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An Organizational Slippery Slope Framework –
The Effect of Trust and Power on Cooperation

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1 Abstract

The present article strives to investigate the effect of trust in and power of the supervisor on different forms of cooperation within organizations by importing ideas from tax psychology – the Slippery Slope Framework (SSF; Kirchler, Hoelzl, & Wahl, 2008) – to organizational psychology. The basic assumptions of the SSF were transformed to an organizational context by proposing a positive effect of legitimate power and trust as well as a negative effect of coercive power on cooperation. The dependent forms of cooperative behaviors were mandatory and discretionary cooperation (Tyler & Blader, 2000) as well as inner resignation (Schmitz, Gayler & Jehle, 2002). A questionnaire was constructed, validated and the new framework was tested with the data of 556 Austrian health sector workers between the ages of 20 and 60 using structural equation modeling. Through a model fitting process the qualities of and relationships between trust, legitimate and coercive power were reconsidered. The final model can explain 38% of the variance in inner resignation as well as 21% in discretionary cooperation. In order to promote cooperation it is suggested that supervisors primarily build trustful relationships with their employees and motivate them through incentives rather than through sanctions. Finally, it is implied to consider legitimate power as another specification of trust in further research.

Keywords: Slippery Slope Framework, Trust, Power, Cooperation, Inner Resignation, Structural Equation Model

2 Introduction

The problem of cooperation with authorities to achieve a certain goal is manifold. Parents, teachers, supervisors as well as whole organizations face it on a daily basis. This article intends to import ideas from tax psychology into the field of organizational psychology – as first proposed by Kirchler, Hoelzl, and Wahl (2009) – by introducing a framework that explains cooperation as depending on trust and power.

In recent years a model of tax compliance – the Slippery Slope Framework (SSF) – has been developed (Kirchler, 2007; Kirchler, Hoelzl, & Wahl, 2008), empirically tested and confirmed (Wahl, Kastlunger, & Kirchler, 2010; Mühlbacher & Kirchler, 2010) as well as further refined (Gangl, Hofmann, Pollai, & Kirchler, 2012). Within this framework the *power* of tax authorities and the *trust* in tax authorities are the two factors that can foster the taxpayers' compliance, i.e. correct payment of taxes. Depending on which factor is perceived to be more dominant the resulting *compliance* will either be *voluntary* or *enforced*.

The present study aims to adapt these main assumptions to an organizational context and to test these assumptions in a workplace setting. However, compliance – or cooperation – in an organizational environment differs greatly from tax compliance, since to cooperate with your superior or agree with organizational goals is a more diverse action than to merely pay your taxes correctly. In order to describe the complex nature of compliant behavior within an organization, voluntary and enforced compliance are replaced by Tyler and Blader's (2000) concepts of *discretionary* and *mandatory cooperation* as well as the concept of *inner resignation* (or "Innere Kündigung"; Schmitz, Gayler, & Jehle, 2002). The basic structure of the SSF (Kirchler et al., 2008) with trust and power as determinants of the different forms of cooperation will remain unchanged. To accommodate for the organizational setting the two factors will, however, not relate to a rather anonymous institution like the tax office but to the

employee's supervisor. In other words this article investigates how trust and power influence different forms of cooperative behavior within an organization. Finally, a new organizational SSF will be presented and its assumptions will be tested in a structural equation model (SEM) with data from a survey conducted in three Austrian hospitals.

2.1 The basic concept of the Slippery Slope Framework

The SSF (Kirchler et al., 2008) makes it possible to jointly take a look at the influence of economic and financial factors as well as social factors on the compliance of taxpayers. Economic factors are described as power of the tax authority to audit and if necessary fine taxpayers. Social factors are linked to trust vested in the tax authority by the taxpayers to work for the common good and spend tax money in a sensible way. Hence the framework consists of three components: the power of tax authorities, the trust in tax authorities and the resulting tax compliance of the taxpayers. The latter being determined by the degree of the former two and their dynamic relationship respectively.

Kirchler et al. (2008) proposed that if the two dimensions trust and power are at a minimum level, tax payments also reach a minimum because taxpayers are acting egoistically by maximizing their profit through evading taxes. However, if trust in the authorities increases tax compliance is assumed to increase. Furthermore, if the power of authorities increases, tax payments are expected to increase as well. Finally the authors state that the change in one dimension will have an impact on the level of the other dimension.

Kirchler and Wahl (2010) also stated that tax compliance may have different motives. People can comply voluntarily and pay taxes because they accept it as their duty as citizens or their responsibility as part of a community. This is called voluntary tax compliance and is linked to a high level of perceived trust in the authorities. According to Kirchler et al. (2008)

high trust and high procedural fairness are key factors in establishing a “synergistic tax climate” in which authorities adopt a “service and client” attitude towards the taxpayer and social distance (Bogardus, 1928) is expected to be low.

On the other hand it is also possible that one does comply but not voluntarily. Here the motive for paying taxes is the fear of being audited and having to pay high fines in case one commits tax fraud. This enforced tax compliance will prevail if citizens perceive the exerted power of the authorities as high. Low trust and excessive use of power will in turn lead to a “antagonistic tax climate” (Kirchler et al., 2008) characterized by a “cops and robbers”-attitude with large social distance (Braithwaite, 2003), where taxpayers feel persecuted by the authorities and will in turn try to maximize their profit by evading taxes whenever possible, making them “robbers” in the eyes of the “cops”.

2.2 *A closer look at trust, power and cooperation*

As mentioned earlier, Gangl et al. (2012) went on to further refine the SSF. In order to do so they took a closer look at the qualities of trust and power and their dynamic relationship, yielding them three possible tax climates (in addition to the antagonistic and synergistic/service climate, they introduce the confidence climate) and in turn three different forms of compliance or cooperation. While the antagonistic climate will lead to enforced, and the service climate will lead to voluntary compliance, they argued that the proposed confidence climate will foster committed cooperation, which is characterized by the taxpayers’ feeling that it is their moral obligation to pay taxes and the natural thing to do (Gangl et al., 2012). However, in order to develop a SSF adapted to the organizational context, this study draws in big parts on the conceptualizations of trust and power as provided in the original (Kirchler et al., 2008; Kirchler & Wahl, 2010; Mühlbacher & Kirchler, 2010;

Wahl et al. 2010) as well as the extended framework (Gangl et al., 2012). This is possible because most of the concepts of trust and power used in the original and extended framework have already been developed in the context of organizational psychology (e.g. Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Raven, Schwarzwald, & Koslowsky, 1998). More to the point, Kirchler et al. (2009) specifically suggested the transformation of the SSF to an organizational model and Wahl, Enders, Kichler and Böck (2011) have successfully tested its assumptions in the setting of public transportation.

2.2.1 Trust

The importance of both trust and power has been recognized by, and their qualities have been the subject of many researchers in different fields (Barber, 1983; Coleman, 1994; Luhmann, 1979; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & Camerer, 1998; Tyler, 2003). However, trust is a somewhat elusive concept (McCune, 1998) as well as a complex and multidimensional phenomenon (Simpson, 2007). Trust is linked to the notion of predictability and involves the possibility to suffer unpleasant consequences, if the trust is broken (Deutsch, 1958). Lewis and Weigert (1985) also argued that trust requires the trusting party to take a certain risk and Mayer et al. (1995, p. 712) stated that to trust means “to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party”. Finally Jones and George (1998) stressed the role of emotions in the development of a trustful relationship.

In line with these characterizations Gangl et al. (2012) followed Castelfranchi and Falcone (2010) in their differentiation between reason-based and implicit trust. They argued that implicit trust fosters committed cooperation, whereas reason-based trust fosters voluntary cooperation. Similar characterizations of trust as having a rational and cognitive as well as an

automatic and unintentional side are found in Lewis and Weigert (1995), Mayer et al. (1995), McAllister (1995) and Tyler (2003).

I draw on Graeff (1998) who argued that trust needs to include at least two qualities: 1. Trust is positively connoted and is the basis for benevolent interactions; 2. Trust contains a certain risk that the hoped for event will occur. Graeff (1998) defined trust as the belief of the trustor that the trustee will effectuate a beneficial outcome in a risky situation (Graeff, 1998). This sums up the previous specifications rather well: the benevolence of the interacting parties, a certain risk as well as the implicit or emotional part of trust are incorporated, since Graeff (1998) stressed that believing in the occurrence of a certain outcome has both knowledge-based and emotional qualities.

2.2.2 Power

The concept of power seems to be outlined much clearer in the literature. There is widespread agreement that power is the capacity to influence another party through the control of resources important to this party (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Festinger, 1950; French & Raven, 1959; Kelman, 1958). Also the difference between power and influence is recognized: power is the potential to influence while influence is the direct exertion of power (French & Raven, 1959; Raven et al., 1998). Kirchler et al. (2008) as well as Wahl et al. (2010) drew on Turner (2005) who stated that the power of authorities, defined as control, can take two forms. Legitimate control is based on the acceptance of the authority and its position whereas control as coercion is described as trying to control others against their will (Turner, 2005).

Gangl et al. (2012) turned to French and Raven's (1959) seminal work on the bases of social power. The main idea behind their conceptualization is that power can emerge in different forms. In their first differentiation the authors described five different bases of social

power – coercive power, reward power, legitimate power, expert power and referent power – adding informational power in a consecutive elaboration (Raven, 1965). This typology is widely recognized, has been tested with various methodologies in different settings (mostly in the organizational) and has undergone a few conceptual alterations (Raven et al., 1998). In their final characterization the authors combined the six different bases into harsh and soft forms of power. I follow Gangl et al. (2012) in referring to the harsh form of power as coercive power as well as referring to soft power as legitimate power.

Coercive power comprises French and Raven's coercive and reward power (Gangl et al., 2012) and is consequently based on the potential to reward compliant behavior and punish non-compliant behavior through monetary or non-monetary means (Raven, 1992, 1993; Raven et al., 1998). A supervisor, for example, may have the potential to reward her employees through special benefits or a promotion and also punish them by withholding these rewards as well as handing out undesirable job assignments (Raven et al., 1998). This characterization strongly leans on force and pressure (Gangl et al., 2012) and corresponds to Turner's (2005) coercive control.

