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## Media Systems of Japan and South Korea: A Comparative Approach

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# Table of Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1	Purpose and Research Question .....	2
1.2	Outline .....	3
1.3	Limitations.....	4
<b>2</b>	<b>Literature Review.....</b>	<b>6</b>
2.1	Terms and Definitions: Communication, Mass Communication, Mass Media, and Media System..	6
2.2	Three Major Theoretical Frameworks for the Comparison of Media Systems.....	11
<b>3</b>	<b>Methodological Framework .....</b>	<b>19</b>
3.1	Political System.....	19
3.2	Political Culture .....	25
3.3	Media Freedom and State Control over the Media .....	27
3.4	Media Ownership .....	29
3.5	Media Financing .....	31
3.6	Political Parallelism and Media Culture.....	33
3.7	Media Orientation.....	36
3.8	Summary .....	38
<b>4</b>	<b>Results and Discussion .....</b>	<b>39</b>
4.1	Political System.....	39
4.2	Political Culture .....	46
4.3	Media Freedom and State Control over the Media .....	50
4.4	Media Ownership .....	61
4.5	Media Financing .....	85
4.6	Political Parallelism and Media Culture .....	104
4.7	Media Orientation .....	108
<b>5</b>	<b>Conclusion and Outlook.....</b>	<b>115</b>
5.1	Further Research.....	116
<b>6</b>	<b>List of Abbreviations .....</b>	<b>118</b>

<b>7</b>	<b>List of Tables .....</b>	<b>121</b>
<b>8</b>	<b>List of Figures .....</b>	<b>124</b>
<b>9</b>	<b>Bibliography .....</b>	<b>125</b>
<b>10</b>	<b>Appendix I—Data.....</b>	<b>149</b>
<b>11</b>	<b>Appendix II—Abstracts .....</b>	<b>153</b>
11.1	Abstract (English) .....	153
11.2	Abstract (German) .....	154
<b>12</b>	<b>Appendix III—Curriculum Vitæ .....</b>	<b>156</b>

“I may not agree with what you have to say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.”

—*Voltaire (1694-1778)*

# 1 Introduction

Today, only 1 in 7 people in the world live in a country with a free press (Freedom House, 2014b, p.1).

This paper will be dealing with the same old question many scholars in communication, or more specifically, political communication, have asked before. *Why is the media as it is?* (Siebert et al., 1956, p.1; Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p.2). Or in other words, why are some media more free than others? It has been commonly accepted that a free, diverse, and independent media, which promotes an informed and engaged citizenry, is critical to the political health of a nation. Most people's knowledge and attitudes relating to politics and the government are not derived from their own personal experience, or through the experience of someone close to them, but are rather shaped and influenced by the media. Essentially, the media functions as the intermediary between the people and the government. It collects, analyzes, and interprets all different kinds of data, ranging from national issues, to international disputes, to stock prices, to local traffic, to weather forecasts, which it makes then publicly available to anyone. Hence, it is not at all that surprising that the media has such a strong influence on a society's understanding and response to such events (Steinberg, 2006, pp.130-31). The availability, quality, and access to information is, therefore, absolutely necessary to ensure the citizens in any particular country make informed and responsible decisions, rather than merely acting on blind assumptions and misinformation, without knowing the full details and facts. Basically, it helps the people to make sense of the world around them. The French political thinker Alexis de Tocqueville (2013) has called the press the "chiefest" democratic instrument, as it promotes and protects all the liberties any free society should be entitled to (The Commission on Freedom of the Press, 1947, p.6). Consequently, the most controlled and censored media in the world today can be found in countries with authoritarian or dictatorial governments (EIU, 2013, pp.3-8; Freedom House, 2014b, pp.20-22) (Freedom House, 2014b, pp.20-22).

Thus, it has become incredibly important to understand why the media systems around the world are so different from each other. *The Four Theories of the Press*, or simply the *Four Theories*, proposed by Siebert et al. (1956) was the first attempt to provide a broad framework for comparing and classifying media systems in the world. Siebert et al. developed a typology, which separated the media systems based on two opposing political philosophies, namely, liberalism and authoritarianism. This approach was heavily influenced by the historical conflict of its time, of capitalism versus communism, between the two

superpowers that emerged at the end of the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union. As a result, their work was later heavily criticized, as no theoretical model should be solely based on philosophical or ideological perspectives. Additionally, its normative approach lacked any explanatory power, as it was merely based on how things should be, rather than how things are. But despite these, and other limitations, it is worth acknowledging that the *Four Theories* put forth a key argument that is the basis of the comparative analysis of media systems to this very day. Namely, Siebert et al (1956, pp.1-2) argued that the “[...] press always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structures within which it operates” and that it will reflect the “[...] basic beliefs and assumptions which the society holds [...].” An argument, which today, might seem quite obvious, as the media system is merely a piece of a far larger system, wherein each functional subsystem is influencing and being influenced by other subsystems (e.g. political system)—this will be discussed in greater detail later (see Media System).

Almost half a century later, Hallin and Mancini (2004), the authors of a more recent model known as the *Three Models of Media and Politics*, or in short the *Three Models*, used the *Four Theories of the Press* as their analytical point of departure. However, in contrast to the *Four Theories*, Hallin and Mancini moved away from a normative model and instead proposed a new typology based on an empirical comparative analysis of the media systems in the Western world. But, as their study was solely based on the media systems of Western Europe and North America, it was necessary, for the purpose of this paper, to find a different approach, one that would go beyond the West and would, therefore, be applicable to any country in the world. Roger Blum, the Head of the Institute of Mass Communication Studies at the University of Bern in Switzerland, put forth such an approach, which he so eloquently called the *Extended Comparative Approach*, and which, as the name already suggests, is an extension, namely, that of the model developed by Hallin and Mancini. Hence, the analysis and interpretation of the media systems presented in this paper will be solely based on the framework developed by Blum, which will be discussed in more detail in the next two chapters (see Literature Review and Methodological Framework).

## 1.1 Purpose and Research Question

Today, one of the greatest challenges and issues in most literature on media is that they, to a very large extent, still remain highly ethnocentric, in the sense that they solely refer to a single country, while being written in very broad and general terms, suggesting that the model that prevailed in one particular country is universally applicable to all the other countries in the world. Additionally, countries with less

developed literature on media, often outside of the Western world, usually tend to borrow from other countries, generally from the Anglo-American literature, and try to apply it to their own situation (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p.2). Regrettably, this universal approach to the studying of the media, especially in the other parts of the world outside of the Western culture, has usually been taken for granted, instead of being challenged or questioned (Thussu, 2009, pp.14-15). However, a solution to overcome these severe limitations has been the development of comparative studies of media systems (Curran & Park, 2000), which again, sadly, rarely went beyond the Western world (Thussu, 2009, p.17). Therefore, this paper sets out to do just that, to go beyond the Western world, by following in the footsteps of those who have long been supporting and advocating the internationalization (Downing, 1996) and de-Westernization (Curran & Park, 2000) of the study of the media.

Interestingly, it has also been observed that the media systems within the same world region, such as Europe, or even more specifically, Northern Europe, tend to be remarkably similar (Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Blum, 2005). It has been argued that this is mainly due to the closely “related mindsets and cultures” within those regions (Blum, 2005, p.6), having being exposed to similar historical, cultural, and social influences. Thus, the sole purpose of this paper is to find out the similarities and differences of two contemporary media systems of the same world region, namely, those of Japan and Korea. Hence, the main research question of this paper is:

*What are the similarities and differences  
between the media systems of Japan and Korea?*

## 1.2 Outline

The following discussion on the comparison of the media systems of Japan and Korea will be divided into five main chapters. The chapter following the introductory chapter will begin by defining the basic terminology used throughout this paper. In the end, it will also briefly discuss the three major theoretical frameworks for the comparison of media systems to this date, whereby one will ultimately serve as the underlying analytical framework, laying the foundation for the analysis and discussion of the comparison of media systems in the chapters preceding it. The third chapter carefully outlines the methodology, based on the chosen framework, which will be used to interpret the results of the research that directly follows it. The next chapter presents, analyzes, and discusses all the findings obtained based on the methodology

specified in the previous chapter. The concluding chapter provides a summary explanation of the similarities and differences of the media systems of Japan and Korea, and it will also briefly provide a few recommendations for any further research that could be conducted in this particular area.

## **1.3 Limitations**

There are also quite a few limitations for this paper, which need to be discussed before moving on to the next chapter. Firstly, in this paper nation-states are mostly referred to by the name that reflect their geographical position, and not by their official names. For example, the Republic of Korea will be referred to as South Korea, or simply Korea. Hence, the reader should not confuse Korea with North Korea, as the paper will explicitly state, which Korea it is referring to in any situation where it deems such a misunderstanding could potentially arise. Secondly, while it would have certainly provided a more interesting and fruitful discussion if more than two countries from East Asia were included in this paper, this study will solely focus on the cases of Japan and Korea, the two most developed countries in East Asia. Thirdly, when the paper speaks of East Asia, it is referring to the following states and territories: China, as well as its two Special Administrative Regions (Hong Kong and Macau), Japan, South and North Korea, Mongolia, and Taiwan.

Fourthly, as this paper is purely based on secondary research, it is important to acknowledge that some data might simply not be publicly available, especially in the case of some financial data, ownership data, or market share data. Moreover, some legal texts were either not publicly available, or not translated into English or German. Additionally, all legal texts presented in this paper, unless otherwise indicated, are unofficial translations by a public office of the country from which the document originates, as the official language always takes precedence over the English, or any other, translation. Fifthly, all the rankings for any website presented in this paper are solely based on the web traffic data provided by Alexa Internet, a subsidiary company of Amazon.com. However, it is necessary to point out that the data provided by Alexa cannot always be guaranteed to be entirely accurate or complete. It might generate far better results for one country, while it might only offer very limited data for another. This is mainly due to the fact that Alexa can only estimate the traffic for a particular site coming from browsers where users have chosen to deliberately and voluntarily install its freely offered browser extension. Hence, the adoption rate by users around the world might vary widely from country to country.



And finally, all currencies presented in this paper will be converted to US dollars, based on the exchange rates listed in the appendix (see Table 70 under Appendix I—Data). It should also be noted that all currencies reported in this paper, unless otherwise indicated, were initially based on the currency of the particular country being discussed at any point in time, and only later converted to US dollars for comparison purposes.

Other limitations will be documented as they arise.

## 2 Literature Review

This chapter—also commonly referred to as the “state of the art”—will provide the basic terminology and theoretical background that will help select and apply the appropriate analytical framework for the comparison of the media systems of Japan and Korea.

### 2.1 Terms and Definitions: Communication, Mass Communication, Mass Media, and Media System

As a first step it is necessary to have a good understanding and knowledge of the key terminology that will be used throughout this paper. As such, it is important to properly define *media systems*, as well as the individual parts that make it up, in order to be able to accurately compare such systems across different countries, or more specifically, in the case of this paper, Japan and Korea.

#### 2.1.1 Communication

Before jumping straight to the definition of media systems, it is necessary to step back a little bit to understand the larger context from which such systems are born. Broadly speaking, this paper will basically be dealing with communication. Etymologically, the term *communication*, or more specifically its verb form, to *communicate*, derives from the Latin word *communicare*, which literally translates to “to share” (Online Etymology Dictionary, 2014a). This immediately raises the question of what exactly is being shared. As in most cases, it is always quite challenging to arrive at a single standard definition for any concept, which at the same time is also widely accepted amongst the scientific community, and the term communication is no exception (Nilsen, 1957; Dance, 1970; Dance & Larson, 1976). But simply put, for this discussion specifically, it is the transfer or exchange (or “sharing”) of information, ideas, and feelings—commonly referred to as messages—between two or more people.

Additionally, there are many different levels in communication, whereas each level is primarily defined by the amount of people involved in this process. Six such levels have been previously identified, namely, intrapersonal (e.g. oneself), interpersonal (e.g. couples), intragroup (e.g. family), intergroup (e.g.

local community), institutional or organizational (e.g. business firm), and mass communication (e.g. society) (Berger, 1995, pp.11-12; McQuail, 2010, p.18). This paper will solely be concerned with the latter—mass communication.

### **2.1.2 Mass Communication**

The term mass communication can be split up into two parts, namely, mass and communication. As the paper already defined the latter, it can move on to defining *mass*. Etymologically, it derives from the Old French word *masse*, which means “large amount” (Online Etymology Dictionary, 2014c). Thus, when speaking of mass communication, it is simply referring to the transfer or exchange (or “sharing”) of messages to a large audience (or “large amount”).

Historically, the beginning of modern mass communication is said to have begun with the invention of the printing press by the German blacksmith Johannes Gutenberg in the 15th century in Western Europe. This was followed by two other major developments—the continuous paper making machine and the steam-powered, rather than hand-operated, printing press—which further spurred the growth, and allowed for the mass production of printed materials, such as newspapers, magazines, and books. The next major breakthrough in mass communication came in the 1920s, with the invention of the radio, which allowed the sending of messages, in the form of sound, by transmitting electromagnetic waves through the air over long distances without any wires. Roughly thirty decades later the television was invented, which allowed the transmission of sound as well as pictures. The latest major breakthrough occurred in the 1990s, when the British computer scientist Tim Berners-Lee wrote the first proposal for what would eventually become the World Wide Web at the European Organization for Nuclear Research, commonly known as CERN, in Switzerland.

All these technological developments, especially the Internet, have made it rather difficult to provide a general definition of mass communication, particularly as the lines between mass communication and interpersonal communication are starting to become blurred (McQuail, 2010, p.15). The traditional perspective on mass communication, first suggested by Freidson (1953), has substantially changed over the last couple of decades. Traditionally, mass communication has been defined as publicly reaching a relatively large, heterogeneous, anonymous, and spatially separated audience through technologically mediated messages, which are solely transmitted from one point to another—contrary to what is known as a “two-way communication,” in which both parties are involved in the transmission of

information (Freidson, 1953, p.313; Maletzke, 1963, p.103; Wright, 1975, pp.5, 9). Especially in the world today, it is necessary to decide if it makes any sense anymore to distinguish mass communication from other forms of communication, based, for example, on the fact whether information is transmitted from one point to another, or whether it is allowing information to be transmitted in either of two opposite directions. Additionally, it could also be argued if it is still necessary for an audience to be considered to be spatially separated, as people, from anywhere in the world, can now easily connect with a message at the same time and to share their own individual opinions and experiences regarding this particular message. But, as this paper does not intend to find a definition for mass communication that could be applied to any given situation, it will instead stick with its traditional definition for the sake of simplicity.

### **2.1.3 Mass Media**

In the definition of mass communication, it is stated that messages are mediated through technological means. These technological means, or channels, are commonly referred as the mass media, through which mass communication is ultimately achieved (Berger, 1995, p.12). However, to arrive at a working definition, it is necessary to again separate the word mass media into two parts, namely, mass and media. The paper has already defined the term *mass*, thus, it only needs to define the term *media*. Etymologically, the word *media*—or rather its singular form, *medium*—derives from the Latin word *medius*, literally *intermediate*, or *the middle* (Online Etymology Dictionary, 2014d). Thus, as the term already suggests, the mass media must be the linkage between the communicated messages and the general public. Dansei (2009, p.192) defined it as “any means of transmitting information [through] various forms, devices, and systems that make up mass communications considered as a whole.” But what exactly are those “various forms, devices, and systems” through which messages are transmitted?

#### **2.1.3.1 Seven Mass Media**

Again, it has been extremely difficult and controversial to define what various forms of media should be classified as mass media, and which ones should be excluded. Usually, it is said to be composed of print (1500s)—for example, newspapers, magazines, and books—recordings (1880s), film (1890s), radio (1920s), and television (1950s) (McQuail, 2010, pp.25-38). However, in recent years, two more channels have been added to that list, commonly referred to as the “new media,” namely, the Internet (1990s) (McQuail, 2010,

pp.39-41) and mobile phones (2000s). Thus, when speaking of the mass media, the paper basically refers to what has been described as the “seven mass media” (Ahonen, n.d.).

### **2.1.3.2 News Media**

However, it is necessary to point out here that this paper is solely focused on those elements of the mass media, which are concerned with delivering political news to the general public, commonly known as the “news media.” Thus, whenever the paper uses the term media, it is specifically referring to news media, unless otherwise indicated. And due to the inherent complexity of media systems, and the various forms of mass media, the primary focus of this paper will be on old or traditional media, or more specifically national daily newspapers and national television networks<sup>1</sup>—excluding, for example, magazines, books, and radio—while at the same time putting a smaller emphasis on new media, with a sole focus on the Internet, meaning online newspapers, in the form of online versions of printed newspapers and stand-alone newspapers—excluding mobile phones, or mobile devices in general.

This decision is primarily based on the results of a survey conducted by the World Value Survey<sup>2</sup> (WVS, 2014, pp.299-303, 305), which measured what mass media people in Japan and Korea mainly rely upon in order to learn about the current affairs in their home country, as well as in the rest world. As illustrated by the survey data (see Table 68 under Appendix I—Data), television is the most used medium when it comes to learning about the latest news, with 93.6 and 79.9 percent in Japan and Korea, respectively. In Japan, newspapers ranked in second place with 72.6 percent, followed by the Internet with 34.8 percent, while radio accounted for only 28.7 percent. In Korea, on the other hand, the Internet ranked in second place with 50.2 percent, followed by newspapers with 31.7 percent, and radio with 30.3 percent. Magazines were the least frequently used sources for news in both countries, representing only 4.2 and 4.6 percent in Japan and Korea, respectively. And while mobile phones accounted for 49.3 percent in Korea, actually ranking in third place, before newspapers, it might be the best to exclude it from the discussion in this paper, due to the fact that it is a rather new and diverse medium. Additionally, the reason why radio has been excluded from the analysis has already been convincingly argued by a different study done by the World Bank, titled *Who Owns the Media*, in which the authors stated that while “radio reaches a high

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<sup>1</sup> The paper will solely focus on terrestrial television, excluding cable and satellite television, for example.

<sup>2</sup> The World Value Survey is a global research project, which “explores people’s values and beliefs, their stability or change over time, and their impact on social and political development of the societies in different countries of the world” (World Values Survey, n.d.).

proportion of the population, even in the lowest income and literacy countries [...] it largely delivers entertainment,” further arguing that “the radio market is also highly regional, which precludes any single station from achieving a large market share” (Djankov et al., 2003, p.7).

#### **2.1.4 Media System**

As a final step, before moving on to the theoretical part, the paper will define *media systems*. The term itself can again be split up into two parts, namely, media and system. As the former has already been described, the paper can move on to defining the term *system*. The word *system* refers to the Greek word *systema*, meaning an “organized whole” (Online Etymology Dictionary, 2014e). Or, as Rosnay (1979, p.58) defined it “a set of interacting elements that form an integrated whole.” This leads to the basic assumption that a media system must, therefore, consist of a set of parts that form a whole, namely, the mass media (e.g. television), which at the same time is also a component of a larger system, which in this case is referred to as a “social system.” And this social system consists of many other functional subsystems, such as the political system and economic system (Luhmann, 1995, p.191).

And as it is practically impossible that any two social systems in the world are exactly alike—here, the paper is not simply referring to its structure—it can be assumed that its subsystems (e.g. media system), which make each social system uniquely different from another, cannot be found in the same form twice anywhere in the world. The same can be said about the human race, for example. Every healthy human being has 46 chromosomes, making them genetically uniquely different from each other (with the exception of identical twins), yet, it can be easily assumed that since the start of mankind, every human that has ever walked the earth was uniquely different from every other human that has ever lived before them, and those that are being born long after they’re gone. And the same holds true for identical twins, even though they share the same genetic characteristics—likewise, two media systems can be completely structured the same—they can never be exactly alike, as each twin is influenced by other environmental factors that are simply outside of their physical control. Thus, each subsystem is born, brought up, and molded into its own social environment, influencing and being influenced by the other subsystems. As Voltmer (2012, p.227) has argued, all media systems are influenced by internal as well as external—especially economic, social, and political—relationships. It has also been observed that, especially the media system and political system are linked tightly together in their structure and

development, and as a result, the relationship between the media and political organizations has constantly changed over the years (Schneider, 1998, pp.422-23).

To summarize, a media system is a functional subsystem of a larger social system, which is closely linked to other subsystems, especially the political system, and which can also be broken down into smaller parts, known as the mass media (e.g. television), through which mass communication is ultimately achieved.

## **2.2 Three Major Theoretical Frameworks for the Comparison of Media Systems**

Today, one of the biggest challenges and issues in most literature on media is that they, to some extent, still remain highly ethnocentric, in the sense that they solely refer to a single country, while being written in very broad and general terms, suggesting that the model that prevailed in one particular country is universally applicable to all the other countries in the world. Additionally, countries with less developed literature on media usually tend to borrow from other countries, generally from the Anglo-American literature, and try to apply it to their own situation (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p.2). Regrettably, this universal approach to the studying of the media, especially in other parts of the world outside of the Western world, has usually been taken for granted, instead of being challenged or questioned (Thussu, 2009, pp.14-15). However, a solution to overcome these severe limitations has been the development of comparative studies of media systems (Curran & Park, 2000), which again, sadly, rarely went beyond the Western world (Thussu, 2009, p.17).

As a result, this paper will follow in the footsteps of those who have long been supporting and advocating the internationalization (Downing, 1996) and de-Westernization (Curran & Park, 2000) of the study of the media. Hereby, the paper will briefly discuss the most influential theories that should help set a solid foundation for the comparative analysis of the media systems of Japan and Korea.

### **2.2.1 Siebert et al.: The Four Theories of the Press (1956)**

*The Four Theories of the Press*, or simply the *Four Theories*, proposed by Siebert et al. (1956) was the first attempt to provide a broad framework for comparing and classifying media systems. In this book, Siebert

et al. developed a typology that separated the media systems in the world between two opposing political philosophies, namely, libertarianism and authoritarianism. Or differently put, they distinguished between a media that can operate freely and independently of state control, which they referred to as the Libertarian theory, and a media that is heavily controlled by the state, which they called the Authoritarian theory. The two other theories are said to be simply “developments and modifications” of the two other major theories, called the Soviet Communist theory (development) and the Social Responsibility<sup>3</sup> theory (modification) (Siebert et al., 1956, p.2).

This book was published during a critical historical period known as the Cold War era, when both sides, the United States and the Soviet Union, which emerged as the two new superpowers at the end of the Second World War, were engaged in a battle to win the newly established nations—after the simultaneous decolonization—over to their side. As an anonymous contribution by George F. Kennan (1947)—who published the article under the name Mr. X—to the journal *Foreign Affairs*, called the “X Article,” formerly known as *The Sources of Soviet Conduct*, highlights, “the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient, but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” This, subsequently, became the basis of the foreign policy of the Truman Administration, and “remained the basic strategy of the United States throughout the Cold War” (US Department of State, n.d.). Thus, it might not really be surprising that the *Four Theories* solely focused on “philosophy” and “ideology.” However, the authors have been frequently and heavily criticized for this in later years.

Also, today, the *Four Theories* simply cannot be applicable anymore. The world order has changed. Communism in Eastern Europe fell, the Soviet Union collapsed, and with it the Cold War finally ended. As a result, the book’s relevance in the post-Cold War era has been repeatedly criticized (Berry et al., 1995, p.18), as well as its lack of empirical analyses and relevant comparisons (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, pp.9-10). Or, in the words of Ostini and Fung (2002, p.42), today, the *Four Theories* is “obsolete and inapplicable for contemporary analysis.” However, despite these and other limitations, it is worth acknowledging that the *Four Theories* has also put forward a key argument that still remains a basis for comparative analysis of

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<sup>3</sup> Siebert et al. have argued in their book that their Social Responsibility theory should not be treated as an abstraction of the theory developed by the Hutchins Commission—officially known as the Commission on Freedom of the Press—and that the theory of social responsibility has already been expressed by others long before the Hutchins Commission (Siebert et al., 1956, pp.4-5).



media systems even to this day. Siebert et al. (1956, pp.1-2) argued that the “press always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structures within which it operates” and that it will reflect the “basic beliefs and assumptions which the society holds.” In other words, the key contribution of the *Four Theories* was not the typology itself, but rather its attempt to put in place a framework that also acknowledges the importance of factors that are external to the media system, for example, and most importantly, the political system. For decades, it has already been assumed that dependencies between the media system and political system exist (Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur, 1979). Thus, the authors showed that the differences of the media systems could also be shown with the relationships they develop and enjoy with the political system, the degree of state control over the media, as well as the type of ownership of the media (Blum, 2005, p.5).

In the years following its publication, different scholars have expanded on the *Four Theories*, such as Merrill and Lowenstein (1971), Hachten (1981), Martin and Chaudhary (1983), Altschull (1984), Picard (1985), as well as Akhavan-Majid and Wolf (1991). However, all these normative theories lacked any explanatory power, as they were merely based on how things should be, rather than how things are. Additionally, it would make it extremely difficult to apply any of these normative theories to other countries outside of the Western world, due to the fundamental differences in cultural and social values. Thus, Hallin and Mancini (2004) attempted to move away from these normative models and instead proposed a new typology based on a comparative analysis of the media systems.

### **2.2.2 Hallin and Mancini: Three Models of Media and Politics (2004/2012)**

*Three Models of Media and Politics*, or in short the *Three Models*, published by Hallin and Mancini (2004), uses the *Four Theories* as the analytical point of departure. However, they made very clear in the beginning of their book that their models are based on an empirical and comparative analysis (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p.xiii), rather than being based on a “philosophy” or “ideology.” They opened their discussion with a very simple and straightforward question, which was also proposed in the *Four Theories* (Siebert et al., 1956, p.1), namely, “why are the media as they are?” (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p.2). In order to answer this question, Hallin and Mancini presented a detailed analysis that examined the relationship between the media system and political system, based on the “most similar systems” design (Hallin &

Mancini, 2004, p.6) of 18 different developed countries in Western Europe and North America (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p.16).

They stated in a later publication, that one of their main objectives was to “demystify” the notion of the existence of a unitary Western media model, by proving that in fact each media system, having been developed under particular historical conditions, is uniquely different compared to all the others (Hallin & Mancini, 2012b, pp.1-2). Thus, making it a historical analysis, rather than a “set of general categories for understanding media systems regardless of time and place” (Hallin & Mancini, 2012b, p.4). But most importantly, they did not want to simply classify the individual media systems that exist in the Western world, but rather sought to identify the dimensions that are responsible for the variation in the different media systems (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p.11).

As a result, they based their analysis on two groups, namely, the media and politics, which consisted of four and five dimensions, respectively (see Table 1). And depending on the particular composition of these different dimensions within these two groups, Hallin and Mancini (2004, pp.67-68) conceptualized three models, of which each was particularly predominant in a specific geographical area, namely, the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model (e.g. France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain), the North/Central European or Democratic Corporatist Model (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland), and the North Atlantic or Liberal Model (e.g. Britain, Canada, Ireland, United States).

