. 247, 37, and, by the opponent, l. 252, p. 37.)
 - iii. *adhyavasitavijātivāṇṛttavastumātraviṣayatva* (l. 250, p. 37).
 - iv. *adhyavasitabāhyaviṣayatva* (l. 256, p. 37).
 - b) Its characteristics are:
 - i. It is what denoting instances have as their object.
 - ii. It is what is denoted.
 - iii. It is an element in the merely conceptually construed relation between denoting and denoted (l. 247, p. 37).
 - iv. It is capable of supporting a linguistic convention (l. 254, p. 37).
 - v. It is a mere thing that is:
 - A. determined,
 - B. differentiated from what is not the same = differentiated from that of another kind,
 - C. external.
4. *s*: All instances qualified by *S*.
5. *v*: All instances not qualified by *S*. The alternative options discussed³¹⁹ are that what is denoted is either

³¹⁹There must be options, since the possibility of not having any object is not accepted. Cf. l. 253, p. 37, as well as 3 on the preceding page.

- a) a particular,
- b) an additional attribute,
- c) a connection to an additional attribute,
- d) what has the same additional attribute, or
- e) a form of awareness.

It is notable that Ratnakīrti is not arguing for any of these claims in much detail.³²⁰ It is therefore required to supply the relevant arguments from the main corpus of the AS. As argued above (section 5.1 on page 112), the various elements appearing here will be interpreted as giving the AS its structure. A schematic overview of the relevant passages is given in table 5.1 on the following page.

5.3 The referent of words

Ratnakīrti gives various definitions of what the word referent is. The most concise is perhaps that the referent (*artha*) of words³²¹ is an affirmation or positive element qualified by exclusion from others (*anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ*, l. 31 in § 8). Since this is also a definition that has no equivalent in Jñānaśrīmitra's AP,³²² it is to be expected that it represents Ratnakīrti's own point of view on the subject in a form clearer than he considered it expressed in Jñānaśrīmitra's writings. But it is not the only definition that Ratnakīrti gives of the word referent. Some of his other explanations are collected in table 5.2 on page 123. Only those have been included that use formulations significantly different from those that have been used in the passages preceding each occurrence.

Patil (2003: 230) has already presented “[...] Ratnakīrti's analysis of this complex entity [*anyāpoha-viśiṣṭa-vidhi* — PMA] by describing each of its analytically separable components [...]”, and I too believe that this is the best tactic to follow in explaining the sense of this definition.

One thus comes to ask these four questions, one for each part of the definition *anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ* (l. 31 in § 8):

1. What is meant by “referent of words” (“...*śabdānām arthaḥ*”)?
2. What is this *vidhi* or positive element?
3. What is this *vidhi*'s property, *anyāpoha*?
4. How does this property qualify its substrate, or what is the relation of *anyāpoha* and *vidhi*?

Apart from this analysis of the definition's content, it is also important to see how far Ratnakīrti must let the explanation go: It has to be made clear that this thing is capable of being the word referent, in order to fulfil its role as *S* in the inference establishing *apoha*. The passages that deal directly with Ratnakīrti's idea of this word referent are: § 8 on page 15– § 9 on page 15, § 49 on page 34, § 53 on page 36.

³²⁰Cf. the observation about the impossibility of a denoting instance having a particular or universal as its object: “We know this to be the case since, as Ratnakīrti has shown earlier in his essay, inferential/verbal awareness-events cannot have either particulars or real universals as their objects.” (Patil 2009: 243)

³²¹This translation of *śabdārtha* has been preferred to a possible “meaning of a word” only because the latter does not make good sense in the context of section 5.3 on page 123 and section 5.5 on page 138.

³²²Cf. the apparatus to the passage just cited, as well as the table in Akamatsu 1986: Appendix A, which shows no correspondence in column “RNA (AS)” for 59,4–6.

Table 5.1: Concordance between claims made in the inference and previous discussions in the AS

Item	Claim (line)	Discussed in Paragraph(s)
<i>H</i>	<i>aviśayaṭve vācaktvāyoga</i> (253) <i>vācyavācakaḥbhāvanasyābhave 'pi adhyavasāyākṛta</i> (247)	§ 49 § 28–§ 32
<i>p</i>	qualified by <i>H</i> (247–249) qualified by <i>S</i> (249–256)	§ 49 § 8–§ 9, § 49, § 53
<i>S</i>	<i>vācyā</i> (= object of <i>vācaka</i>) (247, 252) <i>śamaya / śamketa</i> (254) <i>vastumātra</i> (245, 250), which is <i>adhyavasita</i> (245, 250, 256) <i>ataḍṛṇpaparāṅvṛtta</i> (245, 250) <i>bāhya</i> (256)	cf. <i>p</i> 's being qualified by <i>S</i> § 13 § 16, § 49, § 51–§ 53 § 1, § 8–§ 9, § 13–§ 15, § 16, § 37, § 40–§ 41, § 49–§ 50 § 16, § 35, § 49–§ 50
<i>v</i>	<i>svalakṣaṇa</i> (252) <i>upādhi</i> (252) <i>upādhiyoga</i> (252) <i>sopādhi</i> (252) <i>buddhyākṛti</i> (252)	§ 10–§ 24, § 30 (Vācaspati); § 25–§ 29 (Kumārila's school); § 31 (<i>Nyāyabhāṣana</i>) § 33–§ 37; § 38–§ 42 (Trilocana); § 43 (<i>Nyāyabhāṣana</i>); § 44–§ 48; also cf. § 24; also § 10, § 24, § 30; § 4, § 5, § 16, § 49, § 50

Table 5.2: Definitions of *śabdārtha* found in the *Apohasiddhi*

Formulation	Crit. ed. (starting line)
<i>apohaḥ śabdārtho nirucyate.</i>	2
<i>...anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ.</i>	31
<i>...apohadharmaṇo vidhirūpasya śabdād avagatiḥ ...</i>	69
<i>tad evaṃ vidhir eva śabdārthaḥ.</i>	222
<i>...anyābhāvaviśiṣṭo vijātivyāvṛtto 'rtho vidhiḥ. sa eva cāpoḥaśabda-vācyaḥ śabdānām arthaḥ, pravṛttinivṛttiviśayaś ceti ...</i>	242
<i>yad vācakam, tat sarvam adhyavasitātadrūpaparāvṛttavastumātra-gocaram ...</i>	245

What is meant with “referent”

What has to be understood by the expression “referent of a word” (*śabdārtha*) is not explicitly discussed in the AS. But some passages clearly show that Ratnakīrti here follows the standard account as it is expressed already by Dharmakīrti,³²³ namely that the word referent is the same as the object of all conceptual cognitions. Thus, the discussion about the word referent is of great consequence for an understanding of what conceptual awareness is, and how it operates.

Two examples of such passages show that Ratnakīrti shares this assumption:

One passage appears in the answer to Vācaspatimiśra’s contention that a particular qualified by a class is what a word refers to (cf. § 10 on page 17). Ratnakīrti there effectively endorses that verbal and conceptual cognitions have the same objects by using the phrase: “...those that become the object of words and concepts ...” (*śabdavikalpayor viśayībhavantīnām*, l. 51, p. 18). It seems highly improbable that he would use such an expression without any qualification and not touch on the subject anywhere in the following if he did not accept it.

Another clear indication of this tacit equation is found at the end of the section discussing the possibility of the word referent being some sort of particular (qualified by a universal). He there says: “Therefore it is settled that a particular does not appear because of a word, a concept or a logical mark.” (cf. § 32 on page 28) This statement suggests that there is an equivalence amongst verbal, conceptual, and inferential cognitions in that they do not have a particular as their object.

These two instances should suffice to show that Ratnakīrti takes the equation of conceptual, verbal, and inferentially produced cognitions for granted.

vidhi—The positive element

The term *vidhi* is explained by Ratnakīrti in various statements that, taken together, suggest it would either best be left untranslated, or can only be rendered by a very loose

³²³See, e.g., PV 3 183ab (cf. section A.3 on page 169). I do not know of any scholarly disagreement on this topic, cf., e.g., Steinkellner (1967b: 92, fn. 25), or McCrea and Patil 2006: 305 f. for a concise discussion of the two means of cognition and their objects, and of the problems involved. Dharmottara subverted this clear distinction, cf. McCrea and Patil 2006: 325, fn. 64. To what extent this subversion is upheld in Ratnakīrti’s texts will become apparent in the course of the next sections, especially section 5.4 on page 130.

approximation, as a positive or affirmative element or aspect of the word referent, as opposed to its negative aspect, exclusion of others. The first step in understanding what could be meant by *vidhi* certainly must be to collect Ratnakīrti's explanations of this term and try and see what results from these. To this end, a close look at the following two passages is helpful:

Il. 75–78, § 16 on page 20: And by the word “positive element” an external object that is distinguished from that of another nature is meant according to determination, and according to manifestation a form of awareness [is meant]. Amongst these, the external object is defined as that to be expressed by a word only because of determination, not because of a particular's appearance, since there is no manifestation of an manifest particular that is limited as to space, time and condition, as there is in the case of perception.

Il. 222–227, § 49 on page 34: So in this way only a positive element is the referent of a word. And this [positive element] is intended to be called the external object and the form of awareness. Amongst these, [there is] no affirmation [or] negation of the form of awareness in reality or in a relative sense, because of the fact that [it] is understood through the perception self-awareness, and because of non-determination [of the form of awareness]. Neither is there in reality a negation or affirmation of the external, because of its non-appearance in verbal apprehension. Precisely for this [reason] all properties [of an object] are inexpressible in reality, because there is no determination [or] appearance [of them]. Therefore there is conventional affirmation and negation of an external [object] only, because otherwise there is the unwanted consequence of insufficiency for everyday interaction.

The main points these two passages make about the affirmative element are:

1. by *vidhi* a twofold object is meant — a form of awareness and an external object,
2. two modes of awareness are indexed to these two aspects of it — appearance and determination,
3. the *vidhi* as a determined, external object is the object of practical activities.³²⁴

***vidhi* as a twofold object**

In Il. 75–78, § 16 on page 20, Ratnakīrti defines what is meant by the word *vidhi*: An external object according to determination and a form of awareness according to appearance. The phrasing of the passage, *yathādhyavasāyam ...yathāpratibhāsam*, makes it clear that the *vidhi* is either the external object or the form of awareness depending on the way in which a person becomes aware of it. This suggests that the *vidhi* is better described as a single entity which can play two roles according to the awareness it is

³²⁴This allows for a notion of true and false cognitions in the sense that a cognition can lead to an external object that is able to fulfill a desired aim. Cf., e.g., the succinct formulation in Krasser 1995: 247: “Following Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara defines correct or valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) as reliable cognition (*avisamvādakaṃ jñānam*). *Avisamvādaka* is explained as causing a person to obtain (*prāpaka*) the indicated (*pradarśita*) object (*vastu*), which itself is capable of producing an effect or of fulfilling one's purpose (*arthakriyāsamartha*).”

present in, as opposed to a description of two modes of awareness having two different objects which both are a *vidhi*.³²⁵

In the same passage, the *vidhi* as external object is then explained not to be a particular that appears in a conceptual awareness, but to be due to determination alone. And it is to this external object that the qualification *atadrūpaparāvṛtta*, differentiated from that of another form, is applied. This should be noted as one way in which the *anyāpohaviśiṣṭa* of the central definition in ll. 31–31 (§ 8) can be predicated of the *vidhi*. Taking into account that this aspect of the *vidhi* is the one that is brought to awareness in the form of determination, a first main line of understanding the central definition comes into focus: An external object qualified by other-exclusion is the referent of words, speaking in terms of determination.

Qualified by other-exclusion (*anyāpohaviśiṣṭa*)

So, presupposing the above two sides of *vidhi*, the affirmative element, what can be said about its quality, the exclusion from others?

As already analysed by Patil (2003: 231 ff.), exclusion is presented by Ratnakīrti both as a quality of the positive element, and as a capacity of conceptual awareness.

That it is a quality (or property) of the positive element is clear from the definition *anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ* (ll. 31–31 in § 8).

In ll. 42–44 in § 9, grasping exclusion as a quality of the form of awareness is stated to be a capacity (*śakti*) that conceptual awareness has. These two aspects, being the qualifier of something and being a capacity, are presented alongside a comparison of two types of negation that can be brought to bear on perceptual as well as conceptual cognition of absence.³²⁶ The structure of the example is the following:

1. *prasajyarūpābhāvagrahaṇa*: grasping absence in a non-implicatively negating form³²⁷
 - a) For perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣa*) this is the capacity to produce a concept of absence (*abhāvavikalpotpādanaśakti*), i.e., what is meant by “perception of non-x” is the capacity to produce the conceptual cognition “There is no x there.”
 - b) For the concept of a positive element (*vidhivikalpa*) this is the capacity of leading to activity in conformance with the grasped absence (*tadanurūpānuṣṭhānadānaśakti*), i.e., what is meant by “conceptual cognition of non-x”

³²⁵ About the two modes of awareness, cf. also the comments in section 5.4 on page 130.

³²⁶ Whilst the perceptual grasping of an absence is a special case of perception, the conceptual grasping of absence is not a special case of conceptual cognition. For the object of conceptual cognition is always *anyāpoha*, cf. section 5.3 on page 123.

³²⁷ The terms *prasajya* and *paryudāsa* have long been the subject of discussions. The standard account is Staal 1962. Cf. Kellner 1997: 92, fn. 135 for further literature on the topic. Additionally, there is a useful discussion in Kajiyama 1998: 3 f. where the difference is postulated as a driving factor behind the development of different types of *apoha*. I will use implicative and non-implicative negation for *paryudāsa* and *prasajyapraṭiṣedha* respectively. One way of making sense of this distinction is: “This is a non-red apple.”, which implies that the subject is an apple, and “This is not a red apple.”, not implying that the subject is an apple.

Table 5.3: Grasping absence

	<i>prasajya</i>	<i>paryudāsa</i>
object of <i>abhāvapratyakṣa</i>	<i>ghaṭābhāva</i>	<i>bhūṭala</i>
object of <i>vikalpa</i>	<i>agavapoḍha</i> (not non-cow)	<i>buddhyākāra</i>
cognitive function	<i>adhyavasāya</i>	<i>pratibhāsa</i>
classification	<i>śakti</i>	<i>niyatasvarūpasamvedana</i>

is the capacity that a concept of the positive element has by which it makes activity possible.³²⁸

2. *paryudāsarūpābhāvagrahaṇa*: grasping absence in an implicatively negating form

a) the awareness of something with a fixed own form, *niyatasvarūpasamvedanam*, for both perception and the conceptual awareness of a positive element.

This comparison is not easy to make sense of.³²⁹ I will try and argue that it corresponds to the schema shown in table 5.3.

The two main problems that need to be solved in this passage are the following:

1. How is the absence in the two cases relevantly similar — how is it useful to compare the perceptually cognizable absence of a pot on a perceived stretch of floor with the conceptually cognizable absence of something not being not that, i.e., its quality “the exclusion from others”?
2. What is the relationship between the non-implicative and implicative negation: Is each just possible and sometimes the one and at other times the other will have to be applied in the analysis of these cognitions, or are they somehow interdependent?

What seems clear is that the absence which is grasped both by perception and conceptual cognition can be grasped in two forms: as non-implicative and implicative negation cognized by means of that which is present to cognition, i.e., an empty piece of floor or the form of awareness.³³⁰ In the case of conceptual cognition, the absence which is cognized is *anyāpoha*, exclusion from others, e.g., non-cows. In the case of perception,

³²⁸The relevant example (I. 46) is that someone is told “Tether a cow!”, and tethers a cow, but not a horse. “Tether a cow!” generates a conceptual cognition of cow, which in turn is the awareness of the absence of non-cows that makes activity with regard to *any* cow possible.

³²⁹It seems that both in Patil 2003: 232 and Patil 2009: 213 only the first part of the example (*prasajyarūpābhāvagrahaṇa*) is translated and discussed. The only detailed scholarly discussion of the corresponding passage in the AP is in Akamatsu 1983: 56–7. Katsura 1986: 174 notes that the context in which this comparison appears in the AP is based on the HB Chapter V: *anupalabdhihetuḥ*. The reason he gives there is that Jñānaśrīmitra cites a HB passage in the same context (cf. Katsura 1986: 174 and p. 180, fn. 20), apart from the fact that clearly the grasping of absence in perception is *anupalabdhi*. Note that, according to the explanations by Steinkellner (1967b: 167, n. 6), the *prasajya-paryudāsa* distinction in HB 21*22 has to be understood as follows: It is the perception itself that is either implicatively or non-implicatively negated, and not the absence that it lets the subject cognize.

³³⁰The absence of the pot in some place is the standard example of non-perception, used, e.g., in HB 23*22, as well as in § 14 on page 19. That it is the form of awareness, *buddhyākāra*, that is present in conceptual awareness is apparent from the argument that a form of awareness is not affirmed or negated because of being comprehended through self-awareness, I. 223 in § 49.

it is the non-existence of something in a specific, perceptually cognized place, e.g., on a stretch of floor.

There seem to be two ways of interpreting these statements: either both forms of negation can occur or both must occur so that a full flung³³¹ perceptual and conceptual cognition of absence is such a cognition of absence. I would like to argue for the latter option: Both in perception of absence and in the conceptual awareness of absence, which means in every conceptual awareness given that its object always is other-exclusion (*anyāpoha*, cf. section 5.3 on page 123), an *abhāva* both in the non-implicatively negating form as well as in the implicatively negating form is involved.

In the perception of an empty floor, for example, the absence (*abhāva*) of *all* things not on the floor becomes known in a non-implicatively, or absolutely, negating way. It is not actually all things that are cognized as absent (which would require a judgement like “There is no pot, no cloth, no chair, ...here on the floor.”), but the absence itself of all these things (so that a judgement like “There is no pot here on the floor.” or “There is no chair here on the floor” becomes possible). Correspondingly, in the conceptual awareness “cow” the non-implicatively negating absence (*abhāva*) of *all* things that aren’t cows becomes known for the appearing form of awareness (*ākāra*). In both cases this is a non-implicative negation, i.e., a negation that, upon perception, can potentially be expressed as “It is not the case that anything is here on the floor.”, and in the case of conceptual cognition can lead to activity directed towards anything of which it is true that it is not a non-cow: in the case of the perception of the empty floor, this grasping of a non-implicative absence or negative constituent, which explains the adjective “empty” (i.e., the absence of a pot on the floor, *bhūtalaghatābhāva*), is discernible only as a capacity to generate a conceptual cognition of absence: “There is no pot, chair, etc. on the floor.” In the case of conceptual cognition, the grasping of a non-implicatively negating element, the *anyāpoha*, becomes apparent only in the cognition’s capacity to lead to an act with regard to what is in accordance with this negation, which, in the example, is any cow.³³²

According to Ratnakīrti’s comparison, one also grasps an absence in the form of an implicative negation. The result of this is the same for perception and conceptual cognition: the awareness of something with a fixed own form, *niyatasvarūpasamvedana*, meaning a particular. In the case of the perception of an absence, the awareness of absence is identical with the awareness of the presence of another thing. It is implicative negation or absence in that it is the affirmation or presence of some other positive thing, in this case a particular piece of floor. In the case of conceptual cognition, which always has absence or the exclusion from others as its object, it is the *buddhyākāra* that is qualified by absence in an implicatively negating manner, the form of awareness which is a particular that is present in any given awareness event.

³³¹With “full flung” I want to say that the cognitive event is as complete as it can get, which of course must not happen in every case. I.e., in the case of perceptual cognition of absence, there is an event of direct perception, followed by a perceptual judgement. Both together, at the very least, make for this “full flung” perception of absence (cf. also the careful interpretation of HB 25*9–19 in McCrea and Patil 2006: 322–324). In conceptual cognition the case is not as clear. But important events will be the “becoming aware” of a particular form of awareness, *ākāra*, and a determinative state that, somehow, relates to it.

³³²Actually it depends a bit on the situation. The speaker could be referring to a particular cow that she wishes to be tethered. In that case, the proper other-exclusion would be “what is not not that cow”, instead of “what is not a non-cow.”

The absence in a non-implicatively negating form is determined, and the absence in an implicatively negating form is grasped — both in the perception of absence and in conceptual awareness. For it is a particular that is manifest and grasped in perceptual awareness³³³, and it is a form of awareness that is directly manifest and grasped in conceptual awareness.³³⁴ This is one of the aspects of the *vidhi*. From the side of determination however, it is commonness as a “genericized-particular” (Patil 2009: 259, fn. 32) that is determined in perception, and thus makes activity possible with regard to it (one activity being the formation of the concept “No pot here.”), and it is an external object that is determined on the grounds of the appearing form of awareness in the case of conceptual cognition.

Consequently, the exclusion from others that qualifies the positive or affirmative element is

1. the capacity in a conceptual cognition to make action that accords to expectation possible in so far as this exclusion is understood (determined) as a non-implicatively negating element, and
2. a quality of the form of awareness in so far as it is understood (grasped) as an implicatively negating element.

The second point can be understood as founding the quality aspect “exclusion” on the ontological level, because it states that the reason exclusion is cognized when a word is understood is that that word is defined as referring to something, a cow particular, in so far as it is differentiated from non-cows (cf. § 9 on page 15).

On Ratnakīrti's explanation,³³⁵ this does not present more problems than the explanation of reference as a word's referring to a real commonness taken as a really existing universal: in that case too, the word referent is supposed to be a specific commonness, not a particular or a commonness as such (“ness-ness”, or the fact that a universal is common to various things, as opposed to cowness, the specific commonness).

The question remains how Ratnakīrti's definition of the referent of a word as “affirmative element characterized by the exclusion of others” should be understood as a whole. It is with regard to the relation of the positive and negative aspect involved in this definition that the above differentiation between the capacity aspect and the quality aspect of exclusion from others comes into meaningful perspective.

Relation between *anyāpoha* and *vidhi*

A distinctive feature of Jñānaśrīmitra's and Ratnakīrti's version of the *apoha* theory is the stress they lay on the simultaneous cognition of the two parts of the word referent, exclusion and the positive or affirmative element.³³⁶

³³³About this there is no dispute, so it is not expressly proven. This seems to be the argument in II. 73 f., § 16 on page 20.

³³⁴This is, in my opinion, implied in the argument given in I. 223: There is no activity with regard to the form of awareness, because it is known through the form of perception that is self-awareness. I am here supposing that Ratnakīrti held a notion of self-awareness very similar to that explained in Kajiyama 1998: 47: self-awareness is “[a kind of] indeterminate knowledge free from fictional constructs and unerring”

³³⁵Cf. § 13 on page 18. The point of the arguments given there is to show that *anyāpoha* does not lead to any worse logical problems than the assumption of a really existing universal.

³³⁶This is also the central point of the critique of the affirmationist and negationist positions (*vidhi*- and *pratiṣedhavadin* positions) in this passage. This distinction made by Ratnakīrti has been an impor-

ll. 37–42 in § 9: Therefore the cognition of that excluded from others is called cognition of a cow. And even if the non-representation of the words “excluded from others” has been taught, nevertheless there is no noncognition at all of other-exclusion, which is the qualifier, because the word cow is founded only on that excluded from non-cow. As the appearance of blue is unavoidable at that time when there is the cognition of a blue lotus because of the word *indīvara*[, i.e., blue lotus,] which is founded on a blue lotus, so also the appearance of the exclusion of non-cow is unavoidable, because it is a qualifier, in the same moment as there is the cognition of cow from the word “cow” which is founded on that excluded from non-cow.

From this passage it follows that the cognition “cow” is equivalent with the cognition of that excluded from others, from non-cows in this example. In other words, the positive element, *vidhi*, is that excluded from others, *anyāpoḍha*, due to having exclusion, *anyāpoha*, as its qualifier. The point of the example is that the cognition of “blue lotus” is impossible without the qualifier “blue” being cognized in the same moment as “lotus”. This means that what can be understood as the *vidhi*’s quality, exclusion from others, is essential to it in the sense that it can not be grasped or cognized without it. Understanding the word cow is simultaneous to, and inseparable from, understanding “not non-cow.”

The question that this analysis leads to is the following: Given that the positive element is both present in the mode of appearance and determination (cf. section 5.3 on page 124, section 5.4 on the following page), is its qualifier, the exclusion from others, also present in both modes?³³⁷ I think that on the background of the arguments above (section 5.3 on page 125), this can be answered with a yes. It is with respect to the implicative and non-implicative modes of absence that it can be made sense of how differentiation qualifies and is present in every event in the sphere of conceptual awareness.

Accordingly, the main constituents of the “complex entity” (Patil 2003: 230) that is the referent of words, the *anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ*, might be analysed as follows:

The positive element (*vidhi*) both appears and is determined. Appearing, grasped by a perception of the type self-awareness, it is the form of awareness qualified by the exclusion from others in the manner of an implicative negation. Determined, it is a form of awareness qualified by the exclusion from others in the manner of a non-implicative negation. It is in this sense that determination, which also involves externalisation, makes action according to an expectation possible.

tant factor in periodizing the *apoha* theory’s development. The main secondary literature on how to understand this aspect is: Mookerjee 2006: 132 ff., Kajiyama 1998: 125, fn. 338, Akamatsu 1986, Katsura 1986, Siderits 1986, Patil 2003: 230 f., and—given the reasonably probable similarity of the AS to Jñānaśrīmitra’s AP—also McCrea and Patil 2006.

³³⁷This is not supported in the place where a direct clarification could have been given by Ratnakīrti, l. 75 ff., § 16 on page 20: “And by the word “positive element” an external object that is distinguished from that of another nature is meant according to determination, and according to manifestation a form of awareness [is meant].” Here Ratnakīrti qualifies only the determined aspect of the positive element, the external object, as distinguished from that of another nature, but not the form of awareness. On the other hand, if it were not the case that differentiation from others would qualify the form of awareness also, it would be hard to see how Ratnakīrti separates his view from that of the affirmationist (*vidhivādin*). Cf. Akamatsu 1986 for a description of their view.

5.4 Two modes of awareness: *pratibhāsa* and *adhyavasāya*

In describing the complex object that is the word referent (cf. § 49 on page 34), Ratnakīrti makes use of a distinction between appearance and determination of that complex object. I would like to make some comments on this distinction, in order to gain a clearer picture of Ratnakīrti's general idea of cognition and its structure, and because this structure is one that is repeatedly invoked in Ratnakīrti's writings, for conceptual as well as perceptual cognition.³³⁸

The most extensive analysis of this matter is found in Patil 2009: Chapter 5. The basic theory developed in Patil 2009: 250–299³³⁹ is that each means of valid cognition, *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, has two kinds of object: a direct object, grasped in virtue of directly appearing (*pratibhāsa*) to either perceptual or conceptual awareness, and an indirect one, known to³⁴⁰ perceptual or conceptual awareness in virtue of determination (*adhyavasāya*).

There are, therefore, three pairs of concepts that are used to classify the contents of awareness: “perceptual” or “inferential/verbal,” which indicate the kind of awareness-event in which a particular object/image appears; “manifest” or “determined,” which indicate the way in which it appears; and “particular” or “universal,” which indicate (in retrospect) what appears. (Patil 2009: 253)

The analysis then goes on to show how the direct and indirect objects of perception and conceptual awareness are related to these concepts.

Ratnakīrti's statements about the two states of awareness, perception and conceptual cognition, and their objects are not, at first sight, easy to make sense of. A problem might arise, for example, if the following statements from the VyN and the KBhSA, are read alongside each other:

VyN 8*.12–15 (VyN₂ 109.14–18): *yad dhi yatra jñāne pratibhāsate, tad grāhyam. yatra tu yataḥ³⁴¹ pravarte, tad adhyavaseyam. tatra pratyakṣasya svalakṣaṇam grāhyam, adhyavaseyam tu sāmānyam atadrūpaparāvṛttasvalakṣaṇamātrātmakam. anumānasya tu viparyayaḥ.*

For, what appears in some cognition, that is what is to be grasped. But that, with regard to which [someone] acts because of some [appearance], is what is to be determined. For perception, amongst these [two objects],

³³⁸See, for example, SJS₂ 20.11–13: *āgamānumānāyor dvividho viśayaḥ grāhyo 'dhyavaseyaś ca. tatra grāhyaḥ svākāraḥ, adhyavaseyas tu pāramārthikavastusvalakṣaṇātmā.* (Scriptural tradition and inference have a twofold object, grasped and determined. Amongst these, the grasped [object] is the own form [of awareness], but the determined [object] has the nature of a particular, an ultimately real thing.); KBhSA₂ 73.20: *dvividho hi pratyakṣasya viśayaḥ, grāhyo 'dhyavaseyaś ca.* (For perception has a twofold object, grasped and determined.), as well as section 5.4 on page 135.

³³⁹An overview of the various characteristics assigned to these four objects are shown in table 5.4 on the next page.

³⁴⁰As Patil 2009: 254, fn. 14 points out, Ratnakīrti is not terminologically strict about words related to *√bhāsa* (“appear”). So, instead of “known to” one could expect Ratnakīrti to say “appears to”. It is too early to say whether it is inexact terminology on Ratnakīrti's part, or our inexact understanding which affords us this puzzle.

³⁴¹Read *yataḥ* acc. to VyN 8.13, against Thakur's emendation to *tat* VyN₂ 109.16.

Table 5.4: Four objects (O₁₋₄) of awareness. (Page numbers refer to Patil 2009.)

