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# DISSERTATION

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“Historical Origins of the Arab Spring in Tunisia,  
Egypt and Libya: A Theoretical Analysis”

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# **Dedication**

**To my parents**

## Acknowledgment

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## Abstract

This study is an endeavor towards a structural explanation of the origins of the Arab Spring. In other words, it is an analysis based on the long-term trajectory that led to this climactic event. As to date, most literature is focused on the economic and social factors, which in this study are a controlled variable. As a revisited account of the theory of revolution, the study embarks on the extension of Theda Skocpol's structural theory of social revolution (1979). Our hypothesis is that the origins of the Arab spring are what I call a *political modernization situation* in which new trends emerged namely: intellectual current, new organizational framework and international pressure. This may coincide with a rigidity of the ruling elite and a chance of ousting the ruling elite. Through the methodology of comparative historical analysis, the presence of these three conditions shall be confirmed.

## Keywords:

Political revolution, political class, ruling elite, political modernization situation, virtue of assabiyya management.

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## **Part I: A Theoretical Analysis**





## Introduction

In 2011, a political earthquake hit a number of Arab countries. This event became known as the Arab Spring. Regardless of the terminology, the concern of this study is to trace the origins of the Arab Spring. Arab experts in the mainstream media still debate the phenomenon, as do a host of books and articles written by major think tanks and university professors across the world. What went wrong for these Arab regimes? What led to this political violence? What are the causes of the uprising? To approach this climactic turn in the Arab's history, this study will attempt to shed light on what Paul Pierson calls "politics in time."<sup>1</sup> In other words, long-term origins and causes will be addressed in order to develop a deeper understanding.

My objective is to provide a historical comparative analysis by tracing the long process that led to this crucial moment. Most literature written on the subject focuses on the mobilization angle, namely the populist and the young generation participation, medium-range causes and economy-oriented causes. Moreover, the literature at hand, mostly written by journalists, does not take into consideration the theoretical literature on political decay theory, modernization theory, or the theory of revolution. Therefore the task of this study is to advance an analysis that is based on the literature of these theories.

## Methodology: Case Study Selection

I will be examining Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. These countries were chosen because they were the first to experience the Arab Spring, and are the most similar in terms of regime. In addition, they share the same outcome: a toppled ruling elite and a change in the political class (these I will refer to as "positive cases"). "Negative cases" are those in which the ruling elite was not toppled or the political class did not change, as in the cases of the Gulf states, Algeria. The positive cases will be dealt with

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<sup>1</sup> See Paul Pierson's *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis*.

throughout the study where necessary, whilst the negative cases will be brought out as counterfactuals in the last chapter.

## Theory & Research Question

Sharing the stand with the prominent Tunisian philosopher, Abu Yarub Marzouki, the author will be confined to the concept of the Arab political revolution, not revolutions. This is because the Arab states share one cultural identity. Thus the author considers the Arab Spring a singular revolution that happened in more than one country.

Speaking of revolutions, the author furthermore considers the Arab Spring a political revolution, and not a social one. Social revolutions, like the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions, experience a change in the social class that holds power. This was not the case in the Arab political revolution. The Arab Spring only witnessed a change in the political class. In her book, *States and Social Revolutions*, Theda Skocpol listed three factors that cause those revolutions inter alia: inter-elite conflict, which paves the way for another social class; new organizational framework; and international pressure.<sup>2</sup> The inter-elite conflict is between the elite in government and the economic and social elite outside the government. Skocpol argues that the new organizational framework is a mobilization vehicle, like the vanguard party during the Russian revolution. The international pressure is the pressure generated by the military, as well as by economic competition among states, that exerts pressure on the state under study. Such competition creates pressure on the elite to either modernize or face the risk of revolt and insurrection.<sup>3</sup> These conditions could be applied on the Arab political revolution, but with slight changes and additions.

The concept of “the elite” in this study will have another connotation. Skocpol describes the social elites as landlords or bourgeoisie.<sup>4</sup> In Arabic countries, the same

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<sup>2</sup> In Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, 62-65.

<sup>3</sup> Skocpol, *States & Social Revolutions*, 85-87.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

does not hold true. Hence, in referring to the degree or the level of rule, regardless of the social class or persons in power, I borrow the concept of political class from Gaetano Mosca.<sup>5</sup> According to Mosca's classification, we have to distinguish between the ruling elite, which refers to the personnel, and the political class, which refers to the structure of the ruling elite. Sometimes there is a change in the ruling elite without a change in the political class, as with the dynastic change. And sometimes the change comes from within the political class without a challenge from elites outside the government. In the case of the Arab Spring, the problem came from within, in the form of a succession crisis. With respect to the new organizational framework, in the cases of the Arab Spring, there was neither a vanguard party nor dialectic between peasants and other social classes. In fact, the new organizational framework in the Arab Spring cases is a method called social networking. This means that Skocpol's concepts need a conceptual shift in order to explain the new trends. Furthermore, with respect to international pressure, the concept needs further explanation and refinement in light of new theories of international relations.

Two other shortcomings in Skocpol's theory remain. The first is the absence of ideology or ideas incorporated into the origins of revolution. The ideological divide was not clear in the beginning of the Arab Spring, yet there was an intellectual current building up. The author also borrows the concept of intellectual current from Mosca's theory to include the question of ideas as the origin of a revolution.<sup>6</sup>

Skocpol's second shortcoming concerns the theory structure as a whole. Skocpol uses three conditions of social revolution as a result of induction of her cases, without dwelling on the paradigm of political order in time. In other words, she does not distinguish between what I call the *political modernization situation*, and the revolutionary situation. The first means the potentiality that creates a need for the political class to reform. The second means the potentiality paves the way for the

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<sup>5</sup> Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, chapter xii.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, 254.

ousting of the ruling elite. The conditions of a new organizational framework, international pressure and inter-elite conflict do not necessarily lead to the ousting of the ruling elite, if the elite are well consolidated. Syria, in 2011, can serve as a useful counterfactual. The three conditions mentioned above existed, and yet the ruling elite is still in power in the time of penning these lines. Hence, this study omits the condition of inter-elite conflict, which is applicable in social revolutions, but not necessarily in political revolutions.

Also, by “class” Skocpol means the social class, which is not the subject of this study. Thus far, this study argues that international pressure, a new organizational framework, and an intellectual current (instead of the elite conflict) create a *political modernization situation* (shortened to the acronym of PMS), which I define as the emerging necessity for a change in the political class. These are conditions that call upon the elite to change the political class, not necessarily oust them. While the PMS is a necessary condition, it only creates the potential for a political revolution, not the revolution itself.

This brings me to the revolutionary situation. The revolutionary situation was first elaborated by Trotsky and Lenin, and concerns the moment of mobilization of the working class. In *From Mobilization to Revolution*, Charles Tilly explains that the revolutionary situation needs three conditions inter alia: the existence of a mobilized group that calls for the end of regime; a wider segment of the society with these claims; and the disintegration of the ruling elite.<sup>7</sup>As the approach of this study is elitist, the revolutionary situation will be confined to the rigidity of the ruling elite and to what the author calls a chance of ousting the ruling elite (explained below). This study stresses the fact that Tilly’s conditions don’t necessarily lead to the ousting of the ruling elite, especially if there is no rigidity of the ruling elite, and no chance of ousting it.

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<sup>7</sup>See Charles Tilly *From Mobilization to Revolution*.

A rigidity of the ruling elite means the inability or refusal to respond constructively to the PMS. The patterns of rigidity in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya are exemplified by infrequent elections or irregular elections; long-serving rulers; or in short, inconsistent changes of leaders. The patterns of rigidity within the ruling elite differ from case to case.

The second condition of the revolutionary situation is the chance of ousting the ruling elite. In other words, I relate the chance of ousting the ruling elite to the question of *assabiyya*. According to Ibn Khaldun, *assabiyya* is the group feeling among the would-be ruling elite who seeks power.<sup>8</sup> It can also be interpreted as solidarity. Ibn Khaldun's concept is parsimonious and in need for more specification.

The author divides *assabiyya* into two categories: general *assabiyya* and elite or special *assabiyya*: strong *assabiyya* and weak *assabiyya*. Strong *assabiyya* means the monopolization of succession by one ethnic or religious affiliation within the general *assabiyya*, which constitutes the state. For example, in Libya, the general *assabiyya* would be the Libyan people, and the strong *assabiyya* would be the monopolization of succession within Gaddafi's tribe. In Iraq, a strong *assabiyya* in the current situation would be the hegemony of Shia as a religious affiliation. The weak *assabiyya*, on the other hand, includes the following patterns: the monopoly of succession by one party (like China); the party's penetration of the bureaucracy (clientelism); and the penetration of interest groups in politics, also an army involved in politics and dominates bureaucracy can be considered a weak *assabiyya*, as in the case of Egypt. For revolutionaries, a ruling elite with a weak *assabiyya* is much easier to oust than a ruling elite with a strong *assabiyya*. A chance of ousting the ruling elite is the existence of a weakness in the ruling elite that can be exploited by revolutionaries. This can be a succession crisis, especially in the cases of strong *assabiyya*; a snowballing effect (a revolution or protests in a neighboring country); a war defeat; and a financial or economic crisis.

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<sup>8</sup>Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, 208-210.

For the political revolution to occur more or less all conditions are necessary. If the PMS exists, there is the potential for a political revolution, but it will not occur if the ruling elite is flexible enough (if it responds with reforms), or if there is no chance of ousting it. Then there is no apparent breakthrough in the *assabiyya*, as in the cases of the Gulf states, where there was no succession crisis and their strong *assabiyya* was solidified by oil revenue. A political revolution can only occur when the three conditions exist, namely, the *political modernization situation*, the rigidity of ruling elite, and a chance of ousting the ruling elite.

In short, my hypothesis is that a *political modernization situation*, rigidity of the ruling elite, and a chance of ousting the ruling elite (the question of *assabiyya*) caused the Arab Spring. These conditions led to a change of the political class from aristocratic/autocratic to democratic/transitional.

Social and economic factors (such as unemployment, urbanization, literacy, etc.) are probably necessary for mobilizing people to the streets. Even still, these factors could oust the ruling elite, but not necessarily change a political class. These social and economic patterns always exist, but if there is no PMS—or the ruling elite is flexible and there is no chance of ousting the ruling elite (in other words, the absence of a breakthrough in the *assabiyya*)—the mobilization will be reduced to a rebellion or some pattern of political violence. As Skocpol argues, “rebellions, even when successful may involve revolt of subordinate classes but they do not eventuate in structural change.”<sup>9</sup>

Most of the current literature on the Arab Spring focuses on the social and economic conditions and does not demarcate between conditions that lead to political revolution and conditions that lead to popular rage or mass protests. This study will focus on just three conditions. The social and economic conditions are intervening mechanism that, for the purposes of this study, will be controlled variables, as shown in figure 1.

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<sup>9</sup>Skocpol, *States & Social Revolutions*, 4.

Borrowing from theories by Mosca and Ibn Khaldun, this study endeavors to extend and specify Skocpol's theory in order to explain political revolutions, not social revolutions. The questions of the study are the following:

- The general question: **What were the origins that led to the political revolution in the cases under study?** The main origins hypothetically are the new *political modernization situation*, rigidity of the ruling elite and the chance of ousting the ruling elite. Other conditions could emerge as a result of the research. The definition of a political revolution in this study is simply a popular ousting of the ruling elite and a change of the political class. Our target with respect to the change of the political class is confined in the existence of one election-at least- after the ousting, and a drafted constitution. Questions of detailed process of ousting and post-ousting the ruling elite and democratic transition are beyond the scope of this study. As I recognize that the question of a changing political class is a moving target and could not be settled necessarily in one or two decades...
- **Why did the political revolution in 2011, with all this mass participation, not occur before?** Say in the 18<sup>th</sup> or the 19<sup>th</sup> century? To answer this question, I have to trace how the new *political modernization situation* developed. Change in the new organizational framework, intellectual current and international pressure created the PMS, which will be addressed in chapters 2-4. We will trace the three conditions through three main revolutionary processes in Arab history during a key turning point: namely, the first revolutionary process in 622-662, in which the short-lived Arab republic fell and the absolute monarchy of Umayyad was created; the second process, which occurred during the period between 1923 and the 1950s; and the third process, in 2011. It is not possible to prove the existence of a new *political modernization situation* without comparison with the old ones in the previous revolutionary processes. Hence it is important to revisit the question of previous Arab political orders.

- **Why did the political revolution occur in some cases and not in others?**

This will be dealt with in chapter 5. I will tackle the two other conditions namely: the rigidity of the ruling elite and the chance of ousting the elite. I will look at Tunisia, Egypt and Libya and some negative cases as counterfactuals to prove that the rigidity of the ruling elite and the existence of breakthrough in the assabiyya are what made the difference between the Arab states.

## Research Method & Data Selection

The methodology used in this study is comparative historical analysis (CHA). The reason this method used is for its applicability for studying long-term factors and analyzing causes across time. Some of the most influential literature in this respect include: *Anatomy of Revolutions* (1938) by Crane Brinton; *Social Origins of Dictatorship & Democracy* (1966) by Barrington Moore; *Revolutionary Change* (1966) by Chalmers Johnson; *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968) by Samuel Huntington; *Why Men Rebel* (1970) by Ted Robert Gurr; and *States & Social Revolutions* (1979) by Theda Skocpol. These are some of the classics in the study of revolutions, which were written with the CHA method. One major reason for its usage is its suitability for big questions. As James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer explain:

Contemporary researchers who choose to ask “big” questions—that is questions about large scale outcomes that are regarded as substantively and normatively important by both specialists and non-specialists are often similarly drawn to comparative historical research.<sup>10</sup>

The major large-scale outcomes, which are usually studied in this context, are revolutions. The emphasis will therefore be on process over time with the use of what Mahoney and Rueschemeyer describe as “systematic and contextualized

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<sup>10</sup>Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, 7.



comparison.”<sup>11</sup> Using this method does not, however, necessarily entail generalizations that will deduce universal knowledge on a large population. Instead, it seeks generalization in the context of the study. As Jack Goldstone writes:

Analysts using CHA generally face a finite set of cases chosen against a backdrop of theoretical interests, and aim to determine the causal sequences and patterns producing outcomes of interest in those specific cases. Generalization is certainly a goal, but that generalization is sought by piecing together finite sets of cases, not by sampling and inference to a large universe.<sup>12</sup>

Two methods will be used: process tracing and congruence testing. Process tracing analyzes the sequencing of events over time, and deduces general patterns and principles that explain them. Congruence testing seeks common patterns among the concerned cases. As Goldstone argues, commenting on Skocpol’s theory:

Congruence testing provides the basis for claims regarding “common patterns.” Skocpol demonstrated by careful exploration of her cases that the roles of state crisis, elite revolt, and popular mobilization formed nearly the same or “congruent” patterns in the French, Russian, Chinese revolutions. The goal of congruence testing is therefore not to establish universal generalization across a broad range of cases. Rather, congruence testing uses the fruits of process tracing to challenge and improve our understanding of how particular cases of interest are related or different.<sup>13</sup>

Moreover, in a recent article titled “The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in Social Sciences”, Mahoney defines process tracing in the following manner: “the overall methodology of using causal process observations in conjunction with generalizations

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid,14.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid,43.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, 50.

can be called process tracing.”<sup>14</sup> Using this method, I will trace the existence of the conditions of the PMS (new organizational framework, intellectual current, and international pressure), as well as the existence of the rigidity of the ruling elite and the chance of ousting the ruling elite. The congruence testing of the PMS will be compared to earlier PMS in Arab history; whilst the congruence testing for the rigidity of the ruling elite and chance of ousting the ruling elite will be compared between positive cases (Tunisia, Egypt and Libya) and a sample of negative cases. Thus we will have congruence testing over time—in which we will examine the Arab region as one unit—and congruence testing in space, looking at the three cases (as well as other cases). Confirming the existence of the PMS, the rigidity of the ruling elite, and the chance of ousting the ruling elite will be sufficient for the validity of the hypothesis.

Data selection includes tracing the events, conducting secondary analysis of recent studies, and conducting secondary analysis of expert interviews with contemporary Arab intellectuals.


## Study Plan

The study will be divided in three main parts: Theoretical Analysis, which includes the introduction and chapter 1 (Understanding Revolutions). The second part about the *Political Modernization Situation* is dealt with in chapter 2 (New Organizational Framework), chapter 3 (Intellectual Current) and chapter 4 (International Pressure); finally the third part about the Revolutionary Situation, is discussed in chapter 5 (The Rigidity of the Ruling Elite & the Chance of Ousting the Ruling Elite); and addressed in the conclusion.

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<sup>14</sup>Mahoney, “The Logic of process Tracing Tests in Social Sciences,” 571.

FIGURE 1. The Origins of the Arab Spring Model



## Chapter 1: Understanding Revolutions

### Understanding vs. Explanation

The split between understanding and explanation has been long established, especially between the social sciences and other sciences. The resolution of “*verstehen* vs. *erklären*” is not one of my study goals; I mention it here simply to highlight a middle way. Following Carl Gustav Hempel’s writings on the subject, in *Explanation and Understanding*, George von Wright distinguishes between the two in the following way:

Practically every explanation be it causal or teleological or of some either kind can be said to further our understanding of things. But “understanding” also has a psychological ring which explanation has not. This psychological feature was emphasized by several of the nineteenth century...positivist methodologists, perhaps most forcefully by Simmel who thought that understanding as a method characteristic of the humanities is a form of empathy...<sup>15</sup>

These scholars distinguish between the Galilean tradition (mechanistic explanation) and the Aristotelian tradition “with his efforts to make facts teleologically or finalistically understandable.”<sup>16</sup> In the social sciences, the social actor is an intentional actor, thus the explanation would be teleological. In the natural sciences and physics, the actors are not necessarily human beings; hence the scientist cannot deduce a teleological dimension of the action or process under study. Most of the time, human actions are intelligible, yet to understand a ball falling from a building without prior knowledge of the law of gravity, would require a mechanistic explanation.

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<sup>15</sup> Von Wright, *Explanation and Understanding*, 6.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, 3.

The split between understanding and explanation is, to some extent, a category mistake. Gilbert Ryle, a philosopher of mind, describes the category mistake in the following way: “it is one big mistake of a special kind. It is namely a category mistake. It represents the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category when they actually belong to another.”<sup>17</sup>

Understanding is a general category, which includes explanation. The understanding circle consists of clarification or reflection, which normally examines the question of “whatness” or the quiddity of the things. The middle way is the explanation, which normally includes the question of why and how. In “No Understanding without Explanation” Michael Strevens advances a theory that he calls the *Simple View*, in which he defends the position that “an individual has scientific understanding of a phenomenon just in case they grasp a correct scientific explanation of that phenomenon.”<sup>18</sup> Thus understanding and explanation are complementary.

The last stage of the understanding circle is certification, which is the confirmation in time by a community of scholars on the subject. It is in the last stage in which the falsification takes place. Karl Popper’s position regarding falsification as a hedging against false prophets is understandable, but falsification determinism would destroy knowledge and lead us to nihilism. The demarcation between science and pseudoscience would not be achieved by falsification per se, as a unitary endeavor by one scholar, but rather by the falsification by a host of scholars over time. The question of time is important in order to give the theory an opportunity to be understood. Paul Thagard alludes to the question of time and the role of community of scholars in his “Why Astrology is a Pseudoscience.”<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Quoted in Bailey, *Philosophy of Mind*, 91.

<sup>18</sup> Strevens, “No Understanding without Explanation,” 1.

<sup>19</sup> See Thagard, “Why Astrology is a Pseudoscience”.

Another aspect in the demarcation problem is the question of how useful the theory is to the common good. A theory that does not relate to reality or does not advance the common good of the society will be proven false over time. Hence, certification is the last stage of understanding, which involves the role of a community of practitioners in confirming the theory, and its utility for the common good. A mature demarcation between science and pseudoscience will ultimately emerge in this last stage of understanding, not necessarily in the first (clarification) or middle stage (explanation).

The difference between social sciences and other sciences is presumably a question of departure within one understanding circle. In examining the natural sciences, the first stage of the understanding circle, clarification, is not always intelligible. Hence the natural scientist normally begins the circle from the middle (why and how). In other words, he begins from an explanation. Thus normally the first stage of understanding is skipped. Conversely, in the social sciences, the circle begins from the clarification/reflection and then proceeds to the explanatory phase most of the time; hence a synthetic priori proposition is possible in the field of social science, unlike the field of natural science. The “departure gap” led to the conviction by some philosophers that there are no explanations in the social sciences, which is a logical fallacy. Immanuel Kant dealt with this in his *Critique*. In fact Kant saw no split between understanding and explanation, rather between understanding and sensing. Also in *Understanding and Explanation: A Transcendental Pragmatic Perspective*, Karl Otto Apel refutes the position of splitting understanding from explanation. He even criticizes the sentiment of judging the scientificity of social sciences by “the paradigm of value-free natural science,”<sup>20</sup> as he explains in the following passage:

Whoever holds the social sciences up to the model of the nomological and experimental natural sciences, and considers only those forms of social science legitimate will be inclined to consider social technology and social engineering as constituting the only possible connection between the social sciences and

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<sup>20</sup>Apel, *Understanding and Explanation*, 41.

practice...A third danger in the scientific restriction consists simply in that limiting the idea of science to the paradigm of value free natural science involves a corresponding restriction of the idea of rationality.<sup>21</sup>

I reference the debate of understanding vs. explanation because some readers might classify this study as within the understanding approach. My position is that there is no split between understanding and explanation, except in the mind of some philosophers, which relates to their own construction of reality. This study is an explanation of the Arab Spring; as its two main questions are why questions: why did it not occur before, and why didn't it occur across the whole Arab region? Moreover, the fact/value split argument can be used in natural science, but as philosophers like Friedrich Hayek and Hillary Putnam argue, not necessarily in the social sciences.

In the context of this study, the explanandum is a political revolution, which is an outcome of three conditions: new PMS; the rigidity of the ruling elite; and the chance of ousting the ruling elite. The relationship between the new PMS and the two other conditions are not necessarily interdependent. For example, most of the time, the rigidity of the ruling elite and the chance of ousting the ruling elite exist, while the PMS does not. In this case, the effect or outcome will not be a political revolution. It could be a coup, and merely a dynastic change. Yet the political revolution is logically dependent on the existence of all three because the new PMS creates the potentiality for the change of the political class from one classification to another—for example, from aristocratic to democratic—and the other two create the potentiality for ousting of the ruling elite.

In the following three sections, I will discuss the discourse of revolutions, the classification of modernization, and the theory of origins of political revolution.

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

## The Discourse of Revolution

In his classic book, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Samuel Huntington claims that revolutions are rare events. He even argues that revolutions occurred only in the West, saying that “the great civilizations of the past—Egypt, Babylon, Persia, the Incas, Greece, Rome, China, India, the Arab world—experienced revolts, insurrections and dynastic changes.”<sup>22</sup> Huntington’s remark was inaccurate because it doesn’t acknowledge the Iranian revolution in 1979, and the Chinese revolution in 1949, which Barrington Moore and Skocpol have written about. The Chinese revolution was a social revolution of the peasants against the landed elite; in which there was also a change in the political class. The same occurred during the Russian revolution of 1917.

What distinguishes revolutions from other upheavals are transformation and participation. Rebellions, civil wars, uprisings and insurrections are immediate patterns of political change that involve violence. They might experience mass participation, but they are not necessarily transformative of the political class. Some other scientists confuse political revolutions with social ones, or classify political revolutions under rebellions. In his book, *The Shari’a State*, Bassam Tibi argues that “the outcome of the Arab Spring in Egypt, often wrongly called a ‘revolution’ has been a change of rulers, not yet one of the social structures.”<sup>23</sup> He is partially correct that the social structure didn’t change, but it is deemed a political revolution for having mass participation, and for transforming the political class from dynastic to democratic\*. Failing to distinguish between political revolutions and social revolutions is a common mistake, as Skocpol clarifies that “political revolutions transform state structures but not social structures, and they are not necessarily accomplished through

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<sup>22</sup> Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 264.

<sup>23</sup> Tibi, *The Shari’a State*, 122.

\*What is meant by “democratic” here is within Joseph Schumpeter’s definition that is the competition for votes.



class conflict.”<sup>24</sup> This section emphasizes that those patterns of political upheaval inter alia—rebellion, insurrection, civil war and uprising—should not be seen as counterparts to revolutions in the political change dictionary. They are instead patterns that some revolutions experience, and not others. For example, the 2011 Arab revolution in Libya experienced a civil war, unlike its neighboring countries, Tunisia and Egypt, who underwent a peaceful uprising. When mass participation managed to transform the political class, these uprisings were called revolutions...

Another concept that complicates the question of definition is political violence. Jack Goldstone argues the following:

It was not clear that “political violence” the same as political revolutions. Some countries had high and persistent levels of political violence but without their government slide to revolution. Like Colombian case in 1970...and the other way around in Iran 1979 & Philippines in 1986. Furthermore in some major revolutions such as the Mexican revolution of 1911 and the Russian revolution 1917 major violence occurred in the civil wars of 1911-20 & 1917-21.<sup>25</sup>

Political violence can be part of a revolution or not. Focusing on violence to define revolutions leads to another logical fallacy. In countries where violence leads to a change in the political class, could be called a revolution depending on the process, as in the Russian revolution. Conversely, in cases where violence does not bring about a change in the political class, then it is not deemed a revolution, as in the case of the Arab revolt in 1916. This revolt did bring about a change of the elite and the dynasties, but neither the political nor the social classes were affected. In fact, all Arab political upheavals—except in Prophet Muhammad’s case, which will be revisited in chapter 2—fell short of being deemed revolutions on the basis of participation and

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<sup>24</sup> Skocpol, *States & Social Revolutions*, 4.

<sup>25</sup> In Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, 59.

transformation. In the same respect, Huntington comments on the upheavals in the antiquities as follows: “the rise and fall of dynasties in the ancient empires and the changes back and forth from oligarchy and democracy in the Greek city-states were instances of political violence but not of social revolution.”<sup>26</sup>

Furthermore, the correlation between political violence and revolutions should heed the differences in societies. A study done by Raymond Tanter in 1965, which studied violence in 70 countries between the years 1955-60, highlights the correlation between a society’s wellbeing and its GDP in relationship to violence. The focal point of the study was that 87% of less developed countries experienced violent conflicts, compared to only 37% in developed countries.<sup>27</sup> Political violence should therefore be seen more in the context of development and not confused with the ontological meaning of revolution. In that respect, the political violence in Libya was more acute than in Tunisia and Egypt given the country’s slow economic development, weak middle class, traditional society and tribalism. According to recent official statistics, the number of casualties during the Libyan civil war was 6,048, and 831 people were counted as missing. In Tunisia and Egypt, the numbers were much lower.<sup>28</sup>

This brings me to the argument of modernization and modernity. Modernization is the uphill process of poor countries catching up with the more developed ones. Modernization involves violence, while modernity is the ultimate outcome of this process. Huntington summarizes it by claiming that “modernity breeds stability, but modernization breeds instability.”<sup>29</sup> He argues:

The apparent relationship between poverty and backwardness, on the one hand, and instability and violence, on the other, is a spurious one. It is not the absence of modernity but the efforts to achieve it which produce political

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<sup>26</sup> Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 264.

<sup>27</sup> Tanter, “Dimensions of Conflict Behavior within Nations, 1955-1960: Turmoil and Internal War,” 175.

<sup>28</sup> In *Alquds Alarabi*, October 30, 2013.

<sup>29</sup> Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 41.

disorder. If poor countries appear to be unstable, it is not because they are poor, but because they are trying to become rich. A purely traditional society would be ignorant, poor and stable.<sup>30</sup>

In defining the revolution, modernization should be seen as a reference that distinguishes political/social revolution from other political upheavals, because as Huntington argues, a revolution is an act of modernization.<sup>31</sup>

### Classification of Modernization

There are two levels of modernization: political modernization and political economic modernization. The first one occurs in what Anthony Giddens calls the authorization level, in which the command would be on persons.<sup>32</sup> In other words, the Marxian terminology calls it the superstructure in which the values operate. I look at the political class as the structure of the ruling elite in terms of authorization or superstructure and confront this structure to the conditions that lead to the change of the political class namely: new organizational framework, international pressure and intellectual current as shown in table 1. Using Giddens's terminology, these three conditions together will be called authorization mobilization.<sup>33</sup> The political class is the level of succession—a succession of elite and legislation. For example, the level of succession in a democratic political class would be via election, and in an aristocratic political class, it would be by selection. Likewise, the level of succession in laws in an aristocracy will be autocratic and personified most of the time. In a democracy, the level of succession of laws will be liberal (from the bottom up), and much less personified. New trends in the organizational framework, intellectual currents, and international pressure create the need for succession change. If the ruling elite is

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid, 41.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, 265.

<sup>32</sup> Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory*, 100.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, 100-103.

flexible and manages equilibrium between the political class and the three conditions of authorization mobilization, then a sustainable political development is possible. If the ruling elite is rigid or unable to create equilibrium, the process falls into political decay.

The second level is the level of the political economic modernization. On this level, which Giddens calls the allocation level (command on property); I categorize the bureaucracy vs. the social and economic mobilization, or allocation mobilization.<sup>34</sup> Equilibrium on this level will be a matter of public management, which brings about political economic development. In other respects, disequilibrium will lead to political economic decay, as is shown in the following table.

**TABLE 1. The Classification of Modernization**

-	Political modernization (equilibrium)
	Political class vs. authorization mobilization (intellectual current, new organizational framework, international pressure).
-	Political/economic modernization (equilibrium)
	Bureaucracy vs. allocation mobilization or social and economic mobilization.

The distinction between the two levels is crucial in comparing political revolutions with other revolutionary processes. During a political or a social revolution, coup of modernization (in which a coup junta or a group changes the political class) and reformation, a *political modernization situation* exists. This means that because of new trends (intellectual current, international pressure and a new organizational framework), a political class crisis will emerge that creates the necessity for a change.

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<sup>34</sup>Ibid.

In other revolutionary processes, like coups of circulation (which is a changing of just the elite without a change in the political class) and revolts (which is an ousting of the ruling elite supported by mass participation, without a political class change), the *political modernization situation* does not exist. Only the political economic situation exists, which is a bureaucracy crisis vs. social and economic mobilization. This is one major reason why during a host of revolutionary processes—from the Umayyad coup in 662 to the Arab revolt in 1916—there was no change of the political class. It was merely a dynastic change because the disequilibrium was just at the level of bureaucracy vs. new economic challenges that merely forced riots and political violence.

**TABLE 2. The Classification of Revolutionary Processes**

-	Political modernization situation (disequilibrium):
	Political revolution, social revolution, coup of modernization, and any other process in which the level of succession or political class changes.
-	Political economic modernization situation (disequilibrium)
	Revolts, coup of circulation, and any other process of ousting the ruling elite.

In his general thesis of political decay, Huntington did not distinguish between the two levels. His thesis states that low institutionalization vs. rising mobilization leads to decay in the political order. This might be true, but if this dynamic existed within the political economic level without the existence of a *political modernization situation*, the decay will not bring about a change in the political class. In the Arab Spring cases, the two levels co-existed. But what makes the revolutionary process of 2011 different from the revolutionary process of 1916 is the existence of a new *political modernization situation* that led to a change to a more democratic political class.

In his *Origins of Political Order*, Francis Fukuyama did not distinguish between these levels either.<sup>35</sup> His institutions (state as bureaucracy, rule of law and accountability) are prescriptions for an equilibrium and thus for sustainable political development. He uses state and bureaucracy as synonyms. The distinction between the political class as a level of succession, and bureaucracy (government) as a level of administration, is a theoretical distinction between state and government. In this context, a state is considered a moral person who defines the level of succession. The principle of sovereignty is the idea on which this level of succession exists (divine right, popular sovereignty, etc...). The government is the actuality of this sovereignty. Quentin Skinner alludes to the common mistake of treating the state and government as synonyms—an error that can be tolerated in the media, but not in political theory.<sup>36</sup>

This leads me to the modernization argument. Max Weber, Emil Durkheim and Karl Marx believed that political development was a consequence of economic development or somewhat dependent. In *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Huntington argues differently. He states that more economic development will lead to decay, not necessarily to political development. Yet, Huntington's argument still operates in the paradigm of the political economic level argument, which is just one dimension of the modernization argument. In other words, political development on the level of succession—political class vs. authorization mobilization—is not necessarily related to economics either symmetrically or asymmetrically. Moreover, political development on the level of succession has its own logic, and highlights the command of politics over economics—not the other way around. Giddens alludes to this point implicitly as he criticizes Marxism in dealing with politics as a derivative of economics:

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<sup>35</sup>See Francis Fukuyama's *The Origins of Political Order*.

<sup>36</sup>Skinner "The Genealogy of the State," *You tube video*, 1:02:30, March 8, 2013, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d-bcyHYNxyk>.

There is real force in the critical comments directed against such forms of Marxism that they fail to give sufficient attention to authorization as a resource...authorization tends to be treated reductively as a derivative of allocation. The consequence is not only a defective understanding of the political system of industrial capitalism, but an inability to confront the problem of the nature of authority in socialist societies.<sup>37</sup>

Indeed, in 18<sup>th</sup>- and 19<sup>th</sup>-century Europe—during which an industrial revolution took place, as well as tremendous economic developments—an approach of modernization could be looked at from the perspective of political economic dependency. Yet Arab political development did not undergo the same changes that Europe did during and after the industrial revolution. Thus Weber and Marx analyses could not be replicated in the context of Arab development.

In short, a political revolution exists when, most importantly, a new *political modernization situation* exists. This is what constitutes the difference between a political revolution and a revolt, for example. Moreover, political revolutions and social revolutions share the existence of a *political modernization situation*, yet they differ in the composition of the new organizational framework. The new organizational framework in the political revolution is inclusive and pluralist. In a social revolution, the new organizational framework is inclusive, yet dominated by one social group over another.

### Theory of Origins of the Political Revolution

The theory of revolution, as classified by Skocpol, is divided into three main streams: aggregate-psychological theories, system-value consensus theories, and political-conflict theories.<sup>38</sup> Aggregate-psychological theories analyze revolution in light of

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<sup>37</sup> Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory*, 100.

<sup>38</sup> Skocpol, *States & Social Revolutions*, 9.

psychological motivations. For example, in *Why Men Rebel*, Ted Gurr makes reference to “relative deprivation” between the pursuit of needs and the available.<sup>39</sup>

Chalmers Johnson and his *Revolutionary Change* fall into the second category. His focus is on a “value-coordinated social system”, particularly an ideological movement that struggles against the existing regime. He adds what he calls “desynchronized”, which creates new values or technologies in the society.<sup>40</sup>

And lastly, in terms of political-conflict theory: in *Mobilization to Revolution*, Charles Tilly emphasizes the importance of the “collective action” of the revolutionaries. Also he argues that popular outrage is not enough if there is no vehicle that brings it to political change.<sup>41</sup> Tilly also adds what he calls “multiple sovereignty”, which is the shift of resources from one group to another. In other instances, Moore’s *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* could be considered to have elements from the political-conflict theories and the psychological oriented theories that value the popular outrage argument.<sup>42</sup>

As Jack Goldstone argues, these major theories have a number of shortcomings. Other than Skocpol’s theory, they pay little attention to the revolutionary’s elite. Second, there is a vague correlation between revolution and political violence.<sup>43</sup> This fallacy was explained in the previous part of this study. Another shortcoming of the theory of revolution is the absence of the international dimension, which Skocpol’s theory does address. Furthermore, there is no consensus among these theories that a revolution is a change in the type of political order and an act of modernization. Moore provides

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<sup>39</sup> In Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, 11.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, 10.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid, 11-12.

<sup>43</sup> In Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, 59.



novel analysis in this regard, explaining that there are different routes to modernization according to the societal context.<sup>44</sup>

One of the most influential theories in the last thirty years is Skocpol's structural theory of social revolution. Skocpol's theory consists of three main factors: inter-elite conflict, new organizational framework, and international pressure. In the inter-elite conflict, Skocpol argues that the conflict occurs between different social classes—for example, between land elite and peasants. With respect to the organizational framework, she highlights the importance of the vanguard party or some sort of efficient collective action. Her novel contribution to the theory of revolution is on international pressure, which she explains as follows:

All modern social revolutions, in fact must be seen as closely related in their causes and accomplishment to the internationally uneven spread of capitalist economic development and nation state formation on a world scale. Unfortunately, existing theories of revolution have not explicitly taken these perspectives. To be sure, they have suggested that revolutions are related to modernization, but this has entailed an almost exclusive focus on socioeconomic tendencies and conflicts within national societies, taken one by one in isolation.<sup>45</sup>

Skocpol emphasizes that competition among nations can cause revolutions, bringing the modernization argument to the international level. In the case of the elites, she characterizes the conflict as a conflict between the ruling elite and the other elite groups—those with economic and political power.

Despite its novelty, Skocpol's theory has been challenged by events that have occurred since 1979. For example, during the Iranian revolution, it was neither the involvement of the peasant social class, nor was a vanguard party entangled. During the Iranian

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<sup>44</sup> Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, 160-161.

<sup>45</sup> Skocpol, *States & Social Revolutions*, 19.

revolution, ideology played a critical role, which is absent in Skocpol's theory. Also, there was no "military/economic competition" or international pressure on the Shah regime, given the country's mediocre economic development. Sometimes the problem within the ruling elite is that there are no strong independent elite groups—this was the case during the Iranian revolution and the Arab Spring. Furthermore, with respect to the Arab Spring, there was no vanguard party; in fact, it was leaderless. Also there was no classic social conflict (e.g. peasants vs. land elite). Additionally, with respect to international pressure, there was no economic or military competition among the Arab countries, or among Arab states and other states. Hence Skocpol's theory cannot be fully applied to the Arab Spring cases without further specifications.