**Table 1: Three Models—Dimensions of the Media and Politics (Hallin and Mancini)**

<b>Three Models—Dimensions of the Media and Politics (Hallin and Mancini)</b>	
Media	Politics
Structure of Media Markets	Role of the State
Political Parallelism	Type of Democracy
Professionalization of Journalism	Type of Pluralism
Role of the State	Degree of Rational-Legal Authority and Clientelism
	Degree of Pluralism

(Hallin & Mancini, 2004, pp.22-44, 49-61)

The major contribution of this study was to help replace the paradigm of the *Four Theories*, by simply avoiding any kind of universal approach to the comparative analysis of media systems, which they believed has held back this field of study for nearly half a century (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, pp.1-2). And as mentioned before, their framework was solely based on empirical evidence, rather than on philosophical or ideological arguments. However, the empirical limitations of their study, which was based on the “most similar systems” design are just as easy to identify, as their analysis was strictly restricted to developed countries in Western Europe and North America, making it less useful when trying to apply it to other parts of the world, such as Japan and Korea. This limitation was later acknowledged in their latest book *Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western World*, in which Hallin and Mancini (2012a, p.2) had decided to include other countries, such as China, Brazil, and Russia.

However, according to their findings, the list of dimensions proposed to compare the relationship between the media and politics in the Western world seemed to hold up reasonably well as they shifted to a “most dissimilar systems” design (Hallin & Mancini, 2012b, p.5). This might be based on the observation, already stated in their earlier book, that there seems to exist a continuous homogenization process through which a “global media culture” is gradually starting to emerge, causing media systems around the world to converge, and ending up closely resembling the Liberal Model they had developed (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p.294). And while this paper could have certainly used the framework developed by Hallin and Mancini, it will use a different approach suggested by Roger Blum, which basically represents an extension of the *Three Models*.

### **2.2.3 Roger Blum: Extended Comparative Approach (2001/2005)**

Roger Blum (2005) developed a framework, known as the Extended Comparative Approach, which extends on the previous two major models discussed—the *Four Theories* and the *Three Models*—with a larger emphasis on the latter, and one that would be universally applicable to the entire world and not be restricted to any specific world region. His point of departure was the general observation that media systems within the same world regions are remarkably similar, due to the closely “related mindsets and cultures” within those regions (Blum, 2005, p.6).

Back in 2001, the Institute of Communications and Media Studies at the University of Bern had already proposed a comparative framework for media systems that was based on six dimensions, namely, the political system, media freedom, media ownership, media financing, media culture, and media

orientation. Previous research has shown that these dimensions are needed in order to identify the similarities and differences between media systems. Additionally, each of these dimensions was then classified based on one of three distinct lines, namely, 1) a liberal line (A), 2) a middle line (B), and 3) a regulated line (C) (Blum, 2005, p.8). However, this approach had some significant weaknesses, such as the fact that it relied merely on a few dimensions, which failed to adequately demonstrate the relationship between the media system and political system. Blum, therefore, decided to add three more dimensions, which he borrowed from Hallin and Mancini, namely, the political culture, political parallelism, and state control over the media (Blum, 2005, p.9), thus, ending up with nine dimensions (as seen in Table 2).

**Table 2: Extended Comparative Approach—Dimensions and Classifications (Blum)**

<b>Extended Comparative Approach—Dimensions and Classifications (Blum)</b>			
	Liberal (A)	Middle (B)	Regulated (C)
Political System	Democratic	Authoritarian	Totalitarian
Political Culture	Polarized	Ambivalent	Concordant
Media Freedom	No Censorship	Partial Censorship	Permanent Censorship
Media Ownership	Private	Private and Public	Public
Media Financing	Market	Market and State	State
Political Parallelism	Weak	Moderate	Strong
State Control over the Media	Weak	Moderate	Strong
Media Culture	Investigative	Ambivalent	Concordant
Media Orientation	Commercial	Divergent	Public Service

(Blum, 2005, p.9)

And based on the particular composition of these dimensions, Blum (2005, pp.9-10) conceptualized six models, namely, 1) the Atlantic-Pacific Liberalism Model (e.g. Australia, New Zealand, United States), 2) South European Clientele Model (e.g. Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Malta, Cyprus), 3) North European Public Service Model (e.g. Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden), 4) Eastern European Shock Model (e.g. Belarus, Iran, Russia, Turkey,

Ukraine), 5) Arab-Asian Patriots Model (e.g. Egypt, Indonesia, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia), and 6) Asian-Caribbean Commando Model (e.g. China, Cuba, Myanmar, North Korea, Vietnam) (see Table 3).

**Table 3: Extended Comparative Approach—The 6 Models (Blum)**

The Extended Comparative Approach—The 6 Models (Blum)						
	Atlantic-Pacific Liberalism	South European Clientele	North European Public Service	Eastern European Shock	Arab-Asian Patriots	Asia-Caribbean Commando
Political System	A	A	A	A	B	C
Political Culture	A	B	B	B	C	C
Media Freedom	A	A	A	B	B	C
Media Ownership	A	B	B	B	B	C
Media Financing	A	B	B	B	B	B
Political Parallelism	A	B	A	B	C	C
State Control over the Media	A	B	A	C	C	C
Media Culture	A	B	B	B	C	C
Media Orientation	A	B	C	B	C	C

(Blum, 2005, pp.9-10)

But, there are also several limitations and shortcomings in regards to the framework developed by Roger Blum. First and most foremost, he does not show how he has developed these different models, and neither does he explain why no other combination for these different dimensions is possible. Simply put, there is no train of thought that could easily be followed in the analysis and development of his models. Secondly, his framework has not been as thoroughly discussed and debated in the literature as other works, and it also seems to be little known outside of the German-speaking world. Additionally, most comparative analyses on media systems still rely on the work done by Hallin and Mancini—Brazil (Albuquerque, 2005), Eastern Europe (Jakubowicz, 2007), or South Africa (Hadland, 2007). Thirdly, it seems rather odd to have, for example, China classified as totalitarian—with North Korea most likely

being the only exception in this particular list of countries (Asia-Caribbean Commando Model)—and Iran, or even Russia, classified as democratic (Eastern European Shock Model).

Finally, it seems overly simplistic to have half of the models based on European regions, namely, the North, South, and East, while the rest of the world is then grouped into the remaining three models. Additionally, based on the names of the particular models—which are obviously based on world regions—it seems remarkably difficult to even decide where to place the countries of Central (e.g. Mexico, Costa Rica) and South America (e.g. Argentina, Brazil), as, without even having done any prior research, it could be easily assumed that these countries will most probably not be placed into the Atlantic Pacific Liberalism Model (same world region) alongside the United States. Moreover, it seems that the countries of the Sub-Saharan Africa are completely missing from this list of models. And oddly enough, all the countries in Asia seem to be placed within only two groups, namely, the Arab-Asian Patriots Model and the Asia-Caribbean Commando Model, of which neither includes democratic political systems. Instead, it could be suggested to remove the geographical positions in the naming of these different models, as they appear to be quite redundant.

However, this paper is not particularly interested in trying to place Japan or Korea in any of these six models presented by Roger Blum. Instead, it will use Blum's framework (see Table 2) in order to identify the similarities and differences between those two media systems. It would also appear highly counterproductive to try to manipulate the values for each media system in order to make them fit into any of these six particular models. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that media systems are never fixed in place and time, but that they are constantly evolving and changing, which makes such a table as presented above (see Table 3)—one that is almost a decade old—rather meaningless, for a lack of a better word, in today's world.

## 3 Methodological Framework

This chapter will elaborate more on the dimensions presented by Roger Blum's *Extended Comparative Approach* to media systems, which will later be used to analyze and interpret the empirical findings of the media systems of Japan and Korea. It is important to note in the beginning that Blum did not explain or indicate how to measure—or, in fact, how he measured—the individual dimensions identified in his model. Nor did he clarify what the dimensions mean and how they relate to each other. Thus, the paper will try to fill these gaps by looking at what other scholars have said regarding those dimensions. Additionally, as some of these dimensions are perceived to be largely overlapping and interrelated, it might be the best practice to combine certain dimensions in order to minimize repetition and to be able to make a more consistent analysis later.

### 3.1 Political System

The first dimension is called the political system, which is believed to be a greater determinant than, for example, the economic system as it decides whether to regulate or deregulate the market (Blum, 2005, p.10). Thus, the main purpose here is to figure out if the power rests in the government or the people, in order to be able to determine the degree of control a government has over the media and the society at large. But how do you classify a political system with 193 countries in the world today—based on the current number of UN Members (UN, 2011)—where each must have a uniquely different political system as they have been shaped by different national conditions. Generally, the most classical example is the classification by Aristotle (see Table 4), which is based on two parameters, namely, the number of citizens entitled to rule—one, few, or many—and whether the rulers govern by “common interest” or “private interest”—tyranny (monarch), oligarchy (wealthy), or democracy (needy) (Aristotle, 2009).

**Table 4: Classification of Political Systems (Aristotle)**

Classification of Political Systems (Aristotle)		
	Common Interest	Private Interest
One Ruler	Kingship or Royalty (Monarchy)	Tyranny
Few Rulers	Aristocracy	Oligarchy
Many Rulers	Constitutional Government	Democracy

(Aristotle, 2009)

Another typology, called the “three worlds” typology, was developed after the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War. The “First World” consisted of the capitalist industrialized countries—governed by a democratic regime (e.g. United States)—the “Second World” was formed by the communist countries—governed by an authoritarian regime (e.g. Soviet Union)—and the “Third World”<sup>4</sup> consisted of the economically less developed countries, many of which had just gained their independence from their colonial rulers—mostly governed by a totalitarian regime (e.g. Democratic Republic of Congo under Mobutu Sese Seko), such as personal dictatorships, one-party rule, or military rule. However, today, the term “First World” is rarely used anymore—especially, due to the fact that more and more countries are becoming democratic (Mair, 2008, p.111)—and the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, made the term “Second World” a rather meaningless concept. Additionally, the huge differences in growth rates among the developing countries—for example, Sierra Leone<sup>5</sup> had a GDP growth rate of 15.22 percent, while Cyprus<sup>6</sup> had a negative GDP growth rate of -2.40 percent in 2012 (The World Bank, 2014b)—made it more difficult and dangerous to generalize about the “Third World” (Kesselman et al., 2010, pp.25-26). Thus, the “three worlds” typology is a less useful concept today.

Thus, as based on the model developed by Roger Blum, this paper will distinguish between three contemporary typologies, namely, democracy, authoritarianism, and totalitarianism (Blum, 2005, p.9). Basically, it is between a “limited state” and a “total state”—with democracy on one end and totalitarianism on the other—or whether the state should exist for the people or the people should exist

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<sup>4</sup> A term coined by the French anthropologist Alfred Sauvy in 1952.

<sup>5</sup> Sierra Leone achieved independence from the United Kingdom in 1961.

<sup>6</sup> Cyprus achieved independence from the United Kingdom in 1960.



for the state (Wolfe, 1961, p.261). However, it might have been more appropriate, at least for most cases today, to classify political systems in terms of consolidated democracy, transitional democracy, and authoritarianism, and to leave out totalitarianism completely (Kesselman et al., 2010, p.26). Mainly due to the fact that, as mentioned before, it seems rather odd to have Russia categorized as a democracy—being put alongside other democracies like the United States—while it would have seemed equally odd to have it categorized as an authoritarian or totalitarian regime. Thus, instead it could have been listed as a transitional democracy, in which some authoritarian elements still persist.

### **3.1.1 Democracy**

The word democracy comes from two Greek words, *demos*, meaning the “common people,” and *kratos*, translated to “rule,” thus meaning “rule by the common people” (Online Etymology Dictionary, 2014b)—also often referred to as “popular sovereignty” (Merriam-Webster, 2014). While a democracy in its purest form is also referred to as a “direct democracy,” in which citizens basically rule themselves, as has been practiced by the ancient Greeks, and which would be practically impossible in any modern society today. But the most familiar type of democracy today is called a “representative democracy,” where elected and accountable representatives rule on behalf of the citizens (Pilkington, 1997, p.86). However, this is not to say that there cannot be any “representative” democracy with instruments of a “direct” democracy, such as it is the case, for example, in Switzerland, which however, is a very rare example in today’s world.

Unfortunately, there is also no commonly accepted definition of what a democracy actually is. Thus, it is important to have a good working definition of what is meant when the paper uses the term “democracy.” In a minimalist fashion, Schumpeter (1994, pp.269, 271) defined it as “[an] institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote,” which he then simplified as “[a] free competition for a free vote.” However, this seems rather overly simplistic, even though it appears that Roger Blum might have accepted this definition when analyzing the case of Russia, for example. Thus, the paper is in need of a more comprehensive definition, such as the influential definition presented by Robert A. Dahl. According to Dahl (1971, p.1) a key characteristic of a democracy is the “continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals.” However, as it is quite impossible for a government to be responsive to all the preferences of all its citizens—the classical definition of the “rule of

the many”—he instead refers to the everyday conception of a democracy as “polyarchy,” originally published in his book *A Preface to Democratic Theory* in 1956.

In this book, Dahl (2006, p.64) extracts three key characteristics of democracy that might be made “operationally meaningful,” namely, popular sovereignty, political equality, and majority rule. He (2006, p.84) then further specifies eight components of an operational definition of democracy. In the book *Polyarchy*, published in 1971, Dahl (1971) again offers eight requirements for a democracy, which he then modified in his later work *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy*, published in 1982, ultimately ending up with seven key components, namely, (Dahl, 1982, pp.10-11)—which are also defined in the Articles 19-21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN, 1949):

- 1) **Representative:** the control to make decisions is constitutionally vested in elected officials
- 2) **Free and fair elections:** elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections
- 3) **Right to vote:** all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials
- 4) **Right to run for office:** all adults have the right to run for elective public offices
- 5) **Freedom of expression:** all citizens have the right to express themselves without the threat of severe punishment
- 6) **Alternative sources:** all citizens have the right to seek out alternative sources of information
- 7) **Freedom of association:** all citizens have the right to form independent associations or organizations

As a result, a country can confidently be considered a democracy in which its political institutions adhere most closely to the criteria presented above (Dahl, 1982, p.11). There also different ways on how to measure democracy, the most prominent examples being the Democracy Index by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), a research and analysis division of the Economist Group, and the Freedom in the World Index, the annual flagship publication of the Freedom House organization.

### 3.1.2 Authoritarianism

Authoritarianism is basically the middle path between democracy and totalitarianism, although it is significantly more related to totalitarianism than to democracy, while some authoritarian regimes might “reflect democratic values and practices” (Kesselman et al., 2010, p.30). As there are different forms of democracies, there also exist different variations in authoritarian regimes, such as theocracies (e.g. Iran), military governments (e.g. Thailand), absolute monarchies (e.g. Saudi Arabia), or personal dictatorships (e.g. Iraq under Saddam Hussein) (Kesselman et al., 2010, pp.29-30). Linz (2000, p.263) broadly described the three most defining features of authoritarianism as follows:

- 1) **Limited political pluralism:** opposition political parties are severely limited and restricted
- 2) **Absence of political participation and mobilization:** political participation and mobilization is also severely limited
- 3) **Absence of an ideology:** the system is not legitimized through a common and dominating ideology—as it is the case under totalitarian regimes—but through “mentalities, psychological predispositions, and values in general (patriotism, nationalism, etc.)” (Lauth, 2012)

Or in other words, authoritarianism refers to a political system that is controlled by elected or non-elected representatives—often characterized by single, dominant, or one-party rule—which do not depend on popular legitimacy, and while it might permit some degree of individual freedom, it lacks any significant public participation in government.

### 3.1.3 Totalitarianism

Totalitarianism has been referred to as the “most extreme way of dictatorship” (Brooker, 2008, p.149), and the term was first popularized by Benito Mussolini, who described the fascist, totalitarian state as “everything in the State, nothing outside of the State, nothing against the State” (Brooker, 2000, p.8). Arendt (1958, pp.326, 392) claimed that totalitarianism seeks “the permanent domination of each single individual in each and every sphere of life” and the “total domination of the total population of the earth.” Thus, totalitarian state is trying to “reshape the very nature of man and society [...] to own everything, not only material things but men themselves—to own them body and soul” (Wolfe, 1961, p.267). In short, the essence of the total state is to be total, attempting to transform the entire society by “[denying] autonomy

to the individual, his private purposes, his judgment, his conscience, his moral responsibility" (Wolfe, 1961, p.261).

According to Friedrich and Brzezinski (1956) a totalitarian state consists of the following six elements:

- 1) **Ideology:** the system is legitimized through an elaborate ideology, consisting of an official body of doctrine, which basically covers all aspects of man's existence to which everyone in the society must adhere to
- 2) **Single-party state:** a single party, typically led by one man, known as the dictator, forms the government
- 3) **Terror:** a system of terror, through physical or psychological violence, by a secret police
- 4) **Monopoly controlled media:** the government has total control over all means of communication
- 5) **Monopoly controlled military resources:** the government has total control over all weapons of armed combat
- 6) **Centrally planned economy:** the economy is centrally planned by the government

And while these elements can certainly be found separately in other types of non-democratic systems, only the simultaneous presences of all these elements makes a system totalitarian (Linz, 2000, p.67). Thus, the major difference between an authoritarian regime and a totalitarian regime is that, while the former permits, to some extent, political and economic freedom as long as the legitimacy of the regime is not threatened, the later tries to deny all basic freedoms under the threat of torture and execution. The most prominent examples are Nazi Germany under Hitler, Soviet Union under Stalin, and Facist Italy under Mussolini. However, there are only a few places in the world today where totalitarian regimes still exist. The best-known example probably is North Korea under the Kim regime.

As a result, based on the criteria for each of the different political systems, the paper will then determine which line is the most predominant in each country (see Table 5).

**Table 5: Classification of Political System**

Classification of Political System		
A	B	C
Democratic	Authoritarian	Totalitarian

(Blum, 2005, p.9)

## 3.2 Political Culture

The second dimension is called the political culture<sup>7</sup>. And this dimension is insofar interesting as according to the Economist Intelligence Unit (2013, p.26), a democracy “is more than the sum of its institutions [as a] democratic political culture is also crucial for legitimacy, smooth functioning, and ultimately the sustainability of democracy.” Gabriel A. Almond (1956, p.396) first proposed this term and the book *The Civic Culture*, published by Almond and Verba (1989) is perhaps the best-known study of political culture. According to the authors (1989, p.12) the term “political culture” refers to the political orientations, meaning the attitudes the general public has towards the political system, as well as the attitudes it has towards the role of itself within that system. It includes three types of orientations, namely, (Easton & Jack, 1969, p.5; Almond & Verba, 1989, p.14):

- 1) **Perception:** cognition and knowledge of the public about the political system and its role
- 2) **Affect:** feelings and attitudes of the public about the political system and its role
- 3) **Evaluation:** judgment and opinions of the public about the political system and its role

Thus, the political culture mainly refers to the knowledge, beliefs, feelings, attitudes, values, and norms that people have developed towards the government and politics, as well as the role an individual may play in the political process. However, this is not to say that there do not exist any other mechanisms that influence a modern society, such as the family or the place of work. These other mechanisms certainly also play a significant role, but one that this paper is not particularly interested in.

Almond and Verba (1989) assumed that the political culture has an independent effect on the development of democracy and political systems. However, it has also been argued that there might

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<sup>7</sup> This dimension is derived from the work done by Hallin and Mancini (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p.9).

actually not exist a casual relationship between the political culture and democracy. That the political culture does in fact not act as an independent variable, varying independently from the country's political system. For example, Carole Pateman (1971) argued that if political orientations are a key part of the political system, then attitudes and feelings merely exist in relationship to a specific set of political institutions, and thus, it is impossible to assume that the political culture acts as an independent variable, as it simply cannot be separated from the institutional context in which it exists. However, for the purpose of this paper, it will be assumed that the political culture does in fact act as an independent variable, or else it could be deemed unnecessary to analyze it in the case of Japan and Korea. Thus, the question arises of how it is actually measured.

While the political culture “contributes to the stability of government” under a democratic regime, an authoritarian regime needs to deal with the problems that arise from the “unwillingness to confront the challenge of the ballot box” (Hague & Harrop, 2004, pp.96-97), meaning, as they are lacking the legitimacy that is normally derived through free and fair elections, they are only left with three options on how to respond to the political culture in such a society, namely, to ignore it, to manipulate it, or to transform it (Hague & Harrop, 2004, p.97), with communist regimes having made the “most systematic and long-lasting effort at transforming political culture [by restructuring] the way people think and behave” (Hague & Harrop, 2004, p.97). Thus, a regime that is capable of reshaping the attitudes and feelings of the general public, then the “people living in these societies are expected to prove more positive towards the regime” (Norris, 2010, p.206). Thus, the paper will hereby analyze four types of political attitudes as according to Bradley M. Richardson (1974), namely:

- 1) **Political involvement:** e.g. how interested people are in politics
- 2) **Evaluative attitudes:** e.g. how well people think politics performs
- 3) **Participating attitudes:** e.g. what people think their roles as active participants is in politics
- 4) **Voting attitudes:** e.g. how people vote

In order to evaluate these four types the paper will rely on data drawn from opinion polls, as it is usually done. The most well-known global opinion survey is most likely done by the World Values Survey, which “covers a wide range of countries from all major cultural regions, as well as democratic and [authoritarian] regimes that vary in their levels of press freedom” (Norris, 2010, p.201), and which, for example, measures the confidence of the people in their political institutions, such as the government, parliament, courts, political parties, police, and armed forces, as well as the press and television. And to

make the results more tangible, the paper will compare the results for Japan and Korea with the United States (following the “liberal” line), Germany (as the “middle” line), and China (representing the “regulated” line). Additionally, for this specific dimension, the paper will combine Japan and Korea under one headline, instead of separately discussing them in the next chapter, in order to reduce repetition.

And in the end the paper will determine which of the three types of political cultures presented by Roger Blum, namely, polarized, ambivalent, and concordant is the most applicable (see Table 6). While the terms have not been defined by Blum, it can be assumed that a polarized political culture refers to a society where the people have conflict-oriented views towards the political system, meaning it is divided into starkly contrasting groups with different sets of attitudes and feelings towards that system, whereas a concordant culture refers to a society that is consensus-oriented, meaning the people share similar attitudes and feelings towards that system, while the people in the middle—the “ambivalent” group—have rather mixed feelings towards the system.

**Table 6: Classification of Political Culture**

Political Culture		
A	B	C
Polarized	Ambivalent	Concordant

(Blum, 2005, p.9)

### 3.3 Media Freedom and State Control over the Media

Here, the paper will knowingly combine the third and seventh dimension, media freedom, and state control over the media<sup>8</sup>, respectively. Generally speaking, a media is assumed to be free when it is free from state control, thus, it makes sense to combine those two dimensions together, in order to reduce repetition and to be able to make a more coherent analysis in the next chapter.

According to the Declaration of Windhoek—a statement of press freedom principles put together by African newspaper journalists in 1991—an independent media is “independent from governmental,

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<sup>8</sup>This dimension is derived from the work done by Hallin and Mancini (2004, p.21), which is related to the first dimension introduced by Blumler and Gurevitch (1995, p.62), namely the “degree of state control over media organizations.”

political, or economic control or from control of materials and infrastructure essential for the production and dissemination of newspapers, magazines, and periodicals” (UNESCO, 1991). This is insofar important, as a free media will be prepared to “offend the powerful [and to] express controversial views” (McQuail, 2010, p.195), and most importantly, to “make citizens informed, and to foster public debate” (Waisbord, 2000, p.243).

Therefore, in order to determine the degree of state control as well as the degree of freedom the media enjoys, it is quite common to divide the analysis into three parts, namely, 1) regulation, 2) ownership, and 3) financing (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1995, pp.62-64; Hallin & Mancini, 2004, pp.43-44; Suk, 2009, pp.3-10; McQuail, 2010, p.193):

- 1) **Regulation (media-related laws, policies, and ethics):** in regards to laws regulating, for example, 1) libel and defamation complaints, 2) access to government information, 3) political communication, particularly during election campaigns, and 4) media concentration, ownership, and competition, etc.
- 2) **Ownership (internal):** in regards to the control and interference by media owners, media managers, media editors or group of editors, labor unions, general staff, etc. (see Media Ownership)
- 3) **Financing (external):** in regards to the proximity of their revenue coming from specific sources, such as the government, advertisers, etc. (see Media Financing)

In addition, to determine whether a media is truly free, it is also necessary to look at the degree of separation between the media and the government, due to the fact that there simply cannot be a free media without independent news organizations (Waisbord, 2000, pp.3-4). However, this will be discussed in more detail later (see Political Parallelism and Media Culture).

Thus, “a truly free press would be free not just of [regulation] but also of market forces and ownership ties [...] and a host of other material bonds” (Berry et al., 1995, p.22). But, a truly independent media from legal, political, economic, and ownership controls cannot possibly exist in reality, as the media will always be dependent on something. And while it is easier to understand the degree of control under an authoritarian regime, it is more difficult to evaluate it in democratic societies (LaMay, 2007,



pp.26-27). Thus, the paper will merely try to measure the strength<sup>9</sup> of the freedom of the media and the degree of state control over the media (see Table 7). For this, it will also rely on the ratings and rankings gathered by organizations<sup>10</sup> such as the Freedom House and Reporters Without Borders (RSF), as well as the OpenNet Initiative (ONI), which specifically deals with the media freedom in the online world.

**Table 7: Classification of Media Freedom and State Control over the Media**

Classification of Media Freedom and State Control over the Media		
A	B	C
Weak	Moderate	Strong

(Blum, 2005, p.9)

### 3.4 Media Ownership

Another crucial question is how the media is organized in a country. Thus, the fourth dimension “media ownership” attempts to find out who ultimately controls the production and dissemination of information within a particular society. Hereby, Roger Blum distinguishes between public and private ownership, and a mixture of both (see Table 8). Public ownership refers to the ownership by the government, which is also commonly called state ownership or government ownership. This, however, should not be confused with a public company (e.g. Google) that offers its securities—such as equity securities (e.g. common stock)—for sale to the general public, typically through a stock exchange (e.g. New York Stock Exchange), which, in the case of this paper, would fall under the category private ownership. Thus, private ownership refers the ownership by non-governmental organizations, again, including companies that also offer its stock to the general public on stock exchanges.

There are also basically two sides of the debate on whether media ownership should be public or private. The *Public Choice Theory* argues that media owned by the government would “distort and manipulate information to entrench the incumbent politicians, preclude voters and consumers from making informed decisions, and ultimately undermine both democracy and markets” (Djankov et al.,

<sup>9</sup> While the wordings used by Roger Blum are rather ambiguous, it will be left to the author’s sole discretion to decide which of these best fit a particular country.

