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MASTERARBEIT / MASTER'S THESIS

Titel der Masterarbeit / Title of the Master's Thesis

**“US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS NORTH KOREA.
An analysis under the administrations of
Clinton, Bush, and Obama”**

verfasst von / submitted by

Luis Galvis

angestrebter akademischer Grad / in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master (MA)

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Abstract

North Korea's nuclear program has been a wicked problem for the international community for many years. Over the last two decades the world has witnessed the slow evolution of the North Korean nuclear program, which has brought uncertainty in the region even as major regional powers have tried to negotiate a denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, without any substantial result.

It's an interesting case to study, given the fact that much of the international community predicted the North Korean regime would collapse after the end of the Soviet Union. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has, however, managed to both survive and advance its nuclear program, posing a serious risk to the world. Today, the DPRK maintains a significant Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program including nuclear capabilities, which are complimented by intercontinental ballistic missiles capabilities that are ready to be deployed at any time.

In considering this issue, it is interesting to also note the unique nature of the DPRK regime, which includes a very solid political structure and strict control of information. This stability, assisted by a number of authoritarian tools that I'll discuss further on, has allowed the regime to solidly consolidate and relegitimize itself in spite of structural pressures, thus avoiding destabilizing scenarios like the Arab Spring or the Libyan Civil War.

In analyzing responses of the international community (lead by the US) towards the DPRK's nuclear program, this thesis concentrates exclusively on key American policy positions in the last three US administrations (Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama, from 1992 to 2016). By targeting this specific time frame which follows the end of the Cold War, it illustrates the key policies pursued by the US in the Korean peninsula to contain and respond to North Korea's nuclear ambitions. I explain the causes and consequences in the international

arena of American policy actions towards the DPRK and its nuclear program, which resulted from these policies by successive US administrations.

Abstrakt

Nordkoreas Atomprogramm stellte in den vergangenen Jahren ein kontroverses Thema in der internationalen Gemeinschaft dar. Besonders in den letzten beiden Jahrzehnten trug die Welt zur Entwicklung des koreanischen Atomprogramms bei. Dieses brachte Unsicherheit in die Region, und selbst Big Players blieben bei ihren Versuchen, die Denuklearisierung der Koreanischen Halbinsel zu verhandeln, ohne wesentliches Ergebnis.

Dies ist ein interessantes Forschungsthema in Anbetracht der Tatsache, dass ein Großteil der internationalen Gemeinschaft den Zusammenbruch des Regimes gleich nach jenem der Sowjetunion erwartet hätte. Die DPRK schaffte es jedoch, ihr Atomprogramm voranzutreiben, sodass dieses mittlerweile eine ernste Bedrohung für die Welt darstellt. Heute verfügt die DPRK über ein beachtliches WMD-Programm, kombiniert mit interkontinentalen ballistischen Flugkörpern, die jederzeit startklar sind.

Darüber hinaus verdient auch das Wesen des Regimes, mit seiner soliden Struktur und strengen Informationskontrolle, Beachtung. Unterstützt durch eine Reihe autoritärer Instrumente, schaffte es das Regime, seine Macht zu untermauern und legitimieren, sowie Szenarios wie jene des Arabischen Frühlings oder des Libyschen Bürgerkriegs zu vermeiden.

Zum Zweck der Analyse konzentriert sich diese Arbeit auf den Zeitraum der letzten drei US-Administrationen (Bill Clinton, George W. Bush und Barack Obama). Anhand dieses Zeitrahmens, der an das Ende des Kalten Kriegs anknüpft, will ich die Politik veranschaulichen, die die USA auf der Koreanischen Halbinsel in Bezug auf Nordkoreas nukleare Ambitionen verfolgten. Anhand einer Analyse erkläre ich die Ursachen und Folgen in der internationalen Arena als Ergebnis dieser Politik.

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II. Abbreviations

BoT:	Balance of Threat
CVID:	Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Dismantlement
DMZ:	Korean Demilitarized Zone
DPRK:	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
HEU:	Highly Enriched Uranium
IAEA:	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM:	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
KCNA:	North Korean News Network
KEDO:	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
LWR:	Light Water Reactor
MAD:	Mutual Assured Destruction
NPT:	Non-Proliferation Treaty
PRC:	People's Republic of China's
ROK:	Republic of Korea
SLBM:	Submarine launches of Ballistic missiles
THAAD:	Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
UN:	United Nations
UNGA:	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC:	United Nations Security Council
US:	United States of America
USSR:	Soviet Union
WMD:	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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1. Introduction

1.1.Introduction

This thesis examines the response of the international community the DPRK's nuclear program, understand better the role the US' administrations have played in this nuclear ambition and which dynamics brought the Kim family's regime to power and endure for three generations, and how this has in turn affected the DPRK's nuclear program. In seeking to understand why the Kim regime has pursued nuclear weapons in spite of strong international pressure, it is fundamental to first understand the key values underpinning North Korean society, and how has this helped the regime to consolidate its power over the last seven decades and become a totalitarian society. To explore these aspects, this section will review the concepts of *Juche*, *Songun*, and the strategic importance of acquiring nuclear capabilities, and how each has helped to maintain the DPRK regime's power.

Recent media reports highlight the war of words and personality conflicts between President Donald Trump and DPRK Leader Kim Jong-Un. However, while the world is used to the big words and bravado of North Korea, more recently it was President Trump who shocked the world with his undiplomatic statements. In remarks made on behalf of the United States of America (US) during the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Trump threatened to “*totally destroy*” North Korea¹. These threats in turn led Kim Jong-Un to address Trump in a personal statement, with some commentators stating that Trump has pushed North Korea's brinkmanship “*to a new, potentially more perilous level*”². The war of words has raised the Korean crisis to a new level, leaving the world to wonder “*will North Korea and US actually head to war?*”³. Although such speculation is not new in international politics, in this highly politicized crisis, recent tensions over the DPRK's nuclear ambitions have raised the threat of conflict to the highest level since the end of the Cold War.

Relevant to this discussion is the North Korean nuclear program, which has been seen by successive American administration as a threat to global security. The recent advancement of the DPRK's nuclear program has reached a point of no return; with the regime's secrecy and determination enabling

¹ Holpuch A, Speech at UN sees Trump threaten Pyongyang – as it happened.. *The Guardian*. September 19, 2017 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2017/sep/19/donald-trump-united-nations-general-assembly-live-updates-news>. Accessed September 8, 2017.

² Sang-Hun C, North Korea Hits New Level of Brinkmanship in Reacting to Trump. *The New York Times*. September. 22, 2017 . Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/22/world/asia/kim-trump-north-korea.html?mcubz=3>. Accessed October 21, 2017.

³ Friedman U, How to Tell If North Korea and America Are Actually Headed to War. *The Atlantic*. September 28, 2017 <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/trump-kim-words-korea/541164/>. Accessed November 21, 2017.

development of nuclear weapons to an advanced stage. This program has radically changed the way the US has interacted with the PRK regime. Brinkmanship from the DPRK has escalated to an unprecedented number of missile launches which threaten to jeopardize peace, with a combination of the region's strategic importance, the players involved and past developments further contributing towards a tense atmosphere in North East Asia.

1.2.State of the art

As the North Korean nuclear program has advanced, it is of key importance to understand the main reasons behind its pursuit and development of nuclear capabilities. According to international relations discourse, two main hypotheses can be used to explain the behavior that ultimately led the DPRK to develop a nuclear arsenal:

- Kenneth Waltz's Balance of Power
- Stephen M. Walt's Balance of Threat (BoT) theories.

One school of thought agrees with Waltz's neorealist theory of Balance of Power, which lays out a scenario with different states (Actors) within the international arena who perceive the survival of the states as a priority, and a common goal for all states individually⁴. The balance of power is a concept that originated after World War II, with Waltz seeing nuclear deterrence as a fundamental factor in allowing peaceful coexistence in the international order⁵. Waltz's theory is meant to explain the different options state consider while conducting foreign policy, or how states behave in regards to contested issues such as nuclear deterrence. The Balance of Power concept describes that while it is possible to identify law and order actors and track central authority at a national level or within a delimited frame, in an international system this is more difficult. Waltz perceives states and the interaction between them as being affected by a state of continued anarchy, with states having to find ways to safeguard their survival among other interests⁶.

⁴ Waltz K, International Structure, National Force, And the Balance of Power. *J Int Aff.* 1967;21(2):215.
<http://simsrad.net.ocs.mq.edu.au/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.simsrad.net.ocs.mq.edu.au/docview/1290510295?accountid=12219..>

⁵ Waltz K, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better: Introduction. *The Adelphi Papers.* 1981;21(171):1-1. doi:10.1080/05679328108457394.

⁶ Milner H, The assumption of anarchy in international relations theory: a critique. *Rev Int Stud.* 1991;17(01):67. doi:10.1017/s026021050011232x.

On the other hand, critics of the Balance of Power concept like Joshua Baron argue that deterrence does not work, as there is the risk of miscalculation, particularly with nuclear weapons⁷. One key criticism of the alleged peace provided by nuclear deterrence is that although the US and the USSR never fought a war between them, they engaged in numerous proxy conflicts as Vietnam, Korean Peninsula, Afghanistan, and were both armed with nuclear weapons.⁸ A second counterpoint for critics is the claim that balance of force between states, including nuclear capabilities, encourages deterrence and reduces the risk of war. While Waltz claims there has never been a war between nuclear states; the example of India and Pakistan, who went to war most recently in 1999, shows that this statement is now outdated.⁹ Although it was not a nuclear war, we can now exclude from the balance of power the use of “conventional weaponry”.

Applying the Balance of Power concept to the particularities of the DPRK’s key goals, it can be argued that despite international negotiations to denuclearize or freeze its nuclear program, the country has managed to advance its nuclear program thanks to its diplomatic strategies. And it has managed to take advantage from negotiation rounds to serve its main purpose of regime survival (as argued by Waltz) by carrying out a long-term strategy to advance its interest.

A second theory relevant to the North Korean nuclear scenario is the Balance of Threat (BoT) proposed by Stephen M. Walt.¹⁰ This theory is interesting as it can be perceived as an evolution of Kenneth Waltz’s Balance of Power theory, with Stephen M. Walt arguing that international balance is driven by the fear of threat perceived by individual states. Such fears derive from the proximity of perceived threatening states, the military capabilities of the enemy, and the offensive intention.

The two theories describe different motivations for balance, but ultimately a shared goal of providing strategic balance against potential enemies in the international system. In regards to US-DPRK relations, Stephen M. Walt’s BoT theory is too specific and does not leave room to analyze other external factors outside of the perception of threat; while Waltz’s theory more open to further interpretations.

⁷ Baron J, Balance of Power and Its Critics: The Limitations of Current Paradigms. *Great Power Peace and American Primacy*. 2013:171-187. doi:10.1057/9781137299482_8.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Waltz KN, Why Iran should get the bomb: Nuclear balancing would mean stability. *Foreign affairs*. 2012;91(4). <http://simsrad.net.ocs.mq.edu.au/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.simsrad.net.ocs.mq.edu.au/docview/1317585894?accountid=12219>.

¹⁰ BOCK A, Balancing for (in)security: An analysis of the Iranian nuclear crisis in the light of the Cuban missile crisis. *Perceptions*. 2014;19(2):113-138. <http://simsrad.net.ocs.mq.edu.au/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.simsrad.net.ocs.mq.edu.au/docview/1748863780?accountid=12219>.

A second hypothesis concerning US foreign policy responses to the North Korean nuclear program argues against traditional balancing arguments against state threats.¹¹ In this argument, posited by writers such as Nicholas Eberstadt and Gen. Gary Luck, commander of U.S. forces in Korea, the US never perceived the DPRK as a real threat as it believed that DPRK regime would not survive the death of its Leader Kim Il Sung.¹² Indeed along with Cuba, the DPRK was one of the last remaining Communist states in the nineties to survive the fall of the USSR. American policy makers expected an implosion from the inside as they argued that the regime would have collapsed¹³ imminently due to famine, an outdated Stalinist economic system, and the hope that North Koreans would lose confidence in their system, as was seen in USSR and Eastern Europe. On the other side, the existential threats perceived by Pyongyang from other states, particularly from the US after the Cold War, prompted it to take its own measures, and gave it the last boost to make the decision to develop nuclear capability.

1.3. Research problem and research question

Although multiple dynamics have played their part in shaping security developments on the Korean Peninsula, one of the most important and the center topic of my thesis is the impact of US foreign policy towards the DPRK. This research will cover the last three US administrations: Presidents Clinton (1993-2001), Bush (2001-2009) and Obama (2009-2017). The main aim of my research is to investigate in what way US policies have enabled (or impacted on) the DPRK becoming a *nuclear state*.

The **second chapter** will provide a historical overview of the Cold War period and key events affecting the DPRK, including:

- How conflict in the Korean peninsula war evolved since 1953
- The importance of the *Juche* (self-reliance) and the *Songun* ideologies in the consolidation of the regime
- The different types of missiles relevant to a nuclear program, explaining briefly the components of a nuclear bomb and the importance of its components to build it.

¹¹ Cumings B, *North Korea: Another Country*. New York: New Press; 2004:199

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Moon C, Between Principle and Pragmatism: What Went Wrong with the Lee Myung-bak Government's North Korean Policy. *Journal of International and Area Studies*. 2011;18, No. 2, pp. 1-22(2). Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43111576>

This chapter aims to explain the background history of the Korean peninsula, from the end of WWII to the end of the Cold War, the two superpowers at the time, the US and the USSR creating a polarized international environment marked by ideological conflicts and internal divisions in several states. Proxy wars were fought in the globe; with two important cases being Korea and Vietnam. And despite almost thirty years after the end of the Cold War its consequences are still vivid today in Korea as the nation is still divided. The Korean War (1950-1953) was a divisive conflict in which both forces found themselves unable to attack and conquer the other part of the peninsula, and which ended with an armistice which was supposed to last only for a few months but has never been formally concluded with a formal peace treaty. From 1953 to 1990, the US administration provided a nuclear guarantee to the Republic of Korea (ROK) also known as South Korea, and in exchange ROK rescinded its right to develop nuclear capabilities.¹⁴

In the **third chapter** I will review the beginning of the DPRK's nuclear program, in the period of time coinciding with the Clinton administration. This section will explore:

- End of the Cold War and collapse of the USSR, and the end of financial and military aid from the Communist Bloc
- People's Republic of China's (PRC) establishment of diplomatic relations with South Korea (ROK), on August 24, 1992

The end of the Cold War ushered in a new era for DPRK, as it found itself without any help from the Communist Bloc, after the collapse of the USSR. The DPRK perceived its longtime ally China (PRC) as a traitor for formally recognizing and normalizing relations with the ROK,¹⁵ with Russia also establishing diplomatic relations with ROK from 1990.¹⁶ Affected by severe economic strains, the DPRK commenced development of a nuclear plant; while the international community pressured the regime to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The chapter will analyze the possible reasons for the DPRK's decision to go nuclear during this period, with exploration of how the regime's signing of NPT and negotiations with the US Clinton administration to dismantle the DPRK's nuclear program (ultimately will be formalized through *the "1994 Agreed Framework"*) was affected its perceived risks and national interests. Through the 1994 agreement with the US, the DPRK obtained access to aid, money, oil and other incentives; in exchange for the DPRK

¹⁴ Crane C, *American Airpower Strategy In Korea, 1950-1953*. Lawrence, Kan.: Univ. Press of Kansas; 2000.

¹⁵ Kristoff N, Chinese and South Koreans Formally Establish Relations. *The New York Times*. August 24, 1992. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/08/24/world/chinese-and-south-koreans-formally-establish-relations.html>. Accessed November 21, 2017.

¹⁶ Jane Gross S, After the Summit; GORBACHEV, ENDING U.S. TRIP, MEETS SOUTH KOREA LEADER, WHO SEES A RENEWAL OF TIES. *The New York Times*. June 5, 1990. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/05/world/after-summit-gorbachev-ending-us-trip-meets-south-korea-leader-who-sees-renewal.html>. Accessed December 21, 2017.

pledging to freeze and ultimately roll back its nuclear program. By taking into consideration the standpoints of the time, I will also consider the motivations that drove the US to sign such deal.

In the **fourth chapter** I will consider key policies of the President Bush administration, by which time the DPRK had sparked international concern after it admitted possessing nuclear weapons. In this chapter, Bush's foreign policy towards the DPRK was characterized by frictions between the two states and the discontinuation of the 1994 agreed framework, leading to the "*Six party talks*". Although these talks ultimately failed, they also resulted in the delivery of aid, oil and economic cooperation from the international community, in exchange of giving up its entire nuclear program. Although some scholars such as Chung-in Moon and Jong-Yun Bae have characterized these negotiations as blackmail, as a consequence of this deal, the DPRK obtained significant benefits, including the removal of many international sanctions and economic relief, even while continuing to advance its nuclear secret program.¹⁷ While former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice summarizing claimed that "the price the US paid to have this agreement was a very small compared to the knowledge it was gained from the negotiations".¹⁸, the DPRK gained an even more precious asset; namely time to improve their nuclear capabilities and leave the negotiation room as a winner, and obtaining benefits while giving little substantial in return.

The **fifth chapter** will analyze President Obama's administration policies which took a different approach to nuclear negotiations, with the US administration adopting a policy characterized by sedentary behavior or so called "*Strategic patience*".¹⁹ By this period the DPRK's regime held an expanded range of nuclear weaponry proving the advancement of its nuclear program. In this chapter I will discuss the main aims and causes of Obama's strategic *patience* policy and its consequences in the region, and will continue with analysis of the role of sanctions and how they were ineffective to meet the policy aims of the international community. Finally, I will explore whether or not this "strategic patience" by the US helped or hindered the regime to continue its nuclear program.

¹⁷ Moon C, Bae J. THE BUSH DOCTRINE AND THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS-Special Issue on the Bush Doctrine and Asia. *Asian Perspective*. 2003;27(4):42. Available at: <http://www.jstor.org.simsrad.net.ocs.mq.edu.au/stable/42704429>. Accessed February 3, 2017.

