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„Discussing Turkey, Changing EUrope“

Changing imaginations of EUrope through debating EU-Turkey relationships; exemplified by the German Christian Democratic and Social Democratic Party as empirical case studies

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Abbreviations

9/11	The terror attacks on New York's World Trade Center on September 11 th 2001
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CDU	Christlich-Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union)
CSU	Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union)
DHA	Discourse Historical Approach
ECECs	Eastern and Central European Countries
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Area
EU	European Union
FDP	Freie Demokratisch Partei (Free Democratic Party)
MP	Member of Parliament
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

1 Introduction

The focus of my diploma thesis lies in the analysis of the relationship between the construction of imaginations of EUrope and the debate around the possible accession of Turkey into the European Union (EU). The specific research question I will pose can be summarized as follows:

How are imaginations of EUrope influenced and reconstructed through debates on the relationship between Turkey and the EU?

I will try to answer this question in respect to an empirical case study in Germany's political field. The issue around Turkey's 'European character' is highly controversially debated, and also the question, if this issue should play a significant role for Turkey-EU relationships, is far from being a straight forward one. The impact of imaginations of EUrope upon Turkey-EU relationships is debated and analyzed in a wide range of scientific papers, which is one reason that I believe it is interesting to look at this relationship from the opposite direction. Thereby I will integrate my thesis within perspectives focusing on the role of 'Others' in the construction of identities, although it must be pointed out that the role of Turkey in constructing EUrope cannot clearly be defined as one of an Other.

I hope that this approach will lead to a critical perspective on the often highly emotionalized and essentialized Turkey-Debate. Hereby also my continuing interest in this issue can be explained. It led me to a range of confrontations with the issue of Turkey-EU relationships, in combination with approaches to imaginations of EUrope, within my studies of political science and cultural anthropology. In my eyes it seems that arguments arising out of ideas about a culturally defined EUrope play a far too significant role in contrast to more or less valid arguments about Turkey's lack of political reforms or the Cyprus-conflict. Through my thesis I want to show the arbitrariness of this argument, which often leads to unreasonable stereotypes and anxiousness, which can especially be observed in the Austrian context I am embedded in (see i.e. ESI-Report 2008).

I intend to reach this critical perspective through the deconstruction of ideas about EUrope, and in showing how those imaginations are anything but straight-forward. I want to show how constructions of EUrope are influenced by unequal power-relations and different interests – in my case, in the context of discussing the possible accession of Turkey to the EU. I hope to show how the utilization of imaginations of EUrope, in debating the Turkey question, is in turn changing the ways in which

EUrope is imagined, also in contexts beyond debating Turkey. The theoretical frame through which I conceptualize imaginations of EUrope, is placed in the scientific branch of discourse analysis. I specifically want to utilize approaches of critical discourse analysis. Furthermore, I want to deconstruct those imaginations of EUrope through the analysis of discourse contributions by political parties in Germany; more precisely, I want to focus on the Christian-Democratic Party (CDU/CSU) and Social Democratic Party (SPD).

In the first part of the thesis, I will discuss scientific approaches and papers on topics which are essential to the answering of my research question. Thereby, I will begin with discussing some of the central terms and theoretical concepts which are utilized in these discussions. The most prominent term in the debate on imaginations of EUrope is identity. Hence, I want to present some of the central theoretical approaches to identity. Firstly, I want to focus on the role this term plays in scientific, as well as in public and political debates, and secondly, I will present some work on the theoretical conceptualization of constructions of identities. This will lead me to some of the central ideas, through which identity is understood and constructed today: nationalism, culture, and ethnicity. A central approach in explaining these identities is through the relationship with Others, as I will show in the conclusion of this theoretical discussion. With these theoretical concepts in mind, I will try to de- and reconstruct imaginations of EUrope in the next part of my thesis. In order to do so, I will start with a summary of the historical development understandings of EUrope went through. Subsequently it will become clear that the idea of EUrope is not stable and definite, but rather dynamic and changing. First of all, I will discuss understandings of Europe prior to World War Two and its strong connection to EUropean integration which has resulted in today's EU. However a stronger emphasis will be placed on developments that took after World War Two. Following this, I want to present some theoretical perspectives on the ways EUrope is defined today. Thereby I will present several aspects: first, I will show what role representations of (EUropean) history play. Second, I will come to talk about the difference between picturing EUrope as universal or as particularistic. Third, I want to describe the nationalist bias in imagining EUrope. And finally, I want to show how Others, i.e. in the process of EU-enlargement, influence the qualities EUrope is defined through. The numerous impacts of EU-enlargement on imaginations of EUrope will also come to the fore in the next chapter, where I will discuss the

relationship of EUrope and Turkey, and the debate on it. Therefore, I wish to begin with presenting an historical overview of these relationships. I will show how EUrope influenced the development of Turkey, whereby the central focus will lie on the role of the EU and Turkey's EU-accession process. In the next part of this chapter I want to summarize the debate within the EU on the relationship between Turkey and EUrope, and show the role of different imaginations of EUrope.

This discussion will lead to the second part of my thesis, where I will, in reference to empirical data, try to reconstruct how the Turkey-debate changes the ways EUrope is imagined by German political parties. I will introduce this section by giving a more detailed description of my theoretical and empirical approaches. Thereby, I will come to talk about critical discourse analysis, on which I want to base my analysis, and about the ways I came to and processed my research data. After doing so, I will present the central results, which will be based on my empirical research, as well as on literature about the political debates in Germany about Turkey and EUrope. Thereby I, first, want to describe the national political context the case study is embedded in, before presenting the detailed results of my research. Last but not least, I will summarize the most important results of my paper, try to arrange it within the existing literature or approaches on the issue, and present some possible conclusions to draw out of this work.

2 Central Terms and Theoretical Perspectives

In this introductory part of my paper I want to present some key theoretical approaches to constructions of social entities. This is necessary for building a basis to understand how processes of imagining EUrope, as my example for such a social entity, work. The most common term used in the context of constructing EUrope is the one of identity. In the context of this thesis, I want to avoid focusing solely on identity, due to the many diffuse ideological connotations associated with this term. Theorists and laypeople alike often wonder if a European identity even exists. Thereby they are implying that there would be some special minimal qualities and/or quantities of identifications with EUrope, to talk about the existence of European identity. These ideas go hand in hand with the tight connection of the term identity to nationalism. It is because of this that I prefer to talk about imaginations of EUrope, since it is not unreasonable to state that most people have some understanding of EUrope; they have some image in mind when they talk about EUrope, and hence are imagining EUrope. Also, it must be mentioned that the term imaginations carries similar connotations, since its understanding in a social scientific context is to a large extent crafted by Benedict Anderson's (1983) approach to nationalism. He stated that national and ethnic communities would be imagined communities, and that they only exist through more or less common imaginations of them, by people within and outside them. In contrast to the case of identity, the influence of this approach is widely restricted to the social scientific community. It is hence not as strongly influenced by ideological utilization and connotation in every-day-usage. It is this relative neutrality of the term in a mainstream context, and not so much the theoretical affinity with Anderson, which leads to my preference for the term imaginations of EUrope. Another reason to not primarily focus on the term identity is that it is of second order relevance for my paper, if people are identifying themselves with their imagination of EUrope, or if they see it as central part of their identities. It does not mean that I intend to ignore the aspect of identification associated with imaginations of EUrope. It only means that I want to avoid the restrictions and implications, which solely talking about identity would lead to.

Apart from this approach, it is still useful to look into theories of identity in order to understand the change in imagining EUrope that arises when debating the Turkey-question. This is, first, caused by the popularity of the term amongst scientific approaches to EUrope and, second, by its popularity in public debates. For this

reason I want to start with an overview of the different meanings associated with this term in various debates and contexts.

2.1 Talking Identity

The term identity not only has a prominent role within the social sciences, but is also in widespread use in mainstream and political thinking and debating. It is necessary to begin with looking at the concepts which dominate these discourses since they partly determine the way in which EUrope is imagined. If you ask somebody for her or his identity you will usually be provided with a set of different qualities like nation, gender, age and other such things. The way, such qualities are chosen and treated against each other, is to a large extent determined by social influences and contexts. On the other hand, identity is often treated as an individualistic feature. Hence, there can be an analytical differentiation of identity concepts made between personal identity and collective identity. In spite of this differentiation, these two sides are seen in a relationship of mutual dependency. Tilly (2002) describes the consequences of this as a contradictory situation: “on the one side, we find uniqueness, on the other, common properties. Analysts of social identities have never quite resolved the contradiction” (ibid.: 11). This embedded contradiction resembles irregularities inside groups with a stated homogeneous identity. It helps in constructing a hegemonic group identity by circumscribing those irregularities with individualistic concepts like ‘evil’, ‘sick’ and so on. Those concepts also help to cover or legitimize different power distributions, in constructions of dominant group identities.

This task is further tightened by the naturalization of identity features. Typical features which are constructed as natural or self-evident are qualities like gender or heterosexuality, but also culture and in consequence national or EUropean culture. I will come back to this point later when I elaborate on concepts of culture or nationalism, which are often assigned to imaginations of EUrope. The naturalization of identity features is further supported by ideas of ‘deep identity’, which is a widespread idea in mainstream and political discourses. Identity is seen as some self-evident basis of civilized societies, and treated as something static, which has to be protected. In highlighting a need for identity and in “proceed[ing] as if identity was fractured today and we must find some way to solidify it” (Connolly 2002: 172), such understandings are pushing identity discourses into arenas of political conflict.

Conversely there is an understanding, promoted by constructivist approaches, which emphasizes the dynamic and heterogeneous character of identities. Also Stuart Hall (2005) describes this gap, in writing that “in common sense language, identification is constructed on the back of recognition of some common origin or shared characteristics with another person or group, or with an ideal, and with the natural closure of solidarity and allegiance established on this foundation. In contrast with the ‘naturalism’ of this definition the discursive approach sees identification as a construction, a process never completed – always in ‘process’” (ibid.: 2). This divide will be apparent through the whole course of my thesis, and in my approach to imaginations of EUrope. I will differentiate between Universalistic and Particularistic perspectives on EUrope. My personal approach is, in consequence of my research question, placed within the constructivist tradition. In the following section of this chapter I wish to present some of those constructivist approaches. (Connolly 2002; Hall 2005; Tilly 2002)

2.2 Constructing Identities

The prime question of researchers, which deal with group identity construction, often focuses on the relationship between group and individual identities. A researcher will begin by looking at psychological processes of identification with different groups or qualities. One of the most influential approaches to this question came from Erik H. Erikson, who sees two processes as central in every identity construct: first, the self-perception of one’s own sameness and continuity in time, and, second, the social affirmation of this by others. Constructivist scholars question the contents of this perceived continuous sameness. They try to find out how these contents come into being and change over time. Hence, they are asking about the process of identification, whereby they are deconstructing the notion of continuity. Stuart Hall (2005) can be named as one of the most influential authors in approaching identity through processes of identification. He tries to connect theories on the constitution of the subject out of psychoanalysis, like concepts by Lacan or Freud, to the way subjects are included within social or collective identities, through Foucault’s concept of discourse. By conceptualizing identity as a process, this approach “accepts that identities are never unified and, in late modern times, increasingly fragmented and fractured; never singular but multiply constructed across different, often intersecting and antagonistic, discourses, practices and positions” (ibid.: 4). According to Quenzel

(2005), collective identity occurs through the identification of multiple subjects with the same object, whereby the subjects are conscious about this mutuality. Collective identity is (re)produced in a reciprocal process, through the repeated invocation of the subjects as part of a group, and the acceptance and internalization of this claim by the subjects. Through the permanent repetition of this communality it comes to the construction of identities, which are perceived as space- and time-wise constant (ibid.: 267). As a consequence of this permanent repetition and affirmation the constructed character of identity becomes less and less visible, until a point where it is forgotten, and seen as matter of course. Identity then is seen as a natural quality; it is naturalized.

Also Quenzel's approach, towards analyzing these construction processes, is the one of discourse theory. The social process of identity construction can be encompassed within the concept of discourse, whereby identity becomes the result of various discourses. Hence, identity is constructed within the processes of social communication through many different texts. I will present some more remarks regarding discourse analysis and its value for understanding imaginations of EUrope later in this thesis, when I will formulate my theoretical and methodological approach in more detail (see 5.1). In essence, discourse can be described as the sum of communication acts and formulations of identity claims. The goal of their analysis lies in the search for structures and rules within the discourses. One important factor determining the course of these discourses is power. Discursive power means in this context the possibility to influence discourses and its outcomes; it is the power to be heard, understood and agreed with by a large number of the discourse participants and recipients. In order to further analyze these power distributions, it makes sense to recontextualize some of the analytical tools provided by Pierre Bourdieu, and his elaboration on different kinds of capital, within the field of discourse analysis. Bourdieu distinguishes between cultural, economic and social capital; and it is access to these capitals that determines the discursive power of different actors. The three forms work in combination, and determine each other. Cultural capital represents the, often unconscious, knowledge and ability to perform ably with and within dominant cultural fields. People who possess cultural capital know how to behave and be accepted in different contexts of society, and, hence, within different social discourses. Social capital represents various forms of relationships, or group memberships, which a person can activate in aggregating discursive (and other forms

of) power. Economic capital stands for the economic and material resources, one can rely on, in accumulating power. The forms of capital work hand in hand with a symbolic order which legitimizes them, and determines their legitimate forms of application. The access to these forms of capital and power are to a large extent determined by ancestry. It gives different people different chances in terms of generating socially approved and influential statements. (Quenzel 2005)

2.3 Nations, Culture & Ethnicity

Here I would like to give a brief introduction to some of the most popular and dominant ideas in the construction and imagination of social entities: nation, culture, and ethnicity. All three sources of identification, but especially culture and nation, are to a large extent naturalized in public perceptions; they are seen as a matter of course. From the perspective of the social scientist they are not interesting for their 'objective' existence, but for their existence as a notion in public discourses. Thereby they affect the way people build groups and how the implications of these differentiations manifest themselves. The three sources also work in a relationship of mutual dependency, and are often seen as synonymous. Hence, nations are often imagined as cultural and/or ethnic communities. Eriksen (1997) shows this relationship in stating that, "like ethnic ideologies, nationalism stresses the cultural similarity of its adherents and, by implication, it draws boundaries vis-à-vis others, who thereby become outsiders" (ibid.: 35). On the other hand, the scientific theoretical approaches to these ideas try to differentiate them. This goes back to the emergence of the terms culture and ethnicity out of the social scientific field. Also the idea of nationalism was conceptualized by a countless number of scholars.

For the case of nationalism the defining quality, in contrast to the other two concepts, lies in its relationship with statehood. The nation is defined by its, at least claimed, correlation with a state or political unit. One of the most influential approaches towards nationalism comes from the previously mentioned Benedict Anderson (1983). He defines the nation as "an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (ibid.: 6). In stating that nations are imagined, Anderson highlights the fact that the members of a nation never know most of their fellow-nationals. The community solely exists through the common imagination of it by its members. The consequential focus, of the scientific approach to nationalism, is on the style and qualities in and with which nations are imagined. First of all, they are

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imagined as limited: no nation claims to contain the whole of humankind. Nationality is not seen as a universal quality, and is always imagined as opposed to other nations. The aspect of sovereignty was inspired by Enlightenment values and revolutions. Thereby the nation was defined as a new base for power legitimization in opposition to the old dynasties. Furthermore it is imagined as a community, in setting the claim of a deep horizontal comradeship. In the explanation of the rise of nationalism Anderson, like others, point to aspects of literacy, printing technology, reformation, the development of languages and – most prominent of all – capitalism.

The point of capitalism was famously brought forward by Ernest Gellner (1983), who sees industrialization as the central initiating factor for the rise of nationalism. It was the central trigger because of its need for a relative homogenization of societies. Nationalism became the central tool in accomplishing this need. The industrial form of production needs a proletarian mass with a minimum of common qualifications. Those minimum standards should expand the face-to-face dimension by far. Hence, there was the need for a common education system or ‘exo-socialization’, which was delivered by nation-states: “the imperative of exo-socialisation is the main clue to why state and culture must now be linked, whereas in the past their connection was thin, fortuitous, varied, loose, and often minimal. Now it is unavoidable. That is what nationalism is about and why we live in an age of nationalism” (Gellner 1983: 38). This imperative can be realized in various forms, through which power relations come into play. One of the central power factors was the access to literacy, since it were written and replicated texts, through which a national ideology could be spread and become stabilized in a context, which extends the face-to-face dimension. In dependency of the persons and groups with access to this kind of power and education, different types of nationalism developed, whereby different groups (not) managed to gain positions as cultural norm-founders for a broader nation. The special quality, which turned nationalism into the primary source of identification, is the implicitness and naturalization it gained: “The idea of a man without a nation seems to impose a strain on the modern imagination [...]. A man must have a nationality as he must have a nose and two ears. [...] Having a nation is not an inherent attribute of humanity, but it has now come to appear as such” (Gellner 1983: 6). Nations are seen as matter of course, whereby they are pictured as constant and indefinitely old. Hobsbawm (1983) describes and deconstructs this claim with his concept on ‘the invention of traditions’. Traditions as symbolizations of nations and

other communities are usually detached from their formation and development. Hobsbawm tries to show the arbitrary and man-made-ness of traditions, through the historical reconstruction of their backgrounds.

These conceptualizations of nations as implicit and natural are very often realized through the utilization of the term culture. Also in scientific approaches on nations, the term culture is often given a central place. For example Gellner defines a nation as political principle that claims the congruency between the cultural and the political. 'The cultural' though can be defined in various ways. What the relevant culture should be, and how it is conceptualized, is certainly not a straight forward question. In following Adam Kuper's (1999) elaboration on anthropological culture debates, one principally can, like in the case of identity, differentiate between universalistic and particularistic conceptualizations of culture. This gap can be observed within the anthropological debates on the term, whereby it first was represented by evolutionistic and cultural relativistic approaches. The main difference is that, from the universalistic perspective, culture is basically seen as universal item with common rules between all cultures, although different criteria can lead to different realizations of these rules. The particularistic side sees cultures as somewhat original and matchless, that can only be understood for itself. This gap could never quite be resolved within anthropological debates, and represents the general variety in concepts of culture. The term culture could anyway gain popularity in mainstream understandings of society and group differentiation. Parts of the explanation for this popularity can be found in its strong connection with nationalism and nationalist culture. Very often it is in fact equated.

While this scientific gap can also be found within public discourses, this is not the case for another scientific development in conceptualizing culture. Thereby I mean the development to abolish ideas of stable, homogenous, and circumscribable cultures, and to establish fluid, heterogeneous, and non-circumscribable conceptualizations. This development towards a weaker conceptualization of culture resulted in the postmodern abolishment of the term regarding its meaning as something objectively observable, while still acknowledging its influential role as an idea or imagination. Public discourses proved, according to Grillo (2003), rather unimpressed by these developments, and it is hence an 'old' essentialist – and, from the social scientist's perspective, wrong – version of culture, which continues to play an important role in public discourses on the differentiation of groups. Also Scott

(2003) describes the approach to culture in broad political and public debates as mostly particularistic. Thereby culture is pictured as “internally homogeneous, immobile, self-closed, seamless, and so on” (ibid.: 101). This is often framed as problematic and many social scientists, like Hervik (2004), see its consequences in the development of a cultural racism. The term culture is thereby replacing the rather discredited term race, while accomplishing the same discriminatory result. Culture is in this manner seen as something predetermined, more or less given by history (if not by nature), and cultural differences are pictured as absolute and conflictual. The existence of cultures is usually not questioned, which gives it – like nationalism – such a strong, and often hidden, power.

For the case of ethnicity or ethnic communities very similar points, like those relating to culture or nationalism, can be made in respect of its meaning in public discourses. In comparison it is a relatively new term, which gained popularity especially in the context of minority issues. Ethnic is – like culture – often used as a further alternative replacement for the term race, in describing social groupings. While cultures are in public debates often equated with nations, ethnic groups frequently stand for minorities. The rather arbitrary meaning of ethnicity in public discourses goes hand in hand with definition struggles in the social sciences, where it is often not clear what the term really stands for. As for a minimal agreement, it can be said “that ethnicity has something to do with the classification of people and group relationships” (Eriksen 1997: 34). In Eriksen’s (1997) approach to the concept of ethnicity he sees its value in highlighting the role of group relationships in the construction of groups and their identities. It tries to overcome problems in understanding the development of group differentiation based on classical criteria, like language, political organization, territory and so on. Often, from this perspective apparent culturally similar groups nevertheless tend to construct a high cultural difference between themselves. This constructed difference is based on ethnicity, which in this case describes “an aspect of social relationship between agents who consider themselves as culturally distinctive from members of other groups with whom they have a minimum of regular contact” (Eriksen 1997: 39). Thereby Eriksen states that the relationship or contact between groups, which he terms ethnicity, plays a central part in the construction of cultural uniqueness and differentiation. From this perspective he makes the point that: “A nationalist ideology is an ethnic ideology which demands a state on behalf of the ethnic group” (ibid.: 119). Thereby he

brings forward the point that national ideologies accomplish the task of constructing a 'cultural community' through its relationships with Others. This I want to discuss on a more general level in the upcoming part of this chapter.

2.4 Self-Other Relationships

The imagination of sameness, between members of a group, goes hand in hand with the construction of difference from people outside this group. According to Gingrich (2004), these two sides of identity construction receive a different emphasis in different identity conceptualizations. On the one hand, there are approaches concentrating on the aspect of difference, whereby identity is the consequence of it. Other scholars put, in contrast, their focus on questions of belonging. The role of difference is relegated to the background, and processes of 'Othering' often are, in a moralizing way, demonized. The relationship, between sameness within, and difference to the outside, very much resembles the question regarding the chicken and the egg, and which came first. Gingrich positions himself against these one-sided approaches, and proposes "a working definition of such personal and collective identities as simultaneously including sameness and differing. These identities are multidimensional and contradictory, and they include power-related, dialogical ascriptions by selves and by others which are processually configured, enacted and transformed by cognition, language, imagination, emotion, body and (additional forms of) agency" (ibid: 6). The aim of the analysis of identities can therefore never lie in clear and definite answers, but only in an approximate reconstruction of the processes behind its construction. Its goal can only be to find different logics and relationships within such processes.

An analytical, and in my opinion very useful, categorization of processes of identity construction comes from the anthropologist Baumann (2004), who is building upon and in collaboration with Gingrich's working definition of identity. He describes the different relationships between 'selfing' and 'othering', which determine the existence of three different 'grammars of identity':

- **Orientalization**

Based on Edward Said's elaboration on Orientalism in Europe; identity is constructed through the encounter with Others. The demarcation between Self and Other is relatively clear. The Self is, through a complex process of 'Othering', constructed as counter image to the Other. The Self is classically

seen as superior in comparison, although the process is more complex than a simple good-bad imagination. In a few points the Other can also represent an envied exotic originality, although altogether it is seen as clearly inferior.

- Segmentation

Based on Edward E. Evans-Prichard's research on political systems amongst the east-African Nuer; identity is constructed on different levels, which classically follow the logic of genealogy. The whole (identity) comprehends different segments, which are differentiated on different levels of belonging. Which identity is relevant depends on the context, and the Other one is encountering in this context. The different segments are ideally on a par, and consequentially comprehend equal shares of power, although this never applies in reality. An example for such logic can be found in federal state systems.

- Encompassment

Based on Lois Dumont's research on caste systems in India; identity is constructed through the imagination of different levels of consciousness. Stated differentiation is denied and explained by a low level of consciousness. The (sub-)group, who wants to formulate an independent identity, is deliberately encompassed on a higher level. The identity of this 'higher' whole is usually defined by a dominant sub-group. In this logic it could i.e. be stated that 'in the end we are all humans', but what this is about is defined by a dominant segment; i.e. in stating a basically 'Christian soul' for all humankind.

Those grammars represent different logics of Self-Other, or Whole-Part relationships. They are possible alternatives of identity construction. Through the process of choosing, the factor of agency comes into the analysis: "each of these must construct his or her or its 'Other' and has a choice then, whether to declare this 'other' into an orientalized mirror image, a segmentary ally or adversary in one or another specified context, or an Other who exaggerates his difference while he is 'really and deep-down' just an encompassable part of 'us'" (Baumann 2004: 27). Thereby those actors follow different motives and strategies. The specific grammars are specified, and possibly switched or combined, in dependency of perceived interests: "when one party argues that it encompasses the other, the other party will often respond by postulating a grammar of segmentation; when one party wants to exclude another from a potentially shared segmentary order, it will often fall back on the orientaling

grammar to emphasize the alterity of the other” (ibid.: 31). In looking at those elaborations the variability and dynamism of identity constructions becomes clear. Identity is not simply there, but steadily reconstructed and adapted in engagements with different contexts. Hence, Baumann and Gingrich overcome the simplifying tendency of only seeing Selves and Others. Although three different logics might seem relatively restricted, “there might be good logical reasons why such a limited repertoire of only three grammars of identity/alterity can be offered as a useful analytical tool. Thinking of wholes and parts, of selfings and otherings, only three permutations appear to be possible: whole vs. whole (orientalization), whole as part and part as whole (segmentation), and whole as part (encompassment)” (Baumann/Gingrich 2004: 199).

A further useful analytical differentiation, regarding the roles of Others in the construction of the Self, which focused on the classical logic of ‘Orientalism’, is formulated by Triandafyllidou (2001). She distinguishes ‘significant Others’ from ‘Others’ in general, and shows that not every Other is significant in constructing the Self. These significant Others are generally seen in a close relationship with the in-group. This closeness strengthens the need to differentiate from them in a more critical way, than from Others whose dissimilarity is more obvious. Significant out-groups can be internal or external, and threatening or inspiring. Triandafyllidou sees a higher share of the threatening ones – for national identities, this threat can be a territorial or a cultural one. Typical external Others are neighboring nations, but one could also include more abstract notions, like globalization, in this category. Others inside the nation-state are typically ethnic minorities or immigrant groups, who are often perceived as challenge to the cultural purity of an in-group.

Self-Other relationships are thereby, as pointed out, nothing stable or definite, and positions in- and outside of an imagined group can change with time and context. Like this relationship the constructions of identities, or imaginations of a groups, are constantly changing in dependency of different contexts. From this point of view, I want to present some elaborations on the imagination of the group central to my thesis: EUrope. Thereby, I will build upon the theoretical tools and terms presented in this past chapter, and show how they are applicable in the context of imaginations of EUrope.

3 Imagining EUrope

What is EUrope? What are people referring to with this term? On which concepts and ideas is this EUrope built up? In this part of my thesis I want to give an overview of different answers for these questions. Based on the prior elaborations regarding different theoretical concepts surrounding identity, culture and imaginations of social entities in general, I want to show how imaginations of EUrope changed over time, and how the debate is structured today. In giving a short introduction about the changing meanings of Europe over time, I want to show that imaginations of Europe are certainly nothing new. After a short introduction of historical notions of Europe before 1945, the main part of this chapter will focus on meanings of EUrope after the Second World War.

The somewhat peculiar and deliberate spelling of EUrope, with the capitalized EU at the beginning, should point to the interconnectedness between imaginations of Europe and the EU. The more people talk about ideas like European identity, in relation to the legitimization of the EU, the more confusion exists between these terms. In this chapter I will show that the central role of identity, in the development of the EU, came to prevalence in the 1980s, with a shift from an emphasis on integration to identity. In acknowledgement of this confusion I do not refer to an imagination of Europe or the EU, but I refer to this confused image – hence I will use the, in this sense confused, term EUrope. This does not mean that imaginations of Europe or the EU are unambiguous and straightforward/clear in themselves. Through the widespread use of a combined understanding of the two terms they very often stand for, or overlap, each other. Hence it can be stated that EUrope, in this context, absorbs the other two terms; although the actual vocabulary used is usually one of the two original ones, and thereby blanks out the described confusion.

After reconstructing the chronological development of imaginations of EUrope, I want to present some qualitative aspects, which seem central in defining EUrope and Europeanness in the era of discussing identity. Thereby I will come to talk about the role of historic discourses, universalist and particularist approaches to identity, and a nationalist bias in understanding EUrope. Finally, I want elaborate on the aspect of Othering in imaginations of EUrope, and the special role EU-enlargement plays in these debates.

3.1 The idea of Europe (pre-1945)

Nowadays the debate on Europe is strongly focused on, and limited by, analyzing it through its connections with the EU after World War Two. Disaccording to that, I want to introduce this chapter with a short introduction to prior debates and understandings of Europe, in order to challenge the casualness and the unquestioned character of the utilization of the term. In doing that, it makes sense to also look into Padgen's article 'Europe: Conceptualizing a Continent' (2002), where he presents different and changing understandings of Europe through history.

He traces the idea of Europe back to ancient times, when the name Europe was conceived through various myths about the princess of Tyre, a city in today's Lebanon, who was called Europe. These myths might be of a symbolic value, with tales of abduction and confrontations between what later became known as Europe and Asia. However, the myths do not say much about the development of the term Europe with regard to imagining a geographical and/or cultural space. I can only present a selection of notions and episodes that convey the different and changing ways in which Europe was imagined. The main goal of this introduction cannot lie in the sake of completeness, but rather in referencing the variety of ideas associated with Europe. It should also be stated clearly that, from ancient times on, defining Europe was never simply a geographical question, although geographical obstacles played a role, in collaboration with other factors. For example, from the perspective of Athens, it might make sense to view the Aegean Sea as Europe's Eastern natural border, which would also make the Ionian sea the Western natural border. That accords with the understanding of Europe as an area around Athens, which Padgen presents as one of its meanings at this time. But also according to this understanding, Europe was more than simply a geographical space: it was – as with all other meanings this term came to carry – also one of identity and cultural connotation. It was understood to be connected with a certain way of living and social order, which was considered to have originated in this area; i.e. the role of the city aka Polis, as characterizing Europeanness. (Padgen 2002)

In another version Europe came to describe that which lay West of Athens, which shows the significant role of the center of defining imaginations of Europe. Consequently, when Athens was superseded as this center by Rome and the Roman Empire, the dominant definition of Europe changed. During, and after, this time other defining connotations entered the meaning of Europe, namely Roman Law and

later Christendom. It was the imposed religion in particular that gained a central defining role for Europe in terms of its demarcation from Others and especially from Islam, lasting far beyond the fall of the Roman Empire(s). The confrontation with the East as central Other continued to be an integral point in defining what Europe is (not). The figures that represented this Eastern Other changed, i.e. between the Ottoman Empire, Islam in general or Russia. These confrontations did not only determine the Eastern border of Europe, but also the contents and qualities this Europe was (not) characterized by. (Padgen 2002; Str  th 2000b)

A later defining aspect that Padgen points to is the role of Europe in symbolizing technical progress and, based on that, worldwide domination through colonialism. The era of colonialism can – according to Str  th (2000b) – also be seen as a founding moment for a feeling of European superiority, further enforced by racist and Darwinist-evolutionist undertones. In this sense “the colonial order was a special kind of European unification, a concerted European attempt at market penetration outside Europe based on various expressions of a European self-understanding” (ibid.: 410). The era of Enlightenment, besides a further sophistication of Eurocentric attitudes, also imposed more idealistic qualities on understandings of Europe: i.e. ideas about humanism, secularism, rationalism or a new understanding of science. It was also the time when nationalism began its rise, and – seemingly quite paradoxical from today’s perspective – it was, according to D’Appollonia (2002), the time when ideas about a united Europe were crafted by philosophers like Kant or Rousseau. Thereby a united Europe was seen as a first step towards a united, yet in Eurocentric ways conceptualized, humanity. Enlightenment and its ideas challenged the role of Christendom in defining Europe, and the Catholic Church’s power of definition was further diminished through reformation and the protestant movement. (D’Appollonia 2002; Str  th 2000b)

Those developments, with an increasing distribution of normative and discursive power, in defining Europe, led to a greater diversity in meanings of Europe. At that point the understanding of Europe was very much dependent on different perspectives, i.e. determined by different nationalistic or power positions. My later elaboration, on the development of German understandings of Europe, will show some more of these varieties (see 6.1.). Europe was rarely perceived as a homogeneous block: some parts of Europe were seen to be more European than others. This was very much determined by the distribution of normative power in the

definition of Europe. With this thought in mind, it is thus understandable why, as described by Str  th (2002b), the imagined South-North divide in imagining Europe (with the South as the more European part), turned into a West-East divide, around the Enlightenment period. Eastern Europe, even partly so today, is often considered to be a less European part of Europe. Although Eastern Europe was not seen to be as different as ‘real’ Others, it was connected with a certain ‘backwardness’. The line between Eastern and Western Europe was never clear-cut. It shifted in-between times and perspectives, i.e. between the eastern and western border of Germany, and overlapped with the concept of Central Europe.

In consideration of these factors, it can also be explained how different imaginations about the structure of the continent came into being. In some meanings Europe was seen as determined by one normative center, and in other perspectives and/or times Europe denoted a ‘family of nations’. Also the idea of a united Europe continued to be an important point on the agenda, especially in confrontations with non-European Others. Around 1900 the idea of a united Europe was also meant to secure the dwindling hegemonic position of European powers. The motto can be described as ‘unite or die’, and was hence less idealistic than the Enlightenment version of a united Europe. That aspect partly also explains the rise of those ideas after the two World Wars, when the power position of Europe hit rock bottom. (D’Appollonia 2002; Str  th 2000b)

3.2 The Idea of EUrope (post-1945)

Str  th (2000b) defines EUrope in its post-World War II version as “a continuous discourse on unification, and as such [it] is basically a political project” (ibid.: 420). Within this discourse he detects two key concepts that form its implementation, which “have been, first, integration, and then, when integration had lost its power to mobilize, identity” (ibid.: 420). In the following section I want to show, first, which factors lead to this discourse on unification and, second, how the described shift in approaching unification looked.

3.2.1 EUrope as Integration Process

After the Second World War, it was commonly perceived that the principles of the Treaty of Versailles, built on the idea of a balanced and peaceful side by side existence

of self-dominated nation-states as its core notion, widely failed; and that there was the need for a new order in Europe. The experience of the two World Wars, with their many cruelties, led to a turn towards pacifism as a paradigm of unification. Europe's own past became the central Other, in defining what the new order should (not) look like. The idea of a more united Europe became common sense, although its goals, or rather its relationship with the nationalist order, continued to be ambivalent. European cooperation also was seen to back up a continued dominance of nationalisms in consideration of new geopolitical challenges. On the other hand it was also perceived as alternative to, and hence in opposition to, the nationalist order. (D'Appollonia 2002; Str  th 2000b)

A further trigger of unification was a new world order, characterized by new super-powers and their spheres of interest, whereby a more united Europe was seen as necessary a base to withstand domination by those new powers. However, this new world order led to a split through Europe, or rather to the exclusion of communist Eastern and Central European Countries (ECECs) from Western notions of Europe and the unification project. Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union gained the central role as Others. The Communist threat from the East also initiated a shift from the attitude of hindering Germany from regaining power, to one where a renewed, yet controlled, German power was seen as necessary to protect Europe from this threat. The dilemma between renewing and controlling German power at the same time was seen to be solvable through a deeper cooperation between Western European powers. (Str  th 2000b)

Although the need for unification was more or less political common sense, the way it should be done was not. Thereby two different concepts of implementing this goal dominated the debate: federalism and functionalism. While the functionalists wanted to put the focus on pragmatic and technical cooperation at lower political levels, the federalists promoted the development of a supranational kind of European federal state. Those two sides were brought together by the neofunctionalist concept of integration, which said that cooperation at some lower fields (economic to begin with), will lead to a spill-over-effect and cause deeper and widened cooperation in other fields. This cooperation then leads beyond the economic, and was envisaged to ultimately culminate in the development of a supranational federal state. The general attitude towards uniting Europe was that it could only be done through a relatively slow process – and integration was the core notion in this concept. With these goals

and theoretical approaches in mind, the idea of the European Coal and Steel Community was a corresponding starting point. Although the neofunctionalist paradigm of constantly expanding cooperation proved to be successful in the following years, the development of a federalist version of Europe, which would include the growing identification of its citizens with the project, was not realized. (Str  th 2000b)

A united Europe was not accomplished between the nations on the Western Side of the Iron Curtain, which shows the continuing strength of nationalist attitudes and the continuing top priority of nationalist interests. The split between the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Area, and hence the split of Western Europe, is seen as one trigger for the orientation away from ‘integration’ towards ‘identity’, as a new buzz word for the European unification project. A further trigger of the identity-shift lay in the economic oil crises of the 1970s, the growing strength of neoliberal ideology, and the growing skepticism towards state-controlled economies. This development also led to a renewed role for ideas of individualism, with a focus on individual identification, in opposition to the integration of collective state-systems. The continuing strength of nation-state-centered legitimacy, in combination with the wide perception of different crisis situations, lead to a growing challenge for the permissive consensus through which European integration obtained its legitimacy. The notion of permissive consensus points out that there was a wide lack of interest and knowledge about the European political project amongst its population. This led to the absence of an opposition towards its actions, and was as such interpreted as silent agreement. The permissive consensus was also challenged through the widening of European influences and a growing cognition awareness of it. Its legitimacy was increasingly questioned, and this led to a growing Euroskepticism.

This development triggered a re-orientation of European policy makers, and a new focus on identity. This was often seen as cornerstone in gaining widely perceived legitimacy. Another explanation for the legitimacy crisis and the turn to identity is the nation-state bias in constructing and understanding the European project, as I will show later (see 3.3.3). This bias is not easy to avoid, since “many do not know how to escape intellectually and linguistically from the dominant model of the nation state” (Bellier/Wilson 2000:5). Since the EU, or rather its predecessors, are widely understood in nation-state-terms, and also the constructors of it took the nation-state

as model, the aspect of identity, as a legitimating base in the nation-state model, could no longer be neglected. (Bellier/Wilson 2000; Kaina 2010; Str  th 2000b)

3.2.2 EUrope as Identification Process

As a consequence of this described development, the concept or idea about identity as a base for EUropean unification in the 1980s succeeded the paradigm of integration. This led to a heightened political role for debates about imaginations of EUrope, and about the implications those imaginations (should) have for the political project of unification. The questions are: what the state of identification with EUrope looks like, how it could be promoted, and on what qualities this EUrope should be or is based on.

