



universität  
wien

# DIPLOMARBEIT

Titel der Diplomarbeit

„Civil Society Participation in Development and  
Budget Processes in Uganda“

Verfasserin

Daniela Hirsch, B.A.

angestrebter akademischer Grad

Magistra (Mag.)

Wien, Oktober 2012

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt:

A 057 390

Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt:

Internationale Entwicklung

Betreuer:

Dr. Michael Obrovsky



# Acknowledgements

An dieser Stelle möchte ich mich bei meiner Familie bedanken, die mir mein Studium ermöglicht und mich immer unterstützt hat. Besonderer Dank gilt meiner Mutter, die immer an mich geglaubt und mich in meinen Interessen gefördert hat.

Germán kann ich ebenso nicht genug danken. Seine Fähigkeit mich zu motivieren und sein großes Interesse an meiner Arbeit haben mir vieles erleichtert und ich konnte jeden Tag mit großer Freude ans Werk gehen.

Danke auch an meine Studienkollegin und Freundin Tülin, mit der ich gemeinsam alle Phasen des Studiums, Forschens und Schreibens durchlebt habe und die das Korrekturlesen dieser Arbeit übernommen hat.

Many thanks go to Katelyn who agreed to proofread my thesis and the rest of the family, especially Cheryl, for their support and patience. I appreciate their work and time.

Ein Dankeschön gebührt auch meinem Betreuer, Dr. Obrovsky, der mir durch hilfreiche, kompetente Tipps und seiner ruhigen Art bei meiner Arbeit geholfen hat.

Ebenfalls möchte ich meinen Interviewpartnerinnen und -partnern für die interessanten und aufschlussreichen Gespräche zu meinem Diplomarbeitsthema und darüber hinaus danken.

Wien, im Oktober 2012

Daniela Hirsche

# Table of Contents

<b>Abstract.....</b>	<b>i</b>
<b>Deutsche Zusammenfassung .....</b>	<b>ii</b>
<b>Abbreviations and Acronyms.....</b>	<b>iii</b>
<b>I Introduction.....</b>	<b>1</b>
1. Relevance and Goals.....	1
2. State of Research.....	4
3. Research Questions & Structure .....	6
4. Methodology .....	8
4.1. Research.....	8
4.2. Expert Interview .....	8
4.3. Transcription.....	10
4.4. Evaluation method: Qualitative content analysis.....	10
<b>II Background.....</b>	<b>11</b>
1. Civil Society and Non-Governmental Organizations.....	11
1.1. Distinction of Terms .....	11
1.1.1. Civil Society.....	11
1.1.2. Non-Governmental Organizations.....	14
1.2. Goals and Interests.....	15
1.3. Civil Society Actors and the State .....	17
1.4. Civil Society and NGOs in Development.....	18
1.4.1. Historical Background.....	20
1.4.2. Roles & Functions of Civil Society and NGOs.....	21
1.4.3. Civil Society and NGOs in the Aid Effectiveness Agenda .....	25
2. From Aid to Development Effectiveness? .....	29
2.1. Before the Paris Declaration .....	30
2.2. A New Aid Paradigm: Paris Declaration.....	32
2.2.1. The Principles of the Paris Declaration .....	34
2.2.1.1. Ownership of development policies and strategies .....	34
2.2.1.2. Alignment .....	35
2.2.1.3. Harmonisation.....	37
2.2.1.4. Managing for results .....	38
2.2.1.5. Mutual accountability .....	39
2.2.2. Third High Level Forum .....	39
2.2.3. Have the targets of the Paris Declaration been met?.....	41
2.3. After the Paris Declaration: Fourth High Level Forum .....	44
2.3.1. Demands from Civil Society .....	44
2.3.2. Outcome .....	46
2.4. Development Effectiveness .....	47
2.4.1. Organizational Effectiveness.....	49
2.4.2. Policy Coherence.....	49
2.4.3. Development Outcomes from Aid.....	51
2.4.4. Overall Development Outcomes .....	52

3. Budget Support .....	54
3.1. Context & Definition .....	54
3.2. Forms of Budget Support .....	58
3.2.1. General and Sector Budget Support .....	59
3.2.2. Direct and Indirect Budget Support.....	59
3.2.3. General and Specific conditions for disbursements .....	59
3.2.4. Fixed and Variable Tranches.....	60
3.2.5. Floating and Non-Floating Tranches.....	60
3.3. Expectations and Concerns.....	60
3.4. Basis: Poverty Reduction Strategy .....	64
3.5. NGOs and Budgets .....	65
<b>III Case Study: Uganda .....</b>	<b>69</b>
1. Aid in Uganda .....	69
1.1. Short History of Aid in Uganda.....	69
1.2. Recent Facts and Figures .....	71
1.3. Donor Darling.....	76
1.4. National Development Plan.....	77
2. Civil Society and NGO Landscape .....	79
2.1. Historical Aspects .....	79
2.2. New Roles.....	80
2.3. Variety of Actors .....	81
2.4. Control Mechanisms.....	83
2.4.1. Legal Framework .....	84
2.4.2. Self Regulation Mechanisms.....	89
2.5. Participation Processes in Uganda.....	90
3. Budget Process in Uganda .....	95
3.1. Uganda's Budget .....	95
3.2. Budget Cycle .....	99
3.3. Budget Actors .....	102
3.3.1. Cabinet .....	102
3.3.2. Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development.....	102
3.3.3. Donors .....	102
3.3.4. Parliament.....	103
3.3.5. Civil Society .....	104
4. Civil Society Budget Actors in Uganda.....	105
4.1. Aspects of Civil Society Engagement in Budget Issues .....	106
4.2. Comparison of Actors.....	110
4.3. Civil Society Budget Work Summarized.....	117
<b>IV Conclusion .....</b>	<b>121</b>
<b>V Sources.....</b>	<b>126</b>
1. Books, Articles & Papers .....	126
2. Websites.....	135
3. Interviews.....	136
4. List of Figures .....	137
<b>Curriculum Vitae .....</b>	<b>138</b>

# Abstract

This thesis deals with the role of civil society in development, more precisely, in the context of the aid effectiveness debate which focuses on program modalities. This shows the importance of the state on one hand, whereas on the other side, support and action of civil society is demanded – all in the sense of ownership and the improvement of aid. The understanding of development has therefore changed. It has been recognized that all national stakeholders are necessary for development. Budget support makes up a big part of financial aid flows to Uganda, in fact half of all aid received has been through budget support. In addition, Uganda's budget is marked by a high donor dependency because almost half of it is financed through donors. Civil society is therefore needed to engage in budget issues for democratic budgeting, meaning that civil society organizations are involved in the decision making processes. For that reason, participation processes of civil society in Uganda and the budget work of several civil society organizations in Uganda, such as the *Uganda Debt Network*, the *Uganda National Non-Governmental Organization Forum*, the *Forum for Women in Development* and the *Citizen's Budget Advocacy Group* have been analyzed further in order to find out the ways civil society and non-governmental organizations are involved in the budget process. Through literature and internet research as well as expert interviews on the topic, the thesis has come to the conclusion that civil society organizations are faced with many challenges concerning their work in an aid system of controversies in a country with restrictive legal framework and a questionable political situation. Nevertheless, concerning budget work, many contributions could have been made such as building awareness on budget issues and building up budget literacy as well as budget advocacy for topics such as pro-poor policies and gender budgeting. A useful strategy has also proven to be an engagement with the state via consultancy, presentations at conferences and setting up documents together. Research is one area where civil society organizations are effectively working. They mobilize people on a local level and connect local realities with national policy processes by setting up local budget monitoring committees or village budget clubs.

# Deutsche Zusammenfassung

Diese Arbeit befasst sich mit der Rolle der Zivilgesellschaft in Entwicklung, vor allem im Kontext der Debatte um die Effektivität der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, welche den Fokus auf Programmmodalitäten legt. Der Staat wird damit einerseits wieder wichtiger, wobei andererseits die Unterstützung der Zivilgesellschaft und ihrer Aktionen gefordert ist - für *Ownership* und der Verbesserung von Entwicklung. Das Verständnis von Entwicklung hat sich verändert. Es wurde anerkannt, dass alle nationalen Akteure für Entwicklung notwendig sind. Budgethilfe macht einen großen Teil der Finanzflüsse nach Uganda aus, und zwar die Hälfte der gesamten Entwicklungshilfe. Zusätzlich besteht für Uganda eine große Geberabhängigkeit, da das nationale Budget fast zur Hälfte von Gebern finanziert wird. Aufgrund dieser Tatsache ist das Budget des Landes von großer Wichtigkeit und die Zivilgesellschaft aufgefordert sich an Entscheidungsprozessen zu beteiligen. Partizipationsprozesse der Zivilgesellschaft und Budgetarbeit von verschiedenen zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen in Uganda werden genauer analysiert, um herauszufinden, wie die Zivilgesellschaft und Nichtregierungsorganisationen in den Budgetprozess involviert sind. Das *Uganda Debt Network*, das *Uganda National Non-Governmental Organization Forum*, das *Forum for Women in Development* und die *Citizen's Budget Advocacy Group* sind Teil dieser Betrachtung. Durch Literatur- und Internetrecherche sowie Experten- und Expertinneninterviews zu dem Thema kam die Arbeit zu der Schlussfolgerung, dass zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen mit vielen Herausforderungen konfrontiert sind. Sie operieren in einem widersprüchlichen System der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und in einem Land mit restriktiven gesetzlichen Rahmenbedingungen sowie einer fragwürdigen politischen Situation. Bezüglich der Budgetaktivitäten der verschiedenen Organisationen und Netzwerke konnten allerdings viele Beiträge festgestellt werden, wie Bewusstseinsbildung über Budgetangelegenheiten und der Aufbau von Wissen über das Budget, *budget literacy*, sowie das Eintreten für Themen wie „*pro-poor*“ und *Gender Budgeting*. Eine hilfreiche Strategie war auch die Zusammenarbeit mit dem Staat in den Bereichen Beratung, Präsentationen bei Konferenzen und des Zusammenstellens von Dokumenten. Vor allem Forschung ist ein Gebiet, in dem zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen effektiv arbeiten. Zusätzlich mobilisieren sie Personen und verbinden lokale Realitäten mit nationalen Politikprozessen, indem sie lokale Budgetüberwachungskomitees und Dorfbudgetklubs gründen.

# Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAA	Accra Agenda for Action	NBFP	National Budget Framework Paper
ACCU	Anti-Corruption Coalition of Uganda	NDP	National Development Plan (Uganda)
ACFODE	Action For Development	NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
ADA	Austrian Development Agency	NRA	National Resistance Army
ADC	Austrian Development Cooperation	NRM	National Resistance Movement
AfDB	African Development Bank	ODA	Official Development Assistance
AGEZ	Arbeitsgemeinschaft Entwicklungszusammenarbeit	OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
BFP	Budget Framework Paper	PAF	Poverty Action Fund
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India, China	PBA	Program Based Approach
CBMES	Community Based Monitoring and Evaluation System	PEAP	Poverty Eradication Action Plan
CDF	Comprehensive Development Framework	PD	Paris Declaration
CPE	Community Participation and Empowerment	PFAA	Public Finance and Accountability Act
CSBAG	Civil Society Budget Advocacy Group	PFM	Public Financial Management
CSO	Civil Society Organization	PO	People's Organization
CSTF	Civil Society Task Force	PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
DAC	Development Assistance Committee	PSC	Public Service Contractor
Danida	Danish International Development Agency	QuAM	Quality Assurance Mechanism
DENIVA	Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations	QWIDS	Query Wizard for International Development Statistics
FOWODE	Forum for Women in Development	SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
GBS	General Budget Support	SBS	Sector Budget Support
GF	Gap Fillers	Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
GoU	Government of Uganda	SWAp	Sector Wide Approach
GRB	Gender Responsive Budgeting	UDN	Uganda Debt Network
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries	UGMP	Uganda Governance Monitoring Platform
HLF	High Level Forum	UJAS	Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy
IBP	International Budget Project	UN	United Nations
IDA	International Development Association	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
IMF	International Monetary Fund	UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
KOO	Koordinierungsstelle der Österreichischen Bischofskonferenz für internationale Entwicklung und Mission	UNNGOF	Uganda National NGO Forum
MiA	Ministry of Internal Affairs	UWONET	Uganda's Women Network
MDG	Millennium Development Goal	UWOPA	Uganda Women's Parliamentary Association
MoFPED	Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (Uganda)	UWPA	Uganda Women Parliamentarians Association
MP	Member of Parliament	VIDC	Vienna Institute for International Dialogue and Cooperation
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework	VO	Voluntary Organization
NAWOU	National Association of Women's Organizations in Uganda	WB	World Bank
		WHO	World Health Organization
		WOUGNET	Women of Uganda Network



# **I Introduction**

## **1. Relevance and Goals**

Development policies and aid have been the center of critique for years. The results of development do not correspond to the expectations. Hence, the topic of the effectiveness of aid has become popular. This is shown in several High Level Fora, the last one being the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4) in Busan, in November of 2011. The center pieces of this debate are the Paris Declaration of 2005 and the follow up document in 2008, the Accra Agenda of Action. The HLF-4 “arrives at a crossroads in a context of development cooperation characterized by a wider range of development stakeholders” (OECD 2011: 17). Last year’s forum showed that only one target – Indicator 4 to strengthen capacity by coordinated support - set up in the Paris Declaration has been met so far. Nevertheless, the internationality achieved from these documents and fora are relevant to be considered, by representing a learning process and the obligations by all stakeholders (Ashoff 2010: 63). Civil society participation has been pushed and strengthened further in the last decade and High Level Forum.

According to an African consultative document written for the HLF-4, “the continent needs the shift of the aid effectiveness debate towards the development effectiveness agenda” (Open Forum 2011a: 1). African civil society organizations demand the recognition in discussions and negotiations on aid and development of inclusive processes of all citizens (ibid. 2011a: 1). The discourse on the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness showed a stronger demand of something going beyond aid. Civil Society Organizations talk about the need for development effectiveness, in which aid is only one part of development. This thesis tries to connect this request by looking at participation processes of the Ugandan civil society in development and more concretely in budget processes. African governments are asked to “reaffirm the role of citizens, and more importantly the acknowledgement of citizen voices as important in the development processes” (Open Forum 2011b: 3).

Aid and development are made of a variety of actors: from donors to recipients, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) as well as companies. The OECD’s (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) publication on the progress of implementing the Paris Declaration states that aid is only one element of a wider range of development finance and that other factors need to be considered

(OECD 2011: 17). Budget Support is based on the poverty reduction strategy paper of a country - in Uganda it is the National Development Strategy, which acknowledges that the participation of the civil society is required for ownership. Therefore, it is necessary to look at contextual elements of the budget process for the country. “How participatory, inclusive and representative are processes that lead to the identification of desired development goals?” (Kindornay 2011: 19). In Uganda, budget support is an instrument currently highly debated in regard to the issues of monitoring and democracy while it accounts for a big part of all received financial support of this country. In fact, almost half of Uganda’s budget is financed through donors. The increase in aid is channeled through state structures. Together with the wish of the Government of Uganda (GoU) to receive aid in this manner leads to the question of the role of civil society and NGOs. It is thus important to consider development tools for all actors and the need for taking a closer look at the budget processes of Uganda. More power has been given to the state which is the reason why civil society also needs to be regarded vis-à-vis the state. As Renzio stated in his paper: “new modalities create new problems” (Mfunwa 2006: 3 in Renzio 2006b: 9). This will be investigated by taking a look at budget support being part of the program based approach, which is increasingly enforced due to the aid effectiveness debate. Also, budget issues, their stand in Uganda and the perspective of NGOs will be included.

The example of Uganda was furthermore chosen for the reason that the country is seen by the donor community as one of the best practices for development (the policies of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were implemented by Uganda as one of the first countries such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers). However, there are controversies when it comes to democracy and about the involvement of civil society. While NGO and CSO involvement has been reinforced for a long time for aid and by donors, restrictions from the side of the government exist. Yet, the budget process in Uganda is designed in a rather open way demonstrating the importance of not only involving government officials and administrators.

“Budgets are no longer perceived to be the select domain of the political executive and technical specialists. [...] Civil society organizations have acquired the skill and confidence to intervene in the budget process in a large number of countries. The media is more active in reporting on budget issues and the misuse of public expenditures” (Robinson 2006: 7).

The budget of Uganda will be analyzed according to its allocations, the budget cycle and more importantly how civil society is involved, how they are able to participate and what

contributions they could make. This stems from the quest for ownership and participation. “The new principles of country ownership and participation do not grant governments alone the responsibility for development work but emphasize the close connection with various societal stakeholders, especially within civil society” (Eberlei 2009: 19f.). Budget policies are used as a tool by governments. Therefore, budget policies are relevant for the development and arranging of a country’s priorities. They are described as a “hot topic in public debates” (Robinson/Friedman 2005: 9). There has also been a shift from budgets being kept as a secret, to open budget processes and space for engagement. This space of engagement in Uganda makes up a big part of the thesis. The space is of course shaped by different restrictions and/or invitations that define the work of civil society organizations in Uganda. “The political environment and role of the state, the legal and regulatory environment and the economic policy context can shape civil society influence in important ways“ (ibid. 2005: 9). This thesis aims to enrich the data and perspectives on information of civil society and its contributions and changes.

## 2. State of Research

The literature on Aid Effectiveness and NGOs in general is very complex and the sources are numerous. Since the participation of NGOs on international conferences, seminars and symposia in the 1980s their importance has risen. The Aid Effectiveness Agenda is especially popular due to its forums and declarations, one important outcome being the Paris Declaration from the year 2005, which is still used as one of the main reference points in aid. In the course of the Aid Effectiveness Agenda CSOs joined platforms and umbrella organizations in order to commonly represent their interests. Examples are BetterAid and the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness which also publish many documents with their views and requests. BetterAid is a “diverse global platform that brings together hundreds [over 700] of civil society organizations [from North and South] that engage in development cooperation” and the Open Forum is a “CSO-led global process, which was initiated prior to the 2008 Accra High Level Forum, to deepen CSO accountability to principles and guidelines that will improve CSO effectiveness as development actors” (BetterAid & Open Forum 2011: 8).

Research for this topic has shown that specific literature on Ugandan NGOs seems to be limited. In 2004, the results of the first survey-based research on NGOs in Uganda were published by Barr, Fafchamps and Owens, analyzing the activities and strategies of Ugandan NGOs, their financing, accountability and their objectives<sup>1</sup>. Furthermore, a diploma thesis about the networking process of Ugandan NGOs gives good insights in Ugandan NGOs and their work (see Graffi 2003). The staff of NGOs was interviewed and quite a few estimations and citations were used. A very complete research has been carried out by Susan Dicklitch, in the 1990s, concerning civil society and NGOs in Uganda and their contribution to democracy. Also, many historical facts could be used for this thesis (see Dicklitch 1998). In order to take a look at the participation of civil society and NGOs, NGO papers and reports of policy reviews were found. The papers of Ugandan organizations mainly came from the Uganda National NGO Forum (UNNGOF), the Uganda Debt Network (UDN) and the Forum for Women in Democracy (FOWODE). Research papers by CIVICUS and DENIVA are also used. Scholars, such as Richard Ssewakiryanga, published useful papers on their views on the situation in Uganda as observers of civil society (see Ssewakiryanga 2011a and 2011b, and Brock/McGee/Ssewakiryanga 2002 etc.) and also research papers from Gender-Budgeting issues were insightful. However, the number of sources shows that the focus on the civil

---

<sup>1</sup> Barr, Abigail/ Fafchamps, Marcel/ Owens, Trudy (2004): The Governance of Non-Governmental Organisations in Uganda. World Bank

society and NGOs in Uganda is relevant to add a new perspective. Gubitzer and Klatzer (a.o. 2008: 27f.) even suggest that more research needs to be done in the areas of civil society and development instruments and its role in it. A recent study by the Austrian Development Cooperation (ADC), Danish International Development Agency (Danida) and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) has revealed that “there is relatively little information on the effectiveness of CSOs as change agents, which has led to an increased demand for information on the results of CSO work, their contribution to change and beneficial outcomes” (ADC/Danida/Sida 2012: 2).

Budget support has been quite popular during the last years and sources can be easily found even though not always as detailed – either on donors’ websites or OECD evaluations and statistics. Budget support reflects the trend of program aid in contrast to project aid and is supposed to strengthen a so-called developing country’s budget and national poverty strategy. While there are some analyses on Budget Support in Uganda mentioning the participation of the civil society via Revision Task Forces, assessments and meetings, there are many critics on the real contributions civil society and organizations are able to make. In order to look at the budget processes, the work of civil society actors such as the Uganda Debt Network (UDN), Forum for Women in Development (FOWODE) (especially in the field of gender budgeting), the Uganda National NGO Forum (UNNGOF) and the Citizen’s Budget Advocacy Group (CBAG) will be analyzed further. At the center is Lister’s evaluation of General Budget Support in Uganda (see Lister 2006). To get a better insight on budget issues in Uganda, the website of the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) in Uganda functions as a useful resource that publishes budget speeches and papers.

### 3. Research Questions & Structure

The central research interest of this thesis is the analysis of ways and opportunities of engagement for civil society organizations, especially in budget processes in Uganda. This is important since almost half of Uganda's aid flows consists of budget support (OECD 2012a: 12) and the budget of Uganda is highly donor dependent in general. The contribution of the diploma thesis will be to establish the link between the situation of the country, its development and the role of NGOs. As Curbach noted in her book, research on NGO needs to focus on the conditions for NGOs, in which they can express their critical and innovative potential and not loose it to state bureaucracies (Curbach 2003: 120).

Following research questions were defined:

- ⇒ Why has the involvement of civil society and NGOs increased in aid and development?
- ⇒ What does budget support mean for civil society organizations?
- ⇒ How is the participation of NGOs and the civil society in Uganda possible, and what roles do they hold?
- ⇒ In which ways are civil society and NGOs involved in the budget process and how are they contributing to it?

In order to answer these questions, Part I deals with the methodology that was used for this thesis. Part II defines the background of the civil society and non-governmental organizations. It is important to take a look at the terms since there are many terminal varieties. Chapter 1.4.2 deals with the roles that NGOs have in development or are assigned to. Furthermore, civil society actors are analyzed in regards to the state and in development. One chapter also deals with civil society and NGOs in the aid effectiveness debates, which leads to the next relevant topic for this thesis under Chapter 2: Aid and Development and the debate on Aid Effectiveness. A closer look will be taken on development tools before and after the Paris Declaration, marking a change for aid. The Paris Declaration will also be described in more detail in Chapter 2.2, before dealing with the recent Fourth High Forum on Aid Effectiveness, where CSOs play a major role in demanding development effectiveness. In this context, budget support represents a development tool in order to make aid more effective and will be described in more detail in Chapter 3. Due to the focus on program aid, changes might occur for NGOs. This is the reason why chapter 3.5 deals with NGOs and budgets. Part III is about

Uganda, but first reflects on its aid and development (Chapter 1). This chapter includes history on aid and how Uganda became a donor darling. The National Development Plan, Uganda's development strategy, will be described before moving on to the landscape for civil society and NGOs in Uganda (Chapter 2). The history for civil society and the changes of roles are discussed as well as the different actors. An important part deals with control mechanisms for CSOs in which the legal framework is described in order to understand the environment CSOs are operating in. Chapter 2.5 deals with general participation processes in Uganda, general ways on how civil society can participate, the set up of Uganda's development strategy and how civil society was included), which is the basic documents for budget support to be built on. Subsequently, the understanding of the budget process in Uganda is needed, including the procedures and the different actors involved. Therefore, Chapter 3 treats the matter of the budget process. By comparing several civil society actors in Chapter 4, their ways, strategies and contributions for budget work can be found out, but also their limitations. The UDN and FOWODE will be under closer examination, as well as the UNNGOF and CBAG. The following chapter summarizes the developments and trends of their work in order to see ways of engagement located in the bigger picture before concluding in Part IV.

## **4. Methodology**

Methods like research, expert interviews, transcriptions and evaluation were used for this thesis. Expert interviews were chosen to compare the literature with the experts' opinions and judgments in order to get a better insight. The author is aware of methodological restrictions due to the fact that the research could not be carried out in Uganda. This diploma thesis can cover - due to its limitations in size and length - only some aspects of the discussion. Space for further research exists.

### **4.1. Research**

After the first ideas of a topic and with questions in mind sources need to be found. Research consists, according to Beer and Fischer (2000: 83f.), of the search and the obtaining of literature. Literature lists, reference libraries, reference books, magazines and newspapers should be included. Also online research is a helpful tool when dealing with topics related to the international community. Internet search engines are seen as the new gatekeepers nowadays since they can be an important research instrument for the private, professional and also scientific area (Lewandowski 2005: 13). Especially important is the quality and usability of the material. Statements should always be reviewed and opposed to others in order to get a good overview (Haller 1983:156).

For this thesis, the main research tools were the catalogue from the University of Vienna, scientific databases and internet search engines that not only led to websites, but also to documents. Relevant sources from literature lists were also used as well as different statistical data from the literature.

### **4.2. Expert Interview**

In order to illustrate the findings of the literature, expert interviews were carried out. Experts can be defined as people "who possess special knowledge of a social phenomenon which the interviewer is interested in" (Gläser/Laudel 2009: 117). An expert is a person that is part of the field of action (Handlungsfeld) of the research topic, someone that has a privileged access to information, groups of people or decision processes (Meuser/ Nagel 1991: 443). The person interviewed is not the subject of the interview, but the representation of an organization or institution, knowledge, facts and also personal experience and judgments (ibid. 1991: 442).



Expert interviews belong to qualitative interviews and are very popular in social research because of the efficiency and concentration of the gathered data. It is useful for practical insider knowledge and in cases that the access to a particular social field is not possible. Due to the common scientific background the understanding of the topic and its relevance is more easily given (Bogner/Littig/Menz 2009: 2). “An expert interview is not a specific method of data collection but includes all forms of qualitative interviews that are conducted with experts” (Gläser/Laudel 2009: 118). However, some risks have to be considered, such as lies or not being able to express one’s own opinion, since the experts can be representatives of an institution and have to follow certain rules.

Guidelines were used during interviews and included questions that were relevant for answering the research questions. This is a so called standardized interview which allows the interviewer to prepare questions in advance. A half-standardized form was chosen in order to let the interview partner decide how to answer the questions and in order to allow free space of topics that the interviewers define as important (Gläser/Laudel 2004: 39). Less experienced interviewers are using such guides or manuals to feel more secure and to be prepared for the content (Schlehe 2003: 79). It is important to note that ad hoc questions are still possible (Gläser/Laudel 2004: 39f.). The beginnings of the interviews were usually marked by a very general, open question in the sense of the qualitative open interview in order to stimulate the conversation (Froschauer/Lueger 2003: 62). It is important for the researcher to be open towards the interview partners, the situation, the methods and information. This attitude facilitates the interview according to several authors (Gläser/Laudel 2004: 27f.; Lamnek 1995: 22).

Eight of the people asked agreed to take part in an interview for the topic of this thesis. Many more were contacted, but not available due to time constraints or did not feel knowledgeable enough on the topic. The following list shows the final interview partners who exchanged their ideas and opinions and, furthermore, helped out with contacts and relevant sources for this thesis.

- Maria Hirsch, General Secretary of the Austrian-Ugandan Friendship Association
- Hildegard Wipfel, Policy Officer of the KOO - Koordinierungsstelle der Österreichischen Bischofskonferenz für internationale Entwicklung und Mission
- General Consulate of Uganda

- Franz Schmidjell, Managing Director of VIDC Vienna Institute for International Dialogue and Cooperation
- Gabriele Grosinger, Project Officer for Uganda of Horizont 3000
- Elisabeth Klatzer, Vienna University of Economics and Business (Institute for institutional and heterodox economy)
- Richard Ssewakiryanga, Executive Director of Uganda National NGO Forum
- Roswitha Kremser, Public Financial Management and Public Administration and Günter Engelits, East Africa from the Austrian Development Agency (ADA)<sup>2</sup>

A detailed list for citation will be found at the end of the thesis under the chapter “Sources”.

### **4.3. Transcription**

The interviews held were mostly recorded if the interviewees agreed to it, and in order to utilize the findings, transcribed. “When spoken language, for example from interviews [...], are brought into a written form, this is called transcription” (Mayring 2002: 89, own translation). Transcripts are made in order to capture the information on paper and thus to make it permanently available. It is important for transcripts to clearly define the speaker and to number the lines and pages (Bortz/Döring 2006: 313). Usually, more information is transcribed than used for analysis. In one case, a memory log had to be created from the notes taken during the interview since the interviewee did not wish to be recorded.

### **4.4. Evaluation method: Qualitative content analysis**

This method is used to evaluate the interpretation of the collected material in text form (for example transcription, texts...). The goal of the content analysis is the systematic work on communication material (Mayring 2009: 468). One form of the qualitative content analysis is a form of summary. The goal is to reduce the material to certain contents. Other useful instructions suggested not analyzing every single sentence, but while reading the passages, deducting those that are not important for the questions being asked (Lamnek 1995: 206). Qualitative Content Analysis and the building of structures is a process that can always be changed and adapted to new material (Mayring 2002: 117).

---

<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, despite the interesting interview and points exchanged, the content of the interview is not allowed to be directly used in the paper. It was only possible to use the referred sources from the interview.

## **II Background**

### **1. Civil Society and Non-Governmental Organizations**

The concept of civil society is not new. It has been discussed within political philosophy, sociology and social theory for hundreds of years. However, there is a new increasing emphasis on the concept. Especially its contribution for democracy, which is seen as essential, but also in international development it has become a catchword for reducing poverty. Civil society includes civil society organizations (CSOs), as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The terminal delimitations as well as the roles and functions assigned to civil society and NGOs will be discussed. Another focus of this chapter lies on the space of civil society and NGOs in development, and especially its recent impetus for discussions on Aid Effectiveness.

#### **1.1. Distinction of Terms**

##### **1.1.1. Civil Society**

The meaning of civil society is very ambivalent, such as Ulrich Brand remarks and since the 1990s high hopes and expectations have been connected with this concept (Brand 2000: 72). The notion itself exists since antiquity: “societas civilis” stands for the ideal way of life and has been used by many theorists since then. It experienced its upswing especially in the 1980s (Zimmer 2002: 9). It is a very broad notion, not clearly defined, that is located somewhere between politics, economy and privacy (Obrovsky/Six 2007: 7). “Mit dem Konzept der Zivilgesellschaft wird eine Gestaltung und Implementation von Politik in Verbindung gebracht, die gesellschaftlich eingebunden und rückgekoppelt ist und insofern ein Mehr an Demokratie sowie ein höheres Maß sozialer Gerechtigkeit in Aussicht stellt“ (Zimmer 2002: 9). One definition of civil society describes it as:

“[...] the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating (largely), self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules... It is distinct from society in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the state and hold state officials accountable” (Diamond 1994: 5 in Dicklitch 1998: 10).

Ciganikova points out that civil society is the sphere of institutions, organizations and individuals between the family, the state and the market (Ciganikova 2010: 55). Civil society actors themselves concluded following characteristics as corresponding for CSOs: voluntary, diverse, non-partisan, autonomous, non-violent, working and collaborating for change

(BetterAid & Open Forum 2011: 10). The main characteristic however, is described in civil society as not being identical with the state, which also determines their relationship with each other (Obrovsky/Six 2007: 7). Looking at the broad definition of civil society, it can be seen as an actor of a democratic state and at the same time comprising its own democratic potential. The development of democratic potential and introduction does not only occur in relation to the state but shows an autonomous process itself (Gubitzer/Klatzer a.o. 2008: 44).

Civil society engagement can be spontaneous, short-term but also long-term and organized in forms of interest groups, such as civil society organizations and non-governmental organizations (AGEZ 2006: 8). The term NGO is more widespread than CSO (Kuhn 2005: 89f.). The rise of civil society happened in the context of the new social movements. Traditionally, civil society is seen as “countervailing power“ in opposition to and control of the state (Zimmer 2002: 10). It is characterized in its independency from the state, so that its decisions are autonomous. As mentioned before, the engagement of civil society is seen as an important element for the vitality and strength of democracies because it has become a threshold for active participation of citizens for the general interest and good. In regard to the state, it is supposed to fulfill a complementary, control and relief function, in the sense of checks and balance (Kuhn 2005: 77f. in AGEZ 2006: 8f.). This point will be elaborated on more in the chapter “Civil Society Actors and the State”.

Many definitions and distinctions of civil society assign civil society to a third sphere, delimited from political society, the state, economical society and the market (Curbach 2003: 21). This is also the case of the OECD which defines CSOs as “all non-market and non-state organizations in which people organize themselves to pursue shared interests in the public domain” (OECD 2011: 35). The state sphere includes government, parties and other authorities, while the market sphere includes private-sector companies and company groups. Civil society encompasses the activities of individuals, groups, associations and organizations (AGEZ 2006: 8). However, it has also been argued that civil society has a close connection to the rationale of neoliberalism and the market, since it is supposed to be a private actor operating free from the state (Wahl 1999: 39). This emphasis on civil society in market-oriented policies can be observed and explained by the in development and rise of importance of civil society actors. This issue will be discussed in the chapter “Civil Society and NGOs in Development” and is of interest for civil society and aid effectiveness. The definition of CSOs by the OECD also shows that even though it is distinguished from state and market actors, it

is still acting in the public domain. In fact, it is very difficult to separate another sphere from state and market (examples are parties and unions) (Novy 2007: 12).

For this thesis, another understanding of civil society is of importance. Hirsch argues that state and society are linked together, building hegemony together. Civil society in this context is part of the “extended state” (erweiterter Staat) (Hirsch 2001: 20, 24, own translation). This is also what Gramsci remarked. For him, actors of civil society are not only important to contest a system – as the other definitions say – but also to stabilize it (in Kuhn 2005: 100). The civil society, thus, belongs to the integral state. “This category indicates that the state, in the sense of an institutional ensemble – as the terrain for conflict settlement and compromise, as well as actor, discourse and praxis – is a preconditioned societal process” (Brand 2007: 9).

Civil Society in Africa is described as having a different character than that in Western countries. This leads back to different social and economic conditions as well as historical and political circumstances, such as ethnic and kinship structures, colonialism and its legacy, the way of economic development and authoritarian political rules (Robinson/Friedman 2005: 7). “Greater popular participation is a prerequisite for stability on the continent – particularly since governance is often weak, corruption endemic and democracy in a number of countries little more than a façade” (Mutasa 2007: 18). This argument can be demonstrated with taking a look at the situation in Uganda and the emergence and primary roles for NGOs. However, for development, general trends can be deducted which are debated in the chapter on “Civil Society and NGOs in Development”.