¹⁸ Condoleezza Rice. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bzu_QZaUbPQ; Hoover Institution; 2012.

"...At the minimum we got information that we could not get in any other way...what we did do is take the opportunity to get on the ground improve our knowledge, slow some of the aspects of their program and for that we gave up some fuel oil that was it.."

¹⁹ Choi J, The Perils of Strategic Patience with North Korea. *Wash Q*. 2015;38(4):57-72. doi:10.1080/0163660x.2015.1125829.

The Final chapter I will conclude the whole analysis and summarize how the last three US administrations have obtained through its policy positions and engagement with North Korea and other world powers, and how it ultimately enabled the DPRK to become a *nuclear state*.

1.4.Methodology

This research paper will be framed from a neorealist approach. The neorealist theory of international relations is the most appropriate theoretical framework for the understanding of nuclear deterrence and major power negotiations, as it takes into consideration the key limitations of the international system, and the primary objective of a state to ensure its own survival.

In exploring this topic, the research will investigate in which way has successive US administrations have, through various actions and inaction, enabled the DPRK to become a nuclear state. I will refer Kenneth Waltz' theory of the Balance of Power, because it best describes the relation between the international actors, in this case the DPRK and the US. The central object that would reduce the political imbalance between these two actors is nuclear capability, and the realistic ability to use such weapons in response to external threats. The most recent argument for a balance of power in regards to nuclear weapons comes from Waltz himself, who has repeatedly made the case for Iran having the nuclear bomb as a counterbalance of the Israeli nuclear power in the Middle East.²⁰ This very same approach can also be used to justify the reasons why the DPRK could also be justified in developing a nuclear arsenal.

The main question of this research is: how has the US enabled the DPRK to become a nuclear state. I will critique each US administration in the period surveyed (Clinton, Bush and Obama) by analyzing their foreign policy with respect to North Korea, and how these policies have contributed to the building of a nuclear arsenal by the DPRK, which ultimately constitutes a form of deterrence. I will illustrate the results of the US' policies by showing as a "chart" the advances of the DPRK in the nuclear field, with the number of missile launches and bomb detonations.

²⁰ Waltz KN, Why Iran should get the bomb: Nuclear balancing would mean stability. *Foreign affairs*. 2012;91(4). <http://simsrad.net.ocs.mq.edu.au/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.simsrad.net.ocs.mq.edu.au/docview/1317585894?accountid=12219>.

1.5. Research relevance and limitations

1.5.1. Research Relevance

The DPRK has slowly but firmly advanced its nuclear program to the point some experts have described as a milestone and hardly reversible.²¹ It is also an interesting case study given the fact that the DPRK is a regime that most of international community forecast to collapse after the USSR but has managed to advance in its nuclear program, posing a serious risk to many international actors. Today, the DPRK maintains a significant Weapon of mass destruction (WMD) program which is complimented by the intercontinental ballistic missiles capabilities, which are ready to be deployed at any time. The DPRK also counts a very solid structure and strict control of information, which helped by a number of authoritarian tools, has allowed the regime to consolidate and legitimize itself, avoiding scenarios similar to the Arab Spring or Libyan civil war.

This topic constitutes an excellent study case in international relations; as the DPRK regime succeeded against all odds to survive impose its policies internally and in international negotiations without making any serious concessions. This case also constitutes a dilemma for the international community, as despite sanctions the DPRK has been able to develop their nuclear military capabilities every year, and initiate provocations giving an impression of being an irrational actor. These events are controversial from the public imaginary of the North Korean state; however in reality Korean scholars such as A. Lankov have argued that the regime has been clear in its position and constant and coherent with its goals.²² Such provocations are the product of cost/benefit calculations by the DPRK regime that are studied and considered well beforehand to advance specific goals.

This case study is relevant for policy makers, as despite repeated sanctions North Korea has managed to survive significant isolation and hardship, and it has become almost impossible for even its closest ally, the PRC, to exercise any direct pressure on Pyongyang. This has sparked a security dilemma in North East Asia which as consequence has led the US and its allies to develop defensive measures such as the THAAD (anti-missile shield) program.²³ It has also reopened debate in Japan and ROK regarding the

²¹ Lankov A, Opinion | The inconvenient truth about North Korea and China. *The Washington Post*. June 15, 2017. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/nothing-short-of-war-will-get-north-korea-to-give-up-its-nukes/2017/06/15/1ba427a0-4b94-11e7-bc1b-fddbd8359dee_story.html?utm_term=.5c5e7be6991a. Accessed November 21, 2017.

²² Lankov A, Kim Jong Un Is a Survivor, Not a Madman. *Foreign Policy*. April 26, 2017. Available at: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/26/kim-jong-un-is-a-survivor-not-a-madman/>. Accessed July 8, 2017.

²³ Defensive system designed to shoot down ballistic missiles before reaching the final target

possibility of developing their own nuclear programs, to the point where Japan has been considering changes to its pacifist constitution to build its own nuclear arsenal to balance the DPRK's aggressive behavior.²⁴

Thus even after years of negotiations the security situation remains complicated, with the DPRK regime holding nuclear capabilities and not giving signs of willing to give these up. The US and international community fail to see that there is little to no chance of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula, this continuous stubbornness from the west to roll back the DPRK's nuclear program, has created a regional security dilemma. This in turn that has developed into a global problem, with the introduction of intercontinental missile capabilities (ICBM) by the DPRK regime.

1.5.2. Research and source limitations

The biggest challenge for this research is the lack of information, given the sensitive nature of nuclear negotiations between states. The DPRK is a highly closed country, and access to accurate and up-to-date intelligence material is difficult. However despite limited information sources, there is analytical information available on which this research is built. This leads to the second limitation, in that information comes from highly varied sources. The main sources for this thesis comprise unclassified government documents, presidential libraries texts, reports from different nonprofit organizations, North and South Korean scholars, newspapers from the relevant time period and Korean news agencies.

1.6. Definitions

Nuclear State: A state that possesses Nuclear Weapons.

Nuclear fuel: Fissionable material that has been enriched to a composition that will support a self-sustaining fission chain reaction when used to fuel a nuclear reactor, thereby producing energy (usually in the form of heat or useful radiation) for use in other processes.²⁵

Denuclearization: To remove nuclear arms from active use; prohibiting the use of nuclear arms by a state.²⁶

Light Water Reactor (LWR): A type of thermal neutron reactor that utilizes normal water as opposed to heavy water; a form of water that contains a larger amount of the hydrogen isotope deuterium.²⁷

²⁴ Panda R, Should South Korea go Nuclear?. *Asia-Pacific Review*. 2015;22(1):148-176. doi:10.1080/13439006.2015.1043708.

²⁵ NRC: Glossary - Nuclear fuel. Nrcgov. April 10, 2017. Available at: <https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/nuclear-fuel.html>. Accessed September 21, 2017.

²⁶ Definition of DENUCLEARIZE. *Merriam-webstercom*. 2017. Available at: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/denuclearize>. Accessed November 19, 2017.

²⁷ Zarubin B, Introduction To Light Water Reactors-Submitted as coursework for PH241, Stanford University, Winter 2015. <http://largestanfordedu/courses/2015/ph241/zarubin1/>. 2016. Available at: <http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2015/ph241/zarubin1/>. Accessed November 18, 2017.

Uranium Enrichment: The nuclear fuel used in a nuclear reactor needs to have a higher concentration of the U235 isotope than that which exists in natural uranium ore. U235 when concentrated (or "enriched") is fissionable in light-water reactors (the most common reactor design in the USA). During fission, the nucleus of the atom splits apart producing both heat and extra neutrons. Under controlled conditions, these extra neutrons can cause additional, nearby atoms to fission and a nuclear reaction can be sustained. The heat energy released, by the controlled nuclear reaction within the nuclear reactor, can be harnessed to produce electricity. Commercially, the U235 isotope is enriched to 3 to 5% (from the natural state of 0.7%) and is then further processed to create nuclear fuel.²⁸

Graphite Moderated reactor: Graphite-moderated and gas-cooled nuclear reactor. This is the main reactor design used by the DPRK, as it has several practical advantages including the fact it is fueled by natural uranium (abundant in the DPRK), its cooled by a carbon-dioxide gas cooling system (requiring no heavy water), and its moderated by graphite (also plentiful in North Korea).²⁹

KEDO: Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization.

NPT: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.³⁰

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency.

ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile.³¹

SLBM: Submarine launched ballistic missile: a ballistic missile capable of being launched from submarines.

1.6.1. Nuclear deterrence

Nuclear weapons constitute non-conventional weaponry to be used in a war, with the knowledge of the immense destruction caused by nuclear attack itself constituting a psychological weapon that enhances the art of coercion or intimidation. Schelling says the role of military strength is *"to influence somebody's behavior, to coerce his decision or choice. To be coercive, violence has to be anticipated. And it has to be*

²⁸ Uranium Enrichment. *Nuclear Regulatory Commission*. 2017. Available at: <https://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac/ur-enrichment.html>. Accessed June 18, 2017.

²⁹ The Nuclear Threat Initiative. *YONGBYON 5MWE REACTOR*.; 2017. Available at: <http://www.nti.org/learn/facilities/766/>. Accessed June 16, 2017.

³⁰ United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. *Treaty On The Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)*. UNODA; :<https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/>.

³¹ Missile able to reach targets of at least 5,500 km of distance, this missile is able to carry a nuclear warhead, allowing the nuclear state to reach distant regions.

avoidable by accommodation. The power to hurt is bargaining power".³² To exploit it is diplomacy-vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy nonetheless.

Nuclear deterrence: the term deterrence largely has been applied to the basic strategy of the nuclear powers and of the major alliance systems. The premise of the strategy is that each nuclear power maintains a high level of instant and overwhelming destructive capability against any aggression—*i.e.*, the ability, visible and credible to a would-be attacker, to inflict unacceptable damage upon the attacker with forces that survive a surprise attack. An essential element in successful deterrence is a degree of uncertainty on the part of a would-be aggressor as to whether the target power, although attacked and badly damaged, will nonetheless retaliate—even at the risk of suffering further, crippling damage in a second attack. Thus, nuclear-deterrence strategy relies on two basic conditions: the ability to retaliate after a surprise attack must be perceived as credible; and the will to retaliate must be perceived as a possibility, though not necessarily as a certainty.³³

Assuming there are two nations: Nation A and Nation B both armed with nuclear weapons, the concept of MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) proposes that is quite unlikely that state A or B will launch a nuclear strike on the other, as there is no certainty of inflicting unrecoverable damage and protecting against retaliatory strikes.³⁴ One could argue that once a state that has one nuclear weapon and is able to deliver it, it is already covered by the deterrent doctrine.

Despite this understanding, nuclear deterrence has not been not proven to work in actual conflict scenarios, and nuclear weapons are relatively new in the military field. There are two main approaches in interpreting the place of nuclear deterrence. Researchers including Frank C. Zagare argue that the concept of deterrence is unproven, logically inconsistent and empirically inaccurate;³⁵ as there is no guarantee that in a actual conflict scenario that nuclear weapons will deter another nation from retaliating.³⁶ C. Zagare further argues that as nuclear weapons are meant to fight wars and not exclusively to deter the enemy from attacking. On the other side, neorealist proponents such as Waltz argue that despite existing risks, there has not been a nuclear war between two nuclear-armed states; and therefore we can say that nuclear deterrence works.

³² SCHELLING, T C, *Arms and Influence*. Yale University Press, 1966. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5vm52s.

³³ The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/deterrence-political-and-military-strategy>. Accessed October 18, 2017.

³⁴ Lieber, K., & Press, D, The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy. *Foreign Affairs*, 2006.85(2), 42-54.
doi:10.2307/20031910

³⁵ Zagare F, Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*. 2004;16(2):107-141.
doi:10.1177/0951629804041117.

³⁶ de Castella T, How did we forget about mutually assured destruction?. *BBC News*. February 15, 2012. Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-17026538>. Accessed November 8, 2017.

The nuclear race experienced after World War II encouraged many states to pursue the atomic bomb, or alternatively seek protection under the nuclear umbrella of a major state. In the context of the DPRK, the country has perceived itself living for decades with the threat of a foreign invasion and war. Without any reliable and solid ally in the region, the North Korean regime has isolated itself even more after the collapse of the USSR, with nuclear deterrence seen as almost essential if it wants to avoid to be attacked or avoid regime change. For the DPRK, the WMD program has become the centerpiece of its military strategy, and represents an insurance policy against enemy attack. Besides having a military advantage, the policy insures domestic support and allows the regime to consolidate its control over the North Korean population.

1.7. Research Outline

This research is organized in the following way. In chapter two, I will explain the main developments leading to the crisis on the Korean Peninsula during the Cold War period, and the early beginnings of the DPRK's nuclear program. Chapters three to five will look into the last three US' administrations of Presidents Clinton (Chapter 2), Bush (Chapter 3) and Obama (Chapter 5), and how they responded to diplomatic and security challenges of North Korea's nuclear ambitions. In the final chapter (Chapter 6), a summary of the research findings and the conclusion will be presented, with discussion of what these findings mean for understanding US foreign policy towards the DPRK regime and its nuclear program.

2. Historical Background

This chapter is intended to provide insight into the key historical influences preceding the development of the DPRK's nuclear program, and the country's development as a closed society after the Korean War. The decision to go nuclear was a product of decades of mistrust, misunderstanding and hostility regarding the future of the Korean peninsula. The Korean War and the Cold War periods are key to understanding why today we have reached a nuclear Korea and instability in the region. By illustrating the important pieces of the "North Korean puzzle" I aim to give relevant information that will later give context to understanding the importance of the key players in the negotiation process, and a clear perception of the North Korean goals. Among the important factors that will shape comprehension of the regime is the DPRK's societal structure, as is not a conventional society and does not has access to outside information or free elections (by Western standards).

2.1.Figures

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a state located in northeastern Asia, north of the Korean peninsula bordering the Bay of Korea and the Sea of Japan. It borders PRC, ROK and the Russian Federation.³⁷ The DPRK has an area of 120,480 square km², characterized by being mountainous and dry terrain.³⁸ The arable area is estimated at around 19.5% and the natural hazards of this country include droughts during the spring period, which are followed by heavy floods, as well as occasional typhoons, during the beginning of the autumn.³⁹ Environmental problems include water pollution, lack of drinkable water, deforestation, along with soil erosion and degradation.

As of July 2007 its estimated population was of 23,301,725, Life expectancy at birth is 71.92 years and the fertility rate for 2007 was 2.05 children born per woman.⁴⁰

³⁷ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), *EAST & SOUTHEAST ASIA: KOREA, NORTH*. CIA World Factbook; 2018 <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html>. Accessed October 18, 2017.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Estimated as there are no official governments statistics.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), *EAST & SOUTHEAST ASIA :: KOREA, NORTH*. CIA World Factbook; 2018 <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html>. Accessed October 18, 2017.

2.2. Government

North Korea is divided administratively into 9 provinces and 4 municipalities, with Pyongyang the capital. Formal independence was achieved on August 15, 1945 (the day the Japanese empire surrendered to the Allies in World War II).⁴¹ North Korea's constitution was adopted in 1948 and has undergone modifications on seven occasions, (1972, 1992, 1998, 2009, 2012, 2013 and 2016).⁴² The head of government is Kim Jong Un, son of Kim Jong Il, whom he succeeded by election of the Supreme People's Assembly, which represents the greater authority of the country. Kim Jong Un serves as well as president of the National Defense Commission.⁴³

2.3. Economy

The economy of the DPRK is a centralized planned economy.⁴⁴ The main characteristic of planned economies is that the regime in power controls absolutely all the economic aspects of society, leaving no space for private entrepreneurship. In this way the State decides the production and the price of the goods as well as the distribution of resources, generating a system of rationing of basic necessities. This creates an absolute dependence on the part of its inhabitants towards the regime to satisfy their basic needs.

In North Korea, during the 1960s and 1970s, the planned economy system seemed to function well (with strong external support), however in subsequent decades the regime began to experience economic problems that were remedied by foreign economic aid, mainly from the USSR. However after the fall of the Soviet regime, the country began to face a serious economic crisis from which it could no longer recover. Byoung-Lo Philo Kim has asserted that *“Central planning was highly effective and capable of developing the North Korean economy at the beginning stage— the first seven or fifteen years— relying on mobilization measures. As the size of the economy grew, the complexity of planning and choice-making multiplied”*, which in turn led to the economic problems faced by North Korea.⁴⁵

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Kim P, *Two Koreas In Development*. 2nd ed. New Brunswick: Transaction Publ.; 1995:123.

During the 1990s famine broke out in the DPRK.⁴⁶ This was caused in part by the fall of the USSR, and with it, the loss of economic aid to the DPRK which caused a serious crisis in its agricultural system, given its heavy reliance on subsidies.⁴⁷ Thus, when the food crisis broke out and the famine was exacerbated by the natural disasters that hit the country in the nineties, the regime stuck strictly to the structure of its planned economy system (the only one known), and refused to make systemic changes. Instead, the DPRK regime chose to ask for food aid from friendly governments and non-governmental organizations, rather than make changes to its economic model.

From 2005 the North Korean government announced that all organizations providing aid were to withdraw from the country by the end of that year, which was understood as an intention of the regime that the food crisis had passed. However, after a series of severe floods in August 2007, the famine events reappeared.⁴⁸ And while some theorists argue that the regime began to show fissures as a result of these failures, despite a starving population, famine and economic hardship, the DPRK regime has managed to hold onto and consolidate its power.

2.4. Independence and the Korean War

After end of World War II, the Korean peninsula was finally freed from Japanese occupation, which lasted from 1890 until 1945. Concluding the war in 1943 at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, the three great powers of the time USSR, UK and the US managed to reach an agreement on how to split the areas of influence after the war, as part of their vision of shaping a new world order. For Korea, it was agreed that the Korean peninsula would be freed from Japanese occupation and subsequently divided into two main areas, exactly at the 38th parallel. The northern region was to be controlled by the USSR and the southern one was to be controlled by the US, with the final goal to create of a stable government within five years that would reunite the peninsula.