The identity-shift was, amongst others, initiated by the most prominent representative of the idea of a united EUrope, the European Commission. The Commission, at least partly, also turned away from the neofunctionalist spill-over assumption – where identity follows integration automatically –, towards a more active identity policy. The new goal was to inform the EUropean citizens about their own EUropeanness, in order to gain legitimacy for the EUropean unification project. As pointed out by Shore (2000), “the ‘problem’ according to the European Commission, is that Europeans are not sufficiently aware of their common cultural values and shared European heritage and are inadequately informed about what the Community is doing for them” (ibid.: 25). The political elites of the EU approached this task through different channels, whereby one was the formal implementation of an EU-citizenship. This citizenship was connected to the achievement of certain community rights, and should be one base for the shift of loyalty and identification towards EUrope. It was solely given out based on the criteria of nation-state citizenship in EU member states. Hence, the legal consequences of its implementation were kept within close limits. This leads to the assumption that its introduction was rather motivated by another approach towards identity-building, through its symbolic content. The idea is to achieve a high presence of EUropean symbols in the everyday lives of EUropeans, in order to gain a certain normalization and naturalization of the idea of a united Europe: the EU should be seen as matter of course. In this way, EUrope is expected to possibly gain the same kind of implicit power, which Gellner describes as the peculiar strength of nationalism (see 2.3). In this respect, Shore (2000) talks about creating ‘agents of European consciousness’ as

embodiment of EUrope: „all those actors, actions, artefacts, bodies, institutions, policies and representations [...], singularly or collectively, help to engender awareness and promote acceptance of the ‘European idea’. These agents of consciousness range from the abstract and intangible to the concrete and the mundane: from EU institutions and civil servants, the single market, the euro, the metric system for weights and measures, and the proliferation of EC laws and regulations, to educational exchanges, town-twinning, invented Euro-symbols and traditions, European Union historiography, and the harmonization of European statistics by the Eurostat office” (Shore 2000: 26). The goal of such initiatives is, at least in the second instance, to provide the symbolic foundation for the imagination of a EUropean community, and to promote the identification with this community. (Shore 2000; Shore/Black 1994)

In evaluating the success of those initiatives and, hence, the grade of identification with EUrope, most authors come to a rather pessimistic conclusion. One of these evaluations is given by Delanty and Rumford (2005), who deny the broad existence of the kind of EUropean collective identity that is promoted by the EU-institutions. Instead they talk about numerous personal identities linked with the EU on the one hand; and on the other, about a wider European cultural identity, not strongly linked to the EU, but with ideas about a European cultural heritage. This means that EUropeanness is becoming a feature of more and more personal (and also collective, i.e. national) identity set-ups, without the creation of a common EUropean ‘we-feeling’, which would be a potential base to legitimate collective action and solidarity. Also Kaina (2010) comes to the conclusion that EUropean identity is still outshined by national identifications. The reasons for that may lie within the relatively large (and as such perceived) differences between EU member states, i.e. in economic terms. That makes it difficult to advocate the idea of EUropeans as equals, and leads to the perception of losers and winners of the EUropean project, which diminishes the development of EUropean solidarity. Kaina comes to this conclusion by analyzing attitudes towards EU-enlargement. Her analysis shows that a big sentiment wishes for a clear territory of a finalized version of the EU, and widespread skepticism towards further enlargement in general. In further analyzing this skepticism, she brings forward that there is a variation between old and new member states. This points to the conclusion that it is rather a protectionist nation-centered interest, than a perception of common EUropean values, which is determines those

positions. But Kaina also shows that the values perceived as typically EUropean are widely the same between EU-citizens, although it is not clear to what extent these values are seen to be shared between all EUropeans. (Delanty/Rumford 2005; Kaina 2010).

The description of EU-initiatives promoting imaginations of EUrope within identity-constructions, and the short introduction into the state of EUropean identity, conveyed how this EUrope is imagined. In the following section I will present some more notions on these questions, and reconstruct some of the, in my eyes most relevant, aspects regarding imaginations of EUrope.

3.3 Defining EUrope, Defining EUropean

3.3.1 Constructing a EUropean History

In the previous chapters I tried to reconstruct how meanings of Europe developed. I did this in a very narrow manner, differentiations of perspectives were widely left out, and I focused on a few dominant aspects. In this manner I also reconstructed an image of EUrope's history, which could be seen to rely on a few dominant and generally accepted parts, but leaving out a lot of alternative perspectives on EUrope's past. Thereby, frankly, I joined into constructing EUrope through a selective representation of history and past, which is a very popular activity. On the other hand the goal of my elaboration was to show the variation in imaginations of EUrope, while the more usual approach is to construct EUrope as continuous and homogeneous community. Representations of history and collective memories are central parts in constructing EUrope as, in time and space, a continuous entity. Its construction is a process of forgetting, repressing, acknowledging and highlighting different parts of history. In answering what EUrope is about, one can often find notions about an Ancient tradition, in a symbiosis with other parts of EUropean history like the spread of Christendom, Enlightenment thinking, industrialization, or reformation.

In imaginations of EUrope representations of the past not only play a positive role, as already mentioned earlier. The past is in other contexts also seen as Other of a new EUrope. This perspective sees EUrope as a negative commemoration community. The central part of this aspect is the Second World War and the Holocaust, as a generally accepted contrast for a new EUrope. The high relevance of the Holocaust in constructing Europe's criminal past is also criticized, especially by the 'new'

Europeans in the post-communist ECECs. Their tale of woe under Stalinist regimes is often seen as neglected, which Leggewie (2009) calls an 'asymmetry of European memory'. As other rather suppressed negative memories, he names histories of expulsion, Europe's colonial history or the Armenian question. The reason for its relative suppression in imagining a European past may lie in the, in comparison to the Holocaust, existing disagreements within Europe in judgments about them.

To a large extent these disagreements exist due to the dependency of European memory constructions on single national representations of history. Different historical events are appreciated differently, in different national historiographies. In mentioning this, it should be obvious that the construction of European memory is a, partly conflicting, discursive process of negotiation. Mälksoo (2009) puts it as follows: "Europe's history has been written as that of the sum of national histories that have been considered to be more important, thus leading to the marginalisation or complete exclusion of smaller or 'peripheral' states and alternative topics [...]. There has been a noticeable bias in favour of Western and Southern Europe to the detriment of Northern and Eastern Europe in writing the history of 'Europe'" (ibid.: 672). It also should be mentioned that there are not only internal differences in writing European history. In its context within worldwide history perception, some episodes of Europe's past are put differently; i.e. the history of colonialism is not as marginalized in many outside perspectives on European history, as within many European self-imaginings. (Leggewie 2009; Mälksoo 2009)

3.3.2 Universalist and Particularist Imaginations of Europe

The elaboration about differences in writing European history should point to the fact that qualities, which are seen as defining Europeaness, are not unequivocally valid, but only dominant in certain representations of Europe. Many of these differences, in imagining Europe, can be traced back to a difference in theoretical concepts and approaches towards social entities and identities in general. Based on the analytical distinction of perspectives on identity I presented earlier (see 2.1), it makes sense to classify universalistic and particularistic perspectives on Europe and the way in which its qualities are imagined. Universalists see these qualities as universally valid, and hence potentially enforceable in non(yet)-European areas. In contrast to that, particularists build their imagination of Europe upon the idea that there would be a certain originality and exceptionalism within European qualities.

While the naming of certain qualities and values in defining EUrope does not necessarily vary a lot between these two sides, their explanatory concepts do.

The universalist side often imagines EUrope as represented by and founded on the institutions of the EU and their principles, like the promotion of (universal) human rights and prosperity. In this perspective, EUrope does not constitute a time- and space-wise stable and unchangeable entity, but is pictured as something new and progressive. Furthermore it is a concept which can be expand the borders of 'old' EUrope and, hence, stands for a more inclusive image of EUrope, which i.e. becomes apparent in attitudes towards EU-enlargement (see 3.3.4). In opposition to this perspective the other, particularist, side constructs EUrope through the notion of its century-long existence and continuity. Thereby, they often build upon a certain approach to identity via imaginations of culture. EUropean culture, in this perspective, represents something that was born in the Antiquity the latest and raised over centuries – it is not something which could be changed easily. People who did not share these historical experiences can never become EUropean, since the values and norms that EUropeanness is about, were created and inherited through them. It is hence a rather exclusive imagination of EUrope. What EUrope is, is predetermined, if not by nature, by history.

By looking into mainstream imaginations of EUrope, it becomes clear that the particularistic option is rather dominant, although elements of both sides can be found in most positions. A popular combination, and the confusion, of those two sides is illustrated by the following quote of the European Commission: "Europe's cultural dimension is there in the collective consciousness of its people: their values are a joint cultural asset, characterized by a pluralist humanism based on democracy, justice and liberty. The European Union which is being constructed cannot have economic and social objectives as its only aim. It also involves new kinds of solidarity based on belonging to European culture" (Commission of the European Community 1988: 3, quoted in Shore 2000: 26). Values entitled humanistic, whereby the term 'pluralist' points to a Universalist understanding of them, are mixed with a cryptic notion of a cultural dimension and a joint cultural asset, which is separated from social or economic dimensions. Although the term culture does not necessarily point to a particularist understanding, in everyday usages it is its common understanding, as laid out earlier (see 2.3). It also shows that primarily there is no disagreement regarding the values and norms which define EUropeanness, but about the

theoretical concepts those terms are seen through. It is hence not as important to look at the actual named qualities which should describe EUrope, than to elaborate on the different theoretical assumptions they are understood through. While the one side sees enlightenment values or humanism as something exclusively EUropean, the other side recognizes a potentially universal inclusiveness of EUrope, those values stand for. Other terms in definitions of EUrope are i.e. civilization/civilized, rationality, modernity, secularism, civil rights and democracy, justice, science, social welfare, diplomacy, pacifism; this list could be extended indefinitely, and shows that it is impossible to define EUrope without contradictions.

The definition of EUrope is further restricted by national particularities. A very popular way to deal with these is represented by the slogan 'unity in diversity'. On the other hand imaginations of EUrope should not be too universal, or as Delanty & Rumsford (2005) put it: "the EU is [...] caught in the contradictory situation of having to define a common European culture that is universal – but not so universal that it is global and thus not distinctively European – and at the same time does not negate national and regional cultures" (ibid.: 60). The roots of this problem can be found in the nationalist bias of conceptualizing identity and legitimacy, which will become apparent in the next chapter.

3.3.3 EUrope in Nationalist Terms and Concepts

Nationalism as an identity concept is not only powerful in itself, but also for understandings of EUrope, since it promotes a nation-style identity construction as a basis for any government legitimacy. Hence, in many explanations of EUrope's perceived identity deficit, and in proposing solutions for it, many scholars resort to nation state theories. In that manner Gerhards (according to Quenzel 2005) sees the central reason for a perceived democratic deficit, in the absence of a EUropean 'Demos'. The term Demos is crafted in order to describe an imagined whole of all citizens that symbolizes the political sovereign. It exists through the widespread perspective of citizens, who see themselves as part of this whole. Hence, they identify themselves with the Demos. It is a theory based on nation state concepts, and often, as a matter of course, transferred into an explanation of the EU's democratic deficit through the absence of a EUropean Demos (or identity). The same bias is apparent in another explanation of the problems associated with promoting EUropean identity, which sees a lack of a continuous EU-territory, and hence continuing enlargement

debates, as one of the main obstacles. Another approach in explaining European identity-shortcomings, i.e. represented by Habermas (according to Wimmel 2006), sees the problem in the absence of European publicity or spheres of communication. Although this concept is also inspired by the nation-state, it is more open than the respective concepts presented before. In order to develop such a sphere of communication as a basis for a stronger identification with Europe, it is necessary to establish more synchronic and parallel media debates, with similar topics and frames, and to open the national restriction of public debates, through a stronger inclusion of nation-external inputs. (Quenzel 2005; Wimmel 2006)

All of these proposals, on how to promote Europeanness as the basis of the EU as a nation-like entity, are problematic because there is no foreseeable final version of it yet. A possible approach to European identity, which avoids this inconsistency, is through the imagination of a common European culture that could be seen to be relatively independent from the EU, and should provide a stable foundation for an European identity. Also the term culture can be defined in a Universalist and Particularist form; European culture can represent universal values or exclusive European characteristics, and is in this context used as a synonym for identity. On the other hand, within common understandings in the broad political and public debates, the term culture is seen from a Particularist perspective, as I have argued earlier (see 2.3). Hence, in addition the term culture does not offer an undisputed concept through which one could construct an undisputable European identity.

In questioning the notion, that legitimacy is dependent on identity or identification, Cerutti (2008) comes to the conclusion that a nationalism-biased thought process in imagining Europe, leads ultimately to a competition between the EU and the nation-states. Since the EU is in a weak position in such a competition, “a chance for European identity to put down roots is given only if we conceive it as a purely political identity, not competing with national identities on the same level” (ibid.: 16). Hence, its identity must be based on the political tasks the EU is, and arguably should be, occupying. The argumentation should be focused on the legitimacy of fulfilling tasks, without an orientation towards nationalism-style legitimacy talk. A further critique of the nation-state bias comes from Delanty & Rumford (2005), in opposing themselves to approaches focused on the institutional side and the equation of Europeanization with the EU: “the process we are calling Europeanization cannot be reduced to state-centric approaches or to governance theories. In emphasizing

globalization, as the wider context in which Europeanization is occurring, diverse logics of the social construction of Europe can be identified, ranging from collective identities and imaginaries to new state-society relations and social models” (ibid.: 20). With constructivist and genealogical approaches European society or identity could be enfranchised from the reductionist conceptions of nation state identity. In order to acquire a new approach, for a newly perceived phenomenon, they use concepts of globalization and arrange EUropean identity in a context of global processes, which determine this new EUropean order.

3.3.4 Othering & Enlargement

I already noted that it is impossible to define the qualities which constitute EUropeanness. The utilized concepts, first, often contradict each other. Second, there are many national sensibilities which render them unapplicable in in a uniform manner for every nation. And third, the aspects, which all of EUrope could identify with, are usually not exclusively EUropean. Neumann (2006) summarizes the dilemma of these latter two aspects in pointing out that “it is impossible to find a cultural trait that is shared by all Europeans and not shared by any non-Europeans” (ibid.: 9). This dilemma is not only applicable in the case of EUropean identity building, but for every identity construction, hence also for national ones. It is overcome through different discursive strategies, which make the imagination of a homogeneous community possible; one which can withstand those contradictions. The internal differences are partly reduced through unequal discursive power distributions, which in effect give some qualities, promoted by relatively powerful actors, a higher assertiveness in defining a social entity than others. I already mentioned how, in this logic, the South-West dominates the North-East in the construction of EUropean memory and history.

A way to overcome the obstacle, that there is no EUropean quality which could not be found outside EUrope, lies in differentiated contexts in which certain qualities are highlighted or suppressed. Here with these contexts I mean the respective Others that EUrope deals with in different encounters. For example in differentiating EUrope from the USA there are other qualities brought forward than in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa. In analyzing the role of certain Others in the definition of EUrope, it has to be remembered that not all Others have the same significance. In the development of a post-1945 understanding of EUrope, the officially named Other

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was war or rather the EUropean past of warfare, and hence has triggered the notion of a pacifist vision. Through the development of the Cold War, this pacifist vision soon was joined by one of armed peace, and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe gained a central role in defining what EUrope is (not).

The differentiation towards the East, also after the Cold War, stayed high on the agenda of EUropean identity construction. For centuries it has been central to crafting ideas of Europe. It is not only about the definition of EUropean qualities, but also about defining where EUrope ends. It is not only a process of differentiation, but also one of in- and exclusion, and hence one of drawing borders. This leads to in- and outside positions and/or a perceived imperfect EUropeanness of certain eastern border-regions. There is no unequivocally valid border-line which could be drawn to the east. Due to the absence of clear geographical borders, it can only be based on political and cultural criteria; both are disputed and relatively unstable. Processes of internal Othering towards the east, through stating a certain deficiency of the EUropeanness of i.e. the Balkans or post-communist countries, lead to the construction of the western EUropean parts as superior. Besides the distribution of discursive power, differences in the exercise of influence on defining EUrope are also determined by the factor that the will to imagine oneself in the center of this EUrope is not shared equally by all EUropeans. Some parts of EUrope are not only on the margins of imaginations of EUrope because they are put there by more powerful discourse segments. But they also might choose so in dependency of i.e. different national identity constructions, whereby EUrope can even play the role of an Other. That is for example apparent in looking at British imaginations of EUrope.

Eastern EUropeans, and other internal Others, are often pictured as a little backward, but are still included within EUrope. Hence, they are not seen to be as different as the East, which is commonly excluded from this notion and known as the Orient. Thereby it has to be mentioned that there is also a region, whose in- or exclusion into EUrope is disputed, and whose role in defining EUrope is of a very peculiar kind. In reference to Baumann's 'grammars of identity', presented earlier in this paper (see 2.4), these regions are approached through all three grammars. Hence they are, dependent of context and perspective, seen as an "orientalized mirror image, a segmentary ally or adversary in one or another specified context, or an Other who exaggerates his difference while he is 'really and deep-down' just an encompassable part of 'us'" (Baumann 2004: 27). Eastern EUrope, in contrast, is usually only approached

through the latter two of these grammars. Since Turkey is a representative of this, in terms of imaginations of EUrope peculiar, region, I will elaborate on the role of those 'inbetweeners' for imaginations of EUrope later in this paper (see 4.3, 6 & 7).

The role of the Orient, in defining EUrope, might be clearer than for the aforementioned actors, but still is contradictory and complex. That is most popularly shown by Edward Said's elaboration on Orientalism; roughly summarized, the mirror of the Orient envisions a relative EUropean superiority, and in a few points shapes an envying exoticism. In the last few years the central representation, of this Eastern Otherness, shifted from the Soviet Union towards the Islamic World. This development was significantly boosted by 9/11 and other Islamist terror attacks. Thereby, mainly values like democracy or secularism are highlighted in the construction of EUrope and also, in a usually more implicit way, a Christian heritage of EUrope. Although EUrope is generally not pictured as explicitly Christian, it is emphasized implicitly through the exclusion of Islam, and the constructed impossibility of Islam being an inherent part of EUrope. (Asad 2002; Str  th 2006b)

As a further significant Other in imaginations of EUrope, Str  th (2000b) names the USA. In reference to the analytical tools of Triandafyllidou (2001; see 4.2) I presented earlier, the significance of i.e. Africa as Other, can be described as quiet low in comparison. In this latter case we can find more differences on the one hand, and clearer ones like prosperity or a peaceful order on the other. It is easier to present these latter values as EUropean when we compare it with Africa, than it would be with the USA as the benchmark. The role of America (as a synonym when talking about the USA) can partly be described as the opposite of the Orient. America is often seen as new and modern opposition to the old, non-dynamic, and sort of rusty EUrope. On the other hand the USA is also seen as wild ('Wild West'), uncultivated and sometimes immoral ('Hollywood') 'child', in opposition to the more experienced and grown up EUropean culture. As another aspect in the differentiation from the USA, for example Castellina (2009) utilizes economic issues: "European society has retained a certain distance from the market, from 'economism'. However, this is slowly disappearing— especially since the entry of the Eastern states, which are very openly pro-American" (ibid.: 63). Another text, working on the differentiation to the USA, came from Habermas and Derrida (2003); in the opposition of EUropeans – represented by big demonstrations in cities all over EUrope – to the US-invasion of Iraq in 2003, they see an important case in the making of EUropeanness. The

importance of these events for establishing the feeling of a European togetherness, those two famous philosophers attest, is caused by the character of the USA as a fairly similar, and therefore significant, Other.

Lucarelli (2008) points to the importance of the EU's common foreign policy in the establishment of a European 'We'-feeling. It leads to direct encounters of Others with an 'us', which people can identify themselves with on a European level. It is through foreign politics that Europe creates its representation and external image to the outside-world, whereby it gets the chance to realize an internally formulated political identity, based on i.e. human rights or stability, through international politics. Also Manners (2002) promotes the field of international politics in the search of distinctive European qualities. He argues that Europe's special role in international relationships lies in its normative power. Thereby, he refers to Europe's efforts to define and spread its norms in a global context. Manners exemplifies this thesis with the European approach to the death penalty and the promotion of its abolishment. In trying to find something which is only European, and in constructing a contrast to all possible Others, Manners wants to find a possible base for the construction of a European identity. The, already mentioned, impossibility of this search for distinctive qualities becomes clear when looking at the critique Manners provoked, whereby Diez (2005) makes the argument that this normative power is not only a European thing.

Besides crafting European self-definitions through this envisioned role in international relationships, Europe's foreign policy is also influencing the way in which it is perceived by Others. This in turn leads to a backlash onto European self-imaginings. Thereby it is, as Fioramonti and Lucarelli (2008) show, often more the image of singular European national powers than the EU that crafts this outside-perspective on Europe. For example in former colonies, the former colonial power is often seen as the main representative of Europe. These external images are sometimes close to self-representations of the EU, i.e. as a role model for regional integration. They also often differ, i.e. concerning the economic role of Europe, which is in poorer countries usually seen as neo-liberal and negative like the USA. This would be put very differently in most European self-imaginings.

One of the most influential fields of foreign policy, in the formulation of a European identity, is the enlargement policy towards the ECECs after the Cold War. Besides the picture of relative inferiority of the East, those regions are to a large extent still seen

as part of EUrope, which becomes clear when looking at the EU-enlargement process that was concluded in 2004 and 2008. In the explanation of the successful and uninterrupted conclusion of this process, i.e. by Sjursen (2006) or Schimmelfennig (2003), factors based on dominant imaginations of EUrope and EUropean history played a central role. This is not to say that pragmatic or materialistic interests did not play their role in the formation of the pro- and contra-enlargement coalitions. The success of the pro-side is however to a large extent explained with the utilization of moralist arguments, which are based on a constructed, and also by the contra-side supported, EUropean identity. Buzzwords like *re-unification*, or the construction of a historic and kinship-based duty towards ‘our EUropean brothers and sisters’ to overcome the ‘unnatural division’ of EUrope, were crafted in the context of the Cold War. In the 1990s those phrases turned into one of the important driving forces of the enlargement process. The discourse surrounding this EUropean ‘us’ is not predetermined, but is changing along with the discourse about enlargement. This highlights the interdependence between the enlargement process and imaginations of EUrope, and thus shows the fluidity of the latter. In utilizing identity arguments this fluidity is often denied, which becomes apparent in the Turkey-Debate, as I will show later. In orientating towards these imaginations of EUrope in the debate on EU-enlargement, the confusion between the terms EU and Europe becomes an important political factor. Thereby it is often forgotten that “where Europe ends is one question but where the EU should end is a quite different and more political question” (Delanty/Rumford 2005: 36). Through the enlargement rounds in 2004 and in 2007 the eastern borderline of the EU is now scratching the discursive border area of Europe. Hence, disputes in answering this question come to the fore. This will become clear in the following chapter about the relationships between Turkey and EUrope, and the debate it provoked in EUrope.

4 Turkey Debate

In the previous chapter I tried to illustrate how the contexts in which EUrope is debated are triggering different imaginations of it. The context which is of central relevance for this paper is the relationship between EUrope and Turkey. In the following part I want to give an introduction to this relationship, in order to provide the necessary background knowledge to understand the debate in EUrope about it. I will begin this chapter by describing the relationship between Turkey and EUrope, and how this relationship developed over time. This will show the significant role EUrope, or rather the Turkish perception of EUrope, played in the development of Turkey. Following that, I wish to reconstruct the debate in EUrope regarding the relationship(s) between Turkey and EUrope. This will contain an overview about different positions and arguments on Turkey, and a possible Turkish EU-membership. Last but not least I will show which role imaginations of EUrope play in this debate.

4.1 EUrope-Turkey-Relationships

Turkey's relationships with the area to its West, aka EUrope, are manifold and yet ambiguous, rife with repeated periods of wars and conflict, alternating alliances, cooperation and hostility towards different European actors and governments. They can be drawn back at least until the era of the Ottoman Empire, as widely recognized predecessor of today's Turkey. Over significant periods of the Ottoman Empire (which lasted seven centuries) it represented a uniting Other for European countries, and was partly responsible for defining European qualities, i.e. those based on religion. The Ottoman Empire, which started to develop in the 13th century, was at its most powerful state in the 16th century, and was also central to European power constellations. In looking at this period, one perspective is to present the Ottoman Empire as a central player in European power struggles, and hence as inherited part of Europe. From another perspective the Ottomans can be seen as Europe's central Other and thereby can be considered as a representation of Asia and Europe's eastern border. Its in- or exclusion depends on the perspective, and on the respectively highlighted parts of history. One can focus on coalitions between (other) European powers against the Ottomans, but also on coalitions between the Ottomans and (other) European powers. (Markhgott 2007; Padgen 2002; Pocock 2002)

In the posterior period of Ottoman prevalence its significance in the definition of Europe dwindled due to their weakened and less powerful condition. Since the 17th century Ottoman superiority diminished in comparison to the Empires to its West, who were strengthened by economic developments and colonialism. Furthermore the success story of nationalism also affected parts of the Ottoman Empire, i.e. the Balkans. Also conflicts with an invigorated Russia added to the weakened position of the Ottomans. In this period a fledgling orientation towards a European role model can be reconstructed, with the so called Tanzimat period and various reforms of the Ottoman legal system, such as the equalization of all citizens under public law in 1839. The further development of such reforms was impeded by wars and the consequent consolidation of absolutist structures. At the same time the wish for liberal reforms remained strong within segments of the upper class and the military, which was represented by the 'Young Turks' movement. These Young Turks saw the model for a better Turkey in Western examples. They disempowered the Ottoman Sultan in 1909. The Young Turk period, which lasted until the end of World War I, was interrupted by independence movements in the Balkans, consequential wars,

internal power rivalry, a coup and finally the loss of World War One. The cease-fire and the end of World War One in 1918 meant a subversion and reboot for Turkey. The liberal wing of the Young Turks around Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was able to fill this power vacuum. Atatürk took over power and used his connections to important parts of the elite to put a definitive end to the Ottoman era, and built up new political structures. Ankara was established as the new center and seat of the national parliament. Atatürk managed to restrain the wishes of the victorious allies to further divide Turkey, and militarily ensured the establishment of a Turkish republic which encompassed the whole Anatolian core land. (Markhgott 2007; Tocci 2001)

With the peace treaty of Lausanne in 1923 the Turkish republic was born, and Atatürk intended to construct its identity around the notion of Kemalism. In theory Kemalism is built upon six pillars: nationalism, secularism, republicanism, populism, modernism, and statism. The Kemalist reforms were thereby influenced by a strong orientation towards Western models of state, nationalism and culture. Atatürk wanted to implement a civic nationalism, which should ensure the unity of the Republic and eradicate the perceived lack of identity in the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire. In this new Turkish nationalism religion was, in theory, irrelevant and every inhabitant was first and foremost a Turkish citizen. The rest did, or rather should, not matter from the state's perspective. Thereby Atatürk wanted to follow the French example of civic nationalism. This process is often seen as trigger for the development of two nations within the Turkish state: the elitist, urban, secular and hat-wearing Turks on the one hand, and the traditionalist and rural Muslims on the other. (Markhgott 2007; Tocci 2001)

In this secularist system religion was seen as a threat. It was seen as a task of the state to control religion, and to reduce its role within Turkish life in general. This led to various reforms of the legal system, like the abolishment of any Sharia influence and polygamy, the formal equation of men and women, and the introduction of a European-style Civil Code. These reforms were clearly inspired by the idea of Westernization. They were accompanied by the introduction of Latin scripture, family names, the Gregorian calendar and a new conception of Turkish history. All of these reforms were carried out in an authoritarian style, and resistance was suppressed, by violent means if necessary. The state was, according to the principle of statism, the central institution, and the aspired homogeneity should be realized through a strong and centralized state. The ideals of republicanism, democracy and populism were not

met until Atatürk's death in 1938, and the state was dominated by a one-party system. In the 1940s, partly as a consequence of Western pressure, the first steps towards democracy and a multi-party system were made. During this time new parties were established, with the Democratic Party as the main opposition to the formerly unchallenged People's Party. (Tocci 2001)

During the initial time the Turkish Republic was merely dealing with its own consolidation and stabilization, and tried to stay out of international conflicts; hence Turkey played almost no role in World War II. On the other hand Turkey tried to establish good relationships with the West. After the World War Turkey clearly chose a side and joined NATO in 1952. Thereby Turkey not only took a stand against the USSR, but also created a certain distance from other predominantly Muslim countries. Turkey was the only NATO member with a direct border to the Soviet Union, and played a central role in the Cold War. Turkey furthermore was a founding member of the OEEC, and signed an association agreement with the EEC/EC in 1964. This association, from the Turkish perspective, was seen as first step towards full membership within the framework of the later EU. Also the European side did not preclude this possibility and generally accepted Turkey's Europeaness. (Maderker 2007; Markhgott 2007)

In 1950 the People's Party had to hand over power for the first time, and the Democratic Party took over. As a consequence of democratization, the Kemalist claim of populism found a more accurate realization. This brought religion, and a more sensible handling of religious sentiments, back into politics, whereby the Democratic Party represented a more convincing approach. Besides this power shift, the path of modernization, economic development and liberalization was successfully followed until the economic crises of the late-1950s. What followed was corruption, constraints of basic rights, rumors about electoral fraud and, in 1960, the first coup d'état by the military and the prohibition of the Democratic Party. That was the first of at least three military coups, and shows the central role of the military as guardian of Kemalism. Through the 'National Security Council' (MGK), the political influence of the military was institutionalized. This council, which officially was only consultative, repeatedly enforced its claim for power. After those military coups the democratic competition was always put back in place, usually with a marginally adjusted constitution and a few new parties, often in succession of banned old ones. The military perceived those steps as necessary to secure the dominance of Kemalism.

Hence, democratization faced some obstacles and discrepancies between ideology and reality. (Madeker 2007; Tocci 2001)

Until the 1960s, the Kemalist revolution was characterized by its restriction to the centers and elites, and some kind of permissive consensus of a disinterested and unaffected periphery. Through democratization and modernization this political disinterest diminished, and the autocratic imposition of Kemalism was questioned more often. The aspect of strict laicism was criticized early after democratization, and more radically from the 1970s on, with the development of political Islam as a challenge to laicism. Political parties struggled to accomplish the balancing act between the Kemalist pro-Western and laicist course, and public calls for a more prominent role for Islam. This helped Islamist movements in gaining votes. In the 1990s this movement was represented by the Welfare Party. Under their leader Necmettin Erbakan they gained power in 1995, and were prohibited by the military in 1998. On the other hand there were also problems with the claim of Turkish homogeneity and minority uprisings, which were discriminated in this nationalism, especially Kurds and later Alevis. These developments reflect the imperfection of the intended civic nationalism, in its claim of being free from ethnic or religious factors. In fact 'Turkish' was and is implicitly equated with Turkish Sunni-Muslims, and is thereby partly excluding non-Turkish and non-Sunni citizens. In trying to realize this idea minorities were not acknowledged and their languages were to a large extent suppressed. This, also due to issues of poverty, led to a Kurdish uprising from the 1960s on. The reaction lay in its repression and in its framing as a terrorist threat to the Republic. The ethnic content of Kemalist nationalism is also visible in the relationship with Turkish minorities outside of Turkey. Thereby, Turkey claimed responsibility for those, non-civic, but ethnic, Turks. The most prominent case for this can be found in the Cyprus conflict, where Turkey, in order to protect the Turkish minority, militarily occupied the northern part of the island, and initiated the founding of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The latter exists until today and is only recognized by Turkey itself. This issue remains the central obstacle to the acceptance of Turkey into the EU. (Madeker 2007; Markhgott 2007; Tocci 2001)

These factors, in combination with economic crises, kept Turkish politics from stabilization, and led to further military coups in 1971 and 1980. This also led to a backlash of the relationships with Europe and the aspiration of being part of it. Although those issues, and especially the Cyprus conflict, remain central obstacles to

a successful conclusion of the Turkish EU-accession, the relationship between Turkey and Europe was widely consolidated in the years after the military coup in 1980. A process of Turkish re-democratization reversed the trend, and the connection between Turkey and the EEC was recovered. In 1987 Turkey applied for full membership to the EEC, which was – preliminary – with reference to Turkey's deficient achievements, rejected, although the general possibility of its membership was accepted. Turkey continued to work on its European aspirations and in 1995/96 they became part of the EU's Customs Union. On the other hand, due to the escalation of the Kurdish problem, and the orientation of Erbakan towards the Muslim World, the relationship(s) cooled off again temporarily. After a 'soft coup' through the military and the stepping-down of Erbakan's Islamist government this trend was, again, reversed. In 1997 Turkey tried one more time to approach the EU, in asking for acceptance as an official enlargement candidate, and experienced a further rejection only to gain this status two years later in 1999. (Maderker 2007; Tocci 2001)

After 1999 the reform process in Turkey, also due to the prospect of a possible EU-membership, gathered momentum. Turkey made much progress towards fulfilling the political criteria to begin accession talks. The first steps were made by a coalition government between 1999 and 2002. The reform process was strongly accelerated by the AKP-government after the 2002 elections. This represents a shift of actors in the advocacy of the EU-accession: instead of the Kemalists, who worried about the conservation of the Kemalist status quo in the context of Europeanization, the new political power of moderate Islam, represented by the AKP, turned into the pro-EU force. The reforms concerned democratic standards, civil liberties, the Kurdish issue, or the separation of powers. In the following years Turkey made much further progress in adopting the EU's 'acquis communautaire', abolished the death penalty and the state of emergency in the south-eastern provinces, boosted their efforts in fighting torture, improved the implementation of fundamental freedoms, and signed the European Convention on Human Rights. This progress was also accredited by the EU, and led to the opening of accession talks between Turkey and the EU in 2004. (Avci 2006; Maderker 2007)

The era of reformism is very often explained through the incentives of the potential EU accession, which puts domestic issues in Turkey in the background. Disaccording to that, as laid out by Johansson-Nogués & Jonasson (2011), the changes in Turkey

only could happen because of significant identity changes from the 1990s on. They summarize this change in stating that “there are [...] three principal sub-groups engaged in the current dialectic on the Turkish national identity (Kemalists, AKP and Kurds). This marks a difference compared to only two decades ago when the national discourse was the jealously guarded exclusive terrain of fairly repressive and orthodox Kemalism” (ibid.: 118). This growing pluralism and challenge of the Kemalist hegemony, through, amongst others, Islamic and Kurdish groups, led to the potential for reforms, and the social demand for greater political and personal freedoms.