In this thesis, civil society and its actors like NGOs are also analyzed in regards to the state, or rather seen as necessary part of the state, since civil society is supposed to engage people to participate in decision making processes. Therefore, for the next chapter dealing with the definition of NGOs it is important to keep in mind that the notion non-governmental does not mean total independence from the state – and in Gramsci’s sense should actually be part of it and perpetuate the state. Moreover, it is important to mention that civil society and NGOs are not moral notions of the good but rather collective terms of actors which can be important for a sustainable societal development (Six 2007: 43). It should also be noted that businesses, churches, unions and media are part of civil society. For this thesis, the organized form of civil society in NGOs will be in the center of analysis. However, media is a key element for

influencing policies. Even community radio initiatives exist and help build up communication lines between formal political actors and local communities (Jones/Tembo 2008: 10).

### **1.1.2. Non-Governmental Organizations**

NGOs can be seen as one part of civil society, one part that is structured in the form of an organization. NGOs are especially important for developmental issues. In fact, NGOs portray civil society actions but are not automatically identical with civil society (Obrovsky/Six 2007: 7). However, like civil society, there is no clear all-embracing definition. “NGOs have been defined as mainly voluntary, or not-for-profit organizations that are found in the realm outside of the public and private commercial sectors” (Dicklitch 1998: 4). Besides its non-state character, it is usually also orientated on others (Obrovsky/Six 2007: 7). Originally the notion of Non-Governmental Organization was used by the United Nations in 1949 and can be found in the Charta of the United Nations for international, non-state organizations that were supposed to hold an advising role. Due to this fact, NGOs have been granted consultative status for the United Nations since 1951 (Graffi 2003: 4, Kuhn 2005: 88).

The number of NGOs has been rising since the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Since then, different disciplines have been coping with NGOs according to their definition and roles. Especially from the 1990s and on, NGOs have been in the center of research. However, Curbach still portrays lacks in NGO research. This also leads back to the great variety of NGO activities: from service delivery to experts, to political, advocate NGOs, etc., which makes it hard to define it. Because of the non-existence of an official definition, different actors and institutions all operate with different definitions of civil society and NGOs. Basically, the definition for NGO is negatively defined which excludes certain criteria. Primarily, the notion includes all organizations that are based on a non-state basis and excludes all state organizations. Nevertheless, NGOs are dependent on the state and often operate in accordance with it (Curbach 2003: 26f., 32).

The increasing importance of the role of NGOs in development politics, their rise in numbers and meaning, made it necessary to introduce further notional differentiations. Some of them are: Northern NGOs - NNGOs, Southern NGOs - SNGOs, Community Based Organizations – CBO, Government Organized NGOs – GONGOs, Government run/inspired NGOs – GRINGOs, Quasi NGOs – QUANGOs, Foreign funded NGOs - FFUNGOS etc. This thesis does not carry out such an explicit differentiation but the variety of terms shows the importance and high number of NGOs (Take 2002: 39).

## **1.2. Goals and Interests**

In the understanding of civil society and NGOs as their institutionalized actors being a third sphere next to market and state, two functions were assigned to them. First they were supposed to act as a corrective for economic liberalization dynamics and next to bring democratization for the international political system. The second point can be linked with balancing the deficit of control and legitimization, which leads back to the thought of NGOs as being the connecting link between the interests of the population and others (Curbach 2003: 21).

The thematic goals and interests were defined to mostly lie on environment and protection of nature, human rights, peace work, humanitarian aid, development, and anti-globalization matters or fair globalization (Curbach 2003: 49f.). They are cherished in their ability to reach the poorest of the poor (Dicklitch 1998: 127). Formally, they are often characterized into political and service NGOs. Political NGOs try to support interests and set norms by lobbying, consultancy and monitoring while service NGOs can act as contracting partners of state or other organizations for a certain target group. Also, technical implementation organizations exist focusing in humanitarian and catastrophe aid, including development NGOs (Curbach 2003: 55, 57). In this sense they are often described as “extension of the state” (Wahl 2001 in Curbach 2003: 58, own translation).

Their resources are defined as competence of the matter, high motivation and engagement, dynamics, innovation, as well as the reputation of being morally integer, selfless and ideal. Wahl argues that if NGOs are able to create such a basis among the public and to influence public opinion, they can become a politically relevant factor bringing more transparency in the decision making processes (Wahl 1999: 38).

One important objective and purpose for NGOs lies in democracy. “Civil society and NGOs within civil society play an important role in both the transition to and consolidation of democracy” (Dicklitch 1998: 10). The presence of NGOs in the international system is said to have led to more transparency and publicity as well as a platform for alternative expertise, which are seen as preconditions for democratization (Brand 2000: 128). Within neoliberalism several democratic functions are supposed to be performed by civil society: empowering, educative, watchdog and advocacy. Democracy is defined as the key arena for the implementation of democratic values. In this, advocacy is importance since NGOs act like a

supplement to political parties when interests are not fully represented. Organizations have the ability to voice those interests and channel them to the government. This happens for example for women, youth or other minorities and is important for disadvantaged groups. They can also work together with political parties, associations and the media to make the government accountable and to make information available to the public. In this, the media plays an important role (Dicklitch 1998: 10, 12-14). “[T]he focus of civil society may usefully be directed towards establishing a set of minimum ‘engagements’ with executive and legislative branch actors, promoting government transparency and a respect for human rights” (Jones/Tembo 2008: 4). Peter Wahl sees potential for democracy because of civil society’s alternative expertise on issues and the know-how for implementing political steps (Wahl 1999: 45). However, NGOs can only play their role for democratization if they have material and political autonomy from the state and other actors. This is very difficult due to the high dependency of resources (Hirsch 2001: 39).

In fact, civil society is seen as being able to contribute to good governance by building state capability, state accountability and state responsiveness. This includes activities in participatory policy and budget formulation, education, basic services, standard setting, investigation like monitoring and evaluation government programs, sanctions through protests, strikes, negative publicity and also advocacy (Jones/Tembo 2008: 3).

As mentioned earlier, very often CSOs are involved through dialogue or consultancy. Here the United Nations and the World Bank acknowledge the role of NGOs (Curbach 2003: 20; World Bank Group Website 2012). The UN system actually includes NGOs in their international structures and decision making processes (Brand 2000: 119) to benefit from their expertise in certain areas, knowledge and experiences. Information is an important asset that NGOs can offer (Curbach 2003: 43).

The forms of activity of NGOs will be mentioned here only in a few words to get a better overview. How NGOs operate depends on cultural background, interest, political structure and force of opponents. Conventionally, NGOs engage in project work, public work, further education, science, obtaining information, input in political negotiation processes, advisory and lobbying. Unconventionally, they also work through petitions, demonstrations, blockades and occupation. Influence can be won by demonstrating new problems, making pressure, monitoring if promises are carried out and mobilizing the masses (Take 2002: 45, 59).



### 1.3. Civil Society Actors and the State

Because the first chapter included the definitions of civil society actors in contrast or connection to the state, it is worthwhile to consider their relationship. Many regard the state and civil society as mutually constitutive (Bebbington/Hickey/Mitlin 2008: 7). This chapter will also set up the basis for the consideration of the Ugandan state and its civil society actors. Especially due to policy shifts and new aid modalities that will be discussed later, national policy processes are seen as essential: “[I]t puts the state back in the driving seat” (European Commission 2011: 17).

It is important to have a clear separation of state and public. The state is usually seen as the public realm but it is not always public or open to all citizens. Even though it is supposed to act in the public interest it is very often not (Novy 2007: 15). The role of the states is constantly changing. Especially in the 1980s the state gave up traditional tasks and put competencies on other – private – actors (historical background will be given when taking a look at civil society, NGOs and development). This is when civil society and its actors’ importance were rising (AGEZ 2006: 25). There are several ways for the two parties to engage with one another. The form depends on the interests represented.

1. Cooperation in the sense of supporting each other,
2. Instrumentalization when NGOs are taking over tasks or services from the state, or
3. Confrontation when NGOs are perceived as opposition and a threat to the state (Curbach 2003: 99).

The activities of NGOs are therefore numerous and its scope dependent on the nation’s state. Usually states are interested in cooperation with NGOs for consultancy, legitimization and social service provision (AGEZ 2006: 101). NGOs, on the other hand, hope for support for their activities. Working with the state can have advantages such as the access to information, capital and to gain trust from donors (Graffi 2003: 99). Particularly in development, NGOs are used as counterpart or complementary part of state aid (Obrovsky/Six 2007: 7). This sometimes conflictive relationship stems from different objectives seen for actions and also for themselves. It is also often perceived by NGOs that working with the state can mean a risk of autonomy and on the other hand states often believe that NGOs mean a loss of sovereignty (Curbach 2003: 98). NGOs working as watchdogs or in advocacy work are dealt with suspiciously and are thus criticized (Novy 2007: 13). One argument is that states cannot control the influence of non-state actors. This can mean a threat to them, as mentioned before. “Insbesondere für eine Reihe von Entwicklungsländern, jüngeren Nationalstaaten und

autoritären Regimes stellen NGOs und ihre politische Wachhund-Funktion eine Bedrohung von staatlichen Interessen und ihrer Souveränität dar“ (AGEZ 2006: 103f.). However, NGOs cannot act without legal recognition and are thus bound to government frameworks. States control form, duration and intensity of interactions with NGOs who are bound to the state's power. On the other hand, due to the complexity of global problems, states recognize the role of NGOs with their knowledge and ability to influence the public (Take 2002: 57). The risk of integration for NGOs lies in becoming only performers of the state (because they are cheaper). Thus this would suppress their competencies and initiatives as well as their knowledge and experience. That is why these functions hold an important asset (Novy 2007: 15).

When looking at the relation between civil society and the state in development one can see that the 1970s and 80s were shaped by the state losing its central position for development and thus aid due to the assumption of its inability to manage development processes effectively. Consequently, the state was reduced and other actors became more important. It was only in the 1990s, but more during the last ten years, that the international community has started to think how to strengthen the state again “to protect the provision of basic services and act as a coordinating mechanism for development policies, programmes, budgets and actors” (European Commission 2011: 23).<sup>3</sup>

#### **1.4. Civil Society and NGOs in Development**

There has been a strong increase in the size, scope, and capacity of civil society around the world over the last decades. “According to the Yearbook of International Organizations, the number of international NGOs was reported to have increased from 6,000 in 1990 to more than 50,000 in 2006” (World Bank Group Website 2012). CSOs have also become relevant players in global development assistance. It is estimated that in 2006, CSOs disbursed around US\$15 billion in international assistance (World Bank Group Website 2012). Estimations argue that NGOs have a scope of around 600 million people which are directly concerned with the development of NGO projects or programs (Six 2007: 40). In aid, civil society actors had a tremendous upswing and all big donor organizations and governments included them for the planning and implementation of development programs (Kuhn 2005: 11).

When looking at aid civil society and especially NGOs have been assigned to different roles and functions according to donors' agendas (see later in this chapter). The force coming from

---

<sup>3</sup> More general as well as specific information on Uganda can be found in the article by William Muhumuza (2010): State-Civil Society partnership in poverty reduction in Uganda. EASSRR, Vol. XXVI, No. 1, 1-21.

the donors is seen by the government's rhetoric of working with the civil society is a result of the pressure from donors which in Uganda were the DFID and the World Bank. It has become a condition (Brock/McGee/Ssewakiryanga 2002: 9). In the 1990s, foreign aid donors tried to work with civil society organizations in Africa to improve democracy and governance objectives "by subjecting the state to greater citizen oversights, fostering political pluralism and engaging in policy dialogue and advocacy" (Robinson/Friedman 2005: 30).

The context of the expansion of civil society also lies in the call for democracy – as mentioned in the goals and interests of NGOs before. The European Commission sees the event of the fall of the Berlin Wall as crucial because this was the time when the international community realized the role of civil society in development and cooperation processes. "Under the new paradigm development is no longer only the preserve of central governments, but a multi-actor participatory process, requiring both effective states and engaged civil society". In this sense, civil society is seen as an actor bringing value to the process (European Commission 2011: 19). When looking at Africa, NGOs are not new but the importance as poverty alleviators, emergency and humanitarian aid providers was added during that time. Generally, they are seen as important for empowerment, democratization and economic development. "NGOs, civil society and the market have become the panacea for the failures of the African state in the post-cold war neo-liberal climate" (Dicklitch 1998: 2).

As already stated before, the area of civil society can vary in its nature, composition and the definitions being based on different paradigms, historical origins and the country context. The World Bank considers following definition as useful:

"The term civil society [refers] to the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide of array of organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundations" (World Bank Group Website 2012)

The World Bank's and International Monetary Fund's (IMF) policies mostly regard NGOs as supposed "to fit into the broader governmental development schemes which mirror gap-filling and service provision roles" (Dicklitch 1998: 98). They were described as being stopgaps of the state. This also leads back to the fact that South NGOs were perceived as more trustworthy in comparison with weak or authoritarian states in Africa for example (Graffi

2003: 20). These facets only make up a part of what NGOs can do and are supposed to be doing for the society and international community. The roles and functions of NGOs will be dealt with in the next subchapters.

#### **1.4.1. Historical Background**

The area of development cannot clearly be pictured without non-governmental organizations being part of civil society anymore. They are making up a big share of actors and activities. Bebbington, Hickey and Mitlin (2008: 11-15) define four periods in history which are relevant for the importance, roles and functions of NGOs in development.

1. The first period was defined until the mid and late 1960s. The organizations were small agencies which took action for the needs of groups of people. They held an advocacy role in the topics of abolition of slavery and promotion of peace.
2. The second phase can be narrowed down from the 60s and 70s until between 1980 and 1985. This time was characterized by the acceleration in NGO growth. According to Bebbington, Hickey and Mitlin, in this period Northern states and societies institutionalized NGO projects within their national aid portfolio. This might also be a reason why expectations for NGOs were rising. Still, “[t]he non-governmental sector was one of the more important terrains in which dominance of civil society was being contested” (ibid 2008: 13). The trend in the early 1980s can be described as boom of NGOs, in which increasing interest in funding their activities arose.
3. The third phase is marked by a growth in recognition – also due to the neoliberal agenda and the new roles NGOs had in it. The Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in the 1980s led to the demand of NGO intervention. They were “programme implementers, knowledge generators and activists” (ibid. 2008: 14). Bebbington, Hickey and Mitlin analyze that it was during this time that, due to interventions of NGOs in development, national and multilateral organizations were concerned that NGOs had become “too close for comfort” (ibid. 2008: 14). As a result they compromised their innovativeness, autonomy, legitimacy, accountability and ability to continue elaborating alternatives (ibid. 2008: 14).
4. The fourth period started in the mid/late 1990s until today. The focus lies on a critical view on NGOs (ibid. 2008: 15).

As this short overview of time periods show, the second phase marks the rising emergence of NGOs in the field, while the third phase acknowledges even further roles for NGOs. In fact, in the beginning of the 1980s, reinforced through the end of the Cold War, a new paradigm in

development politics became present. This is known as the “New Policy Agenda” with the basis on neo-liberal and liberal-democratic theories. Before, the state held a central function as control and decision point for the society. The New Policy Agenda follows the logic of the market and asks for strengthening the private actors, such as the civil society (Graffi 2003: 12). It has been a rather donor-driven process where NGOs were preferred in the area of service delivery (Dicklitch 1998: 14). The state has lost its primary position within this paradigm and was no longer seen as necessary for economic growth and development. Instead, political and economical liberalization wanted to be achieved. It was the discontent about positive results, despite financial support to African states that led the donors to search for alternatives to the state (Graffi 2003: 12). A slim state was promoted and state structures were cut (Interview Wipfel 2012). NGOs in this picture were seen as mediators and negotiators between the unorganized mass and the state. In comparison to state institutions, NGOs are said to work closer with people and have a staff and non-capital-intensive way of work. Their focus is mostly pro-poor oriented and the involvement of the people can lead to democratization from bottom to top. NGOs’ organization structure allows efficient, professional and flexible activities. Through their own access to the public they can influence the political consciousness of the population (Graffi 2003: 12f.). For these reasons NGOs’ importance for development was rising and seen as indispensable for development politics.

Concerning the history, I would like to add recent trends in development of the last years in which the state is recognized as center of development again, supposedly by working together with civil society actors. With the introduction of the Millennium Development Goals for example, the state was recognized again to be needed in order to achieve those targets (Interview Wipfel 2012). This is also portrayed by the focus on programme aid channeled through the country’s government in which the emphasis is set again on the accountability and efficiency of the state. The next chapter summarizes the change of the roles and functions of civil society and NGOs.

#### **1.4.2. Roles & Functions of Civil Society and NGOs**

The World Bank created a list of important reasons for the involvement of civil society:

- Voice to stakeholders, especially poor and marginalized people;
- Public sector transparency and accountability, including to contribute to an environment of good governance;
- Public consensus and local ownership for reforms, national poverty reduction and development strategies;

- Innovative ideas and solutions, participatory approach;
- Strengthening programs by bringing in local knowledge, assistance and social capital;
- Professional expertise and increasing capacity for effective service delivery.

(World Bank Group Website 2012)

Dicklitch (1998: 6) classifies three different NGO types according to their basic functions – being at the same time a reflection of its roles: Voluntary Organization (VO), People's Organization (PO) and Gap Fillers (GF) or Public Service Contractors (PSCs). The last category is mostly intermediate NGOs which are gap-filling in the sense that they were taking over services that the state neglected or dismissed. "Failure of the state to provide for basic services has led many official donors to use NGOs rather than the local state to provide services" (Dicklitch 1998: 7). Governments also recognized the crucial role of NGOs and their use for service provision. However, gap-fillers usually do not engage in political work but are concentrated on practical activities, such as education, safe water etc.

"Because they fill in the gaps left by the withdrawal of regime provision of essential services and goods, they tend to buttress the legitimacy of the regime. This legitimacy arises from the co-operation of the NGOs with the regime in national development schemes. Some NGOs are even actively recruited by the regime in order to carry out broader regime objectives". (Dicklitch 1998: 7)

This type of NGOs is not seen as bringing the development of a democratic civil society or polity. Voluntary Organizations on the other hand can be, for example, human rights organizations, environmental groups and regime monitoring organizations that emphasize the education and awareness of rights and abuses of rights. "These organizations usually perform a watchdog role in civil society, in that they monitor regime excesses and abuses" (Dicklitch 1998: 7). This category is not always numerous in Africa in comprising NGOs. POs are close to VOs because they also give voice to public demands. However, their center of attention and action is narrower. An example would be an organization concentrating on women and trying to empower their members but also the wider community (ibid. 1998: 7f.). Their roles and functions can therefore be assigned to service-delivery, as well as awareness raising, empowerment in the sense of giving voice to the people as well as political work and advocacy. The international community was hoping for NGOs to balance out the weaknesses of state structures in Africa and thus to improve aid (Graffi 2003: 103).

Generally, as mentioned before, two approaches can be identified on how civil society and NGOs roles are being perceived. One way is very technical and instrumental for aid resources, the second one includes a broader, political perspective. The political point of view means

that “working with and through the state remains the cornerstone of the new aid architecture” (European Commission 2011: 29). For this, the inclusion of citizens is needed to contest abuse of power, demand government accountability and so on. So, NGOs are increasingly recognized in their political role. This will also be shown in the next part concerning development effectiveness. NGOs as organizations of the civil society are being demanded to engage politically. They are expected to contribute to the Millennium Development Goals and in particular, poverty reduction. Notably, their role as watchdog has increased (AGEZ 2006: 6; Bebbington/Hickey/Mitlin 2008: 15, 22).

Generally, a big push of professionalism of NGOs has occurred. Due to increased financial support, NGOs from the South needed to administer big amounts of capital. The capital’s use had to be portrayed as useful with corresponding activities. Thus the requirements for reporting and documentation rose. In order to communicate with big donors experts and professional skills were needed, making professional skills more important than volunteer work. The content is also often orientated to donor’s wishes (Graffi 2003: 22f., 103). It is a fact that NGOs have to orientate to trends and discourses in order to receive support (Curbach 2003: 38).

For the activities of civil society and NGOs old and new roles need to be strengthened: to empower people as agents of change, demand space for inclusive policy processes, better dialogue, good governance, watchdog function (when thinking of budget support, human rights, general Aid Effectiveness), networking and advocacy, accountability, knowledge and cooperation (AGEZ 2006: 20). New roles are emerging due to changing development modalities, like direct budget payments but also the extension of civil society and NGOs in recipient countries (Obrovsky/Six 2007: 8). However, the following challenges are still defining civil society’s scope of actions:

- acceptance from the government,
- control and regulation of governments,
- securing financial support of programs (change to budget support),
- coordination of state, private and public programs,
- competition between NGOs from North and South (AGEZ 2006: 34).

A crucial role of civil society actors has been identified to lie on advocacy. “NGO advocacy is [...] commonly understood as a political dialogue between civil society, government and

international agencies in a rich-country context". In fact, advocacy is seen as one tool to combat and eventually end poverty (Hirsch 2007: 185f.). However, NGOs engaging in advocacy are not always welcomed in their suggestions and critics, which can lead to a conflictive relation between NGOs and the state. Some countries even feared to lose their sovereignty, legitimacy and financial resources to NGOs (Wahl 2001: 123). Also, for NGOs it is hard to act in a political way since the engagement in projects do not leave a lot of outer space (and especially resources) to be politically active. The call for basic support in order to engage in political processes becomes louder (Interview Wipfel 2012).

A conference dealing with the roles of NGOs in aid summarizes them in watchdog function, translators and enforcers of voices from the people, mediators between North-South and South-South to enhance learning and exchange and actors of change (AGEZ 2006: 12). The area of consultancy and dialogue has also been areas of activity for many NGOs (Curbach 2003: 20; World Bank Group Website 2012). In one interview the possible role for European NGOs in the future was defined as the ones of watchdogs, control for democracy and the preparation of local NGOs in order to support people in their rights, to inform them and to support their confidence in those areas. Capacity building and consultancy were key words used to describe the importance of Northern NGOs. A relevant point for cooperation was defined, namely supporting small organisations in order to enhance their capacity for operations (Interview Grosinger 2012). Hildegard Wipfel sees partnerships between South and North NGOs as well as useful since partner governments are always sceptical towards critical NGOs in a country. If donors assist critical NGOs too much in another country, complaints about external interference will occur. An indirect support between NGOs might be one solution and on the other hand support in the processes for strategies and budgeting in order to guarantee a useful inclusion of civil society (Interview Wipfel 2012). A study carried out for the VIDC suggests that North NGOs should cooperate with civil society actors in partner countries in order to deepen the exchange and improve learning from each other, to support them in building up structures and knowledge, to exchange for lobbying and advocacy, and much more. (Gubitzer/Klatzer a.o. 2008: 23). However, funds that are channelled through international NGOs are not always viewed as effective for CSOs as a recent study reveals because conditions might also be imposed from the INGO side (ADC/Danida/Sida 2012: 59).



Despite all those promising roles, NGOs should not automatically be seen as panacea for all the problems since they are dependent on many other factors and not always successful in reaching the poor (Stickler 2005: 38). The whole debate about aid and its effectiveness includes good governance and democracy – one of the reasons for the involvement of civil society. However there are some restrictions of the democratizing potential of NGOs in Africa. Graffi (2003: 17f.) defines three factors for it. First, NGOs mostly represent only a part of the population – one that has the possibility to gather and to organize. Secondly, political influence is not in many cases given and mainly non-controversial areas are chosen for activities. Third, state structures pose some difficulties and define the setting that NGOs are operating in. It has to be kept in mind that civil society actors are not always free agents independent from the state (Ciganikova 2010: 54). Furthermore, CSOs constantly face limited funding which means they cannot act according to their own interests. This is also linked with autonomy. Furthermore, institutional capacity might be restricted due to technical equipment, vehicles etc. Another important point is the competition between organizations over influence and funding. Limited political space is given all across Africa and recent trends of Sub-Saharan African governments such as Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe show the introduction of NGO registration bills that restricts the space for civil society participation (Jones/Tembo 2008: 8). In order for SNGOs to act as advocates for the population and political control organs, political will is needed. This, however, also depends on the government and the international development politics as well as Northern NGOs to lobby for governments to act in other countries' interests. Graffi sees NGOs as essential and requests the change of the international community in order to include NGOs (Graffi 2003: 18).

The next chapter thus deals with the Aid Effectiveness Agenda and its principles of participation and inclusion of NGOs and civil society. The topic will only be slightly touched and elaborated on more in the next part on Aid and Development Effectiveness.

### **1.4.3. Civil Society and NGOs in the Aid Effectiveness Agenda**

As portrayed in the last chapter, roles and financial supports are changing over the time. Therefore, the context out of which NGOs emerge and act is always different. Structures and characteristics are constantly changing in order to compete with new trends. Very often societal embeddedness was put at risk for adapting to supporter's wishes (Graffi 2003: 13f.).

The Aid Effectiveness Agenda addresses aid and its failed promises of development. Its creation can be led back to the beginning of the Millennium with the Millennium Development Goals putting its focus on reducing and eventually ending poverty. Important fora followed in Rome, Paris, Accra and last year in Busan. While the First High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Rome already included the principles of partnership and set the emphasis on partner countries, the one in Paris marked a change for the involvement of civil society actors. This was defined as essential and evolved further in participation of civil society in the Third Forum as well as in the Fourth Forum (the next chapter deals with the developments in aid and especially aid effectiveness in more detail). “The new principles of country ownership and participation do not grant governments alone the responsibility for development work but emphasise the close connection with various societal stakeholders, especially within civil society” (Eberlei 2009: 19f.). This subchapter already gives some insights into the High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness concentrating on civil society and NGOs in particular.

The 1990 African Charter on Popular Participation was the first to acknowledge that accountability in development must begin with local people. Therefore, governments need to include them (Mutasa 2007: 20). For the making of the Paris Declaration, not only donor and recipient countries were present, but also other development actors were included in the policy dialogue, namely the civil society. It states: “Developing country governments will work more closely with parliaments and local authorities in preparing, implementing and monitoring national development policies and plans. They will also engage with civil society organisations” (OECD 2005/2008: 16). Development is not the domain of governments but also needs motivated societies and citizens, effective states and open governments (European Commission 2011: 19).

In 1996, the OECD was emphasizing the need for a strong civil society – not only being part of the state extension to fulfill tasks. CSOs themselves see their position in a political way on which all other functions are built on: social capital, resource mobilization, social services, empowerment, advocacy and so on. The tasks for NGOs that stem from the Paris Declaration are mainly control and monitoring. Parliaments and an informed civil society are strongly needed (Six 2007: 36) in which civil society was officially entitled to take part in the process. Also, the OECD Paper reflected on the results of the implementation of the Paris Declaration, recognizing the task of donors to assist civil society organizations “in support of their role in

these processes” (OECD 2011: 33). This is supposed to lead to a broad participation and possibilities for citizens to hold governments accountable. “This is done through institutions such as parliaments, civil society organisations, the media, political parties, audit institutions, and processes such as elections, budgeting and service delivery” (ibid. 2011: 33).

“Civil society organizations are a vibrant and essential feature in the democratic life of countries across the globe” (BetterAid & Open Forum 2011: 10). The Accra Agenda of Action, the outcome document of the Third High Level Forum in Accra, first considers CSOs as their own development actors and sees the need for developing country governments to work more closely with them. As a result, CSOs themselves have set up their own principles for effectiveness, which was portrayed in the Istanbul Principles for the effectiveness of CSOs from 2010. The principles are emphasizing on NGOs as promoters of rights and advocates (Open Forum Website 2010). The Istanbul principles focus on the following points:

1. Respect and promote human rights and social justice
2. Embody gender equality and equity while promoting women and girl’s rights
3. Focus on people’s empowerment, democratic ownership and participation
4. Promote environmental sustainability
5. Practice transparency and accountability
6. Pursue equitable partnerships and solidarity
7. Create and share knowledge and commit to mutual learning
8. Commit to realizing positive sustainable change (BetterAid & Open Forum 2011: 10)

This is clearly a contrast to what governments and the donor community have seen in NGOs before, namely in its primary role to deliver services. However, the international community has always acknowledged the need for advocacy work in the sense of rights and in monitoring the government’s and country’s processes. In this context, NGOs are very often forced to accept their apolitical role, especially in development, since political and national frameworks lead them to do this (Graffi 2003: 103).

The following risks were defined for CSOs due to the impact of the Paris Declaration:

“the recentralization of development and aid resources in the hands of governments without the necessary countervailing powers and (downward) accountability checks, the politicization of aid delivered through the CSO channel by control-oriented governments [...], the ‘instrumentalisation’ of civil society as sub-contractors for service delivery, reduced space for meaningful CSO involvement in policy dialogue processes, a weakened capacity to act as watchdog agency, decreasing financial flows channeled through CSOs” (European Commission 2011: 20).

Generally, there have been improvements in engaging non-state actors in national policies and planning processes. This gives high priority to civil society participation. “But engagement is not always consistent or meaningful and remains constrained by political factors, strong donor influence, unclear roles, and limited capacity” (OECD 2011: 36). Some studies show that there is a general trend of limiting the space for CSOs, especially for those being involved in the monitoring of government development policies and practices – although often demanded (ibid. 2011: 36). This means many NGOs accept apolitical roles to avoid restrictions on other levels, which happens especially in development (Graffi 2003: 103). This is the case in Uganda which will be dealt with when taking a look on the civil society and NGO landscape in the country, its political environment, access to budget information, capacity and so on (Renzio 2006b: 11).

This chapter showed the big push for the involvement of civil society in aid and development. However, it has to be noted that “increasing space for CSO involvement does not necessarily imply a major impact on development policies, as structures for dialogue do not necessarily include clear accountability mechanism, or only involve CSOs after decisions have been taken” (Pareira 2011 in OECD 2011: 36). This will be discussed later on by analyzing the situation in Uganda.

In the next chapter, development and especially aid are given closer examination by looking at the debate on aid effectiveness, its emergence, principles and what followed next. The development tool of budget support will also be discussed since it is said to bring more effectiveness to aid and demonstrates one part of the framework NGOs are working in.

## 2. From Aid to Development Effectiveness?

The concept of Aid Effectiveness evolved out of the questions on why aid was not producing the expected development results which were targeted in the Millennium Development Goals (OECD Webpage 2012). This was seen as a failure to the current aid paradigm (Stern 2008: 3) in which the multitude of projects and their effectiveness were of major concern. The scope of projects was questioned due to the low impact on structure building which led to the conclusion of a high number of projects in a high number of countries being a “development problem” (Nuscheler 2008: 473, own translation). Some of the difficulties with project aid were transaction costs, inefficient spending, unpredictability, undermining the effectiveness of government systems etc. (Lawson 2003: 23). The reaction to the perceived failings of the existing aid paradigm is shown in many conferences and especially in the High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness - where this topic was discussed (Stern 2008: 3).

There were four High Level Forums (HLF) on the Effectiveness on Aid:

1. First High Level Forum in Rome 2002
2. Second High Level Forum in Paris 2005
3. Third High Level Forum in Accra 2008
4. Fourth High Level Forum in Busan 2011



This graph shows the sources that contributed to the Paris Declaration, the outcome of the Second High Level Forum in 2005 and the landmark of international agreement, all at the same time being important elements and milestones of the Aid Effectiveness Agenda.

**Figure 1: Sources of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness**

Source: Wood, B. a.o. 2011: 2  
(adapted by the author)

## **2.1. Before the Paris Declaration**

For the processing of the Paris Declaration the concepts and lessons learnt from the decades before were important. The history shows the emergence of a consensus between the OECD/DAC, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which highlighted a new way of seeing and thinking about development and political realities.

Through the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) an economic agenda was promoted and passed on to developing countries. This was done by the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the early 1980s. Loans were then given if the neo-liberal policies based on market competition were adopted. SAPs meant the reduction of government services (a space where NGOs as private actors often filled in, as described in the history), privatization, free trade, business deregulation and so on. As a consequence, the impact on the social sector was immense, especially in the health care sector where improvements were often worsened. The lessons of the SAPs were reflected in the post-Washington consensus which promoted the protection and increase of social expenditure (WHO Website 2012). The failures of SAPs and other conditionalities as well as developing countries pushing for more democracy changed the way of thinking (Stern 2008: v).

As said before, traditionally aid to developing countries came in the form of projects funded by their own donors. Due to criticism in the 1990s of the donor-driven projects, Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAp) emerged. “Under the SWAp, project funds contribute directly to a sector-specific umbrella and are tied to a defined sector policy under a government authority” (WHO Website 2012). Other initiatives started in 1996 and produced results such as “Shaping the 21<sup>st</sup> Century” by OECD and DAC including a new partnership idea between donor and receiving countries (Stern 2008: vi).

“Donors would provide more resources, improve the coordination of assistance in support of domestically owned development strategies, and achieve coherence between their aid policies and other policies which affect developing countries (trade, debt, arms sales, etc.). In return, recipient governments were expected to commit to poverty reduction objectives and to accountable governance” (Fraser/Whitfield 2009: 77).

In 1998 the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) by the WB was set up to “eliminate poverty, reduce inequity and improve opportunity for people in low- and middle-income countries” by recognizing and focusing on the interdependence of all elements of development (social, structural, human, governance, environmental, economic, and financial)

(Stern 2008: vi). The CDF was founded as being a new partnership model to achieve improvements and also to support the accomplishment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which were the outcome of a series of conferences (Obrovsky 2008: 9). The CDF has been operationalized through the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) where each partner country sets up individually to define its goal for reducing poverty (World Bank Group Website 2012). Its objectives seem to have been realized in the Paris Declaration:

- “Development strategies should be comprehensive and shaped by a long-term vision.”
- “Each country should devise and direct its own development agenda based on citizen participation.”
- “Governments, donors, civil society, the private sector and other stakeholders should work together in partnership led by recipient countries to carry out development strategies.”
- “Development performance should be evaluated on the basis of measurable results.”

(World Bank Group Website 2012)

As mentioned before, the OECD/DAC “Shaping the 21<sup>st</sup> Century” as well as the CDF can be seen as precursors for the MDGs that international policy makers agreed on and represented “a concerted effort to address development and encapsulate concerns for economic well-being, gender equality, education, health, the environment, and international development cooperation” (Kindornay 2011: 7). MDGs underlie international development efforts like the subsequent Consensus and the declaration show (ibid. 2011: 7). Through the MDGs the topic of aid and development was brought back on the international agenda. Furthermore, it tried to create a new framework to legitimize development finance and also to give it another push (Obrovsky 2008: 9, Fraser/Whitfield 2009: 78).

Many new ideas were set up as a reversal of the negatives of aid and aid relationships before.