The main issue was how to bring about a stable government in a united Korea while at the same time resolving disagreements between the USSR and US on how this would be achieved. On one hand the US proposed free elections in the two areas, while the USSR was pushing for a Soviet democratic system which

⁴⁶ Noland M. Famine and Reform in North Korea. *Asian Economic Papers*. 2004;3(2):1-40. doi:10.1162/1535351044193411.

⁴⁷ Lankov A, Pyongyang Strikes Back: North Korean Policies of 2002-08 and Attempts to Reverse "De-Stalinization from Below." *Asia Policy*. 2009;8(1):47-72. doi:10.1353/asp.2009.0013.

⁴⁸ BBC NEWS | World | Asia-Pacific | N Korea floods devastate farmland. *Newsbbc.co.uk*. 15 August 2007. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6947230.stm>. Accessed October 21, 2017.

meant to establish a “People’s Assembly”. With disagreements on how to elect the future leadership, the issue was solved by delegating the task to the new-born institution of the United Nations (UN). In order to give a permanent solution, the UN created a “Commission for Korea”. Although the UN elaborated a plan for Korea, the commission did not stop the two Koreas from pursuing different paths. The Southern part of the peninsula held free elections in 1948, which saw the election of “NARRKI” headed by Syngman Rhee.⁴⁹ The northern part elected the General Kim Il Sung, the general who led the revolutionary army with the support of the USSR. The newly elected general Kim Il Sung created the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) with a new constitution. This new state was recognized by PRC and the USSR.

With the creation of the two Korean states there were two separate applications to join the UN. Both applications were rejected, the northern application was vetoed by the US and the southern one was rejected by the USSR. This action created two different regimes vying for the status as the legitimate government of Korea, and backed by the two polarized superpowers of the time. This event preceded the war between the two Koreas, which were separated only by an imaginary line at the 38th parallel. On June 25, 1950, war started when North Korean troops broke through the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea, managing to occupy almost the entire peninsula except for the coastal area around Busan.

The US responded to the situation and sent General McArthur to respond to North Korean aggression, after approval from the UNSC (United Nations Security Council) in Resolution 83 on June 27, 1950.⁵⁰ In October 1950, troops from South Korea and later from the UN managed to cross the 38th parallel, as a consequence the Chinese and the Soviet armies organized themselves and presented themselves as voluntary forces aiding the North Korea to combat South Korean aggression. With shifting frontlines and with no clear winner, the possibility of deployment of nuclear weapons was proposed by General McArthur, before the PRC proposed an armistice which was finally signed on July 27, 1953.⁵¹

The Korean War left 2.2 million casualties, an ideologically-divided peninsula and enormous physical and economic destruction, with resulting divisions persisting until today.⁵² The years following the end of the Korean conflict were mainly characterized by the fear of insecurity, with such insecurities shaped as well by the climate of Cold War tensions around the globe. Key events characterizing such tensions included the

⁴⁹ National Association for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence.

⁵⁰ United Nations Security Council, *Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea* June 27, 1950 | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. Un.org Available at: [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/83\(1950\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/83(1950)). Accessed September 6, 2017.

⁵¹ Crane C, *American Airpower Strategy In Korea, 1950-1953*. Lawrence, Kan.: Univ. Press of Kansas; 2000:36-40.

⁵² Millett A, *Korean War 1950–1953*. 2018: <https://www.britannica.com/event/Korean-War>.

Sino-Soviet split, the Vietnam War, the Cuban missile crisis and the policy of rapprochement and détente between the US administration and PRC under Mao Zedong.

2.5.DPRK Nuclear aims

In order to prevent another act of aggression and maintain peace, the US installed nuclear warheads in the Korean Peninsula to act as a deterrent. With ROK under the US' nuclear umbrella this made it difficult, if not impossible for the North to attack the South without the USSR's or PRC's support.

However, Pyongyang was not the only one aiming to obtain nuclear weapons. In the seventies ROK's dictator Park Chung-hee initiated the *890 Project*, which was a clandestine program aimed to develop nuclear technology and thereafter nuclear capability to defend the ROK from aggression. This shift is described by Se Young Jang in his essay *"The Evolution of US Extended Deterrence and South Korea's Nuclear Ambitions"*, as a reaction to the weakened credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence, along with the withdrawal of 20,000 US troops of the Korean peninsula during the Nixon administration.⁵³ Such measures made ROK President Park doubt the protection and willingness of Washington to ensure his regime and protect the ROK from external aggression.

At the same time, the DPRK had initiated their nuclear research efforts already in 1950's; with the program commencing as part of a long process which started in 1952 with the foundation of the Atomic Energy Research Institute.⁵⁴ In 1956, the USSR and the DPRK signed an agreement for the construction of the Yongbyon nuclear facility. The Yongbyon facility was developed for undertaking research into nuclear energy, however as we will see in this thesis it also played a crucial role in enabling the North Koreans to acquire knowledge of nuclear technology and later develop their own.

After the detonation of the first Chinese nuclear bomb in 1964, which was achieved thanks to the biggest technology transfer in history from the USSR to the PRC, Kim Il sung asked Mao Zedong to share

⁵³ Jang S, *The Evolution of US Extended Deterrence and South Korea's Nuclear Ambitions*. Journal of Strategic Studies. 2016;39(4):502-520. doi:10.1080/01402390.2016.1168012.

⁵⁴ The Nuclear Threat Initiative, *ATOMIC ENERGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE*.; 2017. Available at: <http://www.nti.org/learn/facilities/776/>. Accessed June 16, 2017.

nuclear technology secrets with Pyongyang.⁵⁵ Mao refused to do so, as China was shifting diplomatic positions after Nixon's visit to the PRC.⁵⁶

In the following years, as a consequence of the Korean-Soviet nuclear research program, Pyongyang obtained further knowledge on plutonium and nuclear production. As a result, the DPRK joined the IAEA, and in 1977 was signed an agreement between the USSR, the DPRK and the IAEA to build a working reactor in the Yongbyon research facility.⁵⁷

Reviewing the history of Korea through the Cold War, we see here that by the seventies, nuclear deterrence is seen by both Korean regimes as a strategic necessity to defend their interest in face of an unpredictable and dangerous enemy. The consequences of this are further explored in the following sections.

2.6.A shift in internal policies

As an unstable international situation and events led to a climate of insecurity within the DPRK, the regime understood that in such an unpredictable climate, it needed a tool to secure its survival without depending exclusively on its allies (PRC and USSR). The DPRK's answer was to concentrate the powers of state into the figure of Kim Il Sung. The shift resulted in the veneration of a personality cult typical of totalitarian regimes. In order to obtain stability for the regime, a series of related policies were introduced.

2.6.1. The Role of "Juche"

Among the new ideologies introduced in the North, the "Juche" philosophy, created by Kim Il Sung's ideologist Hwang Jang in the fifties, became the state ideology for the DPRK. In this way Kim Il Sung laid the basis for an isolationist society that did not have to rely on outside factors to forge its own destiny.⁵⁸ The idea behind it consisted of forming a North Korean society that was autonomous and self-sufficient. The DPRK isolates itself to avoid any foreign influence that would damage Korea's identity, tradition and culture based on the perceived threat of globalization; and thus fosters a form of Korean ethnic nationalism. The

⁵⁵ Carter R, *Contemporary Cases In U.S. Foreign Policy : From Terrorism To Trade*. 5th ed. Thousand Oaks: CQ Press; 2014.

Kroenig M, *Exporting The Bomb*. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press; 2010:120-130.

⁵⁶ Kim Il Sung wanted China's support for second Korean War summit records - *The Mainichi*. September 1, 2016. Available at: <https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160901/p2a/00m/0na/009000c>. Accessed February 8, 2018.

⁵⁷ International Atomic Energy Agency, *The DPRK's Violation Of Its NPT Safeguards Agreement With The IAEA Excerpt From "History Of The International Atomic Energy Agency"*. IAEA; 1997:1-5.

⁵⁸ Suh J, *Origins Of North Korea's "Juche"*. Lanham, Md: Lexington Books; 2014.

basis of *Juche* sustains in three main pillars: political independence, economic self-sustainability, and self-reliance in defense. The *Juche* ideology attempts to form a basis in Korean society to fight all external agents that might hinder or prevent the way to a socialist nation. In economic terms *Juche* could be translated as autarky. This new concept blended with nationalism began to become an inseparable part of North Korean society, with application of *Juche* seen as the primary objection of “*auto sustainability*”. By *auto sustainability*, the DPRK regime tried to isolate the North from external factors, with *Juche* becoming the center of the Korean economy and the way the DPRK pursued its economic goals. The uncritical promotion and adoption of *Juche* by the central government also eased the tensions caused by famine in the nineties, as it created a perception that all the needs of the Korean society should be created inside the country, leaving no external option to satisfy the country’s needs and creating a submissive society that would not question failures by the DPRK state.⁵⁹

2.6.2. Songun

Among the DPRK policies implemented to seize total control of the population and to assure the regime’s survival, the *Songun* policy (literally, “military-first policy”) is one of the most important, due to its aims of prioritizing the military as the ultimate task of the State. Through the revolutionary character inculcated into the nation and the effectiveness of the Korean People’s Army as the defender of the homeland and its sovereignty, the DPRK promoted the military as the primary protector of the revolution which would create new spaces for the construction of socialism.⁶⁰ According to the propaganda of the DPRK, the *Songun* Policy is a concept that prioritizes the military and promotes revolutionary struggle and constructive work, having the revolutionary army as its main force of practicing politics based on the revolutionary ideas.

The concept of *Songun* was introduced by the previous “Dear Leader”, Kim Jong Il, in 1990, becoming a core aspect of socialist policy including the allocation of resources in North Korea. Today, the DPRK allocates almost 22.3% of North Korean GDP for military activities, and to support combat readiness for an army of 1.2 million troops.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Apteyeva O, Developing Military Socialism Ideology in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: A Comparative Analysis of “*Juche*” and “*Songun*” Ideas. *Comparative Politics* (Russia). 2015;1(1):225. doi:10.18611/2221-3279-2010-1-1-225-230.

⁶¹ N. Korea ranks No. 1 for military spending relative to GDP: State Department report. *Yonhap News Agency*. December. 22, 2016. Available at:

Thanks to the *Songun* Policy, the DPRK is the most militarized society on the planet today, which is supported by the DPRK's arsenal of nuclear weaponry and ICBMs. The social importance of the *Songun* policy is reflected in the DPRK Constitution Articles 59, 60 and 61, which encourage North Koreans to be in a state of alertness and maximum preparation against any surprise attack from their enemies (the US, ROK and Japan). This climate of continuous alert supports the DPRK regime's warnings on the threat of adversaries conspiring to attack the nation, which explains the eagerness for military spending and a subsequent movement towards non-conventional weaponry, and the regime's tension and paranoia when the US and ROK practice joint military maneuvers and maritime exercises, such as Team Spirit.⁶²

2.7.Missiles

Ballistic missiles constitute a key part to deliver the nuclear weapon, hence the importance of successful ballistic missile launches as a key strategy in striking the enemy. By 1965 the Sino-Soviet split had already taken place, and while the DPRK sought to obtain missile technology from the USSR, the Soviets refused as they feared technology transfer to the PRC. In 1971, the PRC and DPRK signed an agreement confirming the transfer of Chinese missile and personnel to assist their missile programs. With the decline of the relations between Egypt and the USSR, in 1971 the North Koreans managed to buy from Egypt "Frog-7B", Soviet technology missiles. In 1975, as a part of the goal to pursue ballistic technology, in a series of agreements, the North Korean regime managed to obtain further cooperation on ballistic missile technology with the PRC. By 1978 the agreement was cancelled by the PRC, leaving no other option but for the DPRK to develop the ballistic missile program themselves. In the eighties the development of missiles became a source of additional income, as the DPRK regime started to export technology to friendly states.

2.8.Types of nuclear bombs

A nuclear bomb differentiates itself from a conventional bomb in the way the reaction occurs. When a conventional bomb is detonated, the kind of reaction seen is a purely chemical one. In contrast, a nuclear

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2016/12/23/26/0301000000AEN20161223000200315F.html>. Accessed September 19, 2017.

McCafferty G, North Korea's military might - CNN. CNN. October 10, 2015. Available at:

<http://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/09/asia/north-korea-military-might/index.html>. Accessed October 17, 2017.

⁶² Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), *North Korea: Team Spirit And The North-South Dialogue*. CIA; 2011:3.

explosion results from a nuclear chain reaction, with this chain reaction releasing immense amounts of energy in a short amount of time, causing devastation and leaving radiation in the affected area.

To build a nuclear bomb, it is necessary to modify either one of the two following elements of the periodic table, Uranium or Plutonium. The particularity of these elements is that their atoms are modified by either splitting them or fusing them to create other atoms. As we will see, the DPRK regime started its nuclear project with plutonium and later moved on to experimenting with enriching Uranium. Both elements are essential to build a nuclear bomb.

The main distinctions between the two types of bomb are the type of explosion (Fusion vs Fission). The uranium bomb is simpler than that of plutonium one, and starts working when a mass of uranium has not yet reached the critical point of uncontrolled chain reaction. Simultaneously, to this mass are added more elements that promote the creation of free neutrons. This results in an acceleration of the chain reaction speed, resulting in the destruction of the area surrounding the device due to the shock wave created by the release of neutrons.

3. The Clinton administration

In this chapter I will focus on the challenges the Clinton administration faced dealing with the North Korean regime, in the period after the Cold War. In this period, the DPRK rejected the presence of IAEA inspectors in the country and threatened to withdraw from the NPT. The Clinton administration was very reluctant to accept the DPRK as a Nuclear State. We will explore in this chapter how the Clinton administration managed to convince the North Koreans to sign the 1994 Agreed Framework which was crucial, as it represented the first of a series of dialogues between the American administration and the DPRK.

Nuclear weapons represent an intimidation weapon; to achieve their objectives, the Clinton administration used the leverage of such weapons to threaten the DPRK regime with a pre-emptive attack.⁶³ The DPRK, without many available options at the time, took the agreement, and in doing so momentarily abandoned nuclear ambitions. The main aim of the agreement was to fully freeze and rollback North Korea's nuclear program. The 1994 agreement brought about much-needed economic and energy benefits to the DPRK, that served the first priority for the Kim dictators, namely the survival of the regime.

As we will see, although the negotiated agreement was widely supported by the international community, it did not go according to plan, and unforeseen problems emerged in the execution of the 1994 agreement. We will explore flaws and errors which arose in the implementation of the Agreement, which led to tensions and standoffs with the following US administrations.

3.1. Background developments leading to the 1994 agreed framework

In 1985 DPRK signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT), however despite this the regime repeatedly refused access to the IAEA to inspect nuclear facilities in the country. North Korea continued to develop its nuclear weapon program and violating the NPT. In late 1992, the IAEA found evidence that the DPRK had reprocessed more plutonium than the 80 grams it had previously declared to the agency. Such mismatch became a source of concern for the IAEA and the international community, as it suggested the DPRK could be developing a secret processing facility to enrich uranium. After the USS Pueblo and EC121

⁶³ Litwak R, The New Calculus of Pre-emption. *Survival*. 2002;44(4):56. doi:10.1093/survival/44.4.53.

crises there were no major events between the US and the DPRK until the beginning of the nineties.⁶⁴ In 1993, William Clinton won the US' elections, as the incoming US' president one of his first tasks was responding to an announcement from the DPRK regime to the UN, declaring North Korea's intent to withdraw from the NPT.

At the time North Korea's statement did not represent any immediate threat to the US or its allies, as the DPRK was a weak state without any major power's support. The announcement as it was perceived by the Clinton administration, was seen as a desperate move to sustain the regime before its imminent collapse. Although realistically the DPRK did not pose a threat to the region, the Clinton administration intended to resolve the issue in light of previous attempts by the ROK to build its own nuclear arsenal in the seventies, which were ultimately solved by pressuring ROK's president Park to abandon their nuclear program.⁶⁵

The Clinton administration saw a need to act against North Korea's nuclear ambitions to increase security on the Korean peninsula, and to prevent nuclear proliferation by the DPRK and other actors. In order to avoid a similar situation. After taking into consideration a military strike on the Yongbyon nuclear facility and concluding that this was a not a viable option, the Clinton administration sought ways to look for engagement with North Korea, influenced by the perception that the DPRK regime would collapse in a matter of months, in the same way as other Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe. Despite such measures, Clinton opposed seeing North Korea develop into a nuclear state to the point the administration was close to go to war with the DPRK to prevent it acquiring nuclear weapons.

"I was determined to prevent North Korea from developing a nuclear arsenal, even at the risk of war" - William Jefferson Clinton

Later, Secretary of Defence Les Aspin, stated that DPRK could *have a "bomb and a half"*; which modified the position of President Clinton who clarified that the US could not allow DPRK to become *"a nuclear power."*⁶⁶

⁶⁴ EC121 crisis: Was a United States Navy Lockheed EC-121M shot down by North Korean air forces on a reconnaissance mission over the Sea of Japan. USS Pueblo was a U.S. Navy ship attacked and captured by North Korean forces on 23 January 1968.

⁶⁵ Jang S, The Evolution of US Extended Deterrence and South Korea's Nuclear Ambitions. *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 2016;39(4):502-520. doi:10.1080/01402390.2016.1168012.

⁶⁶ *U.S. president said that the DPRK "cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb." A month later, however, after U.S. defense secretary Aspin awkwardly announced that North Korea may already have a "bomb and a half,"*

3.2.The 1994 Agreed Framework

The main goal of the Clinton administration was to avoid the emergence of a nuclear state in North East Asia. As part of the negotiations the US couldn't act alone; therefore in order to gain legitimacy and effectiveness it needed ROK's and PRC's support. The American administration first initiated contact with the North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung, through the PRC diplomatic delegation. The initial stage of negotiations evolved to encourage to remain DPRK in the NPT. In the aftermath of bilateral negotiations the DPRK agreed to remain in the NPT and allow IAEA inspectors to enter North Korea. In exchange, the Clinton administration lessened economic sanctions.