The reform process was only successful as far it accorded with those different approaches to Turkish identity, and only in areas where they did not lie too far apart. The lack of national homogeneity is visible with the end of this reform era after 2004, and the consequential slowdown of progress towards fulfilling the EU’s accession criteria. While priorly the reforms went down relatively smoothly, their interpretation and implementation, as well as upcoming reform projects, caused more conflicts. For example, the difference between Kemalist and AKP approach towards religious freedom became virulent, in debating the legalization of wearing a headscarf in 2008. On the other hand, there is also a bipartisan conservatism in many issues, which became visible in the Turkish reluctance to abolish Article 301 of the penal code. This article penalizes the ‘insult of Turkishness’, and provoked a lot of criticism by European, and other, actors. This conservatism also becomes visible in the reform process concerning minority, or rather Kurdish, rights. Thereby the AKP stood somewhere between Kurdish interests and conservative Kemalism. Initiatives to liberalize the use of the Kurdish language or the status of Kurdish political parties, like for example brought forward by the AKP in 2009, usually met a lot of resistance and were undermined by discriminatory court decisions. Another important field of reforms concerns the (re-)alignment of power between different Turkish state institutions. The AKP-government struggled to take away power from the military, as well as from the judiciary. They tried to overcome the orthodox Kemalist attitude towards the protection of the state from democracy, in order to gain more power for the government and, hence, themselves. Although the AKP won most of the fights for power, the way to a clear separation of power and the diminishment of the military’s political power still has to overcome a lot of obstacles. (Avcı 2006; ESI-Report 2010; Johansson-Nogués/Jonasson 2011; Küçük 2008)


Despite all the justified critique of Turkey's development, it cannot be said that its EUropeanization halted. In the last number of years Turkey made progress concerning the division of powers, minority rights, and the liberalization of the political field in general; i.e. through a positive referendum on a reform package in 2010. Often those reforms are seen as inspired by the accession process towards EUrope. Its eventual stagnation is often explained by the critical discourse on Turkey within EUrope, and the discouraging effect of culturalist arguments or announced referendums in some European countries in the case of the successful conclusion of the accession talks. According to Schrijvers (2007), this brings reform-supporting Turkish governments into domestic legitimization problems, and leads to a weaker and less visible role of EUrope in Turkish politics. That goes hand in hand with the stagnant accession process. While Croatia, whose accession talks started at the same time, has completed the negotiations by now, Turkey has only completed one of 35 negotiation chapters. In 2006 the ratification of the Ankara-protocol, or rather the realization of the Customs Union with Cyprus, was still incomplete. That led the EU to freeze eight of the negotiation chapters, and made the provisional closing of any more chapters impossible. Twelve chapters are being negotiated on until 2011, and since 2008 only one chapter was opened. The situation is further exacerbated by EU members such as France, Cyprus or Germany, which block the opening of a number of negotiation chapters through their veto power. In consequence, only a small number of chapters remain to be opened. Some commentators think that this could lead to a 'natural death' of the negotiation process, since soon there could be nothing left to negotiate. On the other hand, the accession process is not only compromising the official negotiations and Turkey continues to work on frozen or blocked chapters, and once they are officially opened they could find a conclusion fast. (Avcı 2011; BBC 2011; ESI-Report 2010; European Commission 2011; Schrijvers 2007)

The reasons for the often perceived reform crisis are usually seen in the large and rising opposition against the Turkish EU-accession in EUrope, in combination with the falling support of it in Turkey. From 2004 to 2010 the popular support for accession fell from 71% to 47% in Turkey, according to Eurobarometer data (see Zalewski 2011). Also the Cyprus problem, as it seems at the moment, is going nowhere and its solution is hard to imagine. This, amongst other things, led to a perceived re-orientation of Turkish foreign policy: "by insisting that Turkey was as European as it was Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian and Centralasian, the AKP had

launched a foreign policy revolution” (Zalewski 2011: 98). The Turkish government tries, according to their new foreign policy approach of ‘zero problems’, to achieve better relations with all of its neighboring countries. The main goal and tool of this program lies in economic cooperation, whereby questions of human rights and democratic standards are usually not considered. This has led to, amongst other things, concerns in the West about the Turkish attitude towards Iran. It is often framed as a turn, away from the West, towards the Muslim World. In the opinion of Zalewski (2011) this is not the case, since he thinks that “instead of deferring to American or European interests in the Middle East, Turkey has begun to promote its own agenda. Where this coincides with western ones, fine. Where it does not, too bad” (ibid.: 102). On the other hand the Turkish government repeatedly expressed its continuing commitment to the accession process. Although they do not want to express their dependency on EUrope, the accession process is still the number one issue on Turkey’s foreign policy agenda. By pointing to the stagnant reform process, this is often framed as lip service. All in all it can be observed that there is a (perceived) lowering of incentives associated with the EU accession process, i.e. through a weakened credibility of the EU's commitment to the accession process, and a rise of political costs at the Turkish domestic level. The latter factor was partly defused through the strengthening of the AKP-government in the 2011 general elections, after which the AKP's main spokesperson for EUropean affairs Egemen Bağış was promoted to a minister status. The ESI-Report (2010) comes to the conclusion that the chance of a shipwreck of the accession process is minor at the moment. This would simply not be in the interest of most EU-actors, as well as Turkish ones. Neither is it very likely that the accession process will come to a conclusion soon. Hence, the status quo, an open-ended accession process, will probably stay intact for some years to come. (Avcı 2006; Avcı 2011; ESI-Report 2010; Johansson-Nogués/Jonasson 2011; Zalewski 2011)

4.2 Debating Turkey in Europe

After summarizing some literature concerning the relationship between Turkey and Europe, in this part I want to reconstruct the way in which the political elites in Europe view this relationship. I want to give a first impression of the European debates on a possible Turkish EU-accession. These debates, or rather their contentiousness, are often named as central reasons for Turkey's limping accession process. The Turkey question was one of the most controversial EU-issues in the last decade. It certainly is the most polarized enlargement debate. The debate is very emotional and there is a strong polarization between supporters and opponents of a Turkish EU-accession. This polarization is obvious at the political and governmental level, which goes hand in hand with strong concerns in wide segments of the EU's population, as surveys show. Turkey is in this respect, compared to every other potential future EU member state, facing the strongest opposition. Hence, Eurobarometer 69 comes to following result, after asking about attitudes towards potential EU enlargements (Figure 1: European Commission 2008):



The reasons for these strong public concerns regarding Turkey are often explained by the size and relatively high poverty of the country. Other aspects are – highly dependent on the specific member state – discourses on a history of conflict between Europe and Turkey or the Ottoman Empire, or by those on the Turkish Diaspora in

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Europe. In the last few years – at least since 9/11 – the dominant explanatory factor for public anxiety is often seen in Turkey’s predominantly Muslim population. (De Vraese et. al. 2008; McLaren 2007)

The political debate stands in a relationship of mutual dependency with public opinions. It became strongly heated over the course of the ongoing accession process. Schimmelfennig (2009) summarized some of the governmental positions, at European Councils concerning Turkey’s accession process, in the following table (+ stands for pro-, – for anti-Turkey positions):

<i>Member state</i>	<i>1997</i>	<i>1999</i>	<i>2004/2005</i>	<i>2006</i>
Austria	–	–	–	–
Cyprus	NA	NA	–	–
Denmark	–	–	+	+ / –
France	+	+	+ / –	–
Germany	–	+	+ / –	–
Greece	–	+	–	–
Netherlands	–	–	+ / –	–
Poland	NA	NA	+	+
Italy	+	+	+	+
UK	+	+	+	+
NA = Not Applicable.				

(Figure 2: Schimmelfennig 2009: 417, Table 1)

According to Schimmelfennig these respective positions proved relatively stable. Changes in this table were mostly due to governmental changes, and not to processes of policy learning. The table presents positions of actors which were very present and engaged in the debate. It shows a significant decline of support for the Turkish accession process in the latter period. This was mostly due to power changes in Germany and France, where Turkey-skeptic governments came into place. The Turkey debate played a visible role in the election campaigns which preceded those governmental changes, whereby the parties which echoed public doubts on Turkey won.

The Turkey question hence developed into a major issue on EUropean agendas. The debates partly were very intense and brought forward a wide variety of perspectives and arguments. In order to summarize the content of those debates it makes sense to start with one major difference between them. This differentiation is presented by Wimmel (2006), and is about sub-questions of the overall context of discussing the

question of a Turkish EU-accession. Wimmel thereby sees two major questions, which are discussed in debates on Turkey:

- debating the time frame, form and criteria of the accession process, different perspectives on Turkish achievements and shortcomings in fulfilling different criteria
- debating the general possibility of a Turkish full membership, and whether there are relatively unchangeable characteristics of Turkey which speak against it

The second question was formally on the political agenda (informally it is still in place today) in 1997, when Turkey asked for the approval of its official candidacy status. This bid was rejected, whereby religion and the strength of Conservatives amongst EUropean governments played a significant role. In 1999, only two years later, Turkey, successfully, tried again to reach candidate status. This went hand in hand with a more inclusionist attitude of EU-actors towards enlargement in general. That was, amongst other things, due to the strong position of social democrats in EUropean governments. Also criticism about the EU's passive foreign policy attitude during the Kosovo-War played a role. On the other hand Turkey, as described earlier, went through a range of political developments and reforms, which found recognition at the EUropean political elites. Turkey boosted this by carrying out an intense lobbying strategy, and the rise of sympathies was further enhanced after an earthquake catastrophe in Turkey. In 1999, all these factors added up to a very positive constellation for Turkey's ambition to gain official candidacy status. The decision was also influenced by the perception that a Turkish membership would be possible only in the very long-term anyway. Hence, it was seen more as a symbolic act, than a decision with concrete political consequences. (Font 2006; Schimmelfennig 2009)

Due to the successful and fast reform process in Turkey after 1999, actors in the EU countries started to realize, that a possible Turkish EU-membership was becoming more realistic. Hence, the debate became strongly heated. A stronger polarization of the Turkey debate took place, mostly through the introduction of culturalist arguments into the debate, but also through the concern over more materialistic interests. The process of accession continued despite this, and soon the question of the opening of accession negotiations was on the table. In 2002 Turkey's candidacy status was re-confirmed by the European Council, and December 2004 was, following

a mediating initiative by Germany and France, named a possible start date for accession talks. The European Commission, in their annual progress reports on enlargement candidates, expressed a qualified support for the start of accession talks. Thereby they formulated concerns about the continuously deficient implementation of the conducted political reforms in Turkey. They supported maintaining further postponements and the abandonment of accession talks as explicit options. The European Council widely followed this position, although it was a difficult negotiation, with veto threats by Cyprus and Austria. Anti-Turkey actors thereby managed to include further conditions, like options on extended transition periods in the case of a Turkish EU-membership. Their attempts to explicitly formulate alternatives to full membership within the negotiation agreement failed. (Schimmelfennig 2009; Tassinari 2008)

The surprisingly straight forward accession process until 2005 is often explained by the norms which came into force through the granting of candidacy status. Also Schimmelfennig (2009) describes this aspect: “to the extent that Turkey complied with liberal-democratic norms, member states opposed to Turkish membership for economic or cultural reasons could not legitimately block the path to accession but were rhetorically entrapped” (ibid.: 415). In relation to this point, Font (2006) describes institutional arrangements and polity norms within the EU as important aspects in understanding the progress made so far and the decision to engage in accession talks with Turkey. Following the 1999 decision to accept Turkey as an official enlargement candidate, “the agenda and the possible range of outcomes were strongly conditioned by both European fundamental norms and institutional dynamics” (Font 2006: 211). Through those socialized norms, and the legitimately perceived demand of compliance with them, the pro-Turkey coalition was able to keep the accession process on track. Thereby the Commission, and its progress reports on Turkey, gained a relatively powerful role in the enlargement process. In consequence, the European Council did not override the Commission’s recommendations. (Font 2006; Schimmelfennig 2009)

Nonetheless, it was only the start of a very difficult negotiation process, with many obstacles for Turkey’s possible accession. Through governmental changes in Germany and France, the anti-Turkey coalition was significantly strengthened. The Austrian and French threats, to carry out decisive referendums in case of the successful conclusion of accession talks, had cast one more cloud over the process. In general,

much skepticism existed towards future EU-enlargements, after the fast pace of enlargement in the last few years, with the accession of twelve countries in the last decade. Also the negative votes on the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands in 2005, were to a large part interpreted as votes against an overhasty enlargement process. The strengthened anti-Turkey coalition was however bound to the rules of the enlargement process, and dependent on the opinion of the Commission. After 2004 this opinion, represented by the progress reports, became, in the light of the stagnant reform(-implementation) process in Turkey, more critical. The main obstacle for the accession talks was seen in Turkey's deficient realization of the Customs Union, which is not yet fully extended to Cyprus. This led the Commission to recommend that eight of the 35 negotiation chapters should not be opened and none should be provisionally closed until Turkey fixes this problem. The Council, again, acted in accordance with these recommendations, which "demonstrates that rhetorical entrapment cuts both ways. As long as Turkey complied with EU norms, it backed the supporters of Turkish accession and constrained the skeptics. However, when Turkey failed to comply, it gave legitimacy to the claims of the skeptics to slow down the accession process and forced the supporters of Turkey's membership bid to join in." (Schimmelfennig 2009: 428-429). Although the accession process experiences a worrying stagnation, the anti-Turkey actors did not succeed in ending the accession process. (Schimmelfennig 2009)

The entrapment approach, in reference to EU-norms, might explain the relatively successful argumentation of the pro-Turkey coalition, but it cannot explain why different actors joined the respective coalitions. To explain opposition or advocacy of the Turkish accession, it is necessary to take different interests and arguments into account. Subsequently I want to describe some of the, according to respective literature, central issues. A major argument lies in the size and poverty of Turkey, and the economic and financial impacts of a Turkish EU-membership. Since Turkey's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is far under the EU-average, the concern over high financial short- and medium term costs was frequently formulated. In this context the thesis around the EU's lack of absorption capacity for new member-states, after the past enlargement, was brought forward. On the other hand pro-Turkey sentiments brought arguments about potential long-term profits due to the dynamic and fast growing economy and the young demographic conditions of Turkey into the debate. Turkey's opponents translate those demographic conditions into a

threatening migration flow from Turkey towards EUrope. This argument is especially present in countries with big and visible Turkish or Muslim diasporas. The high relevance of this question is for example shown by de Vraese et al. (2008) for the Netherlands. Thereby they bring their empirical research to the conclusion that negative attitudes toward immigrants are the most influential factor in the formation of public opposition towards a Turkish accession. (De Vraese et al. 2008; Font 2006; McLaren)

The size of Turkey is also central in debating institutional interests. These relate to the serviceability and power distribution within the EU institutions. The concern for the potentially high impact of a Turkish inclusion was often brought to the fore. Actors skeptical to the enlargement argued, that Turkey would, according to the current conditions, gain one of the most, or the single most, influential position(s) in terms of voting numbers within EU decision-making processes. On the other hand a Turkish accession also could lead to a potential, yet not certain, strengthening of the EU-impact within the NATO-institutions, and international organizations in general. Also when debating the geopolitical impacts of Turkey's EU-membership – originally the major source of a Turkish inclusion in EUrope –, opposed prognoses and interpretations can be observed between pro- and anti-Turkey speakers. The predominantly Islamic confession of Turks, and EUrope's relationship with the 'Islamic World', are shaping the debate. 9/11 and other Islamist terror attacks are referred to, as well as to the generally perceived threat of clashing civilizations. Turkey is often framed as a bridge between those civilizations, and its EU-membership could heighten the possibility of the EU playing a mediating and peace advocating role. The Turkish accession is hence seen as a possibility for EUrope to heighten its power in international politics, and to potentially relativize the unilateral world order and the USA's monopoly on the status of superpower. Opposed to this argument are culturalist concerns about Turkey's Muslim population. This would make Turkey just too different to join EUrope, and a potential threat to peace within EUrope. Also worries about possible external-borders of the EU with countries like Iraq or Iran, and about increased difficulties to control migration movements are often brought up in the debate. (Baban/Keyman 2008; Font 2006)

These arguments explain parts of the formation of different attitudes towards Turkey. They also go hand in hand with different imaginations of EUrope. They are related to different perspectives on the state, as well as on the future ideal of the EU and

EUrope. Different actors want EUrope to take over different tasks, and thereby a Turkish EU-accession has different consequences on those different imaginations of EUrope. In the following section, I will focus on the role these imaginations of EUrope play in the EU-Turkey debate.

4.3 Imaginations of EUrope in Debating Turkey

Differences between imaginations of EUrope played the central part in turning Turkey into the most debated EU accession candidate so far. For example according to Wimmel (2006), the start of a broad public debate on the Turkey-question is connected to a statement by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, former president of France and the European Convention. In an interview with the newspaper *Le Monde* in autumn 2002 he said, in relation to Turkey, that "its capital is not in Europe, 95% of its population lives outside Europe, it is not a European country." Regarding a possible Turkish EU-accession he said that "in my opinion, it would be the end of Europe" (BBC 2002). In reaction advocates of the Turkish accession, like the British and Spanish governments, and Turkey itself, resolutely rejected this culturalist approach in defining EUrope. They warned of the negative impact such statements could have for Turkey and EUrope. Madeker (2007) argues similarly, that the Turkey debate is organized around the masterframe of EUropean identity. She says that the assumption of EUropean identity is widely unchallenged in general, and determines the validity of arguments. Madeker further argues that the masterframe of the existence of a EUropean identity can be seen as *Derivate* in the sense of Vilfredo Pareto; a *Derivate* is used in discourses to legitimize one's position by masking the real motivations with seemingly rational arguments or (master-)framing, which do not coincide with an empirical scientific reality. The masterframe of EUropean identity that is obvious in the Turkey-Debate is in Madeker's eyes such a *Derivate*, since she falsifies its existence in pointing to Eurobarometer-surveys, which show that most people feel stronger bound to their nationality than to EUrope. In this logic, the notion of EUropean identity would only be used to legitimize one's position. This position actually would be determined by other motivations, which are obscured by the *Derivate* of EUropean identity. Such motivations would lie for example in the more materialistic interests I talked about above. In my eyes Madeker reinforces the reasons why I try to avoid the term identity. It can lead one to forget that the non-existence of a nationalist-inspired collective identity on the EUropean level does not

mean that there might be imaginations of EUrope, with action-relevant and consequential contents, despite that.

In my opinion imaginations of EUrope play, apart from framing the debate, a crucial role in the formation of pro- and anti-Turkey positions and coalitions, although EUropean identity does not exist in a nation-style way. In justifying this opinion, I can rely on Küçük (2008), who, beyond that, points to the complexity of Turkey's role in constructing EUrope. Turkey is a provocation or trigger for altering imaginations of EUrope, since its role as an 'Other' is not clear. Küçük describes the Turkey-issue as a challenge to imaginations of EUrope, and as a boarder mark between two different ways to define EUrope. I described these two ways of imagining EUrope earlier (see 3.3.2) as universalist and particularist approaches. Turkey can potentially be included into the universalist version of EUrope, under the condition of specific and reachable criteria. It is very often excluded from the particularist version, without any real chance of inclusion. The role of imaginations of EUrope, in positioning actors in the Turkey debate, becomes very obvious when comparing it to the debate on the enlargement towards the ECECs. In this latter case, the imaginations of EUrope through these two different perspectives did, in contrast to the Turkey-question, not lead to different positions. The accession of those countries has widely been presented as a historical step and moral duty, i.e. in order to *re-unite* Europe. This kind of rhetoric is usually absent in respect to Turkey, as pointed out by Lundgren (2006): "the Central and Eastern Europeans were considered to be part of 'us' and there was a feeling of responsibility towards them which did not exist towards the Turks" (ibid.: 138).

On the other hand, arguments around EUrope's responsibility towards Turkey are formulated by advocates of an inclusive EUrope. They have less persuasive power in comparison, since they are not common sense. In respect to Turkey this notion is built upon a perceived role of EUrope, as a promoter of universal values. They construct a responsibility to support Turkey's positive development. On the other hand they formulate the concern that negative signals of the EU could result in the stalling of Turkish reforms. The most usual way, in providing an inclusive notion of EUrope, is hence based on a universalist perception of EUropean values. Those are for example represented and summarized by the Copenhagen Criteria for accession. Through fulfilling those criteria Turkey can become EUropean, and hence can become part of the EU. Another common, yet in comparison to the notion of

universal values still unusual, way to include Turkey into notions of EEurope, lies in the utilization of historical and cultural notions and the construction of a common history. It is argued that the Ottoman Empire was a central player in the European system of states and powers. Turkey would have had a big influence on Europe, and also on Christendom. The least common way in imagining an inclusive EEurope, is the one which is based on geographic terms and frames. In focusing on the argument of universal values, the inclusionist side of the debate on Turkey suffers from the absence of explicitness. They cannot deliver a stable and lasting definition of EEurope, which is often asked for in reference to the promotion of a European identity. (Beban/Keyman 2008; Madeker 2007)

In constructing an exclusive version of EEurope in respect to Turkey, the role of geographically framed arguments is much stronger. The geographic definition of EEurope is seen as natural, logical and definite. It is for example realized in references to school books where the Bosphorus is the most common borderline between Asia and EEurope. The imagination of an in- or exclusive geographical notion of Europe, nearly always goes hand in hand with supporting Turkey's in- or exclusion into the EU; they are hence usually taken up by the anti-Turkey side. The geographical frame is usually only used to back up other exclusive frames. A very popular frame of exclusion lies within the construction of a historical and cultural otherness of Turkey. Madeker (2007) calls these arguments 'primordial codes', whereby she points to the imagination of inheritance and ancestry. EEurope is, in this perspective, built upon historical roots. Turkey is missing the mental background, which EEurope was constructed on during i.e. the Antiquity, the Renaissance, the Reformation or the Enlightenment. Because this cultural cognitive element is missing in Turkey, the development of a profound European style civil society, which would include the internalization of European values by the masses, is seen as an impossibility. Whichever reforms the Westernized elite may conduct, Turkey, in this opinion, would at most be a recipient of European values. It could never become a fully-fledged part of EEurope. The same logic of inheritance is also used in the construction of an alien typical Turk. This Turk has a different folk culture, tradition, or patterns of mentality. In this context Turkey is referred to in terms of gender ratios, attitudes towards corruption and loyalty, or general life-styles and habits. The fundamental difference between the Turk and EEurope is explained by, and synchronized in, imagining a difference between Islam and EEurope. Christendom is seen as one more historical

experience in the creation of EUrope. It is also seen as an influential factor in the system of inherited conceptions, which define the typical EUropean, in this approach. The result of these primordial codes of differentiation and exclusion is the definition of a clear-cut border between the Self and the Other. These borders are, in their connection with the past, seen as unchangeable. They build upon widely existent and internalized stereotypes and interpretations of culture and history. This includes the, in some EUropean countries widespread, image of the Turk and/or Muslim as a threat and fundamentally different. Those differences are constructed in an Orientalist tradition; hence the Other is seen as inferior to the Self. (Maderker 2007)

The Turkey question is generally framed as a decisive moment for the future of EUrope. Maderker (2007) talks, in the context of the German debate on Turkey, about its framing as a *Schicksalsfrage*. The decision on Turkey's in- or exclusion is generally perceived as a decision on EUrope's destiny. This construction is connected to a crisis perception: the EU and hence EUrope is seen in crisis. A possible accession of Turkey would mitigate or intensify this crisis. In the exclusive imagination of EUrope the crisis is often described in terms of overextension or overstraining. The admission of Turkey into the EU would be the last straw, which would mean the end of EUrope. It goes hand in hand with the construction of a contradiction between widening and deepening. Only one of these potential goals can be achieved, in this approach. It is argued that, if the EU continues the fast pace of the enlargement process, it could mean the end of further political and cultural integration. It could result in an EU which is nothing more than a free trade area. On the other hand there are, besides actors who would actually prefer such a reduction of EU-influence for the sake of national autonomy, visions of EUrope, which see the multicultural character of EUrope as a central chance to promote a new kind of identity. Baban & Keyman (2008) argue that Turkey could significantly add to this multicultural quality. Such a quality would give EUrope the chance to offer different solutions to i.e. 'cultural' or 'civilizational' conflicts. A EUrope, which comprehends Turkey, is often seen as a possible solution for the conflict between the Western and the Muslim worlds. Similarly to the achievement of an era of peace through cooperation within EUrope, cooperation with Muslim countries could bring a peaceful solution or rather avoid the escalation of this potential conflict. The handling of the Turkey-question could thereby promote a new international role and identity for EUrope. It would, in this approach, also bring a new self-understanding, which overcomes nationalist pledges

for cultural homogeneity and promotes a post-national era. This would deliver a certain EUropean originality, which is seen as necessary in order to promote EUropean identity. (Baban/Keyman 2008; Madeker 2007)

All in all it can be said that the Turkey question provokes a debate in which different visions of EUrope clash. Baban & Keyman (2008) note in this context that “the debate about Turkey is in essence a debate about the future of Europe in terms of its identity, its geography, its political and institutional structure, and its role in our globalizing world” (ibid.: 110). This framing of the Turkey-issue as a vital question may explain the high intensity of this debate in certain political arenas in EUrope. One of the central hypotheses of this paper is that the Turkey question not only provokes the clash of different imaginations of EUrope, but produces new imaginations and reconstructs old ones. In this chapter I reconstructed the literature which mainly elaborates on the role imaginations of EUrope play in the Turkey debate. In the upcoming empirical case study on the political debate in Germany, I want to show, what role the debate on Turkey plays for imaginations of EUrope.

5 Research Design and Methodology

5.1 Theoretical Approach: Critical Discourse Analysis

The approach of my thesis is based on the general understanding that the idea of EUrope is constructed through social processes. Hence, it is determined by different social actors. This means that I see EUrope as a socially constructed imagination. My goal is the de- and reconstruction of the historical processes, in which ideas of EUrope were crafted and established. I will specifically focus on the influence of processes related to the debate on the possible accession of Turkey into the EU. The process of crafting and establishing imaginations of EUrope can be described as discursive process. Hence, imagining EUrope can be labeled as a discourse, and approached through the utilization of discourse analysis. The notion of discourse, in this framing, was put forward by Michel Foucault, who utilized the term in crafting his discourse analysis. Thereby he intended to reconstruct representations of social phenomena. The concepts of discourse and discourse analysis were, following this, utilized and rebranded by a wide range of social scientists. It led to the establishment of various discourse analytical branches. The branch I will approach for my paper can be referred to as ‘Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)’. This choice is based on the consideration of its successful application in the reconstruction of imaginations of nation states and other social entities. Some members of this scientific branch contributed to the volume ‘Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis’ (Eds.: Wodak/Meyer 2009), which was a very useful introduction to the utilization of these approaches in my research context. In consequence, the further elaborations on the central terms and concepts of discourse analysis will follow the works out of the CDA-branch. Within this CDA-tradition I will follow the discourse historical approach (DHA). This was, amongst others, developed by the Viennese linguist Ruth Wodak. Its specific strength lies in the historical reconstruction of interdiscursive relationships. It was also successfully used in the analysis of identities.

To begin, it is first necessary to describe what I mean when I talk about ‘discourse’, since it is a term that can take various forms of meanings and contents: “discourse means anything from a historical monument, a lieu de mémoire, a policy, a political strategy, narratives in a restricted or broad sense of the term, text, talk, a speech, topic-related conversations per se. We find notions such as racist discourse, gendered discourse, discourses on un/employment, media discourse, populist discourse, discourses of the past and many more – thus stretching the meaning of discourse

from a genre to a register or style, from a building to a political programme” (Wodak/Meyer 2009: 2-3). In general it can be said that a discourse consists of some form of texts around a topic. This also means that “as an analytical construct, a ‘discourse’ always depends on the discourse analyst’s perspective” (Reisigl/Wodak 2009: 89). The delimiting of discourses is not a straight forward process. It does not follow any form of clear or objective borders. The texts that discourses are constituted by can take very diverse forms. Despite classical forms of text, it could for example also be a picture or statue. Texts or semiotic practices are relevant for a discourse analysis through the meaning they transport. Language is understood as a social practice, through which meaning is constructed. Discourses stand in a dialectical relationship with the social or specific social phenomena. The social determines the contents of discourses, but discourses also change the social or rather representations of it. The same dialectical relationship can be described between discourses and power; through constructing the social, discourses have an impact on power distribution. At the same time power distributions determine the things going on in discourses. Power does so through its ability to give certain actors the possibility of making a stronger impact on the course of a discourse, i.e. through some sort of socially recognized authority. Power is understood as a “systematic and constitutive element/characteristic of society” (Wodak /Meyer 2009: 9).

The DHA-perspective proposes a historical or chronological perspective to discourses, which makes intertextual and interdiscursive relationships visible. The term intertextual relationship points to the connections between different textual units. It leads to questioning how one text builds upon other texts. In taking on some elements of a past semiotic practice, these elements can become recontextualized. Elements which are established in another discursive context can be inserted into another context, related to another topic. Thereby they do not have to lose the discursive validity, they possessed in the original context. This particular phenomenon can be described by the term interdiscursive relationships. It also highlights that discourses should not be seen as closed entities. There are always countless connections to various societal or discursive elements outside the drawn borders of a discourse. With the fading out those relationships, it is possible to make a discursive representation or narrative seem simply as a given matter of course. Through the visualization of them, the DHA makes it possible to demystify those imaginations.

A central characteristic of CDA is a certain claim of being critical in its approach to discourses and social representations. This critical approach means at first that practitioners of CDA are asked to reflect on their own role in the discourse. They should challenge their own objectivity and make the goals and interests of their research known publicly. To take an impact on the analyzed discourse is not seen as undesirable or in opposition to scientific standards; it is, on the contrary, one of its central goals. CDA should further be critical through its deconstruction of discursive representations as unquestioned facts, and through demonstrating the interconnectedness of things and meanings. Those unquestioned characteristics of discursive representations are embedded in the CDA's notion of ideology; in this context ideology means a set of, mutually sustaining, definitions and understandings of certain things, which in effect produce and legitimize certain worldviews.

The realization of those ideologies is based on different discursive strategies. They are used by the actors of a specific discursive field, in order to exert legitimized influence. Hence, one way to analyze the workings of ideologies is the investigation and pointing out of those strategies. Reisigl & Wodak (2009) therefore propose five specific questions with which to approach the research material. They are related to five different types of discursive strategies:

1. "How are persons, objects, phenomena/events, processes and actions named and referred to linguistically? [related to strategy of nomination]
2. What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social actors, objects, phenomena/events and processes? [related to strategy of predication]
3. What arguments are employed in the discourse in question? [related to strategy of argumentation]
4. From what perspective are these nominations, attributions and arguments expressed? [related to strategy of perspectivization, framing or discourse representation]
5. Are the respective utterances articulated overtly; are they intensified or mitigated? [related to strategy of intensification/mitigation]" (ibid.: 93)

In order to ask and answer these questions Reisigl & Wodak further point to three different dimensions, which should be acknowledged in doing so: "after (1) having identified the specific *contents* or *topics* of a specific discourse, (2) *discursive strategies* are investigated. Then (3) *linguistic means* (as types) and the specific, context dependent *linguistic realizations* (as tokens) are examined" (ibid.: 93).

Before, but also during, conducting those steps of analysis, the research material should be gathered. The research objects of discourse analyses are, in the most general form, texts. The form of the texts of interest varies with, and depending on, the discourse of interest. What the typical text units in a specific analysis are can only be said for those specific contexts. Wodak and Meyer describe the CDA method of research and analysis as hermeneutic, rather than analytical-deductive. That means in this case, that there are no clear cut steps of research. The gaining of knowledge is, dependent on to the research interest, a rather circular process of alternating data collection and analysis. The process of data collection does not have to be terminated before the analysis. A way to structure the semiotic contents of discourses is to assign them to different genres. The term genre thereby stands for socially ratified ways of language use, which are connected to particular types of social action (Reisigl/Wodak 2009: 90). One of the first steps of a discourse analysis must be the identification of typical genres for the discourse of interest.

Despite the hermeneutic character of discourse analysis, which makes universally approachable ways of carrying it out impossible, Reisigl and Wodak (2009) propose an eight-step-programme. This is not a simple to-do-list, but only gives an overview on the different things, which might have to be done and considered, typically in a recursive way:


1. "Activation and consultation of preceding theoretical knowledge [...]"
2. Systematic collection of data and context information [...]"
3. Selection and preparation of data for specific analyses [...]"
4. Specification of the research question and formulation of assumptions [...]"
5. Qualitative pilot analysis [...]"
6. Detailed case studies [...]"
7. Formulation of critique [...]"
8. Application of the detailed analytical results" (ibid.: 96)

The first step was in parts already laid out in earlier sections of this paper (see. 2, 3 & 4). It is continued in the further parts of my paper, whereby it leads to the second step (see 6.1). Steps three and four are to a certain extent conducted as described in my introduction. They are, as step five, not entirely laid out in the thesis, although I will describe the way in which I carried this step out in the upcoming part of this chapter. The same is true for step six, although it is to a large extent illustrated in the description of my results (see 6.2). Step seven and step eight partly inspired my

conclusions (see 7). Reisigl and Wodak recommend that such a study should ideally be carried out by a team of researchers. However, they also acknowledge the possibility of carrying it out alone, under the condition of a reasonable and clear limitation of the research field and material for analysis. Hence it was an essential challenge to downsize the research field on which I approached my research question. I had to limit the sources of data to a manageable, yet significant, size. This proved to be quite a difficult task. I will describe the result of this process in the upcoming part of this chapter.

5.2 Empirical Approach

Here I will describe in detail the empirical case study with which I hope to answer my research question. The first thing to do must be the elaboration and description of the specific discourses that I am working with. I have to define, construct and circumscribe those discourses. The central discourse of interest relates to the topic of EUrope. I am interested in the interdiscursive relationships of this discourse, with the discourse surrounding the topic of Turkey-EU relationships. The discourses, of which I am interested, could (self-creation; following Figure 4.2 in Reisigl/Wodak 2009: 92) be pictured as follows:



Over time, various actors take part in both discourses by producing texts, which relate to the two topics. The arrows in Figure 3 point to the interconnectedness of various texts in the discourses. Thereby the text-producers take arguments out of prior texts, and recontextualize them. The central interest of my paper lies in the texts that can be placed in the overlap of those two discourses. It is also my job to reconstruct the arrows of influence coming from texts, which lie primarily within the

Turkey-EU discourse. The constraints of this drawing should not hide the fact that such arrows could also point in the other direction. Furthermore they also should be drawn to or rather from texts, which are primarily related to further discourses. These latter connections lie in the different topics that the text-authors utilize in their approach on the two discourses. In my case those topics could i.e. deal with questions of religion or human rights, which are both topics one could reconstruct their own discourses around. My final goal is to reconstruct, the way in which the texts from the Turkey-EU discourse, and the ones in-between the two discourses, influence texts lying primarily within the discourse on EUrope.

Before doing so, I had to put more thought into the circumscription of the discourses for my analysis. In general, the discourses contain every realized notion on these topics. For the EUrope discourse, this would include every possible semiotic practice, done in order to define and (re)construct imaginations of Europe, the EU or any other term EUrope is referred to with. The second discourse of my interest contains every argument and textual expression in the debate about the relationships between Turkey and the EU. This means that both discourses contain a field of discursive inputs, which could not possibly be managed in the context of a discourse analysis. Those inputs come from a huge range of different actors. They are realized in many different genres, over a long period of time. In order to approach my research question, it is hence necessary to restrict my analysis to the contributions of a rather small number of definable actors, a reasonable range of genres and relatively short time periods. My concrete restrictions are as follows:

- Actors: the German political parties 'Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD)', and the 'Christliche Demokratische Union (CDU)' in collaboration with its Bavarian sister party 'Christlich Soziale Union (CSU)'
- Genres: (public) plenary debates in the main national parliament, which would be the German Bundestag, and the political manifestos published by the parties. Furthermore I will consider related scientific work, in order to put these texts in their respective political and national contexts
- Time period: In general I want to focus on the time at which a possible admission of Turkey into the EU became a present political issue. To my knowledge, it was the late 1990s in advance of the acceptance of Turkey as official candidate country by the EU in 1999. In order to restrict my data retrieved from parliamentary debates to an assessable quantity, I will lay a

more specific focus on three different time periods, when three different issues were debated. First, I chose the debates around the opening of accession talks in late 2004 and early 2005. Second, I will focus on the debates about the Lisbon Treaty in late 2007 and early 2008. Third, I will take debates from the first half of 2011 into account.

Hence the material, upon which I will approach my research question, will consist of contributions by these two German political parties, in relation to the EUrope and Turkey-EU discourses. Out of these contributions I will take only those into account, which were realized in parliamentary debates or through political manifestos from the time on, when the acceptance of Turkey as an official EU-candidate began to be debated within the EU institutions and beyond. I will focus on debates in three specific time periods. This restriction, in my opinion, makes sense for a number of reasons.

The political parties, I chose to focus on, are for a range of reasons interesting as cases for my research question. First of all, they constitute more or less assessable entities, and consist of a limited range of relevant persons, who take part in the two discourses of interest. Secondly, they are required to deal with the discourse topics in their participation within the EUropean political field. They are required to discuss the Turkey-issue, and to formulate their perspective on EUrope. Another quality, which makes those parties interesting, is their rather privileged and powerful discursive position. They are able to reach a wide audience and enjoy a certain sort of discursive authority (especially in relation to the relatively high number of persons, officially or unofficially associated to the parties). Furthermore, they do not only enjoy discursive power, but also political power in their frequent participation in government. Thereby they can partly decide on the form of the EU, and in consequence, again, have an (indirect) impact on the discursive construction of EUrope. Their position of (temporary) executive power makes it furthermore interesting to reconstruct their imaginations of EUrope, to illustrate the effects they can have on party and government policies. A further quality, which makes those parties interesting for my case, is their claim of representing the 'center' of the political spectrum. The claim of being center parties is connected with the claim to represent the vast majority of public opinions in the particular nation states. In this role they might rather try to fit into established discursive positions on EUrope, without the explicit or strong interest in changing it (which might, more probably, be

the case for younger and smaller parties). With this hypothetical proximity to established discursive positions, I again will deal with the more powerful and hegemonic imaginations of EUrope. Amongst other reasons I chose Germany as a country-wise focus, because the debate on Turkey in Germany is rather controversial and intensive. It brings forward, otherwise rather small, differences between the parties in imagining EUrope. In consideration of respective literature, I will discuss the specific country-wise peculiarity in the discourses of interest later (see. 6.1). Furthermore, Germany is the biggest country of the EU, and hence exerts a lot of influence in the EU- and in world-wide discourses of my interest. Its relatively high discursive (and otherwise) power heightened my interest. A more practical aspect of this selection lies in my knowledge of the German language.

The next restriction I have to justify is one concerning the genres. First of all they, again, constitute an assessable and more or less easily accessible set of data. The plenary debates are transcribed and published via the Internet presence of the Bundestag. Furthermore, the form of parliamentary discussions matches the discourse analytic approach rather well. The connections in-between certain text contributions from the parliamentary debates are often rather obvious and explicit. Whenever it seems reasonable and necessary to follow discursive traces to texts from outside the parliament, I will try to reconstruct them with the help of scientific contributions or through their direct citation. Furthermore, it makes sense to focus on parliamentary debates because of the relatively wide range of different party actors, which take part in them. This is i.e. the case in terms of their regional affiliation, job specialization or their places in the party hierarchies. The party manifestos, as a result of an internal search for consensus, provide an additional back-up for the analysis of the party positions. I will take manifestos into account, which were published over the course of elections to the national and EUropean parliaments since the 1990s. Also the manifestos can be found on the Internet. In the analysis of manifestos, I will have to consider the political atmosphere during the time from which they originated.