“Thus donor imposition of conditions on aid recipients had not worked therefore there had to be count[r]y ownership by these countries of their own priorities and plans; uncoordinated donor inputs imposed high transaction costs on aid recipients hence the need for greater coordination as well as consistency with the priorities of the recipients of aid; bypassing national treasuries had weakened budgeting and planning so channeling resources through national systems was seen as the solution; and the lack of accountability by donors for the consequences of their policies or decisions was to be replaced by mutual accountability with both donors and the recipients of aid responsible for achieving development results.” (Stern 2008: vi).

Specific conferences in Monterrey (2002), Rome (HLF-1, 2003) and Marrakech (2004) led to the Second High Level Forum in Paris in 2005, thus producing the Paris Declaration. The First High Level Forum can be seen as the first time when principles for aid effectiveness were set up in a concrete declaration.

Following priority actions were defined:

- “that development assistance be delivered based on the priorities and timing of the countries receiving it,
- that donor efforts concentrate on delegating co-operation and increasing the flexibility of staff on country programmes and projects,
- and that good practice be encouraged and monitored, backed by analytic work to help strengthen the leadership that recipient countries can take in determining their development path” (OECD Webpage 2012).

It can already be witnessed that the focus should lie on the so called partner countries.

The main issues of the evolution of the Paris Declaration have been discussed. The trend of the late 1990s to focus on poverty, partnership and participation are clearly shown (Fraser/Whitfield 2009: 75). The next part of the chapter deals with the Paris Declaration itself and continues with the fora and foci following the Declaration: Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) and the Fourth High Level Forum in Busan before explaining the shift from Aid to Development Effectiveness and one of the development tools for program based aid – budget support in more detail. Subsequently, aid and Aid Effectiveness in Uganda will be discussed, including aid and development in Uganda and its role as donor darling.

## **2.2. A New Aid Paradigm: Paris Declaration**

The Second High Level Forum produced the well known Paris Declaration (PD) on Aid Effectiveness which was signed by over 100 countries and marked a new focus on development cooperation. Its goal was to improve the framework conditions for the implementation of the MDGs and a reaction to the critique on aid (Obrovsky 2008: 10). “This declaration went further than any of the previous statements of the donor community by specifying the commitments of both sides in the partnership and indicators for monitoring progress” (Fraser/Whitfield 2009: 83). The Second High Level Forum 2005 in Paris already held the understanding of a new aid paradigm which agreed on several points: As mentioned before the focus was set on partnership between donors and receiving countries. Development results were defined in terms of the Millennium Development Goals with the big emphasis being on poverty reduction. Developing countries were supposed to define their own development priorities and require donors to support those. The state was given more responsibility and should not be by-passed and minimized like before. The involvement of citizens and civil society was demanded. Aid represented only one part of development. A result focus existed, where some results were supposed to be there in advance, but at the same time the partner country needed to have a commitment to learn from lessons. The evaluation



is more specific concerning time deadlines and targets and also takes a look on impact and performance (Stern 2008: vi f.).

The Paris Declaration marked a new approach as to “bringing the state ‘back in’ as a key development partner and grand coordinator of development policies, programmes, budgets and actors” (European Commission 2011: 20).

The Paris Declaration containing its principles and commitments has become the **self-referential definition of aid effectiveness** (Stern 2008: vii). Even though it does not define aid effectiveness clearly, it can be seen as the technical representation of the agreement that aid effectiveness refers to the “ability to achieve expected impacts and stated objectives through aid” (Kindornay 2011: 10). Another less self-referential definition was set up by a research group on the Paris Declaration, namely as the “[a]rrangement for the planning, management and deployment of aid that is efficient, reduces transaction costs and is targeted towards development outcomes including poverty reduction” (Stern 2008: vii).

Generally, civil society organizations agreed to the Paris Agenda, especially its emphasis on ownership and better governance of aid. “The potential benefits of budget support were also acknowledged provided the shift was made in a transparent and accountable manner and with due guarantees for effective CSO participation” (European Commission 2011: 20). It is recognized by the Open Forum, for example, that the Paris Declaration has given African governments the chance to participate in discussions on aid delivery. It also stated that “the PD has created some relative energy for achieving aid effectiveness at the country level and also provided an opportunity to develop a better understanding between partners and donors on making aid work better for all” (Open Forum 2011a: 2).


The Program Based Approach (PBA) was emphasized by having donor countries working together in a program-oriented partnership with the recipient countries (Hechenberger 2008: 47). It is seen by many as a turning point for development co-operation since it demands the recognition of all actors to play an important part for the whole agenda (OECD 2011: 17). In fact, it was the “first time that donors and recipients both agreed to commitments and to hold each other accountable for achieving these” (OECD Webpage 2012) and which has distinguished the Paris Declaration from all the others (OECD 2011: 18). In addition to that, representatives from organizations of the civil society took part (OECD 2005/2008: 15).

## 2.2.1. The Principles of the Paris Declaration

The Paris Declaration is made up of five fundamental principles which will be discussed on the following pages. These principles will be connected with the latest publication on the progress of the implementation of the Paris Declaration and the data for Uganda, since it serves as a reference point for the measurement and effectiveness of aid (and has also been demanded by NGOs for a long time) (Obrovsky/Six 2007: 8):

- Ownership
- Alignment
- Harmonisation
- Managing for Results and
- Mutual accountability.

**Figure 2: The Paris Declaration pyramid**



Source: OECD 2011: 18

### 2.2.1.1. Ownership of development policies and strategies

“Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies, and strategies and co-ordinate development actions.” (OECD 2005/2008: 3)

“Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption.” (OECD Webpage 2012)

Donors themselves acknowledged the problems of chaos and conditionality for which ownership was set up as solution. “Rather than waiting for donors to reform themselves, recipient governments are being urged to ‘take ownership’ of aid activities, to establish their own national systems for managing and coordinating donors, and only to accept aid that comes on their terms and accords with their policies” (Whitfield/Fraser 2009: 2). Partner countries’ ownership of policies and programs are central in order to have developing country

governments lead their policies and strategies. One of the indicators looks at the “extent to which partner countries have national development strategies with clear strategic priorities linked to a medium-term expenditure framework and reflected in annual budgets” (OECD 2011: 30). Here, the countries’ own development plan is requested for all actors to act accordingly to it. For the setting up of the development plan the involvement of all national stakeholders is demanded, where ownership can be seen as the “key pillar of a new aid paradigm” (Whitfield/Fraser 2009: 2).

It has to be remarked that the term ownership itself had already been used in the 1980s, meaning a lack of ownership by recipient countries by not showing enough commitment to implement reforms enforced by donors. This version can be understood as “ownership as commitment”, while ownership according to the Paris Declaration and the Aid Effectiveness Agenda lies in “ownership as control over the process and outcome of choosing policies” (Whitfield/Fraser 2009: 3). The concept is also strongly used by development NGOs and donors to talk about the “inclusiveness of the domestic process through which policies are decided, or the breadth and depth of consensus within recipient countries around the policy agenda” (ibid. 2009: 4). For this thesis, the concept understood as control over policies will be taken. Even though the first indicator of the declaration looks at national development strategies and its priorities, the involvement of other actors is central for the negotiation of this strategy. In this sense, Whitfield and Fraser regard ownership from the perspective of sovereignty and see it as “allowing space for domestic political processes: for struggles within recipient societies to define the national interest and for recipients to make their own policy choices and to draw their own lessons from their experiences, respecting that their own perceptions of their own problems and solutions are legitimate” (ibid. 2009: 14).

#### *2.2.1.2. Alignment*

“Donors base their overall support on partner countries’ national development strategies, institutions and procedures.” (OECD 2005/2008: 3)

“Donor countries align behind these objectives and use local systems.”  
(OECD Webpage 2012)

The principle of alignment refers to the provision of aid by donors that use partner countries’ own institutions and systems and is done in a way to include partner countries’ priorities. Because of parallel institutions, for example to implement projects, high transaction costs can occur and the sustainability of development efforts is at risk. When the alignment to partner countries’ priorities and systems is in place, aid can help strengthen capacity, enhance

accountability and add to the sustainability of institutions and thus aid (OECD 2011: 43). Here, budget support is seen as a tool to keep transaction costs low since parallel institutions are not supposed to be used but the country's own structures.

Country systems and procedures include “national arrangements and procedures for public financial management, accounting, auditing, procurement, monitoring and evaluation” (OECD 2011a: 45). This means that donors should give aid in ways that use the financial management procedures, processes and institutions of partner countries – and to not bypass them (ibid. 2011a: 48). When donors provide project aid, they usually set up their own structures or made the partners establish new ones. These are so called project implementation units, which are created to manage the implementation and administration of donor-funded projects and programs.

“These structures are often set up outside – and therefore in parallel with – existing country institutions and structures and can as a result, undermine efforts to strengthen the capacity of core government institutions, distort public sector staffing and salary levels, and reduce the degree of control and accountability exercised by partner governments in the implementation of aid-funded activities.” (ibid. 2011a: 55).

In some countries parallel project implementation units decreased because sector-wide approaches were introduced (ibid. 2011a: 56).

One point of alignment is aligning aid flows on national budgets since some benefits are interrelated with it, such as incentives for stronger budget processes, better alignment to country priorities, and greater accountability to legislatures and citizens (OECD 2011a: 48). In this context, aid through budget support is supposed to bring positive outcomes. Another area of alignment of aid programs is in drawing conditions from developing countries' own policies. “When donors impose conditions on the provision of aid that are not aligned with partner countries' priorities, these can undermine efforts to implement domestic policies and hinder effective prioritisation of activities” (OECD 2011a: 44). In general, there is a slow progress in using partner countries' systems. The reasons for donors are often more political than technical “and include fear of financial misuse and lack of faith in partner country systems” (OECD 2011: 52). The Policy paper outlines a few reasons for this. Fear, of financial misuse and losing control of development choices, is one point.

Moreover, not all donors agree on the quality of a system and not every system fits every donor. Another point is summarized best as follows:

“Using partner country PFM systems is often perceived to be the same thing as providing general budget support, and donors have not yet fully assessed and understood the range of ways in which aid provided through different modalities – including project aid – can make use of partner country systems” (ibid. 2011a: 52).

Budget support is one way in which donors can make use of a country’s PFM system, but when using budget support the execution differs. Some donors such as Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom provide big shares of their bilateral aid in the form of budget support (OECD 2011a: 52).

An important part of alignment is the untying of aid. “Aid is tied when donors place geographical restrictions on the sourcing of goods and services for aid-funded activities.” The tying of aid restricts the choices available to partner countries, creates risk for cost effectiveness and can also hinder ownership and alignment (OECD 2011a: 53).

### 2.2.1.3. Harmonisation


“Donors’ actions are more harmonised, transparent and collectively effective.”  
(OECD 2005/2008: 6)

“Donor countries coordinate, simplify procedures and share information to avoid duplication.”  
(OECD Webpage 2012)

The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness determined the multitude of donor approaches to providing and managing aid that led to ineffective and unsuccessful development results and a greater burden on partner countries that have to deal with a variety of policies and procedures. The Paris Declaration set up common arrangements and procedures that donors and partner countries agreed to follow in order to make the provision of aid easier. It is said that this principle mainly focuses on the work of donors but partner countries still can take part by guiding the donors (OECD 2011: 61).

In this sense, PBAs were seen as a way to ensure aid is provided in such a way that partner countries systems are used. “When donors and partners use PBAs, they typically agree that aid should fund activities within programmes defined by the recipient government or non-governmental organisation” (OECD 2011a: 63). Direct Budget Support represents one way to support program-based approaches. Still, the OECD states that “project-based aid – when it is designed and delivered appropriately – can also make an effective contribution” (OECD 2011a: 63). However, the global target of 66% of aid being PBAs was not met, but only 45%. Half of this was direct budget support (ibid. 2011a: 63).

**Figure 3: Proportion of aid provided in the context of program-based approaches (32 countries)**



Source: OECD 2011: 63

Another possibility is sector-wide approaches:

“A sector wide approach is a PBA at the sector level whereby donor funding supports a single, comprehensive sector or subsector policy and related programmes implemented under government leadership. SWApS have been financed very often through pooled financing among donors but can also include other modalities such as budget support or discrete funding through projects.”

SWApS are planned to lead to more accountability and domestic scrutiny. There are also concerns raised though, such as high transaction costs, as well as the complexity, the heavy dialogue, long negotiations and less frequent but larger and more intensive donor missions (OECD 2011: 64).

#### 2.2.1.4. Managing for results

“Managing resources and improving decision-making for results.”  
(OECD 2005/2008: 7)

“Developing countries and donors shift focus to development results and results get measured.” (OECD  
Webpage 2012)

“The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness is part of an international push for results that was initiated with the Millennium Summit in 2000, and included the adoption of a set of targets and indicators to measure progress in achieving the Millennium Development Goals” (OECD 2011: 85). The Declaration calls for stronger management for development results and wants donors and partners to work together. One indicator evaluates the extent to which partner countries have established “transparent and monitorable performance assessment

frameworks to assess progress against national and sectoral development strategies” (ibid. 2011a: 86). Uganda for example shows a setback in this area (ibid. 2011a: 87).

#### 2.2.1.5. *Mutual accountability*

“Donors and partners are accountable for development results.” (OECD 2005/2008: 8)

“Donors and partners are accountable for development results.” (OECD Webpage 2012)

The Declaration recognizes that for effectiveness, strength and balance of aid accountability mechanism are required (OECD 2011: 85). In this context, transparency plays an important role. Through mutual accountability, public support for national policies and development assistance is supposed to increase. Here partner countries’ commit to:

- “Strengthen as appropriate the parliamentary role in national development strategies and/or budgets.”
- “Reinforce participatory approaches by systematically involving a broad range of development partners when formulating and assessing progress in implementing national development strategies.” (OECD 2005/2008: 8)

*“Beyond its principles on effective aid, the Paris Declaration lays out a practical, action-oriented roadmap to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development. It puts in place a series of specific implementation measures and establishes a monitoring system to assess progress and ensure that donors and recipients hold each other accountable for their commitments.” (OECD Webpage 2012)*

#### 2.2.2. **Third High Level Forum**

However new and praised, the Paris Declaration has also become the center of critique. CSOs especially criticized the agreement as being primarily a government-to-government accord due to a lack of sufficient involvement of CSO. Moreover, CSOs were concerned about their technical nature failing to link aid processes with development goals (Kindornay 2011: 8). The Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra in 2008 (OECD Webpage 2012) resulted in the Accra Agenda of Action (AAA), which recognizes broader development goals and the lack of democracy until this time.

It proposes improvement in the areas of:

- Ownership: “Country ownership is key. Developing country governments will take stronger leadership of their own development policies, and will engage with their parliaments and citizens in shaping those policies.” (OECD 2005/2008: 15)
- Partnerships: “Together, all development actors will work in more inclusive partnerships so that all our efforts have greater impact on reducing poverty” (ibid. 2005/2008: 18) ; and

- Delivering results: “We will demonstrate that our actions translate into positive impacts on people’s lives. We will be accountable to each other and to our respective parliaments and governing bodies for these outcomes. [...] Therefore, we are reaffirming the commitments we made in the Paris Declaration and, in this Accra Agenda for Action, are agreeing on concrete and monitorable actions to accelerate progress to meet those commitments by 2010” (ibid. 2005/2008: 18).

Kindornay (2011: 9) summarizes the outcome of the AAA as follows:

- “It broadened the notion of ownership to emphasize the role of CSOs and parliamentarians.
- It recognized that aid is only one factor in achieving development.
- It stressed the importance of gender equality, respect for human rights, and environmental sustainability.
- It acknowledged the importance of assessing “to what extent aid effectiveness is improving and generating a greater development impact.”
- It referred to the importance of South–South cooperation, setting out alternative principles, and emphasizing non-interference, equality, and diversity.”

Societies were recognized as owners of development efforts together with the executive branches of government. “[D]eveloping country governments committed to work more closely with parliaments and local authorities in the development and implementation of national development policies and plans, and also to engage constructively with civil society” (OECD 2011: 29). Donors on the other hand are supposed to continue strengthening country ownership by increasing the capacity of all development actors. This means that they will work through representative bodies such as parliaments, civil society organisations, the media or political parties, research institutes and the private sector (ibid. 2011a: 29).

The concept of “inclusive ownership” was developed to allow countries to provide information on national policy processes and the extent of stakeholder participation at the country level (ibid. 2011a: 32). Nowadays, it is widely recognized that local governments play an important role in development processes. For this, the Accra Agenda for Action “committed central and local governments in partner countries to work closely in preparing, implementing and monitoring policies and plans” (ibid. 2011a: 34). In the case of Uganda, sub-national governments are officially involved through certain mechanisms to contribute to the creation of a national development or poverty reduction strategy. This is supposed to bring further ownership and better service delivery. “Some case study evidence suggests that where local planning processes are in place in developing countries, challenges to fuller and more effective citizen participation remain in many of them, and linkages between planning and



budgeting often need to be strengthened to ensure sustainability” (OECD 2011: 34). A closer look on the participation will be taken later.

Parliaments’ role is to focus on ensuring more participation and ownership. In fact, their role for the creation of development strategies is acknowledged. Donors state to try to strengthen the ability of all development actors (Ashoff 2010: 62). Usually, parliaments are responsible for “creating the legal framework for development activities, voting on strategies and plans, setting overall priorities, approving the national budget, and controlling the actions of the executive” and have “a constitutional mandate for domestic accountability and oversight of government expenditures, including those funded by aid” (OECD 2011: 34).

The topic of transparency and predictability of aid has already been an issue in the Paris Declaration. The AAA puts even more focus on it, the committed donors and partner countries. Parliamentary control is one important point here (Ashoff 2010: 62). Furthermore, it “emphasised the need for more transparency around the conditions attached to aid, and the need for continued efforts on the part of both donors and partner countries to strengthen accountability, including provision of timely information and efforts to address corruption” (OECD 2011: 73).

“Aid transparency has the potential to play an important role in reducing the incidence of corruption. Corruption undermines efforts to promote development and reduce poverty. It can distort decision making, access to public services, and markets. Widespread corruption undermines political processes and citizen participation and, in conflict-affected and fragile areas, it can amplify existing tensions. The Accra Agenda for Action commits both donors and developing countries to address corruption in adherence with mutually agreed principles, including those set out in the UN Convention against Corruption.” (OECD 2011: 79)

However, the AAA was also criticized for concentrating too much on technical questions about aid and did not bring improvements when looking at tied aid, the predictability of aid and responsibility in dealing with debt (Obrovsky 2008: 10).

### **2.2.3. Have the targets of the Paris Declaration been met?**

There are many critical views on the changes the Paris Declaration has or has not brought. The new practices, including the Paris Declaration, all rely on ownership. The declaration is “a model of change in the aid relationship that relies on recipients making the first move: recipients must improve their administrative systems, adopting international best practices, before they can expect donors to feel comfortable and to rely on national institutions and align

their programmes and projects to national strategies” (Fraser/Whitfield 2009: 88). Many criticize the fact that it is a diplomatic document with compromises. Donors that signed might not put their promises into action and are only rhetorically committed. It is also arguable if the behavior of donors has changed significantly or if the discourse is a response to the criticism of aid and its conditionality giving donors new legitimacy for their activities (Whitfield/Fraser 2009: 2, 5). While putting the focus on economic conditions starting in the 1980s, governance issues were attached during the 1990s and the years after 2000 marked new poverty and planning process conditions. For Fraser and Whitfield this shows the disturbance from the side of donors in economic and political matters of African countries that is now mixed with “an insistence on the part of donors that they do not want to be in the driving seat and that recipients should take the lead” (Fraser/ Whitfield 2009: 75). The authors also define two challenges concerning the Paris Declaration. First, in order to have country-led processes public finance and administration have to be set up and worked by recipient governments. However, donors do not believe in the existence or functioning of the systems and continue to link conditionality with aid. With this, recipient agency cannot occur or be established. Second, partner countries are supposed to decide and lead the way so that donors can pursue those ways, but donors do not always trust the countries and are not helpful in supporting their autonomy (Whitfield/Fraser 2009: 22). It has also been said that donors do not have enough reasons to comply with all the principles. The indicators are said to be not concrete enough and donors are individually not subjected to the targets. Furthermore, the new principles create a new mode of intervention. “Participation and joint planning present opportunities for donors to be involved more directly in the stuff of African politics” (Fraser/Whitfield 2009: 90). An IMF working paper in 2001 even acknowledges that full ownership might not be achieved alone by partner countries, but recognize the task of donors to maximize it through conditionality (corresponding with the idea of ownership as commitment) (ibid. 2009: 90f.).

This subchapter takes a look at the progress of aid effectiveness of Uganda until 2010 in regards to the Paris Declaration. Generally, only the first principle – ownership – has been met by all partner countries having implemented their own development strategies.

**Figure 4: Baselines and targets for 2010 for Uganda**

Principles	Indicators		2005	2007	2010 Actual	2010 Target
Ownership	1	Operational development strategies	B	B	B	B or A
Alignment	2a	Reliable public financial management (PFM) systems	4.0	4.0	3.5	4.5
	2b	Reliable procurement systems	N.A.	B	N.A.	No Target
	3	Aid flows are aligned on national priorities	79%	98%	96%	90%
	4	Strengthen capacity by co-ordinated support	42%	58%	76%	50%
	5a	Use of country PFM systems	60%	57%	66%	73%
	5b	Use of country procurement systems	54%	37%	43%	No Target
	6	Strengthen capacity by avoiding parallel PIUs	54%	55%	15%	18%
	7	Aid is more predictable	84%	74%	74%	92%
	8	Aid is untied	93%	90%	95%	More than 93%
Harmonisation	9	Use of common arrangements or procedures	50%	66%	49%	66%
	10a	Joint missions	17%	21%	24%	40%
	10b	Joint country analytic work	40%	54%	56%	66%
Managing for Results	11	Results-oriented frameworks	B	B	C	B or A
Mutual Accountability	12	Mutual accountability	N	N	Y	Y
		<i>Target has been met</i>				

Source: OECD 2012a: 2 (adapted by the author)

When it comes to ownership, the national development strategy has been in place for quite a long time in Uganda, including private sector, local government and civil society. This strategy is supposed to be the reference point for planning and budgeting activities. In Uganda this is the National Development Plan (NDP, 2010/11-2014/15), before known as Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP). Another achievement defined for alignment is the improvement of the “co-ordination of technical co-operation with national priorities and strategies” (OECD 2012a: 2). However, the decreasing wish of donors to use program-based approaches is seen as a challenge – what was previously seen as the way to make aid more effective. The Government of Uganda (GoU) agreed with this approach and states its wish to receive budget support constantly. Budget support modalities are seen as a way to harmonize the donor community, yet this principle still is not being met. When it comes to mechanisms for monitoring and managing for results, improvements have to be made (ibid. 2012a: 2).

For this thesis, the apparently successful ownership of development strategies and government’s preference for budget support are under closer examination. This is because ownership and the strong orientation on the budget demands that there be orientation towards country strategies and the involvement of many stakeholders, including civil society.

## 2.3. After the Paris Declaration: Fourth High Level Forum

The Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness took place in Busan from November 29 to December 01 in 2011 where the progress and challenges in making aid more effective have been discussed. Its goal was to “assess the achievement of the Paris Declaration targets and the commitments of the Accra Agenda for Action by the 2010 deadline” (Open Forum 2011a: 1). More than 3000 participants, including more than 100 ministers and heads of international organizations, took part. In fact, CSOs participated for the first time as a formal stakeholder group with 300 representatives coordinated through the BetterAid Platform and the Open Forum (Ellmers 2011; Kindornay 2011: 9). BetterAid focuses on vast issues of development effectiveness for reforming international cooperation and the Open Forum is a CSO led process that tries to specify principles for CSO development effectiveness and among that implications for CSO development practices as well as donor and government policies (Kindornay 2011: 9f.).

In fact, the Paris Declaration and the Accra Action Plan are not final, complete answers, but also reach to some limits. However, their relevance can be seen in the context of the Aid Effectiveness Agenda, trying to reach international development goals and linking them together (Ashoff 2010: 63).

### 2.3.1. Demands from Civil Society

From the HLF-4 the African civil society demanded the reinforcement and deepening of already made achievements and to be more open in including all development actors, especially the ones from the South. Furthermore, they want to see citizens at the center of all development programs and projects. The word **country ownership** and not government ownership of development policies is emphasized as the HLF-3 in Accra did with inclusive democratic ownership (Open Forum 2011a: 2). However, despite all commitments made, CSOs are in many cases confronted with instrumentalization (by donors and governments to implement their commitments), marginalization or oppression (BetterAid 2010: 7).

BetterAid and the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness created a document with requests and suggestions for development partners. They call them to:

1. “Fully evaluate and deepen the Paris and Accra commitments through reforms based on democratic ownership,
2. Strengthen development effectiveness through development cooperation practices that promote human rights standards and focus on the eradication of the causes of poverty and inequality,

3. Affirm and ensure the participation of the full diversity of CSOs as independent development actors in their own right,
4. Promote equitable and just development cooperation architecture.” (BetterAid & Open Forum 2011)

In more detail, they want citizens’ voices, their concerns and rights in the center of national development plans and actions for which strong governance institutions for participation and accountability are needed. Also, the vulnerable populations must be included in order to have democratic ownership. Development partners should actively work to show that the political space for civil society is reduced and oppose this trend. The use of country systems as the first option is emphasized as well as the increased use of program-based approaches which should be transparent and participated by all development actors. CSOs demand the ending of policy conditionality and the untying of all forms of aid. Instead, local and regional procurements should be prioritized since it is a prerequisite for making a development impact. CSOs wish aid to be more predictable and suggest to have fixed three or five year funding tranches. Also, in order to be able to sustain oneself, private sector participation in development programs, democratic ownership and the respect and support for internationally agreed upon development goals, sustainable development along with work and human rights standards are needed. Transparency is another key issue: for targets, work and outcome. Information on aid should be “comprehensive, timely, gender-disaggregated and comparable”, but also fully accessible to citizens in donor and partner countries (BetterAid & Open Forum 2011: 3-7). Therefore, the Istanbul Principles need to be acknowledged and put into practice. For this, minimum standards for government and donor policies, laws, regulations and practices for the environment in which CSOs work should be agreed on. For the Busan Compact at HLF-4, specific time-bound commitments and fundamental reforms are requested (ibid. 2011: 3-7).

BetterAid expected the HLF-4 to produce a “Soul Declaration”, which is vast and a framework that should be based on development effectiveness, rather than aid effectiveness, “which advances human rights, solidarity, equality, responsibility and mutual accountability”. Change is demanded in order to go beyond the predecessors (BetterAid 2010: 3). One of the demands concerns the creation of an environment for democratic ownership and participation. This also shows the importance that is put on CSOs, together with parliaments, the media and also the private sector to produce social, political and economic changes. “As the AAA recognized, CSOs are independent development actors in their own right [...] whose efforts complement those of governments and the private sector” and that should be supported in order to increase their contributions to development (ibid. 2010: 7).

### 2.3.2. Outcome

The HLF-4 resulted in several outcomes, one of the most important ones being the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation by donors, developing countries, CSOs, private sector representatives and others. Brazil, China and India also wished to use this agreement as a reference point for South-South co-operation. “The new global partnership for effective development co-operation will be supported by the OECD and United Nations Development Programme” (OECD Webpage 2012).

Other international agreements on development challenges set up in Busan were:

- The New Deal for International Engagement in Fragile States
- The Busan Joint Action Plan on Gender Equality and Development
- The Busan Action Plan for Statistics
- A New Consensus on Effective Institutions and Policies
- A joint statement on public private co-operation

According to Bodo Ellmers (2011) the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation is a “mixed bag” when it comes to what civil society was advocating for. For Richard Ssewakiryanga (2011a) it is “a modest-win, an interesting paradigm shift and a compromise-laden document”.

Progress is seen as strengthening commitments on democratic ownership with country systems are being used and aid is being untied. This is an important issue for building up capacities and ending aid dependency Also, China and other BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China) were slowly moving under the new partnership. China agreed in the end to participate but only under the condition that for South-South partners the basis must be voluntary. The big gain from this Forum can be seen in the high civil society participation and in the commitment to use country systems as a default approach and if not to at least state the reasons for non-use. “The new approach makes country systems the rule, and parallel implementation the exception” (Ellmers 2011).

Ssewakiryanga criticizes the language used in the Busan conference and also in the final document. For example, the title of the outcome document refers to effective development cooperation whereas the purpose of coming together was rather for development effectiveness. When this issue was raised by civil society, there was high resistance to change the text.

Moreover, the word “result” was the key word everyone spoke about, in showing results to tax payers, voters, poor people, donors, partner governments and parliaments. For Ssewakiryanga, results should be about people and processes. Especially since he deemed that the process was left out. Another important issue forgotten was risk. There was no such discussion on how the risks would be shared, for instance risks from a cancellation of grants (Ssewakiryanga 2011a).

For Ellmers “Busan fails to deliver a framework for effective and responsible private finance, and the future of the aid and development effectiveness process post-Busan is unclear, as the modalities of a follow-up and implementation process could not be agreed” (Ellmers 2011). The goal from donors to bring new actors under the umbrella was partly successful, but looking at the involvement of the private sector, one can see that they held an observing role without making any commitments. The second problem defined by Ellmers is that even though the “Busan Partnership Agreements contains much narrative in over 36 paragraphs, [there are] hardly any targets, timelines, indicators, action plans or any other features” to bring real change and action (ibid. 2011).

According to the OECD the HLF-4 “marked a turning point in international discussions on aid and development. It was clear from the agenda of the event, the associated programme of side events, and the principles and commitments agreed in the outcome document that this was a conference about development, not aid” (OECD Webpage 2012). This was in fact what many development actors suggested: to realize a shift from aid to development effectiveness.

The following chapter deals with the concept of development effectiveness: its definition, rhetorics, uses and some implications.

## **2.4. Development Effectiveness**

Especially around the Forum in Busan the call for development effectiveness has become louder. CSOs insist on a new agenda in Busan: they are asking for development effectiveness rather than seeing aid as the only issue leading to development (Kindornay 2011: 5). This demand is also portrayed in the document by the BetterAid Platform (2010), which claims that the promotion of development effectiveness is to guide international development cooperation. Also, the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD recognized the call by many actors to look at development effectiveness (Kindornay 2011: 5).

As mentioned earlier, the Paris Declaration represents a technical understanding of aid effectiveness whose focus lies on targets and direct results. A good definition for comparing the two terms is given by BetterAid and the Open Forum:

“Aid effectiveness relates to measures that improve the quality of the aid relationship, primarily focusing on the terms and conditions of the resource transfer itself. The Paris Declaration defined five principles that should guide official donors and developing country governments to improve the effectiveness of this resource transfer” (BetterAid & Open Forum 2011: 9)

When it comes to development effectiveness, there is no international consensus on what it means concretely and what implications it can have. In some cases, aid and development effectiveness are used interchangeably by actors; others though see development as a different concept to look beyond aid. The first point of view is - among others - portrayed by the Paris Declaration itself. Even though the definition of aid effectiveness focuses on technical aspects of aid delivery, reviewers propose that aid is development oriented. The Asian Development Bank refers “to the effectiveness of aid in development” (Kindornay 2011: 10). The World Bank and the United Nations Development Group also talk about development effectiveness; however at the same time they are using the principles and languages of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. For example, among the guidelines for UN country teams are national ownership and maximizing effectiveness and accountability (ibid. 2011: 10). One example for the second perspective is the BetterAid Platform. For them, aid effectiveness commitments are crucial, but so far reforms were insufficient due to the focus on aid efficiency (BetterAid 2010: 3).

Development effectiveness is defined as follows:

“Development effectiveness is about the impact of development actors’ actions on the lives of poor and marginalized populations. Development effectiveness promotes sustainable change that addresses the root causes as well as the symptoms of poverty, inequality, marginalization and injustice. [...] Development effectiveness requires significant changes in international global governance structures at all levels, including trade, financial markets, foreign direct investment and debt. In practical terms, it means empowering the poor and respecting, protecting and fulfilling international human rights standards.” (BetterAid 2010: 4).

The essence of this approach lies in making poor and marginalized people central actors and owners of development. It “requires legal frameworks and mechanisms that provide for freedom of association, access to information, the right of citizens to organize and participate in national decision-making and a free and open media” (BetterAid 2010: 7).



To take a more analytical and scientific perspective on how to define development effectiveness, the North-South Institute in Canada has defined four categories on how development effectiveness can be conceptualized: organizational effectiveness, coherence or coordination, development outcomes from aid, and overall development outcomes. “These categories are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive, and some development actors have understandings that overlap categories” (Kindornay 2011: 10).

The next chapters give more information on the conceptualization of development effectiveness according to Kindornay (2011), which is based on a study carried out in 2009 by Kindornay and Morton. This helps to capture the ongoing debates and trends.

#### **2.4.1. Organizational Effectiveness**

Development effectiveness, understood as organizational effectiveness, is the most similar to the current aid effectiveness framework. It resembles widely the OECD/DAC definition: “Aid agencies, especially multilaterals, frequently view development effectiveness from the supply side, in terms of the effectiveness of their own policies and programs or how well they are achieving stated organizational objectives and goals”. It does not include external factors like who and how development priorities were set up, roles of other development actors, or the impact of non-aid areas (Kindornay 2011: 11f.).

For CSOs this understanding of development effectiveness does not respond to their objective – to measure development effectiveness against actual outcomes (e.g. gender equality, human rights etc.). However, this definition is still recognized as being an important element of aid effectiveness since agencies need to show their ability to meet objectives and work efficiently and effectively (ibid. 2011: 12f.).

#### **2.4.2. Policy Coherence**

Policy coherence for development is not a new idea. This concept recognizes non-aid policies affecting development processes and thus sees the need for policy coherence across several areas, for example trade investment, immigration, security etc. Policy coherence led to a whole-of-government approaches or coherence across partner-country policies. An example to secure coherence across policies within partner countries are PRSP and regional and national development plans. Bilateral donors who implemented this point of view acknowledge that “aid is not the only factor affecting development” (Kindornay 2011: 13, 15).

This has been tried since the early 1990s (by OECD/DAC), but there is great variation among members' political commitments – in some areas donors are more and in others less willing “to ensure development friendly policies in other areas” (ibid 2011: 15). For donors to be coherent more commitments for policy harmonization across all sectors are needed (ibid. 2011: 15).

The combination of aid and non-aid methods is shown in development cooperation efforts of non-DAC donors, such as on the China-Africa Ministerial Conference in 2000 where leaders agreed on a South-South cooperation program that was based on equality and mutual benefit, also including trade, investment, debt relief, tourism, migration, health, education and human resources. All those areas were involved for cooperation and development (ibid. 2011: 13).