<sup>10</sup> A third such organization is the International Research & Exchanges Board (IREX), however, its Media Sustainability Index (MSI) does not provide any information on Japan or Korea (IREX, n.d.).

2003, p.342). In contrast, *Public Interest Theory* argues, “governments should have higher levels of media ownership [which consequently leads] to greater freedom of the press, more economic and political freedom, and better social outcomes (Djankov et al., 2003, p.343). Proponents of public ownership also usually argue that information is a public good. Economically speaking, this means two things, namely, that it is non-rivalrous—meaning the consumption by one person does not reduce its consumption by others—and non-excludable—meaning it is impossible to prevent others from consuming it (Arnold, 2011, pp.377-78). For example, it is practically impossible to exclude anyone with a working television set to receive free-to-air television, which is contrary to the case of cable and satellite television, where viewers are required to pay a subscription fee, and it is therefore known as a “club good” rather than a “private good” as it still fulfills the first requirement of non-rivalry.

However, several studies have shown that countries, which have a greater degree of public ownership of the media, generally, have less media freedom (Djankov et al., 2003; Gehlbach & Sonin, 2008). Additionally, research has also shown that ownership of the media tends to be highly concentrated—mostly owned by the state or by a few private owners, which can usually be counted on one’s fingers—while widely dispersed ownership structures are rather infrequent (Djankov et al., 2003, p.343), which potentially reduces the range of voices that “predominate in the media,” and thus “[poses] a [direct] threat to the interests of society” (Doyle, 2002, p.6). Therefore, the diversity in the ownership of the media is also usually seen to be necessary for the media to be truly free (Lowenstein, 1970, p.131). But, Roger Blum seems to solely focus on who owns the media without being concerned with the density of ownership concentration.

Moreover, it would also be equally necessary to look at cross-ownership, such as when media conglomerates own television and radio networks, as well as newspapers, and so on. As it is natural that a firm would attempt to control as much of the output in its particular field as possible—commonly referred to as “horizontal integration”—in order to gain a bigger market share, which has the effect of lowering overhead costs and rising the bargaining power with suppliers. Having a bigger market share makes it also easier to control the prices it can charge for its products, such as advertising time, consequently earning them even bigger profits. This is most commonly seen with firms operating in oligopolies—markets that are dominated by a handful of firms, each with a significant market share (McChesney, 1999, p.16). And the main reason for this horizontal integration is that firms face an unknown future. According to Hawley (1893) in his article *The Risk Theory of Profit*, profit is the reward for taking these risks of operating in an

unknown future, which is paid by the society, due to the fact that a firm would simply not take these risks “without the expectation of a compensation in excess of the actuarial value of the risk” (Hawley, 1893, p.460). While others have argued that profit is the reward of uncertainty, rather than risk-taking (Knight, 1964). However, both, again, are related to the unknown future. Consequently, a firm tries to reduce this risk—or uncertainty—by having many different income-generating activities, in order to minimize, or eliminate, negative outcomes, which is usually done through the ownership of multiple other organizations, such as when a newspaper company owns a television network, or vice versa (Picard, 2002, pp.6-9).

While this paper will also briefly look at ownership concentration and cross-ownership, its primary focus will simply be on who owns the media, as suggested by Blum. To do this, the paper will examine the largest companies—determined, if publicly available, by the circulation (newspapers), viewership (television), and site ranking (Internet)—within each media. In addition, it is important to decide at what point ownership is considered to be private or public, which will ultimately be based on who controls the highest number of voting rights<sup>11</sup>.

**Table 8: Classification of Media Ownership**

Classification of Media Ownership		
A	B	C
Private	Private and Public	Public

(Blum, 2005, p.9)

### 3.5 Media Financing

The fifth dimension deals with media financing, which distinguishes between media that is financed through the state (e.g. license fees) the market (e.g. advertising), or a mixture of both (see Table 9).

<sup>11</sup> This is done based on the fact that Roger Blum categorized the media in the United States as being privately owned—while it would seem highly unlikely that any media system in the world would be categorized as being fully privately owned—even though the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), established through the United States Congress and funded by the United States government, promotes public broadcasting by distributing funds to public stations across the United States and to national organizations such as the National Public Radio (NPR) and Public Broadcasting Service (PBS). Thus, it must be assumed that the degree of market share held by either publicly or privately-owned media companies—which is predominantly controlled by the “Big Six” in the United States—is the determinant factor in the classification of media ownership.

Assumingly, whether a media is financed through the state or market will largely depend on the ownership structure of the media, as discussed under the previous headline.

Again, there are two sides to the same coin. While the arguments of having a financially independent media are rather obvious, it is equally important to discuss how a media financed through the market might risk losing some of its independence. In *Rich Media, Poor Democracy*, McChesney (1999) argues that commercialization will eventually lead to companies shifting their focus from promoting an informed citizenry by providing general information to the general public, to sensational news reporting in order to attract a greater audience, and thus, advertisers. This relates to the *Theory of the Firm*, which states that the main purpose of a business is to try to maximize its profits—certainly other objectives exist as well— (Tirole, 1988, p.34), rather than informing and educating the public. Additionally, it is also rational to assume that companies that are dependent on the market—for example, mainly earning their revenue through advertising—will in some cases choose not to offend a big business, which is also a big advertiser. And it is equally rational to assume that companies dependent on funds through the state will also in some cases choose not to offend the incumbent government.

Ultimately, the paper will again look at the largest companies—based on the ownership data from the previous discussion—and depending on the degree of where the financial resources are derived from, it will either be categorized as state, market, or both (see Table 9).

**Table 9: Classification of Media Financing**

Classification of Media Financing		
A	B	C
Market	Market and State	State

(Blum, 2005, p.9)

### **3.6 Political Parallelism and Media Culture**

Here the sixth dimension, political parallelism<sup>12</sup>, and the eighth dimension, media culture will again be combined. The political parallelism is a key feature in the comparative analysis of media systems, as it refers to the links between media and political organizations (Hardy, 2008, p.18; Roudakova, 2012, p.270). This is insofar important, as it has been argued that the more the media disconnects from politics the more professional and critical it will operate (Blum, 2005, p.10). “That ‘apartness’ is crucial. The press does not share the same aims as government, the legislature, the executive, religion, or commerce. It is, or should be, an outsider” (Rusbridger, 2011). Hereby, Blum (2005, p.8) distinguishes between journalists who have established close ties with politics—supporting superior state goals voluntarily or through an order (e.g. fear of censorship or repression)—and those who keep a distance to politics and present themselves more critically to the society. Or more simply put, the existing links between the political system and the media system.

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<sup>12</sup> This dimension is derived from the work done by Hallin and Mancini (2004, pp.21-22), which in turn is related to two of the four dimensions proposed by Blumler and Gurevitch (1995, pp.61-67), namely the “degree of mass media partisanship” and the “degree of media-political elite integration.”

According to Seymour-Ure (1974, p.160) there are three key characteristics that measure the degree of relationship between the media and politics, namely, the organization (e.g. the involvement of political parties in the ownership of the media), goals (e.g. editorial policies), and members and supporters (e.g. party affiliations), which has been extended to a total of six components by Hallin and Mancini, as follows (2004, pp.28-29):

- 1) **Media content:** the extent to which different media reflect distinct political orientations in their news reporting
- 2) **Organizational connections:** the extent to which different media are affiliated to distinct political parties, or other organizations, such as trade unions, churches, etc.
- 3) **Politically active:** the extent to which media personnel are active in political life, such as serving in public offices
- 4) **Career paths:** the extent to which the career path of media personnel is shaped by their political affiliations, such as working for a media organization, which shares the same political views
- 5) **Media audience:** the extent to which supporters of different parties read different newspapers or watch different television channels
- 6) **Media orientation:** the extent to which media personnel see their role as influencing the public opinion or providing neutral information

For example, complete parallelism would exist if the views as well as opinions of every media organization were “linked extremely closely to one or another party” (Seymour-Ure, 1974, p.174). This will in turn prevent journalists to serve as watchdogs. Thus, the media culture is in close connection with the political culture. In the sense that a political culture that is categorized as being polarized—having mainly conflicting views—it is believed to also have a media culture that leans more towards investigative journalism, acting as a watchdog. For example, in a modern democracy it is assumed that the media performs more of a watchdog function, keeping a check on the government, and exposing wrongdoing, corruption, and the abuse of power. However, a media might also simply act as a guard dog, merely educating and informing the citizens so they are able to participate in the political life (Gunther & Mughan, 2000, p.273).

The term *investigative* refers to a form of journalism in which a journalist tries to intensively seek and expose corruption and wrongdoing (Oxford Dictionaries, 2014), also commonly known as watchdog journalism. Steve Weinberg (1996, p.xvi) defined it as, “the reporting, through one’s own initiative and

work product, matters of importance to readers, viewers, or listeners. In many cases, the subjects of the reporting wish the matters under scrutiny to remain undisclosed.” He (1996, p.xvi) further said that investigative journalists themselves decide what they believe needs to be covered, rather than attending a meeting that was arranged by someone in authority. However, even in the United States, used by Blum as the liberal example, there seems to be a decline in investigative journalism, due to its high costs, time consumption, and legal battles that are related to such news stories (Frank, Laura, 2009). Again, this might go back to the argument that the sole purpose of a private company is to maximize profits, which is done, for example, by cutting costs, which will ultimately have a significant impact on the quality of the news reporting. McChesney (1997) explained the problem as, “to do effective journalism is expensive, and corporate managers realize that the surest way to fatten profits is to fire editors and reporters and fill the news hole with inexpensive syndicated material and fluff.” Thus, in order to reduce costs, news reporting will in most cases heavily rely on press releases, or news conferences as its primary source of news information. Therefore, it seems that there might even be a correlation between privately owned companies, financed primarily or solely through the market, and the prominence of investigative journalism in the media, or rather the lack thereof. James Squires (1994) even argued that the corporate takeover of the media has led to the “death of journalism.”

On the other hand, a political culture that is categorized as “concordant”—having mainly complementing views—is believed to also have a media culture that is rather uncritical of political parties, institutions, as well as other political interests, acting as a lapdog. Thus, in the case of media culture, the paper is primarily concerned with whether the media acts as a watchdog or a lapdog. Hence, when there is a rather nonexistent link between the media and politics, and journalists engage in investigative journalism, it can be said to be “weak,” while if there was a dominant link between the media and politics, and journalists rarely, or never, engage in investigative journalism, it can be categorized as “strong” (see Table 10).

**Table 10: Classification of Political Parallelism and Media Culture**

Classification of Political Parallelism and Media Culture		
A	B	C
Weak	Moderate	Strong

(Blum, 2005, p.9)

### 3.7 Media Orientation

The last dimension is called media orientation. Here, Blum (2005, p.9) distinguished between three types of orientations, namely, commercial, public service, or a mixture of both. Simply put, the question here is merely what is the media supposed to do? Make money or inform the public, or try to do both? It can be assumed that the data will strongly correlate with the results from the fifth dimension, media financing, as a company that is mainly financed through the market—for example, being heavily dependent on advertising money—will most likely be more focused on commercial activities in order to remain a profitable business.

Today, there is also greater pressure than ever before on news media, as privately owned media started to expand and to directly compete with public broadcasters in nearly every country in the world, changing the content as well as character of news, to the extent that media will only cover politics as long as it manages to attract and retain the audience (Swanson, 2004, p.50). It has been argued that the media will merely deliver the news the market demands—meaning, the news the general public wants to hear. In the book *The Problem of the Media*, McChesney (2004) tackles several myths, such as that the commercial media will not provide the highest quality of journalism, as the owners are merely focused on maximizing profits. Or that one would also believe that due to the competitive pressure for profit, commercial media would give the people what they demand. To a certain degree this seems quite plausible, because it makes sense that a profit-seeking firm will try to satisfy the market. But this argument has a number of flaws. Not only does the market not necessarily give the people what they want, but it also gives them plenty of what they do not want, which McChesney called the “hyper-commercial carpet-bombing of our culture” (McChesney, 2004, p.10). Additionally, this might also relate to the *principal-agent problem*, also known as the *agency problem*, where one party, the agent (media organization) can pursue “hidden actions,” while the other party, the principal (general public), cannot directly ensure that the agent is actually acting their best interest (McEachern, 2014, pp.312-13)—meaning that media organizations will not act at all times to what the market is telling them, but rather follow their own agendas.

Thus, the news reporting in a privately owned media system that is financed through the market and is solely based on commercial activity—trying to attract the largest audience possible, in order to make the most money from advertisers—will most probably “emphasize the exceptional rather than the



representative [and] the sensational rather than the significant” (The Commission on Freedom of the Press, 1947, p.55). And as Hallin and Mancini (2004, p.279) have previously pointed out, one of the more difficult questions to sort out is whether the commercialization of the media has actually increased or decreased the flow of political information and discussion. But the main argument might always be that any business will always try to focus on the kind of news that the people actually want to read, see, and hear about. If it is sensationalism, they will argue, it has to do with the fact that people actually want it, or else they would immediately stop reading, watching, and listening to the news from that particular media organization, and instead go elsewhere to get their news.

Public service, on the other hand, is based on the belief that the free market, left to itself, would simply fail to satisfy certain criteria, such as putting public interest before financial objectives, providing balanced and impartial information on issues of conflict, or universally geographic coverage, as it would simply not be profitable to do so (Blum, 2005, p.8; McQuail, 2010, p.178). Public service broadcasting refers to a system that is set up by law and that is generally financed through the public—often a compulsory license fee paid by every household that owns, depending on the country, a television or radio set—and ideally given a large degree of editorial and operating independence. According to UNESCO, public service is “made, financed, and controlled by the public, for the public. It is neither commercial nor state-owned, free from political interference and pressure from commercial forces” (UNESCO, n.d.). It further argues that through public service “citizens are informed, educated, and also entertained. When guaranteed with pluralism, programming diversity, editorial independence, appropriate funding, accountability, and transparency, public service can serve as a cornerstone of democracy” (UNESCO, n.d.). However, it is important to note that in some cases, public service could eventually run the risk of basically functioning as the “mouthpiece” of the incumbent government.

As a result, when the largest emphasis in the media system is put on commercial activity, rather than on public service, the liberal line will be chosen over the regulated line, and vice versa. And if none of the two opposing orientations is dominant, then the media system is said to be following the middle path (as seen in Table 11).

**Table 11: Classification of Media Orientation**

Classification of Media Orientation		
A	B	C
Commercial	Divergent	Public Service

(Blum, 2005, p.9)

### 3.8 Summary

Thus, the paper ends up with the following methodological framework (see Table 12), which is a slightly modified version of Roger Blum's original *Extended Comparative Approach* (see Table 2), and which will be used as the basis for the analysis and discussion in the next chapter. Additionally, what this framework has shown is that no dimensions alone can be used to answer the question of why the media are they way they are, as only the sum of the parts can potentially give a satisfactory explanation.

**Table 12: Extended Comparative Approach (Modified)**

Extended Comparative Approach (Modified)			
	Liberal (A)	Middle (B)	Regulated (C)
Political System	Democratic	Authoritarian	Totalitarian
Political Culture	Polarized	Ambivalent	Concordant
Media Freedom and State Control over the Media	Weak	Moderate	Strong
Media Ownership	Private	Private and Public	Public
Media Financing	Market	Market and State	State
Political Parallelism and Media Culture	Weak	Moderate	Strong
Media Orientation	Commercial	Divergent	Public Service

## 4 Results and Discussion

In this chapter, the paper will present, analyze, and discuss all the findings obtained through the methodological framework developed in the previous chapters for the media systems of Japan and Korea.

### 4.1 Political System

According to the first dimension, the paper will try to determine the political system in each country. This is done by briefly discussing the structure of the political system by solely focusing on the executive and legislative branch of the government (excluding the judiciary branch), examining how elections are conducted and executed, and finally by looking at the existing individual freedoms and rights of the general public in each country.

#### 4.1.1 Japan

Japan has a parliamentary system—as do most democracies in the world today (Kesselman et al., 2010, p.28)—in which executive and legislative powers are combined rather than separated, hence, there is no formal separation of powers between the executive and the legislature branch of the government. This is in contrast to presidential systems, such as in the United States (Kurian et al., 2011, p.1179). A country with a parliamentary system may either be, 1) a constitutional monarchy, where a monarch is the ceremonial head of state, while the head of government is almost always a member of the legislature (Kurian et al., 2011, pp.315-16), or 2) a parliamentary republic (e.g. Austria), where, in most cases, a ceremonial president is the head of state, hence, making it a republic, rather than a monarchy, while the head of government, usually referred to as the prime minister (e.g. United Kingdom) or chancellor (e.g. Austria), is regularly a member from the legislature (Kurian et al., 2011, pp.1179-80). However, it may also be the case that the head of government in a parliamentary republic is also the head of state (e.g. South Africa), who, however, is being elected by the legislature, again, in contrast to a presidential system, where the people directly elect the president (e.g. United States).

In Japan, it is the former, meaning it is a parliamentary constitutional monarchy where the power of the Emperor (currently Akihito) is very limited, and rather serves merely as a ceremonial figurehead.

This is similar to the United Kingdom and Spain, which are also both parliamentary constitutional monarchies, in which Queen Elizabeth II and King Felipe VI currently serve as the head of states, respectively. The role of the Emperor in Japan is defined in the Constitution in Chapter 1, under Article 1, as “the symbol of the State and of the unity of the People” (Constitution of Japan, 1946).

The head of government in Japan, referred to as the Prime Minister—currently Shinzo Abe, who is also the president of the currently ruling party called the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)—is appointed by the Emperor after being designated by the National Diet, or simply Diet—Japan’s bicameral legislature, composed of the upper house (House of Councillors) and the lower house (House of Representatives) as under Article 42 (Constitution of Japan, 1946)—and must enjoy the confidence of the House of Representatives to remain in office, as under Article 6 and Article 67 (Constitution of Japan, 1946). Thus, a parliamentary system may be unicameral or bicameral, meaning that it either has one or two houses of parliament, while the upper house usually has comparatively less influence than the larger, lower house of parliament (Kurian et al., 2011, p.1180). The election of the Prime Minister is held when the Cabinet resigns—which it must do during the first session of the Diet after the general election of the House of Representatives—or the post has become vacant, as stated under Article 70 (Constitution of Japan, 1946). The Prime Minister generally is, even though not necessarily, the leader of the dominant party or party coalition in parliament (Kurian et al., 2011, p.1180), as it is currently the case in Japan. As under Article 46, the members of the House of Councillors serve a six year term, while the members of the lower house, the House of Representatives, serve a four year term, as stated under Article 45 (Constitution of Japan, 1946). The Diet is the highest organ of state power, as under Article 41 (Constitution of Japan, 1946), however, sovereignty resides with the Japanese people, as stated in the preamble, as well as under Article 1 of the Constitution (Constitution of Japan, 1946).

In the general election of the House of Representatives, lastly held on December 16, 2012, the LDP won in a landslide victory, ousting the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) from power after only three years. The LDP received 61.25 percent of the votes—winning 294 of 480 seats—with the DPJ receiving meagerly 11.87 percent (57 seats), and the Japan Restoration Party (JRP) 11.25 percent (54 seats) (nippon.com, 2012). The LDP has governed Japan for all but three years since 1958, when in 2009 the LDP suffered the worst defeat of a sitting government in modern Japanese history (ParlGov, 2012)—dropping from 296 seats (61.66 percent) (ParlGov, 2005) to 119 (24.79 percent), a roughly 37 percent point drop (ParlGov, 2009), making Japan what is commonly known as a dominant-party system, which should not be confused with

a single-party system like in China, for example. On December 26, Shinzo Abe was formally elected as Prime Minister by the parliament, making him the sixth Prime Minister since he himself last served as Prime Minister from 2006 to 2007. Thus, every Prime Minister since Junichiro Koizumi—who served from 2001 to 2006—remained in office for merely one year, sometimes even less. However, as this paper is not intended to be a sole discussion about the nature of the political system of Japan, or Korea, it will not go into more detail here.

Under Article 15 of the Constitution, “the people have the inalienable right to choose their public officials and to dismiss them. All public officials are servants of the whole community and not of any group thereof. Universal adults suffrage is guaranteed with regard to the election of public officials. In all elections, secrecy of the ballot shall not be violated. A voter shall not be answerable, publicly or privately, for the choice he has made” (Constitution of Japan, 1946). Thus, the elections are representative, in the sense that the public officials act as servants of the whole community and not only a particular group of the population, further stated under Article 43, which states that “both Houses shall consist of elected members, representative of all the people” (Constitution of Japan, 1946). The elections are free, in the sense that universal suffrage is guaranteed, meaning that every person has the right to vote—the minimum voting age is 20 years in Japan, as stated under Article 9(1) of the Public Offices Election Act (Public Offices Election Act of Japan, 1950). However this is not to say that there are not any other restrictions as well, as for example under Article 11 of the Public Offices Election Act, a person who is imprisoned does not have the right to vote, or even hold office (Public Offices Election Act of Japan, 1950).

Additionally, the elections are fair, in the sense that all Japanese are “equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic, or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status, or family origin” as under Article 14 (Constitution of Japan, 1946). And Article 44 states, “the qualifications of members of both Houses and their electors shall be fixed by law. However, there shall be no discrimination because of race, creed, sex, social status, family origin, education, property, or income” (Constitution of Japan, 1946). The election ballot, as previously stated, is guaranteed to be secret. And the elections are frequent, as the most essential election, namely, that of the House of Representatives, is held every four years, unless the lower house is dissolved earlier, as stated under Article 45. And the election of the members of the House of Councillors is held every six years, while there is an election of half of its members every three years, as under Article 46 (Constitution of Japan, 1946). Thus, elections in Japan are representative, free, fair, secret—in the sense that voters do not have to disclose who they voted for—and

frequent. Furthermore, the Public Offices Election Act states under Article 10 that every Japanese has the right to hold public office, with individual age restrictions, depending on the office (Public Offices Election Act of Japan, 1950).

Chapter 3 of the Constitution deals with the rights, as well as duties, of the people of Japan—consisting of 31 of a total of 103 Articles (Constitution of Japan, 1946). Article 11 states that “the people shall not be prevented from enjoying any of the fundamental human rights” and that these rights should be guaranteed to “the people of this and future generations as eternal and inviolate rights” (Constitution of Japan, 1946). Under Article 21, “freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press, and all other forms of expression are guaranteed. No censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means of communication be violated” (Constitution of Japan, 1946). Hence, the citizens have the right to express themselves without the fear and danger of severe punishment on political matters. Furthermore, Article 19 states, “freedom of thought and conscience shall not be violated” (Constitution of Japan, 1946). Thus, the Japanese people have the right to express themselves, to form independent associations or organizations, as well as the right to seek out alternative sources of information. However, in recent years, the LDP is seeking to substantially revise the Constitution, such as by replacing the “universal human rights principles with a unique system of rights based on Japan’s history, culture, and tradition” (Repeta, 2013, pp.1-2).

Moreover, as these are merely written words, it would be equally important to know whether these laws are actually being adhered to. Thus, in reality it would be necessary to look at each point individually. However, as an entire paper could be written on this subject itself, this paper will merely look at the measurements by two different organizations, namely, the Economist Intelligence Unit and Freedom House. In the latest Democracy Index by the Economist Intelligence Unit for 2012, Japan ranked 23rd of 167 countries—two ranks below the United States. Of the five categories measured, it had its lowest scores in political participation (6.11) and political culture (7.50), with its highest score in civil liberties (9.41), and an overall score of 8.08<sup>13</sup> (EIU, 2013, p.4). Thus, making it a “full democracy,” as it is still slightly above 8 points, which made up 15 percent of the countries in the world (EIU, 2013, p.2). And its overall score has steadily stayed slightly above 8 points since 2006, with its highest overall score in 2008 with 8.25 points (EIU, 2013, p.13). And according to the Freedom House, Japan ranked as “free” in 2013, with both scores in

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<sup>13</sup> Norway had the highest overall score in the world with 9.93 points.

political rights and civil liberties being a 1 (Freedom House, 2014a, p.20), based on a scale of 1 to 7. Civil liberties improved from a 2 in the previous year, due to the “steady rise in activity of civil society organizations and an absence of legal restrictions on religious freedom” (Freedom House, 2014a, p.11). Thus, it can be said with a high degree of certainty that Japan is a democracy.

#### **4.1.2 Korea**

Korea, on the other hand, has a presidential system, where the power of the executive and legislature are strictly separated, as it is for example in the United States. As noted before, in a presidential system, the president is elected independently of the legislature and is simultaneously the head of government as well as the head of state (Kurian et al., 2011, p.394), as is also stated under the Article 66 of the Constitution (Constitution of Korea, 1948, p.21). However, this should not be confused with a semi-presidential system, in which both, a prime minister, acting as the head of government and being selected by the legislature, and an independently elected president, acting as the head of state, exist (Kurian et al., 2011, p.394). And while Korea does have a Prime Minister, the person is appointed by the President with the consent of the National Assembly, under Article 86(1), and merely assists the President and directs the Executive Ministries under the order of the President, as stated under Article 86(2) (Constitution of Korea, 1948, p.26), and does not, in fact, act as the head of government. Thus, it is also commonly called a full-presidential system. The President—currently Park Geun-hye of the Saenuri Party<sup>14</sup>—is elected by a “universal, equal, direct, and secret ballot by the people,” as stated under Article 67(1) of the Constitution (Constitution of Korea, 1948, p.21). The term of the President is five years, and interestingly, is not permitted to be reelected, thus, only able to serve once in their lifetime, as under Article 70 (Constitution of Korea, 1948, p.22). The National Assembly is Korea’s unicameral legislature, as stated under Article 40 (Constitution of Korea, 1948, p.13)—meaning it consists of only one house—whose members are also elected by a “universal, equal, direct, and secret ballot by the citizens,” as stated under Article 41(1), and their term is four years, stated under Article 42 (Constitution of Korea, 1948, p.21). And the sovereignty also resides in the people and “all state authority shall emanate from the people,” as stated under Article 1(2) (Constitution of Korea, 1948, p.2).

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<sup>14</sup> It is also commonly referred to as the “New Frontier Party.”