	O ₁	O ₂	O ₃	O ₄	comment/quote
<i>grāhya</i> (through <i>prati-</i>	x		x		“...directly grasped (<i>grāhya</i>) by awareness.” (p. 251)
<i>bhāsa</i>)					
<i>adhyavaseya</i> (through		x		x	“similarity class”, “constructed through exclusion” (p. 251)
<i>adhyavasāya</i>)					
<i>svlakṣaṇa</i>	x			x	“...O ₁ is a manifest particular and O ₄ a determined particular.” (p. 252)
<i>sāmānya</i>		x	x		“...O ₂ is a determined universal and O ₃ a manifest universal.” (p. 252)
mental images (<i>ākāra</i>)	x	x	x	x	“Both direct and indirect objects can also be understood as mental objects/images ...” (p. 252)
real	x				“...only objects like O ₁ really exist.” (p. 253)
unreal		x	x	x	“...mind-dependent ‘internal’ objects like O ₂ , O ₃ , O ₄ [do not] <i>really</i> exist.” (p. 253)
<i>nirvikalpa</i>	x				Object O ₁ “...is the only object ...not necessarily associated with some form of mental construction (<i>vikalpa</i>).” (p. 253-f.)
<i>saṁkalpa</i>		x	x	x	(idem)
<i>viśayīkṛta</i>		x		x	“...objects that appear to us as though we can act upon them (O ₂ /O ₄) ...” (p. 256); cf. also p. 265–266
<i>bahis</i>		x		x	O ₂ as external is “...an externally projected mental image that only appears to be independent of us.” (p. 264)

Table 5.5: Objects of *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*

Awareness mode	Obj. of perception	Obj. of conc. cognition	Ontological status
<i>grahana</i>	<i>svalakṣaṇa</i>	<i>svākāra</i>	<i>svalakṣaṇa</i>
<i>adhyavasāya</i>	<i>vastumātra</i>	<i>svalakṣaṇa</i>	<i>sāmānya</i>

a particular is what is to be grasped. But what is to be determined is a universal, having the nature of a particular in general excluded from that of another form. But for inference the opposite is [the case].³⁴²

Apparently Ratnakīrti here claims that perceptual and conceptual cognition have the same kinds of objects, but in inverse modes of awareness. This passage, taken for itself, would thus come to mean that perception's grasped object, a particular, is the same as the determined object in conceptual awareness, i.e., a particular, and the determined object of perception is the same commonness or universal³⁴³ that is grasped in conceptual cognitions. So it would be the very same particular that is grasped and determined in perception and conceptual awareness.³⁴⁴ There is nothing here to indicate that the particular is a very different entity in both cases. In a similar vein, Ratnakīrti states:

KBhSA₂ 73.9–17: *na, adhyavasāyasvarūpāparijñānāt. agrhīte 'pi vastu-ni mānasādipravṛttikāratvam*³⁴⁵ *vikalpasyādhyavasāyitvam. apratibhā-se 'pi pravṛttiviśayīkṛtatvam adhyavaseyatvam. etac cādhyavaseyatvam svalakṣaṇasyaiva yujyate, nānyasya, arthakriyārthitvād arthipravṛtteḥ. evaṃ cādhyavasāye svalakṣaṇasyāsphuraṇam eva.*³⁴⁶

In the last sentence of this passage, Ratnakīrti categorically (“*eva*”) denies that a particular can appear in determination. So, according to these two passages, a particular appears, but is not determined, in perception, and is determined, but does not appear, in conceptual cognition.

³⁴²Cf. also the translation and note in Lasic 2000b: 64. This passage is closely modelled on VC 13.3–6. In the translation of that passage, Lasic (2000a: 95, fn. 52) refers to Kajiyama 1998: 58, Steinkellner and Krasser 1989: 77 f. and Krasser 1991: 41 ff. for information about the view that every cognition has two objects. To this should be added the translation of the same passage and the discussion in McCrea and Patil 2006: 334–336. Note also that in VC 13.6–8, Jñānaśrīmitra adds the following: *tatra sādhanapratyakṣam tadaivārthakriyārthinaḥ kṣaṇavikṣaṇe 'pi santānāpekṣayā sāmānyaviśayam.* (Trl. by Lasic (2000a: 95): “Dabei hat die Wahrnehmung eines Mittels [zur Zweckerfüllung] (*sādhanapratyakṣa*), obwohl der, der auf eine Zweckerfüllung abzielt, zu eben dieser Zeit (nur) eine Phase sieht, mit Rücksicht auf das Kontinuum eine Gemeinsamkeit zum Objekt.”) With this statement it becomes clear that the “universal” determined by perception is a continuum of point instants that make up the “thing” of everyday parlance. In as far as this generalisation from a single phase to a continuum of phases is not essentially different from the generalisation from one particular to a class of particulars (cf. Patil 2003: 233 f., as well as Kajiyama 1998: § 7.1.2), Ratnakīrti's use of the term *sāmānya* without further qualification is of course perfectly justified.

³⁴³As pointed out Patil 2009: 259, this universal's characterisation, *atadrūpaparāvṛttasvalakṣaṇa-mātrātmakam*, is importantly reminiscent of what words have as their objects: *adhyavasitātadrūpa-parāvṛttavastumātragocaram* (l. 245 in § 54).

³⁴⁴This would also have to be understood from SJS₂ 20.11–13, quoted and translated in fn. 338 on page 130.

³⁴⁵Corrected against *mānasyādi*° acc. to Woo 1999: 72.

³⁴⁶Cf. chapter C on page 193 for a translation.

There is a different set of statements that points to quite the opposite. Interestingly, these passages usually involve a hint at self-awareness, a perceptual mode common to all cognitive events, perceptual as well as conceptual.

Probably the clearest passage in Ratnakīrti's œuvre is the following, where he answers a Mīmāṃsā (cf. Mimaki 1976: 123, and notes) objection that inference would be both a perceptual and non-perceptual cognition, a non-conceptual and conceptual cognition, and a non-superimposition and superimposition:

SSD₂ 118.8–11 ...[i]ty apy ayuktam. anumānasya hi paramārthataḥ sva-saṃvedanapratyakṣātmāno 'vikalpasyāsamāropasvabhāvasyāpratyakṣa-tvavikalpatvasamāropatvādeḥ parāpekṣayā prajñaptatvād viruddhadharmādhyāsābhāvāt kathaṃ bhedasiddhiḥ.

That also is not correct. For, how should a difference of inference[, due to which it would have said contradictory properties,] be established, since, in reality, [inference,] which has the nature of the perception self-awareness, is unconceptual, and has the nature of non-superimposition, is not determined as having contradictory properties because being perception, conceptual cognition, super-imposition, etc., are defined in respect of each other?³⁴⁷

So, according to this passage, inference, and perforce conceptual awareness, is not really different from perceptual cognition in as far as they are unconceptual, have the nature of self-awareness, and do not perform any super-imposition.³⁴⁸ But if conceptual cognition is thus reducible to perception, then, amongst other difficulties, the above distinction of two objects in two modes of awareness can not hold. So either one or the other of the positions following from these passages will have to be taken less seriously.³⁴⁹

In the last passage, SSD₂ 118.8–11 (on the current page), however, the modifier “in reality” might be given a very literal interpretation that can help understand these two positions as not constituting an opposition. For if the second group of positions is taken as being about how things really are, and the first conversely about how things appear, their discrepancy might be removed. To begin with, therefore, two explanatory motives

³⁴⁷Cf. the translation in Mimaki 1976: 123:

...cela ne pas juste non plus. En effet, du point de vue [de la vérité] absolue ..., l'inférence possède la nature de la perception en tant que connaissance-de-soi ..., n'est pas imagination et a la nature propre de non-surimposition Mais [du point de vue de la vérité conventionnelle] on qualifie l'inférence, par rapport à l'autre [c.-à-d. la perception], de non-perception, imagination et surimposition. Donc, pour l'inférence on ne peut pas mettre [ces] attributs contradictoires [sur le même plan]. Ainsi comment peut-on prouver une différence dans l'inférence?

³⁴⁸This contradiction, or at least tension, arises also in light of formulations important for understanding central issues in the AS, e.g., that the appearing objects are not different for perception and conceptual cognition (I. 44 in § 9: "...ubhayor aviśiṣṭam."); also cf. I. 223 in § 49, and the analysis of this statement in section 5.3 on page 125.

³⁴⁹Alternatives might be to suppose that Ratnakīrti changed his mind, or that he simply made a mistake. But the first alternative would have to be supported by an analysis of the chronology of Ratnakīrti's writings, a project that might not be wholly conclusive, and the second would be very surprising, given that determination and direct appearance are central structural elements in both Jñānaśrīmitra's and Ratnakīrti's writings. (Cf. McCrea and Patil 2006.)

that Ratnakīrti uses should be distinguished: statements about the ontological status of cognitive objects, and statements about the phenomenal status of these objects.

This is also supported by § 49 on page 34 of the AS: There too a double standard, in reality and conventionally, is appealed to to help explain what the word referent actually is. Neither in reality nor conventionally is a form of awareness an object of activity, because it appears in the perception self-awareness. This corresponds to the respect in which SSD₂ 118.8–11 on the previous page expresses that conceptual awareness is no different from perception: A true particular is the grasped object in both cases, and, since this is the perception of a particular, there is no determination (or superimposition)³⁵⁰ of that particular. But conventionally the external particular is the determined object of both a conceptual and perceptual cognition, in as far as practical activity is directed at it.

It also emerges that the “parallelism” of the double object for both perceptual and conceptual cognition can not be a simple one. Otherwise one would have to assume that Ratnakīrti both claims that conceptual cognition has a particular as a determined object, and that it does not. The method of distinguishing 4 objects of cognition, a grasped and a determined object each for perception and conceptual awareness, prefigured in McCrea and Patil 2006, and fully worked out in Patil 2009: chapter 5, is certainly a good solution to this apparent contradiction.

A similar, but perhaps more parsimonious solution to this problem might be to put increased emphasis on the two modes of awareness that objects can be known through. The idea is to show that *whatever appears* to awareness is a particular, and *whatever is determined* is a universal. Thus there would be only two objects of awareness, instead of four.³⁵¹

A first point can be made in noting that, according to Ratnakīrti, both perception and conceptual cognition have a twofold object, a grasped and a determined one.³⁵² As ex-

³⁵⁰Whether this equation of superimposition and determination is appropriate to Ratnakīrti's understanding of the matter is a very difficult question. Cf., e.g., CAPV 135.31–136.2 *tathā vikalpāropābhimānagrahaniścayādayo 'py adhyavasāyavat svākāraparyavasitā eva sphuranto bāhyasya vārtāmātram api na jānantīty adhyavasāyasvabhāvā eva śabdapravṛttinimittabhede 'pi, tat katham yuktyāgamabahirbhūto 'nātmāsphuraṇam ācakṣīta* (Read *śabdapravṛttinimittabhede 'pi* acc. to RNĀ_{ms} 73a1 against the misprinted *śabdapravṛttimittabhede 'pi* in CAPV 136.1. The emendation by Thakur from *yuktyāgamabahir* in RNĀ_{ms} 73a1 to *yuktyāgamabahir* does not seem necessary to me. Trl.: In the same way, also conceptual cognition, imposition, conceit (*abhimāna*), taking [something for something else], ascertainment and so on, like determination, only ending in the form of awareness itself [as they are] appearing, know not even the merest news of the external thing. So (*iti*) [these] have the nature of determination indeed, even though there are different causes for the use of [these] words. Thus, how should someone not transgressing reasoning and scripture assert a manifestation of [something that] is not the self [of awareness]?) Here Ratnakīrti, on the one hand, equates forms of conceptual cognition, imposition, etc. with determination, but immediately adds the reservation that there are different causes for the employment of the different terms.

³⁵¹As noted in Patil 2003: 237, and explicated in Patil 2009: 249, an assessment of Ratnakīrti's epistemological framework, or “...theory of mental content ...” has to proceed “...by providing an interpretation of his scattered remarks on...mental objects/images ...and does not present Ratnakīrti's position as he himself presented it” (Patil 2009: 249) So all attempts at outlining this framework can only be interpretations and reconstructions. One important factor is how broadly the passages that such an interpretation is based on are scattered. For Patil 2009, passages of nearly all of Ratnakīrti's writings were used. Here, I will focus mainly on the AS, and claim coherence only for it and the CAPV. As such the reconstruction, or perhaps only construction, of Ratnakīrti's epistemological framework, whilst probably not as unifying as that in Patil 2009, will hopefully be simpler.

³⁵²Cf. note fn. 338 on page 130 for textual evidence of this claim.

plained, this in itself leads into interpretative difficulties: In some instances this object is said to be, respectively, a particular (as grasped) and a universal (as determined) for perception, and a universal (as grasped) and a particular (as determined) for conceptual cognition.³⁵³ In other instances, especially where self-awareness is discussed or mentioned in the context of conceptual cognition, this clear differentiation is not upheld.³⁵⁴

A second point lies in the fact that “grasped” and “determined” are indexed to two modes of awareness, appearing and determination, or being an object of intentional activity.³⁵⁵

CAPV 131.4–5: *iha dvividho vijñānānām viṣayaḥ grāhyo 'dhyavaseyaś ca. pratibhāsamāno grāhyaḥ. agrhīto 'pi pravṛtṭiviṣayo 'dhyavaseyaḥ.*
(Cf. section 4.2 on page 96 for a translation.)

As seen in the interpretation of Ratnakīrti's comparison of perceiving and conceptually apprehending absence or negativity (section 5.3 on page 125), he equates perception and conceptual awareness as to the directly appearing object: “*paryudāsarūpābhāvagrahaṇam tu niyatasvarūpasamvedanam ubhayor aviśiṣṭam.*” (ll. 44–44 in § 9) This passage also shows an equivalence between grasping absence in an implicative form (i.e., as the presence of something else) and an awareness of something having a “limited own form”, meaning that that awareness has an object that is fixed as to its location, time, etc.³⁵⁶ This means that both perception and conceptual cognition have a particular as their object, at least in respect of what appears in them. In the AS, this is supported by Ratnakīrti's statement that a form of awareness is not positively or negatively acted towards since it is present to awareness through the perceptual mode self-awareness (l. 223 in § 49).³⁵⁷ And, being perception, it must have a particular as its grasped or appearing object.

As their determined object both perception and conceptual cognition have a constructed mere thing. Within the AS, a number of passages support this as far as conceptual cognition is concerned.³⁵⁸ The argument for perception can be made by an

³⁵³Cf., e.g., VyN 8*.12–15 (VyN₂ 109.14–18, quoted and translated section 5.4 on page 130).

³⁵⁴Cf. the material section 5.4 on page 133, as well as l. 223 in § 49.

³⁵⁵It might be debatable as to how being an object of intentional activity is actually a mode of awareness. But at least for the mental activity (“thinking about”) a successful argument might be made (cf. fn. 54 on page 40 for some pointers to the various modes of activity). Another thing to notice in the following quote is that the object of activity will probably have to be understood as including (but not as being limited to) real particulars, especially in light of such arguments as this: *etac cādhyavaseyatvam svalakṣaṇasyaiva yujyate, nānyasya, arthakriyārthitvād arthipravṛtṭeḥ.* (KBhSA₂ 73.11–12, cf. chapter C on page 193 for a translation.) A more detailed argument about *pravṛtṭiviṣaya*, highlighting that determination is what *makes* something into an object of activity, is found in KBhSA₂ 73.9–12 (cf. the references in note fn. 168 on page 61).

³⁵⁶ Cf., e.g., the (negative) formulation in § 16 on page 20: “...*deśakālāvasthāniyata-pravyaktasvalakṣaṇāsphuraṇāt.*” This is the defining characteristic of a particular: “The term *svalakṣaṇa* ...entails from the beginning that the phenomenon is individual, unique and distinct.” (Yoshimizu 2004: 119) Cf. also the similar formulation SSD₂ 124.22–23: *nanv ananuvṛttān api tadarpi-tākārasvarūpasamvedanam eva tadvedanam. tad eva ca saviṣayatvam.* (Trl. by Mimaki (1976: 159): “[Les Bouddhistes:] Même si [l'objet] ne dure pas [jusqu'au moment de la connaissance], la connaissance de la nature propre de la forme projetée par l'[objet], c'est la connaissance de l'[objet], n'est-ce pas? Et ce fait [montre] précisément que la [connaissance] a un objet”)

³⁵⁷Cf. section 5.4 on page 133.

³⁵⁸ Cf., e.g., the guiding inference of the AS (cf. section 5.2 on page 114): *yad vācakaṃ tat sarvam adhyavasitādrūpaparāvṛttavastumātragocaram.* (ll.245–246 in § 54), and see also table 5.1 on

interpretation of the following passage:

[KBhSA₂ 73.18–24] *tathā trītyo 'pi pakṣaḥ prayāsaphalaḥ. nānākāla-syaikasya vastuno vastuto 'sambhave 'pi sarvadeśakālavartinor atadrū-paparāvṛttayor eva sādhyasāadhanayoḥ pratyakṣeṇa vyāptigrahaṇāt. dvi-vidho hi pratyakṣasya viśayaḥ, grāhyo 'dhyavaseyaś ca. sakalātdrū-paparāvṛttavastumātram sākṣād asphuraṇāt pratyakṣasya grāhyo viśa-yo mā bhūt, tadekādeśagrahaṇe tu tanmātrayor vyāptiniścāyakavikalpa-jananād adhyavaseyo viśayo bhavaty eva, kṣaṇagrahaṇe santānaniścā-yavat, rūpamātragrahaṇe rūparasagandhasparśātmakaghaṭaniścāyavac ca. anyathā sarvānumānocchedaprasaṅgāt.*³⁵⁹

As mentioned before, Ratnakīrti here asserts that perception also has two objects: a grasped and a determined object. But he goes on to specify that the determined object of perception is a mere thing that is excluded from that which is not like it (*sakalātdrūpaparāvṛttavastumātram*). And this is quite obviously the same as the determined object of conceptual cognition, which is explained in basically the same phrase in l. 245 in § 54: *adhyavasitātdrūpaparāvṛttavastumātragocaram*.³⁶⁰

So how should VyN 8*.12–15 be reconciled with these statements? I think that the simplest answer is as follows: perception grasps a particular and determines it as a generalised thing excluded from others.³⁶¹ In this latter form it can become an object of activity. But when Ratnakīrti, in VyN 8*.12–15, states that it is the opposite for inference, he does not mean that inference determines a particular in the same sense that perception grasps that particular: rather, a conceptual cognition determines what seems to be a particular, but is in fact a commonness of things (i.e., a non-difference from others erroneously but effectively imposed upon something external), and is directly aware of what seems to be a universal, but is in fact a particular (the form of awareness). Therefore, Ratnakīrti is, in VyN 8*.12–15, not speaking about the ontological status of the objects, but about their phenomenal status.

5.5 Double negation

anyāpoha is a *tatpuruṣa* compound that is usually analyzed as exclusion from others, or exclusion of others.³⁶² Taking “other” to mean “not that”, or “not the same,” one quickly faces the most baffling and counter-intuitive aspect of the *apoha* theory: it is a form of double negation.

Dharmakīrti expresses the situation as follows:

PVSV 38.9 f. *uktaṃ yādṛśaṃ sāmānyam asaṃsṛṣṭānām ekāsaṃsargas tadvyatirekiṇām samānateti.*

page 122 for a list of passages where these points are argued for.

³⁵⁹For a note on the context of this passage, a translation, and an emendation against KBhSA₂, see chapter C on page 194.

³⁶⁰Cf. also fn. 343 on page 132.

³⁶¹In other words, as stated in the passage quoted above, KBhSA₂ 73.23 f.: *...kṣaṇagrahaṇe santānaniścāyavat, rūpamātragrahaṇe rūparasagandhasparśātmakaghaṭaniścāyavac ca.* (...as, when a moment of a particular is grasped, a continuum [of such moments] is ascertained, and as, when only the form [of a particular] is grasped, a pot is ascertained which has the nature of a form, a taste, a smell, [and] a feel.)

³⁶²Cf. the discussion of the various options in § 2 on page 13, and the materials indicated there.

It was explained what a universal is like: That things unmixed [with each other] are not mixed with one thing is the sameness of these things different from that.³⁶³

This passage is a succinct formulation of what *apoha* does in substituting for, or perhaps even being, a universal: It differentiates some things from those that are different.

On a formal level, the insight that double negation is equivalent to a positive statement is not difficult to have.³⁶⁴ It might perhaps be counterintuitive and unwieldy, but it certainly won't make a statement wrong to negate it twice.

Ratnakīrti discusses two logical problems³⁶⁵ that might ensue: a circular dependency, that the negation of non-cow is dependent on the notion of cow, and a contradiction between that qualified by exclusion and exclusion itself (cf., respectively, § 13 on page 18 and § 14 on page 19).³⁶⁶

Circular dependency Ratnakīrti's general strategy to rid himself of this problem is quite remarkable. He basically counters the objection by saying that the same fault applies to the opponent's theory of real universals.³⁶⁷ The parallel, as I understand it, is as follows:

A realist might define cow like this: "A cow is what is qualified by cowness.", and an exclusionist might do the same with this sentence: "A cow is what is qualified by exclusion from non-cow." Structurally, both statements are of the form "X is what is qualified by x."

The realist now says that, in the exclusionist approach, to know what is qualified by the exclusion from non-cow presupposes a knowledge of what a cow is. The circular dependency consists in "exclusion from non-cow" (=x) being dependent on "cow" (=X), and "cow" being defined in terms of x. Ratnakīrti does not, at this point, supply a reason for why someone may say this.

Ratnakīrti counters this as follows: to know what is qualified by cowness presupposes a knowledge of what a cow is. Here, the dependency consists, again, in x ("cowness")

³⁶³Cf. Vora and Ota 1980: 6–7 for another translation and the context.

³⁶⁴Cf. Quine 1980: §16(4) showing the equivalence of the schemata " $\sim\sim p$ " and " p ", or Goldfarb 2003: 12, using " $-$ " as the sign for negation: "It should be clear that " $- - p$ " amounts to the same thing as " p ". For " $- - p$ " is true just in case " $-p$ " is false, and " $-p$ " is false just in case " p " is true. Double negations, therefore, are redundant."

³⁶⁵For pointers to the objections of this kind that were made against *anyāpoha*, cf. fn. 82 on page 45, and fn. 86 on page 46.

³⁶⁶Ratnakīrti's explanations in § 14 on page 19 concerning the contradiction are rather succinct, and I am not sure I understand them very well. A restatement of the problem, based on Kumāṛila's criticism of the *apoha* theory as outlined in Hattori 2006: 62, could be as follows:

The contradiction that Ratnakīrti refers to can be explained like this: there is a contradiction between something excluded from others and an exclusion from others, in so far as both are existing things. The main problem therefore is that there is a contradiction in one thing (e.g., a particular blue lotus) being two things at the same time: an absence of non-blue and an absence of non-lotus.

This kind of criticism is a consequence of Kumāṛila's understanding of *abhāva* as a sort of *bhāva*, as Hattori (2006: 62) pointed out. Ratnakīrti's answer (as I understand the the last sentence of § 14) is that there is no problem: In the *apoha*-theory a qualified thing is qualified only by the absence of another (more precisely, an absence of a difference from another), because absence is not a positive qualifier.

³⁶⁷This is remarkable in my opinion because Ratnakīrti is not even trying to save his own position. He merely states that it is just as wrong in this respect as that of his opponents. The same strategy is employed by Dharmakīrti, cf. the discussions in Hugon 2009: 535–540, and Hugon 2011.

being dependent on X (“cow”), and X being defined in terms of x. For this he supplies a reason: When “cow” (X) is not known, the universal cowness (x) is not known, and, when the universal cowness (x) is not known, that to be designated by the word cow (i.e., X) is not known.³⁶⁸

In other words, Ratnakīrti here shows that setting the convention “cow” for what is qualified by cowness is just as problematic as setting it for that qualified by the exclusion from non-cow.

Denoting and denoted

In the following I will present some observations on how Ratnakīrti sees the relation between a denoting element,³⁶⁹ such as a word, and a denoted element, the referent of the word. From the arguments in § 28 on page 25 and the statements about the denoting-denoted relation in § 54 on page 37, it is plainly obvious that Ratnakīrti does not believe that there really is such a relation, but that it is a conceptual construction. Two questions might be posed here: What kind of relation is this conceptually constructed relation of a word and its object, and of what consequence is the ontological status of this relation according to Ratnakīrti?

Conceptual construction of reference

According to section 5.3 on page 124, Ratnakīrti supposes that there are two aspects of a word's object: the subjective one, a form of awareness, and the objective one, an external thing. They are known in two different awareness modes, perception (of the type self-awareness) and determination respectively.

The question in this section is what sort of relation a word has to this twofold object, and, more specifically, if it can be said to refer to, denote, or express this object.

In lines 75–78 (§ 16), as well as in § 49 and the following verse, Ratnakīrti argues that in reality no real *external* thing is denoted by words (in the first passage), or is affirmed or negated by words (in the second passage). Rather, it is only due to the determination of a form of awareness that an external object becomes the object of any kind of activity, including the activity of denoting it.³⁷⁰ Ratnakīrti explains that an external object is said to be denoted by a word only because of determination:

tatra bāhyo 'rtho 'dhyavasāyād eva śabdavācya vyavasthāpyate, na svalakṣaṇapariśphūrtiā, pratyakṣavad deśakālāvasthāniyataprayuktasvalakṣaṇāsphuraṇāt. (ll. 76–78, p. 20. Trl. on p. 47.)

Consequently a word can be said to denote its object, an external object, only by means of determination, not directly. If it were directly denotative of a real external

³⁶⁸In accordance with this argument, the following reason could be the one that led the opponents to charge the *apoha* theory with circularity: When a cow (X) is not known, exclusion from non-cow (x) is not known, and when the exclusion from cow (x) is not known, a cow (X) is not known.

³⁶⁹Patil usually translates the terms important for this discussion as follows: *vācya* and *vācaka* respectively as “expressed” and “expressor” or “expressive” (Patil 2009: e.g., p. 239, p. 241), *artha* as “meaning, object, or semantic value” (Patil 2009: 202, fn. 13).

³⁷⁰The details of these arguments are discussed in section 5.3 on page 124. For short examples of the various forms of activity that are induced by conceptual cognition, cf. CAPV 139.18–19 (trl.

fn. 71 on page 43). See also the references given in footnote fn. 54 on page 40.

thing there would be the undesirable consequence that a word would make its object known in the same way as a perceptual cognition of that object.³⁷¹

The other aspect of an object of a word is the form of awareness, which directly appears to selfawareness, a perceptual type of cognition.³⁷² But there is no denoted-denoting relation between a word and this aspect of its object because direct appearance refutes the assumption that there is a real relation of a quality and a thing qualified by it (*dharmadharmibhedasya pratyakṣapratikṣiptatvāt*, l. 135, p. 25).³⁷³

To summarize: as regards an external particular a word does not denote, and as regards the form of awareness a word does not denote either. It is only with regard to the determined object that a referential relation can properly be understood. But since this determined object, that everyday activity centers upon, does not really exist, words do not, in reality, refer to anything.

In § 29 on page 26, Ratnakīrti advances an argument that is very important for understanding the relation of word and object. That argument might be paraphrased as follows: If a relation of property and property-bearer were real, the connection would have to be that of supported and supporter, i.e., a property-bearer supporting its properties.³⁷⁴ Perceiving a property bearer, e.g., a tree, entails perception of all its properties, e.g., its height, etc. For a particular (the proper object of perception) can not be in contact with a sense-faculty with only one of its properties or its property-less self (perhaps a substance), because a supporter is a supporter only in as far as it actually is seen to support its properties.

On the opponent's theory now, a word, e.g., "tree", and a logical reason, e.g., "presence of smoke", make something real known (a particular qualified by treeness, a particular place qualified by smokey-ness, cf. § 10 on page 17). This real thing they make known, by the previous argument, must be related to its other properties, height, colour, etc., as a supporter. And since this supporting relation is not different from the supporting relation that causes perception to always grasp the whole particular (properties and their bearer), it follows that that made known by words or logical marks would also be grasped with all its properties at once. Therefore, if words were to make something real known, and there really were this difference of properties and their bearer, conceptual cognition would not be discernable from perceptual cognition.

For Ratnakīrti, the theory of *apoha* in combination with the concept of determination offers a way out of this conundrum: Since it is only a determined difference from other things that a word makes known, it is not a real thing (an entity) that is brought to awareness, and thus the consequences involved in cognizing a real thing do not result.³⁷⁵

³⁷¹Cf. the quote of PVin 1 1.15a-c in § 17.

³⁷²Cf. the arguments in § 49 on page 34, as well as section 5.3 on page 124.

³⁷³Otherwise it would have to be presumed that a word could denote its object (e.g., the word cow denote a form of awareness cow) without all aspects of that form of awareness being known to the person experiencing that cognitive event, so that self awareness would only have partial knowledge of its own object.

³⁷⁴That the only connection is that of supported and supporter was advanced by Dharmakīrti. Cf. the references to the translation of paragraph § 29 on page 26.

³⁷⁵Cf. the notes above as to how exclusion is a capacity, section 5.3 on page 125. Also in perception there is a possibility of an (indirectly) perceived generality: absence. Perceiving an empty stretch of floor, an absence of many things in that place can be correctly cognized, although not every absence has to actually be cognized.

Cf. also PV 3 167 (translated in section A.3 on page 168) about the word not being a part of the referent. The point there is that the referent is an external thing, and it is not possible that something in

Furthermore, that there is no real relation of denoted and denoting should, one expects, hold for Ratnakīrti's theory as well: As the particular height of a particular tree can not be perceived without perceiving all other perceivable characteristics of that same tree, so that which a word signifies, the twofold positive element qualified by other-exclusion,³⁷⁶ must be apprehended in its entirety. For the form of awareness, this is not problematic, since it comes to awareness in the form of direct appearance or self awareness. An account of the external object, on the other hand, is a little more difficult to give. The determined external object (as opposed to a real particular) is known in conceptual awareness by determination. As argued above, section 5.3 on page 125, the external thing, to which activity can be successfully directed by a correct conceptual cognition, does not become directly present to awareness, but is constructed only due to a capacity lying in an awareness of a form of awareness. It is thus only a cognition that has negative content, and that does not require any entity, imagined or real, to appear. And this absence (or difference from what is of another kind) does become fully known in conceptual awareness—as the capacity for a cognition (cf. table 5.3 on page 126). But, since an external object is what everyday activity is directed at, it is conventionally considered as what is denoted by a word.³⁷⁷ This is also supported by ll. 247–249 (in § 54), where Ratnakīrti says that the relation of denoted and denoting, that does not exist in reality, does exist as something constructed by determination.

To sum up: there is no real denotative function at work in conceptual awareness, mainly because neither the subjective or objective aspect of the object that a word makes known is a thing that is denotable (the form of awareness is private and a particular, the constructed external thing is only a negation). It is only conventionally that one has to assume that a word denotes an external particular because otherwise no everyday activity is possible.