The claims and the discourse around the HLF-4 can be defined as development effectiveness in the sense of coherence. It was stated by OECD/DAC that policy coherence for development may be a critical part of the development effectiveness agenda (ibid. 2011: 14). Also it was recognized that aid is one tool among many others. In particular, BetterAid demanded from governments to “enhance policy coherence for development from the international to the national level” (BetterAid 2010: 7).

One point interesting to mention when it comes to coherence for development is the question of whether private-sector actors should be subject to the same obligations like donors. Private actors themselves play a crucial role for development outcomes and the private sector itself is under rising public scrutiny and pressure. When giving the responsibility mainly to states, coherence could imply that “donors should play a greater role in supporting and strengthening the ability of partner-country governments to hold private-sector actors [...] to minimum standards of working conditions, human rights, gender equality, environmental protection etc.” (Kindornay 2011: 16).

Looking at development effectiveness as policy coherence, it is clear that it depends on the political will of governments. Also, it represents a tool that does not address CSO critiques of the aid effectiveness agenda (concerning the limited connection of efficient aid and development outcomes) (ibid. 2011: 17).

### **2.4.3. Development Outcomes from Aid**

Development effectiveness, being viewed as development outcomes from aid, measures the outcomes in relation to aid interventions. “It looks specifically at outcomes, rather than at policy areas or the efficiency with which each aid dollar is spent” (Kindornay 2011: 18). This concept can be seen as complementary to aid effectiveness. This is an approach represented by organizations such as the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the OECD/DAC and CSOs. UNIFEM puts gender equality as an important outcome to reach. The OECD/DAC also considers human rights, gender equality and environmental sustainability as important for development effectiveness, and the CSOs set up value-based principles as heard before by the Open Forum and BetterAid Platform (ibid. 2011: 18).

A way to measure development outcomes are Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which are eight goals set up to be achieved by 2015 and are addressed by actors in aid:

1. End Poverty and Hunger
2. Universal Education
3. Gender Equality
4. Child Health
5. maternal Health
6. Combat HIV/AIDS
7. Environmental Sustainability
8. Global Partnership

(United Nations Website 2010)

Other indicators and indices at international and national levels are economic growth and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index. The implications of such an approach include the assessments of aid results in regard to overall development outcomes and not only in the efficient delivery of aid (Kindornay 2011: 19f.).

The challenge of this approach is certainly the difficulty to attribute development outcomes to aid interventions. It needs a new framework to assess which aid efforts produced what actual development outcomes. “It remains unclear how aid actors might be held accountable for development outcomes from aid (outside existing mechanisms under the Paris process) when attribution is nearly impossible” (ibid. 2011: 20).

#### **2.4.4. Overall Development Outcomes**

This concept of development effectiveness overlaps with the others and sees development effectiveness as a “measure of the overall development process and outcomes” (Kindornay 2011: 20). The emphasis is not put on aid but focuses on the country level, looking at all factors relevant for the development process. The overall development outcome cannot be directly attributed to certain activities by an actor. “Development outcomes result from national and international forces, including aid interventions by various actors, the availability of domestic resources, good governance, global commodity prices, regional stability, and many other determinants” (ibid. 2011: 20). This approach acknowledges country specific context and a theory that there is no one-size-fits-all set of policies.


CSOs define development effectiveness “as rooted in a notion of development that is defined by human rights, decent work, gender equality and women’s rights, environmental sustainability, inclusive democratic power sharing, mutual accountability, and coherent national and global governance” (BetterAid 2010: 2f. in Kindornay 2011: 21). Issues such as human rights, social justice, empowerment, solidarity and sovereignty are emphasized in this concept. Also, many partner-country representatives saw the “human factor” as relevant in reaching development results (Kindornay 2011: 22).

The challenge will lie in prioritizing the most important areas, since not all can be included. There is not only one size or one solution and policy frameworks need to allow more flexibility. Looking at the country level “inclusive participation in political decision-making processes should help governments, including donors, to identify and prioritize the development outcomes that matter to marginalized and affected groups” (ibid. 2011: 23). The roles of CSOs and parliamentarians have especially been acknowledged in this. A broad participation for the definition of national development goals is essential (ibid. 2011: 23).

The accountability of development effectiveness is supposed to lie with all actors: governments, international agencies, CSOs and businesses. It is not clear how the framework for this should look like but democratic ownership, expanded inclusion and participation as demanded by CSOs are needed (ibid. 2011: 21, 24).

**Figure 5: The development effectiveness continuum**

**Graphical summary of all four concepts of development effectiveness**



Source: Kindornay 2011: 11

### **3. Budget Support**

The following chapter describes budget support in order to give an insight into the process and working of this tool, which will help to understand the budget priorities and processes on a country level and the participation issues of other stakeholders, such as civil society, in the following steps.

#### **3.1. Context & Definition**

As mentioned earlier budget support is one tool designed to make aid more effective since critiques on projects were rising through supporting state budget and its impact. Project support is said to have only locally restricted effects, focus on donor priorities and not the partner countries, to cause high transaction costs, to not generate ownership of the partner, to neglect structural and systematic problems, to build parallel structures and to overload local administrations. It has been criticized that with isolated projects no relevant impact can occur (Hemmer 2010: 1f., Leiderer 2010: 230).

Budget support belongs to the New Aid Modalities and are supposed to accomplish the promises and principles of the aid effectiveness agenda (European Commission 2011: 9f.) and program aid (more specifically financial program aid). This can be seen as alternative to structural adjustment programs' conditionalities and contrary to traditional project approach. Its goal is to increase financial means for sectors important for poverty reduction (Küblböck/Langthaler/Six 2006: 6). The Paris Declaration set the goal to increase program aid by 2010 up to 66% (Gerster 2006: 50).

Program aid is a central element in the Aid Effectiveness Agenda with one focus lying on the ownership of transparent and clear budgets of partner countries. The scale for more effective aid is specifically seen in "[s]trengthening partner countries' national development strategies and associated operational frameworks (e.g. planning, budget, and performance assessment frameworks)" (OECD 2005/2008: 1). Program based approaches are described in the Paris declaration as having following features:


- "a leadership by the host country or organisation,
- a single comprehensive programme and budget framework,
- a formalised process of donor co-ordination and harmonisation of donor procedures [...],
- efforts to increase the use of local systems for programme design and implementation, financial management, monitoring and evaluation." (OECD 2005/2008: 11)

Sector wide approaches, basket funding, and also sector and general budget support belong to PBAs (Leiderer 2010: 229).

High hopes are connected with budget support since policy dialogue has to happen between donors and partners, national reform/development strategies are supported, partner countries' own systems are used and disbursements are made with conditions agreed on before together with the countries. This aims at strengthening ownership, improving national household processes and intensifying political dialogue – between donors and partner countries, but also among donor countries (ibid. 2010: 230f.) Budget Support can be divided into General Budget Support and Sector Budget Support – as can be seen on the graph. In general, it means

“the transfer of financial resources of an external financing agency to the National Treasury of a partner country, following the respect by the latter of agreed conditions for payment. The financial resources thus received are part of the global resources of the partner country, and consequently used in accordance with the public financial management system of the partner country” (AIDCO/DEV/RELEX 2007: 10).

**Figure 6: Types of Program Aid**




Source: Hammond 2006: 94

Budget support is not only a financial issue. A package comes with it, consisting of policy dialogue, results in orientation and monitoring, and efforts to harmonize (European Commission 2011: 9). Conditions of cooperation are set up and reform improvements discussed (Gerster 2006: 48). It is therefore a highly political matter and not viewed enough as such (Interview Wipfel 2012).

As the figure below shows, program based support and especially budget support increased dramatically after the mid of the 2000s. This can be drawn back to the Paris Declaration and its emphasis on program based approaches. However, in 2010 a drop can be recognized due to discussions of the risks and challenges of budget support and due to the fact that the results were not what they expected to achieve. In Uganda, the downfall could be observed in 2007, whereas in 2010 numbers go up again.

**Figure 7: Disbursements of Programme Based Support from All Donors 2002-2010**



Source: OECD QWIDS (Query Wizard for International Development Statistics)

According to statistics, numerous countries and institutions are giving budget support. As the list beneath shows, the World Bank is by far the biggest donor in budget support. Others like the EU institutions, the Asian Development Bank and Japan rank also very high. Other big distributors worth mentioning are the United Nations, United Kingdom, Inter American Development Bank, United States, the African Development Bank and France, followed by Canada, Denmark, Germany, IMF, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.



**Figure 8: Aid given as budget support**

	Number of countries 2010	Budget Support (in million USD)
African Dev. Bank	35	663
Asian Dev. Bank	20	1134
Australia	18	75
Austria	9	8
Belgium	20	30
Canada	36	231
Denmark	24	211
EU Institutions	75	1837
Finland	17	45
France	46	625
GAVI alliance	46	7
Germany	59	241
Global Fund	64	5
IFAD	44	20
IMF	10	183
InterAmer.Dev.Bank	10	700
Ireland	14	64
Italy	28	38
Japan	70	1170
Netherlands	33	260
New Zealand	14	13
Norway	20	143
Portugal	5	5
Spain	33	61
Sweden	27	150
Switzerland	35	34
United Kingdom	34	811
United Nations	77	858
United States	61	659
World Bank	76	6387
<b>Total</b>		<b>16891</b>

Source: OECD 2011: 157 (adapted by the author)

The evaluation of the progress of the Paris Declaration defines budget support as a tool to keep transaction costs low since parallel institutions are not supposed to be used, but rather the country's own structures. Aid flows are supposed to be aligned on national budgets as mentioned before. For Koeberle and Stavreski (2006: 7) key characteristics of budget support include:

- “channeling of donor funds to a partner country using its own allocation, procurement, and accounting systems [so to strengthen Public Financial Management systems in a country is of interest (AGEZ/KOO/EU-Plattform 2005: 11)];
- support for a recipient country's own development programs [...];

- policy content, performance assessment, and an accountability framework that focus on policy measures and benchmarks related to overall budget and policy priorities, as set out in the country's own poverty reduction strategy and medium-term expenditure framework;
- provision at regular intervals, ideally in alignment with the country's annual budget cycle; and
- agreement on general budget priorities and expenditures, so that in principle there is no need to earmark funds for specific items".

The Asia-Pacific Aid Effectiveness Portal describes budget support very aptly:

"The theory behind budget support is that, by increasing the amount of discretionary funding available for programming through the budget, it will create incentives for partner countries to improve their planning and budgeting systems as a whole. While giving up control over how their individual funds are allocated, budget support donors hope to gain a 'seat at the table' in the dialogue on development policy and resource allocation, and a more influential position to help strengthen systems. Budget support operations are therefore typically accompanied by policy dialogue and related capacity-development programmes, particularly in public financial management." (Asia-Pacific Aid Effectiveness Portal Website 2009)

However, budget support does not mean that project support will totally lose its role. This can be led back to the fact that central preconditions for budget support are not given in every country. Countries wishing to receive budget support have to demonstrate democracy, human rights and legal regulations. Since state structures are supposed to be strengthened through budget support, other actors like the financial ministry are needed (Gerster 2006: 51). "Democratic budgeting is a crucial precondition for the new aid mechanisms" (Eberlei 2009: 21). Four essentials should already be established for good governance: ownership, transparency of government actions, accountability and institutionalized opportunities for parliament and civil society participation. On the one hand those elements are already needed for budget support to be effective, on the other hand it is also supposed to strengthen good governance and to improve it (ibid. 2009: 21f.).

Budget Support is the appropriate finance instrument depending on several factors like institutional capacities, policy formulation and implementation - also in regards to the finance management - as well as the correspondence of priorities between donor and partner country (Küblböck/Langthaler/Six 2006: 10).

### **3.2. Forms of Budget Support**

Budget Support can either be provided as General or Sector Budget Support. According to the foreign currency regime of the recipient country, budget support can be direct or indirect.

There are also certain disbursement methods defined in the guidelines by the European Commission: general and specific conditions, fixed and/or variable tranches as well as floating and non-floating conditions (European Commission 2011). Those notions will be described in more detail in order to have an overview of the language used when it comes to budget support.

### **3.2.1. General and Sector Budget Support**

General Budget Support (GBS) is a transfer to the national treasury in order to support a national development policy or strategy whereas Sector Budget Support (SBS) gives support to a sector programme policy and strategy. The objectives tend to differ in the scope of the transfer. GBS for example would put its emphasis on supporting an agreement or the PRSP of the country whereas the SBS would support a sector program like education or in the case of Austria water (AIDCO/DEV/RELEX 2007: 13f.). In the late 1990s a new rationale for general budget support emerged which was connected to poverty reduction strategies. It is called “new” or “Partnership” GBS (Lister a.o. 2006: 1).

### **3.2.2. Direct and Indirect Budget Support**

Direct and Indirect Budget Support refer to the transfer of foreign currency to the recipient country. The foreign currency regime of the partner country determines the notion direct or indirect. It is called Direct Budget Support “[w]hen the domestic currency equivalent of the foreign currency transfer is generated or created directly through the usual channels of the banking system” (AIDCO/DEV/RELEX 2007: 15). In this case, the Central Bank credits the equivalent amount of domestic currency in the partner government’s National Treasury account; the domestic currency is convertible. Indirect Budget Support means that “domestic currency equivalent of the foreign currency transfer is generated or created indirectly outside the usual channels of the banking system” (ibid. 2007: 15). The foreign exchange is converted into a domestic currency “through the sale of foreign exchange on a foreign exchange auction, or through allocations of foreign exchange through a general or sectoral import programme, or through the sale of aid in kind, or the use of a currency facility” (ibid. 2007: 16).

### **3.2.3. General and Specific conditions for disbursements**

General Budget Support is disbursed after assurance that conditions for payment are fulfilled. General conditions are valid for all tranches and are related to eligibility criteria for receiving GBS: the existence of a national development or reform policy and strategy, stability-oriented macroeconomic policy, public financial management needs to be relevant. Specific conditions

are related to individual tranches – fixed or variable. These conditions are linked to performance criteria and indicators, thus being result/outcome orientated (AIDCO/DEV/RELEX 2007: 16).

#### **3.2.4. Fixed and Variable Tranches**

As written before, budget support is disbursed via tranches. Fixed tranches have a fixed value that is agreed upon before in the Financing Agreement. If all conditions are fulfilled they are given out fully or not at all; partial disbursement is not an option. Variable tranches on the other hand can be given fully or partly. A maximum value is agreed upon and is dependent on the performance achieved to specific targets or criteria (as well as the general conditions being met) (AIDCO/DEV/RELEX 2007: 17; Küblböck/Langthaler/Six 2006: 10f.). The combined system of fixed and variable tranches is said to open new space for collaboration by being more flexible (Küblböck/Langthaler/Six 2006: 3).

#### **3.2.5. Floating and Non-Floating Tranches**

A floating tranche is when there is no fixed date for having to meet the disbursement condition; otherwise the transfer is being stopped. A non-floating tranche is when the date by which the condition or conditions have to be met cannot vary. “[I]f the disbursement condition is not met by this date, the partner country will, in principle, be ineligible for support” (AIDCO/DEV/RELEX 2007: 17f.).

### **3.3. Expectations and Concerns**

The guidelines set up by AIDCO/DEV/RELEX highlight the potential benefits of budget support as a financing modality, stating that the number of benefits depend on the country context. The list is very long, including:

- increased ownership,
- a more stable macroeconomic framework because budget support provides resources to the budget and the balance of payments,
- a better framework of public policy and public expenditure,
- higher potential for overall impact because all areas are worth and needed to be looked at (instead of “islands of perfection),
- increased coherence,
- lower transaction costs by not having parallel project and reporting arrangement and project management units,

- greater harmonisation of donor practices and alignment with government procedures because budget support focuses on national or sectoral policies,
- improved capacity development due to the fact that budget support represents an incentive for countries to develop their own structures and procedures,
- improved domestic accountability because funds flow through the government accounts and budget and the government is accountable internally to parliament, taxpayers and externally to donors,
- and increased efficiency and sustainability (AIDCO/DEV/RELEX 2007: 18f.; Koeberle/Stavreski 2006: 8).

The main argument found in many papers is that budget support brings government ownership of development policies and better donor coordination (thus harmonization and alignment happening) (Renzio 2006a: 629; IDD and Associates 2006: S1). The predictability of funding is also mentioned several times (IDD and Associates 2006: S1; Koeberle/Stavreski 2006: 8) as well as the increase of pro-poor expenditure. Moreover, it is supposed to have the potential to strengthen the budget process (Renzio 2006a: 631).

Nevertheless, many critical points exist. Fraser and Whitfield come to the conclusion that in general the impact on the power balance between donors and recipients may not be very big. The evaluation on general budget support showed that changes have been more significant on the side of donors than of the recipient countries. Donor priorities still rank very high according to the authors and they are implemented through conditionality, negotiations and influence (Fraser/Whitfield 2009: 89). In one interview accountability was mentioned. While big importance is laid on professional finance administration and control of the household for accountability from the government towards donors, local or domestic accountability is not being pushed. For example, one interviewed person stated that further education has rarely been offered (Interview Schmidjell 2012).

Moreover, many points expressed before demonstrate a very technical point of view and lack the political perspective. Carrying out budget support means that cooperation and conditions need to be set up with other donors. Previous experiences show deficits and weaknesses of budget support. Even though PRSP are needed as a general condition for budget support, donors sometimes barely orientate themselves along those by pushing their own priorities. Furthermore, there are different decentralization levels among partner countries and a lack of

capacities. Budget support leads to a more direct access from outside the budget leading to the question of power relations between donor and recipients. The harmonization of donors showed that the reduction of transaction costs could not have been fulfilled since the agenda of donors differs widely. The advantage of more predictability of aid could not be achieved due to short-time donor approvals or cut-off of budget support (Küblböck/Langthaler/Six 2006: 3).

As a result, challenges of budget support were defined. One challenge is related to the need of adopting the conditions of the partner country. Moreover, risk exists because of only concentrating on “good performers” and leaving other states out. The focus needs to be put on those as well. The political dimension of budget support makes it volatile to crises and changes. Due to the fact that donors can stop their tranches any time, the danger exists that budget support is used as a political regulative in the case of other opinions. Political risk in general brings vulnerability to GBS, causing the role of civil society and parliaments to be under concern since they were reduced to control and monitoring. However, critical points of view and plurality of opinions are necessary preconditions for overall development goals. Local initiatives and civil society groups and organizations need to be supported in order to get involved (AGEZ/KOO/EU-Plattform 2005: 6; Renzio 2006a: 631; Küblböck/Langthaler/Six 2006: 4). In addition, the actual correlation of budget support and improvements on the ground are not as easily seen or rarely possible at all (Interview Wipfel 2012).

Also Kühhas (2007: 18) remarks that civil society is barely active in budget support strategies or implementations – even though an active and informed civil society is seen as a precondition to control public households. In order to transfer control to local structures and the local civil society, access to information and functioning democratic structures are needed. NGOs are not supposed to only fulfill instructions from the government but to be involved in the processes (AGEZ/KOO/EU-Plattform 2005: 12). Kühhas also mentions the lack of participation in PRSP processes. While the drafting is done by including more stakeholders (such as in Uganda, Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania), they are not recognized in the realization phase. Budget support represents a risk for civil society groups of partner countries to be excluded because of the strongly formalized and exclusive dialogue between partner and

donor countries about the household (Kühhas 2007: 18)<sup>4</sup>. The increase of local accountability can furthermore only work in states with democratic basic rights like free opinion. Next to budget support, the capacities of parliament and the competence of civil society need to be strengthened (AGEZ/KOO/EU-Plattform 2005: 13). In addition, donors are very often not capable of recognizing that the political systems of countries are not compatible with participatory processes and transparent administrative practices they may have in mind (Renzio 2006a: 632).

Another concern addresses the risk that other areas, such as the financial ministry, decide the agenda. The focus on public financial management and strengthening of its structures creates a lot of dialogue and exchange in this area (AGEZ/KOO/EU-Plattform 2005: 6). This can overload the capacity of the ministry of finance. This points out other weaknesses namely fiduciary risk in countries with weak financial management systems, volatility of aid when country performance is poor and increased transaction costs (Koeberle/Stavreski 2006: 8). Overall, this shows the lack of predictability of aid and processes, which comes from the many risks just mentioned (Renzio 2006a: 632). Instead of improving the predictability of aid the opposite happened because donors have the possibility to stop disbursements and thus create a big hole for partner countries. Furthermore, due to the need to strengthen the financial management for introducing budget support, in her interview Wipfel criticized the strong cooperation that exists with the ministry of finance. She sees a lot of work going on among donors and between donors and partner government, and shows that very often time and capacity is missing in order to engage with civil society (Interview Wipfel 2012).

While some authors propose the use of budget support with other modalities, especially before implementing it in order to strengthen a country's capacities (see Hemmer 2010 and Interview Wipfel 2012), others argue GBS has been undermined by not fulfilling a corresponding reduction in the use of other aid modalities (see Renzio 2006a: 634).

In spite of all disadvantages, Wipfel describes budget support as a good intermediate stage in order to build up trust from the side of the population in the government and finance structures, with the goal that countries become independent from foreign aid and have enough income generated from their own activities. In this context, however, accountability towards the parliament and one's own civil society needs to be in place (Interview Wipfel 2012).

---

<sup>4</sup> Malawi was mentioned as a positive example for parliament and NGOs working together in order to reach participation of the civil society when setting up the budget (Kühhas 2007: 18).

### 3.4. Basis: Poverty Reduction Strategy

Especially in the second half of the 1990s budget support's focus was put on poverty reduction (Kühhas 2007: 8). Budget Support is connected to the Poverty Reduction Strategy approach since poverty reduction strategy papers formulated by the recipient countries are the basis for paying out budget support. Ideally the disbursement of budget support orientates itself by the annual cycle of the Annual Performance Reviews and to the national planning and budget processes (Küblböck/Langthaler/Six 2006: 6). General Budget Support is usually accompanied by Joint Financing Agreements which address the partner country's development strategy, very often being the PRSP (Kühhas 2007: 14).

The PRSP approach was initiated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in 1999. This showed acknowledgement to ownership and the need to focus on poverty reduction in collaboration with the civil society. They are supposed to link national actions, donor support and development outcomes to achieve the MDGs.

“Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) are prepared by the member countries through a participatory process involving domestic stakeholders as well as eng development partners, including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Updated every three years with annual progress reports, PRSPs describe the country's macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programs over a three year or longer horizon to promote broad-based growth and reduce poverty, as well as associated eng financing needs and major sources of financing.” (IMF Website 2012)

The core principles of the PRSP are following:

- **“country-driven**, promoting national ownership of strategies through broad-based participation of civil society;
- **result-oriented** and focused on outcomes that will benefit the poor;
- **comprehensive** in recognizing the multidimensional nature of poverty;
- **partnership-oriented**, involving coordinated participation of development partners (government, domestic stakeholders, and external donors); and
- based on a **long-term perspective** for poverty reduction” (IMF Website 2012).

According to Küblböck, Langthaler and Six (2006: 12), studies show that there is a gap between theory and reality of ownership of PRSP. They seem to be a very donor driven instrument since PRS processes are not established in institutions in most of the countries. Therefore, a closer look needs to be taken on the national development strategies of Uganda. For the harmonization of aid, the relationship with donors has become part of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan of Uganda in 2000, setting up principles between donors and the



government (the first two development strategies of Uganda were called Poverty Eradication Action Plans, PEAP, before changing in 2010 to National Development Plan, NDP). “At the time, these were unique in Sub-Saharan Africa in guiding donor behavior and support, in steering donor-government cooperation, and in establishing the importance of budget support [...] for increasing the effectiveness of aid” (Republic of Uganda 2005: vi). As a next step the Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (UJAS) was set up. UJAS’ partners were also involved in the revision of the PEAP before it was finally issued in 2004. Eight development partners joined the Joint Assistance Strategy: African Development Bank, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, the World Bank Group (Austria joined in January 2006) emphasizing the need to enforce the PEAP of the country in order to fulfill the MDGs. This caused collaboration among development partners and the government in order the focus on results and outcomes. Special areas were addressed, such as the budget process and public sector management, private sector and economic growth, governance, outcomes in education and health and the resolution of the conflict in the North, ensuring that the development of this region is of particular importance. Four main ways were set up to finance the implementation of the PEAP: “direct budget and project support to the government, support to the programs of civil society organizations, assistance to the private sector, and support channeled through U.N. agencies” (Republic of Uganda 2005: vii, x).

When talking about budget support, the partner countries’ budget framework and budget process, the ownership of its goals and strategies come to the center of arguments. While budget support emerged in the debate of aid effectiveness supposedly to bring alignment, harmonization and ownership, it is also a question of development effectiveness since the basis are the development plans of the country, in which national stakeholders should also be involved. Therefore, after giving an insight into civil society, aid and aid effectiveness, the next chapter deals with NGOs and the importance of budgets before the following section of the thesis takes a look at Uganda and the debate on the issues.

### **3.5. NGOs and Budgets**

The past years have shown big changes in public budget processes for developing countries. “Until recently the budgetary process was viewed as the exclusive preserve of policy-makers and administrators and treated as a technical matter for expert consideration.” (Robinson 2006: 2). This has greatly changed as the roles and functions of civil society and NGOs have shown.

In fact, their participation is demanded and their space has been widened in the sense that participation is seen as necessary for a democratic state and a functioning nation - even though this means a change in roles and can lead to a conflictive relationship with the state. The big push of program aid modalities means an increased use of country systems and procedures where budget processes become more important for the spending of aid resources and for delivering development outcomes. Public Financial Management systems have become the focus of donors to channel aid through national budgets (Renzio 2006b: 1). This means that – due to sector wide approaches, basket funding and budget support, financial resources for NGO programs are reduced (Interview Grosinger 2012). For budget work, it is important to consider the 1990s where many non-governmental initiatives were launched in order to strengthen citizen engagement in processes of budget analysis and public expenditure management for democratization and accountability (European Commission 2011: 39). In fact, NGOs are not invited to all events concerning budget support but rather country representatives are present (Interview Grosinger 2012). This is a pity since NGOs have professionalized and are gaining in expertise on budgets, planning processes and advocacy (Interview Klatzer 2012). Michel argues that budget support strengthens national parliaments and civil society. This is because budget support enters the national budget and is therefore under discussion for decision-making. Accountability to civil society and legislature by improving public finance management is supposed to increase. Furthermore, there exists the demand of civil society and parliaments to directly participate in procedures of performance-assessment and joint reviews for the framework of budget support (Michel 2008: 29). Robinson sees that civil society organizations have gained the skills and capability to get involved in the budget issues. “[D]emocracy and good governance agenda has focused attention on accountability, transparency and participation as desirable attributes of effective states, reflecting the fact that political imperatives fundamentally shape budget priorities and budget outcomes” (Robinson 2006: 3).

The chapter on civil society and NGOs in development dealt with the increased political role of NGOs and their contribution to democracy and governance. Also, for the focus on the budget of a partner country, civil society is needed to participate and in many cases gets support in order to control the expenses of the government. This is desired because in order for organizations to act, to pressure and to demand accountability, they need to be strong enough. This is especially valid where partner countries receive budget support to strengthen the state (AGEZ/KOO/EU-Plattform 2005: 29f., 44).

”Civil society involvement in budget policies and processes is a relatively new phenomenon, stemming from an emerging international consensus on the need for more transparent and inclusive budgeting processes, and for more civil society participation in development policy in general.” (Renzio 2006b: 11)

In order to enforce government accountability, budget analysis and budget advocacy are areas of growing activity by civil society. “Aid donors believe that independent budget work can strengthen the efficiency of the budget process and improve the pro-poor orientation of budget priorities” (Robinson 2006: 8, 10).

Opportunities for activities are seen in strengthening local civil society initiatives for political dialogue and monitoring. Projects are needed though to enforce capacities and competences of parliaments and representatives, whereas advocacy is supposed to bring rights and expression of the needs of marginalized groups (AGEZ/KOO/EU-Plattform 2005: 29).

“Enhancing the accountability of decision-makers is a fundamental objective of budget work; improving the transparency of the decision-making process is an equally important goal, centering on who governments formulate priorities and turn these into actions in the form of expenditure allocations.” (Robinson 2006: 12)

The scope of accountability and significance of civil society budget initiatives will be analyzed in the Ugandan context in the chapter of civil society budget actors in Uganda.

Very often NGOs do not feel involved enough in the planning of budget priorities and do not see enough participation on a local level. Among other actors the question if a government is even capable of administering budget support exists, which is where civil society comes into the picture. It is important to mention that budget support in fact means a loss of resources for NGOs – in the North and the South – since they cannot get money from donors or states in the same way. Due to smaller budgets they might be in competition with each other for support (AGEZ/KOO/EU-Plattform 2005: 29f., 32).

In fact, the European Commission analyzed the topic of extending budget support to civil society themselves. An employee in the governance section defined the challenge in “balancing the provision of support to government while also supporting civil society” (capacity4dev Website 2012). This is especially important since money from donors experiences a change of channel and partner country’s public finance systems are very often weak, which means that the chances for civil society actors to get funding through those systems are small (European Commission 2011: 64).

For democratic budgeting Eberlei demands three things: to strengthen the role of parliaments (which are often weak institutions and suppressed by the power structures of the country), to include civil society actors (by improving their situation restricted by legislation and uncertain resources) and to provide a linkage between civil society and legislatures (Eberlei 2009: 23f.).

“Parliaments are (or should be) the constitutionally based and democratically legitimized forum for domestic debates. Civil societies can initiate ‘communicative power’ (German social scientist Jürgen Habermas) to inspire, influence or even publicly criticize those who are in charge of the legal ‘administrative power’. Both sides need – and can benefit from each other” (Eberlei 2009: 23f.).

Many budgeting initiatives targeted the inclusion of poverty and gender elements of public expenditures as well as the increase of government accountability. “Budget analysis and budget advocacy are now widely regarded as a key component of a growing arsenal of approaches developed by civil society organizations for fostering government accountability” (Robinson 2006: 3f.). In 2001 a guide to budget work for NGOs was launched by the international budget project (IBP) to show how to engage in applied budget work for the poor and the establishment of a participatory society. The outcomes of budget work should affect policies, which can be done by advancing budget literacy, assessing budget process and budget systems and analyzing budget policies. For the authors, NGO engagement in this area is only natural since the budget “is the most important economic policy instrument for governments that reflects its social and economic policy priorities and commitments” (International Budget Project 2001: 5-8) and through the work of NGOs the governments’ decision-making processes can be improved. This shows how complementary roles of government and non-governmental actors are reinforced to address poverty (ibid. 2001: 5-8). The space granted for them will be part of the discussion in the next part on Uganda and especially when talking about civil society actors.

# **III Case Study: Uganda**

## **1. Aid in Uganda**

Uganda has a population of around 32 million people of whom 29% (around 9 million people) live under US\$1.25 per day. However, it is one of the few countries in sub-Saharan Africa that is on its way to meet the MDG of halving poverty by 2015 (Goal 1). The poverty line accounted to 56% in the beginning of the 1990s and only to 31% in the mid 2000s (OECD 2012a: 1; AfDB/OECD 2010: 12). Also Goal 3 (Gender Equality) is on course to be reached (Jimat Consult 2011: xvi). According to the Austrian Development Agency, Uganda has achieved significant successes concerning poverty reduction (however still being on position 161 in the Human Development Index 2011) (ADA 2011: 2). The Government of Uganda with its President Yoweri Museveni is continuously seen as an example of a sub-Saharan African government with “the political will to undertake meaningful poverty reduction policies and strategies” (Brock/McGee/Ssewakiryanga 2002: 1).

This chapter deals with a short history of aid in Uganda, then concentrates on aid modalities with recent figures and donors, and finally shows why Uganda was supported by the international community, becoming its darling. The last point deals with the national development strategies of Uganda.

### **1.1. Short History of Aid in Uganda**

Uganda is a very aid dependent country and aid has played a crucial role there. This leads back to the 1980s when the GoU followed the WB’s strategies. Uganda adopted the Structural Adjustment Programme very early in June 1981 by Milton Obote, although it was not fully implemented due to the war context. When the National Resistance Army (NRA) of Museveni came into power in 1986, its immediate priority was “to end civil war and insecurity, and to begin a process of social, political and economic stabilisation and reconstruction” (Brock/McGee/Ssewakiryanga 2002: 2). After 1986, Uganda experienced a rise in economic growth and international reputation. In fact, it is seen as a success story in Africa for pioneering in a number of development innovations; it was the first country to qualify for Heavily Indebted Poor countries (HIPC) debt relief and it set up its own poverty strategy. However, there were tensions between the WB and the GoU in regards to macroeconomic policy. This was overcome by Museveni enforcing the position of the

Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) (Lister a.o. 2006: S2). In the mid-1980s the World Bank declared itself as an agent of poverty reduction and Uganda followed this agenda as well by setting up a national poverty reduction strategy (Brock/McGee/Ssewakiryanga 2002: 2).

In the mid and late 1990s the HIPC initiative was launched by the WB and IMF. Due to the international credibility that Uganda gained, it benefited from the HIPC debt relief scheme. “It received relief from the IMF and the World Bank amounting to some US\$650 million in 1998, followed by an additional US\$656 million under the enhanced HIPC Initiative in 2000” (Carbone 2008: 56). After the HIPC debt relief, Uganda introduced the Poverty Action Fund (PAF) that was supposed to channel resources to pro-poor sectors. This was of particular importance for budget support since the government identified basic expenditure lines in the budget to reduce poverty. “The government also used the PAF as a mechanism to improve budget management and enhance the accountability of expenditures” (Lister a.o. 2006: 16). Another innovation was the set up of Partnership Principles in 2001 due to the course of the second iteration of the PEAP. This was done in order to manage dialogue and financial aid between the GoU and donors. The GoU states favors following aid forms: first unearmarked GBS, then budget support earmarked to the PAF, then sector budget support and finally project support (ibid. a.o. 2006: 17).


1997 was the year when Uganda presented its first Poverty Eradication Action Plan (followed by revisions and new launches in 2000 and 2004) (Lister a.o. 2006: 8f.). Steadily, poverty reduction became one of the main objectives for reform and the WB and IMF endorsed the document in 2000. “[It] soon came to set the standard for the post-structural adjustment Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) required by the international community” (Carbone 2008: 57). The PEAPs and the NDP will be discussed in a later chapter in terms of participation and involvement of stakeholders.

Before aid effectiveness was discussed on international conferences, Uganda officially showed efforts in important areas (Jimat Consult 2011: 21) and was able to achieve half of the targets set up by the Paris Declaration (see Chapter 2.2.3. Have the targets of the Paris Declaration been met?).

## 1.2. Recent Facts and Figures

Aid to Uganda has been on the rise as the graph below shows, with significant peaks in 2005 and 2008, slightly rising since then.