Last but not least it was necessary to restrict the time period I will take into account. I will set this fictive zero-point, with the intensification of the debate about the possible accession of Turkey into the EU in the late 1990s. As described earlier (see 4.2), the debate on Turkey became noteworthy with the acceptance of Turkey as official enlargement-candidate by the EU in 1999 at the earliest, and in an more intensified

form around 2004. Out of practical and administrative reasons it would be impossible to include materials from all times in which the relationships between the EU (or its predecessors) and Turkey (or its predecessors) were discussed. It would lead me back to the end of World War Two at least, if not to the times of the Ottoman Empire and beyond. However, influences from beyond my time restriction cannot be neglected, i.e. because arguments, which refer to those times, are often heard in today's debates on EUrope and the EU-Turkey relationships. In the introduction of the results (see 6.1 & 6.2.1), and in a more general form in the prior literature-based chapters, I summarized these times and laid a base for comprehending their impact on current debates. My restriction simply means that I will put a stronger focus on the developments after the artificial, hence not arbitrary, starting point of my analysis. Furthermore, it is still impossible to include every parliamentary debate and statement on Turkey and imaginations of EUrope within this time restriction. For this reason I have to focus on relatively short time periods. Since I want to know how the debate on Turkey affected imaginations of EUrope, it seemed reasonable to start with a period when the Turkey question was at the center of political debates. This is definitely the case for the debates around the European Council in December 2004, when the decision regarding beginning accession talks stood on the agenda. The next focus lay on the time when the Lisbon Treaty dominated the Bundestag's debates. This was mostly the time between the signing of the treaty in December 2007 and its ratification by the German Bundestag in April 2008. Thereby different imaginations of EUrope were observable. In this way I intend to analyze and visualize the impact of the earlier Turkey debate on latter imaginations of EUrope. Last but not least I want to look into current debates on those two issues. Although neither of them stood in the center of German political debates in the first half of 2011, they were brought up in various contexts. The 'Arab Spring' or the bailouts of Greece and other EU-countries were just some of these contexts. Beyond the advances of having a further differentiation of contexts in which EUrope was constructed, this should give me an insight into the current situation and possible future developments.

5.3 Methods

5.3.1 Research

The first step of the empirical work is the accumulation of texts to analyze. As described earlier, the materials I will consult for my analysis are, first and primarily, parliamentary debates. Since the transcribed parliamentary debates are published on the web presence of the parliament – ‘www.bundestag.de’ –, these materials are easily accessible. The search function of the website further facilitated the gathering of material. In that manner I was able to filter and locate debates, concerned with the discourses on EUrope and Turkey-EUrope relationships, within the time periods I focused on. The search terms were thereby dependent on the specific sub-debates I wanted to access, and inspired by the main topics of these debates. For the 2004 debate, they are the German translations of, first, ‘Turkey/Turks/Turkish’ and ‘enlargement/accession’. In this way I culled debates in which the opening of accession talks with Turkey played a role at all. In the further course of my research I browsed through the texts in search of relevant material. I focused on texts which dealt with different imaginations of EUrope. On the other hand I tried to collect a range of data that represents the whole variety of arguments in debating if, when and under which conditions the EU should open accession talks with Turkey. I further restricted the research to the time period three months before and after the European Council on December 17th 2004, when the opening of accession talks was affirmed. In the end texts from twelve different parliamentary debates remained. Out of these transcripts I copied relevant paragraphs into text documents, sorted by party, date and speaker.

For the other time periods of analysis I went through the same process, with different search terms and a different focus. For the debate on the Lisbon Treaty in early 2008, the first search terms were i.e. ‘Lisbon’ or ‘European Constitution’. In this way I found the major debates, which took place on seven different dates in the German Bundestag. The time period reached from the signing of the treaty at the European Council of Lisbon on December 13th 2007, until its ratification by the Bundestag on April 24th 2008. Within those transcribed debates I focused, besides notions around i.e. EUropean identity, on references to the Turkey question or enlargement in general. For the debates in the first half of 2011, I basically combined the two prior search focuses. I searched for texts that dealt with Turkey, EU-enlargement, and further concepts, which are often utilized in imaginations of EUrope. Thereby I found

text fragments out of 16 debates. The topics of those debates varied dependent on different happenings in EUrope and around the globe, which initiated and inspired the members of parliament (MPs) to debate their imaginations of EUrope, and the Turkey question.

The text collection, I thereby developed, constituted the base for the further analysis. The word count thereby displayed following text quantities, for the respective time periods and political parties:

Party/Year	2004	2008	2011	Sum
SPD	5550	3850	4550	13950
CDU/CSU	9350	4000	5000	18350

Figure 4 (self-creation, text quantities in words)

The variability of text quantities already reflects a varied set of factors. In the case of 2004 it points to the fact that the conservatives were the prime-initiator of the debate on Turkey in a high intensity. It also points to the general observation that conservative politicians are more verbose in the illustration of their imaginations of EUrope then the social democrats. I will come back to some of these points in the course of the paper.

A further corpus of texts is constituted by the election manifestos that the parties published in the course of elections to the Bundestag and to the European Parliament. Through my Internet research I located all manifestos published in the course of those elections since 1987. This time included seven general elections in Germany: 1987, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2005 and 2009. The European Parliament was elected in 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009 (for the European elections 1989 the parties did not publish their own manifestos). In the case of general German elections the CDU and CSU published their manifestos together, while in the case of European elections they created separate ones. In the latter case I only integrated the CDU-manifestos into my analysis. Out of all these manifestos I, again, tried to filter out the, for my case, relevant paragraphs. I copied text fragments, which dealt with imaginations of EUrope or the Turkey question into text documents, sorted by year and party. Those fragments comprehended 5350 words in the conservative case, and 2800 words out of the SPD's manifestos.

5.3.2 Analysis

In the course of the further treatment of this material, I exposed it to a process of coding and categorization. This supplied me with a more compensated and well-arranged version of it. Since the analysis follows the principles of the DHA, as laid out by Reisigl & Wodak (2009), the same is true for the way I developed a corpus of different codes and categories, which consists of two levels. The first one refers to the respective topics and concepts, a text-fragment is about. The second is about the positions on the respective issue a statement represents. I also noted the position towards the in- or exclusion of Turkey within the respective imagination of EUrope. For positions including Turkey I added '++', for exclusive positions '--', and for unrelated or neutral arguments '+-' to the code. I further assigned the codes to sub-groups, which point to the debates they are mostly referring to. A first set of codes is mainly about constructions of EUrope, one is about takes on rather institutional aspects of the EU, another one about perspectives on Turkey, and a fourth one contains prognoses on consequences of a Turkish EU-accession. In this manner I want to carry forward the gradual compression of my results.

My view on codes or categories, or rather on their qualities and function, thereby to a large extent follows the suggestions of 'grounded theory'. According to Muckel (2011), grounded theory proposes a relatively flexible perspective on codes and categories. In contrast to other methodological proposals, it is not as important to exactly circumscribe and define what a category is about before the actual analysis. The set of categories, as well as their content, is and should be adaptable in the course of the analysis. The meaning and content of a respective category or code is exposed to a constant process of reflection. The changes, this reflection brings, can aim towards the content of existing categories, different codes and categories can be added, and others can be abolished. To begin, I started with the composition of a set of codes and categories, in consideration of the theoretical part and impressions in the research process. At this stage this seemed to summarize the central concepts that I recognized in imaginations of EUrope and positions towards Turkey. In the course of the analysis this set of around 30 codes, which contained roughly a 100 different sub-codes, was more or less tripled.

In the course of the analysis I assigned those codes to respective fragments of the empirical material that I had gathered. Since the codes often represent positions, which describe the poles of a spectrum of stances on an issue, the assignment to a

statement often stands for the relative closeness to a respective pole rather than for its exact congruence. This aspect illustrates the vagueness and uncertainty that the analysis, as a process of constant and repeated reflection, is characterized by. Since the different codes can overlap each other, and many do not contradict each other, I usually assigned more than one code to a text fragment. Rather than choosing the one, which fits best, in case of doubt I assigned all which seemed to fit. An assigned code thereby covered up a cohering statement, which more or less expressed the position the code stands for. If a MP brought up an issue on more than one occasion within his speech, it is possible that I assigned a code more than once to this speech. I added the list of codes and categories, as well as a further description of it, and the quantities of their assignment to the research material, in the appendix.

In the course of the analysis I utilized the computer software ATLAS.ti, which is a program developed to assist qualitative analyses. The benefits and restrictions of this program and scientific software in general are i.e. summarized by Konopásek (2011). She notices that the software cannot take over the analytical work from the researcher, but it can be of great help in organizing the corpus of textual material. ATLAS.ti was developed in consideration of different processes of coding. Hence, it substantially helped me to realize the concept of analysis I just laid out. After inserting the texts into ATLAS.ti and importing the corpus of codes, it enabled me to carry out the assignment of the codes to the material. It furthermore helped me to quantify the application of respective codes, and thereby provided me with a first inkling of a possible result and the practicability of different codes. Through the well-arranged listing of applied codes ATLAS.ti helped me to get an overview of the material. It also enabled me to connect different codes with the linguistic realizations of it through the different speakers (for further information see www.atlasti.com).

After applying the set of codes and categories on the corpus of texts, the next step of the analysis must lie in the gradual abstraction of results. I reflected on the connections between different codes, and exposed these observations to the analytical questions presented earlier. Through the help of other scientific discussions on the debates of interest, I tried to arrange my results within the wider context of the debates. Through the chronological reconstruction of the debates on EUrope and Turkey, I want to show the intertextual and discursive relationships between the texts I analyzed.

6 Results

Through the application of the methods and analytical tools that I just described, I intend to achieve a closer understanding of the different debates, which influence the answers to my research question. Besides the theoretical background, I presented in the first part of the thesis, and the empirical material I collected, I also have to take the German national context, in which the debates are placed, into account. I will discuss different influences, like the political party landscape, different sets of media or economic aspects. Other factors are based on different approaches to the German national identity, imaginations of EUrope, and perspectives on Turkey. I want to describe some of these factors in the upcoming part, by introducing the most important scientific assumptions about the German debates on EUrope and Turkey.

Based on this introduction, I will present a more detailed reconstruction of the different party positions on EUrope, and their interconnectedness with the debate on Turkey. I structured this section in a chronological manner. The clear focus lies on the three debates and/or periods to which I restricted the research for parliamentary debates. Based on scientific literature and the parties' election manifestos, I also reconstructed the most important events despite my focus. This presentation is supposed to reconstruct and illustrate how the two major discourses of interest developed over time. It should also show, how they are interwoven with each other, and point out intertextual- and discursive relationships. In this way I want to reconstruct how the debate on Turkey influenced imaginations of EUrope. Thereby I intend to demystify those imaginations of EUrope, i.e. in showing their context-dependency and processual character.

6.1 German National Context

In the following section I wish to give an introduction to the German debate on EUrope and Turkey. The German debates on those two issues have very different characters, despite the big overlap between them. For the case of German imaginations of EUrope, scientific commentators recognize a wide consensus between the public elites and important political actors. In looking at the relatively intensive Turkey debate very controversial positions come to the fore. The Turkey debate thereby makes the restrictions of the consensus on EUrope apparent.

Before taking a deeper look at more current German imaginations of EUrope, I want to give a brief introduction to their longer history. It is marked by a high quantity of shifts and changes in imaginations of EUrope, with the end of World War Two as an extreme, and so far last, maximum. Starting in medieval times, Spohn (2002) shows the importance of religion in German imaginations of Europe. Back then Europe was often equated with the Western area of Roman Catholic Christianity, as opposed to the Eastern spheres of Greek Orthodoxy. This perspective changed with the development of Protestantism, which led to a new division of Europe right through German principalities. This triggered the development of opposed versions of Europe and the German role in it. The opposition is determined by confession, and the Prussian and Habsburg Empires played the roles of respective centers, which represented these Europes. This division was partly relativized and challenged by ideas of the Enlightenment, like secularism. That, again, heightened the variety of significant German imaginations of Europe. (Spohn 2002)

The German perspectives on Europe were always connected to, and determined by, different constellations of power in Europe, and the German position within those. When German states were in a rather weak position, i.e. in relation to the rise of the big Atlantic colonial powers, Europe was utilized to accentuate the superiority of German states as European in comparison to non-Europeans. The re-strengthening of German states, in economic and political terms, led to an image of Europe as a peace order between more or less equal powers. This later version, in combination with Enlightenment ideas, also triggered the development of ideas about a European common bond and solidarity within a 'family of peoples'. With the French Revolution, republicanism and Napoleonistic imperialism, new imaginations of Europe arose. The French ambitions were, on the one hand, framed as an incarnation of a new universal and unified Europe. On the other hand they threatened the idea of

German particularism and the development of a common German language. This side was represented and triggered by new German nationalism and its supporters.

At the turn of the 19th century, Spohn (2002) observed the intensification of a development, in which “coexisting layers of a crystallizing German identity found their expression in differing images of Europe” (ibid.: 291). One of those images saw Europe as a power balance containing a German federation. A second one saw the chance for a renewed Christian Europe, with Germany as its core representative. A third one defined Germany’s role as a mediator between Western European modernism and Eastern traditionalism. The German political reality, with the failure of republican revolutions, the establishment of a strong and centralized monarchy, and economic growth, triggered the emergence of a different imagination of Europe. Thereby Europe was imagined as a power equilibrium. In this mindset, and in cooperation with the Habsburg-Empire, an Austro-German dominance in Europe was framed as an ideal. This development ended in the First World War, and a radically new situation for Germany in Europe. Germany was now, in comparison to other European powers, in a rather weak and inferior position. On the other hand, the war triggered the development of a widely shared German identity and the establishment of a democratic federal republic. These developments advocated very different imaginations of Europe; one side placed Germany as one of many parts in a Europe of nation states, while another developed the idea of German superiority through an aggressively exclusionary nationalism. The latter version gained power through National Socialism. It led Germany into the next World War and towards a new radical shift in imagining Europe.

By looking at the development of German imaginations of Europe prior to 1945, it becomes clear that they were significantly influenced by different, i.e. political, developments in the German national context. Common to all those versions was a strong connection of the ways in which Germany and Europe were imagined. This connection becomes visible in the parallelism between imaginations of Europe and Germany, which is often observable. Thereby the aspect of egocentrism played a crucial role. Europe was often pictured with a German center and a Germanized Europe was seen as ideal. This discourse was radically disrupted by the end of World War Two. Now the German discourse was based on the trauma of their own guilt, and a consensually perceived need to break with this past. German nationalism had to be radically converted. The solution was found in imagining a EUropeanized Germany,

instead of a Germanized Europe. This was done in a Western and Eastern European version, and, again, there was a parallelism in imaginations of Germany and Europe. This time it widely lacked the aspect of egocentrism, since the parallelism was due to the commonality of a rather involuntary divide. In the further course of this chapter I will restrict myself widely to Western German perspectives on Europe, since they were the ones, which achieved dominance after German reunification. (Spohn 2002, Paterson 2011)

Although the German debate on EUrope after 1945 contained a range of dissents and controversies, and hence a variety of imaginations of EUrope, the overall discourse is described as relatively undisputed and steady. There was, and is, a wide political consensus towards a strong role for EUrope in formulating German identity. The ways of imagining EUrope played a determining role for imaginations of Germany. This consensus was, in the words of Marcussen & Roscher (2000), marked by “German concepts of a social market economy, democracy and political federalism”, which “were central elements in the discourse of exiled German elites during World War II and among the entire political class subsequently. Ideas about European political order resonated well with these concepts. In addition, as a nationalist view of Germany was thoroughly discredited by militarism and Nazism, Europe provided an alternative identity construction and, thus, a way out” (ibid.: 349). Besides emphasizing the consensuality on the issue, it has to be mentioned that this dominant German version of EUrope was, to a large extent, the conservative, or rather CDU’s, one. It was represented by Konrad Adenauer and pan-European visions about a united continent based on Christianity, democracy and a social market economy.

The roles of the central Others were – besides the German Nazi-past – played by communist ideologies and Eastern Europe. This aspect was responsible for the major gap between German imaginations of EUrope, whereby the SPD-version of EUrope did not exclude socialism. It furthermore criticized the dominant conservative EUrope as too small, since it excluded Eastern Europe, and in consequence also Eastern Germany. The SPD-perspective blamed the conservative one, for contradicting the ideal of German reunification. This initial disaccord in German imaginations of EUrope found its closure, through the failure of the SPD-vision to persuade big fractions of the German electorate. The marginalized position of the socialist imagination of EUrope was endorsed through repeated election defeats of the SPD. In the late 1950s this led to a change of actors within the SPD and a different

attitude towards Europe. This new attitude – represented by Willy Brandt – was very close to the conservative one. It supported the social market economy, and the form of the, already ongoing, European integration process. Since this time Marcussen & Roscher (2000), as well as Paterson (2011), attest a continuing consensus within the German political elite in imagining Europe, which survived repeated shifts of governmental power. Also German unification, which could have led to a new and more self-determined imagination of Germany, did not change the perspective on Europe and the role Germany should have in it. Marcussen & Roscher conclude that critical junctures in the perception of national identity, and hence Europe, were widely absent from the political elite's discourses. The only relevant crisis of this kind took place within the SPD, and ended in the assimilation of the party's perspective on Europe, to the dominant ideal, which was crafted by conservatives.

The imaginations of Europe in reality were however never that plain. For example the subordination of Germany in Europe often is relativized through the claim for German leadership. This is, i.e. according to Paterson (2011), usually not formulated aggressively and is contextualized through noting the importance of French-German partnership for Europe, as shown by a glance at election manifestos, below:

*"The core of this Europe is and will remain the Franco-German friendship."
(SPD 1987)ⁱ*

"The Franco-German friendship stays [...] the engine of integration and key to European security." (CDU/CSU 1994)ⁱⁱ

A further relativization of the German consensus on Europe becomes obvious when looking at fields beyond the political elites. Although this attitude often accords with public opinion, the political elite has not always restricted its pan-European agenda to it. Eurobarometer data shows, that the German public opinion on Europe is, in comparison to the political elite, less enthusiastic and definite. In spring 2011 only 38% of the German interviewees saw the EU as something rather positive. This rate is in the lower midfield in relation to other European populations. The strength of the pro-Europe attitude in German political elites is for example shown in its, quite unambiguous, support for introducing the Euro-currency. That is especially peculiar in consideration of the important role, the 'Deutsche Mark' played for German

ⁱ original German version: "Kernstück dieses Europas ist und bleibt die deutsch-französische Freundschaft." (SPD 1987)

ⁱⁱ original German version: "Die deutsch-französische Freundschaft bleibt [...] Motor der Integration und Schlüsselfaktor europäischer Sicherheit." (CDU/CSU 1994)

identity constructions. The popularity of the 'Deutsche Mark', as a symbol for the strength and stability of the German economy, was also reflected by majoritarian skepticism within the German population in the run-up to the introduction of the Euro. The political elite chose nonetheless the EUropean aspect of German identity over the popular old currency. This stands as an example for a potentially conflictive and unpopular EU-policy, which passed without a very intense political debate. On the other hand Paterson (2011) sees a diminishing of the German elite's consensus on EUrope, or at least of its unquestioned character, since the 1980s. This diminishing is also due to the perception of Germany's role as EUrope's paymaster in public opinion. The consequences of the current Euro-crises, for the status of German pro-EUropeanism, might be particularly peculiar, due to this perception. (Eurobarometer 2011; Paterson 2011; Risse et.al. 1999)

The general consensus in favor of a strong role for EUrope, which also covers the general ideals of political and economic organization, should not deceive that, within the political elite, there still are varieties in imagining EUrope. Between different political orientations, the base of EUrope is seen in different aspects. The ejection of socialism from the SPD's imagination of EUrope does i.e. not mean that the parties' views on the role that EUrope should play in redistributing wealth, do not differ. Furthermore, as i.e. outlaid by Spohn (2002), the conservative version more often bases EUrope on a historic heritage and a common culture, which is often represented through Christendom. Thereby a skeptical perspective towards the EUropeanness of Eastern Orthodox countries, and a prevalent exclusion of non-Christian ones, comes to the fore. Another, more progressive and inclusive, version sees universally perceived values as defining factors of a secular and multi-cultural EUrope. This side, which is often represented through the SPD or the Green Party, often struggles with the definition of legitimately assessed boundaries, in order to advocate some kind of identifiability of EUrope.

Those still existent factions between imaginations of EUrope are very present in debating the Turkey question. The issue of a possible accession of Turkey into the EU is hence a clear exception, of the overall consensual spirit in German debates on EUrope. It uncovers discrepancies between political actors, in imagining EUrope. Therefore it is debated very intensively and extensively. The issue is of high relevance in political debates, and, also outside the political field, widely discussed. The width of the debate constantly increased during the last decades. Until the early 1990s a

Turkish EU accession was not talked about much, outside the respective scientific branches. Especially towards the 1999-decision on the Turkish candidacy status, this changed a lot. It reached the political debate, and grew further in popularity. With 2002 most analysts see the Turkey debate reaching the status of a key issue in German political debating and campaigning, which is also debated between laypeople.

In looking at the principal performers of the German debate on Turkey, quite a high variety comes to the fore. Actors out of politics, the media, science, religion, or economic elites bring in their perspectives. The supporting side for a general possibility of Turkish membership is, in the political arena, represented by the SPD and the Green Party. Those two parties formed the governing coalition, when an intensive Turkey debate set in. The, then oppositional, CDU/CSU represents the opposite position. They widely oppose the general possibility of an EU enlargement process towards Turkey. The further parties of the German parliament, the FDP (Free Democratic Party, liberals) and 'Die Linke' (The Left, left-wing), are usually described as rather pro-Turkey. That is especially peculiar in case of the FDP, since it is an exception of their general ideological and political affinity to the conservatives. Besides the general congruency, of the pro- and anti-Turkey sides with the political party landscape, it also should be mentioned that those frontiers are relatively porous. There are actors of the CDU, who see a Turkish accession as quite positive, i.e. out of a pro-NATO or economic perspective, while some SPD-politicians accord with anti-Turkey positions. Within the conservative party it was especially the Bavarian CSU-branch who argued against the Turkish accession in the most explicit and extreme way. (Große Hüttmann 2005)

Especially the anti-Turkey side that very often referred to contributions from the scientific field, which otherwise is seen in an ideological affinity to the Turkey-friendly political left. Here two historians built the front line, in constructing an exclusive imagination of Europe, in respect to Turkey, on cultural and historical terms. Thereby they find support, but also much criticism, from other fields in which the Turkey debate takes place. One of the most important fields is the media, where comments on the Turkey question are the norm, rather than the exception. In looking at the debate in all those fields, the German disunity in respect to a Turkish EU membership gains approval. Also the public opinion, as shown through surveys, confirms the image of German polarization on the Turkey question. When Germans

in 2008 were asked, what they think about a Turkish EU accession, once Turkey complies with all the set conditions, only 35 % are rather in favor, while 63 % are not. Although public skepticism towards Turkey is existent throughout EUrope, it is especially high in the German case. An indicator of the high relevance and polarization, of the Turkey issue in Germany, are the, in comparison very low, 2 %, who do not know what to answer to this question. (Eurobarometer 2008)

The debate thereby did not focus much on the issue of the form of the enlargement process towards Turkey, but on the question about the general possibility of a Turkish EU membership. It is more or less beyond debate, that Turkey should not be admitted in the short-term, and that there are many shortcomings of the Turkish compliance with relevant criteria. It is also widely agreed, that the EU itself is not ready for such a step in the very near future. Disagreements come to the fore, in questioning the general possibility of a Turkish middle- or long-term accession. Thereby the cultural and historical belonging of Turkey to EUrope is talked about, as well as questions of the Turkish advance in fulfilling the accession criteria. The in- or exclusion of Turkey, in imaginations of EUrope, varies thereby between, amongst others, geopolitical, political, historical or cultural frames. It is interwoven with the debate on Turkish migrants in Germany, and worries about the economic, and otherwise, security of Germany. The political debate is full of reciprocal allegations of dishonesty, foolery and irresponsibility. The decision, on Turkey's in- or exclusion, is generally perceived as a decision on EUrope's destiny. This construction is connected to a crisis perception: the EU and hence EUrope is seen in crisis. A Turkish accession would mitigate or intensify this crisis. (Maderker 2008; Walter 2008; Wimmel 2006)

6.2 German Debates on Turkey & EUrope

6.2.1. pre-2004

The German debate on the EU accession of Turkey was not always as intense and important, as it has been since the 2000s. The reason for this growth in popularity is often attributed to the fact that a Turkish accession did not, since the association agreement in 1963, ever seem realistic. The political condition of Turkey did not nearly accord with EUropean standards, and the question was therefore seen as rather theoretical. With Turkey's political stabilization around 2000, and a relatively committed reformism, the answer to this theoretical question about the general possibility of a Turkish EU-membership, became one with realistic political consequences. Backed by this perspective the intensification of the Turkey-debate in Germany becomes more understandable. (Große Hüttmann 2005)

The growth in popularity also induced the relative high originality and variety of the debate around the issue in Germany. Previously, the issue was often determined by political circumstances beyond Turkey itself. Until 1990 this circumstance was primarily the Cold War. Turkey was mainly seen in its role as loyal ally, and bulwark against Soviet Communism. EUrope was mainly defined in opposition to the Soviet Union and Communism, and Turkey was included within this dominant construction. Turkey was, due to its exposed geographical position, important in its role as guardian of the Dardanelles. Walter (2008), in his reconstruction of the German Turkey debate in German newspapers, sees on the one hand a clear inclusion within EUrope. On the other hand, back then Turkey was often positioned at the margins of the continent. This goes hand in hand with the construction of a certain difference, between (EUropean) Germany and Turkey, in aspects besides geopolitics. In looking at frames like democratization and civil rights, a certain imperfection of Turkey's EUropeanness was constructed. This was often seen in connection to the – perceived in an Orientalist style – relatively unEUropean Turkish culture and religion. On the other hand Turkey was also seen as a positive example for a nation, which voluntarily wishes to go down the path of democratization.

In conclusion, the German discourse on Turkey in the Cold War period was relatively ambivalent. There was always skepticism, in respect to the honesty and range, of Turkish 'Westernization'. Turkey was and is pictured as divided between the relatively modern (and EUropean) seeming elite, and Muslim (and therefore unEUropean) masses. Turkey was seen as threatened by two scenarios: the

infiltration by Communist ideology, and the uprising of the primitive masses. The uncertainty about Turkey's Europeanness, in looking at Turkish democratization or culture, thereby did not usually stand in an interdiscursive relationship with the debate on a Turkish EEC-membership. Imperfections of Turkey's Europeanness were overshadowed by the need, to have Turkey as a supporting part of Europe in the Cold War context. It was therefore seen as Europe's responsibility to keep Turkey on its side. This motivated the association of Turkey to the EEC, although full membership for the moment was unrealistic. (Walter 2008)

Towards 1990 the overall dominance of the USSR as Other shrunk and other aspects became important when discussing Turkey. Now, rather than its neighborhood with Russia, the geographical and otherwise (i.e. cultural) proximity, to various troubled spots in the region, gained importance. Turkey hence was still seen as an important actor for the stabilization of the region. The prevalent geopolitical inclusion of Turkey into Europe, triggered through the Cold War context, was nonetheless challenged in its relevance by other aspects. This led to a diversification of the perspectives on Turkey-Europe relations, through a growth of their interdiscursive relationships beyond the geopolitical frame. It went hand in hand with an ever growing German attention towards Turkey during the 20th century. In particular, the possible economic consequences of a Turkish EEC membership gained attention. Besides the chances that a Turkish inclusion could offer, the main topic was a potential increase of Turkish labor migrants in Germany.

The relatively large Turkish Diaspora in Germany is one of the main reasons for the significant growth of German attention towards Turkey. This development goes back to the successful development of the German economy after World War Two. Germany was, in the eyes of many analysts, one of the biggest beneficiaries of European integration, in terms of economic growth. That soon led to a labor shortage and the recruitment of Turkish '*Gastarbeiter*' (*guest workers*). The German government, in cooperation with German corporations and the Turkish government, hired Turkish workers due to a shortage of labor. These workers were envisaged to stay for a restricted space of time, but it did not work out in this way. By 2006, nearly two million Turkish citizens, and more than half a million ethnic Turks with German citizenship, were living in Germany. This outnumbers every other EU country by far. The debate on ethnic Turks in Germany is quite intense and important. It often frames Turks in Germany as problem in terms of the lack of integration. It also

contains aspects of culturalism or racism. For example in 2010, this was shown through the popularity of Thilo Sarrazin's assumptions on the 'statistic inferiority' of Turkish or Muslim immigrants. The image of Turkish labor migrants, as relatively alien to Europe, is partly also assigned to Turkey itself. (Schaefer et.al.: 2005; Walter 2008; Washington Post 2010)

Another important factor in the German Turkey debate can be seen in the new role Islam played in imaginations of Europe. Since 1978, when the Islamist revolution in Iran took place, Islam(ism) rose in relevance as Europe's defining Other. The Iranian Revolution heightened the perceived importance of the threat of Islamization in Turkey. It boosted skepticism about the compatibility of Islam with European values. Demonstrations by Turkish students, against the ban of headscarves for women in the 1980s, were partly interpreted as an advance of Islam into Turkish elites and politics. The German attention towards those demonstrations, which often frames the demonstrators as opponents of Turkish Europeanization, is connected to the often existent exclusion of Islam from imaginations of Europe. The importance of Islam, in representing non-Europeaness, went through ups and downs in the following two decades. It did not however experience the relevance Communism had, until the 9/11 terrorist attacks of 2001. Since then it has become one of the major frames, in defining what Europe is (not) about, and thereby significantly effected perspectives on Turkey. (Walter 2008)

Besides growing skepticism towards Turkey in Germany, at the end of the Cold War, it was generally still seen to be on the way (from Islam) to Europe. There was – i.e. due to geopolitical intentions – a general opposition towards an explicit exclusion of Turkey from Europe. Excluding frames, like cultural or religious ones, were, according to Walter (2008), not often applied to debates about a possible Turkish EEC/EU membership. The strength of factors, such as geopolitics and security, in constructing Europe, can also be seen in the election manifestos of the SPD and CDU. References to Europe in 1987 were most importantly framed through the Cold War context, and Europe was mainly seen as a peace project. Both parties constructed a strong connection between the European and German development in this context. This is for example realized in the following ways:

“The division of Germany only can be superseded in a European peace order” (SPD 1987)ⁱ

“We want to overcome the inhuman division, caused by Soviet imperialism, and work towards a state of peace in Europe, in which the German people in free self-determination regains its unity.” (CDU/CSU 1987)ⁱⁱ

EUrope, at least in looking at the EEC, was seen as a political union, which defined itself through the opposition to war and the USSR. While the CDU had an explicit focus on the second negative, the SPD limited itself mostly to the first frame. Turkey was however – though not often explicitly mentioned – part of this, then dominant, version of EUrope. The strength of geopolitical frames in imagining EUrope did not only become weaker up until the end, but also after the end, of Cold War. The following figure shows the changing share of the codes ‘peace order’, ‘EU’s foreign policy’ and ‘Othering (Cold) War’, of all the codes, I assigned to the election manifestos of CDU/CSU and SPD over the years since 1987:




Figure 5 (self-creation)

This shows that the interdiscursive relationship of imaginations of EUrope to issues related to geopolitical discourses, relatively constantly became weaker. In this geopolitical frame EUrope included Turkey. Since this frame became weaker when discussing EUrope, this was more often challenged, and different aspects were more

ⁱ original German version: “Die Teilung Deutschlands kann nur in einer europäischen Friedensordnung aufgehoben werden“ (SPD 1987)

ⁱⁱ original German version: “Wir wollen die menschenverachtende, vom sowjetischen Imperialismus verursachte Teilung überwinden und auf einen Zustand des Friedens in Europa hinwirken, in dem das deutsche Volk in freier Selbstbestimmung seine Einheit wiedererlangt.“ (CDU/CSU 1987)

prominently brought into the debate on a Turkish EU accession. The Cold War did restrict the influence of other – potentially excluding – aspects, in imagining EEurope within the debate about Turkey. Since the role of opposition to (Cold) war in the construction of EEurope constantly diminished after 1990, approaches to EEurope became more diverse. Different aspects gained relevance in defining EEurope and its qualities. Thereby the role of economic cooperation and prosperity was often given prominence. In this economic context the SPD formulated a vision of EEurope, based on social equality and solidarity, combined with further values:

“The European model relies on freedom, democracy and human rights, workers’ rights and a social, and ecological, market economy.” (SPD 1998)ⁱ

CDU/CSU accorded with the notion of a social market economy as a representative quality of EEurope. Besides this, the conservatives formulated interdiscursive connections to questions like history, culture or religion in their approach to EEurope. In the course of the European elections 1999, this approach also entered the CDU’s election manifesto:

“We Europeans have common roots for many centuries. Through history, culture, religion, tradition and the understanding of values we are interconnected in many ways.” (CDU 1999)ⁱⁱ

This is the first such argument I found within the conservative manifestos I analyzed. Furthermore, the occurrence of rather skeptical notions towards EEurope can be connected to the end of the Cold War. It reduced the pressure against the formulation of this kind of skepticism. While the SPD in their manifestos widely spared this kind of rhetoric, CDU/CSU more explicitly formulated their skepticism towards too much power accumulation on the EEuropean level and an often detected elitism in the EU institutions. Those sentiments were also present before the end of the Cold War, but rose in prominence since then. In general both parties nonetheless clearly stayed pro-European. CDU/CSU wrapped EUroskeptic sentiments in the notion of subsidiarity rather than national(ist) autonomy, and tried to keep a distance from reactionary German nationalism beyond all doubt.

ⁱ original German version: “Das europäische Modell setzt auf Freiheit, Demokratie und Menschenrechte, auf die Rechte der Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmer und auf die soziale und ökologische Marktwirtschaft.” (SPD 1998)

ⁱⁱ original German version: “Wir Europäer haben seit vielen Jahrhunderten gemeinsame Wurzeln. In Geschichte, Kultur, Religion, Tradition und Werteverständnis sind wir in vielfältiger Hinsicht miteinander verbunden.” (CDU 1999)

The frame of peace order in the 1990s was recontextualized within the debate on Eastern enlargement. The vision of a 'united' EUrope went hand in hand with that of a united Germany. That which had once seemed impossible, now became reality. Its perfection through the accession of the ECECs was made into the consequential goal. This goal was advocated by both big political parties simultaneously, and was also placed in their election manifestos:

"CDU and CSU are therefore committed, to a powerful and purposeful advancement of the process of European unification. The European Union is centerpiece of a stable peace and freedom order." (CDU/CSU 1994)ⁱ

"Europe reached a crossroads: Each of our countries is too small, to possibly solve the big problems alone. Only together we are strong. Therefore, we Social Democrats say yes to the European Union." (SPD 1994b, European election)ⁱⁱ

Both parties had a positive attitude towards the enlargement. It was seen as a defining moment for EUrope, and as an incarnation of a EUrope defined by peace and stability, common values and prosperity. The ECECs were seen as approaching this status of EUropeanness, which should have been supported and completed through their accession to the EU. Thereby the role of the EU in representing the dominant imaginations of Europe becomes obvious. With the approximating realization of enlargement, both parties more often formulated skepticism towards the achievements of the ECECs. That was accompanied by the endorsement of transitional periods in aspects, where German national interests were seen to be endangered. This skepticism was hence connected to the integral role that national identity, in comparison to EUropean solidarity, still played. This was, especially since their temporary displacement from government in 1998, more accurate for CDU/CSU, while the SPD stuck to a, widely unblemished, pro-EUropean and pro-enlargement position. In the context of the EU's Eastern enlargement, the image of a contradiction between the enlargement and further integration of EUrope gained popularity. In 2002 it also found entry into the conservative election manifesto:

"The enlargement of the EU must neither overstrain the capability of the accession candidate nor the integrative power of the European Union and its

ⁱ original German version: "CDU und CSU sind daher entschlossen, den Prozeß der europäischen Einigung kraftvoll und zielstrebig voranzubringen. Die Europäische Union ist der Kern einer stabilen Friedens- und Freiheitsordnung." (CDU/CSU 1994)

ⁱⁱ original German version: "Europa steht am Scheideweg: Jedes unserer Länder ist zu klein, um die großen Probleme allein lösen zu können. Nur gemeinsam sind wir stark. Deshalb sagen wir Sozialdemokraten ja zur Europäischen Union." (SPD 1994b, European election)

member countries. Flexible, time-wise differentiated by branch and region, and sufficiently long transition periods are necessary, until free movement of workers, services, and freedom of establishment may be fully granted.” (CDU/CSU 2002)ⁱ

This notion was to a large extent apportioned, and also inspired, by the Turkey question. The question on the general possibility of a Turkish EU membership, and on Turkey’s EUropeanness, were now openly and explicitly referred to more often. Towards the turn of the Millennium the German debate on Turkey continued to grow in width and variety, and became more polarized. Since the early 2000s it is, also beyond the political and otherwise elites, one of the most popular political topics. There was a clearly visible polarization between including and excluding positions, and the Turkey question was generally seen as a decisive moment for the development of EUrope. In 2002 the issue also expanded into the general election manifesto of CDU/CSU for the first time:

“Turkey is a reliable ally. Its strategic role again grew in changed security conditions. We want to promote a European orientation of Turkey. We want Turkey to economically, politically and institutionally be closely connected with the European Union outside a membership.” (CDU/CSU 2002)ⁱⁱ

Although the CDU tried to approach Turkey in a rather positive way, they made it clear that Turkey was seen as a partner, rather than part, of EUrope. The conservative advance of relatively clear and definite exclusion was probably to a large extent made possible through their position of parliamentary opposition. The SPD, on the other side, took part in the EUropean decision-making process which brought Turkey closer to a seemingly realistic membership. They could and did not distance themselves from this position. In reaction to the conservative skepticism they had to explain their position not only within the EUropean institutions, but also in the German public field. On the other side Große Hüttmann (2005) comes to the conclusion, that it was not exploited very much in election campaigning. This is especially surprising in the case of CDU/CSU, who – also in consideration of the later

ⁱ original German version: “Die Erweiterung der EU darf weder die Leistungsfähigkeit der Beitrittskandidaten noch die Integrationskraft der Europäischen Union und ihrer Mitgliedsländer überfordern. Flexible, zeitlich nach Branchen und Regionen differenzierte und ausreichend lange Übergangsfristen sind notwendig, bis Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit, Niederlassungs- und Dienstleistungsfreiheit in vollem Umfang gewährt werden können.” (CDU/CSU 2002)

ⁱⁱ original German version: “Die Türkei ist ein verlässlicher Bündnispartner. Ihre strategische Rolle ist unter den veränderten Sicherheitsbedingungen nochmals gewachsen. Wir wollen eine europäische Orientierung der Türkei fördern. Wir wollen die Türkei wirtschaftlich, politisch und institutionell außerhalb einer Mitgliedschaft eng mit der Europäischen Union verbinden.” (CDU/CSU 2002)

official relationships of potentially conservative-led government with Turkey – flinched from adding too much to the polarization of the debate. Although CDU/CSU still were one of the most prominent anti-Turkey forces in EUrope, they – as well as the German debate in general – did not reach the grade of radicalism and emotionalism observable in other EUropean countries. The issue nonetheless continued to stay one of the most polarized ones of German debates on EUrope. It also continued to gain relevance in German contestation with, and construction of, imaginations of EUrope. In 2004 it reached a peak in debating the opening of accession talks with Turkey. That was also the time, when a Turkish EU membership seemed most realistic. (Große Hüttmann 2005, Walter 2008)

Between the end of the Second World War and the start of my research period the interdiscursive relationships, between the discourse around Turkey-EU relationships and the one about EUrope, were for a long time dominated by geopolitical frames. Thereby Turkey was included within the West, and also within EUrope. Towards and after the end of the Cold War the dominance of those frames became weaker. Other aspects of imaginations of EUrope, which became more diverse in general, gained relevance in debating the Turkey-EU relationships. The interdiscursive relationships of interest now more often contained aspects like democratic standards, economics, or culture. Also other aspects of Turkey gained importance when judging its potential EUropeanness. The perceived, i.e. cultural, difference between Germany and Turkey was brought into a direct relationship with the question of a potential EU accession of Turkey. The formulated Self-Other relationships between EUrope and Turkey became more diverse. Despite the segmentary or encompassing inclusion of Turkey within EUrope (see 2.4), also the grammar of Othering gained relevance in discussions about Turkey. With the intensification of the debate on Turkey in Germany, also its relevance for imaginations of EUrope rose. Subsequently, I will reconstruct the debate on Turkey in the parliamentary plenum. Thereby I want to illustrate different lines of argumentation, as well as their interconnectedness with constructions of EUrope.