The presidential election was held three days after Japan's general election on December 19, 2012, making Park Geun-hye—daughter of the former dictator Park Chung-hee—the first woman to be elected President in Korea, winning with 51.56 percent (IFES, 2014c), while her predecessor, Lee Myung-bak of the Grand National Party (now Saenuri Party) achieved a slightly lower election result of 48.67 percent in the 2007 (IFES, 2014b). Park Geun-hye has been the 11th President of Korea, and the sixth President of the Sixth Republic, which began in 1987 and marked the beginning of the democratization of Korea. The elections in Korea are representative, in the sense that according to Article 7(1), “all public officials shall be servants of the entire people and shall be responsible for the people” (Constitution of Korea, 1948, p.3), and not merely of a specific group of people in the population. The elections are also free, as according to Article 24 of the Constitution, “all citizens shall have the right to vote under the conditions as prescribed by Act” (Constitution of Korea, 1948, p.8)—the minimum voting age is 19 years, as stated under Article 15(1) of the Public Official Election Act (Public Official Election Act of Korea, 1994). However, there are also other restrictions as to who can actually vote, listed under Article 18 of the same act, such as when someone is imprisoned (Public Official Election Act of Korea, 1994).

Moreover, the elections are fair, in the sense that “all citizens shall be equal before the law, and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic, social, or cultural life on account of sex, religion, or social status,” as stated under Article 11 (Constitution of Korea, 1948, p.4). Additionally, under Article 114, the National Election Commission was established for the purpose of fair elections (Constitution of Korea, 1948, p.35), and according to Article 12(1) of the Public Official Election Act, it is supposed to “control and manage election affairs, and [...] cancel or change an illegal or unfair disposition taken by a subordinate election commission” (Public Official Election Act of Korea, 1994). And as mentioned before, when voting for the members of the National Assembly (Article 41) or the President (67), the elections are “universal, equal, direct, and [through a] secret ballot” (Constitution of Korea, 1948, pp.13, 21). The elections are also frequent, in the sense that the members of the National Assembly (Article 42) are elected every four years, and the President (Article 70) is elected every five years (Constitution of Korea, 1948, pp.13, 22). Thus, elections in Korea are also representative, free, fair, secret—in the sense that voters do not have to disclose who they voted for—and frequent.

Additionally, “all citizens shall have the right to hold public office,” as stated under Article 25 (Constitution of Korea, 1948, p.8), and “the establishment of political parties shall be free, and the plural party system shall be guaranteed,” according to Article 8 (Constitution of Korea, 1948, p.3). According to



the last legislative election, there are four major parties in Korea, namely, the Saenuri Party, Democratic United Party<sup>15</sup>, Unified Progressive Party, and the Liberty Forward Party<sup>16</sup>, with the former two being the dominant forces in Korea (IFES, 2014a). However, there are also eligibility requirements for each individual public office, for example, according to Article 16(1) of the Public Official Election Act, in order to run for presidency, a national has to be at least forty years of age and must have lived in Korea for five years or longer prior to the election day (Public Official Election Act of Korea, 1994).

Chapter 2 of the Constitution deals with the rights, as well as duties, of the people of Korea—consisting of 30 of 130 Articles (Constitution of Korea, 1948). Article 10 states that “all citizens shall be assured of human dignity and worth and have the right to pursue happiness. It shall be the duty of the State to confirm and guarantee the fundamental and inviolable human rights of individuals” (Constitution of Korea, 1948, p.4). Under Article 19, “all citizens shall enjoy freedom of conscience” (Constitution of Korea, 1948, p.6) and under Article 21(1), “all citizens shall enjoy freedom of speech and the press, and freedom of assembly and association” (Constitution of Korea, 1948, p.7). According to Article 21(2), “licensing or censorship of speech and the press, and licensing of assembly and association shall not be permitted” (Constitution of Korea, 1948, p.7). However, most interestingly, in regards to the freedom of speech and the press, Article 21(4) states, “neither speech nor the press shall violate the honor or rights of other persons nor undermine public morals or social ethics. Should speech or the press violate the honor or rights of other persons, claims may be made for the damage resulting therefrom” (Constitution of Korea, 1948, p.7). This, for example, is a huge contrast to the Constitution of Japan, which does not have such a paragraph listed under the Article that deals with the guarantee to freedom of speech and the press, but clearly states that “no censorship shall be maintained” (Constitution of Japan, 1946). While the Constitution of Korea provides—not to say it “guarantees,” as it is for example explicitly stated in the Constitution of Japan—freedom of the press, it already gives certain restrictions in this regard in its Constitution, which, however, will be dealt with in more detail in a subsequent chapter (Media Freedom and State Control over the Media).

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<sup>15</sup> The Democratic Party, formerly known as the Democratic United Party, was dissolved and merged into the New Politics Alliance for Democracy on March 26, 2014.

<sup>16</sup> The Advancement Unification Party, formerly known as the Liberty Forward Party, was dissolved and absorbed by the Saenuri Party on November 16, 2012.

Again, as the paper has merely dealt here with legal texts, it is, again, important to look at the measurements provided by the Economist Intelligence Unit and Freedom House. In the latest Democracy Index by the Economist Intelligence Unit for 2012, Korea ranked 20th of 167 countries, hence, three points above Japan, and right above the United States. Of the five categories measured it also had its lowest scores in political participation (7.22) and political culture (7.50), however, it had its highest score in electoral process and pluralism (9.17), and an overall score of 8.13 (EIU, 2013, p.4)—0.05 points better than Japan. Thus, also making it a “full democracy.” And its overall score has fluctuated around 8 points since 2006, and has improved by 0.25 points since 2006, when it had its lowest score of 7.88 (EIU, 2013, p.13). And while Korea, according to the Freedom House, also ranked as “free” in 2013, both scores, in political rights and civil liberties, were at 2 (Freedom House, 2014a, p.22), thus, slightly worse comparatively to Japan. Political rights have dropped from a 1 in the previous year, due to “high-profile scandals involving corruption and abuse of authority, including alleged meddling in political affairs by the National Intelligence Service” (Freedom House, 2014a, p.11). Thus, it is interesting to see that the results by the Economist Intelligence Unit and Freedom House are presented in reverse, Korea ranking better under the study done by Economist Intelligence Unit, while Japan ranked better according to Freedom House. Nonetheless, it can be said in both cases with a high degree of certainty that both countries are a democracy.

### 4.1.3 Conclusion

To keep the discussion for this dimension rather short, the results presented above clearly show that both countries satisfy all the criteria to be considered a democracy (see Table 13).

**Table 13: Political System (Japan vs. Korea)**

Political System (Japan vs. Korea)	
Japan	Korea
Democracy (A)	Democracy (A)

## 4.2 Political Culture

In this section, the paper will attempt to evaluate the political culture of both countries by using the data from the World Values Survey, which, amongst other things, measures the interest of the people in

politics, as well as the political attitudes of the people towards its political institutions, such as the government, parliament, courts, political parties, police, and armed forces, press, and television. And as mentioned in the previous chapter, the results will be compared to the United States (A), Germany (B), and China (C).

#### 4.2.1 Japan and Korea

Of the five countries examined (see Table 14), Japan had the highest percentage of people who stated that they were interested in politics with 65.50 percent (closely followed by Germany with 62.40 percent), whereas in Korea 61 percent stated they were not interested in politics. Interestingly, more people in China were interested in politics than in Korea.

**Table 14: Interest in Politics (2014)**

Interest in Politics (2014)		
	Interested <sup>17</sup>	Not Interested <sup>18</sup>
Japan	65.50	32.20
Korea	38.20	61.00
United States	58.90	40.30
Germany	62.40	37.50
China	45.50	52.50

(WVS, 2014, p.107)

The table below (see Table 15) shows that Japan has the highest percentage of people voting in elections on a national level with 89.3 percent, followed by Korea with 83.90 percent, Germany with 80.90 percent, and the United States with 78.40 percent. China had by far the lowest percentage of people participating in elections with meagerly 12.70 percent of the respondents. But there seems to be no evidence that proves that active participation in elections is required to maintaining a stable democracy (Richardson, 1974, p.29). However, it does show that both, Japan and Korea, have a higher percentage of

<sup>17</sup> It combines “very interested” and “somewhat interested.”

<sup>18</sup> It combines “not very interested” and “not at all interested.”

people participating in elections than the two Western countries, Germany and the United States. Additionally, it is necessary to point out here that compulsory voting—like it is the case for example in Australia—does not exist in any of the countries examined below. Thus, it can be concluded as a high majority of the people in Japan are interested in politics they might also be more inclined to actively participate in elections. Koreans, on the other hand, who appear not be as interested in politics as its Japanese counterparts, are still nearly as actively involved in election as the Japanese. Looking at only these two cases there seems to be no correlation between interest in politics and political involvement.

**Table 15: Voting in Elections on a National Level**

Voting in Elections on a National Level		
	Yes <sup>19</sup>	No
Japan	89.30	9.60
Korea	83.90	14.80
United States	78.40	19.80
Germany	80.90	16.00
China	12.70	74.70

(WVS, 2014, p.317)

Next, the paper will examine the confidence of the people in those five countries towards its political institutions, such as the government, parliament, courts, political parties, police, and armed forces, as well as in the press and television (Appendix I—Data: Table 69). While only a meagerly 24.30 percent of the Japanese are confident in the government, Koreans appear to be twice as confident. In China, on the other hand, there is a stark contrast, with nearly 85 percent of the people feeling confident in the government. Interestingly, the confidence in the parliament, is almost similar in Japan, Korea, and the United States, fluctuating around 20 percent, while there is much more confidence in Germany, and China—again, China has the highest percentage with 77.40 percent. The confidence in the courts is almost similarly high in all five countries, while it is the lowest in the United States with nearly 54 percent. As a result, the Japanese have the largest confidence in their court system, while Koreans have a high confidence in its courts as well as its government.

<sup>19</sup> It combines “always” and “usually.”

The largest contrast of all five countries, when compared to China, is shown when looking at the political parties. Whereas in China 74.5 percent of the people are confident in the political parties—or rather singular, party, as the Communist Party of China is the sole governing party of China—for the other countries it is below 30 percent. However, all five countries have a high confidence in the police. The United States and China have the highest confidence in its armed forces with 81.6 and 84.0 percent, respectively—the two countries with the largest military budgets in the world (SIPRI, 2013), while for the rest of the examined countries it was in the 60 percent range. Japan, Korea, and China all have the highest confidence in the press and television (above 60 percent) with Germany having a moderate confidence (in the 40 percent range) and the United States having the lowest confidence (both slightly above 20 percent).

Thus, it can be concluded that Koreans have a larger confidence than the Japanese in their political institutions, such as the government, parliament, and political parties, while both have a similarly high confidence in the courts. Moreover, Japanese have a larger confidence in the press and television than their Korean counterparts. In terms of the confidence in the government, parliament, and political parties—excluding courts, as they were fairly similar amongst all five countries—Japan came closest to the United States, while Korea was more similar to Germany, except for the confidence in its parliament, which was higher in Germany than in Korea.

#### **4.2.2 Conclusion**

While it would have been equally interesting to look at the “participating attitudes” of the people in each country, as to what they think their role is as an active participant, as well as their “voting attitudes,” as to how and why they vote, there do not seem to be any opinion polls publicly available that could add to this discussion. Additionally, as this paper is more focused on the media aspect of the discussions, rather than politics, it will leave this discussion as it is. However, what has been shown here is that Japan tends to lean in both directions, into the direction of the United States, which could be referred to as “conflict-oriented,” while at the same time it appears to be leaning towards a “consensus-oriented” political culture. Korea, on the other hand, seems to be following, more or less, the same line as Germany. However, as it is not as obvious where to place either of the countries, it will be the best to place both on the middle line (see Table 16).

**Table 16: Political Culture (Japan vs. Korea)**

Political Culture (Japan vs. Korea)	
Japan	Korea
Ambivalent (B)	Ambivalent (B)

## 4.3 Media Freedom and State Control over the Media

In this section, the paper will examine the degree of freedom and state control over the media. This is done by looking at the laws, which appear to have the most significant effect on the freedom of the media. And while there are many examples that could be looked at and discussed, this paper will merely look at some of the most unique, or even unusual, cases in which the state tries to take control over the media in each particular country.

### 4.3.1 Japan

Under Article 21 of the Constitution, “freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press, and all other forms of expression are guaranteed. No censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means of communication be violated” (Constitution of Japan, 1946). In addition, Japan has signed and ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), in 1978 and 1979, respectively (UN, 2014), which is a multilateral treaty adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 16, 1966, committing its parties to respect the civil and political rights of individuals, including, for example, the right to life (Article 6), freedom of movement (Article 12), freedom of religion (Article 18), freedom of expression (Article 19), and electoral rights (Article 25) (OHCHR, 2014).

According to *Freedom of the Press*, globally, Japan ranked 44th of 197 countries, with a score of 25, which is considered “free,” as it is below 30. And it ranked sixth among the 40 countries in the Asia-Pacific region in that same study (Freedom House, 2014b, pp.20, 23). However, in East Asia specifically, it ranked first (seen in Table 17).

**Table 17: Freedom House—Media Freedom Ranking in East Asia (2013)**

Freedom House—Media Freedom Ranking in East Asia (2013)		
	Score	Global Rank
Free		
Japan	25	44
Taiwan	26	47
Party Free		
South Korea	32	68
Hong Kong	37	74
Mongolia	37	76
Not Free		
China	84	184
North Korea <sup>20</sup>	97	197

(Freedom House, 2014b, p.23)

However, according to the study done by Reporters Without Borders, Japan ranked 59th of 180 countries with 26.02 points of 100, dropping five ranks from the previous year (RSF, 2014b, p.30). Interestingly, based on their ranking, Japan ranked third in the East Asian region, behind Taiwan and South Korea (see Table 18).

<sup>20</sup> North Korea ranked last.

**Table 18: Reporters Without Borders—Media Freedom in East Asia (2013)**

Reporters Without Borders—Media Freedom in East Asia (2013)		
	Score (Difference)	Global Rank
Taiwan	23.82 (-2)	50
South Korea	25.66 (-6)	57
Japan	26.02 (-5)	59
Hong Kong	26.55 (-2)	61
Mongolia	30.30 (+11)	88
China	72.91 (-1)	175
North Korea <sup>21</sup>	81.96 (0)	179

(RSF, 2014b, pp.30-31)

Furthermore, according to Freedom House, Japan's Freedom on the Net status is also "free," with a score of 22 of 100. This also coincides with the fact that there is also no report on Japan available by the OpenNet Initiative. Thus, it can be assumed, that the Japanese experience few, if any, obstacles to Internet access. However, no direct political censorship has yet been documented in Japan, as there are only a few cases in which the freedom of the media is severely limited.

#### **4.3.1.1 Defamation and Libel**

Several weaknesses have been revealed in the aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami in March 2011, which caused serious damage and radiation leaks at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. For example, Article 230(1) of the Penal Code, which deals with defamation, states "a person who defames another by alleging facts in public shall, regardless of whether such facts are true or false, be punished by imprisonment with or without work for not more than 3 years or a fine of not more than [4,900 USD]." And while Article 230-2(1) further states "when an act [...] is found to relate to matters of public interest and to have been conducted solely for the benefit of the public, the truth or falsity of the alleged facts shall be examined, and punishment shall not be imposed if they are proven to be true" (Penal Code of Japan,

<sup>21</sup> North Korea ranked second to last, with Eritrea ranking last.



1907, p.49). Shiro Shirakawa—the head of the nuclear security systems company New Tech—filed a libel suit against a freelance investigative journalist called Minoru Tanaka over an article, which appeared in the weekly magazine *Shukan Kinyobi* in December 2011, alleging Shirakawa of “making a lot of money by acting as an intermediary between TEPCO [owner of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant], construction companies, politicians [...], and even clandestine organizations,” upon which Shirakawa demanded roughly 657 thousand USD in damages (RSF, 2013). However, in August 2013, Shirakawa decided to withdraw the libel suit against Tanaka (RSF, 2013). Interestingly, it has been reported that the Tanaka case received very little coverage, or even support, from major media outlets in Japan, which has been argued is due to the strength of the *kasha kurabu* (trans. “press clubs”) (Freedom House, 2013a), which will be discussed in more detail later (see Political Parallelism and Media Culture).

#### **4.3.1.2 Special Intelligence Protection Bill**

The *Special Intelligence Protection Bill* adopted by the National Diet in late 2013 is set out to reduce government transparency on such key national issues, such as nuclear power and relations with the United States. In the *World Press Freedom Index* for 2013, Reporters Without Borders (RSF, 2014b, p.5) reported, “investigative journalism, public interest, and the confidentiality of journalists’ sources are all being sacrificed by legislators bent on ensuring that their country’s image is spared embarrassing revelations.” Asaho Mizushima (The Yomiuri Shimbun, n.d.), a law professor at the Waseda University, listed four main issues of the *Special Intelligence Protection Bill*. Firstly, while Japan already has some legal mechanisms for “secrecy protection,” this new bill is extremely unspecified, in the sense that whatever is deemed “special intelligence” is not publicly revealed, as it is argued that “its leak could cause significant disruptions in [the] nation’s security and therefore its secrecy is especially needed” (Mizushima, n.d.). Secondly, government employees as well as contractors who are charged to handle these secrets are required to go through several background checks, while, for example, members of the Cabinet are not subject to any of these background checks. Thirdly, the “public’s right to know” is supposedly guaranteed, as long as the news gathering is not performed in a “significant unreasonable manner,” which is solely based on the discretion of the enforcement authorities (Mizushima, n.d.). And finally, some information could potentially be classified as a secret for an “indefinite time” (Mizushima, n.d.).

And this is said to have two major consequences on the way news will be reported in the future. Namely, it will be more difficult to find inside information sources, as those who leak information in order to serve the public interest on important matters, such as corruption, or threats to the public health and environment, could quite easily risk prosecution. And lastly, journalists themselves will face prosecution if authorities deem their news gathering methods to be inappropriate. And as a result, self-censorship is practically inevitable (Repeta, 2014).

#### **4.3.1.3 Elections**

While all modern democracies have rules that regulate election campaigns, the Japanese laws are much more strict in comparison. For example, Article 142 of the Public Offices Election Act imposes strict regulations on campaign activities during the period of the official campaign leading up to the day of election, prohibiting the dissemination of “documents” (lit. 文書) and “drawings” (lit. 図画). This restriction has also been interpreted to prohibit online campaigning activities, as it would most likely fall under the category of “documents and drawings,” and thus, politicians stopped using the Internet prior to the general election. Additionally, it has even been understood to prohibit the general public from participating in online election-related activities (Public Offices Election Act of Japan, 1950). In December 2012, before the general election, Ameba, Japan’s 9th most visited website (Alexa, 2014n), and its second most popular blogging website, after FC2, specifically warned its users on its website about the upcoming election as well as offering them guidelines on what they are allowed to post during this specific period (Ameba, 2012). However, in early 2013, it was reported that the ban on online campaign activities would finally be lifted. Thus, for the first time in Japan’s modern history, candidates running for public office will be allowed to use the Internet as well as social media for campaigning activities (The Asahi Shimbun, 2013). Thus, it will also give ordinary citizens a bigger voice, instead of only the mainstream media, which is usually controlled by large corporations.

#### **4.3.2 Korea**

According to Article 21(1) of the Constitution, “all citizens shall enjoy freedom of speech and the press, and freedom of assembly and association.” Furthermore, Article 21(2) states “licensing or censorship of speech and the press, and licensing of assembly and association shall not be permitted” (Constitution of Korea, 1948, p.7). Under Article 3 of the Act on the Promotion of Newspapers, it guarantees the “freedom and

independence of the press for newspapers and online newspapers, and the right to free access to information sources, and to freely publish covered information” (Act on the Promotion of Newspapers, 2010, p.2). Additionally, Korea has also ratified the ICCPR on April 10, 1990 (UN, 2014). However, globally, Korea ranked 68th of 197 countries according to the *Freedom of the Press*, with a score of 32, which is considered “partly free,” a score between 30 and 60. And it ranked 16th among the 40 countries in the Asia-Pacific region (Freedom House, 2014b, pp.20, 23). In East Asia, it ranked third, behind Japan and Taiwan (see Table 17). However, according to Reporters Without Borders, Korea ranked two places above Japan, but also dropping six places from the previous year (RSF, 2014b, p.30), hence, ranking second in East Asia, one place above Japan (see Table 18).

#### **4.3.2.1 Korea Communications Commission (KCC)**

The Korea Communications Commission (KCC), which is the media regulation agency in Korea established in 2008 (KCC, 2013), has the responsibility to ensuring “freedom and independence of broadcasting while raising its public responsibility” (Choi, n.d.). It consists of five commissioners, whereby the President of Korea appoints two commissioners, including the chairman, and the National Assembly appoints the other three. Thus, not surprisingly, the KCC has struggled to earn creditability. Its first chairman, Choi See-joong was a close aide to the former President Lee Myung-bak, who resigned in 2012 after prosecutors began investigating him in connection with several bribery scandals, and later being sentenced to a prison term and a fine of 600 thousand USD (Rahn, 2012), but pardoned by Lee at the end of his term (Chang, 2013). In March 2013, Park Geun-hye named her close aide Lee Kyeong-jae as the new chairman of the KCC (Yonhap News Agency, 2014a), later replaced by the currently chairman Choi Sung-joon (Yonhap News Agency, 2014b).

#### **4.3.2.2 Korea Communications Standards Commission (KCSC)**

In February 2008, the Korea Communications Standards Commission (KCSC) was established to “safeguard the public nature and fairness of broadcasting content, to promote a sound Internet culture, and to create a safe online environment” (Park, 2011), absorbing the content review functions of the previously existing Korea Broadcasting Commission and Information Communications Ethics Committee. Unlike the KCC, which is under the direct control of the President of Korea, the KCSC was packaged as an “independent private organization,” when in fact it is “neither financially independent nor autonomous in its operations” (Hankyoreh, 2009), as its commissioners are also appointed by the

President (Freedom House, 2013c). An UN Special Rapporteur referred to the KCSC as a “quasi-state and quasi-private entity” (La Rue, 2011, p.13).

#### **4.3.2.3 Ban on Private Media Representative Companies**

In February 2012, the Act on Broadcasting Advertising Sales Agencies was passed, ending the 30 year long monopoly of the Korea Broadcasting Advertising Corporation (KOBACO)—established in 1981 (KOBACO, 2012)—to “promote competition in the market for broadcast advertising sales, establish order in fair trade, and thus contribute to vitalizing the market for broadcasting advertising and realizing the public good and public interest,” as stated under Article 1 (Act on Broadcast Advertising Sales Agencies, 2012, p.1). Thus, the establishment of private media representative companies was finally allowed.

#### **4.3.2.4 Ban on Late-Night Broadcasting of Terrestrial Television**

Additionally, the KCC lifted a decade-old ban on late-night broadcasting of terrestrial television broadcasters, whereby stations were only allowed to air programs for 19 hours a day, running from 6am until 1am the next day, a restriction that was not applied to pay television, such as cable television (KBS, 2012; KCC, 2012, p.36).

#### **4.3.2.5 Name Registration**

In August 2013, the Constitutional Court declared that the second item under Article 44-5(1) of the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, as well as Article 29 and Article 30(1) of the Enforcement Ordinance of the same act, which regulated the verification of identity system under which users were required to verify their real names before posting comments online, as unconstitutional as it infringed on the basic human rights, such as freedom of expression and the press (Constitutional Court of Korea, 2013, pp.100-05). Although, other laws that require users to register with their real names remain in place, such as under the Children and Youth Protection Act (Freedom House, 2013c).

#### **4.3.2.6 Defamation and Libel**

The most interesting part in the Constitution is listed under Article 21(4), which states, “neither speech nor the press shall violate the honor or rights of other [people] nor undermine public morals or social ethics.

Should speech or the press violate the honor or rights of other [people], claims may be made for the damage resulting therefrom” (Constitution of Korea, 1948, p.7). Chapter 33 of the Criminal Act deals with crimes against the reputation. Article 307(1) of this act states, “a person who defames another by publicly alleging facts shall be punished by imprisonment or imprisonment without prison labor for not more than two years or by a fine not exceeding [5 thousand USD]” and (2) “a person who defames another by publicly alleging false facts shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years, suspension of qualifications for not more than ten years, or a fine not exceeding [10 thousand USD]” (Criminal Act of Korea, 1953, pp.63-64). Article 309(1) and (2) then further states the penalties if the crimes listed under Article 307 are committed by newspapers, magazines, radio stations, or other publications, which are also more severe (Criminal Act of Korea, 1953, p.64). However, if the alleged facts “are true and solely for the public interest,” then the act is not punishable, as under Article 310 (Criminal Act of Korea, 1953, p.64). The last part, “and solely for the public interest,” makes it somewhat vague, as will be further discussed under the next headline (see National Security Act). This, however, does relate to Article 19(3) of the ICCPR, which states that while everyone should have the right to hold opinions without interference, it also comes with “special duties and responsibilities,” such as the “respect of the rights or reputations of others,” as well as the “protection of national security or of public order [...], or of public health or morals” (OHCHR, 2014). However, certain restrictions need to be put into place, for example, that a statement must be intentionally false.

For example, in the United States the case *New York Times v. Sullivan* ruled that the publication of any statement, even false ones, about the conduct of public figures or officials, except for statements that are knowingly false or knowingly ignore the truth, is protected by the First Amendment (New York Times v. Sullivan, 2014), which includes freedom of speech and the press. In Korea, on the other hand, defamation charges are “occasionally threatened or brought against reporters or commentators who criticize the government” (Freedom House, 2013b). An UN Special Rapporteur also argued that the “criminalization of defamation leads to considerable reduction of the space to exercise the fundamental right to freedom of expression” (UN Special Rapporteur, 2013). The problem here is not the case that defamation laws exist in Korea, as they are nearly recognized in any jurisdiction in the world, however, it is necessary that such laws are “drafted and interpreted narrowly,” in order not to be abused (Washburn, 2013), especially by those in power.

A famous punishment included that of the producers of Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation's (MBC) investigative program called *PD Notebook*, which aired in April 2008, and reported on the alleged risk of mad cow disease associated with beef imports from the United States, criticizing government officials from the Ministry of Agriculture, who were in charge of the negotiations. As a result, they producers were arrested and charged in 2009, based on the defamation law (Amnesty International, 2011). However, four years and two months later, the Supreme Court acknowledged that while the *PD Notebook* report did contain some mistakes all the defendants were still found not guilty (Hankyoreh, 2012).

In addition, defamation committed online draws even heavier penalties. According to Article 47(1) of the Framework Act on Telecommunications, a person who has "publicly made a false communication over the [Internet] for the purpose of harming the public interest shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or by a fine not exceeding [50 thousand USD]" (Framework Act on Telecommunications, 2010, p.4). In January 2009, the blogger Park Dae-sung, known as "Minerva," was arrested for violating this provision after he posted articles online, which predicted the latest economic crisis and at the same time criticizing his own government's economic policy (Han, 2009). The problem, again, being that "false communication" and "public interest" are not clearly defined. Furthermore, it appears that he has been merely arrested for expressing his own opinion without intentionally "harming the public interest." In 2013, state prosecutors were also seeking to arrest the journalists Kim Ou-joon and Choo Chin-woo for publishing a satirical podcast that "defamed" and "spread false information" about President Park Geun-hye's brother (Choe, 2013).