Next, Clinton's Secretary of Defence Les Aspin and former President Jimmy Carter were sent to DPRK as peace emissaries.⁶⁷ In this role, Carter managed to sign a deal which was formally concluded in the "1994 Agreed Framework". For the first time of its existence, an American administration had concluded negotiations with DPRK. The agreement was ultimately signed by Kim Jong Il as the successor to Kim Il Sung, who passed away in July 1994. The ultimate goal of this deal was to freeze the nuclear program and ultimately dismantle it to have a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, in observance of the 1991 joint-declaration between the ROK and DPRK on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

From the very beginning the DPRK negotiators were strategic and focused, and the regime obtained several concessions in different negotiating sectors. Compensation obtained from the negotiations were intended to cover the losses for dismantling and ceasing the activity in the Yongbyon reactor, and costs associated with lost energy production supposedly produced by the reactor. It is important to clarify that denuclearization in this context was intended in military terms, and that nuclear power was still possible to obtain in accordance to a set of rules and inspection meant to be carried out by the IAEA who would verify that the nuclear facilities were used exclusively for civilian purposes.

The deal (see [Annex 1](#)) did not limit itself to economic benefits, with the agreement extending to an evolution in the diplomatic field which would have ultimately led to the normalization of the relations between the US and DPRK. Along with the signing of the 1994 Agreed Framework, the negotiation process created an organization with Japan, ROK and the US, with the purpose of carrying out the construction and

officials suggested that the president had misspoken, that he had meant that North Korea could not be allowed to become "a nuclear power,"

⁶⁷ Creekmore M, *A Moment of Crisis Jimmy Carter, The Power Of A Peacemaker, And North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions*. New York: PublicAffairs; 2006.

financing of two reactors in the DPRK for civilian use. Therefore the KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) was charged with executing all the operations from the construction of the two reactors to the training of DPRK personnel, as an intermediary mechanism that was supposed to execute accordingly to how each part was fulfilling what was stipulated in the 1994 agreed framework.

With the agreement settled, the US administration held serious concerns on compensating the DPRK for an undertaking that could be rescinded in future negotiations. According to V. Gilinsky on his 1997 essay, it was a serious problem to pay DPRK in nuclear coin, as there was no way of peacefully controlling the production of plutonium.⁶⁸ Gilinsky further explained that a major flaw of the agreement consisted of leaving existing North Korean nuclear plants intact until the promised new reactors were built. The non-dismantlement of old nuclear facilities constituted a threat, as they could be reactivated at some point in the future. Gilinsky noted the naiveté of negotiations from the American point of view, and described the resulting deal as: *"We might say it corresponds to paying blackmail for a photograph but not getting the negative"*.⁶⁹

As a reflection of these concerns, and given widespread assumptions that the DPRK regime would collapse in the near future, the US according to R. Gallucci and D. Gregg for different reasons delayed the construction of the reactors, hence not fulfilling the terms of the agreement.⁷⁰ The Clinton administration was not enthusiastic to apply the deal, and sought to capitalize on delays caused by the opposition in the Congress, which was required to provide special authorization and approval for the export of sensitive nuclear technology. By delaying construction of the promised reactor in North Korea, the Clinton administration believed that they had the DPRK regime under control, and they would have to "wait and behave" if they wanted to see the deal completed. However the situation happened to be just the opposite, as the US found itself under pressure from the DPRK to finish the reactor or else it would have to face as consequence the reopening of the old nuclear facilities, which were not destroyed, but frozen. This dilemma was caused by two unforeseen problems which were not addressed when signing the Agreed Framework.

Firstly, the LWR "proliferation-resistant LWRs" promised to the DPRK had a fundamental flaw, as despite producing (percentagewise) less enriched plutonium than the alternative "North Korean endogenous

⁶⁸ "Nuclear Coin" could be interpreted to a synonym of a blackmail based solely on the threat to develop nuclear weaponry.

⁶⁹ Gilinsky V, *Nuclear Blackmail: The 1994 U.S.-Democratic People's Republic of Korea Agreed Framework on North Korea's Nuclear Program 1st ed.* [Stanford, CA]: Hoover Institution; 1997.

⁷⁰ Chief U.S. Negotiator with the DPRK during the nuclear crisis of 1993-1994 Former National Security Adviser to Vice President George Bush (1982-89), former U.S. Ambassador to ROK (1989-93).

gas graphite plants”, because of the generosity of the deal the two reactors it would produce bigger amounts of enriched uranium, than the original graphite reactor. This flaw voided the main purpose of the deal by producing more enriched uranium.

The second question related to the issue of trust, and the extent the North Koreans could be trusted to carry out their agreed commitments. According to the agreement, the DPRK was supposed to dismantle and destroy old plutonium production facilities once the two new reactors provided by the KEDO were already built. Realistically however, the US had little leverage over the old nuclear facility, or ways to ensure compliance by the DPRK.

In 1998, given repeated “accidental” delays in the implementation of the agreement, the DPRK threatened to remove and reprocess fuel rods from the old facility of Yongbyon. To prove they were serious, the same year the DPRK also tested a long range Taepodong rocket, capable of launching a short distance nuclear warhead. Later in 1998, through a satellite the US and ROK discovered a secret building connected to North Korea’s nuclear program. These developments rang alarm bells that prompted US agencies to search for more evidence, and ultimately revealed that the DPRK was securing technology and material to enrich uranium. Despite these findings the Clinton administration continued to engage in dialogue with the DPRK regime, and looked to sign further agreements such as the removal of North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list.

While negotiations with the North Koreans were ongoing, in 1994 the Republican party won the mid-term Congressional elections and the committees’ chairmanship changed, causing the whole deal to be questioned.⁷¹ Criticisms increased as the new Congress installed, and Republican claims of blackmail and appeasement of the DPRK started to be raised in Washington DC. This political change was to play an important role in the following years, as the executive power headed by Clinton had to factor in significant opposition from the the Republican Party, including a more hawkish line on North Korea.

Although the 1994 agreement was a mechanism to stop DPRK from getting the nuclear bomb, it was not an permanent agreement; rather, it was a temporary agreement which aimed to be indefinite. The DPRK signed a temporary agreement which kept alive their hopes of being a nuclear state in the future, while the

⁷¹ BERKE R, THE 1994 ELECTIONS: THE OVERVIEW; G.O.P. WINS CONTROL OF SENATE AND MAKES BIG GAINS IN HOUSE; PATAKI DENIES CUOMO 4TH TERM. *The New York Times*. November 09, 1994. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/09/us/1994-elections-overview-gop-wins-control-senate-makes-big-gains-house-pataki.html?pagewanted=all>. Accessed November 21, 2017.

US hoped for a regime's collapse in the near future. The fact that DPRK was very decisive in the signing of the agreement gives the impression they were willing to cooperate in the first stage of the agreement. By the year 2000 Clinton reached the end of his presidency, and his Vice President Al Gore lost the US presidential elections to George W. Bush, whose administration would next lead negotiations on North Korea's nuclear program.⁷²

3.3.Summary of Clinton Administration

As we see today, DPRK counts enough material to build sixty nuclear bombs and also has access to a missile delivery system which includes intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM).⁷³ Knowing the current state of DPRK weaponry therefore, it is worth reconsidering whether the Agreed Framework endorsed by the Clinton administration was good or not. Considering the narrative and the economic conditions of the time, it was believed that North Korea would shortly collapse and there was no transfer of nuclear technology, and so, from the American perspective, the 1994 agreement looked like a positive deal to gain time while the regime collapsed by itself.

During the eight years in office, President Clinton witnessed the smooth change of leadership in the DPRK and, despite declining economic conditions at the end of the 2000's, there was no implosion nor any kind of attempt to change the North Korean regime, which also remained unaffected by famine and economic mismanagement.

Considering the circumstances of the time therefore, the Agreed Framework was the best deal the US could make, considering the uncertainty about the DPRK's nuclear program and the direct benefits it had, such as the inspection of the North Korean nuclear facilities to gather intelligence on how advanced their program was, and how long it would take them to build an actual nuclear bomb. Besides the immediate benefits of the agreement, it also opened the possibility for diplomatic dialogue between the US and North Korea, and laid the groundwork for future talks and positive outcome, including potentially securing peace on the Korean peninsula.

⁷² Purdum T, COUNTING THE VOTE: THE OVERVIEW; BUSH IS DECLARED WINNER IN FLORIDA, BUT GORE VOWS TO CONTEST RESULTS. *The New York Times*. November 27, 2000. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/27/us/counting-vote-overview-bush-declared-winner-florida-but-gore-vows-contest.html>. Accessed October 21, 2017.

⁷³ Warrick J, Nakashima E, Fifield A. North Korea now making missile-ready nuclear weapons, U.S. analysts say. *The Washington Post*. August 8, 2017. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/north-korea-now-making-missile-ready-nuclear-weapons-us-analysts-say/2017/08/08/e14b882a-7b6b-11e7-9d08-b79f191668ed_story.html?utm_term=.017ed4333b4a. Accessed November 9, 2017.

The circumstances surrounding this deal also benefited from the skillful use of diplomacy by the US administration, with the US increasing pressure and tactical threats to push the North Koreans into accepting the agreement. Through the use of coercion and intimidation, including official statements from the Clinton administration that they were at a brink of going to war with the DPRK, the DPRK was finally brought to the negotiation table. The North Korean negotiators, pushed by the extreme famine of the nineties and the threat of military action by the US, made significant concessions to the IAEA to inspect their nuclear installations. At this stage we can see that nuclear deterrence and intimidation worked on the DPRK, and compelled the DPRK to hold off on progressing their nuclear program based on the threat of war.

To summarize, both parties made important concessions in negotiations (at least on paper), however coercive diplomacy from the US ultimately led to a final agreement. The DPRK was compelled to negotiate in the light of the threats made by the Clinton administration, and as a consequence the regime pledged to freeze all nuclear development and signed a moratorium on ballistic missile launches. The DPRK regime was promised two LWR reactors and foreign aid in exchange for renouncing their nuclear ambitions; with the deal signed as a temporary agreement with the aim of securing a permanent one in the near future.

In achieving this outcome, a crucial role was played by perceptions within the American administration, particularly by those who believed that the DPRK regime would not survive the decade given its famine and harsh economic conditions, and the expectation that would lead to internal revolt. The negotiations also gave the DPRK sufficient “fuel” to survive until the end of the Clinton presidency, and thus outlast predictions of its imminent demise.⁷⁴ In hindsight, many analysts including Thomas Hubbard agree that the 1994 Agreed Framework was the best solution available at the time, given the parameters and available information on North Korea’s nuclear program.⁷⁵

From this chapter therefore, it can be seen how the appeasement of North Koreans ambitions would affect the future and the conception of security in the region. The US was able to lever its own nuclear capabilities to threat the DPRK regime to sign a deal and suspend the development of the nuclear program. Although the DPRK made significant concessions, including allowing international inspections, a moratorium on ballistic launches and the freeze of their nuclear facilities, the regime nevertheless managed to continue

⁷⁴ “Fuel” intended as resources and time.

⁷⁵ PBS. Analyses - Examining The Lessons Of The 1994 U.S.-North Korea Deal | Kim's Nuclear Gamble, FRONTLINE | PBS. Available at: <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/themes/lessons.html>. Accessed May 8, 2017. Hubbard was the former U.S. ambassador to South Korea (2001-2004)

working secretly on such goals. The consequences of this secretive behavior would become apparent in the coming years, after President Bush was elected.

Table 3.1 Summary of North Korean Nuclear Capacity under Clinton						
Administration	Nuclear Arsenal	Nuclear detonations	Nuclear Fuel	DPRK Political Leader	Missile Tests & Launch Year	
President Clinton (1993-2000)	0	0	25-30 kg	Kim Il Sung (1948-94) Kim Jong Il (1994-2011)	1	1998

4. The Bush administration

In this chapter we will explore how the DPRK regime managed to develop and detonate a nuclear bomb, and how this detonation changed the perception of North Korea by the US' administration. The explosion of a real nuclear weapon was a game changer in the way that the Bush administration dealt with the regime, and caused the Bush administration to reconsider how to deal with the DPRK regime even as the American perceptions of North Korea remained unchanged. After the nuclear explosion the Bush Administration could no longer consider a military strike against North Korea, especially after the US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁷⁶ The stated war on terrorism consumed the energies of the Bush administration, and meant that the US could not face a war on another front against a state that had just detonated a nuclear bomb and had plans to continue expanding their nuclear arsenal.

This chapter will illustrate the shift of policy in the Bush administration after the North Korean's first confirmed nuclear explosion. Although the Bush administration was keen to engage in a pre-emptive strike at the Yongbyon nuclear facility, the war on terrorism consumed a lot of resources and goodwill, with support further reduced by the low approval rate of Bush administration particular after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁷⁷ This chapter will examine the role of state negotiations including the *Six Party talks*, and how these talks were shaped and influenced by the DPRK regime's behavior.⁷⁸

The Bush presidency was characterized by a hawkish behavior, and a willingness to intervene militarily in response to identified "rogue states". Based on this, the perception was that Pyongyang would freeze its nuclear activities, for fear of drawing a military response from the US. However the DPRK regime managed to surprise the international community with a nuclear detonation in 2006, which at the time was considered improbable given the country's backwardness and economic difficulties.⁷⁹ Significant misunderstandings were made in official agreements struck with the North Koreans, with the DPRK regime astutely managing to

⁷⁶ Cimbala S, *The George W. Bush Defense Program*. Washington: Potomac Books; 2010.

⁷⁷ Glaser B, Liang W, North Korea: The Beginning of a China-U.S. Partnership? *The Washington Quarterly*. 2008;31(3):165-180. doi:10.1162/wash.2008.31.3.165.

Gallup I, Presidential Approval Ratings -- George W. Bush. *Gallup: Analytics and Advice*. Available at: <http://news.gallup.com/poll/116500/presidential-approval-ratings-george-bush.aspx>. Accessed November 19, 2017.

⁷⁸ *Six Party talks* (2003 to 2008) Is a negotiation table, where representatives from Japan, ROK, US, PRC, DPRK and Russia, engaged in multilateral meeting to peacefully resolve tensions around the North Korean nuclear weapon program.

⁷⁹ Staff and agencies, North Korea claims first nuclear test. *The Guardian*. October 09, 2006. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/oct/09/northkorea>. Accessed June 15, 2017.

control negotiations with regional powers to promote their interests, obtain money, and gain time to allow their further development of their nuclear program. This maneuvering occurred despite the North Koreans had only succeeded in detonating one nuclear bomb, and had not yet managed to acquire further technology such as the miniaturization of the nuclear bomb, or ballistic technology to launch a nuclear device over long distances. The Bush administration dismissed a military response to the North Korean threat, but decided to exhaust all the diplomatic tools available, while there was still time.

With the Bush reluctance to continue the 1994 agreement, the return of a more “hawkish” US’ position changed the position of US-North Korean relations, with the Bush administration’s refusal to continue the nuclear deal becoming problematic for American interests.⁸⁰ North Korean ambitions and the threat of a pre-emptive attack on the peninsula created an environment of instability in Pyongyang, which finally pushed the DPRK to detonate their first nuclear bomb. As a consequence of this detonation the rules of the game changed, and the Americans could no longer rely solely on their nuclear arsenal as a threat to force the North Koreans to rollback their nuclear program.

The North Koreans’ nuclear detonation of October 9, 2006 pushed the Bush administration to initiate the *Six Party talks* between the US, North Korea and regional powers to negotiate a deal to halt further nuclear progress by the DPRK, which ultimately, as we will see, gave the North Koreans more time to develop their nuclear program. By the end of 2008, the Bush administration had run out of time to conclude a deal, with the North Koreans essentially ignoring all further proposals from the Americans to conclude an agreement before the next administration. As a consequence of these years of negotiations, the only advantages the Americans obtained was inside information from the nuclear facilities, knowledge on the advancement of the DPRK’s nuclear program, and of the regime’s firm commitment to continue developing its program.⁸¹

In this chapter I will focus on the policy changes that characterized the Bush administration’s engagement with North Korea, focusing on the “Six Party talks” and the political environment surrounding the talks. Other considerations affecting US-North Korea negotiations included the hawkish attitude of the Bush administration and how it changed after the Iraq war, and the DPRK regime’s resilience and resourcefulness in advancing their nuclear program, despite economic hardship and famine.

⁸⁰ Sanger D, BUSH TELLS SEOUL TALKS WITH NORTH WON'T RESUME NOW. *The New York Times*. March 8, 2001. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/08/world/bush-tells-seoul-talks-with-north-won-t-resume-now.html>. Accessed November 21, 2017.

⁸¹ Reynolds M, North Korea agrees to nuclear disarmament. *MSNBC*. February 13, 2007. Available at: http://www.nbcnews.com/id/17117242/ns/world_news-asia_pacific/t/north-korea-agrees-nuclear-disarmament/. Accessed May 9, 2017.

4.1. Background developments to the Six Party talks

By the year 2000 Clinton reached the end of his presidency, and President George W. Bush won the election for the Republican Party. As Bush assumed power in 2001, the environment changed for the DPRK, with the Republican Party strongly criticizing the “blackmailing narrative” that was claimed to have been caused by the 1994 *Agreed Framework*. The hostile attitude of the Republican Party to any further accommodation with North Korea, coupled with criticism of a long range missile test by the DPRK towards the end of the Clinton presidency, created strong likelihood of the further deterioration in US-North Korean relations.⁸² Bush had strongly campaigned during his presidential race for a tougher line towards the DPR. Although Bush restated intentions for the US to partially honor the 1994 *Agreed Framework*, including the guaranteeing supply of oil shipments for an indefinite timeframe, this did not extend to the commitments regarding the nuclear reactors.⁸³ Bush’s cabinet composition was full of foreign policy “hawks” who advocated a tougher line of North Korea. The hawkish position was mainly represented by Donald Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense), Bolton (Under Secretary of State) and Vice President Dick Cheney.⁸⁴ These figures had an enormous influence in Bush’s administration, as they argued for squeezing the DPRK, with the ultimate goal of finally making the North Korean regime collapse.