A critical shortcoming in the revolutionary theory is the role of ideology. In the theories of impact of revolutions, ideologies are correlated with political leadership, but not with the theory of origins. However, recent contributions from Wickham-Crowley 1992, Calhoun 1994, Foran 1997 and Parsa 2000, have emphasized the importance of ideology in creating alliances among groups.<sup>46</sup> On the shortcomings of the theory of revolution, Goldstone further comments:

Although these scholars overlap to a large degree in identifying the factors important to modern revolutions, they do not agree on precisely which conditions should comprise the core of the revolutionary theories.<sup>47</sup>

This debate of overlapping factors creates problems when analyzing the selected cases. Even the admission of ideology is of no help, given the near absence of ideologies in the Arab Spring mechanism. After this quick tour through the revolutionary theory, I emphasize the following: most theories are in the domain of the theory of origins. Thus, the theory of mobilization or the theory of impact is beyond the scope of this study.

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<sup>46</sup> Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, 73.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid, 74.

The problems with the theory of origins are the following: the first is not distinguishing between ideological and intellectual currents. I prefer using the intellectual current, because in every revolution, there is an intellectual current, but not necessarily an ideological one. Intellectual current is a stream of general ideas, but ideology is an agenda for action.

The second problem lies within Skocpol's interpretation of international pressure which needs to be refined in as far as to include other meanings beyond economic competition between capitalist states.

From the classification of modernization, I deduce that the *political modernization situation*, which includes the three conditions that create a political class crisis (intellectual current, new organizational framework, and international pressure), is the decisive point of departure. Thus I categorize Skocpol's conditions as the *political modernization situation* by excluding elite conflict and adding intellectual current. This definition creates the necessary conditions for a change within the political class but does not necessarily oust the ruling elite. The Syrian case, which I mentioned in the introduction, is a counterfactual. The defined conditions are sometimes absent, or at least one of them is lacking. Even still, one individual alone can generate the *political modernization situation*, for example a creative statesmanship without the existence of international pressure or intellectual current. Two examples for the above situation are the Prophet Muhammad, who created a new *political modernization situation* by transforming a nomadic tribal society into statehood; and Simon Bolivar, who created republics nearly from scratch in an underdeveloped 19<sup>th</sup> Latin America.<sup>48</sup>

Thus far the conditions of international pressure, an intellectual current and a new organization framework are individually sufficient, and sometimes substituted by a creative statesmanship. Hence I place them under the *political modernization situation* category, which creates a potentiality for a political revolution, or a need for the old

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<sup>48</sup> See the new biography of Simon Bolivar by Marie Arana, 2014.

level of succession (old political classical situation) to change. The potentiality for ousting the ruling elite is represented in the revolutionary situation. This will be confined to the rigidity of the ruling elite and the chance of ousting them, as was alluded to in the introduction. In the context of the modernization school, my approach is an elitist approach. It is an extension and refinement of Skocpol's theory to explain a political revolution; or in other words, to provide a structural theory of political revolution.

### **Definitions: Political Formula & Political Legitimacy**

According to Mosca, a political formula is the moral and legal basis that justifies the rule of the political class. In other words, it is the principle of sovereignty or the right to exist. For example, the political formula in the Medieval Ages was the "divine right" and the current one is popular sovereignty. Political legitimacy is the acceptance of this principle of existence by the public. This is a substantive political legitimacy, which is distinct from the procedural political legitimacy. The latter is the acceptance of execution or governance, whilst the substantive legitimacy is the principle of authority. Substantive political legitimacy is what, in international law literature, is called internal sovereignty. This distinction is important in understanding the difference between a political revolution and a revolt. A revolt is an ousting of the ruling elite supported by mass participation (in some cases), without a change in the political class. For example, the Abbasid revolt in the 7<sup>th</sup> century experienced mass participation, yet the Umayyad dynasty was ousted and replaced by the Abbasid dynasty. That said, the political class structure remained aristocratic/autocratic, the political formula remained as the patron or the sultan sovereignty with a divine right, and the substantive political legitimacy remained as a traditional legitimacy. The Umayyad was ousted because it lost the procedural legitimacy, which is related to its arbitrary execution of allocating goods and distributive justice. In contrast, the French revolution experienced a change of the political formula from the divine right to popular sovereignty, and the substantive political legitimacy transformed from the traditional to the charismatic. In political revolutions, even if the political class

structure does not change, at least the political formula and its derivative, the substantive political legitimacy, should change. Furthermore, Mosca elucidates the political class structure according to the succession of elites and succession of legislation. According to the succession of elites, he classifies the political class into aristocratic and democratic. The aristocratic came to office via selection while the democratic came to office via election. The second classification is according to the succession of legislation. If the legislative process works from the top down, it is autocratic; if it functions from the bottom up, it is liberal. Based on this classification, there are four types of political classes: aristocratic/autocratic, aristocratic/liberal, democratic/autocratic, and democratic/liberal.<sup>49</sup>

The first type is exemplified by the absolute monarchies. An example of the second type is the Roman republic, which, while ruled by aristocrats, could be considered liberal because of its legislative succession. The contemporary Russian Federation is an example of the third type, which, despite conducting elections, still rules by autocratic grip. The last example, of course, constitutes most Western democracies. Political revolutions occur when there is a change in the structure of the political class, the political legitimacy, the political formula, or in all three.

### **Intellectual Current**

According to Mosca's theory, an intellectual current is crucial for political revolutions and thus for changing the political class. He argues that the current of liberal ideas and constitutionalism were crucial in the lead up to the English and the French revolutions.<sup>50</sup> Therefore, the intellectual current is an important condition in creating a *political modernization situation*. An intellectual current can include ideologies or ideas in general.

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<sup>49</sup> Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, chapters 1-4 and 12.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid, 254.

### **New Organizational Framework**

The other condition is the new organizational framework. This condition is borrowed from Skocpol's theory but with additional specifications. In Skocpol's theory, the organizational framework is the vanguard party. In the cases in this study, the new organizational framework is the collective action of the young generation using new technology; therefore, neither the vanguard party nor the political leadership was decisive. What is unique about the Arab Spring is the fact that it was leaderless—it was a new revolution made possible by the new media and communication in the information age.

### **International Pressure (New Differentiation Context)**

The international pressure in Skocpol's theory is presented as the economic and military competition among states. In general, international pressure is pressure generated from a conflict of interest among states. This process always exists—both in times of stability and revolution. In the case of political revolutions, we should read the international pressure properly, namely whether there is a new differentiation context or not at play. Is there a change in the formation of states, the method of interaction, or the distribution of powers (bipolar or multipolar system)? In this part of my thesis, I will bring in elements of international relations theory (IR).

In “Differentiation: A Sociological Approach to the International Relations Theory” (2010), published in the *European Journal of International Relations*, Barry Buzan and Mathias Albert argue about the deficiency of international relations theory. They argue that “in adapting differentiation theory to its more complex layered subject matter, IR can develop it into something new and more powerful for social theory as a whole.”<sup>51</sup> In addition, they provide taxonomy of “segmentary differentiation” “stratificatory differentiation” and “functional differentiation”. “Segmentary differentiation” is where every social subsystem is equal to another in the society:

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<sup>51</sup>Buzan and Albert, “Differentiation: A Sociological Approach to International Relations Theory,” 3.

tribes, families, and nation states in international relations.<sup>52</sup> The “stratificatory differentiation” refers to the hierarchical system in general and the discrepancy in the distribution of power. Lastly “functional differentiation” refers to the differentiation in activity and the division of labor generally.<sup>53</sup>

The segmentary and functional differentiations are differentiations of norms, while the stratificatory differentiation is a differentiation of power. One of the major theorists of IR is Kenneth Waltz, who incorporates differentiation in his structural theory. Waltz argues that the structure of international politics consists of three pillars. First there is the ordering principle: anarchy. Anarchy does not mean chaos but the absence of an overriding or central authority. More accurately, anarchy is due to the absence of international sovereignty or leviathan, and the absence of overriding sovereignty is due to the absence of a countering unit. The second pillar is the differentiation of its units. Waltz argues that states are like units, given that there is no division of labor as there is in domestic politics (in which the ordering is hierarchical). He argues that all states pursue the same objective, namely: struggle for survival and national interest. The last pillar is the distribution of its capabilities, which stands for the number of powers in an era of international politics: unipolar, bipolar and multipolar.<sup>54</sup>

The problem with Waltz’s theory is in its theoretical foundation. He confines functional differentiation as similar to the functional differentiation of division of labor in the domestic society. As a result, he misses the meaning of functional differentiation in international politics, and misses the other two differentiations as well.

Based on the aforementioned, in chapter 4, I will explain the new differentiation context even further, and trace the change in segmentary differentiation, functional

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid, 7.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid, 8.

<sup>54</sup> Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, chapters 5 and 6.

differentiation. This will be done in conjunction with the three main revolutionary processes in Arab history in order to assess the difference in the international pressures that were present in 2011, as opposed to those in 1923-1950s and in 662. The other two definitions—the rigidity of the ruling elite and chance of ousting the ruling elite—are already defined in the introduction.

In this chapter 1, the focus lies on the *political modernization situation*, which means the emergence of a need for a change and modernization of the political class. Further elaboration of the *assabiyya* and rigidity of the ruling elite will appear in chapter 5.

In the following chapters 2, 3 and 4, the new *political modernization situation* of 2011 will be traced and compared with the revolutionary processes of 662 and 1923-1950s. The political class will be divided into three sub-conditions, namely: political class structure, political legitimacy, and political formula. I will tackle each sub-condition in every chapter just as an introductory clarification in relationship to one condition of the *political modernization situation*. For example, in chapter 2, I will analyze political class structure in relationship to the new organizational framework in the three revolutionary processes. In chapter 3, I will discuss political legitimacy vs. intellectual current; whereas political formula vs. international pressure is discussed in chapter 4. This classification does not mean that a new organizational framework will affect only the structure and not the legitimacy or political formula of the political class. Nor does it mean that the effect of the intellectual current is just on the political legitimacy and not on the formula. This classification does not relate to the merit of the theory. In other words, it could have been organized as the political class vs. the three conditions of *political modernization situation* in every chapter. Both ways are correct as long as they confirm the existence of a new *political modernization situation*. At the end of chapter 4, the pieces will be put together by comparing the *political modernization situations* among the revolutionary processes of 662, 1923-1950s and 2011.







## **Part II: Political Modernization Situation**



## Chapter 2: The New Organizational Framework

### Political Class Structure in the Arab History

Before dwelling on the degeneration of political class structure in the cases of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, we make a pre-colonial tour de horizon to outline the nature of the Arab political class structure. In order to understand the political class structure in the Arab world, we have to trace back its development. The political class structure crisis and the new organizational framework are traced in three revolutionary processes.

The first is the revolutionary process that shifted the first wave of the Arab political class to the second, in 662 A.D. The second revolutionary process was in the shift from the second to the third wave, between 1923-1950. The last revolutionary process is in 2011, in which the third wave shifted to the fourth wave. We will repeat this process every chapter in order to prove the existence of a new *political modernization situation*.

Our approach is not chronological, but strategic narrative, focusing on the milestones that created the Arab political class. The aristocratic/autocratic type of the Arab political class is described by Max Weber as sultanism. Sultanism, as Weber argues, is “when domination develops an administration and a military force which are purely personal instruments of the master.”<sup>55</sup> This renders the state’s resources part of the sultan’s possessions, without room for autonomous actors. Furthermore, sultanism is based on two pillars interalia: patrimonialism and religious politics.<sup>56</sup> (Another explanation of the strong *assabiyya*). Patrimonialism is the duality of tribalism and loot, which is taking the resources of the state as prey for the ruling tribe or clan. The rest would be merely subjects to the ruling tribe related through patron-client relationship. Patrimonialism is different from feudalism in European history.

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<sup>55</sup>Weber, *Economy & Society*, 231.

<sup>56</sup>Bassam Tibi expanded a great deal on religious politics in numerous books, two of which *The Challenge of Fundamentalism* and *Islamism and Islam*, see them for further explanation.

Feudalism gave space for landownership and the creation of autonomous lordship, while patrimonialism rendered everything more or less a household for the sultan and the ruling tribe, which hindered the development of impersonal corporations in Arab history on both political and economic fronts. Also, given the obscure scrutinizing of the sultan, Islamic legislation (fiqh) was confined to the horizontal dimension; in other words, the individual relations, keeping public law, constitutional law in its infancy.

As a second pillar of sultanism, religious politics is in which religion used as an element of justification and legitimation of the ruling elite. Based on the previous theoretical taxonomy, religious politics is part of the authorization level, and patrimonialism is part of the allocation level. Religious politics does not mean theocracy per se. The Arab political order since its emergence in the 7<sup>th</sup> century was quasi-theocratic. It was not a solid body of clergy as was the case in medieval Europe, which, in its zenith, used to crown and depose emperors. Conversely, in Arab history, the sultan was in full command, and used the religious cloak as he saw fit to sway the subjects at his will. Religious scholars were scattered in different schools, working as freelancers interpreting the religious texts, without being organized in a powerful organization that exerted political pressure. In short, there was no equivalent religious hierarchy to the church in the history of Europe. As a result, this gave the sultan room to maneuver and use religious manipulation to gain legitimacy purposes. As Fukuyama explains, “the world of Islam was effectively caesaropapist rather than theocratic: secular rulers held power and hosted on their territory a caliph and ulama (religious scholars) who administered the sharia.”<sup>57</sup> Ibn Khaldun, the Arab history philosopher, was the first to allude to the element of religion in Arab politics by saying the following: “dynasties of wide power and large royal authority have their origin in religion based either on prophecy or on truthful propaganda.”<sup>58</sup> The use of religion was cemented by what he calls “group feelings” or *assabiyya* among tribe members.

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<sup>57</sup> Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order*, 279.

<sup>58</sup> Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, 210.

Ibn Khaldun further explains that “religious propaganda gives a dynasty at its beginning another power in addition to that of the group feeling it possessed as the result of the number of its supporters.”<sup>59</sup>

The two pillars of patrimonialism and religious politics constituted the substance of the Arab political class with its aristocratic/autocratic structure. It was aristocratic because it consisted of tribal exclusive rule; and it was considered autocratic because the decision-makers were not accountable to the public. What led to the persistence of this tyrannical equation is the persistence of the same organizational framework, namely the tribal alliance. The politics of *assabiyya* (group feeling or solidarity) was the only organizational framework that was available. Therefore, the vicious cycle between religious politics and patrimonialism persisted for centuries without the emergence of a “game changer” in the horizon. What broke the tyrannical equation in Europe is the change of means of production as a synthesis of the feudal institutions, along with the intellectual current of reformation and renaissance.

In the Arab world’s political history, there was no breakthrough around the corner. Patrimonialism hindered any development of a free enterprise, and with the absence of a creative intellectual current that addressed the political question, the problem remained static. The only agents left were the tribes, which resulted in persistence of sultanism. As Perry Anderson explains:

Towns had no corporate or municipal autonomy: indeed, they had no legal existence at all. Just as there was no state, but only a ruler and his agents, no courts but only a judge and his helpers, so there was no city but only a conglomeration of families, quarters and guilds, each with their own chiefs or

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid, 211.

leaders. The towns, in other words were without defense against the will of the commander of the faithful and his servants.<sup>60</sup>

This was the tragedy of Arab politics, which is the politics of assabiyya. Without the change in the duality of religious politics and patrimonialism, and without a new organization framework or intellectual current, there was no political revolution. Political revolution needs an innovation of organization to occur. As James Q. Wilson explains that the rate of proposal of innovation is directly proportional to the diversity of organization, whilst the rate of adoption of innovation is inversely proportional to the diversity of organization.<sup>61</sup> In Europe, the feudal system and the emergence of capitalism provided a diversity of organization for the political revolutions that followed. Wilson further explained that political systems where power dispersed (like in the context of feudalism) would have many proposals and few adoptions, whereas a concentrated political system (patrimonialism) would have few proposals and many adoptions.<sup>62</sup> The game changer in the Arab Spring as a political revolution, as we will examine in the following chapters, is the emergence of new organizational framework: social networking and political parties.

### **The First Revolutionary Process& the Organizational Framework: 622-662**

The first wave of the Arab political class began with the first Arab republic, which was found by the Prophet Muhammad in 622. The political entity the Prophet established was seen by scholars like Bernard Lewis as confederacy of tribes, and to others, like Fukuyama, as a state-level society given that the full grade of statehood (official army and police) began with Muawiya I and Abdul Malik bin Marwan.<sup>63</sup> In other respects, famous Islamic historians like Tabari and Masoudi did not call it a republic, but a caliphate. This bespoke a theoretical incoherence in the Islamic political thought. The

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<sup>60</sup> Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State*, 376.

<sup>61</sup> In Thompson., *Approaches to Organizational Design*, 193-218.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order*, 194.



caliphate was viewed as a form of government, which created a theoretical fallacy that followed by the Islamic thinkers and Orientalists alike. A caliphate “successorship” is a legal philosophy, which means that the rule of law should be compatible with the prophetic precedent. As Ibn Khaldun writes, “to exercise the caliphate means to cause the masses to act as required by religious insight.”<sup>64</sup> Thus, the republic is a form of organization, while a caliphate is a philosophy of rule of law, and there is not necessarily a contradiction. The grave mistake was in presenting caliphate as a form of organization and recognizing the Umayyad, Abbasid and Ottoman empires as caliphates. In fact, those empires were de facto caliphate not a de jure.

The Arab republic was an aristocratic republic that, to some extent, resembled the one in Rome. With respect to the political class structure, it was aristocratic/liberal, which constituted the first wave of political class. The liberal aspect manifested in the decision style from bottom up, and the tendency toward an egalitarian way of governance during the Prophet and the five “righteous guided” Rashidun caliphs. In the 40-year reign of the republic, the government was accountable to the people and the five caliphs were *primus inter pares* leaders. One example was the inauguration address of the first caliph Abu Baker:

Oh people, I was chosen as your commander, though I am not the best among you, therefore, if I ruled justly support me, and if I ruled unjustly correct me. Honesty is the highest burden, and lie is the highest treason, the underdog among you is the closest to me until his right is given....<sup>65</sup>

That speech set the tone of political practice for the coming four caliphs before the change of the republic to monarchy by the establishment of the Umayyad Empire around 662A.D.

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<sup>64</sup> Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, 257.

<sup>65</sup> Ibn Tabari, *History of al-Tabari*, 75.

The reasons for the Arab republic's short lifespan were the following. First, the pact of the Medina that Prophet Muhammad drafted, which were around 46 articles long, was not amended. The document organized the rules of engagement among the tribes living in Medina, but the rules regarding the division of powers, rules of succession, and terms of office were absent. Examples from the document include the following:

The believers and their dependents constitute a single community (umma).

Each clan or subdivision of the community is responsible for bloody-money and ransoms on behalf of its members. (art 2-11).

The members of the community are to show complete solidarity against crime and not to support a criminal even when he is a near kinsman, where the crime is against another member of the community (art 13,21).

The members of the community are to show complete solidarity against the unbelievers in peace and war (art 14, 17, 19, 44).

The Jews of various groups belong to the community, and are to retain their own religion; they and the Muslims are render help (including military aid) to one another when it is needed (art 24-35, 37, 38, 46).<sup>66</sup>

After the death of the Prophet, Arabs confronted the first succession crisis, which led to the birth of the two factions Sunni and Shia. According to the Sunni's (traditionalists) tradition, the Prophet did not leave a will outlining the succession plan. Whereas the Shia (supporters) claims that there was a will that named the Prophet's son in law, Imam Ali, as the rightful successor. Regardless of the authenticity of claims, the unsettled succession set in motion a crisis of the constituency of the

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<sup>66</sup> Watt, *Islamic Political Thought*, 5.

political class. Therefore, the crux of the Sunni/Shia split is constitutional and particularly to the nature of the political class and the succession question.<sup>67</sup>

In the famous gathering of Saqifa, the gathering of the Prophet's companions, the question of succession settled temporarily in a meritocratic manner. The companions agreed on the Prophet's eldest companion, Abu Bakir, as the first caliph. The rationale of the first caliph appointment was based on merit and confined to the Quraish tribe, the Prophet's tribe. The reasoning of rendering the Quraish tribe as the ruling elite was according to the Prophet hadiths or speeches and sayings, one of which dictates that "command shall be in Quraish as long as only two men of them remain."<sup>68</sup> There are, however, two schools of interpretations of this hadith: the literalist school sees the command in Quraish absolutely. The rationalist school is according to the interpretation of Ibn Khaldun in the *Moqaddima*. Ibn Khaldun approaches the hadith in the light of his *assabiyya* theory, which states that Quraish is in command as long as they command the legitimacy. Thus, it is relative and conditional.

From the settlement of the first succession crisis emerged the second reason for the short lifespan of the republic. By confining the succession in Quraish a sustainable succession rendered in jeopardy. Prophet Muhammad was innovative in creating new organizational framework, which was a meritocratic group. That was the coalition of the emigrants with the Prophet to Medina, and the supporters who gave the Prophet and his comrades a refuge. The Arabic word for emigrants is "Muhajiren", and for supporters is "Ansar". The meritocratic group of Muhajiren and Ansar constituted the senate of the republic, particularly the distinguished elders, of whom there were 313. This body represented the political class structure of aristocratic/liberal type. Yet due to the short experience of statehood and political craft, after the death of the Prophet, the companions neither institutionalized the body of Muhajiren and Ansar nor

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<sup>67</sup> "Fil omk," (In Depth) *YouTube Video*, 48:41, October 9, 2012, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0EIjjuDWT4>.

<sup>68</sup> Bukhari, *Sahih al Bukhari*, 1268.

amended the pact of Medina to cover the succession plan. Furthermore, the five caliphs were each elected differently, which bespoke the early succession crisis in the republic. In fact, each caliph had a different interpretation of shura (which refers to both deliberation and election). For example, in a letter from Imam Ali, the fourth caliph, to the governor of Syria Muawiya I, he wrote:

Verily, those who took the oath of allegiance to Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman have sworn allegiance to me. Now those who were present at the election have no right to go back against their oath of allegiance, and those who were not present on the occasion have no right to oppose me. And so far as shura (limited franchise or selection) was concerned, it was supposed to be limited to Muhajirs and Ansars and it was also supposed that whomsoever they selected became caliph as per approval and pleasure of Allah. <sup>69</sup>

Based on this letter, limited shura was not free of shortcomings either. One major challenge was that these gentlemen were supposed to die sooner or later, and without regular selection mechanisms in place, one day Muhajiren and Ansar would disappear. Reading the literature of the caliphs, sayings and letters, it seemed there was no alternative plan (Plan B), and therefore the republic lasted only 40 years rather than 400. As a contrast to the Roman republic, lasted centuries due to the rigorous succession procedure and innovative organization. The Arab republic lacked that groundwork. It was founded by a charismatic leader (Prophet Muhammad), and the rulers after him fell short of routinizing the charisma.

Thus far, there are two major reasons that led to the end of the republic: first, the absence of the institutionalization of the new organizational framework—of Muhajiren and Ansar as a meritocratic group bound by organic solidarity. The second reason was that the charismatic authority was never changed to legal authority. That could have

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<sup>69</sup> Imam Ali Ibn Abu Talib, *Nahjul Balagha* (Peak of Eloquence), 165.

happened by the amendments of the constitution of Medina, and clear regulation of succession.

Nevertheless, what the Prophet did was revolutionary, a political revolution of an Eastern kind. As Huntington explains, “the Eastern revolution...begins with the mobilization of new groups into politics and the creation of new political institutions and ends with the violent overthrow of the political institutions of the old order.”<sup>70</sup> The Prophet founded a political institution in Medina and, after a series of battles, overthrew the old order in Mecca. The reason it was considered a political revolution was that there was a shift from a stateless Arab peninsula to one political order. In addition, the Prophet changed the political class from a tribe to a meritocratic group, and brought a new political formula—the prophetic precedent. In that sense, advancing a new organizational framework, new political formula and political legitimacy with mass participation merits the definition of political revolution. In other words, the Prophet created the original first *political modernization situation*. However, the region witnessed a setback just thirty years after his death in the shift from the first to the second political class wave in 662.

The Eastern and Western historians describe the empire period from the Umayyad to the Ottoman Empire as a caliphate, which is a fallacy. The caliphate only lasted thirty years. This distinction is crucial in understanding Islamic political thought, which is widely misread and misunderstood. A wide spectrum of Islamic scholars and Orientalists point the blame to Muawiya I for setting the precedent of hereditary rule in Arab politics and ending the republic. As Bernard Lewis explains, “Muawiya I set a precedent followed by later caliphs by nominating his son Yazid during his own lifetime an heir apparent.”<sup>71</sup> Yet, what Muawiya I did was a medium-range factor not a long structural one. In fact, using the counterfactual, if the five caliphs of the republic institutionalized the organizational framework and changed the charismatic authority

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<sup>70</sup> Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 266.

<sup>71</sup> Lewis, *The Middle East*, 64.

to legal authority, would Muawiya I still have had a role? Or in other words would the republic have changed to monarchy? Had there been continuity in the meritocratic organizational framework, the change to monarchy would not be conceivable—or at least it would have taken more than thirty years after the death of the Prophet. Muawiya I was only a factor representing the traditional organizational framework (tribal alliance), which existed along with the degenerated political class structure (Muhajiren and Ansar).

Yet Muawiya I actions could be considered a counter-revolution to the revolution unleashed by the Prophet in 662, which changed the political class to aristocratic/autocratic. Muawiya I set the precedent for hereditary rule, which became the norm within Arab politics. Furthermore, the autocratic rule was explicit in his inaugural speech in place called Nukeila in southern Iraq:

I fought you not for to pray or to fast or to go to Hajj, for I know you do that, yet I fought you to command you, and God has given me that in spite of you. <sup>72</sup>

Another account was the inaugural ceremony of the son of Muawiya I, Yazid as the next caliph:

The commander of the faithful is that one, and he pointed to Muawiya I, and if he dies then that one and he pointed to Yazid. And if anyone objects, then this one and he pointed to his sword. Muawiya I said to him “you are the prince of orators.”<sup>73</sup>

The concept of the caliph persisted in the empire period as a legitimation, though as previously mentioned, from Muawiya I until the last Ottoman sultan, they were de facto caliphs, not legitimate ones.

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<sup>72</sup> Abu Faraj al Isfahani, *Maqatel al-Talibiyyin*, 45.

<sup>73</sup> Ibn Qutayba, *Uyun al Akhbar*, 273.

More importantly, the Umayyad dynasty beginning with Muawiya I began the religious politics as the second fold of sultanism. Caliphs of the republic were successors of the prophethood, while the Umayyad set the precedent to be the “caliphs of God” and thus the divine right rule. As Montgomery Watt explains:

They allowed the use of the title “caliph of God” in the sense of ruler or viceroy appointed by God. They further justified their claims to be divinely appointed by quoting the Quranic verse in which God addresses David saying ‘O David, we have made thee a Khalifa in the earth, so judge between the people with truth.’<sup>74</sup>

This development cemented the second wave, which is the aristocratic/autocratic in the periods of Umayyad, Abbasid and Ottoman Empire.

In short, the first revolutionary process spanned from 622-662. An Eastern political revolution created by the Prophet Muhammad which led to the change from a nomadic tribal society to a state. The founded state-republic lasted 40 years and reversed to a monarchy due to a succession crisis, and an absence of intellectual current that provides alternatives. The irrelevance of international pressure by then, and the absence of new organization framework, paved the way for the institutionalization of a traditional monarchy. Muawiya I is the second founder of political order in Arab history after the Prophet by establishing the second wave of aristocratic/autocratic political class.

### **The Second & Third Revolutionary Processes: 1923/1950s-2011**

#### **The Case of Tunisia**

In the post-colonial era, there was the transition from the second wave mechanical-aristocratic/autocratic to the third wave, which was the organic-aristocratic/autocratic. Mechanical according to Emile Durkheim’s terminology( mechanical and organic

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<sup>74</sup> Watt, *Islamic Political Thought*, 33.

solidarity) which refers to the socialization in the primitive society among people with shared beliefs or kinship, while the organic refers to the socializing in the more developed societies along division of labor relations. In this study I used the mechanical and organic concepts to distinguish between aristocratic/autocratic political class in which succession is hereditary within one family or tribe (mechanical-aristocratic/autocratic), and aristocratic/autocratic political class in which the succession confined in one party or military junta (organic-aristocratic/autocratic).

In our cases Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, as a political class structure, sultanism is the common practice. Sultanism kept the personification of political development and economic development alike with a dual relation between patrimonial ruler and subject compared to the relation of feudal lord and serf in Europe. Unlike Europe, which witnessed the impersonal bureaucratization as a result of the capitalist development, much of the Arab region experienced a personal bureaucratization, which was reduced to the loyalty to the sultan. Yet, public administration was simpler compared to the system in Europe. In fact, much of the countryside in North Africa was out of the reach of the central government. They were bound more by the organization of kinship as a political and economic organization, which, for some time, hindered the modern state formation.

In the case of Tunisia, modern state formation began around the nineteenth century. The evolution of the Tunisian state passed through the Ottoman rule from 1534, until it became a French protectorate in 1881 under the treaty of Bardu. During the French rule, the ruling elite in Tunisia was the Hussein dynasty of Beys, which ruled in the name of Ottomans and then under the surveillance of the French. This dynasty was the continuity of the mechanical-aristocratic-autocratic second wave, which lasted until 1957. Owing to the French “peaceful penetration”, Tunisia had an advantage of more modern administrative apparatus than did Libya.<sup>75</sup> This penetration confined the dynastic rule of the Beys and set the path for political modernization via the growing

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<sup>75</sup> Anderson, *The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980*, 32.



dismantling of kinship ties and bureaucratization. However, the French political engineering confronted tremendous pressure during the depression of 1930, as Lisa Anderson argues: “the failure of the French administration to respond to the economic needs of the Tunisian population during the depression led to demands for local control of the Tunisian bureaucracy, that is, for independence.”<sup>76</sup> That failure rendered the French rule and the dynasty of Beys years numbered, which created a legitimacy crisis as well. The treaty of Bardu damaged the legitimacy of the Beys dynasty; combined with the consequences of the depression of 1930, questions were asked about the merits of the hereditary succession in the first place.

The shift to the third wave was not possible without the emergence of a new organizational framework. The new organizational framework culminated in the Neo Destour party, led by Habib Bourguiba, who achieved independence in 1956, and in 1957 deposed the last Bey and established a republic. Unlike Libya and Egypt, which experienced the revolutionary process to the third wave via a military coup, Tunisia’s revolutionary process was a coup led by a national struggle party. This was for the marginalized Tunisian army, whose primary recruits were Turks. Whilst in Egypt and Libya, the army recruits were local nationals. The party in Tunisia was a process of an organic solidarity, which consisted of lawyers, doctors and businessmen that reached out to rural areas through aid and services. Hence, the party development was crucial for cutting the kinship ties in Tunisia and paving the way for more political modernization. Another key to its success was in the bridging of the elite groups in the urban areas with those in the countryside. As Huntington explains, “a crucial turning point in the expansion of political participation in a modernizing society is the inauguration of the rural masses into national politics.”<sup>77</sup> Its objective was in liberating the country from the French colonization as outlined in their program:

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid, 33.

<sup>77</sup> Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 74.

The objective of the formation of this party is to succeed in obtaining the emancipation of the Tunisian country from the bonds of slavery so that the Tunisian people become a free people enjoying all the rights which free nations have.<sup>78</sup>

As was alluded to, the political party in Tunisia was an organic-aristocratic/autocratic that managed to solve the problem of tribalism earlier. The main factor was also in the establishment of the General Labor Union in 1946, the first union in the Arab world. Along with the Nationalist party, it rallied support from the urban areas and managed to gain support for the single Nationalist party. Charles Micaud argues that one out of three adult Tunisians belonged to the party in 1955.<sup>79</sup> This gave Tunisia an edge politically over Egypt and Libya, and no wonder that the revolution of 2011 was first sparked in Tunisia.

After independence, Bourguiba began to consolidate his power under the philosophy of one party rule and one leader. Though secular and Western-educated, Bishara describes Bourguiba as a Khaldonian.<sup>80</sup> In fact, Bourguiba still did not depart from the ideal type of the Arab political order, which is sultanism. Bourguiba first depicted himself as a liberal, and then chanted corporate socialism in 1962 and restructured the constitutional party.<sup>81</sup> For this move, Bourguiba depended on the alliance with the General Labor Union until 1977, and then the union was marginalized as Bourguiba became a lifetime dictator. Yet the corporate state he had created was not a rentier state as the ideal Arab state; it did have a vibrant work force defended by labor unions. Moreover, in terms of political participation, it left the door ajar for marginalized parties as a façade for modern state.

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<sup>78</sup> Quoted in L. Anderson, *The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980*, 163.

<sup>79</sup> In Charrad, *States and Women's Rights: The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco*, 203.

<sup>80</sup> Bishara, *The Glorious Tunisian Revolution*, 66.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

Over the course of the first republic, the Tunisians had a sequence of uprisings. They were respectively in 1969, 1977, 1978, 1980 and 1984. The 1984 uprising was a turning point in the Bourguiba regime. The uprising over bread prices in 1984 was against government resolutions to which the General Labor Union had complied. Numerous protests were not sufficient to solve the problem of autocracy in the political class. In fact, according to Prime Minister Nour, the people of Tunisia were not yet ready for more freedom:

Pluralism for us is just the icing on the cake....England the mother of parliaments, arrived at its own version only after several centuries. Tunisia has had just twenty years of independence; it is still a political baby. I am not advocating a political apprenticeship of several centuries, but at least we should have apprenticeship.<sup>82</sup>

The autocratic approach continued, until Bourguiba's power began to dwindle, and in the same year he appointed Ben Ali as the head of security forces.

After a bloodless coup in 1987, Ben Ali became the second dictator, which bespoke a succession crisis during Bourguiba's rule. Bourguiba neither had a son nor did he appoint an heir, leaving the succession question open. Ben Ali's coup was deemed necessary to save the situation. He came with lofty promises of restricted term presidency, more freedoms and accountability. None of these promises were met. Conversely, he carried on autocracy. Furthermore, Ben Ali created more nepotism via his relatives and his second wife's relatives. Despite nepotism, Tunisia was endowed with sufficient, healthy governance and efficient bureaucracy, and a large educated middle class. In terms of economic growth, the poverty margin improved to the scale of 4.1% in 2006 compared to 11.2% in 1975. In 2010, on the eve of the revolution, the middle class was estimated to be at 80% of the population, the economic growth at

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<sup>82</sup> Quoted in L. Anderson, *The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980*, 243.

3.8% and the national deficit at 1.3%. The problem was in the unemployment rate, which was at 13.3% in 2009.<sup>83</sup>

These indications complicated by the affair of succession, which was looming large. With the rising unemployed, educated young population, the challenge became imminent for the aging presidency. Lots of questions had been in the air since 2009, when Ben Ali turned 73 years old. Both his international and local trips were in decline amid his deteriorating health. By then Tunisia met a critical moment of what Huntington calls “generational age”.<sup>84</sup> The “generational age” is a variable on the question of adaptability in an organization. As Huntington explains, “the more often the organization has surmounted the problem of peaceful succession and replaced one set of leaders by another, the more highly institutionalized it is.”<sup>85</sup> On this matter the political class structure in Tunisia was less flexible than it was in Egypt. Since the republic foundation in 1952 in Egypt, the president used to appoint a vice-president who would ultimately be his successor. This was the practice set by Nassir. The case in Tunisia was not clear. Bourguiba did not announce a successor; therefore the succession crisis was solved with the coup in 1987. In 2009, the same problem was on the minds of the populace; Ben Ali had neither appointed a successor nor abdicated for more plural elections. Therefore rumors were building up about whether his powerful wife or another person from his politburo would succeed him.<sup>86</sup> The American embassy in Tunisia raised high concerns on the question of succession as early as 2006. From a cable dated 9-1-2006, Ambassador William Hudson reported the matter as follows:

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<sup>83</sup> In Bishara, *The Glorious Tunisian Revolution*, 100-102.

<sup>84</sup> Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 14.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid, 14.

<sup>86</sup> Graciet, *La Regent de Carthage* (The Regent of Carthage), 185-187.

Subject: Succession-in-Tunisia:

Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM HUDSON FOR REASONS 1.5

(b) AND (d)

1. (S) SUMMARY: In a country that has had only one president for over eighteen years, suddenly and unusually, talk of the post-Ben Ali era is growing. Several senior and well-connected individuals have recently raised Ben Ali's intentions for the future with Ambassador and other embassy officials. On the heels of Ben Ali's recent illness (Ref A) and a new law providing for "former presidents" (Ref B), these discussions seem, on the surface, to be more relevant than the usual rumors. XXXXXXXXXXXXX given the constitutional framework and the political scene, a successful candidate will likely come from the RCD Politburo. None of the options suggest Tunisia will become more democratic, but the US-Tunisian bilateral relationship is likely to remain unaffected by the departure of Ben Ali. END SUMMARY.<sup>87</sup>

This proves the existence of the succession crisis, at least five years before the revolution in 2011. Ben Ali showed his concerns and presented his goodwill to allies in solving this matter as early as 2009, as this cable shows:

(S) XXXXXXXXXXXXX recently told the Ambassador XXXXXXXXXXXXX that Ben Ali wants to avoid the "difficulties" that arose when Tunisia's first president, Habib Bourguiba, declined in 1987. At the time, Ben Ali argued that Bourguiba was medically unfit to continue as president, while denouncing Bourguiba's de facto presidency for life. One way for Ben Ali to ensure a smoother transition would be to groom a replacement and present him as the only viable candidate in 2009. XXXXXXXXXXXXX later told the Ambassador that, in fact, Ben Ali does not intend to run again in the 2009 presidential

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<sup>87</sup>“Succession in Tunisia: Finding A Successor Or Feet First?” January 9, 2006, [http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06TUNIS55\\_a.html](http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06TUNIS55_a.html).

elections. This scenario, while hard to imagine for many who have witnessed firsthand Ben Ali's jealous control of all power in Tunisia, would allow the President to bask in the glory of being the first Arab leader to voluntarily and peacefully leave office.<sup>88</sup>

Ben Ali did not keep his promises and the problem of succession remained. In the midst of this, the Tunisian army as a potential successor was marginalized and kept in the shadows of the giant security apparatus. Unlike in Egypt and Libya, where the military is the ruling elite, the Tunisian army was a unique case in the Arab world in terms of military-civilian relations. This criterion gave a probability of success for the Tunisia revolution. Ben Ali underestimated the army as it stepped in, siding with the protestors and refusing orders to shoot. The military was part of the new organizational framework, but not at the center of what caused the revolution.