Ontological status of reference

Since denotation is only conceptually constructed, it is not real.³⁷⁸ Its components are related differentiated from each other only conceptually, and have the same ontological status as the relation of a quality and the thing qualified by it, i.e., they do not really have separate existence.³⁷⁹ But since the relation of denoted and denoter is necessary for language and concepts, this relation has to be assumed to be real by anyone who uses language and concepts.

the cognition of a speaker (or hearer) really be a part of the external thing. But it can be a part, or aspect, of the conceptual cognition.

³⁷⁶Cf. the analysis in section 5.3 on page 124.

³⁷⁷Cf. § 49 on page 34. Affirmative and negative activity are there said to be applicable only to the determined external thing.

³⁷⁸Cf. § 49 on page 34.

³⁷⁹Cf. the discussion in § 29 on page 26, and fn. 119 on page 52.

Appendices

About the appendices

The following sections consist of translations of, and notes to, various material that I found helpful in understanding the AS. The purpose of these sections is not to provide a thorough study of all these texts, but rather to acquire at least a basic understanding of their intent, scope, and arguments. As a consequence of this, it will probably not be very useful to read these passages, often not more than sketches, separately from the discussions in the previous sections that reference them.

Appendix A

Dharmakīrti on *apoha*

A.1 Passages from the *apoha* section in the PVSV

Acc. to Frauwallner 1932: 248, Dharmakīrti introduces the concept of *apoha* in an answer to the objection that there is a *petitio principii* in his *svabhāvapratiṭibandha*. Frauwallner (1932: 248) describes the *apoha*-theory as “[...] Lehre von den Vorstellungen, also die Apohalehre.”³⁸⁰

PVSV 24.16–25.26

[PVSV 24.16] | Then precisely that which is produced is precisely that which is imper- pp ↓
manent, because there is no difference [between these two]. [There] would be a reason
that is a part of the object of the thesis.³⁸¹ | [There is] no such error, for [the following up ↓
reason:]

All entities have, through [their] own nature, a part in the differentiation
from both the same and other entities³⁸² because [they] subsist in their own
own nature.³⁸³ // PV 1 40 //

For this reason (*yasmād—tasmād*) different genera, which are based on
whatever the referents are differentiated from, and which fathom (*ava-
√gāh*) [the particulars’] specific differences (*viśeṣa*), are construed (*pra-
√klṛp*).³⁸⁴ // PV 1 41 //

³⁸⁰ Also see Frauwallner 1937: 278 f. for some remarks on the relationship between “Vorstellungen” and object of words.

³⁸¹ Cf. PVSV 108.6 f.: *tathā hi yāvad uktam anityaḥ śabda ’nityatvād iti tāvad anityaḥ kṛtakatvād iti tathā cāsiddho hetur*. (For it is so: the proposition “Sound is impermanent because of being impermanent.” [would be] as much as [the proposition] “[Sound is] impermanent because of being produced.” And in this way the reason would not be established.)

³⁸² For understanding *svabhāva* as *sajātīya* here, cf. the explanations in PVSV 25.14, and Steinkellner 1971: 198, fn. 66.

³⁸³ Cf. the translation of these verses in Steinkellner 1971: 198, where Steinkellner also says that Dharmakīrti explains the main structure of conceptuality (“wesentliche Struktur dieser Begriffslehre”, Steinkellner 1971: 190) in these verses.

³⁸⁴ Here it is quite obvious that differentiation (*vyāvṛtti*), specific difference (*viśeṣa*), and also difference (*bheda*, which is then substituted for *vyāvṛtti* by Dharmakīrti in his explanation of this verse in PVSV 25.15–23) comes to be a synonym for property, aspect, or quality of a thing, in the sense of something that makes it different from other things. This connotation has to be understood in the following

Therefore, whichever specific difference is recognized through some property, that [specific difference is] not capable [of being recognized] through a [property] other than that one. By this (*tena*) a differentiated subsistence [of two properties with respect to the same thing is shown]. // PV 1 42 //

For indeed all entities stand in their own form. They do not mix their nature with a different [entity], because [then] there is the consequence of this[, one entity,] not being a different [entity]. Also, that [form] is not theirs, which is an undifferentiated form for them [and] has become [their] self,³⁸⁵ because then (*tadānīm*) they[, i.e., these entities with a nondifferent form,] do not exist. [PVS 25.1] For there would be only this [one form for them], because [there] is an undifferentiated [form only], because [there] is no [other form for the entities, which is] distinct from this [undifferentiated form] (*vyatirikta*) and differentiated, and because, further, exactly this [nonbeing of a different form] contradicts [their] difference. And therefore (*tac ca*) [each thing is] subsists in [its] self, completely unmixed [with other natures].

[PVS 25.3] Also a different thing, even if connected to many [things], is not a commonness to them, because of [their] not being of that [common] form, because of the unwanted consequence [of being a commonness] also in [the case of] twoness etc.,³⁸⁶ connection, and substance as effect (*kāryadravya*). For, even due to one (*anya*) having a connection [to others], the others should not be called common, [but they] should be called having that (*tadvat*), like figures [are connected] by a garland at the neck [are not called the same]. [They, entities having something in common, are] not objects of

also. Cf. also PVS 111.28–112.5:

yasmād ityādi. yasmāt sarvasmāt sarvabhāvā vyāvṛttās tasmād yato yato nityākṛtakādeḥ śabdādīnām arthānām vyāvṛttis tannibandhanāḥ, *vyāvṛttyādvadhivyāvṛttinibandhanā dharmabhedā anityakṛtakādayaḥ kalpyante vikalpā āropyante. kimviśiṣṭāḥ, tadviśeṣāvagāhinaḥ. tasya svalakṣaṇasya ye viśeṣā akṛtakādivyāvṛttirūpalakṣaṇās tadavagāhinas tadavagāhanaśīlāḥ, tadabhedādvabhāsaśīlā ity arthaḥ. (For that reason etc., i.e.,] for the reason that all beings are differentiated from everything [else, as explained in PV 1 40], therefore, from whatever the objects of words are differentiated from[, e.g.,] from permanent, non-produced etc., based on that, i.e., based on the differentiation of [their] limit[, i.e., what is not something else (cf. PVS 347.28–30),] different properties, such as impermanent, produced, etc., are constructed through differentiation[, that is,] superimposed by conceptual cognitions. How [are those different genera or properties] qualified? [As] *tadviśeṣāvagāhinaḥ*. [They] fathom[, that is, they] have the disposition (*śīla*) of fathoming, its[, i.e.,] a particular's, specificities which are characterised by the form of a differentiation from [those that do not qualify this particular,] such as unproduced etc. [This] means (*artha*) that [these different genera or properties] have the disposition of manifesting the non-differences of these [particulars].)*

³⁸⁵Probably the point is that this same form is identified with the particulars themselves. Karṇakagomin glosses *ātmabhūtam* with “unseparated” in PVS 115.19 f.: “*teṣām iti bhāvānām abhinnaṁ ity ekam ātmabhūtam ity avyatiriktaṁ yad rūpaṁ svabhāvo ...*”. (Read *ekam ātma*° acc. to PVS 44b7 against printed *ekātma*°.)

³⁸⁶PVS 116.21–24: *tadā dvitvādikāryadravyeṣv api prasaṅgaḥ. dvitvam api hy anekadravyasamavetaṁ(.) ādigrahaṇād bahutvādiḥ. tathā saṃyogo 'nekadravyasamavetaḥ. kāryadravyaṃ cāvaya-visaṃjñītamārambhakadravyeṣu samavetamato dvitvādiṣu sāmānyarūpatāprasaṅgaḥ. (Then there is an unwanted consequence also [for the case of] twoness etc., [as well as for the case of a] material cause. For twoness also inheres in multiple substances. From using [the word] “etc.” many-ness etc. [is understood]. In the same way, contact inheres in multiple substances. And a substance as effect, called a whole, inheres in the producing substances. Therefore, there is the unwanted consequence of being a universal for twoness etc.)*

The point is that all these things are not universals, acc. to Vaiśeṣika ontology. Number and contact are qualities, and the *kāryadravya*, here equated with the whole (*avayavin*), is a substance. Cf. the general explanations in Halbfass 1992: 93 f., and 122 f., as well as in Franco and Preisendanz 1998: § 4.

nondifferent apprehensions, like figures [connected by a garland]. For an awareness, mixing together their very selves, appears as having commonness as an object, but not [as having] “two [objects] connected by one” [as an object], as [it does in the case of] the figures.

[Objection:] | This [is] an error of seeing [only] this [commonness].³⁸⁷ | [Answer:] pp ↓
 Why “seeing [only] this”? [Objection:] | Because an error not having a cause is impos- up ↓
 sible. | [Answer:] Only those having this same effect are the cause, because [such an pp ↓
 error] does not exist in [things] possessing number, connection, substance as effect (*kā- up ↓
 ryadravya*), plurality etc. and [it doesn’t exist] in figures etc.³⁸⁸ Therefore, because in
 this way there is no impression [of a commonness] on the cognition of a commonness, a
 commonness is not something other [than the things]. Or if this [commonness] existed
 [as something else], it would not be mixed with something else because of subsisting in
 its own self (*svātman*). Therefore these entities are completely distinct (*vyatirikta*) from
 that considered (*abhimata*) to be of the same genus and from something else, because
 they are of only one form due to [their] own nature.

[PVSV 25.15] Based on the difference from whatever [things are] different from,
 multiple properties are cognized through words which are settled upon (*kṛtasamñiveśa*)
 for causing the apprehension of these differences, even though there is no difference in
 [a thing’s] own nature. These words also are only based on this particular (*svalakṣaṇa*),
 even though [they] do not indicate (*anākṣepa*) all differences [of a particular], because
 they indicate a single difference; [remembering that]³⁸⁹ there is a difference of this [par-
 ticular] from that single [difference] also. Therefore, as many [things having] different
 forms [there are] for a single entity, so many differentiations [are there] with regard to
 these [things of different forms], because [what] has an effect and a cause which can not
 occur for this [other thing] is different from that [thing].³⁹⁰ [PVSV 25.21] And as many

³⁸⁷Cf. PVSVT 118.5–6: *sāmānyam kevalam paśyaty eva buddhiḥ. tasyās tu taddarśinyāḥ samavā-
 yasya sūkṣmatvāt sā bhrāntir yad etad vyaktinām sāmānyābhedenā grahaṇam iti cet.* (Awareness sees
 only the commonness. But for this [awareness] **seeing this** there is, because of the fineness of inherence,
this error, which is exactly this grasping of the particulars without a difference to [their] commonness.)

³⁸⁸The argument is that a cognition as the same can exist for things which are not qualified by any
 real, common thing inhering in them. This shows that commonness is cognisable without such a universal
 being the cause of that cognition, which in turn is an error because particulars do not, in fact, have anything
 in common with each other.

³⁸⁹PVSVT 119.20: *tadekaśmād api yato yato vyāvṛtto ’rthaḥ śabdair viśayīkriyate tasmāt tasmād
 atatkāraṇād atatkāryāc caikāśmād api tasya svalakṣaṇasyānekavyāvṛttasya bhedo ’stīti kṛtvā tadviśa-
 yā ucyante na tu tadviśayā eva.* (Read °ānekavyāvṛttasya acc. to PVSVT_{ms} 46a6. Trl.: **This**, a particular
 which is differentiated from many [differences with other causes and effects], **is different also from this
 single** [thing, i.e.,] from whatever has another cause and has another effect, differentiated from which an
 [external] object is made the object [of a cognition] by words. Thinking so, [words] are said to have this
 [external thing] as an object, but they do not really have it as an object.) In PVSVT 119.13–14, *ekabhe-
 dacodanāt* from PVSV 25.17–18 was glossed by *ekaikasya binnasya svabhāvasya codanāt* (...because
 they indicate some differentiated nature [of a particular]). So in these passages, Kaṇakagomin equates
 “difference” (*bheda*) with a certain aspect of a particular’s real being. It is thus permissible to understand
 the somewhat awkward phrase “differentiated from a difference” simply as “having a certain quality”.
 We could then render PVSVT 119.20 as “This, a particular which has many qualities, is different also
 from this single quality, that is, from whatever thing has another cause and effect” So even though
 words are based on particulars, the particulars do not actually have the qualities (or differences) which
 words pick out in order to make that quality the object of a conceptual cognition.

³⁹⁰PVSVT 119.26–28: *kim kāraṇam. tasmīn vyāvarttye ’vidhibhūte dharmīṇy asambhavi kāryam
 kāraṇam ca yasya vivakṣitasya dharmīṇaḥ sa tadasambhavi kāryakāraṇas tasya tadbhedāt. tasmād ata-
 tkāryād atatkāraṇāc ca bhedaḥ vyāvṛttatvāt* (What is the cause? **Because of a difference of this** [i.e.,]

differentiations [there are], so many sound complexes (*śruti*) [are there] which have the purpose of everyday activity (*vyavahārārtha*) by turning away [that of] another (*atat*) cause and effect. Like [this expression:] “A sound following immediately on an effort is audible.” has the purpose of turning away [that of] another cause and effect. Therefore, even though the own nature [of a thing] is without difference, which characteristic (*viśeṣa*) difference is known through some property[, or] name, that [difference] cannot be made known by another [property, or name]. So words do not all have the same referent. Therefore the logical reason is not a part of the object of the thesis.³⁹¹

PVSV 25.26–27.6

pp ↓ [PVSV 25.26] | [Question:]³⁹² How then is this understood: Through both a word and a logical mark a removal (*vyavaccheda*) is arrived at,³⁹³ [but] not [something] that has the form of a real thing in an affirmative way (*vidhi*)?

up ↓ | [Answer: It is known] because of the use of another means of valid cognition and another word. For [it is] so:

Which other part of an object’s single own nature that is itself directly perceivable could be unobserved, [so that] it is examined by [other] means of valid cognition? // PV 1 43 //

[PVSV 26.4] For the self of an object (*artha*) is one. It is perceptible, because in the case of an unestablished property bearer an establishing [reason] is not possible. Like a sound (*śabda*) [is perceptible], when [its] impermanence is to be established. Because of the establishment of this[, a thing’s nature,] through perception alone, [there is] an establishment of all [the thing’s] forms (*ākāra*), because there is no unestablished [own nature] other than this [own nature of a thing]. Or, if it exists, [it is] not the own nature [of that thing]. For what does not exist as having the same acquisition and keeping (*yogakṣema*) as something, that is not suitable as the own nature of that,³⁹⁴ because

[of] that [property bearer] which **has an effect and cause that does not occur there**; [this] property bearer, which one wishes to express, has an effect and cause that do not occur where [there is] this property bearer that is to be excluded[, or, in other words,] is the limit; [“because of a difference from this” must be understood like this:] because of a difference[, i.e.], because of being excluded, from that[, i.e.], from that which does not have that effect and that which does not have that cause.)

I think the argument works like this: A, which one wants to express, has an effect and cause (properties, for example), neither of which occurs in the case of B. So B is the limit of A, or that which one wishes to exclude. In this sense, A is different from B.

³⁹¹As pointed out by Much 2008: 8, fn. 9, this is the preliminary end of the discussion starting at PVSV 24.16 f., and the same point is made at the end of the *apoha* section, PVSV 93.4–5.

³⁹²Cf. Kellner 2004b: 4 f. for another translation of the next few sentences.

³⁹³*pratipādyate* is glossed as *adhyavasīyate* (is determined) in PVSVT 121.8. This strong connotation of cognition should not be missed. But in the following discussion in the PVSV, where the opponent’s question is answered, it will become apparent that a very factual sense of “arriving at” must also be understood: cf., e.g., the formulations “*vyavacchedakāni ...pramāṇāni* (PVSV 26.23) or *yadānumānam ...pratyāyayati na vyavacchedakṛt* (PVSV 27.9–10), where it is obvious that removal or distinction of a wrong concept from the object of cognition is something that is *done* (and not, primarily at least, understood) by conceptual cognition or inference.

³⁹⁴PVSVT 121.28–29 explains: *alabdhadharmānūvṛttir yogah. labdhadharmānūvṛttiḥ kṣemaḥ. eko yogah kṣemaś ca yasya sa tathā. tulyadharmeti yāvat.* (**Acquisition** is an activity towards unobtained properties, **keeping** is an activity towards obtained properties. That which has [the same] acquisition and keeping is [called] so. [It means] as much as “having the same property.”) Much (2008: 9, fn. 32) cites

everyday usage of [things] having differences is bound (*nibandhana*) to this alone[, i.e., to the sameness in acquisition and keeping]. Because otherwise there is the consequence of nonexistence [of everyday activity]. [This] has been said.³⁹⁵ Therefore, because in the case of a perceived property bearer there is a complete discernment of its own nature, the use of another means of cognition does not have any opportunity here,

unless a cause for an error causes [someone] to attach a different quality (*guṇa*) [to something] like³⁹⁶ the form “silver” to mother of pearl (*śukti*) because of observing a likeness of form. // PV 1 44 //³⁹⁷

[PVSV 26.14] [This means another means of valid cognition is not possible] if the cause of an error, which obstructs the ascertainment (*nīścaya*) of an entity as [it is], even though it is seen with [its] complete reality, does not cause another quality to be attached, as the form of silver to mother of pearl. For there are not two forms for mother of pearl, one common [to it and silver] and a specific [one], because of the [unwanted] consequence [that there is] a cognition like that.³⁹⁸ Or because, if [these two forms are] not cognized separately, this concept of twoness would be wrong, and because of the overreaching consequence.³⁹⁹ Therefore someone seeing what has the form of mother of pearl sees only [its] specific form. But because of the defectiveness of the circumstances (*pratyaya*) of ascertainment [he], without ascertainment, thinks “I see a commonness to this [form of silver].” Therefore there is the superimposition of silver for him. In the same way, [there is], because of the superimposition of that state[, i.e., persistence], the error [of a cognition of] persistence for [someone], who does not cognize a difference [of two moments of a causal continuum] due to the production of a different [second moment], similar [to the first]. As many other states there are for this[, a thing’s own nature,] exactly so many superimpositions are there, coming into existence according to their own cause.⁴⁰⁰ So means of valid cognition, which become what removes these [superimpositions from the objects], do indeed have a result. But these means of cognition resulting in [such a] removal are not applied for causing the apprehension of an uncognized part of a thing, because that [part] has [already] been

the following explanation given in Mookerjee and Nagasaki 1964: 99, n. 1: “This is the commonplace *cliché* in philosophical parlance. Things supposed to be identical must have identical *yoga* and *kṣema*. ...That which has the same incidents, gain or loss with another, is identical with the other.”

³⁹⁵Gnoli 1960b: 189 notes that PVSVT 122.7 says that this refers to PVSV 20.21.

³⁹⁶For *vā* as *iva*, cf. Gnoli 1960b: 26, note to line 13.

³⁹⁷Cf. also the translation in Steinkellner 1971: 194, fn. 55.

³⁹⁸PVSVT 123.14–15: *tathā sāmānyaviśeṣarūpeṇa śavalābhāsāyāḥ pratipatteḥ sarvadā prasaṅgāt*. (...because of the unwanted consequence that there is always a cognition like that[, i.e.,] a multifarious appearance in a both common and particular form.)

³⁹⁹This consequence, which results when there is a construction of a twoness of qualities or forms without a difference in appearance, is that such a construction of twoness would be possible also in another case, where mother of pearl is considered as being only silver, because of the consequence that the negating judgment, “this is not silver,” could not arise. (Cf. PVSVT 123.17–19: *pratibhāśabhedam antareṇa dvitvakalpanāyām atiprasaṅgāt. anyatrāpy ekatvābhimate dvitvakalpanā syāt. nedaṃ rajatam iti bādhakasyānutpādaprasaṅgāc ca*.)

⁴⁰⁰*tasmād yāvanto ’sya śabdādeḥ kṣaṇikānātmādisvabhāvasya parabhāvā nityādayas tāvanta eva yathāsvaṃ nimittabhāvināḥ yasya yad anurūpaṃ nimittan tadbhāvināḥ samāropā iti* | (Read *yathāsvaṃ* acc. to PVSVT_{ms} 48a1 against *yathāsva°* in PVSVT 124.12. Trl.: From this, i.e., from a word etc., **as many other states**, i.e., permanent etc., **of this**, i.e., of that having a nature such as momentary, without self, etc., **exactly so many superimpositions** [are there], **which have come into existence according to their own cause**, i.e., which have come into existence from a cause according to it.)

observed; for, moreover, observing a partless [thing] by [only] one [of its] part is not correct.⁴⁰¹

Therefore each quality of an observed entity is indeed observed, [but] is not ascertained because of an error. So a logical reason is applied.⁴⁰² // PV 1 45 //

This is the recapitulating verse. Therefore no other means of valid cognition is applied to [what was] observed in order to grasp something that wasn't observed.

PVSV 27.7–29.5

And if a real thing [were] grasped because of an inference [there would be] a grasping of all properties when [only] a single property is ascertained. This error does not follow in the case of exclusion. // PV 1 46 //

[PVSV 27.9] Not only is there no application of another means of valid cognition for [something that] has been observed by direct perception, but also, if inference caused the apprehension of a thing in an affirmative [form], [and did] not perform a removal [of a wrong idea], then all properties would be ascertained when one property is ascertained because [they] are not completely distinct from this [one property]. So there [would be] no application of another means of valid cognition. For it is not correct that the self of this [one property] is not ascertained if this [one property] is ascertained. Furthermore, if the removal of a superimposition [from an object] is performed by inference, then, because of the removal of one superimposition, a removal of another would not become pp ↓ effected. So, to this end, another [inference] is applied. [Objection:] | Now,⁴⁰³ an ascertainment of an uncognized [thing] is not necessarily preceded by a mistake. Like inadvertently⁴⁰⁴ [there is] a cognition of fire because of smoke. For in this case the superimposition of non-fire is not considered possible. Therefore, a removal is not up ↓ performed in every case [of conceptual cognition]. | [Answer:] To this it was said:⁴⁰⁵ when a property bearer is cognized there is the cognition of all [properties] because of [their] non-difference. Or, if different, there is no cognition of [a property] which is unconnected in this [case of cognizing a property bearer]. Therefore, also here [in this example] there is no ascertainment of the own nature of this [fiery place as fiery] for

⁴⁰¹Apart from the evidence in the Tibetan tradition mentioned in Gnoli 1960b: 27, ad. l. 1, PVSVT 124.17 attests to a version where these two reasons are not linked by *ca*: ...*dṛṣṭatvāt. kiṃ karaṇam. anamśasyaikadeśena darśanāyogāt*. Since this seems to make quite good sense, I have not taken the two ablatives to be in the same, supporting, relation to the main sentence, but instead understand that the second supports the first (which is the primary reason for the statement). A free rendering would be: Other means of valid cognition only ever remove something from their object, but never make anything about a real thing known, because that must already have been observed. And it must have been observed, because it is not possible to observe a partless thing by only one of its parts.

⁴⁰²Cf. the translation of this verse in Steinkellner 1971: 198, fn. 70.

⁴⁰³For more on the context and a translation of this passage, cf. Kellner 2004b: 11 f.

⁴⁰⁴PVSVT 126.7–8 explains: *akasmād ity atarkitopasthitāt. sahasaiva kvacit pradeśe dhūmād agni-pratipattiḥ*. (Inadvertently, i.e., having come about without thought. The cognition of fire because of smoke in some place [occurs] all suddenly.)

⁴⁰⁵As Much 2008: 12, fn. 43 observes, this point was made in PVSV 26.5–7, although not in the exact same words.

someone seeing that [smoke]. Why? Because of a mistake.⁴⁰⁶ And how should he, who ascertains that place in a form separated from this [fire] through an awareness that is free of the notion of the existence of fire, be called unmistaken? And someone who is free of both a superimposition of this cognitive form [of nonfire onto a smokey place] and doubt⁴⁰⁷ would not follow the [logical] mark [smoke] in the case of this cognition. Neither would he respect [it] in the case of its logical concomitance and separation.

Therefore the logical mark is proclaimed to have exclusion as an object.
[For] otherwise, if the property bearer is established, what apart from it
would [still] be unestablished? // [PV 1 47] //

This[, above,] is a recapitulating verse.

Even when something is observed, a cognition having commonness as a
referent, [i.e., a] conceptual [cognition], has, if there is no other part that is
superimposed, exclusion of that [other part] alone as [its] object.⁴⁰⁸ // [PV
1 48] //

[PVSV 28.8] | An ascertaining cogniton, that follows immediately on seeing form pp ↓
etc., [and] has no logical mark, how can that [cogniton], which exists when there is
no superimposition, exist as having removal as an object? [] Because it does not ex- up ↓
ist where [there is] an object of superimposition. For an ascertainment does not exist
concerning that difference, for which there is a superimposition for a person, such as
“persistent” or “having a self,”

because there is the relation of defeated and defeating between an under-
standing by ascertainment and by imposition. // [PV 1 49ab] //

[PVSV 28.13] For an entity, even though it is observed as differentiated from every-
thing, is not understood in this way alone; because a covering is possible for some dif-
ference, like in the case of mother of pearl’s mother-of-pearlness [which is then thought
to be its silverness]. But for which [difference] a cognizer has no cause for an error, for
that alone a mnemonic ascertainment exists, even though there is no different observa-
tion of this [difference] for him[, as opposed to the observation of the other differences
or aspects of the same thing]. Because of the defeated-defeating relationship between
superimposition and ascertainment, [there is], for ascertainment,

an application of it when there is a removal (*viveka*) of a superimposition.

This is understood. // [PV 1 49cd] //

[PVSV 28.19] And precisely the removal of this is other-exclusion. Therefore this
[ascertaining cognition] too⁴⁰⁹ has the exclusion of this alone as its object. [It] does not
have the nature of the ascertainment of a thing’s own nature. For it is so, because, even
if some [part] is ascertained, the non-cognition of another is observed, and because if

⁴⁰⁶ Acc. to PVSVT 126.18: *viparyāsād evānagnimatā pradeśena tulyatvagrahaṇād eva*. (Only [be-
cause of a mistake], i.e., only because of the grasping of a sameness with a place not having fire.) The
argument is, probably, that because the cognition of fire is inadvertently (*akasmād*) arrived at, there is no
proper ascertainment of this fact, and therefore there is no difference between this place and one where
there is no fire.

⁴⁰⁷ PVSVT 126.30–127.6: *anagnyākārasamāropeṇa saṁśayena ca rahitaś ca ...*

⁴⁰⁸ Cf. the translation of this verse and the next half-verse in Steinkellner 1971: 199, fn. 71.

⁴⁰⁹ *tad api* refers to *niścayañāna* in PVSV 28.8.

its own nature were ascertained, this [cognition of one part but not another] would not be consistent.⁴¹⁰

As many superimpositions of parts [there are], just so many clear ascertainties and words [are there] in order to remove them. Therefore they[, words and ascertainties, each] have different objects. // [PV 1 50] //
Otherwise, if a single thing were pervaded by a single word or by an awareness, [there would] not be any other [uncognized]⁴¹¹ object. So there would be synonymity [of all words]. // [PV 1 51] //

[PVSV 29.5] These are two intermediary verses.

PVSV 29.6–31.5

Also⁴¹² for whom⁴¹³ a cognition (*dhī*) grasps a referent that, having different additional attributes,⁴¹⁴ is differentiated, // [PV 1 52ab] //

[PVSV 29.7] Whoever thinks this: “Additional attributes [are] different from each other and from their basis; sound complexes, which are based on them, apply to substrata (*ādhāra*) of these [additional attributes], or to these [additional attributes] alone. Therefore there is no such unwanted consequence [as synonymity].” For that [person] also,

if that, which has a nature undifferentiated from the capacities that are an auxiliary (*aṅga*) to the additional attributes’ support, is grasped with all its self, which difference of [that which is] supported would not be ascertained? // [PV 1 52cd—53ab] //

[PVSV 29.12] Even if the really different additional attributes [are] the cause of other words and cognitions about a referent, still only this single [referent] having these [additional attributes] is clung to⁴¹⁵ by these [words and cognitions]. [There is] no difference in the own self of a [property possessor] that has the nature of a capacity for supporting the various additional attributes; therefore, if grasping [this supporter] with all its self, indeed which particular additional attribute would not be ascertained, since one grasps [this supporter] as being what supports all the additional attributes.⁴¹⁶ For [it is] not [the case that] a completely different supporter-state of that grasped with its

⁴¹⁰Cf. also the argument in PVSV 26.24–27.2. The construction *tathā hi* plus two ablative clauses and no main sentence strikes me as somewhat awkward.

⁴¹¹Cf. PVV 306.11–12: *nānyo ’pratipanno viśayo ’stīti*

⁴¹²For PVSV 29.6–47.13 (kk. 52–94) cf. also the translation in Vora and Ota 1979, Vora and Ota 1980, Vora and Ota 1982.

⁴¹³PVSV 132.1. 4 identifies this as “*vaiśeṣikasya*” (for a Vaiśeṣika). PVV 306.17 identifies the opinion as “*naīyāyikāder mate*”, i.e., as held “in the theory of the Naiyāyikas and so on”. This “and so on” is paraphrased as “*vaiśeṣikāder*”, “for a Vaiśeṣika and so on” in Vibhū 306, fn. 3.

⁴¹⁴*upādhi*, a non-essential attribute or pseudo universal in *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* theories, is glossed as meaning the proper universals “substance-ness, etc.” by both PVSV 132.9 (*upādhayo dravyatvādayaḥ*) and PVV 306.17 (*nānopādher dravyatvādyanekadharmaviśiṣṭasyā° ...*).

⁴¹⁵PVSV 133.26: “...*upalīyate viśayīkriyate*.” (“...**clung to**, i.e., made an object.”)

⁴¹⁶In other words: A thing’s nature is not different from the capacities by which it can support its attributes. Therefore the thing, grasped with its own nature, can not be grasped without being grasped as supporting these additional attributes. And since there can not be two separate supporting states for the same thing, it must be grasped as the supporter of *all* its additional attributes.

own self is not really grasped. Therefore, exactly that, which is grasped with its own nature, [is grasped] also as being a support. So [it is stated].