#### **4.3.2.7 National Security Act**

According to Herman and Chomsky (2002, p.2) there are five factors, or as they called them, "filters," which directly or indirectly influence the freedom of the media. The most interesting in this regard is the fifth one, in which anti-communism is used as a control mechanism, which in Korea, seems to be represented by the National Security Act (NSA). The NSA was enacted in 1948 after the establishment of the Republic of Korea, in order to fight communism (Kraft, 2006, pp.627-28), which exists in North Korea to this day. According to Article 1, its objective is to "suppress anti-State acts that endanger national security and to ensure [the] nation's security, people's life, and freedom" (Hartford Web Publishing, 1996). Anti-State groups are defined under Article 2, which are "domestic or foreign organizations or groups whose intentions are to conduct or assist infiltration of the Government or to cause national disturbance"

(Hartford Web Publishing, 1996), such as those supporting North Korea's government. Article 7 prescribes imprisonment up to seven years for those who "praise, encourage, disseminate, or corporate with anti-State groups, members, or those under their control" (Hartford Web Publishing, 1996). Thus, the National Security Act allows the government to limit the expression of ideas deemed pro-North Korea, or even communist. Due to being broadly defined, the number of those charged under this vaguely worded act has tremendously increased over the years (Amensty International, 2012, p.3). And while it is important that every government has the right to take necessary measures to ensure the security of its citizens, it should not be used to deny its people the right to express their political views. An UN Special Rapporteur argues that this act "has been used against defenders who have expressed criticism of Government policies and who have been labeled as 'anti-government organizations,' a concept which is broad and vaguely defined," further stating that it should, thus, instead be "restricted to cases of clear threats to national security" (UN Special Rapporteur, 2013).

For example, the NSA might be considered to be similar to Austria's Prohibition Act, an Austrian constitutional law passed on May 8, 1945, which banned the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP)—commonly known as the Nazi Party—and provided the legal grounds for the process of denazification in Austria, as well as aiming to suppress any potential revival of Nazism. According to paragraph 3h, "whoever in a printed work, on broadcasting or in any other media, or whoever otherwise publicly in a matter that it makes it accessible to many people, denies, belittles, condones, or tries to justify the Nazi genocide or other Nazi crimes against humanity," continuing on paragraph 3g, "shall be punished with imprisonment for one to ten years, in the case of special perilousness of the offender or the engagement up to twenty years" (Austrian Federal Chancellery, 2014). However, in the case of Austria, the law leaves no room for any interpretation, as is the case with the National Security Act. As a result, the government can use this vaguely worded act, and the defamation laws, as well as other laws to suppress its loudest critics.

#### **4.3.2.8 Cross-Ownership**

Before 2009, Article 8(3) of the Broadcasting Act prohibited large conglomerates and its affiliates as well as corporations operating daily newspapers to "concurrently run a terrestrial broadcasting business and a program providing business engaged in general programming or specialized programming of news reports" (Broadcasting Act of Korea, 1987). However, after being amended in July 2009, it now states that

large conglomerates and daily newspapers may “not own stocks or equity shares in excess of [10 percent] of the total stocks or equity shares of a terrestrial broadcasting business operator, and shall not own stocks or equity shares in excess of [30 percent] of the total stocks and equity shares of a program providing business operator engaging in general programming or specialized program of news reports” (Broadcasting Act of Korea, 1987), thus, effectively lifting the ban of cross-ownership for large conglomerates and its affiliates as well as daily newspapers. The administration under Lee Myung-bak claimed that these media reform bills have been passed in order to promote competition in the media industry, while the opposition party, The Democratic Party, argued that it merely tried to push more control into the hands of the conservative newspapers (Borowiec, 2011, p.71). However, it is also true that, while the newspaper companies were not allowed to own stock in any terrestrial broadcasting business, television broadcasters were permitted to own newspapers (The Chosun Ilbo, 2008). Additionally, it is not unusual to see cross-ownership in the media industry, as it is the case in many other countries in the world.

#### **4.3.2.9 Elections**

As in Japan, the Public Official Election Act in Korea also puts significant limits on political campaigning prior to and during the elections. Most interestingly, Article 93(1) states, “no one shall distribute, post, scatter, play, or run an advertisement [...] which contains the contents supporting, recommending, or opposing a political party [...] or candidate [...] or showing the name of the political party or candidate with the intention of influencing the election, not in accordance with the provisions of this Act, from 180 days before the election day [...] to the election day” (Public Official Election Act of Korea, 1994), hence, making it illegal for non-candidates to distribute information, “support, recommending, or opposing” any political party or candidate.

#### **4.3.2.10 Internet**

Under the current legal framework, regulation of online content is conducted primarily by two government agencies, namely, the KCSC and the National Election Commission (NEC), authorized to block or close websites, in regards to obscenity (e.g. child pornography), defamation, violence, gambling, and most importantly, websites, which express support for communism or the government of North Korea (ONI, 2012; KCSC, 2011). According to the Freedom House, Korea’s Freedom on the Net status is “partly free,” with a score of 32 of 100 (Freedom House, 2013c). Moreover, while the government’s actions



are transparent and consistent, it showed evidence of having “selective filtering” in the social category—relating to pornography, gambling, and drugs—and “pervasive filtering” in the conflict/security category—relating to North Korea, according to a report by the OpenNet Initiative (ONI, 2012). In 2012, Park Jung-geun, a 24-year old photographer, was convicted for violating the National Security Act by retweeting messages praising North Korea on Twitter (Park, 2012), under Article 7, for those “who praise, encourage, disseminate, or corporate with anti-State groups” (Hartford Web Publishing, 1996). However, there have been no reported incidences of physical violence against online users (Freedom House, 2013c).

### 4.3.3 Conclusion

While it is rather difficult to determine at what particular point it can be assumed that the state’s control over the media is either strong or weak, in comparison, the state control in Japan appears to be weaker than in Korea, while it may still be stricter in many regards compared to other countries in the world. However, it can be concluded that Japan has a weak state control, while slightly leaning towards the center, with Korea is clearly geared towards the middle line (see Table 19).

**Table 19: Media Freedom and State Control over the Media (Japan vs. Korea)**

Media Freedom and State Control over the Media (Japan vs. Korea)	
Japan	Korea
Weak (A)	Moderate (B)

## 4.4 Media Ownership

In this section the paper will try to determine whether the media is publicly or privately owned, or a mixture of both. It will go through the ownership structure of each individual mass media, namely, newspapers, television, and the Internet.

## 4.4.1 Japan

### 4.4.1.1 Newspapers

According to the International Federation of Audit Bureaux of Circulations (IFABC), the largest five national daily newspapers in Japan are the Yomiuri Shimbun, Asahi Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, Nikkei Shimbun—also generally referred to as Nihon Keizai Shimbun—and Sankei Shimbun, which together accounted for slightly over 53 percent of the entire daily newspaper market (see Table 20), which had a total daily newspaper circulation of roughly 48.34 million copies in 2011 (NSK, 2012). The largest daily newspaper is the Yomiuri Shimbun with a circulation of over 9.96 million, which accounted for a little over 20 percent of the entire Japanese newspaper market.

**Table 20: Largest Daily National Newspapers in Japan by Circulation (2011)**

Largest Daily National Newspapers in Japan by Circulation (2011)		
Total Circulation	48,345,304	
	Circulation	Market Share (in %)
Yomiuri Shimbun	9,969,200	20.62
Asahi Shimbun	7,749,584	16.03
Mainichi Shimbun	3,438,280	7.11
Nikkei Shimbun	3,020,087	6.25
Sankei Shimbun	1,609,529	3.33
Total	25,786,680	53.34

(NSK, 2012; IFABC, 2013)

Additionally, four of Japan's largest newspapers are among the world's five largest newspapers in terms of circulation (see Table 21). The Sankei Shimbun ranked 16th in the world (IFABC, 2013).

**Table 21: World's 5 Largest Daily Newspapers by Circulation (2011)**

World's 5 Largest Daily Newspaper by Circulation (2011)		
	Country	Circulation
Yomiuri Shimbun	Japan	9,969,200
Asahi Shimbun	Japan	7,749,584
The Times of India	India	4,090,195
Mainichi Shimbun	Japan	3,438,280
Nikkei Shimbun	Japan	3,020,087

(IFABC, 2013)

Next, the paper will briefly look at the ownership structure of all five major daily newspapers (see Table 22), whereas it will look more closely at each parent company at the end of this chapter.

**Table 22: Ownership Structure of the 5 Largest Daily Newspapers in Japan**

Ownership Structure of the 5 Largest Daily Newspapers in Japan		
	Owner	Group
Yomiuri Shimbun	Yomiuri Shimbun Company	Yomiuri Shimbun Group
Asahi Shimbun	Asahi Shimbun Company	
Mainichi Shimbun	Mainichi Shimbun Company	Mainichi Shimbun Group
Nikkei Shimbun	Nikkei	
Sankei Shimbun	Sankei Shimbun Company	Fujisankei Communications Group

(Sources: Media Ownership: Media Organizations [under Japan])

While this paper is only interested in the largest daily national newspapers, it is important to point out that Japan's regional newspapers typically reach half of the households in their own specific market, while some even reach a penetration rate of 60 percent or higher. Moreover, the regional papers are almost all independently operated (Hayashi, 2013).

#### 4.4.1.2 Television

In 2012, 52,707 households owned a television set (Generator Research, 2012b) of a total of 52,972 households (Generator Research, 2012a), making it roughly 99.5 percent. According to the Japan Commercial Broadcasters Association (JBA)—a general incorporated association established with the start of commercial broadcasting in July 1951 (JBA, 2013, p.24)—the five largest commercial television networks, also commonly known as the “key stations in Tokyo” (lit. 在京キ一局), in Japan are the Nippon News Network (NNN), All-Nippon News Network (ANN), Japanese News Network (JNN), TX Network (TXN, also known as TV TOKYO Network), and Fuji News Network (FNN). In addition, there are 13 independent stations that form a network called the Japanese Association of Independent Television Stations (JAITS) (JBA, 2013, p.6). The two public television networks are called NHK General and NHK Educational. And the ownership structure for those television networks looks as follows (see Table 23).

**Table 23: TV News Networks in Japan (2014)**

TV News Networks in Japan (2014)	
	Owner(s)
Public Network	
NHK General	An independent corporation chartered by the government of Japan under the Broadcasting Act
NHK Educational	
Commercial Networks	
NNN	Nippon Television Network Corporation (Nippon TV, or simply NTV)
ANN	TV Asahi Corporation (EX)
JNN	Tokyo Broadcasting System Television (TBS)
TXN	TV TOKYO Corporation (TX)
FNN	Fuji Television Network, (Fuji TV, or simply CX)

(Sources: Media Ownership: Media Organizations [under Japan])

After the Second World War, the broadcasting monopoly of NHK was broken up to allow for commercial broadcasting. Each of the five largest newspapers began to invest in broadcasting, as shown below (see Table 24). Thus, in Japan, there is a strong linkage between newspapers and broadcasting, and

thus, it can be assumed that there is a lack of tension between newspapers and television networks, and, therefore, the mutual checking system of mass media might be slightly crippled.

**Table 24: Ownership Structure of Television Networks in Japan**

Ownership Structure of Television Networks in Japan		
	Owner	Group
NTV	Nippon TV Holdings	Yomiuri Shimbun Group
EX	TV Asahi Holdings Corporation	Asahi Shimbun Company
TBS	Tokyo Broadcasting System Holdings	Mainichi Shimbun Group
TX	TV TOKYO Holdings	Nikkei
CX	Fuji Media Holdings	Fujisankei Communications Group

(Sources: Media Ownership: Media Organizations [under Japan])

Today, according to the share of viewership of all those six companies, it can be concluded that commercial broadcasting accounted for nearly 74 percent of the viewership, while public broadcasting, in the form of NHK, accounted for only 14.8 percent (see Table 25). Fuji TV and NTV had the highest shares, each accounting for almost 20 percent.

**Table 25: Television Viewing Shares of the 6 TV Networks in Japan (2010)**

Television Viewing Shares of the 6 TV Networks in Japan (2010)	
	Viewership Share (in %)
Public Network	
NHK	14.8
Commercial Networks	
NTV	18.2
EX	16.2
TBS	14.5
TX	6.4
CX	18.6

(Nakamura et al., 2013, p.9)

**4.4.1.3 Internet**

In 2012, Japan had 35.29 million fixed broadband subscriptions, representing 27.66 percent of its population (The World Bank, 2014a), and ranking 25th in the world, two places below the United States (The World Bank, 2013). And it ranked 30th in the world in terms of Internet users, with 79 users per 100 people, five places below the United States (The World Bank, 2014c). The table below shows the most popular online newspapers in Japan (see Table 26).

**Table 26: Most Popular Online Newspapers in Japan (2014)**

Most Popular Online Newspapers in Japan (2014)		
	URLs	Alexa Ranking (in Japan)
Online Newspaper Versions		
Yomiuri Shimbun	<a href="http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/">http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/</a>	66
Asahi Shimbun	<a href="http://www.asahi.com/">http://www.asahi.com/</a>	60
Mainichi Shimbun	<a href="http://mainichi.jp/">http://mainichi.jp/</a>	98
Nikkei Shimbun	<a href="http://www.nikkei.com/">http://www.nikkei.com/</a>	44
Sankei Shimbun	<a href="http://sankei.jp.msn.com/">http://sankei.jp.msn.com/</a>	X <sup>22</sup>
Online Portals		
goo	<a href="http://www.goo.ne.jp/">http://www.goo.ne.jp/</a>	14

(Alexa, 2014q; Alexa, 2014a; Alexa, 2014i; Alexa, 2014l; Alexa, 2014g; Alexa, 2014f)

In the United States, for example, four major news sources were listed among the top 50 websites according to Alexa (2014p), namely, CNN (17), Huffington Post (22), The New York Times (36), and Fox News (42). During the research, no stand-alone online newspaper could be found with any significant market share, as most of the popular news sources in Japan are online versions of the major printed newspapers.

#### **4.4.1.4 Media Organizations**

Next the paper will summarize the ownership structure of the largest media organizations in Japan, namely, NHK, Yomiuri Shimbun Group, Asahi Shimbun Company, Mainichi Shimbun Group, Nikkei, and Fujisankei Communications Group.

<sup>22</sup> As Sankei Shimbun's online newspaper and MSN Japan started a content partnership, called MSN Sankei News, in 2007 it is not possible to have a reliable Alexa ranking, as it does not take subdomains into account, but solely the top level domain (msn.com), which in this case is for Microsoft's "Microsoft Network."

**NHK**

After the Second World War, the Occupation Forces issued instructions on freedom of speech and the press in Japan. Thus, in April 1950, the Three Radio Laws—the Radio Act, the Broadcasting Act, and the Radio Regulatory Law for the establishment of committees, which was later abolished in 1952 when the first TV license was issued—were created and replaced the pre-war Radio Telegraph Law, turning NHK into a special corporation, with the Broadcasting Act leading to a reorganization of NHK (NHK, 2002). According to Article 20 of the Broadcasting Act, its operations include to transmit domestic basic broadcasting, namely, AM broadcasting, FM broadcasting, and television broadcasting (Broadcasting Act of Japan, 1950). NHK operates two television services, NHK General TV and NHK Educational TV, as well as two satellite television services, and two international broadcasting services (NHK, n.d.b). NHK General TV is the main television service of NHK, which offers a broad variety of programming, such as news (46.2 percent), culture (23.3 percent), entertainment (20.0 percent), and education (10.5 percent) (NHK, 2013, p.8). NHK Educational TV is the second television service of NHK, which offers a variety of instructional programs, which are mainly aimed at children and young people—similar to PBS in the United States—and is split up in education (78.8 percent), culture (18.1 percent), and news (3.1 percent), (NHK, 2013, p.8; NHK, n.d.a).

And while NHK earns its revenue solely from license fees (NHK, n.d.c), as will be discussed in more detail later (see Media Financing), this financial independence does not necessarily translate into political independence. The 12 members of the Board of Governors—as according to Article 30(1) (Broadcasting Act of Japan, 1950)—which is the main decision-making body for NHK’s management policy and operations, including annual budget, the operational plan, and basic programming policy—the duties are listed under Article 29 (Broadcasting Act of Japan, 1950)—is approved by both houses of the Diet on behalf of the people of Japan and appointed by the Prime Minister, as stated under Article 31(1) (Broadcasting Act of Japan, 1950) for a term of three years, and may be reappointed, as stated under Article 33 (Broadcasting Act of Japan, 1950). However, the board is expected to make decisions that are impartial and in the public interest (NHK, 2013, p.28). Thus, NHK has been characterized “as autonomous from, but somewhat accountable to, government” (Krauss, 1996, p.90).

**Yomiuri Shimbun Group**

The Yomiuri Shimbun Group, established in 2002, is the owner of the Yomiuri Shimbun Company, which operates the largest newspaper in Japan, the Yomiuri Shimbun, first published in 1874 (Yomiuri Shimbun



Company, 2014). Additionally, it owns 14.27 percent of the shares of the Nippon Television Holdings (see Table 27), which is the owner of the Nippon Television Network Corporation (Nippon Television Holdings, n.d.a; Pharr, 1996, p.6), founded in 1952 (Nippon Television Network Corporation, n.d.b). And the Nippon News Network is part of the Nippon Television Network Corporation (Nippon Television Network Corporation, n.d.c).

**Table 27: Major Shareholders of the Yomiuri Shimbun Group (2013)**

Major Shareholders of the Nippon Television Holdings (2013)	
	Shares (in %)
Yomiuri Shimbun Group	14.27
Yomiuri Telecasting Corporation	6.27
Yomiuri Shimbun Company	5.90
CBNY-ORBIS Funds	3.78
Japanese Trustee Services Bank	3.72
Teikyo University	3.62
CBNY-ORBIS SICAV	3.43
State Street Bank and Trust Company	3.00
NTT DoCoMo	2.94
The Master Trust Bank of Japan	2.67

(NTV, 2013, p.62)

### **Asahi Shimbun Company**

The Asahi Shimbun Company operates the second largest newspaper in Japan, the Asahi Shimbun, first published in 1879 (Asahi Shimbun Company, 2014). Additionally, it owns 24.72 percent of the shares of the TV Asahi Holdings Corporation (see Table 28), which is the owner of the TV Asahi Corporation (TV Asahi Holdings Corporation, n.d.; Pharr, 1996, p.6), formerly known as Nippon Educational Television (NET), and later renamed in 1977 (TV Asahi Corporation, n.d.a), and was originally founded in 1957 (TV Asahi Corporation, n.d.c). And the All-Nippon News Network is part of the TV Asahi Corporation (TV Asahi Corporation, n.d.b).

**Table 28: Major Shareholders of the TV Asahi Holdings Corporation (2013)**

Major Shareholders of the TV Asahi Holdings Corporation (2013)	
	Shares (in %)
Asahi Shimbun Company	24.72
TOEI Company	16.09
Kosetsu Museum of Art	5.00
Mizuho Trust and Baking Company	4.01
Japan Trustee Services Bank (trust account)	3.50
Kyushu Asahi Broadcasting Company	3.20
The Master Trust Bank of Japan (trust account)	2.24
Recruit Holdings Company	2.09
Asahi Shimbun Foundation	2.00
CGML-IPB CUSTOMER COLLATERAL ACCOUNT	1.65

(TV Asahi, 2013)

**Mainichi Shimbun Group**

The Mainichi Shimbun Group Holdings, established in 2011, is the owner of the Mainichi Shimbun Company (Mainichi Shimbun Company, n.d.a), which operates the third largest newspaper in Japan, the Mainichi Shimbun, first published in 1872 (Mainichi Shimbun Company, n.d.b). In the literature it talks about how the Tokyo Broadcasting System is affiliated with the Mainichi Shimbun Group (Westney, 1996, p.61; Ito, 1996, p.71; Frédéric, 2002, p.779), however, there seems to be no official data on the ownership structure that somehow seems to place TBS under the Mainichi Shimbun Group. While the Mainichi Broadcasting System owns 4.03 percent of the shares of the Tokyo Broadcasting System Holdings (see Table 29), there also could not be found any information that directly connects the Mainichi Broadcasting System with the Mainichi Shimbun Group.

**Table 29: Major Shareholders of the Tokyo Broadcasting System Holdings (2013)**

Major Shareholders of the Tokyo Broadcasting System Holdings (2013)	
	Shares (in %)
The Master Trust Bank of Japan (pension trust account held for DENTSU)	6.09
The Master Trust Bank of Japan (trust account)	5.71
Nippon Life Insurance Company	4.09
Mainichi Broadcasting System	4.03
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation	3.76
Mitsui Fudosan Company	3.74
Mitsui & Company	2.80
Bic Camera	2.74
Kodansha	2.47
Panasonic Corporation	2.02

(TBS, 2014)

**Nikkei**

Nikkei operates the fourth largest newspaper in Japan, the Nikkei Shimbun, first published in 1876 (Nikkei, 2014). Additionally, it owns 31.46 percent of the shares of the TV TOKYO Holdings Corporation (see Table 30), which is the owner of the TV TOKYO Corporation (TV TOKYO Holdings Corporation, n.d.), founded in 1964 (TV TOKYO Corporation, n.d.a). And the TX Network is part of the TV TOKYO Corporation (TV TOKYO Corporation, n.d.b).

**Table 30: Major Shareholders of TV TOKYO Holdings Corporation (2014)**

Major Shareholders of TV TOKYO Holdings Corporation (2014)	
	Shares (in %)
Nikkei	31.46
Mizuho Bank	3.50
Mitsui & Company	3.48
The Master Trust Bank of Japan (trust account)	2.63
Nippon Life Insurance Company	2.36
Tokyo Plan	2.29
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ	2.07
Japan Trustee Services Bank (Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation Retirement Benefit Trust Account)	2.05
Japan Trustee Services Bank (trust account)	2.05
TV Tokyo Holdings Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP)	1.90

(TV TOKYO Holdings Corporation, 2014)

### **Fujisankei Communications Group**

The Fujisankei Communications Group is the owner of the Sankei Shimbun Company (Fujisankei Communications Group, 2014), which operates the fifth largest newspaper in Japan, the Sankei Shimbun, first published in 1933 (Sankei Shimbun, 2014). Additionally, the Fuji Media Holdings is part of this group (Fujisankei Communications Group, 2014), which is the owner of the Fuji Television Network (Fuji Media Holdings, n.d.), founded in 1959 (Fuji Television Network, 2013). And the Fuji News Network is part of the Fuji Television Network (Fuji Television Network, n.d.).

Thus, in the case of Japan it can be concluded that media is both, privately and publicly owned, while the privately owned media accounted for a much larger share of the market (see Table 31). Additionally, it clearly showed how the largest daily national newspapers are also affiliated with the largest television networks in Japan.

**Table 31: Media Ownership in Japan**

Media Ownership in Japan	
NHK	Public
Yomiuri Shimbun Group	Private
Asahi Shimbun Company	Private
Mainichi Shimbun Group	Private
Nikkei	Private
Fujisankei Communications Group	Private

#### 4.4.2 Korea

This part will be structured a little bit differently than the part for Japan, due to the fact that the major national newspapers in Korea are not the owners of the major television networks. Thus, the paper will instead go through each large corporation after the other, instead of focusing on the ownership structure of each only at the end of this part.

##### 4.4.2.1 Newspapers

Korea has a total of 168 daily newspapers, and 1,156 weekly newspapers, of which 11 were national daily newspapers (KPF, 2013b, p.27). According to the Korea Press Foundation (KPF), the three largest national daily newspapers in Korea are the Chosun Ilbo, JoongAng Ilbo, and Dong-A Ilbo (KPF, 2013b, p.5), which accounted for 65.05 percent of the total daily newspaper market (see Table 32). The largest daily newspaper is Chosun Ilbo with a circulation of over 1.76 million, which accounted for a little over 27 percent of the entire market. In Japan, on the other hand, the five largest newspapers accounted for only roughly half of the market. However, according to Chapter 2 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, which deals with the prohibition on the abuse of market dominance (FTC, 2011, p.5), Article 4 states that a business shall only be presumed to be a market-dominating business under one of the following two conditions, namely, 1) the market share of one business is 50 percent or more, or 2) the total market share of not less than three businesses is 75 percent or more (FTC, 2011, pp.6-7), which then does not apply to the case of the three largest newspapers in Korea.

**Table 32: Largest Daily National Newspapers in Korea by Circulation (2012)**

Largest Daily National Newspapers in Korea by Circulation (2012)		
Total Circulation	6,337,271	
	Circulation	Market Share (in %)
Chosun Ilbo	1,769,310	27.92
JoongAng Ilbo	1,292,498	20.40
Dong-A Ilbo	1,060,760	16.74
Total	4,122,568	65.05

(KPF, 2013b, p.45)

Next, the paper will briefly look at the ownership structure of the three largest daily newspapers.

### **Chosun Ilbo Company**

The Chosun Ilbo Company publishes the largest, most recognized and influential newspaper in Korea (Chosun Ilbo Company, n.d.a, p.9), called the Chosun Ilbo, founded in 1920 (Chosun Ilbo Company, n.d.b), making it the first private and national newspaper in Korea following the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 (Chosun Ilbo Company, n.d.a, p.17). The ownership structure of the company is listed below (see Table 33), with Sang-hoon Bang acting as the current executive officer.

**Table 33: Major Shareholders of the Chosun Ilbo Company (2010)**

Major Shareholders of the Chosun Ilbo Company (2010)	
	Shares (in %)
Bang Family	73.60
Bang Il-young Cultural Foundation	15.00

(Kwak, 2012, p.72)

### **JoongAng Media Network**

The JoongAng Media Network (JMnet) owns the second largest daily newspaper in Korea, called the JoongAng Ilbo, launched in 1965 (JoongAng Media Network, n.d.b). The ownership structure of the company is listed below (see Table 34), with Jeongdo Hong acting as the current executive officer.

**Table 34: Major Shareholders of the JoongAng Media Network (2010)**

Major Shareholders of the JoongAng Media Network (2010)	
	Shares (in %)
Hong Family	45.46
CJ Construction	9.52
CJ Company	16.68

(Kwak, 2012, p.72)

It also publishes the Korea JoongAng Daily, the English edition of its newspaper, in alliance with the International New York Times (INYT) (JoongAng Media Network, n.d.a), which has a total circulation of 18,414 (KPF, 2013b, p.45). It is one of the three English-language daily newspapers in Korea, the other two being the Korea Times and the Korea Herald, with a total circulation of 20,965 and 33,039, respectively (KPF, 2013b, p.45).