### ***The New Organizational framework***

The new organizational framework that shifted the second wave to the third wave was military juntas and political parties. This was a late development in the second wave. The new organizational framework that was a late development in the third wave is cyber power represented by social networking. In Tunisia, in addition to social networking, the new organizational framework was represented in labor unions besides political parties. Labor unions were especially crucial in initiating strikes. Many social protests began as early as 1969, besides the famous ones in 1977, 1978, 1980 and 1984. Before the 2011 revolution, numerous “bread protests” took place in the country side cities, which developed at a slower pace than within the city. The media frenzy during the revolution framed the protests as a result of the man of who set himself on fire. That act of outrage was a symbol of defiance in the context of an outraged population, and was described by Bishara as the “revolution-susceptibility”.<sup>89</sup> Bishara argues that the “revolution-susceptibility” or (qabilia thawria in Arabic) was

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<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> Bishara, *On Revolution and Susceptibility to Revolution*, 51.

ripe on the periphery of the city of Abo Zeid, which sparked the revolution. He defines this concept as the preparedness of a wider undignified population to struggle against the conventional policies.<sup>90</sup>

Bishara further explains that the main characteristic of the “revolution-susceptibility” is that the security management by the authorities added insult to injury and rendered it wider.<sup>91</sup> Furthermore, Bishara was the first to predict what would happen in Tunisia in his book, *The Arab Question*. He explains that given the large educated middle class, Tunisia was more ready for democratic transition than other Arab states. With respect to the 2011 revolution, Bishara listed nine characteristics of the Tunisian revolution as a model for other Arab Spring states, namely:

1. It began as a social protest against poverty and unemployment from the periphery to the center.
2. Populism, which combines the spontaneity and organization. The spontaneity was in its development from a protest to a revolution that chanted, “people want to bring down the regime”. The essence of the spontaneity was in the unexpected shift to a movement that demanded the end of the regime. Whilst the organization was in keeping the persistence and the escalation of the movement for three weeks.
3. The emergence of the protest beyond party lines. Parties were not the initiators of the struggle. Given decades of marginalization and containment by the regime, they were merely participants. The key actors were the larger spectrum of independents of the young educated unemployed generations.
4. The general political logo or demand. The chant “people want to bring down the regime” sums it all up and defines what happened in Tunisia as a political revolution.

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<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

5. The peacefulness of the revolution.
6. The ability to win the neutrality of the army, which was key in the success of the revolution.
7. The use of the social networking as a tool for organizing and communicating and coordinate with global media, which was crucial in breaking down the monopoly of state media. This was at the core of the new organizational framework in the Tunisian revolution.
8. The citizenship identity, which did not project racial or religious or regional chants.
9. The absence of the explicit leadership.<sup>92</sup>

This challenges Skocpol's theory of defining the new organization framework as the vanguard party. Skocpol's theory was suitable to explain revolutions in the industrial age, whilst the Arab Spring is a political revolution in the information age. In *The Future of Power*, Joseph Nye alludes to the importance of the "cyber power" in the current age and its possible potentials. He argues the following:

Cyber power is the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through use of the electronically interconnected information resources of the cyber domain. Cyber power can be used to produce preferred outcomes within cyberspace, or it can use cyberspace, or it can use cyber instruments to produce preferred outcomes in other domains outside cyberspace.<sup>93</sup>

The difference between the cases is the context on which cyber power was used. In Tunisia, cyber power and labor unions were the main organizational framework: in 2009, approximately 2,800 000 internet users, with average growth of 2,700 per

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<sup>92</sup> Bishara, *The Glorious Tunisian Revolution*, 56-58.

<sup>93</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*, 123.



year.<sup>94</sup> In Egypt, cyber power and Tahrir Square, as an organizing symbol and venue, together formed the organizational framework. In Libya, besides cyber power, the NTC (National Transitional Council) as a political body was the organizational framework to organize a country that became polarized on the basis of regionalism and tribalism.

The upheaval process began with a regional protest, led to an uprising, and lastly, to a political revolution that demanded the end of the regime. The regional protest began in the neglected city of Abu Zaid. The act of protest gained attention from labor unionists and politicians from opposition parties and activists who saw the picture of the man who sat himself on fire on Facebook. Social media was an effective tool to channel the matter to global media, and for mobilizing public opinion in Tunisia. The act of protest developed from the victim's family circles to the provincial labor unions and politicians. The Tunisian opposition party, the Progressive Democratic party, was the first party which issued an announcement condemning the regime and the ruling party for the turmoil that spread across the country.<sup>95</sup>

The labor unionists and some opposition political parties, in addition to political activists, played a crucial role in bringing the matter to a national scale.<sup>96</sup> The first protest gathering was around 350 people in the city of Abu Zaid.<sup>97</sup> Among the political parties were leftist parties, which were spearheaded by labor unionists. Labor unionists role was crucial in helping the protests last longer than a week. Social media activists created communication networks and reached out to key Arab channels like Aljazeera. As one activist argues, their task combined both the activism on the ground and

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<sup>94</sup> In Bishara, *The Glorious Tunisian Revolution*, 148.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid, 216-218.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid, 200-202.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid, 203.

getting the ear of independent journalists on social media to give the case momentum.<sup>98</sup>

Seven days after the beginning of the protests on December 17, 2011, the upheaval became an uprising. In this phase, more parties began participating and the protest spread throughout the surrounding cities like wild fire. Moreover, a number of parties raised the issue of the necessity of fact-finding commissions on the killings of the peaceful protesters since the beginning. In addition to populism, what made this phase an uprising was the official announcements by opposition parties. For example, one of the key announcements was of the Tunisian Communist Workers party. On December 27, the party announced the following:

The Communist party confirms its stand with growing popular protest which indicates the possibility of development towards a total popular uprising against corruption and political despotism. Therefore, it is the responsibility of all political forces and activists to unify their protest symbol on three words “jobs, freedom and national dignity” in order our sacrifices not go in vain.<sup>99</sup>

This declaration was received with goodwill by many forces and marked the turning point toward an all-out uprising. On day 8, the uprising confronted real bullets by security forces, which added insult to injury and caused the uprising to last longer and spread to the rest of the country. According to Bishara, the question of the wounded played another key role in the spread of the uprising. This was because peripheral cities, which had poor healthcare and low bed capacities in hospitals, led to the transporting of the wounded to surrounding cities to be hospitalized. According to the Tunisian National Institute for Statistics, in 2010, Abu Zaid’s bed capacity was 531. While the bed capacity in Savakis city (the important economic city in the middle

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<sup>98</sup> Ibid, 206.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid, 234.

of Tunisia), was around 1679.<sup>100</sup> These facts contributed considerably to channeling the uprising beyond the birth city.

From the 23rd day of the uprising, the upheaval turned into a political revolution. The mark of revolution occurred when the uprising shifted to Savakis, the vibrant city, close to the capital. Given that it is one of the most populated cities in the country, the uprising got more attention from the media, and the army began to spread. The army continued its deployment in the uprising cities and ultimately into the capital city. Bishara argues that the peacefulness of the army, compared to the security forces, gave the impression of neutrality of the army. As a result, the protestors were emboldened to chant bluntly the French word “dégage” (out) to the Ben Ali, especially after his second speech. From January 11-14, the country entered a general strike, which rendered the days of the regime numbered. After Ben Ali’s last speech on the January 13, head of parties demanded the regime be brought down. In Ben Ali’s last attempt at containing the revolution, he said, “in contrast to what some have claimed that I have pledged on November 7 that there would be no presidency for life, no presidency for life.”<sup>101</sup> Yet, his “kiss of life” for his regime was not enough to keep him in charge. By then, it was too late and too little for the ambitious Tunisians. In time, Ben Ali escaped to Saudi Arabia with conflicting stories of his real intentions.

Cyber power, labor unions and parties all contributed to the new organizational framework. On the eve of the revolution, seven parties were represented in the parliament. The ruling party, the Constitutional Democratic Assembly alone had 161 seats out of 214. In the banned parties camp, three parties were the key players: Nahda Islamist party, which began its emergence in 1972; the Conference for the Republic party, which was founded in 2001; and the Tunisian Communist Workers party, which was founded in 1986. Despite winning the majority of the seats in the first elections after deposing Ben Ali, the Nahda party did not play as integral a role in the revolution

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<sup>100</sup>Ibid, 236.

<sup>101</sup> Council of Foreign Affairs, *The New Arab Revolt*, 407.

as did the Tunisian General Labor Union, or other parties like the Communist party. The problem of the leaderless revolution and the absence of a united front for the young protestors, created a vacuum, which was filled by the old opposition parties after the first elections in 2011.

The key actor in the organization framework, however, was without a doubt the Tunisian General Labor Union. Founded in 1946, a decade before the independence, it was the first and the strongest union in the Arab world. Its existence in a homogenous educated society, with its practice of strikes decades before, played a key role in the creating of what Bishara calls “revolution-susceptibility” in Tunisia. In addition, the union was instrumental in framing the protestors’ demands and supporting the uprising until its transformation into a revolution in the last week.

In short, the new organizational framework in Tunisia was a duality of social networking and the labor unions. Both created the Tunisian exceptionalism in the Arab world, therefore it was not an accident for being the start of the Arab Spring. The revolution mechanism was a combination of spontaneity and organization. The spontaneity emerged via social networking used by the young generations. In an interview on the famous Aljazeera talk show “the Talk of Revolution”, the Tunisian philosopher, Abu Yarib Marzouki, said that “the revolt was spontaneous from the people, young people organized via the social networking,”<sup>102</sup> whilst, the discipline and persistence of the labor unions were an undeniable game changer.

The succession crisis as a degeneration condition of the political class structure is a necessary condition to a political change in general, but not necessary for a change of the political class structure if a new organizational framework does not exist. Past upheavals between the second and the third wave only experienced the existence of the traditional organizational framework (the tribal alliance); hence there was no

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<sup>102</sup> “Hadith Al Thawra,” (The Talk of Revolution) YouTube video ,47:03, April 29, 2012, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1JuRenc6zQA>.

change of the political class structure. In the shift from the second to the third political class wave, the emergence of the political party as a new organizational framework, led to the change of political class structure in Tunisia from the mechanical-aristocratic/autocratic to organic-aristocratic/autocratic. The Arab Spring in Tunisia led to the change from the third wave of political class structure to the fourth (democratic/transitional), thanks to the new organizational framework of social networking.

### The Case of Egypt

The transition from the second wave (mechanical-aristocratic/autocratic) to the third wave (organic-aristocratic/autocratic) in Egypt did not occur until the coup in 1952. Before that, Egypt ruled by many empires until the last one, the Ottoman Empire. The last dynasty, which represents the second wave political class, was Muhammad Ali Pasha's dynasty, which ascended to the throne in 1805. Muhammad first was a Wali (governor) for the Ottoman Empire, and then a self-acclaimed Khedive. His rule, which lasted from 1805-1849, was the period that witnessed the creation of modern Egypt. His main achievement, among many, was establishing the first Egyptian army, which consisted fully of Egyptians. Before that, the Egyptian army was restricted to the ruling foreigners. Hence, Muhammad Ali's move was critical in developing the modern nation state, and as a result, paving the way for the third wave of political class.

Before the third wave, three failed revolutionary processes occurred. The first was the 1805 revolt, which was led by a cleric (Omar Makram) whose effort was instrumental in selecting Muhammad Ali Pasha as the governor of Egypt. The second was the 1881 uprising led by Urabi (defense minister) against Khedive Tewfik, in which the Egyptians demanded representation in parliament. The third was the 1919 uprising, which was led by Saad Zaglul, the founder of the Wafd party, which cemented the question of representation and parliamentary government. In *Philosophy of Revolution*, Nassir argues that his "revolution" was a continuation of these processes

in the course of Egypt's struggle. These processes did not lead to a complete change in the political class, nor did they experience mass participation. The mechanical-aristocratic/autocratic system remained without a radical change. Those processes were therefore not complete revolutions. The coup in 1952 succeeded in changing the political class structure from mechanical-aristocratic/autocratic to organic-aristocratic/autocratic, transforming the second wave into the third wave. With respect to Nassir's coup, it was not a coup of circulation, but a coup of modernization, which could have been a revolution if the mass participation had preceded or accompanied the movement of officers.

The difference between what happened in Tunisia in 1957 and Egypt in 1952 is a question of the military. In Tunisia, the coup executed by a national struggle party, whilst in Egypt, the coup was performed by the military. Egypt's military was the new organizational framework. For changing the political class structure, the new organizational framework usually exists during a succession crisis, a political legitimacy crisis, or both. In the case of the dynasty of Beys in Tunisia, there was no serious succession crisis; instead there was a problem of political legitimacy, as previously explained. Likewise, in Egypt, there was no serious succession crisis, only a problem of political legitimacy. The government of Farouk I lost legitimacy due to corruption, British occupation, and the military defeat in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. With the existence of the new organizational framework, the military involvement got *tour de force* and the first republic was established in 1953.

The first republic established what some analysts describe as the "officers' republic". The founding engineer of this republic was Nassir. According to William Baker, after the coup, Nassir relied on around 1,000 officers in different civilian agencies. Furthermore, around 300 officers worked in state ministries in 1961; and in 1964, out of 26 provincial governors, 22 were officers.<sup>103</sup> These military placements were part of Nassir's social engineering in what is called "revolution from above", which includes

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<sup>103</sup> Baker, *Egypt's Uncertain Revolution*, 55.

the agrarian reform and its derivatives of state policies. Despite its social benefits for the poor, Nassir's policies hindered the development to a more pluralist society. Political parties were banned, as he saw that the allocation of wages and economic development should come before the allocation of freedoms. Political parties shut down, came as a result of politicians trying to influence the military. As Anwar Sadat writes in his memoir *In Search of identity*, parties were banned in 1961 to consolidate military rule.<sup>104</sup>

The succession procedure was more orderly than in the case of Tunisia. The conventional practice, after the death of the president, became the succession of the appointed vice-president after a referendum. This procedure created a peaceful transition of power from Nassir, to Sadat, and finally to Mubarak, who ruled from 1981-2011. In terms of the political class structure, during the Sadat's reign, the Arab Socialist Union was replaced with the Nationalist party. The Nationalist party was merely a gathering of interest groups around the president. Besides the ruling party, other parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood, were offered restricted representation during Sadat and Mubarak's regimes. However, these parties were not offered the chance to govern given the scrutinized fraud elections during Mubarak with the last one in 2010.

During Mubarak's reign, the "officers' republic" was rendered more corrupt. Starting in 1991, Mubarak offered a wide range of retiree officers' posts in state ministries, as an exchange for allegiance. The average wage for a military officer is 500 dollars, which barely allows them to make ends meet. Offering them other posts in the state and the military economy gave them the opportunity to earn a monthly salary of up to 16,670 dollars.<sup>105</sup> According to Yezid Sayigh, the slide to more cronyism during Mubarak's term was due to three reasons: first, because he feared the rise of a strong military officer like Nassir, Mubarak allowed officers' involvement in the economy

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<sup>104</sup> Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, 124.

<sup>105</sup> Sayigh, "Above the State: The Officers' Republic in Egypt," 10.

and to have posts in big state-owned companies. Second, due to the assassination attempt in Addis Ababa 1995, and the growing fear from militant Islamists, Mubarak sought refuge in more military recruits in his government, and increased the size of the security apparatus to nearly 1.4 million personnel. The third reason was that as a result of his full-scale privatization of state-owned companies in 1991, military officers held more posts, which rendered the experiment merely crony capitalism.<sup>106</sup> Therefore, during Mubarak's term, the political class structure became more aristocratic (military aristocracy) and autocratic with respect to the allocation of wealth and freedoms.

As Mubarak grew older, a succession crisis developed. Nassir and Sadat were from the same generation, and colleagues of "revolution". Mubarak, in contrast, was not among the officers of the coup. He passed his ladder of military ranks and became a vice-president by luck. With the death of most officers of the coup, and the absence of a vice-president named by Mubarak, a problem of succession occurred. This political vacuum paved the way for Mubarak's eldest son, Gamal, to get involved in political affairs, until he became the secretary general of the Nationalist party. These developments raised rumors on the question of bequeathing power. According to Jason Brownlee in his article, "Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies", this reversion to hereditary rule is due to the following hypothesis. Scanning 22 cases, Brownlee concludes that hereditary succession in modern republics occurs when there is no agreed-upon-successor to the dictator. Given this succession crisis, the dictator bequeaths power to his son particularly when there is a main factor: absence of mature competition among parties, especially when the personal rule existed before the existence of parties.<sup>107</sup> Brownlee's hypothesis can be applied to Libya and Egypt, but not to Syria. Despite the fact that party system was the precursor of personal rule in Syria after independence, Assad's father managed to bequeath power to his son; and made a reversal from the third wave to the second wave in Syria. Yet in the case of

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<sup>106</sup> Ibid, 13.

<sup>107</sup> Brownlee, "Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies," 595-628.



Syria, there was another factor, which challenges Brownlee's hypothesis. The sectarian effect, created a tendency to hereditary succession for the ruling Allawites sect in Syria. However, Brownlee advances a superb analysis that provides a valid explanation for a number of cases.

Be that as it may, the succession of power to son was not without adversaries. There were two wings in the Nationalist party, one that favored another term for Mubarak; the other wing, made up of mostly young businessmen, favored Gamal. Moreover, the military establishment (the republic's aristocracy)—especially Omar Suleiman, the head of intelligence, and Tantawi, the defense minister— were not in consensus about the hereditary solution. This leaked cable from Wikileaks, titled "Gamal Angling to Get Rid of His Competition" describes the situation:

On March 29, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted to Poloff his assessment that the recently approved constitutional amendments package is largely aimed at ensuring Gamal Mubarak's succession of his father, and "a more controllable, stable political scene when he does take the reins." Opining that "Gamal and his clique" are becoming more confident in the inevitability of Gamal's succession, and are now angling to remove potential "stumbling blocks" XXXXXXXXXXXX said that speculation among Cairo's elite is that there could be a cabinet reshuffle as soon as May or June, in which Minister of Defense Tantawi and/or EGIS head Omar Suleiman would be replaced. "Those two are increasingly viewed as a threat by Gamal and those around him," and thus Gamal is reportedly pushing Mubarak to get them out of the way, so they "could not pose any problems" in the event of a succession. XXXXXXXXXXXX speculated that "hitches" to a Gamal succession could occur if Mubarak died before installing his son: "Gamal knows this, and so

wants to stack the deck in his favor as much as possible now, while Mubarak is firmly in control, just in case his father drops dead sooner...<sup>108</sup>

Mubarak's mistake was in not appointing military successor early on. His fear of a strong man rising to the job or of being toppled by the vice-president led to the situation going astray. This put "officers' republic" on the defensive, and developed a revolutionary situation.

### ***The New Organizational Framework***

The new organizational framework in Egypt was a combination of social networking and Tahrir Square protest movements. Labor unions were not as strong as in Tunisia due to the military hegemony.

That said, the Tunisian effect was a major factor in energizing the people of Egypt to take to the streets. Bruce De Mosquita and Alastair Smith argue that "as Tunisia fell, people of Egypt realized that their leader might also be vulnerable."<sup>109</sup> In addition to the neighbor effect, people should have had the awareness of the succession crisis and what it might produce in the years to come. De Mosquita and Smith explain:

A massive natural disaster, an unanticipated succession crisis, or a global economic downturn that drives the autocrat's local economy to the brink or beyond the brink of bankruptcy can also provide a rallying cry for protesters. Other shocks can be "planned"; that is events or occasions chosen by an autocrat who misjudges the risks involved. One common example is a rigged election.<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>108</sup>"Presidential Succession: Wikileaks Cable07CAIRO974," Accessed December 19, 2013, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/pdf/wikileaks-egypt-1.html>.

<sup>109</sup> De Mesquita and Smith, *The Dictator's Handbook*, 203.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid, 203.

Most of the above describes the case of Egypt on the eve of the revolution, which also relates to the existence of the succession crisis, with the new organizational framework. In terms of parties, as a traditional organizational framework, Tunisia and Egypt share a long tradition, unlike Libya. The major two parties were the Wafd party founded in 1919, and the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. Neither party was the initiator of the popular protest. The key initiators were protest movements like Kifaia and the 6<sup>th</sup> of April, not to mention the social networking used by the young generation. Political parties and the military were complementary factors in the organizational framework. Rabab ElMahdi, a political scientist at the American University in Cairo, highlights the importance of the social networking and the young protest movement:

In the case of Egypt, the recent uprising is constructed as a youth, non-violent revolution in which social media (especially Facebook and Twitter) are champions. The underlying message here is that these ‘middle class’ educated youth are not terrorists. They hold the same values as the democratic West, and finally use the same tools (Facebook and Twitter).<sup>111</sup>

The Egyptian revolutionary situation can be traced back to 2003. The Kefaia Movement, which stands for “enough” in Arabic, was a protest movement against the undignified life that most Egyptians suffer from, and also against the question of bequeathing power to Gamal. Abdul Halim Qandil, a doctor and journalist, was chief coordinator of the movement on the eve of the revolution. In a political debate on “Opposite Direction”, a talk show on Aljazeera, Qandil said that “the Kefaia Movement (began after 2003), and the strike of the 6<sup>th</sup> of April 2008 were a preparation for the revolt....The main slogans were: living, freedom, national dignity and social justice.”<sup>112</sup> These two movements used to execute regular protests, especially in Qairo and Alexandria, at least five years before the revolution. The

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<sup>111</sup> El-Mahdi, “Orientalizing Egyptian Uprising,” *Jadaliyya*, April 11, 2011.

<sup>112</sup> “Itigah Muakes,” in Arabic (The Opposite Direction) Youtube video ,47:05, August 28, 2012, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qnz0vQCUHfU>.

existence of such movements bespoke Egypt's political freedoms, which were better than in Tunisia. Particularly with respect to journalism, activists had more room for criticism than in Tunisia.

A major difference with respect to the proceedings of the revolution is related to the center-periphery relationship. From the detailed proceedings in the last section, it was clear that the revolution in Tunisia began from the south and headed north, from the less developed to the more developed. This was not the case in Egypt; in fact there was no involvement from the southern countryside. Moreover, in Egypt, the uprising on January 25 was coordinated by activists from the 6<sup>th</sup> of April Movement and other Facebook circles, which focused on Tahrir Square.

The Egyptian revolution was by design, while the Tunisian revolution occurred by accident. Qandil, the coordinator of the Kefaya Movement, prophesied the importance of Tahrir Square at least four years before the revolution. In an article on March 3, 2007, in the Karama newspaper, Qandil said bluntly that "the fall of Mubarak will be in Tahrir Square."<sup>113</sup> Hence, the Egyptians revolution was less spontaneous, but more organized than the Tunisian revolution. In terms of participation, both revolutions witnessed mass participation with estimates around 7% of the population. In Egypt in particular, the participation was spectacular.<sup>114</sup> Bishara comments on the phenomenon as follows:

The Egyptian people's participation in the revolution...exceeds any other revolution in history where participation is almost always only one percent, with the exception of the 1979 Iranian Revolution where seven percent of the population took to the streets.<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> "An Interview with A. Qandil," Youtube video, 57:18, April 13, 2013, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkVn20KEFMM>.

<sup>114</sup> In Dabashi, *The Arab Spring*, 95.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid, 96.

Labor unions in Egypt contributed to the revolution by organizing strikes, but the protest movements were the most effective. The protests in Tahrir Square persisted three weeks until the announcement of the abdication of Mubarak on February 22, 2011, and the intervention of the military. In the context of military intervention, what is the difference between the military intervention in 1952 and 2011? The revolutionary process in 1952 was a coup (military) and not a revolution because, as previously explained, there wasn't any mass participation. In fact, two factors that define a military coup were in place, namely: the absence of mass participation, and permanent rule by the military. Neither of these were the case in 2011, despite the military intervention. In fact, the military intervention was the result of public pressure, and there was no permanent rule. The temporary transition ended with the election of Muhammad Morsi in June 2012. In 2011, the military acted as a secondary organizational framework; while the primary organizational framework was social networking, in addition to the Tahrir Square protest movements.

### The Case of Libya

On the eve of independence in 1951, the transition from the second wave to the third wave in Libya was not complete, as the regime was still a mechanical-aristocratic/autocratic (absolute monarchy). Before that transition, Libya witnessed a series of foreign rule from antiquity until the Ottoman rule, which rendered a de facto rule during the Sanussi Movement in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The Italian occupation from 1911 until the defeat in World War II, did not leave much administrative tradition, as was the case of the French in Tunisia.

Compared to Tunisia and Egypt, Libya is the weakest link in terms of political development. Throughout history, given the large territory and the scarcity of water and population, there was no central authority that governed the whole of Libyan modern territory. It used to be the Eastern territory Cyrenaica, governed by an authority usually part of Egypt, and the Western part, Tripolitania, governed from Tunisia. A major change was during the 19<sup>th</sup> and the 20<sup>th</sup> centuries when the Sanussi Movement

began to gain ground in Libya, ending the Turkish rule. Only then and during the Italian invasion 1911 did Libya take its shape as the current modern territory. Libya gained its independence in 1951, as the United Kingdom of Libya, headed by King Idris. Dirk Vandewalle explains the problem that “the state in Europe came as a consequence of war & peace that slowly allowed a central authority to take command over a territory. In Libya statehood came at the end of international war and bestowed.. by UN.”<sup>116</sup>

King Idris reign was shaky and not enterprising. In 1952, King Idris banned parties due to the increasing polarization back then. Moreover, in 1963, federalism was abandoned as a beginning for his first development plan from 1963-1968; though the winds were not in his favor amid Gaddafi’s coup. Gaddafi ended dynastic rule in Libya in 1969 in favor of a fascist regime. Despite introducing an ideological mix of Marxism, Islamism and Pan-Arabism, his ruling style was still regarded as traditional and sultanistic par excellence. The Libyan political scientist Mansour El Kikhia describes the s Gaddafi’s rule:

Colonel Qaddafi overthrew a traditional regime by utilizing a local traditional ideology..... The elites maintain cohesion through a system of patronage, spoils and privileges distributed among urban interest groups and tribal elites. In states molded by traditions the ruler is usually endowed with a certain degree of legitimacy even though that ruler may appear by western standards despotic.<sup>117</sup>

The 1969 coup marked a transition to the third wave (organic-aristocratic/autocratic), after a succession crisis and political legitimacy crisis. The succession crisis evolved through two main factors: first, there was the abolishment of political parties after the first election in 1952. The abolishment of political parties allowed the traditional

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<sup>116</sup> Vandewalle, *A History of Modern Libya*, 21.

<sup>117</sup>El Kikhia, *Libya’s Qaddafi the Politics of Contradiction*, 7.

forces (tribes) to fill in the gap. Also, that move aborted the gradual evolution to a constitutional monarchy and brought up the question of the succession process. The second factor was the absence of a son to succeed the thrown. As a result, the king first named his brother, and after his death, named his nephew, Hasan al Rida. What added insult to injury, was the question of degenerated political legitimacy. Given the nepotism that damaged the governance, the very legitimacy of the kingdom was in jeopardy. In numerous letters and accounts, King Idris expressed resentment due to the looming corruption.<sup>118</sup> The other factors that led to deteriorating legitimacy were the two foreign bases that existed until 1970, which rendered independence unfinished. This created a political vacuum, which gave any military coup tour de force.

Gaddafi emergence solidified the aristocratic/autocratic political class structure. During King Idris reign there was some room for freedom compared to Gaddafi's desert of suppression. Even still there was a beginning of growing institutions, albeit the challenges of tribalism. The historical record indicates that throughout King Idris reign, capital punishment was used only once—on his cousin, who killed the king's servant. When Gaddafi assumed power, the first major autocratic measurement was on December 11, 1969, which issued a declaration that suspended the constitution. This was the consequence of a major speech on November 28, stating that the representative democracy was not suited for Libya. In 1970, Gaddafi nationalized oil companies and banks. Trying to follow in Nassir's footsteps, Gaddafi founded the Arab Socialist Union in 1971 and in the same year issued a decree banning the creation of parties outside the ASU. A major student protest in 1976 against the autocratic measures was crushed, and in 1976, Gaddafi published his Green Book. Ever since, the only institution left standing was "Gaddafi's Tent", which led Libya into a dark tunnel: from the elimination of private property in 1978, to the abolition of the army in 1980, to international terrorist attacks. The outcome was a stateless society with poor healthcare and education services despite the liquidity of the state's purse.

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<sup>118</sup> See *The Sanusi* by Evans-Pitchard.

Over the last ten years, the unemployment stayed at 30% and the inflation at 25%, which fluctuated according to the oil prices that comprises 95% of the export earnings.<sup>119</sup>

To cement his autocratic rule, Gaddafi destroyed any succession element except within his family. Given the series of coups attempted on his life beginning in the mid-70s, Gaddafi weakened the army in favor of his private militias led by kinsmen. Even during the monarchy, the regular army was weaker than the provincial security forces. In the absence of an independent strong army, as in Tunisia and Egypt, and in the absence of regular elections, Gaddafi reversed Libya back to the mechanical-aristocratic/autocratic wave and turned it into a hereditary autocracy. Moreover, absents, a regular army and elections, all roads led to hereditary succession by one of Gaddafi's children, the second eldest: Saif El Islam. Wikileaks cables did allude to the matter of succession, as Scott Shane argued in the *New York Times*:

The same 2010 cable said young Libyan contacts had reported that Seif al-Islam is the 'hope' of 'Libya al-Ghad' (Libya of tomorrow), with men in their twenties saying that they aspire to be like Seif and think he is the right person to run the country. They describe him as educated, cultured and someone who wants a better future for Libya-by contrast with his brothers, the cable said.<sup>120</sup>

In the absence of a new organizational framework, Libyans had no choice but to accept the hereditary solution. In fact, without the neighborhood effect of Tunisia and Egypt, the Libyan revolution would not have been feasible. From this incoherence, the problem of succession arises in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, as Bishara argues in

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<sup>119</sup> Murphay, "Libya Opens Up," 22.

<sup>120</sup> Shane, "Wikileaks Cables Detail Qaddafi Family Exploits," *New York Times*, February 2, 2011.



interview on Aljazeera that “the revolution erupted in authoritarian regimes that wanted to bequeath power.”<sup>121</sup>

### ***The New Organizational Framework***

The Libyan uprising began on February 15, 2011, in the Eastern part of the country. The protest was coordinated beforehand on Facebook. The quest for a peaceful protest was soon abolished by Gaddafi’s authorities, who initiated a bloody crackdown. As a result, after five days of protests in the Eastern part of the country, a few ministers and dignitaries defected from the regime, and declared the Eastern part autonomous from Tripoli. The protests in Tripoli were not successful due to Gaddafi’s iron grip, and soon the flow of the uprising ebbed. Some cities in the Western part of the country, like Misrata, defied the regime and declared allegiance to the political body, the National Transitional Counsel (NTC), which emerged a few days after the uprising in Benghazi-as the political front for the revolution. From the beginning, the new organizational framework in Libya was a combination of social networking and the NTC as the steering wheel. Unlike Tunisia and Egypt, neither labor unions nor political parties were present. From the beginning, Gaddafi ruled out any civilian vehicle that might pose a threat to his regime, as his comrade Jallud (the second man in the 1969 coup) said:

The myth of the popular democracy and authority was Gaddafi’s weapon...Libya’s growth in the seventies was 14-16% and had low record on corruption...after the nineties, 72% of GDP was shackled by corruption....and...Gaddafi was against industry, fearing that the urban concentration would create the mobilization for change...Also he located universities in the rural areas to disperse any potential mobilization force. In

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<sup>121</sup>“An interview with A. Bishara,” Youtube video 47:00, December 30, 2011, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ex0VyWzs0zs>.

fact, Qaddafi used to say that my enemies are the students and workers...he shut down the bus company for this reason.<sup>122</sup>

In the absence of real industry, labor unions and political parties, any potential force for revolution ceased to exist. Yet the revolution occurred despite the absence of the vanguard party. Two factors made it possible: social networking and the domino effect of Tunisia and Egypt. On the question of social networking, Dr. Mahmoud Jebril, the mastermind of the NTC and the revolution's prime minister said that "the youth of Facebook made the revolt. Social networking rendered the new party, yet without venue or leadership."<sup>123</sup>

Thus the young unemployed generation was the initiator of the revolution, and given the absence of leadership, the NTC—as a revolutionary interim counsel representing cities and tribes—filled the vacuum and led the revolution. Amid this development, the proceeding of the political upheaval in Libya transformed from an uprising to a civil war, which led to the involvement of the military intervention from the Security Council and then delegated to the NATO nearly one month after the beginning of the uprising. The explicit pretext of the intervention was due to the fear of imminent genocide in the Eastern city of Benghazi, "the revolution's capital", by Gaddafi's security forces. The rationale of tribes that sided with Gaddafi was neither necessarily anti-revolution nor pro-Gaddafi, but the fear of worst scenario.

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<sup>122</sup> "An Interview with Jallud," Youtube video, 45:28, August 24, 2012, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=18QcNwObfeM>.

<sup>123</sup> "An Interview with Dr Jebril," You tube video, 52:56, August 11, 2011, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SBwQ44OIYmg>.

The intervention aborted the would-be-genocide, yet created more polarization among Libyans and led the tribes of the middle of Libya (like Warfalla), to side with Gaddafi. The areas in the rural countryside sided with Gaddafi, except some cities, while the big, urban coastal cities like Tripoli, Misrata and Benghazi were in the revolutionary camp. As Huntington argues, this is the reason why the middle class in urban areas is more revolutionary, whilst the population in rural areas is traditional and prone to conservatism.<sup>124</sup> This was clear in the cases of Egypt and Libya in which the involvement of people in rural areas was weak. In contrast, in Tunisia, the uprising began in the rural areas and spread to the capital. The basic reason was that the network of labor unions and political parties in Tunisia linked the middle class and peasants. As Huntington further argues that “the opposition groups within the city can unseat the governments but they cannot create a revolution. That requires the active participation of rural groups.”<sup>125</sup>

In Egypt the gap between the city and countryside was bridged with the online networking, which rallied the heavy populated urban cities around the Delta of the Nile. In the case of Libya, the absence of labor unions and parties that linked the city with countryside, and the scarcity of population in general, played a role in thwarting a momentum for the revolution. With respect to the Internet, once the civil war broke out, the Internet was weakened by the government and shut down in many parts of the country. Therefore, the gap between the city and the countryside remained huge, and did a disservice to the revolutionary coastal bloc. On this point, Huntington adds that “the role of the dominant groups in the countryside hence becomes the critical factor determining the stability or fragility of the government. If the countryside supports the government, the government has the potential to isolate and contain the urban opposition.”<sup>126</sup> Amid this deficiency, Gaddafi was given some room to exploit the gap and the rivalries between the urban areas and others in the countryside, and to use the

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<sup>124</sup> Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 71-75.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid, 291.

NATO-effect as a swaying factor to rally the traditional groups in the countryside to ally with him.

The city/countryside gap in Libya prompted the civil war to last eight months before Gaddafi was killed in Sirte, his birth city, on October 20, 2011. As mentioned, one major difference between Libya and the sister cases was that the political upheaval of Libya was a civil war, while in Tunisia and Egypt, they were a peaceful uprisings. All of them, however, were political revolutions, given the fact that there was a change in political class structure in addition to mass participation.

Thus far, the organizational framework in Libya was a mix of social networking and traditional forces spearheaded by the NTC. The Libyan revolution played out like a typical Eastern revolution in which an interim political institution emerges and fights the government in a series of battles until finally toppling it. In contrast, the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions were more like a Western revolution, which depends heavily on urban protests that leads to the collapse of the old regime, without creating a new political institution beforehand. This was the case due to the fact that Libya was less modernized than Tunisia and Egypt. Hence without social networking and the neighborhood effect as a trigger, Gaddafi could still in power.

In short, the existence of the political class structure crisis and the existence of the new organizational framework (military junta) in 1969 led Libya to change from the second wave to the third wave. Likewise, the existence of the political class structure crisis in 2011, along with the emergence of the new organizational framework (social networking and NTC), proved necessary for the change from the third wave to the fourth wave: democratic/transitional. In this chapter we traced one dimension of the *political modernization situation*, namely the sub-condition of the political class (political class structure) and the condition of new organizational framework. The dimension was traced through the three revolutionary processes focusing on the last two processes. The Preliminary conclusion shows that so far we had three *political modernization situations* the first was in 662 A.D in the shift from the first to the

second political class wave; the second was between 1923-1950, in the shift from the second to the third political class wave; the third was in 2011, in the shift from the third to the fourth political class wave. In the next chapter, we repeat the same process in the dimension of the sub-condition of political legitimacy vs. the condition of intellectual current.

## Chapter 3: The Intellectual Current

### Political legitimacy

In this chapter we discuss the question of political legitimacy and the condition of intellectual current. Political legitimacy is one of the three dimensions of the degenerated political class, as previously discussed; the degeneration in the political class takes place in the political structure, political legitimacy and political formula. The three dimensions are linked to each other in the way that degeneration in one dimension usually creates a spillover to the other. For example, degeneration in the political class structure (succession crisis) usually leads to degeneration in the political legitimacy.

There are related issues to the question of political legitimacy that should be addressed. As explained in chapter 1, political legitimacy simply deals with the right to exercise power. Weber famously divided the principle of authority into three kinds namely: charismatic, traditional and legal-likewise legitimacy.<sup>127</sup> The loss of legitimacy occurs due to a question of bad governance, “elite in-fighting”<sup>128</sup> or succession crisis, also the question of new ideas generated from the intellectual current. In an important study by Ahmad Rahmani, which studies the question of political legitimacy in 177 countries from 2005-2009, Rahmani argues against the conventional wisdom of policy articles, which focus on the question of services and macro and micro economics:

Instead, fractionalization of political elite groups of a country is suggested as the most significant determinant of state legitimacy, which is rarely emphasized on in the policy circles. By controlling for a number of other

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<sup>127</sup> In the course of the study I use Weber’s taxonomy interchangeably for the legitimacy and authority alike. Authority is the form of exercising power, while legitimacy is the right to exercise power, even still is the principle of authority .Hence authority is a posteriori to the legitimacy, and they share the same taxonomy of charismatic, traditional and legal.