Both are grasped in the cognition of one because of a connection of both in [their] self. // [PV 1 53cd] //

[PVSV 29.20] Because of grasping the relation of supported and supporter, which has become their self,⁴¹⁷ between the additional attribute and that having it, all two are grasped in the cognition of one. So, where this[, which has an additional property,] is grasped, even if [it is] characterized by [only] one additional attribute, there is a grasping of all additional attributes, because grasping that possessing additional attributes is not separable from (*nāntarīyakatva*) grasping that [single additional attribute]. Otherwise, it would not be grasped as such⁴¹⁸ either. For [there is] no really different supporter of another [additional attribute], which would not be grasped. Neither is there a non-grasping of the supported when the supporter is grasped in this way[, i.e., as a supporter], because of the consequence of not grasping this [supporter] either, as in the case of being the owner and property.⁴¹⁹ Therefore, even in the teaching that an additional attribute is a different object [than its supporter], there is a similar consequence. | But those capacities, through which the [different] additional attributes are supported, could also be really different from that having these capacities. Therefore this consequence [does] not [follow]. pp ↓

| Given there is a difference of the capacities that are the support of the properties, why are these [the capacities] of this [having these capacities], if there is no support of those [capacities] by that [possessing them]? In this way there would be no stopping.⁴²⁰ // [PV 1 54] // up ↓

[PVSV 30.3] If the states of being a supporter for each additional attribute are (*bhūta*) not really the own self of this [which has the additional attributes], nor do [these states] experience support from this, why are they called “its”? Or, if there is a support, this single [supporter], [which] supports capacities with capacities that have become its own self, and is grasped even by only a single additional attribute, is grasped with its whole self. For [it is] so: If a single additional attribute is grasped, the capacity supporting it is grasped. If that is grasped, the entity supporting it, having been grasped as the support of all capacities which have become its own self, causes [a person] to grasp all [its] capacities. And these [capacities cause the grasping of] their own additional attributes. So the consequence remains.⁴²¹

[PVSV 30.10] Or, also these capacities that support the capacities are really different from an entity. Because in this way [there is] an endless connection (*ghaṭana*) of the additional attributes and their capacities to always different capacities, this single

⁴¹⁷Cf. the comment above, fn. 385 on page 146.

⁴¹⁸PVSV 234.25 f. comments: *upādhīnām upakāraka upādhimān ity evam api na grhyeta*. ([It] would not be grasped in this way either: that supporting the additional attributes [is] what has the additional attributes.)

⁴¹⁹For the criticism of this argument by Bhāsarvajña, cf. section 4.1 on page 83.

⁴²⁰I.e., a *regressus ad infinitum*.

⁴²¹PVSV 136.22 points out: *tadavasthaḥ prasaṅgaḥ ko bhedaḥ syād aniścita iti ya uktaḥ*. (So the consequence remains, which was explained as “Which difference would not be ascertained?” [in PV 1 53b].) Indeed, the infinite regress mentioned in PV 1 54 does not follow from this argument, but is discussed in the next few lines.

[entity having additional attributes], not having been grasped with these [capacities] at any time, [and] having a self [consisting in] the support of those [capacities],⁴²² is not grasped as having these [capacities]. | If on the other hand words and cognitions were to adhere[, i.e., refer,] exclusively to the additional attributes, then, because there is no inclusion of this [entity having the attributes],⁴²³ there is no cognition of all [additional attributes] by means of the cognition of that [which has the attributes]. | Nevertheless, because of its not being indicated by words, there would not be an application [of words] to it. So the usage of words would be useless.⁴²⁴ For all everyday activity [engaged] with⁴²⁵ affirmation and negation has a basis in causal efficacy. And, since additional attributes [are] without power as to this [causal efficacy], and that having the power[, i.e., a specific particular,] is not named, what [is achieved by] the usage of words? And therefore the additional attributes would not be additional attributes. For it is because [additional attributes] are, when there is an application [of a word] to something, part of some primary [thing], that [additional attributes] are so called with reference to that. These [additional attributes] are not parts of any [primary thing], because this [primary thing] is not indicated by words. So why [are they] additional attributes? If this [is said]:
 | “Because of the characterization [of a thing] through [additional attributes] characterized [by words]⁴²⁶ there is no error.” | , then there is [that] same consequence.⁴²⁷ To begin with, that [having properties,] which is inseparably⁴²⁸ beheld (*upa-√lakṣ*) with these additional attributes, is, if [it] is beheld by even [only] one [additional attribute], beheld with its whole self. So the [unwanted] consequence has this [same] position [as before]. For what difference (*viśeṣa*) is there here [in this matter]—either words should let [a person] behold that [having attributes], or the additional attributes characterized by these [words should let a person behold that having attributes]? [PVSV 31.1] For, to that extent, this [thing having the additional attributes] is ascertained as supporting all [additional attributes] at that time. So this [difference] is nothing. Therefore,

if that supporting a single [additional attribute] is to be grasped, [there are]
 no supports that are different (*apara*) from it, which would be unobserved

⁴²²I.e., the secondary capacities, PVSVṬ 137.7–8 ...*tadupakārātmā. śaktyupakārātmā. upādhyupakārikānām śaktīnām yāḥ śaktayas tadātmeti yāvat* (...**having a self consisting in the support of those**, i.e., having a self consisting in the support of those capacities. That is to say, having a self consisting in the support of those, which [are] the capacities of the capacities supporting additional attributes.)

⁴²³PVSVṬ 137.14: *tasyopādhimataḥ śabdajñānairasamāveśād aviśayīkaraṇāt*. (**Because [there is] no inclusion of this**, i.e., because there is no making an object of that having additional attributes by words and cognitions.)

⁴²⁴*vyartha*, useless, can also literally mean “without a referent”.

⁴²⁵This is a qualification of activity acc. to PVSVṬ 137.21: *itthaṃbhūtalakṣaṇā (pāṇiniḥ)* Also see Speijer 1998: § 67.

⁴²⁶PVSVṬ 138.13–14: *yady upādhimātram codyate tathāpi śabdair lakṣitā ye upādhayas tair upādhimato lakṣaṇāt paricchedād adoṣaḥ. śabdaprayogavaiyarthadoṣo neti cet*. (If it [is said by an opponent]: If only the additional attribute is meant, still [there is] **no such error**, i.e., there is no error of word usage being useless, because of a **characterization**, i.e., a delimitation of that having additional attributes by those additional attributes which are **characterized** by words.)

⁴²⁷I.e., the consequence of grasping all of the thing’s additional properties. Cf. PVSVṬ 138.15: ...*ta-davasthaḥ sarvopādhigrahaṇaprasaṅgaḥ*.

⁴²⁸This was also argued in PVSV 29.22 f. Cf. also PVSVṬ 138.16: *nāntarīyakatayety upādhyupādhimato avyabhicāreṇa*. (Due to not being separable, i.e., since there is no deviation of additional attribute and that having an additional attribute.) This means additional attribute and that having it do not occur separately from each other.

if it is observed. If it is grasped, the whole is grasped. // [PV 1 55] //

This is the recapitulating verse.⁴²⁹

PVSV 32.13–32.18

Moreover,⁴³⁰ in this [case]⁴³¹ words as well as ascertainties, even though [they name and cognize] a differentiation from another and [that] differentiated from another, only conform (*anu-√rudh*) to convention.⁴³² // PV 1 59 //

[PVSV 32.15] There also, in the case of other-exclusion, the differentiation [is] not one, and truly another that [which is] differentiated, because of the unwanted consequence that that, which is being turned away from the differentiation of this, is this.⁴³³ And in this way there is the nonbeing of differentiation. Therefore exactly that is differentiated, which is a differentiation. But the difference of [both] a word and the cognition [due to a word exists] because of convention. There is no difference of that designated.

⁴²⁹This repeats the main intent of the section starting at PV 1 52ab (trl. on page 152).

⁴³⁰This verse and a part of the PVSV concerning it are translated and discussed in Hattori 1996: 392 f.

⁴³¹PVSVṬ 143.14: *tatrāpi cānyāpohe śabdārthe*. (Moreover, in that [case], i.e., when other-exclusion is the referent of a word.) For the discussion preceding this verse, cf. Kellner 2004b: 19 f. The main point that Dharmakīrti was trying to prove in the preceding passages (starting with PV 1 52, trl. on page 152) was that in all cases of a word denoting a real thing (property or property bearer), the result is an understanding of the whole thing in all its aspects. Dharmakīrti now proceeds to show that this problem does not exist when words denote exclusion.

⁴³²Cf. PVSVṬ 143.16–17, explaining *saṃketam anurundhate*: *ye śabdā dharmadharmivācanāḥ niścayāś cobhayaviśayāḥ, te saṃketam anurundhate*. *saṃketānuvidhānenaiśām dharmadharmiviśayavibhāgaḥ kalpitāḥ. paramārthatas tu vyāvṛttir eva nāstīty arthaḥ*. (Words, naming properties and property bearers, and ascertainties, which have these two as [their] objects, [only conform to convention]. This means that in conformity with convention their[, the words' and ascertainties',] separation of objects [into] properties and property bearers is conceptually constructed. But in reality there is no [such] differentiation at all.)

⁴³³This passage is also translated and discussed in Hattori 1996: 392 f. and Kataoka 2009: 491. According to these interpretations (which I agree with), the unwanted consequence is that the thing differentiated from others becomes identical to these others, because its differentiation is not identical with it itself. A cow is qualified by, but not identical with, not non-horseness, and thus is not distinguishable from horses, which are also not identical with not non-horseness.

This is also how PVSVṬ 143.21–24 understands this passage: *yadi cāśvād vyāvṛttir anaśvatā godra-vyasyānyā syāt tadāśvavyāvṛtter api godravyeṇa nivartitavyam bhedaḥ. tataś ca tadvyāvṛtter anaśvatāyāḥ sakāśān nīvartamānasya gos tadbhāvaprasaṅgāt. aśvabhāvaprasaṅgād aśvavat. evaṃ hy aśvavyāvṛtter anaśvatvalakṣaṇāyā gaur vyāvṛtto bhavati yady aśvāśvatvaṃ syāt*. (And if the differentiation from horse, the non-horseness of the material entity cow, were different [from that entity], then also the differentiation from horse would be turned away by the material entity cow, because of a difference [between that differentiated and the differentiation]. And therefore, for a cow[, which is] **that being turned away** from non-horseness[, that is,] **from the differentiation from this** [horseness], **there is the consequence of being this**, i.e., the consequence of being a horse, like a horse. For in that way a cow would become differentiated from the differentiation from a horse, which is characterised as non-horseness.)

PV 1 64

Therefore⁴³⁴ the depiction [of the errors occurring for] the opinion [that a thing] possesses this [genus] is rejected when the [word's] object [is] other-exclusion. For [this] error would exist if there is a separation of genus and that possessing it.⁴³⁵ // PV 1 64 //

- pp ↓ [PVSV 34.19] What was said: | “Even if other-exclusion is the referent of a word, every [unwanted] consequence arising for the position of [a thing] possessing that [genus] [would be the] same, because that qualified by this [exclusion of others] is designated
up ↓ [by words].”, | that also [a defense] is drawn up against by that [explanation].⁴³⁶ For in this [theory of a thing possessing a genus], a word that is applied by means of another referent[, i.e., by means of the genus,] to some other [referent, that possessing the genus,] is oppressed by the errors of non self-dependency etc.⁴³⁷ But⁴³⁸ differentiation from another is not a referent other than that differentiated, because both designate the same. This was explained.⁴³⁹
- pp ↓ [PVSV 34.23] | How then, [when a differentiated thing and its differentiation are one, could] the differentiation from another [be] a commonness, since the one differentiated[,
up ↓ being a particular,] does not correspond to another? | Because there is an appearance in this way [as corresponding to another] in the awareness of this [commonness].⁴⁴⁰ Indeed there is no true (*nāma*) commonness at all. An awareness based on words is generated as

⁴³⁴Cf. the translation and interpretation of this verse in Hattori 1996: 393 and Tillemans 2011a: 452 ff. It is also translated and discussed in Kataoka 2009: 493(6), but I think a slight misunderstanding has happened there: “...*tadvatpakṣoparṇanam / pratyākhyātam*...” is interpreted as “...the [opponent's] explanation of the [Buddhist] view of *tadvat* (a locus qualified by *apoha*) is refuted ...” (Kataoka 2009: 493(6)). This doesn't concur with the understanding of the same phrase in Hattori 1996: 393: “mention (made by Kumāṛila) in reference to (the theory of) *anyāpoha*, of (the faults to be found with the *tadvat* theory (viz., the theory maintaining that a word denotes that which is qualified by the universal) has been rejected.” Apart from the following explanation in PVSV 34.19–21, cf. also PVSVṬ 153.17–19: *yataś ca vyāvṛttivyāvṛttimator abhedas tena kāraṇenānyāpohaviśaye jātīmān śabdair abhidhīyata iti tadvatpakṣaḥ. tatra yo doṣaḥ, so 'nyāpohe 'pi syād iti tadvatpakṣopavarṇanam pratyākhyātam.* (°*viśaye* corr. acc. to PVSVṬ_{ms} 57b7 against °*viśayo* in PVSVṬ 153.18. Trl.: And for the [reason that there is] no difference between differentiation and differentiated [thing], **due to that**, as a cause, **given that other-exclusion is the object** [of words], [the] **depiction** [of these errors occurring] **for the position of “[a thing] possessing that [genus]” is rejected**[, i.e., the depiction which consist in this statement]: the error, which [exists] for this[, i.e., for] the position [that a thing] possesses this [genus][, expressed as] “Words designate that having this [genus].”, would exist also for other-exclusion.)

⁴³⁵ As first explained in Frauwallner 1932: 260–263, it was Kumāṛila's objection against Dignāga's *apoha*-theory that it entailed all the same errors levelled against the *tadvat*-theory by him. Cf. the references in Frauwallner 1932: 261, fn. 2, the explanations and the references in Kataoka 2009: 493(6), as well as the references in fn. 435.

⁴³⁶I.e., that there is no difference between the differentiated thing and the differentiation qualifying it. Cf. PVSVṬ 143.26–27: *aneti vyāvṛttivyāvṛttimator ananyatvena prativyūḍham pratyākhyātam.*

⁴³⁷PVSVṬ 153.29: *ādiśabdād asamānādhikaraṇyopacāradoṣaparigrahaḥ.* (From the word “etc.” the errors of non-co-referentiality and metaphor [should be] understood.) Cf. Much 1997 for a discussion of the first problem, whether and how words can denote the same thing, and cf. Pind 2009: 78–79, and notes thereto for a translation of Dignāga's discussion of all three problems.

⁴³⁸For another translation of PVSV 34.22–35.7, see Tillemans 2011a: 453, fn. 12.

⁴³⁹Cf., e.g., PVSV 32.15–17 (trl. section A.1 on the previous page).

⁴⁴⁰Cf. PVSVṬ 154.1.7 f.: *sāmānyabuddhau vikalpikāyām tathāikākāreṇa pratibhāsanād ekākāra eva vyāvartyate 'neneti vyāvṛttiḥ. sāmānyam ucyate.* (Because of an appearance **in this way**[, i.e.,] with the same (*eka*) form of awareness, to the conceptual awareness of a commonness, exactly the same form of awareness is differentiated by this [appearance]. So differentiation is called commonness.)

mixing together actually unmixed properties, because of the capacity of beginningless mental impressions. By the power of the appearance for this [awareness], commonness and a coreference are defined, no matter [that this appearance has] a nonexistent referent, because there is neither mixing[, so as to justify the commonness, nor] difference[, so as to justify coreference,] of referents.

[PVSV 35.2] The basis for all of these[, commonness and co-reference, are] the referents differentiated from others by having this cause and this effect, and words lead to activity by avoiding the unwanted. Therefore the object [of words] is said [to be] other-exclusion. In this [theory], [an object], which has an external reality that is not indicated [by words and concepts], which is one, and which is differentiated from many by the power of the appearance in awareness, is made an object by words, [and] by concepts, [which] have an origin in the awakening of impressions that are conceived by the experience of this [singular thing] [and that] have referents [which are] determined as being so[, i.e., as an externally existing thing]. And only there[, in the appearance to awareness,] does this which is commonly used[, i.e., spoken about,] as property and property bearer, which are not designatable as being the same [as] or being different [from] each [other], spread out. For there is no property different from a property bearer because [they] do not denote a different referent. Neither is this [property] only [the property bearer], because, like for that denoting this [property bearer], there is the consequence of indicating another distinction[, i.e., another property,] also for that denoting the property,⁴⁴¹ and because, in this way, that which [a person] desires [to express with a word for a property] is not made clear [since it would express a property bearer], no particular convention would be made. This then (*iti*) is the fact that property and property bearer can not be named⁴⁴² with regard to the word referent. But for a real thing, a particular, the common characteristic can not be named because [commonness] does not exist.

PVSV 54.17–55.13

If this is thought: | There is no cognition having a nondifferent appearance
for different [things]. // PV 1 107ab //

pp ↓

[PVSV 54.18] We [opponents] do not say: what is not the same (*aneka*) does not create the same (*eka*) effect. Rather [we say:] an awareness, which has the form of something fixed upon different objects, should not have a non-different appearance. | - Indeed there is no appearance of particulars[, which are not the same,] in [awareness up ↓ events]⁴⁴³ grasping a commonness, because⁴⁴⁴ these [awareness events] exist even if

⁴⁴¹Which means that by saying “blue” about something also other qualities would be known (such as that the thing is a lotus, a plant, etc.).

⁴⁴²Acc. to PVSVT 156.28–29: *etad anantaroktan tattvānyatvābhyām avācyatvaṃ dharmadharmiṇoḥ śabdārthe buddhipratibhāsiny arthe uktam*. (This, which was just explained, is the fact that property and property bearer can not be named as being the [other] (*tattva*) or different, [which is] explained for the word referent, i.e., for the object appearing in awareness.) This argument thus shows that even though property and property bearer are differentiated in everyday activity, this is not really true with regard to the word referent as the object appearing in awareness. And since there is, ultimately, no difference or identity between property and property bearer in this way, the errors that Kumāṛila thought arised for Dignāga’s *apoha*-theory (cf. PV 1 64) are shown not to pertain to it.

⁴⁴³Cf. PVSVT 221.24 *sāmānyagrāhiṇīṣu buddhiṣu* (In [those] grasping a commonness, i.e., in [those] awareness events.)

⁴⁴⁴The three reasons given now are, according to PVSVT 221.25–222.10, aimed against three different

those [particulars] do not exist, and because of the appearance in their own cognition[, i.e., perceptual cognition,] with another form of awareness[, i.e., other than the form of the commonness], and because [there is] an overreaching consequence⁴⁴⁵ since a single [thing] is not consistent with multiple forms of awareness [of it]. Therefore this [awareness of a commonness] does not appear as grasping different objects, as nondifferent, [or] as arising from these [different objects]. Even though [it] has no appearance of this[, a particular], [conceptual awareness] causes the world to engage in everyday activity because of the confusion of determination. But this form, appearing in this [conceptual awareness], does not exist in the objects, other (*anyatra*) than as a difference that has no difference.⁴⁴⁶ But this [common form of awareness] is unreal. In this way this [awareness] grasping only this [unreal common form] goes astray. This was already explained.⁴⁴⁷

[PVSV 55.6] Moreover: even for those teaching a commonness as a real thing, the particulars are completely differentiated. How [should there be] an awareness having a nondifferent form of awareness with regard to these [particulars]? This is to be questioned in the same manner.⁴⁴⁸ | [It is] not [to be questioned] in the same manner, because a non-different commonness really exists there [in the particulars]. | Now,⁴⁴⁹

opinions about the relation between something that appears and particulars or universals: first, the form in which a particular appears to perception is the same as the form in which it appears to conceptual cognition. Second, the form appearing in the awareness of a universal is the form of the particulars. Third, the same individual has a twofold form: with one it appears to perception, with the other to conceptual cognition.

⁴⁴⁵PVSVT 222.8–10: *trīyam pakṣam nirākartum āha—anekākārāyogād iti. ekasyānekatvam ayuktam ekānekatvayor virodhāt. atiprasaṅgāc cety ekasyānekatvakalpanāyām na kvacid ekatvam syād ity arthaḥ.* (In order to refute the third position (cf. fn. 444 on the preceding page), [Dharmakīrti] said: **“Because it is not consistent with multiple forms of awareness.”** Being many is not consistent **for one**, because being one and being many are contradictory. **And because there is the overreaching consequence**[, i.e.,] there would not be oneness for anything when there is the option that one [thing] is many [things]. This is the meaning.

⁴⁴⁶For this way of construing *anyatra*, cf. Böthlingk and R. Roth 1855: 265–266, *anyatra*, 7. A difference that has no difference, is nothing but other-exclusion. Cf. PVSVT 222.22–25: *katham tarhi vyaktiṣv abhinnākārapratibhāsa ity āha—anyatra bhedādabhedina iti. bhedo ’nyāpohaḥ sa eva prati-vyaktiyabhedī. tathā hi yathaikā govyaktir agovyāvṛttā tathānyāpi. tad anena prakāreṇa svalakṣaṇāny eva vijātīyavyāvṛttāny abhedīni bheda ity ucyante. anyatrasābdaś cāyamvibhaktyantapratirūpakonipātaḥ. anyasābdaśamānārthaḥ. na tv ayantralpratyayāntaḥ saptamaryarthasyāvivakṣitatvāt. tenāyam artho yathoktena prakāreṇa svalakṣaṇātmakād bhedādabhedino ’nyaḥ pratibhāsamāna ākaro ’rtheṣu nāsti kiṃ tu svalakṣaṇātmaka eva bhedo vijātīyavyāvṛtter abhedī sarvatra vidyate ’bhedādhyavasāyāt. abhedādhyavasāyasya ca sa eva bhedaḥ pāramparyeṇa nimittam.* (Because of [the question]: “How then is there an appearance of a non-different form in particulars?”, [Dharmakīrti] said: **other than a difference that has no difference**. This difference, i.e., other-exclusion alone has no difference for [multiple] particulars. For [it is] so: As one cow-particular is differentiated from non-cow, so also another [cow-particular is differentiated from non-cow]. Thus, by this method, the particulars alone, which are differentiated from that of another genus, i.e., non-different, are called “difference.” And this word “*anyatra*” is an indeclinable that accords to a case ending. It has the same meaning as “other.” But this is not the *tral* ending[, i.e., *tra*,] because the sense of the seventh[, locative,] case is not meant. Thus this is the meaning: An appearing form, which is different from the non-different difference—which has the nature of a particular in the way explained—does not exist in the objects; rather, a difference, which only has the nature of particulars, [and which is] without difference due to a differentiation from [things] of a different kind, is seen in all [particulars of the same class] because non-difference is determined. And for a determination of non-difference precisely this difference is the indirect cause.)

⁴⁴⁷As pointed out in Gnoli 1960b: 190, acc. to PVSVT 223.9–10 the reference is to PVSV 50.16–17.

⁴⁴⁸I.e., in the same manner that Dharmakīrti’s theory was questioned in PV 1 107a: *abhinnapratibhāsa*

the appearance of this commonness in that [particular], even though it [may] exist, is not noticed. For this [conceptual awareness] is regarded as having an appearance of colour, [and] constellation. But the commonness is not like this [, i.e., it does not have colour, constellation, etc.], and neither is there any undifferentiated form apart from this. Also for one teaching shape (*ākṛti*) as the commonness, there is no occurrence [of the commonness] in another object because, like [the particular] having a specificity, this commonness is not separate [from the particular]. Therefore (*iti*), because of this difference, an undifferentiated appearance is not consistent.

PVSV 56.10–57.23

| [Objection:] Now,⁴⁵⁰ a cognition is their [the particulars'] effect and it is differentiated. // PV 1 108c”d // pp ↓

PVSV 56.11 According to [its] object[, that is], because, like this [particular], also a cognition which has an appearance of this [particular] is different. How [then can there be] the same (*eka*^o) effects? For this [cognition] is their effect and differentiated. Also what is the same effect of a pot etc., like carrying water etc., that also is differentiated because of the difference according to the thing. Therefore different [things] do not have the same effect. | [Answer:] This error [does] not [exist], for [this reason]: up ↓

Because⁴⁵¹ of being the reason for the same judgement (*pratyavamarśa*), a cognition (*dhī*) is without difference. Through being the reason for a single cognition also the particulars are not differentiated. // PV 1 109 //

[It has been] made known earlier (*nivedita*)⁴⁵² how there is no mixing of the own natures of beings. An awareness (*buddhi*) having a mixed form of awareness with regard to these [things] is merely an error. And this (*iti*) [has also been explained]:⁴⁵³ “But the different referents of words (*padārtha*), indirectly being reasons for a concept, generate this [awareness] because of [their] own nature.” But this discrimination (*viveka*) of the own nature causing non-that [i.e., different effects], [is] called their [the referents'] nondifferent difference, because [it is] the cause for some [thing] which is the same, [i.e., the same] cognition etc. Even though it[, an effect like cognition etc.,] also [is] differentiated according to the thing (*pratidravya*), [it] appears (*√khyā*) as non-different, being (*bhavat*) by [its] nature the reason for the same judgement which covers (*°avaskandin*) [different things] with non-difference. Because of being the reason for an object like cognition etc., [which a] [is] the reason for the judgement of being like this [thing, and b]) is qualified by an appearance of a nondifference, things too generate by [their] own nature a single (*eka*) cognition [which has] a mixed form (*ākāra*)[, and

dhīr na bhinneṣv iti cen matam.

⁴⁴⁹Kaṇvakagomin says that “*nanu*” here introduces the Siddhāntavādin’s, i.e., Dharmakīrti’s statement (*nanvityādi siddhāntavādī*, PVSVT 223.14).

⁴⁵⁰Also cf. the translation and discussion of this and the next verse in Dunne 2004: 120–126.

⁴⁵¹Cf. also the translation of this verse and the following commentary up to PVSV 57.7 in Steinkellner 1971: 190, fn. 46.

⁴⁵²Acc. to Gnoli 1960b: 190, note to p. 56, l. 18 and PVSVT 227.26–27, this refers to PV 1 40. Dunne 2004: 122, fn. 111: “a likely candidate is PVI.68–75 and PVSV *ad cit.*”.

⁴⁵³PVSVT 228.7–8 *cakāro niveditam ity āsyānukarṣaṇārthaḥ. etad api tatraiva prastāve niveditam.* (The conjunction “*ca*” has the purpose of pulling over this [phrase]: “it was explained”. This too was explained in the same passage[, i.e., PV 1 40].)

has] the difference [of the thing's] own nature as [its] real referent. This has often been said.⁴⁵⁴ Therefore the non-difference of entites is only that [they] have the same effect.

And this[, that they have the same effect,] is the separation (*viśleṣa*) from [things having] other (*atat*) effects // PV 1 110a //

alone

because of the non-observation and negation // PV 1 110c //

of a real thing

other than that [particular], [which would] persist [in different particulars]
// PV 1 110b //

[PVSV 57.13] “For there is no observable [thing] not appearing separately [from the particulars].” This has been said,⁴⁵⁵ or [also]: “If [it] exists, how [could it,] having no basis anywhere[, be] the reason for a cognition?”, and [also this was said]: “And because [its] negation is performed (*vidhāna*) it is impossible to conceive of it.”

Therefore it is correct that

convention (*saṃketa*) // PV 1 110d' //

also

has a knowledge of that [difference] as [its] purpose // PV 1 110d'' //

alone. Also the convention which is made should shine forth (*√śubh*) only for the [sake of the] cognition of that which is this mutual discrimination of things, since [convention] serves [successful] activity by [means of] a discrimination of [that] causing non-that. If there were no convention with the purpose of a cognition of that [difference], one would not be acting by [means of] an avoidance of others, because, even at the time that there is everyday activity [directed at] this [thing differentiated from others],⁴⁵⁶ there is no contact to it [anymore]. For [then] a discrimination of these [that have the same effect] from those [different effects] is not indicated by a word.⁴⁵⁷

PV 1 113cd–123

pp ↓ | If the object “tree” is grasped through the exclusion from non-trees, both
have a basis in each other. So, if one [of them] is not grasped, both are
up ↓ not grasped. Convention is impossible because of that. | So some (*kecit*)

⁴⁵⁴Gnoli 1960b: 190, to p. 57, l.6: “see f. ex. the words *tām tu bhedināḥ padārthāḥ*, etc. (above p. 56, ll. 19–20) and stanzas 73–74.”

⁴⁵⁵Acc. Gnoli 1960b: 190, note to p. 57, l. 13: “[...] see the stanzas 71–75.” Cf. Dunne 2004: 341–352 for a translation of these verses and Dharmakīrti's autocommentary.

⁴⁵⁶Cf. PVSVṬ 230.16: *tasyānyavyavṛttasya svabhāvasya*

⁴⁵⁷I think the argument here is that if a verbal convention were to be made for something real, then that thing would not exist anymore when that convention is used. And the reason is that words would not indicate a difference (*viveka*) of things, as they do in the *apoha*-theory.

PVSVṬ 230.18–21 explains: *etad uktam bhavati. yadā vidhirūpeṇānyavyāvṛto 'rtho viśayikṛtas tadānyavyavacchedaḥ pratīyeta. etad evāha — na hītyādi. viveka itī viviktaḥ svabhāvaḥ, teṣāṃ tatkāriṇām, tebhya itī atakāryebhyaḥ. yadi hi tasya viviktasya svabhāvasya pratīyate saṅketaḥ kṛtaḥ syād evaṃ vyavahāre 'pi śabdena codyeta. tathā cānyaparihāreṇa pravarteteti saṅketo 'pi tadvidarthika eva yuktaḥ.* ([By this] the [following] is said: When an object differentiated from others is made an object [of conceptual cognition] in a positive form, then [its] separation from another would be cognized. Exactly this [Dharmakīrti] said: “For not” etc. **Discrimination**, i.e., a discriminated nature **of these**, i.e., which have that effect, **from those**, meaning those with different effects. For if a convention were made in order to cognize this discriminated nature [itself], it would **be indicated by words** in the same way also in everyday activity. And in this way a convention also, as (*itī*) [it] should apply [to an object] only through avoiding what is other, has only knowledge of this [separation] as its object.)

say.⁴⁵⁸ // PV 1 113cd–114 //

[PVSV 58.22] | If the difference from non-trees [is] tree, [then,] because this [tree] pp ↓
can not be grasped in this way without grasping non-tree, [and] because also non-tree,
which is has the form of a distinction from that [tree], is not known by [someone who]
does not know tree, convention is not possible for an object that has not arisen in aware-
ness. | So some [say]. up ↓

For these [people], are non-trees distinguished in convention or not? // PV
1 115ab' //

[PVSV 59.2] For those [persons], who, assuming a commonness as a single real
thing, so question (*√cud*) the mutual basis when convention [is made] through distinc-
tion (*vyavaccheda*) from others, [for them], when a convention is made for this [real
commonness] too, [are] non-trees distinguished or not?