The main aim of US policy through the Bush administration was to prevent the North Koreans from obtaining nuclear technology.⁸⁵ Part of this behavior is explained by the common narrative in the conservative party at the time, which saw any type of agreement with the regime as an appeasement strategy. However during the Bush administration, the biggest development was the terrorist attacks of 9/11, which resulted in the declaration of war on Afghanistan as a retaliatory response. Nevertheless, the DPRK remained a big focus of the US, and Bush declared North Korea as one of three “Axis of Evil” states during his State of Union address in 2002. With this State of Union declaration, Bush bluntly laid out his “hawk engagement” strategy, where the US were going to go after states supporting terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The main foreign policy concern for Bush administration was to promote regime change. The same year, the Bush administration stated its clear “Nuclear posture” that the DPRK constituted

⁸² Wudunn S, North Korea Fires Missile Over Japanese Territory. *The New York Times*. September 1, 1998. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/01/world/north-korea-fires-missile-over-japanese-territory.html>. Accessed June 15, 2017.

⁸³ Koppel A, Labott E, CNN.com - Bush warns N. Korea on fuel shipments. *CNN*. November 13, 2002. Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2002/US/11/13/bush.nkorea/>. Accessed June 12, 2017.

⁸⁴ Hawk engagement, labeled by Victor Cha- A Bush administration advisor.

⁸⁵ O'Hanlon M. A, “Master Plan” to Deal With North Korea *The Brookings Institution Policy Brief #114*. January 2003. Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/pb114.pdf>. Accessed May 13, 2017.

a potential target for a pre-emptive nuclear attack; leaving no room or doubts for interpretations about the position the US had in regards to Pyongyang.

Regarding DPRK, Bush's 2002 State of the Union address included the following statement:

"Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction. Some of these regimes have been pretty quiet since September the 11th. But we know their true nature. North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass A regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens.

*States like these and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic"*⁸⁶

This speech marked the final justification the DPRK needed to reengage its a nuclear program, as there were no guarantees of peace and US discourse alluded to a possible attack, thus demonstrating to the North Koreans that there was no room for a non-aggression pact as previously requested by the DPRK on several occasions. Furthermore in October 2002, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly was informed in a visit to Pyongyang that North Korea had a clandestine program to enrich uranium.⁸⁷ This position that was later refuted by the DPRK regime, who denied the existence of such a program.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ Jackson R, *Writing The War On Terrorism: Language, politics and counter-terrorism (New Approaches to Conflict Analysis MUP)* Manchester 1st ed. Manchester Univ. Press; 2012:106.

⁸⁷ Sanger D, NORTH KOREA SAYS IT HAS A PROGRAM ON NUCLEAR ARMS. *The New York Times*. October 17, 2002. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/17/world/north-korea-says-it-has-a-program-on-nuclear-arms.html>. Accessed June 13, 2017.

Uranium Enrichment. *Nuclear Regulatory Commission*. August 02, 2017. Available at: <https://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac/ur-enrichment.html>. Accessed June 18, 2017.

Highly enriched Uranium: The nuclear fuel used in a nuclear reactor needs to have a higher concentration of the U235 isotope than that which exists in natural uranium ore. U235 when concentrated (or "enriched") is fissionable in light-water reactors. The heat energy released, by the controlled nuclear reaction within the nuclear reactor, can be harnessed to produce electricity. Commercially, the U235 isotope is enriched to 3 to 5% (from the natural state of 0.7%) and is then further processed to create nuclear fuel. <https://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac/ur-enrichment.html> August 02, 2017

⁸⁸ Sanger D, NORTH KOREA SAYS IT HAS A PROGRAM ON NUCLEAR ARMS. *The New York Times*. October 17, 2002. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/17/world/north-korea-says-it-has-a-program-on-nuclear-arms.html>. Accessed June 13, 2017.

Bush was reluctant to negotiate with DPRK unless it met a series of conditions, which the North Koreans refused as they believed they would jeopardize the DPRK's security. On the other hand North Korean negotiators insisted on a diplomatic statement guaranteeing peace between the states, as a precondition before any negotiations on relinquishing its nuclear capabilities. As the situation evolved in November 14, 2002, KEDO, announced it would stop the shipment of oil to the DPRK in accordance to the DPRK's violation of the 1994 framework.⁸⁹⁹⁰ In response, the DPRK decided to commence measures to reactivate the Yongbyon 5 MW old Nuclear facility, alleging that North Korea needed to compensate for the loss of oil supply derived from the 1994 framework.⁹¹ On December 12, 2002, North Korea requested the IAEA to remove the seals and surveillance equipment from the nuclear facilities. In light of the IAEA's refusal, fifteen days later the regime expelled two inspectors from the AIEA. Shortly after this decision, the DPRK regime pulled out of the NPT on January 10 2003, justifying their actions by stating that the IAEA was playing a unilateral role in the management of the issue by being biased in favor of the US, and that therefore *"Withdrawal was a legitimate and self-defensive measure"*⁹².

On Jan 12, 2003 the DPRK Ambassador to PRC Choe Jin Su stated that DPRK *"cannot go along with the self-imposed missile moratorium any longer"*, as it jeopardized its chances of self-defense from US aggression, given the fact that the US challenged its survival.⁹³ As the US started fighting its war on terrorism, and in particular after the invasion of Iraq (March 2003) US fears of the DPRK exporting missiles and nuclear technology to terrorist groups grew. American concerns surged when in December 2002, a cargo ship directed to Iraq was intercepted containing North Korean missiles.⁹⁴ Among the fears the Bush administration had was the continuous collaboration and exchange of technology between the DPRK, Syria, Pakistan, Iran, Yemen and Libya.⁹⁵ The Bush administration started to lobby other states for military and diplomatic support against North Korea, with approaches to Seoul, Tokyo, and Moscow. The Bush

⁸⁹ Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was the organization in charge of executing all the operations from the construction of the 2 reactors to the training of DPRK personnel, and the delivery of the promised goods in accordance to the 1994 Agreed Framework.

⁹⁰ Richardson S, *Perspectives On U.S. Policy Toward North Korea*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books; 2006.

⁹¹ BBC NEWS | World | Asia-Pacific | N Korea agrees to talks with Seoul. *BBC*. January 9, 2003. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2641047.stm>. Accessed January 9, 2017.

⁹² Kihl Y, Kim H, *North Korea: The Politics Of Regime Survival*. 1st ed. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe; 2006:20.

⁹³ Demick B, Richter P, N. Korea May Test Missiles. *LA Times*. January 12, 2003. Available at: <http://articles.latimes.com/2003/jan/12/world/fg-norkor12>. Accessed September 8, 2017.

⁹⁴ Shanker T, THREATS AND RESPONSES: ARMS SMUGGLING; Scud Missiles Found on Ship Of North Korea. *The New York Times*. December 11, 2002. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/11/world/threats-and-responses-arms-smuggling-scud-missiles-found-on-ship-of-north-korea.html>. Accessed September 8, 2017.

⁹⁵ Sanger D, THREATS AND RESPONSES: ALLIANCES; In North Korea and Pakistan, Deep Roots of Nuclear Barter. *The New York Times*.. November 24, 2002. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/24/world/threats-responses-alliances-north-korea-pakistan-deep-roots-nuclear-barter.html>. Accessed September 8, 2017.

administration was influenced by its initial rapid success in Iraq and the fall of Saddam Hussein and started using those events as a clear warning to states seeking to challenge American power. US' Vice President, Dick Cheney even went as far as saying: *"If there is anyone in the world today who doubts the seriousness of the Bush doctrine, I would urge that person to consider the fate of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein's regime."*⁹⁶

4.2. The Six Party Talks

Internationally, the PRC had a key interest in North Korean tensions, mainly because it wanted to avoid a refugee crisis and military action on their border. Beijing began its own lobbying efforts to try and persuade Pyongyang to dismantle its nuclear program.⁹⁷ When this approach failed, Beijing proposed to act as a mediator between Washington and Pyongyang.⁹⁸ Given the hawkish and interventionist attitude from the Bush administration in Iraq and Afghanistan, Chinese leaders saw as a potential risk of a pre-emptive military strike on a neighboring state and ally. To avoid this, Chinese diplomats devised a way to avoid such situation, with the creation in Beijing of a dialogue grouping between the interested states in the region. These talks (thereafter to be referenced as the *"Six Party talks"*) involved representatives from Japan, ROK, US, PRC, DPRK and Russia, and took place from 2003 to 2008. The principal aim of the talks was to peacefully resolve tensions around the North Korean nuclear weapon program, and to create an updated agreement to the 1994 Agreed Framework. However despite initial hopes, the talks were chaotic and led nowhere, with North Korean diplomacy skillfully managing to obtain several concessions and benefits without substantially shifting their position.

The Six Party talks are important, as they were the last negotiations that gave some sort of "result" to the American administration. There were different expectations on how the dialogue was meant to be developed, with the North Koreans wanting a continuation of step by step negotiations as in the 1994 Agreed Framework.⁹⁹ In contrast, the US were aiming at a full dismantlement policy ("dismantle first, dialogue later"), and despite North Korean delegation's request for a non-aggression treaty with the US to assure

⁹⁶ Cheney: US will "destroy" enemies. *Al Jazeera*. June 1, 2003. Available at:

<http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2003/06/20084915227827534.html>. Accessed September 10, 2017.

⁹⁷ 14. Revere E, *Facing the Facts: Towards a New U.S. North Korea Policy*. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution; October 2013:7-13. Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/16-north-korea-denuclearization-revere-paper.pdf>. Accessed September 9, 2017.

⁹⁸ Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. *Korean Nuclear Talks Kick Off In Beijing.*; 2003. Available at: <http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t28285.htm>. Accessed June 18, 2017.

The trilateral talks seem to have provided an acceptable compromise.

⁹⁹ Ashizawa K, Tokyo's Quandary, Beijing's Moment in the Six-Party Talks: A Regional Multilateral Approach to Resolve the DPRK's Nuclear Problem. *Pacific Affairs*. 2006;79(3):411-432. doi:10.5509/2006793411.

them of America's intentions, the Bush administration offered only a verbal assurance.¹⁰⁰ This approach was rejected by both parties, making difficult to negotiate. According to Richard Boucher on April 28, in a trilateral meeting, North Koreans officially admitted possession of nuclear weapons, and stated that they had already managed to reprocess spent nuclear fuel in their old nuclear facility Yongbyon.¹⁰¹ According to US Secretary of State Colin Powell, in this meeting the North Korean negotiating team offered their nuclear arsenals as a bargaining chip, stating that they:

*"might get rid of all their nuclear programs...[and] stop their missile exports. For 'something considerable in return' The North Koreans acknowledged a number of things that they were doing, and in effect said these are now up for further discussion. They did put forward a plan that would ultimately deal with their nuclear capability and their missile activities, but they of course expect something considerable in return."*¹⁰²

The first two years of the Six Party round talks were not productive, negotiations moved slowly and there was a perception that both the US and DPRK were looking to gain time. For the North Koreans, it gave the impression that the DPRK wanted to slow negotiations to continue with their nuclear program, and in the meantime be accepted as a nuclear state. For the Americans, the aim appeared to delay as long as possible the DPRK's nuclear program, in the hope that the regime would implode and lead to a regime change. It is also important to note the growing role of the PRC in negotiations between the US and North Korea, with the PRC is seen as key factor to legitimizing the negotiation process for two deeply mistrustful actors. After the Bush decline to formalize a non-aggression pact, American negotiators wanted to obtain a "complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement" (CVID) of the DPRK's nuclear programs.¹⁰³ To achieve CVID, the Bush administration proposed a short term freeze of the plutonium, HEU program, and a return of the IAEA inspectors. In exchange, the DPRK would obtain a removal from the US' State Sponsor of Terrorism list, and a softening of economic sanctions.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁰ Cordesman A, Lin A. *Changing Military Balance In The Koreas And Northeast Asia*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield; 2015.

¹⁰¹ Richard A. Boucher was the state department spokesman
Kessler G, N. Korea Says It Has Nuclear Arms. *The Washington Post*. April 25 2003. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/04/25/n-korea-says-it-has-nuclear-arms/43bc7e65-2c2a-407e-bf71-64e9e52ac3c9/?utm_term=.218409aad394. Accessed September 10, 2017.

¹⁰² Remarks with Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan Jamil Al-Muasher. *US State Department Archive*. April 28, 2003. Available at: <https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/19978.htm>. Accessed September 10, 2017.

¹⁰³ Kwak T, Joo S, *North Korea's Second Nuclear Crisis And Northeast Asian Security*. New York, NY: Ashgate Publishing Group; 2007:2-10.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

Finally in 2005, a joint declaration was issued, where as a result of previous meetings the six parties agreed on key points in order to find common ground to continue diplomatic dialogue. The main issues that the parties agreed on were:

- Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula
- DPRK would be able to pursue nuclear energy with peaceful purposes under the NPT and the watch of IAEA
- The US agreed to not attack the DPRK or place nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula
- ROK agreed to not accepting nuclear weapons on its territory
- The US and DPRK would resume the discussions regarding the construction of the two LWR reactors in North Korea.¹⁰⁵
- A verbal assurance would be given from the Bush administration guaranteeing it would not attack the DPRK.¹⁰⁶

Right after the joint declaration, an unexpected announcement from DPRK's Foreign minister Paek Nam-sun, stated that it was "*essential*" for the US to provide North Korea with LWR reactors "*as early as possible*", as the DPRK would not dismantle its nuclear deterrent before receiving the reactors.¹⁰⁷ The following month, New Mexico Governor and occasional mediator between the white house and Pyongyang, Bill Richardson, was informed that the North Korean officials had already reprocessed 8000 spent fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor.¹⁰⁸

The US' reluctance to seal a deal with the DPRK could also be seen in its contradictory behavior, with the US signing the agreed declaration while at the same time enforcing new sanctions on DPRK with Executive Order 13382, and against eight DPRK entities (and Macau bank Banco Delta Asia) for their involvements in the DPRK's nuclear weapon program.¹⁰⁹ This executive order froze all its assets and prohibited transaction

¹⁰⁵ Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks Beijing 19 September 2005. *US State Department of State*. 19 September 2005. Available at: <https://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm>. Accessed September 10, 2017.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ CNN.com - N Korea: U.S. reactors 'essential' - Sep 22, 2005. *CNN*. Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/09/22/korea.north.un/>. Accessed September 10, 2017.

¹⁰⁸ Bill Richardson former New Mexico Governor who had previously contact with the North Korean officials and mediated in 1996 with the release of American Evan Hunziker (accused of espionage) from North Korean custody.

¹⁰⁹ Executive Order 13382 of June 28, 2005, blocks the property of persons engaged in proliferation activities and their support networks. OFAC administers this blocking program, which initially applied to eight organizations in the DPRK, Iran, and Syria. Treasury, together with the Department of State, is authorized to designate additional WMD proliferators and their supporters under the new authorities provided by this Executive Order.

with these companies by US citizen or entities. These new sanctions created friction with the DPRK, and as a countermeasure the North Koreans launched a short-medium and long distance ballistic missiles.¹¹⁰ The international community reacted to these launches through approval of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1695, calling on the DPRK to return to the six party talks.¹¹¹

4.3. First North Korean Underground Test

Eleven months after the imposition of US sanctions, the DPRK held its first underground nuclear test on October 9, 2006. This was a turning point for the DPRK nuclear program, as the DPRK was able to detonate a nuclear bomb of around one Kiloton (in contrast, the nuclear bomb dropped on Hiroshima was 15 Kilotons).¹¹² The DPRK Foreign ministry stated that the “*nuclear test was entirely attributable to United States threats, sanctions and pressure*”, and that DPRK “*felt compelled to prove its possession of nuclear weapons to protect itself from the danger of war from the United States.*”¹¹³

In light of this scenario the US had no other option but to continue the Six Party talks, with the Bush administration channeling its anger and frustration with the North Koreans to bring together all other negotiating partners to bring pressure against the North Koreans.

After being demanded twice by the UN to resume the Six Party Talks, the DPRK finally returned to negotiations in December 2006; however almost no agreements were made. The DPRK used its most recent nuclear detonation as leverage to impose its agenda in the Six Party talks. DPRK demanded the unfreezing of

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control. *Executive Order 13382, "Blocking Property Of Weapons Of Mass Destruction Proliferators And Their Supporters"*; The Weapons Of Mass Destruction Trade Control Regulations (Part 539 Of Title 31, C.F.R); And The Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Agreement Assets Control Regulations (Part 540 Of Title 31, C.F.R). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Treasury; 2005:1-3.

¹¹⁰ United States Supports UN Sanctions, Vigorous Enforcement Following North Korean Missile and Nuclear Tests. *The American Journal of International Law*. 2007;101(1):216- 220. Available at: Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4149850>. Accessed September 13, 2017.

¹¹¹ United Nations Security Council, *SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMNS DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA'S MISSILE LAUNCHES, UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTING RESOLUTION 1695* (2006).; JULY 15, 2006. Available at: <http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8778.doc.htm>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

¹¹² Sanger D, North Koreans Say They Tested Nuclear Device. *The New York Times*. October 9, 2006. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/09/world/asia/09korea.html>. Accessed September 6, 2017.
Swanson A, What it would look like if the Hiroshima bomb hit your city. *The Washington Post*. August 5, 2015. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/08/05/what-it-would-look-like-if-the-hiroshima-bomb-hit-your-city/?utm_term=.2bcb0fb86d85. Accessed September 6, 2017.