#### **Dong-A Media Group**

The Dong-A Media Group (DAMG) owns the third largest daily newspaper, the Dong-A Ilbo (Dong-A Ilbo, 2009, p.32), which launched in 1920 (Dong-A Ilbo, 2006). The ownership structure of the company is listed below (see Table 35), with Jae-ho Kim acting as the current executive officer.

**Table 35: Major Shareholders of the Dong-A Media Group (2010)**

Major Shareholders of the Dong-A Media Group (2010)	
	Shares (in %)
Kim Family	22.20
Incheon Memorial	24.10
Ilmin Cultural Foundation	5.20

(Kwak, 2012, p.72)

However, there are quite a few more popular and independent newspapers, such as the Hankyoreh, the eighth largest daily newspaper in Korea in terms of circulation (KPF, 2013b, p.45). According to its website it refers to itself as an “independent newspaper [...] by journalists who had dreamed of a genuinely independent newspaper” for the liberal reader (Hankyoreh, n.d.). Its distinct feature is its unique

ownership. Unlike most traditional Korean newspapers, under the ownership of a family or business conglomerate, the Hankyoreh is owned by about 62,000 shareholders, ranging from “teachers to university students to housewives” (Hankyoreh, n.d.). Or the Kyunghyang Shimbun, also known as Kyunghyang Daily News, the 10th largest newspaper in Korea (KPF, 2013b, p.45), which is for the moderate reader, founded by the Catholic Church, also works independently, as the company is solely owned by its current as well as retired employees (Kyunghyang Shimbun, 2005).

Thus, it can be concluded that three largest newspapers in Korea are all privately owned.

#### **4.4.2.2 Television**

In 2012, 17,728 households owned a television set (Generator Research, 2012b) of a total of 17,928 households (Generator Research, 2012a), making it roughly 98.8 percent, just slightly less compared to Japan. Democratization was declared in Korea in 1987, with commercial broadcasting starting in 1991 (Shim, 2008, p.207). Terrestrial broadcasting is provided by the public service broadcasters KBS and EBS, as well as MBC—a commercial broadcaster with a strong public service character—and the commercial broadcaster SBS (Nakamura & Yonekura, 2010, p.126; KPF, 2013b, p.48), all of which, unlike in Japan, do not have any linkage to the major national daily newspapers. The two terrestrial television stations by KBS accounted for the highest viewing share with a total of 28.40 percent (see Table 36)<sup>23</sup>, while MBC and SBS accounted for 15.70 and 15.20 percent, respectively (Nakamura & Yonekura, 2010, p.130).

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<sup>23</sup> The survey does not mention why EBS was deliberately excluded from the list.



**Table 36: Television Viewing Shares in Korea (2008)**

Television Viewing Shares in Korea (2008)	
	Viewing Share (in %)
KBS 1TV	14.40
KBS 2TV	14.00
MBC	15.70
SBS	15.20
Other (satellite, cable, and other channels)	40.70

(Nakamura & Yonekura, 2010, p.127)

### **Korean Broadcasting System (KBS)**

Under Article 43(1) of the Broadcasting Act, KBS was established “as the State’s key broadcasting in order to fix a fair and sound broadcast culture, and to efficiently implement the broadcasts for home and abroad” (Broadcasting Act of Korea, 1987). In 1927, it initiated the country’s first radio broadcasting service, and in 1961 the country’s first television broadcasting service (KBS, 2013a). It runs two terrestrial television stations, namely, 1) KBS 1TV—focused on news, culture, and current affairs—and 2) KBS 2TV—focused on family and cultural entertainment (KBS, 2013b). Article 44(1) of the Broadcasting Act also states that the public responsibility of KBS is to realize “impartiality and public interest” in broadcasting, and 44(4) that it should “develop the broadcast programs, and broadcast them, which may promote the national culture and ensure a homogeneity of the nation, with the objects home and abroad” (Broadcasting Act of Korea, 1987). Under Article 46(1) it states that “in order to guarantee the independence and public nature of [KBS, it] shall have a board of directors as the highest deliberative organ for decision making with regard to the management of [KBS],” and further states under Article 46(3) that the “directors shall be recommended by the Korea Communications Commission in consideration of their typicality of different fields, and appointed by President” (Broadcasting Act of Korea, 1987), which raises the question of whether KBS is actually independent of any political control. As discussed before, the KCC already had its own share of troubles in the past, in terms of lacking any real credibility of acting as an independent regulatory body.

**Educational Broadcasting System (EBS)**

Educational Broadcasting System is the second public service broadcaster, for radio and television, in Korea, which started in 1973. In 1974, it launched its first radio school broadcast, and in 1980 it launched the TV High School Educational Broadcasting. One year later, it established an educational channel at KBS, called KBS 3TV, which it took over in 1990 (EBS, n.d.b), and thus, EBS was officially established by the Korean Educational Development Institute (KEDI), of which it became independent in 1997 (KEDI, 2011). Today, it operates one terrestrial TV station called EBS TV (KPF, 2013b, p.48), with its mission to “complement to school education, lifelong education, and democratic development of education” (EBS, n.d.c).

**Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC)**

MBC is the third public service broadcaster, also for radio and television, in Korea. In 1961 it started with the MBC Radio (AM), in 1969 it launched its first black and white television broadcasting, MBC TV, in 1971 its first MBC Radio (FM) broadcast, and the first color television broadcast in 1981 (MBC, n.d.). One of its four principles is to be independent and impartial in its broadcasting (MBC, 1996c). Its two major shareholders are, the Foundation for Broadcast Culture—a not-for-profit statutory corporation, which was established in accordance with the Foundation for Broadcast Culture Act in 1988 (FBC, 2004a)—holding 70 percent of its shares, whereas the Chung-soo Scholarship Foundation owns the remaining 30 percent (MBC, 1996a). And it also operates one terrestrial TV station called MBC TV (KPF, 2013b, p.48), delivering news, drama, sports, entertainment, and documentaries (MBC, 1996b).

**SBS Media Holdings**

SBS Media Holdings is the owner of the Seoul Broadcasting System (SBS Media Holdings, 2008b), which is the only major commercial broadcaster, for radio and television, in Korea. It operates one terrestrial TV station called SBS-TV (KPF, 2013b, p.48). Other TV stations, such as KNN (Korea New Network), KBC (Kwangju Broadcasting Corporation), and TJB (Taejong Broadcasting Corporation) are, however, affiliated with the SBS Network. In 1991, it launched its first radio network SBS-AM—later renamed to SBS Love FM, when it started broadcasting on FM—and first television broadcast SBS-TV, and in 1996 it started its first FM radio station, SBS-POWER FM (SBS Media Holdings, 2008a). Below is the ownership structure of SBS (see Table 37).

**Table 37: Major Shareholders of SBS (2011)**

Major Shareholders of SBS (2011)	
	Shares (in %)
SBS Media Holdings	34.72
National Pension Service (NPS)	8.66
Korea Investment & Securities	8.11
Kiturami Boiler Corporation	6.30
Mirae Asset Global Investments	6.15
Daehan Flour Mills Company	5.56

(SBS, 2011)

The ownership structure of SBS Media Holdings is shown below (see Table 38), making TaeYoung the largest shareholder (TaeYoung, 2013).

**Table 38: Major Shareholders of SBS Media Holdings (2008)**


Major Shareholders of SBS Media Holdings (2008)	
	Shares (in %)
TaeYoung	60.86
Kiturami Boiler Corporation (including related parties)	10.97
Others	28.17

(SBS Media Holdings, 2009, p.14)

#### 4.4.2.3 Internet

In 2012, Korea had 18.25 million fixed broadband subscriptions, representing 36.50 percent of its population (The World Bank, 2014a), and ranking sixth in the world, 19 places above Japan (The World Bank, 2013), while it only ranked 20th in the world in terms of Internet users, with 84 users per 100 people, five places above the United States (The World Bank, 2014c; Voltmer, 2008). Thus, Korea is one of the most connected countries in the world and most penetrated broadband markets in the world. Its capital, Seoul has been dubbed the “bandwidth capital of the world” by Wired (2002). In Korea there has been a steady

growth of registered online newspapers (see Figure 1), with a total of 1,669 online newspaper companies (KPF, 2013b, p.27).



**Figure 1: Registered Online Newspapers in Japan (2008-2012)**

(KPF, 2013b, p.58)

The table below shows the most popular online newspapers in Korea, including the most popular online portals (see Table 39).

**Table 39: Most Popular Online Newspapers in Korea (2014)**

Most Popular Online Newspapers in Korea (2014)		
	URLs	Alexa Ranking (in Korea)
Online Newspaper Versions		
Chosun Ilbo	<a href="http://chosun.com/">http://chosun.com/</a>	31
JoongAng Ilbo	<a href="http://www.join.com/">http://www.join.com/</a>	43
Dong-A Ilbo	<a href="http://www.donga.com/">http://www.donga.com/</a>	28
Stand-alone Online Newspapers		
OhmyNews	<a href="http://www.ohmynews.com/">http://www.ohmynews.com/</a>	116
Edaily	<a href="http://edaily.co.kr/">http://edaily.co.kr/</a>	250
Online Portals		
NAVER	<a href="http://www.naver.com/">http://www.naver.com/</a>	4
Daum	<a href="http://daum.net/">http://daum.net/</a>	7
Nate	<a href="http://nate.com/">http://nate.com/</a>	11

(KPF, 2013b, p.62; Alexa, 2014b; Alexa, 2014h; Alexa, 2014d; Alexa, 2014m; Alexa, 2014e; Alexa, 2014k; Alexa, 2014c; Alexa, 2014j)

However, none of these stand-alone online newspapers are more popular than the online versions of the daily national newspapers—as well as other newspapers not included in this list (e.g. [khan.co.kr](http://khan.co.kr))—or even those of the news agencies (e.g. [yonhapnews.co.kr](http://yonhapnews.co.kr)), as well as those of the television networks (e.g. [kbs.co.kr](http://kbs.co.kr)).

OhmyNews appears to be the most popular amongst those stand-alone online newspapers. It was launched in 2000, and its motto is “every citizen is a reporter” (lit. 모든 시민은 기자다). Additionally, it claims on its website that it does not seek to make any profit, but rather to change the world (OhmyNews, 2011). Edaily is a privately owned online newspaper, focused on business news and financial information and it was also launched in 2000 (Edaily, n.d.). And while there are plenty of other stand-alone online newspaper (e.g. [etoday.co.kr](http://etoday.co.kr)), none of them have ranked particular well according to Alexa. Thus, instead, the paper will look at the three most popular online portals in Korea.

**NAVER Corporation**

NAVER.com is run by the NAVER Corporation, which is a publicly traded company, and launched in 1999 (NAVER Corporation, n.d.a). It is the fourth most visited website in Korea after Google, Facebook, and YouTube (Alexa, 2014o). Moreover, it is Korea's largest online company in terms of net profit (NAVER Corporation, n.d.b). Its ownership structure can be seen below (see Table 40).

**Table 40: Ownership Structure of NAVER Corporation (2014)**

Ownership Structure of NAVER Corporation (2014)	
	Shares (in %)
National Pension Service	8.18
Baillie Gifford & Company	5.24
Capital Research & Management Company	5.02
Oppenheimer Funds	4.72
Fidelity Management & Research Company	3.79
T. Rowe Price Associates	2.57
BlackRock Fund Advisors	1.65
Norges Bank Investment Management	0.96
Schroder Investment Management	0.95
The Vanguard Group	0.94

(FT, 2014; NAVER Corporation, n.d.c)

**Daum Communications**

Daum.net is operated by Daum Communications, which is also a publicly traded company, and the second largest online portal in Korea, and the seventh most visited website in Korea (Alexa, 2014c). It launched in 1995 with the philosophy of "helping communication between people and between people and society" (Daum Communications, n.d.b). Its ownership structure is shown below (see Table 41).

**Table 41: Ownership Structure of Daum Communications (2013)**

Ownership Structure of Daum Communications (2013)	
	Shares (in %)
JW Lee and Specially Related	15.10
Capital Group International (CGI)	9.70
KB Asset Management	9.30
National Pension Service	7.50
Genesis Asset Managers	6.30
Wellington Management Company	5.30
Templeton Investment Counsel	5.30

(Daum Communications, 2013b)

**SK Telecom**

Nate.com is the third largest online portal, and 11th most visited website in Korea (Alexa, 2014j). It launched in 2002 and is operated by SK Communications (SK Communications, 2008a), which is a subsidiary of the SK Telecom, which is a publicly traded company and part of the SK Holdings (SK Holdings, 2013). Its ownership structure can be seen below (see Table 42).

**Table 42: Ownership Structure of SK Telecom (2013)**

Ownership Structure of SK Telecom (2013)	
	Shares (in %)
SK Holdings	25.22
Citibank	16.94
SK Telecom	12.15
National Pension Service	5.90
Others	39.80

(SK Telecom, 2013)

Thus, it can be concluded that the media ownership in the newspaper market is primarily based on privately owned companies, whereas the television market is largely publicly owned (see Table 43).

**Table 43: Media Ownership in Korea**

Media Ownership in Korea	
Newspapers	
Chosun Ilbo Company	Private
JoongAng Media Network	Private
Dong-A Media Group	Private
Television	
Korean Broadcasting System	Public
Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation	Private / Public
Educational Broadcasting System	Public
SBS Media Holdings	Private
Internet	
NAVER Corporation	Private
Daum Communications	Private
SK Telecom	Private

#### 4.4.3 Conclusion

To quickly summarize, it clearly shows that the media is privately as well as publicly owned in both countries, while the terrestrial television market in Korea has a higher degree of public ownership when compared to Japan (see Table 44).



**Table 44: Media Ownership (Japan vs. Korea)**

Media Ownership (Japan vs. Korea)	
Japan	Korea
Private and Public (B)	Private and Public (B)

## 4.5 Media Financing

Next, the paper will look at how these companies, discussed in the previous chapter, are financed, either through the state, the market, or a mixture of both. The basic assumption here will be that the privately owned companies are financed through the market, such as advertising, whereas the publicly owned companies will be financed through the state, such as license fees.

### 4.5.1 Japan

While it would have been interesting to look at the largest advertisers in Japan, in order to be able to determine which companies might have the strongest influence in this country, as media companies rely on their advertising money, no publicly available list of the biggest advertisers in Japan could be found. Instead, the paper will merely look at the advertising expenditures for each mass media. In Japan, traditional media accounted for nearly half of the entire advertising expenditure in 2013, including newspapers, magazines, radio, and television—while television accounted by far for the largest proportion with 30 percent, followed by newspapers with 10.3 percent. On the other hand, new media, specifically the Internet accounted for slightly over 15 percent (see Table 45).

**Table 45: Advertising Expenditure in Japan (2013)**

Advertising Expenditure in Japan (2013)		
	Expenditure	Ratio (in %)
Traditional Media		
Newspapers	6,032,376,280	10.30
Magazines	2,459,803,920	4.20
Radio	1,229,901,960	2.10
Television	17,570,028,000	30.00
<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>27,292,110,160</i>	<i>46.60</i>
Satellite Media-Related <sup>24</sup>	1,054,201,680	1.80
Internet	9,194,981,320	15.70
Promotional Media <sup>25</sup>	21,025,466,840	35.90
<b>Total Expenditure</b>	<b>58,566,760,000</b>	<b>100.00</b>

(DENTSU, 2014, p.5)

**4.5.1.1 Newspapers**

The advertising expenditure for newspapers is slightly different compared to the data from the Nihon Shinbun Kyokai (NSK) as shown below (see Table 46). However, the data shows that the advertising expenditure for newspapers remained, more or less, the same over the last four years, fluctuating around 10 percent of the total advertising expenditure.

<sup>24</sup> Satellite media-related includes BS digital broadcasting, CS broadcasting, and cable television.<sup>25</sup> Promotional media includes, for example, flyers, direct mail, and out-of-home advertising.

**Table 46: Newspaper Advertising Expenditure in Japan (2010-2013)**

Newspaper Advertising Expenditure in Japan (2010-2013)			
	Total Expenditure	Newspaper Expenditure	Ratio (in %)
2013	58,566,760,000	6,046,600,000	10.32
2012	57,734,740,000	6,117,160,000	10.60
2011	55,954,080,000	5,870,200,000	10.49
2010	57,258,460,000	6,268,080,000	10.95

(NSK, 2014a)

In the table below (see Table 47) it shows that roughly 23 percent of the total revenue of newspapers came from advertising alone, which has remained fairly stable over the past three years. Thus, it shows that newspapers make most of their revenue from the sale of its papers, which accounted for slightly over 60 percent in 2012.

**Table 47: Newspaper Revenue in Japan (2010-2012)**

Newspaper Revenue in Japan (2010-2012)				
	Total Revenue	Sales (in %)	Advertising (in %)	Others (in %)
2012	18,770,920,000	60.20	23.20	16.60
2011	19,143,320,000	59.60	22.60	17.90
2010	18,987,500,000	61.10	23.30	15.60

(NSK, 2014b)

There was no publicly available data for each of the five largest national newspapers in Japan, showing how much of their revenue came from the sale of its newspapers, advertising, or other revenue sources.

#### 4.5.1.2 Television

As mentioned before, the television network landscape is split between public broadcasting and commercial broadcasting. Here, the paper will first look at the public broadcasting company NHK, and

then more generally at the commercial television broadcasters, Nippon Television Network, TV Asahi Corporation, Tokyo Broadcasting System Television, TV TOKYO Corporation, and Fuji Television Network.

### **Public Broadcasting: NHK**

According to Article 20(4) of the Broadcasting Act, “NHK shall not have the aim of making a profit when conducting the operations,” such as the transmission of basic broadcasting through television broadcasting (Broadcasting Act of Japan, 1950). Under Article 83(1), NHK shall not broadcast advertisements relating to the sales by other people (Broadcasting Act of Japan, 1950). Instead, under Article 64, people who own equipment capable of receiving broadcasts are supposed to conclude a contract with NHK (Broadcasting Act of Japan, 1950). Thus, NHK sees its financial base resting mainly on license fees, collected directly from the public and never passing through the hands of government, ensuring its independence of its broadcast programs. License fees made up 96 percent of its operating income, with the remaining 4 percent coming from other income, such as program provision revenue (NHK, 2013, p.28). According to a study in 2011, 66 percent of the respondents had a positive view on paying the license fee (Nakamura et al., 2013, p.26).

The annual license fee—there are different payments for monthly or biannual payments—is 133.28 USD for a broadcast contract and 236.08 USD for a satellite contract (NHK, 2013, p.28). Comparatively, to the annual license fees of other countries (see Table 48) it is relatively low, while Korea has the lowest annual license fee with only 48 USD. However, it is also important to note that in other countries public broadcasting companies, like for example in Austria, are also allowed to make money through advertising, which NHK is not permitted to do according to the Broadcasting Act. Moreover, according to Chapter 11, which deals with penal provisions, all penalties only apply to violations done by the broadcaster, and not the failure by the public to pay the license fee (Broadcasting Act of Japan, 1950), meaning households will not be fined for not paying the license fee.

Additionally, the money NHK currently spends on its fee collection system—representing 12.40 percent of its annual operating income—has been heavily criticized, mainly due to its lack in transparency. Comparatively, BBC only spends 5.20 percent of its revenue on its fee collection system, which has been argued is based on the fact that unlike in Japan, penalties do exist for non-payment in the United Kingdom, with 30 percent of the Japanese households refusing to pay their fees, which has increased over the years to due scandals relating to NHK employees (Clarke, 2006).

**Table 48: Annual License Fees**

Annual License Fees	
	Annual Fee
Japan	133.28
Korea	48.00
Austria <sup>26</sup>	385.39
Germany <sup>27</sup>	298.68
Switzerland <sup>28</sup>	524.13
United Kingdom <sup>29</sup>	244.99

(GIS, 2011; BILLAG, 2014; TV Licensing, 2014; Shin, 2014; ARD ZDF Deutschlandradio Beitragsservice, n.d.)

#### **Commercial Broadcasting: NTV, EX, TBS, TX, CX**

The Broadcasting Act also clarified the legal basis for commercial broadcasters. Thus, the Japanese broadcasting industry had entered a new era, one with NHK supported by license fees and with commercial broadcasters being primarily funded through advertising (NHK, 2002). The total revenue for 127 commercial television broadcasters was 20.64 billion USD in 2012. Of the total revenue, 45 percent was spot commercials, 40 percent was sponsorship commercials, 5 percent came from program sales, royalties, and program-related merchandising, with the remaining 10 percent consisting of revenue coming from businesses not related to broadcasting, such as movies, or real estate (JBA, 2013, p.8). As an example, the table below (see Table 49) shows how the revenue for TBS was broken down.

<sup>26</sup> The license fee in Austria varies from state to state. However, the average cost of 23.20 EUR per month is taken, making it an annual fee of 278.40 EUR. Additionally, it is important to point out that public broadcasting in Austria and Switzerland is financed through license fees as well as advertising.

<sup>27</sup> The monthly license fee for Germany is 17.98 EUR, making it 215.76 EUR annually. Additionally, in Germany and the United Kingdom, public broadcasting is funded through license fees, advertising, as well as government grants.

<sup>28</sup> For Switzerland the annual fee for both, radio and television, is taken, which is 462.40 CHF.

<sup>29</sup> In the United Kingdom the license fee only applies to television sets. In this case, the annual fee for color television sets is taken, which is 145.50 GBP.

**Table 49: Revenue Breakdown of TBS (March 31, 2013)**

Revenue Breakdown of TBS (March 31, 2013)		
	Revenue	Ratio (in %)
Broadcasting	2,075,444,000	60.11
Program Sales and Cultural Events	1,227,254,000	35.54
Real Estate	150,332,000	4.35
<b>Total Revenue</b>	<b>3,453,030,000</b>	<b>100.00</b>

#### 4.5.1.3 Internet

Internet, on the other hand, played only a very little role, as online versions of printed newspapers were more popular and more accessible than stand-alone online newspapers. Thus, we can conclude that of the largest media corporations, only NHK is financed through the state, or rather the general public, whereas the other five corporations are financed through the market (see Table 50).

**Table 50: Media Financing in Japan**

Media Financing in Japan	
NHK	State
Yomiuri Shimbun Group	Market
Asahi Shimbun Company	Market
Mainichi Shimbun Group	Market
Nikkei	Market
Fujisankei Communications Group	Market

#### 4.5.2 Korea

In the case of Korea, there is some publicly available data for the largest advertisers for the year 2012 (see Table 51), in which Samsung Electronics topped the list, having spent slightly over twice as much as the next largest advertiser, Hyundai Motor.

**Table 51: The 10 Largest Advertisers in Korea (2012)**

The 10 Largest Advertisers in Korea (2012)		
	Advertising Expenditure	Ratio (in %)
Samsung Electronics	199,979,000	26.39
Hyundai Motor	90,424,000	11.93
LG Electronics	80,982,000	10.69
Korea Telecom (KT)	68,595,000	9.05
SK Telecom	67,693,000	8.93
Kia Motors	56,565,000	7.46
LG U+	56,533,000	7.46
P&G Korea	48,820,000	6.44
East-West Food (동서식품)	46,323,000	6.11
Industrial Bank of Korea	41,861,000	5.52

(KPF, 2013a, p.8)<sup>30</sup>

This is insofar interesting, as it shows how powerful a large advertiser can be in a market that heavily relies on advertising money. The Hankyoreh reported that the largest conglomerates have tried to control the media in the past, by for example flooding the market with advertising during periods when its executives have come under the spotlight for illegal activities. Analysts have noted that especially the Samsung Group—owner of the Samsung Electronics—has shifted to a “selection and exclusion” strategy of allocating its advertising money, depending on if a media company reported favorably or critically of Samsung, as it for example suspended its advertising with the Kyunghyang Shimbun and Hankyoreh, while focusing on the Chosun Ilbo, Dong-A Ilbo, and JoongAng Ilbo. And other conglomerates, such as the Hyundai Kia Automotive Group or the Doosan Group, have adopted a similar strategy (Hankyoreh, 2010). Thus, it very well shows the influence a very big advertiser can have on the media, when a large conglomerate, like the Samsung Group, tries to silence a few critical voices by heavily reducing its advertising in those companies, while at the same time trying to louden the voices of those that either do

<sup>30</sup> It is based on the data from the Korea Association of Advertising.

not criticize them, ignore them, or praise them. Thus, Korea has also often been dubbed the “Republic of Samsung” (Borowiec, 2011, p.71).

Next, the paper will look at the total advertising expenditure. In Korea, traditional media accounted for almost equally as much as in Japan—half of the entire advertising expenditure—including newspapers, magazines, radio, and television, while new media, specifically the Internet, accounted for slightly over 22 percent (see Table 45)—thus, 6.54 percentage points more than in Japan. Interestingly, in Korea the Internet, rather than television as it is the case in Japan, accounted for the largest proportion of the total advertising expenditure, followed by television with slightly over 20 percent—10 percent less than in Japan—and then followed by newspapers with 17.15percent—roughly 7 percentage points larger than in Japan.



**Table 52: Advertising Expenditure in Korea (2013)**

Advertising Expenditure in Korea (2013)		
	Expenditure	Ratio (in %)
Traditional Media		
Newspapers	15,447,000	17.15
Magazines	4,650,000	5.16
Radio	2,246,000	2.49
Television	18,273,000	20.28
<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>40,616,000</i>	<i>45.09</i>
Satellite Media-Related		
Cable TV / General Programming Channels	13,825,000	15.35
IPTV <sup>31</sup>	380,000	0.42
Satellite TV	151,000	0.17
DMB <sup>32</sup>	124,000	0.14
SO	712,000	0.79
<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>15,192,000</i>	<i>16.86</i>
Internet	20,030,000	22.24
Mobile	4,600,000	5.11
Out-of-Home	9,645,000	10.71
<b>Total Expenditure</b>	<b>90,083,000</b>	<b>100.00</b>

(Kwang, 2013, p.6)

<sup>31</sup> Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) is television delivered through the Internet instead of the traditional terrestrial, satellite, and cable television.

<sup>32</sup> Digital Multimedia Broadcasting (DMB) is a digital radio transmission technology developed in Korea for sending multimedia, such as television, to mobile devices.

#### 4.5.2.1 Newspapers

The table below (see Table 53) shows the total revenue for print and online newspapers. The daily newspapers accounted for 77.16 percent of the entire revenue, while online newspapers accounting for quite astonishing 12.75 percent, and the remaining 10.09 percent coming from weekly print newspapers. Moreover, specifically the national daily newspapers—of which the three largest newspapers previously discussed belong to—accounted for 40.75 percent alone of all the newspapers, print and online, daily and weekly (KPF, 2013b, p.28). Additionally, the table below (see Table 53) shows that advertising accounted for a total, for both print and online, nearly above 56 percent of the entire revenue, which, however is slowly shrinking (KPF, 2013b, p.5). This is in contrast to Japan, where newspapers only received 23.20 percent of its revenue through advertising, and might thus be less influenced by large advertisers, as it for example, has been the case in Korea.