<sup>128</sup> Acemoglu and Robinson, *Why Nations Fail*, 83.

determinants of state legitimacy suggested by prior literature, we found that violation of human rights and existence of state within state were also significant determinants of state legitimacy.<sup>129</sup>

This was the rationale of our three cases, namely that the loss of political legitimacy was due to the question of constitution and human rights.<sup>130</sup> Observing more than 20 expert interviews on the main Arab media (including Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya), most experts allude to the question of elite and deficiency of dignity as the “game changer” of the question of legitimacy.

### Revolutionary Processes and the Intellectual Current

During the first revolutionary process, in 622-662, the legitimacy of the republic was a charismatic legitimacy and given the intellectual current those times did not offer a solution of the succession crisis; the political class reverted to the traditional legitimacy. During the second revolutionary process (1923-1950s), the legitimacy changed from the universal traditional legitimacy to national charismatic/traditional legitimacy due to the bad governance in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire which was described as the “sick man”. It was also influenced by the emergence of the “national method” in the condition of intellectual current, which challenged the “universal method” on which the Islamdom state or the Ottoman Empire was based. Writers like Michel Aflaq, Abd ar-Rahman al-Kawakibi and scholars like Muhammad Abduh emphasized the autonomy of the Arab region as one political unit.<sup>131</sup>

Furthermore, after the Ottoman Empire, between 1923 and the 1950s, bad governance ravaged Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Also they were friendly to colonization. The last Bey of Tunisia, King Farouk of Egypt and King Idris I of Libya did not emphasize

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<sup>129</sup> Rahmani, “Determinants of State Legitimacy,” 13.

<sup>130</sup> What I mean by constitution here is the regime type or the political class using Aristotle’s terminology in the *Politics*.

<sup>131</sup> See Haim, *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology*.

national sovereignty, which did a disservice to the already dwindling legitimacy. Although this study marks the second wave from 662-1923, the ruling dynasties in the three cases were also ruling during the period of 1923 until the 1950s, which is considered a transitional phase between the second and the third wave. The traditional legitimacies of the three cases lost their power as a question of execution and ideas of national independence and socialism, for a rising charismatic authorities. Hence in the second revolutionary process, the shift was from a universal traditional authority to national charismatic authority/traditional authority.

During the third wave (1923/50s-2011), the authority of the three cases since independence was a charismatic authority. Due to nepotism, the authority as the decades passed by rendered traditional authority. The problem of the ruling elite in the three cases was described by Bishara as follows: “the ruling elite was composed of the ruling family, security network and parasitic businessmen.”<sup>132</sup> This triad was an obstacle to the development of a legal authority and democratization, and ultimately decent nation building. Conversely, the process rendered a dynasty building instead of nation building. Hence, that was the basic reason why the revolution took place in the quasi-republics, not the monarchies. The major reason hitherto is due to the unconstitutional leap to traditional authority, especially after the implicit introduction of the authority inheritance in the three cases. In the other Arab states, especially the monarchies, the traditional authority is legitimate for decades; hence their political legitimacy remained less vulnerable. Thus, the three cases share this historic process, the difference, though, is in the specifics in each country. Given Tunisia’s large educated middle class, it is more sensitive to the unconstitutional leap than are Egypt or Libya. Therefore with the triggering factor of unemployment/corruption, the mobilization probability of the educated masses would be more imminent than the less educated. Ben Ali could have avoided the revolution if he had introduced a swift transition to a legal authority. Neglecting the legal transition, Ben Ali lost legitimacy

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<sup>132</sup>“An interview with A. Bishara,” Youtube Video , 47:00, December 30, 2011, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ex0VyWzs0zs>.



during his reelection in 2009 and the project of bequeathing power began, despite his previous promises to foreign officials of stepping down, as alluded to in cables previously. This is because of the fact that the charismatic legitimacy of Ben Ali was different than his predecessor. Bourgaiba's charismatic legitimacy was as the leader of independence, which gave him the de facto life presidency. Yet, the charismatic legitimacy of Ben Ali, if any, was to end lifetime presidencies, and pave the way for pluralism. His refusal to introduce a clear-cut constitutional leap caused his legitimacy to enter a critical phase in 2009.

In Egypt, according to Muhammad Heikel, the political legitimacy of the "officers' republic" passed through three phases. The political legitimacy of Nassir was based on nation-building and liberation, which had begun its decay in 1967 during Egypt's defeat in the Six Days War. His successor's legitimacy, Sadat was based on the outcome of the 1973 war and the Camp David peace treaty, which ultimately led to his assassination. Mubarak's legitimacy was based on keeping stability in Egypt and the region.<sup>133</sup> Yet Mubarak's grave mistake was in treating stability as an end in itself. Mubarak's assessment of legitimacy entered a critical juncture because of three factors. The first factor was the generation gap alluded to in the previous chapter. The second related factor was Mubarak's refusal to appoint a vice-president and successor. The third factor was Mubarak's refusal to make the transition to legal authority. These factors, in the context of rising unemployment and corruption, formed the basis of the crisis, and thus the degeneration of political legitimacy. What added insult to injury, was Mubarak's unconstitutional leap to hereditary succession. This move created what Bishara called a "susceptibility to revolution" in Egypt—it was only a question of when.

Given that economic inequality is higher in Egypt than in Tunisia and that Mubarak's reign was longer than Ben Ali's, why didn't the revolution begin in Egypt? There are two reasons for this. The first cause is due to the relative relationship between the

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<sup>133</sup> Heikel, *Mubarak wa Zmanuh* (Mubarak and his Age), 78-80.

rising educated public vs. the rising unemployment. Unemployment in Egypt is higher than in Tunisia; worse still; Egyptians are less educated than Tunisians. The relative relationship between educations vs. unemployment in the case of Tunisia created a threshold of political upheaval because the educated unemployed are more dangerous than uneducated unemployed. A quantitative study done by Frederick Solt in 2011 alluded to this analysis. In “Social Origins of Authoritarianism” Solt argues that the more economic inequality is widespread, the more authoritarianism is accepted. He concludes that “across the countries and over time, where economic inequality is greater, authoritarianism is substantially more widespread among all citizens regardless of their incomes.”<sup>134</sup> Based on Solt’s argument, Egypt is a more hierarchical society than Tunisia, so the public conforms to authoritarianism more readily in Egypt than in Tunisia. Solt’s theory could also explain why the revolution was delayed in Egypt in comparison to its speed in Tunisia. According to Rhmani and Solt, economic inequality is not a necessary condition for revolutions. Economic causes are double-edged swords, which should be treated with caution in order to not render theoretical paradigms moot.

Libya’s revolution was a result of snowballing effect. Political legitimacy in Libya was first a traditional authority during monarchy, and then shifted to a charismatic authority after Gaddafi’s coup in 1969. Gaddafi’s legitimacy was based on his version of Leninist Marxism, which he detailed in his Green Book. Yet, as he aged, his political legitimacy reached a fork in the road. Either he could make a constitutional leap toward a legal authority or an unconstitutional leap to traditional authority. In 2003, like Ben Ali and Mubarak before him, Gaddafi chose an unconstitutional leap to traditional authority, which rendered his regime’s years numbered. This was an obvious move in a country without elections and parties for decades. Without the miracle of Tunisia, he could have succeeded. This is due to the absence of the new organizational framework compared to Tunisia and Egypt, not to mention tribal

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<sup>134</sup> Solt, “The Social Origins of Authoritarianism,” 20.

polarization. Unlike in Tunisia and Egypt, the new organizational framework in Libya was an ad hoc enterprise, which was created overnight. The NTC as an organizational framework was evidence of the role of political leadership, which was absent in Tunisia and Egypt.

In short, the degeneration in Gaddafi's legitimacy passed three phases. The first phase was in 2003 when he chose implicitly to pave the way for his son Seif Al Islam as the successor. The second phase was the revolution in Tunisia and Egypt, which created an opportunity for the Libyans to mobilize. The third phase was when Gaddafi decided to unleash an all-out war against his people. This rendered the proceedings of the revolutionary processes in Libya a civil war.

The political legitimacy crisis in the three cases was twofold. First is the question of execution or bad governance. The second is the question of constitution. The status of the charismatic authorities in three cases reached a gridlock due to the failure to transform the charismatic authority to legal authority, especially in the existence of a new intellectual current that emphasizes the "democratic method".

With respect to the intellectual current, the three cases will be treated as one unit given that the whole Arab region historically shares one intellectual current. In the sections to come, I will focus on two main intellectual currents namely: the conservative current which dominated since the first revolutionary process, precisely after the fall of the republic, and the second revolutionary process in 1923-50s. In addition, the democratic current which emerged in the 20<sup>th</sup> century up to the third revolutionary process of 2011 which played a role in degenerating the legitimacy of the postcolonial Arab regimes.

### ***The Conservative Current***

#### ***The Arab Question I: Intolerance to Opposition & the Historical Precedent***

Thus far, the patterns of religious politics were cemented in the long wave of the conservative current. The political formula (principle of sovereignty) developed as the

patron sovereignty throughout the second wave, while political legitimacy developed as a traditional authority that used religion to keep public order intact for one ruler. The emergence of these patterns was a result of the civil war and the fall of the republic. The problem of the republic was a problem of authorization. The command in the republic was a command of charisma by being *primus inter pares*. The five charismatic caliphs of the republic did not succeed in transforming this command toward a command of institutions, or a command of law and order. Therefore after the fall of the republic and the establishment of the Umayyad Empire, Muawiya I changed the command to solve the problem of the existence of the political order. Muawiya I set the precedent for the unconstitutional leap from the charismatic authority to the traditional authority for Arab rulers, up until 2011. The failure to change the command from charisma to a command of institutions rendered the command over persons, a command of dogma and order. Dogma and order bespoke the very essence of the Arab political tragedy, which ultimately created the Arab Question.<sup>135</sup>

The command of dogma and order consists of two pillars. The first is the intolerance to opposition<sup>136</sup>, and the second is the determinism of the historical precedent. Paul Kennedy argues that the approach towards dissent was one of the main causes of the Arab world's decline.<sup>137</sup> Furthermore, Anwar Chejne argues the following: "the Muslims... did not escape the unhappy consequences resulting from the unsettled state of affairs as regards the transmission of power. They were perhaps one of the most

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<sup>135</sup> The Arab Question concept was first coined by Azmi Bishara in his influential book, *The Arab Question*. He means by the Arab Question as the condition of authoritarianism durability (rentier state, nepotism ..ect), also the absence of statehood and nation building which became apparent after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the downsizing of the Eastern Question to an Arab Question. My argument in this study is that the Arab Question emerged after the fall of the republic in 662 and culminated in the grounding of the sultanism as the classical situation of the Arab state.

<sup>136</sup> For further information on the question of opposition, please look Alibasic, "Political Opposition in Contemporary Islamic Political Thought in the Arab World," which provided an excellent analysis on which I grounded my judgment in this chapter.

<sup>137</sup> Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers*, 11.

important causes of the decline of the Islamic state.”<sup>138</sup> The command of dogma and order determined the political practice and political thought in the entire second wave of the mechanical-aristocratic/autocratic political class.

The intolerance to opposition was instrumental for the change from the command of charisma to the command of dogma and order after 662 A.D. The Umayyad rulers, beginning from Muawiya I, crushed any opposition to the hereditary rule. To halt any opposition, both hard power (security crackdown) and the soft power were used. An example of the soft power was the propaganda of Al Jabriya (a synonym of religious absolutism). It means that the rulers are your fate and chosen by God, hence opposition to them is a heresy. As a result, the caliphate had a semantic shift from the successorship of prophethood to the successorship of God!

Moreover, as a result of the command of order and dogma, Shiasm and Sunnism were created. Shiasm and Sunnism were merely a quarrel over who would succeed the Prophet. Is he the just ruler? Or is he Hashemite ruler from the Prophet’s clan? Or is he the ruler from the Prophet’s tribe? Shia opted for the second option and confined it to the progeny of the Prophet’s son in law and the fourth caliph Imam Ali; in contrast, the Sunni (led by the Umayyad clan) insisted that the choice be made by the whole tribe—not exclusively by the Prophet’s clan. As previously explained, the problem of succession was not solved constitutionally in the years of the republic; the problem was settled by the sword in the transition to the Umayyad Empire after a three-year civil war. The establishment of the Umayyad Empire, with its grand policy of intolerance to opposition, pushed Sunnism and Shiasm to the wall. As a result, after two centuries, Sunnism and Shiasm developed from merely political factions towards sects with jurisprudence and theology. Using counterfactuals, if the Arabs instead chose the question of how we should succeed the Prophet, instead of the “who question”, these deadlock quarrels and exhausted concepts could not have existed. In addition, the problem of dogma and order would have been solved in an earlier age.

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<sup>138</sup> Chejne, *Succession to the Rule in Islam*, 2.

The process of intolerance to opposition continued throughout the second wave, including the Umayyad, the Abbasid Empire and the Ottomans. During the Umayyad Empire, one of the famous examples was the revolt of Imam Hussein (the Prophet's grandson) in 682 A.D. The death of Hussein was a climax in the tragedy of intolerance to opposition, which the Shia, as well as other rebels and revolutionaries, have capitalized on throughout Arab history. Even during the Abbasid's twenty-year secret campaign, the Abbasids referred to the revenge for Imam Hussein's cause. Yet once they became the caliphs in 754 A.D, the same tragedy of intolerance continued even against Imam Hussein's clan.

One of the most famous incidents of intolerance in the Abbasid era was the story of Ibn Muqaffa (724-759 A.D). This scholar was a man of letters, and during the second Abbasid caliph Al Mansour, had a close relationship with the Abbasid court. Ibn Muqaffa wrote a famous treatise called *Al Sahaba*, which means the companions or the friends. In this treatise, Ibn Muqaffa criticized the caliph's inner circle with respect to the public treasury and their bad governance. In fact, Ibn Muqaffa offered the first text in the public legal theory in which he drew a line for the authority, and the differences in sharia's legislation.<sup>139</sup> Al Mansour did not tolerate Ibn Muqaffa's act of peaceful and reasonable opposition, which led to his tragic death...

Another legendary example of intolerance was during Al Mamoun reign (Haron Rashid's son and second successor). Al Mamoun was a philosopher king in his own right, as well as a distinguished scholar in the emerging doctrine of Mutazila. Mutazila was a theology and jurisprudence doctrine, which was a reaction to the Jabriya doctrine, established by the Umayyad. One of their arguments is that human beings are responsible for their actions. They proposed a different meaning of causality than the Sunni, in which they argue that people, not God, create their own actions. These arguments put the Sunni scholars on the defensive and created polarization. The

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<sup>139</sup> See Lowry, "The First Islamic Legal Theory: Ibn al-Muqaffa on Interpretation, authority, and the Structure of the Law".

problem with Al Mamoun, once he became the caliph, is that he began to persecute Sunni scholars, including Imam Ibn Hanbal, the founder of one of the four schools of Sunni jurisprudence. Mamoun's intolerant behavior created what scholars call Mutazila's disease. Ahmet Alibasic argues the following:

Muslims intellectuals unable to make their point to the Muslim community ally themselves with dictators, or when in power, opt for force and suppression of alternative political platforms and programs. Yet another reason might be that these Islamic activists partake in the political culture shaped by political and educational institutions of existing regimes that do not allow dissent.<sup>140</sup>

These examples and many others set up a culture of intolerance, which affected the quality of political thought. As Leonardo Schapiro writes, "government without an opposition is either a tyranny or illusion."<sup>141</sup>

These incidents became the norm throughout the second wave. As a result, the majority of Muslim scholars abhorred from opposition and justified the tyrannical rule in order not to be persecuted. After the Prophet's generation of companions, Hassan Al Basri was one of the famous scholars. During the revolt against the governor of Iraq, Al Hajjaj, Al Basri declined to participate and advised his disciples not to join the opposition. After his persecution from Al Mamoun, Ibn Hanbal also emphasized in his writings that one should avoid opposing the ruler. Thus, scholars justified and theorized the intolerance to opposition in the name of Islam, which is far from the truth. A saying from the Prophet emphasizes that "the chief of martyrs is Hamza (his uncle who died in the battle of Uhud) and a man who stands up for a tyrant and speaks his mind."<sup>142</sup> This quality of speeches sank under the shifting sands of the political

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<sup>140</sup> Alibasic, "Political Opposition in Contemporary Islamic Political Thought in the Arab World," 10.

<sup>141</sup> Schapiro, *Introduction to Political Opposition in One-Party States*, 2.

<sup>142</sup> Ibn Majah, *Sunnah*.ed Muhammad Fuad Abd al Baqi, 1239.

interest of caliphs. As a result, the majority of scholars simply tried to survive under the shadow of the caliph.

Nevin Mustafa argues that there are three main reasons for the lack of a culture of dissent in the Arab political history. First is the unclear relationship between religion and politics. Therefore, the norm set by the caliphs since the Umayyad stated that any political opposition was punishable on religious grounds. The second reason is the principle established by scholars, namely that power should not be asked for. The last reason is the traditional understanding of the concept of freedom in ulama circles (jurists and theologians). Freedom in the Islamic thought context means freedom from slavery, not the Western connotation, which is related to political freedoms.<sup>143</sup> Therefore, freedom in the Arab political thought had no constitutional meaning until the twentieth century.

In the shadow of intolerance to opposition, theological and political doctrines were developed. These doctrines were: the Asharites, Muhaddithin (traditionalists), Kharijites, Mutazila, Shia (Imamites and Zaidia) and the Zahiria (literalists). The author will not dwell in detail on the tenets of every school of thought, yet I will highlight their political positions. Apart from their theological differences, there are political agreements. None of these answered the “how question”; instead they focused on the “who question”, which did nothing but gain ground for sultanism. In terms of the identity of the ruler, most schools argued the necessity of being from the Quraish tribe, except Shia who insisted on the divine right of the Prophet’s family. While the Zaidia, the second main faction of Shia, argued the concept of selection within the prophetic family, the Imamites emphasized that the ruler should be assigned by a will from his predecessor. With respect to the right to dissent, most schools delegitimized this right except for the Kharijites, Zaidia and the Mutazila. The Kharijites group first appeared during the reign of the fourth caliph, Imam Ali. Their initial position was built on the disapproval of the arbitration between Imam Ali and Muawiya I. Then it

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<sup>143</sup>In Lewis, “Freedom and Justice in the Modern Middle East,” 84.



developed in order to disapprove of the conventional wisdom of the other schools, concerning the legitimacy of the ruler. On this question, Fukuyama argues:

In a sense the group that drew the most logical conclusion from the prophet's teachings was the Kharijites, who established bases of power in Basra and in the Arabian Peninsula. They argued that it did not matter whether the successor to Muhammad was Arab or non-Arab, or what tribe he came from, as long as he was a Muslim. Had Muhammad's successors built upon this idea, they might have tried to create a transnational, multiethnic empire based on ideology rather than kinship along the lines of the Holy Roman Empire.<sup>144</sup>

Yet the Kharijites claim to opposition developed to the first terrorist activities, especially the actions of some of its branches, like Azariqa, who killed civilians for political purposes. In this regard, the current violent Islamists could be considered neo-Kharijites. The second group was the Zaidia. Imam Zaid (695-740 A.D), the founder of the Zaidia school, led a failed revolt against the Umayyad caliph Hisham bin Abdul Malik, just a few years before the fall of the Umayyad dynasty. Despite his failure, Imam Zaid set a precedent for other Zaidia revolutionaries to follow. Conversely, the Imamite Shia developed the doctrine of the Intithar (waiting) for the twelve Imams. They believe this Imam would be the savior for them and the world from the incoherencies of political systems. However, this doctrine kept Shia from either standing for their rights, or from developing a rational, real, and democratic system. The doctrine of "waiting" underwent a significant change after the reign of the Safavid dynasty in 1501-1736 in Iran.

From the 17<sup>th</sup> century on, another theory emerged in the school of Imamites, which argued for guardianship of the Islamic jurists or velayat faqih until the twelve Imam appears. This theoretical breakthrough was the political formula on which Imam

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<sup>144</sup> Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order*, 194-195.

Khomeini founded the Islamic republic in Iran in 1979. Yet it did not offer room for the right to dissent, given that criticizing the Ayatollah is punishable by law.

The third group is the Mutazila. This group emerged as a reaction to the propaganda of Jabriya, which infiltrated Sunnism. Mutazila argues similarly to the fortuna's argument by Machiavelli in which people hold their fate and actions in their hands. This principle opened the door for political activism and changing the status quo. In "The Roots of Revolution in Quran", Muddathir Abd al Rahman dwells on this principle:

At the core of the politically significant teachings of the Qur'an is the notion that man - if he is to fulfill himself on earth and hope for salvation in heaven - must do all that is in his power in order to promote good and combat evil: not only within his own heart and mind as an individual, but also in society with all its facets and, indeed, throughout the world at large. It is natural - indeed imperative - for Muslims to be, not only concerned with, but actively engaged in the unending struggle for the improvement of the economic, social and political aspects of life to remain passive or inactive is to fall behind in the scale of excellence. For as the Qur'an says: "Such of the believers as remain passive - other than the disabled - cannot be deemed equal to those who strive hard in God's cause" (Sura al Nisa 4:95).<sup>145</sup>

Yet, what led to their demise was that Mutazila confined these principles to political activism for individuals. In fact, the principle of commanding good has not been elevated to a constitutional level by any Mutazila theorists, not to mention other schools of thought, which embraced the principle of obedience. In fact, other schools appealed to caliphs to delegitimize Mutazila. A major example was the decree banning Mutazila's thought which was issued by the Abbasid caliph Al Qadir around 1030

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<sup>145</sup> Muddathir, "The Roots of Revolution in the Quran," 10-11.

A.D. As a result, constitutional and revolutionary thought in Arab history was rendered very slim or absent altogether.

These doctrines, under the shadow of intolerance to opposition, created what I call classical Islamism. The concept of Islamism dubbed in the twentieth century as a counterpart to Pan-Arabism. Yet the substance of this ideology emerged during the fall of the republic in 662 A.D. In other words, classical Islamism emerged when the command of dogma and order put in place as the authorization style in Arab politics. Classical Islamism is an ideology of statehood (political formula), which focuses on the principle of sovereignty. Even in terms of the understanding of ideology as a blueprint for political action and the view of the statecraft, classical Islamism is more an *appel au mouvement* than an ideology, for the reason that it was reduced to the religious/sectarian territoriality, in addition to the duality of intolerance to opposition and the historical precedent. The meaning of the religious/sectarian territoriality is that the territory of the state is perceived not along ethnic or nationhood lines, but along religious and sectarian lines. Empirics from the Arab political history support this premise. The Umayyad, Abbasid and Ottoman territories were along the Islamdom borders. Other dynasties like the Fatimids, Safavids, Qaramita, Almoravids, and Almohads were along the sectarian borders. Given the absence of a Westphalia settlement in Arab's history, the main stream of Islamism has difficulty recognizing the nation state, especially since there was no single book or treatise in the entire second wave which theorized the state beyond the box of Islamdom, except Kawakibi's book on the nature of despotism in the 19<sup>th</sup> century *Tabai al Istibdad*. Conversely, in European history there were major works, like Jean Bodin's *Six Books of the Commonwealth* in 1576 nearly a century before the Westphalia treaty in 1648. The absence of such works in the second wave cemented the conservative current.

Before dwelling on the second part of the conservative current (determinism of historical precedent), we shall have a short stop by the rational current, which did not get a chance. According to Hamid Rabiee in his two volume book on the Islamic political thought; none of the rationalist thinkers like Al Farabi, Averroes and Ibn

Khaldun solved the Arab Question. Averroes offered normative groundwork on the relationship between religion and philosophy, which was not enough for creating a balanced political order. Averroes's work was still in need of an empirical theory for application. That task was followed up in Europe, but not in the Arab region. Also Ibn Khaldun neither analyzed the origins of *assabiyya*, nor laid out a solution. Hence, given the gross deficiency on the question of a just political order and rights, the rationalist current did not survive in the face of the strong conservative current or classical Islamism, which was buttressed by sultans. This tragedy is described by Rabiee:

And the problem in question in the context of the Islamic political thought, begs the question of how these thinkers, despite being polymaths and men of genius, did not bother to solve the Arab political problematic? This gross negligence was shared not only by philosophers, but also by jurists. For example neither Abu Hanifa nor Ibn Hanbal raised the problem of rights. Likewise, Averroes and Ibn Khaldun despite experiencing the era of decay of the Arab political order, none of them advanced a solution.<sup>146</sup>

Thus the rationalist current was confined to the development of sciences, without interference in politics. In Europe, in the context of the theocratic state, the struggle was between science and religion. Unlike in the East, the struggle was not between science and religion, but between religion and politics, which led to the synthesis of a religion of establishment. In *Religion versus Religion*, Ali Shariati (1933-1977), an Iranian thinker, makes an argument about the struggle between the religion of the establishment and the religion of the opposition in the Islamic history. The victim in this struggle was political development, because in this struggle there was no tolerance to opposition. Hence, thinkers did not bother to waste their ink, and focused on either theology or arguments about God's existence, or empirical sciences. Worse still,

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<sup>146</sup> Rabiee, (Introduction in the Study of the Islamic Political Heritage), 177.

during the Ottoman Empire, both science and politics were shut down. In his book, *Civilization*, Niall Ferguson argues:

Printing was resisted in the Muslim World. For the Ottomans, script was sacred: there was a religious reverence for the pen, a preference for the art of calligraphy over the business of printing. Scholar ink, it was said “is holier than martyr’s blood.” In 1515 a decree of Sultan Selim I had threatened with death anyone found using the printing press. This failure to reconcile Islam with scientific progress was to prove disastrous. Having once provided European scholars with ideas and inspiration, Muslim scientists were now cut off from the latest research.<sup>147</sup>

By the fourteenth century, the rationalist current witnessed a radical retreat in favor of the conservative current or classical Islamism.

The second pillar of the command of dogma and order was the determinism of the historical precedent, which created the second part of the conservative current. The conservative current represents the problem of jurisprudence which also affected Arab Question. This current emerged in 732 A.D as a result to the development of the process of tadwin. The process of tadwin means “writing down” of the Prophet sayings and sunna (tradition). Parallel to this process, the major schools of jurisprudence developed. In the Sunni branch were the schools of Hanafi, Maliki, Shafei, and Hanbali. Whilst in the Shia branch were the Zaidia, Imamite, and the Ismailia. In addition to two other independent schools which are the Ibadi and Dharisim. The conservatism in these schools is represented by the deficiency of the concept of impersonal authority in politics qua economics, in addition to the deficiency of the political rights and the sphere of public law and constitutional law in general. In this current developed what is called the sharia law. In the question of sharia law, we should distinguish between the overriding rules and legislation

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<sup>147</sup> Ferguson, *Civilization: The West and the Rest*, 86.

according to Hayek's terminology. The practical meaning of sharia law is the legislation done by jurists of those schools in the past centuries. Yet the abstract meaning of the sharia as the overriding rules is not clear given the absence of overriding consensus among jurists. Due to the command of dogma and order in the political development, there were no legislative bodies. Public law was reduced to a rule of de facto by the sultan, leaving the private law to the legislation of the jurists of the eight schools.

The nature of conservatism in legal and political thought lies in the method. The method of jurisprudence in Arab history can be viewed as historicist. In other words, it is a transcendental historicist philosophy of law, in which the legal mind treats the past, particularly the first century after the death of the Prophet, as sacred. On this note, Al Jabri said the following :

The entirety of modern and contemporary Arab thought is characterized by a lack of perspective and objectivity. And that is why it was never able to offer from tradition anything but a fundamentalist reading that treats the past as transcendental and sacral while seeking to extract from it ready-made solutions to the problems of the present and the future.<sup>148</sup>

This approach created vagueness in how to apply the overriding rules. These overriding rules or sources of law are: the Quran, the prophetic sunna or tradition, ijmaa (consensus) and qiyas (analogical deduction). With respect to the Quran, the problem is due to the question of demarcation and compatibility with the prophetic sunna. The demarcation means the clear division between the commands of the public sphere and commands of the private sphere. Jurists of all schools interpreted the commands as imperatives on the umma or the Islamic community without distinction between the individual imperative and the state imperative. Absence of such theorizing jeopardized individual freedoms and shackled the development of a decent public and

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<sup>148</sup> Abed al Jabri, *Arab Islamic Philosophy*, 21.

constitutional theory. One example is the question of the headscarf. The command about the headscarf and modesty with respect to women's clothing is a private command, which is left to women to make their own decision, without state interference. This is because public commands—for example, in cases of robbery—in the Quran are always followed with explicit defined punishment. However, when there is not an explicitly defined punishment after the command, this means that the command is a private one, and therefore the state has no role on what choices citizens make.

This leads us to the second problem, which is the problem of compatibility. Most schools of jurisprudence put the prophetic sunna on nearly the same stature as Quran. Most schools analyzed the Quran through the eyes of the Prophet traditions. Principally, there is no problem with this method. The problem, however, was that the method by which the sunna was collected was historicist. The merit of the hadith (Prophet's sayings) was judged on the chain of tellers from the contemporaries and the generation before them. If the man in question is known by the scholar as a liar or not trustworthy, then the hadith will be quashed. This subjective method led to two leaks: the first was the leak of subjectivism. Sometimes the man in the chain was quashed on the principle of his doctrine, not on the merits of his scholarship. For example, if the man under enquiry is Shiist, usually his hadith would not be taken as an authority even if the man is trustworthy and have great knowledge. The second leak was that this shaky method was used as propaganda by the clergy to persecute maverick scholars before the caliph. This paved the way for drafting fake hadiths to threaten opposition or keep the public order under the grip of the absolute ruler. If the jurists chose the contextual method which judges the prophetic traditions on the question of compatibility to reason and Quran, a reasonable public and constitutional thought could have emerged.

Furthermore, related to the problem of compatibility is the concept of the precedent which is unlike the concept of the precedent in common law that is related to the accumulated rulings of judges. The precedent in sharia law is overwhelmingly vague.

The precedent, or the sunna of the Prophet, is divided into precedents of statesmanship, judge, warrior, mufti and the conveyer of revelations given that the Prophet's actions were in the context of those professions. Despite the fact that the jurists provided sophisticated classifications of the actions of the Prophet in numerous treatises, they missed an utterly important point. Which of the precedents imply absolute obedience at all times, and which are relative? Qarafi (1228-1285 A.D) pointed to this matter, but few other scholars provided a sufficient demarcation between the absolute and the relative.

Another related problem is the precedent of caliphs and muftis. Both precedents were followed and preached without demarcation of the private from the public, or the absolute from the relative. Even still, after the republic, de facto caliphs were followed in their precedents for instance by appointing a hereditary successor, and the justification of the legitimacy of the ruler who came by war and not by selection. This case called in the Sunni jurisprudence *hokm al motaghallib* (the rule of the dominator) by which tyrants' rule was justified and legitimized. As a result of this reasoning, historical events were justified. In this context, Sir Hamilton Gibb explains: "Sunni political theory was in fact only the rationalization of history. All the imposing fabric of interpretation of the sources is merely the post eventum justification of the precedents."<sup>149</sup>

Thus far, the absence of demarcation in Quran's interpretations, have rendered the method of jurisprudence historicist. Despite the rationalism of the Hanafi and Maliki literature, as well as some independent scholars, the main stream of conservatism set the tone...

One major example is about *qiyas* (analogical deduction). This principle was used when a ruling was deduced from a previous ruling that shared the same nature of causality. In this respect, as Al Jabri explains it is an analogical deduction that is called

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<sup>149</sup> Quoted in Tibi, *The Sharia State*, 33.



“analogy of the unknown after the known.”<sup>150</sup> The unknown is the case in question, which could be in the future, and the known is the example at hand. There are two principles on which the validity of this method is based. The first principle is that the unknown and the known must share the same nature. The second principle is that both terms should share a common element.<sup>151</sup> Yet given the tribalism of the schools and polarization, later jurists turned this rigorous method on its head. Al Jabri comments that “every unknown object became some analogy’s in absentia term to which one had to relate an in presentia term (known) at any price.”<sup>152</sup> Moreover, as Al Jabri elaborates in the following, the consequences were immense:

The suspension of the notions of tenses and the evolution, every present became systematically related to the past as if past, present and future were in fact a smooth stretch or an immobile time; hence the absence of historical perspective from Arab thinking. (Also) the absence of disjunction between the subject and the object, by abandoning detailed examination and analysis, they turned the analogical process into a mental device incapable of focusing on the analysis of analogical terminology or on the examination of its components in order to draw similarities. Analogy was therefore used mechanically without research or analysis, without examination or critique, the in presentia referent settled in as a witness that is permanently present inside reason and emotions; hence and absence of objectivity from the Arab thinking.<sup>153</sup>

This way of thinking casts its shadows on all legal and political thought. For example, the insisting by Islamists on the Islamdom state (super state that includes all Muslims) and religious territoriality (religious sovereignty) bespoke the analogy of the present after the past. It is simply a question of method, not a question of script. It was a

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<sup>150</sup>Abd al Jabri, *Arab Islamic Philosophy* , xvii-xix.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid, 16-21.

<sup>152</sup>Abd al Jabri, *Arab Islamic Philosophy*, 20.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid, 21.

method that created a body of laws which mostly fit in the scope of private law. As Abdel Razzak El Sanhuri claimed in most of his works, most jurisprudence of major schools was in the domain of private law, not the public law.<sup>154</sup> The major reason was due to the command of dogma and order, which left little room for jurists to legislate on public matters. In addition, the mediocre tradition of public and constitutional law was also due to the call during the Abbasid Empire to close theorizing on jurisprudence. Bernard Lewis comments:

In time however the range of variations was gradually reduced and ultimately limited, in effect to questions that were minor, marginal, local or an important exception new. From about 900 CE a consensus emerged among Sunni, though not Shi jurists that all outstanding issues had been resolved and that in consequence the gate of *ijtihad* was closed.<sup>155</sup>

This legendary call is still questioned by a number of scholars and historians, and was seen as merely political—or as Abbasid propaganda. Be that as it may, and regardless the validity of the matter, the *ijtihad* was in dark tunnel due to its methodology, and the context of Arab politics.

In another respect, conservative current can be divided into soft conservatism and hard conservatism. Soft conservatism includes the school of Hanafi, Maliki and Shafie, which left the door open for innovation beyond the determinism of historical precedent. Yet this innovation was confined mostly to matters in the private sphere due to the problem of demarcation and compatibility. The duality of demarcation and compatibility still remain the issue in the context of public and constitutional thought. An example of soft conservatism was the treatise of *Muafakat* (The Agreements) by Al Shatibi, who died in 1388 A.D. Al Shatibi advanced a new method in the Maliki jurisprudence, which based the legal reasoning on the *maqasid* (intentions). He argues

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<sup>154</sup> See Al Sanhuri important book *Fkh Alkhelafah* , which was originally a PhD dissertation written in French.

<sup>155</sup> Lewis, *The Middle East*, 226.

that legislation should not only be based on naql (transmission of precedents), but also on the interests of humanity. These interests include: self-preservation, protection of his mental health, his species, property and religion. During this era, it was novel work that stands apart from its peers.<sup>156</sup> In his own words, Shatibi argues:

For science, within the sphere of jurisprudence, is an examination that re-arranges spread out elements in such a way that these elements appear to reason as a set of universal general propositions that are not null and void and not obsolete, that are judging but not subject to judgment. These are also the characteristics of the rational general propositions. The latter are inferred from an examination whose object is the universe is a “given” thing, not a construction of reason. From this viewpoint the rational general propositions in no way differ from the general propositions of the law.<sup>157</sup>

The reasoning of intentions was a constructive move, but the problem was that there was no constructive follow-up after him. In addition, as previously alluded to, the absence of demarcation and compatibility confined the theory of maqasid (intentions) to the private sphere, and not free from loopholes. One major loophole is the question of protecting religion. There is a huge difference between protecting freedom of religion and protecting religion. The latter concept was the pretext for the sultan to politicize religion and expand his prerogatives. In fact, a host of thinkers throughout the second wave—Ibn Muqaffa, Suhrawardi (1155-1186 A.D), one of the founders of hikmat al-ishraq (the philosophy of Illuminationism)—were killed in the name of protecting religion.

The second branch of conservatism is hard conservatism. The major representative of this branch was Ibn Hanbal (780-855 A.D), a contemporary of Haron Al Rashid, who was the founder of a major Sunni school of jurisprudence. His philosophy was

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<sup>156</sup> In Abed al Jabri, *Arab Islamic Philosophy*, 105-106.

<sup>157</sup> In Ibid , 106-107.

historicist par excellence, which was based on the subjective collection of the Prophet's sayings. Also his school is one of the founders of sultanism intellectually, especially after his persecution by Haron's son, Al Mamoun, who reigned from 813-833 A.D. Ibn Hanbal's philosophy later, became known as Salafism from salaf, which means ancestors. Salafism values the historical precedent as a principle of legal reasoning, and takes most sayings of the Prophet for granted, heedless of its context. After Ibn Hanbal, Salafism experienced two resurgences. The first was by Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328 A.D) who is the most influential jurist in this school of thought, and whose thoughts still influence the modern Salafist movements. The second resurgence was by Muhammad Abdul Wahhab (1703-1792), who was the co-founder of the first Saudi Kingdom. This style of thought established the determinism of historical precedent and remained a challenge to the modern Arab state.


This historical process constituted the development of the conservative current, or in other words, classical Islamism, which is the essence of the Arab Question. Revising the process of the Arab Question (figure 2), the development was as follows. The failure to shift the command of charisma to a command of law and order during the first wave (622-662 A.D) led to the development of the command of dogma and order during the second wave (662-1923 A.D). The command of dogma and order was based on the intolerance to opposition and determinism of historical precedent. The first created various theological and political sects, and the latter created the major current of jurisprudence, culminated in the conservative current. As a result, this historical dialectic created classical Islamism as an ideology of statehood, and the essence of strong assabiyya. Classical Islamism is not Islam. Islam is a faith, while classical Islamism is the historical subjectivist-nihilist-political understanding of the faith. This is a common pathology that affects religions, ideologies and philosophies alike. Based on the previous analysis, a political revolution during the second wave was rendered impossible because of the absence of a new organizational framework, and the conservative current, which created politics without institutions, save two: the fatwa and sultan's prerogative.