Legitimate power on the other hand comprises French and Raven's legitimate, expert, referent, and informational power (Gangl et al., 2012). It is therefore based on the accepted right to influence others, the attribution of knowledge and skills, identification with the influencing party and the provision and distribution of information (Raven, 1992, 1993; Raven et al., 1998). An employee could, for example, comply because he can identify well with the supervisor or thinks highly of her capacities in leadership. This characterization is not predicated on force but rather on volition and belief (Gangl et al., 2012) and corresponds to Turner's (2005) legitimate control. Within the SSF, Gangl et al. (2012) argued that coercive power fosters enforced compliance, whereas legitimate power – together with reason-based trust – fosters voluntary compliance.

2.2.3 Cooperation

After discussing the two factors in the SSF we now turn to the behavior that trust and power within an organization are said to cause. To this end, I draw on Tyler and Blader's (2000) definition of cooperation in groups. The authors argued that cooperation "refers to whether or not people act to promote the goals of the group" (Tyler & Blader, 2000, p. 3). Cooperation is seen as similar to a social dilemma where the immediate, individual and egoistic interests of one person are in conflict with the interests of the group this person belongs to (Komorita & Parks, 1994). Since there are certain costs (e.g. resources, time, effort) involved for the individual in order to maximize the interest of the group, the individual may choose to cooperate or not to cooperate. Therefore, the opposite of cooperation is lack of cooperation.

Cooperation has also received much attention in the study of decision-making and game theory (Parks & Vu, 1994). Here, cooperation is seen as the behavior that benefits both parties involved (Tyler & Blader, 2000). Whether or not people cooperate depends on the similarity of preferences the two parties have (Tyler & Blader, 2000). Cooperation also differs according to cultural background (Parks & Vu, 1994), personality (Komorita & Parks, 1995) and the existence of a central authority (Axelrod, 1981).

The central aspect of cooperation, however, is the notion that two different motivations – cooperation and non-cooperation – are involved (Tyler & Blader, 2000). This reflects the qualities of another social dilemma very well. Taxpayers may choose to pay their taxes correctly and contribute to the common good or maximize their own profit by evading them (Kirchler et al., 2008; Wahl et al., 2011).

Returning to the organizational context Tyler and Blader (2003) pointed out that people can choose how much they engage themselves in their work. Some people rigidly stick to the objectives specified in their job description, others engage themselves in their job with

vigor and zeal and thus perform higher and more efficiently. The former form of cooperation is called mandatory cooperation, the latter discretionary cooperation (Tyler & Blader, 2000). This differentiation of cooperative behavior is vital to this paper, since these concepts are supposed to replace enforced and voluntary compliance as well as committed cooperation (Gangl et al., 2012) to form the new organizational SSF.

Mandatory cooperation describes a behavior that is dictated or requested by group rules and norms (Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003). In the workplace, these rules might include the aforementioned job description, operational procedures or the supervisor's instructions. People with this approach to their job focus less on the quality of their work but rather on what is sufficient to complete an assignment (Tyler & Blader, 2000). Mandatory cooperation is therefore motivated by external sources and instrumental judgments about whether cooperative behavior will be rewarded and non-cooperative behavior will be punished. Hence, mandatory cooperation corresponds to enforced compliance (Gangl et al., 2012; Kirchler et al., 2008) because both concepts are predicated on concerns about incentives and sanctions. It is, however, important to note that mandatory cooperation is in fact a form of cooperation and not a lack of cooperation. An employee, for example, might not be as engaged in his work and perform rather low but still adequately complete his assignments (Tyler & Blader, 2000). In this way mandatory cooperation also corresponds to enforced compliance, since one does pay his taxes correctly but out of fear of punishment rather than a sense of responsibility.

Discretionary cooperation on the other hand describes a behavior that is not directly required by group rules or norms (Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003). In the workplace, this form of extra-role behavior might reach from fixing a malfunctioning copy machine to engaging in ones job with vigor and zeal (Tyler & Blader, 2000). Employees with this approach to their job will perform highly and strive to complete their assignments in the best manner possible. Furthermore they need to be instructed and monitored less, since they try to find solutions to

work-related problems on their own. Discretionary cooperation is therefore voluntary and motivated internally. It is developed from personal attitudes and values as well as feelings about the legitimacy of group authorities (Tyler & Blader, 2000). Hence discretionary cooperation corresponds to the constructs of voluntary compliance and committed cooperation (Gangl et al., 2012) since it is by definition voluntary and even exceeds committed cooperation. It does so because discretionary cooperation describes a behavior where an employee, for instance out of personal values, performs higher than he would have to. In contrast, this kind of behavior would not be observed in the tax context, since nobody will purposely pay more taxes than one is required to despite one's conviction that the tax money is used appropriately.

As a final step this article seeks to integrate the concept of *inner resignation* (German: 'innere Kündigung') into its framework. Inner resignation has received attention mostly from German researchers, however, a common definition as well as a proper English translation has yet to be agreed upon. Höhn introduced the German term 'innere Kündigung' in 1982, since then quite a few theoretical and empirical studies have tried to close in on the phenomenon (for an overview see Schmitz et al., 2002). Schmitz et al. (2002) also pointed out the lack of viable research systematic and sufficient empirical foundation although Richter (1999) stated that inner resignation is to be found in more or less any company and incidence rates per company between 2 and 80 % can be found in literature (Schmitz et al., 2002). However, there is some agreement among authors that inner resignation can be seen as the refusal of committed performance in the workplace, that has both behavioral and attitudinal correlates (Richter, 1999). Besides the denial of any other involvement in work except what is legally mandated in the labor contract (Elsik, 1994), examples of the behavioral side of inner resignation according to Echterhoff, Poweleit, Schindler, and Krenz (1997) can include: showing no interest in work-related discussions, always siding with the majority, simply

accepting the decisions being made by the supervisor and not using ones full potential. The attitudinal side includes, among others, a continuous discontentment with the own job (Faller, 1993). Indicators on an organizational level may include high absenteeism, rejection of training programs, decreased productivity and increased complaints by customers (Krystek, Becherer, & Deichelmann, 1995).

This article draws on the conceptualization of Schmitz et al. (2002), who in turn followed Faller (1993) in defining inner resignation as a reaction to the violation of the inner labor contract. In contrast to the legal labor contract the inner labor contract, which is based on the equity principle (Adams, 1965), consists of the employee's expectations towards the company and its representatives (and vice-versa; Faller, 1993). These subjective expectations may include an acceptable working environment, reasonable working hours and career opportunities. Thus, when this contract is broken by the employer, the employee may resort to restoring the equity by resigning internally (Schmitz et al., 2002). A similar characterization can be found in Rousseau's (1989) concept of the psychological contract. The psychological contract constitutes an employee's subjective beliefs regarding the terms and conditions of the reciprocal agreement (e.g. pay for performance) between the employee and the organization that begins to evolve during the recruitment process.

The concept of inner resignation, however, has to be distinguished from mandatory cooperation. While mandatory cooperation focuses exclusively on the behavioral side and is still considered a form of cooperation, inner resignation also takes into account attitudes and expectations (inner contract) and has a distinct negative, non-cooperative connotation (i.e. lack of cooperation; Tyler & Blader, 2000). Furthermore to reach the state of inner resignation an employee has to suffer violations of the inner contract, e.g. long working hours, over a period of time (Richter, 1999).

2.3 *An organizational Slippery Slope Framework*

So far, this article has provided definitions of trust and power as well as of the different forms of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior included in an organizational SSF. In order to present a complete framework from which hypotheses can be derived, the interplay of these factors will be elaborated.

Within the original framework trust is said to foster tax compliance (Kirchler et al., 2008; Wahl et al., 2010), likewise trust enables cooperation in general (Axelrod, 1984; Ostrom & Walker, 2003; Tyler 2003). More specifically Mayer et al. (1995) stated that trust in the supervisor will in many cases lead to cooperation within an organization. Therefore, I assume that trust has a positive effect on discretionary cooperation (replacing voluntary compliance and committed cooperation) as well as a negative effect on mandatory cooperation and inner resignation. This proposed relationship is in line with the original framework where trust is said to increase voluntary compliance (Kirchler et al., 2008) and in line with the refined framework where trust is said to foster committed cooperation (Gangl et al., 2012). Furthermore, Mayer et al. (1995) defined the outcome of trust as risk-taking in relationships. Applied to a scenario where a trustful relationship between an employee and his supervisor exists (and no formal agreement about the benefits for a higher performance of the employee is given), it can be assumed that the employee is willing to take more risks, e.g. investing himself in work (without knowing if there are going to be any benefits). Following the same logic it can be assumed that if the relationship is dominated by mistrust the employee will not take any risks and put an extra effort into his work but will rather display mandatory cooperation or even resign internally. Likewise Robinson and Rousseau (1994) showed that trust is negatively linked to violations of the inner contract and in turn to performance.

Within the SSF, power is also said to foster tax compliance (Kirchler et al., 2008; Wahl et al., 2010). More specifically Gangl et al. (2012) stated that coercive power will facilitate enforced compliance, while legitimate power will foster voluntary compliance. Mayer et al. (1995) elaborated that employees might also cooperate in the absence of trust and in fear of punishment. In line with Gangl et al. (2012) I propose that coercive power will have a positive effect on both mandatory cooperation and inner resignation. In the former case Tyler and Blader (2000) explicitly stated that mandatory cooperation is motivated externally by the expectation that cooperative behavior will be rewarded and non-cooperative behavior will be punished. In the latter case a continuous threat of coercive power will lead the employees to doubt the equity of the inner contract (Faller, 1993) with their employer, eventually leading them to cancel it, rendering them internally resigned.


In contrast, I expect legitimate power to have a distinct positive effect and coercive power to have a negative effect on discretionary cooperation, since this form of cooperation is motivated not instrumentally but internally, which includes considerations regarding the legitimacy of group authorities (Tyler & Blader, 2000).

In summary, the organizational SSF (see Figure 1a) consists of the three independent factors coercive power, legitimate power and trust which are said to influence different forms of cooperative and non-cooperative behaviors and attitudes within an organization. These dependent behaviors represent a continuum from extraordinary engagement in work opposed to mandatory cooperation and inner resignation. Consequently, we can derive the following hypotheses from the elaborations above:

1. Trust has a
 - a) positive effect on discretionary cooperation as well as a
 - b) negative effect on mandatory cooperation and inner resignation.
2. Coercive power has a

- a) positive effect on mandatory cooperation and inner resignation as well as a
 - b) negative effect on discretionary cooperation.
3. Legitimate power has a positive effect on discretionary cooperation.