If [non-trees are] distinguished, how [are they] known without (*rte*) first
grasping tree? // PV 1 115b'cd //

[PVSV 59.7] For then⁴⁵⁹ a cognizer (*pratipattī*) does not know tree, nor non-tree,
because [the cognizer] approaches intent on [learning about] this [convention] only in
order to know that[, what a tree and a non-tree is]. How does this unknowing [person]
understand the distinction from non-tree when a convention [is made]? And if [that
distinction is] not understood, [then]—because of a word [which is] based on [what is]
other than that which is not avoided—

those engaging in everyday activity would, if [there were] no negating [of
nontree at the time a] convention [is made], not act avoiding that [non-tree],
as [they would not act avoiding] a particular kind (*bheda*) of tree. // PV
1 116 //

[PVSV 59.13] Activity because of a word which, at the time a convention [is made],
is based [on something] without a distinction from that which is different (*para*), is
not possible as avoiding that [which was not distinguished] at [the time of] everyday
activity, as a particular kind [of tree], such as *Śimśapā* etc. [is acted towards because
of the word tree]. Or also [this] may be [objected]:

| Affirming [is] not negating another. Pointing out one [thing]⁴⁶⁰ stand- pp ↓
ing in front [of one], an agreement is made: “This is a tree.” This [same
thing] is acted towards also at [the time of] everyday activity. Therefore
this error [of mutual dependency] doesn’t exist [for this position]. // PV
1 117–118ab' //

[PVSV 59.18] Indeed, by someone [adhering to the] teaching that commonness is
an existing real thing nothing is affirmed through the distinction of something. Rather,
clearly seeing a single real thing positioned in front [of one], the convention is made:

⁴⁵⁸PVSVT 233.20–28 cites both Uddyotakara (NV 314.5–7) and Kumāṛila (ŚV Av 83–85ab, cf. sec-
tion B.7 on page 185 for a trl. of ŚV Av 83–84) as maintaining that other-exclusion as a word referent
leads into a circular dependency between A (e.g., a cow) and non-A (e.g., a non-cow).

⁴⁵⁹Acc. to PVSVT 234: *tadeti samketakāle pratipattā, yasmai samketaḥ kriyate*. (Then, i.e., at the
time of a convention, a cognizer, i.e., for whose sake a convention is made.)

⁴⁶⁰PVSVT 236.18 *ekam iti sāmānyam*. (One[, i.e.,] commonness.)

“This is a tree.” This object, exactly as observed at the time when the convention [is made], or that connected to it,⁴⁶¹ is cognized also in everyday activity. [PVSV 60.1] So [there is] no similar [unwanted] consequence[, i.e., that tree and non-tree are inter-
up ↓ dependent]. | [Answer:] There is no dissimilar consequence. For also here[, when a convention is made for a real thing, by saying]

“This also [is] a tree”, “only this [is a tree]”. So the [unwanted] consequence is not averted. // PV 1 118b”cd //

Also someone saying “This is a tree.”, [whilst] pointing out a single [thing] does not go beyond these two options: “That also [is a tree].”, [or] “That only [is a tree].” And
pp ↓ for both of these there is precisely this error. | [Opponent:] [There is] no error, because a cognition of what is opposite to that seen is easy. For, in someone seeing some single [thing] [and] experiencing an awareness that has a form distinct from that [thing], an ascertainment of difference, which distinguishes these [things], arises according to the experience “[this is] other than that.” For, someone who has been taught “Only this is a tree.” whilst being shown [a tree] cognizes all by himself exactly this non-tree just where he does not see this [tree]. This is not possible for someone teaching exclusion, because a form observed in one [instance] does not continue in some [other instance].⁴⁶² When there is a cognition [of tree and non-tree] through observation, there would not
up ↓ be a cognition in this way even for another particular. | [Answer:] Thus then also here there is this same [error], due to this [reason]:

For, based (*sthita*) on a single cognition called a single judgment, the cognizer (*prapattṛ*) himself divides the referents which are reasons for this [cognition] and for another (*atad*) [cognition]. // PV 1 119 //

[PVSV 60.16] As this has been made known earlier,⁴⁶³ some such entities, even though different as to [their] original form (*prakṛti*), produce a single effect, like a cognition etc., [but] not others. These this [cognizer] cognizes there[, at the time a convention is made], all by himself distinguishing reasons for that [same effect] and reasons not for that [same effect].

[The learner of a convention] should cognize the entities present in his⁴⁶⁴ awareness of them—[which] appear as a cognition’s cause, [which] lack the form of not [being that] cause, [and so are] as if of the same form—as different [from those which do not cause that cognition].⁴⁶⁵ So an expression is bound to a difference. A cognition, making this [difference] known

⁴⁶¹I.e., the particular which is connected to a universal, cf. PVSVT 236.22–23: *tatsambandhinam veti sāmānyasambandhinam āśrayam*. (Or that connected to it, i.e., the basis which has a connection to a commonness.)

⁴⁶²According to PVSVD 294b1 *ananvayāt* should be understood as giving the reason for the previous sentence, that this is not possible for someone adhering to an exclusion theory: *mam par gcod pa smra ba la ni ’di mi srid de, gcig na mthoñ ba’i ño bo ni gañ la yañ rjes su ’gro ba med pa’i phyir ro. mthoñ bar rtogs na ni gsal ba gñan pa yañ de ltar rtogs par mi ’gyur ro že na*. This is also reflected in PVSVT 237.22–29 (the opponent is speaking): *anyāpohavādino ’py evam iti cet. āha — nedam ityādi. ekatra samketakāle drṣṭasyāsādhāraṇasya rūpasya kvacid vyaktyantare ’nanvayād ananugamāt*.

⁴⁶³PV 1 73–74 acc. to Gnoli 1960b: 190, note to p. 60, l. 13 (sic!), cf. Dunne 2004: 344–345 for a translation. Also see PVSV 25.15–23.

⁴⁶⁴*tasya* is not part of the verse.

⁴⁶⁵Cf. PVSVT 239.23: ...*atatkāribhyo bhedena* ...

because of this [expression], beholds [this difference] as if it were the same real thing due to an error. // PV 1 120-1 //

[PVSV 60.23] Since⁴⁶⁶ these [things] are experienced only according to [their] nature (*prakṛti*) [there is] continuity (*anvaya*) of such a concept's causes. Therefore a learner⁴⁶⁷ cognizes [those things which]

1. occur in the mind of someone seeing this [same effect amongst the things],
2. are determined as being a cause for this cognition and as excluding what is other than this [cause for this cognition] even though they are really not like [this], [and]
3. have a difference of external and internal [form] that is not distinguished,⁴⁶⁸

[this learner now] who is based on conceptual cognition after having been shown in accordance with [this] cognition [just described] those [things] appearing as the same in his own and the other's concepts, [this person] will cognize as different the reasons for this [conceptual] cognition. [PVSV 61.1] Therefore [the learner] binds an expression to the difference [of these things] from those [things which are] not reasons for that[, i.e., what is not a reason for the conceptual cognition of tree]. [It is] only in virtue of an error [that] a conceptual awareness, understanding this [difference] because of that [expression], appears as if (*iva*) grasping one single real thing[, i.e., a commonness]. Further, no [such] single thing is observable there [amongst the particulars], because of seeing and not-seeing⁴⁶⁹ which [he], even though seeing [things] as different, could make a distinction between tree and non-tree, because [he] does not grasp it [the single real thing, e.g., treeness,] separately from the appearances of branch etc. like [he grasps] a stick where [there is] a stick-bearer. Also, because [such a single thing] which is not grasped as separate (*pravibhāga*) from others (*āpara*) is not noticed (*anupalakṣaṇa*), [as] also because a form (*ākṛti*) seen in one [thing] can not be seen in another,⁴⁷⁰ only a single particular would be a tree, given that [that] having that [form] and [that] not having that [form] are[, respectively,] a tree and not a tree.

PVSV 76.5–77.11

[PVSV 76.25] What's more, some [person] imagining a commonness as an object different [from a particular]⁴⁷¹ will imagine [it] either as being in (*gata*) its own basis alone, or as being in everything, as [in the case of] ether etc. If, amongst these [options], [it is imagined] as being in its own basis alone, [then], if pot etc. comes into being in places that are free from potness etc., how is a commonness, which occurs in material things in different places, possible where these [are]? For this [commonness]

⁴⁶⁶The following passage is translated and discussed in McCrea and Patil 2006: 312 ff.

⁴⁶⁷PVSVṬ 241.7: *yasmai saṃketaḥ kriyate sa pratipattā*. (For whose sake a convention is made, that is a learner.)

⁴⁶⁸Meaning the learner does not differentiate between what is internal and external to his cognition, the form of awareness and the real thing.

⁴⁶⁹Emend *darśānādarśaṇābhyam* PV 1 61.3–4 to *darśanādarśaṇābhyam*, supported by PVSVṬ 242.14.

⁴⁷⁰According to PVSVṬ 242.22 f., this is an argument against an anarthāntarasāmānyavādin. Cf. also the reference to an ākṛtisāmānyavādin in PVSV 55.21 (cf. PVSVṬ 223.20–25).

⁴⁷¹PVSVṬ 301–302 refers to discussions found with Kumārila (ŚV Āv 25–29a and ŚV Vv 30 and 32, with variations) and Uddyotakara (NV 302.21–303.13, approximately, I could not find the last few sentences (following *nīlapratyayas*, PVSVṬ 301.21) in the NV).

does not go // PV 1 152a' //

from an earlier material thing into a material thing wanting to arise, because inactivity [of the commonness] is admitted to [by you]. For an entity occurring in another material thing, which does not move from this [and] which does not pervade the intermediate space between the two, can not be connected with an entity having a different place. This [entity], at an earlier [time],

was not there, [but] is there later // PV 1 152a''b' //

and it has not arisen there, nor come from anywhere. So who is capable of shouldering (*ud-√vāh*) this burden of obstacles, except because of stupidity (*jāḍya*)?

PVSV 82.4–25

pp ↓ [PVSV 82.4–25] | How then, when there is no undifferentiated real thing[, i.e., no universal], is there now an occurrence of a cognition and word which conform [to many things]? | [In the same way] as for cook etc.⁴⁷² | But this is considered: How [can cognition and word apply] to these also? | [But] this was considered, how (*yathā*) [a universal] is not possible for these.⁴⁷³ | So then would these two[, word and cognition,] be without a cause? | [The two are] not without cause, but rather, they do not have a cause that is an external reality. The generation of a concept is due to an awakening—according to [its] self⁴⁷⁴—of mnemonic imprints. From this, words [follow]. Further, that the basis of a concept and a designation is not the existence of a real thing was explained often,⁴⁷⁵ because, even though there is an observation of mutually different [real things], these two[, cognitions and words,] are observed to conform [to these different things] by an association (*samāveśa*) of contradictory forms in virtue of the mnemonic imprints from a convention [set for a thing]. But amongst these [things] there is no own nature at all that has a binding to this[, word and cognition], because an association of two [things], pp ↓ contradictory to each other, in one [thing] at the same time is not possible. | Then [a word and a cognition] would be without any restriction (*aniyama*). For an existing [thing] that has no cause is not capable of restriction, since [it can be said at will:] “[It] up ↓ exists somewhere, [it] doesn’t exist somewhere.” | Truly, that [word and cognition] is not without a cause, because the specific quality of a mnemonic imprint is a cause. But an external [thing] that exists in such a way[, i.e., as a cause for the same cognition,] is not observable. This is what we say. Nor must [a conceptual cognition] not be, when this [external cause] does not exist,⁴⁷⁶ because such a concept is generated when [there

⁴⁷²PVSVṬ 317.30–318.10 *yathā pācakādiṣu pācakatvādisāmānyan nāsti, tathā prasādhitam. atha ca tatra pravartete anvayinau jñānaśabdau. tathānyatrāpy antareṇa sāmānyan tau bhaviṣyataḥ*. (Correct *bhaviṣyataḥ* in PVSVṬ 318.10 to *bhaviṣyataḥ* acc. to PVSVṬ_{ms} 117a1. Trl.: **As for a cook etc.** there is no commonness cookness etc., as is well established. But still (*atha ca*), conforming words and concepts apply to this cook etc., so also for another [thing] they will exist without a universal.)

⁴⁷³Whether the universal cookness qualifies cooks was discussed following PV 1 63 and again in PVSV 80.18–81.23 (cf. the translation of these verses from the Tibetan and their explanation in Frauwallner 1933: 79 ff.).

⁴⁷⁴I.e., every conceptual cognition is due to the awakening of specific (its own, or its proper) mnemonic imprints.

⁴⁷⁵Cf., e.g., PVSV 35.2–9 (section A.1 on page 157).

⁴⁷⁶Additions acc. to PVSVṬ 319.14–15: *na cāsati tasminn anvayini bāhye nimitte vikalpena na bhavitavyam bhavitavyam eva*. (**Nor, when this does not exist**, i.e., the continuous external cause [of a cog-

are] inexistent objects, grasped by sleepers and [persons suffering from] *timira*, and when there are specific forms that are superimposed [due to] mnemonic impressions of an agreement. And it is not [the case that] all forms of awareness [occur] for everything because these [concepts] are generated for inexistent [objects], since those which are perceived in such a way[, i.e., separately,] are [also] conceptualized entirely separate. And about this something was said⁴⁷⁷ by us: even by the nature [of things there are] certain causes for the same cognition, because of a difference in [these things'] own nature. Moreover,

by which contact a genus spreads out into something when [there is] the same difference of things, but not into another, that [contact] alone should be the basis of both words and cognitions. // PV 1 162 //

[PVSV 82.25] This is an intermediate verse.

nitition], **must** a conceptual cognition [not exist][, i.e.,] it really must exist.) For this construction of the 3rd case (instrumental) with *bhavitavyam* cf. Böhlingk and R. Roth 1868: 224 f.

⁴⁷⁷ According to Gnoli 1960b: 191, this refers to PV 1 73. This is also said in PVSVT 319.28–29.

A.2 PVSVT 114.9–21 ad PVSV 41

Because of this⁴⁷⁸, that which was said by Kumāṛila[, i.e.]:⁴⁷⁹

pp ↓ | “But there is no word which performs other-exclusion,⁴⁸⁰ as described on your position. Mere negation is simply not understood⁴⁸¹ in this appearance.

Rather, from words, such as “cow,” “gayal” (*gavaya*), “elephant,” [or] “tree,” a verbal awareness (*mati*) turns up through a determination having an affirmative form.

Therefore, only for those words, to which the [negating particle] *nañ* is joined, shall there be an element of negation of another. For others[, i.e., words that are not negated,] only⁴⁸² the own self [of this word] is understood.”

up ↓ | establishes only what is [already] established [for us], because it is assumed [by us] that the referent of a word has an affirmative form.⁴⁸³

pp ↓ | How then is the Buddhist opinion different from the opinion of others? Or, why is the object of word and [logical] mark called exclusion?

up ↓ | Now, there is a big difference between [these two opinions], because conceptual cognition, which is postulated by the others as being [something that] has a real thing as [its] object, is postulated by the Buddhists as being [something that] has an imagined [thing] as its object. And⁴⁸⁴ the imagined form (*ākāra*), because of being based on exclusion, is called exclusion, or [one states this fact with the words] “[Another] is excluded by this.” But the mere negation of another, which is implicitly (*arthāt*) referred to [in the previous statement], is called [exclusion] since [one says] “[the act of] excluding [is] exclusion.” But the particular is called exclusion since [one says] “In this [particular the other] is excluded.”

⁴⁷⁸The reference is to PV 1 126, which Kaṇvakagomin has just quoted.

⁴⁷⁹As pointed out by Akamatsu (1983: 159–164, n. 4), the first two of the following three verses are not found in the ŚV, and might therefore be from Kumāṛila’s lost *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*. The last verse corresponds to ŚV Av 164.

⁴⁸⁰Cf. PV 3 164 (trl. on the next page) and the references to Dignāga given there.

⁴⁸¹The words have been awkwardly separated here, read *pratibhāse* ‘*vagamya*te instead of *pratibhā-seva gamyate* in PVSVT 114.11.

⁴⁸²Read *svātmaivānyatra* acc. to PVSVT_{ms} 44b2 against *svātmevānyatra* in PVSVT 114.15.

⁴⁸³Cf. the argument in PVSVT 113.6–7.

⁴⁸⁴For the rest of this paragraph, cf. the material in PVT_{Fr}.

A.3 Material from PV 3

The most detailed modern study of the PV as a whole was carried out in Japanese by Tosaki (1979–1985). Even though I do not read (or speak) Japanese, Masamichi Sakai was so kind as to discuss with me the main differences he found between Tosaki’s and my interpretations.

PV 3 147

Even⁴⁸⁵ if [there is] a continuous (*avayavin*) cognition, it [is a cognition possessing] the manifestation (*avabhāsi*) of a word [and] a particular. [But the universal] cowness is indeed declared [to be] free of the form (*ākāra*) of a colour (*varṇa*), a shape (*ākṛti*), [and] a letter (*akṣara*).⁴⁸⁶ // PV 3 147 //

PV 3 161–173

Objects,⁴⁸⁷ even though [there is] a difference [between them], are causes for a similar (*tādrś*) cognition only due to their nature [of being] a real thing. This (*tat*) [similar] cognition, which [occurs] for some [objects], cognizes these [objects] as such[, as being the same]. // PV 3 161 //

Cognitions too, [even though there is a] difference [between them],⁴⁸⁸ [are a cause] for a judgement of a non-difference. So a continuity of a separation (*viśleṣa*) from what does not have that effect, but not of a single real thing, exists for real things.⁴⁸⁹ Therefore a sound complex,⁴⁹⁰ referring to this [separation, applies] to a real thing. // PV 3 162–163ab //

Even though there is no reference (*niṣṭhā*) to a distinction of a capacity of external [things], a sound complex for this [distinction] is bound to [those] reflections in conceptual cognitions [which] have a reference to that [distinction]. Therefore, because of referring to an exclusion from others, a

⁴⁸⁵For Manorathanandin’s commentary on this verse, cf. section A.4 on page 170.

⁴⁸⁶As explained in section 4.1 on page 84, Ratnakīrti’s understanding of the compound *varṇākṛtya-kṣarākāraśūnyam* differs. Cf. the translation of § 34.

⁴⁸⁷The section PV 3 163cd–173 is titled *anyāpohacintā* (“A Consideration of Other-Exclusion”) by Sāṅkṛtyāyana (cf. Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1938–1940: iv), and Miyasaka 1971–1972: 62 probably adopted this title. But it seems easier to understand the question of “continuity” (a word can repeatedly refer to similar objects) and the relation between word, its object, and the real thing starting in PV 3 163cd as following from the context of PV 3 161–163ab.

The translation presented here depends strongly on Manorathanandin’s commentary (PVV 166.16–170.26, trl. section A.4 on page 170). Tosaki 1979: 263–272 lets the section start at PV 3 163ab (but notes, as Masamichi Sakai explained to me, that it can be understood to start with PV 3 161 in Tosaki 1979: 262, fn. 141) and Dreyfus 1997: 225–232 translates and discusses PV 3 163cd–170, adding plenty of information about Tibetan interpretations of these verses.

⁴⁸⁸This interpretation follows that in Tosaki 1979: 259 f. as explained to me by Masamichi Sakai.

⁴⁸⁹Tosaki does not, as Masamichi Sakai told me, construe *vastūnām vidyate* with *anvayaḥ* as I do (and as I think PVV sees it, cf. section A.4 on page 170), but with a supplied *anyāpohaḥ*. Probably this is due to the fact that acc. to Tosaki a new section starts before PV 3 163ab.

⁴⁹⁰*śruti* could simply be a synonym for *śabda* (“word”) as indeed Tosaki 1979 understands it here. I have chosen to translate it as sound complex nevertheless, since it seems to me that Dharmakīrti might have in mind not only words, but also parts of words like suffixes etc.

sound complex was called “making an exclusion from others” [by Dig-nāga].⁴⁹¹ // [PV 3 163cd–164] //

Which reflection⁴⁹² of an object appears in a cognition [arising] because of a word, as if separate [from a cognition], that also [is] not the nature of [that] object. This error arises from impressions. // [PV 3 165] //

pp ↓ [Objection:]⁴⁹³ | If this [reflection] is designated by sound complexes, which part is understood regarding the object? And if that [part] is not understood, making a convention would be meaningless [as it] has that purpose.⁴⁹⁴ // [PV 3 166] //

up ↓ [Answer:] | To this [question:] “Which part of an object does a word express?”, exclusion from others is said [in answer]. But this form does not exist in the object. How [should a word] expressing that [form] partake of the object? // [PV 3 167] //

A continuous word’s interest (*kārya*) is in a continuous object. But this [form of awareness is] discontinuous, because of [its] non-difference from thought, and [it is] formed by the repetition of [a thing’s] observation. // [PV 3 168] //

Further, because of understanding that differentiated from others by means (*gatyā*) of a superimposition of that form, there is no contradiction if [there is] this formulation: “That object alone (*eva*)[, the form of awareness,] is the object of a word.” // [PV 3 169] //

Or, apprehensions, which are formed by words, have an erroneous appearance. And since [these apprehensions] accord to this part of an object, a sound complex [is called] performing exclusion. // [PV 3 170] //

Therefore, even at the time [of forming] a convention, exclusion from others—which has been connected with an object pointed out [that] results in one’s own cognition [of that exclusion]⁴⁹⁵—is connected⁴⁹⁶ to the sound complex. // [PV 3 171] //

⁴⁹¹Cf. PSV 5 11d, and see the corresponding passages in Pind 2009: 85, and notes and the references to TS₂. According to Pind 2009: 183 f., n. 182 this phrase is part of the last verse in the first part of Dig-nāga’s exposition of the *apoha* theory, where all alternatives are shown to be untenable, and *anyāpohakṛt* remains as the only alternative.

⁴⁹²I understand *pratibimbaka* here as a noun (equal to *pratibimba*), which is also how it is understood in Tosaki 1979. If it is taken as a *bahuvrīhi*, one could understand “as if separate and as if reflecting an object.” This has some support in the PVV, cf. section A.4 on page 171.

⁴⁹³Acc. to the interpretation in Dreyfus 1997: 228–229, this verse is Dharmakīrti’s answer to a Buddhist’s objection. I follow the interpretation in the PVV and the explicit identification of the *pūrvapakṣa* and *uttarapakṣa* in Vibhū 168, nn. 4 and 6 (cf. section A.4 on page 172 and section A.4 on page 172), according to which PV 3 166 is spoken from an opponent’s point of view. One text-immanent argument for this is that the question introducing PV 3 167 (*śabdo ’rthāṃśaṃ kam āheti*) seems to make more sense this way, since it can be understood as taking up the central concern of the objection.

⁴⁹⁴Cf. PV 1 110d, referred to in Tosaki 1979: 266, fn. 151 (cf. trl. on page 160), where Dharmakīrti says that the purpose of convention is to make exclusion known, which is understood as a part of an object (e.g., a thing’s difference from all non-red things, its difference from all non-chair things etc.).

⁴⁹⁵I.e., an object (e.g., a red apple) is pointed out to a person who is learning a convention (e.g., “red”), and this object causes that person’s own cognition of the relevant object’s exclusion from others (“is red”, or different from all non-red things).

⁴⁹⁶I would actually prefer the causative *saṃbandhyate* (is caused to be connected) found in PV_M 3 171

Because [a convention] depends on a non-observation [of a word]⁴⁹⁷ for another [thing], [and] because it depends on an observation of this [word] for some [thing], exclusion is bound to a sound complex. This [double dependency] is not possible in [the case of] a real thing. // [PV 3 172] //

Therefore class etc., [and] a connection to these, are not in an object, and a sound complex is [therefore] not bound to these, because words indeed⁴⁹⁸ are joined to differentiation from others. // [PV 3 173] //

PV 3 183ab

Words designate a commonness, and a conceptual construction has the same referent [as words]. // PV 3 183ab //

PV 3 233–235

Even if [a universal such as] whiteness etc. exists, this, [which is] such an object of the sense-faculties, is not designated by words, because of the difference of the form [appearing in] the two cognitions[, a perception and a conceptual awareness]. // PV 3 233 //

If [this is said:] | “Even though awareness [events all] have the same object, this [difference does exist], since there is a different basis [for these awareness events].”, | then cognitions (*citta*) [based on] hearing etc. have different objects. So why [is] that [the case]? // PV 3 234 //

pp ↓

up ↓

The basis of thoughts (*cetas*) is truly different [in each case]. [So] why does a completely unique real thing (*vastu*) have a nature that appears with different forms of awareness (*ākāra*)? // PV 3 235 //

PV 3 407ab

[That an object is] manifest [or] non-manifest [to awareness] can not be due to a difference such as distant, near, etc. // PV 3 407ab //

to *sambadhyate* (is connected) here. On the one hand, it is uncommon that the seventh, locative, case “*śrutau*” is construed with *sambadhyate* (which typically construes with the third, instrumental, case), but it is typical for the causative form (cf. Böthlingk and R. Roth 1868: 13–14). On the other hand, understanding a causative would mean that in setting a convention the learner is *caused* to connect a difference that an object has with a word, which reflects the situation of setting a convention as described by Dharmakīrti quite well (cf., e.g., PV 1 120–121 and PVS, trl. on page 163). But since PV 3 172 contains the same phrase without any variants, it seems more likely that *sambadhyate* is actually the correct form, and I have followed this in my translation.

⁴⁹⁷This addition follows Tosaki 1979 (explained to me by Masamichi Sakai). In a convention, a word is bound to some things, but not to others.

⁴⁹⁸Note that PVV 170.26 reads *anyavyāvṛttāṃ eva*, resulting in “because words are joined only to differentiation from others.” This is also how Tosaki 1979 understands this passage.

A.4 Material from the PVV

PVV 161.9–18 ad PV 3 147

pp ↓ [Objection:] | If universals do not exist, then how [can there be] a continuous (*anvayin*) cognition for completely differentiated particulars? | So [Dharmakīrti] said: **Also [that] continuous cognition**,⁴⁹⁹ which arises, that also (*ca*) is cognized as having that[, i.e., having] an appearance [or] form of a word (*śabda*) such as “cow” etc., and [the appearance] of a particular thing with a specific colour (*varṇa*) [and] shape (*saṁsthāna*); [but it is] not [cognized] as having an appearance of a genus (*jāti*).

pp ↓ [Objection:] | What then, is [there] no [cognition] at all having an appearance of a universal? | So [Dharmakīrti] says: For cowness is explained by the Sāmānyavādins to be empty (*śūnya*) of the form, cognized as such, of these[, i.e., of the form of] colour[, i.e.,] blue etc., shape[, i.e.,] figure, letter[, i.e.,] the word “cow.” Therefore, that which, having colour, shape, etc., appears in a continuous cognition is not a universal.

PVV 166.20–170.26 ad PV 3 161–173

PVV 166.20–167.3 ad PV 3 161

pp ↓ [Objection:] | If a universal is not differentiated from the particulars (*vyakti*),⁵⁰⁰ then how [can] an apprehension [be] continuous (*anugāmin*) [for various particulars]? | So [Dharmakīrti] said: Some **objects, even though there is a difference** between them, are **the cause for a similar, continuous, cognition**[, i.e., a cognition] that has the differentiation from that not having that effect as its object, **only due to their nature [of being] a real thing**[, i.e.,] only due to [their] basic nature (*prakṛti*).

A cognition, which accords to some objects, **cognizes these**, i.e., the objects which are without differences, **as such**, as being the same. But there is no cognition as such in virtue of a single universal.⁵⁰¹

PVV 167.4–167.13 ad PV 3 162–163ab

pp ↓ [Objection:] | May it be that also cognitions are differentiated according to [each] particular. How [then can] a cognition [be] continuous [with regard to these particulars]? up ↓ | So [Dharmakīrti] said:

Cognitions too, [even though there is] **a difference** between them, are, **in the same way**[, i.e.,] like the objects, due to their nature [of being] a real thing,⁵⁰² **a cause for a judgement of a non-difference**. Therefore, cognitions also are called continuous apprehensions due to having as their object the same judgement of this [difference]. **So**, i.e., in this way, **a continuity of a separation**[, i.e.,] of a distinction of an object from that not having that effect amongst the different things exists. **But a continuity of a single real thing**[, i.e.,] of a universal [does not exist for real things],⁵⁰³ [i.e.,] for individuals

⁴⁹⁹Note that PVV (as well as PVV_{ms} 31a5) reads *yad apy* (“Also which”) instead of the *yady apy* (“Even if”) accepted in PV 3 147.

⁵⁰⁰Which would result in there being as many universals as there are particulars.

⁵⁰¹Emend *sāmānyam balāt* in PVV 167.3 to *sāmānyabalāt* acc. to PVV_{ms} 32a7, as suggested by Sāṅkṛtyāyana.

⁵⁰²Read *vastudharmatayā* acc. PVV_{ms} 32a7 against *vastudharmitayā* acc. to PVV 167.7.

⁵⁰³Vibhū 167, n. 1 glosses “for real things” as: “Amongst the real things.”

(*viśeṣa*), because that [universal] is refuted by non-perception[, a valid means of cognition]. **Therefore a sound complex, referring to this**[, i.e.,] which has [that] distinction as its object, applies **to a real thing**.