¹¹³ United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Condemns Nuclear Test by Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1718* (2006) October 14, 2006 | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. Unorg. 2018. Available at: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8853.doc.htm>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

the Macau banks which had been used by the regime, and the full implementation of the September 2005 declaration which included the building of the LWR reactors. The DPRK further demanded the reactivation of the KEDO plus the resuming the supply of oil as agreed to in the 1994 Framework.¹¹⁴

The DPRK accepted the PRC's plan to seal the Yongbyon nuclear facility within two months, in exchange of 50.000 tons of heavy oil and humanitarian assistance, and also agreed to create monitoring groups to implement the measures agreed to in the September 2005 plan. In order to ensure compliance with the Yongbyon reactor shutdown, IAEA agents were invited to monitor the closure of the nuclear facility.¹¹⁵

On December 8 2008, due to disagreement on the verifying process and how the inspections were meant to be conducted, the US stopped oil shipments to the DPRK until it was satisfied that inspections would be carried out effectively.¹¹⁶ Given the North Korean denial and lack of cooperation, this move effectively ended the Six Party talks. The Bush administration sent its representative Christopher Hill to try and broker an agreement before the new administration would come into power; however the North Koreans essentially ignored them and preferred to wait until the next US administration came to power.

The Six Party talks (from 2003-2008) ultimately failed to achieve any consistent result concerning DPRK nuclear capabilities; however they did give the occasional impression that some progress was being made. The North Korean delegation were reluctant to renounce to their nuclear program, and mistrust was ever-present between the parties, particularly the North Koreans and US. Ultimately the negotiations failed and allowed the DPRK to buy time in developing nuclear capabilities, as well as obtaining other benefits from the multiparty negotiations, and no conditions sought by the US were honored or implemented by the DPRK regime.

¹¹⁴ BBC NEWS | World | Asia-Pacific | US 'tables North Korea proposal'. *BBC*. December 20, 2006. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6192323.stm>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

¹¹⁵ Jie-Ae S, U.N. verifies closure of North Korean nuclear facilities - *CNN*. July 18, 2007. Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/07/18/nkorea.iaea/>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

¹¹⁶ Kessler G, North Korea Doesn't Agree to Written Nuclear Agreement; Earlier Verbal Assurances Contradicted. *The Washington Post*. December 12, 2008. Available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/11/AR2008121103706.html>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

4.4. Summary of Bush findings

The Bush administration internally debated what was the best strategy to tackle the North Korean issue, however the administration chose not to accept other solution other than the “Dismantle first, talk later” policy. In the meantime however, Bush removed the DPRK from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism.¹¹⁷ This paved the way to the Six Party talks, where despite considerable setbacks the US managed to acquire valuable information on the North Korean Nuclear facilities and the demolition of the Yongbyon cooling tower.¹¹⁸ At the same time, the DPRK obtained valuable time to continue developing its nuclear program, and received additional foreign and energy/oil aid. The Bush era ended with the DPRK possessing a nuclear arsenal, and as the US can no longer bomb or negotiate with the regime, there are no good policy options left; there are only “least bad options”.

In preventing the DPRK becoming a nuclear power, Robert S. Litwak argues that demanding the DPRK surrender its entire program was not a realistic goal, and that the Bush administration was unrealistic in demanding the North Koreans to fully rollback their nuclear program.¹¹⁹ For the DPRK, this represented their only insurance policy against a possible attack from the US. With the confirmed detonation of a nuclear bomb, the DPRK obtained legitimacy for their regime and their nuclear program; were treated seriously as a negotiating partner; and lastly managed to obtain economic benefits from each of the negotiating parties.¹²⁰

Although it was technically possible for the Bush administration to respond to North Korea’s actions by conducting a pre-emptive nuclear strike, the war on terrorism, and the discrediting of US intelligence in the wake of Iraq and false alarm of WMD in Iraq made such an option highly questionable, with little chance of international support. In addition, the public approval rate of the Bush administration was the lowest for a US president since President Carter. The Bush administration therefore had little choice but to leave North Korean issue to be resolved by the next US administration.

¹¹⁷ Kessler G, U.S. Drops North Korea From Terrorism List. *The Washington Post*.. October 12, 2008. Available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/11/AR2008101100261.html>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

¹¹⁸ Amanpour C, N. Korea destroys nuclear reactor tower - *CNN*. June 27, 2008. Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/06/27/northkorea.explosion/index.html>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

¹¹⁹ Litwak R, *Preventing North Korea’s Nuclear Breakout*. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; February 2017:25. Available at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/book_downloads/preventing_north_koreas_nuclear_breakout_0.pdf. Accessed September 6, 2017.

¹²⁰ Yardley J, North Korea to Close Reactor in Exchange for Aid. *The New York Times*. February 13, 2007. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/13/world/asia/13cnd-korea.html>. Accessed September 11, 2017.

Table 4.1 Summary of North Korean Nuclear Capacity under Bush (in comparison to Clinton)

Administration	Nuclear Arsenal	Nuclear detonations	Nuclear Fuel	DPRK Political Leader	Missile Launch	Tests & Launch Year
President Clinton (1993-2000)	0	0	25-30 kg	Kim Il Sung (1948-94) Kim Jong Il (1994-2011)	1	1998
Bush's Presidency	3?	October 2006	38.5 kg	Kim Jong Il (1994-2011)	7	2006

5. The Obama Administration

While both the Clinton and the Bush administrations engaged in negotiation talks with the DPRK regime, Obama took a different approach when dealing with the regime. Clinton succeeded in signing the 1994 Agreed Frameworks, which seemed to represent the best result the US could achieve from the North Koreans at the time.¹²¹ Bush in one way or another managed to continue talks with the North Koreans and sign some agreements in the “Six Party talks”. Both administrations also managed to increase international access and surveillance of the Yongbyon facility and gain intelligence on the advancement of the North Korean nuclear program, which they aimed to freeze and eventually roll back.

With Barack Obama the US took a different approach, as the administration sought to engage with the North Korean regime, with the only conditions being a sincere and truthful dialogue between parties, and the securing of a permanent deal that would withstand time. A series of events and provocations from the DPRK set and shaped Obama’s shift toward a policy of *strategic patience*.

Under the Obama administration, the US moved towards an enforcement of increasing severe sanctions against North Korea, that aimed to squeeze the regime to the point that the DPRK regime would have no other option than to come to the negotiation table with a sincere attitude.

The DPRK regime was largely ignored by the Obama administration for most of the presidency, and the little attention the regime did receive from the US was primarily to renew and tighten sanctions against North Korea. As a consequence, the DPRK regime did not obtain any sort of benefit from the Obama administration in response to its actions, compared to what it received from the two previous administrations. The strategic patience was a failure in part due to the ineffectiveness of the sanctions, that were meant to coerce the North Korean to sit in the negotiation table and find a common solution.

In this chapter we will explore why US-led sanctions did not work, and why the PRC turned a blind eye in the application of sanctions. We will also consider how the DPRK regime managed to exploit the US’ policy of

¹²¹ Litwak R, *Preventing North Korea’s Nuclear Breakout*. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; February 2017. Available at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/book_downloads/preventing_north_koreas_nuclear_breakout_0.pdf. Accessed September 6, 2017.

strategic patience to accelerate their testing and research of new nuclear devices and technology, and to test and launch missiles without any major interference except for sanctions.

After Obama's inauguration on January 2009, he sought to reset US foreign policy and improve America's standing in the international community.¹²² On North Korea, Obama promised more engagement with the DPRK, as he believed that President Bush did not fully explore a diplomatic dialogue with the regime.¹²³ The idea of the new administration was to recommence the Six Party talks and slowly find a way to a negotiated agreement.¹²⁴ Bush's Six Party talks with DPRK had been disorganized and unpredictable, with the last Bush negotiator, representative Christopher Hill, effectively ignored by the DPRK as they waited for the Obama administration's position. As a result, no agreement was reached on how to effectively monitor North Korea's nuclear facilities.¹²⁵

With the Obama administration there were a great expectations of a shift of foreign policy compared to the Bush era. The new administration was expected to withdraw US troops from the Middle East, close the Guantanamo Detention camp, and present a more engaging and friendly character compared to the policy positions held under President Bush.

As expected, in his inaugural speech on January 20 2009 President Obama gave the impression he

To those leaders around the world who seek to sow conflict or blame their society's ills on the West, know that your people will judge you on what you can build, not what you can destroy.

To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history, but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.

¹²² PHILLIPS M, President Barack Obama's Inaugural Address. *Whitehouse* . January 21, 2009. Available at: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/01/21/president-barack-obamas-inaugural-address>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

¹²³ Ellis J, McCain and Obama on North Korea. *The New York Times*. June 26, 2008. Available at: <https://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/mccain-and-obama-on-north-korea/>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

¹²⁴ The Nuclear Threat Initiative, *The Six-Party Talks and President Obama's North Korea Policy*.; February 1, 2009. Available at: <http://www.nti.org/learn/facilities/766/>. Accessed June 16, 2017.

¹²⁵ Heinrich M, Westall S, N.Korea ousts U.N. monitors, to restart atom bomb plant. *Reuters*. September 24, 2008. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-iaeanews1/n-korea-ousts-u-n-monitors-to-restart-atom-bomb-plant-idUSTRE48N2RI20080924?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

was ready to have a dialogue with all those states that had tensions with the US. He stated:¹²⁶

Obama inherited a unstable situation with the North Korean regime, as the Six Party talks could not agree on the verification process for inspecting North Korea's nuclear facilities. Obama's administration first task therefore, was to actually continue at the point the Bush administration had left the Six Party talks, and to advance and engaging with the DPRK from that point.

Obama's first engagement with the North Koreans occurred in April 2009, when the North Korean news network (KCNA) announced on television that the DPRK was ready to launch a satellite for scientific purposes.¹²⁷ To achieve this, the DPRK regime needed to use long distance ballistic missile technology, which violated previous undertakings agreed to in the Six Party talks. To the international community, it was apparent that the satellite launch of the satellite was a excuse for the regime to test long-range ballistic missile technology. Despite warnings from the international community and the UNSC, the "satellite" was launched with an Unha-2 rocket.¹²⁸ Although the launch was not successful as the so called "satellite" did not reach orbit, the missile test gave the DPRK crucial insights into long range missile engineering, providing more accurate information for future launches.

The botched satellite launch was perceived by the international community as regime failure, as it did not reached orbit and gave the impression that the North Koreans were at a very initial stage on rocket launching technology.¹²⁹ This perception however quickly changed, as the DPRK's ballistic missile program improved aggressively through time. As a consequence of this missile launch in April 2009, Obama's administration adopted a new strategy towards the DPRK, the so called "strategic patience".¹³⁰ According to

¹²⁶ PHILLIPS M, President Barack Obama's Inaugural Address. *Whitehouse*. January 21, 2009. Available at: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/01/21/president-barack-obamas-inaugural-address>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

¹²⁷ Defiant N Korea launches rocket, *BBC*. April 5, 2009. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7982874.stm>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

¹²⁸ Nations Security Council. *SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMNS NUCLEAR TEST BY DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTING RESOLUTION 1718 (2006)* October 14, 2006. Available at: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8853.doc.htm>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

¹²⁹ North Korean satellite 'is transmitting revolutionary songs'. *The Telegraph*. April 5, 2009. Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/5108667/North-Korean-satellite-is-transmitting-revolutionary-songs.html>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

¹³⁰ The policy of "strategic patience" consisted in engaging in dialogue with DPRK so long as the regime cooperated sincerely, and without any kind of sabotage or tricks. As part of this policy Obama tried to persuade the regime to return to negotiations through the Six Party talks. The second pillar of the strategic patience consisted of convincing China to influence the DPRK to ultimately choose a positive outcome. And the third pillar, as seen multiple times in Obama's Foreign Policy, was applying sanctions until the DPRK moved towards the

Tom Donilon, national security advisor to the President, this policy entailed four key principles of US engagement policy towards the DPRK. They include: (1) the US maintains close and expanded cooperation with Japan and South Korea as well as China; (2) the US refuses to reward bad behavior by the DPRK; (3) the US will make every effort to protect its homeland and allies; and finally (4) it will continue to encourage the DPRK to choose a better path through multilateral negotiation.¹³¹ Donilon further states that by encouragement it was implicit the constant renovation and imposition of new sanctions towards the regime.¹³²

The international community through the UNSC called for a strengthening the punitive measures under UNSC Resolution 1718.¹³³ As a result, the DPRK's Foreign Ministry decided to withdraw from future Six Party talks and declared that North Korea would not comply with any of the previous agreements signed.¹³⁴ By doing so, the regime effectively reactivated all nuclear facilities previously sealed as part of the Six Party talk agreements, and expelled all IAEA and US personnel monitoring the nuclear facilities.

In May 2009, the regime successfully concluded its second nuclear test with a yield of 5 kilotons.¹³⁵ This test, a provocation in response to the previous UN resolution, in turn led the international community passing UNSC Resolution 1874.¹³⁶ The new Resolution imposed further inspections on North Korea, and continued to call for further sanctions. Coercive sanctions became the norm through the presidency of Obama, with tightening sanctions expanded to wider targets and sectors gradually becoming part of the US administration throughout the eight years of the Obama presidency.

denuclearization process. In exchange, DPRK would have obtained a normalization of relations with the US, and economic, energy and food aid.

¹³¹ Kim D, The Obama administration's policy toward North Korea: the causes and consequences of strategic patience. *Journal of Asian Public Policy*. 2015;9(1):32-44. doi:10.1080/17516234.2015.1122715.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Nations Security Council, *SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMNS NUCLEAR TEST BY DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTING RESOLUTION 1718 (2006)* October 14, 2006. Available at: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8853.doc.htm>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

¹³⁴ DPRK to withdraw from six-party talks. *China Daily*. April 14, 2009. Available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2009-04/14/content_7675284.htm. Accessed September 6, 2017.

¹³⁵ Large nuclear test in North Korea on 3 September 2017. *NORSAR*. September 3, 2017. Available at: <https://www.norsar.no/press/latest-press-release/archive/large-nuclear-test-in-north-korea-on-3-september-2017-article1534-984.html>. Accessed January 29, 2018.

¹³⁶ Sang-Hun C, North Korea Claims to Conduct 2nd Nuclear Test. *The New York Times*. May 25, 2009. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/25/world/asia/25nuke.html?mtrref=undefined&gwh=50A073B1073F12983A3FCCC53A818DD4&gwt=pay>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

United Nations Security Council, *Security Council, Acting Unanimously, Condemns in Strongest Terms Democratic People's Republic of Korea Nuclear Test, Toughens Sanctions* June 12, 2009. Available at: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2009/sc9679.doc.htm>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

In response to North Korea's 2009 nuclear tests, UN sanctions were initially targeted toward companies and bank accounts related to the proliferation program carried out by the regime. As part of the Resolution; an arms embargo was also imposed over the DPRK. Further sanctions were also aimed at targeting the regime's source of hard currency, with the intent of "squeezing" the regime to a point it that DPRK would abandon its missiles test and at a later date, agree to roll back their nuclear program.

As we will see however, sanctions became the only measure the international community could impose against DPRK regime. As the main "negotiation language" used by Obama, the DPRK's resistance to sanctions was a visible sign that North Koreans were not sincere negotiating partners. The Obama administration refused to negotiate with the DPRK unless they would commit sincerely to negotiations. The imposition of sanctions also depended not only upon the unilateral sanctions executed by the US, but also support from other international actors willing to sanction the regime; however as will be seen below, there were other competing geopolitical interests which reduced the effectiveness of the UN sanctions regime.

Because of the lack of dialogue with the DPRK, sanctions became the center piece of Obama's Foreign Policy toward the DPRK. Among other states, the PRC was undoubtedly one of the main actors who had a lot to risk by sanctioning Pyongyang.¹³⁷ On one hand, extreme sanctions would have probably meant a change of regime and a collapse of the DPRK state itself. Such a collapse could either result in unification with South Korea, with an American-allied state on its border, or a likely mass North Korean refugee influx into mainland China. Therefore to the PRC, the risk of the DPRK collapsing created significant risks to its interests. As a rational actor, the PRC leadership concluded that fully implementing forceful sanctions could cause greater problems for the PRC, and as a result opted for not fully applying sanctions. By doing so the PRC jeopardized the results of the sanctions sought by the American administration.

As we will see in this chapter, these policies of semi-enforced sanctions proved to have a role in enabling the DPRK regime to build up its nuclear arsenal and ICBM levels, as it was never effectively penalized for its repeated breach of resolutions, and continued nuclear detonations and launches. Despite most of sanctions being implemented, the DPRK announced it intended to resume the building of the LWR reactor previously promised in the 1994 Agreed Framework. According to Siegfried S. Hecker, the construction of this LWR could be read as a sincere effort intentioned to supply its people with energy and

¹³⁷ Perlez J, Few Expect China to Punish North Korea for Latest Nuclear Test. *The New York Times*. September 11, 2016. Available , at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/12/world/asia/north-korea-china-nuclear-sanctions-thaad-america.html>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

not exclusively pursue a military nuclear project.¹³⁸ At the same time however, the North Koreans finally found a valid justification to enrich uranium from 0.7% to 3%.¹³⁹

While Obama's administration pursued the effects of sanctions and UN resolutions to lead to return to negotiations, the DPRK regime continued testing their nuclear and missile devices. Andrei Lankov compared DPRK's behavior to a Korean soap opera, with repeated moments of drama, disobedience, and subsequent reconciliation when they sought a settlement through peace talks.¹⁴⁰

Such behavior was seen in 2010, when a North Korean torpedo attack caused the sinking of the South Korean ship *Cheonan*. This event escalated tensions between the two Koreas. Seoul accused the DPRK of the sinking of the ship and suspended all dialogues with Pyongyang. Pyongyang denied being the perpetrator and, resembling a Korean soap opera, it claimed that it will not take such accusations lightly, threatening that if punished, the regime will react with "various forms of tough measures".¹⁴¹

In response to the *Cheonan* incident on 26 March 2010, the US and the South Korean navy executed a four day military exercise, followed by further economic sanctions towards DPRK.¹⁴² Towards the end of the year the DPRK launched another provocative action, this time the shelling of the Yeongpyeong Island.¹⁴³ PRC called for an emergency meeting with the already moribund Six Party talks to discuss and exchange views on the latest major events. The request was rejected by the US, Japan and ROK¹⁴⁴, which was in line with the

¹³⁸ Hecker S, Lessons learned from the North Korean nuclear crises. *Daedalus*. 2010;139(1):48.

doi:10.1162/daed.2010.139.1.44.