Figure 1a
The hypothesized model



3 Method

3.1 Participants and procedure

In order to find a company to conduct the survey in, the Oberösterreichische Gesundheits- und Spitals-AG (*gespag*) in Linz, Upper Austria was approached in August 2012. *Gespag* manages ten hospitals and is the biggest employer in the health sector in Upper Austria, employing a total of 9.870 workers. Human resources management chose the hospitals in Freistadt (492 employees), Rohrbach (541 employees) and one of their hospitals in Linz (1095 employees) to participate in this study. The study was announced at the

beginning of October 2012 through a letter posted in all departments and stations of the three participating hospitals, stating that absolute anonymity was ensured. The participants were provided with an envelope to enclose the filled out forms in. These envelopes could be dropped in a box until the beginning of November.

I received a total of 582 questionnaires from all three hospitals combined, yielding me return rates between 23% and 30%. However, 26 participants had to be excluded from the final analysis because they provided insufficient data in the questionnaire (e.g. leaving whole pages blank). Consequently the final sample ($N = 556$) consisted of 465 (83.6%) females and 78 (14.0%) males between the ages of 20 and 60 ($M = 41.86$, $SD = 9.97$, $Md = 44.00$). While 13 (2.3%) participants chose not to report their gender, 71 (12.8%) made no indication about their age. Almost half of the sample (273, 49.1%) reported to be working full time, while roughly the other half (258, 46.4%) reported to be working part time in their jobs. A vast majority of 309 (55.6%) participants stated to be working in the nursing staff, while 99 (17.8%) indicated to be operating personnel and 71 (12.8%) to be working in the administration, only 34 (6.1%) physicians took part in the survey. Again 25 (4.5%) participants did not indicate their amount of working hours and 43 (7.7%) did not report their field of work. The average tenure was 14.48 years ($SD = 10.10$, $Md = 12.00$) and ranged from one to 39 years. Finally 54 (9.7%) of the participants reported to hold an executive position, while 485 (87.2%) indicated a non-executive position. Again 59 (10.6%) and 17 (3.1%) participants made no indication about their tenure or position respectively.

3.2 *Material*

3.2.1 *Pre-test*

The questionnaire was developed with a group of four other graduate students at the

University of Vienna, Department of Economic Psychology. In order to devise a SSF that grasps the complexity of compliance within an organization, an extensive search in the literature related to trust (Deutsch, 1958; Dietz & Hartog, 2006; Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Graeff, 1998; Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Mayer et al., 1995; McAllister, 1995; Shockley-Zalabak, Ellis, & Winograd, 2000; Simpson, 2007; Tyler, 2003), power (French & Raven, 1959; Raven, 1965, 1990, 1992, 1993; Raven et al. 1998; Turner, 2005), and commitment/cooperation (Allen & Meyer, 1990; Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Blader & Tyler, 2009; Meyer, Allen, & Gellatly, 1990; Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch, & Topolnytsky, 2002; Murphy, Tyler, & Curtis, 2009; Richter, 1999; Schmitz et al., 2002; Smith, Organ, & Near, 1983; Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2001, 2003; Tyler, 2005) was conducted. The aim was to find concepts and corresponding questionnaire items that would enable us to describe this complex situation adequately. It was agreed upon to include trust in the supervisor, organization and colleagues (Graeff, 1998), power of the supervisor (Raven et al., 1998) and organization, organizational commitment (Allen & Mayer, 1990), cooperation (Tyler & Blader, 2000), inner resignation (Schmitz et al., 2002), workplace deviance (Bennett & Robinson, 2000) as well as procedural justice and social identity (Tyler & Blader, 2000). The items that were originally developed in English were translated into German and then translated back to English. To ensure equivalence English native speakers compared the original versions to the re-translated English versions. In addition the items to measure power of the organization were constructed analogously to the items by Raven et al. (1998) since the original items refer only to the supervisor. Two more items to measure the employee's feelings towards hierarchies were also constructed. This yielded us a pool of 169 items on a 7-point Likert-scale (see Appendix A), which were included in an online questionnaire. The link was distributed via email in June 2012 and we were able to attain a sample of 123 participants. Thereupon I conducted multiple analyses of reliability, exploratory factor analyses as well as confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) with the

data collected in the pre-test. The goal of this validation was to drastically reduce the number of items by selecting those items with high loadings or estimates but at the same time preserving the different facets of each scale. The results of this validation are summarized in Appendix B. All reliabilities were satisfactory, the exploratory factor analyses were in line with the original conceptualizations (e.g. Allen & Meyer's, 1990, items on commitment showed a three-factor structure) and the fit of all CFAs was good. Before constructing the final questionnaire all items that were selected through the validation process were checked for overly complicated phrasing, double negations or other linguistic features that could be misleading. In order to devise a tool that could be used in organizations, which employ workers from different educational backgrounds, some items were rephrased to meet this requirement.

3.2.2 Measures

The final questionnaire (see Appendix A) consisted of 76 items on 17 different scales: trust in the supervisor, the organization, and colleagues; coercive power of the supervisor and the organization; legitimate power of the supervisor and the organization; feelings about hierarchies; affective, normative and continuance commitment; discretionary and mandatory cooperation as well as inner resignation and workplace deviance; procedural justice; social identity.

This article, however, only focuses on the six dimensions trust of the supervisor, coercive and legitimate power of the supervisor, mandatory and discretionary cooperation as well as inner resignation. All other scales were measured for research goals extending the scope of this article, except the items concerning workplace deviance, which had to be excluded from this study at the request of *gespag* human resources management. Consequently the material for the present study was a paper-pencil-questionnaire of 72 items

on a 7-point Likert-scale (from “I do not agree at all” to “I completely agree”) including eight demographic questions (sex, sex of supervisor, age, form of work contract, form of employment, field of work, tenure and position) and a cover page again ensuring the participants’ complete anonymity and stating the purpose of the study.

The reliabilities, means and standard deviations as well as the inter-correlations of all relevant scales are listed in Table 1. Furthermore, in order to estimate a full latent model, the adequacy of all measurement models from the pre-test was tested with the data from the main survey. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 2.

Table 1

Means, standard deviations, reliabilities and inter-scale-correlations of trust, coercive power (and its sub-dimensions coercive and reward power), legitimate power, discretionary and mandatory cooperation as well as inner resignation (N = 556).

Scale	M	SD	α	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1 Trust	5.21	1.56	.93	1.00							
2 Coercive Power	3.72	1.29	.60	-.07	1.00						
3 Coercive Power (sub)	4.15	1.22	.63	-.05	.46*	1.00					
4 Reward Power (sub)	3.54	1.52	.71	-.09	.94*	.22*	1.00				
5 Legitimate Power	4.76	1.44	.87	.81*	.03	.03	-.01	1.00			
6 Discretionary Cooperation	4.69	1.24	.69	.32*	.12*	.03	.10*	.33*	1.00		
7 Mandatory Cooperation	2.63	1.40	.87	-.06	.12*	.19*	.08	-.01	-.21*	1.00	
8 Inner Resignation	4.15	1.41	.61	-.39*	.00	.16*	-.04	-.34*	-.18*	.23*	1.00

* p < .01

Trust in the supervisor. The belief of the employee that the supervisor will effectuate a beneficial outcome in a risky situation (Graeff, 1998) was measured with five items (e.g. “If I have a concern, my supervisor takes the time to deal with it.”). As Table 1 shows the trust scale has a very good reliability. In addition, Table 2 reveals an excellent fit of the

measurement model for this scale. However, the inter-scale correlation between this scale and legitimate power ($r = .81, p < .01$) suggests a problem of multicollinearity that will be treated in the results section.

Coercive power of the supervisor. The potential to punish and reward employees (Raven et al., 1998; Gangl et al., 2012) was also measured with five items e.g. “*My supervisor could make my job unpleasant for me.*” or “*My supervisor mainly decides whether I get promoted or not.*”). Table 1 reveals that coercive power – as an independent variable – displays only two low, albeit significant, correlations with mandatory and discretionary cooperation ($r = .12, p < .01$) as well as no correlation ($r = .00, p = .98$) with inner resignation. Turning to Table 2 the RMSEA displays a value of .11, which points to an unsatisfactory fit. A closer look at the standardized regression weights revealed very low values for the two items that were supposed to measure Raven et al.’s (1998) coercive power (CV_01 = .21; CV_02 = .13), thereby causing the inadequate fit. In contrast, satisfactory values for the reward power items (CV_04 = .76; CV_05 = .57; CV_06 = .70) were observed. A viable solution was found by splitting this harsh power scale into its two original sub-dimensions and adding two more items from the scale on coercive power of the organization. Consequently coercive power comprised items CV_01 (.54), CQ_01 (.78) and CQ_02 (.51), whereas reward power comprised items CV_04 (.74), CV_05 (.56) and CV_06 (.73). When the two measurement models are compared it becomes evident that the second model with two latent variables ($\chi^2_{cp} = 12.73, df = 8, p = .12$) displays a significantly better fit to the data ($\chi^2_{\Delta} = 26.48, df = 3, p = .00$) than the model with one latent variable ($\chi^2_{cp} = 39.21, df = 5, p = .00$). Furthermore, the superiority of the second solution is also reflected in the other fit indices, especially the RMSEA of .03, in the standardized regression weights of all items, which are greater than .50, and in the higher reliabilities of the new sub-dimensions coercive ($\alpha = .63$) and reward ($\alpha = .71$) power compared to the original coercive power scale ($\alpha = .63$).

Legitimate power of the supervisor. The potential to influence employees through an accepted right, the attribution of knowledge and skills, identification with the supervisor and the provision and distribution of information (Raven, 1992, 1993; Raven et al., 1998; Gangl et al., 2012) was also measured with five items (e.g. “*My supervisor deserves to be in her position.*” or “*My supervisor knows the best way to do my job.*”). Turning to Table 1 and 2 the legitimate power scale reveals a very good reliability and an excellent fit of the measurement model respectively.