6.2.2 Opening Accession Talks with Turkey

On December 17th 2004 the EUropean head of states met in Brussels, to decide on the opening of accession talks with Turkey. Germany was represented through the SPD-led government around Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, and took the role of a passive supporter for Turkey. The oppositional conservatives could not have their critical voices heard at the EU summit. The decision at the EUropean level was advanced, and was also followed, by intense debates in Germany. They were also held within the plenary sessions of the German Bundestag. Mostly the conservatives encouraged plenary debates on Turkey, which is visible when looking at the quantities of conservative contributions. CDU/CSU-politicians account for 9350 words, I classified as relevant for the debate in the Bundestag, while this number is 5550 for the SPD. The higher quantity of conservative statements did not result in a much higher quantity of arguments and topics. Both parties talked, in different magnitudes and with some relevant exceptions, about the same topics, although the respective positions mostly differed. That goes hand in hand with a slightly higher density of codes and categories, which I applied to SPD-texts; I tagged the CDU-contributions 256 times and the SPD-material 176 times in total (for a full record of respectively assigned codes and categories see in the Appendix). In the Bundestag's debate ten different SPD-politicians and 13 parliamentarians of CDU/CSU took the floor. The contributors in these debates came from all different levels of the party hierarchies. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (SPD) expressed his opinion on Turkey, as well as the party leaders Franz Müntefering (SPD) and Angela Merkel (CDU), and other prominent figures like Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU) and Otto Schily (SPD). The prime contributors were, on the SPD-side, the (then) state minister for Europe Hans Martin Bury, and on the conservative side the speaker for foreign policy Friedbert Pflüger and CSU-man Gerd Müller. The major debates took place before the decision, in the most intense form on October 28th and December 16th 2004. They usually were held on application of CDU/CSU.

After putting the material through my corpus of analyses, it became clear that a big part of the debate consisted of reciprocal intertextual references between CDU/CSU and the government (SPD and Green Party). The parties blamed each other for acting irresponsibly, lying to the German population, or acting against better knowledge. The parties argued on behalf of German and EUropean interests, and saw their opponents acting against those interests. One of the more favored strategies to

support this criticism was the reference to prior positions of the other party or respective popular party representatives. In this sense CDU/CSU enjoyed referring to the former SPD-chancellor Helmut Schmidt's skepticism towards a Turkish accession, and highlighted the SPD-affinity of the aforementioned anti-Turkey historians. On the other hand the SPD's favorite practice lay in pointing out the role that previous conservative governments played in the Turkish approximation to ECC/EU, i.e. 1963 (under chancellor Adenauer) or 1997 (under chancellor Kohl). In this way the parties wanted to uncover inconsistencies in their opponent's positions. Other references, to actors outside the Bundestag, were directed towards the European Commission and other 'experts', i.e. out of a scientific context. The conservatives also very often referred to religious authorities.

The conservatives liked to picture themselves as advocates of the intensity in which the debate on the Turkey question was held. They blamed the SPD for trying to avoid it. This was i.e. realized in Angela Merkel's following statement:

"We wanted to have the debate here in this house today [...], to talk with the people about the consequences of this decision. I think, on the eve of a historic decision for Europe, the people really have this right." (Bundestag 2004h)ⁱ

Thereby the SPD indirectly was pictured, as acting dishonestly behind the back of the German public, in fear of the people's say. The SPD's primary reproach to CDU/CSU lay in stating their breach of German reliability in European affairs, on behalf of populist interests in electoral success, which is i.e. formulated by Gert Weisskirchen:

"You break with a policy, which has a long tradition in Germany. This policy was to be reliable and to give Turkey a perspective. You break with this policy of reliability. Thereby, CDU/CSU take leave of the European Concert" (Bundestag 2004h)ⁱⁱ

Both parties applied the frame 'Schicksalsfrage' (fateful question) on the issue, in order to back their own point, and to further condemn the irresponsibility of the other party. The high relevance of the issue is a bipartisan consensus, and Turkey's integration into the EU is seen as challenging by both parties. While CDU/CSU saw

ⁱ original German version: "Wir haben die Debatte heute hier in diesem Hause [...] gewollt, um mit den Menschen über die Folgen dieser Entscheidung zu sprechen. Ich glaube, darauf haben die Menschen am Vorabend einer für Europa historischen Entscheidung wirklich einen Anspruch" (Bundestag 2004h)

ⁱⁱ original German version: "Sie vollziehen einen Bruch mit der Politik, die eine lange Tradition in Deutschland hat. Diese Politik bestand darin, verlässlich zu sein und der Türkei eine Perspektive zu geben. Sie brechen mit dieser Politik der Verlässlichkeit. Damit verabschiedet sich die Union aus dem europäischen Konzert" (Bundestag 2004h)

that EUrope was not in a position to cope with this challenge, the SPD saw this possibility at least in the long-term. This is backed by respective perspectives on Turkey's and EUrope's condition.

In judging Turkey, both parties acknowledged the progress made through the reform agenda of the previous years. While the SPD highlighted this success story quite often and as consistently positive, the CDU – on the rare occasions they admitted Turkey's rather positive development – always added some skepticism towards the implementation and consequentiality of the reforms; exemplified below in the words of Friedbert Pflüger:

“Turkey in more than 40 years has not even rudimentarily met the criteria [...], whose fulfilment would have been necessary for an accession or even for the start of accession talks. Now we have mere two years Erdogan - with substantial reforms that we do not at all want to question, and which we want to encourage and support. But Mr. Müller is right: A big part of this only exists on paper. And do we really know exactly, in which direction Turkey and the AKP will develop?” (Bundestag 2004h)ⁱ

Thereby Pflüger utilized an argument described by Große Hüttmann (2005), which can be traced back to a general skepticism towards the sincerity and quality of Turkish Westernization. The Turkish political system is imagined as a bad copy of a EUropean-style state, which was involuntarily imposed on the Turks by authoritarian Kemalism. This argument also implies a certain suspicion about a hidden Islamist agenda of the AKP. It is backed by noting the absence of a civil society, and a problematic attitude of the political elite to individual freedoms and human rights. The interdiscursive relationship to these and other grievances detected in Turkey was i.e. realized by CSU-man Gerd Müller:

“You take on negotiations, while the political Copenhagen criteria are not fulfilled. Ankara violates human rights. The Cyprus question remains open. International law is being violated. Ankara violates the right of religious freedom. [...] Yet you still declare, that all criteria in respect to democracy and human rights are fulfilled” (Bundestag 2004h)ⁱⁱ

ⁱ original German version: “die Türkei [hat] über 40 Jahre hinweg nicht einmal ansatzweise die Kriterien erfüllt[...], deren Einhaltung für einen Beitritt oder auch nur für die Aufnahme von Verhandlungen notwendig gewesen wäre. Jetzt haben wir gerade zwei Jahre Erdogan - mit beachtlichen Reformen, die wir überhaupt nicht infrage stellen, zu denen wir ermutigen und bei denen wir unterstützen wollen. Aber der Kollege Müller hat Recht: Ein großer Teil davon steht nur auf dem Papier. Und wissen wir denn wirklich so genau, in welche Richtung sich die Türkei und die AKP entwickeln?” (Bundestag 2004h)

ⁱⁱ original German version: “Sie nehmen Verhandlungen auf, ohne dass die politischen Kopenhagener Kriterien erfüllt sind. Ankara missachtet die Menschenrechte. Die Zypernfrage ist weiter offen. Das

Other aspects, repeatedly named by CDU/CSU, were concerned with human rights and torture. Turkey was – at least implicitly – not considered able to eradicate these shortcomings. While CDU/CSU emphasized negative and deemphasized positive aspects, the opposite was true for the SPD. The social democrats thereby did not often address the conservative objection about the current Turkish fulfillment of the political Copenhagen Criteria. They framed the issue as a process, and Turkey was seen – though not quite there – on the way to complying with the standards of EUropeanness; i.e. Gernot Erler noted:

“Two years ago, the European Council had set clear conditions for the opening of negotiations. This has triggered impressive reform efforts in Ankara” (Bundestag 2004c)ⁱ

Besides the complimenting of Turkey for having made progress, another important SPD-argument shimmers through this quote: the Turkish dependency on the accession process. In case of a rejection, the slowing-down of Turkish reformism, or even regression, were feared. EUrope is seen as responsible to support Turkish modernization, i.e. from the threat of Islamism. This shows that SPD-actors also shared skepticism towards the Turkish progress regarding stabilization and democratization. Turkey was, not only for its size and population, or its relatively weak economy, framed as a special candidate. Sometimes it was, also by the SPD, seen as different in other, rather vague, terms, as i.e. Franz Müntefering stated:

“The negotiations will be long and difficult. Their output is open; you know that. Before 2014 Turkey’s accession to the EU can not be expected anyway. [...] Turkey is not a candidate like any other. We know about the worries and concerns that also exist in our country: Turkey is a very big country, a country with culture which has no tradition in Europe without saying, at least not in the same dimension as other cultures.” (Bundestag 2004h)ⁱⁱ

Völkerrecht wird verletzt. Ankara verletzt das Recht auf Religionsfreiheit. [...] Dennoch stellen Sie fest, dass alle Kriterien hinsichtlich der Demokratie und Menschenrechte erfüllt seien” (Bundestag 2004h)

ⁱ original German version: “Vor zwei Jahren hat der Europäische Rat klare Bedingungen für die Aufnahme von Verhandlungen formuliert. Das hat eindrucksvolle Reformbemühungen in Ankara ausgelöst” (Bundestag 2004c)

ⁱⁱ original German version: “Die Verhandlungen werden lange dauern und schwierig sein. Ihr Ausgang ist offen; das wissen Sie. Vor 2014 jedenfalls ist ein Beitritt der Türkei zur EU nicht zu erwarten. [...] Die Türkei ist kein Beitrittskandidat wie jeder andere. Wir wissen um die Sorgen und Bedenken, die es auch in unserem Lande gibt: Die Türkei ist ein sehr großes Land, ein Land mit einer Kultur, die nicht ohne weiteres in Europa Tradition hat, wenigstens nicht in der Dimension wie andere Kulturen.” (Bundestag 2004h)

Müntefering relativized the relevance of the 2004-decision. In pointing to the long-term perspective of a potential accession, he mitigated the worries about Turkey's cultural peculiarity – which he thereby acknowledged.

The, as stated by Müntefering, exceptionality of Turkey in contrast to prior accession candidates, was an exception to the overall SPD-recontextualization of the 2004/2008-enlargement within the Turkey-debate. The more usual purpose, of SPD-references to prior enlargements, was to show that also back then many worries, which later proved to be wrong, were formulated, and that the same will be the case for Turkey. The typical conservative recontextualization of prior enlargements went in a quite different direction, like Merkel's following statement illustrated:

“The European Union of 25, soon 27 or 28, today itself is not institutionally consolidated and hence not capable to act. Therefore it is important that we not just expand [...] Europe in this form, without bothering, whether the integration achievements of 50 years could get damaged thereby.”
(Bundestag 2004f)ⁱ

Out of this perspective, the fast pace of prior enlargements did not prove EUrope's absorption capacities, but led to a situation in which a rather long period of recovery was needed. This went hand in hand with the imagination of a contradiction between the enlargement and integration of EUrope. This aspect was by far the most prominent one in the conservative approach to the Turkey question. It went hand in hand with the CDU/CSU-plea for a privileged partnership as an alternative to full membership. They argued that the EU (at least for the foreseeable future) would not be able to handle a Turkish EU membership. A Turkish accession was said to overstrain the integration capabilities of the EU, and would only be realizable at the expense of the depth of integration. The main obstacle for a Turkish EU membership was seen in the threatening overextension and overstraining of the EU. In the most extreme form the admission of Turkey into the EU is seen as a last straw, which would mean the end of EUrope. The following two quotes should illustrate this line of argumentation:

ⁱ original German version: “Die Europäische Union der 25, bald 27 oder 28, ist heute in sich institutionell noch gar nicht gefestigt und von daher noch nicht handlungsfähig. Deshalb ist es wichtig, dass wir nicht einfach [...] Europa in dieser Form erweitern, ohne uns Gedanken zu machen, ob das Integrationswerk von 50 Jahren dabei Schaden nehmen könnte.” (Bundestag 2004f)

“To promote deepening and widening [...] at once is a political delusion. You cannot have both” (Gerd Müller/CSU, Bundestag 2004c)ⁱ

“It is pretended, that this would only be about Turkey. In the most part, this is about us, about the future of the decades-long integration project European Union, about its deepening, which is connected with the transfer of sovereignty.” (Angela Merkel, Bundestag 2004h)ⁱⁱ

In the eyes of CDU/CSU a Turkish EU membership would make the goal of a political union impossible. The EU would not be able to handle the negative consequences of a Turkish accession and at the same time advance integration. One of these, potentially negative, consequences was seen in the challenge for the actionability of EU institutions, which was already seen to be in a crisis due to the 2004/2008-enlargement. It was highlighted that, due to its size and population, Turkey would have (too) much power in EU institutions. Große Hüttmann (2005) argues that it is feared, that Turkey would use this power to advocate interests which do not comply with the rest of Europe and Germany, i.e. through a shift of emphasis from political to economic cooperation.

CDU/CSU in general were quite skeptical about potential benefits of a Turkish EU membership, which i.e. the government brought in the debate. On the other hand – in the geopolitical frame, developed during Cold War times – they saw the advances of good relationships with Turkey in terms of defense policy and security. In this context they usually, again, brought forward their plea for some sort of privileged partnership between Turkey and Europe. This would secure these benefits, without endangering European integration, as i.e. Wolfgang Schäuble stated:

“a privileged partnership is the right solution [...]. Because such a partnership is not endangering the chances of political unity by over-stretching the borders and at the same time makes a close relationship between Turkey and Europe possible.” (Wolfgang Schäuble, Bundestag 2004c)ⁱⁱⁱ

CDU/CSU demanded the inclusion of this option within the negotiation agreement. Thereby they implied an automatism of accession talks, since the only possible result

ⁱ original German version: “Vertiefung und Erweiterung [...] gemeinsam voranzutreiben, ist eine politische Lebenslüge. Sie können nicht beides haben” (Gerd Müller/CSU, Bundestag 2004c)

ⁱⁱ original German version: “Es wird so getan, als ginge es nur um die Türkei. Im Wesentlichen geht es aber um uns, um die Zukunft eines jahrzehntelangen Aufbauwerks der Europäischen Union, um seine Vertiefung, das mit der Abgabe von Souveränitätsrechten verbunden ist.” (Angela Merkel, Bundestag 2004h)

ⁱⁱⁱ original German version: “eine privilegierte Partnerschaft [ist] die richtige Lösung [...]. Denn eine solche Partnerschaft gefährdet nicht die Chancen einer politischen Einheit durch Überdehnung der Grenzen und ermöglicht zugleich eine enge Verbindung der Türkei mit Europa.” (Wolfgang Schäuble, Bundestag 2004c)

seemed to be full accession. The importance of the demand of an alternative partnership with Turkey and aspects, which stand in a close relationship with it, can also be illustrated through the quantities of respectively assigned codes. The following table shows the share of respective codes, from all the codes assigned to the CDU/CSU's 2004-contributions:

Alternative partnership	<i>proposing it</i>	6,6% (17/257)
Accession process	<i>assuming automatism</i>	1,2% (3/257)
	<i>warning from continuation</i>	1,2% (3/257)
Integration↔Enlargement	<i>contradictory</i>	6,6% (17/257)
Intake capacity	<i>not given</i>	2,3% (6/257)
EU's actionability	<i>endangered by T-accession</i>	1,6% (4/257)
political level integration	<i>endangered by T-accession</i>	5,4% (14/257)
Sum		24,9% (64/257)

Figure 6
(self
creation)

In summary codes which directly have to do with the demand of a privileged partnership, based on the construction of an integration/enlargement-dilemma, accounted for a fourth of all assigned codes in the CDU/CSU's case. It was by far the most prominent argumentation line of the conservative party in the Turkey debate.

In dealing with this conservative prime argument, the social democrats started with presenting an opposing perspective on the character of the accession process. They denied that the start of accession talks would initiate an automatism towards full membership, and claimed that the negotiations would be open-ended. The SPD pointed to the exceptionality that an explicit mention of a fallback-option would mean. They pleaded against treating Turkey any different from any other candidate country, and criticized the conservative demand as an obscure attempt to harm the EU-Turkey relationships. They blamed the conservative side for discouraging Turkey from its aspirations, to proceed with implementing the criteria of EUropeanness.

On the other hand, the SPD usually accorded with the notion of a crisis situation of the EU's actionability, due to the integration/enlargement-dilemma. In contrast to the conservatives they saw it as challenge, but not an impossibility, to make the EU capable of integrating Turkey. Hence, Angelica Schwall-Düren stated:

“Indeed it does not only matter, that Turkey carries out its reforms, but it is also important, that the EU must undergo essential changes. [...] The strengthening of the European Union's integration at first must be seen totally independent of a possible accession of Turkey; because the ability to

act internally and externally must also be strengthened in the context of the current 25 members.” (Bundestag 2004c)ⁱ

They usually pointed to the long-term perspective of an eventual Turkish membership. EUrope was framed as a dynamic process and it was expected, that the EU would be able to increase its intake capacity by the time a Turkish accession is realistic, which would be in 10 to 15 years.

Besides this challenge for EUropean institutions, the conservatives also feared other negative consequences. Very often they named the potentially high costs of a Turkish EU accession, like Bartholomäus Kalb (CSU) argued:

“The costs [of a possible accession of Turkey] are specified with 21-35 billion Euros per year by reputable institutions. The biggest part of those Germany would have to bear.” (Bundestag 2004e)ⁱⁱ

A further enhancement of the costs, Germany would have to bear in case of Turkish EU membership, was seen in the potential rise of migration from Turkey towards Germany. In the conservative’s opinion, that would, for itself, cause high costs, i.e. in terms of job security. They also worried that a Turkish EU accession would lead to further troubles to integrate the already existing Turkish Diaspora in Germany. In respect to these rather materialist consequences of a Turkish EU membership, the SPD generally also acknowledged its risks, but rated the chances higher. Thus, i.e. SPD-party-leader Müntefering pointed to the economic benefits, which would be especially high for Germany:

“Germany is the biggest trade partner of Turkey. The growth of German exports also this year was striking. [...] The prospect of Turkey’s accession to the European Union also is in the economic interests of Germany and the EU.” (Bundestag 2004h)ⁱⁱⁱ

ⁱ original German version: “Es kommt in der Tat nicht nur darauf an, dass die Türkei ihre Reformen durchführt, sondern es geht auch darum, dass die EU unverzichtbare Veränderungen durchlaufen muss. [...] Die Verstärkung der Integration der Europäischen Union ist zunächst völlig unabhängig von einem möglichen Beitritt der Türkei zu sehen; denn die Handlungsfähigkeit nach innen und nach außen muss auch im Rahmen der jetzigen 25 Mitglieder gestärkt werden.” (Bundestag 2004c)

ⁱⁱ original German version: “Die Kosten [eines möglichen Beitritts der Türkei] werden von seriösen Instituten zwischen 21 und 35 Milliarden Euro pro Jahr angegeben. Den größten Teil davon hätte Deutschland zu tragen.” (Bundestag 2004e)

ⁱⁱⁱ original German version: “Deutschland ist der größte Handelspartner der Türkei. Der Zuwachs der deutschen Exporte war auch in diesem Jahr wieder fulminant. [...] Die Perspektive des Beitritts der Türkei zur Europäischen Union liegt auch im ökonomischen Interesse Deutschlands und der EU.” (Bundestag 2004h)

Furthermore the SPD denounced conservative warnings from migration movements as populist fear mongering. The consequences of a Turkish membership for the integration of the Turkish Diaspora in Germany were expected to be positive.

The SPD also formulated the fear that a rejection could make Turkey turn its back on EUrope, possibly even realign with Iranian-style Islamism instead, and destroy the positive effect a Turkish EU membership could have in geopolitical terms. A Turkish EU membership would contribute to the stabilization of the crisis-ridden regions in its neighborhood, and give the EU more geopolitical power. This point was for example put forward by chancellor Schröder:

*“It [is] of immense importance to the national interests of Germany, to ensure that Turkey becomes and remains a pro-Western factor of stability.”
(Bundestag 2004f)ⁱ*

According to Große Hüttmann (2005), this argument stands in a relationship to, and is triggered by, 9/11 and the perception of Islamism as EUrope’s central Other. In this perspective, the SPD placed their most important pro-Turkey argument: a Turkish membership would prevent an eventual ‘clash of civilizations’, and be an alternative to the ‘war on terror’. Turkey is pictured as a bridge between Islam and EUrope. This bridge does not only work in terms of diplomacy and communication. It would furthermore prove the universality of EUropean values, or rather the possibility of their appliance on Muslim societies. It would dissolve the opposition of Islam and modernity. It could make Turkey into a role model for other Muslim societies and inspire democratic movements. Subsequently, I also want to summarize the quantities of respective codes, I assigned on the SPD-material:

Relations with Islam	<i>T-accession positive impact</i>	2,8% (5/180)	<i>Figure 7 (self-creation)</i>
Security and Stability	<i>T-accession positive impact</i>	2,2% (4/180)	

These low numbers do not say so much about the, in spite of the high, relevance this issue had in the SPD’s take on the Turkey question, but about the character of the debate in general. It is due to the high share of (mostly opposing) reactions to conservative arguments in the SPD’s approach on Turkey, and reconfirms that the conservatives clearly took the thematic leadership in the debate.

ⁱ original German version: “es [ist] von ungeheuer großer Bedeutung für die nationalen Interessen Deutschlands, dafür zu sorgen, dass die Türkei ein prowestlich ausgerichteter Faktor der Stabilität wird und bleibt.” (Bundestag 2004f)

Through pointing to the potential role of Turkey as a mediator between civilizations, the Turkey debate became a significant aspect in imagining EUrope. Imaginations of EUrope, and perspectives on the qualities EUrope is about, entered the debate. They were hence re-contextualized and re-constructed, and an interdiscursive relationship between the debates on Turkey and EUrope was established. The Turkish accession, in the eyes of the SPD, would be the incarnation of a EUrope which is based on universal values, rather than culture and tradition. A Turkish accession would prove and carry out this claim, as Schwall-Düren put it:

“With the accession of Turkey those elements [would get] woven together, which a federated Europe should stand for: for the secularization of historical communities, committed to a cultural tradition, on the base of universal human rights, pluralism and democracy; for a safety, which increasingly proves as indivisible; and of course for the wealth, which links it all together.” (Bundestag 2004c)ⁱ

Although the relevance of culture was accepted for the national level, the SPD tried to distance itself from a nationalist model in imagining EUrope. The acceptance of Turkey within EUrope would represent the independence of EUrope from culturalist notions, and most importantly from the ones about religion, as Gert Weisskirchen noted:

“The European Union [is] thus not a religious project [...]. The European Union is also no geographical project. The European Union is a project of European values. It is not excluded and must not be excluded [...], that Islam develops so, that it takes a complementary role within European values. [...] It is essential, to Europeanize Islam. This is the central task of the European Union.” (Bundestag 2004h)ⁱⁱ

Noting the independence of EUropean integration from religious, geographical, or similar aspects, at the same time was an accusation of CDU/CSU, to imagine EUrope in this way. The conservatives were blamed for being backwardly culturalist, and viewed EUrope as some kind of Christian club. The conservative imagination of

ⁱ original German version: “mit dem Beitritt der Türkei [würden] jene Elemente miteinander verwoben, für die das föderierte Europa einmal stehen dürfte: Für die Säkularisierung historischer, einer kulturellen Tradition verpflichteter Gemeinwesen auf der Grundlage universeller Menschenrechte, Pluralismus und Demokratie; für eine sich zunehmend als unteilbar erweisende Sicherheit; und natürlich für den alles miteinander verknüpfenden Wohlstand.” (Bundestag 2004c)

ⁱⁱ original German version: “die Europäische Union [ist] eben kein religiöses Projekt [...]. Die Europäische Union ist auch kein geographisches Projekt. Die Europäische Union ist ein Projekt der europäischen Werte. Es ist nicht ausgeschlossen und darf auch nicht ausgeschlossen werden [...], dass sich der Islam so entwickelt, dass er innerhalb der europäischen Werte eine komplementäre Aufgabe übernimmt. [...]Es kommt darauf an, den Islam zu europäisieren. Das ist die zentrale Aufgabe der Europäischen Union.” (Bundestag 2004h)

EUrope was seen as motivated by this kind of culturalism, although they usually avoid explicitness on this issue.

CDU/CSU usually vehemently refused allegations, that they would be motivated by religious aspects, and formulated other points, which would constitute the Turkish unEUropeanness. Thereby CDU/CSU, even more than in the rest of their argumentation, preferred to let quotes by other actors and authorities speak through their mouth, in order to overcome the legitimacy-deficit those kind of arguments have in the German debate. One of the most popular sources was thereby found in the geographical school book definition of EUrope. For example Merkel noted that:

“Therefore, I would like to quote, the former judge of the Constitutional Court, Böckenförde [...]: ‘Turkey is in terms of its geographic extent, population, national and cultural identity, economic and political structure of a significance and peculiarity, which makes the question about the concept and finalité of European integration inevitable.’ [...] You will continue to say, that the commitment to Turkey was also given, because it historically and politically belongs to Europe. Fact is, that – after a glance at the map, you can not get around this – for the first time in the history of European unification, negotiations with a country are begun, which boundaries reach far beyond Europe; they extend until Iran, Iraq and Syria.” (Bundestag 2004h)ⁱ

The geographical unEUropeanness was brought in a direct connection with the overall difference of Turkey to EUrope. It stated Turkey’s closeness to Islam and Asia, as opposed to a clear inclusion in EUrope. This difference, in the conservative perspective, would be of a magnitude, which makes the political integration of EUrope impossible. It would destroy the development of a EUropean identity, which would be necessary to back a political union. The base of this was the conceptualization of identity and culture based on historical experience, which makes it relatively inflexible and definite. Pflüger got to the heart of this attitude:

“My parliamentary group and I would never say that Islam and Europe do not fit together [...]. But I believe that Europe also got to do with cultural identity, history and traditions, which have grown over centuries. To begin with that has nothing to do with Christianity and a Christian-Club – that

ⁱ original German version: “Deshalb möchte ich den ehemaligen Verfassungsrichter Böckenförde zitieren [...]: ‘Die Türkei ist nach geographischer Ausdehnung, Bevölkerungszahl, nationaler und kultureller Identität, ökonomischer und politischer Struktur von einer Bedeutung und Eigenart, die die Frage nach dem Konzept, der finalité der europäischen Einigung unausweichlich macht.’ [...] Sie werden weiterhin sagen, dass der Türkei die Zusage auch deshalb gegeben worden sei, weil sie historisch und politisch zu Europa gehöre. Tatsache ist, dass - daran kommt man nach einem Blick auf die Landkarte nicht vorbei - erstmals in der Geschichte des europäischen Einigungsprozesses Verhandlungen mit einem Land begonnen werden, dessen Grenzen weit über Europa hinausgehen; sie reichen bis zum Iran, zum Irak und nach Syrien.” (Bundestag 2004h)

would be a very superficial view – but with the fact that, especially in a globalized world, every organization and association, which wants to be a political union, needs something like a ‘we’-feeling. This ‘we’-feeling is more than a commitment to democracy and human rights. It is based on a centuries-old history, one must have lived through together: the Greek Antiquity, the Roman law, the Investiture Controversy, the Reformation, the Enlightenment; all of this characterizes Europe. [...] You have to work hard on taking the people along the way” (Bundestag 2004h)ⁱ

Although CDU/CSU usually avoided the reference to a religious difference, they build a EUrope on equally inflexible and essentialist notions about culture, geography, historical experience, and identity. The values EUrope is about were widely similar to the SPD-version. They however were, first, not the only prime resource of EUrope-constructions. Second, they were directly connected with the excluding culturalist argument, as i.e. a quote by CSU-man Müller shows:

“Turkey neither geographically nor culturally belongs to the European Union. Mrs. Roth, Ankara violates the human rights.” (Bundestag 2004c)ⁱⁱ

The cultural and geographical difference of Turkey was illustrated through pointing to the Turkish imperfection in fulfilling EUropean values. Thereby the alleged universality of these values was relativized.

In opposition to this argument, the pro-Turkey side often pleaded for the renunciation from this inflexible exclusionary attitude. They wanted to give Turkey a fair chance, to show their ability to fulfill the standards of EUropeanness. Out of this perspective the issue should solely be debated on the grounds of Turkey’s progress in fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria. This would make the question of Turkish EUropeanness obsolete. It is, according to Walter (2008), a legalist or technical understanding of EUrope. It aimed for the de-politicization of the issue, which was prevented by the direct opposition against the bureaucratization of the issue. CDU/CSU argued that this version of EUrope would not supply the needed source of

ⁱ original German version: “Meine Fraktion und ich würden nie sagen, dass Islam und EU nicht zusammenpassen [...]. Aber ich glaube, Europa hat auch mit kultureller Identität, Geschichte und Traditionen, die über Jahrhunderte gewachsen sind, zu tun. Das hat mit Christentum und Christenclub erst einmal gar nichts zu tun - das wäre sehr oberflächlich betrachtet -, sondern damit, dass gerade in der globalisierten Welt jede Organisation bzw. jeder Zusammenschluss, der eine politische Union sein will, so etwas wie ein Wirgefühl benötigt. Dieses Wirgefühl ist mehr als das Bekenntnis zu Demokratie und Menschenrechten. Es beruht auf jahrhundertealter Geschichte, die man gemeinsam durchlebt haben muss: die griechische Antike, das römische Recht, der Investiturstreit, die Reformation, die Aufklärung, das alles prägt Europa. [...] Sie müssen sich darum bemühen, die Menschen mitzunehmen” (Bundestag 2004h)

ⁱⁱ original German version: “Die Türkei gehört weder geographisch noch kulturell zur Europäischen Union. Frau Roth, Ankara missachtet die Menschenrechte.” (Bundestag 2004c)

identification and criticized its alleged unpopularity. In order to guarantee the possibility of a political union, CDU/CSU saw the need for a nation-style conceptualization of EUrope. Turkey, due to its cultural and other such differences, would not fit into this EUrope.

All in all, the parliamentary debate approved the framing of the Turkey question as a defining moment for EUrope. This is true for both parties. Thereby CDU/CSU feared the end of EUrope, while the SPD saw the incarnation of a EUrope based on universal values in a Turkish accession. This demonstrates how important imaginations of EUrope were in debating Turkey. The following list summarizes quantities of the most frequent codes, related to different aspects of EUrope, I assigned to the parties' Bundestag-contributions:

Figure 8 (self-creation)

SPD		CDU/CSU
(9/180) -	Political Level	5,3% (14/262)
(9/180) 5,0%	Changeability	0,4% (1/262)
(2/180) 1,1%	Culture	3,1% (8/262)
(4/180) 2,2%	Values	1,5% (4/262)
(2/180) 1,1%	History	2,3% (6/262)
(4/180) 2,2%	Peace order	0,8% (2/262)
(5/180) 2,8%	Normative Power	- (0/262)
(1/180) 0,6%	Geography	2,3% (6/262)
(3/180) 1,7%	Reliability	0,4% (1/262)
(3/180) 1,7%	Enlightenment	0,4% (1/262)
(2/180) 1,1%	Religion	0,8% (2/262)
(0/180) -	Othering Asia	1,9% (5/262)
(3/180) 1,7%	Adaptility	- (0/262)
(0/180) -	Borders	1,1% (3/262)
(0/180) -	Othering Islam	0,8% (2/262)

This table contains different aspects of EUrope that the parties referred to in order to explain their positions on Turkey. I just listed the issues they took on, but only counted tags which accorded with the parties' overall-position on Turkey. Hence, I only counted pro-Turkey positions for the SPD, and anti-Turkey positions for

CDU/CSU; that covers nearly all assigned codes anyway. The left (SPD), right (CDU/CSU) or centered alignment of the names of the respective codes, is based upon their frequency of occurrence in the respective parties' contributions. Figure 8 thereby summarizes the imagination of EUrope the parties applied to the discourse on Turkey. For the case of the SPD this EUrope is adaptable to a Turkish accession and dynamic in general. It is based on a peace order and Enlightenment values which are independent from culture or religion. Their propagation, i.e. to Turkey, was seen as a central purpose of EUrope. The conservative perspective saw EUrope's destiny in a deep political union, based on culture and history, with definite geographical borders. Turkey is no part of EUrope, neither in terms of geography, nor in terms of

history or culture. The conservative EUrope very much resembled the concept of a nation-state.

This shows that there was an interdiscursive influence from the discourse EUrope to the one about Turkey-EU relationships. My primary research interest however lies in the influence that this relationship exerts in the opposite direction. In the following parts of my paper, I intend to show how the constructions of EUrope in the context of the Turkey debate left marks within the discourse on EUrope in general. Some of these consequences can be already conjectured through looking at the manifestos for the European election in 2004 and the general election in 2005. Thereby a differentiation of approaches towards EUrope within election manifestos can be observed in comparison to prior years. The SPD approached EUrope often through universal values, but also through the confession of social equality, which was not part of their argumentation in the Turkey debate. The conservatives, again, noted the role history, culture and religion, besides other aspects, hold in terms of European solidarity in their European manifesto. Thereby a crisis perception on EUrope was very present, and European solidarity was seen endangered. These attitudes were, at least partly, crafted within in the context of the Turkey question. The general high conservative attention towards Turkey also was implemented within the manifestos. Thereby the well-known arguments on the absent integration capacity and alternative partnerships were formulated again. The difference to the CDU/CSU's attitude to the accession of Romania, Bulgaria or Croatia, which was skeptical but positive in principle, shows that Turkey is not part of their ideal of EUrope. The Turkey issue was not mentioned explicitly in the SPD's manifestos, but the general plea for a fair and reliable treatment of accession candidates in the manifesto to the general elections, is clearly a reference to Turkey. This general attention, which was given to the Turkey question in the election manifestos, shows the high significance in German politics that it reached at this point.

6.2.3 Treaty of Lisbon

On December 13th 2007 a reform treaty for the EU was signed in Lisbon. On April 24th 2008 its ratification through the German Bundestag took place. The treaty was made necessary because of the failed ratification of the European constitution, a few years earlier. The new Lisbon Treaty was prepared under a German presidency in the European Council, and significantly crafted by the German government. During this time, the government was composed of a coalition between CDU/CSU and SPD, with conservative leader Angela Merkel as chancellor. Between the signing of the treaty in Lisbon and the German ratification, it was on the agenda of the German Bundestag's plenary sessions on several occasions. The quantities of contributions, I classified as relevant for my research question in this case, were rather even between CDU/CSU and SPD; they added up to around 4000 words for each party. In analyzing this material, I assigned 114 codes to the SPD's, and 125 codes to the conservative contributions. On the SPD- side parliamentarian Michael Roth, with three speeches, was the prime contributor amongst the nine other SPD-members who took speeches on the issue. Amongst them were prominent figures, like the minister of foreign affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier or party leader Kurt Beck. On the conservative side only Angela Merkel took a speech on the issue twice, while the other ten contributors, like party whip Volker Kauder, only spoke once. The most intense debates took place on the day before the signing, and on the day of the ratification of the treaty. I further utilized statements out of six more plenary sessions for my analysis.