¹³⁹ Enriched Uranium of 0.7% is primarily used as reactor fuel while Uranium enriched from 3% onwards is used produce nuclear weapons.

KCNA: DPRK to build its own light water reactor. *China Daily*. March 29, 2010. Available at:

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2010-03/29/content_9658789.htm. Accessed September 6, 2017.

Committee on Alternative Applications of Atomic Vapor Laser, Isotope Separation Technology. *Alternative Applications Of Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation Technology*. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.; 1991:3-4.

¹⁴⁰ Andersen B, North Korea expert on the Pyongyang soap opera. *ABC News*. August 24, 2015. Available at:

<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-21/north-korea-expert-andrei-lankov-on-the-rogue-kingdom/6715636>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

¹⁴¹ Kessler G. U.S. officials urge measured response in attack on South Korean warship. *The Washington Post* May 21, 2010. Available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/20/AR2010052004336.html>. Accessed June 29, 2017.

¹⁴² North Korea anger at US war games. *BBC News*. July 22, 2010. Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-10722218>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

¹⁴³ Kim J, Jae-won L, North Korea shells South in fiercest attack in decades. *Reuters*. November 23, 2010. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-artillery/north-korea-shells-south-in-fiercest-attack-in-decades-idUSTRE6AM0YS20101123>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

¹⁴⁴ China calls for urgent Korea talks. *BBC News*. November 28, 2010. Available at:

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11856454>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

strategic patience policy sought by Obama, who wanted to see a sincere improvement in the North-South relations before recommencing multilateral negotiations.

5.1.The Leap Day Agreement¹⁴⁵

In 2011, the “Great and Dear Leader” Kim Jong Il died, and was succeeded by his young and inexperienced son, Kim Jong Un. The DPRK government states that from August 2011 it would be willing to observe a nuclear testing moratorium in the context of the Six Party talks.¹⁴⁶ Such declaration found interest from the American administration, who set up a bilateral meeting in Beijing between the DPRK and US. After the meeting, the DPRK declared it would suspend its uranium enrichment program, and invited the IAEA and promised to observe a moratorium on long range missile test.¹⁴⁷

A deal was reached through secret back-channel meetings on Feb 29 2012, and in exchange as part of the deal the US would provide DPRK with 240,000 metric tons of food (equals to 250 million USD).¹⁴⁸ Unexpectedly, just a month after the agreement had already been signed, the North Koreans launched a “weather satellite” using Long range missile technology which ended up of disintegrating in the air ninety seconds later.¹⁴⁹ This launch was again seen by the US as a breaking of the agreement reached the previous month.

¹⁴⁵ Quinn A, Insight: Obama's North Korean leap of faith falls short. *Reuters* March 30, 2012. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-usa-leap/insight-obamas-north-korean-leap-of-faith-falls-short-idUSBRE82T06T20120330>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

¹⁴⁶ North Korea ready to discuss nuclear moratorium: Kremlin. *Reuters*. August 24, 2011. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-russia-nuclear/north-korea-ready-to-discuss-nuclear-moratorium-kremlin-idUSTRE77N27M20110824>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

¹⁴⁷ McGreal C, Branigan T, North Korea agrees to halt nuclear programme in exchange for US aid. *The Guardian*. February 29, 2012. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/29/north-korea-moratorium-nuclear-programme>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

¹⁴⁸ Revere E, Tough Challenges, Hard Choices: Dealing with North Korea after the Collapse of the Leap Day Agreement. *American Foreign Policy Interests*. 2012;34(4):171-177. doi:10.1080/10803920.2012.706553.

¹⁴⁹ North Korea gives details of “weather” satellite launch. *Reuters* March 27, 2012. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclear-summit-satellite/north-korea-gives-details-of-weather-satellite-launch-idUSBRE82Q01S20120327>. Accessed September 6, 2017.
Gladstone C, North Korean Rocket Fails Moments After Liftoff. *The New York Times*. April 12, 2012. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/13/world/asia/north-korea-launches-rocket-defying-world-warnings.html?mtrref=undefined&gwh=84715069C0D7DDF9492F402548A8E5C8&gwt=pay>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

5.2.Obama's Second Term

In 2012, Obama was successfully reelected and in his second term, the administration aimed to negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran and search a new approach to achieve a settlement with the DPRK, as Bush and Clinton did before him in their second terms.¹⁵⁰ In the second term Hillary Clinton is replaced as Secretary of State by former presidential candidate John Kerry.¹⁵¹ Kerry, recalling his record in the 2004 presidential elections, understood the risks of DPRK's nuclear program, and previously made it one of this foreign policy pillars as he advocated for bilateral talks.¹⁵²

Shortly after being nominated and confirmed, the new Secretary of State received news on February 12 2013 of the third North Korean underground nuclear test. This time, the DPRK did not disclose the size, which were however estimated to be around 8.4–16 Kilotons (35–67 TJ).¹⁵³

With this new test, we can see improvements in the power of detonation compared to the North Koreans' first bomb which yielded close to one Kiloton.¹⁵⁴ The latest detonation had an impact on shaping US military policies, and as a result the following month the administration shifted funding from ballistic missile programs towards a defense ballistic missile program in the Asia-Pacific region.¹⁵⁵ This move would later evolve into the ballistic shield in operation in the Korean peninsula, known as THAAD(Terminal High Altitude Area Defense).¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁰ Jackson D, How Obama won re-election. *USA TODAY*. November 7, 2012. Available at: <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2012/11/07/turnout-and-organization-were-key-to-obama-victory/1688537/>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

¹⁵¹ McGreal C, John Kerry to be nominated to replace Hillary Clinton at State Department. *The Guardian*. December 21, 2012. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/21/john-kerry-nominated-state-department>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

¹⁵² Kim S, China and the Six-Party Talks: The New Turn to Mediation Diplomacy. *International Journal of Korean Studies*. 2005;Fall/Winter IX(2):122. Available at: <http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2016/ph241/lu1/docs/kim.pdf>.

¹⁵³ McCurry J, Branigan T, North Korea stages nuclear test in defiance of bans. *The Guardian*. February 12, 2013. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/12/north-korea-nuclear-test-earthquake>. Accessed September 6, 2017. (Estimations from University of Science and Technology of China)

¹⁵⁴ Jeffries I, *Contemporary North Korea: A guide to economic and political developments*. London: Routledge; 2010:5-10.

¹⁵⁵ Weitz R, US MISSILE DEFENSE: Closing the Gap. *World Affairs* JULY / AUGUST 2013),. 2013;176(2):pp. 80-87. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/43554784?seq=1#page_thumbnails_tab_contents.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

After the February 2013 nuclear test, the DPRK had announced it had tested a miniaturized nuclear device, with this move showing the regime was looking to miniaturize the size of the nuclear bomb.¹⁵⁷ This step is fundamental into making a nuclear weapon valuable for a successful missile-directed strike.

To put such measures in perspective, the world's first nuclear bomb was transported by bomber aircraft and weighed 4,400 kilos pounds.¹⁵⁸ With the advancement of technology nuclear bombs are now incorporated into a missiles, are compact and highly integrated. In particular, the weight of the new weapons type has decreased from 4,500 to around 136 kilos pounds.¹⁵⁹

In addition to the miniaturization of nuclear warheads, the DPRK regime also announced it had intentions to restart the Yongbyon reactor.¹⁶⁰ US experts were confident the DPRK was not going to be able to restart a reactor that had been closed for 7 years, and that miniaturization was only a long term goal.¹⁶¹

In Nov 2014, the DPRK announced it was again prepared to resume the Six Party talks, and at the same time the US administration extended sanction on key DPRK individuals involved with North Korea's WMD program.¹⁶² Towards the end of 2015 DPRK again surprised the world when it began to test Submarine-launched Ballistic missiles (SLBM).¹⁶³ This decision was puzzling to many states as submarines are a very expensive investment, and considering the North Korean fleet is composed mainly of old Soviet and Chinese submarines left after the Korean war. Besides being old, the DPRK's fleet do not launch missiles, therefore it was hard to understand whether North Korea is serious or not about developing SLBM. The main advantage of submarines in a military strategy is that it is hard for the striker to be detected as it goes underwater, and there is no way to control submarine activity from satellite or other type of radars.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Cox J, *Hitlers Ashes: How Hitler's Assassination Leads To The Development Of Germany's Atomic Bomb*. Blomington IN: iUniverse Inc.; 2011:213.

¹⁵⁹ The W76 Warhead. *Nuclearweaponarchive.org*. 2018. Available at: <http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Weapons/W76.html>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

¹⁶⁰ Fitzpatrick M, Yongbyon restart: North Korea ramps up nuclear tension. *BBC News*. April 2, 2013. Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-22006636>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

¹⁶¹ Jethro Mullen C, North Korea says it can miniaturize nuclear weapons - *CNN*. May 20, 2015. Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/05/20/asia/north-korea-nuclear-weapons/index.html>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

¹⁶² Sanger D, U.S. Gives North Korea the Silent Treatment. *The New York Times*. November 10, 2014. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/10/world/asia/us-gives-north-korea-the-silent-treatment.html>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

¹⁶³ Ryall J, North Korea plans new submarine-launched ballistic missile tests. *The Telegraph*. October 16, 2015. Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/11936362/North-Korea-plans-new-submarine-launched-ballistic-missile-tests.html>. Accessed June 18, 2017.

In January 2016, DPRK performed its fourth nuclear test, with an underground test causing a 5.1 Richter scale earthquake.¹⁶⁴ This time, the regime claimed it was a hydrogen bomb; however scientists and the international community were more skeptical, as a hydrogen bomb would have a larger impact.¹⁶⁵

A few months after the failed missile launch, despite the condemnation from the UNSC and repeated calls to comply with the agreement, the DPRK launched another UNha-3 missile and this time the missile successfully reached orbit.¹⁶⁶ This was a main goal for the DPRK regime, as it had succeeded to launch a missile into orbit with very few launches, while the international community was surprised at North Korea's success, as it was thought that the regime had still a long way to go before they could have actually reached orbit. The DPRK demonstrated that their space agency, despite little resources and failed launches, was able to improve their technology with very little tests. In response to this new launch, additional sanctions were instigated by the UNSC Resolution 2087 as the regime used long range ballistic missile technology which was explicitly forbidden under UNSC Resolutions 1718 and 1874.¹⁶⁷

5.3. Why have the sanctions not worked with the DPRK?

One key question is why, despite tightening sanctions and near-universal condemnation in the international community, has the DPRK not changed behavior in response to the sanctions regime? And why in the same period have sanctions worked on Iran, but not North Korea?

Obama's administration had two main nuclear problems to solve, on one side the Iranians and on the other North Korea. To enforce behavioral change, the Obama administration managed to apply the same approach to Iran, sanctions over sanctions. In contrast to the DPRK, the sanctions had a significant effect on Iran hitting its core economy, which ultimately led to the signing of a nuclear deal with Iranian leaders. With the DPRK however this did not work, with part of the problem being that most of the foreign trade the DPRK has is with PRC, and is largely done through proxy sellers based in China.¹⁶⁸ According to A. Lankov, part of the reason these sanctions didn't work is due to the fact that China simply did not apply the

¹⁶⁴ What did N Korea's nuclear tests achieve? *BBC News*. September 3, 2017. Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-17823706>. Accessed October 24, 2017.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ Kim M, North Korea Claims Rocket Successfully Put Satellite Into Space. *Bloomberg*. February 7, 2016. Available at: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-07/north-korea-claims-rocket-successfully-put-satellite-into-space>. Accessed June 18, 2017.

¹⁶⁷ United Nations Security Council. *Security Council Condemns Use of Ballistic Missile Technology in Launch by Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in Resolution 2087 (2013)* January 22, 2013. Available at <https://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc10891.doc.htm>. Accessed September 6, 2017.

¹⁶⁸ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), *EAST & SOUTHEAST ASIA :: KOREA, NORTH*. CIA World Factbook; 2018: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html>. Accessed October 18, 2017.

sanction as agreed.¹⁶⁹ By default therefore, complete and total sanctions against DPRK trade interests were destined to fail.

Comparing sanctions enforced on Iran and North Korea, in Pyongyang sanctions don't really have an impact, but the US' Administrations continued to increase measures every six months. The only time sanctions appear to have materially impacted the regime was when Macau bank Banco Delta Asia was frozen, as the money used in those accounts was used by the Kim family and other elites in Pyongyang, to support their.¹⁷⁰ Otherwise the DPRK regime has been able to survive to sanctions most states wouldn't have withstood.

The Obama administration steadily increased sanctions against the regime, and as a consequence the administration implemented a change on the way sanctions were applied. The US administration shifted from sanctioning not only companies, goods and people involved with the DPRK, but expanded sanctions to include common DPRK exports such as steel, coal (94% of exports to PRC). The US also increased the tracking and freezing the DPRK financial assets.

5.4. Diplomatic and economic pressure

On October 2016, US Director of National intelligence James Clapper stated that the aim of getting the DPRK to denuclearize was probably a lost cause, Nuclear weapons are perceived by the DPRK regime as ticket to survival, and *"we're kind of running out of gas ... since we've imposed most of them that we can"*.¹⁷¹ In the same period, after slamming Iran with sanctions, the P5+1 group negotiated with Iran a nuclear deal that freezes the Iranian nuclear program for ten years.¹⁷²

Obama left the White House without finalizing a deal with the DPRK, during his administration it referred to the DPRK's conduct as a "violation of the international norms" rather than an American concept of

¹⁶⁹ Lankov A, Why the United States will have to accept a nuclear North Korea. *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*. 2009;21(3):251-264. doi:10.1080/10163270903087147.

¹⁷⁰ Arnold A, Watch Out for the Blowback of Secondary Sanctions on North Korea. *The Diplomat*. April 28, 2017. Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/watch-out-for-the-blowback-of-secondary-sanctions-on-north-korea/>. Accessed June 18, 2017.

¹⁷¹ Johnson J, North Korea giving up nuclear weapons is 'lost cause,' top U.S. official says | *The Japan Times*. *The Japan Times*. October 26, 2016. Available at: <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/10/26/asia-pacific/clapper-says-push-get-pyongyang-shed-nuclear-arms-probably-lost-cause/#.WmfPLqinHIV>. Accessed June 18, 2017.

¹⁷² The **P5+1** refers to the UN Security Council's five permanent members (the **P5**); namely China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States; plus Germany.

violation of norms.¹⁷³ This confidence in international institutions and multilateral action against non-compliant states, such as North Korea, led his administration to steadily sanction the DPRK regime squeezing it slowly, although without ultimately obtaining any tangible result.

5.5. The basis of Strategic patience

What is interesting about the Obama administration is that there was no real engagement between DPRK and the US. During this timeframe, the regime launched the biggest number of provocations, which contrary to expectations resulted in the US administration ignoring the regime until it would actually engage in negotiations with genuine intent, which did not occur. But what are the causes and consequences of this policy of strategic patience?

In his text *The Obama administration's policy toward North Korea: the causes and consequences of strategic patience*, Dongsoo Kim analyzed the Obama administration's overall Foreign Policy position towards the DPRK. Dongsoo Kim states that such policies could be explained through three main international relations (IR) theories; Realism, constructivism and liberalism, which framed North Korea policies followed by the Obama administration.¹⁷⁴

According to the realist theorists, when states feels threatened by another state, they act firstly in order to avoid a worst-case scenario, such as invasion or attack. By acting beforehand states try to avoid unfavorable scenarios, which can be seen in the case of the US and DPRK. According to this theory the US could have attacked the DPRK, but until today the DPRK has not been attacked. According to Dongsoo Kim, the answer lays in the fact that DPRK is not perceived by the US as threat, hence it has not reacted to minimize any sort of damage that could be inflicted by the DPRK.¹⁷⁵

As Obama's administration did not perceive the DPRK as an existential threat and it assumed that DPRK does indeed have a rational leadership that despite its provocations, it calculates a cost/benefit in each of provocation initiated by North Korea. Ultimately, the US sees the DPRK as a rational actor and a de

¹⁷³ The White House President Barack Obama. *Statement by the President on North Korea's Nuclear Test.*; September 09, 2016 Available at: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/09/statement-president-north-koreas-nuclear-test>. Accessed June 18, 2017.

¹⁷⁴ Kim D, *The Obama administration's policy toward North Korea: the causes and consequences of strategic patience. Journal of Asian Public Policy.* 2015;9(1):34-36. doi:10.1080/17516234.2015.1122715.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

facto nuclear power that has no intention to harm the US, thus implying that mutual deterrence is a successful strategy in this case.¹⁷⁶

The second theory, liberalism, claims that the DPRK is not reliable partner to negotiate. By looking at liberalism as a theory, one can assume that this is the IR theory that best suits Obama's vision, given his support for civil dialogue and cooperation, and the rule of global institutions. In the case of North Korea, instead of engaging and searching for dialogue, Obama instead refused to reward the bad behavior of the DPRK and shunned the regime until it actually changed attitude and conducted serious negotiations.¹⁷⁷ From liberal point of view, Obama did not see the DPRK as a reliable partner, sees a dialogue as a reward for good behavior in the international sphere.

The possible third theory that could explain Obama's policies could be constructivism, which posits that significant aspects of international relations are historically and socially constructed, rather than inevitable consequences of human nature or other essential characteristics of world politics.¹⁷⁸ Applying this to North Korea, according to Dongsoo Kim, the DPRK does not represent a problem for the US, nor is a sincere negotiating partner; thus the US administration chooses to disregard the regime, as in the best case scenario it is useless to negotiate.¹⁷⁹

Given the three possibilities enumerated by author Dongsoo Kim, what are consequences of this strategic patience today?