Figure 9: Aid to Uganda 2002-2010 (in USD million)



Source: OECD QWIDS (Query Wizard for International Development Statistics)

When taking a look on the different aid modalities in Uganda, one can see that project funding has been the dominant aid modality during the last years. Three donors give over half their aid as budget support (Christiansen a.o. 2007: 50f.).

Figure 10: Aid Modalities in Uganda over time (in USD million)



Source: Christiansen a.o. 2007: 50

In regards to Official Development Assistance (ODA) Uganda is number seven of all ODA recipients. This shows the high aid dependency of the country (IDD and Associates 2006: 11).


**Figure 11: Top 10 ODA receipts by recipient in USD million, 2010**

1	Ethiopia	3 529	7%
2	Congo, Dem. Rep.	3 413	7%
3	Tanzania	2 961	6%
4	Nigeria	2 069	4%
5	Sudan	2 055	4%
6	Mozambique	1 959	4%
7	Uganda	1 730	4%
8	Ghana	1 694	4%
9	Kenya	1 631	3%
10	Liberia	1 423	3%
	Other recipients	25 469	53%
	<b>Total</b>	<b>47 932</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: OECD 2012b: 2

In Uganda, half of the government's budget is funded by donors and half of this fund is disbursed via budget support (AGEZ/KOO/EU-Plattform 2005: 29). In the mid 2000s more than 13 donors administered 24 different variants of budget support. The numbers for budget support went up in the mid 2000s due to the Paris Declaration and its program-based approaches. However, in 2004, budget support was reduced due to public expenditure policies, such as high military expenditures and undemocratic happenings in the course of the elections (AGEZ/KOO/EU-Plattform 2005: 29; Kühhas 2007: 17). Also, in 2007 a downfall can be seen which can be led back to the discussion on the elections in Uganda. Since 2009 it is going up again.

**Figure 12: General Budget Support to Uganda 2002-2010**



Source: OECD QWIDS (Query Wizard for International Development Statistics)



Generally, there are many donors, programs and projects involved in Uganda. According to the General Consulate of Uganda in Vienna, from Austria alone there are around 25 to 30 projects currently in Uganda. Imagine other countries that are way bigger and disburse a bigger amount of money, the high sum of activities is clear (Interview General Consulate 2012).

The government of Uganda clearly states its preference for general budget support as aid modality in the National Development Plan (NDP) 2010/11-2014/15 (as well as in the Poverty Eradication Action Plans before) since it “is fully aligned with the Government’s priorities and minimises transaction costs” (Republic of Uganda 2010: 69). Development Partners are asked to join the established Joint Budget Support framework. On the side of the government, Uganda sees itself as having improved its accountability structures. Project support is seen as helpful in certain situations, for example for external expertise. However, “[w]hichever modality is used, the Government must be satisfied that the assistance provided is delivered in an effective and efficient manner, in line with the government priorities and with the objective of reducing transaction costs” (ibid. 2010: 69). Also, Richard Ssewakiryanga from the Uganda National NGO Forum sees budget support as a good modality as long as it helps the government to be able to finance its development from one pot of resources (Interview Ssewakiryanga 2012).

In Uganda, the shift from project funding to budget support took place in the context of the ownership agenda in order to increase national ownership and enhance strong, capable and empowered national institutions.

“Projects lead to a fragmentation of the budget, with decisions about donor project expenditure divorced from national budget process and taken without proper consideration of the relative merits of all competing expenditure demands. Donor-funded projects often involve far higher unit costs than projects funded from the GoU budget and consist of much lower priority expenditures, because they are heavily influenced by donor priorities.” (Poverty Eradication Action Plan 2004: 211 in IDD and Associates 2006: 19)

However, the strong involvement of donor agencies in the work of the GoU to translate decentralization into action is somehow contradictory to budget support (and also sector-wide approaches) with its tendency to recentralize (Brock/McGee/Ssewakiryanga 2002: 10).

**Figure 13: How much aid is programme-based? General Budget Support to Uganda 2002-2010**

	Programme-based approaches			Total aid disbursed (USD m) d	2005	2007	2010
	Budget support (USD m)	Other PBAs (USD m)	Total (USD m)		(for reference)	(for reference)	(%)
	a	b	c = a + b				e = c / d
African Dev. Bank	0	0	0	140	0%	22%	0%
Austria	4	6	9	10	35%	63%	88%
Belgium	12	2	14	25	74%	78%	57%
Denmark	36	5	41	68	93%	96%	59%
EU Institutions	31	0	31	119	46%	54%	26%
France	0	0	0	0	0%	--	--
GAVI Alliance	0	0	0	10	10%	--	0%
Germany	4	27	31	41	11%	--	76%
Global Fund	0	57	57	57	100%	100%	100%
Ireland	22	2	24	44	85%	97%	55%
Italy	--	--	--	--	0%	85%	--
Japan	0	18	18	52	51%	52%	35%
Korea	0	0	0	1	--	--	0%
Netherlands	32	2	34	34	100%	81%	100%
Norway	17	9	26	61	33%	35%	43%
Sweden	20	7	27	37	49%	71%	74%
United Kingdom	92	15	107	130	73%	76%	82%
United Nations	1	26	27	76	53%	47%	36%
United States	1	12	13	267	0%	--	5%
World Bank	101	171	272	332	60%	62%	82%
<b>Total</b>	<b>372</b>	<b>359</b>	<b>732</b>	<b>1 504</b>	<b>50%</b>	<b>66%</b>	<b>49%</b>

Source: OECD 2012a: 12

In Uganda there are more than 30 development partners present. “[T]he top three development partners together accounted for over three-quarters of disbursement in 2008/9”. The largest donors are The World Bank, the European Commission, the United Kingdom, Denmark and the African Development Bank (Jimat Consult 2011: viii). Especially Great Britain and the Netherlands put a great emphasis on budget support and reduced project specific support. This pattern has however varied over time. While England was the highest bilateral donor in 2000, by 2005 USAID became the biggest share, which then changed again. The biggest multilateral donor is the International Development Association (IDA) from the World Bank Group representing 42% of all multilateral donors. Of the European Community’s support, 55% account to budget support, 40% to general budget support in order to enhance the administration of public finances, economic growth and the achievement of the MDGs. Then 15% are given in forms of sector budget support for infrastructure and rural areas (Slezak 2009: 9f.). Some donors are convinced of the use of GBS and want to strengthen it (such as DFID, Netherlands, Ireland, Nordic countries), but others are more sceptical that government systems are capable and safe enough to receive it (USAID, Japan). In total, over half of the financial flows were disbursed by only three development partners (IDA, UK, EU) (Jimat Consult 2011: xi, 17).

**Figure 14: Average Annual Percent Disbursements by Source**

<b>Average Annual Percent Disbursements by Source defined by GoU (Fiscal Year 00/01 to 08/09)</b>	
<b>Development Partner</b>	<b>Percent</b>
1. IDA	30%
2. United Kingdom	12%
3. European Union	11%
4. African Development Fund	7%
5. United States of America	6%
6. Netherlands	5%
7. Ireland	4%
8. Denmark	4%
9. Sweden	3%
10. Germany	3%
Others	15%

Source: Jimat Consult 2011: 18

Also, other Southern countries such as China, India, South Africa and development finance institutions (e.g. Islamic Development Bank) are of increasing importance in Uganda. Especially China has raised its aid given as technical assistance, grants, interest-free loans and debt relief. Here it is important to remark that China is not a member of the DAC of the OECD and does not report details about aid to other countries (Jimat Consult 2011: 19).

In spite of the increase of aid money, there are no signs of improvement or transformation. While ODA flows increase, still around one quarter of Ugandans are poor, affecting rural areas the most. Out of the 7.5 million Ugandans in poverty, 7.1 million are in rural areas. Ssewakiryanga (2011b: 105) argues that the aid industry serves the interests of donors and political elites but is not people centered. There is still a high disparity in the country. Carbone mentions the share of benefits going to the richest 10% of the population and especially to urban areas. North and East Uganda is still politically more instable and excluded from economic growth, thus marginalized (Carbone 2008: 58f.). “The ineffectiveness of aid in Uganda has been attributed to bureaucracy and abuse of the aid system, duplication of donor projects, exclusion of CSOs from the aid discourse and the limited involvement of beneficiaries in the design of projects, among other factors and reasons” (Ssewakiryanga 2011b: 105).

### 1.3. Donor Darling

“Donors need Uganda as much as Uganda needs them” (Brock/McGee/Ssewakiryanga 2002: 6).

The international community and donors are of big importance. In fact, Uganda is seen by the international development community as its darling for pioneering in many strategies and representing an African success story for economic growth and poverty reduction, as said before. They were the first country with PRSP and among the first to implement budget support as the chapter on the history showed (AGEZ/KOO/EU-Plattform 2005: 29). In 1996, it was the fastest growing economy in the world and was praised by the IMF and Western donors as a role-model for Africa. “Because of its largely successful and eager implementation of SAPs, Uganda has become the golden child of the IMF and World Bank” (Dicklitch 1998: 4, 63). Uganda has received international support for a long time in which Carbone (2008: 59) sees two reasons for that. First, international donors and financial institutions were looking for success stories to legitimize the neoliberal approach to economic development and Uganda was recognized as the champion in this field. Moreover, Uganda was of geopolitical importance and noticed as a “natural ally” to the West.

Uganda has experienced a constant flow of development aid:

“Development aid had actually been on the increase since the fall of Idi Amin and the advent of the second Obote government in the early 1980s. However, it was in 1987, after Museveni’s change of mind had led to the adoption of more orthodox economic policies, that there was a sharp rise in international aid to Uganda. Funding arrived mostly in the form of loans from multilateral institutions, especially the World Bank, the IMF, the European Union, the African Development Bank, and the UNDP. [...] Bilateral aid almost doubled during the early 1990s, rising from US\$179.7 million in 1989 to \$342.7 million in 1994.” (Carbone 2008: 60)

Carbone argues that aid was usually offered without too many political questions about the Ugandan regime. “The uniqueness of development aid Uganda received [...] lay in the fact that it came with very few political strings attached” (Carbone 2008: 61). Donors faced difficulties with this behavior when Museveni changed the constitution to his will in order to run for a third term. However, they were afraid to push the topic too much and to risk Uganda’s success story. In the last years donors became increasingly concerned with the issues of corruptions and democracy. Corruption means more problems for money reaching to the bottom, to the people who need it (AGEZ/KOO/EU-Plattform 2005: 29f.). Criticism was

also against the budget in 2004/2005 since public administration costs were too high and expenditures for defense were rising. “The UK, Uganda’s principal donor [at that time], was the first country to cut its aid to Uganda” (Carbone 2008: 62f.). Here, it is important to have a basic consensus on issues such as human rights and democracy before entering into budget support (Interview Wipfel 2012).

Uganda has become increasingly under fire because of democracy and participation of other stakeholders. Before going to the chapter about “Civil Society and NGOs in Development”, the National Development Plan will be explained showing Uganda’s development focus and how civil society is supposed to be included.

#### **1.4. National Development Plan**

Before, the PEAPs and the NDP of Uganda has been mentioned in the context of the PRSP and Uganda being a donor darling. This chapter will take a closer look on the contents of the Plans of Uganda and how they have changed. The participation in setting up the national development strategy will be topic in 2.5. Participation Processes in Uganda.

The first Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) was created in 1997, but by the Ministry of Finance which later merged with the Ministry of Planning to become the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED). It was revised in 2001 with a broader consultative process and in cooperation with external stakeholders due to the fact that it was decided that the PEAP will also become the PRSP (the participation process will be explained in chapter 2.5.) (Brock/McGee/Ssewakiryanga 2002: 7f., 32, 44). The third PEAP subsequently was established in 2004 and contains Uganda’s development objectives. It focuses on five pillars: economic management; enhancing competitiveness, production and incomes; security, conflict resolution and disaster management; governance; and human resources development (Republic of Uganda 2005: ix).

The National Development Plan (NDP) revised the past experiences from the PEAP and wanted to improve several aspects and learn from previous lessons. The emphasis of the PEAP was primarily poverty eradication and social services. The NDP wants to maintain the vision of poverty eradication, “but with an additional emphasis on economic transformation and wealth creation thereby intertwining sustainable economic growth with poverty eradication” (Republic of Uganda 2010: 3). The transition has also been described as “change

with emphasis shifting from ‘aid for recovery’ [...] to ‘aid for economic take-off’” (Jimat Consult 2011: xxi). The Uganda National NGO Forum worked together with other civil society organizations to set up a document about Uganda’s Development Potential. In this document they clearly state development being about people and their wellbeing. “We advocate for an understanding of development that is centred on the quest to achieve an optimal level of health and wellbeing of the human person, spanning crucial aspects of life such as the physical, biological, mental, emotional, social, educational, economic and cultural dimensions” (UNNGOF 2009a: 11). The National Development is not particularly concerned with this issue since “human development is much more than the production of goods and services, or the rise and fall of national income” (ibid. 2009a: 13). Here, the economic focus of the National Development Plan is criticized while the focus on poverty eradication and social services in their opinion is being lost. They demand more profound transformations and the primary focus being on development, as well as the alignment of all stakeholders to this plan.

## **2. Civil Society and NGO Landscape**

The landscape for civil society and NGOs is especially important for the roles they can play. Furthermore, the aid community defined participation and ownership essential for the effectiveness of aid (in the sense of ownership as involvement). This chapter deals with the history of civil society and NGOs in Uganda and represents very well the dichotomy of NGOs as service providers or as being engaged in political issues. Civil society in Uganda is relatively young and many civil society organisations were founded after 1986 when the civil war ended (Isooba 2005: 43). The situation of Ugandan civil society and NGOs will be described according to historical aspects, the old and new roles they play, the different actors that are present, what control mechanisms exist – also from the Ugandan state – and how participation processes in Uganda were possible in regards to the national development strategies.

### **2.1. Historical Aspects**

“Civil society and popular pressures are considered to be crucial for the consolidation of democracy” (Dicklitch 1998: 171).

In Uganda civil society has long been fragmented and oppressed. Before the National Resistance Movement (NRM) in 1986 came into power, NGOs in Uganda have clearly been repressed. Due to the political and economic situation during the decades before there was not much space for NGOs in Uganda. Mostly self-help groups working at a local level were present, such as neighborhood associations and other non-political groups. However, churches can be described as the early watchdogs in Ugandan history since they observed human rights violations (Dicklitch 1998: 52, 54). The NRM regime led to changes and a sharp increase of NGOs in the late 1980s and early 1990s can be detected (Brock/McGee/Ssewakiryanga 2002: 4). Civil society in Uganda at that time can be described as fractured due to ethnicity issues stemming from the past and the colonial regime. Also, regionalism and religion were division points and prevented the emergence of a strong civil society. The first independent organizations in Uganda thus did not aim at setting up one civil society for all (Dicklitch 1998: 55, 171).

NGO's roles were primarily seen in service delivery, especially in the health sector. Initially, they were engaged in areas of relief and emergency. A word used in relation to NGOs' activities in Uganda are gap filler NGOs which are a big group of development political active NGOs (Dicklitch 1998: 6, 54). This can be on one hand explained by the “culture of fear and

political apathy” that has been created and is essential to understand the development of civil society in Uganda (Ciganikova 2010: 217). “[T]he NRM government tolerated and encouraged solely apolitical and service-oriented organizations, as it did not accept the possibility of being challenged” (ibid. 2010: 217). Certain mechanisms are in place to ensure NGOs do not become too political or opposed to the government. This will be discussed further in Chapter 2.4 on control mechanisms that NGOs in Uganda face. Media is one element of civil society that has experienced repression since colonialism. During the colonial regime any critical comments or articles about it were cut down and during the Amin and Obote regime critical newspapers were decreased to not enforce any contrasting thinking (Dicklitch 1998: 51f.). “Linked to these years of repression and civil war, suspicion and lack of trust still permeate the Ugandan polity and society” (ibid. 1998: 27). Government critical NGOs which demonstrated weaknesses of the state were quickly seen as opponents of the state by the state (Interview Wipfel 2012). Together with NRM attempts to confront critical NGOs, the preference of many NGOs remained apolitical. Another explanation leads back to the differentiation between aided and unaided civil society. Aided civil society was operating in the area of service delivery for the health care system and social system and filled the functions the state left in the course of reducing the social services from it. In this space, contracts were set up between governments and NGOs. According to Franz Schmidjell the political part has been weakened by this creation (Interview Schmidjell 2012). However, a new trend can be seen due to changes of the aid paradigm.

## **2.2. New Roles**

“The emergence of ‘civil society’ as a policy actor in Uganda is a relatively recent phenomenon, as indeed is the emergence of civil society itself” (Brock/McGee/Ssewakiryanga 2002: 4). The government of Uganda sees the expansion of the range of NGO activities including macro policy advice, advocacy, integrity and accountability in public office, good governance and democracy and lobbying and research (MiA 2010: 11).

Civil society representatives in Uganda assign themselves areas of awareness raising along with introducing debates on political topics, research, information and knowledge, monitoring such as elections, reporting etc. (Ciganikova 2010: 219). When talking about the new roles it is important to mention the influence donors have had. Donors preferred NGOs in comparison with the state for a long time, while in the last years a change can be seen. NGOs are becoming lobbyists and advocates to monitor state activities. Still, they are recognized in their role for services, such as in health, education, emergency and micro credit programs.



Nevertheless, capacity building and advocate functions are being pushed, although confrontation with the state will always tried to be avoided (Kwagala 2003: 158f.). The National Development Plan of Uganda also states that due to the Paris Declaration CSOs are strengthened in their advocacy role, however emphasizing their service delivery function. “It is also an area of work that donors support and where the Government is opening avenues, especially at the district level where some of the CSOs are being contracted for service delivery” (Republic of Uganda 2010: 27). The following concrete roles are said to be supported: advocacy, service delivery in sectors where the government is not present, subcontracts by the government, support to conflict resolutions and research (Republic of Uganda 2010: 66).

Robinson and Friedman (2005: 19f.) state that only five members of DENIVA, a network of several hundred indigenous voluntary organizations, operate in the fields of advocacy and lobbying. For them, this shows that their emphasis rather lies on service delivery than political engagement. “DENIVA organizes workshops to train NGOs on advocacy and lobbying techniques, but engages in limited advocacy itself out of fear of being de-registered by the government” (Brock/McGee/Ssewakiryanga 2002: 6). NGOs are said to work in other areas not because of their commitment but because donors prefer this way. The activities of some Ugandan civil society actors will be the topic in the chapter on civil society budget actors in Uganda. Recognition and acknowledgement of CSOs differs widely. As a NGO worker said: “You as a CSO representative would speak [at a meeting] and no one would take notes; and they would say thank you very much and pass to the next. A donor speaks, and everyone takes notes and everyone afterwards repeats what the donor was saying in different ways” (ibid. 2002: 6). Graffi (2003: 44) defines the function of consultant of the state as very popular among NGOs. They are included in national discussions together with international financiers and are more represented in committees and fora.

### **2.3. Variety of Actors**

Civil society is a very broad notion and can mean a lot of things. Uganda also has a wide spectrum of actors. For this thesis, civil society organizations for development and budgeting in Uganda are under closer look.

The variety of CSOs and NGOs differ according to their location. NGOs that are located in the periphery have more disadvantages compared to NGOs in the cities, especially Kampala, Kasese and Mbale. Cities have the advantage of a better infrastructure concerning electricity,

telephone and banks. Also, the internet is an important resource that is easier to use and very common in the cities. Thus, the equipment is much better.

“Upcountry very, very few NGOs do have a telephone, the infrastructure is bad, even the whole network – NGOs upcountry are operating in a very small scale, they got many more problems than NGOs in Kampala.” (Margaret Sentamu from UMW 11<sup>th</sup> July 2002 in Graffi 2003: 88).

A big part of civil society consists of churches and religious based organizations. The big advantage of those institutions is their possession of personal and financial resources and infrastructure. As mentioned earlier, media has long been suppressed, but they are important and very often take over the role of political opposition (Ciganikova 2010: 219). Gabriele Grosinger defined churches as a big service-provider, especially for health and education (Interview Grosinger 2012).

Access to financial support is a big issue for NGO work. In Kampala it is easier to contact donors and carry out operations. It is very difficult as a small NGO in the periphery to get attention. However, Graffi sees that NGOs operating in the cities very often lack access to population in other areas (Graffi 2003: 53f., 89). Of course, competition can be mentioned as one point that civil society actors face among each other, especially in the need for resources (Interview Klatzer 2012), but there are other ways of avoiding this rivalry.

Cooperation in Uganda among NGOs happens in different forms and on different levels. This development has increased during the last ten years and is shown in networks becoming more popular. Advantages lie in access to information, an effective use of resources, coordination instead of duplication, the adoption of aims and a better position towards donors and international development politics (Graffi 2003: 56-70). In fact, CIVICUS carried out a regional survey among the population and concluded that 43% of the people argued that networks and umbrella organizations in Uganda are generally effective (ADC/Danida/Sida 2012: 29). Networks and umbrella organizations are becoming more numerous in Uganda and play an important role. Since the numbers of NGOs in Uganda were on the rise, there was the need for a better coordination. Organizations with similar goals and ideas can profit from an exchange of experience and information. DENIVA (Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations) was therefore created in 1988 (Graffi 2003: 35). The Uganda Debt Network (UDN) was formed in 1996 for the campaigning of debt relief in Uganda and 1998 registered as a NGO under the NGO Registration Statute (UDN Website 2012). It is operating in about 16 districts together with members, institutions and individuals. Budget initiatives are its main area (Kwagala 2003: 159). The UDN will be elaborated on further when talking

about civil society budget actors in Uganda. UNNGOF (Uganda National NGO Forum) was formed in 1997 as a platform to strengthen civil society and improve the quality of NGO work by engaging with the government and other development actors. They were also engaged in the revision of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan of Uganda in the beginning of the new Millennium (UNNGOF Website 2012). Their key areas lie in advocacy, lobbying and talking about NGOs' legal framework. They run many campaigns on corruption and poverty (Kwagala 2003: 160). In the field for women's rights platforms, such as Action for Development (ACFODE) and Uganda's Women Network (UWONET), they became very big (Interview Klatzer 2012).

An interesting point is the long history in Uganda of including women. Through the NRM regime, the status of women in Ugandan politics improved and in 1986 many urban women and women's organizations developed around ACFODE (Action for Development) NGO. "[I]n 1989, the government introduced a proactive program that, by reserving one parliamentary seat for a woman in each district (thirty-four at the time) in the indirectly elected national legislature, went beyond anything that the country's women's organizations had actually asked for". To work together, women in parliament organized a Uganda Women Parliamentarians Association (UWPA), in which women Members of Parliament collaborated with other organizations such as the Forum for Women in Democracy (FOWODE), the National Association of Women's Organizations in Uganda (NAWOU) and the Uganda Women's Network (UWONET) (Carbone 2008: 179, 181). FOWODE is also involved in budget issues and especially observes how the government includes pro-poor and engendered topics in the budget and policies (FOWODE Blogspot 2012).<sup>5</sup>

## **2.4. Control Mechanisms**

Graffi considers two control organs in Uganda as important. There is the legal framework set up by the Ugandan government and self regulation mechanisms, such as by the UNNGOF. This network in fact criticizes the operations of the NGO Board and NGOs are generally skeptical of the board (Graffi 2003: 96). The two mechanisms of control and coordination – a wish also expressed by Ugandan NGOs – will be the topic of this subchapter. This is important because the Constitution of Uganda states in Article 38 about civic rights and activities that "[e]very Ugandan citizen has the right to participate in the affairs of

---

<sup>5</sup> For more information on civil society in Uganda see DENIVA (2006): Civil Society in Uganda: At the Crossroads? CIVICUS Civil Society Index Project. [http://www.akdn.org/publications/civil\\_society\\_uganda\\_crossroads.pdf](http://www.akdn.org/publications/civil_society_uganda_crossroads.pdf)

government, individually or through his or her representatives in accordance with law” and that “[e]very Ugandan has a right to participate in peaceful activities to influence policies of government through civic organizations” (ICNL Website 2012).

#### **2.4.1. Legal Framework**

The legal environment is the first level that sets up the boundaries for the environment of NGOs and their enabling environment, meaning their freedom and space to operate in a country (ADC/Danida/Sida 2012: 22f.). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs deals with the registration and operation of nongovernmental organizations in Uganda on its homepage. It wants to “reaffirm its commitment to working with nongovernmental organizations for the development of this country and for the betterment of the Ugandan people” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website 2012). There are around 10,000 NGOs registered in Uganda right now (ibid. 2012). “The legal framework for civil society, however, in Uganda is supportive only to the extent that the sphere of civil society activity is politically convenient to the Government” (ICNL Website 2012). The government itself sees the necessity of regulation measures due to the expansion of NGO activities from service delivery to other areas (MiA 2010: 16).

There are several instruments to regulate NGOs which are the Non Governmental Organizations Registration Act in 1989 that established a NGO Registration Board and was amended by the Registration (Amendment) Act in 2006 (enacted the NGO Amendment Bill of 2001), the NGO Registration Regulations from 1990 and the new National NGO Policy set up by the government in 2010.

The National NGO Board was created in 1989 holding tasks as to “register, regulate, monitor, coordinate and advice government on the NGO sector” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Website). It was first created in 1989 by Museveni and meant that all NGOs, their creators, supporters and tasks, have to be registered in order to operate as a legal organization. Certain conditions have to be fulfilled such as a written contact form and reference letters from the district administration (Graffi 2003: 28). Dicklitch defines that a written report to the District Administrator has to be sent seven days in advance before contacting people in the area. This is done so that district administrators can observe NGOs (Dicklitch 1998: 102). The Board consists of members of the government and members of the Internal and External Security Organisation putting a high emphasis on security issues (UNNGOF 2002). It defines NGOs as “non-governmental organizations, established to provide voluntary services including

religious, educational, literary, scientific, social or charitable services to the community or only part thereof” (Republic of Uganda 1989: Section 13 in Dicklitch 1998: 101). The Board has the following powers: to reject NGO applications, to deny renewal or approval of operation and to delay legal registration of some NGOs (that happened for example with DENIVA and also UNNGOF) (Dicklitch 1998: 101). “The NRM regime permitted the proliferation of NGOs, but attempted to regulate and monitor their activities by establishing an NGO Registration Board” (ibid. 1998: 171). The definition under Article 1 of the NGO Act is narrow and restrictive to the areas for NGO engagement. “NGOs engaged in advocacy or public policy activities, for example, are therefore vulnerable to governmental supervisory action” (ICNL Website 2012).

The fact of the obligation to register should not be the main point of criticism since in many countries organizations have to register, providing that it can have some positive outcomes as well. Maria Hirsch said that the situation is comparable to Austria (Interview Hirsch 2012). Schmidjell however sees the procedure of the Board as very bureaucratic (more than in Austria) and used by the board members in sometimes problematic ways (Interview Schmidjell 2012). This is confirmed by the UNNGOF Briefing Paper stating that the requirements and conditions for NGOs to register in Uganda are very time-consuming and tiring (UNNGOF 2009b: 3). The NGO Law Monitor Research Center defines several barriers for NGOs in Uganda: barriers to entry, barriers to operational activity and barriers to speech/advocacy (ICNL Website 2012). Those barriers and critical points will be discussed on the following pages, showing the restrictive character of the legal framework in Uganda – despite the fact that putting up a mechanism to register and monitor activities of NGOs can have positive results, if used in appropriate ways.

According to the UNNGOF Bulletin, the NGO Registration Amendment Bill of 2001 becoming the Act of 2006 meant further control and restriction for NGOs since the initial registration of a permit for further existence is needed every year. This puts further administrative and financial burdens on NGOs and is problematic for the continuation of their activities and their empowerment (UNNGOF 2002; Ellmers 2010: 19). In fact, NGOs collectively asked the President not to assent to it. For NGOs themselves, the definition for NGOs is too narrow and does not include an activist or political dimension (UNNGOF 2009b: 2). The NGO Board was assigned the additional function of monitoring the operations of NGOs which shows the focus of control and security (CIVICUS 2006: 2). The registration for

NGOs can be refused if the goals are in any contradiction of government plans, policies or interest which means a restriction of the independency of NGOs to criticize, for example unfair policies or ones that are not considered pro-poor to influence the work of the government (UNNGOF 2002). A reason for a rather restrictive law for NGOs was said to be the unpredictability of the NGO sector and the fear of misappropriation of money. The Board is being criticized for dismissing participation and focusing on control instead of support and facilitation. The UNNGOF for example, demands co-work to advice ministers in NGO matters. The NGO Registration Bill determines activities after registration and can pressure NGOs due to the need of annual admissions. NGOs criticize the fact that government interests are not always equal to population interests, therefore very critical NGOs might not be accepted (such as ones being in opposition to the state) (Interview Schmidjell 2012; Kwagala 2003: 157). Instead, NGOs demand they no longer be excluded from the formulation processes of the law and that they help to implement views of NGOs in order to create a more user friendly law (Graffi 2003: 71f.).

Entrance barriers are defined as the obligatory registration, the very extravagant registration procedures when it comes to the documents, the fees and also the re-registration requirements that demand the whole procedure again. This is accompanied by a lack of procedural safeguards: “There is no fixed time period within which the NGO Board must review and decide upon registration for NGO applicants” (ICNL Website 2012). This means that NGOs can wait a very long time for their operations to be legalized in order to continue with their activities. Also, there are no objective reasons set up to know when an NGO application can be refused. “Decisions are therefore subject to the discretion of the Board to accept or reject a registration application” (ibid. 2012). This concerns NGOs a lot because delays in the NGO Board’s decisions mean a high burden for NGOs. Also, “[t]he law does not resolve the question as to what happens if registration is denied even when the interpretation of the Board is contestable” (CIVICUS 2006: 3f.).

When it comes to NGO operations the Board has some impact on the type of activities due to their acceptance – as mentioned before. The NGO Registration Regulation lays down a seven-day notice before people in an area can be contacted. Moreover, the director of the NGO is responsible for all acts of members and employees. A forced dissolution by order of the NGO Board can occur at anytime when the Board sees the public interest threatened. These are very broad reasons making the work of NGOs vulnerable (ICNL Website 2012).

“The board may revoke a certificate of registration of an organization if (a) the organization does not operate in accordance with its constitution; (b) the organization contravenes any of the conditions or

directions inserted in the certificate; or (c) in the opinion of the board, it is in the public interest to do so” (The Non-Governmental Organizations Registration Act 1989 in ICNL Website 2012).

Barriers to speech and advocacy are defined due to the fact that even though CSOs and NGOs have the right to freedom of speech, expression and to participate in peaceful activities to influence policies of government, political activities or the belonging to any political group is not allowed (ICNL Website 2012). Combined with the fear of being labeled as not compiling with public interest, means a major risk for NGOs.

Some critical voices even go as far as to state that the NGO Registration (Amendment) Act of 2006 falls below the minimum standards of the Constitution. “The nature of the constraints imposed on the formation, registration and operation of NGO is a clear assault to these fundamental rights and freedoms [autonomy of civic organizations and their own objectives] embedded in our constitutions. It is contended that these restrictions go beyond what should be allowable and acceptable in constitutional democracy” (CIVICUS 2006: 5).

In the course of the National NGO Policy (the process for drafts started in 2007 with support from the EU Civil Society Capacity Building Programme), NGOs submitted several proposals claiming to remove strict registration conditions and annual permits. They claimed a dialogue with the NGO Board and broke up some rules for activities in rural areas, such as the seven-day notice requirement to the Resident District Commissioner (ICNL Website 2012; UNNGOF 2012: 1). The government’s objective for this policy document lies in the promotion of “a more healthy relationship” (MiA 2010: 5). The preamble acknowledges the “discontent [of CSOs] with what they perceive as overbearing Government regulatory oversight which constrains their freedom of action”, but it however states the recognition of both sides for the necessity of a better coordination and development (ibid. 2010: 8). The government is especially concerned with the donor dependency of the NGO sector, “a factor that has made foreign influence inevitable in Uganda governance processes” and the involvement in politics of NGOs by taking sides (ibid. 2010: 18). Concerning the board, the goal is to establish representation on the district and sub-county level by setting up NGO Monitoring Committees. Local Government Councils are granted important roles for the realization of the policy’s goals (ibid. 2010: 29). The roles of the NGO Board seem to have widened to several points such as to “provide appropriate guidelines for operationalization of the NGO Policy at line ministry and lower levels of district administration” and to “coordinate government engagement with other NGO sector stakeholders including umbrella organizations to promote responsible and accountable conduct amongst NGO sector actors in

the country” (ibid. 2010: 37). Here, the matter to collaborate with the networks – something the UNNGOF demanded – is included. In fact, there are certain roles and responsibilities assigned to registered NGO umbrella organizations or networks:

- to distribute and promote the NGO policy,
- to show leadership for self-regulatory mechanisms for professionalism, ethics, integrity, transparency and accountability of NGOs,
- to collaborate with other stakeholders such as the Board,
- to coordinate the participation of members and NGOs in government policy processes
- and to set up reports and documents with the perspective of NGOs (ibid. 2010: 39).

The UNNGOF as the representative of civil society points out the positive aspects of this policy. One was the process before that is defined as having been open to different actors. Other aspects lie in the long-term basis of the policy and democratic values and principles that are included. The high position the policy holds is seen as an improvement as well as that the autonomy and independency of NGOs and the sector is recognized to be respected. Challenges or difficulties are seen in the NGO definition given in the paper because it is too narrow. Moreover, a NGO monitoring infrastructure is set up at district and sub county levels which means a lot of work to establish it as a productive way that emphasizes development and not security. Although self-regulation is particularly important in the new policy, any mechanism must be approved before which contradicts the idea of such initiatives (UNNGOF 2012: 2).

Media also belongs to the civil society and works very close with NGOs. In March 2012, a new bill was drafted, the Uganda Communications Regulatory Authority Bill that would further narrow license procedures for radio and televisions and create a new regulatory body. On one hand it focuses on making communication services available for many at better rates. Although “[i]f enacted in its current form, the bill could undermine the work of human rights CSOs, particularly those engaged in advocacy of civil and political rights” because of the dependence from the government and the powers of the Information and Communications Technology Minister (ICNL Website 2012).

In fact, “the politics of the country shapes the realities both nationally and at local level so that the situation facing CSOs may in practice be very different from the legal provisions” (ADC/Danida/Sida 2012: vii). This has been demonstrated by the framework that was set up on one hand and the reality that meant restriction for CSOs on the other hand.



#### **2.4.2. Self Regulation Mechanisms**

Ugandan NGOs themselves acknowledge their variety and complexity in number. This is the reason why it is important for them to set up certain standards and criteria in order to determine the quality of NGOs and their activities. The UNNGOF's plan was to set up their own tool to administer and control Ugandan NGOs. While this is also the goal of the government, it has not yet supported the operations of UNNGOF but has denied it legal status for a long time (Graffi 2003: 72, 94). Now, in the National NGO Policy for Uganda, the government sees networks or umbrella organizations as being crucial and acknowledges their need for support in order to enforce its quality assurance mechanism (MiA 2010: 14).