The debate between the two big parties was not very hard or controversial. That was not only caused by their cooperation in government, but also by the general consensus of the German elites on the importance and positivity of the treaty. That was confirmed by the lack of criticism from the oppositional parties, apart from 'Die Linke', who reconfirmed their role as an outsider in the German political debate on EUrope. The ratification of the treaty by the German Bundestag was rather a formality. Both parties insisted on their leading role in realizing the treaty. One of the few dissents related to the question of who contributed more. The SPD pointed to the long social-democrat history of supporting a united Europe, to underline their role in this process, while Merkel liked to picture herself as a booster of the treaty negotiations. The debate consisted more of commitments to the EUropean project, rather than a discussion of the treaty-contents. In these commitments the MPs nevertheless formulated visions of EUrope. These imaginations were not put against

each other very intensively, but the sole variety between them already makes them relevant for my research interest.

The Lisbon Treaty was generally framed as a positive historical achievement. This might have been due to the responsibility of SPD and CDU/CSU in its realization, but obviously was argued on different grounds. Its historic relevance was based on a perceived crisis situation of the EUropean project. This crisis was seen in the lack of actionability of the EU institutions, after the failed constitution and the enlargement of the Union. The reform treaty was framed, at least partly, as a solution to this crisis. One of the primary agents of this positive attitude was chancellor Merkel:

“This day marks a historic achievement for Europe and in retrospect might be seen as decisive milestone in the creation of more capacity to act in Europe.” (Bundestag 2007a)ⁱ

While the pragmatic aim of EUrope’s actionability was especially present in the conservative argumentation, the social democrats often argued on different grounds for the historic dimension of the treaty. They mostly framed it as an important step towards the further integration of EUrope, and thereby towards the conclusion of the EUropean project or vision. This can be illustrated in quoting SPD-man Axel Schäfer:

“For us, today [...], since we ratify the Lisbon Treaty, is day of pride, because a part of our historical identity – better: our visions – is coming true.” (Bundestag 2008e)ⁱⁱ

This view, which was present at both parties’ speeches, went back to certain imaginations of EUrope, which were aimed for. These visions differed in parts between the parties, but in general the consensus on a further deepening of EUropean integration was still powerful. Therefore the SPD still mourned after the EUropean constitution, and would not give up on it, as party-leader Kurt Beck argued:

“The task is set to ourselves [...], to work on the thought of a further consolidation and a further merging along the common values and objectives of this Europe. Therefore, for us social democrats the goal of achieving a

ⁱ original German version: “Dieser Tag markiert einen historischen Erfolg für Europa und er wird im Rückblick vielleicht einmal als eine entscheidende Wegmarke bei der Herstellung von mehr Handlungsfähigkeit in Europa angesehen werden.” (Bundestag 2007a)

ⁱⁱ original German version: “Für uns ist heute [...], da wir den Vertrag von Lissabon ratifizieren, ein stolzer Tag, weil ein Teil unserer geschichtlichen Identität - besser: unserer Visionen - zur Wirklichkeit wird.” (Bundestag 2008e)

European constitution, remains a great vision, we will persist with.” (Bundestag 2008e)ⁱ

On the other hand the parties agreed that EUrope already had achieved a lot, although the vision of a united EUrope was still to be reached.

In reconstructing EUrope’s achievements, and thereby a certain imagination of EUrope, both parties resorted to traditional frames, like the construction of EUrope as a peace order. These classical notions on imagining EUrope in opposition to war, or communist dictatorship, were more present than in the 2004-debate on the Turkey question. What EUrope is about, was to a large extent defined by the dissociation of its past, as also Volker Kauder showed:

“After the Second World War, we began to realize our vision, by striving after the development of falling barriers and the creation of a Europe without borders. In fact we knew: A Europe without borders will be a Europe, which creates peace.” (Bundestag 2007a)ⁱⁱ

The opposition to war, and the German past, is common ground in Germany. The explicit extension of the peace order frame towards the Cold War was more present in the conservative argumentation. Nonetheless, the SPD also spoke of the central achievement to overcome the EUropean divide. Thereby the enlargement towards the ECECs was framed as its realization, and the Lisbon Treaty as its final conclusion. The centrality of EUropean unity was, amongst other things, based on the imagination of its simultaneity with German unity. In the words of Kurt Beck this sounded like that:

“We Germans on our part understood, that we only can reach a united Germany in a united and free Europe. [...] Peace and freedom are a trademark of this community” (Bundestag 2008e)ⁱⁱⁱ

Besides highlighting the relevance of peace in the definition of EUrope, the opposition to the Cold War, and to communism, was also important in the

ⁱ original German version: “es [...] [wird] uns die Aufgabe gestellt [...], an dem Gedanken einer weiteren Festigung und einer weiteren Zusammenführung entlang der gemeinsamen Werte und Ziele dieses Europas zu arbeiten. Für uns Sozialdemokratinnen und Sozialdemokraten bleibt deshalb das Ziel, eine europäische Verfassung zu erreichen, eine große Vision, die wir auch weiter verfolgen werden.” (Bundestag 2008e)

ⁱⁱ original German version: “Nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg begannen wir, unsere Vision zu verwirklichen, indem wir uns darum bemühten, dass die Schlagbäume fallen und ein Europa ohne Grenzen entsteht. Wir haben nämlich gewusst: Ein Europa ohne Grenzen wird ein Europa sein, das Frieden schafft.” (Bundestag 2007a)

ⁱⁱⁱ original German version: “Wir Deutsche haben unsererseits verstanden, dass wir ein gemeinsames Deutschland nur in einem gemeinsamen freien Europa erreichen können. [...] Frieden und Freiheit sind ein Markenzeichen dieser Gemeinschaft” (Bundestag 2008e)

construction of other qualities, EEurope was seen to be about. Beck here named freedom, which is often equivalent to economic freedom, but also connected to values like democracy or human rights.

The economic aspect is the second big achievement, EEurope was celebrated for. While the peace order was framed as concluded through the last enlargements, the economic order was not. Its importance was highlighted through constructing its necessity in a context of globalization. Both parties saw the ideal of European economic organization in a social market economy. Economic cooperation was framed as a core quality of EEurope, and seen as responsible for its wealth. Therefore conservative Gunther Krichbaum stated:

“For me it is [...] important, that for the citizens’ sake we also speak about other European achievements. For me that is competition and the regulation of this competition. After all, we owe a coherent European single market to these regulations.” (Bundestag 2008b)ⁱ

Thereby EEurope was not only put in opposition to a communist economic order, but also to neoliberal ideas of deregulation. This second point was especially strong in the SPD-perspective on EEurope, like in following statement by Michael Roth:

“For me the central momentum seems to be, that we expand, strengthen and intensify the European social and societal model. Here, the European Union is still not as far, as it actually should be.” (Bundestag 2008b)ⁱⁱ

The social dimension was for both parties, in different scopes, central in the definition of EEuropeanness. Thereby an implicit differentiation from the USA was obvious. Especially the SPD still saw thereby a gap between vision and reality. The Lisbon Treaty was framed as a central base for the eradication of these shortcomings.

The imagination of a EEurope defined by social solidarity went hand in hand with the reference to other values. Those values were basically the same between the parties, and included notions of democracy, human rights, or equality. They were mostly addressed in reference to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which was introduced with the Lisbon Treaty. It was framed as a further point, in which the reform treaty pushed EEurope closer to respective visions on it, as i.e. SPD-man Dressel pointed out:

ⁱ original German version: “Für mich ist es [...] wichtig, dass wir im Sinne der Bürger auch über andere europäische Errungenschaften sprechen. Das sind für mich der Wettbewerb und die Regelungen in diesem Wettbewerb. Immerhin verdanken wir diesen Regelungen einen einheitlichen europäischen Binnenmarkt.” (Bundestag 2008b)

ⁱⁱ original German version: “Das zentrale Momentum scheint für mich zu sein, dass wir das europäische Sozial- und Gesellschaftsmodell ausbauen, stärken und intensivieren. Hier ist die Europäische Union noch nicht so weit, wie sie eigentlich sein müsste.” (Bundestag 2008b)

“After the European Union already understands itself for some time as an area of freedom, security and justice, now Article 2 of the EU-treaty contents the values on which the Union is based, values such as liberty, equality, justice and respect for human dignity. For a community, that originally was founded as the European Economic Community, this development towards a community of values is something, that the majority of this house can only welcome with us Social Democrats.” (Bundestag 2008b)ⁱ

These EUropean values now were seen as adopted within the institutional framework of the EU, although they were perceived as existent and powerful beyond that. The answer to the question if EUrope itself changed, or if it was just about the official adoption of EUropean values by the EU, is central in understanding how these values are conceptualized. It shows the difference of conceptualizing EUrope and its values as rather static and determined by history, or as something dynamic and potentially universal. While the assignment of the German parties to these poles was rather clear, in the context of the Turkey debate, it was not in the debate on the Lisbon Treaty. Nonetheless, in looking at the formulations of the implications of the reform treaty, it becomes obvious that the SPD saw the changes as a rather open process, which also gleams through the prior quote of Dressel. The conservative argumentation on the other hand, often framed it as merging between the EU and a rather pre-determined image of Europe; hence i.e. Merkel stated:

“In it [the Charter of Fundamental Rights] the common values and fundamental rights are laid down, which were wrest from European history - also at great sacrifice, as we all know. [...] Only a Europe that stands up for its values will be able to successfully continue its path.” (Bundestag 2007a)ⁱⁱ

The references to history, and beyond that to a static idea of culture and static conceptualizations of EUrope in general, were also existent in the social democratic argumentation in a smaller extent. In general, the party-wise conceptualizations of EUrope did not lie as far apart as in the Turkey debate. The difference lay in the still present tendential closeness of the respective parties, to the poles the parties turned

ⁱ original German version: “Nachdem sich die Europäische Union schon einige Zeit als Raum der Freiheit, der Sicherheit und des Rechts versteht, sind jetzt in Art. 2 des EU-Vertrages die Werte aufgeführt, auf die sich die Union stützt, Werte wie Freiheit, Gleichheit, Gerechtigkeit und die Achtung der Menschenwürde. Für eine Gemeinschaft, die ursprünglich als Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft gegründet wurde, ist diese Entwicklung zu einer Wertegemeinschaft etwas, was mit uns Sozialdemokraten der überwiegende Teil des Hauses nur gutheißen kann.” (Bundestag 2008b)

ⁱⁱ original German version: “In ihr [der Grundrechtecharta] sind die gemeinsamen Werte und grundlegenden Rechte niedergelegt, die der europäischen Geschichte - auch unter großen Opfern, wie wir alle wissen - abgerungen wurden. [...] Nur ein Europa, das sich zu seinen Werten bekennt, wird seinen Weg erfolgreich weitergehen können.” (Bundestag 2007a)

to during the Turkey debate. That went hand in hand with the imagination of EUrope, as a rather homogeneous nation-like community, or dynamic and voluntary agreement between a diverse set of associates.

The last point gives me a bridge to debating the political organization that EUrope should be based on, according to SPD and CDU/CSU. Also here the perspective on EUrope as a rather nation-like entity was very present. Both parties called for a political community, beyond sole economic cooperation. The difference between the parties, in looking at the political level, often lay in the relation between the old nation-states and EUrope. This difference was, again, rather a tendential one. While CDU/CSU often wanted to conserve the power of the nation-states, the SPD more often saw the EUropean interest above the national ones. Hence, SPD-man Stefan Reiche stated:

“According to the Lisbon Treaty, the citizens are the purpose of politics more than ever. [...] They and not the nations are the reason, why the European Union has been built. That must dominate the actions of all institutions of the national players in the first place, so they do not look first and foremost after the national surplus, but have the European interest in mind.” (Bundestag 2008d)ⁱ

The SPD emitted positivity towards a supra-national union, whereby the Lisbon Treaty was framed as step towards a further strengthening of the EUropean level. Especially the strengthening of the EUropean Parliament through the reform treaty was highlighted in this context. On the other hand the SPD did not argue explicitly for the degradation of the nation-states, and sometimes also argued for the idea of subsidiarity. The latter argument on subsidiarity was the most often heard conservative notion in this context. This was obviously motivated by a perspective, which wanted to keep the nations strong, and saw the need to defend them from a further loss of power. That was connected to certain skepticism towards EUrope, although it was usually not formulated explicitly. In the words of Merkel, the plea for subsidiarity i.e. sounded as follows:

“I think that, in the future we more often face the task, to decide, how to configure the right balance between national tasks and European tasks. That means, we have to think about where something can be done best: in

ⁱ original German version: “Nach dem Lissabon-Vertrag sind mehr als bisher die Bürger das Ziel der Politik. [...] Sie und nicht die Nationen sind der Grund, weshalb die Europäische Union gebildet worden ist. Das muss das Handeln aller Institutionen der nationalen Akteure in erster Linie prägen, sodass sie nicht zuallererst nach dem nationalen Mehrwert schauen, sondern das europäische Interesse im Auge haben.” (Bundestag 2008d)

Brussels, Berlin, Schwerin or in Mainz? [...] Let's get ourselves into really developing the culture of subsidiarity in Europe! Germany has made very good experiences with its federal system and we also should show that in Europe.” (Bundestag 2008e)ⁱ

Merkel did however neither side with the claim for a one-way transfer of competences from EUrope to the nations, nor the other way around.

CDU/CSU did not invariably oppose the development of a federal union, and also expressed their positivity to a further strengthening of EUrope. The conservatives actually quite often pleaded for the deepening of EUropean integration, and the Lisbon Treaty was perceived to contribute to that. This apparent contradictoriness was connected to the imagination of EUrope through a nationalist frame. It was hoped that EUrope would come closer to the national model, but at the same time it was hoped that the old nations would not lose their power. The plea for the further deepening of EUropean integration, and the realization of a political union, was very similar to the conservative argumentation on Turkey a few years earlier. It was based on seeing EUrope in a crisis, which was explained with a contradiction between enlargement and integration, as i.e. shown by the conservatives Schockenhoff or Wellenreuther:

“The agreement on the Lisbon Treaty is the expression of the political will, to make up the necessary steps of deepening and to continue the process of political integration.” (Schockenhoff, Bundestag 2008b)ⁱⁱ

“All these changes were necessary, to make the European Union despite massive changes, like the eastward enlargement, functional and capable of action.” (Wellenreuther, Bundestag 2007b)ⁱⁱⁱ

Another important argument in the Lisbon debate, which seems to resonate with the debate on Turkey, lay within references to the identification of the people with EUrope. The Lisbon Treaty was seen to advocate EUropean identity, and to make it possible to bring EUrope closer to its people. Thereby a deepened union was called

ⁱ original German version: “Ich glaube, dass wir in Zukunft stärker vor der Aufgabe stehen, zu entscheiden, wie das richtige Gleichgewicht zwischen nationalen Aufgaben und europäischen Aufgaben auszugestalten ist. Das heißt, wir müssen überlegen, wo etwas am besten erledigt werden kann: in Brüssel, in Berlin, in Schwerin oder in Mainz? [...] Lassen wir uns darauf ein, die Subsidiaritätskultur in Europa wirklich weiterzuentwickeln! Deutschland hat mit seinem föderalen System sehr gute Erfahrungen gemacht, und das sollten wir auch in Europa zeigen.” (Bundestag 2008e)

ⁱⁱ original German version: “Die Einigung auf den Lissaboner Vertrag ist der Ausdruck des politischen Willens, die dafür erforderlichen Schritte der Vertiefung nachzuholen und den Prozess der politischen Integration fortzusetzen.” (Schockenhoff, Bundestag 2008b)

ⁱⁱⁱ original German version: “All diese Veränderungen waren notwendig, um die Europäische Union trotz massiver Veränderungen, wie die Osterweiterung, funktions- und handlungsfähig zu machen.” (Wellenreuther, Bundestag 2007b)

for. In this respect the roles of a strengthened European Parliament, or the Charter of Fundamental Rights, were highlighted.

Beyond that the, through the reform treaty, sharpened appearance of Europe in international relations was seen as a core feature of advocating European identity. These changes should make Europe more actionable, distinct and visible within international relations, and would help it in achieving the status of a 'global power'. This perspective, with the aim of turning Europe into a more identifiable actor, was more often put forward by CDU/CSU, as i.e. through Schockenhoff:

"Many years ago Henry Kissinger once asked, what the phone number of Europe would be. Now we finally have it. This is important for the dialogue with our global partners USA, Russia, China and India. But it is also important for the identification of our citizens with the EU and its policies." (Bundestag 2008b)ⁱ

The SPD also applauded the Lisbon Treaty's achievements in advancing Europe's performance in foreign affairs, but highlighted different aspects. They focused not so much on the thereby produced image within Europe's population, but on Europe's appearance to the outside-world. The goal was to develop an international identity for Europe, based on its potential normative power. This should be characterized by a diplomatic approach to conflict prevention, and the soft advocacy of universal values. An important aspect lay in the presentation of European cooperation as a model for other parts of the world, which was i.e. visible in the continuation of Kurt Beck's latter quote:

"Peace and freedom are a trademark of this community, a trademark of which we hope, that it radiates, so that it becomes clear, that this example of Europe should not only be observed in other parts of the world, but that it is worth to search togetherness even at conflicts which seem however insurmountable." (Bundestag 2008e)ⁱⁱ

The connection, of the issue foreign policy appearance, to the advocacy of European identity was closely related to the idea of Europe's actionability and distinctness. The conservative argumentation implied the need for Europe's closure in terms of

ⁱ original German version: "Henry Kissinger hat vor vielen Jahren gefragt, welches denn die Telefonnummer von Europa sei. Jetzt haben wir sie endlich. Das ist wichtig für den Dialog mit unseren globalen Partnern USA, Russland, China und Indien. Es ist aber auch für die Identifikation unserer Bürger mit der EU und ihrer Politik wichtig." (Bundestag 2008b)

ⁱⁱ original German version: "Frieden und Freiheit sind ein Markenzeichen dieser Gemeinschaft, ein Markenzeichen, von dem wir uns wünschen, dass es auch ausstrahlt, dass deutlich wird, dass dieses Beispiel Europas auch in anderen Teilen der Welt nicht nur wahrgenommen werden sollte, sondern dass es sich lohnt, auch bei scheinbar noch so unüberwindbaren Konflikten den Weg zum Miteinander zu suchen." (Bundestag 2008e)

enlargement, in order to provide such an identifiable image of EUrope. That was further suggested, through the repeat of the conservative call for alternatives to enlargement, in the relationship with EUrope's neighborhood and the general skepticism towards further enlargement, in the Lisbon debate. Also the social democratic approach to EUrope's role in international relations was similar to their argumentation in the Turkey debate. The approach on EUrope's normative power as a role model, which suggested the universality of the European model, was an argument practiced and shaped in debating EUrope's responsibility towards Turkey.

All in all the imagination of EUrope, which came to the fore in debating the Lisbon Treaty, in several aspects resembled the perspectives on EUrope formulated a few years earlier in the context of discussing the opening of EU accession talks with Turkey. On the other hand there were also many differences in talking about EUrope within those different contexts. The two debates led to the focus on different qualities, EUrope was seen to be about. In order to illustrate those similarities and differences, the following table summarizes the most prominent aspects, EUrope was constructed with, in discussing the Lisbon Treaty:

SPD	<i>Figure 9 (self-creation)</i>	CDU/CSU
(6/114) 5,3%	EU Foreign Policy	9,6% (12/125)
(6/114) 5,3%	Peace Order	5,6% (7/125)
(7/114) 6,1%	Social System	2,4% (3/125)
(5/114) 4,4%	Values	4,0% (5/125)
(4/114) 3,5%	Economics	4,8% (6/125)
(2/114) 1,8%	Subsidiarity	5,6% (7/125)
(5/114) 4,4%	Othering NationalISM	1,6% (2/125)
(5/114) 4,4%	Normative Power	1,6% (2/125)
(4/114) 3,5%	Fundamental Rights	2,4% (3/125)
(4/114) 3,5%	Othering War	2,4% (3/125)
(5/114) 4,4%	Changeability	0,8% (1/125)
(1/114) 0,9%	Globalization	4,0% (5/125)
(4/114) 3,5%	Supranationalism	0,8% (1/125)
(1/114) 0,9%	Othering Cold War	3,2% (4/125)
(3/114) 2,6%	Othering Neoliberalism	0,8% (1/125)
(2/114) 1,8%	Culture	- (0/125)
(0/114) -	Open Borders	1,6% (2/125)

Figure 9, in the same logic as Figure 8, shows the quantities of codes, which stand for different EUropean qualities, I assigned to the parties' contributions in the Bundestags' engagement with the reform treaty. The table is supposed to demonstrate how the parties imagine EUrope in this context. It brings differences, between the parties and the debates,

to the fore. It shows that both parties, much more often than in the Turkey debate, constructed EUrope based on its (potential) role in international relations. Also the frame of EUrope as peace order was, like in the manifestos, and according to the

literature in most contexts, a very frequent approach to constructing EUrope in the Lisbon debate. In the Turkey debate this frame was, especially by the conservatives, not an important part of imaginations of EUrope. The table also shows that the most obvious differentiation between the parties' EUropes now lay in the perspective on economic and social aspects. The SPD in particular brought forward their vision of a more social EUrope, while CDU/CSU frequently pointed to the context of globalization which makes EUropean free trade so necessary and central. Also this frame was widely absent from both parties' approaches to EUrope in the context of the Turkey debate.

On the other hand, various aspects of the imaginations of EUrope, formulated in discussing the Turkey question, were missing in the debate on Lisbon. Most eye-catching is the absence of the Turkey question itself. Considering the intensity of this debate, a few years earlier, that might have been due to the coalition setting between the parties. Future enlargements in general were not prominently picked up in the Lisbon debate. In debating Turkey, the conservatives' most important approach to EUrope lay in highlighting the importance of political integration, as opposed to a mere economic cooperation. Although this argument was widely absent in the Lisbon debate, the perspective on which it was based was still effective. Also in 2008 the conservative crisis construction was to a large extent based on a perceived contradiction between enlargement and integration. This image was to a relative degree crafted within the context of debating a potential Turkish accession to the EU. Although Turkey was not addressed directly in the debate on the Lisbon Treaty, it still is to a large part responsible for the strength of this image within the conservative argumentation. The SPD on the other hand reconfirmed their perspective on EUrope as a rather dynamic process around a set of values, i.e. represented through a commitment to fundamental rights. The latter point was to a large extent also true for CDU/CSU. The conceptualization of those values was, again, different between the parties. This time the conservatives did not bind them as explicitly on a historic predetermination, as in the debate on Turkey. The SPD's argumentation, with the high prominence of the aspect 'normative power', leads to the conclusion that they still frame them as rather universally applicable. In general it can be put down, that the differences between the parties' construction of EUrope were to a certain extent simultaneous between the debates on Turkey and the Lisbon Treaty, but the debates also picked up different aspects. There were no direct intertextual relationships

between the Turkey debate of 2004, and the construction of EUrope in this context, in the sense of explicit references. In searching inter-textual and –discursive relationships between the two debates, I can only rely on assumptions. There are obviously aspects which point to its existence, like the prominence of the perceived crisis of the EU's actionability in the conservative case, and the role of EUrope as promoter of universal values from the social democrat perspective.

The impression that the absence of the Turkey question from the Lisbon debate was rather due to a coalitional ceasefire, than to the diminishment of its importance and controversially seems likely at the reading of the manifestos that the parties composed in the context of the competition for votes in the following year. In 2009, the election to the German Bundestag, as well as the one to the European Parliament, was held. In the respective manifestos the Turkey question played an obvious role in their treatise of EUropean agendas. The manifestos show that the attitudes towards Turkey did not change a lot since 2004. They also show that aspects, which were prominent in the parties' construction of EUrope in the context of debating the Turkey question, were also part of perspectives on EUrope in the manifestos. In the conservative case, this concerns i.e. the construction of historical, cultural or religious roots EUrope is seen to be based on. The reference to religion was again avoided in the direct encounter with the Turkey question. Its featuring in general contexts nonetheless adds to the construction of a static EUrope, which makes a potential accession of Turkey such an impossibility in the eyes of CDU/CSU, which was reformulated the manifestos. Also the SPD's position on Turkey did not change, and was reformulated in their manifesto to the European elections. Again, parallels between the construction of EUrope between the debate on Turkey and other contexts became obvious. Like in the debate on the Lisbon Treaty, a certain perspective on EUrope's role as normative power is visible. Also despite the Turkey question the typical patterns, of the German parties in imagining EUrope, are reformulated. That concerns i.e. the balance between economic freedom and social equality, and the role EUrope should play in this dimension. The manifestos show, like the Lisbon debate, that the Turkey question is just one of the contexts which trigger different understandings of EUrope. The following elaboration of various debates in 2011 will bring to the fore more of these contexts.

6.2.3 Debating Turkey and EUrope in 2011

The last time period, I want to take a deeper look at, covers the first six months of 2011. Thereby I do not focus on a debate regarding some specific issue. I take contributions to the plenary sessions out of several different contexts into account, as far they are to a significant extent part of the discourses on EUrope or Turkey. The goal of this part is, to get a more differentiated overview on imaginations of EUrope. Thereby I want to demonstrate how fragments, out of the prior two research periods, were re-contextualized in those debates. A further goal lay in the actualization of the results. Through looking at those current debates, I covered all possible governmental positions of the parties: this time the SPD constituted the parliamentary opposition to the government, built by CDU/CSU in coalition with the FDP. The discourse therefore gained in controversy, in comparison to the 2008-debate.

Imaginations of EUrope were laid out in various contexts during the first half of 2011. The statements, I evaluated as relevant for my research interest, summed up to 5000 words for the case of CDU/CSU and 4550 for the SPD. Thereby I assigned 131 codes to the CDU/CSU-material and 146 to the SPD's contributions. One major context lay in discussing the financial crisis EUrope went through, with the bailouts of EU countries like Greece or Portugal. A further context, where the role of EUrope was relevantly debated, lay in talking about the 'Arab Spring' and the revolutions taking place, for example in Egypt, Libya or Syria. Especially in the SPD's take on these events, EUrope was important. Besides those issues stood smaller ones, in which EUrope was reconstructed. For example both parties gave statements to the opening of the German labor markets towards the ECECs, who in 2004 entered the EU. Also the EU's foreign policy, beyond the events in the Arab world, was important, whereby the focus mostly lay on the EU's relationships to its immediate neighborhood. Different takes on EUrope can i.e. be reconstructed through statements on the countries of Former Yugoslavia, or in CDU/CSU's statements about Russia or Belarus. The SPD further laid out imaginations of EUrope, through criticizing EU countries like Hungary or Italy. A further central context, in which imaginations of EUrope can be reconstructed, was the most relevant one for my case: debates on the EU accession of Turkey. Both parties, again, presented their positions on the accession process. The issue was amongst others brought to the table on behalf of the Green Party, who urged the government to revive the accession talks. Hence, the time period I chose covers the Turkey-discourse as well as other contexts, in which EUrope

was debated. It constitutes a supplementation and cross-check, to the two debates I focused on earlier.

In looking at the parliamentary debates of 2011 it became obvious, that EUrope was, like in all prior contexts, perceived to be in a crisis situation and a defining moment. This time it was the crisis of the Euro-currency, and bankrupt member states. The German debate on it was more contentious than the one on Lisbon, but did not come near the controversy of the Turkey debate. It was – besides the resumed Turkey debate – the only issue, in which both parties intensively placed their imaginations of EUrope, during the research period. To large extents it reminded of the debate on the Lisbon Treaty and both parties again confirmed their pro-EUropean agendas. Both parties formulated their consent to the rescue packages for bankrupt countries, and saw the high German share to them as a necessity without any alternative. The disagreements between the parties did hence not refer to the bail-outs per se, but to accompanying measures or to the performance of the other party. The latter point was visible in the cross party criticism which mostly, due to their oppositional parliamentary position, came from the SPD. The most common critique was directed to the flaccidity of the government, which would not understand the gravity of the crisis. The government was blamed for not showing more courage, especially in defending EUrope in the public field. That was i.e. carried out by former SPD-minister of finance, Peer Steinbrück:

“You should have explained more clearly and distinctly, that and why it is a genuine German interest, to contribute to the stability of the Euro zone and to the further integration of Europe. It was clear from the beginning, that this contribution would cost something and that we would have to give up petty national selfish benefits. [...] In this competition Europe must be more than an economic community and a monetary union, not at least to overcome the gap of its citizens towards European institutions.” (Bundestag 2011g)ⁱ

The central line of argumentation, the SPD utilized, lay in formulating their conviction on the positivity of EUropean integration, and, from this stance, questioning the opponents EUropeanism. The government was blamed for not explaining the necessity of the bail-outs properly, and thereby causing the alienation

ⁱ original German version: “Sie hätten deutlicher und klarer erklären müssen, dass und warum es in einem originären deutschen Interesse liegt, einen Beitrag zur Förderung der Stabilität der Euro-Zone und zur weiteren Integration Europas zu leisten. Es war von vornherein klar, dass dieser Beitrag etwas kosten würde und wir auf kleinliche nationale egoistische Vorteile zu verzichten hätten [...] Europa muss in dieser Konkurrenz mehr sein als eine Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und eine Währungsunion, nicht zuletzt deshalb, um die Kluft seiner Bürger gegenüber europäischen Institutionen zu überwinden.” (Bundestag 2011g)

of the German population from the EUropean project. The construction of EUrope behind this argumentation took on many frames I talked about previously. In continuation of the 2008-argument, the SPD argued for a deeper EUrope, based on more supranationalism, i.e. through the European Parliament. The SPD pleaded for a EUrope beyond economic cooperation, what should be realized through expanding EUrope's role in the social level. This can be exemplified by quoting party whip Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who – after a reference to the importance of EUrope for Germany – said:

“The approval of the German public for these European policies is in danger, if we give the impression, that the beneficiaries of this solidarity are not the states and the people in the European states, but financial investors and banks. European solidarity must be more. In the long run it does not work without the contribution of the financial markets. Therefore we urge you to finally open the way for the financial transaction tax. Make sure, that it will be introduced in Europe. This too is part of a European solidarity.”
(Bundestag 2011k)ⁱ

The SPD's imagination of EUrope was hence placed in opposition to neo-liberal ideas, deregulated financial markets and other classical capitalist enemy stereotypes of social democracy. This was realized through the demand of a financial transaction tax, and contained the implicit framing of the government to represent, or at least tolerate, neoliberal tendencies.

CDU/CSU defended their actions, and framed it – in contrast to the SPD's charges – as responsible and reasonable. They forcefully rejected doubts on their pro-EUropean agenda. CDU/CSU formulated the positive relevance of EUrope for Germany, and framed their party as an important patron of EUropean integration. The conservatives shared the SPD's perception of an EU-crisis in terms of public opinion and democratization. In contrast to the social democratic approach, of strengthening social equity, the conservative response lay in framing the situation as alternative-less, in combination with the reference to the centrality of EUrope. This was often realized through the reference to globalization, as a reason for the necessity of EUropean cooperation, like party whip Volker Kauder's argument showed:

ⁱ original German version: “Die Zustimmung der deutschen Öffentlichkeit für diese europäische Politik ist in Gefahr, wenn wir den Eindruck erwecken, dass die Nutznießer dieser Solidarität nicht die Staaten und die Menschen in den europäischen Staaten sind, sondern Finanzanleger und Banken. Europäische Solidarität muss mehr sein. Sie funktioniert auf Dauer nicht ohne Beteiligung der Finanzmärkte. Machen Sie deshalb endlich den Weg für die Finanztransaktionssteuer frei. Sorgen Sie dafür, dass sie in Europa eingeführt wird. Auch das ist Teil einer europäischen Solidarität.” (Bundestag 2011k)

“Yes, we consciously apprehend the assessment of Europe in the public. In this respect these regulations, which we put on the road, contain the chance, to explain to the people, that these are not simply finance-technical measures, but that it quite honestly is about preserving the future viability of Europe. We know: Germany is our fatherland, but Europe is our future. Without Europe, we will never be strong enough to persist in the world in competition. Therefore, the measure we put on the road, is in the interest of Germany, but also in the interest of all Europe.” (Bundestag 2011g)ⁱ

The conservative argument was to a large extent built upon the crisis perception. They tried to present themselves in the role of leadership, in the prevention of this existential crisis. This went hand in hand with the construction, of a more important role for Germany in EUrope, in the context of the financial crisis. Germany was, more self-confidently than previously, presented as the economic locomotive, and to a certain extent heart and leader, of EUrope. The takeover of the leadership-role is thereby still framed within French-German friendship, since there is still a discomfort of German elites with this role of German leadership. That is also attested by Paterson (2011), who, in this context, refers to the Germany’s development into a ‘reluctant hegemon’. In this logic Germany was more or less pushed into this role involuntarily.

All in all, the German debate on the financial crisis constituted an important moment in the development of the parties’ imaginations of EUrope. The debate also contained formulations of differences, in the respective takes on EUrope. The disagreements thereby were not as visible and contentious, as in the Turkey debate, but also not as small as in the debate on the Lisbon Treaty. The differentiation in this case was based on the very core of the parties’ ideals and genesis. In a more controversial and polarized way than i.e. in 2008, the parties debated about the right balance between social solidarity and free market ideals. In contrast to the Turkey debate, where the conservatives were the prime-advocate of thematizing disagreements on EUrope, here mostly the SPD triggered the Bundestag’s engagement with such aspects. Similarities with the debate on Turkey are rather hard to find, since, in spite of its general controversiality, the aspect of social equality did not play any relevant role in

ⁱ original German version: “Ja, wir nehmen die Beurteilung Europas in der Öffentlichkeit sehr bewusst wahr. Insofern liegt in diesen Regelungen, die wir auf den Weg bringen, die große Chance, den Menschen zu erklären, dass es sich hier nicht um rein finanztechnische Maßnahmen handelt, sondern es schlicht und ergreifend darum geht, die Zukunftsfähigkeit Europas zu erhalten. Wir wissen: Deutschland ist unser Vaterland, aber Europa ist unsere Zukunft. Ohne Europa werden wir nie stark genug sein, um in der Welt im Wettbewerb bestehen zu können. Deshalb ist die Maßnahme, die wir auf den Weg bringen, im Interesse Deutschlands, aber auch im Interesse ganz Europas.” (Bundestag 2011g)

the Turkey debate. Beyond that this aspect always, to different extents, played a role in distinguishing the parties' imaginations of EUrope, which makes it rather peculiar that it did not play a role at all in the Turkey debate, as a context in which different takes on EUrope were frequently formulated in.

A debate, which contained more similarities to the Turkey debate, can be found in the Bundestag's take on the Arab Spring. Both parties interpreted it as an historic moment, and, as the term Arab Spring already suggests, constructed a simultaneity to the fall of the iron curtain in EUrope. Nevertheless, only the SPD saw an important moment, for the development of EUrope, in the reaction to the demonstrations and revolutions in the Arab World. That became obvious through the CDU/CSU's seldom reference to EUrope, when discussing the events in North Africa and the Middle East. In the SPD's eyes on the other hand, EUrope was seen to have a special responsibility towards those, supposedly democratic, movements, as i.e. formulated by Steinmeier:

"What we right now experience in North Africa is probably the most dramatic change in international politics since the fall of the Wall. That does not happen anywhere in the world, but to the southern borders of the European Union, in Europe's closest proximity. And Europe? Europe is unable, to give a really powerful reply - days and weeks of silence, of general statements. [...] To describe what Obama described in his speech last week, would after all have been our job, Europe's job." (Bundestag 2011m)ⁱ

This view was mostly based on two frames, which are typical for the SPD's view on EUrope: the importance of EUrope's normative power, in terms of the promotion of its universal values, and a certain responsibility towards its neighborhood. Like in the debate on the financial crisis, European power centers were blamed for their lack of courage and unity, in fulfilling this EUropean duty. The German reservation and sluggishness, in expressing its support for the revolutionary movements, and the lack of advocacy of a common EUropean reaction, were framed as contributions to a failure of EUrope. They were framed as acting out of populist motivations, which were based on nationalist interests. This was mostly exemplified in reference to the reactions towards migration movements, caused by the civil war-like events of the Arab Spring. EUropean governments, and especially the German one, were blamed

ⁱ original German version: "Das, was wir im Augenblick in Nordafrika erleben, ist wahrscheinlich der einschneidendste Wandel in der internationalen Politik seit dem Fall der Mauer. Das passiert nicht irgendwo auf der Welt, sondern an den südlichen Grenzen der Europäischen Union, in der engsten Nachbarschaft zu Europa. Und Europa? Europa ist außerstande, darauf eine wirklich kraftvolle Antwort zu geben - Tage und Wochen von Sprachlosigkeit, von allgemeinen Statements. [...] Das zu beschreiben, was Obama vergangene Woche in seiner Rede getan hat, wäre doch unsere Aufgabe, Europas Aufgabe gewesen." (Bundestag 2011m)

for relying on nationalist protectionism, instead of the propagation of European solidarity, in coping with the situation.

The parallels to the Turkey debate in the SPD's argumentation on the Arab Spring were quite obvious. Like in the case of Turkey, they constructed a responsibility of Europe, to support the spread of its universal values, especially in its immediate neighborhood. This was connected to the view, that Islam does not contradict the implementation of those European values. Although the conservatives were mostly conspicuous through their absence, in connecting the Arab Spring with imaginations of Europe, CDU-man Andreas Schockenhoff's following quote has at least to be mentioned:

"The thesis that our system of values, characterized by an image of humanity, which is based on freedom, pluralism, human rights, rule of law and good governance, would not be compatible with an Islamic cultural circle, in the moment gets refuted by the events in Egypt. But this is still a fragile and difficult process." (Bundestag 2011c)ⁱ

This was the only such statement by a conservative politician. It nonetheless demonstrated that the parties' imaginations of Europe are only tendentially close to various poles; in this case the poles of constructing European values as universal or particularistic. On the other hand Schockenhoff, in the same statements, also expressed his continuing doubts about the applicability of European values on Muslim cultures.