## FIGURE 2. The Process of the Arab Question

*Failure to shift the command of charisma to a command of law & order*

*During the 1<sup>st</sup> wave (622-662 A.D)*



*The Arab Question II: The Duality of Sultan & Fatwa*

Fatwa means the jurists' rulings or degree on matters of law. It resembles to judicial review in Western legal thought. Fatwa was first a pluralist institution during the dawn of Islam, as representatives of legal and theological schools issued fatwas to their adherents. Until the Ottoman Empire, this institution was monopolized by Sheik Al Islam, as there is only one interpreter of the sharia law. Yet the politicization of fatwa is as old as the Umayyad Empire, as the caliph legitimizes his actions by "made to measure" fatwas against his opponents. One major factor that contributed to the absence of legislative assemblies was an institution of fatwa. As a result, matters of public concern were reduced to the judgment of one or two jurists. This process not only shackled the development of assemblies, but also widened the prerogative of the sultan. Despite much being written on the theory of fatwa, still there is no theory of fatwa in the context of modern states. Qarafi wrote a treatise on the distinction between fatwa and the sultan's prerogative in which he argues that fatwa is the interpretation of the sharia law when the mufti is asked, which is not legally binding; while, the sultan's prerogative has a dual function: legislative and executive.<sup>158</sup>

Historically, this was not the case. A number of sultans took fatwas as legislations, which grounded their legitimacy. Also jurists issued fatwas against each other to delegitimize other schools, which were followed by rulers and the mob alike. A famous example was the tragedy of Ibn Taymiyyah and Averroes and their persecution by these fatwas. Another important loophole was that the sultan could be elevated to the level of law-giver and executive at the same time, which cemented sultanism. The problem of fatwa still continues today due to the effect of the communication revolution. As a result, a proliferation of fatwa was created, which were then followed by zealots. Democratization in the Arab region, therefore, would not be possible without a reformation or dismantling of the institution of fatwa.

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<sup>158</sup> Qarafi, *Al Ihkam*, 34-40.

The second institution was the sultan's prerogative. In his *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, William Blackstone defines prerogative as follows: "that special pre-eminence which the king hath over and above all other persons, and out of the ordinary course of the common law, in right of his regal dignity. It signifies, in its etymology something that is required or demanded before, or in preference to all others."<sup>159</sup> This resembles to some extent to the meaning of the sultan's prerogative in Arab history. A whole discipline developed by jurists called *siasa shariya* (scriptural politics), which was neither scriptural nor political. There is no single treatise that discussed the "how question" with respect to a responsible government. Apart from discussing the conventional question "who should rule", jurists opened the door for limitless prerogative. The majority of them legitimized the tyranny as long it defended the realm and the religion. Their interpretation is based on sayings of the Prophet, which were hijacked and presented out of context. The Prophet explicitly spoke against tyranny, and, as Al-isfahani documented, at least 20 of the Prophet's grandsons and great-grandsons were revolutionary leaders who died in failed revolts.<sup>160</sup>

One major inconsistency of the sultan's prerogative is the question of public interest. Jurists argue that the sultan's prerogative is conditional with the application of *maslaha* (interest). The problem is that the connotation of "interest" in classical Islamism is correlated with public order. Public interest, defined as individual happiness and welfare as understood from John Stuart Mill's letter to George Grote:

Human happiness, even one's own, is in general more successfully pursued by acting on general rules, than by measuring the consequences of each act, and this is still more the case with the general happiness, since any other plan

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<sup>159</sup> Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, 243-244.

<sup>160</sup> See Abu Faraj al Isfahani, *Maqatel al-Talibiyyin*.



would not only leave everybody uncertain what to expect, but would involve perpetual quarrelling.<sup>161</sup>

While public order deals with restrictions of freedom of expression and assembly, public interest relates to the conditions of livelihood and common good which includes the welfare of the people. Jurists in the Islamic political thought rendered the concept of *maslaha* (interest) vague and did not distinguish it from public order. They thus left a lot of room for the sultan's prerogative, leading to a mix of public order measures with public interest. Other than the Umayyad caliph Omar II, who was a just ruler, historical accounts of the dynasties record few sultans who cared for the welfare of people. The majority of sultans maximized the utility of their dynasties and did little to the public's interest.

Alas, between the dialectic of fatwa and the sultan's prerogative, there was no chance of developing a sustainable modern political development. Hence, public law and constitutional law remained useless. As the Oxford scholar Hamid Enayat argues that "provisions remained as legal fiction" and did not develop.<sup>162</sup>

This does not mean that sharia law should be dismantled all together; as some commentators argue that sharia law is merely a morality code and has no relation with government. I beg to differ that sharia law is both a morality and overriding rules of social justice. Indeed, the Quran does not impose a form of government; instead it provides a normative principle that provides an outline for just governance. This is a large shortcoming that has yet to be examined by Islamic thinkers and jurists. Thus, I

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<sup>161</sup> Mill, *The Collected Works*, 762.

<sup>162</sup> Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought*, 131.

personally stand in this regard in the middle between Islamists who consider history as revelation, and scholars who consider revelation as history...<sup>163</sup>

Thus far, the conservative intellectual current created a vacuum, which was filled by nothing, but tyranny. The concept of tyranny in philosophy has two major meanings. First Plato's analysis of tyranny rendered personal and individualistic. Second, Waller Newell argues that Niccolo Machiavelli performed an ontological shift from personal to impersonal tyranny by advancing the idea of fortuna and *virtu*'.<sup>164</sup> According to Machiavelli, what matters is mastering the prince's *virtu*' with respect to fortuna. The complete leap toward impersonal tyranny Newell argues was laid out by Hegel, who argued that impersonal tyranny which destroys the traditional and personal ties of kinship to establish the modern state. This type of tyranny was manifested to some extent by Bismarck, and radically by Hitler.<sup>165</sup>

In *Tyranny: A New Interpretation*, Newell argues that modern tyranny is different from the ancient one in that modern tyranny destroys the eros of the ruler and ruled. He writes:

Whereas the classics understood the passion of eros as both the source of tyranny and as containing the potential for its rehabilitation, modern totalitarian tyranny, I would argue is aimed at the extirpation and suppression of eros altogether in both ruler and ruled. Thus modern tyrannies like those of Stalin and Hitler must be understood not primarily in erotic terms, or even as deformed versions of eros, but as radicalization of the will to master nature that includes the repression of human nature, most especially as it is characterized

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<sup>163</sup> Timur Kuran in his book *The Long Divergence : How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East*, did not distinguish between Islamic law as overriding rules , and legislation . What held back the Middle East is the arbitrary fatwa legislation, especially of the Ibn Hanbal school , and the sultan institutions.

<sup>164</sup> Newell, *Tyranny: A New Interpretation*, 7.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid.

by an erotic longing for the beautiful and the good and the longing for an immortal reputation through noble deeds.<sup>166</sup>

Under this categorization, we can deduce three kinds of tyranny interalia: the subjectivist tyranny, the constructive tyranny, and the destructive tyranny. The first is in line with the Platonian interpretation—the quest for personal pleasure is the norm, as exemplified by Neron. The second is in line with the Machiavellian and the Hegelian interpretation, exemplified by Frederick the Great, Bismarck and Cromwell. The last is in line with Newell’s interpretation of the modern tyranny.

With respect to the tyranny interpretation in the Islamic political thought, is relatively perplexed. There were few treatises that outlined tyranny with harsh criticism, an example of which Imam Ali’s letter to Malik Ashtar (the governor of Egypt) and a few treatises after him. Imam Ali (the fourth caliph) made the case clear against tyranny and for justice as he instructs the governor:

Do justice for Allah (God) and do justice towards the people as against yourself, your near ones and those of your subjects for whom you have a liking because if you do so you will be oppressive, and when a person oppresses the creatures of Allah, then instead of his creatures, Allah become his opponent...that most way coveted by you should be that which is most equitable for the right, the most universal by way of justice.<sup>167</sup>

The problem, however, was that such writings were not taken into consideration by ulama, who laid the groundwork for tyranny.

The major modern anti-tyranny treatise was published in 1902, by a Syrian thinker, Abd ar-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1855-1902). In his treatise, (*The Nature of Despotism*), al-Kawakibi argues similarly to the modern position against tyranny, and conversely to

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<sup>166</sup> Ibid, 499-500.

<sup>167</sup> Imam Ali, *Nahjul Balagha* (Peak of Eloquence), the letter is from pages, 247-263.

the conventional definition by the Islamic jurists and theologian. According to Islamic classics, a tyrant is one who does not defend the religious realm or forbids his adherents from practicing their religion. This means that even if he is a hedonistic (Plato's interpretation), or an impersonal tyrant (Hegel's interpretation), he is—according to jurists—only a tyrant when he betrays his religion. A few scholars, however, like Abu Hanifa and Zaid, legitimized the khrooj (revolting) against the tyrant on the grounds of disservice of public interest. The origins of such interpretation of tyranny were due to the misunderstood interpretations of Quran and the Prophet's sayings with respect to tyranny.

Based on the token, we could describe the type of the tyranny of the Arab political development as the subjectivist tyranny. This kind of tyranny corresponds more with the Platonian interpretation than the Hegelian or the Machiavellian, because the conditioning of tyranny according to the dogma of the ruler, and not his actions, considered as subjective interpretation of tyranny. In fact, all insurrections or revolts in the second wave were subjective, either on the question of dogma or ethnicity. Other than a few failed revolts, none of them happened on the grounds of disservice to public interest.

In short, the intellectual current during the second wave created the conservative Arab mind and legitimized the subjectivist tyranny. Due to the absence of “democratic method” within the intellectual current rendered political changes merely a change of dynasties, in other words an ousting of the ruling elite but not a changing of the political class. Hence, the aristocratic/autocratic political class remained the status quo in the Arab world, while Europe developed. Despite the emergence of the “national method” in the intellectual current on the eve of the second revolutionary process 1923-1950s, it did not suffice to change to a more democratic political class.<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>168</sup>A lot of books addressed the question of nationhood, one good book by Tamim Al- Barghouti, *The Umma and the Dawla: The Nation-State and the Arab Middle East*.

### *The Democratic Current*

As previously mentioned, the third wave took place between 1923 and 2011. 1923 was the year of the abolishment of the Ottoman caliphate. The breakdown of the Islamdom state created an intellectual shock, which led to a host of political currents. Anthony Giddens argues that two developments have marked the international relations since the 19<sup>th</sup> century, namely: “the global consolidation of industrial capitalism and the global ascendancy of the nation state.”<sup>169</sup> The Arab region was not ripe for these radical changes given the weakness of the intellectual current. In fact, the conservative current led by the ulama (jurists and theologians) was still the norm. However, the new changes in the twentieth century created three developments that put the ulama on the defensive. Ibrahim Abu Rabi writes:

The breakdown of the totalistic vision of Islam which considered Islam and the state to be one. The rise of different intellectual currents especially in the nineteenth century that challenged the long established authority in the ulama and the political division and subdivision of the Arab world in the wake of colonialism.<sup>170</sup>

During the twentieth century, the conservative current or classical Islamism witnessed resurgence. A host of scholars and commentators speak of Islamism as a modern phenomenon, originated by the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. Conversely, modern Islamism is a defensive project (not an innovative one) of classical Islamism to return the status quo to an Islamdom state. What is new about modern Islamism is that it is oriented in political movements. Modern Islamism is divided into three movements interalia: Muslim Brotherhood, the party of Tahrir (liberation), and the Salafist movement. The Muslim Brotherhood is considered to be the mother of modern Islamism. Its founder, Hasan Al Banna, a classical cleric, claimed in his letters that the solemn zeal of the movement is to reestablish the Islamdom state after developing the

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<sup>169</sup> Giddens, *The Nation State and Violence*, 255.

<sup>170</sup> Abu Rabi, *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World*, 2.

family and the government. The second branch of modern Islamism was the Tahrir party, founded by jurist Taqi El Din Nabhani in Jerusalem 1953. Currently, the Tahrir party has branches in a number of Muslim countries, which, like the Muslim Brotherhood, call upon the establishment of the Islamdom state. The last branch is the Salafist branch. The Salafist movement is more decentralized than the other two branches and less active in party politics than the Brotherhood. Experts classify the Salafist movement into two divisions: the monarchists and the anarchists.<sup>171</sup> The monarchist Salafism with its leading figures—clergies of Saudi Arabia—values dogma and order and forbid any opposition to the ruler. It could be deduced that Salafism is the original custodian of the conservative current and the classical teachings of ulama. The anarchists represented by the Al Qaeda movement in the 1990s believe in the violent struggle and delegitimize modern statehood. Moreover, it legitimizes killing civilians (Muslims and other adherents of religions) to reach its goal, which is also the Islamdom state.

The three branches try to render nation-state order illegitimate while trying to establish the Islamdom state, yet they do have significant differences. Both the anarchist Salafists and the Tahrir party consider elections blasphemous. Also a wide spectrum of the monarchist Salafists share this view, with the exception of some parties in Egypt after 2011, and Kuwait. The Muslim Brotherhood is the most active branch in party politics that accepts the democratic method of elections in the Arab and Muslim countries, yet with reservations ...

Bassam Tibi divides Islamists into two categories: institutional Islamists and jihadists Islamists.<sup>172</sup> Institutional Islamists accept the institutional process of the state; like the Muslim Brotherhood, the Tahrir party and some monarchist Salafists. The anarchist Salafists are jihadists Islamists, though I cast a doubt on such terminology by Tibi.

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<sup>171</sup> Dr Muhammad Al-Shinqiti, a current professor at Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies alluded to this classification in a number of TV interviews.

<sup>172</sup> Tibi, *The Sharia State*, 88.

Jihad means humans' struggle to reach enlightenment or Nirvana (as the Buddhists call it). Moreover, it is equivalent to Hegel's philosophy on the struggle for freedom and absolute spirit. One branch of this struggle involves armed struggle against the aggressors. The true meaning of the political jihad is equivalent to the concept of just war in the Christian literature by Saint Augustine and others, as shown in this verse of Quran: "you may fight in the cause of God who attack you, but do not aggress, God does not love the aggressors," (2:190). The problem, however, is in the different interpretations of ulama, which distorts the meaning of jihad, not to mention the current media frenzy which adds to the confusion. In addition, anarchist Salafists hijacked the true meaning of jihad and reduced it to terrorism. Hence, the scientific taxonomy of Islamists should be divided to institutional Islamists and anarchists Islamists, who represent the ancient conservative current of the second wave of the Arab political class.

Another fallacy concerning Islamism is the concept of the Islamic state. This concept has different connotations. For example, the connotation of both branches of Islamists of the Islamic state is "the Islamdom state" which is based on the whole territory of Islam. The other connotation relates to what is called Islamic liberalism, which constitutes a new current within Islamism, especially in Tunisia and Morocco. According to Islamic liberalism, the concept of Islamic state deals with the application of law within the nation state. In *Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies*, Leonard Binder defines the concept as follows:

Islamic liberalism or (scriptural liberalism as Binder calls it) would justify the establishment of liberal institutions and even some social welfare policies, not on the basis of the absence of any contradictory Islamic legislation, but rather on the basis of quite specific Islamic legislation, which they are inclined to deduce from canonical sources.<sup>173</sup>

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<sup>173</sup> Binder, *Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies*, 243-244.

Sharia could be applied in the context of what Binder calls “scriptural liberalism”; yet after a development of a modern political and legal philosophy. This connotation of sharia is apparent in the writings of the prominent Moroccan philosopher Taha Abdel Rahman and the leader of the Tunisian Nahda party, Rashid al Gannushi.<sup>174</sup>

The new development in the third wave was the emergence of the democratic current challenging the long reign of the conservative current. In the last section, I presented the conservative current in the third wave as the modern Islamism, which is made up of two divisions: institutional Islamists and anarchist Islamists. Their project is a reaction against modernity and the new state system. Their view of the state is only the Islamdom state; and their understanding of sharia is reduced to conservatism.

The second current is the democratic current. The democratic current historically began as the nahda (renaissance) of the nineteenth century. Abdallah Laroui writes:

A vast political and cultural movement that dominated the period of 1850 to 1914. Originating in Syria and flowering in Egypt, the nahdah sought through translation and vulgarization to assimilate the great achievements of modern European civilization, while reviving the classical Arab culture that antedates the centuries of decadence and foreign domination.<sup>175</sup>

Al-kawakibi defied despotism, but he wasn't the only one. Other thinkers who contributed to this process are Jamal al Din al Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, Rifaah Al Tahtawi, Rashid Rida, and Qasim Amin. Those thinkers were notable for their new interpretation of the Islamic thought and putting it in line with modernity. Yet, as Laroui argues, nahdah did not have the resonance of a renaissance in Europe, as it did neither create “genuine transcendence” from traditional thought; nor succeed in

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<sup>174</sup>See Taha Abdel Rahman new book (The Spirit of Religion), and Rashid al Gannushi book (The Public Freedoms in the Islamic state).

<sup>175</sup> Laroui, *The Crisis of the Arab Intelligentsia*, VII.



engaging the full spirit of modernity.<sup>176</sup> Nevertheless, it created an intellectual avalanche. The most important change during the third wave was the end of the ulama monopoly and the emergence of men of letters, intellectuals, and experts in other professions. M.A Lahbabi writes: “the reign of the faqihs (jurists and theologians, and used as synonym for ulama) was substituted for better or worse by that of the technical experts and the leaders of the masses, this new situation necessitated a new mental attitude and new criteria.”<sup>177</sup>

According to some experts, this development paved the way for an array of routes. In “la problematique arabe,” Laroui divides the modern intellectual current into three parts. The first current is made up of sheiks or jurists who lost their domination during the third wave. The current of sheiks constitute the conservative current, which is the modern Islamism camp. The second current is the politicians current, who acquired their political knowledge from the West (Arab nationalists, socialists and liberals), yet tried to cast it in an Islamic light. The third current was made up of scientists and technocrats, who were outside both religion and politics. Laroui argues that, on one hand, the current of sheiks lost its monopoly, but the other hand, still influences the public discourse and rallies supporters.<sup>178</sup>

Truly, conservatism is still the issue in the Arab discourse, which was apparent after the Arab Spring in the polarization between Islamists and liberal nationalists. This underscored the fact that the Arab region still has no consensus on the best way of governance. In this way, Arabs are not different from Europeans. The revolutions in 18<sup>th</sup>- and 19<sup>th</sup>-century Europe were a result of intellectual currents which only settled the principle of statehood for a while; the principle of sovereignty (the existence of a nation state), was not settled finally until World War II. The resurgence of Nazism and Fascism as ideologies of statehood was an expression of the rejection of the nation

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<sup>176</sup> Sharabi, *Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society*, 6.

<sup>177</sup> Quoted in Abu Rabi, *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World*, 10.

<sup>178</sup> Ibid, 24.

state in the first place. Likewise, the current Islamism is an expression of the refusal of the legitimacy of the nation state. A quite similar path that Arabs should go through until a sustainable political development is reached, and settled.

Though the principle of sovereignty is not settled yet in the Arab region, there was a progressive development that took place in the last decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century which brought about the genesis of the democratic current in parallel to the long conservative current. The new development here is that the idea of a more democratic government or a democratic level of succession is incorporated in the thought. In the lines to come, I will present this development in two groups namely: the sheiks and jurists, and the professionals and thinkers.

#### *The First Group: Among the Jurists*

With respect to the first route, according to analysts, the first radical move towards the democratic current was the book of *al Islam wa Usul al Hukm* (Islam and the Fundamentals of Governance) by Sheik Ali Abdelraziq in 1925. On this book, Tibi comments the following:

I am in agreement with Filali Ansary that the breakthrough started with Ali Abdelraziq's book *al Islam wa Usul al Hukm*. This is the first step in the project of an "enlightened turn" in modern Islamic thought in which Islam is determined as a religious faith and dissociated from its abuse as an ideological concept for legitimating a political order.<sup>179</sup>

The book was controversial among conservative thinkers. Some writers took his book as a manifesto of secularization; others understood his book as a denouncement of the de facto caliphate according to the conservative current *weltanschauung* or world vision....

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<sup>179</sup> Tibi, *The Sharia State*, 77.

On the eve of the abolishment of caliphate in Turkey 1924, there was an important constitutional document issued by the Turkish parliament. In this document, the parliament members denounced the traditional connotation of caliphate as a theocratic regime based on hereditary rule. Moreover, they deleted an article in the Ottoman constitution that stated that the caliph is infallible and beyond accountability. In addition, they based their reasoning on Imam Abu Hanifa (the founder of Hanafi jurisprudence), who denounced the Umayyad and Abbasid as merely monarchies who had no relationship to the original de jure caliphate in the years of the republic.<sup>180</sup> Both the Turkish constitutional document and Abdel Raziq's book influenced not only the emergence of the democratic current, but also a revision within the conservative current.

#### *Rashid Rida*

As one of the *islahiyoun* (reformers), Rashid Rida's thought had a significant contribution to the genesis of "democratic method". One of his major positions is the disapproval of the old fatwas by a host of Islamic jurists who legitimized the rule of the despot. Moreover, Rida reinterpreted the concept of *ahl hal wa al akd* (which means the elite who select the ruler) to be more democratic. The previous traditional theory of Islamic political thought suggests that the advisory commission or parliament is selected by the sultan. Rida criticized this way of selection because this will render the parliament or advisory commission not autonomous, and will issue nothing but decrees of convenience as the sultan sees fit. Rida's understanding of the elite was as the elected parliament.<sup>181</sup>

#### *Abdel El Razzak El Sanhuri*

El Sanhuri was a legal scholar and professor who drafted the Egyptian civil code of 1948. He also drafted other Arab countries civil codes: Iraq, pre-Baath Syria, Libya in

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<sup>180</sup> Kawtharani, (The State and Chalifate in the Arab discourse during the Kemalist Revolt in Turkey), 220.

<sup>181</sup> Ridha, ( The Chalifate), 57.

1954, Jordan in 1976, and Kuwait in 1981. His books, like *The Sources of Rights in Sharia*, and the twelve-volume *Medium Commentary on the New Civil Code* are found on every Arab legal scholar's bookshelf. One of his most prominent political ideas was not the separation of religion and politics, but a distinction between them. In Europe, the canon law of the church was mostly concerned with church business and private affairs of the adherents. In time, those matters of public law were developed in Europe via Roman law. The Arab world sought only the development of the Islamic jurisprudence, which dealt mostly with private law and social relations among individuals, in addition to arbitrary judgments on the public sphere. El Sanhuri argues that keeping sharia confined to the household is not only difficult, but impossible. He consulted the authorities of the French and the English law to fill in the shortcomings of the public law (which was still in its "infancy" according to El Sanhuri), his proposal was to transform sharia commandments to a "pure" legislation. Unfortunately, El Sanhuri died before this project came to fruition. Nonetheless, he advanced a novel theory of caliphate in his Ph.D in 1926. His theory states that the concept of caliphate in the modern age should be an international organization not a super state—a "League of Eastern Nations". His idea surpassed the thinking of his peers those times, which only saw the light in 1984 when the International Organization of the Islamic Conference was established. In terms of jurisprudence, he modernized the concept of ijmaa. Ijmaa (consensus) was a practice by Islamic jurists to deduce their decrees. Their practice was not based on consensus, but on a simple majority among like-minded jurists taken in absentia. Since we are in the age of parliaments, El Sanhuri argued, this is the time for ijmaa to be applied with a modern sensibility.

### *Mohammed al Ghazali*

A writer of around 94 books, Mohammed al Ghazali was an influential sheikh and one of the most revered in the Islamic world. He was a regular public speaker in conference and state television. He emphasized that the people are the source of legitimacy and authority, and refuted the conventional understanding of shura as not

obligatory but informatory for the ruler. Also, he repeatedly criticized the “literalism, anti-rationalism and anti-interpretive approach to Islamic texts.”<sup>182</sup>

### *Rashid al Ghannushi*

An Islamic Tunisian thinker born in 1941, Rashid al Ghannushi was the co-founder of the Nahda party (the ruling party after the Arab Spring elections). Ghannushi was one of the modernizers of modern Islamism in Tunisia, which he tried to develop towards Islamic liberalism. This movement still has no momentum with the existence of still strong conservative current. The critical difference between modern Islamism and Islamic liberalism is that the first still insists on the obligatory status of the Islamdom super state. Wide spectrums of the institutional Islamists still hold this view, in addition to the absolute majority of the anarchist Islamists. Islamic liberals believe that the Islamdom state is not obligatory, but they emphasize the application of sharia within the democratic nation state. The heart of Islamic liberalism is in Tunisia. In *Public Freedoms in the Islamic State*, he argues the following:

It is possible for Islam to live by and acquire the Western democratic system, which guarantees for Muslims and non-Muslims to benefit from its advantages. The election system developed in the West is nothing but an expansion and modernization of the concept of shura in Islam, which is the best possible and practical safeguard of the general, will.<sup>183</sup>

He further argues that “people are the trustees of God on the divine law”<sup>184</sup>, which leads us to the difference between the Western liberalism and Islamic liberalism. The only difference is that the legislative body in Islamic liberalism legislate not a law that contradicts a Quranic imperative. Hence, the general will or popular sovereignty in the Western liberalism is absolute, while Islamic liberalism is relative.

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<sup>182</sup> Ghazali, (Islam and Political Despotism), 62.

<sup>183</sup> Ghannushi, (The Public Freedoms in the Islamic State), 88.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid.

In the past section, the author presented some elements of the democratic current which developed within the traditional conservative current, mostly among sheikhs. Now we present some examples of the democratic current out of the Islamic movement, namely philosophers and independent thinkers.

*The Second Group: Among Professors and Professionals*

*Mohammad Abed Al Jabri*

The political philosopher Al Jabri is one of the leading figures of the democratic current who was known for his series of books, *The Critique of The Arab Mind* and *The Crisis of Islamic Civilization*. Moore is known for saying “no bourgeoisie, no democracy”; Al Jabri’s bourgeoisie is the bourgeoisie of thought. According to Al Jabri, the route to democracy is not through neglecting our traditions and imitating the “other”. Nor is it through embracing the historical legacy with all its ills, and be hostile to the future. Al Jabri writes:

I believe that we ought really to set the problematic as follows: how can contemporary Arab thought regain and reinvest the rationalist and the liberal gains from its own tradition, in a similar perspective to that within which they were invested the first time: the struggle against feudalism, gnosticism, fatalism and the will to found a city of reason and justice, to build the free, democratic and socialist Arab city?<sup>185</sup>

Answering this question is not an easy task. Al Jabri further explains:

We do not in any way want to minimize the great accomplishments of humankind. We simply think that those accomplishments will always remain foreign to us if we do not invest them following a scientific method that is well suited to the needs of our historical conditions, in order to solve our own problems. To that end, we must first provide a basis to those great

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<sup>185</sup>Abd al Jabri, *Arab Islamic Philosophy*, 129.

accomplishments within our thought by comparing them to similar accomplishments in our tradition. Here, as elsewhere, our only chance to read our future no longer in the past or the present of others, but to construct it from our own reality from the specificity of our history and the constituents of our personality, is historical consciousness.<sup>186</sup>

#### *Abu Yarub Marzouki*

Marzouki, born in 1947, is a well-known Tunisian philosopher who wrote numerous books on the construction of a new Arab philosophy. The main difference between Marzouki and Al Jabri is that Al Jabri seeks compatibility between modernization and tradition; while Marzouki believes in one universal civilization, and thus one philosophy. With respect to the Arab Spring, Marzouki participated in the first elections, winning a seat in the constituent assembly. He also participated in the first democratic government as a senior advisor for the prime minister.

#### *Mourad Wahba*

An Egyptian philosopher born on 1926, Wahba is a member of host of international intellectual and philosophical organizations. Like Al Jabri, he is a student of Averroes and advocate of rediscovering Averroes's legacy. In an interview on an Egyptian satellite channel, he said the following:

..... Averroes was responsible through "Latin Averroism" in founding the European rationalism and its product of the religious reformation and enlightenment<sup>187</sup>

With respect to democratization, Wahba's point of view is that secularization is a prerequisite to democracy. Therefore all religious fundamentalisms must be dismantled, and due to the absence of consensual public philosophy, the Arab world is

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<sup>186</sup> Ibid, 130.

<sup>187</sup> "An interview with M. Wahba," YouTube video, 11:00 , April 18,2011, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wacm6b7ag7w>.

still backward in this regard. Wahba writes that without an intellectual leadership, the Arab Spring was merely an “electronic revolution”:

Europe emerged from the medieval ages when the philosophers clarified the concepts and the Arab world still in the medieval age for not clarifying the concepts. Our revolution has no philosophers and the revolt was without intellectual leadership.<sup>188</sup>

The author agrees with Wahba’s position that there is not yet a commanding public philosophy. Neither philosophers nor intellectuals were the leaders of the protests. This position is utterly different from the proof of existence of a “democratic method” in the intellectual current. Other experts, such as Marwan Bishara, argue this view: “the social networking broke the monopoly of transmitting the image, which sent a new image of the Arab that challenged the odd clichés and stereotypes. The revolt was of citizens not intellectuals, yet was influenced by intellectual current.”<sup>189</sup>

It is crucial to differentiate between the absence of intellectuals on the street, from the absence of intellectual current in the public sphere.

### *Azmi Bishara*

Bishara is a well-known public intellectual and political philosopher, and a frequent guest and political analyst on Al Jazeera. Also he is famous from his book, *The Arab Question*, which tackles the problem of democratization in the Arab world. Bishara predicted that the Arab country closest to democratization was Tunisia. Tunisia has the largest educated middle class which, he argues, is the prerequisite for any representative democracy. His most influential books are *The Meaning of Being an*

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<sup>188</sup> “An interview with M. Wahba,” YouTube video, 30:00, September 3, 2013, [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Usf2\\_qhM4yw](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Usf2_qhM4yw).

<sup>189</sup> “An interview with M.Bishara,” YouTube video, 48:27, May 16, 2012, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BF-c-LZgvWE>.



*Arab in Present* (2009), *Revolution and Susceptibility to Revolution* (2011), and *The Glorious Tunisian Revolution: An Analysis of Process and Structure* (2012).

### ***Taha Aburrahman***

A Moroccan philosopher, Aburrahman is one of the current leading philosophers in the philosophy of language and morality. He is also a member of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation. His books include: *The Arabic Right to Differ in Philosophy* (2002), *The Islamic Right to be Intellectually Different* (2005), *Modernity and Resistance* (2007), *The Question of Practice* (2012), *The Spirit of Religion* (2012). In *The Spirit of Religion*, Abdurrahman advances a normative philosophy of religion with respect to its relationship to politics and morality, in which he criticized the approach of Rousseau, Kant, Durkheim, and Luc Ferry.

These scholars are a random sample among many influential thinkers who represent the growing intellectual current around democratization. The significance of the democratic current in the third wave is twofold: first, it plays a vital role in breaking the conservative current's monopoly. Second it challenges the dogma and order paradigm. For centuries, the paradigm of dogma and order dominated. This was due to an absence of intellectual work that discussed democracy. Without new developments within the intellectual current, a political revolution is impossible. The scholars mentioned above all focused their work on the destruction of the intolerance of opposition, which paved the way for more democratic level of succession.

Now we come to the crucial question: was the democratic current alone responsible for the degeneration of political legitimacy in the cases of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya? The straight answer is no. Without the parallel third route of the globalization current—mass media and social media—the democratic current would have neither gained readership nor momentum. The democratic current is still weaker than the conservative current for two reasons. First, literacy among the average Arab is still low; and furthermore, sheiks have frequent access to the masses via the weekly Friday

prayers. Intellectuals, who can only reach the people via TV talk shows, have little access.

### ***The Globalization Current***

The globalization current in the Arab region spurred by mass media, which emerged in the mid-nineties, and social media in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The globalization current created an opportunity for Arab youth to be connected to young people across the globe. Wadah Khanfar, the ex-director of Arabic Al Jazeera, explains this phenomenon:

So there was a new reality emerging, it was virtual, but this virtual reality created a new imagination about what change we would like to see. These youth, they are talking to each other across borders, and they are talking to international youth as well, and learning from them, and listening to them and exchanging thoughts with them. So their imagination is completely different from the imagination of the political elite in the Arab world...These guys started developing themes around good governance, democracy, human rights, fighting corruption, and started also imagining the future.<sup>190</sup>

This new kind of bourgeoisie, *cyber bourgeoisie*, which was built on the capital of information, mushroomed as a result of the globalization current. Consequently, a ground created for a revolution. The original factor was the mass media. In the age of the state media, the state scrutinized the flow of information, so no dissent could have a chance to develop. The emergence of Arabic Al Jazeera in 1996 and a group of other sister Arab satellite channels was a game changer. This development stopped the state's monopoly on information, and created an Arab public sphere in which intellectuals and free citizens could express themselves. In *The Al Jazeera Effect: How the New Global Media Are Reshaping World Politics*, Philip Seib said the following:

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<sup>190</sup> In an interview "Aljazeera and the Arab Spring," *Chatham House*, 4-5.

These programs let viewers in the Middle East and elsewhere participate, even if just vicariously, in the dramatic events of the moment and certainly fostered thoughts about what might happen if other regimes were to fall...The Qatar-based station has played a historic role in transforming media not only in the Middle East but also globally...<sup>191</sup>

Also on the subject of Al Jazeera's effect in creating a new Arab identity, Faisal Al Kasim, host of *The Opposite Direction* talk show at Aljazeera, said the following:

If anything, satellite talk shows have brought the Arab masses together and given them a pan-Arab identity. In other words, to a certain extent they have played a nationalist role by narrowing and sometimes bridging divides. In fact, one might argue that popular talk shows on Al Jazeera and other channels have succeeded where Gamal Abdel Nasser failed. Debate programs and live talks on satellite broadcasting are watched avidly by millions of Arabs and are contributing a great deal to the formation of pan-Arab public opinion over many issues.<sup>192</sup>

The globalization current, along with the democratic current, created a historical block and an overwhelming affront to the degenerating political classes. Many studies were written on the role that Al Jazeera played in the Arab Spring. One Arab study was done among university professors, journalists and politicians in the Arab region. On the question of whether Al Jazeera not only covered the events, but participated in creating the uprisings, 65% of the surveyed said yes. On the question of whether Al Jazeera was biased towards the revolutionaries, 83% answered yes. On the question of objectivity in transmitting the facts, 59% of the surveyed believe that the coverage was objective. With regard to whether Aljazeera offered more air time to discussing the revolution in Egypt, 90% of the surveyed agreed vehemently. Even when the regime

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<sup>191</sup> Seib, *The Aljazeera Effect*, 15.

<sup>192</sup> In *Ibid*, 21.

closed the Al Jazeera office in Tunisia and Egypt during the revolution of 2011, 44% of the survey believes that Aljazeera managed to get the news from citizen reporters via social networking.<sup>193</sup> In his memoir, *The End Of Gaddafi: The Revolution of 17<sup>th</sup> of February Diaries, Secrets and Testimonies*, Abdurrahman Shalgam (The Libyan UN Security Council Ambassador during the uprising) argues that after the revolution in Tunisia, Gaddafi was out of his depth and called the prince of Qatar on the phone more than once to stop the “propaganda of Al Jazeera”.<sup>194</sup>

The Al Jazeera effect as an example on how mass media played a role in the revolution can be classified into two ways. The first phase started in 1996. This phase was characterized by the creation of the Pan-Arab public opinion and a platform for the *cyber bourgeoisie* to flourish. The second phase emerged as a participator in the revolutions of 2011. Al Jazeera was more than a normal satellite channel, but a “situation room” for the protestors and revolutionaries. Yet, the Al Jazeera effect could not have had that impact without the emergence of social networking in the early twenty-first century. In his article, “Liberation Technology”, Larry Diamond argues the following: “liberation technology enables citizens to report news, expose wrongdoing, express opinions, mobilize protest, monitor elections, scrutinize government, deepen participation, and expand the horizon of freedom.”<sup>195</sup>

In fact, the emergence of the internet in the Arab region was a turning point. Together with mass media, it created leverage for the weak democratic current. A paper titled, “Opening Closed Regimes,” discussed the role of social networking in the Arab Spring. The quantitative study believes that social media was “used heavily” to enable protestors to put pressure on their governments.<sup>196</sup> The study is oriented on three findings: the first is that social media played a central role in shaping political debates

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<sup>193</sup> Abdullah, “The Role of Aljazeera in Influencing Political Change in the Arab World,” 98-120.

<sup>194</sup> Shalgam, *Nihaiyat Algathafi* (The End of Gaddafi), 557-560.

<sup>195</sup> Diamond, “Liberation Technology,” 3.

<sup>196</sup> Howard et al, “Opening Closed Regimes,” 2.

during the Arab Spring. The second states that a spike in online revolutionary conversations often preceded major events on the ground. The third finding is that social media played a central role in spreading democratic ideals beyond borders.<sup>197</sup> The study found that conversations on liberty, revolution and democracy often preceded protests. In Tunisia, 20% of the blogs were “evaluating Ben Ali leadership” on the day he fled the country. Also the word “revolution” was the primary topic on blogs.<sup>198</sup>

Moreover, figure 3 (below) shows the percentage of the all blog posts containing one of the following key words: Ben Ali, Bouazizi, economy, Islam, revolution and liberty. In fact, the study argues that social networking witnessed a spike when Bouazizi set himself on fire; in addition the discussion was about revolution and projecting public sentiment.<sup>199</sup> The word “revolution” persisted in the blogs until February 27, 2011, the day prime minister Ghannouchi—who was seen as part of the ancient regime—resigned. Interestingly, the study found that political parties were not part of the conversations of the blogs. This highlights the fact that political parties were merely participants in the revolutions, but not initiators.<sup>200</sup>

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
<sup>197</sup> Ibid, 3.