The DPRK by the end of the Obama administration managed to develop and miniaturize nuclear warheads, considerably improve its ballistic technology and, according to CIA and other intelligence agencies, DPRK gained capabilities to launch a nuclear strike.¹⁸⁰

Conventional options to respond to a credible threat from the DPRK (nuclear or otherwise) are difficult, and create serious obligations on the party who launches an attack. A possible strike on Pyongyang would create serious retaliatory threats to Seoul, which is only 56 Kilometers away from the DMZ (Korean Demilitarized Zone). According to several experts, if the DPRK only struck back with conventional weaponry,

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, pg 36.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, pg 38.

¹⁷⁸ Jackson P, Nexon D, Whence Causal Mechanisms? A Comment on Legro. *Dialogue IO*. 2002;1(01):81-101. doi:10.1017/s7777777702000079.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, pg 38.

¹⁸⁰ Sang-Hun D, As North Korea's Nuclear Program Advances, U.S. Strategy Is Tested. *The New York Times*. May 6, 2016. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/07/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-us-strategy.html>. Accessed June 18, 2017.

"We know they have nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them," Gen. Robert B. Neller.

casualties in Seoul would exceed 100,000 within 48 hours.¹⁸¹ In addition, any war would result in a refugee crisis from North Korea which the PRC wants to avoid. Finally, as the DPRK is now nuclear armed, there are risks that some nuclear weapons could fall into the wrong hands, including potentially, terrorist groups.

According to Rüdiger Frank, the DPRK base their nuclear defense in part on the situation of Libya. In December 2003, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi agreed to eliminate Libya's nuclear and chemical weapons program in exchange for the US offered security guarantees for Libya.¹⁸² However after the 2011 NATO intervention which resulted in the fall of the Libyan leader, the North Koreans determined that giving up their program would make them weaker and vulnerable to attack.¹⁸³

Within this assessment of the world situation, the North Korean leadership concluded that having a nuclear arsenal would secure its position in the region and would avoid a possible invasion from the US. The other possible conclusion the DPRK regime drew from the Libyan case is that the US is not a reliable partner, and that the nuclear arsenal would serve its purpose as an insurance policy.

DPRK's diplomacy took negotiations to another level, and by using small concessions it managed to sign, brake, and resign deals in exchange of its nuclear program. The regime gain significant benefits from its pattern of deceptive deals that it appeared to be a form of official blackmail. To sustain this thesis, Robert Gates referring to a food and oil deal stated in 2012 that "*the US would not buy the same horse twice*", by referring to this sentence Gates left a clear message to the regime.¹⁸⁴

In order to continue the already signed agreement, Pyongyang had to dismantle its nuclear program in order to gain credibility. In a scheme of tit for tat or carrot and stick, it became clear that after almost twenty years negotiations the regime had never intended to stop its nuclear program. A warning was sounded by Andrei Lankov, who stated that the despite the DPRK regime's interest in economic growth, economic reform growth as seen in China represents a danger for the stability of the regime.¹⁸⁵ A. Lankov

¹⁸¹ Franz-Stefan Gady T. What Would the Second Korean War Look Like?. *The Diplomat*. April 19, 2017. Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/what-would-the-second-korean-war-look-like/>. Accessed June 18, 2017.

¹⁸² Krieger D, *The Challenge Of Abolishing Nuclear Weapons*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers; 2011:165.

¹⁸³ McDonald M, North Korea Says Libya Should Have Kept Nuclear Program. *The New York Times*. March 25, 2011. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/world/asia/25korea.html>. Accessed June 18, 2017.

¹⁸⁴ Ch'oe C, *US-China Relations And Korean Unification*. Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification; 2011:85.

¹⁸⁵ Lankov M, Why Capitalism Won't Change North Korea's Regime. *Bloomberg*. April 10, 2013. Available at: <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2013-04-09/why-capitalism-won-t-change-north-korea-s-regime>. Accessed June 18, 2017.

claims that the North Korean elite are playing a survival strategy, and the sole concern they have is regime security and protection from ROK and the US; hence the priority afforded to regime survival through its nuclear program.¹⁸⁶

Comparing Barack Obama with George Bush, both Presidents represented opposite visions in terms of how to engage with the DPRK. President Bush did not want to engage with the DPRK at all, to the point that his administration considered a preemptive strike on the North Korean nuclear facilities. In contrast, while Obama wanted to push the DPRK regime to engage constructively and believed in the role of multilateral talks and institutions, this approach allowed the regime to develop to their nuclear arsenal unchecked. Bush's aggressive interventions practically pushed the North Koreans to go nuclear to avoid a fate like Iraq and Afghanistan. Whereas Obama focused on tightening sanctions which proved to be ineffective in slowing the DPRK's nuclear research, and allowed them to develop their nuclear capabilities to what could be an irreversible stage.

Successive US administrations have also placed a lot of faith in the expectation that the DPRK would collapse on its own, which prevented consideration of other policy options to counter North Korea's nuclear program. From the moment the DPRK detonated their first nuclear bomb, there were no good options left, there are only least bad options. Patrick M. Cronin theorizes that for North Korea, having a nuclear deterrent constitutes DPRK's insurance policy against a possible regime change or war.¹⁸⁷ However it is unclear to what extent US leaders have considered or acknowledged such fears by the DPRK, in their strategy to contain North Korea's nuclear ambitions.

Based on existing mistrust and suspicion, it seems unlikely that the DPRK give up its nuclear program. Therefore the least bad option for the US may be to recognize DPRK as a nuclear power and allow them to keep their nuclear capabilities. A second option is not engage with them at all, and in the absence of negotiation or coercion see them build up to 100 nuclear weapons in the next few years. Considering possible future options, Robert Litwak poses an interesting assessment: *"when zero warheads is not on the table, a negotiated outcome that caps North Korean capabilities at 20 nuclear weapons is better than an*

¹⁸⁶ Lankov A, Opinion | The inconvenient truth about North Korea and China. *The Washington Post*. February 13, 2017. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/nothing-short-of-war-will-get-north-korea-to-give-up-its-nukes/2017/06/15/1ba427a0-4b94-11e7-bc1b-fddbd8359dee_story.html?utm_term=.72a0481d2679. Accessed October 15, 2017.

¹⁸⁷ Cronin P, *Double Trouble: Iran And North Korea As Challenges To International Security*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger; 2008.

*unconstrained program that allows the DPRK to build up an arsenal of 100 warheads by 2020”.*¹⁸⁸ This approach, although strongly differing from current US policy, accords with Waltz’ theory of deterrence; through the idea that the DPRK with a limited number of nuclear weapons could allow a climate of peace.

5.6. Impact of Strategic patience on US decision making

Jong Kun Choi in his paper, *“The Perils of Strategic Patience towards DPRK”* proposes an interesting point on Obama’s policy of strategic patience. According to Jong Kun Choi, he states that while Obama repeatedly stated his belief that the North Korean regime would collapse in the near future, such “collapsist” theories have also blinded the administration to a misunderstanding of North Korean leadership and the status of its WMDs.¹⁸⁹

The policy of strategic patience had an opposite effect to what was intended, as while it aimed to isolate DPRK and push them to the negotiating table, it ultimately made the regime more resistant. Besides economic effects and trade obstacles, the DPRK exploited the freedom to develop its nuclear program without scrutiny, making it difficult to follow up the advancements of its nuclear program.

Part of the failure of these policies could be found in the goal of economic isolation sought by the US administration. While strict economic and trade sanctions could bring other nations to heel, such as Iran, a key difference for North Korea is that it isn’t economically dependent, and has ways to overcome sanctions affecting its trade through China. Further, the DPRK’s main priority is not economic growth but regime survival, which in turn reduces the likelihood of imminent collapse.

Another point is that the sanctions pursued by the international community weren’t fully implemented by PRC, for fears of a refugee crisis in the event that the DPRK regime were to implode. PRC played an ambivalent part in negotiations, as while they are incentivized to solve the North Korean issue for fear of collapse and regional stability, they also benefit from having a buffer state between them and ROK, a

¹⁸⁸ Litwak R, *Preventing North Korea’s Nuclear Breakout*. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; February 2017:25. Available at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/book_downloads/preventing_north_koreas_nuclear_breakout_0.pdf. Accessed September 6, 2017.

¹⁸⁹ Choi J, The Perils of Strategic Patience with North Korea. *The Washington Quarterly*. 2015;38(4):64. doi:10.1080/0163660x.2015.1125829.

US ally. Increasing regional insecurity however creates other risks for the PRC, as the greater nuclear activity by the DPRK may precipitate the ROK and Japan to develop their own defensive nuclear capabilities.¹⁹⁰

The other consequence of this strategic patience is that the Obama administration ran out of time, and was ultimately unable to conclude any deal to stop the nuclear proliferation in the peninsula. As a result, the issue has been passed on to the next US' administration to respond. It is important to note that the policies Obama pursued are nothing new that previous US' administrations have not tried before, with the main difference being intensity, the length of time such policies were enacted and the fact that sanctions were seen almost as the sole choice left to deal with the uncooperative and untrustworthy DPRK regime.

¹⁹⁰ Kausikan B, Opinion | To deter North Korea, Japan and South Korea should go nuclear. *The Washington Post*. October 10, 2017 . Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2017/10/10/to-deter-north-korea-japan-and-south-korea-should-go-nuclear/?utm_term=.4885390d0149. Accessed October 24, 2017.

6. Conclusion

Through this study, I have sought to explore the evolution of US Foreign Policy towards the DPRK relations through the actions of the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations. The history of these two states within the last seven decades is rooted in the Cold War. Nuclear deterrence has proven an infallible insurance policy to deter any potential enemy; the DPRK is no exception, as it has sought to securitize and avoid at all costs any potential regime change. In this study we observed previous attempts from US administrations to negotiate a halt to North Korea's nuclear armament. Today, the DPRK counts a nuclear arsenal of probably twenty nuclear bombs, and a missile technology capable of transporting weaponry to the western coast of the United States.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, The DPRK regime sought to develop nuclear weapons as a way to secure their power and avoid regime change. The Clinton administration with 1994 Agreed Framework aimed at freezing and dismantling the North Korean nuclear program in exchange for food aid, money and improved bilateral relations. In this first stage, coercive diplomacy paved the way to obtain DPRK agreement to the 1994 Agreed Framework. Although this was not a perfect deal, it was considered the best outcome the Clinton administration could have delivered at the time. Ultimately, however the Agreed Framework failed, as it was a temporary settlement that did not progress to a more permanent agreed solution.

Moving forward to the Bush administration and its hawkish approach, and reluctance to negotiate, gave the DPRK additional motivation to improve further on and detonate their first nuclear bomb. In light of the invasions of both Iraq and Afghanistan, the DPRK felt it had little choice, but to escalate its nuclear program, and so reduced the chances of the DPRK being a target. This detonation was a game changer in the Six Party talks, which turned out to be a great tool for the DPRK to obtain benefits from the participating states without giving anything substantial in return.

With the Obama administration, the US pivoted to a different approach of "no negotiation". As a consequence of this approach, the DPRK regime managed to significantly improve their striking capabilities and nuclear weaponry. With no shifts in policy from the DPRK regime, the Obama administration relied on a policy of "Strategic Patience", with the US refusing to negotiate with the

regime unless it would commit “sincerely” to denuclearize the end of their nuclear program. This policy, and the lack of penalty for North Korea’s continued nuclear build-up, ultimately led to a significant expansion in the DPRK’s nuclear arsenal and consolidation of the regime.

Through comparison of the three US administrations, we can see that the DPRK regime managed to seal deals with the US and then, just before the US elections, disavowed or rejected previous agreements already reached. The three administrations conducted negotiations that were unfinalized or sabotaged through North Korean action, which allowed Pyongyang to buy time and maintain an “insurance policy” against any perceived threat of attack.

Based on these findings, a question of interest for further research is the question of security negotiations between democratic states and totalitarian regimes. Whether democracy is a limit when dealing with totalitarian/authoritarian regimes?

Table 6.1 Summary of North Korean Nuclear Capacity under all three presidents						
Administration	Nuclear Arsenal	Nuclear detonations	Nuclear Fuel	Political Leader in the DPRK	Missile Tests & Year Launch ¹⁹¹	
Clinton Presidency	0	0	25-30 kg	Kim Il Sung (1948-94) Kim Jong Il (1994-2011)	1	1998
Bush Presidency	3?	October 2006	38.5 kg	Kim Jong Il (1994-2011)	7	2006
Obama Presidency	16-20?	May 2009 February 2013 January 2016 September 2016	111 LB	Kim Jong Un (2011-)	8	2009
					2	2012
					6	2013
					19	2014
					15	2015
					24	2016

¹⁹¹ Joshua Berlinger C, North Korea's missile tests: What you need to know. *CNN*. December 4, 2017. Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/29/asia/north-korea-missile-tests/index.html>. Accessed December 29, 2017.

Table 6.2 List of nuclear weapons tests of the DPRK during the Bush and Obama administration

Sequence	Date	Location	Earthquake	Norsar Yield ¹⁹²
1	October 9, 2006	Punggye-ri Test Site, North Korea	4.3	1 Kilotons
2	May 25, 2009	Punggye-ri Test Site, North Korea	4.7	5 Kilotons
3	February 12, 2013	Punggye-ri Test Site, North Korea	5.1	10 Kilotons
4	January 6, 2016	Punggye-ri Test Site, North Korea	5.1	10 Kilotons
5	September 9, 2016	Punggye-ri Test Site, North Korea	5.3	20 Kilotons

¹⁹² Large nuclear test in North Korea on 3 September 2017. *NORSAR*. September 3. 2017. Available at: <https://www.norsar.no/press/latest-press-release/archive/large-nuclear-test-in-north-korea-on-3-september-2017-article1534-984.html>. Accessed January 29, 2018.

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8. Annex

8.1. Annex 1: 1994 Agreed Framework



International Atomic Energy Agency

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**AGREED FRAMEWORK OF 21 OCTOBER 1994
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

The attached text of the Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, signed in Geneva on 21 October 1994, is being circulated to all Member States of the Agency at the request of the Resident Representative of the United States of America.

94-04871

AGREED FRAMEWORK BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

GENEVA, OCTOBER 21, 1994

Delegations of the Governments of the United States of America (U.S.) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) held talks in Geneva from September 23 to October 21, 1994, to negotiate an overall resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.

Both sides reaffirmed the importance of attaining the objectives contained in the August 12, 1994 agreed statement between the U.S. and the DPRK and upholding the principles of the June 11, 1993 joint statement of the U.S. and the DPRK to achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. The U.S. and DPRK decided to take the following actions for the resolution of the nuclear issue:

I. Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants.

- 1) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S. will undertake to make arrangements for the provision to the DPRK of a LWR project with a total generating capacity of approximately 2,000 MW(E) by a target date of 2003.
 - The U.S. will organize under its leadership an international consortium to finance and supply the LWR project to be provided to the DPRK. The U.S., representing the international consortium, will serve as the principal point of contact with the DPRK for the LWR project.
 - The U.S., representing the consortium, will make best efforts to secure the conclusion of a supply contract with the DPRK within six months of the date of this document for the provision of the LWR project. Contract talks will begin as soon as possible after the date of this document.
 - As necessary, the U.S. and the DPRK will conclude a bilateral agreement for cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

-2-

- 2) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S., representing the consortium, will make arrangements to offset the energy foregone due to the freeze of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, pending completion of the first LWR unit.
 - Alternative energy will be provided in the form of heavy oil for heating and electricity production.
 - Deliveries of heavy oil will begin within three months of the date of this document and will reach a rate of 500,000 tons annually, in accordance with an agreed schedule of deliveries.
- 3) Upon receipt of U.S. assurances for the provision of LWR's and for arrangements for interim energy alternatives, the DPRK will freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities and will eventually dismantle these reactors and related facilities.
 - The freeze on the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be fully implemented within one month of the date of this document. During this one-month period, and throughout the freeze, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be allowed to monitor this freeze, and the DPRK will provide full cooperation to the IAEA for this purpose.
 - Dismantlement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be completed when the LWR project is completed.
 - The U.S. and DPRK will cooperate in finding a method to store safely the spent fuel from the 5 MW(E) experimental reactor during the construction of the LWR project, and to dispose of the fuel in a safe manner that does not involve reprocessing in the DPRK.

-3-

- 4) As soon as possible after the date of this document, U.S. and DPRK experts will hold two sets of experts talks.

- At one set of talks, experts will discuss issues related to alternative energy and the replacement of the graphite-moderated reactor program with the LWR project.
- At the other set of talks, experts will discuss specific arrangements for spent fuel storage and ultimate disposition.

II. The two sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.

- 1) Within three months of the date of this document, both sides will reduce barriers to trade and investment, including restrictions on telecommunications services and financial transactions.
- 2) Each side will open a liaison office in the other's capital following resolution of consular and other technical issues through expert level discussions.
- 3) As progress is made on issues of concern to each side, the U.S. and DPRK will upgrade bilateral relations to the ambassadorial level.

III. Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.

- 1) The U.S. will provide formal assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.
- 2) The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
- 3) The DPRK will engage in North-South dialogue, as this agreed framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes such dialogue.

- 4 -

IV. Both sides will work together to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

- 1) The DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and will allow implementation of its Safeguards Agreement under the Treaty.
- 2) Upon conclusion of the supply contract for the provision of the LWR project, ad hoc and routine inspections will resume under the DPRK's Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA with respect to the facilities not subject to the freeze. Pending conclusion of the supply contract, inspections required by the IAEA for the continuity of safeguards will continue at the facilities not subject to the freeze.
- 3) When a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components, the DPRK will come into full compliance with its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA ([INFCIRC/403](#)), including taking all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the Agency with regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK.

Kang Sok Ju

Head of the Delegation
of the Democratic
People's Republic of
Korea, First Vice-Minister
of Foreign Affairs of the
Democratic People's
Republic of Korea

Robert L. Gallucci

Head of the Delegation
of United States of America,
Ambassador at Large of the
United States of America

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