PVV 167.16–168.3 ad PV 3 163cd–164

PVV 167.16–20 [Objection:] | Now, the differentiation from [that having] a different pp ↓ (*atat*) effect is the own nature of real things. Therefore, given that the object [of a word] is distinction, only the real thing would be the object of a word.⁵⁰⁴ | So [Dharmakīrti] up ↓ said:⁵⁰⁵ **a distinction of the capacity**, such as not having that effect etc., **of an external** real thing; **a reference to this**[, i.e.,] the state of having [that] as an object; **even though that does not exist, a sound complex for this**[, i.e.,] a sound complex designating this distinction,⁵⁰⁶ **is bound** at the time a convention⁵⁰⁷ [is made] **to the reflections of conceptual cognitions**⁵⁰⁸[, i.e.,] to forms of awareness, **which have a reference to these**[, i.e.,] which have a constancy (*vyavasthiti*) for everyday activity concerning those [things] due to the fact that a classification (*vyavasthā*) [of these things] has an object since the differentiation of these [things from that not having that effect] is real.

Therefore, because reflections of conceptual cognitions are the object of everyday activity due to being of the nature of the external [thing]⁵⁰⁹ which is differentiated[, that is to say,] **because of referring to an exclusion from others**[, i.e.,] because of [this] cause, **a sound complex was called “making an exclusion from others.”** [I.e.,] because of the generation of a conceptual cognition through a form that is differentiated from others, and because of the application⁵¹⁰ to those [real things] differentiated from others, a sound complex is called “making an exclusion from others.”

PVV 168.4–10 ad PV 3 165

[PVV 168.4] [Someone objects]: | Now, that to be grasped in a verbal cognition is pp ↓ recognized only as an external [thing], not as being the image in cognition. | So [Dharmakīrti] up ↓ said: **What appears in a cognition arising because of a word as reflecting an object** [and] **as if separate**[, i.e.,] as if differentiated [and] external, **that also [is] not the nature of [that] object**[, i.e.,] does not have the own form of an externally [existing] object; rather, **this error arises from impressions**.⁵¹¹

Like the mistake of [thinking] “external [thing]” with regard to the hair etc. that is seen by someone [suffering from] *timira*, so [there is] even for the form of concep-

⁵⁰⁴Vibhū 167, n. 2: This [objection] is considered contradictory with this statement: A word does not touch a real thing.

⁵⁰⁵The verses of the PV printed in Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1938–1940 are not actually part of the PVV, cf. Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1938–1940: iv. For their translation, cf. section A.3 on page 167.

⁵⁰⁶Vibhū 167, n. 3: *katham iti na vṛttena sambandhanīyaḥ* [This statement] is not to be connected with the mentioned [word] “how.” (I.e., this is not an answer anymore to the question raised in PVV 167.4.)

⁵⁰⁷Vibhū 167, n. 4: Due to the mistake of [thinking] that a particular and an object of conceptual cognition are one.

⁵⁰⁸I take the sixth, genitive, case as possessive here, i.e., reflections of external things that a conceptual cognition has.

⁵⁰⁹Vibhū 168, n. 1: Because of referring to the distinction of a real thing.

⁵¹⁰Vibhū 168, n. 2: Because of identifying a visible [thing] and a concept.

⁵¹¹Vibhū 168, n. 3: The reason [being] the impression [left by] the experience of particulars.

tual cognition everyday activity [taking that form as] an external [thing] in virtue of ignorance. That (*iti*) [is] the meaning.

PVV 168.11–16 ad PV 3 166

pp ↓ PVV 168.11–16 | Then the form of cognition,⁵¹² which is a real thing, would be what is to be denoted. [So, explaining the objection,] [Dharmakīrti] said [as follows:]⁵¹³

If this form of a cognition is designated by sound complexes, which part is understood regarding the object, which is differentiated from that not having that effect [and] not named by a word? None at all. **And if that**[, i.e.,] an object that is excluded from that which does not have that effect⁵¹⁴ **is not understood**, truly **making a convention would be meaningless** because⁵¹⁵ this [making of a convention] is assumed **as having that purpose**[, i.e.,] as having a cognition of an object differentiated from that not having that [same] effect as a result.

PVV 168.17–24 ad PV 3 167

Then in that way, if a convention is made, even with regard to the exclusion from others, there would be no activity towards the referents, because this [exclusion from others] lacks the nature of a referent.⁵¹⁶

up ↓ | [Answer:] **To this question: “Which part of an object does a word express?”, exclusion from others**[, i.e.,] a differentiation from that not having that effect, which is possible for all distinctions, **is said**[, or declared] as that which is to be designated. Therefore a person who has grasped a convention with regard to other-exclusion, which has the nature of [being] a part of an object, acts towards that [object], having recognized the object because of an uttered word.⁵¹⁷ This is correct. **But**⁵¹⁸ which form of awareness is to be grasped,⁵¹⁹ **that is not in the object. How** should a word, **expressing that** form of awareness, **partake of the object**[, i.e.,] be qualified by expressing the external object?

⁵¹²Vibhū 168, n. 4: The verse introduced (*sāvatāra*) [here] is an objection.

⁵¹³According to Śākyabuddhi, this is the objection of a Buddhist, PVṬ^t 191b4–6: *de ñid kyi phyis bstan par bžed nas, de lta na yañ don gyi rnam pa ’dzin pa žes bya ba la sogs pas re žig rañ gi sde pa la brgal žiñ brtags pa byed pa yin te, gañ dag rnam par rtog pa la snañ ba’i ñañ tshul can gyi rnam pa dños su sgra’i brjod par bya ba yin no žes de ltar žugs pa’o. don gyi rnam pa žes ’dzin pa ni don gyi rnam pa ’dzin pa ste, rnam par rtog pa’i rnam par šes pa la snañ ba’i gzugs brñan no. don gyi žes bya ba ni phyi rol gyi rañ gi mtshan ñid kyi’o. gañ gi tshe de las gžan pa las ldog pa žes bya ba ni dños po la gnas pa’i gžan sel ba’i rañ gi mtshan ñid kyi bdag ñid can no.* Acc. to Dreyfus 1997: 228 f., and n. 36 on p. 515, also Go rams pa understands this as an objection by a Buddhist.

⁵¹⁴Perhaps °*ścittadakārya*°, appearing in both PVV_{ms} 32b3 and PVV 168.15, should be emended to °*ścitatadkārya*°. The meaning I take to be the same in both cases.

⁵¹⁵Vibhū 168, n. 5: [Asked] “Why?” he says.

⁵¹⁶Vibhū 168, n. 6: To this the Siddhantīn says.

⁵¹⁷Read *śabdād uccarītād arthaṃ pratītya* (PVV_{ms} 32b4) against *śabdād uccarītārthaṃ pratītya* (PVV 168.22).

⁵¹⁸Read *yas tu grāhyākāraḥ* acc. to PVV_{ms} 32b4 against *yas tatrākṣarākāraḥ* PVV 169.23.

⁵¹⁹Vibhū 168, n. 7: What was attained (*āyāta*) by the repetition of observing an external blue [thing] etc. is to be known.

PVV 169.1–6 ad PV 3 168

PVV 169.1 Moreover: **A continuous word's interest**⁵²⁰ [is] **in a continuous object**, [i.e., a word's] purpose has the character of a cognition [of the same object] at the time of everyday activity. **But this** form of awareness **is formed** from impressions **through the repetition of observing** particulars, [and is] **not continuous**,⁵²¹ **because of [its] non-difference from thought** which is [itself] not continuous.

PVV 169.7–14 ad PV 3 169

[PVV 169.7] | Now, if the [real] object is not the word's object, then how can other- pp ↓
exclusion, even though it is of the nature of a part of that [object], [be] what is to be
designated? | So [Dharmakīrti] said: **By means of a superimposition of that form**, up ↓
[i.e.,] of the exclusion which is a part of the object, onto the form of awareness,⁵²² [that
is,] through a determination [of exclusion and form of awareness] as being one, the
object,⁵²³ differentiated from another, is understood; because [of this understanding,]
exclusion, which is a part of the object of a word,⁵²⁴ is called word object. But an
object is not understood from a word because of a universal. If, however, because
of cognizing a form of awareness as being the differentiated object, this very form of
awareness is metaphorically called “word referent” by someone proclaiming that the
form of awareness is the word referent (*buddhyākāraśabdārthavādin*),⁵²⁵ then, **if there
is such a formulation, there is no contradiction** at all, because there is no assumption
by [Dharmakīrti] that a form of awareness, which is not qualified by continuity, is the
word referent.

PVV 169.17–170.3 ad PV 3 170

[PVV 169.16] **Or, these erroneously appearing apprehensions that are formed by words.** For [it is] so: first of all a [real] object is not the object of an awareness [that is] due to a word, because the own form of this [object] does not appear [in that awareness], and because for this [object] there is no convention of words. Neither [is] the form of awareness [the object of a word], even though there is a cognition of this [form], because [this form] is not determined as being the object, because it is a particular, and because

⁵²⁰Vibhū 169, n. 1 glosses *śabda* as: “Cow, cow.” Probably the point is that the word “cow” can be used twice with the same meaning, and is so continuous.

⁵²¹Vibhū 169, n. 2: *yatra buddhau bhāsate tato 'bhinnah jñānavat*. (From that awareness, in which something appears, [the form] is not different, like cognition.) The construction of this short phrase is not quite clear to me.

⁵²²Vibhū 169, n. 3: *vināropaṃ vyavahārābhāvāt yathā saṃgatis tasya tathāha* (Tentatively: Because there is no everyday activity without imposition, [Dharmakīrti] spoke so as if it is applicable to this [form of awareness].)

⁵²³Vibhū 169, n. 4: “a particular [...is understood].”

⁵²⁴Perhaps *śabdārthāṃśāpohaḥ* should be emended. One possibility is an emendation to *śabdārthānyāpohaḥ* (“...other-exclusion, which is the word object...”). This is, as Masamichi Sakai informs me, also how Tosaki 1979–1985 1: 269, fn. 160 translates this passage, albeit without making an emendation in the text.

⁵²⁵A similar position is shown to be different from that of an exclusion theorist in TSP₂ 352.5 ff. (cf. section B.5 on page 183), where PV 3 169 is also quoted. Manorathanandin is here saying that Dharmakīrti's explanation is not contradictory to the position that the word referent is the form of awareness, but qualifies that position as metaphorical usage. This qualification is not made in the TSP.

there is no convention [with regard to it]. For the form of awareness is not external, nor is an external [thing] a form of awareness, due to which an appearance as “like”⁵²⁶ would be a true appearance. In reality, therefore, verbal apprehensions have no appearance of a real thing.

pp ↓ [Objection:] | In this case then, how is a sound complex called performing an ex-
up ↓ clusion [that is] a part of the referent?⁵²⁷ | So **Dharmakīrti** said: Words, even though they do not have an appearance of that [object], **accord to this**, exclusion from others, [that is to say,] **a part of the referent**, [meaning they] cause a classification as being the object of activity (*vr̥tti*), because [they] are indirectly connected with it due to being arrived at by an observation of an [external] object.⁵²⁸ **And so [articulate] sound [is called] performing exclusion.**⁵²⁹

PVV 170.5–12 ad PV 3 171

For the [reason] that, due to a word, [there is] a cognition of that separated from another [thing] at the time of everyday activity, **therefore also at the time [of forming] a convention is the exclusion from others, connected to the sound complex** as that to be designated, [but] nothing else.

pp ↓ [Objection:] | Now, a convention is made pointing out an object. So how [can it be]
up ↓ called exclusion? | So [Dharmakīrti] said:

Connected with an object that was pointed out[, i.e.,] [an object] that is excluded from others, [and] whose **result**[, i.e.,] purpose, is **a cognition of [one’s] own** at the time of everyday activity—[connected with such an object, i.e.,] brought near to identity [with that object] because of a determination of non-difference [between the two object’s exclusions], **other-exclusion**, having the nature (*svabhāva*) of a form of awareness, is connected to a sound complex, [but] the [external] object itself (*eva*) [is not connected to a sound complex].

PVV 170.13–21 ad PV 3 172

For [it is] so:⁵³⁰ **Because** convention **depends** on [a word] not being observed **for another** [thing, i.e.,] for a non-tree that is to be distinguished [from tree, and] **because [it] depends on an observation of this** [word] **for some** [thing, i.e.,] for one instance (*eka-deśa*) of a tree that is not to be distinguished, **exclusion is bound to a sound complex**. This is ascertained.

In [the case of] **a real thing**[, i.e.,] for an object of convention [such as] a universal etc., [this] dependence on the observation and non-observation of that to be distinguished and that not to be distinguished **is not possible**.⁵³¹ If a real thing is to be cognized in an affirmative way, what use is the dependence on the non-observation in

⁵²⁶I.e., either the external thing would be like the form of awareness, or vice versa.

⁵²⁷Vibhū 169, n. 5: *aniṣṭaṃ parityajya iṣṭe pravartanāt śabdāḥ*. (Words [perform exclusion], because of activity towards that which is desired avoiding that which is not desired.)

⁵²⁸Read *paramparayā* acc. to PVV_{ms} 32b7 against *parasparaṃ yā* in PVV 170.2.

⁵²⁹Vibhū 170, n. 1: “Dignāga [said]: Not to these, [but] to the object should they apply.” I was not able to find out where Dignāga said this.

⁵³⁰Vibhū 170, n. 2: [Manorathanandin] states the error in the case of the application of a word caused by a commonness [existing] in an affirmative way[, i.e., in the case of a real commonness].

⁵³¹Vibhū 170, n. 3: “For it is so: in the case of a commonness[, which is a real thing].” (Introducing the following argument.)

some other place? But it depends [on this observation]. Therefore, only a distinction from others is to be cognized. This is understood. If [someone says] that | distinction pp ↓ from others depends on [such things as] commonness etc., which have the aim of an apprehension by avoiding a dissimilar instance,⁵³² | then [we say] enough with [this] up ↓ commonness. Because only by the distinction from others is everyday activity fully achieved.

PVV 170.22–26 ad PV 3 173

And for the [reason that] qualifiers such as genus, quality, movement, etc. do not appear in a cognition grasping a real thing, **therefore genus etc., and a connection to these⁵³³ are not in the object.**⁵³⁴ And, therefore, a sound complex is not bound to these, because words are joined only to a differentiation from others that is established by cognition.

PVV 189.14–190.9 ad PV 3 233–235

Or may it be that a universal truly is a real entity, nevertheless, this is not an object of words and concepts. So [Dharmakīrti] said: **Even if whiteness etc., i.e., a universal, is, in a property bearer such as a garment etc., this object of the sense faculties,** which has a clear form of whiteness etc., [nevertheless] **this** [i.e.,] an object that is the object of a cognition of the sense-faculties, **is not named by words, because there is a difference** [between the two objects] due to the clarity or vagueness of the **form**, i.e., the form of awareness, **of these two cognitions**, which are generated by the sense faculties [and] words.

If [this is said]: **“Even though awareness events,** which are generated by sense faculties and words, **have the same object** [i.e., even though] they have the same object,⁵³⁵ [there is] **this**, a difference of the forms of awareness which has the nature of the difference of their cause [i.e.,] **since there is a different basis** [for these awareness events.]” | **Then** [i.e.,] in such a situation, this is explained: **cognitions** [based on] sense faculties up ↓ such as **hearing etc. have different objects** [i.e.,] have different objects such as sound (*śabda*), shape, smell etc. **Why is that** [i.e.,] from [which] means of valid cognition is this ascertained?

Also, what is not contrived [in this result of your thesis]: “These cognitions, even though there is no different object for them, have different forms of awareness because of the difference of the sense faculties that are their basis.”?

Moreover, **the basis of cognitions** of universals etc. [i.e., their] cause **is truly different** [i.e.,] a sense faculty and a word,. Nevertheless, **why does a completely unique real thing**, like a universal etc., **have a nature that appears with different forms of awareness** [i.e.,] appears as clear and unclear [or, have] a clear and unclear appearance. For a single [form], appearing with its own form, [and] having a differentiated appearance is not coherent.

⁵³²Vibhū 170, n. 4: Grasping an object that is filled with constructions.

⁵³³Vibhū: “Connection (*sambandha*).” He is giving a synonym for *yoga*, which I have also translated as connection here.

⁵³⁴Vibhū 170, n. 6: In the object of sense-faculties.

⁵³⁵Manorathanandin glosses *artha* with *viśaya*, both of which have to be translated as “object” here.

Appendix B

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla on *apoha*

B.1 TS₂ 2.5–6

[TS₂ 5–6] This *Tattvasaṃgraha* is composed having bowed to the omniscient one, who, [being] the best of the teachers [and] not hanging on to an autonomous teaching,⁵³⁶ taught, due to a wish for what is beneficial for the world—he had great compassion which had become his nature during a large number of time-periods—dependant arisal, which ...⁵³⁷

[TS₂ 2] is devoid of additional attributes such as quality, substance, activity, genus, inherence etc., [and in which] the object of a [conceptual] cognition and a word [has the nature of] a superimposed form.

TSP₂ ad TS₂ 2

[TSP₂ 14.15] | Now, substance, quality, movement etc. are real things. Why is it not pp ↓ [the case] [that] they [arise in dependence on other factors]?⁵³⁸

| To this [objection Śāntarakṣita] said “**quality**” etc. “Qualities, substances, movements, genus, as well as inherence”, that is a copulative compositum. Through the word “genus” the (*api*) twofold universal, the primary (*para*) and secondary (*apara*) [one], is included.⁵³⁹ By the word “etc.” there is an inclusion of those properties of the specific characteristics occurring in the lowest substances which, separate from a property bearer, are described by some [as] beginning in such a way as “For all six categories, is-ness (*astitva*) is the state of being an object of a valid means of cognition that grasps [the property] ‘existing’.”⁵⁴⁰ [These are] both qualities etc. and additional attributes[, which are the] qualifiers [of qualities, substances, etc.]. This is a modifier compound

⁵³⁶I.e., vedic teachings: TSP₂ 18.20–21: *svatantrā śrutih* = *svataḥ pramāṇabhūto vedaḥ, nityam vacanam iti yāvat*. (An autonomous teaching, [meaning] the Veda, which is a means of valid cognition by itself, which is to say, [it is] an eternal statement.)

⁵³⁷TS₂ 1–4 are to be construed with TS₂ 6ab (cf. TSP₂ 13.13–14). A full translation of these verses, along with a general appreciation for their role in the TS, can be found in McClintock 2010: 96 ff. Cf. also the translation in Jhā 1937: 1 ff.

⁵³⁸Cf. TSP₂ 14.13–14: *sa punar ayaṃ pratītyasamutpādaḥ skandhadhātuvāyatanānām draṣṭavyaḥ, teṣāṃ eva pratītyasamutpannatvāt*. (Moreover, this very dependent arisal is to be observed for the aggregates, the elements, and the sense spheres, because only these have arisen in dependence.)

⁵³⁹Cf. Halbfass 1992: 117.

⁵⁴⁰Cf. the comments on *astitva* in Halbfass 1992: 144 f., and 156 ff.

(*viśeṣaṇasamāsa*). **Empty** means void of these. With regard to this, this was said by the Lord: “Everything everything, o Brahmin, [that means] just as far as the five aggregates (*skandha*), the twelve sense spheres (*āyatana*), the 18 elements (*dhātus*) [go]!”⁵⁴¹ And this is a hint at the investigation of the six categories.⁵⁴²

pp ↓ [TSP₂ 14.23] | Now, if there are no additional attributes, then how can dependent arisal be made an object through both words and concepts? And what is not made an object through these can not be denoted, nor is there [any] usage of word and concept without an additional attribute. [So] how did the Bhagavat teach this [dependant arisal to people]?

up ↓ | [In answer Śāntarakṣita] said: **Superimposed form** etc. Superimposed, [meaning] imposed as being external; form, [meaning] nature; the object of words and cognition which [has] that [nature], that is so called[, i.e., *āropitākāraśabdapratyayagocaraḥ*]. In which dependant arisal [there is this] **object** (*gocara*)[, i.e.,] the object (*viṣaya*) of **word and cognition** which has a superimposed form, that is so called[, i.e., *āropitā...gocaraḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ*]. The word **cognition**, because of its close connection with the word “**word**” [in the compound *śabdapratyaya*] is to be understood as [meaning] the particular cognition “concept,” which has the nature of an internal expression (*āviṣṭā-bhilāpa*), because both [word and conceptual cognition] go together [in the compound] since they don’t deviate with regard to having the same object. By this the [following] is said: Even if additional attributes do not exist, still that conceptual cognition [which is] attained (*ā-√i*) by means of the observation of real things differentiated from each other, [which is] determined as being of an external form, has the nature of a reflection,⁵⁴³ [and] is the referent of a word, [that conceptual cognition] exists here [in dependent arisal]. For this is not really the object of words because here [in dependent arisal] all conceptual cognitions have passed. Rather, exactly as a word referent is established for people due to beauty (*ramaṇīyatā*) that is not [further] considered, so also the Bhagavats, aiming at the reality which is disregarded [by them during teaching], explain [that dependent arisal] by closing their eyes like an elephant [and so] veiling [their] insight into it,⁵⁴⁴ for the introduction [of people] into the highest truth, because there is no other way [to do this]. Even though being a superimposed form, the word referent is, because of an indirect connection with the real thing, truly a reason for the attainment of this [real thing]. Therefore, in this manner the real thing becomes taught indeed, because of their[, the word referents’,] ability [to lead to that real thing]. Thus deception (*vipralambha*) is not possible. With regard to this the Protector said:

For whichever thing is denoted by some name, that [name] does not exist in that [thing] at all. For that is the nature of things.⁵⁴⁵

⁵⁴¹This means everything that exists is contained in these factors.

⁵⁴²These, as Jhā 1937: 18 points out, are the topics of the 10th–15th chapter, TS₂ *Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā-Samavāyapadārthaparīkṣā*.

⁵⁴³Emend to *pratibimbātmakam* against *pratibandhātmakam* found in TSP_p 6a1, TSP₁ 12.6, TSP₂ 15.6–7 . Cf. *rnam par rtog pa’i gzugs brñan gyi bdag ñid* TSP^D 143a3 (= TSP^P 172b6), as well as the formulation *pratibimbātmako ’pohaḥ* in TS₂ 1027.

⁵⁴⁴Cf. Kyuma 2005: 80 f., fn. 101 for the background of this metaphor, and see also Dunne 2004: 410.

⁵⁴⁵Cf. Hoornaert 2002: 125 f. and Eckel 2008: 276 f. for other translations and pointers to other occurrences of this verse. It is quoted again in TSP₂ 339.22–23 ad TS₂ 869, which reads:

yasya yasya hi śabdasya yo yo viṣaya ucyate | sa sa saṃghaṭate naiva vastūnām sā hi dharmatā ||

And this is a hint at the [16th chapter, the] *Śabdārthaparīkṣa*.

B.2 TS₂ 573–574

[TS₂ 573–574] | These property bearers[, i.e., the categories,] were proclaimed to be six. The properties are indeed assumed to be distinct from them. | If that [is said], what is this relation of this [property] with these [property bearers] that is assumed? Connection (*saṃyoga*) is not correct,⁵⁴⁶ because it is limited to substances, and there is no other inherence, and another relation is not accepted by the others. pp ↓
up ↓

TSP₂ ad TS₂ 573–574

[TSP₂ 239.24] | There is no [such] error, because that is accepted.⁵⁴⁷ | If so, how [can it be that] “six categories” are taught? Therefore [Śāntarakṣita] formulated [a *pūrvapakṣa* starting with] “**These are six.**” Only those things that are of the nature of a property bearer are taught as “six categories”, but those [things] that are of the nature of properties are assumed to be different [from] the six categories.⁵⁴⁸ For a passage in the *Padārthapraveśaka* states: “In such a way, this explanation of the property bearers was given without the properties.”⁵⁴⁹ “**What is this**” etc. was said in answer. [Relation] “**of this**” [means] “of a property such as is-ness and so on,”⁵⁵⁰ “**with these**”[, i.e.,] with the six categories. What is the relation on account of which this is a property of those [six categories]? For without a relation, being property and property bearer is not possible, because of the overreaching consequence. For in such a way there would be every property for every [property bearer]; for there is no relation at all with these [property bearers]. For it is so: [this] relation is[, according to Vaiśeṣika authors,] twofold, characterised as connection, and characterised as inherence. Of these, to begin with, there is no [relation] characterised as connection, because this [connection] is restricted to substances alone since it is a quality.⁵⁵¹ Neither is there [a relation] characterised as inherence, because that [inherence] is assumed as singular, like being.⁵⁵² And, if pp ↓
up ↓

⁵⁴⁶Read *yukto* acc. to TSP₁ 12a1 instead of *yuktā*. This is also how *yuktā* is emended in Frauwallner’s copy of Krishnamacharya 1926, and by Hishida 1971: 13.

⁵⁴⁷The opponent has just explained (TS₂ 572a–c) that the is-ness (*astitva*) of the six categories is the reality in the case of an object of a valid means of cognition that lets a person cognise “existing” about a thing. (For some remarks on *astitva*, cf. Halbfass 1992: 143 ff.) Śāntarakṣita’s reply was that this forces the opponent to assume a seventh category in addition to the standard six. The opponent counters here that he accepts that there are *dharma*s separate from the six categories.

⁵⁴⁸In Frauwallner’s copy, the text is emended to *ṣaṭpadārthavyatirikṭā* instead of the printed *ṣaṭpadārthā vyatirikṭā* (in both TSP₁ and TSP₂, as well as TSP_P 61a10). This emendation (or one to *ṣaṭpadārthabhya vyatirikṭā*, as in Hishida 1971: 13, n. 66) is also supported by TSP^D Ze 262b6 (=TSP^P He 323b5): *tsig gi don drug las ma gtogs pa ’dod pa kho na’o*.

⁵⁴⁹This seems to refer to PDhS 15.20: “*evaṃ dharmair vinā dharminām uddeśaḥ kṛtaḥ*.” Cf. Chemparathy 1970 and the notes to Potter 1977: 282 for more information on this text and its author. The import of *uddeśa* in this passage is discussed in Halbfass 1992: 78 f., 96 ff.

⁵⁵⁰Is-ness, denotability, and cognizability are the three characteristics common to all categories. Cf. PDhS 16: *ṣaṇṇām api padārthānām astitvābhidheyatvajñeyatvāni ||*. See Halbfass 1992: 158 ff. for a discussion of this sentence, and Halbfass 1970: 143 f. for how it applies to universals.

⁵⁵¹Cf. the explanations in Halbfass 1970: 122 f.

⁵⁵²Cf. PDhS 16.18: “*dravyādīnām pañcānām samavāyitvam anekatvaṃ ca*.”

there were a relation of the type inherence with inherence, a second inherence would be endorsed.⁵⁵³

B.3 TS₂ 738

[TS₂ 738] For a recurring cognition has an appearance of words and particulars. But a genus is declared [to be] free of colour, shape, and the form of letters.

TSP₂ ad TS₂ 738

[TSP₂ 300.23] Showing also that the thesis is defeated by an inference, [Śāntarakṣita] said: “**Recurring**” etc. [With this] the following is said:⁵⁵⁴ You wish to prove that repeated apprehensions have a cause different from the individual things etc., which is really the basis [for these cognitions]. And this is wrong, because that [cause] does not appear, and because colour, shape, etc., [all] different from this [cause], do appear. For it is so: A universal such as cowness etc. is declared by you to be completely empty of colour, shape, and the forms of letters, but a cognition that conforms to the appearance of colour etc. is experienced. So how should the basis of this [cognition] be empty of colour etc.? For there can not be one (*anya*) basis for a cognition having another (*anya*) form, because of an unwanted consequence [that goes] too far. A [formal] proof: that cognition, which has an appearance of an object different from some [other object], never grasps that [other object], as a cognition through a word does not grasp the shape [of a thing]. And a recurring cognition has an appearance of colour etc., [all of] which are different from a genus. This [is] due to apprehending that opposed to the pervader.⁵⁵⁵ [The phrase] “**it has an appearance of words and particulars**” [is analyzed:] Word is the denomination “a cow” etc., particular is what has the nature of colour, shape, etc.; this appearance of these two belongs to [cognition], so: “it has [that appearance].” **Letters** are such as the letter c, the letter o, the letter w, etc.⁵⁵⁶

⁵⁵³Incidentally, the explanation of ŚV Ps 148 given in Taber 2005: 109 is remarkably close to this passage. Since he thinks it is “...better, rather, for the translator to provide his or her own commentary, after thoroughly studying and digesting the available classical ones ...” (Taber 2005: xiii), these arguments might actually be related.

⁵⁵⁴This is a paraphrase of the thesis of Bhāvivikta’s inference, given in TS₂ 715ab. This thesis is, as formulated in TSP₂ 294.24–295.9: *tatra bhāviviktaḥ prāha—gavāśvamahiṣavarāhamātāṅgādiṣu gavādyabhidhānaprajñānaviśeṣāḥ samayākṛtipiṇḍādivyatiriktasvarūpānurūpasamsarginimittāntara-nibandhanā ity avaghoṣaṇā*. (To this Bhāvivikta said: In the case of cow, horse, buffalo, boar, elephant, etc., the particular cognitions and names such as cow etc. depend on another cause mixed together with [and] according to the own nature [of these things, but] separated from convention, shape, material body, etc.—This is the declaration [of what Bhāvivikta wants to prove].) After giving a slightly different second interpretation of the phrase *samayā*°...°*nibandhanā*, TSP₂ 295.19 clarifies: *avaghoṣaṇeti pratijñā* (Declaration means thesis.). For Bhāvivikta, cf. Potter 1977: 281.

⁵⁵⁵For Bhāvivikta, the pervader, which is what he wanted to prove, was the fact that there must be a cause other than the perceptible qualities of a thing due to which there is the same cognition about different things of the same class, and that this can only be a genus (cf. TSP₂ 295.12–13: *yāni ca tāni nimittāntarāṇi tāni gotvādīnīti siddham*. (And those which are these other causes are cowness etc. That is established.)). The *vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi* here consists in showing that in these cognitions something that is not a genus appears, and that, since cognitions can only be based on what appears in them, they can therefore not be caused (or have their basis in) a genus.

⁵⁵⁶Literally: “The letter ga, the letter au, and the visarga”, these spell the word *gauḥ*, cow.

B.4 TS₂ 870

[TS₂ 870] For⁵⁵⁷ particular, class, the connection to this [class], that having a class, as [also] a form of awareness do not really assemble⁵⁵⁸ where the word referent [is].