Cooperation. In order to measure mandatory and discretionary cooperation (Tyler & Blader, 2000) as well as inner resignation (Schmitz et al., 2002) four (in the latter case three) items per scale were included. Examples being “*I only fulfill the responsibilities specified in my job description.*” (mandatory cooperation), “*I volunteer to do things that are not required in order to help my organization.*” (discretionary cooperation) and “*I used to be much more dedicated to my work.*” (inner resignation). Table 1 reveals low to good reliabilities. In addition, Table 2 displays acceptable fit indices for this model with three latent dimensions. Nonetheless one item from the scale discretionary cooperation (CS_07 = 0.27) and two items from mandatory cooperation (CS_14 = .13; CS_15 = .23) had to be removed due to insufficient loadings on their respective unobserved variables. As a consequence all fit indices showed improved values (see Table 2). It has to be noted here, that although the likelihood ratio test ($\chi^2_{co} = 33.31$, $df = 17$, $p = .01$) suggests an unsatisfactory fit, the fit is – in fact – still adequate. This contradictory conclusion can be explained by the likelihood ratio test’s high sensitivity to sample size (Byrne, 2001; Fan, Thompson, & Wang, 1999). For example, compared to the measurement models from the pre-test (N = 123, see Appendix A) all measurement and full latent models based on the data from the main survey (N = 556) show rather low p-values. This does not mean that the model does not fit the data, it rather means that other, more practical fit indices have to be considered more importantly (Byrne, 2001).

Table 2

Number of items, χ^2 -statistic, degrees of freedom, p-value, GFI, AGFI, CFI and RMSEA of all measurement models used in the full latent model (N = 556).

Measurement model	N° of items	χ^2	df	p	GFI	AGFI	CFI	RMSEA
Trust	5	6.59	3	.07	1.00	.98	1.00	.05
Coercive Power	5	39.21	5	.00	.97	.92	.91	.11
Coercive + Reward Power*	6	12.73	8	.12	.99	.98	.99	.03
Legitimate Power	5	4.01	2	.14	1.00	.98	1.00	.04
Cooperation	11	142.34	41	.00	.96	.93	.91	.07
Cooperation**	8	33.31	17	.01	.99	.97	.98	.04

* Model with two latent variables coercive and reward power.

** Three items had to be removed due to very low standardized regression weights

4 Results

Since participants filled out the questionnaires during their working hours it can be assumed that they answered the questions in a way that truly corresponds to their workplace setting. In order to investigate the validity of the newly proposed organizational SSF, I chose structural equation modeling as a way of theory testing. For this purpose I used AMOS 19.0.0.

4.1 Data Imputation

First of all, some of the questionnaires were not filled out completely. In order to deal with this missing data, I chose to impute the missing values via regression imputation using AMOS. This imputation method replaces the missing values with predicted values from a regression based on complete cases.

4.2 Multicollinearity

Secondly, I took a closer look at the relationship between trust and legitimate power, since the inter-scale-correlation ($r = .81, p < .01$) pointed to an issue of multicollinearity. This statistical phenomenon does not – contrary to widespread rumor – disappear when using structural equation modeling, may pose serious problems to the analysis of data and consequently lead to wrong conclusions (Marsh, Dowson, Pietsch, & Walker, 2004). The deteriorating effects of multicollinearity become visible when two highly correlated exogenous variables are used to cause a third endogenous variable (Garson, 2012). In order to investigate this, an example model with the two independent variables trust and legitimate power causing the dependent variable discretionary cooperation was built. The effects of multicollinearity were visible at once. An extremely high correlation ($r = .89, p < .001$) between the exogenous variables was observed, while – contrary to the hypothesis – neither of the regression paths from trust ($r = .26, SE = .09, p > .05$) or legitimate power ($r = .16, SE = .09, p = .23$) to the endogenous variable were significant. The latter is in line with the assumption that multicollinearity may lead to inaccurate (Mason and Perrault, 1991) and misleadingly non-significant (Grewal, Cote, & Baumgartner, 2004) coefficient estimates. Furthermore, inflated standard errors for these regression paths (Garson, 2012; Grewal et al., 2004; Marsh et al., 2004; Mason & Perrault, 1991) as well as excessively large standardized regression weights and covariances are indicative of a multicollinearity problem (Garson, 2012). All three indicators were observed in this example model. In fact, the standard errors for both regression paths were as high as .09, whereas standard errors for all other paths ranged from .03 to .05. Additionally, six of the thirteen standardized regression weights were greater than .80, while the covariance estimate between trust and legitimate power was 2.17 ($SE = .16, p < .001$). These facts lend support to the notion that multicollinearity caused the

non-significant paths between trust, legitimate power and discretionary cooperation and that, should this problem be resolved, the true relationship would emerge.

Therefore, a viable solution to this problem had to be found. While some ad-hoc solutions like dropping a variable or restricting parameters can be found in the literature (Marsh et al., 2004), other authors favor partial-least-square (PLS) estimation (Grewal et al., 2004; Westlund, Kälström, & Parmler, 2008). However, I chose a more practical approach. Since there was such a high correlation between trust and legitimate power ($r = .89, p < .001$) it had to be assumed that these variables represent either only one dimension or that they were caused by one common dimension. In order to find out which of these assumptions was true, two measurement models were built and compared to each other. The first measurement model represented the first alternative that trust and legitimate power are one dimension, therefore all items were linked to one latent variable. The second measurement model represented the second alternative that trust and legitimate power are caused by one common dimension, therefore the items were linked to their respective latent variables, which were in turn caused by a second order factor called trust factor. When compared, the second measurement model ($\chi^2_{2nd\ order} = 89.63, df = 30, p = .00, GFI = .97, AGFI = .95, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .06$) displayed a better fit than the first one ($\chi^2_{1st\ order} = 133.42, df = 30, p = .00, GFI = .96, AGFI = .92, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .08$). In addition, the second measurement model was significantly more probable ($\chi^2_{\Delta} = 43.79, df = 1, p = .00$) than the first. Hence, it can be reasoned that trust and legitimate power are caused by one common dimension and that if this common dimension is used to cause another endogenous variable the deteriorating effects of multicollinearity should disappear.

To test this I built a new example model with the second order trust factor causing trust and legitimate power on the one hand and discretionary cooperation on the other. Compared to the new example model ($\chi^2_{t+lp} = 162.36, df = 58, p = .00, GFI = .96, AGFI = .93,$

CFI = .98, RMSEA = .06) the first example model with trust and legitimate power as two endogenous variables fit the data rather badly ($\chi^2_{t-lp} = 413.60$, $df = 62$, $p = .00$, GFI = .89, AGFI = .85, CFI = .93, RMSEA = .10). Consequently, the new solution proved to be significantly more probable ($\chi^2_{\Delta} = 251.24$, $df = 4$, $p = .00$) than the first one. In addition, the regression path from the new trust factor to discretionary cooperation was highly significant and displayed a standard error, similar in size to the others ($r = .43$, $SE = .04$, $p < .001$). Therefore, this alteration was included in the analysis of the full latent model.

Before analyzing the full latent model, however, I want to sum up the steps taken so far. The starting point was the hypothesized model with coercive, legitimate power and trust as exogenous as well as discretionary, mandatory cooperation and inner resignation as endogenous variables. Firstly, due to an inadequate fit of the measurement model coercive power had to be split into its sub-dimensions reward and coercive power. Secondly three items from two of the endogenous variables had to be dropped because of loadings below .50. And finally, in a first example model I found prove that there was a problem of multicollinearity between trust and legitimate power. The better fitting measurement model led me to believe that trust and legitimate power are caused by one common factor. By introducing the trust factor as an exogenous variable into a second example model this conclusion could be supported and the effects of multicollinearity could be avoided.


4.3 *Estimation of the full latent model*

As a consequence of the alterations described above the relationships as proposed in the first hypothesized model had to be revisited. It was assumed that the trust factor would – just like trust before – have a positive effect on discretionary cooperation and a negative effect on both mandatory cooperation and inner resignation, whereas both coercive and

reward power would also have an effect on all three forms of cooperation. Furthermore, I expect the trust factor to explain quite some variance in trust and legitimate power.

These modifications lead me from the original hypothesized model presented in Figure 1a to the adjusted model presented in Figure 1b.

Figure 1b
Adjusted model




The latent model was estimated as shown in Figure 1b with the data of the 556 *gespag* employees. The overall fit was very good ($\chi^2_{M0} = 539.76$, $df = 233$, $p = .00$, GFI = .93, AGFI = .91, CFI = .95, RMSEA < .05), however, three of the hypothesized regression paths were not significant. Therefore the paths from coercive power to discretionary cooperation ($r = -.04$, $SE = .07$, $p = .51$) as well as from the trust factor ($r = -.06$, $SE = .07$, $p = .20$) and reward power ($r = -.04$, $SE = .08$, $p = .50$) to mandatory cooperation were dropped for the sake of parsimony. Consequently the final model – presented in Figure 2 – was estimated with the three paths removed.

The fit was still very good ($\chi^2_{M1} = 542.10$, $df = 236$, $p = .00$, GFI = .93, AGFI = .91, CFI = .95, RMSEA < .05), albeit the small rise in the χ^2 -statistic. This change, however, is to be expected when removing any parameters from a model (Byrne, 2001). Furthermore, the

difference is neither significant ($\chi^2_{\Delta} = 2.34, df = 3, p = .51$) nor does it result in any change in the fit indices. Therefore, the model fitting process was finalized here because it can be assumed that the model presented in Figure 2 is the model that fits the data in the best possible way.

Figure 2

The full structural model with standardized regression weights of all significant paths, their respective standard errors in parentheses, squared multiple correlations (R^2) of all endogenous variables and fit indices of the model.



χ^2	df	p	GFI	AGFI	CFI	RMSEA
544.77	237	.00	.93	.91	.95	< .05

* Regression paths are significant at a level of < .001

** Regression paths are significant at a level of < .002

It will be recalled that coercive power is expected to have an effect on all three endogenous variables. In particular, coercive power should have a positive effect on inner

resignation and mandatory cooperation as well as a negative effect on discretionary cooperation. This, in part, is true since coercive power does have a positive effect on inner resignation and mandatory cooperation. However, no negative effect on discretionary cooperation was found. In fact, this non-significant regression path ($r = -.04$, $SE = .07$, $p = .51$) was removed from the final model, as mentioned before. In contrast, the regression paths from coercive power to inner resignation ($r = .28$, $SE = .10$, $p < .001$) and mandatory cooperation ($r = .24$, $SE = .10$, $p < .001$) are both significant, albeit small in size. Consequently the higher the coercive power of the supervisor is perceived, the higher both the inner resignation and mandatory cooperation of the employees will be.

I also assume reward power to have an influence on all three endogenous variables, which is – again in part – true. This form of power has a negative effect on inner resignation as well as a positive effect on discretionary cooperation, whereas no effect on mandatory cooperation could be found. In particular, the first ($r = -.20$, $SE = .07$, $p < .002$) and the second ($r = .17$, $SE = .05$, $p < .002$) path were both highly significant and small in size, while the third path was removed from the model since it was not significant ($r = -.04$, $SE = .08$, $p = .50$). Thus, the higher the reward power of the supervisor is perceived, the fewer employees will resign internally and the more employees will display discretionary cooperation.