NGOs in Uganda set up together the Quality Assurance Mechanism (QuAM) that is hosted by the National Certification Council that consists of networks such as DENIVA and UNNGOF. It was established in 2006 by NGOs for NGOs and provides certification for NGOs according to quality standards. "A quality standard is a defined benchmark or target that an organization promises to adhere to" (UNNGOF/DENIVA 2006: 3). For the certification process, space for learning has been created for NGOs, usually starting with a self-assessment. Once obtained, it is valid for two years and then valid for three years after renewal. The sanction mechanism lies in the possibility of withdrawing a certificate from an organization that violated any standards. Several areas are addressed:

- communications, advocacy, fundraising;
- governance and management concerning auditing, board structure, reporting, funding, procurement;
- human resources;
- participation, for example in monitoring and evaluation;
- commitment to monitoring and evaluation in general;
- and other areas such as gender equality, environmental impact, human rights, CSO cooperation, state and CSO relationships.

There are three types of certificates: provisional certificate, certificate and advanced certificate. The funds for the National Certification Council that oversees NGO activities, reports activities and issues certificates are coming from district committees, NGOs and networks like DENIVA and UNNGOF, donor agencies and individuals (NGO QuAM Working Group 2006; one world trust 2008-2010 Website).

## 2.5. Participation Processes in Uganda

Political participation can be defined as “action which is directed at influencing (controlling, changing, supporting or sharing in) policy making and or execution in a political structure” (Hayward 1973: 594 in Dicklitch 1998: 83). According to Brock, McGee and Ssewakiryanga (2002: 40f.) there are following policy spaces in Uganda for NGO operations:

- Policy formulation processes and resulting policies, such as in the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), the Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture of 2001, the Local Government Act of 1997 and the Land Act of 1998;
- Donor-funded programs, such as in the Local Government Development Programme, the Poverty Reduction Support Credit of 2001, the Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Project and the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund of 2011;
- Government funding mechanism, such as the Poverty Action Fund and District Development Plan;
- Poverty knowledge, such as in the Poverty Monitoring and Analysis Unit and District Planning Units;
- Working groups, such as the PEAP Sector Working Groups and Poverty Eradication Working Group;
- Other processes that allow civil society engagement are presidential and local elections, as well as Monitoring Committees;
- Meetings and delegations;
- Donor-hosted meetings;
- Media through column space, advertisement and local language daily newspapers;
- NGO campaigns or events.

When looking at the democratic processes of the country, where civil society and NGOs are officially considered one part, recent developments show contradictions and inconsistencies in Ugandan politics and democracy. Aid, budget support and the discussion of Uganda’s budget and possible participation of NGOs are not only technical matters, but as demonstrated before include a political dimension. One important issue is the extension of Museveni’s power.

“Since the 1995 constitution was adopted [and being of the longest in the world], Uganda has slid backward precipitously in respecting civil and political liberties. The government increasingly has restricted the freedom of association, harassed and intimidated opposition members and media workers, attempted to ram through undemocratic legislation in Parliament without a quorum, and narrowed political control from what once as a broad-based government to a much smaller circle of individuals.” (Tripp 2010: 158)

In 2006, the movement system was officially replaced by a multiparty system and Museveni was chosen again as a candidate for the 2006 election, although this meant he was trying for a third term of presidency. This posed a big contradiction since the constitution of 1995 that was set up under Museveni and the NRM defines a two-term limit for presidency. Museveni

stated in 2001 that he would be a candidate for the last time and that his task would be to find a successor (BBC 2011). In 2005, multi-partyism became suddenly acceptable - for Museveni a way to stay in power. Tripp argues that Museveni openly bribed Members of Parliament (MP) in order to remove the two-term limit of presidency. In spite of protest, it was accepted and Museveni could run for another term in 2006 (Tripp 2010: 171). The Joint Evaluation Study from ADC, Danida and Sida still sees the National Resistance Movement (NRM) operating as a de-facto single party because of the large majority in parliament (ADC/Danida/Sida 2012: 16). Due to a piece of legislature that passed in 2002 – the Political Parties and Organisations Bill – opponents were restricted on campaigning and organized political activity. It meant that parties were not allowed to operate at the local level or have more than one national conference per year. Also, public meetings were banned (Tripp 2010: 171). Elections held in 2006 were for the first time multi party elections, but the occurrences before the election were marked by arresting opponents and restricting media. “Mr Museveni was once feted as someone the West could do business with – one of the new generation of Africa leaders to replace the ‘Big Men’ – the independence leaders who clung to power for as long as they possibly could” (BBC 2011). His critics see him as having become just another “Big Man”. In fact, 2006 elections were a test of Uganda’s democratic references but Museveni opting for a third term contradicts with his promises, the constitution and thus the democratic process (ibid. 2011). “The opposition has come under increasing repression since 2000. It has not been uncommon for treason and sedition charges to be brought against people who voice opposition to the government through the media or other fora” (Tripp 2010: 172). The last elections in 2011 and the campaigning before were said to have passed mildly. However, Museveni being nominated for a fourth time was bringing democracy in Africa “under the spotlight” (Ross 2011). It was Museveni himself who once said “that the problem with African leaders was overstaying in power” (ibid. 2011). Ongoing support for Museveni can be led back to the restoring of peace after the 1970s and 1980s. The message being conveyed was that Museveni brings stability and security under his regime. This time, his opponent in the campaign was again Dr. Besigye of the Forum for Democratic Change. While in 2006 he had to deal with accusations and legal measures, this campaign was without such extreme happenings (ibid. 2011) due to police and army being present during the time of the campaign. Big criticism arose concerning money spent for the election campaigns (Girke/Kamp 2011: 2). “In January, the finance minister stated the government was broke. At the same time MPs suddenly found an extra 20m shillings in their bank accounts.” (Ross 2011). While the number of private radio and television companies officially rose, many

journalists were confronted with criminal charges because of their work, creating an atmosphere of self-censorship because they did not want to be arrested. The opposing candidate Kizza Besigye was also taken under house-arrest to make sure he did not join the walk to work protest, demonstrating against the increasing commodity prices and inflation. “Amnesty’s report warns that the Ugandan government has banned all forms of peaceful protests in the name of maintaining order” (BBC 2011). These aspects should be taken into account.<sup>6</sup> The Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration in Uganda in 2011 also states:

“The referendum on multi party politics, the removal of presidential term limits in 2005 and the holding of the first multi-party elections in February 2006 signaled a change in the political governance direction including a seemingly greater concentration of political power in the executive. There is evidence of increasing intolerance for variant political views as exhibited during the violent suppression of public demonstrations against arrests of opposition politicians, and intended sale of the Mabira Forest to a private investor amongst others.” (Jimat Consult 2011: 12)

The Uganda Governance Monitoring Platform even described Uganda as a pseudo-democracy because the individual power of the president is still very strong (UGMP 2009).

This shows that “[t]he situation in Uganda today is fraught with contradictions” (Tripp 2010: 173). In this context, participation has to be questioned. Participation in the national development strategy is seen as crucial for ownership in the sense of involvement, but also in the control of the processes. The first PEAP was set up in 1997 but did not involve many non-official sources or actors. At that time it was the Ministry of Finance, which set it up and later merged with the Ministry of Planning to become the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED). The revision process in 2001 happened in a different way. The Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Process was involved and consulted over hundreds of people in different districts concerning their perspective on poverty and how it should be solved. A draft was formulated with Kampala-based CSOs forming a Civil Society Task Force (CSTF) and sector groups. Through this, discussions and criticism were possible, consultation meetings were held because of donor funding from the CSTF and presentations to the government, reports and voices through the media were given. Poor people’s views were acknowledged more and more (Brock/McGee/Ssewakiryanga 2002: 7f., 32, 44). A CSO PEAP Revision Steering Committee was set up under the leadership of the UNNGOF giving

---

<sup>6</sup> Richard Ssewakiryanga mentioned that under the Movement System he saw more opportunities for civil society in the form of discussions around aid and development. He considers the Movement System more direct and the change in 2006 for him means that there will be more production of policy documents without further treating (Interview Ssewakiryanga 2012).

their perspectives and opinions on all six pillars: services, productive capacity, democratic governance, security and conflict reduction, macroeconomic stability, and economic and corporate government<sup>7</sup>. The National Development Plan (NDP) set up in 2010 for the following years clearly states:

“To ensure ownership of the plan and to support the realization of its objectives, the preparation of this NDP took an iterative, consultative, and participatory process [...] [T]he emergence and growing importance of broadly inclusive non-governmental platforms presents an opportunity to engage with civil society in a more strategic and sustained manner.” (Republic of Uganda 2010: 6, 26)

The government of Uganda acknowledges contribution of NGOs to development in the National NGO Policy. The following sectors are mentioned: for the social sectors the areas of education, health, water and sanitation, infrastructure and environment; emergency; and in policy advocacy work to improve democratic processes, human and gender rights, good governance and accountability (MiA 2010: 14). A civil society paper on the development of Uganda was set up collectively under the Uganda National NGO Forum, stating that CSOs play a crucial role in informing and making citizens aware of their rights and responsibilities. For them, “development is about people and their wellbeing”, they criticized the fact that the emphasis is primarily put on economic matters (UNNGOF 2009a: 10).

When looking at participation for women Uganda has had achievements. Under the movement system every council had to have one woman member. At that time 37 districts existed and now 90, meaning there must be at least 90 women in parliament. They are elected separately as women’s representatives (Interview Hirsch 2012). Also, in the constitution-making process women were present. They carried out education programs and submitted memoranda to the constitutional commission. A decade later “women have joined forces under the rubric of the advocacy and lobbying coalition Uganda Women’s Network (UWONET) to protest the proposed lifting of presidential term limits” (Tripp 2010: 173). FOWODE for instance analyzed the NDP according to gender issues and states that it acknowledged the fact that women face many challenges to full participation. However, gender is not clearly embedded in the NDP’s vision, attributes or priority areas and national core projects. One difficulty of the NDP implementation “is that it adopts a sector approach and yet gender mainstreaming requires cross-sectoral measures. Although there are strategic actions for promoting gender equality, these are not mainstreamed in all the other strategic actions, thus leaving gender as a stand alone” (FOWODE 2010: 8). FOWODE declares that

---

<sup>7</sup> For more information see UNNGOF 2003 “In search of consensus on a new development path”

55% of the NDP sectors are “gender blind”, not mentioning women and men’s requirements (ibid. 2010: 6-8).

Policy processes were generally opened up in the 1990s through the Ugandan Constitution passed in 1995 – at least rhetorically. CSOs were granted the opportunity of participation by the government because “it is an important part of the democratic process in the country”<sup>8</sup> (Brock/McGee/Ssewakiryanga 2002: 16). So, theoretically the policy space is open to all Ugandans. Poverty reduction policy spaces are especially growing due to the fact that aid focuses on this topic. “Every now and then, in the name of participation, the government invites specific CSOs [...] to attend the consultation processes” and organizations can take part, but do they have the ability to change decisions or introduce others? (Isooba 2005: 46). Franz Schmidjell knows some experiences of Ugandan NGOs and estimates the participation processes concerning the PRSP or PEAP of having been more consultative rather than been followed by actions (Interview Schmidjell 2012).

Participation in poverty reduction strategy processes depends on the governments, and in many cases, on the pressures of donors. Franz Schmidjell means that political scope has been wider in the past than it is now (Interview Schmidjell 2012). Eberlei (2007: 26) states Uganda and Tanzania as a positive example of “at least politically enforceable rules”. However, there are many limitations for participation. Due to a lot of bureaucracy through formality and protocol, it is hard for organizations to attend official meetings. It is also very costly to take part in all consultations and energies might get lost. “In the spaces where CSOs interact directly with government much seems to get lost in the search for consensus, or at least in the obligations of mutual politeness that regulate these political spaces as they do social spaces” (Brock/McGee/Ssewakiryanga 2002: 46, 48). The state always tried to avoid confrontation and transformed quite a few actors into state agencies, such as with cooperatives, or nationalize them like trade unions, or banned, such as with media (Ciganikova 2010: 216f.). Richard Ssewakiryanga stated that the possibilities to create policy documents is more opened, but when it comes to the final one you cannot be sure what is used. Also, he sees NGOs being threatened in different ways by having meetings being closed, for example (Interview Ssewakiryanga 2012).

“You have to try to open that space. It is your function, you operate within that arena.” (Professor Oloka-Onyango, Makerere University, 16<sup>th</sup> August 2007 in Ciganikova 2010: 216).

---

<sup>8</sup> It should not be forgotten that democratic promises were often also linked with the priorities donors have set. This was shown in the history of the development of NGOs in the first part of the paper.

### **3. Budget Process in Uganda**

“The budget is the single most important tool through which economic and social policy can be influenced” (FM Solutions 2008: 3). This chapter therefore deals with the budget and budget process in Uganda and explains the cycle of every year, actors involved, and the foci of the budget and its allocations.

#### **3.1. Uganda’s Budget**

“[T]he national budget is a document that, once approved by the legislature, authorises the government to raise revenues, incur debts and effect expenditures in order to achieve certain goals. Since the budget determines the origin and application of public financial resources, it plays a central role in the process of government, fulfilling economic, political, social, legal and administrative functions” (Norton/Elson 2002: 5).

The budget is described by the Uganda Debt Network as an economic policy tool by which three targets want to be achieved: “Fiscal discipline, which means controlling overall government spending so it does not go beyond the amount of resources that have been raised; allocation of resources in line with government’s policy goals [...]; the economic, efficient and effective use of resources in achieving its policy goals” (UDN 2006: 19f.).

The budget in Uganda is framed by certain legislations such as the Public Finance and Accountability Act (PFAA), the Constitution of 1995, the Local Government Act from 1997 and the Fiscal Decentralisation Strategy in 2002 (Claassens 2006; Renzio/Azeem/Ramkumar 2008: 148). The legal framework is crucial in defining clear roles and responsibilities for the high number of stakeholders in the budget process (Claassens 2006; UDN 2006: 11). The actors will be discussed in one of the subsequent chapters.

The budget strategy for the Fiscal Year (FY) 2012/13 focuses on the promotion of productive sectors such as agriculture, industry and tourism; the enhancement infrastructure in transport and energy in order to let the private sector grow; and the improvement of the quality of social services and the public sector management (MoFPED 2012: 5).

**Figure 15: Sectoral Budget Allocations, FY 2011/12 and FY 2012/13**

	Allocations (Shs. Billions)		Share of budget	
	Approved budget	Projected budget	Approved budget	Projected budget
SECTOR	FY2011/12	FY2012/13	FY2011/12	FY2012/13
SECURITY	974.9	854.8	10.1%	8.0%
WORKS AND TRANSPORT	1,290.8	1,636.9	13.4%	15.3%
AGRICULTURE	434.0	406.1	4.5%	3.8%
EDUCATION	1,416.3	1,624.6	14.7%	15.2%
HEALTH	799.1	828.5	8.3%	7.7%
WATER AND ENVIRONMENT	271.3	365.9	2.8%	3.4%
JUSTICE/LAW AND ORDER	531.6	499.2	5.5%	4.7%
ACCOUNTABILITY	543.6	606.5	5.6%	5.7%
ENERGY AND MINERAL DEVELOPMENT	1,320.0	1,450.0	13.7%	13.5%
TOURISM, TRADE AND INDUSTRY	53.2	54.5	0.6%	0.5%
LANDS, HOUSING AND URBAN DEV'T	32.4	23.5	0.3%	0.2%
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT	50.4	58.2	0.5%	0.5%
ICT	12.1	12.0	0.1%	0.1%
PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT	986.2	992.4	10.2%	9.3%
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION	231.8	234.8	2.4%	2.2%
LEGISLATURE	162.7	222.4	1.7%	2.1%
INTEREST PAYMENTS DUE	519.6	840.4	5.4%	7.8%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>9,630.0</b>	<b>10,710.6</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: MofPED 2012: 117


The figure above shows the budget allocations by sector for the last year and the projections for the current fiscal year. The biggest part of the current year is planned to go to works and transport with 15.3%, followed by education with 15.2%. Energy is the next biggest sector when it comes to budget allocations with 13.5%, then public sector management with 9.3% and security with 8%. In fact, the budget for security matters is supposed to decrease by 2% in comparison with the last year. Looking at other numbers from the year before it has decreased annually (Kuteesa 2006: 11). Richard Ssewakiryanga sees poverty reduction as one of the main points needed and demands this to be reflected in the budget. Increasing the investments in the health sector and aligning the budget with the National Development Plan are especially crucial for him (Interview Ssewakiryanga 2012). When looking at this request one can see that health allocations are planned to decrease by 0.6%. Education, however, is still on the rise. In the sense of pro-poor budgeting the focus was set on poverty reduction and social sectors, in fact by increasing budget spending on sectors such as education, health etc. (UDN 2006: 18).

An important issue for Uganda's budget is the dependency on donors. Uganda's budget heavily relies on international donors (Interview General Consulate 2012). In fact, donors have a lot of influence when discussing the budget as aid makes up a big part of it. The



problematics described are the conditionalities that come with it, such as the commitment to good governance, the focus on anti-corruption mechanisms and the promotion of accountability in certain ways (Khan 2009: 5). Uganda's revenue is split almost equally between external and internal flows. "Beginning in the second half of the 1990s, Uganda enjoyed an increase in inflows of budget support, including debt relief. Gross aid inflows increased by over four percentage points of GDP, from around 5% in 1998/99 to 9% in the last financial year [2003/04]. By June 2004, external assistance contributed 49% of Uganda's total resource envelope" (Kuteesa a.o. 2006: 5f.).

**Figure 16 Uganda's total revenue, 1992/93 to 2003/04**




Source: Kuteesa a.o. 2006: 5

A critical point mentioned by Wipfel is related to the income distribution of Uganda. It is a risk for donors that partner countries could put less money where donors support them and use their sources for other areas (Interview Wipfel 2012). What my interview partner was talking about can be described as fungibility of aid. It refers to aid financing programs or activities that the partner countries would have to carry out either way, but now do not have to (Ashoff 2010: 38f.). A big part of aid goes to social sectors and services, which means that a country could use it for other areas. Especially in Uganda, one critical point of the budget has been the allocation of resources to the military. In fact, a representative from the MoFPED of Uganda once stated in a meeting with Austrian representatives that they are not willing to open up the military budget to outsiders with the reason that it is a private, internal matter (Interview Wipfel 2012). The General Consulate also mentioned the high population growth that poses a challenge for Uganda since there are not enough resources for all infrastructural tasks that

Uganda needs to accomplish, as well as enough income to deal with such a big growth (Interview General Consulate 2012). If you look at “social services, culture, education and all these things, you will find that nearly 80% of that is still financed by donor funding” (Interview Ssewakiryanga 2012). This reflects again the donor dependence Uganda is faced with.

A good visualisation of Uganda’s aid and budget data is given from the Publish What You Fund campaign and the Open Knowledge foundation that collected all data on Uganda’s budget from 2003 until 2006 and put it together in order to see how aid is spent. It is the first time that something like this has been done (Publish What You Fund Website).

**Figure 17: Aid and Budgets in Uganda visualized**



Source: Publish What You Fund Website

“The vast majority of this \$1.1bn in aid was spent directly by donors on various projects, with only a third given to the government to spend along with its domestic resources. Interestingly, aid money made up only a small proportion of resources for education, while accounting for the majority of resources for health, agriculture, water and the environment.” (Provost 2011)

To get this data, a lot of time had to be spent because it turned out to be rather difficult getting all the information because donors divide their aid in different ways and it takes a long time to

match the different sectors. One result has also been that the Ugandan government was only conscious about 50% of aid spent (Provost 2011).


### **3.2. Budget Cycle**

“The budget cycle is, purportedly, a planning cycle in which monitoring and evaluation inform formulation” (Norton/Elson 2002: 9). The fiscal year in Uganda starts on the first of July and ends on the 30<sup>th</sup> of June of the following year. The budget process itself starts in October with the budget consultative conference of the financial ministry of Uganda, the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development where members of Parliament, line ministries, local government officials, private sector, civil society, donors and the media can take part. During this meeting sector working groups are put together and economic policies for the next years are discussed. The sector working groups are one area where civil society actors can play an important role to enforce their topics. In November, budget consultative meetings are held with local governments which set up Sector Budget Framework Papers (BFP). These are medium term sector budget strategy documents that are distributed in January containing the three year strategy of a local government (Medium Term Expenditure Framework, MTEF) of which the National Budget Framework Paper is developed from by the end of February (including the MTEF)<sup>9</sup>. Those papers have to reflect the national goals of the national development strategy. The budget proposals are checked and another meeting (public expenditure meeting in May) is held to discuss them. Again, different stakeholders are included here to discuss budget proposals. In June, the budget is presented in front of the parliament and to the public. It is finally released by June 15<sup>th</sup> to start the new fiscal year on the 1<sup>st</sup> of July (UDN 2006: 20f.; Renzio/Azeem/Ramkumar 2008: 149; Richter/Stocker-Waldhuber 2008: 12f.). Williamson is talking about a consultative budget process (Williamson 2008: 3). Richter and Stocker-Waldhuber see the advantages of the cyclic process for wider participation and the assessment of local needs. Information can be received, a voice can be given and the sense of community strengthened. When implemented well, local democracy is enforced and a feeling of ownership can emerge. For this, resources are needed and local politicians should not resist against it (Richter/Stocker-Waldhuber 2008: 17f.).

---

<sup>9</sup> Look for MoFPED Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (2010): National Budget Framework Paper. FY 2010/11 – FY 2014/2015.

**Figure 18: National Budget Process of Uganda**



Source: A Citizen's Guide to the Uganda Budget Process in UDN 2006: 23

In the beginning of the Millennium the medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) was formally becoming a tool integrated in the budgeting and planning in Uganda. Before, it was a budgetary plan used as a fiscal policy tool (FM Solutions 2008: 1; Kuteesa a.o. 2006: 8). It has now operated for over ten years and “[i]ts transparent and participatory budget process is one of the most-admired in Africa” (Republic of Uganda 2005: 3). The MTEF captures the resources that are going from the central government to the local governments (UDN 2006: 28). Its objectives are to: “match expenditures with available resources; guide sectoral allocation of expenditure; facilitate strategic sector planning; and improve efficiency and effectiveness in resource use” (Kuteesa a.o. 2006: 8).

As mentioned before budget framework papers are set up on all different levels. Sector working groups prepare sector budget framework papers and local governments prepare local government budget framework papers. Those papers include all funding sources, sector performances are reviewed and objectives and outputs identified. The papers are then submitted to the MoFPED which then prepares the National Budget Framework Paper (NBFP)

in which the MTEF is included (Kuteesa a.o. 2006: 23; Williamson 2008: 8). This means, that the national budget is a collective of BFPs that are prepared at sectoral and sub-national levels.

Besides the BFPs, some popular versions of documents are set up. These are for example Budget at a Glance, Citizen's Guide to the Budget Process, Budget in Brief and so on in order to facilitate the budget for the population and explain expenses and goals (Kuteesa a.o. 2006: 24; Richter/Stocker-Waldhuber 2008: 22). Furthermore, an annual background of the budget paper is created and distributed in seven local languages (Richter/Stocker-Waldhuber 2008: 25). It is described as "user-friendly, easily accessible, timely, comprehensive" (Claassens 2006) and gives information throughout about the whole budget cycle. Pictures and little comics are included to show the population goals of the budget (ibid. 2006). This also includes what an individual can do in order to know if the money that has come to the district is being spent in the correct way or not.

For civil society, some authors argue that space has been provided in the drafting of the budget through sector working groups and local government budget workshops. "While the extent to which civil society organisations are able to shape budget priorities is unclear and perhaps limited, the budget system is increasingly moving toward the establishment of a more participatory approach" (Renzio/Azeem/Ramkumar 2008: 149f.). The question of the involvement of civil society and its activities will be dealt with in the next chapter on civil society budget actors in Uganda. It is a fact that civil society demands more involvement in decision-making processes and the right for information (Richter/Stocker-Waldhuber 2008: 21). This is also what UDN has analyzed. While the budget formulation process demands participation of different stakeholders, "the level of engagement has not been very effective especially on the side of CSOs" (UDN 2006: 21) since they are mainly included at the level of sector working group discussion. Moreover, capacity issues often hinder participation of CSOs and the ability to influence the process in a strong way. Their participation is described as presence rather than opposing, influencing, changing or shaping discussions and outcomes. Three main factors are defined that restrict civil society participation: citizens are very often not aware of their roles, limited capacity restricts policy advocacy, and participation mostly only happens by invitation for only a few (ibid. 2006: 21f.).

Since the budget is considered the most important economic tool of the government and the reflection of a nation's priorities, it is crucial to include all stakeholders at different levels of

the budget process in order to make sure that the budget fits all needs (DENIVA 2006: 122). The actors involved in the budget process will be discussed in the next subchapter.

### **3.3. Budget Actors**

“Until recently the budgetary process was viewed as the exclusive preserve of policymakers and administrators and treated as a purely technical matter for expert consideration” (Robinson 2006: 7). This view has changed and especially in Uganda where a rather participative budgeting process is in place. This chapter deals with the stakeholders involved, such as: the Cabinet that reviews and endorses the budget proposals, the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) that drafts the annual budget, the parliament, donors and civil society. Of course sector ministries and local governments are also involved as described in the budget cycle (Renzio/Azeem/Ramkumar 2008: 148), but will not be under further examination.

#### **3.3.1. Cabinet**

The Cabinet is a meeting of ministers in which decisions for the whole government are made. “It should work according to collective responsibility and accountability to parliament” (Norton/Elson 2002: 9). The Cabinet is also a mechanism to ensure that the final outcome of the budget process is accepted by the ministries and ministers (ibid. 2002: 9f.).

#### **3.3.2. Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development**

The Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) controls the budget process and coordinates it. It has the responsibility for the budget, its expenditures and the management of it. It produces the National Budget Framework Paper every year and publishes popular documents on its website. Sometimes, however, the website is not regularly updated for which it has been criticized (Brock/McGee/Ssewakiryanga 2002: 13f.; Norton/Elson 2002: 10; Ssewakiryanga 2011b: 109).

#### **3.3.3. Donors**

As heard before donors are heavily included in the budget and play an advisory role in the formulation of it. Because of Uganda’s dependency on donors, the role donors play in the budget process is unlikely to change. However, the shift from project to budget support is supposed to give government more control over their funds (Claassens 2006). Another point that should be mentioned is the question of whether donors give support to parliaments or not. Many donors are averse to giving support to parliamentarians due to the political landscape (OECD 2011: 35).

### **3.3.4. Parliament**

“The Parliament of Uganda has a wide mandate to ensure that government officials, civil society and the general public participate” (DENIVA 2006: 122). Due to the Budget Act in 2001 a Parliamentary Budget Office and a Budget Committee were created to make certain that parliament is involved in the budget process from the beginning and giving it more power (Eberlei 2007: 26; FM Solutions 2008: 1f.). “Parliament has a constitutional mandate and responsibility for approving the budget annually. In collaboration with local government councils and civil society it has a key role in monitoring the outcomes of government spending” (Khan 2009: 12). The roles of the parliament are also supposed to promote domestic budget accountability. In the budget cycle parliament can engage in several ways:

- Revision and recommendations to the executive about the contents of the NBFP,
- Deliberation and approval of the national budget,
- Revision of central and local government public accounts (Williamson 2008: 12).

The Parliament consists of twelve committees of which five of them are directly working with financial matters: Committee on Budget, Public Accounts Committee, Committee on Commissions, Statutory Authorities and State Enterprises, Local Government Accounts Committee and Committee on the National Economy. Further ten sessional committees are reporting to the Budget Committee about government activities and estimates for the budget (FM Solutions 2008: 1).

The involvement of the parliament in the budget process brought some developments such as the national consultative meeting in October/November where all stakeholders can discuss on the MTEF. Moreover, the parliament is involved and considered from the first stages of the budget and standards were introduced to ensure the parliament has time to work on ministerial policy statements, for example. A new legislation introduced legal requirements and documentation on the budget. “The Budget Act now requires that every bill introduced in Parliament be accompanied by an explanation of any financial implications” (FM Solutions 2008: 2). The parliament has now more information which improved their work and proved the whole budget (ibid. 2008: 2). One empowerment has also been the ability to reject ministries’ budget proposals (Brock/McGee/Ssewakiryanga 2002: 13).

However, parliaments usually get the information very late and rarely have the expertise and enough staff to engage in all budget processes (Interview Schmidjell 2012). Parliament is also

challenged in terms of their autonomy and independence in order to have a strong position towards the government. “According to the PD Evaluation II, Parliament is still not yet fully given its constitutional space to make critical decisions on new and existing aid, including monitoring aid’s impact on the population and holding sector ministries and development partners accountable” (Ssewakiryanga 2011b: 108).

### **3.3.5. Civil Society**

As described in the budget process civil society can take part during the time of the drafting. Generally, civil society organisations have acknowledged the improvements that have been made in the budget system, although criticism exists on whether their role and function is also recognized and taken into account by government. Commonly, “[e]xisting mechanisms for public participation in the budget include sector working groups, budget workshops at local government level, the preparation of budget framework papers, as well as public expenditure reviews on consultative group meetings” (Claassens 2006). For information about the budget and financial matters, the media is playing an important role (ibid. 2006). This is crucial since high suspicion is coming from the population towards the government, due to history, corruption and politics (Interview Klatzer 2012).

Especially in the last five fiscal years CSOs have been engaged in budget issues and have also been invited by the MoFPED. According to DENIVA the Uganda Debt Network, the Forum for Women in Democracy and Uganda Manufacturers Association are the lead CSOs in these matters.

“The activities carried out by CSOs in Uganda and indeed worldwide are centred on:

- simplifying and disseminating budget information,
- identifying and setting priorities,
- influencing revenues policies,
- identifying trends and providing projections,
- highlighting best practices,
- tracking revenue and expenditures” (DENIVA 2006: 122).

The involvement of CSOs in the budget process means more activity on analysis and review. When it comes to budget work civil society in Uganda is quite strong. In comparison with other countries, civil society structures are stronger and more transparent (Interview Wipfel 2012). Some other organisations are strongly involved in the process which will be analyzed in the next chapter.



## 4. Civil Society Budget Actors in Uganda

In a next step a closer look will be taken at organizations engaging in the budget process. Their activities, involvement and outcomes will be considered and compared with each other.

“[D]emocratic budgeting processes are a new reality in many countries”, however still weak since parliaments capacities are limited and NGOs very often lack enough access to information and budget systems (Eberlei 2009: 19). Nevertheless, it has become an area of activity for many organizations, also in Uganda. In this context, the concept of participatory budgeting is worth mentioning which aims at giving citizens direct choice and power to decide allocations of a budget. This concept was created in the late 1980s in Porto Alegre in Brazil where citizens met in open, public assemblies before the legislative budget cycle. Budget Councillors are elected to meet during the year to set up the final budget document (Norton/Elson 2002: 42). Uganda’s budget process is also designed in a participatory manner by holding meetings and setting up sector working groups at different levels, especially since civil society has been recognized in the last few decades and the need to integrate it in key institutions is crucial for the development of the country (Mutasa 2007: 18).

Civil society organizations are perceived to play a crucial role for the country, in terms of democratization as they mobilize people, engage in advocacy and sometimes oppose government on some issues (Ciganikova 2010: 218). Budget monitoring is also seen as a way to enforce the capacity of communities to hold local governments accountable. Budget effectiveness is an important issue and topics such as corruption show how budgets affect the life of the population. It is necessary to put attention on the budget and mechanisms attached to it (Renzio/Azeem/Ramkumar 2008: 168).

This is especially important due to the change of aid modalities. Projects are usually set up as supplementing policy measures. Through new instruments, tasks of aid are becoming part of state policies again. The reason for this is that financial resources are channelled via state instruments and when using budget support even directly over the state budget. Contents and goals of processes are part of the public sector again and decided by the state. Civil society organisations are therefore trying to participate and be included in the sense of democracy – not only as a completion of policy measures but as actors themselves (Gubitzer/Klatzer a.o. 2008: 115).

#### **4.1. Aspects of Civil Society Engagement in Budget Issues**

One reason for the engagement of civil society is to hold the government accountable. In order to enforce accountability it is necessary to break the silence. This was an important topic for the VIDC in one of their projects. For example, when some centimetres of asphalt of a street are missing although differently planned and nobody complains, something should be done. One of the interview partners talked about the culture of silence where the silence needs to be broken (Interview Schmidjell 2012). Three conditions have been defined on how this is possible: “citizens have access to information about state commitments and its fulfilment (transparency), citizens have the capacity to demand state responsiveness for its actions (answerability) [and] mechanisms exist to sanction poor performance (enforceability)” (European Commission 2011: 69). Furthermore, there are some more factors that define the ability of civil society’s influence on government policies. One such factor is the political environment and if there are ways civil society can participate in the budget process. Transparency and access to budget information are other issues that show the capacity of CSOs to analyze and evaluate policies. Capacity should also be available from organizations themselves since technical skills and supply is needed in order to operate. One way that CSOs finance their activities concerning budget monitoring and advocacy is through donor funding which can be problematic due to criticism of acting according to donor priorities. On the other hand, donors are not always likely to finance basic costs for organisations to engage in lobby and demand administration costs to be held low (ADC/Danida/Sida 2012: 58; Renzio 2006b: 11).

An important point mentioned is policy work in which parliament and CSOs can cooperate for more quality in this process. Four mechanisms are defined where CSOs can collaborate with parliament: to provide expert inputs, to include civil society perspectives in parliamentary hearings, to coordinate outreach activities for the participation of grassroots and secure long-term agreements through alliances with political parties (Jones/Tembo 2008: 6). In addition, quality analyses are a useful way to make an impact, as well as set up alliances. Another option is having good relationships with the government and ministries to collaborate with (Robinson 2006: 27).

In this context, it makes sense to distinguish between claimed and invited spaces for civil society when taking a look at their activities. The Joint Evaluation of Support to Civil Society Engagement in Policy Dialogue sees the use of those claimed spaces by CSOs as “crucial

where Government is unwilling to engage formally and where CSOs purposely intend to create public interest in their cause” (ADC/Danida/Sida 2012: viii). Certain approaches are used in order to claim space such as education and mobilization, demonstrations, media, public hearings, campaigns, research papers etc. Invited spaces on the contrary are given to CSOs in forms of official parliamentary consultations, but also public consultations. While invited space is often coming and controlled from the government top-down, claimed space is created by CSOs themselves. This can be through lobbying, campaigning, education etc. In fact, invited spaces are common when governments are interested in having CSOs’ opinions (ibid. 2012: 4, 26f.).