TSP₂ ad TS₂ 870

[TSP₂ 340.4] If [it is asked:] | Now, which means of valid cognition [is there] for the fact that a verbal cognition⁵⁵⁹ [is] both erroneous and without object? | We have stated the means of valid cognition for this, which is [as follows] (*yad ...iti*): Each and every verbal cognition is erroneous because it occurs by means of a determination of non-difference for different [things].⁵⁶⁰ pp ↓
up ↓

For [it is] so: Which cognition is “this” with regard to what is not this, that [cognition] is erroneous, like the cognition of water where there is a mirage. And this verbal cognition, which determines non-difference with regard to different referents, is so. This [is a reasoning based on] the reason of [a thing’s] own nature. And neither does this [verbal cognition] have a graspable commonness that has the nature of a real thing, due to which the reason would not be established; for this [commonness] has earlier been refuted at length.⁵⁶¹ Or may a commonness [really] exist, still, given that this [commonness] is an object different from the differences[, i.e., the different things], the determination of non-difference with regard to differentiated [things] would be only erroneous. For some things similar to something else, [and so] connected to it, would not be called having that [other thing, i.e., a commonness]. [Alternatively,] even if [you were to say that] a commonness is not an object different [from the particulars], [then] the entire universe (*viśva*) would in reality be only one (*eka*) real thing; so the cognition of a commonness in this is entirely erroneous. For the cognition of a commonness does

⁵⁵⁷This verse gives the reason for the preceding verse, where it was claimed that whatever a word refers to is not a real thing (cf. fn. 545 on page 178).

⁵⁵⁸Literally the phrase *ghaṭām āñcati* means “it enters a group/collection”. It is translated as *sgra don du | de kho na nyid du mi ’thad |* (“...is not really correct as the word referent.”) in TS^D Ze 33a2 (=TS^P He 40b6). I understand it to mean that the particular etc. do not belong to what is rightly categorized as the word referent.

⁵⁵⁹For the reading *śābdapratyayaśya* see also Ishida 2008: 4.

⁵⁶⁰Cf., e.g., TSP₂ 338.10–13:

apohavādināṃ tu na paramārthataḥ śabdānāṃ kiñcid vācyaṃ vastusvarūpam asti. sarva eva hi śabdaḥ pratyayo bhrāntaḥ, bhinneṣv artheṣv abhedākārādhyavasāyena pravṛtteḥ. yatra tu pāramparyeṇa vastupratibandhaḥ, tatrārthasamvādo bhrāntatve ’pīti darśanam.

But for those proclaiming exclusion [as the referent of words] the view [is this]: “For words there is in reality nothing denotable at all that has the nature of a real thing. For every verbal apprehension is erroneous, because [it] applies to different referents due to the determination of a non-different form. But for which [conceptual cognition] there indirectly is a connection to a real thing, for that there is concurrence with the referent, even though [the cognition] is erroneous.”

I follow the emendation in Ishida 2008: 1 to *tatrārthasamvādo*, against *tatrārthāsamvādo* in both TSP₁ and TSP₂.

⁵⁶¹As Śāstrī (1968: 340, n. 2), points out, this was the general topic of chapter 13, the *Sāmānya(padārtha)parīkṣā*, of the TS.

not have the same real thing as an object, because this [cognition] requires the grasping of a difference. And if [this cognition's] erroneousess is established, [its] objectlessness is also established; for[, in the case of a wrong cognition,] there is no referent at all which fullfills the criteria of a basis [for cognition], in that [it is] productive [of the cognition] through a projection of its form [into cognition].

[TSP₂ 340.15] Or else: in another way the objectlessness [of a conceptual cognition] is proven. For only with regard to which referent sounds are agreed upon, that alone is consistent as their referent, [and] nothing else, because of an overreaching consequence. And an agreement of these for any real thing can not exist in reality. Therefore sounds [producing] a cognition are without objects. A [formal] proof: Whichever [sounds] do not, in reality (*bhāvatas*), become agreed upon with regard to something, those do not truly denote that, like the word horse is not agreed upon with regard to a material entity having a dewlap etc.[, i.e., a cow]. And in reality no sounds at all become agreed upon with regard to any real thing. This is because of a non-observation of the pervading element.⁵⁶² Because [a word] denotes is pervaded by the fact that [it has] an agreed upon convention; and this [pervading element] does not exist here[, i.e., words are not agreed upon for real things].⁵⁶³

And, making it clear that this reason is not unestablished etc.[, i.e., that a word does not denote any real thing], [Śāntarakṣita] said “**for**” etc. [in TS₂ 870].

For it is so:⁵⁶⁴ [insofar as] a real thing, which an agreement is grasped for, is defined as being the word referent, [insofar it is] the **particular** that is sometimes defined [as word referent], or the **class**, or the **connection with it**—with it[, meaning] with the class, **connection**[, meaning] relation—or the thing⁵⁶⁵ **having a class**, or the **form of awareness**. These are the alternatives. For none of these is it consistent that [it] is the referent of a word, because a convention is impossible [for them]. By [saying] **really**, [he] shows that a conventional referent of words is not negated. Because of this there is no inconsistency (*vyāghāta*) in [his] own words. For otherwise [if he hadn't added “really”] there would be a contradiction of the thesis to [his] own words. For it is so: without conveying these, particular etc., through a word it is not possible to convey their not being the referent of a word etc. And [someone] showing these, a particular etc., with words, wishing to convey this [that they are not the word referents] would admit

⁵⁶²Consider also the emendation of *vyāpakānupalabdheḥ* to *vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ* in Ishida 2008: 5. But *iti vyāpakānupalabdheḥ* does occur a few times (e.g., TSP₂ 119.13; 137.8–9; 198.12), although not as frequently as *iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ*. So it could be that it is a usage particular to Kamalaśīla. Also, the next sentence's construction is not straightforward, looking more like a gloss on *vyāpakānupalabdheḥ* than an additional statement. The Tibetan is not much clearer: ...*mi dmigs pa ste. brda byas pa ñid rjod par byed pa la khyab pa'i phyir la de 'di la med do*. (TSP^D Ze 313a1–2 = TSP^P He 389a4–5).

⁵⁶³I think the argument is as follows: *abhidhāyaktva*, therefore *kṛtasamayatva*, or *a-kṛtasamayatva*, therefore *an-abhidhāyatva*. This understanding follows the schema found in TBh₂ 31.16–18: *vyāpakānupalabdhir yathā—nātra śiṃśapā, vrkṣābhāvāt. pratiṣedhyāyāḥ śiṃśapāyāḥ vyāpako vrkṣaḥ, tasye-hānupalabdhiḥ* (A non-observation of the pervading element is like this: “There is no *Śiṃśapā* tree here, because there is no tree [here].” Here, there is no observation of a tree, which is the pervading element of a *Śiṃśapā* tree, which is to be negated. Cf. also the trl. and note in Kajiyama 1998: 82.) This means that the following two arguments are correct: *śiṃśapā*, therefore *vrkṣa*, and *a-vrkṣa*, therefore *a-śiṃśapā*.

⁵⁶⁴Read *tathā hi* acc. to Ishida 2008: 5, TSP₁ 276.20 instead of *yathā hi* TSP₂ 340.22.

⁵⁶⁵In the copy I am using there is a handwritten note, in all likelihood by Erich Frauwallner, to the effect of reading *padārtho*, probably according to TSP^D Ze 313a3 (=TSP^P He 389a6): “...*rigs dan ldan pa'i dños po pa'am, blo'i nram pa....*” This emendation is also made in Ishida 2008: 5, and a correction in TSP_P 86a7 can be interpreted as “*h |*”, also supporting *padārthaḥ*,

that [they] are word referents. Furthermore, precisely this is negated by the thesis. So there would be an inconsistency in [his] own words.

By this also what was said by Uddyotakara: “If words do not denote [anything], [there is] inconsistency both of the thesis and the reason.”⁵⁶⁶ is answered. For we do not deny the word referent in every way, because there is a thorough cognition⁵⁶⁷ of this [conventional word referent] right down to the cow-herdsman (*ā-gopāla*). Rather, the property “being in accordance with reality” is negated, which is superimposed by [others] onto this [word referent], but not the property bearer.

B.5 TS₂ 890 (=VP 2.132)

[TS₂ 890] Or⁵⁶⁸ that object, which is the object of awareness [and] has a founding in an external real thing, is assumed by some [to be] the word referent cognized as “external real thing.”

TSP₂ ad TS₂ 890

[TSP₂ 351.20] But others state the word referent to be a form that is a) only placed on (*āruḍha*) awareness, b) belongs to (*viśaya*) the external real things, c) is grasped as being an external real thing, [and] d) appears as being [of] the nature of awareness. This [opinion] he explains[, saying] “**Or that**” etc. **Object of awareness**[, i.e.,] that going around in awareness, that is to say, situated in awareness. **Has a founding in an external real thing**[, i.e.,] that has a founding in an external real thing, for which a real thing, which exists [or] does not exist [and is] external, is undertaken to be shown as the basis[, i.e.,] the own nature having its place in the letter signs (*akṣaracihna*).⁵⁶⁹ **Cognized as “external real thing”**, this means: manifest as having the nature of awareness [and] determined as being external. For it is so: in as far as what has the nature of awareness, that is not projected amongst the objects, is grasped as “only having the form of awareness” through a consideration of [its] real state,⁵⁷⁰ insofar its being the word referent is not determined, because there is no connection to a specific activity concerning it. For activities, such as “Bring the cow! Eat the curd!”, are not possible for that having the form of awareness in such a way; rather, words denote an object that is capable of a connection to an activity. Thus this grasped as having the form of awareness is not the word referent. But if it becomes projected onto an external real thing, then someone erroneously cognizing this (*tasmin*) [form] as being external, thinks [there is] a capacity for establishing action. Thus it becomes the word referent.

[TSP₂ 352.5] | But now, what difference of this is there from the position of an Apohavādin? For it is so: also by an Apohavādin the form of awareness, grasped as

⁵⁶⁶As pointed out in Ishida 2008: 6, fn. 2, this is a quote of NV 312.21–22.

⁵⁶⁷Read *atipratītatvāt*, as suggested by TSP₂ 341.13 against *api pratītatvāt* TSP₁ 277.2. Cf. also *āgopālam atipratītam eva* in TSP₂ 1072.11.

⁵⁶⁸This is the last in a series of options of what the word referent could be, starting TSP₂ 887. This verse is obviously very close to VP 2.132 (or practically the same as VP (II) 132). It is translated in Rau 2002: 71. Cf. also Houben 1995: 159, who notes there that he sees “...no objective reason to assume that in Bhartṛhari’s eyes this view in which superimposition is the crucial notion took a foremost position among the various views [expressed in VP 2.119–142—PMA].”

⁵⁶⁹This phrase is unfortunately not clear to me.

⁵⁷⁰*tattvabhā°* (TSP₁ 285.14, MS Ishida 89a6) seems preferable to *sattvabhā°* in TSP₂ 351.26.

having the nature of an external [thing], is indeed proclaimed as the word referent. As it was said [in PV 3 169:]

Further, because of understanding⁵⁷¹ that distinguished from others due to the obtaining of a superimposition of that of that form, that object alone is the word referent. [Even] if [there is] this formulation, it is not contradictory.

up ↓ | That is not [so]. For a Buddhākāravādin⁵⁷² assumes a form of awareness, which a) is non-erroneous⁵⁷³ with regard to the external real thing, b) belongs to [the external things], and c) is imposed on real [things] such as substance etc., to be the word referent in reality. But⁵⁷⁴ he does not assume [it to be a form of cognition] that is a) without basis, b) erroneous because of [its] occurrence due to a determination of non-difference for differentiated [things], [and] c) based on the [particulars'] differences from each other. But if [he] says, as we [do, in PV 1 72]:

A wholly (*sarva*) false appearance is this grasping of the things as having the same nature. A mutual difference [of things], which an expression has as its object, is the seed of this [grasping].

then that to be established is [already] established. And he[, Śāntarakṣita] will speak in this way [in TS₂ 904]:⁵⁷⁵

If [someone says:] “a mutual difference is the seed of this [grasping],” [then] that is our position.

But by an Apohavādin in reality nothing denotable for words is postulated, neither a form of awareness nor anything else. For it is so: What appears in verbal apprehension due to being what is to be determined, that is the word referent. But the form of awareness is not determined⁵⁷⁶ by verbal cognition, but rather a completely (*eva*) external real thing performing a causal effect. But even an external [thing] is not really determined by it, because there is no determination corresponding to reality, [and] because there is no reality corresponding to determination.⁵⁷⁷ Thus the word referent is only superimposed. And what is superimposed, that isn't anything.⁵⁷⁸ Thus nothing is really denoted by words. What was further said [in PV 1 72], “Exactly this object is the word referent.”, that [was said] intending (*abhisandhāya*) only the superimposed object. But by a Buddhākāravādin a form of cognition is assumed as denotable in reality. This is a big difference [between his view and that of an Apohavādin].

⁵⁷¹Read °vyāvṛttādhigateḥ acc. to PV 3 169 against °vyāvṛttyadhigateḥ TSP₁ 285.20 and °vyāvṛttyadhigate in TSP₂ 352.7.

⁵⁷²This doctrine is also mentioned in PVV 169.13 (section A.4 on page 173).

⁵⁷³Read *vastuṇy abhrāntam* acc. to TSP₁ 285.22 against *vastubhrāntam* TSP₂ 352.9.

⁵⁷⁴This sentence, TSP₁ 285.24–25, is not found in TSP₂. Read *na tu* acc. to TSP_P 89a11 instead of *nanu*, as also noted by Frauwallner's handwritten emendation, and reflected in TSP^D Ze 319a5 (=TSP^P He 397a7–8): ...*sgra'i don du 'dod kyi. tha dad pa dag la tha mi dad par zhen nas 'jug pa'i 'khrul pa phan tshun ldog pa'i rgyu mtshan can* (TSP^D: n.e. TSP^P) 'dod pa ni ma yin no.

⁵⁷⁵Cf. Hattori 1993: 139 f. for a translation and discussion of this verse.

⁵⁷⁶Read *vyavasāyate* acc. to TSP₁ 286.2 against the obvious misprint *vvaprasāyate* TSP₂ 352.18.

⁵⁷⁷Cf. NM_{K2} 460, and see AP 219.16–17.

⁵⁷⁸Cf. also DhAP 239.15 f.: *cuñ zad kyañ ma yin no źes smra'o*.

B.6 TS₂ 923 (=ŚV Av 41)

[TS₂ 923] And⁵⁷⁹ a distinction of an awareness event from another awareness event is not cognized. And this awareness event does not carry any element apart from the arising of its own nature.⁵⁸⁰

TSP₂ ad TS₂ 923

[TSP₂ 364.11] | This might be [said by an Apohavādin]: “There is a differentiation of an appearance [to awareness] from another appearance that is of a different kind; thus exclusion is constructed.” | So [Kumārila] said: “**From another awareness event** etc.” To this [reply:] | “Even though this [distinction of one awareness event from another] is not cognized, nevertheless it really exists.”, | [Kumārila] said: **because it arises with its own nature** etc. Even if there is a differentiation of one awareness event from another awareness event, nevertheless, there is no function of a word regarding this [differentiation]. For it is so: this awareness event that arises because of a word is not observed as carrying another element, [which is] qualified as a differentiation from another awareness, [and] determined because of a word, apart from the arising of its own nature; rather, this means that it arises only as determining what has a positive nature. And that part of a real thing that is not determined because of a word can not be the referent of a word, because of an overreaching consequence.⁵⁸¹ Therefore, the thesis [that exclusion is the word referent] is refuted by [experiential] knowledge.

B.7 TS₂ 942–943 (=ŚV Av 83–84)

[TS₂ 942] And a non-cow would be excluded which was established and has the nature of a negation of cow. In this [expression “non-cow,”] only that cow is expressed which is negated by the [negative] particle *na*.

[TS₂ 943] And if that [cow] had the nature of an absence of non-cow, one would have a connection to the other. If [you say] | cow has been established for the sake of exclusion, | [then] the assumption of exclusion is vain.

⁵⁷⁹This verse is part of a series of objections made by Kumārila in the ŚV Av, and quoted by Śāntarākṣita. See Jhā 1985: 303 ff. and Jhā 1937: 498 ff. for translations.

⁵⁸⁰Read *nānyam aṁśam bibharti sā* acc. to TSP 46b3 against *nānyam saṁjñam bibharti sā* in TS₂ and “(vidhirūpavasāyini)” in TS₁.

⁵⁸¹I emend to “*śabdād anavasīyamāno*” against *śabdād avasīyamāno* in TSP_p 91b17, TSP₂ 364.17 and TSP₁. Cf. TSP^D Ze 324b3–4 (=TSP^P He 404a8): *sgras ma žen pa’i dños po’i cha yañ sgra’i don du rigs pa ma yin te* The copy of TSP₁ with emendations by Frauwallner that I am using has “*na*?” written above “*śabdādavasīyamāno*” so as to suggest “*śabdādanavasīyamāno*”. The translation of Jhā 1937: 498 also reflects such an understanding, even though there is no note as to why this is assumed. Also, I am not quite sure which unwanted consequence is supposed to result. A common error pointed out in these contexts is that, if a word makes something other than its proper object known, it could make any object known. Cf., e.g., the unwanted consequences mentioned in TSP₂ 301.11 (section B.3 on page 180) and TSP₂ 373.9–10 (section B.8 on page 187).

TSP₂ ad TS₂ 942–943

- pp ↓ [TSP₂ 370.15] | Therefore, because of the unwanted consequence of an error of mutual dependence, a convention for exclusion can not be made. Explaining this, [Kumārila] said: “**And the established**” etc. There is a cognition of cow through the differentiation from non-cow, and **that non-cow has the nature of a negation of cow**. Therefore, in [this expression] here, “non-cow”, the latter word referent is what is to be expressed, which is negated by the negative particle *na* as in [this case] here: “A non-cow[, or,] not a cow.” For something that has a nature that is not clearly known can not be negated.
- up ↓ Moreover, now [this] might be [said by an Apohavādin]: | “Is that to be expressed here that cow which has the nature of an absence of non-cow?” |
- pp ↓ Because of this [question Kumārila] said: “**And if that ...**”⁵⁸² “That” [refers to] cow. For it is so: A cognition of cow [comes about] only by means of a cognition of non-cow, because [it] has the essence of an absence of non-cow; and a cognition of non-cow has its very means in a cognition of cow, because [non-cow] consists in a negation of cow. So (*iti*) a dependence on each other very clearly presents itself.
- up ↓ Moreover, [this] might be [said by an Apohavādin]: | “A cow, which is negated by the word non-cow, is established only as having the form of an affirmation for the sake of exclusion[, i.e.,] for the sake of an establishment of exclusion as qualified by a distinction from non-cow. Due to this, there will not be a dependency on each other.”
- pp ↓ Therefore [Kumārila] said: | “If cow is established ...”[, meaning:] If it is so, then a construction of exclusion in such a way as [this]: “For all words the object is exclusion.”⁵⁸³ is vain, because the referent of a word has the form of an affirmation. Therefore, no established word referent at all, which has the form of an affirmation, should be made an element [in exclusion]. And if not making that [positive word referent] an element, the error of dependence on each other is hard to avoid.

B.8 TS₂ 947–949 (=ŚV Av 88–90)

[TS₂ 947] Neither is an awareness of exclusion generated from words such as horse etc. In this [world], an awareness of that which is qualified is not assumed to have an uncognized qualifier.

[TS₂ 948] Neither should a qualifier having one form cause a cognition of another kind.⁵⁸⁴ But how is this[, being of one kind,] called a qualifier for a cognition of another kind?⁵⁸⁵

[TS₂ 949] If a qualifier were assumed even though the qualified [thing] is [classified] in a different way, then, if it were so, any qualifier whatsoever could follow.

TSP₂ ad TS₂ 947

- pp ↓ [TSP₂ 372.11] | And this mode⁵⁸⁶ [of qualifying] is not possible for exclusion. [Kumāri-

⁵⁸²Read *sa ced ity ādi* acc. to TSP_p 93a14 against *sa cety ādi* TSP₂ 370.19, TSP₁ 300.18.

⁵⁸³Read °*āpohārtha* acc. to TSP₂ against °*āpoho ’rtha* in TSP₁.

⁵⁸⁴I.e., exclusion or difference should not lead to a cognition of a positively characterized thing.

⁵⁸⁵ŚV Av 89 reads *jñāte* instead of *jñāne* found in TS₁ 949 and TS₂ 948.

la's] words: “**neither** etc.” show this. For exclusion is not determined through an awareness of “horse” etc., but rather only the real thing. And for that [reason], because an awareness of exclusion can not occur, horse etc. is not coloured with this [exclusion] by the awareness of [horse etc.] itself.

Should this be [said]:⁵⁸⁷ | “Exclusion, even though not cognized, becomes the qual- up ↓
ifier [of a real thing, like horse etc.],” then | this is said [in answer]: **of that qualified** pp ↓
etc. For, an **awareness of a qualified** [thing] **that does not grasp a qualifier** does not
exist. That [awareness] is so called, which has no known qualifier.

[TSP₂ 372.16 Or] may it really be that there is an awareness of exclusion, nevertheless, because there is no awareness with a form of that [exclusion] when there is a real object [that is being cognized], this qualifier[, exclusion,] for that [thing supposedly qualified by it,] is not coherent. Showing this, [Kumārila] said [in ŚV Av 89]: “**Neither should [a qualifier] having one form**” etc. For every qualifier, corresponding to its own form, is seen to generate an awareness with regard to the [thing] qualified. But a qualifier of a different kind does not generate an awareness of [yet] another kind with regard to the specified [thing]. For, [the qualifier] blue does not bring about an awareness “red” with regard to a lotus, or a stick [the awareness] “an earring-possessing one.” Neither is a verbal awareness for [the words] horse etc. produced here that is tainted by the absence [of a thing]. Rather, it determines the form of a thing (*bhāva*).

Should this be [said]: | “[It] is called qualifier, even [if] it produces a cognition [that up ↓
is] of another kind.”, | [Kumārila] said: “**And how, when something of another kind** pp ↓
....” For a [cognition] of another kind [, that is,] for a [cognition] not conforming to the
qualifier.

[TSP₂ 373.8] Because [of the question:] | “If it were so, what error [would there up ↓
be]?” | [Kumārila] said [in ŚV Av 90]: **if [...]** **otherwise** etc. If, for you[, Apohavādin], pp ↓
there should be[, i.e.,] when [there is], an assumption as the qualifier with regard to a
specific quality, even though it is classified in a different way[, i.e.,] as not conforming
to the qualifier, [then,] if that is so, everything indeed, blue etc., would be a qualifier of
everything. And therefore there would be no classification [of anything].

B.9 TS₂ 977cd (=ŚV Av 143cd)

[TS₂ 977cd] And⁵⁸⁸ it is not possible to show absence of another in the
referent of a sentence.

TSP₂ ad TS₂ 977cd

[TSP₂ 384.15] Moreover, the referent of a sentence is assumed to have a single multi-
farious form, like the colour spotted black (*kalmāṣa*). Therefore, absence of others can

⁵⁸⁶In TS₂ 946 (=ŚV Av 87) it was argued that the mere existence of a qualifier is not sufficient for it to be a qualifier of something. Rather, a qualifier (*apoha*) has to “colour” (*√rañj*) that which it qualifies (in this case, exclusion has to qualify the object of conceptual cognition). TS₂ 946cd: *svabuddhyā rajyate yena viśeṣyaṁ tad viśeṣaṇam* (A qualifier is that with which a qualified [thing] is coloured by the cognition [of that qualifier] itself.)

⁵⁸⁷Cf. the argument in par. § 4 on page 14.

⁵⁸⁸This verse is also discussed in Hattori 1979: 69 f., as is Śāntarakṣita's answer (TS₂ 1159–1161); for the latter also see the discussion in Siderits 1985: 143 ff.

not be shown in that [referent] because there is no cognition of an opposite [to this sentence's object] having a completed nature. And the absence of others having the form of a distinction from non-Caitra etc., which is described [by you] in cases like “Caitra, bring [the] cow!” etc., by grasping the parts [of the sentence], that is only the meaning of a word, not the meaning of a sentence, because this [referent of a sentence], which does not have parts, can not be divided. Thus, the definition of the word referent [as exclusion] is not comprehensive.⁵⁸⁹

B.10 TS₂ 1004–1014

[TS₂ 1004] The⁵⁹⁰ reasons for the same judgement [about different things], which were earlier explained [in the chapter called *Sāmānyaparīkṣa*],⁵⁹¹ are similar objects such as [the herb] *abhayā*, which are differentiated from others by [their] very (*eva*) nature.

[TS₂ 1005–8ab] To call that object's reflection, which, based on these objects, appears in a conceptual cognition, [and] is ascertained just as the object,⁵⁹² even though not being of the essence (*ātmatā*) of an [external] object, by the name “exclusion” is well founded, because of the difference from another appearance, because of being the cause of the attainment of real things that are differentiated from others, as well as (*api*) because of [its] origination by means of a real thing not connected [to other things], and⁵⁹³ because the confused determine this [reflection] as identical in nature (*tādātmya*) to the particular which is differentiated from that of another class, [and] has that [reflection] as a result.

[TS₂ 1008cd] Also [to call] a particular that is the reason for this [reflection by the name “exclusion” is reasonable], because [a particular] is differentiated from others.

[TS₂ 1009] And the absolute negation is this: “A cow is not a non-cow.” This is evidently (*ativispaṣṭa*) understood as exclusion from others.⁵⁹⁴

[TS₂ 1010] Amongst these [three sorts of exclusion], the first exclusion[, a reflection in cognition,] is made known by words, because an awareness that determines an external thing arises from a word.

[TS₂ 1011] And, given that, because of a word, there is an arising of a cognition possessing a reflection of that having that form[, i.e., of that determined as external,] this relationship of denoted and denoting has resulted as having the nature of cause and effect.

⁵⁸⁹I.e., it does not cover all cases of language usage. If taken in a more technical sense as “does not pervade”, *avyāpin* could mean that there are some cases where a linguistic referent (*hetu*) occurs without exclusion as an object (*sādhya*).

⁵⁹⁰For these verses I follow the edition in Ishida 2011b: 201 ff., where they are also translated.

⁵⁹¹See the references in Ishida 2011b: 201, fn. 10 (TS₂ 722–725).

⁵⁹²Read *artha ity* acc. Ishida 2011b: 201.

⁵⁹³Read *ca* instead of *vā* according to Ishida 2011b: 201.

⁵⁹⁴The translation follows the emendation in Ishida 2011b: 202 of *ativispaṣṭa* to *iti vispaṣṭam*.

[TS₂ 1012–1014] And if this form is directly cognized in this way[, i.e., as the effect of a word,] also absolute negation is understood by implication, as “That of this nature is not of another nature.” Given that there is a connection with real things, also a cognition of an excluded real thing arises by implication (*arthāt*). Thereby, this [exclusion]⁵⁹⁵ is also figuratively called the proper referent of a word. But this twofold exclusion is not directly expressed by words.

TSP₂ ad TS₂ 1006–7

TSP₂ 391.12 | Now, why is there this designation “exclusion” for this [appearance in awareness]? | Because [of this question, Śāntarakṣita, in TS₂ 1006] said: “[because of the difference] **from another appearance**” etc.. Due to four reasons this [appearance] is named exclusion. Primarily, [this is the case because this appearance] itself appears as different from other appearances imposed by other conceptual cognitions. [This is] because of such an etymological derivation: “It is excluded.”, thus exclusion; “exclusion from another,” thus other-exclusion. But due to metaphorical usage [the name exclusion is given to this appearance] for three reasons: either because of the imposition of the property⁵⁹⁶ of an effect[, i.e., a particular,] onto a cause[, a conceptual cognition,] which was stated by [the words] “**due to being the reason for the attainment of a real thing differentiated from others**”; or because of the metaphorical usage of the property of a cause[, a particular,] for an effect[, a conceptual cognition,] this being explained by “**as well as because of [its] origination by means of a real thing not connected [to other things]**,”—not connected[, i.e.,] not related to another, meaning that differentiated from another. Just this [quality of not being connected with others] is the means[, or] the method, of a real thing [to produce a conceptual cognition], because, in virtue of an experience of this [real thing], a conceptual cognition corresponding [to that thing] arises. And [an appearance is rightly called exclusion] because [this appearance] is determined by erring cognizers as one with the object excluded from that of another class. This is the fourth cause. This is explained: “**that of another class**” etc. **Its** [determination], i.e., [a determination] of the object’s reflection contained in conceptual awareness. **Well founded**[, i.e., the word exclusion] occurs [for the reflection] together with the fourfold foundation (*nibandhana*) explained with [the words] “**because of a difference from another appearance**” etc. So [it is] well founded.

B.11 TS₂ 1060–1061

[TS₂ 1060–1061] And a real thing, differentiated from non-cow, is what is cognized through the sense faculties. A reflection, imposed on it, is cognized by self-awareness. And having observed this [differentiated thing], a word is used for this [thing] by people. Also an experience of the connection of this [word] with that [thing] clearly arises.

⁵⁹⁵*ayam* here refers to the kind of *apoha* being discussed, the one having the nature of a particular. Cf. TSP₂ 393.23: *ayam iti svalakṣaṇātmā*. The import of the following “also” (*api*) is that the *apoha* having the nature of negation is metaphorically called the word referent, TSP₂ 393.23–24: *apiśabdāt prasajyātmā ca*.

⁵⁹⁶Read °*dharmāropitād* acc. to TSP₁ instead of °*dharmyāropitād* in TSP₂.