<sup>198</sup> Ibid.

<sup>199</sup> Ibid, 12.


<sup>200</sup> Ibid,12-13.

FIGURE3



Source: Working Paper "Opening Closed Regimes," p. 12

FIGURE 4



Source: Working Paper “Opening Closed Regimes,” p. 14

In short, the democratic and the globalization current both constitute an intellectual current in the age of information. Furthermore, the satellite media and social media served as a quantum transmitter of democratic ideals—an effect that could not have occurred during the 18th or 19th centuries. Hence the digital impulse of the “democratic method” created a serious challenge to the eroding legitimacy in our cases.<sup>201</sup>

<sup>201</sup> For further readings on the role of media in the Arab Spring, a recent excellent book by Philip N. Howard and Muzammil M. Hussain, *Democracy's Fourth Wave?: Digital Media and the Arab Spring*, clarifies the matter in more detail.


Thus far, during the transition from the first to the second political class wave, in the context of the first revolutionary process 622-662 A.D the new *political modernization situation* did not consist of an intellectual current which contemplates the democratic level of succession. The charismatic legitimacy of the republic was in crisis; the resurgence of tribalism was afoot. The result was the shift to the second wave: traditional legitimacy. The conservative current was built up during the second wave, and the traditional legitimacy remained. Therefore, political change in the second wave did not bring about a change of the political class in the existence of a thought which did not theorize beyond the aristocratic/autocratic political class. However, by the end of the second wave, and on the eve of the third wave from 1923 to the 1950s, a national method was added to the conservative current, represented in the writings of the Bath party in Syria and Iraq, and the Wafd party in Egypt. This “national turn” contributed to the second *political modernization situation*, and to the second revolutionary process 1923-1950 which brought about a slight change in the political class from a mechanical to organic-aristocratic/autocratic and the shift to the third wave. The shift created a political legitimacy crisis in the universal traditional legitimacy (Ottoman Empire), which led to the change to a national traditional legitimacy or national charismatic authority. Despite the emergence of the national method during that period, it could not be considered an autonomous current from the dominant conservative current. Hence, this could explain the short national liberal period in Egypt from 1919 to 1952.

The new development in the third revolutionary process 2011 is the emergence of the democratic current buttressed by the globalization current. In this current numerous books and works raised the question of a more democratic level of succession in density nearly absent in the 19<sup>th</sup> or the 18<sup>th</sup> century. This explains in part why the revolution to a more democratic government was possible in 2011 but not in 1911. Despite the emergence of a liberal thought in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and the early 20<sup>th</sup>, was not in the sophistication of the thought in the middle and late twentieth century. Moreover in the early twentieth century, and in the absence of information revolution, the



burgeoning liberal thought did not have a momentum in the context of the strong conservative current, also in the context of anti-colonial movement back then which directed the attention of the population towards the colonizer more than the question of the tyrant. In this chapter, the existence of a new intellectual current was traced and proved which contributes to the new *political modernization situation*. In the chapter to come, I will discuss the last condition of the new *political modernization situation*, which is the international pressure.

FIGURE 5



Source: Working Paper “Opening Closed Regimes,” p. 17

## Chapter 4: International Pressure

### Political Formula

Political formula is the third sub-condition that defines the political class. In the process of political change, it is important to distinguish between political formula and legitimacy. Political formula deals with the principle of sovereignty. The principle of sovereignty, according to Antonio Cassese, is summarized as follows: it is, first of all, “the power to wield authority over all the individuals living in the territory.”<sup>202</sup> Secondly, it is also the power to “freely use and dispose of the territory under state’s jurisdiction and perform all activities deemed necessary or beneficial to the population.”<sup>203</sup> It also deals with the right of the state to defend itself against other state intruders, and the exemption of the state from jurisdiction from foreign courts. Lastly, it addresses the rights and respect for state nationals and officials abroad.<sup>204</sup> From this taxonomy, two kinds of sovereignty would be deduced: the internal sovereignty, which relates to constitutional law, and the external sovereignty, which relates to international law. Political formula, as a supreme level of legitimacy, is the principle or idea on which the internal and external sovereignty were instituted. For example, popular sovereignty as a political formula is the narrative on which the modern internal and external sovereignty emerged as a substitute for the old political formula of divine right. Political legitimacy, on the other hand, deals with the exercise of this sovereignty or jurisdiction.

Therefore, during some political upheavals, the ruling elite loses power to exercise political legitimacy or jurisdiction, while the political formula itself stays intact. This was apparent in the political upheavals between 662 until 1923 which witnessed just the ousting of the ruling elite due to problems of procedural legitimacies, while

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<sup>202</sup> Cassese, *International Law*, 49.

<sup>203</sup> Ibid, 51-52.

<sup>204</sup> Ibid.

political formula and sustentative political legitimacy remained in place. On the other hand, in the shift from the first to the second Arab political wave, there was a change in the political formula and the substantive political legitimacy. Substantive political legitimacy changed to traditional legitimacy, while the political formula changed to patron sovereignty. Furthermore, in the shift from the second to the third Arab political class wave, the political legitimacy changed to the national traditional/charismatic legitimacy, while the political formula changed from the universal patron sovereignty to the national patron sovereignty. Lastly, in the shift from the third to the fourth wave, the political formula changed from the patron sovereignty to popular sovereignty (in the positive cases of the Arab Spring), and the political legitimacy is heading towards the legal authority.

As previously mentioned, political legitimacy, as a procedural legitimacy, erodes due to bad governance. The political formula and substantive political legitimacy however, do not necessarily change as a result of bad governance alone, but as a result to intellectual current and international pressure, also due to creative or genius statesmanship in some cases. Parallel to the three main revolutionary processes in Arab history, there were three international pressures. Before dwelling on them, I will expand on the theory of international relations and the question of differentiation.

### **The Sociology of International Relations**

Differentiation is how to distinguish elements from a social whole in terms of capability, function or identity. In their 2010 article, “Differentiation: A Sociological Approach to International Relations Theory,” Barry Buzan and Mathias Albert argued the deficiency of IR from a differentiation analysis.<sup>205</sup> The usual taxonomy of differentiation—in relationship to anthropology and sociology—views the individual as the first unit. In international relations, states are the basic units of interaction and evolution. Utilizing the differentiation essentials from other disciplines, Buzan and

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<sup>205</sup> Buzan and Albert, “Differentiation: A Sociological Approach to International Relations Theory,” 2-4.

Albert catalog differentiation into three categories interalia: segmentary differentiation, stratificatory differentiation, and functional differentiation. Segmentary differentiation means the similarity among units in one social system. Families, tribes and individuals are segmentary differentiated units. This category is similar to Durkheim's mechanical solidarity, which defines the relationship between segmentary units as units that share a common belief. Stratificatory differentiation occurs when units differ in terms of capability—for example, classes in society or powers within international system. Lastly, functional differentiation relates to the difference of activities among units. Durkheim's dynamic density and the evolution through division of labor explain this category of differentiation.<sup>206</sup>

The application of this categorization on IR falls into three levels or categories interalia: the formation of states, interaction among states, and power distribution. Segmentary differentiation relates to the formation of states in a particular era, whether universal states, city states or nation states. History teaches us that the formation of states within a particular era is similar. For example, currently, all states are nation states, based on the equality of sovereignty according to international law. Functional differentiation addresses the interaction among states. The interaction among states during the era of universal states or ancient empires is utterly different from the interaction of states during the era of nation states. One example of the functional differentiation is the emergence of international organizations. International organizations are not new units; according to Glenn Snyder, who explains the modern interaction among states, international organizations are a new activity or modifier of activities<sup>207</sup>. Lastly, the stratificatory differentiation is represented in the hierarchy of powers in the international system. The classification of states into developing and under-developed states falls into this category.

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<sup>206</sup> Buzan and Albert, "Differentiation: A Sociological Approach to International Relations Theory," 6-8.

<sup>207</sup> See Snyder, *Alliance Politics*.

In *Theory of International Politics*, Kenneth Waltz was the most influential scholar who examined the concept of differentiation within international relations theory. His theory has since become the epicenter of theoretical debates. Its paradigm consists of three points. He begins by explaining that the structure of international politics is based on the ordering principle. Given the absence of central authority—politics without government—the ordering principle is anarchy. Anarchy here does not mean chaos; it is a self-help system built on the absence of overriding authority. The second point involves the differentiation of its units. Waltz argues that within domestic politics, the classification is hierarchical, with superior entities that command, and subordinates that obey. Conversely, in international politics, given the anarchic system, all states perform the same function, namely: the pursuit of survival. He argues that “anarchy entails relation of coordination among a system’s units, and that implies their sameness.”<sup>208</sup> His last argument involves the distribution of its capabilities. Waltz explains that the distribution of power throughout history was either in a unipolar, bipolar or multipolar system of powers. He argues that the theory of balance of powers is “the” theory of international politics, which was later labeled as defensive realism.<sup>209</sup> The problem in Waltz’s paradigm is twofold. The first, as Buzan and Albert argue, is that he explains differentiation exclusively within domestic politics:

By driving functional differentiation exclusively into domestic politics, Waltz’s theory explicitly removes it from IR theory. This move was challenged by Ruggie (1983. See also Barkdull, 1995; Buzan & Little, 1996, 2000), but the IR debate about functional differentiation nonetheless took place entirely within the political sector, closing the door on its more general meaning.<sup>210</sup>

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<sup>208</sup> Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 93.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid, chapters 5 and 6.

<sup>210</sup> Buzan and Albert, “Differentiation: A Sociological Approach to International Relations Theory,” 17.

The second problem is the distinction between differentiations. In his paradigm, Waltz did not distinguish between the segmentary differentiation and functional differentiation, as he explains that “the second term is not needed in defining international political structure, because so long as anarchy endures, states remain like units. International structures vary only through a change of organizing principle or, failing that, through variations in the capabilities of units.”<sup>211</sup>

The fact that the states are alike does not mean that there is no differentiation at all. This dichotomy will be clarified if Waltz’s paradigm is reoriented. The sociology of IR has only two principles: the ordering principle and the differentiation principle. The first is a fictional and negative principle (negative because its meaning comes from the absence of something not the existence of something). Anarchy as an ordering principle emerges because of the absence of a challenger unit. The whole society of states is treated as one political unit, unless there are other societies of states on other planets that challenge our existence. From the absence of this probability, anarchy becomes an ordering principle. Furthermore, defining anarchy as the absence of an overriding authority is also inaccurate, because institutions like the UN Security Council are considered central authorities to govern during times of war and peace. Yet it’s not a central sovereignty. Great powers or the hegemon can coerce other states to act, but not as an overriding sovereignty that defines our existence. Anarchy is thus the absence of an overriding sovereignty that defines our existence, not the absence of overriding authority.

The second principle of the sociology of IR is the differentiation principle, which is a positive principle, meaning that it generates norms and capabilities. In this regard, the segmentary and functional differentiations generate norms, and the stratificatory generates capabilities.

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<sup>211</sup> Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 93.

According to Katharina Coleman, norms are “international standards defining the behavior expected of international actors, including states.”<sup>212</sup> Other experts say that “a broad definition of norms as a set of rules with a perspective character for a defined scope of application. Norms are codified through treaties or conventions, yet they can also be uncoded, as seen with customary rights.”<sup>213</sup>

This is the political definition of norms. The legal definition, however, is characterized by the concept of customs. According to Antonio Cassese customs in international law are comprised of two elements: either they emerge from the general practice of *usus* or *diuturnitas*; or are deemed *law/opinion juris* by a state, which emerge as a result of political exigencies/opinion necessities. An example of the first category (general practice) is the norm concerning treating ambassadors. An example of the second category (law or political exigencies) is the jurisdiction over the continental shelf and outer space. The norm that emerges from political exigencies develops towards law or opinion juris, if the state is not confronted with opposition from other states.<sup>214</sup>

On the mechanism of emergence and disappearance of norms, Diana Panke and Urlich Petersohn present the following approaches. For example, constructivists emphasize the importance of the density of the process of interaction among states. Finnemore and Sikkink offer a “norm life cycle” theory, which argues three stages interalia: norm emergence, norm cascade, and norm internalization. In the norm emergence, a state or non-state actor convinces a state to adopt a particular norm. In the second stage, the norm cascade, momentum is created for the norm among states and a pressure builds up against the remaining states. The last stage argues the internalization of the norm through treaties and conventions, and adoption by other states. With respect to the realist approach, norm emergence is seen as a reflection of states’ interests and their application is dependent on a particular power’s influence and leadership. Another

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<sup>212</sup> Coleman, “Locating Norm Diplomacy: Venue Change in International Norm Negotiation,” 165.

<sup>213</sup> Panke and Petersohn, “Why International Norms Disappear Sometimes,” 722.

<sup>214</sup> Cassese, *International Law*, 153-155.

approach, the rational design theory, argues that norm emergence is determined on the substance of norms and how they address the conflict of interest among states.<sup>215</sup>

In “Locating Norm Diplomacy: Venue Change in International Norm Negotiation”, Katharina Coleman advances another angle. In the context of “norm life cycle”, Coleman focuses on the importance of venue. She argues that “the excessive focus on persuasion, has prevented recognition of the importance of negotiation, and therefore of venues, during this stage of norm creation.”<sup>216</sup> On other respects, in “Why International Norms Disappear Sometimes,” Panke and Petersohn discuss the disappearance of norms. Moreover, Panke and Petersohn argue that the disappearance of norms occurs when non-compliance is not punished, or non-compliance is followed by a cascade of states until the norm disappears:

A norm degenerates if it loses its perspective status. This is the case if non-compliance becomes the rule rather than the exception. A norm finally ceases to exist if the emerging new practice is no longer framed as non-compliance. In such circumstances, the norm can completely disappear if no competing norm is present, or it can become substituted if a competing norm takes its place.<sup>217</sup>

Questions of reality dictate that only the opposition of major powers can prevent or slow the formation of the norm based on the logic of “persistent objector”-according to customary international law. Yet as Cassese argues that “this is a factual opposition not amounting to a legal entitlement once the rule may be held to have crystallized.”<sup>218</sup> This brings me to one question: should all states be in agreement for the norm to emerge? According to Cassese, for a rule to take root, a majority of compliance by

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<sup>215</sup> Panke and Petersohn, “Why International Norms Disappear Sometimes,” 723-724.

<sup>216</sup> Coleman, “Locating Norm Diplomacy: Venue Change in International Norm Negotiation,” 166.

<sup>217</sup> Panke and Petersohn, “Why International Norms Disappear Sometimes,” 722.

<sup>218</sup> Ibid.



states—not universal consent—is sufficient. Cassese bases his reasoning on the proceedings of the national and international courts:

The universal participation in the formation of customary rule (or norm) is not required is evidenced by the fact that no national or international court dealing with the question of whether a customary rule had taken shape on a certain matter has ever examined the views of all states of the world.<sup>219</sup>

In short, within domestic politics, norms as segmentary differentiation represented the identity of individuals as political units, and norms as functional differentiation represented the division of labor. Lastly, stratificatory differentiation represents the differentiation in the political forces and economic forces. What exists in domestic politics is the same as what exists in international politics, but they differ in the magnitude. Division of labor is apparent in domestic politics because the ordering principle is hierarchical. Conversely, the division of labor in international politics is very limited, which could be among allies. What is apparent within international politics is the change of norms of the formation of states (segmentary differentiation) or the norms of interaction (functional differentiation), which also exists in domestic politics. States are, indeed, like units, but their likeness changes in terms of formation and interaction from time to time. Waltz overlooked this point. The cascade of norms relates to the formation of states as well as their interaction. For example, the segmentary differentiation or the formation of states was previously considered the universal states. Thus the likeness was in the universality, which also relates to the interaction. During the age of nationalism, the likeness in formation changed to nation states, and the likeness in the interaction or functional differentiation changed to interaction of territoriality or the principle of sovereignty.

This brings me to the differentiation argument. A new differentiation context develops as a result of norm emerges from a particular state, which constitutes a formation of

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<sup>219</sup> Ibid, 162.

the state or the way the state interacts. Once it reaches the phase of cascade as a result of interaction with other states, a new segmentary differentiation or functional differentiation exists via coercion or adoption. The cascade among states is the dynamic density, which in the case of international politics is not a division of labor, but a division of position or interest over the new norm. Thus the new differentiation context is the effect of a cascade among states in a particular phase, which exerts pressure on the type or the capability of a state. This new context represented in a new segmentary or functional differentiation in the making. It could be only one differentiation or all of them. The stratificatory differentiation is part of the new differentiation context but of a different nature, dealing with capability.

Thus far, what is the difference between the new differentiation context, and the international pressure? The new differentiation context is a new trend and development in one of the three differentiations (segmentary, functional and stratificatory) or in all of them in a particular era in international politics. International pressure is the foreign policy effect among states as a result of the new differentiation context. International pressure always exists, since conflict of interests among states is permanent, yet the new differentiation context does not always exist. Hence, a distinction should be made between international pressure in the time of old differentiation context, and international pressure in a new differentiation context.

In this study, I argue that the new differentiation context consists of two factors: a differentiation of democratic states as a segmentary differentiation; the question of responsibility to protect as an emerging norm in functional differentiation which will redefine sovereignty. The stratificatory differentiation as the change from the bipolar towards the unipolar and the emergence of the multipolar is included in the analysis of the functional differentiation. This new differentiation context rendered the international pressure, as a democratization pressure. My focus is confined on the segmentary and the functional differentiation. The new differentiation context is

another connotation of what Henry Kissinger calls a “world order” in his recent book *World Order*.<sup>220</sup> Yet I see world order as an aggregate of the three differentiations in particular time in history, whilst Kissinger’s meaning of world order focuses more on the stratificatory differentiation and the question of balance of power.

Thus far, the manifested development as result of the new differentiation context resulted in an international pressure of democratization. The new international pressure rendered the old political formula in the Arab states, patron sovereignty, vulnerable and created a necessity to the change to a popular sovereignty, hence a new *political modernization situation*. In the next sections, I will advance a historical review of the new differentiation context.

## The New Differentiation Context: Historical review

### **The Segmentary Differentiation: Wave of Democratic States (1828-present)**

After the order of nation states, which began in 1648, an order of democratic states emerged. Theorists of democratization, like Huntington, mark the beginning of democratization in the United States as 1828. This is when the wider suffrage among white males was introduced, regardless to their property qualifications. Huntington defines the wave of democratization as follows:

A wave of democratization in a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period

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<sup>220</sup> In other words, the new differentiation context is the new world order every time in history. This is another theoretical speculation on what Kissinger tried to say in his recent book. Also the question of segmentary differentiation wave is a theoretical revisit of Fukuyama thesis’s of the *End of History* and the prevalence of democracy. I agree with Fukuyama on the question that democracy will spread, yet it will not be one-size-fits-all. It should be a made to measure democracy to every country accordingly to its culture. Also the new differentiation context connotes not an end of history, rather a future of history in which the differentiation context changes constantly as long as new ideas exist....

of time. A wave also usually involves liberalization or partial democratization in political systems that do not become fully democratic.<sup>221</sup>

According to Joseph Schumpeter, a democracy “is that the institutional arrangements for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”<sup>222</sup> Democratization is a norm created in one state, which has a susceptibility of application in other states until it reaches a condition of majority or cascade. In this regard, the English revolution of 1688 was to some extent the beginning of the order of democratic states. The American revolution of 1776 settled the order of nation states, and then in 1828 settled the order of democratic states. The English and French revolutions created the order of nation states, yet those countries took more time than the United States to democratize. One major reason was the geopolitical issue. The United States was protected by two seas and adopted the policy of non-interference in what George Washington called the “Byzantine politics” of Europe. This allowed the U.S to be ordered as a nation and democratic state swiftly. Conversely, both the U.K and France were part of a continent that was still struggling to give birth to the orders of the nation and democratic states.

Huntington marks the first wave of democratization from 1828-1926 and the first reverse wave from 1922-1942. In the first wave, 30 countries became democratic or partially democratic. The reverse wave occurred between World War I and World War II. While the internal causes of the reversal varied, one major factor was that it occurred in countries where the question of nation state building overlapped with democratization. It was not merely an accident for the U.S and the U.K to be exempt from this reversal, for they had settled the question of nation state early on. Huntington alludes to this in the following: “the reversal occurred largely in those countries that

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<sup>221</sup> Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 15.

<sup>222</sup> Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 269.

had adopted democratic forms just before or after World War I, where not only democracy was new, but also in many cases, the nation was new.”<sup>223</sup>

Huntington adds that only four out of seventeen countries remained democratic throughout the war.<sup>224</sup> Most political science literature argues that the reversal was due to the rise of right wing ideology. Yet the root cause of that rise was due to the unsettlement of the order of nation states in the countries in question. Both Hitler and Mussolini were revisionists in terms of national boundaries. Most scholars highlight the effect of the Great Depression, but I would argue that the Great Depression created a move toward dictatorships only in cases where the countries hadn't yet solved the problem of nation state.

The second wave was from 1943-62 and the reverse wave was from 1958-75. As Huntington argues, this wave witnessed the end of colonial rule to a host of third world countries. The reverse wave took root in a number of Latin American and African countries. In those societies, the horizontal integration was fragile (in terms of division of labor), and the vertical integration (mechanical identities between tribes and ethnic groups) was still the norm, which left the question of nation states unsettled. In this situation, the military was the only panacea.<sup>225</sup> The unsettlement of the order of nation states in the first reverse wave in Europe was mostly due to the question of national boundaries, while in the cases of Latin America and Africa was—besides being a question of national boundaries—a problem of national integration between ethnic groups along the colonially-drawn boundaries.<sup>226</sup>

Huntington further elaborates that the third wave of democratization began in 1974. This wave began in Portugal and swept through Southern and Eastern Europe after the

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<sup>223</sup> Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 17.

<sup>224</sup> Ibid.

<sup>225</sup> See Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*.

<sup>226</sup> Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 20-30.

fall of the Soviet Union. In this context, the major reason for the fall of the Soviet Union was that it was not congruent with the two orders or waves of nation states and democratic states. From the third wave, the order of democratic states reached the cascade phase of the norms, and it was only a question of time before internalization reached the remaining countries.<sup>227</sup> Huntington explains the global tendency toward democratization in the following passage:

Overall, the movement toward democracy was a global one. In fifteen years the democratic wave moved across southern Europe, swept through Latin America, moved on to Asia, and decimated dictatorship in the Soviet bloc. In 1974 eight of ten South American countries had nondemocratic governments. In 1990 nine had democratically chosen governments. In 1973, according to Freedom House estimates, 32 percent of the world's population lived in free countries; in 1976 as a result of emergency rule in India, less than 20 percent of the world's population did. By 1990, in contrast, close to 39 percent of humankind lived in free societies.<sup>228</sup>

This global phenomenon is still alive. Writers like Amicbai Magen and Michael Mcfaul argue of a fourth wave that began in 2000. Magen argues the following:

By 2000, eighty democracies were created or restored, and the percentage of democratic states in the world rose from 27 percent in 1974 to 63 percent. For the first time in human history, democracy had become not only a near-universal human aspiration, but the predominant form of government in the world. Transitions in Serbia 2000, Georgia 2003, and Ukraine 2004 together with steady democratic consolidation among the other Balkan states, extended

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<sup>227</sup> Ibid.

<sup>228</sup> Ibid, 25.

global democratic gains a little further...in 2006 there were 123 electoral democracies, 64 percent of the world's total.<sup>229</sup>

Despite having three electoral democracies in 2012, it is too early to state whether the Arab Spring is part of the fourth wave or not. However, initial findings stress the fact that the Arab world was hit by the democratization pressure.

The shift of international relations towards human rights and democracy could be called the interaction of responsibility. During the order of nation states, the interaction among states was oriented on the territoriality. This was the traditional connotation of sovereignty. Owing to the cascade of the order of democratic states, an incremental semantic shift developing to the concept of sovereignty: from territoriality towards responsibility.

Responsibility here means states' responsibility to each other and to their citizens. This norm of interaction was initiated by the U.S and EU in their interactions with non-democracies, especially during the third and fourth waves. The interaction of responsibility still did not reach its cascade as a number of states in Africa and Latin America, as well as Russia and China, still interact in the context of interaction of territoriality.

Before 2000, and because of Cold War policies, the interaction in the Arab region was still oriented in the interaction of territoriality. Stability was the norm, fearing a slide towards the Eastern Bloc and a rise of Islamist power. The end of the Cold War and 9/11, as well as a revision of American and British policies, created a shift toward the interaction of responsibility in the Arab region.

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<sup>229</sup> Magen, "On Political Order and the Arab Spring," 11.

## **The Functional Differentiation: Wave of Interaction of Responsibility**

### ***During the Cold War***

The question of reaching the interaction of responsibility in the Arab region was related to the politics of the Cold War. In other words, the question of balance of powers or the stratificatory differentiation was the key determinant in the Arab region and beyond. Namely, the interaction between the U.S and the USSR during the Cold War is crucial in understanding the development of the interaction of responsibility.

In “Confronting the Soviet Power: US Policy during the Early Cold War,” Paul Avey sheds light on the matter. Avey questions whether American confrontations with the USSR were really about stopping Communism or against the expansion of Soviet power. Avey argues that although American politicians were ideologically motivated, as the Cold War developed, the principle of balance of powers was, in fact, the key motivator. One major example was the American engagement with Communist regimes like China to create a “wedge strategy” against being allied with the Soviet Union. Avey explains:

The U.S-Soviet balance of power drove U.S policy toward China in the early Cold War period. Chinese Communism was a threat “only as a possible adjunct of Soviet politico-military power.” “What we are concerned with in China,” Acheson informed the senate in 1950, “is that whoever runs China, even if the devil himself runs China, that he is an independent devil. That is infinitely better that if he is a stooge of Moscow or if China comes under Russia.”<sup>230</sup>

Furthermore, Avey concludes that:

The primacy in U.S policy towards the Soviet Union during the early Cold War given liberalism’s strong tradition in the United States and the drastic

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<sup>230</sup> Avey, “Confronting Soviet Power: US Policy during the Early Cold War,” 185-188.



differences between the U.S and Soviet ideologies suggests that relative power concerns are more important than ideology in generating and shaping confrontational foreign policies.<sup>231</sup>

As a result, this put the balance of powers in the region in question. For instance, during the early part of the Cold War, democratization in the Arab region was not seen as a necessity. Katarina Orsam argues that this was because the U.S's main objective in the region was to contain the Soviet Union, securing the petroleum and Israel. Democratization was "eclipsed" by the intersection of the mentioned objectives, unlike in other regions.<sup>232</sup> On these grounds, Arab autocrats were tolerated for the sake of "stability" and keeping the status quo intact.<sup>233</sup>

While the policy in the Arab region was stuck in the early Cold War narrative of stability, U.S policy focused on other regions. Huntington eloquently argues that U.S policy passed through four phases. The first phase was during the 1960s and 1970s, which was still preoccupied with the balance of powers narratives. In 1973, however, Congress founded a subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements. In 1974, the subcommittee issued a report urging the U.S to make human rights an integral part of its foreign policy. As a result of this report, three acts developed interalia: the Foreign Assistance Act, the Mutual Assistance Act and the Trade Reform Act, in which human rights amendments were added.<sup>234</sup> The second phase was during President Carter's administration. Human rights were a major issue in his foreign policy. The development reached its third and fourth phases under President Reagan. Reagan criticized Carter's focus on human rights without pressuring the political

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<sup>231</sup> Ibid.

<sup>232</sup> Dalacoura, "US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion in the Middle East," 3-4.

<sup>233</sup> Ibid.

<sup>234</sup> Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 91-92.

regimes that were committing human rights atrocities. Hence by 1983 and 1984, the U.S administration undertook the promotion of democratic change.<sup>235</sup>

It is difficult to confirm, however, whether those measures were for the sake of democracy as an ideal, or as a part of a policy of balance of powers. During the early Cold War, human rights and democratization were not integral. A change in the U.S policy, which was represented in Congress's initiatives, created this shift, which is still in the paradigm for balance of powers. A key example of this can be found in the Arab region. Before the end of the Cold War, the Arab region was not part of the policy of democratization, fearing it would jeopardize the balance of powers in the region.

### ***During the Post-Cold War***

The promotion of democracy was part of the United States' strategy against the Soviet Union in countries where the promotion of democracy would give the U.S a comparative advantage over the USSR. Conversely, where the promotion of democracy would do the U.S a disservice, the interaction of stability was kept intact, as in the Arab region. The fall of the Soviet Union therefore paved the way for strategic reconsiderations on the Arab world by the U.S.

Did the unipolar system provide a better chance for democratization in the Arab region? After the demise of the Soviet Union, President Bush, Sr. reframed democracy promotion as an integral part in what is called "New World Order". The first demonstration of the above mentioned was the Gulf War (1990), in which the U.S managed to create a collective security mission without the threat of a Soviet veto. "New World Order" in other words, was the promotion of democracy in the unipolar system. President Clinton reframed the concept to "democracy enlargement" which was actually no different in substance than Bush's doctrine. Anthony Lake writes:

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<sup>235</sup> Ibid,92-93.

The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement-enlargement of the world's free community...We must counter the aggression-and support liberalization-of states hostile to democracy...the United States will seek to isolate diplomatically, militarily, economically and technologically.<sup>236</sup>

Until 2001, the Arab region remained exempt from this “enlargement”. September 11 and the subsequent 2003 Iraq war directed “democracy enlargement” toward the Arab region, as Sean Yom observed:

Following September 11, 2001, American foreign policy prioritized democracy promotion in the Arab states of the Middle East and North Africa, as policymakers and ideologues alike advocated the transformation of these stubborn autocracies into enlightened models of Western liberalism. President Bush's announcement of a new “freedom agenda” in November 2003 suggested that Washington would no longer prioritize strategic friendships with local authoritarian regimes “at the expense of liberty;” the United States would instead sponsor daring political reforms in the hope of fostering democratic transitions across the Arab world.<sup>237</sup>

Furthermore, according to Yom, democratization in the Arab region reconciled two traditionally opposite American foreign policy doctrines. The first is Woodrow Wilson's “missionary idealism” which advocates spreading democracy and liberalism in the world. The other policy is “hard realism” which advocates supporting Arab dictators for security gains—at the expense of democratization. The emergence of

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<sup>236</sup> Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement,” 658-664.

<sup>237</sup> Yom, “The Dilemmas of American Democracy Promotion in the Arab World,” 1.

what is called the “War on Terror”, reconciled the warring foreign policy schools of thought.<sup>238</sup>

Furthermore, William Robinson argues that the objective of democratizing the Arab world falls into four categories interalia: first, democratization provides a solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict. Second, it creates a Middle Eastern partnership for a civil society in the region. Third democratization integrates the region into the global economic system; and lastly, it prevents the emergence of a regional power.<sup>239</sup> Additionally, it contains religious extremism in the region. Be that as it may, states—especially great powers like U.S—are not non-profit organizations. Hence it is naive to believe that the promotion of democracy is for its own sake...

Therefore, one international factor that has delayed democracy in the Arab region is incompatibility with the stakeholder’s (America’s) interests. As a result of the strategic revision of interests by the U.S after the Cold War and 9/11, democracy promotion was considered a key service for American interests in the Arab region. Questioning the real interests behind democracy promotion is beyond the scope of this study. In this regard, the study is confined to referring to the existence of democratization pressure, which was developed two decade before the Arab Spring.

During George W. Bush’s presidency, a host of policy initiatives were directed in the course of democratization. In 2002, the Bush administration launched the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), and in 2004, the Broader Middle East and North Africa Partnership Initiative (BMENA) at the G8 summit in Atlanta.<sup>240</sup> Moreover, according to Thomas Carothers, specific steps were followed with respect to Arab leaders, namely:

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<sup>238</sup> Ibid, 3-4.

<sup>239</sup> Robinson, “What to Expect from US: Democracy Promotion in Iraq,” 441-447.

<sup>240</sup> Carothers, “US Democracy Promotion during and After Bush,” 4-5.

...Public and private jawboning of Arab leaders, particularly of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak... Rewarding reformers with praise and economic benefits such as the free trade agreements with Bahrain and Morocco...revising existing bilateral aid programs such as the Egyptian bilateral aid program to increase their pro-democratic content...setup regional pro-democratic diplomatic and aid initiatives such as the Foundation of Future.<sup>241</sup>

These measures were not to no avail, after all. Experts reason that Mubarak's amendments of Article 79 of the Egyptian constitution to allow for more multiparty inclusion was a result of democratic pressure from 2002-2005.<sup>242</sup> Also, aid was at the epicenter of the pressure to democratize. Before reaching the political reforms phase, U.S aid policy passed through four phases Abdel Mahdi Alsoudi argues. The first was during the mid-seventies and eighties, when aid was focused on improving Arab countries' infrastructure. The second phase happened during the 1980s; the focus was on education, health and family. In the 1990s, the third phase, the aid policy was focused on the environment and economic reforms. The last phase was during the first decade of the 21st century, in which aid policy witnessed a significant shift toward political reforms. Since its foundation in 2002, the U.S has donated \$284 million to the MEPI.<sup>243</sup> Furthermore, under the auspices of the MEPI, the state department organized 50 programs in the region.<sup>244</sup> These programs, however, had a weak presence in the Gulf states as political reforms suffer from incremental progress, if any.

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<sup>241</sup> Ibid, 5.

<sup>242</sup> Ibid, 19.

<sup>243</sup> Alsoudi, "The Impact of US Aid Policy on Democracy and Political Reform in the Arab World," 14.

<sup>244</sup> Ibid, 15.

Yom calls this the “commitment trap”.<sup>245</sup> Particularly in the cases of Egypt and the Gulf states, American pressure challenged old commitments. These states argue that political reforms will allow Islamists to come to power, as they are the strongest and most organized group in the region. Hence, the oil conduct from the Gulf states, as well as the Camp David treaty with Egypt would be put in jeopardy. As a result, the pressure of democratization would not be at the same level of intensity in all the Arab states, and democracy could be accepted in some places but not in others, as in the case of Gaza’s elections in 2006. This might be one factor why the U.S chose to unleash its democratization campaign in Iraq, not in Saudi Arabia.! For the token, Arab policymakers remained skeptical of democratization.

According to Alsoudi, the Arab elite responded to President Bush’s new policy in three ways. The first reaction was represented in the Arab League’s June 2003 Reform Initiative, which rejected the American argument to change the quality of power sharing and to submit to the will of the people. Instead, the Arab League opted for incremental measures until Arab citizens were ready for full liberalization. Second, Islamists asked for inclusive and fair elections, and for a democracy based on sharia law, as was argued in the Muslim Brotherhood 2003 Manifesto. Thirdly, some Arab intellectuals and former diplomats asked for a Western democratic regime in the Alexandria Declaration, which was issued by these groups in March 2004.<sup>246</sup> These approaches represent the impact of international pressure to democratize, with all its ills and graving mistakes. In his 2009 speech in Cairo, President Barack Obama tried to distinguish himself from George W. Bush policy of democracy promotion:

There has been controversy about the promotion of democracy in recent years; and much of this controversy is connected to the war in Iraq. So let me be clear: no system of government can or should be imposed upon one nation by

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<sup>245</sup> MacDonald, *Adventures in Chaos: American Intervention for Reform in the Third World* ,66-73.

<sup>246</sup> Alsoudi, “The Impact of US Aid Policy on Democracy and Political Reform in the Arab World,” 14-16.

any other. That does not lessen my commitments, however, to governments that reflect the will of the people. Each nation gives life to this principle in its own way, grounded in the traditions in its own people. America does not presume to know what is best to everyone, just as we would not presume to pick the outcome of peaceful election. But I do have an unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things: the ability to speak your mind, and have a say in how you are governed; confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration of justice; government that is transparent and does not steal from people; the freedom to live as you choose. Those are not just American ideas, they are human rights, and that is why we will support them everywhere.<sup>247</sup>

Obama tried to reframe the promotion of democracy as a universal inevitable force of nature that will reach every country regardless of culture. In order to emphasize a soft power doctrine, Obama reassured Arab dictators that the war in Iraq would not be repeated. Furthermore, Obama embarked instead on measures of smart power (hard and soft) in supporting civil societies in other countries in the context of public diplomacy. This was clear in his speech in New York, on September 23, 2010:

Civil society is the conscience of our communities and America will always extend our engagement abroad with citizens beyond the halls of government. And we will call out those who suppress ideas and serve as a voice for those who are voiceless. We will promote new tools of communication so people are empowered to connect with one another and in repressive societies, to do so with security.<sup>248</sup>

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<sup>247</sup> In The Council on Foreign Relations, *The New Arab Revolt*, 393-394.

<sup>248</sup> Carothers, "Democracy Policy under Obama," 18.

In terms of aid, Obama continued the work of previous administrations. Around \$2,24 billion was awarded in aid in 2008; which was upped to \$2,48 billion in 2011.<sup>249</sup> According to Thomas Carothers, Obama's policy of democracy promotion characterized by the following ideals:

1. Regular public statements by Obama and high-ranking U.S. officials.
2. Working for the avoidance from democratic backsliding and supporting democratic breakthrough in other countries through carrot and sticks, multilateral arrangements and public diplomacy.
3. The assistance of 100 countries in building democracy infrastructure—from media development to parties strengthening.
4. The long-term initiatives, like the Open Government Partnership in September 2011 by eight governments and nine civil society organizations which was hosted by the US and Brazil for the empowerment of transparent governments.<sup>250</sup>

In the same fashion, the European Union embarked on a pro-democracy campaign along with the U.S. An EU-U.S summit held in June 2005, which issued a declaration supporting aid programs designed for buttressing the movement toward democracy. Yet as some experts argue, the EU policy was more concerned with their neighbors than the broader Arab region or Middle East:

The European approach is structured most substantively as a “Mediterranean policy”, and is less concerned with connections between political development in the Mediterranean rim and development in the broader Middle East. This

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<sup>249</sup> Ibid, 40.

<sup>250</sup> Ibid.



reflects the southern EU states' core concern with immigration and the stability of neighboring states; their concerns are what drove the Barcelona Process from its beginning. Thus Europe's original commitment to reform in the Middle East derives from self-interest as much as the United States does.<sup>251</sup>

Regardless of the implicit interests, the pro-democracy policy changed the pressure in the Arab region from the pressure of stability during the Cold War toward the pressure of democratization. As a result, the interaction of sovereignty as stability and control moved toward the interaction of sovereignty as responsibility. This brings me to the next section, in which I explore the emergence of the norm of responsibility to protect.