Relevant activities concerning the budget also lie on budget awareness, literacy, transparency and participation. Awareness-building includes transmitting information of budgets in order to create budget literacy. Trainings and meetings take place in order to enlarge people and actors involved. Another way is assisting legislators when dealing with budgets by consultation meetings, training seminars or just giving information about budget proposals. Budget transparency can be improved in some ways. One way is the government providing information on budget policies and to allow access and publication of official papers and date. Training is again an important part to having stakeholders involved. Another impact has been widening the space for participation in the budget process and to give people a chance to be heard and to have access (Robinson 2006: 22f., 25). Transparency is also important since it is a key part in program aid in order to make aid more effective, reduce corruption and a lack of institutional capacities (Gubitzer/Klatzer a.o. 2008: 80).

Policy dialogue is defined as one area for civil society actors to engage. Generally, it is defined in the Accra Agenda for Action as “open and inclusive dialogue on development” (ADC/Danida/Sida 2012: 31). Interviews carried out in Uganda by the Uganda CSO Scoping Study 2011 found following definitions what policy dialogue means and should be:

“organizing round table forums with policy makers to discuss pertinent policy issues; participating in legislative drafting and contributing alternative reports on Uganda’s implementation of its obligations; engaging with policy makers on issues as they emerge; having a collective voice on pertinent policy issues and presenting evidence to the policy makers; presenting position papers to Government or to contribute to on-going policy formulation; a transparent, participatory and inclusive process that incorporate issues of others and ensures responsiveness in government processes; a process that allows government to utilize alternatives views from CSOs, and to strengthen service delivery and democratic processes” (in ADC/Danida/Sida 2012: 31).

To sum up the strategies and methods of engagement in policy dialogue, looking at the following graph is helpful:

**Figure 19: Methods of Engagement in Policy Dialogue**

Direct and Formal	Direct and Informal	Indirect Contribution to Dialogue
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Advocacy and campaigning (including public litigation)<sup>33</sup></li> <li>• Invited space for policy reform</li> <li>• Evidence based research</li> <li>• Monitoring (and holding to account)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Behind the scenes lobbying</li> <li>• Networking and collation building</li> <li>• Demonstration and mass action</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Information education and training</li> <li>• Capacity building for supply side CSO engagement</li> </ul>

Source: ADC/Danida/Sida 2012: 32

When it comes to budget work the area of gender budgeting is also interesting since women have tried a long time in Uganda to achieve empowerment and participation, actually having had successes. Basically, gender budgeting aims at analyzing structure and impact of budgets by revising public budgets and taking a look at the position of the sexes. The content of budgets as well as the processes of the whole budget system in terms of participation and transparency are relevant. Budget initiatives are crucial for widening democratic influence mechanisms and improving the use of public resources. In order to have a democratic and financially political system with a transparent, participative budget process and accountable actors, changes need to be made. Program support is especially criticized for leaving out gender issues for which gender budgeting is seen as a useful tool for reform. Similarities in the approaches are defined as good governance, effectiveness orientation, accountability, transparency and inclusion of civil society organizations. Gender equality and other issues related with gender are usually being focussed on in aid. Due to the changes of aid modalities, aid flows are going more directly to the state budget, which means that decisions about the use of resources lie on the government. Generally, while gender action plans might exist, the national development strategies might not be directly including those points (Gubitzer/Klatzer a.o. 2008: 9, 38, 40, 48). In the case of Uganda, the National Development Plan clearly addresses interventions that raise gender equality indicators and acknowledges that “Uganda’s development progress [...] continues to be constrained by gender inequalities and social vulnerabilities” (Republic of Uganda 2010: 21). This is so, even though the constitution includes equality between women and men and commitments are in place such as the Gender policy assuring a framework for gender responsive development (ibid. 2010: i).

The following actions were defined in the National Development plan to promote gender equality:

**Figure 20: Strategic actions for promoting gender equality and transforming mind-set, attitudes, cultural practices, and perceptions**

NO	Strategic Actions
1	Build capacity for mainstreaming gender issues in development plans at both central and local Government levels.
2	Promote affirmative action in all political, economic and social spheres.
3	Promote gender equality and the empowerment of women throughout the economy sectors, particularly in the areas of: governance, education, health, employment, agriculture, trade and industry, and access to justice. Prioritised gender-responsive strategies include: improving retention and participation rates for girls in schools, improving quality and availability of maternal and reproductive health care for women and girls, targeting women in HIV prevention programmes, addressing prevention, treatment and access to justice issues around SGBV, improving access to productive resources and services for female farmers to play a larger role in commercial agriculture, improving access to resources such as credit, business skills, training and market information for female entrepreneurs.
4	Promote equal access to education and other productive, human and social capital assets.
5	Ratify and domesticate international protocols and principles such as the African charter on human rights of women, PWDs and Children and Eliminating gender based violence.
6	Develop, adopt and inculcate a set of national ethical values in line with the national vision while mitigating and reducing the negative cultural values and practices. Ensure respect of the national symbols and values
7	Promote and institutionalise the agreed national ethical values in the education curriculum and other public trainings.
8	Promote patriotism, volunteerism and commitment to national agenda through various national service programmes.
9	Transform the mindset of the population through various training and practical programmes. (Examples of such programmes include epi-centre strategy).
10	Carry out civic education and community mobilization to transform mindsets to appreciate productivity and development.
11	Harness and blend indigenous knowledge with scientific knowledge.
12	Promote cultural and ethnic diversity through various government and non government programmes
13	Strengthen, deepen and expand existing private enterprise development skills through structured institutional support

Source: Republic of Uganda 2010: 47

Furthermore, Uganda has many mechanisms in place assuring women participation in parliament and local governments. It is clear however that in order to have gender budgeting, information is needed. Access to information and the understandable formulation for the people is relevant (Gubitzer/Klatzer a.o. 2008: 80). While background to the budget papers and brochures exist in Uganda, it will be interesting to look at the work of a women civil society organization such as FOWODE, which is active in ensuring gender debates for budgets and their views on the transparency, literacy and openness of the budget and the government of Uganda. This issue also emerges since Klatzer from the Vienna University of Economics and Business sees “policy evaporation” happening when it comes to gender budgeting. Generally, more and more countries open up spaces for NGO participation. Especially in Uganda, processes are designed rather participative. Many discussions and

papers are reproduced. However, when it comes to the final version of policies and decisions, the picture is different. One could say “Evaporation of Participation” (Interview Klatzer 2012).

## **4.2. Comparison of Actors**

Having looked at the budget cycle and restrictions for civil society while their participation is demanded and their possible ways of engaging, this chapter deals with the more concrete actions, activities and goals of CSOs engaged in budget work. The following analysis is primarily based on literature and internet research with further confirmation and illustration of expert interviews. Further empirical research is needed for a full understanding and evaluation of the matter. However, the literature holds many points to see activities and developments concerning the civil society’s engagement in the budget processes in Uganda.

This article will take a look at the Uganda Debt Network (UDN), the Forum for Women in Development (FOWODE), the Uganda National NGO Forum (UNNGOF), and the coalition that was formed, which is the Civil Society Budget Advocacy Group.

One actor mentioned many times with great impact has been the Uganda Debt Network (UDN). UDN was formed in 1996 as a coalition of organizations and individuals to campaign for debt relief for Uganda before it was registered in 1998 as an NGO and started operating. By 2003, it had a total of 40 organisations and 101 individuals in its networks. Its goals, vision and mission are

“to ensure that Uganda emerges from being a debt-burdened poor country and embarks on the road to sustainable development, growth and poverty eradication; to ensure that macro-economic and budget policies are participatory and incorporate the concerns and interests of poor people; to mobilise the public to ensure public accountability and transparency in policy formulation and planning and in the utilisation of public resources; and to ensure that UDN becomes an effective lobbying and advocacy organisation; able to mobilise civil society to influence policy planning at national and local levels.” (Renzio/Azeem/Ramkumar 2008: 151)

Its activities primarily lie on research, advocacy by campaigning in order to enforce government and poverty-reduction in Uganda and anti-corruption initiatives. It is very popular for its local budget monitoring operations as well as engaging in national policy processes. UDN brings outcomes of local monitoring activities and their own research together to have an impact on national policy making (ibid. 2008: 145, 152). The campaign for international debt relief has “consolidated its relationship with government over their joint efforts to secure debt relief as a mutually beneficial outcome of common interest” and UDN has become a

consultant for the GoU and part of the Poverty Action Fund (PAF) monitoring committee. Next to this, it coordinates its own government monitoring system (Brock/McGee/Ssewakiryanga 2002: 31). In fact, UDN has been able to put pressure on the government in order to improve budget implementations in areas of health and education (Renzio 2006b: 11). Together with the UNNGOF, UDN has revised the poverty eradication action plans in cooperation with the government (Kwagala 2003: 159). This shows its collaboration with government, parliament and media and its wide range of relationships established (Renzio/Azeem/Ramkumar 2008: 152). UDN works with people at the grassroots levels, but also initiated media programs on the issues. UDN participates in policy review workshops by the government, organized a forum for civil society and works together with other CSOs. The local budget monitoring was innovated as Community Based Monitoring and Evaluation System to make sure communities are involved and able to monitor their activities (DENIVA 2006: 57). The mentioned budget monitoring work is also presented at forums locally and nationally (Robinson 2006: 26). By this, government expenditure is under scrutiny and in fact, it has helped to improve the quality of government spending because corruption could be reduced (Renzio/Azeem/Ramkumar 2008: 145). Budgets are trained to be monitored for which workshops are provided (Robinson 2006: 23). UDN as a CSO also takes part in budget conferences and in the budget formulation process and analyzes policies regularly (DENIVA 206: 122). Generally, UDN gives out newsletters and other material on government budgets; 10,000 newsletters are circulated throughout the country and local radios are involved in informing people. “In these various ways the press and broadcast media not only provide a platform for disseminating budget information but they also contribute to improved transparency where the availability of official government information is limited” (Robinson 2006: 25). UDN has the advantage of being one of a few who work outside of the cities where they operate as consultants or monitor budget processes (Interview Schmidjell 2012). Budget committees were implemented in many sub-counties of 12 districts at the moment (UDN Website 2012). Many lacks and shortcomings could have been defined so far. For example:

“These include the quality of building materials for the construction of classrooms not being in conformity with technical specifications due to the use of poor quality or inadequate materials, the absence of essential drugs from health centres, and teacher absenteeism. The community monitors report such cases to the local authorities to ensure appropriate action against errant officials and to increase or reassign resource allocations in line with budget provisions.” (Robinson 2006: 20)

Budget monitoring, concerning its implementation and service delivery through local committees that were trained before, has become “one of UDN’s major trademark activities and one which has earned it credibility and recognition” (Renzio/Azeem/Ramkumar 2008: 152). The activities described so far are part of four main programs of UDN. The local committees for budget monitoring belong to the community based monitoring and evaluation system (CBMES) for community participation and empowerment (CPE). Further programmes deal with policy analysis and socio-economic research, Budget Advocacy Initiative and governance and rights (UDN Website 2012). CBMES has brought clear outcomes: the reports showed problems with construction work and corruption, poor infrastructure, teacher absenteeism, absence of drugs and much more (Renzio/Azeem/Ramkumar 2008: 154). The program Policy Analysis and Socio-Economic Research was established in 1999 due to the lack of information available for the public. UDN decided to carry out research before engaging with policy makers. “The major objective of the Policy Analysis and Socio-Economic Research programme is to strengthen the capacity of UDN and Civil Society in general to effectively engage in policy policies at local, national, regional and international levels” (UDN Website 2012). As said before, UDN is acknowledged as a competent organization with the issues it engages in. The publications of UDN are recognized as “timely, relevant, and accurate” (Renzio/Azeem/Ramkumar 2008: 157). UDN is also invited by the government and works together with the MoFPED. In fact, due to the collaboration with the MoFPED the Citizens’ Guide to the Budget was created that explains the budget and budget process in a simpler way (ibid. 2008: 157f.). The Budget Advocacy Initiative was created in the same year as a program of UDN. Its goal has been to mobilize civil society in Uganda since not all needs of the population have been addressed in the budget and other policies (UDN Website 2012).

It “seeks to ensure that national and local budgets incorporate the priorities of poor and marginalised groups; seeks to increase the active participation of civil society in the budget formulation process and to enforce accountability among public officials in charge of the budget process a both national and local levels; aims to develop a strong network of civil society budget practitioners who can work to support the adoption of pro-poor budget policies.” (Renzio/Azeem/Ramkumar 2008: 155)

As the activities show a big emphasis is put on pro-poor activities. UDN has for example published the study on “How pro-poor are local government budgets in Uganda” and is aimed at seeing how local governments work, how budgets are set up and expenditures happen (UDN 2006: x). The governance and Rights programme reflects UDN’s engagement in anti-corruption issues. The goal of the program is for the president “to implement zero tolerance towards corruption, wastage and misuse of public resources” (UDN Website 2012) by



educating citizens via media, establishing networks of anti-corruption activists and publishing articles on topics such as public finance, regulations and mechanisms (Renzio/Azeem/Ramkumar 2008: 156). One concrete outcome has been the creation of the Anti-Corruption Coalition of Uganda (ACCU) because budget transparency helps reduce corruption. ACCU helped mobilize local citizens and communities to claim from the government to fight corruption. An annual anti-corruption week has been sponsored and radio talk shows, TV programs dealt with issues around corruption such as how to eliminate it (Robinson 2006: 25). UDN's strength lies in the connection of local and national approaches that gave it credibility and legitimacy. Its research programme has helped gain a lot of information and knowledge. Furthermore, its networks and relationships established were a key to success, such as with media, government officials, other CSOs and the population. However, areas such as the geographical scope and reach of the programs and the non-confrontational approach towards the government are sometimes criticized (Renzio/Azeem/Ramkumar 2008: 164ff.).

The case of women in Uganda is a sign for how long and time-consuming it can be to influence policy processes. General activities can be traced back until the colonial period and have had a strong increase after the independence of the country (ADC/Danida/Sida 2012: 40). The Forum for Women in Development (FOWODE) is seen as one of the lead CSOs – next to ACFODE and UWONET - for gender issues and also central for gender budgeting. It is operating since 1995. FOWODE could achieve a very good position concerning discussions with the government due to their continuous work in that field. They are seen as a serious partner (Interview Klatzer 2012). FOWODE has its head office in Kampala and exists since the debates concerning the Constitution of 1995. It has the mission “of promoting gender equality in all areas of decision-making through advocacy, training, research and publication” (FOWODE Website 2012). FOWODE works with women in politics and those who would like to be in politics at both national and local levels. Also, young people are included in their programs. FOWODE makes use of collaborations and networks such as international CSOs and other national CSOs, government, donors, media as well as researchers, research institutions and individuals. Currently, they have three programmes put in place: Gender Budget Programme, Leadership Building Programme, Decision Making Programme. The Gender Budget Programme especially deals with development initiatives to ensure that policies for men and women are included in policies, programs and budgets.

Their work encompasses following points:

1. “Build the capacity of women legislators both at the national and local government levels to independently analyze budgets from a gender budget perspective.
2. Monitor government commitment to addressing gender and equity issues through resource allocation
3. Increase awareness about the importance of GBP as a toll for achieving gender equality and equity
4. Work closely with National and district governments to develop mechanisms for engendering their plans and budgets
5. Work with civil society organizations in Uganda under the Civil Society Budget Advocacy Group<sup>10</sup> (CSBAG) to influence National policies and budgets from a pro-poor and gender sensitive perspective.” (FOWODE Website 2012)

A very effective strategy under this program has been the creation of Village Budget Clubs within local communities. These are led by women and engage in budget monitoring to check the performance and expenditures to prevent corruption from happening. This is especially important since infrastructure conditions are very often poor. The positive effect of this program is the empowerment of local citizens and the opportunity to make changes themselves (FOWODE Blogspot 2012, personal experience of Trinity Overmyer). One of the greatest achievements of FOWODE has been the convincement of the government to start gender budgeting (DENIVA 2006: 123). In the area of gender budgeting gender responsive budgets are one of the major points of FOWODE. It is a method to analyze the performance of different sectors and gender analyses of the national budgets are carried out (Khan 2009: 10). Gender responsive budgeting was established for the first time in Australia in 1994 and meant including a gender equality perspective into budgets. Its tools involve research techniques and analytical approaches towards gender issues, people’s priorities, taxes, budget on time use (Holzner 2008: 52). FOWODE’s Leadership Programme especially addresses young people and the Decision Making Programme focuses on women and their empowerment. The focus of women stems from the reason that even though women account for one third of MPs in parliament, the lead of men is dominant. The amount of women therefore does not reflect the share of the population (50/50). Skills and knowledge of women are supported and lobbying work is done in order to integrate women’s agenda in decision making. FOWODE also has a resource center that collects information material on topics such as gender, governance, democracy and human rights (FOWODE Website 2012). On a local level FOWODE works together with ACFODE by setting up trainings for gender budget analysis. “Through their work government plans and budgets include more a gender


---

<sup>10</sup> The Civil Society Budget Advocacy Group will be part of discussion later since it is a network comprising several CSOs.

perspective in the six districts where they are operating (Luwero, Kibaale, Kabale, Pallisa, Masaka, Tororo)” (Khan 2009: 10). Khan sees FOWODE’s impact in improving discussions in parliament and to spread awareness and acceptance of gender in the budget. One strategy for success has been the collaboration with government where FOWODE works with officers in planning and budgeting in general. Gender is not the only issue FOWODE works with when it comes to budgeting, but rather wants to make sure equality is given in the budget. Moreover, MPs and councillors work with the organization (ibid. 2009: 10). FOWODE has also installed a Blog about experiences and actions undertaken. It includes engagements in budget policies. Concerning education and health in this year’s budget a position paper has been presented for the national budget framework before Parliament, which was led by the CSBAG. It suggested raising the budget allocation to education up to 20 percent in order to improve universal primary and secondary education. A need was also expressed in raising teachers’ salaries up. Regarding health, it has been recognized that improvements have happened concerning infrastructure but problems remain among others in shortage of drugs, understaffing, not enough equipment and absenteeism of health workers. The activities of FOWODE presented in the Blog show the tight collaboration of FOWODE with Uganda Women’s Parliamentary Association (UWOPA) that try to strengthen gender responsive budgeting as well. The UWOPA consists of all women MPs. All trends are noted down in order to share experiences and inform others about what is going on in the budget process on a big scale and also on a community level (FOWODE Blogspot 2012).

The Uganda National NGO Forum is a platform for Uganda’s NGOs that aims at building a united NGO sector that is informed and coherent in order to improve citizen’s lives. The UNNGOF focuses their programs on three areas: NGO Sector Observatory and Profiling, Policy Engagement and Enhancement, and Membership and Constituency Servicing. With this focus UNNGOF chose to rather complete than compete with other NGOs and NGO networks (UNNGOF Website 2012).

**Figure 21: Linkage of UNNGOF Programmes**



Source: UNNGOF Website 2012

Generally its activities address advocacy, lobbying, the legal situation of NGOs in Uganda, campaigns against corruption, collective voice of civil society, capacity building, awareness, monitoring, administrative tasks and Quality Assurance Mechanisms of NGOs (Brock/McGee/Ssewakiryanga 2002: 24). One area of the UNNGOF is also Budget Analysis and Advocacy. In fact, it was one of the founding members of the already mentioned Civil Society Budget Advocacy Group (CSBAG) that was created in 2004 with the aim to establish a pro-poor budget. Other CSOs take part as well, such as UDN and FOWODE. The UNNGOF explains it as promotion of social accountability. CSOs should be able to engage in budget issues and budgets should be created in a way as to be transparent, equal and sustainable. The UNNGOF has therefore analyzed national budgets concerning pro-poor policies. The goal and mission of budget advocacy has been presented to the public via media and collaboration with other actors has been established. Major activities for the UNNGOF in its Budget Analysis and Advocacy function by being part of the CSBAG are the following:

- Annual Budget Analysis to scrutinize the budget with a different focus, for example the proportion of expenditure going to the poor people and sector such as agriculture, education, health, and environment budgeting.
  - A mapping of stakeholders in the Budget Advocacy terrain will be undertaken to ascertain what is being done and identify areas for synergy and gaps.
  - Participation in the formulation consultations both at district and national level to ensure that the voices of the people are incorporated.
  - Public Expenditure tracking to monitor public funds expense patterns of the government.”
- (UNNGOF Website 2012)

The Civil Society Budget Advocacy Groups consists of over ten different organizations that deal with budgeting. They gather and write a pamphlet which they present at the Annual Budget Corps of Government. Moreover, they distribute and share the documents with many different parts of the governments. First they sit down with citizens and then they engage with governments (together with UDN, FOWODE) (Interview Ssewakiryanga 2012). This is important given the regional discrepancies that exist in Uganda. It is often very difficult to implement the nationally set up poverty strategy locally in the way it is to be expected. The North very often feels left out and is wary of the central government (Interview Wipfel 2012). “Civil society budget initiatives also contributed to improved accountability by enhancing the answerability of the political executive in relation to policy decisions and budget commitments. [...] Budget tracking in Uganda provided an opportunity for legislators to raise concerns on the utilisation of government resources and to enforce expenditure commitments at the local level” (Robinson 2006: 21). Recently for the budget of 2012-2013 it has set up a dialogue with the government to discuss issues about gender sensitivity. In June the minister presented the budget to the parliament and the public. NGOs, media and development partners were also present. Harriet Adong from the Women of Uganda Network (WOUGNET) that is part of the CSBAG presented her findings, suggestions and concerns about the plan for the next financial year (WOUGNET Website 2012).<sup>11</sup>

Many areas of engagement could have been demonstrated by this chapter. The next one summarizes the organizations’ activities in order to find out patterns for contribution as well as weaknesses.

#### **4.3. Civil Society Budget Work Summarized**

“The significance of applied budget work extends beyond the immediate sphere of budget policies and the budget process by contributing to more enduring change through the strengthening of democracy” (Robinson 2006: 30). It helps to enforce accountability, transparency and participation (ibid. 2006: 30). This could be shown by the different CSOs involved in budget work in Uganda and how budgets are crucial for the life of citizens (Renzio/Azeem/Ramkumar 2008: 168).

---

<sup>11</sup>Here, the full article of the engagement can be found: <http://wougnnet.org/2012/06/civil-society-budget-advocacy-group-csbag-engages-government-during-post-budget-dialogue-for-a-gender-sensitive-budget-2012-2013/>

Research on civil society budget work in Uganda has shown that knowledge on policy matters and the budget are considered one of the most important tools to engage. The UNNGOF sees itself as a “knowledge promotion and support organization for local CSOs” (Brock/McGee/Ssewakiryanga 2002: 25). “For CSOs to effectively participate in the budget process, they need to enhance their knowledge and technical capacity to understand and analyse the budget, and also identify possible entry points for influence” (UDN 2006: 56). It is acknowledged that information is necessary in order to empower people and hold the government accountable for its actions.

This is why research for advocacy has been crucial in all above described organisations. Analyses are carried out on regular bases, such as FOWODE with gender analyses of the national budget, policy suggestions and so on (Khan 2009: 10). “Budget groups have achieved considerable success in providing an independent and authoritative source of budget information that has broadened awareness and understanding of public budgets” (Robinson 2006: 29). Information is essential in order to increase budget literacy. Therefore, publications and other materials have been distributed, for example by the Uganda Debt Network. This helps raise awareness (Renzio/Azeem/Ramkumar 2008: 159). A factor for success has been the demystification of budgets which helps transmit knowledge to the wider public and in a next step encourages citizens to observe government actions and to have accountability. Therefore, access to information is needed (ADC/Danida/Sida 2012: 53; Renzio/Azeem/Ramkumar 2008: 168). In this area, UDN has to be mentioned again and its local budget monitoring committees that ensure services are implemented the way it was planned. Trainings also make up a big part of activities of the organisations. The UDN’s opinion is that the population should be involved in the process. “By monitoring government expenditure at the local level, UDN has helped to improve the quality of government expenditure and service delivery spending and has improved the accountability of local officials” (UDN 2006: 56; Renzio/Azeem/Ramkumar 2008: 166).

In this context, working together with the media is essential since information can be published. Local radio is for example widely used by UDN. Also, other collaborations are helpful and useful, such as with government, which is important for the involvement in formulation and implementing processes (Renzio/Azeem/Ramkumar 2008: 161, 168). Towards the state the organizations described have been able to be recognized by the state. This has also been done by demonstrating their usefulness for the state concerning

consultancies and research (Graffi 2003: 43). In a country context like Uganda this is of special importance since organizations can be denied operation status or continuance when not aligning with government's priorities (see chapter on legal framework). Also, working together with other platforms or NGOs has been helpful, considering the work of the Civil Society Budget Advocacy Group. The very crucial point of the work by the CSOs done is that the local perspectives are linked to the national level and policy debates. In fact, "linking activities to different stages of the budget cycle [including citizens] allows for more effective engagement with government counterparts" (Renzio/Azeem/Ramkumar 2008: 168).

Having pointed out the strategies and ways to success, now a look on the limitations and critical points for CSO work in budgeting will be taken more concretely. One has just been mentioned being the legal framework that defines the work of CSOs and the possibility of criticism towards the state. This is also shown by the Uganda Governance Monitoring Platform which sees a "free, vibrant and publicly accountable civil society [...] important for democracy" (UGMP 2009). Civil society and the media hold the role of watchdogs in Uganda, but their influence leads to resistance from the state. One way this is done is by controlling NGOs and the media using restrictive laws (ibid. 2009). The Uganda Debt Network furthermore defines three main factors for the limitation of civil society participation in the budget process:

"The first one is the high degree of decentralized budget responsibility, especially for budget implementation amidst limited citizen awareness on their roles. The second is the limited capacity, both technical and in terms of lobbying, of NGOs to participate actively in policy advocacy. The third one is the fact that participation in consultation processes is mostly by invitation, and not all are invited." (UDN 2006: 21f.)

Concerning the third point, even if invitations take place and the process seems to be open in practice it is sometimes very different. "At the recent National Budget Workshop, while CSOs had been requested to make an input, their slot was removed at the last minute without prior notice" (Ssewakiryanga 2011b: 107). While Mutasa questions the consistency of CSO engagement in public policy, the organisations have demonstrated the opposite, a long involvement in the process until contributions could have been made. However, competition and conflicts are reality among CSOs that restrict their work (Mutasa 2007: 18). It is a fact, however, that not all districts and sub-counties have been reached by local measures so far. Another issue is the involvement of donors that very often try to push their priorities, especially when working with CSOs. During the interview with Richard Ssewakiryanga the

word “challenge” has been used a lot to describe the situation for CSOs in Uganda. He sees many ways in order to engage and improve and acknowledges that a lot of work has been done by NGOs and networks. However, the high donor dependency of the budget and the threats that NGOs deal with when not operating in the desired ways pose a challenge for their activities (Interview Ssewakiryanga 2012). Donors have often requested CSOs to harmonize with their interests. Whereas in the sense of aid effectiveness the harmonization process has led to the thought that CSOs should also be encompassed, the Joint Study of the Civil Society Engagement in Policy Processes has shown that the independence might be put at risk by such developments. (ADC/Danida/Sida 2012: xi).

“For civil society to flourish it requires a favourable enabling environment, which depends upon the actions and policies of all development actors” (OECD 2010 in ADC/Danida/Sida 2012: 22).



## **IV Conclusion**

In the first part, this thesis dealt with civil society and organizations theoretically and gave insight into the debate on aid effectiveness, development effectiveness and budget support. Civil society in this thesis is primarily understood as being connected with the state and does not necessarily stand in opposition to it. However, the autonomy of civil society actors can still exist. Since NGOs have experienced a big upswing in numbers and recognition during the last decades, the thesis **asked the question why the involvement of NGOs and other civil society actors has increased in aid and development**. Their contributions for democracy, ownership, poverty reduction and accountability have been considered as crucial. Civil society has especially experienced growth in the 1980s for more democracy and social equality. Organizations in the development context have been assigned different roles. For a long time they had been regarded as a corrective for economic liberalization dynamics in delivering services through which their recognition was on the rise. Nevertheless, there has also been criticism due to its high number and misconceptions of CSOs being the solution for all problems. Hence, the new paradigm in aid and development includes all stakeholders and assigns the state greater power by channeling aid through state resources. This is also done through budget support. It should be noted that the role of the state has changed from giving up tasks and competencies to private actors and primarily assuring the national framework for operations in the country, to now in the sense of aid effectiveness and ownership the state comes back in. The international community started to assume civil society needs to be strong within a country to becoming the center for development again. It has been recognized that change needs to come from inside since forces from outside have not brought the expected results. CSOs in the countries themselves are therefore given new roles: they are supposed to engage with the state, act as an advocate and watchdog by monitoring all state activities. The Second High Level Forum in Paris in 2005 especially marked a new trend and focus on the involvement and participation of civil society. On the other hand, given the increased power of the state over its resources based on an increase of program aid, CSOs might face more challenges.

The Paris Declaration's principles Ownership, Alignment, Harmonisation, Managing for Results, and Mutual Accountability are reference points for the measurement and effectiveness of aid. Budget support belongs to program aid and focuses on the dialogue between donors and partners, including the need for donors to support national development strategies and use partner countries' systems. Here, it is necessary to bring civil society in and

to look at their involvement in the whole process and in the budget. This should be seen as a necessity when then countries are negotiating with donors about budget support, e.g. for certain sectors. Within budget support the government is assumed to be representing the population's interests, which in reality is not always the case. **The second research questions asked about the meaning of budget support for CSOs.** With a focus on budget support, financial resources are dependent on the distribution of the Government of Uganda and fewer resources from donors are going to projects. This trend has been defined by scholars from inside and outside the country, yet numbers could not be found and are not easily accessible. NGOs fear the loss of participation and cooperation. While project aid holds the primacy of pro-poor policies, budget support strengthens the position of the financial ministry, which has more power to decide over the whole agenda. As a result, the legal and political situation of a country is of major importance since it defines opportunities and limits of CSO operations. This is the reason for advocacy from the side of CSOs and its relevance of engaging in budget issues. Budget support means changing the channel of resources and calls for the involvement of civil society in budget issues. In fact, domestic accountability institutions are necessary for aid to be effective when coming through national budget systems. A strong civil society is essential in order for the advantages of budget support to work. Some elements it can bring are the strengthening of state structures and that the population might gain more trust in the state again.

When looking at the principles of the Paris Declaration, the **term ownership** has especially caused some discussions and discrepancies since it can be differentiated between ownership as commitment and ownership as control (see Whitfield/Fraser 2009). What donors demand is ownership as commitment by recipient countries whereas ownership as control over processes and decision-making is more central for countries to have. CSOs use the term to define the involvement of the civil society. This has been pushed by focusing on inclusive ownership (as in HLF-3) and recently by the demand of going beyond aid and focusing on development in general, instead of assuming aid as being the only factor that leads to development. In fact, according to the evaluation of the Paris Declaration, ownership in Uganda was achieved through participation processes that helped in setting up national development strategies and other areas. To what extent is disputable when considering CSOs' perspectives and situation. Alignment emphasizes the need to align aid flows on national budgets. However, the fear of misusing the resources is slowing the use of partner countries' structures by donors. Budget support is considered one way to use public financial management systems of a country in an

effective way. Harmonization of the activities of donors is another point which when applied to civil society might be quite controversial, especially when CSOs are demanded to harmonize with donor priorities and programs, meaning a loss of autonomy and no legitimacy from within the country. The evaluation of the Paris Declaration principles argued that the success of aid effectiveness primarily relies on good governance of a country, which means functional structures and management systems, human rights and the combat of corruption. This shows that the **political dimension** should not be excluded, most importantly concerning rather technocratic aid modalities. In fact, for budget support it has been defined as a prerequisite. While budget support is supposed to bring ownership, it already requires ownership in a country to be installed because democratic budgeting is needed. The Government of Uganda prefers budget support as an aid modality and it clearly gives more power to the state again. Considering the political and legal environment for civil society in Uganda demonstrating the many restrictions they have to fight with, this view is weakened. However, Ugandan NGOs do consider budget support important, but need the abilities and capacities to engage in budget issues. The political environment of NGO operations is of crucial importance for the contribution and involvement of NGOs. The nature of the regime and political participation determines their activity.

**This leads to the third research question on the participation of NGOs and the civil society in Uganda and their roles.** The roles for civil society and its organizations have also changed in Uganda. The main role occupied has primarily been service delivery. Especially under the circumstances of war and fear, opposition would not have been possible and very dangerous. However, after Uganda's independence the roles have widened even though the legal framework nowadays provides for a rather restrictive environment for CSOs. Due to pushes from the outside and the general demand for participation of civil society as well as the involvement of CSOs themselves in Uganda, other roles have come to rise. NGOs operate in many policy spaces such as in the formulation of policies, the constitutions, national development strategies and their revisions, in different working groups, as consultants, mobilizers and so on. Moreover, the contribution of civil society and NGOs has been acknowledged by the Government of Uganda. This has also been demonstrated in the National NGO Policy of 2010. Policy processes and space for civil society was opened up in the 1990s due to the Ugandan Constitution where civil society has been officially granted participation. However, participation depends on the government and even though the political scope now is wider than in the past, constraints and tensions are still experienced by

many NGOs, including through the established NGO Board which controls and monitors NGOs and in some cases even hinders their operation. NGO registration is very costly and time-consuming and can be refused for many reasons, including merely the opinion of the Board when it is in the public's interest – no further explanation is defined. This poses many challenges for NGOs.

The budget is an important tool for the government and reflects the priorities of a state; therefore it is crucial for civil society to be involved in the process. It is not only perceived as an area for policymakers and administrators any more. **So, in which ways are civil society and NGOs involved and contributing to the budget process?** Engagement of CSOs in Uganda in the budget process has shown that it is of great advantage to have a good relationship with the state in order to be invited to meetings, conferences and discussions and to act as a consultant. The question emerges how it is then possible for CSOs to question and challenge the whole system in a country faced with corruption and restrictions. The change from the Movement System to a multi-party system is especially critical since it was used by the present president as a way to enlarge his time in power. How open and participatory is the situation in Uganda when NGOs constantly face threat and when opposition is still under scrutiny by the state having been arrested, accused and even worse?! Nevertheless, the budgeting process seems to be quite open in Uganda and involves CSOs in the drafting phase by taking part in meetings, conferences, consultancies and sector working groups. When it comes to the implementation phase, research on civil society actors has shown that by working with local communities, expenditures could have been improved and corruption decreased (e.g. local budget monitoring committees, village budget clubs). Due to the new aid modalities, the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development in Uganda has gained in importance. Therefore, civil society is increasing its engagement with it; for example, the Uganda Debt Network has collaborated with the ministry which created the Citizen's Guide to the Budget that explains the budget in a simpler language to the population. Research and information on the matter are seen as essential in order to raise awareness, mobilize the population and advocate for changes and improvements. Cooperation not only with the government, but with other stakeholders such as the media, other CSOs and forming networks has proven useful for engaging in the process. One example is the Citizen's Budget Advocacy Group that has been set up by several CSOs in order to engage in official budget meetings, presenting own views and opinions. Through that, accountability, transparency and a decrease in corruption could have been enforced as well as budget literacy for a more

democratic budget process. As Klatzer said in her interview, the right to initiative and independency is therefore needed for CSOs to operate. Civil society budget actors show how lobbying activities have risen and how the collaboration with the state has brought positive results. At the same time they work on local levels to ensure the involvement of the population's point of view. The thesis shows how civil society is included in the constitution of the state through its participation.