TSP₂ ad TS₂ 1060–1061

[TSP₂ 369.13] And what was said, “**by sense perceptions**” etc.⁵⁹⁷, is not established. Showing this, [Śāntarakṣita] said: “**And** [a real thing] **differentiated from non-cow**” etc. Here, first of all, exclusion, which has the nature of a particular, is indeed understood by the sense faculties. And this exclusion, which has the nature of a reflection of the object, is established by the very perception self-awareness, because [it, exclusion as a reflection,] is in reality of the nature of awareness. The uninflected word “and” [is spoken] in order to include the meanings [of exclusion] not mentioned. Thereby, also that [exclusion] having the nature of absolute negation is indeed understood by implication. [This] was shown [in TS₂ 1013a] with [the words] “That of this nature is not of another nature.” Thus **having observed**, cognized,⁵⁹⁸ only **this** exclusion that has the nature of a particular etc.,⁵⁹⁹ a word is used by people, but not [on having observed] a real universal, because that is non-existent, and because it doesn’t appear to awareness. A connection of this [word] with that [exclusion] alone is understood, upon the observation of which people use a word; but no [connection] with another [exclusion is understood], because of an overreaching consequence [that then a word would refer to everything].⁶⁰⁰

B.12 TS₂ 1063–1064

[TS₂ 1063–1064] Cows and non-cows were fully established, because of different judgements. But a word, not established itself, is used as one wants.

For a different real thing does not, for [the sake of] an awareness [of this thing], depend on the grasping of another [thing]. Therefore, this error of dependence on each other is out of place here.

TSP₂ ad TS₂ 1063–1064

[TSP₂ 407.23] And to that which was said [by Kumāṛila]: “And non-cow, which was established, would be excluded” etc.,⁶⁰¹ [Śāntarakṣita] said “**Cows and non-cows**” etc. For it is on [their] very own [accord] that things like cows etc., which generate different judgements, are correctly ascertained as separated.⁶⁰² To these things normal speakers apply, according to [their] wish, an unestablished word for the sake of every day language usage. For it is so: if that having the nature of a different real thing depends, for the sake of [its] cognition, on a grasping of another object, then there would be the

⁵⁹⁷This was said in TS₂ 938 = ŚV Av 78. Kumāṛila’s argument was that the exclusion of non-cow is not apprehended by the sense faculties when a linguistic convention is being made, and that consequently the word would not refer to anything.

⁵⁹⁸The *pratīka ca* is mentioned here acc. to TSP₂ 407.18, but I was not able to construe it with the rest of the sentence. It is also not reflected in TSP^D Ze 345a5 (TSP^P He 430b3–4): *de’i phyir ran gi mtsan ñid la sogs pa’i ño bo’i sel ba ’di ñid mthoñ na ste śes nas ’jig rten gyis* (TSP^P: *gyi* TSP^D) *sgra sbyor gyi spyi dños por gyur pa la ni ma yin te*.

⁵⁹⁹By “etc.” here understand exclusion in all senses just described.

⁶⁰⁰Cf. fn. fn. 581 on page 185.

⁶⁰¹This was objected in ŚV Av 83–84, quoted in TS₂ 942–943, cf. section B.7 on page 185.

⁶⁰²Cf., e.g., PV 1 119 (trl. and notes trl. on page 162).

error of mutual dependence. [But] inasfar as a different real thing is known without any grasping of another [thing], the convention “cow and non-cow” is made as one wishes given that this [different real thing] is established as separate [from other real things] due to being the reason for a judgement [as having] a different form. So in what way could there be a dependency on each other? “*vittau*” [in TS₂ 1064b means] “for the sake of an awareness [of this thing].”

B.13 TS₂ 1097–1100

[TS₂ 1097] From⁶⁰³ words such as blue, lotus etc. only a single [object] is determined. What is differentiated from non-blue, non-lotus, etc. is a reflection [of a real thing in the mind].

[TS₂ 1098] But, a real thing endowed with exclusion from others is not postulated by us as what is to be denoted. For us differentiation is not different from the thing that is differentiated from others.⁶⁰⁴

[TS₂ 1099] Thus, this error of dependency does not, as [it does] for a genus, come about for the [object of a word] as explained by the clear minded [Dignāga].⁶⁰⁵ For there is no separation [of a word’s object, which is qualified by exclusion, from the object excluded from others.]

[TS₂ 1100] Therefore a classification of being qualifier and qualified, [as well as] of co-referentiality for the word referent exclusion is not contradictory.

⁶⁰³This verse is an answer to ŚV Av 115–117 (corresponding to TS₂ 966–968). There, Kumābila had pointed out that if it were only other-exclusion that a word refers to, words could not have co-reference or be in a qualifier-qualified relation to each other.

⁶⁰⁴Read, respectively, *bhāvān* and *anyā vyāvṛttir* acc. to TS_P 21a14 instead of *’bhāvān* and *anyād vyāvṛttir* acc. to TS₁ 1097cd, TS₂ 1098cd. Cf. also TS^D Ze 41a1 (TS^P Ĥe 50a4): *g’zan las ldog pa’i dños po las | g’zan pa’i ldog pa’i ña la med ||*.

⁶⁰⁵Read *avadātamatiprokte* acc. to TS_P 21a14 instead of the *avadātamiti prokte* as printed in TS₁ and TS₂. Cf. TSP^D Ze 41a2 (= TSP^P Ĥe 50a6): *blo gros bzañ pos gsuiṣ pa ni*. Also in the copy of TS₁ used by Erich Frauwallner, this phrase is emended to *avadātamati-prokte*, and accordingly also the TSP’s *pratīka* “*avadātamiti prokta iti*.”

Appendix C

KBhSA₂ 73.8–24

KBhSA₂ 73.8 | But both what is grasped and what is determined are negations of another, not real things, because, if [what is grasped and what is determined] concerns (avagāhin) only the particular, there would arise no connection to an expression.⁶⁰⁶ pp ↓

| No, because the nature of determination is not fully understood. Even though a real thing is not grasped, the fact that a conceptual cognition produces activity, like thought etc.,⁶⁰⁷ is the fact that it is what determines. To be made the object of activity, even though there is no appearance [of the real thing], is to be that which is determined.⁶⁰⁸ up ↓
And this fact of being what is determined is correct only for the particular, nothing else, because the activity of someone having an aim (arthin) has an effecting of [this] aim (arthin) as its aim. And in determination [understood] in this way there is absolutely no appearance of a particular. But, even though there is no appearance of it, there is no unwanted consequence [such that] undifferentiated activity towards everything without difference is instigated, because a capacity of activity toward that [particular] which is indeed restricted, [and] excluded from others, even though not cognized, is observed, since a restricted capacity follows from [a thing's] own restricted form, as [this form in turn] is generated from a restricted complex of causes.⁶⁰⁹ As, even though none [of the possible effects] exist [when there is a seed], it is only from a seed that a shoot arises, because the observed restricted relation of cause and effect can not be refuted. Further, when there is a connection with an external object, [conceptual cognition] is a valid means of cognition. But otherwise it is not a valid means of cognition. That is the

⁶⁰⁶ An emendation of 'bhilāpasamṣargānupapatter to 'bhilāpasamṣargayogyapratibhāsānupapatteḥ acc. to SJS₂ 10.26–28 is also possible, because the former could be taken as a mistaken reproduction of an original that was like the latter, and because the latter is clearer ("...there arises no appearance that is capable of a connection to an expression"). But since no variants are given here by Woo 1999: 71 f., and the meaning is not much changed by the omission, the emendation is not necessary.

In any case, the passage is based on Dharmottara's DhAP: Cf. the references in Frauwallner 1937: 277, fn. 3 to KBhSA₁ 33.10 f., and to NVTṬ 444.22. The translation by Bühnemann (1980) of the parallel in SJS₂ 10.26–28 is: "Nämlich, was durch Schlußfolgerung erfaßt wird und was bestimmt wird, auch diese beiden Verneinungen anderer (Bestimmungen) sind keine wirklichen Dinge, weil ein (Erkenntnis-)Bild (pratibhāsa), das für eine Verbindung mit sprachlichem Ausdruck geeignet ist (abhihāpasamṣargayogya), nicht entsteht, wenn ein Bezug auf ein Einzelding vorliegt."

⁶⁰⁷ Emendation of mānasyādi to mānasādi acc. to Patil 2003: 247, fn. 17, following Woo 1999: 72, n. 1.

⁶⁰⁸ Patil 2009: 257, fn. 23, as well as Patil 2003: 247, fn. 17 read pravṛttiviṣayīkṛtam instead of pravṛttiviṣayīkṛtatvam. I take this to be only a typo, since neither RNĀ₂ 73.10 nor Woo 1999: 72 note any variants to pravṛttiviṣayīkṛtatvam.

⁶⁰⁹ The interpretation of this sequence of reasons follows Woo 1999: 188.

difference [between valid and invalid conceptual cognition].

KBhSA₂ 73.18 In this way, also the third option is a result of hard effort,⁶¹⁰ because, even though a single real thing, [existing] at different times, is not really possible, pervasion of that to be established[, i.e., momentariness,] and that establishing [it, i.e., existence], which occur at all places and times, [and] are indeed differentiated from what is not of that nature, is grasped by perception. For the object of perception is twofold, grasped and determined. The mere thing that is differentiated from all that is not of its form⁶¹¹ must not be the grasped object of perception because it does not appear directly, but it certainly is the determined object, because, if there is a grasping of one part[, or instance,] of this [mere thing], [perception] produces a conceptual cognition that ascertains the pervasion of these two as such (*mātra*), like a continuum is ascertained when a moment is grasped, and like, when only the form [of a pot] is grasped, a pot is ascertained that [in fact] has the nature of a form, a taste, a smell, [and] a feel. For, [if it is] otherwise, there is the unwanted consequence that all inference is ended.

⁶¹⁰Acc. to Woo 1999: 189: “The third view is the objection in text [71.28–30] above that no logical reason can have a relationship with momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) in terms of the proving property and the property to be proved. ...Beginning with this passage, he [i.e., Ratnakīrti—PMA] demonstrates that perception can grasp the pervasion (*vyāpti*) between existence and momentariness.”

The opponent there said:

[KBhSA₂ 71.28–30] *yadvā sarvasyaiva hetoḥ kṣaṇikatve sādhye viruddhatvaṃ deśakālāntarānanugame sādhyasāadhanabhāvābhāvāt. anugame ca nānākālam ekam akṣaṇikaṃ kṣaṇikatvena virudhyata iti.* (Or else, if momentariness is to be established, each and every reason is contradictory, because, given that [the reason] does not continue in a different place or time, there is no relation of that which is to be established and that which establishes it. But if [the reason] does continue, then one non-momentary [entity, existing] at a different time, is in contradiction with momentariness.)

⁶¹¹An emendation of “*parāvṛttaṃ vastumātram*” (KBhSA₂ 73.20) to “*parāvṛttavastumātram*” according to Woo 1999: 74, also adopted Patil 2009: 259, fn. 30, does not seem necessary to me.

Appendix D

A passage from Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī*

The paragraph headings are loose translations of the Sanskrit titles supplied by Kei Kataoka.

D.1 NM_{K1} 187.6–186.3

[3.4 A difference of exclusion, due to which words referring to exclusion are not synonymous, is not known through a negation of cow] [NM_{K1} 187.6] Now,⁶¹² if only the negation (*pratiṣedha*) of cow is assumed as the cause for a categorization [of cow particulars as cows], then, alas! (*hanta*) a previously established cow has to be assumed, through the negation of which non-cows must be arrived at. And if the cow that is previously established is known, what is the use of non-cows, or what is the aim of this exclusion?

[3.4.1 Such a difference is not known through the negation of the particular cow] If [it is said:] | The particular cow really is established earlier, | [the answer is:] No, be- pp ↓
cause due to that [particular] there is no common [language] usage. But if the universal up ↓
“cow” is earlier established, then the effort of exclusion is in vain (*mudhā*). This has been explained.⁶¹³

[3.4.2 It is not known through the negation of the commonness cow] Now, [if it is said:] | The universal “cow” is established by the negation of non-cow, | then there is pp ↓
the unconquerable mutual dependence—through the negation of non-cow cow is estab- up ↓
lished, and through the establishment of cow the negation of non-cow is established.

⁶¹²This passage appears within a discussion in which Bhaṭṭa Jayanta shows how Kumārila argues that, in the *apoha*-theory, all words are synonymous (starting in NM_{K1} 191.5). The Buddhist opponent then tries to ward off that unwanted consequence with various arguments. Here, he is trying to argue that a mere negation such as “This is not a cow.” is sufficient for collecting all cows into the class “cow.” Cf. also the general summary of this section in Hattori 2006: 59 ff. (which does not focus on this particular argument). I would like to thank Sanjit Kumar Sadhukhan (Rabindra Bharati University) for his kind help in translating this passage during my visit to Kolkata in 2009.

⁶¹³This seems to be referring to the argument in NM_{K1} 192.6–7: *tasminn aṅgīkṛte vā kim agovyāvṛtti-kalpanāyāsenā*. (Alternatively, if this[, i.e., the universal cowness,] is accepted [by someone endorsing *apoha*], then of what use is the exertion of contriving a differentiation from non-cow?)

Bibliography

General abbreviations

ATBS	Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien.
BKGA	Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens.
BRSNIBS	Bihar Research Society and Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies.
D	K. Hayashima et al., eds. <i>Tibetan Tripiṭaka Sde dge Edition Bstan ḥgyur Preserved at the Faculty of Letters University of Tokyo</i> . 20 vols. Tokyo: Sekai Seiten Kanko Kyokai Co., Ltd. for the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo, 1981ff.
GOS	Gaekwad's Oriental Series.
JBORS	Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society.
JIP	Journal for Indian Philosophy.
KPJRI	Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute.
KVÖAW	Kommissionsverlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
NGMCP	The Nepalese-German Manuscript Cataloguing Project, ed. <i>Database of Indic Manuscripts</i> . Requires login. 2011. url: http://134.100.72.204:3000/titles/skt_search (visited on 11/02/2011).
P	Daisetz T. Suzuki, ed. <i>The Tibetan Tripitaka: Peking Edition: Kept in the Library of the Otani University, Kyoto: Reprinted under the Supervision of the Otani University, Kyoto</i> . 168 vols. Tokyo, Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, 1955–1961.
SCPSN	The Sanskrit Commentaries on the Pramāṇavārttikam from the Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana's Collection of Negatives.
TSWS	Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series.
VKSKS	Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Südasiens.
VKSKSO	Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Süd- und Ostasiens.
VÖAW	Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

- WSTB Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde.
- WZKM Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes.
- WZKS Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens. This abbreviation is used for all three names of the journal, the “Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens und Archiv für indische Philosophie” (numbers 1–13), the “Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens und Archiv für indische Philosophie” (numbers 14–43), and the “Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens (from number 44)”.

Manuscripts

- JNĀ_{ms} Jñānaśrīmitra. “Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali”. A manuscript photographed by Sāṅkṛtyāyana. The negatives are kept in Patna (cf. Much 1988). I had available to me scans showing the AP (folios 8a–20b). These scans are based on the copies of the Patna negatives kept in the “Sammlung des Seminars für Indologie und Buddhismuskunde in Göttingen.” Cf. the description of item “Xc 14/25” in Bandurski 1994: 57–58.
- K Ratnakīrti. “Apohasiddhi”. Manuscript number 4711 in the Collection of the Asiatic Society, Kolkata. See section 1.4 on page 6 for more details.
- N₁ Ratnakīrti. “Apohasiddhi”. Microfilm A109/12 (ID: 3890) in NGMCP. Cf. section 1.4.
- N₂ Ratnakīrti. “Apohasiddhi”. Microfilm A117/7 (ID: 3889) in NGMCP. Cf. section 1.4.
- N₃ Ratnakīrti. “Apohasiddhi”. Microfilm D35/1 (ID: 3891) in NGMCP. Cf. section 1.4.
- P Ratnakīrti. “Apohasiddhi”. RNĀ_{ms} 32b1–36b6.
- PVSVT_{ms} Karṇakagomin. “Karṇakagomin’s Pramāṇavārttika(sva)vṛttiṭīkā. Manuscript A”. In: Ihara 1998, 1–56.
- PVV_{ms} Manorathanandin. “Manorathanandin’s Pramāṇavārttikavṛttiṭīkā. Manuscript”. In: Watanabe 1998, 1–29.
- RNĀ_{ms} Ratnakīrti. “Ratnakīrtinibandhāvali”. A manuscript photographed by Sāṅkṛtyāyana. The negatives are kept in Patna (cf. Much 1988). I had available to me scans based on copies of those negatives, kept in the “Sammlung des Seminars für Indologie und Buddhismuskunde in Göttingen.” Cf. section 1.4 on page 6 and the description of item “Xc 14/26” in Bandurski 1994: 58–60, as well as Thakur 1975a. This ms is the basis for the two editions RNĀ₁ and RNĀ₂.
- S₂ Ratnakīrti. “Apohasiddhi”. Manuscript once in the possession of Shāstri. Used for the edition in AS₁. Not available to me, cf. fn. 23 on page 6.

TS _p	Śāntarakṣita. “Tattvasaṃgraha”. Pāṭaṇa manuscript of the TS. Pāṭaṇa No. 6679.
TSP _p	Kamalaśīla. “Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā”. Pāṭaṇa manuscript of the TSP. Pāṭaṇa No. 6680.

Abbreviations for primary literature

Sanskrit quotations from the primary literature have been emended silently as regards punctuation, sandhi, and spelling variations.

AP	Jñānaśrīmitra. “Apohaprakaraṇa”. In: JNĀ, 201–232.
AS	Ratnakīrti. “Apohasiddhi”. In: Mc Allister 2011. The critical edition in chapter 2 of this thesis.
AS ₁	Ratnakīrti. “Apohasiddhi”. In: Shāstri 1989, 1–19.
AS ₂	Ratnakīrti. “Apohasiddhi”. In: RNĀ ₁ , 53–61.
AS ₃	Ratnakīrti. “Apohasiddhi”. In: RNĀ ₂ , 58–66.
ĀTVK	Śaṅkaramiśra. “Kalpalatā”. In: Dvivedin and Dravida 1986.
ĀTV ₁	Udayana. “Ātmatattvaviveka”. In: Dvivedin and Dravida 1986.
ĀTV ₂	Udayana. “Ātmatattvaviveka”. In: Sastri 1997.
ĀTVP	Bhagīratha Ṭakkura. “Ātmatattvavivekaprakāśikā”. In: Dvivedin and Dravida 1986.
CAPV	Ratnakīrti. “Citrādvaitaprakāśavāda”. In: RNĀ ₂ , 129–144.
DhAP	Dharmottara. “Apohaprakaraṇa”. In: Frauwallner 1937, 235–254.
HB	Dharmakīrti. “Hetubindu”. In: Steinkellner 1967a, 29–99.
ĪSD	Ratnakīrti. “Īśvarasādhanaśūṣaṇa”. In: RNĀ ₂ , 32–57.
JNĀ	Anantalal Thakur, ed. <i>Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali. Buddhist Philosophical Works of Jñānaśrīmitra</i> . 2nd ed. TSWS 5. Patna: KPJRI, 1987(b).
KBhSA ₁	Ratnakīrti. “Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi”. In: Shāstri 1989, 20–53.
KBhSA ₂	Ratnakīrti. “Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ—anvayātmikā”. In: RNĀ ₂ , 67–82.
KBhSV	Ratnakīrti. “Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ—vyatirekātmikā”. In: RNĀ ₂ , 83–95.
KBhV	Jñānaśrīmitra. “Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyaye vyatirekādhikāraḥ”. In: JNĀ, 60–106.
NB	Dharmakīrti. “Nyāyabindu”. In: Malvania 1971.
NBhūṣ	Bhāsarvajña. “Nyāyabhūṣaṇa”. In: Yogīndrānandaḥ 1968.
NBT	Dharmottara. “Nyāyabinduṭīkā”. In: Malvania 1971.

- NM_{K1} Bhaṭṭa Jayanta. “Nyāyamañjarī. Apohaśabdārthapakṣadūṣaṇa”. In: Kataoka 2008, 194–182.
- NM_{K2} Bhaṭṭa Jayanta. “Nyāyamañjarī. Bauddhair Apohadūṣaṇoddharaṇa”. In: Kataoka 2009, 473–458.
- NPSū Śaṅkarasvāmin. “Bauddhācāryaśrī Diṇnāgaviracitaṃ Nyāyapraveśakasūtram”. In: Jambūvijayaṇī 2007, 399–406. Jambūvijayaṇī 2007 ascribes this text to Dignāga, but this is probably not correct (cf. Tachikawa 1971: 119, n. 3).
- NRĀ Pārthasārathi Miśra. “Nyāyaratnākara”. In: Śāstrī 1978.
- NSū Akṣapāda Gotama (?) “Nyāyasūtra”. In: Sen 2003.
- NV Uddyotakara. “Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika”. In: Thakur 1997.
- NVTṬ Vācaspatimiśra. “Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā”. In: Thakur 1996b.
- NVTṬ_D Vācaspatimiśra. “Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā”. In: Drāviḍ 1989.
- PABhP Ratnakīrti. “Pramāṇāntarbhāvaprakaraṇa”. In: RNĀ₂, 96–105.
- Pāṇ Pāṇini. “Pāṇini’s Sūtra”. In: Böthlingk 1887.
- PDhS Praśastapāda. “Praśastapādabhāṣya (=Padārthadharmasamgraha)”. In: Dvivedin 1984.
- PSV 5 Dignāga. “Restored Sanskrit Text of Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti V §§1–66.” In: Pind 2009, Appendix 1.
- PV 1 Dharmakīrti. “Pramāṇavārttike Prathamah Paricchedaḥ”. In: Gnoli 1960b, 1–176.
- PV 3 Dharmakīrti. “Pramāṇavārttika III”. In: Tosaki 1979–1985.
- PVA Prajñākaragupta. “Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra”. In: Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1953.
- PVin 1 Dharmakīrti. “Pramāṇaviniścaya 1”. In: Steinkellner 2007, 1–44.
- PVin 2 Dharmakīrti. “Pramāṇaviniścaya 2”. In: Steinkellner 2007, 45–101.
- PVin 2ⁱ Dharmakīrti. “Tshad ma rnam par ṅges pa (Pramāṇaviniścaya) 2”. In: Steinkellner 1973.
- PV_M 3 Dharmakīrti. “Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā”. In: Miyasaka 1971–1972, 42–112. For the chapter sequence, cf. fn. 10 on page 3 in the present work.
- PV_M 4 Dharmakīrti. “Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā”. In: Miyasaka 1971–1972, 164–206. For the chapter sequence, cf. fn. 10 on page 3 in the present work.
- PVSV Dharmakīrti. “Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti”. In: Gnoli 1960b, 1–176.
- PVSV^D Dharmakīrti. “Tshad ma rnam ḥgrel gyi ḥgrel pa (Tshad ma rnam ḥgrel gyi leḥu daṅ poḥi ḥgrel in the colophon.)” In: D, Ce 261b¹–365a⁷ (No. 4216).

PVSVṬ	Kaṇṭhakagomin. “Pramāṇavārttikavṛttiṭīkā”. In: Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1943.
PVṬ _{Fr}	Śākyabuddhi. “Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā (Fragment)”. In: Krasser, Lasic et al. 2011, 207–208. An appendix to Ishida 2011b.
PVṬ ^t	Śākyabuddhi. “Tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi ’grel bśad”. In: D, Je 1b ¹ –Ñe 282a ⁷ (No. 4220).
PVV	Manorathanandin. “Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti”. In: Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1938–1940.
RNĀ ₁	Anantalal Thakur, ed. <i>Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī. Buddhist Nyāya Works of Ratnakīrti</i> . TSWs 3. Patna: KPJRI, 1957(b).
RNĀ ₂	Anantalal Thakur, ed. <i>Ratnakīrti-nibandhāvalīh. Buddhist Nyāya Works of Ratnakīrti</i> . 2nd ed. TSWs 3. Patna: KPJRI, 1975(b).
SAD	Ratnakīrti. “Santānāntaradūṣaṇa”. In: RNĀ ₂ , 145–149.
SāSaSū	Jñānaśrīmitra. “Sākārasaṃgrahasūtra”. In: JNĀ, 551–578.
SāSiŚā	Jñānaśrīmitra. “Sākārasiddhiśāstra”. In: JNĀ, 367–513.
SJS ₁	Ratnakīrti. “Sarvajñasiddhi”. In: RNĀ ₁ , 1–28.
SJS ₂	Ratnakīrti. “Sarvajñasiddhi”. In: RNĀ ₂ , 1–31.
SR	Vādidevasūri. “Syādvādaratnākara”. In: Lādhājī 1926–30.
SSD ₁	Ratnakīrti. “Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa”. In: RNĀ ₁ , 105–121.
SSD ₂	Ratnakīrti. “Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa”. In: RNĀ ₂ , 112–128.
ŚV	Kumārila. “Ślokavārttika”. In: Śāstrī 1978.
ŚV Av	Kumārila. “Ślokavārttika. Apohavāda”. In: Śāstrī 1978, 400–435.
ŚV Āv	Kumārila. “Ślokavārttika. Ākṛtivāda”. In: Śāstrī 1978, 385–399.
ŚV Ps	Kumārila. “Ślokavārttika. Pratyakṣasūtra”. In: Śāstrī 1978, 97–148.
ŚV Vak	Kumārila. “Ślokavārttika. Vākyaadhikaraṇa”. In: Śāstrī 1978, 598–669.
ŚV Vv	Kumārila. “Ślokavārttika. Vanavāda”. In: Śāstrī 1978, 435–453.
TBh ₁	Mokṣākaragupta. “Tarkabhāṣā”. In: Krishnamacharya 1942.
TBh ₂	Mokṣākaragupta. “Tarkabhāṣā”. In: Iyengar 1952.
TS ₁	Śāntarakṣita. “Tattvasaṅgraha”. In: Krishnamacharya 1926.
TS ₂	Śāntarakṣita. “Tattvasaṅgraha”. In: Śāstrī 1968.
TS ^D	Śāntarakṣita. “De kho na ñid bsdus paḥi tshig leḥur byas pa (Tattvasaṅgraha-pañjikā)”. In: D, Ze 1b ¹ –133a ⁶ (No. 4266).
TS ^P	Shi-ba ḥtsho (Śāntirakṣita). “De-kho-na-ñyid bsdus-paḥi tshig-leḥur byas-pa: Tattva-saṅgraha-kārikā”. In: P, He 1–159a ² (No. 5764).

- TSP₁ Kamalaśīla. “Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā”. In: Krishnamacharya 1926.
- TSP₂ Kamalaśīla. “Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā”. In: Śāstrī 1968.
- TSP^D Kamalaśīla. “De kho na ñid bsdus paḥi dkaḥ ḥgrel (Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā)”. In: D, Ze 133b¹–He 331a⁷ (No. 4267).
- TSP^P Kamalaśīla. “De-kho-na-ñiyid bsdus-paḥi dkaḥ-ḥgrel: Tattva-saṅgrahapañjikā”. In: P, He 159b²–Ye 405a⁷ (No. 5765).
- VC Jñānaśrīmitra. “Vyāptīcarcā”. In: Lasic 2000a, 31–70 (1*–40*).
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- VP (II) Bhartṛhari. “Vākyapadīye Dvītiyaṃ Kāṇḍam”. In: Iyer 1983.
- VS Kaṇāda. “Vaiśeṣikasūtra”. In: Jambūvijayajī 1961.
- VV Maṇḍanamiśra. “Vibhramaviveka”. In: Schmithausen 1965, 19–43.
- VyN Ratnakīrti. “Vyāptinirṇaya”. In: Lasic 2000b.
- VyN₂ Ratnakīrti. “Vyāptinirṇaya”. In: RNĀ₂, 106–111.

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English Abstract

The aim of this dissertation is, first, to fixate a specific point in the development of a philosophical theory, and, second, to give an overview of how it came to this point.

The theory in question is the Buddhist theory of other-exclusion (*anyāpohavāda*), a theory about how radically unique particulars can be known to share common features.

The principal textual basis for this investigation is a text called *Apohasiddhi* (“Proof of Exclusion”), written by the Buddhist monk Ratnakīrti (fl. 1000–1050 CE). Ratnakīrti lived in the north-east of modern-day India, during the last vibrant phase of the Buddhist epistemological tradition in India and approximately 500 years after Dignāga (480–540 CE), the founder of that tradition.

To achieve the first aim it was necessary to critically edit, translate and analyse the *Apohasiddhi* in order to determine, as precisely as possible, the form of the Buddhist theory of other-exclusion in its last Indian phase. For the critical edition five manuscripts were compared, three of which had not been edited before.

An answer to the second question was sought by tracing the *Apohasiddhi*’s central points in texts of Ratnakīrti’s Buddhist predecessors, and comparing their arguments to those of Ratnakīrti. This was augmented by a study that tries to reconstruct the theory of other-exclusion as understood by Ratnakīrti.

Deutsche Zusammenfassung

Das Ziel dieser Dissertation ist es, einen bestimmten Punkt in der Entwicklung einer philosophischen Theorie festzustellen, und einen Überblick darüber zu geben, wie die Entwicklung bis zu diesem Punkt verlief.

Diese Theorie ist die buddhistische Lehre der Sonderung von anderem (*anyāpohavāda*). Sie erklärt, wie völlig voneinander verschiedene Einzeldinge als gemeinsame Merkmale besitzende erkannt werden können.

Die Basis für diese Untersuchung war die *Apohasiddhi* (“Nachweis der Sonderung”), ein Text des buddhistischen Mönchs Ratnakīrti (fl. 1000–1050 u. Z.). Er lebte im Nordosten des heutigen Indien während der letzten indischen Phase der buddhistischen logisch-epistemologischen Tradition, und somit ca. 500 Jahre nach Dignāga (480–540 u. Z.), dem Gründer dieser Tradition.

Um das erste Ziel zu erreichen, mußte eine kritische Edition, eine annotierte Übersetzung und eine gründliche Analyse der *Apohasiddhi* erstellt werden. Damit ließ sich mit einiger Sicherheit feststellen, welche Form die Lehre der Sonderung zu Ratnakīrtis Zeit erhalten hatte. Für die kritische Edition wurden fünf Manuskripte verwendet, von denen drei bisher noch nicht ediert worden waren.

Eine Antwort zur zweiten Frage wurde gesucht indem die Hauptpunkte der *Apohasiddhi* in den Texten von Ratnakīrtis buddhistischen Vorgängern verfolgt, und die Unterschiede bzw. Gemeinsamkeiten in deren Argumenten festgehalten wurden. Dies wurde durch eine Studie ergänzt, die die Lehre der Sonderung, wie sie Ratnakīrti verstand, nachzuzeichnen versuchte.

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