### The Case of Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

As a result of the atrocities committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda, the General Assembly of the UN raised the issue of revising the concept of sovereignty in order for these atrocities to not be repeated. The question of sovereignty has always sparked ongoing debate in international relations theory. Joseph Nye classifies the major arguments of humanitarian intervention into three categories: realists, cosmopolitans, and state moralists. Realists justify interventions and the breach of sovereignty only on the grounds of keeping the balance of powers. Cosmopolitans focus on individual justice, so justify interventions on the grounds of crimes against humanity. Lastly, state moralists value the society of states and consider intervention justifiable only on the grounds of defending a state from external aggression.<sup>252</sup> In *Just and Unjust Wars*, Michael Walzer describes how state moralists' approach specifies four interventionist scenarios. The first example is in the case of a preemptive strike. When a state considers a threat imminent, then a breach in sovereignty is justified. The second is in the case of an intervention meant to balance out a previous intervention, in cases where one state invaded another. The third is when a group of people is

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<sup>251</sup> Wittes and Youngs, "Europe, the United States and Middle Eastern Democracy," 17-18.

<sup>252</sup> Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts*, ch 6.

threatened by a massacre, like in Rwanda. The fourth example is in the case of assisting a secessionist movement when the leader of movement has demonstrated a representative character.<sup>253</sup> All of these approaches demonstrate the continual reconsideration of the concept of sovereignty.

As a result of Kofi Annan's call for the sovereignty concept revision, Canada was the first to agree on humanitarian interventions. Given that an agreement was not achievable in the General Assembly, a new venue, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, was created. The commission consists of twelve commissioners with secretariat in their private capacity without affiliation or dictation from states. After a cumbersome drafting process, the final report was filed on December 18, 2001, and submitted to former Secretary General Kofi Annan. The ICISS reframed the concept of sovereignty as a responsibility to protect. This means that when a state fails to protect its own people from a massacre, the responsibility shifts to the whole international community. After tedious work and negotiations, the norm was first mentioned in a resolution adopted by the General Assembly on October 24, 2005, in the 2005 World Summit Document. Point number 138 on the documents reads as follows:

Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help states to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.<sup>254</sup>

Moreover, point 139 draws the line for action:

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<sup>253</sup> In Ibid.

<sup>254</sup> Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, October 24, 2005, 30.

The international community through the United Nations also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance to chapter VI and VIII of the charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context we prepared to take collective action in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the charter, including chapter VII, on a case by case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate.<sup>255</sup>

Given the reservations of permanent members of the Security Council, R2P was not granted permanent application in every case, but on a case-by-case basis in order to conform to the interests of the states concerned, which were still entrenched in the old philosophy of sovereignty. The ICISS argues for a semantic shift in the meaning of sovereignty. The report explains that “there is no transfer or dilution of state sovereignty. But there is a necessary re-characterization involved: from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility in both internal functions and external duties.”<sup>256</sup> Thus the wording “responsibility to protect” was chosen to reconcile sovereignty with intervention, because the wording of “responsibility to intervene” will be certainly retarded by majority of states.

Thus far, both the pro-democracy promotion and the development of the norm of R2P characterize the shift of interactions among states from the interaction of territoriality towards an interaction of responsibility. Interaction of responsibility does not mean only the R2P, but also the conditions that state interactions should be responsible to and in line with international law commandments. All the states have a long way to go in following this decree.

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<sup>255</sup> Ibid.

<sup>256</sup> “The Responsibility to Protect,” Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 30.

As a result, this has created democratization pressure in the Arab region, as it is located at the crossroads of major powers, and the platform of major engagements and disengagements. This development has played a role in the degeneration of the political formula of the Arab states, which is called the patron sovereignty, or in Karl Marx's language, "the personified sovereignty".<sup>257</sup> The patron sovereignty of much of the Arab nominal states was generated from a de facto emergence of the patriarch of the dominant tribe, as in the case of the Gulf states, or the national independence leader, as the cases of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. All successors followed suit in practicing patron sovereignty, regardless of the difference in the political regime in the Gulf region and North Africa. During the Cold War, the pressure in the region was a stabilizing pressure, so the patron sovereignty political formula remained intact. The end of the Cold War and the emergence of the new policy of pro-democracy and new norms (such as R2P) challenged the traditional political formula, which had already degenerated from the conditions of the new organizational framework and intellectual current. Meanwhile, Arab dictators were still entrenched in the Cold War mindset or what James D. Le Sueur calls "post-colonial time disorder". Sueur explains the problem as such:

Like Mubarak, other "presidents for life" see popular challenges to state authority as inauthentic and conspiracy driven- an understandable worldview, since many of them cut their teeth during decolonization. They suffer from what can be called postcolonial time disorder or PTD, meaning that they still subscribe to an out of date philosophy of governance, according to which authoritarianism is the only cure for external or internal political challenges. They have a Manichean inability to think outside the logic of totalizing power.<sup>258</sup>

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<sup>257</sup> Marx, *Early Writings*, 83.

<sup>258</sup> Sueur, "Postcolonial Time Disorder," *Foreign Affairs*, February 14, 2011.

Thus far, with the existence of the democratization pressure as part of the international democratic transition, the logic of PTD was rendered irrelevant and out of the context, as Bishara argues, the Arab Spring is the “outcome of the international democratic transition.”<sup>259</sup>

On the eve of the Arab Spring, democratization pressure was exercised further through statements from the EU and U.S, urging the swift transition of power. The situation in Tunisia took everyone by surprise. There was no explicit call for a swift transition from the U.S. Instead, the American government expressed concerns about the treatment of protestors to the Tunisian Ambassador on January 7, 2011. Western governments expressed praise only after Bin Ali fled. The EU’s position was less decisive than the U.S’s. France’s prior sympathy for Bin Ali put France’s interest in Tunisia in jeopardy. In the case of Egypt, the EU remained vague and urged reform, but Mubarak did not abdicate. American pressure was more decisive than the EU position. The Americans called for the responsible treatment of protestors, then for reforms, and lastly, on February 4<sup>th</sup>, 2011, called on Mubarak to resign.

Libya represents the first demonstration of the case of R2P. Gaddafi’s calculation was influenced by his two comrades’ fates (Ben Ali and Mubarak). Since the peaceful demonstrations ultimately led to their abdication, he chose a different route. Playing on Westerners’ fear of Islamism, he tried to crush the protest in the Eastern part of Libya by fire, claiming that the uprising was led by Al Qaeda. It failed. Instead, the number of protestors all over Libya increased. (Plan B) was to let Libyans bear arms, and to reframe the story as a fight against terrorism. Gaddafi, in a number of interviews with international channels, insisted that he needed assistance from the West to fight terrorism in his country. While his shrewd plan managed to divide Libyans and led the tribes of the middle and south to side with Gaddafi, the West did not take the bait. The growing mass killings were a driving force for the R2P to be

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<sup>259</sup>“An interview with A.Bishara,” Youtube video, 47:00, April 8, 2013, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=llNAJSr64DY>.

applied in Libya. Two factors were key for R2P's implementation. First there was the geopolitical importance of Libya as an oil country in the southern part of the Mediterranean. A failed state in Libya would mean an uncontrolled exodus of immigrants, which would be bad news for the EU. The second factor was Gaddafi's personality, which alienated him more as the crisis proceeded.

Due to the snowballing effects of Tunisia and Egypt, as well as Gaddafi's mismanagement of the crisis, the U.S and EU agreed on the resignation of Gaddafi through direct statements, which culminated in the resolutions of 1970 and 1973. These resolutions created a No-Fly Zone, military interventions, and "necessary measures to protect civilians"<sup>260</sup>, which were directed by a coalition of the willing and then continued by NATO. The question of the success of the R2P mission in Libya is questionable amid the destructive side effects. Alan Kuperman in his article "A Model Human Intervention? Reassessing NATO's Libya Campaign," argues the following:

An examination of the course of violence in Libya before and after NATO action shows that intervention backfired. The intervention extended the war's duration about six fold, increased its death toll approximately seven to ten times, and exacerbated human rights abuses, humanitarian suffering, Islamic radicalism, and weapons proliferation in Libya and its neighbors.<sup>261</sup>

This gloomy outcome occurred not only because of the absence of a clear post-conflict stabilization strategy from the international coalition, but because of the mismanagement by the new ruling elite, especially with respect to the question of assabiyya management (which will be addressed in the next chapter).

Based on the process of the differentiation context explained before, we assess the international pressure during the three revolutionary processes in Arab history.

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<sup>260</sup> See the Security Council resolution 1973.

<sup>261</sup> Kuperman, "A Model Humanitarian Intervention," Abstract.

## The First Revolutionary Process and the International Pressure: 622-662 A.D

The differentiation context in this revolutionary process was the interaction of universality. Both the segmentary differentiation and the functional differentiation were represented in the formation of universal states and the interaction of universality respectively. The stratificatory differentiation was a bipolar system between the Persian Empire and the Byzantine Empire. On aggregate, the international pressure was a conquest pressure, which has little relationship with the question of political class change. In this regard, the international pressure here was neither sufficient nor necessary. The absence of an intellectual current that might have solved the problem of the republic and the reemergence of the tribal alliance as an organization framework was individually necessary conditions in the change of the political class from aristocratic/liberal towards an aristocratic/autocratic culminated in the Umayyad Empire. Hence the new *political modernization situation* that emerged in 622 was reversed in 30 years for the reasons mentioned in chapter 2. In this process, since that the organizational framework as the tribal alliance did not give a chance for mass participation ( as the participation in tribal alliance is selective ), in addition to the absence of political thought that theorizes the next possible model of political class, chances of political revolution was utterly low. Thus far, political change between 662-1923 was simply dynastic change, and warfare among clans and tribes.

## The Second Revolutionary Process and the International Pressure: 1923-1950s

In this process, the international pressure was a colonialism pressure. The segmentary differentiation was oriented around nation states; the functional differentiation emphasized the question of sovereignty and self-determination; and the stratificatory differentiation shifted from multipolar to bipolar on the eve of the Cold War. In this context, the international pressure as colonialism pressure was a necessary condition for a change in the political class from universal (Ottoman Empire) to a national state. The emergence of the nationalism literature, as an intellectual current, contributed to

this transition. Yet the absence of rigorous thought on a better democratic political class in addition to the emergence of military juntas as the new organization framework led to the political class remaining aristocratic/autocratic. Moreover, with the existence of military juntas, the possibility of mass participation in a revolution was drastically reduced. Hence, the revolutionary process was belittled to coups.

### **The Third Revolutionary process and International Pressure: 2011-present**

In 2011, international pressure developed into a democratization pressure, owing to the changing differentiation context on three levels: segmentary (democratic waves), functional (R2P and the slow move to a new connotation of sovereignty) and stratificatory (the end of the Cold War and developments afterwards). These changes, in addition to the new intellectual current (democratic current) and the new organizational framework (political parties and social networking), created a different *political modernization situation* from the earlier situations. The first *political modernization situation* in 622-662 A.D created a transition from the Arab nomadic era to the era of statehood. The second *political modernization situation*, from 1923-1950s, created a transition from the universal state (Ottoman Empire) towards nation state, which still has not reached its final form in the Arab region. The third *political modernization situation*, in 2011, created the need for a more democratic political class. An intellectual current raised the question of a more democratic government, and a new organization framework (social networking) existed, which created the possibility for mass participation, and thus a chance for a political revolution. This answers the question of why this hadn't occurred before.

Thus far, proving the existence of the new international pressure, a new intellectual current, and a new organizational framework is sufficient to conclude the existence of a new *political modernization situation*. In making comparisons between Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the following will be emphasized: the three cases share geographical location (the Arab region), the intellectual current, and international pressure. In the conditions of international pressure and intellectual current, I treated the three cases as



one unit, with slight differences. For example, in comparison to Tunisia and Egypt, Libya does not boast an abundance of intellectuals. But in the capitals of Tunis, Cairo, and Beirut, one intellectual current was created, which gave the regional shared identity. The mass media revolution rendered the Arab region one unit in the global village.

The international pressure in Tunisia and Egypt—represented by diplomatic pressure—was sufficient for ousting the ruling elite, while in Libya, diplomatic pressure was not sufficient. Instead, it was a necessary condition as military intervention for toppling Gaddafi. The three cases—especially Libya—stand apart on the question of new organizational framework, which was explained in detail in chapter 2.

In Part II (chapters 2-4), I have traced the existence of a new *political modernization situation*, which created the potential for a change of the political class, and a political revolution. This brings me to the last part and the two remaining conditions, which answer a key question: if the whole Arab region shares a similar *political modernization situation*, why the Arab Spring did not occur only in few states?

## **Part III: The Revolutionary Situation**



## Chapter 5: The Rigidity of the Ruling Elite and the Chance of Ousting the Ruling Elite (Breakthrough in the Assabiyya)

### The Existence of the Political Modernization Situation in the Arab Region

The existence of new trends in the organization framework (social networking), intellectual current (democratic method), and international pressure (democratization pressure) infers the existence of a new PMS, which can be summed up in the following statement: the necessity of a more democratic political class. Given that the whole Arab region shares one intellectual current (not to mention one spoken language) and international pressure, it could be deduced that PMS exists in the whole Arab region. One tangible indication is a survey executed by the Doha Institute of Policy Studies in fourteen Arab countries: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Lebanon, Mauritania, Algeria, Sudan, Morocco, Kuwait, Jordan, and Palestine, during the period between July 2012 and March 2013. There were 20,350 interviewees and the countries represent approximately 89% of the total Arab population, which is the largest survey done of its kind.

One of the statements the interviewees were meant to agree or disagree with was: “democracy remains the best possible form of government, despite its difficulties.” 68% of the interviewees supported the democratic system, while 18% disagreed. In a related question, 82% of the respondents answered that the democratic system is suitable for their countries, and between 50% and 62% see the single-party system, authoritarianism and the Islamist regimes as not “appropriate”.<sup>262</sup> Moreover, in the first survey by this institute—which was performed in 2011-2012—67% of the respondents approved of the following statement: “in spite of having its problems, a

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<sup>262</sup> “The Arab Opinion Project: The Arab Opinion Index,” April 29, 2012.  
<http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/5083cf8e-38f8-4e4a-8bc5-fc91660608b0>.

democratic system is better than other systems.”<sup>263</sup> These findings confirm the existence of a new PMS in the Arab region and the question of the necessity for a change in the political class. The 2011-2012 survey argues that a combination of corruption, unemployment, dictatorship and social injustices are to blame for the Arab Spring.<sup>264</sup> The survey did not distinguish between what led to the political revolution (a change in the political class and the ousting of the ruling elite) and what led people to the streets. Also, the conditions mentioned in the survey do not answer why there are positive and negative cases. This brings me to the other two conditions.

### **The Rigidity of Ruling Elite & the Chance of Being Ousted: “Positive & Negative Cases”**

What distinguishes the positive and negative cases is the existence of the rigidity of the ruling elite and the chance of ousting the elite, represented by the breakthrough in the *assabiyya* (succession crisis). The rigidity of the ruling elite includes the inability or refusal to reform. This can be demonstrated by the absence of elections, or of infrequent elections, in addition to long-serving leaders. Tunisia, Egypt and Libya—the positive cases in this study—are all republics governed by long-serving leaders. In Tunisia, Ben Ali is the second post-independence president, and he served 23 years; Mubarak was the third Egyptian president after independence and he served for 30 years; and Gaddafi was the second leader after the independence of Libya and he served for 42 years. The elections in Tunisia and Egypt were neither frequent nor fair, while in Libya there were no elections during all of Gaddafi’s reign. These remarks are indications of the rigidity of the ruling elite, especially in a republic, where succession should not be hereditary. Whereas, the Gulf states are hereditary from the outset, and their rigidity was represented in their conservatism and unwillingness to reform.

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<sup>263</sup> “The Arab Opinion Project: The Arab Opinion Index,” June 13, 2013.  
<http://english.dohainstitute.org/content/af5000b3-46c7-45bb-b431-28b2de8b33c7>.

<sup>264</sup> “The Arab Opinion Project: The Arab Opinion Index,” April 29, 2012.  
<http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/5083cf8e-38f8-4e4a-8bc5-fc91660608b0>.

Republics in the eastern part of the Middle East, such as Iraq and Lebanon, experience frequent changes of leaders (flexibility of the ruling elite), despite setbacks amid the sectarian polarization. Algeria and Morocco, on the other hand—two cases from the western part of the Arab region (Maghreb)—have flexible ruling elite. In Algeria, despite serving for four consecutive terms, Abdel Aziz Bouteflika is the eighth president since independence, which is an indication of flexibility. Morocco is the oldest territorial monarchy in the Middle East since the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Huntington says that “the longer an organization or procedure has been in existence, the higher the level of institutionalization.”<sup>265</sup> A long tradition of monarchy, which survived colonization, renders it more flexible. Morocco witnessed protests like those in Tunisia, yet King Muhammad VI’s response was more constructive and prompt. He swiftly drafted a new constitution that officially changed the monarchy from absolute to more constitutional, which allowed an elected prime minister to be the head of government. Previously, the King appointed the prime minister as he saw fit, regardless of popular accountability. Hence, the existence of some flexibility within the ruling elite led to a change in the political class without an ousting of the ruling elite.

The second condition is the chance of ousting the ruling elite. This study differentiates between general *assabiyya*, which constitutes the general solidarity of a nation, and strong/weak *assabiyya* as micro concepts, which deal with the behavior of the ruling elite. Ibn Kaldun did not demarcate clearly between the two, nor did he offer a solution. Strong *assabiyya* is the monopolization of succession by one ethnic or religious affiliation. For example, in Bahrain, the level of succession as an absolute monarchy is monopolized by the Sunni royal family within a majority Shia population.

Weak *assabiyya*, or clientelism, is the penetration of political parties in bureaucracy, or the control of succession by interest groups. In Tunisia, for example, there is a weak *assabiyya*. The ruling party controls most of the bureaucracy, as well as interest

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<sup>265</sup> Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 13.

groups, like the business circles related to the Trabulsi family (the family of the First Lady, Laila). Likewise, in Egypt, there is not a strong *assabiyya*—not one ethnic or religious group dominates the level of succession. In Egypt, the question of weak *assabiyya* is twofold. First, the army controls a portion of the economy, although there is conflicting information about how much it actually controls. Another indication of weak *assabiyya* is that between 50% and 80% of the provincial governors are from the military, especially the retirees.<sup>266</sup> The ruling party before the 2011 revolution was nothing but a collection of interest group penetrating the bureaucracy, which shackled the opportunity for better governance.

Libya is a case of strong *assabiyya* par excellence. Gaddafi's tribe and its tribal alliance control the intelligence, security forces, and National Security Council. Gaddafi's sons and cousins interfere in politics and business alike. Germaine Tillon wrote that this rendered the republic a "republic of cousins"<sup>267</sup>. Ultimately, this created the conditions for Gaddafi to monopolize the level of succession, and paved the way for hereditary rule within a republic, as occurred in Syria (a case of strong *assabiyya*), when Assad succeeded his father, nearly a decade before the 2011 revolution.

The chance of ousting the ruling elite falls into an array of scenarios. The absence of a strong *assabiyya* that dominates the level of succession is a chance for revolutionaries to mobilize. Also a succession crisis is a quintessential chance and breakthrough especially in the existence of strong *assabiyya*. Other conditions that create a chance of ousting the ruling elite are civil war, economic crises, and a snowballing effect of protests occurring in neighbor countries. The absences of a strong *assabiyya*, in addition to a succession crisis in Tunisia and Egypt, with the existence of rigid ruling elite in a republic, created the conditions for a political revolution. Therefore it was not a merely chance for Tunisia and Egypt to be the first two cases to experience the uprisings!

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<sup>266</sup> Sayigh, "Above the State: The Officers' Republic in Egypt," 19.

<sup>267</sup> In Charrad, *States and Women's Rights*, 23.

A key indication that there was an absence of strong *assabiyya* in Tunisia and Egypt is that both armies sided with the protestors. Because of a domino effect, Libya was the third country to follow. On aggregate, the chance of ousting the ruling elite in Libya was due to the succession crisis and the snowballing effect of revolutions in the two neighboring countries. In fact, without the snowballing effect, a political revolution in Libya would not have been triggered, because even with the availability of the succession crisis, breaking through a strong *assabiyya* would be a tedious and bloody endeavor. Therefore, the revolutionary process in Libya took around eight months of bloody civil war, even with international intervention.

The international intervention was necessary in order to topple Gaddafi. Without which, he could have been still in power, or could have at least split Libya into an Eastern republic and a Western republic. This does not mean that a NATO intervention was an ideal option. Conversely, it complicated the polarization and bred much stronger *assabiyya*. A coalition of the willing by nations of the region could have had less destructive effects; nevertheless it was not feasible in the context of an Arab League and an African Union with neither power nor a voice. As I mentioned in chapter 2, the tribes in the middle and south sided with Gaddafi, not necessarily because of their devotion to him, but unfortunately because of the problems between tribes of the coast lines, and tribes of middle and southern Libya, which Gaddafi astutely exploited. Gaddafi's long reign was thanks to oil and his manipulation of *assabiyya* between tribes. Gaddafi had fortune, but did not have *virtue*. *Virtue*, Machiavelli argues, is the skill or the ability to maintain the state; or according to Skinner, the status of the prince.<sup>268</sup> Gaddafi failed to build a nation state, and failed to maintain his status. Even the international intervention—which some experts argue was to stop Gaddafi from gaining power in Africa and creating one monetary

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<sup>268</sup> Skinner, "How Machiavellian was Machiavelli?" *You Tube Video*, 53:52, February 21, 2013, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gH-NxQmf87k>.



system<sup>269</sup>—would have been a failure for Gaddafi. It is not reasonable to build an integration of continent before building your own state and advancing the common good and dignity of your own people. Moreover, he “successfully” created enemies in his own country, the region and beyond. Therefore these conspiracies are also proof of his failure to maintain his status. Conspiracies always existed among states, and will remain, yet the best fortress against conspiracies, is that the statesman should win his people, cultivate their common good, not neglecting it altogether. In fact, Gaddafi was merely a shrewd politician, not a statesman. The first is simply able to attain and keep power; the latter goes beyond that to create a common good. This is the essence of glory.

In Yemen, there were also rigid ruling elite, and a chance of them being ousted, which was apparent in the succession crisis. Yet is due to the strong *assabiyya*, which was manifested by the dominance of one tribal alliance, the revolutionary process rendered undecided yet. It is difficult to say that the political class changed, because there still aren't regular elections and a new constitution has not yet been drafted. Also, it is difficult to say that the ruling elite was ousted: only Abdullah Salah was ousted after a deal was struck by the neighboring Gulf states. And the war that is ongoing between the interim government and the Shia militias of Houthis in the time of writing these lines is an indication of the difficulty of managing of strong *assabiyya*. Hence, the weak results in Yemen are due to the low maneuverability of the revolutionaries. Also the strong *assabiyya* in Yemen is more powerful than in Libya.

The Gulf states skipped the political revolution due to the absence of a succession crisis. The conditions of a new PMS and the rigidity of the ruling elite exist, but the chance of ousting the ruling elite did not exist, yet. Moreover, the existence of strong *assabiyya*, which is buttressed by oil revenue, rendered the chances for potential

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<sup>269</sup> Some experts and thinkers like Tariq Ramadan argue the conspiracy dimension of the Arab Spring, and Gaddafi's influence in Africa. Conspiracy is not omnipotent; it can oust the elite, but not create a new political class. Also a conspiracy is irrelevant if there was no grievances that can exploit, especially with the question of social injustices.

revolutionary cells slim. The failed revolution attempt in Bahrain confirms the necessity for overcoming the strong assabiyya for the political revolution to proceed. In other words, the failed revolution in Bahrain is evidence of the inability of the Shia revolutionaries to overcome the Sunni's strong assabiyya of the ruling elite.

The Syrian case is an important case for strong assabiyya, in which the level of succession is dominated by one family in a "republic". Additionally the conditions for a new PMS and a rigid ruling elite existed, but there was little or no chance of breaking through the assabiyya. In fact, there was no succession crisis. There was merely the chance of a snowballing effect from Egypt. In a country that is ruled by strong assabiyya, the model of protests in Tahrir Square would not be sufficient. It was sufficient in Egypt and Tunisia, since the assabiyya was weak, coupled with the existence of an autonomous army to intervene for the protestors' cause. In Syria and Libya, the armies are part of the strong assabiyya. Thus the likely outcome would be a long civil war in which the army was split. Hence, in these cases, the ability to overcome the strong assabiyya is a real obstacle.

In short the Arab states fall into one of these four categories:

- Rigidity of the ruling elite + weak assabiyya;
- Rigidity of the ruling elite + strong assabiyya;
- Flexibility of the ruling elite + strong assabiyya;
- And lastly, the flexibility of the ruling elite + weak assabiyya.

As shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3.A Comparative Analysis

<b>1.</b>	<b>A.</b>	Rigidity of the Ruling Elite + Weak Assabiyya Tunisia (+) Egypt (+)
	<b>B.</b>	Rigidity of the Ruling Elite + Strong Assabiyya Libya (+) (succession crisis) Gulf states (-)
<b>2.</b>	<b>A.</b>	Flexibility of the Ruling Elite + Strong Assabiyya Iraq (-) Lebanon(-)
	<b>B.</b>	Flexibility of the Ruling Elite + Weak Assabiyya Morocco (+) ( reformation ), Algeria (-)

From observation, the positive cases are those in which either the ruling elite ousted or the ruling elite began drastic reform measures amid the protests. Tunisia, Egypt, Libya belong to the first category, while Morocco belongs to the second. In the first category of positive cases, the elite ousted, the PMS existed, and the rigidity of the ruling elite and the chance of breaking through the assabiyya (succession crisis) existed. In the second category of positive cases, there was no chance of ousting the elite, but the ruling elite was flexible enough to accept measures that reformed the political class.

Negative cases were ones in which either the elite was not ousted or the elite did not undergo swift reform measures. In the first category, the Gulf states are our best example. The absence of a succession crisis gave these countries a temporary shield against the storms of change. But if they stopped carrying out political class reforms for too long, once a chance of ousting the government emerged (like shortage of oil and a deep fall of the prices that affect salaries), they would be susceptible to being ousted. The second category of the negative cases is a republic such as Algeria. Compared to Libya, the ruling elite in this state is flexible, but if it does not carry out

reforms, once a chance of being ousted emerged (economic/security crisis or succession crisis), the elite in Algeria could be ousted as well...

Last note on the negative cases such as the Gulf states and Algeria is the following. On the question of a chance of ousting the ruling elite, two indications should be heeded. The first is the absence of a succession crisis. In the Gulf states the process of succession is hereditary, which is less risky than in a republic. However, in the hereditary succession, a succession crisis could emerge when there is a contest over the thrown among different wings in the royal family. Saudi Arabia, as the old generation of kings fading, and the second generation of young royals on the marsh, a serious succession crisis is around the corner after the current king, King Salman passed away, unless settled earlier. With respect to Algeria, the main indication is the absence of succession crisis as was in its two neighbors (Tunisia and Libya). Another indication regarding the chance of ousting the ruling elite is the calculation of risk or tradeoffs. In the absence of a chance such as a succession crisis or a drastic fall of oil prices (in oil producing countries), the potential revolutionary cells could suspend the decision of mobilization, or abandon it altogether. Especially after the atrocities of the revolutionary process in Libya, Yemen and Syria, the Arab public became more cautious and aware of the consequences. On this issue, in Algeria the memory of the 1990s civil war and the high death toll, made the Algerians experienced calculators of risk, and value stability instead. A recent report titled “No Arab Spring for Algeria” by Mohsin Khan and Karim Mezran senior fellows at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East emphasizes the calculation of risk a great deal, with lucid analysis and valuable recommendations for the elite in Algeria.<sup>270</sup>

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<sup>270</sup> For more on the Gulf states with respect to the Arab Spring, a book by Toby Matthiesen titled *Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, And the Arab Spring That Wasn't*, is recommended. Matthiesen points out to the problem of sectarianism (which is a manifestation of strong assabiyya) as one major reason for the thwarted spring in the Gulf states. Also his recent book *The Other Saudis: Shiism, Dissent And Sectarianism* gives a valuable analysis on the current standing of the Saudi royal family. Also see Khan and Mezran, “No Arab Spring for Algeria,” for more on the Algerian case. Finally, with respect to the absence of succession crisis in the Gulf states, a host of literature, interviews, and books emphasize

## The Necessity for a Creative Statesmanship: The Virtue of Assabiyya Management

After a revolution, a change of the political class is an open process that needs time and stamina from revolutionaries. In Tunisia, a changing political class is indicated by the election of an interim assembly, a successful drafting of a constitution, and the election of the first permanent parliament in October 2014. These are indications of the change from an aristocratic level of succession to a more democratic one. Despite the burgeoning strong assabiyya between secularists and Islamists, it was well managed, thanks to the troika between moderate Islamists, leftists and moderate secularists. In Egypt, there is an indication of the change of political class but it is creepy compared to Tunisia. Over the past three years in Egypt, two constitutions have been drafted and two presidents have been elected, but the army had to intervene twice. The army intervened in 2011 to force Mubarak to give up power, and in June 2013, it ousted Muhammad Mursi, the first democratically elected president in the history of Egypt. The merits of the second army intervention are still controversial. One side calls it a revolution or a second wave of the 2011 revolution, and the other side sees it as a coup.<sup>271</sup>

According to the classification of modernization, there are two coups. The first is the coup of modernization. Nasser's coup in 1952 falls into this category. This was a coup of modernization, during which the political class changed. In the 1950s, the political

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the advantage of the hereditary succession skipping the uprisings, major of which *The Arab Spring : Pathways of Repression and Reform*, by Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud and Andrew Reynolds.

<sup>271</sup> In my judgment a coup needs two factors: an ousting of the ruling elite without a popular participation. The second is a permanent rule by the new elite, be it military junta or a party. Hence, I think that the second military intervention 2013 cannot be deemed a coup until it is proven that the military wants to rule permanently or the President Sisi rules more than two terms or as assigned in the constitution. Therefore I did not want to rush to a final conclusion, until the second factor takes its time which is the subject of the years to come, also the impartial historians who can prove that the military motivation in 2011 and 2013 was not stability or democracy, but to rule. With respect to the crackdown that is going on in Egypt it is down to the problem of polarization "assabiyya management" in the context of people with high expectations vs. rigid and weak institutions, which in need for time to reform. However, my tentative expectation in this regard that the second republic of Egypt which began in 2011, will be never like the first one, at least on the question of republican succession....

class changed from mechanical-aristocratic/autocratic to organic-aristocratic/autocratic. It is still considered a coup and not a political revolution because the ousting of the ruling elite was not supported by mass participation. The popular approval came after the ousting of King Farouk, in 1952. The second coup was a coup of circulation, which is merely a change of families or names, without the political class being changed. An example of this is Gaddafi's coup in 1969, which was turned out to a circulation scheme than modernization.

In 2011 and 2013 in Egypt, both army interventions were accompanied by mass participation in which the people called for the ousting of the president. Depicting the army intervention as a coup is more ideologically driven than sober scientific analysis. It is true that an elected president was ousted before finishing his term, but the matter should be seen from the *assabiyya* management context. During the Muslim Brotherhood's one-year reign, the strong *assabiyya* on religious lines was building up between secularists and Islamists, and between Coptic Christians and Muslims. Foreign intervention and the meddling of intelligences were present, but the major problem was that Mursi did not have the virtue of managing *assabiyya*. In the context of this study, one of the main virtues statesmen and revolutionaries (or would-be statesmen) should possess is the management of *assabiyya*. During the revolution, the virtue of managing *assabiyya* means the ability to overcome the strong (or weak) *assabiyya*, with the least casualties possible. This means that the endeavor of revolution goes beyond organizing a protest. Rather, it goes on the ability to create alliances, maneuvers to outwit the governing strong *assabiyya*. After the revolution, managing the *assabiyya* means the ability to eliminate the strong *assabiyya* and showing clemency, and limiting the weak *assabiyya*. Eliminating the strong *assabiyya* after the revolution means advancing laws and decrees that abolish the domination of the level of succession by one religious or ethnic affiliation. The limitation of the weak *assabiyya* is what happened in Germany during Otto von Bismarck's chancellorship. He created what Martin Shefter calls "absolutist coalition" between the conservatives and

upper-middle class parties to keep the bureaucracy autonomous.<sup>272</sup> The new elite in Tunisia managed to contain the strong *assabiyya* fault lines, while the Muslim Brotherhood—the ruling elite in Egypt from 2012-2013—did not have such virtue. In fact, they refused to form a coalition, refused to issue laws to eliminate sectarian and religious discrimination, and refused to deal with Egyptians on equal footings. In short, the problem was not whether Mursi was an autocrat or democrat, the problem that Mursi was not a statesman in the first place.

The decree in November 2012 that rendered his policy decisions immune from judicial scrutiny paved the way for mass protests in June 2013, which was followed by an intervention by the army. The army intervention in 2011 was to eliminate a strong *assabiyya*-in-the-making in which power would be passed from father to son. The second intervention, in 2013, was to eliminate a more dangerous, strong *assabiyya*, in which a religious affiliated group (the Muslim Brotherhood) was trying to dominate the level of succession. Analysts who stand firmly against the 2013 army intervention understand the prohibition of ousting an elected president like Kant's categorical imperative: as an evil unto itself. This is not necessarily the case if the president is accused of treason, corruption, scandal (like Richard Nixon), or of instigating strong *assabiyya*, as was the case in Egypt; then the president should be ousted. The question here is consequential as virtue politics, not a categorical imperative. The error in the 2012 constitution is that it did not include any article for recalling a president before finishing his term. Thus the 2013 Egyptian political crisis was-to some extent-due to the new ruling elite inability to manage *assabiyya*, and the deficiencies of the 2012 constitution which did not include clear articles about when to oust a president.

The question in Libya is messier due to the bequest of strong *assabiyya* from Gaddafi, and the deficiency of virtue of managing *assabiyya* by the new ruling elite. The change of Libya's political class was more complicated than of its two sisters, Tunisia and Egypt. Two interim parliaments were elected in 2012 and 2014, yet the civil war is

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<sup>272</sup>In Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay*, 77.

still ongoing. The failure to manage the strong *assabiyya* began from the rush to elections in 2012 before the rehabilitation of a wounded nation. Before 2011, the country had not witnessed real development since 1911, the year of the Italian invasion. The new ruling elite did not grasp the situation properly— especially the strong *assabiyya* between the tribes who fought with NATO for democracy—and the tribes who fought with Gaddafi for national sovereignty. Tribes who fought with Gaddafi were not necessarily against democracy. Gaddafi exploited the NATO intervention, deeming it new imperialism, thus creating a vertical division in the country. What was absent was a creative statesmanship that understood the division between the tribes, and could strike the balance between democracy and sovereignty after the revolution.

Before the elections, a national convention should have been drafted in which the dichotomy between democracy and sovereignty clarified and amnesty granted to the defeated warring party (except to what the Libyans call “Men of the Tent” the forty men who enforced Gaddafi’s decrees). The rest should have been rehabilitated and given amnesty too. The third issue in the convention should have been the question of fatwa. During the revolution, the National Interim Council, the revolution’s political front, appointed mufti, whose power grew and added complexity to the affair. A line should have been drawn between fatwa and the law before the 2012 election. The spirit of this convention would have been to eliminate the strong *assabiyya* before it became too difficult to deal with. The new ruling elite did not follow this plan. The 2012 election was free and fair (as foreign observers confirmed), and was followed by a decree that prevented a number of bureaucrats who worked during Gaddafi’s era from running for office. This decree was more an exclusion of bureaucracy than political forces, which widened cleavages in the society and instigated the strong *assabiyya* and rendered the democratic process shaky. The absence of an efficient army and a functional police, as well as an arbitrary fatwa authority that did not stand midway between the warring parties-increased polarization between Islamists and nationalists , and led to a protracted war.



Thus, the success of political class change depends on the virtue of managing the *assabiyya*. Libya is awash with engineers and medical doctors (who make up the current ruling elite), but there is a scarcity of statesmen who understand the country's history, demographics, temper and who can manage the strong *assabiyya* in order to maintain the democratic level of succession. If a strong *assabiyya* is not managed, Libya will be back to absolutism again.

In short, there was a successful political class change in Tunisia as there were two elections and a drafted constitution, still in the making in Egypt despite drafting constitution amid the polarization between Islamists and the army, and creeping progress despite two elections in Libya. As mentioned before, the process of political class change is open and tedious journey, and the above analysis is sufficed to indicate that there is **a direction towards a changing political class with different trajectories**. In addition, proving the existence of a new *political modernization situation* is a sufficient condition for a potentiality of political class change in the making. In this respect, and according to the Doha Institute, 26% of the respondents of the 2012-2013 Arab Opinion Index think that revolutions will achieve their democratic aim in the near future (1-3 years), and 19% think that revolutions will achieve their aims in the medium term (4-7 years). However, 20% believe that revolutions have already achieved their aims.<sup>273</sup> This speaks to the fact that a change in the political class is underway, despite the odds...

## Main Findings and Counter Arguments

1. What made the difference over time between the three revolutionary processes is the existence of a new *political modernization situation* that created a need for more democratic political order.<sup>274</sup> The existence of the first condition answered

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<sup>273</sup> "The Arab Opinion Project: The Arab Opinion Index," June 13, 2013.  
<http://english.dohainstitute.org/content/af5000b3-46c7-45bb-b431-28b2de8b33c7>.