These conservative doubts, as well as the social democratic conviction, about the universality of European values, in the context of Muslim societies, resemble the parties' positions in the Turkey debate. The major role, the debate on Turkey played in the formation of this differentiation, can be observed in looking at the 2011-fragment of the continuing Turkey debate in the Bundestag. Thereby it became visible, that the parties' approach on Turkey did not change a lot in the last number of years, despite switched positions of government and opposition. This latter point, as well as the absence of upcoming important decisions on the accession process, might have contributed to the relative relaxation of the debate, compared to 2004. The parties' positions were not as clear-cut as in earlier times, and the other side's

ⁱ original German version: "Die These, unsere Werteordnung, geprägt von einem Menschenbild, das auf Freiheit, Pluralität, Menschenrechten, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und guter Regierungsführung beruht, sei mit einem islamischen Kulturkreis nicht vereinbar, wird derzeit durch die Ereignisse in Ägypten widerlegt. Aber es handelt sich noch um einen fragilen und schwierigen Prozess." (Bundestag 2011c)

arguments were more often apprehended and, at least partly, accepted. Nonetheless, even with the relative reduction of inter-party blaming, and the reduction of the variety in speakers in the plenary sessions, the arguments widely stayed the same. The conservatives attested Turkey's continuing shortcomings, in terms of fulfilling the criteria of EUropeanness, while the SPD focused on improvements. The events of the last few years were mostly interpreted as confirmation of the respective party-positions, which were held since at least 2004. Hence, the Turkish development in the conservative perspective was rather stagnant, as Thomas Bareiß argued:

“Whether the accession negotiations will be revived, is completely in the hand of Turkey, which must decide if it wants reforms or not. I think it does not want. [...] At all of the criteria above, Turkey has not made much progress in recent years. Actually, in terms of the abovementioned values, in some points it diverged from Europe [...]. Until Turkey has adopted these basic values of Western democracies not just on paper, and until also the courts and the people have internalized these principles, a long time will have to pass.” (Bundestag 2011f)ⁱ

Bareiß confirmed the CDU/CSU-skepticism about the Turkish reforms, and formulated the suspicion, that Turkey is not honest in its attempts to adapt EUropean standards. They pointed to Turkish shortcomings in many different fields. The strongest focus lay on the field of freedom of religion. Thereby they especially deplored the suppression of Christian communities. Also the supposed contradiction between enlargement and integration was again important. It was still feared, that a Turkish membership would restrict EUropean cooperation to the economic field, and obstruct the advance of political integration. The reason, for the conservative belief that Turkey could not ever fulfill EUropean standards, was again transported – sometimes explicitly, but mostly implicitly – through notions on Turkey's unEUropean character in terms of history or culture. The, in the conservative perspective, Turkish peculiarity becomes obvious in comparing it to the CDU/CSU's attitude to the opening of the German labor markets towards the ECECs, which joined the EU in 2004, in May 2011. Regardless of the foreseen problems that it could cause, they simply saw it as materialization of 'EUropean normality'. In relation to

ⁱ original German version: “Ob die Beitrittsverhandlungen wiederbelebt werden, liegt ganz allein in der Hand der Türkei, die entscheiden muss, ob sie Reformen will oder nicht. Ich glaube, sie will sie nicht. [...] Bei allen oben genannten Kriterien ist die Türkei in den letzten Jahren nicht viel vorangekommen. Sie hat sich vielmehr, gemessen an den oben genannten Werten, bei einigen Punkten von Europa entfernt [...]. Bis die Türkei diese Grundwerte westlicher Demokratien nicht nur auf dem Papier verabschiedet hat, sondern die Gerichte und die Menschen diese Prinzipien auch verinnerlicht haben, wird wohl noch eine lange Zeit vergehen.” (Bundestag 2011f)

the Turkey question this perspective did not exist. EUrope was hence not seen as very responsible, to support Turkey in its development. The potential advantages, of the Turkish membership, should still be secured through an alternative partnership. One of these advantages was, also by the conservatives, seen in the potential Turkish role as mediator between EUrope and the Muslim world, which was also brought in a connection with the 'Arab Spring'.

This latter point was still more important in the SPD's argument. In this context, they, like in 2004, blamed the conservatives for triggering the alienation of Turkey from EUrope. The most direct connection, between the Turkey question and the Arab Spring, was thereby made by Uta Zapf:

"The humiliation by the attitude of certain EU countries, which offer only a 'privileged partnership', sits deeply. [...] This has to alarm the Europeans and the USA, in consideration of the changes and risks caused by the Arab Spring. It must be in our interest that the foreign policies do not diverge too much. [...] A 'model for the Arab world', as some hope, Turkey will only be, if it continues to drive its internal democratic reforms, and if it shows great responsibility in a region of transition, at the same time." (Bundestag 2011n)ⁱ

The German government was again blamed for discouraging Turkey from the further enforcement of the reform process. CDU/CSU, in their opinion, did not act far-sighted, and drew on populist sentiments. The SPD supposed religious and cultural prejudices, as prime motivation for their position. The stagnant reform process, and the re-orientation of Turkish foreign policy, was interpreted as a result of the dismissive attitude of several EUropean governments, especially the conservative-led German one. Despite that they also talked about the positive impact, the accession process had on Turkey's development so far. In order to further exert this impact, the SPD pleaded for a fair treatment of Turkey. As positive impacts of a Turkish EU membership they basically repeated the same points as five years before. Besides rather materialist advantages, in terms of economic growth and foreign policy interests, the proof of the universality of EUrope's values and of the absence from its religious pre-determination, were seen as positive impacts of a Turkish membership.

ⁱ original German version: "Die Kränkung durch die Haltung bestimmter EU-Länder, die nur eine 'privilegierte Partnerschaft' anbieten, sitzt tief. [...] Dies muss die Europäer und die USA angesichts der Veränderungen und Risiken durch den arabischen Frühling alarmieren. Es muss in unserem Interesse sein, dass die Außenpolitiken nicht zu sehr auseinanderdriften. [...] Ein 'Modell für die arabische Welt', wie manche hoffen, wird die Türkei nur werden, wenn sie ihre inneren demokratischen Reformen weitertreibt und gleichzeitig hohe Verantwortung zeigt in einer Region im Umbruch." (Bundestag 2011n)

The aspect of normative power, and the propagation of EUropean values in non-EU countries, was not only strong in the SPD's approach to Turkey. Its strength, in the social democratic view on EUrope, was also effective in other contexts, like in discussing the Arab Spring. Furthermore, in my research period it was also obvious in debates about countries which were already in the EU, as i.e. SPD-man Martin Dörmann's statement showed:

"Do not let us allow that Europe's values are undermined in this way. Do not let us keep quiet, when the Berlusconi and Orbans in Europe want to determine, whether criticizing them is allowed or not." (Bundestag 2011a)ⁱ

This critique of internal EU shortcomings, in fulfilling EUropean standards, is indirectly related to the plea for fairness towards Turkey. This aspect works through the – in this case implicit – relativization of the Turkish deficiencies. It shows that EUropeanness is not predetermined, and that EUropean nations can possibly fail in fulfilling its standards, just as Turkey can fail. Although the normative power aspect was widely absent from the CDU/CSU's approach to Turkey, as well as towards the Arab Spring, it was existent in other contexts. That can be exemplified through CDU-man Karl-Georg Wellmann's contribution:

"We are always asked the question: Why are we more committed in Belarus, than in other states, where the situation of human rights is unsatisfactory? The answer is easy: Belarus belongs to Europe, as does Russia by the way. [...] In the largest part of Europe the universal values – human rights, democracy – are implemented. Insofar, we cannot accept that the government of a European country withholds these values to itself and to the population." (Bundestag 2011d)ⁱⁱ

The named reason, for the special responsibility towards Belarus, was obviously based on a culturalist and static imagination of EUrope. Belarus's inclusion into EUrope was based on pre-determined aspects, and not on its current compliance with EUropean values. Consequently the positivity of the conservatives, towards an eventual EU accession of the countries of former Yugoslavia, in spite of the EU's lack of intake capacity they apprehended in the Turkey context, can be understood.

ⁱ original German version: "Lassen wir nicht zu, dass die Werte Europas auf diese Weise ausgehöhlt werden. Schweigen wir nicht, wenn die Berlusconi und Orbans in Europa selbst bestimmen wollen, ob Kritik an ihnen erlaubt ist oder eben nicht." (Bundestag 2011a)

ⁱⁱ original German version: "Uns wird immer die Frage gestellt: Warum engagieren wir uns bei Belarus mehr als bei anderen Staaten, in denen die Situation der Menschenrechte unbefriedigend ist? Die Antwort ist leicht: Belarus gehört zu Europa, ebenso übrigens Russland. [...] Im allergrößten Teil Europas sind die universellen Werte - Menschenrechte, Demokratie - umgesetzt. Insofern können wir es nicht akzeptieren, dass die Regierung eines europäischen Landes diese Werte sich selbst und der Bevölkerung verweigert." (Bundestag 2011d)

The various debates of 2011, about the role EUrope should play in its immediate vicinity, hence showed that the major difference between SPD and CDU/CSU on Turkey still existed. While the conservatives usually saw a peculiarity of Turkey, beyond its size and economic weakness, in contrast to other candidates for EU membership, the SPD did not. This peculiarity was based on different imaginations of EUrope, and made the Turkey question so central to differentiations within the German discourse on EUrope. On the other hand the 2011-debates again made clear, that the Turkey question was not the only field in which different imaginations of EUrope, of different German political parties, existed. The plenary sessions about the financial crisis showed frames of differentiation, which were non-existent in the Turkey debate.

Figure 10 (self-creation)

SPD		CDU/CSU
(5/146) 3,4%	Values	3,1% (4/131)
(2/146) 1,4%	Peace Order	4,6% (6/131)
(5/146) 3,4%	Normative Power	2,3% (3/131)
(2/146) 1,4%	Economics	3,8% (5/131)
(3/146) 2,1%	EU Foreign Policy	3,1% (4/131)
(4/146) 2,7%	EUrope central for self	2,3% (3/131)
(2/146) 1,4%	Open Borders	3,1% (4/131)
(6/146) 4,1%	Migration Regulation	- (0/131)
(0/146) -	Euro-Currency	3,8% (5/131)
(0/146) -	Globalization	3,8% (5/131)
(4/146) 2,7%	Social System	0,8% (1/131)
(1/146) 0,7%	History	1,5% (2/131)
(2/146) 1,4%	Climate Policy	0,8% (1/131)
(0/146) 0,0%	Self as EUrope's Center	1,5% (2/131)
(2/146) 1,4%	Law & Rights	- (0/131)
<i>EUrope in Context of Turkey Debate</i>		
(2/146) 1,4%	Values	0,8% (1/131)
(2/146) 1,4%	Normative Power	0,0% (0/131)
(0/146) -	Static EUrope	1,5% (2/131)
(0/146) -	History	1,5% (2/131)
(0/146) -	EUrope is Particular	1,5% (2/131)
(2/146) 1,4%	Reliability	- (0/131)
(2/146) 1,4%	Religion	- (0/131)

In order to summarize the imaginations of EUrope, presented in the Bundestag's debates in the first half of 2011, I listed the quantities of assigned codes, which stand for different aspects by which EUrope was constructed. It follows the logic of the Figures 8 and 9. I split the aspects, originating from debating the Turkey question, from other contexts.

The wide field of different issues or

rather contexts, where the parliamentarians placed their respective views on EUrope in, obviously revealed a more differentiated image. The debates covered issues related to the interior organization of EUrope, as well as its relationships with the outside.

The summarized imaginations of EUrope hence should be more balanced than in the prior cases.

Figure 10 shows that both parties saw EUrope in a central role for definitions of Germany. The most common notion, in constructing this EUropean (and German) identities, lay in reference to values. While the SPD placed this reference mostly in the context of the Arab Spring, the CDU did so in talking about the Eastern enlargement or other intra-EUropean contexts. The importance of EUrope for Germany was mostly placed in the debate about the financial crisis. The conservatives thereby pointed to the economic benefits EUrope brought for Germany, i.e. through the common currency. In a globalized world only a cooperating EUrope, in which Germany would have a leading role, could prevail. The SPD also highlighted EUrope's high relevance in the context of the financial crisis. They nonetheless took on a more critical attitude towards the status quo. The SPD pleaded for a more social EUrope, as a solution to the attested alienation of the people from EUrope. They also put the plea for more solidarity between EUropean countries in the context of the Arab Spring, through calling for a fair distribution of respective migration movements. In this context they also placed the notion of normative power, and EUrope's special responsibility in the foreign relations with its neighborhood. The conservatives on the other hand placed similar notions, around a common EUropean foreign policy, only in intra-EUropean contexts; i.e. in debating the Former Yugoslavian countries or the Eastern enlargement. In those debates they also highlighted the aspect of peace order and stability, as defining EUropean qualities. In this they also brought forward an imagination of a rather static EUrope based on history. This was continued and accentuated in talking about the EU accession process of Turkey. Thereby both parties basically repeated their argument of 2004, and the same is true for the respective imaginations of EUrope. This steadiness validates the high relevance of the Turkey question in constructing EUrope. It shows that the Turkey debate was rather a source of influence on, than influenced by, other contexts EUrope was constructed in. It suggests that the simultaneousness, of inter-party differences of constructions of EUrope, between the Turkey debate and other contexts is, at least to a large extent, rooted in positions towards Turkey rather than in positions on the other issues. The interdiscursive influences, between the discourses on EUrope and the Turkey-EU relationships, which were to a certain extent visible, might hence not only be directed in one direction. More on this thought will follow in the conclusion of my thesis.

7 Conclusions

Over the course of the last 100 pages or so, I brought together various sources of knowledge. I was concerned with different theoretical approaches, for example to the construction of identity, summarized literature on the state and character of imaginations of EUrope, and reconstructed the relationships between Turkey and EUrope. Beyond this devotion to literature, I also put together a range of statements by German political parties or rather politicians. I tried to analyze this material with the tools of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), in order to verify, illustrate, and also extend the existing literature. All of these enterprises were endeavored in order to qualify myself for answering this question:

How are imaginations of EUrope influenced and reconstructed through debates on the relationship between Turkey and the EU?

It was clear from the beginning that there would not be a definite and unequivocally answer to this question. A clear answer would actually contradict the theoretical presumption, on which the question is based. This assumption goes back to constructivist approaches to social entities as dynamic and heterogeneous imaginations. Their construction is determined by different social factors, which manifest themselves in the discourses they are constructed through. As an introduction, I presented this and other perspectives on the terms and concepts, which built the base of my thesis. Most commonly these imagined representations are referred to with the term identity. I avoided the term identity in my context, because of the diffuse set of connotations the term carries, and talked about imaginations of social entities instead. The here relevant theoretical approaches nonetheless often are about identity. Therefore it made sense to look at the different perspectives on identities. I showed for example the frequent opposition of the constructivist understanding to popular conceptualizations of identity (see 2.1 & 2.2). In the mainstream, identity often stands for something rather stable and homogeneous. These imaginations are usually connected to ideas of culture, nation or ethnicity (see 2.3). Through those familiar notions, certain identity-constructions are understood as matter of course or nature. The construction process and aspects of agency behind them get hidden. Also the polarization between universalist and particularist perspectives on identity is connected to approaches on, for example, culture. Furthermore, I presented how different approaches to Self-Other relationships conclude in different identity constructs (see 2.4). I showed the variety within those

relationships and the often fluent passage between Selves and Others. The constructed difference to Others and sameness within a group can be seen as the two sides of identity constructions. The various realizations of all these aspects lead to the assignment of different qualities to different groups by different actors. The constructivist approach intends to deconstruct these processes and uncover certain biases, which lead to discriminatory and privileging effects. The approach of critical discourse analysis, which I chose for my empirical analysis, describes those naturalized constructs as ideologies. It states that different such constructs mutually sustain each other and add up to the endorsement of certain worldviews. Discourse analysis places the construction process of those ideologies within the notion of discourse and focuses on the linguistic realization of identity imaginations. In the presentation of my empirical approach (see 5.1) I described CDA in more detail. I illustrated the interdependency between discourses and social constellations, i.e. through aspects of power distribution. Out of the CDA-branch I chose the discourse historical approach (DHA), which proposes a chronological focus on intertextual and interdiscursive relationships. It further asks about different discursive strategies, which are utilized to realize powerful and arcane identity constructions. Its goal is to uncover the role of power within, and discriminatory aspects of, those constructions, and to trigger a critical engagement with them.

In the course of my paper, I reconstructed how those various theoretical aspects are realized in the case of imaginations of EUrope. I started this enterprise by reconstructing some of the changes imaginations of EUrope went through in history (see 3.1 & 3.2). This revealed the dynamic and heterogeneous character of imaginations of EUrope. It showed that Europe always was a product of its time, i.e. dependent on respective power constellations. The respective power center(s) of a time often determined the dominant imaginations of Europe in an egocentric logic. Through different centers, various qualities came to characterize Europe. This led for example to the introduction of the Antique Polis, and later Roman law and Christianity, into understandings of EUropeanness. I further illustrated meanings which were added in more recent centuries, like world wide-dominance through colonialism, Enlightenment values or chaotic warfare and cruelty. The end of World War Two introduced a new era of imaginations of EUrope, which was characterized by a new strength of pan-EUropean ideas and the Cold War order. In opposition to the World Wars and the USSR, it was defined by peaceful cooperation, democracy

and free markets. This EUrope was based on the concept of integration. Since this did not deliver public legitimization for the EEC/EU, its constructors started to directly propagate a EUropean identity. With this shift the latest, disputes on imaginations of EUrope directly entered the arena of EU policy-making.

The perceived need to connect the EU's governmental power with a EUropean identity resembles the nationalist model. This is also the case for various concepts, which are utilized in the construction of such EUropean identities. EUrope was thereby usually equipped with the construction of a certain history. This history-construction can be a positive source of identification, i.e. in pointing to Christian or Enlightenment values. It can also be a negative for the definition of today's EUrope, i.e. in distancing it from EUrope's past of warfare. In elaborating on this aspect (see 3.3.1), I came to the conclusion that there is not one but many histories of EUrope. Dependent on different, i.e. national or regional, perspectives, different (potential) parts of EUropean history are highlighted or mitigated. The literature detects for example the prevalence of Western at the expense of Eastern EUropean memories. Parts of EUrope's past, like the story of colonialism, are rather neglected in EUropean self-portraits, while they are more prominent in non-EUropean perspectives.

Not only the contents of this history are contested, but also the relevance this history should have for today's EUrope. This is rooted in the incorporation of different theoretical approaches (see 3.3.2). I reconstructed how imaginations of EUrope, like identity constructions in general, swing between universalist and particularist conceptualizations. The differences between perspectives on EUrope are not only due to different contents, but also to questioning where these contents came from and to whom they apply in which way. From the universalist perspective EUropean qualities potentially apply to all humanity. EUropeanness is rather a dynamic ideal to long for, than a definite and stable identity feature. The opposite is true for the particularist approach, which bases EUrope on certain originality. EUrope's roots are thereby for example seen in a common culture, history, or religion. The particularist EUrope describes a rather static and exclusive entity with definite borders. It resembles an object of identification EUropeans are very familiar with: nationalism. The closeness to the nationalist model is strength and weakness of the particularist approach to EUrope (see 3.3.3). It provides a clear object of identification but also leads to an often perceived conflicting situation with national sources of identification. In such a competition for loyalty the cards obviously would be stacked against EUrope.

The many nationalisms in EUrope further make it hard to fill the imaginations of EUrope with contents which accord with all of them, since “it is impossible to find a cultural trait that is shared by all Europeans and not shared by any non-Europeans” (Neumann 2006: 9). This is true for all identity constructions, but does not diminish the power of i.e. nationalism in the same way, as perceived in the EUropean context. Hence, there must be ways to deal with it. As one such way I presented the imbalances in imaginations of EUrope; when for example Eastern EUropean peculiarities are faded out of dominant versions of EUrope, they lose some of this heterogeneity. The construction of a EUropean originality also becomes easier by limiting the context in which it is seen. Those contexts are often constituted by different Others, to whom EUrope is compared in different situations. The most significant Other was always the East, i.e. represented by Russia or Islam, but also other differentiations, i.e. from the USA, play a relevant role. I further showed that processes of Othering are not only directed to supposedly extra-EUropean objects. The center can only define the perfection of its EUropeanness in opposition to the periphery’s imperfection. This periphery is often represented by the ECECs, who however, despite their attested deficiency, were unopposed included in imaginations of EUrope. The success of the ECECs in gaining EU membership after the Cold War was to a large extent due to this inclusion. It was framed as re-unification of EUrope, and for this reason pictured as a moral duty.

Despite this power of imaginations of EUrope in different political contexts, the summary of literature about them brought forward their enormous variety and diffusivity. It showed that definitions of EUrope not only varied between different times. They also vary between different actors or perspectives; between in- and outside-, and also inbetween-perspectives on EUrope. They vary between different national contexts, and also between elites and public perspectives. Further they are differentiated dependent on of different political ideologies. In different contexts they are debated in, different qualities are highlighted or mitigated. This variation manifests itself, and is fortified by, different theoretical conceptualizations of identity and similar ideas. It leads to disunity in drawing the borders of EUrope, which manifests itself in enlargement debates. While the ECECs benefited from their unequivocal inclusion within imaginations of EUrope, this argument loses weight in going further east. Thereby it is not unequivocally clear where EUrope ends and Asia begins. This leads to an intensification of the debate on EUrope, and brings different

polarizations in the EUrope discourse to the fore. Turkey is part of this interspace, whose EUropeanness is disputed. While different perspectives on EUrope did not lead to different conclusions in debating the EU enlargement towards the ECECs, they did so in the Turkish case. This debate on the relationship between Turkey and the EU, constituted the second aspect of my research interest. Therefore I first reconstructed scientific views on the relationship between Turkey and the EU itself and, second, literature about the debates in EUrope on it.

This revealed a long history of relationships between Turkey and EUrope, and illustrated the significant role perceptions of EUrope and EUropeanness played for the Turkish development (see 4.1). At the latest from World War One on, Turkey's strong orientation towards a EUropean role model is observable, and significantly inspired Atatürk's concept of Kemalism. This applied for the political and juridical organization of the Turkish state, as well as for questions of culture and tradition. After World War Two it concluded in the Turkish affiliation to the Western alliance in the Cold War. That was accompanied by the institutional integration within the NATO, and an association agreement with the EEC. Due to the political and economic instability of Turkey until the 1990s, the geopolitical inclusion within EUrope, through the Cold War context, did not conclude in further progress towards an EEC/EU accession. This changed with the stabilization of Turkish politics in the late 1990s, and the still effective EUropean orientation of Turkey concluded in a revival of the EU perspective. In 1999, Turkey was accepted as an official EU accession candidate, which was followed by further political reforms in Turkey. In contrast to previous times Turkey's EUropean alignment was no longer carried forward by the Kemalists, but by a new form of moderate political Islam. After their government takeover by Erdogan's AKP, the Turkish reform process significantly accelerated, which concluded in the opening of EU accession talks in 2004. Nonetheless the Turkish accession process, as well as its reforms, slowed down after this success. This was partly due to a stagnant reform process within Turkey. The literature sees the reasons for this in a missing consensus between the political and social forces of Turkey, and often detects a reorientation of Turkish foreign policy. On the other hand, rising in extent and intensity, the skepticism towards a Turkish EU membership in EUrope is seen as cause for this stagnation.

This rising skepticism is approved by the literature (see 4.2 & 4.3). When the Turkish accession became a seemingly realistic option through the 1999- and 2004-decisions,

the EUropean debates about it intensified. In some national contexts they entered the field of political campaigning, which is connected to strong skepticism of public opinions. While the acknowledgement of Turkish reforms by the European Commission and the accordance to EU-norms led to progress of the accession until 2004, more and more skeptical attitudes came to the fore on the national level. I reconstructed various aspects of the debates on Turkey, whereby i.e. concerns about Turkey's size, demography or economic condition were formulated. While the pro-Turkey side saw these points as rather positive in terms of chances in i.e. geopolitical or economic terms, the anti-Turkey side mainly pointed to the high costs it could cause. In summarizing the literature about the EUropean debates on Turkey it was obvious that they were traversed by imaginations of EUrope. Not only the modalities of a potential Turkish accession, but its general possibility and desirability was debated. This dispute was often concerned with questioning Turkey's EUropeanness as a generally accepted criterion for EU membership. Different imaginations of EUrope, i.e. in reference to history, culture, values, religion or geography, led to different positions in the Turkey debate. The exclusive version of EUrope was often built upon a particularistic, static and homogeneous conceptualization. The inclusive side most commonly pointed to universal values, as a base of a dynamic and heterogeneous EUrope. In the context of disputing these imaginations of EUrope, the Turkey question was often framed as a defining moment. It would link the EU with one of these imaginations of EUrope, and abolish the other. The wrong choice could, in the perspective of many actors on both sides, lead to the dissolution of EUrope.

Debates on Turkey often brought different opinions about EUrope to the fore. They often intensified discourses on EUrope, and influenced the ways in which EUrope is imagined in. This is not true for every debate about Turkey within EUrope. The intensity of debates varied across EUrope, and they did not always lead to a significant clash of different imaginations of EUrope. While Turkey is, for example, included in all relevant imaginations of EUrope in British politics, it is nearly always excluded from Austrian ones. German politics reveal a more polarized political debate on Turkey, which is a major reason that I chose it for my empirical case study. This polarization goes hand in hand with an intensive political debate, which was amongst others held between CDU/CSU and SPD. For technical reasons I narrowed down my empirical research to these two main parties of Germany. Further reductions of my research field were concerned with the time frame and genres (see 5.2). The time-

wise focus lay on the period, in which a Turkish EU accession became relevant for German debates on EUrope, after the late 1990s. The genres I analyzed were debates in the plenary sessions of the German Bundestag and the parties' election manifestos to German general and European elections. For technical reasons, I further limited the focus for the parliamentary debates to three relatively short time periods. I, first, covered contributions of the parties' MPs to the debate about the opening of accession talks with Turkey in 2004, and, second, to the one about the Lisbon Treaty in 2008. I further summarized respective statements about the Turkey question and imaginations of EUrope, which were put to protocol in the first half of 2011. The aim of this exercise lay in reconstructing of imaginations of EUrope within different thematic contexts. According to the DHA, I intended to uncover the interdiscursive impact of the debate about Turkey on imagining EUrope in later and other contexts. In order to realize this plan, I utilized different methods of qualitative research and analysis (see 5.3). These were partly inspired by CDA and DHA, and amongst others supplemented with inputs by the grounded theory's approach to coding.

Although I already had summarized the literature on imaginations of EUrope and the relationship between EUrope and Turkey on a general level, I started the realization of this research design with one more literature review. This was necessary due to the strong impact, different national contexts have on these debates. In preparation of this analysis, I hence summarized literature about the German debates on EUrope and Turkey (see 6.1 & 6.2.1). In the first instance this revealed various upheavals of dominant German perspectives on EUrope, throughout history. These upheavals usually were connected to the changing German power position within EUrope. Imaginations of EUrope changed and differed in the way they placed Germany in them, and were strongly determined by constructions of German national identity. The end of World War Two was the last radical upheaval and was followed by a relatively strong continuity of German imaginations of EUrope. This continuity was characterized by a strong consensus within Germany about the importance and positivity of EUropean cooperation. A EUropeanized Germany was seen as a way to distance Germany from past visions about a Germanized EUrope. The restriction of German power in this constellation was accepted in remembrance of German warfare and National Socialism. EUrope was most importantly seen as peace order. The general consensus did not initially cover the approach to the Cold War order, since the SPD did not exclude socialism in the same way, like the dominant conservative

imagination of EUrope did. This dissent did not last very long, and soon the SPD widely turned into the conservative version of EUrope, which shaped the already ongoing integration process. This EUrope was based on democracy, a social market economy and Christendom. In geopolitical terms it was defined in opposition to the USSR. Germany was subordinated within EUrope, although a certain claim for leadership was often formulated through the notion of French-German friendship. The conservative's pro-EUropeanism was relativized by the prominence of subsidiarity in imagining EUrope. This was sometimes connected with a federalist model, but often also to skepticism towards power accumulation on the EUropean level. Nonetheless, the pro-EUropean consensus was and is remarkably strong within German political elites, despite its occasional discordance with public opinion. It also survived German unification and the replacement of the popular Deutsch-Mark with the Euro. Besides the relative strength of this consensus on the positivity of EUropean cooperation, the parties still disagreed in debating the form this EUrope should take. This was for example the case for approaching the balance between social solidarity and a free market economy. On a more general level the parties differed in the theoretical conceptualization of EUrope and EUropeanness. While the conservatives usually saw EUrope in rather particularist terms, the other parties of the Bundestag often constructed a rather universalist EUrope.

These differences did not conclude in a dissent about the enlargement towards the ECECs after the Cold War, which was welcomed by both sides and widely framed as a *re-unification* of EUrope. The limitation of the German consensus on EUrope became apparent during the debate about the potential EU accession of Turkey. In reference to scientific views on these debates, I illustrated the intensity and variety of the German debate on this question. This is the case since the late 1990s, when a Turkish EU accession became a more realistic option. Before that, the German perspective on Turkey was rather unexcited and widely determined by geopolitical concerns. In the context of the Cold War, Turkey was seen as an important ally and for this reason was widely included within imaginations of EUrope. Perspectives on Turkey also contained its otherness, but this was usually not brought in connection to its exclusion from EUrope. With the diminishing relevance of the Cold War for imaginations of EUrope German perspectives on Turkey's EUropeanness changed and became more differentiated. Aspects such as the growing Turkish Diaspora in Germany, the Islamist revolution in Iran, or political turmoil in Turkey, got more

important. The geopolitical inclusion of Turkey was more often challenged by its perceived otherness, for example in political or religious terms. Since a Turkish EU accession was not realistic until the late 1990s, the debate on these aspects did not reach an intensity, which could trigger a reconsideration of Turkey's inclusion within EUrope. This changed with the acceptance of Turkey's candidacy status in 1999, and especially towards the opening of accession talks in 2004. While the SPD-led government backed those decisions in favor of the Turkish accession at the EU-level, the conservatives were more often skeptical. This skepticism was not only concerned with the Turkish shortcomings in fulfilling the accession criteria, but also questioned the general desirability of a EUrope, that includes Turkey. The polarization regarding Turkey was not only restricted to the political field, and also pertained actors of media, science, religion, or economics. The debate was also held on a mainstream level between laypeople, which is connected to much public skepticism towards a Turkish accession. Different authors come to the conclusion, that the German debate on Turkey was to a large extent one between different imaginations of EUrope, and framed as a decisive moment for EUrope.


This was also apparent in analyzing the debate in the German Bundestag about the opening of EU accession talks with Turkey in 2004, like my analysis illustrated (see 6.2.2). Thereby the conservatives endorsed their role as thematic leader and instigator of the debate. They also consciously saw themselves in this role, and blamed the SPD-led government for dishonestly attempting to duck out of a public debate. Both parties blamed each other for irresponsibly acting against German and/or EUropean interests. The occasional dramatics, assigned to the debate, went hand in hand with the importance that both parties attached to the issue. It was frequently framed as a defining moment for the destiny of EUrope. In explaining their respective positions, both parties agreed that the debate was not only about Turkey's, but also about EUrope's constitution. This perspective was however based on an attitude, which sees Turkey as rather peculiar, i.e. in comparison to prior accession candidates. Both parties saw a Turkish EU integration as challenging. While the SPD saw EUrope able to cope with this challenge, the conservatives thought differently. These contrary judgments in the first place were explained with contrary evaluations of the Turkish general constitution and reform process. While the SPD highlighted Turkey's achieved progress, CDU/CSU put more prominence on continuing deficiencies. The conservatives also formulated a general suspicion

towards the sincerity and sustainability of Turkey's reforms. The SPD shared the perception of Turkish instability to a certain extent, through formulating Turkey's dependency on the process and perspective of EU accession. They formulated a responsibility of EUrope to support Turkey in its quest for political, and otherwise forms of, stabilization. The conservatives did not directly deny this argument, although the formulation of such a responsibility towards Turkey was widely absent in their statements. The contrary positions on the Turkey question were also explained with prognoses of the costs and benefits that a Turkish accession would bring for Germany and/or EUrope. CDU/CSU focused on the potential costs, i.e. through direct financial payments or enhanced migration movements towards Germany. The SPD in contrast highlighted potential benefits, i.e. in terms of geopolitical power or trade. The SPD frequently framed Turkey as a bridge to EUrope's neighboring regions and cultures. This bridge should work for example in terms of diplomacy. A Turkish EU membership was seen as a potential for mitigation of the perceived conflict with the Islam World. This also implied a certain inbetween-position of Turkey, which was explicitly formulated by conservative MPs. For this and other reasons, CDU/CSU pleaded for a privileged partnership between the EU and Turkey, as an alternative to full accession. This should secure the potential benefits without accepting the negative effects. These negative effects were seen to conclude in an overstraining of EUropean integration capacities and in the impossibility of the realization of a political union. This point was based on a perceived contradiction between integration and enlargement. The SPD argued against the goal of a privileged partnership, since it would constitute an unfair and unequal treatment of Turkey, in comparison to other candidate countries. They blamed the conservatives for discouraging Turkey from their EUropean quest, and suspected hidden motives for this exclusionary attitude. The SPD suspected religious and cultural prejudices as the basis of the CDU/CSU's position, and positioned EUrope in opposition on universal values. Although CDU/CSU usually refused these allegations, conservative MPs frequently excluded Turkey from EUrope through the explicit reference to historical, cultural or geographical aspects. In this context CDU/CSU feared that a Turkish accession would undermine the development and promotion of a strong EUropean identity, and thereby increase the EU's legitimization problems.

The German parliamentary debate, about the opening of EU accession talks with Turkey, was to a large extent characterized by the formulation of different

imaginations of EUrope. I tried to illustrate these imaginings through the following word clouds. They show the prominence of various aspects in conceptualizing EUrope, according to my analysis and coding of the parliamentary debates on Turkey. The varying size of the terms points to the respective strength of the aspect. The gray bubbles encircle aspects, which stood in close relationships to each other within the respective statements. Also the overlaps between the various gray bubbles point to relationships and intersections of the issues and concepts they stand for.

SPD:



CDU/CSU:




Figure 11
(self-creation)

In reference to Figure 3 (p54), these word clouds describe the interspace between the EUrope discourse and the Turkey-EU discourse. It shows how different perspectives on Turkey triggered the formulation of different imaginings of EUrope. CDU/CSU, in reference to the integration/enlargement dilemma, saw Turkey as too peculiar for EU integration. The SPD estimated this otherness, and the strains it would put on the integration project, as less dramatic, and pointed to EUrope's flexibility and adaptability. The SPD thought that Turkey is able to implement EUropean values, which thereby were framed and highlighted as defining qualities of EUrope. They are seen in contrast to a rejected determination of EUrope by culture, history, geography or religion. The task to promote these values and peace, in the logic of normative power, was a further aspect of the SPD's imagination of EUrope. This aspect is rather mitigated in the conservatives' respective approach to EUrope. CDU/CSU prominently placed the goal of political integration, in connection with a strong


EUropean identity, in their argument, what they saw in opposition to a Turkish EU accession. In this context they warned of an overextension of EUrope's borders, and put EUrope in opposition to Asia. Turkey's otherness in geographical terms was connected to other fields of difference. Thereby CDU/CSU often included a historically grown EUropean culture into their imagination of EUrope.

Debating the opening of EU accession talks with Turkey in 2004 triggered the formulation of, in comparison to the German discourse on EUrope in general, very peculiar imaginations of EUrope. Although they resembled the general German positivity towards EUropean cooperation, many aspects, which characterized imaginations of EUrope in prior times, were absent on behalf of other aspects. Both parties did not talk much about economic and social qualities, which often were the main trigger for dissents between their imaginations of EUrope in other contexts. This absence might have been caused by the conservative argument, that a Turkish membership would reduce the EUropean project to sole economic cooperation on cost of more political cooperation. This also might have led to the absence of the otherwise, in the conservative argumentation, prominent notion on subsidiarity. The conservative constructions of EUrope also widely left out geopolitical frames, which in prior times mainly triggered the inclusion of Turkey within EUrope.

All in all, the Turkey debate brought forward many polarizations between the imaginations of EUrope of SPD and CDU/CSU. These polarizations stand in contrast to the generally quite consensual character of German debates about EUrope. The imaginations of EUrope, which were brought forward in the context of the Turkey question, revealed hence a very peculiar image. My research interest was, to find out if and how those differences provoked a change in imaginations of EUrope, beyond the limitations of the Turkey context. For this reason I looked at different debates in the German Bundestag, which contained imaginations of EUrope. I was concerned with the debate about the Lisbon Treaty, and about various other issues in 2011. These parliamentary debates looked dissimilar to the ones on the Turkey question, and did not contain nearly as much polarization. The debates about the Lisbon Treaty were especially characterized by a strong consensus between the major parties, which both formed the coalition government at this time. Both parties, and two of the three opposition parties, welcomed the Lisbon Treaty. It was seen as a vital step to stabilize and pursue the EUropean project. Thereby both parties expressed their positive attitude towards EUropean integration. This is also true for the debates in the first

half of 2011. In analyzing those debates, I illustrated how the parties constructed EUrope in various contexts. One was the financial crisis, and resembled the debate on the Lisbon Treaty, although the polarization between SPD and CDU/CSU on questions of social solidarity was more intense and visible in this context. Another issue was the Arab Spring, whereby the SPD placed its imagination of a EUrope based on normative power. The notion of EUrope as promoter of universal values was also apparent in conservative statements about the relationships with i.e. Belarus or the Countries of Former Yugoslavia, or in SPD-statements about Italy or Hungary.