Likewise I expected the trust factor to have an effect on all endogenous variables. In particular, it should have a positive effect on discretionary cooperation, a negative effect on both mandatory cooperation and inner resignation and should explain a considerable amount of variance in the original trust scale and legitimate power. This is mostly true, since the trust factor has a positive effect on mandatory cooperation, a negative effect on inner resignation and explains a lot of variance in trust and legitimate power. However, no negative effect on mandatory cooperation was found. In fact, this non-significant regression path ($r = -.06$, $SE = .07$, $p = .20$) was removed from the model. In contrast, the regression paths from the trust

factor to discretionary cooperation ($r = -.54$, $SE = .08$, $p < .001$) and inner resignation ($r = .44$, $SE = .06$, $p < .001$) are both highly significant and medium-sized. Furthermore, the trust factor explains 97.2 % and 89.9 % of the variance in legitimate power and the original trust scale respectively. Thus, the higher the trust in the supervisor is perceived the higher the discretionary cooperation and the lower the inner resignation of the employees will be. In addition, the trust scale and the legitimate power scale are in fact caused by one common dimension.

Finally, the explained variance of the three dependent variables can be determined. In the case of inner resignation, 37.5 % of its variance is accounted for by its three predictors coercive and reward power as well as the trust factor. Furthermore, 20.7 % of the variance in discretionary cooperation are caused by its two predictors reward power and the trust factor. However, only 5.7 % of the variance in mandatory cooperation can be explained by its sole factor coercive power.

In summary, most of the relationships in the hypothesized model could be found in the full latent model, however, some measurement models had to be revisited before the full latent model could be analyzed. This fact and the other results will be discussed in detail below.

5 Discussion

The aim of the present study was to adapt the SSF (Kirchler et al., 2008, Wahl et al., 2010, Gangl et al., 2012) to an organizational context. This was achieved by developing a new framework in which trust and power are expected to influence three different forms of organizational behavior: discretionary cooperation, mandatory cooperation and inner

resignation.

The findings support the main assumptions of the framework that trust and power do have a considerable effect on the different forms of cooperation and non-cooperation within an organization. In fact, coercive power has a positive effect on both inner resignation and mandatory cooperation, whereas reward power has a negative effect on inner resignation and a positive effect on discretionary cooperation. Finally, trust has a negative effect on inner resignation and a positive effect on discretionary cooperation as well. However, before reviewing my hypotheses in detail I want to draw the reader's attention to two important theoretical implications of this study concerning trust and power.

5.1 Trust and power

First of all, the relationship between trust and legitimate or non-coercive forms of power is mostly viewed as positive in the literature (Das & Teng, 1998; Gangl et al., 2012; Kirchler et al., 2008; Leonidou, Talias & Leonidou, 2008). This study replicates these findings but also poses questions about the need to differentiate between these two concepts since they correlate so highly with each other. Their similarity becomes evident when contrasting both trust and legitimate power to coercive power. First of all, it has to be noted that both harsh and soft power forms are, to a certain extent, subject to personal interpretation of the employee. Also trust in the supervisor is by definition a belief of the employee (Graeff, 1998) and therefore subjective. However, sanctions for non-cooperative behavior and incentives for cooperative behavior are more perceptible to the employee and might even be part of a formal or non-formal contract in some companies, while feelings about the legitimacy or expertise of the supervisor are more of an implicit or subjective nature and are attributed to the supervisor by the employee, as is the employee's trust in her. In conclusion, when trust, legitimate and

coercive power are compared to each other, it becomes clear that trust and legitimate power are more alike than coercive and legitimate power, since the former concepts are linked to beliefs and attributions of the employee whereas coercive power is more closely connected to an actual exertion of power by the supervisor. In addition, the better fitting measurement and example models discussed above lend further support to the notion that trust and legitimate power are caused by one common dimension. Therefore, I draw the conclusion that legitimate power as described by Gangl et al. (2012) should be seen as another specification of the dimension trust. This does not mean, however, that legitimate power should be neglected in further research but rather that the present conceptualization lacks discriminatory power towards trust.

Secondly, the inadequate fit of the measurement model for Gangl et al.'s (2012) coercive power, led me to believe that Raven et al.'s (1998) coercive and reward power cannot be viewed as one harsh power dimension. While the fit was still adequate in the pretest (N = 123; see Appendix A) it became evident in the main survey (N = 556; see Table 2) that the summarization of the items into one dimension does not fit the data very well. Therefore, it seems that the power of the supervisor to punish non-cooperative behavior and the power to reward cooperative behavior should, in fact, be viewed as independent factors functioning within this framework. An exploratory factor analysis that produced the two factors was conducted, therefore lending support to this assumption.

At this point it will be recalled that I drew in great parts on Gangl et al.'s (2012) refined conceptualizations when adapting the SSF to the organizational context. However, when we jointly consider the conclusions above, the shape of the final model points more to the first conceptualizations (Kirchler et al., 2008; Wahl et al., 2010). Here coercive power plays a dominant role when it comes to the actual exertion of power, while legitimate power is seen as more of a positive attitude towards an authority (Wahl et al., 2010). This study adds

the notion that legitimate power is more similar to trust than to other forms of power. Furthermore, reward power functions as an independent non-coercive factor, which is in line with Leonidou et al.'s (2008) findings. These conclusions might also have important implications for further research in the field of tax psychology.

5.2 *The antecedents of cooperation*

When we turn to the relationships between the exogenous and endogenous variables it can be observed that all exogenous variables have an influence on the endogenous variables and that they are able to explain quite some variance. In particular, discretionary cooperation is caused by the reward power of and the trust in the supervisor. This implicates that to reach high levels of extraordinary engagement of employees in their work, a supervisor should motivate them with incentives like promotions and benefits as well as build a trustful relationship with them. Furthermore, the positive effect of trust and rewards on cooperation is well documented in the literature (Axelrod, 1984; Das & Teng, 1998; Ostrom & Walker, 2003; Tyler, 2003).

On the other end of the spectrum inner resignation is dependent on high coercive power as well as on low reward power and trust. Therefore, if the supervisor wants to avoid the cancellation of the inner contract between her employees and their organization she should also rely on incentives and build a trustful relationship. In addition, when employees perceive the power exerted by their supervisor as coercive they tend to cancel the inner contract and resign internally. These conclusions reflect findings by different authors: 1. As examples of high coercive power, non-cooperative leadership and other leadership-related problems (Höhn, 1989; Krystek et al., 1995) are known to promote inner resignation; 2. The lack of career opportunities (Schmitz et al., 2002) as an example for low reward power is also

linked to inner resignation; 3. As for trust, the lack of communication and information may foster inner resignation (Van Dierendonck, Schaufeli, Sixma, 1994). Also a decline in trust increases the likelihood of perceiving violations of the psychological contract (Robinson & Rousseau, 1994). These violations may in turn have serious consequences like lower performance and movement of labor (Robinson & Rousseau, 1994).

5.3 *Limitations and outlook*

As for the limitations of this study, Byrne (2001) pointed out that if one chooses to adapt his structural model to the data, it is strictly speaking not theory testing but rather a model fitting process and thus requires cross-validation. In addition, some of the scales displayed low reliabilities (e.g. inner resignation). It would be advisable for further research to reconsider the phrasing and number of some of the questionnaire items. Furthermore, mandatory cooperation has only one predictor, coercive power. Consequently, only 5.7% of its variance can be explained. This implicates either that other predictors are needed to explain mandatory cooperation or that the concept is redundant. A strong point can be made for the second solution, since inner resignation and mandatory cooperation describe similar behaviors and therefore lack discriminatory power, I would suggest dropping the later variable in further research on the adaption of the SSF in an organizational context. On the contrary, it could be advisable to include procedural justice and social identity into an organizational concept of the SSF. On the one hand procedural fairness has received attention from many authors in tax psychology (Braithwaite, 2003; Hartner, Rechberger, Kirchler, Schabmann, 2008; Kirchler et al., 2008, Wahl et al., 2010) on the other Tyler and Blader (2000; 2003) have stressed the importance of procedural fairness and social identity for the emersion of cooperation in their group engagement model. Likewise, Robinson and Rousseau

(1994) point out that procedural justice is linked to the violation of the psychological contract. Finally, the generalizability of the present findings might be questioned since the study was conducted with hospital workers, however, the basic structures and hierarchies of any organization exist here as well.

In summary, a viable transformation of the SSF from the context of tax psychology to organizational psychology was achieved by assuming that trust and power influence different forms of cooperative behavior. The present findings contribute to the understanding of and the discrimination between trust and different forms of power on the one hand and deliver some insight in how to promote cooperation and prevent non-cooperation in organizations on the other. In the latter case a final point should be made that although sanctions and incentives may be more perceptible to an employee, supervisors should not make the mistake to assume that “the carrot and the stick” is the silver bullet of cooperation. On the contrary, this study emphasizes the importance of a trustful relationship between an employee and his employer when it comes to fostering cooperation within an organization.

6 Literature

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7 Appendix

Appendix A

Items and item-codes of the pre-test and final questionnaire listed in their German version as well as their original or adapted English version.