All in all, many new developments, trends, roles and ways of engaging could have been identified. What is striking, are the many **controversies** that emerge when working on those topics. The first one is the controversy of focusing on the state through implementing new aid modalities such as program aid and strengthening while also pushing civil society participation. In history, aid has rather focused on one player and obviously is recognizing the need for more than one stakeholder to be responsible and useful in the process for development. Moreover, when looking at program aid, it is perceived in a very technical way where it is easy to leave out political issues. Aid and development however are political matters and thus important to consider, as the situation in Uganda shows. The whole literature has revealed that CSOs themselves are trapped between service delivery and advocacy. While the state prefers service delivery rather than confrontation, advocacy is pushed from outside, but is also seen as necessary by CSOs. Disbursements of donor support make it quite difficult to engage in advocacy when not having enough capacities and resources for research, information, understanding the official language etc. Donors are not always willing to disburse a big amount for administration or operational costs that are often needed in this area. Generally, good governance and democracy are principles that are wanted and supported from the outside, but are transferred to civil society due to the acknowledgment that it can only work when coming from the inside.

# **V Sources**

## **1. Books, Articles & Papers**

**ADA** Austrian Development Agency (2011): Uganda Länderinformation. Online: [http://www.entwicklung.at/uploads/media/Laenderinfo\\_Uganda\\_Aug2011.pdf](http://www.entwicklung.at/uploads/media/Laenderinfo_Uganda_Aug2011.pdf) [last access 05/07/2012].

**ADC** Austrian Development Cooperation/ **Danida** Danish International Development Agency/ **Sida** Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (2012): Joint Evaluation of Support to Civil Society Engagement in Policy Dialogue. Synthesis Report. Second Draft. 30th August 2012 [will be published in November].

**AfDB** African Development Bank/ **OECD** Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (2010): Uganda. African Economic Outlook 2010.

**AGEZ** Arbeitsgemeinschaft Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (2006): Die Rolle der NGOs in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit - Perspektiven 2015. Dokumentation der Fachtagung von AGEZ und EU-Plattform am 2./3. Februar 2006 im Kardinal-König-Haus.

**AGEZ/ KOO/ EU-Plattform** (2005): Positionspapier der AGEZ, KOO und EU-Plattform zu Budget Support. Wien.

**AIDCO/ DEV/ RELEX** (2007): Aid Delivery Methods. Guidelines on the Programming, Design & Management of General Budget Support. European Commission, Guidelines No 1. Online: [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/economic-support/documents/guidelines\\_budget\\_support\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/economic-support/documents/guidelines_budget_support_en.pdf) [last access 14/06/2012].

**Ashoff**, Guido (2010): *Wirksamkeit als Legitimationsproblem und komplexe Herausforderung der Entwicklungspolitik*. In: Faust, Jörg/ Neubert, Susanne (ed.): *Wirksamere Entwicklungspolitik. Befunde, Reformen, Instrumente*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 27-68.

**BBC** (2011): Uganda's Yoweri Museveni in profile. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12421747> [last access 05/09/2012].

**Bebbington**, Anthony J./ **Hickey**, Samuel/ **Mitlin**, Diana C. (2008): *Introduction: Can NGOs Make a Difference? The Challenge of Development Alternatives*. In: Bebbington, Anthony J. (2008) (Hg.): *Can NGOs Make a Difference? The Challenge of Development Alternatives*. London [u.a.]: Zed Books, 3-37.

**Beer**, Bettina/ **Fischer**, Hans (2000): *Wissenschaftliche Arbeitstechniken in der Ethnologie. Eine Einführung*. Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag.

**BetterAid** (2010): Development Cooperation: Not Just Aid. Key issues: Accra, Seoul and beyond. Online: [http://www.betteraid.org/images/Documents/dev%20coop%20not%20aid\\_english.pdf](http://www.betteraid.org/images/Documents/dev%20coop%20not%20aid_english.pdf) [last access 30/06/2012].

**BetterAid & Open Forum** (2011): CSOs on the road to Busan: Key messages and proposals. Online: <http://betteraid.org/en/betteraid-policy/betteraid-publications/policy-papers/447-cso-asks-on-the-road-to-busan.html> [last access 03/06/2012].

**Bogner, Alexander/ Littig, Beate/ Menz, Wolfgang** (ed.) (2009): Das Experteninterview. Theorie, Methode, Anwendung. 2nd edition. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

**Bortz, Jürgen/ Döring, Nicola** (2006): Forschungsmethoden und Evaluation für Human- und Sozialwissenschaftler. 4th updated edition. Heidelberg: Springer Medizinverlag.

**Brand, Ulrich** (2007): The Internationalization of the state as the reconstitution of hegemony. IPW Working Paper, Nr. 1, Universität Wien.

**Brand, Ulrich** (2000): Global Governance: Alternative zur neoliberalen Globalisierung? Eine Studie von Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung und WEED. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot.

**Brock, Karen/ McGee, Rosemary/ Ssewakiryanga, Richard** (2002): Poverty knowledge and policy processes: a case study of Ugandan national poverty reduction policy. Institute of Development Studies, Research Report 53.

**Carbone, Giovanni M.** (2008): No-party democracy? Ugandan politics in comparative perspective. Boulder, Colo. [a.o.]: Rienner.

**Christiansen, Karin a.o.** (2007): Interim Report of the Uganda Donor Division of Labour Exercise. Overseas Development Institute. Online: <http://www.aidinformationchallenge.org/wp-content/uploads/DoL-interim-report-final-23rd-March.pdf> [last access 09/07/2012].

**Ciganikova, Martina** (2010): The processes of democratization in global comparison: strategic choices of oppositional forces in democratizing societies with case studies of Ghana, Slovakia and Uganda. Doktorarbeit: Universität Wien.

**CIVICUS** (2006): Narrowing the space for civil society operations. The Implications of the NGO Registration (Amendment) Act. Online: [http://www.civicus.org/new/media/Briefing\\_Paper\\_Final.doc](http://www.civicus.org/new/media/Briefing_Paper_Final.doc) [last access 30/08/2012].

**Claassens, Marritt** (2006): Budget Transparency and Participation 2: Nine African Case Studies – Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda and Zambia. IDASA. Online: <http://www.idasa.org/media/uploads/outputs/files/Nine%20African%20Budget%20Transparency%20&%20Participation%20Case%20Studies.pdf> [last access 17/09/2012].

**Curbach, Janina** (2003): Global Governance und NGOs. Transnationale Zivilgesellschaft in internationalen Politiknetzwerken. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.

**DENIVA** Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations (2006): Civil Society in Uganda: At the Crossroads? CIVICUS Civil Society Index Project.

**Dicklitch, Susan** (1998): The elusive promise of NGOs in Africa. Basingstoke [a.o.]: Palgrave.

**Eberlei, Walter** (2009): *Democratic Budgeting Processes and New Aid Mechanisms*. In: GKKE (ed.): Good Governance and Democratic Budget Policies. New tasks for parliaments and civil society. (GKKE Publication Series, 49). Berlin / Bonn, 17-25.

**Eberlei, Walter** (2007): *Accountability in Poverty Reduction Strategies: The Role of Empowerment and Participation*. In: Social Development Papers. Participation & Civic Engagement, No. 104. World Bank.

**Ellmers, Bodo** (2011): Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation: some progress, no clear commitments, no thanks to EU. Post on Eurodad December 7, 2011. Online: <http://eurodad.org/4737/> [last access 09/07/2012].

**Ellmers, Bodo** (2010): Tapping the potential? Procurement, tied aid and the use of country systems in Uganda. A case study from the European Network on Debt and Development (Eurodad) with the Uganda National NGO Forum. Online: [http://www.eurodad.org/uploadedFiles/Whats New/Reports/Tapping the potential Uganda.pdf?n=874](http://www.eurodad.org/uploadedFiles/Whats%20New/Reports/Tapping%20the%20potential%20Uganda.pdf?n=874) [last access 12/04/2012].

**European Commission** (2011): Engaging Non-State Actors in New Aid Modalities. For better development outcomes and governance. Reference Document N 12. Online: <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/public-governance-civilsociety/document/engaging-non-state-actors-new-aid-modalities-0> [last access 25.07.2012].

**FM Solutions** (2008): Enhancing the role of parliament in the budgetary process. Uganda. Operations Policy & Country Services, Number 4.

**FOWODE Forum for Women in Development** (2010): Did the National Development Plan address Women Concerns: an Assessment of how the NDP was gender responsive. Online: <http://www.fowode.org/publications/Gender%20Audit%20of%20NDP%20Report.pdf> [last access 18/09/2012].

**Fraser, Alastair/ Whitfield, Lindsay** (2009): *Understanding Contemporary Aid Relationships*. In: Whitfield, Lindsay (ed.) (2009): *The Politics of Aid. African Strategies for Dealing with Donors*. New York: Oxford University Press, 74-107.

**Froschauer, Ulrike/ Lueger, Manfred** (2003): *Das qualitative Interview. Zur Praxis interpretativer Analyse sozialer Systeme*. Wien: Facultas, WUV.

**Gerster, Richard** (2006): *Brennpunkt Budgethilfe*. In: Österreichische Forschungsförderung für Entwicklungshilfe – ÖFSE (2006) (Hg.): *Mehr Wirksamkeit in der EZA. Quantensprung oder Rhetorik?* Wien: Südwind, 47-60.

**Girke, Peter/ Kamp, Mathias** (2011): Uganda nach den Wahlen. Erste Einschätzungen zu den Präsidentschafts- und Parlamentswahlen 2011. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Länderbericht.

**Gläser, Jochen/ Laudel, Grit** (2009): *On Interviewing ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ Experts*. In: Bogner, Alexander/ Littig, Beate/ Menz, Wolfgang (2009) (ed.): *Interviewing experts*. Basingstoke [a.o.]: Palgrave Macmillan, 117-137.

**Gläser, Jochen/ Laudel, Grit** (2004): *Experteninterviews und qualitative Inhaltsanalyse als Instrumente rekonstruierender Untersuchungen*. Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

**Graffi, Katharina** (2003): *Vernetzung und Zusammenarbeit von Non-Government-Organizations in Uganda. Eine Darstellung aus dem Blickwinkel indigener NGOs*. Universität Wien: Diplomarbeit.



**Gubitzer, Luise/ Klatzer, Elisabeth** (a.o.) (2008): social accountability. gender budgeting als gleichstellungsstrategie in der eza? Wiener Institut für Internationalen Dialog und Zusammenarbeit (VIDC).

**Haller, Michael** (1983): Recherchieren. Ein Handbuch für Journalisten. München: Ölschläger Verlag.

**Hammond, Mike** (2006): *Joint DAC and Partners Evaluation of General Budget Support*. In: Koeberle, Stefan/ Stavreski, Zoran/ Walliser, Jan (ed.): Budget Support as More Effective aid? Recent Experiences and Emerging Lessons, Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 91-104.

**Hechenberger, Nina** (2008): Die Grundsätze der direkten Budgethilfe in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und deren Auswirkungen auf NGOs in Österreich. Wien: Diplomarbeit.

**Hemmer, Hans-Rimbert** (2010): *Ein Plädoyer für die Projekthilfe: Totgesagte leben länger*. In: KFW Development Research, Meinungsforum Entwicklungspolitik, 1-2.

**Hirsch, Philip** (2007): *Advocacy, civil society and the state in the Mekong Region*. In: Rugendyke, Barbara (ed.) (2007): NGOs as advocates for development in a globalising world. London [a.o.]: Routledge, 185-199.

**Hirsch, Joachim** (2001): *Des Staates neue Kleider. NGO im Prozess der Internationalisierung des Staates*. In: Brand, Ulrich (2001) (Hg.): Nichtregierungsorganisationen in der Transformation des Staates. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 13-42.

**Holzner, Brigitte** (2008): *Financing for Gender Equality: What is at stake in Doha?* In: Österreichische Forschungsförderung für Entwicklungshilfe – ÖFSE (2008) (Hg.): Financing for Development. Wien: Südwind, 47-53.

**IBP International Budget Project** (2001): A Guide to Budget Work for NGOs. Online: [http://www.crin.org/docs/resources/publications/hrbap/guide\\_budget\\_work\\_NGOs.pdf](http://www.crin.org/docs/resources/publications/hrbap/guide_budget_work_NGOs.pdf) [last access 18/09/2012].

**IDD and Associates** (2006): Evaluation of General Budget Support: Synthesis Report. Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support 1994-2004. Online: <http://www.oecd.org/development/evaluationofdevelopmentprogrammes/dcdndep/37426676.pdf> [last access 18/9/2012].

**Isooba, Moses** (2005): *Civil society participation in Uganda's PRS process: opportunities and dilemmas*. In: PLAN Participatory learning and Action, 51, 43-46.

**Jimat Consult** (2011): Phase II Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration in Uganda: Final Report. Online: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/17/47083787.pdf> [last access 06/07/2012].

**Jones, Nicola/ Tembo, Fletcher** (2008): Promoting Good Governance through Civil Society-Legislator Linkages. Opportunities and Challenges for Policy Engagement in Developing Country Contexts. Sub-theme on Global Civil Society and Democratic Cultures ISTR

Conference, Barcelona, July 2008. Research and Policy in Development Group. Overseas Development Institute.

**Khan**, Zohra (2009): Just Budgets. Increasing Accountability and Aid Effectiveness through Gender Responsive Budgeting. One World Action.

**Kindornay**, Shannon (2011): From Aid to Development Effectiveness: A Working Paper. The North-South Institute. Online: [http://www.nsiins.ca/images/documents/2011\\_WP\\_Development\\_Effectiveness\\_Kindornay.pdf](http://www.nsiins.ca/images/documents/2011_WP_Development_Effectiveness_Kindornay.pdf) [last access 09/07/2012].

**Koeberle**, Stefan/ **Zavreski**, Zoran (2006): *Budget Support: Concept and Issues*. In: Koeberle, Stefan/ Stavreski, Zoran/ Walliser, Jan (ed.): Budget Support as More Effective aid? Recent Experiences and Emerging Lessons, Washington D.C., 3-26.

**Küblböck**, Karin/ **Langthaler**, Margarita/ **Six**, Clemens (2006): Budgethilfe als entwicklungspolitische Strategie. Grundlagenpapier zur internationalen Diskussion. ÖFSE Working Paper 14. Online: <http://www.oefse.at/Downloads/publikationen/Budgethilfe.pdf> [last access 05/07/2012].

**Kühhas**, Barbara (2007): Budget Support und Menschenrechte/Good Governance in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit: Schnittpunkte und Herausforderungen. Ludwig Boltzmann Institut für Menschenrechte.

**Kuhn**, Berthold (2005): Entwicklungspolitik zwischen Markt und Staat. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen zivilgesellschaftlicher Organisationen. Frankfurt/ New York: Campus Verlag.

**Kuteesa**, Florence (a.o.) (2006): *Uganda: A Decade of Budget Reform and Poverty Reduction*. In: OECD Journal on Budgeting, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1-25.

**Kwagala**, Elizabeth (2003): *Eine neue Rolle für NGOs in Uganda*. In: de Abreu Fialho Gomes, Beah/ Schicho, Walter (2003) (Hg.): Die Praxis der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Akteure, Interessen und Handlungsmuster. Wien: Mandelbaum, 155-165.

**Lamnek**, Siegfried (1995): Qualitative Sozialforschung. Band 1 Methodologie. 3rd updated edition. Weinheim: Beltz, Psychologie Verlagsunion.

**Lawson**, Andrew (a.o.) (2003): General Budget Support. Evaluability Study Phase 1. Synthesis Report Volume 1. Evaluation Report for DFID. Online: <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/4835.pdf> [last access 24/11/2011].

**Leiderer**, Stefan (2010): *Zur Wirksamkeit und Evaluierung von Budgethilfen*. In: Faust, Jörg/ Neubert, Susanne (ed.): Wirksamere Entwicklungspolitik. Befunde, Reformen, Instrumente. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 229-255.

**Lewandowski**, Dirk (2005): Web Information Retrieval. Technologien zur Informationssuche im Internet. Frankfurt/Main: DGI Deutsche Gesellschaft für Informationswissenschaft und Informationspraxis. Online: <http://www.durchdenken.de/lewandowski/web-ir/download/Web-IR-Buch.pdf> [last access: 09/07/2012].

**Lister**, Stephen (a.o.) (2006): Evaluation of General Budget Support - Uganda Country Report. Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support 1994-2004. Online:

<http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/evaluation/gbs-uganda.pdf> [last access 24/11/2011].

**Mayring**, Philipp (2009): *Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse*. In: Flick, Uwe/ Kardorff, Ernst von/ Steinke, Ines (ed.): *Qualitative Forschung. Ein Handbuch*. 7th updated edition. Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 468-475.

**Mayring**, Philipp (2002): *Einführung in die Qualitative Sozialforschung. Eine Anleitung zum qualitativen Denken*. 5th updated edition. Weinheim und Basel: Beltz Verlag.

**Meuser**, Michael/ **Nagel**, Ulrike (1991): *ExpertInneninterviews – vielfach erprobt, wenig bedacht. Ein Beitrag zur qualitativen Methodendiskussion*. In: Garz, Detlef/ Kraimer, Klaus (1991): *Qualitativ-empirische Sozialforschung. Konzepte, Methoden, Analysen*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 442-471.

**MiA** Ministry of Internal Affairs (2010): *The National NGO Policy. Strengthening Partnership for Development*. Online: <http://www.mia.go.ug/docs/NGO%20Policy%202010%281%29.pdf> [last access 18/09/2012].

**Michel**, Louis (2008): *Budget Support. A Question of Mutual Trust*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. (European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid).

**MoFPED** Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (2012): *The Background to the Budget. 2012/13 Fiscal Year. Priorities for renewed economic growth and development*.

**MoFPED** Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (2010): *National Budget Framework Paper. FY 2010/11 – FY 2014/2015*.

**Mutasa**, Charles (2007): *The Role of Civil Society Organizations in Development Policy: The Case of Africa*. In: Österreichische Forschungsförderung für Internationale Entwicklung - ÖFSE (2007): *Zivilgesellschaft und Entwicklung*. Wien: Südwind, 17-23.

**Norton**, Andy/ **Elson**, Diane (2002) *What's behind the budget. politics, rights and accountability in the budget process*. ODI. Online: <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/2422.pdf> [last access 26/07/2012].

**Novy**, Andreas (2007): *Definitionen von Zivilgesellschaft und ihre entwicklungspolitischen Implikationen*. In: Österreichische Forschungsförderung für Internationale Entwicklung - ÖFSE (2007): *Zivilgesellschaft und Entwicklung*. Wien: Südwind, 11-16.

**Nuscheler**, Franz (2008): *Die umstrittene Wirksamkeit der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit*. INEF-Report 93/2008. Universität Duisburg/Essen.

**NGO QuAM Working Group** (2006): *Our Code of Honour: The NGO quality Assurance Certification Mechanism (QuAM)*. Online: [http://ngoforum.or.ug/index.php?option=com\\_docman&task=doc\\_view&gid=6&tmpl=component&format=raw&Itemid=29](http://ngoforum.or.ug/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=6&tmpl=component&format=raw&Itemid=29) [last access 18/09/2012]

**Obrovsky, Michael/ Six, Clemens** (2007): *Zivilgesellschaft und Entwicklung. Eine Einleitung*. In: Österreichische Forschungsförderung für Internationale Entwicklung - ÖFSE (2007): *Zivilgesellschaft und Entwicklung*. Wien: Südwind, 7-10.

**Obrovsky, Michael** (2008): *Financing for Development - 2008. Auf dem Weg zu einer neuen Finanzmarktordnung - eine Einleitung*. In: Österreichische Forschungsförderung für Internationale Entwicklung - ÖFSE (2008): *Financing for Development*. Wien: Südwind, 7-11.

**OECD** Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (2012a): *Uganda. Volume 2 Country Chapters of OECD (2011): Aid Effectiveness 2005-10: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration*. Online: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/51/50456085.pdf> [last access 13/06/2012].

**OECD** Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and (2012b): *Development Aid at a Glance. Statistics by Region. Africa*.

**OECD** Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and (2011): *Aid Effectiveness 2005-10: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration*. Online: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/30/48742718.pdf> [last access 09/07/2012].

**OECD** Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and (2005/2008): *The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action*. Online: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf> [last access 16/02/2012].

**Open Forum** (2011a): 'Road to Busan-Korea' Key Messages by African CSO to the 4th High Level Forum on Development Effectiveness. Africa Consultative Document. Online: <http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/-regional-and-thematic-cso,085-.html?lang=en> [last access 04/06/2012].

**Open Forum** (2011b): *The Accra Civil Society Consensus on Africa's Position on Aid and Development Effectiveness*. Online: <http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/-regional-and-thematic-cso,085-.html?lang=en> [last access 04/06/2012].

**Provost, Claire** (2011): *Solving Uganda's budget puzzle*. The Guardian. Online: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/nov/25/uganda-aid-confusion-analyse-spending> [last access 12/09/2012].

**Renzio, Paolo de/ Azeem, Vitus/ Ramkumar, Vivek** (2008): *Budget Monitoring as an Advocacy Tool: The Uganda Debt Network*. In: Robinson, Mark (ed.): *Budgeting for the poor*. Basingstoke [a.o.]: Palgrave Macmillan, 145-170.

**Renzio, Paolo de** (2006a): *Aid, Budgets and Accountability: A Survey Article*. In: *Development Policy Review* (2006) Vol. 24, Nr. 6, 627-645.

**Renzio, Paolo de** (2006b): *Aid, Budgets and Accountability*. CAPE Workshop 2005 – Summary Paper.

**Republic of Uganda** (2010a): *National Development Plan 2010/11-2014/15*. Online: [http://npa.ug/docs/NDP\\_April\\_2010-Prot.pdf](http://npa.ug/docs/NDP_April_2010-Prot.pdf) [last access 18/09/2012].

**Republic of Uganda** (2005): Joint Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Uganda (2005-2009). Online: <http://www.entwicklung.at/uploads/media/joint-assistance-strat-uganda.pdf> [last access 18/09/2012]

**Richter, Daniela/ Stocker-Waldhuber, Cornelia** (2008): Gender Budgeting. Gendergerechte Budgetierung in Luwero und Kiboga, Uganda. Studie im Rahmen des Genderpools. Wiener Institut für Internationalen Dialog und Zusammenarbeit (VIDC).

**Robinson, Mark/ Friedman, Steven** (2005): Civil Society, Democratisation and Foreign Aid in Africa. IDS Research Summary.

**Robinson, Mark** (2006): Budget Analysis and Policy Advocacy: The Role of Nongovernmental Public Action. IDS Working Paper 279.

**Ross, Will** (2011): Uganda's Museveni pulls out all the stops to stay in power. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12481878> [last access 05/09/2012].

**Schlehe, Judith** (2003): *Formen qualitativer ethnographischer Interviews*. In: Beer, Bettina (Hg.): Methoden und Techniken der Feldforschung. Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag, 71-93.

**Six, Clemens** (2007): *Gut oder nur gut gemeint? Fragen zur Wirkung entwicklungspolitischer Nicht-Regierungsorganisationen (NROs)*. In: Österreichische Forschungsförderung für Internationale Entwicklung - ÖFSE (2007): Zivilgesellschaft und Entwicklung. Wien: Südwind, 33-45.

**Slezak, Gabriele** (2009): Jamhuri ya Uganda. Republic of Uganda. Länderinformation Uganda. ÖFSE und ADA. Online: <http://www.oefse.at/publikationen/laender/uganda.htm> [last access 05/07/2012].

**Ssewakiryanga, Richard** (2011a): Post-Busan Reflections: CSO Participation - An Idea Whose Time has Come! Online: Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness Webpage.

**Ssewakiryanga, Richard** (2011b): *Uganda Registers Mixed progress under the 2005 Paris Declaration*. In: Tomlinson, Brian (2011): Democratic Ownership and Development Effectiveness. Civil Society Perspectives on Progress since Paris. Reality of Aid Report.

**Stern, Elliot** (2008): The Paris Declaration, Aid Effectiveness and Development Effectiveness. Evaluation of the Paris Declaration. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.

**Stickler, Armin** (2005): Nichtregierungsorganisationen, soziale Bewegungen und Global Governance. Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme. Bielefeld: transcript.

**Take, Ingo** (2002): NGOs im Wandel. Von der Graswurzel auf das diplomatische Parkett. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag.

**Tripp, Aili Mari** (2010): *The Politics of Constitution Making in Uganda*. In: Miller, Laurel E. (2010) (ed.): Framing the State in Times of Transition. Case Studies in Constitution Making. Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 158-175.

**UDN** Uganda Debt Network (2006): How Pro-Poor are Local Government Budgets in Uganda? A review of Kampala City Council and Rakai Local Government Budgets FY 2005/06. Review Report No. 8.

**UGMP** Uganda Governance Monitoring Platform (2009): Progress, Stagnation or Regression: Discerning Governance Trends in Uganda (2004-2008). UGMP Governance Trends Report.

**UNNGOF** Uganda National NGO Forum (2012): Statement by Civil Society Representative at the Launch of the National NGO Policy.

**UNNGOF** Uganda National NGO Forum (2009a): Unlocking Uganda's Development Potential. 8 Fundamentals for the Success of the National Development Plan (NDP). A Civil Society Perspective Paper.

**UNNGOF** Uganda National NGO Forum (2009b): The NGO Act, Regulations and Policy in Uganda. The history, contentions and suggestions. A Briefing Paper. Online: <http://www.africancso.org/documents/10136/0/Uganda+NGO+Law+Analysis> [last access 10/09/2012].

**UNNGOF** Uganda National NGO Forum (2002): The Lobbyist.

**UNNGOF** Uganda National NGO Forum/ **DENIVA** Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations (2006): NGOs regulating themselves. The NGO quality standards. Online: [http://www.deniva.or.ug/reports/QuAM/QuAM\\_Standards.pdf](http://www.deniva.or.ug/reports/QuAM/QuAM_Standards.pdf) [last access 18/09/2012].

**Wahl**, Peter (2001): *“Sie küssten und sie schlugen sich” – Zum Verhältnis von NGO und internationalen Regierungsorganisationen.* In: Brand, Ulrich (2001) (Hg.): Nichtregierungsorganisationen in der Transformation des Staates. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 121-139.

**Wahl**, Peter (1999): *Auf der Suche nach dem gesellschaftsverändernden Subjekt. Nichtregierungsorganisationen – überschätzte Akteure.* In: Brand, Ulrich (1999): Internationale Regulierung und Demokratie. Wien: Sonderzahl, 38-46.

**Whitfield**, Lindsay/ **Fraser**, Alastair (2009): *Introduction: Aid and Sovereignty.* In: Whitfield, Lindsay (ed.) (2009): The Politics of Aid. African Strategies for Dealing with Donors. New York: Oxford University Press, 1-26.

**Williamson**, Tim (2008): Putting Aid on Budget: A Case Study of Uganda. A Study for the Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative (CABRI) and the Strategic Partnership with Africa (SPA).

**Wood**, B. et al. (2011): The Evaluation of the Paris Declaration, Final Report. The Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen.

**Zimmer**, Annette (2002): *NGOs als Akteure einer internationalen Zivilgesellschaft.* In: Frantz, Christiane/ Zimmer, Annette (Hg.): Zivilgesellschaft international: alte und neue NGOs. Aktive Bürgerschaft e.V. Opladen: Leske + Budrich (Bürgerschaftliches Engagement und Nonprofit-Sektor, 6), 9-22.



## 2. Websites

**Asia Pacific Aid Effectiveness Portal** 2009 <http://www.aideffectiveness.org/> [last access 15/09/2012]

**FOWODE** Forum for Women in Development Blogspot 2012 <http://fowode.blogspot.co.at/> [last access 15/09/2012]

**FOWODE** Forum for Women in Development Website 2012 <http://www.fowode.org/> [last access 18/09/2012]

**ICNL** The International Center for Not for Profit Law (2012): NGO Law Monitor: Uganda. Online: <http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/uganda.html> [last access 30/08/2012]

**IMF** International Monetary Fund Website 2012 <http://www.imf.org/> [last access 15/08/2012]

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs** Website 2012 <http://www.mofa.go.ug> [last access 30/08/2012]

**Ministry of Internal Affairs** Website 2012 <http://www.mia.go.ug/> [last access 18/09/2012]

**OECD** Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Webpage 2012 <http://www.oecd.org/> [last access 30/07/2012]

**OECD QWIDS** Query Wizard for International Development Statistics <http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/> [last access 30/07/2012]

**One world trust** 2008-2010 [http://www.oneworldtrust.org/csoproject/cso/initiatives/547/ngo\\_qualityassurance\\_mechanism\\_quam](http://www.oneworldtrust.org/csoproject/cso/initiatives/547/ngo_qualityassurance_mechanism_quam) [last access 31/08/2012]

**Publish What You Fund** Website <http://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/resources/uganda/> [last access 14/09/2012]

**UDN** Uganda Debt Network 2012 <http://udn.or.ug/> [last access 15/09/2012]

**United Nations** Website 2010: Milleniumgoals <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/> [last access 07/07/2012]

**UNNGOF** Uganda National NGO Forum Website 2012 <http://ngoforum.or.ug/#> [last access 16/09/2012]

**WHO** World Health Organisation Website 2012 <http://www.who.int/en/> [last access 07/07/2012]

**World Bank Group** Website 2012 <http://www.worldbank.org/> [last access 15/08/2012]

**WOUGNET** Women of Uganda Network Website 2012 <http://wougnet.org/> [last access 16/09/2012]

**capacity4dev.eu** Website 2012 (European Commission - EuropeAid) <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/> [last access 24/08/2012]

### 3. Interviews

- **Interview Hirsch:** Maria Hirsch, General Secretary of the Austrian-Ugandan Friendship Association on 19.03.2012, 1h 44min
- **Interview Wipfel:** Hildegard Wipfel, Policy Officer of the KOO - Koordinierungsstelle der Österreichischen Bischofskonferenz für internationale Entwicklung und Mission on 16.04.2012, 1h 23min
- **Interview General Consulate:** General Consulate of Uganda on 07.05.2012, 43min
- **Interview Schmidjell:** Franz Schmidjell, Managing Director of VIDC Vienna Institute for International Dialogue and Cooperation on 21.05.2012, 1h 2min
- **Interview Grosinger:** Gabriele Grosinger, Project Officer for Uganda of Horizont 3000 on 22.05.2012, 56min
- **Interview Klatzer:** Elisabeth Klatzer, Vienna University of Economics and Business (Institute for institutional and heterodox economy) on 24.05.2012, 51min
- **Interview Ssewakiryanga:** Richard Ssewakiryanga, Executive Director of Uganda National NGO Forum on 25.07.2012 via Skype, 17min
- **Interview ADA:** Roswitha Kremser, Public Financial Management and Public Administration and Günter Engelits, East Africa on 26.07.2012, 1h 19min



## 4. List of Figures

Figure 1: Sources of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness .....	29
Figure 2: The Paris Declaration pyramid .....	34
Figure 3: Proportion of aid provided in the context of program-based approaches (32 countries).....	38
Figure 4: Baselines and targets for 2010 for Uganda.....	43
Figure 5: The development effectiveness continuum .....	53
Figure 6: Types of Program Aid .....	55
Figure 7: Disbursements of Programme Based Support from All Donors 2002-2010 .....	56
Figure 8: Aid given as budget support .....	57
Figure 9: Aid to Uganda 2002-2010 (in USD million) .....	71
Figure 10: Aid Modalities in Uganda over time (in USD million) .....	71
Figure 11: Top 10 ODA receipts by recipient in USD million, 2010 .....	72
Figure 12: General Budget Support to Uganda 2002-2010.....	72
Figure 13: How much aid is programme-based? General Budget Support to Uganda 2002- 2010 .....	74
Figure 14: Average Annual Percent Disbursements by Source .....	75
Figure 15: Sectoral Budget Allocations, FY 2011/12 and FY 2012/13 .....	96
Figure 16 Uganda's total revenue, 1992/93 to 2003/04 .....	97
Figure 17: Aid and Budgets in Uganda visualized.....	98
Figure 18: National Budget Process of Uganda .....	100
Figure 19: Methods of Engagement in Policy Dialogue .....	108
Figure 20: Strategic actions for promoting gender equality and transforming mind-set, attitudes, cultural practices, and perceptions.....	109
Figure 21: Linkage of UNNGOF Programmes .....	116

# Curriculum Vitae

## DANIELA HIRSCH

---

### n PERSONAL DATA n

E-Mail d.hirsch7@gmail.com  
Date of Birth 07/09/1988  
Nationality Austrian

### n EDUCATION n

10/2007 – 11/2012 Diploma Studies of International Development, University of Vienna  
Thesis: *“Civil Society Participation in Development and Budget Processes in Uganda”*  
Study focus on: development and aid, international organizations, human rights, civil society, gender and Africa

09/2010 – 12/2010 Exchange Semester at the University of Ottawa, Canada

10/2007 - 10/2010 Bachelor Studies of Cultural and Social Anthropology, University of Vienna  
Bachelor papers: *“Traiskirchen = Flüchtlingslager. Stadtforschung zur Lebensqualität und Mediendarstellung Traiskirchens”* and *“Der neue Rassismus. Abgrenzungen und Kontinuitäten zu früheren Rassismusvorstellungen.”*

2002 - 2007 Educational School for Tourism and Economy, Hertha Firnberg  
Schulen für Wirtschaft und Tourismus, 1220 Wien  
Special focus on International Career Promotion with working language English

08/2004 - 01/2005 Student Exchange in the USA (Minnesota)

### n LANGUAGES SKILLS n

- German *first language*
- English *very good*
- French *good*
- Spanish *average*
- Swahili *basic knowledge*  
Optional subject of 20 semester hours at the University of Vienna  
Volunteer work in Tanzania for a local organization (07-08 2009)