Those and other aspects were revealed, in my analysis of the German parties' construction of EUrope, within those various contexts. In the following Figure 12 I, in the logic of Figure 11, summarized those aspects. This figure gives an overview on the various imaginations of EUrope, which the parties formulated in the debates on Lisbon and on the various issues of 2011. The variety of the debates, which are included within this figure, gives it a relatively high representativeness of the variety of German imaginations of EUrope.



The impressions of these world clouds resemble the literature about German imaginations of EUrope much more than the ones resulting from the analysis of the Turkey debate. They illustrate the German consensus on the positivity and centrality of EUropean cooperation. This was often realized through highlighting the quality of peace, as opposed to EUrope's and Germany's past of division, warfare and aggressive nationalism. Figure 12 also illustrates the reconceptualization of this aspect within

the notion of prior enlargements, i.e. towards the ECECs. In this context the parties often referred to EUropean values, and their promotion through EUropean cooperation. EUrope's necessity was further argued for, by pointing to the importance of a common occurrence in foreign politics. Another important connotation of the term EUrope was about EUrope's economic benefits.

All these aspects were acknowledged and, to different extents, highlighted by both parties, which reflects the perception of a German consensus on EUrope. The realization and concrete implementation of these aspects however, contained various differences between the parties. Figure 12, further contains aspects, which were prominently picked up by only one of the parties. In the conservative case, this would be for example the notion of subsidiarity, and in the social democratic one, the emphasis of social solidarity. This, as well as differences in conceptualizing various aspects, is connected to a variance of the issues, in which the parties did (not) place their imaginations of EUrope. This is for example obvious for the notion of normative power, as a defining EUropean quality. While the conservatives formulated this aspect in talking about i.e. Belarus or the countries of Former Yugoslavia, the SPD mostly placed this notion in debating the Arab Spring. This illustrates, that the conservatives tendentially restricted the promotion of EUropean values to a predetermined construction of EUrope, while the SPD, independently from such a predetermination, extended it to neighboring regions. This suggests that the SPD, in contrast to CDU/CSU, constructed those values as rather universally applicable. In the reconstruction of this approach, I illustrated a parallel to the Turkey debate. Another such parallel was for example observable in general attitudes towards EUrope's foreign policy appearance. In conservative imaginations of EUrope also the centrality of the enlargement/integration dilemma, in connection with the goal of a deeper union, was to a certain extent recontextualized within the debates of 2008 and 2011. The same is true for references to aspects like culture or history, which are also independent from the Turkey debate more prominent in the CDU/CSU's statements than in the SPD's. The conceptualization of different aspects, and also the relevance that the parties applied to them, and the ways, they (de)emphasized different issues in constructing EUrope, partly resembled the Turkey debate.

Before I can possibly estimate if these similarities represent changes of imaginations of EUrope due to the Turkey debate, I should know to which extent these aspects even represent changes in general. A source, which enabled me to reconstruct such

changes, were the parties' election manifestos. In the logic of Figure 11 & 12, I illustrated the quantitative share of various concepts and qualities, in representations of EUrope within the manifestos. For each party I split those word clouds into the time periods of 1989-2002 and 2004-2009. This is supposed to illustrate the changes of imaginations of EUrope between times when the Turkey question was not a major issue of German political disputes, and times when it was. According to the literature, I specified the appearance of this change with 2002.

SPD:





Figure 13 (non-self-creation)

CDU/CSU:



These word clouds illustrate several changes of the ways in which EUrope was approached within the parties' election manifestos between those two periods. In the case of the SPD, especially the rise in prominence of social solidarity, in opposition to neoliberal deregulation, is eye-catching. Apart from that, most other aspects, which significantly changed, were to a certain extent also part of the Turkey debate. In carrying on the social democratic case, this would be the rise in prominence of EUrope's role in foreign relations, in combination with the notion of normative power and the positivity towards further enlargements. In contrast to this, the conservatives continued to highlight prior enlargements. That was connected to the construction of an integration/enlargement dilemma and skepticism towards further enlargement. The CDU/CSU's more current constructions of EUrope, further display a stronger role for aspects like culture, (enlightenment-)values or history. Also the aspect of EUrope's appearance in foreign politics rose in prominence over the years.

For most of these changes, I illustrated certain correlations to the debate about Turkey, over the course of my paper. Such a correlation is quite obvious, for the heightened role of culture or history, in conservative imaginations of EUrope. The same is true for the prominence of the integration/enlargement dilemma, or the SPD's rather inclusive approach to further EU enlargement. It is less obvious in the case of EUrope's foreign policy appearance. Thereby I made the point, that the conservative notion of it is often connected with the wish, to create a more visible EUrope on the global stage, in order to provide a better object of identification for EUrope's population. The SPD on the other hand is more concerned about the dent EUrope makes in extra-EUropean perspectives, which is often seen as connected to the execution of normative power.

All in all, similarities in constructions of EUrope, between the contexts of discussing a potential Turkish accession, and the other debates I included into my analysis, were frequently obvious. Very often these aspects are connected to general changes of the parties' ways to imagine EUrope. The arguments constituting this correlation, were definitely also crafted and utilized within many contexts beyond the Turkey debate. For example the integration/enlargement dilemma, as well as the frame of EUrope's responsibility in the promotion of universal values, was also existent when debating the enlargement towards the ECECs. On the other hand these issues did, according to the literature, not cause major disagreements between SPD and CDU/CSU, in contexts beyond the Turkey question. It hence can be assumed that those issues did

not touch differences between the parties' imaginations of EUrope. They did not trigger a challenge of the German consensus on EUrope. The debate about Turkey on the other hand caused such conflicts, and thereby triggered the intensification of the German discourse on EUrope. The polarization between SPD and CDU/CSU, on the question if Turkey should or can become part of EUrope, triggered the formulation of differing imaginations of EUrope. In this respect, I would like to echo the similarities, Küçük (2008) described between the Turkey debate and the Valladolid debate. The latter one was held in the 16th century between the Catholic bishop Las Casas and philosopher Sepúlveda. They disagreed about the way Spain should treat the 'Indians', which inhabited the new Spanish territories overseas. While Sepúlveda saw no reason to treat the Native Americans like regular human beings, and saw no moral problem in enslaving them, Las Casas, in reference to a Christian principle of egalitarianism, espoused the possibility of their Christianization. However, there was no dissent on the existence of a difference of the 'Indians' to the Self; in the one case they differed as inferior barbarians, and in the other as non-Christian pagans. Hence, it was not so much the difference, or its degree, which initiated the disagreement, but the criteria of constructing the Self. While in Las Casas's opinion it was enough to adopt Christianity, to become an equivalent human being, this was quite impossible in Sepúlveda's conceptualization. It is hence a debate between two different views on the qualities of collective identity; between the one which is potentially inclusive, and the one which is definitely exclusive. Similarly, the German debate on Turkey triggered such a clash of universalist and particularist imaginations of EUrope. It brought polarizations to the fore, which differed from prior imaginations of EUrope.

This observation alone does not answer the question if, and how, discussing the Turkey question changed imaginations of EUrope in general. Through the analysis of the debates on various issues in the Bundestag, I illustrated that, as a matter of fact, imaginations of EUrope are changing. EUrope is something dynamic and heterogeneous. EUrope is changing, and although these developments are not one-directional and irreversible, there are certain tendencies to be observed. The directions of these tendencies vary between different contexts, in which EUrope is constructed, but there are also many similarities between the different contexts. It hence can be said, that EUrope in general was and is changing in the German political parties' perspective. The relevant context here is the Turkey debate, in contrast to all other issues through which EUrope is contextualized. It can be stated as factual, that

there is, to a certain degree, simultaneity, between imaginations of EUrope in the Turkey context and the overall debate on EUrope. The crucial moment for this paper lies in the question, if this simultaneity constitutes a causal relationship, which comes from the Turkey debate. The honest answer at first must be that I do not really know. I cannot really know, since there are so many influences on the discourse of EUrope, that it is virtually impossible, to definitely single out the influences of the discourse on the Turkey-EUrope relationships. The important word of the latter sentence is definitely; although I cannot answer definitely, how the Turkey question influenced imaginations of EUrope, I, under consideration of certain observations, illustrated the probability of causality in this or that aspect. One such observation was the exceptional nature of the extraordinary polarization between CDU/CSU and SPD, and German elites in general, in the debate about a possible EU integration of Turkey. That stands in a striking contrast to the generally strong consensus in EUropean agendas, which the literature and the analysis of other debates attested for Germany. The Turkey question was hence a major field, in which differentiations between German imaginations of EUrope were developed, debated and shaped.

Under consideration of all the sources of knowledge, I summarized over the course of this thesis, I can finally state, that discussing Turkey changed EUrope. It changed the ways in which EUrope was imagined, at least for the cases of the German political parties SPD and CDU/CSU. It did so when it provoked the outcropping of differing conceptualizations of EUrope. CDU/CSU sharpened their construction of a particularist EUrope, while the SPD tightened its alignment with a universalist imagination of EUrope. This left marks on the parties' takes on EUrope, in contexts beyond the Turkey debate. The conservatives strengthened their attachment to the nationalist model of political organization, which suggests the imagination of a homogeneous and static community as a basis for governance legitimization. The perceived integration/enlargement dilemma was, in the context of the Turkey-question, translated into an identity/enlargement dilemma, and strengthened the conservative desire for a finalized version of EUrope, i.e. in terms of EU enlargement. This perception was escorted by a rising prominence of essentialist notions on EUropean history and culture, in the CDU/CSU's imagination of EUrope. In reaction to this development of conservative imaginations of EUrope, the SPD distanced itself from such excluding and essentialist notions, and strengthened their universalist conceptualization of EUropean qualities. They further intensified their opposition, to

the definition of EUrope independent from Christendom. In accordance with their position on the Turkey question, the SPD verified the dynamic and heterogeneous character of their imagination of EUrope. When the SPD highlighted the responsibility of EUrope to promote the spread of its universal values in the context of the Turkey question, their opposition to definite and exclusive EUropean borders was fortified. All or at least most of these differences between CDU/CSU and SPD were probably already existent in times before the intensification of the Turkey debate. Nonetheless it was the Turkey debate, which pushed them to the fore, and heightened their relevance for the respective imaginations of EUrope. Thereby it changed the parties' imaginations of EUrope in general. I can only state this for the German case, which constituted the focus of my empirical case study. Not everywhere in EUrope the debate on Turkey was held in such an intense and polarized manner, which is likely to trigger a significant change of the ways in which EUrope is imagined. In consideration of the literature it nonetheless can be put down that the German debate about the Turkey question was not exceptional. In many aspects my observation of the German parliamentary debate resembles the literature's reconstruction of EUropean debates on Turkey in general. This suggests that there also might be similarities in the ways it changed imaginations of EUrope outside Germany.

I hope that I overtly illustrated, in a replicable manner, how I arrived at this conclusion. One of my primary intentions for this exercise was the demonstration of the dynamic and heterogeneous character of imaginations of EUrope. Thereby I put my paper within the range of constructivist approaches on EUrope. Along these lines, EUrope can only be what we (or whosoever) make out of it. The notion of EUrope can be utilized to promote solidarity in a predetermined and limited context, which excludes everything beyond the Bosphorus, Christianity, or whichever borders might be drawn. But it can also be utilized to promote a much more inclusive solidarity, which is orientated on a general humanism. Personally I prefer the second option. In contrast to CDU/CSU's argument, I do not think that its chances for success are any smaller than for the first option. I do not think that it provides a less appealing source of identification, than an exclusivist and particularist EUrope. This is at first due to the mere fact of the factual falsity of those approaches, which I illustrated over the course of this thesis. Through the utilization of aspects like culture or religion, they suggest a homogeneity and continuity of EUrope, which does and can not exist. Just

like most nationalisms, this is based on, and concludes in, the exclusion and discrimination of groups with low power access. That was apparent in the CDU/CSU's exclusion of Turkey from imaginations of EEurope. In order to make the best out of the notion of EEurope, it is, in my opinion, necessary to overcome the nationalist bias of imaginations of EEurope, and to create a new form of identity. In contrast to a EEurope which frantically searches for clear-cut borders, the EEurope I would prefer is based on the declared belief in universal values. These universal values should solely be based on the formulation of human rights, independent from culture, nationality, religion, or any other potentially exclusionary notion. The central task of EEurope lies in the promotion of these values, which at the same time should conclude in its continuous expansion. In this sense I want to express my alignment with the inclusivist side of the Turkey debate. I want Turkey to get a fair chance to prove their EEuropeanness, independently from any cultural or religious prejudices. And I would like EEurope to support Turkey in this process as much as possible. In my empirical case study, this side was mostly represented by the SPD. I want to end this thesis by again echoing the following quote of former SPD-parliamentarian Gert Weisskirchen, which illustrates a central reason for this alignment:

"The European Union [is] thus not a religious project [...]. The European Union is also no geographical project. The European Union is a project of European values. It is not excluded and must not be excluded [...], that Islam develops so, that it takes a complementary role within European values. [...] It is essential, to Europeanize Islam. This is the central task of the European Union." (Bundestag 2004h)ⁱ

ⁱ original German version: "die Europäische Union [ist] eben kein religiöses Projekt [...]. Die Europäische Union ist auch kein geographisches Projekt. Die Europäische Union ist ein Projekt der europäischen Werte. Es ist nicht ausgeschlossen und darf auch nicht ausgeschlossen werden [...], dass sich der Islam so entwickelt, dass er innerhalb der europäischen Werte eine komplementäre Aufgabe übernimmt. [...]Es kommt darauf an, den Islam zu europäisieren. Das ist die zentrale Aufgabe der Europäischen Union." (Bundestag 2004h)

Appendix: Codes and Categories

Following, I added the complete list of codes and categories, which constituted the base of my analyses. As described [in chapter 5.3.2], it is made up by, first, topics and concepts, and, second, respective positions the statements, to which they were assigned, represented. In the following table the topics are written bold. Furthermore, I differentiated the system of codes based on a more general level:

- **E_Europe**
Topics and concepts which got to do with the construction of EUrope; they are rather related to the construction of Europe, than with perspectives on the EU, although the overlap is big
- **L_Lisbon treaty and European institutions**
Topics and concepts which are brought up in debates about the institutionalized version of EUrope; hence, they are in relation to the EU-institutions, and other European institutions; since, in my research context, they were most frequently brought up in the debate on the Lisbon treaty, I assigned a according title; frequently those codes refer to statements on the failed European Constitution as well, whereby I used the terms Constitution and Lisbon treaty simultaneous in the list
- **T_Turkey**
Topics and concepts related to perspectives on Turkey; they were brought up in debating the state of Turkey's development, i.e. in the reference to its fulfilment of EUropean standards
- **P_Prognoses on a potential Turkey-accession**
Topics and concepts which were brought up in talking about the consequences a Turkish accession would bring; these consequences might affect the state of Turkey or EUrope
- **S_further Strategies and issues**
Topics and concepts which are not assignable to one of the other sub-groups; very often they point to different rhetorical and other strategies and typical arguments of inter-party- controversies

The figuration of this schema is obviously one with big overlaps, between the sub-groups, but also within the topics and issues, and the respective positions. The codes stand rather for different poles, the statements, they got assigned to, are closest to. The table also shows the quantities of the assignments of respective codes and positions to the empirical material. I broke this up into the parties, and the respective debates I analysed, hence into material out of the party manifestos, the 2004 debate on Turkey, the 2008 debate on Lisbon, and the 2011 debates. The quantities show, first, the absolute number of assignments, and, second, the respective share of total assignments to the parties' statements in the debates.

	Manifest.	2004	2008	2011	Manifest.	2004	2008	2011
	CDU/CSU				SPD			
E Europe								
E Adaptability								
++ Universal						3	1,7%	
-- Particularistic			1	0,8%	2	1,5%		
E Benefits of EU								
+ - more benefits								2
+ - more costs								1,4%
E Borders								
-- relatively exclusive	2	0,7%	3	1,1%				
++ relatively inclusive								
+ - highlighting open borders				2	1,6%	4	3,1%	2
E Changeableness								
++ dynamic			1	0,8%		9	5,0%	5
-- static	1	0,4%	1	0,4%	1	0,8%	2	1,5%
E Climate policy								
+ - central	6	2,2%			1	0,8%	1	0,9%
E Culture								
+ - not central						2	1,1%	
-- central	2	0,7%	8	3,1%				
++ central								
+ - central	5	1,8%		1	0,8%	2	1,7%	2
E Defining Moment/Crisis Topos								
-- central	1	0,4%	7	2,7%				
++ central						11	6,1%	
+ - denying it								
+ - central	5	1,8%		2	1,6%	2	1,7%	4
E Diversity								
++ central							1	0,9%
-- not central								1
+ - central	8	2,9%		1	0,8%	5	4,3%	
E Economic level								
-- central								
++ central					1	0,8%	1	0,6%
+ - not central								
+ - central	14	5,1%		6	4,8%	5	3,8%	4
E Enlargement								
+ - further enlargement desirable	2	0,7%	1	0,4%		3	2,6%	2
+ - against too far enlargement	4	1,4%	1	0,4%	1	0,8%		1,4%
+ - positivity towards prior enlargement	13	4,7%		3	2,4%	11	9,6%	1
+ - preferring alternative partnerships	1	0,4%						0,7%
+ - concerns about performance at prior enlargements							1	0,9%
E Enlightenment								
-- central & exclusive	1	0,4%	1	0,4%				
++ central & inclusive						3	1,7%	
+ - central	4	1,4%						
E EURO								
+ - central	5	1,8%			5	3,8%	1	0,9%
+ - not central								
E Foreign EU Policy								
+ - central & desirable	6	2,2%	1	0,4%	7	5,6%	5	4,3%
+ - not desirable					2	1,5%		3
+ - EUrope as global power	6	2,2%		3	2,4%		2	1,7%
+ - not against USA	5	1,8%	1	0,4%				1
+ - concerning aid								0,9%
+ - focus on neighbourhood	1	0,4%		1	0,8%	1	0,8%	2
+ - focus on defence/military	1	0,4%		1	0,8%	1	0,8%	3
E Geography								
-- central & exclusive			6	2,3%				
++ central & inclusive								
+ - not central							1	0,6%
E Globalization								
+ - makes EUrope necessary	5	1,8%		5	4,0%	5	3,8%	6
+ - makes EUrope not necessary								5,2%
E History								
-- central & exclusive	1	0,4%	6	2,3%				
++ central & inclusive					2	1,5%		
+ - not central				1	0,8%		2	1,1%
+ - central	4	1,4%			2	1,5%		1
E Integration/Enlargement								
-- Integration vs. Enlargement	5	1,8%	17	6,5%		3	2,3%	
++ Integration vs. Enlargement				1	0,8%			
++ Integration & Enlargement					0,0%		1	0,9%
+ - challenging but possible	4	1,4%		4	3,2%		2	1,7%
+ - no (relevant) connection							2	1,1%
E Law & Rights								
+ - central				1	0,8%			1
+ - highlighting fundamental rights	2	0,7%		3	2,4%			4
E Migration regulation								
+ - central	3	1,1%						1
+ - not central				1	0,8%			0,9%
E National identity & autonomy								
+ - vs. Europe	3	1,1%		1	0,8%			
+ - & Europe	1	0,4%			1	0,8%		
+ - not important								

	Manifest.	2004	2008	2011	Manifest.	2004	2008	2011
	CDU/CSU				SPD			
E Normative power								
++ central						5 2,8%		2 1,4%
-- central								
+ central through enlargement			1 0,8%		2 1,7%			
+ central	5 1,8%		2 1,6%	3 2,3%	2 1,7%		5 4,4%	5 3,4%
E Othering								
+ Islam		2 0,8%		1 0,8%				
+ Communism	4 1,4%				1 0,9%			
+ Neoliberalism			1 0,8%		3 2,6%		3 2,6%	
+ War	7 2,5%		3 2,4%		3 2,6%		4 3,5%	
+ Cold War	4 1,4%		4 3,2%		6 5,2%		1 0,9%	
+ Nationalism	2 0,7%		2 1,6%	1 0,8%	2 1,7%		5 4,4%	1 0,7%
+ Asia		5 1,9%						1 0,7%
E Peace order and security								
-- central		2 0,8%						
++ central						4 2,2%		
+ not central								
+ central	19 6,9%		7 5,6%	6 4,6%	15 13,0%		6 5,3%	2 1,4%
E Political level								
-- central		14 5,3%		1 0,8%				
++ central								
+ central	3 1,1%		1 0,8%					
E Reliability								
++ central					1 0,9%	3 1,7%		2 1,4%
-- central		1 0,4%						
E Religion								
-- central	3 1,1%	2 0,8%						
+ central	4 1,4%		1 0,8%					
++ not central		1 0,4%				2 1,1%		2 1,4%
E Science & Technology								
+ central			1 0,8%	1 0,8%				
E Self-placement in EUrope								
++ fully EUropean	1 0,4%			2 1,5%				
+ EUrope central but not exclusive					1 0,9%			2 1,4%
+ simultaneity between self and EUrope	8 2,9%		2 1,6%	1 0,8%	2 1,7%		1 0,9%	2 1,4%
+ self as centre	6 2,2%		2 1,6%	2 1,5%	1 0,9%			
+ Europe as contrast of comparison								
E Social system								
		0,0%						
+ central	6 2,2%		3 2,4%	1 0,8%	8 7,0%		7 6,1%	4 2,7%
+ not central	1 0,4%							
E Subsidiarity								
+ central	16 5,8%		7 5,6%		5 4,3%		2 1,8%	
++ central and not given	1 0,4%							
++ vs. national sovereignty								
E Symbols								
++ central							1 0,9%	
++ not central								
E Values								
++ central and universal						4 2,2%		2 1,4%
-- central and particularistic	1 0,4%	4 1,5%		1 0,8%				
+ not central								
+ central	7 2,5%		5 4,0%	4 3,1%	4 3,5%		5 4,4%	5 3,4%
L Lisbon Treaty & European Institutions								
L Accession wish (pointing to)								
+ to prove Europe's benefits				1 0,8%				
L Competences (distribution)								
+ EU got too many	2 0,7%							
+ EU got not enough							2 1,8%	
L Constitution and/or reform treaty								
+ good	1 0,4%		1 0,8%				4 3,5%	
+ bad								
+ historic/defining	1 0,4%		3 2,4%				1 0,9%	
+ step towards vision conclusion			2 1,6%				1 0,9%	
+ stabilization			1 0,8%					
+ keeps EU actionable			4 3,2%			1 0,6%		
+ not necessary								
+ aiming for real constitution							2 1,8%	
L Constitution/Enlargement								
+ constitution vs. enlargement								
+ constitution & enlargement			4 3,2%		1 0,9%	1 0,6%		
+ Turkish accession makes treaty necessary						1 0,6%		
L Elitism (accusing)								
++ accusing EUrope	1 0,4%							2 1,4%
++ against elitism	4 1,4%		1 0,8%				1 0,9%	
L European Parliament								
+ strengthening positive							2 1,8%	2 1,4%
+ too strong								
L Flexibility of EU								
+ call for it								
+ opposing it			2 1,6%					
L Representation tasks (of EU)								
+ EU represents citizens			1 0,8%				6 5,3%	
+ EU represents nation-states								
L Supranationalism/Intergovernmentalism								
+ pro Supranationalism	1 0,4%		1 0,8%		2 1,7%		4 3,5%	1 0,7%
+ anti Supranationalism			1 0,8%		2 1,7%			

	Manifest.				2004				2008				2011				Manifest.				2004				2008				2011					
	CDU/CSU												SPD																					
L Tasks of EUrope																																		
+- Europe as political community																		1	0,8%										1	0,9%				
+- Europe more than free trade area														1	0,4%																2	1,4%		
T_Turkey																																		
T Comparison with other Countries																																		
-- Turkey less EUropean																	2	0,8%			1	0,8%												
+- Turkey as EUropean																																		
++ Turkey more EUropean																																		
T Copenhagen (political) Criteria																																		
-- no sufficient fulfilment																	4	1,5%	1	0,8%	1	0,8%												
++ sufficient fulfilment																									2	1,1%								
T Cyprus conflict																																		
-- major problem																	2	0,8%			3	2,3%												
+- positive development																								1	0,6%									
+- grievance on both sides																																		
T Democracy																																		
-- grievance																	2	0,8%			2	1,5%							1	0,7%				
+- positive development																	1	0,4%											1	0,7%				
T Demography																																		
++ young and dynamic																													1	0,7%				
-- too young and dynamic																	2	0,8%																
T Dependency on Europe/accession																																		
+- not dependent																	2	0,8%																
+- dependent																								1	0,6%				2	1,4%				
+- partly dependent																					1	0,8%							1	0,7%				
T Economy																																		
++ economic growth																					1	0,8%							1	0,7%				
-- relatively weak GDP																	1	0,4%																
+- positive development																	1	0,4%							1	0,6%								
T Freedom of Expression																																		
-- grievance														1	0,4%				1	0,8%	4	3,1%							2	1,4%				
+- positive development																								1	0,6%									
T Gender Relations																																		
-- woman suppressed														2	0,7%	2	0,8%			2	1,5%			1	0,6%									
++ egalitarian																																		
+- positive development																																		
T Genozide																																		
-- missing acknowledgement																			1	0,8%														
+- positive development																					1	0,8%												
T Human Rights																																		
-- grievance																	7	2,7%									2	1,8%						
++ no (too big) grievance																																		
+- positive development																								1	0,6%									
T Identity of Turkey																																		
++ EUropeanness given																																		
-- EUropeanness not given														1	0,4%	5	1,9%			2	1,5%													
-+ EUropeanness partly given																								1	0,6%									
+ EUropeanness irrelevant																																		
T Justice																																		
-- impact of Courts too strong																																		
-- arbitrariness of Justice																																		
+- positive development																					1	0,8%			1	0,6%								
T Kemalism																																		
-- leads to autocratic structures																	1	0,4%																
++ leads to modernity/Westernization																								1	0,6%		1	0,7%						
+- positive development																																		
T Law Code																																		
-- grievance																					1	0,8%			1	0,6%		1	0,7%					
++ no (too big) grievance																																		
+- positive development																					1	0,8%			2	1,1%		1	0,7%					
T Military																																		
-- impact of military too strong																																		
++ strengthening of West (i.e. through NATO)														2	0,7%									1	0,6%									
+- positive development																								1	0,6%									
T Minorities																																		
-- grievance														2	0,7%	1	0,4%	1	0,8%	2	1,5%						1	0,7%						
+- positive development																								2	1,1%									
T Political 'Culture'																																		
-- problematic																	1	0,4%			2	1,5%			1	0,6%								
++ unproblematic																																		
T Reform process																																		
++ positive eager to reform																	2	0,8%							4	2,2%		2	1,4%					
-- ceasing of reforms																					3	2,3%												
T Religion																																		
-- too strong impact on politics																	1	0,4%							1	0,6%								
-- too strong suppression of religion														2	0,7%	1	0,4%																	
-- no freedom of religion																3	1,1%	2	1,6%	5	3,8%													
++ freedom of religion given																																		
++ secularism works																								1	0,6%									
-- secularism does not work																																		
+- positive development																								2	1,1%									
P Prognoses on a potential Turkey-Accession																																		
P Actionability of EU																																		
+- not in danger																								2	1,1%									
-- vs. Turkey-accession																	4	1,5%																

	Manifest.	2004	2008	2011	Manifest.	2004	2008	2011
	CDU/CSU				SPD			
P Border security								
++ would be strengthened								
-- EU-external-borders to Iraq/Iran/etc.								
P Common Agriculture policy								
-- negative impact								
++ doable								
+ challenging but possible								
P Development of Turkey								
++ would strengthen positive development				1 0,8%		8 4,4%		2 1,4%
-- would not strengthen positive dev.		4 1,5%						
P Economic impact on Europe								
++ positive						1 0,6%		1 0,7%
-- negative								
P Energy policy of Europe								
++ increased energy autarky								1 0,7%
-- no increased energy autarky								
P European identity								
++ would strengthen it								
-- would weaken it		4 1,5%						
P Financial consequences on EUrope								
-- too high (short-term) costs		3 1,1%						
++ future (long-term) financial benefits								
++ (short-term) costs not too high						1 0,6%		
P Further EU-enlargement								
-- would promote indefinite expansion		2 0,8%						
++ would not have a negative impact								
P Intake capacity of EUrope								
-- central & not given	3 1,1%	6 2,3%						
++ central & (potentially) given						4 2,2%		
+ not central								
P Job preservation in EUrope								
++ not in danger						1 0,6%		
-- in danger		1 0,4%						
P Migration to EUrope								
-- would increase Migration		5 1,9%						
++ would decrease Migration						1 0,6%		1 0,7%
+ would not in- or decrease relevantly						1 0,6%		
P Power Distribution in EU								
-- big impact		2 0,8%						
++ big impact								
+ not central								
P Security and Stability of EUrope								
++ would increase Security/Stability	1 0,4%	1 0,4%		1 0,8%		4 2,2%		2 1,4%
-- would decrease Security/Stability		1 0,4%						
P Turkish Diaspora in EUrope								
++ would advocate integration						2 1,1%		
-- would dilute integration		3 1,1%						
P West-Islam-Relations								
++ would advocate West-Islam-Relations				1 0,8%	1 0,9%	2 1,1%		1 0,7%
-- would not advocate West-Islam-Relations		6 2,3%						
+ Turkey example for Muslim Countries					1 0,9%	1 0,6%		
S Further Strategies and issues								
S Accession/negotiation process (attitudes to)								
+ strict and controlled	1 0,4%				2 1,7%	2 1,1%		2 1,4%
+ uncontrolled		3 1,1%				1 0,6%		
++ warning from stop								
-- warning from continuation		3 1,1%						
++ pledge for fair treatment					1 0,9%			2 1,4%
+ pledge for improvement of mechanism							1 0,9%	
S Alternative Partnerships for Turkey								
-- proposing it	8 2,9%	17 6,5%		3 2,3%				
++ opposing it						2 1,1%		1 0,7%
S Arab spring (pointing to)								
+ Europe as example				2 1,5%				2 1,4%
++ Turkey as example								1 0,7%
+ Europe has special responsibility								8 5,5%
+ calling for Turkish involvement				1 0,8%				2 1,4%
+ vs. clash of civilizations				1 0,8%				
S Clearness (claiming, accusing of lack)								
+ neutral								2 1,4%
++ pro-Turkey/inclusive EUrope								1 0,7%
-- anti-Turkey/exclusive Europe		1 0,4%						
S Communication to public								
+ calling for concerning Turkey		4 1,5%						
+ calling for concerning EUrope	4 1,4%				1 0,9%		1 0,9%	4 2,7%
+ accusing of lack								
S Contrib. in T/E-rel.sh. (claiming, accusing lack)								
++ pro-Turkey/inclusive EUrope								
-- anti-Turkey/exclusive EUrope								
S Courage (claiming, accusing of lack)								
+ concerning EUrope	5 1,8%		3 2,4%	3 2,3%	1 0,9%		6 5,3%	5 3,4%
++ pro-Turkey								
-- anti-Turkey								
S Credibility and duties (pointing to)								
++ pro-Turkey/inclusive EUrope						4 2,2%		
-- anti-Turkey/exclusive EUrope				1 0,8%				

	Manifest.	2004	2008	2011	Manifest.	2004	2008	2011
	CDU/CSU				SPD			
S Cross-party support (pointing to)								
++ concerning Turkey								
+- concerning EUrope							1 0,9%	
S Dishonesty (accusing of)								
++ pro-Turkey						6 3,3%		3 2,1%
-- anti-Turkey		13 5,0%		1 0,8%				
+- concerning Europe								3 2,1%
S Emotions (pointing to)								
++ pro-Turkey						2 1,1%		
-- anti-Turkey		3 1,1%						
S Engagement/isolation in EUrope								
+- claiming engagement								1 0,7%
+- denying isolation								
S Experts & other outside actors (pointing to)								
++ pro-Turkey						5 2,8%		
-- anti-Turkey		17 6,5%		1 0,8%				
+- concerning EUrope							1 0,9%	
S Facts, i.e. of process (pointing to)								
++ pro-Turkey/inclusive EUrope						1 0,6%		
-- anti-Turkey/exclusive EUrope								
+- concerning EUrope								
S Ir/Responsibility (accusing of/claiming)								
++ pro-Turkey/inclusive EUrope						7 3,9%		2 1,4%
-- anti-Turkey/exclusive EUrope		9 3,4%						
+- concerning EUrope	4 1,4%			4 3,1%				3 2,1%
S long accession process (predication of)								
++ pro-Turkey/inclusive EUrope						7 3,9%		2 1,4%
-- anti-Turkey/exclusive EUrope				1 0,8%				
++ opposing long negotiations								
S Moral (claiming, accusing of lack)								
++ pro-Turkey/inclusive EUrope						3 1,7%		
-- anti-Turkey/exclusive EUrope		2 0,8%						
+- concerning EUrope								
S National interest (pointing to)								
++ pro-Turkey	1 0,4%	3 1,1%				5 2,8%		2 1,4%
-- anti-Turkey								
+- concerning EUrope	7 2,5%		1 0,8%	2 1,5%	3 2,6%			1 0,7%
S Other EU-Countries/Governments (pointing to)								
++ pro-Turkey						1 0,6%		
-- anti-Turkey		3 1,1%						
+- concerning EUrope								
S Populism (accusing of)								
++ pro-Turkey						5 2,8%		1 0,7%
-- anti-Turkey		2 0,8%						
+- concerning EUrope								3 2,1%
S Prior enlargements (pointing to)								
++ pro-Turkey						5 2,8%		
-- anti-Turkey								
S Public opinion (pointing to)								
++ pro-Turkey								
-- anti-Turkey		5 1,9%						
+- pro Lisbon/constitution			2 1,6%				1 0,9%	
+- anti Lisbon/constitution								
+- concerning EUrope			1 0,8%	1 0,8%			4 3,5%	5 3,4%
S Radicalism (accusing of)								
							0,0%	
++ pro-Turkey						1 0,6%		2 1,4%
-- anti-Turkey	1 0,4%							
+- concerning EUrope	1 0,4%							
S Realism (claiming, accusing of lack)								
++ pro-Turkey								1 0,7%
-- anti-Turkey		6 2,3%		1 0,8%				
+- concerning EUrope								
S Risks and Chances								
++ more Chances						3 1,7%		1 0,7%
-- more Risks		1 0,4%						
+- both						1 0,6%		
S Transitional restrictions after acces.								
++ positive impact						3 1,7%		
-- no (positive) impact								
++ not necessary								
S Turkish interests (pointing to)								
++ pro-accession/inclusive EUrope						5 2,8%		
-- anti-accession/exclusive EUrope		3 1,1%		1 0,8%				

Literature

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Curriculum Vitae

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Citizenship: Austria

Education

1992-1996: Elementary School, Oberwölbling

1996-2000: Post-Elementary School, Oberwölbling

2000-2005: Federal Secondary College of Engineering, Krems/Donau



Higher Education

2006 - Present: University of Vienna, Diploma Study of Political Science & Cultural and Social Anthropology; prospective degree in autumn 2011, as 'Magister' (Diploma study) of Political Science and Bachelor of Anthropology

2008-2009: two Semesters at the University of Copenhagen (Denmark) in the course of the Erasmus programme

Work Experience

2005-2006: Topography of Terror (Holocaust Memorial) as Civil Servant ('Auslands-Zivildienstleistender'), Berlin

2008: short-term internship at the 'Österreichische Gesellschaft für politische Bildung (ÖGPB)' (Austrian Society for political education), Vienna

Further jobs as unskilled worker in the gastronomy industry, in offices, warehouses, and on construction sites and offices

Further Skills and Interests

Languages: German (mother tongue), fluent English (spoken/written)

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Abstract

Based on the constructivist assumption of collective identities as dynamic, heterogeneous and agency dependent, the text at hand reconstructs if and how the debate about a possible EU accession of Turkey changed imaginations of EUrope. Beyond a literature review, which uncovers the changing meanings of EUrope and different perspectives on the Turkey-EUrope relations, it approaches the research question on debates in the German Bundestag. The empirical study follows the approach of Critical Discourse Analyses, and exemplifies how the polarization between the conservative and social democratic party on the Turkey question undermined the generally strong German consensus on EUropean agendas. The text attempts to illustrate the arbitrariness of the idea EUrope, and concludes with the plea for an inclusive and open understanding of EUrope.

kurzer Abriss

Aufbauend auf dem konstruktivistischen Verständnis von kollektiver Identität als dynamisch, heterogen und Handlungs-determiniert, rekonstruiert der vorliegende Text ob und wie die Debatte über einen möglichen EU-Beitritt der Türkei Vorstellungen von EUropa verändert. Neben einer Zusammenfassung entsprechender Literatur, was die sich ändernden Bedeutungen von EUropa und verschiedene Perspektiven auf Türkei-EUropa Beziehungen zeigt, wird die Forschungsfrage auf Debatten im deutschen Bundestag angewandt. Mit dem Ansatz der Kritischen Diskursanalyse veranschaulicht dieser empirische Teil, wie die Polarisierung zwischen Konservativen und SozialdemokratInnen in der Türkei-Frage, den im Allgemeinen starken deutschen Konsens in EUropäischen Angelegenheiten schwächte. Der Text versucht die Willkür der Idee EUropa aufzuzeigen, und schließt in einem Plädoyer für eine inklusive und offene Auffassung von EUropa.