	German Item	English Item
Power (original and adapted items from Raven et al., 1998)		
<i>Coercive Power of the supervisor</i>		
CV_01*	Mein Vorgesetzter kontrolliert meine Arbeit streng.	My supervisor checks up on my work strictly.
CV_02	Mein Vorgesetzter verhängt Sanktionen für Fehlleistungen.	My supervisor sanctions mistakes in the workplace.
CV_03**	Mein Vorgesetzter hat die Möglichkeit, mir meine Arbeit unangenehm zu gestalten.	My supervisor could make my job unpleasant for me.
CV_04*	Mein Vorgesetzter kann Einfluss auf meine Gehaltserhöhung nehmen.	My supervisor can influence whether I get an increase in pay or not.
CV_05*	Meine Beförderung wird vor allem von meinem Vorgesetzten mitbestimmt.	My supervisor mainly decides whether I get promoted or not.
CV_06*	Mein Vorgesetzter entscheidet über Boni oder Begünstigungen (Sonderzahlungen).	My supervisor could help me receive special benefits.
<i>Coercive Power of the organization</i> (own construction and translation)		
CQ_01*	In meinem Unternehmen wird die Arbeitsweise der Mitarbeiter/innen streng kontrolliert.	At my company employees are checked upon strictly.
CQ_02*	In meinem Unternehmen werden für Fehlleistungen Sanktionen gesetzt.	At my company mistakes are penalized.
CQ_03**	Die festgelegten Regeln in meinem Unternehmen können mir meine Arbeit erschweren.	The rules in my company can make my job harder.
CQ_04**	Prinzipiell ist es möglich, in meinem Unternehmen spezielle Boni oder Begünstigungen zu erhalten.	It is possible to receive special benefits at my company.
CQ_05	In meinem Unternehmen ist es üblich, dass gesteigerte Arbeitsleistung mit Gehaltserhöhungen belohnt werden.	In my company it is usual to reward special effort with a pay raise.
CQ_06**	Die Struktur meines Unternehmens ist entscheidend für meine Aufstiegschancen.	The corporate structure is crucial for my career opportunities.
<i>Legitimate Power of the supervisor</i>		
LV_01	Da mir mein Vorgesetzter viele Freiräume lässt, fühle ich mich ihm gegenüber verpflichtet.	My supervisor had let me have my way earlier so I felt obliged to comply now.
LV_02*	Mein Vorgesetzter ist zu Recht in seiner Position.	My supervisor deserves to be in her position.
LV_03	Mein Vorgesetzter ist berechtigt, mir zu sagen, wie ich meine Arbeit erledigen soll.	My supervisor had the right to request that I do my work in a particular way.
LV_04	Ich weiß, dass mein Vorgesetzter meine Hilfe wirklich braucht.	I understood that my supervisor really needed my help on this.
LV_05	Ich weiß, dass mein Vorgesetzter Unterstützung und Entgegenkommen von mir benötigt.	I realized that a supervisor needs assistance and cooperation from those working with
LV_06*	Mein Vorgesetzter ist mir mehrfach entgegen gekommen, deswegen fühle ich mich ihm gegenüber verpflichtet.	For past consideration I had received, I felt obliged to comply.
LV_07	Ich entlaste meinen Vorgesetzten durch meine Arbeit.	Unless I did so, his/her job would be more difficult.
LV_08	Vergangene schlechte Arbeitsleistung versuche ich zukünftig zu vermeiden.	Complying helped make up for things I had not done so well previously.
LV_09	Wenn ich in der Vergangenheit Fehler gemacht habe, habe ich das Gefühl, meinem Vorgesetzten etwas zu schulden.	I had made some mistakes and therefore felt that I owed this to him/her.
LV_10	Mein Vorgesetzter weiß mehr über den Inhalt	My supervisor probably knew more about

	meiner Arbeit als ich.	the job than I did.
LV_11	Mein Vorgesetzter hat mehr Fachwissen in meinem Arbeitsbereich als ich.	My supervisor probably had more technical knowledge about this than I did.
LV_12*	Mein Vorgesetzter weiß am besten wie meine Arbeit durchzuführen ist.	My supervisor knows the best way to do my job.
LV_13	Ich kann mich mit meinem Vorgesetzten identifizieren.	I saw my supervisor as someone I could identify with.
LV_14*	Ich halte viel von meinem Vorgesetzten.	I think highly of my supervisor.
LV_15	Ich respektiere meinen Vorgesetzten.	I respect my supervisor.
LV_16	Ich sehe zu meinem Vorgesetzten auf und gestalte meine Arbeit dementsprechend.	I looked up to my supervisor and generally modelled my work accordingly.
LV_17	Mein Vorgesetzter gibt mir hilfreiche Erklärungen, wenn ich meine Arbeitsweise ändern soll.	My supervisor gave me good reasons for changing how I did the job.
LV_18	Wenn ich von meinem Vorgesetzten auf einen Fehler aufmerksam gemacht werde, kann ich seine Kritik gut nachvollziehen.	Once it was pointed out, I could see why the change was necessary.
LV_19*	Ich kann Anmerkungen/Anweisungen von meinem Vorgesetzten nachvollziehen.	I can understand my supervisor's remarks/instructions.

Legitimate Power of the organization (own construction and translation)

LO_01	Die Unternehmensstruktur rechtfertigt die Festlegung der Arbeitsabläufe.	Corporate structure legitimizes the operational procedures.
LO_02**	Als Mitarbeiter/in bin ich verpflichtet, nach den Richtlinien/Vorgaben des Unternehmens zu handeln.	Since I am an employee, I have to comply with my company's rules.
LO_03	Aufgrund finanzieller Leistungen fühle ich mich verpflichtet, nach den Vorgaben des Unternehmens zu handeln.	For past financial considerations I had received, I feel obligated to comply with corporate rules.
LO_04	Da mir mein Unternehmen Handlungsspielraum gewährt, fühle ich mich verpflichtet, nach den Vorgaben des Unternehmens zu handeln.	For the latitude my company grants me, I feel obligated to comply with corporate rules.
LO_05	Ohne meinen Beitrag wäre die Effektivität meines Unternehmens geringer.	Without my contribution my company would not be as effective.
LO_06	Mein Unternehmen ist auf meinen Einsatz angewiesen.	My company depends on my efforts.
LO_07**	Der Erfolg meines Unternehmens ist auch von mir abhängig.	My company's success also depends on me.
LO_08	Da man in der Vergangenheit bei meinen Fehlern nachsichtig war, versuche ich diese zukünftig zu vermeiden.	Since they were lenient with me for making mistakes in the past, I try to avoid making them in the future.
LO_09	Wenn ich Fehler gemacht habe, führe ich meine Arbeit danach mit größerer Gewissenhaftigkeit aus.	If I have made a mistake, I complete my tasks more carefully.
LO_10	Ich fühle mich meinem Unternehmen gegenüber schuldig, wenn ich in der Vergangenheit Fehler gemacht habe.	I feel like I owe something to my company, if I have made mistakes in the past.
LO_11	In meinem Unternehmen ist sehr viel Fachwissen vorhanden, das für Arbeitsabläufe benötigt wird.	For the operational procedures to run as planned, a lot of technical knowledge is required in my company.
LO_12	Die Unternehmensleitung verfügt über umfassende arbeitsrelevante Informationen aller Mitarbeiter/innen.	Corporate management has extensive work-related information about all employees at their disposal.
LO_13**	Die in meinem Unternehmen festgelegten Arbeitsabläufe sind effizient.	The operational procedures in my company are efficient.
LO_14	Ich kann mich mit meinem Unternehmen identifizieren und verhalte mich dementsprechend.	I can identify with my company and therefore act accordingly.
LO_15	Ich respektiere unsere Unternehmensphilosophie und handle dementsprechend.	I respect our corporate philosophy and act upon it.
LO_16**	Ich stehe hinter unserer Unternehmens-	I support our corporate philosophy and act

	philosophie und gestalte meine Arbeit dementsprechend.	on it.
LO_17	In meinem Unternehmen werden Informationen ausreichend weitergegeben.	Information is passed along adequately in my company.
LO_18**	Für Veränderungen werden von der Unternehmensführung gute Gründe genannt.	Management gives us good reasons for changes that have to be made.
LO_19	Entscheidungen auf Unternehmensebene werden ausreichend erklärt.	Corporate decisions are being explained sufficiently.
<hr/> <i>Feelings towards hierarchies (own construction and translation)</i> <hr/>		
HI_01**	Ich fühle mich wohl in klaren Hierarchien.	I feel comfortable in clear hierarchies.
HI_02**	Eine klare Hierarchie erleichtert das Arbeiten.	An obvious hierarchy makes my job easier.
<hr/> Trust (German original from Graeff, 1998; own translation) <hr/> <i>Trust in the supervisor</i> <hr/>		
TV_01	Ich stehe meinem Vorgesetzten misstrauisch gegenüber.***	I am skeptical of my supervisor.
TV_02	Ich vertraue meinem Vorgesetzten, ohne darüber nachzudenken.	I trust in my supervisor automatically.
TV_03	Ich vertraue meinem Vorgesetzten blind.	I blindly trust in my supervisor.
TV_04	Ich vertraue meinem Vorgesetzten intuitiv.	I trust my supervisor intuitively.
TV_05	Ich kann mich meinem Vorgesetzten anvertrauen.	I can confide in my supervisor.
TV_06	Mein Vorgesetzter kritisiert mich nicht vor anderen.	My supervisor does not criticize me in front of others.
TV_07	Mein Vorgesetzter verhält sich mir gegenüber auch dann loyal, wenn er sich dadurch selbst Angriffen aussetzt.	My supervisor is always loyal to me, even if he makes herself/himself vulnerable by doing so.
TV_08*	Ich kann mich darauf verlassen, dass mein Vorgesetzter ehrlich ist.	I can rely on my supervisor being honest to me.
TV_09*	Mein Vorgesetzter nimmt sich für mich Zeit, wenn ich ein Anliegen habe.	If I have a concern, my supervisor takes the time to deal with it.
TV_10*	Was mein Vorgesetzter verspricht, hält er auch.	My supervisor keeps her/his promises.
TV_11	Mein Vorgesetzter achtet auf die Gefühle seiner Mitarbeiter/innen.	My supervisor regards her/his employee's feelings.
TV_12*	Ich kann mich auf meinen Vorgesetzten verlassen.	I can rely on my supervisor.
TV_13	Mein Vorgesetzter kann sich gut in mich hineinversetzen.	My supervisor knows how to put herself/himself in my position.
TV_14*	Ich vertraue meinem Vorgesetzten ebenso, wie er mir vertraut.	I trust my supervisor just as she/he trusts me.
<hr/> <i>Trust in the organization</i> <hr/>		
TO_01	Ich stehe meinem Unternehmen misstrauisch gegenüber. (reversed)	I am skeptical of my company.
TO_02	Ich vertraue meinem Unternehmen ohne darüber nachzudenken.	I trust in my company automatically.
TO_03	Ich vertraue meinem Unternehmen blind.	I blindly trust my company.
TO_04	Ich vertraue meinem Unternehmen intuitiv.	I trust in my company intuitively.
TO_05**	Ich habe Vertrauen zur GESPAG.	I have trust in my company.
TO_06	Angekündigte Veränderungen im Unternehmen werden schnell umgesetzt.	My company implements advertised changes quickly.
TO_07	Angekündigte Veränderungen im Unternehmen werden gewissenhaft umgesetzt.	Advertised changes are implemented diligently.
TO_08	Mein Unternehmen bietet mir eine Zukunft.	My company can offer me a future
TO_09**	Die Ziele, die sich die GESPAG setzt, werden auch erreicht.	My company reaches the goals it sets.
TO_10	Mein Unternehmen wird sich auch in wirtschaftlich schwierigen Zeiten bewähren.	If times get rough, my company will prevail.
TO_11**	Die GESPAG bildet ein schlagkräftiges Team, das sich wirtschaftlichen Herausforderungen stellen kann.	My company forms a powerful team that can meet economic challenges.
TO_12**	Die GESPAG kümmert sich um seine	My company takes care of its employees and