**Table 53: Newspaper Revenue in Korea (2012)**

Newspaper Revenue in Korea (2012)				
		Revenue	Advertising (in %)	Total (in %)
Print Newspapers <sup>33</sup>	Daily <sup>34</sup>	2,884,955,000	57.73	77.16
	Weekly <sup>35</sup>	377,148,000	48.76	10.09
<i>Subtotal</i>		<i>3,262,103,000</i>	<i>56.70</i>	<i>87.25</i>
Online Newspapers <sup>36</sup>		476,638,000	50.65	12.75
<b>Total Revenue</b>		<b>3,738,741,000</b>	<b>55.93</b>	<b>100.00</b>

(KPF, 2013b, p.30)

This is further illustrated by the fact that newspaper sales only accounted for slightly above 20 percent—the highest among weekly newspapers with 39.62 percent—while in Japan it accounted for a little bit above 60 percent (see Table 54). The rest of the revenue comes from value-added and other businesses, which, in contrast to advertising revenue, are rising.

<sup>33</sup> Daily and weekly newspapers are further split, for example, into national, local, or special newspapers.

<sup>34</sup> The data for daily newspapers consisted of 168 companies.

<sup>35</sup> The data for weekly newspapers consisted of 1,156 companies.

<sup>36</sup> Internet newspapers are split further into general, local, and special newspapers.

**Table 54: Newspaper Sales in Korea (2012)**

Newspaper Sales in Korea (2012)		
	Revenue	Sales (in %)
Daily	2,884,955,000	17.76
Weekly	377,148,000	39.62
<b>Total Revenue</b>	<b>3,262,103,000</b>	<b>20.29</b>

(KPF, 2013b, p.30)

The total media revenue, including all the media in Korea, in 2012 was 8.79 billion USD, of which the three largest newspapers, Chosun Ilbo, JoongAng Ilbo, and Dong-A Ilbo accounted for 11.08 percent of this total revenue alone (KPF, 2013b, p.28).

#### **4.5.2.2 Television**

Of the total revenue, the three largest broadcasting companies, namely, KBS, MBC, and SBS accounted for 35.02 percent alone (KPF, 2013b, p.28). In 2012, public broadcasting revenue accounted for 61.33 percent of the total broadcasting revenue, while private broadcasting accounted for 21.72 percent. However, public broadcasting has been experiencing a negative growth rate, while private broadcasting is increasing, with its largest increase in cable television (KPF, 2013b, pp.29-30). Furthermore, the table below (see Table 55) shows that advertising alone accounts for nearly 48 percent of the revenue for public broadcasting, while for private broadcasting it is slightly above 65 percent.

**Table 55: Broadcasting Revenue in Korea (2012)**

<b>Broadcasting<sup>37</sup> Revenue in Korea (2012)</b>			
	Revenue	Advertising (in %)	Total (in %)
Public Broadcasting	2,979,320,000	47.77	61.33
Private Broadcasting	1,055,366,000	65.34	21.72
Special Broadcasting	425,093,000	14.87	8.75
Cable Television	379,871,000	69.15	7.82
Terrestrial DMB	18,346,000	41.13	0.38
<b>Total Revenue</b>	<b>4,857,996,000</b>	<b>50.36</b>	<b>100.00</b>

(KPF, 2013b, p.30)

Interestingly, for public broadcasting the license fee accounted for 601.513 million USD<sup>38</sup>, thus, only accounting for 20.19 percent of the total revenue, while advertising accounted for more than twice as much (KPF, 2013b, p.30).

### **Korean Broadcasting System**

Article 56 of the Broadcasting Act states that “expenses of [KBS] shall be met by the television broadcast [license] fees under Article 64, but the revenues as prescribed by Presidential Decree such as the revenues from the commercial broadcasts may be appropriated if necessary for the proper accomplishment of the objective affairs” (Broadcasting Act of Korea, 1987). Article 64 of the Broadcasting Act also states that “any person who possesses a television receiver [...] in order to receive television broadcasts shall register the TV set with [KBS], and pay a television broadcast [license] fee” (Broadcasting Act of Korea, 1987). Furthermore, under Article 66(1), it states that “a person liable to pay the [license] fees fails to pay them

<sup>37</sup> Since it says “broadcasting” it can be assumed that it includes television as well as radio.

<sup>38</sup> This number, as reported by the Korea Press Foundation, seems a little odd, as only 17,728 households own a television set in Korea, and they currently only pay 2.50 USD a month (30.00 USD a year), meaning the revenue collected from license fee could only account for 531,840 USD for all households. This is insofar odd, as such places of residence exclusively for residential purposes only need to pay for one television set per household, while merely in other cases the fee is collected according to the number of television sets owned (KBS, 2005)—making it 20,032,705 such sets.

within the relevant payment period, collect an additional charge” (Broadcasting Act of Korea, 1987). Thus, unlike in Japan, Koreans will be required to pay a fine if they fail to pay the license fee.

At the beginning of 2014, KBS submitted a plan to the KCC to increase its license fee from the current 2.50 USD to 4.00 USD per month—which remained unchanged for 33 years—and to reduce the amount of revenue received from advertising from 600 million USD to 210 million USD, while it also plans to get rid of commercials entirely by 2018, in order to ensure the quality of their content, which has been welcomed by the then acting KCC chairman Lee Kyeong-jae (Shin, 2014). As mentioned before, the license fee is immensely low compared to other countries (see Table 48), even if the planned increase is taken into account. In 2012, of the total revenue from license fees, 90.39 percent went to KBS, which contributed part of this revenue, namely, 2.80 percent, directly to EBS (see Table 56), as it is required under Article 68 of the Broadcasting Act (Broadcasting Act of Korea, 1987) and Article 49 of Enforcement Decree of the Broadcasting Act (Enforcement Decree of the Broadcasting Act of Korea, 2000, p.35). The fee is collected via the electricity bill sent out by the Korean Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), which was implemented in 1994, and has ultimately tremendously increased its collection rate to 99 percent by 1999 (Hanawa, 2005, pp.91-92; KBS, 2005). Moreover, according to a survey from 2011, 70 percent of the people responded positively to the importance of license fees (Nakamura et al., 2013, p.26).

**Table 56: Licensing Fee Breakdown in Korea (2012)**

License Fee Breakdown in Korea (2012)		
	Revenue	Ratio (in %)
KBS	528,900,000	90.39
EBS	16,400,000	2.80
Commission for Consignment Collection	39,800,000	7.53
<b>Total Revenue</b>	<b>585,100,000</b>	<b>100.00</b>

(KBS, 2013c, p.43)

The table below (see Table 57) shows that advertising accounted for the largest part of KBS's revenue with slightly over 41 percent, closely followed by the license fee, which accounted for 38.52 percent. However, as mentioned before, only 90 percent of the revenue through the license fee are kept by

KBS, thus, it accounted for only 34.82 percent of its revenue, compared to 1980, when the license fee accounted for 100 percent of its revenue (Hanawa, 2005, p.93).

**Table 57: Revenue Breakdown of KBS (2012)**

Revenue Breakdown of KBS (in 2012)		
	Revenue	Ratio (in %)
License Fee	585,100,000	38.52
Advertising	623,600,000	41.05
Other <sup>39</sup>	359,300,000	23.65
<b>Total Revenue</b>	<b>1,519,000,000</b>	<b>100.00</b>

(KBS, 2013c, pp.44, 46)

Additionally, under Article 61 of the Broadcasting Act, “the state may subsidize part of the expenses required for the operation of [KBS], loan the financial funds, or accept the debentures of [KBS] within the limit of the budget” (Broadcasting Act of Korea, 1987). Thus, compared to the Japanese counterpart (NHK), KBS derives its revenue nearly equally as much from advertising as well as from its collected license fee, while 96 percent of NHK’s revenue comes solely from the license fee, for which Japanese at the same time will not be fined if they fail to make that payment.

### **Educational Broadcasting System**

The table below (see Table 58) shows that only 6.13 percent of EBS’s revenue comes from the license fees, which, as mentioned before, accounted for only 2.80 percent of the total license fee collected in Korea. However, 28 percent of its total revenue is derived from public funds, namely, the license fee, the Broadcasting Development Fund, as well as special grants. But, the largest revenue source is the sale of textbooks, which accounted for 20.42 percent, closely followed by other publications, accounting for 19.22 percent. Advertising, on the other hand, only accounted for slightly above 11 percent of its total revenue.

<sup>39</sup> Other revenue came from the government, as well as from sources not related to broadcasting, such as copyright revenue.

**Table 58: Revenue Breakdown of EBS (2012)**

Revenue Breakdown of EBS (2012)		
	Revenue	Ratio (in %)
Public Funds		
License Fee	16,400,000	6.13
Broadcasting Development Fund <sup>40</sup>	20,000,000	7.48
Special Grants <sup>41</sup>	38,700,000	14.47
<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>75,100,000</i>	<i>28.09</i>
Other Revenue		
Textbook Sales	54,600,000	20.42
Other Publication	51,400,000	19.22
Advertisement	30,500,000	11.41
New Media	25,100,000	9.39
Program Sales, etc.	30,700,000	11.48
<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>192,300,000</i>	<i>71.91</i>
<b>Total Revenue</b>	<b>271,900,000</b>	<b>100.00</b>

(EBS, n.d.a).

**Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation**

In 2010, MBC had a total revenue of 802.1 million USD. However, it is not mentioned how much of that revenue came from advertising, or any other source of revenue. It mainly states on its website that it is a “public broadcaster, which operates on advertising” (MBC, 1996a). Thus, it can be assumed that either its revenue is fully derived from advertising, or that at least a significant proportion comes from advertising.

<sup>40</sup> The Broadcasting Development includes subsidies for program production, disability broadcasting, and disability Internet.

<sup>41</sup> Special Grants include CSAT programs, English Education programs, and After School programs.

However, it is interesting to see how part of its revenue is spent. For example, 4.75 percent of its total revenue is devoted to the Broadcasting Development Fund (MBC, 1996c), which was established by the KCC “for the broadcasting promotion projects and the culture and arts promotion projects,” as stated under Article 36 (Broadcasting Act of Korea, 1987). Under Article 37(2) of the Broadcasting Act, the KCC “may collect the fund from terrestrial broadcasting business operators [namely, KBS, MBC, and SBS] within the limit of [6 percent] of the commercial broadcaster turnover” (Broadcasting Act of Korea, 1987). And thus, projects like EBS, which derives 7.48 percent of its total revenue from this fund, are supported thereby. Additionally, according to Article 13(2) of the Foundation for Broadcasting Culture Act, 15 percent of its profit must be returned to the Foundation (FBC, 2004b), which, as mentioned before, owns 70 percent of its shares (MBC, 1996c). Moreover, MBC annually donates 1.4 million USD to the Chung-soo Scholarship Foundation, which owns 30 percent of its shares (MBC, 1996a). And thus, amongst other things, when speaking of MBC it is commonly referred to as a commercial broadcaster with a focus on public service.

### **Seoul Broadcasting System**

The table below (see Table 59) shows that advertising accounted for 57.71 percent of SBS’s total revenue, while advertising coming from television broadcasts alone accounted for almost 54 percent. Thus, it can be concluded that SBS is largely dependent on advertising in the television market.



**Table 59: SBS Revenue Breakdown (First Quarter of 2014)**

SBS Revenue Breakdown (First Quarter of 2014)			
		Revenue	Ratio (in %)
Advertising	TV	86,211,000	53.85
	Radio	5,907,000	3.69
	DMB	270,000	0.17
<i>Subtotal</i>		<i>92,388,000</i>	<i>57.71</i>
Sponsorship	TV	13,445,000	8.40
	Radio	1,902,000	1.19
<i>Subtotal</i>		<i>15,347,000</i>	<i>9.59</i>
Business Revenue		52,346,000	32.70
<b>Operating Income</b>		<b>160,081,000</b>	<b>100.00</b>

(SBS, 2014)

While KBS and EBS receive some of their revenue from the state—even though also largely financed through the market—MBC and SBS are entirely financed through the market.

#### 4.5.2.3 Internet

As mentioned before, online newspapers accounted for 12.75 percent of the total revenue for newspapers, print and online, and slightly above half of its revenue is derived from advertising (see Table 53). The table below (see Table 60) shows that special online newspapers accounted for the largest part of the total revenue, with slightly above 54 percent.

**Table 60: Online Newspaper Revenue in Korea (2012)**

Online Newspaper Revenue in Korea (2012)		
	Total Revenue	Ratio (in %)
General Online Newspaper	189,278,000	39.71
Local Online Newspaper	29,320,000	6.15
Special Online Newspaper	258,040,000	54.14
Total	476,638,000	100.00

(KPF, 2013b, p.28)

But, as there were not any popular stand-alone newspapers, the paper will instead focus on the three largest online portals in Korea.

#### **NAVER Corporation**

NAVER Corporation receives 75 percent of its revenue from advertising, 21 percent through the sale of content, and 4 percent through other businesses (NAVER Corporation, 2014, p.6).

#### **Daum Communications**

Daum Communications latest presentation on its earnings was not accessible during the time of this research (Daum Communications, 2013a), and the information provided on their website did not illustrate how their revenue was broken down (Daum Communications, n.d.a). However, it can be assumed that most of their revenue might also be derived from advertising.

#### **SK Telecom**

The earnings for SK communication, the owner of nate.com, a subsidiary of SK Telecom was also not accessible (SK Communications, 2008b). However, it can be equally assumed here that most of its revenue for nate.com is also derived from advertising.

Thus, it can be concluded that the media in Korea is financed through both, the market and the state, whereas only a part of television, in regards to the three media discussed, seems to be financed through the state (see Table 61).

**Table 61: Media Financing in Korea**

Media Financing in Korea	
Newspapers	
Chosun Ilbo Company	Market
JoongAng Media Network	Market
Dong-A Media Group	Market
Television	
Korean Broadcasting System	Market and State
Educational Broadcasting System	Market and State
Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation	Market
SBS Media Holdings	Market
Internet	
NAVER Corporation	Market
Daum Communications	Market
SK Telecom	Market

### 4.5.3 Conclusion

While the degree significantly varies between those two countries, it can be concluded that in both cases the media is financed through the market as well as the state (see Table 62).

**Table 62: Media Financing (Japan vs. Korea)**

Media Financing (Japan vs. Korea)	
Japan	Korea
Market and State (B)	Market and State (B)

## 4.6 Political Parallelism and Media Culture

In this section, the paper will closely look at how strong or weak the relationship is between the media and politics.

### 4.6.1 Japan

#### 4.6.1.1 Media Content

While a high circulation of daily newspapers might certainly indicate a largely educated and informed citizenry, it may also be the cause of several problems. For example, it has been reported that the content among the different papers is almost exactly the same, largely being politically neutral. Newspapers instead focus almost exclusively on a factual presentation of the news, and trying to avoid any kind of “interpretation, sensationalism, or even argumentation” (Gunther & Mughan, 2000, p.270). One reason for this uniformity might be that Japanese journalists only rarely decide to engage in investigative journalism<sup>42</sup>, but rather develop a more close personal relationship with government officials, as will be discussed in more detail shortly. And thus, the journalists are reluctant to provide any in-depth analysis on scandals, in order not to compromise their relationship with those public officials. On the other hand, weekly and monthly publications—which are in most cases even owned by large daily newspapers—which have a much lower circulation rate, often times offer a broader range of news and opinions, which are then later picked up by the daily newspapers, when the point is reached where they can no longer avoid addressing a certain issue (Reischauer & Jansen, 1995, pp.219-21; Hayes, 2009, p.125). Another

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<sup>42</sup> The Asahi Shimbun is actually affiliated with the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) (CPI, 2012, p.19) launched by the Center for Public Integrity (CPI), an US-based non-profit investigative journalism organization whose mission is “to serve democracy by revealing abuses of power, corruption, and betrayal of public trust by powerful public and private institutions, using the tools of investigative journalism” (CPI, 2014).

reason for why the content is quite similar in all the daily newspapers is due to the fact that Japan's readership is not segmented by region (e.g. United States), or by educational or social class (e.g. United Kingdom), or political views (e.g. Continental Europe). Thus, as it is treating the market as a homogenous group, rather than a group of people from different regions, or having a different educational or social background, or different political view, the newspapers are trying to make sure that they are not offending anyone from their audience. This is similar to television in some countries (Gunther & Mughan, 2000, p.268). This might also be slightly related to the discussion revolving around Asian values, having its roots in the philosophical system known as Confucianism, where the media, as a result, sees its role primarily in maintaining social and political stability (Veltmer, 2008, pp.34-35).

And this homogeneity in news reporting might ultimately lead to the homogeneity in the political views of the people in Japan, as millions of Japanese are armed with the same news and opinions, from newspapers, as well as television. However, the most important reason, as already mentioned, is the rather unusual method of newsgathering, which is primarily done through press clubs.

#### **4.6.1.2 Press Clubs**

The most interesting aspect of the media in Japan is the press club system, as briefly mentioned before. While it is similar to the White House Press Corps, in Japan it can be found in every major institution, from government agencies, to political parties, and to large businesses (Gunther & Mughan, 2000, p.270). Japan has a long tradition of press clubs, which were originally created so that the government could take control of the media more effectively and efficiently. One of the main issues that arose from this is the fact that journalists, who were not members of these clubs, especially foreign journalists, faced many barriers in the previous years. However, this problem was later resolved in 1993, due to the pressure from the foreign media, which forced the Japan News Publishers and Editors Association to allow foreign journalists to become full members of its association, hence, allowing them to join these press clubs. However, it is still difficult, for example, for freelance journalists to join these press clubs, or non-traditional media companies, but this will be discussed in more detail later. Within those press clubs, individual journalists are usually assigned to a specific faction of the political party—they are commonly referred to as *habitus kasha* (trans. "faction journalists")—and sometimes they are even assigned to specific politicians, giving them the chance to create a strong, close personal tie with a particular official, and are as a result more unlikely to report any unfavorable or derogatory information. And these public

officials, on the other hand, then provide these journalists with some information, such as press releases, which they can then use for reporting to the general public. Thus, this system has often been called *happyo janarizumu* or *happyo hodo* (trans. “announcement journalism”) (Hayes, 2009, p.126). As a result, it can be easily assumed that the government will in most cases not provide any information, which it cannot control.

For example, Yu Terasawa, who has been named one of Reporters Without Borders’ 100 Information Heroes (RSF, 2014a), also explained that the main problem is simply the fact that large media companies are allowed to exclusively use these offices for themselves, located in government buildings, where the journalists of these large corporations are then giving special press conferences, and where freelance investigative journalists like himself are not really welcome. He further stated that these journalists then “just look at the papers handed out [to them] by the officials and say, ‘Ah, so that’s our news story for today’” (Yu, 2014). And as a result, both sides profit, the public officials, as well as these journalists of these large media companies. A prominent example of this is again the incident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, as only members of the press club system were among the few journalists permitted to the official press conferences in the wake of the earthquake and tsunami in 2011, while freelance journalists, as well as foreign and online media were not allowed to attend any these press conferences. This prompted three freelance journalists, among them Yu Terasawa, to file a legal complaint against the press clubs in 2012 (RSF, 2012).

Moreover, it also highlighted the strong influence of TEPCO on the advertising industry, as it reportedly spends 239.12 million USD on advertising per year, which might have led several media companies to take a more conservative stance on their news reporting. Additionally, it has been reported by the Freedom House, that many journalists, such as from the Nikkei and Mainichi Shimbun, have “gone on to work for pro-nuclear organizations and publications” (Freedom House, 2013a).

Thus, it can be concluded that the media in Japan shows rather moderate to strong ties to politics, and that investigative journalism is rather limited, especially amongst large daily newspapers.

## **4.6.2 Korea**

### **4.6.2.1 Media Content**

The three largest newspapers in Korea are considered to be conservative, whereas alternatives, such as the liberal newspaper *Hankyoreh* do exist (Polley, 2009, p.208). Newspapers are usually taking a hard line on the reporting of North Korea, while advocating the relationship between Japan and the United States (Ramstad, 2009). And while newspapers have more or less maintained their ideological orientation, regardless of any regime changes, broadcasting, television in particular, has always changed with the ruling government (Kwak, 2012, p.91).

There is also a sharp contrast between news reporting on political and ideological issues, and economic scandals involving large conglomerates, as the larger media companies usually try to avoid any news story revolving around the corruption or wrongdoing of any particular conglomerate, by either ignoring it, or only reporting the most basic facts. Additionally, like in Japan, they tend to leave out any in-depth analyses. This is mainly done due to the fact that they are financially dependent on these conglomerates, as they derive large portions of their revenue from advertising, as it has been the case with the Samsung Group, as discussed before. However, as soon as they can no longer avoid addressing an issue, they usually break the story more openly to the general public (Kwak, 2012, pp.81-83). However, when it comes to reports that involve corruption or wrongdoing by the government, or public officials, the media will quickly voice its criticism and openly reveal their wrongdoing (Kwak, 2012, pp.89-90). As pointed out in the beginning, each paper has its own “ideological inclination” (Kwak, 2012, p.89), therefore, a conservative newspaper would naturally criticize the political parties at the other side of its political as well as ideological spectrum, practically “waging an ideological war against their opponents” (Rhee et al., 2011, p.331). However, any newspaper, regardless of its ideological view, would naturally resist the government, when it comes to protecting its own very interests (Rhee et al., 2011, p.331).

But, other newspapers, like the moderate newspaper *Kyunghyang Shimbun*, claim to do both, to investigate against the government, whether it is conservative or liberal, as well as to investigate against large conglomerates (*Kyunghyang Shimbun*, 2005). Or *Newstapa*, also known as the Korea Center for Investigative Journalism (KCIJ), affiliated with the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) (CPI, 2012, p.19), even published a report last year calling out Koreans who own offshore companies (Kang, 2013).

#### 4.6.2.2 Press Clubs

Unlike in Japan, Korea decided to eliminate its press club system in 2004, which had still existed from the Japanese colonial rule that ended in 1945, and which acted much in the same manner as the press system still found in Japan. As a direct consequence from this, it forced the large conservative newspapers to report more critically about the government. Now, under the current system, the government charges each reporter assigned to the Blue House—the executive office and official residence of the President, like the White House in the United States—roughly 50 USD a month, and where reporters from any media company, big or small, traditional or non-traditional, are able to register (Onishi, 2004; Kwak, 2012, pp.66-67).

#### 4.6.3 Conclusion

In both cases, the media does not function as a pure “watchdog.” There is a strong tie between the media and politics in Japan, especially due to its press club system. In Korea, on the other hand, it seems there is a stronger tie between the media and large conglomerates, however, some relationships between the media companies and political parties also exist in Korea, especially amongst those who share the same ideology (see Table 63). And while the media in Japan and Korea in some cases appear to be acting rather as lapdogs, either to political parties or large companies, they do sometimes seem to be biting back.

**Table 63: Political Parallelism and Media Culture (Japan vs. Korea)**

Political Parallelism and Media Culture (Japan vs. Korea)	
Japan	Korea
Moderate (B)	Moderate (B)

### 4.7 Media Orientation

In this section, the paper will look at whether the media is focused on commercial activity, public service, or a mixture of both.



### **4.7.1 Japan**

The five largest newspapers in Japan are all privately owned and solely financed through the market, largely from the sale of its newspapers, while advertising merely accounts for around 20 percent of its total revenue. Additionally, these five newspapers account for nearly 55 percent of the entire newspaper market, while the newspapers, Yomiuri Shimbun and Asahi Shimbun, are almost on equal footing, both accounting for around 20 percent each. Thus, it can be assumed that the newspaper market in Japan is highly competitive, and thus, in order to make sure to build a sustainable business for the future a larger focus will most likely be put on commercial activity. And as the newspapers mostly get their news through the press club system, and their content is mostly the same, with little to no differentiation, makes it even harder to stay competitive, in a highly competitive market. And the same is true for television, which relies 85 percent on spot and sponsorship commercials. It makes logically sense that privately owned companies, financed through the market, would put a larger emphasis on commercial activity, rather than on educating the general public, as at the end of the day they most likely only focus on maximizing profits and increasing shareholder value.

NHK is the only public broadcaster, and is solely financed through license fees. And as previously stated, according to Article 20(4) of the Broadcasting Law, “NHK shall not have the aim of making a profit when conducting the operations” (Broadcasting Act of Japan, 1950). Thus, it can only be assumed that NHK is most likely the only large media company in Japan, which is solely focused on public service. This is further shown under Chapter 3 of the Broadcasting Act, which states that NHK was established as a public broadcaster for the “purpose of public welfare” (Broadcasting Act of Japan, 1950).


Furthermore, according to a survey conducted by NHK, 66 percent of the people are satisfied with its programs and services (Nakamura et al., 2013, p.21). However, when looking at the preference between public or commercial television, 64 percent of the people responded that they prefer commercial television, whereas only 20 percent preferred public television (see Table 64).

**Table 64: Preference for Public or Commercial Television in Japan (2011)**

Preference for Public or Commercial Television in Japan (2011)	
	Respondents (in %)
Public Television	20.00
Commercial Television	64.00
Neutral	15.00
No Response	1.00


(Nakamura et al., 2013, p.15)

In the figure below (see Figure 2) it shows that commercial television accounted for the largest profit in Japan, accounting for more than 70 percent.

**Figure 2: Terrestrial Television Profit, Public vs. Commercial, in Japan (2006-2011)**

(JBA, 2013, p.26)

And the five largest television networks in Japan accounted for more than 50 percent of all the profit of the commercial television sector (see Figure 3).



**Figure 3: Profit of Commercial Television, 5 Largest Commercial Television Networks, in Japan (2006-2011)**

(JBA, 2013, p.27)

Thus, it can be assumed that the media in Japan is primarily focused on commercial activity (see Table 66), rather than public service. While public service does certainly exist, it is mostly just in the form of NHK, whereas most people seem to prefer commercially owned television more, which, again, is solely focused on maximizing its profit, like any other privately owned business that is financed through the market.

#### **4.7.2 Korea**

It can be assumed that it is the same case for newspaper market in Korea. The three largest newspapers, which account for around 65 percent of the total newspapers market, are all privately owned, and financed through the market, thus, it makes certainly sense that they are also mostly just focused on commercial

activity. This is further illustrated by the fact that newspapers are reluctant to report any wrongdoing or corruption involving any of the large conglomerates, as they are largely dependent on their advertising money, which, unlike in Japan, accounts for nearly 60 percent of their total revenue.