<sup>274</sup> The *political modernization situation* is in other words the authorization mobilization in time. Moises Naim's recent great book *The End of Power: From Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States*,

my first question as to why this had not occurred before 2011. The new organizational framework of social networking created more opportunities for awareness and thus made mass participation possible. On the other hand, what made the difference between states that witnessed the Arab Spring and states that did not, the existence of the other two conditions of the rigidity of the ruling elite and chance of ousting the ruling elite. States in which the ruling elite was flexible did not witness protests, or undergo a preemptive reform, as in Morocco. States in which the ruling elite was rigid and there was a chance of ousting the ruling elite, witnessed a political revolution (as exemplified by the three cases of the study). And lastly, states in which the ruling elite was rigid but there was no chance of breaking through the *assabiyya*, political revolution chances mitigated. The different contexts of the aforementioned two conditions answer the second question of why some states witnessed a revolution, but not others.

2. Unlike the European Spring of 1848, which accompanied the Industrial revolution and economic development, the Arab Spring did not experience this follow-up. The Arab Spring , in a nutshell, was the result of a failure to build a good statehood. It is, first of all, a failure of statehood. This observation and the existence of the new *political modernization situation* confirm that political modernization has its own logic and that it is not necessarily dependent on the economy, as the classical modernization theory argued, which cannot necessarily be applied wholesale to the Middle East. In *Political Order and Political Decay*, Fukuyama emphasizes this finding. He writes:

Political development in particular follows its own logic independent of economic growth. Successful modernization depends, then on parallel

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*Why Being In Charge Isn't What It Used To Be*, tackles the problem of the dwindling power due to what he calls three revolutions, namely: the more revolution (rising population), the mobility revolution (communication breakthrough), and the mentality revolution. This also connotes an authorization mobilization or a *new political modernization* that affects the state type, and the power concentration. The difference with my analysis is that Naim's theory is a grand theory for politics and other disciplines. My analysis is confined to the state and the international relations, by including the variable of the international pressure.

development of political institutions alongside economic growth, social change and ideas, it is not something that can be taken for granted as an inevitable concomitant of the other dimensions of development.<sup>275</sup>

Also he alludes to the question of economic and social conditions-likewise this study -are not necessary for political revolution. If there is no chance of the ruling elite being ousted and breaking through their *assabiyya*, the growing middle class would not pose a danger. Under a section called “The Future of Democracy” Fukuyama affirms that “the existence of a broad middle class is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition to bring about a liberal democracy.”<sup>276</sup> This intersects with my study’s finding that social and economic conditions are not necessarily what determine a political revolution. However, this study departs from Fukuyama’s commentary on the Arab Spring because it does not precisely define the necessary conditions of the political revolution. Fukuyama mixed the social and economic conditions with the structural trajectory, without demarcation. Also this study takes a concrete stand against Fukuyama’s understanding of the elitist approach. He did not distinguish between the ruling elite and the political class; he also misunderstood Mosca. In a section titled “Arguments against Democracy”, Fukuyama writes:

A different sort of argument was made against democracy by a series of conservative Italian thinkers, who asserted that it was pointless to open up the franchise since true democracy was impossible. This view was first articulated by Gaetano Mosca who stated that different regime types-monarchy, aristocracy, democracy-made little difference to actual life because all were in the end controlled by elites.<sup>277</sup>

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<sup>275</sup>Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay*, 50-51.

<sup>276</sup>*Ibid*, 445.

<sup>277</sup>*Ibid*, 420.

Here he misreads Mosca, who neither claimed that opening up the franchise was pointless, nor argued that true democracy is impossible. In fact, Mosca argued that the timing of the franchise in chaotic Europe and Italy in the late 19th and early 20th century was a mistake. In his own words, he states the following:

We have not mentioned limitation of suffrage among the resorts that might be best calculated to ensure the duration of the representative system. We regard the granting of universal suffrage as a mistake and mistakes are not more frequent in public life than they are in private life. At the same time one could not go back on it without committing a second mistake which might have unforeseeable consequences of a very serious nature. Brief periods of strong government, where the state exercises many powers and great authority may prove actual benefit in some European countries, as helping to restore or provide conditions that will enable the representative system to function normally in the near future.<sup>278</sup>

Mosca does not reject democracy, but argues for “authoritarian transition” (as Huntington did). In fact, what Fukuyama explains in his current book that democracy before a centralized state bureaucracy can breed clientelism is similar to what Mosca meant. Fukuyama writes:

The first and most important institution that fragile or failing states lack is an administratively capable government. Before a state can be constrained by either law or democracy, it needs to exist. This means, in the first instance, the establishment of a centralized executive and a bureaucracy.<sup>279</sup>

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<sup>278</sup> Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, 492-493.

<sup>279</sup> Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay*, 51.

In this regard, Mosca was a precursor to Huntington and Fukuyama's current findings, and more original, yet misunderstood and misread as some other great thinkers.

3. One of the counter arguments of the study's findings is the question of intelligence intervention in the Arab Spring. A number of Arab experts on the subject allude to this fact.<sup>280</sup> Also, 3% of the respondents of the Doha Institute's 2012-2013 survey see the Arab Spring as an American conspiracy.<sup>281</sup> This study emphasizes that foreign intelligence intervention exist in ousting rulers, and always was like the case of Allende in Chile in 1973, yet intelligence is not omnipotent. One of the causes of the Arab Spring is the PMS, which is a mix of democratic intellectual process, new communication and international pressure that generated from a new differentiation context. This complicated process takes decades, if not centuries, and is beyond the capacity of foreign intelligences. The effect that state intelligence apparatus have on the modernization of other states should be studied, but right now there is no tangible evidence that the intelligence was a key necessary condition without which an Arab Spring would not be feasible. Moreover, ruling elite that is flexible will be difficult to oust for revolutionaries and intelligence alike. Also in cases in which there is a strong *assabiyya*, like in Syria, intelligence interference will not necessarily lead to the ousting of the ruling elite. A palace coup might be possible, but an all-out ousting of the strong *assabiyya* is not an easy business. In short, foreign intelligence could oust the ruling elite, but not necessarily create a political revolution.
4. Another controversy the findings address is whether the Arab Spring constitutes a revolution in the first place. As previously discussed, this stems from the fact that

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<sup>280</sup> Riadh Sidaoui a Tunisian political scientist and a researcher at the university of Geneva in numerous you tube videos argues the fact of excessive intelligence intervention. Yet he clearly makes the case that there are reasonable causes for the Arab Spring to exist like political oppression, and social injustice.

<sup>281</sup> "The Arab Opinion Project: The Arab Opinion Index," June 13, 2013.  
<http://english.dohainstitute.org/content/af5000b3-46c7-45bb-b431-28b2de8b33c7>.

there is no consensus regarding the definition of revolution. In *The Arab Uprisings Explained: New Contentious Politics in The Middle East*, Marc Lynch concludes:

The upheavals in the region do not yet constitute revolutions. Nor do they yet disconfirm findings about the resilience of Arab authoritarian regimes. But they do pose a potent challenge to political scientists specializing in the region, unsettling core findings in the literature and demanding new theoretical approaches.<sup>282</sup>

The challenge that the Arab Spring posed is in redefining revolution and expanding the theory of revolution, which this study endeavored to do. Lynch's judgment that the Arab Spring is not a revolution, is either referring to the ongoing process of the political class change, or to the social revolution, which is not the subject of this study. Other scholars, like Fukuyama, compare the Arab Spring to the European Spring of 1848. He writes:

Observers who criticize the chaotic results of this upheaval and argue that they cannot lead to a good democratic outcome in the long run often fail to remember what a long chaotic and violent process the democratization of Europe was.<sup>283</sup>

Thus the question of a particular event being deemed a revolution or not continues to be an ongoing debate, according to each author's school of thought or theory.

5. Another problem concerns theory and methodology. This theory is an extension and specification of Skocpol's theory. In this study, I eliminated the inter-elite conflict because it is not a determining factor for a political revolution. I added the intellectual current and refined the international pressure. My observation is that intellectual current, international pressure and a new organizational framework

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<sup>282</sup> Lynch, *The Arab Uprisings Explained*, 22.

<sup>283</sup> Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay*, 428.

alone do not cause a revolution; rather they create a situation or the need for a political class change. This led me to locate revolutionary theory in a bigger paradigm, to which I added the rigidity of the ruling elite, and borrowed from Ibn Khaldun, with more specification under the third condition (the chance of ousting the ruling elite). The disputed point with this method could be seen as understanding or non-causal explanation. This angle of criticism is already explained in chapter 1 in which I argue that explanation is a stage in the understanding circle, not a separate realm. In fact, in this study, I explained via how and why questions. I explained how the new PMS developed; why the 2011 political revolution was possible, while previous revolutionary processes hadn't been; and why the political revolution exists in some cases and not others. With respect to the question of non-causal explanation, its very existence is still controversial among philosophers. For example, as Bradford Scow explains that in *Making Things Happen*, James Woodward does not confirm that all explanations are causal, nor does Strevens in his book *In Depth*.<sup>284</sup> Furthermore in his "Are There Non-Causal Explanations (of Particular Events)?" in the *British Journal for Philosophy of Science*, Scow argues for the non-existence of non-causal explanation:

I have discussed many of the standard examples believers in the existence of non-causal explanations (of events) have offered. I do not think any of them work. They all rely on overly restrictive views about what a causal explanation must do. A causal explanation does not need to identify a cause of the target event. It does not need even need to imply that the target event was caused. And (I have argued) the fact the some event was independent of prior circumstances that it was unpreventable, can causally explain that event.<sup>285</sup>

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<sup>284</sup> Scow, "Are There Non-Causal Explanation (of Particular Events)?" 2.

<sup>285</sup> Ibid, 26.

Based on the above, my analysis is sufficient to be considered causal. A political revolution as an event is dependent on the existence of the three conditions in order for the political class to change and the ruling elite to be ousted.

6. This study defends the fact that the Arab Spring as explanandum would not have occurred without a *political modernization situation*, or if the ruling elite was flexible or there was no chance in breaking through the assabiyya (succession crisis). The findings in this study constitute a causal explanation based on the arguments of Woodward and Scow. In addition, I added the condition of virtue of assabiyya management as a rational choice variable which operates in the threshold of revolution and after the revolution. The importance of this fourth condition for the theory not to be deterministic and gives a value for the individual as a creative statesmanship. Therefore the theory of political revolution combines the historical process in the PMS, rigidity of the ruling elite and the chance of ousting the ruling elite, and the rational choice variable in the virtue of the assabiyya management. Moreover, this means that if the first three conditions existed, and the virtue of assabiyya management absent, a political revolution would be very unlikely. Likewise if the four conditions existed, and after the revolution the virtue of assabiyya management of the new ruling elite did not manage to create a sustainable political class, the slide to the old political class will not be a surprise.

#### 7. *Final thoughts and remarks.*

I summarize the theory of political revolution in the following: **a *political modernization situation* + revolutionary situation (rigidity of the ruling elite + a chance of ousting the ruling elite) + virtue of assabiyya management.** This is also a historical theory of political decay which explains the decay of old type of statehood through a historical process. Another dimension of this theory is when the old ruling elite lose not the initiative and read the emerging *political modernization situation* beforehand, as the following: **a *political modernization situation* + reformation**



**situation (flexibility of the ruling elite+ limited or the absence of chance of ousting the ruling elite) + virtue of assabiyya management.** In this context, the virtue of assabiyya management vested in the hand of the ruling elite, unlike the first equation in which the virtue of assabiyya management is to the advantage of revolutionaries. The second equation is also a historical theory of political development which explains the change of type of states through long trajectory.

One more comment concerns the chance of ousting the ruling elite. As from the beginning, I rendered the social and economic variables as controlled variables for two reasons. First is the belief that the primacy should be for the political logic over social and economic conditions, if we to understand the order and disorder process of states. Second is that most literature on the Arab Spring is focused on what drove people to the streets-hence emphasizing the social and economic factors. The social and economic factors are misleading because sometimes people revolt for unemployment and other times revolt for another issues. Therefore I place the social and economic factors under the condition of chance of ousting the ruling elite which differs according to the country under study.

In the context of the writings on the Arab Spring, the following should be highlighted. Most writings honed by the short and immediate causes, also the theoretical analysis was nearly absent. One recent book however stands out: *The Arab Spring : Pathways of Repression and Reform* , by Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud and Andrew Reynolds which was praised by political scientists such as Jack A.Gladstone, Fareed Zakaria and Michael Mcfaul. The book tackled six cases, including the three cases in my study. Moreover, the research questions were similar to my second question of why the Arab Spring occurred in some cases and not others. The main questions were the following “why did fewer than half of the Arab majority states experience popular uprisings? Furthermore, why did authoritarian breakdown-the unseating of longstanding

dictators-take place in only four of those states?”<sup>286</sup> They, in short, allude to the conundrum of what they call hereditary despotic rule + oil rents.<sup>287</sup> The authors argue that the hereditary rule with oil rents is responsible to some extent for the authoritarian durability and the low number of the states that witnessed breakdown. The book also covered the question of democratic transition and democratic completion (which is beyond the scope of my study), also offered an abundance of data and rigorous qualitative analysis. Nevertheless, the following should be considered. Though it intersects with my concept of strong *assabiyya*, hereditary succession and oil rent as a variable neither necessarily explains the durability of the authoritarianism nor explains the reason why there was no breakdown in some states. For example, the regimes before the republics in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya were monarchies in the 1950s, and yet were ousted (as shown in chapter 2, they were ousted because there was succession crisis or legitimacy crisis). Also in the current context, Sudan is non-hereditary with low oil production (especially after secession of the South), and Mauritania is neither hereditary nor blessed with oil rent; even worse is the only Arab country in which there is still some elements of ancient slavery, and yet there was no breakdown!

Here comes the importance of the conditions of rigidity/flexibility of the ruling elite, and other conditions. Hence, the explanation should be that the states that did not witness breakdown or ousting of the ruling elite (be it hereditary or non-hereditary) fall in two categories. As explained in chapter 5, these are namely strong *assabiyya* category like Gulf states, Syria, Libya, Sudan, and Yemen in which the level of succession (or the structure of the political class) is monopolized on ethnic or religious grounds. The other category is weak *assabiyya* like Tunisia, Egypt and Mauritania in which the level of succession is not monopolized on religious or ethnic grounds, rather dependent on the persona of the dictator and loyalty to him-and there is some sort of

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<sup>286</sup> Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, *The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform*, 40.

<sup>287</sup> Ibid, 40-60.

autonomy of the security apparatus and the military. In the category of the strong assabiyya, states did not witness an ousting of the ruling elite because there was no chance which represented in the absence of succession crisis as an indication. In the Absence of chance of ousting the ruling elite in the strong assabiyya category states, the virtue of assabiyya management will be to the advantage of the ruling elite. With respect to the cases under the category of the weak assabiyya, there was no ousting of the ruling elite in Algeria, Mauritania because of the condition of the flexibility of the ruling elite which is culminated in the frequent change of leaders. Hence, likewise, the virtue of assabiyya management will be also to the advantage of the ruling elite.

With respect to the cases that witnessed an ousting of the ruling elite is due to that there was a rigidity of the ruling elite, and a chance of ousting the ruling elite (succession crisis) in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen. Hence the virtue of assabiyya management was to the advantage of revolutionaries. In this context there is no deterministic path dependent argument, but a calculation of tradeoffs. Normally the military is better off defecting in the case of weak assabiyya (Tunisia, Egypt). Yet under the category of strong assabiyya (Libya, Yemen, and Syria) is a low probability that the military will defect. Hence the matter is much deeper than the argument of hereditary regime, or oil rent. Especially oil rents should not be used as a primary variable. Thus far the difference of breakdown among states is due to the comparative advantage of chance of ousting the ruling elite and the rigidity of the ruling elite. The hereditary rule and oil rent is just an indicator under the chance of ousting the ruling elite.

On the question of the durability of authoritarianism and the Arab exceptionalism in terms of democracy, here comes my first condition (PMS), which traces the historical process of the problem. The reason is due to what I call the Arab political classical situation or Arab Question in other words. The Arab political classical situation is the Arab political class or regime type that culminated as a result of a historical political development in the first three centuries of Islam. Especially after the first revolutionary process 622-662 A.D , which produced the political class as a strong

assabiyya supported by a web of intellectual current ( rigid historicist legal thought) , a traditional organization framework ( clans and tribes) , and an international pressure with hyper interventionism-amid the strategic location of the Arab region . All the above contributed to the durability of authoritarianism. The importance of the Arab Spring as a historical moment is the emergence of the new web of intellectual current, organizational framework and international pressure that brought the strong assabiyya under siege.

Thus, in other words, a definition of the Arab Question *is the durability of the political classical situation of the Arab state*. The classical situation is the type of Arab political class as sultanism. A sultanism is the special assabiyya which is the strong assabiyya (religious politics as a related meaning), and the weak assabiyya ( patrimonialism and clientelism as related meanings). Neither Ibn Khaldun nor Weber explained how emerged in the Arab region. In chapter 3 , I explained how emerged as a path dependent to the fell of the republic by the end of the first revolutionary process 622-662 A.D and the establishment of the command of dogma and order. Moreover, the strong assabiyya as the essence of sultanism was a result of the dialectic of the intolerance to opposition and the rule of historical precedent as the software of the intellectual current, wedded to the hardware of the traditional organizational framework (tribalism) and the susceptibility to the international pressure given the strategic location. This was the diagnosis of the political tragedy, which is more complicated than the trivial one-cause-explanations like Islam, oil ...

This leads me to the core contribution of this study namely: the **historical political development situation** of a state. For every state there is a **historical political development situation** which determines the type of the state or political class, and highlights the gap between the classical situation and the modernization situation. These are the conditions of intellectual current, international pressure and the organizational framework. The state remains stable and developed as long it is balanced with new *political modernization situation*, and not be entrenched in the classical situation. What delayed the Arab political democratization is the absence of

breakthrough or opportunity to get out from the classical situation, which also down to the deficiency of creative statesmanship, and weak political philosophy. Hence, states should consider its historical political development status as much as the regular political development status or the political economic development which deals with the GDP, urbanization....

One final remark is on the *assabiyya*. The *assabiyya* in Arabic is from *taassub*, which has two connotations. The first relates to the solidarity which is apparent in the general *assabiyya* among the society, modern word is nationalism. The second meaning which relates to the special *assabiyya* (the strong and the weak *assabiyya*) with respect to the elite, has to do more with enmity than solidarity. An enmity towards contesters, who struggle to unseat the ruling elite, is central to the ruling elite, which as a result feeds in the solidarity within the elite. Therefore, the practice by the Ibn Khaldun scholarship on defining *assabiyya* as group feelings or solidarity is not accurate. It is not a singularity, rather a duality of solidarity and enmity. Hence, my finding that special *assabiyya* has to do more with the enmity principle, which intersects more with the writings of Carl Schmitt. Managing the *assabiyya* is in other words, is not enmity per se, but managing the enmity is the essence of political. This could also lead to a quenching answer on the long debated meaning of Machiavelli's *virtue*....

Thus far, in my study I have tried to bring about a general causal mechanism, in order to expand and refine the theory of political revolution. My focus was the combination of theory building with the empirical analysis-with extra theoretical analysis, since other Arab Spring literature covered the proceeding of the ousting of the ruling elite in detail. My theoretical analysis emphasizes the following: the PMS, and the revolutionary situation (rigidity of the ruling elite, chance of ousting them) creates the threshold of the political revolution, while the virtue of *assabiyya* management explains success or failure. This analysis is confined to political revolution as an ousting of the ruling elite and a change of the political class, which is a subject for testing and refinement, as I do not believe that in social sciences there is a rigid law or

efficient causes. It is rather the inefficient causation as Richard Lebow explains in his recent book *Constructing Cause in International Relations*. He argues the following:

Inefficient causation rejects thin Humean accounts on logical and empirical grounds. It insists on thicker understandings that require researchers to identify processes and mechanisms that might be responsible for the outcomes they seek to explain.<sup>288</sup>

Yet, Shortcomings of course exist, and always do. The empirical analysis especially with respect to the process of ousting the elite and the post-ousting of elite (chapter5) was not covered in more detail. One major reason is that other Arab Spring books covered the matter, and advanced rich empirical narrative, which is beyond the scope of my study. Also I have confined myself –from the outset-to the theoretical analysis with just the necessary general observations to prove the existence of my conditions, as a smoking gun. On other respects, the conditions of PMS, the rigidity of the ruling elite and chance of ousting them could further be refined and operationalized as an agenda for future research. Also the virtue of assabiyya management needs more specification which is the task of my following book in which the following themes will be addressed: the political and legal philosophy, the state building and an agenda for democratic transition, military/civilian relations, the question of caliphate as a concept and philosophy, not to mention the solution to the question of fatwa.....

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<sup>288</sup> Lebow, *Constructing Cause in International Relations*, 148.



## Conclusion

In this study, I advanced a theory of the origins of political revolution: a new *political modernization situation*, the rigidity of the ruling elite, and the chance of ousting the ruling elite and the virtue of assabiyya management. These are the origins of the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Yet a host of questions still remain, namely: what is next? Is there an Arab legal and political philosophy? Not to mention the question of political Islam. I will tackle all of these questions in a separate treatise; this study was just a prolegomena. Here I have confined myself to the constructive destruction of old Arab politics and have used the Arab Spring as a turning point.

Over the last few decades, the elite approach to the theory of revolution has been neglected in revolution studies, with more focus placed on the mass phenomenon. Here I emphasized that elite behavior matters in distinguishing a revolution from other phenomena. Also the revolutionaries' behavior is crucial in bringing about a revolution. If the revolutionaries do not have the virtue of managing assabiyya, they will neither succeed in ousting the old elite, nor will they sustain the new level of succession. This is the very essence of the current struggle in Libya, Yemen, and Syria. The existence of the bourgeoisie does not guarantee democracy. In fact, what is the point of the bourgeoisie if it does not produce a world-class statesman who has the virtue of assabiyya management? I would say: no virtue of assabiyya management, no democracy.

Sultanist Islamism (as the classical and modern Islamism explained in chapters 2&3) is a strong assabiyya, which determines the level of succession on the historical precedent of the first three centuries of Islam. Sultanist Islamism as historicist ideology and a pseudo-understanding of Islam, is what challenges democracy in the Arab Spring states. If Arab democrats do not have the virtue to transcend sultanist Islamism to the real spirit of Islam (or neo-Islamism or republican Islamism as a revisiting for the republican phase 622-662) in a modern context, the changing political class will revert back to absolutism. The road to democracy is messy, and the



Arab region is no exception from 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century Europe. One possible solution is that it should be a Westphalia-like treaty in the whole east, from Afghanistan to Morocco, which would eliminate the strong *assabiyya* that shackles the dwindling nation state. The Arab Question is the offshoot of the Eastern Question, which is still not solved, and the phenomenon of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) testifies to that. Bishara argues that when the victors of World War I addressed the Eastern Question, the Arab Question—a nation without a state, and the difficulty to democratize—emerged. The difficulty to democratize the Arab region stems from the difficulty of statehood amid the strong *assabiyya* and continuous foreign intervention. I advise the new ruling elite to focus more on outward participation than inward participation. Namely, over-participation for people in politics without a grand-regional strategy will lead to turmoil and civil wars. Hence more participation among Arab states through conference diplomacy is more needed. Conferences like Westphalia, Utrecht and Vienna is the solution for the current situation. Through these treaties the Arab political classical situation with its old and decaying web of international pressure, intellectual current and traditional organizational framework must be eliminated and new *political modernization situation* installed. The following policy making pathways should be considered:

- To contain the old international pressure that supports dictators, also the regional pressure of anti-democratic Arab states, integration among Arab Spring states is a necessity. The traditional forces of the Arab political classical situation are still strong, and cannot be combatted by every state on its own.
- Also with respect to the conservative current of the intellectual current, the following should be heeded. The concept of caliphate should be revisited and refined and included in a regional legal convention which provides modern explanation. Also in this context, the fatwa is a major issue. The fatwa should be limited, and the proliferation of fatwa across borders, especially fatwa that instigates hatred and jeopardy of peace, should have a

punitive measures. All this and more should be included in a regional convention.

- Lastly, new solutions should be advanced to contain and integrate the traditional organizational framework such as tribal alliances and sectarianism .In fact; sects currently are quasi political units that jeopardize the sovereignty of the state. Therefore one possible solution is that the second chamber of democratic parliaments should not only represent the demographics, but also the secto-graphics to include them in the legislation process.

Moreover, It is necessary that creative political and legal thought splits fatwa from law (and limiting fatwa within the private sphere) and that new definitions or substitutions to the concepts of sovereignty and secularism be introduced within an Arab context. Downloading Western concepts wholesale will do nothing but instigate stronger assabiyya.

Despite evidence of some constructive development of an intellectual current (see chapter 3), Arab political and legal thought is still weak; as still there is no public philosophy, but fragmented narrative.<sup>289</sup> The current discourse in Arab politics can be located between the two poles of pro-secularism and anti-secularism. This is the recipe for a long civil war in the East based on strong assabiyya. The new thought needed should create a third view beyond these dichotomies, which will produce a philosophy that bridges the spirit of Islam with modernity. The tenets of this recipe exist in treatises like Averroes's *The Decisive Treatise on the Bridge between Religion and Philosophy*, which has gone with the wind. Clarifying concepts will save peoples' lives and sustain the development of democracy.

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<sup>289</sup> See Gianni Vattimo, Pier Aldo Rovatti, *Weak Thought*.

The Arab Spring is an event in which effects exceed causes; I confined this study to the necessary causes. In *Philosophy of Event*, Slavoj Žižek writes:

An event is thus the effect that seems to exceed its causes—and the space of an event is that which opens up by the gap that separates an effect from its causes. Already with this approximate definition we find ourselves at the very heart of philosophy since causality is one of the basic problems philosophy deals with: are all things connected with causal law which undermines every stable scheme. The only appropriate solution is thus to approach events in an eventual way—to pass from one to another notion of event by way of bringing out the pervading deadlocks of each.<sup>290</sup>

This corresponds to the Arab Spring, which as an event exceeds the causes of unemployment, corruption and other causes like foreign conspiracy which most commentators allude to. Therefore a sober look back to the origins was a necessary task in order to see further in the future. The future however, is in the hand of the creative statesmanship, or “*Imama khlaka*” (in Arabic), which will determine the possible future outcomes of the Arab Spring: will it be a new phase of absolutism, or the fourth wave of democracy?

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<sup>290</sup> Žižek, *Event: Philosophy in Transit*, 3-4.

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## Appendix

### (Documents in German)

#### **Abstract**

Diese Studie ist ein Versuch einer strukturellen Erklärung des Ursprungs des arabischen Frühlings. Mit anderen Worten ist sie eine Analyse der Langzeit-Entwicklungslinie, die zu diesem einschneidenden Ereignis geführt hat. Der Großteil der Literatur konzentriert sich auf die wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Faktoren, welche in dieser Studie als kontrollierte Variable berücksichtigt werden. Als Neuinterpretation der Theorie der Revolution nimmt die Studie ihren Ausgangspunkt von einer Erweiterung der von Theda Skocpol vorgelegten strukturellen Theorie der sozialen Revolution (1979). Unsere Hypothese ist, dass die Ursprünge des Arabischen Frühlings in einer Konstellation zu finden sind, die ich als Situation politischer Modernisierung bezeichne, in der neue Trends entstanden: nämlich intellektuelle Strömungen, ein neuer organisatorischer Rahmen und internationaler Druck. Dies kann mit einer Starrheit der herrschenden Elite und einer Chance der Ablösung der herrschenden Elite zusammentreffen. Die Methodologie der historischen Vergleichsanalyse kann das Vorhandensein dieser drei Bedingungen nachweisen.

#### **Zusammenfassung**

In dieser kurzen Studie habe ich versucht, die Theorie über die Ursprünge der politischen Revolutionen fortzuführen: eine neue Situation politischer Modernisierung, die Starrheit der herrschenden Elite, und die Chance, die herrschende Elite abzulösen. Dies sind die Ursprünge des arabischen Frühlings in Tunesien, Ägypten und Libyen. Doch eine Vielzahl von Fragen bleiben offen, nämlich: Wie geht es weiter? Wie kann *assabiyya* realisiert werden? Gibt es eine arabische Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie? Da gibt es die Frage des politischen Islam. Ich werde all diese Fragen in einer separaten Abhandlung aufgreifen. Hier habe ich mich auf die konstruktive Zerstörung

der alten arabischen Politik beschränkt und den arabischen Frühling als Wendepunkt definiert.

In den letzten Jahrzehnten wurde der Elite- Ansatz in der Revolutionsforschung vernachlässigt, der Fokus wurde auf das Massenphänomen gelegt. Hier habe ich betont, dass das Verhalten der Elite für die Unterscheidung einer Revolution von anderen Phänomenen wesentlich ist. Auch das Verhalten der Revolutionäre ist bei der Herbeiführung einer Revolution von entscheidender Bedeutung. Wenn die Revolutionäre nicht die Tugend des *assabiyya – Managements* haben, wird es ihnen weder gelingen, die alten Eliten zu verdrängen, noch werden sie die neue Ebene des Machtwechsels erhalten können. Das ist das Wesen der gegenwärtigen Kämpfe in Libyen , Jemen und Syrien. Die Existenz einer Bourgeoisie garantiert die Demokratie nicht. In der Tat, was ist der Sinn des Bürgertums , wenn es nicht einen Staatsmann von hoher Klasse hervorbringen kann, der die Tugend des *assabiyya - Managements* hat? Ich würde sagen: ohne *assabiyya - Management* keine Demokratie.

Sultanist Islamismus (wie der klassischen und modernen Islamismus in den Kapiteln 2 und 3 erklärt) ist ein starker *assabiyya* , die das Niveau der Folge auf dem historischen Präzedenzfall der ersten drei Jahrhunderte des Islam bestimmt . Sultanist Islamismus als Ideologie des Historismus und einer pseudo- Verständnis des Islam ist, was Demokratie Herausforderungen im arabischen Frühling Staaten. Wenn arabische Demokraten haben nicht die Tugend sultanist Islamismus an den wahren Geist des Islam zu überwinden (oder neo- Islamismus oder republikanischen Islamismus als eine Neubetrachtung der republikanischen Phase 622-662 ) in einem modernen Kontext wird die wechselnden politischen Klasse wieder zurück zu absolutismus. Der Weg zur Demokratie ist etwas chaotisch, und die arabische Region ist keine Ausnahme aus dem 18. und 19. Jahrhundert in Europa. Eine mögliche Lösung ist, dass es ein Westfalen-like-Vertrag in der gesamten Osten von Afghanistan nach Marokko, die die starke *assabiyya*, die den schwindenden Nationalstaat Fesseln zu beseitigen wäre. Die arabische Frage ist der Ableger der orientalischen Frage, die noch nicht gelöst ist, und das Phänomen der ISIS (Islamischer Staat Irak und Syrien) bezeugt, dass. Bishara

argumentiert, dass, wenn die Sieger des Ersten Weltkriegs richtete die orientalische Frage, die arabische Frage eine Nation ohne Staat, und die Schwierigkeit, demokratisieren taucht. Die Schwierigkeit, demokratisieren der arabischen Region ergibt sich aus der Schwierigkeit der Staatlichkeit inmitten der starken assabiyya und kontinuierliche ausländische Intervention. Ich rate der neuen herrschenden Elite, sich mehr auf die Beteiligung nach außen als nach innen Beteiligung konzentrieren. Und zwar über Teilnahme für die Menschen in der Politik ohne grand-regionale Strategie werden für Unruhen und Bürgerkriege führen. Daher mehr Beteiligung unter den arabischen Staaten durch Konferenzdiplomatie ist mehr nötig. Konferenzen wie Westfalen, Utrecht und Wien ist die Lösung für die aktuelle Situation. Durch diese Verträge die arabischen politischen klassische Situation mit seinen alten und verfallenden Netz von internationalen Druck, geistiges aktuellen und traditionellen organisatorischen Rahmenbedingungen müssen beseitigt werden und neue politische Modernisierung Lage installiert. Die folgenden Politikgestaltung Wege in Betracht gezogen werden:

- Um den alten internationalen Druck, die Diktatoren unterstützt, auch die regionalen Druck der antidemokratischen arabischen Staaten, Integration zwischen arabischen Frühling Staaten enthalten ist eine Notwendigkeit. Die traditionellen Kräfte der arabischen politischen klassische Situation sind immer noch stark, und kann nicht von jedem Staat für sich allein bekämpft werden.
- Auch in Bezug auf die konservative Strömung des intellektuellen Strom, ist folgendes zu beachten. Das Konzept des Kalifats sollte überarbeitet und verfeinert und in eine regionale Rechtskonvention, die moderne Erklärung gibt einbezogen werden. Auch in diesem Zusammenhang ist die Fatwa ein wichtiges Thema. Die Fatwa begrenzt werden sollte, und die Verbreitung von Fatwa über die Grenzen hinweg, insbesondere Fatwa, die Hass und Gefahr des Friedens stiftet sollte eine Strafmaßnahmen haben. Alle Angebote und Informationen sollten in einem regionalen Konvention, die Grundlage für eine moderne Rechtssystem bietet einbezogen werden.
- Schließlich sollten neue Lösungen vorangetrieben werden, um enthalten und die Integration der traditionellen organisatorischen Rahmenbedingungen wie

Stammesallianzen und Sektierertum .In der Tat; Sekten Zeit sind quasi politischen Einheiten, die die Souveränität des Staates zu gefährden. Daher eine mögliche Lösung ist, dass die zweite Kammer der demokratischen Parlamente nicht nur repräsentieren die Demografie, sondern auch die Secto-Grafiken, um sie in den Gesetzgebungsprozess gehören.

Die oben genannten politischen Empfehlungen sind die wichtigsten sind, nicht zu vergessen die Bereitstellung Arbeitsplätze und mehr soziale Gerechtigkeit. In Europa 1618-1648, ein Kampf der Staatlichkeit wütete. Dies wurde von der Westfalen-Vertrag, der starke assabiyya eliminiert und das Konzept der Souveränität gelöst. Dieser Prozess kam nie in der arabischen Welt, aber besser spät als nie. Es gäbe keine Demokratie, wenn gleichwertige Verträge nicht im Osten entstehen. Andernfalls wird religiösen Extremismus weiter steigen. Es ist notwendig, dass kreative politische und rechtliche Gedanken teilt Fatwa von Recht (und die Begrenzung der Fatwa im privaten Bereich) und dass neue Definitionen oder Substitutionen in die Konzepte der Souveränität und des Säkularismus in einem arabischen Kontext eingebracht werden. Herunterladen westliche Konzepte Großhandel wird nichts tun, sondern veranlassen stärker assabiyya. Trotz Anzeichen für eine gewisse konstruktive Entwicklung einer intellektuellen Strom (siehe Kapitel 3), Arabischen politischen und juristischen Denkens ist immer noch schwach , da immer noch gibt es keine (public philosophy) , aber fragmentierten Erzählung.

Den aktuellen Diskurs in der arabischen Politik kann man zwischen den beiden Polen des pro- Säkularismus und Anti- Säkularismus lokalisieren. Das ist das Rezept für einen langen Bürgerkrieg im Osten auf der Grundlage starker assabiyya. Das notwendige neue Denken sollte eine dritte Sicht jenseits dieser Dichotomien herstellen, woraus eine Philosophie entsteht, die den Geist des Islam mit der Moderne verbindet. Die Grundsätze dieses Rezeptes gibt es in Abhandlungen wie Averroes 'entscheidende Abhandlung über die Brücke zwischen Religion und Philosophie, die aber vom Winde verweht wurde. Eine Klärung der Konzepte wird Menschenleben retten und die Entwicklung der Demokratie untermauern.

Der arabische Frühling ist ein Ereignis, in dem die Wirkungen die Ursachen übertreffen; Ich beschränkte diese Studie auf die notwendigen Ursachen. In seiner „Philosophie der Ereignisses“ schreibt Slavoj Zizek:

„Ein Ereignis ist also die Wirkung, dass die Ursachen zu überschreiten scheint, und - und der Raum eines Ereignisses ist die Lücke , die sich zwischen Ursachen und Wirkungen öffnet. Bereits mit diesem ungefähre Definition befinden wir uns im Zentrum der Philosophie denn Kausalität ist eines der Grundprobleme mit denen sich die Philosophie beschäftigt:: sind alle Dinge durch Kausalketten miteinander verbunden?..... . Die einzig sinnvolle Lösung ist also, sich Ereignissen in einer eventuellen Weise zu nähern - von einem zu einem anderen Begriff des Ereignisses zu wechseln, um die jeweiligen dauerhaften Begriffsblockaden zu zeigen“.

Dem entspricht der arabische Frühling, dessen Wirkungen nicht von der Mittelklasse, der Bourgeoisie oder der UN verursacht werden sondern durch das assabiyya – Management, welches lokale kreative staatsmännische Tugenden voraussetzt. Das Vorhandensein oder die Absenz solcher staatsmännischer Fähigkeiten oder „Imama khlaka“ (auf Arabisch) wird die möglichen zukünftigen Ergebnisse des arabischen Frühlings bestimmen: Wird es eine neue Phase des Absolutismus oder die vierte Welle der Demokratie sein?

## **Lebenslauf**

### **Bildung**

Bachelor in den internationalen Beziehungen , der Webster University , Vienna.2007

Master of Arts: internationale Beziehungen, Webster University , Vienna.2009

Lizenz in Islamwissenschaft (islamischen Rechtswissenschaft) Uzai University,  
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Postgraduierten-Diplom , politische Studien (öffentliche Verwaltung) . University of  
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Puruing Dokortitel in Politikwissenschaften der Dissertationstitel " Historische  
Wurzeln des arabischen Frühlings in Tunesien , Ägypten und Libyen: Eine  
theoretische Analyse" , Universität Wien.

### **Berufserfahrung**

Politik Analyst bei Beratungsunternehmen mit Sitz in Wien von 2007 bis 2014.

2011/2012 Beitrag politischer Berater bei den Policies Kommission der NTC  
(National Transitional Counsel) , der libyschen Zwischen Gesetzgeber während der  
2011 Revolution.

Lehrte die Kurse (westlichen politischen Denkens) und ( internationale  
Organisationen) am Institut für politische Ausbildung in Kuwait für vier Monate im  
Jahr 2013.

Als Mitglied des libyschen Nationalen Versöhnungs Vorstand im Jahr 2013 nominiert.

### **Sprachen:**

Arabisch, Englisch: fließend .

Deutsch: B2