	Mitarbeiter/innen und wird dies auch in Zukunft tun.	will continue to do so.
TO_13	Die Unternehmenspolitik ist transparent.	Our corporate policy is transparent.
TO_14**	Die Unternehmenspolitik der GESPAG ist nachvollziehbar.	My company's corporate policy is reasonable.
<hr/> <i>Trust in colleagues</i> <hr/>		
VK_01**	Meine Meinungen werden bei den Kolleginnen/Kollegen akzeptiert.	My colleagues accept my views.
VK_02	Wenn Probleme bei der Arbeit auftauchen, muss ich diese alleine lösen. (reversed)	If problems should occur at work, I have to deal with them on my own.
VK_03**	Ich kann mit meinen Kolleginnen/Kollegen Emotionen teilen.	I can share my emotions with my colleagues.
VK_04	Meine Kolleginnen/Kollegen stehen für einander ein.	My colleagues stand up for each other.
VK_05**	Ich vertraue meinen Kolleginnen/Kollegen ebenso, wie sie mir vertrauen.	I trust my colleagues just as they trust me.
VK_06**	Zwischen meinen Kolleginnen/Kollegen und mir besteht eine vertrauensvolle Beziehung.	I have a trustful relationship with my colleagues.
VK_07	Ich kann mich darauf verlassen, dass meine Arbeit nicht durch Nachlässigkeit meiner Kolleginnen/Kollegen erschwert wird.	I can rely on my colleagues to not make my job harder by being negligent.
VK_08**	Ich weiß, dass ich mich mit Problemen an meine Kolleginnen/Kollegen wenden kann und diese mir bei der Lösung helfen würden.	If I have a problem I know that I can turn to my colleagues and they will help me resolve it.
<hr/> Organizational Commitment (English original from Allen & Meyer, 1990) <hr/>		
<i>Affective Commitment</i> <hr/>		
CO_01	Ich wäre sehr froh, wenn ich den Rest meiner Berufslaufbahn in meinem Unternehmen bleiben könnte.	I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career with this organization.
CO_02	Es bereitet mir Freude, mit anderen betriebsfremden Personen über mein Unternehmen zu sprechen.	I enjoy discussing my organization with people outside it.
CO_03	Ich betrachte die Probleme meines Unternehmens als meine eigenen.	I really feel as if this organization's problems are my own.
CO_04**	Ich glaube, dass ich mich einem anderen Unternehmen ebenso verbunden fühlen könnte wie der GESPAG. (reversed)	I think that I could easily become as attached to another organization as I am to this one.
CO_05**	Ich fühle mich nicht als Teil der Unternehmensfamilie. (reversed)	I do not feel like part of the family at my organization.
CO_06**	Ich fühle mich der GESPAG emotional nicht verbunden. (reversed)	I do not feel emotionally attached to this organization.
CO_07	Die GESPAG ist von großer persönlicher Bedeutung für mich.	This organization has a great deal of personal meaning for me.
CO_08**	Ich habe kein starkes Zugehörigkeitsgefühl zur GESPAG. (reversed)	I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to my organization.
<hr/> <i>Continuance Commitment</i> <hr/>		
CO_09**	Ich mache mir keine Sorgen darüber, zu kündigen, ohne einen neuen Job in Aussicht zu haben. (reversed)	I am not afraid of what might happen if I quit my job without having another one lined up.
CO_10**	Wenn ich die GESPAG jetzt verlassen wollte, wäre dies für mich mit großen Problemen verbunden.	It would be very hard for me to leave my organization right now, even if I wanted to.
CO_11	Würde ich mein Unternehmen jetzt verlassen, wäre es für mich nicht mit hohen Kosten verbunden. (reversed)	It wouldn't be too costly for me to leave my organization now.
CO_12	Zur Zeit halten sich die Notwendigkeit und der Wunsch, in meinem Unternehmen zu bleiben, die Waage.	Right now, staying with my organization is a matter of necessity as much as desire.
CO_13**	Ich bin der Meinung, dass ich zu wenige andere Möglichkeiten habe, um die GESPAG zu	I feel that I have too few options to consider leaving this organization.

	verlassen.	
CO_14**	Bei einer Kündigung würde es mir an verfügbaren Alternativen fehlen.	One of the few serious consequences of leaving this organization would be the scarcity of available alternatives.
CO_15	Ich bin der Meinung, dass die Menschen heutzutage zu oft ihren Arbeitsplatz wechseln.	I think that people these days move from company to company too often.
CO_16	Ich glaube nicht, dass man seinem Unternehmen gegenüber immer loyal sein muss. (reversed)	I do not believe that a person must always be loyal to his or her organization.
<hr/> <i>Normative Commitment</i> <hr/>		
CO_17**	Ich bin der Meinung, dass ein ständiger Arbeitsplatzwechsel von einem Unternehmen zum anderen unmoralisch ist.	Jumping from organization to organization does not seem at all unethical to me.
CO_18**	Ich fühle mich moralisch verpflichtet, weiter für die GESPAG zu arbeiten.	One of the major reasons I continue to work for this organization is that I believe that loyalty is important and therefore feel a sense of moral obligation to remain.
CO_19**	Wenn ich ein besseres Jobangebot eines anderen Unternehmens erhielte, würde ich es falsch finden, die GESPAG zu verlassen.	If I got another offer for a better job elsewhere I would not feel it was right to leave my organization.
CO_20**	Mir wurde die Bedeutung von Loyalität zum Verbleib bei der GESPAG vermittelt.	I was taught to believe in the value of remaining loyal to one organization.
CO_21	Die Zeiten waren besser, als Arbeitnehmer/innen ihre gesamte Berufslaufbahn in einem Unternehmen verbrachten.	Things were better in the days when people stayed with one organization for most of their careers.
CO_22	Ich bin der Meinung, dass es keinen Sinn mehr macht, ein/e treue/r Mitarbeiter/in sein zu wollen. (reversed)	I do not think that wanting to be a company man or company woman is sensible anymore.
<hr/> Cooperation (adapted items from Tyler & Blader, 2000) <hr/>		
<i>Discretionary Cooperation</i> <hr/>		
CS_01*	Ich widme mich freiwillig Aufgaben, die nicht von mir gefordert werden, aber der GESPAG helfen.	I volunteer to do things that are not required in order to help my organization.
CS_02	Ich würde einem/einer neuen Mitarbeiter/in helfen, sich zu orientieren.	I would volunteer to help orient new employees.
CS_03*	Ich mache Vorschläge, die dabei helfen sollen, das Arbeitsumfeld bei der GESPAG zu verbessern.	I make innovative suggestions to help improve my work setting.
CS_04	Ich helfe freiwillig anderen Mitarbeiter/innen, die mehr Arbeit haben als ich.	I volunteer to help others when they have heavy workloads.
CS_05*	Ich helfe meinem Vorgesetzten, auch wenn dieser mich nicht dazu aufgefordert hat.	I help my supervisor, even when I was not asked to do so.
CS_06	Ich bemühe mich mehr als andere meine Arbeit fertigzustellen, obwohl dies nicht erforderlich ist.	I put an extra effort into doing your job well beyond what is normally expected of you.
CS_07**	Ich packe bei anderen Mitarbeiter/innen mit an.	I lend a helping hand to others at work.
CS_08	Ich führe Aufgaben zum Teil nicht perfekt aus, weil ich mich über meinen Arbeitgeber ärgere. (reversed)	I do work that is not the best I could do because I am angry at my employer.
CS_09	Ich denke manchmal darüber nach, Streitpunkte von meinem Arbeitsplatz an die Öffentlichkeit zu tragen, z. B. an Gerichte. (reversed)	I consider bringing issues at work to the attention of outside agencies like the courts.
CS_10	Ich versuche meinen Vorgesetzten zu behindern oder seine Autorität zu untergraben. (reversed)	I try to find ways to hinder or undermine my work supervisor.
<hr/> <i>Mandatory Cooperation</i> <hr/>		
CS_11*	Ich erfülle ausschließlich die Aufgaben, die in meiner Stellenbeschreibung von mir verlangt werden.	I only fulfill the responsibilities specified in my job description.
CS_12*	Ich führe nur die Aufgaben aus, die von mir in meiner Position erwartet werden.	I only perform the tasks that are expected according to my position.
CS_13	Ich erreiche die von meinem Vorgesetzten erwartete Leistung. (reversed)	I meet the performance expectations of my supervisor.