This is, however, in contrast to television, which seems to be more focused on public service. Under Article 43(1) of the Broadcasting Act, KBS was established “as the State’s key broadcasting in order to fix a fair and sound broadcast culture, and to efficiently implement the broadcasts for home and abroad” (Broadcasting Act of Korea, 1987). Under Article 44, its public responsibilities are listed, such as being impartial, making the general public interested in broadcasting, offering superior quality in broadcasting services, as well as promoting “national culture and [ensuring] a homogeneity of the nation” (Broadcasting Act of Korea, 1987). However, unlike NHK in Japan, KBS is partially financed through advertising, namely, around 40 percent of its total revenue is coming from advertisements. However, KBS plans on reducing the amount of revenue it gets from advertising by two thirds, and even to get rid of commercials entirely by the year 2018. And while MBC heavily relies on advertising it is more focused on public service, with such activities as returning 15 percent of its profit to the Foundation for Broadcasting Culture as well as donating 1.4 million USD to the Chung-soo Scholarship Foundation, both of which are also the sole owners of MBC. SBS, on the other hand, is most likely only focused on commercial activity, as it is privately owned and solely financed through the market.


According to the same survey done by NHK in Japan, 76 percent of the people are satisfied with programs and services of the public broadcasters (Nakamura et al., 2013, p.21), meaning 10 percent more than in Japan. Additionally, in Korea, the preference is split rather equally, with 31 percent saying they prefer public television, and 28 percent preferring commercial television (see Table 65), making them similarly strong. However, most people in Korea were actually neutral (38 percent), while in Japan only 15 percent had no particular preference at all.

**Table 65: Preference for Public or Commercial Television in Korea (2011)**

Preference for Public or Commercial Television in Korea (2011)	
	Respondents (in %)
Public Television	31.00
Commercial Television	28.00
Neutral	38.00
No Response	3.00

(Nakamura et al., 2013, p.15)

The graph below (see Figure 4) also shows that the public broadcasters account for the largest commercial activity, as public broadcasting, radio and television, accounted for more than 70 percent of the total revenue in both years, 2011 and 2012.

**Figure 4: Broadcasting Revenue, Public vs. Private, in Korea (2011-2012)**

(KPF, 2013b, p.29)<sup>43</sup>

Thus, the three largest newspapers, as well as the three largest online portals, are primarily focused on commercial activities, while television, specifically KBS, EBS, and MBC, seems to be more focused on public service. Therefore, it can be concluded that the media orientation in Korea is rather divergent, not too strongly leaning in either of the other two directions, whereas in Japan it is more obvious that the media is oriented rather towards commercial activities (see Table 66).

### 4.7.3 Conclusion

As a result, it can be concluded that while in Japan almost all of the media is largely focused on commercial activity, in Korea, only the largest daily newspapers and online portals are focused on commercial activity, while television is largely concerned with public service (see Table 66).

**Table 66: Media Orientation (Japan vs. Korea)**

Media Orientation (Japan vs. Korea)	
Japan	Korea
Commercial (A)	Divergent (B)

<sup>43</sup> Special broadcasting, cable television, and terrestrial DMB are excluded from this figure.

## 5 Conclusion and Outlook

This paper tried to answer the following research question, which was put at the beginning of the paper:

*What are the similarities and differences  
in the media systems of Japan and Korea?*

While both countries are from the same world region, there are still a few minor differences between the media in both countries, which make each media system a little bit different from each other, however, not by a very high degree. The results are summarized in the table below (see Table 67).

Of the seven dimensions examined, only two seemed to show the biggest differences in those two media systems, namely, the freedom of the media and state control over the media, as well as the media orientation. In terms of the media freedom and state control over the media, Korea has a lower media freedom, which is mostly connected with the stronger state control over the media, with such laws as the vaguely worded National Security Act, while other laws, such as the defamation laws, are sometimes used in both countries in order to silence critically voices. Additionally, Korea has just recently decided to remove certain restrictions on the media, such as the ban on private media representatives, late-night terrestrial television, or cross-ownership. However, both countries did not rank so well according to any of the organizations measuring media freedom in the world, namely, the Freedom House and Reporters Without Borders.

Another difference is shown in their media orientation. In Japan, the five largest newspapers, as well as the five largest televisions networks, which accounted for the largest market share in each segment, are primarily focused on commercial activity. In Korea, on the other hand, while the three largest newspapers and three largest online portals are also primarily focused on commercial activity, the largest television networks, except for SBS, focus mainly on performing a public service. And thus, in the case of Korea, the media orientation can be considered to follow the middle.

However, there are more similarities than differences, such as the fact that both media systems operate in a democratic political system, which is characterized by both, a conflict-oriented and consensus-oriented political culture, whereas the latter might be more highly developed. Moreover, in both countries the newspapers—as well as the online portals in Korea—are privately owned and financed

through the market. Television, on the other hand, is both, privately and publicly owned, and financed through the state as well as the market. And lastly, in both countries moderate to strong ties exist between the media companies and political parties—whereas in Korea, the relationships to large conglomerates seem to be stronger in comparison. And while investigative journalism certainly exists to some extent in both countries, it is mainly done by weekly and monthly publications, or freelance journalists working for non-traditional media companies.

Thus, it can be concluded that the similarities in both media systems outweigh the differences.

**Table 67: Media Systems (Japan vs. Korea)**

Media System (Japan vs. Korea)		
	Japan	Korea
Political System	A	A
Political Culture	B	B
Media Freedom and State Control over the Media	A	B
Media Ownership	B	B
Media Financing	B	B
Political Parallelism and Media Culture	B	B
Media Orientation	A	B

## 5.1 Further Research

It is important to acknowledge that a case study comparing only two countries is rather limited in its capacity to definitely sort out the explanatory power of casual factors. From this study alone, it can certainly not be concluded, if these two systems are so similar to each other based on the fact that they are from the same world region, as other countries from East Asia, such as China or North Korea, have been deliberately excluded from this discussion, and, if included, would have provided a completely different perspective. If one were trying to find out if media systems within the same world region are truly more similar to each other, a multi-country study would be highly recommended.



Additionally, this paper only scratches on the surface of what could be potentially discovered. It tried to give a rather simple, yet somewhat elaborate overview of the media systems of Japan and Korea. However, further research would be still highly recommended. Several things come to mind when thinking about what could be potentially done for any future research. For example, one could include all types of mass media (e.g. radio, mobile phones) to give an even more elaborate picture of the media systems of Japan and Korea, instead of only focusing on the largest daily newspapers, television networks, and stand-alone online newspapers. Or one could focus more deeply on one specific media, such as the Internet, which however will most likely not deliver any satisfying results about the similarities or the differences of the media systems compared, as this paper has already shown that there are quite substantial differences between the different mass media themselves. It could also be interesting to do a content analysis of the individual mass media, and analyze the similarities and differences in content and tone across the various media channels within one or more countries.

## 6 List of Abbreviations

ANN.....	All-Nippon News Network (Japan)
CERN .....	European Organization for Nuclear Research
CHF.....	Swiss Franc
CNN .....	Cable News Network
CPB .....	Corporation for Public Broadcasting
CPI .....	Center for Public Integrity
CS.....	Communication Satellite
CSAT.....	College Scholastic Ability Test (Korea)
CX.....	Fuji Television Network (Japan)
DAMG.....	Dong-A Media Group
DMB.....	Digital Multimedia Broadcasting
DPJ .....	Democratic Party of Japan
EBS .....	Educational Broadcasting System (Korea)
EIU.....	The Economist Intelligence Unit
EUR.....	Euro
EX .....	TV Asahi Corporation (Japan)
FNN .....	Fuji News Network (Japan)
FTC .....	Fair Trade Commission (Korea)
GBP.....	Pound Sterling (£)
GDP.....	Gross Domestic Product
ICCPR.....	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICIJ.....	International Consortium of Investigative Journalists
IFABC.....	International Federation of Audit Bureaux of Circulations
IFES.....	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
INYT.....	International New York Times
IPTV.....	Internet Protocol Television
IREX.....	International Research & Exchanges Board
JAITS.....	Japanese Association of Independent Television Stations

## List of Abbreviations

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JBA.....	Japan Commercial Broadcasters Association
JMnet.....	JoongAng Media Network (Korea)
JNN.....	Japanese News Network
JPY.....	Japanese Yen
JRP.....	Japan Restoration Party
KBC.....	Kwangju Broadcasting Corporation (Korea)
KBS.....	Korean Broadcasting System
KCC.....	Korea Communications Commission
KCIJ.....	Korea Center for Investigative Journalism
KCSC.....	Korea Communications Standards Commission
KEDI.....	Korean Educational Development Institute
KEPCO.....	Korean Electric Power Corporation
KNN.....	Korea New Network
KOBACO.....	Korea Broadcasting Advertising Corporation
KPF.....	Korea Press Foundation
KRW.....	Korean Won
KT.....	Korea Telecom
LDP.....	Liberal Democratic Party (Japan)
MBC.....	Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation
MSI.....	Media Sustainability Index
MSN.....	Microsoft Network
NEC.....	Nippon Electric Company
NET.....	Nippon Educational Television (Japan)
NHK.....	Nippon Hoso Kyokai (Japan Broadcasting Corporation)
NNN.....	Nippon News Network (Japan)
NPR.....	National Public Radio
NSA.....	National Security Act (Korea)
NSDAP.....	National Socialist German Workers' Party
NSK.....	Nihon Shinbun Kyokai (The Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association)
NTV.....	Nippon Television Network Corporation (Japan)
OHCHR.....	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

## List of Abbreviations

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ONI .....	OpenNet Initiative
PBS .....	Public Broadcasting Service
RSF.....	Reporters Sans Frontières (Reporters Without Borders)
SBS.....	Seoul Broadcasting System
SIPRI .....	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
TBS .....	Tokyo Broadcasting System Television
TEPCO.....	Tokyo Electric Power Company
TJB .....	Taejong Broadcasting Corporation (Korea)
TX .....	TV Tokyo Corporation
TXN .....	TX Network (Japan)
UK.....	United Kingdom
UN .....	United Nations
UNESCO.....	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
URL.....	Uniform Resource Locator
US .....	United States
USD.....	United States Dollar
WVS.....	World Value Survey

## 7 List of Tables

Table 1: Three Models—Dimensions of the Media and Politics (Hallin and Mancini).....	14
Table 2: Extended Comparative Approach—Dimensions and Classifications (Blum) .....	16
Table 3: Extended Comparative Approach—The 6 Models (Blum) .....	17
Table 4: Classification of Political Systems (Aristotle) .....	20
Table 5: Classification of Political System .....	25
Table 6: Classification of Political Culture .....	27
Table 7: Classification of Media Freedom and State Control over the Media.....	29
Table 8: Classification of Media Ownership .....	31
Table 9: Classification of Media Financing .....	32
Table 10: Classification of Political Parallelism and Media Culture .....	35
Table 11: Classification of Media Orientation .....	38
Table 12: Extended Comparative Approach (Modified).....	38
Table 13: Political System (Japan vs. Korea).....	46
Table 14: Interest in Politics (2014).....	47
Table 15: Voting in Elections on a National Level.....	48
Table 16: Political Culture (Japan vs. Korea) .....	50
Table 17: Freedom House—Media Freedom Ranking in East Asia (2013).....	51
Table 18: Reporters Without Borders—Media Freedom in East Asia (2013) .....	52
Table 19: Media Freedom and State Control over the Media (Japan vs. Korea).....	61
Table 20: Largest Daily National Newspapers in Japan by Circulation (2011) .....	62
Table 21: World's 5 Largest Daily Newspapers by Circulation (2011).....	63
Table 22: Ownership Structure of the 5 Largest Daily Newspapers in Japan.....	63
Table 23: TV News Networks in Japan (2014) .....	64
Table 24: Ownership Structure of Television Networks in Japan .....	65
Table 25: Television Viewing Shares of the 6 TV Networks in Japan (2010) .....	66
Table 26: Most Popular Online Newspapers in Japan (2014) .....	67
Table 27: Major Shareholders of the Yomiuri Shimbun Group (2013) .....	69
Table 28: Major Shareholders of the TV Asahi Holdings Corporation (2013) .....	70

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Table 29: Major Shareholders of the Tokyo Broadcasting System Holdings (2013) .....	71
Table 30: Major Shareholders of TV TOKYO Holdings Corporation (2014).....	72
Table 31: Media Ownership in Japan .....	73
Table 32: Largest Daily National Newspapers in Korea by Circulation (2012) .....	74
Table 33: Major Shareholders of the Chosun Ilbo Company (2010) .....	74
Table 34: Major Shareholders of the JoongAng Media Network (2010) .....	75
Table 35: Major Shareholders of the Dong-A Media Group (2010) .....	75
Table 36: Television Viewing Shares in Korea (2008) .....	77
Table 37: Major Shareholders of SBS (2011) .....	79
Table 38: Major Shareholders of SBS Media Holdings (2008) .....	79
Table 39: Most Popular Online Newspapers in Korea (2014) .....	81
Table 40: Ownership Structure of NAVER Corporation (2014).....	82
Table 41: Ownership Structure of Daum Communications (2013) .....	83
Table 42: Ownership Structure of SK Telecom (2013).....	83
Table 43: Media Ownership in Korea .....	84
Table 44: Media Ownership (Japan vs. Korea) .....	85
Table 45: Advertising Expenditure in Japan (2013) .....	86
Table 46: Newspaper Advertising Expenditure in Japan (2010-2013) .....	87
Table 47: Newspaper Revenue in Japan (2010-2012) .....	87
Table 48: Annual License Fees .....	89
Table 49: Revenue Breakdown of TBS (March 31, 2013).....	90
Table 50: Media Financing in Japan.....	90
Table 51: The 10 Largest Advertisers in Korea (2012).....	91
Table 52: Advertising Expenditure in Korea (2013) .....	93
Table 53: Newspaper Revenue in Korea (2012) .....	94
Table 54: Newspaper Sales in Korea (2012).....	95
Table 55: Broadcasting Revenue in Korea (2012).....	96
Table 56: Licensing Fee Breakdown in Korea (2012).....	97
Table 57: Revenue Breakdown of KBS (2012).....	98
Table 58: Revenue Breakdown of EBS (2012).....	99
Table 59: SBS Revenue Breakdown (First Quarter of 2014).....	101

Table 60: Online Newspaper Revenue in Korea (2012).....	102
Table 61: Media Financing in Korea .....	103
Table 62: Media Financing (Japan vs. Korea).....	104
Table 63: Political Parallelism and Media Culture (Japan vs. Korea) .....	108
Table 64: Preference for Public or Commercial Television in Japan (2011).....	110
Table 65: Preference for Public or Commercial Television in Korea (2011).....	113
Table 66: Media Orientation (Japan vs. Korea).....	114
Table 67: Media Systems (Japan vs. Korea).....	116
Table 68: Information Sources, Japan vs. Korea (2010-2014) .....	149
Table 69: Confidence in Political Institutions (2014) .....	150
Table 70: Major Exchange Rates to US Dollar (May 1, 2014).....	152

## 8 List of Figures

Figure 1: Registered Online Newspapers in Japan (2008-2012) .....	80
Figure 2: Terrestrial Television Profit, Public vs. Commercial, in Japan (2006-2011) .....	110
Figure 3: Profit of Commercial Television, 5 Largest Commercial Television Networks, in Japan (2006-2011).....	111
Figure 4: Broadcasting Revenue, Public vs. Private, in Korea (2011-2012) .....	113



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## 10 Appendix I—Data

**Table 68: Information Sources, Japan vs. Korea (2010-2014)**

Information Sources, Japan vs. Korea (2010-2014)					
	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	<Monthly	Never
Newspapers					
Japan	72.6	12.3	2.6	3.3	8.4
Korea	31.7	22.8	8.4	12.5	23.2
Magazines					
Japan	4.2	24.7	27.0	21.9	20.2
Korea	4.6	16.8	22.3	23.0	31.3
Radio					
Japan	28.7	15.2	7.1	10.6	37.0
Korea	30.3	19.1	13.2	11.9	23.1
Television					
Japan	93.6	3.7	0.6	0.5	0.8
Korea	79.9	13.9	1.9	1.0	2.8
Internet					
Japan	34.8	14.7	5.2	4.3	39.5
Korea	50.2	12.7	4.9	5.5	25.0
Mobile phones					
Japan	29.6	13.3	5.3	6.7	43.6
Korea	49.3	9.8	5.6	7.8	25.3

(WVS, 2014, pp.299-303, 305)

**Table 69: Confidence in Political Institutions (2014)**

Confidence in Political Institutions (2014)		
	High <sup>44</sup>	Low <sup>45</sup>
Government		
Japan	24.3	64.3
Korea	49.5	50.3
United States	32.6	65.3
Germany	44.4	54.0
China	84.6	7.2
Parliament		
Japan	19.8	67.0
Korea	25.5	74.1
United States	20.2	76.7
Germany	43.5	53.8
China	77.4	11.6
Courts		
Japan	73.7	15.9
Korea	66.7	32.7
United States	53.8	44.1
Germany	71.3	26.4
China	71.1	17.6
Political Parties		
Japan	14.8	71.6

<sup>44</sup> It combines “a great deal” and “quite a lot.”<sup>45</sup> It combines “not very much” and “none at all.”

Korea	26.1	73.4
United States	12.5	85.3
Germany	23.9	73.6
China	74.5	13.1
Police		
Japan	68.2	25.9
Korea	58.3	41.5
United States	68.3	30.0
Germany	81.7	17.2
China	66.6	24.2
Armed Forces		
Japan	67.1	21.2
Korea	63.5	36.4
United States	81.6	16.5
Germany	63.6	33.0
China	84.0	6.8
Press		
Japan	70.6	25.1
Korea	61.0	38.8
United States	22.7	75.5
Germany	44.4	54.7
China	60.2	25.9
Television		
Japan	66.6	29.0
Korea	63.2	36.6

United States	23.9	74.3
Germany	47.4	51.8
China	64.3	25.0

(WVS, 2014, pp.138-140, 142-146)

**Table 70: Major Exchange Rates to US Dollar (May 1, 2014)**

Major Exchange Rates to US Dollar (May 1, 2014)	
	United States Dollar (USD)
Japanese Yen (JPY)	0.0098
South Korean Won (KRW)	0.0010
Euro (EUR)	1.3843
Pound Sterling (GBP)	1.6838
Swiss Franc (CHF)	1.1335

## 11 Appendix II—Abstracts

### 11.1 Abstract (English)

This paper deals with the same old question many scholars in communication, or more specifically, political communication, have asked before. *Why is the media as it is?* Or in other words, why are some media more free than others? It has been commonly accepted that a free, diverse, and independent media will promote an informed and engaged citizenry, which is critical to the political health of a nation. It has previously been observed that the media systems within the same world region are remarkably similar. It has also been discovered that the media system and political system in any particular country are tightly linked together in their structure and development. Hence, the purpose of this research is to find out the similarities and differences in the media systems in East Asia, which is done by exclusively examining the cases of the two most developed countries in this region, namely, Japan and South Korea.

One of the greatest challenges and issues that remain in most literature on media to this day are that they are based on highly ethnocentric assumptions and prejudices, mostly from the Western world, and are, therefore, being written in very broad and general terms, as if a theory that prevailed in one country were applicable to the rest of the world. However, considerable theoretical and practical progress has been achieved since the publication of *The Four Theories of the Press* (1956), moving from a purely normative approach to an empirical and comparative one, which was first introduced by the *Three Models of Media and Politics* (2004). But, as this later study was initially only limited to Western Europe and North America, another approach, one that would go beyond the Western world, had to be found. Thus, the *Extended Comparative Approach* (2005), developed by the Swiss Professor Roger Blum, served as the underlying analytical framework for the comparison of the media systems of Japan and South Korea.

Based on this specific framework it has been concluded that the media systems of Japan and South Korea are quite similar, with only a few, and rather minor, distinctions, namely, those related to media freedom, state control over the media, and media orientation. For example, the media in South Korea is comparatively more restrictive and intrusive, which is most likely connected to its stronger state control over the media, with laws such as the vaguely worded National Security Act. Additionally, the media in Japan appears to be more oriented towards commercial activity, while the media in South Korea seems to

be following a middle path, leaning slightly more towards the position of performing a public service. In the case of the other dimensions discussed, the similarities clearly outweighed the differences. However, from this study alone it could not be concluded whether countries within the same world region are more similar compared to those of other regions, as other countries in East Asia, such as China and North Korea, have been deliberately excluded from this discussion.

### **11.1.1 Keywords**

East Asia, Media Systems, Mass Communication, Mass Media, Media Freedom, Media Ownership, Media Financing, Media Culture, Media Orientation

## **11.2 Abstract (German)**

Die vorliegende Arbeit behandelt die selbe klassische Frage die schon zuvor von vielen Kommunikationswissenschaftlern, im Besonderen der politischen Kommunikation, gestellt wurde. *Warum sind die Medien so wie sie sind?* Oder in anderen Worten, warum sind manche Medien freier als Andere? Es wird ganz allgemein anerkannt das freie, diverse, und unabhängige Medien eine informierte und engagierte Bürgerschaft fördern, welche zugleich entscheidend ist für die politische Gesundheit eines Staates. Es konnte bereits betrachtet werden, dass sich Mediensysteme der gleichen Weltregion einander auffallend ähneln. Es wurde auch bereits erforscht, dass die Struktur und Entwicklung des Mediensystems und Regierungssystems stark miteinander verbunden ist. Die daraus resultierende Zielsetzung dieser Arbeit ist die Erforschung der Gemeinsamkeiten sowie Unterschiede der Mediensysteme in Ostasien, welche durch eine exklusive Untersuchung der zwei weitesten entwickelten Länder dieser Region, nämlich Japan und Südkorea, festgestellt wird.

Eine der größten Herausforderungen und Streitpunkte in den meisten Fachliteraturen über die Medien, die bis zum heutigen Tag bestehen bleiben, beziehen sich auf die äußerst ethnozentrischen Annahmen und Vorurteile—meist von der westlichen Welt abstammend. Daher beschränken sich solche Literaturen auch häufig auf nur sehr allgemein ausgeführte Aussagen, in der Annahme, dass wenn eine Theorie in einem Land überwiegt sie sogleich auch auf den Rest der Welt übertragbar sei. Jedoch konnten beträchtliche theoretische und praktische Fortschritte seit der Veröffentlichung von *The Four Theories of the Press* (1956) erzielt werden, wo man von einer puren normativen Vorgehensweise zu einer

empirischen und vergleichenden Methode übergang, welche zum ersten Mal in der Form von *Three Models of Media and Politics* (2004) erschien. Aber da die letztere Studie sich anfangs nur auf Westeuropa und Nordamerika beschränkte, musste eine andere Vorgehensweise, welche jenseits der westlichen Welt reichte, erforscht werden. Daher dient der *Erweiterte Vergleichs-Ansatz* (2005), welcher vom schweizerischen Universitätsprofessor Roger Blum entwickelt wurde, als der hier zugrundeliegende analytische Ansatz für den Vergleich der Mediensysteme in Japan und Südkorea.

Basierend auf diesen spezifischen Vergleichs-Ansatz konnte die folgende Schlussfolgerung ermittelt werden, dass sich die Mediensysteme in Japan und Südkorea einander ziemlich ähneln, mit nur wenigen, und recht geringen, Unterschieden, nämlich ausschließlich im Bezug auf Medienfreiheit, Staatskontrolle über die Medien, und Medienorientierung. Zum Beispiel, die Medien in Südkorea sind verhältnismäßig eingeschränkter und aufdringlicher, was womöglich im Zusammenhang mit einer stärkeren Staatskontrolle über die Medien steht—durch Gesetze wie der vage formulierte National Security Act. Des Weiteren scheinen sich die Medien in Japan mehr auf kommerzielle Aktivitäten zu konzentrieren, während die Medien in Südkorea eher den mittleren Pfad zu folgen scheinen, und sich mehr in die Richtung des öffentlichen Dienstes neigen. Im Fall der restlichen diskutierten Dimensionen scheinen die Gemeinsamkeiten zu überwiegen. Diese Studie alleine ist jedoch nicht im Stande festzustellen ob sich Länder der gleichen Weltregion mehr ähneln, da andere Länder in Ostasien, wie zum Beispiel China und Nordkorea, bewusst von dieser Diskussion ausgeschlossen wurden.

### **11.2.1 Keywords**

Oostasien, Mediensysteme, Massenkommunikation, Massenmedien, Medienfreiheit, Medienbesitz, Medienfinanzierung, Medienkultur, Medienorientierung

## 12 Appendix III—Curriculum Vitæ

Stefan Firnhammer • [znuffn.com/resume/](http://znuffn.com/resume/)

*I love designing and building products with others  
who share the same love for simplicity and beauty.*

Education	<b>University of Vienna</b>	Vienna, Austria
	<i>East Asian Economy and Society (M.A.)</i>	Oct 2012–present
	<b>University of Applied Sciences Wiener Neustadt</b>	Wiener Neustadt, Austria
	<i>Business Consultancy International (M.A. in Business)</i> Specialization: International Marketing and Sales	Aug 2010–Jul 2012
	<b>University of Applied Sciences Wiener Neustadt</b>	Wiener Neustadt, Austria
	<i>Business Consultancy International (B.A. in Business)</i> Specialization: International Marketing and Sales	Sep 2007–Jul 2010
	<b>St. Cloud State University</b>	St. Cloud, Minnesota
	<i>Criminal Justice (B.A.), 35 Credits</i>	Jan 2005–Dec 2005
Experience	<b>Intercultural and International Business Experience</b>	Warsaw – Gdansk, Poland
	<i>Study Trip</i>	Mar 2012
	<b>Aerodyne Systems</b>	Wiener Neustadt, Austria
	<i>Market Researcher (University Project)</i>	Feb 2012–Apr 2012
	<b>NaKu</b>	Wiener Neustadt
	<i>Market Researcher (University Project)</i>	Feb 2011–May 2011



**OMV Refining and Marketing**

Vienna, Austria

*Business Intern (Business Support Department)*

Feb 2010–May 2010

**Languages**

- German (Native Proficiency)
- English (Full Professional Proficiency)
- Japanese (Elementary Proficiency)
- Spanish (Elementary Proficiency)

**Skills**

Front-End Development: HTML, CSS, LESS/Sass, JavaScript, jQuery

Back-End Development: PHP, MySQL

Creative Suite: Adobe CS (Photoshop, Dreamweaver, Illustrator, Premiere Pro, Acrobat)

Office Suite: Microsoft Office (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Access, Outlook, FrontPage, Project), iWork (Pages, Numbers, Keynote), Google Docs (Document, Spreadsheet, Presentation, Form), OpenOffice.org (Writer, Calc, Impress)

Other Software & Tools: Glyphs, Google Analytics, Google AdWords, phpMyAdmin, ImageMagick, FileZilla, SPSS/PASW, CA Clarity PPM, SAP, Vensim

**Interests**

- Design, Typography, Coding
- Photography & Filmmaking
- Team Sports & Video Games
- Reading
- Outdoors & Traveling
- BBQ & Cooking