CS_14**	Ich erledige meine Arbeit in ausreichender Art und Weise.	I complete my assignments sufficiently.
CS_15**	Ich bemühe mich selten mit vollem Einsatz.	I hardly put an extra effort into work.
<i>Workplace Deviance</i> (adapted items from Bennett & Robinson, 2000)		
CS_16**	Ich nehme Eigentum der GESPAG unerlaubt mit nach Hause.	I take property from work without permission.
CS_17	Ich deklariere private Rechnungen als Geschäftsspesen.	I declare private receipts as work-related expenses.
CS_18**	Ich komme unerlaubt zu spät zur Arbeit.	I come in late to work without permission.
CS_19**	Ich missachte Anweisungen meines Vorgesetzten.	I neglect to follow my boss's instructions.
CS_20**	Ich arbeite absichtlich langsamer, als ich es eigentlich könnte.	Intentionally worked slower than you could have worked.
<i>Inner Resignation</i> (German original from Schmitz et al., 2002; own translation)		
CS_21*	Ich habe mich genug für die Arbeit aufreiben lassen.	I have worked myself into the ground at my job.
CS_22	Ich mache oft Dienst nach Vorschrift.	I usually work to rule.
CS_23*	Früher war ich viel engagierter.	I used to be much more dedicated to my work.
CS_24*	Ich bin froh, wenn ich nach der Arbeit nach Hause gehen kann.	I am happy when I can go home after work.
Procedural Justice (English original from Tyler & Blader, 2000)		
PJ_01**	Die GESPAG hält getroffene Entscheidungen und Zusagen ein.	Does the organization follow through on the decisions and promises it makes?
PJ_02	Entscheidungen werden in meinem Unternehmen aufgrund von Fakten und nicht aufgrund von persönlichen Vorstellungen und Meinungen getroffen.	Decisions are made based upon facts, not personal biases and opinions.
PJ_03	Üblicherweise werden mir in meinem Unternehmen ehrliche Begründungen für Entscheidungen genannt.	I am usually given an honest explanation for decisions made.
PJ_04**	Mein Vorgesetzter hält getroffene Entscheidungen und Zusagen ein.	My supervisor follows through on the decisions and promises he makes.
PJ_05	Meine Bedürfnisse werden bei Entscheidungen berücksichtigt.	My needs are taken into account when decisions are being made.
PJ_06	Die Entscheidungen meines Vorgesetzten basieren auf Fakten und nicht auf persönlichen Einstellungen und Meinungen.	My supervisor's decision are made based upon facts, not their personal biases and opinions.
PJ_07**	Die Regeln und Verfahren bei der GESPAG sind für jeden gleich fair.	The rules and procedures are equally fair to everyone.
PJ_08**	Die Entscheidungen meines Vorgesetzten sind fair.	How fairly does your work supervisor make decisions?
PJ_09	Regeln und Verfahren werden einheitlich und unabhängig von Personen und Situationen angewandt.	How often are the rules and procedures applied consistently across people and situations?
PJ_10	Ich kann die Entscheidungen, die in meinem Unternehmen getroffen werden, beeinflussen.	I am able to influence the decisions made in my organization.
PJ_11**	Mein Vorgesetzter nennt mir üblicherweise ehrliche Erklärungen für getroffene Entscheidungen.	My supervisor usually gives me an honest explanation for the decision he/she makes.
PJ_12	Mein Vorgesetzter gibt mir die Möglichkeit, meine Ansicht darzustellen, bevor er Entscheidungen trifft.	I am given an opportunity to express my views before my supervisor makes decisions.
PJ_13	Mein Unternehmen gibt mir die Möglichkeit, meine Ansicht darzustellen, bevor Entscheidungen getroffen werden.	I am given an opportunity to express my views before decisions are made.
PJ_14	Mein Vorgesetzter berücksichtigt meine Bedürfnisse, wenn er Entscheidungen trifft.	My supervisor takes account of my needs when making decisions.
PJ_15	Die Entscheidungen meines Vorgesetzten sind unabhängig von der Person und Situation.	Are your supervisor's decisions consistent across people and situations?

PJ_16	Ich kann die Entscheidungen, die mein Vorgesetzter trifft, beeinflussen.	I am able to influence the decisions made by my supervisor.
PJ_17**	Die Entscheidungen meines Vorgesetzten sind für jeden gleich fair.	My supervisor's decisions are equally fair to everyone.
Social Identity (English original from Tyler & Blader, 2000)		
SI_01	Die von mir geleistete Arbeit wird von anderen im Unternehmen respektiert.	Others in your work setting respect the work you do.
SI_02	Andere in meinem Unternehmen respektieren meine Ideen.	Others in your work setting respect your ideas.
SI_03**	Meine Arbeit wird von anderen bei der GESPAG geschätzt.	Others in your work setting value what you contribute at work.
SI_04**	Ich werde von anderen bei der GESPAG als Mitglied der Arbeitsgruppe geschätzt.	Others in your work setting value you as a member of your work group.
SI_05	Andere in meinem Unternehmen sind der Auffassung, dass es schwer wäre, mich zu ersetzen.	Others in your work setting think it would be difficult to replace you.
SI_06	Andere in meinem Unternehmen erkennen nicht den Wert, den ich beibringe.	Others in your work setting do not appreciate your contributions to the job.
SI_07	Andere in meinem Unternehmen haben einen guten Eindruck von mir als Person.	Others in your work setting have a good impression of you as a person.
SI_08	In meinem Unternehmen werde ich von anderen als Person gemocht.	Others in your work setting like you as a person.
SI_09	Wenn ich mein Privatleben in der Arbeit besprechen würde, würden sich die anderen in meinem Unternehmen aufregen. (reversed)	Others in your work setting would be upset if I would talk about my private life at work.
SI_16**	Ich bin stolz, bei der GESPAG zu arbeiten.	I feel proud to be working where I am.
SI_17	Ich erzähle in meinem Bekanntenkreis, dass mein Unternehmen ein guter Ort zum Arbeiten ist.	I talk up where I work to my friends as a good place to work.
SI_18	Ich stimme vielem nicht zu, wofür mein Unternehmen steht. (reversed)	I disagree with many of the things that my organisation stands for.
(adapted from Hartner, Rechberger & Kirchler, 2009)		
SI_10	Ich identifiziere mich mit meinem Unternehmen.	I can identify with my company.
SI_11	Ich bin ein/e typische/r Mitarbeiter/in meines Unternehmens.	I am a typical employee of my company.
SI_12	Ich fühle mich meinem Unternehmen zugehörig.	I feel like I belong with my company.
SI_13**	Wenn die GESPAG in der Kritik steht, bin ich persönlich auch betroffen.	If my company is criticized, it concerns me.
SI_14	Ich fühle mich eng mit anderen Mitarbeiter/innen verbunden.	I feel closely connected with my co-workers.
SI_15**	Ich arbeite gerne bei der GESPAG.	I like working at my company.

*Items used in the final questionnaire and the estimation of the full latent model.
** Items used in the final questionnaire but not in the estimation of the full latent model.

Appendix B

Final number of items, χ^2 -statistic, degrees of freedom, p-value, GFI, AGFI, CFI and RMSEA of all scales analysed in the pre-test

Scale	N° of items	Cronbach α	χ^2	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>	GFI	AGFI	CFI	RMSEA A
Trust Supervisor	5	.94	4.36	4	.36	.99	.95	1.00	.03
Trust Organization	5	.92	1.45	3	.70	.99	.98	1.00	.00
Trust Colleagues	5	.92	7.14	5	.21	.98	.93	.99	.06
Coe. Power Supervisor	5	.72	4.27	4	.37	.99	.95	1.00	.02
Coe. Power Organization	5	.58	3.54	4	.48	.99	.96	1.00	.00
Leg. Power Supervisor	5	.87	1.41	4	.84	.99	.98	1.00	.00
Leg. Power Organization	5	.70	3.10	4	.54	.99	.96	1.00	.00
Hierarchy*	2	.80**	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Commitment	13	.72	79.39	62	.07	.92	.88	.96	.05
Cooperation	15	-	99.15	83	.11	.91	.87	.96	.04
Procedural Justice	6	.92	3.70	7	.81	.99	.97	1.00	.00
Social Identity	5	.82	7.77	4	.10	.98	.91	.99	.08

* Probability level and fit indices could not be calculated due to insufficient *df*

** This value represents the correlation between the two items of the scale

Appendix C

German Abstract / Zusammenfassung

Dieser Artikel untersucht den Einfluss von Macht und Vertrauen auf verschiedene Formen der Kooperation in Unternehmen. Zu diesem Zweck werden Ideen aus der Steuerpsychologie – das Slippery Slope Framework (SSF; Kirchler, Hoelzl, & Wahl, 2008) – in die Organisationspsychologie übertragen. Im Sinne dieses Modells wird einerseits angenommen, dass die legitime Macht der Vorgesetzten und das Vertrauen in die Vorgesetzte einen positiven Effekt auf die Kooperation der MitarbeiterInnen haben. Andererseits soll die Zwangsmacht der Vorgesetzten einen negativen Einfluss auf das Kooperationsverhalten haben. Das Kooperationsverhalten wurde anhand der Konzepte der pflichtmäßigen und der uneingeschränkten Kooperation (*mandatory* und *discretionary cooperation* nach Tyler & Blader, 2000) sowie dem der inneren Kündigung (Schmitz, Gayler & Jehle, 2002) operationalisiert. Ein entsprechender Fragebogen wurde entwickelt und durch einen Vortest validiert. Die Gültigkeit des neuen Konzepts wurde mit einer Stichprobe von 556 österreichischen KrankenhausmitarbeiterInnen zwischen 20 und 60 Jahren anhand eines Strukturgleichungsmodells getestet. Das Modell wurde sukzessive an die Daten angepasst, wodurch die Eigenschaften und Beziehungen zwischen Vertrauen, Zwangs- und legitimer Macht neu definiert werden mussten. Das endgültige Strukturmodell erklärte 38% der Varianz der inneren Kündigung sowie 21% der Varianz der uneingeschränkten Kooperation. Die Ergebnisse sprechen dafür, dass Vorgesetzte mit ihren MitarbeiterInnen v.a. eine vertrauensvolle Beziehung aufbauen sowie positive (Belohnung) statt negative Anreize (Bestrafung) schaffen sollten, um Kooperation zu fördern. Schließlich sollte bei der zukünftigen Erforschung des SSF im Organisationskontext legitime Macht als eine weitere Facette des Vertrauens behandelt werden.

8 Eidesstattliche Erklärung

Ich versichere, dass ich die Diplomarbeit ohne fremde Hilfe und ohne Benutzung anderer als der angegebenen Quellen angefertigt habe, und dass die Arbeit in gleicher oder ähnlicher Form noch keiner anderen Prüfungsbehörde vorgelegen hat. Alle Ausführungen der Arbeit, die wörtlich oder sinngemäß übernommen wurden, sind als solche gekennzeichnet.

Wien, am _____

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9 Curriculum Vitae

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Seit 10/2006 Universität Wien (Studiengang: Psychologie)

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09/2009 – 06/2010 Zehnmonatiges Auslandsstudium im Rahmen eines Erasmus-Programms an der Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
08/2010 – 09/2010 Praktikum in der Kinder- und Jugendpsychiatrie des Helios Klinikums Berlin-Buch
03/2012 – 06/2012 Studienassistent bei Univ.-Prof. Dr. Erich Kirchler im Fachbereich Wirtschaftspsychologie und Durchführung einer wissenschaftlichen Studie zum Slippery Slope Modell bei österreichischen Steurzahlern

Besondere Kenntnisse und Fähigkeiten

Sprachkenntnisse Deutsch: Muttersprache
Englisch: fließend in Wort und Schrift
Spanisch: gut in Wort und Schrift
EDV-Kenntnisse SPSS, AMOS und R
MS Office
Testleitererfahrung Intelligenztests: HAWIK-IV, CFT1, CFT 20-R
Weitere spezielle Leistungstests, Persönlichkeitstests und Projektive Verfahren